IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAHARI BAILEY TIMOTHY STREATY, FERNANDO MONTERO, PRESTON FULTON, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR., JOHN CORNISH, CARL CUTLER and JEWELL WILLIAMS, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, CHARLES RAMSEY, Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, OFFICER KEITH DONOFRIO, BADGE NUMBER, OFFICER JANE DOE, OFFICER MICHAEL McCORMICK, BADGE NUMBER 7300, OFFICER GREGORY GIACOMELLI, BADGE NUMBER 3916, OFFICER MARTIN CAMPBELL, BADGE NUMBER 5262. OFFICER PAUL PORT, BADGE NUMBER 3146, OFFICER THOMAS SCHAFFLING, BADGE NUMBER 7535, OFFICER TIMOTHY DEVLIN, BADGE NUMBER 1914, OFFICER DONNA STEWART, BADGE NUMBER 6116, SGT. KEVIN BERNARD, BADGE NUMBER 244, OFFICERS JOHN DOE(S) #1-12, individually and as police officers for the City of Philadelphia c/o Law Department 1515 Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19102,
Defendants

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No. 10-

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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COMPLAINT Preliminary Statement 1. This is a civil rights action in which named plaintiffs Mahari Bailey, Timothy Streaty, Fernando Montero, Preston Fulton, Gregory Blackmon, Jr., John Cornish, Carl Cutler and Jewell Williams, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals, seek relief for defendants' violation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), et seq. (“Title VI”). 2. The defendants have implemented and enforced a policy and practice of stops, frisks, searches and detentions of persons, including plaintiffs, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment. 3. The stops, frisks, searches and detentions by Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”) officers are often based on constitutionally impermissible considerations of race and/or national origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims of such racial and/or national origin profiling are principally Black and Latino men. 4. These constitutional abuses are directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City of Philadelphia (“City”) and Police Commissioner Ramsey who have acted with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by: (a) failing to properly train, supervise and discipline PPD officers; (b) inadequately monitoring PPD officers and their practices related to pedestrian and vehicle stops; (c) failing to properly discipline PPD officers who engage in constitutional abuses; and (d) failing to rectify the PPD's unconstitutional practices of stops, seizures, searches and detentions.
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5. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' policies, practices and/or customs, thousands of persons in the plaintiff class, and in particular Blacks and Latinos, have been subjected to unconstitutional seizures, frisks, searches and detentions by the defendants and other PPD officers, at times accompanied by the unreasonable use of force.
6. The named plaintiffs seek to represent a certified class for the purpose of obtaining injunctive and declaratory relief only. The named plaintiffs seek a class-wide judgment declaring that the policies, practices and/or customs described in this Complaint violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a classwide injunction enjoining the defendants from continuing such policies, practices and/or customs. In addition, the named plaintiffs seek compensatory damages.
Jurisdiction 7. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343(3) and (4), as this action seeks redress for the violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional and civil rights, and under 28 U.S.C. §1367 to address the supplemental state law claims. 8. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202 and Rule 57, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Parties 9. Plaintiff Mahari Bailey (“Bailey”) is a 27 year old African-American man who resides in the City of Philadelphia. 10. Plaintiff Timothy Streaty (“Streaty”) is a 32 year old African-American man who resides in the City of Philadelphia. 11. Plaintiff Fernando Montero (“Montero”) is a 27 year old Latino man who resides in the City of Philadelphia.
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12. Plaintiff Preston Fulton (“Fulton”) is a 20 year old African-American man who resides in the City of Philadelphia.
13. Plaintiff Gregory Blackmon, Jr. (“Blackmon”) is a 20 year old African-American man who resides in the City of Philadelphia.
14. Plaintiff John Cornish (“Cornish”) is a 65 year old African-American man who resides in the City of Philadelphia.
15. Plaintiff Carl Cutler (“Cutler”) is a 65 year old African-American man who resides in the City of Philadelphia.
16. Plaintiff Jewell Williams (“Williams”) is a 52 year old African-American man who resides in the City of Philadelphia.
17. Defendant City of Philadelphia is a municipality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and manages, directs and controls the PPD which employs defendants Ramsey, Donofrio, Jane Doe, McCormick, Giacomelli, Campbell, Port, Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart, Bernard and John Doe(s) #1-12, who are police officers for the City of Philadelphia.
18. Defendant Charles Ramsey is the Commissioner of the PPD and at all times relevant to this action was a final decision-maker for the City of Philadelphia regarding the operation of the PPD. Defendant Ramsey is responsible for establishing the practices and policies of the PPD. He is also responsible for the hiring, screening, training, supervision, discipline and control of the police officers under his command, including the defendant officers in this case. Defendant Ramsey is sued in his official and individual capacities.
19. Defendants Donofrio, Jane Doe, McCormick, Giacomelli, Campbell, Port, Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart, Bernard and John Doe(s) #1-12 (hereinafter “the defendant officers”) are police officers for the Philadelphia Police Department who at all relevant times
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were acting under color of state law. The defendant officers are sued in their individual capacities.
Class Action Allegations 20. Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the named plaintiffs seek to represent a certified plaintiff class consisting of all persons who have been or will be subjected to defendants’ policy, practice and/or custom of stopping, seizing, frisking, searching and detaining persons in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, or on the basis of race and/or national origin, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 21. The members of the class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable. Thousands of people are stopped, frisked, searched and detained each year by the PPD without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, but rather on constitutionally impermissible considerations of race and/or national origin. 22. Joinder is also impracticable because many members of the class are not aware that their constitutional rights have been violated and that they have the right to seek redress in court. Many members of the class are without the means to retain counsel to represent them in a civil rights lawsuit. There is no appropriate avenue for the protection of the class members’ constitutional rights other than a class action. 23. The class members share questions of law and fact in common, including: a. whether the PPD engages in a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping, seizing, searching and detaining members of the class in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct as required by the Fourth Amendment; b. whether the PPD engages in profiling on the basis of race and/or national origin in targeting class members for such stops, searches and detentions in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
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c. whether the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey have failed to adequately and properly train, supervise, monitor and discipline PPD officers, and whether those failures have caused the constitutional violations; and d. whether the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey have failed to rectify unconstitutional stops, frisks, detentions and searches, and whether this failure has caused and will continue to cause constitutional violations. 24. The named plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class. They have been and likely will continue to be, seized, stopped, frisked and/or searched without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and on the basis of their race and/or national origin. 25. The legal theories under which the named plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief are the same as those on which all members of the class will rely, and the harms suffered by the named plaintiffs are typical of the harms suffered by class members. 26. The named plaintiffs have a strong personal interest in the outcome of this action, have no conflicts of interest with members of the plaintiff class, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The named plaintiffs are all African-American and Latino men who reside in and/or visit neighborhoods where PPD officers have been deployed and conduct stops and seizures. All of the named plaintiffs have been subjected to improper stops, frisks, searches and detentions on repeated occasions. As long as the PPD engages in its policy, practice and/or custom of groundless seizures and searches, the named plaintiffs remain at risk of being illegally seized again by the PPD. 27. The named plaintiffs are represented by David Rudovsky and Paul Messing of the law firm of Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, Mary Catherine Roper, the Pennsylvania ACLU, and Seth Kreimer, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. All are experienced civil rights counsel who have litigated a wide range of civil rights actions under §1983 including class action lawsuits. Counsel for the plaintiffs have the resources, expertise
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and experience to prosecute this action. Counsel for the plaintiffs know of no conflicts among members of the class or between the attorneys and members of the class.
28. The plaintiff class should be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate.
Factual Allegations A. Allegations of the Named Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Mahari Bailey: 29. Plaintiff Mahari Bailey is twenty-seven years old and a lifelong Philadelphia resident. He graduated from Central High School in 2000, received a B.S. from Hampton University in 2004, and a J.D. from Georgetown Law School in 2007. Mr. Bailey has practiced law in Philadelphia since 2007. Mr. Bailey is African-American. 30. In early 2008, plaintiff Bailey, in the company of other Black men, was in the neighborhood of West Philadelphia when he was approached by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #1, who, without cause or justification, stopped, searched and verbally abused Mr. Bailey, and thereafter searched his vehicle which was nearby. After a period of detention, Mr. Bailey was released and no criminal charges were brought against him. 31. On or about September 12, 2008, Plaintiff Bailey was driving his automobile in the700 block of North 64th Street, Philadelphia. Without cause or justification, he was pulled over by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #2, who asked Mr. Bailey if there were guns or drugs in his vehicle. Mr. Bailey identified himself as an attorney, told defendants Doe(s) #2 that there was no contraband in his car, and advised the officers that he had previously filed a complaint with Captain Singleton about an earlier unlawful stop by
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Philadelphia police officers. After a period of detention, Mr. Bailey was released and no criminal charges were brought against him.
32. On or about August 9, 2009, plaintiff Bailey and some African-American friends were standing in the area of 53rd and Euclid Streets in Philadelphia. Plaintiff Bailey was approached by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #3, who, without cause or justification, told Mr. Bailey and his companions to stand against a wall to be searched. When Mr. Bailey told the police that he was an attorney and refused to consent to a search, one of the officers raised his fists in a threatening manner, told Mr. Bailey that he “didn’t give a fuck who you are,” and left the scene. Mr. Bailey was released and no criminal charges were brought against him.
33. On or about May 5, 2010, Plaintiff Bailey was driving his vehicle at 59th and Master Streets in Philadelphia. Without cause or justification, he was pulled over by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #4. When Mr. Bailey asked why he had been stopped, one of the officers told him to “shut up” and stated that Mr. Bailey “was in the wrong neighborhood.” When Mr. Bailey protested about being repeatedly stopped by the police for no reason, he was told that the tinted windows on his vehicle were illegal. Mr. Bailey advised the officers that vehicles of that make and model come with tinted windows which were not unlawful. The officers issued a ticket to Mr. Bailey on the false and pretextual charge of a tinted windows violation in retaliation for his verbal protest. The charge was dismissed at Philadelphia Traffic Court.
34. On each of these occasions, defendants Doe(s) #1-4 subjected Mr. Bailey, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, to an unlawful stop, frisk, search and/or detention based on his race in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment. This unconstitutional conduct is a direct and proximate result of policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey.
Plaintiff Timothy Streaty: 35. Plaintiff Timothy Streaty is thirty-two years old and a lifelong Philadelphia resident. He graduated from Simon Gratz High School in 1996 and worked for several years at Medimmune, a pharmaceutical company in Philadelphia. Mr. Streaty is African-American. 36. On September 24, 2009, at about 5:00 p.m., plaintiff Streaty was standing on the corner at 16th and Ontario Streets in Philadelphia in the company of other African-American men. 37. At that time and place, without cause or justification, plaintiff Streaty was approached by defendants Donofrio and Jane Doe. Mr. Streaty and the other men were told to leave the area. Mr. Streaty did not immediately leave and the officers threatened to arrest him. As Mr. Streaty called 911 on his cell phone to ask that a supervisor come to the scene, defendant Donofrio handcuffed and searched Mr. Streaty and placed him under arrest. 38. Plaintiff Streaty was transported to the police district where he was detained for a prolonged period and later released on the false charge of failure to disperse. 39. On March 12, 2010, Judge Georgeanne Daher of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia dismissed the charges. 40. Defendants Donofrio and Jane Doe subjected Mr. Streaty to a stop, frisk, search, detention, arrest and prosecution without cause and did so based on his race. 41. Plaintiff Streaty has been stopped, questioned, frisked and detained by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #5 without probable cause or reasonable suspicion on several other occasions. The most recent stop was in July, 2010 when he was
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walking on North 18th Street in Philadelphia. On all of the occasions described above, plaintiff Streaty was subjected to an unlawful stop, frisk, search and detention in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion and based on his race in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unconstitutional conduct is a direct and proximate result of policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey.
Plaintiff Fernando Montero: 42. Plaintiff Fernando Montero is twenty-seven years old and a Latino Philadelphia resident. He received his B.A. from Princeton in 2006 and has been employed as an ethnographer with the Anthropology Department of the University of Pennsylvania. For the past year, he has been working on a book about the Latino community in Philadelphia, research that has brought him to Latino neighborhoods in the City on a regular basis. 43. In early 2010, plaintiff Montero was walking on Cambria Street in Philadelphia when he was approached by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #6, who, without cause or justification, stopped and seized Mr. Montero and questioned him about his identity and purpose for being in the area. After a period of detention, Mr. Montero was released and no criminal charges were brought against him. 44. In March, 2010, plaintiff Montero was a passenger in a vehicle operated by a colleague from the University of Pennsylvania at Front and Allegheny Streets in Philadelphia. Without cause or justification, he was pulled over by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #7, who detained Mr. Montero to question him about drug activity in the area. When Mr. Montero protested the detention, the officers told him to leave the area or be
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subject to arrest. After a period of detention, Mr. Montero was released and no criminal charges were brought against him.
45. In July 2010, plaintiff Montero was with a colleague in a park at Indiana and Ella Streets in Philadelphia. Plaintiff Montero was approached by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #8, who, without cause or justification, stopped and seized Mr. Montero and questioned him about his identity and purpose for being in the area. After a period of detention, Mr. Montero was released and no criminal charges were brought against him.
46. On September 29, 2010, plaintiff Montero was walking near the intersection of B and Cambria Streets in Philadelphia. Plaintiff Montero was approached by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants John Doe(s) #9, who, without cause or justification, stopped and seized Mr. Montero, questioned him about his purpose for being in the area, and subjected him to verbal abuse and a search of his person. After a period of detention, Mr. Montero was released and no criminal charges were brought against him.
47. On each of the occasions when plaintiff Montero was stopped, searched and/or detained, defendants John Doe(s) #6-9 had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and they subjected plaintiff Montero to a unlawful stop, frisk, search and/or detention based on his race and/or national origin in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unconstitutional conduct is a direct and proximate result of policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey.
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Plaintiff Gregory Blackmon, Jr.: 48. Plaintiff Gregory Blackmon, Jr. is twenty-one years old and a lifelong Philadelphia resident. He graduated from Simon Gratz High School in 2007, completed a year at Philadelphia Community College, and has worked as a carpenter. Mr. Blackmon is African-American. 49. On November 7, 2008, at about 7:30 p.m., plaintiff Blackmon entered a grocery store at the corner of 18th and Ontario Streets in Philadelphia, ordered some food, and stepped outside to await his order. Once outside, as he talked to other African American men at that location, he was approached by defendants McCormick, Giacomelli, Campbell and Port who, without cause or justification, pushed him against a wall, frisked, questioned and detained him. The officers found no weapons, contraband, or evidence of criminal conduct during the search of plaintiff Blackmon. After a period of detention, Mr. Blackmon was released and no formal charges were filed against him. 50. Since November 7, 2008, plaintiff Blackmon has been unlawfully stopped, questioned, frisked and detained by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants Doe(s) #10 on several other occasions, most recently during the week of July 26, 2010 when he was walking near the corner of 17th and Ontario Streets in Philadelphia. On all of the occasions described above, plaintiff Blackmon was subjected to an unlawful stop, frisk, search and detention in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion and based on his race in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unconstitutional conduct is a direct and proximate result of policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey.
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Plaintiff Preston Fulton: 51. Plaintiff Preston Fulton is twenty-one years old and a lifelong Philadelphia resident. He left high school during the 12th grade and has been employed on a part-time basis. Mr. Fulton is African-American. 52. On November 7, 2008, at about 7:30 p.m., plaintiff Fulton entered a grocery store at the corner of 18th and Ontario Streets in Philadelphia, ordered some food, and stepped outside to await his order. Once outside, he, plaintiff Gregory Blackmon, Jr. and other African American men were approached by defendants McCormick, Giacomelli, Campbell and Port who, without cause or justification, pushed Mr. Fulton against a wall, frisked and questioned him. The officers found no weapons, contraband, or evidence of criminal conduct during the search of plaintiff Fulton and his companions. After a period of detention, Mr. Fulton was released and no formal charges were filed against him. 53. Since November 7, 2008, plaintiff Fulton has been unlawfully stopped, questioned, frisked and detained by officers hereinafter referred to as defendants Doe(s) #11 on several other occasions, most recently during the week of July 19, 2010 when he was walking near the corner of 17th and Gratz Streets in Philadelphia. On all of the occasions described above, plaintiff Fulton was subjected to an unlawful stop, frisk, search and detention in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion and based on his race in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unconstitutional conduct is a direct and proximate result of policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey.
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Plaintiffs John Cornish, Carl Cutler and Jewell Williams 54. Plaintiff John Cornish is 65 years old and a lifelong Philadelphia resident. He is employed with the City of Philadelphia. Mr. Cornish is African American. 55. Plaintiff Carl Cutler is 65 years old and a lifelong Philadelphia resident. He recently retired after working for more than twenty years as a tailor and presser for a cleaning establishment in Philadelphia. Mr. Carver is African American. 56. Plaintiff Jewell Williams is 52 years old and a lifelong Philadelphia resident. Since 2001, he has represented the 197th District as a Member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. Mr. Williams is African American. 57. On or about March 28, 2009, plaintiff John Cornish was driving his automobile on the 1600 block of York Street in Philadelphia. Plaintiff Carl Cutler was a passenger in the vehicle. Without cause or justification, defendants Thomas Schaffling, Timothy Devlin and Donna Stewart, acting in concert and conspiracy, stopped the vehicle, seized and detained Mr. Cornish and Mr. Carver. 58. At the same time, plaintiff Jewell Williams was driving his motor vehicle west on the 1600 block of York Street in Philadelphia. 59. Plaintiff Williams stopped his vehicle because traffic was blocked by police activity related to the stop of Mr. Cornish several car lengths in front of him. 60. At that point, defendant Schaffling, without cause or justification, ordered plaintiff Cornish from his vehicle, frisked him roughly and detained him at that location. Mr. Cornish’s property, including cash, was placed on the outside of the vehicle. 61. At the same time, defendant Stewart ordered plaintiff Cutler from the vehicle, frisking him roughly and detained him at that location.
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62. As this was transpiring, Mr. Cornish’s cash starting to blow off the car, attracting the attention of bystanders. Plaintiff Williams exited his vehicle and, while remaining next to his car and observing bystanders grab the money, asked the crowd to “leave the man’s money alone.”
63. At this point, defendant Schaffling began yelling profanities and threats of physical harm at plaintiff Cornish.
64. Simultaneously, defendant Steward placed plaintiff Cutler in excessively tight handcuffs. Defendant Schaffling then placed plaintiff Cornish in excessively tight handcuffs, and thereafter both plaintiffs Cornish and Cutler were detained in a patrol car.
65. Defendant Devlin approached plaintiff Williams and ordered him to “get back in the fucking car and move your car away.” Plaintiff Williams, while remaining next to his car, identified himself to defendant Devlin as a State official, and showed his official State identification.
66. Defendant Devlin then ordered plaintiff Williams to “get back in your fucking car before I give you a bunch of tickets.”
67. Plaintiff Williams asked to speak to defendant Devlin’s supervisor when, without cause or justification, he was handcuffed by defendant Devlin in an excessively tight manner.
68. Defendant Bernard, who was on the scene as the ranking supervisory PPD official, approached plaintiff Williams and, without cause or justification, used rude, profane and insulting language toward plaintiff Williams, and physically pushed him into a police vehicle.
69. Defendant Stewart, without cause or justification, seized plaintiff Cornish’s vehicle and drove it to 19th and York Streets, while both plaintiffs Cornish and Cutler followed while handcuffed and detained in the rear of a patrol car.
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70. Upon arriving at 19th and York Streets, plaintiff Cornish was uncuffed, and his vehicle and other possessions were returned to him, less a substantial amount of cash that had been unlawfully seized by the officers and had blown off the vehicle. Plaintiffs Cornish and Cutler were released from custody and no formal criminal charges were filed against them.
71. Plaintiff Williams was told that he was under arrest on the criminal charge of disorderly conduct.
72. Defendants Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart and Bernard refused plaintiff Williams’ repeated requests to loosen the painfully tight handcuffs. The application of the excessively tight handcuffs caused plaintiffs Cornish, Cutler and Williams to sustain physical injuries, substantial pain and discomfort, some of which may be permanent.
73. Defendants Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart and Bernard, acting in concert and conspiracy and without cause or justification, detained plaintiff Williams, handcuffed, in their vehicle for an excessive period of time, driving him first to the 23rd District police station, then to the Police Administration Building, and then back to the 23rd District police station. Plaintiff Williams was ultimately released and no formal criminal charges were filed against him.
74. Defendant Bernard, as the ranking supervisory official on the scene, failed to intervene to prevent the continuing unlawful actions that subordinate officers – defendants Schaffling, Devlin and Stewart – directed at plaintiffs Cornish, Carver and Williams.
75. At no time did plaintiffs Cornish, Cutler and Williams pose a threat of harm to the defendant officers or any other police officers or civilians. At no time did plaintiffs Cornish, Cutler and Williams violate the laws of the United States, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the City of Philadelphia, or engage in any actions or conduct that justified the actions of defendants Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart and Bernard.
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76. Defendants Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart and Bernard subjected plaintiffs Cornish, Cutler and Williams to unlawful stops, frisks, searches, arrests, unreasonable force and detentions in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion and based on their race in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unconstitutional conduct is a direct and proximate result of policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey.
77. On several other occasions over the past two years, plaintiff Williams has been unlawfully stopped, questioned, frisked and/or detained by officers hereinafter referred to as Defendants John Doe(s) #12. On each of those occasions, plaintiff Williams was subjected to unlawful stops, frisks, searches and/or detentions in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion and based on his race in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unconstitutional conduct is a direct and proximate result of policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey.
************ 78. As a result of the policies, practices, customs, actions and conduct of all Defendants, all named plaintiffs suffered harm, including humiliation, pain, physical injuries and/or emotional distress, some of which may be permanent, loss of liberty, and/or violations of their constitutional and statutory rights. 79. All plaintiffs intend to continue to frequent the neighborhoods where they have been previously stopped, seized, frisked, searched and/or detained as described above, and have a reasonable fear that they will again be subject to similar unlawful conduct by officers of the PPD based on their race and/or national origin in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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B. Allegations of City Policy, Practice and Custom
PPD's History of a Policy, Practice and/or Custom of Unjustified Stops
80. The PPD has a history of conducting stops, frisks, detentions and searches without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion and of intentionally subjecting persons to these measures,
at times accompanied by the unreasonable use of force, based on their race or ethnicity.
81. In 1996, in the matter of NAACP et al. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045, E.D.
Pa., the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement that required the City of Philadelphia to
implement policy and training initiatives to ensure that police officers abide by restrictions on
their investigative powers under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Agreement
provided:
a. There should be specific and detailed training with respect to equal treatment of citizens, promulgation of disciplinary regulation for racially biased police work, and serious and sustained diversity and cultural awareness training in the Academy and on a regular periodic basis for all officers, supervisors and administrative officers.
b. A Deputy Commissioner should (1) monitor police records and complaints as they involve minorities and allegations of racial discrimination, (2) act as a liaison to representatives of minority communities and to officials in the Department dealing with race related issues, and (3) monitor programs with respect to hiring and promotion of minorities.
c. There should be a comprehensive review of police department policies and practices such as discretionary pedestrian and vehicle stops that have the potential for racially biased law enforcement. All pedestrian and vehicle stops should be recorded on 75-48s or other reporting forms even if the stop does not yield information, detention, evidence or an arrest. Each document must state the reason for the stop, for any police action taken (e.g., frisk, search, questioning), and the race of the person(s) stopped.
d. The Department should review and audit, on a regular basis, the patterns of these stops to determine whether impermissible racial factors are involved. Individuals identified on the police reports, but against whom no charges have been made, should be contacted on a random basis to determine if the police conduct was justified and to examine any possible racial patters.
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e. Individual officers’ and supervisors’ files (as computerized) should contain any allegations or findings of racial bias. In addition, the records of stops, searches, arrest and civilian complaints in the files should be periodically reviewed to determine whether racial bias or patterns are evident. In this audit process the Department should randomly interview individuals who were stopped, but were not charged with any criminal conduct. 82. A principal reason for these provisions was a history of racially biased policing in Philadelphia. On three separate occasions in the 1980's federal courts intervened to enjoin PPD practices that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, Cliett v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 85-1846 (E.D.Pa. 1985)(consent decree arising out of the unconstitutionality of “Operation Cold Turkey,” during which 1,500 individuals were unlawfully subjected to search and arrest); Spring Garden United Neighbors v. City of Philadelphia, 614 F.Supp. 1350 (E.D.Pa. 1985)(enjoining police sweep of Latinos in Spring Garden area in aftermath of a shooting of a police officer); Arrington v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 88-2264 (E.D.Pa. 1988)(enjoining the stop and searches of young African-American males during investigation of “Center City Stalker”). 83. The events that precipitated the lawsuit in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, known as the 39th Police District Scandal, involved the unlawful arrest, search and prosecution of hundreds of persons on false or otherwise improper narcotics charges, virtually all of whom were AfricanAmerican or Latino. Officers of the 39th Police District flagrantly violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in the searches and arrests of these individuals. Ultimately, the District Attorney of Philadelphia agreed to vacate hundreds of convictions, and the City of Philadelphia agreed to pay compensation to those wrongfully accused in a total amount of over $6 million. 84. As part of the Settlement Agreement in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, the parties agreed that the City would appoint an Integrity and Accountability Officer (“IAO”) to assess and
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monitor the City’s compliance with the Agreement. The parties also agreed that the plaintiffs, through their attorneys (who are counsel in this case), would also monitor the City’s compliance.
85. To ensure proper monitoring, the IAO and counsel for the plaintiffs were provided documents and data from the PPD relevant to the various provisions of the Settlement Agreement. This monitoring included reviews of police incident reports (PPD Form 75-48a) that documented stops, frisks and detentions by the PPD to determine whether there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the officers’ actions and whether the stops and investigations of persons were undertaken in a racially biased manner.
86. Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted several such reviews, involving the analysis of thousands of pedestrian and car stops in Philadelphia. In each review, counsel found and reported to the City and the PPD that a large number of stops, detentions and frisks were not supported by adequate cause or suspicion, and that there was a large racial disparity in the incidents of stops and frisks that could not be explained by factors other than racial bias. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Fifth Monitoring Report, Pedestrian and Car Stop Audit, December 7, 2000.
87. While the parties disputed the proper inferences to be drawn from the data and the analysis, they did agree that certain factors should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that the PPD was stopping and searching persons only with the required cause or suspicion and that race did not play an inappropriate role in the decision to stop, detain, frisk or search. Yet, the data compiled by the City continued to show lack of cause for stops, frisks and detentions, and a highly racially disparate impact on African-Americans and Latinos through to 2005, when monitoring of the 1996 Agreement terminated.
88. Since 2005, there have been many documented cases of unlawful and racially biased stops, frisks and searches by the PPD, both in Internal Affairs investigations and in litigation.
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Defendants City of Philadelphia and Ramsey have failed to properly monitor and audit the conduct of PPD officers to ensure that the stops, frisks, searches and detentions do not violate the Constitution.
89. In the period 2005-present, the number of persons who have been subjected to stops, detentions and frisks by the PPD has substantially increased. As reported by the Research and Planning Unit of the PPD:
a. In 2005, there were 102,319 pedestrian stops. In 2009, there were 253,333 pedestrian stops, an increase of 148%.
b. Of the 253,333 stops in 2009, over 183,000 or 72.2% were of African-Americans, who comprise 44% of the population of Philadelphia.
c. Of all of the 2009 stops, only 8.4% led to an arrest, and the majority of these arrests were for alleged criminal conduct that was entirely independent from the supposed reason for the stop and/or frisk in the first place.
90. A significant number of the arrests cited by the Research and Planning Unit were based on outstanding warrants (unknown at the time of the stop), or charges of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct or similar charges that were based on interactions following the initial stop. Upon information and belief, in only a small percentage of the stops was the arrest based on the “cause” or “suspicion” that was the reason for the initial police action.
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Failure to Properly Train, Supervise and Discipline PPD Officers 91. Defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey have instituted more aggressive stop and frisk practices in Philadelphia but, with deliberate indifference, they have failed to properly train, supervise and discipline PPD officers with respect to constitutional standards and limitations in conducting stops, frisks, searches, detentions and the use of unreasonable force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The risks of unconstitutional conduct by PPD officers in these police practices is substantial, and the failure to properly train and supervise have caused the violations that have been suffered by the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class. 92. In December 2003, the IAO issued a Report on the Disciplinary System of the PPD which concluded that the “disciplinary system in the Philadelphia Police Department remains fundamentally ineffective, inadequate and unpredictable.” 93. The IAO Report and a separate Report issued by a specially constituted Mayor’s Task Force in 2002 cited serious and continuing deficiencies in critical areas directly relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims in this case, including: • Excessive and chronic delays in resolving disciplinary complaints; • Lack of consistent, rational and meaningful disciplinary actions; • Failure to discipline substantial numbers of officers who were found to have engaged in misconduct. 94. Notwithstanding these Reports and their detailed recommendations, according to data provided by the City in other litigation, the number of physical abuse complaints against PPD officers has more than doubled since 2001, the year that Commissioner Timoney left office. In 2008, Commissioner Ramsey’s first year in office, the number of abuse complaints rose 20%. 95. A nationally recognized police-practices expert, Dr. Paul McCauley, has also examined the PPD’s disciplinary system and several of his reports on this issue have been
22

provided to the City in prior litigation. Dr. McCauley’s review included an analysis of more than one thousand Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigations involving officers of the PPD. In 2009, Dr. McCauley found that the deficiencies “as described by Green-Ceisler in 2003 continue today,” including:
• The PPD’s internal investigatory process has fallen below accepted practices and is arbitrary and inconsistent; • The PPD discipline, as practiced, is incident based rather than progressive. Thus, repeat violators are not being penalized in proportion to the number of violations; • The conduct of IAD investigations demonstrates that PPD internal affairs personnel are not adequately trained and supervised in the proper conduct of such investigations; • The existence of a PPD practice and custom in which police officers and supervisors fail to intervene when other officers violate the rights of citizens in their presence and refuse to report or provide information concerning the misconduct of other police officers, a custom or practice known as the “Code of Silence.” • There are serious deficiencies in the quality of IAD investigations and the validity of the IAD findings and conclusions; and • The PPD lacks an effective early warning system to identify, track and monitor “problem” officers. 96. A number of Courts of the Eastern District have denied the City’s request for summary judgment on municipal liability claims based on evidence that the PPD’s disciplinary system was constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., Tindley v. City of Philadelphia (E.D.Pa. No. 09CV-0169 Brody, J.) (where the City’s request for summary judgment on the Monell claim was denied based on evidence of a failure to properly supervise and discipline police officers Thomas Schaffling and Timothy Devlin, two of the defendant officers in this case); Lyons v. City of Philadelphia, 2007 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 76646*6 (E.D.Pa., No. 06-5195 issued October 15, 2007, Padova, J.), Henderson v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa., No. 06-CV-532, Dalzell, J.).
23

97. The inadequate training, supervision and disciplining of the PPD is a direct and proximate cause of the defendant officers’ unconstitutional conduct in this case, including improper stops, frisks, searches, detentions and the use of unreasonable force.
98. On police practices involving stops, detentions, searches and frisks, defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey have failed to:
a. Take appropriate disciplinary action and corrective measures against PPD officers who have engaged in unjustified stops, frisks, searches and detentions; b. Adequately monitor PPD officers who have incurred a substantial number of civilian complaints related to unjustified stops, frisks, searches, detentions and the use of force, even in instances where the number of complaints should have triggered monitoring under established departmental guidelines; c. Conduct adequate auditing to determine if the stops, frisks, searches and detentions conducted by PPD officers comply with the PPD’s written policy; d. Take sufficient corrective and remedial action against PPD officers who provide fabricated, false, or impermissible justifications for stops, frisks, searches and detentions; and e. Take sufficient corrective, disciplinary and remedial action to combat the “Code of Silence” under which PPD officers regularly conceal or fail to report police misconduct.
24

Legal Claims Count 1 Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against All Defendants for Violations of the Fourth Amendment 99. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-98 of the Complaint. 100. Defendants City, Ramsey, Donofrio, Jane Doe, McCormick, Giacomelli, Campbell, Port, Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart, Bernard and John Doe(s) #1-12 have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping, frisking, searching and detaining the named plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct as required by the Fourth Amendment. 101. The constitutional violations suffered by the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class are directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs implemented and enforced by the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey, as set forth in this Complaint. 102. Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to the Fourth Amendment rights of the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class and as a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of the defendants, the Fourth Amendment rights of the named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members have been violated. 103. The named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class have no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to their constitutional rights unless defendants are enjoined from continuing their policy, practice and/or custom of unconstitutional stops, detentions, searches, and frisks. 104. Defendants have by the above described actions deprived the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class of their rights to be free from unlawful seizures, searches, frisks, and detention. As a result, all named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class have suffered and will
25

continue to suffer harm in violation of their rights under the the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Count 2 Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Against All Defendants for Violation of Equal Protection Clause 105. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-104 of the Complaint. 106. Defendants City of Philadelphia and Commissioner, Ramsey, Donofrio, Jane Doe, McCormick, Giacomelli, Campbell, Port, Schaffling, Devlin, Stewart, Bernard and John Doe(s) #1-12 have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping, frisking, searching and detaining the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class based on their race and/or national origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 107. These constitutional violations are directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs of the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey, as set forth in this Complaint. 108. Defendants have acted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin in police practices relating to stops, detentions, frisks and searches. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of the defendants, the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class members have been violated. 109. Defendants have intentionally targeted Black and Latino individuals for unconstitutional stops and frisks in areas where the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class reside or visit. Under these practices, policies and/or customs, the Equal Protection rights of the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class will continue to be violated.
26

110. The named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class have no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to their constitutional rights unless defendants are enjoined from continuing their policy, practice and/or custom of unconstitutional stops, detentions, searches, and frisks.
111. Defendants have by the above described actions deprived all the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class of their rights to be free from unlawful seizures, frisks, searches and detention. As a result, all named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class have suffered and will continue to suffer harm in violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Count 3 Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), et seq. Against the City 112. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-111 of the Complaint. 113. The law enforcement activities described in this Complaint have been funded, in part, with federal funds. 114. Discrimination based on race in the law enforcement activities and conduct described in this Complaint is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), et seq. The acts, conduct and omissions of the defendants were intended to discriminate on the basis of race and/or national origin, and/or had a disparate impact on minorities, particularly Blacks and Latinos. 115. The named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class have no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to their constitutional rights unless defendants are enjoined from continuing their policy, practice and/or custom of unconstitutional stops, detentions, frisks and searches.
27

116. As a direct and proximate result of the above actions and conduct, the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class have been deprived of their rights under civil rights statutes and the Constitution of the United States, and in particular Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), et seq.
Count 4 Claims of the Named Plaintiffs Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 117. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-116 of the Complaint. 118. The stops, frisks, searches, and detentions of all named plaintiffs, the use of unreasonable force on Plaintiffs Cornish, Cutler and Williams, and the malicious prosecution of Plaintiff Streaty, were done without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and were based on the impermissible factors of race and/or national origin. 119. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, defendants have deprived the individual named plaintiffs of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 120. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, the individual named plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, humiliation, physical and emotional pain and suffering, loss of liberty and violations of their civil rights.
Count 5 Supplemental State Law Claims 121. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-120 of the Complaint. 122. The acts and conduct of the individual defendant officers constitute assault and battery, false arrest and false imprisonment under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and this Court has supplemental jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate these claims.
28

Jury Demand 123. All plaintiffs request a jury trial as to all defendants and all counts of the Complaint.
Relief Wherefore, the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class they seek to represent, respectfully request that the Court: A. Issue an Order certifying this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with the named plaintiffs as class representatives; B. Issue a class-wide judgment declaring that the defendants’ policy, practice and/or custom of unjustified stops, frisks, searches and detentions challenged in this Complaint violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Title VI. C. Issue an order for the following injunctive relief:
1. Enjoin the defendants and the Philadelphia Police Department from continuing its policy, practice and/or custom of stops, frisks, searches and detentions without probable cause or reasonable suspicion; 2. Enjoin the defendants and the Philadelphia Police Department from continuing its policy, practice and/or custom of conducting stops, frisks, searches and detentions based on racial and/or national origin profiling; 3. Require the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey to institute and implement training, supervision and discipline that will eliminate the policy, practice and/or custom of unconstitutional stops, frisks, searches and detentions;
29

4. Require the defendants City and Commissioner Ramsey to monitor and audit stop, frisk, search and detention practices of the PPD, to ensure that stops, frisks, searches and detentions comport with constitutional requirements. D. Award named plaintiffs Bailey, Streaty, Montero, Fulton, Blackmon, Cornish, Cutler and Williams compensatory damages against all defendants; E. Award all plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; F. Award all plaintiffs costs of litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1920 and 1988; and G. Award such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate and just and in the interests of justice.

