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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA, f/k/a/ "DIAMOND-STAR MOTORS CORPORATION,"
Defendant,
and
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW and its LOCAL UNION 2488,
Rule 19 Parties.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 96-1192 ) ) ) Judge McDade ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE
Plaintiff, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and Defendant, Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, f/k/a Diamond-Star Motors Corporation ("MMMA"), respectfully move the Court for approval and entry of the attached Consent Decree. In support of their Joint Motion, EEOC and MMMA state as follows:
1. EEOC and MMMA, with the assistance of Special Master Abner J. Mikva, have negotiated the Consent Decree attached hereto as resolution of the above captioned case.
2. The International Union, UAW and its Local Union 2488 have agreed to the terms of the proposed Consent Decree, and have agreed that the Court may join them in this action as Rule 19 relief parties in order to assist in the implementation of the terms of the Consent Decree.

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3. EEOC and MMMA believe that the terms of this Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable, equitable and just.
4. EEOC and MMMA believe that the Decree conforms with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not in derogation of the rights or privileges of any person. The entry of this Decree will further the objectives of Title VII and will be in the best interests of the parties, those for whom EEOC seeks relief and the public.
For the foregoing reasons, EEOC and MMMA respectfully request that the Court approve and enter the attached Consent Decree.
Respectfully submitted,

John C. Hendrickson
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
500 West Madison Street Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661

Walter B. Connolly, Jr.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, P.L.C.
150 West Jefferson Avenue Suite 2500 Detroit, Michigan 48226

--------------------------- begin next document ------------------------

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA, INC., f/k/a "DIAMOND-STAR MOTORS CORPORATION,"
Defendant,

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 96-1192 ) ) Judge McDade ) Magistrate Judge Kaufman ) ) ) ) )

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and

)

)

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW,

)

and its LOCAL UNION 2488,

)

)

Rule 19 Parties. )

________________________________________)

CONSENT DECREE
1. This Consent Decree (the "Decree") is made and entered into by and between Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission" or "EEOC") and Defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., formerly known as "Diamond Star Motors," (hereinafter referred to as "MMMA") (EEOC and MMMA are collectively referred to herein as "the Parties").
2. Simultaneous with the entry of this Decree, the Court has joined the International Union, UAW, and its Local Union 2488 (hereinafter, the "Unions") in this action as Rule 19 Parties. The Unions have voluntarily permitted themselves to be joined in this action and to be signatories to this Decree in order to assist in the implementation of the terms of this Decree. The Unions covenant and represent that they will make best efforts to effectuate and/or cooperate with all of the non-monetary relief set forth in or contemplated by this Consent Decree.
3. On April 9, 1996, EEOC initiated this action by filing its Complaint against MMMA. EEOC filed its First Amended Complaint on August 14, 1997, to add certain jurisdictional allegations. EEOC's Complaints alleged that MMMA violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including, but not limited to, amendments authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), by engaging in a pattern or practice of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and retaliation against a class of current and former female employees since at least 1990. The Complaint and the First Amended Complaint both further alleged that some of these women were constructively discharged as a consequence of this pattern or practice of discrimination.
4. On June 21, 1996, MMMA filed its Answer to EEOC's Complaint, denying the allegations contained in the Complaint.
5. In the interest of resolving this matter and as a result of having engaged in comprehensive settlement negotiations, the Parties have agreed that this action should be finally resolved by entry of this Decree. This Decree shall not constitute an adjudication and/or finding on the merits of the

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case, and shall not be used as evidence of liability, res judicata, or collateral estoppel in any other legal proceeding against MMMA or any of its vendors.
6. This Decree is final and binding upon the Parties, their successors and assigns.
7. The Parties agree that this Decree resolves all claims arising out of Commissioner's Charge No. 210 94 2132; the charges of all individuals who received monetary relief in the lawsuits Evans v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Civil Action No. 94-1545 (C.D. Ill.) and Aeschelman v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Civil Action No. 96-1212 (C.D. Ill.); and the Complaints filed in this action, and constitutes a complete resolution of all claims of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment, retaliation and/or constructive discharge under Title VII that were made or could have been made by the Commission in this action. The Parties further agree that this Decree does not, however, resolve any Charges that may be pending with EEOC other than the Charges specifically referred to in this paragraph or those that may be released by "Eligible Claimants" (as that term is defined herein) pursuant to this Decree.
8. This Decree constitutes the complete agreement between EEOC and MMMA with respect to the matters referred to herein. No waiver, modification or amendment of any provision of this Decree shall be effective unless made in writing, approved by all parties to this Decree and approved by the Court or ordered by the Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having carefully examined the terms and provisions of this Consent Decree, and based on the pleadings, record and stipulations of the Parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
9. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the parties for purposes of entering and enforcing this Decree.
10. The terms of this Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable, equitable and just.
11. This Decree conforms with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not in derogation of the rights or privileges of any person. The entry of this Decree will further the objectives of Title VII and will be in the best interests of the Parties, those for whom EEOC seeks relief, and the public.
12. This Decree resolves all claims arising out of Commissioner's Charge No. 210 94 2312; the charges of all individuals who received monetary relief in the lawsuits Evans v.

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Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Civil Action No. 94-1545 (C.D. Ill.) and Aeschelman v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Civil Action No. 96-1212 (C.D. Ill.); and the Complaints filed in this action, and constitutes a complete resolution of all claims of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment, retaliation and/or constructive discharge under Title VII that were made or could have been made by the Commission in this action. This Decree does not, however, resolve any Charges that may be pending with EEOC other than the Charges specifically referred to in this paragraph or those that may be released by Eligible Claimants pursuant to this Decree.
13. This Decree comprises the full and exclusive agreement of the parties with respect to the matters discussed herein. No representations or inducements to compromise this action have been made, other than those recited or referenced in this Decree (including the Exhibits attached hereto).
Scope of Consent Decree
14. The duration of this Decree shall be three (3) years from the date of entry of the Decree. During that time, this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter and the Parties for purposes of enforcing compliance with the Decree, including issuing such orders as may be required to effectuate its purposes. Accordingly, this Decree shall expire and shall be without force and effect three (3) years from the date of entry of this Decree.
General Injunctive Provisions
15. Sexual Harassment. MMMA and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory employees), successors and assigns, and all those in active concert or participation with them, or any of them, are hereby enjoined from: (i) discriminating against women on the basis of sex; (ii) engaging in or being a party to any action, policy or practice that is intended to or is known to them to have the effect of harassing or intimidating any female employee on the basis of her gender; and/or (iii) creating, facilitating or permitting the existence of a work environment that is hostile to female employees.
16. Retaliation. MMMA and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory employees), successors and assigns, and all those in active concert or participation with them, or any of them, are hereby enjoined from engaging in, implementing or permitting any action, policy or practice with the purpose of retaliating against any current or former employee of MMMA because he or she opposed any practice of sex discrimination, sexual harassment or sex-based harassment made unlawful under Title VII; filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging any such practice; testified or participated in any manner in any

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investigation (including, without limitation, any internal investigation undertaken by MMMA), proceeding, or hearing in connection with this case and/or relating to any claim of sex discrimination, sexual harassment or sex-based harassment; was identified as a possible witness in this action; asserted any rights under this Decree; or sought and/or received any monetary and/or non-monetary relief in accordance with this Decree.
Monetary Relief
Establishment of Settlement Fund
17. MMMA shall pay the gross sum of THIRTY-FOUR MILLION DOLLARS ($34,000,000.00) (hereinafter referred to as the "Settlement Fund") to be distributed among all "Eligible Claimants" (as that term is defined in paragraph 20 herein), all in accordance with the provisions of this Decree. None of the amounts paid to Eligible Claimants shall be for back pay.
18. Within thirty (30) days after entry of this Decree, MMMA shall establish and maintain a segregated account on its books, as a liability, for the Settlement Fund in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The Settlement Fund shall accrue interest, compounded daily, at a rate equal to the thirty (30) day Treasury Bill Rate (or the closest comparable rate thereto) as published in the Wall Street Journal on the date of entry of this Decree. The Settlement Fund shall accrue interest beginning thirty (30) days after entry of this Decree and continuing until the date of transfer, as provided for by paragraph 19 of this Decree, and the interest will be credited to the account at least once per month.
19. MMMA shall appoint a Payment Agent for the administration of payments from the Settlement Fund. No later than seven (7) days before such payments are to be made to Eligible Claimants, MMMA shall transfer to the Payment Agent for deposit into an account at a commercial bank both the principal of and the interest accrued to the Settlement Fund as of the date of such transfer. Such account shall accrue interest at the customary rate for such commercial bank beginning seven (7) days after transfer and continuing until all moneys have been paid out of that account. Only withdrawals authorized by this Decree may be made from the account.
Claims Process and Distribution of Settlement Fund
20. Eligible Claimants. The Settlement Fund shall be used solely to make payments to women who timely submit Claim Forms (such persons are hereinafter referred to as "claimants") and whom EEOC determines, subject to Court approval, to be eligible to receive monetary relief in this lawsuit (such persons are

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hereinafter referred to as "Eligible Claimants"). No persons other than Eligible Claimants shall receive any payments from the Settlement Fund.
21. Subject only to the approval of the Special Master and/or the Court (as provided for by this Decree), EEOC shall be the sole determiner of eligibility for relief under this Decree and the amount of monetary relief to be received by any Eligible Claimant under this Decree. MMMA will not participate in or object to EEOC's determinations.
22. Eligible Claimants shall include only those claimants who satisfy each and all of the following criteria:
(i) the claimant was either: (a) employed by MMMA at any time between January 1, 1987 and the date of entry of this Decree; or (b) worked at MMMA's Normal, Illinois facility pursuant to a contract between MMMA and her direct employer at any time during such time period and has been identified by EEOC, prior to entry of this Decree, as a potential victim.
(ii) EEOC timely received from such claimant, in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Decree, a Claim Form and a Release in the form of Exhibits B and D attached to this Decree; and
(iii) EEOC received evidence credible to EEOC that the individual was (a) subjected to sexual harassment or sex-based harassment, or (b) retaliated against because she opposed sexual harassment or participated in any proceeding relating to a complaint of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment or retaliation.
23. Acting in its discretion and subject only to final approval by the Court (or the Special Master as provided for in paragraphs 34 and 35 this Decree), EEOC shall exclusively determine the eligibility of claimants for relief under this Decree. In making such determinations, EEOC may consider whatever evidence EEOC deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, evidence received by EEOC in its investigation of the charge of discrimination underlying this action, in connection with its litigation of this action, and in connection with the claims process provided by this Decree.
24. Acting in its discretion and subject only to final approval by the Court (or the Special Master), EEOC shall assign each individual whose Claim Form is timely received by EEOC and whom EEOC determines to be an Eligible Claimant to one of five "claimant tiers," defined by EEOC to reflect approximately the

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relative severity of the Eligible Claimants' claims. In assigning Eligible Claimants among these five "claimant tiers," EEOC will consider the following factors: (i) severity of harassment/retaliation, (ii) duration of harassment/retaliation, (iii) extent of harm, (iv) whether the Eligible Claimant was constructively discharged, and (v) whether and, if so, the extent to which the Eligible Claimant complained to EEOC and cooperated or participated in this litigation prior to May 15, 1998. Individuals who received monetary relief in the lawsuit Evans v. Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Civil Action No. 94-1545 (C.D. Ill.) or Aeschleman v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Civil Action No. 96-1212 (C.D. Ill.), or who, prior to May 15, 1998, advised EEOC in writing that they did not wish EEOC to seek relief for them in this litigation, shall not be Eligible Claimants.
25. Acting in its discretion and subject only to final approval by the Court, EEOC shall determine the portion of the Settlement Fund that will be allocated to each of the five "claimant tiers" provided for by the immediately preceding paragraph. The amounts allocated to each of the "claimant tiers" will vary both in gross amount and on a per capita basis. Within each "claimant tier," the amount of monetary relief to be received by each Eligible Claimant shall be equal and shall reflect the factors enumerated in paragraph 24, above. This Decree contemplates that there will be significant differences in amounts individually received by Eligible Claimants assigned to each tier as compared to those in other tiers. No Eligible Claimant shall receive more than $300,000.00 in gross monetary relief.
26. This Decree further contemplates that there will be a substantially greater difference in the amounts individually received by Eligible Claimants assigned to the lowest tier, with Eligible Claimants in that lowest tier receiving much lower or nominal amounts. In assigning Eligible Claimants to that lowest tier, substantial weight shall be accorded to factor (v) in paragraph 24, above.
Procedures To Determine Eligibility
27. Notification of Settlement/Claims Process. Within fourteen (14) days after entry of this Consent Decree, EEOC shall mail a Notice of Settlement (in the form of Exhibit A-1 attached to this Decree) to all women who were employed by MMMA at any time between January 1, 1987 and the date of entry of this Decree. MMMA shall cooperate in the notification process, including, among other things, providing to EEOC last known addresses and telephone numbers of current and former female employees not previously provided to EEOC. All persons who wish to participate in distribution of the Settlement Fund must

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complete and return a Claim Form (in the form of Exhibit B attached to this Decree) to EEOC so that it is actually received by EEOC by the close of business forty-five (45) days after the Notices of Settlement are mailed by EEOC.
28. Within fourteen (14) days after entry of this Decree, EEOC shall also mail a Notice of Settlement (in the form of Exhibit A-2 attached to this Decree) to women who worked at MMMA's Normal, Illinois facility pursuant to a contract between MMMA and their direct employer and who have been identified by EEOC, prior to entry of this Decree, as potential victims. This Decree shall not constitute an adjudication and/or finding on the merits of the issue of joint employer liability, and shall not be used as evidence of liability, res judicata, or collateral estoppel as to that issue in any other legal proceeding against MMMA.
29. As a further means of notifying potential Eligible Claimants of the settlement of this lawsuit and of the claims process described in this Decree, within ten (10) days after entry of this Decree, there will be published one time in the editorial (not classified) sections of the Peoria Journal-Star and the Bloomington Pantagraph a Notice of Lawsuit Settlement in the form of Exhibit C attached to this Decree. The advertisement shall be no smaller than two (2) columns by ten (10) inches in size.
30. ANY PERSON FROM WHOM EEOC HAS NOT ACTUALLY RECEIVED A COMPLETED CLAIM FORM BY THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS AFTER THE NOTICES OF SETTLEMENT ARE MAILED SHALL NOT BE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ANY MONETARY RELIEF UNDER THE CONSENT DECREE, AND SHALL BE DEEMED, WITHOUT FURTHER ACT OR DEED BY ANY PERSON OR THE COURT, TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR AND FOREVER BARRED FROM RECEIVING ANY PAYMENTS UNDER THIS CONSENT DECREE.
31. EEOC Determination of Eligibility and Computation of Claims. Within seventy-five (75) days after the deadline for receipt by EEOC of returned Claim Forms, EEOC shall make its determinations as to: (i) the eligibility of each claimant who has timely submitted a Claim Form to EEOC, and (ii) the "claimant tier" assignment of each Eligible Claimant. EEOC shall also make at this time preliminary determinations as to the gross (pre-tax) amount of monetary relief from the Settlement Fund that will be awarded to Eligible Claimants in each tier. Such preliminary determinations may be subject to change based on (i) whether and the extent to which EEOC's determinations as to eligibility and tier placement are modified pursuant to the objection process provided for in this Decree, and/or (ii) the amount of additional interest that has accrued to the Settlement Fund between the date on which EEOC renders its determinations pursuant to this paragraph and the date on which the Settlement Fund is actually

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distributed to Eligible Claimants.
32. Notification of Eligibility and Tier Assignment. Within seventy-five (75) days after the deadline for receipt by EEOC of returned Claim Forms, EEOC shall mail to each person from whom it has received a Claim Form a letter containing the following information: (i) whether she has been designated an Eligible Claimant; (ii) if so designated, the "claimant tier" to which EEOC has assigned her and the preliminary determination as to the gross (pre-tax) amount of monetary relief to which such person will be entitled as a member of such tier; and (iii) her opportunity to object to EEOC's determinations in accordance with the provisions of this Decree. The letter will also inform each Eligible Claimant that any monetary payments she may receive from the Settlement Fund may be subject to mandatory federal, state and local income tax withholding.
33. Claim Forms received by EEOC shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed to MMMA or any other person or entity, except that such Claim Forms may be submitted confidentially to the Special Master or the Court in accordance with the claims process set forth in this Decree.
34. Objection Procedure. Any claimant whose Claim Form is timely received by EEOC and who desires to object to an EEOC determination concerning eligibility or "claimant tier" assignment may do so by submitting to EEOC, within thirty (30) days after the date of mailing of EEOC's determination, a written objection. Any such written objection must state the basis for the objection, the tier into which the claimant believes she should have been assigned, and the specific reasons for such assignment. Within two (2) weeks after receipt of such written objection, EEOC shall review its determination as to eligibility and/or "claimant tier" assignment for the objecting claimant and either modify its determination or deny the objection and submit the objection to a Special Master, who shall be nominated by EEOC, and, if acceptable to the Court, approved by the Court.
35. The Special Master shall promptly consider each written objection he or she receives. Within twenty-one (21) days after receiving from EEOC any objections made by a claimant, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, the Special Master shall render a final determination as to whether the objecting claimant is an Eligible Claimant and/or the appropriate "claimant tier" into which such objecting claimant should be assigned. The Special Master shall notify, in writing, both EEOC and such objecting claimant of that final determination, which shall be binding upon EEOC and the objecting claimant. The Special Master shall change the "claimant tier" assignment for an objecting claimant only upon finding that EEOC's initial tier assignment for such person

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constituted a gross deviation from EEOC's application of the provisions contained in paragraphs 22-26, above.
36. Notification of Final Distribution Amount and Release of Claims. Within twenty-one (21) days after receiving notification of the Special Master's final determinations for all claimants who submitted objections, the EEOC shall mail to each Eligible Claimant a letter notifying her of the gross (pre-tax) amount of the payment to which such Eligible Claimant was finally determined to be entitled (hereinafter, the "Final Gross Settlement Amount"), and further notifying each Eligible Claimant that in order to receive any monetary payments under this Decree, she must execute and deliver to EEOC a Release (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D). The letter will inform each Eligible Claimant that such Release must be signed and returned to EEOC so that it is actually received by EEOC no later than thirty (30) days after the date on which EEOC mailed the Releases to such individuals.
37. ANY ELIGIBLE CLAIMANT WHOSE EXECUTED RELEASE IS NOT ACTUALLY RECEIVED BY EEOC WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THE DATE EEOC MAILED SUCH RELEASE TO SUCH ELIGIBLE CLAIMANT WILL BE INELIGIBLE FOR AND FOREVER BARRED FROM RECEIVING ANY MONETARY RELIEF UNDER THIS DECREE.
38. Court Approval of Final Distribution Amounts. Within fourteen (14) days after the time provided for returning Releases to EEOC has expired, EEOC shall file with the Court a motion for the Court's approval of the allocation of the Settlement Fund among Eligible Claimants as determined by EEOC (or, where applicable, the Special Master). In connection with this motion, EEOC shall file, under seal, a final settlement distribution list which shall contain the name, address and Final Gross Settlement Amount for each Eligible Claimant, as well as a copy of the Release signed by each Eligible Claimant.
39. Calculation and Distribution of Final Settlement Amounts. Within fourteen (14) days after the Court enters an Order approving EEOC's proposed allocation of the Settlement Fund, the Payment Agent shall notify EEOC of the net amount to be paid to each Eligible Claimant and the amount of any mandatory income tax withholding required by federal, state and local taxing authorities, based on the Final Gross Settlement Amount indicated by EEOC and approved by the Court in paragraph 38, above.
40. EEOC shall file with the Court any objections to the net amounts calculated by the Payment Agent in accordance with paragraph 39, above, by no later than seven (7) days after receiving the Payment Agent's proposed net amounts. Within fourteen (14) days after the period within which EEOC may file

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objections expires, or after the Court has issued an order resolving any objections filed by EEOC to the Payment Agent's proposed net amounts, whichever occurs last, (a) EEOC shall provide the original signed releases to MMMA's counsel and (b) the Payment Agent shall draw on the Settlement Fund checks in the net amounts calculated by the Payment Agent (or the Court in the event EEOC files an objection), and shall mail such checks to the addresses provided by EEOC for the Eligible Claimants, along with an itemization of any amounts that had been withheld from the Final Gross Settlement Amount. Simultaneously, the Payment Agent shall send to the EEOC a listing of each payee's name, the check amount and an itemization of any amounts withheld. The Payment Agent shall promptly notify EEOC in writing of any checks that are returned or are not cashed after a period of thirty (30) days has elapsed from the date on which the settlement checks were mailed by the Payment Agent. EEOC may take, at EEOC's expense, further steps to reach those Eligible Claimants who did not receive and/or deposit their settlement checks. In the event that any portion of the Settlement Fund, including accrued interest, has not been distributed as required by this Decree after a period of three hundred (300) days has elapsed from the date on which the settlement checks were mailed by the Payment Agent, then such remaining amounts from the Settlement Fund shall be paid, subject to such further orders as the Court may deem appropriate, to one or more public or not-for-profit organizations one of whose primary purposes is to benefit women's workplace interests in the Bloomington-Normal, Illinois area. EEOC shall determine the organization(s) to receive such funds, subject to Court approval, and shall so notify MMMA's counsel.
41. All costs associated with the distribution of the Settlement Fund to Eligible Claimants shall be paid by MMMA, including without limitation, all costs associated with the creation of the Settlement Fund, all costs related to the issuance and mailing of checks from the Settlement Fund, and all costs relating to the Special Master; except, however, that in the event that the total costs relating to the Special Master exceed $25,000, such excess amount shall be paid out of the interest from the Settlement Fund. If the total excess amount of the Special Master's costs exceeds the total amount of interest from the Settlement Fund, MMMA shall be responsible for any remainder amount of costs owed to the Special Master. Under no circumstances is MMMA to use the principal or interest from the Settlement Fund to pay any costs associated with the distribution of the Settlement Fund other than costs relating to the Special Master as is specified in this paragraph.
42. All amounts distributed from the Settlement Fund constitute "compensatory damages," under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a. No payment made pursuant to this Decree shall constitute or be considered to be back-pay.

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Non-Monetary Relief
43. MMMA affirms the following "Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives":
Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. is firmly committed to developing and maintaining a zero-tolerance policy concerning sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and retaliation against individuals who report harassment in the company's workplace; to swiftly and firmly responding to any acts of sexual or sex-based harassment or retaliation of which the company becomes aware; to implementing a disciplinary system that is designed to strongly deter future acts of sexual or sexbased harassment or retaliation; to eradicating any vestiges of a work environment that is hostile to women; and to actively monitoring its workplace in order to ensure tolerance, respect and dignity for all people.
This paragraph does not create any contractual causes of action or other rights that would not otherwise exist.
Specific Non-Monetary Relief
44. In order to effectuate the objectives embodied in MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives and this Decree, MMMA shall make whatever specific modifications are necessary to its existing policies, procedures and practices in order to ensure that the following policies, procedures and practices are in effect:
(a) Sexual Harassment Policy. MMMA agrees that it shall revise its sexual harassment policy, as necessary, in order to: (i) provide examples to supplement the definitions of sexual harassment and sex-based harassment; (ii) include strong nonretaliation language with examples to supplement the definition of retaliation, and provide for substantial and progressive discipline for incidents of retaliation; (iii) eliminate the "false accusation" provision contained in its current sexual harassment policy; (iv) provide that complaints of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation will be accepted by MMMA in writing and orally; (v) provide a

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timetable for reporting harassment, for commencing an investigation after a complaint is made or received and for remedial action to be taken upon conclusion of an investigation; and (vi) indicate that, promptly upon the conclusion of its investigation of a complaint, MMMA will communicate to the complaining party the results of the investigation and the remedial actions taken or proposed, if any.
(b) Complaint Procedures.
(i) MMMA agrees that it shall revise its complaint procedure as necessary in order to ensure that it is designed to encourage employees to come forward with complaints about violations of its sexual harassment policy. As part of this policy, MMMA agrees that it shall provide its employees with convenient, confidential and reliable mechanisms for reporting incidents of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and retaliation. MMMA agrees that it shall designate at least two employees from the department charged with investigating such issues as persons who may be contacted, and their names, responsibilities, work locations and telephone numbers shall be routinely and continuously posted. Also as part of its procedure, MMMA agrees that it shall keep its 24-hour Complaint hotline in place, and shall take seriously anonymous complaints received on the hotline. Additionally as part of its complaint procedure, MMMA agrees that it shall maintain in the plant the presence of personnel charged with handling complaints of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and retaliation.
(ii) MMMA agrees that it shall revise its policies as necessary to enable complaining parties to be interviewed by MMMA about their complaints in such a manner that permits the complaining party, at such party's election, to remain inconspicuous to all of the employees in such party's work area. MMMA agrees that its complaint procedure shall not impose upon individuals seeking to make a complaint alleging sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation any requirements that are more burdensome than

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are imposed upon individuals who make other complaints of comparable gravity.
(iii) MMMA agrees that it shall revise its complaint handling and disciplinary procedures as necessary to ensure that all complaints of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation are investigated and addressed promptly. Specifically, MMMA agrees that it shall make best efforts to investigate all complaints of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation promptly and to complete investigations within three (3) weeks. MMMA will further make best efforts to prepare its written findings of the results of each investigation and the remedial actions proposed within seven (7) days after completion of the investigation, and shall thereupon promptly communicate to the complaining party the results of the investigation and the remedial actions taken or proposed, if any.
(iv) MMMA agrees that it shall make best efforts to ensure that appropriate remedial action is taken to resolve complaints and to avoid the occurrence of further incidents of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation. MMMA specifically agrees that its complaint procedure shall include the power, in MMMA's sole discretion, to order, during the pendency of the investigation, the immediate transfer of persons accused of having violated MMMA's sexual harassment policy or of persons who claim to have been victims of such violations, as well as the power to order the permanent transfer of employees found to have violated such policy, and, upon the request of the complaining party, the permanent transfer of any complaining party who is found to have been the victim of a violation of MMMA's sexual harassment policy. Where possible, transfer will be in line with seniority. MMMA further agrees that it shall revise its progressive discipline policy to provide for substantial discipline short of termination -- including, but not limited to, suspensions without pay -- as a possible consequence for violations of its sexual harassment policy.

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(v) MMMA agrees that it shall, for the duration of the Decree, permit individual complainants to appeal MMMA's findings and remedial actions proposed or taken to the "Complaint Monitor" (as that term is defined herein), in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraphs 58-67 herein.
(c) Policies Designed To Promote Supervisor Accountability.
(i) MMMA agrees that it shall impose substantial discipline -- up to and including termination, suspension without pay or demotion -- upon any supervisor or manager who engages in sexual harassment or sex-based harassment or permits any such conduct to occur in his or her work area or among employees under his or her supervision, or who retaliates against any person who complains or participates in any investigation or proceeding concerning any such conduct. MMMA shall communicate this policy to all of its supervisors and managers.
(ii) MMMA agrees that it shall continue to advise all managers and supervisors of their duty to actively monitor their work areas to ensure employees' compliance with the company's sexual harassment policy, and to report any incidents and/or complaints of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation of which they become aware to the department charged with handling such complaints.
(iii) MMMA agrees that it will complete its current revision of the supervisor appraisal process to include performance evaluations for the handling of equal employment opportunity ("EEO") issues as an element in supervisor appraisals, and to link such evaluations directly to supervisor salary/bonus structure.
(iv) MMMA agrees that it shall include "commitment to equal employment opportunity" as a criterion for qualification for supervisory positions.

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(d) Sexual Harassment Training.
(i) MMMA agrees that it shall continue to provide mandatory annual sexual harassment training to all supervisors; to provide mandatory sexual harassment training to all new employees during employee orientation; to provide mandatory sexual harassment training to all senior management officials; to provide mandatory sexual harassment training for all employees of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation who are assigned to work at MMMA's facility in Normal, Illinois, prior to their commencing employment at MMMA's facility in Normal, Illinois; and to provide training to all persons charged with the handling of complaints of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation related thereto conducted by experienced sexual harassment educators and/or investigators to educate them about the problems of sexual harassment in the workplace and the techniques for investigating and stopping it.
(ii) MMMA agrees that it shall require a senior management official to introduce all sexual harassment training to communicate MMMA's commitment to its Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives.
(e) Policies Reflecting Sensitivity to Women's Needs. MMMA agrees that it shall create a nursing room where nursing mothers can express milk in private, and shall make certain that its practices with respect to personal and hygienic needs of its female employees are realistic, appropriate and fairly administered in accordance with the April 6, 1998 OSHA interpretation of 29 C.F.R. 1910.141(c)(1)(i).
(f) Consent Decree Monitors. In accordance with paragraphs 45-57 of this Decree, MMMA and EEOC shall appoint Consent Decree Monitors who will have broad powers to effectuate the purposes of this Decree.
(g) Complaint Monitor. In accordance with paragraphs 58-67 of this Decree, MMMA shall modify its complaint procedures to provide for the

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appointment of a Complaint Monitor who will, for the duration of this Decree, monitor MMMA's investigation and resolution of complaints alleging violations of MMMA's sexual harassment policy.
Creation and Function of Consent Decree Monitors
45. Immediately upon entry of this Decree, MMMA and EEOC will establish a panel of independent Consent Decree Monitors (the "Decree Monitors") to oversee the implementation by MMMA of the terms of this Decree.
46. The Decree Monitors will have authority, for the entire term of the Decree, under Court supervision, to determine the policies, procedures and practices that should be developed, modified or implemented to meet the non-monetary relief objectives of this Decree.
47. The panel of Decree Monitors will consist of three persons: one MMMA appointee, one EEOC appointee, and one appointee agreed to by the Parties who will serve as Chairperson. MMMA's appointee shall be Joyce E. Tucker. EEOC's appointee shall be Nancy B. Kreiter. The Chairperson shall be George F. Galland, Jr. In the event a Decree Monitor is unable or unwilling to continue to serve as a member of the panel of Decree Monitors, the party who selected such Decree Monitor shall have the authority to replace that member, subject to Court approval. If the Chairperson is unwilling or unable to continue to serve as Chairperson, the parties shall jointly select a new Chairperson, subject to Court approval.
48. The panel of Decree Monitors will operate as a team and will work together in their oversight of the implementation of this Decree. The Decree Monitors will attempt to reach consensus on all recommendations; provided, however, that if they are unable to reach unanimity as to a specific recommendation, a majority shall prevail.
49. Within two (2) months after their appointment, the Decree Monitors will: (i) evaluate all existing employment policies, procedures and practices that are related to the objectives contained in the Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives and this Decree; and (ii) after consultation with EEOC and MMMA, make recommendations for any changes to such existing policies, procedures and practices that the Decree Monitors believe are necessary or appropriate for achieving MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives. The Decree Monitors shall report their findings and recommendations to EEOC and MMMA.

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50. MMMA shall implement each recommendation of the Decree Monitors unless, within twenty-one (21) business days after receiving a recommendation, MMMA files an objection with EEOC that the Decree Monitors' recommendation, in whole or in part, involves the application of unsound business judgment or is technically not feasible. The parties will then have thirty (30) business days within which to try to resolve the objection. If they are unable to do so, MMMA shall then have seven (7) business days within which to file an objection with the Court.
51. In the event that MMMA files with the Court an objection to any of the Decree Monitors' recommendations, EEOC will participate in the proceedings with the Court.
52. Within one (1) year after their appointment, the Decree Monitors shall complete their own review and evaluation of all current employment policies and practices that are related to the Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Workplace Objectives, and shall submit a written report to EEOC, MMMA and the Court setting forth the following information:
(i) an assessment of whether MMMA has successfully implemented each specific change to its policies and practices Ordered in paragraph 44 above;
(ii) for each specific change that has not been successfully implemented, a statement discussing the reason for MMMA's failure to implement such change;
(iii) an evaluation of the impact of the specific changes made pursuant to this Decree;
(iv) an assessment of the effectiveness of MMMA's policies and practices for achievement of MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives;
(v) recommendations for any changes to existing practices, policies or programs or any additional policies, practices or programs that the Decree Monitors deem necessary or appropriate for achieving MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives and the terms of this Decree; and
(vi) timetables for implementation and completion of compliance with any of their recommendations, subject to the terms of this Decree.
53. Thereafter, for the duration of the Decree, the Decree

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Monitors will be responsible for continuing the review and evaluation of all ongoing employment policies and practices of the Company relating to MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives and the terms of this Decree, as well as monitoring the impact and effectiveness of their recommendations. The Decree Monitors will continue during this time to recommend revisions or modifications to ongoing employment policies and practices in order to achieve the Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives and the terms of this Decree. At the end of each successive year, the Decree Monitors shall submit an annual report to EEOC, MMMA and the Court setting forth the information described in paragraph 52 herein.
54. MMMA shall implement each recommendation of the Decree Monitors except as in accordance with the provisions for making objections set forth in paragraphs 50-51 of this Decree.
55. MMMA shall cooperate with the Decree Monitors in connection with their efforts to oversee and monitor the implementation of the non-monetary relief objectives of the Decree, including providing reasonable access to all relevant documents and other sources of information, in whatever form they are maintained in the ordinary course of business, necessary or appropriate to the exercise of their authority. The Decree Monitors shall make best efforts to minimize the disruption to the workplace during the course of their oversight. Nothing in this Decree shall confer on the Decree Monitors the power to require the disbandment or reorganization of any Department at MMMA; provided, however, that the Decree Monitors shall have the power to make specific recommendations for changes to the operations of any Department necessary or appropriate to achieve the objectives of the Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives and of this Decree. Given the need of each Decree Monitor to review confidential business information of MMMA, each Decree Monitor will sign a confidentiality agreement.
56. MMMA shall be responsible for the implementation of all non-monetary relief under the terms of this Decree, except as otherwise provided herein. MMMA shall not be precluded from developing and implementing its own programs as it may find appropriate. In formulating their determinations and recommendations, the Decree Monitors will take such programs into account.
57. MMMA shall compensate all Decree Monitors, at their customary rates or upon other terms acceptable to MMMA, the Decree Monitors and EEOC. MMMA shall pay any and all reasonable costs necessary to fulfill the work of the Decree Monitors. Monitoring of Complaints
58. In addition to the functions and purposes described

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above, the Decree Monitors shall also have the responsibility for overseeing the investigation of all sexual and sex-based harassment and related retaliation complaints reported to MMMA. The Chairperson shall be initially designated as the person who will be responsible for monitoring such complaints (such designated person is hereinafter referred to as the "Complaint Monitor").
59. MMMA shall transmit to the Complaint Monitor a copy of each such written complaint reported to MMMA as soon as practicable and, in any event, no later than the close of the next business day after MMMA receives any such complaint.
60. The Complaint Monitor will oversee the investigation and, where appropriate, may make recommendations to MMMA concerning the conduct of the investigation of each such complaint. MMMA shall make a good faith best effort to follow any recommendations made by the Complaint Monitor concerning the conduct of the investigation. The Complaint Monitor may also interview the complaining party, if the Complaint Monitor deems it appropriate.
61. Upon completion of the investigation, MMMA shall promptly prepare and provide the Complaint Monitor with a copy of a written report summarizing the investigation undertaken and any remedial actions taken or proposed by MMMA, and shall also promptly communicate to the complaining party the results of the investigation and the remedial actions taken or proposed, if any, and shall further inform the complaining party of her right to appeal MMMA's finding to the Complaint Monitor.
62. If, upon receiving and reviewing an appeal from an individual complainant or upon its own initiative, the Complaint Monitor believes that the remedial action proposed by MMMA is inconsistent with MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives or with the terms of this Decree, the Complaint Monitor shall first attempt to resolve the disagreement with MMMA. If MMMA and the Complaint Monitor are unable to reach a resolution of their disagreement to the satisfaction of the Complaint Monitor, the Complaint Monitor shall report to EEOC any such inconsistency.
63. Nothing in this Decree vitiates the right of employees or their Unions to file grievances under the collective bargaining agreement, including but not limited to matters related to alleged sexual harassment or alleged improper disciplinary actions. In the event any disciplinary action taken by MMMA is overturned by an arbitrator as the result of a union grievance, the decision of the arbitrator shall, to the extent required by law, be final and binding. The parties to this Decree recognize that the Unions and MMMA have certain

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obligations under the National Labor Relations Act; this Decree will be administered consistent with federal labor and employment discrimination laws.
64. Except for communicating as may be necessary with MMMA and EEOC, the Complaint Monitor shall retain all information supplied by MMMA relating to each complaint in strict confidence.
65. MMMA shall inform all employees of the appointment and function of the Complaint Monitor, and each individual who files a written complaint to MMMA shall receive, upon the filing of such complaint, a written notice informing him/her of the existence and function of the Complaint Monitor. Such notice shall provide the name, telephone number and address at which the Complaint Monitor may be reached, and shall inform the complainant of his/her right to contact the Complaint Monitor and to appeal MMMA's findings and proposed remedial actions to the Complaint Monitor.
66. MMMA shall compensate the Complaint Monitor at his/her customary rates or upon other terms acceptable to MMMA, the Complaint Monitor and EEOC. MMMA shall also pay any and all reasonable costs necessary to fulfill the work of the Complaint Monitor.
67. The work of the Complaint Monitor shall continue for the full term of this Decree, three (3) years. In the event that the Complaint Monitor is unable or unwilling to continue to serve as Complaint Monitor for the full term of the Decree, then the Decree Monitors shall unanimously designate a new Complaint Monitor to be selected from one of them, subject to the approval of EEOC and MMMA. Such approval may not be unreasonably withheld. In the event that none of the Decree Monitors is able to serve as the Complaint Monitor, then the Decree Monitors shall unanimously designate an outside person to serve as Complaint Monitor, subject to the approval of EEOC and MMMA.
Posting of Notice
68. Within two (2) weeks after entry of this Decree, MMMA shall post a notice in the form of Exhibit E attached to this Decree in prominent and conspicuous locations throughout its facilities in Normal, Illinois. The notice shall remain posted for the duration of this Decree. In the event that the persons and/or departments to whom individuals should make complaints alleging sex-harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation change during the term of the Decree such that the information contained on the Notice is no longer accurate, MMMA shall immediately notify EEOC, who shall then prepare and deliver to MMMA a new notice that contains the correct information. MMMA shall thereupon promptly replace the old notices with the revised

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notices.
69. MMMA shall provide a copy of the Decree to any employee who requests one.
Dispute Resolution
70. In the event that either party to this Decree believes that the other party has failed to comply with any provision(s) of the Decree, the complaining party shall notify the alleged non-complying party in writing of such non-compliance and afford the alleged non-complying party ten (10) business days to remedy the non-compliance or satisfy the complaining party that the alleged non-complying party has complied. If the alleged noncomplying party has not remedied the alleged non-compliance or satisfied the complaining party that it has complied within ten (10) business days, the complaining party may apply to the Court for appropriate relief. In the event that, upon the expiration date of this Decree, a dispute is pending pursuant to this paragraph, then the term of this Decree shall be extended, with respect to the issue in dispute only, until such time as such dispute is resolved by the Parties or the Court.
Enforcement of Decree
71. EEOC, MMMA and the Unions will make best efforts to effectuate the terms of this Decree.
72. EEOC and the Decree Monitors shall each have independent authority to seek the judicial enforcement of any aspect, term or provision of this Decree and may take appropriate measures to effectuate enforcement of this Settlement Agreement and any of its terms or provisions.
73. Eligible Claimants shall have no independent right to enforce any of the terms of this Decree.
74. The Unions shall have no independent right to enforce any of the terms of this Decree; provided, however, that the Unions may continue to enforce other contractual or statutory rights not created by this Decree.
75. The Court will take whatever measures it deems appropriate to effectuate the enforcement of the terms of this Decree.
76. Nothing in this Decree is intended to confer upon any person other than EEOC, MMMA and the Decree Monitors the right to seek enforcement of this Consent Decree or of any of the terms contained herein.
Confidentiality

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77. The Parties shall keep confidential the names of all Eligible Claimants and the Distribution Amounts that each received.
78. The Pre-Trial Protective Order entered by the Court on February 12, 1997 shall continue to remain in full force and effect and govern all confidentiality issues for the duration of the Decree. The Decree Monitors and Complaint Monitor shall, as a precondition to their appointment, agree in writing to abide by the terms of the Pre-Trial Protective Order; except, however, that none of the various reports and submissions prepared by the Decree Monitors in accordance with the terms of this Decree shall be treated as confidential or subject to the Pre-Trial Protective Order.
Costs
79. MMMA agrees to pay all costs associated with the administration of this Decree, except as is specifically provided otherwise in this Decree.
80. Each Party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees associated with this litigation, and neither Party shall seek reimbursement for any outstanding litigation costs.
Other General Provisions
81. Computation of Time Periods. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this Decree, unless otherwise stated, such computation shall be made consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
82. Counterparts. This Decree may be executed in one or more counterparts, and each executed copy shall be deemed an original which shall be binding upon all parties hereto.
83. Persons Bound By Decree. The terms of this Consent Decree are and shall be binding upon the Parties, and upon all of their present and future representatives, agents, directors, officers, assigns and successors of MMMA.
84. MMMA Not Required to Violate Existing Law. MMMA is not required by this Consent Decree to violate any applicable law, order, ordinance, or regulation as interpreted by controlling judicial authority. This paragraph applies to final decisions of all Federal and State courts and agencies with jurisdiction over MMMA and to all court orders naming MMMA. In the event of any conflict between federal law and state law, federal law shall govern.
85. Notices. Except as is otherwise provided for in

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this Decree, all notifications, reports and communications to the Parties required under this Decree shall be made in writing and shall be sufficient as hand-delivered or sent by first class mail to the following persons:

For EEOC: John C. Hendrickson, Esq. Regional Attorney EEOC 500 W. Madison St. Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661

For MMMA: Gary L. Shultz, Esq. Vice President and General Counsel MMMA 100 North Mitsubishi Motorway Normal, Illinois 61761

Any party may change such addresses by written notice to the other parties, setting forth a new address for this purpose. Notwithstanding the provisions for notification contained in this paragraph, the Parties may send each other such notifications, reports and communications by facsimile transmission.

