IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., through and with her next friend and mother, L.T.; B.W., through and with his next friend and father, W.W.; KEVIN WILLIAMSON; SUSAN MISHANSKI; M.Y., through and with her next friends and parents, M.B.Y. and J.Y.; P.S., through and with his next friend and mother, A.S.; S.S. through and with his next friend and mother, R.K.; JESSICA VAN REETH; JACK VAN REETH; M.K., through and with his next friend and father, J.F.K; CHARLES BALASAVAGE, JR.; CHARLES and JOANNE BALASAVAGE; JESSE BALLIET; SARAH MYERS; FRANK WEBER; FLORENCE MYERS; STEVE BRANNIGAN; LISA BRANNIGAN; JEFFREY BRUNO; JAY BRUNO; SCOTT BUKOSKI; D.C., through and with his next friend and mother, R.C.; RUTH DAVIS; CAROL FRONCZEK; WILLIAM DIXON; J.G., through and with his next friend and mother, M.O.; BRIAN GYLE; WAYNE GYLE; TRACY HARVEY; D.J., through and with his next friend and mother, S.J.; BARBARA KEARNS; JESSICA THURSTON; BARBARA THURSTON;

COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION Civil Action No. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

KURT KRUGER; J.M.K., through and with his next friend and mother, B.T.; EDWARD KENZAKOSKI III; J.K., through and with his next friend and father, A.K.; B.L., through and with his next friend and father, M.L.; ANTHONY MILLAN; DAMON MILLAN; CINDY MILLAN; PAUL MORGAN JR.; STEVEN PALCHANIS JR.; STEVEN PALCHANIS SR.; JAMIE QUINN; K.R., through and with his next friend and mother, T.S.; DAVID ROWLANDS; MARY SEVILLE; MICHAEL S. SCARLATO; MICHAEL P. and TINA SCARLATO; A.S., through and with his next friend and father, G.S.; JAMES SWARTLEY; MICHAEL VITALI; M.M.W., through and with her next friend and guardian, J.C.; JOHN ASHFORD JR.; DONNA ASHFORD; SHANE BLY; G.B., through and with his next friends and parents J.B. and P.P.; DARYL CHARLES; LIZA CHARLES; WILLIAM CLARKE;GLENN COOPER; KAREN COOPER; RICHARD COPELAND II; DONNA and RICHARD COPELAND; CHAD DERHAMMER; A.D., through and with her mother and next friend, J.E.; MATTHEW DOUGHERTY; E.E., K.E., and L.E. through and with their mother and next friend, H.E.; A.F. and L.F. through and with their mother and next friend, M.F.; J.D.F., through and with his next friend and mother, M.W.; J.F., through and with his next friend and mother, A.I.K.; ALEXANDRA FAHEY; L.H., through and with her next friend and mother, J.M.; MICHAEL HAINES; BARBARA HAINES; EDWARD KANE, JR.;

BRIANNA KEE; MATTHEW KOPETCHNY; MAGEE MOTT; G.M., through and with his next friend and mother, F.M.; KRYSTAL POPE; LISA SCARBROUGH; LAURIE SCARBROUGH; MARSHOND SEWARD; J.S. through and with his next friend and mother, C.S.; CHAD UCA; W.U., through and with his next friend and mother, D.S.; B.R.W., through and with his next friends and parents, C.W. and S.W., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR.; MICHAEL T. CONAHAN; ROBERT J. POWELL; ROBERT MERICLE; GREGORY ZAPPALA; CINDY CIAVARELLA; BARBARA CONAHAN; MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; MIDATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES; PA CHILD CARE, LLC; WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC; PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC; VISION HOLDINGS, LLC; BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC.,
Defendants.

COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION INTRODUCTION
1. With utter disdain for the rule of law, defendants Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. and Michael T. Conahan, in combination and conspiracy with other defendants named herein, have collectively perpetrated, through their acts and omissions, what ranks as one of the largest and most serious violations of children’s rights in the history of the American legal system. Both in its duration, spanning approximately five years between 2003 and 2008 – and its magnitude, inflicting damage on the lives of thousands of children and their families – the scope of defendants’ unlawful scheme is profoundly shocking. In choosing to treat children as commodities that could be traded for cash, the defendants have placed an indelible stain on the Luzerne County juvenile justice system.
2. Specifically, defendants Ciavarella and Conahan engaged for years in a brazen scheme to accept financial kickbacks from defendants Powell, Mericle, and others in exchange for placing children appearing before Ciavarella in residential programs owned and operated by defendants Powell and Zappala, PA Child Care LLC, Western PA Child Care LLC, and Mid-Atlantic Youth Services. As part of the implementation of this scheme, Ciavarella, in concert with other defendants, routinely deprived

children of their constitutional rights – established for decades – to appear before an impartial tribunal, to be represented by counsel, to be protected against self-incrimination and, through a detailed colloquy with the Court, to insure a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of trial rights before pleading guilty. 3. The fact that the victims of the defendants’ misconduct were children who went before the juvenile court expecting justice and fairness only exacerbates the venality of defendants’ conduct. Instead of due process, thousands of these children, among the most vulnerable members of our society, were victims of a wave of unprecedented lawlessness that within minutes of their court appearances, swept them away in handcuffs and shackles and placed them in detention or other residential facilities for months for infractions as trivial as shoplifting a four dollar jar of nutmeg or taking change from unlocked cars. The abuse and trauma these children suffered at the hands of defendants has dramatically changed the trajectory of many of their lives. 4. Confronted as we are in this case with the wholesale subversion of children’s constitutional rights at the hands of the very public officials, elected judges, charged with enforcing and protecting those rights, the due process clause has never been more relevant; the principle that no
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individual is above the law has never been more compelling. This case requires that we squarely confront these two fundamental principles of our own constitutional tradition. 5. These defendants have shamed the face of justice; plaintiffs now come before this court to seek redress.
JURISDICTION 6. Jurisdiction of this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343(3) and (4), in that claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the redress of rights secured by the United States Constitution and under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 for civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (“RICO”). 7. Plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory and punitive damages are authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 8. Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys’ fees are authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 9. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the plaintiffs reside in this district, the defendants are located in this district, and the acts and omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred in this district.
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PARTIES Plaintiffs 10. Plaintiff H.T. of White Haven, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008. 11. Plaintiff L.T. of White Haven, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff H.T. 12. Plaintiff B.W. of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008. 13. Plaintiff W.W. of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff B.W. 14. Plaintiff KEVIN WILLIAMSON of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008. 15. Plaintiff SUSAN MISHANSKI of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff KEVIN WILLIAMSON. 16. Plaintiff M.Y. of Sugarloaf, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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17. Plaintiffs M.B.Y. and J.Y. of Sugarloaf, Pennsylvania are the next friends and parents of Plaintiff M.Y.
18. Plaintiff P.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
19. Plaintiff A.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff P.S.
20. Plaintiff S.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
21. Plaintiff R.K. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff S.S.
22. Plaintiff JESSICA VAN REETH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is a nineteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
23. Plaintiff JACK VAN REETH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is the father of Plaintiff JESSICA VAN REETH.
24. Plaintiff M.K. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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25. Plaintiff J.F.K. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is the father and next friend of Plaintiff M.K.
26. Plaintiff CHARLES BALASAVAGE, JR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
27. Plaintiffs CHARLES and JOANNE BALASAVAGE of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania are the parents of Plaintiff CHARLES BALASAVAGE, JR.
28. Plaintiff JESSE BALLIET of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twenty-twoyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
29. Plaintiff SARAH MYERS is a nineteen-year-old female from WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
30. Plaintiff FRANK WEBER is a twenty-three-year-old male from WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
31. Plaintiff FLORENCE MYERS of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, is the mother of Plaintiff JESSE BALLIET, Plaintiff SARAH MYERS, and Plaintiff FRANK WEBER.
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32. Plaintiff STEVEN BRANNIGAN is an eighteen-year-old male who resides in Hanover Township, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
33. Plaintiff LISA BRANNIGAN of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff STEVEN BRANNIGAN.
34. Plaintiff JEFFREY BRUNO is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Larksville, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
35. Plaintiff JAY BRUNO of Larksville, Pennsylvania is the father of Plaintiff JEFFREY BRUNO.
36. Plaintiff SCOTT BUKOSKI is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
37. Plaintiff D.C. of Shickshinny, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
38. Plaintiff R.C. of Shickshinny, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff D.C.
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39. Plaintiff RUTH DAVIS of Shavertown, Pennsylvania is a twenty-two-yearold female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
40. Plaintiff CAROL FRONCZEK of Shavertown, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff RUTH DAVIS.
41. WILLIAM DIXON is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Plymouth, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
42. Plaintiff J.G. of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
43. Plaintiff M.O. of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.G.
44. Plaintiff BRIAN GYLE is a nineteen-year-old male who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
45. Plaintiff WAYNE GYLE is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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46. Plaintiff TRACY HARVEY of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
47. Plaintiff D.J. of Edwardsville, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
48. Plaintiff S.J. of Edwardsville, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff D.J.
49. Plaintiff BARBARA KEARNS of Southern Pines, North Carolina is a nineteen-year-old female. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
50. Plaintiff JESSICA THURSTON of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twenty-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
51. Plaintiff BARBARA THURSTON of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff JESSICA THURSTON and Plaintiff BARBARA KEARNS.
52. Plaintiff KURT KRUGER is a twenty-two-year-old male who resides in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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53. Plaintiff J.M.K. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
54. Plaintiff B.T. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.M.K.
55. Plaintiff EDWARD KENZAKOSKI III is a twenty-two-year-old male from Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
56. Plaintiff J.K. of Kingston, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
57. Plaintiff A.K. of Kingston, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff J.K.
58. Plaintiff B.L. of Kinston, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
59. Plaintiff M.L. of Kingston, Pennsylvania is the father and next friend of Plaintiff B.L.
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60. Plaintiff ANTHONY MILLAN of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania is a twentyyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
61. Plaintiff DAMON MILLAN is an eighteen-year-old male who resides in Nanticoke, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
62. Plaintiff CINDY MILLAN of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania, is the mother of Plaintiffs DAMON and ANTHONY MILLAN.
63. Plaintiff PAUL MORGAN JR., is an eighteen-year-old male from Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
64. Plaintiff STEVEN PALCHANIS JR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twenty-one-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
65. Plaintiff STEVEN PALCHANIS SR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the father of Plaintiff STEVEN PALCHANIS JR.
66. Plaintiff JAMIE QUINN is an eighteen-year-old female who resides in Wyoming, Pennsylvania. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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67. Plaintiff K.R. of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
68. Plaintiff T.S. of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is the mother and next friend of Plaintiff K.R.
69. Plaintiff DAVID ROWLANDS of Laporte, Pennsylvania is an eighteenyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
70. Plaintiff MARY SEVILLE of Laporte, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff DAVID ROWLANDS.
71. Plaintiff MICHAEL S. SCARLATO of Hazleton, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
72. Plaintiffs MICHAEL P. and TINA SCARLATO of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, are the parents of Plaintiff MICHAEL S. SCARLATO.
73. Plaintiff A.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
74. Plaintiff G.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff A.S.
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75. Plaintiff JAMES SWARTLEY is a nineteen-year-old male from WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
76. Plaintiff MICHAEL VITALI of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twentytwo-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
77. Plaintiff M.M.W. of Freedland, Pennsylvania is a fourteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
78. Plaintiff J.C. of Freedland, Pennsylvania is the next friend and legal guardian of Plaintiff M.M.W.
79. Plaintiff JOHN ASHFORD JR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twentyone-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
80. Plaintiff DONNA ASHFORD of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff JOHN ASHFORD JR.
81. Plaintiff SHANE BLY of Sugar Loaf, Pennsylvania is a twenty-one-yearold male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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82. Plaintiff G.B. of Larksville, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
83. Plaintiffs P.P. and J.B. of Larksville, Pennsylvania are the next friends and parents of Plaintiff G.B.
84. Plaintiff DARYL CHARLES of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twentyyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
85. Plaintiff LIZA CHARLES of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff DARYL CHARLES.
86. Plaintiff WILLIAM CLARKE of Bear Creek Township, Pennsylvania is a twenty-three-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
87. Plaintiff GLENN COOPER of Meshoppen, Pennsylvania is a twenty-oneyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
88. Plaintiff KAREN COOPER of Meshoppen, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff GLENN COOPER.
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89. Plaintiff RICHARD COPELAND II of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania is a twenty-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
90. Plaintiffs DONNA and RICHARD COPELAND of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania are the parents of Plaintiff RICHARD COPELAND II.
91. Plaintiff CHAD DERHAMMER of Dallas, Pennsylvania is a twenty-threeyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
92. Plaintiff A.D. of Plymouth, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
93. Plaintiff J.E. of Plymouth, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff A.D.
94. Plaintiff MATTHEW DOUGHERTY of Pittston, Pennsylvania is a twentyone-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
95. Plaintiff E.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fourteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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96. Plaintiff K.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
97. Plaintiff L.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
98. Plaintiff H.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff L.E., Plaintiff K.E., and Plaintiff E.E.
99. Plaintiff A.F. of Drums, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
100. Plaintiff L.F. of Drums, Pennsylvania is a nineteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
101. Plaintiff M.F. of Drums, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff A.F. and Plaintiff M.F.
102. Plaintiff J.D.F. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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103. Plaintiff M.W. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.D.F.
104. Plaintiff J.F. of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania is a fourteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
105. Plaintiff A.I.K. of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.F.
106. Plaintiff ALEXANDRA FAHEY is a nineteen-year-old female who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
107. Plaintiff L.H. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
108. Plaintiff J.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff L.H.
109. Plaintiff MICHAEL HAINES of Dallas, Pennsylvania is a nineteen-yearold male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
110. Plaintiff BARBARA HAINES of Dallas, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff MICHAEL HAINES.
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111. Plaintiff EDWARD KANE, JR. is a twenty-two-year-old male who resides in Swoyersville, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
112. Plaintiff BRIANNA KEE is an eighteen-year-old female who resides in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
113. Plaintiff MATTHEW KOPETCHNY is a twenty-year-old male who resides in Kingston, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
114. Plaintiff MAGEE MOTT is a twenty-three-year-old female who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
115. Plaintiff G.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
116. F.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff G.M.
117. Plaintiff KRYSTAL POPE is a nineteen-year-old female who resides in Kingston, Pennsylvania. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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118. Plaintiff LISA SCARBROUGH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is a twenty-one-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
119. Plaintiff LAURIE SCARBROUGH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff LISA SCARBROUGH.
120. Plaintiff MARSHONDA SEWARD is a nineteen-year-old female from Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
121. Plaintiff J.S. is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
122. Plaintiff C.S. of Plymouth, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.S.
123. Plaintiff CHAD UCA is an eighteen-year-old male from Hazleton, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
124. Plaintiff W.U. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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125. Plaintiff D.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff W.U.
126. Plaintiff B.R.W. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
127. Plaintiffs C.W. and S.W. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania are the next friends and parents of Plaintiff B.R.W.
Defendants 128. Defendant MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR. of Kingston, Pennsylvania
(“Ciavarella”) at all relevant times served as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. He was Judge of the Juvenile Court for Luzerne County between approximately 1996 and May 23, 2008. He was named President Judge for Luzerne County in January 2007. He is sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times, he also controlled the business-entity defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 129. Defendant MICHAEL T. CONAHAN of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania (“Conahan”) at all relevant times served as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Between January 2002 and January 2007, he served as President Judge for Luzerne County. He is
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sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times, he also controlled the business-entity defendants BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC. and PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 130. Defendant ROBERT J. POWELL of Drums, Pennsylvania, at all relevant times, was an owner of defendants PA CHILD CARE, LLC; WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC; MID-ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES; and VISION HOLDINGS, LLC. 131. Defendant ROBERT MERICLE of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania at all relevant times was president of defendant MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC. 132. Defendant GREGORY ZAPPALA of Monroeville, Pennsylvania, at all relevant times, was an owner of defendants PA CHILD CARE, LLC; WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC; and MID-ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES. 133. Defendant CINDY CIAVARELLA of Kingston, Pennsylvania (“Cindy Ciavarella”) is the wife of MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., and owner at all relevant times of defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 134. Defendant BARBARA CONAHAN of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania (“Barbara Conahan”) is the wife of MICHAEL CONAHAN and managing
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member, at all relevant times, of defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 135. Defendant MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC. is located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 136. Defendant MID-ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES is located in Pittston Township, Pennsylvania. 137. Defendant PA CHILD CARE, LLC is located in Pittston Township, Pennsylvania. 138. Defendant WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC is located in Emlenton, Pennsylvania. 139. Defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC is a business entity located in Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 140. Defendant VISION HOLDINGS, LLC is a Cayman Islands business entity with a mailing address in West Hazleton, Pennsylvania. 141. Defendant BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC. is a business entity located in Selzer, Pennsylvania.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 142. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of themselves and classes of persons similarly situated.
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143. The classes are defined herein as follows: A. All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008, whose adjudications have been or will be expunged, vacated, or otherwise invalidated, as of the date of class certification. Named plaintiffs H.T., B.W., Kevin Williamson, M.Y., R.S., and S.S. are class representatives. This class is referred to hereinafter as Class A. B. All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella without counsel and without colloquies on the record that informed them of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, before either waiving counsel and/or pleading guilty, during the time period between 2003 and May 2008, and whose adjudications have been or will be expunged, vacated, or otherwise invalidated as of the date of class certification. Named plaintiffs H.T., B.W., Kevin Williamson, M.Y., R.S., and S.S. are also class representatives of this class. This class is referred to hereinafter as Class B. C. All children adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella, and their parents or guardians, who were assessed fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated
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with the adjudication and/or placement during the time period between 2003 and May 2008. All named plaintiff youth and named plaintiff parents or guardians are class representatives. This class is referred to hereinafter as Class C. 144. The classes are sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Between 2003 and May 2008, Ciavarella adjudicated more than 2,500 children delinquent and placed more than 1000 of these children in facilities outside their homes. Other children were placed on probation or put under some other type of court supervision. As of the date of class certification, the vast majority of children adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008 will have had their adjudications expunged, vacated, or otherwise invalidated pursuant to the procedure explained in paragraphs 565 and 566, below. None of the youth who appeared before Ciavarella without counsel and pled guilty had a colloquy regarding their waiver of counsel or guilty plea. The number of children who appeared before Ciavarella without counsel during the relevant time period is believed to be in excess of 1,200. Nearly all the children who were adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella or placed by him between 2003 and May 2008, as well as their parents or guardians, were assessed fees, costs, fines, restitution, or other monetary charges.
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145. There are questions of law and fact common to the classes. With respect to Classes A and B, these questions include, among others, (1) whether defendants did or conspired to violate plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (2) whether defendants did or conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their right to counsel, their right against self incrimination and their right to have any guilty plea they make be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, with respect to Class C, these questions include, among others, (1) whether defendants devised and/or engaged a scheme or artifice to defraud the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including plaintiffs, and to deprive those citizens – and particularly plaintiffs – of the intangible right of honest services and engaged in other racketeering activity; (2) whether defendants, through that racketeering activity, participated in the conduct of the affairs of an association that functioned for the purpose of adjudicating youth and providing housing for youth adjudicated delinquent; (3) whether defendants, through that racketeering activity, acquired or maintained interests in or control of the association; (4) whether defendants conspired and agreed to acquire or maintain interests in or control of the association
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and/or to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the association; and (5) whether defendants’ actions caused injury to plaintiffs’ property interests. 146. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. Like the other members of the class, the named plaintiffs maintain that defendants did or conspired to violate their rights to an impartial tribunal, to counsel, and to a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea, as well as caused them to suffer financial loss or other injuries to their property interests through a pattern of racketeering activity. 147. The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, juvenile and constitutional law, and the intersection thereof. Juvenile Law Center has been at the forefront of protecting and defending children’s legal rights since 1975, and has litigated many class action lawsuits involving children’s constitutional rights over the last 34 years. Juvenile Law Center attorneys have also authored or co-authored numerous scholarly articles addressing children’s legal rights in the juvenile justice system, and they teach courses on the juvenile justice system at both the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Temple University Beasley School of Law. In 2008, Juvenile
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Law Center was one of eight organizations world-wide to receive the MacArthur Foundation Award for Creative and Effective Institutions. Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin’s litigation department is highly regarded, with attorneys concentrating on a wide range of areas, including complex commercial litigation, constitutional litigation, and criminal defense and investigations. The firm’s attorneys have considerable expertise in both bringing and defending class action suits in federal and state courts. The firm is proud of its long-standing relationship with one of the nation’s premiere public interest law firms, the Juvenile Law Center. 148. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods of the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The class members are entitled to recovery as a result of the defendants’ conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights and defendants’ violation of federal RICO statutes. Individual differences in the cases of each class member do not defeat commonality, as plaintiffs seek recovery for the same violations of their constitutional rights and injury to their property interests without regard to each plaintiff’s underlying circumstances.
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OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 149. The juvenile justice system in Pennsylvania and throughout the United
States was created based on the recognition that youth who commit delinquent acts are fundamentally different than adult criminals. Youth are considered less culpable, more vulnerable, and more susceptible to treatment and rehabilitation. The juvenile justice system is therefore designed to provide for the care, supervision and rehabilitation of youth committing delinquent acts. See, e.g., In re M.D., 839 A.2d 1116, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 150. The Juvenile Act in Pennsylvania states as its purpose, inter alia: “[t]o provide for the care, protection, safety and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of [the Act].” 42 Cons. Stat. § 6301(1). The Act aims to achieve its purposes “in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from parents only when necessary for his welfare, safety or health or in the interests of public safety.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6301(3). Courts in Pennsylvania have recognized that, while principles and policies underlying the juvenile justice system may have evolved since its creation, “particular importance is still placed upon rehabilitating and protecting society’s youth.” In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467, 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
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151. Youth in delinquency proceedings are entitled to nearly all of the due process rights guaranteed to adult criminal defendants. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971) (“Among [the constitutional rights applicable in state juvenile proceedings] are the rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Included, also, is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
152. The absolute right to counsel in juvenile adjudications has been firmly established for decades. More than forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees youth charged with delinquency and facing the possibility of incarceration the right to counsel. Gault recognized that a system in which children’s liberty interests are not protected is a system that violates due process. The Court recognized that attorneys are needed in the juvenile justice system to assist clients to “cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether [the client] . . . has a defense and to prepare and submit.” Id. at 36.
153. Consistent with Gault, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have established that the right to counsel
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extends to juveniles through all stages of the juvenile delinquency process (e.g., detention, pre-trial motions or hearings, adjudication, disposition, post-disposition, probation, appeal). The General Assembly codified a juvenile’s right to counsel in the Juvenile Act. Section 6337 of the Act states that “a party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings under [the Juvenile Act].” The judiciary’s concern about delinquency hearings proceeding without counsel for the child led the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to require, effective October 1, 2005, that, where a waiver of counsel is proffered, that juvenile court must conduct an extensive colloquy with the juvenile to determine his or her comprehension of the consequences of a waiver. Pa. R. Juv. Ct. P. 152. 154. Today, the need for the assistance of counsel in juvenile court is even more paramount than it was when the Supreme Court issued the Gault decision in 1967. Delinquency dispositions have become longer and more punitive, and delinquency adjudications now carry collateral consequences that follow youth into adulthood and, in some cases, for the rest of their lives. Of equal if not greater importance, as the stakes in juvenile court have risen, social science research has confirmed that most youth lack the capacity, on their own, to understand the nature of those stakes and to make intelligent decisions about how to navigate the increasingly complex
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dimensions of the modern juvenile court. T. Grisso, L. Steinberg, et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adult Capacities as Trial Defendants, Law and Human Behavior, Aug. 2003, at 333-63. Because of these complexities, as recognized in the Juvenile Act, children charged as delinquents should be provided with continuous legal representation throughout the delinquency process, including, but not limited to, detention, pre-trial motions or hearings, adjudication, disposition, post-disposition, probation, appeal, expungement, and sealing of records. 155. In 2001, Ciavarella himself publicly acknowledged the importance of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings. After the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned Ciavarella’s adjudication of a youth denied his right to counsel, Ciavarella told the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader, “I’ll never do it again . . . . They obviously have a right to a lawyer, and even if they come in and tell me they don’t want a lawyer, they’re going to have one.” 156. During the next six years, Ciavarella, together with the other defendants, violated this promise, his judicial duties, and the constitutional rights of the youth plaintiffs in exchange for approximately $2.6 million.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
A. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS
H.T., through and with her next friend and mother, L.T. 157. H.T., a seventeen-year-old female, and her mother L.T. reside in White
Haven, Pennsylvania. 158. On April 17, 2007, H.T., then a fifteen year old, appeared before Ciavarella
for an adjudication hearing on a charge of harassment, a third degree misdemeanor. Specifically, H.T. was charged with creating a “My Space” page (a website) about the assistant principal of her high school. H.T. had no prior contact with the juvenile justice system. 159. H.T. did not have private counsel, nor was she appointed counsel. At the courthouse, prior to the adjudication hearing, H.T.’s mother signed a form, given to her outside the courtroom and without explanation, waiving her daughter’s right to counsel. H.T. did not sign the statement. 160. At no point during the adjudication hearing did Ciavarella explain the consequences of proceeding without counsel. H.T. admitted creating the website in question. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy with H.T. on the
1 All of the following allegations are based on information or belief, or based on the Bill of Information filed by United States Attorney Martin C. Carlson against Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. and Michael T. Conahan on January 26, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (No. 3:09-cr-028).
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record to explain her rights and the consequences of waiving her right to a trial. 161. Although H.T. had no prior record and was adjudicated for a third degree misdemeanor, the court immediately committed her to a residential treatment facility operated by Youth Services Agency. H.T. was lead away in shackles and her shocked mother collapsed into tears. 162. H.T. remained committed to the treatment facility for approximately one month, when Juvenile Law Center filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of her adjudication and detention. In May 2007, the writ was granted by the juvenile court and H.T. was allowed to return home to her family; her adjudication was vacated. 163. H.T. was eventually placed on a consent decree by the court; she was ordered to make payments – and is still making payments – to Juvenile Probation.
B.W., through and with his next friend and father, W.W. 164. B.W. is a sixteen-year-old male who resides with his father W.W. in
Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 165. In February 2007, at the age of fourteen, B.W. was charged with simple
assault for getting into a fight in school and with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle for driving his parents’ car without permission.
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166. When they arrived at the courthouse, B.W.’s father signed a form waiving counsel. B.W. was told by the court officer that he had to sign the waiver form because his father did.
167. B.W. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel; he was adjudicated delinquent after he admitted to the charges. Ciavarella did not inform B.W. and his father that he had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if they could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to B.W. of waiving his right to counsel and his right to trial by pleading guilty.
168. Ciavarella ordered B.W. into placement at Camp Adams where he remained for about two months. During the time he was at Camp Adams, B.W. was repeatedly bullied by other juveniles. When he returned home he was placed on probation.
169. In January 2008, B.W. was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, simple possession, and unauthorized use of a vehicle. Allegedly, B.W. was threatened by another child he met in Camp Adams to deliver some marijuana.
170. Before the hearing on these new charges, B.W.’s father again signed the waiver of counsel form and B.W. was again told that he needed to sign the form as well.
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171. B.W. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel; he was adjudicated delinquent after he admitted to the charges. Ciavarella did not inform B.W. and his father that he had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if they could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to B.W. of waiving his right to counsel or his right to trial by pleading guilty.
172. Ciavarella sent B.W. back to Camp Adams, where he remained for about six weeks before being transferred to St. Michaels, where B.W. did very well and was nominated for an award for his outstanding performance.
173. A volunteer attorney then stepped in and filed a writ of habeas corpus; B.W. was released from St. Michaels in the summer of 2008.
174. The felony charge was nul prossed, but the adjudications for the misdemeanor charges of possession of a marijuana and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle remain on B.W.’s record.
175. B.W. was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. B.W.’s father was ordered to and paid $3,500 to the court to cover the costs of his placements in the various facilities.
Kevin Williamson and his mother, Susan Mishanski 176. Kevin Williamson, now age eighteen, is the son of Susan Mishanski of
Hanover Township, Pennsylvania.
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177. In April 2008, Kevin, then a seventeen year old, was charged with simple assault when he was in a fight with a friend outside of a concert hall.
178. On April 22, 2008, Kevin was adjudicated delinquent in an approximately five-minute hearing before Ciavarella.
179. Kevin was not told of his right to an attorney, but a public defender did appear in the middle of the hearing. The public defender did not speak to Kevin. Kevin believes that he may have pled guilty to the charges, but he does not think he was told the consequences of pleading guilty or of his right to a trial.
180. Ciavarella ordered that Kevin be placed at Camp Adams for three months. 181. In May 2007, the Juvenile Law Center filed a writ of habeas corpus on
Kevin’s behalf, challenging the constitutionality of Kevin’s adjudication and detention. On June 18, 2008, the court granted the writ; Kevin’s delinquency adjudication was vacated and he was released from Camp Adams. 182. Kevin was put on probation by Judge Lupas on the same charge in July 2008; this time, he was represented by an attorney whom his mother retained. Kevin was successfully discharged from probation on February 5, 2009.
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183. Kevin’s mother paid $450 to Juvenile Probation for the cost of placement. Kevin and his mother also were ordered to and paid $140 in court fees and $140 in Juvenile Probation fees.
M.Y., through and with her next friends and parents, M.B.Y and J.Y. 184. M.Y. is a seventeen-year-old female who resides with her parents, M.B.Y.
and J.Y., in Sugarloaf, Pennsylvania. 185. In April 2008, at the age of sixteen, school security found less than five
dollars worth of marijuana in the glove compartment of her father’s car, which she had driven to school that day. She was arrested. 186. Shortly thereafter, the family received a notice that M.Y. was to report to court for a hearing on the possession charge. M.Y.’s parents considered hiring an attorney but believed the court would be fair since M.Y. was an honor student and this was her first offense. 187. M.Y., without counsel, appeared before Ciavarella and admitted to the charge. Ciavarella adjudicated M.Y. delinquent and ordered that she be placed at Camp Adams for ninety days. 188. M.Y.’s stunned parents immediately sought help for their daughter. A pro bono attorney filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of her adjudication and detention. In response to the writ, the Luzerne
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County Juvenile Court released M.Y. to her parents and vacated the adjudication.
P.S., through and with his next friend and mother, A.S. 189. P.S., now fifteen years old, is the son of A.S. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. In 2007, when he was fourteen years old, P.S. was arrested for stealing loose change from unlocked cars. 190. One of the police officers who arrested P.S. told A.S. that P.S. would receive probation because P.S. cooperated with the police and committed a minor offense. 191. Before P.S.’s hearing, A.S. contacted two attorneys about representing P.S. The first attorney advised her against hiring him because A.S. would likely receive probation even without the assistance of an attorney. The second attorney asked her for the name of the judge assigned to the case. When she told the attorney it was Ciavarella, the attorney advised her that it would be “a waste of money” to hire him because Ciavarella does not listen to the attorneys of juvenile defendants. 192. Before entering Ciavarella’s courtroom, A.S. was asked to sign a form waiving P.S.’s right to an attorney. A.S. told the staff person that she would like P.S. to be represented by an attorney, but that she could not afford to hire one. The staff person pressured A.S. into signing the form by
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telling her that it would take six to eight months to assign a public defender to P.S. and that P.S. would be held in detention in the interim. 193. P.S. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel; he was adjudicated delinquent. Ciavarella did not inform P.S. or A.S. that P.S. had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if P.S. could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to P.S. of waiving his right to an attorney. 194. P.S.’s hearing before Ciavarella lasted no longer than three minutes. Ciavarella asked P.S. whether he would plead guilty, but did not explain the legal rights P.S. would relinquish by waiving his right to a trial. P.S. pled guilty. 195. P.S. was detained at Camp Adams for three days before he was transferred to Glen Mills. 196. P.S. remained at Glen Mills for approximately twelve months, when pro bono attorneys who had become aware of his situation filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of his underlying adjudication and commitment. 197. The Luzerne County Juvenile Court granted the writ in June 2008, his adjudication was vacated, and P.S. returned home. P.S. is currently on probation.
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198. P.S.’s father pays $440 per month in child support for P.S. The Domestic Relations Court redirected the child support payments to Juvenile Probation while P.S. was in placement.
199. The court also ordered P.S. to pay $1,900 in restitution fines. Juvenile Probation also told A.S. that she will have to pay between $45 and $80 per month for every month P.S. is on probation. Juvenile Probation told A.S. that P.S.’s probation will not end until P.S. and A.S. pay the restitution, fines, and probation fees.
200. Although P.S. was fourteen when he was detained at Glen Mills, Glen Mills placed him in pre-GED classes. He was not assigned a grade level. When he returned home from Glen Mills, he was therefore held back a grade.
201. At Glen Mills, P.S. developed anxiety and depression. As a result, he can no longer attend school. He now receives homebound instruction.
S.S., through and with his next friend and mother, R.K. 202. S.S. is seventeen years old. He resides with his mother, R.K., of Wilkes-
Barre, Pennsylvania. 203. In October 2007, when S.S. was sixteen years old, S.S. was charged with
driving without a license and presenting false identification to the police in Dauphin County.
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204. That month, S.S. appeared, with an attorney, before the Dauphin County Juvenile Court and made a counseled admission to the charges. The Dauphin County court then transferred the case to the Luzerne County Juvenile Court as S.S. was (and still is) a resident of Luzerne County.
205. On November 14, 2007, S.S. appeared without counsel before Ciavarella for an adjudication/disposition hearing. Ciavarella did not ascertain whether S.S. knew he had the right to counsel, nor did the court obtain an affirmative waiver of counsel from S.S. on the record.
206. Ciavarella ordered that S.S. be placed a Glen Mills School for an indefinite period. Upon Ciavarella’s order, S.S. spent approximately two weeks from November 14 to November 28, 2007 in PA Child Care and then was transferred to Glen Mills.
207. S.S. remained at Glen Mills until July 2008, when Juvenile Law Center filed a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of his adjudication and detention. On July 31, 2008, Judge Lupas of the Luzerne County Juvenile Court issued an order releasing S.S. from his commitment at Glen Mills and vacating the delinquency adjudication and disposition of November 14, 2007.
208. During S.S.’s placement at Glen Mills, the court garnished S.S.’s survivor’s check of $598 a month, which S.S. has received from Social
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Security since his father passed away. S.S. was also ordered to pay fees and costs of $35 a month to the court.
Jessica Van Reeth and her father, Jack Van Reeth 209. Jessica Van Reeth, now nineteen years old, lives with her mother, Toni,
and her father, Jack Van Reeth, in Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. On January 30, 2007, Jessica, then sixteen, appeared before Ciavarella for an adjudication hearing on a delinquency petition charging her with possession of drug paraphernalia, namely a cigarette lighter and pipe, which is a misdemeanor. Jessica had no prior contact with law enforcement. 210. Prior to the hearing, Jessica and her father were interviewed by a Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Officer, who told them that he would not recommend placement to the court. 211. Jessica appeared in court without a lawyer. Jessica was not advised of her right to counsel, nor did Ciavarella administer a colloquy with Jessica on the record to explain the consequences of proceeding without counsel. During the hearing, Jessica admitted to the charge and she was adjudicated delinquent. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy with Jessica on the record to explain her rights and the consequences of waiving her right to a trial.
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212. Despite the fact that she had no prior record, Ciavarella ordered Jessica placed in Camp Adams for three months. She was immediately handcuffed and escorted out of the courtroom without even getting a chance to say good-bye to her father. She was not allowed to see her parents for the first two weeks she was in placement.
213. Jessica was released from Camp Adams on April 26, 2007 and placed on intensive probation for an additional three months. The Juvenile Court’s supervision over Jessica ended on September 17, 2007.
214. Jessica and her parents were ordered to and paid monies to Juvenile Probation to cover various fees and costs associated with her adjudication and placement.
M.K., through and with his next friend and father, J.F.K. 215. M.K. is the seventeen year old son of J.F.K. of Exeter, Pennsylvania. 216. In December 2004, when he was thirteen years old, M.K. was charged with
simple assault and harassment. The charges arose out of an incident in November, in which his mother’s boyfriend alleged that M.K. spilled beer on the floor, pushed him around, and threw a piece of steak on him. The boyfriend was 6’3” tall and weighed about 210 pounds, while M.K. was 4’2” tall and weighed 87 pounds. At the time, M.K.’s parents were involved in a custody dispute.
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217. On December 28, 2004, M.K. appeared with his father and a lawyer before Ciavarella. M.K., who had no prior police record, told the judge he had done nothing wrong. Ciavarella ordered that M.K. be placed in PA Child Care pending a psychological evaluation. M.K. was taken out of the courtroom in handcuffs and shackles.
218. On January 13, 2005, sixteen days after being locked up in PA Child Care, M.K. was evaluated by Dr. Frank Vita. M.K. remained in placement for an additional thirty-two days after the evaluation. He remained at PA Child Care the entire time, except for one week when he was transferred to Tioga County Detention Center due to space constraints.
219. On January 27, 2005, M.K.’s father attended a meeting at PA Child Care. At that meeting, Sandra M. Brulo, then chief of Juvenile Probation, told M.K.’s father that she could send M.K. away until he was twenty-one years old. Indeed, in a report to the court dated January 28, 2005, Ms. Brulo recommended to the court that M.K. be placed for one year at the Colorado Boys Ranch, followed by a second year at Glen Mills School in Pennsylvania.
220. Frustrated that his son was being held and concerned that he would be sent out of state, M.K.’s father approached the local media. They published a story describing M.K.’s plight on February 9, 2005.
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221. On February 14, 2005, five days after the article appeared in the WilkesBarre Times-Leader, M.K. again appeared in court. Ciavarella ordered that M.K. be released from PA Child Care and placed on probation for approximately six months.
222. M.K. and his father were ordered to pay $420 in probation and detention service fees to the Juvenile Probation department. In addition, M.K.’s father paid for the services of an attorney to represent his son.
Charles Balasavage Jr. and his parents, Charles and Joanne Balasavage 223. Charles Balasavage Jr., now eighteen years old, is the son of Charles and
Joanne Balasavage of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 224. In 2006, when he was sixteen years old, Charles was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for receiving a stolen scooter. Charles did not go to trial but neither he nor his father can remember if he actually pled guilty in the three-minute hearing. Charles was unrepresented. Ciavarella did not inform Charles that he had a right to an attorney, or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Charles of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 225. Although Charles had no prior record and was adjudicated delinquent on a misdemeanor charge, Ciavarella placed him in PA Child Care, where he
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initially remained for approximately four to six weeks. Then he was placed at two other facilities before being sent home and placed on probation. 226. Over the next two years, Ciavarella ordered that Charles be placed in PA Child Care on at least four other occasions, in Western PA Child Care on one occasion, and in various other facilities. 227. Charles was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. His parents were ordered to and paid money to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of his placements in PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, and various other facilities, and for Charles to receive a psychological examination.
Jesse Balliet and his mother, Florence Myers 228. Jesse Balliet, now age twenty-two, is the son of Florence Myers of Wilkes-
Barre, Pennsylvania. 229. In 2003, when he was fifteen years old, Jesse was adjudicated delinquent
for simple assault. Jesse was not represented by counsel. Ciavarella did not inform Jesse that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Jesse of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 230. Even though this was Jesse’s first offense, Ciavarella ordered that Jesse be placed at Camp Adams for three months.
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231. Jesse and his father were ordered to and paid about $2,000 to Juvenile Probation in various fees and costs including for the cost of Jesse’s placement.
Steven Brannigan 232. Steven Brannigan, now eighteen years old, is the son of Lisa Brannigan of
Hanover Township, Pennsylvania. 233. Since 2003, Steven has been before Ciavarella on four separate charges of
delinquency. Each time Steven appeared before Ciavarella, he was placed. 234. In 2003, he was placed in Camp Adams for four months. 235. In January 2005, he appeared before Ciavarella without counsel.
Ciavarella immediately sent Steven to PA Child Care for a month without receiving testimony from anyone. He was later placed in various other facilities. 236. In 2007, on charges of hindering, Steven appeared before Ciavarella, represented by a public defender. The public defender advised Steven that he would likely get a maximum sentence if he did not plead guilty, so Steven pled guilty. Ciavarella did not explain the consequences of a plea, nor did he explain Steven’s right to a trial. Ciavarella accepted his plea, however, and sent Steven to Camp Adams for a month and then to Job Corps for a year. Steven is currently on probation.
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237. Each time Steven was in placement, his mother was required to pay child support to Juvenile Probation. Both Steven and his mother are currently making payments to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of supervision. Steven’s mother pays $25 per month and Steven pays $40 per month.
238. Following his placement, Steven dropped out of high school. However, while in Job Corps, he was able to get his GED.
Jeffrey Bruno 239. Jeffrey Bruno, now twenty-one years old, is the son of Jay and Karen
Bruno of Larksville, Pennsylvania. 240. In 2003, when he was sixteen years old, Jeffrey was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a charge of driving a dirt bike while intoxicated. Jeffrey was not represented by counsel, and he apparently pled guilty by nodding his head after the judge read the charges. Ciavarella did not inform Jeffrey that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Jeffrey of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 241. By Ciavarella’s order, Jeffrey was placed in PA Child Care for about two and one-half months. He was then placed at another facility for six months.
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242. Jeffrey and his parents were ordered to pay various fees and costs to Juvenile Probation. Specifically, his parents paid about $4,500 for placement costs. Funds were deducted from Jeffrey’s father’s disability check and garnished from his mother’s wages. Jeffrey and his parents also paid $225 for probation fees and $1,200 in court costs.
Scott Bukoski 243. Scott Bukoski is a twenty-one-year-old male from Nanticoke,
Pennsylvania. His father is Brian Bukoski. 244. In May 2005, Scott was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a charge
of unlawful use of a vehicle. After Ciavarella read out loud the charges, Scott pled not guilty. However, without a trial, Ciavarella adjudicated Scott delinquent. Scott was not represented by counsel. Ciavarella did not inform Scott that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Scott of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 245. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Scott was placed at Camp Adams for ninety days. 246. Scott and his father were ordered to and paid various fees and costs to Juvenile Probation.
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D.C., through and with his next friend and mother, R.C. 247. D.C., now seventeen years old, is the son of R.C. of Shickshinny,
Pennsylvania. 248. In 2007, when D.C. was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on possession of drug paraphernalia and burglary charges. D.C., who was unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform D.C. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to D.C. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 249. Ciavarella ordered D.C. to be sent to Camp Adams for a few weeks. From there he was sent to PA Child Care for a few days and then to another facility for twelve months. 250. D.C. and his parents were ordered to and paid various fees and costs to the court. Specifically, the court garnished the wages of both D.C.’s father and mother at a rate of roughly $20 per day; a total of $7,300 was garnished. The court also took their adoption subsidy in the amount of $600 per month. While D.C. was on probation, his parents were ordered to pay to Juvenile Probation $35 per month and to pay separately for the ankle
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monitor, which was $100. D.C. also was ordered to pay $1,700 in restitution.
Ruth Davis and her mother, Carol Fronczek 251. Ruth Davis, now twenty-two years old, is the daughter of Carol Fronczek
of Shavertown, Pennsylvania. 252. At age seventeen, Ruth was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a
simple assault charge. Ruth, who was unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Ruth that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Ruth of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty. 253. Upon Ciavarella’s orders, Ruth was in various placements between 2003 and 2005, including in PA Child Care for approximately seven months. 254. Ruth’s mother was ordered to and paid child support to Juvenile Probation for the duration of Ruth’s placement. Ruth and her mother also were ordered to and paid court fees.
William Dixon 255. William Dixon is the twenty-one-year-old son of Janet Dixon of Plymouth,
Pennsylvania.
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256. In April 2003, when he was fifteen, William was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on misdemeanor charges arising out of an incident involving his family. Prior to appearing before Ciavarella, William was held in PA Child Care for five days without a hearing.
257. When William finally appeared before Ciavarella, he was unrepresented by counsel. Ciavarella asked William if had disrespected his grandfather, to which William answered yes. William was adjudicated delinquent even though he did not actually plead guilty or admit to the charges. Ciavarella did not inform William that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to William of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
258. Upon Ciavarella’s order, William was placed at Camp Adams for sixty days; he was placed on probation after he returned home.
259. William’s mother’s paycheck was attached to cover the costs of his placement. William was ordered to and paid Juvenile Probation $35 per month from the period July 2003 through May 2004. In total, William and his family paid about $2,300.
J.G., through and with his next friend and mother, M.O. 260. J.G., now seventeen, is the son of M.O. of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania.
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261. In 2007, when he was fifteen, J.G. was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella. J.G. was unrepresented by counsel. According to J.G.’s mother, J.G. may have pled guilty, but she is not sure because the hearing lasted about five seconds. Ciavarella did not inform J.G. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to J.G. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
262. Upon Ciavarella’s orders, J.G. was sent to Camp Adams for three months. 263. J.G.’s mother was ordered to and paid about $2,000 to Juvenile Probation
for the cost of placement, a portion of which was deducted directly from her tax refund. J.G. and her mother were ordered to and paid about $200 in fees and costs to Juvenile Probation.
Brian Gyle 264. Brian Gyle, now nineteen, is the son of Maria Gyle of Pittston,
Pennsylvania. 265. Brian was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on four occasions from
2003 to 2004. Upon Ciavarella’s orders, Brian was placed at different times in PA Child Care, Camp Adams, and Northwestern Academy.
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266. Brian and his parents were ordered to pay to Juvenile Probation $1,728.68 for fines, probation and detention fees, and services.
Wayne Gyle 267. Wayne Gyle, now age twenty-one, is the son of Maria Gyle of Pittston,
Pennsylvania. 268. On July 21, 2004, Wayne was charged with simple assault, terroristic
threats, and harassment. He was placed in PA Child Care for sixteen days prior to seeing a judge. 269. On August 6, 2004, Wayne appeared before Ciavarella. Although the charges against him were dismissed, Ciavarella ordered that Wayne’s probation resulting from an earlier adjudication be extended for one year. Neither Wayne nor his mother recall that Wayne was represented by an attorney or told of Wayne’s right to counsel at this hearing. 270. Wayne was ordered to pay Juvenile Probation fees and still owes approximately $5,000.
Tracy Harvey 271. Tracy Harvey, now eighteen years old, is the son of Albert Harvey of
Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania.
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272. In 2007, when Tracy was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a charge of being under the influence of a substance. Tracy, who was unrepresented, did not formally plead guilty, nor did Ciavarella seek a plea. Ciavarella merely asked the police officer what happened, and he did not allow anyone else in the courtroom to speak. Ciavarella did not inform Tracy that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Tracy of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
273. Tracy was placed in PA Child Care for one week and then transferred to another facility for seven months.
274. Tracy’s father was ordered by a letter he received from Juvenile Probation to pay $200 per month to the Pennsylvania State Collection Disbursement Unit (“PA SCDU”) to cover the cost of Tracy’s placement. When he was unable to continue paying that amount, his wages were garnished. Since Tracy’s release from placement in July 2008, he has been paying supervision fees for his probation; he was ordered to pay $350 plus $35 per month to Juvenile Probation for supervision.
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D.J., through and with his next friend and mother, S.J. 275. D.J., now sixteen years old, is the son of S.J. of Edwardsville,
Pennsylvania. 276. In 2005, when D.J. was about thirteen years old, the police picked him up
from school on a Friday morning and told him he was being taken to detention because he had failed to appear as a witness to a school fight. D.J.’s mother reports that she never received a subpoena for her minor son to appear as a witness. 277. D.J. was taken from school to PA Child Care. Police would not let D.J.’s mother speak to or see her son, and the police did not fully explain what was going on. 278. D.J. was brought to court on the following Monday, having spent the weekend at PA Child Care. In court, Ciavarella yelled at D.J. and his attorney. D.J. was then released without ever testifying. 279. D.J. has never been arrested or detained aside from this incident. 280. D.J.’s mother paid $500 to the attorney to appear with her son in court.
Barbara Kearns and her mother, Barbara Thurston 281. Barbara Kearns, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Barbara
Thurston of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
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282. In September 2003, when Barbara was fourteen years old, she appeared before Ciavarella on a curfew violation; at the time, she was on probation for a previous adjudication on a retail theft charge. Barbara was unrepresented by counsel. In the very short hearing, Ciavarella did not hear any evidence. Barbara pled not guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Barbara that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Barbara of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty.
283. Barbara was then placed in PA Child Care for three days, at Camp Adams for over six months, and at another boot camp for a week. In 2006, after appearing before Ciavarella again without counsel, Barbara received probation.
284. Barbara was ordered to pay fees and costs to the court. Her Supplemental Security Income check was garnished to offset the cost of placement.
Kurt Kruger 285. Kurt Kruger is a twenty-two-year-old male who resides in Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 286. In 2004, when he was seventeen years old, Kurt was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a charge of conspiracy to shoplift. Before appearing in
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court, Kurt was held in PA Child Care for three days. Kurt did not have counsel at his hearing, at which he made an admission. Ciavarella did not inform Kurt that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Kurt of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 287. Despite the fact that shoplifting is a summary offense, Ciavarella ordered that Kurt be placed at Camp Adams, where he remained for four months. 288. Kurt’s parents were ordered and paid to Juvenile Probation $1,000 to $2,000 for the cost of his placements. Kurt himself was ordered to and paid approximately $200 in restitution.
J.M.K., through and with his next friend and mother, B.T. 289. J.M.K., now seventeen years old, is the son of B.T. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 290. J.M.K. was charged in 2002 with fighting in school and then again for a
curfew violation. When he was fourteen years old, in 2005, J.M.K. was again charged with fighting. 291. In most circumstances when J.M.K. appeared before Ciavarella, he was without counsel. In the very short hearings, J.M.K. attempted to explain the circumstances surrounding the charge, and Ciavarella did not allow him
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to speak. At all but one of these hearings, Ciavarella did not inform J.M.K. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to J.M.K. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 292. Between 2002 and 2005, J.M.K. was placed by Ciavarella in various facilities including PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. 293. J.M.K.’s mother was ordered to pay fees and costs associated with J.M.K.’s placement and supervision. Because of her financial hardship, J.M.K.’s mother was unable to pay more than a couple hundred dollars during the last seven years. Because J.M.K. received Supplemental Security Income, those checks were automatically garnished to cover the costs of his placement and supervision. J.M.K. and his mother still owe money to Juvenile Probation.
Edward Kenzakoski III 294. Edward Kenzakoski III is a twenty-two-year-old male from Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. He is the son of Sandy Fonzo and Edward Kenzakoski, Jr. 295. In September 2003, Edward, then seventeen years old, was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella on a misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. Before the filing of the delinquency petition, Edward had
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no prior contact with law enforcement. Edward appeared before Ciavarella without counsel. Edward was not advised of his right to counsel and to have counsel appointed for him, nor did Ciavarella conduct a colloquy with Edward on the record to explain the consequences of proceeding without counsel. Edward admitted to the charge, but Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy with Edward on the record to explain the consequences of pleading guilty and giving up his right to a trial. 296. After adjudicating him delinquent, Ciavarella immediately committed Edward to PA Child Care for more than thirty days. 297. In October 2003, Edward, then in the custody of PA Child Care, appeared before Ciavarella, again without counsel, and was then ordered into placement at a boot camp for 120 days. Edward was released four months later and was placed on probation for several months. 298. One week before his probation would have expired, Edward failed to appear at a scheduled delinquency review hearing, and the Juvenile Court issued a bench warrant. In the fall of 2005, Edward, then nineteen years old, was involved in a traffic accident. He was taken into custody based on the bench warrant and appeared, without counsel, before Ciavarella for a violation of probation hearing. Edward was immediately committed to Western PA Child Care for 120 days.
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299. Upon his release in the winter of 2006, Juvenile Court jurisdiction ended. 300. Edward was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. His parents
were ordered to and paid approximately $5,000 to the court to cover the costs of his placements.
J.K., through and with his next friend and father, A.K. 301. J.K. is the fifteen-year-old son of A.K. and D.K. of Kingston,
Pennsylvania. 302. In July 2007, when he was thirteen years old, J.K. was adjudicated
delinquent on charges of criminal mischief, trespass, and attempted burglary after having been found one night playing a game called Manhunt on the grounds of a local school. Prior to going to court, J.K.’s parents applied for a public defender to represent J.K., but they were told that they made too much money to qualify. 303. J.K. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel. His parents asked for a continuance to obtain a lawyer, but that request was denied. 304. After he was adjudicated delinquent, J.K. was sent by the court to PA Child Care and then Camp Adams for about five days. When he returned home, he was placed on house arrest. When he broke his house arrest rules, J.K. was sent to another residential facility where he remained for approximately nine months, until September 2007.
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305. J.K.’s parents were ordered to and paid $3,300 to PA SCDU for his placement; a portion of the monies were garnished from unemployment checks. J.K. himself was ordered to and is still paying fees and costs to the court.
B.L., through and with his next friend and father M.L. 306. B.L., now sixteen years old, is the son of M.L. of Kingston, Pennsylvania. 307. In 2006, when he was thirteen years old, B.L. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a charge of perjury. B.L. was unrepresented when he appeared before Ciavarella. Ciavarella did not inform B.L. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to B.L. of waiving his right to counsel. B.L. pled not guilty. Ciavarella told B.L. that he was guilty. 308. Although he had no prior contact with the juvenile justice system, Ciavarella ordered that B.L. be placed in Camp Adams for ninety-three days. 309. M.L. had $150 a week taken from his paycheck during the three months that B.L. was placed. B.L. has received multiple notices indicating that he owes $500 to Juvenile Probation.
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Anthony Millan and his mother, Cindy Millan 310. Anthony Millan, now twenty years old, is the son of Cindy Millan of
Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. 311. In 2005, when Anthony was sixteen years old, Anthony was adjudicated
delinquent for fighting in school. This was Anthony’s first offense. When he appeared before Ciavarella, Anthony was unrepresented by counsel. Ciavarella did not inform Anthony that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Anthony of waiving his right to counsel. Anthony pled not guilty. 312. Ciavarella immediately ordered Anthony shackled and sent him to Camp Adams where he remained for three months. 313. Anthony’s mother was ordered to pay placement fees, court costs, and supervision costs totaling over $200.
Damon Millan and his mother, Cindy Millan 314. Damon Millan, now eighteen years old, is the son of Cindy Millan of
Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. 315. In 2007, when Damon was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a breaking and entering charge. When Damon appeared before Ciavarella, he was represented by a private attorney. Damon pled
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not guilty. However, neither Damon’s attorney nor anyone else was permitted to speak. The homeowners who were burglarized were in the courtroom and wanted to explain that they did not believe Damon was involved, but Ciavarella did not allow them to speak. 316. Ciavarella ordered Damon to Camp Adams, where he remained for three months. 317. Damon’s mother recalls that she and Damon were ordered to and paid to Juvenile Probation roughly $200 for the cost of supervision, placement, and court fees.
Paul Morgan Jr. 318. Paul Morgan Jr., now eighteen years old, is the son of Tracy Stair and Paul
Morgan of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 319. In 2005, Paul was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for possession of a
controlled substance. Paul, unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Paul that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Paul of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 320. Paul was placed in PA Child Care for three days. After he was released, he was put on probation for six months.
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321. Tracy paid Juvenile Probation $35 per month during this six-month period to cover the cost of Paul’s probation.
322. In 2007, Paul was again adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on charges of harassment and disorderly conduct. Again, Paul was unrepresented by counsel and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Paul that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Paul of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
323. Ciavarella placed Paul at Camp Adams for three months and placed him on probation for six months following his release.
324. At the time of these events, Paul’s father had been paying to Tracy $46 per week in child support. These payments were redirected to Juvenile Probation during the three months Paul was detained at Camp Adams. Tracy and Paul paid Juvenile Probation $35 per month while he was on probation.
Steven Palchanis Jr., and his father, Steven Palchanis Sr. 325. Steven Palchanis Jr., now twenty-one years old, is the son of Steven
Palchanis Sr. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
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326. In 2003, when Steven was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for criminal trespass. Unrepresented by counsel, Steven pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Steven that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Steven of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
327. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Steven was shackled and taken to PA Child Care, where he remained for three weeks before going to Camp Adams for ninety days. Following his release from placement, Steven was placed on probation for almost five years, until he paid off approximately $3,000 in restitution.
328. Steven and his parents were ordered to and paid monies to the court for his placement; the money was garnished from the paycheck of Steven’s father. Furthermore, they were required to pay various fees to Juvenile Probation while Steven was on probation. In total, they paid about $7,000.
Jamie Quinn 329. Jamie Quinn is an eighteen-year-old female who resides in Wyoming,
Pennsylvania. 330. In 2005, when she was fourteen years old, Jamie was charged with simple
assault and harassment after punching another girl.
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331. During her hearing, Jamie was not represented by an attorney, as the intake worker had told her she did not need one because the charges were minor. Ciavarella never informed Jamie of her right to an attorney or the consequences of waiving that right. Furthermore, Ciavarella never explained to Jamie her trial rights or what, specifically, she was charged with.
332. Jamie was initially told she would be placed in a detention center for three to six months, but she ended up staying in various facilities (PA Child Care, Vision Quest, and Bridgeview) for nearly a year.
333. Jamie’s parents were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court, as well as costs to Juvenile Probation for Jamie’s placement.
334. Jamie’s detention had lasting and negative consequences to her, most distinctly illustrated by the many scars she bears from self-mutilation during her detention.
K.R., through and with his next friend and mother, T.S. 335. K.R, now seventeen years old, is the son of T.S. of Hanover Township,
Pennsylvania. 336. In 2007, when K.R. was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for disorderly conduct after getting into a fight on a school bus. Unrepresented by counsel, K.R. pled guilty. Ciavarella did not
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inform K.R. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to K.R. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 337. Ciavarella placed K.R. at Camp Adams from April to July 2007, and K.R. is still on probation. 338. K.R. was ordered to pay $30 per month to Juvenile Probation for every month he is on probation.
David Rowlands and his mother, Mary Seville 339. David Rowlands, now eighteen years old, is the son of Mary Seville of
Laporte, Pennsylvania. 340. In October 2003, when David was twelve years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for harassment. Unrepresented by counsel, David pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform David that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to David of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 341. Ciavarella ordered David placed in PA Child Care. Over the course of the next two months, David was placed in PA Child Care, then moved to Camp
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Adams because of space constraints, and then moved back to PA Child Care. Within the two months, he was moved back and forth between PA Child Care and Camp Adams several times. 342. David and his mother were ordered to pay $35 per month to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of his placement and supervision.
Michael S. Scarlato and his parents, Michael P. and Tina Scarlato 343. Michael S. Scarlato, now eighteen years old, is the son of Michael P. and
Tina Scarlato of Hazelton, Pennsylvania. 344. In November 2004, when Michael was fourteen years old, he was
adjudicated delinquent on a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia for bringing a pipe to school. Unrepresented by counsel, Michael made an admission. Ciavarella did not inform Michael that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Michael of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 345. Ciavarella placed Michael at Camp Adams. Over the next four years, Michael was in various court-ordered placements, including PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care.
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346. During that time, Michael’s parents were ordered to and paid approximately $2,500 to the court for Michael’s placements. Additionally, Michael has paid and continues to make payments to Juvenile Probation.
A.S., through and with his next friend and father, G.S. 347. A.S., now fifteen years old, is the son of G.S. and K.S. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 348. In 2007, when he was fourteen years old, A.S. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for writing graffiti with a group of kids. A.S. was unrepresented when he plead guilty before Ciavarella. Ciavarella did not inform A.S. that he had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to A.S. of waiving his right to counsel or of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 349. Ciavarella ordered that A.S. be placed in Camp Adams for ninety days. 350. A.S.’s parents were ordered to pay $140 per month to the court to defray the cost of his placement in Camp Adams; the monies were taken out of his father’s unemployment checks. A.S. himself was ordered to pay $30 a month when he was placed on probation after being released from Camp Adams.
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James Swartley 351. James Swartley, now nineteen years old, is the son of Amy Swartley of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 352. In 2005, when he was sixteen years old, James was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. James was placed at PA Child Care prior to his hearing. When he appeared before Ciavarella, James was unrepresented by counsel and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform James that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to James of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 353. Ciavarella ordered that James return to PA Child Care. James was detained at PA Child Care for approximately eleven days before he was sent home and placed on probation. 354. Over the next two years, Ciavarella placed James in two separate facilities for allegedly violating a term of the probation he was still serving. In total, James spent more than a year in placement. 355. James’s mother’s wages were garnished while James was in placement; about $110 was deducted every two weeks. James’s father had paid $240
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per month in child support. The court redirected the child support payments to Juvenile Probation while James was in placement.
Jessica Thurston and her mother, Barbara Thurston 356. Jessica Thurston, now twenty years old, is the daughter of Barbara
Thurston of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 357. In 2003, when Jessica was fourteen years old, she was adjudicated
delinquent for fighting and theft. Jessica appeared before Ciavarella without counsel and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Jessica that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Barbara of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty. 358. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Jessica was placed in PA Child Care for approximately two weeks, and then she was placed at Camp Adams and another facility in Tioga County for five to six months. 359. Jessica’s mother was ordered to pay fees and costs to the court. Jessica was receiving Supplemental Security Income and her SSI check was garnished to offset the costs of supervision and placement.
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Michael Vitali 360. Michael Vitali, now twenty-two years old, is the son of Eugene and Joan
Vitali of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 361. In 2002, when Michael was fifteen years old, he was charged with assault.
At his adjudicatory hearing before Ciavarella, he was unrepresented by counsel. No colloquy was conducted on his waiver of counsel. Neither Michael nor his parents recall Michael being asked to plead guilty or not guilty, and neither remember Ciavarella explaining to Michael his rights. 362. Following that adjudication, Michael was placed in Camp Adams for three months. Later, he was in and out of various placements, including PA Child Care, for probation violations. He was not represented by counsel at the probation violation hearings. 363. As a result of his placements, both Michael and his parents received a bill from the court to cover the costs of his supervision and placement. They have paid over $1,000 to the court. 364. As a result of Michael’s time in placement, he struggled when he returned to school and opted to take the GED instead. Michael also suffered great psychological harm and was placed on a variety of medications while at KidsPeace that caused him to gain significant weight.
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Frank Weber and his mother Florence Myers 365. Frank Weber, now twenty-three years old, is the son of Florence Myers of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 366. In 1997, when he was thirteen years old, Frank was a passenger in a car
that was reported stolen; the driver of the car got into an accident. Frank was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on various charges related to this incident. Frank was unrepresented by counsel at the adjudicatory hearing. Ciavarella did not inform Frank that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Frank of waiving his right to counsel. 367. Until Frank turned eighteen, he spent the majority of time in various courtordered placements including PA Child Care. These continued periods of placement resulted from violations of probation on the original charge when Frank was thirteen years old. He was not represented by an attorney at any of these violations hearings. 368. Frank’s father paid $400 a month in child support to Juvenile Probation for the cost of placement for the duration of the time that Frank was in placement.
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M.M.W., through and with her next friend and legal guardian, J.C. 369. M.M.W., now fourteen years of age, resides with her guardian J.C. in
Freedland, Pennsylvania. 370. When she was ten years old, M.M.W. was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella. Prior to appearing before Ciavarella, M.M.W. was taken by police to PA Child Care, where she was held for a week without a hearing. M.M.W. was unrepresented at her adjudicatory hearing. Ciavarella did not inform M.M.W. that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to M.M.W. of waiving her right to counsel. 371. M.M.W. returned to PA Child Care, where she spent approximately one month. She was on probation for a year after she was released from PA Child Care. 372. M.M.W.’s guardian had to pay at least $200 to the court.
John Ashford, Jr. and his mother, Donna Ashford 373. John Ashford, Jr., now twenty-one years of age, is the son of Donna
Ashford of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 374. In October 2005, John, then sixteen years old, and three of his friends were
charged with a misdemeanor for shooting some windows with a BB gun. Except for this charge, John has never been in trouble with the law.
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375. John was represented at his adjudicatory hearing before Ciavarella by a public defender. However, each time the public defender attempted to speak, Ciavarella cut her off. The homeowner whose windows were broken spoke on the boys’ behalf and asked Ciavarella not to send them away.
376. After adjudicating John delinquent, Ciavarella ordered that John be placed at Camp Adams, where he remained for ninety-seven days.
377. John’s parents were ordered to and paid monies to PA SCDU for John’s placement at Camp Adams. John and his parents also were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. In total, the family paid more than $5,000.
Shane Bly 378. Shane Bly, now twenty years old, is the son of Linda Bly of Sugar Notch,
Pennsylvania. 379. In May 2005, when Shane was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella. Represented by counsel, Shane pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Shane of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Shane the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 380. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Shane was sent to Camp Adams for three months and then placed on probation when he returned home.
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381. In 2006, Shane appeared with an attorney before Ciavarella at a probation violation hearing. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Shane was placed at two other facilities for a total of six months.
382. During the three months that Shane was in Camp Adams in 2005, the court garnished $85.38 per week from the paycheck of Shane’s father. Consequently, Shane’s parents had to take out loans to cover mortgage payments on their home. The court also ordered Shane to pay $469 in restitution and $35 a month to the court while he was on probation.
G.B., through and with his next friends and parents, P.P. and J.B. 383. G.B., now seventeen years old, is the son of P.P. and J.B. of Larksville,
Pennsylvania. 384. In 2005, when G.B. was fourteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a misdemeanor charge. When G.B. appeared before Ciavarella for the first time, his case had been transferred from Wayne County. G.B. was represented by a private attorney, but the attorney was not permitted to present any evidence as to G.B.’s mental capacity or learning disability. G.B. pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Shane of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Shane the potential consequences of pleading guilty.
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385. Upon adjudication, Ciavarella placed G.B. at PA Child Care, where he remained for a month. He was then placed in other facilities, including Western PA Child Care for four months.
386. G.B.’s mother received a notice ordering her to pay a lump sum of $500 for his placement. She was also ordered to pay $35 per month for the cost of his supervision on probation. She is currently making these monthly payments.
Daryl Charles and his mother, Liza Charles 387. Daryl Charles, now twenty-years of age, is from Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. He is the son of Liza Charles. 388. In October 2005, when he was seventeen years old, Daryl was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for shooting a BB gun out of a window one night. Represented by counsel, Daryl pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Daryl of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Daryl the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 389. Ciavarella ordered Daryl placed at Camp Adams, where he remained for twenty-seven days. After his release, Daryl was placed on probation. 390. Daryl paid $401.42 in fees and costs to the court between November 2005 and January 2006.
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William Clarke 391. William Clarke, now twenty-three years old, is from Bear Creek Township,
Pennsylvania. 392. In March 2003, when he was seventeen years old, William was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella on a simple assault charge for getting into a fight. Prior to his hearing, William was taken to Northwest Academy and then transferred to PA Child Care. William was represented by counsel when he appeared before Ciavarella. However, the attorney was not allowed to speak. Ciavarella read the charge and then said “you’re done.” William does not recall actually pleading guilty. 393. Upon Ciavarella’s order, William spent three months at PA Child Care and three months at another facility. He was sent home in September 2003 and placed on probation for six months. 394. William’s father was ordered to and paid money to the court for William’s placements. William was ordered to and paid restitution in the amount of $3,000.
Glenn Cooper and his mother, Karen Cooper 395. Glenn Cooper, now twenty-one years old, is the son of Karen and David
Cooper of Meshoppen, Pennsylvania.
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396. In 2003, when he was fifteen years old, Glenn was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for simple assault. Glenn pled not guilty. Glenn was represented by private counsel at his hearing; however, Ciavarella would not permit his attorney to speak.
397. Ciavarella initially placed Glenn at PA Child Care and subsequently placed him at several other facilities throughout the state.
398. Glenn’s parents were ordered to pay the costs of his placements in various facilities. To date, they have paid several hundred dollars, but they believe that they still owe approximately $1,000.
Richard Copeland II and his parents, Donna and Richard Copeland 399. Richard Copeland II, now twenty years old, is the son of Donna and
Richard Copeland of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania. 400. In 2005, when he was sixteen years old, Richard was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella when he appeared with counsel at a hearing. Ciavarella asked Richard whether he was guilty, but did not explain the legal rights Richard would relinquish or the consequences he would experience by pleading guilty. Richard stated that he was not guilty. 401. Ciavarella then ordered that Richard be returned to PA Child Care, where Richard was placed prior to the hearing. Richard was kept at PA Child Care for approximately seventy-four days between August and October
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2005. After returning home from PA Child Care, Richard was placed on probation. 402. Soon after Richard returned home, his probation officer accused him of violating his curfew. As punishment for the alleged curfew violation, Richard was sent to a facility for two weekends. 403. Richard’s parents were ordered to and paid $2,700 to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of Richard’s placements. Richard was ordered to and is paying $35 per month to cover the cost of his probation. In addition, Richard was ordered to pay $30,000 for restitution. Richard and his parents have paid approximately $275 per month for restitution over the past four years.
Chad Derhammer 404. Chad Derhammer, now twenty-three years old, is the son of Tammy Ruger
of Dallas, Pennsylvania. 405. In November 2003, when Chad was seventeen years old, he and three other
boys from his high school were charged with simple assault and harassment for an incident of hazing. Although all the boys were represented by counsel at the adjudicatory hearing, none of the lawyers were permitted to speak and neither were the boys’ parents. Chad pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Chad of the rights
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he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Chad the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 406. Although Chad had no prior contact with the juvenile delinquency system, Ciavarella placed him in PA Child Care, where he remained for two weeks. 407. Chad and his family were ordered to pay fees, costs, and restitution to the court. His parents were also ordered to pay Juvenile Probation the cost of his placement in PA Child Care as well as his supervision while on probation.
A.D., through and with her mother and next friend, J.E. 408. A.D., now age seventeen years old, is the daughter of J.E. of Plymouth,
Pennsylvania. 409. On or about 2004, at age thirteen, A.D. was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella on various charges related to being a passenger in the car of a friend that belonged to the friend’s grandmother. At the hearing, A.D. was represented by a private attorney and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform A.D. of the rights she would be giving up if she pled guilty, nor did he explain to A.D. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 410. Upon Ciavarella’s order, A.D. spent about six hours at PA Child Care and was then placed on probation for three months.
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411. A.D. and her family were ordered to and paid $420 in supervision fees. 412. At age sixteen, A.D. was again adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a
charge of terroristic threats for something she said at school. A.D. appeared without counsel at this hearing. A.D. tried to tell her side of the story and to present letters from teachers in her support. She pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform A.D. that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to A.D. of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty. 413. A.D. was sent to Camp Adams for three months. A.D.’s mother’s wages were garnished. She paid about $300 to Juvenile Probation for the cost of placement.
Matthew Dougherty 414. Matthew Dougherty, now twenty-one years old, is the son of Joelle
Dougherty of Pittston, Pennsylvania. 415. In May 2006, when he was eighteen years old, Matthew was adjudicated
delinquent for graffiti writing, stemming from an incident that allegedly occurred before Matthew turned eighteen. 416. Matthew appeared with private counsel before Ciavarella. Matthew’s mother recalls that the attorney said very little during the hearing and that
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there was no opportunity to contest the charges. Matthew did not plead guilty or make an admission on the record. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy informing Matthew of his right to go to trial or the potential consequences of pleading guilty. Nevertheless, Ciavarella adjudicated him guilty. 417. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Matthew was placed at Camp Adams for approximately six weeks. 418. Matthew and his mother were ordered to and paid various fees and costs to the Juvenile Probation department.
E.E., through and with her next friend and mother, H.E. 419. E.E., now fourteen years old, is the daughter of H.E. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 420. In 2007, when she was thirteen years old, E.E. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on charges of disorderly conduct and harassment after getting in a fight on a school bus on her way to elementary school. E.E. was represented by a public defender. Ciavarella presumed E.E. was guilty and asked her why she did it. When E.E. did not respond, but instead started crying, Ciavarella told her that he was going to send her to Camp Adams for three months because she would not respond to his questions.
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Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy informing E.E. of her right to go to trial or the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 421. Even though this was E.E.’s first offense, Ciavarella ordered her placed at Camp Adams for three months. Though E.E. is in special education and has an IEP, she did not receive any special education services while at Camp Adams. 422. H.E. was charged a total of $450 for psychological testing and maintenance fees. She still owes $350.
K.E., through and with her next friend and mother, H.E. 423. K.E., now fifteen years old, is the daughter of H.E. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 424. In 2007, when she was fourteen years old, K.E. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on charges of criminal trespass, simple assault, and harassment after getting into a fight on school grounds. K.E. was represented by a public defender. K.E. pled guilty. H.E. recalls Ciavarella asking questions when K.E. pled guilty, but he asked them so quickly that K.E. could not understand what he was asking. 425. Even though this was K.E.’s first offense, Ciavarella ordered her placed at Camp Adams for three months, followed by three months of probation. She was not allowed to return to public school after her placement.
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426. H.E. was charged $310 in maintenance fees and for psychological evaluations. She still owes this money.
L.E., through and with his next friend and mother, H.E. 427. L.E., now seventeen years old, is the son of H.E. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 428. In 2007, when he was fifteen years old, L.E. was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella for a giving false identification to a police officer. L.E. was represented by a public defender and put on probation. When he missed curfew a couple of times, he was charged with violating his probation. At the hearing, Ciavarella automatically treated him as guilty. H.E. does not recall if L.E. pled guilty. 429. Ciavarella ordered that L.E. be placed in Camp Adams for three months. L.E. was sent to PA Child Care for a week or two before going to Camp Adams. He was placed on probation upon his release from Camp Adams. 430. In May 2008, when L.E. was sixteen years old, L.E. was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for simple assault and theft for allegedly hitting a child and taking his basketball. H.E. does not recall L.E. pleading guilty to the charges or Ciavarella conducting a colloquy informing L.E. of his right to go to trial or the potential consequences of pleading guilty. Nevertheless, Ciavarella adjudicated him delinquent.
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431. L.E. was sentenced to one to three years in placement. He expects to be released in June 2009.
432. L.E. had to pay money upon his release from Camp Adams. A portion of H.E.’s child support payments also paid for his subsequent placement.
A.F. and L.F., through and with their mother and next friend, M.F. 433. A.F., seventeen years old, and her sister, L.F., nineteen years old, reside
with their mother, M.F., in Drums, Pennsylvania. 434. In July 2007, A.F., then sixteen years old, and L.F., then seventeen years
old, were adjudicated by Ciavarella on charges of criminal mischief. Although A.F. and L.F. were represented by counsel, neither their attorney nor their mother was allowed to say anything at the adjudicatory hearing. A.F. and L.F. both pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform A.F. and L.F. of the rights they would be giving up if they pled guilty, nor did he explain to A.F. and L.F. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 435. Ciavarella committed A.F. and L.F. to Camp Adams; they remained there from July 24, 2007 through October 23, 2007. When they returned home, they were placed on probation.
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436. A.F., L.F., and their mother were ordered to and paid $2,325.57 in various fees and costs to the court. Their mother also paid $1,000 to retain a private attorney.
J.D.F., through and with his next friend and mother, M.W. 437. J.D.F., now sixteen years old, is the son of M.W of Exeter, Pennsylvania. 438. In 2006, J.D.F. was adjudicated delinquent in Montgomery County and his
case was transferred to Luzerne County. Ciavarella placed him in PA Child Care for over two years. 439. The county sought payment from M.W. to cover the costs of her son’s placement. However, because she is unemployed, M.W. has not been able to make any payment. 440. J.D.F. has now been in placement for almost three years.
J.F., through and with his next friend and mother, A.I.K. 441. J.F., now fourteen, is the son of A.I.K. of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. 442. In 2008, J.F. was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella. J.F. was
represented by private counsel who entered a guilty plea on J.F.’s behalf. J.F. and his mother told the attorney that J.F. would not plead guilty, especially after they were informed by a representative of the District Attorney that the only witness recanted his statement. Private counsel told
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J.F. and his mother not to speak in court. Ciavarella did not explain to J.F. the consequences of pleading guilty or his right to a trial. 443. J.F. was placed on house arrest for three months. 444. J.F. and his mother were ordered to and paid to Juvenile Probation about $375 for supervision fees. J.F.’s mother still owes $200 for the cost of a court-ordered evaluation completed by Dr. Vita.
Alexandra Fahey 445. Alexandra Fahey, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Robert II and
Maria Fahey of Pittston, Pennsylvania. 446. In 2004, when she was fourteen years old, Alexandra was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for assaulting a police officer who had detained her. Alexandra, who was represented by a private attorney at the hearing, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Alexandra of the rights she would be giving up if she pled guilty, nor did he explain to Alexandra the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 447. Despite having no prior record, Alexandra was placed on house arrest and was made to wear an ankle bracelet for three months. She was subsequently on probation for six months. 448. Alexandra’s family was ordered to and paid costs to Juvenile Probation during both her house arrest and her probation.
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L.H., through and with her next friend and mother, J.M. 449. L.H., now sixteen, is the daughter of J.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 450. When she was fifteen, L.H. was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for
disorderly conduct after she was in an argument in school that escalated. Although L.H. was represented by the public defender, she did not understand what was going on at the hearing or what her rights were. L.H. and her mother are not sure if she pled guilty. 451. Upon Ciavarella’s order, L.H. was shackled and sent to Camp Adams, where she remained committed from August to November 2007. 452. Juvenile Probation garnished J.M.’s Supplemental Security Income for the cost of placement; to the best of her recollection this totaled more than $2,000. L.H. and her mother were also ordered to and paid about $300 in fees to Juvenile Probation.
Michael Haines and his mother, Barbara Haines 453. Michael Haines is nineteen years old and is the son of Barbara Haines of
Dallas, Pennsylvania. 454. In July 2007, when he was seventeen, Michael was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a theft charge for using a snow board that was on a rack outside of a ski lodge. Michael appeared with an attorney, but neither his lawyer nor his mother was allowed to speak. Michael pled guilty.
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Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Michael of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Michael the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 455. Michael was ordered to Camp Adams for thirty days. 456. Michael’s mother paid approximately $400 to Juvenile Probation for the placement. Michael and his mother were ordered to and are still paying fees and costs to Juvenile Probation; they estimate that to date they have paid $630.
Edward Kane, Jr. 457. Edward Kane, Jr., now twenty-two years old, is the grandson of Joanne
Golden of Swoyersville, Pennsylvania. 458. In 2003, when Edward was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent on a misdemeanor charge by Ciavarella. Edward was represented by a public defender. The youth who pressed a simple assault charge against Edward did not appear, so that charge was dismissed. A second charge of criminal trespass was reduced to a misdemeanor. Ciavarella also told Edward that he had an unpaid fine. Edward does not recall pleading guilty to any charge. 459. Ciavarella sent Edward to Camp Adams for ninety days and ordered Edward to pay the unpaid fine. Edward’s grandmother immediately paid
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the fine on Edward’s behalf. Edward was put on probation after his release. 460. In spring 2003, two or three weeks after his release from Camp Adams, Edward was picked up by his probation officer and taken to PA Child Care. He was transferred among three different facilities, including PA Child Care, for three to four weeks before having a hearing. 461. When Edward appeared before Ciavarella for his probation violation hearing, he did not have a lawyer, and no one advised him that he should have an attorney. Ciavarella remanded Edward to Camp Adams for six months based on an accusation that Edward had been drinking while on probation. 462. In 2004, Edward was again placed in PA Child Care due to a probation violation. 463. Within a month of being placed there, he had a hearing before Ciavarella. He was not represented by counsel at that hearing, nor did anyone advise him that he should have an attorney. Ciavarella issued an order placing Edward at Northwestern Boot Camp. Before Edward left the courthouse that day, a probation officer spoke with Edward’s mother about his lack of representation in the hearing. Edward had another hearing before Ciavarella that same day. At the later hearing, the probation officer stated
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that Edward was entitled to have a lawyer represent him and that the earlier hearing should be postponed until Edward had a lawyer. Ciavarella vacated the order placing Edward at Northwestern Boot Camp and scheduled another hearing. Edward was sent back to PA Child Care. 464. A few weeks later, Edward appeared before Ciavarella again and was represented by private counsel. Edward was placed in PA Child Care for another month and a half and then sent to Manose House for six months. Edward was released from Manose House in October 2004. 465. Edward, his parents, and his grandmother were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. Edward believes that his parents each still owe approximately $400 to $500. Edward was ordered to pay more than $750 to Juvenile Probation in supervision fees, processing fees, court costs, and fines. He was also ordered to pay $535.50 to Juvenile Probation in restitution fees.
Brianna Kee 466. Brianna Kee, age eighteen, is the daughter of Cheral and Talif Thomas of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 467. In 2007, when Brianna was seventeen years old, she and two other children
were adjudicated delinquent on criminal trespass and misdemeanor theft charges for going into an unlocked, empty building.
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468. By the time Brianna appeared with an attorney before Ciavarella, the two other children had already been adjudicated and received their dispositions – one was sent to Camp Adams, the other was put on a work program. When Brianna’s attorney addressed Ciavarella, Ciavarella asked and was told by courtroom personnel what disposition the two other children received. Ciavarella immediately ordered that Brianna be placed at Camp Adams, where she remained for three months, from September 5 through November 27, 2007.
469. Brianna and her mother do not recall that Brianna actually pled guilty before Ciavarella. Ciavarella never explained to Brianna her rights or the consequences of pleading guilty.
470. Brianna and her parents were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court; the court garnished the paychecks of both of Brianna’s parents.
Matthew Kopetchny 471. Matthew Kopetchny is the twenty-year-old son of Angelique Ronchetti of
Kingston, Pennsylvania. 472. In 2005, when he was sixteen years old, Matthew was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for shoplifting videos and video games. Matthew appeared with an attorney before Ciavarella and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Matthew of the rights he would be giving
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up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Matthew the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 473. Matthew was initially placed on house arrest, but he violated the terms. When he appeared before Ciavarella for a probation violation hearing at which he was not represented by an attorney, Ciavarella ordered Matthew placed at PA Child Care, where he remained for three months before being sent to another facility for approximately one year. 474. Mathew’s family was ordered to and paid monies to Juvenile Probation for his placements. In addition, Matthew and his mother paid $300 in fees and costs to Juvenile Probation.
Magee Mott 475. Magee Mott, now twenty-three, is the daughter of Bill and Leann Mott of
Pittston, Pennsylvania. 476. In 2002, when Magee was seventeen years old, she was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for drug possession. 477. Magee was represented by the public defender at her adjudication hearing.
She believes she might have pled guilty, but she does not recall ever being told of the consequences of pleading guilty or her right to a trial. 478. Magee was placed at PA Childcare for a few days and then ordered to spend ten months at another facility.
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479. Until Magee turned eighteen, she spent most of her time in placement, including three of four times at PA Child Care. These placements were ordered as a result of probation violations, such as curfew violations and running away.
480. Magee was never represented by an attorney at any of the probation violation hearings. She was never informed of her right to counsel or the consequences of waiving that right.
481. Magee’s parents believe that during the course of Magee’s court-ordered placement, they paid several thousand dollars to Juvenile Probation. Magee’s mother had her wages garnished. Magee’s father was jailed for failing to pay the monies to Juvenile Probation, and Magee’s mother had to pay $1,200 to bail him out. Magee believes she still owes money to Juvenile Probation and that her credit report now shows this debt.
G.M., through and with his mother and next friend, F.M. 482. G.M., now age fifteen, is the son of F.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 483. In 2008, when G.M. was fourteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for breaking into and entering the home of a family member. Prior to his hearing, G.M. was detained. When he appeared before Ciavarella, he did not have an attorney. Ciavarella did not inform G.M. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney
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if he could not afford one. G.M.’s mother left the courtroom and searched the building to try to get an attorney to represent G.M. In the middle of the hearing, an attorney came up to represent G.M. Even though the family member did not want to press charges against G.M. and it was G.M.’s first offense, G.M. pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform G.M. of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to G.M. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 484. G.M. was placed for about one month at PA Child Care, one month at Western PA Child Care, and two months at Camp Adams. G.M. is still on probation. 485. While G.M. was in placement, the court garnished his disability checks. G.M.’s mother still owes costs and fees to the court.
Sarah Myers and Florence Myers 486. Sarah Myers, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Florence Myers of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 487. In 2003, when Sarah was thirteen years old, she was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for taking a bike and change from abandoned cars. 488. Prior to appearing before Ciavarella, Sarah was arrested and taken to PA
Child Care. Her mother was not permitted to see her despite her requests.
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489. When they appeared in court before Ciavarella, Sarah’s mother requested an attorney for her daughter. She was told that a particular public defender would represent Sarah. Her mother asked that another attorney be appointed because that attorney had represented Sarah’s father in a protection-from-abuse proceeding in which Sarah’s mother was the petitioner. This request was refused.
490. At this hearing, Sarah told her public defender that she would not plead guilty because she did not commit the crimes of which she was accused. Her public defender told her that Ciavarella would not agree to that and would send her away. Ciavarella adjudicated Sarah delinquent, but Sarah is not sure if she pled guilty or not.
491. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Sarah was returned to PA Child Care and was then sent to Camp Adams for about ninety days.
492. When Sarah finally returned home from Camp Adams, she was extremely angry. She began cutting herself and was hospitalized. Due to these issues, Sarah was charged with a probation violation. Sarah’s mother does not recall having counsel at that hearing despite her requests.
493. Pursuant to Ciavarella’s orders, Sarah was placed in various facilities including PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care.
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494. Since leaving placement, Sarah has been in and out of hospitals because of her mental health disorders.
495. The money that Sarah’s father paid to her mother for child support went instead to Juvenile Probation for the cost of Sarah’s placements. Sarah’s mother believes that Sarah’s Supplemental Security Income check was also directed to Juvenile Probation for the cost of the placements.
Krystal Pope 496. Krystal Pope, now nineteen years old, resides in Kingston, Pennsylvania. 497. In 2006, when she was seventeen years old, Krystal was adjudicated
delinquent for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. At the adjudication hearing, Krystal was represented by a public defender and she pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Krystal of the rights she would be giving up if she pled guilty, nor did he explain to Krystal the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 498. Despite having no prior record, Krystal was placed in the Youth Services Agency at Wind Gap for three months. Following her release, Krystal was placed on probation for six months. 499. Krystal and her mother were ordered to and paid approximately $500 in various costs and fees to Juvenile Probation.
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Lisa Scarbrough and her mother, Laurie Scarbrough 500. Lisa Scarbrough is currently a twenty-one year old college student. She is
the daughter of Laurie Scarbrough of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 501. In 2003, Lisa, then sixteen, was arrested on a charge of making terroristic
threats. When Lisa was arrested, the officers took her to PA Child Care, where she remained for six days – including Thanksgiving weekend – without a hearing. Lisa had no prior contact with law enforcement. 502. On December 1, 2003, Lisa appeared before Ciavarella. Lisa, who was represented by counsel, brought several witnesses to testify on her behalf at the hearing; however, Ciavarella did not allow them to speak. Lisa’s principal, however, was permitted to testify on behalf of the state. 503. Ciavarella placed Lisa at Camp Adams for an indefinite period; she stayed there for nine days. 504. Lisa and her parents were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court.
Marshonda Seward 505. Marshonda Seward, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Olanda
Carter of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 506. In 2006, when she was sixteen years old, Marshonda was adjudicated
delinquent on an assault charge that arose out of a neighborhood fight. At the adjudication hearing, Marshonda was represented by a public defender.
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Marshonda never entered a guilty plea, but she and all the other children involved in the fight were adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella. 507. Marshonda was placed at Camp Adams for three months, after which she was sent home and placed on probation for six months. 508. Marshonda’s family was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court, as well as $30 monthly to Juvenile Probation during her six months of probation.
J.S., through and with his next friend and mother C.S. 509. J.S. is fifteen years old and resides with his mother C.S. in Plymouth,
Pennsylvania. 510. In March of 2007, when he was thirteen years old, J.S. was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella on charges of burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and criminal conspiracy. 511. When J.S. appeared before Ciavarella, a public defender with whom J.S. had not previously spoken represented J.S. Ciavarella adjudicated J.S. delinquent after J.S. admitted to the charges. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform J.S. of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to J.S. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 512. Ciavarella ordered J.S. into placement at Camp Adams, where he remained for four months.
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513. J.S.’s Access Card was taken away from him and he was removed from his mother’s food stamps. His mother received approximately $130 less a month in food stamps. J.S. is currently back on food stamps, but his Access Card has not been returned to him.
514. J.S. worked at Camp Adams during his time there; the money he earned there will go towards paying his probation costs.
Chad Uca 515. Chad Uca, now eighteen years old, is the son of Ruby Uca of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania. 516. In 2005, when Chad was fifteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
on a simple assault charge for pushing a fellow student who was bothering a classmate. At the brief hearing, Chad was represented by a public defender who spoke very little. Ciavarella did not permit anyone involved, including the victim, to speak. Chad pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Chad of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Chad the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 517. Chad was ordered to Camp Adams, where he remained for more than ninety days.
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518. Chad and Chad’s mother were ordered to pay monies to the court to cover various costs and fees, including the cost of Chad’s placement. Over the course of six to nine months, Chad’s mother paid $600 to $700.
W.U., through and with his next friend and mother, D.S. 519. W.U., now fifteen years old, is the son of D.S. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 520. In 2007, when he was fourteen years old, W.U. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for aggravated assault. At the adjudication hearing, W.U. was represented by a private attorney and initially pled not guilty. Ciavarella pressured W.U. for an admission of guilt, and W.U. ultimately pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform W.U. of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to W.U. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 521. W.U. was placed on indefinite probation after the hearing, but he was finally taken off probation after six months. 522. During the six months of probation, D.S. was ordered to and paid $35 monthly to Juvenile Probation. Furthermore, she was ordered to and paid approximately $110 in initial court fees and costs after the hearing.
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B.R.W., through and with his next friends and parents, C.W. and S.W. 523. B.R.W. is the fifteen-year-old son of C.W. and S.W. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 524. On March 21, 2006, B.R.W., then thirteen years old, was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella. B.R.W., who denied the charge, was represented by private counsel. While the complaining witness was allowed to testify, B.R.W.’s attorney was not allowed to speak or cross examine the witness. 525. At the end of a “trial” that took less than three minutes, B.R.W. was handcuffed and shackled and placed at PA Child Care, where he remained until April 17, 2006. 526. When he returned home, B.R.W. was placed on intensive probation. B.R.W. remained on probation until October 2, 2006, when probation recommended that B.R.W.’s probation be terminated because he had complied with all the terms and had no further violations. 527. B.R.W. and his parents C.W. and S.W. were ordered to and have paid approximately $870 in costs and fees to the court.
B. SECRET AGREEMENTS AND CONSTRUCTION OF DETENTION FACILITIES
528. Beginning in June 2000, Ciavarella, in his administrative capacity as a juvenile court judge, and defendant Powell, an attorney in Luzerne County,
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began discussions about constructing a new juvenile detention facility in Luzerne County. Powell was interested in constructing such a facility. Ciavarella introduced Powell to his friend, defendant Mericle, the owner of defendant Mericle Construction. Together, Powell and Mericle worked to locate land for the construction of such a facility. 529. Powell and defendant Zappala, doing business as defendant PA Child Care, acquired land in Luzerne County. They then entered into an agreement with Mericle and Mericle Construction to build a juvenile detention facility, and Mericle and Mericle Construction controlled the building of the facility. 530. In July 2001, PA Child Care sent Luzerne County an unsolicited proposal to build a juvenile detention facility in Pittston Township and to lease the facility to the county for $37 million over 30 years. 531. Specifically, on or about January 29, 2002, Conahan signed a secret “Placement Guarantee Agreement” between PA Child Care and the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County to house juvenile offenders at the PA Child Care facility. Under this agreement, the court would pay Child Care an annual sum of $1,314,000. At the time, defendant Conahan, as President Judge of Luzerne County, oversaw the administration of the court and its departments.
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532. In October 2002, Conahan, acting in his administrative role as President Judge, announced that judges would no longer send youth to the county-run River Street juvenile detention center (“River Street facility”). Ciavarella and Conahan publicly maintained that conditions there were deplorable. In November 2002, however, the state Department of Public Welfare deemed the River Street facility “safe and satisfactory” to house juveniles. The state Labor and Industry Department and the Wilkes-Barre Health Department also determined that the building met applicable standards.
533. In December 2002, Conahan, acting in his administrative role as President Judge, took official steps to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the River Street facility, effectively closing the county-run detention center. The closing of this detention center helped ensure that youth in Luzerne County would be detained at the detention facility being built by Mericle and PA Child Care.
534. In or before January 2003, defendants agreed that Powell and Mericle would pay $997,600 to Ciavarella and Conahan for their roles in facilitating the construction of the PA Child Care facility.
535. This payment was concealed through a series of financial transactions as described in paragraphs 569 through 574, below.
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536. In February 2003, the PA Child Care facility opened in Pittston. Luzerne County commissioners agreed to allow county juvenile offenders to be housed in the facility. However, as of March 2003, Luzerne County commissioners were continuing to pursue plans to construct a new countyrun juvenile detention facility, alleging that Powell, Zappala, and PA Child Care wanted to charge the county too much. By 2004, newly-elected majority commissioners put these construction plans on hold.
537. Due to the success of the PA Child Care facility, Powell and Zappala, doing business as defendant Western PA Child Care, constructed a juvenile detention facility in Butler County, Pennsylvania. Powell and Zappala again contracted with Mericle and Mericle Construction to build the Western PA Child Care facility, and Mericle and Mericle Construction again controlled the building of the facility. Conahan and Ciavarella were financially rewarded upon the completion of the facility in July 2005, when they received a $1,000,000 payment from Powell through defendant Pinnacle Group.
538. This payment, too, was concealed as described in paragraphs 575 and 576, below.
539. Powell and Zappala also built an addition to the PA Child Care detention facility in Luzerne County, again contracting with Mericle and Mericle
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Construction. When the addition was completed in February 2006, Powell and Mericle made another payment, this time of $150,000, to Conahan and Ciavarella through defendant Pinnacle Group. The payment was concealed as described in paragraphs 577 and 578, below. 540. In addition to these payments, between February 2003 and January 1, 2007, Powell made hundreds of thousands of dollars in concealed payments to Ciavarella and Conahan for their past and future acts relating to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. These payments were made through Pinnacle Group, as described in paragraphs 579 through 582, below. 541. In sum, Ciavarella and Conahan, in their administrative roles as judges in Luzerne County, caused Luzerne County to contract with PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. Conahan and Ciavarella assisted PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care to secure agreements with Luzerne County worth tens of millions of dollars over a period of years for the placement of juvenile offenders in the PA Child Care Facility, including an agreement in late 2004 worth approximately $58,000,000. 542. Through the conspiracy described above, Conahan and Ciavarella received approximately $2.6 million in return.
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C. IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSPIRACY TO DENY CLASS MEMBERS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
543. For defendants’ scheme to succeed, Ciavarella and Conahan had to ensure that youth were placed at the facilities and that youth were not aware of Ciavarella’s or Conahan’s financial stake in their placement. All defendants therefore acted in concert to conceal and disguise the existence, nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the money paid to Ciavarella and Conahan.
544. In February 2003, Ciavarella began placing plaintiff youth in the PA Child Care facility.
545. Ciavarella never informed plaintiffs that he had done business with PA Child Care or that he had a pecuniary interest in ensuring that youth were placed in PA Child Care. Throughout the relevant time period, Ciavarella continued to receive payments from Powell, Mericle and PA Child Care. Ciavarella and Conahan concealed their financial relationship with PA Child Care from plaintiffs by, for example, filing materially false annual statements of financial interest with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, as described below in paragraphs 583 through 586.
546. After the construction of PA Child Care, defendants’ ability to maintain their association and continue their ongoing conspiracy depended on the continued profitability and viability of this private, for-profit facility.
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547. The consistent placement of youth at PA Child Care facilitated the subsequent construction of Western PA Child Care and the expansion of PA Child Care, directly benefiting PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, and their owners and operators, as well as the contractor, Mericle, and Mericle Construction. All defendants had a financial interest in placing juveniles in PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care.
548. If youth from Luzerne County were not placed in PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care, the County would have discontinued contracting with PA Child Care and its private operators. The owners and operators received a per diem reimbursement from the county for every child placed in the facilities.
549. Ciavarella and Conahan received $997,600 from and through the other defendants for facilitating the construction of PA Child Care. Upon the completion of Western PA Child Care and of the PA Child Care addition, Ciavarella and Conahan received $1,000,000 and $150,000, respectively. In addition to these payments, between February 2003 and January 1, 2007, Powell made hundreds of thousands of dollars in concealed payments to Ciavarella and Conahan for their past and future acts relating to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. These payments were made through Pinnacle Group. In total, Ciavarella and Conahan received more than $2.6
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million in payments. These payments were directly tied to the success of the detention facilities. 550. From the opening of PA Child Care in February 2003 until May 23, 2008 (when Ciavarella ceased hearing juvenile cases), Ciavarella took steps to ensure that youth were routinely placed in detention, even in situations where detention was plainly not appropriate or over the objection of some probation officers. These steps were taken as part of the conspiracy with all other defendants. 551. The defendants had an interest in increasing overall adjudications and placements, not just adjudications that resulted in placements at PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. Youth who were adjudicated delinquent and placed at other facilities because of a lack of available space at PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care were transferred into PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care when space opened at PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care. Youth were also often placed in PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care while they were awaiting placement in a longerterm placement facility. 552. To increase the number of out-of-home placements of youth adjudicated delinquent, Ciavarella exerted pressure on staff of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County to recommend detention of juveniles even when
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detention was not appropriate. Ciavarella at times pressured probation officers to change recommendations of release to recommendations of detention. Even when probation officers did not recommend detention, Ciavarella often ordered youth detained. 553. Because Ciavarella had a concealed financial interest in placing youth in detention, the adjudication of every juvenile adjudicated delinquent or referred for placement by him from February 2003 through May 2008 was tainted. Each adjudication and placement occurred in violation of each child’s constitutional right to be adjudicated by an impartial tribunal. Moreover, any order by Ciavarella concerning the disposition of a youth during that time period, even if the youth had been adjudicated delinquent prior to 2003 or by a different judge, was also tainted and violative of the youth’s constitutional right to appear before an impartial tribunal. 554. In spite of the clear mandate from the United States Supreme Court and Ciavarella’s own pledge, the defendants’ interest in this conspiracy also led Ciavarella to regularly deny many of the plaintiff youth, specifically Class B, herein represented by named plaintiffs H.T., B.W., Kevin Williamson, M.Y., R.S. and S.S., basic constitutional rights. These rights include the right to appear before an impartial tribunal, the right to counsel, and the right to be advised of the consequences of waiving counsel or
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entering a guilty plea such that waivers and pleas are knowing, intelligent and voluntary consistent with due process. 555. The United States Constitution requires that valid guilty pleas must be knowing and voluntary because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers. It has been settled for more than forty years that these rights apply to youth in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 56. To enter into a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, a youth must be informed of and then must affirmatively state that he understands the consequences of pleading guilty and the rights he is giving up as a consequence thereof. He must also admit to each and every element of the offenses with which he is charged. The decision to plead guilty must be made freely and without threat or coercion. 556. As a regular matter, Ciavarella took no steps to ensure that Class B plaintiffs’ guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary as required. He regularly failed to inform youth of their right to a trial, their right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the government’s burden of proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. He also regularly failed to ask if youth understood they were giving up these rights before pleading guilty. Ciavarella did not confirm that youth understood
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the acts to which they were pleading guilty. In some cases, Ciavarella adjudicated youth delinquent without even inquiring as to the youth’s plea of guilt or innocence, and he then placed the youth in a detention facility. At other times, even if the youth pled not guilty, Ciavarella adjudicated the youth delinquent in a hearing lasting no more than a few minutes, with no trial or opportunity for the youth to speak on his or her own behalf or to present testimony or evidence. 557. Even when plaintiffs retained private counsel to represent them in their adjudicatory hearings before Ciavarella, Ciavarella regularly gave the privately retained counsel little or no opportunity to speak on behalf of their clients at the hearing. 558. These gross violations of the youth plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were part and parcel of the defendants’ scheme to ensure that youth were adjudicated delinquent and placed in detention. Denying plaintiffs these fundamental rights increased the number of youth adjudicated delinquent and placed in detention while, because of plaintiffs’ lack of counsel, minimizing the likelihood that the adjudications and placement decisions would be questioned or appealed. 559. Data from Luzerne County confirm that this strategy had an impact. According to data collected by the Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission,
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from 2003 through 2006 (the most recent year for which data is available), the Luzerne County Juvenile Court handled 5,160 delinquency dispositions; twenty-two percent of these dispositions resulted in placement, almost double the Pennsylvania state average. See Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Dispositions (2003-2006), available at http://www.jcjc.state.pa.us/ jcjc/cwp/browse.asp?A=3&BMDRN=2000&BCOB=0&C=41835. 560. In 2003, approximately seven percent of all children who waived counsel in Pennsylvania were placed outside the home; in Luzerne County, more than half of the children who waived counsel were placed outside the home (177 of 301 total waivers). In 2004, approximately twelve percent of all children who waived counsel in Pennsylvania were placed outside the home; in Luzerne County, over half of the children who waived counsel were placed outside the home (132 of 252 total waivers). Luzerne County data from 2005 and 2006 show that more than 250 children who were unrepresented at juvenile court hearings were adjudicated delinquent and removed from their homes. In Luzerne County, nearly sixty percent of delinquency dispositions for youth without counsel in both 2005 and 2006 resulted in out-of-home placement. Additionally, while the statewide annual average for waiver of counsel in all counties was about five percent
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during the period from 2003 to 2006, the average annual rate of waiver of counsel in Luzerne County ranged between thirteen percent (in 2003) and eighteen to nineteen percent (from 2004 through 2006). 561. The foregoing actions of Ciavarella and Conahan, as well as other of their actions, related to matters in which they had discretionary decision-making authority. Ciavarella and Conahan took these actions and other actions without recusing themselves from matters in which they had a conflict of interest and without disclosing to parties involved in court proceedings their conflict of interest and the financial relationship that existed between Ciavarella and Conahan, on the one hand, and Powell, Zappala, Mericle, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, on the other hand, which were material matters. 562. By failing to recuse themselves from acting in matters in which they had a material conflict of interest and by failing to disclose to parties appearing before the court their conflict of interest and their financial relationship with Powell, Mericle, Zappala, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, which were material matters, Ciavarella and Conahan violated their duties of independence, impartiality, and integrity in the exercise of their discretionary actions on behalf of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County.
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563. As a result of unconstitutional adjudications and placements described above, youth plaintiffs suffered emotional trauma and all plaintiffs – youth and their parents or guardians – were forced to pay the costs or some portion of the costs of placement at PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other facilities, as well as other court costs, probation fees, fines, restitution, and attorneys’ fees.
564. On January 26, 2009, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania filed a Bill of Information alleging two counts of fraud against Ciavarella and Conahan. The Bill of Information describes, inter alia, a conspiracy among the judges and at least two other unnamed parties, presumed to be Powell and Mericle, to conceal $2.6 million in payments to the judges from owners of juvenile correctional facilities, in exchange for, inter alia, referring children who appeared before Ciavarella to these juvenile correctional facilities. On February 12, 2009, Ciavarella and Conahan pled guilty to these counts. In their guilty pleas, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to serve more than seven years in federal prison. A formal sentencing hearing is pending, following a federal pre-sentence investigation.
565. On February 11, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction and granted Juvenile Law Center’s Amended Application for
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the Exercise of King’s Bench Power or Extraordinary Jurisdiction arising out of Ciavarella’s denial of youth’s constitutional right to counsel and acceptance of guilty pleas without due process during the period from 2003 through May 2008. Pursuant to that order, and citing the recently revealed criminal allegations and plea agreement entered into by Ciavarella, among others, the court appointed Special Master Arthur Grim, Senior Judge, Berks County Court of Common Pleas, to act on its behalf. Specifically, the court authorized Judge Grim to review all juvenile court adjudications and dispositions affected by the recently revealed criminal charges, including all cases in which children were committed to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care, as well as all cases in which it is alleged that youth appearing before Ciavarella were denied their right to counsel, and to make recommendations to the court concerning appropriate remedial actions. 566. Among the remedial actions the Special Master may recommend, on an individual basis, class basis, or both, are orders to expunge records, grant new juvenile proceedings, or find that the affected juvenile proceedings were void ab initio. The request for relief was limited to injunctive or other equitable relief.
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D. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY
567. Defendants Ciavarella, Conahan, Powell, Zappala, and Mericle entered into agreements for constructing and guaranteeing placements in the PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care facilities in return for concealed payments to Ciavarella and Conahan.
568. In or before January 2003, Ciavarella and Conahan arranged with Powell and Mericle to receive a payment from Powell and Mericle in the amount of $997,600 to compensate them for the roles they played in accomplishing the construction of the PA Child Care facility.
569. In order to conceal the $997,600 payment, Powell and Mericle signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by Mericle and backdated to February 19, 2002, which purported to be an agreement for Mericle to pay a broker’s fee of $997,600 to Powell. In fact, however, a large portion of the money was intended to be paid to Ciavarella and Conahan.
570. Ciavarella and Conahan engaged in a series of financial transactions, over time, which were also designed to conceal the $997,600 payment made to them. On January 21, 2003, Mericle wire transferred $610,000 to an attorney trust account of an attorney other than Powell. The remaining
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$387,600 was wire transferred by Mericle to a bank account under the control of Powell. 571. Thereafter, on January 28, 2003, the $610,000 in the attorney trust account was wire transferred to a bank account of defendant Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, a business entity controlled by Conahan. 572. In a series of financial transactions thereafter, a portion of the $610,000 payment was passed from Conahan to Ciavarella. For example, on or about January 28, 2003, Conahan directed that $330,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account controlled by Ciavarella; on or about April 30, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $75,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account controlled by Ciavarella; on or about July 15, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $75,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account under the control of Ciavarella; on or about August 13, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $25,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account under the control of a third party; and, on or about August 20, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $105,000 be transferred to a bank account under the control of Conahan. 573. To conceal the payments to Ciavarella and Conahan, Conahan directed that false entries be made in the books and records of Beverage Marketing of
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Pennsylvania. That direction was followed, and false entries were in fact made in the books and records of Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania. 574. To further conceal the $997,600 payment made to Ciavarella and Conahan, a portion of the $387,600 wire transfer made by Mericle to Powell on January 28, 2003 was paid to Ciavarella and Conahan in a series of financial transactions which occurred over time. One of those transactions occurred on or about August 29, 2003, when a check in the amount of $326,000, drawn on a bank account under the control of Powell, was deposited into a bank account under the control of Conahan but maintained in the name of another person. 575. With respect to the $1,000,000 payment made by Powell to Ciavarella and Conahan in July 2005, after completion of the construction of Western PA Child Care, defendants attempted to hide the compensation they paid, transferred, and/or received by causing that compensation to pass through Pinnacle Group, Vision Holdings, and/or Beverage Marketing, and by creating false records and/or by causing false records to be created. 576. In order to conceal the payment to Ciavarella and Conahan, Powell and Mericle signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by Mericle which purported to be an agreement for Mericle to pay a broker’s fee of $1,000,000 to Powell. In fact, however, the money was
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wire transferred by Mericle to a bank account of the Pinnacle Group, a business entity owned by defendants Cindy Ciavarella and Barbara Conahan, but controlled by Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan. 577. With respect to the $150,000 payment made to Ciavarella and Conahan by Powell and Mericle in February 2006 upon completion of the construction of an addition to PA Child Care by Mericle, the same contractor who built the facility, defendants attempted to hide the compensation they paid, transferred, and/or received by causing that compensation to pass through Pinnacle Group, Vision Holdings, and/or Beverage Marketing, and by creating false records and/or by causing false records to be created. 578. Specifically, in order to conceal the payment to Ciavarella and Conahan, Powell and Mericle signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by Mericle, which purported to be an agreement for Mericle to pay a broker’s fee of $150,000 to Powell. In fact, however, the money was wire transferred by Mericle to a bank account of the Pinnacle Group, a business entity owned by Cindy Ciavarella and Barbara Conahan, but controlled by Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan. 579. Between approximately February of 2003 and January 1, 2007, Ciavarella and Conahan received from Powell hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments for their past and future official actions relating to PA Child Care
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and Western PA Child Care. Again, they took steps to conceal and disguise the existence, nature, location, source, ownership, and control of these payments. 580. Some of the payments were made by checks drawn on one or more bank accounts under the control of Powell and were made payable to Pinnacle Group. The payments included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following: $18,000 paid on or about January 13, 2004; $52,000 paid on or about January 13, 2004; $78,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $75,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $47,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $75,000 paid on or about April 30, 2004; and $25,000 paid on or about April 30, 2004. 581. To conceal the payments to Ciavarella and Conahan, Powell made false notations on the checks and Ciavarella and Conahan directed that false entries be made in the books and records of Pinnacle Group. False entries were made in the books and records of Pinnacle Group. 582. In addition to payments by check, some of the payments were made by wire transfers from one or more bank accounts under the control of Powell and transferred to an account of Pinnacle Group. The payments included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following: $120,000 transferred on July 12, 2004; and $100,000 transferred on September 23, 2004.
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583. In order to conceal the more than $2.6 million in unlawful payments they received, Ciavarella and Conahan knowingly and intentionally filed materially false annual statements of financial interests with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, in which they failed to disclose the source of these payments, the source of the income they received, and their financial relationship with Powell, Zappala, Mericle, PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care, all of which were material matters.
584. Ciavarella made the following materially false filings with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts on or about the following dates: (a) April 2004: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2003 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; (b) March 2005: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2004 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; (c) April 2006: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2005 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; and
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(d) March 2007: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2006 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts.
585. Conahan made the following materially false filings with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts on or about the following dates: (a) April 2004: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2003 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; (b) March 2005: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2004 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; (c) February 2006: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2005 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; and (d) April 2007: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2006 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts.
586. Furthermore, Ciavarella and Conahan, acting on behalf of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County in matters in which they had
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discretionary decision-making authority, knowingly and intentionally issued written, oral and wire communications which were materially false to the extent that the defendants did not disclose their sources of income, their conflict of interest, and their financial relationship with Powell, Zappala, Mericle, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, which were material matters.
CLAIMS COUNT I VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983) All Youth Plaintiffs (Class A and Class B) v. Defendants Ciavarella and Conahan 587. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 588. Ciavarella and Conahan are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 589. Ciavarella and Conahan were acting “under color of state law” and their conduct was subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 590. Ciavarella and Conahan received payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. In return for these payments, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to and did use their judicial offices to ensure that detention facilities would be constructed
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and expanded and that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention. Ciavarella and Conahan knowingly hid these payments from the County of Luzerne, the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, and the public – in particular the named plaintiffs and class members – thereby concealing Ciavarella’s and Conahan’s conflicts of interest, pecuniary interest, bias, and partiality in adjudicating plaintiff youth delinquent and ordering their placement in detention facilities. 591. Because of these actions, plaintiff youth were deprived of their right to an impartial tribunal as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 592. As a result of their actions, the United States Attorney filed a Bill of Information alleging two counts of fraud against Ciavarella and Conahan. As described above, the Bill of Information describes, inter alia, a conspiracy among the judges and unnamed parties to conceal $2.6 million in payments to the judges from owners of juvenile correctional facilities, in exchange for, inter alia, referring children who appeared before Ciavarella to these juvenile correctional facilities. On February 12, 2009, Ciavarella and Conahan pled guilty to these two counts of fraud. 593. As a result of these constitutional violations, plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to emotional trauma and costs, fines,
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fees, and other expenses arising out of their unconstitutional adjudications or placement.
COUNT II CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983) All Youth Plaintiffs (Class A and Class B) v. All Defendants 594. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 595. Each defendant is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 596. All defendants were acting “under color of state law” and their conduct was subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 597. Defendants knowingly and willfully entered into a conspiracy and agreement by which Ciavarella and Conahan would and did receive payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. In return for these payments, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to and did use their judicial offices to ensure that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention facilities by, inter alia, securing a contract from Luzerne County to use these facilities and ordering placement of plaintiffs in these facilities. All defendants knowingly hid these payments from the County of Luzerne, the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, and the public – in
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particular the named plaintiffs and class of youth they represent – thereby concealing the defendants’ conflict of interest, pecuniary interest, bias, and partiality in adjudicating plaintiff youth delinquent and ordering their placement in detention facilities. 598. Because of this conspiracy, plaintiff youth therefore were deprived of their right to an impartial tribunal as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 599. As a result of these constitutional violations, plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to emotional trauma and costs, fines, fees, and other expenses arising out of their unconstitutional adjudications or detention.
COUNT III DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND TO A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Class B Plaintiffs v. Defendant Ciavarella 600. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 601. Ciavarella is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 602. Ciavarella was acting “under color of state law” and his conduct was
subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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603. Ciavarella received payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. In return for these payments, Ciavarella agreed to use his judicial office to ensure that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention facilities.
604. Ciavarella denied Class B plaintiffs their constitutionally protected right to counsel. When Class B plaintiffs appeared before Ciavarella without an attorney, he failed to inquire as to whether they were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving their right to counsel, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This denial substantially enhanced Ciavarella’s ability to adjudicate the Class B plaintiffs as delinquent and place them in detention facilities.
605. Ciavarella failed to engage in any colloquy with Class B plaintiffs pleading guilty to ensure that their admissions and guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is constitutionally required because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of important constitutional rights, including the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial and to confront one’s accusers. Ciavarella’s denial of these rights to Class B plaintiffs significantly enhanced his ability to adjudicate the Class B youth as delinquent and place them in detention facilities.
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COUNT IV CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE YOUTH OF THEIR RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AND TO A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Class B Plaintiffs v. All Defendants 606. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 607. Each defendant is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 608. All defendants were acting “under color of state law” and their conduct was
subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 609. Defendants knowingly and willfully entered into an agreement by which
Ciavarella and Conahan would receive payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. In return for these payments, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to use their judicial offices to ensure that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention facilities. All defendants knowingly hid these payments from the County of Luzerne, the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, and the public – in particular the plaintiffs – thereby concealing the defendants’ conflict of interest, pecuniary interest, bias and partiality in adjudicating plaintiff youth and placing plaintiff youth in detention facilities. 610. As part of this conspiracy and agreement, Ciavarella denied Class B plaintiffs their constitutionally protected right to counsel. When Class B
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plaintiffs appeared before Ciavarella without an attorney, he failed to inquire as to whether the youth were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving their right to counsel, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This denial substantially enhanced Ciavarella’s ability, pursuant to the conspiracy, to adjudicate the Class B plaintiff youth as delinquent and to order their placement in detention facilities. 611. As part of this conspiracy and agreement, defendant Ciavarella failed to engage in any colloquy with Class B plaintiff youth pleading guilty to ensure that the Class B plaintiff youth’s admissions and guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is constitutionally required because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of important constitutional rights, including the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial and to confront one’s accusers. Ciavarella’s denial of these rights to Class B youth significantly enhanced his ability, pursuant to the conspiracy, to adjudicate Class B youth delinquent and order their placement in detention facilities.
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COUNT V CIVIL RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) Class C Plaintiffs v. All Defendants 612. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 613. Each youth or parent plaintiff who paid money as a result of his or her having been adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella, or his or her child having been adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella, between 2003 and May 23, 2008 is a “person” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 614. Each defendant is a “person” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 615. Ciavarella, Conahan, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Powell, Zappala, Mericle, and Mericle Construction together constituted an association-in-fact “enterprise” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 616. This enterprise, an ongoing organization that functioned as a continuing unit for the purpose of adjudicating and housing juveniles adjudicated delinquent in Luzerne County and elsewhere, at all times relevant hereto was engaged in interstate commerce or its activities affected interstate commerce. 617. Specifically, on or about each date listed below, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, Ciavarella and Conahan, aided and abetted by each other and other defendants for the purpose of executing the scheme to
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defraud and the conspiracy to violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights described herein, transmitted and/or caused to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, the following writings, signals and sounds: (a) July 12, 2004: Electronic funds transfer of $120,000 transferred
from an account of Vision Holdings to an account of the Pinnacle Group; (b) September 23, 2004: Electronic funds transfer of $100,000 transferred from an account of Vision Holdings to an account of Pinnacle Group; (c) July 15, 2005: Electronic funds transfer of $1,000,000 transferred from an account of Mericle Construction to an account of Pinnacle Group; and (d) February 3, 2006: Electronic funds transfer of $150,000 transferred from an account of Mericle Construction to an account of Pinnacle Group. 618. Each defendant, along with others known and unknown, was employed by or associated with the enterprise identified in paragraphs 615 and 616. 619. Each defendant, along with others known and unknown, conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs
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through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 620. The pattern of racketeering activity, which each defendant conducted or in which each defendant participated, included the following “racketeering acts” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) which occurred from in or about June 2000 to on or about April 30, 2007: (a) Devising or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud by
means of wire communication in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, in particular as described above, including, without limitation, in Parts B and D; (b) Devising or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including plaintiffs, and to deprive those citizens – and particularly plaintiffs – of the intangible right of honest services by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, in particular as described above, including, without limitation, in Parts B and D; (c) Offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer on another a pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision, opinion, recommendation, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant by the recipient, in
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violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(1), in particular as described above, including, without limitation, in Parts B and D; (d) Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept from another a pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision, opinion, recommendation, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant by the recipient, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(1), in particular as described above, including without limitation, in Parts B and D; and (e) Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept from another any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known legal duty as public servant, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(3), in particular as described above, including without limitation, in Parts B and D. 621. The aforementioned instances of racketeering activity constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The aforementioned acts occurred continuously from on or about June 2000 to on or about April 30, 2007, as part of defendants’ regular way of conducting and participating in the ongoing RICO enterprise. These acts had the same or similar participants, victims, and method of commission. Specifically, these acts were all related to the common purpose of enriching various defendants by constructing and expanding juvenile detention facilities, namely PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care; contracting
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with Luzerne County to use those juvenile detention facilities; and keeping the beds at PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care full. These purposes were accomplished by denying youth who appeared before Ciavarella the right to an impartial judiciary, by obtaining guilty pleas from youth who appeared before Ciavarella in violation of the juveniles’ due process rights, and by denying youth who appeared before Ciavarella the right to assistance of counsel. 622. Ciavarella and Conahan accepted compensation from and/or through PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Zappala, Pinnacle Group, Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, and Vision Holdings in exchange for official actions. 623. Additionally, defendants attempted to hide the compensation they paid, transferred, and/or received by causing that compensation to pass through Pinnacle Group, Vision Holdings, and Beverage Marketing, by creating false records, and/or by causing false records to be created. 624. As a direct and proximate result and by reason of each of the defendants’ conduct of or participation in the affairs of the previously described enterprise, along with others known and unknown, the Class C plaintiffs have been injured in their business or property. 625. Such injuries consist, inter alia, of the following:
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(a) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to defense attorneys;
(b) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to Luzerne County for the cost of placements, court costs and fees, and costs for probation; and
(c) Loss of the youth plaintiffs’ employment, scholarships, and/or financial aid as a result of the youth plaintiffs having been adjudicated delinquent and/or committed to PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other juvenile detention facilities.
626. The aforementioned conduct and practices were specifically devised to injure the plaintiffs. COUNT VI CIVIL RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)) Class C Plaintiffs v. All Defendants
627. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 628. The defendants, along with others known and unknown, acquired and
maintained interests in and control of the enterprise identified in paragraphs 615 and 616, supra, through their pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). 629. They did so through a pattern of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346 and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(1) and (3) in constructing juvenile
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detention facilities, namely PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care; in contracting with Luzerne County to use those juvenile detention facilities; and in keeping the beds at PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care full. 630. As a direct and proximate result and by reason of each of the defendants’ acquisition and maintenance of interests in and control of the enterprise, the constitutional rights of youth plaintiffs who appeared before Ciavarella to due process, counsel, and an impartial judiciary were violated. 631. As a direct and proximate result and by reason of each of the defendants’ acquisition and maintenance of interests in and control of the enterprise, the plaintiffs have been injured in their business or property. 632. Such injuries consist, inter alia, of the following: (a) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to
defense attorneys; (b) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to
Luzerne County for the cost of placements, court costs and fees, and costs for probation; and (c) Loss of employment, scholarships, and/or financial aid as a result of the youth plaintiffs having been adjudicated delinquent and/or committed to PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other juvenile detention facilities.
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633. The aforementioned conduct and practices were specifically devised to injure the plaintiffs. COUNT VII CIVIL RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) Class C Plaintiffs v. All Defendants
634. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 635. As set forth above, defendants agreed and conspired to violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(b) and (c), all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 636. In particular, the defendants intentionally conspired and agreed to acquire
or maintain interests in and control of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, as described in Count VI. Additionally, the defendants intentionally conspired and agreed to conduct and participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, as described in Count V. 637. The defendants took overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy as described above including, but not limited to, those acts described in Counts V and VI. 638. The defendants knew that their predicate acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity, and the defendants agreed to the commission of those acts to further the schemes described in Counts V and VI.
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639. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ conspiracy, the overt acts taken in furtherance of that conspiracy, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) and (c), the plaintiffs have been injured in their business or property.
640. Such injuries consist, inter alia, of the following: (a) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to defense attorneys; (b) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs for the costs of placements, court costs and fees, costs for probation; and (c) Loss of the youth plaintiffs’ employment, scholarships, and/or financial aid as a result of the youth plaintiffs having been adjudicated delinquent and/or committed to PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other juvenile detention facilities.
641. The aforementioned conduct and practices were specifically devised to injure the plaintiffs.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:
1. Assume jurisdiction of this action.
2. Certify this action as a class action.
3. Award compensatory and punitive damages in an amount in excess of
$150,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
4. Award threefold damages in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b)-(c).
5. Award prejudgment interest, costs of suit, and attorneys’ fees.
6. Order disgorgement and restitution of moneys obtained by defendants as a
result of their conspiracy to violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
7. Order such other and further relief as this court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Lourdes M. Rosado Marsha L. Levick, Esq. (PA 22535) Lourdes M. Rosado, Esq. (PA 77109) JUVENILE LAW CENTER 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 625-0551
Daniel Segal, Esq. (PA 26218) HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL & PUDLIN One Logan Square, 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 568-6200
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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 Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 1 of 169

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., through and with her next friend and

mother, L.T.; B.W., through and with his

next friend and father, W.W.; KEVIN

WILLIAMSON; SUSAN MISHANSKI;

M.Y., through and with her next friends

and parents, M.B.Y. and J.Y.; P.S., through AMENDED COMPLAINT –

and with his next friend and mother, A.S.; CLASS ACTION

S.S. through and with his next friend and

mother, R.K.; JESSICA VAN REETH;

JACK VAN REETH; M.K., through and

with his next friend and father, J.F.K;

Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00357-

CHARLES BALASAVAGE, JR.;

ARC

CHARLES and JOANNE

BALASAVAGE; JESSE BALLIET;

SARAH MYERS; FRANK WEBER;

FLORENCE MYERS; STEVE

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

BRANNIGAN; LISA BRANNIGAN;

JEFFREY BRUNO; JAY BRUNO;

SCOTT BUKOSKI; D.C., through and with

his next friend and mother, R.C.; RUTH

DAVIS; CAROL FRONCZEK; WILLIAM

DIXON; RACHELLE FARBER; JUDY

DANE; J.G., through and with his next

friend and mother, M.O.; BRIAN GYLE;

WAYNE GYLE; TRACY HARVEY;

ALEXANDER HOGAN; MOLLY

HOGAN; D.J., through and with his next

friend and mother, S.J.; BARBARA

Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 2 of 169
KEARNS; JESSICA THURSTON; BARBARA THURSTON; KURT KRUGER; J.M.K., through and with his next friend and mother, B.T.; EDWARD KENZAKOSKI III; EDWARD KENZAKOSKI JR.; SANDRA FONZO; J.K., through and with his next friend and father, A.K.; B.L., through and with his next friend and father, M.L.; ANTHONY MILLAN; DAMON MILLAN; CINDY MILLAN; PAUL MORGAN JR.; FRED ODOM JR.; SHERRELL ODOM; STEVEN PALCHANIS JR.; STEVEN PALCHANIS SR.; JAMIE QUINN; K.R., through and with his next friend and mother, T.S.; DAVID ROWLANDS; MARY SEVILLE; MICHAEL S. SCARLATO; MICHAEL P. and TINA SCARLATO; A.S., through and with his next friend and father, G.S.; JAMES SWARTLEY; MICHAEL VITALI; M.M.W., through and with her next friend and guardian, J.C.; JOHN ASHFORD JR.; DONNA ASHFORD; CHRISTIAN BARNES; BRIAN BARNES; SHANE BLY; KEVIN and LINDA BLY; G.B., through and with his next friends and parents J.B. and P.P.; DARYL CHARLES; LIZA CHARLES; WILLIAM CLARKE; SHARON GRAAF; GLENN COOPER; KAREN COOPER; RICHARD COPELAND II; DONNA and RICHARD COPELAND; CHAD DERHAMMER; A.D., through and with her mother and next friend, J.E.; MATTHEW DOUGHERTY; E.E., K.E., and L.E. through and with their mother and next friend, H.E.; A.F. and L.F. through and with their mother and next friend, M.F.; J.D.F., through and with his next friend and mother, M.W.; J.F., through

Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 3 of 169
and with his next friend and mother, A.I.K.; ALEXANDRA FAHEY; L.H., through and with her next friend and mother, J.M.; MICHAEL HAINES; BARBARA HAINES; TIFFANY HARRISON; BERNADETTE HARRISON; EDWARD KANE JR.; BRIANNA KEE; MATTHEW KOPETCHNY; MAGEE MOTT; G.M., through and with his next friend and mother, F.M.; KRYSTAL POPE; LISA SCARBROUGH; LAURIE SCARBROUGH; MARSHOND SEWARD; J.S. through and with his next friend and mother, C.S.; CHAD UCA; W.U., through and with his next friend and mother, D.S.; B.R.W., through and with his next friends and parents, C.W. and S.W., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR.; MICHAEL T. CONAHAN; ROBERT J. POWELL; ROBERT MERICLE; GREGORY ZAPPALA; CINDY CIAVARELLA; BARBARA CONAHAN; MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; MID-ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES CORP.; PA CHILD CARE, LLC; WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC; PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC; VISION HOLDINGS, LLC; BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PA., INC., LUZERNE COUNTY,
Defendants.

Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 4 of 169
AMENDED COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION INTRODUCTION
1. With utter disdain for the rule of law, defendants Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. and Michael T. Conahan, in combination and conspiracy with other defendants named herein, have collectively perpetrated, through their acts and omissions, what ranks as one of the largest and most serious violations of children’s rights in the history of the American legal system. Both in its duration, spanning approximately five years between 2003 and 2008 – and its magnitude, inflicting damage on the lives of thousands of children and their families – the scope of defendants’ unlawful scheme is profoundly shocking. In choosing to treat children as commodities that could be traded for cash, the defendants have placed an indelible stain on the Luzerne County juvenile justice system.
2. Specifically, defendants Ciavarella and Conahan engaged for years in a brazen scheme to accept financial kickbacks from defendants Powell, Mericle, and others in exchange for placing children appearing before Ciavarella in residential programs owned and operated by defendants Powell and Zappala, PA Child Care LLC, Western PA Child Care LLC, and Mid-Atlantic Youth Services. As part of the implementation of this scheme, Ciavarella, in concert with other defendants, routinely deprived

Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 5 of 169
children of their constitutional rights – established for decades – to appear before an impartial tribunal, to be represented by counsel, to be protected against self-incrimination and, through a detailed colloquy with the Court, to insure a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of trial rights before pleading guilty. 3. The fact that the victims of the defendants’ misconduct were children who went before the juvenile court expecting justice and fairness only exacerbates the venality of defendants’ conduct. Instead of due process, thousands of these children, among the most vulnerable members of our society, were victims of a wave of unprecedented lawlessness that within minutes of their court appearances, swept them away in handcuffs and shackles and placed them in detention or other residential facilities for months for infractions as trivial as shoplifting a four dollar jar of nutmeg or taking change from unlocked cars. The abuse and trauma these children suffered at the hands of defendants has dramatically changed the trajectory of many of their lives. 4. Confronted as we are in this case with the wholesale subversion of children’s constitutional rights at the hands of the very public officials, elected judges, charged with enforcing and protecting those rights, the due process clause has never been more relevant; the principle that no
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Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 6 of 169
individual is above the law has never been more compelling. This case requires that we squarely confront these two fundamental principles of our own constitutional tradition. 5. These defendants have shamed the face of justice; plaintiffs now come before this court to seek redress.
JURISDICTION 6. Jurisdiction of this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343(3) and (4), in that claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the redress of rights secured by the United States Constitution and under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 for civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (“RICO”). 7. Plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory and punitive damages are authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 8. Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys’ fees are authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 9. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the plaintiffs reside in this district, the defendants are located in this district, and the acts and omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred in this district.
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PARTIES Plaintiffs 10. Plaintiff H.T. of White Haven, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008. 11. Plaintiff L.T. of White Haven, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff H.T. 12. Plaintiff B.W. of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008. 13. Plaintiff W.W. of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff B.W. 14. Plaintiff KEVIN WILLIAMSON of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008. 15. Plaintiff SUSAN MISHANSKI of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff KEVIN WILLIAMSON. 16. Plaintiff M.Y. of Sugarloaf, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 8 of 169
17. Plaintiffs M.B.Y. and J.Y. of Sugarloaf, Pennsylvania are the next friends and parents of Plaintiff M.Y.
18. Plaintiff P.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
19. Plaintiff A.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff P.S.
20. Plaintiff S.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
21. Plaintiff R.K. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff S.S.
22. Plaintiff JESSICA VAN REETH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is a nineteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
23. Plaintiff JACK VAN REETH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is the father of Plaintiff JESSICA VAN REETH.
24. Plaintiff M.K. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 9 of 169
25. Plaintiff J.F.K. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is the father and next friend of Plaintiff M.K.
26. Plaintiff CHARLES BALASAVAGE, JR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
27. Plaintiffs CHARLES and JOANNE BALASAVAGE of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania are the parents of Plaintiff CHARLES BALASAVAGE, JR.
28. Plaintiff JESSE BALLIET of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twenty-twoyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
29. Plaintiff SARAH MYERS is a nineteen-year-old female from WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
30. Plaintiff FRANK WEBER is a twenty-three-year-old male from WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
31. Plaintiff FLORENCE MYERS of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, is the mother of Plaintiff JESSE BALLIET, Plaintiff SARAH MYERS, and Plaintiff FRANK WEBER.
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32. Plaintiff STEVEN BRANNIGAN is an eighteen-year-old male who resides in Hanover Township, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
33. Plaintiff LISA BRANNIGAN of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff STEVEN BRANNIGAN.
34. Plaintiff JEFFREY BRUNO is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Larksville, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
35. Plaintiff JAY BRUNO of Larksville, Pennsylvania is the father of Plaintiff JEFFREY BRUNO.
36. Plaintiff SCOTT BUKOSKI is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
37. Plaintiff D.C. of Shickshinny, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
38. Plaintiff R.C. of Shickshinny, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff D.C.
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39. Plaintiff RUTH DAVIS of Shavertown, Pennsylvania is a twenty-two-yearold female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
40. Plaintiff CAROL FRONCZEK of Shavertown, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff RUTH DAVIS.
41. WILLIAM DIXON is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Plymouth, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
42. Plaintiff RACHELLE FARBER of Swoyersville, Pennsylvania is a twentyfour-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
43. Plaintiff JUDY DANE of Swoyersville, Pennsylvania is the parent of Plaintiff RACHELLE FARBER.
44. Plaintiff J.G. of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
45. Plaintiff M.O. of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.G.
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46. Plaintiff BRIAN GYLE is a nineteen-year-old male who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
47. Plaintiff WAYNE GYLE is a twenty-one-year-old male who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
48. Plaintiff TRACY HARVEY of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
49. Plaintiff ALEXANDER HOGAN of Kingston, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
50. Plaintiff MOLLY HOGAN of Kingston, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff ALEXANDER HOGAN.
51. Plaintiff D.J. of Edwardsville, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
52. Plaintiff S.J. of Edwardsville, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff D.J.
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53. Plaintiff BARBARA KEARNS of Southern Pines, North Carolina is a nineteen-year-old female. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
54. Plaintiff JESSICA THURSTON of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twenty-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
55. Plaintiff BARBARA THURSTON of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff JESSICA THURSTON and Plaintiff BARBARA KEARNS.
56. Plaintiff KURT KRUGER is a twenty-two-year-old male who resides in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
57. Plaintiff J.M.K. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
58. Plaintiff B.T. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.M.K.
59. Plaintiff EDWARD KENZAKOSKI III is a twenty-two-year-old male from Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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60. Plaintiffs EDWARD KENZAKOSKI JR. and SANDRA FONZO of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania are the parents of plaintiff EDWARD KENZAKOSKI III.
61. Plaintiff J.K. of Kingston, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
62. Plaintiff A.K. of Kingston, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff J.K.
63. Plaintiff B.L. of Kinston, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
64. Plaintiff M.L. of Kingston, Pennsylvania is the father and next friend of Plaintiff B.L.
65. Plaintiff ANTHONY MILLAN of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania is a twentyyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
66. Plaintiff DAMON MILLAN is an eighteen-year-old male who resides in Nanticoke, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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67. Plaintiff CINDY MILLAN of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania, is the mother of Plaintiffs DAMON and ANTHONY MILLAN.
68. Plaintiff PAUL MORGAN JR., is an eighteen-year-old male from Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
69. Plaintiff FRED ODOM JR., is an eighteen-year-old male from Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. He was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
70. Plaintiff SHERRELL ODOM of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff FRED ODOM JR.
71. Plaintiff STEVEN PALCHANIS JR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twenty-one-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
72. Plaintiff STEVEN PALCHANIS SR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the father of Plaintiff STEVEN PALCHANIS JR.
73. Plaintiff JAMIE QUINN is an eighteen-year-old female who resides in Wyoming, Pennsylvania. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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74. Plaintiff K.R. of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
75. Plaintiff T.S. of Hanover Township, Pennsylvania is the mother and next friend of Plaintiff K.R.
76. Plaintiff DAVID ROWLANDS of Laporte, Pennsylvania is an eighteenyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
77. Plaintiff MARY SEVILLE of Laporte, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff DAVID ROWLANDS.
78. Plaintiff MICHAEL S. SCARLATO of Hazleton, Pennsylvania is an eighteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
79. Plaintiffs MICHAEL P. and TINA SCARLATO of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, are the parents of Plaintiff MICHAEL S. SCARLATO.
80. Plaintiff A.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
81. Plaintiff G.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff A.S.
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82. Plaintiff JAMES SWARTLEY is a nineteen-year-old male from WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
83. Plaintiff MICHAEL VITALI of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twentytwo-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
84. Plaintiff M.M.W. of Freedland, Pennsylvania is a fourteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
85. Plaintiff J.C. of Freedland, Pennsylvania is the next friend and legal guardian of Plaintiff M.M.W.
86. Plaintiff JOHN ASHFORD JR. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twentyone-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
87. Plaintiff DONNA ASHFORD of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff JOHN ASHFORD JR.
88. Plaintiff CHRISTIAN BARNES of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twenty-one-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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89. Plaintiff BRIAN BARNES of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the parent of Plaintiff CHRISTIAN BARNES.
90. Plaintiff SHANE BLY of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania is a twenty-one-yearold male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
91. Plaintiffs KEVIN and LINDA BLY of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania are the parents of twenty-year-old SHANE BLY and were ordered to pay for the placement and probation of their son who was placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
92. Plaintiff G.B. of Larksville, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
93. Plaintiffs P.P. and J.B. of Larksville, Pennsylvania are the next friends and parents of Plaintiff G.B.
94. Plaintiff DARYL CHARLES of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a twentyyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
95. Plaintiff LIZA CHARLES of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff DARYL CHARLES.
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96. Plaintiff WILLIAM CLARKE of Bear Creek Township, Pennsylvania is a twenty-three-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
97. Plaintiff SHARON GRAAF of Bear Creek Township, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff WILLIAM CLARKE.
98. Plaintiff GLENN COOPER of Meshoppen, Pennsylvania is a twenty-oneyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
99. Plaintiff KAREN COOPER of Meshoppen, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff GLENN COOPER.
100. Plaintiff RICHARD COPELAND II of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania is a twenty-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
101. Plaintiffs DONNA and RICHARD COPELAND of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania are the parents of Plaintiff RICHARD COPELAND II.
102. Plaintiff CHAD DERHAMMER of Dallas, Pennsylvania is a twenty-threeyear-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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103. Plaintiff A.D. of Plymouth, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
104. Plaintiff J.E. of Plymouth, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff A.D.
105. Plaintiff MATTHEW DOUGHERTY of Pittston, Pennsylvania is a twentyone-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
106. Plaintiff E.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fourteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
107. Plaintiff K.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
108. Plaintiff L.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
109. Plaintiff H.E. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff L.E., Plaintiff K.E., and Plaintiff E.E.
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110. Plaintiff A.F. of Drums, Pennsylvania is a seventeen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
111. Plaintiff L.F. of Drums, Pennsylvania is a nineteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
112. Plaintiff M.F. of Drums, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff A.F. and Plaintiff M.F.
113. Plaintiff J.D.F. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
114. Plaintiff M.W. of Exeter, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.D.F.
115. Plaintiff J.F. of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania is a fourteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
116. Plaintiff A.I.K. of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.F.
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117. Plaintiff ALEXANDRA FAHEY is a nineteen-year-old female who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
118. Plaintiff L.H. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a sixteen-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
119. Plaintiff J.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff L.H.
120. Plaintiff MICHAEL HAINES of Dallas, Pennsylvania is a nineteen-yearold male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
121. Plaintiff BARBARA HAINES of Dallas, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff MICHAEL HAINES.
122. Plaintiff TIFFANY HARRISON of Pittston, Pennsylvania is a twenty-yearold female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
123. Plaintiff BERNADETTE HARRISON of Pittston, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff TIFFANY HARRISON.
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124. Plaintiff EDWARD KANE JR. is a twenty-two-year-old male who resides in Swoyersville, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
125. Plaintiff BRIANNA KEE is an eighteen-year-old female who resides in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
126. Plaintiff MATTHEW KOPETCHNY is a twenty-year-old male who resides in Kingston, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
127. Plaintiff MAGEE MOTT is a twenty-three-year-old female who resides in Pittston, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
128. Plaintiff G.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
129. F.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and father of Plaintiff G.M.
130. Plaintiff KRYSTAL POPE is a nineteen-year-old female who resides in Kingston, Pennsylvania. She was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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131. Plaintiff LISA SCARBROUGH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is a twenty-one-year-old female who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
132. Plaintiff LAURIE SCARBROUGH of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania is the mother of Plaintiff LISA SCARBROUGH.
133. Plaintiff MARSHONDA SEWARD is a nineteen-year-old female from Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
134. Plaintiff J.S. is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
135. Plaintiff C.S. of Plymouth, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff J.S.
136. Plaintiff CHAD UCA is an eighteen-year-old male from Hazleton, Pennsylvania who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
137. Plaintiff W.U. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
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138. Plaintiff D.S. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is the next friend and mother of Plaintiff W.U.
139. Plaintiff B.R.W. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is a fifteen-year-old male who was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed by Defendant CIAVARELLA some time between 2003 and 2008.
140. Plaintiffs C.W. and S.W. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania are the next friends and parents of Plaintiff B.R.W.
Defendants 141. Defendant MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR. of Kingston, Pennsylvania
(“Ciavarella”) at all relevant times served as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. He was Judge of the Juvenile Court for Luzerne County between approximately 1996 and May 23, 2008. He was named President Judge for Luzerne County in January 2007. He is sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times, he also controlled the business-entity defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 142. Defendant MICHAEL T. CONAHAN of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania (“Conahan”) at all relevant times served as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Between January 2002 and January 2007, he served as President Judge for Luzerne County. He is
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sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times, he also controlled the business-entity defendants BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PA., INC. and PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 143. Defendant ROBERT J. POWELL of Drums, Pennsylvania, at all relevant times, was an owner of defendants PA CHILD CARE, LLC; WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC; MID-ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES CORP.; and VISION HOLDINGS, LLC. 144. Defendant ROBERT MERICLE of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania at all relevant times was president of defendant MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC. 145. Defendant GREGORY ZAPPALA of Monroeville, Pennsylvania, at all relevant times, was an owner of defendants PA CHILD CARE, LLC; WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC; and MID-ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES CORP. 146. Defendant CINDY CIAVARELLA of Kingston, Pennsylvania (“Cindy Ciavarella”) is the wife of MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., and owner at all relevant times of defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 147. Defendant BARBARA CONAHAN of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania (“Barbara Conahan”) is the wife of MICHAEL CONAHAN and managing
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member, at all relevant times, of defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC. 148. Defendant MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC. is located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 149. Defendant MID-ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES CORP. is located in Pittston Township, Pennsylvania. 150. Defendant PA CHILD CARE, LLC is located in Pittston Township, Pennsylvania. 151. Defendant WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC is located in Emlenton, Pennsylvania. 152. Defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC is a business entity located in Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 153. Defendant VISION HOLDINGS, LLC is a Cayman Islands business entity with a mailing address in West Hazleton, Pennsylvania. 154. Defendant BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PA., INC. is a business entity located in Selzer, Pennsylvania. 155. Defendant LUZERNE COUNTY is a political subdivision within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania duly incorporated as a County with a principal place of business located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 156. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of themselves and classes of persons similarly situated. 157. The classes are defined herein as follows: A. All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to
placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008, whose adjudications have been or will be expunged, vacated, or otherwise invalidated, as of the date of class certification. Named plaintiffs H.T., B.W., Kevin Williamson, M.Y., R.S., and S.S. are class representatives. This class is referred to hereinafter as Class A. A1. All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to
placement by Ciavarella without counsel and/or without colloquies on the record that informed them of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, before either waiving counsel and/or pleading guilty, during the time period between 2003 and May 2008, and whose adjudications have been or will be expunged, vacated, or otherwise invalidated as of the date of class certification. Named plaintiffs H.T., B.W., Kevin
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Williamson, M.Y., R.S., and S.S. are also class representatives of this class. This class is referred to hereinafter as Subclass A1. A2. All children who were referred to placement at PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008. Named plaintiffs S.S., M.K., Charles Balasavage Jr., Steven Brannigan, Jeffrey Bruno, D.C., Ruth Davis, William Dixon, Rachelle Farber, Brian Gyle, Wayne Gyle, Tracy Harvey, Alexander Hogan, D.J., Barbara Kearns, Kurt Kruger, J.M.K., Edward Kenzakoski III, J.K., Paul Morgan Jr., Fred Odom Jr., Steven Palchanis Jr., Jamie Quinn, David Rowlands, Michael S. Scarlato, James Swartley, Jessica Thurston, Michael Vitali, Frank Weber, M.M.W., G.B., William Clarke, Glenn Cooper, Richard Copeland II, Chad Derhammer, A.D., L.E., J.D.F., Edward Kane Jr., Matthew Kopetchny, Magee Mott, G.M., Sarah Myers, Lisa Scarbrough, and B.R.W. are class representatives. This class is referred to hereinafter as Subclass A2. B. All children adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their adjudications and/or placements during the time period between 2003 and May 2008, as
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well as all children’s parents or guardians who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their children's adjudications and/or placements during the same time period. All named plaintiff youth and named plaintiff parents or guardians are class representatives. This class is referred to hereinafter as Class B. 158. The classes are sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Between 2003 and May 2008, Ciavarella adjudicated more than 2,500 children delinquent and placed more than 1000 of these children in facilities outside their homes. Other children were placed on probation or put under some other type of court supervision. As of the date of class certification, the vast majority of children adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008 will have had their adjudications expunged, vacated, or otherwise invalidated pursuant to the procedure explained in paragraphs 613 through 615, below. None of the youth who appeared before Ciavarella without counsel and pled guilty had a colloquy regarding their waiver of counsel or guilty plea. The number of children who appeared before Ciavarella without counsel during the relevant time period is believed to be in excess of 1,200. Nearly all the children who were adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella or placed by him between 2003
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and May 2008, as well as their parents or guardians, were assessed fees, costs, fines, restitution, or other monetary charges. 159. There are questions of law and fact common to the classes. With respect to Class A and its Subclasses, these questions include, among others, (1) whether defendants did or conspired to violate plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (2) whether defendants did or conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their right to counsel, their right against self incrimination and their right to have any guilty plea they make be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; and (3) whether defendants wrongfully imprisoned plaintiffs in violation of Pennsylvania tort law. Additionally, with respect to Class B, these questions include, among others, (1) whether defendants devised and/or engaged a scheme or artifice to defraud the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including plaintiffs, and to deprive those citizens – and particularly plaintiffs – of the intangible right of honest services and engaged in other racketeering activity; (2) whether defendants, through that racketeering activity, participated in the conduct of the affairs of an association that functioned for the purpose of adjudicating youth and providing housing for
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youth adjudicated delinquent; (3) whether defendants, through that racketeering activity, acquired or maintained interests in or control of the association; (4) whether defendants conspired and agreed to acquire or maintain interests in or control of the association and/or to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the association; and (5) whether defendants’ actions caused injury to plaintiffs’ property interests. 160. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. Like the other members of the class, the named plaintiffs maintain that defendants did or conspired to violate their rights to an impartial tribunal, to counsel, and to a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea, as well as caused them to suffer financial loss or other injuries to their property interests through a pattern of racketeering activity. 161. The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, juvenile and constitutional law, and the intersection thereof. Juvenile Law Center has been at the forefront of protecting and defending children’s legal rights since 1975, and has litigated many class action lawsuits involving children’s constitutional rights over the last thirty-four years. Juvenile Law Center attorneys have also authored or co-authored numerous scholarly articles
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addressing children’s legal rights in the juvenile justice system, and they teach courses on the juvenile justice system at both the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Temple University Beasley School of Law. In 2008, Juvenile Law Center was one of eight organizations world-wide to receive the MacArthur Foundation Award for Creative and Effective Institutions. Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin’s litigation department is highly regarded, with attorneys concentrating on a wide range of areas, including complex commercial litigation, constitutional litigation, and criminal defense and investigations. The firm’s attorneys have considerable expertise in both bringing and defending class action suits in federal and state courts. The firm is proud of its long-standing relationship with one of the nation’s premiere public interest law firms, the Juvenile Law Center. 162. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods of the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The class members are entitled to recovery as a result of the defendants’ conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights and defendants’ violation of federal RICO statutes.
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Individual differences in the cases of each class member do not defeat commonality, as plaintiffs seek recovery for the same violations of their constitutional rights and injury to their property interests without regard to each plaintiff’s underlying circumstances.
OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 163. The juvenile justice system in Pennsylvania and throughout the United
States was created based on the recognition that youth who commit delinquent acts are fundamentally different than adult criminals. Youth are considered less culpable, more vulnerable, and more susceptible to treatment and rehabilitation. The juvenile justice system is therefore designed to provide for the care, supervision and rehabilitation of youth committing delinquent acts. See, e.g., In re M.D., 839 A.2d 1116, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 164. The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act states as its purpose, inter alia: “[t]o provide for the care, protection, safety and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of [the Act].” 42 Cons. Stat. § 6301(1). The Act aims to achieve its purposes “in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from parents only when necessary for his welfare, safety or health or in the interests of public safety.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6301(3). Courts in Pennsylvania have
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recognized that, while principles and policies underlying the juvenile justice system may have evolved since its creation, “particular importance is still placed upon rehabilitating and protecting society’s youth.” In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467, 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 165. Youth in delinquency proceedings are entitled to nearly all of the due process rights guaranteed to adult criminal defendants. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971) (“Among [the constitutional rights applicable in state juvenile proceedings] are the rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Included, also, is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 166. The absolute right to counsel in juvenile adjudications has been firmly established for decades. More than forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees youth charged with delinquency and facing the possibility of incarceration the right to counsel. Gault recognized that a system in which children’s liberty interests are not protected is a system that violates due process. The Court recognized that attorneys are needed in the juvenile justice system to assist clients to “cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
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regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether [the client] . . . has a defense and to prepare and submit.” Id. at 36. 167. Consistent with Gault, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have established that the right to counsel extends to juveniles through all stages of the juvenile delinquency process (e.g., detention, pre-trial motions or hearings, adjudication, disposition, post-disposition, probation, appeal). The General Assembly codified a juvenile’s right to counsel in the Juvenile Act. Section 6337 of the Act states that “a party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings under [the Juvenile Act].” The judiciary’s concern about delinquency hearings proceeding without counsel for the child led the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to require, effective October 1, 2005, that, where a waiver of counsel is proffered, that juvenile court must conduct an extensive colloquy with the juvenile on the record to determine his or her comprehension of the consequences of a waiver. Pa. R. Juv. Ct. P. 152. 168. Today, the need for the assistance of counsel in juvenile court is even more paramount than it was when the Supreme Court issued the Gault decision in 1967. Delinquency dispositions have become longer and more punitive, and delinquency adjudications now carry collateral consequences that follow youth into adulthood and, in some cases, for the rest of their lives.
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Of equal if not greater importance, as the stakes in juvenile court have risen, social science research has confirmed that most youth lack the capacity, on their own, to understand the nature of those stakes and to make intelligent decisions about how to navigate the increasingly complex dimensions of the modern juvenile court. T. Grisso, L. Steinberg, et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adult Capacities as Trial Defendants, Law and Human Behavior, Aug. 2003, at 333-63. Because of these complexities, as recognized in the Juvenile Act, children charged as delinquents should be provided with continuous legal representation throughout the delinquency process, including, but not limited to, detention, pre-trial motions or hearings, adjudication, disposition, post-disposition, probation, appeal, expungement, and sealing of records. 169. In 2001, Ciavarella himself publicly acknowledged the importance of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings. After the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned Ciavarella’s adjudication of a youth whom Ciavarella also allowed to appear unrepresented before him without a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel, Ciavarella told the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader, “I’ll never do it again . . . . They obviously have a right to a
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lawyer, and even if they come in and tell me they don’t want a lawyer, they’re going to have one.” 170. During the next six years, Ciavarella, together with the other defendants, violated this promise, his judicial duties, and the constitutional rights of the youth plaintiffs in exchange for approximately $2.6 million.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
A. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS
H.T., through and with her next friend and mother, L.T. 171. H.T., a seventeen-year-old female, and her mother L.T. reside in White
Haven, Pennsylvania. 172. On April 17, 2007, H.T., then a fifteen year old, appeared before Ciavarella
for an adjudication hearing on a charge of harassment, a third degree misdemeanor. Specifically, H.T. was charged with creating a “My Space” page (a website) about the assistant principal of her high school. H.T. had no prior contact with the juvenile justice system. 173. H.T. did not have private counsel, nor was she appointed counsel. At the courthouse, prior to the adjudication hearing, H.T.’s mother signed a form,
1 All of the following allegations are based on information or belief, or based on the Bill of Information filed by United States Attorney Martin C. Carlson against Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. and Michael T. Conahan on January 26, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (No. 3:09-cr-028).
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given to her outside the courtroom and without explanation, waiving her daughter’s right to counsel. H.T. did not sign the statement. 174. At no point during the adjudication hearing did Ciavarella explain the consequences of proceeding without counsel. H.T. admitted creating the website in question. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy with H.T. on the record to explain her rights and the consequences of waiving her right to a trial. 175. Although H.T. had no prior record and was adjudicated for a third degree misdemeanor, the court immediately committed her to a residential treatment facility operated by Youth Services Agency. H.T. was lead away in shackles and her shocked mother collapsed into tears. 176. H.T. remained committed to the treatment facility for approximately one month, when Juvenile Law Center filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of her adjudication and detention. In May 2007, the writ was granted by the juvenile court and H.T. was allowed to return home to her family; her adjudication was vacated. 177. H.T. was eventually placed on a consent decree by the court; she was ordered to make payments – and is still making payments – to Juvenile Probation.
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B.W., through and with his next friend and father, W.W. 178. B.W. is a sixteen-year-old male who resides with his father W.W. in
Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 179. In February 2007, at the age of fourteen, B.W. was charged with simple
assault for getting into a fight in school and with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle for driving his parents’ car without permission. 180. When they arrived at the courthouse, B.W.’s father signed a form waiving counsel. B.W. was told by the court officer that he had to sign the waiver form because his father did. 181. B.W. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel; he was adjudicated delinquent after he admitted to the charges. Ciavarella did not inform B.W. and his father that he had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if they could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to B.W. of waiving his right to counsel and his right to trial by pleading guilty. 182. Ciavarella ordered B.W. into placement at Camp Adams where he remained for about two months. During the time he was at Camp Adams, B.W. was repeatedly bullied by other juveniles. When he returned home he was placed on probation.
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183. In January 2008, B.W. was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, simple possession, and unauthorized use of a vehicle. Allegedly, B.W. was threatened by another child he met in Camp Adams to deliver some marijuana.
184. Before the hearing on these new charges, B.W.’s father again signed the waiver of counsel form and B.W. was again told that he needed to sign the form as well.
185. B.W. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel; he was adjudicated delinquent after he admitted to the charges. Ciavarella did not inform B.W. and his father that he had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if they could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to B.W. of waiving his right to counsel or his right to trial by pleading guilty.
186. Ciavarella sent B.W. back to Camp Adams, where he remained for about six weeks before being transferred to St. Michaels, where B.W. did very well and was nominated for an award for his outstanding performance.
187. A volunteer attorney then stepped in and filed a writ of habeas corpus; B.W. was released from St. Michaels in the summer of 2008.
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188. The felony charge was nul prossed, but the adjudications for the misdemeanor charges of possession of a marijuana and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle remain on B.W.’s record.
189. B.W. was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. B.W.’s father was ordered to and paid $3,500 to the court to cover the costs of his placements in the various facilities.
Kevin Williamson and his mother, Susan Mishanski 190. Kevin Williamson, now age eighteen, is the son of Susan Mishanski of
Hanover Township, Pennsylvania. 191. In April 2008, Kevin, then a seventeen year old, was charged with simple
assault when he was in a fight with a friend outside of a concert hall. 192. On April 22, 2008, Kevin was adjudicated delinquent in an approximately
five-minute hearing before Ciavarella. 193. Kevin was not told of his right to an attorney, but a public defender did
appear in the middle of the hearing. The public defender did not speak to Kevin. Kevin believes that he may have pled guilty to the charges, but he does not think he was told the consequences of pleading guilty or of his right to a trial. 194. Ciavarella ordered that Kevin be placed at Camp Adams for three months.
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195. In May 2007, the Juvenile Law Center filed a writ of habeas corpus on Kevin’s behalf, challenging the constitutionality of Kevin’s adjudication and detention. On June 18, 2008, the court granted the writ; Kevin’s delinquency adjudication was vacated and he was released from Camp Adams.
196. Kevin was put on probation by Judge Lupas on the same charge in July 2008; this time, he was represented by an attorney whom his mother retained. Kevin was successfully discharged from probation on February 5, 2009.
197. Kevin’s mother paid $450 to Juvenile Probation for the cost of placement. Kevin and his mother also were ordered to and paid $140 in court fees and $140 in Juvenile Probation fees.
M.Y., through and with her next friends and parents, M.B.Y and J.Y. 198. M.Y. is a seventeen-year-old female who resides with her parents, M.B.Y.
and J.Y., in Sugarloaf, Pennsylvania. 199. In April 2008, at the age of sixteen, school security found less than five
dollars worth of marijuana in the glove compartment of her father’s car, which she had driven to school that day. She was arrested. 200. Shortly thereafter, the family received a notice that M.Y. was to report to court for a hearing on the possession charge. M.Y.’s parents considered
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hiring an attorney but believed the court would be fair since M.Y. was an honor student and this was her first offense. 201. M.Y., without counsel, appeared before Ciavarella and admitted to the charge. Ciavarella adjudicated M.Y. delinquent and ordered that she be placed at Camp Adams for ninety days. 202. M.Y.’s stunned parents immediately sought help for their daughter. A pro bono attorney filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of her adjudication and detention. In response to the writ, the Luzerne County Juvenile Court released M.Y. to her parents and vacated the adjudication.
P.S., through and with his next friend and mother, A.S. 203. P.S., now fifteen years old, is the son of A.S. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. In 2007, when he was fourteen years old, P.S. was arrested for stealing loose change from unlocked cars. 204. One of the police officers who arrested P.S. told A.S. that P.S. would receive probation because P.S. cooperated with the police and committed a minor offense. 205. Before P.S.’s hearing, A.S. contacted two attorneys about representing P.S. The first attorney advised her against hiring him because A.S. would likely receive probation even without the assistance of an attorney. The second
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attorney asked her for the name of the judge assigned to the case. When she told the attorney it was Ciavarella, the attorney advised her that it would be “a waste of money” to hire him because Ciavarella does not listen to the attorneys of juvenile defendants. 206. Before entering Ciavarella’s courtroom, A.S. was asked to sign a form waiving P.S.’s right to an attorney. A.S. told the staff person that she would like P.S. to be represented by an attorney, but that she could not afford to hire one. The staff person pressured A.S. into signing the form by telling her that it would take six to eight months to assign a public defender to P.S. and that P.S. would be held in detention in the interim. 207. P.S. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel; he was adjudicated delinquent. Ciavarella did not inform P.S. or A.S. that P.S. had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if P.S. could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to P.S. of waiving his right to an attorney. 208. P.S.’s hearing before Ciavarella lasted no longer than three minutes. Ciavarella asked P.S. whether he would plead guilty, but did not explain the legal rights P.S. would relinquish by waiving his right to a trial. P.S. pled guilty.
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209. P.S. was detained at Camp Adams for three days before he was transferred to Glen Mills.
210. P.S. remained at Glen Mills for approximately twelve months, when pro bono attorneys who had become aware of his situation filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of his underlying adjudication and commitment.
211. The Luzerne County Juvenile Court granted the writ in June 2008, his adjudication was vacated, and P.S. returned home. P.S. is currently on probation.
212. P.S.’s father pays $440 per month in child support for P.S. The Domestic Relations Court redirected the child support payments to Juvenile Probation while P.S. was in placement.
213. The court also ordered P.S. to pay $1,900 in restitution fines. Juvenile Probation also told A.S. that she will have to pay between $45 and $80 per month for every month P.S. is on probation. Juvenile Probation told A.S. that P.S.’s probation will not end until P.S. and A.S. pay the restitution, fines, and probation fees.
214. Although P.S. was fourteen when he was detained at Glen Mills, Glen Mills placed him in pre-GED classes. He was not assigned a grade level.
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When he returned home from Glen Mills, he was therefore held back a grade. 215. At Glen Mills, P.S. developed anxiety and depression. As a result, he can no longer attend school. He now receives homebound instruction.
S.S., through and with his next friend and mother, R.K. 216. S.S. is seventeen years old. He resides with his mother, R.K., of Wilkes-
Barre, Pennsylvania. 217. In October 2007, when S.S. was sixteen years old, S.S. was charged with
driving without a license and presenting false identification to the police in Dauphin County. 218. That month, S.S. appeared, with an attorney, before the Dauphin County Juvenile Court and made a counseled admission to the charges. The Dauphin County court then transferred the case to the Luzerne County Juvenile Court as S.S. was (and still is) a resident of Luzerne County. 219. On November 14, 2007, S.S. appeared without counsel before Ciavarella for an adjudication/disposition hearing. Ciavarella did not ascertain whether S.S. knew he had the right to counsel, nor did the court obtain an affirmative waiver of counsel from S.S. on the record. 220. Ciavarella ordered that S.S. be placed a Glen Mills School for an indefinite period. Upon Ciavarella’s order, S.S. spent approximately two weeks from
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November 14 to November 28, 2007 in PA Child Care and then was transferred to Glen Mills. 221. S.S. remained at Glen Mills until July 2008, when Juvenile Law Center filed a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of his adjudication and detention. On July 31, 2008, Judge Lupas of the Luzerne County Juvenile Court issued an order releasing S.S. from his commitment at Glen Mills and vacating the delinquency adjudication and disposition of November 14, 2007. 222. During S.S.’s placement at Glen Mills, the court garnished S.S.’s survivor’s check of $598 a month, which S.S. has received from Social Security since his father passed away. S.S. was also ordered to pay fees and costs of $35 a month to the court.
Jessica Van Reeth and her father, Jack Van Reeth 223. Jessica Van Reeth, now nineteen years old, lives with her mother, Toni,
and her father, Jack Van Reeth, in Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. On January 30, 2007, Jessica, then sixteen, appeared before Ciavarella for an adjudication hearing on a delinquency petition charging her with possession of drug paraphernalia, namely a cigarette lighter and pipe, which is a misdemeanor. Jessica had no prior contact with law enforcement.
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224. Prior to the hearing, Jessica and her father were interviewed by a Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Officer, who told them that he would not recommend placement to the court.
225. Jessica appeared in court without a lawyer. Jessica was not advised of her right to counsel, nor did Ciavarella administer a colloquy with Jessica on the record to explain the consequences of proceeding without counsel. During the hearing, Jessica admitted to the charge and she was adjudicated delinquent. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy with Jessica on the record to explain her rights and the consequences of waiving her right to a trial.
226. Despite the fact that she had no prior record, Ciavarella ordered Jessica placed in Camp Adams for three months. She was immediately handcuffed and escorted out of the courtroom without even getting a chance to say good-bye to her father. She was not allowed to see her parents for the first two weeks she was in placement.
227. Jessica was released from Camp Adams on April 26, 2007 and placed on intensive probation for an additional three months. The Juvenile Court’s supervision over Jessica ended on September 17, 2007.
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228. Jessica and her parents were ordered to and paid monies to Juvenile Probation to cover various fees and costs associated with her adjudication and placement.
M.K., through and with his next friend and father, J.F.K. 229. M.K. is the seventeen year old son of J.F.K. of Exeter, Pennsylvania. 230. In December 2004, when he was thirteen years old, M.K. was charged with
simple assault and harassment. The charges arose out of an incident in November, in which his mother’s boyfriend alleged that M.K. spilled beer on the floor, pushed him around, and threw a piece of steak on him. The boyfriend was 6’3” tall and weighed about 210 pounds, while M.K. was 4’2” tall and weighed 87 pounds. At the time, M.K.’s parents were involved in a custody dispute. 231. On December 28, 2004, M.K. appeared with his father and a lawyer before Ciavarella. M.K., who had no prior police record, told the judge he had done nothing wrong. Ciavarella ordered that M.K. be placed in PA Child Care pending a psychological evaluation. M.K. was taken out of the courtroom in handcuffs and shackles. 232. On January 13, 2005, sixteen days after being locked up in PA Child Care, M.K. was evaluated by Dr. Frank Vita. M.K. remained in placement for an additional thirty-two days after the evaluation. He remained at PA Child
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Care the entire time, except for one week when he was transferred to Tioga County Detention Center due to space constraints. 233. On January 27, 2005, M.K.’s father attended a meeting at PA Child Care. At that meeting, Sandra M. Brulo, then chief of Juvenile Probation, told M.K.’s father that she could send M.K. away until he was twenty-one years old. Indeed, in a report to the court dated January 28, 2005, Ms. Brulo recommended to the court that M.K. be placed for one year at the Colorado Boys Ranch, followed by a second year at Glen Mills School in Pennsylvania. 234. Frustrated that his son was being held and concerned that he would be sent out of state, M.K.’s father approached the local media. They published a story describing M.K.’s plight on February 9, 2005. 235. On February 14, 2005, five days after the article appeared in the WilkesBarre Times-Leader, M.K. again appeared in court. Ciavarella ordered that M.K. be released from PA Child Care and placed on probation for approximately six months. 236. M.K. and his father were ordered to pay $420 in probation and detention service fees to the Juvenile Probation department. In addition, M.K.’s father paid for the services of an attorney to represent his son.
Charles Balasavage Jr. and his parents, Charles and Joanne Balasavage
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237. Charles Balasavage Jr., now eighteen years old, is the son of Charles and Joanne Balasavage of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
238. In 2006, when he was sixteen years old, Charles was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for receiving a stolen scooter. Charles did not go to trial but neither he nor his father can remember if he actually pled guilty in the three-minute hearing. Charles was unrepresented. Ciavarella did not inform Charles that he had a right to an attorney, or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Charles of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
239. Although Charles had no prior record and was adjudicated delinquent on a misdemeanor charge, Ciavarella placed him in PA Child Care, where he initially remained for approximately four to six weeks. Then he was placed at two other facilities before being sent home and placed on probation.
240. Over the next two years, Ciavarella ordered that Charles be placed in PA Child Care on at least four other occasions, in Western PA Child Care on one occasion, and in various other facilities.
241. Charles was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. His parents were ordered to and paid money to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of
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his placements in PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, and various other facilities, and for Charles to receive a psychological examination.
Jesse Balliet and his mother, Florence Myers 242. Jesse Balliet, now age twenty-two, is the son of Florence Myers of Wilkes-
Barre, Pennsylvania. 243. In 2003, when he was fifteen years old, Jesse was adjudicated delinquent
for simple assault. Jesse was not represented by counsel. Ciavarella did not inform Jesse that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Jesse of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 244. Even though this was Jesse’s first offense, Ciavarella ordered that Jesse be placed at Camp Adams for three months. 245. Jesse and his father were ordered to and paid about $2,000 to Juvenile Probation in various fees and costs including for the cost of Jesse’s placement.
Steven Brannigan 246. Steven Brannigan, now eighteen years old, is the son of Lisa Brannigan of
Hanover Township, Pennsylvania.
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247. Since 2003, Steven has been before Ciavarella on four separate charges of delinquency. Each time Steven appeared before Ciavarella, he was placed.
248. In 2003, he was placed in Camp Adams for four months. 249. In January 2005, he appeared before Ciavarella without counsel.
Ciavarella immediately sent Steven to PA Child Care for a month without receiving testimony from anyone. He was later placed in various other facilities. 250. In 2007, on charges of hindering, Steven appeared before Ciavarella, represented by a public defender. The public defender advised Steven that he would likely get a maximum sentence if he did not plead guilty, so Steven pled guilty. Ciavarella did not explain the consequences of a plea, nor did he explain Steven’s right to a trial. Ciavarella accepted his plea, however, and sent Steven to Camp Adams for a month and then to Job Corps for a year. Steven is currently on probation. 251. Each time Steven was in placement, his mother was required to pay child support to Juvenile Probation. Both Steven and his mother are currently making payments to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of supervision. Steven’s mother pays $25 per month and Steven pays $40 per month. 252. Following his placement, Steven dropped out of high school. However, while in Job Corps, he was able to get his GED.
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Jeffrey Bruno 253. Jeffrey Bruno, now twenty-one years old, is the son of Jay and Karen
Bruno of Larksville, Pennsylvania. 254. In 2003, when he was sixteen years old, Jeffrey was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a charge of driving a dirt bike while intoxicated. Jeffrey was not represented by counsel, and he apparently pled guilty by nodding his head after the judge read the charges. Ciavarella did not inform Jeffrey that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Jeffrey of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 255. By Ciavarella’s order, Jeffrey was placed in PA Child Care for about two and one-half months. He was then placed at another facility for six months. 256. Jeffrey and his parents were ordered to pay various fees and costs to Juvenile Probation. Specifically, his parents paid about $4,500 for placement costs. Funds were deducted from Jeffrey’s father’s disability check and garnished from his mother’s wages. Jeffrey and his parents also paid $225 for probation fees and $1,200 in court costs.
Scott Bukoski
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257. Scott Bukoski is a twenty-one-year-old male from Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. His father is Brian Bukoski.
258. In May 2005, Scott was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a charge of unlawful use of a vehicle. After Ciavarella read out loud the charges, Scott pled not guilty. However, without a trial, Ciavarella adjudicated Scott delinquent. Scott was not represented by counsel. Ciavarella did not inform Scott that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Scott of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
259. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Scott was placed at Camp Adams for ninety days. 260. Scott and his father were ordered to and paid various fees and costs to
Juvenile Probation.
D.C., through and with his next friend and mother, R.C. 261. D.C., now seventeen years old, is the son of R.C. of Shickshinny,
Pennsylvania. 262. In 2007, when D.C. was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on possession of drug paraphernalia and burglary charges. D.C., who was unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform D.C. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would
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appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to D.C. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 263. Ciavarella ordered D.C. to be sent to Camp Adams for a few weeks. From there he was sent to PA Child Care for a few days and then to another facility for twelve months. 264. D.C. and his parents were ordered to and paid various fees and costs to the court. Specifically, the court garnished the wages of D.C.’s father for two weeks at a rate of $125 per week. The court also took their adoption subsidy in the amount of $600 per month for a total of approximately $7200. While D.C. was on probation, his parents were ordered to pay to Juvenile Probation $35 per month and to pay separately for the ankle monitor, which was $100. D.C. also was ordered to pay $1,700 in restitution.
Ruth Davis and her mother, Carol Fronczek 265. Ruth Davis, now twenty-two years old, is the daughter of Carol Fronczek
of Shavertown, Pennsylvania. 266. At age seventeen, Ruth was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a
simple assault charge. Ruth, who was unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Ruth that she had a right to an attorney or
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that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Ruth of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty. 267. Upon Ciavarella’s orders, Ruth was in various placements between 2003 and 2005, including in PA Child Care for approximately seven months. 268. Ruth’s mother was ordered to and paid child support to Juvenile Probation for the duration of Ruth’s placement. Ruth and her mother also were ordered to and paid court fees.
William Dixon 269. William Dixon is the twenty-one-year-old son of Janet Dixon of Plymouth,
Pennsylvania. 270. In April 2003, when he was fifteen, William was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella on misdemeanor charges arising out of an incident involving his family. Prior to appearing before Ciavarella, William was held in PA Child Care for five days without a hearing. 271. When William finally appeared before Ciavarella, he was unrepresented by counsel. Ciavarella asked William if had disrespected his grandfather, to which William answered yes. William was adjudicated delinquent even though he did not actually plead guilty or admit to the charges. Ciavarella did not inform William that he had a right to an attorney or that the court
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would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to William of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 272. Upon Ciavarella’s order, William was placed at Camp Adams for sixty days; he was placed on probation after he returned home. 273. William’s mother’s paycheck was attached to cover the costs of his placement. William was ordered to and paid Juvenile Probation $35 per month from the period July 2003 through May 2004. In total, William and his family paid about $2,300.
Rachelle Farber and her mother, Judy Dane 274. Rachelle Farber, now twenty-four years old, is the daughter of Judy Dane
of Swoyersville, Pennsylvania. 275. In December 2002, Rachelle appeared with a private attorney before
Ciavarella on charges of aggravated assault. 276. While at the probation office prior the hearing, Rachelle and her mother
were told by the probation officer that, if the lawyer did not cease efforts to intervene on behalf of Rachelle, Rachelle would be placed in a maximum security facility. The probation officer told her that having an attorney present was “making things worse.”
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277. Rachelle was initially placed by Ciavarella in Camp Adams. Then, in a subsequent hearing before Ciavarella, she was placed in PA Child Care for 90 days.
278. Rachelle’s mother was told by the probation office that she was required to pay to cover the cost of Rachelle’s placement. Rachelle’s mother met with the probation office and filled out paperwork that allowed Juvenile Probation to garnish her wages at the rate of $225 per month to cover the cost of placement.
279. Upon release from PA Child Care, Rachelle was placed on house arrest and on probation. Her mother was ordered to pay to cover the cost of the ankle bracelet, psychological testing, drug testing, and the supervision fees associated with probation. In total, Rachelle and her mother were ordered to pay nearly $950 in probation fines and fees.
280. As a result of her placement, Rachelle suffered severe separation anxiety. She also attempted suicide immediately after she was placed. She continues to have nightmares about her experiences in placement.
J.G., through and with his next friend and mother, M.O. 281. J.G., now seventeen, is the son of M.O. of Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania. 282. In 2007, when he was fifteen, J.G. was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella. J.G. was unrepresented by counsel. According to J.G.’s
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mother, J.G. may have pled guilty, but she is not sure because the hearing lasted about five seconds. Ciavarella did not inform J.G. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to J.G. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 283. Upon Ciavarella’s orders, J.G. was sent to Camp Adams for three months. 284. J.G.’s mother was ordered to and paid about $2,000 to Juvenile Probation for the cost of placement, a portion of which was deducted directly from her tax refund. J.G. and her mother were ordered to and paid about $200 in fees and costs to Juvenile Probation.
Brian Gyle 285. Brian Gyle, now nineteen, is the son of Maria Gyle of Pittston,
Pennsylvania. 286. Brian was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on four occasions from
2003 to 2004. Upon Ciavarella’s orders, Brian was placed at different times in PA Child Care, Camp Adams, and Northwestern Academy. 287. Brian and his parents were ordered to pay to Juvenile Probation $1,728.68 for fines, probation and detention fees, and services.
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Wayne Gyle 288. Wayne Gyle, now age twenty-one, is the son of Maria Gyle of Pittston,
Pennsylvania. 289. On July 21, 2004, Wayne was charged with simple assault, terroristic
threats, and harassment. He was placed in PA Child Care for sixteen days prior to seeing a judge. 290. On August 6, 2004, Wayne appeared before Ciavarella. Although the charges against him were dismissed, Ciavarella ordered that Wayne’s probation resulting from an earlier adjudication be extended for one year. Neither Wayne nor his mother recall that Wayne was represented by an attorney or told of Wayne’s right to counsel at this hearing. 291. Wayne was ordered to pay Juvenile Probation fees and still owes approximately $5,000.
Tracy Harvey 292. Tracy Harvey, now eighteen years old, is the son of Albert Harvey of
Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania. 293. In 2007, when Tracy was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a charge of being under the influence of a substance. Tracy, who was unrepresented, did not formally plead guilty, nor did Ciavarella seek a plea. Ciavarella merely asked the police officer what
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happened, and he did not allow anyone else in the courtroom to speak. Ciavarella did not inform Tracy that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Tracy of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 294. Tracy was placed in PA Child Care for one week and then transferred to another facility for seven months. 295. Tracy’s father was ordered by a letter he received from Juvenile Probation to pay $200 per month to the Pennsylvania State Collection Disbursement Unit (“PA SCDU”) to cover the cost of Tracy’s placement. When he was unable to continue paying that amount, his wages were garnished. Since Tracy’s release from placement in July 2008, he has been paying supervision fees for his probation; he was ordered to pay $350 plus $35 per month to Juvenile Probation for supervision.
Alexander Hogan and his mother, Molly Hogan 296. Alexander Hogan, now age eighteen, is the son of Molly Hogan of
Kingston, Pennsylvania. 297. In September of 2007, Alexander, then sixteen years old, was charged with
simple assault and other related charges.
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298. Alexander pled guilty and was adjudicated delinquent in a hearing that lasted less than ten minutes.
299. Alexander does not remember being represented by counsel during his adjudicatory hearing. Ciavarella did not inform Alexander of his right to an attorney or explain that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella conduct a colloquy with Alexander on the record to explain the consequences of waiving his right to a trial.
300. Alexander was detained at PA Child Care for about a month and then transferred to Western PA Child Care where he was detained for another month. Finally, Alexander was transferred to Northwestern Academy where he remained for approximately four months.
301. The court ordered Alexander’s mother to pay costs associated with Alexander’s adjudication but she has been unable to afford to do so.
302. When Alexander returned to his school, after being released from placement, he was harassed incessantly. Ultimately, he stopped going to school because the taunting became unbearable. He plans to work towards a GED.
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D.J., through and with his next friend and mother, S.J. 303. D.J., now sixteen years old, is the son of S.J. of Edwardsville,
Pennsylvania. 304. In 2005, when D.J. was about thirteen years old, the police picked him up
from school on a Friday morning and told him he was being taken to detention because he had failed to appear as a witness to a school fight. D.J.’s mother reports that she never received a subpoena for her minor son to appear as a witness. 305. D.J. was taken from school to PA Child Care. Police would not let D.J.’s mother speak to or see her son, and the police did not fully explain what was going on. 306. D.J. was brought to court on the following Monday, having spent the weekend at PA Child Care. In court, Ciavarella yelled at D.J. and his attorney. D.J. was then released without ever testifying. 307. D.J. has never been arrested or detained aside from this incident. 308. D.J.’s mother paid $500 to the attorney to appear with her son in court.
Barbara Kearns and her mother, Barbara Thurston 309. Barbara Kearns, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Barbara
Thurston of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
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310. In September 2003, when Barbara was fourteen years old, she appeared before Ciavarella on a curfew violation; at the time, she was on probation for a previous adjudication on a retail theft charge. Barbara was unrepresented by counsel. In the very short hearing, Ciavarella did not hear any evidence. Barbara pled not guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Barbara that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Barbara of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty.
311. Barbara was then placed in PA Child Care for three days, at Camp Adams for over six months, and at another boot camp for a week. In 2006, after appearing before Ciavarella again without counsel, Barbara received probation.
312. Barbara was ordered to pay fees and costs to the court. Her Supplemental Security Income check was garnished to offset the cost of placement.
Kurt Kruger 313. Kurt Kruger is a twenty-two-year-old male who resides in Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 314. In 2004, when he was seventeen years old, Kurt was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a charge of conspiracy to shoplift. Before appearing in
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court, Kurt was held in PA Child Care for three days. Kurt did not have counsel at his hearing, at which he made an admission. Ciavarella did not inform Kurt that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Kurt of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 315. Despite the fact that shoplifting is a summary offense, Ciavarella ordered that Kurt be placed at Camp Adams, where he remained for four months. 316. Kurt’s parents were ordered and paid to Juvenile Probation $1,000 to $2,000 for the cost of his placements. Kurt himself was ordered to and paid approximately $200 in restitution.
J.M.K., through and with his next friend and mother, B.T. 317. J.M.K., now seventeen years old, is the son of B.T. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 318. J.M.K. was charged in 2002 with fighting in school and then again for a
curfew violation. When he was fourteen years old, in 2005, J.M.K. was again charged with fighting. 319. In most circumstances when J.M.K. appeared before Ciavarella, he was without counsel. In the very short hearings, J.M.K. attempted to explain the circumstances surrounding the charge, and Ciavarella did not allow him
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to speak. At all but one of these hearings, Ciavarella did not inform J.M.K. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to J.M.K. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 320. Between 2002 and 2005, J.M.K. was placed by Ciavarella in various facilities including PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. 321. J.M.K.’s mother was ordered to pay fees and costs associated with J.M.K.’s placement and supervision. Because of her financial hardship, J.M.K.’s mother was unable to pay more than a couple hundred dollars during the last seven years. Because J.M.K. received Supplemental Security Income, those checks were automatically garnished to cover the costs of his placement and supervision. J.M.K. and his mother still owe money to Juvenile Probation.
Edward Kenzakoski III and his parents, Edward Kenzakoski Jr. and Sandra Fonzo 322. Edward Kenzakoski III is a twenty-two-year-old male from Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. He is the son of Sandy Fonzo and Edward Kenzakoski, Jr. 323. In September 2003, Edward, then seventeen years old, was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella on a misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. Before the filing of the delinquency petition, Edward had
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no prior contact with law enforcement. Edward appeared before Ciavarella without counsel. Edward was not advised of his right to counsel and to have counsel appointed for him, nor did Ciavarella conduct a colloquy with Edward on the record to explain the consequences of proceeding without counsel. Edward admitted to the charge, but Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy with Edward on the record to explain the consequences of pleading guilty and giving up his right to a trial. 324. After adjudicating him delinquent, Ciavarella immediately committed Edward to PA Child Care for more than thirty days. 325. In October 2003, Edward, then in the custody of PA Child Care, appeared before Ciavarella, again without counsel, and was then ordered into placement at a boot camp for 120 days. Edward was released four months later and was placed on probation for several months. 326. One week before his probation would have expired, Edward failed to appear at a scheduled delinquency review hearing, and the Juvenile Court issued a bench warrant. In the fall of 2005, Edward, then nineteen years old, was involved in a traffic accident. He was taken into custody based on the bench warrant and appeared, without counsel, before Ciavarella for a violation of probation hearing. Edward was immediately committed to Western PA Child Care for 120 days.
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327. Upon his release in the winter of 2006, Juvenile Court jurisdiction ended. 328. Edward was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. His parents
were ordered to and paid approximately $5,000 to the court to cover the costs of his placements.
J.K., through and with his next friend and father, A.K. 329. J.K. is the fifteen-year-old son of A.K. and D.K. of Kingston,
Pennsylvania. 330. In July 2007, when he was thirteen years old, J.K. was adjudicated
delinquent on charges of criminal mischief, trespass, and attempted burglary after having been found one night playing a game called Manhunt on the grounds of a local school. Prior to going to court, J.K.’s parents applied for a public defender to represent J.K., but they were told that they made too much money to qualify. 331. J.K. appeared before Ciavarella without counsel. His parents asked for a continuance to obtain a lawyer, but that request was denied. 332. After he was adjudicated delinquent, J.K. was sent by the court to PA Child Care and then Camp Adams for about five days. When he returned home, he was placed on house arrest. When he broke his house arrest rules, J.K. was sent to another residential facility where he remained for approximately nine months, until September 2007.
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333. J.K.’s parents were ordered to and paid $3,300 to PA SCDU for his placement; a portion of the monies were garnished from unemployment checks. J.K. himself was ordered to and is still paying fees and costs to the court.
B.L., through and with his next friend and father M.L. 334. B.L., now sixteen years old, is the son of M.L. of Kingston, Pennsylvania. 335. In 2006, when he was thirteen years old, B.L. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a charge of perjury. B.L. was unrepresented when he appeared before Ciavarella. Ciavarella did not inform B.L. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to B.L. of waiving his right to counsel. B.L. pled not guilty. Ciavarella told B.L. that he was guilty. 336. Although he had no prior contact with the juvenile justice system, Ciavarella ordered that B.L. be placed in Camp Adams for ninety-three days. 337. M.L. had $150 a week taken from his paycheck during the three months that B.L. was placed. B.L. has received multiple notices indicating that he owes $500 to Juvenile Probation.
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Anthony Millan and his mother, Cindy Millan 338. Anthony Millan, now twenty years old, is the son of Cindy Millan of
Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. 339. In 2005, when Anthony was sixteen years old, Anthony was adjudicated
delinquent for fighting in school. This was Anthony’s first offense. When he appeared before Ciavarella, Anthony was unrepresented by counsel. Ciavarella did not inform Anthony that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Anthony of waiving his right to counsel. Anthony pled not guilty. 340. Ciavarella immediately ordered Anthony shackled and sent him to Camp Adams where he remained for three months. 341. Anthony’s mother was ordered to pay placement fees, court costs, and supervision costs totaling over $200.
Damon Millan and his mother, Cindy Millan 342. Damon Millan, now eighteen years old, is the son of Cindy Millan of
Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. 343. In 2007, when Damon was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a breaking and entering charge. When Damon appeared before Ciavarella, he was represented by a private attorney. Damon pled
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not guilty. However, neither Damon’s attorney nor anyone else was permitted to speak. The homeowners who were burglarized were in the courtroom and wanted to explain that they did not believe Damon was involved, but Ciavarella did not allow them to speak. 344. Ciavarella ordered Damon to Camp Adams, where he remained for three months. 345. Damon’s mother recalls that she and Damon were ordered to and paid to Juvenile Probation roughly $200 for the cost of supervision, placement, and court fees.
Paul Morgan Jr. 346. Paul Morgan Jr., now eighteen years old, is the son of Tracy Stair and Paul
Morgan of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 347. In 2005, Paul was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for possession of a
controlled substance. Paul, unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Paul that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Paul of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 348. Paul was placed in PA Child Care for three days. After he was released, he was put on probation for six months.
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349. Tracy paid Juvenile Probation $35 per month during this six-month period to cover the cost of Paul’s probation.
350. In 2007, Paul was again adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on charges of harassment and disorderly conduct. Again, Paul was unrepresented by counsel and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Paul that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Paul of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
351. Ciavarella placed Paul at Camp Adams for three months and placed him on probation for six months following his release.
352. At the time of these events, Paul’s father had been paying to Tracy $46 per week in child support. These payments were redirected to Juvenile Probation during the three months Paul was detained at Camp Adams. Tracy and Paul paid Juvenile Probation $35 per month while he was on probation.
Fred Odom Jr. and his mother, Sherrell Odom 353. Fred Odom Jr., now eighteen years old, is the son of Sherrell Odom of
Mountain Top, Pennsylvania.
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354. In 2003, when he was thirteen years old, Fred was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for disorderly conduct and simple assault. Fred’s mother had called the police to scare Fred when he was acting out at home. Against his mother’s wishes, the police arrested Fred and filed charges. Fred was detained at PA Child Care from November 7, 2003 until his adjudicatory hearing on November 26, 2003. Fred entered a guilty plea during his twominute hearing, as he and his mother believed that the judge would simply order Fred to attend counseling. Fred was unrepresented. Ciavarella did not inform Fred that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Fred of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty.
355. Although Fred had no prior record, Ciavarella placed him at Camp Adams for three months, from November 26, 2003 until March 3, 2004.
356. Fred was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. His mother was ordered to pay $480 a month via garnishment to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of Fred’s placement. She also paid for a court-ordered psychological evaluation. Both Fred and his mother have made payments for the cost of his probation. His mother had to withdraw funds from her
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401(k), incurring penalties and taxes for early withdrawal, in order to make ends meet. 357. As a result of his placement at Camp Adams, Fred had to repeat ninth grade. He was also initially not allowed to return to his local public high school. Fred has since obtained his GED and is pursuing post-secondary studies.
Steven Palchanis Jr., and his father, Steven Palchanis Sr. 358. Steven Palchanis Jr., now twenty-one years old, is the son of Steven
Palchanis Sr. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 359. In 2003, when Steven was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for criminal trespass. Unrepresented by counsel, Steven pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Steven that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Steven of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 360. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Steven was shackled and taken to PA Child Care, where he remained for three weeks before going to Camp Adams for ninety days. Following his release from placement, Steven was placed on
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probation for almost five years, until he paid off approximately $3,000 in restitution. 361. Steven and his parents were ordered to and paid monies to the court for his placement; the money was garnished from the paycheck of Steven’s father. Furthermore, they were required to pay various fees to Juvenile Probation while Steven was on probation. In total, they paid about $7,000.
Jamie Quinn 362. Jamie Quinn is an eighteen-year-old female who resides in Wyoming,
Pennsylvania. 363. In 2005, when she was fourteen years old, Jamie was charged with simple
assault and harassment after punching another girl. 364. During her hearing, Jamie was not represented by an attorney, as the intake
worker had told her she did not need one because the charges were minor. Ciavarella never informed Jamie of her right to an attorney or the consequences of waiving that right. Furthermore, Ciavarella never explained to Jamie her trial rights or what, specifically, she was charged with. 365. Jamie was initially told she would be placed in a detention center for three to six months, but she ended up staying in various facilities (PA Child Care, Vision Quest, and Bridgeview) for nearly a year.
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366. Jamie’s parents were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court, as well as costs to Juvenile Probation for Jamie’s placement.
367. Jamie’s detention had lasting and negative consequences to her, most distinctly illustrated by the many scars she bears from self-mutilation during her detention.
K.R., through and with his next friend and mother, T.S. 368. K.R, now seventeen years old, is the son of T.S. of Hanover Township,
Pennsylvania. 369. In 2007, when K.R. was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for disorderly conduct after getting into a fight on a school bus. Unrepresented by counsel, K.R. pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform K.R. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to K.R. of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 370. Ciavarella placed K.R. at Camp Adams from April to July 2007, and K.R. is still on probation. 371. K.R. was ordered to pay $30 per month to Juvenile Probation for every month he is on probation.
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David Rowlands and his mother, Mary Seville 372. David Rowlands, now eighteen years old, is the son of Mary Seville of
Laporte, Pennsylvania. 373. In October 2003, when David was twelve years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for harassment. Unrepresented by counsel, David pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform David that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to David of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 374. Ciavarella ordered David placed in PA Child Care. Over the course of the next two months, David was placed in PA Child Care, then moved to Camp Adams because of space constraints, and then moved back to PA Child Care. Within the two months, he was moved back and forth between PA Child Care and Camp Adams several times. 375. David and his mother were ordered to pay $35 per month to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of his placement and supervision.
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Michael S. Scarlato and his parents, Michael P. and Tina Scarlato 376. Michael S. Scarlato, now eighteen years old, is the son of Michael P. and
Tina Scarlato of Hazelton, Pennsylvania. 377. In November 2004, when Michael was fourteen years old, he was
adjudicated delinquent on a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia for bringing a pipe to school. Unrepresented by counsel, Michael made an admission. Ciavarella did not inform Michael that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Michael of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 378. Ciavarella placed Michael at Camp Adams. Over the next four years, Michael was in various court-ordered placements, including PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. 379. During that time, Michael’s parents were ordered to and paid approximately $2,500 to the court for Michael’s placements. Additionally, Michael has paid and continues to make payments to Juvenile Probation.
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A.S., through and with his next friend and father, G.S. 380. A.S., now fifteen years old, is the son of G.S. and K.S. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 381. In 2007, when he was fourteen years old, A.S. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for writing graffiti with a group of kids. A.S. was unrepresented when he pled guilty before Ciavarella. Ciavarella did not inform A.S. that he had a right to an attorney and that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to A.S. of waiving his right to counsel or of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 382. Ciavarella ordered that A.S. be placed in Camp Adams for ninety days. 383. A.S.’s parents were ordered to pay $140 per month to the court to defray the cost of his placement in Camp Adams; the monies were taken out of his father’s unemployment checks. A.S. himself was ordered to pay $30 a month when he was placed on probation after being released from Camp Adams.
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James Swartley 384. James Swartley, now nineteen years old, is the son of Amy Swartley of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 385. In 2005, when he was sixteen years old, James was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. James was placed at PA Child Care prior to his hearing. When he appeared before Ciavarella, James was unrepresented by counsel and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform James that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to James of waiving his right to counsel and of waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. 386. Ciavarella ordered that James return to PA Child Care. James was detained at PA Child Care for approximately eleven days before he was sent home and placed on probation. 387. Over the next two years, Ciavarella placed James in two separate facilities for allegedly violating a term of the probation he was still serving. In total, James spent more than a year in placement. 388. James’s mother’s wages were garnished while James was in placement; about $110 was deducted every two weeks. James’s father had paid $240
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per month in child support. The court redirected the child support payments to Juvenile Probation while James was in placement. Jessica Thurston and her mother, Barbara Thurston 389. Jessica Thurston, now twenty years old, is the daughter of Barbara Thurston of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 390. In 2003, when Jessica was fourteen years old, she was adjudicated delinquent for fighting and theft. Jessica appeared before Ciavarella without counsel and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform Jessica that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Barbara of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty. 391. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Jessica was placed in PA Child Care for approximately two weeks, and then she was placed at Camp Adams and another facility in Tioga County for five to six months. 392. Jessica’s mother was ordered to pay fees and costs to the court. Jessica was receiving Supplemental Security Income and her SSI check was garnished to offset the costs of supervision and placement.
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Michael Vitali 393. Michael Vitali, now twenty-two years old, is the son of Eugene and Joan
Vitali of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 394. In 2002, when Michael was fifteen years old, he was charged with assault.
At his adjudicatory hearing before Ciavarella, he was unrepresented by counsel. No colloquy was conducted on his waiver of counsel. Neither Michael nor his parents recall Michael being asked to plead guilty or not guilty, and neither remember Ciavarella explaining to Michael his rights. 395. Following that adjudication, Michael was placed in Camp Adams for three months. Later, he was in and out of various placements, including PA Child Care, for probation violations. He was not represented by counsel at the probation violation hearings. 396. As a result of his placements, both Michael and his parents received a bill from the court to cover the costs of his supervision and placement. They have paid over $2,000 to the court. 397. As a result of Michael’s time in placement, he struggled when he returned to school and opted to take the GED instead. Michael also suffered great psychological harm and was placed on a variety of medications while at KidsPeace that caused him to gain significant weight.
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Frank Weber and his mother Florence Myers 398. Frank Weber, now twenty-three years old, is the son of Florence Myers of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 399. In 1997, when he was thirteen years old, Frank was a passenger in a car
that was reported stolen; the driver of the car got into an accident. Frank was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on various charges related to this incident. Frank was unrepresented by counsel at the adjudicatory hearing. Ciavarella did not inform Frank that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if he could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to Frank of waiving his right to counsel. 400. Until Frank turned eighteen, he spent the majority of time in various courtordered placements including PA Child Care. These continued periods of placement resulted from violations of probation on the original charge when Frank was thirteen years old. He was not represented by an attorney at any of these violations hearings. 401. Frank’s father paid $400 a month in child support to Juvenile Probation for the cost of placement for the duration of the time that Frank was in placement.
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M.M.W., through and with her next friend and legal guardian, J.C. 402. M.M.W., now fourteen years of age, resides with her guardian J.C. in
Freedland, Pennsylvania. 403. When she was ten years old, M.M.W. was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella. Prior to appearing before Ciavarella, M.M.W. was taken by police to PA Child Care, where she was held for a week without a hearing. M.M.W. was unrepresented at her adjudicatory hearing. Ciavarella did not inform M.M.W. that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to M.M.W. of waiving her right to counsel. 404. M.M.W. returned to PA Child Care, where she spent approximately one month. She was on probation for a year after she was released from PA Child Care. 405. M.M.W.’s guardian had to pay at least $200 to the court.
John Ashford, Jr. and his mother, Donna Ashford 406. John Ashford, Jr., now twenty-one years of age, is the son of Donna
Ashford of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 407. In October 2005, John, then sixteen years old, and three of his friends were
charged with a misdemeanor for shooting some windows with a BB gun. Except for this charge, John has never been in trouble with the law.
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408. John was represented at his adjudicatory hearing before Ciavarella by a public defender. However, each time the public defender attempted to speak, Ciavarella cut her off. The homeowner whose windows were broken spoke on the boys’ behalf and asked Ciavarella not to send them away.
409. After adjudicating John delinquent, Ciavarella ordered that John be placed at Camp Adams, where he remained for ninety-seven days.
410. John’s parents were ordered to and paid monies to PA SCDU for John’s placement at Camp Adams. John and his parents also were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. In total, the family paid more than $5,000.
Christian Barnes and his father, Brian Barnes 411. Christian Barnes, now twenty-one years old, is the son of Brian Barnes of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 412. In 2006, when Christian was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for underage drinking and bringing a multi-tool to school on his keychain. Christian appeared before Ciavarella without counsel on the advice of the Juvenile Probation Officer that he would wait weeks to be appointed a public defender, during which time Christian would have to remain in detention. Christian pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Christian of the rights he would be giving
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up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Christian the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 413. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Christian was placed at Clearbrook rehabilitation facility for alcoholism treatment where he remained for six months. 414. During the time Christian was placed at Clearbrook, the domestic relations court ordered his father to pay $520 to cover the cost of his placement. He made two separate payments to the Luzerne County to pay the amount. 415. While Christian was on house arrest, his father was ordered to pay $20 per day, for six weeks, for use of the ankle monitor. Christian’s father was also ordered to pay an additional $3000 over the course of three years while Christian was on probation. These payments were also made to Luzerne County. Christian was also ordered to pay up to $1500 in restitution. 416. As a result of the incident and placement, Christian was expelled from school and was required to repeat tenth grade. Christian eventually returned to his school and graduated one year later than he should have had he not lost that time in placement. As a result of his adjudication, he has been unable to enlist in the military.
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Shane Bly, and his parents Kevin and Linda Bly 417. Shane Bly, now twenty years old, is the son of Kevin and Linda Bly of
Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania. 418. In May 2005, when Shane was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella. Represented by counsel, Shane pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Shane of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Shane the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 419. Upon advice of counsel, Shane requested a mental health evaluation. Ciavarella then ordered that Shane be placed at Camp Adams for three months and then placed on probation when he returned home. 420. In 2006, Shane appeared with an attorney before Ciavarella at another adjudication hearing on a separate charge. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Shane was placed at two other facilities for a total of six months. After being placed for six months, Shane was ordered to pay restitution and then was discharged from court supervision. 421. During the three months that Shane was in Camp Adams in 2005, the court garnished $85.38 per week from the paycheck of Shane’s father. Consequently, Shane’s parents had to take out loans to cover mortgage payments on their home. Shane’s parents were also required to pay $200
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for the mental health examination. The court also ordered Shane to pay $469 in restitution and $35 a month for six months to the court while he was on probation.
G.B., through and with his next friends and parents, P.P. and J.B. 422. G.B., now seventeen years old, is the son of P.P. and J.B. of Larksville,
Pennsylvania. 423. In 2005, when G.B. was fourteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a misdemeanor charge. When G.B. appeared before Ciavarella for the first time, his case had been transferred from Wayne County. G.B. was represented by a private attorney, but the attorney was not permitted to present any evidence as to G.B.’s mental capacity or learning disability. G.B. pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform G.B. of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to G.B. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 424. Upon adjudication, Ciavarella placed G.B. at PA Child Care, where he remained for a month. He was then placed in other facilities, including Western PA Child Care for four months. 425. G.B.’s mother received a notice ordering her to pay a lump sum of $500 for his placement. She was also ordered to pay $35 per month for the cost of
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his supervision on probation. She is currently making these monthly payments. Daryl Charles and his mother, Liza Charles 426. Daryl Charles, now twenty-years of age, is from Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He is the son of Liza Charles. 427. In October 2005, when he was seventeen years old, Daryl was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for shooting a BB gun out of a window one night. Represented by counsel, Daryl pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Daryl of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Daryl the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 428. Ciavarella ordered Daryl placed at Camp Adams, where he remained for twenty-seven days. After his release, Daryl was placed on probation. 429. Daryl paid $401.42 in fees and costs to the court between November 2005 and January 2006. William Clarke and his mother, Sharon Graaf 430. William Clarke, now twenty-three years old, is from Bear Creek Township, Pennsylvania. He is the son of Sharon Graaf.
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431. In March 2003, when he was seventeen years old, William was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a simple assault charge for getting into a fight. Prior to his hearing, William was taken to Northwest Academy and then transferred to PA Child Care. William was represented by counsel when he appeared before Ciavarella. However, the attorney was not allowed to speak. Ciavarella read the charge and then said “you’re done.” William does not recall actually pleading guilty.
432. Upon Ciavarella’s order, William spent three months at PA Child Care and three months at another facility. He was sent home in September 2003 and placed on probation for six months.
433. William’s parents were ordered to and paid money to the court for William’s placements. William was ordered to and paid restitution in the amount of $3,000.
Glenn Cooper and his mother, Karen Cooper 434. Glenn Cooper, now twenty-one years old, is the son of Karen and David
Cooper of Meshoppen, Pennsylvania. 435. In 2003, when he was fifteen years old, Glenn was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for simple assault. Glenn pled not guilty. Glenn was represented by private counsel at his hearing; however, Ciavarella would not permit his attorney to speak.
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436. Ciavarella initially placed Glenn at PA Child Care and subsequently placed him at several other facilities throughout the state.
437. Glenn’s parents were ordered to pay the costs of his placements in various facilities. To date, they have paid several hundred dollars, but they believe that they still owe approximately $1,000.
Richard Copeland II and his parents, Donna and Richard Copeland 438. Richard Copeland II, now twenty years old, is the son of Donna and
Richard Copeland of Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania. 439. In 2005, when he was sixteen years old, Richard was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella when he appeared with counsel at a hearing. Ciavarella asked Richard whether he was guilty, but did not explain the legal rights Richard would relinquish or the consequences he would experience by pleading guilty. Richard stated that he was not guilty. 440. Ciavarella then ordered that Richard be returned to PA Child Care, where Richard was placed prior to the hearing. Richard was kept at PA Child Care for approximately seventy-four days between August and October 2005. After returning home from PA Child Care, Richard was placed on probation.
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441. Soon after Richard returned home, his probation officer accused him of violating his curfew. As punishment for the alleged curfew violation, Richard was sent to a facility for two weekends.
442. Richard’s parents were ordered to and paid $2,700 to Juvenile Probation to cover the costs of Richard’s placements. Richard was ordered to and is paying $35 per month to cover the cost of his probation. In addition, Richard was ordered to pay $30,000 for restitution. Richard and his parents have paid approximately $275 per month for restitution over the past four years.
Chad Derhammer 443. Chad Derhammer, now twenty-three years old, is the son of Tammy Ruger
of Dallas, Pennsylvania. 444. In November 2003, when Chad was seventeen years old, he and three other
boys from his high school were charged with simple assault and harassment for an incident of hazing. Although all the boys were represented by counsel at the adjudicatory hearing, none of the lawyers were permitted to speak and neither were the boys’ parents. Chad pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Chad of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Chad the potential consequences of pleading guilty.
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445. Although Chad had no prior contact with the juvenile delinquency system, Ciavarella placed him in PA Child Care, where he remained for two weeks.
446. Chad and his family were ordered to pay fees, costs, and restitution to the court. His parents were also ordered to pay Juvenile Probation the cost of his placement in PA Child Care as well as his supervision while on probation.
A.D., through and with her mother and next friend, J.E. 447. A.D., now age seventeen years old, is the daughter of J.E. of Plymouth,
Pennsylvania. 448. On or about 2004, at age thirteen, A.D. was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella on various charges related to being a passenger in the car of a friend that belonged to the friend’s grandmother. At the hearing, A.D. was represented by a private attorney and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform A.D. of the rights she would be giving up if she pled guilty, nor did he explain to A.D. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 449. Upon Ciavarella’s order, A.D. spent about six hours at PA Child Care and was then placed on probation for three months. 450. A.D. and her family were ordered to and paid $420 in supervision fees.
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451. At age sixteen, A.D. was again adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella on a charge of terroristic threats for something she said at school. A.D. appeared without counsel at this hearing. A.D. tried to tell her side of the story and to present letters from teachers in her support. She pled guilty. Ciavarella did not inform A.D. that she had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney if she could not afford one. Nor did Ciavarella explain the potential consequences to A.D. of waiving her right to counsel and of waiving her right to trial by pleading guilty.
452. A.D. was sent to Camp Adams for three months. A.D.’s mother’s wages were garnished. She paid about $300 to Juvenile Probation for the cost of placement.
Matthew Dougherty 453. Matthew Dougherty, now twenty-one years old, is the son of Joelle
Dougherty of Pittston, Pennsylvania. 454. In May 2006, when he was eighteen years old, Matthew was adjudicated
delinquent for graffiti writing, stemming from an incident that allegedly occurred before Matthew turned eighteen. 455. Matthew appeared with private counsel before Ciavarella. Matthew’s mother recalls that the attorney said very little during the hearing and that there was no opportunity to contest the charges. Matthew did not plead
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guilty or make an admission on the record. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy informing Matthew of his right to go to trial or the potential consequences of pleading guilty. Nevertheless, Ciavarella adjudicated him delinquent. 456. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Matthew was placed at Camp Adams for approximately six weeks. 457. Matthew and his mother were ordered to and paid various fees and costs to the Juvenile Probation department.
E.E., through and with her next friend and mother, H.E. 458. E.E., now fourteen years old, is the daughter of H.E. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 459. In 2007, when she was thirteen years old, E.E. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on charges of disorderly conduct and harassment after getting in a fight on a school bus on her way to elementary school. E.E. was represented by a public defender. Ciavarella presumed E.E. was guilty and asked her why she did it. When E.E. did not respond, but instead started crying, Ciavarella told her that he was going to send her to Camp Adams for three months because she would not respond to his questions. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy informing E.E. of her right to go to trial or the potential consequences of pleading guilty.
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460. Even though this was E.E.’s first offense, Ciavarella ordered her placed at Camp Adams for three months. Though E.E. is in special education and has an IEP, she did not receive any special education services while at Camp Adams.
461. H.E. was charged a total of $450 for psychological testing and maintenance fees. She still owes $350.
K.E., through and with her next friend and mother, H.E. 462. K.E., now fifteen years old, is the daughter of H.E. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 463. In 2007, when she was fourteen years old, K.E. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on charges of criminal trespass, simple assault, and harassment after getting into a fight on school grounds. K.E. was represented by a public defender. K.E. pled guilty. H.E. recalls Ciavarella asking questions when K.E. pled guilty, but he asked them so quickly that K.E. could not understand what he was asking. 464. Even though this was K.E.’s first offense, Ciavarella ordered her placed at Camp Adams for three months, followed by three months of probation. She was not allowed to return to public school after her placement. 465. H.E. was charged $310 in maintenance fees and for psychological evaluations. She still owes this money.
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L.E., through and with his next friend and mother, H.E. 466. L.E., now seventeen years old, is the son of H.E. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 467. In 2007, when he was fifteen years old, L.E. was adjudicated delinquent by
Ciavarella for a giving false identification to a police officer. L.E. was represented by a public defender and put on probation. When he missed curfew a couple of times, he was charged with violating his probation. At the hearing, Ciavarella automatically treated him as guilty. H.E. does not recall if L.E. pled guilty. 468. Ciavarella ordered that L.E. be placed in Camp Adams for three months. L.E. was sent to PA Child Care for a week or two before going to Camp Adams. He was placed on probation upon his release from Camp Adams. 469. In May 2008, when L.E. was sixteen years old, L.E. was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for simple assault and theft for allegedly hitting a child and taking his basketball. H.E. does not recall L.E. pleading guilty to the charges or Ciavarella conducting a colloquy informing L.E. of his right to go to trial or the potential consequences of pleading guilty. Nevertheless, Ciavarella adjudicated him delinquent. 470. L.E. was sentenced to one to three years in placement. He expects to be released in June 2009.
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471. L.E. had to pay money upon his release from Camp Adams. A portion of H.E.’s child support payments also paid for his subsequent placement.
A.F. and L.F., through and with their mother and next friend, M.F. 472. A.F., seventeen years old, and her sister, L.F., nineteen years old, reside
with their mother, M.F., in Drums, Pennsylvania. 473. In July 2007, A.F., then sixteen years old, and L.F., then seventeen years
old, were adjudicated by Ciavarella on charges of criminal mischief. Although A.F. and L.F. were represented by counsel, neither their attorney nor their mother was allowed to say anything at the adjudicatory hearing. A.F. and L.F. both pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform A.F. and L.F. of the rights they would be giving up if they pled guilty, nor did he explain to A.F. and L.F. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 474. Ciavarella committed A.F. and L.F. to Camp Adams; they remained there from July 24, 2007 through October 23, 2007. When they returned home, they were placed on probation. 475. A.F., L.F., and their mother were ordered to and paid approximately $7500 in restitution and $2,325.57 in various fees and costs to the court. Their mother also paid $1,000 to retain a private attorney.
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J.D.F., through and with his next friend and mother, M.W. 476. J.D.F., now sixteen years old, is the son of M.W of Exeter, Pennsylvania. 477. In 2006, J.D.F. was adjudicated delinquent in Montgomery County and his
case was transferred to Luzerne County. Ciavarella placed him in PA Child Care for over two years. 478. The county sought payment from M.W. to cover the costs of her son’s placement. However, because she is unemployed, M.W. has not been able to make any payment. 479. J.D.F. has now been in placement for almost three years.
J.F., through and with his next friend and mother, A.I.K. 480. J.F., now fourteen, is the son of A.I.K. of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania. 481. In 2008, J.F. was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella. J.F. was
represented by private counsel who entered a guilty plea on J.F.’s behalf. J.F. and his mother told the attorney that J.F. would not plead guilty, especially after they were informed by a representative of the District Attorney that the only witness recanted his statement. Private counsel told J.F. and his mother not to speak in court. Ciavarella did not explain to J.F. the consequences of pleading guilty or his right to a trial. 482. J.F. was placed on probation and house arrest for eight months.
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483. J.F. and his mother were ordered to and paid to Juvenile Probation about $375 for supervision fees. J.F.’s mother still owes $200 for the cost of a court-ordered evaluation completed by Dr. Vita.
Alexandra Fahey 484. Alexandra Fahey, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Robert II and
Maria Fahey of Pittston, Pennsylvania. 485. In 2004, when she was fourteen years old, Alexandra was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for assaulting a police officer who had detained her. Alexandra, who was represented by a private attorney at the hearing, pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Alexandra of the rights she would be giving up if she pled guilty, nor did he explain to Alexandra the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 486. Despite having no prior record, Alexandra was placed on house arrest and was made to wear an ankle bracelet for three months. She was subsequently on probation for six months. 487. Alexandra’s family was ordered to and paid costs to Juvenile Probation during both her house arrest and her probation.
L.H., through and with her next friend and mother, J.M. 488. L.H., now sixteen, is the daughter of J.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
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489. When she was fifteen, L.H. was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella for disorderly conduct after she was in an argument in school that escalated. Although L.H. was represented by the public defender, she did not understand what was going on at the hearing or what her rights were. L.H. and her mother are not sure if she pled guilty.
490. Upon Ciavarella’s order, L.H. was shackled and sent to Camp Adams, where she remained committed from August to November 2007.
491. Juvenile Probation garnished J.M.’s Supplemental Security Income for the cost of placement; to the best of her recollection this totaled more than $2,000. L.H. and her mother were also ordered to and paid about $300 in fees to Juvenile Probation.
Michael Haines and his mother, Barbara Haines 492. Michael Haines is nineteen years old and is the son of Barbara Haines of
Dallas, Pennsylvania. 493. In July 2007, when he was seventeen, Michael was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella on a theft charge for using a snow board that was on a rack outside of a ski lodge. Michael appeared with an attorney, but neither his lawyer nor his mother was allowed to speak. Michael pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Michael of the rights he
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would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Michael the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 494. Michael was ordered to Camp Adams for thirty days. 495. Michael’s mother paid approximately $400 to Juvenile Probation for the placement. Michael and his mother were ordered to and are still paying fees and costs to Juvenile Probation; they estimate that to date they have paid $630.
Tiffany Harrison and her mother, Bernadette Harrison 496. Tiffany Harrison, now twenty years old, is the daughter of Bernadette
Harrison of Pittston, Pennsylvania. 497. In 2005, when she was fifteen years old, Tiffany was accused of biting a
boy in a scuffle after school and was charged with simple assault. 498. Tiffany was represented by a public defender at her hearing. While she
intended to plead not guilty, the public defender entered a guilty plea. Tiffany’s mother does not recall Ciavarella ever informing Tiffany of her rights during the hearing or the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 499. Despite having no prior record, Tiffany was adjudicated delinquent and led out of the courtroom in shackles. Ciavarella sentenced her to six months of probation, during which she reported to a probation officer at school and
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had counseling sessions at home two to three times every week as part of a forensic program. 500. Tiffany’s mother was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court and Juvenile Probation. She was also ordered to and paid additional costs for the forensic program. 501. Tiffany’s mother believes that Tiffany, who has both ADHD and dyslexia, was unable to get into a private school for children with learning disabilities because of her juvenile record.
Edward Kane Jr. 502. Edward Kane Jr., now twenty-two years old, is the grandson of Joanne
Golden of Swoyersville, Pennsylvania. 503. In 2003, when Edward was sixteen years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent on a misdemeanor charge by Ciavarella. Edward was represented by a public defender. The youth who pressed a simple assault charge against Edward did not appear, so that charge was dismissed. A second charge of criminal trespass was reduced to a misdemeanor. Ciavarella also told Edward that he had an unpaid fine. Edward does not recall pleading guilty to any charge. 504. Ciavarella sent Edward to Camp Adams for ninety days and ordered Edward to pay the unpaid fine. Edward’s grandmother immediately paid
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the fine on Edward’s behalf. Edward was put on probation after his release. 505. In spring 2003, two or three weeks after his release from Camp Adams, Edward was picked up by his probation officer and taken to PA Child Care. He was transferred among three different facilities, including PA Child Care, for three to four weeks before having a hearing. 506. When Edward appeared before Ciavarella for his probation violation hearing, he did not have a lawyer, and no one advised him that he should have an attorney. Ciavarella remanded Edward to Camp Adams for six months based on an accusation that Edward had been drinking while on probation. 507. In 2004, Edward was again placed in PA Child Care due to a probation violation. 508. Within a month of being placed there, he had a hearing before Ciavarella. He was not represented by counsel at that hearing, nor did anyone advise him that he should have an attorney. Ciavarella issued an order placing Edward at Northwestern Boot Camp. Before Edward left the courthouse that day, a probation officer spoke with Edward’s mother about his lack of representation in the hearing. Edward had another hearing before Ciavarella that same day. At the later hearing, the probation officer stated
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that Edward was entitled to have a lawyer represent him and that the earlier hearing should be postponed until Edward had a lawyer. Ciavarella vacated the order placing Edward at Northwestern Boot Camp and scheduled another hearing. Edward was sent back to PA Child Care. 509. A few weeks later, Edward appeared before Ciavarella again and was represented by private counsel. Edward was placed in PA Child Care for another month and a half and then sent to Manose House for six months. Edward was released from Manose House in October 2004. 510. Edward, his parents, and his grandmother were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court. Edward believes that his parents each still owe approximately $400 to $500. Edward was ordered to pay more than $750 to Juvenile Probation in supervision fees, processing fees, court costs, and fines. He was also ordered to pay $535.50 to Juvenile Probation in restitution fees.
Brianna Kee 511. Brianna Kee, age eighteen, is the daughter of Cheral and Talif Thomas of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 512. In 2007, when Brianna was seventeen years old, she and two other children
were adjudicated delinquent on criminal trespass and misdemeanor theft charges for going into an unlocked, empty building.
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513. By the time Brianna appeared with an attorney before Ciavarella, the two other children had already been adjudicated and received their dispositions – one was sent to Camp Adams, the other was put on a work program. When Brianna’s attorney addressed Ciavarella, Ciavarella asked and was told by courtroom personnel what disposition the two other children received. Ciavarella immediately ordered that Brianna be placed at Camp Adams, where she remained for three months, from September 5 through November 27, 2007.
514. Brianna and her mother do not recall that Brianna actually pled guilty before Ciavarella. Ciavarella never explained to Brianna her rights or the consequences of pleading guilty.
515. Brianna and her parents were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court; the court garnished the paychecks of both of Brianna’s parents.
Matthew Kopetchny 516. Matthew Kopetchny is the twenty-year-old son of Angelique Ronchetti of
Kingston, Pennsylvania. 517. In 2005, when he was sixteen years old, Matthew was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for shoplifting videos and video games. Matthew appeared with an attorney before Ciavarella and pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Matthew of the rights he would be giving
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up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Matthew the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 518. Matthew was initially placed on house arrest, but he violated the terms. When he appeared before Ciavarella for a probation violation hearing at which he was not represented by an attorney, Ciavarella ordered Matthew placed at PA Child Care, where he remained for three months before being sent to another facility for approximately one year. 519. Mathew’s family was ordered to and paid monies to Juvenile Probation for his placements. In addition, Matthew and his mother paid $300 in fees and costs to Juvenile Probation.
Magee Mott 520. Magee Mott, now twenty-three, is the daughter of Bill and Leann Mott of
Pittston, Pennsylvania. 521. In 2002, when Magee was seventeen years old, she was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella for drug possession. 522. Magee was represented by the public defender at her adjudication hearing.
She believes she might have pled guilty, but she does not recall ever being told of the consequences of pleading guilty or her right to a trial. 523. Magee was placed at PA Child Care for a few days and then ordered to spend ten months at another facility.
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524. Until Magee turned eighteen, she spent most of her time in placement, including three of four times at PA Child Care. These placements were ordered as a result of probation violations, such as curfew violations and running away.
525. Magee was never represented by an attorney at any of the probation violation hearings. She was never informed of her right to counsel or the consequences of waiving that right.
526. Magee’s parents believe that during the course of Magee’s court-ordered placement, they paid several thousand dollars to Juvenile Probation. Magee’s mother had her wages garnished. Magee’s father was jailed for failing to pay the monies to Juvenile Probation, and Magee’s mother had to pay $1,200 to bail him out. Magee believes she still owes money to Juvenile Probation and that her credit report now shows this debt.
G.M., through and with his mother and next friend, F.M. 527. G.M., now age fifteen, is the son of F.M. of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 528. In 2008, when G.M. was fourteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for breaking into and entering the home of a family member. Prior to his hearing, G.M. was detained. When he appeared before Ciavarella, he did not have an attorney. Ciavarella did not inform G.M. that he had a right to an attorney or that the court would appoint an attorney
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if he could not afford one. G.M.’s mother left the courtroom and searched the building to try to get an attorney to represent G.M. In the middle of the hearing, an attorney came up to represent G.M. Even though the family member did not want to press charges against G.M. and it was G.M.’s first offense, G.M. pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform G.M. of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to G.M. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 529. G.M. was placed for about one month at PA Child Care, one month at Western PA Child Care, and two months at Camp Adams. G.M. is still on probation. 530. While G.M. was in placement, the court garnished his disability checks. G.M.’s mother still owes costs and fees to the court.
Sarah Myers and Florence Myers 531. Sarah Myers, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Florence Myers of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 532. In 2003, when Sarah was thirteen years old, she was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for taking a bike and change from abandoned cars. 533. Prior to appearing before Ciavarella, Sarah was arrested and taken to PA
Child Care. Her mother was not permitted to see her despite her requests.
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534. When they appeared in court before Ciavarella, Sarah’s mother requested an attorney for her daughter. She was told that a particular public defender would represent Sarah. Her mother asked that another attorney be appointed because that attorney had represented Sarah’s father in a protection-from-abuse proceeding in which Sarah’s mother was the petitioner. This request was refused.
535. At this hearing, Sarah told her public defender that she would not plead guilty because she did not commit the crimes of which she was accused. Her public defender told her that Ciavarella would not agree to that and would send her away. Ciavarella adjudicated Sarah delinquent, but Sarah is not sure if she pled guilty or not.
536. Upon Ciavarella’s order, Sarah was returned to PA Child Care and was then sent to Camp Adams for about ninety days.
537. When Sarah finally returned home from Camp Adams, she was extremely angry. She began cutting herself and was hospitalized. Due to these issues, Sarah was charged with a probation violation. Sarah’s mother does not recall having counsel at that hearing despite her requests.
538. Pursuant to Ciavarella’s orders, Sarah was placed in various facilities including PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care.
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539. Since leaving placement, Sarah has been in and out of hospitals because of her mental health disorders.
540. The money that Sarah’s father paid to her mother for child support went instead to Juvenile Probation for the cost of Sarah’s placements. Sarah’s mother believes that Sarah’s Supplemental Security Income check was also directed to Juvenile Probation for the cost of the placements.
Krystal Pope 541. Krystal Pope, now nineteen years old, resides in Kingston, Pennsylvania. 542. In 2006, when she was seventeen years old, Krystal was adjudicated
delinquent for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. At the adjudication hearing, Krystal was represented by a public defender and she pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Krystal of the rights she would be giving up if she pled guilty, nor did he explain to Krystal the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 543. Despite having no prior record, Krystal was placed in the Youth Services Agency at Wind Gap for three months. Following her release, Krystal was placed on probation for six months. 544. Krystal and her mother were ordered to and paid approximately $500 in various costs and fees to Juvenile Probation.
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Lisa Scarbrough and her mother, Laurie Scarbrough 545. Lisa Scarbrough is currently a twenty-one year old college student. She is
the daughter of Laurie Scarbrough of Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. 546. In 2003, Lisa, then sixteen, was arrested on a charge of making terroristic
threats. When Lisa was arrested, the officers took her to PA Child Care, where she remained for six days – including Thanksgiving weekend – without a hearing. Lisa had no prior contact with law enforcement. 547. On December 1, 2003, Lisa appeared before Ciavarella. Lisa, who was represented by counsel, brought several witnesses to testify on her behalf at the hearing; however, Ciavarella did not allow them to speak. Lisa’s principal, however, was permitted to testify on behalf of the state. 548. Ciavarella placed Lisa at Camp Adams for an indefinite period; she stayed there for nine days. 549. Lisa and her parents were ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court.
Marshonda Seward 550. Marshonda Seward, now nineteen years old, is the daughter of Olanda
Carter of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 551. In 2006, when she was sixteen years old, Marshonda was adjudicated
delinquent on an assault charge that arose out of a neighborhood fight. At the adjudication hearing, Marshonda was represented by a public defender.
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Marshonda never entered a guilty plea, but she and all the other children involved in the fight were adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella. 552. Marshonda was placed at Camp Adams for three months, after which she was sent home and placed on probation for six months. 553. Marshonda’s family was ordered to and paid fees and costs to the court, as well as $30 monthly to Juvenile Probation during her six months of probation.
J.S., through and with his next friend and mother C.S. 554. J.S. is fifteen years old and resides with his mother C.S. in Plymouth,
Pennsylvania. 555. In March of 2007, when he was thirteen years old, J.S. was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella on charges of burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and criminal conspiracy. 556. When J.S. appeared before Ciavarella, a public defender with whom J.S. had not previously spoken represented J.S. Ciavarella adjudicated J.S. delinquent after J.S. admitted to the charges. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform J.S. of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to J.S. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 557. Ciavarella ordered J.S. into placement at Camp Adams, where he remained for four months.
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558. J.S.’s Access Card was taken away from him and he was removed from his mother’s food stamps. His mother received approximately $130 less a month in food stamps. J.S. is currently back on food stamps, but his Access Card has not been returned to him.
559. J.S. worked at Camp Adams during his time there; the money he earned there will go towards paying his probation costs.
Chad Uca 560. Chad Uca, now eighteen years old, is the son of Ruby Uca of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania. 561. In 2005, when Chad was fifteen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent
on a simple assault charge for pushing a fellow student who was bothering a classmate. At the brief hearing, Chad was represented by a public defender who spoke very little. Ciavarella did not permit anyone involved, including the victim, to speak. Chad pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform Chad of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to Chad the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 562. Chad was ordered to Camp Adams, where he remained for more than ninety days.
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563. Chad and Chad’s mother were ordered to pay monies to the court to cover various costs and fees, including the cost of Chad’s placement. Over the course of six to nine months, Chad’s mother paid $600 to $700.
W.U., through and with his next friend and mother, D.S. 564. W.U., now fifteen years old, is the son of D.S. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 565. In 2007, when he was fourteen years old, W.U. was adjudicated delinquent
by Ciavarella for aggravated assault. At the adjudication hearing, W.U. was represented by a private attorney and initially pled not guilty. Ciavarella pressured W.U. for an admission of guilt, and W.U. ultimately pled guilty. Ciavarella did not conduct a colloquy to inform W.U. of the rights he would be giving up if he pled guilty, nor did he explain to W.U. the potential consequences of pleading guilty. 566. W.U. was placed on indefinite probation after the hearing, but he was finally taken off probation after six months. 567. During the six months of probation, D.S. was ordered to and paid $35 monthly to Juvenile Probation. Furthermore, she was ordered to and paid approximately $110 in initial court fees and costs after the hearing.
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B.R.W., through and with his next friends and parents, C.W. and S.W. 568. B.R.W. is the fifteen-year-old son of C.W. and S.W. of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. 569. On March 21, 2006, B.R.W., then thirteen years old, was adjudicated
delinquent by Ciavarella. B.R.W., who denied the charge, was represented by private counsel. While the complaining witness was allowed to testify, B.R.W.’s attorney was not allowed to speak or cross examine the witness. 570. At the end of a “trial” that took less than three minutes, B.R.W. was handcuffed and shackled and placed at PA Child Care, where he remained until April 17, 2006. 571. When he returned home, B.R.W. was placed on intensive probation. B.R.W. remained on probation until October 2, 2006, when probation recommended that B.R.W.’s probation be terminated because he had complied with all the terms and had no further violations. 572. B.R.W. and his parents C.W. and S.W. were ordered to and have paid approximately $870 in costs and fees to the court.
B. SECRET AGREEMENTS AND CONSTRUCTION OF DETENTION FACILITIES
573. Beginning in June 2000, Ciavarella, in his administrative capacity as a juvenile court judge, and defendant Powell, an attorney in Luzerne County,
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began discussions about constructing a new juvenile detention facility in Luzerne County. Powell was interested in constructing such a facility. Ciavarella introduced Powell to his friend, defendant Mericle, the owner of defendant Mericle Construction. Together, Powell and Mericle worked to locate land for the construction of such a facility. 574. Powell and defendant Zappala, doing business as defendant PA Child Care, acquired land in Luzerne County. They then entered into an agreement with Mericle and Mericle Construction to build a juvenile detention facility, and Mericle and Mericle Construction controlled the building of the facility. 575. In July 2001, PA Child Care sent Luzerne County an unsolicited proposal to build a juvenile detention facility in Pittston Township and to lease the facility to the county for $37 million over 30 years. 576. Specifically, on or about January 29, 2002, Conahan signed a secret “Placement Guarantee Agreement” between PA Child Care and the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County to house juvenile offenders at the PA Child Care facility. Under this agreement, the court would pay Child Care an annual sum of $1,314,000. At the time, Conahan, as President Judge of Luzerne County, oversaw the administration of the court and its departments. Conahan also had final decision-making authority with
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regard to defendant Luzerne County’s funding of the county-run River Street juvenile detention center (“River Street facility”). 577. In October 2002, Conahan, acting in his administrative role as President Judge, announced that judges would no longer send youth to the River Street facility. Ciavarella and Conahan publicly maintained that conditions there were deplorable. In November 2002, however, the state Department of Public Welfare deemed the River Street facility “safe and satisfactory” to house juveniles. The state Labor and Industry Department and the Wilkes-Barre Health Department also determined that the building met applicable standards. 578. In December 2002, Conahan, acting in his administrative role as President Judge and with his authority to make final decisions with regard to defendant Luzerne County’s funding of the River Street facility, took official steps to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the River Street facility, effectively closing the county-run detention center. The closing of this detention center helped ensure that youth in Luzerne County would be detained at the detention facility being built by Mericle and PA Child Care.
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579. In or before January 2003, defendants agreed that Powell and Mericle would pay $997,600 to Ciavarella and Conahan for their roles in facilitating the construction of the PA Child Care facility.
580. This payment was concealed through a series of financial transactions as described in paragraphs 617 through 623, below.
581. In February 2003, the PA Child Care facility opened in Pittston. Luzerne County commissioners agreed to allow county juvenile offenders to be housed in the facility. However, as of March 2003, Luzerne County commissioners were continuing to pursue plans to construct a new countyrun juvenile detention facility, alleging that Powell, Zappala, and PA Child Care wanted to charge the county too much. By 2004, newly-elected majority commissioners put these construction plans on hold.
582. Due to the success of the PA Child Care facility, Powell and Zappala, doing business as defendant Western PA Child Care, constructed a juvenile detention facility in Butler County, Pennsylvania. Powell and Zappala again contracted with Mericle and Mericle Construction to build the Western PA Child Care facility, and Mericle and Mericle Construction again controlled the building of the facility. Conahan and Ciavarella were financially rewarded upon the completion of the facility in July 2005, when
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they received a $1,000,000 payment from Powell through defendant Pinnacle Group. 583. This payment, too, was concealed as described in paragraphs 624 and 625, below. 584. Powell and Zappala also built an addition to the PA Child Care detention facility in Luzerne County, again contracting with Mericle and Mericle Construction. When the addition was completed in February 2006, Powell and Mericle made another payment, this time of $150,000, to Conahan and Ciavarella through defendant Pinnacle Group. The payment was concealed as described in paragraphs 626 and 627, below. 585. In addition to these payments, between February 2003 and January 1, 2007, Powell made hundreds of thousands of dollars in concealed payments to Ciavarella and Conahan for their past and future acts relating to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. These payments were made through Pinnacle Group, as described in paragraphs 628 through 631, below. 586. In sum, Ciavarella and Conahan, in their administrative roles as judges in Luzerne County, caused Luzerne County to contract with PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. Conahan and Ciavarella assisted PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care to secure agreements with Luzerne County worth tens of millions of dollars over a period of years for the
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placement of juvenile offenders in the PA Child Care Facility, including an agreement in late 2004 worth approximately $58,000,000. 587. Through the conspiracy described above, Conahan and Ciavarella received approximately $2.6 million in return.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSPIRACY TO DENY CLASS MEMBERS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
588. For defendants’ scheme to succeed, Ciavarella and Conahan had to ensure that youth were placed at the facilities and that youth were not aware of Ciavarella’s or Conahan’s financial stake in their placement. All defendants therefore acted in concert to conceal and disguise the existence, nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the money paid to Ciavarella and Conahan.
589. In February 2003, Ciavarella began placing plaintiff youth in the PA Child Care facility.
590. Ciavarella never informed plaintiffs that he had done business with PA Child Care or that he had a pecuniary interest in ensuring that youth were placed in PA Child Care. Throughout the relevant time period, Ciavarella continued to receive payments from Powell, Mericle and PA Child Care. Ciavarella and Conahan concealed their financial relationship with PA Child Care from plaintiffs by, for example, filing materially false annual
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statements of financial interest with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, as described below in paragraphs 632 through 635. 591. After the construction of PA Child Care, defendants’ ability to maintain their association and continue their ongoing conspiracy depended on the continued profitability and viability of this private, for-profit facility. 592. The consistent placement of youth at PA Child Care facilitated the subsequent construction of Western PA Child Care and the expansion of PA Child Care, directly benefiting PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, and their owners and operators, as well as the contractor, Mericle, and Mericle Construction. All defendants had a financial interest in placing juveniles in PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. 593. If youth from Luzerne County were not placed in PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care, the County would have discontinued contracting with PA Child Care and its private operators. The owners and operators received a per diem reimbursement from the county for every child placed in the facilities. 594. Ciavarella and Conahan received $997,600 from and through the other defendants for facilitating the construction of PA Child Care. Upon the completion of Western PA Child Care and of the PA Child Care addition, Ciavarella and Conahan received $1,000,000 and $150,000, respectively.
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In addition to these payments, between February 2003 and January 1, 2007, Powell made hundreds of thousands of dollars in concealed payments to Ciavarella and Conahan for their past and future acts relating to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. These payments were made through Pinnacle Group. In total, Ciavarella and Conahan received more than $2.6 million in payments. These payments were directly tied to the success of the detention facilities. 595. Because Ciavarella had a concealed financial interest in placing youth in detention, the adjudication of every juvenile adjudicated delinquent or referred for placement by him from February 2003 through May 2008 was tainted. Each adjudication and placement occurred in violation of each child’s constitutional right to be adjudicated by an impartial tribunal. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). Moreover, any order by Ciavarella concerning the disposition of a youth during that time period, even if the youth had been adjudicated delinquent prior to 2003 or by a different judge, was also tainted and violative of the youth’s constitutional right to appear before an impartial tribunal. 596. From the opening of PA Child Care in February 2003 until May 23, 2008 (when Ciavarella ceased hearing juvenile cases), Ciavarella took steps to
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ensure that youth were routinely placed in detention, even in situations where detention was plainly not appropriate or over the objection of some probation officers. These steps were taken as part of the conspiracy with all other defendants. 597. The defendants had an interest in increasing overall adjudications and placements, not just adjudications that resulted in placements at PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. Youth who were adjudicated delinquent and placed at other facilities because of a lack of available space at PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care were transferred into PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care when space opened at PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care. Youth were also often placed in PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care while they were awaiting placement in a longerterm placement facility. 598. To increase the number of out-of-home placements of youth adjudicated delinquent, Ciavarella exerted pressure on Luzerne County probation staff to recommend detention of juveniles even when detention was not appropriate. Ciavarella at times pressured probation officers to change recommendations of release to recommendations of detention. Even when probation officers did not recommend detention, Ciavarella often ordered youth detained.
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599. In spite of the clear mandate from the United States Supreme Court and Ciavarella’s own pledge, the defendants’ interest in this conspiracy also led Ciavarella to regularly deny, for a period of years, many of the plaintiff youth, specifically Subclass A1, herein represented by named plaintiffs H.T., B.W., Kevin Williamson, M.Y., R.S. and S.S., their most basic constitutional rights. These rights include the right to appear before an impartial tribunal, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to be advised of the consequences of waiving counsel or entering a guilty plea such that waivers and pleas are knowing, intelligent and voluntary, as required by due process.
600. The United States Constitution requires that valid guilty pleas must be knowing and voluntary because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers. It has been settled for more than forty years that these rights apply to youth in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 56. To enter into a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, a youth must be informed of and then must affirmatively state that he understands the consequences of pleading guilty and the rights he is giving up as a consequence thereof. He must also admit
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to each and every element of the offenses with which he is charged. The decision to plead guilty must be made freely and without threat or coercion. 601. As a regular matter, Ciavarella took no steps to ensure that Subclass A1 plaintiffs’ guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary as required. He regularly failed to inform youth of their right to a trial, their right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the government’s burden of proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. He also regularly failed to ask if youth understood they were giving up these rights before pleading guilty. Ciavarella did not confirm that youth understood the acts to which they were pleading guilty. In some cases, Ciavarella adjudicated youth delinquent without even inquiring as to the youth’s plea of guilt or innocence, and he then placed the youth in a detention facility. At other times, even if the youth pled not guilty, Ciavarella adjudicated the youth delinquent in a hearing lasting no more than a few minutes, with no trial or opportunity for the youth to speak on his or her own behalf or to present testimony or evidence. 602. In addition to Ciavarella’s obligation under the Constitution to accept only knowing and voluntary guilty pleas in the absence of trial, since 2005, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, through its rule making authority, has specifically required that juvenile court judges go through an eight question
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colloquy with any juvenile seeking to enter an admission (guilty plea) to a
charge of delinquency. Rule 407 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile
Court Procedure provides, in part, as follows:
A. Admissions. At any time after a petition is filed, the juvenile may tender an admission to the facts, adjudication of delinquency, and/or disposition.
1) Requirements. Before the court can accept an admission, the court shall determine that the admission is made voluntarily and knowingly. The court, at a minimum, shall ask questions to elicit the following information:
a) Does the juvenile understand the nature of the allegations to which he or she is admitting?
b) Is there a factual basis for the admission?
c) Does the juvenile understand that he or she has the right to a hearing before the judge?
d) Does the juvenile understand that he or she is presumed innocent until found delinquent?
e) Is the juvenile aware of the dispositions that could be imposed?
f) Is the juvenile aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such agreement?
g) Has the juvenile spoken with his or her attorney or waived the right to counsel in accordance with Rule 152?
h) Does the juvenile have any questions about admitting to the facts or delinquency based on the allegations?
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i) Has the juvenile had the opportunity to speak with a guardian about his or her decision? 603. Even when plaintiffs retained private counsel to represent them in their adjudicatory hearings before Ciavarella, Ciavarella regularly gave the privately retained counsel little or no opportunity to speak on behalf of their clients at the hearing. 604. These gross violations of the youth plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were part and parcel of the defendants’ scheme to ensure that youth were adjudicated delinquent and placed in detention, in furtherance of their scheme to line their own pockets through financial payments or kickbacks from other defendants named herein. Additionally, in furtherance of his scheme to deny children their constitutional right to counsel, Ciavarella directed Sandra Brulo, then Chief Juvenile Probation Officer for Luzerne County, to draft a waiver form which on its face failed to advise youth or their parents of the serious consequences of giving up their right to counsel. See Waiver of Counsel Form, attached hereto as Exhibit A. This form was routinely provided to children and their parents prior to entering Ciavarella’s courtroom by court personnel or other probation officers at Ciavarella’s direction, and also expressly allowed parents to waive counsel for their children. Ciavarella continued to direct the use of this form even after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s adoption of a rule in 2005 that only
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children may waive their right to counsel; parents may not waive a youth’s
right to counsel. See Pa. R. Juv. Ct. P. 152. The Comments to Rule 152
state:
It is recommended that, at a minimum, the court ask questions to elicit the following information in determining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel:
1) Whether the juvenile understands the right to be represented by counsel;
2) Whether the juvenile understands the nature of the allegations and the elements of each of those allegations;
3) Whether the juvenile is aware of the dispositions, community service, or fines that may be imposed by the court;
4) Whether the juvenile understands that if he or she waives the right to counsel, he or she will still be bound by all the normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be familiar with these rules;
5) Whether the juvenile understands that there are possible defenses to these allegations that counsel might be aware of, and if these defenses are not raised at the adjudicatory hearing, they may be lost permanently;
6) Whether the juvenile understands that, in addition to defenses, the juvenile has many rights that, if not timely asserted, may be lost permanently; and if errors occur and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised by the juvenile, these errors may be lost permanently;
7) Whether the juvenile knows the whereabouts of absent guardians and if they understand they should be present; and
8) Whether the juvenile has had the opportunity to consult with his or her guardian about this decision.
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605. Denying plaintiffs their fundamental right to counsel increased the number of youth adjudicated delinquent and placed in detention while minimizing the likelihood that the adjudications and placement decisions would be questioned or appealed.
606. Data from Luzerne County confirm that this strategy had an impact. According to data collected by the Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, from 2003 through 2006 (the most recent year for which data is available), the Luzerne County Juvenile Court handled 5,160 delinquency dispositions; twenty-two percent of these dispositions resulted in placement, almost double the Pennsylvania state average. See Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Dispositions (2003-2006), available at http://www.jcjc.state.pa.us/ jcjc/cwp/browse.asp?A=3&BMDRN=2000&BCOB=0&C=41835.
607. In 2003, approximately seven percent of all children who waived counsel in Pennsylvania were placed outside the home; in Luzerne County, more than half of the children who waived counsel were placed outside the home (177 of 301 total waivers). In 2004, approximately twelve percent of all children who waived counsel in Pennsylvania were placed outside the home; in Luzerne County, over half of the children who waived counsel
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were placed outside the home (132 of 252 total waivers). Luzerne County data from 2005 and 2006 show that more than 250 children who were unrepresented at juvenile court hearings were adjudicated delinquent and removed from their homes. In Luzerne County, nearly sixty percent of delinquency dispositions for youth without counsel in both 2005 and 2006 resulted in out-of-home placement. Additionally, while the statewide annual average for waiver of counsel in all counties was about five percent during the relevant time period, the average annual rate of waiver of counsel in Luzerne County reached as high as ten times the state average during the relevant time period. 608. The foregoing actions of Ciavarella and Conahan, as well as other of their actions, were undertaken by Ciavarella and Conahan without recusing themselves from matters in which they had a conflict of interest and without disclosing to parties involved in court proceedings their conflict of interest and the financial relationship that existed between Ciavarella and Conahan, on the one hand, and Powell, Zappala, Mericle, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, on the other hand, which were material matters. 609. By failing to recuse themselves from acting in matters in which they had a material conflict of interest and by failing to disclose to parties appearing
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before the court their conflict of interest and their financial relationship with Powell, Mericle, Zappala, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, which were material matters, Ciavarella and Conahan violated their duties of independence, impartiality, and integrity in the exercise of their discretionary actions on behalf of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County. 610. Additionally, in deliberately conducting juvenile proceedings without regard to the mandates of the United States Constitution, the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, Ciavarella acted outside the law and without lawful jurisdiction to adjudicate the youth who appeared before him and without lawful jurisdiction to place the youth who appeared before him. By denying the children who appeared before him their fundamental constitutional rights, Ciavarella effectively operated an illegitimate courtroom; further, by taking money as part of his scheme to deny children their constitutional rights, he operated this illegitimate courtroom for illegitimate purposes. 611. As a result of unconstitutional adjudications and placements described above, youth plaintiffs suffered emotional trauma, including removal from their homes and families, disruptions in their education, loss of educational credits and delayed completion – or in some case loss of the opportunity to
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complete – their high school education. Additionally, all plaintiffs – youth and their parents or guardians – were forced to pay the costs or some portion of the costs of placement at PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other facilities, as well as other court costs, probation fees, fines, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. 612. On January 26, 2009, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania filed a Bill of Information alleging two counts of fraud against Ciavarella and Conahan. The Bill of Information describes, inter alia, a conspiracy among the judges and at least two other unnamed parties, presumed to be Powell and Mericle, to conceal $2.6 million in payments to the judges from owners of juvenile correctional facilities, in exchange for, inter alia, referring children who appeared before Ciavarella to these juvenile correctional facilities. On February 12, 2009, Ciavarella and Conahan pled guilty to these counts. In their guilty pleas, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to serve more than seven years in federal prison. A formal sentencing hearing is pending, following a federal pre-sentence investigation. 613. On February 11, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction and granted Juvenile Law Center’s Amended Application for the Exercise of King’s Bench Power or Extraordinary Jurisdiction arising
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out of Ciavarella’s denial of youth’s constitutional right to counsel and acceptance of guilty pleas without due process during the period from 2003 through May 2008. Pursuant to that order, and citing the recently revealed criminal allegations and plea agreement entered into by Ciavarella, among others, the court appointed Special Master Arthur Grim, Senior Judge, Berks County Court of Common Pleas, to act on its behalf. Specifically, the court authorized Judge Grim to review all juvenile court adjudications and dispositions affected by the recently revealed criminal charges, including all cases in which children were committed to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care, as well as all cases in which it is alleged that youth appearing before Ciavarella were denied their right to counsel, and to make recommendations to the court concerning appropriate remedial actions. 614. Among the remedial actions the Special Master may recommend, on an individual basis, class basis, or both, are orders to expunge records, grant new juvenile proceedings, or find that the affected juvenile proceedings were void ab initio. The request for relief was limited to injunctive or other equitable relief. 615. On March 26, 2009, Special Master Grim entered the first of several anticipated orders vacating the adjudications and expunging the records of hundreds of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella between 2003 and
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May 2008. In his Order, Judge Grim specifically noted that his own investigation “point[ed] to the conclusion that a very substantial number of juveniles who appeared without counsel before Judge Ciavarella for delinquency or related proceedings did not knowingly and intelligently waive their right to counsel. My investigation also has uncovered evidence that there was routine deprivation of children’s constitutional rights to appear before an impartial tribunal and to have an opportunity to be heard.” First Interim Report and Recommendations of the Special Master, at ¶ 10, approved and adopted by Order, No. 81 MM 2008 (Pa. Mar. 26, 2009), attached hereto as Exhibit B.
D. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY
616. Ciavarella, Conahan, Powell, Zappala, and Mericle entered into agreements for constructing and guaranteeing placements in the PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care facilities in return for concealed payments to Ciavarella and Conahan.
617. In or before January 2003, Ciavarella and Conahan arranged with Powell and Mericle to receive a payment from Powell and Mericle in the amount of $997,600 to compensate them for the roles they played in accomplishing the construction of the PA Child Care facility.
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618. In order to conceal the $997,600 payment, Powell and Mericle signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by Mericle and backdated to February 19, 2002, which purported to be an agreement for Mericle to pay a broker’s fee of $997,600 to Powell. In fact, however, a large portion of the money was intended to be paid to Ciavarella and Conahan.
619. Ciavarella and Conahan engaged in a series of financial transactions, over time, which were also designed to conceal the $997,600 payment made to them. On January 21, 2003, Mericle wire transferred $610,000 to an attorney trust account of an attorney other than Powell. The remaining $387,600 was wire transferred by Mericle to a bank account under the control of Powell.
620. Thereafter, on January 28, 2003, the $610,000 in the attorney trust account was wire transferred to a bank account of defendant Beverage Marketing of Pa., a business entity controlled by Conahan.
621. In a series of financial transactions thereafter, a portion of the $610,000 payment was passed from Conahan to Ciavarella. For example, on or about January 28, 2003, Conahan directed that $330,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account controlled by Ciavarella; on or about April 30, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $75,000 of the
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$610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account controlled by Ciavarella; on or about July 15, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $75,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account under the control of Ciavarella; on or about August 13, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $25,000 of the $610,000 be wire transferred to a bank account under the control of a third party; and, on or about August 20, 2003, Conahan directed that an additional $105,000 be transferred to a bank account under the control of Conahan. 622. To conceal the payments to Ciavarella and Conahan, Conahan directed that false entries be made in the books and records of Beverage Marketing of Pa. That direction was followed, and false entries were in fact made in the books and records of Beverage Marketing of Pa. 623. To further conceal the $997,600 payment made to Ciavarella and Conahan, a portion of the $387,600 wire transfer made by Mericle to Powell on January 28, 2003 was paid to Ciavarella and Conahan in a series of financial transactions which occurred over time. One of those transactions occurred on or about August 29, 2003, when a check in the amount of $326,000, drawn on a bank account under the control of Powell, was deposited into a bank account under the control of Conahan but maintained in the name of another person.
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624. With respect to the $1,000,000 payment made by Powell to Ciavarella and Conahan in July 2005, after completion of the construction of Western PA Child Care, defendants attempted to hide the compensation they paid, transferred, and/or received by causing that compensation to pass through Pinnacle Group, Vision Holdings, and/or Beverage Marketing of Pa., and by creating false records and/or by causing false records to be created.
625. In order to conceal the payment to Ciavarella and Conahan, Powell and Mericle signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by Mericle which purported to be an agreement for Mericle to pay a broker’s fee of $1,000,000 to Powell. In fact, however, the money was wire transferred by Mericle to a bank account of the Pinnacle Group, a business entity owned by defendants Cindy Ciavarella and Barbara Conahan, but controlled by Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan.
626. With respect to the $150,000 payment made to Ciavarella and Conahan by Powell and Mericle in February 2006 upon completion of the construction of an addition to PA Child Care by Mericle, the same contractor who built the facility, defendants attempted to hide the compensation they paid, transferred, and/or received by causing that compensation to pass through Pinnacle Group, Vision Holdings, and/or Beverage Marketing of Pa., and by creating false records and/or by causing false records to be created.
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627. Specifically, in order to conceal the payment to Ciavarella and Conahan, Powell and Mericle signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by Mericle, which purported to be an agreement for Mericle to pay a broker’s fee of $150,000 to Powell. In fact, however, the money was wire transferred by Mericle to a bank account of the Pinnacle Group, a business entity owned by Cindy Ciavarella and Barbara Conahan, but controlled by Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan.
628. Between approximately February of 2003 and January 1, 2007, Ciavarella and Conahan received from Powell hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments for their past and future official actions relating to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. Again, they took steps to conceal and disguise the existence, nature, location, source, ownership, and control of these payments.
629. Some of the payments were made by checks drawn on one or more bank accounts under the control of Powell and were made payable to Pinnacle Group. The payments included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following: $18,000 paid on or about January 13, 2004; $52,000 paid on or about January 13, 2004; $78,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $75,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $47,000 paid on or about
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February 15, 2004; $75,000 paid on or about April 30, 2004; and $25,000 paid on or about April 30, 2004. 630. To conceal the payments to Ciavarella and Conahan, Powell made false notations on the checks and Ciavarella and Conahan directed that false entries be made in the books and records of Pinnacle Group. False entries were made in the books and records of Pinnacle Group. 631. In addition to payments by check, some of the payments were made by wire transfers from one or more bank accounts under the control of Powell and transferred to an account of Pinnacle Group. The payments included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following: $120,000 transferred on July 12, 2004; and $100,000 transferred on September 23, 2004. 632. In order to conceal the more than $2.6 million in unlawful payments they received, Ciavarella and Conahan knowingly and intentionally filed materially false annual statements of financial interests with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, in which they failed to disclose the source of these payments, the source of the income they received, and their financial relationship with Powell, Zappala, Mericle, PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care, all of which were material matters.
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633. Ciavarella made the following materially false filings with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts on or about the following dates: (a) April 2004: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2003 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; (b) March 2005: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2004 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; (c) April 2006: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2005 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; and (d) March 2007: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2006 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts.
634. Conahan made the following materially false filings with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts on or about the following dates:
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(a) April 2004: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2003 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts;
(b) March 2005: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2004 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts;
(c) February 2006: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2005 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts; and
(d) April 2007: Materially false annual statement of financial interests for calendar year 2006 submitted to the Pennsylvania Administrative Office of the Courts.
635. Furthermore, Ciavarella and Conahan, acting on behalf of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County in matters in which they had discretionary decision-making authority, knowingly and intentionally issued written, oral and wire communications which were materially false to the extent that the defendants did not disclose their sources of income, their conflict of interest, and their financial relationship with Powell, Zappala, Mericle, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, which were material matters.
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CLAIMS COUNT I VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983) All Youth Plaintiffs (Class A) v. Defendants Ciavarella and Conahan 636. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 637. Ciavarella and Conahan are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 638. Ciavarella and Conahan were acting “under color of state law” and their conduct was subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 639. Ciavarella and Conahan received payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. Their receipt of these payments was not in furtherance of their roles and responsibilities as judges, nor did the receipt of these monies fall within their administrative responsibilities. Their receipt of these payments was criminal and completely outside the law. In return for these unlawful payments, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to and did act in their administrative capacities to ensure that detention facilities would be constructed and expanded and that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention. Ciavarella and Conahan knowingly hid these payments from the
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County of Luzerne, the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, and the public – in particular the named plaintiffs and class members – thereby concealing Ciavarella’s and Conahan’s conflicts of interest, pecuniary interest, bias, and partiality in adjudicating plaintiff youth delinquent and ordering their placement in detention facilities. 640. Because of these actions, plaintiff youth were deprived of their right to an impartial tribunal as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 641. As a result of their actions, the United States Attorney filed a Bill of Information alleging two counts of fraud against Ciavarella and Conahan. As described above, the Bill of Information describes, inter alia, a conspiracy among the judges and unnamed parties to conceal $2.6 million in payments to the judges from owners of juvenile correctional facilities, in exchange for, inter alia, referring children who appeared before Ciavarella to these juvenile correctional facilities. On February 12, 2009, Ciavarella and Conahan pled guilty to these two counts of fraud. 642. As a result of these constitutional violations, plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to emotional trauma and costs, fines, fees, and other expenses arising out of their unconstitutional adjudications or placement.
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COUNT II CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983) All Youth Plaintiffs (Class A) v. Defendants Ciavarella; Conahan; Powell; Mericle; Zappala; Cindy Ciavarella; Barbara Conahan; Mericle Construction, Inc.; Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp.; PA Child Care, LLC; Western PA Child Care, LLC; Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC; Vision Holdings, LLC; and Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc.
643. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 644. Each defendant is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 645. All defendants were acting “under color of state law” and their conduct was
subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 646. Defendants knowingly and willfully entered into a conspiracy and
agreement by which Ciavarella and Conahan would and did receive payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. Their receipt of these payments was not in furtherance of their roles and responsibilities as judges, nor did the receipt of these monies fall within their administrative responsibilities. Their receipt of these payments was criminal and completely outside the law. In return for these unlawful payments, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to and did act in their administrative capacities to ensure that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention facilities by, inter alia, securing a contract
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from Luzerne County to use these facilities and ordering placement of plaintiffs in these facilities. All defendants knowingly hid these payments from the County of Luzerne, the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, and the public – in particular the named plaintiffs and class of youth they represent – thereby concealing the defendants’ conflict of interest, pecuniary interest, bias, and partiality in adjudicating plaintiff youth delinquent and ordering their placement in detention facilities. 647. Because of this conspiracy, plaintiff youth therefore were deprived of their right to an impartial tribunal as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 648. As a result of these constitutional violations, plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to emotional trauma and costs, fines, fees, and other expenses arising out of their unconstitutional adjudications or detention.
COUNT III DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND/OR TO A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Subclass A1 Plaintiffs v. Defendant Ciavarella 649. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 650. Ciavarella is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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651. Ciavarella was acting “under color of state law” and his conduct was subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
652. Ciavarella received payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. In return for these payments, Ciavarella agreed to misuse his judicial office to ensure that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention facilities.
653. Acting completely outside the law and in derogation of and contrary to his role and responsibilities as a judge, Ciavarella intentionally and knowingly, in a pervasive and persistent scheme ongoing throughout the relevant time period herein, denied Subclass A1 plaintiffs their constitutionally protected right to counsel. When Subclass A1 plaintiffs appeared before Ciavarella without an attorney, he failed to inquire as to whether they were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving their right to counsel, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Accordingly, as Ciavarella was effectively operating an illegitimate courtroom for illegitimate purposes, Ciavarella was without lawful jurisdiction to adjudicate these plaintiff youth. Yet this pervasive pattern of intentionally denying Subclass A1 plaintiffs their constitutional rights substantially enhanced Ciavarella’s ability to adjudicate the Subclass
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A1 plaintiffs as delinquent and place them in detention facilities or placement facilities. 654. Also acting completely outside the law and in derogation of and contrary to his role and responsibilities as a judge, Ciavarella intentionally and knowingly, in a pervasive and persistent scheme ongoing throughout the relevant time period from 2003 through May 2008, failed to engage in any colloquy with Subclass A1 plaintiffs pleading guilty to ensure that their admissions and guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, as Ciavarella was effectively operating an illegitimate courtroom for illegitimate purposes, Ciavarella was without lawful jurisdiction to adjudicate these youth. Ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is constitutionally required because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of important constitutional rights, including the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial and to confront one’s accusers. Ciavarella’s pervasive pattern of intentionally denying Subclass A1 plaintiffs their constitutional rights substantially enhanced his ability to adjudicate the Subclass A1 youth as delinquent and place them in detention facilities or other placement facilities.
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COUNT IV CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE YOUTH OF THEIR RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND/OR TO A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND
VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983) Subclass A1 Plaintiffs v. Defendants Ciavarella; Conahan; Powell; Mericle; Zappala; Cindy Ciavarella; Barbara Conahan; Mericle Construction, Inc.; Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp.; PA Child Care, LLC; Western PA Child Care, LLC; Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC; Vision Holdings, LLC; and Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc.
655. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 656. Each defendant is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 657. All defendants were acting “under color of state law” and their conduct was
subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 658. Defendants knowingly and willfully entered into an agreement by which
Ciavarella and Conahan would receive payments by and through the other defendants in connection with the construction of new detention facilities. In return for these payments, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to misuse their judicial offices to ensure that plaintiff youth would be placed in detention facilities. All defendants knowingly hid these payments from the County of Luzerne, the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, and the public – in particular the plaintiffs – thereby concealing the defendants’ conflict of interest, pecuniary interest, bias and partiality in
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adjudicating plaintiff youth and placing plaintiff youth in detention facilities. 659. As part of this conspiracy and agreement, Ciavarella denied Subclass A1 plaintiffs their constitutionally protected right to counsel. Acting completely outside the law and in derogation of and contrary to his role and responsibilities as a judge, when Subclass A1 plaintiffs appeared before Ciavarella without an attorney, he intentionally and knowingly, in a pervasive and persistent scheme ongoing throughout the relevant time period from 2003 through May 2008, failed to inquire as to whether the youth were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving their right to counsel, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This denial substantially enhanced Ciavarella’s ability, pursuant to the conspiracy, to adjudicate the Subclass A1 plaintiff youth as delinquent and to order their placement in detention facilities. 660. As part of this conspiracy and agreement, and also acting completely outside the law and in derogation of and contrary to his role and responsibilities as a judge, defendant Ciavarella intentionally and knowingly, in a pervasive and persistent scheme ongoing throughout the relevant time period 2003 through 2008, failed to engage in any colloquy with Subclass A1 plaintiff youth pleading guilty to ensure that the Subclass
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A1 plaintiff youth’s admissions and guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is constitutionally required because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of important constitutional rights, including the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial and to confront one’s accusers. Accordingly, as Ciavarella was effectively operating an illegitimate courtroom for illegitimate purposes, Ciavarella was without lawful jurisdiction to adjudicate these youth delinquent. Ciavarella’s pervasive denial of these rights to Subclass A1 youth significantly enhanced his ability, pursuant to the conspiracy, to adjudicate Subclass A1 youth delinquent and order their placement in detention facilities.
COUNT V CIVIL RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) Class B Plaintiffs v. Defendants Ciavarella; Conahan; Powell; Mericle; Zappala; Cindy Ciavarella; Barbara Conahan; Mericle Construction, Inc.; Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp.; PA Child Care, LLC; Western PA Child Care, LLC; Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC; Vision Holdings, LLC; and Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc.
661. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 662. Each youth or parent plaintiff who paid money as a result of his or her
having been adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella, or his or her
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child having been adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella, between 2003 and May 23, 2008 is a “person” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 663. Each defendant is a “person” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 664. Ciavarella, Conahan, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Powell, Zappala, Mericle, and Mericle Construction together constituted an association-in-fact “enterprise” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 665. This enterprise, an ongoing organization that functioned as a continuing unit for the purpose of adjudicating and housing juveniles adjudicated delinquent in Luzerne County and elsewhere, at all times relevant hereto was engaged in interstate commerce or its activities affected interstate commerce. 666. Specifically, on or about each date listed below, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, Ciavarella and Conahan, aided and abetted by each other and other defendants for the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud and the conspiracy to violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights described herein, transmitted and/or caused to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, the following writings, signals and sounds:
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(a) July 12, 2004: Electronic funds transfer of $120,000 transferred from an account of Vision Holdings to an account of the Pinnacle Group;
(b) September 23, 2004: Electronic funds transfer of $100,000 transferred from an account of Vision Holdings to an account of Pinnacle Group;
(c) July 15, 2005: Electronic funds transfer of $1,000,000 transferred from an account of Mericle Construction to an account of Pinnacle Group; and
(d) February 3, 2006: Electronic funds transfer of $150,000 transferred from an account of Mericle Construction to an account of Pinnacle Group.
667. Each defendant, along with others known and unknown, was employed by or associated with the enterprise identified in paragraphs 664 and 665.
668. Each defendant, along with others known and unknown, conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
669. The pattern of racketeering activity, which each defendant conducted or in which each defendant participated, included the following “racketeering
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acts” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) which occurred from in or about June 2000 to on or about April 30, 2007: (a) Devising or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud by
means of wire communication in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, in particular as described above, including, without limitation, in Parts B and D; (b) Devising or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including plaintiffs, and to deprive those citizens – and particularly plaintiffs – of the intangible right of honest services by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, in particular as described above, including, without limitation, in Parts B and D; (c) Offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer on another a pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision, opinion, recommendation, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant by the recipient, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(1), in particular as described above, including, without limitation, in Parts B and D; (d) Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept from another a pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision, opinion, recommendation,
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or other exercise of discretion as a public servant by the recipient, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(1), in particular as described above, including without limitation, in Parts B and D; and (e) Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept from another any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known legal duty as public servant, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(3), in particular as described above, including without limitation, in Parts B and D. 670. The aforementioned instances of racketeering activity constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The aforementioned acts occurred continuously from on or about June 2000 to on or about April 30, 2007, as part of defendants’ regular way of conducting and participating in the ongoing RICO enterprise. These acts had the same or similar participants, victims, and method of commission. Specifically, these acts were all related to the common purpose of enriching various defendants by constructing and expanding juvenile detention facilities, namely PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care; contracting with Luzerne County to use those juvenile detention facilities; and keeping the beds at PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care full. These purposes were accomplished by denying youth who appeared before Ciavarella the right to an impartial judiciary, by obtaining guilty pleas from
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youth who appeared before Ciavarella in violation of the juveniles’ due process rights, and by denying youth who appeared before Ciavarella the right to assistance of counsel. 671. Ciavarella and Conahan accepted compensation from and/or through PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Zappala, Pinnacle Group, Beverage Marketing of Pa., and Vision Holdings in exchange for official actions. 672. Additionally, defendants attempted to hide the compensation they paid, transferred, and/or received by causing that compensation to pass through Pinnacle Group, Vision Holdings, and Beverage Marketing of Pa., by creating false records, and/or by causing false records to be created. 673. As a direct and proximate result and by reason of each of the defendants’ conduct of or participation in the affairs of the previously described enterprise, along with others known and unknown, the Class B plaintiffs have been injured in their business or property. 674. Such injuries consist, inter alia, of the following: (a) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to
defense attorneys;
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(b) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to Luzerne County for the cost of placements, court costs and fees, and costs for probation; and
(c) Loss of the youth plaintiffs’ employment, scholarships, and/or financial aid as a result of the youth plaintiffs having been adjudicated delinquent and/or committed to PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other juvenile detention facilities.
675. The aforementioned conduct and practices were specifically devised to injure the plaintiffs. COUNT VI CIVIL RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)) Class B Plaintiffs v. Defendants Ciavarella; Conahan; Powell; Mericle; Zappala; Cindy Ciavarella; Barbara Conahan; Mericle Construction, Inc.; Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp.;
PA Child Care, LLC; Western PA Child Care, LLC; Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC; Vision Holdings, LLC; and Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc.
676. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 677. The defendants, along with others known and unknown, acquired and
maintained interests in and control of the enterprise identified in paragraphs 664 and 665, supra, through their pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
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678. They did so through a pattern of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346 and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4701(a)(1) and (3) in constructing juvenile detention facilities, namely PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care; in contracting with Luzerne County to use those juvenile detention facilities; and in keeping the beds at PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care full.
679. As a direct and proximate result and by reason of each of the defendants’ acquisition and maintenance of interests in and control of the enterprise, the constitutional rights of youth plaintiffs who appeared before Ciavarella to due process, counsel, and an impartial judiciary were violated.
680. As a direct and proximate result and by reason of each of the defendants’ acquisition and maintenance of interests in and control of the enterprise, the plaintiffs have been injured in their business or property.
681. Such injuries consist, inter alia, of the following: (a) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to defense attorneys; (b) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to Luzerne County for the cost of placements, court costs and fees, and costs for probation; and (c) Loss of employment, scholarships, and/or financial aid as a result of the youth plaintiffs having been adjudicated delinquent and/or
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committed to PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other juvenile detention facilities. 682. The aforementioned conduct and practices were specifically devised to injure the plaintiffs.
COUNT VII CIVIL RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) Class B Plaintiffs v. Defendants Ciavarella; Conahan; Powell; Mericle; Zappala; Cindy Ciavarella; Barbara Conahan; Mericle Construction, Inc.; Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp.; PA Child Care, LLC; Western PA Child Care, LLC; Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC; Vision Holdings, LLC; and Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc.
683. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 684. As set forth above, defendants agreed and conspired to violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(b) and (c), all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 685. In particular, the defendants intentionally conspired and agreed to acquire
or maintain interests in and control of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, as described in Count VI. Additionally, the defendants intentionally conspired and agreed to conduct and participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, as described in Count V.
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686. The defendants took overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy as described above including, but not limited to, those acts described in Counts V and VI.
687. The defendants knew that their predicate acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity, and the defendants agreed to the commission of those acts to further the schemes described in Counts V and VI.
688. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ conspiracy, the overt acts taken in furtherance of that conspiracy, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) and (c), the plaintiffs have been injured in their business or property.
689. Such injuries consist, inter alia, of the following: (a) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to defense attorneys; (b) Payments made by the youth plaintiffs and/or the parent plaintiffs to Luzerne County for the costs of placements, court costs and fees, costs for probation; and (c) Loss of the youth plaintiffs’ employment, scholarships, and/or financial aid as a result of the youth plaintiffs having been adjudicated delinquent and/or committed to PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, or other juvenile detention facilities.
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690. The aforementioned conduct and practices were specifically devised to injure the plaintiffs. COUNT VIII VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHTS TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983) All Youth Plaintiffs (Class A) v. Defendant Luzerne County
691. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 692. Luzerne County is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 693. At all relevant times, all defendants were acting “under color of state law”
and their conduct was subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 694. Conahan had final decision-making authority with regard to Luzerne
County’s de-funding of the River Street facility and, consequently, Conahan was acting as an agent or representative of Luzerne County. 695. Conahan’s actions with respect to Luzerne County’s de-funding of the River Street facility constitute and reflect the official policy or practice of Luzerne County. 696. As described in paragraphs 576 through 587 herein, at the same time that Conahan was making decisions regarding Luzerne County’s de-funding of the River Street facility, Conahan and Ciavarella were accepting illegal kickbacks from other defendants in exchange for placing children
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appearing before Ciavarella in residential programs owned and operated by other defendants. 697. Conahan and Ciavarella took the actions referred to in paragraphs 695 and 696 as part of a larger conspiracy with these other defendants to deprive plaintiffs of their due process rights – including their rights to an impartial tribunal, to counsel, and to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea -- under the United States Constitution. 698. Luzerne County, through the actions of Conahan and Ciavarella described herein, is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
COUNT IX VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHTS TO COUNSEL
AND TO A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983) Subclass A2 Plantiffs v. Defendant Luzerne County 699. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 700. Luzerne County is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 701. At all relevant times, all defendants were acting “under color of state law” and their conduct was subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 702. As described in detail in paragraphs 588 through 615 herein, Ciavarella instituted a custom, policy and practice in the Luzerne County juvenile
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court from 2003 through 2008 of denying plaintiffs their constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to be advised of the consequences of waiving counsel or entering a guilty plea such that waivers and pleas are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as required by the due process provisions of the United States Constitution. 703. These practices ran contrary to and were in violation of controlling United States Supreme Court case law, Pennsylvania statutory law, and Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court, as described in paragraphs 595 through 604 herein. 704. From 2003 through 2008, additional county actors with responsibility for ensuring the lawful and constitutional operation of the Luzerne County juvenile court – including, but not limited to, the Luzerne County District Attorney, the Luzerne County Probation Department and the Luzerne County Public Defender – were routinely non-compliant with controlling United States Supreme Court case law, Pennsylvania statutory law, and Pennsylvania court rules regarding plaintiffs’ due process rights. 705. The practices of these county officials in the Luzerne County juvenile court, which deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, were “so
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permanent and well settled” as to have the “force of law.” Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 706. That Ciavarella was the presiding judge in the Luzerne County juvenile court does not excuse county officials from complying with controlling United States Supreme Court case law, Pennsylvania statutory law, or Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court regarding plaintiffs due process rights, as “[p]rivate citizens are presumed to know the law, and no less should be expected of public officials.” Anela v. Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1067 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 707. The county’s routine and persistent noncompliance with controlling United States Supreme Court case law, Pennsylvania statutory law, and Pennsylvania court rules over a period of five years amounted to a policy of the county for purposes of § 1983 liability. Anela, 790 F.2d at 1067.
COUNT X WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT (STATE TORT) Subclass A2 Plaintiffs v. Defendants Powell; Zappala; Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp.; PA Child Care, LLC; and Western PA Child Care, LLC 708. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated herein. 709. Defendants Powell, Zappala, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care intentionally confined Subclass A2 plaintiffs in PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care, LLC and Subclass A2
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plaintiffs were aware of their confinement in PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care. 710. The detentions of Subclass A2 plaintiffs were unlawful. 711. All defendants entered into a corrupt conspiracy whereby Ciavarella and Conahan would receive payments by and through the other defendants, including Powell, Zappala, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, in connection with the construction and expansion of PA Child Care, and the construction of Western PA Child Care. In return for these payments, Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to and did use their judicial offices to ensure that plaintiffs would be placed in detention facilities. 712. In furtherance of this corrupt conspiracy with Powell, Zappala, MidAtlantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, and the other defendants, Ciavarella adjudicated Subclass A2 plaintiffs delinquent and placed them in PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care. Subclass A2 plaintiffs’ placements at PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care were therefore a result of corrupt and tainted delinquency adjudications and corrupt and tainted placement orders. Powell, Zappala, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care, participated in this corrupt conspiracy and detained Subclass A2 plaintiffs in PA Child Care
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and Western PA Child Care in spite of the corruption and illegality underlying the detention orders.
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Case 3:09-cv-00357-ARC Document 50 Filed 04/23/09 Page 169 of 169
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:
1. Assume jurisdiction of this action.
2. Certify this action as a class action.
3. Award compensatory and punitive damages in an amount in excess of
$150,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
4. Award threefold damages in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b)-(c).
5. Award prejudgment interest, costs of suit, and attorneys’ fees.
6. Order disgorgement and restitution of moneys obtained by defendants as a
result of their conspiracy to violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
7. Order such other and further relief as this court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Lourdes M. Rosado Marsha L. Levick, Esq. (PA 22535) Lourdes M. Rosado, Esq. (PA 77109) JUVENILE LAW CENTER 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 625-0551
Daniel Segal, Esq. (PA 26218) Rebecca L. Santoro, Esq. (PA 206210) HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL & PUDLIN One Logan Square, 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 568-6200
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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2012 WL 6552134 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Raul Clark, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. Wayne Dawn, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Angela Rimmer Belanger, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Mark A. Ciavarella, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–cv–286, 3:09–cv–0291, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–0630, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–2535, 3:10–cv–1405. | Dec. 14, 2012.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiffs in this consolidated action comprising both individual cases and putative class actions have moved for final approval of a settlement agreement (the “Settlement”) between Plaintiffs and Defendants Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (collectively “Mericle”). (Doc. 1227.) The Settlement received preliminary approval on February 28, 2012. Now, following the final approval hearing held on November 19, 2012, Plaintiffs seek final certification of the Classes for settlement, approval of the Settlement, and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, the Classes will be certified, the Settlement will be approved, and attorneys’ fees and costs will be awarded as requested.

I. Background
A. Facts This civil action arises out of the alleged conspiracy related to the construction of two juvenile detention facilities, and subsequent detainment of juveniles in these facilities, orchestrated by two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”). The juvenile detention facilities, PA Child Care (“PACC”) and Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”),1 were both constructed by Mericle. Plaintiffs in this action, juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella, seek redress from the former judges, as well as the individuals and business entities involved in the construction and operation of these facilities, for the alleged unlawful conspiracy and resulting deprivations of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights.
The individual and class complaints assert, in part, the following causes of action against Mericle: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; (3) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq.; (3) conspiracy to violate RICO; and (4) state-law civil conspiracy.
B. Procedural History The first of these consolidated cases, Wallace v. Powell, No. 09–CV–286, was filed on February 13, 2009 against multiple Defendants, including Mericle. Although the case was originally filed as a class action, the Wallace complaint was subsequently amended in May 2009 to proceed on behalf of a number of individual juvenile and parent Plaintiffs. Shortly thereafter, Conway v. Conahan, No. 09–CV–291, and H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 09–CV– 357, were filed as putative class actions, both naming Mericle, among others, as Defendants. Subsequently, Humanik v. Ciavarella, No. 09–CV–630, was filed on behalf of a single individual Plaintiff. Collectively, these four cases are the “Civil Actions.”
The Conway and H.T. Plaintiffs filed the Master Complaint for Class Actions in June 2009. (Doc. 136.) At the same time, the Wallace and Humanik Plaintiffs filed the Master Long Form Complaint for Individual Actions. (Doc. 134.)
With respect to the Mericle Defendants, they filed various motions to dismiss the actions in 2010 and 2011. The most recent motion to dismiss filed by Mericle and
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resolved by the Court was granted in part and denied in part on November 30, 2011. (Doc. 1002 .) Shortly thereafter, on December 16, 2011, Plaintiffs and Mericle filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Doc. 1005.) On February 28, 2012, following a preliminary approval hearing, the Court issued an order conditionally certifying the Settlement Classes, preliminarily approving the class action settlement, and approving the notice plan. (Doc. 1084.) On November 19, 2012, the Court held a final Settlement approval hearing.
C. The Settlement Agreement *2 Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Mericle and Plaintiffs agree to settle the Civil Actions (i.e., the H. T., Conway, Wallace, and Humanik Actions) to provide a final resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims against Mericle and the Luzerne County Parties. Solely for the purposes of settlement, two settlement classes are established: (1) the “Juvenile Settlement Class,” which consists of “all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 [the “Class Period”] who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella”; and (2) the “Parent Settlement Class,” which is comprised of the parents and/or guardians of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008, and, who in connection with the juvenile’s appearance: “(i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties assessed against them or their child; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or family integrity.” (Doc. 1005, Ex. 1, Master Settlement Agreement, “MSA”, ¶ I.A .) The Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class are referred to collectively as the “Settlement Classes,” and the members of the Settlement Classes are the “Settlement Class Members .” (Id.)
Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Mericle agrees to pay $17,750,000.00, which will be used to pay settlement costs and claims by Class Members. (Id. at ¶ II.A.)
Under the proposed Allocation Plan, both basic and enhanced benefits are available to qualifying Plaintiffs.
1. Basic Benefits Basic settlement payments to the Juvenile Settlement Class will be provided as follows: (1) each qualifying Juvenile that was adjudicated by Ciavarella during the Class Period but never spent time in any juvenile detention facility shall receive a payment of $500.00; (2) each qualifying Juvenile who was placed in a detention

facility besides PACC or WPACC as a result of an adjudication or placement by Ciavarella during the Class Period shall receive a payment of $1,000.00; and (3) each qualifying Juvenile who was placed in PACC or WPACC as a result of an adjudication or placement by Ciavarella during the Class Period shall receive a payment of $5,000.00.2
Basic settlement payments with respect to the Parent Settlement Class under the Allocation Plan provide each qualifying Parent Settlement Class Member who, as a result of a juvenile’s adjudication or placement by Ciavarella during the period of January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008, (i) made payments to Luzerne County or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn by Luzerne County; or (ii) had court-ordered services or paid court-ordered costs, fees, interests, and/or penalties assessed against them or their child, shall receive the actual amount of monies paid, garnished, or withdrawn. Due to the overwhelming response of the Parent Settlement Class Members, the proposed allocation to the benefit fund will be insufficient to compensate all qualifying Parent Settlement Class Members’ claims. As such, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks approval to contribute a portion of their requested fee to the Parent benefit fund to make up any shortfall.
2. Enhanced Benefits *3 The Allocation Plan also provides that certain qualifying Juveniles will be entitled to enhanced benefits from the Enhanced Benefit Fund (“EBF”). The EBF will initially contain $8,035,000.00. And, any funds remaining after the basic settlement fund is fully funded will be added to the EBF.
The Allocation Plan consists of seven categories for which a Juvenile may qualify to receive enhanced benefits under the Settlement Agreement.
a. Non–PACC/WPACC Enhancement The first enhancement is the non-PACC/WPACC enhancement. Under this category, any Juvenile who was placed in a detention facility for ninety (90) days or more as a result of an adjudication or placement by Ciavarella during the Class Period but never spent any time at PACC and/or WPACC shall receive a flat $4,000.00 enhancement payment.
b. Age Enhancement The second enhancement relates to the age of the Juvenile when adjudicated or placed. Any Juvenile that was thirteen (13) years or younger at the time of his or her first
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adjudication or placement by Ciavarella during the Class Period shall receive 20 EBF points.3
c. Petition and Detention Days Enhancement The third enhancement category is the petition and detention days enhancement. Juveniles that were adjudicated delinquent only once during the Class Period (based on only one juvenile petition) and that were also detained or placed at PACC/WPACC for more than ten (10) days as a result of their appearance before Ciavarella shall receive 4 EBF points. And, if the single petition was a first offense, the Juvenile shall receive 8 additional EBF points. Any Juvenile that, during the Class Period, was adjudicated delinquent only twice (based on no more than two separate juvenile petitions) and was detained or placed at PACC/WPACC for more than twenty-five (25) days as a result of that Juvenile’s appearance before Ciavarella, shall receive 5 EBF points. Lastly, under the petition and detention days enhancement, if, at any time prior to May 28, 2008, including before January 1, 2003, the Juvenile was adjudicated three (3) times or fewer (based on three or fewer separate juvenile petitions), and the Juvenile was detained or placed at PACC/WPACC for at least one (1) day as a result of his or her appearance before Ciavarella during the Class Period, and the Juvenile was detained or placed at a non-PACC/WPACC facility for more than one hundred eighty days (180) as a result of the appearance(s) before Ciavarella during the Class Period, then the Juvenile shall receive 4 EBF points.
d. Physical Injury or Illness Enhancement The fourth enhancement category is the physical injury or illness enhancement. A Juvenile that suffered a physical injury or illness, for which he or she received documented treatment from a healthcare professional, either while detained or placed at PACC/WPACC or as a result of the detention or placement at PACC/WPACC during the Class Period, shall receive 3 EBF points. If the physical injury or illness is determined to be severe, the Juvenile shall receive 10 EBF points.
e. Psychological or Emotional Harm Enhancement *4 The fifth enhancement is for any Juvenile that suffered psychological or emotional harm. Any Juvenile that suffered psychological or emotional harm for which he or she received documented treatment from a licensed mental health professional, either while detained or placed at PACC/WPACC or as a result of the detention or placement at PACC/WPACC by Ciavarella during the Class Period, shall receive 3 EBF points. If the psychological or emotional harm is found to be severe, the Juvenile shall receive 10 EBF points.

f. Adverse Educational Harm Enhancement The sixth enhancement provides that if a Juvenile’s educational progress was adversely affected, including, but not limited to, a documented loss of education credits or loss of a full or partial class year, as a result of having been detained or placed at PACC/WPACC by Ciavarella during the Class Period, the Juvenile shall receive 2 EBF points. If the harm to the Juvenile’s educational progress is determined to be severe, the Juvenile shall receive 8 EBF points.
g. Juvenile Suicide Enhancement Lastly, any Juvenile that committed suicide as a result of having been detained or placed at PACC/WPACC by Ciavarella during the Class Period shall receive 100 EBF points. No verified claims fall into this category according to Plaintiffs.
3. Allocation Plan Based on these enhancements, the Allocation Plan provides that the EBF will be distributed pursuant to a point system, with the exception of the $4,000.00 flat benefit enhancement to Juveniles that were placed in a non-PACC/WPACC facility for more than ninety (90) days. The EBF points were calculated by the Claims Committee based on its review of the Proof of Claim Forms submitted by each Claimant and a review of all documentation submitted by the Claimant and/or released at the request of the Claimant. And, upon completion of the still ongoing process of calculating the total EBF points, the Claims Committee will tabulate the grand total of all EBF points for all Claimants. This total will then be divided into the total value of the EBF to determine the dollar value of each EBF point.
Settlement Class Members who submitted timely Proof of Claims Forms will receive a “proposed payment amount with a written explanation” from the Claims Committee. If the Settlement Class Member believes the value assigned to his or her claim has been wrongly determined, the Claimant has the option to appeal to the Courtappointed Special Master.
In exchange for the relief provided under the Settlement Agreement, the named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members will release all claims against Mericle and the Luzerne County Parties.4 In addition, Settlement Class Members agree and covenant not to sue Mericle or the Luzerne County Parties over any matter which could have been alleged in these Civil Actions.
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4. Notice Notice of the Settlement was disseminated to potential Settlement Class Members through a variety of means, including direct mailings, a toll-free call center, publication in newspapers, and a website. With respect to direct mailings, Class Counsel mailed a total of 7,354 copies of the Notice of Settlement and Proof of Claim Form to the last known addresses of potential Class Members by first-class and certified mail. Additionally, the toll-free call center established by Class Counsel, which was open to receive calls twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, received 873 calls regarding the litigation and the terms of the Settlement. And, when the call center’s customer service representatives were unable to answer questions about the Settlement, the representatives arranged for the callers to speak with Class Counsel. In addition to direct mailings of the Class Notice, Class Counsel also caused the Notice of Settlement to be published in the Times Leader and the Citizens’ Voice. Finally, Class Counsel maintained a website containing information about the Settlement. Since April 1, 2012, the website has received 907 visits.
II. Discussion
A. Class Certification *5 Even though the Settlement Agreement has already been preliminarily approved, there must still be a final determination as to whether to certify the class and grant final approval of the Settlement. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick–Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 797 (3d Cir.1995). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that class action settlements must be approved by the Court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled ... only with the court’s approval.”); see also Ripley v. Sunoco, Inc., ––– F.R.D. ––––, 2012 WL 2402632, at *1 (E.D.Pa. June 26, 2012). However, “the ultimate inquiry into the fairness of the settlement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) does not relieve the court of its responsibility to evaluate Rule 23(a) and (b) considerations.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir.2005).
As such, “before approving a class settlement agreement, ‘a district court first must determine that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) are met.’ “ Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 296 (3d Cir.2011) (en banc) (quoting In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir.2010)). Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains four threshold requirements which every putative class must satisfy:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). These requirements are referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. If these four prerequisites are satisfied, “a district court must then determine that the proposed class fits within one of the categories of class actions enumerated in Rule 23(b).” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 296. Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), under which certification is proper where “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).
The “[f]actual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, to certify a class the district court must find that the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 257–58 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir.2008)).
1. Rule 23(a)
a. Numerosity The first requirement for a class action is that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). “ ‘No single magic number exists satisfying the numerosity requirement.” Logory v. Cnty. of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 140 (M.D.Pa.2011) (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 05– 3619, 2008 WL 800970 at *6 (D.N.J. Mar.20, 2008)). However, the Third Circuit has opined that while there is technically no minimum class size, “generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.” Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226–27 (3d Cir.2001).
*6 Here, the Settlement Classes are comprised of over three thousand members. As such, the numerosity requirement is satisfied. See, e .g., Williams v. City of Phila., 270 F.R.D. 208, 215 (E.D.Pa.2010) (numerosity requirement satisfied where putative class could number
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in the hundreds or thousands); Zeno v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.R.D. 173, 184 (W.D.Pa.2006) (proposed class of 2,100 claimants sufficient to satisfy numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)).
b. Commonality To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), there must be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Satisfaction of the commonality requirement requires that plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims “depend upon a common contention,” the resolution of which “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). “Commonality does not require an identity of claims or facts among class members; instead, [t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 597–98 (3d Cir.2012). But, the Supreme Court recently indicated that “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.” Wal– Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (citations and internal quotation omitted). That is, “[t]heir claims must depend upon a common contention.... That common contention, moreover must be capable of classwide resolutionwhich means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id.
The commonality requirement is sufficiently satisfied in this case. In particular, the claims of the Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class stem from the construction, and subsequent operation, of two juvenile detention facilities. Specifically, their claims turn on whether Defendants, including Mericle, acted in conspiracy with Conahan and Ciavarella to deprive Juvenile Plaintiffs of their constitutionally guaranteed rights, whether Defendants organized an association-infact enterprise, and whether Defendants participated in the affairs of an entity through a pattern of racketeering activity. These claims are capable of classwide resolution, as they all “arise from the same nucleus of operative facts and involve the same legal theories” against Mericle. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 249 (E.D.Pa.2012). Thus, the commonality prong of Rule 23(a)(2) is met.
c. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses

of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). “The concepts of typicality and commonality are closely related and often tend to merge.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 597 (citing Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir.1994)). “The typicality criterion is intended to preclude certification of those cases where the legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict with those of the absentees by requiring that the common claims are comparably central to the claims of the named plaintiffs as to the claims of the absentees.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 57. “Factual differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based on the same legal theory.” Id. at 58 (citation omitted). When analyzing typicality, a court must compare the situation of the proposed representative to that of the class as a whole by considering “the similarity of the legal theory and legal claims; the similarity of the individual circumstances on which those theories and claims are based; and the extent to which the proposed representative may face significant unique or atypical defenses to her claims.” In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 597 (3d Cir.2009).
*7 The claims of the Representative Plaintiffs, as identified in the Settlement Agreement, are typical of the Juvenile Settlement Class Members and the Parent Settlement Class Members. With respect to the Juvenile Settlement Class, the gravamen of the Representative Plaintiffs’ claims is that, as a result of the alleged conspiracy, Ciavarella and Conahan had an undisclosed financial interest and conflict-of-interest in adjudicating children delinquent and sending them to placement. And, like all other Juvenile Settlement Class Members, the Representative Plaintiffs were denied their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal when they appeared before Ciavarella. As such, the legal theories for all Juvenile Plaintiffs, that their adjudications were unconstitutional, will be the same. Thus, the typicality requirement is satisfied as to the Juvenile Settlement Class.
The claims of the Parent Settlement Class Representatives are also typical of all Parent Settlement Class Members. Specifically, all Parent Settlement Class Members assert RICO claims based on the alleged conspiratorial conduct of Defendants, which resulted in the payment of court fees, fines, interest, and penalties. As the legal theories for all Parent Settlement Class Members will be the same, the typicality requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a) (3) is satisfied.
d. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). “The adequacy requirement has two components: (1) concerning the experience and
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performance of class counsel; and (2) concerning the interests and incentives of the representative plaintiffs.” Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir.2012) (citing In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 303). Essentially, the adequacy inquiry considers whether “the putative named plaintiff has the ability and the incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously, that he or she has obtained adequate counsel, and that there is no conflict between the individual’s claims and those asserted on behalf of the class.” Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
The qualifications and performance of class counsel under Rule 23(a)(4) is based upon the factors set forth in Rule 23(g). See Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir.2010) (“Although questions concerning the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) ... those questions have, since 2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).”). That subsection lists several non-exclusive factors that a district court must consider in determining “counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1) (B), including: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action,” (2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action,” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law,” and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1)(A).
*8 Here, Class Counsel has the experience, skill, and qualification necessary to conduct this litigation. In particular, the individual attorneys in this action have extensive experience in complex class action litigation involving mass actions and civil rights claims. Consistent with their impressive qualifications, Class Counsel, throughout this litigation, has demonstrated considerable ability in prosecuting this case. Specifically, Class Counsel has performed substantial work, and expended considerable time and resources, in presenting the facts and complex legal issues implicated in this litigation, as Class Counsel has prepared multiple complaints, responded to numerous motions to dismiss, engaged in mediation, and reviewed discovery. Class Counsel has pursued this action vigorously and with great dedication on behalf of all Plaintiffs. Thus, based on Class Counsel’s work to date in this litigation, it is apparent that these attorneys have fairly and adequately represented the interests of the Settlement Class Members.
With respect to the second prong of the adequacy inquiry, the Third Circuit has “recognized that the linchpin of the adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of the class.” Dewey, 681 F.3d at 183 (citations

omitted). The adequacy requirement “is designed to ferret out” intra-class conflicts, and to ensure that the named plaintiffs have the incentive to represent the claims of the class. Id. at 184 (citations omitted). If any conflicts “undercut the representative plaintiffs’ ability to adequately represent the class” they are “fundamental,” such that class representation is structurally faulty and Rule 23(a)(4) cannot be satisfied. Id. at 184–85.
The Representative Plaintiffs fairly and adequately protected the interests of the Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class in this action. Here, the interests of the Representative Plaintiffs are consistent with the Settlement Class Members, and there appears to be no conflicts between or among the groups. As discussed, the Representative Juvenile Plaintiffs were damaged as a result of Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct, including Mericle’s alleged conduct, and the Representative Juvenile Plaintiffs would have to prove the same wrongdoing as the Juvenile Settlement Class Members to establish Defendants’ (and Mericle’s) liability. Similarly, the Representative Parent Plaintiffs were damaged as a result of the alleged conspiratorial conduct of Defendants, including Mericle, which resulted in the payment of court fees, fines, interest, and penalties, and which would require all Parent Plaintiffs to demonstrate the same wrongdoing to establish Defendants’ liability. Thus, as “the interests of the named plaintiffs are not antagonistic to those of the class[es],” Marsden v. Select Med. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 480, 485 (E.D.Pa.2007) (citing In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 303), and nothing in the record suggests that the Representative Plaintiffs acted in conflict with the Settlement Classes or failed to vigorously pursue the claims of all Class Members, see, e.g., Esslinger v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., No. 10–3213, 2012 WL 5866074, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Nov.20, 2012), the adequacy requirement is satisfied by the Representative Plaintiffs.
2. Rule 23(b)(3) *9 Besides meeting the four threshold requirements under Rule 23(a), a proposed class must also satisfy one of the three sub-parts of Rule 23(b). See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir.2004). Here, Plaintiffs seek to maintain this class action under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows for a class action to proceed if “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and [ ] a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). These requirements are commonly separated into the “predominance” and “superiority” requirements. See In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 308–09.
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a. Predominance The predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) “ ‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’ “ Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 297 (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 266 (3d Cir.2009)). “Parallel with Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality element, which provides that a proposed class must share a common question of law or fact, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement imposes a more rigorous obligation upon a reviewing court to ensure that issues common to the class predominate over those affecting only individual class members.” Id. (citing Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 266). Thus, the Third Circuit “ ‘consider[s] the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement to be incorporated into the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and therefore deem it appropriate to analyze the two factors together, with particular focus on the predominance requirement.’ “ Id. (quoting Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 266). And, Third Circuit precedent “provides that the focus of the predominance inquiry is on whether the defendant’s conduct was common as to all of the class members, and whether all of the class members were harmed by the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 298.
In assessing predominance, “a court at the certification stage must examine each element of a legal claim ‘through the prism’ of Rule 23(b)(3).” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600 (quoting In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 630 (3d Cir.2011)). Thus, “[a] plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that the element of [the legal claim] is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.’ “ Id. (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311).
With respect to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought by the Juvenile Settlement Class Members, Juvenile Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that Mericle “(1) acting under color of law, (2) violated the plaintiff[s’] federal constitutional or statutory rights, (3) and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 299 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.1998)). As to the “state actor” inquiry, proof of this element would focus solely on Mericle’s conduct, specifically whether Mericle willfully participated in joint activity with Ciavarella and Conahan. And, due to the alleged conspiratorial conduct, each member of the Juvenile Settlement Class claims that they appeared before a partial tribunal, depriving them of their constitutional rights. Because the § 1983 claims against Mericle rely on the same course of conduct, common proof of such conduct, and damage as a result of that conduct, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is met for these claims.
*10 Next, “[t]he elements of a civil RICO claim under §

1962(c) are (1) the conducting of, (2) an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity, (5) which results in injury to the plaintiffs’ business or property.” Tapp v. Proto, 718 F.Supp.2d 598, 625 (E.D.Pa.2010) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). For a § 1962(d) claim, a plaintiff must establish “(1) an agreement to commit the predicate acts of fraud, and (2) knowledge that those acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity conducted in such a way as to violate section 1962(a), (b), or (c).” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir.1989) (citing Odesser v. Continental Bank, 676 F.Supp. 1305, 1312 (E.D.Pa.1987)).
Proving the first element of the § 1962(c) RICO claims in this case would involve common questions about the activities of Mericle, and, whether Mericle participated or engaged in conduct with other Defendants. See Ins. Brokerage, 579, F.3d at 269. The second element also involves common legal and factual questions, specifically whether an enterprise existed. See id. at 269–70. Likewise, proof of the third and fourth elements would encompass common questions of law and fact, notably whether activities that constitute racketeering were occurring through the enterprise, and whether these racketeering activities were occurring in a pattern that could be established. See id. at 270. And, “[w]hile establishing an injury is not as conducive to common proof,” “plaintiffs have presented a plausible theory for proving a class-wide injury as a result of the racketeering activities of the alleged enterprise.” Id. For the same reasons, the § 1962(d) claim focuses on the conduct of Defendants, and whether Defendants “conspire[d] to violate § 1962(c).” Id. at 269. Thus, all elements of the alleged RICO violations involve common questions of law and fact. Therefore, Plaintiffs adequately satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).
b. Superiority According to Rule 23(b)(3), the considerations relevant to the superiority inquiry include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature theof any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). “The superiority requirement asks a district court ‘to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternative available methods of adjudication.’ “ In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 309 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir.1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997)). And, when “confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689.
*11 A class resolution in the manner proposed in the Mericle Settlement is superior to other available methods for resolution of this action against Mericle. First, proceeding as a class action in this case is far superior to allowing piecemeal litigation of the exact same claims in countless lawsuits. See, e.g., Logory, 277 F.R.D. at 146 (quoting Stanford v. Foamex L.P., 263 F.R.D. 156, 174 n. 22 (E.D.Pa.2009)). Second, where a claim is small in comparison to the costs of prosecuting a lawsuit, a class action allows for litigation costs to be spread among the injured parties. See Processed Egg Prods., 284 F.R.D. 249. Indeed, “[a]ddressing the rights of those who would not otherwise be appropriately incentivized to bring their own singular claims was precisely the aim of the Advisory Committee in promulgating Rule 23(b)(3).” Logory, 277 F.R.D. at 146 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689). Third, this is an appropriate forum for concentrating the claims of the Settlement Classes because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and personal jurisdiction over the parties. See Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *5. Lastly, the difficulties in managing a class action need not be considered since the Settlement will avoid trial. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689. For these reasons, the superiority requirement is satisfied.
3. Conclusion as to Class Certification for Settlement Purposes Because all of the Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements have been met, the Classes will be certified for settlement purposes.
B. Notice “In the class action context, the district court obtains personal jurisdiction over the absentee class members by providing proper notice of the impending class action and providing the absentees with the opportunity to be heard or the opportunity to exclude themselves from the class.”

In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 326 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985)). Rule 23 contains two distinct notice provisions. See id. at 326. First, Rule 23(c)(2) requires that class members be given the best notice practicable, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable efforts. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c) (2).5 Second, Rule 23(e) requires all class members to be notified of the terms of any proposed settlement. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). This “notice is designed to summarize the litigation and the settlement” and “to apprise class members of the right and opportunity to inspect the complete settlement documents, papers, and pleadings filed in the litigation.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 327 (citation omitted).
Here, the Notice of the Mericle Settlement contained the information required by Rules 23(c)(2) and 23(e). Specifically, the Notice detailed the nature of the action, the definition of the Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class, the claims of the Settlement Classes, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and the right to object or request exclusion from the terms of the Settlement. The Notice also informed members of their opportunity to be heard at the fairness hearing, to enter an appearance through an attorney of their choice, and that the Settlement would be binding on members that did not opt out.
*12 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ efforts to notify the Settlement Class Members satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 and due process. The Notice was sent to potential Settlement Class Members by first-class and certified mail based on the last known addresses of these individuals. Notice was also published in two local newspapers, and information about the proposed Settlement was available through a detailed website. Based on the extensive individual notice, as well as the published notice, the notice requirements of both Rule 23 and the Due Process Clause have been satisfied. See Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir.1985) ( “first-class mail and publication regularly have been deemed adequate under the stricter notice requirements ... of Rule 23(c)(2).”).
C. Fairness of the Settlement Certified federal class actions may only be settled with court approval. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). While the approval of a class action settlement is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, “it can endorse a settlement only if the compromise is fair, adequate, and reasonable.’ “ Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 482 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Walsh v. Great. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir.1983)). This is especially true in cases such as this “where settlement negotiations
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precede class certification, and approval for settlement and certification are sought simultaneously.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 535 (citing Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 805).
The Third Circuit has identified nine factors, known as the Girsh factors, to be considered when determining whether a proposed class action settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.1975). These factors are:
(1) The complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; 4) the risks of establishing liabiliy; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 534–35 (citing Girsh, 521 F.3d at 157). “The settling parties bear the burden of proving that the Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of the settlement.” Pet Food, 629 F.3d at 350 (citing Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 785).
1. Complexity, Expense, and Duration of Litigation The first Girsh factor “captures the probable costs, in both time and money, of continued litigation.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 535–36. This litigation was commenced almost four years ago, and it encompasses a Class Period dating back to 2003. In order to prepare this action to proceed to trial against Mericle, Plaintiffs would be required to expend considerable financial resources conducting depositions and drafting and responding to further motions. And, as recognized by Plaintiffs, this case raises complex legal issues with respect to the RICO and § 1983 claims. Additionally, a trial on the merits would require hours of attorney preparation and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Likewise, even if this case proceeded to trial against Mericle, a “complicated, lengthy trial,” would ensue, and the “inevitable ... posttrial motions and appeals would not only further prolong the litigation but also reduce the value of any recovery to the class.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 536. As such, the first Girsh factor weighs in favor of approving the Mericle

Settlement.
2. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement *13 “The second Girsh factor ‘attempts to gauge whether members of the class support the settlement.’ “ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 536 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 318). The Third Circuit has noted that a vast disparity between the number of potential class members who received notice of a proposed settlement and the number of objectors “creates a strong presumption that this factor weighs in favor of the Settlement.” In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 235 (3d Cir.2001). Similarly, “[c]ourts have generally assumed that ‘silence constitutes tacit consent to the agreement.’ “ Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 812 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1313 n. 15 (3d Cir.1993).
The reaction of the class strongly favors approval of the Settlement. Here, following extensive notice, both to potential Settlement Class Members individually and by general publication, none of the class of approximately 3,910 Members objected to the proposed Settlement.6 Furthermore, only fourteen (14) Settlement Class Members opted out the Settlement, and, since that time, Mericle has resolved all of the opt out claims. The lack of objections and the low number of opt outs demonstrate a general acceptance of the Settlement by Class Members. See, e.g., Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 118–19 (3d Cir.1990) (approving settlement where “only” 29 objections were made in a 281–member class); Alexander v. Washington Mut., Inc., No. 07–4426, 2012 WL 6021098, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Dec.4, 2012) (reaction of class favored approval of settlement where only five class members opted out and no formal objections were filed to the settlement); Ripley v. Sunoco, Inc., ––– F.R.D. ––––, 2012 WL 2402632, at *1 (E.D.Pa. June 26, 2012) (reaction of the class favored approval of settlement where “less than 1 percent of the eligible class members opted out of the settlement”). The second Girsh factor thus strongly counsels in favor of settlement approval.
3. Stage of the Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed The third Girsh factor “captures the degree of case development that class counsel had accomplished prior to settlement,” and allows the court to “determine whether counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (citation, quotations, & alterations omitted); see also Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 813 (“Given the purpose of this inquiry, ... it is ... appropriate to measure the stage by reference to the commencement of proceedings either in the class action at issue or in some related proceeding.”).
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When analyzing this Girsh factor, courts also examine whether the settlement resulted from arm’s-length negotiations. See In re Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F.Supp.2d 484, 491 (E.D.Pa.2003). When the settlement results from arm’s-length negotiations, the court will “afford[ ] considerable weight to the views of experienced counsel regarding the merits of the settlement.” McAlarnen v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 09– 1737, 2010 WL 365823, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Jan.29, 2010); see also Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts generally recognize that a proposed class action settlement is presumptively valid where, as in this case, the parties engaged in arm’s length negotiations after meaningful discovery.”); In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F.Supp.2d 423, 431 (E.D.Pa.2001) (“Significant weight should be attributed to the belief of experienced counsel that the settlement is in the best interests of the class.”).
*14 The Settlement was preliminarily approved in February 2012, almost three years after the commencement of this litigation. Arm’s-length settlement discussions lasted for one year, and an agreement was reached only after a failed mediation and numerous telephone conferences and face-to-face meetings between counsel for the parties. During that time, considerable time, effort, and money was expended by both parties, including the production and review of over 200,000 pages of documents and hundreds of Plaintiff Fact Sheets. Numerous pleadings and motions were also filed, and responded to, by Plaintiffs and Mericle in this action, including a motion to stay (Doc. 221), motions to dismiss (Docs. 442; 704; 932), and a motion to amend. (Doc. 749.) As such, at this stage of the proceedings “ ‘the parties certainly had a clear view of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.’ “ McCoy v. Health Net, Inc., 569 F.Supp.2d 448, 461 (D.N.J.2008) (quoting Bonett v. Educ. Debt Servs., Inc., No. 01–6528, 2003 WL 21658267, at *6 (E.D.Pa. May 9, 2003)). The third Girsh factor therefore weighs in favor of settlement approval.
4. Risks of Establishing Liability “The fourth Girsh factor ‘examines what the potential rewards (or downside) of litigation might have been had class counsel decided to litigate the claims rather than settle them.’ “ Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 322 (quoting Cendant, 264 F.3d at 237). “[T]he more risks that Plaintiffs may face during litigation the stronger this factor favors approving a settlement.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *9 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 319). “The inquiry requires a balancing of the likelihood of success if ‘the case were taken to trial against the benefits of immediate settlement.’ “ In re Safety Components, Inc. Sec. Litig. ., 166 F.Supp.2d 72, 89 (D.N.J.2001) (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 319).

As previously noted, Plaintiffs face a difficult task of proving all elements of their claims should these actions proceed to trial. While Plaintiffs did not provide, in detail, the risks of establishing liability in this case, this is understandable in this case “[g]iven that the litigation [will] continue against other defendants, [and] the parties may [have been] reluctant to disclose fully and candidly their assessment of the proposed settlement’s strengths and weaknesses that led them to settle separately. Processed Egg Prods., 284 F.R.D. 249 (quoting David F. Herr, The Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.651, at 505 (4th ed.2011)).
In addition, possible appeals, summary judgment motions, and trial still remain if the Settlement is not approved. Thus, as “this case involves difficult factual and legal issues which would have translated into protracted litigation and accumulating expenses, in both time and money,” In re. Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 104 (D.N.J.2012), this factor weighs in favor of approval.
5. Risks of Establishing Damages *15 This factor “attempts to measure the expected value of litigating the action rather than settling it at the current time.” Cendant, 264 F.3d at 239 (quoting Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 816). “This factor, like the last, involves a balancing of risks.” In re CertainTeed Corp. Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 269 F.R.D. 468, 488 (E.D.Pa.2010).
In this case, even if Plaintiffs were able to establish liability, they would still be tasked with proving the appropriate amount of damages against Mericle. For Juvenile Plaintiffs that only seek presumed damages with respect to the § 1983 claims, proving damages may not present a daunting task. However, Juvenile Plaintiffs seeking more than presumed damages may face significant obstacles in establishing individual damages. The issue of individualized damages could very well lead to a “battle of the experts” with no guarantee whom the jury would believe. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 236. Furthermore, even if damages are established, post-trial motions and appeals present increased risk to the recovery of damages.
In the instant case, the risks of establishing damages factor is neutral. Although some Plaintiffs may face difficulty in establishing individualized or special damages, establishing presumed damages suffered by the Juvenile Settlement Class as a whole would not present the same risks. As such, this factor does not weigh for or against approval.
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6. Risks of Maintaining the Class Action through Trial The sixth Girsh factor “measures the likelihood of obtaining and keeping a class certification if the action were to proceed to trial” in light of the fact that “the prospects for obtaining certification have a great impact on the range of recovery one can expect to reap from the class action.” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 322. “The value of a class action depends largely on the certification of the class because, not only does the aggregation of the claims enlarge the value of the suit, but often the combination of the individual cases also pools litigation resources and may facilitate proof on the merits.” Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 817. However, a “district court retains the authority to decertify or modify a class at any time during the litigation if it proves to be unmanageable.” Id. (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321).
If the Settlement was rejected, Mericle would likely vigorously oppose class certification. Indeed, Mericle specifically reserved the right to challenge any type of class certification other than certification for settlement purposes. And, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized: “There will always be a ‘risk’ or possibility of decertification, and consequently the court can always claim this factor weighs in favor of settlement.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321. The sixth Girsh factor therefore slightly favors settlement approval.
7. Ability of Defendants to Withstand a Greater Judgment *16 The seventh Girsh factor considers “whether the defendants could withstand a judgment for an amount significantly greater than the settlement.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537–38 (citation, quotations, & alteration omitted). Mericle Construction, a large commercial real estate corporation, may conceivably be able to withstand a greater judgment. However, “ ‘in any class action against a large corporation, the defendant entity is likely to be able to withstand a more substantial judgment, and, against the weight of the remaining factors, this fact alone does not undermine the reasonableness of the instant settlement.’ “ Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 323 (quoting Weber v. Gov’t Empl. Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 431, 447 (D.N.J.2009)). Furthermore, “the settling defendant’s ability to pay greater amounts [may be] outweighed by the risk that the plaintiffs would not be able to achieve any greater recovery at trial.” In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F.Supp.2d 619, 632 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 95 F.Supp.2d 290, 318 (W.D.Pa.1997)).
Based on the lack of information submitted with respect to this factor, the Court is not in a position to determine whether Mericle could withstand a greater judgment than that provided under the Settlement. Thus, the seventh Girsh factor is neutral. However, it is significant to note that there is no insurance coverage with respect to the

claims in this case, the benefits owed under the Settlement have been placed in escrow, and all opt outs from the Settlement have been resolved. As such, even though Mericle may be able to pay a greater sum, the Court is satisfied that the Settlement is still fair, reasonable, and adequate. See, e.g., In re Auto. Refmishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 617 F.Supp.2d 336, 344 (E.D.Pa.2007) (finding the settlement figure fair, reasonable, and adequate despite defendants’ ability to withstand greater judgment, in light of the substantial benefits provided to class members); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F.Supp.2d 235, 262–63 (D.N.J.2000), aff’d, In re Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d 201 (approving settlement despite lack of evidence of defendant’s ability to withstand greater judgment).
8. Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement in Light of the Best Possible Recovery and the Attendant Risks of Litigation “The last two Girsh factors evaluate whether the settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor value for a strong case. The factors test two sides of the same coin: reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and reasonableness in light of the risks the parties would face if the case went to trial.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322). “Notably, in conducting the analysis, the court must guard against demanding too large a settlement based on its view of the merits of the litigation; after all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution.” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 324.
*17 To assess the reasonableness of a settlement in a case, such as this, seeking primarily monetary relief, a court should compare “ ‘the present value of the damages plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, appropriately discounted for the risk of not prevailing ... with the amount of the proposed settlement.’ “ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322).
The Settlement provides for $17,750,000.00 to be distributed to the Settlement Classes, less attorneys’ fees and costs. Although Plaintiffs do not set forth an exact estimation of the damages they would likely recover if successful, Plaintiffs discuss the obstacles that must be surmounted before any damages may be awarded. These hurdles could substantially reduce, if not eliminate, any recovery by Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs retained an ethics expert, Professor Lynn A. Baker, to offer an opinion as to fairness and reasonableness of the Settlement. Professor Baker has served as an ethics expert in multiple large-dollar, large-group settlements. Professor Baker, based upon her experience, opined that all of the components of the Settlement Agreement were fair, reasonable, and appropriate under the circumstances.
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Here, “while the exact maximum possible recovery in this case may be unclear, the extensive risks of litigation are not.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *10 (finding eighth and ninth Girsh factors favored settlement approval despite lack of exact estimation as to likely recovery). Based on these attendant risks, the final two Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of the Settlement.
9. Prudential Factors In addition to the Girsh factors, courts in the Third Circuit also consider the following factors outlined in Prudential:
the maturity of the underlying substantive issues, as measured by experience in adjudicating individual actions, the development of scientific knowledge, the extent of discovery on the merits, and other facts that bear on the ability to assess the probable outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and individual damages; the existence and probable outcome of claims by other classes and subclasses; the comparison between the results achieved by the settlement for individual class or subclass members and the results achievedor likely to be achieved-for other claimants; whether class or subclass members are accorded the right to opt out of the settlement; whether any provisions for attorneys’ fees are reasonable; and whether the procedure for processing individual claims under the settlement is fair and reasonable.
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 323.
In this case, none of the Prudential factors weigh against approval, and three (3) factors weigh in favor of settlement: (1) whether members are accorded the right to opt out; 35(2) whether any provisions for attorneys’ fees are reasonable; and (3) whether the procedure for processing individual claims under the Settlement is fair and reasonable. As noted, the Settlement Class Members were given the opportunity to opt out. The attorneys’ fees sought by Class Counsel, as discussed below, are reasonable in light of the time expended litigating this action. And, finally, the procedure for processing individual claims under the Settlement is fair and reasonable, and the procedure has been explained clearly in forms available to Settlement Class Members.

10. Summary of Girsh and Prudential Factors *18 After consideration of the Girsh factors and the relevant Prudential factors, I conclude that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e). As discussed, a few factors do not weigh in favor of settlement. Not every factor need weigh in favor of settlement, however, in order for the Settlement to be approved. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 242–43 (affirming final settlement approval when not all factors weighed in favor of approval). Because the ultimate balance of the Girsh and Prudential factors when considered together weigh in favor of settlement, the Settlement will be approved.
D. Provider Defendants Lack Standing to Object to the Settlement While no Plaintiffs filed objections to the Settlement, Provider Defendants oppose approval of the Mericle Settlement. Non-settling defendants, such as Provider Defendants, generally “lack standing to object to a partial settlement, because they are ordinarily not affected by such a settlement.” Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 482 (3d Cir.1995) (citing In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1330, 1332 (3d Cir.1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1622, 113 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). “There is, however, a recognized exception to this general rule, which permits non-settling defendants to object to a partial settlement where they can demonstrate that they will suffer some formal legal prejudice as a result of the partial settlement.” Id. (citing Zupnick v. Fogel, 989 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir.1993); Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d at 1332). For example, “ ‘a non-settling defendant has standing to object to a partial settlement which purports to strip it of a legal claim or cause of action, an action for indemnity or contribution for example,’ or to invalidate its contract rights.” Id. (quoting Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Amer., 828 F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir.1987)). But, when a “settlement agreement ... specifically recognizes the existence of indemnification and contribution rights of non-settling defendants and the Order approving the settlement contains no ruling purporting to limit any claims nonsettling defendants may have,” non-settling defendants lack standing to challenge the settlement. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d at 1333.
Provider Defendants raise the following to establish their standing to object to the proposed Settlement: (1) the Settlement precludes them from getting evidence for their defense, namely, they will not see any documents submitted to the Claims Committee in support of enhanced claims; (2) they will be deprived of the ability to assert factual determinations made about the validity or invalidity of enhanced claims as precluding litigation of
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those issues as to damages in the case against them; (3) they will be deprived of knowing how much in money damages individual enhanced benefit Claimants will receive; and (4) Plaintiffs will determine whether the amount of damages attributable to the settling Mericle Defendants in the action against the Provider Defendants will be pro rata or pro tanto. None of these contentions establishes standing.
*19 First, since the personal histories of Juvenile Plaintiffs have been precluded by the Court as irrelevant (Memorandum and Order dated October 31, 2012; Docs. 1222; 1223), this basis for standing lacks merit.
Second, since this is a settlement, the factual determinations made by a settlement tribunal for settlement purposes cannot be the basis of collateral estoppel in claims against Provider Defendants, they would be covered by Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and precluded from use by or against Provider Defendants. That is, but for the Settlement with the Mericle Defendants, there would be no settlement tribunal or settled claims. The fact that Rule 408 precludes such evidence is manifest.
Third, the amount of settlement recovery by an individual Plaintiff or Class Member will not be concealed. Such amounts will have to be known for any determination of the amount of liability of Provider Defendants. The Court will require the disclosure of such sums assuming the settling parties do not wish to make such disclosures.
Lastly, it is clear that Plaintiffs will not determine the pro rata/pro tanto issue. The Court will do so.
Given the foregoing analysis of Provider Defendants’ proffered bases for standing, it is clear that none meet the test for standing, as Provider Defendants have not demonstrated “that they will suffer some formal legal prejudice as a result of the partial settlement.” Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 482. Therefore, Provider Defendants do not have standing to object to the Mericle Settlement, and their objections to the Settlement will be denied by way of separate Order.7
E. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Under Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]n a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h). A district court must conduct a “thorough judicial review of fee applications ... for all class action settlements.” In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333 (internal quotations omitted)).

In assessing attorneys’ fees, courts typically apply either the percentage-of-recovery method or the lodestar method. The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees from the fund “in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for failure .” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333 (internal quotations omitted). The lodestar method is more typically applied in statutory fee-shifting cases because it allows courts to “reward counsel for undertaking socially beneficial litigation in cases where the expected relief has a small enough monetary value that a percentage-of-recovery method would provide inadequate compensation” or in cases where the nature of the recovery does not allow the determination of the settlement’s value required for application of the percentage-of-recovery method. Id. Regardless of the method chosen, we have suggested it is sensible for a court to use a second method of fee approval to crosscheck its initial fee calculation. Id.
*20 Id. As suggested by the Third Circuit, the percentageof-recovery method will be employed to determine the proper fee to award Class Counsel, and then the lodestar will be utilized as a cross-check to ensure the reasonableness of the award. See id.
1. Application of the Percentage–of–Recovery Method Class Counsel requests a combined award of common benefit attorneys’ fees and expenses of $4,335,000.00 under the percentage-of-recovery method.8 The Third Circuit has instructed a district court to consider ten factors when undertaking a percentage-ofrecovery analysis: (1) the size of the fund created and the number of beneficiaries; (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs’ counsel; (7) awards in similar cases; (8) the value of benefits attributable to the efforts of class counsel relative to the efforts of other groups, such as government agencies conducting investigations; (9) the percentage fee that would have been negotiated had the case been subject to a private contingent fee arrangement at the time counsel was retained; and (10) any innovative settlement terms. In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir.2009) (citations omitted). The award factors, however, “ ‘need not be applied in a formulaic way’ “ because each case is different, “ ‘and in certain cases, one factor may outweigh the rest.’ “ Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 301 (quoting Gunger v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n. 1 (3d Cir.2000)).
13

a. Size of the Fund and Number of Beneficiaries The Settlement Agreement establishes a common fund of $17,750,000 .00 and notice has been disseminated to over 3,000 individuals. In general, as the size of the settlement fund increases the percentage of the award decreases. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 339. “The basis for this inverse relationship is the belief that ‘[i]n many instances the increase [in recovery] is merely a factor of the size of the class and has no direct relationship to the efforts of counsel.’ “ Id. (citing In re First Fid. Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F.Supp. 160, 164 n. 1 (D.N.J.1990)). As explained below, Class Counsel’s requested fees in this case represent less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the common benefit fund, well within the range of reasonable fees, on a percentage basis, in the Third Circuit. See, e.g., Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *12 (thirty percent (30%) fee award reasonable considering size of the fund); In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08–2002, 2012 WL 5467530, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Nov.9, 2012) (approving a thirty percent (30%) fee award for $25,000,000.00 settlement). And, while the size of the common fund “is certainly substantial, it is not a ‘megafund’ that would dictate an award at the low end of the sliding scale.” Frederick v. Range Resources–Appalachia, LLC, No. 08–288, 2011 WL 1045665, at *10 (W.D.Pa. Mar.17, 2011) ($22,000,000.00 settlement does not qualify as a “mega-fund”). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding the fee request reasonable.
b. Presence or Absence of Substantial Objections by Class Members *21 As discussed above with respect to the Girsh factors, no objections were filed to the Settlement by any Settlement Class Member. Similarly, no objections have been filed to Class Counsel’s fee application. “The absence of objections supports the reasonableness of the fee request.” Frederick, 2011 WL 1045665, at *10 (citing In re Rent–Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Su pp.2d 491, 514–15 (W.D.Pa.2003)); In re Amer. Inv. Life Ins. Co. Annuity and Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 263 F.R.D. 226, 244 (E.D.Pa.2009) (“small number of objections and the objections’ lack of merit indicate that the class is satisfied with the fee award”). This factor also weighs in favor of the requested award of attorneys’ fees.
c. Skill and Efficiency of the Attorneys Involved The quality of representation of Class Counsel considers “ ‘the quality of the result achieved, the difficulties faced, the speed and efficiency of the recovery, the standing, experience and expertise of the counsel, the skill and professionalism with which counsel prosecuted the case and the performance and quality of opposing counsel.’ “ In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 194 (E.D.Pa.2000) (quoting In re Computron

Software, Inc., 6 F.Supp.2d 313, 323 (D.N.J.1998)). As set forth in greater detail above, Class Counsel is highly experienced, as the individual attorneys in this action have litigated numerous complex class actions involving mass actions and civil rights claims. Additionally, Class Counsel’s ability to successfully negotiate the Settlement “demonstrates the significant skill and expertise of counsel.” Processed Egg Prods., 2012 WL 5467530, at *3. Likewise, counsel for Mericle has extensive experience defending complex litigation and class actions. Thus, this factor supports the reasonableness of the fee award.
d. Complexity and Duration of the Litigation The Third Circuit has stated that “complex and/or novel legal issues, extensive discovery, acrimonious litigation, and tens of thousands of hours spent on the case by class counsel” are “the factors which increase the complexity of class litigation.” In re Cendant Corp., PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 741 (3d Cir.2001). These factors all support the requested fee award. Class Counsel participated in mediation, engaged in discovery, and submitted numerous, well-researched filings. Equally significant is the complex nature of this litigation, and the alleged judicial corruption scheme for which these actions seek redress. Furthermore, the litigation proceeded against Mericle for almost three years prior to the parties agreeing to the terms of the Settlement. Therefore, the complexity and duration of the litigation supports the requested fee award.
e. Risk of Nonpayment “This factor allows courts to award higher attorneys’ fees for riskier litigation.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at * 13. Here, Class Counsel undertook this complex civil rights/RICO litigation on a contingent fee basis without any guarantee of payment. Class Counsel, in litigating this case, incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs and expenses while facing the risk of not being reimbursed. The risk of nonpayment, therefore, weighs in favor of granting the requested fee award. See, e.g., Processed Egg Prods., 2012 WL 5467530, at *4 (“any contingency fee arrangement includes a risk of nonpayment”); Ripley, 2012 WL 2402632, at *12 (“it follows, therefore, that there was a risk of nonpayment under a contingency arrangement”).
f. Amount of Time Devoted by Class Counsel *22 According to the motion for attorneys’ fees, Class and Plaintiffs’ Counsel have spent 34,900.48 hours prosecuting this matter. Upon reviewing the declarations submitted by Class Counsel, Class Counsel alone spent
14

26,630.18 hours litigating this action.9 Such a large number of hours represents a substantial commitment to this litigation. Furthermore, the amount of time spent on this case prior to final approval of the Settlement reflects the complexity of Plaintiffs’ claims, not the inefficiency of their counsel. Presumably, the thousands of hours counsel spent working on this matter prevented those individuals from litigating other cases. This factor thus strongly favors granting the motion for attorneys’ fees.
g. Awards in Similar Cases “In the Third Circuit, fee awards in common fund cases generally range from 19% to 45% of the fund.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *15 (citing Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc., No. 09–905, 2011 WL 1344745, at *15 (D.N.J. Apr.8, 2011)). “Many courts, including several in the Third Circuit, have considered 25% to be the ‘benchmark’ figure for attorney fee awards in class action lawsuits, with adjustments up or down for significant case-specific factors.” In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 262 (D.Del.2002) (gathering case law and awarding 22.5% in fees on a $10.01 million settlement fund). And, courts in the Third Circuit have found a thirty percent (30%) fee reasonable in cases raising violations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Delandro v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 06–927, 2011 WL 2039099, at *14 (W.D.Pa. May 24, 2011) (“the Court finds that a percentage of thirty percent (30%) ... is in fact identical to, the percentage awarded in a number of other strip-search class action settlements in this Circuit”); Boone v. City of Phila., 668 F.Supp.2d 693, 714 (E.D.Pa.2009) (“30% fee percentage is commensurate with other strip-search class actions”). Therefore, the combined award of attorneys’ fees and costs which will be less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the Settlement fund is reasonable.
h. Value of Benefits Attributed to Class Counsel The eighth factor the Court must consider is the degree to which the benefits of the settlement are attributable to Plaintiffs’ counsel as opposed to the efforts of other actors, such as, for example, government investigators. See In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541. While government investigation uncovered the alleged conspiracy orchestrated by Ciavarella and Conahan which resulted in the indictment of the former judges, “[t]here is no contention ... that the settlement could be attributed to work done by other groups, such as government agencies.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *14. This factor supports the requested fee.
i. Negotiated Fee in a Contingent Fee Arrangement

In private contingency fee cases, attorneys routinely negotiate agreements for between thirty percent (30%) and forty percent (40%) of the recovery. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 123 (D.N.J.2012); In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 194 (E.D.Pa.2000). The requested fee is below this range.
j. Innovative Settlement Terms *23 In their submission, Class Counsel did not identify any particularly “innovative” terms in the Settlement Agreement. Thus, this factor neither weighs against nor for the proposed fee request. See, e.g, McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 329, 345 (E.D.Pa.2011) (“In the absence of any innovative terms, this factor neither weighs in favor or against the proposed fee request.”).
2. Lodestar Cross–Check “The lodestar crosscheck is intended to gauge the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fee award as a whole.” Milliron v. T–Mobile, USA, Inc., 423 F. App’x 131, 136 (3d Cir.2011). In performing the lodestar cross-check, the court multiplies “the number of hours reasonably worked on a client’s case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services based on the given geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the attorneys .” Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 305. Then, the court may apply a multiplier to “account for the contingent nature or risk involved in a particular case and the quality of the attorneys’ work.” Id at 305–06. If the multiplier that must be used in order to obtain the result reached by application of the percentage-of-recovery method “is too great, the court should reconsider its calculation under the percentage-of-recovery method.” Id. at 306. But, because the cross-check is not the primary analysis in common fund cases, it does not require “mathematical precision [ ] or bean-counting.” Id. In evaluating the hours reasonably spent on the case, the court does not have to “review actual billing records” but can “rel[y] on summaries submitted by the attorneys.” See id.
According to Plaintiffs’ submission, the lodestar for Plaintiffs’ counsel of record is $10,754,199.35, and the lodestar for Class Counsel alone is $8,520,861.85. Based on the number of hours spent prosecuting this action, the hourly billable rate for Plaintiffs’ Counsel of record is approximately $308.00, and the hourly billable rate for Class Counsel is approximately $320.00. In assessing whether the hourly billable rate is reasonable, courts should apply “blended billing rates that approximate the fee structure of all the attorneys who worked on the matter.” Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 306. The hourly rate should be reasonable in light of “the given geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the
15

attorneys.” Id. at 305. While the requested hourly rates are higher than those typically approved in cases in the Scranton–Wilkes–Barre area, see, e.g., Supinski v. UPS, Inc., No. 06–CV–0793, 2012 WL 2905458, at *2 (M.D.Pa. July 16, 2012) (awarding hourly rate of $250.00); Carey v. City of Wilkes–Barre, No. 05–CV– 2093, 2011 WL 1900169, at *2 (M.D.Pa. May 19, 2011) (awarding hourly rate of $225.00), a higher hourly billable rate is acceptable in light of the extensive experience that Class Counsel collectively shares and the complex legal services it provided in this case. Furthermore, if the additional hours that will be expended by counsel relating to the processing of claims and allocation appeals are taken into account, the hourly rate used to reach Plaintiffs’ lodestar would be greatly reduced and approach the rates typically found reasonable in this community.
*24 And, using a lodestar of $10,754,199.35, the award of $4,335,000.00 in combined fees and expenses yields a multiplier of significantly less than one. Thus, the lodestar cross-check supports the requested fee award.

fees and costs will be approved.
4. Allocation of Fees Lastly, the motion seeks to allow Lead Counsel to allocate the fee among counsel entitled to share the award. “Generally, a district court may rely on lead counsel to distribute attorneys’ fees among those involved.” Milliron, 423 F. App’x at 134. Allocation of fees in this manner is rationale because counsel “are most familiar with the work done by each firm and each firm’s overall contribution to the litigation,” and this process “conserves the time and resources of the courts.” Processed Egg Prods., 2012 WL 5467530, at *7 (citation omitted). Co– Lead Counsel will therefore be permitted to distribute the fee award to those attorneys who assisted in creation of the Settlement fund. Of course, should all counsel not agree with Co–Lead Counsel’s allocation of fees, the ultimate allocation will then be made by the Court. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99–20593, 2002 WL 32154197, at *24 (E.D.Pa. Oct.3, 2002).

3. Reimbursement of Costs and Expenses In addition to an award of attorneys’ fees, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $707,920.32. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court “may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs” to Plaintiffs’ counsel. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h). “Reimbursement is particularly appropriate in situations where, as here, no class members have objected to it.” Processed Egg Prods., 2012 WL 5467530, at *7. Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel are requesting a combined award of attorneys’ fees and costs, meaning all expenses will be paid and then the remainder of the $4,335,000.00 will be considered the total fee. As this request is reasonable, Plaintiffs’ motion for an award of

III. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the Settlement Classes will be certified, the Settlement will be approved, and the requested attorneys’ fees and costs will be awarded. Furthermore, Provider Defendants’ objections to the Settlement will be denied for lack of standing.
An Order approving the Settlement follows, as does a separate Order denying Provider Defendants’ objections.
	  

Footnotes

1

PACC, WPACC, and Mid–Atlantic Youth Services, Inc. (“MAYS”) are the Provider Defendants. Provider Defendants, along with

Consulting Innovations and Services, Inc., Gregory R. Zappala, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., Perseus House, Inc.

d/b/a Andromeda House, Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Mark A.

Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Barbara Conahan, and Cindy Ciavarella, and all of the aforesaids’ lawyers, agents, and

employees, and subsidiary and parent organizations in their capacities as such, are “Non–Released Parties” under the terms of the

Settlement Agreement.

2

Based on the response to the Notice of Class Action Settlement, Plaintiffs request a modification of the Allocation Plan to have the

remaining balances of the Probation and Non–PACC/WPACC Benefit Funds transferred to the PACC/WPACC Benefit Fund.

(Doc. 1228, 10.)

3

The value of each EBF point awarded will be discussed in detail below.

4

The Luzerne County Parties include the County of Luzerne and all departments and instrumentalities thereof, any current or former

employee, official or agent of the County of Luzerne, and all related parties, successors, and assigns, and all of the aforesaids’

lawyers, agents, and employees. (MSA, ¶ I.B.12.)

5

The notice, in clear and concise language, must state:

(i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class

16

member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2).

6

Indeed, the only “objection” to the Settlement was filed by Provider Defendants. However, for the reasons discussed in greater

detail below, Provider Defendants lack standing to object to the Settlement.

7

At the fairness hearing, Provider Defendants sought to admit the exhibits attached to their opposition to the motion for final

approval. (Docs.1242–1244.) Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the exhibits. Because Provider Defendants lack standing to

object to the Settlement, the request to admit the exhibits will be denied.

8

As noted, Plaintiffs have requested that the total combined award be reduced by the amount necessary to satisfy the claims of the

Parent Settlement Class.

9

The 26,630.18 hours consists of: 9,101.18 hours by attorneys, paralegals, and IT personnel at Anapol Schwartz, (Doc. 1230, Ex.

F); 6,587.94 hours by attorneys and paralegals at Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, (Id. at Ex. G); 4,673 hours by

attorneys, paralegals, and IT personnel at Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, (Id. at Ex. H); and 6,268.06 hours by

attorneys, paralegals, and law students at Juvenile Law Center. (Id. at Ex. I.)

	   	  
End	  of	  Document	  
	  

©	  2013	  Thomson	  Reuters.	  No	  claim	  to	  original	  U.S.	  Government	  Works.	  

17

 
 	  
2012 WL 5379153 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Raul Clark, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. Wayne Dawn, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Angela Rimmer Belanger, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Mark A. Ciavarella, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–cv–286, 3:09–cv–0291, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–0630, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–2535, 3:10–cv–1405. | Oct. 31, 2012.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Before the Court is a discovery dispute between Defendants Mid–Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC (together, the “Provider Defendants”) and the Class and Individual Plaintiffs in this action. In particular, Plaintiffs oppose Provider Defendants’ discovery requests implicating Juvenile Plaintiffs’ delinquency adjudications that have previously been expunged by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Provider Defendants argue that the proposed discovery will demonstrate that any harm or damage suffered by Juvenile Plaintiffs as a result of the denial of their constitutional rights was caused by their

own conduct, and not as a consequence of Provider Defendants’ participation in the alleged conspiracy. Provider Defendants also claim that the proposed discovery is relevant to their defense to class certification.
Because causation and damages can be evaluated in this civil rights action based on Defendants’ conduct and role in the alleged conspiracy without reconsideration on the merits of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding, Provider Defendants’ proposed discovery related to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying adjudications will not be permitted as the requests are irrelevant and inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s expungement orders. Furthermore, because Juvenile Plaintiffs’ family, social, educational, psychological and court histories (the “Juveniles’ Histories”) are not relevant to the issues for which class certification will be sought, Provider Defendants’ proposed discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories in defense of class certification will not be permitted.1
I. Background
As set forth in greater detail in my July 3, 2012 Memorandum, this civil action arises out of the alleged conspiracy related to the construction of juvenile detention facilities, and subsequent detainment of juveniles in these facilities, orchestrated by two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella. See Wallace v. Powell, No. 09–cv–286, 2012 WL 2590150, at *1 (M.D.Pa. July 3, 2012). Plaintiffs in this action, juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella, seek redress from the former judges, as well as the individuals and business entities involved in the construction and operation of these facilities, for the alleged unlawful conspiracy and resulting deprivations of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights.
On August 21, 2012, Provider Defendants and Plaintiffs submitted a joint letter to the Court in an effort to resolve various discovery disputes. (Doc. 1180.) Specifically, Plaintiffs oppose Provider Defendants’ proposed requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents directed to four named Juvenile Plaintiffs. (Id.) In total, Provider Defendants seek 1,057 requests for admission from these four Plaintiffs. (Id.) Provider Defendants intend to submit similar requests to each named Plaintiff in this action. (Id.) Provider Defendants’ discovery requests implicate issues relating to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ stays at the detention facilities and the facts and
1

circumstances surrounding Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying adjudications. According to Provider Defendants, the discovery requests are pertinent to oppose class certification and to the issues of causation, injuries, and damages. (Id.) In opposition, Plaintiffs emphasize that the Juveniles’ Histories and the delinquency adjudication records are irrelevant to causation, damages, and class certification.
*2 Thereafter, on September 5, 2012, a conference was held in an effort to resolve the discovery dispute. At the September 5, 2012 conference, the parties requested the opportunity to fully brief their positions in support of and against the proposed discovery. Subsequently, on October 19, 2012, oral argument was heard as to the parties’ respective positions. Now, as Plaintiffs’ opposition to Provider Defendants’ proposed discovery has been fully briefed, the issue is ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
A. Section 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... or any other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 749 n. 9, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, (1) acting under color of law, (2) violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, (3) and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 299 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v.. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.1998)).2
A § 1983 plaintiff may raise three categories of due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) claims incorporating “specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights”; (2) substantive due process claims “bar[ring] certain arbitrary, wrongful, government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them”; and (3) procedural due process claims concerning the absence of procedural remedies where an

individual is “depriv [ed] by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In their submissions, Provider Defendants contend that: (1) Plaintiffs do not assert any substantive due process claims; and (2) the proposed discovery is relevant to (a) § 1983 causation, and (b) § 1983 damages. (Docs. 1196; 1206.) These issues will be addressed in seratim.
1. Plaintiffs allege claims relating to all three categories of due process identified by the Supreme Court in Zinermon and liability is not dependent on the underlying adjudications. Initially, Provider Defendants argue that the proposed discovery is relevant in this action based on the type of § 1983 claims asserted by Plaintiffs. Specifically, Provider Defendants argue that this action involves claims relating to procedural due process and the denial of constitutional protections set forth in the Bill of Rights. (Doc. 1206.) Provider Defendants further contend that substantive due process is not at issue in this action. Thus, Provider Defendants dispute my previous statement that “Juvenile Plaintiffs allege not only a deprivation of procedural due process, but also a significant denial of substantive due process rights.” Wallace v. Powell, No. 09–286, 2012 WL 2007294, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 5, 2012).
*3 Here, a review of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims demonstrates that the allegations in this action include claims for procedural due process violations, denial of specific rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claims under the “substantive” prong of the Due Process Clause. (Individual Plfs.’ Master Long Form Compl., Count III.) First, Plaintiffs allege procedural due process violations because they were denied a fair procedure prior to the deprivation of their liberty interests. Second, Plaintiffs assert violations of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights—protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. These “rights protected via incorporation are technically part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protection.” John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 577 n. 3 (5th Cir.2000) (“one form of substantive due process is the substantive protections in the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the power of the States”). Lastly, Plaintiffs assert a claim under the “substantive” prong of the Due Process Clause, as they allege Provider Defendants engaged in conscience shocking, arbitrary behavior resulting in the deprivation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ liberty interests. (Individual Plfs.’
2

Master Long Form Compl., Count III.)
With respect to liability for these claims, guilt or innocence is not relevant to the determination of whether a constitutional right has been violated. If someone were subjected to a search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the the search produced incriminating evidence and may even have resulted in a criminal conviction, would not nullify the violation of the Fourth Amendment or necessarily bar a § 1983 claim for damages. Indeed, this is the hypothetical posed by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d (1994):
For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful. In order to recover compensatory damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable injury, which, we hold today, does not encompass the “injury” of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned).
See id. (internal citations omitted). This is the result here. Whether Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated is not dependent on the past conduct of Plaintiffs, it is dependent on the conduct of Provider Defendants. Moreover, given the nullification of their proceedings by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the exercise of examining whether these Plaintiffs were delinquent in any event would be to nullify the nullification of the constitutionally defective determination of delinquency (as discussed in more detail below).
2. The proposed discovery is not relevant to the issue of § 1983 causation or damages.

*4 Provider Defendants next assert that “due to the Juvenile’s own actions and their family, social, educational, psychological and court histories (‘Juveniles’ Histories’), the Juveniles would have been detained and adjudicated, and would have received the same dispositions notwithstanding the alleged payments and alleged violations of constitutional rights.” (Doc. 1196.) The Juveniles’ Histories, according to Provider Defendants, will demonstrate that Juvenile Plaintiffs committed the crimes they were charged with, and, as a result, they are responsible for their own injuries and damages they suffered regardless of Provider Defendants’ participation in the denial of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
a. Causation as to the § 1983 claims hinge on the conduct of Powell and Provider Defendants, not the guilt or innocence of Juvenile Plaintiffs. Provider Defendants first argue that the proposed discovery is relevant to § 1983 causation.3 According to Provider Defendants, “they had no motive to pay the judges” and “the alleged bribes were needless because police would have delivered the juveniles to detention, and Ciavarella would have detained and adjudicated them and rendered the same dispositions because of the Juveniles’ Histories.” (Doc. 1196.) Provider Defendants elaborate that:
These Juveniles’ Histories demonstrate that the Juveniles would have been detained, adjudicated and sentenced anyway, whether or not the judges received any payments, and prove that Provider Defendants had no motive to conspire to bribe the judges. Powell had no more incentive to bribe the judges in his alleged capacity as an agent for Provider Defendants than did the Provider Defendants. The Juveniles’ Histories discredit Powell’s testimony that he paid the judges because he feared that they would stop sending Juveniles to the PACC and WPACC facilities, while they simultaneously support Provider Defendants’ evidence that Powell acted instead for his own purposes to enhance his own law practice, to purchase or rent a condominium, to rent a boat dock, or to hide his assets from his wife. (Id.) Provider Defendants also argue that what former judge Ciavarella did is essentially of no consequence. Likewise, they contend that Plaintiffs’ loss of liberty would have occurred regardless of whether they received a fair tribunal or not, simply because of their past histories. It does not follow that Juvenile Plaintiffs’ past behavior would demonstrate that Provider Defendants had no
3

motive to pay the former judges. It appears the argument is that because Plaintiffs were “bad” (and would have been declared delinquent in any event) Provider Defendants had no motive to pay the judges money. This, of course, begs the question of whether Provider Defendants wanted to assure the right result in the adjudicatory court.4 This question can also be answered without reference to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ past behavior. The past behavior has no bearing on whether the tribunal was fair and whether Provider Defendants were involved in that violation.
*5 This, along with the necessity of retrying Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying criminal cases has been addressed before:
More importantly, the Provider Defendants have failed to convincingly demonstrate that an investigation into the factual background of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s adjudication is necessary to their defense on the issues of causation and damages. The question of causation in this case does not appear to turn on whether the Defendants’ actions caused the incarceration of the Juvenile Plaintiffs, but rather whether the Defendants’ actions caused a deprivation of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights to a fair trial. Moreover, in view of the expungement of the records of all of the juvenile plaintiffs because they were denied due process and a fair tribunal, they have, ipso facto, been damaged. Determining damages by the degree of culpability a plaintiff had regarding the delinquency allegations would involve a trial of each plaintiff on the delinquency allegations, which would effectively nullify the determination that the proceedings conducted by former Judge Ciavarella violated the rights of those juveniles. Neither causation nor damages are appropriately evaluated by resurrecting the expunged records of each juvenile plaintiff. For these reasons, the promotion of fairness does not require the granting of a

modification to or relief from the Protective Order.
Wallace v. Powell, No. 09–CV–286, 2012 WL 1191607, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Apr. 10, 2012). This position was further discussed in the same opinion:
Finally, I must emphasize that I am hesitant to grant any order that would result in the unnecessary reopening and reinvestigation of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ prior convictions. Whether a particular juvenile would have been declared delinquent if given due process would require a fair retrial of the juvenile. Such an exercise is inconsistent with the expungement on the basis that the juvenile was denied due process. Therefore, the reconsideration of the merits of each juvenile plaintiff’s case on the issue of causation and/or damages is inappropriate, and discovery of their records for those purposes will note [sic] be permitted.
Id.
Thereafter, Provider Defendants sought reconsideration of the April 10, 2012 Memorandum and Order. By Memorandum and Order dated June 5, 2012, Provider Defendants’ request for reconsideration was denied, and I reiterated my ruling regarding reconsideration of the merits of each Juvenile Plaintiffs’ criminal case, observing:
Moreover, the Court is not convinced that Carey compels the resolution in this action advanced b y Provider Defendants. Provider Defendants, applying Carey, imply that if Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been detained, or adjudicated guilty, even in the absence of Ciavarella’s improper conduct, then, unless emotional distress is proven by Plaintiffs, they have not suffered actual injuries. Unrecognized by Provider Defendants, however, is that the factual scenario in this case—denial of procedural and substantive due process rights related to an impartial tribunal, including, inter alia, the right to counsel, the right to an unbiased fact finder, and the right to a fair trial—implicate issues far ferent from the school district’s deprivation of presuspension hearings in Carey. Rephrased, unlike the students in Carey, Juvenile Plaintiffs allege not only a deprivation of procedural due process, but also a
4

significant denial of substantive due process rights. In light of these considerations, the Court, at this time, is not convinced that Carey conclusively resolves the issue of damages in this case. See also Stachura, 477 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I do not understand the Court, however, to hold that deprivations of constitutional rights can never themselves constitute compensable injuries. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the logic of Carey, and would defeat the purpose of § 1983 by denying compensation for genuine injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.”).
*6 Wallace v. Powell, No. 09–CV–286, 2012 WL 2007294, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 5, 2012).
Provider Defendants’ insistence on exploring the guilt or innocence of each Juvenile Plaintiff misapprehends the relevant causation inquiry with respect to the § 1983 claims in this case. That is, the issue of causation in this action does not depend on what Juvenile Plaintiffs allegedly did or did not do which put them in the position to appear before former judge Ciavarella. Stated differently, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ conduct—which resulted in them being susceptible to the denial of their constitutional rights in Ciavarella’s courtroom—is irrelevant to the issue of causation in this § 1983 case. Rather, the causation inquiry as to Provider Defendants depends on whether federal law has been violated by an act of their policymaker. See Wallace, 2012 WL 2590150, at *13 (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir.2003)). Provider Defendants’ insistence that causation in this matter can be determined simply based on the “goodness” or “badness” of each Juvenile Plaintiff misconstrues the issue of causation in this action. Accordingly, a retrial of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s criminal case with respect to causation will not be held .5
b. Reopening and reinvestigation of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s underlying delinquency adjudication is not necessary to resolve the issue of damages in this action. Provider Defendants also assert that Juvenile Plaintiffs’ prior adjudications are relevant to the issue of damages in this action. Provider Defendants argue that the delinquency adjudications are necessary to defend against Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages, to show that Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been adjudicated guilty even in the absence of the due process violations—thus limiting recovery to nominal damages, and to establish that Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of their substantive rights do not warrant recovery of presumed damages.