S/ Paul Messing Paul Messing No. 17749 KAIRYS, RUDOVSKY, MESSING & FEINBERG, LLP 718 Arch Street, Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400 Counsel for Plaintiffs
S/ Mary Catherine Roper Mary Catherine Roper No. 71107 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 125 South 9th Street, Suite Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 592-1513 Counsel for Plaintiffs

S/ David Rudovsky David Rudovsky No. 15168 KAIRYS, RUDOVSKY MESSING & FEINBERG, LLP 718 Arch Street, Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400 Counsel for Plaintiffs
S/ Seth Kreimer Seth Kreimer No. 26102 3400 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104 Counsel for Plaintiffs

30

 
 Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 1 of 9

IN TilE UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mahari Bailey, et al., Pla in tiffs
v.
City of Philadelphia, et aI., Defendants

C.A. No. 10·5952

SETILEMENT AGREEMENT, CLASS CERTIfICATION, AND CONSENT DECREE I . Introduction A. Plaintiffs' Claims This class action was fi led on Novem ber 4, 2010, and alleges that practices related to stops, frisks, searches, and detentions by the Philadelphia Ponce Department C'PPDR ) violate the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions by (1) depriving class members of their rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution where stops, frisks, or searches are made without the requisite reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and (2) denying class members the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution where st ops, detentions, frisks or searches are Impermissibly conducted on the basis of race or ethnic origin. Pla intiffs' claims are based on the facts alleged by the Individual named plaintiffs, data analyzed during the course of the litigation In NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa.), and PPD data regarding stops and frisks in Philadelphia for the years 2005-2009. Plaintiffs allege that the constitutional violations are systemic and result from the failure of the PPD to properly train, supervise and discipline police officers with respect to these practices . In particular, plaintiffs allege that the City has as a matter of policy Increased the number of stop and frisks in Phlladelph ia, but has failed to properly monitor, audit or supervise these practices Since the termination of the NAACP case In 2005, notwithstanding assurances that the City would continue to monitor and supervise these practices.

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 2 of 9
B. The City's Response The City of Philadelphia aCknowledges that there has been an increase in the number of persons stopped and frisked by the PPD in the period 2008-20 10, but denies all allegations regarding systemic violation of the rights of class members under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments or the Pennsylvania ConStitution, and the City further denies the legal and fa ctual claims made by the plaintiffs. The City asserts that PPD training on and supervision of stop and frisk practices is fully consistent with constitutional standards and that there have not been violations of the constitutional rights of the members of the plaintiff class. SpeCifically, the City asserts that Its practices and procedures related to stops, frisks, searches and detentions by the PPD are fully consistent with constitutional standards and are made with the requisite reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause. In addition, the City denies that the stops, frisks, searches and detentions are, In any way, conducted on the basis or racial or ethnic origin In violation of Individuals' constitutional rights. Neverthe less, the City, without admission of any legal or factual claims made by the plaintiffs, agrees that there are appropriate measures that should be implemented as a matter of City policy and practice to ensure that stops and frisks by the PPD are conducted consistent with constitutional mandates. C. Mutual Recognition of Principles All parties to this Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree recognize the need for (1) diligent law enforcement in the City of Philadelphia, (2) the proper use and Implementation of stop and frisk practices and policies as Instrumental in legitimate po!ice practices, and (3) compliance with the requirements and mandates of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and to Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Accordingly, the parties have agreed to the fo llowing binding provisions of this Settlement Agreement, Class Certification and Consent Decree {"AgreementT
2

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 3 of 9
II. Prelim i nary D iscove ry, Re v iew o f Current Stop and Fri sk Practices, an d Da t a Analysis A. The City has agreed to provide the plaintiffs the fOllowing documents and data regarding stop and frisk practices of the PPD: 1. 75-48a forms for the PPD for selected two week periods in the years 2006-20 10. 2. PPD directives and related instructional and training materials governing stop and frisk policies and practices, Including information as to codes entered on the 7S048a forms. 3. Audits, reports, and data analysis prepared by or for the PPD for the period 2006 to the present regarding stop and frisk practices and policies, inclUding reports and audits prepared by Temple University and the University of Pennsylvania. 4. PPD Compstat and Research and Planning data for the years 2006-20 10 regarding (a) arrests, (b) reported crime, and (c) seizures of contraband (guns and/or drugs) pursuant to stops and frisks, 5. Data regarding deployment of PPD officers by district and unit for the years 2006-20 10. 6. The parties have also agreed to discuss other disclosures that may be appropriate for proper assessment and monitoring of stop and frisk practices by the PPD. B. The parties have ag reed not to litigate the constitutionality of past stop and frisk practices, and they enter into this Agreement to implement measures to ensure future comp liance with constitutional standards, The parties reserve the right to review and ana lyze 75-48a forms for the years 2006-2010. C. No later than January 1, 2012, the PPD will begin entering all new 75 -48a forms into an electronic data base that provides the parties with access to digitized information that is sufficient to enable the parties to conduct electronic data analysis with respect to legality of the stops and frisks, The data base sha ll have the capability to retrieve Information by DC number, district, date, race, officer's actions, and other relevant characteristics necessary to effective monitoring of stop and frisk practices , To ensure that this data base provides the necessary information regarding stops and frisks, the parties will confer on the need for any changes to the 75-48a form and the design and structure of the electronic data base, including the na ture and scope of the information to be entered, If there are any unresolved differences between the parties as to this process, the Court shall have the authority to enter an appropriate Order.
1

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 4 of 9
Further, the City shall train PPO officers with respect to the electronic data base system and their responsibilities to record the relevant information for each stop and frisle O. The Plaintiffs and the City will review current PPO training, supervision, and discip line policies to determine whether any changes are necessary or appropriate to ensure that stops are conducted only where there is reasonable suspicion of crim ina l conduct and that frisks are made only where there Is reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed and dangerous. Where appropriate, new directives, regulations or other policy statements will be issued by the PPO, or ordered by the Court pursuant to Sections IV(E) and (F). E. Stops and frisks sha ll not be permissible, without limitation, where the officer has on ly anonymous information of criminal conduct, or because the person is only Mloiterlng M or engaged in "furtive movements/, or is acting "suspiciously/, or for the purpose of "Investigation of person/ or on the basis of non-articulated "flash information," or only because the person is In a " high crime" or "high drug ~ area. These restrictions are not exclusive and the parties agree that stops and frisks shall not be made without the requisite reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution . F. The City agrees to implement poncles and practices to ensure that stops and frisks are not conducted on the basis of the race or ethnic origin of the suspect, except where the law permits race or ethnic orfgin to be considered in determin ing whether a person shall be stopped or frisked (e.g., where a suspect has been described by his race) . G. By January 1, 2012 the City shall establish and enforce policies and procedures governing supervisory review and audits on agreed upon periodic basis of stop and frisk practices that Include (1) review by police district or unit supervisors of selected 75-48a forms to determine whether they state legal grounds for a stop or frisk, (2) reviews and audits by PPD supervisory officia ls of relevant data to determine whether there are impermissible racial disparities in stops and frisks, (3) the establishment of triggering thresholds for re-training, enhanced supervision, or discipline of officers who engage In unconstitutional stops and frisks or who vio late PPO policies or procedures governing these practices, and (4) department wide audits and assessments of stop and frisk practices that include PPD stop and frisk documents,
4

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 5 of 9
civilian complaints, Internal complaints, use of force forms and data, community surveys, and other relevant PPD data or documentation. There shall be written documentation of all re-tralnlng, enhanced supervision, or discipline of officers who are reviewed under the triggering thresholds. These reviews and audits shall be made available to the parties, Monitor, and the Court.
III. Class Certification The parties agree to the following Class Certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), F.R .Clv.P.:
All persons, including pedestrians and operators or passengers in motor vehicles, who were or will be stopped, frisked, detained andlor searched by Philadelphia police officers on or after November 4, 2008 without legal justification as required by the Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution, or on legally impennissible considerations of race or national origin in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(d).
IV. Monitoring and Compliance A. By June 21, 2011, the Court shall appOint a Monitor after considering the recommendation(s) of the parties. The Monitor shall have the authority to recommend to the parties and to the Court practices, policies and other measures that are appropriate or necessary to ensure that PPD stop and frisk practices and policies are in compliance with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Monitor sha ll be provided with all relevant and necessary information, data analysis, and documents and may conduct an Independent ana lysis and review of stop and frisk practices as a basIs for the Monitor's Reports and Recommendations. The Monitor may seek the advice and assistance of police practices and statistical experts in the formulation of reports or recom mendations to the parties and the Court. The Court retains the power to ensure that the Monitor Is provided with all necessary and relevant information and documents. 8. For the period of time preceding full implementation of the electronic data base of 7S-..tJ8a Information, see Section lI(C), on a quarterly basis the City sha ll provide to the plaintiffs, the Monitor, and the Court relevant data regarding stops and frisks, including the Information and documents listed In Section lI(A), In this regard, the City shall provide an 75-48a forms that are part of the City's audits of stop and frisk
,

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 6 of 9
practices (under the supervision of Police Department Inspectors), as well as other relevant forms and data. C. Upon Implementation of the 75-48a electronic data base, the digitized information In this data base shall be provided to plaintiffs' counsel and the Monitor on a monthly basis. D. The parties shall analyze and review this data and documentation under agreed upon benchmarks for measuring compliance with Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment and Pennsylvania constitutional standards and, on a semi-annual basis, shall submit their reports and rec ommend ations to the Monitor and the Court. The benchmarks shall include, but need not be limited to, those developed by the parties in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia. E. The City shall implement policIes, practices and other measures that the parties agree wil l foster PPD compliance wIth constitutional standards. If the parties disagree on such practices and poliCies, they shall separately set forth their positions In a Report to the Monitor. The Monitor shall discuss the matter with the parties and, If agreement is not reached between the parties, shall issue a formal Report and Recommendation. The recommendations shall be implemented unless a party objects by filing Objections with the Court. F. Upon the filing of such Objections, the Court shall determine whether the recommendations are appropriately designed to ensure that stop and frisk practices are consistent with constitutional standards. The Court has the authority under this Agreement to order specific policies, practices and/or other measures that are necessary or appropriate to ensure compliance with constitutional standards. G. Upon a showing of non-compliance with its Orders or of a pattern of violations of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class, the Court shall have the power to Issue contempt or other sanctions. H. In determining whether the City is in compliance with constitutiona l standards with respect to stop and frisk policies and practices, the Monitor and the Court may consider among other factors, (1) the number and nature of stops and frisks that do not comply with constitutional standards under the Fourth Amendment or Pennsylvania Constitution, (2) allinformatian regarding the reasons prOVided for stops and frisks, the resultant "hit-rates/ including arrest data, seizures af evidence, and information resu lting
6

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 7 of 9
from audits and surveys conducted by the parties, (3) racial disparities In stop and frisk practices under appropriate criteria and benchmarks and under professionally established statistical protocols and analysis. Non-compliance under the Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution may be found where there are a significant number of unconstitutional stops and/or frisks. Non-compliance under the Fourteenth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution may be found where the evidence proves that there are significant racial disparities in stop and frisk practices that are not explained by non-racial factors for such disparities, Including but not lim ited to crime rates, suspect-descriptions [n stop and frisk cases, police deployment patterns, or other non-racia l factors.
V. Fees a nd Costs
A. The City shall be responsible for reasonab le costs and fees of the Monitor. B. The City shall pay counsel fees and costs to the plaintiffs' attorneys David Rudovsky, Paul Messing, Mary Catherine Roper (ACLU of Pennsylvania), and Seth Kreimer, and their expert, Professor David Abrams on an agreed upon hourly basiS and subject to an agreed upon annual cap tor time spent to date and for ali time spent in the monitoring phase of the litigation. Counsel shall submit Invoices for their time and costs on a semi-annual basis. Any disputes over fees and costs shall be adjudicated by the Court.
e. Pla intiffs agree to waive fees for work done in the investigation and negotiation at the individua l
damage claims of the named plaintiffs. VI. Miscellaneous A. The parties sha ll attempt to negotiate the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. The Court shall have the authority to resolve these claims by mediation or tria1. B. Members of the plaintiff class may sue for damages for alleged stop and frisk violations and any such claims sha ll be considered "related" for purposes of Local Rule, Civ. P. 40 .1(c)(1), or other later cognate rules.
e. Th is Agreement shaH remain In effect until the Court, upon motion of a party, determines that the
provisions regarding data disclosure and ana lysis, document production, Monitor Reports and
7

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 8 of 9
Recommendations, and Court review are no longer necessary to ensure that the PPD stop and frisk poncles and practices are consistent with constitutional standards. D. Reports and recommendations of the parties and the Monitor and any Orders of the Court shall be filed of public record w ith the Court. All fi lings will redact persona l information regarding persons subject to stop and frisks and the parties agree to keep Information regarding the identities of persons stopped or frisked confidential, E. Neither th is Agreement nor any act taken in furtherance of this Agreement by the City or any CIty officia ls or employees Is or may be deemed an admission or evidence of the validity of any claims made by the plaintiffs In the Complaint in any civil, crimina l, or administrative proceeding. f . The Mon itor shall not be retained by any party to this litigation in a claim or suit against the defendants, or any of their officers, employees, or agents. The Monitor shall not testify on behalf of any party In any new claim or suit against the defendants, their officers, employees, or agents, but may testify in this action on Issues re lating to the Monitor's duties or responsibilities. The Monitor sha ll notify the defendants upon receipt of a subpoena and/or request for documents and materials that relate to the Monitor's duties and responsibilities under this Agreement.
8

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 16 Filed 06/21/11 Page 9 of 9
It is so agreed .
Counsel for Plaintiffs:
sl David Rudovsky David Rudovsky, Esquire
s/ Pau l Messing Paul Messing, Esquire Kalrys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg , llP 718 Arch Street, Suite 5015 Ph iladelphia, PA 19106 215-925-4400
sl Mary Catherine Roper Mary Catherine Roper, Esquire AClU of Pennsylvania P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106
sl Seth Kreimer Seth Kreimer, Esquire University of Pennsylva nia law Schoo l 3900 Chestnut Street PhUadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Defendants:
s/ Shelley R. Smith Shelley R. Smith, City Solicitor
s/ Craig M. Straw Craig M. Straw, Chief Deputy City Solicitor law Department ISIS Arch Street Philade lphia , PA 19102
s/ Carlton l. Johnson Archer & Greiner, P.e. One liberty Place Philadelphia, PA 19103
Approved by the Court:
~Ho- ~~a- lzel=l United States DIstrict Judge
9

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mahari Bailey, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
City of Philadelphia, et al., Defendants

:

:

C.A. No. 10-5952

:

:

:

:

:

PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD REPORT TO COURT AND MONITOR ON STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES

I. Introduction

A. Procedural History

On June 21, 2011, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and

Consent Decree (“Agreement”) in this matter. On February 6, 2012, plaintiffs submitted their

First Report which analyzed stop and frisk data for the first two quarters of 2011. The First

Report focused on Fourth Amendment issues, and specifically whether there was sufficient cause

for the stops, frisks, and searches reported by the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”). The

audits showed very high rates of stops and frisks undertaken without reasonable suspicion.

Plaintiffs’ Second Report was submitted in July 2012, and included (1) a Fourth

Amendment analysis of the Third Quarter 2011 stop and frisk data, (2) a racial analysis of the data

for the First and Second Quarters, 2011, and (3) a racial analysis of possession of marijuana arrests

for the period September 15-November 15, 2011. Plaintiffs reported continued high rates of stops

and frisks without reasonable suspicion. On the question of racial disparities, plaintiffs’ expert,

Professor David Abrams, considered the benchmarks that had been agreed upon by the parties as

metrics that should be used in this analysis. Professor Abrams also conducted a series of

regression analyses and concluded that the racial disparities in stops and frisks (numbers by race

1

compared to census data) were not fully explainable by non-racial factors. Further, the analysis of marijuana arrests showed even more pronounced disparities, with African-Americans and Latinos constituting over 90% of all marijuana arrests.1
Plaintiffs’ Third Report focuses on stop and frisk practices for the first two quarters of 2012, from the perspective of compliance with Fourth Amendment standards. We will also present our analysis of the marijuana arrests for the period September 15-November 15, 2012. The Fourth Report, slated for May 2013, will present the racial analysis for stops and frisks for the first two quarters, 2012.
This Third Report considers stops conducted after the PPD had completed re-training of officers, issued new protocols on stop and frisk practices, and implemented accountability measures, as required by the Agreement. The 2012 data provides the first opportunity to determine the degree to which the remedial measures in the Agreement have been implemented.
Finally, by way of background, in December 2012, the parties agreed to a plan for the development of a new PPD electronic data system that is designed to provide more accurate information on stops and frisks and which will enable the parties to more effectively conduct audits and analysis of the data. The parties also agreed to a new schedule for the City’s submission of stop and frisk data to the plaintiffs. See Stipulated Order for Compliance with Consent Decree, entered December 18, 2012 (Document 43).
1 In June, 2012, the City filed its First Report and asserted that the rates of impermissible stops and frisks were lower than reported by plaintiffs. However, the PPD recognized that the Inspectors who conducted the audits should not be crediting many stops based on allegations of loitering or other conduct that does not constitute reasonable suspicion.
2

B. The Data Review Process Plaintiffs have established a careful and comprehensive review process of the stop and frisk data provided by the Police Department. Each quarter, we are provided data from approximately 3200 randomly selected pedestrian and car stops. For the Fourth Amendment analysis, we consider only pedestrian stops. Counsel for plaintiffs and trained law students independently review each pedestrian stop and frisk under guidelines that incorporate the standards set forth in the Agreement and by the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts.2 We accept at face value the reasons stated by police officers for the stops and frisks, and make assessments based solely on whether these reasons comport with standards established by the Agreement and the Fourth Amendment. In close cases, we credit the stated basis for the stop and frisk. Plaintiffs are confident that their audits are accurate and, therefore, are troubled by the contrary findings of the PPD. In an effort to determine the reasons for these different findings, counsel for plaintiffs met with the Department’s Inspectors to discuss the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards. Along the same lines, plaintiffs have provided to the City a breakdown of the categories of stops and frisks that were found to have most frequently resulted in improper police interventions.3 The City has stated that changes are being made in the Department’s audit process, including the assignment of Deputy Commissioner Nola Joyce to oversee the implementation of the Agreement, the assignment of new Inspectors to ensure more accurate reviews, and a more effective system of accountability. While we do not expect that the reviews
2 These reviews show a very high level of agreement between counsel and the law students as to the propriety of stops and frisks. This Report is based on counsel’s reviews.
3 See, infra, 11-12.
3

by plaintiffs’ counsel and by the Police Department will be perfectly aligned, unless there is a sharp reduction in both the number of impermissible stops and frisks and in the stark disparities reflected in the audits conducted over the first 18 months of data analysis, plaintiffs will request the intervention of the Monitor and the Court. II. Review of 75-48a Forms in First and Second Quarters, 2012
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis In this section, plaintiffs set forth their findings and assessments on the issue of whether stops and frisks for the first two quarters of 2012 were supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion.4 As in previous audits, in assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed for the stop or frisk, we fully credited the narrative information provided by the officer and in “close” cases found that reasonable suspicion was present.5 There is one positive development: the number of pedestrian stops has been reduced. In 2009, there were 253,000 pedestrian stops; in 2012 there were 215,000 stops, a decrease of almost 15%. Unfortunately, there has been no significant improvement in the quality of stops and frisks. By our analysis, pedestrian stops are being made without reasonable suspicion in approximately 43-47% of the cases, depending on how certain “stops” are categorized. Frisks are being conducted without reasonable suspicion in over 45% of the cases, again depending on categorization of frisks and searches. By race, 76% of the stops were of minorities
4 The review process was the first using the PPD electronic database. As noted, this system had design deficiencies and the City is currently developing a new electronic data base to enable the parties to make more timely and efficient audits.
5 With respect to frisks, we have created a third category for analysis. Where the stop was impermissible, but the reasons for the frisk were otherwise proper, we recorded the frisk as “the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Under this doctrine, the evidence that was seized would likely be suppressed due to the improper stop. See note 8, infra.
4

(African-Americans and Latinos) and 85% of the frisks were of minorities.6 The findings as to impermissible stops and frisks are particularly disturbing given the fact that the Police Department had the time and resources following the entry of the Agreement to re-train its officers on stop and frisk practices and to establish supervisory reviews to ensure accountability for practices that failed to meet clear mandates under the Agreement. Moreover, as detailed below, the Department continues to report very low levels of improper stops and frisks, thus calling into question whether the Inspectors (and IAD) are currently applying the appropriate standards.
6 This data shows significant disparities by race as compared to the census data. The question of whether non-racial factors explain the disparities will be addressed in the Fourth Report, based on application of benchmarks and regression analysis.
5

First and Second Quarters, 2012

Pedestrian Stops7 Number of Pedestrian Stops
Stops with Reasonable Suspicion

Pedestrian Frisks8

1852

Number of Pedestrian Frisks

265

976

Frisks with Reasonable Suspicion

97

Stops without Reasonable Suspicion
“Non-Stops” (e.g., arrests, request for assistance)

876

Frisks without Reasonable Suspicion 115

186

Frisks with RS following Stop w/o

53

RS

(“Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”)

“Non-Frisks” (searches incident to

26

arrest)

First and Second Quarters, 2012: Presence of Reasonable Suspicion to
Stop

First and Second Quarters, 2012: Presence of Reasonable Suspicion to
Frisk

NO Reasonable Suspicion
47%

Reasonable Suspicion
53%

Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree 20%
NO Reasonable Suspicion
43%

Reasonable Suspicion
37%

7 From the data base provided by the City, we have excluded “stops” that were sight arrests (based on probable cause) or “stops” that were not investigative in nature, e.g., a person turning herself in on an outstanding warrant. We understand that further discussion with the City is necessary to resolve how these stops should be analyzed. In any event, even if these stops are considered the rates of improper stops remains very high (43% as opposed to 47%).
8 Where the police conducted a search based on probable cause or a search incident to an arrest, we did not count that activity as a “frisk.” The “fruit of the poisonous tree” category includes frisks that follow impermissible stops, but which were otherwise based on permissible factors. That is, the officers had no legal reason to make a stop, but having done so, the suspect’s conduct would otherwise justify a frisk. The Fourth Amendment would usually require exclusion of any evidence found in this situation. Again, we will discuss with the City how best to analyze these cases.
6

Contraband Contraband Recovered Total Guns Recovered Hit Rates (fraction of stops) Contraband Recovered Guns Recovered Arrests10

299 3
1.57% 0.16% 5.29%

First and Second Quarters, 2012 Total Fraction of Stops Resulting in
Contraband Recovery or Gun Recovery

CONTRABAND

GUNS

First and Second Quarters, 2012 Total Fraction of Stops Resulting in
Arrest
ARREST

NONE

NO ARREST

9 This number may over-count contraband secured as a result of a stop and frisk, as total contraband recovered includes cases of searches and frisks.
10 We recognize the limitations in using arrest data as a benchmark for “hit-rates.” On one hand, the number may be too low as officers may have probable cause to arrest for very minor offenses, but properly exercise their discretion not to make a custodial arrest (as opposed to a citation or verbal warning). On the other hand, the number may be inflated since some arrests are based not on the conduct observed, but on post-stop information received, such as an outstanding warrant.
7

B. Commentary There are a number of significant findings from the data review. 1. It is remarkable that 43-47% of all stops and over 45% of all frisks were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. These results are not appreciably different from the data reviews for 2011, as set forth in the First and Second Reports. Thus, tens of thousands of persons in Philadelphia continue to be stopped each year (and a significant number frisked) without reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in our view, the audits conducted by the City for these two quarters are flawed. As the following data shows, Inspectors’ audits reported very low numbers of stops or frisks without reasonable suspicion. First Quarter, 2012 Central Police Division: 392 stops.11
No reasonable suspicion for stop: 4% (adjusting for car stops, 8%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 2% East Police Division: 391 stops. No reasonable suspicion for stop: 4% (adjustment=8%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 0% Northeast Police Division: 393 stops No reasonable suspicion for stop: 1% (adjustment=2%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 2%
11 Since the police audits included car stops, we have adjusted the reported rates of impermissible stops and frisks to reflect pedestrian stops only. On the assumptions that there are an equal number of car and pedestrian stops and that almost all car stops are made with reasonable suspicion, we have doubled the percentages of pedestrian stops made without reasonable suspicion. But even with this upward adjustment, the PPD and plaintiffs are still far apart in their conclusions.
8

Second Quarter, 2012 Central Police Division: 390 stops.
No reasonable suspicion for stop: 1% (adjustment=2%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 1% East Police Division: 394 stops No reasonable suspicion for stop: 2% (adjustment=4%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 1% Northeast Police Division: 393 stops No reasonable suspicion for stop: 0% No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 2% As this data makes clear, the differences between the PPD and plaintiff analysis is stark. Under plaintiffs’ assessments of the stops and frisks, not only is there an intolerably high level of unlawful stops and frisks, but the Inspectors and IAD are improperly crediting a substantial number of stops and frisks. 2. As with the data for 2011, the number of recorded frisks continues to be very low, with only14.4% of stops resulting in a frisk. Indeed, this ratio is substantially lower than the low rates (20-25%) reported in 2011. And, similar to the data review for 2011, a review of stops in which the police reported suspicion regarding possession of a gun or a violent crime revealed a large number of cases in which the police reported no frisk of the suspect. Thus, of 149 stops in which guns, gunshots, or a robbery is mentioned as a basis for the stop, there were no frisks recorded on 79 stops (53%). 3. Of substantial significance, the hit rates were again quite low. Contraband of any kind was recovered in only 29 stops (1.57% of all stops) and only 3 guns were seized (.16 of 1 %).
9

Further, 112 stops were made where the police indicated that the suspect possessed a weapon, yet in only 3 of these stops was a weapon recovered. Arrests occurred in 5.29% of all stops. While the courts have not quantified the reasonable suspicion standard in terms of expected hit rates for contraband (or for guns and other weapons), the hit rates in Philadelphia appear to be well below a reasonable threshold. In other words, if there was reasonable suspicion for all stops, and frisks, there should be far more than a 1.57% chance of recovering contraband. Moreover, in a program designed to remove guns from the street, there should be a far higher percentage of stops that yield guns or other weapons than the current 0.16%.
Reduction in the number of impermissible stops and frisks does not create a risk to public safety. New York City has recently released data on its stop and frisk practices for 2011, reporting a 28% reduction in the number of stops and a decrease in violent crime, and in particular homicides. As noted, Philadelphia has also reduced the number of stops, but the number of impermissible stops can be further substantially reduced without risk to public safety.
4. Analyzing improper stops and frisks by category, the results were quite similar to those for 2011. As we have reported to the City, there continue to be significant numbers of stops for conduct which the Agreement and case law make clear are not justifiable grounds for police stops or frisks. These include:
loitering (or persons hanging out; congregating) investigation of passenger in stopped car involved in a disturbance single person “obstructing” the sidewalk anonymous information (e.g., man with gun; man with drugs) person on steps or porch of “abandoned” property
10

person involved in verbal dispute (non-domestic)12 high crime area/roll call complaints panhandling flash information (e.g., theft or robbery), but where officer states that suspect did not match the flash information curfew or bar checks where person was well over 21 years of age As for frisks, problematic grounds include: frisk for officer protection frisk based on narcotics investigation frisk because suspect stopped in high crime or high drug area Plaintiffs did not expect that the transition from a stop and frisk practice that lacked any meaningful oversight to a system that accurately tabulates all stops and frisks and in which there is substantial compliance with the Constitution would be immediately successful. On the technology front, the initial design of the data base was flawed, but the City is moving to implement a new system. On the issue of whether stops and frisks are being conducted consistent with established legal standards, and in particular only where reasonable suspicion supports the stop or frisk, the results of our audits through the first two quarters of 2012 reflect persistent and unacceptably high rates of improper actions. Unless there is a dramatic change in practices, we will be compelled to seek judicial relief.
12 We credit reports of “domestic” disputes.
11

III. Racial Disparities In Possession Of Marijuana Arrests In Plaintiffs’ Second Report, our analysis of police arrest reports for a two month period
(September 15-November 15, 2011) for cases in which the only charge was possession of marijuana disclosed substantial racial disparities. Plaintiffs have reviewed police arrest reports for the same two month time frame in 2012. We conducted a City-wide analysis of arrests and then examined the data by police district. The results show even greater racial disparities than the 2011 data.
A. Possession of Marijuana Arrests in the City of Philadelphia In the time frame subject to analysis, there were 798 arrests solely for possession of marijuana, a slight increase from 2011 when there were 785 arrests. There were four circumstances that led to the seizures of marijuana:
pedestrian stops/arrests: 60% (compared to 49% in 2011);13 observed street purchases: 22% (23% in 2011); car stops: 14% (22% in 2011); and routine school security searches: 4% (6% in 2011). As depicted in the chart below, 673 or 84.4% of the arrests were of African Americans (compared to 83.4% in 2011), 69 or 8.6% were of Latinos (8.2% in 2011), 46 or 5.8 % were of Whites (7.4% in 2011), and 10 (or about 1%) were others (the same as in 2011). According to U.S. Census Data in 2010 the racial composition of Philadelphia County is 43.4% African American, 36.9% White, 12.3% Latino, 6.3% Asian, and 1.1% other. Thus, in a City where Whites represent
13 The arrests resulted from either investigatory stops that led to seizure of marijuana or actual arrests based on observations or information that established probable cause.
12

36.9% of the population, only 5.8% of those arrested for marijuana possession were White. This finding is of particular concern in light of evidence (discussed in Plaintiffs’ Second Report, at 32) that marijuana use is higher among Whites than among African Americans. Conversely, while African Americans represent 43.4% of the population, nearly double or 84.4% of those arrested for possession of marijuana were African Americans.

