. JS44MD(Rev.3/99)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

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The JS-44 civil cover s~eetand the information contained herein neither replace nor ~upplernentthe filing and ~icc ofpl.cadings or other pa~rs as~uired by law, except as proVIded by local rules of court. ThiS form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States m Sq)tetDber 1974, is required for
the useof the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the ciVIl docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS

EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommissionB, altimoreField Office, 10S.HowardSt.,Suite3000,Baltimore,MD 2120I

BouzianisI,nc.,d/b/aDoubleT Diner 5617SpectrumDrive FrederickM, D 21703

(b) COlmtyof ResidenceofFint Listed Plaintiff (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINT1FF CASES)

I 0>WItyof ResidencoefFint LisledDefendant---=---

(IN U.S.PLAINTIFFCASESONLY) -

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LAND INVOLVED.

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(e) Attorney's (Finn Name, AddIas, and TelephoneNumber)

Attorneys (If Known)

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CECILE C. QUINLAN, Esq.,EEOC/BaltimoreField Office, 10 S. Howard St., Suite 3000,Baltimore, MD 21201

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S. Government

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C 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)

Citizen of This State

0 I 0I

lnro~rated or Principgplace of Business In This State

4 04

[J 2 U.S. Government Defendant

0 4 Diversity
(Indicate Citizenship of Parties
in ItemIll)

Citizen of Another State 0 2 02 03 Citizen or Subject of a 03

Incorporated and Principal Place 0 5 of BusinessIn Another Slate

Fo~ign Nation

06

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06

Forei2n Countrv

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X'. in One Box Onlv)

CONTRACT

OTHER STATUTES

PERSONAL INJURY
8 310 Airplane
315 Airplane Product
Liability
0 320 Assault, Libel &
Slander
0 330 Federal Employers'
0 Liability 340 Marine
0 345 Marine Product
8 Liability 350 Motor Vehicle

I§ [J P3E6R2PSO~NAL IInNjuJUryR-Y

661200A0pIhX:euIrtIFIICood&.Drug I

[J 365MP~cd.MaIlnpjrwacyt-ice

ProducLt iability

[J 368AsbestoPs ersonal

Injwy Product

Liability

PERSONALPROPERTY

370OdICrFIaud

[J

1

371TNIh in Lending

3800dICrP~

625DrugRetaINSeiZIR ofPropelty21USC8811

630L;qw., Laws

640R.R.&.TIUck

650AirlineRCBJ.

660acx..,.IiImal

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Safety/Healdl

690QdIer

LABOR

I

8230CPopa~tent 840Tradcmark
SOCIAL SECURITY

2120LF-~' CoodamIaIion

355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability
0 36OOd1erPersooallnjwy - -
CIVIL RIGHTS
. 4412EVmoIpiDkglyment 1

230RCIItLeue & Ejeclment

224450TToortrtsPtIoOOlaIIiCdt Liability

~

8

290AD~ ReaPl ropcny

443Housing!
AcroDIIOOdatioos
444Wc~ 440Qd)CCrivilRigbls

~Damage

[J 385~

DamaF

Product Liability

PRISONER

PETITION

[J 510 MoliIXIs to V 8Cate
Sentalce Habeas Corpus:
~ 5305 GDeaJI1eilIal Penally

540 Malldamus

&. OIlIer

550 Civil Rights

555 ~

CoodiIioo

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i~ 710FairLaborS1mdards

8612 BHlIaAc(k139SLtII)IIIj (923)

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D 720Labor/MgmtRelation

863 DIWClDIWW

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864 ssm Tide xV]

,0 730Labor/MglDtRcportinI 86S RS1 (40S(gJ)

D I

&;Disc~ Act

740 Railway Labor Ad

FEDERAL

TAX

SUITS

I 10

790 Odler Labor Liligatioo

0 870 Taxes (U.s. Plainlitr

or Defendant)

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10 791 Empl. Ret Inc.

Sealrity Act

0 871 IRS- Third Party

26 USC 7609

~
Act
Infom1aIiOIIAct
C 900 AppeaI of Fee
DeIamiDalion Under Equal Access b) Juslice
C 950 CalStiblliOllality of
Stale S1ab11a C 890 Odler S1ab11orAyctions

V. ORIGIN

(pLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)

T~fened from

[ZJ 1 Original 0 2 Removedfrom 0 3 Remandefdrom

0 0 4 Reinstateodr 5 a(snoptehecrifydi)strict

ProCeeding

StateCourt

AppellateCourt

Reopened

. VI CAUSE OF ACTION (CDjoteDdo1tCeit,e!j.uSri:sCd!ic~tsio.o-taes1ltDatludteersIDwIbiciscsdhiyvoerusaItrye.).tilingandwritebrief_tofcause.

