Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 87 Filed 08/07/06 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER 1313 Lincoln Place Brooklyn, NY 11213
NICOLE DAVIS 403 West 23rd Street Baltimore, MD 21211
HELEN JOHNSON 318 Woods End Road Westfield, NJ 07090
JESSICA LAHOOD 54 E. 8th Street Apartment 6-H New York, NY 10003
NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG 1414 Lincoln Place Brooklyn, NY 11213
TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG 403 West 23rd Street Baltimore, MD 21211
BRIAN ROSA 950 Main Street Worcester, MA 01610
FRANCIS SCHLEICHER 1551 N. 60th Street Wauwatosa, WI 53208
DEBRA SMITH 403 West 23rd Street Baltimore, MD 21211
TODD SPALT 403 West 23rd Street Baltimore, MD 21211

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) Civil Action No.: 03-906 (JDB)

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Jury Trial Demanded

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and

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JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN

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403 West 23rd Street

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Baltimore, MD 21211

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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CHIEF CHARLES H. RAMSEY

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and in his official capacity as

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Chief of Police

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Metropolitan Police Department

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300 Indiana Avenue, NW

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Washington, DC 20020

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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441 4th Street, NW

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Washington, DC 20001

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MARK BEACH

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Captain, Metropolitan Police Dept.

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in his individual capacity

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c/o 300 Indiana Ave., N.W.

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Washington, D.C. 20001

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ARTHUR BROWN

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in his individual capacity

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MPD Officer #4283

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Residential address uncertain

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c/o D.C. Metropolitan Police Dept.

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300 Indiana Ave., NW

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Washington, D.C. 20001

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MICHAEL CARRUTH

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in his individual capacity

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MPD Officer #2043

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510 21st Street, NW

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Washington, D.C. 20006

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MALCOLM FORBES

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in his individual capacity

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MPD Officer #2093

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Residential address uncertain

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c/o Metropolitan Police Department

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300 Indiana Ave., NW

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Washington, D.C. 20001

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ANDREA LATSON

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in her individual capacity

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MPD Officer #3725

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Residential address uncertain

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c/o D.C. Metropolitan Police Dept.

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300 Indiana Ave., NW

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Washington, D.C. 20001

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C. MEYLA

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in his or her individual capacity

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Current or former MPD Officer #748

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address unknown

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RAYMOND MINCEY

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in his individual capacity

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MPD Officer #283

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Residential address uncertain

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c/o D.C. Metropolitan Police Dept.

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300 Indiana Ave., NW

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Washington, D.C. 20001

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WENDY PAYNE

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in her individual capacity

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Residential address uncertain

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MPD Officer #524

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c/o Metropolitan Police Dept.

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300 Indiana Ave., NW

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Washington, D.C. 20001

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ADRIAN SANDERS

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in individual capacity

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Residential address uncertain

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MPD Officer #2332

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c/o Metropolitan Police Dept.

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300 Indiana Ave., NW

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Washington, D.C. 20001

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and

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ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

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in official capacity as Director,

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

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935 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

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Washington, D.C. 20535

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Defendants.

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SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (False arrest and imprisonment; First and Fourth Amendments and due process violations
in addition the common law of the District of Columbia; conspiracy to commit said violations)

The right to engage in political association and peaceful assembly free of government

targeting or discriminatory treatment or arrest is a fundamental bedrock of democracy.

The District of Columbia and federal law enforcement agencies, however, have singled out and targeted persons who are, or are perceived to be, adherents or advocates of Anarchy1 in

the absence of probable cause. In this current period of increased political activism and a growing

social justice movement, there is time and again the presence in concerted political action of

persons who either self-identify as Anarchists or are perceived (and therefore, targeted) as

Anarchists because they dress in black. Current D.C. Metropolitan Police Department training

1 There is no suggestion here that there is a singular ideology or stream of thought that is Anarchy, which has a long history of activism, political association as well as ideological expression through writings. Current day anarchist Noam Chomsky writes that “Anarchism, in my view, is an expression of the idea that the burden of proof is always on those who argue that authority and domination are necessary. They have to demonstrate, with powerful argument, that that conclusion is correct. If they cannot, then the institutions they defend should be considered illegitimate.”
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materials on mass demonstrations candidly describe how “law enforcement would target anybody dressed in black.”
On April 20, 2002, plaintiffs engaged in mass demonstration activity, as part of a demonstration that drew tens of thousands to Washington, D.C. Many in plaintiffs’ group were dressed in black, and perceived by law enforcement to be Anarchists. At the end of the day, they were in a parking garage for which a member of their group possessed a swipe card (for weekend access), where a vehicle they were using was parked. They had paused after a day of outdoor demonstration to eat some food.
Plaintiffs were targeted by law enforcement, who approached with guns drawn. Protestors were ordered to sit against a wall, and to place their possessions in front of them. The police searched their possessions and persons and reviewed their political material. The protestors had committed no crime. There was no probable cause to arrest them.
Law enforcement used this false arrest for intelligence gathering. They demanded to know about the protestors’ political activities, their associations, what demonstrations they had been to in the past, and with whom they were staying. Two agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation selected protestors and one-by-one questioned them on video. Officers took images of political patches and slogans on the protestors’ clothing. They reviewed their flyers and political material. Law enforcement arrested the protestors and, in the process, took even more information including fingerprints.
Keenly aware of the political nature of these arrests, one officer harassed the activists by telling them that he did not believe they were informed about the issues they were protesting, that they probably did not even know what the International Monetary Fund or World Bank did.
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When a female arrestee spoke in substantive response, the officer told her to shut up, and explained that women are beaten by their boyfriends because “women run their mouths and then their boyfriends have to shut them up.” He let a male protestor respond.
The protestors were handcuffed, taken away and put in jail. After detaining the plaintiffs in jail for a period of hours, and having collected identity, associational, and political activity information, the District of Columbia then released them, charging each with unlawful entry into the garage within which their vehicle was parked and for which they possessed an electronic swipe card. The prosecutor declined to pursue these charges and the plaintiffs were no-papered. The D.C. Superior Court has since ruled that there is clear and convincing evidence that each did not commit the crime for which he/she was arrested, and has expunged the arrests.
Plaintiffs now seek to hold accountable the District of Columbia and federal law enforcement authorities and each of the individual officers who committed these unlawful and unconstitutional warrantless arrests in the absence of probable cause. Plaintiffs seek compensation and related relief for these false arrests, made in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the common law of the District of Columbia.
PARTIES 1. Plaintiff ELIZABETH BOLGER, a resident of New York State, was arrested on April 20,
2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 22, 2002, Ms. BOLGER’s case was “no papered.” On or about December 11, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that BOLGER did not commit the offense for which she was
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arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 2. Plaintiff NICOLE DAVIS, a resident of Maryland, was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 22, 2002, Ms. DAVIS’ case was “no papered.” On or about November 21, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that DAVIS did not commit the offense for which she was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 3. Plaintiff HELEN JOHNSON, a resident of New Jersey, was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about May 6, 2002, Ms. JOHNSON’S case was “no papered.” On or about November 13, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that JOHNSON did not commit the offense for which she was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 4. Plaintiff JESSICA LAHOOD, a resident of New York State was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 23, 2002, Ms. LAHOOD’s case was “no papered.” On or about December 4, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that LAHOOD did not commit the offense for which she was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 5. Plaintiff NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, a resident of New York was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 22, 2002, Mr. MEYSENBURG’s case was “no
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papered.” On or about November 25, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that MEYSENBURG did not commit the offense for which he was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 6. Plaintiff TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, a resident of Maryland, was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 23, 2002, Mr. MEYSENBURG’s case was “no papered.” On or about November 14, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that MEYSENBURG did not commit the offense for which he was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 7. Plaintiff BRIAN ROSA, a resident of Massachusetts was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about May 2, 2002, Mr. ROSA’s case was “no papered.” On or about November 14, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that ROSA did not commit the offense for which he was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 8. Plaintiff FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, a resident of Wisconsin, was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about May 2, 2002, SCHLEICHER’s case was “no papered.” On or about November 21, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that SCHLEICHER did not commit the offense for which he was
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arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 9. Plaintiff DEBRA SMITH, a resident of Maryland, was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 23, 2002, SMITH’s case was “no papered.” On or about November 25, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that SMITH did not commit the offense for which she was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 10. Plaintiff TODD SPALT, a resident of Maryland, was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 23, 2002, SPALT’s case was “no papered.” On or about November 14, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that SPALT did not commit the offense for which he was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 11. Plaintiff JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, a resident of Maryland, was arrested on April 20, 2002 by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for unlawful entry upon property. On or about April 22, 2002, ZIMMERMAN’s case was “no papered.” On or about November 25, 2002, the D.C. Superior Court found that there is clear and convincing evidence that ZIMMERMAN did not commit the offense for which she was arrested, and ordered the expungement and/or sealing of the related arrest records. 12. Defendant CHARLES H. RAMSEY is Chief of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. He is a policy maker for the District of Columbia and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. He is sued in his official capacity.
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13. Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA is a municipal corporation and constitutes the local government of Washington, D.C.
14. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #4283, defendant ARTHUR BROWN, was the arresting officer of plaintiffs DAVIS and ZIMMERMAN.
15. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #2043, defendant MICHAEL CARRUTH, was the arresting officer of plaintiff TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG.
16. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #748, defendant C. MEYLA, was the arresting officer of plaintiffs SPALT and SCHLEICHER.
17. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #2093, defendant MALCOLM FORBES, was the arresting officer of plaintiff NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG.
18. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #3725, defendant ANDREA LATSON, was the arresting officer of plaintiff BOLGER.
19. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #283, defendant RAYMOND MINCEY, was the arresting officer of plaintiff ROSA.
20. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #524, defendant WENDY PAYNE, was the arresting officer of plaintiff LAHOOD.
21. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Officer #2332, defendant ADRIAN SANDERS, was the arresting officer of plaintiff JOHNSON.
22. Defendant Mark BEACH was a Commander of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. BEACH directed and authorized the arrests of plaintiffs.
23. Two unknown individuals, federal officers, JANE and JOHN DOE participated in the arrest of plaintiffs and used those false arrests to gather intelligence for maintenance, use
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and dissemination by Federal Bureau of Investigation. 24. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III is the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an
agency of the United States Government headquartered in Washington, D.C. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
25. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (4) (civil rights jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).
26. Venue is appropriately vested in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred in the District of Columbia, including each of the false arrests. FACTS
27. On April 20, 2002, BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN participated in, and attended, a political demonstration in Washington, D.C.
28. After the demonstration, at approximately 4:00 p.m., BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN along with other protestors went to an indoor garage located at or near 1725 K Street, N.W., within which a van they were using was parked.
29. BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN and the others had permission to enter the garage, as an associate worked in the attached building and had lawful possession of an electronic “swipe” card that opens the gate to the garage.
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30. The gate was opened with the swipe card, as it had been earlier in the day opened for the purpose of parking the van inside.
31. BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN and the others, who had spent the day outside, had pre-prepared food and fruit and spent a few minutes in the garage eating those items.
32. At no time did any person, including but not limited to any person in charge of the premises or in charge of the garage, demand that BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN or any member of their group leave the garage.
33. At no time did BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN or any member of their group refuse to quit the same or refuse to leave the garage.
34. Law enforcement targeted plaintiffs for adverse treatment because many of them were dressed in black; and/or were perceived to support an Anarchist political ideology or affiliation; and/or had engaged in First Amendment protected activity.
35. Law enforcement made contact with BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN and the others with them. Officers approached the group inside the garage with their police weapons drawn.
36. Outside, law enforcement directed arrestees to sit up against a wall and to put their bags in front of them.
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37. Law enforcement searched BOLGER’s, DAVIS’, JOHNSON’s, LAHOOD’s, N. MEYSENBURG’s, T. MEYSENBURG’s, ROSA’s, SCHLEICHER’s, SMITH’s, SPALT’s, ZIMMERMAN’s person and possessions. They searched the parked van they were using, without consent.
38. Officers recorded images of political patches and slogans on the protestors’ clothing. They reviewed their flyers and political material.
39. Law enforcement posed questions about plaintiffs’ political activities, including asking whether this was their first protest and, if not, for disclosure of the other political protests in which they had participated.
40. Law enforcement was evidently prepared to conduct political intelligence gathering. 41. Two agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, pulled out selected detained
protestors for the purpose of conducting on-camera video taped interviews. 42. Among the questions posed, were disclosure of the identities of persons with whom they
had associated over the protest weekend, with whom they stayed, and with whom they drove to Washington, D.C. 43. During the time-consuming video interview process, although not free to go, some arrestees were allowed to sit and drink water. Some of the officers indicated that the group was going to be “let go,” that everything was “O.K.” and that the group would be free to leave eventually. Nevertheless, BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN and others were thereafter handcuffed and charged with unlawful entry. 44. Officers made frequent comments and criticisms regarding plaintiffs’ manner of dress and
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clothes. 45. Questions were posed, and comments made, about plaintiffs’ political activities. Officers
verbally abused the arrestees. One officer told them that he did not believe they were informed about the issues they were protesting, that they probably did not even know what the IMF or World Bank did. A male arrestee provided a substantive response about international trade policies. When a female arrestee spoke in response, the officer told her to shut up, that no one had asked her to talk, and that is why he had to respond to so many domestic violence calls, because “the women run their mouths and then their boyfriends have to shut them up.” One officer warned that none of the protestors should admit to being gay, because he hated homosexuals. Protestors were called “faggots.” 46. At no time did BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN without lawful authority, enter, or attempt to enter any public or private dwelling, building, or other property against the will of the lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in charge thereof, or being therein or thereon, without lawful authority to remain therein or thereon refuse to quit the same on the demand of the lawful occupant, or of the person lawfully in charge thereof. 47. There was no warrant for the arrest of BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN. 48. There was no probable cause for the arrest of BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT,
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ZIMMERMAN. 49. The arrests of BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T.
MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT and ZIMMERMAN were directed by and authorized by Commander Mark BEACH. 50. The actions of the above-referenced defendants violated the following clearly established and well settled federal constitutional rights: a. Freedom from unreasonable arrest, search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment; and to due process of law; b. Freedom of speech, including the freedom from government disruption of,
interference with, or retaliation for, engagement in lawful free speech, assembly, association and petition activities; c. Freedom of association, including the freedom from government deterrence or punishment of lawful political association based on perceived political ideology or group association. 51. The District of Columbia developed and maintains policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of protestors, and also of Anarchists or persons perceived to be Anarchists, which caused the violations of plaintiffs’ rights. 52. The District of Columbia targets certain political activists, including: those who are perceived as advocating Anarchism or associating with Anarchists; and political activists who are dressed in black, on the presumption or perception that such manner of dress signals advocacy of Anarchism or association with Anarchism. 53. The District of Columbia maintains an unconstitutional policy, practice, and custom of
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toleration and approval of false arrest and imprisonment of targeted political activists engaged in demonstration or political associational activity, including mass manifestations of this on April 15, 2000 when 600+ targeted individuals were falsely arrested, and on September 27, 2002 when 400+ targeted individuals were falsely arrested. 54. As a result of the above-referenced policies, practices and customs, police officers of the District of Columbia, including the defendant officers, believed that their actions would not be properly monitored by supervisory officers and that false arrests of targeted political activists would not be investigated or sanctioned, but would be tolerated. 55. As a consequence of defendants’ wrongful conduct, BOLGER, DAVIS, JOHNSON, LAHOOD, N. MEYSENBURG, T. MEYSENBURG, ROSA, SCHLEICHER, SMITH, SPALT, ZIMMERMAN suffered injury, including the loss of physical liberty during the period of detention and imprisonment, a loss of constitutional rights to be free from unconstitutional search and seizure and interference with First Amendment protected rights, and related pain and suffering.
Allegations Related to the FBI Collection and Maintenance of Records 56. The FBI agents engaged in extensive video interrogations and interviews of certain
plaintiffs, as referenced above, and on information and belief collected information and created records relating to all plaintiffs. 57. The subject of the interrogations and interviews, and the collection of information, was wholly unrelated to any legitimate activities of law enforcement and consisted of the questioning of persons in police custody about their First Amendment protected political
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associations and activities. The FBI used the coercive environment of an arrest interrogation, in the absence of any legal counsel, to obtain this information. This is an established practice of the FBI. 58. These information and records were collected and are maintained and used by the FBI and disseminated outside the FBI. 59. The maintenance, use and dissemination of the collected information and records falsely cast and stigmatize plaintiffs as actual or potential lawbreakers. 60. The information and records in this particular case also associate arrestees with anarchism, which is an adverse association within law enforcement and is inaccurately considered by the FBI and others in law enforcement as an indicia of criminality. 61. The information and records also constitute an unlawful and unconstitutional collection and cataloging of private citizens’ protected political activities, beliefs and associations. 62. The use and dissemination of such (false) arrest and derivative records, secured solely through mass civil rights violations, subjects those arrested to risk of personal, professional, educational, financial, reputational and other forms of irreparable and concrete harms. 63. The injury is both current as well as future, as the existence of the records may also at a later time be a detriment to plaintiffs.
COUNT I False Arrest and Imprisonment In Violation of the U.S. Constitution and Common Law 64. Paragraphs 1 through 63 are incorporated by reference herein.
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65. The conduct complained of herein deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights pursuant to the First and Fourth Amendments and to due process under the law; as well as violated the common law of the District of Columbia.
66. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each plaintiff claims compensatory and punitive damages from his or her arresting officer, and jointly and severally from all other officers or individuals who acted jointly in the group arrest; and compensatory damages from the District of Columbia for violation of his or her constitutional rights under color of law.
67. Each plaintiff claims damages from his or her false arrest for compensatory and punitive damages from the individual defendants except for Defendant BEACH pursuant to the common law of the District of Columbia respecting false arrest and imprisonment, and from the District of Columbia via respondeat superior. COUNT II Civil Conspiracy
68. Paragraphs 1 through 63 are incorporated by reference herein. 69. The individual defendants tacitly or explicitly agreed to unlawfully and unconstitutionally
arrest plaintiffs in the absence of probable cause, and in violation of the U.S. Constitution and common law, and to thereby collect identity and other information about plaintiffs. 70. Each plaintiff claims damages against the individual defendants jointly and severally for civil conspiracy for the harms caused by this conspiracy and its execution.
COUNT III Collection, Maintenance, Use and Dissemination of Information 71. Paragraphs 1 through 63 are incorporated by reference herein. 72. The FBI collected, maintained, used and disseminated records, including the videotaped
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interviews of arrestees, that are derived solely and exclusively through the unconstitutional mass false arrest of plaintiffs, who were falsely arrested because they were perceived to be associated with First Amendment protected activity. 73. The FBI collected, maintained, used and disseminated records, including specifically videotaped interviews of arrestees, that described how an individual, or individuals, exercised their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. The collection of these records was not authorized by statute or by the individual(s) about whom the record is maintained. The conduct of video interviews consisting of questioning about First Amendment protected activity was not within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. 74. Each plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory and equitable relief for this conduct in violation of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment and the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief: a. Compensatory damages against the District of Columbia for violations of federal
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for violation of common law rights pursuant to respondeat superior, in an amount appropriate to the proof adduced at trial; b. Compensatory damages and punitive damages against the MPD officers (including Defendant BEACH) sued in their individual capacities, jointly and severally, for violations of federal rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in an amount appropriate to the proof adduced at trial; c. Compensatory damages and punitive damages against the arresting officers (excluding Defendant BEACH) for violations of the common law, in an amount appropriate to the proof adduced at trial; d. Declaratory judgment that these arrests were in violation of the U.S. Constitution
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and common law; e. Declaratory judgment that the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of
records describing each plaintiff’s exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment was in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Privacy Act. f. Injunctive relief against all ongoing unconstitutional and unlawful policies, practices and customs that caused the harm complained of herein; mandatory injunctive relief compelling the collection, provision to plaintiffs and expungement of all records that are derived from the unconstitutional false arrests; mandatory injunctive relief compelling the collection, provision to plaintiffs and expungement of records describing the First Amendment protected activities of plaintiffs. g. An award of plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses; and h. Such other and further relief, including all appropriate equitable relief, as to the Court may seem proper. PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY OF ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE
Respectfully submitted,
______________________________ Carl Messineo (#450033) Mara Verheyden-Hilliard (#450031) PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INC. 10 G Street, NE Ste 650 Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 789-4330 (202) 789-4333 - facsimile
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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 Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208 Filed 11/13/09 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

______________________________

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ELIZABETH BOLGER, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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Civ. Action No. 03-0906 (JDB)

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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______________________________

)

JOINT MOTION FOR ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE

All remaining plaintiffs in this matter, Elizabeth Ann Bolger, Helen Johnson, Jessica Lahood, Nathaniel Meysenburg, Timothy Meysenburg, Brian Rosa, Francis Schleicher, and Deborah Smith, (collectively “plaintiffs”) and defendants District of Columbia, Charles H. Ramsey, Arthur Brown, Michael Carruth, Malcom Forbes, Andrea Latson, C. Meyla, Raymond Mincey, Wendy Payne, Adrian Sanders, and Mark Beach (collectively the “District Defendants”) have entered into a Settlement Agreement resolving all claims against the District Defendants in this proceeding. A copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached hereto.
The settlement amount having been tendered in full, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, plaintiffs and the District Defendants jointly move this Court to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against the District Defendants with prejudice.

1

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208 Filed 11/13/09 Page 2 of 2

Respectfully submitted,

PETER J. NICKLES Attorney General for the District of Columbia
GEORGE C. VALENTINE Deputy Attorney General Litigation Division
/s/ Ellen A. Efros ELLEN A. EFROS [250746] Assistant Deputy Civil Litigation Division
/s/ Chad Copeland CHAD COPELAND [982119] Assistant Attorney General Equity Section I 441 Fourth Street, NW, Sixth Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 724-6610 (202) 741-8880 (fax) ellen.efros@dc.gov chad.copeland@dc.gov
Attorneys for District Defendants

/s/ Carl Messineo Carl Messineo [450033] Mara Verheyden-Hilliard [450031] Radhika Miller [984306] PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL Civil JUSTICE FUND 617 Florida Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 232-1180 (202) 747-7747 (fax)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Dated: November 13, 2009

2

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-1 Filed 11/13/09 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

______________________________

)

ELIZABETH BOLGER, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

Civ. Action No. 03-0906 (JDB)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

______________________________

)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Joint Motion for Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice, it is

this

day of

, 2009, hereby

ORDERED that plaintiffs’ claims against the District Defendants are dismissed with

prejudice.

JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge

1

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELIZABETH BOLGER, et at.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 03-906 (JDB)

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASES BETWEEN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEFENDANTS AND ALL PLAINTIFFS, COLLECTIVELY
All remaining plaintiffs in this matter, Elizabeth Ann Bolger, Helen Johnson, Jessica Lahood, Nathaniel Meysenburg, Timothy Meysenburg, Brian Rosa, Francis Schleicher, and Debra Smith, (collectively "Plaintiffs") sued defendants District of Columbia, Charles H. Ramsey, Arthur Brown, Michael Canuth, Malcolm Forbes~ Andrea Latson, C. Meyla, Raymond Mincey, Wendy Payne, Adrian Sanders, and Mark Beach (collectively the "District Defendants"), among others in this matter, Elizabeth Ann Bolger, et al. v. District ofColumbia, et aI., 03-CV-906 (JDB), asserting claims of constitutional violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and common law tort claims, seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and' injunctive relief, costs, and attorney fees. These parties have engaged in discovery, conducted motions practice, and participated in negotiations to resolve this matter. Having done so, these parties have agreed that it is in their respective and mutual best interests to settle this dispute and to resolve this litigation upon the following terms.