Conversely, Class and Individual Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to recover damages without consideration of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ delinquency adjudications. According to Class Plaintiffs, they may recover two categories of compensatory damages: (1) damages stemming directly from the deprivation of their rights themselves; and (2) damages based on the injuries sustained by plaintiffs as a result of their unconstitutional adjudications and incarcerations—such as emotional damage. (Doc. 1195.) Class Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to presumed damages for their loss of liberty claim, in addition to any special damages related to any physical, emotional, or economic suffering they, individually, may establish, as well as punitive damages. (Doc. 1205.) Developing that position, Individual Plaintiffs assert that damages available under their § 1983 claims include damages “for everything other than detention/incarceration” such as: (1) mental and emotional distress damages; (2) “the value of the rights violated;” (3) presumed damages; (4) punitive damages; and (5) disgorgement. (Doc. 1194.) Individual Plaintiffs also claim that they may recover “damages for incarceration/detention” based on “two substantive aspects of their Fourteenth Amendment claims”—the violation of their rights under the Bill of Rights and the deprivation of their substantive due process rights based on the conscious shocking behavior of Defendants. (Id.) Both Class and Individual Plaintiffs maintain that Juvenile Plaintiffs’ adjudications are irrelevant to the issue of damages.
i. The framework for compensatory damages in § 1983 actions—Carey v. Piphus and Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura. *7 The Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d (1978) and Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) established the basic parameters for recovery of compensatory damages in § 1983 actions. Because these cases provide the broad framework for the issue of damages in this action, which in turn addresses Provider Defendants’ efforts to reinvestigate Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying delinquency adjudications with respect to damages, Carey and Stachura will both be examined before proceeding to the relevancy of the prior adjudications to the issue of damages.
According to Provider Defendants, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ adjudications are critical to the issue of compensatory damages under the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d (1978). Pursuant to Carey, Provider Defendants argue that “Juvenile Plaintiffs will not be entitled to compensatory damages if the Juveniles would have been detained,
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adjudicated, and disposed of as they actually were after having been accorded [sic] their constitutional rights.” (Doc. 1196, 15.)
In Carey, the Supreme Court reviewed two consolidated cases implicating “the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages by students who were suspended from public elementary and secondary schools without procedural due process.” Carey, 435 U.S. at 248, 98 S.Ct. 1042. In one action, Respondent Jarius Piphus was suspended from school for violation of a school rule against the use of drugs. See id. at 249. Although school officials arranged a meeting to discuss the suspension with Respondent Piphus’ mother, the purpose of the meeting was solely to explain the reasons for the suspension. See id. Subsequently, the respondent commenced a § 1983 action claiming that he had been suspended without due process of law. See id. The second consolidated action in Carey involved the suspension of Respondent Silas Briso for wearing an earring in violation of a school rule prohibiting male students from wearing earrings. See id. at 250. Like Respondent Piphus, Respondent Brisco commenced a § 1983 action for the deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id.
The cases were consolidated for trial, and the district court held that both students had been suspended without procedural due process. See id. at 251. No determination was made by the trial court, however, on whether the respondents would have been suspended if they had received hearings. See id. at 252. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that even if the respondents’ suspensions were justified, “they would be entitled to recover substantial ‘nonpunitive’ damages simply because they had been denied procedural due process.” Id. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to “consider whether, in an action under § 1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must prove that he was actually injured by the deprivation before he may recover substantial ‘nonpunitive’ damages.” Id. at 253.
*8 As to compensatory damages for injuries caused by the suspensions and denial of procedural due process, the Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s finding that “if petitioners can prove on remand that ‘respondents would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held,’ then respondents would not be entitled to recover damages to compensate them for injuries caused by the suspensions.’ “ Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court next addressed whether the respondents could recover substantial, unspecified damages to compensate them for “the injury which is

inherent in the nature of the wrong,” because “injury fairly may be ‘presumed’ to flow from every denial of procedural due process.” Id. at 260–61. The respondents argued that injury should be presumed even if they were guilty of the conduct charged because they were denied the opportunity to present facts in mitigation to the initial decision maker. See id. at 261 n. 16. In rejecting the respondents’ contention, the Court reiterated that the Seventh Circuit found that compensatory damages would not be recoverable if the suspensions were justified, thus negating presumed damage compensation (due to the lack of injury). See id. Importantly, “[t]his holding ... necessarily assumes that the District Court can determine what the outcome would have been if respondents had received their hearing.” Id. (emphasis in original).6
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Seventh Circuit’s finding that substantial nonpunitive damages could be awarded for the denial of procedural due process “even if ... there is no proof of individualized injury to the plaintiff.” Id. at 253. The Carey Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit that damages could be presumed where procedural due process is denied without any showing that injury was caused by the constitutional deprivation. Indeed, the Court found the authority relied upon by the respondents and the Seventh Circuit unpersuasive because those cases actually “held or implied that some actual, if intangible, injury must be proved before compensatory damages can be recovered.” Id . at 264. Nevertheless, he Court cautioned that “the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another.” Id. at 264–65. Rather, “these issues must be considered with reference to the nature of the interests protected by the particular right in question.” Id. at 265.7
The Supreme Court elaborated on the principles of Carey eight years later when it decided Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). In Stachura, the respondent, a tenured public school teacher, was suspended with pay after he showed his class pictures and films concerning human growth and sexuality. See id. at 300–01. The respondent subsequently filed suit alleging that his suspension violated his due process rights and his First Amendment right to academic freedom. See id. at 301–02. A jury found the petitioners liable for the deprivation of the respondent’s constitutional rights, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the respondent’s suspension violated both procedural due process and the First Amendment. See id. at 303. The Supreme Court granted certiorari “limited to the question whether the Court of
6

Appeals erred in affirming the damages award in light of the District Court’s instructions that authorized not only compensatory and punitive damages, but also damages for the deprivation of any ‘constitutional right.’ “ Id. at 304 (citation omitted). The challenged jury instruction provided:
*9 The precise value you place upon any Constitutional right which you find was denied to Plaintiff is within your discretion. You may wish to consider the importance of this right in our system of government, the role which this right has played in the history of our republic, [and] the significance of the right in the context of the activities which the Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the violation of the right.
Id. at 302–303.
At the outset, the Court rejected the respondent’s claim that Carey did not apply to cases involving substantive constitutional rights. See id. at 309. Carey, according to the Stachura Court, “does not establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights, with substantive right afforded greater protection than ‘mere’ procedural safeguards.” Id. And, while the elements and prerequisites of damages vary depending on the interests protected by the constitutional right at issue, damages must always be designed to compensate injuries caused by constitutional deprivations. See id. Thus, “damages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases.” Id. at 311.
The Stachura Court similarly rejected the respondent’s claim that the challenged instruction simply authorized the jury to award a form of “presumed” damages. See id. “Presumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury.” Id. According to the Stachura Court, “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may be appropriate. In those cases, presumed damages may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be impossible to measure.” Id. Expanding on this passage, Justice Marshall, concurring in the judgment, emphasized that:

The Court properly remands for a new trial on damages. I do not understand the Court, however, to hold that deprivations of constitutional rights can never themselves constitute compensable injuries. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the logic of Carey, and would defeat the purpose of § 1983 by denying compensation for genuine injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.
Id. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring).
The Court, however, concluded that the challenged instruction did not, in fact, instruct the jury on presumed damages. See id. at 311. This was precisely because the challenged instruction did not seek to compensate the plaintiff for harm that occurred but was impossible to measure. See id. Instead, since the instruction required the jury to measure damages based on a subjective evaluation of the importance of the right, the instruction could not fairly be characterized as a presumed damage instruction. See id.
*10 In their briefs, the parties vigorously debate how Carey and Stachura should be applied to this action, what remedies are available with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, and whether Juvenile Plaintiffs’ delinquency adjudications must be reinvestigated, and essentially retried, with respect to damages. For the reasons that follow, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ prior adjudications are not properly reinvestigated for purposes of damages.
ii. Retrying whether a particular Juvenile Plaintiff would have been declared delinquent would be inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s expungement orders. Pursuant to the declaration of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ adjudications have been declared a nullity. See In re: J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008, Slip. Op. (Oct. 29, 2009) (per curiam). As articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
[T]his Court now approves of Judge Grim’s recommendation that, for all cases in which Ciavarella entered adjudications of delinquency or consent decrees between January 1, 2003 and May 31, 2008, orders shall be entered vacating those adjudications and consent decrees, regardless of whether the juvenile was represented by counsel.
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...
[G]iven the nature and extent of the taint, the Court simply cannot have confidence that any juvenile matter adjudicated by Ciavarella during this period was tried in a fair and impartial manner.
This Court approves of Judge Grim’s further recommendation that adjudications of delinquency and consent decrees be reversed and dismissed with prejudice, and that expungement of records proceed (with copies to be retained under seal in accordance with any other order of court), in all cases, whether final or not, where a juvenile either proceeded before Ciavarella without counsel, or was committed by Ciavarella to PA Childe Care or Western PA Child Care.
Id. Allowing a retrial of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ adjudications for purposes of damages would effectively nullify the determination that Ciavarella violated Juvenile Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and would be inconsistent with the expungement on the basis that Juvenile Plaintiffs were denied due process.
iii. Carey does not compel reconsideration of the merits of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding. Provider Defendants have attempted, on multiple occasions, to align this case with the Carey Court’s finding that if “petitioners can prove on remand that respondents would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held, then respondents will not be entitled to recover damages to compensate them for injuries caused by the suspensions.” Carey, 435 U.S. at 261, 98 S.Ct. 1042. For the same reason, the Carey Court rejected the respondents’ claim that damages should be presumed “even if they were guilty of the conduct charged [because] they were deprived of the chance to present facts or arguments in mitigation to the initial decision maker.” Id. at 261 n. 16. Attempting to apply this analysis, Provider Defendants opine that Plaintiffs are limited to recovery of nominal damages in this action if Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been detained, adjudicated, and disposed of as they actually were after having been afforded their constitutional rights.
*11 Provider Defendants’ argument fails to recognize a core component of the Carey Court’s analysis as to whether the school district could demonstrate that the suspensions were justified:
This holding, which respondents do not challenge, necessarily assumes

that the District Court can determine what the outcome would have been if respondents had received their hearing. We presume that this determination will include consideration of the likelihood that any mitigating circumstances to which respondents can point would have swayed the initial decisionmaker.
Carey, 435 U.S. at 261 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (emphasis added).
Carey presented a straightforward application—would the students have been suspended had they received an administrative hearing? Conversely, the instant case presents much more complex questions. This action implicates the denial of multiple, fundamental constitutional guarantees necessary to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings. As a result, predicting the outcome of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ delinquency adjudications had they appeared before an impartial tribunal with counsel is significantly more difficult than the issue addressed, and assumed, by the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court in Carey. Particularly, in this case, to determine what “the outcome would have been” may require consideration of a number of unknown and unascertainable components, including, but not necessarily limited to: the legal strategy Juvenile Plaintiffs would have pursued had they been afforded counsel; the legal strategy Juvenile Plaintiffs would have pursued had they been fully informed of the consequences of a guilty plea; and the extent to which Juvenile Plaintiffs’ proceedings would have differed in an impartial courtroom. Based on these variables, it would be impossible to determine whether Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been adjudicated “as they actually were” after being afforded their constitutional rights. (Doc. 1196.) Thus, a critical assumption to the Carey analysis is not present in this case—an ability to accurately predict what the outcome would have been had Plaintiffs been afforded their rights. Discovery of the facts related to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ delinquency adjudications is therefore not necessary to the determination of compensatory damages in this action.
iv. The proposed retrials are not tenable. Provider Defendants also argue that the defense they seek to rely on under Carey-if “Juveniles would have been detained, adjudicated, and disposed of as they actually were after having been accorded [sic] their constitutional rights,” (Doc. 1196, 15)—does not require that juvenile
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court be recreated in this action as part of their defense. Provider Defendants assert that “there is no need to duplicate juvenile court in this forum” because:
[We] are defendants in this civil, federal § 1983 actions. Federal juries regularly determine guilt or innocence in both criminal and civil cases. Provider Defendants desire to use the Juveniles’ Histories to defend against Plaintiffs’ scurrilous claims. “A ‘preponderance of the evidence’ is sufficient to establish criminal conduct as a defense in a civil action.” United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 34 S.Ct. 213, 58 L.Ed. 494 (1914). A civil jury applying the preponderance of the evidence standard can make findings of fact that a criminal jury did not find under the reasonable doubt standard. Mullins v. City of Phila., 287 F. App’x 201, 203 (3d Cir.2008).
*12 (Doc. 1196.)
In opposition, Class Plaintiffs argue that the proposed retrials would require the Court or a jury to stand in the place of the juvenile court and determine for each class member: (1) what evidence would have been available at the time of the hearing; (2) what evidence would have been admissible at the time of the hearing; (3) what evidence and witnesses would have been credible; and (4) what direct and cross-examination would have ensued with respect to each witness in each case. (Doc. 1195.) And, after making all of these determinations, “the Court would then have to determine whether an impartial juvenile court judge would have adjudicated the Plaintiff delinquent on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and then what each Juvenile Plaintiff’s disposition would have been, ...” (Id.) This process, according to Class Plaintiffs, would result in a hopelessly complex inquiry, requiring the Court or jury to determine “by a preponderance of the evidence, whether each particular juvenile was delinquent ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ “ (Id.) Thus, Class Plaintiffs argue that the proposed retrial of each Juvenile Plaintiff is unworkable.
In reply to Class Plaintiffs’ brief, Provider Defendants contend that they “may prove their defense, even the Juveniles’ vilest criminal acts, only by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Doc. 1206.) And, “contrary to Class Plaintiffs’ bald assertions, the jury does not have to stand in the shoes of a juvenile court, is not required to apply Miranda or other exclusionary rules, or determine by a preponderance of the evidence [sic] what a theoretical judge would have done.” (Id.)
I am unconvinced by Provider Defendants’ argument that retrial of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s criminal case would not require juvenile court to be replicated in this action.

Initially, even if I found Carey’s reasoning regarding the “outcome” of the adjudications to be applicable in this case, Provider Defendants’ analysis is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning. As noted, Carey limited the recovery of damages to the respondents if the school district could demonstrate that the suspensions were “justified”, which required a showing that the students would have been suspended “even if a proper hearing had been held.” Carey, 435 U.S. at 260, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (emphasis added).
I interpret these passages in Carey to mean that for Juvenile Plaintiff’s adjudications to have been “justified”, Provider Defendants would be required to establish how Juvenile Plaintiffs’ proceedings would have proceeded after eliminating all of the defects that made the underlying proceedings unconstitutional. Then, once these constitutional defects have been remedied, Provider Defendants would be required to demonstrate the outcome/disposition of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ readjudications. Because this process would have occurred in juvenile court, it necessarily implies that all protections afforded to juvenile defendants would need to be afforded to determine how Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been adjudicated. This exercise would require: (1) an impartial tribunal, including the rights that were previously denied, and all other constitutionally guaranteed rights; and (2) strict compliance with the procedures set forth in the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 6301, et seq .
*13 Under the Juvenile Act:
If the court finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason of which he is alleged to be delinquent it shall enter such finding on the record and shall specify the particular offenses, including the grading and counts thereof which the child is found to have committed.
42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 6341(b) (emphasis added).
The retrials proposed by Provider Defendants, however, do not comport with this Juvenile Act requirement. Instead, Provider Defendants attempt to discard the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof on the basis that this is a civil action. Provider Defendants apparently believe that they can present evidence to the jury of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ conduct, and then have a jury determine that they committed the alleged crime by a
9

preponderance of the evidence to satisfy Carey. This analysis, however, is incomplete. Under Carey, Provider Defendants must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been adjudicated of and disposed of the same had they received a proper hearing (i.e.—an impartial tribunal). But, to be adjudicated delinquent requires a juvenile court determination of delinquency “beyond a reasonable doubt.” As a result, proof of guilt alone (by a preponderance of the evidence) would not satisfy Carey. Instead, Provider Defendants must show that Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been declared delinquent in juvenile court even if they had been afforded their constitutional rights. This would include not just the rights Juvenile Plaintiffs were denied, such as the right to counsel, but would also require consideration of issues regarding the admissibility of evidence and whether evidence should have been suppressed as well issues involving Miranda and the voluntariness of any Juvenile Plaintiff’s confession.
This exercise is not tenable. Provider Defendants have not articulated a clear method with which they can return to the juvenile adjudications and afford Juvenile Plaintiffs their constitutional rights before exploring their guilt or innocence as to the underlying criminal charges. Provider Defendants have merely argued that the proposed retrials would proceed in the following manner: Juvenile Plaintiffs or other witnesses would take the stand in this action, be shown or asked about records, statements, and/or events, and then Provider Defendants would argue to the jury that if they find that Plaintiffs committed the alleged criminal acts, then Juvenile Plaintiffs have not suffered actual injury. This exercise may allow a jury to reach a determination, on a civil standard of proof, as to whether or not each Juvenile Plaintiff in question engaged in the alleged criminal conduct. This exercise, however, would not show the outcome of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding, or how each Juvenile Plaintiff would have been disposed of, had their constitutional rights been provided and had their criminal cases been presented to an impartial tribunal—the key to the Carey analysis. Thus, a jury would be left to predict the dispositions of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings if they were before an impartial tribunal.8 Such an exercise would be based on pure speculation—inviting the jury to guess how an unbiased tribunal would have resolved Juvenile Plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings had they received the full panoply of guaranteed constitutional rights. Outside of resorting to speculation, the finder of fact in this action can simply not determine how a theoretical, impartial juvenile court would have adjudicated Juvenile Plaintiffs’ criminal actions. This reason alone, without regard for the other deficiencies related to Provider Defendants’ efforts

to align this case with Carey, reinforces my determination that Juvenile Plaintiffs’ delinquency adjudications should not be retried with respect to damages.
*14 Finally, the legal propositions advanced by Provider Defendants do not compel a contrary result. Provider Defendants argue that a civil jury can make findings of fact that a criminal jury did not find. Provider Defendants cite, for example, Mullins v. City of Philadelphia, 287 F. App’x 201, 203 (3d Cir.2008), where a civil jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff, who claimed he was assaulted by two deputy sheriffs. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that he was found not guilty of assaulting the officers. See id. In recognizing that the standards of proof differ in civil and criminal cases, the Third Circuit stated “[t]hat a factfinder did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that [the plaintiff] assaulted [the officer] does not mean that a civil jury could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that [the plaintiff] started the conflict.” Id. (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972)). Here, however, Provider Defendants are not attempting to show civil and criminal juries reached different verdicts on the same facts (upon differing standards of proof). Rather, Provider Defendants are asking a civil finder of fact to predict of how a juvenile court would have resolved Juvenile Plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings.
Also unconvincing is Provider Defendants’ arguments that certain constitutional protections are irrelevant to this case because it is a civil action. First, Provider Defendants contend that “the Court need not be concerned that it will be required to resolve Miranda issues” about the two hundred fourteen Juvenile Plaintiffs that admitted their delinquent acts because Miranda need not be met to admit statements in civil cases. (Doc. 1196.) While Provider Defendants are correct that “the results of interrogation without Miranda warnings are admissible in civil cases,” Hanson v. Dane Cnty., 608 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir.2010) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)), Provider Defendants misconstrue how Miranda is applicable in these cases. Under Provider Defendants’ proposed retrials of Juvenile Plaintiffs, Miranda is implicated as a constitutional guarantee with respect to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying adjudications. Because Provider Defendants would have to show Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been declared delinquent even had they not been denied their constitutional rights to comport with Carey, it necessarily follows that Miranda issues would need to be resolved with respect to the reenactment of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings. For the same reasons, the exclusionary rule, although inapplicable to civil actions,
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see, e.g., Cyrus v. City of N.Y., 450 F. App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir.2011) (“exclusionary rule does not apply to § 1983 claims”), would still be relevant with respect to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ hypothetical criminal proceedings.
v. The damages available in this action do not require a retrial on the merits of each Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying criminal case. *15 Provider Defendants argue that many Juvenile Plaintiffs suffered no harm because they were guilty anyway, their past records demonstrate no harm could have been inflicted on them by any constitutional violation, and that in any event, any claim of damages for emotional distress or economic loss would be diminished, if not eliminated, by their past behavior. Thus, Provider Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are limited to recovery of nominal damages in this action. Class and Individual Plaintiffs vigorously dispute these arguments, and assert that they are entitled to recover compensatory, presumed, emotional distress, economic, and/or punitive damages.
While the parties’ submissions implicitly seek a determination as to what remedies and damages are properly available in this action, I do not believe that such a pronouncement is necessary at this stage in the litigation. Instead, for purposes of the issue before me, it is sufficient to note that discovery related to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying adjudications is not relevant with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims and to emphasize that “ ‘the basic purpose’ of § 1983 damages is ‘to compensate people for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.’ “ Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537 (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 254, 98 S.Ct. 1042). Issues related to the available remedies in this action will be resolved at a future point in this litigation.
In sum, a reinvestigation and retrial on the merits of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s underlying adjudication is not necessary to resolve the issue of § 1983 damages in this case. This exercise would be inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s expungement orders and is not justified under any controlling Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. Therefore, a readjudication on the merits of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s criminal case, and discovery of the related records, will not be permitted.9
B. Class Certification Provider Defendants also argue that discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories is relevant to the class descriptions and to class certification. Provider Defendants’ arguments are unconvincing.

1. The proposed discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories is not relevant to determinating membership in the proposed classes. According to Provider Defendants, “Class Plaintiffs must prove that Ciavarella adjudicated and placed the Juveniles in order for the defined classes to survive. Therefore, the Juveniles’ Histories are relevant to the existence of the classes.” Class Plaintiffs, however, have the more convincing position. As to composition of the juvenile class, Class A, members of both Subclass A1 (juveniles who waived counsel and/or pled guilty without counsel or without appropriate colloquies on the record) and Subclass A2 (juveniles who were placed at PACC or WPACC) can be determined solely by reference to the daily case lists and the transcripts of hearings. Composition of Class B, juveniles and parents who paid costs, fines, or other charges associated with the juveniles’ adjudications and/or placements, can be determined without discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories. This, as noted by Class Plaintiffs, can be determined based on the daily case lists and account statements maintained by Juvenile Probation and the Domestic Relations branch of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. Discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories is therefore not necessary for determining membership in the classes.
2. The proposed discovery is not relevant for class certification. *16 Provider Defendants also claim that discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories is necessary to address and resolve issues relevant to class certification. In particular, they cite the class certification requirements of predominance and typicality. Initially, it is necessary to note that it would be premature in connection with a discovery dispute to determine how class certification should proceed. The following discussion is therefore intended only to address Provider Defendants’ specific claim that discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories is necessary in anticipation of class certification.
a. The proposed discovery is not necessary to resolve the predominance inquiry. The predominance requirement for class actions “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Provider Defendants suggest an
11

analogy to products liability cases and decisions that indicate common questions do not predominate where the defenses may depend on the facts of each plaintiff’s case. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir.2012). Again, however, Provider Defendants are offering the Juveniles’ Histories as impacting on the predominance of common issues. The predominate concern is whether Juvenile Plaintiffs were deprived of an impartial tribunal, an element common to all Plaintiffs, which is unrelated to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ adjudications or histories. Further, the allegations implicate a single conspiracy through the ultimate action of a single decision-maker, and whether Provider Defendants participated in this conspiracy is not dependent on the Juveniles’ Histories.
b. The proposed discovery is not necessary to resolve the typicality inquiry. Provider Defendants’ likewise assert that the Juveniles’ Histories prove a lack of typicality. Typicality derives its legal significance from its ability to “ ‘screen out class actions in which the legal or factual position of the representatives is markedly different from that of other members of the class even though common issues of law or fact are present.’ “ Id. at 598 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1764 (3d ed.2005)). “If a plaintiff’s claim arises from the same event, practice or course of conduct that gives rises to the claims of the class members, factual differences will not render that claim atypical if it is based on the same legal theory as the claims of the class.’ Id. (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir.1992)). Again, the issues of constitutional deprivation and causation have no relationship to the Juveniles’ Histories. Indeed, the claims arise from the same event, practice, and course of conduct—the conspiracy to operate for-profit detention centers at the expense of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights—which are all based on the same legal theory. Thus, discovery of the Juveniles’ Histories is not necessary as to the typicality consideration prior to class certification.

the commonality inquiry. *17 Finally, Provider Defendants argue that commonality is not satisfied because the “crucial questions here are: why was I detained, why was I adjudicated and why was my case disposed of in this way. Because of the widely varying, complex Juveniles’ Histories there can be no common answer to these questions.”
“The threshold for establishing commonality is straightforward: ‘The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.’ “ In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 596 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir.1994)). In this case, all Plaintiffs identically claim that Defendants engaged in a concerted effort to achieve one illegal objection: to fill private, for profit juvenile detention facilities with children to ensure monetary gain in direct violation of the youths’ constitutionally guaranteed rights. Thus, all Plaintiffs present a single issue, one that can produce a common answer to all class members’ claims for relief without consideration of the Juveniles’ Histories.
III. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, Provider Defendants’ proposed discovery related to the facts and circumstances of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ underlying criminal proceedings will not be permitted. Whether Juvenile Plaintiffs were guilty or innocent in their underlying criminal proceedings is unrelated to Provider Defendants’ liability for Plaintiffs’ claims in this action. Thus, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ delinquency adjudications will not establish whether Provider Defendants’ caused the denial of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights or whether Plaintiffs were damaged by Provider Defendants’ conduct. The proposed discovery is likewise unnecessary with respect to the issue of class certification.
An appropriate order follows.

	  
c. The proposed discovery is not necessary to resolve

Footnotes

1

Plaintiffs, however, do not appear to dispute that some discovery related to the Juveniles’ Histories may be relevant later in this

litigation with respect to individualized damage claims.

2

In my July 3, 2012 Memorandum, I determined that Plaintiffs sufficiently established a violation of their rights to an impartial

tribunal, but that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Private Defendants were state actors for purposes of §

1983 and whether Provider Defendants caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. See Wallace, 2012 WL 2590150, at *9–*16.

12

3

In the July 3, 2012 Memorandum, I set forth the causation standard that governs Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against

Provider Defendants. See Wallace, 2012 WL 2590150 (“Although Plaintiffs argue that the applicable causation standard to apply

to Provider Defendants and Vision Holdings is the ‘setting in motion’ theory discussed above, the Court agrees with Provider

Defendants that the causation inquiry for these Defendants is governed by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct.

2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).”).

4

It also begs the question of whether payment was made to ensure a stream of youths to PACC or WPACC and not other facilities.

5

Provider Defendants suggest that “Plaintiffs grasp at the alleged violations of Juveniles’ right to an impartial tribunal and

substantive due process as if they were strict liability torts.” (Doc. 1196.) Provider Defendants’ statement is flawed in a number of

respects. First, as recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this Court in addressing Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants’

cross-motions for summary judgment, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ claim that their right to an impartial tribunal has not simply been alleged,

it has been conclusively established. See Wallace, 2012 WL 2590150, at *8 (“Plaintiffs have made the required objective showing

of the denial of their constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal.”). Second, Plaintiffs, in their filings in connection with the

instant discovery dispute and their summary judgment motion, have argued that their § 1983 claims require proof of causation.

Provider Defendants’ argument to the contrary is not supported by the documents of record in this case. Third, even strict liability

torts require proof of causation. See, e.g., DiPaolo v. Black and Decker (US) Inc., No. 07–4314, 2009 WL 5064548, at *6 (E.D.Pa.

Dec. 15, 2009) (to prevail on strict liability claim under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff must prove, among other elements, “that the

defect caused the harm”); DeSantis v. Frick Co., 745 A.2d 624, 629 (Pa.Super.1999)) (strict liability requires proof that “the defect

was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries”); Thompson & Phillips Clay Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 582 A.2d 1162, 1165

(Pa.Cmwlth.1990) (“all torts, including those which fall into the strict liability category, require cause, the relationship between the

actor’s conduct and the harm, to be shown.”).

6

Accordingly, to recover distress damages, the plaintiff must show he or she suffered distress because of the procedural due process

deprivation. See id. at 263–64 (“we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to

justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused.”).

7

The Carey Court further held that “if, upon remand, the District Court determines that respondents’ suspensions were justified,

respondents nevertheless will be entitled to recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar from petitioners.” Id. at 267.

8

As described at the September 5, 2012 discovery conference and in Class Plaintiffs’ submissions, the proposed retrials would

require the finder of fact in this action to determine, by a “preponderance of the evidence,” whether Juvenile Plaintiffs would have

been adjudicated delinquent “beyond a reasonable doubt” had they been afforded all of their deprived constitutional rights.

9

Provider Defendants arguments for discovery of the juvenile adjudications with respect to the RICO and false imprisonment claims

are similarly unpersuasive.

	   	  

13

 
 Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2590150
2012 WL 2590150 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Raul Clark, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. Wayne Dawn, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Angela Rimmer Belanger, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Mark A. Ciavarella, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–cv–286, 3:09–cv–0291, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–0630, 3:09–cv–0357,
3:09–cv–2535, 3:10–cv–1405. |
July 3, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
David S. Senoff, Lauren C. Fantini, Richard C. Defrancesco, William R. Caroselli, Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, Philadelphia, PA, Michael J. Cefalo, Cefalo & Associates, West Pittston, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Mark B. Sheppard, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.
Michael T. Conahan, Coleman, FL, pro se.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., Peltin, IL, pro se.
Jane S. Sebelin, Sebelin Law Offices PC, Lehighton, PA, Bernard M. Schneider, Brucker Schneider & Porter, William G. Brucker, Pittsburgh, PA, Alison Tanchyk, Eric Kraeutler, Joseph B.G. Fay, Nathan J. Andrisani, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Arnold Levin, Daniel C.
1

Levin, Levin Fishbein Sedran & Berman, Philadelphia, PA, Kimberly D. Borland, Ruth S. Borland, Borland & Borland, Nicole F. Bednarek, Bednarek & Stahl, WilkesBarre, PA, Demetrius W. Fannick, Kingston, PA, Thomas Edward Brenner, Goldberg Katzman, PC, Scott D. McCarroll, Thomas Thomas & Hafer LLP, Harrisburg, PA, Suzanne McDonough, Holsten & Associates, Media, PA, Elmer Robert Keach, III, Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, PC, Amsterdam, NY, Deborah H. Simon, Timothy T. Myers, Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, Blue Bell, PA, John G. Dean, Elliott Greenleaf & Dean, Scranton, PA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment Against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid– Atlantic Youth Services Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC (Doc. 1024) and Defendants Mid–Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC’s Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 1079) and Supplemental Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Out of Time. (Doc. 1080.)1 Plaintiffs seek summary judgment as to liability against Private Defendants on their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 denial of an impartial tribunal claims. Provider Defendants, on the other hand, seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Because a dispute of fact exists as to whether Private Defendants, through Robert Powell, willfully participated in a conspiracy with state actors to cause the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Plaintiffs’ motion and Provider Defendants’ crossmotions will be denied.
I. Factual Background
This civil action arises out of the alleged conspiracy related to the construction of juvenile detention facilities, and subsequent detainment of juveniles in these facilities,

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 2590150
orchestrated by two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”). Plaintiffs in this action, juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella, seek redress from the former judges, as well as the individuals and business entities involved in the construction and operation of these facilities, for the alleged unlawful conspiracy and resulting deprivations of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights. These motions for partial summary judgment all implicate Private Defendants’ liability for Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
A. The Construction of the Facilities and the Concealed Payments The idea of constructing a new juvenile detention center in Luzerne County was first mentioned to Robert Powell (“Powell”) by Ciavarella at some time in 2000. (Doc. 1025, Plfs.’ Statement Material Facts, “Plfs.’ SMF”, ¶ 55.) Ciavarella suggested that Powell discuss the idea of constructing a juvenile detention center with Gregory Zappala (“Zappala”). (Id.) On June 9, 2000, Powell, Robert Mericle (“Mericle”), John Kimball, and Keith Frederick, a financial specialist who worked for Zappala, attended a kick-off meeting about the juvenile detention center project at Mericle’s office. (Id. at ¶ 56, Ex. 21, Powell Tr., 113:7–114:25.) Mericle subsequently acquired property at the Pittston Industrial Park for the purpose of constructing a juvenile detention center, and Powell and Zappala formed PACC to build the facility. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 57–58.)
Thereafter, Powell and Zappala sought financing for the construction of the facility. (Powell Tr., 117:7–24.) However, obtaining financing was difficult for Powell and Zappala because neither individual had experience constructing juvenile detention facilities. (Id.) As such, Powell informed Conahan and Ciavarella, on or about July 11, 2001, that PACC would not be able to build a detention facility unless it had an agreement with Luzerne County or some other entity that could ensure that juveniles would be sent to the newly constructed facility. (Id. at 118:10–119:3.) On December 21, 2001, the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County and PACC entered into a Placement Guarantee Agreement which required any juvenile determined to be committed to a detention facility to be sent to the PACC facility, provided that the facility had vacancy for the juvenile. (Doc. 1120, Provider Defs.’ Corrected Statement Material Facts, “Prov. Defs.’ SMF”, Ex. 10.) Conahan signed the Placement Guarantee on behalf of Luzerne County as president judge. (Id.) At this time, Powell was aware that
2

the Luzerne County Commissioners were also trying to construct a juvenile detention facility, but he did not show the Commissioners the Placement Guarantee at Conahan’s direction. (Powell Tr., 122:3.)
*2 After Conahan became president judge in January of 2002, he informed the Luzerne County Commissioners that the court would no longer send juveniles to the thenexisting detention center. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 66.) Conahan, Ciavarella, and their staff then arranged for the existing detention center’s employees to be hired to work at the PACC facility. (Id. at ¶ 68.)
On February 19, 2002, Mericle Construction, Inc. and PACC entered into an agreement for the construction of a juvenile detention center in Pittston. (Id. at ¶ 70.) The facility was completed approximately eleven months later, in or about January of 2003. (Id. at ¶ 72.) Upon completion of the facility, Powell became aware that Mericle intended to pay Conahan and Ciavarella a fee of close to one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in connection with the construction of the facility. (Id. at ¶ 73.)
On or about January 3, 2003, Powell signed an agreement which provided that he would be paid a referral fee upon completion of the PACC facility. (Powell Tr., 130:22.) Powell received the agreement from Mericle, and after he signed the agreement, he returned it to Mericle. (Id. at 131:13.) The agreement, however, was not dated as of January 3, 2003, but was instead back-dated to February 19, 2002. (Id., at 130:22.) And, the referral fee referenced in the back-dated agreement was not for Powell, but was intended for Ciavarella and Conahan. (Id. at 131:10–12.)
On January 28, 2003, Mericle wired $610,000.00 to Attorney Robert Matta (“Matta”). (Powell Tr., 132:20– 133:12.) Matta then transferred the same sum of money to Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., (Plfs.’ SMF, Ex. 24, Matta Tr., 95:19–23,), a company owned by Conahan. (Powell Tr., 135:1–2.) Powell also accepted $387,000.00 of the initial payment from Mericle. (Id. at 133:24– 134:4.) Powell paid taxes on the sum before giving Conahan a check from Vision Holdings for $326,000.00. (Powell Tr., 136:3.)
In 2004, Mericle Construction, Inc. and WPACC entered into a construction agreement with a stated price of $9,745,300.00 for the construction of a juvenile detention facility in Western Pennsylvania. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 85.) Construction of the WPACC facility was completed in July of 2005. (Id. at ¶ 88.) Upon completion of the WPACC facility, Conahan and Ciavarella were paid one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) by Mericle. (Id. at ¶ 90.)

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2590150
Thereafter, in February of 2006, an addition to the PACC facility was completed which increased the number of beds available in the detention center by twelve. (Id. at ¶¶ 93, 96.) Mericle paid Conahan and Ciavarella a fee of $150,000.00 to build the addition to the PACC facility. (Id. at ¶ 95.)
Powell also made multiple payments to the Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, a company which was formed by Conahan, Ciavarella, and their wives. (Powell Tr., 142:1– 2.) The payments to the Pinnacle Group were noted as being paid for reasons such as “rent prepay,” “marina prepay,” “reserving lease,” “rental,” and “slip rental fee.” (Id. at 145:15–152:21.) The sum paid by Powell to Conahan and Ciavarella included $590,000.00 from draws that were taken from PACC. (Id. at 150:14–18; Prov. Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 173.) Ultimately, from January of 2003 until January 1, 2007, Conahan and Ciavarella accepted a total of more than $2.1 million dollars from Mericle. (Plfs. SMF, ¶ 114.) And, Conahan accepted $590,000.00 by check and wire from Powell for rent, and Conahan and Ciavarella accepted $142,000.00 in cash from Powell. (Id. at ¶ 115.)
B. The Business Entities *3 PACC is a Pennsylvania limited liability company that was formed by Powell and Zappala. (Doc. 1099, Plfs.’ Answer Prov. Defs.’ Statement Material Facts, “Plfs.’ Answer”, ¶ 150). The members of PACC are Vision Holdings, LLC, and Consulting and Information Services, Inc. (“CIS”). (Id.) The members of Vision Holdings are Powell and his wife. (Id. at ¶ 143.) CIS was formed by Zappala. (Doc. 1119, Prov. Defs.’ Corrected Answer Plfs.’ SMF, “Prov. Defs.’ Answer”, ¶ 47.) As with PACC, the members of WPACC are Vision Holdings and CIS. (Plfs. Answer, ¶ 149.) As such, Powell himself, as opposed to through Vision Holdings, was not a member of PACC or WPACC, nor was he a manager of PACC or WPACC. (Id. at ¶¶ 151–152.)
Mid–Atlantic Youth Services Corp. (“MAYS”) is a Pennsylvania corporation. (Id. at ¶ 144.)2 In November of 2004, Luzerne County entered into an agreement to lease the PACC facility from PACC and the contract was ultimately awarded to MAYS to operate the PACC facility. (Id. at ¶¶ 162–163.) And, in May of 2005, MAYS entered into an agreement with WPACC to operate the WPACC facility. (Id. at ¶ 161.)
In addition to his involvement in the construction of the detention facilities, Powell was also an attorney and
3

owner, officer, shareholder, and/or operator of the Powell Law Group. (Doc. 1060, Powell Answer Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 46.) Beginning in July of 2003, Patrick Owens (“Owens”) became the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Powell Law Group. (Prov. Defs.’ SMF, Owens Decl., ¶ 1.) In or about September of 2003, the Powell Law Group began to sell Owens’ accounting and bookkeeping services to PACC for a fee. (Id. at ¶¶ 10–11.) The Powell Law Group also sold Owens’ services to WPACC for a fee. (Id. at ¶ 12.) And, in May of 2005, MAYS entered into an agreement with the Powell Law Group to contract for Owens’ accounting and bookkeeping services. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Despite these arrangements, Owens received his wages from the Powell Law Group, and not from PACC, WPACC, and/or MAYS. (Id. at ¶ 43.)
In or around 2006, Owens began to transfer money from PACC and/or WPACC to other corporate entities owned by Powell and record the transfers as loans. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Typically, Owens would move the funds from PACC or WPACC to Vision Holdings, and then the money would be transferred to other Powell entities. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Owens also obtained large amounts of cash by writing checks from the Powell Law Group, Vision Holdings, and/or PACC and then cashing the checks. (Id. at ¶ 40.) While Owens never informed Zappala of the fund transfers between the companies and he never sent Zappala financial information about the entities, the financial information was available to Zappala. (Id. at ¶ 49.)
C. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Expunges Juvenile Plaintiffs’ Records On January 26, 2009, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania filed a Bill of Information alleging two counts of fraud against Conahan and Ciavarella. (Plfs.’ SMF, Ex. 9, Bill of Information.)3 Thereafter, on February 11, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction and appointed the Honorable Arthur E. Grim as Special Master “to review all Luzerne County juvenile court adjudications and dispositions that have been affected by the recently-revealed criminal allegations.” (Id. at Ex. 27, In re: J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008, Feb. 11, 2009 Order.) At the conclusion of the case, the Court determined:
*4 Ciavarella admitted under oath that he had received payments from Robert Powell, a co-owner of the PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care facilities, and from Robert K. Mericle, the developer who constructed

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 2590150
the juvenile facilities, during the time that Ciavarella was presiding over juvenile matters in Luzerne County. It is a matter of record that Ciavarella routinely committed juveniles to one or another of these facilities. It is also a matter of record that Ciavarella failed to disclose his ties to Powell, much less the financial benefits he received in connection with the facilities to which he routinely committed Luzerne County juveniles. Ciavarella’s admission that he received these payments, and that he failed to disclose his financial interests arising from the development of the juvenile facilities, thoroughly undermines the integrity of all juvenile proceedings before Ciavarella. Whether or not a juvenile was represented by counsel, and whether or not a juvenile was committed to one of the facilities which secretly funneled money to Ciavarella and Conahan, this Court cannot have any confidence that Ciavarella decided any Luzerne County juvenile case fairly and impartially while he labored under the specter of his self-interested dealings with the facilities.
In short, there is ample support before us to assess the bases cited by Judge Grim for his finding that all juvenile adjudications and consent decrees entered by Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 31, 2008, are tainted.
(Id. at Ex. 28, In re: J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008, Slip. Op. (Oct. 29, 2009) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the expungement of the records of all juveniles “whether final or not, where a juvenile either proceeded before Ciavarella without counsel, or was committed by Ciavarella to PA Child Care or Western PA Child Care.” (Id.)
D. Procedural History and the Instant Motions for Summary Judgment Pursuant to the Court’s May 14, 2009 Case Management Order, the present actions have all been consolidated for purposes of discovery. (Doc. 82.) Thereafter, on June 25, 2009, Class Plaintiffs filed a Master Complaint. (Doc. 136.) Individual Plaintiffs also filed a Master Long Form Complaint on the same day. (Doc. 134.)
Subsequently, Private Defendants filed multiple motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaints, which were granted in part and denied in part. As to the Master Complaint for Class Actions, the claims remaining in this case against Private Defendants are: (1) Count IIConspiracy to Violate Plaintiffs’ Right to an Impartial Tribunal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Count IVConspiracy to Deprive Youth
4

of their Right to Counsel and/or a Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Guilty Plea pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) Count V–Civil RICO against Powell and Vision Holdings only; (4) Count VIICivil Rico Conspiracy against all Private Defendants; and (5) Count IXWrongful Imprisonment against Powell, PACC, WPACC, and MAYS only. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 9.) The Individual Plaintiffs’ Master Long Form Complaint contains the following nondismissed claims against Private Defendants: (1) Count IRICO against Powell and Vision Holdings only; (2) Count IIConspiracy to Violate RICO against all Private Defendants; (3) Count IIIDeprivation of Substantive and Procedural Due Process Rights pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 against all Private Defendants; (4) Count IVDeprivation of Rights pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Private Defendants; (5) Count VIIICivil Conspiracy against Powell, PACC, WPACC, and MAYS only; and (6) Count IXFalse Imprisonment against Powell, PACC, WPACC, and MAYS only. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment *5 On January 5, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability on their § 1983 impartial tribunal claims against Private Defendants. (Doc. 1024, Plfs. Mot. Partial Summ. J.) Plaintiffs argue that they were deprived of their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal by Private Defendants acting “under color of state law,” which caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Doc. 1041, Plfs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ J.)
In opposition, Powell and Vision Holdings assert that none of the “Private Defendants acted with the intent to violate the rights of the Plaintiffs,” and that there is no evidence of record “which in any way shows that Robert Powell by his actions, or those reasonably foreseeable from his actions would have implicated the rights of the Plaintiffs.” (Doc. 1059, Powell Br. Opp’n Plfs.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., “Powell Opp’n”.) Thus, Powell and Vision Holdings argue that “at most, all Plaintiffs have shown is that the Private Defendants conspired with the former judges for the construction and operation of a detention facility.” As a result, they argue that genuine issues of fact exist in this case mandating denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.
Provider Defendants also oppose Plaintiffs’ motion. (Doc. 1074, Prov. Defs.’ Br. Opp’n Plfs.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., “Prov. Defs.’ Opp’n”.) Among other arguments, Provider Defendants assert that: (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish a Provider Defendant custom or policy caused the violation

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2590150
of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; (2) Powell was not a Provider Defendant policymaker; (3) and Powell was not acting as Provider Defendants’ agent when he made payments to the former judges. (Id.) Thus, Provider Defendants argue that, at a minimum, a jury should determine whether Plaintiffs have established a case for the violation of their right to an impartial tribunal. (Id.)
2. Provider Defendants’ Cross–Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Provider Defendants have also filed a Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 1079) and a Supplemental Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 1080.) The cross-motion, filed on February 24, 2012, requests summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because “Plaintiffs are unable to show that any alleged agent of Provider Defendants acted pursuant to the policy of any Provider Defendant.” (Prov. Defs.’ Cross–Mot. Partial Summ. J.) The supplemental cross-motion, filed on February 27, 2012, seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because “Individual Plaintiffs admitted that Ciavarella and Conahan coerced Powell to make the alleged payments to them.” (Prov. Defs.’ Supplement Cross–Mot. Summ. J.)
In opposition to Provider Defendants’ cross-motion, Plaintiffs assert that, “at the bare minimum, a question of fact exists as to whether Powell was a ‘policymaker’ when he took the relevant actions on behalf of PACC, WPACC, and MAYS.” (Doc. 1097, Plfs.’ Consolidated Reply Br., “Plfs.’ Reply”.) And, as to the supplemental cross-motion, Plaintiffs argue that it is undisputed that some of the payments at issue were not coerced by Conahan or Ciavarella. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert that both the cross-motion and supplemental cross-motion must be denied. (Id.)
*6 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Provider Defendants’ Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Provider Defendants’ Supplemental Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment have all been fully briefed. As such, they are now ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
5

A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 2D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (2d ed.1983). The moving party may present its own evidence or, where the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to the court that “the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
“When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to either present affirmative evidence supporting its version of the material facts or to refute the moving party’s contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256– 57. The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party’s favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Galli v. New

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2590150
Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.” Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.2005)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
B. Section 1983 *7 Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on their § 1983 right to an impartial tribunal claims against Private Defendants. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... or any other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 749 n. 9, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, (1) acting under color of law, (2) violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, (3) and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 299 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.1998)). The Court will begin its analysis with the second element, violation of Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional right to an impartial tribunal.
1. Right to an Impartial Tribunal Plaintiffs argue that it is uncontroverted that the juveniles that appeared before Ciavarella were denied their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal. (Plfs.’ Br. Supp. Partial Mot. Summ. J.) The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
6

accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, ...” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Although the Sixth Amendment applies only to the federal government, the right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment has been “made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, ...” Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986) (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n. 6, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976)).
“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.” Marshall v. Jericho, 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). Indeed, “it is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ ” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed.2d 942 (1955)). As such, “a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to a fair and impartial tribunal.” Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 474 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997)); Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Cross, 128 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir.1997).
*8 Embodied in the guarantee of an impartial tribunal is the absolute right to a criminal proceeding conducted by a judge free of bias or pecuniary motivation. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). In that regard, the Supreme Court has held:
[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.
...
... [T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law.

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 2590150
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, 532. Stated differently, “[o]ne of the fundamental canons of our jurisprudence is that a criminal trial must be free not just from demonstrative impropriety on the part of the judge, but also from the appearance of impropriety that leads to substantial doubt about the fairness of the proceedings.” United States ex rel. Perry v. Cuyler, 584 F.2d 644, 650 (3d Cir.1978) (Adams, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Hurles v. Ryan, 650 F.3d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir.2011) (“an appearance of impropriety, regardless of whether such impropriety is actually proven, erodes that confidence and weakens our system of justice”); Crane v. Sparkman, 165 F.3d 26 (6th Cir.1998) (fair trial in a fair tribunal requires avoiding “the appearance of impropriety when it may reasonably cause impartiality to be questioned”); Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1450 (10th Cir.1996) (“it is not solely the reality of actual bias or prejudice but also the appearance of impropriety that we must guard against”); United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 155–56 (5th Cir.1995) (“avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important in developing public confidence in our judicial system as avoiding impropriety itself”). And, the Supreme Court has recently stated that the inquiry as to a judge’s bias in the due process context requires an objective determination considering “not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 2262.
Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently established a violation of their federal constitutional rights for purposes of their § 1983 impartial tribunal claims. In particular, the Court is persuaded that this determination has already been made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re: J.V.R. The Court will therefore adopt the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reasoning and conclusion: “this Court simply cannot have confidence that any juvenile matter adjudicated by Ciavarella during this period was tried in a fair and impartial manner.” It is apparent that Juvenile Plaintiffs, as criminal defendants, were denied the right to a fair and impartial tribunal before a disinterested judge. Specifically, the concealment of Ciavarella’s role in the development and construction of the detention facilities is sufficient evidence to create an appearance of impropriety that casts serious doubt as to the fairness of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings.4 And, as a potential for bias existed that would prejudice an average judge in Ciavarella’s position, Plaintiffs have made the required objective showing of the denial of their constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal.
7

2. Under Color of State Law *9 To prevail on a § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs must establish that Private Defendants acted under color of state law. See Elmore, 299 F.3d at 281. Plaintiffs argue that the state actor requirement is satisfied in this matter because Private Defendants, through Powell, willfully participated in joint activity with two state officials, Conahan and Ciavarella. (Plfs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.) Conversely, Private Defendants argue that they are not state actors because Powell was an unwilling participant in the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights. (Powell Opp’n.)
It is well-settled that private actors may be regarded as acting under color of state law pursuant to § 1983. See, e.g., Donnell v. Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 405 F. App’x 617, 622 n. 5 (3d Cir.2010). “ ‘To act under color of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.’ ” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed. 242 (1970) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)). “[C]ompelled participation by a private actor may fall outside of the contours of state action.” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir.2005). Thus, a private actor willfully participates if his participation is voluntary and without coercion. See Benta v. Bryan, 420 F. App’x 214, 217 (3d Cir.2011) (citing Harvey, 421 F.3d at 196). And,
“Joint action” has been explained as follows: [t]he requirement of action under color of law is satisfied ... when a private person willfully participates in joint action with a state official.... Thus, [to survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,] plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that there existed between the private defendant and the state official an understanding, agreement, or conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right. He must show a genuine factual issue of a combination, agreement, or understanding among the defendants.... There must also be a genuine factual issue that the defendants plotted, planned, or conspired together to carry out the chain of events.

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 2590150
Bates v. MHM Corr. Servs., No. 05–2285, 2008 WL 396225, at *3–*4 (M.D.Pa. Feb.11, 2008) (quoting Drum v. Nasuti, 648 F.Supp. 888, 897 (E.D.Pa.1986)). To establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private actor, the plaintiff must show that a private actor and at least one of the state actors named as a defendant “somehow reached an understanding to deny” the plaintiff his or her rights. See Kost, 1 F.3d at 185; see also McCleester v. Mackel, No. 06–120, 2008 WL 821531, at *11 (W.D.Pa. Mar.27, 2008).
Recently, the Third Circuit has provided guidance on what does not satisfy the “willful participant in joint activity” requirement for private actor liability under § 1983. For example, in Harvey, the Third Circuit emphasized that “a private citizen acting at the orders of a police officer is not generally acting in a willful manner, especially when that citizen has no self-interest in taking the action,” because “compulsion by the state negates the presence of willfulness.” Harvey, 421 F.3d at 196. Similarly, in Benta, the Third Circuit found an absence of willful participation in joint activity where private security officers acted at the direction of a state official in preventing an individual from climbing a stage at a public event. See Benta, 420 F. App’x at 217. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the private defendants helped plan the public event, that they had a contract or agreement with the state, or that they received renumeration from the state for their efforts. See id.
*10 Plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment and Provider Defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment will be denied because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Powell conspired or engaged willfully in joint activity with Conahan and Ciavarella to render him, as well as PACC, WPACC, MAYS, and Vision Holdings, liable under § 1983. Private Defendants argue that Powell’s participation in the conspiracy to deny Plaintiffs their constitutional rights was unwillful or coerced participation because he repeatedly testified that he only made the payments to Ciavarella and Conahan since they had the power to destroy his investment in the detention centers. (Powell Opp’n.) In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that it is undisputed that some of the payments to the former judges were not coerced, and that Powell knew from the outset that Ciavarella and Conahan would expect to be paid for their role in the construction of the detention centers. (Plfs.’ Reply.)
Here, a reasonable jury could conclude that Powell, as well as the other Private Defendants, had an interest in making the payments to Ciavarella and Conahanwhich would be indicative of willful participation in the alleged
8

conspiracy. Specifically, a jury could conclude that Private Defendants had an interest in ensuring that the detention facilities remained operational, and, therefore, had an interest in making payments to the former judges to guarantee that juveniles would be committed to the facilities.5 Thus, a jury could believe that the payments were made to the former judges because the judges possessed the power to destroy the financial viability of the facilities. On the other hand, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Powell made the payments to Ciavarella and Conahan, as sitting judges, out of fear that they could ruin his law firm and his private practice. Alternatively, the trier of fact could find that the payments were made to the former judges simply for their assistance in getting the facilities constructed. In addition, because “the existence or nonexistence of a conspiracy is essentially a factual issue that the jury, not the trial judge, should decide,” Adickes, 398 U.S. at 176 (Black, J., concurring), the Court will deny the summary judgment motions and allow a jury to determine whether Powell conspired with state officials rendering Private Defendants state actors for purposes of § 1983.6
3. Causation The third element Plaintiffs must establish for their § 1983 fair tribunal claims is that Private Defendants “caused the complained of injury.” Elmore, 399 F.3d at 281. Plaintiffs argue that the causation element is satisfied as to Powell because he set into motion a series of acts that he reasonably should have known would violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Plfs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J.) Plaintiffs also contend that Provider Defendants and Vision Holdings caused Plaintiffs’ injuries because Powell was acting on their behalf, as they benefitted from Powell and Owens’ conduct, or because they ratified Powell’s conduct. (Id.) Conversely, Powell asserts that no evidence demonstrates that he set in motion a series of events that he knew or reasonably should have known would deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. (Powell Opp’n.) And, Provider Defendants argue that Powell was not their agent and they cannot be liable because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that there was a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation. (Prov. Defs.’ Opp’n.)
a. Powell *11 As to the causation element of Plaintiffs’ § 1983

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2590150
claim against Powell, the applicable inquiry is whether Powell set in motion a series of events that he knew, or should have reasonably known, would cause the constitutional injury suffered by Plaintiffs. Because a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment against Powell.
In a § 1983 case, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, see Argueta v. U.S. I.C.E., 643 F.3d 60, 71–72 (3d Cir.2011), and that “the defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of the violation of [the plaintiff’s] federally protected right.” Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284–85, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980)). The Third Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of causation in § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Burnsworth v. PC Lab., 364 F. App’x 772, 775 (3d Cir.2010). However, this Court, other district courts in this Circuit, and other Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied the “setting in motion” theory of causation. See id. This Circuit, though, has not specifically adopted or rejected this causation standard. See id.
The “setting in motion” theory of causation, as previously applied by this Court, provides:
A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made. Indeed, the requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.
Pilchesky v. Miller, No. 05–2074, 2006 WL 2884445, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Oct.10, 2006) (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter,
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449 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.2006) rev’d on other grounds, 466 F.3d 646 (9th Cir.2006), and 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir.2007)) (emphasis added). This standard has been accepted by multiple Circuit Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011); Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 51 (1st Cir.2009); Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 672 (5th Cir.1999); Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 776 (4th Cir.1998); Waddell v. Forney, 108 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir.1997); Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396–97 (7th Cir.1988).
Based on this precedent, the “setting in motion” standard provides the proper framework for determining Powell’s liability on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 impartial tribunal claims. Applying this standard to the evidence of record, a reasonable jury could find that Powell did not know, or reasonably should have known, that Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights would be violated.
*12 Here, the undisputed facts include: Powell discussed constructing a detention center with Ciavarella in 2000; Powell concealed the former judges’ role in the development and subsequent construction of the detention facilities; Powell, as a Luzerne County attorney, knew that Ciavarella served as the judge of the juvenile court; Powell knew that Conahan, once he became president judge, could ensure that juveniles would no longer be sent to the former Luzerne County Detention Center; Powell facilitated payments to Conahan and Ciavarella after the construction of the PACC facility; shortly thereafter, Powell facilitated payments to the former judges after the WPACC facility was constructed and the PACC facility was expanded; Powell disguised thousands of dollars in payments to Ciavarella and Conahan; and Powell signed sham agreements that were designed to filter money from Mericle to Conahan and Ciavarella.
Plaintiffs argue that, based on this evidence, Powell “should have known” that his conduct would violate the juveniles’ rights to an impartial tribunal. Yet, missing from the record is any evidence that Powell was aware that the former judges were depriving juveniles of their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal. Indeed, there is no undisputed evidence that a minimum number of juveniles were required to be detained at either the PACC or WPACC facility. Nor has there been any evidence presented demonstrating that the former judges admitted to wrongfully imprisoning juveniles. Furthermore, it is unclear from the evidence of record whether the WPACC facility was constructed and the PACC facility expanded because of the legitimate demand for bed space in detention centers from various counties besides Luzerne County, or if the increased bed space can be attributed to

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
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the alleged conspiracy to detain Luzerne County juveniles for pecuniary gain. Thus, it is uncertain whether a market for bed space existed without the necessity of detaining Luzerne County juveniles in violation of their constitutional rights. Although Plaintiffs suggest that Powell, as a practicing lawyer, logically should have known that the payments would impermissibly tempt Ciavarella to deny juveniles an impartial tribunal, the absence of concrete evidence demonstrating a need to detain a minimum number of juveniles is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in Powell’s favor and that Powell should not have known that juvenile rights were being violated.7
Plaintiffs, as the moving party with the burden of proof, have failed to establish a lack of genuine issues of material fact for trial. Plaintiffs have established that Powell conspired with the former judges to conceal their role in the construction of juvenile detention facilities. This alone, however, does not establish that Powell should have known that his conduct would set in motion a series of acts resulting in the deprivation of constitutional rights. And, because in § 1983 cases “the presence of the requisite causation is normally a question of fact for the jury,” Rivas, 365 F.3d at 193; see also Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Corr. Inst. for Women, 128 F. App’x 240, 250 (3d Cir.2005) (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“the causation element in a § 1983 claim, like other difficult questions of fact, is normally reserved for a jury”), the trier of fact will be permitted to determine whether Powell should have known that Juvenile Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights would be violated based on his dealings with the former judges.
b. MAYS, PACC, WPACC, and Vision Holdings *13 Although Plaintiffs argue that the applicable causation standard to apply to Provider Defendants and Vision Holdings is the “setting in motion” theory discussed above, the Court agrees with Provider Defendants that the causation inquiry for these Defendants is governed by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs assert that even under Monell, causation is satisfied because Powell acted as a “policymaker” for PACC, MAYS, WPACC, and Vision Holdings. Conversely, Provider Defendants argue in opposition that Plaintiffs have presented no evidence indicating that Powell was a Provider Defendant “policymaker.” Because the Court cannot determine from the evidence of record whether Powell was a “final policymaker” for Provider Defendants, Plaintiffs’ motion and Defendants’ cross-motions will be denied.
10

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.
Although Monell applied to municipal governments and not to private entities acting under color of state law, the Third Circuit has extended the Monell doctrine to private § 1983 defendants. See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).8 Thus, for a private employer defendant to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish an employer policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation alleged. See id. at 584 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). The Natale court set forth three scenarios where the acts of an employee may be attributed to his or her private employer rendering the entity liable under § 1983:
The first is where the appropriate officer or entity promulgates aenerally applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act complained offs simply an implementation of that policy. The second occurs where no rule has been announced as policy but federal law has been violated by an act of the policymaker itself. Finally, a policy or custom may also exist where the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to control the agents of the government is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). *14 Relevant to the matter before the Court is whether Powell was a PACC, WPACC, MAYS, and/or Vision Holdings “policymaker.” “In order to ascertain who is a policymaker, ‘a court must determine which official has final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take action.’ ” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir.1990)). According to the Supreme Court, “ ‘whether a particular official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law.’ ” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct.

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
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2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (quoting St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107(1988) (plurality opinion)).9 Thus, to ascertain if an official has “final policymaking” authority, the Court must determine “(1) whether as a matter of state law, the official is responsible for making policy in the particular area of ... business in question, and (2) whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted).
In the private employer context, “the relevant ‘policymaker’ inquiry is whether [the employee], as a matter of state and local positive law, or custom or usage having the force of law, exercised final policymaking authority.” Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 729 (4th Cir.1999). And, the Third Circuit has indicated that an individual, even without final policymaking authority, can bind his or her employer when the entity delegates authority or acquiesces in the individual’s conduct. See Laverdure v. Cnty. of Montgomery, 324 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir.2003).
According to Jett, the Court is tasked with making the legal determination of whether Powell was a “policymaker” for the other Private Defendants. See Jett, 491 U.S. at 737. Thus, as a preliminary matter, the Court must ascertain what relevant “state law” governs this inquiry.
Initially, the Court rejects Provider Defendants’ position that whether Powell was a “policymaker” for PACC, WPACC, and MAYS is controlled by Pennsylvania corporate law, 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 8942 and 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 1721. Specifically, section 8942(a) provides: “the affirmative vote or consent of a majority of the members or managers of a limited liability company entitled to vote on a matter shall be required to decide any matter to be acted upon by the members or managers.” Id. Provider Defendants assert that because Powell was at most a twenty-five percent (25%) owner of PACC and WPACC, this is an insufficient interest to make Powell a “policymaker” for these entities. (Prov. Defs.’ Opp’n.) Similarly, Provider Defendants argue that an individual cannot be a “policymaker” of a corporation unless he or she is a member of the board of directors because corporations are managed or controlled by their directors. See 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 1721(a). Since Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that Powell was a MAYS director, Provider Defendants argue that Powell could have not been MAYS’ “policymaker.” (Prov. Defs.’ Opp’n.)
*15 The Court disagrees with Provider Defendants’ “policymaker” analysis. Provider Defendants imply that a
11

member of a limited liability company can never be a policymaker of the company unless the individual has a controlling interest in the company. (Prov. Defs.’ Opp’n.) Essentially, Provider Defendants posit that no member of an LLC could be considered a “policymaker” if the company had multiple members (because no individual member would have a controlling interest), and, also, that only a majority director could be a company’s “policymaker.” This analysis defines who can be a “policymaker” for § 1983 too narrowly. The proper inquiry to determine whether an individual is a “policymaker” for private entity liability under § 1983 does not depend on the individual’s corporate title and/or his or her ownership interest in the entity. Instead, the Court must determine whether Powell had “unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take action,” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1212, which, in turn, requires the Court to consider whether Powell had the final authority to bind Provider Defendants. Accordingly, the controlling “question of state law,” Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, in this case, is whether Powell, pursuant to Pennsylvania law,10 was an agent of PACC, WPACC, MAYS, and/or Vision Holdings with final “policymaking” authority. Thus, Plaintiffs must make two showings. First, that Powell was an agent acting within the scope of his authority on behalf of Provider Defendants. And, second, that Powell had “final policymaking” authority.
Pennsylvania law is well-settled that a corporation, as a legal fiction, can act only through its employees, agents, and officers. See Tayar v. Camelback, 957 A.2d 281, 289 (Pa.Super.2008) (citing Lokay v. Lehigh Valley Co-op. Farmers, Inc., 342 Pa.Super. 89, 492 A.2d 405, 408–410 (Pa.Super.1985)). The determination of a principal-agent relationship involves considerations of the “manifestations by the principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking, and the understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking.’ ” Karas v. Jackson, 582 F.Supp. 43, 45–46 (E.D.Pa.1983) (quoting Scott v. Purcell, 490 Pa. 409, 117, 415 A.2d 56, 60 (1980)).
An agency relationship exists when the alleged agent has express or actual authority to act, implied authority, apparent authority, or authority that the principal is estopped from denying. See Bolus v. United Penn Bank, 363 Pa.Super. 247, 525 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Pa.Super.1987) (quoting SEI Corp. v. Norton & Co., 631 F.Supp. 497 (E.D.Pa.1986)). Actual authority exists when directly granted by the principal. See id. Apparent authority, on the other hand, “exists where a principal, by words or conduct, leads people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe that the principal has granted the agent authority he purports to exercise.” Turner Hydraulics, Inc.

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 2590150
v. Susquehanna Const. Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 130, 606 A.2d 532, 534 (Pa.Super.1992) (citing Stallo v. Ins. Placement Facility of Pa., 359 Pa.Super. 157, 518 A.2d 827 (Pa.Super.1986)). Nevertheless, a principal is generally not liable for an agent’s actions made out of the scope of the agent’s authority. See Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v. Med. Servs. Ass’n of Pa., 474 F.Supp. 472, 476 (M.D.Pa.1979) (citing Revere Press, Inc. v. Blumberg, 431 Pa. 370, 246 A.2d 407 (1968)). But, “the nature and extent of an agent’s authority is a question of fact for the trier, [and the trier-of-fact] is [also] to evaluate the conduct of the parties in light of all the circumstances in determining the existence of apparent authority.” Turner Hydraulics, 606 A.2d at 534–35 (internal citations omitted); see also Regis Ins. Co. v. All American Rathskeller, Inc.., 976 A.2d 1157, 1169 (Pa.Super.2009) (“[t]he question of whether a principal-agent relationship exists is ordinarily one of fact for the jury”).
*16 The Court will reserve judgment on whether Powell was an agent with “final policymaking” authority for PACC, WPACC, MAYS, and/or Vision Holdings until evidence is submitted at trial due to the competing evidence presented in these motions.11 Evidence indicative of Powell’s “final policymaking” authority for these entities includes that Powell signed the following: the February 19, 2002 Agreement Between Owner and Contractor on behalf of PACC; the February 15, 2003 and January 1, 2004 Placement Guarantees with Luzerne County as PACC’s representative; the June 8, 2004 Agreement Between Owner and Contractor for the construction of WPACC on behalf of PACC; and the November 17, 2004 lease agreement between PACC and Luzerne County as a member of PACC. (Plfs.’ Answer, ¶ 143.) Additionally, Powell, through Owens, could direct funds between the entities and even withdraw substantial sums from the companies without recourse or oversight from Zappala or any other Provider Defendant officer, member, or employee. Such unfettered access to Provider Defendants’ funds suggests that Powell had the authority to create final policy and dictate Provider Defendants’ course of business.
On the other hand, Provider Defendants have set forth evidence which indicates that Powell lacked “final policymaking” authority. In particular, the Agreements signed on behalf of Powell for Provider Defendants were not made with the former judges, nor do the Agreements discuss payments to the former judges. Furthermore, while Powell’s signature on these Agreements could indicate that he had “final policymaking” authority to enter the Agreements on behalf of the entities, it could also imply that he simply had authority to sign agreements on behalf of Provider Defendants as their
12

representative.
Based on the evidence before the Court, genuine issues of material fact exist and neither Provider Defendants nor Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. In particular, the issues that the Court cannot resolve based on the evidence as presented includes: (1) the extent of Powell’s involvement in Provider Defendants’ affairs; (2) Zappala’s role in controlling Provider Defendants’ operations; and (3) Powell’s specific connection with MAYS. Additionally, the Court cannot determine from the record before it whether PACC or WPACC received per diem payments for detaining Luzerne County juveniles, or, instead, whether Provider Defendants received only set, fixed payments. To the extent that Provider Defendants received per diem compensation for detained juveniles, this evidence may suggest that Powell paid the former judges for the benefit of PACC and WPACC as “final policy” to keep the facilities at or near full occupancy. And, this factual issue is specifically in dispute as Private Defendants repeatedly emphasize that per diem payments were received by Luzerne County and not MAYS12 or PACC, (Prov. Defs.’ SMF, Owens Decl.), but Plaintiffs have identified other agreements which provide that Luzerne County would pay PACC for “services rendered on a per diem or unit of service basis.” (Plfs.’ Answer, ¶ 246.) Accordingly, in light of these unresolved issues, both Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and Provider Defendants’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment will be denied because the evidence before the Court presents a genuine issue of whether Powell was Private Defendants’ “final policymaker.”
III. Conclusion
*17 For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, Provider Defendants’ crossmotion for partial summary judgment, and Provider Defendants’ supplemental cross-motion for partial summary judgment will all be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 2590150

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2590150

Footnotes

1

Defendants Powell, Vision Holdings, PA Child Care (“PACC”), Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”), and Mid–Atlantic Youth Services

(“MAYS”) will be referred to collectively as the “Private Defendants.” “Provider Defendants” will refer to PACC, WPACC, and

MAYS.

2

Provider Defendants assert that Jeffrey Giovino was the sole shareholder of MAYS. (Prov. Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 145.) Plaintiffs, however,

dispute this claim and argue that Powell had a fifty percent (50%) interest in MAYS. (Plfs.’ Answer, ¶¶ 145, 147.)

3

Conahan and Ciavarella, pursuant to plea agreements they reached with the United States, pled guilty to these counts. The plea

agreements, however, were rejected by the Court. Subsequently, a federal grand jury returned a 48–count Indictment against

Ciavarella and Conahan. Conahan ultimately pled guilty to a RICO conspiracy charge, which was accepted by the Court. He was

sentenced on September 23, 2011. The grand jury issued a 39–count Superseding Indictment against Ciavarella on September 23,

2010. Ciavarella pled not guilty and he went to trial on the charges in February of 2011. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on 12

of the 39 counts of the Superceding Indictment.

Powell and Mericle have also faced criminal prosecution. Powell pled guilty to misprison of a felony and accessory after the

fact to conspiracy to commit income tax evasion. On November 4, 2011, he was sentenced to serve eighteen months in

prison. Mericle also pled guilty to a Bill of Information charging him with misprison of a felony (filing a false tax return).

Mericle has not yet been sentenced.

4

Because the Court has determined that Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to a fair tribunal was deprived by an appearance of impropriety

with regard to Ciavarella’s involvement in the juvenile detention facilities, the Court makes no determination on whether

Ciavarella was actually biased, or whether Ciavarella committed juveniles to these facilities for pecuniary gain. Instead, the

Court’s holding is predicated solely on Ciavarella’s disguised interest in the detention centers which created an appearance of

impropriety and eroded the public’s confidence in the Luzerne County juvenile justice system.

5

And, as noted below, it is disputed whether Provider Defendants received per diem payments for juveniles detained at the PACC

or WPACC facilities, or whether Provider Defendants received fixed payments regardless of the facilities’ occupancy rates.

6

Provider Defendants’ Supplemental Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will also be denied because Plaintiffs did not

admit that Ciavarella and Conahan coerced Powell to make the payments. Instead, Individual Plaintiffs’ Complaint simply alleges

“upon information and belief” that Powell “believed” that Conahan and Ciavarella would have retaliated against him had he

stopped making payments and that Conahan and Ciavarella “demanded” payments for closing the former Luzerne County

detention center and for sending juveniles to PACC and WPACC. These averments do not constitute admissions that Powell was

coerced into making payments to Ciavarella and Conahan. As such, a jury will be permitted to determine whether Powell willfully

participated in the alleged conspiracy with Conahan and Ciavarella.

7

As noted, there is a dispute of fact over whether MAYS, PACC, or WPACC received per diem compensation for detained juveniles,

or, instead, whether these payments were received by Luzerne County.

8

In addition to the Third Circuit, multiple other Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied Monell to § 1983 claims against private

defendants. See, e.g., Clark v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 316 F. App’x 279 (4th Cir.2009); Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,

336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir.2003); Jackson v. Ill. Medi–Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir.2002); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d

1127, 1129 (11th Cir.1992); Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408–09 (2d Cir.1990).

9

In Jett, the Supreme Court indicated that the identification of officials whose decisions represent official policy is “a legal

question to be resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury.” Jett, 491 U.S. at 737. However, “once those

officials who have the power to make official policy on a particular issue have been identified, it is for the jury to determine

whether their decisions have caused the deprivation of rights at issue by policies which affirmatively command that it occur.” Id.

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 661 n. 2).

10

Typically, the “question of state law” inquiry is resolved by applying a state statute or local regulation governing the conduct or

operation of a municipality. See, e.g., Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 134 n. 11 (3d Cir.2010) (township Police Chief

not final policymaker according to 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 66902); McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 Pa. 359, 368–69 (3d Cir.2005) (24 Pa.C.S. § 11–

1123 established school superintendent was final policymaker); La Verdure, 324 F.3d at 125 (resolving question of state law by

applying 16 Pa.C.S. § 504). However, as this case raises issues relating to the policymaking authority of an agent in a private

13

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2590150

business setting, the “question of state law” inquiry requires a slightly different application.

11

As mandated by the Supreme Court, however, this issue will be resolved by the Court before the case is submitted to the jury.

See Jett, 491 U.S. at 737.

12

Provider Defendants argue that the MAYS Operating Agreement provided that Luzerne County received all per diem payments

for children treated or detained at the PACC facility. (Prov. Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 245.) However, the Operating Agreement attached to

Provider Defendants’ submission appears to be an incomplete version of the Agreement. (Id. at Ex. 6, Exs. E & L.)

End of Document

14

 
 Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 2007294
2012 WL 2007294 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Raul Clark, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. Wayne Dawn, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Angela Rimmer Belanger, et al, Plaintiffs,
v. Mark A. Ciavarella, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:10–cv–1405, 3:09–cv–0291, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–0630, 3:09–cv–0357,
3:09–cv–2535, 3:10–cv–1405. |
June 5, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Arnold Levin, Daniel C. Levin, Levin Fishbein Sedran & Berman, Adrianne Walvoord, Amber M. Racine, Sol H. Weiss, Anapol Schwartz Weiss Cohan Feldman & Smalley PC, Daniel Segal, Rebecca L. Santoro, Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudlin, Daniel E. Kleiner, Metzger & Kleiner, Lourdes M. Rosado, Marsha L. Levick, Richard G. Freeman, Philadelphia, PA, Elmer Robert Keach, III, Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, PC, Amsterdam, NY, Barry H. Dyller, Law Office of Barry H. Dyller, Wilkes–Barre, PA, Johanna L. Gelb, Gelb Law Firm, Scranton, PA, Bridget E. Montgomery, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, David J. Schertz, Harrisburg, PA, Michael A. Fazio, Michael O’Mullan, Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP, Morristown, NJ, for Plaintiffs.
Deborah H. Simon, Timothy T. Myers, Elliott, Greenleaf
1

& Siedzikowski, Blue Bell, PA, John G. Dean, Elliott Greenleaf & Dean, Scranton, PA, John Flounlacker, Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, Jonathan Vipond, III, Buchanan Ingersoll, Thomas Edward Brenner, Goldberg Katzman, PC, Scott D. McCarroll, Harrisburg, PA, Suzanne McDonough, Holsten & Associates, Media, PA, Mark B. Sheppard, Jessica L. Richman, Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, Joseph B.G. Fay, Nathan J. Andrisani, Matthew J.D. Hogan, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, Alison Tanchyk, Eric Kraeutler, Philadelphia, PA, Kimberly D. Borland, Ruth S. Borland, Borland & Borland, John G. Dean, Mark W. Bufalino, Elliott Greenleaf & Dean, Nicole F. Bednarek, Bednarek & Stahl, Wilkes–Barre, PA, Bernard M. Schneider, Brucker Schneider & Porter, William G. Brucker, Pittsburgh, PA, Philip Gelso, Briechle & Gelso, LLC, Kingston, PA, Stephen D. Rhoades, Law Offices of Edward McNeels, Edward P. McNelis, Hazleton, PA, for Defendants.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., Kingston, PA, pro se.
MEMORANDUM
DATE A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is the Motion to Clarify Order, to Reconsider Order, for Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers or to Amend Order to Certify Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed. R.App. P. 5(A)(3) and to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 1107) brought by Defendants Mid–Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC (together, the “Provider Defendants”). On April 10, 2012, the Court, applying the test for relief from a protective order set forth by the Third Circuit in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787–91 (3d Cir.1994), denied Provider Defendants’ Motion for Modification of or Relief from the Stipulated Protective Order. (Docs. 1101; 1102.) Now, Provider Defendants seek clarification, reconsideration, summary judgment, leave to amend, and/or certification for interlocutory appeal of the Court’s Order. (Doc. 1107.) Because relief from the April 10, 2012 Order is not warranted, Provider Defendants’ Motion will be denied in its entirety.

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2007294
I. Background
As discussed in the April 10, 2012 Memorandum, (Doc. 1101), this action arises out of an alleged conspiracy in which two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan, accepted payments from various individuals and corporations for the purpose of facilitating the construction of juvenile detention facilities. Thereafter, Ciavarella and Conahan are alleged to have taken steps to ensure that a disproportionate number of juveniles were incarcerated in those facilities. Plaintiffs in this action are all juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella.
On July 27, 2011, Provider Defendants filed a motion for relief from the stipulated Protective Order that had been agreed upon by the parties and signed by the Court on July 23, 2009. (Doc. 205.) Specifically, Provider Defendants sought to modify the Protective Order so that they could show Attorneys’ Eyes Only material to persons who were not privy to the material under paragraph 8 of the Order. (Doc. 957.) The Court denied the motion. (Doc. 1102.) Provider Defendants subsequently filed the instant Motion requesting the Court to clarify, or reconsider, the prior decision. (Doc. 1107.) The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
In the instant Motion, Provider Defendants request the Court to: (A) clarify the April 10, 2012 Order; (B) reconsider the Order; (C) grant summary judgment due to Plaintiffs’ spoliation of evidence; (D) permit Provider Defendants to amend their answers to deny previously admitted averments; and/or (E) certify the April 10, 2012 Order for appeal. (Doc. 1107.) These issues will be addressed in seratim.
A. Clarification of the Order According to Provider Defendants, “this Court should clarify its Order to state the nature of the damages that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover and the discovery about
2

those damages to which Provider Defendants are entitled.” (Doc. 1108.) “ ‘The general purpose of a motion for clarification is to explain or clarify something ambiguous or vague, not to alter or amend.” Montgomery Cnty. v. Microvote Corp., No. 97–6331, 2000 WL 341566, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Mar.31, 2000) (quoting Resolution Trust Co. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, No. 92–1373, 1993 WL 211555, at *2 (E.D.Pa. June 8, 1993)).
*2 Clarification of the April 10, 2012 Order is unwarranted. Contrary to Provider Defendants’ assertion, the Court’s Order did not fundamentally alter the rules of these actions. Likewise, the Order did not deny Provider Defendants due process. Rather, the Court’s determination was narrow: Provider Defendants are not entitled to relief from the parties’ stipulated Protective Order. And, this determination is clearly, and unambiguously, stated in the Court’s Order: “NOW, this 10th day of April, 2012, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order (Doc. 957) is DENIED.” (Doc. 1102.) In that regard, the Order did not limit or alter the remedies or theories of relief in this action that existed prior to the Court’s Order. Instead, the Court simply upheld the status quo pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreed upon Protective Order. Further clarification of the Court’s Order is therefore unnecessary.
B. Reconsideration Provider Defendants’ motion for reconsideration will be denied. Here, Provider Defendants’ motion for reconsideration arises under Middle District Local Rule 7.10. The procedure for such reconsideration is essentially the same as a motion to alter or amend judgment brought under Rule 59(e), except that it allows for reconsideration of any court order, and is not limited to the entry of judgment. Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:06–CV–1105, 2011 WL 4916397, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Oct.17, 2011) (clarifying that the “difference between a motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 7.10 and a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) is that a motion for reconsideration under Local Rule may be filed in response to any order of the court, not solely after the entry of judgment.”).
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. See Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985). A judgment may be altered or amended if the party seeking reconsideration establishes at least one of the following: “(1) an

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 2007294
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café, by Lou–Ann, Inc., v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999). “A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D.Pa.2002). “[R]econsideration motions may not be used to raise new arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Hill v. Tammac Corp., Civ. A. No. 05–1148, 2006 WL 529044, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 3, 2006). Lastly, reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy, and should be granted sparingly. D’Angio v. Borough of Nescopeck, 56 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (M.D.Pa.1999).
*3 Provider Defendants argue that the Court committed clear error of law in its application of the fairness and efficiency prong of the Pansy criteria. (Doc. 1108.) Specifically, Provider Defendants assert that the Court’s determination was contrary to controlling authority, incorrectly applied offensive collateral estoppel against them, and unfairly prohibited them from examining Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records. (Id.) These arguments are without merit.
First, reconsideration is unwarranted on the basis of the Court’s application of the fairness and efficiency consideration of the Pansy criteria. Although Provider Defendants argue that the Court’s evaluation of the fairness and efficiency factor is controlled by the Supreme Court’s holding in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), the Court disagrees.
In Carey, a school district suspended students without providing the students pre-suspension hearings. See id. at 249–50. The students filed suit against the school district alleging that they had been suspended without due process of law. See id. at 250. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether “in an action for the deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must prove that he was actually injured by the deprivation before he may recover substantial ‘non-punitive’ damages.” Id. at 253. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of proof of actual injury, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for the deprivation of procedural due process may not recover compensatory damages and is instead limited to recovery of nominal damages. Id. at 264. Thus, if the students would have been suspended in Carey even if they had been given pre-suspension hearingsthat is the suspensions were “justified” then, in the absence of proof of emotional distress damages, the students could recover
3

only nominal damages. Id. at 267.
Here, unlike in Carey, the Court did not determine what remedies are available to Plaintiffs in this case.1 Instead, the Court, in applying the fairness and efficiency factor of the Pansy criteria, concluded that, in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination that the proceedings conducted by former Judge Ciavarella violated the rights of juveniles, the promotion of fairness did not require a modification of the stipulated Protective Order. As such, Carey is not outcome-determinative of whether Provider Defendants, as the moving party, satisfied their burden to obtain relief from the Protective Order.2
Moreover, the Court is not convinced that Carey compels the resolution in this action advanced by Provider Defendants. Provider Defendants, applying Carey, imply that if Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been detained, or adjudicated guilty, even in the absence of Ciavarella’s improper conduct, then, unless emotional distress is proven by Plaintiffs, they have not suffered actual injuries. Unrecognized by Provider Defendants, however, is that the factual scenario in this casedenial of procedural and substantive due process rights related to an impartial tribunal, including, inter alia, the right to counsel, the right to an unbiased fact finder, and the right to a fair trialimplicate issues far different from the school district’s deprivation of pre-suspension hearings in Carey. Rephrased, unlike the students in Carey, Juvenile Plaintiffs allege not only a deprivation of procedural due process, but also a significant denial of substantive due process rights.3 In light of these considerations, the Court, at this time, is not convinced that Carey conclusively resolves the issue of damages in this case.4 See also Stachura, 477 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I do not understand the Court, however, to hold that deprivations of constitutional rights can never themselves constitute compensable injuries. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the logic of Carey, and would defeat the purpose of § 1983 by denying compensation for genuine injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.”).
*4 Second, contrary to Provider Defendants’ assertion, the Court’s Order does not implicitly prevent Provider Defendants from denying “that [they] were involved in Ciavarella’s alleged due process violations.” (Doc. 1108.) The relevant passage of the Court’s Memorandum, as quoted by Provider Defendants, states that “a trial of each plaintiff on the delinquency allegations would effectively nullify the determination that the proceedings conducted by former Judge Ciavarella violated the rights of those juveniles.” (Doc. 1101.) While this passage is consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination to

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2007294
expunge Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records, it does not expressly state, nor implicitly indicate, that Provider Defendants are barred from arguing against involvement in Ciavarella’s violation of Plaintiffs’ rights.
Third, Provider Defendants are not entitled to reconsideration on the basis that the Court unfairly prohibited them from examining Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records. Contrary to Provider Defendants’ characterization of the Order, they are not prevented from discovering Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records. The Order did not alter Provider Defendants’ access to documents produced in this case, including court and probation files for Juvenile Plaintiffs. Likewise, the Order did not modify Provider Defendants’ access to their own documents and their ability to question third parties about these documents in the context of a deposition. Thus, because the Court simply maintained the status quo based upon an agreement of the parties, reconsideration is not justified.
C. Summary Judgment Based on Spoliation of Evidence Provider Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiffs’ alleged spoliation of evidence. “ ‘Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve properly for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.’ ” Fortune v. Bitner, No. 01–0111, 2006 WL 839346, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Mar.29, 2006) (Vanaskie, C.J.) (quoting Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F.Supp.2d 332, 335 (D.N.J.2004)). Here, as noted, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records have not been destroyed or altered, nor have Plaintiffs failed to preserve the records. In fact, the records have been specifically maintained for use in this litigation. Thus, as Provider Defendants fail to establish that evidence has been destroyed or not properly preserved for use in this litigation, their request for summary judgment will be denied.
D. Leave to Amend Admissions Provider Defendants will be denied the opportunity to “amend their answers to deny allegations previously admitted.” (Doc. 1115 .) Initially, the Court recognizes that Provider Defendants provide no legal support for the position that “[w]hat Provider Defendants know as a matter of fact is different from what they are permitted to
4

know as a matter of law.” (Id.) More troubling to the Court, however, is that Provider Defendants’ request to deny known facts seemingly contradicts the mandates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by this Court pursuant to Local Rule 83.23.2. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(4) (“[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper ... an attorney ... certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief ... [that] the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information”); Pa. Rules of Prof’ l Conduct R. 3.1 (2012) (“a lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”); Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 (2012) (“a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal ... (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false”). Because Provider Defendants have access to the records and evidence that formed the basis of their previous admissions and they specifically “know [this information] as a matter of fact,” (Doc. 1115), they will not be permitted to amend their prior admissions.
E. Certification for Interlocutory Appeal *5 Lastly, the Court will not amend the April 10, 2012 Order to certify it for immediate appeal. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district judge may certify an interlocutory order for appeal when the judge is “of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id. As the Court has discussed at length, the prior decision was based on a single issue: whether to modify or grant relief from the stipulated Protective Order. And, because it is well-settled in this Circuit that “a district court has wide discretion in weighing any relevant factors and deciding whether to grant a motion for a protective order,” Caldon, Inc. v. Advanced Measurement & Analysis Grp., Inc., No. 04–1951, 2007 WL 4571165, at *1 (W.D.Pa. Dec.27, 2007) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787; Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir.1995)), the Court will not amend the Order to certify it for appeal.

Wallace v. Powell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 2012 WL 2007294
III. Conclusion For the above stated reasons, Provider Defendants’ Motion will be denied in its entirety.
An appropriate order follows.

All Citations Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 2007294

Footnotes

1

This issue, in fact, was not briefed in Provider Defendants’ opening brief in support of their motion to modify, nor was it

addressed in Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to modify.

2

Even if Carey supports the conclusion that the fairness and efficiency factor favor Provider Defendants, this finding alone would

be insufficient to convince the Court that reconsideration is necessary. In particular, if the fairness inquiry favored Provider

Defendants, this would impact the resolution of only a single Pansy factor and would not change the Court’s previous

determination that “there was good cause to issue the protective order because the compelling concerns regarding privacy and

embarrassment strongly outweighed the minor issues of efficiency and public importance.... [And], the Juvenile Plaintiffs relied

upon the Protective Order.” (Doc. 1101.) Thus, a finding that the promotion of fairness weighs in favor of Provider Defendants

would not alter the Court’s ultimate conclusion. That is, even assuming arguendo that the fifth Pansy consideration favors

Provider Defendants, the balancing of interests would still not weigh in favor of granting relief from the Protective Order.

3

Although Carey did “not establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights, with substantive rights afforded greater protection

than ‘mere’ procedural safeguards,” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249

(1986), Carey recognized that:

[T]he elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of

one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another....

[T]hese issues must be considered with reference to the nature of the interests protected by the particular constitutional right

in question.

Carey, 435 U.S. at 265–66 (emphasis added). Thus, while damages for a constitutional deprivation must always be designed to

compensate injuries, “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to

establish, some form of presumed damages may be appropriate.” Stachura, 477 U .S. at 311.

4

However, as this issue is not currently before the Court, its resolution will be left for another day.

5

 
 	  
2012 WL 1191607 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Raul Clark, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. Wayne Dawn, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Angela Rimmer Belanger, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Mark A. Ciavarella, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–cv–286, 3:09–cv–0291, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–0630, 3:09–cv–2535,
3:10–cv–1405. | April 10, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
David S. Senoff, Lauren C. Fantini, Richard C. Defrancesco, William R. Caroselli, Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, Daniel Segal Rebecca L. Santoro, Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudlin, Daniel E. Kleiner, Metzger & Kleiner, Lourdes M. Rosado, Marsha L. Levick, Philadelphia, PA, Michael J. Cefalo Cefalo & Associates West Pittston, PA, Barry H. Dyller, Law Office of Barry H. Dyller, Wilkes-Barre, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Mark B. Sheppard Montgomery MCcRacken, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.
Michael T. Conahan, Mountaintop, PA, pro se.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., Peltin, IL, pro se.
Elmer Robert Keach, III, Law Offices Of PC, Amsterdam, NY, Bernard M Schneider, Brucker Schneider & Porter, William G. Brucker, Pittsburgh, PA, Howard Wishnoff, Donna Adelsberger & Associates, P.C., Glenside, PA, Demetrius W. Fannick, Kingston, PA, Thomas Edward Brenner, Goldberg Katzman, Pc, Scott D. McCarroll,

Thomas Thomas & Hafer LLP, Harrisburg, PA, Suzanne McDonough, Holsten & Associates, Media, PA, Deborah H. Simon, Timothy T. Myers, Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, Blue Bell, PA, Alison Tanchyk, Eric Kraeutler, Joseph B.G. Fay, Nathan J. Andrisani, Alison Tanchyk, Eric Kraeutler, Joseph B.G. Fay, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Arnold Levin, Daniel C. Levin, Levin Fishbein Sedran & Berman, Philadelphia, PA, Ruth S. Borland, Kimberly D. Borland, Borland & Borland, Nicole F Bednarek, Bednarek & Stahl, John G. Dean, Elliott Greenleaf & Dean, Wilkes-Barre, PA, Jane S. Sebelin, Sebelin Law Offices Pc, Lehighton, PA, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. Richard Caputo, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is the Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order brought by Defendants Mid–Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Childcare, LLC (together, the “Provider Defendants”) and joined by Defendant Sandra Brulo. Because there was good cause to issue the Protective Order and it was relied upon by the Juvenile Plaintiffs, the motion will be denied.
I. Background
This consolidated action stems out of an alleged conspiracy in which two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan, accepted payments from various individuals and corporations for the purpose of facilitating the construction of juvenile detention facilities and then took steps to ensure that a disproportionate number of juveniles were incarcerated in those facilities. Plaintiffs in the action are all juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Mr. Ciavarella.
On July 23, 2009, I signed a Stipulated Protective Order that had been negotiated by the parties. The Protective Order limits the disclosure of certain discovery documents, including records of Plaintiffs’ juvenile adjudications. In particular, the Protective Order states that:
For all plaintiffs, regardless of age, no receiving party shall disclose any information regarding a
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specific juvenile protected by the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile Act ... in any public filings or in any public forum other than trial or hearing, in accordance with Paragraph 11. Any information regarding a specific juvenile protected by the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile Act ... but to which a plaintiff is entitled to inspection under such provisions, produced by plaintiffs or by a nonparty to the above-captioned actions, shall be treated as ... Attorneys’ Eyes Only Material by plaintiffs for purposes of paragraph 8.
Stipulated Protective Order, Doc. 205 ¶ 1. Under paragraph 8 of the Protective Order, disclosure of Attorneys’ Eyes Only Material is limited to counsel for the receiving party, employees and agents of counsel, the Court, and any deponent who it appears “authored or received a copy of [the material]” or “was or was alleged to be involved in the subject matter described therein or is employed by the party who produced the [material].” Id. ¶¶ 5(b)-(f); 8. The Protective Order reserved the parties’ rights to move the Court for modification of or relief from any of its terms. Id. ¶ 14.
On October 29, 2009, and March 29, 2010, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated and dismissed with prejudice the adjudications of all juveniles who appeared before former judge Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008, ordering that all records relating to these adjudications be expunged. In re J.V.R., 81 M.M.2008, Order ¶ 3–4 (Pa. Oct. 29, 2009); id. Order ¶ 3 (Pa. Mar. 29, 2010). The Court stated that “neither the victims, the juveniles, nor the community will benefit by having new proceedings in cases of juveniles who have received final discharge either from commitment, placement, probation or any other disposition and referral, and who have paid all fines, restitution, and fees.” Id., Order (Oct. 29, 2009).
*2 The Provider Defendants, joined by Defendant Sandra Brulo, filed a motion for relief from or a modification to the Protective Order on July 27, 2011. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
The Third Circuit held in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg that when considering a motion to modify a protective order, a court must “use the same balancing test that is used when determining whether to grant such

orders in the first instance.” 23 F.3d 772, 790 (3d Cir.1994). Protective orders should be granted in the first instance where “good cause” exists, considering the following factors:
1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests;
2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or an improper purpose;
3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment;
4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public health and safety;
5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency;
6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and
7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.
Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787–91). Additionally, a court deciding whether to modify a protective order must consider the parties’ reliance on the protective order. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790. Reliance will be greater where a protective order induced a party to allow discovery. Id. (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475–76 (9th Cir.1992)). The party seeking modification has the burden of “explaining why his need for the materials outweighs existing privacy concerns.” Id.
III. Discussion
The Provider Defendants seek modification to or relief from the Protective Order so that they may show Attorneys’ Eyes Only material to persons who are not privy to the material under paragraph 8 of the Order. Specifically, the Provider Defendants would like to (1) contact reported victims, reported witnesses, and responding police officers involved in the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ alleged delinquent acts; (2) reveal the names of the Juvenile Plaintiffs to those reported victims, reported witnesses, and responding police officers; and (3) use the corresponding police reports and court charging documents-both of which are Attorney’s Eyes Only material- to refresh the recollection of those reported victims, reported witnesses, and responding police officers. The Provider Defendants argue that this investigation is crucial to their defense because it allows them to deny both causation and damages by showing that
2

the Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been incarcerated regardless of the alleged conspiracy.
In order to determine whether to grant Defendants’ motion, there must be a consideration of the Pansy factors. Plaintiffs argue that the balance of these factors weighs in favor of denying any modification of or relief from the protective order.
1. Privacy Interest *3 First and foremost, Plaintiffs correctly point out that disclosure of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ adjudication records would be a clear violation of their privacy interests. The privacy interests inherent in these records is demonstrated both by their statutory protection under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 6301 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s expungement orders. The Provider Defendants argue that the Juvenile Plaintiffs have in effect waived their right to privacy by filing pleadings that disclose personal information and by participating in media coverage of the alleged conspiracy. But filing a lawsuit does not automatically constitute a waiver of privacy as to all personal information, especially where a plaintiff negotiates a protective order, as the Juvenile Plaintiffs did here. And the Provider Defendants do not assert that the Juvenile Plaintiffs violated the Protective Order during their media interviews or at any other time. In sum, nothing suggests that the Juvenile Plaintiffs waived the privacy rights guaranteed by the Protective Order. Therefore, this factor strongly weighs against modification.
2. Purpose of Disclosure The Provider Defendants state that they seek this information for a proper purpose: the investigation of the case for the purposes of building their defense. Although the Plaintiffs have suggested that there may be an improper purpose, they failed to support this allegation with any evidence. This factor thus lies in favor of the Defendants.
3. Embarrassment The disclosure of this sensitive material could subject the Juvenile Plaintiffs to great embarrassment and possibly emotional trauma by reopening old wounds relating to incidents that occurred as many as eight years ago. The Provider Defendants again point to the media coverage of the alleged conspiracy, suggesting that the Juvenile Plaintiffs cannot now assert embarrassment after having subjected themselves to scrutiny. But the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ selective disclosure of certain facts has far less potential for embarrassment than full disclosure of the

details of the police reports to former victims and witnesses. This is another factor that favors the denial of the Provider Defendants’ motion.
4. Public Health and Safety Defendants do not argue that the Protective Order involves information important to health and safety; this factor therefore does not favor modification to or relief from the Order.
5. Fairness & Efficiency In terms of efficiency, the Provider Defendants contend that they will face exorbitant litigation costs unless the Protective Order is modified. They point out that they do not seek to show the records to anyone who is barred under the Protective Order, as the Order specifically allows for disclosure to deponents who have involvement in the subject matter of the material. See Doc. 205 ¶¶ 5(f); 8. Rather, the Provider Defendants explain, they merely seek to change the location at which they can make the inquiry: instead of showing the records to reported victims, reported witnesses, and responding police officers during a deposition, they would like to disclose the records at an informal deposition setting. If the Provider Defendants were to individually depose every reported victim, reported witness, and responding police officer, it would indeed be time-intensive and costly. The issue of efficiency, therefore, strongly favors the Provider Defendants.
*4 The fairness inquiry, on the other hand, favors the Juvenile Plaintiffs. Although the Provider Defendants argue that basic fairness requires that they be permitted to fully investigate their defense without prohibitive expense, the Plaintiffs point out that the Defendants already have access to this material and that it would be unfair to modify an order that was stipulated to and relied upon by the parties.
More importantly, the Provider Defendants have failed to convincingly demonstrate that an investigation into the factual background of each Juvenile Plaintiff’s adjudication is necessary to their defense on the issues of causation and damages. The question of causation in this case does not appear to turn on whether the Defendants’ actions caused the incarceration of the Juvenile Plaintiffs, but rather whether the Defendants’ actions caused a deprivation of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights to a fair trial. Moreover, in view of the expungement of the records of all of the juvenile plaintiffs because they were denied due process and a fair tribunal, they have, ipso facto, been damaged. Determining damages by the degree of culpability a plaintiff had regarding the delinquency allegations would involve a trial of each plaintiff on the
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delinquency allegations, which would effectively nullify the determination that the proceedings conducted by former Judge Ciavarella violated the rights of those juveniles. Neither causation nor damages are appropriately evaluated by resurrecting the expunged records of each juvenile plaintiff. For these reasons, the promotion of fairness does not require the granting of a modification to or relief from the Protective Order.

may, in the long run, reduce other litigants’ confidence in protective orders, rendering them less useful as a tool for preventing discovery abuse and encouraging more strenuous objections to discovery requests.” Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 11.432 (2004). The Juvenile Plaintiffs’ reliance on the terms of the Protective Order thus suggests that modification of the Order would be improper.

6. Government Parties There is no question that the Juvenile Plaintiffs are not public entities or public officials, so this factor cannot support granting the Provider Defendants’ motion.
7. Importance to Public The parties agree that the conspiracy alleged in this case is of great public importance, so this factor weighs in favor of the Provider Defendants.
8. Reliance The Provider Defendants argue that even though the Juvenile Plaintiffs relied on the Protective Order, their reliance included an understanding that the adjudication records could be showed to certain deponents. But the Provider Defendants are not attempting to disclose the records to certain deponents; instead, they are attempting to modify the terms of the agreement that they negotiated in order to disclose records outside of the deposition setting. The Juvenile Plaintiffs relied upon the limiting effect of the Protective Order’s deposition requirement, and the Provider Defendants fail to allege any factual changes or developments justifying relaxation of that requirement. Additionally, judicial policy cautions against modifying a protective order where parties have relied on it, as “[i]f a party freely disclosed information without contest based on the premise that it would remain confidential, subsequent dissemination may be unfair and
	  

9. Balancing *5 Based on a balancing of the foregoing factors, the Provider Defendants’ motion for modification of or relief from the Protective Order must be denied. There was good cause to issue the protective order because the compelling concerns regarding privacy and embarrassment strongly outweighed the minor issues of efficiency and public importance. Further, the Juvenile Plaintiffs relied upon the Protective Order, and it would be unfair to now modify it. Finally, I must emphasize that I am hesitant to grant any order that would result in the unnecessary reopening and reinvestigation of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ prior convictions. Whether a particular juvenile would have been declared delinquent if given due process would require a fair retrial of the juvenile. Such an exercise is inconsistent with the expungement on the basis that the juvenile was denied due process. Therefore, the reconsideration of the merits of each juvenile plaintiff’s case on the issue of causation and/or damages is inappropriate, and discovery of their records for those purposes will note be permitted.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for relief from or modification to the protective order will be denied. An appropriate order follows.

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2010 WL 3398992 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
This decision was reviewed by West editorial staff and not assigned editorial enhancements.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Judge Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–CV–286, 3:09–CV–291, 3:09–CV–357, 3:09–CV–630. | Aug. 24, 2010.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is Defendant Frank Vita’s Motion to Dismiss Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 462.) He requests that this Court dismiss all claims against him. Because Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege a factual basis for their claims against Vita, the motion will be granted.
This Court has jurisdiction over the present action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (“federal question”) and 1367 (“supplemental”).
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background

The allegations of the Individual Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint (“IC”) (Doc. 134) relevant to the present motions are as follows:
Defendant Frank Vita, Ph. D., (“Vita”) was at all relevant times a psychologist and brother-in-law of Defendant Michael Conahan (“Conahan”). (IC ¶ 23.) Defendants Conahan and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”) were at all relevant times Judges of the Court of Common Pleas of the Eleventh Judicial District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (IC ¶¶ 5, 6.) Defendants PA Child Care, LLC (“PACC”) and Western PA Child Care, LLC (“WPACC”) were a limited liability companies which each owned and operated a youth detention center. (IC ¶¶ 7, 8.) Plaintiffs are a number of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella (hereinafter the “Juvenile Plaintiffs”), along with the parents or guardians of those juveniles (hereinafter the “Parent Plaintiffs”). (IC ¶ 3.)
A conspiracy existed “among the judges and [the other Defendants] to conceal $2.6 million in payments to the judges from Defendants and others as yet unknown in exchanged for referring children who appeared before [Ciavarella] to these juvenile correctional facilities.” (IC ¶ 29.) In exchange for this improper income, Conahan and Ciavarella entered into agreements guaranteeing placement of juvenile offenders exclusively with PACC, removed funding from the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility, facilitated the construction and expansion of PACC and WPACC, and directed juvenile be housed at PACC and WPACC. (IC ¶ 34.) Vita did not participate in the payment of funds to Conahan and Ciavarella. (IC ¶ 37.) Implicit in the demand for kickbacks was the understanding that the payments were quid pro quo for Conahan and Ciavarella’s exercise of their judicial authority to send juveniles to PACC and WPACC “and to take other discretionary acts.” (IC ¶ 46.) In approximately February 2003, Ciavarella began directing that youthful offenders be sent to PACC’s facility. (IC ¶ 55.)
“Defendants one and all participated in a scheme to ensure that a disproportionate number of juveniles ... were incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities owned, operated, and influenced by Defendants.” (IC ¶ 36.) Vita had an exclusive contract or series of contracts that made him the sole provider of psychological examinations for Luzerne County’s Department of Probation Services providing recommendations for alleged juvenile offenders. (IC ¶ 23.) Because of his exclusive contract or contracts, Vita developed “an inventory” which necessitated that juveniles be detained at PACC and WPACC while awaiting evaluations. (IC ¶ 24.) “The
1

result of this inventory was that juveniles were detained and/or lodged at PACC or WPACC for longer than required thereby allowing PACC and WPACC to collect additional fees for said lodging.” (IC ¶ 25.)
II. Procedural Background *2 The present memorandum concerns four cases consolidated for purposes of discovery by this Court’s May 14, 2009, Case Management Order. (Doc. 82.) Subsequent to consolidation, Plaintiffs filed one master amended complaint for individual plaintiffs (Doc. 134) with claims against Vita. Vita filed the present motion to dismiss on April 29, 2010. (Doc. 462.) This motion has been briefed by both parties and is now ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6). Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ “ each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ “ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ “ or “ ‘legal conclusions,’ “ Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
*3 When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs bring several claims against Vita pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their federal constitutional rights. At Count III, the Juvenile Plaintiffs allege violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to § 1983. At Count IV, the Parent Plaintiffs allege violations of their substantive due process rights. At Count V, the Parent Plaintiffs allege violations of their procedural due process rights. Section 1983 provides redress for individuals whose constitutional rights are violated by governmental actors.1 “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005).
Vita argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted against him. As a threshold matter, Vita does not dispute that the alleged conduct of Ciavarella violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Instead, Vita argues that Plaintiffs fail to provide a sufficient factual basis for their claims. (Br. in Supp. 3, Doc. 463.) I agree. As to Vita’s personal conduct,
2

Plaintiffs allege that as a result of his contract with Luzerne County Vita had a backlog of evaluations to be performed. (IC ¶ 24.) While the alleged conduct may have resulted in longer detentions, Plaintiffs do not allege that these longer periods violated their rights. Thus, it cannot be said that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Vita directly violated Plaintiffs’ rights. As to Vita’s role in the alleged conspiracy, I also find that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient. While Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants one and all participated” in the conspiracy, standing alone this type of conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim; there must be a factual basis for this legal conclusion. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1950 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). Plaintiffs do not provide any underlying factual allegations against Vita that he participated in the conspiracy. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Vita “had an exclusive contract” which caused an inventory to develop and that “the result of this inventory was that juveniles were detained.” (IC ¶¶ 23–25.) Plaintiffs do not, however, allege that Vita entered into the contract knowing that it would create a backlog or that he intended to delay adjudications; they allege only that the contract ultimately had that effect. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allegations actually undermine their legal conclusion that Vita participated in the conspiracy, such as when they explicitly exclude Vita from the group of Defendants involved in the payments to

Conahan and Ciavarella. (IC ¶ 37.) I find Plaintiffs fail to provide factual allegations to support their legal conclusion that Vita either directly or through the alleged conspiracy violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Therefore, Vita’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
CONCLUSION *4 Because Plaintiffs have failed to provide a factual allegations to support their legal conclusion that Vita is liable for their alleged constitutional violations, Vita’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER NOW, this 24th day of August, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Vita’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 462) is GRANTED.
	  

Footnotes

1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any

State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress ....“

	   	  
End	  of	  Document	  
	  

©	  2013	  Thomson	  Reuters.	  No	  claim	  to	  original	  U.S.	  Government	  Works.	  

3

 
 	  
2010 WL 3398995 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
This decision was reviewed by West editorial staff and not assigned editorial enhancements.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Judge Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–CV–286, 3:09–CV–291, 3:09–CV–357, 3:09–CV–630. | Aug. 24, 2010.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court are five motions to dismiss: (1) Defendant Barbara Conahan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 433); (2) Defendant Cindy Ciavarella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 435); (3) Defendants Robert J. Powell’s and Vision Holdings, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 437); (4) Motion to Dismiss by Mid–Atlantic Youth Services Corp, PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC (Doc. 439); and (5) Motion of Defendants Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, to Dismiss the Master Complaint for Class Actions and the Individual Plaintiffs’ Master Long Form Complaint (Doc. 442). For the reasons discussed below, the motions of Defendants Cindy Ciavarella and Barbara Conahan will be granted, and the remaining motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
This Court has jurisdiction over the present action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (“federal question”) and

1367 (“supplemental”).
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background The allegations of the Individual Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint (“IC”) (Doc. 134) and Class Action Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint (“CAC”) (Doc. 136) that are relevant to the present motions are as follows:
A. Parties Defendants Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella were at all relevant times Judges of the Court of Common Pleas of the Eleventh Judicial District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (IC ¶¶ 5, 6; CAC ¶¶ 161, 162.) From approximately January 2002 until January 2007, Conahan served as President Judge. (IC.¶ 5.) Conahan and Ciavarella were also owners, officers, shareholders, operators, and beneficiaries of Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC (“Pinnacle”) and Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc. (“Beverage”). (IC ¶¶ 5, 6; CAC ¶¶ 161, 162.) Pinnacle was owned and operated by Defendants Barbara Conahan (“Mrs.Conahan”) and Cynthia Ciavarella (“Mrs.Ciavarella”), the wives of Defendants Conahan and Ciavarella, respectively. (IC ¶¶ 12–14; CAC ¶¶ 166, 167.)
Defendants Robert Powell (“Powell”) and Gregory Zappala (“Zappala”) were at all relevant times owners, officers, shareholders, and operators of Defendants PA Child Care, LLC (“PACC”), Western PA Child Care, LLC (“WPACC”), Mid Atlantic Youth Services (“MAYS”), Vision Holdings, LLC. (IC ¶¶ 4, 11; CAC ¶¶ 163, 165.) Powell was also an attorney-at-law and owner, officer, shareholder, and operator of Powell Law Group, P.C. (IC ¶ 4.) PACC and WPACC are a limited liability companies which each own and operate a youth detention center. (IC ¶¶ 7, 8.) MAYS was a corporation responsible for the operation of the PACC and WPACC facilities by virtue of contractual agreement. (IC ¶ 18.) Defendant Robert Mericle (“Mericle”) was at all relevant times an owner, shareholder, officer, and operator of Mericle Construction, Inc. (“Mericle Construction”). (IC ¶ 9; CAC ¶ 164.) Mericle Construction was at all times a closely held corporation. (IC ¶ 10.) Mericle was a contractor and friend of Ciavarella. (IC ¶ 39 .)
*2 Plaintiffs are a number of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella and their parents. (IC ¶ 3; CAC ¶¶ 10– 160, 176–183, 192–648.)
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B. Conspiracy A conspiracy existed “among the judges and [the other Defendants] to conceal $2.6 million in payments to the judges from Defendants and others as yet unknown in exchanged for referring children who appeared before [Ciavarella] to these juvenile correctional facilities.” (IC ¶ 29; CAC ¶ 664.) In exchange for this improper income, Conahan and Ciavarella entered into agreements guaranteeing placement of juvenile offenders exclusively with PACC, removed funding from the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility, facilitated the construction and expansion of PACC and WPACC, and directed juvenile be housed at PACC and WPACC. (IC ¶ 34.) “Defendants one and all participated in a scheme to ensure that a disproportionate number of juveniles ... were incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities owned, operated, and influenced by Defendants.” (IC ¶ 36.) “Defendants entered into and through various overt acts described above an agreement between themselves to illegally deprive Plaintiffs of their basic constitutional rights for their own personal enrichment and profit.” (IC ¶ 81.) Implicit in the demand for kickbacks was the understanding that the payments were quid pro quo for Conahan and Ciavarella’s exercise of their judicial authority to send juveniles to PACC and WPACC “and to take other discretionary acts.” (IC ¶ 46; CAC ¶ 656.)
C. Construction of PACC and WPACC Facilities In approximately June 2000, Ciavarella had discussions with Powell who was interested in constructing a juvenile facility in Luzerne County. (IC ¶ 39; CAC ¶ 649.) Powell was then introduced to Mericle for the purpose of locating land and constructing the facility. (IC ¶ 39; CAC ¶ 649.) Powell and Zappala, doing business as PACC, acquired land in Luzerne County and entered into an agreement with Mericle to construct a juvenile detention center to be operated by PACC and MAYS. (IC ¶ 40; CAC ¶¶ 649– 50.) In or before January 2003, Conahan and Ciavarella arranged to receive a payment of $997,600 for their actions accomplishing the construction of PACC’s facility. (IC ¶ 43; CAC ¶ 656, 701.) In order to conceal this payment, Conahan, Ciavarella, Powell, and Mericle signed an agreement prepared by Mericle purporting to pay a broker’s fee to Powell, when a large portion of the money was intended for Conahan and Ciavarella. (IC ¶ 44; CAC ¶ 702.) Conahan and Ciavarella also took steps to close the existing Luzerne County juvenile facility. Conahan removed funding for the existing Luzerne County juvenile detention facility. (IC ¶ 42; CAC ¶ 655.) Conahan and Ciavarella publicly maintained that conditions at the existing facility were deplorable. (CAC ¶ 654.) They also demanded kickbacks from Powell in exchange for closing the existing Luzerne County juvenile facility. (IC ¶ 46.) On or about January 29, 2002,

Conahan executed a “Placement Guarantee Agreement” between PACC and the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County to house juvenile offenders at the PACC facility. (IC ¶ 41; CAC ¶ 652.)
*3 Due to the success of PACC, Powell and Zappala, doing business as WPACC, constructed a juvenile facility in western Pennsylvania. (IC ¶ 51; CAC ¶ 659.) This facility was also constructed by Mericle. (IC ¶ 51; CAC ¶ 659.) Upon completion of the WPACC facility in July 2005, a $1,000,000 payment was made to Conahan and Ciavarella by Powell. (IC ¶ 51; CAC ¶ 659, 709.) To conceal this payment, Conahan, Ciavarella, Powell, and Mericle signed a “Registration and Commission Agreement” purporting to be an agreement for Mericle to pay Powell a fee of $1,000,000, while the money was instead transferred to Pinnacle, an entity owned by Conahan and Ciavarella. (IC ¶ 52; CAC ¶ 659.) Mericle Construction was also hired to construct an addition onto the PACC facility. (IC ¶ 53; CAC ¶ 661.) Upon completion of that project in February 2006, a $150,000 payment was made to Conahan and Ciavarella via Pinnacle. (IC ¶ 53.) Again Conahan, Ciavarella, Powell, and Mericle signed a written agreement to hide this transaction. (IC ¶ 54.) In addition to these payments, “Powell made hundreds of thousands of dollars in concealed payments to Ciavarella and Conahan for their past and future acts relating to [PACC] and [WPACC]” through Pinnacle and Vision. (CAC ¶ 662.) Conahan and Ciavarella also engaged in a number of other transactions to hide any sums they received. (IC ¶¶ 48–50, 55–58, 60– 65; CAC ¶¶ 703–21.)
D. Juvenile Adjudications “For defendants’ scheme to succeed, Ciavarella and Conahan had to ensure that youth were placed at the facilities and that youth were not aware of Ciavarella’s or Conahan’s financial stake in their placement.” (CAC ¶ 665.) The consistent placement of youth facilitated the construction of WPACC’s facility, the expansion of PACC’s facility, and the continuing contract between Luzerne County and these private operators. (CAC ¶¶ 669–670.) Powell believed that if he stopped paying Conahan and Ciavarella they would have retaliated against him by sending no more juveniles to PACC and WPACC. (IC ¶ 59.) In approximately February 2003, Ciavarella began directing that youthful offenders be sent to PACC’s facility. (IC ¶ 55.) In these juvenile adjudications, Ciavarella routinely deprived the juveniles of their constitutional rights. (CAC ¶¶ 2, 672–73, 681– 87.) Conahan and Ciavarella also implemented “zero tolerance” policies for the purpose of making it virtually impossible for juveniles to avoid placement. (CAC ¶¶ 676–77.)
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II. Procedural Background The present memorandum concerns four cases consolidated for purposes of discovery by this Court’s May 14, 2009, Case Management Order. (Doc. 82.) Subsequent to consolidation, Plaintiffs filed one master amended complaint for individual plaintiffs (Doc. 134) and one master amended complaint for class-action plaintiffs (Doc. 136). Defendants filed the present motions on March 22, 2010, requesting that all claims against them in both complaints be dismissed. (Docs .433, 435, 437, 439, 442.) Each of these motions has been fully briefed and they are now ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
*4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6). Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ “ each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ “ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a

complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ “ or “ ‘legal conclusions,’ “ Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000).
DISCUSSION
*5 Plaintiffs’ Complaints bring a number of causes of action against Defendants:1 (1) claims pursuant to § 1983 for violations of the Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights (IC Counts III, IV, V); (2) claims pursuant to § 1983 for conspiracy to violate the Plaintiffs’ rights (IC Count VIII; CAC Counts II, IV); (3) claims pursuant to civil RICO (IC Count I; CAC Counts V, VI); (4) claims of RICO conspiracy (IC Count II; CAC Count VII); (5) state law civil conspiracy (IC Count VIII); and (6) state law false imprisonment (IC Count IX; CAC Count IX). The sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations as to each claim will be discussed seriatim.
I. Federal Law Claims
A. Section 1983 Plaintiffs bring numerous claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their federal constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides redress for individuals whose constitutional rights are violated by governmental actors.2 “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005).
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that there is an additional element necessary to prove the juvenile plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants cite Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.2000), and argue that because Plaintiffs’ claims are analogous to the common law tort of malicious prosecution, to state a claim for which relief may be
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granted the juvenile plaintiffs must also allege that they were innocent of the charged offenses. While the court in Hector analogized § 1983 actions to common law torts and discussed the impact of innocence on such claims, the court’s ultimate holding related to the damages that were available. Id. at 160. Even if Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs must establish innocence before recovering certain damages, that would not defeat Plaintiffs’ claims entirely as an award of nominal damages would be appropriate if no other damages were shown. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Because Plaintiffs could state a claim for which relief may be granted without alleging any damages, it cannot be said that actual innocence is required to state a claim for which relief may be granted. I find that there is no such additional element when alleging Plaintiffs’ § 1983 causes of action. I will now consider the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims using the two elements discussed above.
1. Under Color of State Law Under the traditional definition of “acting under color of state law,” the defendant must have “exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law.” David v. City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, cert denied, 522 U.S. 858, 118 S.Ct. 157, 139 L.Ed.2d 102 (10th Cir.1996). The parties do not dispute that the moving Defendants could not independently act under color of state law. Instead, Plaintiffs correctly argue that “a private party who willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right acts ‘under color of state law’ for purposes of § 1983.” Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 147–48 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980)). Thus, whether each Defendants acted under color of state law turns on the question of whether Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that each Defendant participated in a conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights.
*6 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege that they were part of a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ rights. “ ‘To demonstrate a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right ‘under color of law.’ “ Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp.2d 649, 666 (M.D.Pa.1999) (quoting Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir.1993)). Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants participated in a scheme to construct PACC and WPACC’s facilities, and to ensure that a disproportionate number of juveniles were incarcerated at those facilities. (IC ¶ 36; CAC ¶ 664.) But standing alone this conclusory allegation is insufficient; Plaintiffs must provide factual allegations to support their claims. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

1950. As to Mericle and Powell, the Plaintiffs outline at length the factual allegations as to each as to their interactions with Conahan and Ciavarella. (IC ¶¶ 39–54; CAC ¶¶ 649–702.) And because Mericle and Powell are alleged to be owners, operators, officers, and controlling members of Mericle Construction, Vision, PACC, WPACC, and MAYS, Plaintiffs also provide sufficient factual allegations against those entities.3
As to Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, however, Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are significantly more limited. Plaintiffs allege that Pinnacle, an entity involved in the payment of kickbacks, was “owned and operated” by the Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella. (IC ¶¶ 12–14; CAC ¶¶ 166–67.) While allegations of ownership might be enough to bind Pinnacle for any actions by Mrs. Conahan or Mrs. Ciavarella, the inverse is not necessarily true, e.g. that conduct by Pinnacle must have involved the wives. It is entirely possible that other actors in an entity, such as Pinnacle, could act on its behalf without the knowledge of its owner. In the present case, Plaintiffs even allege that while Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Civarella owned and operated Pinnacle generally, that their husbands controlled Pinnacle during the conspiracy. (CAC ¶ 709.) Plaintiffs provide no further factual allegations that the wives agreed, assisted, knew of, or otherwise participated in the alleged conspiracy beyond “owning and operating” an entity used by the conspiracy. I find that this allegation alone fails to provide sufficient factual basis for Plaintiffs’ legal conclusion that Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella were part of the alleged conspiracy. Therefore, as to Mrs. Conahan and Ciavarella, I find that they did not act under color of state law, and their motions to dismiss will be granted.
Defendants’ final argument is that even if a conspiracy existed, it did not extend to Ciavarella’s adjudications. Effectively, they argue that at best the allegations demonstrate a conspiracy to pay kick-backs, and a separate conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. In support of their argument, Defendants point to the guilty plea colloquoies of Mericle and Powell. While Defendants may factually dispute whether they were involved in a conspiracy to violate of Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs clearly allege in their complaints that there was one overarching conspiracy. At this stage of the proceedings, this Court must assume as true all well pleaded allegations. Defendants’ challenge is better suited for the summary judgment stage at which point all parties can marshal evidence in support of their positions. Therefore, as to all Defendants except Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, I find that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a conspiracy with state actors, and thus those Defendants’ motions to dismiss on this ground will be denied.
2. Violation of Federal Constitutional Right
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*7 Plaintiffs may be considered in two groups when examining their claims for violations of their federal constitutional rights. First, the individual and class-action plaintiffs who were juveniles brought before Ciavarella (hereinafter “Juvenile Plaintiffs”). The Juvenile Plaintiffs bring claims for violations of their substantive and procedural due process rights, their right to counsel, their right to an impartial tribunal, and their right against involuntary guilty pleas. Second, the individual plaintiffs who were parents or guardians of those in the first group. I will consider the claims of each separately (hereinafter “Parent Plaintiffs”). The Parent Plaintiffs may not bring claims for damages based upon violations of the Juvenile Plaintiffs rights, but instead bring claims for violations of their own substantive and procedural due process rights. See O’Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir.1973) (party may not bring claim based on the violation of another’s rights). I will consider each group’s allegations separately.
a. Juvenile Plaintiffs’ Claims Defendants do not dispute that the juvenile plaintiffs sufficiently allege that their constitutional rights were violated by Ciavarella. Instead, Defendants argue that Ciavarella’s conduct, not their conduct, was the proximate cause of the juvenile plaintiffs’ injuries and that his actions were beyond the scope of the alleged conspiracy. As discussed above there are sufficient factual allegations to support Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants, except for Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, conspired not only to construct the juvenile facilities, but to fill those facilities through violations of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights. While Plaintiffs will ultimately have the burden of establishing the scope of the conspiracy, an evaluation of the strength of Plaintiffs’ evidence is inappropriate at this juncture. It is sufficient that Plaintiffs allege that the purposes of the conspiracy included the depravation of the juveniles’ rights.4 Therefore, I find the Juvenile Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged violations of their constitutional rights.
b. Parent Plaintiffs’ Claims The parent plaintiffs raise two claims. First, the allege that their procedural due process rights were violated when they were deprived of monetary sums as a result of the juvenile adjudications without due process of law. Second, they allege that Defendants violated their substantive due process protected interest in the family relationship between parent and child.
Defendants first argue that the Parent Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violations of their due procedural process rights. To establish a cause of action for a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must first prove that a person

acting under color of state law deprived him of a protected property interest; and second, he must show that the procedures available to him failed to provide him with due process of law. See, e.g., Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000). Defendants argue that the Parent Plaintiffs do not seek damages for violations of their own rights, but rather that they are impermissibly bringing claims for damages they suffered as a result of violations of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights. See O’Malley, 477 F.2d at 789 (party may not bring claim based on the violation of another’s rights). Plaintiffs counter that the same adjudications which violated the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights also deprived the Parent Plaintiffs of their own property, monetary sums through the applications of fines, restitution, and other similar sanctions.5 Plaintiffs cite Stacey v. City of Hermitage, 178 Fed. Appx. 94 (3d Cir.2006) and argue that both the Juvenile Plaintiffs and the Parent Plaintiffs were each deprived of their own rights simultaneously. In Stacey, the home of one of the plaintiffs was allegedly demolished by the local municipality in violation of her constitutional rights. Id. at 98. Plaintiffs, the home owner and her son, brought a civil rights action pursuant to § 1983 alleging violations of their constitutional rights. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part the district court’s order and permitted the claims of both plaintiffs. Id. at 103. In doing so, the court noted that the son sufficiently alleged a violation of his own Fourth Amendment right because he had private property in his mother’s home, thus both he and his mother suffered simultaneous rights violations through a single governmental act. Id. at 100. Similar to the son in Stacey, the Parent Plaintiffs allege that their property was taken without due process during the same adjudications which violated the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights. I find that the Parent Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that their own property was taken by the Defendants’ conduct, and thus that the Plaintiffs sufficiently allege their procedural due process claim.6
*8 Defendants also argue that the Parent Plaintiffs fail to allege a substantive due process violation. “It is by now well-settled that the Due Process Clause protects certainly narrowly defined fundamental rights of parents in their relationships with their children.” McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 826 (3d Cir.2003). To sufficiently state a due process claim for interference with the parent-child relationship, a plaintiff must allege deliberate conduct that the defendant sought to harm that relationship. Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist. Of Philadelphia Bd. Of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 192 (3d Cir.2009). In McCurdy, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a parent’s substantive due process claim for interference with the parent-child relationship arising from the fatal shooting of plaintiff’s adult son. McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830. While the court ultimately held that the plaintiff’s claim was barred because the decedent was an adult, the court stated that it was “hesitant to extend the
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Due Process Clause to cover official actions that were not deliberately directed at the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 829. The court also noted that “it would ... stretch the concept of due process too far if we were to recognize a constitutional violation based upon official actions that were not directed at the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 830. Subsequently in Chambers the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly held that this requirement that defendant’s conduct be deliberately directed at the parentchild relationship also extends to situations involving minor and un-emancipated children. Chambers, 587 F.3d at 192. Applying this requirement to the present case, while Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants deliberately acted to place the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ into PACC and WPACC, they do not allege that Defendants’ deliberately sought to interfere with the Parent Plaintiffs’ parent-child relationships. While it must be said that placing juveniles into PACC and WPACC would be disruptive to the parent-child relationship, given that the disruption caused by the death of a child is insufficient to create a substantive due process claim for a parent unless the defendant deliberately sought to interfere in the parentchild relationship, the conduct alleged here does not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim will be granted.
3. Punitive Damages Defendants Mericle and Mericle Construction also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a factual basis for their § 1983 punitive damages claims. It is clear that in certain circumstances punitive damages may be awarded for violations of civil rights. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1978). The test for determining whether punitive damages should be awarded for civil rights violations is whether Defendants acted with actual knowledge that they were violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard for whether they were doing so. Cochetti, 572 F.2d at 106. While Defendants again dispute whether the conspiracy was intended to violate Plaintiffs’ rights, as stated above Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Mericle, and thus Mericle Construction, was involved in the conspiracy to intentionally violate Plaintiffs’ rights in furtherance of making PACC and WPACC profitable ventures for the conspirators. Defendants’ request to dismiss claims for punitive damages will be denied.
B. Civil RICO *9 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) contains both criminal and civil consequences for violative conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. RICO makes it unlawful to corruptly engage in a pattern of racketeering activity via an enterprise engaged

in interstate commerce. Id. § 1962 (listing prohibited activities). In addition to criminal penalties, RICO authorizes “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court ....“ Id. § 1964(c). Plaintiffs bring causes of action alleging that Defendants Conahan, Ciavarella, Mericle, and Powell violated § 1962(c), and that all Defendants violated § 1962(d).7 (IC Counts I and II; CAC Counts V and VII.) Section 1962(c) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” Id. § 1962(c). Section 1962(d) makes in unlawful to conspire to violate the other subsections of § 1962. Id. § 1962(d). Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs lack standing to make RICO claims, that they do not sufficiently allege RICO violations under subsection (c), and that they do not sufficiently allege a RICO conspiracy under subsection (d). I will consider each of these arguments in turn.
1. Standing The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that there are two distinct parts of the standing requirement of a civil RICO action: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury to business or property and (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s RICO violation. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir.2000). In Zimmerman, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that a plaintiff seeking recovery pursuant to RICO must allege injury “in his business or property” which was caused by a violation of the act. Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir.1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964). The court has also noted that “ ‘a showing of injury requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.’ “ Maio, 221 F.3d at 482. Plaintiffs bringing RICO causes of action are those alleging that they suffered economic harm when forced to pay monetary fines and other similar sums after the Juvenile Plaintiffs were adjudicated delinquent as part of the Defendants’ conspiracy.8 This type of economic harm clearly satisfies a “property” interest protected by RICO.
To have standing to bring civil RICO claims, however, Plaintiffs’ injuries must also have been proximately caused by the underlying predicate acts. At common law, proximate cause was the demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992). Proximate cause, however, “is a flexible concept that does not lend itself to a black-letter rule that will
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dictate the result in every case.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 2142, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008). “[T]he compensable injury flowing from a [RICO violation] ‘necessarily is the harm caused by the predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.’ “ Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. at 457 (quoting Sedmia, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). When considering whether an alleged injury is sufficiently direct, the Supreme Court has looked to three of the underlying justifications for the requirement of proximate causation: (1) difficulty in calculating the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to remote violations; (2) avoiding the need to apportion damages among different “levels” of plaintiffs and to avoid multiple recoveries; and (3) the general interest in deterrence is already served where other plaintiffs with more direct injuries may assert claims. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269–70, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992)). Applying these considerations, the Supreme Court has addressed civil RICO’s proximate cause requirement several times in recent years.
*10 In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006), the plaintiff brought a civil RICO claim against a competing business. Id. at 454. The plaintiff alleged that the underlying pattern of racketeering activity was the submission of fraudulent tax returns which gave the competitor an advantage and caused lost profits for the plaintiff. Id. The Court rejected the argument that the proximate causation requirement was satisfied merely because the defendant’s alleged aim was to increase its own market share at the expense of the plaintiff. Id. at 460–61 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537). Instead, the Court looked to the predicate acts and determined that the direct victim of the fraud was the state that lost tax revenue as a result of the filings, not the plaintiff. Id. at 458. In confirming this conclusion, the Court discussed the difficulty in calculating what portion, if any, of the plaintiff’s lost profits were caused by the competitor’s tax fraud. Id. at 258–59. And while acknowledging that there was no risk of multiple recovery, the Court noted that the immediate victim, the state, would be able to vindicate its rights with its own claim, satisfying the law’s objective of deterrence without the need for more “indirect” actions such as the plaintiff’s. Id. at 460. The Court ultimately held that the plaintiff’s alleged injury was not proximately caused by the RICO violations, and thus that the plaintiff had no standing to bring its claim. Id. at 461.
The Court again discussed the issue of RICO proximate causation in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008). Bridge involved a county treasurer’s office’s public

auction selling tax liens on delinquent taxpayers’ property. Id. at 2135. Instead of bidding in cash amount, prospective buyers bid in percentage penalties the property owner must pay the bidder in order to clear the lien. Id. As a result of stiff competition for these liens, most parcels attracted multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest possible penalty. Id. When resolving ties the county allocated parcels on a rotating basis. Id. To avoid allowing a party to receive a disproportionate number of liens via the rotation, the county had implemented a “Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule” requiring each party to submit bids in its own name and prohibits the submission of other simultaneous bids for the same parcel through other agents. Id. The plaintiff alleged that defendant had committed fraud by violating submitting multiple bids via proxies to obtain an unequal share of the tax liens. Id. at 2136. While the holding of the Court ultimately related to the issue of whether first-party reliance is required for a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud, in the course of that discussion the Court addressed the requirement of proximate causation. Id. at 2141–45. The Court stated that the plaintiff’s alleged injury, the loss of valuable liens, was the direct result of the defendant’s fraud. Id. at 2144. It distinguished Anza using the directness factors stating “there are no independent factors that account for respondents’ injury, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violation, and no more immediate victim is better situated to sue.” Id.
*11 Most recently, in Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, –––U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 983, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2010), the Supreme Court considered the issue of proximate cause in an action relating to the sale of cigarettes in New York City. Id. at 986. New York State and the City of New York each are permitted under New York law to tax the sale of cigarettes. Id. at 987. When purchasers buy cigarettes from in-state vendors, those vendors are responsible for charging, collecting, and remitting these taxes. Id. When sold by out-of-state vendors, they vendor need only file a report with the state listing the name, address, and quantity of cigarettes purchased so that the taxes may be collected. Id. The defendant was an out-of-state vendor who allegedly failed to provide the buyers’ information to New York State. Id. As a result, New York City also did not get this information, depriving it of the ability to collect its portion of the taxes. Id. New York City brought a RICO action against the defendant, alleging as its harm the lost tax income as a result of defendant’s mail and wire fraud in failing to submit buyer information. Id. 987–88. A plurality of four justices stated that New York City’s theory of causation was “far too indirect.” Id. at 989. They noted that the conduct directly responsible for the harm was the customers failure to pay taxes, and that the fraud only made enforcement more difficult. Id. at 990. The plurality also stated that the disconnect here was even
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more significant than in Anza; the defendant allegedly defrauded New York State, who then passed on insufficient information to New York City, which made it easier for the taxpayers to cause the harm. Id. The Hemi plurality also rejected the dissenting justices’ argument that RICO’s proximate causation requirement should turn on forseeability, rather than on the directness of the relationship between the predicate act and the harm. Id. at 991. They also rejected New York City’s argument that the defendant’s acts should be characterized as a systemic scheme to defraud tax revenue, stating “the City cannot escape the proximate cause requirement merely by alleging that the fraudulent scheme embraced all those indirectly harmed by the alleged conduct. Otherwise our RICO proximate cause precedent would become a mere pleading rule.” Id. The plurality also distinguished Bridge, stating that in that case each time the fraud occurred a legitimate bidder was directly harmed and only those plaintiffs, not the county, were harmed. Id. at 992.
Applying these precedents to the present case, it is necessary to begin with the alleged predicate acts in violation of RICO. Anza, 547 U.S. at 461 (central question is whether the alleged RICO violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries). Plaintiffs allege Defendants committed a pattern of predicate racketeering acts which can be split into two categories. First, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants committed mail and wire fraud by deceptively hiding the sums paid to Conahan and Ciavarella. It is clear that these predicate acts cannot be said to be the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries. Not only would it be difficult to calculate how the hiding of income caused the alleged monetary damages to the Plaintiffs, but there are also more direct victims of this conduct; namely, the United States and Pennsylvania who were defrauded from successfully collecting on this taxable income. Id. at 461 (rejecting argument that tax fraud also proximately harms third party). Therefore, these allegations cannot support Plaintiffs’ claims.
*12 Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ committed honest services fraud, a specific type of mail fraud, and state law bribery as the predicate acts. Each of these alleged offenses relates to the payment of bribes or kickbacks to Conahan and Ciavarella, in return for favorable judicial adjudications. See Skilling v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2931, 177 L.Ed.2d 619, –––– (2010) (“we now hold that [mail fraud] criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core”). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the payments to Ciavarella directly resulted in the monetary sanctions these Plaintiffs were forced to pay. The fact that the Plaintiffs may have been the target of the predicate acts, however, is not enough. Anza, 547 at 460–61 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537). Similarly, it is not sufficient that the harm suffered by Plaintiffs was

foreseeable. Hemi, 130 S.Ct. at 991. Plaintiffs must instead have been directly harmed by the predicate acts.
Defendants argue that there is a more immediate victim, namely the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the citizens of Luzerne County, who were deprived of the honest services of their judicial officer. However, the statutory codification of honest services fraud specifically states that honest services fraud includes “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible rights of honest services.” 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Even if the group most directly affected by Conahan’s and Ciavarella’s fraud were the people of Pennsylvania or Luzerne County, the injury they suffered would be, by definition, intangible. In order to serve the deterrence goals articulated in the Supreme Court’s proximate cause jurisprudence, it would be imprudent to hold that the only group whose injuries were proximately caused by honest services fraud is a group that suffered no tangible injury and is not in a position to bring suit. Thus the present case is most analogous to Bridge, where the government, although most directly connected to the fraud, did not suffer any tangible injury and would not be able to maintain a civil RICO action. The loss of the “honest services” of a judicial officer cannot be said to be the same time of concrete injury as the losses of tax income suffered in Anza and Hemi.
Plaintiffs’ claims also better achieve the other objectives underlying proximate cause than any other. For example, calculating and apportioning the damages as to the value of honest judicial services vis a vis the citizens of Luzerne County as whole would not be logistically feasible. Similarly, there is no concern about apportioning damages or multiple recovery, because as stated above no other group suffered this type of economic harm. Ultimately, as was the case in Bridge, while the government may have been defrauded, the economic impact was felt immediately by the Plaintiffs each time conduct occurred. Because Plaintiffs allege an economic injury proximately related to the predicate acts of honest services fraud, they have standing to bring civil RICO claims.
2. Violation of § 1962(c) *13 Plaintiffs first allege that Defendants Conahan, Ciavarella, Mericle and Powell are civilly liable for violating RICO § 1962(c). In United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273 (3d Cir.2003), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals described the requirements for establishing a violation of this section, stating:
To establish a § 1962(c) RICO violation, the government must prove the following four elements: (1) the existence of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (2)
8

that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that the defendant participated in, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and (4) that he or she participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Id. at 285 (quotation and citation omitted). As a threshold issue, Defendants PACC, WPACC, MAYS, Mrs. Conahan, and Mrs. Ciavarella move to dismiss claims that they are liable under this section because they are not alleged to have taken action in direct violation of this provision. Because Plaintiffs concede this point and have withdrawn the claims against these Defendants for violations of § 1962(c), their motions to dismiss will be granted as to Count I of the Individual Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Count V of the Class Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Br. in Opp’n 63 n. 24, Doc. 473.)
The remaining Defendants make several arguments in favor of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims based upon § 1962(c). They argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged the structure of the enterprise and that the enterprise existed separate and apart from the alleged conspiracy. Plaintiffs only allegation of a RICO enterprise is that an association-infact enterprise existed among Defendants. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), the Supreme Court set forth three factors for establishing such an enterprise: (1) ‘an ongoing organization, formal or informal”; (2) that “the various associated function as a continuing unit”; and (3) that the enterprise exists “separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.” Pappa v. Unum Life Ins. Co. Of America, No. 3:07–CV–0708, 2008 WL 744820, at *10 (citing Hollis– Arrington v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 205 Fed. App’x 48, 53 (3d Cir.2006)) (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.) While Defendants are correct that ultimately Plaintiffs will need to establish each of these factors, at the early juncture of a motion to dismiss it is sufficient merely to allege the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. Id. at *11 (citing Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir.1984)). While Defendants arguments that the enterprise did not exist apart from the racketeering activity and that there was an insufficient decision-making structure may have merit, Plaintiffs need not satisfy these requirements at this stage. Because Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that an associationin-fact enterprise existed, they have satisfied the pleading requirements of this element at this stage.
3. Conspiracy under § 1962(d) *14 Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants participated in a conspiracy to violation § 1962(d). As stated above,

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that all Defendants, except Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, participated in a conspiracy which included conduct in violation of § 1962(c). See supra Part I.A.1. Again, while the Defendants dispute the scope of the conspiracy, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that a universal conspiracy existed to violate Plaintiffs’ rights and to commit the predicate acts described above. Therefore, the motions to dismiss of Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella will be granted, and the remaining motions will be denied.
II. State Law Claims
A. False Imprisonment The Individual Plaintiffs allege at Count IX that Defendants PACC, WPACC, Powell, and MAYS falsely imprisoned the Juvenile Plaintiffs. Defendants raise three types of arguments in favor of dismissal: (1) that some of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted; (3) that they are immune from claims relating to facially valid orders. I will consider each argument in turn.
1. Statute of Limitations Defendants argue that some of the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that the statute of limitations for claims of false imprisonment in Pennsylvania is two (2) years. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524(1). Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). Because Plaintiffs allege that they were aware of their detentions, the statute of limitations on each claim would ordinarily have started running on the date each was released. See Martin v. Red Lion Police Dept., 146 Fed. Appx. 558, 561 (3d Cir.2005) (statute of limitations began upon release from hospital or at least when aware of nature of treatment therein). Plaintiffs and Defendants also agree, however, that by statute the claims of minors are tolled until they reach age eighteen (18). 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5533(b). Thus the false imprisonment claim of each Minor Plaintiff who turned eighteen (18) more than two (2) years prior to the filing of their action would be barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled until January 26, 2009, the date that the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal information outlining the Defendants’ alleged conspiracy. (Br. in Opp’n 117, Doc. 473.) First, they argue that the “discovery rule” should toll the statute of limitations. “The purpose of the
9

discovery rule has been to exclude from the running of the statute of limitations that period of time during which a party who has not suffered an immediately ascertainable injury is reasonably unaware he has been injured, so that he has essentially the same rights as those who have suffered such an injury.” Fine v. Checcio, 582 Pa. 253, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa.2005) (citation omitted). While it may be true that the Minor Plaintiffs did not know of the conspiracy until that date, the discovery rule acts to toll the statute of limitations until the injury is known. In this case, the alleged injuries arise from the imprisonment, which Plaintiffs allege were known from the time of incarceration. I find that the discovery rule is inapplicable here.
*15 Plaintiffs also argue that equitably estoppel should bar Defendants from raising a statute of limitations defense because of their intentional fraud or concealment of the facts relating to Juvenile Plaintiffs’ causes of action. “A party relying on this doctrine will be entitled to a tolling of the Statute of Limitations by proving that there has been either intentional or unintentional deception by the Defendant, Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 96, 204 A.2d 473 (1964), and the statute will be tolled until the Plaintiffs would, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraudulent concealment.” Piccolini v. Simon’s Wrecking, 686 F.Supp. 1063, 1074 (M.D.Pa.1988) (other citation omitted). “The Plaintiff, however, must prove such fraud or concealment by clear, precise, and convincing evidence.” Id. (citing Ritter v. Theodore Pendergrass, 356 Pa.Super. 422, 514 A.2d 930, 935 n. 8 (1986)). Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendants intentionally acted to conceal their conspiracy from Plaintiffs and others. (IC ¶ 44, 48–50, 52, 60–65; CAC ¶ 659, 702–21.) Concealment of the conspiracy could prevent Plaintiffs from bringing the present cause of action. Ultimately, Plaintiffs will be required to prove the alleged fraud or concealment in order to equitable toll the statute of limitations until January 26, 2009, the date of the U.S. Attorney’s criminal information, is appropriate here. But, considering only the allegations in the complaint I find that estoppel might be appropriate here and I will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
2. Failure to State a Claim Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for false imprisonment. There are two elements to a claim of false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law: “(1) the detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa.1994). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs have satisfied these elements, and instead they make several other arguments. Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that their detentions lacked probable cause. When detention is in

the form of an arrest, to show the unlawfulness of that detention, Plaintiff must show “that the process used for the arrest was void on its face or that the issuing tribunal was without jurisdiction; it is not sufficient that the charges were unjustified.” Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 984–85 (Pa.Super.1997). In order to consider the claims of false imprisonment and false arrest collectively, however, the confinement must be “inextricably intertwined with the unlawful arrest.” Gagliardi v. Lynn, 446 Pa. 144, 285 A.2d 109, 128 (1971). Plaintiffs do not allege that the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ arrests were unlawful or that the arresting officials were part of the conspiracy, thus it cannot be said that the arrest and confinement were “inextricably intertwined.” Therefore, Plaintiffs need not allege a lack of probable cause to state a claim for false imprisonment.
*16 Defendants also argue that several time periods of detention should be excluded from Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claims. First, they argue that the preadjudicatory detentions, detentions before juveniles were placed by Ciavarella, cannot be said to be unlawful. I disagree. The alleged conspiracy here involved not just the adjudication of juveniles but the opening and operation of PACC and WPACC generally. I find Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that they were also unlawfully detained pre-adjudications. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs may not bring false imprisonment claims against institutions where they were not personally held. Plaintiffs allege “Juvenile Plaintiffs were detained at Defendants PACC and/or WPACC.” (IC ¶ 166.) While Defendants may dispute factually where, if at all, each Juvenile Plaintiff was held, at this stage of the proceedings this Court must accept as true all factual allegations. Defendants’ argument is better suited for summary judgment. Finally, Defendants argue that MAYS and WPACC may not be held liable as to torts occurring before MAYS and WPACC existed. To demonstrate the start-up dates for MAYS and WPACC Defendants submit evidence of “public records” and asks that this Court take judicial notice of them. I decline to do so. Again, this type of argument, relying upon extrinsic evidence not attached or discussed directly in the complaints, is better suited for summary judgment. Therefore, Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim of false imprisonment will be denied.
3. Enforcement of Court Order Defendants also argue that because they received orders for the detentions they are shielded from liability unless the orders were facially invalid or issued without jurisdiction. See Hamay v. County of Washington, 291 Pa.Super. 137, 435 A.2d 606, 609 (1981). In order for tort liability to attach for a party executing a court order for detention, “they would have had to have been enforcing orders that were ordered by the judge acting without any
10

jurisdiction at all.” As discussed above, however, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendants were part of the conspiracy to hold these juveniles in PACC and WPACC, and thus it must be said that Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants knew the orders were invalid. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground will be denied.
B. Civil Conspiracy The Individual Plaintiffs allege at Count VIII that Defendants PACC, WPACC, Powell, Mericle, Mericle Construction, MAYS, Conahan, Mrs. Conahan, Ciavarella, and Mrs. Ciavarella, committed state law civil conspiracy. To state a claim for civil conspiracy under Pennsylvania law, a complaint must allege:
(1) a combination of two or more persons acting with a common purpose to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means or for an unlawful purpose; (2) an overt act done in pursuance of the common purpose; and (3) actual legal damage.
McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 660 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000). Moreover, if there is no civil cause of action for a particular act, there can be no cause of action for conspiracy to commit that act. Id. As stated above, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that all Defendants, except Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, participated in a conspiracy which included conduct in violation of § 1962(c). See supra Part I.A.1. And while only some Defendants are alleged to have committed the tort of false imprisonment, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the remainder were part of the conspiracy to do so. Therefore, the motions to dismiss of Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella will be granted, and the remaining motions will be denied.
CONCLUSION
*17 Plaintiffs have provided sufficient factual and legal allegations to support many of their claims of rights violations under § 1983, Civil RICO, false imprisonment, and conspiracies to do the same. As to Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, Plaintiffs’ do not allege a sufficient factual basis for their claims, and thus their motions to dismiss will be granted. Plaintiffs also fail to sufficiently state a claim for interference with the Parent Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, therefore, as to these claims Defendants’ motions will be granted. As to the remaining claims, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a

factual and legal basis for their claims. And while Defendants dispute the scope of the conspiracy and the sufficiency of the RICO allegations, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to deny the present motions to dismiss. Therefore, the remaining portions of Defendants’ motions will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
NOW, this 24th day of August, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant Barbara Conahan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 433) is GRANTED.
(2) Defendant Cindy Ciavarella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 435) is GRANTED.
(3) Defendants Robert J. Powell’s and Vision Holdings, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 437) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
(a) As to Count V of the Individuals Master Complaint (Doc. 134) the motion is GRANTED.
(b) As to the remainder, the motion is DENIED.
(4) Motion to Dismiss by Mid–Atlantic Youth Services Corp, PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC (Doc. 439) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
(a) As to Counts I and V of the Individuals Master Complaint (Doc. 134), and Count V of the Class Action Master Complaint (Doc. 136), the motion is GRANTED.
(b) As to the remainder, the motion is DENIED.
(5) Motion of Defendants Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, to Dismiss the Master Complaint for Class Actions and the Individual Plaintiffs’ Master Long Form Complaint (Doc. 442) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
(a) As to Count V of the Individuals Master Complaint (Doc. 134) the motion is GRANTED.
(b) As to the remainder, the motion is DENIED.
	  
11

Footnotes

1

Throughout the remainder of this opinion, the Court will use “Plaintiffs” “Defendants” to refer to those parties whose claims and

motions are presently under consideration.

2

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any

State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress ....“

3

Defendants argue that the Monell standard requiring a policy or custom by an entity applies to these private entities as it would to

public entities. I need not address this issue because Mericle and Powell are clearly alleged to be in positions of policy-making

authority. Thus under either respondeat superior or the Monell standard, there are sufficient factual allegations against these

entities.

4

Plaintiffs also may be able to establish “the requisite causal connection ... not only by some kind of direct personal participation in

the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would

cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Pilchesky v. Miller, Civil Action No. 3:CV–05–2074, 2006 WL 2884445, at *4–5

(M.D.Pa. Oct.10, 2006) (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir.2006), rev’d on other grounds, 466 F.3d 676 (9th

Cir.2006)). In light of the conclusion that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the conspiracy covered the alleged constitutional

violations, I need not decide whether Plaintiffs establish a claim under this standard.

5

It is unclear whether the juveniles were ordered to pay costs which were then voluntarily assumed by the parents, or whether the

parents or guardians themselves were sanctioned as a result of the juveniles’ adjudications. While Plaintiffs do not explicitly

explain how they were required to pay, they do allege that they were compelled to do so through wage garnishment, the loss of

eligibility for public assistance, and similar measures. These allegations, combined with the allegations that Plaintiffs were

required to pay sums, are sufficient for the present stage of these proceedings.

6

It is unclear at this time what type of process was due to the Parent Plaintiffs, or whether they had any opportunity to appeal the

allegedly improper adjudications. The Defendants do not argue this issue, and thus I need not consider it at this time.

7

Plaintiffs have withdrawn claims at Count IV of the Class Complaint for violations of § 1962(b), and the claims at Count I of the

Individual Complaint and Count V of the Class Complaint against PACC, WPACC, MAYS, Mrs. Conahan, and Mrs. Ciavarella.

(Br. in Opp’n 63 n. 24, Doc. 473.)

8

Plaintiffs have clarified that their claims should be interpreted as only being brought on behalf of those individuals.

	  

12

 
 	  
2010 WL 2746394 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
This decision was reviewed by West editorial staff and not assigned editorial enhancements.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Judge Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–CV–286, 3:09–CV–0291, 3:09–CV–0357, 3:09–CV–0630. | July 9, 2010.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is Defendant Luzerne County’s Motion to Dismiss All Claims Against It By All Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 450.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted. This Court has jurisdiction over the present action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1367 (supplemental).
BACKGROUND
The allegations of the Individual Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint (“IC”) (ECF No. 134) and Class Action Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint (“CAC”) (ECF No. 136) that are relevant to the present motion are as follows:1
Defendants Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark

Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”) abused their positions as judges of the Luzerne County Court of Commons Pleas by accepting compensation in return for favorable judicial determinations. (IC ¶ 33; CAC ¶ 2.) As part of this conspiracy, Conahan and Ciaverella acted with Defendants Robert Powell, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Pennsylvania Child Care (“PACC”), Western Pennsylvania Child Care (“WPACC”), Pinnacle, Beverage, Vision, and perhaps others. (IC ¶ 31.) The basic outline of the conspiracy was that Conahan and Ciavarella used their influence as judicial officers to select PACC and WPACC as detention facilities, and that they intentionally filled those facilities with juveniles to earn the conspirators excessive profits. (IC ¶ 34; CAC ¶ 2.) In return, approximately $2.6 million was paid to Conahan and Ciavarella for their influence. (IC ¶ 33; CAC ¶ 664.)
Conahan acted with final policy-making authority for Luzerne County regarding the funding of juvenile detention centers. (IC ¶ 143; CAC ¶ 653.)2 Conahan’s actions in furtherance of the conspiracy such as ordering the placement of juveniles and removing the funding from other facilities represent the “policy” of Luzerne County. (IC ¶¶ 143–45; CAC ¶¶ 652, 654.) Probation officials Sandra Brulo and Michael Loughney were also final policy-makers for Luzerne County who took actions as part of the conspiracy. (IC ¶¶ 148–49.) Ciavarella instituted a custom, policy and practice on behalf of Luzerne County to deny juveniles of various constitutional rights. (IC ¶ 153; CAC ¶ 781.) Other actors for Luzerne County, such as the District Attorney’s and Public Defenders’ Offices failed to prevent the violation of the juveniles’ rights. (CAC ¶ 783.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6). Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ “ each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information
1

from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ “ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
*2 In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ “ or “ ‘legal conclusions,’ “ Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U .S. 232, 236 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000).
DISCUSSION
Luzerne County has moved for all claims against it in both the individual and class-action master complaints to be dismissed. Each of the master complaints contains one count against Luzerne County. In the individual plaintiffs complaint, Count VI alleges. A cause of action pursuant to § 1983 for depravation of Plaintiffs substantive and procedural due process rights. (IC ¶¶ 140–55.) In the class-action plaintiffs complaint, Count VIII alleges a

similar cause of action also pursuant to § 1983. (CAC ¶¶ 778–86 .) Because the causes of action are identical and the factual allegations are very similar, I will address both claims simultaneously.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Luzerne County, a duly organized political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (IC ¶ 26), must be considered under the standard set forth for municipal liability claims. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipal liability cannot be established under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). “A public entity such as [Luzerne] County may be held liable for the violation of a Constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when the alleged unconstitutional action executes or implements policy or a decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir.1997). Plaintiffs do not allege any specific policy or custom of Luzerne County caused their constitutional violations, other than those policies established through the actions of the parties identified. Therefore, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims hinge on whether any of those parties were final policy-makers for Luzerne County.
*3 This Court previously considered whether the parties identified by the Plaintiffs had final policy-making authority for Luzerne County in its prior opinion denying Plaintiffs’ motions to file amended complaints. (Mem. and Order 12–24, ECF No. 335.) As this Court noted, “[t]he identification of policy-making officials is not a question of fact, but is instead a question of law which is appropriate for the court to determine.” (Id. at 1 (citing Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125–26 (1988)).) This Court held that county judges (Id. 13–18), probation officials (Id. at 18–19), and officers in the District Attorney’s and Public Defenders offices (Id. at 19–23) were not final policy-makers for Luzerne County in the course of the conduct alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaints. Plaintiffs argue that this Court is not bound by those holdings and that it should reconsider them here, but they do not present any new arguments in support of their positions. (Br. in Opp’n 7–9, ECF No. 474.) I see no reason to alter the prior determinations. I find that Plaintiffs fail to allege any conduct completed by actors with final policy-making authority. Plaintiffs, therefore, fail to allege any policy or custom of Luzerne County which caused their alleged constitutional violations. Luzerne County’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
CONCLUSION
2

Because Plaintiffs fail to allege a policy or custom of Luzerne County, they fail to sufficiently allege a cause of action for municipal liability. Specifically, the actors they allege create liability for Luzerne County are not final policy-makers, and therefore, their actions may not be said to establish policy or custom for the county. Because a county policy or custom is necessary to establish liability, Luzerne County’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
An appropriate order follows.

ORDER
NOW, this 9th day of July, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Luzerne County’s Motion to Dismiss All Claims Against It By All Plaintiffs (ECF No. 450) is GRANTED.
	  

Footnotes

1

Additional factual background may be found in this Court’s November 20, 2009 Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiffs’ first

motions to file amended complaints. (Mem. and Order at 2–7, ECF No. 335.)

2

As noted in this Court’s prior Memorandum and Order, while Plaintiffs allege that numerous officials were final policy-makers for

Luzerne County, this status is a legal question to be decided by the Court. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997).

	   	  
	  

3

 
 	  
2010 WL 2367672 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Judge Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09-cv-286, 3:09-cv-0291, 3:09cv-0357, 3:09-cv-0630. | June 9, 2010.
West KeySummary
1 Courts Restraining Particular Proceedings
A federal district court had authority, under the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception for injunctions to protect or effectuate a federal court’s judgments, to enjoin state court orders for defendants to expunge their records relating to litigation in the federal district court. The federal district court had issued an order requiring the preservation of evidence that could be relevant to the federal litigation. There was an apparent conflict between the preservation order and the state court expungement orders. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Pennsylvania Child Care, and Western Pennsylvania Child Care (collectively “Defendants”) (Doc. 388) as modified by their Motion to Amend (Doc. 396). Defendants request this Court enjoin Special Master the Honorable Arthur E. Grim, acting on behalf of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, from ordering the Defendants to expunge their own records which relate to this litigation. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Injunctive Relief Since nearly the birth of the country, Congress has limited the ability of federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings to demarcate the lines between the federal and state legal systems in order to “prevent needless friction between state and federal courts.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (quoting Okla. Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9, 60 S.Ct. 215, 84 L.Ed. 537 (1940)). The All Writs Act provides affirmative statutory authority for a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings, but that power is limited by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 500 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir.2007). The power available under the All Writs Act must be “construed narrowly and invoked sparingly .” In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litig., 369 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir.2004) (quotation omitted) (hereinafter Diet Drugs II ).
The AIA is an “an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions.” Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. at 286. The word “proceeding” under the AIA has a broad meaning and includes injunctions directed against the enforcement of a state court proceeding or judgment. See Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403, 56 S.Ct. 278, 80 L.Ed. 293 (1935) (the prohibition against enjoining state proceedings “applies not only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to making the suit or judgment effective”). The parties do not dispute that the state court expungement orders are part of state court proceedings; thus the Anti-Injunction Act bars this Court from issuing an injunction against the expungement orders unless one of the three exceptions applies.
The three exceptions1 authorized by the AIA are: (1)
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where an injunction is expressly authorized by Act of Congress, (2) where it is necessary in aid of a federal court’s jurisdiction, or (3) to protect or effectuate a federal court’s judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “The exceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act are to be construed narrowly.” In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, 282 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir.2002) (hereinafter Diet Drugs I ). Even if an exception to the AIA is applicable, the exception only establishes that a federal court may grant an injunction, not that it must do so. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 306. Defendants’ argue that each of the exceptions is applicable here, and that this Court should granted the requested injunctive relief. I will first consider whether any of the specific exceptions are satisfied, then I will consider whether an injunction is appropriate here.
A. Authority to Enjoin (Exceptions to the AIA) *2 Defendants argue that the AIA does not bar their requested relief because this Court may act to protect its order (Scheduling Order 5, Doc. 72) requiring the preservation of evidence “that may be relevant to this action.” Id. The exception to protect or effectuate a federal court’s judgments, also known as the “relitigation” exception, applies where it is necessary for a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings from determining what has already been decided by a federal court judgment. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 305 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988)). The AIA also applies to discovery determinations. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practice Litigation, 261 F.3d 355, 368 (3d Cir.2001). At least one Court of Appeals has held that granting an injunction to effectuate an earlier discovery order does not violate the AIA. Sperry Rand Corp. V. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.1961). Here there is an apparent conflict between this Court’s scheduling order to preserve and the state court expungement orders to destroy the same evidence. I find that this exception to the AIA applies, and permits this Court to enjoin the state court expungement orders.
Defendants also argue that the AIA exception for injunctions “necessary in aid of a federal court’s jurisdiction” also applies. This exception should be read similarly to the exception to “protect or effectuate judgments” in that it is necessary when the injunction prevents a state court from impairing a federal court’s “flexibility and authority to decide that case.” Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. at 295. Traditionally, cases where it is necessary in aid of a federal court’s jurisdiction are in removal cases, in rem cases, or complex class actions and multi-district litigation where state court proceedings threaten to derail a tentative settlement. Piper v. Portnoff

Law Associates, 262 F.Supp.2d 520, 529 (E.D.Pa.2003). Even when a case does not fall into one of these categories, a three step test may be used to consider if this exception applies. Id. at 530. These factors are: (1) examining the nature of the federal action to determine what kinds of state court interference would sufficiently impair the federal proceeding; (2) assessing the state court’s actions, in order to determine whether they present a sufficient threat to the federal action; and (3) considering principles of federalism and comity, for a primary aim of the Anti-Injunction Act is “to prevent needless friction between the state and federal courts.” Id. (citing Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 234). Here the nature of the federal action lends itself to this exception, because of its nature as a complex litigation involving hundreds, if not thousands, of plaintiffs. Likewise, the state court’s actions unwittingly threaten this Court’s proceedings because they restrict discovery and the presentation of evidence in this litigation. And for the reasons discussed further below, see infra Part I.B., the balance of federalism and comity in this case leans in favor of applying this exception. I find that the AIA exception for situations necessary in aid of a federal court’s jurisdiction also applies.
*3 In light of the above conclusions that this Court may act to protect its discovery order and to aid this Court’s jurisdiction, I need not consider Defendants’ argument that Congress expressly permitted such an injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Discretion to Enjoin As stated above, even if an exception to the AIA is applicable, the exception only establishes that a federal court may grant an injunction, not that it must do so. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 306. Before granting any such injunction, however, a federal court must consider principles of comity and federalism. Id. Plaintiffs do not oppose the preservation of the Defendants’ records, but instead argue that this Court should give deference to the interests of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.2 When considering the principles of comity and federalism, it is important to understand the interaction between this litigation and the proceedings before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On April 9, 2009, at the outset of this litigation, I entered a pre-trial order which provides: “until the parties reach agreement on a preservation plan, all parties and their counsel are reminded of their duty to preserve evidence that may be relevant to this action.” (Scheduling Order 5, Doc. 72.) On July 2, 2009, this Court denied a motion for a protective order, stating:
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For this Court, by order of preservation for discovery purposes in a civil suit, to directly interfere with the Supreme Court[of Pennsylvania’s] determination to expunge, erase and leave no trace would reverse appropriate priorities in the relief addressing the fundamental issue of integrity in the system, and would otherwise thereby disrupt the delicate balance necessitated in our system of federalism. The Pennsylvania priority in correcting and restoring the state juvenile judicial system and the consequent confidence of the public in that system outweighs any benefit to particular civil litigants that would be gained by this Court’s effect order that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remedy be somehow nullified or delayed.
(Memorandum Opinion 6, July 2, 2009, Doc. 146.) Thus I have expressed my reluctance to meddle in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination to remove all traces of a process marred by fundamental unfairness in the name of discovery and availability of evidence to be used in a civil rights suit in this Court. Thereafter, in its effort to assure fairness in the litigation in this Court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an order preserving certain records held by Luzerne County until the conclusion of the litigation before this Court. Unwittingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has effectively determined not only the scope of discovery, viz what is discoverable in this case, but also what may or may not ultimately be used as evidence in trial before this Court. The Plaintiffs, by virtue of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order of preservation, have had evidence of their claims protected from destruction, while, at the same time, the Defendants’ records or evidence needed to defend themselves are arguably subject to destruction. In its effort to assure fairness by preserving juvenile records maintained in Luzerne County for use in this litigation, the Supreme Court’s order leaves the Defendants in a quandary regarding their ability to use their own records in their defense. This demonstrates that this Court must have the flexibility to control the litigation before it. Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. at 295.
*4 While undoubtably Pennsylvania continues to have an interest in restoring the integrity of its juvenile justice system, as stated above the interaction between the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s preservation and expungement orders unintentionally undermines this Court’s ability to manage the present action. Even considering the interests of comity and federalism, such an intrusion, though surely unwitting, cannot be permitted. That is not to say, however, that this Court is not mindful of the repercussions that granting an injunction will have on the Pennsylvania proceedings. In that vein, this Court will take appropriate steps to limit any conflicts between the federal and state proceedings. Pursuant to the local rules of this Court and the protective orders already in place, all documents which identify juveniles by name must be filed under seal. This Court will also limit the duration of the present injunction to the same time frame already established by Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the preservation of Luzerne County’s records; this injunction will terminate thirty (30) days after the resolution of this case. Therefore, I find, even after considering the principles of comity and federalism that underlie the AIA, enjoining the enforcement and issuance of further expungement orders, under the terms noted, is necessary to protect the fairness and integrity of the litigation before this Court.
C. Elements for Injunctive Relief Turning to the elements for granting any preliminary injunction, I also find that Defendants have demonstrated the necessary elements here. “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief .” Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir.2004). Defendants have shown a likelihood that at least some of these records need to be preserved for use in their defense, and they have demonstrated irreparable harm to their defense if these records are expunged at this time. Defendants have also demonstrated that Plaintiffs and Pennsylvania will not suffer greater harm by delaying the expungement of the Defendants’ records, and that public interest weighs in favor of permitting this Court to control a balanced and fair litigation. Defendants’ motion for injunctive relief will be granted.
II. Remaining Requests Defendants request an adverse instruction at trial for spoliation of evidence since the records would only be expunged at the request of the Plaintiffs. They argue this type of intentional destruction of evidence amounts to
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spoliation. Defendants present no evidence that evidence has in fact been destroyed, and in fact they argue that they still have the relevant evidence. Defendants’ motion for sanctions as a result of spoliation will denied as moot. Similarly, as the Defendants’ motion has been resolved as discussed above, the motion for a stay will also be denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
*5 For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part. Defendants’ motion for an injunction will be granted, as the expungement orders of Special Master the Honorable Arthur E. Grim on behalf of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unwittingly interfere with this Court’s ability to effectively and responsibly manage the litigation before it. Defendants’ motions for spoliation sanctions and for a stay of discovery will be denied as moot.
An appropriate order will follow.
ORDER

NOW, this 9th day of June, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Pennsylvania Child Care, and Western Pennsylvania Child Care’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 388) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
(1) As to Defendants’ request to enjoin the expungement of their records, the motion is GRANTED as follows:
(a) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, along with Special Master the Honorable Arthur E. Grim, are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or issuing orders to expunge the records of Pennsylvania Child Care, Western Pennsylvania Child Care, and Mid-Atlantic Youth Services relating to the Plaintiffs in the present action.
(b) This injunction will DISSOLVE THIRTY (30) DAYS after the termination of this litigation.
(2) As to Defendants’ request for spoliation sanctions, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.
(3) As to Defendants’ request for a stay pending resolution of this motion, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.
	  

Footnotes

1

The Supreme Court may also have articulated a limited exception so that where a state court has ordered the enforcement of a

statute, a stranger to the state court proceedings is not barred from seeking an injunction from the federal court enjoining

enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. Imperial County, California v. Monuz, 449 U.S. 54, 59, 101 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed.2d

258 (1980) (citing Hale v. Bimco Trading, 306 U.S. 375, 377-78, 59 S.Ct. 526, 83 L.Ed. 771 (1939)). Because the present state

court proceedings do not require the enforcement of a statute, I need not consider such an exception here.

2

Plaintiffs also argue that the Defendants should have first gone to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for clarification. Even if such a

resolution was possible, it is not for this Court to decide what else the parties could have done to avoid the necessity of the present

motion. The only question before this Court is whether, given the facts and arguments presented, this Court should enjoin the

expungement orders of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

	   	  

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2010 WL 785253 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Judge Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–cv–286, 3:09–cv–0291, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–0630. | March 1, 2010.
Attorneys and Law Firms
David S. Senoff, Lauren C. Fantini, Richard C. DeFrancesco, Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, Daniel E. Kleiner, Metzger & Kleiner, Adrianne Walvoord, Amber M. Racine, Sol H. Weiss, Anapol, Schwartz, Weiss, Cohan, Feldman & Smalley P.C., Daniel Segal, Rebecca L. Santoro, Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudlin, Lourdes M. Rosado, Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, Richard G. Freeman, Philadelphia, PA, Michael J. Cefalo, Cefalo & Associates, West Pittston, PA, William R. Caroselli, Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy LLC, Ittsburgh, PA, Barry H. Dyller, Law Office of Barry H. Dyller, Wilkes-Barre, PA, Johanna L. Gelb, Gelb Law Firm, Scranton, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey S. Feldman, Jessica Richman Birk, Mark B. Sheppard, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP, Alison T. Dante, Eric Kraeutler, Joseph B.G. Fay, Matthew J.D. Hogan, Nathan J. Andrisani, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Bernard M. Schneider, Brucker Schneider & Porter, Pittsburgh, PA, Kimberly D. Borland, Ruth S. Borland, Borland & Borland, L.L.P., Nicole F. Bednarek, Bednarek & Stahl, Wilkes-Barre, PA, Donna L. Adelsberger, Howard Wishnoff, Donna Adelsberger & Associates, P.C., Glenside, PA, Stephen D. Rhoades, Law Offices of Edward McNeels, Edward P. McNelis, Hazleton, PA, James A. Swetz, Stroudsburg, PA, Deborah Hart Simon, Timothy T. Myers, Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski,

Blue Bell, PA, John G. Dean, Elliott Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, P.C., Scranton, PA, Thomas Edward Brenner, Goldberg Katzman, PC, Harrisburg, PA, Suzanne McDonough, Holsten & Associates, Media, PA, for Defendants.
Michael T. Conahan, Mountaintop, PA, pro se.
Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Kingston, PA, pro se.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is the Class Action Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Amend/Correct Master Complaint for Class Actions. (Doc. 375.) Because the Luzerne County District Attorney acted as a state official in training subordinate assistant district attorneys, the proposed amendments are futile and I will deny the motion to amend.
BACKGROUND
The Class Action Plaintiffs’ allegations relevant to the present motions are as follows:1
Defendants Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”) abused their positions as judges of the Luzerne County Court of Commons Pleas by accepting compensation in return for favorable judicial determinations. (Class Action Amend. Compl. (“Amend.Compl.”) ¶ 2, Doc. 250.) As part of this conspiracy, Conahan and Ciaverella acted with Defendants Powell, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Pennsylvania Child Care (“PACC”), Western Pennsylvania Child Care (“WPACC”), Pinnacle, Beverage, Vision, and perhaps others. (Amend.Compl.¶ 2.) The basic outline of the conspiracy was that Conahan and Ciavarella used their influence as judicial officers to select PACC and WPACC as detention facilities, and that they intentionally filled those facilities with juveniles to earn the conspirators excessive profits. (Amend.Compl.¶ 669.) In return, approximately $2.6 million was paid to Conahan and Ciavarella for their influence. (Amend.Compl.¶ 670.)
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Prosecuting juvenile cases is a specialized practice with its own set of rules and procedures. (Amend.Compl.¶ 708.) The need for proper training and supervision of the assistant district attorneys appearing in juvenile court was obvious. (Amend.Compl.¶ 706.) The district attorney knew or should have known that the assistant district attorneys appearing in Ciavarella’s courtroom were young and inexperienced. (Amend.Compl.¶ 707.) Because of the lack of supervision and training for the assistant district attorneys, they did not intervene and prevent the constitutional violations occurring in Ciavarella’s courtroom. (Amend.Compl.¶ 710.) Plaintiffs allege that the district attorney acted as a Luzerne County final policy-maker when training and supervising the assistant district attorneys, thereby creating liability for Luzerne County. (Amend.Compl.¶ 709–10.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Motion to Amend Pleadings Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “a party may amend the party’s pleadings ... by leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P.15(a). It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party shall have leave to amend pleadings out of time. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing, 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir.1981). However, “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’ ” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
*2 In the Third Circuit, the touchstone for the denial of leave to amend is undue prejudice to the non-moving party. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413–14 (3d Cir.1993); Cornell & Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (1978). “In the absence of substantial or undue prejudice, denial instead must be based on bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414 (citing Heyl, 663 F.2d at 425).
The only pertinent issue here is whether Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to their Complaint are “futile.” An

amendment is futile if “the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir.1996)). In making this assessment, the Court must use the same standard of legal sufficiency employed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. In other words, “[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss.” Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir.1988).
II. Motion to Dismiss Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ “ each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ “ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the
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complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ “ or “ ‘legal conclusions,’ “ Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
DISCUSSION
*3 Plaintiffs acknowledge that the proposed amendments seek only to add a claim against Luzerne County under the theory that it is liable for the failure of its district attorney to train and supervise subordinate prosecutors. (Pl. Brief in Opp’n 14, Doc. 383 .) Plaintiffs are correct that when this Court previously ruled that the District Attorney was a state rather than county decision-maker, it ruled so only as to Plaintiffs’ claim that the District Attorney’s own prosecutorial decisions created liability. (Memorandum Opinion 22–23, Doc. 335.) The proposed amendments require this Court to now evaluate whether the same is true with respect to the District Attorney’s duties to train and supervise subordinate assistant district attorneys.
I. Monell Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipal liability cannot be established under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents”). “A public entity such as [Luzerne] County may be held liable for the violation of a Constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when the alleged unconstitutional action executes or implements policy or a decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir.1997). Alternatively, “in the absence of an unconstitutional policy, a municipality’s failure to properly train its employees and officers can create an actionable violation of a party’s constitutional rights under § 1983 ... where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [municipal employees] come into contact.’ ” Id. at 145. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges under the latter theory that Luzerne County’s policy-maker, the

district attorney, was deliberately indifferent to the minor Plaintiffs’ rights when training and supervising subordinate prosecutors.
II. Final Policy–Maker for Luzerne County To determine if the Plaintiffs articulate a claim against Luzerne County via the proposed amendments, first it must be determined whether the district attorney had final policy-making authority for Luzerne County when training and supervising assistant district attorneys. The power to establish policy is not the exclusive province of the legislature. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir.2005). “Monell ‘s language makes clear that it expressly envisioned other officials whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Pembaur v. City of Cinncinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion). “When an official’s discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official’s making, those policies, rather than the subordinate’s departures from them, are the act of the municipality.” Id. Similarly, “when a subordinate’s decision is subject to review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies.” Id. Any inquiry into the status of an official as a final policy-maker must focus on whether decisions are final on a particular issue, not in an “all or nothing manner.” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (official must have final policy-making authority in that area of the city’s business). The identification of policy-making officials is not a question of fact, but is instead a question of law which is appropriate for the court to determine. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 125–26.
*4 In McMillian v. Monroe County, the Supreme Court set forth the applicable standard when determining if a governmental actor has final policy-making authority as a municipal actor under § 1983. The Court noted that state law controlled the determination of whether an actor has final policy-making authority. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 783. The Court also emphasized that the inquiry must be focused on the specifically alleged conduct, rather than the general authority of that position under state law. Id. at 783. The McMillian Court ultimately concluded that an Alabama sheriff acted as a state official, rather than a county official, through a consideration of the Alabama Constitution, Alabama statutory and case law, and the
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allegations of the parties. Id. at 786.
As stated in this Court’s prior opinion, the district attorney is defined in the Pennsylvania Constitution as a county officer. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 4. Similarly, there is some Pennsylvania statutory law which reflects the status of the district attorney as the “chief law enforcement officer” for the county in which they were elected. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 350 (3d Cir.1999); 71 P.S. §§ 732–101, et seq. (2009); 16 P.S. § 401(1)(11) (2009). Pennsylvania case law also identifies that district attorneys may be local officials. Chalfin, 233 A.2d, 565; Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 41, 362 A.2d 486, 490 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1976) (“District attorneys and their assistants are officers of the counties in which they are elected and not officers of the Commonwealth.”). There is also evidence demonstrates that district attorneys are state officials. The historical foundation for the office of district attorney as a replacement for state deputy attorneys’ general leans in favor of district attorneys as state officers. Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp. 649, 660 (M.D.Pa.1999). Similarly, the relationship between the state’s chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General, and prosecutors when enforcing Pennsylvania statutes also leans in favor of prosecutors as state officials. Commonwealth v. Bauer, 437 Pa. 37, 261 A.2d 573, 575 (Pa.1970).
Prosecutors can have “a dual or hybrid status” sometimes as a state officer, and sometimes as a county officer. Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir.1996) (discussing New Jersey law). In fact, in Pennsylvania they have such a hybrid role. In Carter v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the status of a Pennsylvania district attorney and stated:
When “enforcing their sworn duties to enforce the law ... they act as agents of the State [but] when county prosecutors are called upon to perform administrative tasks unrelated to their strictly prosecutorial functions ... the county prosecutor in effect acts on behalf of the county that is the situs of his or her office.” Absent direct intervention by the state, county prosecutors act as county officials when they are called upon to make administrative decisions on a local level.
*5 Carter, 181 F.3d at 353 (citing Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1504). As stated in this Court’s prior opinion, the status of the district attorney as a state or county official hinges on whether the actions alleged were prosecutorial or administrative in nature. (Memorandum Opinion 21, Doc. 335.)
Defendants point to Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009), and argue

that it directly controls this issue. As a threshold matter, it is important to note that while analysis under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity or under the Eleventh Amendment is persuasive when conducting McMillian analysis, neither of these related theories is binding. Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp.2d at 658. While Van de Kamp discussed prosecutorial immunity and is therefore not controlling, I find that the Supreme Court’s analysis is persuasive in this case. Van de Kamp, 129 S.Ct. at 858. Van de Kamp involved a claim against a district attorney for failing to train or supervise subordinate prosecutors in handling mandatory disclosures of impeachment material. Id. at 861. While the Court classified training and supervision as “administrative” duties, it distinguished these duties from more ministerial tasks such as payroll management or managing maintenance requests. Id. The Court stated that training assistant district attorneys to exercise their prosecutorial duties is “directly connected with the prosecutor’s basic trial advocacy duties.” Id. at 863. Because of the similarity between directly prosecuting and training others to do the same, the Court held that prosecutorial immunity extended to training or supervision of subordinates performing prosecutorial acts. Id. at 861. This analysis is convincing that training a prosecutor is more similar to a prosecutorial than administrative function. Plaintiffs correctly argue that Van de Kamp did not consider any Pennsylvania law as this Court must when conducting McMillian analysis. This does not, however, weaken the persuasiveness of the Court’s arguments as to the similarity between direct prosecutorial actions and training subordinates to do the same.
Plaintiffs argue that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Carter v. City of Philadelphia requires the opposite conclusion. The facts of that case, however, distinguish it from the present situation. In Carter, the court determined, while considering a claim of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, that a district attorney acted as a county official in supervising municipal police officials, and training assistant district attorneys to do the same. Carter, 181 F.3d at 383. The court found the district attorney was a municipal actor where they supervised municipal officials and instructed others to do the same. Id. Unlike in Carter, here the district attorney was to instruct subordinate prosecutors on prosecutorial functions. In Carter, it was clearly a municipal act for the district attorney to directly oversee municipal police. It made sense, therefore, that training a subordinate to perform the same task would also be a municipal act. Here, the underlying prosecutorial acts would be state acts if taken directly by the district attorney. Plaintiffs’ argument identifies the district attorney a county actor when training others to perform
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this state act, creating the anomalous result of requiring a county actor train a state actor on how to perform a state prosecutorial function. I find that it is simply too broad to state that all training and supervision tasks are county acts, and that instead it is appropriate to consider the nature of the act being taught. Here, the instruction is on state prosecutorial conduct, therefore, the district attorney acts in his role as a state official.
*6 As explicitly warned in McMillian, the question is to “ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785 (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 737) (emphasis added). In many capacities the district attorney is indeed the “chief law enforcement officer” for Luzerne County. But after examining Pennsylvania law and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Van de Kamp, I find that in making direct prosecutorial decisions in the courtroom, and in training subordinates to do the same, a district attorney is a state actor. Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments with respect to Luzerne County fail to allege decisions by a final policy-maker for the municipality, and therefore, are futile.