[J 6 Multidistrict Litigation

Appeal to District Jud~ from
0 7 ~strate Judgment

Pursuantto Title VII of the CRA of 1964 & Title I of the CRA of 1991. A female employee was subjected to unwelcome touching, sexual advances& other verbal & physical conduct ofa sexual nature, constituting sexual harassmentby Defendant's manager/owner. The hostile working environment resulted in constructive discharge of the employee.

VII. REQUESTED

IN

COMPLAINT:

VIll. RELATED CASE(S)

IF ANY

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

UNDERF.R.CP.23

(Seeinstructions):

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CHECK YES only if demandedin complaint:

JURY DEMAND:

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JUDGE

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MAGJU. DGE

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

EEOC,

*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

Civil Action No.: RDB 06-2520

BOUZIANIS, INC.

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d/b/a Double T Diner,

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Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Plaintiff”) initiated

this employment action against Bouzianis, Inc. d/b/a Double T Diner (“Bouzianis, Inc.” or

“Defendant”) alleging that the Diner’s manager and owner, Stylianos Bouzianis (“Bouzianis”),

subjected his employee, Kelly L. Martin (“Martin”) to sexual harassment and a sexually hostile

working environment that caused her to be constructively discharged from her employment on

the basis of her sex. Currently pending before this Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Paper No. 5.)

The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and this Court heard oral arguments on this motion

on July 24, 2007.1 For the reasons that follow, the Court will, by separate Order, DENY

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2005, Kelly L. Martin (“Martin”) filed a Charge of Discrimination (the

1 In addition, this Court has reviewed the letter dated July 25, 2007 that was submitted by counsel for Defendant. (See Paper No. 19.)
1

“Charge”) with the Maryland Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”) and EEOC against Double T Diner.2 (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Ex. A. (“the Charge”).) She alleged that while she was employed as a waitress at Double T Diner, her manager, Bouzianis inappropriately touched the female employees and sexually assaulted her on October 17, 2004. (Id.) Martin further contended that she filed criminal charges against Bouzianis for which he was found guilty in February 2005.3 (Id.) As a result of being subjected to this behavior, Martin alleged that she was constructively discharged from her position. (Id.) The Charge named “Double T Diner” as the Employer, and identified 5617 Spectrum Drive, Frederick, Maryland as the address of the restaurant where Martin worked. (Id.) The Charge’s heading listed both MCHR and EEOC as agencies to which the complaint was made and was signed by Martin on August 9, 2005. (Id.) There is also a date stamp illustrating that MCHR received the Charge that same day. (Id.) On August 23, 2005, MCHR issued a letter to Martin informing her that her claim was untimely filed with the state agency pursuant to Article 49B.4 MCHR also indicated that since Martin was “within the time frame” to file her complaint with the EEOC, MCHR would forward it to the agency.5 (Id.)
On or about September 9, 2005, comporting with the records of the Maryland State
2 As will be discussed later, the parties dispute the exact date of filing. 3 Counsel for Defendant represented to this Court at the hearing on July 24, 2007 that Bouzianis was given probation before judgment in the state court proceeding. 4 Plaintiff submitted this letter to the Court during the hearing on July 24, 2007. 5 As explained in further detail below, the time period for filing a claim of discrimination with the MCHR (the Maryland state agency) is six months or approximately 180 days from the alleged discriminatory event while the time for filing the same claim with the EEOC (the federal agency) in a deferral state such as Maryland is 300 days or approximately ten months. See MD ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 9A; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
2

Department of Assessments and Taxation, EEOC served a Notice of the Charge of Discrimination (“Notice of Charge”) to Ioannis Korologos (“Korologos”) as resident agent for Double T Diner at 6300 Baltimore National Pike, Baltimore, Maryland. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 2 & Ex. B.) On September 26, 2005, EEOC received a letter from Ronald W. Taylor (“Taylor”), counsel for Double T Diner, arguing that EEOC did not file the Charge in a timely manner. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 2.) Essentially, the position of Defendant is that Martin filed her claim ten days late. This position is based upon MCHR waiting 14 days before advising Martin of the six-month State limitations period. On December 21, 2005, Taylor sent Plaintiff a second letter notifying it that: (1) Bouzianis, Inc. was Martin’s employer at the time of the alleged incident, not Koros, LLC, and (2) the Charge was untimely because the event occurred more than 300 days prior to the filing of Martin’s complaint. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. 2.) On May 11, 2006, EEOC forwarded an exact copy of the Charge against Koros to Bouzianis. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3.) On or about June 9, 2006, Taylor issued a letter responding to EEOC’s Charge, this time on behalf of Bouzianis, Inc., that the claims should be dismissed because: (1) they were time-barred since the Charge was filed more than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory incident on October 17, 2004, and (2) they were legally insufficient to state an actionable claim of discrimination.6 (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. 4.) Nonetheless, EEOC proceeded with its investigation, with which Bouzianis voluntarily cooperated. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 8.)
The investigation revealed the relationship between Korologos and Bouzianis.
6 This argument is not contained within Defendant’s papers in support of its Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, this Court will not address this argument at this time.
3