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 2 of 15
Scope of Settlement Offer and Resultant Settlement 1. The District Defendants' Settlement Offer ("Offer") and this resultant Settlement
Agreement may only be accepted jointly and collectively by all Plaintiffs in resolution, satisfaction, and dismissal of any and all claims that have been or could have been brought by any of the Plaintiffs against any and all District Defendants in this case, to include any and all persons who are now or have ever been agents, employees, officers, or officials of the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs' acceptance of the District Defendant's Offer and this Settlement Agreement are reflected by their signatures upon this Settlement Agreement.
2. The District of Columbia reasserts its policy as set forth in the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, that all persons and groups have a right to organize and participate in peaceful First Amendment assemblies on the streets, sidewalks, and other public ways, and in the parks of the District of Columbia, and to engage in First Amendment assembly near the object of their protest so they may be seen and heard, subject to reasonable restrictions .designed to protect public safety, persons, and property, and to accommodate the interest of persons not participating in the assemblies to use the streets, sidewalks, and other public ways to travel to their intended destinations, and use the parks for recreational purposes.
3. The Metropolitan Police Department's Standard Operating Procedures for Handling First Amendment Assemblies and Mass Demonstrations (SOP) and/or its successor publication, in the event of a change of title, shall, within 120 days, provide written notice that officers utilizing the Field Arrest Form (PD 759) to document an arrest in the context of a mass demonstration will in addition to the other requirements set forth in Attachment F to the SOP include the name of any federal law enforcement officer or agent who questioned the arrestee,
2

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 3 of 15

noting the name of the federal agency, date, time and loc"ation of the questioning and whether

MPD was given copies of any audiotapes, videotapes or written versions of the questioning. This

provision shall remain in effect for no less than three (3) years from the date of the Settlement

Agreement. Thereafter, there shall be no right of enforcement by any of the Parties hereto and

the MPD may rescind this provision.

4. All District Defendants deny culpability and/or liability for or upon any claim

asserted by any and all Plaintiffs.

5

The District of Columbia will pay the "Settlement Amount" of a total of

$450,000 to all Plaintiffs, jointly and collectively, in full satisfaction of all claims and potential

claims for damages and other relief against the District Defendants that were or could have been

encompassed by all claims that were or could have been brought in this action or upon the

underlying events, including all claims for attorneys fees andlor other costs incurred in prosecuting

this action, through the date ofthe execution ofthis Settlement Agreement by all Plaintiffs and

counsel for the District Defendants. Plaintiffs agree, jointly and severally, and on behalfoftheir

attorneys, as well as themselves, that under no circumstances may Plaintiffs or their attorneys obtain

any relief andlor recovery for the claims that have been or could have been raised in this civil

action and encompassed by this Offer in addition to this $450,000 and such interest as may

become payable thereon pursuant to paragraph 6, below, from the District, or any official, officer

agent, or employee or any person who is now or has ever been an official, officer, agent, or

employee ofthe District.

6

The Settlement Amount, which includes all costs and attorneys' fees as

included in the payment referenced above, is payable only from the funds of the District

of Columbia and may not be collected from any other defendant in this action or from

3

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 4 of 15
any other person or entity. This Settlement Amount is to be paid by check payable to The Partnership for Civil Justice Trust Account ("the Payee"), within thirty (30) days of the execution of this Settlement Agreement and the receipt of all necessary paperwork for processing payment, including a hard copy of a W-9 for the payee; in the event that payment is not made within thirty (30) days of the execution ofthis Settlement Agreement and the receipt of all necessary paperwork for processing payment, interest will accrue upon the Settlement Amount at the rate provided for by 28 U.S.C. Section 1961 for interest upon judgments commencing on the thirty-first (31st) day following the execution of this Settlement Agreement and the receipt of all necessary paperwork for processing payment. If payment of the Settlement Amount and such interest as may be provided for pursuant to the terms of this paragraph is not transmitted to the Payee within thirty-one (31) days as provided above, the Payee may move to enforce the payment provisions of this Settlement Agreement against the District of Columbia.
7. This Settlement Agreement may be executed in duplicate originals. 8. Plaintiffs agree to release and to indemnify and hold the District Defendants harmless from and against all actions, claims, demands, damages, debts, liabilities, obligations costs, expenses, liens, attorneys' fees, actions, claims for relief and causes of action (whether or not litigation be commenced) arising or in connection with any action or from any matter encompassed by this Settlement Agreement or other proceeding brought or prosecuted contrary to the provisions ofthis Settlement Agreement. This Settlement Agreement and Releases also releases and indemnifies the District Defendants against any and all claims brought under any theory ofliability arising from any incident described in the complaint that were brought or could have been brought in any forum.
4

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 5 of 15
9. The terms ofthis Settlement Agreement and of the resultant Settlement are not severable. Should any provision of this Settlement Agreement be held invalid, unenforceable or illegal, such holding shall render this entire Settlement Agreement and resultant Settlement invalid, unenforceable and void, and shall require all Plaintiffs to return to the District within 30 days of such holding all consideration provided them pursuant to this Settlement Agreement.
10. The parties hereto agree that this Settlement Agreement shall not constitute an admission or denial or any allegation made by any party, whether in the litigation or otherwise. This Settlement Agreement shall not be cited as such by any party in any subsequent judicial proceeding, except under the following circumstances: (1) as may be necessary to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement or (2) to comply with the law or a court order.
11. The parties hereto expressly state, understand, and agree that they have had a reasonable and sufficient period of time to consider their decision to accept this settlement and to enter into this Settlement Agreement. The parties hereto enter into this Settlement Agreement voluntarily and of their own free will. The parties further acknowledge that they fully and completely understand and accept the terms of this Settlement Agreement, and that they have the legal capacity and authorization to enter into this Settlement Agreement. This Agreement shall not be construed against the party preparing it, but shall be construed as if all parties prepared it.
12. Plaintiffs agree to file a praecipe of dismissal of the complaint with prejudice in this matter within five (5) business days of receiving the compensation set forth in paragraph 4 above.
13. Plaintiffs, individually and collectively, represent that they have not transferred or assigned to any person or entity any claim against the Defendants and that any such claim is not assignable or transferable.
5

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 6 of 15
14. The parties agree that this Agreement contains and comprises the entire agreement and understanding of the parties, and that there are no additional promises or terms of the Agreement among the parties other than those contained herein, and that this Agreement shall not be modified except in writing signed by each of the parties hereto. This Agreement is not intended to and does not confer any rights or remedies upon any person other than the Parties hereto.
15. This Agreement and the Releases contained herein shall be governed by, and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Agreement as of the days and year set forth below.

ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER HELEN JOHNSON JESSICA LAHOOD NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2009 on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,' 2009 on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2009 on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2009
6

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 7 of 15

14. The parties agree that this Agreement contains and comprises the entire agreement and understanding of the parties, and that there are no <J.dditional promises or terms of the Agreement among the parties other than those contained herein, and that this Agreement shall not be modified except in writing signed by each of the parties hereto. This Agreement is not intended to and does not confer any rights or remedies upon any person other than the Parties hereto.
15. This Agreement and the Releases contained herein shall be governed by, and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Agreement as of the days
and year set forth below.

ACCEPTED FOR PLAINTIFFS BY:

PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--',2009

(Print Name of individual signing for Partnership For Civil Justice)

~~on -ro E~ETANNBOLGER

I 19 0 c:... be.r ,2009 I

HELEN JOHNSON

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2009

JESSICA LAHOOD

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2009

NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2009

6

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 8 of 15

14. The parties agree that this Agreement contains and comprises the entire agreement :and tmderstanding ofthe parties, and that there arc no additional promises or temls of the Agreement among the parties other than those contained herein, and that this Agreement stullt not be modified except in writing signed byeacb ofthe parties hereto. This Agreement is not intended to and does not confer auy rights or remedies upon any person othor than the Parties hereto.
15. This Agreement and the Releases contained herein shall be governed by, and shall be construed in accordance with the laws ofthe Distl'ict ofCol~rnbja.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Agreement as ofthe days and year set forth below.

ACCEPTED FOR PLAINTIFFS BY:

on _ _ _ _ _ _~_ _, 2009 PARTNBRSHlP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE

(print Name ofindividua.l sigmog for Partnership For Civil Justice)

ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER
M~

on _ _ _ _~_ _ _ _• 2009

If on

CtkD~- ,2009

JESSICA LAHOOD NATHAN18L lVIEYSENBURG

on _ _ _ _~_ _ _........". 2009 on ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'.2009 -

6

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 9 of 15

14. 1. he parties agree that this Agreement contains and comprises the entire agreement and lmderstanding of the parties, and that there an" nO additional promises or terms of the Agreement ~1I11ong the parties other than those contained herein, and that this Agreement shall not be ll10clified except hi writing Signed by each of the parties hereto. This Agreement is not intended to Imd does not confer any rights or remedies upon any person other than the Parties hereto.
15. 1 his Agreement and the Releases contained hel'ein shall be governed by, and s~all be construed in 11ccordance with the laws ofthe District of Columbia.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Agreement as of the days and year set forlh below.

ACCEPTED F(tRPLAINTlf'FS BY;

PARTNERSHlj' FOR CIVIL JUSTICE

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _~_, 2009

(Print Name ofmdividual signing for Partnership For Civil Justice)

on ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER

,2009

HELEN JOHN~:'ON
JE~;#

on
on 10/.2D

,2009 ,2009

-on NATHANIEL 1l,1EYSENBURG

,2009

6

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Documen.. t 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 10 of 15

14. The parties agree that this Agreement contains and comprises the entire agreement and understanding of the parties, and that there are no additional promises or terms of the Agreement among the parties other than those contained herein, and that ~his Agreement shall not be modified except in writing signed by each of the parties hereto. This Agreement is not intended to and does not confer any rights or remedies upon any person other than the Parties hereto.
15. This Agreement and the Releases contained herein shall be governed by, and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Agreement as of the days and year set forth below.

ACCEPTED FOR PLAINTIFFS BY:

PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2009

(Print Name of individual signing for Partnership For Civil Justice)

ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER

on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2009

HELEN JOHNSON

on _ _ _ _ _-'--_ _ _ _, 2009

JESSICA LAHOOD
N!effiL~

on __________, 2009
/ rJ/02 on ----J--,0f---------, 2009

6

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 11 of 15

BRIAN ROSA FRANCIS SCHLEICHER DEBRA SMITH

on ____~______~__,,2009 on ________________,,2009 on __~_ _~______•2009

ACCEPTED FOR D1STRICT DEFENDANTS BY: on _ _ _ _~_ _ _ _ _• 2009

7

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 12 of 15
,.,

TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG
&~~~
BRIAN ROSA

on on \()\ 2.0

on FRANCIS SCHLEICHER

DEBRA SMITH

---- on

,2009 ,2009 ,2009 ,2009

ACCEPTED FOR DISTRICT DEFENDANTS BY: on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,2009

7

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 13 of 15

TIMOTHY MEYSENBCRG
SCHLEICHER DEBRASMlTH

on on
on {6) / If-
on

,2009 ,2009 ,2009 ,2009

ACCEPTED FOR DlSTRICT DEFENDANTS BY: on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---',2009

7

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 14 of 15

TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG BRIAN ROSA FRANCIS SCHLEICHER

on
on on on 101 'j...() I

,2009 ,2009 .2009 ,2009

ACCEPTED FOR DISTRICT DEFENDANTS BY: on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----",2009

7

Case 1:03-cv-00906-JDB Document 208-2 Filed 11/13/09 Page 15 of 15

on TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG
011
BRIAN ROSA
on FRANCIS SCHLEICHER
on
DEBRA SMITH

,2009 ,2009 ,2009 ,2009

~j_D.t-.FJ,...:f-_D_IS_TR_ICT ~

DEFENDANTSB_Y_:_
on

_-I-.
Iv (

-:.-_
1--'

_

_ -

'
,2

009

7

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELIZABETH BOLGER, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 03-0906 (JDB)

MEMORANDUM OPINION This case arises out of the highly publicized arrests of a group of protesters at a Washington, D.C. parking garage on April 20, 2002. Eleven of the arrestees ("plaintiffs") filed suit against the District of Columbia, various Washington, D.C. ("MPD") police officers, and Robert S. Mueller, III, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). The case has proceeded primarily against District of Columbia defendants, focused on the false-arrest claims. As is relevant here, however, plaintiffs allege that two FBI agents on the scene interrogated them about their political activities and affiliations, videotaped the interrogations, collected information about plaintiffs, and used and disseminated that information improperly. These actions, plaintiffs assert, violated their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments, as well as the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2007). Defendant Mueller, who has been sued in his official capacity, seeks dismissal of the claims against him, or in the alternative summary judgment on those claims. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and have countered with a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendant Mueller's motion and deny plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion.
1

BACKGROUND The facts, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("Second Am. Compl."). On April 20, 2002, plaintiffs were among the thousands of protesters who participated in mass demonstrations during the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington, D.C. Second Am. Compl. at 5. Plaintiffs were dressed in black, a color that law enforcement officials associate with supporters of Anarchism. Id. A member of plaintiffs' group had a key card that permitted weekend access to an indoor parking garage located at 1725 K Street, N.W. Id. at 11 ¶ 28. Plaintiffs entered the garage by swiping the key card and parked the van that they were using there. Id. at 11-12 ¶¶ 2930. After the demonstration ended, plaintiffs returned to the garage to eat food that they had previously prepared. Id. at 12 ¶ 31. While plaintiffs were in the garage, law enforcement officers approached them with their weapons drawn. Id. at 12 ¶ 35. The officers ordered plaintiffs out of the garage, searched their persons and possessions, and searched the van without consent. Id. at 12-13 ¶¶ 36-37. In addition, the officers questioned plaintiffs about their political activities, reviewed flyers and political material, and recorded with video equipment images of political patches and slogans on plaintiffs' clothing. Id. at 13 ¶¶ 38-39. MPD officers arrested plaintiffs for unlawful entry. But charges against plaintiffs were not pursued, and the D.C. Superior Court eventually ordered the expungement and sealing of their arrest records. Id. at 6-9 ¶¶ 1-11. Under Superior Court rules, the court's order required, among other things, that the prosecutor collect all law enforcement records in his possession and that he provide a certification that no further records exist "or that, if such records do exist, steps have been taken to retrieve them." See D.C. SCR-Crim. Rule
2

118(f)(2)(A), (B). Of particular relevance here is the role of the FBI. Plaintiffs alleged in their original
Complaint and have since reasserted that two FBI agents "pulled out selected detained protesters for the purposes of conducting on-camera video taped interviews." Id. at 13 ¶ 41; Original Comp. at 13 ¶ 40. These interviews allegedly centered on "political associations and activities" protected by the First Amendment. Second Am. Compl. at 16-17 ¶ 57. The Second Amended Complaint further avers that (1) the FBI collected information and created records as to all plaintiffs; (2) the information and records were maintained, used, and disseminated both inside and outside of the FBI; and (3) the information and records stigmatize plaintiffs by associating them with political beliefs and associations that law enforcement officials believe are indicative of criminal conduct. Id. at 16-17 ¶¶ 56-63. In so acting, plaintiffs maintain, the FBI violated their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.1 Second Am. Compl. ¶ 74. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment to that effect, as well as an injunction "compelling the collection, provision to plaintiffs and expungement of" both the records "derived from" their arrests and the records that "describ[e]" their constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 20 (e, f).
Defendant Mueller filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment
1 Plaintiffs do not specify in either their Second Amended Complaint or their subsequent briefs which provision or provisions of the Privacy Act they believe that the FBI has violated. The language of the Complaint, however, suggests that they are asserting violations of 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(e)(6) and (e)(7). Respectively, these two subsections govern dissemination of records outside of the agency and bar federal agencies from "maintain[ing any] record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment . . . ." These provisions are then enforceable under certain circumstances in a civil action pursuant to the Privacy Act's catchall provision for judicial review, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
3

in November 2006. Plaintiffs responded with an opposition and their counter-motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) two months later. After briefing on these motions was ostensibly complete, however, the protracted discovery efforts related to plaintiffs' claims against the District of Columbia defendants yielded new information about the FBI's role in the events of April 20, 2002. The so-called "running resume" -- a log of police activity from that evening -- confirmed the FBI's involvement and provided a timeline for what transpired. A prominent newspaper reported on the transmittal of the log to the plaintiffs in this suit and commented on the law enforcement action on its editorial page. See Carol D. Leonnig, Police Log Confirms FBI Role In Arrests; Group Detained, Questioned During D.C. War Protest, Wash. Post, April 3, 2007, at B01; Editorial, A Black Mark, Wash. Post, April 11, 2007, at A14.
In light of these developments, the Court provided defendant Mueller with an opportunity to supplement the record and plaintiffs with a chance to respond. Dkt. #115 (Order of 4/12/2007). Defendant Mueller attached to his supplemental brief sworn declarations from two FBI special agents who had questioned the group of plaintiffs on the night in question: Sean McMenamin and Amy Landman. Dkt. #120 (Def.'s First Supp. Mem.). The FBI later agreed to allow the two agents to appear for depositions and to give non-privileged and unclassified testimony. Dkt. #133 (6/5/2007 Motion). These depositions took place in July 2007, and the Court permitted the parties to file a second round of supplemental briefs and accompanying materials to address the deposition testimony. Dkt. #134 (6/12/2007 Status Report); Minute Order of 7/12/2007. This latest round of briefing having been received, defendant Mueller's dispositive motion and plaintiffs' counter-motion are now ripe for resolution.
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW Defendant Mueller has moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. When, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see Yates v. District of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Here, the parties have presented, and the Court has considered, extensive materials beyond the pleadings.2 In addition, both parties were given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the other's submissions. The Court will accordingly treat defendant's dispositive motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may successfully support its motion by "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
2 The current record consists of the following briefs along with their accompanying exhibits: Defendant Mueller's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mem."); Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Mueller's Motion ("Pls.' Opp'n"); Defendant Mueller's Reply ("Def.'s Reply"); Defendant Mueller's First Supplemental Memorandum ("Def.'s First Supp. Mem."); Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Memorandum ("Pls.' First Supp. Mem."); Defendant Mueller's Second Supplemental Memorandum ("Def.'s Second Supp. Mem."); and Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Memorandum ("Pls.' Second Supp. Mem.").
5

the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, the court must regard the non-movant's statements as true and accept all evidence and make all inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A non-moving party, however, must establish more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the non-moving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant fails to offer "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Id. at 252.
Plaintiffs seek an order under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deferring defendant Mueller's motion for summary judgment and permitting additional discovery. Such an order is available where "it appear[s] from the affidavits of the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion that the party cannot . . . present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). The "party making a Rule 56(f) request must 'state[] concretely' why additional discovery is needed to oppose a motion for summary judgment." Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A Rule 56(f) motion need not be granted "where the requesting party has offered only a 'conclusory assertion without any supporting facts' to justify the proposition that the discovery sought will produce the evidence required." Id. (citation omitted); see also Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 248 n.8 (D.C.
6

Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must "show what facts he intended to discover that would create a triable issue and why he could not produce them in opposition to the motion"). But where the party making the Rule 56(f) motion has not yet conducted any discovery, that party's Rule 56(f) motion should normally be granted. See Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
DISCUSSION A. Privacy Act
Defendant Mueller argues as a threshold matter that plaintiffs' claim under the Privacy Act must be dismissed because (1) the Second Amended Complaint names an improper defendant, and (2) the claim is untimely. The first of these arguments is a highly technical one that, even if meritorious, would likely lead first to an order dismissing the Privacy Act claim without prejudice, and then to a Third Amended Complaint adding the FBI as a defendant. See Bavido v. Apfel, 215 F.3d 743, 747 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2000); Reyes v. Supervisor of the Drug Enforcement Admin., 834 F.2d 1093, 1097 (1st Cir. 1987); Hewitt v. Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986). In other words, the improper-defendant argument defers rather than disposes of the Privacy Act claim. Defendant's second argument presents close and contested questions (a) as to when plaintiffs knew or should have known that FBI agents may have collected and maintained records of the April 20, 2002 arrests and (b) as to whether, assuming that the two-year limitations period expired before plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, the limitations period should nonetheless be equitably tolled. See Chung v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 333 F.3d 273, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Court's conclusion (explained in detail below) that plaintiffs are not
7

entitled to the requested declaratory and injunctive relief on any of their claims against the FBI obviates the need to resolve defendant Mueller's proper-party and timeliness arguments under the Privacy Act. B. Availability of Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the FBI for alleged violations of the Privacy Act and the First and Fourth Amendments. Second Am. Compl. at 19 ¶ 74. In addressing their claims, defendant Mueller first contends that plaintiffs' requests for relief are in the nature of mandamus and that plaintiffs must therefore meet a heavy burden to demonstrate entitlement to that extraordinary remedy. Def.'s Mem. at 8-9. Plaintiffs counter, and the Court agrees, that the Second Amended Complaint is best read as seeking a remedy directly under the Constitution. See Pls.' Opp'n at 9. The availability of such a remedy has been recognized by the D.C. Circuit and other courts. See Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding the power of federal courts "to grant equitable relief to remedy agency violations of constitutional rights"); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 229-230 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (reaffirming this aspect of Hubbard); accord Mitchum v. Hurt, 73 F.3d 30, 34-35 (3d Cir. 1995) (Alito, J.). Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief because the APA waives the federal agency's sovereign immunity even when the claim is one directly under the Constitution and not under the APA. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Hence, the question here is not whether plaintiffs have satisfied the rigorous standard for issuance of a writ of mandamus, but instead (1) whether they can establish that the actions of the FBI violated the Constitution and the Privacy Act and, if so, (2) whether they can demonstrate an entitlement
8

to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. The Court concludes that the standards governing this latter issue -- a party's entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief -- control the resolution of defendant's motion.
To begin with, suits for declaratory or injunctive relief must present a live controversy justiciable under Article III of the Constitution. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. --, 127 S. Ct. 764, 771 (2007) (declaratory judgment); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (injunctive relief). An actual, justiciable controversy must exist not just at the moment that the suit is initiated, but also at the time that the party's entitlement to the requested relief is decided. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969). It is further settled in this regard that a past injury, without more, cannot form the basis for either injunctive or declaratory relief. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) ("Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects."); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (equating case-or-controversy requirement for declaratory judgment with one applicable to request for injunctive relief); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74 (1985) (rejecting the view that "declaratory judgments expressly adjudicating the question of past violations are routinely available"). Hence, to obtain declaratory or injunctive "relief for past wrongs, a plaintiff must demonstrate either continuing harm or a real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future." Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2003). The D.C. Circuit has further clarified that a party pursuing an injunction or a declaratory judgment "must allege a likelihood of future violations of their rights by [the defendant], not simply future effects from past violations." Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing
9

Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Applying these principles, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are not entitled to the
requested declaratory and injunctive relief. With respect to the former, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment "that the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of records describing each plaintiff's exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment was in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Privacy Act." Second Am. Compl. at 20(e). The requested relief amounts to a judicial declaration that the FBI previously engaged in unlawful conduct injurious to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief that is on the one hand broad in its scope (relief against all of the "ongoing unconstitutional and unlawful policies, practices and customs that caused the harm" of which they complain), and on the other more targeted. Second Am. Compl. at 20(f). This more targeted relief consists of an injunction compelling "the collection, provision to plaintiffs and expungement of" both any records derived from the allegedly unconstitutional arrests and any records "describing the First Amendment protected activities of plaintiffs." Id. The injunction, while targeted, would not be narrow; plaintiffs instead envision an order requiring the FBI not only to expunge any records improperly gathered or held, but also to track down and recover any records already disseminated. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 & n.2.
Even assuming that plaintiffs' allegations are true and that the FBI in fact collected, maintained, used, and disseminated the records described, plaintiffs have established only that they were the victims of past wrongs. As was explained above, plaintiffs cannot rely exclusively on "future effects from [these] past violations" of their rights as a basis for obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief. See Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1273. Rather, they can secure
10

declaratory and injunctive relief for their past injuries only by "demonstrat[ing] either continuing
harm or a real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future." See Bauer, 342 F.3d at 358;
see also Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 100 (D.D.C. 1999) ("[A] declaratory judgment
is appropriate to declare the rights between the parties only where there is 'a very significant
possibility of future harm; it is insufficient . . . to demonstrate only a past injury.'") (citation
omitted). This they have not done. Plaintiffs allege that their injury is past, present, "as well as
future," suggesting that the use and dissemination of the records continue to "subject[] those
arrested to risk of personal, professional, educational, financial, reputational and other forms of
irreparable and concrete harms." Second Am. Compl. at 17 ¶¶ 62-63; Pls.' Opp'n at 14.
Assuming that records were created, the past injury is "plain enough"; it consists of harm that is
potentially economic and reputational in nature. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 970
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But the risk of
continued harm or a repeated injury persists only if (and to the extent that) records of plaintiffs'
past activities and arrests currently exist.3 Put another way, the only thing that can cause
plaintiffs to suffer one of the present or future injuries enumerated above are records stating the
3 This proposition is consistent with the cases holding that, at least with respect to certain violations of the Privacy Act, "a plaintiff may be entitled to have the offending records amended or expunged even if the records are not maintained within the agency's system of records." See Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1376-77 (11th Cir. 1982). Critically, the agency in Clarkson admitted that it retained "surveillance reports and other documents" containing individual references to the plaintiff. Id. at 1373. There was thus no dispute as to the continued existence of the records. One judge even concurred separately to emphasize that the court's holding turned on the IRS's admission, and to caution that not "every plaintiff who alleges agency maintenance of first amendment material will be entitled to a judicially enforced scavenger hunt through that agency's records." Id. at 1378-79 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). Indeed, had it been shown either that the offending records never existed or that they were previously expunged, collected, and recalled, there would have been no need for the court to consider the options of amendment and expungement, and nothing for the IRS to amend or expunge.
11

fact of plaintiffs' arrests and/or the circumstances underlying those arrests. Plaintiffs' speculation to the contrary notwithstanding, the unrebutted declarations in the
summary judgment record confirm that the FBI has no such records at this time. The first two declarations submitted by the FBI establish that no records chronicling plaintiffs' activities or arrests on April 20, 2002 are currently stored in three databases: the Fingerprint Identification Records System ("FIRS"), the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), and the FBI's Central Records System. Del Greco Decl. ¶ 11; Turner Decl. ¶ 10. That no such records currently exist would not surprise Special Agents McMenamin and Landman, who have averred that they turned over the lone videotape they took on April 20, 2002, along with "all of the notes that were taken during the interviews," to a uniformed MPD officer on the scene. McMenamin Decl. ¶ 19; Landman Decl. ¶ 19. Both agents have further sworn that they did "not prepare any documentation [on the interrogations] for the FBI or for inclusion in any FBI files or systems of records," and they are not aware of any of their FBI counterparts doing so. McMenamin Decl. ¶¶ 23-24; Landman Decl. ¶¶ 23-24. The declaration of former Special Agent McInerney, although less forthcoming, tells much the same story. McInerney does not deny that plaintiffs were interrogated on tape, but disclaims having removed any videotape from the scene for placement in FBI files; having gathered any other information for inclusion in FBI files; or having created, opened, or maintained records on any of the arrestees. McInerney Decl. ¶¶ 6-12.
Plaintiffs attack the sufficiency and veracity of these declarations in a variety of ways. Emphasizing first the careful and limited nature of the declarations, plaintiffs observe that the FBI has not averred that records of their arrests do not exist in any database, such as the "OneDOJ" system or the databases used by new "fusion centers" in which local law enforcement
12

agencies share intelligence with their federal counterparts. Pls.' Opp'n at 3.4 They also point to the FBI's refusal to comply with a February 2006 subpoena, and in particular to the responding official's statement that he had reviewed plaintiffs' request "and determined that the FBI is not authorized to produce the documents [plaintiffs] seek." Pls.' Opp'n, Exh. 3 at 2; Pls.' Second Supp. Mem. at 15. In a similar vein, plaintiffs contend that the fact that records no longer exist does not mean that such records never existed. The gist of this argument is that, if records did exist, any use or dissemination of those records served to let the cat out of the bag, thus raising a risk of continued harm in the future. Pls.' Opp'n at 5.
None of these arguments demonstrates a likelihood of present or future harm sufficient to justify declaratory or injunctive relief. The first line of argument falters as a factual matter and is highly speculative. Specifically, one of the potentially inadmissible newspaper articles on which plaintiffs rely reveals nothing about the record-keeping practices of the nascent fusion centers, and the other article suggests that the information available via the OneDOJ system is already contained in FBI files (and hence would be in one of the searchable databases in which the FBI has looked). Pls.' Opp'n, Exhs. 1, 2. There is consequently no indication that the records search conducted by the FBI left particular stones unturned or failed to account for locations in which any records collected would likely be stored.
Nor does the FBI's refusal to honor plaintiffs' subpoena constitute an admission -- explicit
4 Plaintiffs base their references to the OneDOJ system and the fusion centers on two articles that appeared in the Washington Post in 2006. Pls.' Opp'n, Exhs. 1, 2. To the extent that plaintiffs rely on these articles for the truth of the assertions therein, the articles would constitute hearsay and hence be inadmissible in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.); Gonzalez v. City of New York, 354 F. Supp. 2d 327, 347 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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or implicit -- that responsive documents or records existed at that time. Plaintiffs pluck one sentence out of a letter that lists any number of ways in which the subpoena request failed to comply with the strict regulations that govern the FBI's production of documents. Pls.' Opp'n, Exh. 3 at 1-2 (explaining, among other problems, that the FBI was not properly served with the subpoena and that the request did not comply with the applicable Touhy regulations). The strained inference that plaintiffs ask the Court to draw does them little good in any event because it speaks to the existence of records at one time in the past, not to the continued presence in FBI databases of records that could cause plaintiffs present or future harm. Plaintiffs' repeated reliance on the letter is an illustrative example of this misguided focus on the possible existence of records at some point in the past. As explained above, the existence of records at a discrete moment in the past has little bearing on plaintiffs' entitlement to forms of relief that depend on the likelihood that they will suffer present or future injury. The expungement of plaintiffs' arrest records ordered by the Superior Court appears to have rendered the risk of any such injury negligible if not nonexistent. After all, how can the FBI cause plaintiffs the feared "personal," "professional," or "reputational" injuries that may arise from being associated with Anarchism if the FBI cannot locate any records of such an association? See Second Am. Compl. at 17 ¶¶ 6263. In the end, the absence of any records within the FBI's control means that the only present or future harm that plaintiffs will suffer and that is traceable to the FBI's actions are the continuing "emotional consequences" of the alleged intelligence-gathering efforts. But this type of harm, the Supreme Court has held, is an insufficient basis for injunctive -- and by extension, declaratory -relief "absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant." See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8. Plaintiffs have not shown that there is any likelihood of such an injury.
14

In their supplemental filings, plaintiffs take a somewhat different tack, attempting to demonstrate that the FBI's sworn declarations are unworthy of credence and, relatedly, that factual disputes preclude a grant of summary judgment. They point out, among other things, that information gleaned during discovery has called into question the belief that only two FBI agents participated in the interrogations, and instead suggests that as many as five agents were present.5 Pls.' Second Supp. Mem. at 13. These other agents might have been responsible for other videotaped interrogations, and hence could have created additional records of plaintiffs' protected activities. Plaintiffs also challenge the assertion by Special Agents Landman and McMenamin that they took written notes and turned their notes over to an MPD officer. Pls.' First Supp. Mem. at 6-7. According to affidavits submitted by two of the plaintiffs, the agents took no such notes. Id. In addition, plaintiffs question the agents' statements that the audio function of the camcorder that they were using had been disabled and did not record sound during the interviews conducted. It strains credulity, plaintiffs insist, that the FBI would dispatch agents to conduct counterintelligence and then have them record only the video component of question-and-answer interviews. Id. at 2.
Although plaintiffs are correct that some of the facts surrounding these and other issues remain disputed, none of the factual disputes is material to deciding plaintiffs' entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief. Taking the examples listed above, the number of agents or teams present is relevant to the relief requested only in so far as those agents and teams generated records that can currently be expunged, collected, or recalled. The sworn declarations provided
5 Plaintiffs have not, however, sought to amend their complaint to revise their assertion that two FBI agents conducted the on-camera interviews.
15

by Special Agents McMenamin, Landman, and McInerney account for the record-keeping and record-creating activities -- or lack thereof -- of both teams. Plaintiffs' focus on whether McMenamin and Landman took written notes is misguided. Stated simply, if plaintiffs Spalt and DeRosa are correct and the agents did not take notes during the interviews, then there were fewer documents at risk of landing in agency files. The dispute over the audio capabilities of the camcorder is similarly immaterial. What matters with regard to the relief requested is whether the videotape currently exists, not whether the tape includes sound. While doubts as to the tape's ultimate resting place are not definitively dispelled by the sworn declarations, the record evidence does establish that the FBI does not have the tape. That fact is material, and plaintiffs' good-faith efforts to dispute it fall short.
Many if not all of those efforts stem from and reflect plaintiffs' evident distrust of the FBI. Plaintiffs argue, not at all inaccurately, that the salient facts in this case have come to light only through their discovery efforts, and not because of voluntary disclosures by the FBI or the District of Columbia. It is not surprising, therefore, that plaintiffs seek further discovery, a request that forms the basis for their counter-motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). In their initial motion, plaintiffs sought information regarding "the complete nature and extent of the maintenance, usage and dissemination of the video tapes and any derivative records," which information they expected to obtain via "interrogatories and requests for production," as well as depositions of, among others, "the plain clothed FBI agents who conducted the interrogations." Pls.' Opp'n at 15. They have already gotten much of this in the form of sworn declarations from and depositions of Special Agents McMenamin and Landman; a declaration from former Special Agent McInerney was also provided in the latest round of supplemental filings, and plaintiffs are
16

scheduled to depose him this month. Def.'s Second Supp. Mem. at 1 n.2; id., Exh. 6. The questions then become, what good would further discovery do, and what form would it take? More discovery might shed further light on the events of April 20, 2002, providing details that could be material to plaintiffs' claims against other defendants and would be material here if plaintiffs were seeking even nominal damages against the FBI. Cf. Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting oddity of rule that "a complaint for nominal damages could satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirements, when a functionally identical claim for declaratory relief will not"). But such discovery is unlikely to have any bearing on the propriety of injunctive and/or declaratory relief related to records that, if they ever existed, no longer do. Plaintiffs' desire for a full accounting of what was done with any records that actually existed does not require the Court to permit discovery that, to the extent it requires asking every FBI agent involved to certify that no records were created, retained, or are still in existence, approximates the ultimate relief plaintiffs seek. The Court will therefore exercise its discretion to deny plaintiffs' motion for discovery beyond that which they have already conducted since filing their Rule 56(f) motion.
In ruling that plaintiffs are not entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief they seek, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether the FBI violated either the Constitution or the Privacy Act by participating in the pre-arrest interrogations of plaintiffs. The Court is not, however, oblivious to the serious questions plaintiffs have raised regarding the propriety and the lawfulness of the FBI's actions during the events of April 20, 2002. Indeed, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, as fleshed out in the parties' supplemental filings, paint a picture of potential governmental misconduct of constitutional dimension. Moreover, it has taken four
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years and often painful discovery efforts to fill in even the most basic aspects of this picture. Nevertheless, neither the seriousness of the allegations nor the at times less-than-forthcoming attitude of some governmental defendants compensates for plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate that the FBI's alleged misconduct subjects them to the continued harm or threat of future injury that must form the basis for declaratory or injunctive relief. It is on this ground, then, that the Court grants summary judgment in the FBI's favor.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendant Mueller's motion for summary judgment and denies plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion. A separate order has been posted on this date.

Dated: September 11, 2007

/s/ John D. Bates JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge

18

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELIZABETH BOLGER, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 03-0906 (JDB)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiffs are eight individuals who were arrested for unlawful entry of a parking garage after attending the daylong protests on April 20, 2002 that coincided with the spring meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. Plaintiffs allege that their arrests violated the U.S. Constitution and D.C. common law, and they assert claims against both the District of Columbia (the "District") and various Washington, D.C. ("MPD") police officers.1 Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have also requested sanctions against the District based on the destruction of recorded police radio communications sought during discovery. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and will deny their request for sanctions without prejudice. The Court will enter judgment in favor of defendants on those claims as to

1 In their Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs also asserted claims against former FBI Director Robert Mueller based on the FBI's alleged involvement in the arrests. On September 11, 2007, the Court granted Director Mueller's motion for summary judgment on those claims. See Bolger v. District of Columbia, 510 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2007).

which plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal,2 but it will deny defendants' motion in all other respects with the exception of qualified immunity for MPD Officers Michael Carruth, Andrea Latson and Adrian Sanders, which will be granted.
BACKGROUND After nearly six years of litigation and an extremely contentious discovery process, many facts in this case remain hotly contested. What follows is a brief overview of the key events that transpired on April 20, 2002. Where facts are disputed, the Court has so noted. A group of individuals, including plaintiffs, traveled from Baltimore to Washington, D.C. on the morning of Saturday April 20, 2002 to attend the protests that were scheduled to coincide with the spring meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). See Pls.' Stmt. of Facts As to Which There Exists a Genuine Issue to Litigate ("Pls.' Stmt.") ¶ 1. One member of the group, Jacob Leshner, worked as an information technologies specialist at the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology ("APIC"). Id. APIC's offices are located at 1275 K Street, N.W., in downtown Washington, D.C. As an APIC employee, Leshner possessed an electronic keycard that granted him access to the building garage on weekends. Id. Upon arrival at APIC's offices that day, Leshner used his electronic keycard to open the garage door and the group -- traveling in two vans and one car -- parked in the underground garage. Id. The group then exited the garage and spent the day participating in
2 In their first opposition brief, plaintiffs state that they "are not opposing the dismissal of the conspiracy count or the claims asserted against defendants Forbes, Micey [sic] and Brown." Pls.' First Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pls.' First Opp'n") at 1 n.1. Accordingly, the Court will enter judgment in favor of defendants on Count II (Civil Conspiracy) and it will also enter judgment in favor of individual defendants Malcolm Forbes, Raymond Mincey and Arthur Brown, and they will be dismissed from this action.
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the protests. Id. As the protests were winding down, some members of the group told Leshner that they
wished to return to the parking garage to eat food that had been left in one of the vans. Id. ¶ 4. Because Leshner wanted to remain at the final rally site for another ten or twenty minutes to listen to a musical performance, he invited members of the group to return to the garage without him. In order to allow them to enter the garage, Leshner gave his electronic keycard to Todd Spalt. Id. Among those who returned to the parking garage with Spalt were individuals dressed in all black attire and/or in possession of black bandanas, carrying protest signs bearing anti-war and anti-capitalist messages, wearing t-shirts with radical political slogans, and wearing items of clothing displaying the letter "A" surrounded by a circle, a recognized symbol for anarchism. Id. ¶ 2.
The group led by Spalt arrived at the parking garage in two batches, with one arriving shortly after the other. Id. ¶ 9. They both claim that they utilized Leshner's keycard to gain entry to the garage. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. According to defendants, however, at approximately the same time, U.S. Secret Service Sergeant Mike Kuchinsky ("Sgt. Kuchinsky") observed a group of approximately twelve individuals standing near the entrance to an underground parking garage at 13th and K Streets, N.W. See Defs.' Stmt. of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Dispute ("Defs.' Stmt.") ¶ 1. Sgt. Kuchinsky noticed that some of these individuals had helmets, gas masks, or defense shields. Id. ¶ 2. As he was driving, Sgt. Kuchinsky observed a vehicle exiting the parking garage or a neighboring alley, and he also saw the garage gate begin to close. Id. ¶ 3. He then says that he saw four to six individuals from the group diving or rolling under the garage gate just before it closed. Id. ¶ 4. At this point, Sgt. Kuchinsky says that he called
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MPD to report what he had witnessed. Id. ¶ 5. MPD arrived at the scene soon thereafter. Id. ¶ 6.
Meanwhile, shortly after the protestors returned to the van and began to eat, one group member, plaintiff Helen Johnson, walked to the top of the parking ramp to use her cell phone. Pls.' Stmt. ¶¶ 16-17. At that time, Ms. Johnson encountered a law enforcement officer who was located on the other side of the grated metal garage door. According to Ms. Johnson, the officer demanded to know who was in the garage and demanded to be let in. Id. ¶ 17. Once she explained that she could not let the officer into the garage because she did not have the electronic keycard, Ms. Johnson returned to the lower level of the garage to find Spalt and apprise him of the situation. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Spalt, accompanied by at least one other member of the group, immediately walked up the ramp to speak to the officer. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. After Spalt explained that the group was gathered in the garage eating food, Sgt. Kuchinsky asked Spalt if he would open the garage door so that law enforcement could speak with the group further. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. In response, Spalt passed the keycard through the metal grate of the gate so that the law enforcement personnel could enter. Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiffs assert that upon opening the garage door, a number of law enforcement officers charged down the ramp into the garage while yelling and shouting. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Many of the individuals within the garage contend that, in response to the loud noises they heard coming down the ramp, they chose to exit the garage by using the stairwell. Id. ¶ 29. By contrast, defendants claim that upon reaching the group, one officer yelled "police" and most of the individuals then ran away. Defs.' Stmt. ¶ 10. The individuals who did exit the garage via the stairwell say that they walked briskly, but calmly, up the stairwell, through the lobby, and out
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onto the street. Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 34. Once there, a number of these individuals encountered the police, who detained them. Id. ¶ 33; Defs.' Stmt. ¶¶ 13, 15. Those individuals who remained in the garage were escorted to the street level by MPD officers and detained. Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 32; Defs.' Stmt. ¶ 15. A total of twenty-four individuals, including Spalt, were detained by MPD. Defs.' Stmt. ¶ 15; Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 28. However, none of these individuals was arrested immediately. Pls.' Stmt. ¶¶ 38, 40.
Rather than arrest the group, the MPD commenced an investigation soon after the group had been cleared out of the garage. Around this time, Leshner also arrived at the scene. Id. ¶ 46. Leshner says that he was very vocal in his efforts to inform the authorities that he worked in the building, that those individuals being detained had parked in the garage with him that morning, and that because he was running a few minutes behind he had given his keycard to Spalt in order to allow them access to the garage. Id. Leshner was left with the impression at the time that his statements to law enforcement were generally disregarded. Id. ¶ 47. Contrary to this belief, however, Leshner's pleas did not fall on deaf ears. The record demonstrates that numerous law enforcement personnel -- including Commander Mark Beach ("Cmdr. Beach"), the officer in charge at the scene -- were aware at the time that the group possessed an electronic keycard that was provided by a building employee (i.e., Leshner) and that the keycard was used to gain entry to the garage. See id. ¶ 50.
During the course of the investigation, John Johnson, a building security guard at 1275 K Street, N.W., employed by Admiral Security, was interviewed by MPD. Affidavit of John Johnson ("Johnson Aff.") ¶ 2. Johnson says that he "never told the police that the individuals lacked authority to be on the premises." Id. ¶ 3. He also claims that when speaking to MPD at
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the scene, he did not request that the protestors be arrested, nor did he believe that he had any reason to make such a request. Deposition of John Johnson ("Johnson Dep.") at 10. By contrast, MPD Officer Jeffrey Cadle, who interviewed Johnson at the scene, testified that Johnson told him that the individuals did not have authority to be on the premises. Deposition of Jeffrey Cadle ("Cadle Dep.") at 49. Officer Cadle's notes from the scene are consistent with his testimony. Defs.' Ex. J (Cadle notes) ("Security Guard Johnson advises that they do not have authorization to be on premises.").
It is undisputed that during the course of MPD's investigation some effort was made to locate a representative of the building management company to ascertain whether the group had permission to use the parking garage. The parties vehemently disagree whether such an individual was ever contacted. Cmdr. Beach testified that he was informed that "a representative of property management requested their arrest and indicated that the representative from property management would be a complainant in the D.C. Superior Court for the prosecution of those persons for unlawfully entering." Deposition of Mark Beach ("Beach Dep.") at 155; see also Beach's Responses to Pls.' First Set of Interrogs. ("Beach's Responses") at 6-7. Cmdr. Beach did not speak to the representative directly; rather, he says this information was relayed to him by another law enforcement officer. Beach's Responses at 6. Cmdr. Beach does not recall the name of the officer who provided this information to him and the officer has never been identified. Beach Dep. at 24-26.
The identity (as well as existence) of the building management representative also remains a mystery. Cmdr. Beach admitted that he never knew the representative's name, even at the time, nor did he ever see the individual. Id. at 23-24. The representative's name was not
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recorded at the scene by Officer Cadle along with the names of other witnesses. See Defs.' Ex. J. Nor was the name noted in the arrest documentation prepared several days later -- instead, "JBG Company" was listed as the "complainant." See Pls.' Opp'n, Ex. 59 (MPD supplement report). MPD Sergeant Gregory Shamenek ("Sgt. Shamenek") testified that he recalled attempting to call a contact number listed on the wall of the parking garage during the investigation, but that he could not recall if those efforts were successful. Deposition of Gregory Shamenek ("Shamenek Dep.") at 39-41. Efforts by the building management company, JBG Properties, to search its records and identify such a person were also unsuccessful. See Affidavit of JBG Props., Inc. ("JBG Props. Aff."). Nonetheless, defendants contend that Sgt. Kuchinsky's testimony corroborates Cmdr. Beach's story. See Defs.' Reply to Pls.' Opp'ns to Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.' Reply") at 9-10. Sgt. Kuchinsky testified that he observed an individual having a conversation with MPD officers, and he "would assume" that someone from MPD verified that this person was a representative of the building management. Deposition of Michael Kuchinsky ("Kuchinsky Dep.") at 125-26. Sgt. Kuchinsky's testimony, however, offers nothing more concrete than this assumption. Based on the lack of corroborative evidence, plaintiffs assert that Cmdr. Beach is lying. See Pls.' First Opp'n at 2. On plaintiffs' view of the facts, Cmdr. Beach simply fabricated the building management representative in an attempt to manufacture probable cause where none existed. See id. at 2-3.
After investigating the circumstances surrounding the group's presence in the parking garage for over an hour, Cmdr. Beach gave the order to arrest plaintiffs, along with the other group members who were being detained, for unlawful entry. See Pls.' Stmt. ¶¶ 40, 55. While the investigation was still ongoing, members of the MPD's Civil Disturbance Unit ("CDU")
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arrived at the scene. Defs.' Stmt. ¶ 17. CDU was on duty that day in response to the World Bank/IMF meeting and the related protests. Id. ¶ 18. The CDU squad members who arrived at the scene included Officers Michael Carruth, Andrea Latson, Wendy Payne and Adrian Sanders. Id. ¶ 19. Acting pursuant to Cmdr. Beach's order, and at the direction of their commanding officers, Officers Carruth, Latson, Payne and Sanders processed plaintiffs' arrests. Id. ¶¶ 39-47. After being transported from the scene to a MPD facility and there undergoing further processing, plaintiffs were released that night with a citation that directed them to appear in court on a future date to respond to the unlawful entry charges. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. Before their court date, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office made the determination not to prosecute and entered a nolle prosequi on all charges. Id. ¶ 55.
This action was initiated in 2003.3 After several amendments to the complaint, the gravamen of plaintiffs' case remains the same -- plaintiffs believe that they were targeted improperly by law enforcement because they were perceived to be anarchists and, consequently, they were arrested without probable cause for exercising their constitutionally protected rights to free speech and free association during the World Bank/IMF protests. Based on this premise, plaintiffs assert claims against the District and the individual MPD officers involved in their arrests pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"), contending that their arrests violated both the First and Fourth Amendments and deprived them of due process of law. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-66. Plaintiffs also assert claims for false arrest and imprisonment under D.C. common law against all defendants with the exception of Cmdr. Beach. Id. ¶ 67.
3 Three of the original plaintiffs in this case -- Nicole Davis, Todd Spalt and Jennifer Zimmerman -- settled their claims in early 2006 and are no longer a part of this litigation.
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LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may successfully support its motion by identifying those portions of "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits" that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, the court must regard the non-movant's statements as true and accept all evidence and make all inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A non-moving party, however, must establish more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the non-moving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant fails to offer "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Id. at 252.
ANALYSIS I. Probable Cause to Arrest Plaintiffs for Unlawful Entry
In Count I, plaintiffs raise claims alleging that they were falsely arrested and imprisoned
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in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments and D.C. common law.4 Second Am. Compl. ¶
65. Both parties agree that because the arrests at issue here were made without a warrant, the
presence or absence of probable cause to arrest plaintiffs is essential to resolving Count I. See
Pls.' Am. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pls.' Am. Mot.") at 7-13; Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.' Mot.")
at 6-14; see also Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Where, as here, a
false arrest claim is based on a warrantless arrest, the defendant officers must establish probable
cause to arrest."). Although the Court agrees with the parties, it cannot, based on the present
record, determine as a matter of law whether there was probable cause in this case because there
is a genuine issue of material fact whether a representative of the building management ever
informed law enforcement that plaintiffs were not authorized to be in the parking garage.
Without resolving that fact -- which is unmistakably a task for the jury, especially because Cmdr.
Beach's credibility is at issue -- the Court cannot determine as a matter of law whether there was
probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for unlawful entry. Consequently, summary judgment on this
issue is precluded for both parties, and none of the claims encompassed by Count I can be
resolved at this time.
"The elements of a constitutional claim for false arrest are substantially identical to the
elements of a common-law false arrest claim." Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753
4 Plaintiffs also allege that defendants' actions deprived them of "due process under the law." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 65. Plaintiffs, however, make no reference to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments in their pleadings. The Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of persons or property in criminal cases." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975). Therefore, and to the extent plaintiffs intended to plead another independent basis for relief under section 1983, the Court will regard plaintiffs' due process-based claim as merged with their Fourth Amendment claim.
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(D.C. Cir. 1997). In resolving a claim for false arrest, whether raised pursuant to section 1983 or D.C. common law, the central inquiry is identical: was the arresting officer justified in ordering the arrest of the plaintiff? See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1977). If the arrest was justified then "the conduct of the arresting officer is privileged and the action fails." Id. Because "[j]ustification can be established by showing that there was probable cause for arrest of the plaintiff on the grounds charged," id., "[m]ost false arrest claims turn on the issue of whether the arresting officer had probable cause," Scott, 101 F.3d at 754.
"It is well settled that an arrest without probable cause violates the fourth amendment." Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111). Probable cause is determined on the basis of the "totality of the circumstances," see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983), which requires that "the police had enough information to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested has committed it," Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted); see Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111 (probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that the individual has committed an offense).
Here, plaintiffs were arrested and charged with unlawful entry. In pertinent part, D.C. Code § 22-3302 defines the offense of unlawful entry as follows:
Any person who, without lawful authority, shall enter, or attempt to enter, any public or private dwelling, building, or other property, or part of such dwelling, building, or other property, against the will of the lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in charge thereof . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or
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imprisonment in the Jail for not more than 6 months, or both.5 To prosecute this type of unlawful entry offense,6 the government must prove that the accused: (1) entered or attempted to enter public or private premises or property; (2) did so without lawful authority; (3) did so against the express will of the lawful occupant or owner; and (4) had general intent to enter. Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174, 1176 (D.C. 1985). Therefore, to have probable cause to arrest an individual for an unlawful entry of this sort an officer must have "enough information to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that all four of these elements are present. Barham, 434 F.3d at 572.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the first two elements were present when they entered the parking garage at 1275 K Street, N.W., in the early evening of April 20, 2002. Pls.' Am. Mot. at 8. The primary dispute concerns the third element -- whether plaintiffs entered the parking garage "against the will of the lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in charge thereof." D.C. Code § 22-3302. On this issue, the parties have wildly divergent views of the facts. Without resolution of this core factual dispute, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law whether there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for unlawful entry.
In defendants' view, plaintiffs were not authorized to be in the parking garage because, inter alia, the police confirmed with persons in charge of the building that the group did not have
5 Since the time of plaintiffs' arrests on April 20, 2002, the statutory definition of unlawful entry has been amended, see D.C. Law 16-302, § 219, 53 DCR 8610 (Apr. 24, 2007), but the relevant portion of the offense quoted above has not been altered.
6 A person may also be guilty of unlawful entry if he or she "refuse[s] to quit [any public or private dwelling, building, or other property, or part of such dwelling, building, or other property] on the demand of the lawful occupant, or of the person lawfully in charge thereof." D.C. Code § 22-3302. Because no such demand or refusal was made in this case, this type of offense is not at issue.
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permission to be on the premises.7 See Defs.' Mot. at 11-14; Defs.' Reply at 9-10. Defendants
first point to Officer Cadle's testimony regarding his conversation with security guard Johnson,
whom he interviewed at the scene. Officer Cadle testified that Johnson told him that the
individuals did not have authority to be on the premises. Cadle Dep. at 49. His notes from the
scene are consistent with his testimony. Defs.' Ex. J ("Security Guard Johnson advises that they
do not have authorization to be on premises.").8 As further evidence, defendants also highlight
Cmdr. Beach's testimony. He testified that he was informed by another member of law
enforcement that "a representative of property management requested their arrest and indicated
that the representative from property management would be a complainant in the D.C. Superior
Court for the prosecution of those persons for unlawfully entering." Beach Dep. at 155; see also
Beach's Responses at 6-7. Lastly, defendants contend that Sgt. Kuchinsky's testimony
7 Defendants cite several other factors that purportedly informed the probable cause determination. See Defs.' Mot. at 8-11. However, it was only after law enforcement allegedly received the information that a representative of the building management was willing to be a complainant that the decision to arrest was actually made. Cmdr. Beach -- the officer who gave the order to arrest -- testified that it was this information that established probable cause to order the arrests. See Beach Dep. at 28-29. The Court agrees that this appears to be the dispositive fact in the probable cause determination here. In any event, there are also genuine issues regarding the facts underlying defendants' other asserted bases for probable cause. See Pls.' First Opp'n at 9-26.
8 Plaintiffs suggest that Officer Cadle's testimony and his notes regarding his conversation with Johnson are entitled to no weight on summary judgment because both pieces of evidence are inadmissible hearsay. See Pls.' First Opp'n at 32; see also Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("sheer hearsay . . . counts for nothing on summary judgment") (internal quotations omitted). The Court disagrees. Johnson's out-of-court statement is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., the group's lack of authority to be on the premises); rather, it is being offered to show that Johnson made such a statement at the scene to Officer Cadle and that the substance of his statement was known to Cadle (and thereby MPD) at the time. Consequently, this evidence is not hearsay in this context and the Court can properly consider it in resolving summary judgment.
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corroborates Beach's story because Kuchinsky says that he observed an individual having a conversation with MPD officers, and he "would assume" that someone from MPD verified that this person was a representative of the building management. Kuchinsky Dep. at 125-26; see also Defs.' Reply at 9-10.
Plaintiffs offer a starkly different view of the evidence. To begin with, they contend that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that law enforcement knew at the time that plaintiffs' entry into the parking garage was invited by a building employee (Leshner), was effectuated by use of an electronic keycard, and was therefore with permission and was not against the will of the lawful owner or person in charge. See Pls.' First Opp'n at 1; Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 50. Because defendants possessed such knowledge, plaintiffs argue that it is reasonable to infer that the communications with the building management representative were fabricated in order to create the appearance that the group's presence was unauthorized. To support their claim, they attack Cmdr. Beach's credibility and assert that "[a]side from Beach's bare assertion, there is no evidence that any officer reported to Beach that there was such a [building management] representative." Pls.' First Opp'n at 2. Plaintiffs point out that Cmdr. Beach has never claimed to have spoken directly to the representative; rather, he says the information from the representative was relayed to him by another law enforcement officer. See Pls.' First Opp'n at 29-30; Beach's Responses at 6. At his deposition Cmdr. Beach could not identify the officer who provided this information to him. Beach Dep. at 24-26. Moreover, the record does not contain any evidence of this unknown officer's identity. Cmdr. Beach also admitted that he never knew the building representative's name, even at the time, nor did he ever see the individual. Id. at 23-24.
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Plaintiffs assert that beyond Cmdr. Beach's "unsubstantiated claim, there is no evidence at all" to support the conclusion that a building management representative spoke to law enforcement. Pls.' First Opp'n at 29. The representative's name was not recorded at the scene by Officer Cadle along with the names of other witnesses. See Defs.' Ex. J. Law enforcement also failed to note the name in the arrest documentation prepared several days later -- instead, "JBG Company" was listed as the "complainant." See Pls.' Opp'n, Ex. 59. Sgt. Shamenek testified that he recalled attempting to call a contact number listed on the wall of the parking garage during the investigation, but that he could not recall if those efforts were successful. Shamenek Dep. at 39-41. Efforts by the building management company, JBG Properties, to search its records and identify such a person were also unsuccessful. See JBG Props. Aff. This evidence, plaintiffs argue, leads to the conclusion that the building management representative described by Cmdr. Beach "is wholly fictional." Pls.' First Opp'n at 28.
Plaintiffs also note that security guard Johnson's own testimony and his sworn affidavit directly conflict with Officer Cadle's account of their interaction. See Pls.' Reply in Supp. of Am. Mot. for Summ J. ("Pls.' Reply") at 9-10. Johnson says that he "never told the police that the individuals lacked authority to be on the premises." Johnson Aff. ¶ 3. He also testified that when speaking to MPD at the scene, he did not request that the protestors be arrested, nor did he believe that he had any reason to make such a request. Johnson Dep. at 10.
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Likewise, the Supreme Court has cautioned that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
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and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts, are jury functions, not those of a judge" resolving a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 255.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that summary judgment on the issue of probable cause is precluded for both parties because there is a genuine issue of material fact whether a representative of the building management ever informed law enforcement that plaintiffs were not authorized to be in the parking garage. This factual dispute, which goes to the heart of the central element of the unlawful entry offense, makes it impossible to evaluate the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrests, see Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, and therefore the Court cannot determine as a matter of law whether Cmdr. Beach and the other officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs. The jury will ultimately have to resolve this dispute. II. Qualified Immunity and Common Law Privilege
Irrespective of probable cause, the remaining individual defendants -- Cmdr. Beach and Officers Carruth, Latson, Payne and Sanders (the "arresting officers") -- argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under section 1983. See Defs.' Mot. at 15-20. The arresting officers also assert that under D.C. law they are entitled to common law privilege, which would immunize them from suit on plaintiffs' common law false arrest claims as well. Id. at 20. In response, plaintiffs contend that the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity or common law privilege because their actions were not reasonable under the circumstances. See Pls.' First Opp'n at 33-37; Pls.' Second Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pls.' Second Opp'n").
Both parties acknowledge that for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, Cmdr. Beach, as the commanding officer who ordered the arrests, is situated differently than the
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officers who carried out the arrests at the direction of their superiors. For essentially the same reasons discussed above, the Court must deny Cmdr. Beach's qualified immunity claim at this time because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of the building management representative, and the reasonableness of Beach's conduct cannot be assessed without first resolving that issue. On the other hand, the qualified immunity claims of the four arresting officers are, for the most part, untainted by this factual dispute. For that reason, the Court can resolve those qualified immunity claims as a matter of law. Based on the undisputed record evidence currently before the Court, the qualified immunity claims of Officers Carruth, Latson and Sanders will be granted. However, given certain factual circumstances that are unique to her case, Officer Payne's qualified immunity claim must be denied at this time.
Police officers enjoy a qualified immunity from suits alleging violations of constitutional rights. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The Supreme Court has made it clear that there are two inquiries involved in the qualified immunity analysis. The first question is: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id. at 201. If the court determines that there is no such violation, the analysis is over and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. If, however, there is a constitutional violation, the second step in the analysis is to determine "whether the right was clearly established." Id. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202. When conducting the second step of the inquiry, it "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. at 201; see Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
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615 (1999) ("the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established").
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), has altered the qualified immunity analysis somewhat by revisiting the sequence of the two-part inquiry set forth in Saucier. In Pearson, the Supreme Court wrote:
On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. 129 S. Ct at 818. In granting courts greater discretion to conduct the qualified immunity analysis, Pearson also noted that "we continue to recognize that [the Saucier protocol] is often beneficial." Id. The newfound flexibility that Pearson affords is of little import in this case because, on plaintiffs' version of the facts, there is no question that they have alleged a constitutional violation against the individual officers for either ordering (Cmdr. Beach) or carrying out (Officers Carruth, Latson, Payne and Sanders) plaintiffs' arrests without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and in retaliation for the exercise of protected First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the second part of the qualified immunity inquiry will be the Court's focus here. A. Commander Beach Cmdr. Beach's qualified immunity claim must be denied at this time due to the genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of the building management representative. Until the jury resolves this underlying factual dispute, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law
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whether Cmdr. Beach's conduct in ordering plaintiffs' arrests was objectively reasonable under the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. As this Court has recognized, "[o]nce a genuine issue of material fact is found to exist, the defense of qualified immunity shielding the defendant from trial must be denied. . . . [W]here there are issues of material fact surrounding [the conduct of either an arrestee or an arresting officer] it is impossible for the court to determine, as a matter of law, what predicate facts exist to decide whether or not the officer's conduct clearly violated established law." Halcomb v. WMATA, 526 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1385 (8th Cir. 1992)). If these facts are resolved in Cmdr. Beach's favor, then it seems likely that he would be entitled to qualified immunity. But if the jury resolves the facts in plaintiffs' favor, and concludes that the building management representative was a fabrication, then it seems equally likely that Cmdr. Beach would not be entitled to qualified immunity because it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his actions were unlawful under those circumstances. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. As a result, the Court cannot resolve Cmdr. Beach's qualified immunity claim on summary judgment at this time and his claim must be denied.
B. The Four Arresting Officers Defendants argue that the four arresting officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not participate in the decision to arrest plaintiffs and they were not involved in plaintiffs' initial detention.9 See Defs.' Mot. at 18. The arresting officers, along with other members of MPD's CDU, were only called to the scene after the initial detention and once the
9 Defendants do not dispute that Officers Carruth, Latson, Payne and Sanders participated sufficiently in plaintiffs' arrests such that they may incur liability under section 1983; they simply argue that the officers are all entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
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investigation was already underway. Thereafter, they received a directive from their superior
officers to "process" the arrests and, according to defendants, they did so "based on the official
representations made to them that the detainees had entered the building without authority and
that probable cause existed to arrest for unlawful entry." Id. at 18-19. Plaintiffs do not dispute
most of the relevant facts pertaining to the arresting officers' involvement at the scene, but
nonetheless contend that qualified immunity should not be granted because these arrests were
made without probable cause, none of the officers conducted their own independent assessment
of probable cause, and simply following the orders of commanding officers was not reasonable
under the circumstances. See Pls.' Second Opp'n at 2-3. Moreover, plaintiffs claim that the
officers "ignored critical 'red flag' factors, including the possession of a key card, that in the
exercise of reasonable prudence would have merited some inquiry." Id. at 6.
Although plaintiffs argue that the four arresting officers had an "obligation to
independently determine probable cause," id. at 4, the law is clear -- and was so at the time of
plaintiffs' arrests10 -- that "an officer may rely on another officer's determination of probable
cause to make an arrest" even if the arresting officer does not have firsthand knowledge of the
facts supporting probable cause, Barham v. Salazar, 556 F.3d 844, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
10 For this duty, plaintiffs rely on language from the District Court opinion in Barham v. Ramsey, 338 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61 (D.D.C. 2004). However, subsequent opinions by the D.C. Circuit in the same case speak of no such duty and, as discussed in this section, the most recent Barham opinion supports the conclusion that reliance on the orders of other officers is permitted as long as objectively reasonable. See Barham v. Salazar, 556 F.3d 844, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Moreover, the decision relied on by plaintiffs came several years after the conduct at issue in this case. Hence, that opinion, and the rule that plaintiffs extract from it, cannot serve as the basis for a "clearly established" constitutional rule in this case. Lastly, even if the purported duty to independently investigate predated the events at issue in this case, the D.C. Circuit cases discussed here establish that such a rule could not be considered "clearly established" in this Circuit at that time.
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(Henderson, J., concurring); see United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985) ("'[E]ffective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and . . . officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information.'") (quoting United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Loundmannz, 472 F.2d 1376, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (probable cause exists if officer ordering arrest has "adequate first-hand knowledge to support a finding of probable cause" even though arresting officer does not); Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("There is no requirement that the arresting officer have sufficient firsthand knowledge to constitute probable cause. It is enough that the police officer initiating the chain of communication either had firsthand knowledge or received his information from some person . . . who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth."). However, the law is equally clear that an arresting officer is only permitted to rely on such representations and remain entitled to the protections of qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for him or her to do so under the circumstances. See Barham, 556 F.3d at 850 (stating that an arresting officer's reliance on the probable cause determination of another officer "must be objectively reasonable for him to be clothed with qualified immunity"); Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 174-75 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Plausible instructions from a superior or fellow officer support qualified immunity where, viewed objectively in light of the surrounding circumstances, they could lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the necessary legal justification for his actions exists (e.g., a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances).").
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With these principles in mind, a careful examination of the unique factual circumstances relevant to each individual officer establishes that, as a matter of law, Officers Carruth, Latson and Sanders were objectively reasonable in following orders to arrest plaintiffs and hence they are entitled to qualified immunity and common law privilege. However, due in large part to her knowledge of the electronic keycard prior to plaintiffs' arrests and her own testimony that she did not, at the time, believe that plaintiffs lacked authority to be in the parking garage, the Court cannot conclude, based on the current record, that Officer Payne's conduct was objectively reasonable. Therefore, the Court must, at this time, deny her qualified immunity claim, as well as her claim for common law privilege.
1. Officers Carruth, Latson and Sanders The question here is whether the reliance by Officers Carruth, Latson and Sanders on the information about the existence of probable cause and the arrest orders of their superiors was objectively reasonable given that they had little, if any, firsthand knowledge of the underlying facts upon which a probable cause determination would have been based. Perhaps most critical to the Court's inquiry is whether any of these three officers possessed information at the time that would tend to undermine the existence of probable cause. After a thorough review, and despite plaintiffs' assertions to the contrary, the record does not contain any such information with respect to these three officers. The record demonstrates that Officer Michael Carruth had extremely limited knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the detention and arrest of plaintiffs, but he also lacked any knowledge that would undermine the conclusion that there was probable cause to arrest. Officer Carruth was the arresting officer for plaintiffs Nathaniel and Timothy Meysenburg. Defs.' Ex. R
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(MPD field arrest forms). He testified that his actions at the scene were taken at the direction of his superior officers and that he "was advised by [one of them] that [the Meysenburgs were] in the building and we had probable cause to make the arrest." Deposition of Michael Carruth ("Carruth Dep.") at 8, 16. Officer Carruth stated that he did not view himself as the arresting officer of plaintiffs because he merely "processed" the detainees after he was advised they were under arrest. See id. at 11. In his role as an officer processing the arrests, he presumed that the officer who gave the order to arrest had established probable cause and, consequently, he carried out the order without objection and without asking further questions. See id. at 18-19. He testified that he did not have any specific recollection about what was communicated to him, only that "these are the individuals who broke the law, unlawful entry . . . let's process them." Id. at 26. Officer Carruth also testified that at the time of the arrests he had no knowledge that one of the group members possessed an electronic keycard that allowed access to the garage. Id. at 16.
Officer Andrea Latson was the arresting officer for plaintiff Elizabeth Bolger. Defs.' Ex. R. She, too, relied on the information provided to her by her superior officer, Sergeant Malcolm Forbes. Officer Latson made clear that she never approached the detainees prior to the arrest; rather, she remained in the CDU van while Sgt. Forbes and other officials conferred near the suspects who were gathered on the sidewalk. Deposition of Andrea Latson ("Latson Dep.") at 69. She testified that her "probable cause came from [her] sergeant and what he advised [her]." Id. at 23. Officer Latson stated that after receiving the order to arrest from Sgt. Forbes, she:
[A]sked him, well, what happened? I know he couldn't go into detail, not that very moment, you know, and that's when he said that they were in the garage and they were in the garage without authorization and it is not 100 percent clear as to
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how they got in but they were in the garage and they weren't supposed to be in there. No one had permission to be in there. Id. at 77-78. She also testified that at the time of the arrests she had not seen the electronic keycard, nor had she heard mention of it. Id. at 9. She said that she was only advised of the electronic keycard after this litigation had commenced. Id. Of all the arresting officers, Officer Adrian Sanders had the most knowledge of the events that were thought to support the probable cause determination. Officer Sanders was the arresting officer for plaintiff Helen Johnson. Defs.' Ex. R. He testified that prior to the arrests he was "told that there were people who broke into a garage and that they weren't supposed to be in the garage." Deposition of Adrian Sanders ("Sanders Dep.") at 119. He also "learned that the building management did not give them permission to be in the garage." Id. Additionally, Officer Sanders testified that he was told that there was probable cause to arrest by Sgt. Forbes and Lieutenant Phillip Lanciano. Id. at 126. According to Officer Sanders, the conversations that he had with his fellow officers along with his own observations supported his belief that there was probable cause. Id. With respect to the electronic keycard, Officer Sanders said that he did not have any information about the keycard when he arrived on the scene. Id. at 152. Nor did he have any information about the existence of a keycard, whether from a detainee or a fellow officer, prior to the arrests. Id. 127-28. His testimony was clear that he was not aware of the actual existence of the electronic keycard until after the arrests when plaintiffs were being transported from the scene for further processing. Id. at 135-36 ("[A]fter the transport condition, then we learned that there was an access card.").
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Officer Sanders's order to arrest came from Lt. Lanciano, who told him: "Let's lock them up." Id. at 111. Officer Sanders testified that when an order is given in a CDU situation there is little time for conversation or further questions. See id. at 31. But he also testified that this limitation did not present a problem for him in this situation because
[H]ad I believed at the time that the arrest was unlawful, that would be an entirely different situation, but because I believed at the time that there was baseline probable cause, I didn't object to what we were doing. Now, when the issue with the pass card came up later on, that -- at that point, which was a time later, there was an opportunity to discuss. Id. at 127. Despite learning of the keycard after the arrests, Officer Sanders was clear that based on the information available to him at the time of the arrests, he believed that plaintiffs lacked the lawful authority to be inside the garage. Id. at 148. Plaintiffs' primary argument against qualified immunity for these three officers rests with the assertion that "[t]hey knew of evidence negating probable cause and yet arrested plaintiffs anyway." Pls.' Second Opp'n at 2. The Court simply does not agree. With respect to these three officers, plaintiffs strain the record to find any support for the proposition that the officers had information, prior to the arrests, that would undermine the existence of probable cause and make their conduct objectively unreasonable. Plaintiffs attack Officer Carruth for his general lack of knowledge about the underlying basis for probable cause, and they point to the fact that he did not even know who ordered the arrests as evidence of his unreasonableness. Id. at 6-7. Officer Latson's conduct is characterized as unreasonable because she acknowledged that she relied on her superior officer, Sgt. Forbes, for probable cause yet he did not even know plaintiff Bolger's method of entry into the garage. Id. at 7-8, 11. Finally, plaintiffs impugn Officer Sanders's conduct because he also lacked
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information about the method of entry into the garage and he did not investigate whether plaintiffs possessed a keycard when he had overheard some talk about an access card prior to the arrests. Id. at 9, 12-13. Plaintiffs, however, fail to acknowledge that Officer Sanders did not actually become aware of the existence of the electronic keycard until after the arrests, a point clarified multiple times in his deposition testimony. See Sanders Dep. at 127-28, 135-36, 152.
Although plaintiffs try mightily to argue that these officers possessed information at the time of the arrests that would tend to undermine the existence of probable cause, the record simply does not support such a conclusion. In reality, plaintiffs would like the Court to secondguess the conduct of these officers and withhold the protection of qualified immunity based largely on the fact that they could have, arguably, undertaken a more active role at the scene by attempting to build an independent basis for probable cause. But the law is clear that these officers were entitled to rely on the arrest orders of their superior officers even if they themselves had scant firsthand knowledge of the underlying facts that were thought to support probable cause at the time. See Loundmannz, 472 F.2d at 1379; Daniels, 393 F.2d at 361. Moreover, the record does not reveal any facts that suggest that it was unreasonable for these officers to rely on the representations of their superiors with regard to the existence of probable cause (even if its existence may have, in fact, been questionable) and the ultimate decision to arrest. Therefore, the Court concludes that based upon the uncontroverted record evidence, the conduct of Officers Carruth, Latson and Sanders was objectively reasonable; hence, they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under section 1983.
The arresting officers also assert that they are entitled to common law privilege, which would immunize them from suit on plaintiffs' common law false arrest claims. Defs.' Mot. at 20.
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Under D.C. law, a police officer can justify an arrest, and establish that it was privileged, "by demonstrating that '(1) he or she believed, in good faith, that his or her conduct was lawful, and (2) this belief was reasonable.'" Scott, 101 F.3d at 754-55 (quoting District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34, 36 (D.C. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). "In making this inquiry, good faith is to be evaluated from the perspective of the arresting officer, rather than that of the plaintiff." Liser v. Smith, 254 F. Supp. 2d 89, 96 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Murphy, 631 A.2d at 36-37). Having already concluded that their conduct was objectively reasonable, the Court also concludes that Officers Carruth, Latson and Sanders exhibited the good faith, reasonable belief necessary for common law privilege. As the Court concluded in Liser, even when probable cause to arrest is based on a mistake of fact: "Without any evidence that [the officer] possessed information to the contrary, his mistake cannot be said to be the product of bad faith; without any evidence that the source of his information was untrustworthy, his good faith mistake cannot be said to be unreasonable." Id. at 100. Such evidence is lacking here and, accordingly, these three individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' common law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.
2. Officer Payne Several critical facts distinguish Officer Payne's case from those of her colleagues and make it impossible, at this time, for the Court to grant her qualified immunity. Officer Payne was the only one of the arresting officers who was aware that one of the group members possessed an electronic keycard prior to the arrests, and she testified that she knew at the time that this fact potentially undermined the existence of probable cause. She also testified that at the time of the arrests she did not believe that plaintiffs lacked authority to be on the premises.
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Lastly, Officer Payne's testimony implies that she carried out the arrests not because she had a reasonable belief that the directives of her superior officers were lawful, but rather because she believed she had no choice but to follow the chain of command. Considered together, these facts preclude a finding at this time that Officer Payne's conduct was objectively reasonable.
Officer Payne was the arresting officer for plaintiffs Jessica Lahood and Debra Smith. Defs.' Ex. R. After arriving at the scene, Officer Payne estimates that she remained in the CDU van for thirty to forty-five minutes. Deposition of Wendy Payne ("Payne Dep.") at 43-44. Sgt. Forbes eventually approached the van and notified Officer Payne and her squad that they could get out of the van because the detainees were going to be arrested. Id. at 51. When she asked Sgt. Forbes what was going on he told her "to go with the flow until we find out further notice." Id. Once out of the van, Officer Payne said that she observed Cmdr. Beach talking to Lt. Lanciano and immediately thereafter Lt. Lanciano approached her and other members of CDU and told them that they were going to be the arrest team. Id. at 52-53. Sgt. Forbes also told her that the detainees were being charged with unlawful entry, but he did not convey any further information to her about the conduct that led to their arrest or their method of entry into the garage. Id. at 54. Officer Payne testified that she did not "make any independent evaluation as to whether probable cause existed to arrest" because she had a direct order to arrest from her superior officer or "official." Id. at 57. After receiving the order to arrest from Sgt. Forbes, Officer Payne said "the only question was, what are they being charged with, and that's when he informed us unlawful entry." Id. at 58.
Officer Payne testified that at the time of the arrests she was aware that one of the detainees had an access card to the garage. Id. at 61 ("Q: At the time of the arrests, did you
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know that one of the people within the group that was arrested had an electronic access swipe card to get into the garage? A: It was mentioned, but I don't recall by whom."). Officer Payne later clarified that she learned this information because she heard Sgt. Forbes and Lt. Lanciano discussing it. Id. at 62 ("I cannot quote directly what they were saying. I did hear them saying there was a probability one of them had a key card."). She testified that this information gave her pause about carrying out the arrests. Id. ("Q: Did that information give you any pause in terms of participating in these arrests? A: Yes."). Officer Payne stated that she was concerned at the time "[b]ecause if he had a key card, he had access to the building. That gives him authorization, if it was issued from the building." Id. Despite this concern, Officer Payne did not ask any follow-up questions of Sgt. Forbes or Lt. Lanciano or offer any objections -- she simply carried out her orders. Id. at 63 ("Q: Did you object at any point in time, like along the lines of hey, if they had a key card, we really shouldn't be locking them up for unlawful entry? A: Well, I had a direct order, and once I get that direct order, that's what we have to abide by.").
In her deposition, Officer Payne also stated that she did not believe at the time of the arrests that the three individuals she was arresting lacked authority to be in the parking garage. Id. at 60-61 ("Q: Based on the information that you knew at the time of the arrests, did you believe that your arrestees lacked the lawful authority to be inside the garage? A: No."). She also stated that she did not believe, at the time of the arrests, that any of the individuals had been given an order to leave the premises or had refused to leave the premises. Id. at 61. When asked if she understood "that within your responsibility or authority that you are entitled to object or ask for clarification of an order where you believe that there's a civil rights violation," Officer Payne responded: "Right, but unfortunately, in MPD, when an officer and a lieutenant comes to
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you and gives you a direct order that's what you do." Id. at 64. She further testified that she thought she lacked authority to ask for clarification about the circumstances of the arrests "[b]ecause [she is] an officer, and they are officials." Id. at 65.
Officer Payne contends that her conduct was reasonable because she learned of the possibility of the keycard from Sgt. Forbes and Lt. Lanciano and it was these same superior officers who gave the order to arrest. See Defs.' Reply at 14. Hence, according to her, "when the order to arrest came through these same superiors [she] could reasonably conclude that the probable cause determination took into account the key card." Id. Officer Payne also tries to mitigate the impact of her testimony regarding her belief that her arrestees did not lack authority to be on the premises. She argues that this testimony merely acknowledged "that she had no personal knowledge to form such a belief [and] . . . [t]here is no dispute that the defendant officers generally lacked such personal knowledge." Id. at 15 n.3.
The Court finds these interpretations of Officer Payne's testimony unconvincing. It is clear from the totality of her deposition testimony that she doubted the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrests and that she disregarded these doubts and carried out the arrests without objection or inquiry because she was given a direct order to do so by her superior officers. When viewed in context, Officer Payne's interpretation of her own testimony is selfserving and speculative and, in any event, is insufficient to recast her conduct as objectively reasonable.
The Court acknowledges that assessing the reasonableness of Officer Payne's conduct is made somewhat more difficult in light of the genuine issues of material fact that are at the core of this case. Much like in Cmdr. Beach's circumstance, if the jury resolves key facts in favor of
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defendants, then the facts supporting Officer Payne's qualified immunity claim may look drastically different at the close of trial than they do today. However, the Court is at this moment tasked with evaluating Officer Payne's qualified immunity claim in light of the record as it now stands. On that record, and given the genuine factual issues relating to probable cause and her assessment on the scene, the Court cannot conclude that Officer Payne's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances that she confronted at the scene in the time leading up to plaintiffs' arrests on April 20, 2002. As a result, Officer Payne's qualified immunity claim will be denied. Because the Court has concluded that Officer Payne's conduct was not objectively reasonable, it also cannot conclude that she acted with the requisite good faith, reasonable belief in the lawfulness of her conduct for common law privilege to attach. See Scott, 101 F.3d at 754-55; Murphy, 631 A.2d at 36. Consequently, the Court will also deny Officer Payne's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' common law claim of false arrest and false imprisonment. III. Section 1983 Claim Against the District of Columbia
In their motion, defendants state that they are moving "for summary judgment on all claims against them in this matter." Defs.' Mot. at 1. However, defendants' motion fails to address plaintiffs' claim against the District for municipal liability under section 1983. Generally, a local government cannot be held liable under section 1983 for a constitutional tort committed by its agent or employee because respondeat superior does not apply. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). However, the Supreme Court has established that municipalities may be held liable under section 1983 if the injuries occurred pursuant to the "government's policy or custom, whether made by its
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lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Id. at 694.
There is no dispute that the Second Amended Complaint states a so-called Monell-style section 1983 claim alleging that plaintiffs' injuries were caused, at least in part, by the District's "policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of protestors, and also of Anarchists or persons perceived to be Anarchists." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 51. Because defendants have failed to address this claim in their motion, summary judgment on this basis will be denied. IV. Plaintiffs' Request for Sanctions
Plaintiffs have also requested sanctions against the District, in the form of an adverse inference instruction, based on the destruction of recorded police radio communications sought during discovery. This Court has already sanctioned the District once during the course of this case for its failure to produce certain materials in response to plaintiffs' discovery requests and orders of this Court. See Bolger v. District of Columbia, 248 F.R.D. 339 (D.D.C. 2008). Although the Court's prior findings have some general relevance here, the operative facts are unique to the instant request and will be recounted briefly below.
According to plaintiffs, the "radio runs" or recorded police channel communications at issue here were destroyed at some time in 2006 "after the MPD engaged in ad hoc non-routine and undocumented 'heavy purging' of recorded police communications." Pls.' Updated Request for Sanctions ("Pls.' Request") at 1; see Deposition of James Crane ("Crane Dep.") at 6-7, 11-13. The destruction of these radio communications is particularly troubling from plaintiffs' perspective because it occurred years after the first discovery requests for such materials were
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made and months after Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") counsel Thomas Koger certified that the District "has no radio runs recorded during or related to the protests of April 20, 2002 and the arrests of plaintiffs." Pls.' Request, Ex. 2 at 38 (Def. D.C.'s Responses to Pls.' Second Request for Production of Documents and Things (May 2, 2005)).
The District counters by asserting that "[t]o the extent that recordings were lost that might have related to this case, such loss was the unintentional result of a routine operation of the police communications system." Def. D.C.'s Response to Pls.' Updated Request for Sanctions ("Def.'s Response") at 1. This routine operation was a purge of past recorded communications that, according to the District, "was necessary to allow police communications to have enough memory to continue recording new radio communications." Id. at 3; see Crane Dep. at 7. Although the District concedes that it made some errors by not immediately putting in place a litigation hold when this action commenced and by failing, until at least April 2006, to contact MPD's Office of Communications -- the office where the recorded radio communications were stored prior to their destruction -- the District nonetheless maintains that an adverse inference instruction is unwarranted here because "the recordings were minimally relevant, cumulative of other available evidence, and at any rate, would not have supported plaintiffs' claims in this case." Def.'s Response at 1.
The parties agree that three elements must be satisfied to warrant an adverse inference: (1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it when it was destroyed or altered; ( 2) the destruction or loss was accom panied by a "culpable state of m ind"; and (3) the evide nce that was destroyed or altered was "relevant" to the claim s or defenses of the party that sought the discovery of the spoliated evidence, to the extent that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the lost evidence would have supported the claims or defense of the party that sought it. Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep't, 530 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (D.D.C. 2008)
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(quoting Thompson v. HUD, 219 F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. Md. 2003) (internal citations omitted)). The District does not dispute that the first element is satisfied here because it was under an obligation to preserve the evidence at the time it was destroyed and it failed to do so. See Def.'s Response at 4. With regard to the second and third elements, however, the District is adamant that they have not been satisfied.
The District contends that it did not act with a "culpable state of mind" for two reasons. First, the District argues that it made efforts to locate radio runs, which normally would have been signified by an "event" in MPD's Computer-Aided Dispatch ("CAD") system. Because there was no CAD event related to a request for police service at 1275 K Street, N.W., on April 20, 2002, the District certified that it had no radio runs relating to plaintiffs' arrests. See Declaration of Anne Grant ("Grant Decl.") ¶ 4. The District does concede, however, that it erred by focusing only on radio runs "and not considering the possibility that some recorded police channels might still have captured transmissions related to the arrests." Def.'s Response at 5. Second, the District asserts that "the purge was the result of a normal, routine operation of the police communications system." Id. The District admits that the purges did not occur at regularly defined intervals, but claims that they "were nevertheless routine, periodic events occurring whenever the system was reaching capacity." Id. Both of these facts, the District argues, demonstrate that it did not act with the requisite "gross negligence or bad faith" needed to satisfy the second element for an adverse inference.
Plaintiffs cite a laundry list of evidence to support their position that the District did, in fact, act with "gross indifference or reckless disregard" in destroying the recorded radio communications. See Pls.' Request at 3-4; see also Rice v. United States, 917 F. Supp. 17, 20
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(D.D.C. 1996). In brief, that evidence includes: the District's failure to issue a litigation hold; the District's December 31, 2003 discovery response erroneously representing that no responsive materials existed apart from sealed arrest records, see Pls.' Request, Ex. 4 (Pls.' Limited Discovery to Defs.); the District's mistaken February 25, 2005 discovery certification that it "has no radio runs recorded during or related to the protests of April 20, 2002 and the arrests of plaintiffs," Pls.' Request, Ex. 2 at 38; the District's incomplete representation, in an April 7, 2006 status report (Dkt. No. 61) filed in response to the Court's February 15, 2006 Order, that it had supplemented its discovery responses and that they were complete despite the District's failure to contact the Office of Police Communications to search for recorded radio communications prior to making this representation, see Crane Dep. at 5-6, 16-17; and the District's failure to contact the MPD's Office of Police Communications to search for recorded radio communications until May 2006 when it finally did so in response to the Court's May 2, 2006 Order, but by which time the relevant recordings had already been destroyed, see id.
This Court has recognized that "the adverse inference doctrine embraces negligent (in addition to deliberate) destruction of evidence." Mazloum, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 292; see also More v. Snow, 480 F. Supp. 2d 257, 275 (D.D.C. 2007). Consequently, the District's stance that it did not act with "gross negligence or bad faith" is of no moment. Moreover, given the District's poor track record in satisfying its discovery obligations in this case, the Court cannot help but view the District's proffered explanation for its destruction of evidence with a jaundiced eye. Based on the facts recited above, the Court concludes that at a minimum the District was negligent in allowing the police radio communications to be destroyed. Therefore, plaintiffs have established the requisite "culpable state of mind" for an adverse inference instruction.
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The final element of "relevance" requires a determination whether "a reasonable trier of fact could infer that 'the destroyed . . . evidence would have been of the nature alleged by the party affected by its destruction.'" Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted); see Mazloum, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 109). It is at this final step of the adverse inference inquiry that the limited record currently before the Court presents some difficulties.
Plaintiffs allege that two types of evidence relevant to their claims were lost by the destruction of the recorded radio communications: (1) evidence of defendants' discriminatory intent and animus against those perceived to be anarchists (i.e., evidence supporting their First Amendment claims), and (2) evidence of defendants' knowledge at the time of the arrests regarding the existence, or non-existence, of the building management representative (i.e., evidence supporting their Fourth Amendment claims). See Pls.' Request at 6-7. Plaintiffs cite to Cmdr. Beach's deposition testimony as support for the claim that the destroyed recordings contained evidence of discriminatory intent or animus. As a general matter, Cmdr. Beach testified that he would expect that there would have been information recorded over the various police channels related to plaintiffs' arrests. See Beach Dep. at 89-91. He also said that on at least one occasion that day he referred to persons "dressed in black, anarchists, using that term," over a recorded police radio channel. Id. at 124. With respect to the second type of evidence related to probable cause, plaintiffs point to the timeline of events surrounding their arrests for support. Pls.' Request at 7. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the gap of only twelve minutes between a report that there was no complainant on the scene (1825 hours), Pls.' Request, Ex. 11 (J.O.C.C. running resume), and the time that, according to Officer Cadle's notes, plaintiffs were
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arrested (1837 hours), Pls.' Request, Ex. 12 (Cadle notes), creates the reasonable inference that there may have been radio communications about the presence or absence of a complainant from the building management company.
Not surprisingly, the District argues that "the importance of the [destroyed] evidence to the plaintiffs' claims is minimal" and "[p]laintiffs present only wild speculation" to support their assertion that the lost recordings would have supported their claims. Def.'s Response at 5, 7. As to the first type of evidence, the District argues that the scope of information that was potentially lost is very narrow and, in any event, plaintiffs possess adequate substitute evidence because there is ample evidence in the record that Cmdr. Beach and other law enforcement officers referred to the group members as anarchists. See id. at 6-7. With regard to the latter type of evidence, the District simply dismisses plaintiffs' proffer as "wild speculation" and asserts that there is no reasonable basis from which to infer that the lost recordings would have contained statements supporting plaintiffs' contention that the building management complainant was fictional. See id. at 7.
Although the Court sympathizes with plaintiffs here, it cannot grant plaintiffs' request at this time. Put simply, plaintiffs have asked too much. In the Court's view, on the record currently before it, a reasonable trier of fact could not infer that the destroyed recordings would have contained evidence of retaliatory intent or animus beyond the identifying statements (i.e., persons dressed in black, anarchists) already acknowledged by the District. Nor could a reasonable jury infer that there would have been evidence tending to disprove the existence of the building management company's mystery complainant. Plaintiffs' proffer with respect to this evidence is too speculative at this time. However, because plaintiffs have made the necessary
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showing on the first two elements -- and the Court believes that a record developed fully during the course of trial could potentially provide plaintiffs with the support necessary to warrant an adverse inference instruction -- the Court will deny plaintiffs' request without prejudice and will allow them to renew their request at an appropriate time after sufficient proof has been adduced at trial. The adverse inference they seek, after all, would be part of the jury instructions finalized at the close of the trial.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of Commander Beach's liability and it will deny plaintiffs' request for sanctions without prejudice. The Court will enter judgment in favor of defendants on those claims as to which plaintiffs have not opposed dismissal, but it will deny defendants' summary judgment motion in all other respects with the exception of qualified immunity, which will be granted only as to MPD Officers Michael Carruth, Andrea Latson and Adrian Sanders at this time. In the interest of moving efficiently toward a trial on the remaining issues in this case, a scheduling conference with the Court shall be held on April 23, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 8. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: March 31, 2009