CONCLUSION
Because the Luzerne County District Attorney acted as a state official in training subordinate assistant district attorneys, the proposed amendments are futile and I will deny the motion to amend. In light of this conclusion, I need to reach the parties’ remaining arguments.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
NOW, this 1st day of March, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Class Action Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File an Amended Master Complaint (Doc. 375) is DENIED.
	  

Footnotes

1

The individual and class action plaintiffs in this case bring federal and state law claims against a number of defendants for an

alleged scheme involving the corruption of the Luzerne County Common Pleas and Juvenile Courts. Because the allegations are

lengthy, only those relevant to liability for Luzerne County will be discussed here.

	   	  

5

 
 	  
2009 WL 6850318 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. William Conway, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Judge Michael T. Conahan, et al., Defendants. H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants. Samantha Humanik, Plaintiff, v.
Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–cv–286, 3:09–cv–0291, 3:09–cv–0357, 3:09–cv–0630. | Nov. 20, 2009.
West KeySummary
1 Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement;   prisons
County commissioners’ actions in funding juvenile detention facility could not establish liability for alleged constitutional harms suffered by juveniles in the facility. Therefore, amendments to civil rights complaint against county were dismissed as futile. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.

*1 Presently before the Court are two motions to file amended master complaints, one by the individual plaintiffs (Doc. 249), and one by the class action plaintiffs (Doc. 250). Defendant Luzerne County objects to these amendments, arguing that they are futile. (Docs.298, 297.) Because the amendments are futile, I will deny the motion to amend.
BACKGROUND
The individual and class action plaintiffs in this case bring federal and state law claims against a number of defendants for an alleged scheme involving the corruption of the Luzerne County Common Pleas and Juvenile Courts. Because the allegations are lengthy, only those relevant to liability for Luzerne County will be discussed below.
The Plaintiffs’ allegations relevant to the present motions are as follows:
A. Conspiracy Defendants Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”) abused their positions as judges of the Luzerne County Court of Commons Pleas by accepting compensation in return for favorable judicial determinations. (Ind.Amend.Compl.(“Ind.”) ¶ 59, Doc. 249.; Class Action Amend. Compl. (“CA”) ¶ 2, Doc. 250.) As part of this conspiracy, Conahan and Ciaverella acted with Defendants Powell, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Pennsylvania Child Care (“PACC”), Western Pennsylvania Child Care (“WPACC”), Pinnacle, Beverage, Vision, and perhaps others. (Ind.¶ 60.) The basic outline of the conspiracy was that Conahan and Ciavarella used their influence as judicial officers to select PACC and WPACC as detention facilities, and that they intentionally filled those facilities with juveniles to earn the conspirators excessive profits. (Id. ¶ 110.) In return, approximately $2.6 million was paid to Conahan and Ciavarella for their influence. (Id. ¶ 66.)
Conahan took official actions to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget from the Luzerne County facility, and he exerted influence to facilitate the construction, expansion, and lease of the PACC facility. (Ind.¶ 63.) Conahan also signed a secret “Placement Guarantee Agreement” with PACC on behalf of Luzerne County. (Id. ¶ 29.) Conahan had “final decision-making authority with regard to Luzerne County’s funding of the county-
1

run River Street juvenile detention center.”1 (Id.) Ciavarella acted “in his administrative capacity” when he began discussions with Powell about constructing a new facility. (CA ¶ 648.) Conahan and Ciavarella also executed a number of schemes to conceal the unlawful proceeds of this conspiracy. (Ind.¶ 64.)
B. Courtroom Conduct Ciavarella sentenced thousands of juveniles to detention in violation of their constitutional rights such as the right to counsel, the right to an impartial tribunal, and the right to a free and voluntary guilty plea. (CA ¶¶ 176–77.) Conahan and Ciavarella also pressured court probation officers to make recommendations in favor of incarcerating juvenile offenders, even when the probation officers would have otherwise recommended release. (Ind. ¶ 96.; CA ¶ 713.) Chief Juvenile Probation Officers Sandra Brulo (“Brulo”) and Michael Loughney (“Loughney”) also acted to influence probation officers in this fashion. (Ind. ¶ 96 .) Brulo and Loughney created waiver forms for the county department of probation, which were given to juveniles to encourage them to waive their right to counsel. (Id. ¶ 174.) Brulo also told juvenile offenders that they did not need a lawyer, and that if they did not plead guilty they would risk being charged with additional offenses. (Id. ¶ 99.)
*2 Plaintiffs also allege that the constitutional harms resulted from the deliberate indifference of the district attorney and public defender to the actions of Ciavarella. (CA ¶ 728.) Plaintiffs allege that both were Luzerne County decision-makers, and that they effectively sanctioned the actions of Ciavarella by failing to intervene. (Id.)
C. Actions of the County Commissioners In July 2001, Defendant Pennsylvania Child Care (“PACC”) sent Luzerne County an unsolicited proposal to build a juvenile detention facility and to lease the facility to the county over a thirty (30) year period. (Ind.¶ 28.) A consultant hired by Luzerne County estimated that the cost to construct the PACC facility would be $8 million, and that it would be worth about $8 million or $9 million if the County wanted to purchase the facility. (Id. ¶ 30.) Luzerne County Commissioners Greg Skrepenak and Todd Vonderheid rejected concerns that PACC wanted to charge too much for the facility, and on October 18, 2004, they announced they would vote for the construction. (Id. ¶ 31.) In doing so, they also abandoned the County’s existing plans to construct its own facility. (Id.; CA ¶ 660.)

On or around October 19, 2004, an auditor for the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”) notified Luzerne County that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania would be auditing the PACC facility. (Ind.¶ 32.) Despite this notice from the DPW and public disapproval, a majority of the county commissioners voted to lease the PACC detention center for twenty (20) years at a cost of $58 million. (Id. ¶ 33.) On or about November 16, 2004, the state auditor faxed an urgent letter about the PACC audit to the Luzerne County Commissioners. (Id. ¶ 36.) Despite the ongoing audit, a majority of the county commissioners continued with the lease signing process. (Id. ¶ 37.) Luzerne County Controller Steve Flood subpoenaed documents from the DPW relating the audit of the PACC facility. (Id. ¶ 38.) Before Flood or the DPW could release the contents of the audit, Conahan granted an ex parte preliminary injunction filed by PACC which prevented the release of the PACC audit documents. (Id. ¶ 40.) On December 23, 2004, the Times Leader, a local newspaper who had copies of the PACC audit documents, moved to intervene. (Id. ¶ 41.) That same day Conahan granted final injunctive relief preventing the release of the PACC audit documents. (Id.) Conahan filed an opinion in support of this decision on Mar 31, 2005. (Id. ¶ 45.) On November 16, 2005, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed Conahan’s decision. (Id. ¶ 46.) The PACC audit documents were never made public. (Id. ¶ 47.) The DPW issued its final report on February 6, 2007, but stated that because of the inability to obtain certain information from PACC and Luzerne County the results of the audit were limited. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49.)
*3 In January 2005 the lease agreement between Luzerne County and PACC when into effect. (Ind.¶ 43.) The Luzerne County Commissioners hired Defendant Mid– Atlantic Youth Services (“MAYS”) to run the PACC facility at a cost of $3.5 million per year. (Id. ¶ 44.) Under the terms of this agreement if the facilities actual operating costs were less than the budgeted costs, MAYS would have to remit a portion of the savings to Luzerne County. (Id. ¶ 44.) The DPW audit revealed that PACC was projected to have a profit of 34% in 2004. (Id. ¶ 50(a).) PACC’s detention rates exceeded actual costs by the average amount of $85.26 in 2004–2005. (Id. ¶ 50(b).) Under the agreement PACC received excessive federal and state reimbursements in the amount of $1.6 million annually for the term of the lease. (Id. ¶ 50(d) .) The lease agreement was also unusual in that it did not include standard language prohibiting PACC from charging for the day of discharge, resulting in $387,359.000 worth of improper reimbursements from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 50(e).) Luzerne County also
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purchased in excess of $1 million in services from Western Pennsylvania Child Care (“WPACC”) during 2006–2007. (Id. ¶ 50(f).) The audit also found that Luzerne County had violated state and federal contracting rules and regulations in its agreement with PACC. (Id. ¶ 52.) PACC’s profits on its face demonstrate that Luzerne County failed to perform its required analysis or simply disregarded the regulations. (Id. ¶ 54.) “In sum, Defendant Luzerne County allowed excessive amounts of public money to be paid to Defendant PACC ... who yielded excessive profits and were able to use these excessive funds to pay Defendants Conahan and Ciavarella.” (Id. ¶ 57.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Motion to Amend Pleadings Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “a party may amend the party’s pleadings ... by leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party shall have leave to amend pleadings out of time. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing, 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir.1981). However, “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’ “ Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
In the Third Circuit, the touchstone for the denial of leave to amend is undue prejudice to the non-moving party. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413–14 (3d Cir.1993); Cornell & Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (1978). “In the absence of substantial or undue prejudice, denial instead must be based on bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414 (citing Heyl, 663 F.2d at 425).
*4 The only pertinent issue here is whether Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to their Complaint are “futile.” An amendment is futile if “the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,

1434 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1 st Cir.1996)). In making this assessment, the Court must use the same standard of legal sufficiency employed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. In other words, “[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss.” Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir.1988).
II. Motion to Dismiss Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ “ each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ “ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ “ or “ ‘legal conclusions,’
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“ Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
DISCUSSION
*5 Plaintiffs seek to amend the Individual and Class Action Master Complaints to provide additional detail to the allegations against Luzerne County. (Docs.249, 250.) Luzerne County opposes these amendments as futile. (Docs.298, 297.) As stated above, futility uses the same standard applied during a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipal liability cannot be established under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents”). “A public entity such as [Luzerne] County may be held liable for the violation of a Constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when the alleged unconstitutional action executes or implements policy or a decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir.1997). Alternatively, “in the absence of an unconstitutional policy, a municipality’s failure to properly train its employees and officers can create an actionable violation of a party’s constitutional rights under § 1983 ... where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [municipal employees] come into contact.’ “ Id. at 145. Plaintiffs make no allegations about the failure to train municipal employees, therefore liability will rely upon the creation of a policy or custom which caused the alleged constitutional harm.
When a government policy or custom, “whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,” inflicts constitutional harm then the governmental entity may be held responsible under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). While the proposed amendments by the individual and class-action plaintiffs allege slightly different causes of action, they are sufficiently similar to be analyzed together.

I. Plaintiffs’ Claims The amended individuals master complaint contains four subheadings with theories of liability: (1) liability based on actions of persons with final authority; (2) liability based on persons with final authority conspiring with defendants; (3) liability based on persons with final authority being deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations; (4) liability based on the creation of a custom, policy, or practice. These claims are directed against three individuals/groups: (1) former President judge Conahan, (2) Chief Juvenile Probation Officers Brulo and Loughney, and (3) the Luzerne County Commissioners.2 In the proposed amended class-action complaint, the Plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to Luzerne County are found in Count VIII, for violations of the Plaintiffs Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they allege: (1) that Ciavarella instituted a custom, policy, or practice of denying constitutional rights, and (2) that “County decision-makers ... including, but not limited to, the Luzerne County District Attorney ... and Public defender” failed to intervene after observing these violations, thus demonstrating deliberate indifference on the part of the County.
*6 To determine if the Plaintiffs articulate a claim against Luzerne County via the proposed amendments, first it must be determined whether any of these actors had final policy-making authority for Luzerne County. Then it must be determined whether any final policy-maker created liability for Luzerne county through their own actions, through affirming a subordinate’s conduct, or through the creation of a policy or custom, which caused the alleged harm.
II. Final Policy–Making Authority The power to establish policy is not the exclusive province of the legislature. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir.2005). “Monell’ s language makes clear that it expressly envisioned other officials whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Pembaur v. City of Cinncinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion). “When an official’s discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official’s making, those policies, rather than the subordinate’s departures from them, are the act of the municipality.” Id. Similarly, “when a subordinate’s
4

decision is subject to review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies.” Id. Any inquiry into the status of an official as a final policy-maker must focus on whether decisions are final on a particular issue, not in an “all or nothing manner.” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (official must have final policy-making authority in that area of the city’s business). The identification of policy-making officials is not a question of fact, but is instead a question of law which is appropriate for the court to determine. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 125–26.
In McMillian v. Monroe County, the Supreme Court set forth the applicable standard when determining if a governmental actor has final policy-making authority as a county actor under § 1983. The Court noted that state law controlled the determination of whether an actor has final policy-making authority. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 783. The Court also emphasized that the inquiry must be focused on the specifically alleged conduct, rather than the general authority of that position under state law. Id. at 783. The McMillian Court ultimately concluded that an Alabama sheriff acted as a state official, rather than a county official, through a consideration of the Alabama Constitution, Alabama statutory and case law, and the allegations of the parties. Id. at 786. A similar analysis is appropriate here with respect to each alleged actor.
A. Former Judges Conahan and Ciavarella3 The Pennsylvania Constitution outlines a separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary. PA CONST. art. V (judiciary); Id. art. V (legislature). Pennsylvania has a unified judicial system, extending authority in one sweep from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court down to the Courts of Common Pleas and Community Courts. Id. art. V, § 1. The role of the president judge, in addition to traditional judicial functions, is to act as an administrator for the trial courts. Id. art. V, § 10. (discussing the administrative responsibilities of a president judge). Notably, the Pennsylvania Constitution also explicitly defines “county officers” including numerous court officials, but never mentions judges. Id. art. IX, § 4 (county officers include clerks of the courts, prothonotaries, district attorneys, and public defenders). Examining the Pennsylvania Constitution, the president judge is defined as a state judicial officer, rather than as a county official. The Pennsylvania Constitution suggests that even in the administrative role, the president judge is a state policymaker.

*7 The statutory law of Pennsylvania also supports the role of the President judge as a state, rather than county, officer. 42 PA. C.S. § 325(e) expands upon the administrative duties of a Pennsylvania President judge, stating:
(e) POWERS OF President judge.—Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by this title, by general rule or by order of the governing authority, the president judge of a court shall:
(1) Be the executive and administrative head of the court, supervise the judicial business of the court, promulgate all administrative rules and regulations, make all judicial assignments, and assign and reassign among the personnel of the court available chambers and other physical facilities.
(2) Exercise the powers of the court under section 2301(a)(2) (relating to appointment of personnel).
42 PA.C.S. § 325. There is no question that a Court of Common Pleas is a state entity. See Benn v. First Judicial District of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir.2002) (“under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state constitution, the Judicial District and its counterparts are state entities.”). Therefore, the executive and administrative decisions made by a president judge as the “head of the court” are made as a state actor. Even in employment matters, the authority of the president judge stems from his role as a state actor. See Jakomas v. McFalls, 229 F.Supp.2d 412, 428–29 (W.D.Pa.2002) (finding judge not a county actor when firing his staff). Furthermore, the statutory language provides no explicit basis, powers, or duties to the president judge as a county official. There is no language to suggest that included in the powers of a president judge is the ability to apportion or spend a budget. The statutory law also provides no support that the president judge is a county actor.
Plaintiffs also fail to cite any cases in support of the proposition that a Pennsylvania president judge is a county policy-maker with final authority. Courts which have considered the judicial actions of common pleas judges have found that they are not county actors. See e.g., Giallorenz v. Beaver County, No. 06–0354, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79427, at * 11 (W.D.Pa.2006) (county not proper party for actions taken by Court of Common Pleas or one of its magisterial justices). There appears to be no legal basis for the argument that the president judge has final authority with respect to the county budget.4 Indeed the Plaintiffs argue in their brief in opposition to Conahan’s claim of legislative immunity that “Pennsylvania law does not vest a president judge with
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the power to create, vote on, or sign into law a county budget.” (Doc. 282 at 67.)5 The cases which address the interaction between the president judge and the county commissioners instead suggest that the president judge makes budget recommendations to the commissioners, but that the commissioners must make the final spending allocations. See e.g., Lavelle v. Koch, 532 Pa. 631, 617 A.2d 319 (Pa.1992) (president judge seeking to compel commissioners to disperse funds); Becket v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (Pa.1981) (same). This type of political lobbying is a far cry from final policy-making. Plaintiffs argue that these recommendations, combined with the fact that the courts received funding through Luzerne County, makes the president judge a county policy-maker. The argument that county funding alone makes an actor a county official and policy-maker was specifically rejected in McMillian. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 791. In McMillian the Court also rejected the argument that being elected locally was a sufficient justification to support a finding as a county actor. Id. The evidence as to a Pennsylvania president judges’ status weighs even more towards the conclusion that the president judge is a state actor.
*8 With this state law in mind, it is appropriate to focus specifically on the alleged conduct by Conahan. Here the conduct can be divided into three categories. First, those actions which were conducted in the courtroom as a judge. Second, those actions of inappropriately pressuring probation officers to change their recommendations. Third, the alleged budgetary and contract signing actions. Any actions taken in the courtroom in his capacity as a judge, such as the granting of an injunction to conceal the audit results (Ind.¶ 40) were taken as a state official. See Giallorenzo, No. 06–cv–0354, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79427 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 31, 2006). Therefore, there is no liability for Luzerne County based on those types of actions. Similarly, allegations with respect to a failure to be impartial in the courtroom and failure to disclose sources of income (Ind.¶¶ 93–94, 102) deal with Conahan’s judicial role, not county role. Any direction to court officials, like probation officers, would be drawn from the authority of the president judge as a state judicial officer. Finally actions as to where an individual was to be detained (Id. ¶ 95) or via orders to close certain facilities, were also clearly taken in the role of a state judicial officer. I find that Conahan was not a Luzerne county final policy-maker with respect to any of these actions.
The Plaintiffs also allege that several of Conahan’s actions were taken as a policy-maker over budgetary expenditures. Plaintiffs allege that Conahan executed a “Placement Guarantee Agreement” with PACC (Ind.¶¶

70, 95), that he “took official action to remove funding from the budget” (Id. ¶ 71), and that he was the person with final authority in the County of Luzerne regarding the funding of the detention facilities (Id. ¶ 172). As a matter of law, there is no support for the Plaintiffs’ legal conclusion that Conahan had the final authority to distribute the budget on his own. Instead, as Plaintiffs state in their proposed amended complaint when arguing the county commissioners approved of his conduct, Conahan as the president judge would make budget recommendations. (CA ¶ 657) (“A majority of the three Luzerne County Commissioners approved the Court’s budget request to remove funding from the River Street facility ....”). Even if Conahan could be considered a county actor for these administrative requests, to create Monell liability Conahan must be a final policy-maker. Because the commissioners had ultimate oversight on those matters, Conahan clearly is not the final policymaker who can bind the county. Finally as to any contracts such as the “secret Placement Guarantee Agreement” allegedly signed by Conahan, because he was a state actor any contracts would be imputed to the state, not the county. The president judge is a state actor with administrative authority over a state agency, the Court of Common Pleas.
As to Ciavarella, his authority as a Common Pleas Judge extends from the same constitutional and legal background as the President judge. Unlike the president judge, however, a traditional judge has no specific administrative duties which could be argued as county actions. Furthermore, the allegations against Ciavarella are mainly for his conduct in the courtroom, which would clearly be in his capacity as a state officer. Finally, as to any oversight or influence over probation officers, if the president judge is not a county policy-maker, then certainly a traditional judge would also not be one.
*9 Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions that Conahan as president judge was a final policy-maker for Luzerne County, after considering Pennsylvania law and the factual allegations, I find that Conahan was not a final policy-maker for the county. I also find that as a common pleas judge Ciavarella was not a final policy-maker for the county.
B. Chief Juvenile Probation Officers Brulo and Loughney Similar to the sheriff discussed in McMillian, at the outset it is clear that the Chief Probation Officer has policymaking authority over the probation department and its officials. Here the question is the same as in McMillian: whether the actor is a state or county policy-maker. The same analysis discussed above for the President judge
6

must also be applied to the office of chief juvenile probation officer to determine if such an actor is a county final policy-maker. Similar to judges, when the Pennsylvania Constitution lists county officers, probation officers are not included in that list. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 4. Other courts who have considered this issue have found that probation officers, as an arm of the court, are more like judges as state actors than as county actors. Kelly v. County of Montgomery, No. 08–1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61572, at *41 (E.D.Pa.2008) (suit based upon probation departments conduct should have been brought against the court, rather than against the county); see In Matter of Antolik, 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 258, 501 A.2d 697 (Pa.Commw.1985) (position of chief juvenile probation officer a judicial position). While these cases are not directly on point as to the issue of Monell final policy-maker liability, they effectively demonstrate probation officers fall on the “state” side of the line as an arm of the court.
Plaintiffs allege that Brulo and Loughney created liability for Luzerne County by creating the right to an attorney waiver forms, and by pressuring subordinate probation officers into making recommendations for incarceration. While it is clear that they acted as final policy-makers for the probation department, I find that they acted as state rather than county officers. Because Luzerne County may only be liable through the actions of their own final policy-makers, I find that for the purpose of these motions Brulo and Loughney were not final policy-makers.
C. County Commissioners As to the county commissioners, there can be no question that they have final policy-making authority for Luzerne County, and that their actions (or inactions) can potentially create liability under § 1983. One can hardly imagine a more “final” decision-maker for the municipality. The conduct alleged such as allocating the county budget would also be within the expected decision-making authority of county commissioners. I find that the Luzerne County Commissioners were final policy-makers for Luzerne County.
D. District Attorney Unlike judges and probation officers, the district attorney is defined in the Pennsylvania Constitution as a county officer. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 4. Similarly, there is some Pennsylvania statutory law which reflects the status of the district attorney as the “chief law enforcement officer” for the county in which they were elected. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 350 (3d Cir.1999); 71 P.S. §§

732–101, et seq. (2009); 16 P.S. § 401(1)(11) (2009). Pennsylvania case law also identifies that district attorneys may be local officials. Chalfin, 233 A.2d, 565; Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 41, 362 A.2d 486, 490 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1976) (“District attorneys and their assistants are officers of the counties in which they are elected and not officers of the Commonwealth.”). There is also evidence demonstrates that district attorneys are state officials. The historical foundation for the office of district attorney as a replacement for state deputy attorneys’ general leans in favor of district attorneys as state officers. Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp. 649, 660 (M.D.Pa .1999). Similarly, the relationship between the state’s chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General, and prosecutors when enforcing Pennsylvania statutes also leans in favor of prosecutors as state officials. Commonwealth v. Bauer, 437 Pa. 37, 261 A.2d 573, 575 (Pa.1970).
*10 Prosecutors can have “a dual or hybrid status” sometimes as a state officer, and sometimes as a county officer. Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir.1996) (discussing New Jersey law). In fact, in Pennsylvania they have such a hybrid role. In Carter v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the status of a Pennsylvania district attorney under the Supreme Court’s decision in McMillian. The Carter Court considered the “hybrid” status of a district attorney and stated:
When “enforcing their sworn duties to enforce the law ... they act as agents of the State [but] when county prosecutors are called upon to perform administrative tasks unrelated to their strictly prosecutorial functions ... the county prosecutor in effect acts on behalf of the county that is the situs of his or her office.” Absent direct intervention by the state, county prosecutors act as county officials when they are called upon to make administrative decisions on a local level.
Carter, 181 F.3d at 353 (citing Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1504). Under Pennsylvania law, therefore, district attorneys have a hybrid status and the alleged conduct must be considered in light of their role. In Carter, the alleged conduct was the failure to train or supervise police officers from procuring “perjurious eyewitnesses.” Id. at 343. The district attorney was found to be a county official in completing this administrative task. Id. at 353.
This Court has considered this hybrid status twice for purposes of Monell liability since the Court of Appeals’ decision in Carter. In Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp.2d 649, 658 (M.D.Pa.1999), Judge Vanaskie stated:
As in McMillian, there is some evidence in this case to
7

support the proposition that a Pennsylvania district attorney is a county policy maker when engaged in his law enforcement capacity. Indeed, the constitutional designation of the Pennsylvania district attorney as a county officer is a factor not present in McMillian that supports Williams’ position. But that factor does not tip the scales in Williams’ favor. The historical foundation for the office of district attorney—serving as a replacement for state deputy attorneys’ general, with the obligation to perform the duties that had been performed by those deputy attorneys’ general—coupled with the district attorneys’ subordinate relationship to the state’s chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General, compel the conclusion that when engaged in his or her “basic function—enforcement of the Commonwealth’s penal statutes,” a district attorney in Pennsylvania represents the interests of the Commonwealth and not the County.
Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp.2d at 660 (citations omitted). This same analysis was adopted by Chief Judge Kane in Tavenner v. Shaffer, No. 08–cv–1089, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90307 (M.D.Pa. Nov. 6, 2008) (dismissing actions against county for district attorney’s conduct in a prosecutorial capacity). I find these discussions persuasive, and hold that the status of the district attorney as a state or county official hinges on whether the actions alleged were prosecutorial or administrative in nature.
*11 Decisions whether to prosecute, or what specific charges should be brought against a defendant, have been found as prosecutorial actions. Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp.2d at 660; Tavenner, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *10–11. The Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case center on the failure to intervene when Ciavarella violated the Plaintiffs’ rights in the courtroom. Specifically, they argue that the district attorney should not have accepted the guilty pleas which were in violation of constitutional norms. Allowing a defendant to plead guilty, however, is analogous to the clearly prosecutorial act of negotiating a plea bargain; both deal with the prosecutor’s discretion whether to accept a guilty plea for a given charged offense. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (discussing prosecutorial immunity and the need for discretion when to plea bargain); Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 629 (3d Cir.1993) (prosecutorial immunity for determination not to divert defendant to pretrial intervention).6 The decision to accept a guilty plea, like the decision to plea bargain, is prosecutorial in nature. Such a decision is made in the state role of a prosecutor. There are also no allegations of a failure to manage a subordinate officer in an administrative capacity. A common pleas judge is not an employee over whom the district attorney has administrative control. Any failure to intervene by the

district attorney was within the prosecutorial—the state side—of the hybrid role.
As explicitly warned in McMillian, the question is to “ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785 (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 737) (emphasis added). While in many capacities the district attorney is indeed the “chief law enforcement officer” for Luzerne County, I find that for the specific conduct alleged the district attorney was a state, not county, official. Therefore, I find that given these allegations that the district attorney was not a final policy-maker for Luzerne County.
E. Public Defender Like district attorneys, the public defender is also set forth in the Pennsylvania Constitution as a county official. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 4. Unlike other county officers listed in that section, public defenders are appointed rather than elected. Id. This is in light of their unique role in opposing the state during criminal proceedings. Plaintiffs seek liability for Luzerne County for the same type of deliberate indifference alleged against the district attorney. But a similar failure in the courtroom by the public defender in their “defense” capacity, mirroring the prosecutorial capacity of the district attorney, would not be imputed to Luzerne County. In fact, for purposes of § 1983 liability, the public defender cannot even be fairly categorized as a state actor. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (public defenders typically opposed the State and therefore do not act “under color of state law”); Von Schlicten v. County of Northamption, 279 Fed. Appx. 176, 179 (3d Cir.2008). I find that the public defender is not a final policy-maker for Luzerne County.
F. Summary *12 A president judge, a common pleas judge, and a chief juvenile probation officer are all state, rather than county, actors and therefore they cannot be county policy-makers. The district attorney has a “hybrid” status, with some actions being taken as a state official and some being taken as a county official. The specific actions alleged will determine whether the district attorney is a state or county policy-maker. The public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. County commissioners are final policy-makers for a county.
Given the Plaintiffs’ allegations, the only final policymakers in this case are the Luzerne County
8

Commissioners. The actions alleged of the district attorney were within the prosecutorial role, and therefore the district attorney was a state, not county, actor at the time. Therefore, liability for Luzerne County must be predicated upon actions taken by the Luzerne County Commissioners.
III. Liability for a Policy or Custom When a government policy or custom, “whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,” inflicts constitutional harm then the governmental entity may be held responsible under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A municipality acts through the actions of its employees, and there are three instances when the constitutional torts of a municipal employee meet this standard. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir.2005). First, a municipality is liable when its employee acts pursuant to formal government policy or standard operating procedure long accepted within the government entity. Id. (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)). Second, a municipality is liable for the actions of an employee when the employee has final policy-making authority, rendering his behavior an act of government policy. Id. (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480–81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)). Finally, a municipality is liable for the actions of its employee when an official with authority has ratified the unconstitutional actions of the subordinate, rendering the action official. Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). Because only the Luzerne County Commissioners acted with final policy-making authority,7 it is their conduct which is the focus of this analysis.
A. Formal Policy or Standard Operating Procedure A policy is made “when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues a final proclamation, policy or edict.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion)). A custom is an act “that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decision maker,” but that is “so widespread as to have the force of law.” Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). In either case, the policy or custom must be tied to the responsible municipality. Natale v. Camden County

Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir.2003). “It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quotations omitted). “[A] municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)). A plaintiff must show “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.” Chernavsky v. Twp. of Holmdel Police Dep’t, 136 Fed Appx. 507, 509 (3d Cir.2005) (no n-p recede ntial) (citing Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir.2004); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir.2001)).
*13 The Plaintiffs make two arguments with respect to the adoption of a policy or custom. First, that the Luzerne County Commissioners adopted an explicit policy when they decided to privatize the juvenile detention facilities, thus creating the danger for abuse. Second, the Luzerne County Commissioners established a custom for Luzerne County by being deliberately indifferent to the constitutional violations occurring in Ciavarella’s courtroom. Neither of these arguments, however, correctly states the basis for liability against Luzerne County.
1. Creation of a Policy The Plaintiffs argue that by adopting the policy of having a private, instead of public, juvenile detention facility the Luzerne County Commissioners created the ability for this corruption scheme to succeed. “[A] plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct casual link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. Of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). “It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quotations omitted). Here the “injury” was the deprivation of constitutional rights during the juvenile delinquency proceedings. The alleged policy is the determination that a private facility should be used to incarcerate individuals. The execution of this policy did not directly cause any of the constitutional failures in Ciavarella’s courtroom. At best, and in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, this policy
9

created an environment in which the corruption could grow. Even this does not establish a direct causal link as required. It cannot fairly be said that Luzerne County was the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” Id.
Plaintiffs also advance the argument that it was the excessive payments to PACC and WPACC that provided the source of the funds used to bribe Conahan and Ciavarella. But again, this argument fails to demonstrate that the Luzerne County policy, namely the funding a private facility, directly inflicted the constitutional harm. Simply because the county allegedly filled PACC’s pockets with the money allegedly used in this conspiracy does not demonstrate that Luzerne County was the direct cause of every resulting use of those funds. At worst, the agreements signed with PACC and WPACC allege poor management and violations of state law in the use of Luzerne County Funds. Again, there is no direct causal link between the agreement with PACC and the unconstitutional actions by Ciavarella. The policy of privatizing the juvenile detention facility was not a direct cause of the constitutional violations, and therefore this policy does not establish liability for Luzerne County under § 1983.
2. Formation of a Custom *14 Plaintiffs also argue that the county commissioners were deliberately indifferent to the actions of Ciavarella, and that their indifference caused the constitutional harms.8 Deliberate indifference may be inferred from a failure to supervise municipal employees. Knicrumah v. Albany City School Dist., 241 F.Supp.2d 199 (N.D.N.Y.2003). The key question is whether the State, rather than the municipality, controlled the official when he was performing the particular function that is alleged to have resulted in an injury under Sections 1981 and 1983. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 70–71 (2d Cir.2005); Grech v. Clayton County, Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330–31 (11th Cir.2003); Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir.2002) (citing McMillian, 520 U.S. at 790–91). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for officials acting as state, rather than municipal, policymakers. Hailey v. City of Camden, 631 F.Supp.2d 528, 542 (D.N.J.,2009) (citing McMillian v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 793, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1(1997)).
When a subordinate continuously violates the constitutional rights of citizens, and a supervisor does nothing with full knowledge of this violation, then the supervisor has adopted the “custom” of allowing the violations to occur. If the supervisor is a final policy-

maker, then she has created potential liability for the municipality. In the present case, however, deliberate indifference to the courtroom conduct of Ciavarella is very different. Ciavarella was a state, not county, employee over whom the Luzerne County final policymakers had no control. Even if the county wanted to stop the conduct, it had no ability to do so directly. See e.g. Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 316 (9th Cir.1994) (“A municipality cannot be liable for judicial conduct it lacks the power to require, control, or remedy, even if that conduct parallels or appears entangled with the desires of the municipality.”) Unlike conduct committed by municipal police officers, over whom the county would have authority, here there was no formal ability to stop Ciavarella. If the Plaintiffs argument was correct, then the Luzerne County Commissioners would be liable for the unconstitutional actions of any governmental actor, state or federal, operating within the county limits, so long as the violations were continuous enough to put them on notice. To create liability there must be deliberate indifference to the conduct of an individual over whom there is control or responsibility. Short of that, it cannot be said the municipality is “adopting” the behavior of actors beyond its authority.
Additionally, it is worth noting that the Plaintiffs correctly argue that detaining an individual in violation of their rights is not automatically excused by affirmation from a state judge. Anela v. Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1067 (3d Cir.1986). In Anela, an inappropriate bond schedule was developed by the municipality, and implemented by a state court judge. Id. Despite being approved by the judicial officer, the municipality was still held liable since its officers applied the bail schedule in what was a clear violation of state and constitutional law. Id. The critical distinction in the present case is that the unconstitutional actions were taken by the judge, rather than by the municipal officials. In Anela it was municipal conduct ratified by the judge. Here the alleged violations were committed by the judge. Because there is no unconstitutional act by the municipality which was then ratified by Ciavarella, Anela is inapposite given the present allegations.
B. Actions of a Final Policy–Maker *15 Plaintiffs next argue that the Luzerne County Commissioners’ actions in funding PACC and WPACC establish liability for the constitutional harms. If made by a final policy-maker, even a single decision may expose a municipality to liability by creating official policy. McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 367–68. Again, only the actions of the county commissioners are relevant. A municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for its unconstitutional
10

acts in formulating and passing a budget. Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 850 (3d Cir.2000). However, for Monell liability to be appropriate, it must be this policy which inflicts the constitutional harm. Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (“municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible”). In Langford, the plaintiffs alleged that the budget was adopted to eliminate their positions in retaliation for their political speech. Id. at 18–19. It was therefore directly the passing of the budget which was the unconstitutional action. Id. This is distinguishable from the present situation, since the passage of the budget and signing of contracts did not deprive the juveniles of their constitutional rights. As stated above, none of the funding determinations or contract signing inflicted the injuries alleged. See supra III.A. The budget decisions with respect to the detention of juveniles by the Luzerne County Commissioners cannot be a direct cause of the constitutional harms.
C. Ratification by a Final Policy–Maker Slightly different than the adoption of a custom by longterm deliberate indifference is the ratification of a decision by a final policy-maker. Here even a single act of a subordinate can become municipal policy if there is an explicit adoption of the subordinate’s conduct by a final policy-maker. The Plaintiffs argue that when the county commissioners adopted Conahan’s budget recommendations, they effectively adopted his corrupt behavior as their own. This, however, is too broad a reading of the scope of adopting behavior. Only where the supervisor is aware of the motive behind the behavior, does the municipality become liable. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (ratification chargeable to municipality where policy-maker approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it ) (emphasis added). If, for example, the subordinate reaches a decision but hides the unconstitutional basis of the decision when on review, then a supervisor without knowledge of the unconstitutional decision cannot adopt it on behalf of the municipality. Id.
Here there are two problems with liability through ratification. First, Conahan was at the relevant times a state actor, even when requesting funding. In his capacity as the state administrator for the courts, budget requests would have been within his state role and not as a subordinate. Second, for the conduct to be imputed to Luzerne County, the commissioners must have been aware of the corruption behind the decision. The Class Action Plaintiffs make no such allegation, nor do they

include the county commissioners as a party to the bribes or Civil RICO conspiracy. While the Individual Plaintiffs allege “[t]he Luzerne County Commissions ... were willful participants in joint activity and or jointly engaged” in the conspiracy, this legal conclusion is insufficient without factual allegations which would support it. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). There are no factual allegations as to what the commissioners knew, or perhaps more importantly when they knew it. Without any such allegations, the factual allegations are insufficient to support the argument that the Luzerne County Commissioners ratified conduct of Conahan. Either of these two problems would be sufficient to defeat the argument that the commissioners ratified Conahan’s conduct, effectively adopting it as a Luzerne County Policy.
*16 The Plaintiffs fail to allege a policy of Luzerne County which inflicted the constitutional harms under any of the following theories: a formal policy of Luzerne, adoption of a long-standing custom by deliberate indifference, direct actions of a final policy-maker, or ratification of a subordinates conduct by a final policymaker.
CONCLUSION
Given the current allegations, the only final policy-maker for Luzerne County was the Luzerne County Commissioners. Because the alleged conduct of the commissioners fails to state a claim for liability under § 1983, the Plaintiffs’ Motions to Amend will be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
NOW, this 20th day of November, 2009, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Individual Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File an Amended Master Complaint (Doc. 249) is DENIED.
2. Class Action Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File an Amended Master Complaint (Doc. 250) is DENIED.
	  
11

Footnotes

1

While Plaintiffs make the assertion that Conahan had final decision-making authority, this is a question of law to be decided by the

court. See supra Discussion, II.A.; McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997).

2

While not listed in their proposed amended complaint, the Individual Plaintiffs’ Brief argues that the county is also liable for the

indifference of the district attorney and the public defender. (Doc. 310, at 16, n 5.) While the Court need not address these

arguments as to the individual plaintiffs because they are not plead, these issues will be discussed as they have been raised by the

class action plaintiffs.

3

Luzerne County cites a number of decisions from other Circuits in support of their argument that Conahan and Ciavarella are not

county actors. While I reach a similar conclusion to these courts, they are not particularly persuasive because none discuss the role

of a president judge under Pennsylvania law. After all, the hallmark of our system of federalism is that each state may create

different laws and different roles for their officials.

4

Not only is the power to directly control budgetary matters not specifically given to president judges, it would likely violate the

separation of powers under the Pennsylvania Constitution to give this type of legislative spending power to a judicial officer. See

Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa.1949) (“The function of the judiciary to administer justice does not include the

power to levy taxes in order to defray the necessary expenses in connection therewith. It is the legislature which must supply such

funds.”); Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697 (Pa.1932) (Control of state finances rests with the

legislature, subject only to constitutional limitations).

5

Plaintiffs also argue that because Conahan claims legislative immunity, he must be a county actor. Regardless of whether that

immunity applies, the mere claim of a party is insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the actor has such authority.

6

While these cases discuss the related issue of prosecutorial immunity, rather than § 1983 liability, absolute prosecutorial immunity

uses a parallel dichotomy between prosecutorial and administrative acts.

7

See supra, Part II. Final Policy–Making Authority.

8

Ciavarella’s repeated courtroom conduct is the only possible event, as alleged by the plaintiffs, which was “so widespread as to

have the force of law.” Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626

(1997).

	   	  

12

 
 	  
2011 WL 1601627 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Angela Rimmer BELANGER, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Mark A. CIAVARELLA, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:10–CV–1405. | April 27, 2011.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 749.) For the reasons stated below, this Motion will be granted as to the amendments concerning Defendant Sandra Brulo, but denied as to the amendments concerning Defendants Luzerne County Commissioner Greg Skrepenak and Luzerne County.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this suit has been outlined in a number of opinions of this Court, see, e.g., Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (M.D.Pa.2010) and therefore need not be set forth here.
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on July 7, 2010. After Motions to Dismiss were filed by the various Defendants, an Amended Complaint was filed, followed by another round of Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 749.) This Motion has been opposed by Luzerne County Defendants Sam Guesto, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid, Luzerne County, and Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation (“Luzerne County Defendants”) as well as Defendant Sandra Brulo.

LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Motion to Amend Pleadings Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “a party may amend the party’s pleadings ... by leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party shall have leave to amend pleadings out of time. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Hous ., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir.1981). However, “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’ “ Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
In the Third Circuit, the touchstone for the denial of leave to amend is undue prejudice to the non-moving party. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413–14 (3d Cir.1993); Cornell & Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (1978). “In the absence of substantial or undue prejudice, denial instead must be based on bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414 (citing Heyl, 663 F.2d at 425).
The pertinent issue here is whether Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to their Complaint are “futile.” An amendment is futile if “the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir.1996)). In making this assessment, the Court must use the same standard of legal sufficiency employed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. In other words, “[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss.” Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir.1988).
II. Motion to Dismiss *2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for
1

the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ “ each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ “ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ “ or “ ‘legal conclusions,’ “ Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000).

DISCUSSION
*3 Plaintiffs seek to amend their Complaint a second time to provide additional detail to the allegations against Luzerne County, former Luzerne County Commissioner Greg Skrepenak, and Sandra Brulo. As stated above, the futility standard employed in evaluating an Motion to Amend is the same as used in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
I. Luzerne County Defendants Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend their Complaint will be denied with respect to the amendments against Luzerne County and Greg Skrepenak, as Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against these defendants.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipal liability cannot be established under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents”). “A public entity such as [Luzerne] County may be held liable for the violation of a Constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when the alleged unconstitutional action executes or implements policy or a decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir.1997). When a government policy or custom, “whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,” inflicts constitutional harm then the governmental entity may be held responsible under § 1983. Monell v.. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
When a government policy or custom, “whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,” inflicts constitutional harm then the governmental entity may be held responsible under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A municipality acts through the actions of its employees, and there are three instances when the constitutional torts of a municipal employee meet this standard. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir.2005). First, a municipality is liable when its employee acts pursuant to formal government policy or standard operating procedure long accepted within the government entity. Id. (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). Second, a municipality is liable for the actions of an employee when the employee has final policy-making authority, rendering his
2

behavior an act of government policy. Id. (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. Finally, a municipality is liable for the actions of its employee when an official with authority has ratified the unconstitutional actions of the subordinate, rendering the action official. Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).

A policy is made “when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues a final proclamation, policy or edict.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (plurality opinion)). A custom is an act “that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decision maker,” but that is “so widespread as to have the force of law.” Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). In either case, the policy or custom must be tied to the responsible municipality. Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir.2003). “It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386 (1989) (quotations omitted). “[A] municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). A plaintiff must show “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.” Chernavsky v. Twp. of Holmdel Police Dep’t, 136 Fed Appx. 507, 509 (3d Cir.2005) (non-precedential) (citing Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir.2004); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir.2001)).

*4 Actions by persons with final authority for making a decision within the municipal entity constitute official policy for purposes of § 1983. See Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483–484, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (“municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question”). The Third Circuit has further held:

An

individual’s

conduct

implements official policy or

practice under several types of

circumstances, including when (1)

the individual acted pursuant to a

formal government policy or a

standard operating procedure long

accepted within the government entity, (2) the individual himself has final policy-making authority such that his conduct represents official policy, or (3) a final policymaker renders the individual’s conduct official for liability purposes by having delegated to him authority to act or speak for the government, or by ratifying the conduct or speech after it has occurred.
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225. 245 (3d Cir.2006).
In a prior Memorandum Opinion of this Court (Doc. 335), this Court found that, while the Luzerne County Commissioners had final policy-making authority, the act of deciding to fund PACC and WPACC did not make the County liable under § 1983 because that act alone did not inflict the constitutional harm.
Here, Plaintiffs have attempted to avoid a similar ruling by alleging that the decision to fund the facilities was part of a much larger “culture of corruption” and that Defendants Skrepenak, Vonderheid, and Guesto were participants in the underlying judicial kickback scheme that helped foster such a culture. However, the allegations made against these Defendants are too vague to make out a claim for relief under 12(b)(6). While the pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, is liberal, and requires only notice pleading, Plaintiffs must still plead facts sufficient to demonstrate a “plausible” claim for relief. Plaintiffs’ allegations against Defendants Skrepenak, Vonderheid, and Guesto1 remain in the hazy realm of innuendo, conjecture, and implication and do not meet this standard. The new allegations provide no facts connecting any of the actions of the Luzerne County Defendants to the underlying conspiracy in any meaningful way. The fact that Defendant Skrepenak has negotiated a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office regarding unrelated business dealings, or that he received a bribe, without any allegations as to when or why it was received, are not, by themselves, sufficient bases for § 1983 liability in this suit. Similarly, allegations Skrepenak and Vonderheid “knew” about the kickback scheme and were willing parties in furthering the scheme, without any allegations as to what they knew or when or how they knew it, are too nebulous to state a claim for relief. With respect to the allegations against Vonderheid and Guesto, they are also too speculative and are therefore similarly insufficient as the basis for a claim
3

upon which relief can be granted. Allegations that Defendant Guesto is the subject of other federal investigations into corruption charges or that he received employment or recommendations from Defendant Conahan, as well as allegations that Defendant Vonderheid was politically aligned with Judges Conahan and Ciavarella, are similarly insufficient to state a claim for relief. Taking all these allegations as true, Plaintiffs have failed to establish any concrete causal links between the decision of the County to fund the prisons and the constitutional violations alleged by the Plaintiffs. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to state in any sort of concrete way how these Defendants participated in the underlying kickback scheme.
II. Sandra Brulo *5 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend will be granted as to proposed amendments regarding Sandra Brulo. This Court has already ruled, in Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239, that while Defendant Brulo is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as to her pre-sentence recommendations, she is not entitled to sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, or quasi-judicial immunity as to allegations of altering probation reports or fabricating probation violations to ensure that the plaintiffs were kept in the juvenile facilities longer. While discovery may show that Defendant Brulo wasn’t personally involved in decision-making regarding these Plaintiffs, the allegations in the Complaint make out a plausible claim for relief given Brulo’s position within the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs will be allowed to amend additional allegations as to Defendant Brulo, but not as to Defendants Skrepenak and Luzerne County. The Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for relief against Defendants Skrepenak, Guesto, and Vonderheid. The Plaintiffs have also not stated a claim for municipal liability against Luzerne County insofar as such a claim would be the result of actions taken by Defendants Skrepenak, Guesto, and Vonderheid.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
NOW, this 26th day of April, 2011, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff has Leave to Amend the Complaint as to the additional allegations against Defendant Brulo, but not as to Defendants Skrepenak and Luzerne County. Plaintiff is directed to file this Second Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days.
	  

Footnotes

1

This Court has already held, in the prior opinion already mentioned, that Defendant Brulo’s conduct cannot be attributed to

Luzerne County for purposes of § 1983 liability.

	   	  

4

 
 	  
2011 WL 6003916 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:09–CV–286. | Nov. 30, 2011.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Robert Powell (Doc. 922), MAYS, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care (Doc. 927), Sandra Brulo (Doc. 929), Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, and Todd Vanderheid (Doc. 931), and Robert Mericle and Mericle Construction (Doc. 932). For the reasons stated below, these motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer (“Belanger plaintiffs”) in their proposed class action, allege the following.
All four named plaintiffs live in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Defendants Mark A. Ciavarella and Michael T. Conahan are former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges. Defendant Luzerne County is a county government organized under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania. Defendant Sam Guesto is the former County Manager/Chief Clerk of Luzerne County and held that position until January 2008. Following his resignation, he was hired by defendant Ciavarella as a court administrator. Defendants Gregory Skrepenak and Todd Vonderheid are former members of the Luzerne County Board of Commissioners. Defendant Sandra Brulo is a former Deputy Director of Forensic Programs

of the Luzerne County Department of Probation. Defendant Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation is the Department of Juvenile Probation for Luzerne County. Defendant Robert Powell is a former partner in PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC. Defendant Robert Mericle is the owner of Mericle Construction, Inc. Defendant Mericle Construction is a close corporation registered under the laws of Pennsylvania. Defendant PA Child Care LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC are limited liability companies registered under the laws of Pennsylvania. Defendant Mid–Atlantic Youth Services, Inc. (“MAYS”) is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Emlenton, PA.
Defendants Powell and Mericle paid approximately $2.6 million in bribes to defendants Ciavarella and Conahan to ensure the placement of juveniles in PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care—facilities built by Mericle and run by Powell. In Pennsylvania, juveniles retain the same rights as other criminal defendants, including the right to due process of law and the right to counsel. Specifically, the bribes facilitated a “Placement Guarantee Agreement” that guaranteed substantial annual payments from Luzerne to the juvenile facilities operated by defendant Powell. To ensure placements in these facilities, defendant Ciavarella often sentenced juveniles to terms of incarceration for minor offenses. Ciavarella also typically adjudicated these cases without any of the procedural protections normally associated with juvenile cases, including giving the juveniles legal counsel to protect their rights. Juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella were provided with a waiver of counsel form, prepared by defendant Brulo, which was insufficient and illegal on its face. Of the juveniles who waived counsel before Ciavarella, over half were incarcerated, compared with roughly ten percent of juveniles who waived counsel in the rest of the state. At least 5,000 children were adjudicated by Ciavarella during the period relevant to the complaint. During that time, Luzerne County had the highest rate of juvenile incarceration in Pennsylvania by several orders of magnitude. Thousands of childrens’ lives were negatively affected by defendants’ conduct, and the childrens’ parents were similarly affected.
*2 The Belanger plaintiffs further allege that several Luzerne County officials helped facilitate the bribery scheme. Luzerne County initially rejected PA Child Care’s unsolicited proposal in 2000 to build a juvenile detention facility in Pittston and to lease it to the County for $37 million over thirty years. Although the County had an adequate juvenile facility, after Judge Conahan announced that juveniles would no longer be sent to it
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because of its deplorable conditions, the County made plans to build its own facility. However, after the elections of Gregory Skrepenak and Todd Vonderheid as County Commissioners in 2004, the County agreed to contract with PA Child Care for $58 million over 20 years to house adjudicated juveniles. Through this period, Skrepenak and Vonderheid, allied politically and socially with Chivarella and Conahan and aware of the bribery scheme, abdicated their oversight responsibilities regarding personnel, budget, and contract decisions relating to juvenile detention, giving Ciavarella and Conahan a free hand. The County’s lease with PA Child Care was roundly criticized as grossly overpriced. However, Skrepenak and Vonderheid continued to support it. When Steve Flood, the Luzerne County Controller, launched an investigation into the matter, Skrepenak and Vonderheid obstructed his investigation. Additionally, Sam Guesto, a member of the conspiracy closely aligned with both Skrepenak and the Judges, in his position as Luzerne County manager, participated in the decision to hire PA Child Care and helped draft the agreement. Sandra Brulo, Deputy Director for Forensic Services for the Luzerne County Probation Department, was also a member of the bribery conspiracy. She used her position to implement Conahan’s “zero tolerance policy” regarding juvenile crimes—initiated just days after the opening of the PA Child Care facility. Brulo instructed Luzerne County probation officers that all juveniles supervised in Luzerne County had to have their probation violated. Such a policy was to ensure that PA Child Care would remain full. She also recommended juveniles be placed in rehabilitation facilities in order to legitimize placements made by Conahan and Chivarella and altered probation reports to ensure further detention.
As a result of the defendants’ actions, the lives of the Belanger plaintiffs have been dramatically affected. After Zane Farmer was arrested following a verbal altercation with his mom, Kelly Farmer, Judge Ciavarella sentenced him to six months incarceration without due process or being advised of his right to counsel. Joseph Rimmer, after being charged with vandalism, was sentenced to thirty days incarceration—later increased to several months—by Judge Ciavarella after a summary proceeding in which he was denied due process. Angela Rimmer Belanger, Joseph’s mother, was later sued by Luzerne County for child support during Joseph’s incarceration.
In their complaint, the Belanger plaintiffs bring the following claims: conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count I), against all defendants; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (count II), against all defendants; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (count III), against the Luzerne County defendants; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count IV),

against the Luzerne County defendants; violation of right to substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count V), against the Luzerne County defendants; unconstitutional policies and practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count VI) against the Luzerne County defendants; wrongful taking under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count VII) against Sandra Brulo, the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, and Luzerne County; violation of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count VIII) against Sandra Brulo and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation; injunctive relief for wrongful payment to municipality (count IX), against Luzerne County and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation; wrongful payment to municipality of child support (count X), against Sandra Brulo, Luzerne County, and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, and punitive damages against all defendants except Luzerne County and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation.
*3 The Belanger plaintiffs have amended their complaint twice. Following the second set of amendments, defendants re-filed their motions to dismiss. Each motion has been briefed and is ripe for review. Each will be discussed in turn below.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ “ each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ “ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is
2

contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ “ or “ ‘legal conclusions,’ “ Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000).
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant Powell’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 922) *4 Defendant Robert Powell moves to dismiss the three claims against him in the Belanger plaintiffs’ second amended complaint: (1) the claim that Powell conspired to deny plaintiffs of their rights to due process, an impartial tribunal, and familial relations, in violation of their Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count I); (2) the 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim (count II); and (3) the punitive damages claim. Since the Court has already ruled that allegations similar to those underlying the § 1983 conspiracy—as they relate to the procedural due process and impartial tribunal claims—and punitive damage claims were sufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), see Clark v.

Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (M.D.Pa.2010), these counts will not be dismissed as to defendant Powell. The Court will, however, grant defendant Powell’s motion to dismiss the § 1985(3) claim and the aspect of the § 1983 conspiracy claim relating to the interference with familial relations.
A. The § 1983 conspiracy claim This Court previously held in Clark that allegations stemming from the same events stated claims under 12(b)(6) for violations of juveniles’ Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Powell, incorporating arguments made by defendant Mericle in his motion to dismiss, argues that this ruling was wrong. The Court does not agree.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a plaintiff cannot bring a cognizable claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906, (1997) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)). As to Plaintiffs’ Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, although the precise contours of those claims are unclear at this stage of the proceeding, those claims necessarily will imply the invalidity of the underlying juvenile conviction and sentences.
This Court held in Clark that:
Defendants argue that Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (3d Cir.2009), stands for the proposition that a favorable termination must be indicative of actual innocence. While it is true that Kossler does stand for this proposition, it is unclear whether Kossler, which very explicitly limited its holding to the facts of that case, applies with equal force to § 1983 claims that are brought under a claim other than malicious prosecution. See Kossler, 564 F.3d at 187, 192. Assuming without deciding that Kossler does require an indication of actual innocence, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals went on to list six (6) ways in which a plaintiff may indicate his innocence:1) discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, 2) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, 3) the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the prosecutor, 4) the quashing of an indictment or information, 5) acquittal, or 6) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or appellate court. Id. at 187–88 (citing Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir.2002)).
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*5 In the instant case, the adjudications of probation violations that occurred after January 1, 2003 were vacated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order of October 29, 2009. Thus, [plaintiff] was the beneficiary of a final order in favor of the accused by an appellate court, which is one of the terminations of a criminal proceeding that indicates innocence. As [plaintiff] has received a favorable termination of these adjudications, he is not barred by Heck and may bring actions pursuant to § 1983 for any injury arising from the actions taken against him after January 1, 2003.
Clark, 737 F.Supp.2d at 260.
The Court applies the same findings here and will deny defendant Powell’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 conspiracy claims relating to violation of the Belanger plaintiffs’ rights to due process and an impartial tribunal.
However, the Belanger plaintiffs’ substantive due process stemming from interference with the family relationship will be denied. In Wallace v. Powell, which dealt with the same underlying allegations, this Court held that:
It is by now well-settled that the Due Process Clause protects certainly narrowly defined fundamental rights of parents in their relationships with their children.” McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 826 (3d Cir.2003). To sufficiently state a due process claim for interference with the parent-child relationship, a plaintiff must allege deliberate conduct that the defendant sought to harm that relationship. Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist. Of Philadelphia Bd. Of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 192 (3d Cir.2009). In McCurdy, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a parent’s substantive due process claim for interference with the parent-child relationship arising from the fatal shooting of plaintiff’s adult son. McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830. While the court ultimately held that the plaintiff’s claim was barred because the decedent was an adult, the court stated that it was “hesitant to extend the Due Process Clause to cover official actions that were not deliberately directed at the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 829. The court also noted that “it would ... stretch the concept of due process too far if we were to recognize a constitutional violation based upon official actions that were not directed at the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 830. Subsequently in Chambers the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly held that this requirement that defendant’s conduct be deliberately directed at the parent-child relationship also extends to situations involving minor and un-emancipated children. Chambers, 587 F.3d at 192. Applying this requirement to the present case, while Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants deliberately acted to place the Juvenile

Plaintiffs’ into PACC and WPACC, they do not allege that Defendants’ deliberately sought to interfere with the Parent Plaintiffs’ parent-child relationships. While it must be said that placing juveniles into PACC and WPACC would be disruptive to the parent-child relationship, given that the disruption caused by the death of a child is insufficient to create a substantive due process claim for a parent unless the defendant deliberately sought to interfere in the parent-child relationship, the conduct alleged here does not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim will be granted.
*6 No. 3:09–CV–286, 2010 WL 3398995 (M.D.Pa. Aug.24, 2010). For the same reasons, the Court will grant defendant Powell’s motion to dismiss that part of the § 1983 conspiracy claim dealing with the substantive due process interference with familial relations allegations.
B. The § 1985(3) claim The Court will also dismiss the § 1985 claim against defendant Powell because juveniles are not a discrete and insular minority who have historically been subjected to pervasive discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) states:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ... the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
To state a claim under §§ 1985(2) or (3), a plaintiff must allege four things: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). In Magnum v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 253 Fed.Appx. 224 (3d Cir.2007), plaintiffs, alleging sexual abuse by
4

certain Diocesan priests, brought civil RICO claims against the Archdiocese as well as claims under § 1985 and § 1986. The Third Circuit, upholding the district court’s dismissal of the § 1985 claim, held that: “minor children—who have not been recognized as “victims of historically pervasive discrimination” and whose sole classifying characteristic (i.e., their minority) is not immutable—fall outside the ambit of [1985].”
Following Magnum, the Court will grant defendant Powell’s motion to dismiss the Belanger plaintiffs’ § 1985 claim against him.
C. The Punitive Damages Claim The Court will deny defendant Powell’s motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim.
It is clear that in certain circumstances punitive damages may be awarded for violations of civil rights. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1978). The test for determining whether punitive damages should be awarded for civil rights violations is whether Defendants acted with actual knowledge that they were violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard for whether they were doing so. Cochetti, 572 F.2d at 106. In Wallace, the Court denied a similar motion brought by defendants Mericle and Mericle Construction. Here, as in Wallace, defendant Powell argues that the complaint does not allege he acted with actual knowledge that he was violating the plaintiffs’ rights. However, the complaint alleges a quid pro quo whereby Ciavarella and Conahan violated the plaintiffs’ civil rights by unjustly incarcerating them in facilities run by Powell in exchange for cash. These allegations satisfy the “actual knowledge” requirement for punitive damages.
II. MAYS’, PA Child Care’s, and Western PA Child Care’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 927) *7 Similarly, most of the issues in the motion to dismiss filed by MAYS, PA Child Care, and Western PA Child Care have already been ruled on. The punitive damages and juvenile plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims will not be dismissed, but the § 1985 claim and the interference with familial relationships claims will be. Although these defendants argue all claims brought against them should be dismissed because Rimmer and Farmer acknowledge their guilt in the pleadings, the Court finds the second amended complaint ambiguous on this point and will not dismiss the complaint on this ground. The Court will also deny the motion to strike.

III. Sandra Brulo’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 929) Defendant Brulo’s motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part as follows. Again, many of these issues have already been decided by this Court in previous opinions.
A. “Official capacity” claims Plaintiffs have not brought any claims against defendant Brulo in her official capacity. This argument is therefore moot.
B. Quasi-judicial immunity for “personal capacity” claims Defendant Brulo argues she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for actions stemming from her role as Chief Juvenile Probation Officer of Luzerne County.
Absolute immunity is available to government actors that are performed in their “quasi-judicial” role for conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir.1992); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). In determining whether to grant such immunity, courts must take a functional approach, focusing on “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it and evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of that function.” Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F.Supp.2d 543, 552 (M.D.Pa.2007) (quoting Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 78 (3d Cir.2007)), aff’d, 251 Fed.Appx. 743 (3d Cir.2007). However, where a government actor is acting in his or her investigative or administrative capacity, those actions are only protected by qualified immunity, not absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1463. Probation officers enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for participation in the preparation of pre-sentence reports. Stankowski, 487 F.Supp.2d at 552–53.
Regarding this precise issue, this Court has previously held:
In this case, Defendant Brulo is subject to absolute quasi-judicial immunity regarding her actions stemming from her sentencing recommendations. These activities are intimately associated with the
5

judicial phase of the juvenile proceedings; as noted above, there is precedent in this district for holding that such activities are subject to immunity. See id. However, the other actions alleged against Brulo, such as altering drug tests, or conjuring up fake probation violations, were taken in her investigative role as a probation officer. As such, these activities are not subject to quasi-judicial immunity.
*8 Clark, 737 F.Supp.2d 239,259 (M.D.Pa.2010).
Therefore, Brulo’s motion to dismiss will be granted for all her actions regarding sentencing recommendations and denied as to the other activities.
C. Qualified immunity Defendant Brulo argues she is entitled to qualified immunity for plaintiffs’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims. Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit for conduct that does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would be aware. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). This Court has already ruled any reasonable person would know that what she is accused of doing violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Clark, 737 F.Supp.2d at 257. Therefore Brulo is not entitled to qualified immunity for these actions, and the motion to dismiss will be denied on that count.
D. Sovereign immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521 Defendant Brulo argues she is entitled to immunity under 42 Pa. C .S. § 8521. Sovereign immunity is only available to state employees while they are acting within the scope of their duties. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. The probation department is an arm of the state, and its employees are state actors, making them subject to sovereign immunity. See Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir.2008). Conduct of an employee is within the scope of employment when (1) it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform, (2) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits, and (3) the action is prompted, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. Larsen v. State Employees’ Ret. Sys. 553 F.Supp.2d 403, 420

(M.D.Pa.2008).
This Court has already ruled that defendant Brulo is not entitled to sovereign immunity because the alleged acts are not within the scope of her employment:
Altering drug tests, changing recommendations as part of a scheme to ensure the detention of juveniles, and concocting fake probations violations to have juveniles placed in custody are not the type of conduct that juvenile probation officers are hired to perform. As such, the allegations fail to fall within the first prong of the scope of employment test, and, therefore, Defendant Brulo’s actions cannot be shielded by sovereign immunity.
Clark, 737 F.Supp.2d at 258.
Therefore, the Court will deny defendant Brulo’s motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity.
E. Failure to establish actual innocence Defendant Brulo argues that plaintiffs have failed to establish “actual innocence” as required to pursue their § 1983 claims. As mentioned above, this Court has already ruled that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s vacating of the juvenile adjudications involving these plaintiffs meets the “actual innocence” requirement. Brulo additionally argues that plaintiffs Zane Farmer and Joseph Rimmer admit their guilt in their complaint. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds these admissions of “involvement” in the incidents with which they were charged of no consequence.
F. Dismissal of parent plaintiffs’ Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims *9 This Court has previously ruled that the parent plaintiffs cannot use violations of their children’s rights to make out claims that their rights were violated. Id. at 273. The Sixth Amendment provides for a right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that “a person’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (citations omitted). Under the
6

Eighth Amendment, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
Since the parent plaintiffs were not personally involved in any criminal proceedings and have not alleged they were forced to pay excessive fines or bail, the Court will dismiss these claims.
G. Parent plaintiffs Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims for support payments they were required to make Defendant Brulo argues that the parent plaintiff claims stemming from the support payments they were required to make for their children’s incarceration should be dismissed because: (1) the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal employees; (2) there was no “taking” here since parents are required to support their children; (3) these claims are barred under Rooker–Feldman.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal government actors, not state actors like defendant Brulo. Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 719 F.2d 52 (3d Cir.1983).
The United States has “eschewed the development of any set formula for identifying a forbidden “taking” ... and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case.” Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986). In this factual inquiry, three factors have been deemed to have particular significance: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (internal citations omitted).
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is derived from the two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483–84, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine is rooted in the statutory propositions that federal district courts are courts of original, not appellate, jurisdiction and that the United States Supreme Court is the only federal court that has jurisdiction to review final judgments from a state’s highest court. See 28 U.S .C. § 1257(a); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284–85, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Simply put, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine divests a lower federal court of subject matter jurisdiction of an action if the relief

requested would effectively reverse a state court decision or void its ruling. See, e.g., Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir.2006).
*10 For a number of years, many courts in the Third Circuit applied a two-part test in evaluating whether the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applied: (1) if the federal claim was actually litigated in state court prior to the filing of the federal action; or, (2) if the federal claim was “inextricably intertwined” with the state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong. E.g., McClain v. Bank of New York, 2010 WL 1837908, at *2 (E.D.Pa.Apr.29, 2010).
In Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2010), the Third Circuit altered the Rooker–Feldman analysis to be employed by courts in this Circuit. The court instructed the lower courts in this Circuit to cease considering whether the federal claim was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment. Id. at 170 (“The phrase ‘inextricably intertwined’ does not create an additional legal test or expand the scope of Rooker–Feldman” ). The court articulated the following four-part test for dismissal of a federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Rooker–Feldman:
(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court;
(2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment;
(3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and,
(4) the plaintiff is inviting the federal court to review and reject the state judgments.
Id. at 166. The Third Circuit observed that the second and fourth elements of the test are “key to determining whether a federal suit presents an independent, non-barred claim.” Id. Focusing on the second requirement—that the injuries be caused by the state court judgment—the court stated that “when the source of the injury is the defendant’s actions (and not the state court judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court.” Id. at 167.
Here, while the Fifth Amendment claim against defendant Brulo is obviously out, she claims the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim should be out as well because, since the parents were already obliged to support their children, the support payments they were forced to
7

pay as a result of their children’s allegedly illegal incarceration is not a “taking.” This argument lacks merit. The parent plaintiffs had no expectation that their children would be incarcerated in violation of their constitutional rights in order to further a kickback scheme, and additionally, they would have to pay for the privilege. The corrupt nature of these alleged actions further substantiates the view that this was a “taking” and the claims will not be dismissed on this ground. Additionally, Rooker–Feldman does not apply because: (1) the parent plaintiffs’ claim was not previously litigated in state court, (2) they did not lose in state court, (3) the source of the injury is defendant Brulo’s actions, and (4) parent plaintiffs are not asking the court to reject state judgments. Also, the state judgments have been vacated, so there is no worry here of this Court interfering with a state court action or overstepping this Court’s authority.
H. The § 1985(3) and § 1986 claims *11 Defendant Brulo’s motion to dismiss the § 1985(3) and § 1986 claims against her will be granted. As discussed above, the Third Circuit has already held that juveniles fall outside the ambit of § 1985(3). § 1986 states in part that:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act[.]
Therefore, liability under § 1986 presupposes liability under § 1985. Since the § 1985(3) claim is out, so is the § 1986 claim.
I. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) claim Defendant Brulo moves to dismiss the claim for violation of the JJDPA, 42 U.S.C. § 5633. The JJDPA was intended to provide a private right of action only against state or local agencies, not individuals. Doe v. Borough of Clifton Heights, 719 F.Supp. 382, 384 (E.D.Pa.1984). The Court will therefore dismiss this claim.

IV. Motion to dismiss by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, and Todd Vanderheid (Doc. 931) This motion will be granted. In its ruling on plaintiffs’ leave to amend, this Court held that plaintiffs proposed second amended complaint failed to state any claims against Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, and Todd Vanderheid, and denied the motion for leave to amend as to claims against these defendants. (Doc. 840.) However, perhaps misunderstanding the Court’s ruling, plaintiffs submitted their second amended complaint with claims against these defendants. Since, as the Court has already held, plaintiffs have failed to any state claims against these defendants, their motion to dismiss will be granted.
V. Robert Mericle and Mericle Construction’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 932) Defendants Mericle and Mericle Construction’s motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. The majority of the arguments brought in this motion have already been ruled on by the Court. As a result, the interference with familial relationships and § 1985(3) claims will be dismissed, but not the juvenile plaintiffs’ § 1983 or punitive damages claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions to dismiss have been granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
NOW, this 30th day of November, 2011, upon consideration of defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 922, 927, 929, 931, and 932), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(1) Defendant Powell’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 922): The interference with familial relationships and § 1985(3) claims are dismissed. The remaining § 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.
8

*12 (2) MAYS’, PA Child Care’s, and Western PA Child Care’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 927): The interference with familial relationships and § 1985(3) claims are dismissed. The remaining 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.
(3) Sandra Brulo’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 929): The § 1985(3), § 1986, the JDPA, and the parent plaintiffs’ Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed. Defendant Brulo also has quasi-judicial immunity for all claims stemming from her sentencing recommendations. The remaining § 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.
(4) Motion to dismiss by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County,
	  

Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, and Todd Vanderheid (Doc. 931): All claims against these defendants are dismissed.
(5) Robert Mericle and Mericle Construction’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 932): The interference with familial relationships and § 1985(3) claims are dismissed. The remaining § 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.
(6) Motions to dismiss filed prior to the filing of the second amended complaint (Doc. 906–909) are moot.
	  

9

 
 2012 WL 642452 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Florence WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Robert J. POWELL, et al., Defendants. Angela Rimmer Belanger, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Mark A. Ciavarella, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 3:09–cv–286, 3:10–cv–1405. | Feb. 28, 2012.

Mr. Skrepenak, determining that Plaintiffs had failed to state a plausible claim against them. Nevertheless, on May 10, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint that included allegations against the two Defendants. I dismissed the claims against Luzerne County and Mr. Skrepenak on November 30, 2011. On December 16, 2011, the Plaintiffs in Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09–cv–0286, and several Defendants jointly moved for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement.
On December 30, 2011, Plaintiffs filed this motion seeking an entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b) as to the dismissal of the claims against Luzerne County and Mr. Skrepenak. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
*1 Presently before the Court is the Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak, brought by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Joseph Rimmer, Kelly Farmer, and Zane Farmer. Because there is just reason for delay the entry of final judgment, the motion will be denied.

II. Legal Standard
Federal courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions” of federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Ordinarily, an order which terminates fewer than all claims, or claims against fewer than all parties, does not constitute a ‘final’ order for purposes of appeal under 28 U. S.C. § 1291.” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir.1999). Here, Plaintiffs wish to appeal the dismissal of their claims against Defendants Luzerne County and Gregory Skrepenak, but that order was not final for appellate jurisdiction purposes because it did not terminate all claims in the litigation. For this reason, they request that the Court certify those claims as final pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

I. Background
Plaintiffs brought this action against the Defendants on July 7, 2010. Their claims arise out of an alleged conspiracy between private individuals, corporations, state court judges, and county officials to profit from the placement of juveniles in private detention facilities.1 Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 24, 2010, then moved for leave to file a second amended complaint on February 3, 2011. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint a second time in order to provide additional detail to their allegations against Luzerne County, former Luzerne County Commissioner Greg Skrepenak, and Sandra Brulo, the former Deputy Director of Forensic Programs of the Luzerne County Department of Probation.
On April 27, 2011, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint with regard to Luzerne County and

Rule 54(b) creates an “exception to the finality rule.” Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Kali Labs., Inc., Nos. 02– 5707, 04–0886, 06–3533, 2007 WL 1814080, at *2 (D.N.J. Jun.2, 2007). The rule provides that in actions involving multiple parties or more than one claim for relief, “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
*2 In order for Rule 54(b) to apply, a district court must find that “(1) there has been a final judgment on the merits, i.e. an ultimate disposition on a cognizable claim for relief; and (2) there is ‘no just reason for delay.’ “ Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Allis–Chambers Corp. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 363 (3d Cir.1975), overruled on other grounds by Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 6, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980)). When

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1

determining whether there is a “just reason for delay,” a court must balance “considerations of judicial administrative interests (preservation of the federal policy against piecemeal appeals) and equities (justice to the litigants).” Carter, 181 F.3d at 346 (citing Curtiss– Wright, 446 U.S. at 8). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has laid out several factors for consideration:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.
Id. at 203 (citing Allis–Chambers, 521 F.2d at 364). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that a case is appropriate for certification under Rule 54(b). Anthuis v. Colt. Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1003 (3d Cir.1992).
III. Discussion
Plaintiffs move for the entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b) regarding the dismissal of their claims against Defendants Luzerne County and Gregory Skrepenak. The parties do not dispute that the dismissal order was the ultimate disposition of those claims. The only remaining question is whether there is any just reason for delay, and thus an examination of the Rule 54(b) factors is required.

issues or evidence. See, e.g., Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1372 (3d Cir.1994) (reversing Rule 54(b) certification because “the facts underlying the [certified] claim ... may be intertwined with the remaining issues”); Ortho–McNeil, 2007 WL 1814080, at *3 (denying Rule 54(b) certification where the parties, legal issues, and factual issues in claims were similar). Here, Defendants point out that the legal and factual issues in the claim against Luzerne County and Mr. Skrepenak are very similar to the issues in the remaining claims. However, the claim involves different parties and there would be no overlap of evidence because the appellate review would solely examine the sufficiency of the complaint. Thus, this factor is neutral and not dispositive.
B. Possible Mooting in Future *3 Neither party suggests that there may be possible mooting in the future. Therefore, this factor does not form the basis for a just reason for delay.
C. Possible Redundant Review Neither party suggests that there may be redundant review. Therefore, this factor does not form the basis for a just reason for delay.
D. Possible Set–Offs Against Judgment The possibility of set-offs here suggests that delay of review is appropriate. Plaintiffs point out that the other Defendants may be entitled to a set-off against any judgment entered against the County or Mr. Skrepenak if the appellate court reverses the dismissal of the claims against those Defendants. Plaintiffs misconstrue this factor as weighing in their favor, but “the presence of a [claim or] counterclaim, which could result in a set-off against any amounts due and owing to the plaintiff, weighs heavily against the grant of 54(b) certification.” Allis–Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 366. Thus, this factor indicates that there is just reason for delay.

A. Relationship Between Adjudicated and Unadjudicated Claims The relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims in this case does not provide any definitive guidance on whether to grant the motion. Generally, Rule 54(b) certification is disfavored where the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims share the same legal

E. Miscellaneous Factors Concerns regarding delay and impact on the remaining claims caution against entering a final judgment as to the dismissal order. First, allowing piecemeal appellate review would extend the duration of this already lengthy litigation. Second, Defendants point out that appellate review of the dismissal order may sabotage the pending proposed class-wide settlement. There is a “strong judicial

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2

policy in favor of class action settlement,” Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir.2010), and I find that this policy outweighs any need for immediate appeal of the dismissal order. Plaintiffs claim that Rule 54(b) certification would only threaten certain terms of the proposed settlement involving the County and Mr. Skrepenak, and those terms could be removed from the settlement. The proposed settlement was the product of great effort and negotiation, however, and it is possible that interference with any part of it could jeopardize the whole. Therefore, this factor weighs heavily in favor of denying Plaintiffs’ motion.
F. Conclusion A review of the Rule 54(b) factors makes it clear that there are just reasons to delay review of the dismissal order. There is a possibility that there could be a set-off

against any judgment against the County. More importantly, immediate review of the order is counter to judicial interests in preventing protracted litigation, promoting settlement, and avoiding piecemeal review. Based on this, certification of the dismissal order as final under Rule 54(b) is inappropriate.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Final Judgment will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.

Footnotes

1

Several other groups of plaintiffs have filed similar actions based on this alleged conspiracy. See Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09–cv–

0286; Conway v. Conahan, No. 3:09–cv–0291; H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09–cv–0357; Humanik v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09–cv–0630.

These cases were consolidated for discovery purposes on October 26, 2010. The instant motion was brought only by the Belanger

Plaintiffs.

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3

 
 Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 1 of 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, Individually

:

and on behalf of all others similarly situated :

and as the parent of B.W., a minor, on behalf :

of her daughter individually and on behalf of :

all others similarly situated,

:

:

Plaintiffs

:

vs.

:

:

ROBERT J. POWELL,

:

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN,

:

MARK A. CIAVARELLA,

:

PA CHILD CARE, LLC,

:

WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC,

:

ROBERT K. MERICLE,

:

MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

:

GREGORY ZAPPALA,

:

PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC, :

BARBARA CONAHAN and

:

CINDY CIAVARELLA and

:

BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PA, INC., :

VISION HOLDINGS, LLC,

:

JOE DOE, ESQUIRE,

:

MID ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES CORP:

and POWELL LAW GROUP, P.C.,

:

:

:

Defendants

:

CIVIL ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION
NO.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, FLORENCE WALLACE, individually and on behalf of and as representative of the putative class of all similarly situated persons and, on behalf of her daughter, B.W., a minor individually and on behalf of and as representative of the putative

1

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 2 of 35
class of all similarly situated persons, by and through their attorneys, Cefalo & Associates and Caroselli, Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, LLC, by way of Class Action Complaint against the Defendants hereby aver the following:
I. JURISDICTION 1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because this action arises under the laws of the United States and under 28 U.S.C. § 1964(c), because this action alleges violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, et seq. 2. This Court has venue over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) and (c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1965. Upon information and belief, Defendants Powell, Conahan, Ciavarella, PA Child Care, LLC, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Powell Law Group, P.C., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, and Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., reside in this Judicial District. Further, a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims alleged in the Class Action Complaint occurred in this Judicial District.
II. NATURE OF ACTION 3. This is a class action brought against Defendants who while acting under color of law engaged in a pattern and practice to conspire, cooperate, scheme, engage in racketeering activity, violate, and willfully subject the class member to a violation of civil rights all for personal gain and/or profit. 4. It is believed and therefore averred that Defendants conspired one and all to violate the civil rights of Plaintiff and those similarly situated utilizing a widespread and
2

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 3 of 35
persistent practice in the Luzerne County Juvenile Court to deny youths their constitutional right to counsel and violate their individual and collective civil rights through the widespread scheme and subversion of the Luzerne County juvenile justice system. This scheme included but was not limited to violations of the RICO Statute and intended to enrich the defendants at the expense of the putative class members constitutionally protected civil rights.
III. PARTIES 5. Plaintiff FLORENCE WALLACE is an adult individual and the mother of B.W., a minor who resides in Shavertown, Pennsylvania. 6. B.W. is a minor who resides in Shavertown, PA. In and around May, 2007 B.W., then 14 years old was charged with multiple criminal offenses including 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(l) Terroristic Threats. B.W. appeared before Defendant CIAVARELLA in Luzerne County Juvenile Court for an adjudication hearing on a delinquency petition for inter alia a violation of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(l), Terroristic Threats. 7. Defendant ROBERT J. POWELL, hereinafter POWELL, is an adult individual who resides at 10 Fox Run Road Drums, Pennsylvania, and at all times relevant was an owner, officer, shareholder, and operator of Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC., Vision Holdings LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., and Powell Law Group, P.C. 8. Defendant MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, hereinafter CONAHAN, is an adult individual residing at 301 Deer Run Road, Mountain Top, PA was at all times relevant a Judge on the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County and owner, officer, shareholder, operator, and beneficiary of Defendants Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, and Beverage
3

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 4 of 35
Marketing of PA, Inc. 9. Defendant MARK A. CIAVARELLA, hereinafter CIAVARELLA, is an adult
individual residing at 585 Rutter Ave. , Kingston, Pennsylvania and was at all times relevant a Judge on the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County and owner, officer, shareholder, operator, and beneficiary of Defendants Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, and Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc.
10. Defendant PA CHILD CARE, LLC, hereinafter PACC, is a Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company with a registered office address of 520 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 8581, Reading, Pennsylvania.
11. Defendant WESTERN PA CHILD CARE, LLC, hereinafter WPACC, is a Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company with a registered office address of 1105 Berkshire Boulevard, Suite 320, Wyomissing, Pennsylvania.
12. Defendant ROBERT K. MERICLE, hereinafter MERICLE, is an adult individual residing at 100 Baltimore Drive, Wilkes-Barre, PA and was at all times relevant an owner, shareholder, officer, and operator of Mericle Construction, Inc.
13. Defendant MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., hereinafter MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, is a Pennsylvania Close Corporation with a registered office address at 33 Beekman Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
14. Defendant GREGORY ZAPPALA, hereinafter ZAPPALA, is an adult individual residing at1212 Cliffview Drive, Monroebille, PA and was at all times relevant an owner, shareholder, officer, and operator of Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC., and Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp.
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15. Defendant PINNACLE GROUP OF JUPITER, LLC, hereinafter PINNACLE, is a Florida limited liability company with a registered address at 301 Deer Run Drive, Mountain Top, Pennsylvania that was owned and operated by Defendants BARBARA CONAHAN and CINDY CIAVARELLA.
16. Defendant Barbara Conahan is an adult individual and upon information and belief the wife of Defendant Michael Conahan who resides at 301 Deer Run Road, Mountain Top, PA. At all times relevant hereto Defendant Barbara Conahan was either the owner, officer, shareholder, operator and/or beneficiary of Defendant, Pinnacle.
17. Defendant Cindy Ciavarella is an adult individual and upon information and belief the wife of Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella who resides at 585 Rutter Ave. , Kingston, Pennsylvania. At all times relevant hereto Defendant Cindy Ciavarella was either the owner, officer, shareholder, operator and/or beneficiary of Defendant, Pinnacle.
18. Defendant BEVERAGE MARKETING OF PA, INC., hereinafter BEVERAGE, is a Pennsylvania Corporation with a registered address of P.O. Box 17, Pottsville Road, Seltzer, Pennsylvania.
19. Defendant VISION HOLDINGS LLC, hereinafter VISION, is a Cayman Islands Company with a principal address in the Cayman Islands that is unknown at this time, but that was owned and operated by inter alia Defendant POWELL.
20. It is believed and therefore averred that Defendant JOE DOE, ESQUIRE, hereinafter DOE, is an unidentified Schuylkill County attorney and co-conspirator listed in the Federal Criminal Information filed against Defendant Conahan and Defendant Ciavarella in United States District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
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21. Defendant MID ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES CORP., hereinafter MAYS, is a Pennsylvania Corporation with a registered office address at 701 Sathers Drive, Pittston Township, Pennsylvania.
22. Defendant POWELL LAW GROUP, P.C., hereinafter POWELL LAW, is a Pennsylvania Professional Corporation with a registered office address at 10 Fox Run Road, Drums, Pennsylvania.
23. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA were judges of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.
24. Between approximately January of 2002 and January of 2007, Defendant CONAHAN served as President Judge for Luzerne County, and between approximately 1996 and June of 2008, Defendant CIAVARELLA served as Judge of the Juvenile Court for Luzerne County.
25. In approximately January of 2007, Defendant CIAVARELLA was named President Judge for Luzerne County.
26. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants acted through their agents, servants, employees, officers, directors and/or other representatives who are presently known and unknown named individuals.
27. As judges of the Court of Common Pleas, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs and the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to the Judiciary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and were required to file an annual statement of financial interests with the Administrative Office of the
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Pennsylvania Courts, reporting the source of any income, direct or indirect. The Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts maintains offices in Cumberland County, Middle District of Pennsylvania, and Philadelphia County, Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. ACTION OF DEFENDANTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 28. From in or about June 2000, the exact date being unknown to the Plaintiff, to on or about April 30, 2007, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, Defendants, while acting under color of law, engaged in a pattern and practice to conspire, cooperate, scheme, engage in racketeering activity, violate, and willfully subject the Plaintiff and the class to a violation of civil rights. Additionally, Defendants aided and abetted each other and by other persons known and unknown, devised and intended to devise a material scheme and artifice to defraud the juveniles of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Judiciary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to deprive those juveniles of their right to the honest services of CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, as judges of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, performed free from deceit, favoritism, bias, selfenrichment, self-dealing, concealment, and conflict of interest, and within their fiduciary duty. 29. In furtherance of the scheme and artifice to defraud, Defendants CONAHAN, and CIAVARELLA, abused their positions as judges of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County by accepting compensation from Defendants PACC, WPACC, MERICLE, MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, ZAPPALA, PINNACLE, BEVERAGE, VISION, and DOE. 30. Between approximately June of 2000 and January 1, 2007, Defendants
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CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA abused their positions and violated the fiduciary duty they owed to the minor Plaintiff and the class and citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to the Judiciary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by secretly deriving more than $2,600,000 in income, in addition to the compensation to which they were lawfully entitled, in exchange for official actions and anticipated official actions.
31. The actions from which they derived improper income included, but were not limited to: entering into agreements guaranteeing placement of juvenile offenders with Defendant PACC; taking official action to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility; facilitating the construction of juvenile detention facilities and an expansion to one of those facilities by Defendants PACC and WPACC; directing that juvenile offenders be lodged at juvenile detention facilities operated by Defendants PACC and WPACC; summarily granting motions to seal the record and for injunctive relief in a civil case related to Defendant PACC; and, through their actions, assisting Defendants PACC and WPACC to secure agreements with Luzerne County worth tens of millions of dollars for the placement of juvenile offenders, including an agreement in late 2004 worth approximately $58,000,000.
32. The Defendants together employed a number of schemes in an attempt to hide the transfer of the income forwarded to CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, including, but not limited to, causing income to pass through intermediaries including but not limited to some of the defendants herein, and causing false records to be created.
33. The United States Attorney’s filing on January 26, 2009, of a bill of information alleging two counts of fraud against Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., then President
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 9 of 35 Judge in Luzerne County, and former President Judge Michael T. Conahan, also of Luzerne County, United States of America v. Michael T. Conahan and Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., No.
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3:09-LR-028, United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The bill of information, to which both judges have already agreed to plead guilty and serve more than seven years in federal prison, describes, inter alia, a conspiracy among the judges and other unnamed parties believed and averred to be Defendants and others as yet unknown to conceal $2.6 million in payments to the judges from Defendants and others as yet unknown in exchange for referring children who appeared before Defendant CIAVARELLA to these juvenile correctional facilities.
34. It is believed and therefore averred that Defendants one and all participated in a scheme to ensure that a disproportionate number of juveniles, such as Plaintiff and those similarly situated, were incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities owned, operated, and influenced by Defendants.
35. It is believed and therefore averred that Defendants schemed to deprive children, including Plaintiff and those similarly situated, of their constitutional rights.
36. Defendants one and all participated in the payment of approximately $2.6 million to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA in exchange for their influence over Plaintiff and those similarly situated and to disproportionately sentence juveniles in Luzerne County to detention prior to delinquency determinations and after delinquency determinations.
37. The collective actions of Defendants were considered sufficiently suspect for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to exercise King’s Bench Power to appoint a receiving judge to review all juvenile matters in Luzerne County from 2003 until 2008.
38. It is believed and therefore averred that in approximately June of 2000,
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Defendant CIAVARELLA, whose duties then included presiding over juvenile proceedings as a judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, had discussions regarding who was interested in constructing a juvenile detention facility in Luzerne County. Defendant CIAVARELLA was introduced to a contractor, Defendant MERICLE, who was a friend of Defendant CIAVARELLA, for the purpose of locating land for the juvenile facility and for constructing the facility.
39. It is believed and therefore averred that Defendants POWELL and ZAPPALA, doing business as Defendant PACC, acquired land in Luzerne County and entered into an agreement with Defendant MERICLE to construct a juvenile detention center to be operated by Defendant PACC.
40. On or about January 29, 2002, Defendant CONAHAN, acting in his capacity as President Judge of Luzerne County and under the color of law, surreptitiously signed a “Placement Guarantee Agreement” between PACC and the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County to house juvenile offenders at the PACC facility. The “Placement Guarantee Agreement” provided that the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County would pay PACC the annual “Rental Installment” sum of $1,314,000 and stipulated that “[t]he obligation of the Court to make payment of the Rental Installments shall be absolute and unconditional.”
41. In or about December 2002, Defendant CONAHAN, acting in his capacity as President Judge of Luzerne County, took official action to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility.
42. In or before January of 2003, Defendant CONAHAN and Defendant CIAVARELLA arranged to receive a payment in the amount of $997,600 in connection with
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the roles they played as judges in accomplishing the construction of Defendant PACC juvenile detention facility.
43. In order to conceal the $997,600 payment to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, POWELL and MERICLE signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by MERICLE and backdated to February 19, 2002, which purported to be an agreement for MERICLE to pay a broker’s fee of $997,600 to POWELL. In fact, however, a large portion of the money was intended to be paid to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
44. Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA engaged in a series of financial transactions, over time, designed to conceal the $997,600 payment made to them. On January 21, 2003, $610,000 was wire-transferred by Defendant MERICLE to an attorney trust account of an attorney, namely Defendant DOE. The remaining $387,600 was wiretransferred by Defendant MERICLE to a bank account under the control of POWELL.
45. Thereafter, on January 28, 2003, the $610,000 in the DOE attorney trust account was wire-transferred to a bank account of Defendant BEVERAGE, a business entity controlled by Defendant CONAHAN.
46. In a series of financial transactions thereafter, a portion of the $610,000 payment was passed from Defendant CONAHAN to Defendant CIAVARELLA; for example, on or about January 28, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN directed that $330,000 of the $610,000 be wire-transferred to a bank account controlled by Defendant CIAVARELLA; on or about April 30, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN directed that an additional $75,000 of the $610,000 be wire-transferred to a bank account controlled by Defendant CIAVARELLA; on
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or about July 15, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN directed that an additional $75,000 of the $610,000 be wire-transferred to a bank account under the control of Defendant CIAVARELLA; on or about August 13, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN directed that an additional $25,000 of the $610,000 be wire-transferred to a bank account under the control of a third party; and on or about August 20, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN directed that an additional $105,000 of the $610,000 be transferred to a bank account under the control of Defendant CONAHAN.
47. To conceal the payments to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, Defendant CONAHAN directed that false entries be made in the books and records of Defendant BEVERAGE.
48. To further conceal the $997,600 payment made to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, a portion of the $387,600 wire transfer made by Defendant MERICLE to POWELL on January 28, 2003, was paid to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA in a series of financial transactions which occurred over time. One of those transactions occurred on or about August 29, 2003, when a check in the amount of $326,000, drawn on a bank account under the control of Defendant POWELL, was deposited into a bank account maintained in the name of another person but under the control of Defendant CONAHAN.
49. Due to the success of the juvenile detention facility operated in Luzerne County, Defendants POWELL and ZAPPALA and his partner, doing business as Defendant WPACC, constructed a juvenile detention facility in western Pennsylvania. Defendant MERICLE, the same contractor who built the facility in Luzerne County, was employed to
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construct the WPACC facility. In July of 2005, upon completion of construction, a $1,000,000 payment was made to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA by POWELL. To conceal the payment, it was made to Defendant PINNACLE, a business entity owned by other persons but controlled by Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
50. In order to conceal the payment to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, POWELL and MERICLE signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by MERICLE, which purported to be an agreement for MERICLE to pay a broker’s fee of $1,000,000 to POWELL. In fact, however, the money was wiretransferred by MERICLE to a bank account of PINNACLE, a business entity owned by other persons but controlled by CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
51. It is believed and therefore averred that Defendant POWELL and his partner, Defendant ZAPALLA, doing business as PACC, constructed an addition to the juvenile detention facility in Luzerne County. Defendant MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, the same contractor who built the facility, was employed to complete the expansion project and, in February of 2006, upon completion of construction of the addition, a $150,000 payment was made to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA. To conceal the payment, it was made to Defendant PINNACLE, a business entity owned by other persons but controlled by Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
52. In order to conceal the payment to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, Defendants POWELL and MERICLE signed a written “Registration and Commission Agreement” prepared by Defendant MERICLE. which purported to be an agreement for the MERICLE to pay a broker’s fee of $150,000 to POWELL. In fact,
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however, the money was wire-transferred by MERICLE to a bank account of Defendant PINNACLE, a business entity owned by other persons but controlled by Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA.
53. In approximately February of 2003, when construction of the PACC juvenile detention facility was completed, Defendant CIAVARELLA, in his capacity as a juvenile court judge, began directing that youthful offenders be sent to that facility. Between approximately February of 2003 and January 1, 2007, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA received from POWELL hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments for their past and future official actions relating to PACC and WPACC and took steps to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the money paid by POWELL.
54. Some of the payments were made by checks drawn on one or more bank accounts under the control of Defendant POWELL and were made payable to Defendant PINNACLE. The payments included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following:
$18,000 paid on or about January 13, 2004; $52,000 paid on or about January 13, 2004; $78,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $75,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $47,000 paid on or about February 15, 2004; $75,000 paid on or about April 30, 2004; and $25,000 paid on or about April 30, 2004. 55. To conceal the payments to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, Defendant POWELL made false notations on the checks and Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA directed that false entries be made in the books and records of Defendant PINNACLE.
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56. In addition to payments by check, some of the payments were made by wire transfers made from one or more bank accounts under the control of Defendant POWELL and were transferred to an account under the control of the Defendant PINNACLE. The payments included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following: $120,000 transferred on July 12, 2004; and $100,000 transferred on September 23, 2004.
57. In order to conceal the more than $2,600,000 in unlawful payments they received, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA knowingly and intentionally filed materially false annual statements of financial interests with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts in which they failed to disclose the source of these payments and in which they failed to disclose their financial relationship with Defendants POWELL, MERICLE, MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, PACC, and WPACC, all of which were material matters.
58. At all times material to this information, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA were elected judges of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County and, as such, were public officials. Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA owed a fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff and the class and to the public not to realize personal financial gain through their office other than compensation provided by law, to refrain from conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest or that constitutes seeking or accepting improper influence, to recuse themselves from matters in which they have a conflict of interest, and to file a truthful and complete annual statements of financial interests, reporting the sources of all income, direct or indirect.
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59. One source of the fiduciary duty owed by Defendants was imposed by constitutional law, including Article 5, §§17(b) and 17(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
60. Another source, among others, of the fiduciary duty owed by Defendants, independent of statutory law, arose from Defendants’ positions as judges of the Court of Common Pleas, including requirements of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct and Administrative Orders of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding matters related to Judges of the Court of Common Pleas.
61. Part of the fiduciary duty owed by Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA included the duty arising from their positions as judges to disclose material information affecting their ability to engage in impartial decision-making. Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA breached this duty.
62. It was a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA knowingly and intentionally filed materially false annual statements of financial interests with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts in which they failed to disclose the source of income they received and in which they failed to disclose their financial relationship with POWELL, MERICLE, MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, PACC, and WPACC, which were material matters.
63. Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA made materially false filings with the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts.
64. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, acting on behalf of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County in matters in which they had discretionary decision-making authority,
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knowingly and intentionally issued written, oral, and wire communications which were materially false to the extent that Defendants did not disclose their conflict of interest and their financial relationship with POWELL, MERICLE, MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, PACC, and WPACC, which were material matters.
65. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, acting on behalf of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County in matters in which they had discretionary decision-making authority, knowingly and intentionally issued reports and statements to the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts which were materially false to the extent that Defendants did not disclose their sources of income and their financial relationship with POWELL, MERICLE, MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, PACC and WPACC, which were material matters.
66. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that Defendant CONAHAN entered into agreements guaranteeing placement of juvenile offenders with PACC and took official action to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility, effectively closing a county-run youth detention center. Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, through their actions, facilitated the construction of juvenile detention facilities and an expansion to one of those facilities by Defendants PACC and WPACC and directed that juvenile offenders be lodged at juvenile detention facilities operated by PACC and WPACC. Through their actions, Defendants assisted PACC and WPACC to secure agreements with Luzerne County worth tens of millions of dollars for the placement of juvenile offenders, including an agreement in late 2004 worth approximately $58,000,000. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to
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defraud and conspire to violate the civil rights of Plaintiffs that, on numerous occasions, accused juvenile offenders, including Plaintiffs, were ordered detained by Defendant CIAVARELLA even when Juvenile Probation Officers did not recommend detention. Defendant CIAVARELLA, and others operating at his behest, also exerted pressure on staff of the Court of Common Pleas to recommend detention of juvenile offenders. On some occasions, probation officers were pressured to change recommendations of release to recommendations of detention. The foregoing actions, as well as other actions, were all part of a scheme of Defendants which Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA directed related to matters in which they had discretionary decision-making authority. Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA took these actions, and other actions, without recusing themselves from matters in which they had a conflict of interest, and without disclosing to parties involved in court proceedings their conflict of interest and the financial relationship that existed between Defendants and POWELL, MERICLE, MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, PACC, and WPACC, which were material matters.
67. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA violated their duties of independence, impartiality and integrity in the exercise of their discretionary actions on behalf of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County by failing to recuse themselves from acting in matters in which they had a material conflict of interest and in failing to disclose to parties appearing before the court their conflict of interest and their financial relationship with POWELL, MERICLE, MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, PACC, and WPACC, which were material matters.
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68. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to violate the civil rights of Plaintiff and the class that Defendant CIAVARELLA utilized administrative powers to adopt procedures in juvenile court, including procedures adopted for a ‘“specialty court.” The adoption of these procedures was accomplished through the administrative discretionary decision-making authority of Defendant CIAVARELLA. The adoption of these procedures created the potential for an increased number of juvenile offenders to be sent to the juvenile detention facilities of PACC and WPACC. Defendant CIAVARELLA took these actions without disclosing to the parties before the court his conflict of interest and the financial relationship that existed between the Defendants.
69. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to violate the civil rights of Plaintiffs that Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA otherwise conducted the affairs of the Court of Common Pleas in matters in which they had discretionary decision-making authority without disclosing their conflict of interest and financial relationship with other Defendants.
70. On or about each date listed below, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, aided and abetted by each other, for the purpose of executing the above-described material scheme and artifice to defraud and deprive the citizens of Luzerne County and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of their right to the honest services of Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, transmitted and caused to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, the following writings, signals, and sounds: in violation of Title 18, United States Code, §§2, 1341, and 1346:
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Date July 12, 2004

Wire Transmission Electronic funds transfer of $120,000 transferred from an account of Vision Holdings, Inc., to an account of the Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC.

September 23, 2004 Electronic funds transfer of $100,000 transferred from an account of Vision Holdings, Inc., to an account of Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC.

July 15, 2005

Electronic funds transfer of $1,000,000 transferred from an account of Mericle Construction, Inc., to an account of Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC.

February 3, 2006

Electronic funds transfer of $150,000 transferred from an account of Mericle Construction, Inc. to an account of Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC.

71. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect the objects thereof, the
following overt acts, among others, were committed by Defendants in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania and elsewhere:
A. On or about January 21, 2003, Defendants caused MERICLE and/or MERCILE CONSTRUCTION to wire-transfer $610,000 to the bank account of an attorney;
B. On or about January 28, 2003, Defendants caused John Doe attorney in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania to wire-transfer $610,000 to an account of BEVERAGE;
C. On or about January 28, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN caused $330,000 to be wire-transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE to a bank account under the control of Defendant CIAVARELLA;
D. On or about April 30, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN caused $75,000 to be wire-transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE to a bank account under the control of Defendant CIAVARELLA;

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E. On or about July 15, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN caused $75,000 to be wire-transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE to a bank account under the control of Defendant CIAVARELLA;
F. On or about August 13, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN caused $25,000 to be wire-transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE to a bank account under the control of a third party;
G. On or about August 13, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN caused $25,000 to be wire-transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE to a bank account under the control of a third party;
H. On or about August 20, 2003, Defendant CONAHAN caused $105,000 to be wire-transferred from a bank account of BEVERAGE to a bank account under the control of Defendant CONAHAN;
I. To conceal the payments to Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA, Defendant CONAHAN directed that false entries be made in the books and records of BEVERAGE between on or about January 1, 2002, and on or about April 15, 2007;
J. On or about January 20, 2004, Defendants caused $18,000 to be deposited in a bank account of PINNACLE which was falsely characterized as “Rent Prepay”;
K. On or about January 20, 2004, Defendants caused $52,000.00 to be deposited in a bank account of PINNACLE which was falsely characterized as “Rent Marine Prepay”;
L. On or about February 24, 2004, Defendants caused $47,000 to be deposited into a bank account of PINNACLE which was falsely characterized as “Slip Rental Fees”;
M. On or about February 24, 2004, Defendants caused $78,000 to be deposited into a bank account of PINNACLE which was falsely characterized as “Reserving Lease”;
N. On or about February 24, 2004, Defendants caused $75,000 to be deposited into a bank account of PINNACLE which was falsely characterized as “Rental Feb, Mar, Apr”;
O. On or about May 3, 2004, Defendants caused $75,000 to be deposited into a bank account of PINNACLE which was falsely characterized
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as “Lease Expenses April May June”; P. On or about May 3, 2004, Defendants caused $25,000 to be
deposited into a bank account of PINNACLE which was falsely characterized as “Dock Expenses Related April May June”;
Q. On or about July 12, 2004, Defendants caused $120,000 to be wire-transferred to a bank account of PINNACLE;
R. On or about September 23, 2004, Defendants caused $100,000 to be wire-transferred to a bank account of PINNACLE;
S. On or about July 15, 2005, Defendants caused $1,000,000 to be wire-transferred to a bank account of PINNACLE;
T. On or about February 3, 2006, Defendants caused $150,000 to be wire-transferred to a bank account of PINNACLE;
U. Between on or about January 1, 2002, and on or about April 15, 2007, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA provided information to their respective tax return preparers that contained material omissions and misclassifications;
V. Between on or about April 15, 2004, and on or about May 21, 2007, Defendants CONAHAN and CIAVARELLA caused to be prepared, subscribed to, and filed with the Internal Revenue Service, materially false tax returns, namely, IRS forms 1040 and 1040X relating to tax years 2003 through 2006; B. The Case of B.W. 72. In May, 2007, B.W. was questioned by Swoyersville Police regarding an argument that took place on Myspace.com, an internet chat web site, between her and another individual. 73. As a result of the investigation regarding the Myspace.com argument, B.W., then 14 years old, was charged with multiple criminal offenses including 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(l) Terroristic Threats.
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74. B.W. had no prior contact with law enforcement. 75. B.W. appeared before Defendant CIAVARELLA in Luzerne County Juvenile Court for an adjudication hearing on a delinquency petition for inter alia a violation of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(l), Terroristic Threats. 76. Prior to appearing before Defendant CIAVARELLA, B.W. was persuaded, without the advice of counsel, to admit guilt in front of Defendant CIAVARELLA. 77. B.W. was not advised about her right to counsel and was told outside the courtroom that if she admitted guilt she was to receive 3-6 months of probation. If she did not admit guilt, she would be held until she was 18 years old and the judge would be a lot harder on her. 78. At the adjudication hearing, and having admitted to the Myspace chat, B.W. was found delinquent and removed from court in shackles. B.W. was transported to Camp Adams, as no beds were available in Defendant PACC. A psychological evaluation was also to be scheduled. 79. Plaintiff Florence Wallace was told to “shut up or be held in contempt” when she attempted to speak during the proceedings to indicate that she and her daughter were told that B.W. would be receiving probation for an admission and returned home. 80. B.W. became hysterical upon learning that she would be incarcerated pending a psychological evaluation. B.W. experienced severe anxiety and chest pain which threatened an underlying heart condition. As B.W. was led from the courtroom by sheriffs, her mother was told that her heart condition would be “taken care of”. 81. Plaintiff Florence Wallace contacted her previous medical providers to hastily
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arrange the facsimile of her medical records to Camp Adams. 82. Thereafter it is believed and therefore averred that B.W.’s psychological
evaluation was delayed as she was transferred back to Defendant PACC’s facility. 83. B.W. was forced to be incarcerated in Defendant PACC’s facility
unnecessarily awaiting a psychological evaluation that was delayed by transfers from Camp Adams to Defendant PACC’s facility.
84. At the conclusion of the psychological evaluation it is believed and therefore averred that probation rather than incarceration was recommended.
85. Additionally, B.W. was required to seek drug and alcohol counseling as a “preventative measure”, although no drugs or alcohol were included in the criminal accusations.
B. USE OF THE MAILS AND WIRES 86. During the Class Period, Defendants used numerous mail and interstate wire communications to create, execute and manage their fraudulent scheme, as described above. 87. Defendants’ use of the mails and wires to execute their fraud involved transfers of funds as described above, communication with plaintiffs and the classes, and communications throughout the class period, via email, telephone, sent through the U.S. mails and over the internet including communications concerning the fraudulent scheme to deprive juvenile offenders of their basic civil rights. B. CONSPIRACY AND CONCERT OF ACTION 88. Defendants entered into and through various overt acts described above an agreement between themselves to illegally deprive juvenile defenders of their basic civil
25

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 26 of 35
rights for their own personal enrichment and profit. Defendants implemented said agreement and conspiracy, in concert of action, and each aiding and abetting the other, such that defendants are jointly and severally liable for the resulting damages to plaintiffs.
E. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 89. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(1)(B) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of themselves, and the following Classes, defined as follows: a) All minors that were the subject of delinquency proceedings in the Luzerne
County Juvenile Court from June 1, 2000 through January 26, 2009 (the Class Period), and were the subject of a proceeding presided over by either Defendants CIAVARELLA or CONAHAN; and were adjudicated delinquent and/or referred for placement or testing at juvenile detention facilities owned and/or operated by Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Vision Holdings LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp.; and, b) All adult individuals who were the parents and/or guardians of class member minors that were charged or caused to be charged fees, costs, or expenses in connection with psychologist testing and/or placement at juvenile detention facilities owned and/or operated by Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Vision Holdings LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., as a result of the decisions rendered by Defendants CIAVARELLA and/or CONAHAN against the minor class member. 90. Plaintiffs reserve the right herein to define other classes and/or subclasses in their Motion for Class Certification. Excluded from the classes are (a) Defendants and any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest, and their legal representatives, officers, directors, assignees and successors, and (b) any co-conspirators. Also excluded from the classes are any Judge or Justice to whom this action is assigned, together with any relative of such Judge or Justice within the third degree of relationship, and the spouse of any such person.
26

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 27 of 35
91. The members of the above classes are so numerous that joinder of all members in impracticable, as required by Rule 23(a)(1). The disposition of the claims of the members of the classes in a single class action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court.
92. The exact number of class members is presently unknown, and can only be ascertained by examining the financial and administrative records of Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Vision Holdings LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., as well as the available records and decisions of Defendants CIAVARELLA and CONAHAN. Upon information and belief, however, the number of minor class members, and adult class members number well into the hundreds of victims.
93. The claims of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the classes they seek to represent, as required by Rule 23(a), in that minor B.W. was the subject of a juvenile proceeding presided over by Defendant CIAVARELLA within the class period, and was referred for placement and testing at the juvenile detention facility owned and operate by Defendant PACC. Additionally, Florence Wallace is the parent of B.W., and incurred monetary losses as a result of the decision rendered by Defendant CIAVARELLA regarding her daughter, B.W.
94. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the respective classes, and protect the interests of the members of the classes. The named Plaintiffs are members of the respective classes, and have retained competent counsel, experienced in class action litigation. Neither of the named Plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with the interests of the other members of the class.
27

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 28 of 35
95. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the classes and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the classes. Among the common questions of law and fact common to the classes are:
a) Whether Defendants participated in and pursued the common course of conduct alleged herein;
b) Whether Defendants engaged in ‘racketeering activity” as defined by RICO § 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 and made unlawful under RICO § 1962, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, including whether Defendants employed the mails and wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud Plaintiffs and members of the classes;
c) Whether Defendants improperly adjudicated minor class members by referring them for placement or testing at juvenile detention facilities owned and/or operated by Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Vision Holdings LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp. for profit and/or financial benefit;
d) Whether Defendants’ participated in and pursued a common course of conduct that resulted in the violation of the civil rights of minor class members; and,
e) Whether Plaintiffs and the members of the classes have sustained damages, and, if so, the appropriate measure thereof.
96. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs, and members of the classes have suffered economic harm and damages as a result of Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that is conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency, and efficiency of adjudication.
28

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 29 of 35
CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I
For Violation fo RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq by The Class 97. Plaintiffs and the Class incorporate by reference herein all preceding and succeeding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) who conducted affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 99. There is the association-in fact of all Defendants for the purpose of constructing juvenile detention centers, ordering juveniles to be placed in those centers in violation of their basic civil rights for defendants’ own enrichment and profit as an “enterprise” within the definition of RICO. (the “Association-In-Fact Enterprise”) the Association-In-Fact Enterprise was created, controlled and conducted by all defendants for the purposes hereinbefore described. All defendants are defendants for purposes of the Association-in-Fact Enterprise. 100. All defendants have exerted ongoing and continuous control over the Association-In-Fact Enterprise, and the have participated in the operation or management of the affairs of the Association-In-Fact Enterprise as described in great detail above. 101. Defendants have conducted the affairs of the Association-In-Fact Enterprise, through a pattern of racketeering activity that includes predicate acts indictable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud) and 1343 (wire fraud), through the structuring of the payments
29

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 30 of 35
described above to the defendants and through the following actions, among others, as is set forth above:
A. Entering into agreements guaranteeing placement of juvenile offenders with PACC;
B. Taking official action to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget for the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility;
C. Facilitating the construction of juvenile detention facilities and an expansion to one of those facilities by PACC and WPACC;
D. Directing that juvenile offenders be lodged at juvenile detention facilities operated by PACC and WPACC; and
E. Assisting PACC and WPACC to secure agreements with Luzerne County worth tens of millions of dollars for the placement of juvenile offenders, including an agreement in late 2004 worth approximately $58,000,000.
102. Each of the Defendants’ fraudulent mailings and interstate wire transmissions constitutes “racketeering activity” with the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Collectively these violations are a “pattern of racketeering activity” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
103. Defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity intending to defraud adult plaintiffs and the adult class and deny the minor Plaintiff and the minor class of their liberty.
104. Defendants’ criminal acts of racketeering had the same pattern and similar purposes. Each such racketeering activity was related, had similar purposes, involved the same or similar participants and methods of commission, and had similar results affecting similar victims including adult Plaintiffs and members of the adult
30

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 31 of 35
class. Defendants’ fraudulent activities are part of their ongoing business and constitute a continuing threat to the property of adult Plaintiffs and the adult Class members.
105. Defendants were an association of individuals, partnerships, and corporations joined in purpose of conspiring to commit honest services fraud. The association employed a number of schemes in an attempt to hide the income they received including, but not limited to, causing income to pass through intermediaries and causing false records to be created, thereby hiding said income from the United States Internal Revenue Service.
106. Defendants were organized in a consensual decision-making manner in which to hide and distribute the monies among the conspirators.
107. Defendants engaged in said association and actions during the entire class period, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1961.
108. As a result of Defendants’ violations of RICO, Plaintiffs had wages garnished, public assistance monies taken, social security benefits seized, and were otherwise forced to pay for the wrongful incarceration of the juvenile offenders.
109. Adult Plaintiff and members of the adult class’ injuries to their business and property were directly and proximately caused by Defendants’ racketeering activity as described above.
110. By virtue of these violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) Defendants are jointly and severally liable to adult Plaintiff and members of the adult class for three times the damages adult plaintiff and members of the adult class have sustained, plus the costs of this suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
31

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 32 of 35
WHEREFORE, adult Plaintiff, Florence Wallace and Adult Class Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants, individually, jointly, and/or jointly and severally for compensatory and treble damages in an amount in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees and such other relief and such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem appropriate.
COUNT II FOR CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE RICO 110. Adult Plaintiff and the adult class incorporate by refrence herein all preceeding and succeeding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 112. Defendants conspired with one another to commit the violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962 alleged herein. WHEREFORE, adult Plaintiff, Florence Wallace and Adult Class Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants, individually, jointly, and/or jointly and severally for compensatory and treble damages in an amount in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees and such other relief and such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem appropriate.
COUNT III DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871, 42 U.S.C § 1983 AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS ON BEHALF OF ALL MINOR PLAINTIFF and
MINOR CLASS 113. Plaintiffs and the classes incorporate by reference all preceding and succeeding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
32

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 33 of 35

114. At all times relevant hereto, all above named Defendants were “persons”

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

115. At all times relevant hereto, all above named Defendants were acting “under

color of state law” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

116. All the named Defendants, while acting under the color of state law,

unlawfully, and/or intentionally, unreasonably, willfully, maliciously, and/or with deliberate

and/or reckless indifference to the minor Plaintiff and all minor class Plaintiffs’ rights

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and deprived minor Plaintiff, B.W., and all minor class Plaintiffs

their rights a guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution, similar provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Federal Law, State

Law and/or local law in that these Defendants without lawful basis caused the

aforementioned injures and damages to the minor Plaintiff, and all minor class Plaintiffs as

describe in the Class Action Complaint, in violation of their aforesaid guaranteed rights as

follows:

(ggggg)

Defendants conspired to adjudicate juvenile offenders as delinquent

without assistance of counsel;

(hhhhh)

Defendants conspired to adjudicate juvenile offenders as delinquents

without the due process of law;

(iiiii) Defendants improperly ordered minor Plaintiff and minor class Plaintiffs to

detention centers owned and/or operated by Defendants PACC and/or

WPACC;

(jjjjj) Defendants conspired to interfere with the juvenile probation department’s

33

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 34 of 35
ability to recommend probation over detention; and ( ) Defendants conspired to negotiate and collect monies for the use of detention
centers owned and/or operated by Defendants PACC and/or WPACC. 117. Defendants’ aforesaid conduct, initiated under color of state law, unlawfully, and/or intentionally, unreasonably, willfully, maliciously, and/or with deliberate and/or reckless indifference violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and deprived minor Plaintiff and minor class Plaintiffs their rights as guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, similar provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Federal Law, State Law and/or local law without lawful basis, thus causing injuries and damages to minor Plaintiff and minor class Plaintiffs. 118. By reason of the aforesaid actions and inactions of Defendants, minor Plaintiff and minor class Plaintiffs suffered substantial injuries, damages and special damages. WHEREFORE, minor Plaintiff, B.W., by Florence Wallace, parent and natural guardian, and minor class Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants, individually, jointly, and/or jointly and severally for compensatory and punitive damages in an amount in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees and such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem appropriate.
34

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1 Filed 02/13/09 Page 35 of 35
CEFALO & ASSOCIATES By: Michael J. Cefalo, Esquire
MICHAEL J. CEFALO, ESQUIRE GEORGE G. OSCHAL III, ESQUIRE KARL J. KWAK, ESQUIRE LINDA L. BARTLETT, ESQUIRE PATRICIA K. HARRIS, ESQUIRE JAMES J. ALBERT, ESQUIRE 309 WYOMING AVENUE WEST PITTSTON, PA 18643 T: (570) 655-5555 F: (570) 655-5100
WILLIAM R. CAROSELLI, ESQUIRE TIMOTHY CONBOY, ESQUIRE CAROSELLI BEACHLER MCTIERNAN & CONBOY 20 STANWIX STREET, 7TH FLOOR PITTSBURGH, PA 19522 T: (412) 391-9860 F: (412) 391-7453
DAVID S. SENOFF, ESQUIRE CAROSELLI BEACHLER MCTIERNAN & CONBOY 1500 WALNUT STREET, SUITE 507 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 T: (215) 609-1350 F: (215) 609-1351
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASSES
35

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v.

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAUL CLARK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

***************************************************************************************************** IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WAYNE DAWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-2535 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

***************************************************************************************************** 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-1405

v. MARK A. CIAVARELLA, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM Presently before the Court is the Motion for Class Certification as to All Issues of Defendants’ Liability to Plaintiffs (Doc. 1319) filed by Plaintiffs in H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 090357, and Conway v. Conahan, No. 09-0291 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) of Classes and Subclasses as to Defendants’ liability on Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d), and wrongful imprisonment claims. Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp., and Mark Ciavarella oppose Plaintiffs’ request for class certification. Particularly, moving Defendants assert that certification of the proposed Classes is improper because Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the threshold requirements for certification under Rule 23(a) or the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Defendants further contend that too many individualized issues exist as to each class member to permit certification of the liability only Classes under Rule 23(c)(4). Lastly, Provider Defendants maintain that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, - - - U.S. - - -, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), prohibits certification of liability only classes. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ motion will be

3

granted and the proposed Classes and Subclasses will be certified. I. Background1
A. Factual Background This civil action arises out of the alleged conspiracy related to the construction of two
juvenile detention facilities, and subsequent detainment of juveniles in these facilities, orchestrated by two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”). The juvenile detention facilities, PA Child Care (“PACC”) and Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”), were both constructed by Mericle Construction, Inc. Plaintiffs in this action, juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella, seek redress from the former judges, as well as the individuals and business entities involved in the construction and operation of these facilities, for the alleged unlawful conspiracy and resulting deprivations of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights.
As set forth in the Master Complaint for Class Actions, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conspiracy to violate § 1983; violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d) (“RICO”); and state-law false imprisonment against the following: Ciavarella and Conahan;2 two entities controlled by Ciavarella and Conahan (Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, and Beverage

1

As the facts underlying this litigation have been recited at length on numerous

occasions, see, e.g., Wallace v. Powell, No. 09-cv-286, 2012 WL 5379153 (M.D.

Pa. Oct. 31, 2012); Wallace v. Powell, No. 09-cv-286, 2012 WL 2590150 (M.D.

Pa. July 3, 2012); Wallace v. Powell, No. 09-cv-286, 2009 WL 4051974 (M.D.

Pa. Nov. 20, 2009), only those facts necessary for the resolution of the instant

motion will be repeated herein.

2

With respect to the claims against Ciavarella and Conahan, while the former

judges are afforded judicial immunity for their “courtroom acts,” no such

protection is provided for their “non-judicial acts.” Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974.

4

Marketing of PA, Inc.);3 PACC, WPACC, and Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp. (“MAYS”) (collectively, “Provider Defendants”); Robert J. Powell; and Vision Holdings, LLC, an entity controlled by Powell that was a member of both PACC and WPACC (collectively, “remaining Defendants” or “Defendants”).4 The current claims against the remaining Defendants in the Master Complaint are: (a) Count I- violation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Ciavarella and Conahan only; (b) Count IIconspiracy to violate Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all remaining Defendants; (c) Count III- violation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to counsel and/or a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Ciavarella only; (d) Count IV- conspiracy to violate Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to counsel and/or a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all remaining Defendants; (e) Count V- violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), against Ciavarella, Conahan, Powell, Vision Holdings, Beverage Marketing, and Pinnacle Group only; (f) Count VII- conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), against all remaining Defendants; and (g) Count IX- wrongful imprisonment against Powell and Provider Defendants only. (Doc. 136.)5

3

Defaults have been entered against Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc. (Doc. 301),

and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC. (Doc. 467.)

4

Class Plaintiffs also asserted claims against Gregory Zappala, Cindy Ciavarella,

Barbara Conahan, Robert Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., and Luzerne

County. (Doc. 136, ¶¶ 164-168, 175.) The claims against these defendants have

all been dismissed or resolved by agreement of the parties.

5

Count VI, which asserted a RICO claim under § 1962(b), was withdrawn by

Plaintiffs. See Wallace, 2010 WL 3398995, at *9 n.7. And, the claim in Count

VIII no longer remains in this action as it was asserted solely against Luzerne

County. See Wallace, 2010 WL 2746394, at *2-3.

5

B. Class Certification Motion
On February 1, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. (Doc. 1319.)
Plaintiffs seek class certification of all issues as to Defendants’ liability pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4). Plaintiffs propose the following Classes and
Subclasses for certification:
Class A
Violations of Right to Impartial Tribunal
All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008, whose adjudications were vacated, expunged, and dismissed with prejudice by orders of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dated October 29, 2009 or March 29, 2010. See in re Expungement of Juvenile Records and Vacatur of Luzerne County Juvenile Court Consent Decrees or Adjudications from 2003-2008, No. 81-MM-2008 (Pa.)
Subclass A.1
Violations of Right to Counsel and/or Colloquy
All children in Class A who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella without counsel and/or without colloquies on the record that informed them of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, before either waiving counsel and/or pleading guilty, during the time between 2003 and May 2008.
Subclass A.2
False Imprisonment
All children in Class A who were referred to placement at PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008.
Class B
Violations of RICO Act
All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their adjudications and/or placements during the time period between 2003 and May 2008, as well as all children’s parents or guardians who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their children’s adjudications and/or placements during the same time period.
(Doc. 1320, 12-14.)
6

Class A includes approximately 2,421 juveniles, and is represented by Paige Cicardo, Elizabeth Habel, Angelia Karsko, H.T., Jessica Van Reeth, Dezare Dunbar, and Alexandra Fahey. (Id. at 12.) Subclass A.1 includes at least 1,855 juveniles. Subclass A.1 is represented by Paige Cicardo, H.T., and Jessica Van Reeth. (Id. at 13.) Subclass A.2, represented by Paige Cicardo, Elizabeth Habel, and Angelia Karsko, contains approximately 1,442 juveniles. (Id. at 14.) Class B, estimated by Plaintiffs to be comprised of over 2,400 juveniles and parents, is represented by Elizabeth Habel and Jack Van Reeth. (Id. at 14.)
On March 1, 2013, Provider Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.6 First, Provider Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ calculation of the size of the Classes, and assert that there “are no more than 1,787 actual class members, and as many as 535 have opted out.” (Doc. 1345, 6.)7 Second, Provider Defendants contend that Rule 23(c)(4) does not allow for certification of liability only classes in this case, which they claim is also supported by Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, - - U.S. - - -, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). Third, Provider Defendants argue that the Classes and Subclasses cannot be certified because Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
On April 30, 2013, oral argument was held on the motion for class certification. The motion is now ripe for disposition.

6

Ciavarella joined Provider Defendants’ opposition to the request for class

certification. (Doc. 1374.)

7

Plaintiffs contend that Provider Defendants’ assertion is inaccurate based on

Juvenile Probation’s records that 2,421 juveniles were adjudicated delinquent or

referred to placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008 and whose

adjudications were vacated, expunged, and dismissed with prejudice by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. (Doc. 1367, 2.) Thus, even if all Juvenile Plaintiffs

that filed individual actions or opted out of the Mericle Settlement were to elect to

opt out of the Classes if certified, this would amount to approximately 343

Juvenile Plaintiffs in Class A, which comprises only 14% of that class. (Id. at 3.)

7

II. Discussion A. Legal Standard
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for class action certification. Under Rule 23(a), class certification may be appropriate if the following requirements are satisfied:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Once the requirements of 23(a) are satisfied, the class may be certified if at least one of the three subsections of 23(b) are met. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiffs seek to certify the Classes and Subclasses pursuant to Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4). A court may certify a class action only if it “is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the [requirements of Rule 23] have been satisfied.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982). In weighing the merits of class certification, a “district court must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary and must consider all relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307. Specifically, a certifying court must find that each element of Rule 23 is met by a preponderance of evidence, and it “must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits- including disputes touching on elements of the cause of action.” Id. at 305. This reflects the notion that Rule 23 is more than a “mere pleading standard,” and a plaintiff “seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.” Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011). B. Certification Under Rule 23(a) Plaintiffs as the moving party bear the burden of first showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and then demonstrating that the elements of subsection (b)(3) are met. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-14, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138
8

L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 591 (3d Cir. 2012). The “threshold requirements” of Rule 23(a) are referred to as (1) numerosity; (2)
commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613, 117 S. Ct. 2231. Each requirement will be evaluated in turn.
1. Numerosity The first requirement for a class action is that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “‘No single magic number exists satisfying the numerosity requirement.” Logory v. Cnty. of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 140 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 05–3619, 2008 WL 800970, at *6 (D. N.J. Mar. 20, 2008)). However, the Third Circuit has opined that while there is technically no minimum class size, “generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.” Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, Class A consists of approximately 2,421 juveniles that were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008. (Doc. 1367, Ex. 1.) Subclass A.1 is comprised of the approximately 1,855 juveniles adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement without counsel by Ciavarella during the class period, together with the juveniles who did not have a constitutionally adequate colloquy before pleading guilty. Subclass A.2 includes the approximately 1,442 juveniles placed at PACC and/or WPACC by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008. And, Class B is likely in excess of 2,400 Juvenile Plaintiffs and Parent Plaintiffs who made payments in connection with the juvenile adjudications between 2003 and May 2008. These Classes well surpass the lower limits for numerosity, and Rule 23(a)(1) has been met. 2. Commonality To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), there must be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Commonality requires that plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims “depend upon a common contention,” the resolution of which “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at
9

2551. “Commonality does not require an identity of claims or facts among class members; instead, [t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marcus, 687 F.3d at 597-98 (3d Cir. 2012).
Recently, however, the Supreme Court opined that commonality is not the mere existence of a classwide question, but instead the potential for a “classwide resolution.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. “What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions'- even in droves- but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).
In this case, the allegations raise a number of common issues capable of classwide resolution with respect to the liability of Defendants. For example, as to the constitutional claims, common issues include: whether the non-judicial Defendants willfully participated in joint activity with Ciavarella and Conahan; whether Defendants conspired with the former judges to deprive Juvenile Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights; and whether Powell had final policymaking authority for PACC, WPACC, MAYS, and/or Vision Holdings. The RICO claims implicate common issues such as whether an association-in-fact enterprise was established by Defendants, as well as whether a universal conspiracy existed to violate Plaintiffs’ rights and to commit the predicate acts. See Wallace, 2010 WL 3398995, at *1314. Lastly, as to the wrongful imprisonment claim, a common issue exists as to whether, based on the alleged conspiracy, Defendants knew Ciavarella’s detention orders were invalid. See id. at *16. Since these issues can be answered commonly by way of a classwide proceeding, Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied. See, e.g., Marcus, 687 F.3d at 597.
Provider Defendants, however, insist that commonality does not exist in this case pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes. In Dukes, three current or former WalMart employees, representing the 1.5 million members of the certified class, claimed that
10

the company discriminated against them on the basis of their sex. Dukes, 131 S. Ct at 2548. The members of the class “held a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed . . . .” Id. at 2557 (citation omitted). The class certified by the district court consisted of “‘all women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and management track promotions policies and practices.’” Id. at 2549 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141-42 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). The district court’s certification order was substantially affirmed by a divided en banc Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See id. (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether certification of the plaintiff class was consistent with Rules 23(a) and (b)(2). See id. at 2547.
In finding that the respondents failed to establish commonality as required by Rule 23, the Court noted that “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Id. at 2551 (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982)). To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), claims must:
depend upon a common contention- for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution- which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. Id. And, in a case such as Dukes where the “respondents wish[ed] to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once,” the Court emphasized that “[w]ithout some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.” Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original). This passage, Provider Defendants contend, demonstrates that “the crucial questions here are: why was I detained, why was I adjudicated and why was my case disposed of in this way. Because
11

of the widely varying, complex Juveniles’ Histories, there can be no common answer to these questions.” (Doc. 1345, 36-37.)
Provider Defendants disregard Dukes’ emphasis that a court should focus on the “dissimilarities” between class members only “to determine (as Rule 23(a)(2) requires) whether there is even a single common question.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (emphasis in original). As set forth above, and in contrast to Dukes where the plaintiffs failed to identify a single common question, common questions permeate this litigation. Essentially, the claims rest on the common contention that Defendants “acted in conspiracy with Conahan and Ciavarella to deprive Juvenile Plaintiffs of their constitutionally guaranteed rights, . . . organized an association-in-fact enterprise, and . . . participated in the affairs of an entity through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Wallace, 2012 WL 6552134, at *6. As all class members claim the same injury, denial of rights, and as the common contention of why Ciavarella deprived juveniles of these rights is capable of classwide resolution, the claims at issue are markedly different from those in Dukes.
Moreover, this case differs from Dukes in another crucial respect. Dukes specifically recognized that a common contention in that case could be predicated by an assertion of bias “on the part of the same supervisor.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis added). The common contention here fits squarely into that reasoning, as the claims are predicated on a conspiracy that resulted in the unconstitutional and unlawful adjudications of all Juvenile Plaintiffs by the same judge. This provides the “glue” that was absent in Dukes. And, this common contention is capable of classwide resolution, as the answer to why Juvenile Plaintiffs were deprived of their rights will be resolved in one stroke. In essence, unlike the class members in Dukes that were “sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors . . . , subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed,” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557, Juvenile Plaintiffs here were all adjudicated in the same county, before the same judge, and as a result of the same alleged unlawful conspiracy. The commonality requirement is therefore satisfied.
12

3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The concepts of typicality and commonality are closely related and often tend to merge.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 597 (citing Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir.1994)). “The typicality criterion is intended to preclude certification of those cases where the legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict with those of the absentees by requiring that the common claims are comparably central to the claims of the named plaintiffs as to the claims of the absentees.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 57. “Factual differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based on the same legal theory.” Id. at 58 (citation omitted). When analyzing typicality, a court must compare the situation of the proposed representative to that of the class as a whole by considering “the similarity of the legal theory and legal claims; the similarity of the individual circumstances on which those theories and claims are based; and the extent to which the proposed representative may face significant unique or atypical defenses to her claims.” In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 597 (3d Cir. 2009). The claims of the representatives with respect to liability are typical of the claims of the Classes they represent. Like all Class A members, Paige Cicardo, Elizabeth Habel, Angelia Karsko, H.T., Jessica Van Reeth, Dezare Dunbar, and Alexandra Fahey appeared before Ciavarella and were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement between 2003 and May 2008, and their adjudications were vacated, expunged, and dismissed with prejudice by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Class A representatives’ claims are typical of those of all Class A members as they all allege that the former judges’ undisclosed conflict-of-interest in adjudicating children delinquent and sending them to placement resulted in the denial of their constitutional rights. The Subclass A.1 representatives, Paige Cicardo, H.T., and Jessica Van Reeth, assert, like all other members of Subclass A.1, that they were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella during the class
13

period without counsel and/or without colloquies on the record informing them of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, before either waiving counsel and/or pleading guilty. Similarly, the Subclass A.2 representatives, Paige Cicardo, Elizabeth Habel, and Angelia Karsko, like all other members of the Subclass, were referred by Ciavarella to PACC and/or WPACC for placement. Lastly, Elizabeth Habel and Jack Van Reeth, the Class B representatives, allege, like all other members of Class B, that Defendants’ conduct resulted in their paying court fees, fines, restitution, and other monetary charges associated with the adjudications or placements by Ciavarella betwen 2003 and May 2008.
Thus, the class representatives and class members all rely on identical theories of liability. Moreover, with respect to liability, the class representatives do not face any unique or atypical defenses different from other class members. As such, since the representatives’ claims are highly typical of those of the Classes and Subclasses generally, the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied.
4. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “The adequacy requirement has two components: (1) concerning the experience and performance of class counsel; and (2) concerning the interests and incentives of the representative plaintiffs.” Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 303 (3d Cir. 2005)). Essentially, the adequacy inquiry considers whether “the putative named plaintiff has the ability and the incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously, that he or she has obtained adequate counsel, and that there is no conflict between the individual's claims and those asserted on behalf of the class.” Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Adequacy of counsel under Rule 23(a)(4) is based upon the factors set forth in Rule 23(g). See Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although questions concerning the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the
14

adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . those questions have, since 2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).”). That subsection lists several non-exclusive factors that a district court must consider in determining “counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B), including: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action,” (2) “counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action,” (3) “counsel's knowledge of the applicable law,” and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).
To date, proposed Class Counsel, Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller (“Hangley”), Juvenile Law Center (“JLC”), and Anapol Schwartz (“Anapol”), has efficiently and effectively prosecuted this litigation on behalf of the Classes by coordinating these consolidated civil actions, preparing and filing comprehensive briefs in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss and cross-motions for summary judgment, litigating discovery disputes, and pursuing settlements. In obtaining approval of the Mericle Settlement, Co-Lead Counsel was found to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).
Class Counsel has the experience, skill, and qualification necessary to conduct this litigation. In particular, the individual attorneys in this action have extensive experience in complex class action litigation involving mass actions and civil rights claims. Consistent with their impressive qualifications, Class Counsel, throughout this litigation, has demonstrated considerable ability in prosecuting this case. . . . Class Counsel has pursued this action vigorously and with great dedication on behalf of all Plaintiffs. Wallace, 2012 WL 6552134, at *8. This finding is equally applicable here, and, as such, proposed Class Counsel is capable of fairly and adequately representing the interests of the class members. While Provider Defendants do not suggest that the proposed Class Counsel lacks the skill or ability to adequately represent the class members, Provider Defendants contend that Anapol cannot adequately represent the Classes because it also represents ninetyseven (97) plaintiffs individually. Provider Defendants insist that “Anapol’s dual representations of class members and individual plaintiffs are clearly conflicts of interest that preclude them from adequately representing the class.” (Doc. 1345, 40.)
15

Provider Defendants cite district court cases from other Circuits to support their claim that Anapol cannot simultaneously represent class and individual Plaintiffs. (Id. citing In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 552, 557 (S.D. Ohio 200); Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 679 (N.D. Ohio 1995); Kuper v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 145 F.R.D. 80, 83 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Jacksaw Pontiac, Inc. v. Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 102 F.R.D. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 258 (N.D. Cal.1978)). Moreover, “[c]ourts have consistently held that counsel cannot simultaneously represent a class and prosecute either individual or class claims against the same defendants in a different proceeding.” 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:39 (5th ed. 2009) (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 144 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1999) (stating that “an attorney who represents another class against the same defendant may not serve as class counsel,” and finding conflict of interest where attorneys represented proposed settlement class and also separately represented individual clients with prior-negotiated, more favorable settlement)).
Here, however, only one . . . of class counsel, [Anapol], has brought individual cases against Defendant based on the Policies. Presumably, the other class counsel would not allow their colleague to put the interests of his individual cases before the interests of the class. Moreover, Defendant has not demonstrated that Plaintiffs' counsel suffers from an actual conflict. Admittedly, situations may arise where counsel seeking to represent both class members and individual plaintiffs in separate actions against the same defendant suffers from actual conflict (e.g., pursuing a class action as well as actions on behalf of individual plaintiffs when both actions pursue a common pool of assets that might be insufficient to support the total amount sought). See, e.g., Kuper v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 145 F.R.D. 80, 83 (S.D. Ohio 1992). Ruderman ex rel. Schwartz v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co., 263 F.R.D. 670, 685 (S.D. Fla. 2010). In this case, just as in Ruderman ex rel. Schwartz, “the individual actions and the purported class action appear to pursue the same goal: . . .” Id. Likewise, “Defendant[s] ha[ve] not alleged that the proposed class members and individual plaintiffs seek recovery from a single pool of assets.” Id. Accordingly, I perceive no conflict, and Plaintiffs’ proposed Class Counsel can fairly and adequately represent the Classes as required by Rule
16

23(a)(4). See also Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 590 (3d Cir. 1999).8 With respect to the second prong of the adequacy inquiry, the Third Circuit has
“recognized that the linchpin of the adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of the class.” Dewey, 681 F.3d at 183 (citations omitted). The adequacy requirement “is designed to ferret out” intra-class conflicts, and to ensure that the named plaintiffs have the incentive to represent the claims of the class. Id. at 184 (citations omitted). If any conflicts “undercut the representative plaintiffs' ability to adequately represent the class” they are “fundamental,” such that class representation is structurally faulty and Rule 23(a)(4) cannot be satisfied. Id. at 184-85.
The class representatives’ interests are aligned with those of the class members. There appears to be no conflicts between or among the Classes, and the representatives are “‘part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.’” In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Amchem Prods., 512 U.S. at 625-26, 117 S. Ct. 2231). As the representatives share a common interest with the Classes in establishing Defendants’ liability for the alleged unlawful conduct, they will adequately protect the interests of the class members.
Accordingly, the representatives’ interests are not in conflict with those of the Classes and proposed Class Counsel is capable of representing the Classes. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are fully satisfied.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs have satisfied the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements under Rule 23(a).

8

Of course, “[o]nce the decision to certify a class has been made, the court remains

under a continuing duty to monitor the adequacy of representation to ensure that

class counsel provides zealous, competent representation through the proceedings

and to address conflicts of interests if they develop.” In re Integra Realty

Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1112 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Key v. Gillette Co.,

782 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1986); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 22, 27

(3d Cir. 1980)).

17

C. Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(c)(4) Having met the threshold requirements under Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must also satisfy
one of the three sub-parts of Rule 23(b). See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, Plaintiffs are seeking certification as to liability only pursuant to Rules 23(b)(3) and (c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 23(b)(3) allows for a class action to proceed if “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and [ ] a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). These requirements are commonly separated into the “predominance” and “superiority” requirements. See In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 308-09. The factors pertinent to finding predominance and superiority are: (A) the class members' interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any class member's litigation concerning the controversy; (C) the appropriateness of concentrating the litigation in this forum; and (D) any likely difficulties in managing the class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Although the plain language of Rule 23(b)(3) directs courts to consider these factors in evaluating predominance and superiority, “in a majority of cases courts consider these factors solely with respect to making a determination of superiority.” Powers v. Lycoming Engines, 272 F.R.D. 414, 426 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
Rule 23(c)(4) provides “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Like any other certification determination under Rule 23, a district court’s decision to exercise its discretion pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) “‘must be supported by rigorous analysis.’” Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 272 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2009)). The Third Circuit has explained that Rule 23(c)(4) “‘both imposes a duty on the court to insure that only those questions which are appropriate for class adjudication be certified, and gives it ample power to treat common things in common and to distinguish the distinguishable.’” Id. (quoting Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 267
18

(3d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318 n.18).
The interplay between the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and
(b) and the recognition of issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) “is a difficult matter that has
generated divergent interpretations among the courts.” Id. (quoting Hohider, 574 F.3d at 200
n.25). Nevertheless, “‘[c]ourts frequently use Rule 23(c)(4) to certify some elements of
liability for class determination, while leaving other elements to individual adjudication.’”
Carroll v. Stettler, No. 10-2262, 2011 WL 5008349, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2011) (citing
Chiang, 385 F.3d at 267). In determining whether common issues are divisible from
individual issues so as to decide whether to certify an issue class:
the trial court should consider: the type of claim(s) and issue(s) in question; the overall complexity of the case; the efficiencies to be gained by granting partial certification in light of realistic procedural alternatives; the substantive law underlying the claim(s), including any choice-of-law questions it may present and whether the substantive law separates the issue(s) from other issues concerning liability or remedy; the impact partial certification will have on the constitutional and statutory rights of both the class members and the defendant(s); the potential preclusive effect or lack thereof that resolution of the proposed issue class will have; the repercussions certification of an issue(s) class will have on the effectiveness and fairness of resolution of remaining issues; the impact individual proceedings may have upon one another, including whether remedies are indivisible such that granting or not granting relief to any claimant as a practical matter determines the claims of others; and the kind of evidence presented on the issue(s) certified and potentially presented on the remaining issues, including the risk subsequent triers of fact will need to reexamine evidence and findings from resolution of the common issue(s).
Gates, 655 F.3d at 273 (citing Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation §§ 2.02–05
(2010); Hohider, 574 F.3d at 201).
Additionally, the Third Circuit has instructed that when certifying an issue class, the
issues to be tried should be clearly enumerated. Id. (citing Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2006)). Likewise, the district court should explain
how the remaining issues will be resolved. Id. (citing Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation §§ 2.02(e) (2010)).
With these considerations in mind, Plaintiffs’ request for certification of the Classes
and Subclasses for liability purposes will be granted for the following reasons.
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1. Predominance The predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) “‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’” Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 266 (3d Cir. 2009)). “Parallel with Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality element, which provides that a proposed class must share a common question of law or fact, Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement imposes a more rigorous obligation upon a reviewing court to ensure that issues common to the class predominate over those affecting only individual class members.” Id. (citing Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 266). Thus, the Third Circuit “‘consider[s] the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement to be incorporated into the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and therefore deem it appropriate to analyze the two factors together, with particular focus on the predominance requirement.’” Id. (quoting Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 266). And, Third Circuit precedent “provides that the focus of the predominance inquiry is on whether the defendant's conduct was common as to all of the class members, and whether all of the class members were harmed by the defendant's conduct.” Id. at 298. In assessing predominance, “a court at the certification stage must examine each element of a legal claim ‘through the prism’ of Rule 23(b)(3).” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600 (quoting In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 630 (3d Cir. 2011)). Thus, “[a] plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that the element of [the legal claim] is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.’” Id. (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311).
a. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims assert that Defendants violated or conspired to violate their rights to an impartial tribunal and their right to counsel and/or a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. (Doc. 136, Counts I-IV.) “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, (1) acting under color of law, (2) violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights, (3) and thereby caused
20

the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 299 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998)). Liability under § 1983 does not require proof of actual damages. See Wallace, 2010 WL 3398995, at *5.
i. Impartial Tribunal Plaintiffs first allege under § 1983 that Defendants are liable for the denial of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal. With respect to liability for the impartial tribunal claims, the predominance requirement is satisfied. Particularly, Defendants’ conduct in denying or allegedly conspiring to deprive Juvenile Plaintiffs of their right to an impartial tribunal is identical to all class members, and all class members were injured by the same alleged conduct of Defendants. In addition, whether the non-judicial Defendants were “state actors” for purposes of § 1983 liability is capable of proof at trial through evidence common to the class members. The predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is met for the impartial tribunal claims as questions common to the Classes predominate over those affecting only individual members.
ii. Right to Counsel Common issues as to liability also predominate regarding the denial of Plaintiffs’ right to counsel claims. Again, as noted above, a determination of whether Defendants are “state actors” is capable of common proof. Moreover, all class members claiming that they were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement without counsel and/or without on-therecord colloquies similarly assert that they were denied the protections afforded them under the Sixth Amendment.9 Whether the class members were denied the right to counsel is capable of common proof in the form of the daily case lists maintained by Juvenile Probation. And, since the resolution of whether Defendants’ conduct caused Ciavarella to

9

The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment applies to the States under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See McMahon v. Fulcomer,

821 F.2d 934, 944 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92

S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-

45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963)).

21

adjudicate or place class members without counsel and without knowing and voluntary waivers of the right to counsel is capable of proof common as to all members, the predominance requirement is satisfied with respect to the right to counsel claims.
Provider Defendants contend, however, that too many Juvenile Plaintiff specific questions exist as to whether each class member was denied the right to counsel to permit this litigation to proceed as a class action. Those unique, individualized issues, according to Provider Defendants, include: forty-three (43) juveniles were before Ciavarella for multiple hearings and had an attorney present on at least one occasion; seventeen (17) expressly waived counsel; 159 Class or Individual Plaintiffs received Miranda warnings from police or probation officers; many juveniles received “written advice” of their right to an attorney before entering Ciavarella’s courtroom; some parents declined public defenders due to a perceived conflict of interest; some families were not income-eligible for a public defender; public defenders were in the courtroom during some juvenile adjudications but refused to “step in for them”; and some juveniles were advised by police officers, attorneys, or probation officers that an attorney was not necessary. (Doc. 1345, 15-16.) Provider Defendants argue that “[t]his information is unique to each Juvenile and relevant to whether the Juveniles were denied counsel or trial, or chose not to have counsel or trial for reasons other than the lack of colloquy.” (Id. at 16.)
These individualized issues have no impact on whether Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to counsel was denied and not waived. “The right to assistance of counsel is ‘one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.’” Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 218 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967). Nevertheless, a criminal defendant may waive the right to counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004). To be effective, however, the relinquishment of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See id. Prior to waiving counsel, the defendant “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record
22

will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); see also United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982) (“a defendant's waiver of counsel can be deemed effective only where the district court judge has made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him that the defendant's waiver was understanding and voluntary.”). According to the Third Circuit:
It is clear from the Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta . . . and this Court’s decision in Welty . . . that the district court must undertake an affirmative onthe-record colloquy to explain to the defendant the possibility of waiver and give the defendant an awareness of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending oneself. Thomas, 357 F.3d at 362; see also United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (3d Cir. 1995) (court must “engage in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that a defendant who chooses to represent himself is making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”). Here, subclass members all uniformly claim that they were not provided in court and on-the-record colloquies by Ciavarella prior to waiving their right to counsel. The subclass members thus all similarly allege that since no such colloquy was provided before proceeding without counsel, they did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel. As the Sixth Amendment “imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge in determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused,” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S. Ct. 1019, and “whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record,” id., individual Juvenile Plaintiffs’ circumstances cited by Provider Defendants are irrelevant to the determination of whether the right to counsel was violated. That is, whether a Sixth Amendment deprivation occurred (and whether Defendants caused such a deprivation) is unaffected by the fact that some class members received Miranda warnings, had been represented by an attorney on other occasions, had income exceeding the financial eligibility requirements for a public defender, or had been advised by people outside of the courtroom that an attorney was unnecessary.
23

Accordingly, issues common to the Subclass predominate over those affecting only individual members with respect to the right to counsel claims.
iii. Guilty Plea Colloquy Lastly, Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants liable under § 1983 for the denial of a constitutionally adequate guilty plea. When a plea of guilty is entered, several constitutional rights are waived. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) (the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and the right to confront one's accusers protected by the Sixth Amendment are all waived by entering a guilty plea). As a result, a guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, “courts may not accept a guilty plea without first determining, on the record, that the guilty plea was the result of a knowing, and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Jamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709). Therefore, “absent ‘a record adequate’ to determine that a guilty plea is a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver, a reviewing court can not conclude that the guilty plea complied with constitutional safeguards.” Id. at 274 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709). As to the guilty plea colloquy claims, Defendants’ conduct was common as to all class members. And, proof of whether Defendants deprived or conspired to deprive Juvenile Plaintiffs of knowing and voluntary guilty pleas can be established by proof common to all class members. Moreover, based on Defendants’ alleged conduct, Plaintiffs contend that they all suffered the same injury, the denial of their constitutional right to an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea. Common issues as to liability therefore predominate over individual questions on the denial of voluntary and constitutionally adequate guilty plea claims.
24

b. RICO Claims Plaintiffs also allege violations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d).10 To establish a § 1962(c) RICO violation, Plaintiffs must establish: (1) the existence of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (2) Defendants’ association with the enterprise; (3) Defendants’ participation in the conduct or affairs of the enterprise; and (4) Defendants’ participation through a pattern of racketeering activities. See Wallace, 2010 WL 3398995, at *13; see also Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 269 (establishing liability under § 1962(c) “requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity,” plus an injury to “business or property.”). For the § 1962(d) claims, Plaintiffs must establish “(1) an agreement to commit the predicate acts of fraud, and (2) knowledge that those acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity conducted in such a way as to violate section 1962(a), (b), or (c).” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Odesser v. Continental Bank, 676 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). Here, common legal and factual determinations predominate over individual issues with respect to the RICO claims. Violations of § 1962(c) can be established by common proof as to the activities of Defendants, whether an enterprise existed, and whether Defendants associated and participated in the affairs of the enterprise. See Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 269-70. Likewise, proof of the remaining elements would encompass common questions of law and fact, notably whether activities that constitute racketeering were occurring through the enterprise, and whether these racketeering activities were occurring in a pattern that could be established. See id. at 270. Thus, common issues concerning liability for a violation of § 1962(c) predominate and are capable of proof common to the Class. Similarly, the § 1962(d) conspiracy claim focuses on the conduct of Defendants and whether Defendants “conspire[d] to violate § 1962(c).” Id. at 269. This proof is common to all Class B members. And, to the extent any individual issues exist with respect to
10 As noted, the § 1962(c) claim is asserted against Ciavarella, Conahan, Powell, Vision Holdings, Beverage Marketing, and Pinnacle Group, while the § 1962(d) claim is against all remaining Defendants. 25

damages, these issues do not predominate over those common and relevant to resolution of Defendants’ liability for Plaintiffs’ RICO claims. Therefore, common issues predominate as to Defendants’ liability for the RICO claims.
c. Wrongful Imprisonment Claim Plaintiffs also assert a wrongful imprisonment claim against Provider Defendants and Powell. There are two elements to a claim of false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law: (1) the detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention. See Wallace, 2010 WL 3398995, at *15 (citing Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994)); see also Goldstein v. United Lift Serv. Co., No. 09-286, 2010 WL 4236932, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2010) (elements for false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law are: (1) defendant acts intending to confine a person within boundaries fixed by the actor; (2) defendant’s act directly or indirectly results in such confinement of that person; and (3) the person confined is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it). Proof of false imprisonment liability requires no proof of damages. See Carter v. May Dep’t Store Co., 853 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2004) (noting that the fact that there has been a false imprisonment establishes a cause of action for at least nominal damages). Common issues predominate over individual issues in regard to Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claims against Provider Defendants and Powell. First, whether class members were detained or placed at PACC or WPACC by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008 can be determined by Provider Defendants and Juvenile Probation’s records and files. Second, the unlawfulness of the detentions, and Provider Defendants and Powell’s liability for false imprisonment, can be determined by common proof as to their conduct. That is, whether Provider Defendants and/or Powell conspired with the former judges and knew Ciavarella’s detention orders were invalid is susceptible to proof of Defendants’ conduct which is the same as to all class members. See Wallace, 2010 WL 3398995, at *16 . Thus, common issues predominate as to Provider Defendants and Powell’s liability for the wrongful imprisonment claim.
26

d. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend Following the close of the briefing period on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the United States Supreme Court, on March 27, 2013, issued its opinion in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, - - - U.S. - - -, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). In light of the Court’s decision, Provider Defendants were granted leave to file a supplemental brief to address Comcast’s impact on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Doc. 1378.) Provider Defendants contend that Comcast: (1) prohibits the Court from certifying a class as to Defendants’ liability; (2) supports Provider Defendants’ claim that the proof of the existence and cause of each alleged injury must be considered before addressing the damages caused by each alleged injury; and (3) supports Provider Defendants’ Carey v. Piphus defense. (Doc. 1392.) Comcast, as stated by Provider Defendants, holds that “a district court may not certify a class unless damages are measurable on a class-wide basis.” (Id. at 1.) In Comcast, the respondents, the plaintiffs in the district court, subscribed to Comcast’s cable-television services. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430. The respondents claimed that the petitioners, Comcast Corporation and its subsidiaries, engaged in an anticompetitive clustering strategy in the Philadelphia Market Area “by acquiring competitor cable providers in the region and swapping their own systems outside the region for competitor systems located in the region.” Id. As a result of this strategy, the petitioners’ share of subscribers in the region increased from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 69.5 percent in 2007. Id. The clustering scheme, claimed the respondents, eliminated competition and kept prices above competitive levels. See id. The respondents sought to certify a class of all Comcast cable customers in the Philadelphia cluster during the class period pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). See id. To satisfy the predominance requirement, the district court held that the respondents had to show that the “antitrust impact” was “‘capable of proof at trial through evidence that was common to the class rather than individual to its members’” and that the “damages resulting from that injury were measurable on a ‘class-wide basis through’ use of a ‘common methodology.’”
27

Id. (quoting Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 154 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).11 The respondents proposed four theories of antitrust impact; however, the district court accepted only the “overbuilder” theory as capable of classwide proof, and the respondents’ proof of antitrust impact was limited to that theory. See id. at 1431(citing 264 F.R.D. at 165, 174, 178, 181). The district court also found that the damages resulting from this theory could be calculated on a classwide basis. See id. The regression model relied on by the respondents’ expert, however, did not isolate damages resulting from the overbuilder theory from the other three theories of antitrust impact that were not susceptible to proof on a classwide basis. See id. Nevertheless, the district court certified the class. See id.
A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed. See id. On appeal, the petitioners argued that the class was improperly certified because the regression model, among other shortcomings, failed to attribute damages solely to the overbuilder theory, the only antitrust impact theory remaining in the case. See id. The Third Circuit did not consider the argument because “such an ‘attack on the merits of the methodology had no place in the class certification inquiry.’” Id. (quoting Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 207 (3d Cir. 2011)).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether certification was appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3). The question presented was: “Whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class had introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” Id. at 1431 n.4. Despite the respondents’ claims that the petitioners forfeited their ability to answer this question in the negative because the petitioners did not object to the admission of the expert’s testimony in the district court, the Supreme Court concluded that this forfeit only made it impossible for the petitioners to argue that the expert’s testimony was not admissible evidence. Id. However, the forfeit did “not make it impossible for [the petitioners] to argue that the evidence failed ‘to show that
11 This holding was not contested by the parties before the Supreme Court. 28

the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis’” because the petitioners had “argued below . . . that certification was improper because respondents had failed to establish that damages could be measured on a classwide basis. That is the question we address here.” Id.
The Supreme Court held that the class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See id. at 1432. The Court reasoned that the Third Circuit’s failure to consider arguments against the respondents’ damages model ran afoul of Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 1432-33. And, applying the proper legal standard, the Court found it clear that the “respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurements on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court “start[ed] with an unremarkable premise. If respondents prevail on their claims, they would be entitled only to damages resulting from reduced overbuilder competition, since that is the only theory of antitrust impact accepted for class-action treatment by the District Court.” Id. As a result, a model serving “as evidence of damages in this class action must measure only those damages attributable to that theory.” Id. “If the model does not even attempt to do that, it cannot possibly establish that damages are susceptible of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).” Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the district court and Third Circuit erred by failing to translate “‘the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event.’” Id. at 1435 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011)).
In dissent, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, emphasized that the majority opinion “breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).” Id. at 1435 (Ginsburg, J. and Breyer, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissenting Justices noted that “when adjudications of questions of liability common to the class will achieve economies of time and expense,
29

the predominance standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate.” Id. at 1437 (citing Advisory Committee’s 1966 Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S.C. App. p. 141). This, as set forth by the dissent, is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which permit a class to “be certified for liability only, leaving individual damages calculations to subsequent proceedings.” Id. at 1437 n.*. Accordingly, the Court’s ruling is “good for this day and case only,” as the “black letter rule” remains that a class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) “when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to class members.” Id. at 1437.
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning, Provider Defendants insist that a liability only class cannot be certified in this case. I disagree.
First, the Comcast Court’s analysis followed from an uncontested holding of the district court: satisfaction of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) required the respondents to show that the damages resulting from the alleged antitrust injury were measurable on a classwide basis through the use of a common methodology. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430. Second, Comcast involved a request for certification of the entire case, including both liability and damages. Here, however, Plaintiffs have only sought certification of Classes for a liability determination under Rule 23(c)(4), a subsection of Rule 23 that was not at issue in Comcast or even mentioned in the majority opinion. Consequently, Comcast’s discussion of the defectiveness of the respondents’ damages model when compared to the theories of antitrust impact susceptible to classwide proof does not impact a case such as this where classwide resolution is sought only with respect to liability. Based on the differences in the requests for certification in this case when compared to Comcast, I am hesitant to interpret Comcast in the manner suggested by Provider Defendants. (Doc. 1392, 4 (“Comcast teaches that the Supreme Court will . . . deny class certification in any case in which plaintiffs cannot establish that damages are capable of measurement on a class-wide basis.”).) Rather, in the absence of authority to the contrary, I am not inclined to extend Comcast beyond its facts and holding. Thus, Comcast does not foreclose a district court from certifying a liability only class under Rule 23(c)(4), and Plaintiffs have
30

satisfied the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). 2. Superiority According to Rule 23(b)(3), the considerations relevant to the superiority inquiry
include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Specifically, the superiority requirement asks a trial court to “balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternative available methods of adjudication.” Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir.1996)).
Here, considering the interest of putative members of the Classes in individually controlling the actions, and balancing the merits of the class action device with respect to efficiency and fairness with individual prosecutions, the interests of the putative members of the proposed Classes weigh in favor of certification because the costs of prosecution and the potentially numerous amount of class members suggest that a class action is the superior method of adjudication. Significantly, some class members have relatively small claims and lack incentive to undertake the burden of litigation. “Addressing the rights of those who would not otherwise be appropriately incentivized to bring their own singular claims was precisely the aim of the Advisory Committee in promulgating Rule 23(b)(3).” Logory, 277 F.R.D. at 146 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617, 117 S. Ct. 2231). And, as Plaintiffs aptly note, the instant litigation is premised on claims by juveniles relating to the denial of their constitutional rights during the course of their adjudication proceedings. As a result of their experiences during these proceedings, many class members harbor a distrust of the judicial system, rendering it unlikely that they will seek redress individually. Thus, allowing “this to proceed as a class action would not be removing claims from the hands of the class members, but would instead afford them an opportunity to pursue them.”
31

Logory, 227 F.R.D. at 146. The presence of numerous common questions of law and fact as to class members’ claims also supports class treatment as it will promote efficiency and preserve judicial resources. Lastly, the Court envisions no practical difficulties in managing this class action. The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is therefore satisfied.
3. Rule 23(c)(4) In addition to those arguments addressed previously, Provider Defendants also contend that certification of a liability class under Rule 23(c)(4) is improper in this case because there are too many uncommon issues about injuries, the damages jury would be required to revisit the fact of injury on an individual basis, Class Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief requires proof that Ciavarella erred in each Juvenile’s case, and that Defendants have a right to prove that the Juveniles would have been detained, adjudicated, and sentenced as they actually were after having been afforded their constitutional rights. The majority of these arguments have already been rejected by the Court and need not be addressed again. See Wallace, 2012 WL 5379153, at *1 (individualized issues related to each Juvenile’s family, social, education, psychological and court histories not relevant to issues of liability for class certification). Next, Provider Defendants opine that certification of a Rule 23(c)(4) class in this case fails to satisfy many of the relevant factors set forth by the Third Circuit in Gates, 655 F.3d at 273, and Hohider, 574 F.3d at 201. However, as discussed in detail above, certification of specific issues relevant to Defendants’ liability on Plaintiffs’ § 1983, RICO, and wrongful imprisonment claims is particularly appropriate in this case. Certification is consistent with a number of the ALI’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation: the substantive law in this case does not require a person-by-person inquiry to determine classwide liability; a single body of law applies to the claims; certification will provide an effective method to resolve these proceedings; certification of a liability class will be significantly more efficient than resolving each of these cases individually; individual proceedings will have no impact on the class proceeding; and the evidence presented in support of liability will be different than that needed to establish individualized damage claims. Gates, 655 F.3d 255 at 273 (citing
32

Principles of Law of Aggregate Litigation §§ 2.02-05 (2010); Hohider, 574 F.3d at 201). With regard to the last factor, Provider Defendants’ contention that the claims of
particular damages asserted by Juvenile Plaintiffs would have to be tried twice- once as part of the liability determination and again as part of the damages determination- misconstrues the proof and evidence relevant to these separate determinations. As noted by Class Plaintiffs, “the type and amount of damages will not be a part of the liability determination under the substantive law of Class Plaintiffs’ claims.” (Doc. 1367, 8.) Instead, individualized damages will be addressed only once (if Defendants are found liable). Moreover, Provider Defendants improperly conflate “injury” and “damages,” as they claim that “proof of the cause and fact of Class Plaintiffs’ emotional, medical, educational, employment and monetary injuries, and the defenses thereto, require assessments too individualized and divergent to warrant class certification under Rule 23(c)(4).” (Doc. 1345, 14.) These individualized assessments impact on the computation of damages, not whether each Plaintiff was in fact injured and denied their rights as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
Lastly, to the extent that Provider Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient specificity as to how these actions will proceed if they are found liable, “Rule 23 allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to problems created by the presence in a class action litigation of individual damages issues.” Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). These solutions include bifurcating liability and damage trials with different juries or “decertifying the class after the liability trial and providing notice to class members concerning how they may proceed to prove damages.” Slapikas v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 250 F.R.D. 232, 249 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 661). Thus, once the question of liability is answered concerning Defendants’ conduct, the Court may consider whether to decertify the Classes or take other appropriate measures.
33

III. Conclusion For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification will be granted, and the Classes and Subclasses will be certified for classwide determination of Defendants’ liability. An appropriate order follows.

May 14, 2013 Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

34

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v.

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAUL CLARK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

***************************************************************************************************** IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WAYNE DAWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-2535 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

***************************************************************************************************** 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-1405

v. MARK A. CIAVARELLA, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Liability on Impartial Tribunal Claims Against Defendant Ciavarella. (Doc. 1459.)1 Plaintiffs seek summary judgment against Mark Ciavarella, a former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judge, for his non-judicial conduct which Plaintiffs assert set in motion and furthered a conspiracy that deprived them of their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal. Because the undisputed facts establish that Ciavarella’s non-judicial acts subjected Plaintiffs to a deprivation of their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal, the motion for partial summary judgment will be granted.
I. Relevant Factual Background This civil action arises out of the alleged conspiracy related to the construction of juvenile detention facilities, and subsequent detainment of juveniles in these facilities, orchestrated by two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”). Plaintiffs in this action seek redress from the former judges, as well as the individuals and business entities involved in

1

Partial summary judgment is sought by Plaintiffs in Case Nos. 09-286

(“Wallace”), 09-291 (“Conway”), 09-357 (“H.T.”), and 09-630 (“Humanik”) of

the consolidated cases. (Doc. 1459.)

3

the construction and operation of these facilities, for the alleged unlawful conspiracy and resulting deprivations of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights. The alleged conspiracy and resulting injury to Plaintiffs are described in the two operative complaints, the Master Complaint for Class Actions (“CAC”) filed by Class Plaintiffs in H.T. and Conway (Doc. 136), and the Master Long Form Complaint (“IC”) filed by Individual Plaintiffs in Wallace and Humanik. (Doc. 134.)
The Complaints assert the following claims against Ciavarella: (A) violation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal (CAC Count I; IC Count III); (B) conspiracy to violate Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal (CAC Count II; IC Count III); (C) violation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to counsel and/or to a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea (CAC Count III; IC Count III); (D) conspiracy to deprive Juvenile Plaintiffs of their right to counsel and/or to a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea (CAC Count IV; IC Count III); (E) violation of the civil RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (CAC Count V; IC Count I); (F) conspiracy to violate the civil RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (CAC Count VII; IC Count II); and (G) civil conspiracy (IC Count VIII). On July 27, 2009, Ciavarella filed a motion to dismiss the Complaints in their entirety as to him on the basis of judicial immunity.2
By Memorandum and Order dated November 20, 2009, Ciavarella’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. See Wallace v. Powell, No. 9-286, 2009 WL 4051974 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20-2009). In that Memorandum, I noted that “[b]ecause the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action.” Id. at *9. Specifically,

2

Conahan also filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrines of judicial and

legislative immunities. (Doc. 216.)

4

I held that Ciavarella’s courtroom acts, namely, the “determinations of delinquency and the sentences imposed,” were judicial acts shielded by judicial immunity. Id. at *8. Thus, Ciavarella’s motion to dismiss was granted as to his “courtroom conduct.” Id. at *10.
However, because not “every act of [Ciavarella] was judicial in nature,” the remainder of his motion to dismiss based on judicial immunity was denied. Id. at *8 (emphasis in original). In particular, the doctrine of judicial immunity did not provide Ciavarella protection for the allegations relating to non-judicial acts. Id. at *10. For instance, Ciavarella’s role “in coercing probation officers to change their recommendations is outside the role of a judicial officer” and not protected by judicial immunity. Id. at *8. Thus, as to Ciavarella’s non-judicial conduct, his motion to dismiss was denied. See id. at *10.
On September 8, 2010, Ciavarella filed his Answers with Affirmative Defenses to the Complaints. (Docs. 578; 579.) Thereafter, the actions proceeded to discovery. Additionally, by Memorandum and Order dated May 14, 2013, the motions filed by Plaintiffs in H.T. and Conway for class certification as to all issues of Defendants’ liability was granted, (Docs. 1409; 1410), and a dispositive motion deadline was set for November 4, 2013. (Docs. 1420; 1437.)
On November 4, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on their impartial tribunal claims against Ciavarella, a statement of facts, and brief in support of the motion. Plaintiffs, while reserving their rights to appeal, “seek summary judgment against Ciavarella in the context of the Court’s immunity ruling.” (Doc. 1460, 3 n.2.) Ciavarella’s brief in opposition was due on November 29, 2013. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d); M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.6. Ciavarella has failed to file a brief in opposition or otherwise oppose Plaintiffs’ motion. As such, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is ripe for disposition.
5

II. Legal Standard Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Edelman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68, 70 (3d Cir. 1996). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 2D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (2d ed.1983). The moving party may present its own evidence or, where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to the court that “the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). “When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is
6

required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to either present affirmative evidence supporting its version of the material facts or to refute the moving party's contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57. The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990).
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.” Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
III. Discussion As noted, Plaintiffs filed their motion for partial summary judgment against Ciavarella, statement of undisputed facts, and brief in support on November 4, 2013. Ciavarella, however, has failed to oppose Plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is thus deemed unopposed. Moreover, because Ciavarella failed to file a statement of material facts controverting Plaintiffs’ properly filed statement of facts, all
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material facts set forth in Plaintiffs’ Statement (Doc. 1459-2) will be deemed admitted pursuant to Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 56.1. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1 (providing, in pertinent part, that “[s]tatements of material fact in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements. All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.”). Ciavarella likewise failed to submit any evidence in response to that submitted by Plaintiffs. Nonetheless, I must still analyze the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. See Lorenzo v. Griffith, 12 F.3d 23, 28 (3d Cir. 1993); Anchorage Associates v. Virgin Islands Board of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1990); Moultrie v. Luzerne Cnty. Prison, No. 06–1153, 2008 WL 4748240, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2008). A. Undisputed Facts
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts (Doc. 1459-2) as to which there is no genuine issue of dispute and supporting Exhibits (Doc. 1459, Exs. 1-30) establish the following:
1. The Conspiracy At all relevant times to this litigation, Ciavarella and Conahan were judges of the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts (“Plfs.’ SMF”), Doc. 1459-2, ¶ 20.) Conahan served as president judge of the court between 2002 and 2007. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Ciavarella served as judge of the juvenile court from 1996 until September 2001, then again from January 2002 through June 2008. (Id. at ¶ 22.) In late 1999, Ciavarella approached Conahan and suggested that they bring together a team that had the financial ability to build a new juvenile detention facility. (Ciavarella Test., 13:1-7.) At Ciavarella’s initiative, Conahan assembled a meeting of individuals, including Robert Powell (“Powell”), that potentially had the financial resources to construct
8

a new facility. (Ciavarella Test., 13:10-18.) Ciavarella subsequently contacted Robert Mericle (“Mericle”) about becoming involved in the project at the suggestion of Conahan. (Ciavarella Test., 16:4-12.) Ultimately, Mericle acquired property for the juvenile detention facility in Pittston, Pennsylvania, and Powell and his partner formed PA Child Care (“PACC”) to build the juvenile detention facility. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 27-28.)
Constructing the detention facility initially proved difficult for PACC’s owners because they faced hurdles acquiring financing. (Id. at ¶ 29.) In particular, the lenders they approached indicated that they were unwilling to loan money unless they had a concrete agreement ensuring repayment. (Id.) On or around July 11, 2001, Powell informed Conahan that unless there was an agreement with either Luzerne County or some other entity that could promise that children would be sent to PACC, they would not be able to build the facility. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Powell then developed a plan which called for the president judge to sign a placement guarantee to show to lenders. (Powell Test., 119:7-16.) Because Conahan would not become president judge until January 2002, the parties waited to go forward with the plan to build the facility. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 31.) After Conahan became president judge, he signed a placement guarantee agreement stating that the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas would pay PACC rent for a new facility in monthly installments which amounted to $1,314,000 annually. (Id. at ¶ 32.) As a result, PACC was able to obtain over $12,000,000 in financing. (Id.)
Ciavarella learned of the placement guarantee agreement shortly after it was signed, and he knew that the agreement required Luzerne County to make payments to PACC. (Ciavarella Test., 109:7-110:19.) Ciavarella, however, never told anyone about the agreement. (Id. at 112:20-22.)
Once Conahan became president judge, he informed the Luzerne County Commissioners that the court would no longer send juveniles to the existing Luzerne County
9

Juvenile Detention Center (the “River Street facility”). (Id. at 107:17-18.) Ciavarella also had no intention of sending any juveniles to the River Street facility. (Id. at 108:9-12.) Conahan did not seek any funds for the operation of the River Street facility, (id. at 107:14-16), and he instructed the Luzerne County Probation Department to return the facility’s license to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. (Powell Test., 125:15-19.)
Ciavarella assisted PACC in getting the facility off the ground. In particular, Ciavarella helped PACC hire the employees of the old facility, which further ensured that the River Street facility could not re-open. (Id. at 124:4-125:1.) Ciavarella and Conahan also appeared on television on December 19, 2002 to discuss the need to shut down the River Street facility. (Ciavarella Test., 83:24-84:11, 88:5-13). Ciavarella later acknowledged that he “was not doing anything in [his] official capacity as a judge” when he gave the interview. (Id. at 86:18-19.) According to Ciavarella, his actions, together with the actions of Conahan, put the River Street facility out of business. (Ciavarella Test., 108:13-17.) Ciavarella was also aware that closing the River Street facility would benefit PACC. (Id. at 87:23-88:1.)
In order to ensure the success of the PACC facility, Powell was told by Conahan that Ciavarella would need to be taken care of financially. (Powell Test.,127:25-128:8.) In January 2003, Powell signed an agreement back-dated to February 19, 2002 stating that Mericle would pay him a referral fee once the construction of the PACC facility was completed. (Id. at 130:12-131:2.) Powell knew, however, that the approximately $1,000,000 was not intended for him but was intended for Ciavarella and Conahan. (Id. at 131:10-12.)
On January 16, 2003, at the direction of Conahan, Powell drafted a document instructing Mericle to pay $610,000 to Robert Matta (“Matta.”). (Id. at 132:20-133:1.) The money was wire transferred to Matta on January 21, 2003. (Matta Test., 95:4-10.) On January 28, 2003, Matta transferred the $610,000 to Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc. (Id.
10

at 95:19-23.) On January 28, 2003, $330,000 was transferred from Beverage Marketing to Ciavarella’s bank account, and on April 30, 2003 and July 15, 2003, $75,000 was wired from Beverage Marketing to Ciavarella’s account. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 49-51.)
After the PACC facility opened in February 2003, (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 82), Ciavarella and Conahan kept track of the number of children sent to the facility and how PACC was doing financially. (Powell Test., 139:17-140:14.) Ciavarella continued to monitor the profitability of PACC until 2008. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 53.)
Powell’s company, Vision Holdings, and his business partner’s company, CIS, doing business as Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”), entered into a new contract with Mericle Construction in June 2004 to construct a juvenile detention and treatment facility in western Pennsylvania. (Powell Test., 157:6-9.) The WPACC facility was completed in July 2005. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 56.) When the WPACC facility was completed, Mericle paid Conahan and Ciavarella an additional $1,000,000. (Mericle Test., 31:10-13.) Similar to the payments related to the PACC facility, bogus financial transactions were used to conceal the payments from Mericle to Conahan and Ciavarella through Powell in connection with the WPACC facilty. (Powell Test., 160:6-25.) With respect to the second two payments from Mericle to Conahan and Ciavarella, Ciavarella provided the directions as to where the money should be sent. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 58.)
In February 2006, Mericle Construction completed a 12 bed addition to the PACC facility. (Mericle Test., 38:14-39:12.) Mericle paid $150,000 to the former judges for the privilege of building the addition to the PACC facility. (Id. at 38:19-22.)
Acting on behalf of other Private Defendants in this action, Powell made payments, including from PACC’s funds, to Conahan and Ciavarella. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 63.) These payments included checks and wire transfers to Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, an entity controlled by Conahan and Ciavarella, (id.), and Powell falsely documented the payments
11

for various legitimate reasons, such as “rent prepay,” “marina prepay,” “reserving lease,” “rental,” and “slip rental fee” to conceal that the payments were for Conahan and Ciavarella. (Powell Test., 145:15-152:21.) These payments totaled at least $590,000 in draws taken by Powell from the PACC account. (Id. at 153:9-20.)
Between 2003 and 2007, Ciavarella admitted that he was paid more than $2,700,000 and that he concealed all of the payments. (Ciavarella Test., 116:3-9, 128:1-17.) The payments were concealed by Ciavarella because he knew it “wouldn’t look good” if he was receiving payments from Powell while also sending juveniles to his facility. (Id. at 128:1-17.)
Between 2003 and 2007, Ciavarella sent anywhere from 217 to 330 juveniles to placement each year. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 84.) However, between 2009 and 2011, the Luzerne County juvenile court sent between 31 and 38 juveniles for placement each year. (Id. at ¶ 85.)
Ciavarella also testified in a hearing conducted in Joseph v. Scranton Times, No. 2166-C-2009, in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas that he had a duty to disclose material information relevant to his ability to engage in impartial discretionary decisionmaking. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 69.) Ciavarella admitted that he violated this duty, and he further acknowledged that during the relevant time period he never informed any of the juveniles who appeared before him that he was receiving money from PACC, WPACC, or Powell. (Id. at ¶ 70.)
2. Pennsylvania Supreme Court King’s Bench Proceedings In light of the events described above, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, on January 26, 2009, filed a Bill of Information alleging two counts of fraud against Ciavarella and Conahan. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 1.) Shortly thereafter, on February 11, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction and appointed the Honorable Arthur E. Grim as Special Master “to review all Luzerne County juvenile court
12

adjudications and dispositions that have been affected by the recently-revealed criminal
allegations.” (In re: J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008, Feb. 11, 2009 Order.) The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found:
Ciavarella admitted under oath that he had received payments from Robert Powell, a co-owner of the PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care facilities, and from Robert K. Mericle, the developer who constructed the juvenile facilities, during the period of time that Ciavarella was presiding over juvenile matters in Luzerne County. It is a matter of record that Ciavarella routinely committed juveniles to one or another of these facilities. It is also a matter of record that Ciavarella failed to disclose his ties to Powell, much less the financial benefits he received in connection with the facilities to which he routinely committed Luzerne County juveniles. Ciavarella’s admission that he received these payments, and that he failed to disclose his financial interests arising from the development of the juvenile facilities, thoroughly undermines the integrity of all juvenile proceedings before Ciavarella. Whether or not a juvenile was represented by counsel, and whether or not a juvenile was committed to one of the facilities which secretly funneled money to Ciavarella and Conahan, this Court cannot have any confidence that Ciavarella decided any Luzerne County juvenile case fairly and impartially while he labored under the specter of his self-interested dealings with the facilities.
(In re: J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008, Slip. Op. (Oct. 29, 2009) (per curiam)). Thus, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that “given the nature and extent of the taint, this
Court simply cannot have confidence that any juvenile matter adjudicated by Ciavarella
during this period was tried in a fair and impartial manner.” (Id. (emphasis in original).)
3. Ciavarella and Conahan’s Criminal Proceedings
As noted, on January 26, 2009, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania filed a Bill of Information alleging two counts of fraud against Ciavarella and
Conahan. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 1.) The Bill described a conspiracy among the judges and at least
two other unnamed parties to conceal $2,600,000 in payments to the judges from the
owners of PA Child Care (“PACC”) and Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”). (Id.) Ciavarella
and Conahan, pursuant to plea agreements they had reached with the United States, pled
guilty to these counts, but the plea agreements were rejected by the Court. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.)
On September 9, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a 48-count indictment against
Ciavarella and Conahan alleging racketeering, fraud, money laundering, extortion, bribery,
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and federal tax violations in connection with the construction and operation of juvenile detention facilities owned by PACC and WPACC. (Id. at ¶ 4.)3 Ciavarella was subsequently re-indicted on September 29, 2010 in a 39-count superseding indictment. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Ciavarella pled not guilty to the charged offenses. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
Ciavarella proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict finding Ciavarella guilty of 12 of the 39 counts of the superseding indictment, including racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, conspiracy to defraud the United States, mail fraud, and filing false tax returns. (Id. at ¶ 10.) On August 11, 2011, Ciavarella was sentenced to serve 28 years in prison. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
4. Robert Powell and Robert Mericle’s Criminal Proceedings On June 9, 2009, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania filed a two-count Bill of Information against Robert Powell. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Powell plead guilty and was sentenced to serve 18 months in prison. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.) Robert Mericle also pled guilty to misprison of a felony. He has yet to be sentenced. (Id. at ¶ 16.) B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment on their claims against Ciavarella for violation of their right to an impartial tribunal and conspiracy to violate their right to an impartial tribunal as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs’ claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

3

Conahan entered a guilty plea on July 23, 2010, and he was adjudicated guilty as

to Count 2 of the indictment and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 210

months.