Korologos and Bouzianis have a 25% and 15% ownership interest, respectively, in the trade name “Double T Diner,” which Bouzianis, Inc. used in connection with its operation of the restaurant in Frederick, Maryland. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. 2; Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. C.) There are only three additional owners. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. C.) Additionally, the records of the Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation reveal that Koros, LLC is the primary owner of Double-T Diner II, located at 6300 Baltimore National Pike, Baltimore, Maryland and that Korologos’s principal office is located there. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. B.) The records also indicate that that address is Bouzianis Inc.’s principal place of business as well as the location of Bouzianis, its resident agent. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. E.)
In addition to participating in the investigation, Bouzianis also engaged in the conciliation process with the EEOC. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. F.) On September 26, 2006, after conciliation proved to be unsuccessful, EEOC filed a Complaint against Bouzianis, Inc. d/b/a Double T Diner in this Court on Martin’s behalf. EEOC seeks relief for Martin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Plaintiff contends that Bouzianis subjected Martin to sexual harassment and a sexually hostile working environment, including “physical touching, lewd and sexually suggestive advances, comments and actions by [her] supervisor” on the basis of her sex. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also asserts that this treatment caused Martin to be constructively discharged from her employment. (Id.) On January 22, 2007, Bouzianis, Inc. filed the subject Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Paper No. 5.)
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW I. Motion to Dismiss for Untimeliness of Filing
Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As the legal sufficiency of the Complaint is challenged under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court assumes “the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint and the existence of any fact that can be proved, consistent with the complaint’s allegations.” Eastern Shore Mkts. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “should only be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2001). “The court need not . . . accept unsupported legal conclusions, Revene v. Charles County Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papason v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).” Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 2d 574, 578 (D. Md. 2004). In addition, the court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc., 213 F.3d at 180. II. Motion to Dismiss for Failing to Satisfy Title VII’s Naming Requirement
Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A party may move to dismiss for lack of
5

subject matter jurisdiction in two ways: it can attack a complaint for failure “to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based,” or it may contend “that the jurisdiction allegations of the complaint were not true.” Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). When a motion attacks the complaint on its face, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and “the plaintiff, in effect, is afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.” Id. When a motion challenges the underlying allegations of the complaint, however, a court may look beyond the allegations of the complaint to determine if there are sufficient facts to support the jurisdiction allegations. Id. In this type of 12(b)(1) review, “[u]nlike the procedure in a 12(b)(6) motion where there is a presumption reserving the truth finding role to the ultimate factfinder, the court in a 12(b)(1) hearing weighs the evidence to determine its jurisdiction.” Id. The plaintiff has the burden to prove that subject matter jurisdiction exists and the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Miller v. Pac. Shore Funding, 224 F. Supp. 2d 977, 995 (D. Md. 2000); Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999); see Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). A District Court will only grant a 12(b)(1) motion “if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Moffet v. Computer Sciences Corp., 457 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768).
ANALYSIS Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on two grounds: (1) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin failed to exhaust her administrative
6

remedies against Defendant since she did not file a timely charge with the EEOC; and (2) under Rule 12(b)(1), this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in that the Charge fails to satisfy Title VII’s naming requirement. Plaintiff responds that the Charge was timely filed with the EEOC on August 9, 2005, less than 300 days after the alleged incident. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that since the purpose of the naming requirement was substantially met, failure to name Bouzianis in the EEOC’s Notice of Charge does not bar the instant suit. I. Timeliness of the Filings
To assert a Title VII claim in federal court, plaintiffs must first exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267, 268 (4th Cir. 1967); Mickel v. S.C. State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1967). In order for the charge to qualify as “timely,” a plaintiff must file the charges within 180 days or 300 days of the alleged discriminatory incident, depending on whether the incident occurred in a “deferral state.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 1998). A “deferral state,” such as Maryland, is one with “a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Tinsley, 155 F.3d at 439; EEOC v. R & R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 338 n.* (4th Cir. 2001). When a charge is filed with a state agency in a deferral state, the complainant cannot file with EEOC until either 60 days have elapsed from the initial filing date with the state or the state terminates its proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (emphasis added). This means that if the charge is filed with the state agency after 240 days have passed since the underlying incident, the state must
7