/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge
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 Partnership for Civil Justice: PCJF wins settlement in illegal arrest case in D.C.

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Peaceful protestors targeted for wearing black

The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund (PCJF) is pleased to announce a victorious settlement on behalf of eight people who were illegally arrested following April 20, 2002 lawful anti-war and IMF/World Bank protests. In this landmark case, the arrestees, who were never prosecuted for the

PCJF forces D.C. Police to disclose General and Special Orders

false arrests, were politically targeted by law enforcement, in part based

on the black clothing that some were wearing. Following their arrests, they more ... were interrogated about their political beliefs by a secret intelligence unit

of the FBI. The case, which has been litigated for six years by attorneys at

the PCJF, was about to go to trial.

The case of Bolger, et al. v. District of Columbia, et al. Civil Action 030963, United States Court for the District of Columbia, has been settled for $450,000 and changes in police procedures and policies. The District will pay each of the eight arrestees $25,000 plus $250,000 in attorneys’ fees, which is in addition to the approximately $200,000 the District has already paid in the course of the litigation for attorneys’ fees including sanctions for its discovery misconduct. The arrests have been expunged.

The settlement also provides equitable relief provisions requiring that the police department modify its policies and require that police officers formally sign off on, and document, any effort by federal authorities to gain access to interview or interrogate protestors.

"This unconstitutional interrogation could never have occurred but 'off the books' and under cloak of secrecy and cover-up. The FBI and MPD long denied that it occurred, representations that were proven in the course of the litigation to be false," stated Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, an attorney with the PCJF.

"The MPD gave a secret FBI intelligence unit access to interrogate the protestors on video," stated Carl Messineo, attorney with the PCJF. "The FBI interrogators demanded disclosure of their political activities, associations, names of friends and associates, and even demanded disclosure of an arrestee’s religious beliefs. Law enforcement took images of their political literature and materials, examined their bodies and photographed any political tattoos."

Background Information

This is the first nationally recorded case of alleging protestors were falsely arrested because they had been protesting in black, a color which police associated with holding anarchist or anti-capitalist political beliefs.

The MPD falsely arrested the protestors, charging them with "unlawful entry" into a garage on K St. following a lawful protest, even though police records—originally hidden—documented that at the scene, prior to the arrests, the MPD interviewed a building employee who attested he invited the group to park in the garage on the Saturday afternoon when it would be relatively empty. The protestors also showed police at the scene that they had not entered unlawfully but entered using the employee’s electronic key card that opened the garage door to facilitate their invited entry.

For years, the MPD denied allowing the FBI to engage in the interrogations. The MPD denied the FBI was even on the scene.

http://www.justiceonline.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5407&news_iv_ctrl=1003 11/11/2009

Partnership for Civil Justice: PCJF wins settlement in illegal arrest case in D.C.
Ultimately, FBI agents identified Sergeant Jeffrey Madison of the MPD’s Intelligence Unit as having allowed them access. Evidence developed by the plaintiffs showed that members of a joint MPD-FBI intelligence team had infiltrated the group earlier in the day, at the demonstration rally site, and proceeded with protestors to the garage.
The cover-up continued for years as MPD’s attorneys represented that the MPD’s Joint Operations Command Center did not create a running resume or log of the underlying events. After years of intense efforts resulting in a nearly $100,000 sanction against the MPD for discovery violations, plaintiffs’ counsel proved that not only had the MPD created the running resume, but that it had been in the possession of the MPD’s Office of General Counsel all along. The running resume duly noted that the FBI was on the scene and interviews of the arrestees were being conducted. This foreshadowed even broader evidence of MPD evidence secretion, loss and destruction as has been documented in Barham, et. al. v. Ramsey, et al., Civil Action 02-2283 pertaining to the mass false arrest at Pershing Park in September, 2002, in which the PCJF is also counsel.
Click this link to read the Washington Post article on the settlement victory.
The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund (PCJF) is a not-for-profit legal and educational organization which, among other things, seeks to ensure constitutional accountability within police practices. The PCJF recently won a unanimous ruling at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals finding the MPD's unprecedented military-style police checkpoint program unconstitutional. PCJF is counsel on still pending class action lawsuits against the District for the mass false arrests of more than 1,000 persons during First Amendment protected demonstrations, among other litigation. The PCJ previously uncovered and disclosed that the D.C. police employed an unlawful domestic spying and agent provocateur program in which officers were sent on long-term assignments posing as political activists and infiltrated lawful and peaceful groups. For more information go to: www.JusticeOnline.org.