14

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured, . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998)). Plaintiffs seek summary judgment as to liability against Ciavarella on the impartial tribunal claims for his non-judicial acts that set the conspiracy in motion and furthered the conspiracy.
1. Under Color of Law Under § 1983, Plaintiffs must establish that Ciavarella was acting under color of law. “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941)). Here, the undisputed facts confirm that at all times relevant to Ciavarella’s non-judicial acts alleged in the Complaints and for which summary judgment is sought, Ciavarella was a Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judge cloaked with the authority of state law. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 20, 22.) Ciavarella was therefore acting under color of state law. Cf. Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1236 (7th Cir. 1980) (rejecting state court judge’s claim that “[i]f jurisdiction is absent or the act is not judicial, counsel maintains, the color of law requirement is not met; if the color of law requirement is met, the act is judicial and jurisdiction is present,” because “[a]cceptance of this theory would remove the limitations on absolute judicial immunity discussed above and render judges immune from any suit whatsoever under § 1983.”).
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2. Deprivation of Constitutional Rights According to Plaintiffs, the undisputed facts demonstrate that their federal constitutional rights to an impartial tribunal were violated when they appeared in Ciavarella’s courtroom. “The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.” Marshall v. Jericho, 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980). Indeed, “it is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009) (quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 2d 942 (1955)). As such, “a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to a fair and impartial tribunal.” Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 474 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997)); Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Cross, 128 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 1997). Embodied in the guarantee of an impartial tribunal is the absolute right to a criminal proceeding conducted by a judge free of bias or pecuniary motivation. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the inquiry as to a judge’s bias in the due process context requires an objective determination considering “not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 2262, 129 S. Ct. 2252. I previously held that Plaintiffs “sufficiently established a violation of their federal constitutional rights for purposes of their § 1983 impartial tribunal claims.” Wallace v. Powell, No. 09-286, 2012 WL 2590150, at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2012). The Pennsylvania
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Supreme Court has similarly found that Plaintiffs suffered a violation of their constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. See id. (citing In re: J.V.R., No. 81 MM 2008, Slip. Op. (Oct. 29, 2009) (per curiam)). Accordingly, as there is no genuine dispute that all Juvenile Plaintiffs who appeared before Ciavarella during the relevant time period were denied their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal, this element is established.
3. Liability for Non-Judicial Acts As discussed in detail above, Ciavarella is immune from suit for his judicial acts. As a result, “Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action.” Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *9. Nevertheless, judicial immunity does not shelter Ciavarella’s “non-judicial conduct.” Id. at *9-10. In view of my prior decision, Plaintiffs contend that Ciavarella is liable for his nonjudicial acts which set in motion and furthered the conspiracy that resulted in the deprivation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal. Judicial acts include those “which are traditionally done by judges [such as] issuing orders, resolving cases and controversies, making rulings, and sentencing criminal defendants.” Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *7. Plaintiffs argue that Ciavarella engaged in a number of non-judicial acts for which he is not protected by judicial immunity, namely, his role in closing the River Street facility, his enactment and expansion of a zero tolerance policy, and his out-of-court conduct which initiated and thereafter concealed the conspiracy.
a. Closing of the River Street Facility First, Plaintiffs contend that the undisputed facts entitle them to summary judgment on their impartial tribunal claims against Ciavarella relating to his role in closing the River Street facility. Presented with a threat that the Luzerne County Commissioners would continue to fund and staff the county-run River Street facility, Ciavarella and Conahan worked together to ensure that the old facility would be closed. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 38-42, 73-
17

77.) In particular, Ciavarella and Conahan appeared on television in December 2002 to urge the shutdown of the River Street facility. (Id. at ¶ 73.) Ciavarella also assisted PACC hire employees from the River Street facility by setting up interviews. (Id. at ¶¶ 43, 75.) As a result, Ciavarella ensured that the River Street facility could not re-open, effectively putting the facility out of business. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-42.)
Ciavarella is not entitled to judicial immunity for his role in closing the River Street facility. That is, appearing on television urging a shutdown of a county-run detention facility and facilitating hiring decisions for a private detention facility are not functions “normally performed by a judge.” Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *7 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978)). During Ciavarella’s criminal trial, he acknowledged that he was not performing any official duties when he took part in the television interview. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶ 74.) Moreover, aiding PACC in staffing its facility with employees of the River Street facility also falls outside the traditional role of a judge. Cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988) (“personnel decisions made by judges[ ] are often crucial to the efficient operation of public institutions (some of which are at least as important as the courts), yet no one suggests that they give rise to absolute immunity from liability in damages under § 1983.”).
b. Zero Tolerance Policy Second, Plaintiffs argue that the enactment of a zero tolerance policy was not a judicial act. While Ciavarella served as judge of the juvenile court, he enacted an administrative policy that dictated instances in which probation officers had to file charges against and detain juveniles in Luzerne County. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 79-82.) Ciavarella expanded his zero tolerance policy in February 2003, the same month PACC opened, to require that children on probation be violated and detained for any violation of their probation, including zero tolerance for drug and alcohol violations, not attending school, not
18

attending appointments, or violating curfew. (Id. at ¶ 80.) Under this policy which was distributed to all juvenile probation officers on February 20, 2003, (id. at ¶ 82), Ciavarella eliminated juvenile probation officers’ discretion to informally adjust juveniles’ charges. (Id. at ¶ 79.)
Ciavarella’s enactment and expansion of a zero tolerance policy dictating how probation officers were to handle violations of probation and other charging decisions fall outside the scope of judicial action. “Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228, 108 S. Ct. 538. Under Pennsylvania law, probation officers have the authority to informally adjust allegations before a delinquency petition is filed. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6323; Pa. R. Juv. Ct. P. 312 (“At any time prior to the filing of a petition, the juvenile probation officer may informally adjust the allegation(s) if it appears: (1) an adjudication would not be in the best interest of the public and the juvenile; (2) the juvenile and the juvenile's guardian consent to informal adjustment with knowledge that consent is not obligatory; and (3) the admitted facts bring the case within the jurisdiction of the court.”). Moreover, “coercing probation officers to change their recommendations is outside the role of a judicial officer. Probation officers are to advise the court, not the other way round, on sentencing matters.” Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *8. In adopting the zero tolerance policy, Ciavarella was acting in an administrative capacity, and acts such as that which involve “supervising court employees and overseeing the efficient operation of a court- may have been quite important in providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system. The decision[ ] at issue, however, [was] not [itself] judicial or adjudicative.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229, 108 S. Ct. 538. Because Ciavarella’s enactment and expansion of the zero tolerance policy were non-judicial acts, judicial immunity does not shield this conduct.
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c. Additional Out-of-Court Actions Finally, Ciavarella is not sheltered from liability for his out-of-court conduct that was not judicial in nature. Ciavarella initiated the plan by approaching Conahan and suggesting that they bring together a team that had the financial ability to construct a new detention facility. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 23-26.) Ciavarella also connected Powell and Mericle. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Ciavarella’s failure to disclose the payments he received from Mericle and Vision Holdings also furthered the conspiracy. Specifically, Ciavarella took steps to conceal the more than $2,700,000 he and Conahan received from Mericle and Powell starting in 2003. (Id. at ¶ 66.) Indeed, Ciavarella sought to conceal the payments because knew that it would not look good that he was receiving payments from Powell while sending juveniles to his detention facility. (Id. at ¶ 67.) In that regard, Ciavarella instructed Mericle where to send the second and third payments. (Id. at ¶ 58.) This out-of-court conduct was not judicial in nature, and, as such, is not protected by judicial immunity. 4. Causation Lastly, Plaintiffs must establish that Ciavarella “caused the complained of injury.” Elmore, 399 F.3d at 281. I previously indicated that the “setting in motion” theory of causation would be applied to individual Defendants in this case. See Wallace, 2012 WL 2590150, at *11. This standard provides: A person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made. Indeed, the requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Id. (quoting Pilchesky v. Miller, No. 05–2074, 2006 WL 2884445, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct.10, 2006). While the Third Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of causation in § 1983 cases, see, e.g., Burnsworth v. PC Lab., 364 F. App’x 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2010), the “setting
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in motion” theory has been accepted by multiple Circuit Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 51 (1st Cir. 2009); Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 672 (5th Cir. 1999); Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); Waddell v. Forney, 108 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 1997); Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir. 1988).
The undisputed facts establish that Ciavarella caused the violation of Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal through the receipt and concealment, by himself and Conahan, of payments from and through other Defendants. In particular, Ciavarella knew he had a duty to disclose information relevant to his ability to engage in impartial decision-making, that he violated that duty, and that he never informed any juveniles that he was receiving payments from PACC, WPACC, or Powell. (Plfs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 69-70.) The undisputed facts conclusively establish that Ciavarella knew that, as a result of his conduct, Plaintiffs would be deprived of their right to appear before an impartial tribunal.
Ciavarella’s role in closing the River Street facility set the conspiracy in motion. Significantly, knowing that he stood to profit from the completion of the PACC facility, Ciavarella took steps to close the old facility and ensure that it would not re-open, resulting in PACC being the only detention facility in Luzerne County where a child could be detained. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-42, 73-77.) Yet, despite his financial stake in closing the River Street facility, he never disclosed this interest. (Id. at ¶¶ 44, 69-72.) Thus, the undisputed material facts establish that Ciavarella knew, or he should have known, that his role in the closure of the River Street facility and his concealment of his interest in its closure (and the resulting opening of the PACC facility while he served as judge of the juvenile court) would deprive Plaintiffs of an impartial tribunal.
The zero tolerance policy adopted by Ciavarella also furthered the conspiracy and caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal. In 2003 when Ciavarella
21

knew he had a financial interest in PACC, he expanded the zero tolerance policy, which increased the number of juveniles that would appear before him and be detained. As a result of the expansion of this policy, more juveniles appeared before him and were subject to adjudication by a biased tribunal. And, as detailed above, Ciavarella’s out-of-court conduct which set the conspiracy in motion, and which concealed the existence and the nature of the conspiracy, as well as the corresponding payments, all furthered the goals of the conspiracy. As the undisputed facts establish that Ciavarella knew or should have known that, as a result of his out-of-court conduct, Plaintiffs would not appear before an impartial tribunal when they were in his courtroom, the causation element of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 impartial tribunal claims against Ciavarella is satisfied.
Therefore, for Ciavarella’s conduct which is not protected by judicial immunity, i.e., his non-judicial acts, Ciavarella is liable to Plaintiffs on their § 1983 impartial tribunal claims. In particular, Ciavarella’s non-judicial acts detailed above set in motion and/or caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal as he initiated the scheme to construct a new detention facility, he assisted in closing the River Street facility, and he expanded a policy which increased the number of juveniles that appeared before him. And, these acts were all taken without Ciavarella ever disclosing, and, in fact, while he took affirmative steps to conceal his financial interest in the success of PACC and WPACC. Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ciavarella subjected Plaintiffs to a deprivation of their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal. For the conduct which Ciavarella is not shielded by judicial immunity, he is liable to Plaintiffs on their § 1983 impartial tribunal claims
IV. Conclusion For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment against Defendant Ciavarella will be granted. Judgment will be entered in Plaintiffs’ favor and against Ciavarella for his conduct which is not protected by judicial immunity on the claims
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for violation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal (CAC Count I; IC Count III), and conspiracy to violate Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal (CAC Count II; IC Count III). A determination of damages will be made at a later date.
An appropriate order follows.

January 9, 2014 Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

23

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.

CONSOLIDATED TO: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants. ******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

JUDGE MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants. ******************************************************************************************************

H.T., et al.,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357

MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

MEMORANDUM Presently before the Court are five (5) motions to dismiss: (1) Defendant Perseus House’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 170) on grounds of immunity for complying with a court order; (2) Defendant Vita’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 188) on grounds of absolute immunity as an “arm of the court;”1 (3) Defendant Mark Ciavarella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 210) on grounds of absolute judicial immunity; (4) Defendant Michael Conahan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 216) on grounds of absolute judicial and legislative immunity; and (5) Defendant Luzerne County’s Motion to Dismiss on grounds of immunity imputed from the other actors. These motions will be granted in part and denied in part as discussed below.

BACKGROUND The individual and class action plaintiffs in this case bring federal and state law

1 Vita also argues issues with respect to Heck v. Humphrey and the RookerFeldman doctrine. These arguments will be disposed in a separate order along with the remaining Defendants’ motion on those issues. (Doc. 221.)
2

claims against a number of defendants for an alleged scheme involving the corruption of the Luzerne County Common Pleas and Juvenile Courts. The Plaintiffs’ allegations relevant to the present motions are as follows:
Defendants Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”) abused their positions as judges of the Luzerne County Court of Commons Pleas by accepting compensation in return for favorable judicial determinations. (Ind. Amend. Compl. (“Ind.”) ¶ 30, Doc. 134; Class Action Amend. Compl. (“CA”) ¶ 2, Doc. 136.) As part of this conspiracy, Conahan and Ciavarella acted with Defendants Robert Powell, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Pennsylvania Child Care (“PACC”), Western Pennsylvania Child Care (“WPACC”), Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, and perhaps others. (Ind. ¶ 31.) The basic outline of the conspiracy was that Conahan and Ciavarella used their influence as judicial officers to select PACC and WPACC as detention facilities, and that they intentionally filled those facilities with juveniles to earn the conspirators excessive profits. (Id. ¶ 81.) In return, approximately $2.6 million was paid to Conahan and Ciavarella for their influence. (Id. ¶ 37.)
Conahan took official actions to remove funding from the Luzerne County budget from the Luzerne County facility, and he exerted influence to facilitate the construction, expansion, and lease of the PACC facility. (Ind. ¶ 34.) Conahan also signed a secret “Placement Guarantee Agreement” with PACC on behalf of Luzerne County. (Id. ¶ 41.) Conahan had “final decision-making authority with regard to Luzerne County’s funding of the county-run River Street juvenile detention center.” (Id.) Conahan also granted an injunction which prevented the results of an audit of the PACC facility by the Pennsylvania
3

Department of Public Welfare from being disclosed to the public.2 Ciavarella sentenced thousands of juveniles to detention in violation of their
constitutional rights such as the right to counsel, the right to an impartial tribunal, and the right to a free and voluntary guilty plea. (CA ¶¶ 177-78.) Ciavarella acted “in his administrative capacity” when he began discussions with Powell about constructing a new facility. (Id. ¶ 650.) Conahan and Ciavarella also pressured court probation officers to make recommendations in favor of incarcerating juvenile offenders, even when they would have otherwise recommended release. (Ind. ¶ 67.; CA ¶ 679.) Conahan and Ciavarella also executed a number of schemes to conceal the unlawful proceeds of this conspiracy. (Ind. ¶ 35.) They failed to disclose their financial relationship to the other Defendants, and knowingly and intentionally filed materially false annual statements of financial interests. (Id. ¶ 60.)
Dr. Frank Vita (“Vita”) contracted with Conahan and Ciavarella to be the exclusive provider of psychological evaluations for juvenile offenders. (Ind. ¶ 23.) Due to the large number of evaluations Vita was required to perform based upon this exclusive agreement, a backlog developed which necessitated that juveniles be detained and/or lodged at PACC and/or WPACC for extended periods while awaiting evaluations. (Id. ¶ 24.) Vita conspired to bring PACC and WPACC more fees by creating this backlog to lengthen the duration of the juvenile detentions. (Id. ¶ 25.)
Defendant Perseus House wrongly kept Plaintiff Samantha Humanik (“Humanik”) in
2 This allegation was in the proposed amended complaints of the Individual and Class Action Plaintiffs (Docs. 249, 250). While leave to file those amendments was denied, this Court will consider this specific allegation for purposes of examining the boundaries of judicial immunity.
4

custody and subjected her to an unnecessary medical regimen against her will. (Ind. ¶ 158.) Humanik was incarcerated pursuant to a delinquency order signed by Ciavarella which stated that Humanik was to be detained for treatment. (Id.) Humanik was forcibly medicated and subjected to other cruel and unusual punishment while detained by Perseus House. (Id. ¶ 159.)
The present motions have been fully briefed and argued orally, and are now ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARDS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’” each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does
5

not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1998), or credit a complaint’s “‘bald assertions’” or “‘legal conclusions,’” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
DISCUSSION Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "'every person' who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). Despite these broad terms, the Supreme Court has held consistently that the Section 1983 did not abolish long-standing common law immunities from and defenses to civil suits. McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d
6

Cir. 1992) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478(1991)). Such common law immunities also
apply to RICO and state law actions. Slater v. Jokelson, No. 96-cv-672, 1997 WL 164236,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 1997) (no evidence of legislative intent to abrogate judicial immunity
in civil RICO statute); see Pullman v. Allen, 466 U.S. 552, 529 (1984) (The Supreme Court
has indicated that its cases “have proceeded on the assumption that common-law principles
should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do so.”). "[T]he official seeking
absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the
function in question." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). The present motions to
dismiss address three types of absolute immunity: judicial, quasi-judicial, and legislative.
Finally, the extension of immunity to a municipality for the actions of an “immune” employee
will also be discussed.
I. Absolute Judicial Immunity
A. Background
The doctrine of judicial immunity has long been recognized in both the American and
English legal systems. See Jeffrey Shaman, Judicial Immunity from Civil and Criminal
Liability, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1990).
As a historical matter, the doctrine of judicial immunity arose in response to the creation of the right of appeal. In the tenth and eleventh centuries in England, when no right of appeal existed, losing litigants could challenge unfavorable judgments on the ground that they were false. The litigant was entitled to both the nullification of a false judgment and a fine (known as an amercement) against the judge who had rendered it. As the right to appeal became available, it replaced amercements against judges, and gradually the doctrine of judicial immunity developed. . . . [O]nce appeal became available, judicial immunity was gradually accepted under the common law. In the seminal case of Floyd v. Barker, decided by Lord Coke in 1607,
7

judicial immunity was established for judges who served on English courts of record. In that decision, Lord Coke discussed for the first time what are now considered some of the modern policies that underlie the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity serves the following purposes according to Lord Coke: (1) It insures the finality of judgments; (2) it protects judicial independence; (3) it avoids continual attacks upon judges who may be sincere in their conduct; and (4) it protects the system of justice from falling into disrepute. Id. at 3. The doctrine of judicial immunity provides that judges are immune from suit for their judicial acts so long as the judicial acts are not in the “clear absence of jurisdiction.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871). The first major application of judicial immunity by the United States Supreme Court occurred in Bradley. Attorney Joseph Bradley brought suit against Judge George Fisher after the judge effectively disbarred him for rude and contemptuous behavior in the courtroom. Id. at 344-45. The Supreme Court found that this sanction was too harsh, but that the doctrine of judicial immunity shielded Judge Fisher from any monetary liability. Id. at 357. After discussing the decision in Floyd v. Barker, the Court stated that “[j]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Id. at 351. Bradley alleged that immunity was not appropriate because Fisher “wantonly, corruptly, arbitrarily, and oppressively” acted to remove him from the practice of law without any notice. Id. at 338. The Court stated that “[n]or can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed. The purity of their motives cannot in this way be the subject of judicial inquiry.” Id. at 348.
8

In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), reversed on other grounds in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court held that judicial immunity applies to actions under § 1983. In that case, the plaintiffs were members of a group of white and African-American Episcopal clergymen who attempted to use segregated facilities at an interstate bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi in 1961. Id. at 549. They brought suit against local police officers and a municipal police justice for false imprisonment after they were convicted of disturbing the peace. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the judge’s findings of guilt and sentences were based upon racial discrimination. Id. at 551. The Court again stated that “[judicial] immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” Id. at 554 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. at 349 n.16).
Judicial immunity was again the focus of the Supreme Court in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). In Stump, an Indiana circuit court judge granted a mother’s petition to sterilize her fifteen (15) year old daughter. Id. at 349. The petition was approved ex parte without a hearing and without notice to the daughter or appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id. The daughter was sterilized without her knowledge under the pretext of having her appendix removed. Id. After the daughter discovered the sterilization, she brought suit against the mother, the judge, the doctors, and others. Id. The Court clarified the two-part inquiry for determining whether judicial immunity applied: (1) a judicial act, (2) within the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction. Id. at 356. The Court stated, “[a] judge will not be deprived
9

of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id. at 356-57 (citation omitted). There was no question that the granting of a petition, even an unusual one such as this, was within the general jurisdiction of the Indiana circuit court. Id. at 350. The Court also expanded upon the requirement of a “judicial act” stating that it is “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” that informs the immunity analysis. Id. at 362. When determining if the act is a judicial, it is appropriate to consider “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,” and “the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his official capacity.” Id. The daughter argued that the judge’s act was “so unfair and so totally devoid of judicial concern for the interests and wellbeing of the young-girl involved as to disqualify it as a judicial act.” Id at 363. The Court, however, rejected this argument and granted judicial immunity. Id. 364.
In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), the Supreme Court addressed judicial immunity in relation to specific allegations of corruption. A judge of the District Court of Duval County, Texas granted an injunction preventing the production of minerals from certain oil leases by the plaintiffs. Id. at 26. The injunction was dissolved by an appellate court as being illegally issued. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the order was corruptly issued as a result of a conspiracy between the judge and two other defendants. Id. The Court had no difficulty in affirming the lower court’s ruling that the judge was immune from suit. Id. at 28. While the judge was immune from suit, the Court found that the conspiring parties could still be held liable under § 1983, stating:
10

Under these allegations, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the character of the judge’s action or that of his co-conspirators. Id. at 28. Because the granting of an injunction was within the jurisdiction of the judge, and it was a judicial act, judicial immunity shielded the judge from liability for damages. Id. The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion on judicial immunity came in Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). The Court again considered whether the judge acted within his jurisdiction, and whether the alleged conduct was a judicial act. Id. at 11. The plaintiff was a public defender who was scheduled to appear before the judge. Id. at 10. The plaintiff alleged that when he failed to appear for the initial call of the morning calendar, the judge ordered several police officers to forcibly bring him from another courtroom where he was waiting to appear. Id. The plaintiff further alleged that the judge instructed the officers to use unreasonable force, that they slammed him through the doors and swinging gates, and that the judge called him vulgar and offensive names. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had found that the alleged conduct was not a judicial act, and therefore that judicial immunity did not apply. Id. at 11. The Supreme Court summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and held that such conduct was a judicial act. Id. at 12. The Court again focused on the nature of the alleged act, in this case that the judge issued an order to the officers. Id. at 13. The Court held that this type of conduct was a judicial act, and therefore judicial immunity applied, regardless of any bad faith which might have motivated it. Id. at 12. The Court again repeated the justification behind judicial immunity:
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Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Id. at 10 (citing Bradley v. Fisher) (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has decided two cases where the doctrine of judicial immunity did not apply; in both cases because of the non-judicial nature of the acts involved. In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court focused on the requirement of a judicial act. Id. at 227. In Forrester, the plaintiff was a former probation officer who was fired by a state court judge, allegedly because of the probation officer’s sex. Id. at 221. The Court held that the decision to demote and fire an employee was taken in the capacity as an employer, rather than a judge. Id. The judge was not entitled to judicial immunity because the act was administrative, rather than judicial. Id. The Court stated, “this Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.” Id. The Supreme Court also denied judicial immunity in Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). In Cleavinger, the plaintiff sued a committee of prison officials who had a judicial-like function of adjudicating prison disciplinary violations. Id. at 194. The Court noted that judicial immunity has been extended to those “functionally comparable” to a judge, such as a federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge. Id. at 200 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 678, 513 (1978)). The Court found, however, that the officials were not independent decision-makers, only employees
12

of the prison temporarily diverted from their normal duties. Id. at 204. The doctrine of judicial immunity, therefore, did not extend to them as they did not have impartial decisionmaking power which should be protected for the public benefit. Id.
Judicial immunity, however, does not “insulate the judiciary from all aspects of public accountability.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980). Judges are immune from damages actions, but they may be removed by from office for their misconduct. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (impeachment); Pa. Const. art. V, § 18 (removal from office). Judges are also subject to criminal prosecutions. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). Indeed, the judges here have been indicted by a federal grand jury for the conduct for which damages are sought in this case. Similarly, judges are not immune from all hassle created by civil litigation; for example, they may be called as witnesses. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 31.
B. Application Judges have absolute judicial immunity for conduct pursuant to their role as judicial officers. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 359 ("A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors."). “Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, ‘it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347). For judicial immunity to apply, only two requirements need to be met: jurisdiction over the dispute, and a judicial act. As to the first, a judge is not immune only when he has acted
13

in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump 435 U.S. at 349 (citation omitted). Second, a judicial immunity extends only to “judicial acts,” not administrative, executive, or legislative ones. Id. at 360-61.
1. Jurisdiction “[T]he necessary inquiry in determining whether a defendant judge is immune from suit is whether at the time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him . . . . [T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (citation omitted). The fact that the judge was incorrect about the status of jurisdiction or that there were procedural errors causing the judge to act without jurisdiction does not satisfy the requirements for defeating immunity. Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 771 (3d Cir. 2000). Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a), “the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings by law and usage in the court of common pleas.” In the present case, the courtroom actions3 of Ciavarella and Conahan were not taken in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Decisions to grant a preliminary injunction, as Conahan did, or in adjudicating juveniles delinquent and imposing sentences, as Ciavarella did, are both well within the jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania common pleas judge. The Plaintiffs argue that because Ciavarella’s acts contravened the Constitution of the United States, he was acting in the “clear absence of jurisdiction” and therefore is not immune from suit. The Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition, nor is there any. They
3 I focus on the courtroom conduct of Ciavarella and Conahan given the discussion below of a judicial act, infra Part I. B. 2.
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allege that Ciavarella violated the constitutional rights of the juveniles brought before him in the following ways: (1) his court or tribunal was not impartial; (2) he failed to advise them of the right to counsel and therefore assure that any waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary; and (3) he failed to determine that the pleas of guilty were knowing and voluntary. While these acts constitute egregious, unjustifiable judicial behavior, they do not make out a case for the absence of jurisdiction. If unconstitutional acts by a judge deprived the court of jurisdiction, and hence eliminated judicial immunity, it could be argued that all erroneous decisions in constitutional tort cases would subject the judge to civil liability. Such is not, and should not be, the case. As to their courtroom behavior, I conclude that both Ciavarella and Conahan had jurisdiction.
2. Judicial Act When determining if the act is a judicial, it is appropriate to consider “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,” and “the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his official capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. It is the nature of the function performed, not the identify of the actor who performed it, that informs the immunity analysis. Id. “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of authority.” Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351. There is an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227. There must be an evaluation of each alleged act to determine if it is “judicial” in nature. Acts which are traditionally done by judges include issuing orders, resolving cases and controversies, making rulings, and
15

sentencing criminal defendants. Other actions such as sending a fax, or hiring and firing subordinates, have been found to be administrative, rather than judicial, acts. Note, however, that even if an act is not judicial, there may be still be immunity if the act is legislative or executive in nature.
Plaintiffs argue that because the decisions were made corruptly or in a predetermined fashion that they were not judicial acts. Plaintiffs, however, cite no cases in support of this position. In fact, a judicial act “does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227. Judges are not liable even when they have allegedly acted maliciously or corruptly. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351. In Stump v. Sparkman, a similar argument was made by the plaintiffs and rejected. In that case, Judge Stump ordered that a young girl be sterilized without her knowledge or consent at her mother’s request. The Court stated:
[R]espondents argue that Judge Stump’s action was “so unfair” and “so totally devoid of judicial concern for the interests and well-being of the young girl involved” as to disqualify it as a judicial act. Disagreement with the action taken by the judge, however, does not justify depriving the judge of his immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 363. The Court went on to find that Judge Stump had absolute judicial immunity. Id. at 364. The inquiry at this step is not the intent of the judge, nor the extent of the error. The only question is objectively whether the alleged action is one that traditionally a judge would perform or that the parties expected would come from the judge in an official capacity. Conahan’s issuance of an injunction for an alleged corrupt motive is identical to the conduct the Supreme Court considered when granting immunity in Dennis v. Sparks.
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Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28 (illegal injunction allegedly based upon corruption). As to Ciavarella, focusing only on the nature of the act performed, as I am required to do by law, I also find that the determinations of delinquency and the sentences imposed were judicial acts. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the alleged motivations, be they corrupt or with malice, are irrelevant to this determination. As to the courtroom acts of Conahan and Ciavarella, I find that they are protected by judicial immunity.
That is not to say, however, that every act alleged of the two was judicial in nature. For example, Conahan’s signing of a “Placement Agreement” would be an administrative, not a judicial act. Similarly, any acts in making budget requests to the Luzerne County commissioners would also be administrative or executive in nature. And the actions of Conahan and Ciavarella in coercing probation officers to change their recommendations is outside of the role of a judicial officer. Probation officers are to advise the court, not the other way round, on sentencing matters. The nature of these acts are not judicial in nature, and therefore judicial immunity does not shield such conduct.
In finding that the courtroom conduct of Conahan and Ciavarella is shielded by the doctrine of judicial immunity, I am not unmindful of the egregious nature of the alleged conduct presented by this case. This is, however, about the rule of law. It is about the rule of law in the face of popular opinion which would seek a finding directly contrary to the result the rule of law dictates. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have argued that such egregious actions demand a contrary result. They argue that the conduct is so contemptible that immunity should not be available. They also note Ciavarella’s admission that he did some, if not all, of the acts for which he was indicted and suggest that this fact renders judicial immunity unavailable. They argue further that immunity should be available only for honest mistakes
17

and that failing such, the doctrine of immunity should not apply.4 As previously noted, the doctrine of judicial immunity is grounded on notions dating
back to Lord Coke. These notions are: the finality of judgments, the protection of judicial independence, the avoidance of continual acts on judges who may be sincere, and the protection of the justice system from falling into disrepute. Shaman, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. at 3. These concerns are as valid today as they were four hundred years ago. Moreover, the case law establishes that the availability of immunity is not determined by a sliding scale. The degree of corrupt behavior is not the touchstone of the immunity doctrine’s application. The doctrine holds that judges with bad intentions, as well as those with good intentions, are immune from suit.
Egregious conduct is immune to assure that honest mistakes will be immune. Subjecting judges to a determination of the existence of good faith on a case by case basis is not desirable. It would create chaos and undermine judicial independence. It would eliminate the finality of judgments and destroy public confidence in the judiciary. Every decision by every judge would be subject to attack (in court) on the basis that it was not an honest mistake. Even though almost all erroneous decisions – and history proves this – are honest mistakes, subjecting each decision to judicial scrutiny as to whether it was motivated by good faith, would render the justice system unstable, ineffective and would destroy public confidence in the judiciary. It would turn the justice system upside-down. Imagine the continuum of litigation over decisions to determine whether they were rendered in good faith. Even the decisions that determined they had been rendered in good faith would be
4 These contentions were also advanced in an amicus curae brief filed by a group of twenty former judges, law school deans, law professors, and practitioners.
18

subject to attack themselves, and so on. The notion of the stability provided by the finality of judgments would perish. Moreover, it is not as though judicial decisions are not scrutinized. Mistakes are dealt with on appeal, and egregious behavior by judges is subject to prosecution under the criminal law and removal from office. It is readily apparent that the doctrine of judicial immunity, as it has developed and exists today, creates an environment which permits judges to be independent of the other branches of government, the will of the majority, and designing persons; it provides stability through finality; and, it has the confidence of the public. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit. Former Judge Conahan, however, is not immune for the majority of his conduct, as the Plaintiffs’ allegations pertain to non-judicial acts. The shielding blanket of judicial immunity does not cover his actions simply because of his former status. The doctrine of judicial immunity need not, and does not, shelter Ciavarella and Conahan’s non-judicial conduct.
The Motions to Dismiss by Ciavarella and Conahan will be granted as to their courtroom conduct. Specifically, Conahan’s motion will be granted as to his action granting injunctive relief preventing the release of the PACC audit. Ciavarella’s motion will be granted as to his juvenile delinquency determinations and the sentences he imposed. As to the remaining allegations against each, the doctrine of judicial immunity does not shield
19

them from liability, because the other allegations relate to non-judicial acts. I will deny their Motions to Dismiss as to such non-judicial conduct.
II. Quasi-Judicial Immunity A. Witness/Psychologist Immunity Persons functioning as integral parts of the judicial process are immune from suits under § 1983. McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992). This immunity extends to a psychologist retained or appointed by the court to evaluate an individual and to report back to the court. Id. This immunity does not extend, however, to actions taken beyond the assistance to the court in making its ruling. Id. at 1086 (immunity does not extend to filing a petition for involuntary commitment which was full of lies, since any person could file such a request). Dr. Vita argues that because he acted as a psychologist to assist the court, he cannot be held liable for his actions advising the court. Plaintiffs respond that it was not the recommendations by Vita which furthered the conspiracy, rather that he intentionally created a backlog of recommendations so that juveniles remained incarcerated for a longer period of time. The signing of a contract and the management of one’s caseload are administrative actions to which quasi-judicial immunity does not apply. The delays would not assist the court in making any determinations about the juveniles. As the Plaintiffs’ allegations focus only on these administrative acts, Dr. Vita’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied. B. Compliance with a Court Order “[A]ction taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2003);
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see Wolfe v. City of Pittsburgh, 140 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1998); Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2001). Immunity has been granted to a group-home for complying with a court order. Von Schlichten v. County of Northampton, 279 Fed. Appx. 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008). In the present case, Perseus House claims that their incarceration of plaintiff Humanik was based upon a court order. To the extent that Perseus House was simply complying with the court order, they are immune. Plaintiff Humanik’s allegations, however, extend beyond mere incarceration to mistreatment, abuse, and forced medication during her incarceration. (Ind. ¶ 158-59.) For any conduct beyond the court order, there is no immunity. Perseus House argues that because Ciavarella’s order declared that “treatment” was to be given, it shields them from liability from subsequent conduct. This is simply too broad of a reading of quasi-judicial immunity for acting pursuant to a court order. This would give them carte blanche to treat incarcerated juveniles in any manner which they believed was effective treatment. Only that conduct specifically demanded by the court order is shielded by absolute immunity; any remaining conduct can still create liability. As to the allegations of false imprisonment, I find that Perseus House is entitled to quasijudicial immunity because a facially valid court order directed Humanik’s incarceration. As to the allegations of mistreatment at the facility, I find that such conduct would be beyond compliance with the order, and therefore immunity does not attach. The Motion to Dismiss will be granted as to false imprisonment, and denied as to the remaining counts.
III. Absolute Legislative Immunity “Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken ‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.’” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (quoting Tenney v.
21

Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)). “Legislative immunity shields from suit not only legislators, but also public officials outside of the legislative branch when they perform legislative functions.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). There is a two-part test to determine whether actions are to be regarded as legislative for immunity purposes: (1) the action must be "substantively" legislative, which requires that it involve a policy-making or line-drawing decision; and (2) the action must be "procedurally" legislative, which requires that it be undertaken through established legislative procedures. Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989)).
The Supreme Court has recognized that judges sometimes perform legislative actions. Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 773 (3d Cir. 2000); see Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 (noting a distinction "between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform"). “Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. Generally legislative acts are those which apply generally to the entire community, while acts specifically directed at one or a few individuals are administrative. Acierno, 40 F.3d at 611. Again, like judicial immunity the question is not the intent of the actor. Only the type of action taken is considered to determine if an act is legislative. There must be an analysis made of each alleged action to determine if immunity applies. Conahan alleges that legislative immunity applies only to his conduct with respect to the court’s budget.
22

There appears to be no legal basis for the argument that the president judge has the legislative power to control and administer even a portion of the county budget.5 As the Plaintiffs argue in their brief in opposition, “Pennsylvania law does not vest a president judge with the power to create, vote on, or sign into law a county budget.” (Doc. 282 at 67.) The cases which address the interaction between the president judge and the county commissioners instead suggest that the president judge makes budget recommendations to the commissioners, but that the commissioners must make the final spending allocations. See, e.g., Lavelle v. Koch, 617 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1992) (president judge seeking to compel commissioners to disperse funds); Becket v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1981) (same). This type of political lobbying is distinct from legislative activity. Because Conahan’s activity with respect to the Luzerne County budget was not legislative in nature, I find that absolute legislative immunity does not apply.
IV. Extension to a Municipality Luzerne County argues that because the relevant actors, such as the county commissioners or judges, may be entitled to immunity, so too should the county be immune. This argument, however, ignores the nature of absolute immunity. Absolute immunity such as legislative or judicial immunity is to protect the actor to make them capable of completing
5 Not only is the power to directly control budgetary matters not specifically given to president judges, it would likely violate the separation of powers under the Pennsylvania Constitution to give this type of legislative spending power to a judicial officer. See Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57 (Pa. 1949) ("The function of the judiciary to administer justice does not include the power to levy taxes in order to defray the necessary expenses in connection therewith. It is the legislature which must supply such funds."); Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697 (Pa. 1932) (Control of state finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional limitations).
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their task, not to vacate all responsibility for such conduct. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (conspirators liable “under color of state law” even where judge was immune). The Supreme Court has specifically held that “municipalities have no immunity from damages flowing from their constitutional violations.” Hynson By and Through Hynson v. City of Chester, 827 F.2d 932, 934 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980)). Luzerne County is therefore not protected by any of the aforementioned immunity doctrines.
CONCLUSION Motions to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part as discussed above. An appropriate Order follows.

November 20, 2009 Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

24

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.

CONSOLIDATED TO: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants. ******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

JUDGE MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants. ******************************************************************************************************

H.T., et al.,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357

MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

ORDER
NOW, this 20th day of November, 2009, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Perseus House’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 170) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. As to the claim of false imprisonment, the motion is GRANTED. b. As to the remainder the motion is DENIED.
2. Defendant Vita’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 188) is DENIED.
3. Defendant Mark Ciavarella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 210) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. As to judicial immunity for the courtroom adjudications and sentences imposed, the motion is GRANTED. b. As to the remainder the motion is DENIED.
4. Defendant Michael Conahan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 216) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. As to judicial immunity for the granting of injunctive relief, the motion is GRANTED. b. As to the remainder the motion is DENIED.
5. Defendant Luzerne County’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 218) is DENIED.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

 
 Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 1 of 40

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

__________________________________________

:

ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER,

:

KELLY FARMER, JOSEPH RIMMER, and

:

ZANE FARMER,

:

both individually and on behalf of a class of others :

similarly situated,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER

:

10-CV-1405-ARC

MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., MICHAEL T. :

CONAHAN, COUNTY OF LUZERNE,

:

GREG SKREPENAK, TODD VONDERHEID, :

SAM GUESTO,

:

SANDRA BRULO, LUZERNE COUNTY

:

SECOND AMENDED

DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE PROBATION, :

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

ROBERT POWELL, ROBERT MERICLE,

:

MERICLE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

:

PA CHILD CARE, LLC, WESTERN PA

:

CHILD CARE, LLC., and MID-ATLANTIC

:

CHILD YOUTH SERVICES, INC.,

:

:

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

:

__________________________________________:

The present class action addresses one of the most horrific violations of civil rights

imaginable, where two state court judges, Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan, accepted

bribes from several corporations and private citizens to incarcerate children. These children

were incarcerated in the absence of any due process protections, including the right to counsel or

the right to a fair trial. Ciavarella and Conahan could not have acted alone, however. Instead, in

order for their bribery scheme to work, they need the assistance of several officials in the

Luzerne County government, including the County Manager, two County Commissioners and

Luzerne County’s chief probation officer. The Plaintiffs in this action maintain the above-named

Luzerne County officials affirmatively conspired with, if not actively participated in, Judges

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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 2 of 40
Ciavarella and Conahan’s scheme of trading kids for cash. As several of these individuals are policy makers for Defendant County of Luzerne, Luzerne County is directly responsible for the wholesale violation of constitutional rights suffered by members of the proposed class.
The proposed classes here represent all children who were placed into detention by former Judges Ciavarella and Conahan, as well as the parents of those children. All of these children had a range of constitutional rights violated by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan, as well as several Luzerne County officials, and all were illegal incarcerated in the absence of any meaningful due process. The emotional devastation suffered by these children defies explanation. All of the parents in the proposed classes were required to pay Luzerne County child support, and all were illegally deprived of the companionship of their children for weeks or months. All deserve to be compensated by a County government that can fairly be characterized as being corrupt to its core, and one where the suffering of innocent children was tolerated for the sake of greed.
With this as a background, Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer and Zane Farmer, complain, through counsel, as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1341 & 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction under claims relating to a violation of state law under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 3 of 40
2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims and those of proposed class members occurred in this judicial district. Additionally, all of the Defendants reside in this judicial district.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Angela Rimmer Belanger is a citizen of the United States and resides in Luzerne County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 4. Plaintiff Kelly Farmer is a citizen of the United States and resides in Luzerne County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 5. Plaintiff Joseph Rimmer is a citizen of the United States and resides in Luzerne County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 6. Plaintiff Zane Farmer is a citizen of the United States and resides in Luzerne County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 7. Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella (“Defendant Ciavarella”) is a former Judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, and held that position at all times relevant to this complaint. Defendant Ciavarella currently resides at 585 Rutter Avenue, Kingston, Pennsylvania. Claims are asserted against Defendant Ciavarella in his individual capacity. 8. Defendant Michael T. Conahan (“Defendant Conahan”) is a former Judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, and held that position at all times relevant to this complaint. Defendant Conahan currently resides at 301 Deer Run Road, Mountain Top, Pennsylvania. Claims are asserted against Defendant Conahan in his individual capacity.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 4 of 40
9. Defendant Luzerne County is a county government duly organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business being 200 North River Street, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711.
10. Defendant Sam Guesto is the former County Manager/Chief Clerk of Defendant Luzerne County, and held that position until on or about January 23, 2008. Following his resignation as County Manager, Defendant Guesto was then employed as a court administrator, having been hired by Defendant Ciavarella. Upon information and belief, Defendant Guesto currently resides in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Claims are asserted against Defendant Guesto in his individual capacity.
11. Defendant Gregory Skrepenak is a former member of the Luzerne County Board of Commissioners, and held that position at all times relevant to this complaint. Upon information and belief, Defendant Skrepenak currently resides in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Claims are asserted against Defendant Skrepenak in his individual capacity.
12. Defendant Todd Vonderheid is a former member of the Luzerne County Board of Commissioners, and held that position at all times relevant to this complaint. Upon information and belief, Defendant Vonderheid currently resides in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Claims are asserted against Defendant Vonderheid in his individual capacity.
13. Defendant Sandra Brulo is the former Deputy Director of Forensic Programs of the Luzerne County Department of Probation, and held that position, or position of similar importance, at all times relevant to this complaint. Defendant Brulo currently resides at 96 Allenberry Drive, Hanover, Pennsylvania. Claims are asserted against Defendant Brulo in her individual capacity.
4

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 5 of 40
14. Defendant Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation is the duly authorized Department of Juvenile Probation for the County of Luzerne, with its principal place of business being the Luzerne County Courthouse, Penn Place, 20 N. Pennsylvania Avenue, Wilkes-Barre, PA.
15. Defendant Robert Powell is a former partner in Defendants PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care LLC, and held that position at all times relevant to this lawsuit. Defendant Powell currently resides at 10 Fox Run Road, Drums, Pennsylvania.
16. Defendant Robert Mericle is the current owner of Defendant Mericle Construction, Inc., and held that position at all times relevant to this lawsuit. Defendant Mericle currently resides at 100 Baltimore Drive, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
17. Defendant Mericle Construction, Inc., is a close corporation duly registered under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business being 33 Beekman Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
18. Defendant PA Child Care, LLC, is a limited liability company duly registered under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business being 520 Walnut Street, P. O. Box 8581, Reading, Pennsylvania.
19. Defendant Western PA Child Care, LLC, is a limited liability company duly registered under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business being 1105 Berkshire Boulevard, Suite 320, Wyomissing, Pennsylvania.
20. Defendant Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Inc. is a corporation registered under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business being 12 Dakota Drive, Emlenton, PA 16373.
5

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 6 of 40
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 21. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals who were both illegally incarcerated, and forced to pay child support, based on the reprehensible actions of Judges Ciavarella and Conahan. 22. The Plaintiffs seek to represent three classes. The first class, to be represented by Class Representatives Joseph Rimmer and Zane Farmer, is defined as follows: CLASS ONE All children who were adjudicated delinquent, adjudicated to have violated the conditions of their probation, and/or referred for placement by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan from January 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008, whose adjudications have been or will be expunged or otherwise vacated on the date of class certification. 23. The second and third classes, to be represented by Class Representatives Angela Rimmer Belanger and Kelly Farmer are defined below. The third subclass, to be represented by Kelly Farmer, is also defined below: CLASS TWO All parents/guardians of children in Class One who were required to pay child support and/or other costs and fees to the County of Luzerne, including court costs, fines, penalties, restitution, fees, payments for psychological assessments, or any other costs, as a result of their adjudications and/or residential placements made by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan. CLASS THREE All parents/guardians of children in Class One who were placed in residential facilities and/or were incarcerated following adjudications by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan. 24. There are no conflicts between the representatives of the distinct classes.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 7 of 40
25. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action under Federal law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements for maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
26. The members of the class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable. There were several hundred juveniles who were adversely adjudicated by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan, each of whom had parents or guardians who were required to pay child support and/or other costs based on these adjudications. Upon information and belief, the size of the proposed class for Class One totals at least 1,500 individuals, some of whom have had their civil rights violated on multiple occasions. The size of the proposed class for Class Two totals, upon information and belief, at least 2,500 individuals.
27. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of class members and the fact that class members are likely dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of Luzerne County and this Judicial District. Furthermore, upon information and belief, many members of the class are low-income persons, and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights individually.
28. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, in that they all had their civil rights violated by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan. The juvenile class members had their due process rights violated by these Judges. The parent class members also had their rights violated, including their right to due process regarding child support payments and their rights to family relationships being free from illegal government interference.
7

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 8 of 40
29. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs and all members of the class sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s course of conduct. The harms suffered by the Plaintiff are typical of the harms suffered by the class members.
30. The representative Plaintiffs have the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse to the interests of the members of the Class.
31. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who have substantial experience and success in the prosecution of class action and civil rights litigation.
32. In short, Plaintiffs’ counsel has the resources, expertise and experience to successfully prosecute this action against the Defendants, including Luzerne County. Counsel for the Plaintiff knows of no conflicts among members of the class or between counsel and members of the class.
33. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and the respective Subclasses, and predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the Class. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation, the impact of the conspiracy between all of the Defendants to engage in the wholesale violation of civil rights of both juvenile and parent class members, and the responsibility of Luzerne County and/or its municipal policymakers for these civil rights violations.
34. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members of the class is impracticable given the large number of class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to
8

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 9 of 40
them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating thousands of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action in this District presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the Class.
35. In the alternative to certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs also seek partial certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS The Conspiracy to Bribe Judges Ciavarella and Conahan 36. Under Pennsylvania Law, juvenile court proceedings are handled by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in the county in which a juvenile delinquency proceeding is filed. 37. Juveniles retain the same rights as other criminal defendants, including the right to due process of law and the right to counsel. 38. The actions of Judges Ciavarella and Conahan clearly eviscerated these rights, in that the Judges consistently refused to provide the juvenile class members with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and also had them waive their right to counsel, in an effort to incarcerate as many children as possible under a bribery scheme. 39. Both Judge Ciavarella and Conahan have pled guilty to accepting $2.6 million in bribes paid to them by Defendants Robert Powell and Robert Mericle for placing juveniles from Luzerne County in the custody of PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 10 of 40
40. Powell was the co-owner of PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. Mericle owned a construction company that was hired to build the facilities for PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care. Mid-Atlantic Youth Services provides services at both the PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care facilities, and, upon information and belief, was also owned by Defendant Powell.
41. These bribes were paid to Judges Ciavarella and Conahan over time, including monies paid through the use of multiple fraudulent financial transactions or shell companies.
42. These bribes were paid to facilitate a “Placement Guarantee Agreement” between Judge Conahan and PA Child Care. This “Placement Guarantee Agreement” guaranteed substantial annual payments from Luzerne County to PA Child Care. In June 2002, at the time this agreement was reached, Conahan was the President Judge of Luzerne County.
43. Ciavarella freely testified during an evidentiary hearing that Mericle himself came to his chambers and indicated he was going to pay Ciavarella a “finder’s fee.” Upon information and belief, Ciavarella and Conahan told others in the Luzerne County government about this “finder’s fee” on several occasions during the class period.
44. Conahan was offered half of the bribe money by Ciavarella because “he was the one who made it all possible. He put the people in the room that came up with the financing to build the facility.”
45. In exchange for their bribes to Conahan and Ciavarella, Powell and Mericle were to receive approximately $58 million from Luzerne County over twenty years to house juveniles. In pleading guilty to Federal fraud charges, Defendant Powell acknowledged that the bribes paid to Conahan and Ciavarella were a “quid pro quo” for the sentencing of youth to the facilities owned by PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care, as well as ensuring the future relationship
10

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 11 of 40
between Luzerne County and these for-profit juvenile detention facilities. Defendant Conahan further confirmed that the payments to himself and Judge Ciavarella from Powell and Mericle were “kickback gratuities.”
46. Ciavarella and Conahan lived up to their end of the “quid pro quo.” During the proposed class period, Ciavarella routinely sentenced juveniles to terms of incarceration for even the most minor of offenses. Most importantly, Ciavarella adjudicated these cases in the absence of any of the procedural protections normally associated with juvenile cases, including giving the juvenile class members legal counsel to protect their rights. Given the underlying facts of the bribery scheme, it is easy to understand why Ciavarella was reticent to allow for the participation of legal counsel in these juvenile proceedings.
47. One of Ciavarella’s worst abuses came in the form of an unorthodox “fine court,” where juveniles who could not pay Court Ordered fines were incarcerated.
48. During this time, children appearing before Ciavarella were provided with waiver of counsel forms, prepared by Defendant Sandra Brulo, that were insufficient and illegal on their face. Of the children who waived counsel before Defendant Ciavarella, over half were incarcerated, as compared to roughly ten percent of juveniles who waived counsel in the rest of Pennsylvania.
49. Additionally, many children were also held in custody for two weeks for a “psychological evaluation” conducted by Conahan’s brother-in-law; evaluations that almost always recommended incarceration for juvenile detainees.
50. At least 5,000 children were adjudicated by Ciavarella during the class period. During that time, Luzerne County had the highest rate of juvenile incarceration in Pennsylvania—by several orders of magnitude.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 12 of 40
51. The damage caused by Ciavarella and Conahan’s greed is beyond imagination. Thousands of children had their lives negatively affected, if not destroyed, by their conduct. The damage to the parents of these children, including their relationship with their children, was similarly affected.
52. The County, of course, was able to recoup some of their ill-made expenditures to facilitate the Judges’ bribery scheme because they were able to take child support, and social security payments, from the parents of children that were wrongfully incarcerated. The County, and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, upon information and belief, also used funds received from the Federal government under Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (hereafter, the Juvenile Justice Act), 42 U.S.C. § 5601 et. seq. to facilitate the illegal incarceration of juvenile class members.
53. The Judges’ bribery scheme, and the particulars of their actions, and the actions and inactions of other Defendants, was thoroughly detailed in the Report of the Interbranch Commission on Juvenile Justice.
The Participation of Luzerne County Officials in the Conspiracy, Either Directly or by Fostering and Tolerating a Culture of Corruption
A. Defendants Skrepenak and Vonderheid 54. The revelations about the conduct of Ciavarella and Conahan resulted in an
expansive Federal investigation into Luzerne County government; an investigation that revealed a culture of corruption and graft that permeated all levels of county management.
55. The Plaintiffs, as stated below, maintain that members of the Luzerne County government, including the County Manager, two County Commissioners, and Luzerne County’s chief probation officer, actively conspired with Judges Ciavarella and Conahan to facilitate their
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bribery scheme to illegally incarcerate juveniles. At a minimum, these individuals participated as members of a conspiracy to deprive thousands of juveniles, and their parents, of their civil rights, and further oversaw a County government that was rotten to its core.
56. Judges Ciavarella and Conahan’s bribery scheme, including their efforts to send juvenile detainees to PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care facilities, was aided on several occasions by Luzerne County officials that the County’s participation in this fiasco can hardly be considered anything less than willful.
57. In 2000, Defendants Powell and Ciavarella discussed the prospect of having Defendant Luzerne County house juvenile offenders at a private facility. These discussions resulted in Defendant PA Child Care sending an unsolicited proposal to the County to build a juvenile detention facility in Pittston and lease the facility to the County for $37 million over thirty years.
58. The dialogue between Powell and Ciavarella led to the execution of the “Placement Guarantee Agreement” in January 2002.
59. Luzerne County Commissioners initially rejected PA Child Care’s proposals, stating their preference to continue using a County-owned juvenile detention Center.
60. Despite having an adequate facility for housing juvenile detainees that was judged “safe and satisfactory” by the Department of Public Welfare, Judge Conahan announced that juveniles would no longer be sent to the County facility, claiming the conditions there were “deplorable.”
61. The County later agreed to house juvenile offenders at the PA Child Care facility, although the County, prior to the election of Commissioners Gregory Skrepenak and Todd
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Vonderheid, planned to build a new public facility rather than utilize PA Child Care because of the exorbitant fees charged by PA Child Care.
62. In 2004, upon the election of Gregory Skrepenak and Todd Vonderheid as County Commissioners, the County backed away from building their own facility, and instead agreed to contract with PA Child Care for $58 million over 20 years to house adjudicated juveniles. This vote was held subsequent to Powell and Mericle agreeing to pay a substantial sum of money to Judges Conahan and Ciavarella to guarantee that children would continue to be sent to PA Child Care facilities. Shortly after Skrepenak and Vonderheid’s vote to approve the PA Child Care contract, Judges Conahan and Ciavarella received another $1,000,000 kickback from Powell and Mericle.
63. In their role as County Commissioners, Skrepenak and Vonderheid were policy makers for Luzerne County.
64. During the course of their tenure as County Commissioners, Skrepenak and Vonderheid allowed Judges Ciavarella and Conahan to spend money, let contracts and hire personnel without regarding to county rules or policies, and in violation of the separation of powers provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution
65. As noted by the Interbranch Commission on Juvenile Justice, “the Luzerne County Commissioners, during the period from 2002 to 2008, abdicated certain responsibilities by failing to exercise appropriate oversight regarding budget issues, managing the county-owned juvenile detention facility, and supervising county staff.”
66. Following the agreements and bribes detailed above, the County provided PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care with a sweetheart deal that guaranteed excessive profits to Defendant Robert Powell. Specifically, state auditors harshly criticized the County’s contract
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with PA Child Care, determining that the County would have paid significantly less to build and maintain its own facility. State auditors also harshly criticized the County’s decision to pay for empty beds at the Western PA Child Care facility.
67. Following an audit by the Pennsylvania Welfare Department, it was revealed that Luzerne County made excessive payments above reimbursable costs to both PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care, and that the County could have built three juvenile detention centers for the cost of its lease with PA Child Care.
68. The Agreements were subjected to harsh criticism by Steve Flood, the Luzerne County Controller, who held public hearings, attempted to subpoena Judges Ciavarella and Conahan, and repeatedly criticized and questioned Defendants Skrepenak and Vonderheid at commissioner meetings. Several county officials, including Skrepenak and Vonderheid, repeatedly denigrated and retaliated against Flood for criticizing the County’s agreement with PA Child Care. Skrepenak and Vonderheid also repeatedly obstructed Flood’s investigation into the County’s contract with PA Child Care.
69. The sequence of events detailed above (besides the bribes) were printed, repeatedly, in local newspapers who questioned the County’s decision to send children to PA Child Care facilities, and further questioned the series of sweetheart deals that allowed for PA Child Care to receive so many juveniles from Luzerne County. Local newspapers further printed facts about the record number of juveniles being incarcerated from Luzerne County.
70. Unbelievably, despite being aware of the bribery scheme, Defendant Vonderheid has publicly defended the County’s contract with PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care, and further attempts to justify his actions in agreeing to that contract.
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71. The actions of Judges Ciavarella and Conahan are set against the backdrop of the culture of corruption that was Luzerne County politics during Skrepenak and Vonderheid’s term as Luzerne County Commissioners. Bribing public officials was the name of the game in Luzerne County, and several Luzerne County officials, including Commissioner Skrepenak, have pleaded guilty to accepting bribes from various contractors and businessmen for their help in obtaining County contracts or favors. Skrepenak has also been accused of being involved in several shady business dealings with no-bid contracts in exchange for receiving free services from those contractors.
72. During Skrepenak and Vonderheid’s reign as the majority of County Commissioners, the following Luzerne County officials pled guilty and/or were criminally charged with corruption: William Brace, Deputy County Manager, acceptance of a bribe for supporting a contract relative to County business; Gerald Bonner, Luzerne County Housing Authority Member and Jury Commissioner, assisting a fellow board member to obtain a bribe; William Maguire, Luzerne County Housing Authority Member, accepting a bribe from a business owner with business with his County agency; Howard Bellas, Luzerne County Redevelopment Authority, accepting a bribe from a contractor for assistance with a tax forgiveness program; Bob Reilly, Clerk of Courts of Luzerne County, accepting bribe from contractor; William Sharkey, Luzerne County Court Administrator, stealing court funds; Douglas Richards, Luzerne County Human Resources Director, accepting $1,000 bribe in support with contract awarded by the County; Jill Moran, Luzerne County Prothonotary, honest services fraud.
73. Upon information and belief, Skrepenak and Vonderheid were allied both politically and socially with Judges Conahan and Ciavarella.
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74. In short, the Plaintiffs believe that, as at least Skrepenak has taken bribes from others having dealings with the County, that both Skrepenak and Vonderheid either knew of Judges Ciavarella and Conahan’s illegal conduct relative to PA Child Care and participated in it, or knew that something was improper, did nothing to address it and, in fact, actively worked to facilitate it.
75. The Plaintiffs’ suspicions in this regard are confirmed by the testimony of County Commissioner Stephen Urban that he met with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to discuss the County’s contract with PA Child Care in 2006.
76. The Plaintiffs further maintain that Skrepenak, Vonderheid and others in County government were made aware of the unusual nature of the PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care contracts when PA Child Care sued the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare to stop an audit, claiming that the audit of the use of public funds would violate “trade secrets.” PA Child Care’s lawsuit seeking to quash a subpoena was granted, and the entire proceeding was sealed – by Judge Conahan.
77. The Honorable Chester Muroski, a judge on the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, also complained to the FBI in 2005. Muroski went further, and wrote to the Luzerne County Commissioners, including Defendants Skrepenak and Vonderheid, complaining about the massive amount of County money being spent on incarcerating juvenile detainees. Muroski was removed from hearing juvenile cases by Conahan just days after writing to the County Commissioners.
78. Upon information and belief, Conahan and Ciavarella openly discussed their “finder’s fee” arrangement with Powell and Mericle with others in the Luzerne County government, including Defendants Skrepenak, Vonderheid, Guesto and Brulo.
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79. The Plaintiffs in this action maintain that the actions of the County, through its chief policymakers, smell to high heaven, in that county officials were either expressly aware of the bribery scheme, or, at a minimum, should have known about it and did nothing to intervene. These actions, as further detailed below, make Luzerne County equally responsible for the trading of kids for cash.
80. All of these facts, taken together, cannot be coincidental.
B. County Manager Sam Guesto 81. The Plaintiffs maintain that Sam Guesto, the Luzerne County Manager, was an
integral part of the conspiracy to allow for the payment of kids for cash to Judges Conahan and Ciavarella.
82. In his position as County Manager, Guesto oversaw the expenditure of funds by Luzerne County.
83. In his role as County Manager, Guesto was a policy maker for Luzerne County. 84. During his tenure as County Manager, Guesto participated in a number of shady and improper dealings regarding the expenditure of county money, including working to expand the Luzerne County Jail, and providing preferential treatment to contractors, without receiving approval from the County Commissioners, and a “no bid” contract to JPW Construction Management. 85. Guesto also oversaw the expenditure of County funds to pay for the County’s contract with PA Child Care, and, upon information and belief, he participated in drafting the County’s agreement and in the decision to hire PA Child Care in the first instance.
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86. Guesto was also involved in a scandal involving County debit cards being used improperly. Despite this fraud, Skrepenak advocated for Guesto to keep his job as County Manager.
87. Guesto is described in media reports as part of Greg Skrepenak’s “inner circle;” several members of the “inner circle” have been indicted as part of the federal corruption probe of Luzerne County politics.
88. Defendant Guesto is currently the subject of an extensive criminal investigation by the United States Government, including for participating in the culture of corruption and bribery in Luzerne County that allowed for the routine abuses detailed in this complaint.
89. Upon information and belief, Guesto was well aware of the scheme to bribe Judges Conahan and Ciavarella, given that he oversaw exorbitant payments to PA Child Care, including some made on an “emergency” basis, and was closely aligned with the Judges.
90. In his role as County Manager, Mr. Guesto repeatedly stonewalled any investigation into the County’s contract with PA Child Care, including refusing to provide a copy of a state audit to members of the County Commissioners. Guesto also severely inhibited Steve Flood’s investigation into the PA Child Care contracts.
91. Subsequent to revelations that Guesto misused, and failed to supervise, the use of County debit cards, Judge Conahan telephoned and threatened County Commissioner Maryanne Petrilla in an effort to keep Guesto in his job. Conahan also facilitated over 40 other public officials calling Petrilla to advocate for Guesto.
92. Once Guesto lost his job as County Manager, he had a soft landing, being hired by Judge Conahan to be an administrator in the Luzerne County Courts in a new position created for Guesto. This fact, in and of itself, is indicative that Guesto was part of the “inner circle”
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relative to the fraudulent payments to Luzerne County; Guesto was hired by the very court system whose fraud he had facilitated, tolerated, and/or worked to conceal.
93. The Plaintiffs maintain the circumstantial evidence, and Guesto’s current investigation by federal authorities, demonstrates that Guesto, as County Manager, either knew of Judges Ciavarella and Conahan’s illegal conduct relative to PA Child Care, or knew that something was improper, did nothing to address it and, in fact, actively worked to facilitate it.
94. At a minimum, Guesto is a participant in a conspiracy to deprive class members of their civil rights.
C. Sandra Brulo 95. The Plaintiffs maintain Sandra Brulo, the Deputy Director for Forensic Services
of the Luzerne County Probation Department, was an integral part of the conspiracy to allow for the payment of kids for cash to Judges Conahan and Ciavarella.
96. In her role as Deputy Director for Forensic Services, Sandra Brulo was a policy maker for Luzerne County.
97. Brulo was responsible for implementing Conahan’s “zero tolerance policy” regarding juvenile crimes, and for directing that her subordinate probation officers follow this policy. This ”zero tolerance policy” was developed just three days after the opening of the PA Child Care facility.
98. Probation Officer Tom Lavan testified before the Interbranch Commission on Juvenile Justice that he received instructions from Sandra Brulo that the PA Child Care facilities needed to remain full, and that she received her instructions directly from Judge Conahan.
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99. Brulo provided these instructions to Luzerne County Probation Officers in a series of memoranda reflecting that, among other things, all juveniles supervised in Luzerne County should have their probation violated regardless of the nature, or seriousness, of the violation.
100. Many, if not all, of Brulo’s actions in facilitating the illegal incarceration of juveniles under her supervision were taken in her administrative role as head of the Juvenile Probation Department. Furthermore, her actions in facilitating Judges Conahan and Ciavarella’s scheme to incarcerate “kids for cash” were outside of, and contrary to, her job duties as a Juvenile Probation Officer. Brulo’s job was to honestly make recommendations regarding the best outcome for juvenile detainees, not fabricate reports to recommend incarceration regardless of a juvenile’s circumstances.
101. Upon information and belief, Brulo intentionally deprived class members of their constitutional rights by, inter alia, (1) recommending that Plaintiffs and proposed class members be detained or placed in rehabilitation facilities in order to “legitimize” the placements made by Defendants Conahan and Ciavarella; (2) altering probation reports in order to have Plaintiffs and proposed class members on probation placed in further detention; and (3) concocting bogus probation violations to ensure that Plaintiffs and proposed class members were placed in and/or further detained at one of the juvenile detention facilities.
102. Brulo’s actions also violated the Juvenile Justice Act, in that she was responsible to spend Federal monies paid to Luzerne County under the Act on, amongst other expenditures, alternatives to incarceration, rather than the wholesale incarceration of juveniles.
103. Brulo was the individual responsible, for much of the time relevant to this Complaint, for reviewing juvenile delinquency petitions and making “recommendations” to the
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Court for placement. Brulo would frequently overrule her subordinate probation officers regarding recommendations for placement and/or probation. This practice continued until 2008.
104. Brulo was also responsible for recommending juveniles for psychological evaluations by Conahan’s brother-in-law, a process that usually require the juvenile to be housed in the PA Child Care facility.
105. Brulo subsequently pled guilty of federal obstruction of justice charges for attempting to modify court documents regarding a juvenile case to conceal her, and the Judges’, misconduct. The Plaintiffs maintain that this alteration of court records is an admission of guilt regarding the underlying conduct.
106. Upon information and belief, Brulo was directly aware of the payments being made to the Judges to illegally incarcerate juvenile detainees.
107. The facts detailed above make clear that Defendant Brulo either knew of Judges Ciavarella and Conahan’s illegal conduct relative to PA Child Care and participated in it, or knew that something was improper, did nothing to address it and, in fact, actively worked to facilitate it.
108. At a minimum, Brulo is a participant in a conspiracy to deprive class members of their civil rights.
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The Affect of the Conspiracy Upon the Class Representatives 109. Predictably, the affect of the Defendants’ conduct on the Plaintiffs was absolutely devastating. A. Zane Farmer and Kelly Farmer 110. Plaintiff Zane Farmer was a standout football player at Berwick High School until he had a verbal altercation with mother, Kelly Farmer, at the end of 2004. 111. Zane Farmer was then arrested, and later taken before Judge Ciavarella in the absence of a lawyer. Kelly Farmer asked the State Police if she should hire a lawyer, and was told that one was not necessary. 112. Despite her pleas to Judge Ciavarella about Zane not being a “bad kid,” Judge Ciavarella stated that he wanted to teach Zane a “lesson,” and sentenced him to six months incarceration. Zane later was required to remain on probation until the end of 2008. 113. At no time was Zane advised to his right to counsel, nor was he provided with anything but summary process. 114. During the course of Zane’s incarceration, Plaintiff Kelly Farmer was forced to pay child support to the Luzerne County Department of Probation to compensate them for her son’s placement, including funds taken from Federal social security payments for the benefit of Zane Farmer. 115. Zane Farmer’s incarceration destroyed his relationship with his mother and other family members. Despite the fact that young Mr. Farmer was incarcerated by a corrupt Judge, who exchanged kids for cash, Mr. Farmer, at least until recently, had considerable animosity towards Kelly Farmer regarding his incarceration.
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116. Kelly Farmer was also denied the companionship of her son during his term of incarceration, and otherwise had her parental relationship with Zane disrupted by the corrupt actions detailed in this complaint.
B. Joseph Rimmer and Angela Rimmer Belanger 117. Plaintiff Joseph Rimmer was involved in a vandalism incident in February 2003,
and was later charged and taken before Judge Ciavarella. 118. Joseph Rimmer was sentenced to thirty days incarceration, with that term later
increased for several months. 119. While Mr. Rimmer was represented by counsel during a hearing before Judge
Ciavarella, the proceeding was summary in nature, and Rimmer was denied due process given that Judge Ciavarella (secretly) was taking payments for incarcerating juveniles.
120. Plaintiff Angela Rimmer Belanger was later sued by the Luzerne County Department of Probation for child support during Joseph Rimmer’s incarceration, and paid child support to Luzerne County over the course of several months.
121. Plaintiff Belanger was also deprived of the companionship of her son during the term of his illegal incarceration.
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CAUSES OF ACTION AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION BY ALL REPRESENTITIVE PLAINTIFFS
AND ALL CLASS MEMBERS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of State Law -- Conspiracy, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
122. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 121.
123. As detailed in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs had their constitutional rights violated in several different ways by the Defendants. The members of Class One had their rights to due process and an impartial tribunal violated by the bribery scheme of the Defendants. Members of all classes had their fundamental right to be free of interference in familial relationships by the conduct of the Defendants.
124. All of the Defendants listed above conspired with each other to violate the civil rights of class members by participating in the Judges’ bribery scheme of trading kids for cash. All of the Defendants listed above either affirmatively participated in, or, at a minimum, promoted the conspiracy, and all knew, or should have known, about the Judges’ illegal actions.
125. Defendant Luzerne County is directly responsible for this constitutional violation given that its senior policy makers, Skrepenak, Vonderheid, Guesto and Brulo, actively participated in, and facilitated, the Judges’ bribery scheme.
126. The conduct by all Defendants violates the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 127. This conduct on behalf of the above-named Defendants is undertaken in bad faith, and with malice toward the Plaintiffs. 128. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
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AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS ZANE FARMER, JOSEPH RIMMER AND MEMBERS OF CLASS ONE AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of State Law -- Conspiracy, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) –
129. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 128.
130. As detailed in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs had their constitutional rights violated in several different ways by the Defendants. The members of Class One had their rights to due process and an impartial tribunal violated by the bribery scheme of the Defendants.
131. All of the Defendants listed above conspired with each other to violate the civil rights of class members by participating in the Judges’ bribery scheme of trading kids for cash. All of the Defendants listed above either affirmatively participated in, or, at a minimum, promoted the conspiracy, and all knew, or should have known, about the Judges’ illegal actions.
132. Any conspiracy to deprive citizens of their rights and privileges under Federal law and the United States Constitution violates the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Defendants’ conduct violates this statutory provision.
133. The conspiracy detailed in this complaint directly targeted, and discriminated against, the juvenile members of Class One, and deprived them of the equal protection of the law. Juveniles are a class of individuals whose rights are protected under 42. U.S.C. § 1985(3).
134. Defendant Luzerne County is directly responsible for this constitutional violation given that its senior policy makers, Skrepenak, Vonderheid, Guesto and Brulo, actively participated in, and facilitated, the Judges’ bribery scheme.
135. This conduct on behalf of the above-named Defendants is undertaken in bad faith, and with malice toward the Plaintiffs.
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136. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS ZANE FARMER, JOSEPH RIMMER AND MEMBERS OF CLASS ONE AGAINST DEFENDANTS SKREPENAK, VONDERHEID, GUESTO, BRULO AND THE COUNTY OF LUZERNE
Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of State Law -- Failure to Prevent Violation of Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 – 137. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated Paragraphs 1 through 136. 138. As stated in this Complaint, Defendants Conahan, Ciavarella, Powell, Mericle and others participated in a conspiracy to deny juvenile class members their rights under the United States Constitution and Federal law. This conspiracy violates 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 139. While the Plaintiffs maintain that the above-named County Defendants actively participated in this conspiracy, these Defendants, at a minimum, had the power to prevent, or aid in preventing, this conspiracy, and either neglected to do so, or refused to do so. 140. This failure by the Defendants violates the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 141. Defendant Luzerne County is directly responsible for this constitutional violation given that its senior policy makers, Skrepenak, Vonderheid, Guesto and Brulo, failed in their responsibilities to prevent the conspiratorial and illegal actions of the other Defendants. 142. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
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AS AND FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS ZANE FARMER, JOSEPH RIMMER, AND CLASS ONE AGAINST DEFENDANTS CIAVARELLA,
CONAHAN, BRULO, AND THE COUNTY OF LUZERNE Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of State Law
-- The Rights to Procedural and Substantive Due Process of Law, Assistance of Counsel and to an Impartial Tribunal –
143. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 142.
144. The United States Constitution, and associated amendments, guarantees several fundamental rights to individuals charged with criminal offenses by the government. These rights include the right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal, the right to assistance of legal counsel and the right to proffer a knowing guilty plea. These rights of co-extensive with the Constitution’s guarantee of procedural and substantive due process of law.
145. The actions of Defendants Ciavarella and Conahan detailed above violated the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In short, the Judge Ciavarella’s court room was a sham where juveniles were railroaded into incarceration in the absence of any appropriate process, and in willful disregard for a range of constitutional mandates regarding the rights of the accused. Judge Conahan knew that this was the case, directed Ciavarella’s actions as his supervisor, and materially benefited from Ciavarella’s actions in incarcerating kids for cash. Both Judges Ciavarella and Conahan performed much of their misconduct outside of their job responsibilities as judges of the Court of Common Pleas. It is difficult to comprehend a more direct violation of the civil rights of the Plaintiffs and class members.
146. Defendant Brulo, a senior policymaker for the Luzerne County Department of Probation, actively participated in Ciavarella and Conahan’s scheme to incarcerate kids for cash
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by encouraging the waiver of right to counsel, and recommending incarceration for even the most minor offenses.
147. Defendant Brulo is a policy maker for the County of Luzerne, making the County directly responsible for this constitutional violation.
148. The actions of Judges Ciavarella and Conahan, and Defendant Brulo, were undertaken in bad faith, and with malice toward the Plaintiffs.
149. This conduct on the part of the above-named Defendants also represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
150. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
AS AND FOR A FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, KELLY FARMER AND CLASS TWO AGAINST DEFENDANTS CONAHAN, CIAVARELLA, BRULO AND THE COUNTY OF LUZERNE Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of State Law -- The Right to Substantive Due Process of Law – 151. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation
stated in Paragraphs 1 through 150. 152. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
neither liberty nor the property of individual citizens will be taken away without due process of law. Specifically, the Amendment provides that governmental entities cannot engage in conduct that, while using legitimate procedures, is entirely unlawful and illegitimate.
153. Here, the conduct of the Defendants detailed above violates the Plaintiffs’ right to substantive due process of law. Senior members of the Luzerne County Department of Probation actively participated in Judge Ciavarella and Judge Conahan’s bribery scheme, with
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Defendant Brulo actively working to help facilitate the Judges trading kids for cash. These sham juvenile proceedings then led Luzerne County, through its probation department, to institute thousands of child support proceedings against the Plaintiffs and the proposed class seeking compensation for housing juveniles who were illegally incarcerated. It is beyond cavil for the Defendants to illegally incarcerate thousands of juveniles, and then Luzerne County, whose probation department facilitated these sham legal proceedings, to shake down parents for child support payments as a result of those proceedings.
154. The actions of Defendants Conahan, Ciavarella and Brulo were undertaken in bad faith, and with malice toward the Plaintiffs.
155. Defendant Brulo is a policy maker for the County of Luzerne, making the County directly responsible for this constitutional violation.
156. This conduct on the part of Defendants Conahan, Ciavarella and Brulo also represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
157. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
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AS AND FOR A SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY ALL PLAINTIFFS AND ALL CLASSES AGAINST DEFENDANTS SKREPENAK, VONDERHEID, GUESTO AND
THE COUNTY OF LUZERNE Violation of Civil Rights under Color of State Law -- Municipal and Individual Liability for Unconstitutional Policies and Practices – 158. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 157. 159. As stated throughout this complaint, Luzerne County operated under a culture of corruption during the tenure of Defendants Skrepenak and Vonderheid on the Board of County Commissioners, and during Guesto’s tenure as County Manager. In short, bribing public officials in exchange for favoritism and special treatment was the de facto policy and practice of Luzerne County during the tenure of these Defendants. Looking the other way in the face of corruption by others in County government goes hand in hand with overseeing such an organization. 160. The actions of Defendants Guesto, Skrepenak and Vonderheid represent the actions of Luzerne County, as these individuals are policy makers for the County. 161. The above-named individual Defendants knew, or should have known, that Judges Ciavarella and Conahan were involved in corrupt activities that violated the civil rights of thousands of juveniles, and acted with deliberate indifference toward those activities as part of the County’s culture of corruption. 162. Additionally, the Plaintiffs maintain that the actions of the County Defendants, in and of themselves, represent the policies of Luzerne County given Skrepenak, Vonderheid and Guesto’s role as senior policy makers for the County. The Plaintiffs further maintain that direct and circumstantial evidence will show that these defendants were aware of the Judges’ actions, and took steps to facilitate them in their role as County officials.
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163. The policies, practices, customs and procedures of the above-named Defendants violated the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs.
164. This conduct on the part of the above-named Defendants and the County of Luzerne also represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
165. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
AS AND FOR A SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS KELLY FARMER, ZANE FARMER, AND CLASSES ONE AND TWO AGAINST DEFENDANTS SANDRA BRULO, THE LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE PROBATION AND
THE COUNTY OF LUZERNE Violation of Federal Law; Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of State Law
-- Wrongful Taking of Social Security Payments – 166. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 165. 167. Many of the members of the proposed classes received social security benefits, either for disability or for survivorship benefits. Plaintiff Zane Farmer received such benefits because of the death of his father, which were used by his mother to pay for basic needs for her family. 168. The Plaintiffs were all sued by Luzerne County, and the Luzerne County Department of Probation, for child support payments. 169. As a result of being illegally incarcerated, Plaintiff Zane Farmer’s social security benefits were seized by the County of Luzerne to pay child support to the County. The Plaintiffs maintain that several other class members had their social security benefits taken as
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well. The Plaintiffs also believe that many class members had welfare benefits taken to pay for child support.
170. Under relevant Federal regulations, social security and/or welfare benefits are paid for the exclusive benefit of the recipients, and are to be applied to maintain their welfare and standard of living. Luzerne County, through the Luzerne County Department of Probation, by seizing these benefits to pay child support for the illegal incarcerations required by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan, violated these federal regulations. The County should, accordingly, be ordered to pay back any seized Federal payments to the children and parents from whom they were seized.
171. Additionally, the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution precludes the taking of private property for governmental use without just compensation. The actions of the above-named Defendants, in seizing child support and welfare payments for the benefit of Luzerne County, represents in improper taking in the absence of appropriate compensation.
172. Defendant Brulo is a policy maker for the County of Luzerne and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, making the County and the Department of Juvenile Probation directly responsible for this constitutional violation.
173. This conduct on the part of Defendants Conahan, Ciavarella and Brulo also represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
174. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
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AS AND FOR A EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS ZANE FARMER, JOSEPH RIMMER AND CLASS ONE AGAINST DEFENDANTS BRULO AND THE
LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE PROBATION Violation of Federal Law, Violation of Federal Law Under Color of State Law
-- Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 – 175. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 174. 176. The Juvenile Justice Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 and elsewhere, provides a range of requirements upon government agencies who received federal funds for the purposes of housing and providing programs for juvenile offenders. These requirements include providing for community-based alternatives to incarcerating juveniles, community based programs for the purposes of encouraging family development, and programs to provide an adjudicated juvenile delinquent with “a sense of safety and structure.” The Juvenile Justice Act also requires participating agencies to implement a range of post-adjudication remedies for juveniles short of confinement in a correctional setting. 177. Most importantly, the Juvenile Justice Act requires participating agencies to “provide for procedures to be established for protecting the rights of recipients of services,” and requiring all juvenile adjudications, especially those involving juvenile individuals who are receiving welfare benefits, to have an unbiased case plan prepared and reviewed prior to incarceration. 178. A sizable number of class members from the juvenile class are recipients of welfare benefits. 179. The actions of Brulo and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation violate both the express language and the statutory intent of the Juvenile Justice Act. In short,
34

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 35 of 40
drafting placement reports recommending incarceration to facilitate a conspiracy to fill private juvenile facilities is a direct violation of several provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act.
180. The Plaintiffs have a private right of action under the Juvenile Justice Act, both on its face and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
181. Upon information and belief, the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation receives Federal funds under the Juvenile Justice Act for the housing of juvenile offenders, and utilized these funds to illegally incarcerate thousands of juveniles as part of the Judges’ regime of trading “kids for cash.” As the recipient of such funds, the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation has waived sovereign immunity to be sued for violations of Federal law.
182. Defendant Brulo is a policy maker for the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, making the Department of Juvenile Probation directly responsible for this constitutional violation.
183. This conduct on the part of above-named Defendants also represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 36 of 40
AS AND FOR AN NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, KELLY FARMER AND CLASS ONE AGAINST DEFENDANTS
LUZERNE COUNTY AND THE LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE PROBATION
-- Violation of State Law – Wrongful Payment to Municipality – Request for Injunctive Relief 184. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 183. 185. Plaintiffs and members of the class were assessed an unlawful child support lien/unlawful child support payments by the Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department as a result of their children being unlawfully incarcerated by Judges Ciavarella and Conahan. 186. As noted elsewhere in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs maintain that senior members of the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, including Defendant Sandra Brulo, were well aware of the Judges’ scheme to trade kids for cash. In fact, Defendant Brulo actively participated in this scheme by facilitating the waivers of counsel and recommendations for incarceration that enabled Judge Ciavarella to engage in the wholesale incarceration of juveniles without significant appellate scrutiny. 187. Under 72 PS § 5566b, all Plaintiffs and members of Class One are entitled to a refund of any penalties, taxes or any other monies to which a political subdivision is not legally entitled. 188. Since the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation acted as the named plaintiff in child support proceedings against the Plaintiffs and members of Class One, and wrongfully collected money pursuant to Pennsylvania Law, the Plaintiffs and members of Class One are entitled to reimbursement of these monies.
36

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189. The Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation was not entitled to monies collected for the unlawfully sentenced juveniles detailed in this complaint.
190. Plaintiffs and members of Class One respectfully request that the Court provide injunctive relief in the form of reimbursement for funds illegally paid to the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation.
AS AND FOR A TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, KELLY FARMER AND CLASS ONE AGAINST DEFENDANTS SANDRA
BRULO, LUZERNE COUNTY AND THE LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE PROBATION -- Violation of State Law –
Wrongful Payment to Municipality for Child Support 191. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 190. 192. Under Pennsylvania law, a person, government agency or department are subject to liability if child support payments are procured by false information. 193. Plaintiffs, and all members of Class One, had their children unlawfully incarcerated, in part, because of the actions of Defendants Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation and Sandra Brulo, including the provision of false/contrived child placement recommendations to Judge Ciavarella, and the actions of Brulo to advance the conspiracy to trade kids for cash. 194. The child support payments that were required to be paid by the plaintiffs and members of Class One were, therefore, procured through fraud. 195. Pursuant to 22 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304.1, Plaintiffs and members of the class seek repayment of monies that were obtained through fraud.
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DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS EXCEPT LUZERNE COUNTY AND THE LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE
PROBATION 196. The actions of the Defendants detailed above are so depraved that they defy explanation. Suffice it to say, no decent human being would participate in an effort incarcerate juveniles in exchange for money. The devastation wrought by the individuals and companies detailed in this complaint is horrific and irreversible. 197. Rarely in the history of American jurisprudence can one point to a case that is the perfect example of one where severe punitive damages should be imposed. 198. This is such a case. The Plaintiffs and members of the proposed classes seek an award of punitive damages accordingly.
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 199. The Plaintiffs and members of the proposed classes hereby demand a trial by jury.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, requests that this Honorable Court grant them the following relief:
Class I, II and III 1. An order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.23. 2. A judgment against defendants to the named plaintiffs and each member of the proposed class in an amount to be determined by a Jury and/or the Court on both an individual and class wide basis. 3. Members of Class I seek attorneys’ fees and damages for unlawful imprisonment, false imprisonment and emotional and psychological injuries. Plaintiffs also seek all compensatory damages caused and other relief the Court may deem appropriate. 4. Members of Class II seek all child support, costs and attorneys’ fees associated with the unlawful incarceration of their children. Class members also seek all damages, costs, attorneys’ fees and relief the Court deems appropriate. 5. Members of Class III seek damages in the form of pain and suffering, psychological injuries and damages associated with their children being unlawfully incarcerated. Class members also seek attorneys’ fees, costs and compensatory damages and other relief the Court deems appropriate. 6. An award of injunctive relief to the named plaintiffs ordering the return of child support payments. 7. A monetary award for attorney’s fees and costs of this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed.R.Civ.P.23.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 915 Filed 05/10/11 Page 40 of 40

Dated: May 10, 2011

Respectfully submitted:
/s Daniel C. Levin, Esquire
___________________________________ Arnold Levin, Esquire Member of the Bar, United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania Daniel Levin, Esquire Admitted Pro Hac Vice LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN 250 Walnut Street Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Telephone: 215.592.1500
/s Elmer Robert Keach, III
____________________________________ Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esquire Admitted Pro Hac Vice LAW OFFICES OF ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, PC 1040 Riverfront Center Post Office Box 70 Amsterdam, NY 12010 Telephone: 518.434.1718

40

 
 Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CIAVARELLA, et al.,
Defendants.
CONWAY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CONAHAN, et al.,
Defendants.
WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. POWELL, et al.,
Defendants.

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-357

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-291

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-0286

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 2 of 9

HUMANIK, Plaintiff,
v. CIAVARELLA, et al.,
Defendants.

:

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-0630

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

ORDER CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS AND PRELIMINARILY APPROVING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT NOW, this 28th day of February, 2012, upon review and consideration of the Motion for Preliminary Approval, brief in support thereof and the attached Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) dated December 16, 2011 and the exhibits thereto (collectively, the “Settlement Documents”), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
Preliminary Approval of the Master Settlement Agreement and Conditional Certification of Settlement Classes
1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the MSA on file with this Court, and all capitalized terms used herein that also appear in the MSA are intended to have the meanings set forth in the MSA.

2. The Court has jurisdiction over the Actions, each of the Parties and all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.

3. The terms of the MSA, including the exhibits, are preliminarily approved, subject to further consideration at the Settlement Hearing provided for below. The Court preliminarily finds that the settlement terms set forth in the MSA are sufficiently

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 3 of 9
within the range of reasonableness, such that notice of the Settlement in the form presented to this Court as Exhibit A to the MSA should be disseminated to all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
4. The Court preliminarily finds for settlement purposes only, and subject to final determination at the Settlement Hearing provided for below, that the proposed Settlement Classes meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, for purposes of settlement only, and pending Final Judicial Approval, the Court conditionally certifies the Settlement Classes, and in particular,
(1) the Juvenile Settlement Class consisting of:
all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella; and
(2) the Parent Settlement Class consisting of:
all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who, in connection with their child’s appearance: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn, (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties assessed against them or their child; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity.
For purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), all claims asserted in the Actions are certified for class treatment, for settlement purposes only.

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 4 of 9
5. The Court finds on a preliminary basis that the Representative Plaintiffs are proper class representatives for the Settlement Classes as their claims are typical of those of other all members of the proposed Settlement Classes and involve common questions or law and fact. Further, Representative Plaintiffs appear to have no conflicts of interest with other all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
6. The Court finds on a preliminary basis that the law firms of Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller; Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, LLC; Anapol Schwartz; and Juvenile Law Center, acting as Class Counsel, are competent and experienced counsel and as such will adequately represent the interests of the all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
7. If the MSA is terminated, the foregoing conditional certification of the Settlement Classes, appointment of Representative Plaintiffs as class representatives, and approval of Class Counsel shall be void and of no effect and the Parties to the MSA shall be returned to the status each occupied before entry of this Order.
8. Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall cause the Notice to be given to the all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
(a) The Court finds that the Mailed Notice and the Published Notice, attached to the MSA at Exhibit A, and the Settlement Hearing provide appropriate notice to the conditionally certified Settlement Classes.

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 5 of 9
(b) Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall disseminate the Mailed Notice to the last known addresses of all individuals in the Settlement Classes.
(c) The Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department shall, within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, provide to Class Counsel a list of the last known mailing address of each juvenile whose adjudications were vacated and/or records expunged in accordance with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s October 29, 2009 and March 29, 2010 orders. See In re J.V.R., 81 M.M. 2008, Order ¶¶ 3-4 (Pa. Oct. 29, 2009) and Order, ¶ 3 (Pa. Mar. 29, 2010). The Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department and the Domestic Relations branch of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas shall also promptly provide to Class Counsel its complete files for all individuals for whom Class Counsel provide signed releases.
(d) Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall disseminate the Published Notice via publication in the Times Leader and the Citizens Voice.
(e) The dissemination of notice described above shall occur within fourteen (14) days of the date of the entry of this Order.
(f) Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall bear the costs of notice.

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9. Settlement Class Members of the conditionally approved Settlement Classes will have until the Opt-Out Deadline, or May 13, 2012 (seventy-five (75) days from the date of entry of this Preliminary Approval Order) to exclude themselves from the Juvenile Settlement Class or Parent Settlement Class. To do so, Settlement Class Members shall adhere to the provisions set forth in the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form attached at Exhibits A and C to the MSA.
10. Any Settlement Class Member who does not properly and timely Opt-Out pursuant to the provisions set forth in the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form attached at Exhibits A and C to the MSA, shall be included in the Juvenile Settlement Class or Parent Settlement Class and shall be bound by the MSA, regardless of whether such person participates in the Cash Settlement Fund.
11. Any Settlement Class Member who properly and timely Opts-Out pursuant to the provisions set forth in the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form and intends to pursue a separate claim against the Released Parties shall be required to participate in confidential non-binding mediation with the Mericle Defendants prior to the Opt-Out Termination Deadline, which shall be ninety (90) days after the Opt-Out Deadline. Richard G. Fine of Scranton, Pennsylvania is approved as the mediator.
12. On or before May 13, 2012 (“Proof of Claim Deadline”), each Settlement Class Member who wishes to claim against the Cash Settlement Fund shall be required to submit a timely Proof of Claim, with the required documentation, as directed in the MSA and in the form attached at Exhibit C to the MSA.

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 7 of 9
13. Any Settlement Class Member who fails to file a proper and timely Proof of Claim shall forever be barred from receiving any distribution from the Cash Settlement Fund but will in all other respects be bound by the MSA if it is finally approved. Each Settlement Class Member that submits a proper and timely Proof of Claim shall be bound by the MSA if it is finally approved.
Settlement Hearing 14. Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a hearing on final settlement (“Settlement Hearing”) will be held before this Court on Monday, September 10, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. EST. At the Settlement Hearing, the Court will consider the following issues: (a) the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the MSA; (b) whether the Settlement Classes should remain certified for settlement purposes; (c) whether the Court should approve awards of costs and attorneys’ fees as described in fee applications submitted by Class Counsel; (d) whether entry of a Final Approval Order terminating the Actions should be entered; and (f) such other matters as the Court may deem necessary or appropriate.
15. All briefs and materials of any party in support of the Final Judicial Approval, as well as the fee petition and supporting papers, shall be served on the Court and all Parties at least ten calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing.
16. Any Settlement Class Member wishing to object to the MSA must submit to the Claims Committee a letter stating that he or she objects to the MSA, together with his or her Proof of Claim Form. The letter must be sent so that it is received by the Claims Committee no later than May 12, 2012 (seventy-four (74) days after the Court

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 8 of 9
has entered the Preliminary Approval Order). Service on the Claims Committee shall be by first class mail. No later than May 13, 2012 (seventy-five (75) days after the Court has entered the Preliminary Approval Order), the Claims Committee must cause all such objections to be filed with the Court. All responses by the Parties to objections shall be filed and served by first class mail on the objecting person or his or her attorney no later than ten (10) days before the Settlement Hearing. Any Settlement Class Member who does not serve an objection as described in the Notice and this Order shall be deemed to have waived any such objection by appeal, collateral attack, or otherwise.
17. Judge Marina Corodemus (Ret.) is approved as the Special Master for Allocation Appeals, to resolve the claims of any Settlement Class Members who dispute the award made to them by the Claims Committee.
18. The parties shall utilize any necessary procedures in order to ensure that the settlement complies with Pennsylvania state law regarding settlements by minors.
19. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as, or deemed to be, evidence of an admission or concession by the Released Parties as to the validity of any claim that was or could have been asserted or as to any liability by them as to any manner set forth in this Order. Neither this Order nor the MSA nor any other Settlement-related document shall constitute any evidence of admission of liability by the Released Parties, nor shall either the MSA, this Order or any other Settlement-related document be offered in evidence or used for any other purpose in this or any other matter or proceeding except as may be necessary to consummate or enforce the MSA or the

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1084 Filed 02/28/12 Page 9 of 9

terms of this Order, or if offered by the Released Parties in, inter alia, responding to any action purporting to assert Released Claims; provided, however, the Released Parties may use such documents insofar as it may be necessary or appropriate to establish the terms thereof.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_/s/ A. Richard Caputo____ A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--21 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 11 ooff 9301
Exhibit 1

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--21 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 22 ooff 9301
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT dated December 16, 2011 by and among
Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., the Representative Plaintiffs, Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--21 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 33 ooff 9301
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Definitions............................................................................................................................... 2 A. Proposed Settlement Classes................................................................................... 2 B. Other Defined Terms .............................................................................................. 2
II. The Cash Settlement Fund ...................................................................................................... 6 A. Settlement Payment ................................................................................................ 6 B. Common Benefit Fees and Expenses...................................................................... 7 C. Plan of Allocation ................................................................................................... 7
III. Preliminary Approval Of Master Settlement Agreement ....................................................... 7 A. Motion For Preliminary Approval .......................................................................... 7 B. Effect Of Termination On Conditional Certification.............................................. 8
IV. Notice, Opt-Out Rights And Claim Procedures...................................................................... 8 A. Notice ...................................................................................................................... 8 B. Submission Of Proof Of Claim Form ..................................................................... 9 C. Opt-Out Rights........................................................................................................ 9 D. Bar Order .............................................................................................................. 10 E. Objection Deadline ............................................................................................... 10 F. Special Master For Allocation Appeals ................................................................ 10
V. Claims Committee ................................................................................................................ 11 VI. Settlement Hearing................................................................................................................ 11 VII. Opt-Out Termination Rights ................................................................................................. 12
A. Opt-Out Termination Rights and Reasonable Efforts Obligation......................... 12 B. Reduction In Settlement Amount.......................................................................... 13 VIII.Escrow Account .................................................................................................................... 13 A. Qualified Settlement Fund .................................................................................... 14 B. Taxes ..................................................................................................................... 14 C. Interest Earned ...................................................................................................... 14 D. No Liability........................................................................................................... 14 E. No Claims ............................................................................................................. 14 F. Unclaimed Amounts And Returned Checks ......................................................... 14 IX. Releases................................................................................................................................. 15 A. Dismissal Of Claims And Release ........................................................................ 15 B. Covenant Not To Sue, And Non-Solicitation ....................................................... 15 X. Future Claims For Contribution Or Indemnity ..................................................................... 15 XI. Termination Provisions ......................................................................................................... 16 A. Right To Terminate The MSA.............................................................................. 16 B. Stay Of Proceedings.............................................................................................. 17 XII. Miscellaneous Provisions...................................................................................................... 17 A. Not Evidence; No Admission of Liability ............................................................ 17 B. Confidentiality ...................................................................................................... 17 C. Public/Media Statements ...................................................................................... 17 D. Entire Agreement .................................................................................................. 18 E. No Presumption Against Drafter .......................................................................... 18 F. Force Majeure ....................................................................................................... 18 G. Continuing And Exclusive Jurisdiction ................................................................ 19

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H. Counterparts .......................................................................................................... 19 I. Divisions And Headings ....................................................................................... 19 J. Plurals And Singulars Of Defined Terms ............................................................. 19 K. Governing Law ..................................................................................................... 19 L. Waiver................................................................................................................... 19 M. No Third Party Beneficiaries ................................................................................ 19 N. Successors And Assigns ....................................................................................... 19 O. Authority And Acknowledgement ........................................................................ 20

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--21 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 55 ooff 9301
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA” or “Agreement”) is made and entered into as of December 14, 2011 by and among the following parties (the “Parties”):
1. The representative plaintiffs, through their counsel, as will be appointed by the Court, on behalf of themselves and each member of the putative classes, in the following actions: (a) H.T., et al. v. Ciavarella, pending in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania at Civ. Action No. 09-cv-357 (the “H.T. Action”); and (b) Conway v. Conahan, pending in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania at Civ. Action No. 09-cv-291 (the “Conway Action”) (together, the “Class Actions”);
2. Certain individual plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record in Wallace v. Powell, pending in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania at Civ. Action 09-cv-286 (the “Wallace Action”) and Humanik v. Ciavarella, pending in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania at Civ. Action 09-cv-630 (the “Humanik Action,” and together with the Wallace Action, the “Individual Actions,” and with the Class Actions, the “Actions”); and
3. Defendants Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (the “Mericle Defendants”).
WHEREAS, the Actions were filed against Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. and others;
WHEREAS, Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. deny the claims asserted against them in the Actions, including all charges of liability arising out of the allegations in the Actions;
WHEREAS, Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. have asserted a number of defenses to the factual allegations and legal claims in the Actions, and believe those defenses to be meritorious; nonetheless, Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. have concluded that further proceedings in the Actions would be protracted and expensive, and they desire to resolve the Actions to avoid the costs of litigation;
WHEREAS, the Parties desire to fully and finally settle the Actions in the manner and upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the Representative Plaintiffs (for themselves and the Settlement Class Members defined herein), individually and by and through Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Class Counsel, as defined herein, and by Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., all intending to be legally bound hereby, that, subject to the approval of the Court, the Actions and the Released Claims, as defined herein, shall be fully and finally resolved, compromised, discharged and settled as among the Parties under the following terms and conditions:
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CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--21 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 66 ooff 9301
I. Definitions
A. Proposed Settlement Classes
Solely for purposes of this Settlement and without prejudice to or abandonment of any positions taken in the Actions regarding class certification, the Parties agree to the certification of two settlement classes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3):
1. all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella (“Juvenile Settlement Class”); and
2. all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who, in connection with their child’s appearance: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties assessed against them or their child; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity (“Parent Settlement Class”).
The Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class are herein collectively referred to as the “Settlement Classes.” Members of the Settlement Classes shall be referred to as “Settlement Class Members.”
B. Other Defined Terms
1. Actions, Individual Actions and Class Actions – the H.T. Action and Conway Action are herein collectively referred to as the “Class Actions”; the Wallace Action and Humanik Actions are herein collectively referred to as the “Individual Actions.” The Individual Actions and the Class Actions are herein collectively referred to as the “Actions.”
2. Cash Settlement Fund – settlement fund to be established by the Mericle Defendants that will contain the Escrow Amount and out of which Settlement Class Members will receive compensation in accordance with the Plan of Allocation and this Agreement, as further described in Paragraph II herein.
3. Class Counsel – the attorneys representing plaintiffs in the Class Actions.
4. Common Benefit Fees and Expenses – the common benefit fee award to be approved by the Court and not to exceed thirty (30) percent of the Settlement Amount and, in addition, common benefit litigation expenses, as further described in Paragraph II.B herein.
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5. Conditional Class Certification – certification of the proposed Settlement Classes solely for the purposes of implementation, approval and consummation of the Settlement, as further defined in Paragraph III herein.
6. Court – the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Judge assigned to the Actions.
7. Escrow Account – the account held by the Escrow Agent which will contain the Cash Settlement Fund, further described in Paragraph II.A herein.
8. Escrow Amount – $17,750,000, the amount of money that the Mericle Defendants will transfer into the Escrow Account in the manner specified in Paragraph II.A herein.
9. Final Order and Judgment – an order of the Court fully and finally approving the Settlement and dismissing the Actions with prejudice as to the Released Parties, as further described in Paragraph VI herein.
10. Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel – the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in the Individual Actions.
11. Later Discovered Parties – any entity or person (other than a Mericle Party or a Luzerne County Party) against which or whom some or all Plaintiffs may bring a claim in any of the Actions based on evidence not currently known to Class Counsel or Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel. Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel expressly certify that, as of December 14, 2011, they are aware of no evidence sufficient to justify a claim in any of the Actions against any persons or entities other than the persons and entities specifically identified in Subparagraph 17.
12. Luzerne County Parties – the County of Luzerne and all departments and instrumentalities thereof, including the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, the Luzerne County District Attorney’s Office, the Luzerne County Public Defender’s Office and Luzerne County Children & Youth Services, Sandra Brulo, Sam Guesto, the Luzerne County Commissioners, past and present, including without limitation Gregory Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid, and Steven Urban, and any other current or former employees, officials or agents of the County of Luzerne, and any departments and instrumentalities thereof, all related parties, successors and assigns, and all of the aforesaids’ lawyers, agents and employees.
13. Mailed Notice – notice to be mailed to members of the proposed Settlement Classes for whom last known addresses are readily available or identifiable, in a form substantially identical to Exhibit A, subject to Court approval.
3

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14. Mericle Parties – Defendant Robert K. Mericle, his family, and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors, grantees and assigns, Defendant Mericle Construction, Inc., Mericle Commercial Real Estate Group Inc., Mericle Commercial Real Estate Services and all of their respective entities, affiliates, successors, assigns and related parties, and/or any other party that is, or may have ever been, owned or controlled by any of the foregoing individuals or entities, and all of the aforesaids’ lawyers, agents, officers, employees and former employees.
15. Mutually Agreed-Upon Statement – the statement agreed to by the Parties attached to a letter dated herewith by and between the Parties and further described in Paragraph XII.C herein.
16. Notice – collectively, Mailed Notice and Published Notice, as they are defined in sub-paragraphs 13 and 30 of this Paragraph and as further described in Paragraph IV.A herein.
17. Non-Released Parties – PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Inc., Consulting Innovations and Services, Inc., Gregory R. Zappala, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., Perseus House, Inc. d/b/a Andromeda House, Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Barbara Conahan, and Cindy Ciavarella, and all of the aforesaids’ lawyers, agents and employees, and subsidiary and parent organizations in their capacities as such; and, Later Discovered Parties.
18. Objection Deadline – the date by which members of the proposed Settlement Classes who object to the Settlement must submit a written statement of such objection to the Claims Committee, as further described in Paragraph IV.E herein.
19. Opt-Out – the right of members of the proposed Settlement Classes to exclude themselves from the Settlement by returning, no later than the Proof of Claim Deadline, the Proof of Claim Form indicating their OptOut election.
20. Opt-Out Plaintiffs – members of the proposed Settlement Classes who have properly elected to Opt-Out, as described in Paragraph IV.C.
21. Opt-Out Termination Deadline – the date which is ninety (90) days following the Opt-Out Deadline, by which the Mericle Defendants may elect to withdraw from and terminate the MSA, as further described in Paragraph VII.A herein.
22. Opt-Out Termination Period – the ninety (90) day period following the Opt-Out Deadline, as further described in Paragraph VII.A herein.
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23. Opt-Out Termination Right – the Mericle Defendants’ right to withdraw from and terminate the MSA as provided in Paragraph VII herein.
24. Parties – the Mericle Defendants and Plaintiffs.
25. Plaintiffs – all individual plaintiffs in the Individual Actions, and all representative plaintiffs and members of the putative classes in the Class Actions.
26. Plan of Allocation – document approved by the Court and setting forth the plan for distribution of the Cash Settlement Fund to Settlement Class Members who have timely and properly completed and returned a Proof of Claim Form indicating their participation in the Settlement.
27. Preliminary Approval Order – the order of the Court preliminarily approving Settlement and Notice procedures, as set forth in Paragraph III and substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B.
28. Proof of Claim Deadline – the date by which members of the proposed Settlement Classes must return completed Proof of Claim Forms to the Claims Committee, as further described in Paragraphs IV.B and V. The Proof of Claim Deadline shall also be the “Opt-Out Deadline.”
29. Proof of Claim Form – the form that eligible Settlement Class Members must submit to participate in the Settlement Amount or to elect to OptOut, in a form substantially identical to Exhibit C, subject to Court approval.
30. Published Notice – notice to be published in at least two newspapers of general circulation in Luzerne County in a form substantially identical to Exhibit A, subject to Court approval.
31. Released Claims – any and all claims, demands, requests for payments, requests for benefits, requests for costs or expenses, requests for attorneys’ fees, requests for restitution, requests for punitive damages, requests for equitable relief or requests of any kind or nature whatsoever that have been or could have been asserted by or on behalf of any Settlement Class Member against the Released Parties, or any of them, and which arise out of or are related to any of the facts, acts, claims, allegations, events, transactions, occurrences, courses of conduct, representations, omissions, circumstances or other matters alleged or referred to or which could have been or may ever be alleged or referred to in the Actions, whether known or unknown, and whether such claim was or could have been asserted by any Settlement Class Member on his or her own behalf or on behalf of other persons.
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32. Released Parties – The Mericle Parties, the Luzerne County Parties, and any entity or individual that is not a Non-Released Party.
33. Representative Plaintiffs – collectively Dezare Dunbar, Alexandra Fahey, Elizabeth Habel, Gloria and Richard Habel, Angelia Karsko, H.T., Jessica Van Reeth, and Jack Van Reeth.
34. Settlement – the settlement embodied in this MSA.
35. Settlement Class Counsel – solely for purposes of this Settlement, and subject to the Court’s appointment, Daniel Segal of Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller; William R. Caroselli and David S. Senoff of Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, LLC; Sol H. Weiss of Anapol Schwartz; and Marsha L. Levick of Juvenile Law Center.
36. Settlement Amount – the payment of $17,750,000 by the Mericle Defendants, plus payment by the Mericle Defendants of an amount equal to fifty (50) percent of the first $3,500,000, if any, actually recovered by the Mericle Defendants in the Third Circuit Action, all as further described in Paragraph II.A herein.
37. Third Circuit Action – the appeal titled Travelers Property and Casualty Co. of America v. Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at No. 10-3887, as further described in Paragraph II.A herein.
38. Withdrawal Determination – Mericle Defendants’ written communication, on or before the Opt-Out Termination Deadline, to Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel stating their withdrawal from, and termination of this MSA, as further described in Paragraph VII.A herein.
II. The Cash Settlement Fund
In full satisfaction of all Released Claims against the Released Parties, as well as consideration for the releases, bar orders and other provisions for the benefit of the Released Parties provided for in this Agreement, the Mericle Defendants shall establish a settlement fund (the “Cash Settlement Fund”) out of which Settlement Class Members will receive compensation in accordance with this Agreement. The Cash Settlement Fund will be held in an escrow account at PNC Bank (“Escrow Agent”) (the “Escrow Account”). The Escrow Account shall be governed by the provisions set forth in ParagraphVIII herein and Exhibit D hereto.
A. Settlement Payment
The Mericle Defendants will transfer a total of $17,750,000 (the “Escrow Amount”) into the Escrow Account in three transactions, as follows:
1. $5,375,000 no later than ten (10) business days after the execution of this Agreement;
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2. $5,375,000 no later than ten (10) business days after the Court’s entry of the Preliminary Approval Order; and
3. $7,000,000 no later than ten (10) business days after the Opt-Out Deadline.
The Mericle Defendants will also deposit into the Escrow Account an amount equal to fifty (50) percent of the first $3,500,000, if any, actually recovered by the Mericle Defendants based on their claims for defense costs and/or indemnity against Travelers Property and Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”) pursuant to the general commercial liability and excess liability policies which are the subject of the Third Circuit Action (together with the Escrow Amount, the “Settlement Amount”), within five (5) business days of any such actual recovery. The Mericle Defendants shall not have any obligation to pursue their claims against Travelers beyond the Third Circuit Action. Further, it is within the Mericle Defendants’ sole discretion whether to pursue the Third Circuit Action to a decision or to enter into a settlement with Travelers so long as Plaintiffs are informed thereof and the decision is made in good faith.
B. Common Benefit Fees and Expenses
The Mericle Defendants will not oppose an application to the Court by Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel for a common benefit fee award not to exceed thirty (30) percent of the Settlement Amount and, in addition, for common benefit litigation expenses (collectively, “Common Benefit Fees and Expenses”). Common Benefit Fees and Expenses shall be drawn exclusively from the Cash Settlement Fund.
C. Plan of Allocation
The amount remaining in the Cash Settlement Fund after the payment of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses pursuant to Paragraph II.B, payments to the Escrow Agent pursuant to Paragraph VIII and Exhibit D, and the payment of taxes, tax expenses and other costs pursuant to Paragraph VIII, shall be distributed to Settlement Class Members who have timely returned a Proof of Claim Form indicating their participation in the Cash Settlement Fund pursuant to a plan of allocation proposed by Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and approved by the Court (“Plan of Allocation”). No distribution to any Settlement Class Member may be made from the Cash Settlement Fund until after the Court’s approval of the Plan of Allocation and entry of the Final Order and Judgment, and the expiration of any time period in which review could be sought with respect to approval of this MSA, or the judgments contemplated herein; if such review is sought, no distribution shall be made until proceedings in connection with such review are finally and fully resolved.
III. Preliminary Approval Of Master Settlement Agreement
A. Motion For Preliminary Approval
Within five (5) days of executing this Agreement, pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Representative Plaintiffs, Class Counsel, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel, and the Mericle Defendants shall submit this Agreement, together with the exhibits attached hereto, to the Court and jointly move the Court for the entry of an Order for preliminary
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approval (“Preliminary Approval Order”) substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B (“Proposed Preliminary Approval Order”). The Mericle Defendants reserve the right to file a separate brief in support of the motion.
The Proposed Preliminary Approval Order shall:
1. Certify the Settlement Classes defined herein for settlement purposes only;
2. Solely for the purposes of the implementation, approval and consummation of this Settlement, appoint counsel to represent all proposed Settlement Class Members (“Settlement Class Counsel”);
3. Solely for the purpose of the implementation, approval and consummation of this Settlement, appoint Representative Plaintiffs;
4. Grant preliminary approval of this MSA;
5. Authorize Notice of this MSA; and
6. Schedule a final Settlement Hearing, as set forth in Paragraph VI herein, to review comments concerning this Agreement, to consider its fairness, reasonableness and adequacy, and to determine whether to enter an Order approving the Settlement (“Final Order and Judgment”) substantially in the form described in Paragraph VI. The Settlement Hearing shall be scheduled to give sufficient time for notice to be disseminated and to allow for objections pursuant to the terms of this MSA.
B. Effect Of Termination On Conditional Certification
Certification of the proposed Settlement Classes and appointment of Representative Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel by the Court shall be binding only with respect to the Settlement set forth in this Agreement. In the event that this Agreement is terminated in accordance with its terms, or that the Court does not enter the Final Order and Judgment, the stipulated certification of the proposed Settlement Classes and the appointment of Settlement Class Counsel shall be vacated and the Actions shall proceed as though the proposed Settlement Classes had never been certified. Except to effectuate this Agreement, the Parties and their respective counsel agree not to present as evidence or legal precedent, rely upon, make reference to or otherwise make use of this stipulated certification of the proposed Settlement Classes in the Actions or any other legal proceeding.
IV. Notice, Opt-Out Rights And Claim Procedures
A. Notice
No later than fourteen (14) days after the Court has (1) entered the Preliminary Approval Order, and (2) approved the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form, notice shall be sent to all potential Settlement Class Members via First Class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested and in any additional form as the Court shall direct; provided that
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the forms of Notice are substantially identical to the proposed Mailed Notice and the proposed Published Notice forms that are attached hereto at Exhibit A, and the Proof of Claim Form is substantially identical to the proposed form attached hereto at Exhibit C.
Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall be responsible for providing the names and addresses of potential Settlement Class Members. Plaintiffs shall advance the reasonable cost of Notice to Settlement Class Members, including costs for the mailing of the Mailed Notice, and costs for publishing the Published Notice. Notice costs shall be reimbursed as cost of administration from the Cash Settlement Fund as set forth in paragraph II.B above. In the event that the Court does not issue a Final Order and Judgment in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, the Mericle Defendants shall reimburse Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel for one half of the Notice cost (i.e., postage and publication costs) unless the Mericle Defendants terminate this Agreement, in which event they shall reimburse Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel for the entire Notice cost. The Parties have agreed that such publication is sufficient for the Settlement Classes in compliance with the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
All Mailed Notices sent to the all potential Settlement Class Members shall be sent by First Class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested to:
Claims Committee c/o Sol H. Weiss, Esquire Adrianne E. Walvoord, Esquire Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 735-2098
B. Submission Of Proof Of Claim Form
In order to participate in the Cash Settlement Fund, Settlement Class Members must complete and submit to the Claims Committee a Proof of Claim Form.
Each Mailed Notice shall enclose a Proof of Claim Form. The Published Notice shall set forth a web site address from which a Proof of Claim Form can be downloaded and a mailing address that can be used to request a Proof of Claim Form. The Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form shall direct potential Settlement Class Members to return the completed Proof of Claim Form, together with identified documentation, to the address indicated on the Proof of Claim Form on a date certain no later than seventy-five (75) days after the Court has entered the Preliminary Approval Order and approved the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form (“Proof of Claim Deadline”).
C. Opt-Out Rights
Potential Settlement Class Members will have the right to exclude themselves from the Settlement (“Opt-Out”) by returning the Proof of Claim Form indicating their Opt-Out election no later than the Proof of Claim Deadline. Settlement Class Members who timely request to
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Opt-Out shall be excluded from this Agreement and from participation as Settlement Class Members. Any member who does not otherwise comply with the agreed-upon Opt-Out procedures approved by the Court shall be a Settlement Class Member and bound by the terms of this Agreement and the Final Order and Judgment. Within fourteen (14) days after the Opt-Out Deadline, the Claims Committee shall provide the Court and all undersigned counsel with a list of the proposed Settlement Class Members who have elected to Opt-Out (“Opt-Out Plaintiffs”).
Any Opt-Out Plaintiff who, following his or her initial election, wishes to participate as a Settlement Class Member, may revoke his or her Opt-Out election by delivering to the Claims Committee prior to the Proof of Claim Deadline a written revocation of such individual’s election to Opt-Out.
D. Bar Order
Any Settlement Class Member who does not submit a request to Opt-Out by the Proof of Claim Deadline (or, “Opt-Out Deadline”), or who does not otherwise comply with the agreedupon Opt-Out procedures approved by the Court, or who revokes his or her request to Opt-Out by no later than the Opt-Out Deadline, shall be a Settlement Class Member and shall be bound by the terms of this MSA and the Court’s Final Order and Judgment.
Any Settlement Class Member who does not submit a completed Proof of Claim Form by the Proof of Claim Deadline shall also be a Settlement Class Member, shall be bound by the terms of this MSA and the Court’s Final Order and Judgment, and shall have his or her Released Claims against Released Parties extinguished with prejudice, but shall not be eligible to participate in the Cash Settlement Fund.
E. Objection Deadline
Settlement Class Members also have the right to object to the Settlement no later than the Proof of Claim Deadline. Settlement Class Members shall deliver to the Claims Committee, described in Paragraph V herein, a written statement of any objections such that the written statement of objections is received by the Claims Committee no later than the day before the Proof of Claim Deadline. The Claims Committee shall electronically file any such objections with the Court no later than 11:59 p.m. on the Proof of Claim Deadline.
If the Court approves the MSA and enters a Final Order and Judgment which is affirmed on appeal, if any, Settlement Class Members who previously objected to the Settlement and did not elect to Opt-Out shall be bound by the MSA and the Final Order and Judgment.
F. Special Master For Allocation Appeals
The Parties hereto request that the Court appoint Judge Marina Corodemus (Ret.) as a Special Master to resolve with finality, the award to any Settlement Class Member who appeals their preliminary monetary award as set forth more particularly in the Proof of Claims Form and the Plan of Allocation. The costs of the Special Master shall be paid out of the Cash Settlement Fund following the Court’s Final Order and Judgment.
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V. Claims Committee
Plaintiffs shall form a claims committee that will be responsible for administering various aspects of the Settlement, as described herein (the “Claims Committee”). The Claims Committee shall consist of four attorneys, including one representative from each of the following four law firms: (1) Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller; (2) Anapol Schwartz; (3) Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, LLC; and (4) Juvenile Law Center.
The Claims Committee shall be responsible for: (1) reviewing the Proof of Claims Forms returned by Plaintiffs; (2) determining which Plaintiffs have elected to Opt-Out; (3) notifying the Court and the Mericle Defendants of any objections made to the Settlement by any Settlement Class Members; and (4) pursuant to the Plan of Allocation, calculating the appropriate portion of the Cash Settlement Fund to be paid to each Settlement Class Member who timely submitted a Proof of Claim Form electing to participate in the Settlement. An attorney representative from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP shall have the right to: (1) participate in any and all of the Claims Committee’s discussions and meetings determining the identities of and/or otherwise concerning Opt-Out Plaintiffs; and (2) review and have full access to all Proof of Claim Forms, objections, or other documents received in response to the Mailed Notice and/or the Published Notice, as well as any reports and/or summaries concerning Opt-Out Plaintiffs prepared by the Claims Committee.
On each Thursday after Notice is issued pursuant to paragraph IV.A, and before the OptOut Deadline, the Claims Committee shall provide to all undersigned Counsel via e-mail: (1) a list of all Opt-Out elections (by Plaintiff name) received up to that date; (2) copies of the Proof of Claim Forms indicating Plaintiffs’ elections to Opt-Out; and (3) copies of any written objections made to the Settlement by any Settlement Class Members. Within fourteen (14) business days after the Opt-Out Deadline, the Claims Committee shall provide to all Counsel via e-mail: (1) a complete list of all Opt-Out elections (by Plaintiff name); (2) copies of the Proof of Claim Forms indicating Plaintiffs’ elections to Opt-Out; (3) a statement of the total number of Mailed Notices mailed and the total number of Opt-Out elections received; (4) copies of any written objections made to the Settlement by any Settlement Class Members; and (5) a complete list of all Settlement Class Members claiming from the Cash Settlement Fund.
Thereafter, the Claims Committee shall provide to all undersigned Counsel, on a weekly basis via e-mail, copies of any written objections made to the Settlement by any Settlement Class Members.
VI. Settlement Hearing
Representative Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel shall ask the Court to set the Settlement Hearing for a date that is no earlier than ten (10) days after the Opt-Out Termination Deadline, as set forth in Paragraph VII herein (the “Settlement Hearing Date”). On or before the Settlement Hearing Date, Settlement Class Counsel shall move the Court for the entry of a Final Order and Judgment.
The Final Order and Judgment shall include:
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1. Affirmation of certification of the Settlement Classes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for settlement purposes only;
2. Final approval of this Settlement in its entirety as fair, reasonable and adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Classes as a whole;
3. A determination that all Settlement Class Members shall be bound by the Settlement and shall be deemed conclusively to have settled and released with prejudice the Released Parties and to have covenanted not to sue the Released Parties;
4. A bar order precluding each Settlement Class Member from asserting any and all Released Claims against any Released Parties that the Settlement Class Member had or has, in any court;
5. Dismissal of all Released Claims of the Settlement Class Members with prejudice as to the Released Parties; and
6. Reservation of the Court’s continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties to administer, supervise, interpret and enforce this Agreement in accordance with its terms.
VII. Opt-Out Termination Rights
A. Opt-Out Termination Rights and Reasonable Efforts Obligation
Notwithstanding any other provision of this MSA, if there are any Opt-Out Plaintiffs, the Mericle Defendants may terminate this MSA if, within their discretion, they believe there exists an unacceptably high risk to themselves associated with such Opt-Out Plaintiff(s). Each Opt-Out Plaintiff who intends to pursue a separate claim against the Released Parties shall participate in confidential non-binding mediation with the Mericle Defendants prior to the Opt-Out Termination Deadline, defined below. Expenses incurred in connection with the mediation described in this paragraph shall not be paid from the Cash Settlement Fund. The Mericle Defendants shall, within a ninety (90) day period following the Opt-Out Deadline (“Opt-Out Termination Period”), use reasonable efforts to attempt to mitigate the risks and exposure presented by such Opt-Out Plaintiff(s). The Claims Committee, Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel agree to respond in an expedited manner to the Mericle Defendants’ requests for information, if any, concerning the Opt-Out Plaintiff(s) to the extent to which counsel have the requested information in their possession. Upon request by Class Counsel and/or Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel, the Mericle Defendants agree to provide interim communications to Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel describing in reasonable detail their efforts to attempt to mitigate any risk or exposure presented by such Opt-Out Plaintiff(s). The determination of whether the Mericle Defendants have used reasonable efforts to attempt to mitigate the risks and exposure presented by the Opt-Out Plaintiff(s) is subject to judicial review. However, the determination of whether or not there exists an unacceptably high risk to the Mericle Defendants associated with such Opt-Out Plaintiff(s) is within the sole discretion of the Mericle Defendants and is not subject to judicial review.
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Following the reasonable efforts referred to in this Paragraph VII.A and on or before the expiration of the Opt-Out Termination Period (“Opt-Out Termination Deadline”), the Mericle Defendants shall, in their discretion with respect to there being an unacceptably high risk associated with Opt-Out Plaintiffs, have the right to withdraw from and terminate this MSA. Unless on or before the Opt-Out Termination Deadline, the Mericle Defendants communicate in writing to Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel their intention to withdraw from and terminate this MSA (the “Withdrawal Determination”), the parties shall proceed to the Settlement Hearing and a Final Order and Judgment pursuant to Paragraph VI of this MSA.
If the Mericle Defendants communicate a Withdrawal Determination to Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel, then Plaintiffs shall have the right to challenge, within fourteen (14) days thereafter, whether the Mericle Defendants have used reasonable efforts to attempt to mitigate the risks and exposure presented by the Opt-Out Plaintiff(s) and to present that challenge to the Court for a determination of that issue.
If the Mericle Defendants make a Withdrawal Determination, and if (i) Plaintiffs do not challenge whether the Mericle Defendants have used reasonable efforts to attempt to mitigate the risks and exposure presented by the Opt-Out Plaintiff(s), or (ii) Plaintiffs challenge whether the Mericle Defendants have used reasonable efforts to attempt to mitigate the risks and exposure presented by the Opt-Out Plaintiff(s) and the Court rejects their challenge, then, in either event, this MSA shall terminate and the Mericle Defendants shall be entitled to immediate repayment of any amounts deposited into the Escrow Account and any interest accrued thereon (“Opt-Out Termination Right”).
If the Mericle Defendants make a Withdrawal Determination, and Plaintiffs challenge whether the Mericle Defendants have used reasonable efforts to attempt to mitigate the risks and exposure presented by the Opt-Out Plaintiff(s) and the Court sustains their challenge, then this MSA shall remain in full force and effect and shall not terminate pursuant to this Paragraph VII.A, and the parties shall proceed to the Settlement Hearing and a Final Order and Judgment pursuant to Paragraph VI.
B. Reduction In Settlement Amount
If there are any Opt-Out Plaintiff(s) and the Mericle Defendants choose not to exercise their Opt-Out Termination Right, or choose to do so but the Court sustains Plaintiffs’ challenge as described herein, then the $17,750,000 portion of the Settlement Amount and, consistent with Paragraph II.A, any amount deposited into the Cash Settlement Fund as a result of a recovery by the Mericle Defendants in the Third Circuit Action, shall be reduced by an amount equal to the aggregate value of the Opt-Out Plaintiffs’ claims under the Plan of Allocation, including any pro rata distribution of unclaimed amounts and returned checks as further described in Paragraph VIII. F, and such amount shall be returned to the Mericle Defendants.
VIII. Escrow Account
The Escrow Account shall be administered in the manner set forth in the Escrow Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit D.
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A. Qualified Settlement Fund
The Escrow Account is intended by the Parties to be treated as a “qualified settlement fund” for federal income tax purposes pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1. The Parties therefore agree not to take any position in any filing or before any tax authority that is inconsistent with such treatment. The Parties further agree that the Mericle Defendants shall direct the Escrow Agent to make a timely “relation back election” (as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1(j)) back to the earliest possible date.
B. Taxes
In accordance with the Escrow Agreement, the funds in the Escrow Account shall be used to pay: (1) all taxes or estimated taxes on any income earned on funds in the Escrow Account; and (2) all related costs and expenses incurred in connection with the Escrow Account. In all events, the Parties and their counsel shall not have any liability or responsibility for the taxes, tax expenses or the filing of any tax returns or other documents with the Internal Revenue Service or any state or local tax authority. Taxes and tax expenses shall be treated as, and considered to be, a cost of administration of the Escrow Account and shall be timely paid by the Escrow Agent out of the Escrow Account following the Court’s Final Order and Judgment, but without further order of the Court.
C. Interest Earned
The Escrow Amount, and any interest earned on it, but less any costs of administration, shall revert to the party receiving the principal. Should this MSA be terminated for any reason, including pursuant to the Mericle Defendants’ Opt-Out Termination Right set forth in Paragraph VII, the Escrow Amount and any interest earned on it shall revert to the Mericle Defendants.
D. No Liability
The Parties shall have no liability with respect to the investment or distribution of the Cash Settlement Fund held in the Escrow Account, the Plan of Allocation, the determination or administration of taxes, or any losses incurred in connection with the Escrow Account.
E. No Claims
No person shall have any claim against the Representative Plaintiffs, Class Counsel, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel, the Mericle Defendants, counsel for the Mericle Defendants, or the Claims Committee based on the distributions made in accordance with this Agreement, the Plan of Allocation, or further orders of the Court.
F. Unclaimed Amounts And Returned Checks
The net amount remaining in the Escrow Account following the first and any subsequent distributions in conformance with the Plan of Allocation, including any unclaimed amounts and returned uncashed checks, shall be distributed to Settlement Class Members in accordance with the Plan of Allocation.
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IX. Releases
A. Dismissal Of Claims And Release
Upon the entry of the Final Order and Judgment, all Released Claims against the Released Parties (but not the Non-Released Parties) shall be dismissed with prejudice and the Plaintiffs shall be deemed to have unconditionally, fully, finally, and forever, remised, released, relinquished, compromised and discharged all Released Claims whether or not any particular Plaintiff seeks or receives payment under the terms of the MSA.
B. Covenant Not To Sue, And Non-Solicitation
Settlement Class Members agree and covenant not to sue or to prosecute, institute or cooperate in the institution, commencement, filing, or prosecution of any lawsuit, appeal, arbitration or other proceeding relating to or based on any claim that concerns, arises out of or relates to any of the facts, actions, claims, allegations, events, transactions, occurrences, courses of conduct, representations, omissions, circumstances or other matters alleged or referred to, or which could have been alleged or referred to in the Actions, with respect to the Released Parties.
Other than existing clients with whom Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and/or Class Counsel currently have an engagement letter, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Class Counsel agree not to initiate any communications for the purpose of seeking to represent any other Settlement Class Members against any Released Party, with regard to any matter which is the subject of the first paragraph immediately above, who may Opt-Out or who elects to Opt-Out.
X. Future Claims For Contribution Or Indemnity
It is the express intention of the Parties that, to the fullest extent possible, Plaintiffs shall in all future litigation against Non-Released Parties eliminate all claims for contribution and/or indemnity that might be asserted against the Released Parties. Plaintiffs, when entering into a settlement agreement with any Non-Released Party resolving some or all of the claims in the Actions, or resolving any other claims related in any way to the claims, allegations and/or facts in the Actions, shall insist on and include a provision barring any Non-Released Party from bringing any contribution claim, any indemnity claim, or any other claim related in any way to the claims, allegations and/or facts in the Actions against a Released Party. Plaintiffs in any jury trial against a Non-Released Party shall proffer a jury verdict form that includes the Released Parties, and in any bench trial or binding alternative dispute forum where claims are asserted against any Non-Released Party, request that the Released Parties’ wrongful conduct, if any, be adjudicated. The purpose of this paragraph is to allocate liability among all Released Parties and Non-Released Parties, and that any judgment recovered against any Non-Released Parties in the Actions or any other proceeding shall be reduced pro rata or pro tanto to account for the Released Parties’ allocation of liability, regardless of whether Released Parties herein were in fact joint tortfeasors, and regardless of whether the Released Parties participate in any such action or proceeding. The intent of this Paragraph is to be consistent with Griffin v. U.S., 500 F.2d 1059 (1974).
Plaintiffs agree that any recovery against a Non-Released Party as to which there has not been a binding allocation of liability as to the Released Parties shall be held in escrow and shall
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not be distributed until the expiration of any statutes of limitations period for any possible indemnification and/or contribution claims that such Non-Released Party may bring against any Released Party, regardless of the Released Parties’ and/or Plaintiffs’ assessment of such claims’ merit. If, upon expiration of the statutes of limitations, no claims have been filed against any Released Party by the Non-Released Party, any such recovery may be distributed. If any claims have been filed by the Non-Released Party against any Released Party, no distribution shall be made until all proceedings in connection with such claims, including appeals, are finally and fully resolved.
This provision is intended, inter alia, to accomplish the complete and permanent disengagement of the Released Parties from all possible claims – known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, present or future – that arise out of or could arise out of the facts alleged in the Actions, for which the Released Parties have been released and to avoid the necessity and expense of having the Released Parties participate in any litigation related to such claims.
XI. Termination Provisions
A. Right To Terminate The MSA
This Agreement may be terminated upon written notice within fourteen (14) days of any one of the following events.
1. If, at the Preliminary Approval Hearing or within sixty (60) days thereafter, the Court denies preliminary approval of the Settlement or refuses to preliminarily approve the Settlement without requiring substantial and material changes to the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and/or the Proof of Claim Form submitted to the Court pursuant to Paragraphs IV.A and B of this Agreement.
2. If, within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the Settlement Hearing Date, the Court denies final approval of the Settlement or refuses to finally approve the Settlement without requiring substantial and material changes to the information provisions contained in the Final Order and Judgment as set forth in Paragraph VI herein, in order to enter the Final Order and Judgment.
3. The Mericle Defendants only shall have the right to terminate this Agreement pursuant to the terms of Paragraph VII.
4. The Final Order and Judgment is substantially modified or reversed on any writ or appeal.
In the event of any termination pursuant to the Agreement, the Parties shall be restored to their original positions, including without limitation, the return to the Mericle Defendants of the Escrow Amount and, consistent with Paragraph II.A, any amount deposited into the Cash Settlement Fund as a result of a recovery by the Mericle Defendants in the Third Circuit Action.
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B. Stay Of Proceedings
The Parties agree that, upon their filing of a motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement, they jointly will move the Court to stay the following discovery pending final approval of the Settlement: (1) any depositions of individual Plaintiffs; and (2) any discovery directed to the Released Parties, including without limitation depositions, interrogatories, documents requests and requests for admission. Assuming there is no Court order providing for an earlier deadline, Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel agree not to move in any of the Actions to seek certification of any litigation classes until the Court either denies approval of the Settlement or enters the Final Order and Judgment. If the Court enters an order providing for an earlier deadline, and if Plaintiffs file a motion seeking certification of any litigation class, the Mericle Defendants shall be free to oppose any such certification.
XII. Miscellaneous Provisions
A. Not Evidence; No Admission of Liability
In no event shall this Agreement, in whole or in part, whether effective, terminated, or otherwise, or any of its provisions or any negotiations, statements or proceedings relating to it in any way be construed as, offered as, received as, used as or deemed to be evidence of the factual allegations and/or legal conclusions in the Actions, in any other action, or in any judicial, administrative, regulatory or other proceeding. Without limiting the foregoing, neither this Agreement nor any related negotiations, statements or proceedings shall be construed as, offered as, received as, used as or deemed to be evidence, or an admission or concession of liability or wrongdoing whatsoever or breach of any duty on the part of the Released Parties or any applicable defense, including without limitation any applicable statute of limitations. This Agreement does not constitute or reflect any admission of any liability by the Released Parties of the claims brought against them in the Actions. None of the Parties waives or intends to waive any applicable attorney-client privilege or work product protection for any negotiations, statements or proceedings relating to this Agreement.
B. Confidentiality
The Parties agree that any and all documents, material, correspondence and/or information received and/or produced or disclosed in furtherance of this Agreement, including all drafts of this Agreement, shall be considered confidential and shall not be disclosed to any third parties unless otherwise required by law.
C. Public/Media Statements
On the day that, pursuant to Paragraph III.A. above, the Parties submit this Agreement to the Court and jointly move the Court for the entry of a Preliminary Approval Order, the Parties will issue a mutually agreed-upon statement (the “Mutually Agreed-Upon Statement”). Class Counsel, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and counsel for the Mericle Defendants agree that they will not make or cause to be made any other public comment regarding the Settlement, other than the Mutually Agreed-Upon Statement.
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The Parties agree that the provision in the paragraph immediately above is material and in the event that Class Counsel, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel or counsel for the Mericle Defendants issue or make any public comment concerning the Settlement besides the Mutually Agreed-Upon Statement, the Plaintiffs or the Mericle Defendants shall, as the case may be, be in material breach of this Agreement and the Plaintiffs or the Mericle Defendants, as the case may be, shall have all rights in law and equity to seek relief for said breach.
Notwithstanding the two paragraphs immediately above, the Parties agree that oral or written communications between Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel on the one hand and Representative Plaintiffs, the Settlement Class Members or individual Plaintiffs on the other hand shall not constitute making or causing to be made a public comment regarding the Settlement. The Parties further agree that, notwithstanding the two paragraphs immediately above, oral or written communications between counsel for the Mericle Defendants on the one hand and the Mericle Defendants on the other hand shall not constitute making or causing to be made a public comment regarding the Settlement.
D. Entire Agreement
This Agreement, including its Exhibits, contains an entire, complete, and integrated statement of each and every term and provision agreed by and among the Parties; it is not subject to any condition not provided for herein. This Agreement supersedes any prior agreements or understandings, whether written or oral, between and among the Representative Plaintiffs, the Settlement Class Members, Class Counsel, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and counsel for the Mericle Defendants regarding the subject matter of the Actions or this Agreement.
This Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by or on behalf of Class Counsel, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and counsel for the Mericle Defendants, and approved by the Court.
E. No Presumption Against Drafter
None of the Parties shall be considered to be the drafter of this Agreement or any provision hereof for the purpose of any statute, case law, or rule of interpretation or construction that would or might cause any provision to be construed against the drafter hereof. This Agreement was drafted with substantial input by all Parties and their counsel, and no reliance was placed on any representation other than those contained herein.
F. Force Majeure
The Mericle Defendants shall not be liable for delay or non-performance of their obligations under this Agreement arising from any act of God, governmental act, and act of terrorism, war, fire, flood, explosion or civil riot. The performance of the Mericle Defendants’ obligations under this Agreement, to the extent affected by the delay, shall be suspended for the period during which the cause of the delay persists.
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G. Continuing And Exclusive Jurisdiction
The Court will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all provisions of this Agreement, including the administration, supervision, interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement in accordance with its terms and any award of attorney’s fees.
H. Counterparts
This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall constitute an original. Scanned signatures shall be considered valid signatures as of the date submitted, although the original signature pages shall thereafter be appended to this Agreement.
I. Divisions And Headings
The division of this Agreement into paragraphs and the use of captions and headings in connection herewith, are solely for convenience and shall have no legal effect in construing the provisions of this Agreement.
J. Plurals And Singulars Of Defined Terms
Where a term is defined in plural and used in singular in the text, it means one such. Where a term is defined in singular is used in plural in a text, it means more than one such.
K. Governing Law
This Agreement is to be interpreted according to the substantive law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without regard to its choice of law or conflicts of laws principles.
L. Waiver
The provisions of this Agreement may be waived only by an instrument in writing executed by the waiving Party. The waiver by any Party of any breach of this Agreement shall not be deemed to be or construed as a waiver of any other breach, whether prior, subsequent, or contemporaneous, of this Agreement.
M. No Third Party Beneficiaries
Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Agreement is intended, nor shall it in any way be construed, to create or convey any rights in or to any person other than the Plaintiffs and the Released Parties.
N. Successors And Assigns
The provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors and assigns.
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(215) 568-6200 dated: - - - - - -
For Plaintiffs in the action titled,
 Conway, et al v. Conahan et al., No. 3:09-cv-291
 (M.D. Pa.)
By: I LJJ»v1 Sol H. Weiss, Esquire Adrianne E. Walvoord, Esquire Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 735-2098 dated: /J---({P -1/
By: Barry H. Dyller, Esquire Gettysburg House 88 North Franklin Street Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701 (570) 829-4860 dated: - - - - - 
 
 

For Plaintiffs in the action titled,
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(215) 568-6200 dated: _ _ _ _ __
For Plaintiffs in the action titled, 
 Conway, et aI v. Conahan et aI., No. 3:09-cv-291 
 (M.D. Pa.)
By: Sol H. Weiss, Esquire Adrianne E. Walvoord, Esquire Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 735-2098 dared: __________
By: BarryH. D Gettysbur 88 North F in Street 
 Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701 
 (570) 829-4860
dated: 1"2-/15'"/JI

 



For Plaintiffs in the action titled,
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CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--21 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 3300 ooff 9301

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CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--13 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee312 ooff 1920
Exhibit A
to the Master Settlement Agreement

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--13 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee323 ooff 1920
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEGAL NOTICE OF A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
If you are a juvenile who appeared before former Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. at any time
from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 --- or ---
If you are the parent/guardian of a juvenile who appeared before former Judge Ciavarella during this time,
YOU COULD RECEIVE BENEFITS FROM A SETTLEMENT with Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc.
A federal court authorized this Notice. This is not a solicitation from a lawyer.
Various class action lawsuits and individual lawsuits were filed on behalf of juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and on behalf of the parents and natural guardians of the juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by former Judge Ciavarella during that period of time. This Notice refers to these parties as the “Juveniles” and the “Parents,” respectively.
The class action lawsuits, captioned H.T., et al. v. Ciavarella, Case No. 09-cv-357, Conway v. Cohanan, Case No. 09-cv-291, and Belanger v. Ciavarella, and the individual lawsuits, captioned Wallace v. Powell, Case No. 09-cv-286, Humanik v. Ciavarella, Case No. 09-cv-630, Clark v. Conahan, Case No. 09-cv-2535, Dawn v. Conahan, Case No. 10-cv-0797, Elia v. Powell, Case No. 11cv-465, and Gillette v. Ciavarella, Case No. 11-cv-0658, are pending in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. This Notice refers to these lawsuits as “the Actions.”
The Actions were filed against multiple defendants. All of the Actions include Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. as defendants. This Notice refers to Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. jointly as “the Mericle Defendants.” The Actions allege that the Mericle Defendants violated the Juveniles’ constitutional rights, that they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and that they violated Pennsylvania law.
On December 14, 2011, representatives of the Juveniles and the Parents (the “Representative Plaintiffs”), on behalf of the members of the class and the individual plaintiffs, through their respective counsel, entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA” or “Agreement”) with the Mericle Defendants, through their counsel. The Mericle Defendants will pay $17,750,000 to resolve the claims
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030
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of the Juveniles and the Parents against them and against Luzerne County. For purposes of settlement, all claims set forth in the Actions are certified for class treatment.
The Mericle Defendants have not admitted to doing anything wrong, and the Court has not found that the Mericle Defendants have done anything wrong. However, the Mericle Defendants wish to enter into the MSA to release the Released Parties as defined below from any potential liability and to end all further litigation by the Juveniles and the Parents against these parties.
This Notice is a description of important terms of the Agreement, but it does not set forth every term of the Agreement or modify the Agreement. You may obtain a copy of the entire Agreement at www.kidswinsettlement.com.
WHO IS INVOLVED IN THIS SETTLEMENT?
This Class Action Settlement is to resolve the claims of the Settlement Class Members. The Settlement Class Members fall into two groups:
1. “Juveniles” - all juveniles who appeared before former Judge Ciavarella at any time between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who were adjudicated delinquent and/or placed in a detention center by former Judge Ciavarella;
2. “Parents” - all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles in paragraph (1) who, as a result of their child’s adjudication or placement by Judge Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties assessed against them or their child; and/or (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity.
This Class Action Settlement is paid for by the Mericle Defendants:
This Class Action Settlement is paid for by Robert K. Mericle and/or Mericle Construction, Inc.
This Class Action Settlement is paid for the benefit of the Released Parties:
This Class Action Settlement is paid for by the Mericle Defendants for their benefit and for the benefit of the Mericle Parties, defined as defendant Robert K. Mericle, his family, and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors, grantees and assigns, defendant Mericle Construction, Inc., Mericle Commercial Real Estate Group Inc., Mericle Commercial Real Estate Services and all of their respective entities, affiliates, successors, assigns and related parties, and/or any other party that is, or may have ever been, owned or controlled by any of the foregoing individuals or entities, and all of the aforesaids’ lawyers, agents, officers, employees and former employees.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 2 of 10 -

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The Class Action Settlement is also paid for by the Mericle Defendants for the benefit of the Luzerne County Parties. The Luzerne County Parties include the County of Luzerne and all departments and instrumentalities thereof, including the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, the Luzerne County District Attorney’s Office, the Luzerne County Public Defender’s Office and Luzerne County Children & Youth Services, Sandra Brulo, Sam Guesto, the Luzerne County Commissioners, past and present, including without limitation Gregory Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid, and Steven Urban, and any other current or former employees, officials or agents of the County of Luzerne, and any departments and instrumentalities thereof, all related parties, successors and assigns, and all of the their lawyers, agents and employees.
The Mericle Parties, the Luzerne County Parties, and any entity or individual that is not a NonReleased Party as defined below, are considered “Released Parties.”
This Class Action Settlement does NOT include Non-Released Parties:
This proposed Settlement does NOT include PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Inc., Consulting Innovations and Services, Inc., Gregory R. Zappala, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., Perseus House, Inc. d/b/a Andromeda House, Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Barbara Conahan, and Cindy Ciavarella, and all of the aforesaids’ lawyers, agents and employees, and subsidiary and parent organizations in their capacities as such; and, Later Discovered Parties (collectively, “NonReleased Parties”). “Later Discovered Parties” is defined as any entity or person (other than a Mericle Party or a Luzerne County Party) against which or whom some or all Plaintiffs may bring a claim in any of the Actions based on evidence not currently known to Class Counsel or Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel .
Claims by the Juveniles or the Parents that are currently pending in the Actions against certain Non-Released Parties, including PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, MidAtlantic Youth Services, Inc., Consulting Innovations and Services, Inc., Gregory R. Zappala, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Mark A. Ciavarella, Michael T. Cohanan, Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella are not settled by the Agreement.
WHAT IS THE SETTLEMENT?
The Mericle Defendants shall pay $17,750,000 into a Cash Settlement Fund, which will be held in escrow by PNC Bank, in exchange for the release of all claims against the Released Parties related to the Actions (“Released Claims”). After payment of court-approved attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of common costs, the money in the Cash Settlement Fund shall be divided among all eligible Settlement Class Members pursuant to the method described in more detail below.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030
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The Mericle Defendants shall pay up to an additional $1,750,000 into the Cash Settlement Fund if, and when, they are successful in resolving a separate lawsuit the Mericle Defendants filed against their insurance carrier.
 If you agree to participate in this Settlement and qualify as a Settlement Class Member, you will receive a portion of the Cash Settlement Fund pursuant to the method described below on pages 6-7. In exchange for participating in the Settlement, you will give up your right to pursue all present and future claims and lawsuits against the Released Parties arising from the Released Claims related to these Actions. Your rights to collect additional money from NonReleased Parties, listed above, will not be affected.
 All payments from the Cash Settlement Fund shall be approved in writing by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
HOW DO I PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT?
To qualify for payment from the Cash Settlement Fund, you must complete a Proof of Claim Form attached to this Notice and submit it, together with any required documentation identified on the form, to:
Claims Committee c/o Sol H. Weiss, Esquire Adrianne E. Walvoord, Esquire Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 735-2098
You can also obtain a Proof of Claim Form at www.kidswinsettlement.com or call toll-free 1-866510-3030 and request that the Claims Committee send you a Proof of Claim Form.
The Proof of Claim Form must be submitted to the Claims Committee post-marked no later than _________________ [75 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order]. You will not be permitted to participate in the Settlement if you miss this deadline.
HOW DO I KNOW IF I QUALIFY FOR A PORTION OF THE CASH SETTLEMENT FUND?
A “Claims Committee” will be established to administer various aspects of the Settlement, including reviewing the Proof of Claim Forms returned by Settlement Class Members and calculating the amount of the Cash Settlement Fund to be paid to each Settlement Class Member who timely submits a Proof of Claim Form electing to participate in the Settlement.
The Claims Committee has access to records from the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation that identify every juvenile who appeared before former Judge Ciavarella at any time between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008. The Claims Committee also has access to records from
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030
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CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--13 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee367 ooff 1920
the Luzerne County Department of Domestic Relations that list all parents and/or natural guardians of juveniles who paid costs and fees in connection with their child’s appearance(s) before former Judge Ciavarella at any time between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008. This Notice refers to the records from the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation and Luzerne County Department of Domestic Relations as “the Records.” The Records will verify whether you are an eligible Settlement Class Member.
After you submit your completed Proof of Claim Form, and any required additional documents, the Claims Committee will review your information. Eligible Settlement Class Members are those juveniles and parents who qualify to receive a portion of the Cash Settlement Fund.
 If you are not a Settlement Class Member, meaning that you do not qualify for payment from the Cash Settlement Fund, you will receive a written notice to that effect from the Claims Committee. In the event you receive notice that you are not a Settlement Class Member, it is likely because your name does not appear in the Records or the Records do not show that you are a Settlement Class Member as defined above. You will have thirty (30) days from the date of the notice to submit written documentation establishing that you, or your child, was adjudicated delinquent or placed by former Judge Ciavarella at any time between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008.
 If you are a Settlement Class Member, meaning that you do qualify for payment from the Cash Settlement Fund, the Claims Committee will send you a proposed payment amount with a written explanation.
HOW WILL I KNOW WHAT AMOUNT I AM QUALIFIED TO RECEIVE FROM THE CLASS SETTLEMENT FUND?
Based upon your responses on the Proof of Claim Form, the information in the Records, and any other written documentation you provide in support of your responses on the Proof of Claim Form, the Claims Committee will determine the amount you are qualified to receive from the Cash Settlement Fund in accordance with the procedure set forth at pages 6-7, below.
PROOF OF CLAIM FORM
You must answer questions on the attached Proof of Claim Form so that the Claims Committee can determine (1) whether you are a Settlement Class Member and, if so, (2) what Benefit Fund you qualify for, and (3) what portion of that Benefit Fund you are eligible to receive. The answers you provide in the Proof of Claim Form, in addition to information from the Records, will also allow the Claims Committee to assess whether you are eligible for a portion of the Enhanced Benefit Fund, explained in more detail below.
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EXPLANATION OF BENEFIT FUNDS – PLAN OF ALLOCATION
The Cash Settlement Fund will be allocated, or divided, among qualifying Settlement Class Members from the Benefit Funds described below. This Notice refers to the division of funds as the Plan of Allocation.
_________________________________________________________________________
1. PROBATION BENEFIT FUND. Each qualifying Juvenile Settlement Class Member who never spent any time in PACC, WPACC, or any other juvenile detention facility as a result of an adjudication by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 shall receive a payment of $500.
The Probation Benefit Fund shall be $410,000. In the event the Probation Benefit Fund is not depleted by required distributions, the balance shall be added to the Enhanced Benefit Fund. ________________________________________________________________________
2. NON-PACC/WPACC BENEFIT FUND. Each qualifying Juvenile Settlement Class Member who was placed in a detention facility as a result of an adjudication or placement by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, but who never spent any time in PACC and/or WPACC, shall receive a payment of $1,000.
The Non-PACC/WPACC Benefit Fund shall be $820,000. In the event the NonPACC/WPACC Benefit Fund is not depleted by required distributions, the balance shall be added to the Enhanced Benefit Fund. _________________________________________________________________________
3. PACC/WPACC BENEFIT FUND. Each qualifying Juvenile Settlement Class Member who was placed in PACC or WPACC as a result of an adjudication or placement by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 shall receive a payment of $5,000.
The PACC/WPACC Benefit Fund shall be $3,650,000. In the event the PACC/WPACC Benefit Fund is not depleted by required distributions, the balance shall be added to the Enhanced Benefit Fund. _________________________________________________________________________
4. PARENT AND/OR NATURAL GUARDIAN BENEFIT FUND. Each qualifying Parent Settlement Class Member who, as a result of their child’s adjudication or placement by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, (i) made payments to Luzerne County or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn by Luzerne County; or (ii) had court-ordered services or pay courtordered costs, fees, interest, and/or penalties assessed against them or their child, shall receive the actual amount of monies paid, garnished, or withdrawn.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030
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The Parent and/or Natural Guardian Benefit Fund shall be $500,000. In the event the Parent and/or Natural Guardian Benefit Fund is not depleted by required distributions, the balance shall be added to the Enhanced Benefit Fund. _________________________________________________________________________
5. ENHANCED BENEFIT FUND. A portion of the total Cash Settlement Fund shall be reserved for the Enhanced Benefit Fund to compensate Juveniles with specified unique situations. Affirmative answers to the Enhanced Benefit Fund questions in the Proof of Claim Form will, in various combinations, be assigned certain numbers of points. The Claims Committee will then add the points for all Settlement Class Members qualifying for the Enhanced Benefit Fund and divide the available portion of the Cash Settlement Fund by the total number of points to arrive at the cash value of each Enhanced Benefit Fund point.
The Enhanced Benefit Fund shall be at least $8,035,000.
Enhanced benefits will be based on the factors below as documented in the Records or other supporting documents provided by you:
• Age • Number of juvenile petitions • Number of days spent at PACC and/or WPACC • Number of days spent in placement at facilities other than PACC or WPACC • Physical injury or illness, for which you received treatment from a healthcare
provider, while detained or placed at PACC or WPACC and/or as a result of your detention or placement at PACC or WPACC by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008. • Psychological or emotional harm, for which you received treatment from a licensed professional, while you were detained or placed at PACC or WPACC or as a result of your detention or placement at PACC or WPACC by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008. • Adverse effects on your educational progress as a result of having been detained or placed at PACC or WPACC by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008. • Suicide as a result of having been detained or placed at PACC or WPACC by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 2003 through May 28, 2008.
Juveniles shall not seek an award from the Enhanced Benefit Fund without a good faith basis for asserting such a claim.
After Settlement Class Members qualifying for payment from the Enhanced Benefit Fund receive payments, and after all disputes have been resolved, any money remaining (as a result of, for example, uncollected claims) will be paid on a pro rata basis to the Settlement Class Members who qualify for the Enhanced Benefit Fund.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030
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HOW MAY I DISPUTE THE AMOUNT I WAS OFFERED?
If you qualify as a Settlement Class Member, file a Proof of Claim Form, and believe the amount you were assigned by the Claims Committee was wrongly determined, you can dispute this amount in the following way.
The Court will appoint a Special Master for Allocation Appeals who will independently review your dispute. The Special Master will re-assess the Claims Committee’s decision. This reassessment will include a complete review of your Proof of Claim Form, the information available in the Records, and any additional written documentation provided by you in support of your claim. If appropriate, the Special Master will make adjustments to the amount assigned by the Claims Committee under the terms of the Plan of Allocation.
The determinations made by the Special Master are final and shall not be subject to any further review or appeal.
I. IF YOU QUALIFY AS A SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBER -- AND -- YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SETTLEMENT, YOU MUST SUBMIT A PROOF OF CLAIM FORM
Complete a Proof of Claim Form attached to this Notice and submit to the Claims Committee below by ____________________ [75 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order]:
Claims Committee c/o Sol H. Weiss, Esquire Adrianne E. Walvoord, Esquire Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 735-2098
A separate Proof of Claim Form, together with any required documentation as identified on the form, must be submitted for each Settlement Class Member – whether a Juvenile Class Member or a Parent Class Member – participating in this Settlement.
You can also obtain a Proof of Claim Form at www.kidswinsettlement.com or call toll-free 1866-510-3030 and request that the Claims Committee send you a Proof of Claim Form.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 8 of 10 -

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II. IF YOU QUALIFY AS A SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBER -- AND -- YOU DO NOT WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT, YOU CAN EITHER:
1. DO NOTHING
If you do nothing and do not return a completed Proof of Claim Form by the Proof of Claim Deadline on DATE [75 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order], you will not receive a portion of the Cash Settlement Fund. You will be bound by all terms of the Agreement and give up your rights to pursue present and future claims and lawsuits against the Released Parties, including the Mericle Parties and the Luzerne County Parties, arising from the events related to these Released Claims. Your case will be dismissed with prejudice against the Released Parties. However, claims against certain Non-Released Parties that are still in the Actions, including PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, MidAtlantic Youth Services, Inc., Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Mark A. Ciavarella, and Michael T. Conahan will not be affected.
2. OPT OUT OF THE SETTLEMENT
If you choose to “Opt-Out” of the Settlement, indicate in the appropriate area on the Proof of Claim Form that you wish to “Opt-Out” and return the Proof of Claim Form to the Claims Committee by DATE [75 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order].
To Opt-Out means that you will receive no payment from the Cash Settlement Fund. However, if you Opt-Out you will keep the right to sue, or continue to sue, the Released Parties, on your own or with your own attorney, about the legal issues in this case.
NOTE  If you Opt-Out and you wish to pursue your claims against the Mericle Parties, on your own or with your own attorney, you will be required to participate in confidential nonbinding mediation with the Mericle Defendants at some point during the ninety (90) days following the deadline to return your Proof of Claim Form.
NOTE  If you wish to Opt-Out but do not submit a Proof of Claim Form indicating your desire to opt-out by _______________________ [75 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order], you will not receive a portion of the Cash Settlement Fund; you will be bound by all terms of the MSA and give up your rights to pursue present and future claims and lawsuits against the Released Parties, including the Mericle Parties and the Luzerne County Parties, arising from the events related to these Actions; and your case will be dismissed with prejudice against the Released Parties. However, claims against certain Non-Released Parties that are still in the Actions, including PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Inc., Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Mark A. Ciavarella, and Michael T. Conahan will not be affected.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030
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III. IF YOU QUALIFY AS A SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBER -- AND -- YOU DO NOT BELIEVE THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR -- BUT -- YOU STILL WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT IF IT ULTIMATELY IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, YOU MAY:
1. WITHIN 75 DAYS OF THE COURT’S PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT, OBJECT TO THE SETTLEMENT IN WRITING
If you qualify as a Settlement Class Member, you can object to the Settlement if you do not like some or all of it. You can give reasons why you think the Court should not approve it. The Court will consider your views.
To object, you must send your completed Proof of Claim Form and required documentation, together with a letter saying that you object to the Settlement, to the Claims Committee. In your letter, be sure to include your (1) name; (2) address; (3) telephone number; (4) reasons you object to the Settlement; and (5) signature. Mail your Proof of Claim Form and letter objecting to the Settlement to the Claims Committee so that it is received by DATE [74 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order because the Claims Committee must file the objections with the Court 75 days after]. The Claims Committee must file any objections with the Court by _____________________ [75 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order].
 What’s the difference between objecting and opting-out? Objecting is telling the Court that you do not like something about the settlement. You can object only if you participate in the Settlement, i.e., timely submit a completed Proof of Claim Form. If you Opt-Out, you are telling the Court that you do not want to participate in the Settlement. If you Opt-Out, you may not object to the Settlement because the Settlement no longer affects you.
2. ATTEND A HEARING TO OBJECT TO THE SETTLEMENT
The Court will hold a hearing to decide whether to finally approve the Settlement. You may attend and you may ask to speak, but you don’t have to.
 When and Where. The exact date and location of the hearing are unknown, although the hearing will be after all Proof of Claim Forms and objections have been submitted. We will post the date and location on www.kidswinsettlement.com as soon as the Court announces them.
 After the hearing, the Court will decide whether to finally approve the Settlement. We do not know how long it will take for the Court to decide.
** You have a right to select a lawyer of your choosing for the purpose of assisting you in determining whether you wish to participate, object, opt-out, or dispute your proposed payment amount.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030
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If you are a JUVENILE who appeared before former Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. at any time
from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 --- or ---
If you are the PARENT/GUARDIAN OF A JUVENILE who appeared before former Judge Ciavarella during this time,
YOU COULD RECEIVE BENEFITS FROM A SETTLEMENT with Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc.

A partial settlement has been entered into on behalf of juvenile and parent/guardian Settlement Class Members with Mericle Construction, Inc. and its president, Robert K. Mericle (referred to in this notice as the “Mericle Defendants”). The Mericle Defendants will pay $17.75 million into a Cash Settlement Fund with the potential of up to an additional $1.75 million. This Notice is a description of important terms of the Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA” or “Agreement”), but it does not set forth every term of that Agreement or modify that Agreement. You may obtain a copy of the entire MSA at www.kidswinsettlement.com.
If you believe you qualify to receive a payment as part of this settlement, you may submit a Proof of Claim form to get benefits, exclude yourself from this partial settlement, or object to it.

HOW DO I RECEIVE A PAYMENT?
You must submit a Proof of Claim form to the Claims Committee in order to receive a payment. You will also have to sign an authorization to release records to the Claims Committee so it can verify your information and calculate your payment.
The Proof of Claim Form must be submitted to the Claims Committee postmarked no later than ___________. You will not be permitted to participate in the Settlement if you miss this deadline.
HOW MUCH WILL I RECEIVE?

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania authorized this notice. The Court will have a hearing to consider whether to approve this settlement, so that the benefits may be paid.
WHO’S INCLUDED?
You are a Juvenile Settlement Class Member or Parent/Guardian Settlement Class Member, as defined in the MSA, if you fall into either of the following groups:
• Juvenile Settlement Class Members: all juveniles who appeared before former Judge Ciavarella at any time between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who were adjudicated delinquent and/or placed in a detention center by former Judge Ciavarella.
• Parent Settlement Class Members: all parents and/or legal guardians of Juvenile Settlement Class Members who made payments as a result of his or her child’s adjudication or placement.
WHAT’S THIS ABOUT?
Various class action lawsuits and individual lawsuits were filed against the Mericle Defendants and other defendants. The lawsuits allege that the Mericle Defendants and other defendants violated the Juveniles’ constitutional rights, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and Pennsylvania law.
This settlement resolves all claims against the Released Parties, which includes the Mericle Parties and Luzerne County Parties. The Mericle Defendants have not admitted to doing anything wrong, and the Court has not found that the Mericle Defendants have done anything wrong. However, the Mericle Defendants wish to enter into this MSA to release the Released Parties, as defined in the MSA, from any potential liability and to end all further litigation by the Juveniles and the Parents against these parties.

Settlement Class Category

Base Award

1. Probation Only………………………………….$500
2. Non-PACC/WPACC……………………………$1000 *** [if you were adjudicated and placed in a facility other than PACC and/or WPACC, you fall in this category]
3. PACC/WPACC………………………………….$5000 *** [if you were adjudicated and placed in PACC and/or WPACC for any period of time, you fall in this category]
***May be entitled to the Enhanced Benefit Fund. See www.kidswinsettlement.com for complete information.
4. Parents/Guardians…………………………actual amount paid

WHAT ARE MY OTHER OPTIONS?
If you do not want to be legally bound by this settlement, you must exclude yourself – or opt-out – by ___________. If you opt-out, you cannot get money from this settlement and may continue individually to proceed against the Mericle Defendants. If you want to be included in the settlement but do not agree to all the terms, you can object. The complete notice describes how to opt-out or object.

FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION

For more information, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com, call toll-free 1-866510-3030, or write to:
Claims Committee Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103

The class action and individual lawsuits will continue against certain Non-Released Parties, as defined in the MSA, including the former Judges Ciavarella and Conahan, Robert Powell, PA Child Care (“PACC”) and Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”).

D1B1-/8686663502-72525901.120-3030

www.kidswinsettlement.com

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Exhibit B
to the Master Settlement Agreement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CIAVARELLA, et al.,
Defendants.
CONWAY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CONAHAN, et al.,
Defendants.
WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. POWELL, et al.,
Defendants.

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-357

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-291

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-0286

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

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HUMANIK, Plaintiff,
v. CIAVARELLA, et al.,
Defendants.

:

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

NO. 3:09-CV-0630

:

:

The Honorable A. Richard Caputo

:

:

:

ORDER CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS AND PRELIMINARILY APPROVING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT Upon review and consideration of the Motion for Preliminary Approval, brief in support thereof and the attached Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) dated December 16, 2011 and the exhibits thereto (collectively, the “Settlement Documents”), it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

Preliminary Approval of the Master Settlement Agreement and Conditional Certification of Settlement Classes
1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the MSA on file with this Court, and all capitalized terms used herein that also appear in the MSA are intended to have the meanings set forth in the MSA.

2. The Court has jurisdiction over the Actions, each of the Parties and all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.

3. The terms of the MSA, including the exhibits, are preliminarily approved, subject to further consideration at the Settlement Hearing provided for below. The Court preliminarily finds that the settlement terms set forth in the MSA are sufficiently within the range of

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reasonableness, such that notice of the Settlement in the form presented to this Court as Exhibit A to the MSA should be disseminated to all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
4. The Court preliminarily finds for settlement purposes only, and subject to final determination at the Settlement Hearing provided for below, that the proposed Settlement Classes meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, for purposes of settlement only, and pending Final Judicial Approval, the Court conditionally certifies the Settlement Classes, and in particular,
(1) the Juvenile Settlement Class consisting of:
all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2008 who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella; and (2) the Parent Settlement Class consisting of: all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2008 and who, in connection with their child’s appearance: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn, (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties assessed against them or their child; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity. For purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), all claims asserted in the Actions are certified for class treatment, for settlement purposes only.
5. The Court finds on a preliminary basis that the Representative Plaintiffs are proper class representatives for the Settlement Classes as their claims are typical of those of
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other all members of the proposed Settlement Classes and involve common questions or law and fact. Further, Representative Plaintiffs appear to have no conflicts of interest with other all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
6. The Court finds on a preliminary basis that the law firms of Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller; Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, LLC; Anapol Schwartz; and Juvenile Law Center, acting as Class Counsel, are competent and experienced counsel and as such will adequately represent the interests of the all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
7. If the MSA is terminated, the foregoing conditional certification of the Settlement Classes, appointment of Representative Plaintiffs as class representatives, and approval of Class Counsel shall be void and of no effect and the Parties to the MSA shall be returned to the status each occupied before entry of this Order.
8. Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall cause the Notice to be given to the all members of the proposed Settlement Classes.
(a) The Court finds that the Mailed Notice and the Published Notice, attached to the MSA at Exhibit A, and the Settlement Hearing provide appropriate notice to the conditionally certified Settlement Classes.
(b) Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall disseminate the Mailed Notice to the last known addresses of all individuals in the Settlement Classes.
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(c) The Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department shall, within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, provide to Class Counsel a list of the last known mailing address of each juvenile whose adjudications were vacated and/or records expunged in accordance with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s October 29, 2009 and March 29, 2010 orders. See In re J.V.R., 81 M.M. 2008, Order ¶¶ 3-4 (Pa. Oct. 29, 2009) and Order, ¶ 3 (Pa. Mar. 29, 2010). The Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department and the Domestic Relations branch of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas shall also promptly provide to Class Counsel its complete files for all individuals for whom Class Counsel provide signed releases.
(d) Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall disseminate the Published Notice via publication in the Times Leader and the Citizens Voice.
(e) The dissemination of notice described above shall occur within fourteen (14) days of the date of the entry of this Order.
(f) Class Counsel and Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall bear the costs of notice.
9. Settlement Class Members of the conditionally approved Settlement Classes will have until the Opt-Out Deadline, or _____________________, 2012 (seventy-five (75) days from the date of entry of this Preliminary Approval Order) to exclude themselves from the Juvenile Settlement Class or Parent Settlement Class. To do so, Settlement Class Members shall
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adhere to the provisions set forth in the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form attached at Exhibits A and C to the MSA.
10. Any Settlement Class Member who does not properly and timely Opt-Out pursuant to the provisions set forth in the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice and the Proof of Claim Form attached at Exhibits A and C to the MSA, shall be included in the Juvenile Settlement Class or Parent Settlement Class and shall be bound by the MSA, regardless of whether such person participates in the Cash Settlement Fund.
11. On or before _____________________, 2012 (“Proof of Claim Deadline”), each Settlement Class Member who wishes to claim against the Cash Settlement Fund shall be required to submit a timely Proof of Claim, with the required documentation, as directed in the MSA and in the form attached at Exhibit C to the MSA.
12. Any Settlement Class Member who fails to file a proper and timely Proof of Claim shall forever be barred from receiving any distribution from the Cash Settlement Fund but will in all other respects be bound by the MSA if it is finally approved. Each Settlement Class Member that submits a proper and timely Proof of Claim shall be bound by the MSA if it is finally approved.
Settlement Hearing 13. Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a hearing on final settlement (“Settlement Hearing”) will be held before this Court on _____________________, 2012 at _______ EST. At the Settlement Hearing, the Court will consider the following issues: (a) the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the MSA; (b) whether the Settlement Classes should remain certified for settlement purposes; (c) whether the
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Court should approve awards of costs and attorneys’ fees as described in fee applications submitted by Class Counsel; (d) whether entry of a Final Approval Order terminating the Actions should be entered; and (f) such other matters as the Court may deem necessary or appropriate.
14. All briefs and materials of any party in support of the Final Judicial Approval, as well as the fee petition and supporting papers, shall be served on the Court and all Parties at least ________ calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing.
15. Any Settlement Class Member wishing to object to the MSA must submit to the Claims Committee a letter stating that he or she objects to the MSA, together with his or her Proof of Claim Form. The letter must be sent to that it is received by the Claims Committee no later than _____________________, 2012 (seventy-four (74) days after the Court has entered the Preliminary Approval Order). Service on the Claims Committee shall be by first class mail. No later than _____________________, 2012 (seventy-five (75) days after the Court has entered the Preliminary Approval Order), the Claims Committee must cause all such objections to be filed with the Court. All responses by the Parties to objections shall be filed and served by first class mail on the objecting person or his or her attorney no later than ten (10) days before the Settlement Hearing. Any Settlement Class Member who does not serve an objection as described in the Notice and this Order shall be deemed to have waived any such objection by appeal, collateral attack, or otherwise.
16. Judge Marina Corodemus (Ret.) is approved as the Special Master for Allocation Appeals, to resolve the claims of any Settlement Class Members who dispute the award made to them by the Claims Committee.
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admission or concession by the Released Parties as to the validity of any claim that was or could have been asserted or as to any liability by them as to any manner set forth in this Order. Neither this Order nor the MSA nor any other Settlement-related document shall constitute any evidence of admission of liability by the Released Parties, nor shall either the MSA, this Order or any other Settlement-related document be offered in evidence or used for any other purpose in this or any other matter or proceeding except as may be necessary to consummate or enforce the MSA or the terms of this Order, or if offered by the Released Parties in, inter alia, responding to any action purporting to assert Released Claims; provided, however, the Released Parties may use such documents insofar as it may be necessary or appropriate to establish the terms thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ________________________ Caputo, J.
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Exhibit C
to the Master Settlement Agreement

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EACH SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBER PARTICIPATING IN THE SETTLEMENT – WHETHER A JUVENILE CLASS MEMBER OR A PARENT CLASS MEMBER –
MUST SUBMIT A SEPARATE PROOF OF CLAIM FORM.