terminate its proceedings prior to the expiration of the 300-day period for the filing with the
EEOC to be timely. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 815 n.16 (1980). This is meant to
“give States and localities an opportunity to combat discrimination free from premature federal
intervention.” EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110 (1988).
The filing period is not meant to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit under Title
VII. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002) (citing Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982)). To the contrary, “it is a requirement [like a statute of
limitations] subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling ‘when equity so requires.’” Id.
(quoting Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398). This allows courts “to honor Title VII's remedial purpose
‘without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the
employer.’” Id.
Defendant argues that Martin’s charge was untimely in two ways: (1) she did not file the
original charge with MCHR until August 23, 2005, 310 days after the alleged incident on
October 17, 2004, and (2) she did not attempt to serve Bouzianis until 571 days after the alleged
incident.7 In sum, Defendant contends that the date of filing is the date that MCHR certified the
7 Defendant further argues that even if Martin submitted the Charge to MCHR within the 300-day filing period, it was not timely filed with the EEOC. Plaintiff responds that, pursuant to the Worksharing Agreement between MCHR and EEOC, the Charge was contemporaneously filed with the EEOC when Martin submitted it to MCHR. (See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss. Ex. J.) While Defendant contends that there is no legislative history to indicate that these agreements are self-executing waivers of the state’s exclusive jurisdiction, this Court finds no such history to indicate the contrary. In addition, this Court notes that in a recent unpublished opinion in Coleman v. Talbot County Det. Ctr., No. 06-2024, 2007 WL 2022056, at *1 (4th Cir. July 12, 2007), the Fourth Circuit reversed a dismissal of a Title VII complaint and found that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. In that decision, the Fourth Circuit referred to the Worksharing Agreement between EEOC and MCHR in dicta and did not address the contention raised by Defendant in this case. Therefore, pursuant to the Worksharing Agreement between MCHR and EEOC, this Court finds Martin’s filing with the
8

Charge. Defendant makes this assertion even though Martin was not within the state’s sixmonth filing period. In addition, this Court notes that MCHR could have denied the Charge immediately, but instead waited 14 days. In response, Plaintiff argues that the date of filing should be August 9, 2005, the date Martin signed and submitted the charge to MCHR. Therefore, Plaintiff concludes that the Charge was filed within the 300-day filing period.
As noted above, Martin signed and submitted the Charge to MCHR on August 9, 2005, 296 days after the alleged discriminatory incident on October 17, 2004. While the date stamp on the Charge demonstrates that MCHR received it that same day, the agency did not sign the Charge until August 23, 2005. This, however, does not mean that Martin untimely filed the Charge. She took the appropriate measures to file the Charge before the expiration of the 300day period. She completed the Charge, signed it on the 296th day and addressed it to both EEOC and MCHR. She also submitted it to the state agency that very day. Therefore, this Court finds that August 9, 2005 qualifies as the date of filing and was within the 300-day filing period.
In the alternative, even if the date MCHR signed and forwarded the Charge to EEOC were to constitute the date of filing, this Court tolls the 300-day filing period from the moment Martin filed her charge to the date it was processed pursuant to this Court’s authority as noted in the recent unpublished opinion by the Fourth Circuit in Coleman v. Talbot County Det. Ctr., No. 06-2024, 2007 WL 2022056 (4th Cir. July 12, 2007).8 Equitable tolling is “reserved for those
MCHR sufficient to constitute a contemporaneous filing with the EEOC. 8 In its supplemental submission to this Court (Paper No. 19.), the Defendant notes this
opinion and in response suggests that “this is not a case where equitable tolling applies.” In that letter, counsel for the Defendant cites the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mohasco Corp v. Silver,
9

rare instances where – due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct – it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.” Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). “[E]quitable tolling must be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes.” Gayle v. UPS, 401 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). In order to warrant equitable tolling, Plaintiff must “present (1) extraordinary circumstances, (2) beyond [her] control or external to [her] own conduct, (3) that prevented [her] from filing on time.” United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
Martin submitted the Charge on August 9, 2005, within the time period, but MCHR took 14 days to examine it. The submission of the claim was so clearly outside the 180-day time period for the filing of the state complaint that the state agency could have summarily denied the claim immediately.9 The state agency’s delay in processing is certainly an “extraordinary circumstance” that was “beyond Martin’s control” and then prevented her from timely filing the Charge with the EEOC. It would be unconscionable to enforce the Title VII filing period against a complainant who was diligent in submitting her Charge within the time limit but, through no fault of hers, was subject to the delay of a state agency. Therefore, alternatively, even if the operative date of filing was treated as August 23, 2005 and not August 9, 2005, this Court finds
447 U.S. 807 (1980) in support of the Defendant’s position. In that case, the New York State Division of Human Rights reviewed the complaint and in due course determined that there was no merit to the charge. Id. at 810. That case did not involve a situation in which the state agency denied the claim purely on the basis of the date of filing.
9 At the hearing on July 24, 2007, counsel for the Defendant acknowledged that the state agency could have denied the claim immediately.
10