86. Construction. The terms of this Decree are the product of joint negotiations and shall not be construed as having been authored by one party rather than another.

87. Integration. This Decree constitutes the entire agreement between MMMA and EEOC hereto with respect to the matters herein and it supersedes all negotiations, representations, comments, contracts, and writings prior to the date of this Consent Decree.

SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED this ______ day of ______, 1998.

__________________________________ United States District Court Judge

Agreed to in form and content:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION:
C. Gregory Stewart General Counsel
Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1801 "L" Street Washington, D.C. 20507

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______________________________ John C. Hendrickson Regional Attorney

______________________________ Pamela Moore Gibbs Trial Attorney

______________________________ Jean P. Kamp Supervisory Trial Attorney

______________________________ Michelle A. Caiola Trial Attorney

______________________________ Steven J. Levine Trial Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
500 West Madison Street Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661 (312) 353-8551
Dated: _________________

______________________________ Noelle Brennan Trial Attorney

Agreed to in form and content:
FOR THE DEFENDANT, MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA, INC.:

______________________________ Walter B. Connolly, Jr.
MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE, P.L.C.
150 West Jefferson Avenue Suite 2500 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 963-6420
______________________________ Alison B. Marshall
MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE, P.L.C.
1900 K Street, NW

Dated:______________ Dated:______________

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Suite 1150 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 429-5575.Agreed to in form and content: FOR RULE 19 PARTY UAW INTERNATIONAL:

______________________________ Paul C. Korman Director, UAW Region 4

Dated:______________

Paul C. Korman Director, UAW Region 4 2700 South River Road, 2d Floor Des Plaines, IL 60018 .Agreed to in form and content:

FOR RULE 19 PARTY UAW LOCAL UNION 2488:

______________________________ Charles Kearney President, UAW Local 2488 UAW Local 2488 Charles Kearney -- President RR 3, Box 560 Bloomington, IL 61704
This page was last modified on July 6, 2000.
Return to Home Page

Dated:______________

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 1:96-cv-01192-JBM # 1 Page 1 of 6

E-FILED

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T.RE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLrHOIS

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PEORIA DIV:ISION

APR 9 1996

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

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COMMISSION;

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J0H1~ '"l V;IATERS, Clark
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Plaintiff,

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MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING

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OF AMERICA, INC., f/k/a

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"DIAMOND-STAR MOTORS CORPORATION1 11 )

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JURY TRIAL DBMAlltD

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Defendant.

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NATURE OF THE AQTION
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seg. enTitle VII"), and 'l'itle
I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 u.s.c. §198l(A), to correct
unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and retaliation and to provide appropriate relief to a class of female employees
who were adversely affected by such practices. As alleged with
greater particularity in paragraph 7, below, since at least 1990, Defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., f/k/a "Diamond-Star Motors Corporation," has engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against a class of female employees by subjecting theln to sexual harassment and sex:-based harass:me.nt, retaliation, and constructive discharge.
JPRISDICTION AND VENUE
l. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to :28
u.s.c. §§451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized
and instituted pursuant to Sections 706(f) (1) and (3) and Section
707 of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. §§2000e-5(f) (1) and (3), and -6.

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2
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United states District Court for the central District of Illinois, Peoria Division.
P.AR"l':IES
3. Plaintiff1 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration,.interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by
Sections 706(f) (1) and (3) and Section 707 of Title VII, 42 u.s.c.
§§2000e-5(f)(~) and (3), and -6. 4. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been a
Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Illinois and the city of Normal, Illinois, and has continuously had at least fifteen (15) employees.
5. At all relevant times, Defendant has been and is now an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce. within the meaning of Sections 70l(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. §§2000e {b) , (g) , and (h).
STATEM~NT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty (30) days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, a Charge was filed with the Commission by R- Gaull Silberman, a member thereof, alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. From at least 1990 until the present,. Defendant has

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engaged in a pattern and practice of un~awfu~ emp~oyment practices at its Normal, Illinois facility, in violation of Sections 703(a) and 704 of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(a) and -3. such unlawful emp~oyment practices include 1 but are not linl.ited to:
(a) sexually harassing a class of female employees because of their sex by creating a hostile and abusive work environment based on unwelcome verba~ and physical sexual conduct, including sexual graffiti, se~ally derogatory and explicit oonnnents and innuendo, and unwanted groping, grabbing, and touching;
(b) sexually harassing a class of female employees because of their sex by conditioning their employment, benefits of their employment, andjor terms and conditions of their employment on their acquiescence in sexual harassment andfor sexual relationships;
(c) harassing on the basis of sex a class of felnale employees by creating a hostile and abusive work environment based on unwelcome sex-based comments and conduct;
(d) failing to take immediate and appropriate corrective action in response to complaints or other notice of sexual or sex-based harassment and/or retaliation;
(e) retaliating against a class of felnale employees who have opposed practices made unlawful by Title VII; and
(f) causing a class of female employees to resign their employment because of continued sexual and sex-based harassment and retaliation, thus constructively

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4
discharging them. 8. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 7, above, has been to deprive a class of female employees of Defendant of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees because <:>f their sex and :because of retaliation. 9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7, above, were and are intentional. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, were and are done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of a class of female employees of Defendant.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Coltlltlission respectfully requests that this Court:
A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex or retaliation.
B. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for women and for individuals who have opposed practices made unlawful by Title VII, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.
C. Order Defendant to lnake whole a class of individuals adversely affected by the unlawful :Practices alleged above by

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providing appropriate backpay with pre-judgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial 1 and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful elnployment practices, including but not limited to rightful place reinstatement for a class of empl.oyees who were constructively discharged by Defendant.
D. Order Defendant to make whole a class of individuals adversely affected by the unlawful practices alleged above by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 7, above, including job search expenses and medical expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant to make whole a class or individuals adversely affected by the unlawful practices· alleged above by providing contpe:nsation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 7, above, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant to pay to a class of individuals adversely affected by the unl.awful practices alleged above punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct, as described in paragraph 7, above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.

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1:96-cv-01192-JBM # 1 Page 6 of 6

6
JUBY TRI:AL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact
raised by its co~plaint.
Respectfully submitted,
C. Gregory stewart General counsel
Rosalind D. Gray Deputy General Counsel
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
lSOl "L" S

UAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Chicago District Office
500 West Madison Street, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60661 {312) 353-8551.

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 960 F.Supp. 164 (1997)
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA, INC. f/k/a "Diamond-Star Motors Corporation," Defendant.
No. 96-1192.
United States District Court, C.D. Illinois.
March 24, 1997.
165 *165 Jean P. Kamp, John C. Hendrickson, Steven J. Levine, E.E.O.C., Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.
Peter W. Brandt, Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, Bloomington, IL, Walter B. Connolly, Jr., Peter W. Waldmeir, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, Detroit, MI, Alison B. Marshall, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, Washington, DC, for defendant.
Jeffrey B. Rock, Hasselberg & Rock, Julie L. Galassi, Peoria, IL, for intervenor.
ORDER
McDADE, District Judge.
Before the Court are Defendant's Objections to the EEOC's Third Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees and Motion to Enforce Scheduling Order [Doc. # 51]. This is just the latest chapter in an ongoing war between the parties regarding proposed communications to the alleged victims of sexual harassment. A brief history of this dispute is in order.
BACKGROUND
On September 13, 1996, Plaintiff EEOC sent a form letter to all current and former female associates of Defendant Mitsubishi which stated in relevant part: "You should know that you are not required to discuss any issues relating to this lawsuit with Mitsubishi's Human Resource Department." On October 24, 1996, Mitsubishi filed a motion for clarification of the EEOC's letter requesting the Court to issue a corrective notice. In its Order of November 14, 1996, as modified on reconsideration on November 21, 1996, the Court ordered that the following notice be sent out on EEOC letterhead:
Our letter of September 13, 1996, should not be read to suggest that you should not present any complaints you may have relating to sexual harassment, sex-based harassment, and retaliation to Mitsubishi's Human Resources Department pursuant to the company's sexual harassment policy. You should feel free to bring these matters to the company's Human Resources Department pursuant to the company's sexual harassment policy. Of course, you are also free to inform the EEOC of such matters at any time that you wish.
After EEOC's appeal from these Orders was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the notice was sent out.
Soon after this time, Mitsubishi's human resources personnel began to hold scripted interviews of its employees regarding "certain claims of sexual harassment that had not previously been brought to the Company's attention." These claims had been revealed to Mitsubishi through discovery of EEOC's administrative files which related various alleged incidents occurring at least two years earlier. Mitsubishi conducted a dozen of these interviews on the representation that it was "ensur[ing] that there was no ongoing harassment" in the workplace.
The script used by human resources personnel at these interviews included the following questions:

1. Tell me about any incidents of sexual harassment that occurred to you that you may not have reported to ER.[1]

166

*166 2. Was your supervisor aware of it? Who was that? How was your supervisor made aware of

the situation?

3. If your supervisor did not take action, why didn't you come to ER?

4. What did you say to the harasser?

5. Did you keep a journal or any notes on what happens to you at the plant? Will you bring it in so we can have a copy of it? YES or NO

6. Is the behavior continuing today? When did it stop? Why did it stop?

7. What do you feel is the proper remedy for this allegation?

8. Have you ever witnessed sexual harassment of any other people? Who?

9. Have you ever witnessed sexual harassment of any of the plaintiffs? Who?

10. What do you want the Company to do today?

The following were "closing questions and statements":

* As you are aware, the EEOC has filed a class action lawsuit against MMMA, are you interested in participating in this lawsuit? This in no way prevents you from being eligible for any monetary compensation the EEOC feels you may be eligible to receive. YES or NO

* Do you want the EEOC to bring your personal allegations into the public domain? You have MMMA's commitment that we will not air any personal complaints in public. YES or NO.

* There will be no retaliation whatsoever for any participation in the lawsuit or this interview. If you feel you have been retaliated [against] in any way, please let me know immediately.

* The information in this meeting should not be discussed with anyone else. Your supervisor does not know the reason for this meeting.

After concluding each interview, Mitsubishi typed up the notes of the interviews and asked the interviewee to review and sign the notes, authenticating them for later use.

When EEOC discovered that Mitsubishi was engaging in these ex parte interviews, it insisted that Mitsubishi cease conducting them immediately. Counsel for Mitsubishi agreed and has not conducted any interviews since the initial twelve. In a letter dated January 30, 1997, Mitsubishi expressly agreed "not to engage in any ex parte contacts with any current or former female Associates who presented complaints to the EEOC relating to sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation prior to the filing of the lawsuit, i.e., potential claimants identified by the EEOC." In a subsequent letter dated February 12, 1997, Mitsubishi agreed to the "minideposition" approach previously discussed by the parties. Under this approach, EEOC counsel would be present at all future interviews and they would be conducted as noticed depositions pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Mitsubishi insisted that due to its pressing need to remedy all vestiges of ongoing discrimination in the workplace, it could not wait until the time for formal depositions to be conducted in October of 1997.

The Court's Orders of November 14 and 26, 1996, set up a system by which the parties could provide advance notice to opposing counsel of any mass mailings that it intended to send to the alleged victims of discrimination. Opposing counsel would then have ten calendar days in which to file objections to the content or form of such communications. The latest EEOC submission to which Mitsubishi has objected states as follows:

EEOC is writing to tell you that we are giving to attorneys for Mitsubishi a list of all women about whom, at this time, we have information indicating that they have been (1) subjected to a working environment which included unwelcome physical or verbal conduct of a sexual nature directed toward women, (2) harassed because of their sex, and/or (3) retaliated against because of complaints about sexual or sex based harassment.

EEOC's position in this lawsuit0907which is denied and contested by Mitsubishi 0907is that Mitsubishi

167

permitted an environment of sexual harassment which affected virtually *167 all of those women

who observed or were subjected to it at the Normal plant. Your name has been included on the list

of women who EEOC believes were personally subjected to or who witnessed the hostile

environment which EEOC alleges. Court rules controlling the lawsuit require that EEOC give this

list to Mitsubishi's lawyers.

EEOC will not disclose to anyone other than attorneys for Mitsubishi the fact that your name is on the list. EEOC has been assured that Mitsubishi and its lawyers will not disclose the fact that your name is on the list to the public or to other employees.

EEOC has been told by Mitsubishi that Mitsubishi staff and lawyers for the company may want to discuss your claims with you. The decision about whether to talk with Mitsubishi personnel or its lawyers is your personal decision. However, you should also be told that the best legal judgment of the EEOC lawyers bringing this case is that if 0907 you want to obtain relief through this case 0907you should not discuss this lawsuit or your claims with Mitsubishi staff or its lawyers. EEOC recommends, for example, that you not discuss any statements you may have previously given or complaints you may have previously made about past events. Mitsubishi's interest is to reduce its liability in this lawsuit. Information which Mitsubishi staff and attorneys get from conversations with you may be used against you at trial. In brief, the recommendation of EEOC's lawyers is like that you have probably heard about lawyers giving in many types of cases: "Don't talk about it."

Mitsubishi and its lawyers will have the right to take your deposition with a court reporter and EEOC representatives present. If your deposition is taken, there will be lawyers for all sides present to make sure that all rules are being followed and there will be an exact record of what you say.

If you do wish to discuss your claims informally with Mitsubishi personnel, we strongly recommend that you ask an EEOC representative to participate in the discussion.

EEOC has previously written you, and we want to repeat, that EEOC encourages you to make known any complaints of any sexual harassment at Mitsubishi which is going on right now. Mitsubishi has told EEOC that it desires to eliminate any ongoing sexual harassment and will do so if advised that there is a current problem. EEOC supports Mitsubishi's stated determination to eliminate current sexual harassment. If you have any such complaints, please call us at the number set forth below, and EEOC will make arrangements to have you meet with the appropriate Mitsubishi personnel and will, if you wish, be present at any interview.

Finally, we wish to advise you that if you are certain that you do not wish EEOC to seek monetary or any other relief for you in this lawsuit, you should tell us so in writing. We will then remove your name from the list.

Please feel free to call us at (312) 353_____ if you have any questions about this letter.

ANALYSIS

There are in fact two interrelated issues that need to be addressed here: (1) whether and in what manner Mitsubishi may interview its employees about alleged claims of sexual harassment; and (2) whether and to what extent the Court should allow EEOC to send its proposed letter to the alleged victims in this case.

In its Order of November 14, 1997, the Court noted that "the EEOC was wrong to inform Mitsubishi's current employees that they are `not required to discuss any issues relating to this lawsuit with Mitsubishi's Human Resources Department.'" While the Court continues to adhere to this view, it must be tempered by EEOC's legitimate interest in communicating legal advice and information to those persons that it will potentially represent in this action. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981).[2] The Court 168 remains *168 reluctant to interfere with such a right so long as it does not mislead or confuse those persons who it is meant to inform. Babbitt v. Albertson's Inc., 1993 WL 150300, at *4 citing Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 101 (C.D.Cal.1980).
Fortunately, the Court's task is made easier by the current posture of this case. In letters to EEOC and in its Objections filed with this Court, Mitsubishi has obligated itself to conduct "mini-depositions" of those employees who are included on EEOC's list of alleged victims of past harassment and retaliation. The Court agrees with EEOC that it "should hold Mitsubishi to this offer" and now makes it explicit: any future attempt by Mitsubishi to hold discussions with the alleged victims in this case concerning past incidents of harassment must be done by a noticed deposition in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This is not to say, however, that Mitsubishi must wait until formal discovery of these alleged victims (scheduled to begin in October of 1997) in order to obtain further information in its attempt to remedy ongoing discrimination in the workplace. The parties are ordered to prioritize and depose as soon as practicable any alleged victim who has information about ongoing harassment at Mitsubishi's plant. Likewise, to the extent that Mitsubishi can justify an expedited deposition by its need to investigate and remedy any previously unreported incidences of harassment, EEOC must be willing to accommodate such a request.[3] Specific disputes of this nature should be taken up with Magistrate Judge Kauffman.
This agreement resolves any fears that informal interviews or discussions will be initiated by Mitsubishi personnel. But how is Mitsubishi supposed to deal with employee-initiated discussions by those designated by EEOC as alleged victims? This inquiry must be divided into two subcategories: (1) employee-initiated discussions of past claims of harassment involved in this litigation, and (2) employee-initiated complaints of "new" instances of harassment at the plant.
The first category already appears to be covered by Mitsubishi's agreement to "not to engage in any ex parte contacts with any current or former female Associates who presented complaints to the EEOC relating to sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and/or retaliation prior to the filing of the lawsuit, i.e., potential claimants identified by the EEOC." This broad language does not distinguish between employer-initiated and employeeinitiated discussions and the Court presumes that Mitsubishi will turn away alleged victims in this case who attempt to initiate discussions about their claims of past harassment. In such a case, Mitsubishi must notify the employee that she has the right to be represented by EEOC counsel and that all such discussions will be done by noticed deposition.
With regard to the second category0907employee-initiated complaints of "new" harassment 0907EEOC apparently agrees that informal interviews would be appropriate for such claims so long as the complainant is informed of the availability of EEOC representation. EEOC additionally recommends that complainants who are alleged victims in this case should bring their new grievances directly to EEOC who will then relay them to Mitsubishi. While Mitsubishi contends that such an approach would discourage employees from making new complaints of 169 ongoing harassment, the Court does not share this concern, as it believes that the EEOC will not abuse *169 such a process.[4] Moreover, the approach is narrowly tailored to apply only to those employees who are listed as alleged victims by EEOC. Such persons are probably more likely to bring forth new claims of discrimination to EEOC rather than to Mitsubishi directly. Thus, the process will actually assist Mitsubishi in its attempt to remedy ongoing harassment.[5]
The resolution of these issues provides much of the answer to the second question before the Court: should EEOC be allowed to send out its letter to those persons named on the list of alleged victims? With the caveats expressed below, the Court believes that EEOC should be able to do so.

The persons on the list have a legitimate right to know that their names are being turned over to Mitsubishi but will not be disclosed to the public at large. Thus, the first three paragraphs of the letter are appropriate. Regarding the third paragraph of the letter, EEOC concedes that Mitsubishi may have a reasonable basis for disclosing the names of alleged victims to certain Mitsubishi employees. Thus, the phrase "or to other employees" should be deleted from the last sentence of that paragraph.
Paragraphs four and six, however, are extraneous and confusing in light of the agreement between the parties previously discussed in this Order. With the safeguards described above, the Court sees no reason for EEOC to warn employees of the danger of speaking informally with Mitsubishi personnel or counsel. This simply will not occur and if it does, appropriate sanctions may be sought at that time.
The remainder of the letter poses no problem. Indeed, paragraph seven addresses the Court's concern that new complaints of ongoing harassment should be promptly addressed by Mitsubishi without the need for a formal deposition. As discussed above, EEOC's proposal that alleged victims initially contact EEOC, rather than Mitsubishi, with such claims is reasonable absent abuse by EEOC.
One final issue deserves mentioning. The second paragraph of EEOC's proposed letter states that EEOC's position in this lawsuit is that the hostile work environment at Mitsubishi has affected virtually all of the women "who observed or were subjected to it at the Normal plant" (emphasis added). Likewise, the next sentence states that the recipient's "name has been included on the list of women who EEOC believes were personally subjected to or who witnessed the hostile environment which EEOC alleges" (emphasis added). Yet, on page 12 of its memorandum in response to Mitsubishi's objections, EEOC states:
Contrary to Mitsubishi's assertions, the proposed letter does not affect "witnesses" to harassment who are not themselves victims (whether through conduct directed at themselves or others) of the sexually hostile work environment alleged by EEOC. It is addressed to the women on the list of known class member and/or victims of the hostile work environment at Mitsubishi which EEOC is ready to provide to Mitsubishi.
(emphasis added).
While it may be a matter of mere semantics, the Court believes that the language in paragraph two is misleading. Without ruling upon the merits of EEOC's legal theory, it may be proper for EEOC to say that one who observes or witnesses the perpetration of sexual harassment upon others may herself be "subjected to" a hostile work environment. However, it is confusing to say that observing or witnessing this hostile work environment is something different than being "subjected to" that environment. In sum, the Court finds that the words "observed 170 or" *170 should be redacted from the first sentence of the second paragraph and the phrase "or who witnessed" should be redacted from the second sentence of the second paragraph. The resulting language will be more coherent to its readers and more in line with what appears to be EEOC's legal position here.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Objections to the EEOC's Third Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees and Motion to Enforce Scheduling Order [Doc. # 51] are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. EEOC's third proposed letter may be sent out immediately with the following redactions: (1) the phrase "observed or" in the first sentence of paragraph two; (2) the phrase "or who witnessed" in the second sentence of paragraph two; (3) the phrase "or to other employees" in the last sentence of paragraph three; and (4) paragraphs four and six in their entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that EEOC shall turn over its list of alleged victims to Mitsubishi within five (5) days of the date it sends out the letter discussed above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any future attempt by Mitsubishi to engage in discussions with alleged victims concerning past incidents of harassment must be done by a noticed deposition in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall prioritize and depose as soon as practicable any alleged victim who has information about ongoing harassment at Mitsubishi's Normal, Illinois plant. Likewise, the parties shall expedite those depositions which Mitsubishi can justify by its need to investigate and remedy any previously unreported incidences of harassment. Specific disputes shall be taken up with Magistrate Judge Kauffman.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Reply Memorandum [Doc. # 55] is GRANTED.
[1] Presumably, "ER" refers to the Employee Relations department or some similar entity.
[2] While the Executive Branch of the federal government has no free speech rights under the First Amendment, EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manf. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir.1996), the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil appeared to base its holding not on the First Amendment but on "the policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23." 452 U.S. at 102, 101 S.Ct. at 2200-01. And even though Rule 23 does not technically apply here because this is not a class action, General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1707-08, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), the EEOC seeks relief for the benefit of individual claimants and Gulf Oil should be applied. Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 332, 334-35 (D.Kan.1986).
[3] Even if the harassment is not actually "ongoing," Mitsubishi is still obligated to speak with the alleged harassers to discover whether the allegations are true and to take appropriate remedial measures against these individuals.
[4] The Court presumes that EEOC will not abuse this privilege by winnowing out potential claims before they can be subjected to Mitsubishi's internal grievance procedures or by dissuading employees to take advantage of such procedures. Such conduct could expose EEOC to contempt of Court or other appropriate sanctions.
[5] The Court further notes that this process is not mandatory; it is up to the alleged victims to choose whether to approach EEOC or Mitsubishi with their new complaints of harassment. However, if they approach Mitsubishi directly, Mitsubishi should give adequate notice to EEOC and inform the claimant of her right to be represented by EEOC counsel before engaging in an informal discussion of such charges.
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 990 F.Supp. 1059 (1998)
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA, INC., f/k/a "Diamond-Star Motors Corporation," Defendant.
No. 96-1192.
United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division.
January 20, 1998.
106012345678 *1060 *1061 *1062 *1063 *1064 *1065 *1066 *1067 *1068 Jean P. Kamp, John C. Hendrickson, Steven J. Levine, Michelle A. Caiola, E.E.O.C. Chicago, IL, for E.E.O.C.
Peter W. Brandt, Livingston Barger Brandt & Schroeder, Bloomington, IL, Walter B. Connolly, Jr., Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone, Detroit, MI, Alison B. Marshall, Peter W. Waldmeir, Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone PLC, Washington, DC, for Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of America, Inc.
Jeffrey B. Rock, Hasselberg Rock Bell & Kuppler, Peoria, IL, Julie L. Galassi, Hasselberg Rock Bell & Kuppler, Peoria, IL, for Peoria Journal Star.
ORDER
McDADE, District Judge.
This is a civil pattern or practice action filed pursuant to §§ 706 and 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. ("Mitsubishi"), alleging that Mitsubishi is liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, gender discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge at its auto assembly plant located in Normal, Illinois. The Complaint requests the following relief: a permanent injunction enjoining Mitsubishi from continuing its prohibited activities; a mandatory injunction requiring Mitsubishi to adhere to certain equal employment policies; and compensatory damages for the victims including backpay, reinstatement, past and future pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses; punitive damages; prejudgment interest; and costs.
There are two motions currently before the Court: Mitsubishi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 78-1); and the EEOC's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. # 93-1). The Court's discussion of 1069 these motions proceeds in two parts. Part I addresses the limited legal question[1] presented by Mitsubishi's *1069 motion for partial summary judgment.[2] Part II addresses the procedural questions presented by Mitsubishi's motion[3] and the EEOC's motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint, which seeks to cure the procedural deficiencies raised by Mitsubishi's motion.
DISCUSSION
I. The Legal Question
The principal legal question presented by Mitsubishi, whether a pattern or practice action can be brought for sexual harassment claims, requires the Court to grapple with the essential principles that animate Title VII. This has not been an easy task, but it is one which the Court recognizes as a privilege. To the Court's knowledge, this is the first time that this legal question has ever been raised. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments

and the relevant case law, this Court finds that a pattern or practice action for sexual harassment is authorized by Title VII and can be brought by the EEOC, both as a legal matter and in this case.
The EEOC seeks to hold Mitsubishi liable for a pattern or practice of hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment. The pattern or practice theory is that Mitsubishi created and maintained a sexually hostile and abusive work environment at its Normal, Illinois, auto assembly facility because it tolerated, from the facility's inception, individual acts of sexual harassment by its employees by refusing to take notice of, investigate, and/or discipline the workers who sexually harassed other employees. As a consequence, the EEOC argues that Mitsubishi's "standard operating procedure 0907 its regular rather than unusual practice" 0907 was to ignore most (if not all) of its female employees' complaints that they were individually, or as a group, being subjected to a sexually hostile and abusive environment, in violation of Title VII, based upon: unwelcome sexual advances, demands for sexual favors, and other offensive verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature.
If such a "standard operating procedure" of unlawful tolerance within the company's confines exists, it constitutes a "pattern and practice" of sexual harassment. Pattern or practice liability, rather than liability for individual conduct, is the primary focus of the EEOC's case. The EEOC argues, however, that the evidence which establishes a pattern or practice of sexual harassment by the company goes at least half the distance toward establishing the individual cases of sexual harassment brought by the class members, because it establishes the objective portion of their case. According to the EEOC, the pattern or practice case for injunctive relief, therefore, can and should be tried together with the individual claims for relief that stem from this pattern or practice.
Mitsubishi disagrees. In fact, Mitsubishi argues that proving a pattern or practice of sexual harassment simply cannot be done, because the gravamen of a sexual harassment claim, as it has been defined by the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) and Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), is that the allegedly 1070 offensive conduct was subjectively unwelcome.[4] At first glance, this argument *1070 may appear to have some merit; but, in reality, the argument constitutes the proverbial "straw man." Although it is true that Meritor and Harris require individuals, in an individual case of sexual harassment, to prove that the conduct they experienced was subjectively unwelcome, this is not an individual case; it is a pattern or practice case, and the rules of engagement in this context are different. The Meritor and Harris cases involved individual charges of sex discrimination alleging individual acts of sexual harassment. They were not and did not purport to be pattern or practice cases, and the holdings regarding the proofs necessary to establish an individual case of sexual harassment must, accordingly, be modified.
To scrap the entire pattern or practice case, as Mitsubishi would have us do, would ignore the statutory base for bringing Title VII actions for sex discrimination. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Therefore, Title VII authorizes a pattern or practice suit for sexual harassment. This Court has concluded that a pattern or practice case for sexual harassment can be brought and maintained by the EEOC on behalf of the public for injunctive relief under §§ 706 and 707 of Title VII, based solely on an objective showing of the employer's unlawful pattern or practice. A pattern or practice case seeks to eradicate systemic, company-wide discrimination and focuses on an objectively verifiable policy or practice of discrimination by a private employer against its employees. To establish an unlawful pattern or practice, there is no need for the individual, subjective showings required by Meritor and Harris and, thus, no need for an employer's individual defenses. Once pattern or practice liability is established, individual relief is possible for the victims of an unlawful pattern or practice if these individuals can satisfy the subjective showings required by Meritor and Harris. As part of the individual relief phase, this Court believes that the victims of an unlawful pattern or practice are entitled to a presumption in their favor. The rationale for these conclusions and the methods of proof for such a case follow. Our analysis is broken down, as the case will be, into the "pattern or practice" phase and the "individual relief" phase.
A. The Pattern or Practice Case0907 Phase I
This Court does not need to make a great leap of faith to state the obvious: Title VII authorizes a pattern or 1071 practice action for sexual harassment. The statutory authority *1071 for the EEOC to bring a civil action on behalf
of alleged victims of discrimination is found at § 706(f)(1) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC also

has the power to bring a pattern or practice suit under § 707(e) of that Title, subject to the administrative prerequisites of § 706, for systemic discrimination by private employers against their employees. Id. § 2000e-6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1). It is now well-established that "sex discrimination" includes claims for sexual harassment, both for quid pro quo harassment and for hostile environment harassment. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-66. Title VII, therefore, expressly authorizes the EEOC to bring a pattern or practice action for claims of sexual harassment.
The question in this case, then, is not whether a pattern or practice action for sexual harassment can be brought at all, but rather how such a pattern or practice case can be tried and proven, given the unique element of subjectivity found in a sexual harassment claim. Questions of proof are the questions that this Court has spent a considerable amount of time trying to satisfactorily resolve. These questions are not easy ones. The pattern or practice model established in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), which works for every other form of prohibited discrimination under Title VII, breaks down for sexual harassment claims, as Mitsubishi suggests, because the two seminal cases defining the essence of a claim of sexual harassment 0907 Meritor and Harris 0907 require consideration of individual issues and defenses particular to an individual claimant.
In Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), the United States Supreme Court first recognized that a "hostile or abusive work environment" may constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. Id. 477 U.S. at 66. In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), the Court found that a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment exists "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' which is `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. 510 U.S. at 21 ( quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
Determination of whether harassing conduct creates a hostile environment "sufficiently severe or pervasive [enough] to alter the conditions of the victim's employment" requires the trier of fact to view the conduct in light of the record as a whole and the totality of the circumstances. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b)). In reviewing the record, the trier of fact must answer two main questions: (1) was the complainant, "because of her sex, subjected to such hostile, intimidating, or degrading behavior, verbal or nonverbal, as to affect adversely the conditions under which she worked[,]" and, if so, (2) was "the defendant's response or lack thereof to its employees' behavior ... negligent." Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir.1994).
The first question requires the trier of fact to determine the severity or pervasiveness of the particular conduct at issue by testing it against both an objective and a subjective component. In other words, the trier of fact must find both that an objectively reasonable person would find the environment hostile and that the victim, herself, subjectively perceived the environment as hostile. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. The objective showing operates as a limitation on the subjective assertions of the claimant by requiring that the claimant's individual perceptions fall within a range that the reasonable person can understand. However, the gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the claimant, herself, personally found the alleged sexual advances "unwelcome." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. If "the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is not a Title VII violation." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. 1072 However, there *1072 is no requirement of tangible economic consequences or psychological injury. Id. In order to establish a subjective perception of abuse, the charging party must only testify that she found the alleged conduct to be hostile or abusive at the time it occurred because she did not solicit or incite it, and she regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir.1982). Unless the respondent produces evidence to the contrary, the subjective prong of the analysis will be satisfied. Id.
The second question, the employer's negligence, is equally fact-specific. In general, an employer can be held negligent if it knows or should have known about the harassing conduct. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., and Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 123 F.3d 490, 494-495 (7th Cir.1997) ("Jansen") (per curiam) (stating that the "law of

the circuit" in these cases is "negligence, not strict liability."). In fact, "[a] plaintiff has no duty under the law to complain about discriminatory harassment, but the employer ... will not be liable if it had no reason to know about it. Nor does a plaintiff have a legal duty to cooperate with the employer's investigation; but the reasonableness of the employer's attempts to rectify harassment is measured against how much it knows or should have known." Perry v. Chernin, 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir.1997).
The negligence requirement incorporates the necessity of notice to the employer, since without notice there cannot be negligence. Id. at 1013 (imposing liability without notice would constitute strict liability to the employer, which was rejected in Jansen). See also Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't., 96 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir.1996) (If "the only possible source of notice to the employer ... is the employee who is being harassed," she must present evidence "that she gave the employer enough information to make a reasonable employer think there was some probability that she was being sexually harassed."). An employer is said to be on notice when information about the harassment comes to the attention of someone who either has the power to do something about it or who has0907or can reasonably be believed to have "a 0907 duty to pass on the information to someone within the company" who does. See Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir.1997). However (and this is an important "however"), "[i]f the harassment is pervasive [as it certainly must be in a pattern or practice case] it can be presumed, subject ... to rebuttal, to have come to the attention of someone authorized to do something about it." Id. (emphasis added). "In either case," says the Seventh Circuit, "the enterprise has a reasonable chance of being able to respond to the information, whether it is information that it is being sued or information that subordinate employees are committing criminal or tortious acts." Id.
These concerns are also present in quid pro quo cases of sexual harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment describes situations in which submission to sexual demands is made a condition of tangible employment benefits. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 911 (11th Cir.1982); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir.1990). "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual[.]" 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997). The proof required to establish quid pro quo sexual harassment is the same as that required for a hostile environment claim except that the employee, instead of showing that her work environment was pervaded by severe harassment, must show that "the employee's submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee's refusal to submit to the supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment[.]" Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir.1992). However, in the situation where the victim submitted to the request for sexual favors, she need not show any tangible economic harm to state a claim for quid pro quo harassment. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778-79 (2d Cir.1994).
1073 *1073 Thus, under either type of harassment, there is both an objective and a subjective component of the claim. To prevail, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that she personally was adversely affected by the conduct, and (2) that a reasonable person would also have been adversely affected. Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir.1993). In addition, for the employer to be liable, the plaintiff must establish both that the employer had notice of the harassment and was negligent in taking corrective action. See generally Jansen, 123 F.3d at 493-94; Perry, 126 F.3d at 1013.
Although these two theories of liability involve different conduct,
[v]ictims of quid pro quo harassment often suffer a hostile environment. Indeed, the quid pro quo concept, in its widest reach, could include any situation in which individuals must accept a genderhostile environment in order to enjoy the tangible benefits of their jobs. Similarly, victims of hostile environments often suffer the tangible job detriments associated with quid pro quo harassment. A hostile environment may drive employees off the job, demoralize or upset them to the extent that they are fired for absenteeism or unsatisfactory work, or cause them to complain about the harassment and risk retaliatory discharge.

See e.g., BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 8-9 (1992). Consequently, the proof offered to establish a hostile environment case may also serve to establish a quid pro quo case of sexual harassment.
This Court believes that the overlap in proof is especially relevant in a pattern or practice case, such as this one, which alleges both theories. The overlap in proof is relevant, in part, because the Meritor and Harris decisions 0907 which require consideration of subjective elements 0907 do not purport to address the method of proof in pattern or practice cases, as opposed to individual cases. Consequently, a pattern or practice case alleging either theory will follow the same format.
In a pattern or practice case brought by the EEOC for injunctive relief, it is not really necessary or appropriate to consider the subjective issues of individuals. If a company engages in a pattern or practice which is proved by an objective test, and the company is negligent in preventing it, then the EEOC can and should be able to obtain injunctive relief, regardless of whether some of the individuals may have no subjective objection to the harassing conduct (i.e., the conduct may be welcome to some). The Meritor and Harris decisions do not address these issues, and this Court believes that the teachings of Meritor and Harris are not intended to apply lockstep in a case such as this one. The law, therefore, must be that at the pattern or practice phase, subjective proofs are not necessary and should not be considered to find a pattern or practice of sexual harassment.
The framework for the pattern or practice case that this Court has conceived is divided into phases, like the Teamsters model. See 431 U.S. at 360-62. In an effort to organize the controlling principles of law, the Court has organized its discussion by providing both a method of proof and a rationale section for each phase. The Court's conclusions of law are set forth below.

1. Method of Proof

In Phase I, the pattern or practice phase, the EEOC will be permitted to establish a pattern or practice of sexual harassment by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objectively reasonable person would find the existence of: (1) a hostile environment of sexual harassment within the company (a hostile environment pattern or practice) or a situation where individuals within the workplace, as a whole, must accept a genderhostile environment to enjoy the tangible benefits of their jobs (a quid pro quo pattern or practice); and (2) a company policy of tolerating (and therefore condoning and/or fostering) a workforce permeated with severe and pervasive sexual harassment. Determining whether a hostile environment exists (for purposes of establishing hostile environment or quid pro quo harassment), in a pattern or practice case, must be done by the trier of fact in light of the totality of the circumstances.

1074

*1074 Under the totality of the circumstances analysis the district court should not carve the environment into a series of discrete incidents and then measure the harm occurring in each episode. Instead, the trier of fact must keep in mind that "each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment [thereby] [sic] created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes."

See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 847, 885 (D.Minn.1993) (quoting Burns v. McGregor Electronic Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir.1992) and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D.Fla.1991)). See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir.1990) ("A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents but on the overall scenario."). Accordingly, the landscape of the total work environment, rather than the subjective experiences of each individual claimant, is the focus for establishing a pattern or practice of unwelcome[5] sexual harassment which is severe and pervasive.[6] The existence of a company's policy of tolerating sexual harassment is the basis for pattern or practice liability. Tolerance of sexual harassment permits rampant discrimination to take place. If, based on the sum of the individual testimony by the class, the trier of fact determines that an objectively reasonable person would have to spend the work day running a "gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living[,]" Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49

(1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.1982)), then a finding that sexual harassment is occurring in the workplace is justified.

The company's pattern or practice of tolerating such harassment, however, will require an additional showing of the company's notice and negligence.[7] When harassing behavior occurs frequently enough and is both common and continuous, a company can reasonably be said to be on "notice" of a severe and pervasive problem of sexual harassment that constitutes a hostile environment. See Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir.1997) ("If the harassment is pervasive, it can be presumed, subject we imagine to rebuttal, to have come to the attention of someone authorized to do something about it."); Jenson, 824 F.Supp. at 886 (when sexual harassment is "pervasive," the pervasive nature of the problem "gives rise to an inference of knowledge or constructive knowledge."); Robinson, 760 F.Supp. at 1531 ("an employer incurs liability when harassing behavior 1075 happens frequently enough that the employer can take steps to halt it."). In addition, evidence that many of *1075 a company's first-line supervisors had actual knowledge of the harassing behaviors (some of them may have participated in the harassment and others may have simply worked closely with those who did), would be sufficient under Young to hold that the company had notice of sexual harassment within the plant, if these supervisors had a duty or reasonably could be believed to have such a duty, under the company's sexual harassment policy, to "pass on the information to someone within the company who has the power to do something about it." 123 F.3d at 674.