I. PERSONAL INFORMATION

Name:

____________________________________________________________

Address: ____________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

Email:

____________________________________________________________

Home Phone No.: (____)_____-_________ Cell Phone No.: (____)_____-________

Date of Birth: _______________________ SSN:_______-______-______________

II. OPT-OUT RIGHT

You can elect to opt out of this Settlement and be free to legally pursue Robert K. Mericle and/or Mericle Construction, Inc., on your own or with your own attorney, and outside of the Settlement. To opt out means that you will receive no payment from the Cash Settlement Fund and you will not be a Settlement Class Member.

If you wish to opt out of the Settlement with Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., please indicate below by signing your name.

DO NOT SIGN UNLESS YOU INTEND TO OPT-OUT. IF YOU OPTOUT, YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY BENEFITS UNDER THIS SETTLEMENT.

_______________________________________________ Signature of Settlement Class Member

__________________ Date

_______________________________________________ Signature of Parent if Settlement Class Member is a Minor

__________________ Date

*IF YOU OPT OUT OF THIS SETTLEMENT - STOP HERE. DO NOT ANSWER ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS.
IF YOU DO NOT OPT OUT, AND YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT, CONTINUE TO THE NEXT PAGE.
If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 1 of 8 -

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III. CATEGORIES FOR COMPENSATION

DIRECTIONS

On the questions below, check your response where indicated.

In order to determine whether you qualify for the Cash Settlement Fund, you must include your file from the Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department -- OR -- sign the attached Release authorizing the Claims Committee to access your probation file. You must submit either your file or the Release with your Proof of Claim Form.

Note that this Form uses the following terms:

• “Ciavarella” refers to former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr.

• Being “adjudicated delinquent” is similar to being found guilty, but in Juvenile Court. An “adjudication” is a Juvenile Court Order adjudicating a youth delinquent based on an underlying juvenile petition. A Petition is a document containing all charges against a juvenile stemming from an alleged criminal act.

• “PACC/WPACC” refers to the juvenile detention and treatment facilities run by PA Child Care, LLC (in Luzerne County) and Western PA Child Care, LLC (in Butler County).

• A “NON-PACC/WPACC facility” is a juvenile detention or treatment facility (or other out-of-home placement facility) other than PACC/WPACC.

QUESTIONS

1. Are you a PARENT or a GUARDIAN of a child who appeared in the Luzerne County Juvenile Court before Ciavarella at any time during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008? --OR-Are you a JUVENILE who appeared in the Luzerne County Juvenile Court before Ciavarella at any time during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

PARENT/GUARDIAN ____

JUVENILE ____

 If you are a PARENT/GUARDIAN, go to Questions 15-19.

 If you are a JUVENILE, continue on to Question 2.

If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 2 of 8 -

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2. Were you adjudicated delinquent (found guilty) by Ciavarella at any time between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008? AND/OR Were you placed outside the home as a result of your appearance before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?
YES, I was adjudicated delinquent and/or placed outside the home ____
NO, neither ____
 If YES, continue to Question 3.
 If NO, you are NOT eligible to participate in this Settlement. **STOP HERE** You do not need to answer any additional questions.

3. Were you sent to or detained at any juvenile detention facility or any other residential facility as a result of your appearance before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

YES ____

NO____

 If YES, continue to Question 4.

 If NO, you are entitled to $500. **STOP HERE** You do not need to answer any additional questions.

4. Were you detained or placed at PACC/WPACC as a result of your appearance before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

YES____

NO____

 If YES, continue to Question 5.

 If NO -- AND -- you were detained at a NON-PACC/WPACC facility for 90 days or more as a result of your appearance before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, continue to Question 5.

 If NO -- AND -- you were detained at a NON- PACC/WPACC facility for less than 90 days as a result of your appearance(s) before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, you are entitled to $1000. **STOP HERE** You do not need to answer any additional questions.

If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 3 of 8 -

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5. At any time prior to May 28, 2008, including before January 1, 2003, were you ever adjudicated delinquent on (found guilty of) any of the following crimes: (1) rape; (2) arson of a dwelling; (3) any type of sexual assault; (4) any crime involving a firearm that was not a BB Gun; or (5) any other crime that you were originally charged with in adult criminal court or for which you appeared in adult criminal court?

YES____

NO____

 If YES, you are entitled to $5000. **STOP HERE** You do not need to answer any additional questions.

 If NO, continue to Question 6.

6. At any time prior to May 28, 2008, including before January 1, 2003, were you adjudicated delinquent (found guilty) based on four (4) or more separate juvenile petitions?

YES____

NO____

 If YES, you are entitled to $5000. **STOP HERE** You do not need to answer any additional questions.

 If NO, please answer all the questions in Section IV, Factors for the Enhanced Benefit Fund, below.

IV. FACTORS FOR THE ENHANCED BENEFIT FUND

Only check “YES” if you answer “YES” to all parts of a question. If your answer would be “NO” to any part of a question, you must check “NO.”

7. Were you age 13 or younger at the time of your first offense for which you were adjudicated by Ciavarella or at the time of your first placement by Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

YES____

NO____

If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 4 of 8 -

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--15 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee568 ooff 1910

8. From January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, were you adjudicated delinquent only once (based on only one (1) juvenile petition)? -- AND-Were you detained or placed at PACC/WPACC as a result of your appearance(s) before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 for more than 10 days?

YES to both questions_____

NO_____

 If YES, was this single juvenile petition filed against you your FIRST offense?

YES_____

NO_____

9. From January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, were you adjudicated delinquent only twice (based on no more than two (2) separate juvenile petitions)? -- AND – Were you detained or placed at PACC/WPACC as a result of your appearance(s) before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 for more than 25 days?

YES to both questions_____

NO_____

10. At any time prior to May 28, 2008, including before January 1, 2003, were you adjudicated delinquent three times or fewer (based on three (3) or fewer separate juvenile petitions)? -- AND – Were you detained or placed at PACC/WPACC as a result of your appearance(s) before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 for at least one (1) day? -- AND – Were you detained or placed at a NON-PACC/WPACC facility as a result of your appearance(s) before Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 for more than 180 days?

YES to all three questions_____

NO_____

If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 5 of 8 -

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--15 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee579 ooff 1910

11. Did you suffer a physical injury or illness, for which you received treatment, either while you were detained or placed at PACC or WPACC or as a result of your detention or placement at PACC or WPACC by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

Written documentation supporting your claim from a healthcare professional, or a signed authorization allowing the Claims Committee to obtain records from the healthcare professional, is necessary to receive enhancement points. Authorization forms may be obtained at www.kidswinsettlement.com.

YES____

NO____

12. Did you suffer psychological or emotional harm, for which you received treatment from a licensed professional, either while you were detained or placed at PACC or WPACC or as a result of your detention or placement at PACC or WPACC by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

Written documentation supporting your claim from a licensed mental health professional, or a signed authorization allowing the Claims Committee to obtain records from the licensed mental health professional, is necessary to receive enhancement points. Authorization forms may be obtained at www.kidswinsettlement.com.

YES____

NO____

13. Was your educational progress adversely affected, including but not limited to loss of education credits or loss of a full or partial class year, as a result of your having been detained or placed at PACC or WPACC by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

Written documentation supporting your claim from an appropriate professional, such as a school counselor or school administrator, or a signed authorization allowing the Claims Committee to obtain records from the appropriate professional, is necessary to receive enhancement points. Authorization forms may be obtained at www.kidswinsettlement.com.

YES___

NO____

If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 6 of 8 -

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--15 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee680 ooff 1910

14. Were you ONLY detained or placed at a NON-PACC/WPACC facility for MORE than 90 days?

YES ____

NO____

V. PARENT PLAINTIFF COMPENSATION

15. Did your child commit suicide as a result of having been detained or placed at PACC or WPACC during the period from January 2003 through May 28, 2008?

Written documentation supporting your claim from an appropriate professional, or a signed authorization allowing the Claims Committee to obtain records from the appropriate professional, is necessary to receive enhancement points. Authorization forms may be obtained at www.kidswinsettlement.com.

YES____

NO____

16. Was your child adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

YES____

NO____

 If YES, continue to Question 17.

 If NO, you are NOT eligible to participate in this Settlement. **STOP HERE** You do not need to answer any additional questions.

17. What are the name(s) and date(s) of birth of your child(ren) who were adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella at any time during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

Name

D.O.B.

__________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________

If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 7 of 8 -

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--15 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee691 ooff 1910

18. Did you make payments to Luzerne County or have wages, social security payments, unemployment compensation, or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn by Luzerne County as a result of your child’s adjudication or placement by Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

YES____

NO____

 If YES, state how much: _______________________________

 If YES, attach all receipts and documentation of these payments, garnishments, or withdrawals.

19. Did you pay for court-ordered services or pay court-ordered costs, fees, interest, and/or penalties assessed against you or your child as a result of your child’s adjudication or placement by Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008?

YES____

NO____

 If YES, state how much: _______________________________

 If YES, attach all receipts and documentation of these payments.

If you have any questions, visit www.kidswinsettlement.com or call 1-866-510-3030 - 8 of 8 -

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--51 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 6120 ooff 9101

Instructions to Settlement Class Members: • Each Juvenile Settlement Class Member must submit a copy of his/her complete
probation file and/or submit the release below. • Each Parent Settlement Class Member who paid money to the Domestic Relations
branch of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas must submit records and receipts of all payments made and/or submit the release below. • Each Settlement Class Member – Juvenile or Parent – must submit a separate release.

AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE CONFIDENTIAL COURT RECORDS AND INFORMATION

I,

_______________________________________, hereby authorize

[Settlement Class Member or Parent/Guardian if Settlement Class Member is a Minor]

the Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department and the Domestic Relations branch of the

Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, and their employees, agents, and legal counsel, to

release records to the Settlement Claims Committee in the civil actions pending at Wallace v.

Powell, No. 09-0286 (M.D. Pa.) (Caputo, J.), and to provide and discuss all records and

information concerning the following individual:

Name of Settlement Class Member: ____

_

Address:

Phone Number:

_____

Date of Birth:

Social Security Number: ______________________

For purposes of this Release, “Records” means all documents created, collected or maintained by the Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department and the Domestic Relations branch of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, including but not limited to:

1. Documents and forms signed by the above-named Settlement Class Member and/or the above-named Settlement Class Member’s parent or guardian; notes, transcripts, reports, forms, or other electronic or written materials documenting any and all proceedings in the Luzerne County Juvenile Court involving the above-named Settlement Class Member, including but not limited to adjudicatory hearings,

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--51 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 6131 ooff 9101

disposition hearings, review hearings and probation revocation hearings; progress reports, medical, psychological and/or psychiatric evaluations, school records, treatment plans, Individual Service Plans (ISPs), incident reports, discharge recommendations, and discharge summaries, including but not limited to those prepared and/or submitted by a placement facility or other agency that supervised the above-named individual; police reports, allegation complaints, petitions alleging delinquency, summonses; and any and all written notes of interviews or meetings or other agency with above-named individual and/or above-named individual’s parent(s) or guardian(s) family.
2. Documents sufficient to identify all monies paid the above-named Settlement Class Member, as a result of adjudications before former Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr., including, but not limited to, court costs, fees, fines, restitution, placement costs, electronic monitoring costs, and probation costs. These documents shall include, but not be limited to, the following: complaints filed by probation against the abovenamed Settlement Class Member named above for child support; court orders to pay child support; court orders to withhold income for support; income and expense statements regarding by the above-named Settlement Class Member; notices of payment owed by the above-named Settlement Class Member; receipts for payments made by the above-named Settlement Class Member; Participant Accounting Reports for the above-named Settlement Class Member; Account Statements for the abovenamed Settlement Class Member named above.
Copies of all documents should be sent to:
Claims Committee c/o Sol H. Weiss, Esquire Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103.
A representative of the Claims Committee can be reached at 1-215-735-2098 or 1-866-510-3030.
I hereby consent and authorize this Release of records and information.

_______________________________________________ Signature of Settlement Class Member

______

_________________________________________

Signature of Parent if Settlement Class Member is a Minor

__________________ Date
__________________ Date

2

CCasaese3:30:90-9c-vc-v0-0208268-6A-ARRCC DDocoucmumenetn1t 018042-21 Filed 012/0248/12 Page 164ofo1f 390
Exhibit D
to the Master Settlement Agreement

CCasaese3:30:90-9c-vc-v0-0208268-6A-ARRCC DDocoucmumenetn1t 018042-21 Filed 012/0248/12 Page 265ofo1f 390
REDACTED

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CCasaese3:30:90-9c-vc-v0-0208268-6A-ARRCC DDocoucmumenetn1t 018042-21 Filed 012/0248/12 Page 467ofo1f 390

CCasaese3:30:90-9c-vc-v0-0208268-6A-ARRCC DDocoucmumenetn1t 018042-21 Filed 012/0248/12 Page 568ofo1f 390

CCasaese3:30:90-9c-vc-v0-0208268-6A-ARRCC DDocoucmumenetn1t 018042-21 Filed 012/0248/12 Page 69ofo1f 390

CCasaese3:30:90-9c-vc-v0-0208268-6A-ARRCC DDocoucmumenetn1t 018042-21 Filed 012/0248/12 Page 70ofo1f 390

CCasaese3:30:90-9c-vc-v0-0208268-6A-ARRCC DDocoucmumenetn1t 018042-21 Filed 012/0248/12 Page 871ofo1f 390
REDACTED

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CCaassee33:0:099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt11008242-1 FFilieledd0012/0/248/1/122 PPaaggee1703ooff1930

CCaassee33:0:099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt11008242-1 FFilieledd0012/0/248/1/122 PPaaggee1714ooff1930

CCaassee33:0:099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt11008242-1 FFilieledd0012/0/248/1/122 PPaaggee1725ooff1930
REDACTED

CCaassee33:0:099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt11008242-1 FFilieledd0012/0/248/1/122 PPaaggee1736ooff1930
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Daniel Segal, hereby certify that, on this 4th day of January, 2012, the foregoing
Revised Exhibit D to the Master Settlement Agreement (replacing Doc. No. 1005-6) was filed
and made available via CM/ECF to all counsel of record. Additionally, the foregoing was served
by first-class mail upon the parties proceeding pro se:
Mark A. Ciaverella, 15008-067 Federal Correctional Institution P.O. Box 5000 Pekin, IL 61555-5000
Michael T. Conahan Inmate # 15009-067 FCI Coleman Low P.O. Box 1031 Coleman, FL 33521
Robert J. Powell, Esquire 10 Fox Run Road Drums, PA 18222
s/ Daniel Segal Daniel Segal

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee717 ooff 1940
Exhibit 2

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee728 ooff 1940

Daniel Segal

Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller One Logan Square 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-6933
E-mail: dsegal@hangley.com Phone: 215.496.7003 Fax: 215.568.0300

Areas of Practice
Complex Civil Litigation (Chair, Firm Litigation Department)
Education
Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973, JD, magna cum laude
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, 1968, BA, magna cum laude Major: Political Science and Economics
London School of Economics, London, England, 1969 Master of Science in International Relations with Honors
Clerkship
The Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1975-1976

Daniel Segal, a litigator, is a 1973 magna cum laude graduate of the Harvard Law School, where he was Executive Editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. Segal received his B.A. magna cum laude in 1968 from Yale University. In 1969, he received a Master of Science degree in international relations from the London School of Economics. From 1974 to 1975, Mr. Segal served as law clerk to the Honorable David Bazelon, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. From 1975 to 1976, he served as law clerk to the Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. From 1976 to 1979, Mr. Segal was Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, teaching juvenile justice, civil procedure and First Amendment law. He was the Thomas A. O'Boyle Adjunct Professor of Law at the Law School and has taught on a regular basis in the constitutional law area.
Mr. Segal is past President of the Juvenile Law Center, past President of the Auerbach Central Agency for Jewish Education, past President of Akiba Hebrew Academy and past Chair of the Philadelphia Soviet Jewry Council. He was Vice President of Hillel of Greater Philadelphia and President of the Board of Overseers of the University of Pennsylvania Hillel Foundation. He is a member of the International Board of the New Israel Fund.
Mr. Segal has been active in the Philadelphia Bar Association, having served as chair of its Commission on Judicial Selection and Retention. He has also served as a Settlement Master for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. As chair of his firm's Litigation Department, Mr. Segal's practice includes complex civil litigation involving defamation, First Amendment, civil rights and liberties, juvenile justice, intellectual property, class actions, health care, professional ethics, education, securities, antitrust, academic research misconduct and employment.

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee739 ooff 1940

Honors and Awards

The Honorable David

•

Bazelon, Chief Judge of the • United States Court of

Appeals for the District of

•

Columbia Circuit, 1974-1975

• Bar Admissions

Law Review: Executive Editor, Harvard Law Review, 1972 – 1973 Master of the Bench of University of Pennsylvania Law School American Inn of Court Ranked as a leading civil litigator in Pennsylvania in Chambers USA American Leading Lawyers for Business, 2006-2011 Jewish Social Policy Action Network (JSPAN) Social Justice Award

Pennsylvania, 1977

Recent Publications

District of Columbia, 1981
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1977

•

Daniel Segal & John S. Stapleton, U.S. Supreme Court's Splintered

Decision on State Voter ID Law: More Questions Than Answers, The

Legal Intelligencer & Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Litigation

Supplement), July 14, 2008.

Representative Reported Cases

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, •

1977 •

United States Supreme

•

Court, 1977

•

Languages

•

•

Hebrew

•

•

• • •

•

Computer Aid, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 526 (E.D. Pa. 1999) Conrail v. United States, 883 F.Supp. 1565 (S. Ct. Reg. Rail Reorg. 1995) Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988) General Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 806 A.2d 469 (Pa Super 2002) Goodman v. Lukens Steel, 482 U.S. 656 (1987) Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1328 (M.D. Pa. 1990) McDermott v. Biddle, 436 Pa. Super, 94, 647 A.2d 514 (Pa.) Nazarewych v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 19 Phila. 429, 1989 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 43 (Pa. Super. 1989) Phillips, et al. v. Selig, et al., 959 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. 2008) Strick v. AJF, 532 F.Supp. 951 (E.D. Pa. 1982) United States v. American Color and Chemical, 858 F.Supp. 445 (M.D. Pa. 1994) United States v. Chromatex, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 900 (M.D. Pa. 1993)

Representative Clients

•

Anderson Kill & Olick

•

Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC

•

Charter Consolidated, Inc.

•

Chimeric Therapies, Inc.

•

Chromatex, Inc.

•

City of Philadelphia

•

Class of African American employees at Lukens Steel Co.

•

Clear Channel, Inc.

•

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare

•

Drexel University

•

General Dynamics Electric Boat

•

General Refractories Company

•

The Gorgonz Group Inc.

•

Matflex, Inc.

•

Metroweek, Inc.

•

Norbord, Inc.

•

Philadelphia City Paper

•

Parmalat, Inc.

•

Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee840 ooff 1940

•

SGL AG

•

Shapiro Sher Guinot & Sandler

•

Silgan Containers Corporation

•

Temple University

•

Wellman Industries

Professional Associations and Memberships

•

Juvenile Law Center, President, 2000 - 2002

•

New Israel Fund, International Member, 2007-present

•

Philadelphia Bar Association Judicial Selection Commission, Chair,

1997 - 1998

•

Philadelphia Bar Association, Municipal Courts Committee, Co-Chair,

1997 - 1998

•

Philadelphia Bar Association, Member, 1979 - Present

•

American Bar Association, Member, 1979 - Present

•

Pennsylvania Bar Association, Member, 1979 - Present

•

Hillel of Greater Philadelphia, Vice President, 2003 - Present

•

University of Pennsylvania Hillel, President, 2005 - Present

•

Auerbach Central Agency for Jewish Education, President, 1998 - 2000

•

Akiba Hebrew Academy, President, 1993 - 1995

•

Soviet Jewry Council of Philadelphia, Co-Chair, 1983 - 1986

Teaching/Lecturing

•

CLE Courses: Public Access to Judicial Records, Philadelphia Bar

Association, June 1994

•

CLE Courses: Confidentiality Orders, Philadelphia Bar Association, June

1995

•

CLE Courses: Federal Written and Oral Discovery, Philadelphia Bar

Association, April 1996

•

CLE Courses: Federal Discovery, Philadelphia Bar Association, February

1997

•

CLE Courses: Federalism, Philadelphia Bar Association, January 1998

•

CLE Courses: What's at Stake in the Upcoming Supreme Court Term,

October 2005

•

Philadelphia's Legal Crisis, Presentation to Outdoor Advertising

Association of America, April 2006

•

The Developing Relationship Between Insurance Claims Executives and

Outside Counsel, Presentation to Computer Services Corporation

Claims Executive Forum, April 2007

William R. Caroselli | Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C. | Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee851 ooff 1940

Asbestos Practice Overview Workers' Compensation Medical Malpractice Personal Injury Sexual Abuse Auto Accidents Social Security Disability Defective Products Class Action Litigation Bad Faith Insurance Injuries Unemployment Compensation
Legal Articles

Location: Phone:
Fax: E -mail:

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
412 -567 -1232 866-466-5789 (Toll Free) 412 -664 -1180
412- 391-7453
E-mail Me

Attorney William Caroselli is a partner in the Pittsburgh law firm of Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, LLC.He concentrates his practice on personal injury law, toxic torts and complex litigation, as well as arguing complex matters before the Pennsylvania appellate courts.Attorney Caroselli is a member and Past President of the Allegheny County Academy of Trial Lawyers, a member and past President of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, the American College of Trial Lawyers, The American Board of Trial Advocates, and is also a member of the American Association for Justice, where he served on its Executive Committee.Attorney Caroselli is Executive Trustee of LAWPAC, a past Chair of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and also served as a member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Civil Procedural Rules Committee.He has participated in many continuing legal education programs for the Pennsylvania Bar Institute, Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, the American Bar Association, the Allegheny County Bar Association and the Pennsylvania Defense Institute.
Attorney Caroselli has been listed in the Best Lawyers in America since 1987 and is presently listed in six categories:Bet-the-Company Litigation, Commercial Litigation, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury Litigation, Product Liability and Workers' Compensation. In 1999, he was a finalist for the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice Trial Lawyer of the Year award for his work in the Apollo, Pennsylvania nuclear radiation cancer litigation.In 2009, Attorney Caroselli had two of the fifty largest verdicts and settlements in Pennsylvania.In 2004 - 2006, the Pennsylvania Law Journal named him as one of Pennsylvania's 100 Super Lawyers.He graduated with a B.A. from Brown University and received his J.D. from The Dickinson School of Law of Pennsylvania State University where he is a member of the Board of Counselors.In 2010 he was selected as 2011 Best Lawyers' Pittsburgh Product Liability Lawyer of the Year.

William R. Caroselli visit superlawyers.com
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William R. Caroselli | Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C. | Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee862 ooff 1940
Areas of Practice
Medical Malpractice

Personal Injury

Toxic Torts

Complex Civil Litigation

Commercial Litigation

Commercial Torts

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Gaming Law Appellate Practice

Workers Compensation

Bar Admissions Pennsylvania, 1966 U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 1966 U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 1966 U.S. Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit, 1966 U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1966

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PHILADELPHIA OFFICE CAROSELLI BEACHLER MCTIERNAN & CONBOY, L.L.C. 1500 WALNUT STREET, SUITE 507 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 PHILADELPHIA LAW OFFICE

TOLL FREE: 866-466-5789 PHONE: 215-792-6153 FAX: 215-609-1351

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BOLD LABELS ARE REQUIRED.

Education Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, Carlisle, Pennsylvania J.D. - 1966 Brown University A.B. - 1963
Published Works Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Practice and Procedure Pennsylvania Bar Institute (1985), 1987
Honors and Awards Finalist, Trial Lawyer of the Year Award, Lawyers for Public Justice, 1999 Best Lawyers in America, Bet- The- Company Litigation, Commercial Litigation, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Workers Compensation, 1987 - 2011 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers, 2004-2011 Pennsylvania Top 100 Super Lawyers 2004-2006 The American Association for Justice Fellow: International Academy of Trial Lawyers (Board of Directors, 1998-2003) Fellow: American College of Trial Lawyers American Board of Trial Advocates (Board of Directors, 1999) Best Lawyers' Pittsburgh Product Liability Lawyer of the Year for 2011 Top 50 Lawyers Pittsburgh, Super Lawyers , 2004 - 2011

I HAVE READ THE DISCLAIMER.

Professional Associations and Memberships American Bar Association, Member Allegheny County Bar Association, Member Allegheny County Bar Association Ethics Committee, Member, 1983-1986 Allegheny County Bar Association Judiciary Committee, Chairperson, 1988 and Member 19811988 Allegheny County Bar Association, Bench Bar Conference, Chairperson, 1970 Pennsylvania Bar Association, Member

http://www.cbmclaw.com/Attorneys/William-R-Caroselli.shtml[12/12/2011 10:00:11 AM]

William R. Caroselli | Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C. | Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee873 ooff 1940
Pennsylvania Bar Association, Workmens' Compensation Section, Chairperson, 1986 Pennsylvania Bar Association, Member, Special Tort Reform Committee American Association for Justice, Member; Executive Board, 2000-2001 American Association for Justice, Member; Board of Governors 1986-1988 American Association for Justice, State Committeeman, 1978-1980, 1985-1986; Executive Board 1999 Pennsylvania Association for Justice, President, 1985-1986 Pennsylvania Association for Justice, Trustee LAWPAC, 1980-Present Western Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, President, 1983 Academy of Trial Lawyers of Allegheny County, President 2007-2008 American Bar Foundation Lawyers for Consumer Rights, President, 1986-1988 Appointments Pennsylvania Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules Committee, 1988-1994 Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Member 1996-2002; Chair 19992000 Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University, Board of Counselors Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Special Ad Hoc Medical Malpractice Rules Committee, 2003 Governor's Health Reform & Medical Malpractice Committee, 2002

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Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C., has two Pennsylvania locations, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Our attorneys represent clients across Pennsylvania, in locations including Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Butler, Beaver, Uniontown, Johnstown, Altoona, Bedford, Somerset, Kittanning, Indiana, McKeesport, Greensburg, Latrobe, Meadville, New Castle, Sharon, Mercer, Grove City, Erie, Oil City, Franklin, Warren, Clearfield, Washington, State College, Tyrone, Harrisburg and York. Our lawyers
also represent clients across the country in asbestos litigation and toxic torts.
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David Senoff | Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C. | Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11008045--17 FFilieledd0122/2/186/1/121 PPaaggee884 ooff 1940

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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 215 -792 -6153 866-466-5789 (Toll Free) 215 -609 -1351 E-mail Me

Attorney David S. Senoff is a partner with Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C. and the managing attorney of the Philadelphia office. He is a 1989 graduate of Temple University and a 1992 graduate of the Temple University School of Law. At law school, Attorney Senoff co-founded and served as the Executive Editor of the Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review and also served as a judicial intern for The Honorable Herbert Hutton of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In 2005, 2006 and 2007, Attorney Senoff was named one of Pennsylvania's "SuperLawyers Rising Stars" and then in 2008 - 2011, he was named as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer by his peers for his professional achievements. Attorney Senoff was also selected for membership in the Million Dollar Advocates Forum in 2003 and the Multi-Million Dollar Advocates Forum in February 2008. Membership is limited to attorneys who have won million and multi-million dollar verdicts, awards and settlements for their clients. The award recognizes recipients' excellence in advocacy.
Attorney Senoff's practice focuses on insurance and HMO bad faith cases, class action litigation involving medical provider reimbursement for services, insurance coverage disputes and complex personal injury litigation including medical malpractice actions.
He has represented physicians in a class action lawsuit against health insurance companies and health maintenance organizations over reimbursements to physicians for medical care provided to patient subscribers, as well as a separate class action on behalf of dentists who were denied millions of dollars when insurance providers paid commissions to consultants with government money.
Attorney Senoff also represented the parents of a child who died of a drug overdose after being denied drug rehabilitation despite medical authorization. He also obtained an injunction barring a health insurance managed care organization from denying a first remission bone marrow transplant to a patient suffering from aggressive T-cell lymphoma. He also successfully mediated a civil rights and negligent supervision claim on behalf of a minor who was sexually abused while an in-patient at a residential treatment facility.
He has written extensively on the topics of managed care liability and has been published in The Legal Intelligencer and The Verdict.

http://www.cbmclaw.com/Attorneys/David-S-Senoff.shtml[12/12/2011 10:00:51 AM]

David Senoff | Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C. | Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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Attorney Senoff is admitted to practice before all courts in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey. He is also admitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the United States District Court of New Jersey. He is a member of the American Association for Justice, the Pennsylvania Association for Justice and the Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association. He also serves as a Judge Pro Tempore in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.

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PITTSBURGH OFFICE CAROSELLI BEACHLER MCTIERNAN & CONBOY LLC

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PHILADELPHIA OFFICE CAROSELLI BEACHLER MCTIERNAN & CONBOY, L.L.C. 1500 WALNUT STREET, SUITE 507 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 PHILADELPHIA LAW OFFICE

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David S. Senoff
visit superlawyers.com Bar Admissions
Pennsylvania, 1992 New Jersey, 1992 U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1992 U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1993 U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1992
Education Temple University School of Law, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Temple University
Honors and Awards Pennsylvania SuperLawyers 2008 - 2011 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star 2005 - 2007 Member, Million Dollar Advocates, 2003 - Present Multi-Million Dollar Advocates Forum, 2008 - Present
Professional Associations and Memberships American Association for Justice Pennsylvania Association for Justice Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Judge Pro Tempore Pennsylvania Association for Justice , Board of Governors, 2010 - Present Pennsylvania Association for Justice, Co-Chair Insurance Bad Faith Section
Past Employment Positions The Honorable Herbert Hutton of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judicial Intern

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Home Firm Overview

Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C., has two Pennsylvania locations, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Our attorneys represent clients across Pennsylvania, in locations including Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Butler, Beaver, Uniontown, Johnstown, Altoona, Bedford, Somerset, Kittanning, Indiana, McKeesport, Greensburg, Latrobe, Meadville, New Castle, Sharon, Mercer, Grove City, Erie, Oil City, Franklin, Warren, Clearfield, Washington, State College, Tyrone, Harrisburg and York. Our lawyers

http://www.cbmclaw.com/Attorneys/David-S-Senoff.shtml[12/12/2011 10:00:51 AM]

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Sol H. Weiss
Shareholder 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 735-2098 sweiss@anapolschwartz.com

Practice Areas • Pharmaceutical Litigation • Class Actions • Securities Litigation and
Stockbroker Claims • Complex Civil Litigation • Medical and other
Professional Malpractice • Products Liability
Professional Activities • President, Eastern
Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates • Treasurer, J. Willard O’Brien Inns of Court at Villanova University Law School • Mediator, United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania • American, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bar Associations • American, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Associations • Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association
Other Affiliations • Board of Consultors,
Villanova University School of Law • Former Director, Linda Creed Breast Cancer Foundation

Sol H. Weiss, a Shareholder of Anapol Schwartz, is an experienced trial attorney known for his exacting preparation and attention to detail. A “lawyer’s lawyer”, he is able to handle the most complex case and still present the facts and law in a way the judge and jury will understand.
Mr. Weiss concentrates his practice in complex civil litigation, including class actions and pharmaceutical cases, medical and other professional malpractice, securities litigation and products liability matters. He earned his Bachelor’s Degree from the Pennsylvania State University in 1968 and his law degree from Villanova University School of Law in 1972. He is licensed to practice in Pennsylvania, as well as being specially admitted to practice in other states.
Mr. Weiss has served in various positions for the Pennsylvania Association for Justice and was a member of the Board of the Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association. He is past President of the Eastern Pennsylvania Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates. He also served as Treasurer of the J. Willard O’Brien Inn of Court of Villanova University Law School. He is a frequent lecturer on class actions, pharmaceutical liability, civil litigation issues, trial skills and technology in the courtroom. He has lectured for many professional groups, including the Pennsylvania Bar Institute, Mealey’s, Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association, American Association for Justice and for private industry. He is a member of the American, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bar Associations, as well as the American Association for Justice, Pennsylvania Association for Justice and Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association. Mr. Weiss is on the Board of Directors and is currently on the Executive Committee of the American Association for Justice. In 2009, he received the Harry M. Philo Award as the Association’s outstanding trial lawyer for his work on limiting Federal Preemption.
Mr. Weiss is an active member of the Board of Consultors of the Villanova University School of Law. He also served as a Director of the Linda Creed Breast Cancer Foundation.
Mr. Weiss has been involved in many significant verdicts and settlements, including:
 $3.75 Billion Dollar Settlement in National Diet Drug Settlement Case. Mr. Weiss started a nine-week long trial in

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Middlesex County, New Jersey seeking medical monitoring screening benefits for New Jersey residents. The case was eventually stayed when Sol and other attorneys negotiated a $3.75 billion dollar settlement in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. David Jacoby assisted in the New Jersey State Court Trial.
 $68.5 Million Dollar Settlement for Baycol Pharmaceutical Case. Mr. Weiss earned a $68.5 million dollar settlement for 168 people seriously injured by the statin drug, Baycol. Sol negotiated the settlement with Bayer, who withdrew the medication from the market in 2001.
 $4.85 Billion Dollar Vioxx Settlement. Mr. Weiss served as CoLiaison Counsel for 16,000 cases in the New Jersey State Court coordinated litigation.
 AM/PM Franchisee Association v. Atlantic Richfield Company. Mr. Weiss earned a confidential multi-million dollar class action settlement for AM/PM Mini Market operators against Atlantic Richfield Company to recover lost profits when ARCO supplied defective gasoline to dealers in New York and Pennsylvania.
 900 Individual Diet Drug Victims Settle Lawsuits. Mr. Weiss, along with David Jacoby, negotiated a confidential settlement for 900 individual diet drug lawsuits on behalf of clients from seven law firms in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
 Duncan v. Lord, 409 F.Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Contingency Fee Agreement in Legal Malpractice. Mr. Weiss successfully argued that a victim of legal malpractice should not be injured twice by having damages reduced by the percentage of the Contingency Fee Agreement a victim signed with a negligent attorney. This was an issue of first impression that had not been previously decided upon under Pennsylvania Law.
 Alfiero v. Berks Mutual Leasing Co., 500 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super. 1985). Insurance Companies Forced to Pay Amount Insured Agreed to Pay to Protect Personal Assets. Mr. Weiss and Paul Anapol achieved a landmark decision in which CNA Insurance Company was forced to pay an amount its insured agreed to pay to protect its personal assets. CNA argued unsuccessfully that it had no legal duty to indemnify the insured until it personally paid the judgment. This precedent has helped both victims and small corporations settle serious personal injury cases when the insurance company would rather delay or unjustly deny payment.
 Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1997). Court Must Focus on Manufacturer's Conduct Rather than Victim's Actions in Product Liability Cases. Mr. Weiss successfully argued that the fact finder must focus on the manufacturer's conduct rather than the victim's actions in a products liability case. Rarely should a jury consider a victim's actions in such product liability cases.

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Marsha Levick
Juvenile Law Center
Marsha Levick co-founded Juvenile Law Center in 1975. Juvenile Law center is the nation’s oldest public interest law firm for children. She currently serves as Deputy Director and Chief Counsel. Throughout her legal career, Levick has been an advocate for children’s and women's rights and is a nationally recognized expert in juvenile law. Levick oversees Juvenile Law Center’s litigation and appellate docket. She has successfully litigated challenges to unlawful and harmful laws, policies and practices on behalf of children in both the juvenile justice and child welfare systems. Levick led the Juvenile Law Center team that first exposed systemic and pervasive violations of children’s constitutional rights in Luzerne County – work which led to the exposure of the “kids for cash” scandal, the largest judicial corruption scandal in the history of the American legal system. Juvenile Law Center successfully sought the expungement and vacatur of thousands of juveniles’ cases before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and is pursuing civil damages for the children and their families in a federal civil rights class action.
Recent civil rights cases Levick has co-counseled on behalf of children include:
A M. v Luzerne County, Case No. 03-3075 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004) (a federal civil rights against the Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center and several of its administrators and staff, alleging they violated the substantive due process rights of a 13-year-old boy with serious mental health problems by failing to protect him from harm while he was detained at the detention center. The suit alleged that the defendants failed to protect him from assaults by other residents in the facility and failed to provide him with proper medical and mental health care. The District Court in the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the suit. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff raised serious issues and that a county can be liable for deficient hiring and staffing policies and practices; lack of an adequate training program for the detention center’s staff in critical areas such as de-escalating conflicts between youth and managing youth behavior generally; lack of established protocols to ensure youth safety; and lack of established policies to address the mental and physical health needs of its residents.
Brian B. v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, Case No. 99-1576, 230 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2000) (civil rights class action lawsuit on behalf of school-age pre-trial and convicted offenders detained or incarcerated in Pennsylvania's 73 adult county prisons and jails to enforce their rights to basic and special education under state and federal law. Juvenile Law Center and the Pennsylvania Department of Education entered into a separate settlement agreement to resolve the claims of the incarcerated students with special education needs. Pursuant to this agreement, the State issued a policy bulletin outlining the educational obligations of school districts to pre-trial youth and youth eligible for special education. With respect to the rights of convicted school-age offenders to basic education within the county jails, the District rejected plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed.)
Anderson v. Houstoun, Case No. CV-04148-BWK (M.D. Pa. 2000) (class action lawsuit challenging state and county officials’ failure to pay kinship caregivers for their care of

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dependent children. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief to ensure that state practices were in line with legal requirements. A March 2005 settlement paved the way for relatives caring for their grandchildren, nieces, nephews or other related children to receive financial help from the state.
Troy D. v. Mickens et al., Case No. 1:10-cv-02902-JEI –AMD (D. N.J. 2010) (a federal civil rights lawsuit on behalf of two individual plaintiffs against New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission officials as well as other state officials. Plaintiffs claim that their substantive and procedural due process rights under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions were violated, and also challenge certain New Jersey administrative regulations that allow indefinite isolation for youth with serious mental health needs as well as disciplinary isolation without appropriate due process protections.)
Levick has also authored or co-authored numerous appellate and amicus briefs in state and federal appeals courts throughout the country, including many before the US Supreme Court, and has argued before both state and federal appellate courts in Pennsylvania and numerous other jurisdictions. Levick co-authored the lead child advocates’ amicus briefs in Roper v. Simmons, where the U. S. Supreme Court struck the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment; Graham v. Florida, where the U. S. Supreme Court struck life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses under the Eighth Amendment; and J.D.B. v North Carolina, where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for the first time that a juvenile’s age is relevant to the Miranda custody analysis under the Fifth Amendment. Levick is a frequent speaker and lecturer on children’s rights nationwide, and has also co-authored numerous scholarly articles on children’s rights, including zero tolerance policies, girls in the juvenile justice system, juveniles' right to effective counsel; the emergence of a juvenile Eighth Amendment standard; and the emergence of a ‘reasonable juvenile’ standard in criminal law.
Recent publications include:
Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. Supreme Court Heralds The Emergence of the ‘Reasonable Juvenile’ in American Criminal Law, The Criminal Law Reporter, 89 CrL 753, 08/24/2011.
Marsha Levick, Kids Really are Different: Looking Past Graham v. Florida, Criminal Law Reporter, Vol. 87, No. 14, 2010.
Marsha Levick and Kristina Moon, Prosecuting Sexting as Child Pornography: A Critique, Valparaiso University Law Review, Volume 44, No. 4, Summer 2010.
Jessica Feierman, Marsha Levick, and Ami Mody, The School to Prison Pipeline…and Back: Obstacles and Remedies for the Re-Enrollment of Adjudicated Youth, New York Law School Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2009/10.

CCaassee 33::0099--ccvv--0000228866--AARRCC DDooccuummeenntt 11000854--71 FFiilleedd 0122//2186//1121 PPaaggee 9104 ooff 9104
Marsha Levick and Robert G. Schwartz, Changing The Narrative: Convincing Courts To Distinguish Between Misbehavior And Criminal Conduct In School Referral Cases, University of the District of Columbia Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 2007.
Marsha Levick and Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 1, Fall 2007.
Nina W. Chernoff and Marsha Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty: Implications of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful Offenders, Clearinghouse Review: Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, July 2005
Marsha Levick and Francine T. Sherman, When Individual Differences Demand Equal Treatment: An Equal Rights Approach TO the Special Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2003.
Levick serves on the boards of the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana; Southern Poverty Law Center; the advisory board of Rutgers-Camden Law School's Juvenile Justice Clinic; and the advisory board of Bureau of National Affairs Criminal Law Reporter. Levick has received numerous awards for her work, including:
• Temple University’s Women's Law Caucus Professional Achievement Award (2006) • Pennsylvania Bar Association Child Advocate of the Year Award (2008) • Foundation for the Improvement of Justice Award (2009) • Philadelphia Bar Association’s Andrew Hamilton Award (2009) • Philadelphia Inquirer Citizen of the Year (2009) (co-recipient) • American Association for Justice Leonard Weinglass Award (2010) • American Bar Association Livingston Hall Award (2010) • Rutgers-Camden Black Law Student Association Champion of Justice Award (2010) • The Legal Intelligencer, Women of Distinction (2010) • Clifford Scott Green Bill of Rights Award, Federal Bar Association, Philadelphia
Criminal Justice Section (2010) (co-recipient) • Good Shepherd Mediation Program Shepherd of Peace Award (2010) • Philadelphia Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Thurgood Marshall Award (2011)
(Co-recipient) • Friends Select School, Distinguished Alumnae Award (2011)
Levick is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University Law School. Levick is currently an adjunct faculty member at both the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Temple University Beasley School of law.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v.

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAUL CLARK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

***************************************************************************************************** IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WAYNE DAWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-2535 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

*****************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-1405

v. MARK A. CIAVARELLA, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

ORDER NOW, this 14th day of December, 2012, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC’s objections to the Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification, (Doc. 1241), and the request to admit exhibits in opposition to Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification are DENIED.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v.

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAUL CLARK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

***************************************************************************************************** IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WAYNE DAWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-2535 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

*****************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-1405

v. MARK A. CIAVARELLA, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

ORDER
NOW, this 14th day of May, 2013, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for
Class Certification as to All Issues of Defendants’ Liability to Plaintiffs (Doc. 1319) filed by
Plaintiffs in H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 09-0357, and Conway v. Conahan, No. 09-0291
(collectively “Plaintiffs”), is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1) The following litigation classes (the “Classes”) are certified pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3):
Class A
Violations of Right to Impartial Tribunal All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008, whose adjudications were vacated, expunged, and dismissed with prejudice by orders of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dated October 29, 2009 or March 29, 2010. See in re Expungement of Juvenile Records and Vacatur of Luzerne County Juvenile Court Consent Decrees or Adjudications from 2003-2008, No. 81-MM-2008 (Pa.)

3

Subclass A.1

Violations of Right to Counsel and/or Colloquy

All children in Class A who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella without counsel and/or without colloquies on the record that informed them of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, before either waiving counsel and/or pleading guilty, during the time between 2003 and May 2008.

Subclass A.2

False Imprisonment

All children in Class A who were referred to placement at PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008.

Class B

Violations of RICO Act

All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their adjudications and/or placements during the time period between 2003 and May 2008, as well as all children’s parents or guardians who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their children’s adjudications and/or placements during the same time period.

(2) The Classes are certified pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) for determination of all legal

and factual issues as to Defendants’ liability on Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts I, II, III,

IV, V, VII, and IX of the Master Complaint for Class Actions (Doc. 136).

(3) The following representative Plaintiffs are appointed as representatives of the

Classes and Subclasses:

Paige Cicardo- Class A, Subclass A.1, Subclass A.2

Elizabeth Habel- Class A, Subclass A.2, Class B

Angelia Karsko- Class A, Subclass A.2

H.T.-

Class A, Subclass A.1

Jessica Van Reeth- Class A, Subclass A.1

Dezare Dunbar- Class A

Alexandra Fahey- Class A

4

Jack Van Reeth- Class B (4) Pursuant to Rule 23(g), Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, Juvenile Law
Center, and Anapol Schwartz are appointed as Class Counsel. (5) Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file a motion for
approval of their proposed forms of class notice and their notice program (the “Notice Motion.”) If the Notice Motion is opposed by any party, that party shall file a brief in opposition to the Notice Motion no later than fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice Motion.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge
5

 
 Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1511 Filed 01/09/14 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v.

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1511 Filed 01/09/14 Page 2 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAUL CLARK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

***************************************************************************************************** IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WAYNE DAWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-2535 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

*****************************************************************************************************

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1511 Filed 01/09/14 Page 3 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-1405

v. MARK A. CIAVARELLA, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

ORDER NOW, this 9th day of January, 2014, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Liability on Impartial Tribunal Claims Against Defendant Ciavarella (Doc. 1459), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion (Doc. 1459) is GRANTED and Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella on all issues of liability for which he is not protected by judicial immunity on the followings claims of the Master Complaint for Class Actions (“CAC”) and Master Long Form Complaint (“IC”) in Case Nos. 09-286, 09-291, 09-0357, and 09-630: (A) Violation of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal (CAC Count I; IC
Count III). (B) Conspiracy to violate Juvenile Plaintiffs’ right to an impartial tribunal (CAC
Count II; IC Count III).
A determination of damages will be made at a later date.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

ROBERT J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v.

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

MEMORANDUM Plaintiffs in this consolidated action comprising both individual cases and class actions seek final approval of a settlement agreement (the “Settlement”) between Plaintiffs and Defendants PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, and Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp. (collectively “Provider Defendants”). (Doc. 1527.) The Settlement received preliminary approval on November 27, 2013. Now, following the final approval hearing held on June 10, 2014, Plaintiffs seek final certification of the Class for settlement, approval of the Settlement, and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, the Class will be certified, the Settlement will be approved, and attorneys’ fees and costs will be awarded as requested.

I. Background A. Facts
This civil action arises out of the alleged conspiracy related to the construction of two juvenile detention facilities, and subsequent detainment of juveniles in these facilities, orchestrated by two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges, Michael Conahan (“Conahan”) and Mark Ciavarella (“Ciavarella”). The juvenile detention facilities,
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PA Child Care (“PACC”) and Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”),1 were both constructed by Mericle Construction, Inc. Plaintiffs in this action, juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella, seek redress from the former judges, as well as the individuals and business entities involved in the construction and operation of these facilities, for the alleged unlawful conspiracy and resulting deprivations of Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights.
The individual and class complaints assert, in part, the following causes of action against Provider Defendants: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; (3) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq.; (3) conspiracy to violate RICO; (4) state-law civil conspiracy; and (5) state-law false imprisonment. B. Procedural History
The first of these consolidated cases, Wallace v. Powell, No. 09-CV-286, was filed on February 13, 2009 against multiple Defendants, including Provider Defendants. Although the case was originally filed as a class action, the Wallace complaint was subsequently amended in May 2009 to proceed on behalf of a number of individual juvenile and parent Plaintiffs. Shortly thereafter, Conway v. Conahan, No. 09-CV-291, and H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 09-CV-357, were filed as putative class actions, both naming Provider Defendants, among others, as Defendants. Subsequently, Humanik v. Ciavarella, No. 09-

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Under the Master Settlement Agreement, (Doc. 1448, Ex. B, Master Settlement

Agreement, “MSA,” ¶ I.B), “Provider Parties” means “PACC, WPACC, and

MAYS, and all related parties, successors, assigns, members, managers,

shareholders, directors, officers, employees, agents, and attorneys.”

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CV-630, was filed on behalf of a single individual Plaintiff. Collectively, these four cases are the “Civil Actions.”
The Conway and H.T. Plaintiffs filed the Master Complaint for Class Actions in June 2009. (Doc. 136.) At the same time, the Wallace and Humanik Plaintiffs filed the Master Long Form Complaint for Individual Actions. (Doc. 134.)
With respect to Provider Defendants, they filed various motions to dismiss the actions in 2010 and 2011. The most recent motion to dismiss filed by Provider Defendants and resolved by the Court was granted in part and denied in part on November 30, 2011. (Doc. 1002.)
Shortly thereafter, on December 16, 2011, Plaintiffs and Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (collectively, the “Mericle Parties”) filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Mericle Settlement”). (Doc. 1005.) On February 28, 2012, following a preliminary approval hearing, the Court issued an order conditionally approving the Mericle Settlement. (Doc. 1084.) On November 19, 2012, the Court held a final approval hearing on the Mericle Settlement. The Mericle Settlement was granted final approval on December 14, 2012. (Doc. 1268.) As to the non-settling Defendants, including Provider Defendants, discovery remained ongoing at that time.
On February 1, 2013, Class Plaintiffs sought class certification for the litigation of all issues of Provider Defendants’ liability to Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). (Doc. 1319.) By Memorandum and Order dated May 14, 2013, Class Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was granted. (Docs. 1409; 1410.)
Subsequently, on October 16, 2013, Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants filed a Joint
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Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Doc. 1448.) On November 27, 2013, following a preliminary approval hearing, the Court issued an order conditionally certifying the Settlement Class, preliminarily approving the class action settlement, and approving the notice plan as modified. (Doc. 1491.) On June 10, 2014, the Court held a final Settlement approval hearing. C. The Settlement Agreement
Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agree to settle the Actions to provide a final resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims against Provider Defendants.2 Solely for the purposes of settlement, two settlement classes are established: (1) the “Juvenile Settlement Class,” which consists of “all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 [the “Class Period”] who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella”; and (2) the “Parent Settlement Class,” which is comprised of the parents and/or guardians of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008, and, who in connection with the juvenile’s appearance: “(i) made payments in their own names or had wages, social security or other entitlements in their own names garnished or withdrawn; (ii)

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The MSA defines the “Released Parties” as the “Provider Parties, the Zappala

Parties, and any entity or individual that is not a Non-Released Party.” (MSA, ¶

I.B.) The “Zappala Parties” are “Gregory R. Zappala (“Zappala”), Consulting

Innovations and Services, Inc., and Southwestern PA Child Care, LLC, and all

related parties, successors, assigns, members, managers, shareholders, directors,

officers, employees, agents, and attorneys (excluding Non-Released Parties).”

The “Non-Released Parties” are “Robert J. Powell; Powell Law Group P.C.;

Beverage Marketing of PA., Inc.; Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC; Vision

Holdings, LLC; Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr.; Michael T. Conahan; and any of the

foregoing persons’ or entities’ current or former employees, related parties,

successors, or assigns (excluding the Provider Parties and Zappala parties)”.

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paid costs, fees, interest and/or penalties in their own name; (iii) suffered any loss of
companionship and/or family integrity, . . . and who were not fully reimbursed as a result of
claims made in connection with the Mericle Settlement, . . .” (MSA, ¶ I.A.) The Juvenile
Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class are referred to collectively as the
“Settlement Classes,” and the members of the Settlement Classes are the “Settlement
Class Members.” (Id.)
Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Provider Defendants agree to
pay $2,500,000.00, which will be used to pay settlement costs and claims by Class
Members. (Id. at ¶ II.A.) Under the proposed Allocation Plan, basic benefits are available
to qualifying Juvenile Settlement Class Members and Parent Settlement Class Members.
1. Juvenile Settlement Class Benefits
Under the terms of the Allocation Plan, each qualifying Juvenile Settlement Class
Member (“Juvenile”) will receive settlement payment based on the following Settlement
Categories:
i. Probation: Each qualifying Juvenile who never spent any time in PACC, WPACC, or any other juvenile detention facility as a result of an adjudication by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 shall receive one (1) point.
ii. Non-PACC/WPACC: Each qualifying Juvenile who was placed in a detention facility as a result of an adjudication or placement by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, but who never spent any time in either PACC and/or WPACC, shall receive two (2) points.
iii. PACC/WPACC: Each qualifying Juvenile who was placed in PACC or WPACC as a result of an adjudication or placement by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008 shall receive five (5) points.
2. Parent Settlement Class Benefits
The Allocation Plan also provides that each qualifying Parent Settlement Class
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Member (“Parent”) will receive settlement payment as follows:
Each qualifying Parent Settlement Class Member who, as a result of their child’s adjudication or placement by former Judge Ciavarella during the period from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2008, (i) made payments to Luzerne County or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn by Luzerene County; or (ii) had court-ordered services or pay courtordered costs, fees, interest, and/or penalties assessed against them or their child, shall receive the actual amount of monies paid, garnished, or withdrawn.
Parent Settlement Class Members will be paid from the Settlement Fund, however,
only if they did not already receive full reimbursement as a result of the Mericle Settlement.
Moreover, the total amount of funds to be paid to Parent Settlement Class Members may
be reduced pro rata if the total exceeds the amount allocated to the Parent Settlement
Class.
3. Allocation Plan
The Cash Settlement Fund will be divided among qualifying Settlement Class
Members according to the Plan of Allocation. The Plan of Allocation provides that court-
approved costs and fees will be taken out of the Cash Settlement Fund first. The remaining
funds will then be divided into (1) the Juvenile Fund; (2) the Parent Fund; and (3) the
Holdback Fund.
i. Juvenile Fund. Seventy percent (70%) of the amount remaining in the Cash Settlement Fund will compromise the Juvenile Fund. Each qualifying Juvenile Settlement Class Member will be assigned to a Settlement Category and awarded a number of points as described above. The total number of points for all Juvenile Settlement Class Members will be divided in the Juvenile Fund to determine the monetary value of each point. Each Juvenile Settlement Class Member will receive the value of each point multiplied by his or her points, as determined by his or her Settlement Category.
ii. Parent Fund. Fifteen percent (15%) of the amount remaining in the Cash Settlement Fund will comprise the Parent Fund. Each qualifying Parent Settlement Class Member will be awarded a specific amount of money based on the amount of payments documented in the Records or in records provided by the Parent Settlement Class Members showing payments made in their own names.
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If the total amount of funds to be paid to the Parent Settlement Class Members exceeds the total funds in the Parent Fund, Parent Settlement Class Members will be awarded their pro-rata share of the Parent Fund. If the total amount of funds to be paid to Parent Settlement Class Members is less than the total funds in the Parent Fund, the remaining funds will pour over to the Juvenile Fund.
iii. Holdback Fund. Fifteen percent (15%) of the amount remaining in the Cash Settlement Fund will comprise the Holdback Fund. The Holdback Fund will remain in escrow until all final accounting is complete for the Cash Settlement Fund. With written permission from the Court, the Holdback Fund may be used to pay settlement costs and attorneys’ fees. The Holdback Fund will also be used to pay all costs of the appeal process, described below, and all additional payments to Settlement Class Members resulting from successful appeals. If the funds remaining in the Holdback fund after payment of all costs, fees, and appeals, total $75,000 or more (3% of the gross Cash Settlement Fund), the remaining funds will be paid to the Juvenile Settlement Class Members in proportion to the number of points assigned to each Juvenile Settlement Class Member. If the funds remaining in the Holdback Fund after payment of all costs, fees, and appeals, total less than $75,000, Class Counsel will seek permission from the Court regarding the distribution of the remaining funds.
(Doc. 1528, Ex. A, 7-8.)
Each Juvenile and Parent choosing to participate in the Settlement was required to
complete a Proof of Claim Form providing necessary information and a release for counsel
to obtain relevant records. Based upon the responses of each Claimant and supporting
documentation, the Claims Committee calculated the points for all Settlement Class
Members who timely submitted claim forms.
However, in the event a Claimant believes that the Claims Committee “wrongly
determined” his or her claim, the Settlement provides the Claimant with the option to appeal
to a Court-appointed Special Master for Allocation Appeals. Where an appeal is lodged by
a Claimant, the Notice of Settlement provides:
The Special Master will re-assess the Claims Committee’s decision. This reassessment will include a complete review of your Proof of Claim Form, the information available in the Records, and any additional written documenation provided by you in support of your claim. If appropriate, the Special Master will change the Settlement Category assigned by the Claims Committee or the amount of your payment from the Cash Settlement Fund, and your award will
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be adjusted under the terms of the Plan of Allocation. (Doc. 1528, Ex. A, 8.) The Notice of Settlement further provides that the “determinations by the Special Master are final and shall not be subject to any further review or appeal.” (Id.)
To fund this Allocation Appeal Process, Class Counsel request that 15% of the Cash Settlement Fund not be distributed, but instead be held back in the Escrow Account for the benefit of any successful Allocation Appellant and the costs associated with the Allocation Appeal Process. The requested hold back amount is thus $265,054.74. As indicated above, in the event that the hold back amount is not fully depleted, the balance will be distributed in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
In exchange for the relief provided under the Settlement Agreement, the named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members will release and dismiss all claims against Provider Defendants. In addition, Settlement Class Members agree and covenant not to sue PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, and Mid-Atlantic Youth Service, Corp., or any of their affiliates as defined in the Settlement Agreement, over any matter which could have been alleged in these Civil Actions.
4. Notice Notice of the Settlement was disseminated to potential Settlement Class Members through a variety of means, including direct mailings, a toll-free call center, publication in newspapers, and a website. With respect to direct mailings, Class Counsel mailed a total of 3,795 copies of the Notice of Settlement and Proof of Claim Form to the last known addresses of potential Class Members by first-class mail. Additionally, the toll-free call center (the “Center”) established by Class Counsel, which was open to receive calls twenty-
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four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, answered over 1,559 calls regarding the litigation and the terms of the Settlement. The Center was staffed with non-lawyer customer service representatives trained to respond to particular questions regarding the terms of the Settlement. And, when the Center’s customer service representatives were unable to answer questions about the Settlement, they provided contact information to allow the callers to speak with Class Counsel, and Class Counsel all returned calls and answered questions from claimants and potential claimants about the settlement and the Proof of Claim Form. Additionally, Class Counsel also caused the Notice of Settlement to be published in the Times Leader and the Citizens’ Voice. Finally, Class Counsel maintained a website containing information about the Settlement. Since December 3, 2013, the website has received 2,552 visits.
Significantly, Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated at the Fairness Hearing that the Claims Committee received 2,243 Proof of Claim Forms. And, of those Forms received, 2,157 will be considered for payment, which amounts to a participation rate of ninety-six percent (96%). In comparison, 2,019 Proof of Claims Forms were submitted for participation in the Mericle Settlement, and only 1,614 were considered for payment, resulting in a participation rate of eighty percent (80%).
II. Discussion A. Class Certification
Even though the Settlement Agreement has already been preliminarily approved, there must still be a final determination as to whether to certify the class and grant final approval of the Settlement. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
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Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 797 (3d Cir. 1995). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that class action settlements must be approved by the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the court's approval.”); see also Ripley v. Sunoco, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 300, 306 (E.D. Pa. 2012). However, “the ultimate inquiry into the fairness of the settlement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) does not relieve the court of its responsibility to evaluate Rule 23(a) and (b) considerations.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2005).
As such, “before approving a class settlement agreement, ‘a district court first must determine that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) are met.’” Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 296 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2010)). Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains four threshold requirements which every putative class must satisfy:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These requirements are referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. If these four prerequisites are satisfied, “a district court must then determine that the proposed class fits within one of the categories of class actions enumerated in Rule 23(b).” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 296. Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), under which certification is proper where “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
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available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The “[f]actual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, to certify a class the district court must find that the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008)).
1. Rule 23(a) a. Numerosity
The first requirement for a class action is that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “‘No single magic number exists satisfying the numerosity requirement.” Logory v. Cnty. of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 140 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 05–3619, 2008 WL 800970 at *6 (D. N.J. Mar. 20, 2008)). However, the Third Circuit has opined that while there is technically no minimum class size, “generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.” Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, the Settlement Classes are comprised of thousands of members. As such, the numerosity requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Phila., 270 F.R.D. 208, 215 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (numerosity requirement satisfied where putative class could number in the hundreds or thousands); Zeno v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.R.D. 173, 184 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (proposed class of 2,100 claimants sufficient to satisfy numerosity requirement of
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Rule 23(a)). b. Commonality
To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), there must be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs must thus demonstrate that their claims “depend upon a common contention,” the resolution of which “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, - - U.S. - - -, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011). “Commonality does not require an identity of claims or facts among class members; instead, [t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 597-98 (3d Cir. 2012). But, the Supreme Court recently indicated that “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.” Wal–Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (citations and internal quotation omitted). That is, “[t]heir claims must depend upon a common contention. . . . That common contention, moreover must be capable of classwide resolution- which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id.
The commonality requirement is sufficiently satisfied in this case. In particular, the claims of the Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class stem from the construction, and subsequent operation, of two juvenile detention facilities. Specifically, their claims turn on whether Defendants acted in conspiracy with Conahan and Ciavarella
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to deprive Juvenile Plaintiffs of their constitutionally guaranteed rights, whether Defendants organized an association-in-fact enterprise, and whether Defendants participated in the affairs of an entity through a pattern of racketeering activity. These claims are capable of classwide resolution, as they all “arise from the same nucleus of operative facts and involve the same legal theories” against Provider Defendants. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 249 (E.D. Pa. 2012). Thus, the commonality prong of Rule 23(a)(2) is met.
c. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The concepts of typicality and commonality are closely related and often tend to merge.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 597 (citing Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir.1994)). “The typicality criterion is intended to preclude certification of those cases where the legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict with those of the absentees by requiring that the common claims are comparably central to the claims of the named plaintiffs as to the claims of the absentees.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 57. “Factual differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based on the same legal theory.” Id. at 58 (citation omitted). When analyzing typicality, a court must compare the situation of the proposed representative to that of the class as a whole by considering “the similarity of the legal theory and legal claims; the similarity of the individual circumstances on which those theories and claims are based; and the extent to which the proposed representative may
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face significant unique or atypical defenses to her claims.” In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 597 (3d Cir. 2009).
The claims of the Representative Plaintiffs, as identified in the Settlement Agreement, are typical of the Juvenile Settlement Class Members and the Parent Settlement Class Members. With respect to the Juvenile Settlement Class, the gravamen of the Representative Plaintiffs’ claims is that, as a result of the alleged conspiracy, Ciavarella and Conahan had an undisclosed financial interest and conflict-of-interest in adjudicating children delinquent and sending them to placement. And, like all other Juvenile Settlement Class Members, the Representative Plaintiffs were denied their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal when they appeared before Ciavarella. As such, the legal theories for all Juvenile Plaintiffs, that their adjudications were unconstitutional, will be the same. Thus, the typicality requirement is satisfied as to the Juvenile Settlement Class.
The claims of the Parent Settlement Class Representatives are also typical of all Parent Settlement Class Members. Specifically, all Parent Settlement Class Members assert RICO claims based on the alleged conspiratorial conduct of Defendants, which resulted in the payment of court fees, fines, interest, and penalties. As the legal theories for all Parent Settlement Class Members will be the same, the typicality requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied.
d. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “The adequacy requirement has two components: (1) concerning the experience and performance of class counsel; and (2)
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concerning the interests and incentives of the representative plaintiffs.” Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 303). Essentially, the adequacy inquiry considers whether “the putative named plaintiff has the ability and the incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously, that he or she has obtained adequate counsel, and that there is no conflict between the individual's claims and those asserted on behalf of the class.” Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
The qualifications and performance of class counsel under Rule 23(a)(4) is based upon the factors set forth in Rule 23(g). See Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although questions concerning the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . those questions have, since 2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).”). That subsection lists several non-exclusive factors that a district court must consider in determining “counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B), including: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action,” (2) “counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action,” (3) “counsel's knowledge of the applicable law,” and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).
Here, Class Counsel has the experience, skill, and qualification necessary to conduct this litigation. In particular, the individual attorneys in this action have extensive experience in complex class action litigation involving mass actions and civil rights claims. Consistent
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with their qualifications, Class Counsel, throughout this litigation, has demonstrated considerable ability in prosecuting this case. Specifically, Class Counsel has performed substantial work, and expended considerable time and resources, in presenting the facts and complex legal issues implicated in this litigation, as Class Counsel has prepared multiple complaints, responded to numerous motions to dismiss, engaged in mediation, and reviewed discovery. Class Counsel has pursued this action vigorously and with great dedication on behalf of all Plaintiffs. Thus, based on Class Counsel’s work to date in this litigation, these attorneys have fairly and adequately represented the interests of the Settlement Class Members.
With respect to the second prong of the adequacy inquiry, the Third Circuit has “recognized that the linchpin of the adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of the class.” Dewey, 681 F.3d at 183 (citations omitted). The adequacy requirement “is designed to ferret out” intra-class conflicts, and to ensure that the named plaintiffs have the incentive to represent the claims of the class. Id. at 184 (citations omitted). If any conflicts “undercut the representative plaintiffs' ability to adequately represent the class” they are “fundamental,” such that class representation is structurally faulty and Rule 23(a)(4) cannot be satisfied. Id. at 184-85.
The Representative Plaintiffs fairly and adequately protected the interests of the Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class in this action. Here, the interests of the Representative Plaintiffs are consistent with the Settlement Class Members, and there appears to be no conflicts between or among the groups. As discussed, the Representative Juvenile Plaintiffs were damaged as a result of Defendants’ allegedly
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unlawful conduct, and the Representative Juvenile Plaintiffs would have to prove the same wrongdoing as the Juvenile Settlement Class Members to establish Provider Defendants’ liability. Similarly, the Representative Parent Plaintiffs were damaged as a result of the alleged conspiratorial conduct of Defendants, which resulted in the payment of court fees, fines, interest, and penalties, and which would require all Parent Plaintiffs to demonstrate the same wrongdoing to establish Defendants’ liability. Thus, as “the interests of the named plaintiffs are not antagonistic to those of the class[es],” Marsden v. Select Med. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 480, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 303), and nothing in the record suggests that the Representative Plaintiffs acted in conflict with the Settlement Classes or failed to vigorously pursue the claims of all Class Members, see, e.g., Esslinger v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., No. 10-3213, 2012 WL 5866074, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2012), the adequacy requirement is satisfied by the Representative Plaintiffs.
2. Rule 23(b)(3) Besides meeting the four threshold requirements under Rule 23(a), a proposed class must also satisfy one of the three sub-parts of Rule 23(b). See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiffs seek to maintain this class action under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows for a class action to proceed if “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and [ ] a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). These requirements are commonly separated into the “predominance” and “superiority” requirements. See In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 308-09.
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a. Predominance The predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) “‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 297 (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 266 (3d Cir. 2009)). “Parallel with Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality element, which provides that a proposed class must share a common question of law or fact, Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement imposes a more rigorous obligation upon a reviewing court to ensure that issues common to the class predominate over those affecting only individual class members.” Id. (citing Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 266). Thus, the Third Circuit “‘consider[s] the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement to be incorporated into the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and therefore deem it appropriate to analyze the two factors together, with particular focus on the predominance requirement.’” Id. (quoting Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 266). And, Third Circuit precedent “provides that the focus of the predominance inquiry is on whether the defendant's conduct was common as to all of the class members, and whether all of the class members were harmed by the defendant's conduct.” Id. at 298. In assessing predominance, “a court at the certification stage must examine each element of a legal claim ‘through the prism’ of Rule 23(b)(3).” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600 (quoting In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 630 (3d Cir. 2011)). Thus, “[a] plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that the element of [the legal claim] is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.’” Id. (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311). With respect to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought by the Juvenile Settlement
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Class Members, Juvenile Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that Provider Defendants “(1) acting under color of law, (2) violated the plaintiff[s’] federal constitutional or statutory rights, (3) and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 299 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998)). As to the “state actor” inquiry, proof of this element would focus solely on Provider Defendant’s conduct. And, due to the alleged conspiratorial conduct, each member of the Juvenile Settlement Class claims that they appeared before a partial tribunal, depriving them of their constitutional rights. Because the § 1983 claims against Provider Defendants rely on the same course of conduct, common proof of such conduct, and damage as a result of that conduct, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is met for these claims.
Next, “[t]he elements of a civil RICO claim under § 1962(c) are (1) the conducting of, (2) an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity, (5) which results in injury to the plaintiffs' business or property.” Tapp v. Proto, 718 F. Supp. 2d 598, 625 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985)). For a § 1962(d) claim, a plaintiff must establish “(1) an agreement to commit the predicate acts of fraud, and (2) knowledge that those acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity conducted in such a way as to violate section 1962(a), (b), or (c).” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Odesser v. Continental Bank, 676 F.Supp. 1305, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
Proving the first element of the § 1962(c) RICO claims in this case would involve common questions about the activities of Provider Defendants, and, whether Provider
20

Defendants participated or engaged in conduct with other Defendants. See Ins. Brokerage, 579, F.3d at 269. The second element also involves common legal and factual questions, specifically whether an enterprise existed. See id. at 269-70. Likewise, proof of the third and fourth elements would encompass common questions of law and fact, notably whether activities that constitute racketeering were occurring through the enterprise, and whether these racketeering activities were occurring in a pattern that could be established. See id. at 270. And, “[w]hile establishing an injury is not as conducive to common proof,” “plaintiffs have presented a plausible theory for proving a class-wide injury as a result of the racketeering activities of the alleged enterprise.” Id. For the same reasons, the § 1962(d) claim focuses on the conduct of Defendants, and whether Defendants “conspire[d] to violate § 1962(c).” Id. at 269. Thus, all elements of the alleged RICO violations involve common questions of law and fact. Therefore, Plaintiffs adequately satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).
b. Superiority According to Rule 23(b)(3), the considerations relevant to the superiority inquiry include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “The superiority requirement asks a district court ‘to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternative available methods of adjudication.’” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 309 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 591, 117
21

S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997)). And, when “confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S. Ct. 2231.
A class resolution in the manner proposed in the instant Settlement is superior to other available methods for resolution of this action against Provider Defendants. First, proceeding as a class action in this case is far superior to allowing piecemeal litigation of the exact same claims in countless lawsuits. See, e.g., Logory, 277 F.R.D. at 146 (quoting Stanford v. Foamex L.P., 263 F.R.D. 156, 174 n.22 (E.D. Pa. 2009)). Second, where a claim is small in comparison to the costs of prosecuting a lawsuit, a class action allows for litigation costs to be spread among the injured parties. See Processed Egg Prods., 284 F.R.D. at 264. Indeed, “[a]ddressing the rights of those who would not otherwise be appropriately incentivized to bring their own singular claims was precisely the aim of the Advisory Committee in promulgating Rule 23(b)(3).” Logory, 277 F.R.D. at 146 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617, 117 S. Ct. 2231). Third, this is an appropriate forum for concentrating the claims of the Settlement Classes because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and personal jurisdiction over the parties. See Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *5. Lastly, the difficulties in managing a class action need not be considered since the Settlement will avoid trial. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S. Ct. 2231. For these reasons, the superiority requirement is satisfied.
3. Conclusion as to Class Certification for Settlement Purposes Because all of the Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements have been met, the Class will
22

be certified for settlement purposes. B. Notice
“In the class action context, the district court obtains personal jurisdiction over the absentee class members by providing proper notice of the impending class action and providing the absentees with the opportunity to be heard or the opportunity to exclude themselves from the class.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 326 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985)). Rule 23 contains two distinct notice provisions. See id. at 326. First, Rule 23(c)(2) requires that class members be given the best notice practicable, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable efforts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).3 Second, Rule 23(e) requires all class members to be notified of the terms of any proposed settlement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). This “notice is designed to summarize the litigation and the settlement” and “to apprise class members of the right and opportunity to inspect the complete settlement documents, papers, and pleadings filed in the litigation.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 327 (citation omitted).
Here, the Notice of the Provider Defendant Settlement contained the information

3

The notice, in clear and concise language, must state:

(i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). 23

required by Rules 23(c)(2) and 23(e). Specifically, the Notice detailed the nature of the action, the definitions of the Juvenile Settlement Class and the Parent Settlement Class, the claims of the Settlement Classes, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and the right to object or request exclusion from the terms of the Settlement. The Notice also informed members of their opportunity to be heard at the fairness hearing, to enter an appearance through an attorney of their choice, and that the Settlement would be binding on members that did not opt out.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ efforts to notify the Settlement Class Members satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 and due process. The Notice was sent to potential Settlement Class Members by first-class mail based on the last known addresses of these individuals from the database used to administer the Mericle Settlement. Notice was also published in two local newspapers, and information about the proposed Settlement was available through a detailed website. Based on the extensive individual notice, as well as the published notice, the notice requirements of both Rule 23 and the Due Process Clause have been satisfied. See Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1985) (“first-class mail and publication regularly have been deemed adequate under the stricter notice requirements . . . of Rule 23(c)(2).”). C. Fairness of the Settlement
Certified federal class actions may only be settled with court approval. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). While the approval of a class action settlement is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, “it can endorse a settlement only if the compromise is fair, adequate, and reasonable.’” Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)
24

(quoting Walsh v. Great. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983)).
The Third Circuit has identified nine factors, known as the Girsh factors, to be
considered when determining whether a proposed class action settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate. See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975). These
factors are:
(1) The complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 534-35 (citing Girsh, 521 F.3d at 157). “The settling parties bear the
burden of proving that the Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of the settlement.” Pet
Food, 629 F.3d at 350 (citing Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 785).
1. Complexity, Expense, and Duration of Litigation
The first Girsh factor “captures the probable costs, in both time and money, of
continued litigation.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 535-36. This litigation was commenced well over
five years ago, and it encompasses a Class Period dating back to 2003. In order to prepare
this action to proceed to trial against Provider Defendants, Plaintiffs would be required to
expend considerable financial resources drafting and responding to further motions. And,
as recognized by Plaintiffs, this case raises complex legal issues with respect to the RICO
and § 1983 claims. Additionally, a trial on the merits would require hours of attorney
preparation and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Likewise, even if this
case proceeded to trial against Provider Defendants, a “complicated, lengthy trial,” would
ensue, and the “inevitable . . . post-trial motions and appeals would not only further prolong
25

the litigation but also reduce the value of any recovery to the class.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 536. As such, the first Girsh factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement.
2. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement “The second Girsh factor ‘attempts to gauge whether members of the class support the settlement.’” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 536 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 318). The Third Circuit has noted that a vast disparity between the number of potential class members who received notice of a proposed settlement and the number of objectors “creates a strong presumption that this factor weighs in favor of the Settlement.” In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 235 (3d Cir. 2001). Similarly, “[c]ourts have generally assumed that ‘silence constitutes tacit consent to the agreement.’” Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 812 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1313 n.15 (3d Cir. 1993). The reaction of the class strongly favors approval of the Settlement. Here, following extensive notice, both to potential Settlement Class Members individually and by general publication, none of the Settlement Class Members objected to the proposed Settlement. Furthermore, only ten (10) Settlement Class Members opted out of the Settlement. The lack of objections and the low number of opt outs demonstrate a general acceptance of the Settlement by Class Members. See, e.g., Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 118–19 (3d Cir.1990) (approving settlement where “only” 29 objections were made in a 281–member class); Alexander v. Washington Mut., Inc., No. 07-4426, 2012 WL 6021098, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2012) (reaction of class favored approval of settlement where only five class members opted out and no formal objections were filed to the settlement); Ripley v. Sunoco, Inc.,287 F.R.D.300, 312 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (reaction of the class favored approval
26

of settlement where “less than 1 percent of the eligible class members opted out of the settlement”). Also indicative of overwhelming support by the Class is that, when compared to the Mericle Settlement, more than 200 additional Proof of Claim Forms were submitted for payment with respect to the Provider Settlement. Yet, despite this increase, less Settlement Class Members opted out of the instant Settlement than the Mericle Settlement. The second Girsh factor thus strongly counsels in favor of settlement approval.
3. Stage of the Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed The third Girsh factor “captures the degree of case development that class counsel had accomplished prior to settlement,” and allows the court to “determine whether counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (citation, quotations, & alterations omitted); see also Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 813 (“Given the purpose of this inquiry, . . . it is . . . appropriate to measure the stage by reference to the commencement of proceedings either in the class action at issue or in some related proceeding.”). When analyzing this Girsh factor, courts also examine whether the settlement resulted from arm's-length negotiations. See In re Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2003). When the settlement results from arm's-length negotiations, the court will “afford[ ] considerable weight to the views of experienced counsel regarding the merits of the settlement.” McAlarnen v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 09–1737, 2010 WL 365823, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010); see also Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (“Courts generally recognize that a proposed class action settlement is presumptively valid where, as in this case, the parties engaged in arm's length negotiations
27

after meaningful discovery.”); In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F.Supp.2d 423, 431 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“Significant weight should be attributed to the belief of experienced counsel that the settlement is in the best interests of the class.”).
The Settlement was preliminarily approved in November 2013, almost five years after the commencement of this litigation. During that period, considerable time, effort, and money was expended by both parties, including the production and review of over 200,000 pages of documents and hundreds of Plaintiff Fact Sheets. Moreover, numerous pleadings and motions were filed, and responded to, by Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants. As such, at this stage of the proceedings “‘the parties certainly had a clear view of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.’” McCoy v. Health Net, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (D. N.J. 2008) (quoting Bonett v. Educ. Debt Servs., Inc., No. 01-6528, 2003 WL 21658267, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2003)). The third Girsh factor therefore weighs in favor of settlement approval.
4. Risks of Establishing Liability “The fourth Girsh factor ‘examines what the potential rewards (or downside) of litigation might have been had class counsel decided to litigate the claims rather than settle them.’” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 322 (quoting Cendant, 264 F.3d at 237). “[T]he more risks that Plaintiffs may face during litigation the stronger this factor favors approving a settlement.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *9 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 319). “The inquiry requires a balancing of the likelihood of success if ‘the case were taken to trial against the benefits of immediate settlement.’” In re Safety Components, Inc. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 72, 89 (D. N.J. 2001) (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 319).
28

As previously noted, Plaintiffs face a difficult task of proving all elements of their claims should these actions proceed to trial. While Plaintiffs did not provide, in detail, the risks of establishing liability in this case, this is understandable in this case “[g]iven that the litigation [will] continue against other defendants, [and] the parties may [have been] reluctant to disclose fully and candidly their assessment of the proposed settlement's strengths and weaknesses that led them to settle separately.” Processed Egg Prods., 284 F.R.D. at 271 (quoting David F. Herr, The Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.651, at 505 (4th ed. 2011)).
In addition, possible appeals, summary judgment motions, and trial still remain if the Settlement is not approved. Thus, as “this case involves difficult factual and legal issues which would have translated into protracted litigation and accumulating expenses, in both time and money,” In re. Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 104 (D.N.J. 2012), this factor weighs in favor of approval.
5. Risks of Establishing Damages This factor “attempts to measure the expected value of litigating the action rather than settling it at the current time.” Cendant, 264 F.3d at 239 (quoting Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 816). “This factor, like the last, involves a balancing of risks.” In re CertainTeed Corp. Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 269 F.R.D. 468, 488 (E.D. Pa. 2010). In this case, even if Plaintiffs were able to establish liability, they would still be tasked with proving the appropriate amount of damages against Provider Defendants. For Juvenile Plaintiffs that only seek presumed damages with respect to the § 1983 claims, proving damages may not present a daunting task. However, Juvenile Plaintiffs seeking more than presumed damages may face significant obstacles in establishing individual damages. The
29

issue of individualized damages could very well lead to a “battle of the experts” with no guarantee whom the jury would believe. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 236. Furthermore, even if damages are established, post-trial motions and appeals present increased risk to the recovery of damages.
In the instant case, the risks of establishing damages factor is neutral. Although some Plaintiffs may face difficulty in establishing individualized or special damages, establishing presumed damages suffered by the Juvenile Settlement Class as a whole would not present the same risks. As such, this factor does not weigh for or against approval.
6. Risks of Maintaining the Class Action through Trial The sixth Girsh factor “measures the likelihood of obtaining and keeping a class certification if the action were to proceed to trial” in light of the fact that “the prospects for obtaining certification have a great impact on the range of recovery one can expect to reap from the class action.” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 322. “The value of a class action depends largely on the certification of the class because, not only does the aggregation of the claims enlarge the value of the suit, but often the combination of the individual cases also pools litigation resources and may facilitate proof on the merits.” Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 817. However, a “district court retains the authority to decertify or modify a class at any time during the litigation if it proves to be unmanageable.” Id. (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321). Here, as noted, the Classes have already been certified for all issues of liability. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[t]here will always be a ‘risk’ or possibility of decertification, and consequently the court can always claim this factor weighs
30

in favor of settlement.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321. 7. Ability of Defendants to Withstand a Greater Judgment The seventh Girsh factor considers “whether the defendants could withstand a
judgment for an amount significantly greater than the settlement.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537-38 (citation, quotations, & alteration omitted). Here, Plaintiffs retained a forensic accountant, Stephen J. Scherf (“Scherf”), to assess and review Provider Defendants’ financial records and its ability to withstand a judgment greater than that provided by the Settlement. (Doc. 1528, Ex. N.) Scherf opines “within a reasonable degree of professional certianty that the payment of $2.5 million was fair and reasonable given the financial condition and equity value of the Provider Defendants after consideration of the significant third party debt obligations totaling $20,036,722 (comprised of a mortgage to PACC of $7,616,653, a mortgage to WPACC of $12,195,069 and a line of credit to Mays of $225,000).” (Id.) Scherf also concludes that “the payout over the time periods provided above are fair and reasonable given the Provider Defendants’ financial obligations.” (Id.) Based on this evidence, the seventh Girsh factor weighs in favor of approval.
8. Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement in Light of the Best Possible Recovery and the Attendant Risks of Litigation
“The last two Girsh factors evaluate whether the settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor value for a strong case. The factors test two sides of the same coin: reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and reasonableness in light of the risks the parties would face if the case went to trial.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322). “Notably, in conducting the analysis, the court must guard against demanding too large a settlement based on its view of the merits of the litigation;
31

after all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution.” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 324.
To assess the reasonableness of a settlement in a case, such as this, seeking primarily monetary relief, a court should compare “‘the present value of the damages plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, appropriately discounted for the risk of not prevailing . . . with the amount of the proposed settlement.’” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322).
The Settlement provides for $2,500,000.00 to be distributed to the Settlement Class, less attorneys’ fees and costs. Although Plaintiffs do not set forth an exact estimation of the damages they would likely recover if successful, Plaintiffs discuss the obstacles that must be surmounted before any damages may be awarded. These hurdles could substantially reduce, if not eliminate, any recovery by Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs retained an ethics expert, Professor Lynn A. Baker, to offer an opinion as to fairness and reasonableness of the Settlement. Professor Baker has served as an ethics expert in multiple large-dollar, large-group settlements. Professor Baker, based upon her experience, opines that all of the components of the Settlement Agreement were fair, reasonable, and appropriate under the circumstances.
Here, “while the exact maximum possible recovery in this case may be unclear, the extensive risks of litigation are not.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *10 (finding eighth and ninth Girsh factors favored settlement approval despite lack of exact estimation as to likely recovery). Based on these attendant risks, the final two Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of the Settlement.
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9. Prudential Factors
In addition to the Girsh factors, courts in the Third Circuit also consider the following
factors outlined in Prudential:
the maturity of the underlying substantive issues, as measured by experience in adjudicating individual actions, the development of scientific knowledge, the extent of discovery on the merits, and other facts that bear on the ability to assess the probable outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and individual damages; the existence and probable outcome of claims by other classes and subclasses; the comparison between the results achieved by the settlement for individual class or subclass members and the results achieved-or likely to be achieved-for other claimants; whether class or subclass members are accorded the right to opt out of the settlement; whether any provisions for attorneys' fees are reasonable; and whether the procedure for processing individual claims under the settlement is fair and reasonable. Prudential, 148 F.3d at 323. In this case, none of the Prudential factors weigh against approval, and three (3)
factors weigh in favor of settlement: (1) whether members are accorded the right to opt out;
(2) whether any provisions for attorneys’ fees are reasonable; and (3) whether the
procedure for processing individual claims under the Settlement is fair and reasonable. As
noted, the Settlement Class Members were given the opportunity to opt out. The attorneys’
fees sought by Class Counsel, as discussed below, are reasonable in light of the time
expended litigating this action. And, finally, the procedure for processing individual claims
under the Settlement is fair and reasonable, and the procedure has been explained clearly
in forms available to Settlement Class Members.
10. Summary of Girsh and Prudential Factors
After consideration of the Girsh factors and the relevant Prudential factors, I conclude
that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e). As discussed, a few
factors do not weigh in favor of settlement. Not every factor need weigh in favor of
settlement, however, in order for the Settlement to be approved. See Cendant, 264 F.3d
33

at 242-43 (affirming final settlement approval when not all factors weighed in favor of
approval). Because the ultimate balance of the Girsh and Prudential factors when
considered together weigh in favor of settlement, the Settlement will be approved.
D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Under Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]n a certified class action,
the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized
by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). A district court must conduct a
“thorough judicial review of fee applications . . . for all class action settlements.” In re Rite
Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333
(internal quotations omitted)).
In assessing attorneys' fees, courts typically apply either the percentage-of-recovery method or the lodestar method. The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees from the fund “in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for failure.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333 (internal quotations omitted). The lodestar method is more typically applied in statutory fee-shifting cases because it allows courts to “reward counsel for undertaking socially beneficial litigation in cases where the expected relief has a small enough monetary value that a percentage-of-recovery method would provide inadequate compensation” or in cases where the nature of the recovery does not allow the determination of the settlement's value required for application of the percentage-of-recovery method. Id. Regardless of the method chosen, we have suggested it is sensible for a court to use a second method of fee approval to cross-check its initial fee calculation. Id. Id. As such, the percentage-of-recovery method will be employed to determine the proper
fee to award Class Counsel, and then the lodestar will be utilized as a cross-check to
ensure the reasonableness of the award. See id.
1. Application of the Percentage-of-Recovery Method
Class Counsel requests a combined award of common benefit attorneys’ fees and
expenses of $732,968.36 under the percentage-of-recovery method. The Third Circuit has
34

instructed a district court to consider ten factors when undertaking a percentage-of-recovery analysis: (1) the size of the fund created and the number of beneficiaries; (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel; (7) awards in similar cases; (8) the value of benefits attributable to the efforts of class counsel relative to the efforts of other groups, such as government agencies conducting investigations; (9) the percentage fee that would have been negotiated had the case been subject to a private contingent fee arrangement at the time counsel was retained; and (10) any innovative settlement terms. In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The award factors, however, “‘need not be applied in a formulaic way’” because each case is different, “‘and in certain cases, one factor may outweigh the rest.’” Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 301 (quoting Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000)).
a. Size of the Fund and Number of Beneficiaries The Settlement Agreement establishes a common fund of $2,500,000.00 and notice has been disseminated to over 3,000 individuals. In general, as the size of the settlement fund increases the percentage of the award decreases. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 339. “The basis for this inverse relationship is the belief that ‘[i]n many instances the increase [in recovery] is merely a factor of the size of the class and has no direct relationship to the efforts of counsel.’“ Id. (citing In re First Fid. Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 164 n.1 (D. N.J. 1990)). As explained below, Class Counsel’s requested fees in this case
35

represent less than thirty percent (30%) of the common benefit fund, well within the range of reasonable fees, on a percentage basis, in the Third Circuit. See, e.g., Sakalas v. Wilkes Barre Hosp. Co., No. 11-546, 2014 WL 1871919, at *5-8 (M.D. Pa. May 8, 2014) (approving award of twenty-seven percent (27%) of the common fund); Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 082317, 2013 WL 84928, at *12-13 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2013) (approving award of thirty-two percent (32%) of the fund). And, with respect to the Mericle Settlement, I approved a combined award of attorneys’ fees and costs of $4,335,000.00, which amounted to 24.4% of the $17,750,000.00 common benefit fund. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding the fee request reasonable.
b. Presence or Absence of Substantial Objections by Class Members
As discussed above with respect to the Girsh factors, no objections were filed to the Settlement by any Settlement Class Member. Similarly, no objections have been filed to Class Counsel’s fee application. “The absence of objections supports the reasonableness of the fee request.” Frederick v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC, No. 08-288, 2011 WL 1045665, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2011) (citing In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 514-15 (W.D. Pa. 2003)); In re Amer. Inv. Life Ins. Co. Annuity and Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 263 F.R.D. 226, 244 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“small number of objections and the objections' lack of merit indicate that the class is satisfied with the fee award”). This factor also weighs in favor of the requested award of attorneys’ fees.
c. Skill and Efficiency of the Attorneys Involved The quality of representation of Class Counsel considers “‘the quality of the result achieved, the difficulties faced, the speed and efficiency of the recovery, the standing,
36

experience and expertise of the counsel, the skill and professionalism with which counsel prosecuted the case and the performance and quality of opposing counsel.’” In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (quoting In re Computron Software, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 313, 323 (D. N.J. 1998)). As set forth in greater detail above, Class Counsel is highly experienced, as the individual attorneys in this action have litigated numerous complex class actions involving mass actions and civil rights claims. Additionally, Class Counsel’s ability to successfully negotiate the Settlement “demonstrates the significant skill and expertise of counsel.” In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2002, 2012 WL 5467530, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2012). Likewise, counsel for Provider Defendants has extensive experience defending complex litigation and class actions. Thus, this factor supports the reasonableness of the fee award.
d. Complexity and Duration of the Litigation The Third Circuit has stated that “complex and/or novel legal issues, extensive discovery, acrimonious litigation, and tens of thousands of hours spent on the case by class counsel” are “the factors which increase the complexity of class litigation.” In re Cendant Corp., PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 741 (3d Cir. 2001). These factors all support the requested fee award. Class Counsel participated in mediation, engaged in discovery, and submitted numerous, well-researched filings. Equally significant is the complex nature of this litigation, and the alleged judicial corruption scheme for which these actions seek redress. Furthermore, the litigation proceeded against Provider Defendants for well over four years prior to the parties agreeing to the terms of the Settlement. Therefore, the complexity and duration of the litigation supports the requested fee award.
37

e. Risk of Nonpayment “This factor allows courts to award higher attorneys’ fees for riskier litigation.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at * 13. Here, Class Counsel undertook this complex civil rights/RICO litigation on a contingent fee basis without any guarantee of payment. Class Counsel, in litigating this case, incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs and expenses while facing the risk of not being reimbursed. The risk of nonpayment, therefore, weighs in favor of granting the requested fee award. See, e.g., Processed Egg Prods., 2012 WL 5467530, at *4 (“any contingency fee arrangement includes a risk of non-payment”); Ripley, 2012 WL 2402632, at *12 (“it follows, therefore, that there was a risk of nonpayment under a contingency arrangement”).
f. Amount of Time Devoted by Class Counsel According to the motion for attorneys’ fees, attorneys, paralegals, and staff at Anapol Schwartz, along with the Dyller Law Firm, expended 2,280.37 hours working towards the settlement with Provider Defendants. (Doc.1535, Ex. L.) Additionally, since fees were awarded under the Mericle Settlement, attorneys and paralegals at Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller expended 1,196.4 hours litigating this action, 1,015.3 hours of which were unrelated to the Mericle Settlement. (Id. at Ex. M.) Attorneys at the Juvenile Law Center expended 725.56 hours prosecuting this litigation since November 1, 2012 (the first date after fees were awarded in connection with the Mericle Settlement), and 651.18 of these hours were unrelated to the Mericle Settlement. (Id. at Ex. N.) Lastly, from November 1, 2012, attorneys and paralegals at Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, LLC expended 1,275 hours on the prosecution of this litigation; however, it is unclear from
38

Plaintiffs’ submissions the number of these hours that were unrelated to the Mericle Settlement. (Id. at K.) Upon reviewing the declarations submitted by Class Counsel, Counsel spent thousands of hours litigating claims in this action unrelated to the Mericle Settlement. Furthermore, the amount of time spent on this case prior to final approval of the Settlement reflects the complexity of Plaintiffs' claims, not the inefficiency of their counsel. And, the hours spent working on this matter prevented those individuals from litigating other cases. This factor thus favors granting the motion for attorneys' fees.
g. Awards in Similar Cases “In the Third Circuit, fee awards in common fund cases generally range from 19% to 45% of the fund.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *15 (citing Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc., No. 09–905, 2011 WL 1344745, at *15 (D. N.J. Apr. 8, 2011)). “Many courts, including several in the Third Circuit, have considered 25% to be the ‘benchmark’ figure for attorney fee awards in class action lawsuits, with adjustments up or down for significant case-specific factors.” In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 262 (D. Del. 2002) (gathering case law and awarding 22.5% in fees on a $10.01 million settlement fund). And, courts in the Third Circuit have found a thirty percent (30%) fee reasonable in cases raising violations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Delandro v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 06927, 2011 WL 2039099, at *14 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2011) (“the Court finds that a percentage of thirty percent (30%) . . . is in fact identical to, the percentage awarded in a number of other strip-search class action settlements in this Circuit”); Boone v. City of Phila., 668 F. Supp. 2d 693, 714 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“30% fee percentage is commensurate with other strip-search class actions”). Therefore, the combined award of attorneys’ fees and costs
39

amounting to approximately twenty-nine percent (29%) of the Settlement fund is reasonable.
h. Value of Benefits Attributed to Class Counsel The eighth factor the Court must consider is the degree to which the benefits of the settlement are attributable to Plaintiffs' counsel as opposed to the efforts of other actors, such as, for example, government investigators. See In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541. While government investigation uncovered the alleged conspiracy orchestrated by Ciavarella and Conahan which resulted in the indictment of the former judges, “[t]here is no contention . . . that the settlement could be attributed to work done by other groups, such as government agencies.” Esslinger, 2012 WL 5866074, at *14. This factor supports the requested fee.
i. Negotiated Fee in a Contingent Fee Arrangement In private contingency fee cases, attorneys routinely negotiate agreements for between thirty percent (30%) and forty percent (40%) of the recovery. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 123 (D. N.J. 2012); In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The requested fee is below this range.
j. Innovative Settlement Terms In their submission, Class Counsel did not identify any particularly “innovative” terms in the Settlement Agreement. Thus, this factor neither weighs against nor for the proposed fee request. See, e.g, McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc ., 834 F. Supp. 2d 329, 345 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ( “In the absence of any innovative terms, this factor neither weighs in favor or against the proposed fee request.”).
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2. Lodestar Cross-Check “The lodestar crosscheck is intended to gauge the reasonableness of the attorneys' fee award as a whole.” Milliron v. T–Mobile, USA, Inc., 423 F. App'x 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2011). In performing the lodestar cross-check, the court multiplies “the number of hours reasonably worked on a client's case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services based on the given geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the attorneys.” Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 305. Then, the court may apply a multiplier to “account for the contingent nature or risk involved in a particular case and the quality of the attorneys' work.” Id at 305–06. If the multiplier that must be used in order to obtain the result reached by application of the percentage-of-recovery method “is too great, the court should reconsider its calculation under the percentage-of-recovery method.” Id. at 306. But, because the cross-check is not the primary analysis in common fund cases, it does not require “mathematical precision [ ] or bean-counting.” Id. In evaluating the hours reasonably spent on the case, the court does not have to “review actual billing records” but can “rel[y] on summaries submitted by the attorneys.” See id. Here, as best can be determined from Counsel’s submissions, the lodestar for work performed by Counsel since November 1, 2012 unrelated to the Mericle Settlement is $1,618,843.00.4 Based on the approximate number of hours spent prosecuting this action since November 1, 2012 that are not related to the Mericle Settlement, the hourly billable

4

As stated, this figure is an estimation because Counsel did not indicate the number

of hours worked by attorneys and paralegals at Caroselli Beachler McTiernan &

Conboy, LLC since November 1, 2012 that were unrelated to the Mericle

Settlement.

41

rate for Counsel of record is approximately $300.00.5 In assessing whether the hourly billable rate is reasonable, courts should apply “blended billing rates that approximate the fee structure of all the attorneys who worked on the matter.” Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 306. The hourly rate should be reasonable in light of “the given geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the attorneys.” Id. at 305. While the requested hourly rates are higher than those typically approved in cases in the Scranton-Wilkes-Barre area, see, e.g., Supinski v. UPS, Inc., No. 06-CV-0793, 2012 WL 2905458, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2012) (awarding hourly rate of $250.00); Carey v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 05-CV2093, 2011 WL 1900169, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2011) (awarding hourly rate of $225.00), a higher hourly billable rate is acceptable in light of the extensive experience that Class Counsel collectively shares and the complex legal services it provided in this case. Moreover, this hourly rate is consistent with the rate awarded to Counsel in connection with the Mericle Settlement. See Wallace v. Powell, 288 F.R.D. 347, 376 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (lodestar cross-check demonstrated hourly billing rate of $308.00).
And, using a lodestar of $1,618,843.00, the award of $732,968.36 in combined fees and expenses yields a multiplier of significantly less than one. Thus, the lodestar crosscheck supports the requested fee award.
Additionally, the requested fee when considered in combination with the Mericle Settlement supports a finding that the fee sought pursuant to the Provider Settlement is reasonable. With respect to the $17,750,000.00 Mericle Settlement, Counsel sought a

5

This assumes that all hours worked by attorneys and paralegals at Caroselli

Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, LLC since November 1, 2012 were unrelated to

the Mericle Settlement.

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combined award of attorneys’ fees and costs of $4,335,000.00, and, at that time, Counsel had spent 34,900.48 hours prosecuting this matter. See Wallace, 188 F.R.D. at 373-76. Combined with the Provider Settlement, the claims against Mericle and Provider Defendants have settled for $20,250,000.00, and Counsel fees of $5,067,968.36 amounts to approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of the aggregate settlement value. Moreover, Counsel’s lodestar for the period before the Mericle Settlement was $10,754,199.35. See Wallace, 188 F.R.D. at 376. And, Counsel’s most recent submission indicates that attorneys, paralegals, and staff have expended at least 5,479.33 hours litigating this matter since November 1, 2012, with a lodestar for this time frame of $1,697,837.00. Thus, the aggregate lodestar for both settlement totals $12,452,036.35 for 40,739.81 hours worth of work, which amounts to an hourly rate of approximately $306.00. Thus, the fee requested here is also reasonable when considered in connection with the fee sought and awarded under the Mericle Settlement.
3. Reimbursement of Costs and Expenses In addition to an award of attorneys’ fees, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $107,968.36. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court “may award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs” to Plaintiffs' counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). “Reimbursement is particularly appropriate in situations where, as here, no class members have objected to it.” Processed Egg Prods., 2012 WL 5467530, at *7. Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel are requesting a combined award of attorneys’ fees and costs, meaning all expenses will be paid and then the remainder of the $732,968.36 will be considered the total fee. As this request is reasonable, Plaintiffs’
43

motion for an award of fees and costs will be approved. 4. Allocation of Fees Lastly, the motion seeks to allow Lead Counsel to allocate the fee among counsel
entitled to share the award. “Generally, a district court may rely on lead counsel to distribute attorneys’ fees among those involved.” Milliron, 423 F. App’x at 134. Allocation of fees in this manner is rationale because counsel “are most familiar with the work done by each firm and each firm's overall contribution to the litigation,” and this process “conserves the time and resources of the courts.” Processed Egg Prods., 2012 WL 5467530, at *7 (citation omitted). Co-Lead Counsel will therefore be permitted to distribute the fee award to those attorneys who assisted in creation of the Settlement fund. Of course, should all counsel not agree with Co-Lead Counsel’s allocation of fees, the ultimate allocation will then be made by the Court. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 9920593, 2002 WL 32154197, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2002).
III. Conclusion For the above stated reasons, the Settlement Class will be certified, the Settlement will be approved, and the requested attorneys’ fees and costs will be awarded. An appropriate order follows.

July 7, 2014 Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge

44

 
 Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 1 of 27

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, ET AL.

CONSOLIDATED TO:

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv 0286

v. ROBERT J. POWELL, ET AL.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM CONWAY, ET AL.

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v. MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, ET AL.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T.,ET AL.

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357

v. MARK A. CIAVARELLA, ET AL.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 2 of 27

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630

v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., ETAL.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

PLAINTFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS
AND POWELL DEFENDANTS

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 3 of 27
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), Plaintiffs, move for an order certifying a settlement class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and preliminarily approving a partial settlement that, upon final judicial approval, shall fully resolve all of Plaintiffs' claims against the Releasees, as defined in the Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement ("Settlement Agreement" or "Agreement"), attached hereto as Exhibit 1; and, in connection therewith, the Plaintiffs seek an order to:
1. Certify the Settlement Classes defined herein for settlement purposes only;
2. Appoint counsel to represent all proposed Settlement Class Members ("Settlement Class Counsel") solely for the purposes of the implementation, approval and consummation of this Settlement;
3. Appoint Representative Plaintiffs solely for the purposes ofthe implementation, approval and consummation of this Settlement;
4. Grant preliminary approval of this Settlement Agreement and schedule deadlines for Settlement Class Members to participate in the Settlement, opt out of the Settlement, or object to the settlement.
5. Authorize notice of this Settlement Agreement in the form

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 4 of 27
attached to the Motion; 6. Schedule a hearing to review any potential comments concerning
this Agreement, to consider its fairness, reasonableness and adequacy, and to determine whether to enter a Final Order approving the Settlement as proposed by the Parties ("Final Settlement Hearing"); and 7. Require non-binding mediation for any Settlement Class Member who properly and timely opts out and intends to pursue a separate claim against the Releasees.
For the reasons set forth below, and in Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, the Motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
1. The first of these consolidated cases, Wallace v. Powell, No. 09-0286, was filed on February 13, 2009 on behalf of plaintiffs represented by Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, LLC ("Caroselli Beachler") against a number of defendants, including the Powell Defendants.
2. Two putative class actions, Conway v. Conahan, No. 09-0291, filed by Anapol Schwartz, andHT. v. Ciavarella, No. 09-0357, filed by Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller ("Hangley Aronchick") and Juvenile Law
2

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 5 of 27
Center ("JLC"), were filed shortly thereafter, again naming as defendants, among others, the Powell Defendants.
3. In addition, presently pending before this Court are the following related civil actions against the Powell Defendants:
(a) Humanik v. Ciavarella, No. 09-630 (b) Clarkv. Ciavarella,No. 09-2535 (b) Dawn v. Conahan, No. 10-797 (c) Belangerv. Ciavarella,No. 10-1405 (d) Eliav.Powell,Nos. 11-0465, 11-0466 (e) Gillette v. Ciavarella,No. 11-658 These cases, together with Wallace, Conway, and H T., are referred to collectively herein as the "Civil Actions."1 4. Three of the Civil Actions, Conway, H T., and Belanger, are class actions. The Conway and H T. plaintiffs filed a Master Complaint for Class Actions ("CAC") in June 2009. 5. The remaining Civil Actions were filed on behalf of individual plaintiffs. Contemporaneously with the filing of the Master Complaint for Class Actions, the Wallace and Humanik plaintiffs filed a Master Long Form Complaint 1 The term Civil Actions is different from the term "Actions." Actions only refers to the lawsuits included in this Settlement and does not include the Belanger or the Clark cases.
3

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 6 of 27
for individual actions ("IC"). 6. The Civil Actions assert a number of causes of actions against some
or all of the Powell Defendants, including: (1) claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (IC Count III, V; CAC Counts II, IV); (2) claims alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.(IC Count I; CAC Counts V, VI); (3) claims alleging conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (IC Count II; CAC Count VII); and (4) a claim alleging state-law civil conspiracy (IC Count VIII).
7. On August 24, 2010, the Court's ruling on motions to dismiss filed in the Wallace, Conway, H T, and Humanik cases allowed said cases, in large part, to proceed. (See Doc. No. 573.)
8. In 2011, following extensive arms-length negotiations, Plaintiffs in the Actions reached a settlement (the "Mericle Settlement") with Defendants Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (collectively the "Mericle Parties") on December 16, 2011. The Court conditionally approved the Mericle Settlement on February 28, 2012 and appointed the law firms ofHangley Aronchick; Caroselli Beachler; Anapol Schwartz; and JLC as acting Class Counsel on a preliminary basis. (See Doc. No. 1084.)
9. Class Counsel noticed, processed, and administered the Mericle Settlement for the next eight months. A final approval hearing for the Mericle Settlement was held on November 19, 2012. Thereafter, the Court granted final
4

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 7 of 27
approval of the Mericle Settlement and final certification of the Mericle Settlement Classes for settlement purposes. Additionally, the Court found that Class Counsel adequately represented the Classes for purposes of entering and implementing the Mericle Settlement and satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also dismissed the claims against the Mericle Parties with prejudice. (See Doc. No. 1268.)
10. Apart from the Mericle Settlement, the litigation proceeded against Pa Child Care, LLC ("PACC"), Western Pa Child Care, LLC ("WPACC") and Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp. ("MAYS" and collectively the "Provider Defendants") and other defendants, including former judges Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella, Robert Powell, and Vision Holdings. Discovery was extensive. Documents were produced by Plaintiffs and by other defendants in the Civil Actions and depositions were taken.
11. On May 14, 2013, the Court granted Class Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability to Plaintiffs and certified litigation classes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). (See Doc. No. 1410.)
12. Also in 2013, following extensive arms-length negotiations and due diligence, the Plaintiffs in the Actions reached a settlement (the "Provider Defendants Settlement") with the Provider Defendants. The Court preliminarily
5

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 8 of 27
approved the Provider Defendants Settlement on December 9, 2013 and appointed the law firms ofHangley Aronchick; Caroselli Beachler; Anapol Schwartz; and JLC as acting Class Counsel on a preliminary basis. (See Doc. No. 1491.)
13. Class Counsel noticed, processed, and administered the Provider Defendants Settlement for the next year. A final approval hearing for the Provider Defendant Settlement was held on June 10, 2014. Thereafter, the Court granted final approval of the Provider Defendant Settlement and final certification of the Provider Defendant Settlement Classes for settlement purposes. Additionally, the Court found that Class Counsel adequately represented the Classes for purposes of entering and implementing the Provider Defendant Settlement and satisfied the requirements ofRule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also dismissed the claims against the Provider Defendant Parties with prejudice. (See Doc. No. 1539.)
14. Apart from the Provider Defendant Settlement, the litigation proceeded against Defendants Robert J. Powell ("Powell"), Vision Holdings, LLC; and Powell Law Group, P.C. ("PLG") (collectively the "Powell Defendants"), and other defendants, including former judges Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella.
15. The Court scheduled the trial of the Powell Defendants to begin on January 12, 2015.
16. Despite the Parties' strong belief in their respective positions, the
6

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 9 of 27
Parties recognize that there are substantial uncertainties and significant litigation costs with respect to the Actions and their potential outcomes if they were taken to trial. Having thoroughly considered their investigations and analyses of the facts and their evaluations of the law relating to the matters set forth in the Complaints, they have each determined that settlement of the Plaintiffs' claims and allegations, as set forth in the Agreement, is a fair and reasonable result for the Settlement Class Members.
17. The delay inherent in complex litigation may eliminate or diminish the chance for any meaningful recovery from the Powell Defendants. For that reason and for the reasons outlined above and more fully set forth in Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, Plaintiffs thus desire to proceed promptly to finalize and implement their settlement with the Powell Defendants.
18. While denying any liability, the Powell Defendants also consider it desirable that the Actions be settled and ended so as to halt the substantial expense of litigation.
19. After this settlement, additional claims will remain in the litigation, including Plaintiffs' claims against the Non-Releasees, as defined in the Agreement.
20. For these reasons, both Plaintiffs and the Powell Defendants believe it is in their best interests, and in the best interest of the members of the Settlement
7

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 10 of 27
Class, to settle the Actions under the terms presented.
BASIC TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT
The Settlement Class
21. Pursuant to Paragraph l(r) and (ff) of the Settlement Agreement, the
proposed Settlement Classes are defined as follows:
A. All juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella ("Juvenile Settlement Class").
B. All parents and/or guardians of all juveniles in paragraph (A) who, as a result of their child's adjudication of delinquency or placement by Judge Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008: (i) made payments in their own names or had wages, social security or other entitlements in their own names garnished or withdrawn; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties in their own names assessed against them or their child; and/or (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity ("Parent Settlement Class") and were not fully reimbursed as a result of claims made in connection with the Mericle Settlement and/or the Provider Defendant Settlement, defined in the Agreement.
The Releasees
22. Paragraph l(tt) of the Agreement defines the Releasees, which
include the "Powell Defendants" as defined in Paragraphs l(kk) of the Agreement.
The Powell Defendants have agreed to settle for the benefit of all Releasees.
The Cash Settlement Fund
23. In final settlement of the obligations of the Releasees to the
8

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 11 of 27
Settlement Class Members, and in return for full and unconditional releases of the claims of the Settlement Class Members against the Powell Defendants, the Powell Defendants have agreed to pay a total of$4,750,000.00 (the "Settlement Amount") into an escrow account at PNC Bank ("Escrow Account"). The Settlement Amount will be deposited into the Escrow Account in two transactions:
(1) Within thirty (30) days after the Court's entry ofthe Preliminary Approval Order, the Powell Defendants will transfer $200,000.00 (the "First Escrow Payment") into the Escrow Account.
(2) On or before December 21, 2015, the Powell Defendants will transfer an amount of money into the Escrow Account such that, together with interest accrued on the money deposited pursuant to the paragraph above, the balance will be $4,750,000 (the "Second Escrow Payment" and collectively with the First Escrow Payment, the "Escrow Payment").
24. Further, on or before the earlier of December 21, 2016 or 30 days after all litigation brought by Gregory Zappala or entities he owns or controls against the Powell Defendants is terminated by settlement or a final nonappealable judgment and Powell has received all fees and expenses from the proceeds of the Tronox, Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., No 14 Civ. 5495(KBF), if Powell's Net Worth is greater than $4,750,000 as calculated pursuant to
9

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 12 of 27
Paragraphs 7-9 of the Agreement, the Powell Defendants will deposit into the
Escrow Account the conditional payment below.
a. Powell Defendants, thirty (30) days before the latest date for determining Powell's Net Worth (Net Worth Evaluation Date) shall proffer their evaluation of Powell's Net Worth using the formula set forth in Paragraphs 7-9 of the Agreement. Plaintiffs have 10 business days to accept or dispute the proffer.
b. In the event that Plaintiffs' dispute the proffer the parties will jointly engage Thomas Pratt who will be provided with all documentation he may reasonably request for performing the computation set forth in Paragraphs 7-9 of the Agreement. His opinion shall be binding on the parties with no further right of appeal.
25. The settlement proceeds described above comprise the "Cash
Settlement Fund" and shall be applied as follows:
(1) Common benefit attorneys' fees and costs awarded by the Court upon application by Settlement Class Counsel pursuant to Paragraph 44-46 of the Settlement Agreement;
(2) All settlement administration costs and costs of notice related to the settlement; and
(3) Distribution of all remaining funds to the Settlement Class Members who properly and timely submit the required Proof of Claim Form and any required additional documentation, as described in Paragraphs 47-57 of the Settlement Agreement and in the Notice.
10

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 13 of 27
The Plan of Allocation 26. Under the Plan of Allocation, the amount remaining in the Cash Settlement Fund after payment of the attorneys' fees and cost will be distributed as described in the Notice of the Proposed Settlement, attached as Exhibit A to the Agreement. Exhibit A includes the "Legal Notice" of the proposed Settlement and an abbreviated version of the Legal Notice, referred to as the "Published Notice."
Notice 27. As described generally in Paragraphs 33-35 of the Settlement Agreement, adequate notice will be provided to Settlement Class members. 28. Upon approval by the Court, the Legal Notice of Proposed Settlement will be mailed via first class mail to the last known address of each Settlement Class Member for whom Settlement Class Counsel have an address, advising Settlement Class Members ofthe Settlement Agreement; of the procedure for filling a Proof of Claim Form, opting out and/or objecting to the Settlement; and of the applicable deadlines. 29. The Legal Notice will also be made available on the settlement website, www.kidswinsettlement.com, on the same date on which it is mailed to the Settlement Class Members. This website is the same website accessed by Settlement Class Members for information about the Mericle Settlement and the Provider Defendants Settlement.
11

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30. Upon approval by the Court, the Published Notice will be published in the Citizens Voice and the Times Leader the same week the Legal Notice is mailed to Settlement Class Members. The Proof of Claim deadline, which will be assigned by the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order, will be inserted into the Published Notice before publication.2
Opt-Outs and Objections
31. Pursuant to Paragraphs 59-65 of the Settlement Agreement, Settlement Class Members will have the right to exclude themselves from the Settlement ("Opt-Out") by returning a Proof of Claim Form indicating their OptOut election no later than the Proof of Claim Deadline (also, the "Opt-Out Deadline").
32. Pursuant to Paragraphs 59-65 of the Settlement Agreement, Settlement Class Members will also have the right to object to the Settlement no later than the Proof of Claim Deadline (also, the "Objection Deadline"). In order to object to the Settlement, Settlement Class Members shall deliver to the Claims Committee a written statement of any objection(s) as described in Paragraph 62 of the Agreement.
2 The Proof of Claim deadline assigned by the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order will be no later than 60 days after the Court has entered its Preliminary Approval Order and shall be consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), meaning that the deadline will not fall on a weekend or legal holiday.
12

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33. In order for an Opt-Out or Objection to be timely, the completed form or written objection must be either (1) physically received by the Claims Committee by the Proof of Claim Deadline (which is the same as the Opt-Out Deadline and the Objection Deadline),3or {2) clearly postmarked by the United States Postal Services or a commercial mail carrier no later than the Proof of Claim Deadline.
34. Settlement Class Members who do not timely Opt-Out shall automatically be included in the settlement as Settlement Class Members, as described in Paragraph 47-56-7 of the Agreement.
35. Settlement Class Members who elect to opt out of the Settlement (the "Opt-Out Plaintiffs") and who intend to pursue claims against the Powell Defendants will, pursuant to Paragraph 33 of the Agreement, be required to participate in confidential non-bindings mediation with the Powell Defendants.
The Claims Committee 36. The Claims Committee, as further described in Paragraph 36 of the Agreement, shall consist of four attorneys, including one representative from each ofthe following firms: (1) Hangley Aronchick; (2) Anapol Schwartz; (3) Caroselli Beachler; and (4) JLC. The Powell Defendants shall have no liability for the
3 The Proof of Claim Deadline, which is the same date as the Opt-Out Deadline and the Objection Deadline, will be designated in the Court's order conditionally approving the settlement.
13

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 16 of 27
administration and processing of claims. The Claims Committee shall be responsible for: (1) reviewing the Proof of Claims Forms returned by the Proof of Claim Deadline; (2) determining which Settlement Class Members have elected to Opt-Out; (3) notifying the Court and Powell Defendant Counsel of any objections to the Settlement; and (4) pursuant to the Plan of Allocation, calculating the amount of the Cash Settlement Fund to be paid to each Settlement Class Member who participates in the Settlement.
37. The Claims Committee will maintain a toll-free number and a website (www.kidswinsettlement.com) for Settlement Class Members. The toll-free number and website address will be printed in the Legal Notice and the Published Notice. The Claims Committee shall make itself available for consultations with Settlement Class Members as reasonably necessary to assist any Settlement Class Member in evaluating and asserting his or her rights under the Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation.
38. As required by Paragraph 42 of the Settlement Agreement, the Claims Committee will report to the Court the number of: (a) individuals who participating in the Settlement; (b) Settlement Class Members who qualifying for payment under the terms of the Settlement, (c) Settlement Class Members who opt out of the Settlement, and (d) Settlement Class Members who submit objections to the Settlement.
14

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 17 of 27
39. If the Court gives final approval to the Settlement at or following the Final Settlement Hearing, the Claims Committee will coordinate the payment to Settlement Class Members pursuant to the Plan of Allocation.
Appeals from Allocation Determinations 40. Pursuant to Paragraph 39 of the Settlement Agreement, the Parties request that the Court approve Judge Marina Corodemus (Ret.) as the Special Master for Allocation Appeals, to resolve the claims of each Settlement Class Member who disputes the award made to him or her by the Claims Committee. 41. Judge Corodemus was appointed and served with distinction as the Special Master for Allocation Appeals for the Mericle Settlement (see Doc. No. 1268) and the Provider Defendants Settlement (see Doc. No. 1538), and is therefore familiar with this litigation. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE PRELIMINARY CERTIFIED 42. The Parties jointly seek certification of this Settlement Class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Rule 23 provides for class treatment when the elements ofRule 23(a) are met and "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and ... a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." 43. This Court has previously certified a litigation class under Rule 23
15

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 18 of 27
applying the same factors as required to certify a class for the purposes of the Powell Defendants Settlement.
44. As set forth below, the following elements of Rule 23(a) are established: (1) the settlement class is so numerous that separate joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Numerosity 45. According to daily case lists maintained by the Juvenile Probation Department and reviewed by Settlement Class Counsel and the Claims Committee for the Mericle Settlement and the Provider Defendants Settlement, the Juvenile Settlement Class consists of at least 2,400 individuals who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008. The Parent Settlement Class is at least as large; based on the information reviewed by the same. For purposes of this Settlement, however, the Cash Settlement Fund will only be used to reimburse Parent Settlement Class Members who were not fully reimbursed for eligible payments by the Mericle Settlement and/or the Provider Defendant Settlement. (See Doc. No. 1409, at 9.)
16

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 19 of 27
Commonality 46. The claims set forth in the Master Complaints raise many questions of law or fact common to the Settlement Class Members. "When the party opposing the class has engaged in some course of conduct that affects a group of persons and gives rise to a cause of action, one or more elements of that causes of action will be common to all of the persons affected." Newberg§ 3:20 (5th ed. 2011). This element is satisfied. (See Doc. No. 1409, at 9-12.)
Typicality 47. The claims of the Class Representatives are typical of the claims of the class. (See Doc. No. 1409, at 13-14.) 48. As described in additional detail in Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, the proposed Juvenile Settlement Class representatives assert the same facts and claims against the Defendants as are asserted on behalf of the classes they represent. 49. Alexandra Fahey and Dezare Dunbar, like the other Settlement Class Members who will be paid from the Probation Only Benefit Fund, as described in the Notice, were adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella during the class period, but spent no time in out-of-home placements. 50. H.T. and Jessica Van Reeth, like the other Settlement Class Members who will be paid from the Non-PACC/WPACC Benefit Fund, as described in the
17

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 20 of 27
Notice, were adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella during the class period, and were sent to out-of-home placements by Ciavarella, but spent no time in either the PACC or the WPACC facility.
51. Elizabeth Habel and Angelia Karsko, like the other Settlement Class members who will be paid from the PACC/WPACC Benefit Fund, as described in the Notice, were adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella during the class period and were sent by him to out-of-home placements at either the PACC or WPACC facilities.
52. Jack Van Reeth, the father of Jessica Van Reeth, is the proposed representative ofthe Parent Settlement Class. Like all other members of the Parent Settlement Class, he asserts RICO claims based on Defendants' alleged conspiratorial conduct resulting in payments of court fees, fines, interest and/or penalties. As a result of Jessica's adjudication and place by Ciavarella, Mr. Van Reeth made payment and had costs and fees assessed against him.
Adequacy of Representation 53. Finally, with respect to Rule 23(a) elements, the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class. The Class Representatives were previously approved as adequate representatives of the settlement classes under the Mericle Settlement (Doc. No. 1268) and the Provider Defendant Settlement (Doc. No. 1538) and as adequate representatives of the
18

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 21 of 27
litigation classes approved by this Court as to all issues of Defendants' Liability to Plaintiffs (Doc. No. 1410). The Class Representatives' interests are aligned with those of the class represented, as they have asserted the same claims as the class represented. (See Doc. No. 1409, at 17.)
54. Additionally, Plaintiffs are represented by counsel with extensive experience with complex litigation, class actions, and juvenile-justice in general. More significantly, Anapol Schwartz, Caroselli Beachler, Hangley Aronchick, and JLC were previously appointed as Settlement Class Counsel for the Mericle Settlement and the Provider Defendants Settlement and found to "have fully and adequately represented the Classes for purposes of entering and implementing the Settlement and have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable law." (See Doc. Nos. 1268 and 1538.) This Court also appointed three of these firms as Class Counsel for the certified litigation classes as to all issues of Defendants' Liability. (See Doc. No. 1410; see also Doc. No. 1409, at 15-16.) The proposed Class Counsel have demonstrated their full commitment to the continued prosecution of this litigation, and they possess the skill, experience, and resources to do so. See Exhibit 2 (attaching biographies).
Rule 23(b)(3) Factors: Predominance and Superiority 55. Plaintiffs' claims satisfy the requirements ofRule 23(b)(3) insofar as such requirements are relevant in the content of the proposed Settlement Class.
19

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 22 of 27
(See Doc. No. 1409, at 20-31 (analyzing predominance in the context of certifying a litigation class).)
56. Courts have recognized that, where the focus is on liability-imposing conduct of defendants that is identical as to all putative plaintiffs, the predominance element may be satisfied. See, e.g., Harrington v. City of Albuquerque, 222 F.R.D. 505 (D.N.M. 2004). Additionally, there is no indication that Settlement Class Members have an interest in the individual prosecution of their actions, particularly in light of the fact that the Actions were all consolidated and settled with the Mericle Parties and the Provider Defendants, with very few opt-outs and no objectors. This forum is the most efficient and desirable location in which to resolve this lawsuit.
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS WITHIN THE RANGE OF FAIR AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT
57. At this stage, the Court is not being asked to finally approve the settlement; final approval may take place only after the Final Settlement Hearing. Instead, the Court is being asked simply to preliminarily approve the Settlement and authorize the dissemination of Notice.
58. Approving dissemination of notice "is at most a determination that there is what might be termed 'probable cause' to submit the proposed to class members and hold a full-scale hearing as its fairness." In re Traffic Exec. Ass 'n-
20

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 23 of 27
Eastern R.R.s, 627 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1980). 59. Moreover, a "presumption of correctness" should attach to this
settlement, which was reached in "arm's-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful discovery." In re Linerboards Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Hanrahan v. Britt, 174 F.R.D. 356, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).
60. The Agreement between the Parties is the product of lengthy arms'length negotiations undertaken in good faith. Furthermore, the Settlement was negotiated by counsel with extensive experience in complex litigation who zealously advocated their clients' interest and positions. Through motions, briefs, and discovery, the Parties, through counsel, carefully considered and evaluated the relevant legal authorities to support the claims asserted against the Powell Defendants, the likelihood of prevailing on these claims, and the risk, expense and duration of continued litigation.
61. The proposed Settlement falls well within the range of possible approval. See Stoetznerv. US. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 117-20 (3d Cir. 1990).
WHEREFORE, for the reason set forth herein, the Parties respectfully request that the Court enter the proposed Order attached hereto.
21

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 24 of 27
For Plaintiffs in the action titled, Wallace v. Powell, et al., No. 3:09-cv-286 (M.D. Pa.)
By: /s/ David S. Senoff William R. Caroselli, Esquire Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy 20 Stanwix Street, 7th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 19522 (412) 391-9860
David S. Senoff, Esquire Lauren C. Fantini Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy 1845 Walnut Street, 15th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 609-1350
For Plaintiffs in the action titled, Conway, et a/. v. Conahan et a/., No. 09-cv-291 (M.D. Pa.), Elia v. Powell, No. 11-cv-465 (M.D. Pa.), and Elia v. Powell, No. 11-cv-466 (M.D. Pa.)
By: /s/ Sol H. Weiss Sol H. Weiss, Esquire Joseph J. Fantini, Esquire Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 735-2098
22

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 25 of 27
For Plaintiffs in the action titled, H. T., eta/. vs. Ciavarella, et al., No. 09-cv-357 (M.D. Pa.) By: /s/ MarshaL. Levick
Marsha L. Levick, Esquire Juvenile Law Center 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 625-0551 By: /s/ Daniel Segal Daniel Segal, Esquire Rebecca S. Melley, Esquire Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller One Logan Square, 27th Floor 18th and Cherry Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 568-6200
Dated: March 10, 2015
23

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 26 of 27

CERTIFICATE OF CONCURRENCE OR NONCONCURRENCE

I, DavidS. Senoff, hereby certify that pursuant to Local Rule 7.1, that

counsel for all represented parties was contacted for purposes of seeking

concurrence in the foregoing Motion, Counsel for Powell Defendants concur with

the instant Motion.

Is/ DavidS. Senoff David S. Senoff, Esquire

24

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1676 Filed 03/10/15 Page 27 of 27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DavidS. Senoff, Esquire, hereby certify that, a true and correct copy of
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs
and Provider Parties was filed electronically on March 10, 2015 and is available to
all parties for viewing electronically. Additionally, the foregoing Motion was
served via First Class Mail upon the following prose parties:
Mark A. Ciaverella, 15008-67 Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 5000 Pekin, IL 61555-5000
Michael T. Conahan Inmate #15009-067 FCI Coleman Low
PO Box 1031 Coleman, FL 33521

Dated: March 10, 2015

/s/ David S. Senoff David S. Senoff

25

 
 Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENCE WALLACE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ROBERT J. POWELL, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

v. MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

H.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

******************************************************************************************************

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 2 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA HUMANIK, Plaintiff, v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630 (JUDGE CAPUTO)

REVISED FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2015, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification (Doc. 1676) and all supporting documents thereto, Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 1707) and all supporting documents, and following a final approval hearing held on December 16, 2015, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. This Order incorporates and makes part hereof: a. The Master Settlement Agreement, filed March 10, 2015, which sets forth the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement (the “Settlement”). b. The findings and conclusions contained in the Court’s August 10, 2015 Order Conditionally Certifying Settlement Class and Preliminarily Approving Proposed Settlement (the “Preliminary Approval Order”). (Doc. 1699.) All capitalized terms in this Final Order and Judgment have the same meanings as in the MSA. 2. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Powell Defendants and Plaintiffs (as

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 3 of 11
defined in the Memorandum accompanying this Order) and has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, including, without limitation, jurisdiction to approve the Settlement, to settle and release all claims denominated as the Released Claims in the MSA, and to dismiss this action on the merits with prejudice as to the Powell Defendants ONLY. All Class Members who have not excluded themselves from the Class have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of this action and the partial settlement of this action.
3. The Class, as defined in the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order to which notice was directed, is hereby finally certified for settlement purposes. No person who previously requested exclusion from the class by timely opting-out shall be a member of the Class for purposes of Rule 23(c)(3)(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but all other persons within the class as defined in the Preliminary Approval Order shall be subject to this Final Order and Judgment.
4. Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, LLC; Anapol Schwartz; Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller; and Juvenile Law Center (“Co-Lead Counsel” or “Class Counsel”) and other counsel of record herein for the Named Plaintiffs have fully and adequately represented the Class for purposes of entering and implementing the Settlement and have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other applicable law. Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy, LLC; Anapol Schwartz; Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller; and Juvenile Law Center shall continue as CoLead Counsel.
5. Mailed Notice was sent to each reasonably identifiable Class Member via firstclass mail to his or her last known address, and Published Notice took place in the Times
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Leader and the Citizens’ Voice in accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order. Other materials were also made available on a publically available Internet site. The Court, therefore, concludes:
a. The Notice constituted the best practicable notice to Class Members under the circumstances of this action.
b. The Notice was reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise Class Members of (i) the pendency of this class action lawsuit, (ii) the right to exclude themselves from the Class, (iii) the right to object to any aspect of the proposed Settlement, the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the proposed Settlement, the adequacy of the Classes’ representation by Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ Counsel, and/or the award of Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, (iv) the right to request to appear at the Fairness Hearing, personally or through counsel, if they did not exclude themselves from the Class, and (v) the binding effect of the orders and judgment in this action, whether favorable or unfavorable, on all persons who did not request exclusion from the Classes.
c. The Notice was reasonable and constituted due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to be provided with notice.
d. The Notice complied with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. e. The Notice fully satisfied the requirements of the United States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause) and all other applicable law and procedural rules. 6. The terms and provisions of the Settlement have been entered into in good faith, and are fair, reasonable, and adequate as to the Settlement Class Members, and in full compliance with all applicable requirements of the United States Constitution (including the
4

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 5 of 11
Due Process Clause) and all other applicable laws and procedural rules. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification (Doc. 1676) is GRANTED and the Settlement is APPROVED pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Settlement, and this Final Order and Judgment, shall be binding on Plaintiffs and all other Class Members, as well as their heirs, executors, and administrators, successors and assigns, and shall have res judicata and other preclusive effect in all pending and future claims, lawsuits, arbitrations or other proceedings maintained by or on behalf of any such persons, to the fullest extent allowed by law as against the Released Parties ONLY. All of Plaintiffs’ claims as against the Non-Released Parties shall remain pending and active. This Settlement shall have no binding effect whatsoever as against the Non-Released Parties.
7. The Parties are directed to implement the Settlement according to its terms and conditions.
8. To properly fund the Allocation Appeal Process consistent with the MSA, fifteen percent (15%) of the Cash Settlement Fund shall not be distributed, but instead shall remain held back in the Escrow Account for the benefit of any successful Allocation Appellants and the costs associated with the Allocation Appeal Process. The hold back will amount to $712,500.00. In the event that the hold back is not fully depleted, the balance shall be returned to the Cash Settlement Fund and shall be distributed in accordance with the MSA.
9. Class Counsel are hereby authorized to communicate with Class Members, as contemplated by and in accordance with the terms of the MSA and the Preliminary Approval Order, without requiring further approval of the Court.
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Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 6 of 11
10. Any appeal from this Final Order and Judgement must be preceded by (i) a timely objection to the Settlement filed in accordance with the requirements of the MSA and Preliminary Approval Order or a request to intervene upon a representation of inadequacy of counsel, (ii) a request for a stay of implementation of the Settlement, and (iii) posting of an appropriate bond. Absent satisfaction of all three of these requirements, the Parties are authorized, at their sole option and in their sole discretion, to proceed with implementation of the Settlement, even if such implementation would moot any appeal.
11. Pursuant to the MSA and Notices, Class Counsel are directed to mail to Class Members who made a claim against the Settlement Fund a proposed payment amount, if any, together with a written explanation of how that amount was determined postmarked not later than forty-five (45) days after the date of this Final Order and Judgment.
12. Upon the entry of this Final Order and Judgment, all Released Claims against the Released Parties (but not the Non-Released Parties) shall be dismissed with prejudice and Plaintiffs shall be deemed to have unconditionally, fully, finally, and forever, remised, released, relinquished, compromised and discharged all Released Claims whether or not any particular Plaintiff seeks or receives payment under the terms of the MSA.
13. Settlement Class Members agree and covenant not to sue or to prosecute, institute, or cooperate in the institution, commencement, filing, or prosecution of any lawsuit, appeal, arbitration or other proceeding relating to or based on any claim that concerns, arises out of, or relates to any of the facts, actions, claims, allegations, events, transactions, occurrences, courses of conduct, representations, omissions, circumstances, or other matters alleged or referred to, or which could have been alleged or referred to in the
6

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 7 of 11
Actions, with respect to the Released Parties. Other than existing clients with whom Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and/or Class
Counsel currently have an engagement letter, Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Class Counsel agree not to initiate any communication for the purpose of seeking to represent any other Settlement Class Member against any Released Party, with regard to any matter which is the subject of the first paragraph immediately above, who has timely opted out of the Settlement.
14. Paragraph 19 of this Order covers, without limitation, any and all claims for attorneys’ fees and expenses, and any costs or disbursements incurred by Class Counsel or other plaintiffs’ counsel representing Plaintiffs or Class Members in this action, in connection with or related in any manner to the prosecution of this action as against the Released Parties ONLY, the settlement of this action as against the Released Parties ONLY, the administration of such settlement as against the Released Parties ONLY, and/or the Released Claims as to the Released Parties ONLY, except to the extent otherwise specified in this Order and/or the MSA.
15. Any Settlement Class Member who did not submit a timely request to exclude themselves from the Settlement or did not otherwise comply with opt-out procedures approved by the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order shall be a Settlement Class Member and shall be bound by the terms of the MSA and this Final Order and Judgment.
Any Settlement Class Member who did not submit a timely and properly completed Proof of Claim Form shall also be a Settlement Class Member and shall be bound by the terms of the MSA and this Final Order and Judgment, and shall have his or her claim
7

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 8 of 11
against the Released Parties ONLY extinguished with prejudice, but shall not be eligible to participate in the Cash Settlement Fund.
16. Any settlement Class Member who (a) properly and timely opted out pursuant to the provisions set forth in the MSA, the Mailed Notice, the Published Notice, and the Proof of Claim Form, and (b) intends to pursue a separate claim against the Released Parties, shall be required to participate in confidential non-binding mediation with the Powell Defendants, at the Opt-Out Plaintiff’s expense.
17. Nothing in this Final Order and Judgment shall preclude any action to enforce the terms of the MSA; nor shall anything in this Final Order and Judgment preclude Plaintiffs or Class Members from participating in the Allocation Appeal process described in the MSA, if they are entitled to do so under the terms of the MSA.
18. On or before forty-five (45) days after the entry of this Final Order and Judgment, Class Counsel shall file with the Court any Motions to Settle or Compromise a Minor’s Wrongful Death and/or Survival Action (as may be appropriate) for all of those Settlement Class Members who have not reached the age of majority on or before May 31, 2014 and who will also receive monetary relief from the Cash Settlement Fund and/or the estates of any Class Members.
19. Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 1707) is GRANTED.
a. Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class of record herein are hereby awarded combined common benefit attorneys’ fees, disbursements, and costs in the amount of $1,456,357.91.
8

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 9 of 11
b. All costs, expenses, and disbursements shall be paid to each of the firms that incurred said costs, expenses, and disbursements first, before the distribution of attorneys’ fees. Thereafter, the remainder shall be considered the fee. Payment of additional costs incurred and submitted by Co-Lead Counsel in the administration of the settlement out of the $712,500.00 Holdback Fund will be permitted upon later application.
c. The combined total of the attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of disbursements of expenses, totaling $1,456,357.91, plus interest from date the Escrow Account was funded, covers any and all claims for attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by any and all counsel for common benefit of Plaintiffs and the Class in connection with the Settlement and the administration of such Settlement.
d. The reimbursement of expenses shall be deposited by the Escrow Agent into an account maintained by Co-Lead Counsel within five (5) business days after entry of this Final Order and Judgment and then dispersed to the law firms in the amount each firm incurred and submitted.
e. The attorneys’ fees shall remain in the original escrow account and shall be dispersed when the Class Members are paid their awards. The award of common benefit attorneys’ fees shall be allocated among Plaintiffs’ counsel in a fashion which, in the opinion and discretion of Co-Lead Counsel, fairly compensates Plaintiffs’ counsel for their respective contributions in the prosecution of the Actions, Individual Actions and Class Actions.
20. The Parties are hereby authorized, without needing further approval from the Court, to agree to and adopt such amendments to, and modifications and expansions of,
9

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 10 of 11
the MSA as are not materially inconsistent with this Order and do not unreasonably limit the rights of Plaintiffs and/or Class Members under the MSA.
21. The Court has jurisdiction to enter this Final Order and Judgment. Without in any way affecting the finality of this Final Order and Judgment, the Court expressly retains original and exclusive jurisdiction as to all matters relating to the administration, consummation, enforcement and interpretation of the MSA and of this Final Order and Judgment, and for any other necessary purpose, including, without limitation:
a. Enforcing the terms and conditions of the MSA and resolving any disputes, claims or causes of action that, in whole or in part, are related to or arise out of the MSA, this Final Order and Judgment (including, without limitation, determining whether a person or entity is or is not a Class Member, and enforcing the Bar Order that is a part of this Final Order and Judgment) and determining whether claims or causes of action allegedly related to this case are or are not barred by this Final Order and Judgment;
b. Entering such additional orders as may be necessary or appropriate to protect or effectuate this Final Order and Judgment, or to ensure the fair and orderly administration of the Settlement; and
c. Entering any other necessary or appropriate orders to protect and effectuate the Court's retention of continuing jurisdiction; provided however, nothing in this paragraph is intended to restrict the ability of the parties to exercise their rights under the MSA that are not in conflict with this Final Order and Judgment.
22. Neither this Final Order and Judgment, nor the MSA, nor any other document referred to herein or therein, nor any action taken to carry out this Final Order and Judgment
10

Case 3:09-cv-00286-ARC Document 1718 Filed 12/23/15 Page 11 of 11
is, may be construed as, or may be used as an admission or concession by or against the Released Parties of the validity of any claim or any actual or potential fault, wrongdoing or liability whatsoever. Entering into or carrying out the MSA, and any negotiations or proceedings relating to it, shall not in any event be construed as, or deemed evidence of, an admission or concession as to the Released Parties’ denials or defenses, and shall not be offered or received in evidence in any action or proceeding against any party to the MSA in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal for any purpose whatsoever, except as evidence of the Settlement or to enforce the provisions of this Final Order and Judgment and the MSA; provided however, this Final Order and Judgment and the MSA may be filed in any action against or by Released Parties (as defined in the MSA) to support a defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release, waiver, good-faith settlement, judgment bar or reduction, full faith and credit, or any other theory of claim preclusion, issue preclusion or similar defense or counterclaim to the extent allowed by law.
23. All of the Actions, Individual Actions, and putative Class Actions encompassed in this proceeding, and all claims asserted therein or otherwise presented thereby, are dismissed on the merits and with prejudice as against the Powell Defendants ONLY, without fees or costs to any party except as otherwise provided in the MSA or this Final Order and Judgment.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo A. Richard Caputo United States District Judge
11

 
 Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 1 of 41
ATYADM,CLASS ACTION,CLOSED,CONSOLIDATED,MM,SCR
United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania (Scranton) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:09−cv−00357−ARC

H.T. et al v. Ciavarella et al Assigned to: Honorable A. Richard Caputo Related Case: 3:09−cv−00286−ARC Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff H.T. through and with her next friend and mother, L.T.
Plaintiff B.W. through and with his next friend and father, W.W.

Date Filed: 02/26/2009 Date Terminated: 05/13/2009 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Daniel Segal Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudlin One Logan Square 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103−6933 215−496−7003 Email: dsegal@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado Juvenile Law Center 1315 Walnut Street, 4th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−625−0551 Email: lrosado@jlc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick Juvenile Law Center 1315 Walnut Street, 4th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−625−0551 Email: mlevick@jlc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley Segal Pudlin & Schiller One Logan Square 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−496−7374 Email: rsantoro@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 2 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kevin Williamson

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Mishanski

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
M.Y. through and with her next friends and parents, M.B.Y. and J.Y.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 3 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
P.S. through and with his next friend and mother, A.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
S.S. through and with his next friend and mother, R.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jessica Van Reeth

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 4 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jack Van Reeth

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
M.K. through and with his next friend and father J.F.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Charles Balasavage, JR.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 5 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Charles Balasavage

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joanne Balasavage

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jesse Balliet

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 6 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sarah Myers

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Frank Weber

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Florence Myers

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 7 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steve Brannigan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lisa Brannigan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeffrey Bruno

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 8 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jay Bruno

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Scott Bukoski

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
D.C. through and with his next friend and mother, R.C.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 9 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ruth Davis

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carol Fronczek

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff William Dixon

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 10 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.G. through and with his next friend and mother M.O.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brian Gyle

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wayne Gyle

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 11 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tracey Harvey

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
D.J. through and with his next friend and mother, S.J.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Kearns

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 12 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jessica Thurston

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Thurston

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kurt Kruger

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 13 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.M.K. through and with his next friend and mother B.T.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward Kenzakoski, III

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.K. through and with his next friend and father, A.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 14 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
B.L. through and with his next friend and father M.L.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anthony Millan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Damon Millan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 15 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cindy Millan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Paul Morgan, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steven Palchanis, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 16 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steven Palchanis, Sr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jamie Quinn

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
K.R. through and with his next friend and mother, T.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 17 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Rowlands

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mary Seville

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael S. Scarlato

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 18 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael P. Scarlato

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tina Scarlato

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
A.S. through and with his next friend and father G.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 19 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Swartley

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Vitali

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
M.M.W. through and with her next friend and guardian J.C.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 20 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Ashford, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Donna Ashford

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Shane Bly

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 21 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
G.B. through and with his next friends and parents, J.B. and P.P.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daryl Charles

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Liza Charles

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 22 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff William Clarke

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Glenn Cooper

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Karen Cooper

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 23 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Copeland, II

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Donna Copeland

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Copeland

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 24 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chad Derhammer

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
A.D. through and with her mother and next friend J.E.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Dougherty

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 25 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
E.E. through and with their mother and next friend M.F.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
K.E. through and with their mother and next friend H.E.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.E. through and with their mother and next friend

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 26 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
A.F. through and with their mother and next friend, M.F.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.F. through and with their mother and next friend M.F.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.D.F. through and with his next friend and mother M.W.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 27 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.F. through and with his next friend and mother A.I.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Alexandra Fahey

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.H. through and with her next friend and mother, J.M.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 28 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Haines

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Haines

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward Kane, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 29 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brianna Kee

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Kopetchny

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Magee Mott

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 30 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
G.M. through and with his next friend and mother F.M.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Krystal Pope

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lisa Scarbrough

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 31 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laurie Scarbrough

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Marshond Seward

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.S. through and with his next friend and mother, C.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 32 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chad Uca

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
W.U. through and with his next friend and mother D.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
B.R.W. through and with his next friends and partents, C.W. and S.W., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 33 of 41

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff All Plaintiffs

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr.
Defendant Michael T. Conahan
Defendant Robert J. Powell Defendant Robert Mericle

represented by Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. 585 Rutter Ave. Kingston, PA 18704 PRO SE
represented by Philip Gelso Law Offices of Philip Gelso 63 Pierce Street Kingston, PA 18704 570−763−0006 Email: pgelso@gelsolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Tanchyk Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103−2921 215.963.5847 Email: atanchyk@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Kraeutler

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 34 of 41

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−963−4840 Email: ekraeutler@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly D. Borland Borland & Borland 69 Public Square 11th Floor Wilkes−Barre, PA 18701 570−822−3311 Email: kborland@borlandandborland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J.D. Hogan Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−963−4681 Email: mjdhogan@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathan J. Andrisani Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−963−5362 Email: nathan.andrisani@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth S. Borland Borland & Borland, L.L.P. 69 Public Square Suite 1100 Wilkes−Barre, PA 18701 570−822−3311 Email: rborland@borlandandborland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Gregory Zappala

represented by Bernard M Schneider Brucker Schneider & Porter 300 Weyman Road Suite 320 Pittsburgh, PA 15236 412−881−6620 Email: bmschn@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Vipond , III Buchanan Ingersoll 409 North Second Street Suite 500 Harrisburg, PA 17101−1357 717−233−7444 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 35 of 41

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Cindy Ciavarella

represented by Edward P. McNelis McNelis Law 19 East Broad Street Hazleton, PA 18201 570−455−6335 Fax: 570−454−3651 Email: nedmcnelis@mcnelislaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen D. Rhoades Law Offices of Edward McNeels 19 East Broad St Hazleton, PA 18201 570−455−6335 Fax: 4543651 Email: rhoadeslegal@hotmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Barbara Conahan

represented by Edward P. McNelis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen D. Rhoades (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Mericle Constructions, Inc.

represented by Alison Tanchyk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Kraeutler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly D. Borland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J.D. Hogan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathan J. Andrisani (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth S. Borland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 36 of 41

Defendant Mid−Alantic Youth Services
Defendant PA Child Care, LLC
Defendant Western PA Child Care, LLC
Defendant Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC
Defendant Vision Holdings, LLC Defendant Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, Inc. Defendant Luzerne County

represented by Bernard M Schneider (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Vipond , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bernard M Schneider (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Vipond , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bernard M Schneider (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Vipond , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Philip Gelso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Philip Gelso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah H. Simon Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski Union Meeting Corporate Center V 925 Harvest Dr Suite 3010 Blue Bell, PA 19422 215−977−1000 Email: dhs@elliottgreenleaf.com

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 37 of 41
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Dean Elliott Greenleaf & Dean 201 Penn Avenue Suite 202 Scranton, PA 18503 570−346−7569 Email: jgd@elliottgreenleaf.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy T. Myers Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski Union Meeting Corporate Center V. 925 Harvest Drive Blue Bell, PA 19422 (215) 977−1000 Email: ttm@elliottgreenleaf.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/26/2009
02/26/2009 02/27/2009 02/27/2009 03/09/2009 03/10/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert J. Powell, Robert Mericle, Gregory Zappala, Cindy Ciavarella, Barbara Conahan, Mericle Constructions, Inc., Mid−Alantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, Inc. ( Filing fee $350, Receipt Number 1508555), filed by William Dixon, J.G., Brian Gyle, Wayne Gyle, Tracey Harvey, D.J., Barbara Kearns, Jessica Thurston, Barbara Thurston, Kurt Kruger, Susan Mishanski, J.M.K., Edward Kenzakoski, III, J.K., B.L., Anthony Millan, Damon Millan, Cindy Millan, Paul Morgan, Jr, Steven Palchanis, Jr, Steven Palchanis, Sr, M.Y., Jamie Quinn, K.R., David Rowlands, Mary Seville, Michael S. Scarlato, H.T., Michael P. Scarlato, Tina Scarlato, A.S., James Swartley, Michael Vitali, P.S., M.M.W., John Ashford, Jr, Donna Ashford, Shane Bly, G.B., Daryl Charles, Liza Charles, William Clarke, Glenn Cooper, Karen Cooper, S.S., Richard Copeland, II, Donna Copeland, Richard Copeland, Chad Derhammer, A.D., Matthew Dougherty, E.E., K.E., L.E., A.F., Jessica Van Reeth, L.F., J.D.F., J.F., Alexandra Fahey, L.H., Michael Haines, Barbara Haines, Edward Kane, Jr, Brianna Kee, Matthew Kopetchny, Jack Van Reeth, Magee Mott, G.M., Krystal Pope, Lisa Scarbrough, Laurie Scarbrough, Marshond Seward, J.S., Chad Uca, W.U., B.R.W., M.K., Charles Balasavage, JR, Charles Balasavage, Joanne Balasavage, Jesse Balliet, Sarah Myers, B.W., Frank Weber, Florence Myers, Steve Brannigan, Lisa Brannigan, Jeffrey Bruno, Jay Bruno, Scott Bukoski, D.C., Ruth Davis, Carol Fronczek, Kevin Williamson. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(cw, ) (Entered: 02/26/2009)
Summons Issued as to Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert J. Powell, Robert Mericle, Gregory Zappala, Cindy Ciavarella, Barbara Conahan, Mericle Constructions, Inc., Mid−Alantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, Inc. and provided to Attorney Rosado for service on Defendant(s). (cw, ) (Entered: 02/26/2009)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Lourdes M. Rosado. (jc) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Marsha L. Levick. (jc) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
2 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Lourdes M. Rosado on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Lourdes M. Rosado is seeking special admission. Filing Fee: 25.00 Receipt Number: 333009287 (bg, ) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
3 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Lourdes M. Rosado, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/10/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/10/2009)

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03/11/2009 03/12/2009 03/19/2009
03/23/2009
03/23/2009
03/23/2009
03/23/2009
03/26/2009 03/26/2009 03/26/2009 03/26/2009 03/31/2009 03/31/2009
04/02/2009 04/02/2009 04/02/2009 04/02/2009

4 NOTICE of Appearance by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
5 LETTER ORDER Re: Case Assignment and Procedures. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/12/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
Summons Reissued as to Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert J. Powell, Robert Mericle, Gregory Zappala, Cindy Ciavarella, Barbara Conahan, Mericle Constructions, Inc., Mid−Alantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Vision Holdings, LLC, Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, Inc. Per phone call from Attorney Lordes Rosado summons reissued due to incorrect addresses placed on summons. (cw, ) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
6 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. Attorney Nathan J. Andrisani, Esquire is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001530029.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
7 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. Attorney Matthew J.D. Hogan is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001530068.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
8 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. Attorney Alison Tanchyk Dante is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001530072.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
9 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. Attorney Eric Kraeutler is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001530078.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
10 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Nathan J. Andrisani, Esq. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/26/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
11 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Matthew J.D. Hogan, Esq. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/26/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
12 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Eric Kraeutler, Esq. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/26/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
13 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Alison Tanchyk Dante, Esq. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/26/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
14 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff Complaint by Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(bg, ) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
15 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Bernard M Schneider on behalf of Gregory Zappala, Mid−Alantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC Attorney Bernard Schneider is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001538342.. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Alison T. Dante on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. (Dante, Alison) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Nathan J. Andrisani on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. (Andrisani, Nathan) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
18 STIPULATION Stipulation for Extension of Time for Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc., to Answer or Otherwise Plead by Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew J.D. Hogan on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 04/02/2009)

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04/02/2009 04/02/2009 04/04/2009 04/06/2009
04/06/2009
04/06/2009
04/08/2009 04/08/2009 04/08/2009 04/08/2009 04/09/2009 04/09/2009
04/09/2009 04/09/2009 04/09/2009 04/14/2009 04/16/2009 04/17/2009 04/20/2009

20 NOTICE of Appearance by Eric Kraeutler on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc. (Kraeutler, Eric) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
21 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Bernard M. Schneider, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/2/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by Philip Gelso on behalf of Michael T. Conahan, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, Inc. (Gelso, Philip) (Entered: 04/04/2009)
23 STIPULATION for Extension of Time To Answer, File Motions Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12 or Otherwise Plead by Michael T. Conahan, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Stipulated Order)(Gelso, Philip) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
33 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr served on 3/10/2009, answer due 3/30/2009; Michael T. Conahan served on 3/10/2009, answer due 3/30/2009; Cindy Ciavarella served on 3/10/2009, answer due 3/30/2009; Barbara Conahan served on 3/10/2009, answer due 3/30/2009; Beverage Marketing of Pennsylvania, Inc. served on 3/10/2009, answer due 3/30/2009. (Rosado, Lourdes) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 04/08/2009)
34 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Robert J. Powell served on 3/11/2009, answer due 3/31/2009; Mid−Alantic Youth Services served on 3/11/2009, answer due 3/31/2009; PA Child Care, LLC served on 3/11/2009, answer due 3/31/2009; Western PA Child Care, LLC served on 3/11/2009, answer due 3/31/2009. (Rosado, Lourdes) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 04/08/2009)
Documents #'s 24 − 32 "Affidavit of Service" deleted, re−filed correctly by attorney as Documents #33 and #34 "Summons Returned Executed". (ga, ) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
35 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint,,,,,, by Mid−Alantic Youth Services.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
36 First MOTION for Extension of Time to by PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
37 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint,,,,,, by Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
38 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr re 14 MOTION to Dismiss. (bg, ) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
39 SCHEDULING ORDER: ORDERED that Counsel for all parties shall appear for an initial conference on FRIDAY, MAY 8, 2009 at 10:00 AM in Chambers, Wilkes Barre. See Order for additional details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/9/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
40 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by All Plaintiffs. Mericle Constructions, Inc. waiver sent on 4/6/2009, answer due 6/5/2009. (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
41 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by All Plaintiffs. Robert Mericle waiver sent on 3/11/2009, answer due 5/11/2009. (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
42 NOTICE of Appearance by Ruth S. Borland on behalf of Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc.. (Borland, Ruth) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
43 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen D. Rhoades on behalf of Barbara Conahan (Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 04/14/2009)
44 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Marsha L. Levick on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Marsha L. Levick is seeking special admission. Filing Fee: 25.00 Receipt Number: 333009734. (bg, ) (Entered: 04/16/2009)
45 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Marsha L. Levick, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/17/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/17/2009)
46 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by All Plaintiffs. Gregory Zappala waiver sent on 4/15/2009, answer due 6/15/2009. (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/20/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 40 of 41

04/21/2009 04/21/2009 04/21/2009 04/22/2009 04/23/2009 05/03/2009
05/04/2009 05/04/2009 05/04/2009 05/07/2009 05/13/2009 05/13/2009 01/27/2011 04/29/2011 12/20/2011 01/04/2013

47 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen D. Rhoades on behalf of Cindy Ciavarella (Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 04/21/2009)
48 NOTICE of Appearance by Edward P. McNelis on behalf of Cindy Ciavarella, Barbara Conahan (McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 04/21/2009)
49 NOTICE of Appearance by Rebecca L. Santoro on behalf of all plaintiffs (Santoro, Rebecca) (Entered: 04/21/2009)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Edward P. McNelis. (jc) (Entered: 04/22/2009)
50 AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibits A and B to amended complaint, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
51 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN by William Dixon, J.G., Brian Gyle, Wayne Gyle, Tracey Harvey, D.J., Barbara Kearns, Jessica Thurston, Barbara Thurston, Kurt Kruger, Susan Mishanski, J.M.K., Edward Kenzakoski, III, J.K., B.L., Anthony Millan, Damon Millan, Cindy Millan, Paul Morgan, Jr, Steven Palchanis, Jr, Steven Palchanis, Sr, M.Y., Jamie Quinn, K.R., David Rowlands, Mary Seville, Michael S. Scarlato, H.T., Michael P. Scarlato, Tina Scarlato, A.S., James Swartley, Michael Vitali, P.S., M.M.W., John Ashford, Jr, Donna Ashford, Shane Bly, G.B., Daryl Charles, Liza Charles, William Clarke, Glenn Cooper, Karen Cooper, S.S., Richard Copeland, II, Donna Copeland, Richard Copeland, Chad Derhammer, A.D., Matthew Dougherty, E.E., K.E., L.E., A.F., Jessica Van Reeth, L.F., J.D.F., J.F., Alexandra Fahey, L.H., Michael Haines, Barbara Haines, Edward Kane, Jr, Brianna Kee, Matthew Kopetchny, Jack Van Reeth, Magee Mott, G.M., Krystal Pope, Lisa Scarbrough, Laurie Scarbrough, Marshond Seward, J.S., Chad Uca, W.U., B.R.W., M.K., Charles Balasavage, JR, Charles Balasavage, All Plaintiffs, Joanne Balasavage, Jesse Balliet, Sarah Myers, B.W., Frank Weber, Florence Myers, Steve Brannigan, Lisa Brannigan, Jeffrey Bruno, Jay Bruno, Scott Bukoski, D.C., Ruth Davis, Carol Fronczek, Kevin Williamson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A −− Documents That May Be Requested or Subpoenaed, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Santoro, Rebecca) (Entered: 05/03/2009)
52 NOTICE of Appearance by Deborah Hart Simon on behalf of Luzerne County. (Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
53 NOTICE of Appearance by John G. Dean on behalf of Luzerne County. (Dean, John) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
54 NOTICE of Appearance by Timothy T. Myers on behalf of Luzerne County. (Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
55 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by All Plaintiffs. Luzerne County waiver sent on 4/27/2009, answer due 6/26/2009. (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
57 ORDER finding as moot 14 Motion to Dismiss. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is moot, and is therefore DENIED without prejudice. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/13/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/13/2009)
58 ORDER DISMISSING CASE: Case Consolidated to 09−286; Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/13/09. (kn, ) (Entered: 05/14/2009)
59 ORDER instructing Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC to file any objections they may have to the Confidentiality Order by 1/28/2011.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/27/2011. (bg, ) (Entered: 01/27/2011)
60 ANSWER to 50 Amended Complaint by Robert Mericle, Mericle Constructions, Inc..(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Doc. 61 DELETED. Please see case 09−cv−286 for Order (bg, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
61 Scheduling ORDER consolidating cases for discovery purposes only. Please see Order for details & deadlines.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/2/2013. (bg)

Case: 3:09-cv-357 As of: 06/29/2018 04:29 PM EDT 41 of 41

01/09/2013

(Entered: 01/04/2013)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Hogan had failed, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 61 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info. (ep) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

 
 Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
	  
737 F.Supp.2d 239 United States District Court,
M.D. Pennsylvania.
Raul CLARK, Bruce Clark, and Iraida Clark, Plaintiffs, v.
Michael T. CONAHAN, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:09–CV–2535. | Aug. 25, 2010.
Synopsis Background: Juvenile and his parents brought action against juvenile court judges, private attorney, juvenile probation staff, owner of construction company, property owners, and others, alleging that, in connection with scheme to divert juvenile offenders to the newly constructed privately-owned juvenile detention facilities in return for kickbacks, defendants violated juvenile’s constitutional rights, and engaged in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, and alleging false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Defendants moved to dismiss.
Holdings: The District Court, A. Richard Caputo, J., held that:
[1] expungement of juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency was not favorable termination under Heck v. Humphrey;
[2] Pennsylvania Supreme Court order vacating juvenile’s adjudications of probation violations constituted a favorable termination of those adjudications;
[3] juvenile lacked standing to assert RICO action;
[4] judge was entitled to absolute immunity for alleged conduct of ordering juveniles to be placed in new privately-owned juvenile detention facilities as part of a scheme;
[5] judge was not entitled to immunity for his alleged nonjudicial conduct;
[6] judge was not entitled to legislative immunity for budgetary actions he took in his role as president judge;

and
[7] allegations did not state claim against judges’ wives.
Motions granted in part, and denied in part.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*248 Bridget E. Montgomery, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, David J. Schertz, Harrisburg, PA, Michael A. Fazio, Michael O’Mullan, Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP, Morristown, NJ, for Plaintiffs.
Alison T. Dante, Eric Kraeutler, Joseph B.G. Fay, Matthew J.D. Hogan, Nathan J. Andrisani, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, *249 Jessica Richman Birk, Mark B. Sheppard, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Bernard M. Schneider, Brucker Schneider & Porter, William G. Brucker, Pittsburgh, PA, Kimberly D. Borland, Borland & Borland, Wilkes–Barre, PA, Stephen D. Rhoades, Edward P. McNelis, Law Offices of Edward McNeels, Hazleton, PA, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
Presently before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss of Defendants Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (Doc. 24), Michael T. Conahan (Doc. 28), Sandra Brulo (Doc. 59), Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (Doc. 68), PA Child Care, LLC (“PACC”) (Doc. 70), Robert J. Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC (Doc. 72), and Barbara Conahan and Cindy Ciavarella (Doc. 78). For the various reasons discussed more fully below the motions of Mr. Conahan, Mr. Ciavarella, Ms. Brulo, Mr. Mericle, Mericle Construction, PACC, Powell, and Vision will be granted in part and denied in part, and the motion of Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella will be granted.
BACKGROUND
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
I. GENERAL FACTS The facts alleged in the Complaint are as follows. Defendants Ciavarella and Conahan both served as judges for the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County. (Compl. ¶ 42.) Conahan served as president judge from January 2002 to June 2007, and Ciavarella served as president judge from June 2007 to January 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 43, 46.) Defendant Ciavarella oversaw juvenile matters in his role as judge between 2000 and 2007. (Compl. ¶ 45.)
In approximately June 2000, Ciavarella met with Defendant Powell, a local attorney, regarding Mr. Powell’s desire to construct a new privately-owned juvenile detention facility in Luzerne County. (Compl. ¶ 47.) Ciavarella introduced Powell to Defendant Mericle, the owner of a local construction company; Mericle and his company, Mericle Construction, Inc. agreed to build a facility on land that Powell and his partner, Mr. Gregory Zappala, would later acquire. (Compl. ¶¶ 49–50.) Although the pre-existing publicly-owned juvenile detention facility served the needs of Luzerne County, Conahan and Ciavarella, in exchange for kickbacks from Defendants Powell, Powell Law Firm, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Zappala, Vision Holdings, PACC and Western PA Child Care (“WPACC”), set out to demonstrate the need for a new facility by increasing the number of juveniles who were sentenced to custodial detention. (Compl. ¶¶ 54–57.)
In order to assure a sufficiently high number of juveniles were sentenced to custodial detention, Ciavarella and Conahan regularly denied juveniles their constitutional rights by failing to allow them an impartial tribunal because of the judges’ conflicts of interest, denying juveniles their right to counsel, and pressuring juveniles to take guilty pleas without advising them of their rights and ensuring a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 59–62.) Conahan and Ciavarella also imposed draconian sentences “for hundreds of first-time offenders of (sic) youthful indiscretions.” (Compl. ¶ 64.) These actions rendered the Luzerne County juvenile detention facility overcrowded and inadequate. (Compl. ¶ 68.)
On January 29, 2002, Conahan, as president judge, signed a Placement Guaranty Agreement with PACC that agreed to house juvenile offenders in the PACC facility *250 and provide PACC an annual fee of $1,314,000.00 from Luzerne County. (Compl. ¶¶ 70–71.) By December 2002, Conahan had removed all funding from the publiclyowned facility, functionally closing that facility, and

requiring all juveniles to be transferred to other facilities, including PACC. (Compl. ¶ 77.) Due to the success of PACC, Powell and Zappala constructed another juvenile detention center, WPACC, in western Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 80.)
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Brulo, who was deputy director of forensic programs at the Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department (“Juvenile Probation”), and other members of the Juvenile Probation staff actively participated in this scheme by routinely altering their recommendations, at the behest of Conahan and Ciavarella, to state that juvenile offenders should be placed in detention facilities, falsified drug tests, and concocted “bogus” probation violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 83– 87.) In return for their cooperation, Brulo and the other members of the Juvenile Probation staff involved in this plan received kickbacks from Conahan and Ciavarella. (Compl. ¶ 86.)
Plaintiffs allege that Powell, Zappala, Mericle, PACC and WPACC paid approximately $2.6 million dollars to Conahan and Ciavarella. (Compl. ¶ 172.) In order to conceal the money received for their participation in this scheme, Conahan and Ciavarella funneled the money, via wire transfer and check, through various shell corporations and bank accounts. (Compl. ¶¶ 180–211.) One of these corporations, Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC (“Pinnacle”), is alleged to have been owned and operated by Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, but controlled by Mr. Conahan and Mr. Ciavarella. (Compl. ¶¶ 13–15, 197, 199.) Conahan and Ciavarella also used their positions to assist PACC and WPACC in securing juvenile placement agreements with Luzerne County worth approximately $58 million dollars. (Compl. ¶ 176.) This scheme deprived the citizens of Luzerne County and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of their right to the honest services of Conahan and Ciavarella, and constituted wire and wire and mail fraud. (Compl. ¶ 210.)
II. FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFFS In October 2002, Plaintiff Raul Clark was arrested and charged with violation of his town’s 10:00 P.M. curfew and possession of drug paraphernalia; at the time of the arrest, Raul was a fourteen-year-old high school freshman. (Compl. ¶¶ 103, 109.) On November 4, 2002, Raul appeared before Ciavarella, at which time Ciavarella falsely stated that Raul was charged with being intoxicated and possession of marijuana. (Compl. ¶¶ 112, 116.) Raul was represented by a public defender at this
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
hearing. (Compl. ¶ 113.) Without providing Raul with an opportunity to enter a plea or explaining that Raul had a right to trial and the consequences of waiving that right, Ciavarella asked Raul if he “did it,” before adjudicating Raul delinquent. (Compl. ¶¶ 118–121.) Ciavarella then asked Raul how many birds he saw on the window outside the courtroom; when Raul answered “six,” Ciavarella sentenced Raul to six months of custodial detention. (Compl. ¶¶ 122–124.)
Raul spent several weeks in the Luzerne County facility before it closed, at which time Ciavarella transferred Raul to the Lackawanna County juvenile detention facility. (Compl. ¶¶ 131–134.) On December 16, 2002, after spending one week at the Lackawanna County facility, Raul again appeared before then-Judge Ciavarella and was summarily transferred to the Adelphoi Treatment Facility, which was *251 hundreds of miles from Raul’s parents’ home. (Compl. ¶¶ 137–141.) After six weeks at Adelphoi, Raul was brought before Ciavarella again; Raul was transferred to Clearbrook Lodge, where he spent three (3) months before being released and placed on probation in May 2003. (Compl. ¶¶ 145–157.) Raul was not represented by counsel at any of the hearings regarding his transfer between facilities. (Compl. ¶¶ 133, 139, 148, 156.)
Thereafter, Raul missed his 8:00 P.M. curfew and was summarily ordered by Ciavarella to spend three (3) days in PACC for violation of his probation. (Compl. ¶¶ 158– 159.) In 2004, Raul’s probation officer, Officer Bliche, took a urine sample from Raul. (Compl. ¶ 161.) Raul was later advised that he had failed the test and that PCP and methamphetamine had been found in his urine sample; Plaintiffs allege that Raul did not ingest those drugs and that Juvenile Probation switched urine samples and/or falsely reported test findings in order to ensure Raul’s detention. (Compl. ¶¶ 163–166.) Defendant Ciavarella sent Raul to PACC for violating his probation by failing the drug test. (Compl. ¶ 165.) Between 2002 and 2005, Plaintiffs Bruce and Iraida Clark, Raul’s parents, paid three thousand, eight hundred thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents ($3,837.50) to Luzerne County for Raul’s incarceration and probation, including having Mrs. Clark’s wages and unemployment benefits garnished. (Compl. ¶¶ 167–168.) Plaintiffs allege that “Raul has suffered great emotional distress and financial harm as a result of the actions of the Defendants.” (Compl. ¶ 170.)
On October 27, 2009, Raul’s November 4, 2002 disposition was expunged pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9123(a)(3), which provides for expungement of juvenile

records if the juvenile has not been convicted of a felony, misdemeanor or adjudicated delinquent for five (5) years. (Doc. 88, Ex. C.) On October 29, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Third Interim Report and Recommendations of Special Master Judge Arthur E. Grim; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that all juvenile adjudications and consent decrees entered by Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 31, 2008 were tainted, and, therefore, would be vacated. (Doc. 88, Ex. D.)
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 24, 2009, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint asserted causes of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution against Mr. Conahan, Mr. Ciavarella, Juvenile Probation, and Ms. Brulo (Count I), violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution against Juvenile Probation (Count II), violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution against Powell, PACC, WPACC, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Zappala, Pinnacle, Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Mid–Atlantic Youth Services Corp. (“MAYS”), and Powell Law Group (Count III), violation of civil RICO provisions against all defendants (Count IV), conspiracy to violate RICO against Conahan, Ciavarella, Powell, Mericle, Mericle Construction, PACC, WPACC, Zappala, Pinnacle, Mrs. Conahan, Mrs. Ciavarella, Beverage, MAYS, Powell Law Group and John Doe Defendants 1–10 (Count V), false imprisonment against all defendants (Count VI), and intentional *252 infliction of emotional distress against all defendants (Count VII).
Defendants Zappala, WPACC, MAYS, and Juvenile Probation were voluntarily dismissed from this action. (Docs. 9, 52.) On May 3, 2010, Pinnacle filed an Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Doc. 65.) Motions to dismiss were filed by Defendants Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (Doc. 24), Michael T. Conahan (Doc. 28), Sandra Brulo (Doc. 59), Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (Doc. 68), PA Child Care, LLC (“PACC”) (Doc. 70), Robert J. Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC (Doc. 72), and Barbara Conahan and Cindy Ciavarella (Doc. 78).
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
These motions have been fully briefed and are currently ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
[1] [2] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “ ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ ” each necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring a complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2007).
[3] [4] [5] In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). The Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n. 13 (3d Cir.1998), or credit a complaint’s “ ‘bald assertions’ ” or “ ‘legal conclusions,’ ” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
[6] [7] When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that *253 a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000).
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the specific motions by various defendants, this Court must first address two jurisdictional concerns that loom over the entirety of this case. Once those issues have been disposed of, the Court will discuss the pending motions.
I. HECK v. HUMPHREY [8] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a plaintiff cannot bring a cognizable claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)). Thus, this Court must first determine whether Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Raul’s conviction or sentence, and then determine whether Raul’s conviction or sentence has been invalidated.
A. Necessarily Implies Invalidity [9] As to Plaintiffs’ Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, although the precise contours of those claims are unclear at this stage of the proceeding, those claims necessarily will imply the invalidity of the underlying juvenile conviction and sentences. Essentially, Plaintiffs are claiming that Defendants’ failure to ensure that Raul was provided with adequate procedural
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
safeguards led to his being wrongfully adjudicated delinquent and then later adjudicated as being in violation of his probation. These procedural defects, if established, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Ciavarella’s adjudication of delinquency. See, e.g., Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646–48, 117 S.Ct. 1584.
[10] To the extent that Plaintiffs are challenging the conditions of Raul’s confinement pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, such as being put in a six-by-six cell or being confined to his cell for twenty-three hours per day (Compl. ¶¶ 130, 136), these claims do not call into question the validity of the underlying juvenile proceedings. Therefore, they do not require a favorable termination to proceed. See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 149–50 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that favorable termination rule does not apply where plaintiff challenges conditions, rather than fact or duration, of confinement).
B. Favorable Termination In this case, there are several instances where Raul was adjudicated delinquent and/or sentenced for violation of probation. First, there was the original hearing in which Raul was adjudicated delinquent on November 4, 2002. This adjudication was ultimately expunged on October 27, 2009, because Raul had gone five (5) years with being convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or adjudication of delinquency, as per Pennsylvania statute. Next, there were the two probation violations that occurred some time after 2003 that resulted in Ciavarella ordering Raul to be detained at PACC. These decisions regarding probation violations were later vacated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when, on October 29, 2009, it ordered that all juvenile adjudications made by Ciavarella between 2003 and 2008 were tainted and should be vacated. As will be discussed below, these different dispositions lead this Court to come to different conclusions regarding favorable termination.
*254 1. October 27, 2009 Expungement
In Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.2005), the plaintiff, while videotaping his partner’s inflammatory preaching on a university campus, was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and failure of disorderly persons to disperse; he then entered the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”)

program, which permits expungement of the criminal record after successful completion of a probationary term. After completing this probationary period and having his record expunged, Plaintiff brought a § 1983 action claiming that the arresting officers and various university administrators had violated his First Amendment rights. Gilles, 427 F.3d at 208–09.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that completion of the ARD program was not a favorable termination under Heck, reasoning that the ARD program is a courtsupervised compromise that “imposes several burdens upon the criminal defendant not consistent with innocence,” including a probationary period during which a violation of the program’s terms may result in prosecution. Id. at 211–212. Therefore, participation in the ARD program barred plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 212.
[11] Similarly, expungement of a juvenile’s record pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9123(a)(3), is a statutorily created compromise where a juvenile will not be hounded by youthful indiscretions if he or she does not commit any crimes or delinquent acts for five years following final discharge. This is a burden that is not consistent with innocence of the underlying crimes, but rather a “period of observation” to ensure that the juvenile is not a repeat offender and, therefore, should not be eternally haunted by his or her juvenile record. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211 (quoting Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 194 (2d Cir.1980)). In fact, such expungement does not indicate anything regarding the juvenile’s culpability vis a vis the underlying delinquent acts. Therefore, expungement pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9123(a)(3) is not a favorable termination for purposes of Heck. As such, the expungement of the acts relating to Raul’s November, 4, 2002 adjudication have not been favorably terminated, and he cannot recover any claims relating to actions taken arising from that hearing.
2. October 29, 2009 Expungement
[12] Defendants argue that Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (3d Cir.2009), stands for the proposition that a favorable termination must be indicative of actual innocence. While it is true that Kossler does stand for this proposition, it is unclear whether Kossler, which very explicitly limited its holding to the facts of that case, applies with equal force to § 1983 claims that are brought under a claim other than malicious prosecution. See
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
Kossler, 564 F.3d at 187, 192. Assuming without deciding that Kossler does require an indication of actual innocence, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals went on to list six (6) ways in which a plaintiff may indicate his innocence: 1) discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, 2) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, 3) the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the prosecutor, 4) the quashing of an indictment or information, 5) acquittal, or 6) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or appellate court. Id. at 187–88 (citing Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir.2002)).
In the instant case, the adjudications of probation violations that occurred after January 1, 2003 were vacated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order of October 29, 2009. Thus, Raul was the beneficiary of a final order in favor of the accused by an appellate court, which is one of the *255 terminations of a criminal proceeding that indicates innocence. As Raul has received a favorable termination of these adjudications, he is not barred by Heck and may bring actions pursuant to § 1983 for any injury arising from the actions taken against him after January 1, 2003.
II. INJURY TO BUSINESS OR PROPERTY [13] [14] [15] In order to have standing to bring a RICO claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), as Plaintiffs do here, Plaintiffs must plead injury to his business or property and that Defendants proximately caused such injury. Pappa v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, No. 3:07–cv– 0708, 2008 WL 744820, at *8 (M.D.Pa. March 18, 2008). A injury “by nature of mental distress” is not sufficient to claim damage to business or property. Id. (citing Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir.1987)). The phrase “business or property” has been held by the Supreme Court, in construing the Clayton Act, to exclude personal injury. Id. (citing Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979)). Mental distress, emotional distress, and harmed reputations do not constitute injury to business or property sufficient to confer standing on a RICO plaintiff. Id. at *8–9; Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1169. Furthermore, injury for RICO purposes requires proof of concrete financial loss, not mere injury to an intangible property interest. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Steele v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir.1994)).
[16] [17] While Mr. and Mrs. Clark have sufficiently pled injury to property in the form of the money paid and the

wages that were garnished to pay for Raul’s incarceration and probation, Plaintiffs have only alleged that Raul suffered “great emotional distress” and “financial harm.” Clearly, the emotional harm claim is not sufficient to meet the injury to business or property standard. Furthermore, while “financial harm” may not sufficiently plead business or property injury, Plaintiffs argue in their brief that the injuries Raul is claiming include loss of earning capacity based on education that he missed while in custodial detention. However, this is not the type of concrete monetary lost envisioned by Maio. While a loss of actual employment might be sufficient, allegations of lost earnings and/or decreased earning capacity is not sufficient to support a civil RICO claim. Magnum v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, No. 06–CV–2589, 2006 WL 3359642, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 17, 2006). Therefore, Raul has not alleged that he has suffered an injury to business or property, and does not have standing to bring a claim pursuant to civil RICO. Thus, Counts IV and V will dismissed as to Raul, but will remain as to Mr. and Mrs. Clark.
III. DEFENDANT CONAHAN Defendant Conahan moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, claiming that he cannot be sued due to absolute judicial immunity in his role as judge and absolute legislative immunity for his role as a budgetmaker while acting as President Judge. This Court shall address each of these arguments below.
A. Judicial Immunity This Court has previously had the opportunity, now on two occasions, to examine the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity in a very similar factual scenario in Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09–cv–286, 2009 WL 4051974, at *3–4 (M.D.Pa. Nov. 20, 2009) and Dawn v. Ciavarella, 3:10–cv–0797, 2010 WL 3122858, at *3–5 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 9, 2010). Those cases arose from the *256 same set of circumstances, alleging that Conahan and Ciavarella had denied the juvenile plaintiffs their Constitutional rights as part of the scheme to divert juvenile offenders to the newly constructed PACC and WPACC facilities in return for kickbacks. E.g., Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *1–2. Defendants Conahan and Ciavarella moved to dismiss based on absolute judicial immunity in those cases as well. Id. at *1.
[18] [19] [20] For judicial immunity to apply, only two
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
requirements must be met: 1) jurisdiction over the dispute, and 2) a judicial act. Id. at *7. As to the first, a judge is not immune only when he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted). As to the second prong, judicial immunity extends only to “judicial acts,” not administrative, executive, or legislative ones. Id. at 360–61, 98 S.Ct. 1099.
[21] [22] “[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citation omitted). The fact that the judge was incorrect about the status of jurisdiction or that there were procedural errors causing the judge to act without jurisdiction does not satisfy the requirements for defeating immunity. Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 771 (3d Cir.2000).
[23] [24] [25] In determining whether an act is judicial, “it is appropriate to consider ‘the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,’ and ‘the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his official capacity.’ ” Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *7 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099). “Acts which are traditionally done by judges include issuing orders, resolving cases and controversies, making rulings, and sentencing criminal defendants. Other actions such as sending a fax, or hiring and firing subordinates, have been found to be administrative, rather than judicial, acts. Note, however, that even if an act is not judicial, there may be still be immunity if the act is legislative or executive in nature.” Id.
[26] In Wallace, this Court held that the allegations that Conahan and Ciavarella did not act as impartial judges, failed to advise juveniles of their right to counsel, and failed to determine whether guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary, while “egregious, unjustifiable judicial behavior,” did not “make out a case for the absence of jurisdiction.” Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *7. Thus, as to their courtroom behavior, both Conahan and Ciavarella were held to have jurisdiction.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Conahan ordered various juveniles to be placed in the new juvenile facilities as part of a scheme to ensure that the facilities were lucrative. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 58.) As to this type of courtroom behavior, Conahan clearly had jurisdiction.