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http://www.justiceonline.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5407&news_iv_ctrl=1003 11/11/2009

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 1 of 40
CLOSED,JURY,TYPE−H
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03−cv−00906−JDB

BOLGER et al v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al Assigned to: Judge John D. Bates Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/21/2003 Date Terminated: 11/16/2009 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER

represented by Carl L. Messineo PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE FUND 617 Florida Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 232−1180 x201 Fax: (202) 747−7747 Email: cm@JusticeOnline.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zachary J. Wolfe GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 801 22nd Street, NW Rome Hall 557 Washington, DC 20052 (202) 265−5965 Fax: (202) 250−6712 Email: zwolfe@PeoplesLawResourceCenter.org TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff NICOLE DAVIS

represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff HELEN JOHNSON

represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JESSICA LAHOOD

represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 2 of 40

Plaintiff NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG
Plaintiff TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG
Plaintiff BRIAN ROSA
Plaintiff FRANCIS SCHLEICHER
Plaintiff DEBRA SMITH
Plaintiff

Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 3 of 40

TODD SPALT

represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN

represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zachary J. Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/06/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ALL PLAINTIFFS

represented by Carl L. Messineo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Radhika M.S. Miller EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS 1730 M Street, NW Suite1010 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 466−3686 x 114 Fax: (202) 429−9766 Email: radhika.singhmiller@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

represented by Caroline M. Mew FULBRIGHT &JAWORSKI LLP 801 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 662−4753 Fax: (202) 662−4643 Email: cmew@fulbright.com TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ellen A. Efros OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9886 Fax: (202) 727−3625 Email: ellen.efros@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 4 of 40
Julie Steptoe Lee OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6602 Fax: (202) 727−3625 Email: julie.lee@dc.gov TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY
Thomas Louis Koger OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, D.C. Public Interest Division 441 4th Street, NW Suite 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 727−4170 Fax: (202) 715−7762 Email: thomas.koger@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/04/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl James Schifferle OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 441 4th Street, NW Suite 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6624 Fax: (202) 730−1472 Email: carl.schifferle@dc.gov TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chad Wayne Copeland OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6623 Email: chad.copeland@dc.gov
James H. Vricos OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 Fourth Street, NW 6th Floor Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6600 Email: james.vricos@dc.gov TERMINATED: 06/14/2007
Lori S. Parris 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 442−8404

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 5 of 40

Fax: (202) 727−3625 Email: lori.parris@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL BRUCKHEIM, LLC 800 South Frederick Avenue Suite 104 Gaithersburg, MD 20877 (240) 753−8222 Fax: (301) 670−9899 Email: mpbruckesq@aol.com TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. D.C. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Civil Litigation Division 441 Fourth Street, NW 6th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6642 Fax: 202−741−8895 Email: robert.deberardinis@dc.gov TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
CHARLES H. RAMSEY Chief, in his official capacity as Chief of Police Metropolitan Police Department

represented by Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
ARTHUR BROWN in his indivdual capacity, MPD Officer #4283

represented by Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 6 of 40

TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James H. Vricos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2007

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
MICHAEL CARRUTH in his indivdual capacity MPD Officer #2043

represented by Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James H. Vricos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2007

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 7 of 40

MALCOLM FORBES in his individual capacity MPD Officer #2093

Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James H. Vricos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2007

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
ANDREA LATSON in her individual capacity MPD Officer #3725

represented by Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James H. Vricos (See above for address)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 8 of 40

TERMINATED: 06/14/2007

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
C. MEYLA in his or her indivdual capacity, current or former MPD Officer #748

represented by Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant
RAYMOND MINCEY in his individual capacity MPD Officer #283

represented by Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James H. Vricos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2007

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 9 of 40

Defendant
WENDY PAYNE in her individual capacity MPD Officer #524

represented by Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ellen A. Efros (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chad Wayne Copeland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James H. Vricos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2007

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
ANDRIAN SANDERS in individual capacity MPD Officer #2332

represented by Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 10 of 40

TERMINATED: 01/04/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James H. Vricos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2007

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A. DeBerardinis , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/01/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
JOHN AND JANE DOE two unknown federal officers in their individual capacity

represented by Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant
UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS

represented by Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Lori S. Parris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2006

Defendant
MARK BEACH in his individual capacity

represented by Caroline M. Mew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ellen A. Efros (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Julie Steptoe Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Thomas Louis Koger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 11 of 40

Defendant
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Carl James Schifferle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chad Wayne Copeland (See above for address)
James H. Vricos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2007
Michael P. Bruckheim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/18/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William Mark Nebeker U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514−7230 Fax: (202) 514−8780 Email: mark.nebeker@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/21/2003
04/21/2003
04/24/2003 07/03/2003 07/03/2003 07/15/2003

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN AND JANE DOE, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ANDRIAN SANDERS, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS (Filing fee $ 150.) , filed by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN.(mpt, ) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
SUMMONS Not Issued as to ARTHUR BROWN ; MICHAEL CARRUTH ; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ; JOHN AND JANE DOE ; MALCOLM FORBES ; ANDREA LATSON ; C. MEYLA ; RAYMOND MINCEY ; WENDY PAYNE ; CHARLES H. RAMSEY ; ANDRIAN SANDERS ; UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS (mpt, ) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
Summons (10) Issued as to ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ANDRIAN SANDERS. (mpt, ) (Entered: 04/24/2003)
2 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA served on 6/26/2003, answer due 7/16/2003 (nmw, ) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
3 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. CHARLES H. RAMSEY served on 6/26/2003, answer due 7/16/2003 (nmw, ) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
4 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to the Complaint by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY. (DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 07/15/2003)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 12 of 40

07/18/2003 08/15/2003
08/18/2003 08/18/2003 08/20/2003 09/02/2003
09/02/2003 09/16/2003 09/22/2003
09/23/2003 09/30/2003 10/02/2003 10/15/2003
10/17/2003 10/28/2003 10/28/2003

MINUTE ENTRY: Upon consideration of 4 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. Defendants' time to respond to the complaint is extended until August 18, 2003. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 7/18/03. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
5 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Effect Service of Process by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN. (Wolfe, Zachary) (Entered: 08/15/2003)
6 ANSWER to Complaint by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.(DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 08/18/2003)
7 MOTION to Dismiss by CHARLES H. RAMSEY. (DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 08/18/2003)
MINUTE ENTRY: Upon consideration of 5 Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' time to serve the complaint is extended until October 16, 2003. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 8/20/03. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/20/2003)
8 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 7 MOTION to Dismiss by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN. (Wolfe, Zachary) (Entered: 09/02/2003)
9 NOTICE by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY re 8 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 7 MOTION to Dismiss (DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 09/02/2003)
10 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 7 MOTION to Dismiss by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/16/2003)
11 Upon consideration of [8 &10] Plaintiffs' motions for extension of time to file response/reply as to 7 Defendant's motion to dismiss, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's motions are GRANTED. Plaintiffs may file a response or reply by not later than September 23, 2003. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 09/22/03. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
12 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 7 MOTION to Dismiss by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/23/2003)
13 RESPONSE to Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Chief Charles Ramsey filed by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/30/2003)
14 MOTION for Discovery in Advance of Rule 26(f) Conference, for Purpose of Ascertaining the Identity and Address of Individual Defendant Officers by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
15 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to Effect Service of Process by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/15/2003)
16 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. MICHAEL CARRUTH served on 10/14/2003, answer due 11/3/2003 (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
17 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. ANDRIAN SANDERS served on 10/20/2003, answer due 11/10/2003 (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
18 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. ARTHUR BROWN served on 10/20/2003, answer due 11/10/2003 (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/28/2003)

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10/31/2003 10/31/2003 11/06/2003 12/18/2003 12/18/2003 01/07/2004
01/08/2004 01/09/2004
01/11/2004 01/12/2004 01/15/2004 01/16/2004 01/23/2004 01/23/2004 02/05/2004 02/26/2004

19 ORDER granting 15 plaintiffs' second motion to enlarge time to effect service of process. Service of process shall be completed by not later than December 15, 2003. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/31/03. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/31/2003)
20 ORDER granting 14 plaintiffs' motion for limited discovery in advance of Rule 26(f) conference. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/31/03. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/31/2003)
21 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. WENDY PAYNE served on 10/30/2003, answer due 11/19/2003 (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/06/2003)
22 ORDER granting 7 defendant Charles H. Ramsey's motion to dismiss the complaint as to him. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 12/18/03. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
23 ORDER setting an initial scheduling conference for January 23, 2004, at 9:00 a.m. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 12/18/03. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
24 MOTION for Entry of Default For Defendants Arthur Brown, Michael Carruth, Wendy Payne and Adrian Sanders by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit return of service for Arthur Brown# 2 Affidavit Return of service, Michael Carruth# 3 Affidavit Return of service, Wendy Payne# 4 Affidavit Return of service, Adrian Sanders# 5 Exhibit Printout of docket / case filing history as of Jan 7, 2004)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/07/2004)
25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 answer)(DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 01/08/2004)
MINUTE ENTRY: Upon consideration of 25 the consent motion of defendants Brown, Carruth, Payne, and Sanders for an enlargment of time to file an answer to the complaint and of the entire record, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that defendants shall file an answer by not later than January 16, 2004. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 01/09/04. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/09/2004)
26 ANSWER to Complaint by ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS.(DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 01/11/2004)
MINUTE ENTRY: Defendants Brown, Carruth, Payne, and Sanders filed 26 an answer to plaintiffs' complaint on January 11, 2004. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that 24 plaintiffs' motion for entry of default is DENIED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 01/12/04. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/12/2004)
27 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/15/2004)
Set/Reset Hearings: Scheduling Conference set for 1/23/2004 09:00 AM before Judge John D. Bates. (tb) (Entered: 01/16/2004)
Minute Entry Initial Scheduling Conference held on 1/23/2004 before Judge John D. Bates: Status Conference set for 5/25/2004 09:00 AM before Judge John D. Bates. Additional status conference set for 09/14/04 @ 9:00 AM.(Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
28 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge John D. Bates on 01/23/04. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
29 ANSWER to Complaint by ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY.(DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 02/05/2004)
30 ENTERED IN ERROR.....ANSWER to Complaint by MALCOLM FORBES.(DeBerardinis, Robert) Modified on 3/9/2004 (bcs, ). (Entered: 02/26/2004)

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03/09/2004 03/09/2004 04/01/2004
04/02/2004 05/25/2004 09/24/2004 09/29/2004
10/01/2004 10/01/2004
11/24/2004
11/27/2004
11/27/2004 12/27/2004

31 ANSWER to Complaint by MALCOLM FORBES.(DeBerardinis, Robert) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
"NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY. Document No. 30 was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile the answer to the complaint." (bcs, ) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
32 Consent MOTION for Discovery Orders Authorizing the Release of Relevant Records in the Possession of the Clerk, D.C. Superior Court, the Department of Justice, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
33 ORDER on 32 plaintiffs' consent motion for the release of various records. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 04/02/04. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/02/2004)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 5/25/2004 before Judge John D. Bates: (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb) (Entered: 05/25/2004)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 9/24/2004 before Judge John D. Bates: Proposed Modified Scheduling Order due by 9/29/2004. Status Conference set for 3/24/2005 09:00 AM in Courtroom 10 before Judge John D. Bates. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
34 NOTICE by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, NICOLE DAVIS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MALCOLM FORBES, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, BRIAN ROSA, ANDRIAN SANDERS, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN re Status Conference, Set Deadlines/Hearings,, (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/29/2004)
35 ORDER adopting parties' proposed scheduling order. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/1/04. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Amendments to Complaint due by 11/24/2004. Close of Discovery on 3/24/2005. Dispositive Motions due by 4/23/2005. Oppositions to Dispositive Motions due by 5/24/2005. Replies to Dispositive Motions due by 6/7/2005. Status hearing scheduled for 3/24/2005 at 9:00 a.m. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
36 MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend Set/Reset Deadlines, to File Amendments to Complaint by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/24/2004)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 36 plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to amend the Complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that any amendments to the complaint shall be filed by not later than December 24, 2004. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 11/27/2004. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 11/27/2004)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Amended Complaint due by 12/24/2004. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 11/27/2004)
37 MOTION for Leave to File Amendment to the Complaint to Add Mark Beach as an Individual Defendant by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit First Amended Complaint)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/27/2004)

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01/07/2005 01/07/2005 01/25/2005
01/25/2005 01/25/2005 02/22/2005 02/22/2005 02/28/2005 03/17/2005
03/17/2005

38 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas Louis Koger on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS (Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
39 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 37 Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint To Add Mark Beach As A Defendant filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Complaint To Add Mark Beach As A Defendant)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
40 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 39 Memorandum in Opposition,, 37 MOTION for Leave to File Amendment to the Complaint to Add Mark Beach as an Individual Defendant by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
MINUTE ENTRY: Upon consideration of 40 plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time nunc pro tunc, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any reply brief in support of their motion for leave to amend the complaint by not later than February 14, 2005. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 1/25/2005. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply due by 2/14/2005. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
41 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply In Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Mark Beach as an Individual Defendant by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
42 REPLY to opposition to motion re 37 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Mark Beach as an Individual Defendant filed by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 41 plaintiffs' consent motion for an extension of time until February 22, 2005, to file their reply in support of their motion for leave to amend the complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED nun pro tunc. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 2/28/2005. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
43 Joint MOTION to Continue Joint Motion to Enlarge Discovery And To Enlarge Time To Answer Outstanding Discovery Requests And To Continue the Status Conference by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Parris, Lori) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
44 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS (see docket entry no. 43 for document images). (lc, ) (Entered: 03/18/2005)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 16 of 40

03/21/2005
03/21/2005 04/04/2005 04/04/2005
04/04/2005 04/15/2005
04/29/2005 09/27/2005 09/27/2005
09/27/2005 12/22/2005 01/04/2006

Upon consideration of 43 &44 the parties' joint motions for an extension of time, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that written discovery shall be completed by not later than April 30, 2005; that discovery shall be completed by not later than September 30, 2005; and that the status conference previously scheduled for March 24, 2005, be continued to April 4, 2005, at 9:15 a.m. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/21/2005. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Written discovery due by 4/30/2005. Discovery due by 9/30/2005. Status Conference set for 4/4/2005 09:15 AM before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 4/4/2005 before Judge John D. Bates: Status Conference set for 9/27/2005 09:00 AM in Courtroom 10 before Judge John D. Bates. (Court Reporter Bryant Wayne) (tb) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 37 plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint and the status conference held on this date, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file an Amended Complaint that adds Mark Beach as a defendant only as to the claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by not later than April 15, 2005; and it is further ORDERED that a status conference is set for September 27, at 9:00 a.m. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/4/2005. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Complaint due by 4/15/2005. Status Conference set for 9/27/2005 09:00 AM before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
45 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERSfiled by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD.(nmw, ) (Entered: 04/18/2005)
46 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS.(Parris, Lori) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 9/27/2005 before Judge John D. Bates : Discovery closes by 3/27/2006. Status Conference set for 2/3/2006 09:15 AM in Courtroom 10 before Judge John D. Bates. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne.) (tb) (Entered: 09/27/2005)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the parties' joint motion for an extension of time to complete discovery, presented orally at the status conference with the Court held on this date, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the parties shall complete discovery by not later than March 27, 2006; and it is further ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a status conference with the Court at 9:15 a.m. on February 3, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/27/2005. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/27/2005)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Discovery due by 3/27/2006. Status Conference set for 2/3/2006 09:15 AM before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/27/2005)
47 NOTICE of Appearance by Caroline M. Mew on behalf of MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS (Mew, Caroline) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
48 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH,

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01/10/2006 01/10/2006 02/01/2006 02/03/2006 02/03/2006 02/03/2006 02/14/2006
02/14/2006 02/15/2006
02/15/2006 02/28/2006

MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. Attorney Thomas Louis Koger and Lori S. Parris terminated. (Parris, Lori) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
49 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Requests for Production of Documents by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mew, Caroline) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 49 defendants' consent motion for an extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' third set of requests for production of documents, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that defendants shall respond to the requests for production by not later than January 25, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 1/10/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
50 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Carl James Schifferle on behalf of MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS Substituting for attorney Robert A. DeBerardinis, Jr. (Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Based upon the representations of counsel regarding the status of discovery in this matter, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court will hold a discovery scheduling conference with the parties on February 15, 2006, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 8. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 2/3/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings: Discovery Scheduling Conference set for 2/15/2006 10:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 2/3/2006 before Judge John D. Bates : (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
51 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS. Attorney Caroline M. Mew terminated. (Mew, Caroline) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
52 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael P. Bruckheim on behalf of MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS (Bruckheim, Michael) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Based upon the parties' representations at the discovery scheduling conference held on this date, it is hereby ORDERED that the discovery schedule in this action is modified as follows: Defendants shall provide plaintiffs with supplemental answers to interrogatories by not later than March 10, 2006; defendants shall provide plaintiffs with supplemental responses to requests for production of documents and other materials by not later than March 31, 2006; the parties shall submit joint status reports on the progress of discovery on April 7, 2006, and May 5, 2006; and the parties shall complete all discovery by not later than July 31, 2006. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall inform the Court by not later than February 28, 2006, if they have failed to reach an agreement on a proposed protective order covering certain matters relating to the employment of defendant Mark Beach. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 2/15/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
Minute Entry Discovery Hearing held on 2/15/2006for proceedings held before Judge John D. Bates : SEE MINUTE ORDER PREVIOUSLY ENTERED FOR DETAILS. (Court Reporter Chrystal Pilgrim) (tb, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
53 NOTICE Joint Notice of Dispute and Request for Briefing Schedule by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Vricos, James) (Entered: 02/28/2006)

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03/01/2006
03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/20/2006 03/20/2006 03/24/2006
03/31/2006 04/05/2006 04/07/2006 04/07/2006 04/07/2006 04/14/2006 04/14/2006

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 53 the parties' joint request for a briefing schedule with respect to a proposed protective order, it is hereby ORDERED that, in the event the parties remain unable to resolve their dispute over the need for a protective order to prevent public disclosure of materials contained in the personnel file of defendant Mark Beach, defendants shall file a motion for entry of a protective order by not later than March 31, 2006; and it is further ORDERED that any opposition to such a motion is due by not later than April 28, 2006, and any reply by defendants is due by not later than May 15, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/1/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
54 NOTICE of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
55 CONSENT JUDGMENT pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 against defendant District of Columbia and in favor of plaintiffs Nicole Davis, Todd Spalt, and Jennifer Zimmerman. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/6/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
56 MOTION for Attorney Fees by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
57 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Submit Briefing on Motion for Attorneys Fees by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Messineo, Carl) Modified on 3/21/2006 (nmw, ). (Entered: 03/20/2006)
58 MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 57 plaintiffs' consent motion for leave to supplement 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any supplement to their motion for attorney's fees by not later than April 17, 2006; and it is further ORDERED that, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the amount of fees, defendant shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than May 17, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/24/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
59 MOTION for Protective Order by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A (Letter 1/25/06)# 3 Exhibit B (Klein Declaration))(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
60 NOTICE of Change of Address by Carl L. Messineo (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
61 STATUS REPORT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Bruckheim, Michael) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
62 NOTICE of Appearance by Julie Steptoe Lee on behalf of all defendants (Lee, Julie) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
63 STATUS REPORT by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
64 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Supplement to Motion for Attorney's Fee by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 64 plaintiffs' consent motion for an extension of time to supplement 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any supplement to their motion for attorney's fees by not later than May 1, 2006; and it is further ORDERED that, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the amount of fees, defendant shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than May 31, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/14/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/14/2006)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 19 of 40

04/18/2006
04/18/2006 04/28/2006 04/28/2006 04/28/2006 05/01/2006 05/01/2006 05/01/2006 05/02/2006
05/02/2006 05/02/2006 05/09/2006

MINUTE ORDER: Based upon the representations of counsel regarding the status of discovery in this matter, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court will hold a discovery conference with the parties on May 2, 2006, at 10:15 a.m. in Courtroom 8, and it is further ORDERED that the parties shall submit by not later than 12:00 p.m. on May 1, 2006, a status report, not to exceed three (3) pages in length, outlining any remaining issues related to document discovery as well as any other discovery disputes that require the Court's attention. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/18/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings: Discovery Conference set for 5/2/2006 10:15 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
65 Consent MOTION to Seal File Under Seal Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 65 the consent motion to file under seal, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs may file their opposition to defendants' motion for protective order under seal. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/28/2006. (CK) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
66 NOTICE of Filing Under Seal by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
67 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Supplement to Motion for Attorney's Fees by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
68 STATUS REPORT Pursuant to Minute Order of April 18, 2006 by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
69 STATUS REPORT Pending Discovery Issues by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) Notice)(Lee, Julie) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 67 plaintiffs' unopposed motion for an extension of time to supplement 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any supplement to their motion for attorney's fees by not later than May 15, 2006; and it is further ORDERED that, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the amount of fees, defendant shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than June 14, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/1/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
Minute Entry Discovery Hearing held on 5/2/2006 before Judge John D. Bates : Status Conference set for 7/11/2006 09:30 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. Scheduling Order forthcoming.(Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb ) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
70 DISCOVERY SCHEDULING ORDER: See order for details; status conference set for 7/11/2006 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/2/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
71 STATUS REPORT Recorded Police Transmissions by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C.

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 20 of 40

05/09/2006
05/12/2006 05/15/2006 05/15/2006 05/15/2006 05/15/2006 05/16/2006
05/16/2006
06/13/2006 06/13/2006

MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. (Lee, Julie) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
72 NOTICE Pursuant to Discovery Scheduling Order of May 2, 2006 by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD re 70 Scheduling Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − email from Schifferle to Kim 3.6.06# 2 Exhibit 2 − email from Kim to defense counsel 3.6.06# 3 Exhibit 3 − email from Bruckheim to Messineo 4.6.06# 4 Exhibit 4 − email from Lee to Messineo 4.7.06)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
73 STATUS REPORT on Radio Runs by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. (Lee, Julie) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
74 Consent MOTION to Seal Reply by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 74 defendants' consent motion for leave to file under seal their reply brief in further support of 59 their motion for a protective order, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that defendants may file their reply under seal. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/15/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
75 NOTICE of Filing of Reply Under Seal by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
76 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Supplement to Motion for Attorneys Fees by one additional day by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 76 plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to supplement 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any supplement to their motion for attorney's fees by not later than May 16, 2006; and it is further ORDERED that, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the amount of fees, defendant shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than June 15, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/16/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
77 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM re 56 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by NICOLE DAVIS,, TODD SPALT,, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit 1 − Affidavit of Carl Messineo# 2 Exhibit 1a − Statement of Services Rendered part 1 of 2# 3 Exhibit 1b − Statement of Services Rendered Part II# 4 Affidavit 2 − Affidavit of Mara Verheyden−Hilliard# 5 Affidavit 3 − Affidavit of Zachary Wolfe# 6 Exhibit 4 − Updated Laffey Matrix# 7 Exhibit 5 − exhibit from Bynum fee petition# 8 Exhibit 6 − Firm by Firm Survey of Billing Rates)(Messineo, Carl) Modified on 5/17/2006 (lc, ). (Entered: 05/16/2006)
78 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to file a response to Plaintiff's motion for Attorney's fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Vricos, James) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 78 defendants' consent motion for an extension of time to file an opposition to 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the amount of fees, defendant shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than July 14, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 6/13/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 06/13/2006)

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06/16/2006 07/11/2006 07/11/2006 07/13/2006 07/14/2006
07/25/2006
07/28/2006 07/28/2006
07/28/2006 07/31/2006
07/31/2006
08/03/2006

79 STATUS REPORT Regarding 2005 Internal Investigation by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 7/11/2006 before Judge John D. Bates : Status Conference set for 8/22/2006 09:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. Scheduling Order forthcoming.(Court Reporter Lisa Griffth) (tb) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
80 DISCOVERY SCHEDULING ORDER: See order for details; status conference set for for 8/22/2006 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 7/11/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
81 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 56 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Vricos, James) Modified on 7/14/2006 (lc, ). (Entered: 07/13/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 81 defendants' motion for an extension of time to file an opposition to 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the amount of fees, defendant shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than July 31, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 7/14/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
82 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE. Attorney Julie Steptoe Lee terminated. (Lee, Julie) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
83 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Vricos, James) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 83 defendants' motion for an extension of time to file an opposition to 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the amount of fees, defendant shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than August 14, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 7/28/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 56 MOTION for Attorney Fees. Responses due by 8/14/2006 (lcjdb2) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
84 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Provide Supplemental Discovery Responses Pursuant to the Court's Order of July 11, 2006 by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 84 defendants' consent motion for an extension of time to provide certain supplemental discovery responses pursuant to the Court's July 11, 2006, Discovery Scheduling Order, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that defendants shall by not later than 12:00 p.m. on August 21, 2006, provide, in writing, supplemental responses to the following: (1) all written discovery requests by plaintiffs for information regarding the identification of law enforcement officers who were present at the location where plaintiffs were arrested on April 20, 2002, and (2) plaintiffs' request for identification of any complaining witness. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 7/31/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
85 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER denying 59 defendants' motion for a protective order. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 8/3/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/03/2006)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 22 of 40

08/07/2006
08/07/2006
08/07/2006
08/09/2006 08/14/2006 08/14/2006 08/14/2006
08/14/2006 08/15/2006 08/15/2006 08/15/2006 08/18/2006 08/21/2006

86 Consent MOTION to Amend/Correct 45 Amended Complaint, by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit Second Amended Complaint)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 86 plaintiffs' consent motion for leave to amend the complaint to add as a defendant the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall promptly file the Second Amended Complaint and effectuate service on the appropriate parties. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 8/7/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
87 Second AMENDED COMPLAINT against FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS filed by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD.(lc, ) (Entered: 08/08/2006)
SUMMONS (3) Issued as to FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General (lc, ) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
88 MOTION for Extension of Time to File a Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attroney's Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Vricos, James) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
89 Memorandum in opposition to re 88 MOTION for Extension of Time to File a Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attroney's Fees filed by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 88 defendants' motion for an extension of time to file an opposition to 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that defendants shall file an opposition to the motion by not later than August 18, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 8/14/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 56 MOTION for Attorney Fees. Responses due by 8/18/2006 (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
90 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION served on 8/14/2006, answer due 10/13/2006. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
91 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on Attorney General. Date of Service Upon Attorney General 8/14/06. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
92 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the US Attorney. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
93 Memorandum in opposition to re 56 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Vricos, James) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
94 Consent MOTION to Continue August 22, 2006 Status Conference by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, ALL PLAINTIFFS, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 23 of 40

08/21/2006 08/21/2006 08/24/2006 08/24/2006
08/25/2006
09/13/2006 09/13/2006 09/15/2006
09/18/2006 09/19/2006
09/20/2006

Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/21/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 94 plaintiffs' consent motion for a continuance of the status conference presently scheduled for August 22, 2006, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion if GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that the status conference is continued until 9:00 a.m. on September 13, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 8/21/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/21/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 9/13/2006 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/21/2006)
95 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 56 MOTION for Attorney Fees by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 95 plaintiffs' consent motion for an extension of time to file a reply in further support of 56 the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of plaintiffs Davis, Spalt, and Zimmerman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file any reply brief by not later than September 15, 2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 8/24/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
96 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. Related document: 87 Amended Complaint,, filed by ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER,, NICOLE DAVIS,, HELEN JOHNSON,, JESSICA LAHOOD,, NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG,, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG,, BRIAN ROSA,, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER,, DEBRA SMITH,, TODD SPALT,, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN,.(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 9/13/2006 before Judge John D. Bates : Status Conference set for 2/1/2007 09:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. Scheduling Order forthcoming.(Court Reporter Santa Zizzo) (tb) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
97 DISCOVERY SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 2/1/2007. See order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/13/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
99 REPLY to opposition to motion re 56 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3A# 4 Exhibit 3B# 5 Exhibit 4# 6 Exhibit 5# 7 Exhibit 6# 8 Exhibit 7# 9 Exhibit 8# 10 Exhibit 9# 11 Exhibit 10# 12 Exhibit 11A# 13 Exhibit 11B# 14 Exhibit 12# 15 Exhibit 13# 16 Exhibit 14# 17 Exhibit 15)(lc, ) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
98 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/18/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 98 plaintiffs' consent motion for leave to exceed the twenty−five page limit of Local Civil Rule 7(e) for the reply memorandum in support of plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs' memorandum may exceed the page limit by twelve pages. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/19/06.(lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
100 ERRATA to Exhibit 15 of Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs by TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, NICOLE DAVIS 99 Reply to opposition to Motion, filed by NICOLE DAVIS,, TODD SPALT,, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN,. (Attachments: # 1 Errata Exhibit 15 of Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/20/2006)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 24 of 40

10/03/2006 10/12/2006 10/12/2006
11/02/2006 11/15/2006 11/15/2006
11/30/2006 12/06/2006
12/11/2006
12/21/2006 12/22/2006
12/29/2006

101 ERRATA by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 93 Memorandum in Opposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (LaShawn A. Memorandum Opinion))(Schifferle, Carl) Modified on 10/4/2006 (zlc, ). (Entered: 10/03/2006)
102 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 87 Amended Complaint,, by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. (Nebeker, William) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 102 defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation's motion for extension of time to answer 87 plaintiffs' second amended complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that the answer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be filed by not later than 11/2/2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/12/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit DelGreco Declaration# 2 Affidavit Turner Declaration# 3)(Nebeker, William) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
104 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 104 plaintiffs' consent motion for extension of time to file opposition to 103 defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation's motion to dismiss, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file their opposition to the motion to dismiss by not later than 12/7/2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 11/15/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
105 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER granting in part and denying in part 56 plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 11/30/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
106 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/06/2006)
Upon consideration of 106 plaintiffs' unopposed motion for extension of time, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file their opposition to 103 defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment by not later than December 21, 2006, and it is further ORDERED that defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation shall file any reply thereto by not later than January 11, 2007. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 12/11/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 12/11/2006)
107 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Opposition to FBI's Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for Summary Judgmentr by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 107 plaintiffs' motion for extension of time, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file their opposition to 103 defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment by not later than December 29, 2006, and it is further ORDERED that defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation shall file any reply thereto by not later than January 19, 2007. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 12/22/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
108 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 12/29/2006)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 25 of 40

12/29/2006
01/03/2007
01/03/2007 01/24/2007 02/01/2007
02/01/2007 03/29/2007 03/30/2007
03/30/2007 03/30/2007

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 108 plaintiffs' motion for extension of time, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file their opposition to 103 defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment by not later than January 3, 2007; and it is further ORDERED that defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation shall file any reply thereto by not later than January 24, 2007. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 12/29/2006. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 12/29/2006)
109 Memorandum in opposition to re 103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, ALL PLAINTIFFS, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts # 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit 3# 5 Exhibit 4# 6 Exhibit 5# 7 Exhibit 6# 8 Exhibit 7# 9 Exhibit 8# 10 Exhibit 9)(nmw, ) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
110 Counter MOTION Pursuant to Rule 56(f) by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Please see Document No. 109 for scanned images). (nmw, ) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
111 REPLY to opposition to motion re 103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment, 110 MOTION Pursuant to Rule 56(f) filed by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rosa Interrogatory Resp.# 2 Exhibit http://dc.indymedia.org)(Nebeker, William) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of the status conference held with the Court on this day, it is hereby ORDERED that parties shall complete all discovery by not later than March 30, 2007; it is further ORDERED that dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than April 30, 2007; it is further ORDERED that oppositions to dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than May 30, 2007; and it is further ORDERED that any replies thereto shall be filed by not later than June 14, 2007. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 2/1/2007. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 2/1/2007 before Judge John D. Bates : Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb, ) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
112 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 112 defendants' consent motion for extension of time to complete discovery, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the parties shall complete discovery by not later than May 2, 2007; and it is further ORDERED that dispostive motions shall be filed by no later than May 31, 2007, oppositions thereto shall be filed by not later than July 2, 2007, and any replies shall be filed by no later than July 16, 2007. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/30/2007. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Discovery due by 5/2/2007. Dispositive Motions due by 5/31/2007. Response to Dispositive Motions due by 7/2/2007. Reply to Dispositive Motions due by 7/16/2007. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
113 MOTION for Sanctions and Related Relief for Discovery Abuse Perpetrated by the District of Columbia by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 2 Text of Proposed Order # 3 Exhibit 1_2nd Am Notice of 30b6 Dep to DC# 4 Exhibit 2_DC's Resp to Pls' 1st RFP# 5 Exhibit 3_DC's Suppl Resp to Pls' 1st INT# 6 Exhibit 4_DC's 2nd Suppl Resp to Pls' 1st INT# 7 Exhibit 5_Pls' Limited Disc to Defs# 8 Exhibit 6_Pls' 1st INT and RFP to DC# 9 Exhibit 7_DC's Suppl Resp to Pls' 2nd RFP# 10 Exhibit 8_Running Resume_Bolger# 11 Exhibit 9_Dep Excerpts# 12 Exhibit 10_Dep of Cadle# 13 Exhibit 11_April 10, 2000 running resume.pdf# 14 Exhibit 12_April 11, 2000 running resume# 15 Exhibit 13_April 12, 2000 running resume# 16 Exhibit 14_April 14, 2000 running resume# 17 Exhibit 15_April 15, 2000 running resume# 18 Exhibit 16_April 16, 2000 running resume# 19 Exhibit 17_April 17, 2000

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 26 of 40

04/09/2007
04/09/2007 04/09/2007 04/12/2007 04/12/2007
04/27/2007
04/27/2007 05/01/2007 05/01/2007 05/03/2007
05/11/2007
05/11/2007

running resume# 20 Exhibit 18_Dep of Madison# 21 Exhibit 19_Dep of Beach# 22 Exhibit 20_DC's Resp to Pls' 1st INT)(Messineo, Carl) Modified on 4/2/2007 (zlc, ). (Entered: 03/30/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 113 plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and related relief, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a status conference on April 12, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom Eight before Judge John D. Bates. It is further ORDERED that the District shall produce an unredacted copy of the April 20, 2002, running resume to chambers, ex parte, by not later than the close of business on April 11, 2007. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/9/2007. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 4/12/2007 10:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
114 NOTICE Regarding Running Resume by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 4/12/2007 before Judge John D. Bates : Scheduling Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
115 SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 7/2/2007. Dispositive Motions due by 8/1/2007. Response to Dispositive Motions due by 8/31/2007. Reply to Dispositive Motions due by 9/14/2007. Supplemental Memorandum due by 5/3/2007. Status Conference set for 5/22/2007 at 10:00 AM before Judge John D. Bates. SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/12/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
116 Memorandum in opposition to re 113 MOTION for Sanctions and Related Relief for Discovery Abuse Perpetrated by the District of Columbia filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Harris Decl.)# 2 Exhibit B (Kuchinsky Depo.)# 3 Exhibit C (Spalt Depo.)# 4 Exhibit D (Leshner Depo.)# 5 Exhibit E (Cadle Depo.)# 6 Exhibit F (Letter 7/31/06)# 7 Exhibit G (Email 9/22/06)# 8 Exhibit H (Jones Depo.)# 9 Exhibit I (Madison Depo.)# 10 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
117 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 113 MOTION for Sanctions and Related Relief for Discovery Abuse Perpetrated by the District of Columbia and to Plaintiffs' Letter of April 17, 2007 filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
118 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on February 1, 2007 before Judge John D. Bates. Court Reporter: Bryan A. Wayne. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (lc, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
119 TRANSCRIPT of Discovery Conference held on May 2, 2006 before Judge John D. Bates. Court Reporter: Bryan A. Wayne. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (lc, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
120 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 110 MOTION Pursuant to Rule 56(f), 103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit McMenamin Decl.# 2 Affidavit Landman Decl.# 3 Exhibit Bolger_Yates Dep. Exhibit 3 2/16/07# 4 Exhibit 4 (SA McMenamin))(Nebeker, William) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
121 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 113 MOTION for Sanctions and Related Relief for Discovery Abuse Perpetrated by the District of Columbia by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for an Enlargement of Time to File a Reply in Support of the Motion for Sanctions and

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 27 of 40

05/11/2007 05/15/2007 05/17/2007
05/17/2007
05/17/2007 05/18/2007
05/18/2007

Related Relief for Discovery Abuse, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file their reply by not later than May 18, 2007. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/11/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply due by 5/18/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
122 NOTICE of Change of Address by Carl L. Messineo (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
123 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to FBI Director Mueller's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 123 plaintiffs' consent motion for an extension of time to file a response to defendant Mueller's supplemental memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file their response by not later than May 21, 2007. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/17/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Response due by 5/21/2007 (lcjdb1) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
124 REPLY to opposition to motion re 113 MOTION for Sanctions and Related Relief for Discovery Abuse Perpetrated by the District of Columbia filed by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/18/2007)
125 REPLY to opposition to motion re 113 MOTION for Sanctions and Related Relief for Discovery Abuse Perpetrated by the District of Columbia (Exhibits) filed by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − MPD General Order 803.6# 2 Exhibit 2 − JOCC Activations Procedure Manual# 3 Exhibit 3 − June 1, 2006 letter from Lee to Messineo# 4 Exhibit 4 − July 31, 2006 letter from Schifferle to Messineo# 5 Exhibit 5 − February 15, 2006 transcript# 6 Exhibit 6 − Ramsey's Written Deposition Responses# 7 Exhibit 7 − DC's Response to Pls' 2nd RFP.pdf# 8 Exhibit 8 − redaction log.pdf# 9 Exhibit 9 − Gainer dep.pdf# 10 Exhibit 10 − 30(b)(6) dep of DC (Jones).pdf# 11 Exhibit 11 − Pls' 1st INT and RFP to DC# 12 Exhibit 12 − DC's Response to Pls' 1st INT in Alliance# 13 Exhibit 13 − DC's Response to Fish's 1st Discovery Requests in Alliance# 14 Exhibit 14 − DC's Supplemental Response to Pls' 1st INT in IAC# 15 Exhibit 15 − DC's 2nd Supplemental Response to Pls' 1st INT in IAC# 16 Exhibit 16 − DC's 3rd Supplemental Response to Pls' 1st INT in IAC# 17 Exhibit 17 − AGJ Document Production Index and Privilege Log# 18 Exhibit 18 − May 2, 2003 letter from Mullen to Wolfe# 19 Exhibit 19 − DC's Opp to Pls' Mot to Compel in IAC# 20 Exhibit 20 − IAC redaction log# 21 Exhibit 21 − July 11, 2006 transcript# 22 Exhibit 22 − May 2, 2006 transcript# 23 Exhibit 23 − June 16, 2006 letter from Lee to Messineo# 24 Exhibit 24 − March 30, 2007 letter from Messineo to Schifferle# 25 Exhibit 25 − March 31, 2006 letter from Spagnoletti to Messineo# 26 Exhibit 26 − September 13, 2006 transcript# 27 Exhibit 27 − April 11, 2000 running resume# 28 Exhibit 28 − April 12, 2000 running resume# 29 Exhibit 29 − April 14, 2000 running resume# 30 Exhibit 30 − April 15, 2000 running resume# 31 Exhibit 31 − April 16, 2000 running resume# 32 Exhibit 32 − April 17, 2000 running resume# 33 Exhibit 33 − September 26, 2002 running resume# 34 Exhibit 34 − September 27, 2002 running resume# 35 Exhibit 35 − September 28, 2002 running resume# 36 Exhibit 36 − February 7, 2006 letter from Messineo to Mew# 37 Errata 37 − April 12, 2006 letter from Messineo to Lee# 38 Exhibit 38 − April 12, 2006 letter from Messineo to Lee# 39 Exhibit 39 − April 18, 2006 letter from Messineo to Lee# 40 Exhibit 40 − March 6, 2007 letter from Messineo to Schifferle# 41 Exhibit 41 − March 22, 2007 letter from Messineo to Schifferle# 42 Exhibit 42 − April 6, 2007 letter from Messineo to Schifferle# 43 Exhibit 43 − April 17, 2007 letter from Messineo to Schifferle# 44 Exhibit 44 − Beach dep# 45 Exhibit 45 − John Johnson dep# 46 Errata 46 − May 13, 2005 letter from Koger to Messineo# 47 Exhibit 47 −

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 28 of 40

05/21/2007 05/22/2007 05/22/2007 05/22/2007
05/24/2007 05/25/2007 05/25/2007 05/30/2007 05/31/2007 06/05/2007

September 7, 2005 email from Messineo to Koger# 48 Exhibit 48 − September 8, 2005 email from Parris to Messineo# 49 Exhibit 49 − December 9, 2005 letter from Messineo to Koger# 50 Exhibit 50 − March 17, 2006 letter from Kim to Lee# 51 Exhibit 51 − June 6, 2006 letter from Messineo to Lee# 52 Exhibit 52 − May 2, 2005 email and May 3, 2005 email# 53 Exhibit 53 − May 5, 2005 email from Onisko to Koger# 54 Exhibit 54 − May 5, 2005 email from Koger to Onisko# 55 Exhibit 55 − January 5, 2006 ltr from Kim to Mew# 56 Exhibit 56 − January 10, 2006 email from Mew to Messineo# 57 Exhibit 57 − Nobember 1, 2006 email from Kim to Schifferle# 58 Exhibit 58 − February 13, 2006 email from Parris to Messineo# 59 Exhibit 59 − February 14, 2006 email from Johnson to Messineo# 60 Exhibit 60 − March 30, 2007 letter from Schifferle to Messineo# 61 Exhibit 61 − June 8, 2006 letter from Messineo to Lee# 62 Exhibit 62 − June 20, 2006 letter from Messineo to Lee# 63 Exhibit 63 − July 6, 2006 email from Messineo to Lee# 64 Exhibit 64 − April 27, 2007 leeter from Schifferle to Messineo)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/19/2007)
126 RESPONSE re 120 Supplemental Memorandum, filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 7# 7 Exhibit 8# 8 Exhibit 9# 9 Exhibit 10)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
127 ORDER modifying the Scheduling Order previously entered and setting a Status Conference for July 12, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/22/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
Minute Entry. Status Conference held on 5/22/2007 before Judge John D. Bates : See Scheduling Order previously entered today. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb, ) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Plaintiffs and defendant Mueller joint notice due by 6/12/2007. Proposed Joint or Separate Schedule due by 6/29/2007. Distict of Columbia shall provide certification by 6/15/2007. Defendant Mueller's reply due by 6/5/2007. Plaintiff's Supplemental Response due by 6/12/2007.Plaintiff notice explaining nature of discovery−related certifications from the District of Columbia due by 5/25/2007. Status Conference set for 7/12/2007 09:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (ztb, ) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
130 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on July 11, 2006 before Judge John D. Bates. Court Reporter: Lisa Walker Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (lc, ) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
128 NOTICE Regarding Discovery−Related Certification Sought from the District of Columbia by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
129 ENTERED IN ERROR.....SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 126 Response to Document Exhibit 6 to Plaintiffs' Response to FBI's Supplement filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Messineo, Carl) Modified on 5/30/2007 (lc, ). (Entered: 05/25/2007)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 129 Supplemental Memorandum was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile Affidavit as an electronic attachment to a notice and link correctly. (lc, ) Modified on 5/31/2007 (lc, ). (Entered: 05/30/2007)
131 RESPONSE re 128 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) Regarding Discovery−Related Certification filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
132 NOTICE Regarding Exhibit 6 to Response to FBI's Supplemental Memorandum by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 126 Response to Document (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 6 − Affidavit of Helen Johnson)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 06/05/2007)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 29 of 40

06/05/2007 06/05/2007
06/12/2007
06/12/2007
06/12/2007 06/14/2007 06/15/2007 06/15/2007 06/18/2007 06/20/2007 06/29/2007

133 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Supplemental Memoranda by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Nebeker, William) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 133 the unopposed motion for an extension of time for defendant Mueller and plaintiffs to file supplemental memoranda, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the parties shall file a notice informing the Court of the date on which the depositions of the two FBI special agents will be taken, or, if the depositions have already been taken, the date on which they were completed; it is further ORDERED that defendant Mueller shall file his supplemental memorandum within three weeks of the date on which those depositions are taken; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiff's supplemental memorandum will be due not later than three weeks from the date on which defendant files his memorandum. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 6/5/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
134 STATUS REPORT by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ALL PLAINTIFFS, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Nebeker, William) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of 134 the Joint Status Report filed on this date, and in accordance with the Minute Order entered on June 5, 2007, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant Mueller shall file his supplemental memorandum by not later than August 1, 2007; it is further ORDERED that plaintiff's supplemental memorandum is due by not later than August 23, 2007; and it is further ORDERED that no additional extensions of time will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 6/12/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Supplemental Memorandum due by 8/1/2007. Supplemental Response due by 8/23/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
135 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney James H. Vricos terminated. (Vricos, James) (Entered: 06/14/2007)
136 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Provide Discovery−Related Certification Pursuant to the Court's Order of May 22, 2007 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 136 defendant's consent motion for an extension of time to file its discovery−related certification, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that defendant shall submit its discovery−related certification by not later than June 20, 2007. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 6/15/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
137 TRANSCRIPT of Discovery Conference held on February 15, 2006 before Judge John D. Bates. Court Reporter: Crystal M. Pilgrim. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (lc, ) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
138 RESPONSE re 128 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) (Supplemental) filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 06/20/2007)
139 NOTICE of Proposed Schedule (Joint) by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ALL

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 30 of 40

06/29/2007
06/29/2007 07/12/2007
07/12/2007 07/12/2007 08/09/2007 08/23/2007
09/05/2007
09/11/2007 09/11/2007

PLAINTIFFS (Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 139 the Joint Notice of Proposed Schedule filed on this date, it is hereby ORDERED that the schedule currently in place is modified as follows: discovery shall be completed by not later than September 14, 2007; dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than October 15, 2007; and oppositions to dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than November 14, 2007, with replies to be filed by not later than November 29, 2007. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 6/29/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Discovery due by 9/14/2007. Dispositive Motions due by 10/15/2007. Response to Dispositive Motions due by 11/14/2007. Reply to Dispositive Motions due by 11/29/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of the Status Conference held on this date, and upon consideration of the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the schedule previously entered is modified as follows: plaintiff and defendant the District of Columbia shall submit a joint status report by not later than September 5, 2007; defendant Mueller shall file his supplemental memorandum by not later than August 9, 2007; plaintiff shall file her supplemental memorandum by not later than August 23, 2007; and no additional extensions of time will be granted with respect to the supplemental briefing absent extraordinary circumstances. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 7/12/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 9/5/2007. Supplemental Memorandum due by 8/9/2007. Supplemental Response due by 8/23/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
Minute Entry. Status Conference held on 7/12/2007 before Judge John D. Bates. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne.) (tb, ) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
140 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 103 MOTION to Dismiss Or, in The Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9)(Nebeker, William) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
141 RESPONSE to 140 FBI's Second Supplement to Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit McMenamin Dep# 2 Exhibit 2 − Landman Dep# 3 Exhibit 3 − Gonzalez Dep# 4 Exhibit 4 − Rosa Aff# 5 Exhibit Smith Dep# 6 Exhibit 6 − Smith Aff# 7 Exhibit 7 − Carey Dep# 8 Exhibit 8 − Johnson Aff# 9 Exhibit 9 − Schleicher Aff# 10 Exhibit 10 − Schleicher Aff# 11 Exhibit Spalt Aff# 12 Exhibit 12 − Acevedo Dep# 13 Exhibit 13 − Post article# 14 Exhibit 14 − Ltr from FBI)(Messineo, Carl) Modified on 8/24/2007 (lc, ). (Entered: 08/23/2007)
142 STATUS REPORT by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
143 ORDER granting 103 defendant Mueller's motion for summary judgment; and denying 110 plaintiffs' counter−motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/11/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 09/11/2007)
144 MEMORANDUM OPINION accompanying 143 Order granting 103 defendant Mueller's motion for summary judgment; and denying 110 plaintiffs' counter−motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/11/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 09/11/2007)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 31 of 40

09/14/2007
09/14/2007
09/14/2007 10/04/2007 10/15/2007 10/15/2007
10/15/2007 11/30/2007 11/30/2007
11/30/2007 01/09/2008 01/25/2008

145 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS, ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 145 the Joint Motion for an Extension of Time to Complete Discovery, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that discovery shall be completed by not later than October 1, 2007; it is further ORDERED that dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than October 30, 2007; it is further ORDERED that oppositions to dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than November 30, 2007; and it is further ORDERED that replies, if any, shall be be filed by not later than December 17, 2007. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/14/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Discovery due by 10/1/2007. Dispositive Motions due by 10/30/2007. Response to Dispositive Motions due by 11/30/2007. Reply to Dispositive Motions due by 12/17/2007. (lcjdb1) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
Minute Entry. Telephone Conference held on 10/4/2007 before Judge John D. Bates. (Court Reporter− No Reporter) (tb, ) (Entered: 11/07/2007)
146 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS (Attachments: # 1)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 146 consent motion for extension of time to complete discovery, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that discovery shall be completed by not later than November 30, 2007; and it is further ORDERED that any dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than December 31, 2007; oppositions shall be filed by not later than January 31, 2008; and replies shall be filed by not later than February 15, 2008. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/15/2007.(lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Discovery due by 11/30/2007. Dispositive Motions due by 12/31/2007. Responses to Dispositive Motions due by 1/31/2008. Replies to Dispositive Motions due by 2/15/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
147 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ALL PLAINTIFFS (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/30/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 147 the parties' joint motion for an extension of time to complete discovery, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that discovery shall be completed by not later than January 29, 2008; and it is further ORDERED that any dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than February 29, 2008; oppositions shall be filed by not later than March 31, 2008; and replies shall be filed by not later than April 15, 2008. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 11/30/2007.(lcjdb2) (Entered: 11/30/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Discovery due by 1/29/2008. Dispositive Motions due by 2/29/2008. Responses to Dispositive Motions due by 3/31/2008. Replies to Dispositive Motions due by 4/15/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 11/30/2007)
148 NOTICE of Change of Address by Carl L. Messineo (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/09/2008)
149 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 01/25/2008)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 32 of 40

01/29/2008
01/29/2008 03/17/2008 03/17/2008 03/17/2008 03/18/2008 03/31/2008
03/31/2008 03/31/2008