The negligence analysis is the same. An employer can be said to be negligent for company-wide sexual harassment when it has a policy or practice of tolerating a work environment that it knows or should have known is permeated with sexual harassment, but does not take steps to address the problem on a company-wide basis. The assertion that it may have investigated individual cases of sexual harassment will not be a defense to pattern or practice liability. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 847, 887 (D.Minn.1993). A systemic remedy is necessary to correct a company-wide problem.[8] "Situation-specific" responses will not suffice. Id. Steps must be taken to determine whether individual incidents, which occur frequently and continuously, are "indicative of a larger problem requiring a company wide response." Id. (citing Rauh v. Coyne, 744 F.Supp. 1186, 1189 (D.D.C.1990)). In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.Cir. 1981), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that when an employer knows of sexual harassment, it "should promptly take all necessary steps to investigate and correct any harassment, including warnings and appropriate discipline directed at the offending party, and should generally develop other means of preventing harassment within the [organization]." Id. at 947. [9] The Bundy approach works well in a pattern or practice case, because it recognizes the distinction between "situation-specific" remedies, which do not address the company-wide problem, and company-wide remedies which are directed at eradicating the discriminatory policy and the effects of that policy. In a pattern or practice case, an employer must take company-wide action to establish that it has not been negligent.

The "effectiveness" of the remedial action, however, is also relevant to the negligence analysis. In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., the district court found that although the employer in that case "did respond to some aspects of the sexually hostile work environment, the effectiveness of its response must be evaluated." 760 F.Supp. at 1531. The Robinson court then outlined the two methods of measuring effectiveness that have received endorsement. Id.

1076

One, the employer's total response is evaluated on the basis of the circumstances as then existed. The employer's response is ineffective if "it delay[ed] unduly ... [and] the action it [did] take, however promptly, *1076 [was] not reasonably likely to prevent the misconduct from recurring." Two, an employer can defend successfully by showing that the conduct brought to the company's attention was not repeated after the employer took action. In this regard, the employer must show that the effectiveness of the actions, not merely that actions were taken.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

In short, to find that an employer was "negligent" in a pattern or practice case, the EEOC must show that the employer had notice, failed to take steps to remedy the company-wide problem of harassment that it knew or should have known about, and, if it took steps, failed to take effective steps. Such a showing should be sufficient to establish a "policy" of tolerance by the company toward sexual harassment that would justify a finding of

pattern or practice liability, so long as the other objective showings necessary to establish the existence of severe and pervasive harassment on a wide-scale basis are in place.
2. Rationale
The Court's rationale for eliminating the subjective proofs necessary in an individual action at the pattern or practice phase is quite simple. Sexual harassment claims involve individual questions and defenses which cannot be tried, as to the class,[10] on common issues of liability. This is the problem and the solution.
A pattern or practice case can be established without the subjective showings required by Meritor and Harris. In fact, to require subjective showings would needlessly conflate the proofs necessary to establish a pattern or practice with those necessary to establish individual liability for sexual harassment. Such conflation would cause confusion and essentially undermine the goals of a pattern or practice case. Meritor and Harris, with their focus on an individual action of discrimination, did not address pattern or practice liability and, therefore, were not called upon to recognize that the purpose of a pattern or practice case is different than the goal of an individual action. This Court, therefore, concludes that Meritor and Harris do not apply lockstep to a pattern or practice case for sexual harassment.
In a pattern or practice case, the EEOC acts both for the benefit of specific individuals who are subject to discrimination by the employer and "to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination." General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (footnote omitted). The goal of vindicating the public's interest in eradicating systemic discrimination by private employers is central to the purpose of a pattern or practice action. In such an action, the EEOC seeks to impose pattern or practice liability upon an employer who violates Title VII on a system-wide basis to enjoin the employer's discriminatory practices. Individual relief is permitted once pattern or practice liability is established, but, it is not the central or the initial focus of a pattern or practice case. Individual issues, therefore, are not even relevant until the individual relief stage 0907 a stage which occurs only if pattern or practice liability has first been established.[11] Accordingly, pattern or practice cases are not like individual actions, even though individuals typically may be able to obtain relief based on a pattern or practice finding.
Instead, pattern or practice cases target large scale, system-wide discriminatory practices and their effects, rather 1077 than "simply intentional wrongs." See Pub.L. No. 92-261, H.R.Rep. No. 92-238 (June 2, 1971). *1077 The
purpose and effect of a successful pattern or practice case is to impose liability upon a private employer, not simply for individual wrongs, but for discriminatory policies created and maintained by an employer that result in a system-wide pattern or practice of disparate treatment against individuals who fall within a protected class.
Consistent with the imposition of liability for a system-wide, rather than an individual, wrong is Title VII's provision of injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).[12]See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). See also Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir.1984); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 847, 888 (D.Minn.1993). When the EEOC establishes pattern and practice liability, the federal district court is authorized to enjoin the discriminatory practices of the employer. Injunctive relief achieves a public benefit, because it is intended to eradicate, insofar as possible, an ongoing practice of discrimination by a private employer against its employees and to "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (citation omitted). Injunctive relief, however, does not remedy the damage already done to the individuals who have been the victims of this systemwide discrimination prior to the establishment of pattern or practice liability. Pattern or practice cases have, therefore, been designed in a way that permit individual victims of an employer's pattern or practice of discrimination to obtain individual relief based on a presumption of liability that flows from the pattern or practice finding against the employer. See generally Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357-60, 361-62 ("The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy.").

B. Individual Relief Phase 0907 Phase II
1. Method of Proof
The Teamsters presumption of liability, however, does not work at the individual relief phase of a sexual harassment case. The problem is that the presumption of liability that typically flows from a pattern or practice action shifts the burden of proof (rather than production) to a company. Shifting a burden of proof does not work in a pattern or practice action for sexual harassment, because individual relief for sexual harassment, even if the harassment for which a plaintiff recovers is based on a pattern or practice of tolerance by an employer, still requires a plaintiff to prove that she was subjectively harmed by the harassing conduct under Meritor and Harris. Proof of subjective harm is not relevant to the pattern or practice case and cannot be admitted at Phase I. Therefore, to presume liability and shift the burden of proof to an employer in Phase II, without requiring an individual to make her subjective showings, would presume away an individual's burden of proof on elements essential to the establishment of individual liability for sexual harassment under Meritor and Harris. The United States Supreme Court has expressly cautioned the federal courts not to do this. Acknowledging that differing factual situations may require a more flexible framework for "establishing a prima facie case of discrimination[,]" the Court made clear that inferences cannot be created which relieve a plaintiff of her ultimate burden of proof.
The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specification of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)).
1078 *1078 A finding of pattern or practice liability for sexual harassment does not give rise to any obvious presumptions with regard to individual liability for sexual harassment, because there are subjective perceptions that must be taken into account in Phase II. All that the EEOC will have established in Phase I by a finding of pattern or practice is that an objectively reasonable person would find that, as a whole, the environment within the company is hostile and that the company was on notice of and was negligent regarding the systemic problem.
To simply eliminate the presumption that can and should flow from the pattern or practice case altogether, however, as did the district court in Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 847, 876 (D.Minn.1993),[13] would effectively disassociate the pattern or practice case from the individual cases so that there would be no benefit to the individual class members from a pattern or practice finding. We do not believe that eliminating any and all presumptions, as Jenson did, is the solution.[14]
"Presumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to the proof." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). This Court, unlike the district court in Jenson, believes that a rebuttable presumption can be applied at the individual relief phase, Phase II, to help individuals secure relief for their individual claims. In a pattern or practice case, the finding of objective discrimination in Phase I may be applied at Phase II to relieve an individual claimant of her prima facie burden to prove that element. The subjective elements of an individual's sexual harassment claim, although not established by the pattern or practice case, are not difficult to make out in Phase II. The gravamen of an individual's sexual harassment claim is that the complained of conduct was unwelcome. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). The proof needed to establish a subjective perception of abuse in the typical individual case for hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment, however, is minimal, virtually a formality; the charging party must merely testify that she found the alleged conduct to be hostile or abusive at the time it occurred. Unless the respondent produces evidence to the contrary, the subjective prong of the analysis will be satisfied. The burden of coming forward with evidence to challenge the plaintiff's assertion that the alleged harassment was "unwelcome" has

always been on the employer. Absent such evidence, the mere fact that a person is now complaining is enough to minimally satisfy the subjective prong of the sexual harassment claim. Shifting the burden of production to the employer on the subjective prong, in a pattern or practice case, therefore, does not appear to be anything new in sexual harassment law, since that burden has essentially always been borne by the employer.
Thus, having found a pattern and practice of sexual harassment in Phase I, the likelihood that any potential class member would be able to satisfy the threshold proof required to establish the subjective element of her claim, in 1079 Phase II, is highly probable. In *1079 fact, a presumption shifting the burden of production to the employer to offer some evidence showing that its conduct was welcomed by a particular female employee is consistent with the realistic expectation that it is the employer, not the female employee, who will be in the best position to produce such evidence. This rebuttable presumption also furthers the goal codified in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
By ordering the proof to conform with the probabilities that an individual can easily offer proof of her subjective perception of discrimination, a presumption may be applied to shift the burden of production on this issue to the employer, still leaving the ultimate burden of proof on the subjective elements to the individual plaintiffs. This approach, unlike the approach taken in Jenson, is more consistent with the essential nature of a pattern or practice case. The existence of a presumption is essential in a pattern or practice case, because "[a] finding of a discriminatory pattern or practice creates `a greater likelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall pattern,' and changes `the position of the employer to that of a prove[n] wrongdoer.'" See e.g., Craik v. Minnesota State Univ., 731 F.2d 465, 471 n. 9 (8th Cir.1984) (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359-60 n. 45, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). To eliminate the presumption, as Jenson did, ignores the likelihood that the individual decisions a company makes about individuals, consistent with its company-wide pattern or practice, are discriminatory. Rather than eliminating the presumption, this Court chooses to extend a rebuttable presumption of individual liability to all women in the workplace. It then becomes the goal of Phase II to determine which of the women are actually part of the "affected class." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 331 n. 6.
The concept of an "affected class" is not new. In Teamsters, the parties and the Court acknowledged some limitation on the members of the class who could benefit from the presumption(s) which flowed from a finding of pattern or practice liability. Id.; Jenson, 824 F.Supp. at 885 (the plaintiff must establish that she was an "`affected individual,' that is, that she, personally, was as affected by the conduct as the reasonable woman."). Limiting the presumption of liability to the "affected class" acknowledges that not all individuals in the class are necessarily entitled to the presumption, while preserving the presumption's benefit for those who are entitled to it.
How then does one determine which members of the potential class have been subjectively "affected" by the objectively hostile environment for liability to be established? This Court's solution is to change the Teamsters model slightly to make the employer's burden one of production rather than proof. A burden of production requires an employer to come forward with evidence to show that the individual members of the potential class, either in whole or in part, did not subjectively perceive the environment as hostile. In this way, it is the employer who essentially determines, based upon its individual defenses, who belongs in the affected class and who does not.
Until an employer's individual defenses are proffered, however, one can "presume" from an objective pattern or practice finding that the working environment, as a whole, is hostile, and that most women[15] would also find such an environment subjectively hostile. One may also presume from a pattern or practice finding of sexual harassment that an employer is on notice that individuals within its workforce are experiencing sexual harassment. The employer may not know precisely who the affected individuals are, but the knowledge that a hostile environment exists, which gives rise to a duty to remediate the company-wide problem, certainly also 1080 gives rise to a similar *1080 duty to seek out and investigate individual cases of sexual harassment that the employer knows or should know about, so that the remediation occurs both at the systemic and the individual level.
This Court sees no inherent unfairness in presuming from a pattern or practice finding that the employer has notice that individual members of its workforce are subject to sexual harassment within its enterprise. Knowing

exactly who these individuals are is a function of the reporting systems set up within the organization and, therefore, relates to the negligence analysis. If a supervisor knows or has reason to know that a particular individual is being harassed, the assertion that this individual did not formally complain is no defense. The Seventh Circuit recently made clear that a plaintiff has no duty to complain about discriminatory harassment. See Perry v. Chernin, 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir.1997). Failure to complain can be relevant, but only if the harassment cannot be discerned in any other way. Id. If the harasser is the very person within the company charged with a duty to report and/or investigate harassment, then the victim's "failure" to complain will not be a defense for the employer on the basis that it did not have "notice."[16]Id. This is especially true in a pattern or practice case where the employer has been found to be a proven wrongdoer with notice of company-wide harassment by individuals in its workforce. If the employer is found liable for a pattern or practice of tolerating sexual harassment within its company, it stands to reason that the employer also tolerates individual sexual harassment, and a presumption to this effect is in order.
The issues of notice and negligence, however, require some thought. Although "[a] plaintiff has no duty under the law to complain about discriminatory harassment, .. the employer ... will not be liable if it had no reason to know about it. Nor does a plaintiff have a legal duty to cooperate with the employer's investigation; but the reasonableness of the employer's attempts to rectify harassment is measured against how much it knows or should have known." Id. at 1015. A pattern or practice finding that an employer had notice (i.e., knowledge) and was negligent in responding to the pervasive hostile environment probably means 0907but does not necessarily mean 0907 that this same employer was negligent with regard to the individuals working there. In fact, it is quite possible that, although the employer failed to take remedial action with regard to the systemic problem, it did take an unusual course with respect to certain individuals by intervening in legally appropriate ways to correct individual problems of harassment. Thus, an individual would still need to bear her ultimate burden of proof on the issues of notice and negligence.
There is, however, no need to duplicate proofs with respect to the objective findings of notice and negligence established in Phase I. All that is required in Phase II is for the individual claimant to assert that the employer had notice and was negligent with regard to the harassment she suffered. It will then be necessary, as it is in an individual case, for the employer to come forward with some evidence rebutting these assertions. If the employer fails to produce such evidence, then the presumption of notice and negligence which flows from the pattern or 1081 practice *1081 finding, together with the individual's subjective assertion of such facts, is enough to establish a basis for individual liability. If the employer does, however, proffer such evidence, it will be up to the individual plaintiff to satisfy her burden of proof on these elements.
2. Rationale
These conclusions are supported, we believe, by the following rationale. Although "isolated" or "sporadic" instances of harassment experienced by a person in an individual action are typically not enough to establish hostile environment sexual harassment, single instances of conduct must be taken together with the continuous pattern of harassment in the workplace, as a whole, which was established at the pattern or practice phase. It is this total environment which establishes the context for a particular plaintiff's experience of harassment. When the work environment is permeated with sexual harassment, an individual's exposure to this environment may be severe enough to impose individual liability. In fact, a finding of pattern or practice liability takes into account the necessity of showing "more than the mere occurrence of isolated or accidental or sporadic discriminatory acts[,]" because it requires a pattern of consistent behavior. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
To disregard the pattern or practice findings at the individual relief phase would be unrealistic. An individual's personal experience of sexual harassment is part of the larger context in which she works. Although she may be the target of only one or two incidences of harassment by an individual, these incidences are part of a pattern of conduct by the employer that is actionable. The individual claimant is, therefore, not only a victim of the individual acts of discrimination perpetrated by the harasser within the plant, but she is also the victim of a systemic policy of tolerance by the company. It is this systemic policy, together with the individual acts of harassment, for which the employer is liable in Phase II, because it is the policy which makes the perpetration of the individual conduct

possible. The two types of conduct, the employer's tolerance and the harasser's behavior, cannot be artificially separated. It is the employer's tolerance of the individual acts of sexual harassment that make the continuation of such harassment against individuals possible. Proof of such conduct, therefore, must work together to establish the total environment. The net effects of this environment may yield a pattern or practice finding, and the individual conduct within the environment may yield individual liability. The pattern or practice finding, however, makes it easier to believe that a company's decisions regarding individual incidents of harassment were discriminatory. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n. 45, 362 (proof of pattern or practice supports inference that any particular employment decision made while discriminatory policy in force was made in pursuit of that policy).
The Court believes that the framework we have set forth for proving a pattern or practice case through which individuals can obtain individual relief remains true to the mandates of Title VII and the case law defining the contours of actionable sexual harassment. To summarize, this Court's solution is to keep the basic Teamsters framework, but to do two things: (1) eliminate the application of the subjective showings required by Meritor and Harris in Phase I because a pattern or practice case focuses on the employer's objective policy or practice, not individual charges of discrimination and therefore does not contemplate the need for subjective or individual proofs or defenses; and (2) change the presumption in Teamsters from an absolute presumption of liability that shifts the burden of proof to the respondent to a rebuttable presumption of liability that merely shifts the burden of producing some evidence that certain of the women were not subjectively offended by the pervasive hostile environment. This burden of production allows the respondent to identify, by its proofs, who belongs in the affected class and who does not. Once the employer comes forward with its individual defenses, those class members who have been challenged with elimination will then carry the ultimate burden of proving and persuading the trier of fact that they were subjectively affected. For the other individuals who have not been 1082 challenged, the presumption turns *1082 into a finding of individual liability. The parties will then move to Phase III, the individual damages phase.
II. Procedural Questions
We now turn to the procedural questions raised by Mitsubishi's motion for partial summary judgment. These questions require consideration of matters outside the pleadings and are, therefore, properly raised in a motion for summary judgment. Mitsubishi's motion raises four (4) procedural questions: (1) are the individual claims of sexual harassment barred by the statute of limitations; (2) is this action barred by the equitable doctrine of laches; (3) did the EEOC fail to engage in good faith conciliation efforts before the Commissioner filed his charge; and, if so, is this action barred by that failure; and (4) should the independent contractors whose names appear on the list of alleged victims, submitted to the Court under seal by the EEOC, be dismissed because they are not "regular employees" of Mitsubishi? The EEOC's motion for leave to amend its Complaint seeks to add allegations that would remedy any potential statute of limitations problems in its original Complaint.
A. Undisputed Facts
The following facts are undisputed for purposes of Mitsubishi's motion for summary judgment regarding the procedural issues identified above.[17] These facts are relevant to all of the procedural issues discussed below.
This lawsuit began when the EEOC Commissioner filed a charge of discrimination alleging a pattern or practice of sexual harassment against Mitsubishi on April 19, 1994. See Mits. Stmt. of Facts ("Stmt of Facts"), ¶ 36. The Commissioner's charge stated:
Specifically, the unlawful discriminatory practices include, but are not limited to: Maintaining discriminatory policies and practices and other terms and conditions of employment which operate to disadvantage females because of their sex, including the failure to provide a working environment free from sexual harassment.
Id. at ¶ 37.

After issuance of the Commissioner's charge, the EEOC started its investigation of "pattern or practice" claims. Id. at ¶ 40. On August 9, 1995, the EEOC issued a Determination finding probable cause for the Commissioner's charge. The Determination stated:

I have determined that the evidence obtained in the investigation establishes reasonable cause to believe that Respondent has violated Title VII, by discriminating against a class of female employees on the basis of sexual harassment and sex-based harassment. Further, I have determined that reasonable cause exists to believe that Respondent retaliated against and constructively discharged a class of female employees in violation of Title VII.

Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. In this Determination, the EEOC also asked Mitsubishi to submit a proposed conciliation agreement within fourteen (14) days and stated that in the absence of a timely response, "we may conclude that further conciliation efforts would be futile or nonproductive." Id. at ¶ 44. In a letter dated August 17, 1995, during conciliation negotiations, the EEOC asked Mitsubishi to accept the EEOC's "concept of relief" (e.g., policies and practices, training, affected class relief, reporting and monitoring), without worrying about "the actual amount of monetary relief due affected class members." Id. at ¶¶ 48-49. On September 1, 1995, Mitsubishi replied to the EEOC's August 17, 1995 letter. Id. at ¶ 50. Mitsubishi's September 1, 1995 letter, stated, in relevant part:

Affected Class Relief

1083

From the date the Company began operations through this date, the Company has employed in excess of 1,200 women. Of all of these, 28 filed claims that resulted in a *1083 lawsuit now before the Federal Court. We understand the desire of the EEOC to determine an affected class of our employees, but virtually all female past and present employees have been subjected to the plaintiffs' extensive public media campaign, direct personal, mailing and telephone solicitations. It is the Company's position that further solicitation of claimants is unwarranted and that these 28 plaintiffs, alone, after all of their solicitation efforts are the only ones who chose to file a lawsuit. It is, furthermore, the Company's position that the pending lawsuit addresses the issue of relief for persons who claim to be affected by the allegedly unlawful acts. Any further effort by the EEOC to pursue a remedy for these specific claimants would be duplicative and inappropriate. In short, there is no need for an affected class relief provision in any proposed conciliation agreement.

Mits.Ex. 26 at 3-4. The September 1, 1995, letter went on to state:

[T]he Company has acted responsibly in dealing with this issue. Unless the Commission can affirmatively and specifically demonstrate that one or more of the Company's policies, practices and procedures somehow are erroneous, the Company is unwilling to modify them solely for the sake of change.

With respect to the issue of relief for persons who claim to have been adversely affected, the pending lawsuit is sufficient to resolve their claims. It does not appear that further solicitation of claims would be appropriate. In fact, it could adversely impact the claims of the current plaintiffs.

Id. at 5.

On September 14, 1995, the EEOC sent a letter to Mitsubishi ending conciliation, noting that "further" conciliation efforts would be "futile or non-productive." Id. at ¶ 51. The EEOC filed its Complaint in this case on April 9, 1996. Id. at ¶ 52. The EEOC produced a list of 289 alleged victims to counsel for Mitsubishi on April 11, 1997. Id. at ¶ 54. The EEOC has included among the 289 alleged victims all women who have received right to sue letters from the EEOC and/or who have been plaintiffs in other actions filed in federal court. Id. at ¶ 56. The EEOC has also included among its alleged victims, six women who are or were contract employees of Mitsubishi, and twenty-five women whose employment with Mitsubishi ended prior to June 23, 1993. Id. at ¶¶ 57-58.

B. Four Questions

1. Statute of Limitations
Mitsubishi's first procedural challenge involves a timeliness question. Mitsubishi seeks to bar certain individuals from obtaining individual relief by arguing that a 300-day statute of limitations applies to cut off all individual claims that were not filed with the EEOC 300 days before the Commissioner's charge was filed. Mitsubishi's argument is that the Commissioner's charge is controlling for purposes of determining the timeliness of the discrimination claims of the vast majority of class members who did not file their own charges with EEOC or IDHR. Mitsubishi also argues that employees who left the company more than 300 days before the Commissioner filed his charge and employees who did not complain to the company about harassment within this 300-day window are also time-barred. Finally, Mitsubishi claims that the complaints of harassment it did receive and did address prior to the 300-day window are not actionable.
The EEOC counters with three arguments: (1) it has authority to seek relief for aggrieved individuals irrespective of the 300-day limitations period; (2) it can proceed with claims beyond the 300-day period because Mitsubishi's conduct constitutes a continuing violation; and (3) even if a 300-day limitations applies and there is no continuing violation exception in this case, the three individual charges timely filed with the EEOC would extend the limitations period to 300 days prior to the date that the first individual claimant filed her charge.
The parties have complicated an already complicated timeliness question by failing to acknowledge one simple fact: this is a § 707 pattern or practice case, as well as a § 706 case. Although § 707(e) indicates that a § 707 action is subject to the procedural requirements of § 706, there is no statutory language, no regulation, no case, 1084 and no commentator which definitively holds that there *1084 is any limitations period applicable to a § 707 pattern or practice case initiated by the filing of a Commissioner's charge. In fact, the very nature of a pattern or practice case attacking systemic discrimination by a company seems to preclude the application of a limitations period. Because this Court finds, for the reasons set forth below, that a § 707 pattern or practice case is not subject to a limitations period, all individual claims that seek relief based on this pattern or practice will be allowed into the individual relief phase. The fact that some claims might otherwise be time-barred under § 706, which does expressly contain its own limitations period, both for individual and Commissioner charges, is irrelevant.
(a) The § 707 Pattern or Practice Case
There are two principle distinctions between a § 706 case and a § 707 case. The first distinction is that a § 706 case is based on one or more individual charges or complaints of unlawful discrimination by an employer, and a § 707 case is based on a pattern or practice of systemic discrimination by an employer. Although both a § 706 case and a § 707 case can be filed by the EEOC in its own name and initiated by a "Commissioner's charge,"[18] rather than an individual charge, the converse is not true. A § 707 case cannot be initiated by an individual charge, and it cannot be filed as a civil suit by an individual. See generally General Tel., 446 U.S. at 327 (§ 707 pattern or practice cases not designed to advance personal interest of any particular aggrieved person). A § 707 case is a "pattern or practice" case that challenges systemic, wide-spread discrimination by an employer. Conversely, a § 706 case seeks to vindicate, sometimes on a class-wide basis, the rights of aggrieved individuals who are challenging an unlawful employment practice by an employer. The distinction is subtle and not immediately apparent from the language of Title VII, but it is, nonetheless, an important distinction.
The second distinction between the two sections is that § 706 contains its own statute of limitations,[19] whereas, § 707 does not. Although § 707(e) indicates that all actions brought under § 707 are subject to the procedural requirements of § 706, the application of a limitations period in a § 707 action does not make intuitive or legal sense. The statute and the regulations (promulgated by the EEOC) do not help clarify this very important issue. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged as much in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984):
Section 707(e) of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e), which authorizes the EEOC "to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination," provides that "[a]ll such actions

1085

shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in [section 706, 42 U.S.C. § ] 2000e-5." As indicated in the text, § 706 expressly delegates to the EEOC responsibility to determine the form and content of charges of discrimination. The statutory scheme ... empowers the Commission to promulgate regulations that differentiate between charges alleging individual instances of discrimination and charges alleging *1085 patterns or practices of discrimination. The Commission has not exercised that authority. Instead, it has adopted a single regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12, applicable to both kinds of charges. The result is considerable awkwardness when complainants try to fit allegations of systemic discrimination into a mold designed primarily for individual claims. Under these circumstances, we can and must try to construe § 1601.12, as applied to systemic charges, in a manner consistent both with the plain language of the rule and with the structure and purposes of Title VII as a whole. But our task would be made significantly easier if the Commission saw fit to adopt special regulations more closely tailored to the characteristics of "pattern-or-practice" cases.

466 U.S. at 67 n. 19.

The Court in Shell Oil did not address the limitations question before us, but we face the same dilemma that it did: neither the statute nor the regulations adequately address the differences between an individual (albeit a "class" action) and a pattern or practice action. This is especially true regarding the limitations question. Like the Supreme Court, we believe that there must be an articulation of the relevant differences between the two cases which adheres to the "structure and purposes of Title VII as a whole." After careful consideration, this Court has concluded that the limitations period applicable to § 706 actions does not apply to § 707 cases, despite the language of § 707(e), which mandates adherence to the other procedural requirements of § 706. See generally E.E.O.C. v. Harvey L. Walner & Assoc., 91 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir.1996) (§ 707 suits may be brought by EEOC on its own initiative "without certain of the prerequisites to a civil action under [ § 706]") (citing General Tel., 446 U.S. at 327).

This is why. "[I]t is crucial that the Commission's ability to investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be impaired." Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69. Interpretation of the regulations and the case law must advance that statutory goal. At the time a Commissioner's charge alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination is filed and an investigation of the allegations by the EEOC begins, "the Commissioner rarely can identify any single instance of discrimination until the Commission has gained access to the employer's personnel records. Thus, a requirement that the Commissioner in [the] charge identify the persons injured, when and how, would cut short most of these investigations. That result would be manifestly inconsistent with Congress' intent." Id. at 71 (emphasis added). Without any single incident of discrimination from which to start the 300-day clock running, a court cannot determine whether a Commissioner's charge is "timely filed," as it must do under § 706. See Walner, 91 F.3d at 968 (enforcement provisions of § 706 "predicated upon a timely charge"). To simply count back 300 days from the date when a Commissioner's charge is filed for purposes of determining which individuals can obtain individual relief is arbitrary, since the purpose of the limitations period is to prevent the filing of stale claims. This purpose contemplates that the 300-day period, whether one counts forward or backward, is designed to determine whether a charge is "timely filed." A Commissioner's charge alleging a pattern or practice, however, involves a continuing violation that occurs over time. The particular date on which such a charge is filed is, therefore, not amenable to a timeliness determination. Similarly, to impose a 300-day limitations period on the Commissioner's charge would be inconsistent with the very nature of a pattern or practice violation. This is, however, what Mitsubishi wants us to do. We decline this invitation.

There is some support in the case law for the proposition that the limitations period of § 706 does not apply in a pattern or practice case brought under § 707. See Walner, 91 F.3d at 968. See also E.E.O.C. v. Continental Oil Co., 393 F.Supp. 167, 170 (D.C.Colo. 1975) (the 180-day provision of § 2000e-5(e) is for the protection of individuals and was not intended to limit the time within which the Commission may bring a pattern or practice suit under this section); U.S. v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 592 F.2d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.1979) (because it takes more than one unlawful practice to constitute a pattern or practice of employment discrimination, there can be no 1086 certain date from which the statutory period for filing an employment discrimination charge runs and, therefore, it *1086 is questionable whether the statutory filing period applies to a suit based on a pattern or practice of discrimination). Finally, at least one commentator has indicated that he does not believe that § 707 suits need to

comply with the timeliness requirements of § 706. See 4 Lex K. Larson & Arthur Larson, Employment Discrimination § 75.02[2] (2d ed.1997) (more than one unlawful act needed to constitute a pattern or practice of employment discrimination and other parts of § 706 establishing certain time limitations have questionable application to pattern or practice litigation).
There is also authority from the Seventh Circuit indicating that a pattern or practice of sexual harassment case is, by its very nature, a continuing violation. See Dasgupta v. Univ. of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138, 1139 (7th Cir.1997) (clearest example of continuing violation is sexual harassment where character of violation reveals itself over time and cannot be made subject of lawsuit when it first occurs). However, the continuing violation theory, traditionally an exception to a statutory bar, does not support the application of a limitations period to § 707 actions either, because it does not make sense in a pattern or practice case. Under § 706, a court can count back 300 days from the filing of a timely individual charge (or Commissioner's charge based on individual incidences of discrimination) to determine the relevant time period for determining which claims come in to the case and which are barred. If there is a continuing violation asserted, as there is in this case, a § 706 action permits the court to determine whether the individuals claiming the exception are entitled to it by matching the allegations of the individual charge, which is time-barred, with the conduct alleged in the timely charge. See Walner, 91 F.3d at 969 (citing Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir.1992)). If those allegations can be linked up, then the continuing violation exception applies to allow particular individuals into the lawsuit.
Under § 707, however, such an analysis is impossible. By its nature, the Commissioner's charge alleging a pattern or practice of sexual harassment is not filed within 300 days of any particular incident of sexual harassment, because it is not based on an individual charge, but rather on the evidence gathered over a course of time showing a pattern of harassment against many individuals. See generally Walner, 91 F.3d at 969 (suggesting that a § 707 pattern or practice case does not require a valid charge filed in a "timely" manner). As a result, there is no way for a court to determine if the Commissioner's charge is "timely." The date picked for the filing of a Commissioner's charge is, most likely, when the Commissioner has some reason to suspect a pattern or practice of systemic discrimination by an employer.[20] Presumably, the pattern or practice of discrimination, itself, as alleged, has continued over a period of time and most likely for more than 300 days prior to the filing of the Commissioner's charge.
Another problem for a court trying to apply a limitations period to a § 707 claim is determining which individuals are entitled to be a part of the case. Certainly, all the victims of the alleged pattern or practice should be entitled to relief; but how does a court determine who these individuals are? Unlike a § 706 case; where there is an individual, timely filed charge to set the boundaries and mark out the period of discrimination being litigated, in a § 707 case there is only the Commissioner's charge, filed at a single point in time, but alleging discrimination which has a durational and "continuing" aspect that precedes any particular "limitations period." Moreover, in a § 707 case, the Commissioner's charge can allege a variety of discriminatory conduct experienced by a wide-range of individuals, based on its investigation; the Commissioner is not limited to the conduct which an individual charge alleges, as is the case in a § 706 action. Given that the conduct alleged by time-barred claims must be 1087 linked to the conduct alleged *1087 in the timely claim, application of a continuing violation exception would be unmanageable, even if a limitations period established a date certain, because a wide-range of conduct constitutes the marker for purposes of deciding which time-barred individuals can claim a stake in the pattern or practice case.
To summarize: In a § 706 case, the court would simply look at the conduct alleged in the charge and by the timebarred individuals to determine whether the necessary nexus was present. However, where pattern or practice allegations are the sum and substance of the Commissioner's charge, the potential scope of the conduct to which individuals can claim a link is far reaching, to say the least. In fact, the scope of alleged but unproven pattern or practice allegations is so large that any line drawn at this stage of the litigation would be arbitrary.
The only conceivable rationale for setting a limitations period on § 707 claims is that the absence of a limitations period may allow stale claims to proceed. For example, although this case involves evidence dating back to 1988 or 1989, other pattern or practice cases may involve companies with longer histories. To set a precedent that there is no statute of limitations for § 707 cases might place an impossible burden on defendants in other cases to preserve stale evidence.

The Court believes that the solution to this problem is to let the evidence of a pattern or practice determine the relevant "limits" for the lawsuit. Once the EEOC establishes that a pattern or practice exists, in Phase I, this evidence will determine when the provable pattern or practice began. Any individual claims that fall within that period will be allowed to proceed to the individual relief stage. This method will honor the "continuing violation" nature of a pattern or practice case, without applying the exception as it is traditionally conceived.
A pattern or practice action seeks to eradicate a continuing violation. In this case, the EEOC alleges the pattern or practice of discrimination by Mitsubishi occurred over time through repeated tolerance of individual acts of sexual harassment within the Normal, Illinois plant. The "durational" aspect of this violation means that it is of a "continuing" nature. See generally Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 71 (when a § 707 charge is filed, the Commissioner, "based upon statistical manifestations of the net effects of the employer's practices," has reason to "believe that the employer has violated Title VII on a continuing basis."). "A continuing violation is one that could not reasonably have been expected to be made the subject of a lawsuit when it first occurred because its character as a violation did not become clear until it was repeated during the limitations period." Dasgupta v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138, 1139 (7th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). "The clearest examples involve sexual harassment, where ... duration is often necessary to convert what is merely offensive behavior, and therefore not actionable under Title VII, ... into an actionable alteration in the plaintiff's working conditions." Id. Moreover,
[W]here as here, a plaintiff attacks a rule or policy that continued to exist right up into the limitations period, concerns about prejudice to the defendant are absent or diminished ... the continued nature of the policy represents its affirmative perpetuation ... and is susceptible to characterization as a conscious waiver of limitations period protection.... "Simply put, an employer that maintains a continuing violation neither deserves nor obtains repose."
U.S. E.E.O.C. v. City of Chicago, 1989 WL 134788, * 9 (N.D.Ill.1989) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Home Ins. Co., 553 F.Supp. 704, 712 (S.D.N.Y.1982)).
The EEOC's allegations of a pattern or practice are therefore sufficient at 0907 this stage of the litigation to 0907 save the individual claims from a statute of limitations bar. Once the evidence establishes either the existence or the nonexistence of a pattern or practice, the trier of fact will be able to determine when the pattern or practice actually began and, therefore, who the individuals who were victims of such a pattern or practice actually are for purposes of a statutory bar.
That said, we do not believe that any plaintiff who has received a right to sue letter from the EEOC and initiated 1088 civil proceedings in federal court based on that right to sue may obtain individual relief in this *1088 case. These
plaintiffs, therefore, will not be permitted to participate in an individual relief phase, should the parties reach such a phase. They will, however, be able to proceed as part of the pattern or practice case, offering anecdotal evidence. With that condition in mind, the Court denies Mitsubishi's motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations question presented under § 707.
(b) The § 706 Case
If the pattern or practice case is allowed to proceed, as this Court has determined it should, and this Court's analysis of the § 707 limitations issue is correct, then any statutory bar to the § 706 claims is irrelevant, since these claims will come in under § 707. However, in the event that we have erred, a § 706 analysis is in order.
The Commissioner's § 706 case is based, for purposes of the statute of limitations question, on three individual charges of discrimination: (1) the Terry Paz charge filed on November 13, 1992, alleging a pattern or practice of hostile environment sexual harassment; (2) the Brenda Schillaci charge, filed on July 19, 1993, alleging the same; and (3) the Lena Rector charge, filed on November 16, 1993, alleging the same.[21] According to the EEOC, these three charges would extend the 300-day limitations period to January 18, 1992; September 22, 1992; and January 20, 1993, respectively. In other words, for purposes of the § 706 cases, no individual claims that predate January 18, 1992, would be entitled to relief. The parties appear to agree that a January 18, 1992, time bar would eliminate fifteen women. See Mits. Ex. NN to Aff. of Paul Betts. See also EEOC Resp. at 47, n.

39. However, there is no need to eliminate these women from the proceedings now, since this Court's pattern or practice rulings keep them in the lawsuit. Unless these rulings are reversed, all 289 plaintiffs remain in this lawsuit for purposes of the pattern or practice case, and all but the plaintiffs who have already filed individual claims in federal court in another case, will proceed to the individual relief stage, if the pattern or practice case is successful.

2. Laches

Mitsubishi's second procedural challenge is based on the equitable doctrine of laches. Mitsubishi argues that laches bars the EEOC's action on behalf of some or all of the claimants based on the following facts: (1) the Paz charge was not investigated for 19 months; (2) the Commissioner's charge was based on fewer than a dozen interviews; (3) the Commissioner's charge did not provide Mitsubishi with notice regarding specific incidents of sexual harassment; (4) the EEOC never informed Mitsubishi of any incident of alleged harassment based on the 91 interviews taken after the Commissioner filed his charge; (5) the EEOC's Determination Letter offered no factual support for its findings and did not provide Mitsubishi with notice regarding specific complaints; and (6) the EEOC's Complaint was filed 3 1/2 years after the Paz charge. Based on these facts, Mitsubishi argues that it has been "severely prejudiced" because it has been precluded from taking remedial action at the earliest possible date and its damage exposure has been increased as a result.

These arguments are meritless. First, there is some basis for questioning whether the laches defense is even available as a complete bar to an action filed by the EEOC to enforce Title VII. See E.E.O.C. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 80 (3rd Cir.1984) (because the EEOC is a government agency, application of laches defense is problematical). Without deciding that particular question, this Court finds that even if the laches defense is available, the standards governing application of the defense have not been met here.

In Great A & P, the Third Circuit summarized the controlling principles of law to apply in considering a laches defense against the EEOC in a Title VII case:

1089

[A]ssum[ing,] arguendo, without deciding, that laches may in some cases bar an EEOC action rather than simply counsel a modification of the remedy[,] ... [t]he elements of the equitable defense of laches are (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and *1089 (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense. These elements are conjunctive, and since laches is a defense, the burden of establishing both is on the defendant. If a statutory limitations period that would bar legal relief has expired, then the defendant in an action for equitable relief enjoys the benefit of a presumption of inexcusable delay and prejudice. In that case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to justify its delay and negate prejudice. No statute of limitations applies to an EEOC Title VII action. Thus, the burden remains on [the defendant] to establish both elements of the defense. On summary judgment, the movant's affidavits must establish a prima facie defense of laches.

Id. at 80-81 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977)).

In Occidental Life, the Supreme Court discussed the importance of preserving the EEOC's enforcement powers and held that there is no limitations period that governs the time between when an individual charge is filed under § 706 with the EEOC and the time when (and if) the EEOC brings an enforcement action on behalf of that individual. See 432 U.S. at 361. The 180-day statutory period controls only when the individual seeks to bring his or her claim individually, and the EEOC has issued a right to sue notice. Thus, "[t]he 180 day limitation provides only that [a] private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed." Id. It does not limit enforcement action by the EEOC if the individual wishes to "leave the ultimate resolution of [the] charge to the efforts of the EEOC." Id.