it appropriate to toll Title VII’s 300-day filing period so that a filing on August 23, 2005, 310 days after the alleged discriminatory event, would be timely.
Defendant further contends that this Court should dismiss the Complaint since the EEOC did not serve Bouzianis, Inc. until 571 days after the alleged discriminatory incident and therefore did not provide him fair notice of the Charge. This Court finds, however, that the record clearly shows that Defendant had fair notice of the charge even if he was not formally served until May of 2006. The Charge, which was attached to the Notice of Charge sent to Koros, LLC, specifically identified Bouzianis as Martin’s manager and alleged that he sexually assaulted her. (See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1.) It also listed the correct address of the Double T Diner in which Bouzianis, Inc. employed Martin. While the Notice of Charge named Koros, LLC as the defendant and was sent to Korologos at 6300 Baltimore National Pike, Baltimore, Maryland, the Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation lists Bouzianis’s principal office at this exact same address and describes him as its resident agent. Furthermore, Bouzianis and Korologos both shared ownership interest of the trade name Double T Diner and were two of only five owners of the company’s common stock. Furthermore, Defendant’s current counsel has been actively involved in this case since the time the original charge was filed against Koros, LLC in September 2005. As counsel for the Defendant acknowledged at the motions hearing, this is not a routine case; rather, it is highly unique in that Bouzianis was not only facing tort allegations in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland, but also faced criminal charges of sexual assault for the acts he allegedly committed against Martin. This Court concludes that Bouzianis and Bouzianis, Inc. had actual notice of the Charge set forth in this case. As such, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the
11

timeliness of the filing is DENIED.
II. Naming Requirement of Title VII
Defendant also argues that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Martin had counsel when she filed the original
Charge and still did not name Bouzianis, Inc. in the original charge.10 Plaintiff responds that,
while Bouzianis, Inc. was not formally named in the original EEOC charge, the purposes of Title
VII’s naming requirement were substantially met and therefore the Complaint should not be
dismissed.
Title VII’s “naming requirement” provides:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (emphasis added). This Court has previously held that a plaintiff’s
failure to name a defendant in an EEOC charge does not bar the subsequent suit if “the purposes
of the naming requirement were substantially met,” that is if (1) defendants received fair notice,
and (2) the EEOC was able to attempt conciliation. Vanguard Justice Soc. Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F.
10 Defendant also contends that the charge filed on May 11, 2006 against Bouzianis does not relate back to the charge against Koros, LLC. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) provides that “[a] charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received.” Since an exact copy of the Charge in this case was sent to Bouzianis, it was never amended to “cure technical defects or omissions.” Therefore, this Court determines Defendant’s argument to be irrelevant and need not be addressed.
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Supp. 670, 687 (D. Md. 1979) (internal citations omitted); see also Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d
795, 800 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cmty. Coll., 848 F.2d
457, 460 (4th Cir. 1988)). Additionally, this Court has previously applied a four-part test in
determining whether a civil action can be brought against a defendant not named in the EEOC
Charge:
1) whether the role of the unnamed party could through reasonable effort by the complainant be ascertained at the time of the filing of the EEOC complaint; 2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named [party] are so similar as the unnamed party's that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC proceedings; 3) whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party; 4) whether the unnamed party had in some way represented to the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be through the named party.
McAdoo v. Toll, 591 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D. Md. 1984) (citing Vanguard Justice Soc. Inc., 471
F. Supp. at 688). Of these four factors, the second and third are the most important as they are
most reflective of the two-fold purpose of the naming requirement. Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F.
Supp. 676, 682 (D. Md. 1996) (internal citation omitted).
With regards to the fourth prong, it is reasonable for Martin to have believed that she
should list the name of her employer as “Double T Diner” on the Charge, since she worked at a
restaurant with that name. See Thomas v. Bet Sound-Stage Restaurant/BrettCo, Inc., 61 F.
Supp.2d 448, 458 (D. Md. 1999) (finding it reasonable for plaintiff to believe she was employed
by BET Sound-Stage Restaurant since all of the materials she received while employed there had
the logo on it, although it was not the appropriate legal party to sue); Alvarado, 848 F.2d at 460
(4th Cir. 1988) (finding it reasonable for plaintiff to name the company where he thought he
13

worked, although it was not the legally appropriate entity to “sue or be sued”). As to the second prong, the record reflects that Bouzianis voluntarily engaged in
conciliation with the EEOC. This fact coupled with this Court’s finding that Defendant had fair notice of the Charge satisfies the second and third prongs of the four-part test. See Thomas, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (finding no prejudice since defendant had constructive notice of the charge); Adamczyk v. Chief, Baltimore County Police Dep’t., 952 F. Supp. 259, 263 n.10 (D. Md. 1997) (finding that American Disabilities Act’s naming requirement was met when unnamed defendants received notice of the violation and participated in the EEOC proceedings). Even more importantly, this means that the purposes of the naming requirement were substantially met. As such, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. A separate Order follows.

Dated: August 2, 2007

/s/ Richard D. Bennett United States District Judge

14

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

EEOC,

*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

Civil Action No.: RDB 06-2520

BOUZIANIS, INC.

*

d/b/a DOUBLE T DINER

*

Defendant.

*************

ORDER

Defendant Bouzianis, Inc. d/b/a Double T Diner (“Defendant”) having filed a Motion to

Dismiss, and this Court having reviewed the parties’ submissions, conducted a hearing on June

24, 2007, reviewed the Defendant’s supplemental letter of July 25, 2007 (Paper No. 19), and for

the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 2nd

day of August 2007, that:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Paper No. 5) is DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of the Court shall transmit copies of this Order and the foregoing

Memorandum Opinion to counsel for the parties.