Racial Composition of Philadelphia

Latino 12.3%

Other 1.1%
Asian 6.3%

Black 43.4%

White 36.9%

Racial Composition of Marijuana Arrests in Philadelphia

Other 1%
Latino 8.6%
White 5.8%

Black 84.4%

13

B. Possession of Marijuana Arrests By Philadelphia Police District There are twenty-one police districts that report arrest data in Philadelphia. The demographics of each district vary along socio-economic and racial lines. The data on marijuana arrests by district in 2012 is quite similar to the arrest patterns observed in 2011, though there has been an increase in the proportion of pedestrian stops that led to the seizure of small amounts of marijuana. In predominantly African American districts (Districts 12, 14, 16, 19, 22, 35 and 39), almost all of the possession of marijuana arrests were of African American, principally young men. In many predominantly white districts (Districts 3, 6, 9, 15, 24, 25 and 26), most of the arrests were also of young African American men. As in 2011, in one largely White district (District 5), there were no arrests for possession of marijuana. C. Commentary The 2012 data bears a striking similarity to the data set analyzed in 2011. The nature of the arrests, the overall racial disparities, and the disparities by police districts with markedly different racial compositions show that these disparities are directly linked to policing protocols. While other factors may influence the extent of racial disparities in the overall stop and frisk data (e.g., crime patterns; deployment of more police in “high crime areas”), the stunning disparities found in even predominantly White police districts supports the conclusion that racial factors are impermissibly influencing the decision to stop, search and arrest. As noted, plaintiffs will be filing a Fourth Report that examines the racial implications of stop and frisk data. Plaintiffs’ Second Report urged the City to take remedial steps. We suggested that the PPD enhance protocols related to training and supervision to ensure that officers are not making arrests for possession of marijuana in a racially discriminatory manner. To that end, we requested that a
14

Commissioner’s Memorandum and appropriate training curriculum for use at the Police Academy and for PPD officers and officials.
Plaintiffs also suggested that the PPD carefully monitor police practices in this area with supervisory and, if necessary, disciplinary actions to correct patterns of race-based enforcement. To accomplish that goal, we suggested that the PPD create a data base on possession of marijuana arrests that includes the date and place of occurrence, biographical information about the arrestee (including age, race and gender), and the circumstances that gave rise to the stop, seizure of the marijuana, and arrest. We requested that the data be provided to the plaintiffs’ counsel on a quarterly basis. The City failed to adopt the remedial measures proposed by plaintiffs or to undertake any steps to remedy the racially disparate practices related to marijuana arrests.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David Rudovsky, Esquire
/s/ Paul Messing, Esquire
Kairys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street, Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400

/s/ Mary Catherine Roper, Esquire ACLU of Pennsylvania PO Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106
/s/ Seth Kreimer, Esquire University of Pennsylvania Law School 3900 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Plaintiffs14

14 Counsel express their appreciation to a number of volunteer lawyers and law students who have donated hundreds of hours of time in this project. Special thanks to Solena Laigle and Jonathan C. Dunsmoor who have organized and structured the data collection and student reviews.
15

 
 Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 1 of 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mahari Bailey, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
City of Philadelphia, et al., Defendants

:

:

C.A. No. 10-5952

:

:

:

:

:

PLAINTIFFS’ FOURTH REPORT TO COURT AND MONITOR ON STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES

I. Introduction

A. Procedural History

On June 21, 2011, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and

Consent Decree (“Agreement”) in this matter. On February 6, 2012, plaintiffs submitted their

First Report which analyzed stop and frisk data for the first two quarters of 2011. The First

Report focused on Fourth Amendment issues, and specifically whether there was sufficient cause

for the stops, frisks, and searches reported by the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”). The

audits showed very high rates of stops and frisks undertaken without reasonable suspicion.

Plaintiffs’ Second Report was submitted in July 2012, and included (1) a Fourth

Amendment analysis of the Third Quarter 2011 stop and frisk data, (2) a racial analysis of the data

for the First and Second Quarters, 2011, and (3) a racial analysis of possession of marijuana arrests

for the period September 15-November 15, 2011. Plaintiffs reported continued high rates of stops

and frisks without reasonable suspicion. On the question of racial disparities, plaintiffs’ expert,

Professor David Abrams, considered the benchmarks that had been agreed upon by the parties as

metrics that should be used in this analysis. Professor Abrams also conducted a series of

regression analyses and concluded that the racial disparities in stops and frisks (numbers by race

1

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 2 of 29
compared to census data) were not fully explainable by non-racial factors. Further, the analysis of marijuana arrests showed even more pronounced disparities, with African-Americans and Latinos constituting over 90% of all marijuana arrests.
Plaintiffs’ Third Report focused on stop and frisk practices for the first two quarters of 2012, from the perspective of compliance with Fourth Amendment standards. Plaintiffs also presented an analysis of the marijuana arrests for the period September 15-November 15, 2012. In the Third Report plaintiffs found a rate of non-compliance with Fourth Amendment standards of over 40%. In response, the City has stated that the PPD is providing additional training, issuing revised auditing protocols, and instituting new accountability measures.
The Fourth Report presents a Fourth Amendment analysis for the First Quarter, 2013 and a racial analysis for stops and frisks for the first two quarters, 2012.1
B. The Data Review Process Plaintiffs have established a careful and comprehensive review process of the stop and frisk data provided by the Police Department. Each quarter, we are provided data from approximately 3200 randomly selected pedestrian and car stops. For the Fourth Amendment analysis, we consider only pedestrian stops. Counsel for plaintiffs and trained law students independently review each pedestrian stop and frisk under guidelines that incorporate the standards set forth in the Agreement and by the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts.2 We accept at face value the reasons stated by police officers for the stops and frisks, and make
1 The lag time is attributable in part to the flaws in the current electronic data system, but the parties are hopeful that a new system will be in place in early 2014.
2 These reviews show a very high level of agreement between counsel and the law students as to the propriety of stops and frisks. This Report is based on counsel’s reviews.
2

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 3 of 29
assessments based solely on whether these reasons comport with standards established by the Agreement and the Fourth Amendment. In close cases, we credit the stated basis for the stop and frisk.
Counsel for plaintiffs have discussed the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards with Inspectors in the PPD. Along the same lines, plaintiffs have provided to the City a breakdown of the categories of stops and frisks that were found to have most frequently resulted in improper police interventions.3 As noted, the City has stated that changes are being made in the Department’s audit process, including the assignment of Deputy Commissioner Nola Joyce to oversee the implementation of the Agreement, the assignment of new Inspectors to ensure more accurate reviews and a more effective system of accountability, and reviews by the PPD Office of Standards and Accountability. A September 6, 2013 audit of stops made for 2013, Second Quarter, by the Office of Standards and Accountability reported an improper stop rate of 37% for patrol officers. II. Review of 75-48a Forms, First Quarter, 2013
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis In this section, plaintiffs set forth their findings and assessments on the issue of whether stops and frisks for the first quarter of 2013 were supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion.4 As in previous audits, in assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed for the stop or frisk, we fully credited the narrative information provided by the officer and in “close” cases credited the
3 See, infra, 8-9. 4 The review process was the first using the PPD electronic database. As noted, this system had design deficiencies and the City is currently developing a new electronic data base to enable the parties to make more timely and efficient audits.
3

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 4 of 29 assertion of reasonable suspicion.5
Pedestrian stops were made without reasonable suspicion in approximately 43% of the cases. Frisks were conducted without reasonable suspicion in over 50% of the cases. By race, 76% of the stops were of minorities (African-Americans and Latinos) and 79% of the frisks were of minorities.
5 With respect to frisks, we have created a third category for analysis. Where the stop was impermissible, but the reasons for the frisk were otherwise proper, we recorded the frisk as “the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Under this doctrine, the evidence that was seized would likely be suppressed due to the improper stop. See note 7, infra.
4

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 5 of 29

First Quarter, 2013

Pedestrian Stops6 Number of Pedestrian Stops
Stops with Reasonable Suspicion

Pedestrian Frisks7

1126

Number of Pedestrian Frisks

196

639

Frisks with Reasonable Suspicion

77

Stops without Reasonable Suspicion

487

Frisks without Reasonable Suspicion

106

“Non-Stops” (e.g., arrests, request for assistance)

203

Frisks with RS following Stop w/o RS

13

(“Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”)

First Quarter, 2013: Presence of Reasonable Suspicion
to Stop

First Quarter, 2013: Presence of Reasonable Suspicion to
Frisk

NO Reasonable Suspicion
43%

Reasonable Suspicion
57%

Reasonable Suspicion
39%
Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree 7%

NO Reasonable Suspicion
54%

6 From the data base provided by the City, we have excluded “stops” that were sight arrests (based on probable cause) or “stops” that were not investigative in nature, e.g., a person turning herself in on an outstanding warrant.
7 Where the police conducted a search based on probable cause or a search incident to an arrest, we did not count that activity as a “frisk.” The “fruit of the poisonous tree” category includes frisks that follow impermissible stops, but which were otherwise based on permissible factors. That is, the officers had no legal reason to make a stop, but having done so, the suspect’s conduct would otherwise justify a frisk. The Fourth Amendment would usually require exclusion of any evidence found in this situation.
5

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 6 of 29

Contraband Contraband Recovered Total Guns Recovered Hit Rates (fraction of stops) Contraband Recovered Guns Recovered Arrests8

36 3
2.93% 0.27% 4.14%

First Quarter, 2013 Total Fraction of Stops Resulting in
Contraband Recovery or Gun Recovery

CONTRABAND

GUNS

First Quarter, 2013 Total Fraction of Stops Resulting in
Arrest
ARREST

NONE

NO ARREST

8 We recognize the limitations in using arrest data as a benchmark for “hit-rates.” On one hand, the number may be too low as officers may have probable cause to arrest for very minor offenses, but properly exercise their discretion not to make a custodial arrest (as opposed to a citation or verbal warning). On the other hand, the number may be inflated since some arrests are based not on the conduct observed, but on post-stop information received, such as an outstanding warrant. Further, a number of arrests were made on probable cause of criminal activity and thus are not counted in this report as arrests that resulted from a stop and frisk. The parties will further discuss this data question before we issue the next Report.

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 7 of 29
B. Commentary There are a number of significant findings from the data review. 1. 43% of all stops and over 50% of all frisks were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. These results are not appreciably different from the data reviews for 2011 and 2012, as set forth in the First, Second, and Third Reports. Thus, tens of thousands of persons in Philadelphia continue to be stopped each year (and a significant number frisked) without reasonable suspicion. 2. As with the data for 2011 and 2012, the number of recorded frisks continues to be very low, with only 20% of stops resulting in a frisk. And, similar to previous data reviews, a review of stops in which the police reported suspicion regarding possession of a gun or a violent crime revealed a large number of cases in which the police reported no frisk of the suspect. Thus, of 79 stops in which guns, gunshots, or a robbery is mentioned as a basis for the stop, there were no frisks recorded on 33 stops. 3. The hit rates were again quite low. Contraband of any kind was recovered in only 36 stops (2.93% of all stops) and 3 guns were seized (.27 of 1 %). Arrests occurred in 4.14% of all stops, excluding arrests made on observations that amounted to probable cause even before a stop or frisk was conducted. While the courts have not quantified the reasonable suspicion standard in terms of expected hit rates for contraband (or for guns and other weapons), the hit rates in Philadelphia appear to be well below a reasonable threshold. In other words, if there was reasonable suspicion for all stops and frisks, there should be far more than a 2.93 % chance of recovering contraband. Moreover, in a program designed to remove guns from the street, there should be a far higher percentage of stops that yield guns than the current 0.27%.
7

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 8 of 29
Reduction in the number of impermissible stops and frisks does not create a risk to public safety. New York City has recently released data on its stop and frisk practices for 2012, reporting a significant reduction in the number of stops and a decrease in violent crime, and in particular homicides.
4. Analyzing improper stops and frisks by category, the results were quite similar to those for 2011. As we have reported to the City, there continue to be significant numbers of stops for conduct which the Agreement and case law make clear are not justifiable grounds for stops or frisks. These include:
loitering (or persons hanging out; congregating)9 investigation of passenger in stopped car involved in a disturbance single person “obstructing” the sidewalk anonymous information (e.g., man with gun; man with drugs) person on steps of “abandoned” property person involved in verbal dispute (non-domestic)10 high crime area/roll call complaints panhandling flash information (e.g., theft or robbery), but where officer states that suspect did not match the flash information curfew or bar checks where person was well over 21 years of age As for frisks, problematic grounds include:
9 The PPD has again instructed officers that “loitering” is not a valid basis for a stop. And while the number of such stops has decreased, the PPD has recognized that officers are using other vague narratives (e.g. blocking buildings) to justify stops. PPD, September 6, 2013 Audit.
10 We credit reports of “domestic” disputes.
8

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 9 of 29
frisk for officer protection
frisk based on narcotics investigation
frisk because suspect stopped in high crime or high drug area
We have previously written:
“Plaintiffs did not expect that the transition from a stop and frisk practice that lacked any meaningful oversight to a system that accurately tabulates all stops and frisks and in which there is substantial compliance with the Constitution would be immediately successful. On the technology front, the initial design of the data base was flawed, but the City is moving to implement a new system. On the issue of whether stops and frisks are being conducted consistent with established legal standards, and in particular only where reasonable suspicion supports the stop or frisk, the results of our audits through the first two quarters of 2012 reflect persistent and unacceptably high rates of improper actions. Unless there is a dramatic change in practices, we will be compelled to seek judicial relief.” Third Report, at 11.
Plaintiffs adhere to this position and are concerned by the lack of significant
progress. With a new electronic data system for 2014 and new audit and accountability
measures in places, we expect significant improvements in 2014, and will seek sanctions
from the Court if necessary.
III. Racial Analysis of Stop and Frisk Practices, January-June, 2012
A. Introduction
This section sets forth a statistical analysis of the “Stop and Frisk” practices of the PPD for the first half of 2012, conducted by plaintiffs’ consultant and economics’ expert, David Abrams. The benchmarks to be used in the analysis were described in detail in a Memorandum dated November 9, 2011, and attached to Plaintiffs’ First Report.
In creating benchmarks to measure compliance of the PPD with the terms of the Agreement, we considered several criteria. First, the benchmarks are designed to be straightforward in terms of computation and interpretation. Second, they are designed to
9

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 10 of 29
measure characteristics at the core of the Agreement, namely compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, they consider other potential explanations for patterns in the data beyond suspect race. The benchmarks are based on a combination of those discussed and used in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, academic literature on the topic, and those used recently in other jurisdictions, as described in Plaintiffs’ Second Report.
In a recent opinion in Floyd v. City of New York, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113271 (S.D.N.Y. August 12, 2013), stayed pending appeal, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, November 13, 2013, the court engaged in an intensive analysis of competing benchmarks submitted by the plaintiffs and the City in the New York City class action stop and frisk litigation. The court credited the approach of plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Jeffrey Fagan (Columbia Law School) who examined data on all stops in New York City from 2004 through 2009. Professor Fagan used a regression technique similar to that detailed in the benchmarks that have been approved by the parties in Bailey. Professor Fagan considered the impact of the racial composition of a district on the likelihood of being stopped, arrested, or issued a citation. Additional outcomes included gun and other weapon seizures, and contraband seizures. Professor Fagan controlled for various district characteristics, including age composition, racial composition, crime complaints, police patrol strength, socioeconomic status, population, foreign born population, business district status, and time controls.
B. Summary of Differences from 2011 Analysis
The results of the 2012 Q1 and Q2 analysis are detailed below, but we first provide a brief summary of differences between this time period and that of the year prior. The demographic makeup of individuals stopped is substantially the same as before, with young black males still comprising the largest portion. The location of stops in the sample has changed somewhat, with some districts, like the 1st, 6th, and 17th, comprising a substantially higher share of the data, and others, like 12th, 14th, 15th, and 25th, a substantially smaller share.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 11 of 29
The biggest difference between 2011 and 2012 is the large decline in arrests, frisks, and discovery of contraband resulting from stops. Each of these rates has dropped almost in half in a year’s time. While these declines are substantial, as detailed in Section II, supra, the rate of unfounded stops and frisks remains extremely high at a rate over 40%.
The regression results show some similarities and some differences from 2011 as well. As in 2011, Blacks are stopped at higher rates than Whites, a fact that is undiminished by controlling for a multitude of individual and district characteristics. Blacks are also frisked at substantially higher rates than Whites, a result that was found in 2011 as well. In 2012 we find evidence that the rate of unfounded stops of Blacks is significantly greater than that of Whites, something that was not the case in 2011.
C. Summary of the Stop and Frisk Data
We examined data from Q1 and Q2 2012 pedestrian stops. The sample dataset includes 1,848 total pedestrian stops. The median age of a detainee is 28 and 85% of detainees are male (Figure 1). Blacks account for 67% of those stopped, Whites comprise 23%, and 9% are (non-Black) Latinos. The demographic characteristics of individuals stopped are similar to those from the 2011 pedestrian stops. The number of stops varies substantially by district, with the 24th, encompassing the Port Richmond area (Figure 2), accounting for the most, with 10%. As in 2011, the fewest stops are in the 5th, which includes Roxborough, and accounts for just 1% of all stops.
Table 1 reports stop, frisk and arrest rates for pedestrian stops broken down by race. Approximately 17% of stops of Black or Latino suspects lead to a frisk, considerably higher than the 11% rate for Whites. Blacks and Latinos are also searched at a substantially higher rate than Whites, about 10% and 13% of the time versus 6%. 8.8% of stops of Blacks lead to arrest; Whites are at 5.3%; and Latinos at 12.7%. As noted above, arrest rates are imprecise measures of the legality of stops and frisks. The decision to arrest is highly discretionary (e.g., where a person may be acting in a disorderly fashion, has an open liquor container, curfew or truancy violations). Further, to determine whether
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 12 of 29
the arrest rates are related to improper racial considerations, a more precise analysis of the reasons for the stops by race is necessary.
D. The Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
The question of whether race is impermissibly used as a factor in the decision to stop, frisk, search or arrest from cannot be answered by a simple comparison of stop and frisk rates to census data. Non-racial factors may explain the disparities. However, the stop rate/census comparison is the first step in this process. As set forth in Table 1, the stop rate by race in comparison to the census is as follows:
Black stops=67%; Black census=43.4% White stops=23%; White census=41% Latino stops=9%; Latino census=12.3%
To inform the Fourteenth Amendment analysis regarding racial fairness of stops, we examined whether the number of stops lacking reasonable suspicion varied by race or Latino identity. Table 2 shows little variation by race in the share of stops lacking reasonable suspicion, which ranged from 40% for Latinos to 42% for Whites to 44% for Blacks. While the differences for the racial groups do not appear to vary significantly, this analysis does not include relevant control variables that are considered below. There is more variation by race in frisks, with 44% of frisks of Latinos lacking reasonable suspicion, compared with 56% of frisks of Blacks and Whites that lack reasonable suspicion.
1. Regression Analysis To address non-racial influences, we move to a multivariate regression analysis. This approach is more robust than a comparison of averages because it examines the relationship among multiple variables simultaneously. To determine the impact of suspect race on the likelihood of a stop or frisk, we controlled for factors that include the demographic makeup and crime rate of the neighborhood.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 13 of 29
(a) Addition of Census and Crime Data
In this section, we add data collected from the U.S. census as well as Uniform Crime Report data on reported crimes, by district. We begin by examining differences in overall stop rates by race in Table 5. This table and those that follow share the same format: each column in the table reports results from a separate regression that identifies the relationship between the variables listed in the first column and the dependent variable. For example, regression 2 can be written as:
(1) Stop Rate is the number of stops in the sample examined per 10,000 residents in a district and Black is coded 0 if the detainee is White and 1 if the detainee is Black. Similarly, Hispanic is coded 1 if the detainee is Hispanic and zero otherwise. Age is the detainee’s age in years. By including 3 variables in the equation, this regression can better isolate the impact of race and Hispanic identity on the likelihood of being stopped, even if age is an important factor in stop rate. The coefficient on Black found in column 2 is 7.702, which means that in the sample about 7.7 more Black individuals were stopped than White individuals for every 10,000 residents of a district. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and the double stars on the standard error indicates that this result is statistically significant at better than the 1% level. This means that there is less than a 1% chance that the difference in stop rates between Blacks and Whites is zero.
At first blush 7.7 extra stops per 10,000 residents, out of hundreds of thousands of annual stops in Philadelphia, may not seem significant. The 2010 Census counted 1,526,006 residents of Philadelphia, so this would translate to a difference of 1,175 stops city-wide in the first two quarters of 2011. But these numbers are from the randomly selected sample of all stops. In order to determine the total difference we must adjust for the share of overall stops included in the sample. The total number of pedestrian stops in 2012 was approximately 216,000 and, therefore, the expected disparity in annual stops citywide is
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 14 of 29
approximately 69,600 or 32% of the total annual stops.
A racial disparity in stops should be expected based on differences in population composition. The 2010 Census reports similar levels of Black and White population shares in Philadelphia, with Blacks accounting for 43.4% and Whites 41.0%. It is possible to examine variation in the share of Black stops by district, reported in Table 6. The table reports the share of stops in each district that are of Blacks as well as the Black population share. The final column computes the ratio of Black stop share to Black population share. Significantly, in all districts Blacks are stopped at rates higher than their population share. In some districts Blacks are stopped at several times the rate of the population share. There is substantial variation across districts in the ratio of Black stops to Black population. As discussed below, it is unlikely that crime rate variation can explain the extent of the differences.
There may be reasons other than race that Blacks are stopped at higher rates. For example, if Blacks tend to be younger on average, since more crime is committed by younger individuals, one might expect a higher stop rate for blacks. We controlled for this factor (as in equation 1 above) and others relevant to this issue. Column 2 in Table 5 controls for detainee age and adds Latino identity. Column 3 controls for the district racial composition as well as the share of the male population under 24 years of age. Even after adding these controls, the coefficient on Detainee Black (7.345) is still very similar to what it was with only two controls. The 4th column includes a control for whether flash information led to the stop, which does not have a statistically significant influence on the stop rate. Column 5 adds the district racial composition as well as employment rate to the regression. Since poor economic conditions are associated with higher crime, higher stop rates could be explained by low employment rates. The effect is statistically significant, but does not mitigate the impact of race, as the coefficient on Black in this regression is 8.153.
The final four columns add different controls for district crime rates. The crime rates are based on crimes reported to the police (not arrests) in 2010. It is preferable to use lagged
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 15 of 29
crime because current crime levels could be influenced by policing policies. In each case, districts with higher crime rates have more stops, but controlling for crime rates does not affect the influence of detainee race on stop rate.
Another potential explanation for higher stop rates of minorities is that they commit crimes at higher rates. Addressing this concern raises several challenges. First, we do not have accurate data as to crime rates by race. There is arrest data, but even if arrest data was an accurate measure of crime rates by race, an issue we discuss below, we would need this breakdown on a district by district basis to engage in the proper statistical analysis, and this information was not available.
Second, there is a methodological problem: arrest rates are not independent of stop rates; that is, they are not an unbiased measure of crime. Higher stop rates of one group will almost certainly lead to higher arrest rates. Thus, as we explained in Plaintiffs’ Third Report to the Court patterns of drug enforcement have far more to say about the racial breakdown of persons arrested for drugs than actual drug use or possession. This is not to say that arrest rates are solely a function of enforcement, but that the measure is almost certainly a function of stop rates.
Third, there is a legal problem with using crime rates by race to explain disparities in stop rates: as a matter of Equal Protection doctrine, race is an impermissible factor to use when making stops, absent a racial description of a suspect. Thus, even if race-specific crime rates were available, it may not make sense to use them as controls in the regressions. See, Floyd v. City of New York, supra. Even in high crime areas, the commission of crimes is by relatively few persons and therefore it is problematic to justify higher rates of stops in these communities based on a kind of group-actuarial basis.
(b) Reasonable Suspicion for Stops and Frisks As the Plaintiffs’ previous Reports and Section I of this Report demonstrate, a substantial number of the pedestrian stops do not meet the reasonable suspicion standard. For the first six months of 2012, approximately 43% of the stops were made without reasonable
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 16 of 29
suspicion, an improvement of about 9 percentage points from 2011. See Table 2. Further, we found that the share of frisks without reasonable suspicion increased from 48% in 2011 to 55% in 2012.
On the issue of race and reasonable suspicion for pedestrian stops, each column in Table 7 reports the results from a separate regression. In each regression the variable of interest is Detainee Black and various control variables are added in the different columns. In most of the columns the coefficient on Detainee Black is between -.01 and -.07 indicating that reasonable suspicion was found in 1 to 7 percentage points fewer cases when the detainee was black. After including controls for district racial composition, employment rate and crime rates, these differences become statistically significant (columns 5-9). The rate of unfounded Black detainee stops is 6.5 percentage points higher than the comparable rate for Whites.
Table 8 reports the results of a regression of the rate of pedestrian frisks on detainee race and various controls. In each regression, the coefficient on Detainee Black is statistically significantly different from zero and ranges from about 0.05 – 0.06. This indicates that the frisk rate for Black detainees is 5– 6 percentage points higher than for Whites. Since the pedestrian frisk rate for Whites is 11%, this translates to a 45 – 56% greater likelihood for Blacks to be frisked than Whites. None of the control variables, including age, district demographic variables, or crime rates diminish this effect.
Table 9 is similar to Table 7 and describes regressions about the rate of reasonable suspicion, but now for a frisk rather than a stop. The coefficient on Detainee Black ranges from about -.04 to -.12 meaning reasonable suspicion is 4 to 12 percentage points less likely to be found for a frisk when the detainee is Black. The coefficients on Detainee Hispanic range between 0 and -.09. These coefficients are of a substantial magnitude, but none are statistically significant. This means there is not enough data to determine whether these are actually different from zero.
Table 10 reports the results of regressions of the rate of pedestrian arrests on detainee race
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 17 of 29
and control variables. Black and Hispanic detainees are substantially more likely to be arrested following a pedestrian stop than White detainees, but unlike in 2011, most of the coefficients on Detainee Black and Detainee Hispanic are not demonstrably significant. Still, the magnitude of the differences are large: a Black detainee is between 28 and 63% more likely to be arrested, depending on what control variables are included, and Latino/non-Latino disparities are even larger.11
2. Hit-Rate Analysis An important measure of the propriety of stops is the rate at which they lead to the discovery of contraband, and particularly weapons, since frisks are permitted only where the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Moreover, seizures of weapons are often cited as justification for a robust stop and frisk program. The rates of discovery of contraband are reported in Table 4. Contraband is categorized as firearms, other weapons, drugs, or other. “Other” is not included in the table as it is a very rare event, consisting either of small amounts of cash or unspecified materials.
As Table 4 reports, the overall detection rate for firearms is extremely low, with fewer than 1 in 900 pedestrian stops yielding a firearm. Including other weapons raises the rate to 0.16%, which means a weapon is found fewer than once in 600 stops. Slightly more than 1stop in 40 yields drugs. All of these hit-rates are at least a factor of 2 lower than in 2011, meaning stops are yielding far less evidence of criminal activity.
Table 4 reports results of a basic hit-rate analysis by race and Latino identity (with no control variables). None of the stops of Whites in the sample yielded firearms or other weapons, while 0.16% of stops (a total of 2 firearms) of Blacks yielded firearms and 0.08% yielded other weapons (1 weapon total). Table 11 is a more sophisticated approach to the firearms hit-rate analysis. The regressions report the rate of discovery of a firearm in pedestrian stops. None of the coefficients on Detainee Black or Detainee Hispanic are statistically significant, but this is likely due to the fact that firearms are very rarely
11 Whether the disparities reflect improper discretionary decisions to arrest or are reflective of stops more often justified by reasonable suspicion (or a combination of these factors) is not evident from the data.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 18 of 29
discovered. Drugs are discovered in 2.65% of stops of Black pedestrians, 1.91% of Whites, and in 4.43% of Latino stops. While suspicion of drug activity may be grounds for a stop, a frisk may not be done to detect drugs. Further, many of the “stops” for narcotics-related conduct that are recorded by police are actually arrests based on probable cause (e.g., observed drug transactions), and therefore the data is itself questionable on this issue. And, as we have shown in previous reports, drugs are not possessed or used at significantly different rates by different racial groups. Thus, any assertion that drugs found in stop and frisk practices is a reliable indicator of violations of drug laws by race is highly questionable. C. Conclusion We have examined the relationship of race to stop and frisk practices from multiple perspectives, following standard statistical theories. The regression and hit rate analyses are widely approved and provide the most reliable means of measuring racial bias. For the period reviewed, the data show statistically significant racial disparities that are not fully explainable by non-racial factors. If these trends continue into 2014, we will suggest appropriate remedial measures.
18

Frequency 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 50 0

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 19 of 29 Figure 1
Distribution of Stops by Age

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Age

19

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 20 of 29 Figure 2
20

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 21 of 29

Black Latino White

Table 1

STOPS, FRISKS, SEARCHES AND ARRESTS BY RACE, PEDESTRIAN STOPS

Number of Stops

Share

Stops with Frisks Stops with Searches Stops with Arrests

1,247

0.684

17.6%

9.9%

8.8%

158

0.087

17.1%

12.7%

12.7%

418

0.229

11.0%

5.7%

5.3%

Table 2 REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR PEDESTRIAN STOP BY RACE

All

Black

Latino

White

#

%

# % # %#%

Yes

1,049 56.8 696 55.8 95 60.1 243 58.1

No

799 43.2 551 44.2 63 39.9 175 41.9

Table 3 REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR PEDESTRIAN FRISK BY RACE

All

Black

Latino

White

#

%

# % # %#%

Yes

80 45.2 59 44.4 9 56.3 12 44.4

No

97 54.8 74 55.6 7 43.8 15 55.6

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 22 of 29

Table 4

DISCOVERY OF CONTRABAND BY RACE, PEDESTRIAN STOPS

All

Black

Latino

White

Firearms

0.11%

0.16%

0.00%

0.00%

Other Weapons

0.05%

0.08%

0.00%

0.00%

Drugs

2.60%

2.65%

4.43%

1.91%

Any

4.44%

4.65%

6.96%

3.11%

VARIABLES

Table 5

Pedestrian Stop Rate per 10,000 Residents

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Detainee Black Detainee Hispanic Detainee Age District Asian share District Black share District Hispanic share Male population under 24 Flash Information Employment Rate Overall Crime Rate Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate Drug Crime Rate Constant Observations R-squared

5.567 (2.081)*

7.702 (2.550)**
7.665 (7.866) 0.256 (0.197)

4.511 (1.471)**
42 0.152

-5.479 (7.052)
42 0.202

7.345 (2.954)* 8.119 (11.71) 0.138 (0.220) 36.53 (32.64) 10.76 (7.280) 12.05 (14.01) -29.72 (19.58)
1.124 (9.173)
42 0.272

7.711 8.153 7.399 7.566 7.406 7.805

(2.561)** (2.666)** (2.590)** (2.516)** (2.610)** (2.481)**

7.192 9.891 8.000 8.257 8.030 10.31

(7.922) (10.53) (10.16) (9.913) (10.23) (9.783)