Mitsubishi argues that an "inexcusable delay" occurred between the time when Terry Paz filed her charge of discrimination on November 13, 1992, and the filing of this lawsuit on April 9, 1996. We disagree. In an EEOC Title VII action, especially a pattern or practice action, a court must take into account that the EEOC is seeking to vindicate both the "public interest in eliminating employment discrimination and the private interests of those

class members it represents." See Great A & P, 735 F.2d at 81. Investigation and conciliation of pattern or practice charges takes time. After a charge is filed and notice of the charge is given the employer, the EEOC must investigate the claim and issue a reasonable cause determination if warranted. The EEOC must then enter into conciliation efforts with the employer. Title VII "imposes no maximum time limitation on these three steps in the administrative process: (1) the filing of a charge; (2) the determination of reasonable cause; and (3) the filing of a complaint." Id. at 73. And "it is crucial that the Commission's ability to investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be impaired." Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69.
Application of the laches defense in a case such as this would certainly undermine and impair the EEOC's statutory duty to investigate and extirpate any pattern or practice of discrimination at Mitsubishi's Normal, Illinois, plant. There are several simple reasons for this conclusion. First, Mitsubishi was notified, within ten (10) days, of each individual charge filed with the EEOC and of the Commissioner's charge. Title VII required such notification, and Mitsubishi has not provided any evidence that it did not receive notice of these charges. "Neither an individual charge nor a Commissioner's charge need be supported by reasonable cause at the time of its filing." Great A & P, 735 F.2d at 72 (citing Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 75-76). Thus, it is irrelevant that the Paz charge was not investigated for nineteen (19) months and that the Commissioner's charge was based on fewer than a dozen interviews. Second, Mitsubishi had a duty to preserve its records regarding the individual charges of discrimination filed by its employees with the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1997). The company's failure to comply with the record-preservation requirements would not qualify as establishing prejudice. Id. See also Great A & P, 735 F.2d at 72 ("[a]n employer notified of a charge is obliged by regulation to preserve relevant personnel records until the charge's final disposition."). The fact that some individual complaints of discrimination may never have been made to Mitsubishi's own employee relations department is irrelevant. The EEOC charge, served on Mitsubishi, was enough to trigger the record preservation duties. Similarly, the fact that many of Mitsubishi's 1090 socalled *1090 "witnesses" no longer work for the company does not establish their unavailability and does not establish prejudice. Mitsubishi's argument that it did not have "notice" of the individual claims is, therefore, unavailing. Dim memories and missing witnesses are no defense. Mitsubishi had a duty, when the individual charges were filed, to preserve its records for its own defense.
Mitsubishi's biggest complaint is that the EEOC failed to provide Mitsubishi with specific information regarding the individual incidences of harassment which form the basis for its pattern or practice case. In particular, Mitsubishi claims that: the Commissioner's charge did not put Mitsubishi on notice as to any particular incident of sexual or sex-based harassment; the EEOC did not share the results of its investigation with Mitsubishi; and the Determination Letter offered no factual support for its findings. As the Supreme Court in Shell Oil pointed out, however, "the Commissioner can rarely identify any single instance of discrimination until the Commission has gained access to the employer's personnel records." See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 71. In fact, Congress eliminated the Commissioner's duty to have "reasonable cause" at the time a charge was filed. Id. at 76. "The only plausible explanation for that change is that Congress wished to place a Commissioner on the same footing as an aggrieved private party: neither was held to any prescribed level of objectively verifiable suspicion at the outset of the enforcement procedure. Rather, the determination whether there was any basis to their allegations of discrimination was to be postponed until after the Commission had completed its inquiries." Id. at 76-77. Moreover, "a requirement that the Commissioner in his charge identify the persons injured, when and how [would] radically limit the ability of the EEOC to investigate allegations of patterns and practices of discrimination [and be] manifestly inconsistent with Congress' intent." Id. at 70-71. The "net effect" of such a requirement "would be to hamper significantly the Commission's ability to investigate expeditiously claims of systemic discrimination." Id. at 72. Thus, the EEOC cannot be faulted for "failing" to provide Mitsubishi with specific information before its investigation was complete.[22]
Finally, Mitsubishi cannot credibly claim that the time the EEOC took to conciliate this case should be included as part of the inexcusable delay. "The express policy of Title VII favors voluntary compliance not only before, but even after an EEOC suit is filed." Great A & P, 735 F.2d at 84. "It would be inconsistent with that policy to attribute to the EEOC delays which ... were attributable to ..." the EEOC's efforts to comply with that policy, especially when Mitsubishi helped contribute to those delays. Id.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Mitsubishi has failed to establish the two elements of the laches defense, inexcusable delay and prejudice. The laches defense, therefore, fails, and Mitsubishi's motion for partial summary judgment is denied on this issue.
3. Duty to Conciliate
Mitsubishi argues that this case should be stayed for further conciliation because the EEOC did not adequately comply with its statutory obligations to conciliate the Commissioner's charge in good faith before this lawsuit was filed. Mitsubishi, therefore, is not arguing that the EEOC failed to attempt conciliation; it is arguing that the conciliation was not conducted in good faith.
Section 706(b) of Title VII requires the EEOC, before instituting a lawsuit, to "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Only if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent an acceptable 1091 conciliation agreement may the EEOC bring a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See also *1091 E.E.O.C. v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884, 889 (10th Cir.1977) (only where conciliation is attempted and the efforts fail may the Commission enter into litigation to vindicate individual instances of discrimination in employment). Good faith conciliation is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a § 706 suit by the EEOC. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 490 F.Supp. 1245, 1256 (D.C.Ala.1980) (attempt to conciliate claim sued upon was a condition precedent to action brought by Commission challenging alleged pattern or practice of hiring discrimination against blacks). The same requirements apply to a § 707 suit. See id.
The good faith requirement appears to be an easy burden to satisfy. A review of the relevant statutory language on conciliation reveals that substantial discretion is vested in the Commission. The Commission shall continue conciliation until such time as it is "unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). An effort by the Senate in 1972 to require judicial review of the Commission's determination of "acceptable" agreements was soundly rejected. See 118 Cong.Rec. 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972). Such an examination of the conciliation process was deemed unworkable. Id. See also E.E.O.C. v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir.1978) (although good faith efforts required, court should not examine details of offers and counteroffers between parties, nor impose its notions of what an agreement should provide); E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F.Supp. 241, 262 (N.D.Ill.1980) (same).
The record in this case reveals that the EEOC sent Mitsubishi a Determination Letter dated August 9, 1995, outlining its basis for finding reasonable cause to proceed with a pattern or practice suit against its company. In this letter, the EEOC outlined the Title VII violations found to exist at the Normal, Illinois, plant and it invited Mitsubishi to conciliate the Commissioner's charge by requesting that Mitsubishi provide the EEOC with a list of its conciliation terms within fourteen (14) days. The Determination Letter also described the types of relief that the EEOC seeks for Title VII violations. See Mits.Ex. 19. Mitsubishi's response, dated August 16, 1995, requested that the EEOC provide it with a list of demands for conciliation. Mits.Ex. 23. Undaunted by this "cat-and-mouse" game, the EEOC responded with a letter setting out the provisions that would be central to an "acceptable conciliation agreement." Mits.Ex. 24. This letter, as the EEOC argues, was sufficient to satisfy its conciliation obligations and to inform Defendant of the remedies it sought for the pattern or practice violations outlined in its Determination Letter. Mitsubishi, however, responded with a letter dated September 1, 1995, which any reasonable person would read to mean that the conciliation provisions offered by the EEOC were not acceptable to Mitsubishi and that further efforts to negotiate on these terms would be futile. See Mits.Ex. 26. As the EEOC puts it, each settlement term proposed by the EEOC was declared unnecessary by Mitsubishi. Using unambiguous language, Mitsubishi stated that it was not willing to change any of its policies, practices or procedures unless EEOC demonstrated to its satisfaction that such change was necessary.
Based on this record, the Court finds that the EEOC's conciliation efforts, as of September 1, 1995, were satisfied in good faith and that further conciliation efforts, based on the terms that the Commission found acceptable, were futile at that time.[23] The statutory requirements for filing suit were therefore met. Mitsubishi's request for a stay,

based on the argument that good faith conciliation never occurred, is therefore denied. To the extent that Mitsubishi seeks dismissal of this action on jurisdictional grounds, that motion is denied too.
4. Independent Contractors
Mitsubishi's final procedural challenge is to the six individuals who worked at Mitsubishi under contract and who 1092 have been identified as potential victims of the alleged pattern or practice of sexual *1092 harassment. Mitsubishi
claims that these six women have never been employed by its company and are not "employees" for purposes of Title VII who are able to claim relief under the statute. The EEOC claims that these six women were "jointly employed" by Mitsubishi and their contract employer and are entitled to proceed in this case. Alternatively, the EEOC argues that the determination of whether these six individuals were employed by Mitsubishi involves an issue of "control" which requires factual discovery that is not yet complete. Accordingly, the EEOC claims that it is too early to decide this issue on summary judgment. Mitsubishi replies that the "joint employer" theory has not been alleged in the Complaint and is, therefore, not a part of this case.
Mitsubishi's arguments are, once again, unavailing. The "notice pleading" rule is well-established in federal court. Under Rule 8, the plaintiff is only required to provide the defendant with "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The plaintiff is not required to plead its theory or theories of the case. The EEOC has alleged that Mitsubishi employees were subject to the company's unlawful pattern or practice of sexual harassment under Title VII. The determination of whether the six identified individuals were Mitsubishi employees under a "joint employer" theory is, as the EEOC correctly points out, a factual issue that cannot be decided without more discovery. The allegations of the original and the amended complaints are sufficient to bring the joint employer theory into play. We, therefore, deny Mitsubishi's motion for partial summary judgment on this issue at this time.
C. Motion for Leave to Amend
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Rule 15(a). The parties acknowledge that leave to amend should be freely granted, except where the opposing party can show undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of the amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Mitsubishi, however, claims that the EEOC's amendment comes too late in the litigation and should be denied as a blatant attempt to cure the very deficiencies that Mitsubishi has pointed out in its motion for partial summary judgment. The EEOC responds that its attempt to cure these deficiencies by amendment, even at this stage of the litigation, is entirely proper. This Court agrees with the EEOC.
The EEOC's amendment, offered to support its factual basis for the allegations made in the original Complaint regarding the relevant time periods when a pattern or practice of sexual harassment occurred at the Mitsubishi plant, is not unduly prejudicial, nor can it come as a great surprise to Defendants. As for the delay, given the fact that the lawsuit is still at a relatively early stage, this Court does not believe that the delay is undue or prejudicial to Mitsubishi. Further, the Court does not find any of the other exceptions noted by Foman present in this case. At most, the amendment, which refers to "additional" charges of sexual harassment filed by three individuals, simply extends the dates from which a 300-day statute of limitations, if it applied in this case, would run. If we were dealing with a § 706 case, the amendment would be relevant. However, since this Court has found that there is no statute of limitations or 300-day period applicable to the Commissioner's charge under § 707, the fact that this is a § 707 case, as well as a § 706 case, means that the addition of the three new charges in the amendment is irrelevant to the limitations issue. At most, the amendment simply adds more support to the EEOC's allegations that numerous individuals were the subject of sexual harassment at the Mitsubishi plant in Normal. The Court believes that "justice" is served by allowing the amendment. The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint support the allegations in the original Complaint, are not prejudicial, and serve the truth finding function of this lawsuit. The motion for leave to amend is, therefore, allowed.

CONCLUSION
1093 This opinion has resolved the five questions raised by Mitsubishi as follows: (1) a *1093 pattern or practice action can be brought for sexual harassment claims under §§ 706 and 707 of Title VII; (2) there is no applicable statute of limitations in a § 707 case to bar the individuals identified by the EEOC as potential victims of the alleged pattern or practice of sexual harassment; (3) the equitable doctrine of laches does not bar this action because there has not been an inexcusable delay or severe prejudice in this case; (4) the EEOC satisfied its statutory good faith obligations to conciliate this matter prior to filing this lawsuit; and (5) the six individuals who worked at Mitsubishi under contract will not be excluded from this action at this time.
Because the determination of these questions "involves ... controlling question[s] of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion[,]" the Court believes that "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Accordingly, the legal and procedural questions resolved by this Order will be certified to the Seventh Circuit for immediate appeal.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mitsubishi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 78-1) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the EEOC's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. # 93-1) is ALLOWED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the five legal and procedural questions raised by Mitsubishi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (identified above) be CERTIFIED for immediate interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).[24] The parties have ten (10) days from the date of this Order in which to file such an appeal. In the event that an interlocutory appeal is filed, this case shall be STAYED pending its outcome. In the event that the Court's Order is not appealed, a status conference setting new discovery and trial dates will be set, and all parties will receive notice of this conference by mail. Current discovery dates remain in effect until that notice; but the pretrial order due on February 2, 1998, the pretrial conference set on February 16, 1998, and the jury trial date of March 2, 1998, are hereby canceled. IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] The legal question of whether a pattern or practice case can ever be brought for sexual harassment claims does not require consideration of facts or matters outside the pleadings. Thus, both litigants' use of additional pages in their briefs to argue already discovered facts, as well as the voluminous exhibits, attachments, documents, and photos filed under seal, are 0907 to say the least 0907 unnecessary to the resolution of this basic legal question. The parties' use of such materials and the arguments regarding them have resulted in the expense of valuable judicial resources, in particular, the time necessary to wade through these untimely documents. The parties are, therefore, reminded that: "Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991). This litigation strategy has not been appreciated by the Court, and future requests to file briefs in excess of 15 pages will be looked upon unfavorably as a result.
[2] The legal question raised by Mitsubishi is really a jurisdictional question for a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6), not one for summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court will treat the jurisdictional question, which does not require review of anything other than the allegations of EEOC's Complaint, as arising under Rule 12(b)(6).
[3] The procedural questions raised by Mitsubishi do require review of matters outside the pleadings and therefore must be considered under Rule 56.
[4] The Court allowed Mitsubishi to file a 74-page "theory of the case," together with its 54-page memorandum in support of its motion and its 55-page reply. Each argument raised in these voluminous documents need not be outlined in this opinion because the sum of these arguments essentially boils down to the single question of whether the "individual issues" necessary to resolve an individual claim of sexual harassment precludes the establishment of pattern or practice liability. We believe that the analysis set forth in this opinion fully resolves all issues raised by Mitsubishi in its papers, with one exception.

In a footnote, Mitsubishi claims that a pattern or practice case for retaliation and constructive discharge cannot be brought by the EEOC because these claims require individual analysis. In support of this argument, Mitsubishi relies on Strong v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 496, 511 (E.D.Ark.1980), which held that retaliation claims are not class issues. We find Strong not only distinguishable but also uncontrolling. The Strong case does not apply here because this is a pattern or practice action, not a class action. In a pattern or practice case, the challenge is made to an employer's policy regarding an allegedly unlawful employment practice; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's concerns, such as the adequacy of the class representative and/or whether individual issues and defenses predominate, are simply not considered in a pattern or practice action. See E.E.O.C. v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir.1996). Mitsubishi's argument is also meritless because neither retaliation nor constructive discharge claims require proof of a subjective element, as do claims of individual sexual harassment. See Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., GMC, 32 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (7th Cir.1994) (constructive discharge claim requires plaintiff to show "that the discrimination to which she was subjected was sufficiently serious to cause a reasonable person to quit."); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir.1994) (prima facie case of retaliation established by showing that claimant engaged in protected activity under Title VII; suffered an adverse employment action; and that causal connection exists between adverse employment action and claimant's participation in protected activity). Accordingly, because a purely objective standard applies in cases of retaliation and constructive discharge due to sexual harassment, this Court finds that the traditional Teamsters pattern or practice burden-shifting framework applies to such claims to shift a burden of proof to the employer once the EEOC has established, in Phase I, an objectively verifiable pattern or practice of retaliation and/or constructive discharge. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-60, 361-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Concomitantly, individuals will be entitled to a presumption of liability, in Phase II, based on this pattern or practice finding, just as the individuals in Teamsters were entitled to such a presumption without any further showings. Id.
[5] This Court agrees with the district court in Jenson regarding its pattern or practice finding of unwelcomeness: "a finding of unwelcomeness will be justified where the plaintiff class shows by a preponderance of the evidence that women, by their conduct[,] indicated that the acts of sexual harassment were unsolicited and regarded as undesirable or offensive." 824 F.Supp. at 883. We do not agree with Jenson's elimination of the presumption, however, as will be discussed infra.
[6] It is the harasser's conduct, not the alteration of the conditions of employment, that must be "severe and pervasive." Muench v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J.Super. 288, 289, 605 A.2d 242, 62 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 476, 479 (N.J.Super.A.D.1992).
[7] Notice and negligence, we believe, must be established at both the pattern or practice and individual relief phases. A company's notice of a pattern or practice and its notice of individual harassment, although related, involve slightly different inquiries. Similarly, a company's negligence in responding to a systemic problem of sexual harassment requires different findings than those required to hold a company negligent for failing to remedy an individual act of sexual harassment. The Court believes, however, that the establishment of a pattern or practice of unlawful sexual harassment by the company entitles individual claimants to a presumption that the company had notice and was negligent with respect to the individual victims of the pattern or practice. As the following discussion will illustrate, such a presumption makes sense in light of the fact that it is the company's burden to offer evidence that it did not have notice or was not negligent as to a particular individual. Having proven that a company is a "wrongdoer" at the pattern or practice phase, because it had notice and was negligent of the systemic problem, certainly justifies such a presumption and places the burden, at least of production, on the company to show that it was not on notice and was not negligent with respect to a particular claimant.
[8] The sexual harassment need not occur in the auto assembly plant, as a whole, to be actionable in a pattern or practice case; rather, if the alleged harassment is only occurring in one or two areas of the plant, then those areas will be the relevant populations examined for purposes of determining whether or not there was a severe and pervasive problem of sexual harassment within the plant. To do otherwise would effectively mean that Title VII did not apply to those unlucky enough to work in the areas in which the alleged harassment was occurring, simply because this harassment was not occurring every place else. Such a requirement is not consistent with

Title VII, nor does it appear to be required by the United States Supreme Court. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n. 16 (legislative history of pattern or practice actions reflects that the legislature intended pattern or practice liability to attach if a company practiced discrimination "through all or a significant part of its system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by the statute.").
[9] We note, in passing, that Mitsubishi developed a company-wide response to sexual harassment, beyond its written policies, once this lawsuit was filed. For example, it hired the former Secretary of Labor, Lynn Martin, and developed what the parties refer to as the "Opportunity Programs Department," known as "OPD," an organization supposedly filled with experts on handling sexual harassment complaints. Whether "OPD" has been effective is not really the point right now. What is interesting to the Court, even though the factual issues are not now before us, is that a company-wide response was not initiated until this lawsuit for pattern or practice liability was filed. Such "evidence" seems to justify the use of the pattern or practice powers of the EEOC, all by itself.
[10] This Court is aware of the Seventh Circuit's decision in this case, which indicated that this is not a class action subject to Rule 23. See E.E.O.C. v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir.1996). Nonetheless, as the Seventh Circuit also indicated, the use of the term "class" for the group of individuals on whose behalf the EEOC is bringing this action is, for lack of a better term, an acceptable nomenclature for the group. Id. at 870.
[11] This is because the individual testimony offered as anecdotal evidence of the pattern or practice in phase I is offered solely for the purpose of establishing the objectively verifiable pattern or practice; it is not offered for the purpose of establishing individual liability. The same story by an individual may be offered as evidence in both phases, but the purpose of the story will differ depending upon the type of liability to be established. A limiting instruction, therefore, would be necessary in Phase I of a jury trial.
[12] The statute provides in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
[13] The Court is aware that the Eighth Circuit recently reviewed the findings of the district court in Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1997 WL 748204 (8th Cir. Dec.5, 1997). The parties did not challenge the district court's finding of § 706 classwide liability for a pattern or practice of sexual harassment on appeal. The Eighth Circuit, nonetheless, placed its imprimatur on the district court's conclusion that the burden shifting framework of Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) and Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), applies in a pattern or practice class case to shift a burden of proof to the employer, once an individual has established the subjective elements of her case. See Jenson, 130 F.3d 1287, 1299. As our discussion indicates, this Court does not agree with that conclusion.
[14] In Jenson, the district court held that a presumption of discrimination does not arise from an objectively hostile environment because the employee's subjective perception is an essential element of a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment. See 824 F.Supp. at 876 ("presumption that the employer discriminated against individual class members may not arise from a determination that the reasonable woman would have been affected by the acts of sexual harassment.").
[15] Nonetheless, even if a particular charging party has not been subjectively offended by the conduct in question, if a reasonable person would find the conduct offensive, the EEOC, itself, may pursue individual relief for any other persons identified in the course of the investigation who subjectively found the environment to be hostile and who were, therefore, affected by the hostile conditions existing in the workplace, as a whole. See generally General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).
[16] An important aspect of this case; factually, is going to be whether women who allege that they were victims of harassment "failed to report" the objectionable conduct. There are several possible reasons for a failure to

report. The harasser could be a supervisor charged with the duty to report the harassment, and the woman fears retaliation if she sidesteps him and goes to the personnel department. Or, a woman may "fail" to report the harassment because, over a period of time, she has observed that reports of harassment, either to supervisors or the personnel department, results in no action or inadequate relief. For instance, there is some evidence in the record suggesting that the only penalties for harassing behavior doled out by the company were the presentation of videotapes to the harasser. These videotapes apparently became a joke among those in the plant who allegedly perpetuated the harassment. The harassment, itself, however, was not a joke, and, in some cases, appears to have intensified after these videotapes were viewed. The company's tolerance or perceived tolerance of such harassment allegedly sent a message to women in the plant over a period of time. This message, in effect, was that a woman was expected to put up with harassment as a condition of her job, and if she didn't like it, she should quit. Title VII requires more of a company, and it provides protection against such conduct by individuals and employers.
[17] Because the EEOC has failed to follow the local rule regarding the format necessary to file a response to a statement of undisputed facts, see Local Rule 7.1, EEOC's response shall be disregarded. See Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1994) (Seventh Circuit has repeatedly upheld the strict enforcement of local rules); Monroe v. Children's Home Ass'n of Illinois, 128 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding this court's strict enforcement of local rule 7.1).
[18] In EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
A Commissioner may file a charge in either of two situations. First, when a victim of discrimination is reluctant to file a charge ... because of fear of retaliation, a Commissioner may file a charge on behalf of the victim. [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.] Second, when a Commissioner has reason to think that an employer has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discriminatory conduct, he may file a charge on his own initiative. § 2000e-6.
Id. 466 U.S. at 62. The Supreme Court's statements recognize the difference between a § 706 and a § 707 case, by indicating that a Commissioner's charge under § 706 is filed on behalf of an individual, whereas a Commissioner's charge under § 707 is filed on "his own initiative" for the purpose of alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination rather than individual discrimination.
[19] Section 706(e)(1) provides that a charge shall be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, except in cases where the aggrieved individual has instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant relief for such practices (an "FEP" agency). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1997). In Illinois, a Title VII charge under § 706(b) must be filed by an individual and/or the EEOC on the individual's behalf, within 300 days from the date of the unlawful practice or 30 days after the state agency notifies the aggrieved party that it is terminating its own proceedings under state law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
[20] We know, however, from the Shell Oil case, that the Commissioner need not know of particular, individual incidences of discrimination at the time a charge is filed. It is the investigation, which will support a reasonable cause determination, that will uncover the factual basis, if any, for the suspicions that led to the Commissioner's charge and the EEOC's subsequent investigation. See generally 466 U.S. at 70-72.
[21] The 30 additional charges alleging sexual harassment by Mitsubishi, filed with the EEOC after the Paz' charge on November 13, 1992, are not at issue. See Mits.Mem. at 3.
[22] Mitsubishi also argues that it was prejudiced by the EEOC's failure to identify the 289 women claiming individual relief in its Determination Letter. Mitsubishi has not provided this Court with any authority to support the imposition of such an obligation upon the EEOC. Without such authority, this Court believes the prejudice to Mitsubishi, if any, is minimal and does not support a finding of laches in this case.
[23] We note that further conciliation efforts may be more fruitful now, just as settlement, mediation, and arbitration may appear more attractive to Mitsubishi given the developments in this litigation. Alternatives of this kind are open, and this Court urges the parties to pursue them. The Court will not, however, order a stay of proceedings for this purpose.

[24] The Court's ruling on EEOC's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. # 93-1) is not being certified.
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14, CLOSED
U.S. District Court United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois (Peoria)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:96-cv-01192-JBM

EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg, et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Joe Billy McDade Demand: $0 Case in other court: 96-03957
96-03988 Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

Date Filed: 04/09/1996 Date Terminated: 06/23/1998 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Jean P Kamp EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Ste 2800 500 W Madison St Chicago, IL 60661 312-353-7719 Fax: 312-353-8555 Email: jean.kamp@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John C Hendrickson EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Ste 2800 500 W Madison St Chicago, IL 60661 312-353-8551 Fax: 312-353-8555 Email: john.hendrickson@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle A Caiola EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Ste 2800 500 W Madison St

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V.
Defendant
Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America Inc formerly known as Diamond-Star Motors Corporation

Chicago, IL 60661 (312)353-7526 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Noelle C Brennan BRENNAN & MONTE LTD Suite 1515 321 S Plymouth Court Chicago, IL 60604 312-431-1800 Fax: 312-431-1808 Email: nbrennan@brennan-monte.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J Levine EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Ste 2800 500 W Madison St Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 353-7659 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison B Marshall MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK & STONE PLC Suite 1150 1900 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 429-5575 Fax: 331-1118 TERMINATED: 07/23/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter W Brandt LIVINGSTON BARGER BRANDT & SCHROEDER 115 W Jefferson St Suite 400 P O Box 3457 Bloomington, IL 61702-3457 309-828-5281 Fax: 309-827-3432

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Intervenor
. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America

Email: pbrandt@lbbs.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter W Waldmeir MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK & STONE PLC Suite 1150 1900 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 429-5575 Fax: 331-1118 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roy G Davis DAVIS & CAMPBELL LLC Suite 1600 401 Main St Peoria, IL 61602-1241 309-673-1681 Fax: 309-673-1690 Email: rgdavis@dcamplaw.com TERMINATED: 12/04/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter B Connolly, Jr MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK & STONE PLC 150 W Jefferson Av Ste 2500 Detroit, MI 48226 313 (496-7503) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harold A Katz KATZ FRIEDMAN EAGLE EISENSTEIN & JOHNSON 77 W Washington St Suite 2000 Chicago, IL 60602-2904 (312) 263-6330 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha A Garcia KATZ FRIEDMAN EAGLE

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Intervenor Local 2488 UAW
Intervenor Peoria Journal Star suing as The Peoria Journal Star Inc

EISENSTEIN & JOHNSON 77 W Washington St Suite 2000 Chicago, IL 60602-2904 (312) 263-6330 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harold A Katz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha A Garcia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeffrey B Rock HASSELBERG ROCK BELL & KUPPLER Associated Bank Bldg Suite 200 4600 N Brandywine Dr Peoria, IL 61614-5591 (309) 688-9400 Fax: 688-9430 Email: jrock@hrbklaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie L Galassi HASSELBERG ROCK BELL & KUPPLER Associated Bank Bldg Suite 200 4600 N Brandywine Dr Peoria, IL 61614-5591 309-688-9400 Fax: 309-688-9430 Email: jgalassi@hrbklaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed

# Docket Text

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04/09/1996 04/09/1996 04/09/1996 06/19/1996 06/21/1996 06/21/1996 06/21/1996 06/28/1996 07/03/1996 07/03/1996
07/09/1996 08/16/1996 08/16/1996

1 COMPLAINT case referred to Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman - Certificate of Interest/Rule 41/Waiver of Service/Consent to Magistrate forms given to Plaintiff by Clerk (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/09/1996)
2 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/09/1996)
NOTICE OF LAWSUIT ; Waiver(s) of Service due on 6/10/96 for Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
3 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to transfer case from Judge McDade to Judge Mihm (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/20/1996)
4 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST pursuant to Local Rule 11.3 filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
5 ANSWER by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
5 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
6 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to motion to transfer case from Judge McDade to Judge Mihm [3-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/28/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm; Joint Conference for Coordination of Discovery set for 3:00, Friday, 9/6/96 in person in Courtroom A. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
7 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade denying motion to transfer case from Judge McDade to Judge Mihm [3-1]. Case set for Initial Pre-Trial/ Rule 16 conference on Friday, 8/16/96 at 9:30am in person in Judge McDade's courtroom at the Federal Building in Peoria, IL. Rule 16 notice enclosed. Parties are to comply with Rule 26(f) by the time of the Rule 16 hearing and bring a proposed order as required by rule 16(b). FURTHER ORDERED that a Joint Hearing for Coordination of Discovery in this case and in 94-1545 (Evans vs Mitsubishi) is set on Friday, 9/6/96 at 3:00pm in person in Chief Judge Mihm's courtroom at the Federal Building in Peoria, IL. Attorneys from both cases are to be present at the 9/6/96 hearing. (cc: all counsel in cases 96-1192 & 94-1545) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/08/1996)
8 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg of change of address of Attorney Roy Davis (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
9 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff EEOC by Steven J Levine and Jean P Kamp (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/16/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present by Attys Hendrickson/Kamp/Levine/Connolly/Davis/Waldmeir/ Marshall for Rule 16 conference held 9:30 Friday, 8/16/96 . After informal meeting with counsel, court deems it expedient to defer a Rule 16 order until after the joint meeting with counsel in the Evans case on 9/6/96. Rule 16 conference continued to 10:00 AM, Friday, 9/27/96 (in person in Peoria). Parties to submit Rule 16 Order to court by 9/23/96. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

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08/19/1996
09/06/1996 09/23/1996 09/25/1996 09/27/1996 09/30/1996

MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade The parties in this case have agreed to submit a jointly proposed Scheduling Order to the Court by 9/23/96 ; (misc ddl set 9/23/96) . By this same date, the Court requests that the parties submit a jointly proposed plan to structure the litigation in this case. By this, the Court contemplates that certain issues will need to be tried before other ones. There appear to be four different types of claims asserted by the EEOC here: (1) hostile work enviornment sexual harassment; (2) constructive discharge; (3) quid pro quo sexual harassment; and (4) retaliation. The first two types of claims require proof of a pattern or practice of sexual discrimination that is objectively offensive to a reasonable person. In contrast, the latter two types of claims are much more individualized and may require a fact-intensive inquiry into each particular case. The order in which these issues will be tried may affect the discovery process as well as other relevant deadlines in the Scheduling Order. Thus, the parties should propose a joint plan to structure the litigation in a simple and logical order. If the parties disagree on the proper approach to take, their objections should be noted in the proposed plan submitted to the Court. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade. Attys. Benassi/Galland/Schmidt present for plaintiffs/ Connolly/Waldmeir for Mitsubishi/Hendrickson/Levine/Kamp for EEOC and JOINT Status hearing held 3:00 9/6/96 ( with 94-1454.) Parties discuss discovery of both cases.(cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 09/09/1996)
11 PROPOSED DISCOVERY PLAN filed by plaintiff, defendant (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
10 PROPOSED JOINT DISCOVERY/SCHEDULING PLAN filed by plaintiff & defendant (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present via phone by Attys Hendrickson/Kamp.Levine/Waldmeir/Connolly/ Marshall for Rule 16 conference at 10:00 Fri., 9/27/96 . Discussion by counsel re: status of case and proposed discovery schedule. Written Order to enter. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/27/1996)
12 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade. Pursuant to Rule 16 Conference held 9/27/96 the Court enters the following scheduling order: joint agreed confidentiality protective order by 10/15/96; defts motion for confidentiality protective order (if necessary) by 10/25/96; phase I discovery to be completed by 2/1/97; dispositive threshold motions by 4/1/97 misc ddl of 6/15/97 created for amendment to pleadings; submission of pretrial memoranda by 7/1/97; Special Pretrial Conference set on July 11, 1997 at 10:30am-in person; Pltfs expert designations by 8/1/97; defts expert designations by 9/1/97; phases 2,3 & 4 discovery by 10/1/97; pltfs expert reports by 10/1/97; depositions of pltfs experts by 11/1/97; defts expert reports by 11/1/97; depositions of defts experts by 12/1/97; any dispositive motions to be filed by 12/1/97; joint final pretrial order due by 2/2/98; Final Pretrial/ jury instruction conf set at 9:00am on 2/16/98-in person; jury trial set at 9:00am on 3/2/98-in person. In addition 1) the Court waives any limitation of maximum number of interrogatories & depositions 2)all motions for protective order to be filed in written form & will be addressed to Judge McDade 3)Court refers the discovery portion to Mag Judge Kauffman. Motions to reconsider his

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09/30/1996 10/24/1996 10/24/1996 10/25/1996 10/25/1996 10/28/1996
11/07/1996 11/07/1996 11/07/1996 11/07/1996 11/07/1996 11/14/1996

rulings may be filed with Judge McDade. Case referred to Mag Judge Kauffman. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) Modified on 12/04/1996 (Entered: 09/30/1996)
13 LETTER from Attorney Waldmeir to Clerk of Court dated 9/26/96 re:9/27/96 hearing w/joint discovery schedule attached (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1996)
14 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to Clarify the EEOC'S September 13, 1996 letter to all of Mitsubishi's Current and Former Female Associates (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/24/1996)
15 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to Clarify the EEOC'S September 13, 1996 letter to all of Mitsubishi's Current Former Female Associates [14-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/24/1996)
16 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to extend time to comply with the protective order provisions of the 9/30/96 scheduling order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/25/1996)
17 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Peter Brandt on behalf of defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/28/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Defendant's Unopposed Motion for Enlargement of time to comply with the protective order provisions of the 9/30/96 scheduling order [16-1] is granted. The parties are given until 11/6/96 to submit a Joint Confidentiality Protective Order and/or file any pleadings with regard to that matter. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/28/1996)
18 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION motion to Clarify the EEOC'S September 13, 1996 letter to all of Mitsubishi's Current and Former Female Associates [14-1] by plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
19 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for entry of (partially-agreed confidentiality) protective order (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
20 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for entry of (partially-agreed confidentiality) protective order [19-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
21 CERTIFICATE of Service (Re: #19 & 20) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
22 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to withdraw attorney Roy G Davis (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
23 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting in part and denying in part the motion to Clarify the EEOC'S September 13, 1996 letter to all of Mitsubishi's Current and Former Female Associates [14-1]. FURTHER ORDERED that within 7 days of the date of this Order, EEOC shall send out the corrective notice on EEOC letterhead to all current and former female associates of Mitsubishi. (SEE ORDER); deadline for EEOC to send out corrective notice is 11/25/96. FURTHER ORDERED that all future proposed nonprivileged communications between counsel for either side and the potential class members in this case shall be forwarded to opposing counsel for a period of ten (10) calendar days for review. If opposing counsel has any objections to the content or form of such communications, they shall file an objection with the Court within such time. No

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11/18/1996
11/18/1996 11/20/1996 11/21/1996
11/25/1996 11/25/1996 11/25/1996 11/25/1996 11/26/1996 11/26/1996
11/26/1996 11/26/1996
11/29/1996 12/03/1996

communications shall be distributed to potential class members before the ten-day time period expires without objection or, if objections are filed, before the Court rules on them. FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff EEOC is barred from relying upon any information gathered from managerial employees of Mitsubishi as the direct result of the September 13, 1996 letter. FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff EEOC is barred from using any second-hand information gathered as a result of the September 13, 1996 letter in order to seek out and persuade other employees to join the plaintiff class. (SEE ORDER) (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/14/1996)
24 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC & Evans Plaintiffs for order to set uniform briefing schedule and for joint hearing on Mitsubishi's motion for protective order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/1996)
25 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg of taking deposition duces tecum of Scott Sommers on 11/20/96 (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/1996)
26 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for reconsideration (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
27 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting in part & denying in part the motion for reconsideration [26-1]. The corrective notice, as revised, shall read: See Order. Notice shall be sent out on EEOC letterhead on or before 11/27/96. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
28 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to stay pending appeal (FAX COPY) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/25/1996)
29 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to stay pending appeal (FAX COPY) [28-1] by plaintiff EEOC (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/25/1996)
30 NOTICE of APPEAL by plaintiff EEOC from Dist. Court decision of 11/14/96 & as modified on 11/21/96 [23-2] (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/25/1996)
31 SHORT RECORD ON APPEAL sent to USCA (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/25/1996)
28 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to stay pending appeal (original of fax copy filed 11/25/96) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/26/1996)
29 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to stay pending appeal [28-1] by plaintiff EEOC (original of fax copy filed 11/25/96) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/26/1996)
30 NOTICE of APPEAL by plaintiff EEOC from Dist. Court decision [30-1] (original of fax copy filed 11/25/96) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/26/1996)
31 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade denying motion to stay pending appeal (original of fax copy filed 11/25/96) [28-1] . The corrective notice shall be sent out on November 27, 1996, as originally scheduled. (cc: all counsel by fax and mail) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
32 Notification by USCA of Appellate Docket Number 96-3957 (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
33 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to joint motion of Evans Pltfs & EEOC for order to set uniform briefing schedule [24-1] and motion hearing on

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12/04/1996 12/05/1996 12/06/1996
12/09/1996 12/09/1996 12/10/1996 12/11/1996
12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996

Mitsubishi's motion for protective order [24-2] (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion to withdraw attorney Roy G Davis [22-1] for Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1996)
34 ORDER from USCA - Ordered that the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/06/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Joint Motion of Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC to set Uniform Briefing Schedule and Joint Hearing on Mitsubishi's Motion for Protective Order is granted. Joint telephone conference is set for hearing on Mitsubishi's motion for protective order [24-2] at 1:00 Thursday, 12/12/96 (via phone - court to call) (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
35 Notification by USCA of Appellate Docket Number 96-3988 (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
36 MOTION by plaintiff to extend time in which to respond to defendant Mitsubishii's objections to the EEOC's Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees and preliminary response to correct immediately certain flase statements made by Mitsubishi (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
37 JOINT MOTION by EVANS plaintiffs and EEOC to exceed page limitation in response to Mitsubishi's Motion for Protective Order (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/10/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion to extend time in which to respond to defendant Mitsubishii's objections to the EEOC's Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees and preliminary response to correct immediately certain flase statements made by Mitsubishi [36-1] ; response is due on or before 12/31/96 (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting joint motion of Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC to file an oversized Brief in Response to Mitsubishi's Motion for Protective Order [37-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
38 RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC to motion for entry of (partially-agreed confidentiality) protective order [19-1] (filed as Joint Memorandum of the Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC on Contested Protective Order Issues) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
39 MOTION by intervenor Peoria Journal Star to intervene by Peoria Journal Star and for leave to file response to motion for entry of amended confidentiality protective order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
40 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to intervene by Peoria Journal Star [39-1] by intervenor Peoria Journal Star (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
41 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file certificate of service to joint memorandum of the Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC on contested protective order issues and joint motion of Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC to file an oversize brief in response to Mitsubishi's motion for protective order (HK, ilcd) (Entered:

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12/12/1996
12/12/1996 12/16/1996
12/16/1996 12/27/1996 12/27/1996 12/31/1996 01/06/1997 01/16/1997 01/27/1997 02/10/1997

12/12/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade & Chief Judge Michael M Mihm. Attorneys Waldmeir, Connollly, P Benassi, Galland, Hendrickson & Levine present via phone, Attorney Galassi present in person for hearing on pending motions in 96-1192 & 94-1545. Argument by counsel regarding motion to intervene by Peoria Journal Star [39-1]. Motion granted. Motion leave to file response to motion for entry of amended confidentiality protective order [39-2] is granted. Argument by counsel regarding motion for entry of (partially-agreed confidentiality) protective order [19-1]. Court adopts the wording by the EEOC/Evans Plaintiffs with respect to paragraphs 3,5 & 6 which were the only paragraphs in dispute. Those parties to submit proposed order to the Court. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) Modified on 12/13/1996 (Entered: 12/13/1996)
42 RESPONSE by intervenor Peoria Journal Star to motion for entry of (partially-agreed confidentiality) protective order [19-1] (HK, ilcd) Modified on 12/13/1996 (Entered: 12/13/1996)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file certificate of service to joint memorandum of the Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC on contested protective order issues and joint motion of Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC to an oversize brief in response to Mitsubishi's motion for protective order [41-1] (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/16/1996)
43 CERTIFICATE by plaintiff EEOC regarding joint memorandum of the Evans/EEOC pltfs on Contested Protective Order Issues and joint motion of Evans/EEOC to file an oversized brief in response to Mitsubishi's motion for protective order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/17/1996)
Remark : Court grants Pla leave to file response to Dft's objections by FAX on 12/31/96. (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/27/1996)
44 TRANSCRIPT of joint hearing ( w/94-1545) held 12/12/96 on proposed protective order filed (CL, ilcd) Modified on 03/11/1997 (Entered: 12/27/1996)
45 MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC to defendant's objections to the EEOC's proposed letter to Mitsubishi employess (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 12/31/1996)
46 Memorandum in RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC to Defendant's Objections to the EEOC's Proposed letter to Mitsubishi Employees - NOTE: This is a copy of the Memorandum filed on 12/31/96, but has Exhibit A attached, which was not attached to the filing on 12/31/96. (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade finding the defendant's objections to the EEOC's proposed letter to Mitsubishi employees [18-] is DENIED as moot. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/16/1997)
47 MANDATE from USCA dismissing the appeal [30-1] - 96-3988 is DISMISSED as duplicative of appeal no. 96-3957 (SH, ilcd) Modified on 03/14/1997 (Entered: 01/28/1997)
48 MANDATE from USCA - motion for stay was denied, and the appeal dismissed [30-1], with costs, for want of jurisdiction (SH, ilcd) Modified on 03/14/1997 (Entered: 02/11/1997)