/s/ Richard D. Bennett United States District Judge

 
 Case 1:06-cv-02520-RDB Document 22 Filed 10103/2007 Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

FILED ;) .S. DISTRICT COUR T DI STR!~T OF ri.'.RYLAN D

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

*

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

BOUZIANIS, INC.

d/b/a DOUBLE T DINER,

*

ZOOl OCT -ll P 4: 4 1
CLER";'S Or-::ICE AT B:d.Tli'lORE By______ DEPUT Y
Civil Action No. 06-CV-2520 RDB

Defendant

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

CONSENT DECREE

This action was instituted by Plaintiff, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or the "Commission"), against Defendant,

Bouzianis, Inc. d/b/a Double T Diner ("Defendant"), on September 26, 2006. The

Commission's complaint alleges that Charging Party Kelly Martin was subjected

to sexual harassment and to a hostile work environment resulting in her

constructive discharge, on the basis of sex, female, in violation of Section

703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1).

The Commission and Defendant desire to resolve this action

without t he time and expense of continued litigation, and they desire to

formulate a plan to be embodied in a Decree which will promote and effectuate

the purposes of Title VII.

Case 1:06-cv-02S20-RDB Document 22 Filed 10103/2007 Page 2 of 8

For the purposes of resolving this action only, Defendant admits

that the Court has jurisdiction over this action and that all jurisdictional

prerequisites to suit have been satisfied.

This Decree, being entered with the consent of the Commission and

Defendant, shall not constitute an adjudication or finding on the merits of this

case and shall not be construed as an admission of liability by Defendant or as a

waiver by the Commission of any contentions of discrimination.

The Court has examined this Decree and finds that it is reasonable

and just and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title

VII.

THEREFORE, upon due consideration of the record herein and

being fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED AND DECREED:

1. This Decree resolves all issues and claims relating to the

allegations in the Complaint filed by the Commission in this Title VII action

which emanated from the Charge of Discrimination No. 12F-2005-00625 filed by

Kelly Martin.

2. Defendant, its officers, agents, servants, employees and all

persons acting or claiming to act in its behalf and interest shall be enjoined and

restrained from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on

the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, including with regard to sexual

harassment and constructive discharge.

3. Within five (5) business days of the Court's approval of this

Decree, Defendant will pay to Kelly Martin monetary damages in the total

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Case 1:06-cv-02520-RDB Document 22 Filed 10/03/2007 Page 3 of 8

amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) in full settlement of the

claims on behalf of the case, consisting of the back wages in the amount of Three

Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00), less amounts to be withheld by Defendant for

applicable federal and state taxes as required by law, and Thirty-Two Thousand

Dollars ($32,000.00) in compensatory damages. Defendant will issue a W2 form

for the back wage amount listed above. Defendant shall take no withholding

from the compensatory monetary amount listed above and will issue a Form

1099 to Kelly Martin reflecting this payment. Defendant agrees that the check

shall be forwarded to Kelly Martin by overnight mail at an address to be

supplied by the Commission. Within five (5) days of this payment, Defendant

shall send to the Commission's attorney-of-record a copy of the checks along with

a copy of the overnight delivery receipt.

4. Within five (5) days of the Court's approval of this Decree,

Defendant will post in all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted at its facility, the Notice attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part

hereof. Said Notice attached hereto as Exhibit "A" shall be posted and

maintained for a period of at least three (3) years from the date of posting and

shall be signed by a responsible official of Defendant with the date of actual

posting shown thereon. Should the Notice become defaced, marred, or otherwise

made unreadable, Defendant will ensure that new readable copies of the Notice

are posted in the same manner as heretofore specified. Within ten (10) days of

such posting, Defendant shall forward to the Commissioner's attorney-of-record

at the Baltimore Office a copy of the signed Notice attached hereto as Exhibit

BA2/325770

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Case 1:06-cv-02S20-RDB Document 22 Filed 10/03/2007 Page 4 of 8

"A" and written certification that the Notice referenced herein has been posted

and a statement of the location(s) and date ofl osting.

5. Defendant agrees that witbin twenty-one (21) days of the

Court's approval of this Decree, it shall institl te a revised sexual harassment

policy. The policy shall include at a minimuJ, a clear explanation of prohibited

w10m conduct, designation of a contact person to

the prohibited conduct should

ass~rance be reported, with an effective method of contabt, a complaint procedure that

provides accessible avenues of complaint,

that the employer will take

all reasonable measures to protect confidentij lity, conduct an impartial

investigation, refrain from retaliating againS any person who participates in
J such investigation, and take prompt and app lopriate corrective action. The

revised policy is to be reviewed by the Commibsion. Within ten (10) days of the

Court's approval of the Decree, Defendants sJall forward to the Commission its

proposed revised sexual harassment policy fal review and comment. Thereafter,

within twenty-one (21) days of the Court's apl roval of this Decree, Defendant

will post the (revised) sexual harassment pOlily in all places where notices to

employees are customarily posted at its facilJy. The revised sexual harassment

policy shall be posted and shall be maintainel for a period of at least three (3)

years from the date of posting. Within ten (ll) days of the posting of the policy,

Defendant shall forward to the commissione1 s attorney-of-record at the

Baltimore Office a written certification that the policy referenced herein has

been posted and a statement of the location(s and date of posting.