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 149 the parties' joint motion for an extension of time, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that discovery shall be completed by not later than February 29, 2008; and it is further ORDERED that any dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than March 31, 2008; oppositions shall be filed by not later than May 1, 2008; and replies shall be filed by not later than May 16, 2008. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 1/29/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/29/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Discovery due by 2/29/2008. Dispositive Motions due by 3/31/2008. Responses to Dispositive Motions due by 5/1/2008. Replies to Dispositive Motions due by 5/16/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 01/29/2008)
150 MEMORANDUM OPINION accompanying order on 113 plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/17/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
151 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 113 plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. See order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/17/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' updated motion due by 3/31/2008. Response due by 4/14/2008. Plaintiffs' detailed explanation of the amounts they are requesting in attorney's fees and costs due by 4/21/2008. Response due by 5/15/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
152 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE. Attorney Michael P. Bruckheim terminated. (Bruckheim, Michael) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
153 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Liability Against the District of Columbia and Mark Beach in His Individual Capacity by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 2, # 5 3, # 6 4, # 7 5, # 8 6, # 9 7, # 10 8, # 11 9, # 12 10, # 13 11, # 14 12, # 15 13, # 16 14, # 17 15, # 18 16, # 19 17, # 20 18, # 21 19, # 22 20, # 23 21, # 24 22, # 25 23, # 26 24, # 27 25, # 28 26, # 29 27, # 30 28, # 31 29, # 32 30, # 33 31, # 34 32, # 35 33, # 36 34, # 37 35, # 38 36, # 39 37, # 40 38, # 41 39, # 42 40, # 43 41, # 44 42, # 45 43, # 46 44)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
154 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Updated Request for Sanctions by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
155 MOTION for Summary Judgment by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Anderson Affid.), # 2 Exhibit B (Kuchinsky Depo.), # 3 Exhibit C (T. Meysenburg Depo.), # 4 Exhibit D (Payne Depo.), # 5 Exhibit E (Carruth Depo.), # 6 Exhibit F (Latson Depo.), # 7 Exhibit G (Spalt Depo.), # 8 Exhibit H (Leshner Depo.), # 9 Exhibit I (Cadle Depo.), # 10 Exhibit J (Cadle Notes), # 11 Exhibit K (Beach Depo.), # 12 Exhibit L (Sanders Depo.), # 13 Exhibit M (Incident Report), # 14 Exhibit N (Evidence Report), # 15 Exhibit O (N. Meysenburg Depo.), # 16 Exhibit P (Forbes Ans. to Interrog.), # 17 Exhibit Q (Mincey Ans. to Interrog.), # 18 Exhibit R (Field Arrest Forms), # 19 Exhibit S (Brown Depo.), # 20 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 03/31/2008)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 33 of 40

04/01/2008 04/01/2008 04/01/2008
04/01/2008 04/04/2008 04/18/2008 04/19/2008 04/21/2008

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 154 the consent motion for an extension of time, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that plaintiff shall have up to and including April 4, 2008, to file their updated request; and it is further ORDERED that the District shall have up to and including April 18, 2008, to file a response. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/1/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Updated request due by 4/4/2008. Response due by 4/18/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
156 Amended MOTION for Summary Judgment Amended/Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability Against Mark Beach in His Individual Capacity by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute, # 2 Ex 1 − Leshner Dep, # 3 Ex 2 − DSCN4053, # 4 Ex 3 − DSCN4054, # 5 Ex 4 − DSCN4055, # 6 Ex 5 − DSCN4056, # 7 Ex 6 − DSCN4058, # 8 Ex 7 − DSCN4059, # 9 Ex 8 − DSCN4060, # 10 Ex 9 − DSCN4061, # 11 Ex 10 − DSCN4062, # 12 Ex 11 DSCN4063, # 13 Ex 12 − DSCN4064, # 14 Ex 13 − DSCN4065, # 15 Ex 14 − DSCN4066, # 16 Ex 15 − DSCN4067, # 17 Ex 16 − DSCN4068, # 18 Ex 17 − DSCN4092, # 19 Ex 18 − DSCN4076, # 20 Ex 19 − DSCN4090, # 21 Ex 20 − DSCN4079, # 22 Ex 21 − DSCN4081, # 23 Ex 22 − DSCN4088, # 24 Ex 23 − DSCN4075, # 25 Ex 24 − Brown Dep, # 26 Ex 25 − Gainer Dep, # 27 Ex 26 − Beach Dep, # 28 Ex 27 − Madison Dep, # 29 Ex 28 − JOCC Running Resume, # 30 Ex 29 − PD 163, # 31 Ex 30 − Kuchinsky Dep, # 32 Ex 31 − Latson Dep, # 33 Ex 32 − Beach Ans to Interrog, # 34 Ex 33 − DC Ans to Interrog, # 35 Ex 34 − Fore Dep, # 36 Ex 35 − Cadle Dep, # 37 Ex 36 − Cadle Notes, # 38 Ex 37 − Sanders Dep, # 39 Ex 38 − Lanciano Dep, # 40 Ex 39 − Payne Dep, # 41 Ex 40 − McMenamin Dep, # 42 Ex 41 − Neal Dep, # 43 Ex 42 − Smith Dep, # 44 Ex 43 − Johnson Dep, # 45 Ex 44 − JBG Affid, # 46 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
157 NOTICE of Filing of Bulky Exhibit by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, TODD SPALT, JENNIFER ZIMMERMAN, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, ALL PLAINTIFFS, NICOLE DAVIS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD re 156 Amended MOTION for Summary Judgment Amended/Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability Against Mark Beach in His Individual Capacity (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
158 Supplemental MOTION for Sanctions Related to the Destruction of Recorded Police Communications by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Dep. of Crane, # 2 Exhibit 2 − DCs Response to 2nd RFPs (excerpt), # 3 Exhibit 3 − Dep of Crane in Barham case, # 4 Exhibit December 11, 2003 Discovery Request, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Ltr from Schifferle to Messineo, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Ltr from Koger to Messineo, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Jones Dep in Barham case, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Command manual excerpt re radio channels, # 9 Exhibit 9 − Dep of Beach, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Dep of Kuchinsky, # 11 Exhibit 11 − JOCC running resume excerpt, # 12 Exhibit 12 − Jeffrey Cadle's notes (excerpt))(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
159 Memorandum in opposition to re 158 Supplemental MOTION for Sanctions Related to the Destruction of Recorded Police Communications filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Grant Decl.), # 2 Exhibit B (Crane Depo.), # 3 Exhibit C (Beach Depo.), # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
160 NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 158 Supplemental MOTION for Sanctions Related to the Destruction of Recorded Police Communications, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File, 151 Order on Motion for Sanctions, 159 Memorandum in Opposition, (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
161 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Explanation of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to Discovery Violations by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/21/2008)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 34 of 40

04/22/2008 04/22/2008 04/23/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008
05/02/2008 05/06/2008 05/12/2008

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 161 the consent motion for an extension of time, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file their explanation of attorney's fees and costs relating to discovery violations by not later than April 23, 2008; and it is further ORDERED that the District shall file its response by not later than May 19, 2008. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/22/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/22/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' explanation of attorney's fees and costs due by 4/23/2008. Response due by 5/19/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/22/2008)
162 MEMORANDUM re 150 Memorandum &Opinion, 151 Order on Motion for Sanctions by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 − Fee itemization, # 2 Exhibit Affidavit of Crystal Kim, # 3 Exhibit Ex 3 − Affidavit of Radhika Miller, # 4 Exhibit Ex 4 − Declaration of Michael Kavanaugh)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/23/2008)
163 Memorandum in opposition to re 156 Amended MOTION for Summary Judgment Amended/Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability Against Mark Beach in His Individual Capacity filed by MARK BEACH. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit T (Kuchinsky Depo.), # 2 Exhibit U (Beach Depo.), # 3 Exhibit V (Cadle Depo.), # 4 Exhibit W (Lanciano Depo.), # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
164 Memorandum in opposition to re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts, # 2 1 − Dep of Leshner, # 3 2 − Dep of Spalt, # 4 3 − DSCN4053, # 5 4 − DSCN4054, # 6 5 − DSCN4055, # 7 6 − DSCN4056, # 8 7 − DSCN4058, # 9 8 − DSCN4059, # 10 9 DSCN4060, # 11 10 DSCN4061, # 12 11 DSCN4062, # 13 12 DSCN4063, # 14 13 DSCN4064, # 15 14 DSCN4065, # 16 15 DSCN4066, # 17 16 DSCN4067, # 18 17 DSCN4068, # 19 18 DSCN4092, # 20 19 DSCN4076, # 21 20 DSCN4090, # 22 21 DSCN4079, # 23 22 DSCN4081, # 24 23 DSCN4088, # 25 24 DSCN4075, # 26 25 Dep of Brown, # 27 26 − Dep of Gainer, # 28 27 − Dep of Beach, # 29 28 − Dep of Madison, # 30 29 − Running Resume, # 31 30 − PD 163, # 32 31 − Dep of Smith, # 33 32 − Dep of Landman, # 34 33 − Aff of H Johnson, # 35 35 − Aff of Schleicher, # 36 35 − Dep of Schleicher, # 37 36 − Dep of Bolger, # 38 37 − Dep of LaHood, # 39 38 − Dep of Rosa, # 40 39 − Dep of H Johnson, # 41 40 − Dep of T Meysenburg, # 42 41 − Dep of Kuchinsky, # 43 42 − Dep of N Meysenburg, # 44 43 − Dep of J Johnson, # 45 44 − Dep of McMenamin, # 46 46 DSCN4073, # 47 47 − Cadle Notes, # 48 48 − Aff of J Johnson, # 49 49 − Beach int, # 50 50 − Dep of Fore, # 51 51 − Dep of Cadle, # 52 52 − Dep of Sanders, # 53 53 − Dep of Latson, # 54 54 − Dep of Neal, # 55 55 − Dep of Payne, # 56 56 − DC Int, # 57 57 − Dep of Lanciano, # 58 57 − JBG Aff, # 59 58 − Dep of Shamenek, # 60 60, # 61 61 − July 19 2006 Email, # 62 62 − June 2, 2006 email, # 63 63 − Datawatch card, # 64 64 − 30(b)(6) Dep of DC in Barham, # 65 65 − DC Council Report, # 66 66 − Dep of Carruth)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
165 Memorandum in opposition to re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
166 NOTICE of Filing of Bulky Exhibit by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 164 Memorandum in Opposition,,,,,,, (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
167 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 156 Amended MOTION for Summary Judgment Amended/Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability Against Mark Beach in His Individual Capacity Joint Motion for One−Week Enlargements, Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 162 Plaintiffs' Explanation of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to Discovery Violations by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, JOHN AND JANE DOE, UNKNOWN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS, ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/12/2008)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 35 of 40

05/13/2008
05/13/2008 05/23/2008 05/23/2008 05/27/2008 05/27/2008
06/05/2008 06/05/2008 06/27/2008 07/17/2008 08/20/2008

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 167 the joint motion for an extension of time, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the parties' replies to dispositive motions shall be filed by not later than May 23, 2008; and it is further ORDERED that defendants shall file a response to plaintiffs' explanation of attorney's fees and costs by not later than May 27, 2008. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 5/13/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Replies to Dispositive Motions due by 5/23/2008. Response to Plaintiffs' Explanation of Attorney's Fees and Costs due by 5/27/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
168 REPLY to opposition to motion re 156 Amended MOTION for Summary Judgment Amended/Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability Against Mark Beach in His Individual Capacity filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
169 REPLY to opposition to motion re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit X (Schleicher Depo.), # 2 Exhibit X1 (Schleicher Depo. Exh. 1), # 3 Exhibit Y (Payne Depo.))(Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
170 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas Louis Koger on behalf of MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS (Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
171 Memorandum in opposition to re 161 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Explanation of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to Discovery Violations −− Defendant District of Columbia's Parytial Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petition for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to Tjhis Court's March 17, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Def X.1 Numbered Itemization, # 2 Exhibit Defs x.2 Facially Valid/Facially Invalid Entries, # 3 Exhibit Defs X.3 Duplicative Efforts List, # 4 Exhibit Defs X.4 Pls Excessive Conferencing List, # 5 Exhibit Defs X.5 Current OUSA Laffey Matrix, # 6 Exhibit Defs X.6 Bolger Pls RFP Response Ecxerpt, # 7 Exhibit Defs X.7 E Bolger Interrogatory Resp Excerpt, # 8 Exhibit Defs X.8 Barham Pls RFP Response Excerpt)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
172 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in Support of Explanation of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to DC's Discovery Violations by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 172 plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file a reply in support of their explanation of attorney's fees and costs by not later than June 27, 2008. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 6/5/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
173 REPLY re 162 Memorandum, Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs Related to Discovery Sanctions filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Ex 1 − transcript of 2.1.07 Hearing, # 2 Ex 2 − 30(b)(6) Dep. of DC, # 3 Ex 3 − Second Affidavit of Michael Kavanaugh)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 06/27/2008)
174 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, DEBRA SMITH, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
175 ORDER awarding plaintiffs $91,207.74 in attorney's fees and costs related to the District's sanctionable discovery violations. See order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 8/20/2008. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 08/20/2008)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 36 of 40

03/31/2009 03/31/2009
03/31/2009 04/09/2009 04/15/2009
04/22/2009 04/23/2009 04/23/2009
04/23/2009
04/23/2009 04/23/2009 06/01/2009 08/21/2009 08/21/2009
08/21/2009

176 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/31/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
177 ORDER denying 153 , 156 plaintiffs' motion/amended motion for summary judgment; denying 158 plaintiffs' request for sanctions without prejudice; granting in part and denying in part 155 defendants' motion for summary judgment; and setting status conference for April 23, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 8. See Order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 3/31/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
Set/Reset Hearings: Scheduling Conference set for 4/23/2009 09:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
178 MOTION for Reconsideration by WENDY PAYNE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
179 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS. Attorney Carl James Schifferle terminated. (Schifferle, Carl) (Entered: 04/15/2009)
180 NOTICE of Appearance by Chad Wayne Copeland on behalf of MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE (Copeland, Chad) (Entered: 04/22/2009)
181 ORDER setting pretrial and trial schedule. See Order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 4/23/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Motions due by 8/21/2009. Responses due by 9/4/2009. Replies due by 9/14/2009. Pretrial Statement due by 10/9/2009. Pretrial Conference set for 10/23/2009 09:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. Jury Trial set for 11/30/2009 09:30 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
182 Memorandum in opposition to re 178 MOTION for Reconsideration Plaintiffs' Opposition and Response to Defendant Payne's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Order Denying Summary Judgment filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Ex. 1 − Dep. of Payne)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
183 RESPONSE re 178 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (tr)(See Docket Entry 182 to view document) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 4/23/2009 before Judge John D. Bates. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb, ) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
184 ORDER denying 178 defendant Wendy Payne's Motion for Reconsideration. See Order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 6/1/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
185 NOTICE of Appearance by Radhika M.S. Miller on behalf of ALL PLAINTIFFS (Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 08/21/2009)
186 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Offering Evidence of Any Arrests or Conviction of Any of the Plaintiffs, Should Any Exist at the Time of Trial, Except for Those Falling Within the Strict Limitations of Fed.R.Evid. 609 and Except for the April 20, 2002 Arrests that are the Subject of the Complaint by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 08/21/2009)
187 MOTION in Limine by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Defs Proposed Order, # 2 Memorandum in Support Defs Memorandum of Pts &Authorities in Support, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 1a DC Council Report Pt 1, # 4 Exhibit Ex, 1b DC Council Report Part II, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 3 DC Council Report Part III, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 1d DC Council Report Part IV, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 1e DC Council Report Part V, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 2 Washington Post &whywar.com articles, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 3 Chastain Deposition Excerpt)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 08/21/2009)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 37 of 40

09/02/2009 09/02/2009 09/08/2009 09/08/2009 09/10/2009 09/11/2009
09/11/2009
09/11/2009

188 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 186 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Offering Evidence of Any Arrests or Conviction of Any of the Plaintiffs, Should Any Exist at the Time of Trial, Except for Those Falling Within the Strict Limitations of Fed.R.Evid. 609 and Except for th, 187 MOTION in Limine Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Enlargement of Two Business Days for the Parties to File Their Oppositions and Replies to Motions in Limine by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 188 Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motions In Limine, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the parties' reponses to the motions in limine are due by not later than September 9, 2009 and the replies, if any, are due by not later than September 16, 2009. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/2/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
189 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 186 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Offering Evidence of Any Arrests or Conviction of Any of the Plaintiffs, Should Any Exist at the Time of Trial, Except for Those Falling Within the Strict Limitations of Fed.R.Evid. 609 and Except for th, 187 MOTION in Limine by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Miller, Radhika) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 189 Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motions In Limine, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the parties' reponses to the motions in limine are due by not later than September 11, 2009 and the replies, if any, are due by not later than September 21, 2009. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/8/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses to parties' motions in limine due by 9/11/2009. Replies due by 9/21/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
190 ENTERED IN ERROR.....Memorandum in opposition to re 186 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Offering Evidence of Any Arrests or Conviction of Any of the Plaintiffs, Should Any Exist at the Time of Trial, Except for Those Falling Within the Strict Limitations of Fed.R.Evid. 609 and Except for th filed by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion In Limine, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 1 Schleicher Depo Exceprt, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 2 T. Meysenberg Depo Exceprt, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 3 Lahood Depo Excerpt, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 4 Schleicher Interrogatory Response, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 5 T. Meysenberg Interrogatory Response, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 6 Lahood Interrogatory Response)(Koger, Thomas) Modified on 9/14/2009 (znmw, ). (Entered: 09/11/2009)
191 Memorandum in opposition to re 187 MOTION in Limine Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude and Preclude Elicitation Regarding the D.C. Council Report on Investigation of Metropolitan Police Department Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the District of Columbia filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 − Council Resolution and LIMS Printout 15−505, # 2 Ex. 2 − Transcript of Oct. 7, 2004 Public Hearing, # 3 Ex. 3 − Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. of D.C. in Becker (DC designee Burke), # 4 Ex. 4 − Transcript of Council Investigatory Hearing, # 5 Ex. 5 − Cassette tapes and transcript cover of depositions, # 6 Ex. 6 − Written Responses of Charles Ramsey, # 7 Ex. 7 − Transcript of Council Investigative Hearing, Statements of Koger, # 8 Ex. 8 − LIMS printout R−15−462, # 9 Ex. 9 − Newsham Dep. in Barham, # 10 Ex. 10 − Chastain Dep., # 11 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
192 Memorandum in opposition to re 187 MOTION in Limine Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude and Preclude Elicitation Regarding Metropolitan Police Department Office of Internal Affairs Investigation # 01−265 filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 − Final Report with Recommendations, # 2 Ex. 2 − Ramsey Dep., # 3 Ex. 3 − Beach Dep., # 4 Ex. 4 − Gainer Dep., # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/11/2009)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 38 of 40

09/11/2009 09/14/2009 09/14/2009
09/17/2009 09/21/2009 09/21/2009 09/21/2009 09/23/2009
09/23/2009

193 Memorandum in opposition to re 187 MOTION in Limine Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine Seeking to Preclude Introduction of Policy, Practice and Custom Evidence filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 − Prisoner Control After Action Report, # 2 Ex. 2 − Intel After Action Report, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 190 Memorandum in Opposition; emailed to thomas.koger@dc.gov, cc'd 5 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Incorrect header/caption/case number, 2. Please refile document, 3. Entered in error; incorrect case number (znmw, ) (Entered: 09/14/2009)
194 Memorandum in opposition to re 186 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Offering Evidence of Any Arrests or Conviction of Any of the Plaintiffs, Should Any Exist at the Time of Trial, Except for Those Falling Within the Strict Limitations of Fed.R.Evid. 609 and Except for th Corrected Opposition filed by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Denying Pls Motion, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 1 Schleicher Depo Excerpt, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 2 T. Meysenburg Dep Excerpt, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 3 Lahood Depo Excerpt, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 4 Schleicher Interrogatory Response, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 5 T. Meysenburg Interrogaory Response, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 6 Lahood Interrogatory Response)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 09/14/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that jury selection will commence on Monday, November 30, 2009, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 8 as previously scheduled. The commencement of trial shall be deferred until Friday, December 4, 2009, at 10:00 a.m. Pursuant to the Order entered on April 23, 2009, counsel shall remain under an obligation to allot ten business days for trial −− that is, through December 17, 2009. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/17/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
195 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 187 MOTION in Limine Enlarging Time to Reply by Two Days by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Propoer Order Granting 2 Day Enlargement)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 09/21/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 195 defendants' unopposed motion for enlargement of time, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion be GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that defendants' reply in support of defendants' omnibus motion in limine is due by not later than September 23, 2009. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 9/21/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 09/21/2009)
196 REPLY to opposition to motion re 186 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Offering Evidence of Any Arrests or Conviction of Any of the Plaintiffs, Should Any Exist at the Time of Trial, Except for Those Falling Within the Strict Limitations of Fed.R.Evid. 609 and Except for th filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 09/21/2009)
197 REPLY to opposition to motion re 187 MOTION in Limine Regarding OIA Investigation And report #01−265 filed by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 Bolger Interrogatory Response Excerpt, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 Johnson Interrogatory Response Excerpt, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3 N. Meysenburg Interrogatory Response Exceprt, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4 T. Meysenburg Interrogatory Response Exceprt, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 5 Rosa Interrogatory Response Excerpt, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 6 Smith Interrogatory Response Excerpt, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 7 Schleicher Interrogatory Response Excerpt, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 8 LaHood Interrogatory Response Excerpt, # 9 Exhibit Ramsey Letter Granting Appral)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
198 REPLY to opposition to motion re 187 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Other Incidents Evidence filed by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 Bolger Response, # 2 Exhibit Ex 2 Johnson Response, # 3 Exhibit Ex 3 N Meysenburg Response, # 4 Exhibit Ex 4 T Meysenburg Response, # 5 Exhibit Ex 5 Rosa Response, # 6 Exhibit Ex 6 Smith Response, # 7 Exhibit Ex 7 Schleicher Response, # 8 Exhibit Ex 8 LaHood

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 39 of 40

09/23/2009 09/30/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009
10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/23/2009
10/23/2009 10/23/2009 11/13/2009

Response)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
199 REPLY to opposition to motion re 187 MOTION in Limine To Exclude D.C. Council Report filed by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 Messineo to Koger email, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 Herold 8.16.07 decl)(Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
200 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE. Attorney Thomas Louis Koger terminated. (Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 09/30/2009)
201 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Statement by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE (Copeland, Chad) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
202 Memorandum in opposition to re 201 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Statement filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Ex. 1 − 10.1.09 Verheyden−Hilliard Email)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
203 REPLY to opposition to motion re 201 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Statement filed by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit September 25, 2009 Email from Thomas Koger to Carl Messineo, Mara Verheyden−Hilliard, and Radhika Miller, # 2 Exhibit September 30 Email from Mara Verheyden−Hilliard to Chad Copeland)(Copeland, Chad) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
204 NOTICE of Appearance by Ellen A. Efros on behalf of MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
205 ORDER granting 201 defendants' motion for enlargement of the deadline for filing of the pretrial statements. The pretrial statements are now due on October 16, 2009. See text of Order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/1/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
206 Joint MOTION to Vacate Order, To Vacate Trial Related Deadlines in Light of Agreement by the Parties to Terms of Settlement by MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WENDY PAYNE, ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
207 ORDER granting as modified 206 the parties' joint motion to vacate trial−related deadlines in light of the parties' settlement agreement. See text of Order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/16/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon the Court's own motion, and in consideration of the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a status conference on November 20, 2009, in Courtroom 8 at 9:45 a.m. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 10/23/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/23/2009)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 11/20/2009 09:45 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 10/23/2009)
Minute Entry Status Conference held on 10/23/2009 before Judge John D. Bates: Status Conference set for 11/20/2009 09:45 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judge John D. Bates. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne) (tb, ) (Entered: 10/23/2009)
208 Joint MOTION for Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice by NATHANIEL MEYSENBURG, TIMOTHY MEYSENBURG, BRIAN ROSA, FRANCIS SCHLEICHER, DEBRA SMITH, MARK BEACH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES H. RAMSEY, ARTHUR BROWN, MICHAEL CARRUTH, MALCOLM FORBES, ANDREA LATSON, ELIZABETH ANN BOLGER, C. MEYLA, RAYMOND MINCEY, WENDY PAYNE, ANDRIAN SANDERS, HELEN JOHNSON, JESSICA LAHOOD (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Settlement Agreement)(Messineo, Carl) (Entered: 11/13/2009)

Case: 1:03-cv-00906-JDB As of: 06/25/2012 11:04 AM EDT 40 of 40

11/16/2009

209 ORDER granting 208 the parties' joint motion for an order dismissing the case. The status conference scheduled for November 20, 2009, is hereby canceled. See text of Order for details. Signed by Judge John D. Bates on 11/16/2009. (lcjdb2) (Entered: 11/16/2009)