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02/12/1997 02/18/1997 02/18/1997 03/03/1997 03/11/1997 03/13/1997 03/20/1997 03/24/1997
03/24/1997

49 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade : SEE ORDER (original filed in Case No. 94-1545). (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) Modified on 02/12/1997 (Entered: 02/12/1997)
50 NOTICE by plaintiff EEOC of change of Fax Number (new Fax Number is 312-353-8555 (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 02/18/1997)
51 Defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc's Objections to the EEOC's Third Proposed Letter to Mitsibishi Employees and MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for order to Enforce Scheduling Order (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 02/18/1997)
52 RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC to Defendant's Objections to EEOC's Third Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees and Motion to Enforce Scheduling Order [51-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/03/1997)
53 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for order (filed as Stipulation for Temporary Suspension of Case) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/12/1997)
54 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for order (filed as Stipulation for Temporary Suspension of Case) [53-1]. This matter shall be placed in temporary suspense until 3/20/97. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/14/1997)
55 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file reply memorandum in support of its objections to the EEOC's 3rd Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees & Motion to Enforce Scheduling Order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 03/20/1997)
56 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting in part and denying in part motion for order to Enforce Scheduling Order [51-1]. EEOC's 3rd proposed letter may be sent out immediately with the following redactions: (1) the phrase "observed or" in the first sentence of paragraph two; (2) the phrase "or who witnessed" in the second sentence of paragraph two; (3) the phrase "or to other employees" in the last sentence of paragraph three; and (4) paragraphs four and six in their entirety. FURTHER ORDERED that EEOC shall turn over its list of alleged victims to Mitsubishi within 5 days of the date it sends out the letter discussed above. FURTHER ORDERED that any future attempt by Mitsubishi to engage in discussions with alleged victims concerning past incidents of harassment must be done by a noticed deposition in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall prioritize and depose as soon as practicable any alleged victim who has information about ongoing harassment at Mitsubishi's Normal, IL plant. Likewise, the parties shall expedite those depositions which Mitubishi can justify by its need to investigate and remedy any previously unreported incidences of harassment. Specific disputes shall be taken up with Magistrate Kauffman. FURTHER granting motion for leave to file reply memorandum in support of its objections to the EEOC's 3rd Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees & Motion to Enforce Scheduling Order [55-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
57 REPLY by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to response to motion for order to Enforce Scheduling Order [51-1] (filed as Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Objections to the EEOC's Third Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi

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03/27/1997 03/27/1997 04/01/1997 04/01/1997 04/01/1997 04/02/1997
04/02/1997
04/02/1997 04/25/1997 05/08/1997 05/12/1997 05/12/1997 05/16/1997 05/19/1997

Employees and Motion to Enforce Scheduling Order) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
58 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for reconsideration (FAX DOCUMENT) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/28/1997)
59 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for reconsideration (original of fax document #58) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/31/1997)
60 MOTION by plaintiff, defendant for order to Modify Joint Discovery/Scheduling Plan (filed as Stipulation to Modify) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/01/1997)
61 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file a response to the EEOC's motion to reconsider (fax document) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 04/02/1997 (Entered: 04/02/1997)
61 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file response to the EEOC's Motion to Reconsider (original of fax documenet #61) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
62 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for order to Modify Joint Discovery/Scheduling Plan [60-1]. Ordered that the deadlines for Phase I Discovery and Dispositive Threshold Motions, except as otherwise ordered, shall be extended to 6/1/97. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
63 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for reconsideration [59-1] [58-1]. The second paragraph is reworded to reflect EEOC's concern, as indicated in this order. Further ordered that Defendant's motion for leave to file response to the EEOC's Motion to Reconsider [61-1] is granted. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
64 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to motion for reconsideration [59-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
65 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg of change of address of law firm of Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/25/1997)
69 LETTER to court from defendant counsel requesting status conference (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
66 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for order to disregard Deft Counsel's 5/7/97 letter to Judge McDade and to require Deft to communicate with the Court by motion (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 05/13/1997)
67 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT of motion for order to disregard Deft Counsel's 5/7/97 letter to Judge McDade and to require Deft to communicate with the Court by motion [66-1] by EEOC (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 05/13/1997)
68 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff EEOC by Michelle A. Caiola as additional counsel (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/16/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for order to disregard Deft Counsel's 5/7/97 letter to Judge McDade and to require Deft to communicate with the Court by motion [66-1]. The Clerk is directed to file such letter but the Court shall take no further action pending a formal motion by Defendant. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/19/1997)

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05/19/1997 05/19/1997
05/19/1997 05/21/1997
05/30/1997 06/02/1997 06/03/1997
06/03/1997 07/11/1997 07/23/1997

70 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for reconsideration of minute entry granting plaintiff's motion to disregard defendant counsel's 5/7/97 letter to Judge McDade and to require counsel to communicate with the Court by motion and in the alternative, motion to regard defendant's 5/7/97 as a motion for a telephonic status conference (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/20/1997)
71 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for reconsideration of minute entry granting plaintiff's motion to disregard defendant counsel's 5/7/97 letter to Judge McDade and to require counsel to communicate with the Court by motion and in the alternative, motion to regard defendant's 5/7/97 as a motion for a telephonic status conference [70-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/20/1997)
72 CERTIFICATE of Service re: #70 & #71 by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/20/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Defendant's motion for reconsideration of minute entry granting plaintiff's motion to disregard defendant counsel's 5/7/97 letter to Judge McDade and to require counsel to communicate with the Court by motion is DENIED. However, at Defendant's request, the Court construes the letter of 5/7/97 as a motion for a telephonic status conference [70-1]. Status hearing set 11:00 Friday, 6/6/97 (via phone - court to call). (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/21/1997)
73 MOTION by EEOC, Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for order to modify joint discovery/scheduling plan (filed as Stipulation to Modify) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/02/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Status hearing previously set 6/6/97 is VACATED and Status hearing reset to 2:30 PM (CDT), Tues., 6/2/97 (cc: all counsel - all counsel notified by court on 5/30/97) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/02/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present by Attys Hendrickson, Kamp & Levine for Plaintiff and Attys Connolly & Marshall for Dft via phone for Status hearing held 2:30 6/3/97 . Stipulation to Modify Joint Discovery/Scheduling Plan (#73) heard. Court is granting motion for order to modify joint discovery/scheduling plan [73-1]. Dispositive threshold motions, except as othrewise ordered is extended to 8/1/97. (See Order). All phase I deadlines are therefore extended 2 additional months. Phase 3-5 extended to 12/1/97. Parties to submit proposed amended scheduling order to Court reflecting all rulings today. Parties discuss communications of this case with the press. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/04/1997)
74 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade Ordered that the deadlines for Phase I Discoverey and Dispositive Threshold Motions, except as otherwise ordered, shall be extended to 8/1/97. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/04/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: Rule 16 conference previously set 10:30 7/11/97 is VACATED pursuant to the Order of 6/3/97 extending all deadlines. (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
75 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to exceed page limitation in support of its motion to dismiss and/or for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd)

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07/23/1997 07/23/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/01/1997
08/01/1997 08/11/1997
08/11/1997 08/11/1997

Modified on 09/17/1997 (Entered: 07/23/1997)
76 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to exceed page limitation in support of its motion to dismiss and/or for partial summary judgment [75-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 07/23/1997)
77 CERTIFICATE of Service re: #75 & 76 by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 07/23/1997)
78 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for partial summary judgment (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
79 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for partial summary judgment [78-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
80 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its motion for partial summary judgment (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
81 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its motion for partial summary judgment [80-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
82 STATEMENT OF FACTS ( undisputed) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg in support of motion for partial summary judgment [78-1] (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
83 EXHIBITS for defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg stored in file in support of defendant's memorandum in support of motion for partial summary judgment (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
84 EXHIBITS for defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg stored in file to affidavit of Paul Betts filed in support of defendant's memorandum of law in support of motion for partial summary judgment (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
85 STATEMENT OF THEORY OF CASE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
86 IN CAMERA documents by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg sealed and placed in vault in accordance with the Court's pretrial protective order dated 2/12/97 in support of motion for partial summary judgment (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
87 CERTIFICATE (PROOF OF SERVICE) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg re: documents #78-#85 (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion to exceed page limitation in support of its motion to dismiss and/or for partial summary judgment [75-1] - NUNC PRO TUNC 8/1/97 (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 09/17/1997 (Entered: 08/11/1997)
88 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for order to set briefing schedule (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
89 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to motion for order to set briefing schedule [88-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/11/1997)

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08/11/1997 08/13/1997 08/13/1997
08/14/1997
08/14/1997 08/20/1997 08/22/1997 08/22/1997 08/22/1997
08/27/1997

90 Joint MOTION by plaintiff, defendant to reset status conference (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade ;Status hearing set 9:30 Thurs., 9/18/97 (in person in Peoria) (Parties notified by Court) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 08/14/1997 (Entered: 08/14/1997)
91 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for order to set briefing schedule [88-1]. Plaintiff's response to Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment [78-1] due 9/15/97; Defendant's reply due 10/2/97. No further threshold motions or briefs shall be filed without prior leave of this Court. Further, court is denying motion to reset status conference [90-1]. At this point, the hearing remains set for 9/18/97 at 9:30 AM in person in Peoria. However, at the request of the parties, the hearing may be delayed until after Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment has been resolved by the Court. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/14/1997)
92 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade - Upon further consideration, the Court is changing the 9:30 AM, Thurs., 9/19/97 hearing to a telephone status conference rather than requiring the parties to appear in person. The Court will set up the call. The parties should be prepared to discuss the present status of the case as well as any issues that may require the Court's intervention or guidance, such as discovery or other scheduling matters. However, because Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment will not be resolved by the time of the hearing, the Court will leave it to another day to schedule the special pretrial conference referenced in the Court's original scheduling order in this case. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/14/1997)
93 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file first amended complaint (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/14/1997)
94 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for protective order (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/20/1997)
95 Memorandum of Law in RESPONSE by defendant to motion for leave to file first amended complaint [93-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/22/1997)
96 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for protective order [94-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/22/1997)
97 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting in part motion for protective order [94-1] and suspends the taking of depositions in this case by either party until 9/18/97. All further discovery matters will be discussed at the telephone status hearing scheduled for 9/18/97, including EEOC's suggestion that depositions be limited to six per week until the partial summary judgment motion is resolved. Court is granting motion for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its motion for partial summary judgment [80-1]. Ruling on motion for leave to file first amended complaint [93-1] is deferred because that motion is apparently tied up with the merits of Defendant's partial summary judgment motion. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 09/17/1997 (Entered: 08/25/1997)
98 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file reply memorandum in support of motion of EEOC for leave to file First Amended Complaint (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1997)

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08/28/1997 09/15/1997 09/15/1997 09/15/1997 09/15/1997
09/15/1997 09/15/1997 09/15/1997 09/15/1997 09/15/1997 09/18/1997
09/25/1997 09/26/1997 09/26/1997

MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file reply memorandum in support of motion of EEOC for leave to file First Amended Complaint [98-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 08/28/1997)
99 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file, instanter, an overlength memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
100 STATEMENT OF FACTS (disputed) by plaintiff EEOC in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment [78-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
101 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its opposition to moton for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its opposition to moton for partial summary judgment [101-1], granting motion for leave to file, instanter, an overlength memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment [99-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
102 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to motion for partial summary judgment [78-1] by plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
103 EXHIBITS for plaintiff EEOC in support of memorandum in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
104 EXHIBITS for plaintiff EEOC filed UNDER SEAL in support of memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
105 NOTICE of Filing re: documents 99-104 by plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
106 CERTIFICATE of Service re: documents 99-104 by plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present via phone by Attorneys Hendrickson/Kamp/Levine/Caiola/Brennan/ Marshall and Connolly for Status hearing held 9/18/97 . Discussion by counsel regarding deposition schedule. Parties have 7 days to submit stipulation or proposed orders re: deposition schedule. Further status to be set after decision on summary judgment. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/18/1997)
107 Remark - Proposed Orders re: deposition schedule received by fax from Plaintiff & Defendant pursuant to hearing held 9/18/97 (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/26/1997)
108 NOTICE of Filing proposed Order (re: deposition schedule) by plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/26/1997)
109 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade ORDERED that pending decision on the motion for summary judgment parties may take as many as 4 depositions per week. These depositions may not exceed 8 hours in aggregate, exclusive of lunch and breaks. A break of 20 minutes shall be permitted between each EEOC claimant deposition. Further ordered that the defendant may take as many as 3

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09/29/1997 09/30/1997 09/30/1997
10/01/1997 10/02/1997 10/02/1997 10/02/1997 10/02/1997 10/02/1997 10/02/1997 10/02/1997 10/03/1997

depositions of EEOC claimants per day. Each deposition may last a maximum of 3 hours. In the event dft believes that it will take more than 3 hours to complete the deposition, it shall schedule only 2 depositions on that day, and each such deposition may last a maximum of 4 hours. This order does not address the total number of depositions each side may take. Either party may hereafter move the Court for entry of an Order placing reasonable limits on the scope of deposition discovery in this case. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/26/1997)
112 CERTIFICATE of service by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg in re Order Concerning Deposition Schedule (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1997)
110 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file, instanter documents under seal (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1997)
111 EXHIBITS for plaintiff EEOC filed UNDER SEAL in accordance with the Court's Pretrial Protective Order dated 2/12/97 in support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting plaintiff's motion for leave to file, instanter documents under seal [110-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/01/1997)
113 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to EEOC's Statement of Undisputed Facts [100-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
114 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its reply memorandum ofo law in support of its motion for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
115 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file, instanter, an overlength reply in support of its motion for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
116 EXHIBITS for defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg in support of Reply Brief in Support of motion for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
117 CERTIFICATE of service (re: #114-116) by plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
118 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for sanctions and memorandum of support thereof (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
119 CERTIFICATE of Service (re: #118) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting defendant's motion for leave to file, instanter, an overlength reply in support of its motion for partial summary judgment [115-1], granting defendant's motion for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its reply memorandum ofo law in support of its motion for partial summary judgment [114-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)

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10/03/1997 10/03/1997 10/03/1997 10/03/1997
10/10/1997 10/14/1997 10/14/1997 10/14/1997 10/14/1997 10/14/1997
10/14/1997 10/15/1997 10/16/1997

120 REPLY by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to response to motion for partial summary judgment [78-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
121 EXHIBITS for defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg FILED UNDER SEAL in support of Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
122 CERTIFICATE of Service (re: #113-116 & 120-121) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
123 CERTIFICATE of Service by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (re: Statement of Undisputed Facts, Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Motion for leave to file materials under seal, motion for leave to file instanter an overlength reply, exhibits not under seal and exhibits under seal) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/06/1997)
124 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file instanter sur-reply memorandum in opposition to defendant Mitsubhish's motion for partial summary judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
125 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to motion for sanctions [118-1] by plaintiff EEOC (WW, ilcd) Modified on 10/15/1997 (Entered: 10/14/1997)
126 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file instanter a reply brief in support of its motion for sanctions (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
127 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for leave to file instanter a reply brief in support of its motion for sanctions [126-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
128 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file instanter, materials under seal in connection with its reply in support of its motion for sanctions (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
129 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for leave to file instanter, materials under seal in connection with its reply in support of its motion for sanctions [128-1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) Modified on 10/15/1997 (Entered: 10/14/1997)
130 CERTIFICATE of Service by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg re: Doc. Nos. 126-129 & reply and materials under seal (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
131 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to motion for leave to file instanter a reply brief in support of its motion for sanctions [126-1] by plaintiff EEOC (Fax document) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 10/17/1997 (Entered: 10/16/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file instanter a reply brief in support of its motion for sanctions [126-1]; granting motion for leave to file instanter, materials under seal in connection with its reply in support of its motion for sanctions [128-1]; granting motion for leave to file instanter sur-reply memorandum in opposition to defendant Mitsubhish's motion for partial summary judgment [124-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/16/1997)

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10/16/1997 10/16/1997 10/16/1997 10/17/1997 10/17/1997 10/17/1997 10/20/1997 10/21/1997 10/21/1997 10/22/1997
10/23/1997 11/25/1997 11/28/1997 12/04/1997 12/04/1997 12/12/1997

132 REPLY by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to response to motion for sanctions [118-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/16/1997)
133 Sur-REPLY by plaintiff EEOC to response to motion for partial summary judgment [78-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/16/1997)
134 APPENDIX filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg filed as DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL in support of Defendant's Reply Brief in support of motion for sanctions [118-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/16/1997)
135 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for order for expedited consideration of Mitsubishi's motion for sanctions (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/17/1997)
136 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to Defendant's motion for leave to file reply brief in support of its motion for sanctions [118-1] by plaintiff EEOC (hard copy of fax document #131) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 10/17/1997 (Entered: 10/17/1997)
137 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to substitute original affidavit (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/17/1997)
138 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to motion for order for expedited consideration of Mitsubishi's motion for sanctions [135-1] (FAX DOCUMENT) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/20/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to substitute original affidavit [137-1] (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 10/21/1997)
139 AFFIDAVIT of Professor Irving J Rein (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 10/21/1997)
140 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to motion for order for expedited consideration of Mitsubishi's motion for sanctions [135-1] and Supplemental Affidvit in Support of Motion for Sanctions (hard copy of fax document #138) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1997)
141 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade denying motion for sanctions [118-1] and denying as moot motion for order for expedited consideration of Mitsubishi's motion for sanctions [135-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1997)
142 NOTICE by Alison Marshall attorney for defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg of change of address (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 11/28/1997)
143 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file instanter documents under seal w/proposed documents (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 12/01/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file instanter documents under seal w/proposed documents [143-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1997)
144 SEALED DOCUMENT - Executed Copy of EXHIBIT 41 filed in support of EEOC's Memorandum in Opposition to Mitsubishi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (stored in Vault) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1997)
145 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file, instanter, recent decision in further support of EEOC's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1997)

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12/15/1997
12/18/1997
12/24/1997 01/05/1998 01/05/1998
01/07/1998 01/07/1998 01/08/1998 01/15/1998 01/15/1998
01/15/1998 01/15/1998 01/20/1998

MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file, instanter, recent decision in further support of EEOC's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [145-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/16/1997)
146 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to motion for leave to file, instanter, recent decision in further support of EEOC's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [145-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/19/1997)
147 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file instanter reply to Mitsubishi's Memorandum in Response (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/24/1997)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file instanter reply to Mitsubishi's Memorandum in Response [147-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/05/1998)
148 REPLY by plaintiff EEOC to response to motion for leave to file, instanter, recent decision in further support of EEOC's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [145-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/05/1998)
149 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file instanter surreply to Plaintiff EEOC's Reply (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/07/1998)
150 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its surreply to Plaintiff EEOC's reply (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/07/1998)
151 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to Defendant's motion for leave to file instanter surreply to Plaintiff EEOC's Reply [149-1] by plaintiff EEOC (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/08/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade ;Telephone Status hearing set 1:15 PM, Friday, 1/23/98 (court to set up call) (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/15/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for leave to file instanter surreply to Plaintiff EEOC's Reply [149-1], granting motion for leave to file materials under seal in connection with its surreply to Plaintiff EEOC's reply [150-1] (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/15/1998)
152 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg [70-1] (filed as Defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc's Surreply to Plaintiff EEOC's Reply) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/16/1998)
153 LETTERs of 10/16/97 & 10/23/97 from Osamu Ito to Art Zintek in support of Defendant's Surreply to EEOC's Reply (#145) (FILED UNDER SEAL) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/16/1998)
154 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade denying motion for partial summary judgment [78-1]; granting motion for leave to file first amended complaint [93-1]. Further Ordered that the five legal and procedural questions raised by Mitsubishi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be CERTIFIED for immediate interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 USC

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01/20/1998 01/23/1998 01/29/1998
03/23/1998 03/25/1998 04/01/1998

Sec 1292(b). Court's ruling on EEOC's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (#93) is not being certified. The parties have 10 days from the date of this Order in which to file such an appeal. In the event that an interlocutory appeal is filed, this case shall be STAYED pending its outcome. In the event that the Court's Order is not appealed, a status conference setting new discovery and trial dates will be set, and all parties will receive notice of this converence by mail. Current discovery dates remain in effect until that notice; but the pretrial order due 2/2/98, the pretrial conference set 2/16/98, and the jury trial date of 3/2/98 are hereby cancelled. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/20/1998)
155 AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiff EEOC; jury demand [1-1] (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/20/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present via phone by Attys Hendrickson/Kamp/Levine/Caiola/Brennan/ Connolly and Marshall for telephone Status hearing held 1:15 1/23/98 . Discussion re: discovery while case on appeal. Parties to submit proposed order re: completion of outstanding written discovery. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/23/1998)
156 STIPULATED ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade Ordered that with only the following limited exceptions this CASE is STAYED pending the outcome of the appeal to USCA. The exceptions are as follows: (1)Defendant shall continue to produce to the EEOC the (a) Group Leader Logs, (b) Floor Files, and (c) Discipline Files or Personnel Files, as applicable, as previously identified by the EEOC to Defendant, the production of which has been ongoing; (2) At the close of all briefing required by the appeal to USCA, each party shall resume responding to any written discovery, including any interrogatories and documents requests, outstanding as of 1/20/98. To the extent that there are differences between the parties concerning any objections interposed to discovery, the parties shall meet to resolve those differences. There shall, however, be no discovery motion practice during the pendency of the stay. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/29/1998)
157 USCA Order: Before the Court: Petition for Permission to Appeal Under 28 USC Sec 1292(b) and Opposition of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to Petition for Permission to Appeal. We are persuaded at this time that acceptance of this appeal would not serve to "materially advance the ultimate termination of the littigation." Accordingly, it is ordered that the Petition is Denied. (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade ;Telephone Status hearing set Wed., 4/1/98 at 1:30 PM (court to set up call) (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 03/25/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present via phone by Attys Henrickson/Kamp/Levine/Gibbs/Brennan/ Connolly/Marshall/Haddad/Brandt for Status hearing held 4/1/98 . Discussion by counsel re: length of trial. Discussion re: possible mediation/arbitration/appointment of Special Master and possible settlement. Parties each to submit within 7 days (misc ddl set 4/10/98) three names for possible special master. Court is LIFTING STAY of case, but discovery stay remains in effect pending possible settlement. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/02/1998)

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04/10/1998 04/10/1998 04/14/1998 04/15/1998 04/16/1998
04/16/1998
05/29/1998
06/08/1998 06/11/1998 06/18/1998 06/18/1998
06/23/1998 06/23/1998 06/23/1998

158 NOTICE by plaintiff EEOC filed as Plaintiff EEOC's List of Names for Special Master (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/10/1998)
159 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (filed in letter form) regarding candidates for appointment as a Special Master (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/13/1998)
160 Official Court Reporters TRANSCRIPT of 4/1/98 hearing filed (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 04/14/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade. Case is set for Telephone Status hearing at 9:00am on Thursday, 4/16/98; via phone, Court to set up the call. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 04/15/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present via phone by Attys Kamp/Levine/Caiola/Connolly for Status hearing held 4/16/98 re: appointment of special master. Court will appoint Abner J. Mikva as special master. No objection by parties. Order to enter. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/16/1998)
161 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade Court hereby appoints former Federal Appellate Court Judge Abner Mikva to serve as a Special Master for 30 days from the date of this Order for the limited purpose of attempting to resolve this case short of trial. This matter is set for a telephone Status hearing on Fri., 5/29/98 at 2:30 PM (court to set up call) to review the progress made by the parties and the Special Master. If the settlement negotiation has failed to achieve full resolution of the issues in this case, the Court will set a schedule for trial at that time. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/17/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade. Attys Hendrickson & Connolly Jr present via phone for Status hearing. Same held 2:30 5/29/98. Case is set for further Status hearing at 1:30pm on Thursday, 6/18/98; via phone, Court to call. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 05/29/1998)
162 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by Noelle Brennan for plaintiff EEOC (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 06/08/1998)
163 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg for order for entry of consent decree (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/11/1998)
164 LETTER to Court from Special Master Abner J. Mikva re: settlement (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/18/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present via phone by Attys Hendrickson/Kamp/Marshall/Haddad for Status hearing held 6/18/98. Discussion re: fairness hearing. Hearing on motion for order for entry of consent decree [163-1] set 1:30 PM (CDT) on Tues., 6/23/98 (in person in Peoria) (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/18/1998)
165 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Rule 19 parties UAW, and Local 2488 UAW (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1998)
166 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Rule 19 parties UAW, and Local 2488 UAW (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present in open court by Attys Hendrickson/Kamp/Levine/Brennan/

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06/23/1998 06/24/1998 06/25/1998
06/25/1998 06/26/1998 01/11/1999 06/17/1999 06/17/1999 06/17/1999 06/18/1999

Moore-Gibbs/Connolly/Marshall/Garcia for hearing on motion for entry of the consent decree. Court allows International Union, UAW and its Local Union 2488 to intervene as Rule 19 parties. Entry of appearance by UAW filed. Argument by counsel re: entry of consent decree. Court is granting motion for order for entry of consent decree [163-1] . Consent Decree signed by Judge in open court, filed and entered. Plaintiff requests that signature pages be substituted (pages 39/39) for orignal signatures; same allowed and original signatures placed in Consent Decree. Parties request a special master re: consent decree - same granted and court appoints Mary Lee Leahy as Special Master. Case terminated. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1998)
167 ORDER (Consent Decree) by Judge Joe B. McDade (See Decree) (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1998)
168 JUDGMENT in a civil case entered - Ordered that in accordance with the terms set forth in the Consent Decree entered 6/23/98 this action is dismissed with prejudice. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 01/22/2001 (Entered: 06/25/1998)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade - The Clerk is directed to contact counsel to determine if counsel has any objection to the shredding of all sealed documents filed in this matter. If counsel has no objection, Clerk is directed to remove the sealed documents from the vault and shred them, along with all copies of sealed documents which were provided for court use. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/25/1998)
Remark - Pursuant to conversation with Atty Walter Collolly, Clerk's Office was given permission to shred all sealed documents submitted by defendants (originals and copies). Same shredded this date (document nos. 86, 121, 134, 144 & 153) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 07/07/1998)
Remark - Pursuant to telephone conversation with Atty Steven Levine, EEOC requests that all sealed documents submitted by Plaintiff remain under seal until expiration of the consent decree (6/23/2001). Document Nos. 104 & 111 will remain sealed in vault until that time. (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 07/07/1998)
169 LETTER to Court and Counsel from Mary Lee Leahy (Special Master) regarding review of objections to settlement (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/11/1999)
170 Unopposed MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for order for approval of the Allocation of the Settlement Fund Among Eligible Claimants (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
171 SEALED EXHIBITS for plaintiff EEOC in connection with Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Approval of Allocation of the Settlement Fund Among Eligible Claimants stored in Vault(SH, ilcd) Modified on 03/20/2000 (Entered: 06/17/1999)
172 Unopposed MOTION by Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to amend consent decree (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Chief Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion to amend consent decree [172-1]-consent decree amended as requested. Further, the Court will hold a hearing on the EEOC's Unopposed motion for order for approval of

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06/24/1999
07/06/1999 07/19/1999
12/21/1999 09/06/2000 02/02/2001 02/05/2001
05/23/2001 05/23/2001

the Allocation of the Settlement Fund Among Eligible Claimants [170-1] at 2:15pm on Thursday, 6/24/99;in person, in Peoria. At that time, any objections by claimants who have not executed releases will be heard; failure to appear and present objections at that time will result in the waiver of such objections. The Court directs the EEOC to notify any remaining claimants who have not yet executed releases of this hearing and their obligation to appear in order to have their objections heard. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 06/18/1999)
MINUTE-ENTRY: by Chief Judge Joe B. McDade Parties present in open court by Attys Henrickson/Levine/Brennon on behalf of Pla; Dft not present nor represented by counsel for hearing on Motion for Order for Approval of the Allocation of the Settlement Fund. Court advised of status of settlement. Court is granting motion for order for approval of the Allocation of the Settlement Fund Among Eligible Claimants [170-1] and gives final approval to the Allocation of the Settlement Fund to Eligible Claimants. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 06/25/1999 (Entered: 06/25/1999)
173 LETTER from Chief Judge McDade dated 7/6/99 sent certified mail to George Wood filed under seal (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/07/1999)
MINUTE-ENTRY:by Chief Judge Joe B. McDade. EEOC Attys Hendrickson & Levine, Atty Wood for payment agent present via phone for emergency hearing re:status of remaining payout to settlement claimant. Same held. AMENDMENT 8/5/99: in that Payment Agent is ordered to make payout to remaining claimant immediately. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) Modified on 08/05/1999 (Entered: 07/20/1999)
174 STATUS REPORT - filed as One-Year Report to the Parties and the Court by Consent Decree Monitors (George F. Galland, Jr., Joyce E. Tucker and Nancy B. Kreieter) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 12/21/1999)
175 Two-Year STATUS REPORT to the Parties and the Court from the Consent Decree Monitors (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 09/06/2000)
176 Unopposed MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for entry of an order providing for payment of amount remaining in the settlement fund to YWCA of McLean County (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 02/02/2001)
177 ORDER by Chief Judge Joe B. McDade granting motion for entry of an order providing for payment of amount remaining in the settlement fund to YWCA of McLean County [176-1]. Pursuant to Paragraph 40 of the Consent Decree entered on 6/23/98, it is hereby ordered that Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America jointly instruct Payment Agent to pay the remainder of the Settlement Fund to: YWCA of McLean County, 1202 N. Hersey Road, Bloomington, IL 61704-3619 (cc: all counsel) (S, ilcd) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
178 Final STATUS REPORT to the parties and the Court by Consent Decree Monitors (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
179 NOTICE of Filing re: Final Report to the Parties and the Court by the Consent Decree Monitors (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/23/2001)

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 EEOC CHAIRMAN COMMENTS ON LAWSUIT AGAINST MITSU...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-22-96.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 22, 1996

CONTACT:

Claire Gonzales Reginald Welch (202) 663-4900 TDD: (202) 663-4494

EEOC CHAIRMAN COMMENTS ON LAWSUIT AGAINST
MITSUBISHI

WASHINGTON -- Gilbert F. Casellas, Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), issued the following statement today regarding the EEOC's pending lawsuit against Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc.:
The EEOC stands by the lawsuit it filed against Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. on April 9, 1996. This lawsuit alleges a pattern of egregious and pervasive sexual harassment and retaliation at Mitsubishi's Normal, Ill., plant. It was based on a thorough investigation which extended well over a year and involved interviews of more than 100 current and former employees. The lawsuit was filed only after efforts to resolve these matters out of court failed.
The media has chronicled an aggressive and coordinated effort by Mitsubishi to discredit both this litigation and the EEOC. I understand that Mitsubishi management has informed employees that their jobs are threatened by the EEOC's lawsuit and has installed phones in the plant for employees to use to make free telephone calls to Congress, the President, and the press about the case. Today, Mitsubishi is sponsoring an all-expenses-paid trip for employees and their families to protest at our office in Chicago. It has been reported that employees will be excused from their normal shifts and Mitsubishi will pay them at their regular wage to participate in the demonstration. Employees who do not join the bus trip will be required to work. As many as three thousand persons may participate.
Mitsubishi and its employees are certainly free to express their opinions in any lawful manner. However, the EEOC will not be intimidated from pursuing this litigation. While we remain open to the possibility of settlement, we are fully prepared to take this case to trial where a jury drawn from the community will decide its outcome.

This page was last modified on January 15, 1997.

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7/3/2007 4:06 PM

 
 EEOC RESPONDS TO FINAL REPORT OF MITSUBISHI CONSEN...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-23-01.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE MAY 23, 2001

CONTACT: John C. Hendrickson Regional Attorney EEOC Chicago District Office (312) 353-8551
TTY: (312) 353-2421

EEOC RESPONDS TO FINAL REPORT OF MITSUBISHI CONSENT DECREE MONITORS

Commission Says Control of Sexual Harassment in Future May Depend on Auto Maker's Adoption of Recommendations
CHICAGO - The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) said that it was encouraged by the final report of the Mitsubishi Consent Decree Monitors filed today with Chief Judge Joe B. McDade of the federal District Court in Peoria, Illinois. The report is in accordance with the Consent Decree which resolved the federal agency's landmark sexual harassment case against Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America (No. 96-1192). The Consent Decree, entered June 23, 1998, provided for payment of $34 million to the victims of sexual harassment at Mitsubishi's facility in Normal, Illinois, for wide-ranging injunctive relief, and for the creation of a blue-ribbon panel of monitors to track Mitsubishi's efforts to comply with the Decree.
The $34 million in monetary relief provided for by the Consent Decree was the largest sexual harassment settlement in the history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The amount was distributed to more than 400 women, many of whom still work at Mitsubishi. The Decree has a three year term and, unless extended, expires June 23, 2001.
Today's final report, authored by the monitors, concludes: "Both Mitsubishi and EEOC should be extremely pleased with the overall progress Mitsubishi has made during the three years of the Consent Decree. While its program...has not been free of problems, we believe Mitsubishi has exhibited a strong commitment to preventing and controlling sexual and sex-based harassment in the workplace. Serious incidents of sexual harassment are rare."
John C. Hendrickson, regional attorney of EEOC's Chicago District Office and the leader of the agency's litigation team, said, "The report of the monitors confirms that, although our litigation and the Consent Decree did not create a perfect world at Mitsubishi, they did make a huge and positive difference in the daily work life of many women."
Hendrickson added: "By any measure, EEOC's effort in this case has been a success not only for the agency but also for the company and its employees. The test now is whether the company can maintain and build upon its success by continuing to implement the recommendations of the monitors. The future at Mitsubishi is now truly in the company's own hands. We hope it will resist complacency and back-sliding and will continue its efforts to become a model employer."
The monitor's report, while noting that Mitsubishi's "Normal plant in many ways is a different place than it was three years ago," also "remind[s] the company of the need to remain vigilant and proactive" in combating sexual harassment. In order to do so, the monitors say, the company should continue the Opportunity Programs Department, responsible for dealing with complaints of sexual harassment, and other new practices which were put in place under the Consent Decree.
The monitors state in the report: "We believe that the investigation, monitoring, tracking, enforcement and follow-up mechanisms that were established and have worked well under the Decree are necessary to prevent retrogression. We recommend that those measures remain in place. In addition, we cannot stress too strongly the continued need for the existence of an adequately staffed, adequately funded, and independent Opportunity Programs Department."
The monitors are Nancy B. Kreiter, Research Director of Women Employed in Chicago; Joyce E. Tucker, formerly an EEOC Commissioner and now a principal of Tucker Spearman & Associates in Alexandria, Virginia; and George F. Galland, Jr., a member of the Miner, Barnhill & Galland, P.C. law firm in Chicago.
John P. Rowe, director of EEOC's Chicago District Office, said, "The experience, expertise, and integrity of the Consent Decree monitors are all beyond dispute. They have worked hard to measure Mitsubishi's performance under the Decree. When they tell us that things have changed for the better at Mitsubishi, we have confidence in their assessment and are encouraged about the future for women at that plant."
Rowe continued, "We at EEOC always believed in our investigation, in our litigation, and in the Consent Decree which we were finally able to put in place with the cooperation of the company. Today's report demonstrates that our belief was well founded."
EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which protects workers 40 and older; the Equal Pay Act, which bars sex-based differences in compensation; the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits

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discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; prohibitions against discrimination affecting persons with disabilities in the federal government; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on its Web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on May 23.

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7/3/2007 4:07 PM

 
 EEOC SCORES MAJOR VICTORY IN MITSUBISHI LAWSUIT

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/1-21-98.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Wednesday, January 21, 1998

CONTACT: Jean P. Kamp (312) 353-7582
Steven J. Levine (312) 353-7649
Reginald Welch (202) 663-4900

EEOC SCORES MAJOR VICTORY IN MITSUBISHI LAWSUIT

CHICAGO -- The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) scored a major legal victory yesterday in its class action sexual harassment lawsuit against Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. Ruling in EEOC's favor, Federal District Court Judge Joe Billy McDade held that the agency could pursue its sexual harassment lawsuit as a class action "pattern or practice" suit. Mitsubishi had argued that a class action "pattern or practice" approach was not workable in the sexual harassment context, and sought to require EEOC to litigate the case, involving more than 300 victims, on a person-to-person basis.
In its sweeping decision, the Court also rejected a number of procedural arguments raised by Mitsubishi in its efforts to derail the lawsuit.
John C. Hendrickson, EEOC's Regional Attorney in the agency's Chicago District Office, said, "This decision constitutes a significant victory not only for EEOC in this lawsuit, but for all plaintiffs who have been victims of sexual harassment. This is the first court that has addressed directly the question of whether Title VII authorizes 'pattern or practice' suits in the sexual harassment context. The court answered this question with an emphatic 'yes'."
Hendrickson added: "This decision will make it easier for women to pursue class action lawsuits for sexual harassment and make it more difficult for employees to engage in 'scorched earth' litigation tactics to deter women from pursuing class action sexual harassment claims. While we are still in the process of digesting the Court's scholarly and well-supported opinion, it doubtless constitutes a major victory for the rights of victims of sexual harassment."
C. Gregory Stewart, EEOC's General Counsel, noted that EEOC's lawsuit against Mitsubishi was only one of a number of sexual harassment suits that are currently pending in the federal courts. "The Court's acceptance of a 'pattern or practice' model in the sexual harassment context will go far in assisting plaintiffs in the litigation of these types of cases," Stewart said.
At the conclusion of his decision, Judge McDade urged the parties to pursue settlement in this case, noting that further conciliation efforts "may appear more attractive to Mitsubishi given the developments in the litigation."
EEOC Chairman Paul M. Igasaki stated, "The EEOC is extremely pleased by Judge McDade's decision and hopes that it will send a strong signal to Mitsubishi. EEOC believes the decision confirms the agency's approach in this important challenge to employment discrimination."
EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which prohibits discrimination against individuals 40 years of age or older; sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the Equal Pay Act; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; and the Rehabilitation Act's prohibitions against disability discrimination in the federal government.

This page was last modified on January 21, 1998.