BA2/325770

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Case 1:06-cv-02520-RDB Document 22 Filed 10103/2007 Page 5 of 8

6. Defendant agrees that within thirty (30) days of the Court's

approval of this Decree, it shall provide mandatory training to its employees,

including managers and supervisors, regarding federal EEO laws prohibiting

discrimination in employment enforced by the Commission, particularly those

concerning sex discrimination and harassment. Defendant's revised sexual

harassment policy shall be distributed during such training. The trainer's

credentials and an outline of program materials shall be forwarded to the

EEOC's attorney-of-record ten (10) days prior to such training being conducted

and a representative of the Commission shall be invited to attend such training.

Within fifteen (15) days of the completion of this training, Defendant shall

forward to the Commissioner's attorney-of-record at the Baltimore Office written

certification that the training has been completed together with a list of

employees and managerial staff who have been trained, and the dates of

training. Defendant also agrees to provide to each newly-hired employee an

orientation to its equal employment opportunity policies, including the sexual

harassment policy, within a reasonable time of hire.

7. Defendant will not discriminate against any individual

because such individual has opposed any practice that is made unlawful under

Title VII or because of the filing of a charge, the giving of testimony, assistance

or participation in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing, under Title VII.

8. The Commission reserves the right to monitor compliance

with the provisions of this Decree. As part of such review, the EEOC, upon

notice to Defendant, may require written reports concerning compliance, inspect

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Case 1:06-cv-02S20-RDB Document 22 Filed 10103/2007 Page 6 of 8
Defendant's premises, interview witnesses, and examine and copy documents at reasonable times to be mutually agreed to by the parties.
9. If any party to this Decree believes that any other party has breached a material provision of this Decree, it shall so notify the party(s), in writing, of the alleged breach. Upon receipt of written notice, a party(s) shall have fifteen (15) days to either correct the alleged breach, and so inform the other party(s), or deny the alleged breach, in writing: a) If the parties remain in dispute, they shall attempt in good faith to resolve their dispute; b) If the parties cannot in good faith resolve their dispute, the party alleging a breach may file with the Court a motion to correct and remedy the breach; c) Each party shall bear its own costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred in connection with such action; and d) Jurisdiction and venue to resolve any dispute arising under this Decree resides in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
10. This Decree shall remain in full force and effect for a period of three (3) years from the date of approval and entry of this Decree by the Court.
11. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action to ensure compliance with this Decree. In all other respects, upon approval and entry by the Court of this Decree, the Commission's action against Defendant is dismissed with prejudice and the Clerk of the Court is directed to remove this action from the Court's calendar.

BA2/325770

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Case 1:06-cv-02520-RDB Document 22 Filed 10/03/2007 Page 7 of 8

12. The Commission and Defendant shall bear their own costs,

expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with this action.

13. The undersigned counsel of record, on behalf of their

respective clients, hereby consent to the entry of the foregoing Consent Decree.

AGREED:

FOR DEFENDANT:

FOR PLAINTIFF:

BOUZIANIS, IN. d/b/a DOUBLE T DINER

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

_ _ _----.;/s/_ _ _ _ __
RONALD W. TAYLOR Venable LLP 2 Hopkins Plaza, Suite 1800 Baltimore, MD 21201 (41) 244-7400

RONALD S. COOPER General Counsel
JAMES LEE Deputy General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel

_ _ _ _/s/_ _ _ _ _ __
JACQUELINE H. MCNAIR Regional Attorney EEOC-Philadelphia District Office (including Baltimore Field Office)

_ _ _ _/s/_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DEBRA M. LAWRENCE Supervisory Trial Attorney EEOC-Baltimore Field Office

BA2/325770

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Case 1:06-cv-02520-RDB Document 22 Filed 10/03/2007 Page 8 of 8
_ _-----'/s/_ _ _ _ _ __ CECILE C. QUINLAN Senior Trial Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION EEOC-Baltimore Field Office 10 S. Howard St., 3rd Floor Baltimore, MD 21201 (410) 209-2728
SO ORDERED.
Signed and entered this ~?J-day of ~ e'10 6 e;?,.. ,2007.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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CASREF, CLOSED
U.S. District Court District of Maryland (Baltimore) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:06-cv-02520-RDB

EEOC v. Bouzianis, Inc. Assigned to: Judge Richard D Bennett Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)
Plaintiff EEOC