0.186 0.284 0.158 0.193 0.159 0.170

(0.215) (0.203) (0.206) (0.195) (0.208) (0.194)

49.66 35.76 37.05 36.38 35.83

(29.63) (29.35) (28.35) (29.56) (28.08)

7.763 3.364 0.187 4.099 -6.303

(6.614) (6.744) (7.010) (6.703) (8.331)

0.0428 -6.516 -8.982 -5.801 -22.68

(13.19) (13.11) (12.98) (13.15) (15.26)

-108.6 -78.62 -84.79 -79.02 -55.99

(31.48)** (33.95)* (31.28)* (34.50)* (36.04)

-9.076

(11.17)

-109.6 -93.88 -81.79 -96.60 -40.15

(36.24)** (35.73)* (36.05)* (35.74)* (43.63)

0.00853

(0.00439)

0.0567

(0.0243)*

0.00953

(0.00523)

0.0926

(0.0370)*

-2.179 70.23 56.32 51.56 57.73 27.31

(8.165) (24.30)** (24.41)* (24.18)* (24.47)* (28.36)

42

42

42

42

42

42

0.216 0.430 0.490 0.512 0.483 0.523

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 23 of 29

Table 6

Black Share of Stops and Population, by District

District

Stops Population Stops/Population

1

61.9%

33.7%

1.84

2

61.4%

26.1%

2.35

3

48.4%

10.5%

4.63

5

26.3%

5.1%

5.15

6

76.3%

20.6%

3.70

7

11.8%

4.5%

2.61

8

31.8%

11.8%

2.69

9

70.5%

11.0%

6.39

12

91.1%

84.3%

1.08

14

96.4%

76.9%

1.25

15

48.2%

22.2%

2.18

16

96.1%

79.8%

1.20

17

87.1%

59.9%

1.45

18

94.4%

64.0%

1.48

19

96.1%

84.6%

1.14

22

93.0%

89.2%

1.04

24

25.4%

22.8%

1.11

25

37.3%

34.3%

1.09

26

34.4%

24.5%

1.40

35

93.1%

73.4%

1.27

39

93.7%

78.6%

1.19

23

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 24 of 29

VARIABLES

Table 7

Reasonable Suspicion for Pedestrian Stop

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Detainee Black Detainee Hispanic

-0.0287 (0.0250)

-0.0174 (0.0272) 0.0441

-0.0599 (0.0313) 0.0587

-0.0215 (0.0272) 0.0386

-0.0641 (0.0314)* 0.0574

-0.0654 (0.0315)* 0.0566

-0.0661 (0.0315)*
0.0562

-0.0652 (0.0315)* 0.0567

-0.0654 (0.0315)*
0.0567

Detainee Age District Asian share

(0.0424) (0.0457) (0.0423) (0.0457) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0457)

0.00159 0.00150 0.00178 0.00145 0.00140 0.00137 0.00141 0.00137

(0.000902) (0.000906) (0.000904)* (0.000906) (0.000913) (0.000912) (0.000913) (0.000911)

0.394

0.168

0.146

0.121

0.150 0.0490

District Black share District Hispanic share

(0.439) 0.194 (0.102) 0.0479

(0.458) 0.187 (0.102) 0.0832

(0.461) 0.177 (0.104) 0.0638

(0.462) 0.161 (0.107) 0.0520

(0.460) 0.179 (0.104) 0.0664

(0.478) 0.121 (0.127) -0.0173

Male pop. under 24 Flash Information

(0.142) -0.203 (0.232)

0.0966

(0.143) 0.399 (0.423)

(0.148) 0.483 (0.456)

(0.148) 0.510 (0.446)

(0.148) 0.474 (0.457)

(0.183) 0.669 (0.523)

Employment Rate Overall Crime Rate

(0.0379)*

0.768 (0.452)

0.807 (0.458) 2.64e-05

0.918 (0.490)

0.793 (0.455)

1.144 (0.623)

Violent Crime Rate

(5.35e-05) 0.000249

Property Crime Rate

(0.000317) 2.74e-05

Drug Crime Rate

(6.30e-05) 0.000425

Constant

0.587 0.525 0.510

0.512

0.00690 -0.0441

-0.106

(0.000485) -0.0341 -0.235

Observations R-squared

(0.0206)** (0.0375)** (0.0796)** (0.0378)**

1,823 1,823 1,823

1,823

0.001 0.003 0.007

0.006

(0.306) 1,823 0.009

(0.323) 1,823 0.009

(0.338) 1,823 0.009

(0.321) 1,823 0.009

(0.413) 1,823 0.009

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

24

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 25 of 29

VARIABLES

Table 8

Pedestrian Frisks

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Detainee Black Detainee Hispanic

0.0497 0.0610 (0.0185)** (0.0201)**
0.0443

0.0585 (0.0231)* 0.0146

0.0489 (0.0195)* 0.0279

0.0579 (0.0232)* 0.0144

0.0550 (0.0233)* 0.0126

0.0543 (0.0233)* 0.0122

0.0552 (0.0233)* 0.0127

0.0587 (0.0232)* 0.0149

Detainee Age District Asian share

(0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0304) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338)

-0.00218 -0.00208 -0.00160 -0.00209 -0.00222 -0.00224 -0.00221 -0.00204

(0.000666)**(0.000668)** (0.000649)* (0.000669)**(0.000674)**(0.000673)**(0.000674)**(0.000673)**

-0.204

-0.235

-0.285

-0.320

-0.277

-0.161

District Black share District Hispanic share

(0.324) 0.0230 (0.0754) 0.0961

(0.339) 0.0219 (0.0755) 0.101

(0.340) -0.000956 (0.0770)
0.0574

(0.341) -0.0245 (0.0792) 0.0445

(0.340) 0.00336 (0.0766) 0.0609

(0.353) 0.0630 (0.0937) 0.164

Male pop. under 24 Flash Information

(0.105) 0.0961 (0.171)

0.285

(0.106) 0.179 (0.312)

(0.110) 0.368 (0.336)

(0.110) 0.381 (0.329)

(0.109) 0.359 (0.337)

(0.135) 0.0111 (0.386)

Employment Rate Overall Crime Rate

(0.0272)**

0.106 (0.333)

0.193 (0.338) 5.96e-05

0.378 (0.362)

0.164 (0.336)

-0.128 (0.460)

Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate

(3.94e-05) 0.000452 (0.000234)

6.56e-05

Drug Crime Rate

(4.65e-05) -0.000265

Constant

0.127 0.183

0.137

0.145

0.0676

-0.0475

-0.137

(0.000358)

-0.0304

0.218

Observations R-squared

(0.0153)** (0.0277)** 1,823 1,823 0.004 0.011

(0.0587)* 1,823 0.016

(0.0272)** 1,823 0.068

(0.226) 1,823 0.016

(0.239) 1,823 0.017

(0.250) 1,823 0.018

(0.237) 1,823 0.017

(0.305) 1,823 0.016

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, *

25

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 26 of 29

VARIABLES

Table 9

Reasonable Suspicion for Pedestrian Frisk

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Detainee Black

-0.0448 -0.0491 -0.0894 -0.0590 -0.114 -0.111 -0.110 -0.111 -0.122

Detainee Hispanic

(0.0878) (0.101) (0.109) (0.101) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) -0.0112 -0.0744 0.000555 -0.0849 -0.0860 -0.0885 -0.0856 -0.0914

Detainee Age

(0.140) (0.146) (0.139) (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.146) (0.146) 0.000162 -6.68e-05 0.000761 0.000230 0.00121 0.00176 0.00108 0.000863

District Asian share

(0.00328) (0.00331) (0.00328) (0.00332) (0.00339) (0.00337) (0.00339) (0.00335)

-0.0599

-0.478 -0.397 -0.524 -0.393 0.0754

District Black share District Hispanic share

(1.407) 0.448 (0.309) 0.637

(1.456) 0.462 (0.309) 0.713

(1.454) 0.487 (0.309) 0.753

(1.443) 0.520 (0.308) 0.699

(1.456) 0.481 (0.309) 0.756

(1.523) 0.746 (0.387) 1.097

Male population under 24 Flash Information

(0.407) -0.664 (0.753)

0.138

(0.413) 0.589 (1.362)

(0.413) -0.137 (1.468)

(0.409) -0.200 (1.404)

(0.414) -0.0795 (1.479)

(0.519)* -0.738 (1.744)

Employment Rate Overall Crime Rate

(0.0815)

1.599 (1.450)

1.060 -0.00398 (1.504) (1.639) -0.000243

1.216 (1.486)

-0.419 (2.202)

Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate

(0.000186) -0.00222 (0.00109)* -0.000253

Drug Crime Rate Constant

0.488

0.488

0.474

0.432

-0.590

-0.00954

0.585

(0.000220) -0.00200 (0.00164)
-0.116 0.694

Observations R-squared

(0.0763)** (0.129)**

176

176

0.001 0.002

(0.273) 176 0.028

(0.132)** 176 0.018

(1.003) 176 0.035

(1.094) 176 0.045

(1.149) 176 0.059

(1.083) 176 0.043

(1.455) 176 0.044

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

26

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 27 of 29

VARIABLES

Table 10

Pedestrian Arrests

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Detainee Black

0.0149 0.0336 0.0269 0.0303 0.0256 0.0226 0.0230 0.0226 0.0239

(0.0146) (0.0158)* (0.0182) (0.0158) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183)

Detainee Hispanic

0.0735 0.0460 0.0687 0.0456 0.0438 0.0441 0.0438 0.0447

(0.0249)** (0.0270) (0.0248)** (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0270)

Detainee Age

0.000466 0.000586 0.000631 0.000577 0.000466 0.000486 0.000465 0.000480

(0.000524) (0.000525) (0.000524) (0.000525) (0.000528) (0.000528) (0.000528) (0.000528)

District Asian share

-0.0982

-0.159 -0.206 -0.210 -0.202 -0.293

(0.250)

(0.260) (0.261) (0.262) (0.261) (0.271)

District Black share

0.0220

0.0202 -0.00276 -0.0111 -2.19e-05 -0.0601

(0.0582)

(0.0582) (0.0594) (0.0611) (0.0591) (0.0733)

District Hispanic share

0.0642

0.0743 0.0320 0.0370 0.0323 -0.0462

(0.0815)

(0.0824) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0853) (0.106)

Male pop. under 24

0.181

0.349

0.539

0.489

0.543

0.688

(0.134)

(0.243) (0.263)* (0.257) (0.263)* (0.307)*

Flash Information

0.0757

(0.0216)**

Employment Rate

0.215

0.307

0.403

0.283

0.678

(0.259) (0.263) (0.282) (0.261) (0.364)

Overall Crime Rate

5.82e-05

(3.09e-05)

Violent Crime Rate

0.000303

(0.000182)

Property Crime Rate

6.92e-05

(3.64e-05)

Drug Crime Rate

0.000508

(0.000282)

Constant

0.0728 0.0381 -0.0394 0.0273 -0.181 -0.298 -0.322 -0.288 -0.482

(0.0121)** (0.0218) (0.0461) (0.0219) (0.176) (0.187) (0.195) (0.185) (0.242)*

Observations

1,674 1,674 1,674

1,674

1,674

1,674

1,674

1,674

1,674

R-squared

0.001 0.006 0.016

0.013

0.016

0.018

0.018

0.018

0.018

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, *

27

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 28 of 29

VARIABLES

Table 11

Firearm Recovered

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Detainee Black Detainee Hispanic

0.00160 0.00151 0.00159 0.00108 0.00200 0.00193 0.00193 0.00193 0.00198 (0.00167) (0.00182) (0.00210) (0.00182) (0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00211)
-0.000354 0.000436 -0.000944 0.000558 0.000513 0.000514 0.000514 0.000546

Detainee Age District Asian share

(0.00283) (0.00306) (0.00282) (0.00306) (0.00306) (0.00306) (0.00306) (0.00306)

-3.03e-05 -2.35e-05 -9.41e-06 -1.86e-05 -2.17e-05 -2.16e-05 -2.17e-05 -2.00e-05

(6.03e-05) (6.07e-05) (6.03e-05) (6.06e-05) (6.11e-05) (6.10e-05) (6.11e-05) (6.10e-05)

0.00338

0.0253 0.0241 0.0236 0.0242 0.0233

District Black share

(0.0294) -0.00522

(0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0320) -0.00448 -0.00506 -0.00541 -0.00497 -0.00558

District Hispanic share

(0.00685) -0.00990

(0.00685) (0.00698) (0.00718) (0.00695) (0.00850) -0.0133 -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0150

Male pop. under 24

(0.00949) 0.0197

(0.00958) (0.00993) (0.00994) (0.00992) (0.0123) -0.0386 -0.0338 -0.0345 -0.0339 -0.0341

Flash Information

(0.0155)

(0.0283) (0.0305) (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0350)

0.0103

Employment Rate

(0.00253)** -0.0744 -0.0722 -0.0690 -0.0729 -0.0681

Overall Crime Rate Violent Crime Rate

(0.0302)*

(0.0307)* (0.0328)* 1.49e-06 (3.58e-06)
9.00e-06

(0.0305)*

(0.0417)

Property Crime Rate Drug Crime Rate

(2.12e-05) 1.72e-06 (4.21e-06) 7.10e-06

Constant
Observations R-squared

0 (0.00138)
1,823 0.001

0.00105 -0.00314 -0.000338 0.0456 (0.00251) (0.00533) (0.00252) (0.0205)*
1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.005

0.0427 (0.0216)*
1,823 0.005

0.0415 (0.0226)
1,823 0.005

(3.25e-05) 0.0430 0.0416 (0.0215)* (0.0276) 1,823 1,823 0.005 0.005

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

28

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 48 Filed 12/03/13 Page 29 of 29 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David Rudovsky, Esquire
/s/ Paul Messing, Esquire
Kairys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street, Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400

/s/ Mary Catherine Roper, Esquire ACLU of Pennsylvania PO Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106
/s/ Seth Kreimer, Esquire University of Pennsylvania Law School 3900 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Plaintiffs12

12 Counsel express their appreciation to a number of volunteer lawyers and law students who have donated hundreds of hours of time in this project. Special thanks to Jon Dunsmoor who organized and structured the data collection and student reviews.
29

 
 Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 1 of 47

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mahari Bailey, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
City of Philadelphia, et al., Defendants

:

:

C.A. No. 10-5952

:

:

:

:

:

PLAINTIFFS’ FIFTH REPORT TO COURT AND MONITOR ON STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES

I. Introduction

A. The Current State of Non-Compliance with the Consent Decree

This Fifth Report to the Court and Monitor presents compelling evidence that

nearly four years after the entry of the Consent Decree the City has failed to adequately

remedy the serious flaws that existed (and continue to exist) in the Police Department’s

stop and frisk practices. The Consent Decree was intended to ensure that stops and frisks

are conducted only where there is the requisite “reasonable suspicion” of criminal

conduct and to ensure that any racial disparities in stops and frisks are not the result of

racial bias. On the issue of whether stops and frisks are supported by reasonable

suspicion, the data shows very high levels of impermissible stops. And, on the issue of

whether impermissible racial factors are causing high numbers of racial minorities to be

stopped and frisked, consideration of the “benchmarks” for assessing possible racial bias

demonstrates that non-racial factors do not explain the racial disparities. As we discuss

below, there is an urgent need for substantial improvements on both issues, and if that is

not accomplished in the near future, we will seek court intervention.

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 2 of 47
B. Procedural History On June 21, 2011, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement, Class
Certification, and Consent Decree (“Agreement”) in this matter. On February 6, 2012, plaintiffs submitted their First Report which analyzed stop and frisk data for the first two quarters of 2011. The First Report focused on Fourth Amendment issues, and specifically whether there was sufficient cause for the stops and frisks reported by the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”). The audits showed that over 50% of stops and frisks were undertaken without reasonable suspicion.
Plaintiffs’ Second Report was submitted in July 2012, and included (1) a Fourth Amendment analysis of the Third Quarter 2011 stop and frisk data, (2) a racial analysis of the data for the First and Second Quarters, 2011, and (3) a racial analysis of arrests for possession of small amounts of marijuana for the period September 15-November 15, 2011. Plaintiffs reported continued high rates of stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion (over 40% in both categories). On the question of racial disparities, plaintiffs’ expert, Professor David Abrams, considered the benchmarks that had been agreed upon by the parties as metrics that should be used in this analysis. Professor Abrams also conducted a series of regression analyses and concluded that the racial disparities in stops and frisks (numbers by race compared to census data) were not fully explainable by non-racial factors. Further, the analysis of marijuana arrests showed even more pronounced disparities, with Blacks and Latinos constituting over 90% of all marijuana arrests.
Plaintiffs’ Third Report focused on stop and frisk practices for the first two quarters of 2012 and analyzed marijuana arrests for the period September 15-November
2

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 3 of 47
15, 2012. Plaintiffs again found a rate of non-compliance with Fourth Amendment standards of over 40%, and racial minorities constituting over 90% of arrests for small amounts of marijuana. In response, the City stated that the PPD was providing additional training, issuing revised auditing protocols, and instituting new accountability measures.
The Fourth Report, filed in December, 2013, analyzed stops and frisks in 2012 and 2013, on both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. We found that pedestrian stops were made without reasonable suspicion in 43% of the cases reviewed, and frisks were conducted without reasonable suspicion in over 50% of the cases. There continued to be very low “hit-rates,” with only 3 guns recovered in over 1100 stops (0.27%). Overall, contraband of any kind was recovered in only 3% of the stops. We also noted the relatively low number of frisks reported, with only 20% of stops resulting in frisks, and numerous stops based on allegations of violent crime or weapon possession, where no frisk was conducted.
The stops and frisks continued to be racially disproportionate with statistically significant racial disparities that were not explained by non-racial factors (e.g., crime rates, demographics of police districts, age, and gender). The rate of stops without reasonable suspicion for Blacks was 6.5 percentage points higher than the rate for Whites, indicating that police were using a higher threshold of “reasonable suspicion” for stops of White suspects.
Thus, by the close of 2013, two and one-half years after the entry of the Consent Decree in this case, there continued to be very high rates of stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion and sufficient evidence to conclude that the racially disproportionate rates of stops and frisks was not explainable by non-racial factors.
3

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 4 of 47
Plaintiffs stated that the time for court intervention was drawing closer: Plaintiffs did not expect that the transition from a stop and frisk practice that lacked any meaningful oversight to a system that accurately tabulates all stops and frisks and in which there is substantial compliance with the Constitution would be immediately successful. On the technology front, the initial design of the data base was flawed, but the City is moving to implement a new system. On the issue of whether stops and frisks are being conducted consistent with established legal standards, and in particular only where reasonable suspicion supports the stop or frisk, the results of our audits through the first two quarters of 2012 reflect persistent and unacceptably high rates of improper actions. Unless there is a dramatic change in practices, we will be compelled to seek judicial relief. Third Report, at 11.
Plaintiffs also stated that with the new electronic data system on-line in 2014 and new audit and accountability measures in place, we expected significant improvements in 2014 and, failing such progress, that we would seek sanctions from the Court. Fourth Report, at 9.1
On the Fourth Amendment issue, the City’s Response included an internal audit that showed a 35% rate of pedestrian stops without reasonable suspicion by patrol officers. The City asserted that the high rates of stops without reasonable suspicion were the result of “incomplete paperwork, improper narratives used by police officers, and an overall lack of credibility in the electronic data base.” City Reply, at 1. Further, the City asserted that these problems would be rectified once the new electronic data base was implemented, training of officers was completed, and better auditing procedures were instituted.
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the City’s expert, Dr. Ralph Taylor of Temple University, using certain benchmarks that differed from those agreed upon by the
1 The electronic data base developed by the City in 2011-2012 proved to be deficient in several respects and a new data base was developed and implemented in 2014.
4

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 5 of 47
parties, found no statistically significant evidence of racial bias. To ensure that the experts were in accord on the proper benchmarks, the parties met and conferred with the Court Monitor, Dean Joanne Epps. Professor Abrams thereafter drafted a slightly revised set of benchmarks which is the basis of his analysis in this Fifth Report.
We turn now to our analysis of the first two quarters, 2014. C. The Data Review Process Plaintiffs have established a careful and comprehensive review process of the stop and frisk data provided by the Police Department. Each quarter, we are provided data from approximately 3200 randomly selected pedestrian and car stops, but for our review we consider only pedestrian stops. Counsel for plaintiffs and trained law students independently review each pedestrian stop and frisk under guidelines that incorporate the standards set forth in the Agreement and by the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts.2 We accept at face value the reasons stated by police officers for the stops and frisks, and make assessments based solely on whether these reasons comport with standards established by the Agreement and the Fourth Amendment. In close cases, we credit the stated basis for the stop and frisk. Counsel for plaintiffs have discussed the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards with Inspectors in the PPD. Along the same lines, plaintiffs have provided the City a breakdown of the categories of stops and frisks that have most frequently resulted in improper police interventions. The City has made changes in the PPD audit process, including the assignment of Deputy Commissioner Nola Joyce to oversee the
2 These reviews show a high level of agreement between counsel and the law students as to the propriety of stops and frisks. This Report is based on counsel’s reviews.
5

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 6 of 47
implementation of the Agreement, the assignment of trained Inspectors to ensure more accurate reviews, and reviews by the PPD Office of Standards and Accountability.
II. Review of 75-48a Forms, First Two Quarters, 2014 A. Fourth Amendment Analysis
In this section, plaintiffs set forth their findings on the issue of whether stops and frisks for the first two quarters of 2014 were supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. As in previous audits, in assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed for the stop or frisk, we fully credited the narrative information provided by the officer and in “close” cases credited the assertion of reasonable suspicion.3
For the first two quarters of 2014, the PPD provided a random sample of 2974 pedestrian stops. We determined that 2519 of these stops were actual pedestrian stops (as opposed to arrests, car related stops, or contacts with civilians that did not constitute a Terry stop). We also excluded stops at the airport as those stops (few in number) could not be analyzed for racial disparities given the unknown racial demographics of airport travelers and visitors. Of these 2519 pedestrian stops, 63% were supported by reasonable suspicion and 37% were made without reasonable suspicion (and the same ratios were found even including the few airport stops excluded from our analysis). Frisks were reported in 589 stops, but 156 were searches and not frisks (often, searches incident to arrest), thus leaving 433 actual frisks. Of these, 47% were made with reasonable suspicion, 39% were made without reasonable suspicion, and 14% were preceded by a
3 With respect to frisks, we have created a third category for situations where the stop was impermissible, but the reasons for the frisk were otherwise proper. In these cases, we record the frisk as “the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Under this doctrine, the evidence that was seized would likely be suppressed in a criminal prosecution due to the improper stop.
6

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 7 of 47

stop without reasonable suspicion (“fruit of the poisonous tree” category). By race, 80% of the stops were of minorities (African-Americans and Latinos) and 89% of the frisks were of minorities.

1. Stop Data
Actual Stops Reasonable Suspicion No Reasonable Suspicion

2519 1578 63% 941 37%

Stops: First Two Quarters, 2014
No Reasonable Suspicion 37%
Reasonable Suspicion
63%

7

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 8 of 47

2. Frisk Data
Frisks Reasonable Suspicion No Reasonable Suspicion Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

433 204 47% 168 39% 61 14%

Frisks: First Two Quarters, 2014

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
14%

No Reasonable Suspicion 39%

Reasonable Suspicion
47%

8

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 9 of 47 3. Stop/Frisk Ratio
As noted above, while officers documented frisks in 589 cases, in 156 of these cases, the officers conducted a search, and not a frisk. The 433 frisks represent 17% of the 2519 stops.
Stops Followed By Frisk
Frisk 17%
Non-Frisk 83%
9

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 10 of 47

4. Contraband Recovered by Stops

Non-Gun Contraband Guns No contraband Total Stops

53 5 2461 2519

Stops Resulting In Recovery Of Contraband

53

5

2461

Non-Gun Contraband Guns Nothing

10

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 11 of 47

5. Contraband Recovered by Frisks

Non-Gun Contraband

19

Guns

2

No contraband

412

Total Frisks

433

Frisks Resulting In Recovery Of Contraband
19 2

Non-Gun Contraband Guns No Contraband
412

6. Contraband Recovered By Frisks, With and Without Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable Suspicion

11 (out of 204 frisks with RS)

No Reasonable Suspicion 5 (out of 168 frisks without RS)

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

5 (out of 61 frisks as FPT)

11

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 12 of 47

7. Racial Composition of Philadelphia (2010 Census)

1,517,550 total

White Black & African American Hispanic Asian American Indian / Pacific Islander / Other

644,395 655,824 128,928 67,654 20,749

42.46% 43.22% 8.50% 4.46% 1.37%

Racial Composition of Philadelphia

Hispanic 9%

Asian 4%

American Indian / Pacific Islander /
Other 1%

Black & African American 43%

White 43%

12

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 13 of 47

8. Stops by Race
Black White Latino Total

1803 498 218 2519

71.58% 19.77% 8.65%

80.23% minorities

Stops by Race

218 498
1803

Black White Latino

13

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 14 of 47

9. Stops by Race and Reasonable Suspicion

Black White Latino Total

Reasonable 1109 339 130 1578
62.64%

Unreasonable 694 159 88 941
37.36%

Reasonable % 61.51% 68.07% 59.63% 2519

Reasonable Basis For Stop

Latino 130 88

White

339

159

Black 0

1109

694

200

400

600

800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

Reasonable Unreasonable

14

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 15 of 47

10. Frisks By Race
Black White Latino Total

344 79.45%

47 10.85%

42

9.70%

433

89.15% minorities

Frisks by Race

42 47

Black White Latino

344

15

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 16 of 47

11. Frisks by Race and Reasonable Suspicion

Black White Latino Total

Reasonable 171 18 15 204
47.11%

Unreasonable 124 25 19 168
38.80%

FTPT 49 4 8 61
14.09%

Reasonable % 49.71% 38.30% 35.71% 433

Reasonable Basis for Frisk

Latino 15 19 8

White 18 25 4

Black 0

171

124

49

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Reasonable Unreasonable FTPT

16

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 17 of 47
B. Commentary on Fourth Amendment Issues There are a number of significant findings from the data review. 1. We have determined that 37% of all stops were made without the requisite
reasonable suspicion. Significantly, the PPD audits show similar rates of stops without reasonable suspicion: the audits for the first two quarters of 2014 by the PPD show patrol officer stops without reasonable suspicion at 39% and 29%, respectively. The data show only very modest improvement from the previous data reviews (where impermissible stops were at 40-50%) and, in light of the over 200,000 pedestrian stops for 2014, tens of thousands of persons in Philadelphia continue to be stopped each year without reasonable suspicion. Thus, close to four years from the entry of the Settlement Agreement in this case, the City has clearly failed to achieve substantial compliance with the provisions requiring reasonable suspicion for stops of pedestrians.
2. We have also found that 39% of all frisks were made without reasonable suspicion and an additional 14% were made in cases where the stop itself was not supported by reasonable suspicion (“fruit of the poisonous tree”). The PPD audits for this period show much lower rates of frisks without reasonable suspicion (5% and 3%, respectively, for the first two quarters of 2014).
Given the large discrepancies in this data analysis, to demonstrate the validity of our findings, we attach a spread-sheet of the relevant data for frisks for these two quarters. See Exhibit A. The spread-sheet includes the D.C. number, the reasons for the stop and the frisk, and our findings on the legality of the frisks (y=with reasonable suspicion; n=without reasonable suspicion; x=a search and not a frisk; f=fruit of the poisonous tree). This data and analysis shows that the City has not achieved substantial
17

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 18 of 47
compliance with the provisions of the Settlement Agreement that require reasonable suspicion that a suspect be armed and dangerous as a basis for a frisk.
3. As with the data for 2011-2013, the number of reported frisks is quite low, with only 17% of stops recording a frisk (and an additional 6% resulting in a search). To be clear, we do not suggest that the police should conduct frisks where there are no legal grounds for such action. But we do strongly believe that officers have not been reporting all frisks. For example, in stops based on suspicion of gun possession or a violent crime, the police frequently report no frisk of the suspect. Of the 211 stops in which guns or gun-related activity are referenced as a basis for the stop, there were no frisks recorded on 80 stops, or 38% of the total. It is simply not plausible to suggest that frisks are not being conducted in these situations. 4. The very low “hit-rate” of stops and frisks is further cause for serious concern. Contraband of any kind was recovered in only 58 stops (2.5 % of all stops) and 5 guns were seized (0.2 % of all stops), but 3 of these seizures were the result of searches, not frisks. Arrests occurred in 7.5% of all stops, excluding arrests made on probable cause even before a stop or frisk was conducted. These hit-rates continue to be far below what one would expect if stops and frisks were being conducted with reasonable suspicion. We recognize that some legitimate stops are not likely to disclose contraband or lead to an arrest and given the high rate of stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion, it is not surprising that contraband is infrequently recovered in those incidents.
The best metric for determining whether these police interventions are justified is one that determines the hit-rate for frisks, and whether weapons (or other contraband) are seized. Police officers must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and
18

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 19 of 47
dangerous before a frisk can be conducted. Thus, we would expect that seizure of weapons or other contraband would be made in a significant number of these cases if the officers are accurately reporting facts that establish reasonable suspicion. Yet, the rate of recovery is vanishingly small. Overall, of 433 frisks, only 2 firearms were seized and contraband other than weapons was seized in only 19 other frisks. Thus, in over 95% of all frisks, no evidence was seized. And the real number is likely even higher given the fact that police reported no frisks in 80 stops involving violent crimes or reports of weapons. And even more telling, if we limit our analysis to cases in where police reported that the suspect was armed or involved in a violent crime, a weapon was seized in a frisk in only 2 cases.
Moreover, the data raise serious questions regarding the justifications for many frisks. Most frisk reports assert that the suspect has a “bulge” in a pocket, refuses to take his hands out of his pockets, does not cooperate with police, or that the stop was based on a report of a gun or violent crime. “Bulges” inevitably turn out to be cell phones and the other triggering factors are very weak indicators of criminal activity. Thus, in 78 cases in which police conducted a frisk based on a “bulge,” a weapon was detected in only 1 case. The fact that so few frisks lead to the recovery of a weapon raises serious questions as to whether the police are accurately reporting what they observe and whether the reasons generally provided for frisks are appropriate proxies for weapon possession.
5. Reduction in the number of stops and frisks (and particularly those conducted without reasonable suspicion) does not create a risk to public safety. For example, New York City has reported a huge reduction in the number of stops and a decrease in violent crime, and in particular homicides. New York City reported 700,000 stops per year in
19