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7/3/2007 4:07 PM

 
 MONITORS SAY MITSUBISHI IN COMPLIANCE WITH EEOC C...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-6-00.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Wednesday, September 6, 2000

CONTACT: John C. Hendrickson (312) 353-8551 John P. Rowe (312) 353-8550
TTY: (312) 353-2421

MONITORS SAY MITSUBISHI IN COMPLIANCE WITH EEOC CONSENT DECREE; SEXUAL HARASSMENT 'FIRMLY
UNDER CONTROL' AT U.S. PLANT

CHICAGO -- Monitors watching over efforts of Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. to combat sexual harassment and to obey the Consent Decree which resolved the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) landmark lawsuit against the company reported today to the Federal District Court in Peoria, Illinois, that: "Mitsubishi is in compliance with the Decree, has sexual harassment in the plant firmly under control, and has made commendable progress in improving its systems for preventing such behavior and dealing with it appropriately when it occurs."
The monitors were appointed by District Judge Joe Billy McDade in the Consent Decree he entered on June 23, 1998, which brought to an end the largest sexual harassment case in the history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Decree required Mitsubishi to pay $34 million to the victims of sexual harassment identified by EEOC, enjoined the company from permitting sexual harassment or retaliating against women who complain, and required the company to implement procedures to deal effectively with any harassment which arose in the future. The Decree provided that the team of three monitors would periodically assess whether the changes required by the Decree are actually being carried out by Mitsubishi.
"I applaud the job that the Decree monitors are doing and share their cautionary note that Mitsubishi must not become complacent with their success, but must firmly secure its progress to ensure a harassment-free work environment well beyond the three-year life of the Decree," said EEOC Chairwoman Ida L. Castro. "While this report shows that Mitsubishi has made substantial progress in ridding pervasive sexual harassment from its workplace, the Commission will remain vigilant in monitoring its employment practices in accordance with the landmark settlement of two years ago."
The monitors, who submitted their second annual report under the Decree, are Nancy B. Kreiter, Research Director of Women Employed in Chicago; George F. Galland, Jr., an attorney in the Chicago law firm of Miner, Barnhill & Galland; and Joyce E. Tucker, formerly a Commissioner of EEOC and now a member of the consulting firm of Tucker, Spearman & Associates of Alexandria, Virginia.
The report says:
"We [the monitors] have had continuous dealing with [Mitsubishi] management. We have been provided extensive documentation by the company, including, among many other subjects, copies of complaints of sexual and sex-based harassment and related retaliation and the company's reports of the investigations into and follow-up on those complaints. We have visited the plant on a number of occasions . . . when we conducted extensive interviews with plant employees. We observed the sexual harassment training for associates . . . and for supervisors."
"Today . . . we remain confident that sexual harassment remains firmly under control at the plant and that [Mitsubishi] is in compliance under the Consent Decree."
The report continues:
"Despite the fact that we believe that very little sexual harassment is occurring at the plant, and that sexual harassment is dealt with appropriately when brought to management's attention, as a result of increased responsibilities and the increased scope of [line supervisors'] duties, we have some concern . . . The company cannot let down its guard in the control of harassment, which requires vigilance. . ."
"The challenge for [Mitsubishi] now is to institutionalize these systems [for preventing and dealing

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with sexual harassment] so that when the Decree expires a year from now, the company can continue the significant progress it has made."
John C. Hendrickson, Regional Attorney in EEOC's Chicago District Office and lead counsel for the government in the Mitsubishi case, said, "The test of success for EEOC in the Mitsubishi case has always been comparable to the two-sides of a coin. On one side was monetary relief to compensate for the harm done in the past. Thirty-four million dollars is the most ever in a sexual harassment case and surely counts as a major success. On the other side -- equally important is putting a stop to sexual harassment in the workplace itself, making a concrete change for the employees of today and tomorrow. The monitors are telling us that this kind of change is a reality at Mitsubishi. That, I believe, means that EEOC has had a real success here."
Hendrickson said that EEOC believed the experience of the monitors and the way they worked under the Consent Decree was particularly significant. "This is not, as I have said before, a blue-ribbon panel designed to conduct drive-by inspections and issue once-over-lightly reports which go nowhere and say nothing. Under this Consent Decree, the monitors all of whom have distinguished real-world records were expected to dig in at the plant, spend time there, and assess what is actually going on."
"Their report," Henrickson added, "including its recommendations for further improvement, shows they have been doing their job. More than that, it shows that this kind of monitoring process can be an efficient and effective way for both EEOC and employers to get on top of the most difficult problems of employment discrimination."
John P. Rowe, EEOC District Director in Chicago, said, "It is always fair to ask of us at EEOC whether what we are doing makes a difference. What we are learning from the Consent Decree monitors is very positive. Not only have women who suffered from sexual harassment been provided relief, but their sisters and daughters who go into jobs at Mitsubishi today and tomorrow will be going into a very different workplace. Under the impetus of the Consent Decree and the guidance of the monitors, the company appears to have made a real change for the better. That is making a difference."
EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Equal Pay Act; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; prohibitions against discrimination affecting individuals with disabilities in the federal government; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on the agency's web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on September 6, 2000.

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7/3/2007 4:08 PM

 
 MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING AND EEOC REACH ...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-11-98.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Thursday, June 11, 1998

For:

EEOC

Contact: John Hendrickson

(312) 353-8551

Jean Kamp

(312) 353-7582

For:

MMMA

Contact: Gael O'Brien

(309) 888-8201

MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING AND EEOC REACH VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT TO SETTLE HARASSMENT SUIT

NORMAL AND CHICAGO, ILL. -- Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. (MMMA) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced today that they have reached a $34 million settlement, subject to court approval, that resolves all claims in the lawsuit filed on April 9, 1996, by the EEOC on behalf of a class of current and former MMMA employees who were subjected to an alleged pattern and practice of sexual harassment at MMMA's Normal, Illinois, manufacturing plant since 1990.
The terms of the settlement are in a proposed Consent Decree to be submitted to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, and will be in effect for three years from the date of final Court approval.
At the joint request of the parties, U.S. District Court Judge Joe Billy McDade appointed a "special master," Judge Abner Mikva, on April 16, 1998, to facilitate settlement discussion which led to the proposed Consent Decree.
Judge Mikva said: "This is a fair settlement designed to accelerate the creation of a workplace that is free of sexual harassment. The lawyers representing Mitsubishi and the EEOC did an outstanding job of representing their interests. They insisted on principle, but recognized the need to find common ground. This is a win-win situation for the company, for the EEOC and, most of all, for the employees."
Kohei Ikuta, Executive Vice-President of MMMA, said: "MMMA and the EEOC share the same goal -- to have a harassment-free workplace for our employees. Over the last 20 months, we have been instituting best practices and training programs to further our commitment to address and prevent harassment in the workplace."
Mr. Ikuta continued: "With today's settlement, our company takes significant further steps to accelerate the progress toward the type of workplace environment we have been working to create, free of harassment or discrimination of any kind. We are moving forward -- women and men, management and employees -- to work together to have the best possible workplace and to build the best cars possible for our customers.
"We want to reaffirm today what we have said previously: we have had problems involving sexual harassment which required correction and we extend our sincere regret to any woman who has been harmed. But today we are moving forward. The goal of today's settlement with the EEOC is to enhance our commitment that our workplace environment achieves our goal of zero tolerance of sexual harassment. We acknowledge and respect the EEOC's authority to pursue equal employment opportunity and we look forward to working with the EEOC as a partner in our progress."
Paul M. Igasaki, Chairman of the EEOC, said: "The people of the United States have looked to all of their institutions -- the government, our employers, and our labor unions -- to act decisively to stop the serious problem of sexual harassment. By now agreeing to pay $34 million, the largest amount ever paid in resolution of a sexual harassment case, and to work with the panel of Decree Monitors, MMMA is demonstrating that it stands ready to so act. Perhaps the most important aspect of this settlement is what happens from this day forward. On that score, I am hopeful that with continued effort and vigilance the problems at Mitsubishi will be a thing of the past."
Karsuhiko Kawasoe, President of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, the parent company of MMMA, said: "We are pleased that MMMA has reached a resolution with the EEOC in this matter. This is the right business decision in order to be able to move forward. We support MMMA's future efforts in working with the EEOC to carry out the terms of the Consent Decree."
EEOC General Counsel C. Gregory Stewart said: "The importance of the injunctive, non-monetary relief elements of this settlement -- whether the monitors, the `zero tolerance' policy, the training, or other items -- cannot be overestimated. We have all been around too long to believe that anything is absolutely certain, but we at EEOC

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http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-11-98.html

are optimistic that MMMA's agreement to the terms of the proposed Consent Decree announced today will make concrete differences in the day to day life of the dedicated line workers at Mitsubishi. If we are right about this, then the consequences for both the mission of our agency and the objectives of the business community can be huge."
John C. Hendrickson, EEOC's Regional Attorney in Chicago and lead counsel for the government, said: "The litigation of this case and the negotiations which produced today's settlement have been as tough and rigorous as any I have experienced. But just as the heat of fire tempers the strongest steel, the rigor of this litigation has forged a decree with real strength."
Hendrickson added: "It provides immediate compensation to women who suffered discrimination, it provides protection for them inside the work place, and it ensures fairness and cooperation and dignity for everybody on the line at Mitsubishi. These are the things that the federal employment discrimination laws and the public interest are all about. This is a good result."
According to the proposed Consent Decree, MMMA will pay $34 million, which will be distributed among all eligible claimants, as defined in the proposed Consent Decree. In the proposed Consent Decree, which MMMA entered into voluntarily and which formally enjoins MMMA, the Company agreed that it will revise as necessary its existing sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure to ensure that it continues to encourage employees to come forward with complaints about violations of MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives. MMMA further agrees that it will continue its best efforts to investigate all complaints of sexual harassment within three weeks and prepare its written findings of the results of each investigation and remedial actions proposed seven days thereafter. As part of the settlement, MMMA will continue to provide mandatory sexual harassment training to employees.
The Company has voluntarily agreed to the appointment of a three-person panel of Decree Monitors to oversee the execution of the steps included in the settlement for the duration of the proposed Consent Decree. The Decree Monitors will work as a team to review the policies and practices to ensure that they meet MMMA's Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives. The Decree Monitors will complete their review and evaluation within one year after their appointment and will provide continuing review and evaluation of ongoing employment policies and practices related to the Zero-Tolerance Policy and will provide a final written report to MMMA, the EEOC, and the Court.
Additionally, one of the three Decree Monitors will serve as the Complaint Monitor who will monitor, for the duration of the proposed Consent Decree, the investigation and resolution of complaints alleging violations of MMMA's sexual harassment policy.
Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, manufactures the Mitsubishi Eclipse, Eclipse Spyder convertible and Galant, and the Dodge Avenger and Chrysler Sebring.
EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which prohibits discrimination against individuals 40 years of age or older; sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the Equal Pay Act; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; and the Rehabilitation Act's prohibitions against disability discrimination in the federal government.
This page was last modified on June 11, 1998.

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 Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      1  of  57
U.S. District Court CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (Peoria) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:94−cv−01545−MMM

11,CLOSED

Evans, et al v. Mitsubishi Motors, et al Assigned to: Judge Michael M. Mihm Demand: $0 Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights Plaintiff Linda Evans TERMINATED: 11/18/1997
Plaintiff Terry Paz TERMINATED: 11/19/1997

Date Filed: 12/15/1994 Date Terminated: 03/25/1999 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder GARRISON PHELAN LEVIN−EPSTEIN &PENZEL 405 Orange Str New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 777−4425 TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison GARRISON PHELAN LEVIN−EPSTEIN &PENZEL 405 Orange Str New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 777−4425 TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter GARRISON PHELAN LEVIN−EPSTEIN &PENZEL 405 Orange Str New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 777−4425 TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi BENASSI &BENASSI PC 300 NE Perry Ave Peoria, IL 61603 (309) 674−3556 Fax: 674−7989 Email: patricia@benassi.com TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr MINER BARNHILL &GALLAND 14 W Erie St

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      2  of  57

Chicago, IL 60610 312−751−1170 Fax: 312−751−0438 Email: ggalland@lawmbg.com TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A Slevin VONACHEN LAWLESS TRAGER &SLEVIN Ste 425 456 Fulton St Peoria, IL 61602 309−676−8986 Fax: 309−676−4130 Email: jslevin@vltslaw.com TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Margaret Bajic TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      3  of  57

Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kim Becker TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Betty Blue TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia C Benassi (See above for address)

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      4  of  57

TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christine Bonesteel TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Nellie Ray Boswell TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      5  of  57

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Desiree Cawthon TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Margaret A Coleman TERMINATED: 03/09/1998

represented by Margaret A Coleman #3 Park Drive North Pekin, IL 61554 PRO SE
Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/09/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/20/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/09/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/09/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      6  of  57

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/20/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall D Schmidt EDWIN F MANDEL LEGAL AID CLINIC 6020 S University Ave Chicago, IL 60637 (773) 702−9611 TERMINATED: 03/09/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Michelle Colvin TERMINATED: 11/19/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Karen Eslinger TERMINATED: 11/19/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      7  of  57

Plaintiff Debra Emmons TERMINATED: 11/18/1997
Plaintiff Lori Farris TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      8  of  57

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Darlene Feiste

represented by Darlene Feiste 614 Indianapolis Bloomington, IL 61701 (309) 829−1082 PRO SE
Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A Allison ALLISON &MOSBY−SCOTT 210 1/2 N Williamsburg Drive Bloomington, IL 61704 (309) 662−5084 Fax: 662−2994 Email: WAA05@aol.com TERMINATED: 05/01/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      9  of  57

Plaintiff Allene Gregory TERMINATED: 11/18/1997
Plaintiff Lori Hampton TERMINATED: 11/19/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      10  of  57

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Sylvia Hampton TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Deanna Hasler TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      11  of  57

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Pat Hosea TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Elizabeth Keefe TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      12  of  57

Plaintiff Patricia Kich TERMINATED: 11/18/1997
Plaintiff Christine McGrath TERMINATED: 11/18/1997
Plaintiff

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      13  of  57

Jenny Mallicoat TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robbin Mattingly TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christina Morris TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address)

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      14  of  57

TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Cledith Wellenreiter TERMINATED: 12/02/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Debbie Bledsoe TERMINATED: 11/19/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      15  of  57

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Julia Cosby TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      16  of  57

Stacy Jackson TERMINATED: 11/18/1997

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Petitioner Terry Paz TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Petitioner Lori Hampton TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Petitioner

represented by John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Anthony Riley P O Box 3129 Peoria, IL 61612 (309) 686−4444 TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Anthony Riley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

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Michelle Colvin TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Anthony Riley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner
Karen Eslinger TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Anthony Riley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner
Debbie Bledsoe suing as Deborah Bledsoe TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by John A Slevin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Anthony Riley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Steven J Levine EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Ste 2800 500 W Madison St Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 353−7659 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Diamond Star Motors Inc sued as Diamond Star Motors Corporation TERMINATED: 09/12/1995

represented by Roy G Davis DAVIS &CAMPBELL LLC Suite 1600 401 Main St Peoria, IL 61602−1241 309−673−1681

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Fax: 309−673−1690 Email: rgdavis@dcamplaw.com TERMINATED: 09/12/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America formerly known as Diamond Star Motors Inc

represented by Alison B Marshall MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK &STONE PLC Suite 1150 1900 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 429−5575 Fax: 331−1118 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clara G DeQuick MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK &STONE PLC 150 W Jefferson Av Ste 2500 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 963−6420 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donna J Donati MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK &STONE PLC 150 W Jefferson Av Ste 2500 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 963−6420 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith J Braskich DAVIS &CAMPBELL LLC Suite 1600 401 Main St Peoria, IL 61602−1241 309−673−1681 Fax: 309−673−1690 Email: Kjbraskich@dcamplaw.com TERMINATED: 11/12/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter W Brandt LIVINGSTON BARGER BRANDT &SCHROEDER 115 W Jefferson St Suite 400 P O Box 3457 Bloomington, IL 61702−3457 309−828−5281 Fax: 309−827−3432 Email: pbrandt@lbbs.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roy G Davis (See above for address)

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TERMINATED: 11/12/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter B Connolly , Jr MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK &STONE PLC 150 W Jefferson Av Ste 2500 Detroit, MI 48226 313 (496−7503) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yvonne R Haddad MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK &STONE PLC Suite 1150 1900 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 429−5575 Fax: 331−1118 TERMINATED: 06/24/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Respondent Patricia C Benassi TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Respondent George F Galland, Jr TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Respondent Joseph Golden TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi

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(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Respondent
Joseph Garrison TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Respondent
Mary Anne Sedey TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Respondent
David A Kotzian TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor
Peoria Journal Star TERMINATED: 12/12/1996

represented by Jeffrey B Rock HASSELBERG ROCK BELL &KUPPLER Associated Bank Bldg Suite 200 4600 N Brandywine Dr Peoria, IL 61614−5591 (309) 688−9400 Fax: 688−9430 Email: jrock@hrbklaw.com TERMINATED: 12/12/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie L Galassi HASSELBERG ROCK BELL &KUPPLER

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Associated Bank Bldg Suite 200 4600 N Brandywine Dr Peoria, IL 61614−5591 309−688−9400 Fax: 309−688−9430 Email: jgalassi@hrbklaw.com TERMINATED: 12/12/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant
Patricia C Benassi TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant
George F Galland, Jr TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant
Joseph Golden TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant
Joseph Garrison TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Counter Claimant Mary Anne Sedey TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Counter Claimant David A Kotzian TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Counter Claimant Patricia C Benassi TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Counter Claimant George F Galland, Jr TERMINATED: 04/13/1998
Counter Claimant Joseph Golden TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address)

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TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant
Joseph Garrison TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant
Mary Anne Sedey TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant
David A Kotzian TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Counter Defendant
Terry Paz TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Defendant
Lori Hampton TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by Deborah Krauss Snyder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George F Galland , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph D Garrison (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michele Lang Palter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia C Benassi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/18/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Defendant
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by Steven J Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Defendant
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission TERMINATED: 04/13/1998

represented by Steven J Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed

# Docket Text

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12/15/1994 12/15/1994 12/15/1994 12/15/1994 12/27/1994 01/31/1995 01/31/1995 01/31/1995 01/31/1995 01/31/1995 01/31/1995 02/06/1995
02/17/1995 02/17/1995 03/08/1995 03/09/1995
03/17/1995 03/23/1995
04/07/1995

1 COMPLAINT filed; case referred to Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman (forms to attorney by Clerk.) (CL, ilcd) Modified on 11/12/1996 (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 12/15/1994)
2 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST pursuant to Local Rule 1.6 filed by plaintiff (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/15/1994)
NOTICE OF LAWSUIT ; Waiver(s) of Service due on 2/13/95 for Diamond Star Motors (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/15/1994)
FILING FEE PAID on 12/15/94 in the amount of $ 120.00 receipt # 018257. (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/20/1994)
3 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION by plaintiffs (to substitute page 16 of the complaint) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/27/1994)
4 MOTION by defendant Diamond Star Motors to dismiss Counts IV and V (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/01/1995)
5 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to dismiss Counts IV and V [4−1] by defendant Diamond Star Motors (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/01/1995)
6 MOTION by defendant Diamond Star Motors to strike (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/01/1995)
7 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to strike [6−1] by defendant Diamond Star Motors (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/01/1995)
8 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST pursuant to Local Rule 1.6 filed by defendant Diamond Star Motors (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/01/1995)
9 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Diamond Star Motors by Attorney Roy G Davis (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/01/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman setting motion to strike [6−1] at 2:00 3/9/95, setting motion to dismiss Counts IV and V [4−1] at 2:00 3/9/95 for hearing by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/06/1995)
10 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to dismiss Counts IV and V [4−1] (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/17/1995)
11 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION motion to strike [6−1] by plaintiffs (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/17/1995)
12 MOTION by plaintiff for protective order (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/08/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present via phone by Attorneys Benassi/Galland/Davis for motion hearing held on Thursday March 9, 1995, at 2:00 pm re motion to strike [6−1], re motion to dismiss Counts IV and V [4−1]. As plaintiffs confess (#4) Motion to Dismiss, Court is granting motion to dismiss Counts IV and V [4−1]. Oral argument by counsel re: Motion to Strike (#6). Court is taking under advisement on 3/9/95 motion to strike [6−1]. Court is setting motion for protective order [12−1] for motion hearing at 1:30 pm on Thursday, 3/23/95, via phone. Court to call. (cc: all counsel) (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
13 RESPONSE by defendant Diamond Star Motors to motion for protective order [12−1] (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/20/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present via phone by Attorneys Benassi/Galland/Davis for motion hearing on Thursday, March 23, 1995, at 1:30 p.m. re motion for protective order [12−1]. Same held with oral argument by counsel. Court is taking under advisement on 3/23/95 motion for protective order [12−1]. Magistrate Recommendation to issue. Court sets case for Discovery Conference/ Status hearing at 3:00 pm on Friday, 4/28/95 , via phone. Court to call. (cc: all counsel) (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 03/24/1995)
14 ORDER by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman granting motion to strike [6−1] insofar as jurisdiction under 1343(a)(3) is STRICKEN; it is DENIED in all other respects.

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04/07/1995 04/17/1995
04/18/1995 04/26/1995 04/27/1995 04/28/1995
05/03/1995 05/08/1995
06/02/1995 06/05/1995 06/05/1995 06/07/1995
06/07/1995 06/08/1995

(cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 04/07/1995)
15 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman : granting motion for protective order [12−1]. (See protective order) (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 04/07/1995)
16 SUBPOENA filed by plaintiffs Linda Evans, Terry Paz, Margaret Bajic, Kim Becker, Betty Blue, Christine Bonesteel, Nellie Ray Boswell, Desiree Cawthon, Margaret A Coleman, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Debra Emmons, Lori Farris, Darlene Feiste, Allene Gregory, Lori Hampton, Sylvia Hampton, Hasler, Pat Hosea, Elizabeth Keefe, Patricia Kich, McGrath, Jenny Mallicoat, Robbin Mattingly, Christina Morris, Cledith Wellenreiter as to Charles Kearney President UAW Local Union No 2488 (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1995)
17 OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE'S ORDER re: protective order entered 4/7/95 by defendant Diamond Star Motors (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/21/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm setting objection to Magistrate's order [17−1] at 11:00 Monday, 5/8/95 in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 04/26/1995)
18 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendant's objections to Magistrate's Protective Order [17−1] (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 05/01/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present via phone by Atys Benassi/Galland/Davis for Discovery conference. Status hearing held at 3:00 Friday, 4/28/95. Parties are to file Rule 26 plan within 10 days (by 5/12/95). Court will adopt plan upon receipt of the plan. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm; objection to Magistrate's order [17−1] is set for hearing at 11:00 5/8/95. This hearing is changed from an in person appearance to a telephone conference hearing. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 05/03/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attorneys Benassi/Davis/Galland present by phone and motion hearing re objection to protective order [17−1] held with oral arguments by counsel. Court affirms Magistrate Judge Kauffman's entry of protective order. As case progresses, deft may renew request and Court will reconsider.(cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 05/09/1995)
19 AGREED PROPOSED DISCOVERY PLAN filed by plaintiffs, defendant with notice of filing (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/05/1995)
20 MOTION by plaintiff Margaret A Coleman to withdraw attorney Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland as counsel for plaintiff Margaret Coleman (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/05/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman adopting the discovery plan [19−1] ; Discovery to be completed by 8/30/95 , ; misc ddl of 5/12/95 satisfied by discovery plan (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/06/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman setting motion to withdraw attorney Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland [20−1] at 1:30 6/20/95 by phone. Court to set up call. Counsel to give notice to pla that she may appear for the hearing if she wishes. Pla must furnish a phone number where she will be available if she decides to be present for this hearing.(cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
CORRECTED MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Minute entry of 6/5/95 states all discovery to be completed by 8/30/95 − this should read "all written discovery to be completed by 8/30/95".(cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
21 ANSWER by defendant Diamond Star Motors (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/08/1995)

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06/08/1995 06/19/1995 06/20/1995
06/21/1995 06/22/1995 07/07/1995 07/07/1995 07/11/1995
07/11/1995
07/18/1995 07/20/1995 07/21/1995 07/27/1995
07/27/1995

21 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES filed by defendant Diamond Star Motors (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/08/1995)
22 MOTION by defendant Diamond Star Motors for protective order restraining threatening and harrassing conduct of Plaintiff Margaret Coleman (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/20/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present via phone by attorneys Benassi/Davis/Pltf Colman for hearing re motion to withdraw attorney Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland [20−1]. Court granting motion to withdraw attorney Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland [20−1]. Withdrawing attorney George F Galland Jr for Margaret A Coleman and attorney Patricia C Benassi for Margaret A Coleman. Court setting hearing re motion for protective order [22−1] for 10:00, Tuesday, 7/11/95 via phone. Court to call. Clerk to call Pltf. Coleman at 309−263−7793, if no attorney appearance. Miscellaneous deadline for Plaintiff Coleman to find counsel or enter appearance Pro Se is 7/21/95. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 06/21/1995)
23 Court Reporter's TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held 5/8/95 filed (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/21/1995)
24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by defendant Diamond Star Motors (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/22/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Oral motion by plaintiff for leave to file response to motion for protective order is granted. (cc: all counsel/ pro se pla) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/07/1995)
25 RESPONSE by plaintiff Margaret A Coleman to motion for protective order [22−1] (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/07/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present via phone by attorneys Galland/Benassi/Davis/Pltf. Coleman for hearing re motion for protective order [22−1]. Court granting motion for protective order [22−1]. Order to enter. Per discovery agreement, discovery to be completed by 7/1/96. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 07/11/1995)
26 ORDER by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. It is ORDERED that Plaintiff Margaret Coleman is directed not to communicate with any current employee of the Defendant, Diamond Star Motors Corporation or any member of the family of such an employee. This order extends to telephone communications including messages left on voice mail and answering machines. Plaintiff Margaret Coleman is directed not to annoy, threaten, harass or intimidate any witness or potential witness in this action. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 07/11/1995)
27 MOTION by plaintiffs for protective order , and for discovery (filed as motion for final protective order and for order for immediate commencement of production of documents) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/18/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm setting motion for protective order [27−1] at 10:45 Thu 7/27/95, setting motion for discovery [27−2] at 10:45 Thu 7/27/95 by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/21/1995)
28 RESPONSE by defendant Diamond Star Motors to motion for protective order [27−1] (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/24/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland/Davis pres by phone and motion hearing held. Court is granting motion for protective order [27−1], (order to be submitted to Court ) and is granting motion for discovery [27−2]. Court directs parties exchange all non confidential materials immediately. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/27/1995)
29 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm : (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/27/1995)

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07/28/1995 08/10/1995
08/10/1995
09/11/1995 09/11/1995 09/12/1995 09/12/1995
09/19/1995
10/02/1995 10/02/1995 10/05/1995 10/13/1995 10/19/1995

30 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held 7/27/95 filed (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/31/1995)
31 MOTION by plaintiff Linda Evans, plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Margaret Bajic, plaintiff Kim Becker, plaintiff Betty Blue, plaintiff Christine Bonesteel, plaintiff Nellie Ray Boswell, plaintiff Desiree Cawthon, plaintiff Margaret A Coleman, plaintiff Michelle Colvin, plaintiff Karen Eslinger, plaintiff Debra Emmons, plaintiff Lori Farris, plaintiff Darlene Feiste, plaintiff Allene Gregory, plaintiff Lori Hampton, plaintiff Sylvia Hampton, plaintiff Deanna Hasler, plaintiff Pat Hosea, plaintiff Elizabeth Keefe, plaintiff Patricia Kich, plaintiff Christine McGrath, plaintiff Jenny Mallicoat, plaintiff Robbin Mattingly, plaintiff Christina Morris, plaintiff Cledith Wellenreiter for leave to file First Amended Complaint (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 08/10/1995)
32 NOTICE of Filing #31 by plaintiff Linda Evans, plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Margaret Bajic, plaintiff Kim Becker, plaintiff Betty Blue, plaintiff Christine Bonesteel, plaintiff Nellie Ray Boswell, plaintiff Desiree Cawthon, plaintiff Margaret Coleman, plaintiff Michelle Colvin, plaintiff Karen Eslinger, plaintiff Debra Emmons, plaintiff Lori Farris, plaintiff Darlene Feiste, plaintiff Allene Gregory, plaintiff Lori Hampton, plaintiff Sylvia Hampton, plaintiff Deanna Hasler, plaintiff Pat Hosea, plaintiff Elizabeth Keefe, plaintiff Patricia Kich, plaintiff Christine plaintiff Jenny Mallicoat, plaintiff Robbin Mattingly, plaintiff Christina Morris, plaintiff Cledith Wellenreiter (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 08/10/1995)
33 MOTION by defendant Diamond Star Motors for order to show cuase why Pltf. Margaret Coleman Should not be held in Contempt of Court (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 09/12/1995)
34 AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by defendant Diamond Star Motors (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 09/12/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman granting motion for leave to file First Amended Complaint [31−1] (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 09/12/1995)
35 AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiffs Linda Evans, Terry Paz, Margaret Bajic, Kim Becker, Betty Blue, Christine Bonesteel, Nellie Ray Boswell, Desiree Cawthon, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Debra Emmons, Lori Farris, Darlene Feiste, Allene Gregory, Lori Hampton, Sylvia Hampton, Deanna Hasler, Pat Hosea, Elizabeth Keefe, Patricia Kich, Christine McGrath, Jenny Mallicoat, Robbin Mattingly, Christina Morris, Cledith Wellenreiter; jury demand [1−1]; party Diamond Star Motors terminated as defendant, party Margaret A Coleman terminated as a plaintiff; adding Debbie Bledsoe, Julia Cosby, Stacy Jackson as plaintiffs, adding Mitsubishi Motor as defendant (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 09/12/1995)
36 ORDER by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman ;IT IS ORDERED that Pltf. Margaret Coleman is to personally appear before CHIEF JUDGE MICHAEL M. MIHM at 11:30am on Friday, 12/1/95 to show cause why she should not be found in contempt of court. Pltf. Coleman is to be personally served not less than 10 days prior to this hearing. (cc: all counsel; 1−285 form w/order given to US Mar for personal service on Coleman by Clerk) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 09/19/1995)
37 ANSWER by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1995)
37 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 10/03/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman finding the motion for order to show cuase why Pltf. Margaret Coleman Should not be held in Contempt of Court [33−1] moot by entry of 9/19/95. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/05/1995)
38 RETURN OF SERVICE unexecuted − attempted as to Margaret A Coleman (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 10/17/1995)
39 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm : See order. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 10/19/1995)

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10/20/1995 10/20/1995 11/01/1995 12/01/1995 12/01/1995
04/10/1996 04/15/1996
04/17/1996 04/17/1996
04/17/1996
04/18/1996 04/18/1996 04/18/1996

40 ORDER by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman ; show cause hearing set 11:30 12/1/95 in person before Chief Judge Mihm. Margaret Coleman to be served not less than 10 days prior to this hearing. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 10/20/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. The U.S. Marshal is directed to serve the court order of 10/20/95 on plaintiff Margaret Coleman. (cc: all counsel/USM) (KB, ilcd)) (Entered: 10/23/1995)
41 RETURN OF SERVICE executed upon Margaret A Coleman on behalf of defendant Mitsubishi Motor on 10/25/95 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/02/1995)
42 MOTION by plaintiff Margaret A Coleman pro se for appointment of counsel (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/01/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Pla Margaret Coleman pro se &Atty Roy Davis present in person and ; show cause hearing held 11:30 12/1/95 . Court advises Pla of the allegations and that her continued compliance with the protective order will stop any further action by this Court. Court finds the motion for appointment of counsel [42−1] moot.(cc: all counsel/pla Coleman) (CL, ilcd) Modified on 01/17/1996 (Entered: 12/01/1995)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm ;Status hearing set for 3:00, Monday, 4/15/96, via phone. Court to call. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attorneys Patricia Benassi/Galland/Davis present via phone for Status Conference. Same held 4/15/96 ;Case set for Further Status hearing at 1:00 pm on Friday, 6/28/96 ;Attorneys Benassi &Davis to appear in person, Attorney Galland may appear via phone, Crt. will set up the call. terminating case referral to Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 04/15/1996)
43 MOTION by plaintiff Margaret A Coleman for appointment of counsel (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
44 MOTION by plaintiff Linda Evans, plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Margaret Bajic, plaintiff Kim Becker, plaintiff Betty Blue, plaintiff Christine Bonesteel, plaintiff Nellie Ray Boswell, plaintiff Desiree Cawthon, plaintiff Margaret A Coleman, plaintiff Michelle Colvin, plaintiff Karen Eslinger, plaintiff Debra Emmons, plaintiff Lori Farris, plaintiff Darlene Feiste, plaintiff Allene Gregory, plaintiff Lori Hampton, plaintiff Sylvia Hampton, plaintiff Deanna Hasler, plaintiff Pat Hosea, plaintiff Elizabeth Keefe, plaintiff Patricia Kich, plaintiff Christine McGrath, plaintiff Jenny Mallicoat, plaintiff Robbin Mattingly, plaintiff Christina Morris, plaintiff Cledith Wellenreiter, plaintiff Debbie Bledsoe, plaintiff Julia Cosby, plaintiff Stacy Jackson for leave to file second amended complaint (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
45 NOTICE of filing re: Plaintiff's third request for production of documents by plaintiff Linda Evans, plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Margaret Bajic, plaintiff Kim Becker, plaintiff Betty Blue, plaintiff Christine Bonesteel, plaintiff Nellie Ray Boswell, plaintiff Desiree Cawthon, plaintiff Margaret A Coleman, plaintiff Michelle Colvin, plaintiff Karen Eslinger, plaintiff Debra Emmons, plaintiff Lori Farris, plaintiff Darlene Feiste, plaintiff Allene Gregory, plaintiff Lori Hampton, plaintiff Sylvia Hampton, plaintiff Deanna Hasler, plaintiff Pat Hosea, plaintiff Elizabeth Keefe, plaintiff Patricia Kich, plaintiff Christine McGrath, plaintiff Jenny Mallicoat, plaintiff Robbin Mattingly, plaintiff Christina Morris, plaintiff Cledith Wellenreiter, plaintiff Debbie Bledsoe, plaintiff Julia Cosby, plaintiff Stacy Jackson (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
46 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
47 NOTICE of hearing on Friday, April 19, 1996 at 3:00 p.m. by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
48 EMERGENCY MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor for protective order (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)

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04/19/1996 04/19/1996
04/19/1996
04/24/1996 04/29/1996 04/29/1996 04/29/1996
04/29/1996
05/07/1996

MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm Case is referred to Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman for the handling of motion for protective order (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
49 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION motion for protective order [48−1] (faxed copy) by plaintiff Linda Evans, plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Margaret Bajic, plaintiff Kim Becker, plaintiff Betty Blue, plaintiff Christine Bonesteel, plaintiff Nellie Ray Boswell, plaintiff Desiree Cawthon, plaintiff Margaret A Coleman, plaintiff Michelle Colvin, plaintiff Karen Eslinger, plaintiff Debra Emmons, plaintiff Lori Farris, plaintiff Darlene Feiste, plaintiff Allene Gregory, plaintiff Lori Hampton, plaintiff Sylvia Hampton, plaintiff Deanna Hasler, plaintiff Pat Hosea, plaintiff Elizabeth Keefe, plaintiff Patricia Kich, plaintiff Christine McGrath, plaintiff Jenny Mallicoat, plaintiff Robbin Mattingly, plaintiff Christina Morris, plaintiff Cledith Wellenreiter, plaintiff Debbie Bledsoe, plaintiff Julia Cosby, plaintiff Stacy Jackson (S, ilcd) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present in open court with Attys Benassi/Galland/Braskich/ Lubben/Jannusch for Motion hering re: emergency motion for protective order (#48). Same held. Arguments by counsel. Court finds that the motion for protective order [48−1] is denied; The referral to Mag Judge Robert J Kauffman is terminated; The motion for leave to file second amended complaint [44−1] and the motion for appointment of counsel [43−1] are referred to Chief Judge MIchael M Mihm. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/22/1996)
50 TRANSCRIPT re: Emergency motion hearing held 3:00 p.m. on 4/19/96 filed (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/24/1996)
51 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to motion for leave to file second amended complaint [44−1] (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/29/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for leave to file second amended complaint [44−1]. Defendant's responsive pleading due on or before misc ddl is 5/13/96 . (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/29/1996)
52 NOTICE of filing re Plaintiff's Fourth Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatory by plaintiff Linda Evans, plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Margaret Bajic, plaintiff Kim Becker, plaintiff Betty Blue, plaintiff Christine Bonesteel, plaintiff Nellie Ray Boswell, plaintiff Desiree Cawthon, plaintiff Margaret A Coleman, plaintiff Michelle Colvin, plaintiff Karen Eslinger, plaintiff Debra Emmons, plaintiff Lori Farris, plaintiff Darlene Feiste, plaintiff Allene Gregory, plaintiff Lori Hampton, plaintiff Sylvia Hampton, plaintiff Deanna Hasler, plaintiff Pat Hosea, plaintiff Elizabeth Keefe, plaintiff Patricia Kich, plaintiff Christine McGrath, plaintiff Jenny Mallicoat, plaintiff Robbin Mattingly, plaintiff Christina Morris, plaintiff Cledith Wellenreiter, plaintiff Debbie Bledsoe, plaintiff Julia Cosby, plaintiff Stacy Jackson (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/30/1996)
53 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiff Linda Evans, plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Margaret Bajic, plaintiff Kim Becker, plaintiff Betty Blue, plaintiff Christine Bonesteel, plaintiff Nellie Ray Boswell, plaintiff Desiree Cawthon, plaintiff Michelle Colvin, plaintiff Karen Eslinger, plaintiff Debra Emmons, plaintiff Lori Farris, plaintiff Darlene Feiste, plaintiff Allene Gregory, plaintiff Lori Hampton, plaintiff Sylvia Hampton, plaintiff Deanna Hasler, plaintiff Pat Hosea, plaintiff Elizabeth Keefe, plaintiff Patricia Kich, plaintiff Christine McGrath, plaintiff Jenny Mallicoat, plaintiff Robbin Mattingly, plaintiff Christina Morris, plaintiff Cledith Wellenreiter, plaintiff Debbie Bledsoe, plaintiff Julia Cosby, plaintiff Stacy Jackson; jury demand [1−1] (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 05/01/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm denying motion for appointment of counsel [43−1]. This Court's authority to appoint counsel arises under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d). As Ms. Coleman has not demonstrated to this Court that she is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court must deny the motion. The Clerk is directed to forward Ms. Coleman the necessary IFP forms. If she qualifies for IFP status, Coleman may renew her motion. However, IFP status alone will not be determinative. (cc: all counsel) (S, ilcd) (Entered: 05/07/1996)

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05/13/1996 05/13/1996 05/28/1996 05/28/1996 06/05/1996 06/07/1996 06/13/1996
06/27/1996 06/28/1996
07/03/1996 07/03/1996
07/09/1996 08/26/1996 08/26/1996 08/26/1996 08/26/1996 08/26/1996 08/26/1996 08/26/1996

54 ANSWER to Second Amended Complaint by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 05/13/1996)
54 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES to Second Amended Complaint filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 05/13/1996)
55 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff Margaret A Coleman (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 05/28/1996)
56 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST pursuant to Local Rule 11.3 filed by plaintiff Margaret A Coleman (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 05/28/1996)
57 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff, defendant to extend discovery cutoff (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 06/06/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm re motion to extend discovery cutoff [57−1] hearing set for 9:00, Thursday, 6/13/96 via phone. Court to call. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 06/07/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland/Schmidt/Davis/Marshal present by phone and motion hearing held w/statements by counsel. Court is granting motion to extend discovery cutoff [57−1]. Discovery ddl of 7/1/96 vacated. New discovery schedule to be set at future hearing. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/13/1996)
58 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Mitsubishi Motor by Attorneys Walter B. Connolly, Jr., Donna J. Donati, and Alison B. Marshall (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/27/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/Davis present in person. Attys. Schmidt/ Marshall/ Connelly present by phone and ; Status hearing held 1:00 6/28/96 with discussion re: motion for transfer and Crt advises counsel the Judge McDade will be scheduling a status conference re: the motion to transfer (filed in the EEOC case) This Court will schedule a further status conference after Judge McDae has held his hearing. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/01/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm; Joint Conference for Coordination of Discovery set for 3:00, Friday, 9/6/96 in person in Courtroom A. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
59 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade in 96−1192. Motion to transfer filed in 96−1192 is DENIED. Initial Pre−Trial Conference is set on Fri. 8/16/96 at 9:30am before Judge McDade in 96−1192. Joint hearing for coordination of discovery in 94−1545 &96−1192 is set on Friday, 9/6/96 at 3:00pm in person in Judge Mihm's courtroom (cc: all counsel in 96−1192 &94−1545) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/08/1996)
60 NOTICE by atty Roy G Davis on behalf defendant Mitsubishi Motor of change of address (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
61 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Christine McGrath on 9/9/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
62 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Debbie Emmons on 9/10/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
63 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Terry Paz on 9/11/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
64 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Nellie Boswell on 9/12/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
65 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Lori Hampton on 9/13/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
66 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Linda Evans on 8/26/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
67 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Margaret Bajic on 10/1/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)

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08/26/1996 08/26/1996 08/26/1996 09/03/1996 09/06/1996
09/10/1996 09/25/1996 09/26/1996 09/26/1996 09/26/1996 09/27/1996 09/27/1996 09/27/1996 09/30/1996 09/30/1996 09/30/1996 10/01/1996
10/01/1996 10/02/1996