Date Filed: 09/26/2006 Date Terminated: 10/04/2007 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Debra Michele Lawrence U S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission City Crescent Bldg 10 S Howard St Third Fl Baltimore, MD 21201 14102092734 Fax: 14109624270 Email: debra.lawrence@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecile Celeste Quinlan Equal Employment Opportunity Commission City Crescent Bldg 10 S Howard St Third Fl Baltimore, MD 21201 14109624260 Fax: 14109624270 Email: cecile.quinlan@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline H McNair US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 801 Market St Penthouse Ste 1300 Philadelphia, PA 19107 12154402666 Fax: 12154402674 Email: jacqueline.mcnair@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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V.
Defendant
Bouzianis, Inc. doing business as Double T Diner

represented by Ronald W Taylor Venable LLP Two Hopkins Plz Ste 1800 Baltimore, MD 21201 14102447400 Fax: 14102447742 Email: RWTaylor@venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Todd James Horn Venable LLP Two Hopkins Plz Ste 1800 Baltimore, MD 21201 14102447709 Fax: 14102447742 Email: thorn@venable.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/26/2006 09/26/2006 09/26/2006 09/27/2006 11/22/2006 01/22/2007
02/06/2007 02/07/2007

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Bouzianis, Inc., filed by EEOC. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(raf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
Jury Trial Demand by EEOC. (raf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
2 NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND REQUEST FOR WAIVER of Service by EEOC as to Bouzianis, Inc. (raf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Jacqueline H McNair on behalf of EEOC (jnl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
4 REQUEST FOR WAIVER of Service sent to Bouzianis resident agent/counsel on 11/20/06 by EEOC. (Quinlan, Cecile) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
5 MOTION to Dismiss by Bouzianis, Inc.. Responses due by 2/8/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum In Support# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3# 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4)(Taylor, Ronald) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
6 STIPULATION re 5 MOTION to Dismiss - JOINT REQUEST FOR ADR AND EXTENSION TO RESPOND by EEOC. (Quinlan, Cecile) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
7 MARGINAL ORDER APPROVING 6 Joint Request for Court Settlement/ADR Conference and Extension of Time For Filing Opposition Motion by EEOC.. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 2/6/07. (eg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/07/2007)

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02/12/2007
02/20/2007
03/13/2007 05/25/2007 06/08/2007
06/15/2007 06/15/2007 06/21/2007 06/22/2007
06/29/2007 06/29/2007
07/11/2007
07/13/2007 07/24/2007
07/25/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007

8 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Susan K. Gauvey for settlement conference. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 2/12/2007. (fk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
9 LETTER ORDER SCHEDULING Settlement Conference. Signed by Judge Susan K. Gauvey on 2/16/07. (Attachments: # 1 Mediation)(eg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/20/2007)
10 LETTER ORDER RESCHEDULING Settlement Conference. Signed by Judge Susan K. Gauvey on 3/13/07. (eg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
Settlement Conference held on 5/25/2007 held before Judge Susan K. Gauvey. (eg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
11 ORDER DIRECTING counsel to submit a status report on or before June 15, 2007. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 6/8/07(cag, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
12 STATUS REPORT by Bouzianis, Inc.. (Taylor, Ronald) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
Judge Susan K. Gauvey no longer assigned to case. (eg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
Telephone Conference held on 6/21/2007 before Judge Richard D Bennett. (hml, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
13 MARGINAL ORDER APPROVING 12 Request to extend briefing schedule deadlines. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 6/21/07. (hml, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
14 RESPONSE in Opposition re 5 MOTION to Dismiss filed by EEOC.Replies due by 7/13/2007. (Quinlan, Cecile) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
15 NOTICE by EEOC re 14 Response in Opposition to Motion Of Filing Lengthy Exhibits (Quinlan, Cecile) (LENGTHY EXHIBITS REC'D 7/2/07) Modified on 7/2/2007 (hml, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 06/29/2007)
16 REPLY to Response to Motion re 5 MOTION to Dismiss Defendant's Reply to EEOC's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral Hearing filed by Bouzianis, Inc.. (Taylor, Ronald) (Entered: 07/11/2007)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Todd James Horn on behalf of Bouzianis, Inc. (Horn, Todd) (Entered: 07/13/2007)
18 Motion Hearing held on 7/24/2007 re 5 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Bouzianis, Inc. held before Judge Richard D Bennett. Ruling to be entered at a later date. (Court Reporter: L. Bankins) (kmt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/24/2007)
19 Correspondence re: Comment Re: Letter Submitted by Plaintiff at 7/24/07 Hearing (Taylor, Ronald) (Entered: 07/25/2007)
20 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 8/2/07. (hml, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
21 ORDER denying 5 Motion of defendant to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 8/2/07. (hml, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/02/2007)

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10/03/2007 10/04/2007

22 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT /CONSENT DECREE FOR ENTRY by EEOC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice for Posting)(Quinlan, Cecile) (Entered: 10/03/2007)
23 CONSENT DECREE and Approval. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 10/4/07. (mcb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/05/2007)

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