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 20 of 47
2011, but was on target for approximately 50,000 stops in 2014. See Washington Post, December 3, 2014. By contrast, in a City with a population one-fifth that of New York City, Philadelphia police made over 200,000 pedestrian stops in 2014. In 2009, a year before this case was filed, there were 253,000 pedestrian stops.
6. Analyzing improper stops and frisks by category, the results were quite similar to those for 2013. As we have reported to the City, there continue to be significant numbers of stops for conduct which the Agreement and case law make clear are not justifiable grounds for stops or frisks. These include:  loitering (or persons hanging out; congregating)4  investigation of passenger in stopped car  person involved in a disturbance  single person “obstructing” the sidewalk  anonymous information (e.g., man with gun; man with drugs)  person on steps of or near “abandoned” property  person involved in verbal dispute (non-domestic)5  high crime area/roll call complaints  panhandling  suspicion of narcotics activity As for frisks, problematic grounds include:  frisk for officer protection
4 The PPD has instructed officers that “loitering” is not a valid basis for a stop. And while the number of such stops has decreased, the PPD has recognized that officers are using other vague narratives (e.g., blocking buildings) to justify stops. PPD, September 6, 2013 Audit.
5 We credit reports of “domestic” disputes.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 21 of 47
 frisk based on narcotics investigation  frisk because suspect stopped in high crime or high drug area
Moreover, as discussed above, given the extraordinarily low rate of recovery of weapons or any contraband in frisk cases, there is good reason to believe that none of the factors cited as establishing reasonable suspicion are good indicators of a person in possession of a weapon.
7. We provide a more detailed analysis of racial disproportionality in the next section, but as the stop and frisk data presented above shows, there is evidence of disproportionate stops and frisks of minorities not explainable by factors other than race. For example, in examining the differences by race of stops with and without reasonable suspicion, White suspects are being stopped less frequently than minorities where no reasonable suspicion is stated, indicating that a higher factual threshold is being applied for stops of White suspects.
8. Although the reasons for the continued high rates of impermissible stops and frisks are likely the result of several factors, we believe that the primary cause at this point is the lack of accountability of officers and their immediate supervisors. There is substantial agreement between the parties that the rate of stops without reasonable suspicion continues to exceed 30% and plaintiffs’ analysis shows that the rate of frisks without reasonable suspicion is even higher. The City reports that the PPD has retrained all officers and has provided specific instructions to officers as to the proper grounds for stops and frisks. In these circumstances, the failure of the PPD to hold officers accountable is unacceptable. We have requested notice of any new accountability measures, but there has been no response by the City on this front. Without strong
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 22 of 47 accountability measures, the high level of violations of constitutional rights will likely continue.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 23 of 47
III. Racial Analysis of Stop and Frisk Practices, January-June, 2014 A. Introduction This section sets forth a statistical analysis of the “Stop and Frisk” practices of the
PPD for the first half of 2014, conducted by plaintiffs’ expert, Professor David Abrams. The benchmarks to be used in the analysis were described in detail in a Memorandum dated November 9, 2011 and updated in 2014. See Exhibit B.
In creating benchmarks to measure compliance of the PPD with the terms of the Agreement, we considered several criteria. First, the benchmarks are designed to be straightforward in terms of computation and interpretation. Second, they are designed to measure characteristics at the core of the Agreement, namely compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, they consider other potential explanations for patterns in the data beyond suspect race. The benchmarks are based on a combination of those discussed and used in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, academic literature on the topic, and those used recently in other jurisdictions, as described in Plaintiffs’ Second Report.
In Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), the court engaged in an intensive analysis of competing benchmarks submitted by the plaintiffs and the City in the New York City class action stop and frisk litigation. The court credited the approach of plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Jeffrey Fagan (Columbia Law School) who examined data on all stops in New York City from 2004 through 2009. Professor Fagan used a regression technique similar to that detailed in the benchmarks that have been adopted by the parties in Bailey. Professor Fagan considered the impact of the racial composition of a district on the likelihood of being stopped, arrested, or issued a citation. Additional outcomes included gun and other weapon seizures, and contraband seizures.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 24 of 47
Professor Fagan controlled for various district characteristics, including age composition, racial composition, crime complaints, police patrol strength, socioeconomic status, population, foreign born population, business district status, and time controls. The benchmarks in this case, as reflected in this Report, use many of the benchmarks credited by the Floyd court.
B. Summary of the Racial Aspects of the Stop and Frisk Data We examined data from Q1 and Q2 2014 pedestrian stops. The sample dataset includes 2,523 total pedestrian stops.6 The median age of a detainee is 29 and 84% of detainees are male. Figure 1. Blacks account for 72% of those stopped, Whites comprise 20%, and 9% are Latinos. Compared to 2012, Black stop share has increased by 3 percentage points, while the White stop share has decreased by 3 percentage points. Minorities account for an even higher share of individuals frisked, of which 79% are Black, 10% Latino and 11% White. The number of stops varies substantially by district, with the 25th, encompassing Hunting Park and other parts of North Philadelphia, accounting for the most, with 9%. See Figure 2. As in 2011 and 2012, the fewest stops are in the 5th police district which includes Roxborough, accounting for less than 1% of all stops. Table 1 reports stop, frisk, and arrest rates for pedestrian stops broken down by race. Approximately 19% of stops of Black and Latino suspects lead to a frisk, considerably higher than the 10% rate for Whites.
6 As in past reports, we are proceeding on a district-level analysis, rather than at the “sector” (“PSA”) level, due to the fact that not all of the control variables were made available at the PSA level. District level analysis should not materially impact the statistical analysis. We will move to PSA-level analysis as soon as all of the data is available at this level of aggregation.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 25 of 47
Blacks and Latinos are also searched at a higher rate than Whites, 6.0% and 6.9%, respectively versus 4.1%, although the search rate of minorities dropped relative to 2012. It is possible that the increase in the frisk rate and decline in the search rate is due to anomalies in police reporting. We have attempted to identify cases in which police record a “frisk,” but which under the circumstances was clearly a search (e.g., incident to arrest), but that process is not perfect and is evolving with the implementation of the new electronic database.
The 2014 arrest rates were 6.0% for Blacks, 8.8% for Latinos, and 4.9% for Whites. However, as discussed in previous reports, plaintiffs and the City agree that arrest rates are not a good measure of the legality of stops and frisks since the decision to arrest is highly discretionary (e.g., where a person may be acting in a disorderly fashion, has an open liquor container, or is stopped on suspicion of curfew or truancy violations). Further, to determine whether the arrest rates are related to improper racial considerations, a more precise analysis of the reasons for the stops by race would be necessary. C. Benchmark Applications 1. Stops, Census and Regression Analysis
The question of whether race is impermissibly used as a factor in the decision to stop and frisk cannot be answered by a simple comparison of stop and frisk rates to census data. Non-racial factors may explain the disparities. However, the stop rate/census comparison is the first step in this process. As set forth in Table 1, the stop rate by race in comparison to the census is as follows:
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 26 of 47
Black stops=72%; Black census=43.4% White stops=20%; White census=41% Latino stops=9%; Latino census=12.3%
The next step is a cross-district comparison of stop rates by Black/Minority population share. A racial disparity in stops should be expected based on differences in population composition. It is possible to examine variation in the share of Black and Latino stops by district, as reported in Tables 2A and 2B, respectively. Each row in the tables represents a district (column 1) and the tables are sorted by the Black or minority share of the population in the district, as reflected in column 2. The third column reports the share of stops that are of Black/minority pedestrians and the fourth is the ratio of Black/minority stops to Black/minority population share. Note that in all districts, Blacks and minorities account for a higher share of stops than they do in the population; in some districts, they are stopped at a rate over 5 times their share of the population. Thus, in the 7th Police District, where the population is 5% Black, 25% of the stops were of Blacks and in the 9th District where the population is 11% Black, 69% of the stops were of Blacks. By contrast, in the 22d Police District, where Blacks make up 89% of the population, the ratio of stops by race was close to a 1:1 ratio.
The last three columns report characteristics based on the census population of the district, not just minorities. The fifth column provides a measure of total stops to police officers (not including higher ranked officers) to measure how stop rates per officer vary across district by Black/minority population share. There is substantial variation across districts in the ratio of stops to officers. The correlation between average stops per officer
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 27 of 47
and minority stop share is over 0.5, which means that districts where police officers make more stops also tend to stop a higher share of minorities. Of course, this is only a correlation and a more precise analysis is provided by the regression analysis set forth below.
The final two columns in Tables 2A and 2B report total stops per capita and the violent crime rate in the district (violent crimes per 1,000 residents). The correlation between stops per capita and the minority share of stops is also approximately 0.5 indicating that minorities constitute a higher fraction of those stopped in districts with a high stop rate. Again, regression analysis is necessary to determine whether the violent crime rates in these districts explains the extent of the differences.
To address non-racial influences, we next move to a multivariate regression analysis. This approach is more robust than a comparison of averages because it examines the relationship among multiple variables simultaneously. To determine the impact of suspect race on the likelihood of a stop or frisk, we controlled for factors that include the demographic makeup and crime rate of the neighborhood.
First, we add data collected from the U.S. Census as well as Uniform Crime Report data on reported crimes, by district. We begin by examining differences in overall stop rates by race in Table 3. This table (and tables 4, 7, 8 and 10) share the same format: each column in the table reports results from a separate regression that identifies the relationship between the variables listed in the first column and the dependent variable. For example, regression 2 can be written as:
(1)  =  + 1 + 2 + 3 +  Stop Rate is the number of stops in the sample examined per 10,000 residents in a district
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 28 of 47
and Black is coded 0 if the detainee is White and 1 if the detainee is Black. Similarly, Hispanic is coded 1 if the detainee is Latino and zero otherwise. Age is the detainee’s age in years. By including 3 variables in the equation, this regression can better isolate the impact of race and Latino identity on the likelihood of being stopped, even if age is an important factor in stop rate. The coefficient on Black found in column 2 is 11.31, which means that in the sample about 11.3 more Black individuals were stopped than White individuals for every 10,000 residents of a district. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and the double stars on the standard error indicates that this result is statistically significant at better than the 1% level. This means that there is less than a 1% chance that the difference in stop rates between Blacks and Whites is zero.
At first blush, 11.3 extra stops per 10,000 residents, out of more than 200,000 annual stops in Philadelphia, may not seem significant. The 2010 Census counted 1,526,006 residents of Philadelphia, so this would translate to a difference of 1,724 stops city-wide in the first two quarters of 2014. But these numbers are from the randomly selected sample of all stops. In order to determine the total difference we must adjust for the share of overall stops included in the sample. The total number of pedestrian stops in the first half of 2014 was approximately 107,000 and, therefore, the expected disparity in annual stops citywide is approximately 73,600 or 34% of the total annual stops.
There may be reasons other than race that minorities are stopped at higher rates. For example, if minorities tend to be younger on average, since more crime is committed by younger individuals, one might expect a higher stop rate for minorities. We controlled for this factor (as in equation 1 above) and others relevant to this issue. Column 2 in Table 3 controls for detainee age and adds Latino identity. Column 3 controls for the
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 29 of 47
district racial composition as well as the share of the male population under 24 years of age. Even after adding these controls, the coefficient on Detainee Black (8.482) is still similar to what it was with no controls. The 4th column includes a control for whether flash information led to the stop, which does not have a statistically significant influence on the stop rate. Column 5 adds the district racial composition as well as employment rate to the regression. Since poor economic conditions are associated with higher crime, higher stop rates could be explained by low employment rates, but here the impact is not statistically significant.
The final four columns add different controls for district crime rates. The crime rates are based on crimes reported to the police (not arrests) in 2013. It is preferable to use lagged crime because current crime levels could be influenced by policing policies. In each case, districts with higher crime rates have more stops, but controlling for crime rates does not affect the influence of detainee race on stop rate.
Another potential explanation for higher stop rates of minorities is that they commit crimes at higher rates. Addressing this concern raises several challenges. First, we do not have accurate data as to crime rates by race. There is arrest data, but even if arrest data was an accurate measure of crime rates by race, an issue we discuss below, we would need this breakdown on a district by district (or sector by sector) basis to engage in the proper statistical analysis, and this information was not available.
Second, there is a methodological problem: arrest rates are not independent of stop rates; that is, they are not an unbiased measure of crime. Higher stop rates of one group will almost certainly lead to higher arrest rates. Thus, as we explained in Plaintiffs’ Third and Fourth Reports to the Court, patterns of police enforcement have far more to
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 30 of 47
say about the racial breakdown of persons arrested for drugs than actual drug use or possession by race. This is not to say that arrest rates are solely a function of enforcement, but that the measure is almost certainly a function of stop rates.
Third, there is a legal problem with using crime rates by race to explain disparities in stop rates: as a matter of Equal Protection doctrine, race is an impermissible factor to use when making stops, absent a racial description of a suspect. Thus, even if race-specific crime rates were available, it may not make sense to use them as controls in the regressions. See, Floyd v. City of New York, supra. Even in high crime areas, the commission of crimes is by relatively few persons and therefore it is problematic to justify higher rates of stops in these communities based on a kind of group-actuarial basis.
Table 4 is analogous to Table 3, but it reports the results of a regression of the rate of pedestrian frisks (rather than stops) on detainee race and various controls. In each regression, the coefficient on Detainee Black is statistically significantly different from zero and ranges from about 0.075 – 0.095. This regression shows that the frisk rate for Black detainees is 7.5– 9.5 percentage points higher than for Whites. Since the pedestrian frisk rate for Whites is 9.7%, this translates to an increased likelihood of 75% to almost 100% that Black detainees are frisked, relative to Whites. Including the control variables, such as age, district demographic variables, or crime rates, makes the result even more robust. 2. Reasonable Suspicion for Stops and Frisks: Racial Analysis
As the Plaintiffs’ previous Reports and Section II of this Report demonstrate, a substantial number of the pedestrian stops do not meet the reasonable suspicion standard.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 31 of 47
For the first six months of 2014, 37% of the stops were made without reasonable suspicion (see Table 5). While an improvement of 6 percentage points from 2013, this rate of stops without reasonable suspicion is unacceptably high. Further, while we found that the share of frisks without reasonable suspicion declined from 55% in 2012 to 52% in 2014 (see Table 6), that rate is also far too high.
To inform the Fourteenth Amendment analysis we considered whether the number of stops lacking reasonable suspicion varied by race or Latino identity. Table 5 shows significant variation by race in the share of stops lacking reasonable suspicion, which ranged from 32% for Whites to 39% for Blacks to 41% for Latinos. There is a 29% higher unfounded stop rate for Latinos and 21% higher for Blacks relative to Whites. The impact of detainee race on unfounded stop rates is explored in more detail below, by using regression analysis. There is also variation by race in unfounded frisk rates, see Table 6, with 50% of frisks of Blacks, 64% of Latinos and 60% of Whites lacking reasonable suspicion. However, regression analysis reveals that these differences are not statistically significant, largely due to the small sample size.
On the issue of race and reasonable suspicion for pedestrian stops, each column in Table 7 reports the results from a separate regression. In each regression the variable of interest is Detainee Black and various control variables are added in the different columns. In most of the columns the coefficient on Detainee Black is between -.05 and -.08 indicating that reasonable suspicion was found in 5 to 8 percentage points fewer cases when the detainee was black, and these differences are statistically significant. Thus, while the overall rate of unfounded stops is high for Whites at 32%, the unfounded rate is higher for Blacks, even when controlling for an array of potentially relevant
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 32 of 47
characteristics. This means that the disparity in unfounded stops cannot be explained by differences in district demographics, crime rates, economic conditions, or other control variables, and thus strongly suggests that race is the underlying reason for the disparities.
Table 8 is similar to Table 7 and describes regressions about the rate of reasonable suspicion, but now for a frisk rather than a stop. The coefficient on Detainee Black ranges from about .06 to .09, but none of these coefficients are statistically significant. Overall there is little evidence that there are significant disparities in the rates of unfounded frisks, although this is largely due to the less precise estimates due to the smaller sample size. This holds true when examining Latino identity as well, where the results are statistically indistinguishable from Whites in this and the other regression analyses. 3. Hit-Rate Analysis
An important measure of the propriety of stops and particularly of frisks is the rate at which they lead to the discovery of contraband, and particularly weapons, since frisks are permitted only where the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Moreover, seizures of weapons are often cited as justification for a robust stop and frisk program. The rates of discovery of contraband from frisks are reported in Table 9. Contraband is categorized as firearms, other weapons, drugs, or other. “Other” is not included in the table as it is a less significant event, consisting either of small amounts of cash or unspecified materials.
Table 9 reports an overall detection rate for firearms that is extremely low, with fewer than 1 in 200 pedestrian frisks yielding a firearm. There were a few other weapons discovered as well, but they raise the overall rate of detection of weapons to only 0.92%.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 33 of 47
Table 9 reports results of a basic hit-rate analysis by race and Latino identity (with no control variables). None of the frisks of Whites in the sample yielded firearms and only 1 of the 47 frisks yielded other weapons. By comparison 0.58% of frisks of Blacks yielded firearms (a total of 2) and 0.29% yielded other weapons (1 other weapon). Table 10 is a more sophisticated approach to the firearms hit-rate analysis. The regressions report the rate of discovery of a firearm in pedestrian frisks. None of the coefficients on Detainee Black or Detainee Hispanic are statistically significant, but this is likely due to the fact that firearms are very rarely discovered.
Drugs were detected in about 1 in 60 frisks. By racial category, drugs were discovered in 1.75% of frisks of Black pedestrians, 2.13% of Whites, and in no frisks of Latinos. Thus, there does not appear to be any evidence from frisk results to suggest that minorities possess drugs more frequently than Whites; indeed, the data points in the opposite direction. Further, although suspicion of drug activity may be grounds for a stop, a frisk may not be undertaken in a search for drugs and many of the “stops” for narcotics-related conduct that are recorded by police are actually arrests based on probable cause (e.g., observed drug transactions). 4. Marijuana Arrests
In previous Reports to the Court, plaintiffs have analyzed arrest data to determine whether there were racial disparities in cases involving small amounts of marijuana. The data from 2011, 2012 and 2013 were strikingly similar, showing that for these arrests, Blacks and Latinos accounted for over 90% of those charged. As we have previously asserted, these rates are not explainable by patterns of use or possession of marijuana as all reliable data shows that Blacks and Whites use and possess marijuana at
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 34 of 47
approximately the same rate. Philadelphia City Council recently found that “minorities are disproportionately
impacted by the enforcement of marijuana laws, with African Americans 5.19 times more likely to be arrested for [possession of marijuana] in Philadelphia than Caucasians despite evidence showing nearly identical use across both communities.”1 City Council enacted an Ordinance which provides that possession of under 30 grams of marijuana is to be treated as a Civil Code Violation punishable by a small fine and, in most circumstances, the offender is not subject to arrest and prosecution. Mayor Nutter signed the Ordinance, effective as of October 20, 2014. In light of this significant development, we have agreed with the City to postpone further review of the data on police enforcement of this Ordinance pending implementation of new protocols. The City will provide data on marijuana arrests and Civil Code Violations for the period February-April, 2015 and we will analyze the data in Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report. 5. Commentary We have examined the relationship of race to stop and frisk practices from multiple perspectives, following standard statistical theories. It is significant that on the key benchmarks that provide the most reliable measures of racial bias—regression analysis, comparisons of stops without reasonable suspicion by race, and hit rate analysis—there is strong evidence that the large difference in stop and frisk rates by race in Philadelphia are not explained by non-racial factors. To the contrary, the data show statistically significant racial disparities that are not fully explainable by non-racial factors.
1 Philadelphia Code, Chapter 10-2100.
34

Frequency 100 200 300 400 500 600 0

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 35 of 47 Figure 1
Distribution of Stops by Age
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Age
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 36 of 47 Figure 2
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 37 of 47

Black Latino White

Table 1

Number of Stops 1,803 222 498

STOPS, FRISKS, SEARCHES AND ARRESTS BY RACE, PEDESTRIAN STOPS

Stop Share Number of Frisks Frisk Share Stops with Frisks Stops with Searches Stops with Arrests

71.5%

342

79.4%

19.4%

6.0%

6.0%

8.8%

42

9.7%

19.4%

6.9%

8.8%

19.7%

47

10.9%

9.7%

4.1%

4.9%

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 38 of 47

District
22 19 12 16 39 14 35 18 17 25 1 2 26 24 15 6 8 9 3 5 7

Table 2A

District Level Analysis - Black Stops

Black Population
Share

Black Stop Share

Black Stop Share/Black Population
Share

Total Stops/ Officer

Violent Total Stops Crimes per per capita 1,000
population

89% 93%

1.0

85% 96%

1.1

84% 92%

1.1

80% 97%

1.2

79% 96%

1.2

77% 96%

1.2

73% 90%

1.2

64% 98%

1.5

60% 89%

1.5

34% 57%

1.7

34% 71%

2.1

26% 63%

2.4

25% 38%

1.5

23% 24%

1.0

22% 57%

2.6

21% 67%

3.3

12% 31%

2.7

11% 69%

6.2

10% 37%

3.5

5%

26%

5.1

5%

25%

5.5

81

0.29

23

60

0.12

11

53

0.13

16

70

0.26

17

60

0.14

15

91

0.15

10

68

0.11

13

76

0.15

12

90

0.26

13

103

0.29

21

80

0.20

8

64

0.08

7

76

0.20

15

102

0.24

18

58

0.08

11

80

0.27

14

35

0.03

3

95

0.24

8

61

0.13

9

20

0.04

3

29

0.03

3

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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 39 of 47

District Level Analysis - Minority Stops

District
22 12 19 16 35 39 14 18 17 25 1 2 26 24 6 3 15 9 8 7 5

Minority Minority Population Stop
Share Share

91%

93%

89%

91%

86%

97%

85%

98%

85%

93%

81%

97%

79%

96%

73%

98%

69%

90%

51%

87%

46%

69%

44%

71%

38%

64%

36%

53%

35%

71%

31%

41%

29%

67%

23%

72%

19%

32%

19%

30%

9%

24%

Minority Stop Share/Minority
Population Share 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.3 2.3 3.1 1.7 1.6 2.7

Total Stops/ Officer
82 53 60 70 69 60 91 76 91 105 82 66 78 102 81 66 58 97 37 30 22

Violent

Total Stops Crimes per

per capita 1,000

population

0.30

23

0.14

16

0.12

11

0.26

17

0.12

13

0.14

15

0.15

10

0.15

12

0.27

13

0.29

21

0.20

8

0.08

7

0.20

15

0.24

18

0.27

14

0.14

9

0.08

11

0.24

8

0.03

3

0.03

3

0.05

3

* Minority is defined as Black or Latino (or both) Table 2B

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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 40 of 47

VARIABLES

Table 3
Pedestrian Stops

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Detainee Black

9.924 11.31 8.482 11.20 8.689 7.429 7.931 7.390

(2.801)** (2.744)** (3.312)* (2.713)** (3.278)* (3.159)* (3.131)* (3.174)*

Detainee Hispanic

9.239 12.76 -1.080 12.90 0.387 -4.435 -2.295 -4.626

(8.696) (8.444) (12.63) (8.346) (12.54) (12.08) (11.96) (12.15)

Detainee Age

0.568 0.352 0.557 0.304 0.0189 0.101 0.0161

(0.257)* (0.288) (0.254)* (0.287) (0.302) (0.288) (0.305)

District Asian share

24.19

34.82 26.49 30.88 26.03

(35.29)

(35.79) (34.13) (34.02) (34.27)

District Black share

13.83

13.53 8.567 3.378 9.787

(7.966)

(7.880) (7.805) (8.840) (7.692)

District Hispanic share

25.85

20.47 13.46 4.378 15.52

(15.33)

(15.68) (15.20) (16.66) (15.09)

Male population under 24

-24.78

-66.83 -39.89 -48.87 -39.38

(20.84)

(37.68) (37.78) (36.72) (38.06)

Flash Information

-14.60

(10.59)

Employment Rate

-55.36 -48.22 -32.38 -51.58

(41.54) (39.49) (40.84) (39.52)

Overall Crime Rate

0.0139

(0.00636)*

Violent Crime Rate

0.0830

(0.0386)*

Property Crime Rate

0.0159

(0.00747)*

Constant

3.288 -16.59 -7.484 -14.07 31.34 25.86 19.55 27.31

(2.487) (9.297) (11.54) (9.369) (31.28) (29.75) (30.19) (29.79)

Observations

42

42

42

42

42

42

42

42

R-squared

0.263 0.347 0.408 0.379 0.439 0.511 0.510 0.508

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

40

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 41 of 47

VARIABLES

Table 4

Pedestrian Frisks

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Detainee Black

0.0933

0.0902

0.0799

0.0854

0.0777

0.0779

0.0777

0.0780

(0.0185)** (0.0184)** (0.0206)** (0.0179)** (0.0206)** (0.0207)** (0.0207)** (0.0207)**

Detainee Hispanic

0.0961

0.0893

0.0365

0.0755

0.0365

0.0370

0.0362

0.0372

(0.0271)** (0.0270)** (0.0282) (0.0262)** (0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0283)

Detainee Age

-0.00345 -0.00336 -0.00295 -0.00328 -0.00325 -0.00329 -0.00325

(0.000579)** (0.000578)** (0.000564)** (0.000579)** (0.000582)** (0.000581)** (0.000582)**

District Asian share

0.374

0.0926

0.110

0.0793

0.116

(0.272)

(0.298)

(0.301)

(0.300)

(0.301)

District Black share

0.101

0.0915

0.0951

0.0828

0.0948

(0.0618)

(0.0619) (0.0627) (0.0666) (0.0623)

District Hispanic share

0.275

0.314

0.318

0.302

0.317

(0.0810)**

(0.0826)** (0.0833)** (0.0891)** (0.0829)**

Male population under 24

0.173

0.728

0.682

0.764

0.666

(0.144)

(0.278)** (0.303)* (0.296)** (0.304)*

Flash Information

0.264

(0.0217)**

Employment Rate

0.724

0.686

0.785

0.682

(0.310)* (0.325)* (0.354)* (0.321)*

Overall Crime Rate

-0.000167

(0.000443)

Violent Crime Rate

0.000977

(0.00278)

Property Crime Rate

-0.000261

(0.000516)

Constant

0.0982

0.215

0.0505

0.168

-0.425

-0.389

-0.468

-0.380

(0.0165)** (0.0255)** (0.0492) (0.0251)** (0.209)* (0.230)

(0.242)

(0.228)

Observations

2,461

2,456

2,456

2,456

2,456

2,456

2,456

2,456

R-squared

0.011

0.025

0.042

0.081

0.044

0.044

0.044

0.044

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

41

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 42 of 47

Table 5 REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR PEDESTRIAN STOP BY RACE

All

Black

Latino

White

#

%

#

%

# %#

%

Yes

1,579 62.6% 1109 61.5% 131 59.0% 339 68.1%

No

944 37.4% 694 38.5% 91 41.0% 159 31.9%

Table 6 REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR PEDESTRIAN FRISK BY RACE

All

Black

Latino

White

#

%

#

%

# %#

%

Yes

205 47.6% 171 50.0% 15 35.7% 19 40.4%

No

226 52.4% 171 50.0% 27 64.3% 28 59.6%

42

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 43 of 47

VARIABLES

Table 7

Reasonable Suspicion for Pedestrian Stop

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Detainee Black

-0.0558 -0.0524 -0.0716 -0.0522 -0.0747 -0.0746 -0.0747 -0.0745

(0.0234)* (0.0234)* (0.0263)** (0.0234)* (0.0263)** (0.0264)** (0.0263)** (0.0264)**

Detainee Hispanic

-0.0571 -0.0501 -0.0170 -0.0493 -0.0169 -0.0166 -0.0172 -0.0164

(0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0361) (0.0343) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361)

Detainee Age

0.00293 0.00282 0.00290 0.00294 0.00295 0.00292 0.00296

(0.000736)** (0.000739)** (0.000738)** (0.000740)** (0.000743)** (0.000742)** (0.000743)**

District Asian share

0.345

-0.0487 -0.0389 -0.0608 -0.0343

(0.348)

(0.379)

(0.383)

(0.382)

(0.383)

District Black share

0.119

0.105

0.107

0.0971

0.107

(0.0791)

(0.0792) (0.0801) (0.0851) (0.0796)

District Hispanic share

-0.0227

0.0320

0.0343

0.0208

0.0339

(0.103)

(0.105)

(0.106)

(0.114)

(0.106)

Male pop. under 24

-0.329

0.458

0.432

0.491

0.420

(0.183)

(0.354)

(0.386)

(0.376)

(0.386)

Flash Information

-0.0159

(0.0283)

Employment Rate

1.023

1.001

1.080

0.997

(0.394)** (0.413)* (0.449)* (0.408)*

Overall Crime Rate

-9.71e-06

(5.64e-05)

Violent Crime Rate

9.29e-05

(0.000354)

Property Crime Rate

-1.64e-05

(6.58e-05)

Constant

0.672

0.573

0.640

0.576

-0.0325 -0.0115 -0.0728 -0.00417

(0.0209)** (0.0324)** (0.0625)** (0.0328)** (0.266)

(0.293)

(0.307)

(0.289)

Observations

2,519

2,514

2,514

2,514

2,514

2,514

2,514

2,514

R-squared

0.002

0.009

0.014

0.009

0.016

0.016

0.016

0.016

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

43

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 44 of 47

VARIABLES

Table 8

Reasonable Suspicion for Pedestrian Frisk

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Detainee Black

0.0861 0.0810 0.0670 0.0755 0.0626 0.0633 0.0716 0.0615

(0.0698) (0.0705) (0.0756) (0.0706) (0.0757) (0.0767) (0.0764) (0.0767)

Detainee Hispanic

-0.0734 -0.0762 -0.00997 -0.0850 -0.00906 -0.00898 -0.00584 -0.00914

(0.0846) (0.0849) (0.0870) (0.0851) (0.0869) (0.0871) (0.0870) (0.0870)

Detainee Age

-0.00109 -0.00118 -0.00100 -0.00116 -0.00116 -0.00107 -0.00117

(0.00209) (0.00209) (0.00209) (0.00208) (0.00209) (0.00209) (0.00209)

District Asian share

0.793

0.101 0.0869 -0.0654 0.123

(0.870)

(1.036) (1.063) (1.054) (1.064)

District Black share

-0.0311

-0.0646 -0.0655 -0.128 -0.0643

(0.192)

(0.194) (0.195) (0.207) (0.195)

District Hispanic share

-0.375

-0.323 -0.321 -0.374 -0.327

(0.244)

(0.248) (0.249) (0.255) (0.252)

Male population under 24

0.218

1.273 1.305 1.700 1.225

(0.512)

(1.001) (1.128) (1.114) (1.125)

Flash Information

0.0685

(0.0519)

Employment Rate

1.305 1.344 2.184 1.252

(1.063) (1.248) (1.466) (1.208)

Overall Crime Rate

1.11e-05

(0.000183)

Violent Crime Rate

0.000985

(0.00113)

Property Crime Rate

-1.99e-05

(0.000213)

Constant

0.417 0.453 0.413 0.435 -0.444 -0.476 -1.039 -0.397

(0.0662)** (0.0963)** (0.178)* (0.0973)** (0.721) (0.899) (0.993) (0.876)

Observations

431

431

431

431

431

431

431

431

R-squared

0.011 0.012 0.035 0.016 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.038

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

44

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 45 of 47

Table 9

DISCOVERY OF CONTRABAND BY RACE, PEDESTRIAN FRISKS

All

Black

Latino

White

Firearms

0.46%

0.58%

0.00%

0.00%

Other Weapons

0.46%

0.29%

0.00%

2.13%

Drugs

1.62%

1.75%

0.00%

2.13%

Any

5.10%

5.84%

0.00%

4.26%

45

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 46 of 47

VARIABLES

Table 10

Firearm Recovered

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Detainee Black

0.00490 0.00394 0.00437 0.00451 0.00411 0.00373 0.00345 0.00380

(0.00954) (0.00964) (0.0104) (0.00966) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106)

Detainee Hispanic -0.00219 -0.00272 -0.000969 -0.00182 -0.000915 -0.000959 -0.00115 -0.000937

(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)

Detainee Age

-0.000201 -0.000191 -0.000210 -0.000190 -0.000193 -0.000197 -0.000192

(0.000285) (0.000288) (0.000286) (0.000288) (0.000289) (0.000289) (0.000289)

District Asian share

0.133

0.0921 0.0998 0.104 0.0983

(0.120)

(0.143) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147)

District Black share

-0.00516

-0.00713 -0.00664 -0.00245 -0.00704

(0.0266)

(0.0268) (0.0270) (0.0287) (0.0269)

District Hispanic share

-0.0122

-0.00915 -0.0100 -0.00536 -0.0103

(0.0337)

(0.0342) (0.0345) (0.0352) (0.0348)

Male pop. under 24

0.0453

0.107 0.0901 0.0755 0.0937

(0.0707)

(0.138) (0.156) (0.154) (0.155)

Flash Information

-0.00701

(0.00710)

Employment Rate

0.0765 0.0550 0.0113 0.0615

(0.147) (0.172) (0.203) (0.167)

Overall Crime Rate

-6.01e-05

(0.000253)

Violent Crime Rate

-0.000730

(0.00156)

Property Crime Rate

-5.60e-05

(0.000295)

Constant

0.00103 0.00777 -0.0130 0.00968 -0.0633 -0.0456 -0.0192 -0.0502

(0.00906) (0.0132) (0.0246) (0.0133) (0.0996) (0.124) (0.137) (0.121)

Observations

431

431

431

431

431

431

431

431

R-squared

0.001 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009

Standard errors in parentheses , ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

46

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 50 Filed 02/24/15 Page 47 of 47

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David Rudovsky, Esquire
/s/ Paul Messing, Esquire
Kairys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street, Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400

/s/ Mary Catherine Roper, Esquire ACLU of Pennsylvania PO Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106
/s/ Seth Kreimer, Esquire University of Pennsylvania Law School 3900 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Plaintiffs7

7 Counsel express their appreciation to a number of volunteer lawyers and law students who have donated hundreds of hours of time in this project. Special thanks to Jon Dilks who organized and structured the data collection and student reviews.
47

 
 Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 1 of 61

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mahari Bailey, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
City of Philadelphia, et al., Defendants

:

:

C.A. No. 10-5952

:

:

:

:

:

PLAINTIFFS’ SIXTH REPORT TO COURT AND MONITOR ON STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES: FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

I. Introduction

This Sixth Report to the Court and Monitor provides an update on stops and frisk

practices for 2015 and sets forth plaintiffs’ monitoring and enforcement plans for 2016.