68 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Kim Becker on 10/2/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
69 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Cledith Wellenreiter on 10/3/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
70 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Patricia Kich on 10/4/96 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
71 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Sylvia Hampton on 9/13/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/03/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland/Schmidt for plaintiffs/ Connolly/Waldmeir/ for Dft/Hendrickson/Levine/Kamp for EEOC and JOINT Status hearing held 3:00 9/6/96 with case 96−1192 re: discovery. This case to be set for status conference in mid November, 1996.(cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 09/09/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm setting status hearing at 11:00a.m. Fri 11/15/96 . Parties to appear in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 09/10/1996)
72 NOTICE of service re medical records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
73 RENOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Terry Paz on 9/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
74 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Cledith Wellenreiter on 10/3/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
75 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition of Patricia Kich on 10/4/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
76 MOTION by EEOC for order for leave to intervene (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/27/1996)
77 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] by EEOC (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/27/1996)
78 NOTICE of motion re motion for leave to intervene, memorandum of law in support and proposed order by EEOC (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/27/1996)
79 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to compel Plaintiffs to produce documents , and for sanctions (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1996)
80 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to compel Plaintiffs to produce documents [79−1], of motion for sanctions [79−2] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1996)
81 CERTIFICATE of service re medical records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties present via phone by Attorneys Benassi/Galland/Schmidt/Connolly/Marshall for telephone status hearing at Tuesday, October 1, 1996, at 3:00 p.m. Same held with discussion re: depositions and discovery disputes. Parties are to submit a new protective order which incorporates the parameters stated by the Court in today's hearing re: medical records and past employer records. Parties are to resubmit the order delivered to chambers to include procedure for producing medical providers names in a timely manner. FURTHER ORDERED that the court is granting motion to compel [79−1] in part and denying it in part and denying motion for sanctions [79−2]. (cc: all counsel) (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
82 LETTER from Atty Benassi to Judge Mihm with attached proposed order re depositions (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/02/1996)
83 NOTICE (filed as Proof of Service) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor re third party docuemtns concerning Ms. Paz (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/02/1996)

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10/04/1996 10/04/1996 10/07/1996 10/08/1996 10/11/1996 10/11/1996 10/11/1996 10/15/1996 10/16/1996 10/16/1996 10/17/1996 10/18/1996
10/18/1996
10/18/1996 10/18/1996 10/18/1996

84 CERTIFICATE of service (filed as Proof of service) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor re third party documents concerning Plaintiffs Becker, Cosby, Eslinger, Wellenreiter, Bajic, Evans, Kich, Paz, Blue, Cawthorn and Bonesteel (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/04/1996)
85 CERTIFICATE of service (filed as Proof of service) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor re supplemental materials concerning Ms Paz (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/04/1996)
87 CERTIFICATE of service re documents in Plaintiffs' files by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/10/1996)
86 CERTIFICATE of service re documents bearing Bates numbers by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/08/1996)
88 CERTIFICATE of service re third party documents produced 10/8/96 by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/11/1996)
89 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to EEOC's motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/11/1996)
90 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Peter Brandt on behalf of defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/11/1996)
93 LETTER from Atty Connolly to Judge Mihm re motion for leave to intervene (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/17/1996)
91 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of taking deposition duces tecum of C. Gregory Stewart on 10/21/96 (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/16/1996)
92 foreign SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to C. Gregory Stewart (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/16/1996)
94 MOTION by movant EEOC to quash subpoena and for protective order (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 10/18/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. The parties are hereby ordered to cancel the deposition of EEOC General Council Gregory Stewart that has been noticed for 10/21/96 pending this Court's resolution of the EEOC's motion to quash and for protective order. The EEOC is given leave to file a memorandum in support of its motion by 10/25/96; misc ddl for memorandum in support of is 10/25/96. Any reply from Defendant will be filed by 11/1/96. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/18/1996)
95 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Each Plaintiff shall provide to Counsel for the Defendant a list of each and every health care provided who has treated, consulted, or otherwise rendered any medical, psychiatric or other health care related service since January 1, 1985 to date. At least 30 days prior to the scheduled date for the deposition of any Plaintiff, Counsel for such Plaintiff shall certify in writing to Counsel for Defendant, that such Plaintiff has made a diligent search for all documents in Plaintiff's possession, custody or control that such Plaintiff has been requested to produce pursuant to any timely outstanding discovery requst. At least 30 days prior to the scheduled date for deposition of any Plaintiff, Counsel for Defendant shall certify in writing to Counsel for Plaintiffs. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) Modified on 10/23/1996 (Entered: 10/18/1996)
96 MOTION by plaintiff Linda Evans for leave to file memorandum on the EEOC's motion to intervene (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for leave to file memorandum on the EEOC's motion to intervene [96−1] (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
96 BRIEF FILED (filed as memorandum on the EEOC's motion to intervene) by plaintiff regarding motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/24/1996)

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10/21/1996
10/21/1996 10/22/1996 10/23/1996
10/23/1996 10/23/1996 10/24/1996 10/25/1996 10/28/1996 10/28/1996 10/28/1996 10/28/1996 10/30/1996 10/30/1996
11/01/1996
11/01/1996 11/01/1996

MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status hearing previously set for 11:00, Friday, 11/15/96 is is cancelled and ;Status hearing reset to 11:30, Friday, 11/15/96 in person. Note that this is a change in time only. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
97 STIPULATION and Order of voluntary dismissal of ADA Claims filed (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
99 MOTION by movant EEOC for leave to file, instanter, EEOC's reply memorandum in further support of its motion for leave to intervene (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
98 ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF ADA CLAIMS by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting stipulation of parties, it is ordered that Count II of the Second Amended Complaint, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, is dismissed with prejudice and without costs. [97−1] (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for leave to file, instanter, EEOC's reply memorandum in further support of its motion for leave to intervene [99−1] (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
100 REPLY (filed as reply memorandum in further support of its motion for leave to intervene) by movant EEOC to response to motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
101 BRIEF FILED (filed as Statement joining in the Evans Plaintiffs' memorandum on the EEOC's motion to intervene) by plaintiff Margaret A Coleman (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/24/1996)
102 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to quash subpoena [94−1], of motion for protective order [94−2] by movant EEOC (faxed copy) (LR, ilcd) Modified on 10/28/1996 (Entered: 10/28/1996)
103 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to quash subpoena [94−1], of motion for protective order [94−2] by movant EEOC (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/29/1996)
104 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Coil's regarding Candice Aeschelman (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/30/1996)
105 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Yordy's True Value regarding Candice Aeschelman (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/30/1996)
106 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Krueger's regarding Candice Aeschelman (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/30/1996)
107 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor for leave to file a surreply memorandum in opposition to the EEOC's motion for leave to intervene (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/30/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm setting telephone conference call re motion to quash subpoena [94−1] and motion for protective order [94−2] at 1:30, Monday, 11/4/96 via phone. EEOC to place the call. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/31/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. On 10/30/96, Defendant filed a motion for leave to file a surreply memorandum in opposition to the EEOC's motion for leave to intervene. Court granting motion for leave to file a surreply memorandum in opposition to the EEOC's motion for leave to intervene [107−1]. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/01/1996)
108 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION motion to quash subpoena [94−1], motion for protective order [94−2] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/01/1996)
108 RESPONSE (filed as surreply memorandum in opposition) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to motion for leave to intervene [76−1] (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/15/1996)

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11/04/1996
11/07/1996 11/12/1996 11/12/1996 11/13/1996
11/15/1996 11/18/1996 11/18/1996 11/18/1996 11/25/1996 11/26/1996 11/27/1996

MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Galland/Schmidt/Henrickson/Leviene/Camp/Connolly/Brandt present by phone and motion hearing re motion to quash subpoena [94−1], re motion for protective order re motion to intervene [76−1] held with oral arguments by counsel. Any additional discovery re: possible intervention by EEOC is barred. EEOC to provide proposed amended intervenor complaint by 11/11/96. Any additional briefs re: motion to intervene to be filed by Mtn filing ddl of 11/18/96 . Status hearing previously set 11:30 11/15/96 is CANCELLED. Further motion hearing re: motion to quash subpoena [94−1], motion for protective order [94−2], and motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] is set at 3:00 Friday 11/22/96 by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/05/1996)
109 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to withdraw attorneys Roy G Davis &Keith J Braskich (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion to withdraw attorneys Roy G Davis &Keith J Braskich [109−1]; attorney Keith J Braskich for Mitsubishi Motor, attorney Roy G Davis for Mitsubishi Motor is withdrawn. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/12/1996)
110 UNOPPOSED MOTION by movant EEOC for order for modification of filing schedule concerning motion for leave to intervene (faxed copy) (LR, ilcd) Modified on 11/12/1996 (Entered: 11/12/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for order for modification of filing schedule concerning motion for leave to intervene [110−1]. The EEOC's deadline for filing both its amended complaint−in−intervention and supplemental memo re the preclusive effect of intervention on the EEOC's direct action is 11/18/96. Defendant Mitsubishi's dealine for filing its memo in response is 11/25/96; Mtn filing ddl for response is 11/25/96. Telephone conference re motion to quash subpoena [94−1], motion for protective order [94−2], and motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] set for 3:00, Friday, 11/22/96 will be rescheduled. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/14/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm setting hearing re motion to quash subpoena [94−1], motion for protective order [94−2] and motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] at 8:30 (Central Standard Time), Wednesday, 11/27/96 via phone. Court to call. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/15/1996)
111 MOTION by plaintiff for order to set uniform briefing schedule and for joint hearing on Mitsubishi's motion for protective order (S, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/1996)
112 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF ADA CLAIMS by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Margaret Coleman's claim in Count II of the First Amended Complaint, alleging violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, is dismissed with prejudice and without costs. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/1996)
113 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by movant EEOC to motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] (faxed copy) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
114 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to EEOC's motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] (faxed copy) (LR, ilcd) Modified on 11/27/1996 (Entered: 11/27/1996)
115 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] (original to faxed copy) (LR, ilcd) Modified on 11/27/1996 (Entered: 11/26/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties present via phone by attorneys Benassi/Schmidt/Marshall/Brandt/Hendrickson/Levine/Kamp for hearing re motion to quash subpoena [94−1], re motion for protective order [94−2], and re motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1] held at 8:30, Wednesday, 11/27/96. Court will notify the parties of its decision on Monday, 12/2/96, and will enter a written opinion re motion to intervene. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 11/27/1996)

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11/27/1996
11/27/1996
11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996
11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996
11/27/1996
11/27/1996 11/27/1996

117 Revised EXHIBIT A to Supplemental Memorandum Concerning EEOC's motion for leave to Intervene for movant EEOC stored in file (faxed copy) (LR, ilcd) Modified on 12/02/1996 (Entered: 12/02/1996)
118 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Bloomington Normal Otolaryngology regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
119 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Bloomington Radiology regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
120 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Jerald J Bratberg, M.D. regardings Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
121 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Brokaw Hospital regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
122 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Michael Cochran, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
123 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to James R. DeBord, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
124 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Richard Driessnack, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
125 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Eastland Medical Plaza, Surgicenter regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
126 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Susan Emmerson, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
127 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. John Everingham regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
128 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to John Everingham, D.C. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
129 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Emilio Fernandez Gatti regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
130 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Reid Hansen, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
131 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Stephen Irwin regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
132 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Stephen Irwin, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
133 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Phyllis Lehman regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
134 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Robert Martin, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
135 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to McLean County Radiology Group regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
136 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to McLean County Orthopedics regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
137 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Methodist Medical Center regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
138 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Gary Misamore, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)

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11/27/1996
11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996
11/27/1996
11/27/1996
11/27/1996
11/27/1996
11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996

139 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Albert G. Nachowicz, DPM regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
140 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Edward Pegg, III, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
141 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Arthur Rettig, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
142 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to St. Joseph Medical Center regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
143 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to James Strickland, MD regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
144 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Paul Theobald, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
145 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Edward Trudeau, M.D. regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
146 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Judy Wright, MD and John Wright, MD regarding Allene Gregory served on 10/30/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
147 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Gailey Eye Clinic regarding Michelle Colvin AKA Peciado executed on 11/21/96 (LR, ilcd) Modified on 12/03/1996 (Entered: 12/03/1996)
148 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mr. Mark Henss, Associate University Counsel regarding Christina Morris executed on 11/21/96 (LR, ilcd) Modified on 12/03/1996 (Entered: 12/03/1996)
149 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Gailey Eye Clinic regarding Michelle Colvin AKA Preciado executed on 11/20/96 (LR, ilcd) Modified on 12/03/1996 (Entered: 12/03/1996)
150 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mr. Mark Henss, Associate University Counsel regarding Christina Morris executed on 11/20/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
151 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Lee Ann Goleash regarding Julia Cosby executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
152 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Luban regarding Julia Cosby executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
153 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Jane Valez regarding Debbie Emmons executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
154 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Paul Taylor regarding Karen Eslinger (Whicker) executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
155 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Janice Young regarding Darlene Feiste executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
156 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Diana Brandt, LCSW regarding Darlene Feiste executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
157 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Mel French regarding Darlene Feiste executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
158 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Gabriel Telot regarding Darlene Feiste executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
159 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Douglas Bey regarding Darlene Feiste executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
160 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Laura Koiner regarding Darlene Feiste executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)

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11/27/1996 11/27/1996 11/27/1996
11/27/1996
11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996
11/29/1996
11/29/1996
11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996

161 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Kathy Thomquist regarding Sylvia Hampton executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
162 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Arthur C Rettig MD regarding Allene Gregory executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
163 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Bloomington Family Practice regarding Christina Morris executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
164 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Professional Associates of Illinois regarding Christina Morris executed on 11/22/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
165 NOTICE of copying records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
168 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Mel French regarding Kim Becker executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
169 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Glen Sidler regarding Kim Becker executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
170 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Azipour regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
171 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to BroMenn Hospital regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
172 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Grieco regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
173 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Joseph N. Hernandez regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
174 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Methodist Hospital regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
175 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to St. Joseph Hospital regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
176 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Yeater regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
177 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Ms. Kathy Anderson regarding Desiree Cawthon executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
178 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Ms. Debbie Garners regarding Desiree Cawthon executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
179 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mr. Denny Marquardt regarding Desiree Cawthon executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
180 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Ms. Vickie May regarding Desiree Cawthon executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
181 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Ms. Jenny Strong regarding Desiree Cawthon executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
182 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Ms. Jennifer Armstrong regarding Julia Cosby executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
183 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mr. Joe Elble regarding Julia Cosby executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
184 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. David Kruger regarding Julia Cosby executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)

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11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996
11/29/1996
11/29/1996
11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996

185 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Esperanza Kabaty regarding Debbie Emmons executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
186 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Sherwood Metal Products regarding Karen Eslinger executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
187 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Beer regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
188 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mr. John Clayton regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
189 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Lawrence Dowden regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
190 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Farm &Fleet regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
191 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Mel French regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/29/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
192 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Robert P. Hahnel regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
193 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Kullberg regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
194 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. J. McCreskin regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
195 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Roy Patterson regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
196 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Proctor Community Hospital regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
197 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to St. Anthony Medical Center regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
198 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Swedish American Hospital regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
199 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Edward Trudeau regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
200 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mr. George Vincere regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
201 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Charles Washington regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
202 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Otis Allen regarding Deanna Hasler executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
203 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. A. Heath regarding Deanna Hasler executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
204 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Gandolfi Chiropractic regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
205 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Medi regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
206 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dan Fulk regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
207 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Chestnut Health Systems regarding Patricia Kich executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)

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11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 11/29/1996 12/02/1996
12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/03/1996 12/04/1996
12/04/1996

208 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mr. Pastor Betterman regarding Jenny Mallicoat executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
209 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Ruppman's Market regarding Jennifer Mallicoat executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
210 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Ulbrich regarding Christine McGrath executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
211 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Sue Ann Corvin regarding Cledith Wellenreiter executed on 11/8/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. In the telephone hearing held on 11/27/96, Judge Mihm said that he would inform the parties of his decision on the EEOC's motion to intervene on 12/2/96. That ruling is as follows: The Court has determined that the motion to intervene will be granted. A written order will issue. (cc: all counsel/all counsel notified via phone 12/2/96) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
212 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Reid Hansen regarding Kim Becker executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
213 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Bradley Pueschel regarding Kim Becker executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
214 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Abortion Access regarding Lori Hampton executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
215 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Birk regarding Lori Hampton executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
216 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to BroMenn Healthcare regarding Lori Hampton executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
217 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. David Holden regarding Lori Hampton executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
218 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Christine Nelson regarding Lori Hampton executed on 12/2/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
219 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Ted Rogers regarding Lori Hampton executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
220 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Women's Strength regarding Lori Hampton executed on 11/12/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
221 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor for entry of (partially agreed) amended confidentiality protective order (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
222 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for entry of (partially agreed) amended confidentiality protective order [221−1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
223 CERTIFICATE of service re #221 and #222 by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
166 RESPONSE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to joint motion of Evans Pltfs &EEOC for order to set uniform briefing schedule [111−1] and motion for joint hearing on Mitsubishi's motion for protective order [111−2] (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Joint conference hearing set 1:00 Central Standard Time on Thurs 12/12/96 (with case no. 96−1192) re: proposed protective order − in person in Peoria in Courtrooom A. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1996)
167 NOTICE of copying records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1996)

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12/06/1996 12/09/1996
12/09/1996 12/09/1996 12/09/1996 12/10/1996
12/10/1996
12/10/1996
12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996

224 NOTICE of copying records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/10/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for order to set uniform briefing schedule [111−1], granting motion for joint hearing on Mitsubishi's motion for protective order [111−2]. The hearing set for 12/12/96 at 1:00pm CST has been converted from an in person hearing to a telephone Status hearing at the request of the parties. Court will set up the call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
225 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Atty Deborah Krauss Snyder on behalf of plaintiffs (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
226 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Atty Michele Lang Palter on behalf of plaintiffs (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
227 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Joseph D Garrison on behalf of plaintiffs (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
228 MOTION by plaintiffs and movant EEOC for leave to file an oversize brief in response to Mitsubishi's motion for protective order (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for leave to file an oversize brief in response to Mitsubishi's motion for protective order [228−1] (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
229 BRIEF FILED (filed as Joint Memorandum of the Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC on Contested Protective Order Issues) by plaintiffs and movant EEOC regarding motion for entry of (partially agreed) amended confidentiality protective order [221−1] (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
236 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to FTSMC regarding Margaret Bajic executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
237 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to NAPA Corporation regarding Debbie Bledsoe executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
238 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to General Electric regarding Betty Blue executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
239 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to The Lexington Bank regarding Betty Blue executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
240 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Jeff Traina regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
241 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Josef Kaneti regarding Margaret A. Coleman executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
242 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Robert Hahnel regarding Linda Evans executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
243 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Robert Martin regarding Darlene Feiste executed 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
244 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Richard Dreissnack regarding Allene Gregory executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
245 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Stephen Irwin regarding Allene Gregory executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
246 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Bloomington Academy regarding Patricia Hosea executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
247 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to The Space Place regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
248 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Richard Grant regarding Patricia Kich executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      42  of  57

12/11/1996
12/11/1996
12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996
12/11/1996
12/11/1996 12/11/1996
12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 12/12/1996
12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996

249 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. James Ward regarding Michelle Colvin AKA Preciado executed on 11/27/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
250 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Archer Daniel Midland regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 12/4/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
251 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Aetna regarding Lori A Farris executed on 12/4/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
252 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to John P. Pearl &Associates regarding Lori A. Farris executed on 12/4/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
253 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Saint Francis Medical Center regarding Kimberly Becker executed on 12/6/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
254 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Mark Werking, D.C. regarding Nellie Ray Boswell executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
255 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Kullberg regarding Linda Evans executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
256 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Coles County Mental Health Center regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
257 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. William Houseworth regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
258 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to William Gillen regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
259 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Francis Lee regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
260 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Kathleen LeVeck regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
261 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Rohi Patil regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
262 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to St. Mary's Hospital regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
263 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Bruce Stiles regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
264 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Dr. Roy Tsuda regarding Elizabeth Keefe executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
265 SUBPOENA filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor as to Saint Francis Medical Center regarding Terry Paz executed on 12/7/96 (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
230 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for order for leave to intervene [76−1]. The EEOC's amended Complaint−in−Intervention shall be deemed filed as of the date of this Order. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
231 INTERVENOR'S COMPLAINT by intervenor plaintiff EEOC (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
232 MOTION by intervenor Peoria Journal Star to intervene by Peoria Journal Star , and for leave to file response (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
233 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to intervene by Peoria Journal Star [232−1] by intervenor Peoria Journal Star (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1996)

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      43  of  57

12/12/1996 12/12/1996
12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/23/1996
12/27/1996 01/02/1997 01/02/1997 01/28/1997 02/06/1997 02/10/1997
02/11/1997

234 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file certificate of service to joint memorandum of the Evans Plaintiffs &EEOC on contested protective order issues and joint motion of Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC to file an oversize brief in response to Mitsubishi's motion for protective order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm &Judge Joe B McDade. Attorneys Waldmeir, Connolly, P Benassi, Galland, Hendrickson &Levine present via phone, Attorney Galassi present in person in open court for hearing on pending motions in 94−1545 &96−1192. Court grants motion to intervene by Peoria Journal Star [232−1] and grants motion for leave to file response [232−2]. Argument by counsel regarding motion for entry of (partially agreed) amended confidentiality protective order [221−1]. Court adopts the wording by EEOC/Evans Plaintiffs with respect to paragraphs 3,5 &6 which were the only paragraphs in dispute. Those parties to submit proposed order to the Court. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
235 RESPONSE by intervenor Peoria Journal Star to motion for entry of (partially agreed) amended confidentiality protective order [221−1] (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. It has come to the Court's attention that discovery has been filed with the Court in this matter. Discovery should not be filed with the Court unless that discovery is the subject of a motion or there is some other valid reason why the Court needs to be aware of such information. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. The minutes of the telephone conference held on 11/4/96 inadvertently omitted the ruling of the Court on the EEOC's motion to quash and for protective order. The Court denied motion to quash subpoena [94−1], granted motion for protective order [94−2]. Additionally, Court granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to file certificate of service to joint memorandum of the Evans Plaintiffs &EEOC on contested protective order issues and joint motion of Evans Plaintiffs and EEOC to file an oversize brief in response to Mitsubishi's motion for protective order [234−1]. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
266 TRANSCRIPT on Joint hearing ( 96−1192) on proposed protective order filed (see original in 96−1192) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/27/1996)
267 ANSWER by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 01/02/1997)
267 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 01/02/1997)
268 NOTICE of copying records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 01/28/1997)
269 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of copying records of Health Center − BroMenn Counseling Services on 2/12/97 at 9:00 a.m. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 02/06/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Mary Anne Sedey &Garrison present in person/Attys. Benassi/Connolly/Schmidt present by phone. (EEOC not present). Crt proceeds with hearing re: depositions. Oral arguments by counsel. Atty. Connolly to submit in writing a statement re: Non Ford Motor Co. Offer. Same to be submitted by 5:00 p.m. on 2/11/97. Dft to also confirm the 75 day extension. Crt suggests that the Connolly Firm be held responsible for costs of Attys Sedeys' and Garrisons' time in Peoria for which depos were previously scheduled and they were unable to conduct them (depos) and or interview witnesses. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) Modified on 04/08/1997 (Entered: 02/12/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties present via phone by Attorneys George Galland, Jr./Randall Schmidt/Mary Anne Seday/Alison Marshall/Peter Brandt/John Hendrickson/Noel Brennan/Michelle Caiola/Joe Garrison/Charles Tucker/David Kolzian/Tara Crean for telephone status hearing at 2:30 p.m. on Tuesday, February 11, 1997. Same held with discussion re: telephone status hearing held 2/10/97 and the letter from defense counsel dated 2/11/97. (cc:

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      44  of  57

02/12/1997 02/13/1997 02/18/1997 02/20/1997 03/04/1997 04/04/1997 04/25/1997 04/29/1997 04/30/1997
05/23/1997 06/25/1997 06/30/1997 07/01/1997 07/17/1997
07/18/1997

all counsel) (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 02/11/1997)
270 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm : SEE ORDER. (cc: all counsel) (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 02/12/1997)
271 NOTICE of Copying Records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 02/13/1997)
272 NOTICE of change of facsimile number (312) 353−8555 by intervenor−plaintiff EEOC (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 02/19/1997)
273 NOTICE of copying records at Chestnut Health Systems, Inc. and Balanced Life, S.C. by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 02/20/1997)
274 NOTICE of copying records at Chestnut HealthSystems−Family Counseling Center; Chestnut Health Systems−Employee Development Associates; Chestnut Health Systems−Dr. James Baker by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 03/04/1997)
275 NOTICE of copying records by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/07/1997)
276 NOTICE by Attorneys Alison Marshall, Donna Donati &Walter Connolly by defendant Mitsubishi Motor of change of address (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 04/28/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status hearing set at 10:00 Wednesday, 4/30/97 via phone. Court to call. (cc: Parties notified by Court) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/29/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland for plaintiffs/Randll Schmidt for Pla Coleman/Connolly &Marshall for Mitsubishi/Attys Hendrickson/Levine/Brennan/Ciaola/Camp for EEOC present by phone and Status hearing held 10:00 4/30/97 . Parties report progress of case to Court. Status hearing set 4:30 p.m. Mond 6/30/97 (Peoria time) by phone, for update of progress. Court to set up call. Counsel are reminded that Court can only conference five (5) lines plus the Court. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 04/30/1997)
277 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held April 30, 1997 filed (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/28/1997)
278 MOTION by Attorneys Patricia Benassi, George Galland on behalf of plaintiff Darlene Feiste to withdraw attorney Patricia Benassi and George Galland (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/Galland/Schmidt/Henrickson present by phone. Dfts not present nor represented. Status hearing not held 4:30 6/30/97 . Same to be reset. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm ;Status hearing set 3:30 Thurs., 7/17/97 (via phone − court to call) (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/Schmidt/Connolly/Marshal/Hendrickson/Levine/Kamp present by phone and Status hearing held 3:30 7/17/97 . Parties indicate progress and request further status conference. Atty Benassi granted leave to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff FEISTE. (Court to enter written order re: Pla Feiste). Further status hearing set 8:30 Wed 7/30/97 by phone. Dft's counsel to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) Modified on 05/19/1998 (Entered: 07/18/1997)
279 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion to withdraw attorney Patricia Benassi and George Galland [278−1]. Plaintiff Feiste has 21 days from the entry of this Order in which to file her own individual appearance or have an attorney enter an appearance on her behalf. Failure to do so will result in her dismissal from this action with prejudice for failure to prosecute; misc ddl for plaintiff Feiste to file her own individual appearance or have an attorney enter an appearance on her behalf is 8/8/97. (cc: plaintiff Feiste/all counsel) (VB, ilcd)

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07/23/1997 07/30/1997
08/05/1997 08/08/1997 08/19/1997 08/21/1997
08/22/1997
08/22/1997 08/26/1997
08/26/1997 08/26/1997 08/28/1997 08/29/1997 10/02/1997

(Entered: 07/18/1997)
280 NOTICE by Attorney Randall D Schmidt on behalf of plaintiff Margaret A Coleman of change of telephone number to: (773) 702−9611 (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/23/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/Marshall/Connolly/Hendrickson present by phone and status hearing held 8:30 7/30/97 with statements by counsel. Dfts request settlement conference. Court sets settlement conference at 9:00AM Thurs 8/28/97 . Attys. to appear in person in Peoria someone of settlement authority also present. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/30/1997)
281 NOTICE by plaintiff Darlene Feiste entering her appearance pro se in this case (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/05/1997)
282 LETTER (FAXED COPY) to Judge Mihm from Atty Galland re: ex parte communications pertaining to settlement (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/08/1997)
283 LETTER of 8/15/97 to Judge Mihm re:submissions for the settlement conference being filed under seal by Atty Connolly (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 08/20/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. In response to Mitsubishi's request for clarification, the materials to be filed under seal are to be accorded the same provisions for confidentiality vis a vis third parties that applied to the mediation itself. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 09/17/1997 (Entered: 08/21/1997)
285 +++ SEALED DOCUMENT..Exhibit to Doc #285 (Attachments: # 1 vol 1 part 1b, # 2 vol 1 part 2a, # 3 vol 1 part 2b sec 1, # 4 vol 1 part 2b sec 2, # 5 vol 1 part 2b sec 3, # 6 vol 1 part 3)(TK, ilcd) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/5/2007: # 7 vol 2 part 1a, # 8 vol 2 part 1b, # 9 vol 2 part 2a, # 10 vol 2 part 2bb, # 11 vol 2 part 2 sec 1, # 12 vol 2 part 2 sec 2, # 13 vol 2 part 2 sec 3, # 14 vol 2 part 3) (TK, ilcd). Modified on 12/12/2007 (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 11/05/2007)
284 +++ SEALED DOCUMENT−sealed document #284.. (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
287 IN CAMERA (SEALED DOCUMENT) by plaintiiffs Linda Evans, Terry Paz, Margaret Bajic, Kim Becker, Betty Blue, Christine Bonesteel, Nellie Ray Boswell, Desiree Cawthon, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Debra Emmons, Lori Farris, Allene Gregory, Lori Hampton, Sylvia Hampton, Deanna Hasler, Pat Hosea, Elizabeth Keefe, Patricia Kich, Christine McGrath, Jenny Mallicoat, Robbin Mattingly, Christina Morris, Cledith Wellenreiter, Debbie Bledsoe, Julia Cosby, Stacy Jackson sealed and placed in vault (VB, ilcd) (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 08/27/1997)
288 LETTER from Attorney Walter B Connolly requesting all Evans plaikntiffs be present for settlement conference (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm denying letter (construed as a motion to require all Evans plaintiffs to attend settlement conference) [288−1]. However, someone with settlement authority must attend on behalf of the Evans plaintiffs. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/27/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties and counsel present in person and Settlement conference held 9:00 8/28/97 . (cc: all counsel) (S, ilcd) (Entered: 08/29/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland/Connolly/Schmidt/Hendrickson present by phone and status conf held with statements by court and counsel. (cc: all counsel) (S, ilcd) (Entered: 08/29/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY:by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Patricia Benassi &Galland present for pltfs &W Connolly present for Mitsubishi &Jean Kamp for EEOC for status conf re:settlement. Same held (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered:

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10/08/1997 10/14/1997 10/16/1997 10/17/1997 10/21/1997
10/29/1997 10/29/1997 10/29/1997
10/31/1997 11/05/1997 11/05/1997 11/07/1997 11/07/1997 11/11/1997
11/12/1997

10/02/1997)
289 IN CAMERA document by plaintiff sealed and placed in vault (letter from a plaintiff) (CL, ilcd) (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 10/08/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm; Status hearing re: status of settlement set for Thursday, 10/16/97 at 5:30 pm, by phone, court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attorneys present in person and status hearing re: settlement held 5:30 10/16/97 . (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 10/20/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Settlement conference as to plaintiff Margaret Coleman only set at 2:00 Wednesday, 10/29/97 in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel/plaintiff Coleman) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 10/17/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Settlement conference hearing as to plaintiff Darlene Feiste is set at 10:30 Wednesday, 10/29/97 in person in Peoria. SOMEONE WITH SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY TO BE PRESENT OR IMMEDAITELY AVAILABLE BY PHONE. (cc: all counsel/plaintiff Feiste) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 10/21/1997)
290 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff Darlene Feiste (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Pltf Feiste &Atty Allison &Deft Attys Connolly &Schultz present in open court for Settlement Conf. Same held 10:30 10/29/97. Continued Settlement conference set at 11:00am on Monday, 11/10/97; in person. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY:by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Pltf Coleman present personally &Deft Attys Connolly &Schultz present in open court for Settlement Conference. Same held 10/29/97 at 2:00pm. Parties are to notify the Court within 21 days of the status of settlement negotiations. (misc ddl of 11/19/97 created for status) (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Galland/Slevin present by phone and status conferece held. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/03/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Settlement conference previously set at 11:00 Monday, 11/10/97 is cancelled and reset at 10:30 Thursday, 12/11/97 in person in Peoria re: plaintiff Darlene Feiste only. (cc: all counsel/Plaintiff Feiste) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/05/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Connolly/Galland/Slevin present by phone and status conference held. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/06/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. As to Plaintiff's represented by John Sleven ONLY, this case is set for settlement conference at 2:00 Tues 11/11/97 . Attys. to appear in person with someone of settlement authority. (cc: all counsel/John Slevin) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/Galland/Marshal/Schultz present by phone and status conference held. At request of parties settlement conference will be held sometime during the week of 11/10/97. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/07/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY:by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Pltfs Paz, L.Hampton, Bledsoe, Eslinger &Colvin present with John Slevin, Attys P. Benassi, Garrison &Galland also present. Attys A. Marshall &Schultz present for Defts for Settlement Conf. Same held 2:00 11/11/97. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/13/1997)
291 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE for plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Lori Hampton and Debbie Bledsoe by attorney John A Slevin (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 11/13/1997)

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11/14/1997 11/18/1997 11/18/1997
11/18/1997 11/18/1997 11/18/1997 11/18/1997 11/19/1997 11/19/1997 11/24/1997

292 MOTION by Attorneys Patricia Benassi, George Galland, Mary Anne Sedey, Jon Ray, Joseph Golden, David Kotzian, Joseph P Garrison, Michelle Lang Palter on behalf of plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Lori Hampton, Debbie Bledsoe to withdraw attorneys Benassi, Galland, Sedey, Ray, Golden, Kotzian, Garrison, Palter for plaintiffs Hampton, Paz, Bledsoe, Eslinger and Colvin (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
293 STIPULATION FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE filed by plaintiffs and defendant (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/1997)
294 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting stipulation for order of dismissal with prejudice [293−1]. Based on the foregoing stipulation between parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all claims made by plaintiffs Linda Evans, Margaret Bajic, Kim Becker Pendragon, Betty Blue, Christine Bonesteel Schoenfeld, Nellie Ray (Boswell) Bailey, Desiree Cawthon, Julia Cosby, Debra Emmons, Lori Farris, Deanna Hasler, Sylvia Hampton, Stacy Jackson, Elizabeth Keefe Nave, Patricia Kich, Jennifer Mallicoat, Christine McGrath, Christina Morris, Allene Gregory, Robbin Mattingly−Dickerson and Patricia E ("Pat") Hosea are dismissed with prejudice and without costs; to dismiss plaintiffs Stacy Jackson, Julia Cosby, Christina Morris, Robbin Mattingly, Jenny Mallicoat, Christine McGrath, Patricia Kich, Elizabeth Keefe, Pat Hosea, Deanna Hasler, Sylvia Hampton, Allene Gregory, Lori Farris, Debra Emmons, Desiree Cawthon, Nellie Ray Boswell, Christine Bonesteel, Betty Blue, Kim Becker, Margaret Bajic, Linda Evans (SEE ORDER) (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 11/19/1997 (Entered: 11/18/1997)
295 STIPULATION FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE filed by plaintiffs Lori Hampton, Terry Paz and Deborah Sue ("Debbie") Bledsoe and defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing w/proposed order (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
296 STIPULATION FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE filed by plaintiffs Karen Eslinger and Michelle Colvin Preciado and defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing w/proposed order (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
297 MOTION by plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Lori Hampton, Debbie Bledsoe, Karen Eslinger for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages, and for other relief (FILED UNDER SEAL AND PLACED IN VAULT) (VB, ilcd) (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 11/19/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiffs Hampton, Paz, Bledsoe, Eslinger and Colvin [292−1] with respect to attorneys Benassi, Galland, Garrison and Lang Palter. With respect to attorneys Sedey, Ray, Golden and Kotzian, the Court finds the motion MOOT, as the Court's records do not indicate that any appearance was ever entered by these attorneys in this matter. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
298 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting stipulation for order of dismissal with prejudice filed by plaintiffs Karen Eslinger and Michelle Colvin Preciado and defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing [296−1]. Based on the foregoing stipulation between the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all claims made by plaintiffs Karen Eslinger and Michelle Colvin Preciado are dismissed with prejudice and without costs. (SEE ORDER) (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
299 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting stipulation by plaintiffs Lori Hampton, Terry Paz, Deborah Sue ("Debbie") Bledsoe and defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing [295−1]. Based on the foregoing stipulation between the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all claims made by plaintiffs Lori Hampton, Terry Paz and Deborah Sue ("Debbie") Bledsoe are dismissed with prejudice and without costs. (SEE ORDER) (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. The Court has received notification from Plaintiff Coleman that settlement negotiations are still underway. Parties are to submit settlement documents or otherwise inform the court of the

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11/25/1997
11/28/1997 12/02/1997 12/02/1997 12/11/1997 12/15/1997 12/16/1997 12/16/1997 12/16/1997 12/16/1997 12/16/1997
12/16/1997

status of settlement negotiations within 28 days. ; Settlement papers to be filed 12/22/97 . (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/24/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties present via phone by Attorneys Patricia Benassi/Galland/Slevin/Brandt for status hearing held Tuesday, November 25, 1997, at 8:30 a.m., re: [#297] Petition for Relief. Attorney Galland states they intend to file a Motion for Summary Judgment. Court sets Dispositive Motion filing ddl of 12/16/97 , by which Motion for Summary Judgment is to be filed. Court sets case for Status hearing at 4:30 pm on Thursday, 12/18/97 , via phone. Court to call. Attorney Brandt is ordered to turn over agreements of the five plaintiffs and they are to kept confidential. All three sides are to file briefs addressing confidentiality issues by 12/16/97 . (cc: all counsel) (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 11/25/1997)
300 NOTICE by Alison B Marshall, attorney for defendant Mitsubishi Motor, of change of address (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 12/01/1997)
301 STIPULATION FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE filed by plaintiff Cledith Jordan Wellenreiter and defendant Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1997)
302 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting stipulation for order of dismissal with prejudice [301−1]. Based on the foregoing stipulation between the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all claims made by plaintiff Cledith Jordan Wellenreiter are dismissed with prejudice and without costs. (SEE ORDER) (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 12/03/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties present in person and settlement conference held 10:30 12/11/97 as to Pla Feiste only. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/15/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm Status hearing set 4:45 Wed 1/21/98 as to Pla Feiste. Hearing will be by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/15/1997)
303 BRIEF (FILED AS MEMORANDUM UNDER SEAL) by defendant Mitsubishi Motor in accordance with the Court's pretrial protective order dated 2/12/97 (SEALED AND PLACED IN VAULT) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/17/1997 (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 12/17/1997)
304 MOTION by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian for summary judgment on petitioners Paz, Hampton, Colvin, Eslinger and Bledsoe claims (FILED UNDER SEAL) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997 (HK, ilcd). (Additional attachment(s) added on 7/12/2007: # 1 pages 19−22) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 12/17/1997)
305 STATEMENT OF FACTS (undisputed) by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian in connection with their motion for summary judgment [304−1] (FILED UNDER SEAL) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997 (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 12/17/1997)
306 BRIEF FILED (FILED AS MEMORANDUM OF EVANS COUNSEL ON THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF THESE FEE PROCEEDINGS) by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997 (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 12/17/1997)
307 EXHIBITS for respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian to memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment on petitioners' claims stored in VAULT UNDER SEAL (volume I) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997 (Additional attachment(s) added on 7/25/2007: # 1 Part 2, # 2 Part 3, # 3 Part 4, # 4 Part 5) (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 12/17/1997)
308 EXHIBITS for respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian to memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment on petitioners' claims stored IN VAULT UNDERS SEAL (volume II) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997

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12/16/1997 12/17/1997 12/18/1997 12/18/1997 12/19/1997 12/19/1997 12/22/1997
12/24/1997
12/29/1997 12/29/1997 01/13/1998 01/13/1998 01/13/1998