[27] However, many of the actions allegedly taken by Conahan were not judicial acts that would confer absolute judicial immunity. To the extent that Plaintiff makes allegations regarding Conahan’s disposition of other juvenile cases before him in his role as judge, those are judicial acts and Conahan has immunity. However, the vast majority of activity alleged against Conahan was taken outside his role as judicial officer. In fact, most of the allegations against Conahan, as they relate to Raul specifically, were taken outside of the court room. The agreements entered into by Conahan with Mericle, Ciavarella and Powell, any budget decisions made by Conahan as President Judge, or any of *257 advocacy for building WPACC and PACC are non-judicial acts that are not subject to absolute judicial immunity. See Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *8 (delineating judicial and nonjudicial acts taken by Conahan). Therefore, Conahan’s motion to dismiss is granted regarding any actions he may have taken in delinquency determinations of other minors in furtherance of the conspiracy and other judicial acts. However, the remaining claims against Conahan fall outside of the realm of judicial acts and he cannot be shielded by judicial immunity for these actions. The motion will be denied as to these actions.
B. Legislative Immunity [28] Conahan also argues that he is subject to legislative immunity for all budgetary actions he took in his role as President Judge. This Court was presented with a similar argument by Conahan in Wallace and Dawn. In Wallace, this Court held:
There appears to be no legal basis for the argument that the president judge has the legislative power to control and administer even a portion of the county budget. As the Plaintiffs argue in their brief in opposition, “Pennsylvania law does not vest a president judge with the power to create, vote on, or sign into law a county budget.” (Doc. 282 at 67.) The cases which address the interaction between the president judge and the county commissioners instead suggest that the president judge makes budget recommendations to the commissioners, but that the commissioners must make the final spending allocations. See, e.g., Lavelle v. Koch, 532 Pa. 631, 617 A.2d 319 (Pa.1992) (president judge seeking to compel commissioners to disperse funds); Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (Pa.1981) (same). This type of political lobbying is distinct from legislative activity. Because Conahan’s activity with respect to the Luzerne County budget was not
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
legislative in nature, I find that absolute legislative immunity does not apply.
Wallace, 2009 WL 4051974, at *11.
This Court also found this reasoning dispositive in Dawn, 2010 WL 3122858, at *5. The reasoning in Wallace applies with equal force to the instant case, just as it did in Dawn. Conahan lacked the general policy-making power that would imbue his actions with legislative immunity. As such, Conahan’s motion will be denied with regard to his legislative immunity arguments.

general involvement in the scheme in order to detain the juveniles of Luzerne County, but do not allege that Brulo did anything to Raul specifically. (See Compl. ¶¶ 66, 83, 84.) However, Plaintiffs do allege that Brulo’s actions affected Raul. (Compl. ¶ 232.) Defendant Brulo argues that she is shielded from liability due to sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and qualified immunity.1 Brulo also argues about the merits of the claims brought against her. This Court will address the federal causes of action against Brulo in this section, and discuss the state law claims against all Defendants, including Brulo, later in this opinion.

IV. DEFENDANT CIAVARELLA Defendant Ciavarella also argues that absolute judicial immunity shields him from Plaintiff’s allegations. In this case, Ciavarella acted with jurisdiction, as he was the judge that presided over Raul’s juvenile case and subsequent probation violations. Regarding the judicial acts prong of the test, some of Ciavarella’s alleged actions are covered by judicial immunity, while others are not. Ciavarella’s court room actions in adjudicating and sentencing juveniles are precisely the type of judicial act that is protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Clearly then, any of the court room activity that Ciavarella engaged in in the disposition of Raul’s case, during the adjudication hearings, sentencing, probation hearings, or other in-court actions, are also covered by absolute judicial immunity. As for to the other allegations, such as Ciavarella’s role in the conspiracy to build the juvenile detention centers and receive kickbacks, those allegations are extra-judicial activity that is not protected by absolute judicial immunity. Therefore, Ciavarella’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part. It will be granted for all judicial acts, such as the *258 dispositions of juvenile proceedings, including Raul’s, and denied as to all other allegations.
V. DEFENDANT BRULO The factual allegations against Defendant Brulo are that she 1) recommended that Raul and other juveniles be detained in order to lend the orders of Conahan and Ciavarella with a brush of legitimacy, 2) altered probation reports and drug tests in order to have Raul and other children placed in detention, and 3) concocted “bogus” probation violations to ensure that Raul and other juveniles were placed in detention. (Compl. ¶ 232.) The majority of Plaintiffs’ allegations focus on Brulo’s

A. Sovereign Immunity [29] Brulo argues that the state law claims against her should be dismissed due to sovereign immunity pursuant to 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.. § 8521. Sovereign immunity is only available to state employees while they are acting within the scope of their duties. 1 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.. § 2310. The probation department is an arm of the state, and its employees are state actors, making them subject to sovereign immunity. See Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir.2008). Conduct of an employee is within the scope of employment when it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform, it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits, and the action is prompted, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. Larsen v. State Employees’ Retirement System, 553 F.Supp.2d 403, 420 (M.D.Pa.2008).
[30] In the instant case, Defendant Brulo is not entitled to sovereign immunity because the alleged acts are not within the scope of her employment. Although the scope of employment is often a question of fact, the scope of probation officers is set out by statute in 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.. § 6304. Thus, this Court can determine whether, as a matter of law, the allegations in the Complaint fall outside that scope. Altering drug tests, changing recommendations as part of a scheme to ensure the detention of juveniles, and concocting fake probations violations to have juveniles placed in custody are not the type of conduct that juvenile probation officers are hired to perform. As such, the allegations fail to fall within the first prong of the scope of employment test, and, therefore, Defendant Brulo’s actions cannot be shielded by sovereign immunity. The motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity will be denied.
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
B. Quasi–Judicial Immunity [31] [32] [33] Absolute immunity is available to government actors that are performed in their “quasi-judicial” role for conduct *259 that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir.1992); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). In determining whether to grant such immunity, courts must take a functional approach, focusing on “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it and evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of that function.” Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F.Supp.2d 543, 552 (M.D.Pa.2007) (quoting Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 78 (3d Cir.2007)), aff’d, 251 Fed.Appx. 743 (3d Cir.2007). However, where a government actor is acting in his or her investigative or administrative capacity, those actions are only protected by qualified immunity, not absolute quasijudicial immunity. Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1463. Probation officers enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for participation in the preparation of pre-sentence reports. Stankowski, 487 F.Supp.2d at 552–53.
[34] In this case, Defendant Brulo is subject to absolute quasi-judicial immunity regarding her actions stemming from her sentencing recommendations. These activities are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the juvenile proceedings; as noted above, there is precedent in this district for holding that such activities are subject to immunity. See id. However, the other actions alleged against Brulo, such as altering drug tests, or conjuring up fake probation violations, were taken in her investigative role as a probation officer. As such, these activities are not subject to quasi-judicial immunity. Therefore, Brulo’s motion to dismiss is granted for all her actions regarding sentencing recommendations and denied as to the other activities.
C. Qualified Immunity [35] Brulo argues that the remaining activity is protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit for conduct that does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would be aware. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396

(1982)).
[36] The remaining factual allegations are that Brulo altered reports and drug tests and “concocted bogus probation violations” to have Raul and other juveniles placed in detention. (Compl. ¶ 232.) Undoubtedly, an objectively reasonable person would know that it is a violations of constitutional rights to falsify court documents and drug tests to ensure that juvenile offenders are placed in custodial detention. Therefore, Brulo is not entitled to qualified immunity for these actions, and the motion to dismiss will be denied on that count.
D. Section 1983 [37] Defendant Brulo argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any personal involvement in a § 1983 violation against Raul. Section 1983 provides redress for individuals whose constitutional rights are violated by governmental actors. “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005). Brulo, as employee of Juvenile Probation, was acting under color of state law for all the conduct alleged in the Complaint. She instead argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of rights by Brulo.
*260 While Brulo is correct that the main thrust of the Complaint is aimed at alleging Brulo’s general association with the scheme to incarcerate juveniles, there are sufficient allegations specific to Raul to allow the § 1983 claim to survive a motion to dismiss. As noted above, the actual count for § 1983 violations against Brulo (Count I) contains allegations that all of the conduct that Brulo engaged in was done “to have Raul and other children” placed in detention. While discovery may uncover that Brulo was not actually personally involved with Raul’s case in any way, that is not an appropriate inquiry at this stage. Instead, looking solely to the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged conduct by Brulo that would constitute a § 1983 violation against Plaintiffs.
Defendant also argues that Mr. and Mrs. Clark lack standing to bring causes of action pursuant to § 1983. This argument will be discussed at length in the next section of this opinion. The forthcoming discussion regarding standing of Mr. and Mrs. Clark to bring § 1983 claims applies with equal force to Mrs. Brulo’s motion.
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
E. RICO Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Conahan, Ciavarella, Powell, PACC, WPACC, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Zappala, Pinnacle, Mrs. Conahan, Mrs. Ciavarella, Beverage, Visions, MAYS, and Powell Law Group (“RICO Defendants”) formed an enterprise to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity. (Compl. ¶¶ 251–253.) While the Complaint includes Brulo in the caption for the RICO claims (Counts IV and V), it does not contain any mention of her in the substantive paragraphs of those claims. Plaintiffs incorrectly state in their brief that Ms. Brulo is named in paragraph 251 of the Complaint. She is not. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to bring a RICO claim against Defendant Brulo and her motion to dismiss will be granted as to Counts IV and V of the Complaint.
VI. REMAINING MOVING DEFENDANTS’ FEDERAL CLAIMS A. Section 1983
1. Under Color of State Law
[38] [39] Generally, to satisfy the under color of state law prong, the defendant must have “exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law.” David v. City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344 (10th Cir.1996). The parties do not dispute remaining Defendants could not independently act under color of state law.2 Instead, Plaintiffs allege that because the remaining moving Defendants conspired with Conahan and Ciavarella, who acted under color of state law, that they may be held liable. Plaintiffs are correct that “a private party who willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right acts ‘under color of state law’ for purposes of § 1983.’ ” Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 147–48 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980)).
[40] Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege that they were part of a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ rights. “ ‘To demonstrate a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement *261 to deprive him or her of a constitutional right ‘under color of law.’ ‘ ” Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp.2d 649, 666 (M.D.Pa.1999) (quoting

Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir.1993)). Plaintiffs allege that the remaining Defendants intentionally, deliberately, and maliciously deprived Raul of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring with Conahan and Ciavarella to participate in bribery schemes, routinely place juvenile offenders in custodial detention for minor offenses, create a system where juveniles were not advise of their right to trial or counsel, and interfere with Juvenile Probation’s ability to recommend probation rather than detention. (Compl. ¶ 248.) But this conclusory allegation by itself is insufficient; Plaintiffs must provide factual allegations to support their claims, as per Twombly.
As to Mericle and Powell, the Plaintiffs outline at length the factual allegations as to each as to their interactions with Conahan and Ciavarella. (Compl. ¶¶ 48–53, 79– 81,182–211.) And because Mericle and Powell are alleged to be owners, operators, officers, and of shareholders of Mericle Construction, Inc., PACC, and Vision, Plaintiffs also provide sufficient factual allegations against those entities.3
[41] As to Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, however, Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are significantly more limited. Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella were owners and operators of Pinnacle, an entity involved in the payment of kickbacks and hiding of funds. (Compl. ¶ 13.) While this allegation would be enough to bind Pinnacle for any actions by Mrs. Conahan or Mrs. Ciavarella, the inverse is not necessarily true, i.e., conduct by the entity, Pinnacle, through its agents or apparent agents, would not necessarily bind the wives as owners and operators of the entity. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that while Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella owned Pinnacle, that their husbands controlled Pinnacle during the conspiracy. (Compl. ¶¶ 197, 199.) Plaintiffs provide no further factual allegations that the wives agreed, assisted, knew of, or otherwise participated in the alleged conspiracy beyond owning and operating an entity used by the conspiracy. This allegation alone fails to provide sufficient factual basis for Plaintiffs’ bare legal conclusion that Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella were part of the alleged conspiracy. Therefore, as to Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, they did not act under color of state law, and their motions to dismiss will be granted. As to the other remaining Defendants, I find that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a conspiracy with state actors, and thus their motions to dismiss on this ground will be denied.
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
2. Violation of Federal Constitutional Right
Plaintiffs must be broken into two groups when considering the violation of federal constitutional rights in this case. First, this Court must consider the alleged violations of Raul’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The precise contours of these claims are slightly unclear at this stage of the litigation, but seem to be for violations of Raul’s substantive and procedural due process rights, his right to counsel, his right to an *262 impartial tribunal, his right against involuntary guilty pleas, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The second group consists of Raul’s parents, Mr. and Mrs. Clark. Notably, Mr. and Mrs. Clark may not bring claims for damages based upon violations of Raul’s rights, but instead must bring claim for violations of their own constitutional rights. See O’Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir.1973) (party may not bring claim based on the violation of another’s rights). I will consider the allegations of Raul and his parents separately.
a. Raul’s Claims
Defendants do not dispute that the juvenile plaintiffs sufficiently allege that their constitutional rights were violated by Ciavarella. Instead, Defendants argue that Ciavarella’s conduct, not their conduct, caused Raul’s injuries and that his actions were beyond the scope of the alleged conspiracy. As discussed above there are sufficient factual allegations to support Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants, except for Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, conspired not only to construct the juvenile facilities, but to ensure that those facilities remained full and financially viable by violating the rights juvenile offenders like Raul. While Plaintiffs will ultimately have the burden of establishing the scope of the conspiracy, an evaluation of the strength of Plaintiffs’ evidence is inappropriate at this juncture. It is sufficient that Plaintiffs allege that the purposes of the conspiracy included the deprivation of the juveniles’ rights.4 Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead a conspiracy involving the remaining Defendants that deprived Raul of his constitutional rights, and their motions to dismiss will be denied on this count.

b. Mr. and Mrs. Clark’s Claims
[42] [43] [44] Mr. and Mrs. Clark, as noted above, cannot use violations of Raul’s constitutional rights to make out a claim that their rights were violated. O’Malley, 477 F.2d at 789. As such, several of the alleged constitutional violations necessarily fail. First, Mrs. and Mrs. Clark cannot bring a claim for violations of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that “a person’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (citations omitted). Because Mr. and Mrs. Clark never had any adversary proceedings taken against them, their Sixth Amendment right to counsel never attached, and they cannot bring a § 1983 claim under this theory. Next, Mr. and Mrs. Clark have not made out a cognizable claim pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, which states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The only possible claim that Mr. and Mrs. Clark could have standing to bring is that they were forced to pay excessive fines as a result of Raul’s adjudication, incarceration, and probation. Although the Clarks do *263 allege that they had to pay fines arising out of Raul’s delinquency proceedings, they do not allege anywhere in the Complaint that those fines were excessive in nature. Thus, Mr. and Mrs. Clark have not sufficiently alleged a cause of action pursuant to § 1983 for violations of the Eighth Amendment.
This leaves only the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Again, the exact claims being brought under these constitutional provisions is unclear. It would seem that the only cognizable claims would be 1) that their procedural due process rights were violated when they were deprived of monetary sums as a result of the juvenile adjudications without due process of law and 2) that Defendants violated their substantive due process interest in the family relationship between parent and child.
[45] [46] To establish a cause of action for a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must first prove that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a protected property interest; and second, he must show that the procedures available to him failed to provide him with due process of law. Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000). Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants deprived them of monetary sums through fines and garnishment of Mrs. Clark’s wages and unemployment benefits.
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Defendants argue Mr. and Mrs. Clark are seeking their damages not for violations of their own rights, but vicariously for the violation of Raul’s rights.
In, Stacey v. City of Hermitage, 178 Fed.Appx. 94 (3d Cir.2006), plaintiff, along with her son, brought a civil rights action pursuant to § 1983 against the local municipality alleging violations of their constitutional rights arising out of the demolition of plaintiff’s home. Id. at 98. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 103. In doing so, the court permitted the claims of both plaintiffs, noting that the son alleged that he had a Fourth Amendment property interest in private property in the home. Id. at 100.
Like the son in Stacey, Mr. and Mrs. Clark allege that their own property, namely money they were forced to pay, was taken by the same process which also violated Raul’s rights. At this stage is unclear whether Raul was ordered to pay costs, which were then voluntarily assumed by his parents, or whether Mr. and Mrs. Clark were directly sanctioned as a result of Raul’s adjudications in front of Ciavarella. Because the Plaintiffs allege that they were forced to pay the financial requirements, through wage and benefit garnishment, there are sufficient allegations at this stage that the Mr. and Mrs. Clark were directly harmed at the same time as Raul. Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Clark have sufficiently alleged that their own property was taken by the Defendants’ conduct, and thus Mr. and Mrs. Clark sufficiently allege their procedural due process claim.5
[47] [48] To sufficiently state a due process claim for interference with the parent-child relationship, a plaintiff must allege deliberate conduct that the defendant sought to harm that relationship. Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 192 (3d Cir.2009). While the Plaintiffs’ sufficiently allege a conspiracy to violate *264 the juveniles’ rights by placing them in facilities, Plaintiffs’ provide no explicit allegations that the Defendants’ specifically acted with the intent to harm the Clarks’ relationship with Raul, or vice versa. Although placing juveniles into the Defendant facilities would be disruptive to that relationship, Plaintiffs’ allegations fall short of alleging the type of deliberate conduct aimed specifically at the relationship that states a claim for due process violations. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim will be granted on substantive due process claims brought by the Clarks.
Plaintiffs’ Complaints fail to provide sufficient factual

allegations that Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella acted as part of the alleged conspiracy to violate the Juvenile Plaintiffs’ rights. Because Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella are not alleged to be state actors themselves, the motions of Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella will be granted and Count III of the Complaint will be dismissed as to Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella. As to Raul’s claims, the remaining portions of Defendants’ motions to dismiss his § 1983 claims will be denied. As to Mr. and Mrs. Clark’s claims, Defendants motion will be granted on the Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, but denied as to the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.
B. Civil RICO The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) contains both criminal and civil consequences for violative conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. RICO makes it unlawful to corruptly engage in a pattern of racketeering activity via an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. Id. § 1962 (listing prohibited activities). In addition to criminal penalties, RICO authorizes “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court ....” Id. § 1964(c). Plaintiffs bring causes of action alleging that Defendants violated § 1962(c), and that Defendants violated § 1962(d).6 Section 1962(c) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” Id. § 1962(c). Section 1962(d) makes in unlawful to conspire to violate the other subsections of § 1962. Id. § 1962(d). Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs lack standing to make RICO claims, that they have not pled sufficient distinctiveness between the “persons” and the “enterprise,” that they have not pled an enterprise that exists separate from the racketeering activities, that they do not sufficiently and that they do not sufficiently allege a RICO conspiracy under subsection (d). This Court will consider each of these arguments in turn.
1. Standing
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
[49] The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that there are two distinct parts of the standing requirement of a civil RICO action: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury to business or property and (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s RICO violation. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir.2000). As noted above, Mr. and Mrs. Clark have *265 sufficiently pled injury to business or property, but Raul has not; therefore, Raul does not have standing to bring claims pursuant to RICO.
[50] [51] To have standing to bring civil RICO claims, however, Mr. and Mrs. Clark’s injuries must also have been proximately caused by the underlying predicate acts. At common law, proximate cause was the demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992). Proximate cause, however, “is a flexible concept that does not lend itself to a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 2142, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008). “[T]he compensable injury flowing from a [RICO violation] ‘necessarily is the harm caused by the predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.’ ” Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). When considering whether an alleged injury is sufficiently direct, the Supreme Court has looked to three underlying justifications for the requirement of proximate causation: (1) difficulty in calculating the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to remote violations; (2) avoiding the need to apportion damages amongst different “levels” of plaintiffs and to avoid multiple recoveries; and (3) the general interest in deterrence is already served where other plaintiffs with more direct injuries may assert claims. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70, 112 S.Ct. 1311. Applying these considerations, the Supreme Court has addressed civil RICO’s proximate cause requirement several times in recent years.
In Anza, the plaintiff brought a civil RICO claim against a competing business. Id. at 454, 126 S.Ct. 1991. The plaintiff alleged that the underlying pattern of racketeering activity was the submission of fraudulent tax returns which gave the competitor an advantage and caused lost profits for the plaintiff. Id. The Court rejected

the argument that the proximate causation requirement was satisfied merely because the defendant’s alleged aim was to increase its own market share at the expense of the plaintiff. Id. at 460–61, 126 S.Ct. 1991 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983)). Instead, the Court looked to the predicate acts and determined that the direct victim of the fraud was the state that lost tax revenue as a result of the filings, not the plaintiff. Id. at 458, 126 S.Ct. 1991. In confirming this conclusion, the Court discussed the difficulty in calculating what portion, if any, of the plaintiff’s lost profits were caused by the competitor’s tax fraud. Id. at 458–59, 126 S.Ct. 1991. And while acknowledging that there was no risk of multiple recovery, the Court noted that the immediate victim, the state, would be able to vindicate its rights with its own claim, satisfying the law’s objective of deterrence without the need for more “indirect” actions such as the plaintiff’s. Id. at 460, 126 S.Ct. 1991. The Court ultimately held that the plaintiff’s alleged injury was not proximately caused by the RICO violations, and thus that the plaintiff had no standing to bring its claim. Id. at 461, 126 S.Ct. 1991.
In Bridge, the county treasurer’s office held public auctions to sell tax liens on delinquent taxpayers’ property. Id., 128 S.Ct. at 2135. Instead of bidding a set *266 monetary amount, prospective buyers bid in percentage penalties the property owner would have to pay the bidder in order to clear the lien. Id. As a result of stiff competition for these liens, most parcels attracted multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest possible penalty, namely zero percent. Id. To resolve ties, the county allocated parcels on a rotating basis. Id. To avoid allowing a party to receive a disproportionate number of liens via the rotation, the county had implemented a “Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule” requiring each party to submit bids in its own name and prohibiting the submission of other simultaneous bids for the same parcel by having agents of that party also submit bids. Id. The plaintiff alleged that defendant had fraudulently violated the “Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule” by submitting multiple bids via proxies or agents, thereby obtaining an unequal share of the tax liens. Id. at 2136.
While the holding of the Court focused on the issue of whether first-party reliance is required for a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud, the Court addressed the requirement of proximate causation in the course of its opinion. Id. at 2141–45. The Court stated that the plaintiff’s alleged injury, the loss of valuable liens, was the direct result of the defendant’s fraud. Id. at 2144. It
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distinguished Anza, stating “there are no independent factors that account for respondents’ injury, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violation, and no more immediate victim is better situated to sue.” Id.
Most recently, in Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 983, 175 L.Ed.2d 943 (2010) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court considered the issue of proximate cause in an action relating to the sale of cigarettes in New York City. Id. at 986. New York State and the City of New York each are permitted under New York law to tax the sale of cigarettes. Id. at 987. When purchasers buy cigarettes from in-state vendors, those vendors are responsible for charging, collecting, and remitting these taxes. Id. However, when cigarettes are sold by out-of-state vendors, the vendor need only file a report with the state listing the name, address, and quantity of cigarettes purchased so that the taxes may be collected. Id.
The defendant in Hemi Group was an out-of-state vendor who allegedly failed to provide the buyers’ information to New York State. Id. As a result, the information was never passed along to New York City, depriving the city its ability to collect its portion of the taxes. Id. New York City brought a RICO action against the defendant, alleging as its harm the lost tax income as a result of defendant’s mail and wire fraud in failing to submit buyer information. Id. at 987–88.
In a plurality opinion, four justices held that New York City’s theory of causation was “far too indirect.” Id. at 989. They noted that the conduct directly responsible for the harm was the customers failure to pay taxes, and that the fraud only made enforcement more difficult. Id. at 990. The four justices joining the plurality stated that the disconnect was even more significant than in Anza because the defendant in Hemi Group allegedly defrauded New York State, who then passed on insufficient information to New York City, which made it easier for the taxpayers to cause the harm. Id. The Hemi plurality also rejected the dissent’s argument that RICO’s proximate causation requirement should turn on foreseeability, rather than on the directness of the relationship between the predicate act and the harm. Id. at 991. They also rejected New York City’s argument that the defendant’s acts should *267 be characterized as a systemic scheme to defraud tax revenue, stating “the City cannot escape the proximate cause requirement merely by alleging that the fraudulent scheme embraced all those indirectly harmed by the alleged conduct. Otherwise our

RICO proximate cause precedent would become a mere pleading rule.” Id. The opinion also distinguished Bridge, stating that in that case each time the fraud occurred a legitimate bidder was directly harmed and only those plaintiffs, not the county, were harmed. Id. at 992.
Applying this precedent to the present case, it is necessary to begin with the alleged predicate acts in violation of RICO. Anza, 547 U.S. at 461, 126 S.Ct. 1991 (central question is whether the alleged RICO violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries). Plaintiffs alleged predicate acts may be considered in two categories. First, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants committed mail and wire fraud by deceptively hiding the sums paid to Conahan and Ciavarella, “thereby hiding said income from the United States Internal Revenue Service.” (Compl. ¶¶ 210, 258.) These predicate acts cannot be said to be the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries because it would be extremely difficult to calculate how the hiding of income caused the alleged monetary damages to the Plaintiffs and, more importantly, there are also more direct victims of this conduct. Namely, the Complaint alleges that the United States Internal Revenue Service was defrauded from successfully levying and collecting taxes on this taxable income. Therefore, these allegations cannot support Plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ committed honest services fraud, a specific type of mail fraud, as a RICO predicate act, which deprived “the citizens of Luzerne County and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of their right to the honest services of Defendants Conahan and Ciavarella.” (Compl. ¶¶ 210, 257.) This allegation necessarily relates to the payment of kickbacks to Conahan and Ciavarella, in return for favorable judicial adjudications. Skilling v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2931, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“we now hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core”). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the payments to Ciavarella directly resulted in the monetary sanctions that Plaintiffs were forced to pay through wage and unemployment benefit garnishment. The mere fact that the Plaintiffs may have been the target of the predicate acts, however, is not enough. Anza, 547 U.S. at 460–61, 126 S.Ct. 1991 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537, 103 S.Ct. 897). Similarly, it is not sufficient that the harm suffered by Plaintiffs was foreseeable. Hemi, 130 S.Ct. at 991. Plaintiffs must instead have been directly harmed by the predicate acts.
After reviewing the recent Supreme Court cases, it appears that the instant case is most analogous to the facts
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of Bridge where the government was defrauded, but where each act of fraud directly caused economic harm to Plaintiffs. Considering the “directness” articulated by the Supreme Court, the underlying justifications for the proximate cause requirement do not compel a finding that Mr. and Mrs. Clark’s injuries were not proximately caused by Defendants’ alleged RICO violations. Unlike the injuries in Anza and Hemi, the injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs in the case at bar are substantially more concrete; in fact, Plaintiffs have alleged the precise amount they paid as a result of Defendants’ actions. Similarly, there is no concern about apportioning damages or multiple recovery, as no other group of Plaintiffs suffered this type of economic harm. Finally, when considering the deterrent interest there are no other *268 parties better suited to bring these claims because it was Plaintiffs.
Defendants argue that there is a more immediate victim, namely the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the citizens of Luzerne County, who were deprived of the honest services of their judicial officer. However, the statutory codification of honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, specifically states that honest services fraud includes “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible rights of honest services.” Even if the group most directly affected by Conahan and Ciavarella were the people of Pennsylvania or Luzerne County, that injury would be necessarily intangible. In order to serve the deterrence goals articulated in the Supreme Court’s proximate cause jurisprudence, it would be imprudent to hold that the only group whose injuries were proximately caused by honest services fraud is a group that suffered no tangible injury and is not in a position to bring suit. It is analogous to Bridge, where the government, although most directly connected to the fraud, did not suffer any tangible injury and would not be able to maintain a civil RICO action. The loss of the “honest services” of a judicial officer cannot be said to be the same type of concrete injury as the loss of tax income suffered in Anza and Hemi. Thus, there is no more directly injured group of plaintiffs than plaintiffs like Mr. and Mrs. Clark that could equally serve the deterrence purposes underlying civil RICO.
A civil RICO action brought by Mr. and Mrs. Clark also better achieves the other goals stated by the Supreme Court in setting out the factors underlying proximate cause. Calculating and apportioning the damages as to the value of judicial services vis a vis the citizens of Luzerne County as whole would be logistically infeasible. Ultimately, as was the case in Bridge, while the

government may have been defrauded, the economic impact was felt immediately by the Plaintiffs each time conduct occurred. Because Plaintiffs allege an economic injury proximately related to the predicate acts of honest services fraud, they have standing to bring civil RICO claims.
2. Violation of § 1962(c) [52] In United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273 (3d Cir.2003), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals described the requirements for establishing a violation of this section, stating:
To establish a § 1962(c) RICO violation, the government must prove the following four elements: (1) the existence of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (2) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that the defendant participated in, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and (4) that he or she participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Id. at 285 (quotation and citation omitted).
a. Enterprise
[53] Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged an association-in-fact enterprise because 1) the “persons” and the “enterprise” alleged are not sufficiently distinct and 2) the enterprise is not alleged to have existed separate and apart from the alleged conspiracy. Plaintiffs have alleged that Conahan, Ciavarella, Powell, PACC, Mericle, Mericle Construction, Mrs. Conahan, Mrs. Ciavarella, and Vision are “persons” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). (Compl. ¶ 251.) Plaintiffs also allege that these Defendants formed an enterprise within the meaning of § 1961(4).
RICO defines “person” as including “any individual, partnership, corporation, *269 association, or other legal entity.” Clearly, the group of individuals and legal entities alleged to have committed RICO violations are, in fact, “persons” as defined by § 1961(3). “Enterprise” includes
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a “group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). However, associationsin-fact have been read liberally to include an enterprise consisting of individuals and corporate entities associating with one another. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir.1993). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficiently distinct enterprise from the “persons” who form that enterprise. Specifically, the “enterprise” here is an association-in-fact enterprise comprised of the aforementioned individuals and other legal entities.
In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), the Supreme Court set forth three factors for establishing such a RICO enterprise: (1) “an ongoing organization, formal or informal,” (2) that “the various associated function as a continuing unit,” and (3) that the enterprise exists “separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.” See Pappa v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, No. 3:07–CV–0708, 2008 WL 744820, at *10 (citations omitted). While Defendants are correct Plaintiffs will ultimately need to establish each of these factors, at this early juncture it is sufficient to merely to allege the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. Pappa v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 2008 WL 744820, at *11 (citing Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir.1984)). While Defendants’ arguments that the enterprise did not exist apart from the racketeering activity may have merit, Plaintiffs need not satisfy these requirements at this stage. Because Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that an association-in-fact enterprise existed, they have satisfied the pleading requirements of this element at this stage.
b. Participation in the Enterprise
[54] [55] [56] A plaintiff must also establish that the defendants were associated with and participated in the “operation or management” of the enterprise to bring a cause of action pursuant to civil RICO. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993). In order for a Defendant “to conduct or participate” in the affairs of a RICO enterprise, a defendant must, in some capacity, direct the affairs of the enterprise. Id. at 178–79, 113 S.Ct. 1163. A defendant will not be liable simply because he provides services that benefit the enterprise; instead, there “must be a nexus between the person and the conduct in the affairs of an enterprise. The operation or management test goes to that

nexus. In other words, the person must knowingly engage in ‘directing the enterprise’s affairs’ through a pattern of racketeering activity.” University of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1539 (3d Cir.1993). That does not necessarily mean that a defendant must have a managerial position in the enterprise, but only that he or she “knowingly further[s] the illegal aims of the enterprise by carrying out the directives of those in control.” United States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 796 (3d Cir.1998).
Here, Mrs. Ciavarella, Mrs. Conahan, and PACC argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged participation in the enterprise. Turning first to Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, the Complaint does not contain any allegations that Mrs. Ciavarella and Mrs. Conahan did anything to participate in the enterprise. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s allege that they were owners and operators of Pinnacle, but that the entity was controlled by their husbands to engage in wire and mail fraud. *270 Without more, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that Mrs. Ciavarella or Mrs. Conahan were personally involved in taking any action that would constitute knowingly advancing the illegal aims of the alleged association-infact.
[57] [58] Although respondeat superior liability may be applied under RICO where it is not otherwise prohibited by the statute, Petro–Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir.1987),7 PACC argues that it should not be held liable for Powell’s actions because he was acting outside of the scope of his employment as an agent for PACC. Conduct is within the scope of employment if a) it is the kind that the employee is employed to perform, b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits, and c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 146 (3d Cir.2008). However, all of these inquiries are factual questions that are not properly determined at the motion to dismiss stage. Without a developed factual record, it is impossible to know the scope and contours of Powell’s relationship with PACC. While his activities here might well be outside that scope, it is too early for this Court to make that determination and the motion to dismiss will be denied.
3. Conspiracy under § 1962(d) Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants participated in a conspiracy to violation § 1962(d). As stated above, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that all Defendants, except
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Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella, participated in a conspiracy which included conduct in violation of § 1962(c). Therefore, the motions to dismiss of Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella will be granted, and the remaining motions will be denied.
C. Punitive Damages
[59] [60] Defendants Mericle, Mericle Construction, Powell, and Vision also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a factual basis for their § 1983 punitive damages claims. It is clear that in certain circumstances punitive damages may be awarded for violations of civil rights. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1978). The test for determining whether punitive damages should be awarded for civil rights violations is whether Defendants acted with actual knowledge that they were violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard for whether they were doing so. Cochetti, 572 F.2d at 106. While Defendants again dispute whether the conspiracy was intended to violate Plaintiffs’ rights, as stated above Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendants Mericle and Powell, and, therefore Mericle Construction and Vision, were involved in the conspiracy to intentionally violate Plaintiffs’ rights in furtherance of making PACC and WPACC profitable ventures for the conspirators. Defendants’ request to dismiss claims for punitive damages will be denied.
VII. STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
A. Count VI: False Imprisonment
[61] In Count VI of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants conspired *271 to falsely imprison Raul and that Mr. and Mrs. Clark have suffered injury as a result of Raul’s false imprisonment. It is unclear from the face of the Complaint whether this is a cause of action under civil conspiracy or simply a cause of action for false imprisonment. However because Plaintiffs have disclaimed a cause of action under civil conspiracy, this Court will treat this as a cause of action solely for false imprisonment. (See Doc. 89 at 29 n. 4.)
[62] [63] First and foremost, Mr. and Mrs. Clark cannot

recover under a theory of false imprisonment because they do not allege that they were ever detained. A claim of false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law requires: “(1) the detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (1994). An actor is liable for false imprisonment if “(1) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor and (2) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (3) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.” Crivellaro v. Pa. Power and Light Co., 24 Pa.D. & C.3d 590, 595 (Pa.Com.Pl.1982).
[64] Defendants argue that the false imprisonment claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for claims of false imprisonment in Pennsylvania is two (2) years. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524(1). Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). Because Plaintiffs allege that they were aware of their detentions, the statute of limitations on each claim would ordinarily have started running on the date each was released. See Martin v. Red Lion Police Dept., 146 Fed.Appx. 558, 561 (3d Cir.2005) (statute of limitations began upon release from hospital or at least when aware of nature of treatment therein).
[65] [66] Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled until January 2009, when the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal information outlining the Defendants’ alleged conspiracy. First, they argue that the “discovery rule” should toll the statute of limitations. “The purpose of the discovery rule has been to exclude from the running of the statute of limitations that period of time during which a party who has not suffered an immediately ascertainable injury is reasonably unaware he has been injured, so that he has essentially the same rights as those who have suffered such an injury.” Fine v. Checcio, 582 Pa. 253, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (2005) (citation omitted). While it may be true that Raul did not know of the conspiracy until that date, the discovery rule acts to toll the statute of limitations until the injury is known. In this case, the alleged injuries arise from the imprisonment, which Plaintiffs allege were known from the time of incarceration. Therefore, the discovery rule is inapplicable here.
[67] [68] [69] Plaintiffs also argue that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because of
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Defendants’ intentional fraud or concealment of the facts relating to Raul’s causes of action. “A party relying on this doctrine will be entitled to a tolling of the Statute of Limitations by proving that there has been either intentional or unintentional deception by the Defendant, and the statute will be tolled until the Plaintiffs would, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraudulent concealment.” Piccolini v. Simon’s Wrecking, 686 F.Supp. 1063, 1074 (M.D.Pa.1988) (internal citations omitted). “The Plaintiff, however, *272 must prove such fraud or concealment by clear, precise, and convincing evidence.” Id. (citing Ritter v. Theodore Pendergrass, 356 Pa.Super. 422, 514 A.2d 930, 935 n. 8 (1986)). Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendants intentionally acted to conceal their conspiracy from Plaintiffs and others. Concealment of the conspiracy may have prevented Plaintiffs from bringing the present cause of action. Ultimately, Plaintiffs will be required to prove the alleged fraud or concealment in order to equitably toll the statute of limitations. But, considering only the allegations in the complaint, the Court holds that equitable tolling might be appropriate here and will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
[70] [71] [72] Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Raul’s detention lacked probable cause. When detention is in the form of an arrest, to show the unlawfulness of that detention, Plaintiff must show “that the process used for the arrest was void on its face or that the issuing tribunal was without jurisdiction; it is not sufficient that the charges were unjustified.” Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 984–85 (Pa.Super.1997). In order to consider the claims of false imprisonment and false arrest collectively, however, the confinement must be “inextricably intertwined with the unlawful arrest.” Gagliardi v. Lynn, 446 Pa. 144, 285 A.2d 109, 112 (1971). Plaintiffs do not allege that Raul’s arrests were unlawful or that the arresting officials were part of the conspiracy, thus it cannot be said that the arrest and confinement were “inextricably intertwined.” Therefore, Plaintiffs need not allege a lack of probable cause to state a claim for false imprisonment.
[73] As such, Raul has clearly stated a claim for false imprisonment against PACC and Powell, who were responsible for his detention following his probation violations. Furthermore, false imprisonment claims “can lie against one who instigated an arrest or imprisonment through his influence on a third party.” Gilbert v. Feld, 788 F.Supp. 854, 862 (E.D.Pa.1992). However, the only

party that instigated the false imprisonment of Raul was Ciavarella when he issued an order confining Raul to PACC. As noted above, that type of in-court activity is shielded by absolute judicial immunity; therefore, Raul does not have a cause of action against Ciavarella for false imprisonment. The remaining defendants have not been alleged to be directly involved in the imprisonment of Raul or instigating the imprisonment of Raul; the Complaint fails to state a claim against these Defendants, although they may be liable for civil conspiracy, as discussed below.
Thus, the motion to dismiss the false imprisonment claim will be granted as to Mrs. and Mrs. Clark, denied as to Raul for PACC and Powell, and granted as to Raul for the remaining Defendants.
B. Count VII: IIED
[74] [75] [76] “To prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the following elements must be established: (1) the conduct must be extreme and dangerous; (2) it must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; (4) that distress must be severe.” Hoy v. Angelone, 456 Pa.Super. 596, 691 A.2d 476, 482 (1997). Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct which is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possibly bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society.” Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 987 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997). Generally, “the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community *273 would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘outrageous’!” Id. Furthermore, “in order to state a claim under which relief can be granted for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffs must allege physical injury.” Hart v. O’Malley, 436 Pa.Super. 151, 647 A.2d 542, 554 (1994); see also Mann v. Brenner, No. 1:06–cv–1715, 2008 WL 4491950, at *7 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 30, 2008).
[77] In the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Clark have not alleged that they suffered any type of physical injury. Raul has only alleged that he suffered “great emotional distress.” Plaintiff argues that this is a sufficient allegation of physical injury to survive a motion to dismiss. Although allegations of emotional distress can be sufficient to support a claim for infliction of emotional
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distress, Plaintiffs’ bare allegations on this matter are not sufficient to state a cause of action intentional infliction of emotional distress. Compare Behm v. Luzerne County Children and Youth Policy Makers, 172 F.Supp.2d 575, 588 (M.D.Pa.2001) (dismissing intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for failure to allege physical injury), with Frank v. Smith, No. 3:09–cv–596, 2009 WL 5214978, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 29, 2009) (holding that allegation of “severe emotional distress, causing [plaintiff] to obtain both medical and psychiatric advice, medication, obtain ongoing counseling, subjecting her to therapy and deep depression” sufficient to defeat motion to dismiss). Here, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged physical injury to make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and this count of the Complaint will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the various reasons discussed above the motions of Mr. Conahan, Mr. Ciavarella, Ms. Brulo, Mr. Mericle, Mericle Construction, PACC, Powell, and Vision will be granted in part and denied in part, and the motion of Mrs. Conahan and Mrs. Ciavarella will be granted.
ORDER
NOW, this 25th day of August, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant Mark Ciavarella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(a) Defendant Ciavarella’s motion on judicial immunity is GRANTED only for the courtroom adjudications and sentences imposed. The remainder of Defendant Ciavarella’s motion on judicial immunity is DENIED.
(b) Defendant Ciavarella’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count I for Claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark for violations of Procedural Due Process occurring on or after January 1, 2003, and GRANTED as to Count I for the remaining claims.

(c) Defendant Ciavarella’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I for claims brought by Raul Clark for Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring before January 1, 2003, but DENIED for all Eighth Amendment claims and DENIED for all Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring on or after January 1, 2003.
(d) Defendant Ciavarella’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Raul Clark, but DENIED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark
*274 (e) Defendant Ciavarella’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts VI and VII.
(2) Defendant Michael T. Conahan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(a) Mr. Conahan’s motion on judicial immunity is GRANTED only for the courtroom adjudications and sentences imposed. The remainder of Mr. Conahan’s motion on judicial immunity is DENIED.
(b) Mr. Conahan’s motion on legislative immunity is DENIED.
(c) Defendant Conahan’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count I for Claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark for violations of Procedural Due Process occurring on or after January 1, 2003, and GRANTED as to Count I for the remaining claims.
(d) Defendant Conahan’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I for claims brought by Raul Clark for Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring before January 1, 2003, but DENIED for all Eighth Amendment claims and DENIED for all Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring on or after January 1, 2003.
(e) Defendant Conahan’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts IV and V for claims
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Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)
brought by Raul Clark, but DENIED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark
(f) Defendant Conahan’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts VI and VII.
(3) Defendant Sandra Brulo’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 59) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(a) Ms. Brulo’s motion on quasi-judicial immunity is GRANTED only for activity regarding presentence recommendations. The remainder of Brulo’s motion on sovereign immunity, qualified immunity and quasi-judicial immunity is DENIED.
(b) Defendant Brulo’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count I for Claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark for violations of Procedural Due Process occurring on or after January 1, 2003, and GRANTED as to Count I for the remaining claims.
(c) Defendant Brulo’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I for claims brought by Raul Clark for Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring before January 1, 2003, but DENIED for all Eighth Amendment claims and DENIED for all Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring on or after January 1, 2003.
(d) Defendant Brulo’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts IV, V, VI, and VII.
(4) Defendants Mericle Construction and Robert K. Mericle’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 68) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(a) Defendant Mericle Construction and Robert K. Mericle’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count III for Claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark for violations of Procedural Due Process occurring on or after January 1, 2003, and GRANTED as to Count III for the remaining claims.
*275 (b) Defendant Mericle Construction and

Robert K. Mericle’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count III for claims brought by Raul Clark for Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring before January 1, 2003, but DENIED for all Eighth Amendment claims and DENIED for all Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring on or after January 1, 2003.
(c) Defendant Mericle Construction and Robert K. Mericle’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Raul Clark, but DENIED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark
(d) Defendant Mericle Construction and Robert K. Mericle’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts VI and VII.
(e) Defendant Mericle Construction and Robert K. Mericle’s motion to dismiss punitive damages will be DENIED.
(5) Defendant PACC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 70) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(a) Defendant PACC’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count III for Claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark for violations of Procedural Due Process occurring on or after January 1, 2003, and GRANTED as to Count III for the remaining claims.
(b) Defendant PACC’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count III for claims brought by Raul Clark for Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring before January 1, 2003, but DENIED for all Eighth Amendment claims and DENIED for all Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring on or after January 1, 2003.
(c) Defendant PACC’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Raul Clark, but DENIED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark
20

Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)

(d) Defendant PACC’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count VI as to false imprisonment claims made by Raul and GRANTED as to Count VI for claims made for false imprisonment by Bruce and Iraida Clark and GRANTED as to Count VII.
(6) Defendants Vision Holdings and Robert Powell’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 72) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
(a) Defendant Vision Holdings and Robert Powell’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count III for Claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark for violations of Procedural Due Process occurring on or after January 1, 2003, and GRANTED as to Count III for the remaining claims.
(b) Defendant Vision Holdings and Robert Powell’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count III for claims brought by Raul Clark for Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities occurring before January 1, 2003, but DENIED for all Eighth Amendment claims and DENIED for all Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for activities *276 occurring on or after January 1, 2003.

(c) Defendant Vision Holdings and Robert Powell’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Raul Clark, but DENIED as to Counts IV and V for claims brought by Bruce and Iraida Clark
(d) Defendant Vision Holdings and Robert Powell’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count VI as to false imprisonment claims made by Raul against Defendant Powell and GRANTED as to Count VI for claims made for false imprisonment by Bruce and Iraida Clark against Powell, GRANTED as to all false imprisonment claims against Defendant Vision, and GRANTED as to Count VII.
(e) Defendant Vision Holdings and Robert Powell’s motion to dismiss punitive damages will be DENIED.
(7) Defendants Barbara Conahan and Cindy Ciavarella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 78) is GRANTED.
	  

Footnotes

1

Defendant Brulo also argues that she cannot be sued in her official capacity. Plaintiffs conceded this point at oral argument and all

the causes of action against Brulo will be treated as though they are brought against her in her personal capacity.

2

“Remaining Defendants” are Mericle, Mericle Construction, PACC, Powell, Vision, Mrs. Conahan, and Mrs. Ciavarella.

3

Defendants argue that the Monell standard requiring a policy or custom by an entity applies to these private entities as it would to

public entities. I need not address this issue because Mericle and Powell are clearly alleged to be in positions of policy-making

authority. Thus under either respondeat superior or the Monell standard, there are sufficient factual allegations against these

entities.

4

Plaintiffs also may be able to establish “the requisite causal connection ... not only by some kind of direct personal participation in

the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would

cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Pilchesky v. Miller, Civil Action No. 3:CV–05–2074, 2006 WL 2884445, at *4–5

(M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2006) (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir.2006), rev’d on other grounds, 466 F.3d 676 (9th

Cir.2006)). In light of the conclusion that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the conspiracy covered the alleged constitutional

violations, this Court need not decide whether Plaintiffs establish a claim under this standard.

5

While it is unclear at this time what type of process was due to the Mr. and Mrs. Clark, or whether they had any opportunity to be

heard or appeal the allegedly improper adjudications, the Defendants do not argue this issue, and therefore, I need not consider it at

this time.

6

Although Plaintiff do not specify that Count V is brought pursuant to § 1962(d), this Court assumes that “conspiracy to commit

RICO” is a § 1962(d) claim.

21

Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (2010)

7

This Court recognized that Petro–Tech ultimately held that respondeat superior liability under § 1962(c) was foreclosed “insofar

as it would make the enterprise liable for RICO violations which victimized it.” Id. at 1359. However, this case is readily

distinguishable from Petro–Tech; in that case, plaintiff was trying to hold the defendant corporation liable as a participant in the

RICO activity while at the same time alleging the corporation was the RICO enterprise being corrupted. In this case, PACC is not

the enterprise for purposes of the RICO violation but is instead only alleged to be a “person” who participated in the association-in-

fact.

	   	  

22

 
 Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 1 of 341
LEAD,MM,SCR
United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania (Scranton) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:09−cv−00286−ARC

Wallace v. Powell et al Assigned to: Honorable A. Richard Caputo Related Cases: 3:09−cv−00357−ARC
3:09−cv−00291−ARC
3:09−cv−00630−ARC
3:09−cv−02535−ARC
3:10−cv−00797−ARC
3:10−cv−01405−ARC Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Florence Wallace Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated and as the parent of B.W., a minor, on behalf of her daughter individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

Date Filed: 02/12/2009 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by David S. Senoff Anapol Weiss One Logan Square 130 N. 18th St. Suite 1600 Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−735−1130 Email: dsenoff@anapolweiss.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy 1845 Walnut Street 15th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215.609.1350 Email: lfantini@cbmclaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo Cefalo & Associates 309 Wyoming Avenue West Pittston, PA 18643 570−655−5555 Fax: 6555100 Email: info@cefaloandassociates.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco Caroselli Beachler McTiernan & Conboy 1845 Walnut Street 15th Philadelphia, PA 19103 215.609.1350 Email: rdefrancesco@cbmclaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy LLC 20 Stanwix Street 7th Floor

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 2 of 341

Pittsburgh, PA 15222 412−391−9860 Email: wcaroselli@cbmclaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller Law Office of Barry H. Dyller ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeffrey Arnott

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dawn Babbitt

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 3 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Babbitt

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Clyde Backes

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 4 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joshua Backes

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Bodnar

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 5 of 341

Joann Boyle

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anthony Marsicano

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff T.B. a minor by Joyce Brown

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 6 of 341

Plaintiff Joyce Brown
Plaintiff Josh Cragle

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 7 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff E.S. a minor by Linda Donovan

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Linda Donovan

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 8 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Debra Dumas

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Fred Dumas

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 9 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff J.D. a minor by Debra Dumas

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anthony Dupak

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 10 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff K.D. a minor by Anthony Dupak

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Amanda Eddy

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 11 of 341

Plaintiff Charles Edwards TERMINATED: 04/05/2013
Plaintiff James Trocki

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 12 of 341

Plaintiff Christine Evans
Plaintiff C.E. a minor by Christine Evans
Plaintiff Julian Trevino

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 13 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Maryann Grosky

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jesse Hartman

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 14 of 341

Plaintiff Melaine Heiser
Plaintiff Joshua Heiser TERMINATED: 04/22/2013

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Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 15 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff J.B. a minor by Glen Henry

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Glen Henry

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 16 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeffrey Hoyt

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Keith Jeffrey Golomb

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 17 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Craig Daniels

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Robert Hunter

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 18 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Debra Dumas

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Ide

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 19 of 341

Plaintiff Eric Ide
Plaintiff Timothy Jones

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 20 of 341

Plaintiff Kevin Kuklinski
Plaintiff D.K. a minor by Duane Kennedy
Plaintiff Duane Kennedy

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 21 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kevin Klauss

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brittany Klein

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 22 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lori Klug

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jennifer Klug

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 23 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Kotz

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nicole Kotz

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 24 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Walter Kulic

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Raheem Armitage

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 25 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Denise Lenahan

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dyllon Rybka

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 26 of 341

Plaintiff Alex Hippeli
Plaintiff William Von Tulganburg

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 27 of 341

Plaintiff Marie Mancia
Plaintiff Anthony Mancia
Plaintiff Evan Maurer

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 28 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Mazur

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff K.M. a minor by Mesunga McCree

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 29 of 341

Plaintiff Mesunga McCree
Plaintiff Ryan McManus

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 30 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patrick Merrick

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff B.M. a minor by Mark Metzo

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 31 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mark Metzo

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Milne

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 32 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Randy Ozehoski

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eric Parsons

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 33 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mary Pearce

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Stephen Pearce

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 34 of 341

Plaintiff Jessica Silva
Plaintiff Faith Powell TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 35 of 341

Plaintiff A.K. a minor by Faith Powell
Plaintiff Tonetti Schatzel
Plaintiff John Schatzel

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 36 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff D.S. a minor by Kipp Sebo

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James John Albert Cefalo and Associates 309 Wyoming Ave West Pittston, PA 18643 570−655−5555 Email: jalbertlaw@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 37 of 341

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kipp Sebo TERMINATED: 04/22/2013

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Theodore Sherill

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kenny Shotwell

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 38 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tiffany Shotwell

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Justin Soboski

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 39 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nadine Spiker

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Spiker

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 40 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mariah Stewart

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Paul Stolarik

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 41 of 341

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff J.R. a minor by Sandra Swortzfigure

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sandra Swortzfigure

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 42 of 341

Plaintiff Ruth Ungvarsky
Plaintiff Amy Ungvarsky

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 43 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff George Vermack

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daryl Widder

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 44 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Sisk

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bruce Williams

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 45 of 341

Skyler Dane

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ashley Woolbert

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Z.Z. a minor by David Zablotney TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 46 of 341

Plaintiff David Zoblotney
Plaintiff Kyle Avery

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 47 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacqueline Bartenope

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff B.F. a minor by Jacqueline Bartenope

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 48 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff A.B. a minor by Ruth Blake

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ruth Blake

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 49 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sarah Martz

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Deborah May

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 50 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James John Albert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Raymond Naugle

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Raymond Lobman

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 51 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lacy Strong

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
D.G. a minor by Romaine Trzesniowski

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 52 of 341

Plaintiff Romaine Trzesniowski
Plaintiff Jamie Zaccagni

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 53 of 341

Plaintiff Michelle Zinga TERMINATED: 04/05/2013
Plaintiff Amanda Dombek
Plaintiff Denise Anderson

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 54 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dennis Yost

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Plaintiffs, 09−286

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 55 of 341

Plaintiff Samantha Humanik
Plaintiff William Conway

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E. Kleiner Metzger & Kleiner Two Penn Center, Suite 1204 15th Street & JFK Blvd. Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 567−6616 Fax: 215−561−6326 Email: dankleiner@verizon.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard G. Freeman Two Penn Center, Suite 1204 1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard Philadelphia, PA 19102 215−275−6473 Fax: 215−922−1599 Email: rgfrim@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb Anapol Schwartz Weiss Cohan Feldman & Smalley PC 1710 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−825−3211 Email: awalvoord@anapolschwartz.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amber M. Racine Raynes McCarty

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 56 of 341

1845 Walnut Street 20th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215255−4433 Fax: 215−988−0618 Email: amracine@raynesmccarty.com TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller Law Office of Barry H. Dyller 88 North Franklin St. Gettysburg House Wilkes−Barre, PA 18701 570−829−4860 Email: barry.dyller@dyllerlawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb Gelb Law Firm 538 Spruce Street Suite 600 Scranton, PA 18503 570−343−6383 Fax: 3437348 Email: jgelb7@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss Anapol Weiss 130 North 18th Street Suite 1600 Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−735−2098 Email: sweiss@anapolschwartz.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christian Ryan

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 57 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kevin Ryan

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tracey Rowlands

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mary Seville

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 58 of 341

Plaintiff Paige Cicardo
Plaintiff William Cicardo

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 59 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Angelia Karsko

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Rosemary Karsko

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 60 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elizabeth Habel

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Gloria Habel

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Habel

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 61 of 341

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elizabeth Lorah

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Terry Lorah

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 62 of 341

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Amanda Lorah

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tiffany Murphy

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 63 of 341

Plaintiff James Murphy
Plaintiff Stephen Fino
Plaintiff Lynn Fino

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amber M. Racine (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 64 of 341

TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jared Padden

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Padden

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 65 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Paul Schweizer

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Adam Thompson

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 66 of 341

Plaintiff Liza Charles

represented by Daniel Segal Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudlin One Logan Square 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103−6933 215−496−7003 Email: dsegal@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado Juvenile Law Center 1315 Walnut Street, 4th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−625−0551 Email: lrosado@jlc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick Juvenile Law Center 1315 Walnut Street, 4th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−625−0551 Email: mlevick@jlc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley Segal Pudlin & Schiller One Logan Square 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−496−7374 Email: rsantoro@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff William Clarke

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 67 of 341

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Glenn Cooper

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Karen Cooper

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Copeland, II

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 68 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Donna Copeland

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Copeland

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 69 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chad Derhammer

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
A.D. Through And With Her Mother And Next Friend J.E.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Dougherty

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 70 of 341

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
E.E. Through And With Their Mother And Next Friend M.F.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
K.E. Through And With Their Mother And Next Friend H.E.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 71 of 341

Plaintiff L.E. Through And With Their Mother And Next Friend
Plaintiff A.F. Through And With Their Mother And Next Friend M.F.
Plaintiff L.F. Through and With Their Mother And Next Friend M.F.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 72 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
H.T. through and with her next friend and mother, L.T.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
B.W. through and with his next friend and father, W.W.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 73 of 341

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kevin Williamson

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Mishanski

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
M.Y. through and with her next friends and parents, M.B.Y. and J.Y.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 74 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
P.S. through and with his next friend and mother, A.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
S.S. through and with his next friend and mother, R.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 75 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jessica Van Reeth

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jack Van Reeth

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff M.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 76 of 341

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Charles Balasavage, JR.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Charles Balasavage

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 77 of 341

Plaintiff Joanne Balasavage
Plaintiff Jesse Balliet
Plaintiff Sarah Myers

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 78 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Frank Weber

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Florence Myers

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 79 of 341

Plaintiff Steve Brannigan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lisa Brannigan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeffrey Bruno

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 80 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jay Bruno

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Scott Bukoski

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
D.C. through and with his next friend and mother, R.C.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 81 of 341

Plaintiff Ruth Davis
Plaintiff Carol Fronczek

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 82 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff William Dixon

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.G. through and with his next friend and mother M.O.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brian Gyle

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 83 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel M. Keene Ballard Spahr LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215.864.8276 Email: keener@ballardspahr.com TERMINATED: 01/13/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon D. Farmer Ballard Spahr LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103−7599 215−864−8221 Email: farmers@ballardspahr.com TERMINATED: 01/13/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wayne Gyle

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 84 of 341

Tracey Harvey

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
D.J. through and with his next friend and mother, S.J.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Kearns

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 85 of 341

Plaintiff Jessica Thurston
Plaintiff Barbara Thurston
Plaintiff Kurt Kruger

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 86 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
All Plaintiffs, 09−291 CONWAY, et al

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amber M. Racine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Kleiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily C. Keller Juvenile Law Center 1315 Walnut Street 4th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−625−0551 Email: ekeller@jlc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 87 of 341

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard G. Freeman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
All Plaintiffs, 09−357 H.T., et al

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Kleiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily C. Keller (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2016

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 88 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard G. Freeman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Neha Desai 1315 Walnut Street Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−625−0551 Email: ndesai@jlc.org TERMINATED: 06/23/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 89 of 341

J.D.F. Through And With His Next Friend And Mother M.W.

Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.F. Through And With His Next Friend And Mother A.I.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Alexandra Fahey

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 90 of 341

Plaintiff L.H. Through And With Her Next Friend And Mother J.M.
Plaintiff Michael Haines
Plaintiff Barbara Haines

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 91 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward Kane, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brianna Kee

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 92 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Kopetchny

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Magee Mott

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
G.M. Through And With His Next Friend And Mother M.F.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 93 of 341

Plaintiff Krystal Pope
Plaintiff Lisa Scarbrough

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 94 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laurie Scarbrough

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Marshond Seward

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.S. Through And With His Next Friend And Mother C.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 95 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chad Uca

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
W.U. Through And With His Next Friend And Mother D.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 96 of 341

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
B.R.W. Through And With His Next Friends And Parents C.W. And S.W. On Behalf Of Themselves And All Others Similarly Situated

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Ashford, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Donna Ashford

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 97 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Shane Bly

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
G.B. Through And With His Next Friend And Parents J.B. And P.P.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 98 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daryl Charles

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.M.K. through and with his next friend and mother B.T.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward Kenzakoski, III

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 99 of 341

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.K. through and with his next friend and father, A.K.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff B.L.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 100 of 341

Plaintiff Anthony Millan
Plaintiff Anthony Millan
Plaintiff Damon Millan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha L. Levick

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 101 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cindy Millan

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Paul Morgan, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 102 of 341

Plaintiff Steven Palchanis, Jr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steven Palchanis, Sr.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jamie Quinn

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 103 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
K.R. through and with his next friend and mother, T.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Rowlands

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 104 of 341

Plaintiff Mary Seville

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael S. Scarlato

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael P. Scarlato

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 105 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tina Scarlato

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
A.S. through and with his next friend and father G.S.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 106 of 341

James Swartley

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Vitali

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
M.M.W. through and with her next friend and guardian J.C.

represented by Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 107 of 341

Plaintiff Bernard Wallace
Plaintiff Nancy Henry TERMINATED: 04/05/2013
Plaintiff Teresa Metzo
Plaintiff David Quick
Plaintiff Arthur Blake TERMINATED: 04/05/2013
Plaintiff

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 108 of 341

Michelle Martz

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joelle Angeli

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Maria Brooks

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Melanie Coxe

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Heath Houseknecht

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bridget DeFalco

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Zachary Richards

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 109 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dawn Evans

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Evans Charles

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff K. E.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Heather Evans

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Gazdziak

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Rebecca Gazdziak

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 110 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Peter Huff

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laura Kilheeney

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tiffany Wren

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Kulp

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff D. K.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dale Kropa

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 111 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Debra Kropa

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Lombard

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jack Lombard

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Maguschak

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Rodriquez

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anthony Morales

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 112 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Morgans

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kelcy Morgans

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff C. U.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Desiree Parduski

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Catherine Schmeer

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Karlie Schmeer

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 113 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mark Soltis

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff C. W.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chantell Welch

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eric Davis

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kathleen Brekke

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Britny Cunnington

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 114 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff J. W.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James John Albert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Annie Bryant

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lloyd Bryant

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kimberly Delaney Goggin

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nicholas Jamilowski

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 115 of 341

Plaintiff K. J.
Plaintiff Tracey Jarmon
Plaintiff Derek Klick
Plaintiff Larry M. Muhlenberg, Jr.
Plaintiff Deanna O'Boyle
Plaintiff Donna Olsen
Plaintiff

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 116 of 341

J.C. P.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wanda Pacheco

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Justin Rosser

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brandon Schmeer

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elise Wallace

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Wallace

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 117 of 341

Maureen Stinson TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Stepfhon Edwards, Jr.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff L.M. K.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Pinkey Brooks TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chyna Reese

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joel Foster

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 118 of 341

Lori Shusta TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anthony Lavin

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Geoff Presley

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christopher Bower

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Alissa Conahan

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elaine Macri

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cynthia Ide

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 119 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christina Tremblay

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Robert Klein

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eileen Maurer

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lisa Mazur

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
David Mazur TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff William Parsons

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 120 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carri Perna

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jane Everett

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Natalie Woolbert

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dennis Yost, Sr.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ian Alexander

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Fronczkiewicz

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 121 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Babbitt, III

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Marlin Boehmer TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jeremy Boehmer TERMINATED: 04/22/2013

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carl N. Busch

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kim Riccio

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brock Riccio

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 122 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Salko, Jr.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Keith Perschau

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mary Ellen Balliet

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lisa Brock

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steve Fromel

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joshua Fromel

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 123 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff S. S.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Johnson

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Wrhel

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Heather Walton

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wayne Allen Hunter, III

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Avery

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 124 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Donna Roman

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff E. E.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James John Albert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Heather Evans

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Heather Lake

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cristal Lee Mutua

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 125 of 341

Plaintiff Necia Gazdziak
Plaintiff Douglas Klug
Plaintiff Colleen Kluchinsky
Plaintiff John Stolarik
Plaintiff Joyce Stolarik
Plaintiff C.A. M.
Plaintiff

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 126 of 341

Debbie Martin

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Margaret McGrath TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nicholas Miller

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff April Roman

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Timothy Bantell

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Stacey Hvizda

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christopher Hughes

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 127 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kelly M. Grey−Wasielewski

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Austra

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Angela Bezdziecki

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Linda Bezdzeicki

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff L. E.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James M. Hughes

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 128 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christina Jennings

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jason Kisthardt

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff T. L.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lynn Downs

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Lomascolo

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff A. M.

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 129 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ardest Maldonado

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff S. N.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Stephanie Parsons

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Alan Parsons

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daniella Ormsby

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Autumn Parry

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 130 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff B. P.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dorothy Jackson−Pearyer

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kylie Scheleble

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ashton Schelble

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Paul DePrimo

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph DePrimo

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 131 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff G. S.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Angela Davis

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michelle Yurkanin

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Alexander Lomascolo

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cynthia Lomascolo

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeremiah Lenchick

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 132 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Sieminski

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Baily Sieminski−Hess

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff R. O.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laura O'Gorman

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eric Drouse, Sr.

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Erica Drouse

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 133 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Andrew Kuklinski

represented by William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff All Plaintiffs, 09−630

represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Kleiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily C. Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 134 of 341

Plaintiff All Plaintiffs, 09−286

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard G. Freeman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adrianne Walvoord Webb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Kleiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Segal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily C. Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Johanna L. Gelb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lourdes M. Rosado (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 135 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marsha L. Levick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sol H. Weiss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James John Albert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J. Fantini Anapol Schwartz 1710 Spruce St. Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−790−4559 Fax: 215−627−2665 Email: jfantini@anapolschwartz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard G. Freeman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dakota Jadush

represented by Daniel E. Kleiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carl Andrews

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 136 of 341

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff T.B, a minor by Viola Belt

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Viola Belt TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 137 of 341

Plaintiff M.B., a minor by Angela Breznak
Plaintiff Angela Breznak

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 138 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
CC, a minor by by Theresa Carannante

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Theresa Carannante

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 139 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Aubri Yefko

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Shane Balliet

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 140 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeremy Bevan

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ronni Blight

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 141 of 341

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Deborah Seeman

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Justin Bodnar

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 142 of 341

Plaintiff Luis Cruz
Plaintiff Mayra Cruz
Plaintiff Megan Fox

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 143 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christopher Garrison

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Gilvary

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 144 of 341

Plaintiff Theresa Hadvance
Plaintiff George Hadvance

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 145 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jessica Hargrave

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Lekiewicz

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 146 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christine Biniek

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elizabeth Ludwig

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 147 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Adam Lutz

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jesse Sabecky

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 148 of 341

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dave Sabecky

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Derek Sippel

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 149 of 341

Plaintiff Daniel Stiegelbauer
Plaintiff Claudia Stiegelbauer

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 150 of 341

Plaintiff Malcolm Yaple
Plaintiff Lauren Yaple
Plaintiff Karen Adamski

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren C. Fantini (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Cefalo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard C. DeFrancesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Caroselli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 151 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacqueline Kenney

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dorothy Backes

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ida Kravitz

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lazaro Gonzalez

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Phillip Jadush

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mario Katona

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 152 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Collin Kaye

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeff Kehler

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kneller Jesse

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Kneller

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Darlene Jones

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Amanda McDavitt

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 153 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Peter Mindick

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brittney Rushton

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JoAnne Gattuso

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kaitlyn Serota

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laurelle Serota

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carl Smith

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 154 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Linda Smith

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lisa Kneller

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Deborah Pringle

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Harry Witko

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Josh Bevan

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kristin Smith TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 155 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Janet Castrignano

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Davis

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brenda Dalzell

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Drahaus

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Drahaus

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tina Drahaus

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 156 of 341

David Folweiler

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff L.F, a minor by Michelle Fuqua

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sarah Gonzalez

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lazaro Gonzalez

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Hall

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michelle Hall

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jettie Johnson

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 157 of 341

Plaintiff Damien Kratz
Plaintiff Matthew Mikolaichik
Plaintiff Jason Miller
Plaintiff Jamie Nicholson
Plaintiff Robert Novac
Plaintiff Patricia Cooper
Plaintiff Alexander Pierce

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 158 of 341

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Keith Polerecki

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff T.S., a minor by Bobbi Hargrove

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Keith Soto

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ely Soto

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ashley Acri

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cindy Lehan

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Frank Andrukaitis

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Taylor Warman

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 159 of 341

Michelle Cardinale

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ryan Arcangeli

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Arcangeli

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Balbach

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Louise Balbach

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nicholas Biros

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nancy Biros

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joshua Brotzman

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elizabeth Brotzman

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Vincent Burgio

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Campbell

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Vincent Cirello

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 160 of 341

Plaintiff Cheryl Magoski
Plaintiff J. D.
Plaintiff K. D.
Plaintiff K. D.
Plaintiff Jeremy DeAngelo
Plaintiff Roxanne DeAngelo
Plaintiff James DeAngelo
Plaintiff Dezare Dunbar
Plaintiff Maurisa Dunbar
Plaintiff C. E., Jr.
Plaintiff C. E., Sr.
Plaintiff P. E.

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 161 of 341

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Antoine Evans

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kimberly Rhodes

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Alex Ferrence

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Ferrence

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lousia Ferrence

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff D. F.

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff R. S.

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Colleen Gembitski

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jared Goodwin

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Colby Gronski

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Larry Hallock, II

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 162 of 341

Plaintiff Nancy Kulp
Plaintiff Michael Hodle
Plaintiff Barbara Craig
Plaintiff Joseph Homanko, Jr.
Plaintiff Joseph Homanko, Sr.
Plaintiff Lisa Homanko
Plaintiff Peter Echon
Plaintiff Colleen Bradigan TERMINATED: 04/05/2013
Plaintiff Michael Inman
Plaintiff Lisa Naugle

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 163 of 341

Plaintiff Abigail Sterowski

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff K. S.

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff L. N.

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christopher Lane

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Lynch

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Lynch

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jared Mason

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Mattie, Jr.

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steven Mattie

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lisa Mattie

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bree McCabe

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 164 of 341

Plaintiff Michelle McCabe
Plaintiff Thomas McCabe
Plaintiff Christopher McDermott
Plaintiff Charmaine Yarger
Plaintiff Michelle Nguyen
Plaintiff Kyle Pennington
Plaintiff Brian Pennington
Plaintiff John Perea
Plaintiff M. P.
Plaintiff T. P.
Plaintiff Robert Rogo
Plaintiff Barbara Rogo

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 165 of 341

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chad Solarek

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bonnie Nelson

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward Solimini

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kimbell Stanford, III

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Foster

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Justin Steele

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jonathan Stewart

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Elvis Tejeda

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Evelyn Fernandez

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Justina Toole

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patrice Lingle

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 166 of 341

Plaintiff Mallerie Ungvarsky
Plaintiff Dwayne Vanderhoff, Jr
Plaintiff Margaret Vanderhoff
Plaintiff Joshua Vanderhoff
Plaintiff Wilve Veras
Plaintiff Donald Wallace
Plaintiff Tyler Werts
Plaintiff Donald Werts
Plaintiff Daniel Wilde
Plaintiff Richard Williams, Jr
Plaintiff Leann Crise

represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 167 of 341

Plaintiff James Crise
Plaintiff Rebecca Hodle
Plaintiff Elizabeth Lorenz
Plaintiff Timothy Vassello
Plaintiff Norm Demming
Plaintiff Melissa Bonilla Plaintiff Eugenio Bonilla Plaintiff Andre Minucci

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 168 of 341

Plaintiff Wayne Dawn
Plaintiff Angela Rimmer Belanger
Plaintiff Kelly Farmer

represented by Timothy R. Hough Jaffe & Hough 1907 Two Penn Center Plaza 15th St. & John F. Kennedy Boulevard Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 564−5200 Fax: 12155638729 Email: jafhough@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Arnold Levin Levin Fishbein Sedran & Berman 510 Walnut Street Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−592−1500 Email: alevin@lfsblaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel C. Levin Levin Sedran & Berman 510 Walnut Street Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−592−1500 Email: dlevin@lfsblaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elmer Robert Keach , III Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, PC One Pine West Plaza Suite 109 Albany, NY 12205 518.434.1718 Email: bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Arnold Levin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel C. Levin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 169 of 341

Plaintiff Joseph Rimmer
Plaintiff Zane Farmer
Plaintiff Raul Clark

Elmer Robert Keach , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Arnold Levin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel C. Levin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elmer Robert Keach , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Arnold Levin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel C. Levin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elmer Robert Keach , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bridget E. Montgomery Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC 213 Market St 8th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17101 717−237−6054 Fax: 717−237−6019 Email: bmontgomery@eckertseamans.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David J. Schertz

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 170 of 341

Department of State Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs P.O Box 2649 Harrisburg, PA 17105 717−783−7200 Email: dschertz@pa.gov TERMINATED: 01/23/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Fazio Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP One Speedwell Avenue Headquarters Plaza P.O. box 1981 Morristown, NJ 07962 973−451−8438 Email: mfazio@riker.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael P. O'Mullan Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP One Speedwell Avenue Morristown, NJ 07962 973−451−8520 Email: momullan@riker.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony Valenziano Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti, LLP One Speedwall Avenue Headquarters Plaza Morristown, NJ 07962 973−451−8514 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bruce Clark

represented by Bridget E. Montgomery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David J. Schertz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/23/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Fazio (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael P. O'Mullan

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 171 of 341

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony Valenziano (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Iraida Clark

represented by Bridget E. Montgomery (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David J. Schertz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/23/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Fazio (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael P. O'Mullan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony Valenziano (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacqueline Bezak

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Freddy Calle

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ryan Cordy

represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 172 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Gockley

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Gockley

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Natalie Gunshannon

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Keiling

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kyle Laton

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Timonthy Morrison, Jr.

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 173 of 341

Plaintiff Timothy Morrison, Sr.
Plaintiff Paul Rosengrant
Plaintiff Ronda Rosengrant
Plaintiff Barry Gately
Plaintiff Nikita Shumway
Plaintiff Preston Smith
Plaintiff Dana Shumway

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James John Albert

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 174 of 341

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Mazza

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Amanda McDonald

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Travis Lakey

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Amber Donnelly

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Calandra Hummell

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ashley Sabanos

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tristan Brennan

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 175 of 341

Plaintiff Catherine Hughes
Plaintiff Frank Mason
Plaintiff Joseph Cordick
Plaintiff Vanessa Klein
Plaintiff Kermit Olivier
Plaintiff Katheryn Turner TERMINATED: 04/05/2013
Plaintiff Sonya Ormsby

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 176 of 341

David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff George Walton

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Edwards

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Gary Smith

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Lois Andrews TERMINATED: 04/05/2013

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carl Andrews

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Davis, Sr.

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 177 of 341

Plaintiff John McDermott
Plaintiff Kathleen Evans
Plaintiff Katelyn Fialko
Plaintiff Richard Ford
Plaintiff Mary Osterwell
Plaintiff Kristopher Beckhorn
Plaintiff Carl Craig

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 178 of 341

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matthew Daley

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff William Daley

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kevin Naylor

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Devon Hughes

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ajanee Wright

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daniel Yale

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff DeeDee Jones

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 179 of 341

Plaintiff Frank Coyle
Plaintiff Sandy Coyle
Plaintiff Amy Centurione
Plaintiff Adam Kamus
Plaintiff Jonathan Condry
Plaintiff Patrick Shanahan Plaintiff Lance Warnagiris

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry H. Dyller

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 180 of 341

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brian Shaffer

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff David Hartranft

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daniel David

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Cebula, Jr.

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jean Scott

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joyce Prebula

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Maxwell Howe

represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 181 of 341

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Petitioner Attorney Stephen A. Seach

represented by Stephen A. Seach The Seach Law Offices 30 North Old Turnpike Road Suite B Drums, PA 18222 5703593283 Fax: 5703593284 Email: sseach.attorney@gmail.com PRO SE
Stephen A. Seach The Seach Law Offices 53 West Foothills Drive Drums, PA 18222 570−359−3283 Email: sseach@seachlawoffice.com TERMINATED: 11/10/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Movant Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts
Movant Jeffrey S Feldman
Movant Jessica L Richman

represented by Michael P. Daley Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, AOPC 1515 Market Street Suite 1414 Philadelphia, PA 19102−1913 215.560.6300 Email: legaldepartment@pacourts.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jeffrey S Feldman Montgomery McCracken 123 South Broad St., 24th Fl. Philadelphia, PA 19109−1099 215−772−1500 Email: jfeldman@mmwr.com PRO SE
Mark B. Sheppard Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads 123 S. Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19109 215−772−7235 Email: msheppard@mmwr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jessica L Richman Montgomery McCracken 123 South Broad St., 24th Fl.

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 182 of 341

Philadelphia, PA 19109−1099 215−772−1500 Email: jrichman@mmwr.com PRO SE

Mark B. Sheppard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Mark B. Sheppard

represented by Mark B. Sheppard Montgomery McCracken 123 South Broad St., 24th Fl. Philadelphia, PA 19109−1099 215−772−1500 Email: msheppard@mmwr.com PRO SE

Mark B. Sheppard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry H. Dyller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Robert J. Powell TERMINATED: 12/22/2015

represented by Jeffrey S Feldman Starfield & Smith, P.C. 1300 Virginia Drive Suite 325 Fort Washington, PA 19034 267−470−1231 Fax: 215−542−0723 Email: jfeldman@starfieldsmith.com TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jane S. Sebelin Sebelin Law Offices PC 120 South First Street Lehighton, PA 18235 610−377−4800 Email: jane@sebelinlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/23/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica L. Richman Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP 123 South Broad 24th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19109 215−772−7472 Email: jrichman@mmwr.com TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph V. Sebelin , Jr. Sebelin Law Offices, PC

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 183 of 341

120 South First Street Lehighton, PA 18235 610−377−4800 Email: joe@sebelinlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/23/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark B. Sheppard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M Sinaiko Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 212−715−9258 Email: ssinaiko@kramerlevin.com TERMINATED: 11/16/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen S Stallings The Osterling Building 228 Isabella Street Pittsburgh, PA 15212 412−735−3206 Email: attorney@stevestallingslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tobias B Jacoby Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP TERMINATED: 11/16/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Michael T. Conahan

represented by Michael T. Conahan 15009−067 COLEMAN LOW FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION Inmate Mail/Parcels P.O. BOX 1031 COLEMAN, FL 33521 PRO SE

Philip Gelso Law Offices of Philip Gelso 63 Pierce Street Kingston, PA 18704 570−763−0006 Email: pgelso@gelsolaw.com TERMINATED: 08/31/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Mark A Ciavarella, Jr.

represented by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr. 15008−067 WILLIAMSBURG SPECIAL MAIL − OPEN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE INMATE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION Inmate Mail/Parcels

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 184 of 341

P.O. BOX 340 SALTERS, SC 29590 PRO SE

Defendant
PA Child Care, LLC TERMINATED: 07/07/2014

represented by Bernard M Schneider Brucker Schneider & Porter 300 Weyman Road Suite 320 Pittsburgh, PA 15236 412−881−6620 Email: bmschn@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel B. Huyett Stevens & Lee 111 North Sixth Street P.O. Box 679 Reading, PA 19603−0679 (610) 478−2219 Email: dbh@stevenslee.com TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald E. Wieand , Jr. Stevens & Lee 190 Brodhead Road Suite 200 P.O. Box 20830 Lehigh Valley, PA 18002−0830 610−997−5071 Email: dew@stevenslee.com TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Schwartzman Stevens & Lee 1818 Market Street 29th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−751−2863 Fax: 610−371−7980 Email: JCSC@stevenslee.com TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Vipond , III Buchanan Ingersoll 409 North Second Street Suite 500 Harrisburg, PA 17101−1357 717−233−7444 TERMINATED: 05/12/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne J. Gilmartin Stevens & Lee, PC 425 Spruce St. Ste 300

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 185 of 341

Scranton, PA 18503 (570) 343−1827 Email: mjg@stevenslee.com TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William G. Brucker 300 Weyman Road Suite 320 Pittsburgh, PA 15236 412−881−6620 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert K Mericle TERMINATED: 12/14/2012

represented by Alison Tanchyk Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103−2921 215.963.5847 Email: atanchyk@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Kraeutler Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−963−4840 Email: ekraeutler@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph B.G. Fay Morgan Lewis & Bockius 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215/963−5000 Email: jfay@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly D. Borland Borland & Borland 69 Public Square 11th Floor Wilkes−Barre, PA 18701 570−822−3311 Email: kborland@borlandandborland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J.D. Hogan Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−963−4681 Email: mjdhogan@morganlewis.com TERMINATED: 04/29/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathan J. Andrisani

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 186 of 341

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−963−5362 Email: nathan.andrisani@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth S. Borland Borland & Borland, L.L.P. 69 Public Square Suite 1100 Wilkes−Barre, PA 18701 570−822−3311 Email: rborland@borlandandborland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mericle Construction, Inc. TERMINATED: 12/14/2012

represented by Alison Tanchyk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Kraeutler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph B.G. Fay (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly D. Borland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J.D. Hogan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/29/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathan J. Andrisani (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth S. Borland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Gregory Zappala TERMINATED: 01/10/2012

represented by Donna L. Adelsberger Donna Adelsberger & Associates, P.C. 6 Royal Avenue PO Box 530 Glenside, PA 19038 215−576−8690 Email: dadelsberger@dlalawyers.com TERMINATED: 09/25/2013

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 187 of 341

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Howard Wishnoff Donna Adelsberger & Associates PC 6 Royal Avenue PO Box 530 Glenside, PA 19038 215.576.8690 Email: hwishnoff@dlalawyers.com TERMINATED: 09/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan J. Wiener Forry Ullman 150 S. Warner Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 610−977−4124 Email: swiener@forryullman.com TERMINATED: 07/06/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC

represented by Demetrius W. Fannick 297 Pierce St. Kingston, PA 18704 570−283−3191 Email: dwfesq@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Gelso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin M. Walsh 297−299 Pierce Street Kingston, PA 18704 (717) 283−3041 Fax: 570−283−2778 Email: KMWesq@aol.com TERMINATED: 05/19/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole F Bednarek Bednarek & Stahl 63 West River Street Wilkes−Barre, PA 18702 570−270−7070 Fax: 570−270−7075 Email: nfbesq@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen D. Rhoades Law Offices of Edward McNeels 19 East Broad St Hazleton, PA 18201 570−455−6335 Fax: 4543651 Email: rhoadeslegal@hotmail.com

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 188 of 341

TERMINATED: 01/18/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Barbara Conahan TERMINATED: 08/24/2010

represented by Edward P. McNelis McNelis Law 19 East Broad Street Hazleton, PA 18201 570−455−6335 Fax: 570−454−3651 Email: nedmcnelis@mcnelislaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen D. Rhoades (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Cindy Ciavarella TERMINATED: 08/24/2010

represented by Edward P. McNelis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen D. Rhoades (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc.

represented by Philip Gelso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Vision Holdings, LLC

represented by Jane S. Sebelin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/23/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jessica L. Richman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph V. Sebelin , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/30/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark B. Sheppard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen A. Seach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/10/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M Sinaiko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/16/2016

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 189 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen S Stallings (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tobias B Jacoby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/16/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Joe Doe Esquire

Defendant
Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp. TERMINATED: 07/07/2014

represented by Bernard M Schneider (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel B. Huyett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald E. Wieand , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donna L. Adelsberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Howard Wishnoff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/25/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Schwartzman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Vipond , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marianne J. Gilmartin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan J. Wiener

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 190 of 341

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/06/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Powell Law Group, P.C. TERMINATED: 12/22/2015

represented by Jane S. Sebelin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/23/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John M. Steidle Burns White LLC Burns White Center 48 26th Street Pittsburgh, PA 15222 412.995.3106 Email: jmsteidle@burnswhite.com TERMINATED: 12/17/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura E Benson Burns White LLC Four Northshore Center 106 Isabella Street Pittsburgh, PA 15212 412−995−3085 Email: lebenson@burnswhite.com TERMINATED: 11/13/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura E. Caravello Burns White Four Northshore Center 106 Isabella St Pittsburgh, PA 15212 4129953244 Email: lecaravello@burnswhite.com TERMINATED: 11/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen A. Seach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/10/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen S Stallings (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Sandra Brullo TERMINATED: 09/01/2009

represented by John Flounlacker Thomas, Thomas & Hafer 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108−0999 (717) 237−7134 Fax: 17172377105 Email: jflounlacker@tthlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott D. McCarroll Thomas Thomas & Hafer LLP 305 North Front Street

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 191 of 341

P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108−0999 717−237−7131 Email: smccarroll@tthlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Suzanne McDonough Holsten & Associates One Olive Street Media, PA 19091 610−627−8307 Email: smcdonough@holstenassoc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Frank Vita, Ph.D. TERMINATED: 09/15/2010

represented by James A. Swetz 711 Sarah Street Stroudsburg, PA 18360 570−421−5568 Email: jaswetz@csmjlawyer.com TERMINATED: 09/15/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Luzerne County TERMINATED: 07/09/2010

represented by Deborah H. Simon Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski Union Meeting Corporate Center V 925 Harvest Dr Suite 3010 Blue Bell, PA 19422 215−977−1000 Email: dhs@elliottgreenleaf.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John G. Dean Elliott Greenleaf & Dean 201 Penn Avenue Suite 202 Scranton, PA 18503 570−346−7569 Email: jgd@elliottgreenleaf.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy T. Myers Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski Union Meeting Corporate Center V. 925 Harvest Drive Blue Bell, PA 19422 (215) 977−1000 Email: ttm@elliottgreenleaf.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Perseus House, Inc. d/b/a Andromeda House TERMINATED: 07/18/2012

represented by Thomas Edward Brenner Caldwell & Kearns, PC 3631 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 232−7661 Fax: 717−232−2766 Email: TBrenner@cklegal.net

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 192 of 341

TERMINATED: 07/18/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Michael Loughney Individually And In His Official Capacity As Chief Juvenile Probation Officer of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

represented by Suzanne McDonough (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Luzerne County TERMINATED: 11/30/2011

represented by Deborah H. Simon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy T. Myers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Maureen Loughney As Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Loughney

represented by Suzanne McDonough (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert Matta TERMINATED: 09/01/2009

Defendant Vision Holdings, Inc.

represented by Mark B. Sheppard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane S. Sebelin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/23/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M Sinaiko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/16/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen S Stallings (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tobias B Jacoby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/16/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Sandra Brulo

represented by Scott D. McCarroll (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 193 of 341

Suzanne McDonough (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Barbara Conahan TERMINATED: 08/24/2010

represented by Edward P. McNelis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Cindy Ciavarella TERMINATED: 08/24/2010

represented by Edward P. McNelis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen D. Rhoades (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Gregory Zappala TERMINATED: 01/10/2012

represented by Bernard M Schneider (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc.

Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr.

represented by Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. 15008−067 WILLIAMSBURG SPECIAL MAIL − OPEN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE INMATE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION Inmate Mail/Parcels P.O. BOX 340 SALTERS, SC 29590 PRO SE

Defendant Michael T. Conahan

Defendant County of Luzerne

represented by Deborah H. Simon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John G. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy T. Myers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 194 of 341

Defendant Greg Skrepenak TERMINATED: 11/30/2011
Defendant Todd Vanderheid TERMINATED: 11/30/2011
Defendant Sam Guesto TERMINATED: 11/30/2011
Defendant Sandra Brulo

Harry G. Mahoney Deasey, Mahone Valentini & North LTD 1601 Market Street Suite 3400 Philadelphia, PA 19103−2301 (215) 587−9400 Email: hgmahoney@dmvlawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah H. Simon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy T. Myers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah H. Simon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy T. Myers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah H. Simon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy T. Myers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott D. McCarroll (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 195 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Suzanne McDonough (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation TERMINATED: 11/30/2011

represented by Deborah H. Simon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John G. Dean (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy T. Myers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel A. Falcone , Jr. Saporito, Falcone & Watt 490 North Main St. Suite 202 Pittston, PA 18640 570−654−4643 Email: sfalcone@saporitofalcone.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert Mericle TERMINATED: 12/14/2012

represented by Alison Tanchyk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Kraeutler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph B.G. Fay (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly D. Borland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J.D. Hogan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/29/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathan J. Andrisani (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 196 of 341

Defendant Mericle Construction, Inc. TERMINATED: 12/14/2012
Defendant Western PA Child Care, LLC TERMINATED: 07/07/2014

represented by Alison Tanchyk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Kraeutler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph B.G. Fay (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimberly D. Borland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J.D. Hogan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/29/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathan J. Andrisani (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel B. Huyett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald E. Wieand , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Schwartzman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Vipond , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bernard M Schneider (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marianne J. Gilmartin Stevens & Lee, PC TERMINATED: 06/14/2016

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 197 of 341

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mid−Atlantic Child Youth Services, Inc. TERMINATED: 07/07/2014

represented by Bernard M Schneider (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Howard Wishnoff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/25/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert J Powell TERMINATED: 12/22/2015

represented by Jessica L. Richman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark B. Sheppard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/02/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane S. Sebelin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/23/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M Sinaiko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/16/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen S Stallings (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tobias B Jacoby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/16/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc.

Defendant John Doe Defendants Nos. 1−10

Defendant John Doe Entities Nos. 1−10

Defendant Todd Vonderheid

represented by Deborah H. Simon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy T. Myers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 198 of 341

V. Respondent Judge Arthur E. Grim
Objector Plymouth Borogh
Objector Wright Township Objector Plains Township
Objector . Fairview Township
Objector Hanover Township

represented by A. Taylor Williams Administrative Office of PA Courts 1515 Market Street Suite 1414 Philadelphia, PA 19102 215−560−6300 Fax: 12155605486 Email: legaldepartment@pacourts.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael R. Kostelansky 340 Market St. Kingston, PA 18704 570−283−5800 Email: mkostelansky@frontier.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael R. Kostelansky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen A. Menn 225 Wyoming Ave. West Pittston, PA 18643 570−654−4441 Fax: 6558616 Email: sdlmen@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Donald H. Brobst Rosenn Jenkins & Greenwald 15 S. Franklin Street Wilkes−Barre, PA 18711−0075 570−826−5655 Email: dbrobst@rjglaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J. Campenni Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, LLP 15 South Franklin Street Wilkes−Barre, PA 18711 (570) 826−5652 Fax: 570−706−3437 Email: tcampenni@rjglaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert V. Davison 480 Pierce Street Suite 216 Kingston, PA 18704

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 199 of 341

570−331−2483 Fax: 3312493 Email: rdavison@epix.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Objector Swoyersville Borough

represented by Joseph J. Yeager Law Offices of Joseph J. Yeager 1208 Wyoming Ave. Forty Fort, PA 18704 570−288−6050 Fax: 570−288−6080 Email: yeagerlaw@epix.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miscellaneous Party Kingston Borough Police Department

represented by Harry P. Mattern 777 Wyoming Avenue Kingston, PA 18704 570−288−3363 Fax: 570−288−2363 Email: mattern@epix.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Amicus Amici Curiae Proposed Amici Curiae
Amicus D.B., a minor by Dawn Bosworth

represented by Sara B. Richman Pepper Hamilton LLP 3000 Two Logan Square 18th and Arch Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 215.981.4658 Fax: 215.359.1869 Email: richmans@pepperlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David S. Senoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Rice Township

represented by William E. Vinsko , Jr. Vinsko & Associates, P.C. 253 South Franklin Street Wilkes−Barre, PA 18701 570−970−9700 Fax: 570.970.9711 Email: wvinsko@vinsko.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/13/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against all defendants ( Filing fee $350, Receipt Number 1498515), filed by Florence Wallace. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(ga, ) (Entered: 02/13/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 200 of 341

02/20/2009 02/25/2009
03/04/2009
03/04/2009
03/04/2009
03/04/2009 03/04/2009 03/04/2009 03/05/2009
03/05/2009
03/05/2009
03/05/2009 03/05/2009 03/05/2009 03/06/2009
03/06/2009 03/06/2009 03/06/2009

2 LETTER ORDER Re: Case Assignment and Procedures Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/20/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/23/2009)
3 AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by all Plaintiff's . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Information, # 2 Exhibit(s) Plea Agreements, # 3 Exhibit(s) Audit)(Cefalo, Michael) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/26/2009: # 4 Amended Complaint) (jam, ). Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 02/25/2009)
4 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Richard C. DeFrancesco on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Richard C. DeFrancesco is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001514024.. (DeFrancesco, Richard) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
5 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by David S. Senoff on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney David S. Senoff is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001514049.. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
6 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Lauren C. Fantini on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Lauren C. Fantini is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001514096.. (Fantini, Lauren) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by David S. Senoff on behalf of all plaintiffs (Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Lauren C. Fantini on behalf of all plaintiffs (Fantini, Lauren) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard C. DeFrancesco on behalf of all plaintiffs (DeFrancesco, Richard) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
10 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by David S. Senoff on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney David S. Senoff is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001515543.. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
11 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Lauren C. Fantini on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Lauren C. Fantini is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001515546.. (Fantini, Lauren) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
12 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Richard C. DeFrancesco on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Richard C. DeFrancesco is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001515600.. (DeFrancesco, Richard) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
13 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Richard C. DeFrancesco, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/5/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
14 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Lauren C. Fantini, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/5/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
15 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to David S. Senoff, Esq. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/5/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
16 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by William R. Caroselli on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney William R. Caroselli is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001517221.. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by William R. Caroselli on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Edward P. McNelis on behalf of Cindy Ciavarella (McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by Edward P. McNelis on behalf of Barbara Conahan (McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 03/06/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 201 of 341

03/06/2009 03/06/2009 03/09/2009 03/09/2009 03/11/2009 03/11/2009 03/11/2009 03/12/2009 03/13/2009 03/13/2009
03/13/2009 03/16/2009
03/17/2009 03/17/2009
03/17/2009
03/17/2009 03/17/2009 03/17/2009 03/18/2009 03/19/2009
03/20/2009

20 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Florence Wallace. Barbara Conahan waiver sent on 2/25/2009, answer due 4/27/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
21 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Florence Wallace. Cindy Ciavarella waiver sent on 2/17/2009, answer due 4/20/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Edward P. McNelis. (jc) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
22 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to William R. Caroselli, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/9/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
23 NOTICE of Appearance by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
24 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Florence Wallace. Barbara Conahan waiver sent on 3/9/2009, answer due 5/8/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
25 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Florence Wallace. Cindy Ciavarella waiver sent on 3/9/2009, answer due 5/8/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
26 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen D. Rhoades on behalf of Barbara Conahan (Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
27 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Florence Wallace. Frank Vita, Ph.D. waiver sent on 3/10/2009, answer due 5/11/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
28 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Florence Wallace. Mericle Construction, Inc. waiver sent on 3/7/2009, answer due 5/6/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
29 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Florence Wallace. Robert K Mericle waiver sent on 3/7/2009, answer due 5/6/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
30 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Bernard M Schneider on behalf of Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC Attorney Bernard Schneider is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001524109.. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/16/2009)
31 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Plead by all Plaintiff's . (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/17/2009)
32 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Plead for Defendant PA Child Care, LLC by all Plaintiff's . (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/17/2009)
33 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Plead for Western PA Child Care, LLC by all Plaintiff's . (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/17/2009)
34 Subpoena To Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department by Florence Wallace.. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
35 Proof of Service − Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department by Florence Wallace. 34 Document Filed. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
36 Proof of Service − Luzerne County Solicitor by Florence Wallace. 34 Document Filed. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
37 NOTICE of Appearance by James A. Swetz on behalf of Frank Vita, Ph.D.. (Swetz, James) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
38 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Bernard M. Schneider, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/19/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
39 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Plead for Defendant Frank Vita by all Plaintiff's . (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/20/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 202 of 341

03/20/2009 03/23/2009 03/23/2009
03/23/2009
03/23/2009 03/23/2009 03/23/2009 03/23/2009 03/23/2009
03/23/2009 03/23/2009 03/23/2009 03/24/2009 03/24/2009 03/25/2009 03/25/2009 03/26/2009 03/26/2009

40 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's . Western PA Child Cared, LLC waiver sent on 3/17/2009, answer due 5/18/2009. (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/20/2009)
41 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's . Western PA Child Cared, LLC waiver sent on 2/17/2009, answer due 5/18/2009. (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/23/2009)
42 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. Attorney Nathan J. Andrisani is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001530051.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
43 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. Attorney Matthew J. D. Hogan is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001530064.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
44 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint served on Mark A. Ciavarella on 02/17/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
45 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint served on Powell Law Group on 02/17/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
46 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint served on Robert J. Powell on 02/17/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
47 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's . Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp. waiver sent on 2/17/2009, answer due 4/20/2009. (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/23/2009)
48 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. Attorney Eric Kraeutler is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001530088.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
49 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint served on Robert J. Powell, Defendant's Representative on 03/10/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
50 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Amended Complaint served on Mark A. Ciavarella on 03/04/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
51 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Amended Complaint served on Robert J. Powell, Representative of Vision Holdings, LLC on 03/10/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
52 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's. Mark A Ciavarella waiver sent on 3/4/2009, answer due 5/4/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/24/2009)
53 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's . PA Child Care, LLC waiver sent on 2/17/2009, answer due 4/20/2009. (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/24/2009)
54 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Amended Complaint served on Harriet Harris, Agent of Defendant Powell Law Group on 03/17/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
55 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Amended Complaint served on Hattie Harris, Agent of Defendant Robert J. Powell on 03/17/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
56 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's. Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC waiver sent on 3/4/2009, answer due 5/4/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/26/2009)
57 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's. Michael T. Conahan waiver sent on 3/4/2009, answer due 5/4/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/26/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 203 of 341

03/26/2009 03/26/2009 03/26/2009 03/26/2009 03/27/2009 03/30/2009
03/30/2009 03/31/2009 04/02/2009 04/02/2009 04/02/2009 04/03/2009 04/04/2009 04/09/2009
04/09/2009 04/13/2009 04/13/2009 04/16/2009 04/20/2009 04/21/2009

58 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by all Plaintiff's. Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc. waiver sent on 3/4/2009, answer due 5/4/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/26/2009)
59 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Nathan J. Andrisani, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/26/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
60 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Matthew J.D. Hogan, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/26/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
61 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Eric Kraeutler, Esq. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/26/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
62 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Plead for Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella by all Plaintiff's . (Senoff, David) Modified on 4/8/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 03/27/2009)
63 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kimberly D. Borland on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. Attorney Alison Tanchyk Dante is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001536010.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 03/30/2009)
64 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Amended Complaint served on Katherine E. Farrell on behalf of Defendant Sandra Brullo on 03/09/2009, filed by Florence Wallace. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 03/30/2009)
69 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Alison Tanchyk Dante, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/31/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
65 NOTICE of Appearance by Nathan J. Andrisani on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. (Andrisani, Nathan) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
66 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew J.D. Hogan on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
67 NOTICE of Appearance by Eric Kraeutler on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. (Kraeutler, Eric) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
70 NOTICE of Appearance by Alison T. Dante on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. (Dante, Alison) (Entered: 04/03/2009)
71 NOTICE of Appearance by Philip Gelso on behalf of Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Michael T. Conahan (Gelso, Philip) (Entered: 04/04/2009)
72 SCHEDULING ORDER: ORDERED that Counsel for all parties shall appear for an initial conference on FRIDAY, MAY 8, 2009 at 10:00 AM in Chambers, Wilkes−Barre. See Order for additional details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/9/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
73 NOTICE of Appearance by Ruth S. Borland on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Borland, Ruth) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
74 NOTICE of Appearance by Suzanne McDonough on behalf of Sandra Brullo (McDonough, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
75 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Sandra Brullo. Sandra Brullo waiver sent on 3/4/2009, answer due 5/4/2009. (McDonough, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
76 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by All Plaintiffs. Gregory Zappala waiver sent on 3/24/2009, answer due 5/26/2009. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/16/2009)
77 NOTICE of Appearance by John Flounlacker on behalf of Sandra Brullo (Flounlacker, John) (Entered: 04/20/2009)
78 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen D. Rhoades on behalf of Cindy Ciavarella (Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 04/21/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 204 of 341

04/27/2009 05/04/2009 05/12/2009 05/14/2009
05/14/2009 05/14/2009 05/15/2009 05/20/2009 05/21/2009 05/21/2009 05/21/2009 05/21/2009 05/22/2009

79 NOTICE of Appearance by Scott D. McCarroll on behalf of Sandra Brullo (McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 04/27/2009)
80 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
83 ORDER: In view of the oral motion of Jonathan Vipond, III, Esquire to withdraw as counsel for Western PA Child Care, LLC, PA Child Care, LLC and Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted, and the Clerk of Court is directed to reflect Mr. Vipond's withdrawal on the docket. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/12/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 05/14/2009)
82 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: Plaintiffs may amend their Complaints on or before May 29, 2009. Motions regarding judicial immunity, abstention and/or the application of the Rooker−Feldman Doctrine, together with supporting briefs, shall be filed on or before June 29, 2009. Briefs in opposition to any such motions shall be filed on or before July 29, 2009. Reply briefs shall be filed on or before August 12, 2009. Counsel have advised they are in the process of arriving at an agreed−upon Confidentiality Agreement to be approved by the Court. The Agreement shall be submitted to the Court no later than June 8, 2009. These cases will be consolidated for discovery purposes. ALL FUTURE FILINGS IN THESE MATTERS SHALL BE DOCKETED TO CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 3:CV−09−286. Filings should contain a caption with all four (4) cases as set forth on this Order. Discovery shall proceed as discussed at the conference on May 8, 2009 on both the issue of class certification and on the merits. Motions for further amendments and motions for joinder of additional parties shall be filed no later than August 12, 2009. A periodic conference will be held regarding ongoing matters of case management (including expert reports and the maintenance of plaintiffs' counsel's billing records) on FRIDAY, JULY 31, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, 197 South Main Street, Wilkes−Barre, Pennsylvania. A periodic conference regarding consideration of and dates for dispositive motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and 56, pretrial conference, trial date and RICO statements will be held on THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, 197 South Main Street, Wilkes−Barre, Pennsylvania. (See Order for further details) Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/12/09. (ga, ) Modified on 5/15/2009 (jam, ). (Entered: 05/14/2009)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Lourdes M. Rosado. (jc) (Entered: 05/14/2009)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM AND ECF REGISTRATION FORM SENT to Marsha L. Levick. (jc ) (Entered: 05/14/2009)
84 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Samantha Humanik. Perseus House, Inc. waiver sent on 4/16/2009, answer due 6/15/2009. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
85 NOTICE of Appearance by Donna L. Adelsberger on behalf of Gregory Zappala, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp. (Adelsberger, Donna) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
86 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Samantha Humanik. PA Child Care, LLC waiver sent on 4/16/2009, answer due 6/15/2009. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
87 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Samantha Humanik. Western PA Child Cared, LLC waiver sent on 4/16/2009, answer due 6/15/2009. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
88 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Samantha Humanik. Gregory Zappala waiver sent on 4/16/2009, answer due 6/15/2009. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
89 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Samantha Humanik. Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp. waiver sent on 4/16/2009, answer due 6/15/2009. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
90 NOTICE of Appearance by Mark B. Sheppard on behalf of Robert J. Powell (Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 05/22/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 205 of 341

05/26/2009 05/28/2009

SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Mark B. Sheppard. (jc) (Entered: 05/26/2009)
91 AMENDED COMPLAINT Second Amended Complaint against Luzerne County, Gregory Zappala, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Joe Doe, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., Powell Law Group, P.C., Sandra Brullo, Frank Vita, Ph.D., Robert J. Powell, Michael T. Conahan, Mark A Ciavarella, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., filed by Bernard Wallace, Nancy Henry, Teresa Metzo, David Quick, Arthur Blake, Michelle Martz, Joelle Angeli, Maria Brooks, Melanie Coxe, Heath Houseknecht, Bridget DeFalco, Zachary Richards, Dawn Evans, Evans Charles, K. E., Heather Evans, David Gazdziak, Rebecca Gazdziak, Peter Huff, Laura Kilheeney, Tiffany Wren, Joseph Kulp, D. K., Dale Kropa, Debra Kropa, John Lombard, Jack Lombard, Richard Maguschak, James Rodriquez, Anthony Morales, Susan Morgans, Kelcy Morgans, C. U., Desiree Parduski, Catherine Schmeer, Karlie Schmeer, Mark Soltis, C. W., Chantell Welch, Eric Davis, Kathleen Brekke, Britny Cunnington, J. W., Annie Bryant, Lloyd Bryant, Kimberly Delaney Goggin, Nicholas Jamilowski, K. J., Tracey Jarmon, Derek Klick, Larry M. Muhlenberg, Jr., Deanna O'Boyle, Donna Olsen, J.C. P., Wanda Pacheco, Justin Rosser, Brandon Schmeer, Elise Wallace, David Wallace, Maureen Stinson, Stepfhon Edwards, Jr., L.M. K., Pinkey Brooks, Chyna Reese, Joel Foster, Lori Shusta, Anthony Lavin, Geoff Presley, Christopher Bower, Alissa Conahan, Elaine Macri, Cynthia Ide, Christina Tremblay, Robert Klein, Eileen Maurer, Lisa Mazur, David Mazur, William Parsons, Carri Perna, Jane Everett, Natalie Woolbert, Dennis Yost, Sr., Ian Alexander, John Fronczkiewicz, Joseph Babbitt, III, Marlin Boehmer, Jeremy Boehmer, Carl N. Busch, Kim Riccio, Brock Riccio, Michael Salko, Jr., Keith Perschau, Mary Ellen Balliet, Lisa Brock, Steve Fromel, Joshua Fromel, S. S., Barbara Johnson, Matthew Wrhel, Heather Walton, Wayne Allen Hunter, III, Richard Avery, Donna Roman, E. E., Heather Lake, Cristal Lee Mutua, Necia Gazdziak, Douglas Klug, Colleen Kluchinsky, John Stolarik, Joyce Stolarik, C.A. M., Debbie Martin, Margaret McGrath, Nicholas Miller, April Roman, Timothy Bantell, Stacey Hvizda, Christopher Hughes, Kelly M. Grey−Wasielewski, Joseph Austra, Angela Bezdziecki, Linda Bezdzeicki, L. E., James M. Hughes, Christina Jennings, Jason Kisthardt, T. L., Lynn Downs, Matthew Lomascolo, A. M., Ardest Maldonado, S. N., Stephanie Parsons, Alan Parsons, Daniella Ormsby, Autumn Parry, B. P., Dorothy Jackson−Pearyer, Kylie Scheleble, Ashton Schelble, Paul DePrimo, Joseph DePrimo, G. S., Angela Davis, Michelle Yurkanin, Alexander Lomascolo, Cynthia Lomascolo, Jeremiah Lenchick, Barbara Sieminski, Baily Sieminski−Hess, R. O., Laura O'Gorman, Eric Drouse, Sr., Erica Drouse, Andrew Kuklinski, Timothy Jones, Kevin Kuklinski, D.K. a minor by Duane Kennedy, Duane Kennedy, Kevin Klauss, Brittany Klein, Lori Klug, B.W., Jennifer Klug, David Kotz, Nicole Kotz, Walter Kulic, Raheem Armitage, Denise Lenahan, Dyllon Rybka, Alex Hippeli, William Von Tulganburg, Marie Mancia, Anthony Mancia, Evan Maurer, Michael Mazur, K.M. a minor by Mesunga McCree, Mesunga McCree, Ryan McManus, Patrick Merrick, B.M. a minor by Mark Metzo, Jamie Quinn, Mark Metzo, Matthew Milne, Randy Ozehoski, Eric Parsons, Jessica Silva, Faith Powell, A.K. a minor by Faith Powell, Tonetti Schatzel, John Schatzel, D.S. a minor by Kipp Sebo, Kipp Sebo, Theodore Sherill, Kenny Shotwell, Tiffany Shotwell, Justin Soboski, Nadine Spiker, David Spiker, Mariah Stewart, Paul Stolarik, J.R. a minor by Sandra Swortzfigure, Sandra Swortzfigure, Ruth Ungvarsky, Amy Ungvarsky, Florence Wallace, George Vermack, Daryl Widder, David Sisk, Bruce Williams, Skyler Dane, Ashley Woolbert, Z.Z. a minor by David Zablotney, David Zoblotney, Kyle Avery, Jacqueline Bartenope, B.F. a minor by Jacqueline Bartenope, A.B. a minor by Ruth Blake, Ruth Blake, Sarah Martz, Deborah May, Raymond Naugle, Raymond Lobman, Lacy Strong, Jamie Zaccagni, Michelle Zinga, Amanda Dombek, Denise Anderson, Dennis Yost, Jeffrey Arnott, Dawn Babbitt, Matthew Babbitt, Clyde Backes, Joshua Backes, Michael Bodnar, Joann Boyle, Anthony Marsicano, T.B. a minor by Joyce Brown, Joyce Brown, Josh Cragle, E.S. a minor by Linda Donovan, Linda Donovan, Debra Dumas, Fred Dumas, J.D. a minor by Debra Dumas, Anthony Dupak, K.D. a minor by Anthony Dupak, Amanda Eddy, Charles Edwards, James Trocki, Christine Evans, C.E. a minor by Christine Evans, Julian Trevino, Maryann Grosky, Jesse Hartman, Melaine Heiser, Joshua Heiser, J.B. a minor by Glen Henry, Glen Henry, Jeffrey Hoyt, Keith Jeffrey Golomb, Craig Daniels, Robert Hunter, David Ide, Eric Ide. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Information, # 2 Exhibit(s) Plea Agreements, # 3 Exhibit(s) Audit)(Caroselli, William) (Entered: 05/28/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 206 of 341

05/28/2009 05/29/2009
05/29/2009
05/29/2009 05/29/2009 06/01/2009 06/01/2009
06/01/2009 06/02/2009 06/02/2009 06/02/2009 06/02/2009 06/02/2009 06/03/2009

92 AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Samantha Humanik.(Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/28/2009)
93 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Elizabeth Lorah, Terry Lorah, Amanda Lorah, Tiffany Murphy, James Murphy, Stephen Fino, Lynn Fino, Jared Padden, John Padden, Paul Schweizer, Adam Thompson, Mary Seville, William Conway, Christian Ryan, Kevin Ryan, Tracey Rowlands, Paige Cicardo, William Cicardo, Angelia Karsko, Rosemary Karsko, Elizabeth Habel, Gloria Habel, Richard Habel. Robert J. Powell waiver sent on 3/31/2009, answer due 6/1/2009. (Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
94 AMENDED COMPLAINT Conway Second Amended Complaint against Gregory Zappala, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., Sandra Brullo, Robert J. Powell, Michael T. Conahan, Mark A Ciavarella, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC, Robert K Mericle, Luzerne County, Michael Loughney, Mericle Construction, Inc., filed by Elizabeth Lorah, Terry Lorah, Amanda Lorah, Tiffany Murphy, James Murphy, Stephen Fino, Lynn Fino, Jared Padden, John Padden, Paul Schweizer, Adam Thompson, William Conway, Christian Ryan, Kevin Ryan, Tracey Rowlands, Mary Seville, Paige Cicardo, William Cicardo, Angelia Karsko, Rosemary Karsko, Elizabeth Habel, Gloria Habel, Richard Habel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Service)(Walvoord, Adrianne) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
95 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen A. Seach on behalf of Vision Holdings, LLC. (Seach, Stephen) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
96 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen A. Seach on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C.. (Seach, Stephen) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
97 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Howard Wishnoff on behalf of Gregory Zappala, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp. Attorney Howard Wishnoff is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001588621.. (Wishnoff, Howard) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
98 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Terry Lorah, Amanda Lorah, Tiffany Murphy, James Murphy, Stephen Fino, Lynn Fino, Jared Padden, John Padden, Paul Schweizer, Adam Thompson, Mary Seville, William Conway, Christian Ryan, Kevin Ryan, Tracey Rowlands, Paige Cicardo, William Cicardo, Angelia Karsko, Rosemary Karsko, Elizabeth Habel, Gloria Habel. Vision Holdings, LLC waiver sent on 3/31/2009, answer due 6/1/2009. (Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
99 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Donna L. Adelsberger on behalf of Gregory Zappala, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp. Attorney Susan Wiener is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001588775.. (Adelsberger, Donna) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
100 NOTICE of Appearance by Suzanne McDonough on behalf of Maureen Loughney, as Adminstratrix of the Estate of Michael Loughney (McDonough, Suzanne) Modified on 6/2/2009 (kn, ). (Entered: 06/02/2009)
101 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint by Perseus House, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Brenner, Thomas) (Entered: 06/02/2009)
102 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Samantha Humanik. Robert J. Powell waiver sent on 5/28/2009, answer due 7/27/2009. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/02/2009)
103 CERTIFICATE of Non−Concurrence by Perseus House, Inc. re 101 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Brenner, Thomas) (Entered: 06/02/2009)
104 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 101 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by Perseus House, Inc..(Brenner, Thomas) (Entered: 06/02/2009)
105 Joint MOTION for Order of Preservation by Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Gregory Zappala, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Pinncale Group of Jupiter, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Vision Holdings, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., and by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 207 of 341

06/03/2009
06/03/2009 06/03/2009
06/03/2009 06/03/2009 06/04/2009 06/04/2009 06/04/2009 06/05/2009 06/05/2009 06/09/2009
06/09/2009
06/09/2009 06/09/2009
06/09/2009 06/10/2009 06/10/2009

Concurrence)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 06/03/2009)
106 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Unopposed Motion for Preservation Order re 105 Joint MOTION for Order of Preservation by Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Gregory Zappala, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Pinncale Group of Jupiter, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Vision Hol filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 06/03/2009)
107 DISCLOSURE REPORT by Samantha Humanik by Samantha Humanik.(Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/03/2009)
108 Proposed Pretrial Order for Preservation by Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Gregory Zappala, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Pinncale Group of Jupiter, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Vision Holdings, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group P.C., and by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 06/03/2009)
112 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Susan J. Wiener, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/3/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
113 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Howard Wishnoff, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/3/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
109 MOTION to Dismiss on the Basis of Judicial, Quasi−Judicial and Qualified Immunity by Sandra Brullo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McDonough, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
110 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Defendant Brulo's re 109 MOTION to Dismiss on the Basis of Judicial, Quasi−Judicial and Qualified Immunity filed by Sandra Brullo.(McDonough, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
111 NOTICE of Appearance by Suzanne McDonough on behalf of Maureen Loughney (McDonough, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
114 NOTICE of Appearance by Howard Wishnoff on behalf of Gregory Zappala, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp. (Wishnoff, Howard) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
115 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan J. Wiener on behalf of Gregory Zappala, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp. (Wiener, Susan) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
116 CERTIFICATE of by Perseus House, Inc. re 105 Joint MOTION for Order of Preservation by Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Gregory Zappala, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Pinncale Group of Jupiter, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Vision Hol CERTIFICATE OF CONCURRENCE. (Brenner, Thomas) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
117 CERTIFICATE of Concurrence by Frank Vita, Ph.D. re 105 Joint MOTION for Order of Preservation by Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Gregory Zappala, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Pinncale Group of Jupiter, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Vision Hol. (Swetz, James) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
118 NOTICE of Appearance by Jessica Richman Birk on behalf of Robert J. Powell (Birk, Jessica) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
119 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Jessica Richman Birk on behalf of Robert J. Powell Attorney Jeffrey Feldman is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001596398.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Birk, Jessica) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
120 CERTIFICATE of Service by Frank Vita, Ph.D. re 117 Certificate,. (Swetz, James) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
121 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Santoro, Rebecca) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
122 STATUS REPORT letter dated 6/8/09 from Attorney Marsha L. Levick re: Master Complaints. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/10/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 208 of 341

06/11/2009
06/15/2009 06/16/2009 06/16/2009
06/17/2009 06/17/2009 06/17/2009
06/17/2009 06/22/2009
06/24/2009 06/25/2009

124 SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendants shall file their supplemental brief in support of the Unopposed Motion for Preservation Order Directed to Third parties by 6/16/09. 2. ORAL ARGUMENT on Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Preservation Order Directed to Third Parties (Doc. 105) will be held on WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2009 at 12:00 p.m. in a courtroom to be determined, William J. Nealon Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 235 North Washington Ave., Scranton, Pennsylvania. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/11/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/11/2009)
125 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Joseph B.G. Fay on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. Attorney Joseph Fay is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 03140000000001600612., filed by on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Fay, Joseph) (Entered: 06/15/2009)
126 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph B.G. Fay on behalf of Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. (Fay, Joseph) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
127 BRIEF IN SUPPORT Supplemental Memorandum of Law re 105 Joint MOTION for Order of Preservation by Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Gregory Zappala, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., Pinncale Group of Jupiter, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Vision Hol filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
128 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Joseph B.G.Fay.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/16/09. (rm, ) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
129 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 101 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of defendant Perseus House d/b/a Andromeda House filed by Samantha Humanik.(Freeman, Richard) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
130 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Diana Gilbride (570)498−7552 of Hearing before Judge Caputo on Wed., June 17, 2009. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on Wed., June 17, 2009. By s/ Diana Gilbride. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr1, ) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
131 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Jeffrey S. FeldmanSigned by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/17/09. (ga, ) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
132 AMENDMENT TO CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER OF MAY 12, 2009 − In accordance with a telephone conference held on June 11, 2009, it is hereby ORDERED that Sections 3 and 8 of the Case Management Order dated May 12, 2009 (Docket Entry 82) be deleted and that the following sections be substituted for them: 3. (See Order for details) and 8. Motions for further amendments and motions for joinder of additional parties shall be filed no later than September 10, 2009.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/22/09. (ga, ) (Entered: 06/22/2009)
133 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order by Luzerne County Domestic Relations. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) subpoena to testify at deposition or produce documents)(Menn, Stephen) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
134 AMENDED COMPLAINT Individual Plaintiffs' Master Long Form Complaint against Robert Matta, Gregory Zappala, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., Powell Law Group, P.C., Sandra Brullo, Frank Vita, Ph.D., Robert J. Powell, Michael T. Conahan, Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC, Robert K Mericle, Luzerne County, Perseus House, Inc., Mericle Construction, Inc., filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Conahan and Ciavarella Information, # 2 Exhibit(s) Conahan and Ciavarella Plea Agreement, # 3 Exhibit(s) Powell Information, # 4 Exhibit(s) Powell Plea Agreement, # 5 Exhibit(s) Audit)(Caroselli, William) (Entered: 06/25/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 209 of 341

06/25/2009
06/25/2009
06/26/2009 06/26/2009 06/26/2009 06/29/2009 06/29/2009 06/30/2009 07/01/2009 07/02/2009 07/02/2009 07/02/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009

135 AMENDED COMPLAINT Proposed Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Gregory Zappala, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., Powell Law Group, P.C., Robert Matta, Sandra Brullo, Frank Vita, Ph.D., Robert J. Powell, Michael T. Conahan, Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC, Robert K Mericle, Luzerne County, Perseus House, Inc., Mericle Construction, Inc., filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Caroselli, William) (Entered: 06/25/2009)
136 AMENDED COMPLAINT Master Complaint for Class Actions against Gregory Zappala, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., Robert J. Powell, Michael T. Conahan, Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC, Robert K Mericle, Luzerne County, Mericle Construction, Inc., filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A and B)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 06/25/2009)
137 First MOTION for Protective Order by Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Probation Department.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
138 First MOTION for Protective Order by Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Probation Department.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Documents #137 and #138 under seal pending review by the court. (kc, ) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
139 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion For Protective Order by West Pittston Borough. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 3 Exhibit(s) Subpoena)(Bufalino, Charles) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
140 Letter to the Court from Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts dated June 25, 2009 regarding pending Motion for Preservation Order. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
142 ORDER denying 109 Motion to Dismiss. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant Brulo's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 109) is moot, and is therefore DENIED without prejudice. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/30/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 07/01/2009)
143 by Fairview Township. Objection to Subpoena Pursuant to Rule 45(c)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Brobst, Donald) (Entered: 07/01/2009)
144 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order by Edwardsville Borough. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit "A" − Subpoena, # 2 Certificate of Non−Concurrence, # 3 Proposed Order)(Finnegan, William) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
145 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order by City Of Nanticoke. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit "A" − Subpoena, # 2 Certificate of Non−Concurrence, # 3 Proposed Order)(Finnegan, William) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
146 MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 105 Motion for Order of Preservation. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/2/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
147 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Susan J. Wiener terminated on behalf of Gregory Zappala and Mid Atlantic Youth Services. (Wiener, Susan) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
148 MOTION to Quash Supoena or alternatively for protective order by Plymouth Borogh. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Kostelansky, Michael) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
149 MOTION to Quash Subpoena or alternatively for Protective Order by Wright Township. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Kostelansky, Michael) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document #149 placed under seal until review by court. (kc, ) (Entered: 07/06/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 210 of 341

07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009
07/08/2009 07/08/2009 07/08/2009 07/08/2009 07/09/2009 07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/13/2009 07/13/2009 07/14/2009 07/14/2009 07/14/2009

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Correction, document #148 sealed pending court review not # 149. (kc, ) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
150 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order by Rice Township. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Vinsko, William) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
151 MOTION to Quash Subpoena by Plains Township. (Attachments: # 1 Subpoena)(Menn, Stephen) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
152 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena by Forty Fort Borough.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
153 BRIEF IN SUPPORT Motion for Protective Order and to Quash Subpoena of Plaintiffs re 138 First MOTION for Protective Order filed by Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Probation Department.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
154 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Motion for Protective Order and To Quash Subpoena of Defendants Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. re 137 First MOTION for Protective Order filed by Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Probation Department.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
155 Letter dated June 29, 2009 from Rebecca L. Santoro, Esq. to the Court regarding pending Motion for a Preservation Order. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
156 MOTION for Protective Order and/or, MOTION to Quash subpoena by Luzerne County District Attorney's Office.(Barletta, Frank) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
157 MOTION to Quash subpoena and/or, MOTION for Protective Order by Luzerne County District Attorney's Office.(Barletta, Frank) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
158 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 133 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order filed by Luzerne County Domestic Relations.(Menn, Stephen) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
159 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order by City of Pittston.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
162 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 149 MOTION to Quash Subpoena or alternatively for Protective Order filed by Wright Township.(Kostelansky, Michael) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
163 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 148 MOTION to Quash Supoena or alternatively for protective order filed by Plymouth Borogh.(Kostelansky, Michael) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
164 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Forty Fort Police Department's re 152 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena filed by Forty Fort Borough.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
165 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of the City of Pittston Police Department's re 159 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by City of Pittston.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
166 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 139 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion For Protective Order filed by West Pittston Borough.(Bufalino, Charles) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Documents #160 "Disclosure Report 26(a)3 & #161 "Disclosure Report(26(a)3 deleted. (ga, ) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
167 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 145 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by City Of Nanticoke.(Finnegan, William) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
168 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 144 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Edwardsville Borough.(Finnegan, William) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
169 ORDER finding as moot 101 Motion to Dismiss, and Motion is therefore DENIED without prejudice. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/14/09 (jam, )

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 211 of 341

07/15/2009 07/15/2009 07/15/2009 07/15/2009 07/15/2009 07/15/2009 07/16/2009 07/16/2009 07/16/2009
07/17/2009 07/17/2009 07/17/2009 07/17/2009 07/17/2009
07/17/2009
07/20/2009 07/20/2009 07/20/2009

(Entered: 07/14/2009)
170 MOTION to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs' Master Long Form Complaint by Perseus House, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Brenner, Thomas) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
171 CERTIFICATE of Non−Concurrence by Perseus House, Inc. re 170 MOTION to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs' Master Long Form Complaint. (Brenner, Thomas) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
172 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 170 MOTION to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs' Master Long Form Complaint filed by Perseus House, Inc..(Brenner, Thomas) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
173 OBJECTIONS by Luzerne County Public Defender's Office.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Brobst, Donald) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
174 MOTION to Quash by Hanover Township. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A)(Davison, Robert) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
175 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 174 MOTION to Quash filed by Hanover Township.(Davison, Robert) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
176 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Hanover Township re 175 Brief in Support, 174 MOTION to Quash (Davison, Robert) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
177 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas J. Campenni on behalf of Fairview Township, Luzerne County Public Defender's Office. (Campenni, Thomas) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
178 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preservation Order or, in the Alternative, for Reconsideration filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
179 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order by Duryea Borough.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
180 ORDER denying 178 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/17/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
181 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order by Jenkins Township Police Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ga, ) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
182 First MOTION for Protective Order by Kingston Borough Police Department. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Mattern, Harry) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
183 MOTION for Order for Preservation or, in the Alternative, for Reconsideration by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence or Non−Concurrence, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
184 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 183 MOTION for Order for Preservation or, in the Alternative, for Reconsideration filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Certification of Compliance with Word−Count Limit, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B, # 4 Exhibit(s) C − M, # 5 Certificate of Service)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
185 BRIEF IN SUPPORT Duryea Borough Police Department's re 179 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Duryea Borough.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
186 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order by Larksville Borough Police Department.(ga, ) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
187 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 186 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Larksville Borough Police Department.(ga, ) (Entered:

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 212 of 341

07/20/2009 07/20/2009 07/20/2009 07/20/2009
07/20/2009 07/21/2009
07/21/2009
07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009

07/20/2009)
188 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint by Frank Vita, Ph.D.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Swetz, James) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
189 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 188 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint filed by Frank Vita, Ph.D..(Swetz, James) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
190 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 151 MOTION to Quash Subpoena filed by Plains Township.(Menn, Stephen) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
191 First MOTION for Leave to File Omnibus Response to Motions to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A)(Caroselli, William) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
192 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 150 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Rice Township.(Vinsko, William) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
193 SCHEDULING ORDER: Oral Argument on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preservation Order or, in the Alternative, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 183) set for 7/27/2009 10:00 AM in Scranton before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/21/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
194 ORDER granting 191 Motion for Leave to File Omnibus Response to Motions to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion is GRANTED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs shall file one (1) Omnibus Response to all seventeen Motions to Quash. 2. Plaintiffs' Omnibus Response Brief may exceed the fifteen (15) page limit set forth in Local Rule 7.8(b)(1), but shall not exceed twenty (20) pages. 3. Plaintiffs' Omnibus Response Brief shall be filed on or before August 7, 2009. The Motion is DENIED insofar as it requests a stay. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/21/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
195 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 170 MOTION to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs' Master Long Form Complaint with Response and Memorandum filed by Samantha Humanik.(Freeman, Richard) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
196 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 170 MOTION to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs' Master Long Form Complaint with Response and Memorandum CORRECTED filed by Samantha Humanik.(Freeman, Richard) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
197 First MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Master Complaint Based Upon Immunity by Sandra Brullo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
198 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 197 First MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Master Complaint Based Upon Immunity filed by Sandra Brullo. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
199 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 Plaintiffs Voluntary Dismissal of Gregory Zappala Only (Walvoord, Adrianne) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
200 MOTION to Quash subpoena − plaintiffs by Luzerne County Clerk of Courts Office.(Moses, Peter) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
201 Proposed ORDER re: Motion to Quash subpoena − plaintiffs by Luzerne County Clerk of Courts Office.(Moses, Peter) Relates to (Doc. 200) Modified on 9/23/2009 (jam, ). (Entered: 07/23/2009)
202 I>Brief in support of Motion (Doc. 200) to quash subpoena − plaintiffs by Luzerne County Clerk of Courts Office.(Moses, Peter) Modified on 9/23/2009 (jam, ). (Entered: 07/23/2009)
203 MOTION to Quash subpoena − mericle by Luzerne County Clerk of Courts Office. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order order for subpoena − mericle, # 2 Supplement brief in support for subpoena − mericle)(Moses, Peter) (Entered: 07/23/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 213 of 341

07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009
07/23/2009 07/24/2009
07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009
07/27/2009

204 Letter from M. John Haley to Judge Caputo, Re: Order of July 21, 2009 (ga, ) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
205 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/23/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
206 MOTION to Quash by Township of Kingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ga, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/1/2009: # 2 Motion to Quash) (ga, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/1/2009: # 2 Motion to Quash) (ga, ). (Entered: 07/23/2009)
207 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 206 MOTION to Quash filed by Township of Kingston.(ga, ) (ga, ). (Entered: 07/23/2009)
208 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 137 First MOTION for Protective Order or to Quash Subpoena Served on the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Probation Department filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
209 STIPULATION To Dismiss Claim of Medical Malpractice by Samantha Humanik. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
210 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Federal Fule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ga, ) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
211 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 210 MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. To Dismiss Plaintiff' Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr..(ga, ) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
212 MOTION to Dismiss by Cindy Ciavarella.(McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
213 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 212 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Cindy Ciavarella.(McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
214 MOTION to Dismiss by Barbara Conahan.(McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
215 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 214 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Barbara Conahan.(McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
216 MOTION to Dismiss , Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs' Complaints on the Basis of Judicial and Legislative Immunity by Michael T. Conahan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gelso, Philip) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
217 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 216 MOTION to Dismiss , Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs' Complaints on the Basis of Judicial and Legislative Immunity filed by Michael T. Conahan.(Gelso, Philip) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
218 MOTION to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
219 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 218 MOTION to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds filed by Luzerne County.(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
221 Joint MOTION to Stay or for Abstention by defendants Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Robert J. Powell, the Powell Law Group P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., the Pinnacle Group of Jupiter LLC, Frank Vita, Perseus House d/b/a Andromeda House, and by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
222 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 221 Joint MOTION to Stay or for Abstention by defendants Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Robert J. Powell, the Powell Law Group P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Mark filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−D, # 2 Exhibit(s) Attached Unpublished Opinions, # 3 Proposed Order for Stay)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 07/27/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 214 of 341

07/28/2009 07/28/2009 07/28/2009 07/28/2009 07/29/2009
07/30/2009 07/31/2009 08/03/2009 08/06/2009 08/06/2009 08/06/2009 08/07/2009
08/07/2009

223 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. Robert Matta waiver sent on 7/9/2009, answer due 9/8/2009. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
224 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 212 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Cindy Ciavarella.(McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
225 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 214 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Barbara Conahan.(McNelis, Edward) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
226 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Motion to Quash and/or for Protective Order re 182 First MOTION for Protective Order filed by Kingston Borough Police Department.(Mattern, Harry) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
227 STIPULATION AND ORDER − It is hereby stipulated by and between counsel for plaintiff Samantha Humanik and defendant Andromeda House d/b/a Perseus House that plaintiff's claim of medical malpractice against defendant Andromeda House d/b/a Perseus House is hereby withdrawn with prejudice.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/29/09. (ga, ) (Entered: 07/29/2009)
228 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED CONFERENCE − Periodic Case Management Conference RESET for 8/21/2009 10:00 AM in Wilkes−Barre before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.July 30, 2009 (arcsec) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
229 Letter dated 7/31/09 to the Court from Zygmont A. Pines, Court Administrator, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re: authorization to broaden group of juveniles whose records are to be retained under seal. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
230 Mailed Copy of Letter dated July 31, 2009 to the Court from Zygmont A. Pines, Court Administrator, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re: authority to broaden the group of juveniles whose records are to be retained under seal. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
231 MOTION for Extension of Time to to file brief by Luzerne County District Attorney's Office. (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation, # 2 Order, # 3 Certificate of Concurrence, # 4 Certificate of Service)(Barletta, Frank) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
232 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 156 MOTION for Protective Order and/or MOTION to Quash subpoena, 157 MOTION to Quash subpoena and/or MOTION for Protective Order filed by Luzerne County District Attorney's Office.(Barletta, Frank) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
233 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. Luzerne County served on 8/4/2009, answer due 8/24/2009. (Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
234 ORDER granting 231 Motion to Extend Time. IT IS ORDERED that the Luzerne District Attorney's Office may have an extension of time to 8/7/09 to file its Memorandum in support of its Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 156) as to the subpoena served on it by Mericle Construction, Inc. and, further, that Mericle Construction, Inc. may file its brief in response to the memorandum of the Luzerne District Attorney's Office by 8/21/09. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/7/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
235 REPLY BRIEF re 179 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order, 149 MOTION to Quash Subpoena or alternatively for Protective Order, 148 MOTION to Quash Supoena or alternatively for protective order, 133 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order, 201 Proposed MOTION to Quash order for subpoena − plaintiffs, 186 MOTION to Quash, 152 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena, 206 MOTION to Quash, 150 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order, 144 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order, 159 First MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order, 181 MOTION to Quash, 157 MOTION to Quash subpoena and/or MOTION for Protective Order, 139 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion For Protective Order, 145 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order, 174 MOTION to Quash, 182 First MOTION for Protective Order, 151 MOTION to Quash Subpoena, 138 First MOTION for Protective Order filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law, # 2 Proposed Order, # (Attachment 3, Exhibit(s), DELETED PER COUNSEL REQUEST, TO BE REFILED), # 4 Certificate of Service)(Rosado, Lourdes)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 215 of 341

08/10/2009 08/10/2009 08/10/2009 08/11/2009 08/12/2009 08/12/2009 08/18/2009 08/18/2009
08/19/2009
08/20/2009
08/21/2009 08/27/2009
08/27/2009

Modified on 8/10/2009 (ep, ). (Entered: 08/07/2009)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Per request of filing counsel, Exhibit A to 235 deleted, to be refiled; (ep, ) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
236 EXHIBIT by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 re 235 Reply Brief,,,,,. (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
237 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 203 MOTION to Quash subpoena − mericle filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−D, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Proposed Order)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
238 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC by Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Michael T. Conahan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gelso, Philip) (Entered: 08/11/2009)
239 Document filed, Entitled: Certified Order dated August 7, 2009 by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Re: Preservation of Documents. (ga, ) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
240 Letter dated 8/11/09 to the Court from Lourdes M. Rosado, Esq. re: matters to be discussed at scheduled telephone conference on 8/12/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/13/2009)
242 Letter from Daniel Segal, Esquire on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
243 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to to Respond to Motions to Dismiss Filed by Defendants Mark Ciavarella, Michael Conahan, Sandra Brulo, and Frank Vita by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
244 ORDER granting 243 Motion to Extend Time. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' responses in opposition to Motions to Dismiss filed by Mark Ciavarella (Doc. 210), Michael Conahan (Doc. 216), Sandra Brulo (Doc. 197) and Frank Vita (Doc. 188) shall be filed no later than 9/10/09. Defendants' reply briefs shall be filed no later than 9/24/09. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/19/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
245 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 238 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc., and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A − F, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
246 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 157 MOTION to Quash subpoena and/or MOTION for Protective Order filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−B, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 08/21/2009)
248 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 221 Joint MOTION to Stay or for Abstention by defendants Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Robert J. Powell, the Powell Law Group P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Mark filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certification of Word Count, # 3 Certificate of Service, # 4 Exhibit(s) A − D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Unpublished Opinions)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
249 First MOTION for Leave to File Individual Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint by All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Indiv Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint, # 2 Exhibit(s) Indiv Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint, # 3 Exhibit(s) Indiv Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint, # 4 Exhibit(s) Indiv Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint, # 5 Exhibit(s) Red Line Version)(Caroselli, William) (Entered: 08/27/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 216 of 341

08/27/2009
08/31/2009 08/31/2009
08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009

250 First MOTION for Leave to File AMENDED Master Class Action Complaint by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Amended Master Class Action Complaint, # 2 Exhibit(s) Amended Master Class Action Complaint Exhibits A − E, # 3 Exhibit(s) Amended Master Class Action Complaint Exhibits F − J, # 4 Exhibit(s) Amended Master Class Action Complaint Exhibits K − O, # 5 Exhibit(s) REDLINED Amended Master Class Action Complaint)(Walvoord, Adrianne) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
251 AMENDED DOCUMENT by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. Amendment to 250 First MOTION for Leave to File AMENDED Master Class Action Complaint −− CORRECTED Exhibit A to Motion for Leave (Amended Master Class Action Complaint). (Walvoord, Adrianne) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
252 ORDER granting 238 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney as follows: 1. The motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, and Philip Gelso, Esquire is terminated as attorney of record for Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc., and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC in the above−captioned cases. 2. Within twenty (20) days of the entry of this Order, defendants Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc. and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC shall secure representation, and new counsel shall enter an appearance of record on behalf of Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc. and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC in the above cases. 3. Failure of either Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc. or Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC to comply with Paragraph 2 of this Order shall result in the entry of a default against the entity or entities failing to do so. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
254 ORDER denying 133 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Luzerne County Domestic Relations Section. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
255 ORDER denying 139 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by West Pittston Borough. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
256 ORDER denying 144 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Edwardsville Borough. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
257 ORDER denying 145 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by City of Nanticoke. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
258 ORDER denying 148 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Plymouth Borough Police Department.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
259 ORDER denying 149 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Wright Township Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
260 ORDER denying 150 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Rice Township.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
261 ORDER denying 151 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Plains Township Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
262 ORDER denying 152 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Forty Fort Borough Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
263 ORDER denying 156 Motion for Protective Order; denying 156 Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Luzerne County District Attorney's Office. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
264 ORDER denying 157 Motion to Quash Subpoena; denying 157 Motion for Protective Order filed by Luzerne County District Attorney's Office. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 217 of 341

08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 09/01/2009 09/01/2009 09/01/2009 09/01/2009 09/03/2009
09/03/2009
09/07/2009 09/09/2009
09/09/2009 09/09/2009 09/09/2009

265 ORDER denying 159 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by City of Pittston Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
266 ORDER denying 174 Motion to Quash Subpoena an/dor Motion for Protective Order filed by Hanover Township Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
268 ORDER denying 181 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Jenkins Township Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
269 ORDER denying 182 Motion for to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Kingston Borough Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
253 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 of Defendant Sandra Brulo Only Pursuant to FED.R.Civ.P.41(a)(1)(A)(i) (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
267 ORDER denying 179 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective Order filed by Duryea Borough Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
270 ORDER denying 186 Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or Motion for Protective order filed by Larksville Borough Police Department. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/31/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
271 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 of Defendant Robert Matta only Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.41(a)(1)(A)(i) (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
272 Unopposed MOTION for Order Granting Plaintiffs Leave to File a Single Brief in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss on the Basis of Judicial Immunity Filed by Defendants Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
273 ORDER granting 272 Motion for Leave to file a Single Brief in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss on the Basis of Judicial Immunity. Plaintiffs may file a single brief in opposition to the two motions, and the word count of that brief shall not exceed 17,500 words.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/3/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
274 Supplemental MOTION to Quash by Swoyersville Borough.(Yeager, Joseph) (Entered: 09/07/2009)
275 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 249 First MOTION for Leave to File Individual Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibit B)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
276 NOTICE of Appearance by Emily C. Keller on behalf of All Plaintiffs, 09−357 (Keller, Emily) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
277 NOTICE of Appearance by Neha Desai on behalf of All Plaintiffs, 09−357 (Desai, Neha) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
278 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings − Oral Argument (RE: Motion for Preservation Order) held on June 17, 2009, before Judge Caputo. Court Reporter Diana Gilbride, Telephone number (570)498−7552. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/30/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/13/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/8/2009. (cr1, ) (Entered: 09/09/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 218 of 341

09/10/2009 09/10/2009 09/10/2009 09/10/2009
09/10/2009
09/14/2009 09/15/2009 09/15/2009 09/16/2009 09/18/2009 09/19/2009 09/21/2009 09/23/2009 09/23/2009 09/24/2009

279 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 188 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint by defendant Frank Vita filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Freeman, Richard) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
280 NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 278 Transcript. Copy of notice mailed to Benjamin Jones, Charles G. Ross, Jr., John Haley and Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (lh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
281 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 250 First MOTION for Leave to File AMENDED Master Class Action Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibits A & B)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
282 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 210 MOTION to Dismiss, 216 MOTION to Dismiss , Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs' Complaints on the Basis of Judicial and Legislative Immunity filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Compliance with Word−Count Limit, # 3 Certificate of Service, # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Unpublished Opinions)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
283 REPLY BRIEF re 221 Joint MOTION to Stay or for Abstention by defendants Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Robert J. Powell, the Powell Law Group P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Sandra Brulo, Michael T. Conahan, Beverage Mark filed on behalf of Luzerne County, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Robert J. Powell, the Powell Law Group, Vision Holdings, Frank Vita, the Perseus House d/b/a Andromeda House, Cynthia Ciavarella, Barbara Conahna, Robert K. Mericle, and Mericle Construction, Inc. filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−D, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
284 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File a Sur−Reply Brief by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/14/2009)
285 ORDER denying 284 Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply Brief. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/15/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
286 ORDER denying 206 Motion to Quash. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/15/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
287 ORDER denying 274 Motion to Quash Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/16/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
288 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen D. Rhoades on behalf of Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC (Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 09/18/2009)
289 REPLY BRIEF re 188 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint filed by Frank Vita, Ph.D..(Swetz, James) (Entered: 09/19/2009)
290 MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae In Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss of Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella by Amici Curiae. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Exhibit(s) A−B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C−D, # 4 Proposed Order)(Richman, Sara) (Entered: 09/21/2009)
291 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
292 ORDER granting 290 Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss of Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella. The Amici Curiae shall file their brief within 10 days. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/23/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
293 ORDER granting 291 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Luzerne County's brief in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Master Class Action Complaint (Doc. 250), due on 9/28/09, shall not exceed 22 pages or 7,500 words, as determined by the word count feature of the word−processing system used to prepare the brief. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/24/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/24/2009)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 219 of 341

09/24/2009
09/25/2009 09/28/2009 09/28/2009 09/28/2009 09/29/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009 10/02/2009
10/02/2009
10/02/2009 10/02/2009
10/02/2009

294 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on July 27, 2009, before Judge Caputo. Court Reporter Diana Gilbride, Telephone number (570)498−7552. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/15/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/26/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/23/2009. (cr1, ) (Entered: 09/24/2009)
295 NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 294 Transcript. Copy of notice sent to Benjamin R. Jones, Charles G. Ross, Jr., John Haley and Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (lh, ) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
296 BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss of Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella (Brief filed pursuant to Court Order dated 9/23/09 (DOC # 292).. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−B, # 2 Exhibit(s) C−D)(kn, ) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
297 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 250 First MOTION for Leave to File AMENDED Master Class Action Complaint filed by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
298 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 249 First MOTION for Leave to File Individual Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint filed by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) "A", # 3 Exhibit(s) "B")(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
299 Partial Withdrawal of Motion Without Prejudice by Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella. 213 Brief in Support, 212 MOTION to Dismiss, 214 MOTION to Dismiss, 215 Brief in Support. (Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 09/29/2009)
300 STIPULATION for Production of Documents by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
301 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter the default of defendant Beverage Marketing of Pa., Inc. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/1/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
302 Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc. for failure to answer, plead or otherwise defend.Signed by Deputy Clerk on 10/1/09. (ga, ) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
303 SCHEDULING ORDER: Oral Argument on Motions to Dismiss filed by Perseus House (Doc. 170), Dr. Vita (Doc. 188), Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (Doc.210), Michael T. Conahan (Doc. 216) and the Joint Motion to Stay or for Abstention (Doc. 221) set for Wednesday, 10/28/2009 10:00 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 1 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/2/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
305 STIPULATION AND ORDER regarding Productions of Documents to Mericle Defendants by Clerk of Courts − Luzerne County. See Stipulation oand Order for specific details. Motions terminated: 203 MOTION to Quash subpoena − mericle filed by Luzerne County Clerk of Courts Office.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/2/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
306 Letter dated 9/30/09 from Daniel Segal, Esq. to the Court, requesting Court's assistance in resolving discovery dispute, outlining background and dispute. (jam, ) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
307 ORDER re discovery dispute regarding the issue designated "Section 9". IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the permitted interrogatory shall be: Does Plaintiff claim in this lawsuit that she or he did not commit the acts for which he or she was adjudicated delinquent by Ciavarella or another judge and/or was placed by Ciavarella?Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/2/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
308 Proposed Order filed, pursuant to the direction of the Court during the Oct. 1, 2009 conference, regarding the Probation Department's Motion to Quash (Doc. No. 137) by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. 137 First MOTION for Protective

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 220 of 341

10/07/2009 10/13/2009 10/13/2009 10/15/2009
10/20/2009
10/22/2009 10/22/2009 10/22/2009 10/22/2009 10/27/2009 10/28/2009
10/28/2009 10/29/2009

Order. (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
309 ORDER denying 137 Motion for Protective Order; denying 138 Motion for Protective Order. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to quash filed by the Probation Department for the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas (the "Probation Department") is DENIED. See Order for additional, specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/7/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 10/08/2009)
310 REPLY BRIEF re 249 First MOTION for Leave to File Individual Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
311 REPLY BRIEF re 250 First MOTION for Leave to File AMENDED Master Class Action Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Compliance, # 2 Certificate of Service, # 3 Unpublished Opinions)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
312 SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that oral argument on the Motions to Amend filed by the Plaintiffs (Doc. 249, 250) shall be held on WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2009 at 10:00 A.M., in Courtroom #1, Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, 197 South Main Street, Wilkes−Barre, Pennsylvania. This is in addition to the arguments set by the Court's October 2, 2009 scheduling order (Doc. 303). Counsel should be prepared to argue the following issues: 1) Whether the President Judge of Luzerne County is a final municipal policy−maker for the municipality when making funding determinations. 2) The obligation and ability of the District Attorney's office to intervene when a court has failed to comply with the constitutional requirements. 3) If the District Attorney's office does have such a duty, whether that function would be prosecutorial or administrative in nature. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/15/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
313 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 re 249 First MOTION for Leave to File Individual Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint, 248 Brief in Opposition,, 279 Brief in Opposition, 282 Brief in Opposition, 275 Brief in Support, 281 Brief in Support, 250 First MOTION for Leave to File AMENDED Master Class Action Complaint, 310 Reply Brief, 311 Reply Brief, of Supplemental Exhibit (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A. Testimony of Judge Muroski 10−14−2009)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 10/20/2009)
314 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Stephen A. Seach.(Seach, Stephen) (Entered: 10/22/2009)
315 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 314 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Stephen A. Seach.(Seach, Stephen) (Entered: 10/22/2009)
316 CERTIFICATE of Concurrence or non−concurrence by Stephen A. Seach re 314 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney. (Seach, Stephen) (Entered: 10/22/2009)
317 Proposed Order re: Motion to Withdraw (Doc. 314) by Stephen A. Seach.(Seach, Stephen) Modified on 10/23/2009 (jam, ). (Entered: 10/22/2009)
318 STATUS REPORT /Letter Regarding Oral Arguments and Rule 12 Motions by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 10/27/2009)
319 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by K. Yeager of Oral argument on motions before Judge Caputo on 10/28/09. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on 10/28/09. By s/ K. Yeager. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr, ) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
320 Letter dated 10/22/09 from Michael T. Conahan to the Court indicating he will not participate in oral argument on 10/28/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
321 STIPULATION for the Production of Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs' Sunpoena by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/29/2009)

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10/30/2009
11/02/2009 11/02/2009
11/05/2009
11/06/2009 11/09/2009 11/09/2009 11/09/2009 11/10/2009 11/16/2009
11/16/2009 11/20/2009
11/20/2009

323 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 re 249 First MOTION for Leave to File Individual Plaintiffs' Amended Master Long Form Complaint, 248 Brief in Opposition,, 279 Brief in Opposition, 196 Brief in Opposition, 282 Brief in Opposition, 275 Brief in Support, 281 Brief in Support, 250 First MOTION for Leave to File AMENDED Master Class Action Complaint, 310 Reply Brief, 311 Reply Brief, of Supplemental Exhibit (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) October 29, 2009 Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order)(Keller, Emily) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
324 Letter dated October 30, 2009 to the Court from Daniel Segal enclosing copy of October 29 Order from Pennsylvania Supreme Court. (jam, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/2/2009: # 1 October 29 Order) (jam, ). (Entered: 11/02/2009)
325 Letter from Luzerne County, Pennsylvania Child Care, Western Pennsylvania Child Care, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Robert J. Powell, Robert K. Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, Frank Vita, Perseus House, Barbara Conahan, and Cynthia Ciavarella re: Order from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Regarding Motion for Stay/Abstention)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 11/02/2009)
326 REPLY BRIEF re 314 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney , Plaintiffs' Brief in Response to Steven Seach, Esquire's, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Powell Law Group, P.C. and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibits A−E)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/05/2009)
327 DOCUMENT FILED by Dakota Jadush. Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption By Reference. (Kleiner, Daniel) Modified on 11/9/2009 (ga, ). (Entered: 11/06/2009)
328 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 of Defendant Powell Law Group Only (Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
329 NOTICE of Appearance by Mark B. Sheppard on behalf of Vision Holdings, LLC. (Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
330 NOTICE of Appearance by Jessica Richman Birk on behalf of Vision Holdings, LLC. (Birk, Jessica) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
331 ORDER finding as moot 314 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/10/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/10/2009)
332 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Oral argument held on 10/28/09 before Judge Caputo. Court Reporter Kristin Yeager, Telephone number 570.344.1323. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/7/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/17/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/14/2010. (cr, ) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
333 NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 332 Transcript. Copy of notice mailed to Benjamin R. Jones, Charles G. Ross, Jr., Dakota Jadush, John Haley, Mark Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan. (lh, ) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
334 MEMORANDUM ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. That the Defendants' Motion to Stay or for Abstention (Doc. 221) is deemed WITHDRAWN. 2. Because the remaining issues of the Motions to Dismiss by Cindy Ciavarella (Doc. 212) and Barbara Conahan (Doc. 214) are thus resolved, these motions are DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/20/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
335 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 249 Motion for Leave to File; denying 250 Motion for Leave to File. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Individual Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Master Complaint (Doc. 249) is DENIED. 2. Class Action Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Master Complaint

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11/20/2009
12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009

(Doc. 250) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/20/09 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
336 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, Motions terminated: 210 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., 216 MOTION to Dismiss , Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs' Complaints on the Basis of Judicial and Legislative Immunity filed by Michael T. Conahan, 170 MOTION to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs' Master Long Form Complaint filed by Perseus House, Inc., 188 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint filed by Frank Vita, Ph.D., 218 MOTION to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds filed by Luzerne County. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Defendant Perseus House's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 170) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. As to the claim of false imprisonment, the motion is GRANTED. b. As to the remainder the motion is DENIED. 2. Defendant Vita's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 188) is DENIED. 3. Defendant Mark Ciavarella's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 210) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. As to judicial immunity for the courtroom adjudications and sentences imposed, the motion is GRANTED. b. As to the remainder the motion is DENIED. 4. Defendant Michael Conahan's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 216) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. As to judicial immunity for the granting of injunctive relief, the motion is GRANTED. b. As to the remainder the motion is DENIED. 5. Defendant Luzerne County's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 218) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/20/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
337 by Carl Andrews, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complainti−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
338 by T.B, a minor by Viola Belt, Viola Belt, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
339 by M.B., a minor by Angela Breznak, Angela Breznak, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviate Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
340 by CC, a minor by by Theresa Carannante, Theresa Carannante, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
341 by Aubri Yefko, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
342 by Shane Balliet, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
343 by Jeremy Bevan, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
344 by Ronni Blight, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
345 by Deborah Seeman, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
346 by Justin Bodnar, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
347 by Luis Cruz, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and

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12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009 12/02/2009

Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
348 by Mayra Cruz, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
349 by Megan Fox, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
350 by Christopher Garrison, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
351 by Joseph Gilvary, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
352 by Theresa Hadvance, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
353 by George Hadvance, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
354 by Jessica Hargrave, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
355 by Joseph Lekiewicz, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
356 by Christine Biniek, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
357 by Elizabeth Ludwig, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
358 by Adam Lutz, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
359 by Jesse Sabecky, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
360 by Dave Sabecky, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
361 by Derek Sippel, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
362 by Daniel Stiegelbauer, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
363 by Claudia Stiegelbauer, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
364 by Malcolm Yaple, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)

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12/02/2009 12/03/2009 12/07/2009 12/07/2009 12/07/2009 12/07/2009 12/07/2009 12/08/2009 12/08/2009 12/14/2009 12/17/2009
12/21/2009 12/21/2009 12/21/2009
12/22/2009

365 by Lauren Yaple, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 134 Amended Complaint,,, Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 12/02/2009)
366 SCHEDULING NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a PERIODIC CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE has been SCHEDULED for Monday, December 21, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., Max Rosenn U.S. Courthouse, 197 South Main St., Wilkes−Barre, PA. (jam, ) (Entered: 12/03/2009)
367 MOTION to Stay Filing Of Answers To All Complaints Filed by Individual Plaintiffs and Class Action Plaintiffs by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ga, ) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
368 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 367 MOTION to Stay Filing of Answers To All Complaints Filed By Individual Plaintiffs and Class Action Plaintiffs, filed by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr..(ga, ) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
369 MOTION to Stay Filing of Answers To All Complaints Filed By Individual Plaintiffs and Class Action Plaintiffs by Michael T. Conahan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ga, ) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
370 CERTIFICATE of Non−Concurrence by Michael T. Conahan re 369 MOTION to Stay. (ga, ) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
371 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 369 MOTION to Stay to File Answers to Plaintiffs' Complaints filed by Michael T. Conahan.(ga, ) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
372 MOTION for Protective Order by Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Daley, Michael) (Entered: 12/08/2009)
373 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 372 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D)(Daley, Michael) (Entered: 12/08/2009)
374 STIPULATION By Consent Governing Disclosure of Subpoenaed Pennsylvania State Police REcords by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/14/2009)
375 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Master Complaint for Class Actions by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Brief in Support of Second Motion for Leave to Amend, # 3 Exhibit(s) Proposed Amended Complaint −− Part 1, # 4 Proposed Amended Complaint −− Part 2, # 5 Exhibit(s) Exhibits A−B to Proposed Amended Complaint, # 6 Exhibit(s) Exhibits C−D to Proposed Amended Complaint, # 7 Exhibit(s) Exhibits E−J to Proposed Amended Complaint, # 8 Exhibit(s) Exhibits K−Q to Proposed Amended Complaint, # 9 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 2, Part 1 to Motion for Leave to Amend (Redline), # 10 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 2, Part 2 to Motion for Leave to Amend (Redline), # 11 Exhibit(s) Exs. 3−4 to Motion for Leave to Amend)(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 12/17/2009)
378 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 367 MOTION to Stay, 369 MOTION to Stay Filing of Answers to All Plaintiffs Individual and Class Action Complaints filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A − C)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
379 CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER by consent governing disclosure of subpoenaed Pennsylvania State Police records Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/21/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
380 SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Briefs in opposition to Class Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Leave to Amend the Master Complaint for Class Actions (Doc. 375) shall be due on 1/22/10. Reply briefs shall be due 2/12/10. 2. Motions to Dismiss, with supporting briefs, shall be filed within twenty (20) days after a decision on the Class Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Leave to Amend the Master Complaint for Class Actions.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/21/09. (jam, ) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
381 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 372 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A through F, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 12/22/2009)

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12/28/2009 12/30/2009 01/04/2010 01/04/2010 01/12/2010
01/12/2010 01/12/2010 01/12/2010
01/15/2010 01/18/2010 01/18/2010 01/19/2010 01/19/2010
01/20/2010

382 Letter dated 12/22/09 to the Court from Eric Kraeutler, Esq. re: status of Motion to Quash Subpoena served by theClerk of Courts, Luzerne County. (jam, ) (Entered: 12/28/2009)
383 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 375 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Master Complaint for Class Actions, filed by Lourdes M. Rosado..(ga, ) (Entered: 12/30/2009)
384 Letter from Judge A. Richard Caputo to Mr. Kraiutler, Re: Response to letter dated December 22, 2009 regarding Motion to Quash. (ga, ) (Entered: 01/04/2010)
385 REPLY BRIEF re 372 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts.(Daley, Michael) (Entered: 01/04/2010)
388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1−5, # 3 Exhibit(s) 6−11, # 4 Certificate of Concurrence and Non−Concurrence, # 5 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/12/2010)
389 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/12/2010)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Documents #386 and #387 filed incorrectly. Documents deleted and refiled correctly as #388 and #389. (kc, ) (Entered: 01/12/2010)
390 MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 367 Motion to Stay; denying 369 Motion to Stay. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Mark Ciavarella, Jr.'s Motion to Stay Filing of Answers (Doc. 367) and Defendant Michael Conahan's Motion to Stay Filing of Answers (Doc. 369) are DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/12/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/12/2010)
391 MOTION for Hearing re 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence and Non−Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/15/2010)
392 REQUEST for Production of Documents by Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC.(Bednarek, Nicole) (Entered: 01/18/2010)
393 REQUEST for Production of Documents by Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC.(Bednarek, Nicole) (Entered: 01/18/2010)
394 NOTICE of Appearance by Nicole F Bednarek on behalf of Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC (Bednarek, Nicole) (Entered: 01/19/2010)
395 *** VACATED BY ORDER DATED JANUARY 22, 2010 (DOC. 399) *** ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs have until January 26, 2010 to file a response to Defendants Mid Atlantic Youth Services, Pennsylvania Child Care, and Western Pennsylvania Child Care's Motions for Preliminary Injunction or, Alternatively, Motion to Dismiss for Spoliation of Evidence Claims of Plaintiffs Who Seek Expungement Orders and Motion for Stay of Movants' Response to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production of Documents Pending Disposition of Proceding Motions (Doc. 388) and Motion for Hearing Date for Motions for Preliminary Injunction or, Alternatively, Motion to Dismiss for Spoliation of Evidence Claims of Plaintiffs Who Seek Expungement Orders and Motion for Stay of Movants' Response to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents Pending Disposition of Preceding Motions (Doc. 391). Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/19/10. (jam, ) Modified on 1/22/2010 (jam, ). (Entered: 01/19/2010)
396 MOTION to Amend/Correct 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1, # 3 Exhibit(s) 2, # 4 Exhibit(s) 3, # 5 Certificate of Word Count in Proposed Brief, # 6 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 7 Certificate of Concurrence and Non−Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/20/2010)

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01/20/2010 01/22/2010 01/22/2010
01/22/2010 01/26/2010 01/26/2010 01/28/2010
01/28/2010 01/28/2010
02/11/2010
02/12/2010

397 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 396 MOTION to Amend/Correct 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION to Amend/Correct 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/20/2010)
398 Letter dated January 19, 2010 from Attorney David Senoff to the Court regarding Luzerne County Clerk of Court's Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 200). (jam, ) (Entered: 01/22/2010)
399 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Defendants Mid Atlantic Youth Services, Pennsylvania Child Care, and Western Pennsylvania Child Care's Motion to Amend/Correct [Doc. 396] is GRANTED, and deemed filed 1/22/10. (2) The Court's Order giving Plaintiffs until 1/26/10 to respond (Doc. 395) is VACATED. (3) Plaintiffs have until 2/1/10 to file their responses. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/22/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/22/2010)
400 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 375 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Master Complaint for Class Actions filed by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 01/22/2010)
401 ORDER denying 200 Motion to Quash. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Quash Subpoena of Robert F. Reilly, Clerk of Courts of Luzerne COunty and the Office of the Clerk of Courts − Luzerne County (Doc. 200) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/26/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/26/2010)
402 MEMORANDUM ORDER denying the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Court's Motion for Protective Order [Doc. 372]. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/26/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/27/2010)
403 STIPULATION to Extend Time to Respond to PACC, WPACC, and MAYS's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion to Dismiss for Spoliation of Evidence, and Motion for Stay of Movant's Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Stipulated Order)(Santoro, Rebecca) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
404 CERTIFICATE of Service by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 re 403 Stipulation,. (Santoro, Rebecca) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
405 *** MODIFIED BY ORDER DATED 2/12/10 (DOC. 407) *** Order approving re 403 Stipulation to Extend Responses to PACC, WPACC and MAYS's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Or Alternatively, Motion To Dismiss For Spoliation Of Evidence Claims Of Plaintiffs Who Seek Expungement Orders, And Motion For Stay Of Movants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Requests For Production Of Documents Pending Disposition Of Preceding Motions. All responses are due Tuesday, 2/16/10. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/28/10. (jam, ) Modified on 2/12/2010 (jam, ). (Entered: 01/28/2010)
406 STIPULATION for Second Extension to Respond to PACC, WPACC, and MAYS's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion to Dismiss for Spoliation of Evidence, and Motion for Stay of Movant's Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A − Proposed Order)(Walvoord, Adrianne) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
407 *** MODIFIED BY ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 25, 2010 (DOC. 410) *** Order approving Stipulation for Second Extension to File Responses to PACC, WPACC and MAYS's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Or Alternatively, Motion To Dismiss For Spoliation Of Evidence Claims Of Plaintiffs Who Seek Expungement Orders, And Motion For Stay Of Movants' Responses To Plaintiffs' Requests For Production Of Documents Pending Disposition Of Preceding Motions. The Court modifies its prior Order of 1/28/10 (Doc. 405) and all responses are due 2/26/10. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/12/10. (jam, ) Modified on 2/25/2010 (jam, ). (Entered: 02/12/2010)

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02/12/2010 02/24/2010
02/25/2010
03/01/2010 03/09/2010 03/10/2010 03/12/2010 03/12/2010 03/16/2010 03/16/2010 03/16/2010 03/17/2010 03/17/2010

408 REPLY BRIEF re 375 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Master Complaint for Class Actions filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibits A and B to reply brief, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s) Unpublished opinions cited in reply brief)(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 02/12/2010)
409 STIPULATION For An Additional Extension to File Responses to PACC, WPACC, MAYS's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion to Dismiss for Spoliation of Evidence, and Motion for Stay of Movant's Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A − Proposed Order)(Walvoord, Adrianne) (Entered: 02/24/2010)
410 Order approving Stipulation for an Addition Extension to File Responses to PACC, WPACC and MAYS'S Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, or Alternatively, Motion to Dismiss for Spoliation of Evidence Claims of Plaintiffs Who Seek Expungement Orders, and Motion for Stay of Movants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production of Documents Pending Disposition of Preceding Motions. The Court modifies its prior Order of 2/12/10 (Doc. No. 407) and all responses to PACC, WPACC and MAYS's Amended Motion (Doc. No. 396) are due Friday, March 12, 2010. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/25/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/25/2010)
411 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 375 Motion to Amend/Correct. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Class Action Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Master Complaint (Doc. 375) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/1/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/03/2010)
412 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION − Withdrawal and Entry of Attorney Appearance. Attorney John Haley terminated. Attorney Michael J. Bendick and Michael J. Bendick for Larksville Borough Police Department added. (Bendick, Michael) (Entered: 03/09/2010)
413 Signed Copy of Document 412 by Larksville Borough Police Department.. (Bendick, Michael) (Entered: 03/10/2010)
414 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Request for Extension to File Response to Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Keller, Emily) (Entered: 03/12/2010)
415 ORDER granting 414 Motion to Extend Time. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/12/2010 (bg, ) (Entered: 03/12/2010)
416 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation and File Common Brief in Support of Motions to Dismiss by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Dante, Alison) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
417 MOTION for Extension of Time to to April 2, 2010 and for relied from Local Rule 7.8 concerning length of briefs and incorporating other briefs by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
418 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence and Non Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
419 CERTIFICATE of Concurrence by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. re 416 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation and File Common Brief in Support of Motions to Dismiss. (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
420 RESPONSE by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286 to 417 MOTION for Extension of Time to to April 2, 2010 and for relied from Local Rule 7.8 concerning length of briefs and incorporating other briefs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 03/17/2010)

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03/18/2010
03/18/2010
03/18/2010 03/18/2010 03/18/2010
03/19/2010 03/19/2010 03/19/2010
03/19/2010
03/19/2010 03/22/2010
03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/22/2010

421 ORDER granting 416 Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits. Defendants may file a common brief in support of their respective motions to dismiss, not to exceed 72 pages. Defendants joining or adopting by reference such a common brief may file additional separate memoranda in support of their respective motions to dismiss. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/18/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
422 ORDER granting 417 Motion to Extend Time and Exceed Page Limits. Luzerne County's motions to dismiss and supporting briefs due 4/2/10 and shall not exceed 30 pages or 10,000 words.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/18/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
423 ORDER granting 418 Motion for Leave to File A Single Motion Under Rule 12 and Single Supporting Brief Not Exceeding 45 Pages. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/18/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
424 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion to Dismiss by Frank Vita, Ph.D.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Swetz, James) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
425 BRIEF IN SUPPORT /Submission of Mericle Defendants in Response re 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
426 ORDER granting 424 Motion of Defendant, Frank Vita, Ph.D., for Extension of Time. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss shall be due on or before 4/30/10. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/19/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/19/2010)
427 REPLY BRIEF re 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Arthur E. Grim. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B)(Williams, A.) (Entered: 03/19/2010)
429 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Compliance with Word−Count Limit, # 2 Certificate of Service, # 3 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A, # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Levick, Marsha) (Entered: 03/19/2010)
430 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 391 MOTION for Hearing re 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Hearing re 388 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Levick, Marsha) (Entered: 03/19/2010)
431 NOTICE by Vision Holdings, LLC, Robert J. Powell re 425 Brief in Support Notice of Joinder of Robert J. Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 03/19/2010)
432 REPLY by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. to 429 Brief in Opposition, 427 Reply Brief, 430 Brief in Opposition,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
433 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) by Barbara Conahan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
434 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 433 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by Barbara Conahan.(Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
435 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) by Cindy Ciavarella. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
436 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 435 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by Cindy Ciavarella.(Rhoades, Stephen) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
437 MOTION to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by Vision Holdings, LLC, Robert J. Powell.(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
438 Per Mark Sheppard's Office, Document #438 deleted, refiled as Document #441. (Entered: 03/22/2010)

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03/22/2010
03/22/2010 03/22/2010
03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/22/2010 03/22/2010
03/24/2010
03/24/2010 03/24/2010 03/25/2010 03/25/2010 04/01/2010 04/01/2010 04/01/2010 04/02/2010