As with the previous Reports, this submission presents compelling evidence that

the City has failed to remedy serious flaws in the Police Department’s stop and frisk

practices. The Consent Decree was intended to ensure that stops and frisks are conducted

only where there is the requisite “reasonable suspicion” of criminal conduct and to ensure

that any racial disparities in stops and frisks are not the result of impermissible bias. On

reasonable suspicion issues, the data continues to show very high numbers of illegal stops

and frisks. For the First and Second Quarters, 2015, plaintiffs found that 33% of all

stops and 42% of all frisks were without reasonable suspicion. The City reports even

higher rates: for the Second Quarter, 62% of all stops and 53% of all frisks were without

reasonable suspicion. Moreover, using benchmarks agreed upon by the parties,

including regression analysis, there is strong evidence that the large difference in stop and

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 2 of 61
frisk rates by race are not explained by non-racial factors. Over the past four years the City has asserted that compliance with the Consent
Decree could not be achieved until there were new police directives on stop and frisk practices, a reliable electronic data base, re-training of officers, and internal accountability measures. As of 2015, the City had implemented all of these measures and, therefore, continued non-compliance cannot be excused on the need for further training or supervision. We understand that Mayor Kenney has recognized the serious problems in stop and frisk practices and we are willing to work with his Administration in implementing the necessary remedial steps. However, given the four year history of non-compliance, there is an immediate need for the Mayor and Police Commissioner to ensure substantial improvements. II. Procedural History
On June 21, 2011, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree (“Agreement”). On February 6, 2012, plaintiffs submitted their First Report which analyzed stop and frisk data for the first two quarters of 2011. The First Report focused on Fourth Amendment issues, and specifically whether there was sufficient cause for the stops and frisks reported by the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”). The audits showed that over 50% of stops and frisks were undertaken without reasonable suspicion.
Plaintiffs’ Second Report was submitted in July 2012, and included (1) a Fourth Amendment analysis of the Third Quarter 2011 stop and frisk data, (2) a racial analysis of the data for the First and Second Quarters, 2011, and (3) a racial analysis of arrests for possession of small amounts of marijuana for the period September 15-November 15,
2

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 3 of 61
2011. Plaintiffs reported continued high rates of stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion (over 40% in both categories). On the question of racial disparities, plaintiffs’ expert, Professor David Abrams, conducted a series of regression analyses and concluded that the racial disparities in stops and frisks (numbers by race compared to census data) were not fully explainable by non-racial factors. Further, the analysis of marijuana arrests showed even more pronounced disparities, with Blacks and Latinos constituting over 90% of all marijuana arrests.
Plaintiffs’ Third Report focused on stop and frisk practices for the first two quarters of 2012 and analyzed marijuana arrests for the period September 15-November 15, 2012. Plaintiffs again found a 40% rate of non-compliance with Fourth Amendment standards, and racial minorities constituted over 90% of arrests for small amounts of marijuana. In response, the City stated that the PPD was providing additional training, issuing revised auditing protocols, and instituting new accountability measures.
The Fourth Report, filed in December, 2013, analyzed stops and frisks in 2012 and 2013, on both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Pedestrian stops were made without reasonable suspicion in 43% of the cases reviewed, and frisks were conducted without reasonable suspicion in over 50% of the cases. There continued to be very low “hit-rates,” with only 3 guns recovered in over 1100 stops (0.27%). Overall, contraband of any kind was recovered in only 3% of the stops. We also noted the relatively low number of frisks reported, with only 20% of stops resulting in frisks, and numerous stops based on allegations of violent crime or weapon possession, where no frisk was conducted.
3

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 4 of 61
The stops and frisks continued to be racially disproportionate with statistically significant disparities that were not explained by non-racial factors (e.g., crime rates, demographics of police districts, age, and gender). The rate of stops without reasonable suspicion for Blacks was 6.5 percentage points higher than the rate for Whites, demonstrating that police were using a higher threshold of “reasonable suspicion” for stops of White suspects.
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the City’s expert, Dr. Ralph Taylor of Temple University, using benchmarks that differed in part from those agreed upon by the parties, disputed certain of plaintiffs’ findings of racial bias. To ensure that the experts were in accord on the proper benchmarks, the parties met and conferred with the Court Monitor, Dean Joanne Epps. These meetings and discussions have produced a draft set of revised benchmarks.1
The Fifth Report covered the first two Quarters of 2014 and showed a rate of stops without reasonable suspicion of 37%. The rate of frisks without reasonable suspicion, or as fruits of an impermissible stop, was 53%.2 Hit rates remained very low, with 433 frisks yielding only two firearms. Indeed, where officers stated that a “bulge” justified a frisk, they seized a gun in only 1 of 78 frisks. On the issue of racial impact, both experts found statistically significant evidence of racial bias in stops and frisks.
1 The new Benchmark Memorandum is attached as Exhibit A. 2 While the City initially disputed the frisk data, on review it conceded that there were substantial numbers of frisks without reasonable suspicion.
4

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 5 of 61
III. Review of 75-48a Forms, First Two Quarters, 2015: Fourth Amendment Analysis In this section, plaintiffs set forth their findings on the issue of whether stops and
frisks for the first two quarters of 2015 were supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. As in previous audits, in assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed for the stop or frisk, we fully credited the narrative information provided by the officer and in “close” cases credited the assertion of reasonable suspicion.
For the first two quarters of 2015, from the random sample of pedestrian stops produced by the Police Department, we found 2380 pedestrian stops (as opposed to arrests, car stops, or contacts with civilians that did not constitute a Terry stop). Of these 2380 pedestrian stops, 67% were supported by reasonable suspicion and 33% were made without reasonable suspicion, an improvement of 4% over the same period in 2014.
Frisks (as opposed to searches) were reported in 326 stops. Of these, 43% were made with reasonable suspicion, 42% were made without reasonable suspicion, and 14% were preceded by a stop without reasonable suspicion (“fruit of the poisonous tree” category). In contrast to the stop data, this shows a 4% slippage from the 2014 compliance rates.
5

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 6 of 61

1. Stop Data
Actual Stops Reasonable Suspicion No Reasonable Suspicion

2380 1586 67% 794 33%

Stops: First Half 2015

No Reasonable Suspicion 33%

Reasonable Suspicion
67%

6

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 7 of 61

2. Frisk Data
Frisks Reasonable Suspicion No Reasonable Suspicion Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

326 141 43.3% 138 42.3% 47 14.4%

Frisks: First Half 2015

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
14.4%
No Reasonable Suspicion 42.3%

Reasonable Suspicion
43.3%

7

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 8 of 61 3. Stop/Frisk Ratio
The 326 frisks represent 13.6% of the 2380 stops.
Stops Followed By Frisk
Frisk 14%
Non-Frisk 86%
8

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 9 of 61

4. Contraband Recovered by Stops

Non-Gun Contraband Guns No contraband Total Stops

36 6 2338 2380

Stops Resulting In Recovery Of Contraband

36

6

2338

Non-Gun Contraband Guns Nothing

9

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 10 of 61

5. Contraband Recovered by Frisks

Non-Gun Contraband

15

Guns

4

No contraband

307

Total Frisks

326

Frisks Resulting In Recovery Of Contraband
15 4

Non-Gun Contraband Guns Nothing
307

6. Contraband Recovered By Frisks, With and Without Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable Suspicion

9

No Reasonable Suspicion

9

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

1

10

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 11 of 61

7. Racial Composition of Philadelphia (2010 Census)

1,517,550 total

White Black & African American Hispanic Asian American Indian / Pacific Islander / Other

644,395 655,824 128,928 67,654 20,749

42.46% 43.22% 8.50% 4.46% 1.37%

Racial Composition of Philadelphia

Hispanic 9%

Asian 4%

American Indian / Pacific Islander /
Other 1%

Black & African American 43%

White 43%

11

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 12 of 61

8. Stops by Race
Black White Latino Total

1626 546 208 2380

68.32% 22.94% 8.74%

77.06% minorities

Stops by Race
208
546 Non-Latino Black Non-Latino White Latino & Other
1626

12

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 13 of 61

9. Stops by Race and Reasonable Suspicion

Black White Latino Total

Reasonable 1065 375 146 1586
66.64%

Unreasonable 561 171 62 794
33.36%

Reasonable % 65.50% 68.68% 70.19% 2380

Reasonable Basis for Stop
Reasonable Unreasonable
Latino & Other 146 62

Non-Latino White

375

171

Black

1065

561

13

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 14 of 61

10. Frisks By Race
Black White Latino Total

253 77.61% 36 11.04% 37 11.35% 326

88.96% minorities

Frisks by Race

37 36

Black Non-Latino White Latino & Other

253

14

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 15 of 61

11. Frisks by Race and Reasonable Suspicion

Black White Latino Total

Reasonable 109 19 13 141

Unreasonable 109 12 17 138

43.25%

42.23%

FTPT 35 5 7 47
14.42 %

Reasonable % 43.08% 52.78% 35.14% 326

Reasonable Basis For Frisk
Reasonable Unreasonable FTPT
Latino & Other 13 17 7

Non-Latino White 19 12 5

Black

109

109

35

15

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 16 of 61

12. Frisks by Race and Contraband Recovery

Black Non-Latino White Latino & Other

Contraband 13 3 3 19
5.83%

No Contraband 240 33 34 307
94.17%

Total 253 36 37
326

% w/ Contraband 5.14% 8.33% 8.11%

Frisks, Race & Contraband Recovered
Contraband No Contraband
Latino & Other 3 34

Non-Latino White 3 33

Black 13

240

16

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 17 of 61

13. Stops Leading to Frisks by Race

Stops Leading To Frisk Black Non-Latino White Latino & Other

Frisked 253 36 37 326

Unfrisked 1373 510 171 2054

Stopped 1626 546 208 2380

Frisked % 15.56% 6.59% 17.79%

Stops Leading To Frisk
Frisked Unfrisked
Latino & Other 37 171

Non-Latino White 36

510

Black 253

1373

17

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 18 of 61
Commentary on Fourth Amendment Issues There are a number of significant findings from the data review. 1. 33% of all stops were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. Significantly, the PPD audits show even higher rates of stops without reasonable suspicion: the audits for the first two quarters of 2015 by the PPD show stops without reasonable suspicion at 36% and 62%, respectively. In light of the over 200,000 pedestrian stops for 2015, tens of thousands of persons in Philadelphia continue to be stopped each year without reasonable suspicion. 2. 42% of all frisks were made without reasonable suspicion and an additional 14% were made in cases where the stop itself was not supported by reasonable suspicion (“fruit of the poisonous tree”). The PPD audit for the Second Quarter (the first audit conducted after significant changes were made in the standards for assessing frisks) show frisks without reasonable suspicion at a comparable rate of 53%.3 3. As with previous data analysis, the number of reported frisks is quite low, with only 13.6% of stops recording a frisk (and an additional 3.5% resulting in a search). There is good reason to believe that officers have not been reporting many frisks. For example, in stops based on suspicion of gun possession or a violent crime, the police frequently report no frisk of the suspect. Of the 159 stops in which guns or gun-related activity are referenced as a basis for the stop, there were no frisks recorded on 55 stops, or 35% of the total. It is simply not plausible to suggest that frisks are not conducted in these situations.
3 The Department’s First Quarter frisk analysis, which showed a very low rate of frisks without reasonable suspicion, was conducted with what the Department concedes was flawed metrics.
18

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 19 of 61
4. The very low “hit-rate” of stops and frisks is further cause for serious concern. Contraband of any kind was recovered in only 42 stops (with 54 seizures of different types of contraband (2.3 % of all stops) and 6 guns were seized (0.25 % of all stops), but 2 of these seizures were the result of searches, not frisks. We recognize that some legitimate stops are not likely to disclose contraband or lead to an arrest, but such low hit rates are troubling and are likely the product of the high rate of stops without reasonable suspicion.
By contrast, hit-rates for frisks are a highly reliable metric as officers must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous before a frisk can be conducted. Thus, we would expect that seizure of weapons or other contraband would be made in a significant number of these cases if the officers are accurately reporting facts that establish reasonable suspicion. Yet, the rate of recovery is vanishingly small. Of 326 frisks, only 4 firearms were seized (98.8% of all frisks yielded no weapons) and contraband other than weapons was seized in only 15 other frisks (a 95% rate of no contraband or weapon seizure). And it is highly likely that the hit-rates are even lower, given the fact that police reported no frisks in 80 stops involving violent crimes or reports of weapons.
Moreover, the data raise serious questions regarding the justifications for many frisks. Most frisk reports assert that the suspect has a “bulge” in a pocket, refuses to take his hands out of his pockets, does not cooperate with police, or that the stop was based on a report of a gun or violent crime. “Bulges” inevitably turn out to be cell phones or wallets and the other triggering factors are very weak indicators of criminal activity. Thus, in 38 cases in which police conducted a frisk based on a “bulge,” not a single
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weapon was detected. The fact that so few frisks lead to the recovery of a weapon raises serious questions as to whether the police are accurately reporting what they observe and whether the reasons generally provided for frisks are appropriate indicators of weapon possession.
5. Analyzing improper stops and frisks by category, there continue to be significant numbers of stops for conduct which the Agreement and federal and state case law make clear are not justifiable grounds for stops or frisks. These include: • loitering (or persons hanging out; congregating)4 • person involved in a “disturbance” • single person “obstructing” the sidewalk • anonymous information (e.g., man with gun; man with drugs)5 • person on steps of or near “abandoned” property • person involved in “verbal dispute” (non-domestic)6 • high crime area/roll call complaints • panhandling • suspicion of narcotics activity As for frisks, problematic grounds include: • frisk for “officer protection”
4 The PPD has instructed officers that “loitering” is not a valid basis for a stop. And while the number of such stops has decreased, the PPD has recognized that officers are using other vague narratives (e.g., blocking buildings) to justify stops. 5 Notwithstanding clear case law, e.g. Florida v. J.L, 529 U.S. 266 (2000) and the terms of the Consent Decree, the Police Department was until this year training officers to make a stop and frisk based on anonymous information only. 6 We credit reports of “domestic” disputes.
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• frisk based on “narcotics investigation”
• frisk because suspect stopped in “high crime” or high drug area
6. Although the continued high rates of impermissible stops and frisks are
the result of several factors, we believe that the primary cause at this point is the lack of
accountability of officers and their supervisors for violations of the Consent Decree.
The Police Department delayed implementation of the accountability process until 2015
(following establishment of the electronic data base, re-training of officers with respect to
stop and frisk practices, and the institution of an internal auditing process). These
accountability measures are set forth in the Department’s Directive on stop and frisk
practices (currently Directive 12.11, Appendix B), and include:
1. Under Section 7, patrol supervisors must review each 75-48a, send incomplete forms back to the officer, and note what actions were taken where the officer did not provide sufficient reasons for the stop or frisk.
2. Under Section 8, Commanding Officers must take necessary actions to correct errors in stop and frisk practices including the identification of officers who fail to state reasonable suspicion and they are accountable for officers and their supervisors who repeatedly engage in impermissible stops or frisks. The Commanding Officers must submit memorandum on a periodic basis detailing corrective actions taken.
3. Under Section 9, Special Unit Inspectors must complete audits of randomly selected stop and frisk reports, provide Commanding Officers under their supervision and command with memorandum detailing errors and deficiencies in these reports, review responses by the Commanding Officers as to remedial actions taken by the Commanding Officers, and to forward all findings and actions taken to the Chief Inspector, Office of Standards and Accountability.
4. Under Section 9, the Office of Standards and Accountability must ensure departmental compliance with stop and frisk procedures under the Directive (including reports on any racially biased or other discriminatory patterns), and provide quarterly audits of stop and frisk reports to various officials and offices within the Police Department, including the Police Commissioner, Deputy Police Commissioner and all Inspectors.
We have reviewed the reports generated pursuant to this accountability process for
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the Third Quarter, 2015 and, as we have already informed the City, that process has failed to produce anything near the level of supervision, accountability, or remedial measures required by the Directive, and which are essential to compliance with the Consent Decree. A few Commanders have acknowledged Fourth Amendment and Consent Decree compliance issues, but overall there is only minimal recognition of the scope of the problems and the fact that tens of thousands of persons are being stopped and frisked each year without reasonable suspicion. Some Commanders continue to assert that 75-48a reports that do not state reasonable suspicion for stops and frisks are the product of “incomplete paperwork;” others do not even address the reasons for impermissible stops. There is no indication of any process for identifying officers (or their supervisors) who repeatedly engage in stops or frisks without reasonable suspicion or of any specific retraining, increased supervision, or other remedial action. Nor does there appear to be a remedial process of accountability in place.
In short, plaintiffs have been more than reasonable in giving the City the means and the time to implement what the Police Department has insisted are the necessary measures for compliance. We have also stated from the start that the kind of organizational/cultural change envisioned by the Consent Decree cannot be achieved simply by new Directives or training. Unless officers and supervisors are held accountable, the current state of affairs will not change. The time for such action cannot be delayed.
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IV. Racial Analysis of Stop and Frisk Practices, January-June, 2015 A. Introduction This section sets forth a statistical analysis of the “Stop and Frisk” practices of the
PPD for the first half of 2015, conducted by plaintiffs’ expert, Professor David Abrams. The benchmarks to be used in the analysis are those set forth in a revised Benchmark Memorandum agreed to by the parties in 2016. See Exhibit A.
In creating benchmarks to measure compliance of the PPD with the terms of the Agreement, we considered several criteria. First, the benchmarks are designed to be straightforward in terms of computation and interpretation. Second, they are designed to measure characteristics at the core of the Agreement, namely compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, they consider other potential explanations for patterns in the data beyond suspect race. The benchmarks are based on a combination of those discussed and used in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, academic literature on the topic, and those used recently in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
B. Summary of the Racial Aspects of the Stop and Frisk Data We examined data from Q1 and Q2 2015 pedestrian stops. A random sample of the stops was drawn by the Philadelphia Police Department for legal analysis for stop and frisk sufficiency by the plaintiffs. In this report we largely focus on an analysis of this randomly selected sample (see Table 1).7 We also include a description of the full array of stops (Table 2) at the PSA-race level, which is the way the overall stop rate is analyzed
7 The Tables and Figures are set forth, infra 35-53.
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(Table 5). The sample dataset (Table 1) includes 2,380 total pedestrian stops and the full
data set has 117,559.8 The mean detainee age is 34 and 82% of detainees are male. The likelihood of being stopped rises sharply in the late teens and early 20’s (Figure 1), which is not surprising given the evidence that criminal activity rises sharply at this age. Blacks account for 69% of those stopped and compared to 2014, Black stop share has decreased by 3 percentage points.
The data is subdivided into 64 Police Service Areas (PSA). See Table 2.9 There were an average of 1251 stops of Black pedestrians per PSA in the first half of 2015, compared with 375 White stops and 136 of Hispanics. In light of the fact that much of this variation is due to different resident racial composition, we also report the stop rate by race per 10,000 residents of the same race. This varies from a low of 583 to Hispanics, to 747 for Whites and 1,611 stops of Blacks for every 10,000 Black residents. Below we use a regression framework to determine whether other factors account for these differences.
The control variables include demographic, economic and crime factors. The employment rate varies substantially across PSA’s, from 20% to 67%. The variation in racial composition is even greater, with the Black residential share ranging from 3% to 98%. To account for higher crime rates among juvenile and young adult males, we control for the share of males under 24 in some regression specifications. This rate also
8 The data originally provided contains 300 additional observations that were incorrectly coded as stops. These observations were dropped from the analysis. 9 Two PSA’s are omitted: 77, which is the airport and has no residential population and 254, due to missing demographic information.
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varies widely, from 9 to 52 percent, with a mean of 37%. Crime rates are also likely to drive stop rates and thus we control for them using three different measures of violent crime, property crime and overall Part 1 crimes.
Table 3 provides a breakdown of stop, frisk and arrest rates by race. As mentioned, Blacks account for 69% of stops, and Whites are 23% with Latinos accounting for 7%. Minorities account for an even higher share of individuals frisked, of which 79% are Black, 10% Latino and 11% White. This racial composition is identical to that in 2014. About 1 in 6.4 stops of Black pedestrians result in a frisk, but the rate is only 1 in 15.2 for Whites. The difference is greater for arrests, with an arrest of a Black detained resulting from 16.3 stops on average, while for Whites it takes 28.7 stops. The arrest rate for Blacks and Latinos is similar to 2014, while the White arrest rate dropped somewhat.
The number of stops varies substantially by district, with the 19th, which includes Overbrook and parts of West Philadelphia, accounting for the most, with 9% (Figure 2). The fewest stops are in the 7th police district, in Northeast Philadelphia, accounting for less than 1% of all stops. C. Benchmark Applications 1. Stops, Census and Regression Analysis
The question of whether race is impermissibly used as a factor in the decision to stop and frisk cannot be answered by a simple comparison of stop and frisk rates to census data. Non-racial factors may explain the disparities. However, the stop rate/census comparison is the first step in this process. As set forth in Tables 2 and 3, the stop rate by race in comparison to the census is as follows:
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Black stops=69%; Black census=46% White stops=23%; White census=42% Latino stops=7%; Latino census=11%
The next step is a cross-PSA comparison of stop rates by Black/Minority population share. A racial disparity in stops should be expected based on differences in population composition. It is possible to examine variation in the share of Black and Latino stops by PSA, as reported in Tables 4A and 4B, respectively. Each row in the tables represents a PSA (column 1) and the tables are sorted by the Black or Latino share of the population in the district, as reflected in column 2. The third column reports the share of stops that are of Black/Latino pedestrians and the fourth is the ratio of Black/Latino stops to Black/Latino population share. Note that in all but four PSAs, Blacks account for a higher share of stops than they do in the population; in some PSA’s, they are stopped at a rate over five times their share of the population. Thus, in PSA 243, where the population is 3% Black, 24% of the stops were of Blacks and in PSA 63, where the population is 7% Black, 59% of the stops were of Blacks. By contrast, in the PSA 192, where Blacks make up 96% of the population, the ratio of stops by race was close to a 1:1 ratio.
This trend of a vastly inflated minority stop rate in heavily White locations can be seen visually in Figure 3. If the ratio of minority stops were independent of PSA minority share, the points should form a horizontal line. The fact that the points in the left end of the figure (heavily White PSA’s) have much higher Black stop ratios,
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reinforces the results from Table 4A. The last two columns in Tables 4A and 4B report characteristics based on the
census population of the district, not just minorities. Column 5 reports total stops per capita and Column 6, the violent crime rate in the district (violent crimes per 10,000 residents). Figure 4 visually displays the relationship between overall stop rate and Black population share. It shows that areas with a greater Black population experience a higher stop rate than those with a lower Black population share.
To address non-racial influences, we next move to a multivariate regression analysis. This approach is more robust than a comparison of averages because it examines the relationship among multiple variables simultaneously. To determine the impact of suspect race on the likelihood of a stop or frisk, we control for factors that include the demographic makeup and crime rate of the neighborhood.
First, we add data collected from the U.S. Census as well as Uniform Crime Report data on reported crimes, by PSA. We begin by examining differences in overall stop rates by race in Table 5. This table (and tables 6, 8, 9 and 11) share the same format: each column in the table reports results from a separate regression that identifies the relationship between the variables listed in the first column and the dependent variable, which is the title of the table. For example, the regression that is reported in column 4 can be written as:
(1)  =  + 1𝐵𝐵 + 2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 4𝐴𝐴 +  Stop Rate is the number of stops in the sample examined per 10,000 residents in a district and Black is coded 0 if the detainee is White and 1 if the detainee is Black. Similarly, Latino is coded 1 if the detainee is Latino and zero otherwise. Male is coded 1 for men
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and 0 for women. Age is the detainee’s age in years. By including four variables in the equation, this regression can better isolate the impact of race and Latino identity on the likelihood of being stopped, even if sex or age are important factors affecting the stop rate.
The coefficient on Black found in column 4 is 962.0, which means that in the full dataset about 962 more Black individuals were stopped than White individuals for every 10,000 residents of a PSA. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and the double stars on the standard error indicates that this result is statistically significant at better than the 1% level. This means that there is less than a 1% chance that the difference in stop rates between Blacks and Whites is zero.
There may be reasons other than race that minorities are stopped at higher rates. For example, if minorities tend to be younger on average, since more crime is committed by younger individuals, one might expect a higher stop rate for minorities. We control for this factor (as in equation 1 above) and others relevant to this issue. Column 5 adds controls for the PSA racial composition and Column 6 the share of the male population under 24 years of age. Even after adding these controls, the coefficient on Detainee Black (978.3) is still similar to what it was with no controls. The 7th column includes a control for whether flash information led to the stop, which does not have a statistically significant influence on the stop rate. Column 8 adds the PSA employment rate to the regression. Not surprisingly, PSA’s with higher employment rates have lower stop rates, but this control does not have a substantial impact on the race effect.
Columns 9-11 add different controls for PSA crime rates. The crime rates are based on crimes reported to the police in 2014. It is preferable to use lagged crime
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because current crime levels could be influenced by policing policies. In each case, PSA’s with higher crime rates have more stops, but controlling for crime rates does not affect the influence of detainee race on stop rate.
The final column reproduces column 10, but includes additional econometric safeguards. It controls for other potential differences across districts (district fixed effects) as well as potential correlations in the errors within a district (clustering standard errors at the district level). A comparison between columns 10 and 12 shows that the coefficients on Black and Latino are not greatly impacted by these additions. The coefficient on Black is of a similar magnitude, although now significant at the 5% level, not 1%. All of the regressions reported were run with the addition of district fixed effects and clustering of standard errors, and the results were not materially changed.
A number of additional specification checks were run to insure the robustness of the results. Instead of using stop rate as the outcome, the number of stops was also examined. The results from these regressions were consistent with those reported. While the number of stops per PSA is large enough that an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is appropriate, we also made use of a negative binomial regression, which is appropriate for use with count data. Again the results were consistent with those reported. Next, we varied the types of control variables used, including replacing the demographic, economic and crime control variables with those provided by the defendant’s expert. This, too, did not change the results.
Table 6 is analogous to Table 5, but it reports the results of a regression of the incidence of pedestrian frisks (rather than stops) on detainee race and various controls. Rather than aggregating data to the PSA-race level, the data in Table 6 is at the stop level
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and controls for the quarter of the year. In each regression, the coefficient on Detainee Black is statistically significantly different from zero and ranges from about 0.044 – 0.084. The preferred estimate is .047 and may be found in column 10 and controls for demographic, economic and crime variables. This means the frisk rate for Black detainees is 4.7 percentage points higher than for Whites, once controlling for the entire array of variables described above. Since the frisk rate for Whites is 6.6%, this translates to an 71% greater likelihood that a Black detainee is frisked compared to a White detainee. This results is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is robust to the array of alternative specifications described above for the stop rate regressions.
There are several other interesting results reflected in Table 6. Latinos are also far more likely than Whites to be frisked (see second row) as the coefficient of .072 indicates that Latinos have a 7.2 percentage point higher frisk rate than Whites, which is over twice as high a rate, accounting for all of the control variables. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. Also statistically significant are results for age and gender: an extra decade of age decreases likelihood of frisk by 2 percentage points and male detainees are far more likely to be frisked than females. Additionally, if a detainee matches flash information, that individual is 27 percentage points more likely to be frisked than otherwise. Overall, in assessing data as to frisks, and controlling for non-racial factors, there is a substantially higher frisk rate of minorities.
2. Reasonable Suspicion for Stops and Frisks: Racial Analysis As the previous Reports and Section II of this Report demonstrate, a substantial
number of the pedestrian stops do not meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Table 7
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shows the share of stops without reasonable suspicion across racial and ethnic categories, at 31% for Whites and Latinos and 35% for Blacks. The average of 33% unfounded stops is 4 percentage points lower than in 2014. This is a move in the right direction, but still an extraordinarily high rate of stops without reasonable suspicion. The share of frisks made without reasonable suspicion is far higher, at 56% overall. This is an increase of 4 percentage points from 2014 and very close to the 55% unfounded frisk rate in 2012. The unfounded rate is highest for minorities, making up 62% of Latino frisks and 57% for Blacks, whereas the rate for Whites is still quite high at 47%.
As with stop rates and frisks, summary statistics can only get you so far, and regressions are necessary to control for potentially confounding factors. Table 8 reports results from such regressions, with each column representing a separate regression where the dependent variable is whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. As before, additional control variables are added in the different columns. In most of the columns the coefficient on Detainee Black is between -.019 and -.034 indicating that reasonable suspicion was found in 1.9 to 3.4 percentage points fewer cases when the detainee was black. However, none of these differences are statistically significant. There is also no statistically significant impact of Latino status on likelihood of an improper stop. The two variables for which there are consistently significant effects are age and sex. Younger detainees and males are far more likely to be subject to unfounded stops than older detainees and females.
Table 9 is similar to Table 8 and describes regressions of the rate of reasonable suspicion, but now for a frisk rather than a stop. The coefficient on Detainee Black covers a wide range, but as in Table 8, but none of these coefficients are statistically significant.
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The same is true for Latino detainees. Overall there is little evidence that there are significant disparities in the rates of unfounded frisks, although this is largely due to the less precise estimates from a smaller sample size. 3. Hit-Rate Analysis
An important measure of the propriety of stops and particularly of frisks is the rate at which they lead to the discovery of contraband, and particularly weapons, since frisks are permitted only where the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Moreover, seizures of weapons are often cited as justification for a robust stop and frisk program. The rates of discovery of contraband from frisks are reported in Table 10. Contraband is categorized as firearms, drugs, or other. “Other” includes small amounts of cash or unspecified materials.
Table 10 reports an overall detection rate for firearms that is extremely low, with fewer than 1 in 80 pedestrian frisks yielding a firearm. Drugs were by far the most commonly detected type of contraband, and were found in 1 of every 46 frisks. Overall, contraband was found in under 6% of all frisks.
Table 11 is a more sophisticated approach to the firearms hit-rate analysis. The regressions report the rate of discovery of a firearm in pedestrian frisks. None of the coefficients on Detainee Black or Detainee Latino are statistically significant, but this is likely due to the fact that firearms are very rarely discovered and there are just over 300 frisks available for analysis in the sample.
This suggests that the full dataset will be more useful than the sample to understand the impact of race on contraband hit-rates. These results are presented in Table 12, which examines 15,821 frisks in Q1 and Q2 of 2015, of which 9.2% resulted in
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the recovery of some kind of contraband (the type is not categorized in the full data). An examination of column 10, one of the most conservative specifications, shows that Blacks who are frisked are 2.9 percentage points less likely to have contraband, and this result is statistically significant at the 1% level. From an overall contraband recovery rate of 9.2% this means that frisks of Blacks are 31% less productive than those of Whites, even when controlling for a whole host of variables. Frisks of males are also vastly less productive than those of females. Due to the recent introduction of electronic data collection by the Philadelphia Police Department, this is the first time the contraband analysis has been done using all available stops and is thus vastly more powerful than prior analyses, which were akin to the results shown in Table 11. These new findings are some of the strongest evidence yet that Blacks are treated differently from Whites, in ways that cannot be explained by a host of other factors. 4. Marijuana Arrests
In previous Reports to the Court, plaintiffs analyzed arrest data to determine whether there were racial disparities in cases involving arrests for small amounts of marijuana. The data from 2011, 2012 and 2013 showed that Blacks and Latinos accounted for over 90% of those charged. These rates were not explainable by patterns of use or possession of marijuana, as all reliable data shows that Blacks and Whites use and possess marijuana at approximately the same rate.
In 2014, an Ordinance sponsored by Mayor (then Council Member) Kenney was enacted and provides that possession of under 30 grams of marijuana is to be treated as a Civil Code Violation punishable by a fine. In most circumstances, the offender is not
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subject to arrest or prosecution.1 This legislation has had a significant positive impact. In the period March 1-May 15, 2015, there were 203 possession of marijuana arrests, an 80% decline from previous years during the same time frame. The racial disparities continue, with over 90% of arrests of Blacks and Latinos, and with no arrests in several predominantly White police districts. Most (80%) of the arrests were the result of observed marijuana transactions.
D. Commentary We have examined the relationship of race to stop and frisk practices from multiple perspectives, following standard statistical theories. It is significant that on the key benchmarks that provide the most reliable measures of racial bias—regression analysis, comparisons of stops without reasonable suspicion by race, and hit rate analysis—there is strong evidence that the large difference in stop and frisk rates by race in Philadelphia are not explained by non-racial factors. To the contrary, the data show statistically significant racial disparities that in almost all respects are not explainable by non-racial factors.
1 Philadelphia Code, Chapter 10-2100. 34

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Figure 1
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Figure 2
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Figure 3
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Figure 4
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Table 1

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Table 2

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Table 3

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Table 4A
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Table 4A, continued
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Table 4B
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Table 4B, continued
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Table 5
4 6

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Table 6
4 7

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Table 7
48

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Table 8
4 9

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Table 9
5 0

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Table 10
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Table 11
5 2

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Table 12
5 3

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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David Rudovsky, Esquire
/s/ Paul Messing, Esquire
Kairys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street, Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400

/s/ Mary Catherine Roper, Esquire ACLU of Pennsylvania PO Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106
/s/ Seth Kreimer, Esquire University of Pennsylvania Law School 3900 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Plaintiffs10

10 Counsel express their appreciation to Jon Dilks who organized and structured the data collection.
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EXHIBIT A
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BENCHMARKS FOR BAILEY V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

I.