(Additional attachment(s) added on 7/25/2007: # 1 Part 2, # 2 Part 3, # 3 Part 4, # 4 Part 5) (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 12/17/1997)
309 BRIEF FILED (FILED AS POSITION OF CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS ON ISSUE OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROCEEDINGS) by plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Debbie Bledsoe (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997 (Entered: 12/17/1997)
310 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian of documents #304−#308 (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997 (Entered: 12/17/1997)
311 MOTION by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian for leave to file corrected copy of statement of undisputed facts (FILED UNDER SEAL AND PLACED IN VAULT) (VB, ilcd) Modified on 12/19/1997 (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 12/19/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/Galland/ Slevin/Brandt present by phone and status hearing held 12/18/97 4:30. Further Status hearing set 8:30 Wed 12/24/97 by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 12/19/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting motion for leave to file corrected copy of statement of undisputed facts [311−1] (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 12/19/1997)
312 SEALED DOCUMENT: CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS (undisputed) by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, and David A Kotzian (WW, ilcd) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 12/19/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. The Court has received notification from the parties that settlement negotiations with plaintiff Coleman are still underway, but likely to conclude within the next 28 days. Accordingly, parties are to submit settlement documents or otherwise inform the Court of the status of settlement negotiations within 28 days (by 1/20/98). (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 12/22/1997)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm Parties present via phone by Attys Benassi/Galland/Slevin/Brandt for status conference held 12/24/97. Discussion re: discovery. Atty Slevin to file response to motion for summary judgment [304−1] by 1/13/98; respondents to file response by 2/6/98 ; (misc ddl for response set 2/6/98) Court is setting motion for summary judgment [304−1] and motion for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages, and for other relief [297−1] at 1:00 Friday, 2/20/98 (in person in Peoria). (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) Modified on 12/24/1997 (Entered: 12/24/1997)
313 NOTICE of filing of agreed protective order by plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Lori Hampton and Debbie Bledsoe and respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey and David A Kotzian (original agreed protective order given to district judge) (KD, ilcd) Modified on 12/29/1997 (Entered: 12/29/1997)
314 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm: see order (cc: all counsel) (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 12/29/1997)
315 (FILED UNDER SEAL) RESPONSE by plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Lori Hampton, Debbie Bledsoe to statement of undisputed facts [312−1] (VB, ilcd) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 01/14/1998)
316 (FILED UNDER SEAL) STATEMENT OF FACTS ( undisputed) by plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Lori Hampton, Debbie Bledsoe (VB, ilcd) Modified on 01/14/1998 (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 01/14/1998)
317 (FILED UNDER SEAL) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to motion for summary judgment [304−1] by plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen

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01/15/1998 01/21/1998 02/06/1998 02/06/1998 02/19/1998 02/24/1998
02/24/1998
02/25/1998 02/26/1998 03/03/1998

Eslinger, Lori Hampton, Debbie Bledsoe (VB, ilcd) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/13/2007: # 1 1.2, # 2 2.1.a, # 3 2.1.b, # 4 2.2) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 01/14/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status hearing previously set at 4:45 Wednesday, 1/21/98 is CHANGED to 3:15 Wednesday, 1/21/98 via phone. Court to call. The change is in the time only. This hearing is regarding plaintiff Feiste. (cc: all counsel/plaintiff Feiste) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/15/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Allison, Marshall &Shultz present via phone for Status hearing. Same held 3:15 1/21/98. Case is set for Scheduling Conference at 4:30 on Thursday, 2/26/98; in person. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 01/22/1998)
318 FILED UNDER SEAL REPLY by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian to response to motion for summary judgment [304−1] (VB, ilcd) Modified on 02/06/1998 (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/10/2007: # 1 pages 41−80, # 2 pages 81−120, # 3 pages 121−173) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 02/06/1998)
319 FILED UNDER SEAL EXHIBITS for respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian stored in vault (VB, ilcd) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 02/06/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Motion hearing previously set at 1:00 Friday, 2/20/98 is cancelled and the Court is resetting Motion hearing re motion for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages, and for other relief [297−1] and re motion for summary judgment [304−1] at 2:00 Tuesday, 2/24/98 in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel)(VB, ilcd) Modified on 02/20/1998 (Entered: 02/19/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. The Court has received notification from the parties that settlement negotiations with plaintiff Coleman are likely to be finalized in the near future. Accordingly, parties are to submit settlement papers within 14 days, by 3/10/98. As a significant amount of time has passed since these negotiations began, absent receipt of these documents by 3/10/98, the Court will set this matter for a hearing to determine the future course of this case. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 02/24/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland/ Kotzian/Slevin/Riley present in person and hearing re motion for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages, and for other relief [297−1] re motion for summary judgment [304−1]. held with oral arguments by counsel. Atty Slevin to amend petition and add specific claim as directed within 7 days. Motions #297 and #304 are taken under advisement in part and ruling is reserved in part. Court to enter written order. Further Status hearing set 4:30 Wed 3/11/98 by phone. Court to set up call. Evidentiary hrg set for 9:00a.m. Wed 3/25/98 in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/25/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status hearing set at 4:30 Thursday, 2/26/98 is changed to a telephone conference call. The attorneys for plaintiff Feiste and Mitsubishi are the only attorneys to participate in this hearing by telephone. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 02/25/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Atty Allison for pla Fieste/Atty Schultz/Connolly for Mitsubishi present by phone and status re: settlement held. Further hearing set 8:45 Fri 3/20/98 by phone to check status of settlement progress. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 02/27/1998)
320 AMENDED MOTION (filed as petition) by plaintiffs Terry Paz, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger, Lori Hampton and Debbie Bledsoe for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages and for other relief (FILED UNDER SEAL) (KD, ilcd) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 03/03/1998)

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03/04/1998 03/09/1998 03/09/1998 03/10/1998
03/11/1998 03/11/1998 03/18/1998
03/18/1998 03/19/1998
03/23/1998
03/23/1998 03/25/1998 03/25/1998 03/25/1998 03/25/1998

321 MAIL Returned: minute entry [0−0] addressed to Margaret A Coleman (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/04/1998)
322 STIPULATION for order of dismissal with prejudice as to Margaret A Coleman (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 03/09/1998)
323 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm granting stipulation [322−1] dismissing party Margaret A Coleman with prejudice and without costs. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/09/1998)
324 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Motion for summary judgment [304−1] is granted in part &motion for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages, and for other relief [297−1] is denied in part &the remaining issues in both motions are taken under advisement. Case is set for Evidentiary Hearing on motion for summary judgment [304−1] &motion for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages, for other relief [297−1] at 9:00am on Wednesday, 3/25/98;in person. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 03/11/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland/Slevin/Riley present by phone and status hearing held 2:00 3/11/98 . (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/12/1998)
325 TRANSCRIPT filed by court reporter re 2/24/98 oral argument on motion for summary judgment (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 03/13/1998)
326 (FILED UNDER SEAL)−RESPONSE (filed as answer and affirmative defenses) by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey and David A Kotzian to motion (filed as petition) for order to forfeit or reduce fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages and for other relief [320−1] (KD, ilcd) Modified on 03/19/1998 (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 03/19/1998)
326 SEALED COUNTERCLAIM; by Respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey, David A Kotzian against petitioner Terry Paz, petitioner Lori Hampton (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 03/19/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm, finding the motion for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages, and for relief [297−1] moot as a result of the filing of the comprehensive amended petition for order to forfeit or reduce fees [320−1]. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 03/19/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Connolly/Schultz/Allison present by phone and status hearing held 8:45 3/23/98 . (Hearing set 3/20/98 not held and was rescheduled to 3/23/98). Parties recommend further settlement conference. Same agreed by Court and Supplemental Settlement conference set 4:30 Mond 4/6/98 as to Pla FIESTE ONLY. Attys. &Pla Fieste to appear in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel/Crt Rptr) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
327 TRIAL MEMORANDUM submitted by respondents Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr, Joseph Golden, Joseph Garrison, Mary Anne Sedey and David A Kotzian (KD, ilcd) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 03/24/1998)
328 MOTION by plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Lori Hampton to supplement the record as to additional uncontested fact and additional documents (CL, ilcd) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 03/25/1998)
329 MOTION by plaintiff Terry Paz, plaintiff Lori Hampton to strike affirmative defenses, answer and counterclaim (CL, ilcd) (HK, ilcd). (Entered: 03/25/1998)
330 EXHIBIT LIST from evidentiary hearing held 3/25/98 (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/26/1998)
331 SEALED EXHIBITS from evidentiary hearing held 3/25/98 stored in VAULT (CL, ilcd) Modified on 03/30/1998 (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/3/2007: # 1 Part 2, # 2 Part 3, # 3 Part 4, # 4 Part 5, # 5 Part 6, # 6 Part 7, # 7 Part 8)

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03/25/1998
04/01/1998
04/06/1998 04/06/1998 04/09/1998
04/13/1998
04/14/1998 04/14/1998 04/17/1998 04/21/1998 04/22/1998 04/24/1998

(Additional attachment(s) added on 8/28/2007: # 8 Part 9) # 9 Part 10, # 10 Part 11, # 11 Part 12), (12) Part 13, # 13 Part 14, # 14 Part 15), # 15 Part 16, # 16 Part 17, # 17 Part 18, # 18 Part 19) (SM, ilcd). (Entered: 03/26/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Galland/Benassi /Slevin/Riley present in person and motion hearing held re motion for order to forfeit or reduce attorneys' fees, for reimbursement for improper costs, for damages and for other relief [320−1], re motion for summary judgment [304−1] Court is granting motion to supplement the record as to additional uncontested fact and additional documents [328−1]. Evidence and arguments by parties. Court orders all exhibits from this hearing are SEALED pending further order of the Court. Case set for further hearing at 10:00 Wed 4/1/98 for Court to render it's decision, by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 03/26/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Galland &Slevin present via phone for hearing to announce the Court's decision. hearing held 10:00 4/1/98. Remaining claims asserted in the amended petition are denied &Court will enter a written order. Parties are to attempt to work out this motion but if they can't, the Court sets motion to strike affirmative defenses, answer and counterclaim [329−1] at 11:45am on Thursday, 4/9/98; via phone, Court to set up the call. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 04/01/1998)
332 TRANSCRIPT of 4/1/98 ruling of the Court filed (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 04/06/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Allison/Connolly/Schultz present in person with Pla FEISTE and settlement conference held 4:30 4/6/98 . Court to set TSC in approximately 3 weeks. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 04/07/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties present via phone by Attorneys Galland/Slevin for motion hearing held on Thursday, April 9, 1998, at 11:45 a.m. re motion to strike (#329). Same held with oral argument by counsel. Parties report that remaining miscellaneous cost issues asserted in Amended Petition and Count II of Counterclaim are moot by agreement. Court is granting motion to strike Count I of counterclaim [329−1]. Written order to enter. (cc: all counsel) (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 04/09/1998)
333 ORDER by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Two portions of the Amended Petition [320−1] previously taken under advisement are denied. The remaining miscellaneous cost items asserted in the amended petition and count II of respondent attorneys' counterclaim are moot by agreement of the parties. Petitioner's motion to strike [329−1] is granted in part and denied in part. (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) Modified on 04/14/1998 (Entered: 04/13/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status conference as to plaintiff Feiste ONLY set for Friday, 5/1/98 at 10:00 cst, via phone, Court to set up the call. (cc: attys Brandt/Donati/Marshall/Connolly/Allison) (KD, ilcd) (Entered: 04/14/1998)
334 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings filed held on 11/27/96 (KD, ilcd) Modified on 04/21/1998 (Entered: 04/17/1998)
335 MOTION by plaintiff Darlene Feiste to withdraw attorney William A Allison (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/20/1998)
336 NOTICE by plaintiff Darlene Feiste (filed as consent to withdrawal of counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/21/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. The Court has received Atty Allison's motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff Feiste. This matter will be discussed along with any other items of business during the telephone Status hearing currently set at 10:00 Friday, 5/1/98 central time. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/22/1998)
337 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to dismiss claims of plaintiff−intervenor Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/24/1998)

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04/24/1998 04/24/1998 04/24/1998 04/30/1998 05/01/1998
05/12/1998 05/13/1998 05/13/1998 05/18/1998 05/18/1998
05/18/1998

338 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to dismiss claims of plaintiff−intervenor Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [337−1] by defendant Mitsubishi Motor (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/24/1998)
339 EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS for defendant Mitsubishi Motor stored in file (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/24/1998)
340 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor re #337−#339 (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/24/1998)
341 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to motion to dismiss claims of plaintiff−intervenor Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [337−1] by intervenor−plaintiff EEOC (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 04/30/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Allison with Darlene Feiste; Deft Attys Marshall, Connolly &Schultz &EEOC Attys Kamp &Hendrickson present via phone for Telephone Status hearing. Same held 5/1/98 10:00. Court grants motion to withdraw attorney William A Allison [335−1] &attorney A Allison is withdrawn for Darlene Feiste. Darlene Feiste is to enter her appearance pro se or is to have her attorney enter his/her appearance within 28 days of today− misc ddl of 5/29/98 created for said entry of appearance. Case is set for Telephone Status hearing on Monday, 6/8/98 at 4:30pm (CST); via phone, Court to set up the call. Parties are to notify the Court within one week as to whether they can resolve the motion to dismiss by Mitsubishi. Parties are to submit a proposed order to the Court entering judgment pursuant to rule 54(b).(cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 05/01/1998)
342 NOTICE by plaintiff Darlene Feiste of proceeding pro se in this case (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/12/1998)
343 LETTER to Judge Mihm from Atty Walter B Connolly Jr with proposed Rule 54(b) form of judgment (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/14/1998)
344 MOTION by intervenor−plaintiff EEOC for order for entry of proposed judgment order with proposed judgment (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/14/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status hearing previously set at 4:30 Monday, 6/8/98 is CHANGED to a Rule 16 conference at 4:30 Monday, 6/8/98 in person in Peoria. (cc: plaintiff Feiste only/all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/18/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. The EEOC's motion for order for entry of proposed judgment order [344−1] is GRANTED. The Clerk's office will prepare a form of Rule 54(b) judgment for the Court's signature incorporating the language presented in the EEOC's proposed version. As a result of the Court's ruling on this matter, the Court believes that Mitsubishi's motion to dismiss claims of plaintiff−intervenor Equal Employment Opportunity [337−1] is effectively MOOT. Should any party disagree with this conclusion, they should submit an appropriate pleading within 14 days; misc ddl for parties to submit appropriate pleading is 6/1/98. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/18/1998)
345 JUDGMENT in a civil case entered. This action came pursuant to Rule 54(b). IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that pursuant to Order entered November 18, 1997 plaintiffs Linda Evans, Margaret Bajic, Kim Becker Pendragon, Betty Blue, Christine Bonesteel, Nellie Ray Boswell, Desiree Cawthon, Julia Cosby, Debra Emmons, Lori Farris, Deanna Hasler, Sylvia Hampton, Stacy Jackson, Elizabeth Keefe, Patricia Kich, Jennifer Mallicoat, Christine McGrath, Christina Morris, Allene Gregory, Robbin Mattingly, Patricia E Hosea are dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear their own costs. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Order entered November 19, 1997 plaintiffs Karen Eslinger, Michelle Colvin, Lori Hampton, Terry Paz, Deborah Sue Bledsoe are dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear their own costs. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Order entered December 2, 1997 plaintiff Cledith Jordan Wellenreiter is dismissed with pejudice. Each party to bear their own costs. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Order entered March 9, 1998 plaintiff Margaret Coleman is dismissed with prejudice and without costs. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Order entered April 13, 1998 petitioners Terry Paz, Lori Hampton, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger and Deborah Bledsoe are dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear

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06/02/1998 06/03/1998 06/04/1998 06/19/1998 06/26/1998 06/26/1998
07/13/1998 12/23/1998 01/21/1999 01/21/1999
01/28/1999
02/02/1999 02/10/1999 03/04/1999

their own costs. FURTHER ORDERED that Intervening plaintiff EEOC's claims in intervention with respect to all plaintiffs except Darlene Feiste are hereby dismissed with prejudice and without costs. This Order is without prejudice of any kind to any claims asserted by EEOC against Mitsubishi in EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America f/k/a "Diamond Star Motors Corporation", 96−1192, presently pending before Judge Joe B McDade. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/19/1998)
346 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor reset (reschedule) Rule 16 conference (FAX COPY) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/04/1998)
346 Remark−original of motion to reset (reschedule) #346 received 6/3/98 (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/04/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Rule 16 conference previously set at 4:30 Monday, 6/8/98 is cancelled and reset at 1:00 Friday, 6/26/98 in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel/plaintiff Feiste) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/04/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. In light of the fact that the Rule 16 conference with respect to plaintiff Feiste was rescheduled at 1:00 Friday, 6/26/98 , defendant's motion to reset (reschedule) Rule 16 conference [346−1] is now MOOT. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/19/1998)
347 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Mitsubishi Motor by Yvonne R Haddad (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 06/26/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm. Pla Darlene Feiste pro se/Atty Yvonne Haddad for Dft present in person / Atty John Hendrickson for EEOC present by phone Rule 16 conference held 1:00 6/26/98 . Court is advised that plaintiff now qualifies as a member of the Class in 96−1192. This case is ordered stayed as to plaintiff FEISTE pending outcome of Class case. Misc ddl created 12/28/98 to check on status of stay . CASE STAYED (cc: all counsel/pla Feiste) (CL, ilcd) Modified on 07/16/1998 (Entered: 06/29/1998)
348 MAIL Returned: of minute entry dated 6/26/98 addressed to Attorney Alison B Marshal on behalf of Mitsubishi Motor (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/15/1998)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm; Status hearing set at 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, 1/21/99 via phone, Court to set up the call. (cc: all counse/P. Benassi) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 12/23/1998)
349 MAIL Returned: minute entry [0−0] dated 12/23/98 to Yvonne Haddad was returned "moved not forwardable" (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 01/21/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/ Galland/Hendrickson/S. Levine/ J Camp/ N Brennon/ Y Haddad/ G Schultz/ D Fieste pro se present by phone and status hearing held 3:00 Thurs 1/21/99 . Pla Fieste to advise Court whether or not she will accept the proposed settlement agreement on or before misc ddl of 1/27/99 . (cc: all counsel/Fieste) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 01/22/1999)
350 ORDER by Judge Michael M. Mihm;Plaintiff, Darlene Feiste, indicated to the Court on 1/27/99, that she is willing to join settlement in E.E.O.C. v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. case no 96−1192 and forego her claim in the above−titled cause of action. She is further willing to pay one−third of the outstanding attorneys' fees owed to counsel, Patriicia Benassi and George Galland. Settlement papers from the parties shall be filed with the Court on or before 3/4/99. (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 01/28/1999)
351 MAIL Returned: minute entry dated 1/21/99 addressed to Yvonne R Haddad (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 02/02/1999)
352 MAIL Returned: order [350−2] dated 1/28/99 and addressed to Yvonne Haddad; marked "attempted not known" (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 02/11/1999)
353 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor to extend time to provide settlement papers (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 03/04/1999)

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      55  of  57

03/04/1999 03/08/1999 03/18/1999 03/19/1999 03/25/1999
03/25/1999 03/25/1999
04/02/1999 06/02/1999 06/04/1999

MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Defendant's motion for extension of time [353−1] is GRANTED. Settlement papers shall be filed with the Court on of before 3/18/99 . (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 03/04/1999)
354 NOTICE by Attorney Yvonne R Haddad on behalf of defendant Mitsubishi Motor of her change of address (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 03/09/1999)
355 MOTION by defendant Mitsubishi Motor for status conference (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 03/18/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm Status hearing set at 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, 3/25/99 via telephone, court to set up call. (cc: all counsel/pla Feiste) (Former Empl) (Entered: 03/19/1999)
356 ORDER by Judge Michael M. Mihm. The Court has been advised by counsel that this action has been settled or is in the process of being settled. Therefore, it is not necessary that the action remain upon the calendar of the Court. IT IS ORDERED that the case is dismissed without prejudice. The Court retains complete jurisdiction to vacate this Order and to reopen the action within 35 days upon cause shown that settlement has not been completed and further litigation is necessary. IT IS FURTHER ordered that the Clerk forthwith serve copies of this order by United States mail upon the attorneys for the parties appearing in this action. (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 03/25/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Parties present via phone by Attys Connelly, Schultz, Galland, Benassi, Kamp and Feiste pro se for status conference. Same held. Motion for status conference [355−1] is GRANTED in part. Case is settled with 35 day order to enter. (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 03/25/1999)
357 JUDGMENT in a civil case entered. IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that pursuant to Order entered 11/18/97 plaintiffs Linda Evans, Margaret Bajic, Kim Becker, Betty Blue, Christine Bonesteel, Nellie Ray Boswell, Desiree Cawthon, Julie Cosby, Debra Emmons, Lori Faris, Deanna Hasler, Sylvia Hampton, Stacy Jackson, Elizabeth Keefe, Patricia Kich, Jennifer Mallicoat, Christine McGrath, Christina Morris, Allene Gregory, Robbin Mattingly, Patricia E Hosea are dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear their own costs. FURTHER ordered that pursuant to Order entered 11/19/97 plaintiffs Karen Eslinger, Michelle Colvin, Lori Hampton, Terry Paz, Deborah Sue Bledsoe are dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear their own costs. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Order entered 12/2/97 plaintiff Cledith Jordan Wellenreiter is dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear their own costs. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Order entered 3/9/98 plaintiff Margaret Coleman is dismissed with prejudice and without costs. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Order entered 4/13/98 petitioners Terry Paz, Lori Hampton, Michelle Colvin, Karen Eslinger and Debroah Bledsoe are dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear their own costs. Further ordered that pursuant to order on 5/18/98 intervening plaintiff EEOC's claims in intervention with respect to all plaintiffs except Darlene Feiste is hereby dismissed with prejudice and without costs. The remaining parties have announced settlement of the case and the court has entered an order dismissing the case without prejudice pending presentation of a stipulation order of dismissal. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this case is dismissed without prejudice with parties having leave to reinstate within 35 days. Parties to bear their own costs.(cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 03/25/1999)
358 MAIL Returned:judgment [357−1] and minute entry addressed to Margaret A Coleman as not deliverable as addressed (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 04/02/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status hearing set 10:30 Monday, 6/7/99 by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/02/1999)
359 MOTION by Patricia C Benassi and George F Galland, former counsel for plaintiff Darlene Feiste to enforce oral settlement agreement (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 07/22/1999)

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      56  of  57

06/07/1999 06/11/1999 06/15/1999
06/17/1999 06/23/1999 06/23/1999 06/24/1999 06/24/1999 06/25/1999
06/28/1999 07/01/1999 07/02/1999 07/09/1999

MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys Benassi/Galland/Levine/Kemp/Connolly/Schultz/Haddad and Pla Darlene Fiese pro se present by phone and status hearing held 10:30 6/7/99 . Pla to file response to motion to enforce oral settlement agreement [359−1] no later than 6/28/99. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/07/1999)
360 MOTION by plaintiff Darlene Feiste's former attorneys Benassi and Galland to issue withholding order pending decision on the motion to enforce plaintiff Feiste's settlement agreement (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm; Attorneys Benassi and Galland have moved the Court to enter an order that directs the EEOC to withhold $22,111.12 from Fieste's upcoming settlement payment in EEOC v. Mitsuibishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., No. 96−1192. Benassi and Galland are directed to supplement their motion to explain under what authority this Court has to enter such an order in light of the fact that this Court did not preside over case no. 96−1192. Misc ddl for submission is 6/18/99 . (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
361 RESPONSE of defendant Mitsubishi Motor to plaintiffs' motion to issue withholding order pending decision on the motion to enforce plaintiff Feiste's settlement agreement [360−1] (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 06/18/1999)
362 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr to motion to enforce oral settlement agreement [359−1] (filed as Supplemental Memorandum on the Court's Authority to Enter Requested Order) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/23/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm setting motion to issue withholding order pending decision on the motion to enforce plaintiff Feiste's settlement agreement [360−1] at 2:00 Fri 6/25/99 by phone. Court to set up call. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/23/1999)
363 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION: terminating attorney Yvonne R Haddad for Mitsubishi Motor and substituting attorney Clara G DeQuick (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 06/24/1999)
364 RESPONSE by plaintiff Darlene Feiste to motion to enforce oral settlement agreement [359−1] and motion to withhold attorney's fees pending decision on motion to enforce (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 06/25/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Benassi/Connelly/Hendrickson/Camp/Levine and pro se Pla Darlene Fieste present by phone and hearing held re: motion to enforce and re: Court's jurisdiction with statements by counsel and pla. Court finds that it does have jurisdiction to resolve the issues re: settlement enforcement. Court will consider entering an order to stay payment in the amount of $22,111.12 of the settlement due to be paid to Pla Fieste pursuant to order entered in 96−1192 by Chief Judge McDade. Evidentiary hearing re motion to issue withholding order pending decision on the motion to enforce plaintiff Feiste's settlement agreement [360−1] hearing set for 2:30 p.m. Thurs 7/15/99 in person in Peoria. (cc: all counsel/Pla Fieste) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/25/1999)
Remark: received proposed order in re settlement agreement (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 06/30/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Status hearing set at 1:00 p.m. on Friday, 7/2/99 via phone, Court to set up the call. (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 07/01/1999)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Attys. Galland/Connolly/Kemp/Levine/Hendrickson/ and Pla Fieste pro se present by phone and status hearing held 1:00 7/2/99 . Parties to submit briefs on limited issue of whether or not the Court has jurisdition to enforce settlement. Same to be filed by misc ddl of 7/9/99 . (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/02/1999)
365 MOTION by movants Patricia C Benassi, George F Galland Jr for relief from judgment (ML, ilcd) (Entered: 07/09/1999)

Case:  1:94-­cv-­1545      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:27  AM  CDT      57  of  57

07/13/1999 07/23/1999

MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Michael M. Mihm. Evidentiary hearing set 7/15/99 at 2:30 p.m. in re motion to issue withholding order pending decision on the motion to enforce plaintiff Feiste's settlement agreement [360−1] is cancelled. Written order to follow. (cc: all counsel) (WW, ilcd) (Entered: 07/13/1999)
366 ORDER by Judge Michael M. Mihm denying motion for relief from judgment [365−1], finding the motion to issue withholding order pending decision on the motion to enforce plaintiff Feiste's settlement agreement [360−1] moot and denying without prejucide the motion to enforce oral settlement agreement [359−1] (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/23/1999)

 
 Case:  1:96-­cv-­1212      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:31  AM  CDT      1  of  3
15,CLOSED,MTNDDL,REFER
U.S. District Court CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (Peoria) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:96−cv−01212−JBM−RJK

Aeschleman v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg Assigned to: Chief Judge Joe Billy McDade Referred to: Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman Demand: $300,000 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)
Plaintiff
Candace A Aeschleman

Date Filed: 04/18/1996 Date Terminated: 04/29/1997 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Kim L Spaits SAINT LAW GROUP Ste 303 115 W Jefferson St Bloomington, IL 61701−3904 (309) 829−7086 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America Inc formerly known as Diamond Star Motors Corporation

represented by Alison B Marshall MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK &STONE PLC Suite 1150 1900 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 429−5575 Fax: 331−1118 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter W Brandt LIVINGSTON BARGER BRANDT &SCHROEDER 115 W Jefferson St Suite 400 P O Box 3457 Bloomington, IL 61702−3457 309−828−5281 Fax: 309−827−3432 Email: pbrandt@lbbs.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter B Connolly , Jr MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK &STONE PLC 150 W Jefferson Av Ste 2500 Detroit, MI 48226 313 (496−7503) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith J Braskich DAVIS &CAMPBELL LLC Suite 1600 401 Main St Peoria, IL 61602−1241

Case:  1:96-­cv-­1212      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:31  AM  CDT      2  of  3
309−673−1681 Fax: 309−673−1690 Email: Kjbraskich@dcamplaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/18/1996 04/18/1996 04/18/1996 05/09/1996 05/09/1996 05/21/1996 06/17/1996
06/25/1996 06/27/1996 06/28/1996 07/09/1996
07/11/1996 07/16/1996 07/18/1996 08/05/1996 09/19/1996 09/30/1996

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT (summons(es) issued) case referred to Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Rule 41 notice sent; Consent to Magistrate form given (LR, ilcd) Modified on 04/19/1996 (Entered: 04/18/1996)
FILING FEE PAID on 4/18/96 in the amount of $ 120.00 receipt # 022655. (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
2 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST pursuant to Local Rule 11.3 filed by plaintiff Candace A Aeschleman (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
3 ANSWER by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/09/1996)
4 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST pursuant to Local Rule 11.3 filed by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/09/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman ; Rule 16 conference set 10:00 Monday, 6/17/96 (in person in Peoria). Rule 16 notice enclosed. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present in person by Attys Spaits/Braskich for Rule 16 conference held at 10:00 Monday, 6/17/96. Parties discuss deadlines. Discovery to end 10/31/96; Deadline for dispositive motions is 11/29/96. Attorney Spaits to prepare a scheduling order and submit to Court within 10 days; misc ddl set of 7/1/96 for submission of scheduling order. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE FOR PLAINTIFF'S RULE 26 DISCLOSURES by plaintiff Candace A Aeschleman (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 06/25/1996)
6 CERTIFICATE of Service of Discovery Upon Defendant by plaintiff Candace A Aeschleman (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/27/1996)
7 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg by Walter B. Connolly, Jr. (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 06/28/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Pursuant to entry of minute entry dated 06/17/96 the discovery is to end 10/31/96; Mtn filing ddl for any dispositive motions is 11/29/96. (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/09/1996)
8 SCHEDULING ORDER ENTERED. Discovery to be completed by 10/31/96, dispositive motions to be filed by 11/29/96. Final Pretrial Conf to be scheduled after dispositive motions (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/11/1996)
9 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg's attorney Keith Braskich of change of address (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/16/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman ;Case set for Telephone Status hearing at 1:30pm on Monday, 8/5/96 via phone, Court to set up the call. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 07/18/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman. Parties present via phone by Attys Spaits/Connolly/Haddad for Status hearing held at 1:30 Monday, 8/5/96 . (cc: all counsel) (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
10 CERTIFICATE of service re:request to produce documents by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 09/19/1996)
11 NOTICE/Proof of Service defts first request for production of documents by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 09/30/1996)

Case:  1:96-­cv-­1212      As  of:  08/03/2013  10:31  AM  CDT      3  of  3

10/07/1996 10/23/1996 10/25/1996 10/28/1996
11/12/1996 11/18/1996 12/04/1996 12/05/1996 01/07/1997 01/13/1997 01/16/1997 02/24/1997 02/24/1997
04/25/1997 04/28/1997 04/29/1997 04/30/1997 01/09/2003

12 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by Alison B Marshall for defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/08/1996)
13 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff &defendant to amend scheduling order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
14 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Peter Brandt on behalf of defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg (LR, ilcd) (Entered: 10/28/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman granting motion to amend scheduling order [13−1]. Scheduling order entered 7/11/96 is VACATED. All Discovery to be completed by 2/28/97. Any dispositive motions are to be filed by 4/1/97. Final pretrial conf to be set after ruling on dispositive motions. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) Modified on 12/05/1996 (Entered: 10/28/1996)
15 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg of taking deposition of Candace Aeschleman on 11/19/96 (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/12/1996)
16 Re−NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg of taking deposition of Candace Aeschleman on 12/10/96 (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/1996)
17 CERTIFICATE of service of plaintiff's response to request for production of documents by plaintiff Candace A Aeschleman (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/04/1996)
18 OBJECTIONS by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg to the EEOC's Proposed Letter to Mitsubishi Employees (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
MINUTE−ENTRY: by Judge Joe B. McDade. Dft's objection to the EEOC's proposed letter to Mitsubishi Employees [18−1] is denied as moot. (cc: all counsel) (CL, ilcd) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
19 NOTICE by defendant filed as Proof of Service re: supplemental documentation (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 01/14/1997)
Remark−minute entry dated 1/7/97 docketed in this case in error. Should have been docketed in 96−1192. (VB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/16/1997)
20 STIPULATION/MOTION by plaintiff &defendant to amend scheduling order (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 02/25/1997)
21 ORDER by Mag. Judge Robert J. Kauffman granting motion to amend scheduling order [20−1]. Pltf shall submit expert disclosures and reports by 4/30/97; Deft shall submit expert disclosures and reports by 7/17/97; Pltf may seek leave to identify rebuttal experts but shall do so within the time limits set forth in this agreed schedule; All discovery to be completed by 9/30/97 and any dispositive motions to be filed by 11/13/97. Final Pre−Trial to be set if necessary after dispositive motions. (cc: all counsel) (HK, ilcd) (Entered: 02/25/1997)
22 NOTICE by defendant Mitsubishi Motor Mfg of change of address for Attys Allison Marshall and Walter Connolly (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/28/1997)
23 MOTION by plaintiff, defendant to dismiss with prejudice (filed as Stipulation to Dismiss with prejudice) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/28/1997)
24 ORDER by Judge Joe B. McDade granting stipulation to dismiss with prejudice [23−1] Case dismissed. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/30/1997)
25 JUDGMENT in a civil case entered − cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. Parties to bear their own costs. (cc: all counsel) (SH, ilcd) (Entered: 04/30/1997)
ARCHIVES FILE sent to FRC, Chicago on 12/23/02, Accession No. 021 03 0043 Box No. 17 of 36 Location 798658−798693 (RK, ilcd) (Entered: 01/09/2003)

 
 102 F.3d 869 (1996)
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
MITSUBISHI MOTOR MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 96-3957.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted November 27, 1996. Decided November 27, 1996. Opinion Issued December 16, 1996.
870 Jean P. Kamp, submitted, John C. Hendrickson, Steven J. Levine, Equal Employment *870 Opportunity Commission, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Peter W. Brandt, Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schoeder, Bloomington, IL, Walter B. Connolly, Jr., Peter W. Waldmeir, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Detroit, MI, Alison B. Marshall, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Washington, DC, Roy G. Davis, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Peoria, Il, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission believes that sex discrimination and sexual harassment are rife at Mitsubishi's auto assembly plant in Normal, Illinois. Earlier this year the EEOC commenced a pattern-orpractice suit against Mitsubishi under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, on behalf of women currently or formerly employed at the plant. Like a class action under Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3), the suit can produce monetary remedies for injured persons, but the EEOC is not their "representative," and the district court need not certify a class. For many purposes, however, a pattern-or-practice suit operates as a class action, and we follow the parties' convention in referring to the approximately 600 women potentially eligible for relief as the "class."
As is its right, each side sent a communication to the class members. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981). Mitsubishi's letter told them that they "have no legal obligation to cooperate or talk to any representative of the EEOC unless you are subpoenaed to do so. Otherwise, it is your decision whether you talk to the EEOC or anyone else." The EEOC replied in kind, telling the employees: "You should know that you are not required to discuss any issues relating to this lawsuit with Mitsubishi's Human Resources Department." Both statements are legally accurate; the employees can decide for themselves with whom they will talk, and about what subjects. Mitsubishi was concerned about the EEOC's advice, however, for communications are useful in locating and disciplining those who engage in harassment. In order to keep the workplace civil for the benefit of women, an employer must know what is going on there. Following the EEOC's advice, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d), Mitsubishi adopted a formal policy that forbids sexual harassment and invites unhappy employees to complain as soon as possible to persons who have been specially trained to address these issues; yet the EEOC's letter could be read to undermine that policy. Mitsubishi also was concerned that it could be held liable for harassment that the EEOC had made it harder to prevent. Although an employer often is not liable for sexual harassment unless the affected employee has complained, see Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff's Department, 96 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 1996), we have suggested that protest is unnecessary if the employer knows that harassment is pervasive, id. at 1018-19, a condition that the EEOC believes exists at Mitsubishi's plant. See also Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir.1996). Failure to complain might, however, deprive workers of their remedies under labor agreements. So the EEOC's advice to employees, if taken, could simultaneously make conditions worse for current workers and increase Mitsubishi's potential Title VII liability (while reducing its contractual exposure).

Persuaded by Mitsubishi's arguments, the district court ordered the EEOC to send a second letter, telling employees that the first letter
should not be read to suggest that you should not present any complaints you may have relating to sexual harassment, sex-based harassment, and retaliation to Mitsubishi's Human Resources Department pursuant to the company's sexual harassment policy. You should feel free to bring these matters to the company's Human Resources Department pursuant to the company's sexual harassment policy. Of course, you are also free to inform the EEOC of such matters at any time that you wish.
871 See Manual for Complex Litigation 234 (3d ed. 1995) (suggesting that district judges order *871 appropriate curative communications). The court added, when denying the EEOC's motion for a stay pending appeal, that "without a finding of liability, EEOC has no right to disrupt Mitsubishi's existing grievance procedures."
Taking a hint from Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 104 n. 20, 101 S.Ct. at 2202 n. 20, the district court also directed each side to give the other, and the court, 10 days' notice of any future non-privileged communications to the class members, so that misleading statements could be avoided. Finally, the district court directed the EEOC not to use information gathered from current and former employees "who are not themselves victims but have provided second-hand information to EEOC about other employees" to "seek out and persuade any employees to join the plaintiff class who have not already expressed their desire to do so." On November 25 0907 two days before the corrective letter was to be sent 0907 the EEOC filed a notice of appeal. On the morning of November 27 it asked us to issue a stay. We denied the motion that afternoon with a notation that an explanation was in the works. This is that explanation: we declined to issue a stay because this court lacks jurisdiction.
The district court's resolution of Mitsubishi's protest obviously is not a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in the traditional sense. It does not end the litigation or afford (or deny) any relief on the merits. It is instead a managerial order, like dozens of others a court must enter in the course of complex litigation. The limitation on the use the EEOC may make of information it receives in response to its letter is no different from a limitation on discovery, not appealable because any error can be corrected at the end of the case. See Reise v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin, 957 F.2d 293 (7th Cir.1992); cf. Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976) (rejecting an effort to obtain review of discovery decisions by mandamus). Actually, it is not clear that this portion of the district court's order has any effect, because the EEOC is not seeking people to "join the plaintiff class"; the EEOC is and will remain the only plaintiff. The direction to submit proposed communications 10 days in advance might be characterized as a prior restraint of speech 0907 if it were Mitsubishi that felt aggrieved. The Executive Branch of the federal government does not have rights under the first amendment; what particular agents will say, and to whom, is a subject that can be worked out without considering the special rules applicable when the government attempts to fetter private speech. An order to submit proposals for the conduct of litigation 0907 which is what the 10-day-notice directive amounts to 0907 is not appealable unless it has the effect of adjudicating the merits. See Mercer v. Magnant, 40 F.3d 893 (7th Cir.1994); Spates v. Manson, 619 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.1980) (Friendly, J.); Groseclose v. Dutton, 788 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.1986); Liddell v. St. Louis Board of Education, 693 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1981). This order has no such effect. Although it may hamper counsel's efforts to obtain information from class members, so may any order by the district court controlling what questions may be asked during depositions, or what interrogatories may be propounded. Demonstrable injury will be a ground of appeal from a final decision.
According to the EEOC, the court's direction to send a corrective letter is appealable under the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), because it conclusively deals with an issue separate from the merits that is not effectively reviewable at the end of the case. The Supreme Court held in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2150, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), that an order to pay for notice to a class is appealable under Cohen 0907 although it held in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), that an order declining to certify a class is not appealable, even if that sounds the "death knell" of the litigation. We need not try to reconstruct the line separating these decisions, for this court has already classified as non-appealable orders functionally similar to the one at hand: those regarding the form and content of notices to a class under 872 Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2) and (d)(2). Oswald v. McGarr, 620 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th *872 Cir.1980); Weit v. Continental

Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 535 F.2d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir.1976). Accord, Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 178-79 (3d Cir.1984). Misleading or inappropriate information in a class notice can have effects hard to undo at the end of the case 0907 just as advice to follow Mitsubishi's sexual harassment plan could lead some employees not to contact the EEOC (if only because they are satisfied with their employer's efforts) 0907 but would justify an appeal only if courts of appeals were willing to micro-manage the conduct of all complex cases.
Many an order shapes the course of litigation in a way that is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final decision. That is why the Supreme Court has emphasized that appeal under the collateral order doctrine depends on substantial effects 0907 not only irreparable in the sense of irreversible, but also "important" in the sense of looming large to the litigation. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994); Oak Park Board of Education v. Illinois State Board of Education, 79 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir.1996). Whatever one can say about the advice the district court directed the EEOC to provide, it does not seem likely to cause substantial and irreversible damage. Employees who fear retaliation will not use the firm's internal grievance machinery. Those who complain internally yet become dissatisfied with the firm's responses can protest to the EEOC, the court, or both, as the EEOC told them in its first letter and remains free to remind them in follow-up correspondence. Mitsubishi's personnel department will think long and hard before giving employees misleading information or taking adverse action against those who complain. One of the EEOC's allegations is that Mitsubishi has come down hard on whistle-blowers. Objectionable treatment of disgruntled employees in the midst of litigation would not be in Mitsubishi's interests. Whether the court's directive was right or wrong, a subject on which we do not express a view, whatever irreversible (because undetectable) consequences it may produce are unlikely to be substantial. Unless we are to serve as the real day-to-day managers of this case, which we are neither authorized nor willing to do, we could not have granted the EEOC the relief it requested.
The motion for a stay therefore was denied, and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
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