Introduction

This Memorandum sets forth agreed upon benchmarks for evaluating the compliance of the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”) with the Settlement Agreement, Class Certification and Consent Decree (“Agreement”).

The Agreement provides for monitoring of the stop and frisk practices of the PPD to measure and ensure compliance with the terms of the Agreement. The parties agreed to a set of benchmarks in 2010 and plaintiffs have employed those benchmarks in assessing compliance in their Reports to the Courts. In 2013, the City’s expert, Professor Ralph Taylor, suggested additional benchmarks in his analysis of the racial distribution of stops and frisks. Thereafter, the parties met and discussed these issues and as a result of further collaboration between the respective experts, some modifications in the Benchmark Memorandum have been made. These modified benchmarks are intended to fairly measure and assess PPD compliance with the provisions of the Agreement under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

II. Fourth Amendment Issues The major question with respect to Fourth Amendment compliance in pedestrian and car stops (and related frisks, searches and/or arrests) is whether the PPD is stopping and frisking suspects with the requisite reasonable suspicion mandated by the Fourth Amendment. The substantive standards on reasonable suspicion are set forth in the Agreement and applicable court decisions. Under the Agreement and Consent Decree, the Court has the power to determine whether the rate of stops and/or frisks made without reasonable suspicion are grounds for a finding of non-compliance with the Consent Decree. To measure compliance, both sides review randomly selected 75-48a forms by the PPD on a quarterly basis. To ensure the most accurate analysis, the following procedures will be used.

First, the PPD will ensure that the randomly selected files do not contain more than a single 75-48a from a particular incident. Where multiple persons are stopped and/or frisked in one incident, only one of these stops will be part of the randomly selected files for review.

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Second, in each quarterly review both sides will screen the reported stops and frisks to separate out (1) “stops” that are either sight arrests or are otherwise not forcible stops under the Fourth Amendment and (2) “frisks” that are searches (often incident to arrest). In these cases, officers have filed 75-48a reports even though the incident was not within the Departmental definition of a stop or frisk pursuant to Directive 12.11. These incidents will not be included in the Fourth Amendment “reasonable suspicion” analysis.
Third, the category of “fruit of an illegal stop” will be used to signify where a frisk, though proper given the officers observations, was made pursuant to a stop without reasonable suspicion.
Finally, there will be a “hit-rate” analysis on the Fourth Amendment issues. More specifically, the ratio of “hits” (i.e., finding of weapons or contraband) to the number of frisks will be tabulated. In addition, there will be a designation of cases in which the officer marks “no frisk” in cases in which a frisk was highly likely to have occurred (e.g., stop for a robbery investigation).
III. Fourteenth Amendment Issues: Racial Fairness
The Agreement requires monitoring and analysis with respect to the question of whether race is being impermissibly used as a factor in the decision to stop and frisk. Over the years, a number of “benchmarks” have been used by economists, statisticians, lawyers and courts to measure possible racial bias in stop and frisk practices. The following benchmarks will be used in Bailey.
A. Regression Analysis Regarding Police Stops and Frisks. There is no dispute over the fact that racial minorities are stopped and frisked far more frequently than whites, but this fact alone does not prove race bias, as non-racial factors may be contributing causal influences.
To assess possible bias, both sides will start with a comparison of actual stop and frisk rates by race by Police Service Areas (PSA), which are geographical subdivisions of Police Districts in Philadelphia, to those that would be expected based on census data on the racial composition for
3

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 58 of 61
that PSA. This analysis will use race specific data comparing stops and frisks and the census population by race.
A multivariate regression analysis will then be used to assess the relationship among multiple variables simultaneously. To determine the impact of suspect race on the likelihood of a stop or frisk, it is important to control for factors that include the demography and crime rates of the PSA. The regressions have been used in all previous reports, but they have been modified by agreement.
The following regressions will be used, with the dependent variable of number of stops and frisks.
a. Defendant race; b. Defendant race, Latino status; c. Defendant race, Latino status, sex; d. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age; e. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age, district racial composition; f. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age, district racial composition, district age composition; g. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age, district racial composition, district age composition, defendant matches flash information; h. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age, district racial composition, district age composition, defendant matches flash information, district employment rate; i. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age, district racial composition, district age composition, defendant matches flash information, district employment rate; district crime rate; j. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age, district racial composition, district age composition, defendant matches flash information, district employment rate; district violent crime rate; k. Defendant race, Latino status, sex, age, district racial composition, district age composition, defendant matches flash information, district employment rate; district property crime rate;
4

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 59 of 61

The above regressions are summarized in the following table:

Defendant Race Defendant Latino Status Defendant Sex Defendant Age District Racial Composition District Age Composition Presence of Flash Information District Employment Rate District Crime Rate District Violent Crime Rate District Property Crime Rate

abcde f gh i jk X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

The following protocols will be followed in the regression analysis:
1. The PSA as opposed to Police Districts will be the geographical areas for data analysis. The City has agreed to provide to Professor Abrams the relevant PSA population data.
. 2. Crime rates will be measured by the incidence of serious crime (using lagged data, i.e., the
crime rate from the previous Quarter or Year), but the parties will initially use somewhat different measures of serious crime, including violent and property crimes. The operating assumption is that these different metrics will not lead to different conclusions, but the experts will confer again if there are significant differences reported. 3. Economic and social data will be used as controls and these will account for cross-PSA variation in economic and demographic circumstances. As with crime rates, there may be some differences in the regression factors used by each side, and to the degree there appear to be different conclusions based on different factors, the experts will determine which are the most relevant and reliable.

5

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 60 of 61
4. The data will be presented cumulatively for two or more consecutive quarters and may also include controls for time period or be broken out by quarter.
5. Professors Abrams and Taylor may perform “robustness” checks beyond the regressions outlined above. Thereafter, these experts will confer as to their usefulness.
Regression analysis allows for more precise statements about the effects of different variables on outcomes, but it is also important to determine whether any differences in the racial data is statistically significant. If the effect of race is not statistically significant, it means that the effect of race is lower than the ability of the regression to detect. This relates to the power of the regression, which is affected by the sample size. If the sample size is large enough, a statistically insignificant coefficient indicates that the difference by race is statistically indistinguishable from zero (i.e., no race effect) to a high degree of accuracy. Regression analysis provides measures for determining statistically significant racial disparities and in the social sciences, the standard significance threshold for the likelihood of finding the same result is 95%.11 For some of the benchmarks, including analysis of gross numbers of stops and frisks with regression for salient factors, there is no need for sampling as all of this data is available in the electronic data base.
Even if the coefficient on race is statistically significant, the magnitude may be so small that it is not meaningful. For example, if blacks are frisked 10% of the time and whites 10.1% of the time, even though the difference might be statistically significant, it is not likely to be of great concern. For evaluating these regression results, a good rule of thumb for a meaningful amount of difference is about 20% of the variable mean. Using the same numbers from the frisk example above, this means that if the frisk rates differed by more than 20% of the 10% frisk rate (0.2 * 0.1 = 0.02 or 2 percent) that would represent a meaningful racial disparity.
B. Regression Analysis/Dependent Variable of No Reasonable Suspicion for Stop or Frisk
11 This corresponds to a p-value of .05
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 56 Filed 03/22/16 Page 61 of 61
The same set of regressions will be used where the dependent variable is whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop or frisk. Since this variable is only available for the sample of the data that has been analyzed for reasonable suspicion, it will contain a smaller number of observations than the regressions described above.
C. Stops and Frisks by Race, Contraband Recovered, and Racial Characteristics of PSA In addition to the regressions described above, other benchmarks will be used to determine possible racial bias. First, there will be an analysis of the rate of frisks by race. Second, a hit-rate analysis will be used to determine possible racial effects of stop and frisk practices. As an example, if hit-rates for Whites are higher than for Blacks, there is a question as to whether the police are employing different thresholds for reasonable suspicion. An example of a hit-rate is the share of frisks that result in a firearm. Third, there will be a hit-rate analysis at the PSA-level to test for the possibility that stops or frisks may increase at a disproportionate level for all persons in heavily minority neighborhoods. In this analysis, there will be calculations of the PSA-level stop and frisk rates per reported crimes to determine whether these ratios are correlated with PSA racial demographics. The question in this context is whether there is a possible racial effect of stop and frisk practices if the crime rate in PSA-1 is five times the crime rate in PSA-2, but the stop rate is 10 times higher in PSA-1.
7

 
 Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 41 Filed 12/20/11 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 


MAHARI BAILEY, et al.

CIVIL ACTION

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.

NO. 10-5952

JUDGMENT

AND NOW, this 20th day of December, 2011, upon the

jury's verdict this day, and in accordance with § VI.A of this

Court's June 21, 2011 Consent Decree, JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in

favor of plaintiff Jewell Williams and against defendants City of

Philadelphia, Officer Thomas Schaffling, Officer Timothy Devlin

and Sgt. Kevin Bernard in the amount of $50,000.00.

BY THE COURT:

~~Stewart Dalzell, J.

 
 Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mahari Bailey, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
City of Philadelphia, et al., Defendants

:

:

C.A. No. 10-5952

:

:

:

:

:

PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD REPORT TO COURT AND MONITOR ON STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES

I. Introduction

A. Procedural History

On June 21, 2011, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and

Consent Decree (“Agreement”) in this matter. On February 6, 2012, plaintiffs submitted their

First Report which analyzed stop and frisk data for the first two quarters of 2011. The First

Report focused on Fourth Amendment issues, and specifically whether there was sufficient cause

for the stops, frisks, and searches reported by the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”). The

audits showed very high rates of stops and frisks undertaken without reasonable suspicion.

Plaintiffs’ Second Report was submitted in July 2012, and included (1) a Fourth

Amendment analysis of the Third Quarter 2011 stop and frisk data, (2) a racial analysis of the data

for the First and Second Quarters, 2011, and (3) a racial analysis of possession of marijuana arrests

for the period September 15-November 15, 2011. Plaintiffs reported continued high rates of stops

and frisks without reasonable suspicion. On the question of racial disparities, plaintiffs’ expert,

Professor David Abrams, considered the benchmarks that had been agreed upon by the parties as

metrics that should be used in this analysis. Professor Abrams also conducted a series of

regression analyses and concluded that the racial disparities in stops and frisks (numbers by race

1

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 2 of 15
compared to census data) were not fully explainable by non-racial factors. Further, the analysis of marijuana arrests showed even more pronounced disparities, with African-Americans and Latinos constituting over 90% of all marijuana arrests.1
Plaintiffs’ Third Report focuses on stop and frisk practices for the first two quarters of 2012, from the perspective of compliance with Fourth Amendment standards. We will also present our analysis of the marijuana arrests for the period September 15-November 15, 2012. The Fourth Report, slated for May 2013, will present the racial analysis for stops and frisks for the first two quarters, 2012.
This Third Report considers stops conducted after the PPD had completed re-training of officers, issued new protocols on stop and frisk practices, and implemented accountability measures, as required by the Agreement. The 2012 data provides the first opportunity to determine the degree to which the remedial measures in the Agreement have been implemented.
Finally, by way of background, in December 2012, the parties agreed to a plan for the development of a new PPD electronic data system that is designed to provide more accurate information on stops and frisks and which will enable the parties to more effectively conduct audits and analysis of the data. The parties also agreed to a new schedule for the City’s submission of stop and frisk data to the plaintiffs. See Stipulated Order for Compliance with Consent Decree, entered December 18, 2012 (Document 43).
1 In June, 2012, the City filed its First Report and asserted that the rates of impermissible stops and frisks were lower than reported by plaintiffs. However, the PPD recognized that the Inspectors who conducted the audits should not be crediting many stops based on allegations of loitering or other conduct that does not constitute reasonable suspicion.
2

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 3 of 15
B. The Data Review Process Plaintiffs have established a careful and comprehensive review process of the stop and frisk data provided by the Police Department. Each quarter, we are provided data from approximately 3200 randomly selected pedestrian and car stops. For the Fourth Amendment analysis, we consider only pedestrian stops. Counsel for plaintiffs and trained law students independently review each pedestrian stop and frisk under guidelines that incorporate the standards set forth in the Agreement and by the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts.2 We accept at face value the reasons stated by police officers for the stops and frisks, and make assessments based solely on whether these reasons comport with standards established by the Agreement and the Fourth Amendment. In close cases, we credit the stated basis for the stop and frisk. Plaintiffs are confident that their audits are accurate and, therefore, are troubled by the contrary findings of the PPD. In an effort to determine the reasons for these different findings, counsel for plaintiffs met with the Department’s Inspectors to discuss the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards. Along the same lines, plaintiffs have provided to the City a breakdown of the categories of stops and frisks that were found to have most frequently resulted in improper police interventions.3 The City has stated that changes are being made in the Department’s audit process, including the assignment of Deputy Commissioner Nola Joyce to oversee the implementation of the Agreement, the assignment of new Inspectors to ensure more accurate reviews, and a more effective system of accountability. While we do not expect that the reviews
2 These reviews show a very high level of agreement between counsel and the law students as to the propriety of stops and frisks. This Report is based on counsel’s reviews.
3 See, infra, 11-12.
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Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 4 of 15
by plaintiffs’ counsel and by the Police Department will be perfectly aligned, unless there is a sharp reduction in both the number of impermissible stops and frisks and in the stark disparities reflected in the audits conducted over the first 18 months of data analysis, plaintiffs will request the intervention of the Monitor and the Court. II. Review of 75-48a Forms in First and Second Quarters, 2012
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis In this section, plaintiffs set forth their findings and assessments on the issue of whether stops and frisks for the first two quarters of 2012 were supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion.4 As in previous audits, in assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed for the stop or frisk, we fully credited the narrative information provided by the officer and in “close” cases found that reasonable suspicion was present.5 There is one positive development: the number of pedestrian stops has been reduced. In 2009, there were 253,000 pedestrian stops; in 2012 there were 215,000 stops, a decrease of almost 15%. Unfortunately, there has been no significant improvement in the quality of stops and frisks. By our analysis, pedestrian stops are being made without reasonable suspicion in approximately 43-47% of the cases, depending on how certain “stops” are categorized. Frisks are being conducted without reasonable suspicion in over 45% of the cases, again depending on categorization of frisks and searches. By race, 76% of the stops were of minorities
4 The review process was the first using the PPD electronic database. As noted, this system had design deficiencies and the City is currently developing a new electronic data base to enable the parties to make more timely and efficient audits.
5 With respect to frisks, we have created a third category for analysis. Where the stop was impermissible, but the reasons for the frisk were otherwise proper, we recorded the frisk as “the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Under this doctrine, the evidence that was seized would likely be suppressed due to the improper stop. See note 8, infra.
4

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 5 of 15 (African-Americans and Latinos) and 85% of the frisks were of minorities.6 The findings as to impermissible stops and frisks are particularly disturbing given the fact that the Police Department had the time and resources following the entry of the Agreement to re-train its officers on stop and frisk practices and to establish supervisory reviews to ensure accountability for practices that failed to meet clear mandates under the Agreement. Moreover, as detailed below, the Department continues to report very low levels of improper stops and frisks, thus calling into question whether the Inspectors (and IAD) are currently applying the appropriate standards.
6 This data shows significant disparities by race as compared to the census data. The question of whether non-racial factors explain the disparities will be addressed in the Fourth Report, based on application of benchmarks and regression analysis.
5

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 6 of 15

First and Second Quarters, 2012

Pedestrian Stops7 Number of Pedestrian Stops
Stops with Reasonable Suspicion

Pedestrian Frisks8

1852

Number of Pedestrian Frisks

265

976

Frisks with Reasonable Suspicion

97

Stops without Reasonable Suspicion
“Non-Stops” (e.g., arrests, request for assistance)

876

Frisks without Reasonable Suspicion 115

186

Frisks with RS following Stop w/o

53

RS

(“Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”)

“Non-Frisks” (searches incident to

26

arrest)

First and Second Quarters, 2012: Presence of Reasonable Suspicion to
Stop

First and Second Quarters, 2012: Presence of Reasonable Suspicion to
Frisk

NO Reasonable Suspicion
47%

Reasonable Suspicion
53%

Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree 20%
NO Reasonable Suspicion
43%

Reasonable Suspicion
37%

7 From the data base provided by the City, we have excluded “stops” that were sight arrests (based on probable cause) or “stops” that were not investigative in nature, e.g., a person turning herself in on an outstanding warrant. We understand that further discussion with the City is necessary to resolve how these stops should be analyzed. In any event, even if these stops are considered the rates of improper stops remains very high (43% as opposed to 47%).
8 Where the police conducted a search based on probable cause or a search incident to an arrest, we did not count that activity as a “frisk.” The “fruit of the poisonous tree” category includes frisks that follow impermissible stops, but which were otherwise based on permissible factors. That is, the officers had no legal reason to make a stop, but having done so, the suspect’s conduct would otherwise justify a frisk. The Fourth Amendment would usually require exclusion of any evidence found in this situation. Again, we will discuss with the City how best to analyze these cases.
6

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 7 of 15

Contraband Contraband Recovered Total Guns Recovered Hit Rates (fraction of stops) Contraband Recovered Guns Recovered Arrests10

299 3
1.57% 0.16% 5.29%

First and Second Quarters, 2012 Total Fraction of Stops Resulting in
Contraband Recovery or Gun Recovery

CONTRABAND

GUNS

First and Second Quarters, 2012 Total Fraction of Stops Resulting in
Arrest
ARREST

NONE

NO ARREST

9 This number may over-count contraband secured as a result of a stop and frisk, as total contraband recovered includes cases of searches and frisks.
10 We recognize the limitations in using arrest data as a benchmark for “hit-rates.” On one hand, the number may be too low as officers may have probable cause to arrest for very minor offenses, but properly exercise their discretion not to make a custodial arrest (as opposed to a citation or verbal warning). On the other hand, the number may be inflated since some arrests are based not on the conduct observed, but on post-stop information received, such as an outstanding warrant.
7

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 8 of 15
B. Commentary There are a number of significant findings from the data review. 1. It is remarkable that 43-47% of all stops and over 45% of all frisks were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. These results are not appreciably different from the data reviews for 2011, as set forth in the First and Second Reports. Thus, tens of thousands of persons in Philadelphia continue to be stopped each year (and a significant number frisked) without reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in our view, the audits conducted by the City for these two quarters are flawed. As the following data shows, Inspectors’ audits reported very low numbers of stops or frisks without reasonable suspicion. First Quarter, 2012 Central Police Division: 392 stops.11
No reasonable suspicion for stop: 4% (adjusting for car stops, 8%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 2% East Police Division: 391 stops. No reasonable suspicion for stop: 4% (adjustment=8%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 0% Northeast Police Division: 393 stops No reasonable suspicion for stop: 1% (adjustment=2%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 2%
11 Since the police audits included car stops, we have adjusted the reported rates of impermissible stops and frisks to reflect pedestrian stops only. On the assumptions that there are an equal number of car and pedestrian stops and that almost all car stops are made with reasonable suspicion, we have doubled the percentages of pedestrian stops made without reasonable suspicion. But even with this upward adjustment, the PPD and plaintiffs are still far apart in their conclusions.
8

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 9 of 15
Second Quarter, 2012 Central Police Division: 390 stops.
No reasonable suspicion for stop: 1% (adjustment=2%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 1% East Police Division: 394 stops No reasonable suspicion for stop: 2% (adjustment=4%) No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 1% Northeast Police Division: 393 stops No reasonable suspicion for stop: 0% No reasonable suspicion for frisk: 2% As this data makes clear, the differences between the PPD and plaintiff analysis is stark. Under plaintiffs’ assessments of the stops and frisks, not only is there an intolerably high level of unlawful stops and frisks, but the Inspectors and IAD are improperly crediting a substantial number of stops and frisks. 2. As with the data for 2011, the number of recorded frisks continues to be very low, with only14.4% of stops resulting in a frisk. Indeed, this ratio is substantially lower than the low rates (20-25%) reported in 2011. And, similar to the data review for 2011, a review of stops in which the police reported suspicion regarding possession of a gun or a violent crime revealed a large number of cases in which the police reported no frisk of the suspect. Thus, of 149 stops in which guns, gunshots, or a robbery is mentioned as a basis for the stop, there were no frisks recorded on 79 stops (53%). 3. Of substantial significance, the hit rates were again quite low. Contraband of any kind was recovered in only 29 stops (1.57% of all stops) and only 3 guns were seized (.16 of 1 %).
9

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 10 of 15
Further, 112 stops were made where the police indicated that the suspect possessed a weapon, yet in only 3 of these stops was a weapon recovered. Arrests occurred in 5.29% of all stops. While the courts have not quantified the reasonable suspicion standard in terms of expected hit rates for contraband (or for guns and other weapons), the hit rates in Philadelphia appear to be well below a reasonable threshold. In other words, if there was reasonable suspicion for all stops, and frisks, there should be far more than a 1.57% chance of recovering contraband. Moreover, in a program designed to remove guns from the street, there should be a far higher percentage of stops that yield guns or other weapons than the current 0.16%.
Reduction in the number of impermissible stops and frisks does not create a risk to public safety. New York City has recently released data on its stop and frisk practices for 2011, reporting a 28% reduction in the number of stops and a decrease in violent crime, and in particular homicides. As noted, Philadelphia has also reduced the number of stops, but the number of impermissible stops can be further substantially reduced without risk to public safety.
4. Analyzing improper stops and frisks by category, the results were quite similar to those for 2011. As we have reported to the City, there continue to be significant numbers of stops for conduct which the Agreement and case law make clear are not justifiable grounds for police stops or frisks. These include:
loitering (or persons hanging out; congregating) investigation of passenger in stopped car involved in a disturbance single person “obstructing” the sidewalk anonymous information (e.g., man with gun; man with drugs) person on steps or porch of “abandoned” property
10

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 11 of 15
person involved in verbal dispute (non-domestic)12 high crime area/roll call complaints panhandling flash information (e.g., theft or robbery), but where officer states that suspect did not match the flash information curfew or bar checks where person was well over 21 years of age As for frisks, problematic grounds include: frisk for officer protection frisk based on narcotics investigation frisk because suspect stopped in high crime or high drug area Plaintiffs did not expect that the transition from a stop and frisk practice that lacked any meaningful oversight to a system that accurately tabulates all stops and frisks and in which there is substantial compliance with the Constitution would be immediately successful. On the technology front, the initial design of the data base was flawed, but the City is moving to implement a new system. On the issue of whether stops and frisks are being conducted consistent with established legal standards, and in particular only where reasonable suspicion supports the stop or frisk, the results of our audits through the first two quarters of 2012 reflect persistent and unacceptably high rates of improper actions. Unless there is a dramatic change in practices, we will be compelled to seek judicial relief.
12 We credit reports of “domestic” disputes.
11

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 12 of 15
III. Racial Disparities In Possession Of Marijuana Arrests In Plaintiffs’ Second Report, our analysis of police arrest reports for a two month period
(September 15-November 15, 2011) for cases in which the only charge was possession of marijuana disclosed substantial racial disparities. Plaintiffs have reviewed police arrest reports for the same two month time frame in 2012. We conducted a City-wide analysis of arrests and then examined the data by police district. The results show even greater racial disparities than the 2011 data.
A. Possession of Marijuana Arrests in the City of Philadelphia In the time frame subject to analysis, there were 798 arrests solely for possession of marijuana, a slight increase from 2011 when there were 785 arrests. There were four circumstances that led to the seizures of marijuana:
pedestrian stops/arrests: 60% (compared to 49% in 2011);13 observed street purchases: 22% (23% in 2011); car stops: 14% (22% in 2011); and routine school security searches: 4% (6% in 2011). As depicted in the chart below, 673 or 84.4% of the arrests were of African Americans (compared to 83.4% in 2011), 69 or 8.6% were of Latinos (8.2% in 2011), 46 or 5.8 % were of Whites (7.4% in 2011), and 10 (or about 1%) were others (the same as in 2011). According to U.S. Census Data in 2010 the racial composition of Philadelphia County is 43.4% African American, 36.9% White, 12.3% Latino, 6.3% Asian, and 1.1% other. Thus, in a City where Whites represent
13 The arrests resulted from either investigatory stops that led to seizure of marijuana or actual arrests based on observations or information that established probable cause.
12

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 13 of 15
36.9% of the population, only 5.8% of those arrested for marijuana possession were White. This finding is of particular concern in light of evidence (discussed in Plaintiffs’ Second Report, at 32) that marijuana use is higher among Whites than among African Americans. Conversely, while African Americans represent 43.4% of the population, nearly double or 84.4% of those arrested for possession of marijuana were African Americans.

Racial Composition of Philadelphia

Latino 12.3%

Other 1.1%
Asian 6.3%

Black 43.4%

White 36.9%

Racial Composition of Marijuana Arrests in Philadelphia

Other 1%
Latino 8.6%
White 5.8%

Black 84.4%

13

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 14 of 15
B. Possession of Marijuana Arrests By Philadelphia Police District There are twenty-one police districts that report arrest data in Philadelphia. The demographics of each district vary along socio-economic and racial lines. The data on marijuana arrests by district in 2012 is quite similar to the arrest patterns observed in 2011, though there has been an increase in the proportion of pedestrian stops that led to the seizure of small amounts of marijuana. In predominantly African American districts (Districts 12, 14, 16, 19, 22, 35 and 39), almost all of the possession of marijuana arrests were of African American, principally young men. In many predominantly white districts (Districts 3, 6, 9, 15, 24, 25 and 26), most of the arrests were also of young African American men. As in 2011, in one largely White district (District 5), there were no arrests for possession of marijuana. C. Commentary The 2012 data bears a striking similarity to the data set analyzed in 2011. The nature of the arrests, the overall racial disparities, and the disparities by police districts with markedly different racial compositions show that these disparities are directly linked to policing protocols. While other factors may influence the extent of racial disparities in the overall stop and frisk data (e.g., crime patterns; deployment of more police in “high crime areas”), the stunning disparities found in even predominantly White police districts supports the conclusion that racial factors are impermissibly influencing the decision to stop, search and arrest. As noted, plaintiffs will be filing a Fourth Report that examines the racial implications of stop and frisk data. Plaintiffs’ Second Report urged the City to take remedial steps. We suggested that the PPD enhance protocols related to training and supervision to ensure that officers are not making arrests for possession of marijuana in a racially discriminatory manner. To that end, we requested that a
14

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 44 Filed 03/19/13 Page 15 of 15

Commissioner’s Memorandum and appropriate training curriculum for use at the Police Academy and for PPD officers and officials.
Plaintiffs also suggested that the PPD carefully monitor police practices in this area with supervisory and, if necessary, disciplinary actions to correct patterns of race-based enforcement. To accomplish that goal, we suggested that the PPD create a data base on possession of marijuana arrests that includes the date and place of occurrence, biographical information about the arrestee (including age, race and gender), and the circumstances that gave rise to the stop, seizure of the marijuana, and arrest. We requested that the data be provided to the plaintiffs’ counsel on a quarterly basis. The City failed to adopt the remedial measures proposed by plaintiffs or to undertake any steps to remedy the racially disparate practices related to marijuana arrests.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David Rudovsky, Esquire
/s/ Paul Messing, Esquire
Kairys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street, Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400

/s/ Mary Catherine Roper, Esquire ACLU of Pennsylvania PO Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106
/s/ Seth Kreimer, Esquire University of Pennsylvania Law School 3900 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Plaintiffs14

14 Counsel express their appreciation to a number of volunteer lawyers and law students who have donated hundreds of hours of time in this project. Special thanks to Solena Laigle and Jonathan C. Dunsmoor who have organized and structured the data collection and student reviews.
15

 
 Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mahari Bailey, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
City of Philadelphia, et al., Defendants

C.A. No. 10-5952

DEFENDANTS' SECOND REPORT TO COURT AND MONITOR1 I. Introduction
A. Procedural History The City, rather than restating Plaintiffs' Procedural History in its entirety, is in agreement with Plaintiffs' recitation, except for the following issues. 1. Plaintiffs' averments that high rates of stops and frisks undertaken by the Philadelphia Police Department ("PPD") were done so without reasonable suspicion is disputed by the City. The disparity in statistics between the parties is in large part due to incomplete paperwork, improper narratives used by police officers, and an overall lack of credibility in the electronic data because of a faulty electronic tracking and auditing system.2 2. The stops considered by Plaintiffs' Third Report were conducted after the PPD began a re-training of police officers; however, that re-training is not complete. In fact, Plaintiffs' counsel will have an opportunity to participate in further training of Police Inspectors on March 28, 2013. In addition to these measures, the PPD has also undertaken an initiative to
1 Defendants submit their Second Report in response to Plaintiffs' Third Report. Because Defendants' did not send a report in response to Plaintiffs' Second Report, the Defendants will address the issues outlined in that report in response to Plaintiffs' Fourth Report, which Defendants anticipate will include the same analysis. 2 The parties have held several meetings to discuss the City's plan to develop a comprehensive electronic tracking system for the 75-48A Forms, as well as a revamping of the auditing process.

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 2 of 14
promote and train more Inspectors and designate personnel solely committed to the management ofthe electronic 75-48A process.
B. The Data Review Process The PPD has established a process where all stops recorded on 75-48A forms either completed electronically or by paper forms, which are then manually data entered in the PPD database. PPD Inspectors then conduct audits of a random sample of data to determine whether a stop and frisk was recorded properly and conducted with reasonable suspicion. Those Inspector Audits then go through another level of review, where the Internal Affairs Division conducts their own audit of the Inspectors' work. At the end of each quarter, the PPD randomly selects approximately 3200 pedestrian and car stops that are subsequently turned over to the Plaintiffs. 3 In response to Plaintiffs' findings of significant problems in the implementation of the electronic database, the City has investigated those issues and has concluded that the electronic database, as it exists, is not capable of producing comprehensive and error free data for the purposes of the Consent Decree ("Agreement"). The City can produce the relevant data as required by the Agreement; however, it cannot do so without delay and without electronic 75-48A files missing from the database. The Philadelphia Police Department ("PPD") has implemented patches in order to improve its ability to comply with the Agreement. For example, the PPD is compiling hard copies of the 600 or so missing electronic 75-48A files, and forwarding them to Plaintiffs for their review. In addition to this work, the City and the PPD have found that it is necessary to create an entirely new
3 As Plaintiffs noted in their Third Report, the data is provided by the PPD in accordance with a stipulated schedule signed into Order by the Court.
2

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 3 of 14
database that will function more efficiently and be capable of producing more complete sets of data as required by the Agreement.
The process of creating a new electronic database has begun, with the enlistment of an IT Project Manager, who has interviewed all pertinent parties to gather requirements for the new system. The Project Manager is now creating the new electronic 75-48A form, which will then be followed by the creation of a new mechanism that will assist the Inspectors with their Audits of the data on a quarterly basis.4 The PPD plans to have a new electronic system implemented by December 31, 2013, and will provide Plaintiffs with periodic progress reports and access to the PPD personnel charged with the creation of the new system.
II. Police Review of 75-48A Forms in First and Second Quarters, 2012 A. Fourth Amendment Analysis Pursuant to the Agreement, PPD Inspectors were provided a random sample of 75-48A
Reports to review and audit on a quarterly basis. These samples were provided to Plaintiffs for their review. For the first and second quarters of2012, each PPD Inspector reviewed and audited approximately 400 75-48A Reports each quarter. As a result, the eight PPD Inspectors reviewed a total of approximately 3,200 75-48A Reports per quarterly audit. In addition, Internal Affairs conducted quarterly reviews and audits of a random sampling ofthe approximately 3200 75-48A Reports audited by the Inspectors. See Audit Statistics Citywide for 1Q and 2Q 2012 incorporated at pages 5 - 6 of this Report.
For purposes of this Report, the City will provide information based on the City-wide audits and reviews conducted by the Internal Affairs Division. The audits conducted by Internal Affairs provide an analysis of whether the stops and frisks for the period of January through June 2012 were supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion consistent with the Fourth and
4 The City and PPD have committed to allotting sufficient funds to create and implement this new electronic system. 3

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 4 of 14 Fourteenth Amendments.5 Further, the audits provide a racial breakdown of the individuals subjected to stops and frisks for the period of January- June 2012.
5 Under the Section titled "Error Rates", the PPD lists several error types that provide the basis for this Report. Specifically, "Basis for Stop Missing" is an analysis of whether reasonable suspicion for a stop existed; "Reasonable Suspicion Missing" is an analysis of whether reasonable suspicion for a frisk existed; and "Probable Cause Missing" is an analysis of whether probable cause for a search existed.
4

Audit Statistics Citywide for 102012
Total Number of Audits performed for 102012: 3625

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 5 of 14

Counts hy Race

White Black Asian American Indian Other* Total

1129 2126
98 18 254 3625

* - (Includes Latino(no race selected), UNK, Unknown or missing)

Actions Taken

Arrested Searched Frisked lVR Issued Live stop

Action

Total

White

Black

Asian American Indian

Other*

% of Total Audits

Ll\

286

84

187

4

0

11

7.89%

352

140

192

9

1

10

9.71%

459

104

324

5

0

26

12.66%

667

256

307

39

7

58

18.40%

2

0

2

0

0

0

0.06%

*-(Includes Latino(no race selected), UNK, Unknown or missing)

Error Rates

Error Type Race Info Misisng Location Missing Basis for Stop Missing Reasonable Suspicion Missing

Total 14 0 107 30

White 6 0 16 7

Black 3 0 82 23

Asian 0 0 0 0

American Indian 0 0 0 0

Other* 5 0 9 0

% of Total Audits 0.39% 0.00% 2.95% 0.83%

Probable Cause Missing

4

1

3

0

0

0

Subjects Personal Info Missing

24

5

19

0

0

0

Officer Payroll Missing

3

2

1

0

0

0

Officer Signature Missing

2

2

0

0

0

0

Supervisor Payroll Missing

169

42

120

3

0

4

Supervisor Signature Missing

180

29

143

6

0

2

Other Information Missing

324

61

226

14

1

22

* - (Includes latino(no race selected), UNK, Unknown or missing)

0.11% 0.66% 0.08% 0.06% 4.66% 4.97% 8.94%

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 6 of 14

\0

Audit Statistics Citywide for 202012
Total Number of Audits performed for 202012: 3516
Counts hy Race

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 7 of 14

White Black Asian American Indian Other* Total

1054 2164
66 13 219 3516

*-(Includes Latino( no race selected), UNK, Unknown or missing)

Arrested Searched Frisked lVR Issued Live stop

Action

Actions Taken
r--

Total 257 316 425 595
2

White 61 101 83 211 0

Black 179 195 309 317
0

Asian 1 1 2 22 0

American Indian 0 1 0 3 0

Other* 16 18 31 42 2

% of Total Audits 7.31% 8.99% 12.09% 16.92% 0.06%

* - (Includes Latino(no race selected), UNK, Unknown or missing)

Error Rates

Error Type Race Info Misisng location Missing Basis for Stop Missing

Total 11 0 75

White 4 0 15

Black 5 0 57

Asian 0 0
0

American Indian 0 0 0

Other* 2
0
3

%of Total Audits 0.31% 0.00% 2.13%

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 8 of 14

Reasonable Suspicion Missing

33

7

25

0

0

1

Probable Cause Missing

2

0

2

0

0

0

Subjects Personal Info Missing

20

6

14

0

0

0

Officer Payroll Missing

7

3

4

0

0

0

Officer Signature Missing

1

1

0

0

0

0

Supervisor Payroll Missing

209

46

134

2

0

27

Supervisor Signature Missing

191

50

137

2

0

2

Other Information Missing

350

84

233

7

3

23

*-(Includes Latino( no race selected), UNK, Unknown or missing)

0.94% 0.06% 0.57%
0.20%
0.03% 5.94% 5.43% 9.95%

00

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 9 of 14
Over the first and second quarters of2012, Internal Affairs reviewed and audited a total of7,141 75-48A Reports. As a result of the Internal Affairs audit process, the City contends that 6959 pedestrian/vehicle stops were made with the requisite reasonable suspicion and 182 pedestrian/vehicle stops were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. Of 884 frisks conducted by PPD, 821 were made with the requisite reasonable suspicion and 63 were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. In addition, the Audit Statistics Citywide forms provide a racial breakdown of those individuals subjected to frisks, searches and arrests. This racial breakdown includes a category labeled "Other'', which accounts for the Latino population.
B. Commentary The City will address each of Plaintiffs' conclusions and concerns in the order as they appear in Plaintiffs' Third Report: 1. The disparity between Plaintiffs' and the PPD's analysis ofthe data should not lead to the conclusion that about half of all stops and frisks are conducted without reasonable suspicion and thus unlawful. Clearly, a disconnect exists between the analyses conducted by Plaintiffs' and the PPD personnel tasked with auditing the data. Inspectors and lAD Investigators possess a knowledge and training to read and understand the narratives provided by police officers. While these narratives may not at times comport to the requirements established in the Agreement, they do not in and of themselves constitute an unconstitutionality of the stops and frisks. The Inspectors and lAD Investigators comprehend what the officers are describing and are crediting stops as lawful based on their familiarity with the verbiage used by the officers. The City and the PPD have made many strides towards bringing police officers' reporting of stops and frisks in line with constitutionally required standards. First, Directive 54 of the PPD Directives has been amended to provide more guidance and clarity into what information is
9

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 10 of 14
required on 75-48A forms. Second, the PPD has installed newly promoted Inspectors who have been trained to audit stops and frisks. These new Inspectors are dedicated to this process, and are being provided with the resources and oversight capabilities required to successfully carryout their functions. Finally, in addition to the re-training provided to police officers, the PPD provided a forum for Plaintiffs' counsel to offer their interpretation of what are constitutional stops and frisks directly to PPD personnel. On March 28, 2013, together with the PPD Plaintiffs' counsel participated in a training session designed to further educate police personnel on lawful stops and the proper way to articulate the reasons for stops and frisks.
2. The lack of recording of frisks in reports of gun possession, gun shots fired, and burglary is indicative of the difficulty the PPD has had in having the 75-48A Forms properly created. Clearly the recording system needs to be re-vamped and officer re-training is required, because frisks do occur when suspects are stopped for gun-related offenses, and those frisks arise from reasonable suspicion.
3. The City renews its reservations with respect to the significance of"hit-rates" in assessing the legality and effectiveness of stop and frisk practices. Assessing and utilizing a "hitrate" in the analysis of stops and frisks would also have to take into consideration an officer's discretion to not arrest an individual for what is considered or perceived as minor/nuisance offenses. By removing this type of discretion, the "hit-rate" could be substantially increased. Plaintiffs themselves even acknowledge that courts have not quantified the reasonable suspicion standard in terms of expected hit rates for contraband, yet still surmise that reasonable suspicion did not exist for a large number of stops without offering any standard to support their conclusions.
10

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 11 of 14
Plaintiffs' counsel has mischaracterized the purpose of stops and frisks, which is a wellrecognized law enforcement tool. The PPD has made a concerted effort to implement many law enforcement strategies in order to reduce crime, specifically violent crime. While the recovery of illegal weapons is something any law enforcement agency strives for, it is not in and of itself the only reason why the police department conducts its investigative techniques. Plaintiffs have put the cart before the horse when they state a low recovery rate for contraband can only be explained by a high rate ofunconstitutional stops and frisks. When conducting audits, the analysis begins with the determination of whether there exists reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk, and not whether contraband was recovered thus validating the stop and frisk.
Finally, Plaintiffs point to data that a reduced number of stops and a drop in violent crime can only lead one to conclude that the reducing stops further will not risk public safety. What this data actually shows is that stop and frisk, as a law enforcement technique, is working and the reduction in violent crime can be explained by the implementation of several police tactics. Plaintiffs themselves even admit that Philadelphia has reduced the number of stops, but to go a step further and say a further reduction in stops will not harm public safety is conclusion offered without the support of empirical evidence.
4. The City and the PPD agree that "loitering" and "loitering-related" narratives account for a high percentage of improper stops. As a result, we have undertaken substantial steps to address this area of concern. Specifically, PPD implemented Bridging the Gap Curriculum, which is mandatory training to be taken by all police officers. The course has been offered from October 2011 through the present. As of May of2012, 3,649 sworn personnel have been trained through this program. After several meetings with Plaintiffs' counsel, the PPD agreed to provide counsel with an opportunity to participate in a training program designed to
II

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 12 of 14
further identify narratives being used that do not adequately describe the basis for lawful stop.6 It has long been the PPD's position that such faulty narratives are not the result of an unlawful stop, but that of improper paperwork.
The City and the PPD have worked tirelessly to implement a proper and reliable method for recording stops and frisks in order to provide dependable data to Plaintiffs' counsel and the ACLU. In addition to these efforts, the PPD has implemented, and continues to establish, further training of police personnel in the form of written directives, memoranda, and actual classroom style training. Plaintiffs agree with the City and PPD that the electronic database is particularly flawed. The PPD continues to work on the creation and implementation of a new database, devoted to providing reliable data not only to Plaintiffs but also for the benefit of police officers to assist in carrying out their duties.
III. Racial Disparities In Possession Of Marijuana Arrests Pursuant to the Stipulated Order for Compliance with the Consent Decree, the PPD has
provided marijuana related arrest reports for a two-month period (September 15- November 15) and will continue to provide those reports on an annual basis for the same two-month period. The City and the PPD have not conducted a statistical analysis of the data as of yet, but take issue with Plaintiffs characterization of the arrests as being a harbinger of racial discrimination.
A. Possession of Marijuana Arrests in the City of Philadelphia Plaintiffs point to a chart included in their Second Report as evidence that marijuana use is higher among Whites than African Americans. However, the characterization of this data is misleading. The chart shows that in 2008-2009 almost 60% of Whites stated they had ever used marijuana in their lives, as opposed to 50% of African Americans. However, when both Whites
6 As noted above in this report, Plaintiffs' counsel participated in a March 28,2013 training session where a discussion of what a proper narrative for a stop and frisk should articulate.
12

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 13 of 14
and African Americans were asked if they used marijuana in the last month, according to the chart both demographics registered at 20%. Assuming these numbers are indicative ofmarijuana use in Philadelphia7, to claim that marljuana is consistently used more by Whites than African Americans because those persons asked admitted to have tried marijuana at least once in their lives is erroneous.
B. Possession of Marijuana Arrests By Philadelphia Police District Besides reciting the raw data surrounding the number ofmarijuana arrests by police district, Plaintiffs fail to provide any analysis that would lead to a reasonable conclusion. Plaintiffs admit in their Third Report that other factors such as crime patterns and increased police deployment in high crime areas play a role in examining the factors leading to marijuana arrests. Yet these factors are not ultimately considered when Plaintiffs assert that police protocols are linked to racial discrimination. In addition to police deployment, there are other factors that must be taken into consideration. A further evaluation into how, where, and when marijuana is used by race and socio-economic factors could more accurately provide an understanding as to why the data shows more African Americans are being arrested for possession of marijuana. Also, Plaintiffs' breakdown of the marijuana arrest data also does not take into account the usage of marijuana "off the street". This type of use and possession of course cannot be accounted for via stops and frisks conducted by police officers on the street. C. Commentary Plaintiffs' have suggested the City and PPD to take steps to further train and supervise officers with respect to the City's stop and frisk police, and with marijuana arrests. As stated
7 The data provided by Plaintiffs' counsel is not tailored to the City of Philadelphia, but instead constitutes a National study into marijuana use.
13

Case 2:10-cv-05952-SD Document 47 Filed 04/02/13 Page 14 of 14
previously in this report, the City and PPD have amended police directives, issued memoranda, and implemented training programs for existing officers and for new recruits. The City and the PPD have made Inspectors and lAD Investigators available to Plaintiffs' counsel in order to achieve a better understanding among the parties and to bridge the gap between each sides' interpretations of the data.
In addition to training and investment into human capital, the PPD has and continues to improve its technological capabilities in order to more accurately capture the data required by the Consent Decree. Ultimately, the data that is now being provided to Plaintiffs' counsel is not as accurate as it can and should be. Until we have a working database with data integrity, the statistics cannot be relied upon to support a conclusion that over half of the stops and frisks conducted in the City of Philadelphia are done so without reasonable suspicion, and thus are unconstitutional.
Respectfully Submitted,
Is/ Craig M. Straw
Craig M. Straw, Esquire Chief Deputy City Solicitor
Dimitrios Mavroudts, squire Pa. Attorney ID No. 93773 City ofPhiladelphia Law Department 1515 Arch Street, 14th Floor Philadelphia, PA 191 02 (215) 683-5433 dimitrios.mavroudis@phila.gov
14

 
 Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 1 of 13
CLOSED,SPECIAL
United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:10−cv−05952−SD

BAILEY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al Assigned to: HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL all others Case: 2:10−cv−05250−RBS
related Cases: 2:96−cv−06045−SD
2:14−cv−03365−SD
2:15−cv−04940−SD Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Adminstrator

Date Filed: 11/04/2010 Date Terminated: 12/20/2011 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

DEAN JOANNE EPPS

represented by JOANNE EPPS BEASLEY SCHOOL OF LAW 813 KLEIN BUILDING 1719 NORTH BROAD STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19122 Email: JAEPPS@TEMPLE.EDU PRO SE

Plaintiff MAHARI BAILEY

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY KAIRYS RUDOVSKY MESSING & FEINBERG LLP THE CAST IRON BLDG STE 501 SOUTH 718 ARCH STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−925−4400 Fax: 215−925−5365 Email: drudovsky@krlawphila.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MARY CATHERINE ROPER ACLU OF PA PO BOX 60173 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−592−1513 Email: mroper@aclupa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

PAUL M. MESSING KAIRYS RUDOVSKY MESSING & FEINBERG LLP THE CAST IRON BLDG STE 501 SOUTH 718 ARCH STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−925−4400 Fax: 215−925−5365 Email: pmessing@krlawphila.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SETH KREIMER 3400 CHESTNUT STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104 215−898−7447

Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 2 of 13

Email: skreimer@law.upenn.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff TIMOTHY STREATY

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARY CATHERINE ROPER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL M. MESSING (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SETH KREIMER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff FERNANDO MONTERO

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARY CATHERINE ROPER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL M. MESSING (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SETH KREIMER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff PRESTON FULTON

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARY CATHERINE ROPER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL M. MESSING (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SETH KREIMER

Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 3 of 13

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff GREGORY BLACKMON, JR.

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARY CATHERINE ROPER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL M. MESSING (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SETH KREIMER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JOHN CORNISH

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARY CATHERINE ROPER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL M. MESSING (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SETH KREIMER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff CARL CUTLER

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARY CATHERINE ROPER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL M. MESSING (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SETH KREIMER

Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 4 of 13

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
JEWELL WILLIAMS Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARY CATHERINE ROPER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL M. MESSING (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SETH KREIMER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

represented by CARLTON L. JOHNSON ARCHER & GREINER, P.C. ONE LIBERTY PL 32ND FL 1650 MARKET ST PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103−7393 215−963−3300 Fax: 215−963−9999 Email: cjohnson@archerlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPT 1515 ARCH ST., 14TH FL PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−683−5444 Fax: 215−683−5069 Email: dimitrios.mavroudis@phila.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JONATHAN COOPER PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT 1515 ARCH STREET 14TH FLOOR PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−683−5448 Email: jonathan.cooper@phila.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHELLEY R. SMITH 30 E. SPRINGFIELD AVENUE PHILADEPHIA, PA 19118 267−254−5679 Email: shelley.smith@phila.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 5 of 13

CRAIG M. STRAW CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT 1515 ARCH STREET 14TH FLOOR PHILA, PA 19102 215−683−5442 Email: craig.straw@phila.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
CHARLES RAMSEY Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER KEITH DONOFRIO BADGE NUMBER

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant OFFICER JANE DOE

Defendant
OFFICER MICHAEL MCCORMICK BADGE NUMBER 7300

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address)

Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 6 of 13

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER GREGORY GIACOMELLI BADGE NUMBER 3916

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER MARTIN CAMPBELL BADGE NUMBER 5262

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER PAUL PORT BADGE NUMBER 3146

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER THOMAS SCHAFFLING BADGE NUMBER 7535

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 7 of 13

SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER TIMOTHY DEVLIN BADGE NUMBER 1914

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER DONNA STEWART BADGE NUMBER 6116

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
SGT. KEVIN BERNARD BADGE NUMBER 244

represented by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JONATHAN COOPER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SHELLEY R. SMITH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG M. STRAW (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICERS JOHN DOE(S) #1−12 individually and as police officers for the

Case: 2:10-cv-05952-SD As of: 10/27/2016 01:16 PM EDT 8 of 13 City of Philadelphia

Date Filed 11/04/2010
11/04/2010 11/04/2010 11/09/2010
11/24/2010 11/24/2010 11/29/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, JANE DOE, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, OFFICERS JOHN DOE(S) #1−12, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number PPE032113.), filed by FERNANDO MONTERO, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR, JOHN CORNISH, MAHARI BAILEY, PRESTON FULTON, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS, CARL CUTLER.(jeb, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/13/2012: # 1 designation form) (tl, ). (Entered: 11/04/2010)
Summons Issued as to KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART. 11 Forwarded To: Counsel on 11/4/10 (jeb, ) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
DEMAND for Trial by Jury by MAHARI BAILEY, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR, JOHN CORNISH, CARL CUTLER, PRESTON FULTON, FERNANDO MONTERO, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS. (jeb, ) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
2 SUMMONS Returned Executed by FERNANDO MONTERO, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR, JOHN CORNISH, MAHARI BAILEY, PRESTON FULTON, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS, CARL CUTLER re: PAUL MESSING served Summons and Complaint upon KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART by PERSONAL. KEVIN BERNARD served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; MARTIN CAMPBELL served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; TIMOTHY DEVLIN served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; KEITH DONOFRIO served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; GREGORY GIACOMELLI served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; MICHAEL MCCORMICK served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; PAUL PORT served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; CHARLES RAMSEY served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; THOMAS SCHAFFLING served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010; DONNA STEWART served on 11/8/2010, answer due 11/29/2010. (dp, ) (Entered: 11/09/2010)
3 Stipulation for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1 Complaint, by all parties filed by PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, DONNA STEWART, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, MARTIN CAMPBELL, KEVIN BERNARD, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, KEITH DONOFRIO. (STRAW, CRAIG) **(FILED IN ERROR BY ATTY., STIPULATION FORWARDED TO CLERK/JUDGE FOR APPROVAL)** Modified on 11/26/2010 (fh) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
4 Stipulation for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1 Complaint, by all parties filed by KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART. (STRAW, CRAIG) **(FILED IN ERROR BY ATTY., DUPLICATE FILING, SAME AS DOC. 3 )** Modified on 11/26/2010 (fh) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
5 ORDER THAT KEVIN BERNARD; MARTIN CAMPBELL; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ; TIMOTHY DEVLIN; KEITH DONOFRIO; GREGORY GIACOMELLI; MICHAEL MCCORMICK; PAUL PORT; CHARLES RAMSEY; THOMAS SCHAFFLING; DONNA STEWART SHALL FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING ON OR BEFORE 1/7/2010.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE R. BARCLAY SURRICK ON 11/29/10. 11/29/10 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED.(dp, ) (Entered: 11/29/2010)

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12/06/2010
12/13/2010 12/14/2010 12/20/2010 12/21/2010 03/22/2011 04/25/2011 05/09/2011 06/21/2011
06/21/2011 06/21/2011

6 Request to Transfer Case from Honorable R. Barclay Surrick to Honorable Stewart Dalzell by All Parties filed by KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART, Certificate of service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − D) (STRAW, CRAIG) Modified on 12/7/2010 (nd). (Entered: 12/06/2010)
7 ORDER THAT THIS CASE IS REASSIGNED FROM HONORABLE R. BARCLAY SURRICK TO HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL FOR ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS AS IT IS RELATED TO C.A. 96−6045. SIGNED BY HONORABLE HARVEY BARTLE, III ON 12/13/2010. 12/14/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/14/2010)
8 ORDER THAT THE INITIAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SHALL CONVENE ON 12/20/2010 10:00 AM IN JUDGE CHAMBERS BEFORE HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 12/14/2010. 12/14/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/14/2010)
9 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Pretrial Conference held on 12/20/2010. (kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
10 ORDER THAT THE PARTIES SHALL CONVENE IN CHAMBERS FOR CONTINUED CONSIDERATION OF PRETRIAL MATTERS ON 3/21/2011 04:00 PM BEFORE HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL,ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 12/20/2010. 12/21/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
11 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Pretrial Conference held on 3/21/2011. (kk, ) (Entered: 03/22/2011)
12 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Pretrial Conference held on 4/25/2011. (kk, ) (Entered: 04/26/2011)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by CARLTON L. JOHNSON on behalf of CITY OF PHILADELPHIA with Certificate of Service(JOHNSON, CARLTON) (Entered: 05/09/2011)
14 ORDER THAT THE CONSENT DECREE IS APPROVED AND MADE AN ORDER OF THIS COURT; A CLASS IS CERTIFIED PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P 23(b)(2) AS FOLLOWS: ALL PERSONS, INCLUDINCG PEDESTRIANS AND OPERATORS OR PASSENGERS IN OTOR VEHICLES, WHO WERE OR WILL BE STOPPED, FRISKED, DETAINED AN/OR SEARCHED BY PHILADELPHIA POLICE OFFICERS ON OR AFTER 11/4/2008 WITHOUT LEGAL JUSTIFICATION AS REQUIRED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, OR ON LEGALLY IMPERMISSIBLE CONSIDERATIONS OF RACE OR NATIONAL ORGIN IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OR TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000(d); PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P.23(g)(1), MARY CATHERINE ROPER, DAVID RUDOVSKY, PAUL MESSING, AND SETH KREIMER, ESQUIRES, ARE APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR THE CLASS, AND THIS COURT SHALL RETAIN JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE CONSENT DECREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS,ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 6/21/2011. 6/21/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kk, ) Modified on 6/22/2011 (kk, ). (Entered: 06/21/2011)
15 ORDER THAT JOANNE A. EPPS IS APPOINTED MONITOR TO CARRY OUT THE DUTIES OF THAT OFFICE AS PROVIDED IN THE CONSENT DECREE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 6/21/2011. 6/21/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kk, ) Modified on 6/22/2011 (kk, ). (Entered: 06/21/2011)
16 ORDER AND CONSENT DECREE AS OUTLINED HEREIN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 6/21/2011. 6/21/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(kk, ) Modified on 6/22/2011 (kk, ). (Entered: 06/21/2011)

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07/11/2011 07/19/2011
07/19/2011 08/11/2011
09/13/2011 09/16/2011
09/16/2011 09/28/2011 11/02/2011
11/03/2011 11/03/2011

17 NOTICE of Hearing: A RULE 16 CONFERENCE IS SET FOR 7/19/2011 AT 10:00 AM IN JUDGE CHAMBERS, ROOM 15613, BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL.(ea, ) (Entered: 07/11/2011)
18 ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANT SHALL COMPLETE AN IME OF PLAINTIFF JEWELL WILLIAMS BY 8/12/2011; COUNSEL SHALL COONVENE IN CHAMBERS (ROOM 15613) AT 4:00 PM ON 8/15/2011 FOR A PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE; THE CLERK OF COURT MARK THIS ACTION CLOSED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES AND PLACE THE MATTER IN THE CIVIL SUSPENSE FILE., ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 7/19/2011. 7/20/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
19 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Pretrial Conference held on 7/19/2011. (kk, ) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
20 ORDER THAT UPON CONSIDERATIN OF DEFENDANTS' LETTER TODAY TO THE COURT, THE CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 8/15/2011 AT 4:00 PM, IS CANCELLED; AND COUNSEL SHALL CONVENE IN CHAMBERS (ROOM 15613) AT 3:00 PM, ON 9/8/2011 FOR A PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, AND THE PLAINTIFF AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEFENDANTS WITH PLENARY AUTHORITY TO SETTLE SHALL BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 8/11/2011. 8/11/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(amas) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
21 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Settlement Conference held on 9/13/2011. (kk, ) (Entered: 09/13/2011)
22 ORDER THAT BY 9/23/2011 THE PARTIES SHALL SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS COURT SHOULD (1) NOT CONSTRUE THE PHRASE "THESE CLAIMS" IN VI.A. TO MEAN SOLELY THE MONETARY DAMAGE CLAIMS OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS WHO DID NOT SETTLE, AND (2) NOT DEEM THE LIABILITY OF THE DEFENDANTS TO THE JEWELL WILLIAMS CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN DEFINITIVELY RESOLVED AS TO THE CLASS AS TO WHICH JEWELL WILLIAMS WAS A CLASS REPRESENTATIVE IN THE 6/21/2011 CONSENT DECREE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 9/16/2011. 9/16/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
23 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Settlement Conference held on 9/16/2011. (kk, ) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
24 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by JEWELL WILLIAMS.Memorandum of Law and Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(MESSING, PAUL) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
25 ORDER THAT THE PARTIES SHALL BY NOON ON 11/7/2011 ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHY THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS NOT FUTILE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE JURISPRUDENCE UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 15 IN VIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF VI.A OF THIS COURT'S CONSENT DECREE OF 6/21/2011. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 11/2/2011. 11/3/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED AND FAXED BY CHAMBERS.(kk, ) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
26 Letter from PAUL MESSING, ESQ. TO JUDGE DALZELL: RESPONSE TO COURT'S ORDER OF 11/2/2011. (kk, ) (Entered: 11/04/2011)
27 ORDER THAT THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND IS DENIED AS MOOT; THE PARTIES SHALL FILE THEIR PRETRIAL SUBMISSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COURT'S STANDING ORDER BY NOON ON 11/17/2011; AND A JURY TRIAL WILL BE HELD ON 11/21/2011 09:30 AM IN COURTROOM 13−B BEFORE HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL, ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 11/3/2011. 11/4/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED AND FAXED BY CHAMBERS.(kk, ) (Entered: 11/04/2011)

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11/08/2011
12/08/2011 12/08/2011 12/08/2011 12/08/2011 12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011
12/20/2011 12/20/2011
12/18/2012

28 ORDER THAT THE EPISTOLARY REQUEST IS GRANTED IN PART; PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS COURT'S ORDER OF 11/3/2011 IS AMENDED TO SUBSTITUTE " DECEMBER 9, 2011" AS THE DATE FOR FILING PRETRIAL SUBMISSIONS; PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE NOVEMBER 3 ORDER IS AMENDED TO SUBSTITUTE "12/19/2011 09:30 AM IN COURTROOM BEFORE HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL" AS THE DATE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL; AND NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED ABSENT GRAVE CAUSE, SUCH AS THE DEMISE OF TRIAL COUNSEL. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 11/8/2011. 11/8/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 11/08/2011)
29 Proposed Voir Dire by JEWELL WILLIAMS. Certificate of Service (MESSING, PAUL) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
30 Proposed Jury Instructions by JEWELL WILLIAMS. Certificate of Service (MESSING, PAUL) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
31 Proposed Jury Interrogatories by JEWELL WILLIAMS. Certificate of Service (MESSING, PAUL) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
32 STIPULATION Joint Pretrial Stipulation by JEWELL WILLIAMS. (MESSING, PAUL) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
33 Proposed Voir Dire by KEVIN BERNARD, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING. Certificate of Service (STRAW, CRAIG) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
34 Proposed Jury Instructions by KEVIN BERNARD, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING. Certificate of Service (STRAW, CRAIG) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
35 Proposed Verdict Sheet by KEVIN BERNARD, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING.. Certificate of Service (STRAW, CRAIG) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
36 ORDER THAT THE CLERK OF COURT TRANSFER SAID CASE FROM THE CIVIL SUSPENSE FILE TO THE CURRENT DOCKET FOR FINAL DISPOSITION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 12/20/2011. 12/20/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
37 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Jury Trial (Day 1) held on 12/19/2011 (kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
38 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Jury Trial (Day 2) completed on 12/20/2011 (kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
39 Questions to Jurors with answers thereof. (kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
40 ORDER THAT THE CLERK OF COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PA BE AND HE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO FURNISH LUNCH FOR JURORS ENGAGED IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 12/20/2011. 12/20/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
41 JUDGMENT in favor of JEWELL WILLIAMS against CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, KEVIN BERNARD, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, TIMOTHY DEVLIN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 12/20/2011. 12/20/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
42 ORDER THAT THE COURT HAVING THIS DAY ENTERED JUDGMENT ON THE REMAINING INDIVIDUAL CLAIM OF JEWELL WILLIAMS, THE CLERK SHALL CLOSE THIS MATTER STATISTICALLY. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 12/20/2011. 12/20/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
43 STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE WITH CONSENT DECREE AS OUTLINED HEREIN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 12/18/2012. 12/19/2012 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 12/19/2012)

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03/19/2013 03/21/2013 04/02/2013
04/02/2013 12/03/2013 12/23/2013 02/24/2015 03/13/2015 01/08/2016 02/25/2016 02/29/2016 03/22/2016

44 Report Of Plaintiffs to Court and Monitor by MAHARI BAILEY, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR, JOHN CORNISH, CARL CUTLER, PRESTON FULTON, FERNANDO MONTERO, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS. (MESSING, PAUL) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
45 ORDER THAT THE CLERK OF COURT SHALL LIST ON THE DOCKET SHEET DEAN JOANNE EPPS AS "COURT−APPOINTED MONITOR" WITH THE INFORMATION OUTLINED HEREIN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 3/21/2013. 3/22/2013 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 03/22/2013)
46 NOTICE of Appearance by DIMITRIOS MAVROUDIS on behalf of KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART with Certificate of Service(MAVROUDIS, DIMITRIOS) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
47 Report Of Defendants to Court and Monitor by KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART. (MAVROUDIS, DIMITRIOS) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
48 STATUS REPORT Fourth Report to Court by MAHARI BAILEY, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR., JOHN CORNISH, CARL CUTLER, PRESTON FULTON, FERNANDO MONTERO, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS. (RUDOVSKY, DAVID) Modified on 12/4/2013 (md). (Entered: 12/03/2013)
49 STATUS REPORT Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Fourth Report by KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART. (MAVROUDIS, DIMITRIOS) (Entered: 12/23/2013)
50 STATUS REPORT Fifth Report by Plaintiffs by MAHARI BAILEY, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR, JOHN CORNISH, CARL CUTLER, PRESTON FULTON, FERNANDO MONTERO, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
51 STATUS REPORT Reply to Plaintiffs' Fifth Report by CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(MAVROUDIS, DIMITRIOS) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
52 NOTICE of Appearance by JONATHAN COOPER on behalf of KEVIN BERNARD, MARTIN CAMPBELL, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TIMOTHY DEVLIN, KEITH DONOFRIO, GREGORY GIACOMELLI, MICHAEL MCCORMICK, PAUL PORT, CHARLES RAMSEY, THOMAS SCHAFFLING, DONNA STEWART with Certificate of Service(COOPER, JONATHAN) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
53 ORDER THAT PARTIES SHALL CONVENE IN CHAMBERS (ROOM 15613) FOR A STATUS CONFERENCE AT 9:00 A.M. ON 3/15/2016. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 2/25/16. 2/25/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kw, ) (VACATED as per 54 Order) (va, ). (Entered: 02/25/2016)
54 ORDER OUR ORDER FROM FEBRUARY 25, 2016 (DOCKET ENTRY # 53 ) IS VACATED; AND THE PARTIES SHALL CONVENE IN CHAMBERS (ROOM 15613) FOR A STATUS CONFERENCE AT 9:00 A.M. ON MARCH 22, 2016. SIGNED BY HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL ON 2/29/16. 2/29/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED. (va, ) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
55 STATUS REPORT Sixth Report by Plaintiffs by MAHARI BAILEY, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR, JOHN CORNISH, CARL CUTLER, PRESTON FULTON, FERNANDO MONTERO, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS. (ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 03/22/2016)

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03/22/2016 03/22/2016

56 STATUS REPORT Sixth Report by Plaintiffs − corrected by MAHARI BAILEY, GREGORY BLACKMON, JR, JOHN CORNISH, CARL CUTLER, PRESTON FULTON, FERNANDO MONTERO, TIMOTHY STREATY, JEWELL WILLIAMS. (ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
57 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE STEWART DALZELL: Status Conference held on 3/22/2016. (aeg) (Entered: 03/25/2016)