439 MOTION to Dismiss by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 5 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 6 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 7 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 8 Proposed Order, # 9 Certificate of Concurrence and non concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
440 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 439 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement certificate of page count)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
441 BRIEF IN SUPPORT (CORRECTED DOCUMENT TO REPLACE MISFILED No. 438) re 437 MOTION to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by Vision Holdings, LLC, Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A (Transcript of Arraignment and Guilty Plea Proceedings), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s) (McCleester; Sershen; Salvation Army))(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
442 First MOTION to Dismiss All Complaints by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Certificate of Service, # 3 Proposed Order)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
443 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 442 First MOTION to Dismiss All Complaints filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
444 CERTIFICATE of by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. re 443 Brief in Support Certificate of Service and Certificate of Compliance. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
445 BRIEF IN SUPPORT /Common Brief in Support of Motions to Dismiss filed by of Robert Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Luzerne County, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, Western PA Child Care, Mericle Construction, Inc., Robert K. Mericle, Perseus House, Barbara Conahan, and Cindy Ciavarella re 439 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
446 MEMORANDUM: Plaintiffs request clarification as to Luzerne County's present status in this case. As Luzerne County is a named party in the Plaintiffs' complaints, and no order from this Court or stipulation from the paties has dismissed it, Luzerne County must be said to remain a party in this action. See Memorandum for complete details). Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/24/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
447 REQUEST for Production of Documents by Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC.(Bednarek, Nicole) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
448 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC Service of Defendant's First Set of Request for Production of Documents on all Plaintiffs (Bednarek, Nicole) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Left message for Attorney Bednarek to re−file signature page to Doc. 447 "Request for Production of Documents" and use Document filed event. (ga, ) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
449 Defendant Pinnacle's SIGNED Request for Production of Documents on All Plaintiffs by Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC.. (Bednarek, Nicole) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
450 MOTION to Dismiss All Claims by All Plaintiffs by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
451 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 450 MOTION to Dismiss All Claims by All Plaintiffs filed by Luzerne County.(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
452 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Nicole F Bednarek terminated on behalf of Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC. (Bednarek, Nicole) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
453 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Connection with Motion for Injunction and Preservation of Records by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction,

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04/06/2010 04/07/2010 04/08/2010 04/09/2010 04/09/2010
04/23/2010 04/26/2010 04/29/2010 04/29/2010 05/03/2010 05/03/2010 05/04/2010 05/04/2010 05/06/2010

Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Proposed Sur−Reply, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Certificate of Service, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 04/02/2010)
454 SCHEDULING NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a PERIODIC CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE has been SCHEDULED for WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010 at 4:45 p.m., Max Rosenn U.S. Courthouse, 197 South Main St., Wilkes−Barre, Pennsylvania. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
455 ORDER denying 453 Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply Brief.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/7/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 04/07/2010)
456 MOTION for Order Setting a Briefing Schedule for Response and Reply Briefs Relating to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 04/08/2010)
457 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 456 MOTION for Order Setting a Briefing Schedule for Response and Reply Briefs Relating to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Certificate of Service filed by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 04/09/2010)
458 ORDER, Motions terminated: 456 MOTION for Order Setting a Briefing Schedule for Response and Reply Briefs Relating to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1)Plaintiffs Motion to Set a Briefing Schedule for Response and Reply Briefs Relating to Defendants Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 456) is DENIED.(2)Briefs in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss by Defendants Barbara Conahan (Doc. 433); Cindy Ciavarella (Doc. 435); Vision Holdings, LLC and Robert Powell (Doc. 437); Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC (Doc. 439); Robert Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (Doc. 442), and Luzerne County (Doc. 450) shall be due on May 10, 2010.(3)Reply briefs to the aforementioned motions shall be due May 31, 2010Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/9/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/09/2010)
460 AMENDED COMPLAINT Modified Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Karen Adamski, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/23/2010)
461 Letter dated 4/23/10 to the Court from Attorney David Senoff re: Motion to Conform filed with Pennsylvania Supreme Court. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/26/2010)
462 MOTION to Dismiss by Frank Vita, Ph.D..(Swetz, James) (Entered: 04/29/2010)
463 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 462 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Frank Vita, Ph.D..(Swetz, James) (Entered: 04/29/2010)
464 MOTION for Entry of Default as to Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 05/03/2010)
465 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 464 MOTION for Entry of Default as to Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−E)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 05/03/2010)
466 ORDER granting 464 Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default as to Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/4/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/04/2010)
467 Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC for failure to answer, plead or otherwise defend.Signed by Deputy Clerk on 5/4/10. (ga, ) (Entered: 05/04/2010)
468 SCHEDULING ORDER: Settlement Conference set for 6/11/2010 09:30 AM in Wilkes−Barre before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/6/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 05/06/2010)

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05/06/2010 05/10/2010 05/10/2010 05/10/2010 05/10/2010
05/10/2010 05/11/2010
05/11/2010 05/11/2010
05/11/2010 05/11/2010
05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010

469 SCHEDULING ORDER: Prel/Perm Injunction Hearing set for 6/4/2010 09:30 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 1 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/6/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
470 AMENDED COMPLAINT Modified Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jacqueline Kenney, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/10/2010)
471 MOTION for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in Opposition to the Various Motions to Dismiss by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/10/2010)
472 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Individual Plaintiffs' Request for Enlargement of Time Within Which to Answer Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Frank Vita by Samantha Humanik.(Freeman, Richard) (Entered: 05/10/2010)
473 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 435 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 439 MOTION to Dismiss, 442 First MOTION to Dismiss All Complaints, 437 MOTION to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 433 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A − G, # 3 Exhibit(s) H − K, # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 05/10/2010)
474 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 450 MOTION to Dismiss All Claims by All Plaintiffs filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 05/10/2010)
475 MOTION Leave to Inspect and Copy Documents in the posession, custody and control of the Director of the Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence and non concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
476 ORDER granting 472 Motion for Enlargement of Time to Answer the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Vita. Individual Plaintiffs shall file their response to said motion on or before 6/1/10. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/11/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
477 ORDER granting 471 Wallace Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in Opposition to the Various Motions to Dismiss. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall file the Wallace Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Opposition to the Various Motions to Dismiss upon entry of this Order granting Said Motion. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/11/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
478 AMENDED DOCUMENT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. Certificate of Concurrence and Non Concurrence. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
479 WALLACE PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 435 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 439 MOTION to Dismiss, 442 First MOTION to Dismiss All Complaints, 450 MOTION to Dismiss All Claims by All Plaintiffs, 437 MOTION to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 433 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by Wallace Plaintiffs, 09−286.(jam, ) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
480 NOTICE by Samantha Humanik OF ADOPTION BY REFERENCE (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
481 REPLY BRIEF re 450 MOTION to Dismiss All Claims by All Plaintiffs filed by Luzerne County.(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
482 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Dorothy Backes, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered:

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05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010

05/12/2010)
483 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Ida Kravitz, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
484 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Lazaro Gonzalez, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
485 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Phillip Jadush, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
486 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Mario Katona, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
487 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Collin Kaye, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
488 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jeff Kehler, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
489 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Kneller Jesse, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
490 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Richard Kneller, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
491 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Darlene Jones, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
492 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Amanda McDavitt, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
493 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Peter Mindick, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
494 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Brittney Rushton, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
495 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by JoAnne Gattuso, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)

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05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010 05/12/2010
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05/14/2010 05/17/2010 05/17/2010 05/19/2010 05/20/2010 05/21/2010

496 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Kaitlyn Serota, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
497 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Laurelle Serota, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
498 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Carl Smith, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
499 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Linda Smith, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
500 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Lisa Kneller, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/12/2010)
501 ORDER granting 475 Motion for Leave to Inspect and Copy Documents in the Possession, Custody and Control of the Luzerne County Office Director of the Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Office or Such Other Locations as were Approved by the Special Master. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/12/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
502 STIPULATION re 460 Amended Complaint, 470 Amended Complaint for Time to Answer, Respond, or Otherwise Plead filed on behalf of Robert K. Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., Pennsylvania Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, Inc., Barbara Conahan, Cindy Ciavarella, and the Individual Plaintiffs by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
503 MOTION Join Stipulation filed by certain Defendants re 502 Stipulation, by Frank Vita, Ph.D.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Swetz, James) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
504 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin M. Walsh on behalf of Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC (Walsh, Kevin) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
505 ORDER granting 503 Motion to Join in the Stipulation.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/17/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
506 . (Attachments: # 1 certif of service)(Fannick, Demetrius) (Entered: 05/19/2010)
NOTICE of Appearance by Demetrius W. Fannick on behalf of Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC. (ga, ) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
507 ORDER re 502 Stipulation for Time to Answer, Respond or Otherwise Plead filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1)The parties Stipulation for Time to Answer, Respond, or Otherwise Plead (Doc. 502) is MODIFIED.(2)All Defendants will be permitted to answer, respond, or otherwise plead to the allegations in the complaints until THIRTY (30) DAYS after the Court rules on all of the following motions:(a)Motion to Dismiss by Barbara Conahan (Doc. 433);(b)Motion to Dismiss by Cindy Ciavarella (Doc. 435);(c)Motion to Dismiss by Vision Holdings, LLC and Robert Powell (Doc. 437);(d)Motion to Dismiss by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC (Doc. 439); (e)Motion to Dismiss by Robert Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. (Doc. 442);(f)Motion to Dismiss by Luzerne County (Doc. 450); and(g)Motion to Dismiss by Frank Vita (Doc. 462);Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/21/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 05/21/2010)

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05/25/2010 05/26/2010 05/26/2010 05/27/2010 05/28/2010 05/28/2010 05/28/2010
05/31/2010
06/01/2010 06/01/2010 06/01/2010
06/01/2010
06/01/2010 06/02/2010 06/03/2010

508 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 462 MOTION to Dismiss of Frank Vita filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Freeman, Richard) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Left message for Attorney Richard Freeman to re−file signature pages to the Brief in Opposition", Doc. #508. (ga, ) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
509 Corrected Signature Pages to Brief in Opposition by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. 508 Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of Frank Vita. (Freeman, Richard) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
511 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
512 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Deborah Pringle, Harry Witko, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
513 Letter from A. Taylor Williams, Esquire. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Attachment 1)(Williams, A.) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
514 ORDER granting 511 Defendants' Motion to Exceed Page Limits and File a Common Reply Brief in Support of motions to dismiss the complaints. Defendants may file a common Reply brief in support of their respective motions to dismiss in excess of the page and word limits contained in Local Rule 7.8(b) not to exceed 25 pages. Defendants joining or adopting by reference such a common Reply brief may file additional separate Reply briefs in support of their respective motions to dismiss and may incorporate other briefs by reference. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/28/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
515 REPLY BRIEF re 439 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 5, # 2 Exhibit(s) 6, # 3 Exhibit(s) 7, # 4 Exhibit(s) 8, # 5 Exhibit(s) 9, # 6 Exhibit(s) 10, # 7 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 8 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2010)
516 MOTION to Clarify Motion For Clarification of Length of Reply Brief by Robert K Mericle. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
517 ORDER granting 516 Motion to Clarify. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the page limit with regard to Reply Briefs to the Motion to Dismiss is 25 pages or 8,333 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/1/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
518 REPLY BRIEF re 437 MOTION to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Supplemental Reply Brief in Further Support of Their Motions to Dismiss filed by Vision Holdings, LLC, Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Compliance with Word Count, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
519 REPLY BRIEF re 439 MOTION to Dismiss, 442 First MOTION to Dismiss All Complaints, 437 MOTION to Dismiss the Master Complaints Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Common Reply Brief in Further Support of Non−Judicial Defendants Common Brief in Support of Motions to Dismiss All Complaints filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
520 REPLY BRIEF re 442 First MOTION to Dismiss All Complaints against Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. filed by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
521 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 06/02/2010)
522 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s),

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 235 of 341

06/03/2010 06/03/2010 06/03/2010 06/04/2010 06/04/2010 06/07/2010
06/09/2010
06/11/2010 06/23/2010 06/30/2010 07/01/2010 07/09/2010 07/14/2010

# 9 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
523 EXHIBIT Unreported Decisions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC re 522 Memorandum of Law,. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
524 EXHIBIT Unreported Opinions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC re 522 Memorandum of Law,. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
525 MOTION to File Document Under Seal by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
527 Exhibit List of Exhibits utilized at 6/4/10 Oral Argument on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
528 ORDER granting 525 Motion to File Documents Under Seal.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/4/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
529 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Suzanne halko of preliminary injuction hearing before Judge A. Richard Caputo on 6/4/2010. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge A. Richard Caputo on 6/4/2010. By s/ Suzanne halko. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr1, ) (Entered: 06/07/2010)
530 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 388 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Pennsylvania Child Care, and Western Pennsylvania Child Cares Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 388) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:(1)As to Defendants request to enjoin the expungement of their records, the motion is GRANTED as follows:(a)The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, along with Special Master the Honorable Arthur E. Grim, are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or issuing orders to expunge the records of Pennsylvania Child Care, Western Pennsylvania Child Care, and Mid−Atlantic Youth Services relating to the Plaintiffs in the present action.(b)This injunction will DISSOLVE THIRTY (30) DAYS after the termination of this litigation.(2)As to Defendants request for spoliation sanctions, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.(3)As to Defendants request for a stay pending resolution of this motion, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/9/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 06/09/2010)
531 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a CONFERENCE CALL has been SCHEDULED for Monday, July 12, 2010 at 11:30 A.M. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the call. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/11/2010)
533 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Neha Desai terminated on behalf of H.T. Plaintiffs 09−357. (Desai, Neha) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
535 Proposed Pretrial Order by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, Vision Holdings, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Robert J. Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) "A" Stipulated Protective Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 06/30/2010)
536 ORDER regarding objections of provider Defendants to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/1/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/01/2010)
537 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 450 Defendant Luzerne County's Motion to Dismiss All Claims Against It By All Plaintiffs. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/9/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
539 SCHEDULING ORDER: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a STATUS CONFERENCE has been SCHEDULED for Wednesday, September 15, 2010 at 9:30 AM, in Wilkes−Barre.(jam, ) (Entered: 07/14/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 236 of 341

07/21/2010
07/21/2010 08/12/2010 08/12/2010 08/13/2010 08/16/2010 08/18/2010
08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010

540 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on June 4, 2010, before Judge A. Richard Caputo. Court Reporter Suzanne Halko, Telephone number 570−237−1867. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/11/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/23/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/19/2010. (cr1, ) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
541 NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 540 Transcript. Copy of notice mailed to Benjamin R. Jones, Charles G. Ross, Jr., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. and Michael T. Conahan on 07/21/10. (mep, ) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
542 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena by Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Probation Department. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
543 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 542 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena filed by Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Probation Department.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
544 MOTION Consent for leave to disclose juveniles' names to NHS PA to Aid Discovery by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Stipulated Order with doc. 205 Protective Order)(Wishnoff, Howard) (Entered: 08/13/2010)
545 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 542 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena to the Luzerne County Probation Department − Juvenile Division filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A − C, # 2 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 08/16/2010)
546 ORDER granting 544 Motion − it is Ordered that Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp may provide to NHS Pennsylvania the names of Juveniles from Luzerne County PA who were detained at or treated at the PA Child Care LLC facility in Pittston, PA from 1/1/2003 through 4/30/2005. Further, any information that NHS PA produces in response to the subpoena shall be subject to teh Stipulated Protective Order (attached hereto). Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/17/2010 (rm, ) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
547 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Josh Bevan, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
548 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Kristin Smith, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
549 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Janet Castrignano, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
550 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by James Davis, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
551 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Brenda Dalzell, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
552 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Joseph Drahaus, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 237 of 341

08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010

553 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Joseph Drahaus, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
554 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Tina Drahaus, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
555 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by David Folweiler, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
556 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by L.F, a minor by Michelle Fuqua, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
557 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Sarah Gonzalez, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
558 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Lazaro Gonzalez, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
559 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Richard Hall, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
560 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michelle Hall, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
561 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jettie Johnson, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
562 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Damien Kratz, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
563 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Matthew Mikolaichik, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
564 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jason Miller, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
565 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jamie Nicholson, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
566 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Robert Novac, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered:

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 238 of 341

08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/18/2010 08/24/2010
08/24/2010 08/30/2010 09/02/2010 09/03/2010

08/18/2010)
567 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Patricia Cooper, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
568 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Alexander Pierce, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
569 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Keith Polerecki, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
570 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by T.S., a minor by Bobbi Hargrove, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
571 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Keith Soto, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
572 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Ely Soto, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
573 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 433 Motion to Dismiss; granting 435 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 437 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 439 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 442 Motion to Dismiss. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/24/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/25/2010)
574 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 462 Defendant Vita's Motion to Dismiss Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/24/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/25/2010)
575 NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the STATUS CONFERENCE currently scheduled for 9/15/10 has been RESCHEDULED to WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 at 10:00 A.M., Wilkes−Barre. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
576 ORDER denying 542 Motion to Quash Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/2/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/02/2010)
577 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 549 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, 482 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 460 Amended Complaint, 485 Amended Complaint, 493 Amended Complaint, 470 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 490 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 486 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 484 Amended Complaint, 488 Amended Complaint, 483 Amended Complaint, 492 Amended Complaint, 489 Amended Complaint, 554 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 487 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 556 Amended Complaint, 572 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 491 Amended Complaint, 494 Amended Complaint, 495 Amended Complaint, 135 Amended Complaint,, 567 Amended Complaint, 134 Amended Complaint,,, 497 Amended Complaint, 512 Amended Complaint, 136 Amended Complaint,, and to answer, respond or otherwise plead to the "Short Form Complaints" by Robert K Mericle,

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 239 of 341

09/08/2010 09/08/2010 09/08/2010
09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010

Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Stipulated Order, # 2 Stipulation for Extension of Time)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 09/03/2010)
578 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses To Plaintiffs' Class Action Master Complaint to 136 Amended Complaint,, 135 Amended Complaint,, by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr..(ga, ) (Entered: 09/08/2010)
579 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Individual Plaintiffs' Consolidated Complaint to 134 Amended Complaint by Mark A Ciavarella, Jr..(ga, ) (Entered: 09/08/2010)
580 Order approving Stipulation re 577 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer. Defendants will have until 10/15/10 to answer the Master Individual Complaint and the Master Class Action and answer, resond or otherwise plead to the issues in the Short Form Complaints not already resolved by the Court's prior Order. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/8/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 09/08/2010)
581 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Ashley Acri.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
582 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Cindy Lehan.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
583 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Frank Andrukaitis.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
584 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Taylor Warman.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
585 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michelle Cardinale.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
586 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michelle Cardinale.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
587 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Ryan Arcangeli.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
588 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michael Arcangeli.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
589 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michael Balbach.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
590 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Louise Balbach.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
591 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Nicholas Biros.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
592 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Nancy Biros.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
593 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Joshua Brotzman.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 240 of 341

09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010

594 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Elizabeth Brotzman.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
595 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Vincent Burgio.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
596 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Matthew Campbell.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
597 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Vincent Cirello.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
598 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Cheryl Magoski.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
599 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by J. D..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
600 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by K. D..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
601 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by K. D..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
602 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jeremy DeAngelo.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
603 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Roxanne DeAngelo.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
604 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by James DeAngelo.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
605 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by James DeAngelo.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
606 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Dezare Dunbar.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
607 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Maurisa Dunbar.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
608 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by C. E., Jr..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
609 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by C. E., Sr..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
610 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by P. E..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 241 of 341

09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010 09/09/2010

611 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Antoine Evans.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
612 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Kimberly Rhodes.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
613 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Alex Ferrence.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
614 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michael Ferrence.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
615 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Lousia Ferrence.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
616 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by D. F..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
617 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by R. S..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
618 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Colleen Gembitski.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
619 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jared Goodwin.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
620 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Colby Gronski.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
621 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Larry Hallock, II.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
622 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Nancy Kulp.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
623 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michael Hodle.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
624 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Barbara Craig.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
625 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Joseph Homanko, Jr..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
626 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Joseph Homanko, Sr..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)
627 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Lisa Homanko.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/09/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 242 of 341

09/13/2010
09/13/2010
09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010
09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010

628 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Peter Echon, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
629 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Colleen Bradigan, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
630 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michael Inman.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
631 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Lisa Naugle.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
632 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Abigail Sterowski, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
633 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by K. S..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
634 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by L. N..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
635 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Christopher Lane.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
636 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by David Lynch.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
637 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Barbara Lynch.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
638 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jared Mason.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
639 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by John Mattie, Jr..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
640 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Steven Mattie.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
641 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Lisa Mattie.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
642 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Bree McCabe.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
643 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michelle McCabe.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
644 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 243 of 341

09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010

defendants, filed by Thomas McCabe.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
645 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Christopher McDermott.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
646 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Charmaine Yarger.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
647 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Michelle Nguyen.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
648 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Kyle Pennington.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
649 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Brian Pennington.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
650 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by John Perea.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
651 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by M. P..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
652 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by T. P..(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
653 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Robert Rogo.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
654 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Barbara Rogo.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
655 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Chad Solarek.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
656 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Bonnie Nelson.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
657 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Edward Solimini.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
658 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Kimbell Stanford, III.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
659 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Susan Foster.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
660 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Justin Steele.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
661 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Jonathan Stewart.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 244 of 341

09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/15/2010

662 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Elvis Tejeda.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
663 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Evelyn Fernandez.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
664 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Justina Toole.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
665 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Patrice Lingle.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
666 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Mallerie Ungvarsky.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
667 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Dwayne Vanderhoff, Jr.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
668 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Margaret Vanderhoff.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
669 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Joshua Vanderhoff.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
670 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Wilve Veras.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
671 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Donald Wallace.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
672 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Tyler Werts.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
673 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Donald Werts.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
674 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Daniel Wilde.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
675 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Richard Williams, Jr.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
676 CERTIFICATE of Service by All Plaintiffs, 09−286 re 582 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, 616 Amended Complaint, 634 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 614 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 593

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 245 of 341

10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010

Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 669 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 658 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 617 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 597 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint. (Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
678 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Leann Crise, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
679 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by James Crise, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
680 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Rebecca Hodle, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
681 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Elizabeth Lorenz, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
682 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Timothy Vassello, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
683 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Norm Demming, All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
684 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 582 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 482 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 460 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, 485 Amended Complaint, 616 Amended Complaint, 634 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 493 Amended Complaint, 470 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 614 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 490 Amended Complaint, 499

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 246 of 341

10/07/2010 10/08/2010
10/11/2010 10/11/2010 10/11/2010 10/11/2010

Amended Complaint, 486 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 484 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 488 Amended Complaint, 483 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 492 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, 489 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 554 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 683 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 487 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 669 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 556 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 572 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 658 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 617 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 491 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 494 Amended Complaint, 495 Amended Complaint, 135 Amended Complaint,, 604 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 597 Amended Complaint, 134 Amended Complaint,,, 497 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 512 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 136 Amended Complaint,, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
685 Unopposed MOTION to Consolidate Cases for Discovery and Scheduling Purposes and for Extension of Time by Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Consolidate Cases for Discovery Purposes, # 2 Exhibit(s) A through C)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 10/07/2010)
686 ORDER granting 684 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC will have until November 15, 2010 to answer the Master Individual Complaint and the Master Complaint for Class Action, and to answer, respond or otherwise plead to the Short Form Complaints in the above−captioned matters. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/7/10 (ga, ) (Entered: 10/08/2010)
687 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Melissa Bonilla.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 10/11/2010)
688 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Eugenio Bonilla.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 10/11/2010)
689 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint−Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against all defendants, filed by Andre Minucci.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 10/11/2010)
690 CERTIFICATE of Service by Melissa Bonilla, Eugenio Bonilla, Andre Minucci re 689 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint. (Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 10/11/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 247 of 341

10/14/2010
10/27/2010
10/28/2010 10/28/2010 10/28/2010 10/29/2010 11/01/2010 11/10/2010
11/10/2010 11/10/2010 11/11/2010 11/12/2010 11/12/2010 11/15/2010

691 MOTION for Extension of Time until November 15, 2010 the deadline within which moving Defendant may answer the Master Individual Complaint and the Master Complaint for Class Action, and to answer, respond or otherwise plead to the Short Form Complaints in the above captioned matters by Michael T. Conahan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ga, ) (Entered: 10/14/2010)
692 STIPULATED CASE MANAGMENT ORDER − The above−noted cases will be consolidated for discovery purposes. All future filings in these matters shall be docketed to Civil Action Number 3:09−cv−0286. Filings should contain a single case caption that references all the filed civil actions, as indicated above. The Defendants will have until November 15, 2010 to (a) answer the Master Individual Complaint, the Master Class Action, and the Clark Complaint and (b) answer, respond or otherwise plead to the Rimmer Belanger Complaint and issues in the Short Form Complaints that have not already been resolved by the Court's prior order issued in connection with the matters in which the Short Form Complaints have been filed. (See Order for further details) Notice of Compliance due by 11/15/2010.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/26/10 (ga, ) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Elmer Robert Keach. (jc) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Michael A. Fazio. (jc) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM AND ECF REGISTRATION FORM SENT to Michael O'Mullan. (jc) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
693 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by County of Luzerne, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid, Sam Guesto, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation.(Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 10/29/2010)
694 ORDER granting 693 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendants shall file their Motion and Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on or before 11/15/10 and said brief shall not exceed 13,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/1/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/01/2010)
695 MOTION to Dismiss Belanger Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint by Sandra Brulo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A − Order of October 29, 2009, # 4 Exhibit(s) Exhibit B1 − Interbranch Report Part 1, # 5 Exhibit(s) Exhibit B2 − Interbranch Report Part 2)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
696 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Sandra Brulo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
697 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Unopposed Motion for Approval of Extension of Time to Answer Complaints by Robert K Mericle. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Borland, Kimberly) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
698 CERTIFICATE of Counsel re 695 MOTION to Dismiss Belanger Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint by Scott D. McCarroll on behalf of Sandra Brulo (McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 11/11/2010)
699 NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Conference Call regarding the Unopposed Motion for Approval of Extension of Time to Answer Complaints (Doc. 697) has been scheduled for MONDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2010 at 9:00 AM. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the call. (jam, ) (Entered: 11/12/2010)
700 ORDER granting 696 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendant Brulo shall file her Brief in Support of her Motion to Dismiss on or before 11/24/10 and said brief shall not exceed 15,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/12/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/12/2010)
701 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 695 MOTION to Dismiss Belanger Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by Sandra Brulo. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix AFSCME Order of 10/19/04)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 11/15/2010)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 248 of 341

11/15/2010 11/15/2010 11/15/2010 11/15/2010 11/15/2010 11/15/2010 11/16/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010
11/17/2010
11/17/2010

702 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
703 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 702 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 5 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
704 First MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
705 MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Putative Class Action Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer by Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
706 MOTION to Dismiss and to Strike by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
708 ORDER granting 697 Motion for Approval of Extension of Time to Answer Complaints. The parties will advise the Court no later than 2/20/11 whether any answers will be necessary and, if so, to which complaints. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/15/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
709 CERTIFICATE of Noncurrence by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid re 702 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint. (Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
710 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by David J. Schertz on behalf of Bruce Clark, Iraida Clark, Raul Clark Attorney Michael O'Mullan is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2032806.. (Schertz, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
711 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by David J. Schertz on behalf of Bruce Clark, Iraida Clark, Raul Clark Attorney Michael Fazio is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2032821.. (Schertz, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
712 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Jacqueline Bezak.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
713 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Freddy Calle.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
714 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Ryan Cordy.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
715 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert Mericle,

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 249 of 341

11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010

Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Matthew Gockley.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
716 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid−Atlantic Child Youth Services, Inc., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Susan Gockley.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
717 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Natalie Gunshannon.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
718 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, John Keiling.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
719 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Kyle Laton.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
720 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Timonthy Morrison, Jr..(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
721 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Timothy Morrison, Sr..(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
722 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Paul Rosengrant.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
723 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs,

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 250 of 341

11/17/2010
11/17/2010
11/17/2010
11/22/2010 11/23/2010 11/29/2010 11/29/2010 11/29/2010 11/30/2010 12/01/2010 12/02/2010 12/02/2010 12/03/2010

09−286, Ronda Rosengrant.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
724 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Barry Gately.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
725 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Nikita Shumway.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
726 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form for Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption by Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Preston Smith.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
727 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Michael Anthony Fazio, Esquire. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/22/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
728 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Michael P. O'Mullan, Esquire. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/23/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
729 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 706 MOTION to Dismiss and to Strike filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
731 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 704 First MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
732 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 705 MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Putative Class Action Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer filed by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1−3, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s) Part 1 of 2, # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s) Part 2 of 2)(Sheppard, Mark) Modified on 11/30/2010 (ga, ). (Entered: 11/30/2010)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document #730 "Memorandum of Law" deleted, re−filed by attorney as Doc. #732 "Brief in Support". (ga, ) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
733 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Elmer Robert Keach, III on behalf of Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer Attorney Elmer Robert Keach, III is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2044343.. (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 12/01/2010)
734 MOTION for Extension of Time to To File Response to Pending Motions to Dismiss in Rimmer Belanger action and for Entry of Briefing Schedule by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
735 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 734 MOTION for Extension of Time to To File Response to Pending Motions to Dismiss in Rimmer Belanger action and for Entry of Briefing Schedule (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
736 ORDER granting 734 Motion to Extend Time. Plaintiffs' Consolidated Response to Motions due January 4, 2010. Defendants' Reply Papers due January 25, 2010. Signed

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12/07/2010 12/20/2010 12/21/2010 01/04/2011
01/07/2011
01/12/2011
01/19/2011 01/21/2011 01/21/2011 01/24/2011

by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/3/10 (ga, ) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
737 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esquire. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/7/10. (jam, ) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
738 Consent MOTION Order declaring waiver of psychiatric patient privilege by Mid−Atlantic Child Youth Services, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Wishnoff, Howard) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
739 ORDER granting 738 Consent Motion for Order Permitting Disclosure of Mental Health Records. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/21/10 (jam, ) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
740 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 702 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint, 705 MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Putative Class Action Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer, 706 MOTION to Dismiss and to Strike, 695 MOTION to Dismiss Belanger Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, 704 First MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer And For Entry of Revised Briefing Schedule, on Consent filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Stipulated Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 01/04/2011)
741 ORDER − Having considered Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Joseph Rimmer, Kelly Farmer and Zane Farmer's Motion for Extenstion of Time to respond to the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, the Court hereby orders as follows: The Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an overlength brief of not more than 40 pages and 13,000 words. The Court hereby orders the following briefing schedule: Plaintiffs' Consolidated Response to Motions are due January 14, 2011 and Defendants' Reply Papers are due February 21, 2011. No further extensions for the Plaintiffs.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/7/11 (ga, ) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
742 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 702 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint, 705 MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Putative Class Action Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer, 706 MOTION to Dismiss and to Strike, 695 MOTION to Dismiss Belanger Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, 704 First MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
743 ORDER granting 742 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Plaintiffs Consolidated Response to Motions due January 24, 2011 and Defendants' Rsply Papers due March 3, 2011. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/18/11 (ga, ) (Entered: 01/19/2011)
744 STIPULATION By Consent Governing Disclosure of Subpoenaed Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Records by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 01/21/2011)
745 MOTION for Leave to File Objections to Confidentiality Order by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/21/2011)
746 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 705 MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Putative Class Action Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer, 704 First MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer, 702 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint, 706 MOTION to Dismiss and to Strike, 695 MOTION to Dismiss Belanger Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A − Proposed Second

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 252 of 341

01/27/2011 01/28/2011 02/03/2011
02/03/2011 02/04/2011 02/04/2011 02/04/2011 02/11/2011 02/17/2011 02/17/2011 02/17/2011
02/17/2011

Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit(s) B −− Skrepenak Plea Agreement, # 3 Exhibit(s) C −− Newspaper Article, # 4 Exhibit(s) D −− Newspaper Article, # 5 Exhibit(s) E −− Newspaper Article, # 6 Exhibit(s) F −− Newspaper Article, # 7 Certificate of Service)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 01/24/2011)
747 ORDER−IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mid Atlantic, PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care shall file by January 28, 2011 any objecttions they may have to the Confidentiality Order by Consent Governing Disclosure(See Order for further details) by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/27/11 (ga, ) (ga, ). (Entered: 01/27/2011)
748 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 745 MOTION for Leave to File Objections to Confidentiality Order filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/28/2011)
749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 −− Proposed Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2 −− Proposed Second Amended Complaint, with redlines, # 3 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 4 Proposed Order)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/03/2011)
750 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/03/2011)
751 Letter from Elmer Keach to Hon. A. Richard Caputo, in response to faxed correspondence from Feb. 4, 2011 from Luzerne County Defendants. (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/04/2011)
752 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 751 Letter (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/04/2011)
754 Letter dated 2/4/11 to the Court from Timothy Myers re: pending Motion to Amend (Doc. 749). (jam, ) (Entered: 02/16/2011)
753 SCHEDULING ORDER: Oral Argument on Provider Defendants' Objections to Confidentiality Order by Consent Governing Disclosure of Subpoenaed Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Records (Doc. 748) set for 2/22/2011 02:00 PM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/11/11. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
755 Joint MOTION to Withdraw 748 Brief in Opposition, 753 Scheduling Order, 744 Stipulation To Withdraw Confidentiality Order, Objections Thereto, to Cancel Oral Argument Thereon and to Confirm Agreement to be Governed by Protective Order by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
756 Objections & Response to Plaintiff Bellanger's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, filed by Sandra Brulo.(McDonough, Suzanne) Modified on 2/18/2011 (ga, ). (Entered: 02/17/2011)
757 Amended MOTION to Withdraw 755 Joint MOTION to Withdraw 748 Brief in Opposition, 753 Scheduling Order, 744 Stipulation To Withdraw Confidentiality Order, Objections Thereto, to Cancel Oral Argument Thereon and to Confirm Agreement to be Governed by Protective OrderJoint MOTION to Withdraw 748 Brief in Opposition, 753 Scheduling Order, 744 Stipulation To Withdraw Confidentiality Order, Objections Thereto, to Cancel Oral Argument Thereon and to Confirm Agreement to be Governed by Protective Order by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
758 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action Supplemental Affirmation In Support filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A −− Proposed Amended Complaint, # 2

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 253 of 341

02/17/2011 02/17/2011 02/18/2011 02/18/2011
02/22/2011
03/03/2011 03/03/2011
03/03/2011 03/03/2011 03/03/2011 03/03/2011
03/03/2011 03/03/2011

Exhibit(s) B −− Proposed Amended Complaint, with Redlines)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
759 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer.(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
760 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 759 Brief in Support, 758 Affidavit in Support of Motion, (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/17/2011)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document #755 Motion termed, replaced with Doc. #757 Amended Motion. (ga, ) (Entered: 02/18/2011)
761 ORDER granting 757 Motion to Withdraw Confidentiality Order by Consent Governing Disclosure of Subpoenaed Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Records and Objections thereto and to Cancel Oral Argument. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/18/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 02/18/2011)
762 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties will advise the Court no later than 3/25/11 as to whether any answers will be necessary, and, if so, to which complaints, at which time, the parties will request the Court to set a date, no earlier than 10 days later, for filing of answers to any complaints that remain extant at that time. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/22/11. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/22/2011)
763 REPLY BRIEF re 702 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid and filed by Luzerne County.(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
764 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action of Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid filed by Luzerne County. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A & B)(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
765 REPLY BRIEF re 695 MOTION to Dismiss Belanger Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by Sandra Brulo.(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
766 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action filed by Sandra Brulo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
767 REPLY BRIEF re 706 MOTION to Dismiss and to Strike filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
768 REPLY BRIEF re 704 First MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibits A and B (Orders from PA Supreme Court), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
769 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Denying Motion for Leave to Amend)(Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
770 REPLY BRIEF re 705 MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Putative Class Action Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer filed by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Appendix Unpublished Cases)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 03/03/2011)

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03/03/2011 03/04/2011 03/08/2011 03/17/2011
03/17/2011
03/21/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011

771 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action filed by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 03/03/2011)
772 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Bruce Clark, Iraida Clark, Raul Clark of Sandra Brulo (Montgomery, Bridget) (Entered: 03/04/2011)
773 NOTICE by Sandra Brulo Notice of Citation of Supplemental Authority (McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 03/08/2011)
774 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief Regarding Motion to Amend filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Letter from Judge Giardino, Fulton County Court, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence Regarding All Defendants Except Luzerne County Defendants, # 3 Certificate of Nonconcurrence Regarding Luzerne County Defendants, # 4 Proposed Order)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 03/17/2011)
775 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 774 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief Regarding Motion to Amend filed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief Regarding Motion to Amend filed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief Regarding Motion to Amend filed (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 03/17/2011)
776 ORDER granting 774 Pltfs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action Reply Brief due by 3/24/2011.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/21/11 (ao, ) (Entered: 03/21/2011)
777 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Dana Shumway.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
778 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, D.B., a minor by Dawn Bosworth.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
779 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Michael Mazza.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
780 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Amanda McDonald.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)

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03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011

781 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Travis Lakey.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
782 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid−Atlantic Child Youth Services, Inc., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Amber Donnelly.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
783 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Calandra Hummell.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
784 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Ashley Sabanos.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
785 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Tristan Brennan.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
786 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Catherine Hughes.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
787 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Frank Mason.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
788 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Joseph Cordick.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
789 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K

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Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Vanessa Klein.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
790 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Kermit Olivier.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
791 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Katheryn Turner.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
792 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Sonya Ormsby.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
793 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, George Walton.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
794 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Susan Edwards.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
795 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Gary Smith.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
796 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Lois Andrews.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
797 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Carl Andrews.(Senoff,

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David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
798 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, James Davis, Sr..(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
799 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, John McDermott.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
800 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Kathleen Evans.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
801 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Katelyn Fialko.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
802 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Richard Ford.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
803 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Mary Osterwell.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
804 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Kristopher Beckhorn.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
805 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Carl Craig.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)

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806 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Matthew Daley.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
807 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, William Daley.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
808 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Kevin Naylor.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
809 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Devon Hughes.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
810 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Ajanee Wright.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
811 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Daniel Yale.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
812 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, DeeDee Jones.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
813 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Frank Coyle.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
814 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K

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03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011

Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Sandy Coyle.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
815 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Amy Centurione.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
816 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Adam Kamus.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
817 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Jonathan Condry.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
818 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Patrick Shanahan.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
819 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Lance Warnagiris.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
820 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Brian Shaffer.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
821 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, David Hartranft.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
822 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Daniel David.(Senoff,

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03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011 03/24/2011
03/25/2011 03/25/2011 03/25/2011 04/19/2011 04/20/2011

David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
823 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, James Cebula, Jr..(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
824 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Jean Scott.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
825 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Joyce Prebula.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
826 AMENDED COMPLAINT Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint− Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation And Adoption By Reference against Beverage Marketing Of PA, Inc., Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr, Michael T. Conahan, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Pinnacle Group Of Jupiter, LLC, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, Maxwell Howe.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
827 REPLY BRIEF re 749 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint in Rimmer Belanger Action filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A −− Letter from Myers to Court, February 4, 2011, # 2 Exhibit(s) B −− Interbranch Commission Report, # 3 Exhibit(s) C −− Skrepenak Plea Agreement, # 4 Exhibit(s) D − Newspaper Article, # 5 Exhibit(s) E −− Newspaper Article, # 6 Exhibit(s) F −− Mericle Trial Testimony, Day One, # 7 Exhibit(s) G −− Mericle Trial Testimony, Day Two, # 8 Exhibit(s) H −− Transcript of July 30, 2008 Wiretap, # 9 Exhibit(s) I −− Carelli Trial Testimony, # 10 Exhibit(s) J −− Newspaper Article, # 11 Exhibit(s) K −− Partial Hearing Transcript, Interbranch Commission, # 12 Exhibit(s) L −− Newspaper Article, # 13 Exhibit(s) M −− Newspaper Article, # 14 Exhibit(s) N −− Crowe Trial Testimony)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
828 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 827 Reply Brief,,, (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
829 STATUS REPORT by Sandra Brulo. (McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
830 STATUS REPORT by Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation. (Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
831 SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Answers to complaints in the following cases shall be filed on or before 4/29/11: Cases No. 09−286, 09−291, 09−630 and 09−2535. 2. An in−person status conference will be held with counsel on MONDAY, MAY 2, 2011 AT 2:00 P.M., Jury Room to Courtroom #3, Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, 197 South Main St., Wilkes−Barre, Pennsylvania. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/19/11. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
832 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 582 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 798 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 585 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 816 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 261 of 341
Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 826 Amended Complaint, 799 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 791 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 805 Amended Complaint, 614 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 490 Amended Complaint, 714 Amended Complaint,, 653 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 782 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 492 Amended Complaint, 796 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 719 Amended Complaint,, 645 Amended Complaint, 817 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 724 Amended Complaint,, 554 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 683 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 808 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 669 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 806 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 556 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 572 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 800 Amended Complaint, 723 Amended Complaint,, 624 Amended Complaint, 617 Amended Complaint, 819 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 491 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 494 Amended Complaint, 495 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 135 Amended Complaint,, 781 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 512 Amended Complaint, 814 Amended Complaint, 795 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 136 Amended Complaint,, 793 Amended Complaint, 822 Amended Complaint, 718 Amended Complaint,, 596 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 482 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 820 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 720 Amended Complaint,, 787 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 823 Amended Complaint, 715 Amended Complaint,, 675 Amended Complaint, 802 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 460 Amended Complaint, 726 Amended Complaint,, 485 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, 616 Amended Complaint, 809 Amended Complaint, 813 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 634 Amended Complaint, 493 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 470 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 713 Amended Complaint,, 815 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 818 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 486 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 812 Amended Complaint, 484 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 792 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 483 Amended Complaint, 488 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, 489 Amended Complaint, 811 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 722 Amended Complaint,, 643 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 825 Amended Complaint, 804 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 487 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 721 Amended Complaint,, 779 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 717 Amended Complaint,, 663 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 810 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, 821 Amended Complaint, 807 Amended

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04/21/2011 04/21/2011 04/26/2011
04/26/2011
04/27/2011 04/27/2011 04/27/2011 04/27/2011
04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011

Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 658 Amended Complaint, 803 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 824 Amended Complaint, 716 Amended Complaint,, 589 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 597 Amended Complaint, 134 Amended Complaint,,, 668 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint with Stipulation, Proposed Order Approving Stipulation by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Concurrence, # 4 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 04/20/2011)
833 Order approving Stipulation re 832 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/21/11. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/21/2011)
834 ORDER granting 832 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer Robert J Powell answer due 5/23/2011; Powell Law Group, P.C. answer due 5/23/2011; Vision Holdings, Inc. answer due 5/23/2011; Vision Holdings, LLC answer due 5/23/2011. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/21/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 04/21/2011)
835 MOTION to Amend/Correct 205 Order, 379 Order by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Brief in Support, # 3 Exhibit(s) A (Stipulated Protective Order), # 4 Exhibit(s) B (Confidentiality Order), # 5 Exhibit(s) C (Powell ABPO & Certificate), # 6 Certificate of Concurrence, # 7 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 04/26/2011)
836 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for defendants Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, and Powell Law Group, P.C. by Jeffrey S Feldman, Jessica L Richman, Mark B. Sheppard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Brief in Support, # 3 Certificate of Concurrence, # 4 Certificate of Service (Motion), # 5 Certificate of Service (Brief))(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 04/26/2011)
837 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 835 MOTION to Amend/Correct 205 Order, 379 Order MOTION to Amend/Correct 205 Order, 379 Order filed by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 04/27/2011)
838 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 836 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for defendants Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, and Powell Law Group, P.C. filed by Jeffrey S Feldman, Jessica L Richman, Mark B. Sheppard. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 04/27/2011)
839 AMENDED DOCUMENT by Robert J. Powell. Amendment to 835 MOTION to Amend/Correct 205 Order, 379 Order MOTION to Amend/Correct 205 Order, 379 Order Attachment #6 − AMENDED Certificate of Concurrence/Non−Concurrence. (Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 04/27/2011)
840 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 749 Motion to Amend/Correct. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff has Leave to Amend the Complaint as to the additional allegations against Defendant Brulo, but not as to Defendants Skrepenak and Luzerne County. Plaintiff is directed to file this Second Amended Complaint within ten (10) days. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/26/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 04/27/2011)
841 NOTICE by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. Letter to the Court regarding Elia Cases (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
842 ANSWER to 482 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
843 ANSWER to 484 Amended Complaint by Mid−Atlantic Child Youth Services, Inc., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
844 ANSWER to 483 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 263 of 341

04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011
04/28/2011
04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011

845 ANSWER to 485 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
846 ANSWER to 486 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
847 ANSWER to 487 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
848 ANSWER to 488 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
849 ANSWER to 489 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
850 ANSWER to 490 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
851 ANSWER to 491 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
852 ANSWER to 493 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
853 ANSWER to 494 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
854 ANSWER to 495 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
855 ANSWER to 135 Amended Complaint,, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 ANSWER, # 2 ANSWER, # 3 ANSWER, # 4 ANSWER, # 5 ANSWER, # 6 ANSWER, # 7 ANSWER, # 8 ANSWER, # 9 ANSWER, # 10 ANSWER)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
856 ANSWER to Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 ANSWER, # 2 ANSWER, # 3 ANSWER, # 4 ANSWER, # 5 ANSWER, # 6 ANSWER, # 7 ANSWER, # 8 ANSWER, # 9 ANSWER, # 10 ANSWER, # 11 ANSWER, # 12 ANSWER, # 13 ANSWER, # 14 ANSWER, # 15 ANSWER, # 16 ANSWER, # 17 ANSWER)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
857 ANSWER to 812 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
858 ANSWER to 813 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
859 ANSWER to 814 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
860 ANSWER to 815 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 264 of 341

04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011

861 ANSWER to 816 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
862 ANSWER to 817 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
863 ANSWER to 818 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
864 ANSWER to 819 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
865 ANSWER to 820 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
866 ANSWER to 821 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
867 ANSWER to 822 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
868 ANSWER to 823 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
869 ANSWER to 824 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
870 ANSWER to 825 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
871 ANSWER to 826 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
872 ANSWER to 811 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
873 ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 265 of 341
Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 266 of 341

04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011

Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 556 Amended Complaint, 550 Amended Complaint, 497 Amended Complaint, 496 Amended Complaint, 551 Amended Complaint, 558 Amended Complaint, 498 Amended Complaint, 559 Amended Complaint, 552 Amended Complaint, 560 Amended Complaint, 548 Amended Complaint, 500 Amended Complaint, 555 Amended Complaint, 547 Amended Complaint, 561 Amended Complaint, 549 Amended Complaint, 499 Amended Complaint, 557 Amended Complaint, 553 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
874 ANSWER to 795 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
875 ANSWER to 796 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
876 ANSWER to 797 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
877 ANSWER to 798 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
878 ANSWER to 799 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
879 ANSWER to 801 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 267 of 341

04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 04/29/2011

880 ANSWER to 803 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
881 ANSWER to 804 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
882 ANSWER to 805 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
883 ANSWER to 806 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
884 ANSWER to 807 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
885 ANSWER to 808 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
886 ANSWER to 809 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
887 ANSWER to 810 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
888 ANSWER to 800 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
889 ANSWER to 802 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
890 ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 268 of 341
Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 269 of 341

04/29/2011

Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 572 Amended Complaint, 570 Amended Complaint, 628 Amended Complaint, 564 Amended Complaint, 568 Amended Complaint, 565 Amended Complaint, 566 Amended Complaint, 681 Amended Complaint, 571 Amended Complaint, 632 Amended Complaint, 680 Amended Complaint, 682 Amended Complaint, 629 Amended Complaint, 712 Amended Complaint, 562 Amended Complaint, 563 Amended Complaint, 679 Amended Complaint, 567 Amended Complaint, 678 Amended Complaint, 569 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
891 ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 270 of 341
Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 271 of 341

04/29/2011

Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 597 Amended Complaint, 599 Amended Complaint, 581 Amended Complaint, 588 Amended Complaint, 595 Amended Complaint, 594 Amended Complaint, 586 Amended Complaint, 596 Amended Complaint, 583 Amended Complaint, 584 Amended Complaint, 589 Amended Complaint, 587 Amended Complaint, 600 Amended Complaint, 598 Amended Complaint, 593 Amended Complaint, 590 Amended Complaint, 582 Amended Complaint, 585 Amended Complaint, 591 Amended Complaint, 592 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
892 ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 272 of 341
Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 273 of 341
Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended Complaint,, ANSWER to 782 Amended Complaint, 787 Amended Complaint, 783 Amended Complaint, 789 Amended Complaint, 786 Amended Complaint, 725 Amended Complaint,, 726 Amended Complaint,, 791 Amended Complaint, 784 Amended Complaint, 780 Amended Complaint, 788 Amended Complaint, 778 Amended Complaint,, 792 Amended Complaint, 793 Amended Complaint, 781 Amended Complaint, 779 Amended Complaint, 777 Amended Complaint, 785 Amended Complaint, 794 Amended Complaint, 790 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 274 of 341

04/29/2011 04/29/2011

Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
893 ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 722 Amended Complaint,, 717 Amended Complaint,, 716 Amended Complaint,, 720 Amended Complaint,, 721 Amended Complaint,, 715 Amended Complaint,, 718 Amended Complaint,, 714 Amended Complaint,, 713 Amended Complaint,, 719 Amended Complaint,, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
894 ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 275 of 341
Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 276 of 341

04/29/2011 04/29/2011

Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 614 Amended Complaint, 607 Amended Complaint, 618 Amended Complaint, 604 Amended Complaint, 608 Amended Complaint, 610 Amended Complaint, 615 Amended Complaint, 622 Amended Complaint, 601 Amended Complaint, 606 Amended Complaint, 609 Amended Complaint, 612 Amended Complaint, 603 Amended Complaint, 602 Amended Complaint, 621 Amended Complaint, 611 Amended Complaint, 605 Amended Complaint, 620 Amended Complaint, 613 Amended Complaint, 619 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Cared, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
895 CERTIFICATE of by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. re 837 Brief in Support, 835 MOTION to Amend/Correct 205 Order, 379 Order MOTION to Amend/Correct 205 Order, 379 Order. (Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
896 ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 277 of 341
Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 278 of 341
Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 634 Amended Complaint, 644 Amended Complaint, 641 Amended Complaint, 631 Amended Complaint, 630 Amended Complaint, 640 Amended Complaint, 639 Amended Complaint, 624 Amended Complaint, 637 Amended Complaint, 623 Amended Complaint, 633 Amended Complaint, 643 Amended Complaint, 625 Amended Complaint, 627 Amended Complaint, 626 Amended Complaint, 636 Amended Complaint, 645 Amended Complaint, 638 Amended Complaint, 635 Amended Complaint, 642 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 279 of 341

04/29/2011

Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
897 ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 280 of 341
Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 281 of 341

04/29/2011

Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 658 Amended Complaint, 663 Amended Complaint, 646 Amended Complaint, 665 Amended Complaint, 662 Amended Complaint, 657 Amended Complaint, 661 Amended Complaint, 647 Amended Complaint, 649 Amended Complaint, 656 Amended Complaint, 659 Amended Complaint, 654 Amended Complaint, 653 Amended Complaint, 652 Amended Complaint, 648 Amended Complaint, 660 Amended Complaint, 664 Amended Complaint, 650 Amended Complaint, 655 Amended Complaint, 651 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
898 ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 282 of 341

04/29/2011 04/29/2011
04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011
04/29/2011 04/29/2011

Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 669 Amended Complaint, 687 Amended Complaint, 668 Amended Complaint, 667 Amended Complaint, 688 Amended Complaint, 670 Amended Complaint, 674 Amended Complaint, 673 Amended Complaint, 689 Amended Complaint, 666 Amended Complaint, 675 Amended Complaint, 671 Amended Complaint, 672 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
899 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Matthew J.D. Hogan terminated on behalf of Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Hogan, Matthew) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
900 ANSWER to 723 Amended Complaint,, 724 Amended Complaint,, 484 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 723 Amended Complaint,, 724 Amended Complaint,, 484 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 723 Amended Complaint,, 724 Amended Complaint,, 484 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
901 ANSWER to 134 Amended Complaint,,, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 ADDENDUM, # 2 ADDENDUM)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
902 ANSWER to 136 Amended Complaint,, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
903 ANSWER to Complaint RAUL CLARK, ET AL by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
904 ANSWER to 617 Amended Complaint, 616 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 617 Amended Complaint, 616 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
905 ANSWER to 554 Amended Complaint, 492 Amended Complaint, ANSWER to 554 Amended Complaint, 492 Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
906 MOTION to Dismiss by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
907 MOTION to Dismiss by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
908 MOTION to Dismiss by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
909 MOTION to Dismiss by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
910 ANSWER to 134 Amended Complaint,,, 135 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 134 Amended Complaint,,, 135 Amended Complaint,, by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Addendum to IMC Answer − Responses to Documents Styled as Short Form Complaints)(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
911 ANSWER to 136 Amended Complaint,, by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
912 ANSWER to Complaint (Civ. No. 09−2535) by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 04/29/2011)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 283 of 341

05/04/2011 05/10/2011
05/10/2011 05/12/2011 05/13/2011 05/20/2011 05/20/2011 05/23/2011 05/23/2011 05/23/2011
05/23/2011
05/23/2011 05/23/2011 05/24/2011 05/24/2011

914 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/04/2011)
915 AMENDED COMPLAINT in Rimmer Belanger v. Ciavarella, Filed with Leave of Court against Sandra Brullo, Mark A Ciavarella, Jr., Michael T. Conahan, County of Luzerne, Sam Guesto, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc., Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Robert J Powell, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid, Western PA Child Care, LLC, filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer.(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
916 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 915 Amended Complaint, (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
917 Letter from Mark Sheppard to Honorable A. Richard Caputo to amend protective order (Dk. #835). (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 05/12/2011)
918 ORDER granting 835 Motion to Amend/Correct Stipulated Protective Order (Doc. 205) and Confidentiality Order (Doc. 379) Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/13/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/13/2011)
919 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation Certificate of Concurrence, Certificate of Service by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid.(Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 05/20/2011)
920 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Sandra Brulo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 05/20/2011)
921 ORDER granting 920 Defendant Brulo's Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendant Brulo may file brief which shall not exceed 14,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/23/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
922 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Putative Class Action Complaint Originally Filed As Rimmer Belanger, et al. v. Ciavarella, et al., No. 3:10−cv−1405 by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
923 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 922 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Putative Class Action Complaint Originally Filed As Rimmer Belanger, et al. v. Ciavarella, et al., No. 3:10−cv−1405 filed by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Compliance, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1, # 3 Exhibit(s) 2, # 4 Exhibit(s) 3, # 5 Appendix Unpublished Decisions (1 of 2), # 6 Appendix Unpublished Decisions (2 of 2), # 7 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
924 ANSWER to 134 Amended Complaint,,, 135 Amended Complaint,,, ANSWER to 134 Amended Complaint,,, 135 Amended Complaint,, by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Addendum to IMC Answer − Responses to Documents Styled as Short Form Complaints, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
925 ANSWER to 136 Amended Complaint,, by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
926 ANSWER to Complaint (Civ. No. 09−2535) by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Sheppard, Mark) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
927 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/24/2011)
928 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 927 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/24/2011)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 284 of 341

05/24/2011 05/24/2011 05/24/2011
05/24/2011 05/25/2011 05/27/2011
05/31/2011 05/31/2011 05/31/2011 05/31/2011 05/31/2011 05/31/2011 06/01/2011 06/01/2011 06/02/2011

929 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint by Sandra Brulo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) Supreme Court Order of 10/29/09, # 3 Exhibit(s) Interbranch Report, Part 1, # 4 Exhibit(s) Interbranch Report, Part 2)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 05/24/2011)
930 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 929 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Sandra Brulo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) AFSCME Order)(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 05/24/2011)
931 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence Certificate of Nonconcurrence−Certificate of Service)(Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 05/24/2011)
932 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Cert. of Service & Non/Concurrence by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 05/24/2011)
933 RESPONSE of Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., to Documents Styled as "Abbreviated Individual Civil Action Complaint Short Form For Luzerne County Litigation and Adoption By Reference" filed in Wallace et.al, v. Powell, et.al, 09−286 by Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (ga, ) (Entered: 05/25/2011)
934 ORDER granting 919 Motion for Leave to Exceed page Limits. The Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Luzerne County, Luzerne County Juvenile Probation Department, Gregory Skrepanak, Todd Vonderheid, Sam Guesto shall not exceed 11,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/27/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 05/27/2011)
935 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Sandra Brulo in Explanation of Position on Proposed Joint Pre−Trial Plan. (McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
936 Proposed Pretrial Order (Comparison of Parties' Proposed Pre−Trial Plans) filed by Plaintiffs, Provider Defendants, Powell Defendants, Brulo and by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
937 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357 in Support of H.T. and Conway Plaintiffs' Proposed Pre−Trial Plan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
938 TRIAL BRIEF in Support of Pre−Trail Plan by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
939 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. in Support of the Mericle Defendants' Proposed Pre−Trial Plan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
940 TRIAL BRIEF OBJECTIONS TO PARTIES PRE−TRIAL AND CLASS CERTIFICATION DISCOVERY PLANS by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid. (Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
941 Proposed Pretrial Order by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 06/01/2011)
942 Defendant Brulo's Proposed Pretrial Plan by Sandra Brulo. 935 Memorandum of Law Proposed Order. (McCarroll, Scott) Modified on 6/2/2011 (ga, ). (Entered: 06/01/2011)
943 ORDER granting 836 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Mark B. Sheppard, Jeffrey S. Feldman and Jessica L. Richman are hereby WITHDRAWN as attorneys of record for Powell, Vision and/or PLG in the above−captioned cases. Within 30 days of this Order, defendants Vision Holdings LLC and Powell Law Group, P.C. shall secure legal representation, and new counsel shall enter an appearance of record on their behalf. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/2/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 06/02/2011)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 285 of 341

06/07/2011 06/07/2011 06/21/2011 06/22/2011 06/24/2011
06/24/2011
06/24/2011 07/08/2011 07/08/2011 07/18/2011 07/18/2011 07/21/2011

944 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 931 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid, Todd Vonderheid.(Simon, Deborah) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
945 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 932 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Cert. of Service & Non/Concurrence filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
946 MOTION for Extension of Time to Three Day Extension to File Response to Motions to Dismiss in Rimmer−Belanger Action With Certificate of Service by Angela Rimmer Belanger. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
947 ORDER granting 946 Motion of Rimmer−Belanger Plaintiffs for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Various Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiffs shall file their reponse by 6/24/11. Defendants shall file their replies by 7/18/11. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/22/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 06/22/2011)
948 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 931 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, 932 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Cert. of Service & Non/Concurrence, 922 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Putative Class Action Complaint Originally Filed As Rimmer Belanger, et al. v. Ciavarella, et al., No. 3:10−cv−1405, 927 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, 929 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer.(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 06/24/2011)
949 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 922 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Putative Class Action Complaint Originally Filed As Rimmer Belanger, et al. v. Ciavarella, et al., No. 3:10−cv−1405, 929 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, 931 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, 932 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Cert. of Service & Non/Concurrence, 927 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A −− Letter from Myers to Court, # 2 Exhibit(s) B −− Interbranch Commission Report, # 3 Exhibit(s) C −− Skrepanak Plea Agreement, # 4 Exhibit(s) D −− Newspaper Article, # 5 Exhibit(s) E −− Newspaper Article, # 6 Exhibit(s) F −− Mericle Trial Testimony, Day One, # 7 Exhibit(s) G −− Mericle Trial Testimony, Day Two, # 8 Exhibit(s) H −− Transcript of Wiretap, # 9 Exhibit(s) I Carelli Trial Testimony, # 10 Exhibit(s) J −− Newspaper Article, # 11 Exhibit(s) K −− Partial Trancript of Hearing, Interbranch Commission, # 12 Exhibit(s) L −− Newspaper Article, # 13 Exhibit(s) M −− Newspaper Article)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 06/24/2011)
950 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 949 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,,,, 948 Brief in Opposition,, (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 06/24/2011)
951 REPLY BRIEF re 929 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Sandra Brulo.(McCarroll, Scott) (Entered: 07/08/2011)
952 REPLY BRIEF re 927 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/08/2011)
953 REPLY BRIEF re 932 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Cert. of Service & Non/Concurrence filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
954 REPLY BRIEF re 931 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint Certificate of Compliance and Certificate of Service filed by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid.(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
955 MOTION for Order for Modiication of or Relief from Stipilated Protective Order by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/21/2011)

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 286 of 341

07/21/2011 07/21/2011 07/21/2011 07/28/2011 08/01/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011
08/05/2011 08/05/2011
08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/09/2011 08/09/2011

956 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 955 MOTION for Order for Modiication of or Relief from Stipilated Protective Order filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
957 MOTION for Order Corrected Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
958 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 957 MOTION for Order Corrected Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
959 First MOTION for Extension of Time to to Respond to Provider Defendants' Motion For Modification Of Or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order (Doc. No. 955) , Certificate of Service, Certificate of Concurrence by All Plaintiffs, 09−357.(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 07/28/2011)
960 ORDER granting 959 Plaintiffs' Motion for an Extension of Time to File Response to PA Childcare, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC and Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp.'s Motion for Modification of or Relief from Stipulated Protective Order. Responses to the Motion are due 9/2/11. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/1/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/01/2011)
961 MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
962 BRIEF in Support re 961 MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action, filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. Related document: 961 MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
963 MOTION to Amend/Correct 901 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Individual Long Form Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
964 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 963 MOTION to Amend/Correct 901 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Individual Long Form Complaint MOTION to Amend/Correct 901 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Individual Long Form Complaint filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
965 MOTION to Amend/Correct 903 Answer to Complaint of Raul Clark and Parents by PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
966 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 965 MOTION to Amend/Correct 903 Answer to Complaint of Raul Clark and Parents filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
967 MOTION for Entry of Default as to Vision Holdings, LLC with Certificate of Concurrence/Non−Concurrence and Certificate of Service by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
968 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 967 MOTION for Entry of Default as to Vision Holdings, LLC with Certificate of Concurrence/Non−Concurrence and Certificate of Service

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08/11/2011 08/11/2011 08/11/2011 08/12/2011
08/15/2011 08/15/2011 08/16/2011 08/16/2011 08/19/2011 08/19/2011
08/19/2011
08/23/2011
08/25/2011 08/26/2011 08/31/2011 09/02/2011

filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
969 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
970 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 969 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
971 EXHIBIT A by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 969 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
972 *** STRICKEN. SEE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 12, 2011 (Doc. 994) ***Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Vision Holdings, LLC for failure to answer, plead or otherwise defend.Signed by Deputy Clerk on 8/10/11. (ga, ) Modified on 10/12/2011 (jam, ). (Entered: 08/12/2011)
973 First MOTION for Relief from Judgment 972 Clerk's Entry of Default filed by Vision Holdings, LLC by Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
975 NOTICE of Appearance by Jane S. Sebelin on behalf of Vision Holdings, LLC (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
976 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 973 First MOTION for Relief from Judgment 972 Clerk's Entry of Default filed by Vision Holdings, LLC filed by Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 08/16/2011)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document #974 "Reply Brief" deleted, re−filed as Doc. #976 "Brief in Support". (ga, ) (Entered: 08/16/2011)
977 Letter from Clark Plaintiffs requesting extension of time to oppose Provider Defendants' motion to amend/correct answer and affirmative defenses. (Fazio, Michael) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
978 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 961 MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
979 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 963 MOTION to Amend/Correct 901 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Individual Long Form Complaint MOTION to Amend/Correct 901 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Individual Long Form Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
980 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clark Plaintiffs shall respond to the Provident Defendants' motion to amend/correct their answer and affirmative defenses no later than August 26, 2011. It is further ORDERED that any reply shall be filed no later than September 2, 2011.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/23/11. (ga, ) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
981 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 969 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
982 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 965 MOTION to Amend/Correct 903 Answer to Complaint of Raul Clark and Parents with Certification of Service filed by Bruce Clark, Iraida Clark, Raul Clark.(O'Mullan, Michael) (Entered: 08/26/2011)
984 NOTICE of Appearance by Jane S. Sebelin on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C.. (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 08/31/2011)
985 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 957 MOTION for Order Corrected Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order with Certificate of Compliance and Certificate of Service filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs,

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09/02/2011 09/02/2011
09/02/2011
09/08/2011 09/09/2011 09/09/2011 09/09/2011 09/16/2011
10/12/2011 10/17/2011 10/20/2011 10/24/2011 10/24/2011 11/07/2011

09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
986 REPLY BRIEF re 965 MOTION to Amend/Correct 903 Answer to Complaint of Raul Clark and Parents filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
987 REPLY BRIEF re 961 MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action MOTION to Amend/Correct 902 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Complaint for Class Action filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
988 REPLY BRIEF re 963 MOTION to Amend/Correct 901 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Individual Long Form Complaint MOTION to Amend/Correct 901 Answer to Amended Complaint Master Individual Long Form Complaint filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
989 REPLY BRIEF re 969 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/08/2011)
990 EXHIBIT Unpublished Opinions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 989 Reply Brief. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/09/2011)
991 EXHIBIT Unpublished Opinions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 989 Reply Brief. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/09/2011)
992 EXHIBIT Unpublished Opinions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 989 Reply Brief. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/09/2011)
993 REPLY BRIEF re 957 MOTION for Order Corrected Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 certificate of word count, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
994 ORDER granting 973 Motion for Relief from Judgment. ORDERED that the Default entered on August 10, 2011 is stricken. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/12/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
995 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #994 "Return to Sender" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. (ga, ) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
996 Mail Returned − Michael T. Conahan Doc 994 "Return to Sender − Moved Left No Address". (cw, ) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
997 MOTION to Quash Subpoena of PA Child Care, LLC, MOTION for Protective Order by Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 10/24/2011)
998 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 997 MOTION to Quash Subpoena of PA Child Care, LLC MOTION for Protective Order filed by Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation.(Falcone, Samuel) (Entered: 10/24/2011)
999 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 997 MOTION to Quash Subpoena of PA Child Care, LLC MOTION for Protective Order filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/07/2011)

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11/15/2011 1000 NOTICE of Change of Address by Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr (ga, ) (Entered: 11/15/2011)

11/17/2011 1001 NOTICE of Change of Address by Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr (ga, ) (Entered: 11/17/2011)

11/30/2011

1002

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER finding as moot 906 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 907 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 908 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 909 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 922 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 927 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 929 Motion to Dismiss; granting 931 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 932 Motion to Dismiss. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:(1)Defendant Powells Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 922): The interference with familial relationships and § 1985(3) claims are dismissed. The remaining § 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.(2)MAYS, PA Child Cares, and Western PA Child Cares motion to dismiss (Doc. 927): The interference with familial relationships and § 1985(3) claims are dismissed. The remaining 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.(3)Sandra Brulos motion to dismiss (Doc. 929): The § 1985(3), § 1986, the JDPA, and the parent plaintiffs Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed. Defendant Brulo also has quasi−judicial immunity for all claims stemming from her sentencing recommendations. The remaining § 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.(4)Motion to dismiss by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, and Todd Vanderheid (Doc. 931): All claims against these defendants are dismissed. (5)Robert Mericle and Mericle Constructions motion to dismiss (Doc. 932): The interference with familial relationships and § 1985(3) claims are dismissed. The remaining § 1983 claims and the punitive damages claims are not dismissed.(6)Motions to dismiss filed prior to the filing of the second amended complaint (Doc. 906−909) are moot. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/30/11 (jam, ) (Entered: 11/30/2011)

12/12/2011 1003 Defendant Sandra Brulo's ANSWER to 915 Amended Complaint, with Affirmative Defenses by Sandra Brullo.(McDonough, Suzanne) (Entered: 12/12/2011)

12/14/2011 1004 ANSWER to 915 Amended Complaint, by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/14/2011)

12/16/2011

1005

Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Mericle Defendants to be Preliminarily Approved by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1 −− Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA"), # 3 Exhibit(s) A to MSA, # 4 Exhibit(s) B to MSA, # 5 Exhibit(s) C to MSA, # 6 Exhibit(s) D to MSA, # 7 Exhibit(s) 2)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 12/16/2011)

12/20/2011 1006 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 12/20/2011)

12/20/2011

1007

SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY BY ORDERED that a preliminary hearing on the Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Doc. 1005) will be held on Friday, January 6, 2012 at 10:30 a.m.. (See Order for complete details)Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/20/11. (ga, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)

12/20/2011 1008 MOTION to Stay Certain Discovery and Class Certification Briefing by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 12/20/2011)

12/21/2011 1009 NOTICE − The Preliminary Hearing on Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement has been changed to Friday, January 6, 2012 @9:00 a.m.. (ga, ) (Entered: 12/21/2011)

12/21/2011 1010 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 915 Amended Complaint, by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 12/21/2011)

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12/22/2011 1011 ORDER granting 1006 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of the Motion for Preliminary Approval not exceed thirty (30) pages or 10,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/22/11 (ga, ) (Entered: 12/22/2011)

12/23/2011 1012 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1005 Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Mericle Defendants to be Preliminarily Approved filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 12/23/2011)

12/26/2011 1013 MOTION to Continue January 6, 2012 Hearing by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/26/2011)

12/27/2011 1014 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Postpone Hearing on Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement (Doc. 1013) is DENIED.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/27/11 (ga, ) (Entered: 12/27/2011)

12/30/2011 1015 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/30/2011)

12/30/2011 1016 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 12/30/2011)

01/03/2012 1017 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1007 Mail sent to Michael T. Conahan (ga, ) (Entered: 01/03/2012)

01/03/2012 1018 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1011 Mail sent to Michael T. Conahan (ga, ) (Entered: 01/03/2012)

01/03/2012 1019 NOTICE of Change of Address by Michael T. Conahan (ga, ) (Entered: 01/03/2012)

01/03/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Documents #1007 and #1011 will be sent to Michael T. Conahan at FCI Coleman Low. (ga, ) (Entered: 01/03/2012)

01/03/2012

1020

ORDER granting 1015 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC are granted leave to file a response brief not to exceed 45 pages or 15,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/3/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/03/2012)

01/03/2012 1021 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1008 MOTION to Stay Certain Discovery and Class Certification Briefing filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 01/03/2012)

01/04/2012

1022

EXHIBIT D to the Master Settlement Agreement (Revised), replacing Doc. No. 1005−6, by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, Robert K Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc. re 1005 Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Mericle Defendants to be Preliminarily Approved. (Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 01/04/2012)

01/04/2012

1023

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1005 Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Mericle Defendants to be Preliminarily Approved filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/04/2012)

01/05/2012

1024

First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

01/05/2012 1025 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC,

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Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) List, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1, # 3 Exhibit(s) 2, # 4 Exhibit(s) 3, # 5 Exhibit(s) 4, # 6 Exhibit(s) 5, # 7 Exhibit(s) 6, # 8 Exhibit(s) 7, # 9 Exhibit(s) 8, # 10 Exhibit(s) 9, # 11 Exhibit(s) 10, # 12 Exhibit(s) 11, # 13 Exhibit(s) 12, # 14 Exhibit(s) 13, # 15 Exhibit(s) 14, # 16 Exhibit(s) 15, # 17 Exhibit(s) 16, # 18 Exhibit(s) 17, # 19 Exhibit(s) 18, # 20 Exhibit(s) 19, # 21 Exhibit(s) 20, # 22 Exhibit(s) 21, # 23 Exhibit(s) 22, # 24 Exhibit(s) 23, # 25 Exhibit(s) 24, # 26 Exhibit(s) 25, # 27 Exhibit(s) 26, # 28 Exhibit(s) 27, # 29 Exhibit(s) 28, # 30 Exhibit(s) 29)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

01/05/2012 1026 MOTION to Seal filed by defendants Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC. and Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(kn, ) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

01/05/2012 1027 SEALED DOCUMENT (kn, ) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

01/05/2012 1028 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (DOCUMENT IN LARGE ENVELOPE − PAPERS ENCLOSED TOO LARGE TO SCAN) − SENT TO JUDGE CAPUTO'S CHAMBERS. (kn, ) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

01/05/2012 1029 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1014 − Return to sender − unable to forward" Mail sent to Michael T. Conahan (ga, ) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

01/05/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document #1014 sent to Michael T. Conahan at FCI − Coleman on 1/5/12. (ga, ) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

01/09/2012 1031 Letter from Daniel Segal Enclosing Revised Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' and Mericle Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order −− Revised, # 2 Proposed Order −− Revised (Redline Comparison))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 01/09/2012)

01/13/2012 1032 REPLY BRIEF re 1005 Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Mericle Defendants to be Preliminarily Approved filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 01/13/2012)

01/13/2012

1033

COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Suzanne Halko of Preliminary Hearing before Judge A. Richard Caputo on 1/6/2012. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge A. Richard Caputo on 1/6/2012. By s/ Suzanne Halko. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr2, ) (Entered: 01/13/2012)

01/13/2012

1034

MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 1016 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 01/13/2012)

01/17/2012 1035 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation For Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

01/17/2012 1036 ANSWER to 915 Amended Complaint, by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

01/17/2012

1037

ORDER granting 1034 Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief in Support of 1016 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak. Brief in Support due by 1/17/2012. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/17/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

01/17/2012 1038 ORDER granting 1035 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that may not exceed 55

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pages or 18,315 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/17/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

01/17/2012

1039

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1016 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer.(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

01/17/2012 1040 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 1039 Brief in Support, (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

01/19/2012

1041

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 01/19/2012)

01/20/2012 1042 MOTION for Leave to File a Reply to Plaintiffs' Reply by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/20/2012)

01/23/2012 1043 RESPONSE by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630 to 1042 MOTION for Leave to File a Reply to Plaintiffs' Reply. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 01/23/2012)

01/25/2012

1044

ORDER denying 1042 Motion for Leave to File a Reply to Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp, PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC's Response in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/25/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 01/25/2012)

01/30/2012

1045

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1016 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak Certificate of Service and Exhibit "A" filed by Sam Guesto, Luzerne County, Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation, Greg Skrepenak, Todd Vanderheid.(Myers, Timothy) (Entered: 01/30/2012)

01/31/2012 1046 ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS re 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 01/31/2012)

02/02/2012 1047 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/02/2012)

02/02/2012 1048 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief in response to motion for summary judgment filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/02/2012)

02/03/2012 1049 ORDER granting 1047 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages, no more than 20,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/3/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 02/03/2012)

02/03/2012

1050

ORDER granting 1048 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC Brief in Opposition due by 2/23/2012Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/3/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 02/03/2012)

02/07/2012 1051 MOTION for Extension of Time to Motion for Extension of Time by Robert J. Powell.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 02/07/2012)

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02/10/2012 1052 CERTIFICATE of by Robert J. Powell. (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 02/10/2012)

02/13/2012 1053 ORDER granting 1051 Motion to Extend Time to File a Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to February 23, 2012. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/13/12 (ga, ) (Entered: 02/13/2012)

02/13/2012 1054 REPLY BRIEF re 1016 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak filed by Angela Rimmer Belanger.(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/13/2012)

02/14/2012 1055 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Angela Rimmer Belanger re 1054 Reply Brief, (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/14/2012)

02/21/2012 1056 ORDER denying 997 Motion to Quash Subpoena of PA Child Care and/or Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/21/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 02/21/2012)

02/21/2012

1057

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to Amend/Correct Answer to Amended Master Complaint for Class Action (Doc. 961), the Motion to Amend/Correct Answer to Amended Master Individual Long Form Complaint (Doc. 963), and the Motion to Amend/Correct Answer to Complaint of Raul Clark and Parents (Doc. 965) brought by Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC are GRANTED. The moving Defendants have fourteen (14) days from the date of this order to amend their answers. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/21/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/21/2012)

02/23/2012

1058

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 1/6/2012, before Judge A. Richard Caputo. Court Reporter Suzanne A. Halko, Telephone number 570−237−1867. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/15/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/26/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2012. (cr2, ) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012

1059

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Lease)(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1060 ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS re 1025 Statement of Facts,,, filed by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Lease)(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1061 NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 1058 Transcript. A copy of notice was sent to Benjamin Jones, Charles Ross, Mark Ciavarella, Michael T. Conahan, William Brucker on 2/23/12. (lh, ) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1062 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1063 EXHIBIT by Mid−Atlantic Child Youth Services, Inc., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1064 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1065 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

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02/23/2012 1066 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1067 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1068 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1069 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1070 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1071 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1072 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/23/2012 1073 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

02/24/2012

1074

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/24/2012)

02/24/2012 1075 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 1074 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Answer filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/24/2012)

02/24/2012 1076 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 1074 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/24/2012)

02/24/2012 1077 CERTIFICATE of by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1074 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, word count. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/24/2012)

02/24/2012

1078

MOTION for Leave to File, MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 1075 Statement of Facts, 1074 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 1076 Statement of Facts NUNC PRO TUNC filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/24/2012)

02/24/2012 1079 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Stipulated Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/24/2012)

02/27/2012 1080 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment Cross−Motion by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/27/2012)

02/27/2012 1081 ORDER granting 1078 Motion for Leave to File; granting 1078 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. This Court grants MAYS, PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care leave to file their answer and objections to plaintiffs'

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statement of facts, counterstatement of facts, and brief in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in support of their cross−motion for summary judgment out of time. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/27/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 02/27/2012)

02/28/2012

1082

MEMORANDUM re 1016 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepenak filed by Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Angela Rimmer Belanger, Joseph Rimmer Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/27/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/28/2012)

02/28/2012

1083

ORDER re 1082 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry), Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Against Defendants County of Luzerne and Gregory Skrepanak (Doc. 1016) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/27/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 02/28/2012)

02/28/2012 1084 ORDER CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS AND PRELIMINARILY APPROVING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/28/12. (Attachments: # 1 MSA and Exhibits)(jam, ) (Entered: 02/28/2012)

02/28/2012

1085

ORDER granting 1008 Joint Motion to Stay Certain Discovery and Class Certification Briefing. The depositions of Plaintiffs, discovery against Release Parties, and class certification briefing will be STAYED until the Court enters a Final Order and Judgment finally approving the Settlement, denies Plaintiffs' anticipated Motion for Final Order and Judgment, or the Parties inform the Court that the Master Settlement Agreement has been terminated pursuant to its terms, whichever is sooner. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/28/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 02/28/2012)

02/29/2012

1086

MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Provider Defendants' Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment and to Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, for Leave to File a Consolidated Brief, and for Enlargement of the Word Limit by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 02/29/2012)

03/01/2012

1087

ORDER granting 1086 Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Provider Defendants' Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment and to Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, for Leave to File a Consolidated Brief, and for Enlargement of Word Limit. Plaintiffs' consolidated brief shall not exceed 20,000 words; shall be filed on or before 4/5/12. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/1/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/01/2012)

03/06/2012 1088 Amended ANSWER to Complaint and Affimative Defenses to Clark Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/06/2012)

03/06/2012 1089 Amended ANSWER to Complaint and Affirmative Defenses to Master Complaint for Class Actions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/06/2012)

03/06/2012 1090 Amended ANSWER to Complaint and Affirmative Defensses to Master Individual Complaint by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/06/2012)

03/09/2012

1091

MOTION for Extension of Time to Send Mailed Notice to Potential Parent Settlement Class Members and for Order Authorizing Luzerne County Domestic Relations Section to Provide Last Known Addresses of Potential Parent Settlement Class Members by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 03/09/2012)

03/14/2012 1093 ORDER granting 1091 Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Send Mailed Notice to Potential Parent Settlement Class Members and for Order Authorizing Luzerne County Domestic Relations Section to Provide Last Known Addresses of

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Potential Parent Settlement Class Members. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/14/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/14/2012)

03/15/2012 1094 ORDER granting 1026 Motion to Seal Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/15/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 03/15/2012)

03/21/2012 1095 MEMORANDUM − (Order to follow)Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/21/12. (ga, ) (Entered: 03/21/2012)

03/21/2012

1096

ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants' Motion for Judgment on Pleadings (Doc.969) is denied. re 969 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/21/12. (ga, ) (Entered: 03/21/2012)

04/05/2012

1097

REPLY BRIEF re 1079 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment, 1080 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment Cross−Motion, 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC and OPPOSITION BRIEF TO CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/05/2012)

04/05/2012 1098 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630 re 1097 Reply Brief,, and OPPOSITION BRIEF TO CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/05/2012)

04/05/2012

1099

ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS re 1097 Reply Brief,, and OPPOSITION BRIEF TO CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 30, # 3 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 31, # 4 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 32, # 5 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 33, # 6 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 34, # 7 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 35, # 8 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 36, # 9 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 37, # 10 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 38, # 11 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 39, # 12 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 40, # 13 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 41, # 14 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 42, # 15 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 43, # 16 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 44, # 17 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 45, # 18 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 46, # 19 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 47, # 20 Exhibit(s) Pls. Ex. 48)(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/05/2012)

04/05/2012 1100 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630 re 1099 Answer to Statement of Facts,,, (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/05/2012)

04/10/2012 1101 MEMORANDUM re 957 MOTION for Order Corrected Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/10/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/10/2012)

04/10/2012 1102 ORDER re 1101 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order (Doc. 957) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/10/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 04/10/2012)

04/19/2012 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/19/2012)

04/20/2012 1104 CERTIFICATE of by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/20/2012)

04/20/2012 1105 CERTIFICATE of by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts Corrected Certificate. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered:

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04/20/2012)

04/20/2012

1106

REPLY BRIEF re 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Exhibit(s), # 11 Exhibit(s), # 12 Certificate of Word Count)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/20/2012)

04/24/2012

1107

MOTION to Clarify Reconsider, For Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers ot to amend order to certify for appeal by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence and non−concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/24/2012)

04/24/2012

1108

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1107 MOTION to Clarify Reconsider, For Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers ot to amend order to certify for appeal filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 ertificate of word count, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s) deleted at request of counsel, refiled as 1109 , # 4 Exhibit(s) deleted at request of counsel refiled as 1110 , # 5 Errata, # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/25/2012:(ep, ). Modified on 4/25/2012 (ep, ). (Entered: 04/24/2012)

04/24/2012 1109 EXHIBIT REDACTED by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1108 Brief in Support,. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/24/2012)

04/24/2012 1110 EXHIBIT REDACTED by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1108 Brief in Support,. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/24/2012)

04/25/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: At counsel's request, Clerk's Office deleted Attachments 3 and 4 from 1108 Brief in Support; counsel re−filed attachments as 1109 and 1110 (redacted) Exhibits; (ep, ) (Entered: 04/25/2012)

05/08/2012

1111

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1107 MOTION to Clarify Reconsider, For Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers ot to amend order to certify for appeal filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 05/08/2012)

05/08/2012

1112

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/08/2012)

05/09/2012

1113

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 05/09/2012)

05/10/2012

1114

REPLY BRIEF re 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 5 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 6 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/10/2012)

05/22/2012 1115 REPLY BRIEF re 1107 MOTION to Clarify Reconsider, For Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers ot to amend order to certify for appeal filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/22/2012)

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05/31/2012

1117

MEMORANDUM re 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/30/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012

1118

ORDER re 1117 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry), Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry), Motions terminated: 1103 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts MOTION to Amend/Correct 1075 Statement of Facts, 1076 Statement of Facts filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to Correct Provider Defendants Answer to Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts and Provider Defendants Counter Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 1103) brought by Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC is GRANTED.The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to docket Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care LLC and Western PA Child Care LLCs Corrected Answer to Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts, (Doc. 1103, Ex. 2), and Provider Defendants Corrected Counter Statement of Undisputed Facts. (Doc. 1103, Ex. 4).Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/30/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1119 Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care LLC and Western PA Child Care LLCs Corrected Answer to Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts.(jam, ) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1120 Provider Defendants Corrected Counter Statement of Undisputed Facts..(jam, ) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1121 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1122 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1123 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1119 Answer to Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1124 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1125 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1126 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1127 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1128 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1129 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1130 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

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05/31/2012 1131 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1132 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1133 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1134 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1135 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

05/31/2012 1136 EXHIBIT Corrected by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1120 Statement of Facts. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

06/05/2012 1137 MEMORANDUM re 1107 MOTION to Clarify Reconsider, For Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers ot to amend order to certify for appeal filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/5/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/05/2012)

06/05/2012

1138

ORDER re 1137 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry), Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Clarify Order, to Reconsider Order, for Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers or to Amend Order to Certify Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed. R. App. P. 5(A)(3) and to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 1107) brought by Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC is DENIED.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/5/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/05/2012)

06/05/2012 1139 MOTION to Substitute Party by All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Statement Noting Death, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 06/05/2012)

06/06/2012 1140 ORDER granting 1139 Motion to Substitute Party. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/6/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 06/06/2012)

06/08/2012 1141 Letter to the Court from Thomas E. Brenner, Esq. re: settlement of Perseus House claims. (jam, ) (Entered: 06/08/2012)

06/12/2012 1142 NOTICE by Dakota Jadush (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/12/2012)

06/12/2012 1143 CERTIFICATE of Counsel re 1142 Notice of Death by Daniel E. Kleiner on behalf of Dakota Jadush (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/12/2012)

06/12/2012 1144 First MOTION to Substitute Party by Dakota Jadush.(Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/12/2012)

06/12/2012 1145 CERTIFICATE of Concurrence by Dakota Jadush re 1144 First MOTION to Substitute Party. (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/12/2012)

06/12/2012 1146 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Dakota Jadush re 1144 First MOTION to Substitute Party, 1145 Certificate (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/12/2012)

06/13/2012 1147 ORDER granting 1144 Motion to Substitute Party. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/13/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 06/13/2012)

06/21/2012 1148 MOTION for Order for production of probation files by vendor by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 06/21/2012)

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06/28/2012 1149 MOTION for Relief from Judgment , First MOTION for Order of February 28, 2012 by All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/28/2012)

06/28/2012 1150 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1149 MOTION for Relief from Judgment First MOTION for Order of February 28, 2012 filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/28/2012)

06/28/2012 1151 First MOTION for Relief from Judgment /Order of February 28, 2012 by Dakota Jadush. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/28/2012)

06/28/2012 1152 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1151 First MOTION for Relief from Judgment /Order of February 28, 2012 filed by Dakota Jadush.(Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/28/2012)

06/28/2012 1153 CERTIFICATE of Counsel re 1149 MOTION for Relief from Judgment First MOTION for Order of February 28, 2012 (Corrected Certificate of Concurrence) by Daniel E. Kleiner on behalf of All Plaintiffs, 09−630 (Kleiner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/28/2012)

06/29/2012 1154 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1151 First MOTION for Relief from Judgment /Order of February 28, 2012 filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 06/29/2012)

07/03/2012

1155

MEMORANDUM re 1079 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, 1080 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment Cross−Motion filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, 1024 First MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−630 Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/3/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/03/2012)

07/03/2012

1156

ORDER re 1155 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1) Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary Judgment Against Robert Powell, PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp., and Vision Holdings, LLC (Doc. 1024) is DENIED.(2) Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLCs Cross−Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 1079) is DENIED.(3) Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLCs Supplemental Cross−Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Out of Time (Doc. 1080) is DENIED., Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/3/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/03/2012)

07/05/2012

1157

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1148 MOTION for Order for production of probation files by vendor Response Partial Opposition to Motion for Reproduction of Probation Files by Vendor filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/05/2012)

07/09/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: e−notifications for Docs. 1155 & 1156 have failed as to Atty Jeffrey S. Feldman. Courtesy hard copies have been mailed to his Philadelphia address along with instructions to update contact info with the court. (bg, ) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

07/12/2012 1158 REPLY BRIEF re 1148 MOTION for Order for production of probation files by vendor filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 07/12/2012)

07/16/2012 1159 MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 1148 Motion for Reproduction of Juvenile Probation Files by Class Counsel's Vendor. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/16/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 07/16/2012)

07/18/2012 1160 CLOSING ORDER as to the Samantha Humanik vs. Perseus House, Inc. portion of litigation. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/18/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/18/2012)

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07/19/2012

1161

ORDER granting 1149 Motion for Relief from Judgment; granting 1149 Motion for Order; granting 1151 Motion for Relief from Judgment. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Rule 60 Motions for Relief from Order of Court (Docs. 1149; 1151) are GRANTED. Plaintiffs Humanik and Jadush are granted leave from the Court's February 29, 2012 order solely to file Proof of Claim Forms after the Proof of Claim Deadline. Plaintiffs Humanik and Jadush may file Proof of Claim Forms on or before 8/8/12. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/19/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 07/19/2012)

07/30/2012

1162

First MOTION Relief From Order Of Court by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Attorney Verification, Federal Express Proof of Delivery, Rule 60 Motion Jadush, Master Settlement Agreement,, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence, # 3 Certificate of Service, # 4 Brief in Support of Rule 60 Motion, # 5 Proposed Order, # 6 Proposed Order)(Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 07/30/2012)

07/30/2012 1163 CORRECTED Certificate of Concurrence re: (Doc. 1162) MOTION to Amend/Correct 1162 First MOTION Relief From Order Of Court by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Cefalo, Michael) Modified on 7/31/2012 (jam, ). (Entered: 07/30/2012)

07/31/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: (Doc. 1164) has been deleted. To be re−filed by counsel. (jam, ) (Entered: 07/31/2012)

07/31/2012 1164 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1162 First MOTION Relief From Order Of Court filed by Florence Wallace.(Cefalo, Michael) (Entered: 07/31/2012)

08/01/2012 1165 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 60 and relief to confirm the timely filing of proof of claims forms on behalf of represented plaintiffs is GRANTED.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/1/12 (ga, ) (Entered: 08/01/2012)

08/02/2012 1166 MOTION for Relief from Order of Court by All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Gelb, Johanna) (Entered: 08/02/2012)

08/02/2012 1167 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1166 MOTION for Relief from Order of Court filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291.(Gelb, Johanna) (Entered: 08/02/2012)

08/03/2012 1168 MOTION for Extension of Time to of Opt−Out Termination Deadline by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 08/03/2012)

08/03/2012

1169

ORDER granting 1166 Motion to Confirm Timely Filing of 20 Proof of Claim Forms on Behalf of Represented Plaintiffs or, in the Alternative, Petition for F.R.C.P. 60 Relief to Accept Proof of Claim Forms Executed by Counsel for Represented Plaintiffs. Claims Committee is instructed to accept and process the Proof of Claim Forms submtited by Attorney Barry H. Dyller solely for the purpose of participation in the settlement funds. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/3/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/03/2012)

08/06/2012 1171 MOTION from Order of Court RULE 60 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF COURT by All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence Certificate of Concurrence and Non−Concurrence)(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 08/06/2012)

08/07/2012 1172 ORDER granting 1171 Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order of Court. The claims committee is instructed to accept and process claim forms submitted by Jared Mason solely for the purpose of participation in the settlement funds. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/7/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/07/2012)

08/08/2012 1173 Letter dated 8/7/12 to the Court from John G. Dean, Esq. regarding juvenile probation records retrieval. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/08/2012)

08/10/2012 1174 MOTION Rule 60 for T. Lawrence by All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 08/10/2012)

08/13/2012 1175 ORDER granting 1174 Rule 60 Motion for Relief From Order of Court. The claims committee is instruct4ed to accept and process a proof of claim form submitted by Timothy Lawrence on or before September 4, 2012 solely for the purpose of participation in the settlement funds. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on

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8/13/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 08/13/2012)

08/16/2012 1176 Letter from Daniel Segal to Judge Caputo dated 8/16/12 . (Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 08/16/2012)

08/17/2012

1177

ORDER AMENDING February 26, 2012 Order Preliminarily Approving Proposed Settlement and Clarifying July 161, 2012 Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reproduction of Juvenile Probation Files by Class Counsel's Vendor. ORDERED as follows: Settlement Hearing set for 11/15/2012 10:00 AM before Honorable A. Richard Caputo. Section VII.A of the Master Settlement Agreement, as preliminarily approved by the Preliminary Approval Order, is hereby amended to provide that the Opt−Out Termination Period is extended until Friday, 10/5/12. The Court's July 16, 2012 Memorandum Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for the Reproduction of Juvenile Probation Files by Class Counsel's Vendor (Doc. No. 1159) is clarified to permit reproduction on−site by a third−party vendor retained by plaintiffs' counsel. See Order for additional, specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/17/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/17/2012)

08/17/2012 1178 Letter to Plaintiff Counsel of Record from the Court re: potential member of class (see case 3:12−CV−980). (Attachments: # 1 Complaint, # 2 Correspondence) (jam, ) (Entered: 08/17/2012)

08/23/2012 1179 SCHEDULING ORDER: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an IN PERSON DISCOVERY CONFERENCE has been SCHEDULED for Wednesday, August 29, 2012 at 11:00 AM, Bankruptcy Conference Room, Second Floor, Max Rosenn US Courthouse, Wilkes−Barre, PA.(jam, ) (Entered: 08/23/2012)

08/24/2012 1180 Letter from Daniel Segal and Bernard M. Schneider (August 21, 2012) . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 08/24/2012)

08/24/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Exhibit B re (Doc. 1180) in form of CD received in Chambers 8/22/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/24/2012)

08/24/2012 1181 NOTICE : PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the IN PERSON DISCOVERY CONFERENCE has been RESCHEDULED for WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2012, 10:00 AM, Bankruptcy Conference Rooom Second Floor, Max Rosenn U.S. Courthouse, Wilkes−Barre, PA. (jam, ) (Entered: 08/24/2012)

08/28/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty Feldman has failed, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 1181 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info.(bg, ) (Entered: 08/28/2012)

09/05/2012

1183

SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1)Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants shall submit briefs regarding Provider Defendants discovery requests identified in the August 21, 2012 letter (Doc. 1180) by September 21, 2012.(2)The parties shall file reply briefs by October 5, 2012.(3)Oral argument will be held on the parties submissions on October 19, 2012 AT 10:00 A.M., Courtroom #3, Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, 197 South Main Street, Wilkes−Barre, Pennsylvania.(4)Proposed trial plans shall be submitted by the parties within seven (7) days after a decision is rendered on the parties discovery dispute. (5)Plaintiffs request to depose William Brucker is DENIED without prejudice. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/5/12. (jam, ) (Entered: 09/05/2012)

09/17/2012 1184 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 1183 Scheduling Order,,, filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 09/17/2012)

09/18/2012 1185 MOTION for Leave to File a Separate Brief Regarding Discovery Issues Raised at September 5, 2012 Conference by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Caroselli, William) (Entered: 09/18/2012)

09/18/2012

1186

ORDER: Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants shall submit briefs regarding Provider Defendants' discovery request identified in the August 21, 2012 letter (Doc. 1180) by September 28, 2012. The parties shall file reply briefs by October 12, 2012. All other aspects of this Court's Order of September 5, 2012 (Doc. 1183) remain in effect. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/18/12. (lh, ) (Entered: 09/18/2012)

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09/18/2012

1187

ORDER granting 1185 Motion for Leave to File. Individual Plaintiffs shall file their Brief on or before September 28, 2012. Individual Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, and any Reply Brief by Provider Defendants, shall be filed on or before October 12, 2012. Oral argument on these discovery issues shall take place on October 19, 2012.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/18/12 (lh, ) (Entered: 09/18/2012)

09/26/2012 1188 MOTION to file and Electronic Document on a CD Under Seal by Bernard m. Schneider o/b/o Defendants, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC.(kn, ) (Entered: 09/26/2012)

09/26/2012 1189 SEALED DOCUMENT (kn, ) (Entered: 09/26/2012)

09/26/2012 1190 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (CD enclosed). (kn, ) (Entered: 09/26/2012)

09/26/2012 1191 ORDER granting 1188 Motion to Seal Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/26/12 (jam, ) (Entered: 09/26/2012)

09/28/2012 1194 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by All Plaintiffs, 09−286 . (Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/28/2012)

09/28/2012 1195 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357 Opposing Provider Defendants' Proposed Discovery into Facts Underlying Juvenile Plaintiffs' Nullified Adjudications and Juvenile Plaintiffs' Retrials. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 09/28/2012)

09/28/2012

1196

BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Proposed Discovery re 1188 MOTION to Seal filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 11 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/28/2012)

09/28/2012 1197 Proposed Order by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) Modified on 10/1/2012 (jam, ). (Entered: 09/28/2012)

09/28/2012 1198 Proposed Pretrial Order re discovery by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 09/28/2012)

10/01/2012 1199 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1191 "Returned for Better Address" Mail sent to Michael T. Conahan (ga, ) (Entered: 10/01/2012)

10/04/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Schertz had failed, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 1191 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info.(ep, ) (Entered: 10/04/2012)

10/04/2012 1200 Letter from Counsel for the Mericle Defendants regarding the Class Settlement. (Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 10/04/2012)

10/09/2012 1202 NOTICE of Rescheduling Hearing: Settlement Hearing currently scheduled for 11/15/12 has been RESCHEDULED for 11/19/2012 10:00 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.(jam, ) (Entered: 10/09/2012)

10/11/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Feldman had failed, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 1202 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info.(ep, ) (Entered: 10/11/2012)

10/12/2012 1203 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Amber M. Racine terminated on behalf of Plaintiffs. (Walvoord, Adrianne) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1204 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by All Plaintiffs, 09−286 Reply Brief of Individual Plaintiffs in Opposition to Provider Defendants' Discovery Requests. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1205 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357 Class Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Opposing Provider Defendants' Proposed Discovery. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

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10/12/2012 1206 REPLY BRIEF re 1197 MOTION for Order filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 certificate of page count)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1207 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1208 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1209 EXHIBIT Unpublished Opinion by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1210 EXHIBIT unpublisheopinions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1211 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/12/2012 1212 EXHIBIT Unpublished opinions by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/19/2012

1213

COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Diana Gilbride (570)498−7552 of Oral Argument − Re: Discovery Dispute Submissions before Judge Caputo on Friday, October 19, 2012. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on Friday, October 19, 2012. By s/ Diana Gilbride. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr1, ) (Entered: 10/19/2012)

10/23/2012 1215 MOTION to Produce NHS PA Records of 35 Potential Juvenile Settlement Class Members by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 10/23/2012)

10/24/2012 1216 MOTION to Seal by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(kc) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012 1217 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (Attachments: # 1 page 2, # 2 attachment) (kc) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/24/2012

1218

ORDER granting 1215 Motion for Order Directing NHS Pennsylvania to Release Records of Thirty−Five Potential Juvenile Settlement Class Members to Designee of Class Counsel. Records shall be released as soon as reasonably practical; records subject to the provisions of the Stipulated Protective Order (Doc. 205) entered 7/23/09. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/23/12 (jam) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/25/2012 1219 ORDER granting 1216 Motion to Seal Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/25/12 (jam) (Entered: 10/25/2012)

10/31/2012 1220 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of the Motion for Final Approval of the Master Settlement Agreement by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

10/31/2012 1221 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Award of Fees and Costs by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

10/31/2012 1222 MEMORANDUM re: juvenile records discovery request Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/31/12. (jam) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

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10/31/2012

1223

ORDER re 1222 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery of records related to Juvenile Plaintiffs' criminal adjudications is not permitted. IF IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery of Juveniles' Histories is not permitted at this time. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/31/12. (jam) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

11/01/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Feldman had failed, courtesy hard copy of Docs. 1218 , 1219 , 1222 and 1223 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info.(ep) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

11/01/2012 1224 ORDER granting 1220 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in support of the Motion for Final Approval not to exceed sixty (60) pages or 15,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/1/12 (ga) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

11/01/2012 1225 ORDER granting 1221 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintifs may file a Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Award of Fees and Costs not to exceed thirty (3) pages or 10,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/1/12 (ga) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

11/01/2012 1226 ORDER granting re 1221 MOTION to Exceed Page LimitationSigned by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/1/12. (ga) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

11/05/2012 1227 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/05/2012

1228

BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification re 1227 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J, # 11 Exhibit(s) K, # 12 Exhibit(s) L, # 13 Exhibit(s) M)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/05/2012 1229 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/05/2012

1230

BRIEF IN SUPPORT Plaintiffs Unopposed Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs re 1229 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J, # 11 Exhibit(s) K, # 12 Exhibit(s) L)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/05/2012 1231 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence an non concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/06/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Feldman had failed, courtesy hard copy of Docs. 1224 , 1225 , 1226 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info. (ep) (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/06/2012 1232 ORDER granting 1231 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Provider Defts may file their brief in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for final approval of class settlement and class certification not to exceed 56 pages or 15,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/6/12 (jam) (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/06/2012 1233 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/06/2012 1234 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1233 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 certificate of word count)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered:

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11/06/2012)

11/06/2012 1235 MOTION to Stay by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/06/2012 1236 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1235 MOTION to Stay filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/06/2012 1237 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1236 Brief in Support, 1234 Brief in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/07/2012 1238 TRIAL BRIEF Individual Plaintiffs' Modification of the Pretrial Plan Submitted on May 31, 2011 by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Caroselli, William) (Entered: 11/07/2012)

11/07/2012 1239 TRIAL BRIEF Class Plaintiffs' Modification of the Pretrial Plan Submitted on May 31, 2011 by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/07/2012)

11/07/2012 1240 TRIAL BRIEF in Support of Proposed Pre−trial Plan by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/07/2012)

11/08/2012

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Feldman had failed, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 1232 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info.(ep) (Entered: 11/08/2012)

11/09/2012

1241

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1227 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/09/2012 1242 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1241 Brief in Opposition,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/09/2012 1243 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1241 Brief in Opposition,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/09/2012 1244 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1241 Brief in Opposition,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/09/2012 1245 CERTIFICATE of by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1241 Brief in Opposition, certificate of compliance. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/13/2012 1246 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1235 MOTION to Stay filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Fay, Joseph) (Entered: 11/13/2012)

11/16/2012

1247

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1233 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability , Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Provider Defendants' Motion to Amend Order to Add Certification Pursuant to 28 USC Section 1292(B) filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

11/16/2012 1248 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1235 MOTION to Stay filed by Provider Defendants filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

11/16/2012 1249 REPLY BRIEF re 1227 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

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11/16/2012 1250 REPLY BRIEF re 1227 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification filed by Robert K Mericle, Robert Mericle, Mericle Construction, Inc..(Fay, Joseph) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

11/18/2012 1251 REPLY BRIEF re 1233 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/18/2012)

11/18/2012 1252 REPLY BRIEF re 1235 MOTION to Stay filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 11/18/2012)

11/19/2012

1253

COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Laura Boyanowski of Fairness Hearing before Judge Caputo on 11/19/12. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on 11/19/12. By s/ Laura Boyanowski. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr5, ) (Entered: 11/19/2012)

11/19/2012 1284 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (jam) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

11/27/2012

1254

MEMORANDUM re 1235 MOTION to Stay filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, 1233 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/12. (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2012)

11/27/2012

1255

ORDER re 1254 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry),, Motions terminated: 1235 MOTION to Stay filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, 1233 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1.Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLCs Motion to Amend Order to Add a Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1296(b) (sic) (Doc. 1233) is DENIED.2.Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLCs Motion to Stay These Proceedings Pending Final Resolution of Motion to Amend Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Doc. 1235) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/12. (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2012)

12/03/2012

1257

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 11/19/12, before Judge Caputo. Court Reporter L. Boyanowski, Telephone number 570−499−0038. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/24/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/3/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/4/2013. (cr5, ) (Entered: 12/03/2012)

12/05/2012

1258

COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Diana Gilbride of Oral Argument − Re: Discovery Dispute Submissions before Judge Caputo on Friday, October 19, 2012. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on Friday, October 19, 2012. By s/ Diana Gilbride. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only)., NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings Court Reporter Diana Gilbride, Telephone number (570)498−7552. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/26/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/7/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/5/2013. (cr1, ) (Entered: 12/05/2012)

12/07/2012 1259 MOTION to Stay by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/07/2012)

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12/07/2012 1260 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1259 MOTION to Stay filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 certificate of word count, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/07/2012)

12/07/2012 1261 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1260 Brief in Support,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/07/2012)

12/07/2012 1262 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1260 Brief in Support,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/07/2012)

12/07/2012 1263 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1260 Brief in Support,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/07/2012)

12/13/2012 1264 First MOTION to Take Deposition from Defendant Robert J. Powell in Prison by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/13/2012)

12/13/2012 1265 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1264 First MOTION to Take Deposition from Defendant Robert J. Powell in Prison filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/13/2012)

12/13/2012 1266 EXHIBIT A and Proposed Order by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630 re 1265 Brief in Support. (Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/13/2012)

12/14/2012 1267 MEMORANDUM approving Settlement Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/14/12. (jam) (Entered: 12/14/2012)

12/14/2012 1268 FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT re 1267 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry) approving Mericle Settlement. See Order to additional, specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/14/12. (jam) (Entered: 12/14/2012)

12/14/2012

1269

ORDER re 1267 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and Western PA Child Care, LLC's objections to the Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification (Doc. 1241) and the request to admit exhibits in opposition to Final Approval of the Settlement and Class Certification are DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/14/12. (jam) (Entered: 12/14/2012)

12/17/2012 1270 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1259 MOTION to Stay filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−C)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/17/2012)

12/18/2012 1271 RESPONSE by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC to 1264 First MOTION to Take Deposition from Defendant Robert J. Powell in Prison . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/18/2012)

12/20/2012 1272 First MOTION for Protective Order Providing that the Depostion of the PACC, WPACC and Mays Corporate Designee Deposition be Held After March 31, 2013 by Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, Inc..(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 12/20/2012)

12/20/2012 1273 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1272 First MOTION for Protective Order Providing that the Depostion of the PACC, WPACC and Mays Corporate Designee Deposition be Held After March 31, 2013 filed by Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, Inc..(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 12/20/2012)

12/21/2012 1274 MOTION for Order of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice of Defendants Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction, Inc. by Bruce Clark, Iraida Clark, Raul Clark. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Montgomery, Bridget) (Entered: 12/21/2012)

12/26/2012 1275 CONSENT ORDER granting 1274 Motion for Voluntary Dismissal as to Defts Robert K. Mericle and mericle Constuction, Inc. − Signed by Honorable A. Richard

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Caputo on 12/26/2012 (rm) (Entered: 12/27/2012)

12/28/2012 1276 REPLY BRIEF re 1259 MOTION to Stay filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/28/2012)

12/28/2012

1277

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1272 First MOTION for Protective Order Providing that the Depostion of the PACC, WPACC and Mays Corporate Designee Deposition be Held After March 31, 2013 filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−E)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/28/2012)

01/03/2013 1278 RESPONSE by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC to 1272 First MOTION for Protective Order Providing that the Depostion of the PACC, WPACC and Mays Corporate Designee Deposition be Held After March 31, 2013 . (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/03/2013)

01/03/2013 1279 MOTION to Stay by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/03/2013)

01/03/2013 1280 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1279 MOTION to Stay filed by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/03/2013)

01/03/2013 1281 EXHIBIT by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1280 Brief in Support,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/03/2013)

01/04/2013 1282 REPLY BRIEF re 1264 First MOTION to Take Deposition from Defendant Robert J. Powell in Prison filed by Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 01/04/2013)

01/04/2013 1283 SCHEDULING ORDER: The following case shall be consolidated for discovery purposes only. (See Order for dates and deadlines).Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/2/13. (ga) (Entered: 01/04/2013)

01/09/2013 1285 ORDER denying 1272 Motion for Protective Order. The depositions of the corporate designee for Defendants PACC, WPACC, and MAYS shall take place as scheduled on January 14, 15 and 16, 2013, respectively. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/9/13 (jam) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

01/09/2013 1286 ORDER granting 1264 Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave of Court to Depose Robert J. Powell Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2)(B). Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/9/13 (jam) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

01/09/2013 1287 MEMORANDUM re 1259 MOTION to Stay filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/9/13. (jam) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

01/09/2013

1288

ORDER re 1287 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Stay These Proceedings Pending Resolution of a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Untied States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Case 12−4452 (Doc. 1259) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/9/13. (jam) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

01/15/2013

1289

MOTION to Dismiss Party Motion to Dismiss Claims against Mericle Construction, Robert Mericle, Gregory Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid, Sam Guesto, Sandra Brulo, Luzerne County and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation by Virtue of Settlement by Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 01/15/2013)

01/15/2013 1290 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1279 MOTION to Stay filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: #

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1 Exhibit(s) A)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 01/15/2013)

01/21/2013 1291 REPLY BRIEF re 1279 MOTION to Stay filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/21/2013)

01/22/2013 1292 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney David J. Schertz by Raul Clark. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Montgomery, Bridget) (Entered: 01/22/2013)

01/23/2013 1293 NOTICE : PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Conference Call re: Individual Plaintiffs' Fact Sheets has been scheduled for FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 2013 at 2:00 p.m. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the call. (jam) (Entered: 01/23/2013)

01/23/2013 1294 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357.(Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 01/23/2013)

01/23/2013 1295 ORDER granting 1292 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney David J. Schertz terminated. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/23/13 (jam) (Entered: 01/23/2013)

01/24/2013 1296 ORDER granting 1294 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. H.T. and Conway Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of the Motion for Class Certification not to exceed 30 pages or 10,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/24/13 (jam) (Entered: 01/24/2013)

01/25/2013 1297 MOTION for Order Granting Leave to File Documents Under Seal by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 01/25/2013)

01/25/2013

1298

ORDER denying as moot 1279 Motion to Stay. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Stay These Proceedings Until Resolution of Petition for Permission to Appeal From Orders of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania Dated December 14, 2012 Pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Case 12−8117 (Doc. 1279) is DENIED as moot in light of the Third Circuits denial of Provider Defendants Petition on January 25, 2013. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/25/13 (jam) (Entered: 01/25/2013)

01/28/2013 1299 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013

1300

MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer re 1289 MOTION to Dismiss Party Motion to Dismiss Claims against Mericle Construction, Robert Mericle, Gregory Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid, Sam Guesto, Sandra Brulo, Luzerne County and the Luzerne County Department of Juvenile Probation by Virtue of Settle . (Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1301 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1302 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1303 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1304 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1305 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1306 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1307 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (kc) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1308 ORDER granting 1297 Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/28/13 (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1309 SEALED ORDER (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1310 SEALED ORDER (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1311 SEALED ORDER (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1312 SEALED ORDER (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

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01/28/2013 1313 SEALED ORDER (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1314 SEALED ORDER (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013 1315 SEALED ORDER (jam) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

02/01/2013 1318 Letter to the Court from Attorney David Senoff, follow−up to 1/25/13 conference call (jam) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/01/2013 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/01/2013 1320 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/01/2013 1321 MOTION for Order Granting Leave to File Documents Under Seal by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/02/2013

1322

MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC Re: Plaintiff Fact Sheets. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Exhibit(s), # 11 Exhibit(s), # 12 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/02/2013)

02/05/2013 1323 DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C, # 2 Exhbit D, # 3 Exhibit E, # 4 Exhibit F, # 5 Exhibit G, # 6 Exhibit H, # 7 Exhibit I, # 8 Exhbit) (kc) (Entered: 02/05/2013)

02/07/2013 1324 Letter to the Court dated 2/5/13 from Attorney David Senoff re: deposition of Robert Powell. (jam) (Entered: 02/07/2013)

02/11/2013

DOCKET ANNOTATION: James C. Schwartzman, Daniel B. Huyett, Donald E. Wieand, Jr., and Marianne J. Gilmartin all added as counsel for defendants, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC and Western PA Child Care, LLC. (kn) (Entered: 02/11/2013)

02/15/2013

1325

MOTION for Consideration PETITION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER DENNIS FISHER by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A − Letter from Dyller Law Firm to Dennis Fisher, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence CERTIFICATE OF CONCURRENCE AND NON−CONCURRENCE)(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 02/15/2013)

02/18/2013

1326

BRIEF IN SUPPORT Brief in Support of Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filing of Proof of Claim on Behalf of Represrented Plaintiff and Class Member Dennis Fisher re 1325 MOTION for Consideration PETITION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER DENNIS FISHER filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 02/18/2013)

02/22/2013 1328 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/22/2013)

02/22/2013 1329 CERTIFICATE of by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1328 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation . (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/22/2013)

02/22/2013 1330 ORDER granting 1289 Motion of Rimmer Belanger Plaintiffs to Dismiss Claims Against Several Defendants by Virtue of Settlement. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/22/13 (jam) (Entered: 02/22/2013)

02/22/2013 1331 AMENDED ORDER: Paragraph 3 of the Scheduling Order docketed 1/4/13 (Doc. 1283) which established deadlines to guide Individual Plaintiff actions, is AMENDED as follows: 3. The first trial group of Individual Plaintiff actions shall

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proceed in the following manner: a. sixty (60) cases have been randomly selected to comprise the available pool of cases for the first trial group (see Order for specifics); b. Plaintiffs shall provide Fact Sheets as soon as reasonably practical. Plaintiffs shall provide an update to the Court regarding the status of the production of these 60 Fact Sheets on or before 4/1/13 if they have not all been produced at that time. c. Within 20 days after the last of the 60 Fact Sheets have been delivered to Defendants, 30 cases will be selected for discovery consistent with the 10/31/12 Memorandum and Order; d. The parties shall advise the Court once the 30 cases for discovery have been selected. At that time, the Court will set a schedule for completion of discovery and filing of dispositive/Daubert motions for the cases in the first trial group. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/22/13. (jam) (Entered: 02/22/2013)

02/22/2013 1332 ORDER granting 1328 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Provider Defendants are granted leave to file a Brief in Opposition of the Motion for Class Certification not to exceed 15,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/22/13 (jam) (Entered: 02/22/2013)

02/25/2013 1333 ORDER granting 1321 Motion for Order for Leave to File Documents Under Seal. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/25/13 (jam) (Entered: 02/25/2013)

02/26/2013 1334 MOTION to File Document Under Seal by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(kc) (Entered: 02/26/2013)

02/26/2013

1335

DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 to Brief in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2 to Brief in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3 to Brief in Oppostion to Motion for Class Certification, # 4 Exhibit(s) 4 to Brief in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, # 5 Exhibit(s) 5 to Brief in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, # 6 Exhibit(s) 6 to Brief in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, # 7 Exhibit(s) 7 to Brief in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification) (kc) (Entered: 02/26/2013)

02/26/2013 1336 MOTION for Order for Leave to Incorporate by Reference by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 02/26/2013)

02/27/2013 1337 ORDER granting 1334 Motion to File Document Under Seal.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2//27/13 (jam) (Entered: 02/27/2013)

02/27/2013 1338 ORDER granting 1336 Motion for Leave to Incorporate Prior Briefs. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/27/13 (jam) (Entered: 02/27/2013)

02/28/2013

1339

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1325 MOTION for Consideration PETITION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER DENNIS FISHER filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 02/28/2013)

03/01/2013 1340 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 03/01/2013)

03/01/2013 1341 EXHIBIT by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/01/2013)

03/01/2013 1342 EXHIBIT by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/01/2013)

03/01/2013 1343 EXHIBIT by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s), # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/01/2013)

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03/01/2013 1344 MOTION to Seal by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(kc) Modified on 3/4/2013 (kc). (Entered: 03/04/2013)

03/01/2013

1345

DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION − BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF MID−ATLANTIC YOUTH SERVICES CORP., PA CHILD CARE LLC AND WESTERN PA CHILD CARE LLC TO H.T. and Conway Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of their Motion for Class Certification as to all issues of Defendants' Liability TP Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 part 2, # 2 part 3, # 3 attachment) (kc) (Entered: 03/04/2013)

03/04/2013 1346 ***WITHDRAWN without prejudice. See Doc. 1498*** MOTION for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) Modified on 12/5/2013 (jam). (Entered: 03/04/2013)

03/04/2013 1347 ORDER granting 1340 Motion for Leave to Exceed page Limit for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees, not to exceed 8,500 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/4/13 (jam) (Entered: 03/04/2013)

03/04/2013

1348

***WITHDRAWN without prejudice. See Doc. 1498***BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1346 MOTION for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−D, # 2 Exhibit(s) E−F, # 3 Exhibit(s) G−H, # 4 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) Modified on 12/5/2013 (jam). (Entered: 03/04/2013)

03/07/2013 1349 ORDER granting 1344 Motion to Seal Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/7/13 (jam) (Entered: 03/07/2013)

03/07/2013

1350

REPLY BRIEF re 1325 MOTION for Consideration PETITION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER DENNIS FISHER filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A − Declaration of Dennis Fisher, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibit B − May 7, 2012 email)(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 03/07/2013)

03/15/2013 1351 MOTION to Seal Exhibits to Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(kc) (Entered: 03/15/2013)

03/15/2013

1352

EXHIBITS TO PROVIDER DEFENDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3, # 4 Exhibit(s) 4, # 5 Exhibit(s) 5, # 6 Exhibit(s) 6) (kc) (Attachment 1 replaced on 3/15/2013) (jw). (Entered: 03/15/2013)

03/15/2013 1353 EXHIBITS TO PROVIDER DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DOCUMENT(S) PENDING SEALING DECISION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 8, # 2 Exhibit(s) 9, # 3 Exhibit(s) 10, # 4 Exhibit(s) 11, # 5 Exhibit(s) 12, # 6 Exhibit(s) 13) (kc) (Entered: 03/15/2013)

03/16/2013 1354 Emergency MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/16/2013)

03/16/2013 1355 CERTIFICATE of by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1351 MOTION to Seal Amended Certificate of Concurence. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/16/2013)

03/18/2013 1356 MOTION for Order for Leave to Pay from Mericle Settlement Holdback Fund a Claim that was Inadvertently Not Initially Processed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 03/18/2013)

03/18/2013 1357 ORDER granting 1354 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Provider Defendants are granted leave to file a Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Sanctions not to exceed 10,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/18/13 (ga)

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(Entered: 03/18/2013)

03/18/2013 1358 MEMORANDUM (Order to follow)Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/18/13. (ga) (Entered: 03/18/2013)

03/18/2013 1359 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely filing of Proof of Claim on Behalf of Represented Plaintiff and Class Member Dennis Fisher (Doc. 1325) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/18/13. (ga) (Entered: 03/18/2013)

03/18/2013

1360

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1346 MOTION for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel filed by Respondents Bruckers Schneider & Porter, Bernard M. Schneider and William Brucker and filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Word Count)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/18/2013)

03/19/2013 1361 EXHIBIT 13 to Brief In Opposition to Sanctions by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1360 Brief in Opposition,. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/19/2013)

03/19/2013 1362 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation , H.T. and Conway Plaintiffs' Motion to Exceed Word Limit For Reply Brief in Support of Class Certification, with attached Certificate of Service by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 03/19/2013)

03/20/2013 1363 ORDER granting 1362 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/20/13 (lh) (Entered: 03/20/2013)

03/20/2013 1364 ORDER granting 1356 Motion for Leave to Pay from the Mericle Settlement Holdback Fund a Claim that was inadvertently not initially processed. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/20/13 (lh) (Entered: 03/20/2013)

03/20/2013

1365

MOTION for Reconsideration re 1359 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry), MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S MARCH 18, 2013 ORDER (DOC. 1359) PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 59(D) & M.D.PA. L.R. 7.10 by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence CERTIFICATE OF CONCURRENCE AND NON−CONCURRENCE)(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 03/20/2013)

03/20/2013

1366

BRIEF IN SUPPORT Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 18, 2013 Order (Doc. 1359) Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 59(e) & M.D.AP. L.R. 7.10 re 1365 MOTION for Reconsideration re 1359 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry), MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S MARCH 18, 2013 ORDER (DOC. 1359) PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 59(D) & M.D.PA. L.R. 7.10 filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 03/20/2013)

03/21/2013 1367 REPLY BRIEF re 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 and 2, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 03/21/2013)

03/25/2013 1368 NOTICE of Appearance by Shannon D. Farmer on behalf of Brian Gyle (Farmer, Shannon) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/25/2013 1369 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Rachel M. Keene on behalf of Brian Gyle Attorney Rachel Keene is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2734134.. (Keene, Rachel) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/25/2013 1370 ORDER granting 1351 Motion to Seal Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/22/13 (jam) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/25/2013

1371

MOTION for Relief from Judgment MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER BRIAN GYLE by Brian Gyle. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B, # 4 Exhibit(s) C, # 5 Certificate of Concurrence and Nonconcurrence, # 6 Certificate of Service)(Farmer, Shannon) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

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03/25/2013 1372 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1371 MOTION for Relief from Judgment MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER BRIAN GYLE filed by Brian Gyle.(Farmer, Shannon) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/25/2013 1373 Letter to the Court dated 3/13/13 from Mark A. Ciavarella, requesting to join in Provider Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Class Certification as to all issues of Defendants' Liability to Plaintiffs. (jam) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/25/2013

1374

ORDER: Upon consideration of the request by Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. to join Provider Defendants' Brief in Opposition to H.T. and Conway Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of their Motion for Class Certification as to all issues of Defendants' Liability to Plaintiffs (Doc. 1345), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Ciavarella's motion is GRANTED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/25/13. (jam) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/26/2013 1375 MOTION for Leave to File a Sur−Reply Brief by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 3 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/26/2013)

03/27/2013 1376 ORDER denying 1375 Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply Brief Regarding Anapol Schwartz's Conflict of Interest. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/27/13 (jam) (Entered: 03/27/2013)

03/27/2013

ORAL ORDER: Defendant Robert Powell, shall have thirty (30) days from March 27, 2013 to produce individual tax returns requested by Plaintiffs for the period 2002 to 2008. Vision Holdings shall produce corporate tax returns for the same period. By Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/27/13. (jam) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

03/29/2013 1377 REPLY BRIEF re 1346 MOTION for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 03/29/2013)

03/29/2013 1378 MOTION to Supplement Briefs by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 3 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/29/2013)

04/01/2013

1379

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1365 MOTION for Reconsideration re 1359 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry), MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S MARCH 18, 2013 ORDER (DOC. 1359) PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 59(D) & M.D.PA. L.R. 7.10 filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

04/01/2013 1380 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1371 MOTION for Relief from Judgment MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER BRIAN GYLE filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

04/01/2013

1381

SCHEDULING ORDER: Oral Argument on H.T. and Conway Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability to Plaintiffs (Doc. 1319) set for 4/30/2013 10:00 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/1/13. (jam) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

04/01/2013 1382 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Rachel M. Keene, Esquire.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/28/13. (jam) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

04/03/2013 1384 MOTION to Supplement briefs regarding motion for sanctions by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/03/2013)

04/04/2013 1385 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1378 MOTION to Supplement Briefs , H.T. and Conway Plaintiffs' Opposition to Provider Defendants' Motion for Leave to File a

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Supplemental Brief filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
04/04/2013 1386 ORDER granting 1378 Motion to Supplement Brief due on or before 4/15/13. (See Order for further details).Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/4/13 (ga) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
04/04/2013 1387 ORDER granting 1384 Motion to Supplement Brief due on 4/15/13. (See Order for further details).Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/4/13 (ga) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
04/05/2013 1388 Letter to the Court dated 4/1/13 from Attorney David Senoff providing update regarding status of the production of fact sheets. (jam) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
04/05/2013 1389 Letter to the Court dated 4/1/13 from Attorney David Senoff requesting discontinuation of those cases listed in letter. (jam) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
04/09/2013 1390 Letter from Marianne J. Gilmartin, Esq. to The Honorable Richard A. Caputo. (Gilmartin, Marianne) (Entered: 04/09/2013)
04/09/2013 1391 Letter from David S. Senoff, Esq. to The Honorable A. Richard Caputo. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/09/2013)
04/15/2013 1392 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability Supplemental Brief filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
04/15/2013 1393 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1346 MOTION for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel Supplemental Brief filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
04/15/2013 1394 REPLY BRIEF re 1371 MOTION for Relief from Judgment MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER BRIAN GYLE with Certificate of Service filed by Brian Gyle.(Keene, Rachel) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
04/22/2013 1395 Letter to the Court from Attorney David Senoff requesting Court marked as discontinued cases listed in letter. (jam) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
04/25/2013 1396 BRIEF IN SUPPORT Supplemental Brief in Support re 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Keller, Emily) (Entered: 04/25/2013)
04/25/2013 1397 BRIEF IN SUPPORT Supplemental Brief in Support re 1346 MOTION for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Keller, Emily) (Entered: 04/25/2013)
04/29/2013 1398 REPLY BRIEF re 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability replysupplementalbrief filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
04/29/2013 1399 REPLY BRIEF re 1346 MOTION for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel supplemental reply filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
04/29/2013 1400 NOTICE by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability Notice of Supplemental Authority (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
04/30/2013 1401 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Diana Gilbride (570−498−7552) of Oral Argument on Motion to Certify Class before Judge Caputo on Tuesday, April 30, 2013. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United

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States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on Tuesday, April 30, 2013. By s/ Diana Gilbride. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr1, ) (Entered: 04/30/2013)

05/01/2013 1402 MOTION to Compel Discovery , MOTION for Sanctions against Powell Defendants by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement A−J)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 05/01/2013)

05/03/2013 1403 BRIEF IN SUPPORT Plaintiffs' re 1402 MOTION to Compel Discovery MOTION for Sanctions against Powell Defendants filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−K)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 05/03/2013)

05/08/2013 1405 Letter dated 5/6/13 from Attorney David S. Senoff listing Individual Plaintiffs selected as Plaintiffs' fifteen trial picks (jam) (Entered: 05/08/2013)

05/08/2013 1406 Letter dated 5/6/13 from Attorney Marianne J. Gilmartin listed fifteen Individual Plaintiffs which Provider Defendants designate for first trial group. (jam) (Entered: 05/08/2013)

05/13/2013 1407 NOTICE − Case Management Conference has been SCHEDULED with respect to the individual case on Monday, June 3, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. in Bankruptcy Conference Room, Second Floor Max Rosenn U.S. Courthouse, 197 South Main Street, Wilkes−Barre, PA (ga) (Entered: 05/13/2013)

05/14/2013 1408 Letter to the Court dated 5/10/13 from Attorney David Senoff, requesting Court schedule in−person case management conference. (jam) (Entered: 05/14/2013)

05/14/2013 1409 MEMORANDUM re 1319 MOTION to Certify Class as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−291 Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/14/13. (jam) (Entered: 05/14/2013)

05/14/2013

1410

ORDER re 1409 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Class Certification as to All Issues of Defendants Liability to Plaintiffs (Doc. 1319) filed by Plaintiffs in H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 09−0357, and Conway v. Conahan, No. 09−0291 (collectively Plaintiffs), is GRANTED. See Order for addition, specific details regarding litigation classes. Pursuant to Rule 23(g), Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, Juvenile Law Center, and Anapol Schwartz are appointed as Class Counsel.Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file a motion for approval of their proposed forms of class notice and their notice program (the Notice Motion.) If the Notice Motion is opposed by any party, that party shall file a brief in opposition to the Notice Motion no later than fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice Motion.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/14/13. (jam) (Entered: 05/14/2013)

05/15/2013

1411

MOTION for Relief from Judgment 1268 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry) MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF FROM ORDER OF COURT TO ESTABLISH DEADLINES FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE MERICLE SETTLEMENT by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 05/15/2013)

05/15/2013

1412

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1411 MOTION for Relief from Judgment 1268 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry) MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF FROM ORDER OF COURT TO ESTABLISH DEADLINES FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE MERICLE SETTLEMENT filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 05/15/2013)

05/16/2013 1413 ORDER granting 1411 Motion for Relief from Order of Court to Establish Deadlines For The Conclusion Of The Merical Settlement. See Order for additional, specific information and deadlines. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/16/13 (jam) (Entered: 05/16/2013)

05/16/2013

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Kostelansky CONTINUES TO FAIL, courtesy hard copy of Docs. 1409 , 1410 , 1413 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info; if counsel is no longer associated with case, co−counsel or replacement counsel are urged to file praecipe for withdrawal or

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substitution of attorney.(ep) (Entered: 05/16/2013)

05/16/2013 1414 RESPONSE by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC to 1402 MOTION to Compel Discovery MOTION for Sanctions against Powell Defendants . (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 05/16/2013)

05/17/2013

1415

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on April 30, 2013, before Judge Caputo. Court Reporter Diana Gilbride, Telephone number (570)498−7552. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 6/7/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/17/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/15/2013. (cr1, ) (Entered: 05/17/2013)

05/17/2013 1416 NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 1415 Transcript. A copy of transcript notice was sent to Benjamin R. Jones, Charles G. Ross, Jonathan Vipon, III, Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. on 5/17/13. (lh) (Entered: 05/17/2013)

05/17/2013

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Fazio CONTINUES TO FAIL, courtesy hard copy of Docs. 1413 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info; if counsel is no longer associated with case, co−counsel or replacement counsel are urged to file praecipe for withdrawal or substitution of attorney.(ep) (Entered: 05/17/2013)

05/22/2013

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Attys. Williams and Daley has failed, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 1413 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info; if counsel is no longer associated with case, co−counsel or replacement counsel are urged to file praecipe for withdrawal or substitution of attorney.(ep) (Entered: 05/22/2013)

06/03/2013

1419

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 1402 Motion to Compel Discovery; Motion for Sanctions. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1)Robert Powell shall produce full and complete copies of his individual tax returns from 2002 through 2008 within ten (10) days from the date of entry of this Order.(2)Vision Holdings, LLC shall produce full and complete copies of its corporate tax returns from 2002 through 2008 within ten (10) days from the date of entry of this Order.(3)Defendants Robert Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC and their Counsel shall pay reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs for the time and expenses related to Defendants failure to comply with the Courts March 27, 2013 Order and for preparing the underlying motion. Plaintiffs Counsel shall submit to the Court documentation supporting their time and expenses for preparing the motion within ten (10) days from the date of entry of this Order. (4)Plaintiffs request for a default judgment pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vi) against Defendants Robert Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/3/13 (jam) (Entered: 06/03/2013)

06/03/2013

1420

AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Fact discovery in the 30 Individual Cases shall be completed by 8/30/13. Expert discovery due 9/16/13 for Plaintiffs, 10/15/13 for Defendants, 11/4/13 for Plaintiffs' rebuttal reports; Depositions of all expert witnesses to be completed by 11/4/13. All Daubert motions and briefs in support filed by 11/4/13. Briefs in opposition to Daubert motions filed by 11/18/13. All dispositive motions filed by 11/4/13. Pretrial conference will be held in November 2013. Case placed on the December 2013 trial list of this Court. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/3/13. (jam) (Entered: 06/03/2013)

06/04/2013 1421 Letter dated 6/4/13 to the Court from Attorney Sebelin re: compliance with Court's Order re: tax returns, requesting phone conference to address. (jam) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

06/06/2013 1423 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Bridget E. Montgomery on behalf of Bruce Clark, Iraida Clark, Raul Clark Attorney Anthony Valenziano is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2801286.. (Montgomery, Bridget) (Entered: 06/06/2013)

06/07/2013

As counsel and parties in this action are many, counsel are urged to verify that their contact information on the docket and in ECF is up todate and that all co−counsel

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listed are still active in the case and that *their* contact information is correct on the docket; Please file the appropriate withdrawals of counsel and/or substitutions of counsel for those no longer associated with the case, or have contact information corrected. Thank you.For toll−free ECF telephone support, you may call the divisionaloffice nearest to you during regular business hours:Scranton: 866−263−8479Harrisburg: 866−333−3261Williamsport: 866−736−3914 Ed PetroskiDeputy Clerk(ep) (Entered: 06/07/2013)

06/07/2013 1424 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Anthony C. Valenziano, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/7/13. (jam) (Entered: 06/07/2013)

06/10/2013

1425

ORDER: Paragraph 5 of the Order docketed 5/14/13 (Doc. 1410) is AMENDED as follows: 5. On or before 9/11/13, Plaintiffs shall file a motion for approval of their proposed forms of class notice and their notice program (the "Notice Motion"). If the Notice Motion is opposed by any party, that party shall file a brief in opposition to the Notice Motion no later than 9/25/13. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/10/13. (jam) (Entered: 06/10/2013)

06/10/2013 1426 Letter dated 6/7/13 to the Court from Attorney Adrianne Walvoord Webb, including proposed Amended Order to extend deadlines. (jam) (Entered: 06/10/2013)

06/11/2013 1427 by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. 1419 Order on Motion to Compel Discovery, Order on Motion for Sanctions,,,,,,,, Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 06/11/2013)

06/18/2013 1428 Mail Returned as Undeliverable (forwarding time expired). Mail 1409 , 1410 , 1413 sent to Michael R. Kostelansky (ep) (Entered: 06/18/2013)

06/18/2013 1429 Letter dated 6/13/13 tot he Court from Jane Sebelin, Esq. requesting leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order; advising tax documents supplied to Plaintiffs' counsel. (jam) (Entered: 06/18/2013)

06/24/2013 1430 MEMORANDUM Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/24/13. (jam) (Entered: 06/24/2013)

06/24/2013

1431

ORDER re 1430 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry) ; granting 1371 Motion for Relief from Judgment, granting 1365 Motion for Reconsideration. The Claims Committee shall accept and evaluate the Proof of Claim Forms submitted by Dennis Fisher and Brian Gyle. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/24/13 (jam) (Entered: 06/24/2013)

07/01/2013 1432 Letter dated 6/28/13 to the Court from Attorney Adrianne Walvoord Webb re: Fisher and Gyle settlement awards. (jam) (Entered: 07/01/2013)

07/01/2013

1433

AMENDED ORDER: Paragraph 3 of the Order docketed 6/24/13 (Doc. 1431) which ordered the Mericle Settlement Claims Committee to accept and evaluate the Proof of Claim Forms submitted by Dennis Fisher and Brian Gyle is AMENDED as follows: 3. The Claims Committee shall accept and evaluate the Proof of Claim Forms submitted by Dennis Fisher and Brian Gyle to determine the settlement funds to be awarded to each. The Claims Committee shall pay the settlement awards for Dennis Fisher and Brian Gyle from the Enhanced Benefit Fund. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/1/13. (jam) (Entered: 07/01/2013)

08/28/2013 1435 Letter dated 8/27/13 from Attorney Sol H. Weiss re: additional costs associated with administration of settlement, enclosing proposed Order. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (jam) (Entered: 09/03/2013)

09/10/2013 1436 NOTICE of Appearance by Harry G. Mahoney on behalf of County of Luzerne (Mahoney, Harry) (Entered: 09/10/2013)

09/11/2013

1437

AMENDED ORDER: Paragraph 5 of the Order docketed 5/14/13 (Doc. 1410) ("Litigation Class Certification Order"), which granted Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification as to All Issues of Defendants' Liability to Plaintiffs, is AMNEDED as follows: 5. On or before November 4, 2013, Plaintiffs shall file a motion for approval of their proposed forms of class notice and their notice program (the 'Notice Motion"). If the Notice Motion is opposed by any party, that party shall file brief in opposition to the Notice Motion no later than November 18, 2013. FURTHER ORDERED that the Order docketed 6/30/13 (Doc. 1425), which previously amended the Litigation

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Class Certification Order, is now vacated. FURTHER ORDERED that paragraph 2(d) of the Order docketed 1/4/13 (Doc. 1283), is AMENDED as follows: All dispositive and Daubert motions, along with supporting briefs, shall be filed by 11/4/13. The case will be placed on the April 2014 trial list of this Court. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/11/13. (jam) (Entered: 09/11/2013)

09/12/2013 1438 Letter dated 9/6/13 from Adrianne Walvoord Webb, enclosed proposed Order granting extension (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Proposed Order) (jam) (Entered: 09/12/2013)

09/13/2013

1440

AMENDED ORDER: Paragraph 19 of the Final Order and Judgment docketed December 14, 2012 (Doc. 1268) is AMENDED as follows: 19. Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Doc. 1229) is GRANTED. a. Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class of record herein are hereby awarded combined common benefit attorneys' fees, disbursements, and costs in the amount of $4,335,000.00. b. All costs expenses and disbursements....totaling $707,920.32 are approved. See Order for additional, specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/13/13. (jam) (Entered: 09/13/2013)

09/23/2013

1441

SCHEDULING ORDER: In Chambers Conference set for 9/26/2013 03:30 PM in Wilkes−Barre before Honorable A. Richard Caputo to discuss the settlement negotiations between the Plaintiffs and the Provider Defendants. Counsel for Plaintiffs, the Provider Defendants, the Mericle Defendants and Robert Powell shall be present. Named parties are welcome to attend, if they so desire. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/23/13. (jam) Modified on 9/24/2013 (jam). (Entered: 09/23/2013)

09/25/2013 1443 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Howard Wishnoff terminated on behalf of Gregory Zappala, Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp and Mid−Atlantic Child Youth Services, Inc.. (Wishnoff, Howard) (Entered: 09/25/2013)

09/25/2013 1444 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Donna L. Adelsberger terminated on behalf of Gregory Zappala and Mid−Atlantic Youth Services Corp.. (Adelsberger, Donna) (Entered: 09/25/2013)

09/25/2013 1445 Letter from Daniel B. Huyett re. Confirmation of Cancellation of Conference Scheduled for September 26, 2013. (Huyett, Daniel) (Entered: 09/25/2013)

10/02/2013

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Fazio has failed, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 1441 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info; if counsel is no longer associated with case, co−counsel or replacement counsel are urged to file praecipe for withdrawal or substitution of attorney.(ep) (Entered: 10/02/2013)

10/02/2013

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As electronic notification to Atty. Kostelansky CONTINUES TO FAIL, courtesy hard copy of Doc. 1441 mailed with instructions for updating ECF account info; if counsel is no longer associated with case, co−counsel or replacement counsel are urged to file praecipe for withdrawal or substitution of attorney.(ep) (Entered: 10/02/2013)

10/02/2013 1446 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Certification in Support of Request to Enter Default)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 10/02/2013)

10/03/2013 1447 Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Michael T. Conahan for failure to plead or otherwise defend.Signed by Deputy Clerk on 10/3/13. (ga) (Entered: 10/03/2013)

10/16/2013 1448 Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 10/16/2013)

10/28/2013 1449 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 10/28/2013)

10/28/2013 1450 SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a preliminary hearing on the Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between

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Plaintiffs and Provider Parties (Doc. 1448) will be held on WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2013 at 10:30 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/28/13. (jam) (Entered: 10/28/2013)

10/29/2013 1451 ORDER granting 1449 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of the Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval not to exceed 40 pages or 12,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/29/13 (jam) (Entered: 10/29/2013)

10/30/2013 1452 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1448 Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 10/30/2013)

10/30/2013 1453 NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the TIME of the Preliminary Hearing on Approval of Class Settlement set for 11/20/2013 HAS BEEN CHANGED to 12:00 PM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.(jam) (Entered: 10/30/2013)

10/31/2013 1454 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Keller, Emily) (Entered: 10/31/2013)

11/01/2013 1455 ORDER granting 1454 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file briefs in support not to exceed 6,500 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/1/13 (jam) (Entered: 11/01/2013)

11/04/2013 1456 ***WITHDRAWN. SEE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 8, 2013 (Doc. 1469)***First MOTION for Summary Judgment by Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc..(Sebelin, Jane) Modified on 11/8/2013 (jam). (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013 1457 ***STRICKEN. SEE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 8, 2013 (DOC. 1469)***BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1456 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) Modified on 11/8/2013 (jam). (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013

1458

STATEMENT OF FACTS re 1457 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1456 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F)(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013

1459

MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Impartial Tribunal Claims by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Statement of Facts, # 3 Exhibit(s) 1−10, # 4 Exhibit(s) 11−20, # 5 Exhibit(s) 21−30)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013 1460 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1459 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Impartial Tribunal Claims filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013

1461

MOTION for Default Judgment as to Michael T. Conahan and Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order granting Default Judgment, # 2 Proposed Order granting Summary Judgment, # 3 Statement of Facts, # 4 Exhibit(s) A−E)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013 1462 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1461 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Michael T. Conahan and Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013 1463 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc. and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC and Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs,

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09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order granting Default Judgment, # 2 Proposed Order granting Summary Judgment, # 3 Statement of Facts, # 4 Exhibit(s) A−F)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013

1464

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1463 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Beverage Marketing of PA, Inc. and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC and Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013 1465 MOTION for Order Appoving the Litigation Class Notice Plan and the Form of the Litigation Class Notice by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/04/2013 1466 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1465 MOTION for Order Appoving the Litigation Class Notice Plan and the Form of the Litigation Class Notice filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 11/04/2013)

11/07/2013 1467 MOTION to Strike 1456 First MOTION for Summary Judgment , 1457 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−E, # 2 Proposed Order)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/07/2013)

11/08/2013 1468 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1467 MOTION to Strike 1456 First MOTION for Summary Judgment , 1457 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/08/2013)

11/08/2013

1469

MEMORANDUM ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group and Vision Holdings, LLC's Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 1457) is STRICKEN from the record. (2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 1456) is deemed WITHDRAWN. (3) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Powell Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 1467) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/8/13. (jam) (Entered: 11/08/2013)

11/14/2013 1470 First MOTION for Settlement Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Parties by Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Operating Agreement)(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 11/14/2013)

11/14/2013

1471

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1470 First MOTION for Settlement Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Parties, 1448 Joint MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants filed by Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 11/14/2013)

11/14/2013 1472 First MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation , First MOTION for Extension of Time to Motion for leave to refile and extension of time to file Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support by Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 11/14/2013)

11/14/2013

1473

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1472 First MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation First MOTION for Extension of Time to Motion for leave to refile and extension of time to file Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support filed by Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 11/14/2013)

11/19/2013

1474

MOTION to Strike 1470 First MOTION for Settlement Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Parties by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit(s) Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit(s) Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit(s) Exhibit D)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/19/2013)

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11/19/2013

1475

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1474 MOTION to Strike 1470 First MOTION for Settlement Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Parties , 1470 First MOTION for Settlement Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Parties filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/19/2013)

11/19/2013

1476

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1472 First MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation First MOTION for Extension of Time to Motion for leave to refile and extension of time to file Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A through D)(Segal, Daniel) (Entered: 11/19/2013)

11/20/2013 1477 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Joseph J. Fantini on behalf of All Plaintiffs, 09−286 Attorney Joseph Fantini is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2942621.. (Fantini, Joseph) (Entered: 11/20/2013)

11/22/2013 1478 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 11/22/2013)

11/22/2013 1479 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1478 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 11/22/2013)

11/22/2013 1481 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Joseph J. Fantini, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/22/13. (jam) (Entered: 11/22/2013)

11/22/2013 1482 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1478 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 11/22/2013)

11/25/2013 1483 Letter dated 11/25/13 to the Court from Robert J. Powell re: Motion to Withidraw as counsel filed by Ms. Sebelin. (jam) (Entered: 11/25/2013)

11/26/2013 1484 Letter dated 11/4/13 to the Court from Mark Ciavarella, Jr. re: not being served with Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (jam) (Entered: 11/26/2013)

11/26/2013 1485 Letter from Rebecca S. Melley in response to letter dated 11/4/13 to the Court from Mark Ciavarella. (Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 11/26/2013)

11/27/2013

1486

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1470 First MOTION for Settlement Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Parties filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit(s) Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit(s) Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit(s) Exhibit D)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013

1487

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the MOTION for Order Appoving the Litigation Class Notice Plan and the Form of the Litigation Class Notice (Doc. 1465) is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending resolution of the outstanding motions for summary judgment and/or default judgment against Defendants Ciavarella, Conahan, Beverage Marking of Pa., Inc. and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC (Docs. 1459, 1461, 1463). Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/13. (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1488 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Robert Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC's Motion for Leave to Refile Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 1472) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/13 (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1489 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs are awarded attorney's fees and costs in the sum of $4,000.00 from Defendants Robert Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC and their Counsel. Liability under this Order shall be joint and several. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/13. (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

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11/27/2013

1490

ORDER granting 1478 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1)The Motion to Withdraw (Doc. 1478) is GRANTED, and Jane Sebelin, Esquire, is terminated as attorney of record for Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC, and Powell Law Group, P.C.(2)Within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order, Defendants Vision Holdings, LLC and Powell Law Group, P.C. shall secure representation, and new counsel shall enter an appearance of record on their behalf. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/13 (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1491 ORDER re: Motion for Preliminary Approval (Doc. 1448) CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS AND PRELIMINARILY APPROVING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT. See Order for specific details and deadlines. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/13 (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013

1492

ORDER denying 1470 Defendants Robert Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC's Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement between Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants; denying as moot 1474 Plantiffs' Motion to Strike Powell Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement between Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/27/13 (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1493 Letter dated 11/26/13 to the Court from Attorney Sol H. Weiss in response to Robert Powell's letter of 11/25/13. (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1494 Letter to the Court dated 11/26/13 from Attorney Jane S. Sebelin, responding to letters of Sol H. Weiss and Robert Powell. (jam) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1495 Letter from the Court to Robert J. Powell in response to his letter of 11/25/13. (jam) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/27/2013: # 1 Order (Doc. 1283)) (jam). (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1496 RESPONSE by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC to 1471 Brief in Support, Provider Defendants' Answer to Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Huyett, Daniel) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013 1497 REPLY BRIEF re 1470 First MOTION for Settlement Defendants' Motion to Deny Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Provider Parties filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Huyett, Daniel) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

12/04/2013 1498 Praecipe to Withdraw Motion for Sanctions against Provider Defendants' Counsel . (Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/04/2013)

12/06/2013 1499 ORDER granting 1463 Motion for Default Judgment. Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants Beverage Marking of PA, INC. and Pinnacle Group of Jupiter, LLC. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/6/13 (jam) (Entered: 12/06/2013)

12/06/2013 1500 ORDER granting 1461 Motion for Default Judgment. Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Michael T. Conahan. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/6/13 (jam) (Entered: 12/06/2013)

12/09/2013 1501 NOTICE of Appearance by Jane S. Sebelin on behalf of Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 12/09/2013)

12/10/2013 1502 Letter dated 12/9/13 to the Court from Jane Sebelin, Esq. re: continuation of representation of Powell Defts. (jam) (Entered: 12/10/2013)

12/12/2013

1503

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on November 20, 2013, before Judge Caputo. Court Reporter Diana Gilbride, Telephone number (570)498−7552. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/2/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/13/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/12/2014. (cr1, ) (Entered: 12/12/2013)

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12/17/2013 1504 NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 1503 Transcript. A copy of transcript notice was sent to Benjamin Jones, Charles Ross, Jonathan Vipond, III, Mark Ciavarella, Jr. and William Brucker. (lh) (Entered: 12/17/2013)

12/17/2013 1505 Letter to the Court dated 12/3/13 from Attorney Sol Weiss re: finalizing accounting of Mericle Settlement. (jam) (Entered: 12/17/2013)

12/18/2013 1507 Letter from Mericle Defendants Re: Mericle Settlement. (Tanchyk, Alison) (Entered: 12/18/2013)

12/23/2013 1508 Letter to the Court from Attorney Sol H. Weiss, enclosing revised proposed Order (jam) (Entered: 12/23/2013)

12/23/2013 1509 ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' request to finalize the accounting of the Mericle Settlement, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that said request is GRANTED. See Order for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/20/13. (jam) (Entered: 12/23/2013)

01/09/2014 1510 MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1459 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Impartial Tribunal Claims filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−630 Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/9/14. (jam) (Entered: 01/09/2014)

01/09/2014

1511

ORDER granting 1459 Motion for Summary Judgment : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion (Doc. 1459) is GRANTED and Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Mark A. Ciavarella on all issues of liability for which he is not protected by judicial immunity on the followings claims of the Master Complaint for Class Actions (CAC) and Master Long Form Complaint (IC) in Case Nos. 09−286, 09−291, 09−0357, and 09−630:(A)Violation of Juvenile Plaintiffs right to an impartial tribunal (CAC Count I; IC Count III).(B)Conspiracy to violate Juvenile Plaintiffs right to an impartial tribunal (CAC Count II; IC Count III).A determination of damages will be made at a later date.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/9/14 (jam) (Entered: 01/09/2014)

01/10/2014

1512

ORDER granting 1465 Motion for Approval of the Litigation Class Notice Plan and the Form of the Litigation Class Notice. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1)The Motion (Doc. 1465) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs plan for notifying the Litigation Class certified by the Courts May 14, 2013 Memorandum and Order (Docs. 1409; 1410) and their proposed form of the Litigation Class Notice is APPROVED. (2)The Litigation Class Notice shall be posted on the internet website www.kidswinsettlement.com.(3)An updated notice shall be mailed to the Litigation Class Members after the Court decides whether to grant final approval of the proposed settlement between Plaintiffs and Provider Defendants. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/10/14 (jam) (Entered: 01/10/2014)

01/17/2014 1513 NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an IN−PERSON CONFERENCE re: Trials in Individual Plaintiff cases will be held on FRIDAY, JANUARY 31, 2014 at 10:00 A.M., Bankruptcy Conference Room, Max Rosenn U.S. Courthouse, Wilkes−Barre, Pennsylvania. (jam) (Entered: 01/17/2014)

01/23/2014 1514 First MOTION Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filing and Compel Acceptance of Proof of Claims O/B/O Represented Plaintiffs by All Plaintiffs, 09−286. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Service, # 3 Certificate of Concurrence)(Albert, James) (Entered: 01/23/2014)

01/23/2014 1515 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1514 First MOTION Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filing and Compel Acceptance of Proof of Claims O/B/O Represented Plaintiffs filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286.(Albert, James) (Entered: 01/23/2014)

02/20/2014 1517 Letter to the Court dated 2/14/14 from Attorney Sebelin, advising on behalf of her client, desire to proceed with jury trial. (jam) (Entered: 02/20/2014)

03/06/2014

1518

ORDER granting 1514 Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filing and Compel Acceptance of Proof of Claims on Behalf of Represented Plaintiffs Submitted by Counsel. The claims committee is instructed to accept and process claims forms submitted by Cefalo & Associates soely for the purpose of participation in the Provider Defendant settlement funds. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on

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3/6/14 (jam) (Entered: 03/06/2014)

03/13/2014

1519

MOTION for Consideration Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filings and Compel Acceptance of Proof of Claims on Behalf of Represented Plaintiffs Submitted by Counsel by All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit A − Emails to the Claims Committee, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 03/13/2014)

03/13/2014

1520

BRIEF IN SUPPORT Brief in Support of Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order of Court re 1519 MOTION for Consideration Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filings and Compel Acceptance of Proof of Claims on Behalf of Represented Plaintiffs Submitted by Counsel filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291.(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 03/13/2014)

03/13/2014 1521 CERTIFICATE of Service by All Plaintiffs, 09−291 re 1520 Brief in Support, 1519 MOTION for Consideration Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filings and Compel Acceptance of Proof of Claims on Behalf of Represented Plaintiffs Submitted by Counsel . (Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 03/13/2014)

04/14/2014

1522

ORDER granting 1519 Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filing and Compel Acceptance of Proof of Claims on Behalf of Represented Plaintiffs Submitted by Counsel. The claims committee is instructed to accept and process claims forms submitted by the Duller Law Firm solely for the purpose of participation in the Provider Defendant settlement funds. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/14/14 (jam) (Entered: 04/14/2014)

04/25/2014 1523 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of the Motion for Final Approval of the Master Settlement Agreement by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/25/2014)

04/25/2014 1524 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Award of Fees and Costs by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/25/2014)

04/28/2014 1525 ORDER granting 1524 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Award of Fees and Costs not to exceed 30 pages or 10,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/28/14 (jam) (Entered: 04/28/2014)

04/28/2014 1526 ORDER granting 1523 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of the Motion for Final Approval, not to exceed 60 pages or 15,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/28/14 (jam) (Entered: 04/28/2014)

05/30/2014 1527 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

05/30/2014

1528

BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification re 1527 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J, # 11 Exhibit(s) K, # 12 Exhibit(s) L, # 13 Exhibit(s) M, # 14 Exhibit(s) N)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

05/30/2014 1529 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

05/30/2014

1530

BRIEF IN SUPPORT Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Awards of Attorneys' Fees and Costs re 1529 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

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05/30/2014 1531 Praecipe to Substitute Exhibit. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

06/09/2014 1532 Praecipe to Substitute . (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Amended Proposed Final Order and Judgment as to the Provider Defendants Only)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 06/09/2014)

06/10/2014

1533

COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Diana Gilbride (570)498−7552 of Final Settlement Hearing before Judge Caputo on Tuesday, June 10, 2014. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on Tuesday, June 10, 2014. By s/ Diana Gilbride (570)498−7552. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr1, ) Modified on 1/23/2015 (ga). (Entered: 06/10/2014)

06/25/2014 1535 Praecipe to Attach Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) K−N)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 06/25/2014)

06/30/2014 1537 Letter dated 6/30/14 to the Court from Attorney Sebelin re: discovery (jam) (Entered: 07/07/2014)

07/01/2014 1536 Letter from David S. Senoff, Esquire to Honorable A. Richard Caputo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Senoff, David) (Entered: 07/01/2014)

07/07/2014 1538 MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1527 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−630 Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/7/14. (jam) (Entered: 07/07/2014)

07/07/2014

1539

FINAL ORDER and JUDGMENT granting 1527 Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Class Certification; granting 1529 Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (See Order for specific details. Relates to Provider Defendants only). Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/7/14 (jam) (Entered: 07/07/2014)

08/18/2014 1540 MOTION for Relief from Judgment Motion for Rule 60 Relief Regarding Paragraph 18 of July 7, 2014 Order by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−B)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 08/18/2014)

08/21/2014 1541 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION − Withdrawal and Entry of Attorney Appearance. Attorney Frank P. Barletta terminated. Attorney James L McMonagle for Luzerne County District Attorney's Office, James L McMonagle for Luzerne County District Attorney's Office, added. (Barletta, Frank) (Entered: 08/21/2014)

08/21/2014 1542 ORDER granting 1540 Motion for Relief from Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Class Counsel is granted relief from the requirement set forth in paragraph 18 of the July 7, 2014 Order. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/21/14 (ga) (Entered: 08/21/2014)

10/03/2014

1543

MOTION Pursuant to Local Rule 7.8(b)(3) for Leave to Exceed Page Limit for Plaintiffs' Brief In Support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings to Enjoin Them from Concealing or Dissipation Assets. Submitted by counsel for Plaintiff. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) Modified on 10/6/2014 (kn). (Entered: 10/03/2014)

10/06/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: The text of DOC # 1543 edited to reflect the proper title of the Motion. (kn) (Entered: 10/06/2014)

10/06/2014

1544

ORDER granting 1543 Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings. Brief not to exceed 25 pages or 6,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/6/14 (jam) (Entered: 10/06/2014)

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10/06/2014 1545 Defendant Robert J. Powell's ANSWER to 915 Amended Complaint, of Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Joseph Rimmer, and Zane Farmer by Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell.(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 10/06/2014)

10/06/2014

1546

MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings to enjoin them from concealing or dissipating assets by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 10/06/2014)

10/06/2014

1547

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1546 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings to enjoin them from concealing or dissipating assets filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J, # 11 Exhibit(s) K, # 12 Exhibit(s) L)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 10/06/2014)

10/08/2014

1548

SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings to Enjoin Them From Concealing or Dissipating Assets (Doc. 1546) will be held on THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2014 at 10:00 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo. A conference will be held at the conclusion of the hearing to discuss the scheduling of these actions for trial. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/8/14. (jam) (Entered: 10/08/2014)

10/10/2014 1549 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Stephen S Stallings on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C. Attorney Stephen Stallings is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−3244775.. (Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1550 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen S Stallings on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C. (Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1551 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Laura E Benson on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C. Attorney Laura E. Benson is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−3244918., filed by on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C..(Benson, Laura) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1552 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Laura E. Caravello on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C. Attorney Laura Caravello is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−3244953.. (Caravello, Laura) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1553 NOTICE of Appearance by Laura E. Caravello on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C. (Caravello, Laura) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1554 NOTICE of Appearance by John M. Steidle on behalf of Powell Law Group, P.C. (Steidle, John) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1555 NOTICE of Appearance of Laura E. Benson, Esquire, filed by Powell Law Group, P.C..(Benson, Laura) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1556 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Laura E. Benson, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/10/14. (jam) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1557 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Laura E. Caravello, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/10/14. (jam) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/10/2014 1558 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Stephen S. Stallings, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/10/14. (jam) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/13/2014

1559

MOTION for Joinder by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Exhibit(s), # 11 Exhibit(s), # 12 Exhibit(s), # 13 Exhibit(s), # 14 Exhibit(s), # 15 Exhibit(s), # 16 Exhibit(s), # 17 Exhibit(s), # 18 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/13/2014)

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10/13/2014 1560 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1559 MOTION for Joinder filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/13/2014)

10/13/2014 1561 CERTIFICATE of of Non−Concurrence by Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1559 MOTION for Joinder . (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 10/13/2014)

10/14/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Attorney Laura Caravellos is active with the PA state bar. (lh) (Entered: 10/14/2014)

10/14/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Attorney Stephen Stallings and Laura Benson are both active with PA state bar. (lh) (Entered: 10/14/2014)

10/15/2014 1562 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1546 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings to enjoin them from concealing or dissipating assets filed by Powell Law Group, P.C..(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 10/15/2014)

10/15/2014

1563

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1546 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings to enjoin them from concealing or dissipating assets filed by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J, # 11 Exhibit(s) K, # 12 Exhibit(s) L, # 13 Exhibit(s) M, # 14 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 10/15/2014)

10/15/2014 1564 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC re 1563 Brief in Opposition,, (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 10/15/2014)

10/16/2014 1565 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Powell Law Group, P.C. re 1562 Brief in Opposition, (Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 10/16/2014)

10/16/2014 1566 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Jane S. Sebelin on behalf of Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC Attorney Stephen M. Sinaiko is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−3249059.. (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 10/16/2014)

10/16/2014 1567 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Stephen M. Sinaiko, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/16/14. (jam) (Entered: 10/16/2014)

10/17/2014 1569 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Jane S. Sebelin on behalf of Robert J Powell, Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC Attorney Tobias B. Jacoby is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−3251545.. (Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 10/17/2014)

10/20/2014 1570 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Tobias B. Jacoby, Esq.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/20/14. (jam) (Entered: 10/20/2014)

10/21/2014 1571 MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 1546 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/21/14 (jam) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/21/2014

1572

BRIEF IN SUPPORT − Provider Defendant's Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Defendants Robert Powell, Powell Law Group, and Vision Holdings to Enjoin Them from Concealing or Dissipating Assets. (Brief was provided to the Court by Attorney Schneider at hearing held 10/16/14)(jam) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/21/2014 1573 Letter/email correspondence to the Court from George Vermac re: freezing assets of Deft. Powell. (jam) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/21/2014 1574 ORDER denying as moot 1559 Motion for Joinder filed by Provider Defendants. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/21/14 (jam) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/21/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Tobias Jacoby is active with the NY state bar. (lh) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/22/2014 1575 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 10/16/2014, before Judge A. Richard Caputo. Court Reporter Suzanne A. Halko, Telephone number 570−237−1867. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for

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Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/12/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/24/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/20/2015. (cr2, ) (Entered: 10/22/2014)

10/24/2014

1576

NOTICE TO UNREGISTERED ECF ATTORNEYS/PRO SE PARTIES regarding the filing of 1575 Transcript. A copy of transcript notice was sent to Anthony Valenziano, Benjamin Jones, Charles Ross, Jr., Jonathan Vipond, III, Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., Michael Conahan, William Brucker on 10/24/14. (lh) (Entered: 10/24/2014)

10/27/2014

1577

SCHEDULING ORDER:A final Pretrial Conference set for 12/15/2014 at 10:00 AM in Wilkes−Barre before Honorable A. Richard Caputo. Jury Selection set for 1/12/2015 at 09:30 AM in Scranton before Honorable A. Richard Caputo. Jury Trial set for 1/12/2015 09:30 AM in Scranton before Honorable A. Richard Caputo. Motions in limine due by 12/8/2014.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/27/14. (ao) (Entered: 10/27/2014)

11/05/2014 1578 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1574 "Not at This Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 11/05/2014)

11/06/2014 1579 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen S Stallings on behalf of Robert J Powell (Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 11/06/2014)

11/07/2014

SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM emailed to Stephen S. Stallings (lg) (Entered: 11/07/2014)

11/07/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Attorney Stallings notified us that he has already been specially admitted in this case; no further admission paperwork needed. (lg) (Entered: 11/07/2014)

11/12/2014 1580 MOTION for Laura Benson to Withdraw as Attorney o/b/o Powell Law Group, P.C. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(aaa) Modified on 11/12/2014 (aaa). (Entered: 11/12/2014)

11/13/2014 1581 ORDER granting 1580 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Laura E Benson terminated as counsel for Powell Law Group, P.C. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/13/14 (jam) (Entered: 11/13/2014)

11/13/2014 1582 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Powell Law Group, P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Caravello, Laura) (Entered: 11/13/2014)

11/14/2014 1583 ORDER granting 1582 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Laura E. Caravello terminated as counsel for Powell Law Group PC.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/14/14 (jam) (Entered: 11/14/2014)

11/20/2014 1585 Letter to the Court from Attorney Weiss re: discovery issues, requesting telephone conference to address. (Attachments: # 1 Protective Order) (jam) (Entered: 11/20/2014)

11/20/2014

1586

ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the deposition transcript(s), and exhibits thereto, of Robert Powell taken in Western PA Child Care LLC, et al. v. Robert J. Powell, et al., now Civil Action Number 3:CV−14−2197 in this Court, shall be produced to the Plaintiffs in this case on or before November 25, 2014. The transcript(s) shall be subject to the Protective Order dated August 29, 2014 executed by Judge Conti in Western PA Child Care LLC, et al. V. Robert J. Powell, et al., and entered to Civil Action Number 2:CV−14−968 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania prior to the transfer of the case to this Court. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/20/14. (jam) (Entered: 11/20/2014)

11/26/2014 1588 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1581 − "Not at this Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 11/26/2014)

11/26/2014 1589 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1583 "Not at this Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 11/26/2014)

11/26/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Documents #1581 and #1583 re−sent to updated address for Mark A. Ciavarella. (ga) (Entered: 11/26/2014)

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12/08/2014 1590 MOTION in Limine to Exclude any and all evidence regarding Juvenile Plaintiffs' Underlying Adjudications, Histories and Records by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−I)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1591 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1590 MOTION in Limine to Exclude any and all evidence regarding Juvenile Plaintiffs' Underlying Adjudications, Histories and Records filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1592 MOTION in Limine to Exclude any evidence Challenging this Court's July 3, 2012 Finding of a Violation of Plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional Rights by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−C)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1593 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1592 MOTION in Limine to Exclude any evidence Challenging this Court's July 3, 2012 Finding of a Violation of Plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional Rights filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1594 MOTION in Limine to Exclude any Evidence that Plaintiffs did not Suffer any damages by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−F)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1595 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1594 MOTION in Limine to Exclude any Evidence that Plaintiffs did not Suffer any damages filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1596 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Proceedings or Results of Related Criminal Proceedings by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014

1597

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1596 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Proceedings or Results of Related Criminal Proceedings filed by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s) Laufen, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s) Salko, # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s) Flickinger, # 4 Unpublished Opinion(s) WorldCom, # 5 Unpublished Opinion(s) Air Crash)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1598 MOTION to Bifurcate or in the Alternative Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Ability to Pay by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1599 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1598 MOTION to Bifurcate or in the Alternative Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Ability to Pay filed by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s) Zabiyaka, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s) Salko)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/10/2014 1600 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1586 "Return to Sender" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

12/10/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document #1586 "Order" re−sent to Mark A. Civarella to updated address. (ga) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

12/10/2014 1601 RE−SCHEDULING NOTICE: The Pretrial Conference currently scheduled for 12/15/14 at 10:00 a.m., will now be held on Monday, December 15, 2014, at 12:00 p.m..Signed by Dawn M. Wychock, Judicial Assistant on 12/10/14. (ga) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

12/10/2014 1602 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−E)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

12/10/2014 1603 Praecipe to Substitute . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) D)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

12/10/2014 1604 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) "A" − Exhibit List)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

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12/15/2014 1605 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1512 Order on Motion for Order,, Docket No. 1512, to Provide For Mailing of Litigation Class Notice After Resolution of Powell Trial by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/15/2014)

12/15/2014 1606 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1605 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1512 Order on Motion for Order,, Docket No. 1512, to Provide For Mailing of Litigation Class Notice After Resolution of Powell Trial filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 12/15/2014)

12/16/2014 1607 MOTION to Quash by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/16/2014)

12/16/2014 1608 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1607 MOTION to Quash filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/16/2014)

12/17/2014 1609 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Powell Law Group, P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Steidle, John) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

12/17/2014 1610 CERTIFICATE of by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1607 MOTION to Quash . (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

12/17/2014

1611

ORDER granting 1605 Class Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the Court's Litigation Class Approval Order (Docket No. 1512) to Provide For Mailing of Litigation Class Notice After the Resolution of the Powell Trial. ORDERED that paragrpah 3 of the Order docketed 1/10/14 (Doc. 1512) is AMENDED as follows: (3) An updated notice shall be mailed to the Litigation Class Members after the conclusion of the trial between certain individual plaintiffs in Case No. 09−CV−0286 and the remaining defendants in this case, which is scheduled for January 2015. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/17/14 (jam) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

12/17/2014 1612 ORDER granting 1609 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney John M. Steidle terminatedas cousnel for Powell Law Group.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/17/14 (jam) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

12/22/2014 1614 STIPULATION re 1596 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Proceedings or Results of Related Criminal Proceedings by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/22/2014 1615 STIPULATION re 1598 MOTION to Bifurcate or in the Alternative Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Ability to Pay by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291. (Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/22/2014 1616 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1594 MOTION in Limine to Exclude any Evidence that Plaintiffs did not Suffer any damages filed by Robert J. Powell.(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/23/2014 1617 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Powell Law Group by Vision Holdings, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sebelin, Jane) (Entered: 12/23/2014)

12/23/2014 1618 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Robert J. Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sebelin, Joseph) (Entered: 12/23/2014)

12/23/2014 1619 STIPULATION AND ORDER re: Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Proceedings or Results of Related Criminal Proceedings. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/23/14. (jam) (Entered: 12/23/2014)

12/23/2014 1620 STIPULATION AND ORDER re: MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate or in the Alternative Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Ability to Pay, Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/23/14. (jam) (Entered: 12/23/2014)

12/23/2014 1621 ORDER granting 1617 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants Robert J. Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC. Attorney Jane S. Sebelin terminated. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/23/14 (jam) (Entered: 12/23/2014)

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12/23/2014 1622 Letter from David S. Senoff, Esquire . (Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/23/2014)

12/29/2014 1623 Mail Returned (Doc #1601) as Undeliverable. Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ao) (Entered: 12/30/2014)

12/30/2014

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Doc #1061 remailed to Ciavarella at new address. (ao) (Entered: 12/30/2014)

12/30/2014 1624 ORDER granting 1618 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Joseph V. Sebelin, Jr terminated.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/30/14 (jam) (Entered: 12/30/2014)

12/30/2014 1625 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1607 MOTION to Quash filed by Robert J. Powell.(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 12/30/2014)

01/05/2015 1626 REPLY BRIEF re 1607 MOTION to Quash filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/05/2015 1627 MOTION to Quash by Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Proposed Order)(kc) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/05/2015 1628 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1627 MOTION to Quash filed by Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts.(kc) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/05/2015

1629

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the LOCATION of the JURY SELECTION and TRIAL in this case has been CHANGED. Jury Selection/Trial set for 1/12/2015 09:30AM before Honorable A. Richard Caputo at the Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, 197 South Main Street, Wilkes−Barre−Pennsylvania. (jam) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/05/2015

1630

SCHEDULING ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence that Plaintiffs Did Not Suffer Damages (Doc. 1594) and Defendant Robert Powells brief in opposition thereto (Doc. 1616), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that oral argument will be held at the conclusion of jury selection on January 12, 2015 on the issue of damages, namely, whether presumed damages are recoverable in this litigation or whether Plaintiffs are limited to recovering only nominal and punitive damages. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/5/15. (jam) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/05/2015

1631

SCHEDULING ORDER: Jury Selection/Trial set for 1/12/2015 09:30 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo. Cameras of any kind are PROHIBITED in the courtroom. Photographs and video and audio recordings are PROHIBITED in the courthouse. See Order for additional, specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/5/15. (jam) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/06/2015 1632 MOTION to Change Venue by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

01/06/2015 1633 MOTION to Seal by Robert J. Powell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

01/06/2015

1634

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying re 1607 MOTION to Quash. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Quash Defendant Robert Powells Subpoenas Directed to Gregory Zappala, William Brucker, and Patrick Owens (Doc. 1607) is DENIED. Zappala and Brucker shall submit documentation relating to the spring 2009 meeting for in camera review on or before January 12, 2015.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/6/15. (jam) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

01/06/2015

1635

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion in Limine to Exclude Juvenile Plaintiffs Underlying Adjudications, Histories, and Records (Doc. 1590) and the Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence Challenging this Courts July 3, 2012 Finding of a Violation of Plaintiffs Federal Constitutional Rights (Doc. 1592) are DENIED without prejudice as moot. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/6/15 (jam) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

01/06/2015 1636 SEALED MOTION by deft Powell to file documents under seal (Attachments: # 1 Justification Statement, # 2 Proposed Order) (kc) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

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01/06/2015 1637 SEALED MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF DEFT POWELL in Support of His Motion to Change Venue for Trial. C. of S. (Attachments: # 1 ATTACHMENT A) (kc) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

01/06/2015 1638 SEALED EXHIBIT 1 − of deft Powell in support of Memorandum of Law (Attachments: # 1 Part1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 1 − part 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 1 − part 2, # 4 Exhibit(s) 1 − part 2) (kc) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

01/06/2015 1639 SEALED EXHIBIT 2 of deft Powell in Support of his Memorandum of Law to Change Venue (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 2 − part 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2 − part 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 2 − part 3) (kc) (Entered: 01/06/2015)

01/07/2015 1640 ORDER denying 1632 Motion to Change Venue for Trial, without prejudice to Defendant Robert J. Powell renewing his request for a change of venue during or following individual voir dire of the prospective jurors. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/7/15 (jam) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/07/2015 1641 MOTION to Amend/Correct Reply Brief by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Nonconcurrence)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/07/2015 1642 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1641 MOTION to Amend/Correct Reply Brief filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/07/2015 1644 Letter from David S. Senoff, Esquire . (Senoff, David) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/07/2015 1645 ORDER granting 1633 Motion to Seal Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/7/15 (jam) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/08/2015 1647 Praecipe to Substitute Exhibit "A" in Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/08/2015 1648 EXHIBIT by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1641 MOTION to Amend/Correct Reply Brief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/08/2015 1649 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1611 "Return to Sender − Not At This Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/12/2015

1651

COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by K. Yeager of Conference Re: Settlement before Judge Caputo on 1/12/15. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on 1/12/15. By s/ K. Yeager. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr) (Entered: 01/12/2015)

01/13/2015 1653 ORDER granting 1641 Motion for Leave to Amend Reply Brief. Gregory Zappala, William Brucker, and Patrick Owens may amend their reply brief in the form as submitted as Exhibit 2 to the Motion. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/13/15 (jam) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/13/2015 1654 ORDER denying as moot 1627 Motion to Quash Subpoena and for a Protective Order Filed on Behalf of the Honorable David W. Lupas.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/13/15 (jam) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/13/2015 1655 ORDER denying without prejudice as moot 1594 Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence that Plaintiffs Did Not Suffer Damages.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 1/13/15 (jam) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/13/2015 1656 REPLY BRIEF re 1607 MOTION to Quash Amended filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/13/2015 1657 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Rachel M. Keene terminated on behalf of Brian Gyle. (Keene, Rachel) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/13/2015 1658 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Shannon D. Farmer terminated on behalf of Brian Gyle. (Farmer, Shannon) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

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01/20/2015 1659 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc.# 1624 "Return to Sender − Not at this Address" Mail sent to Mark A.Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 01/20/2015)

01/23/2015 1660 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1629 − Return to Sender − Not at this Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 01/23/2015)

01/23/2015 1661 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. # 1635 − Return to Sender − Not at this Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 01/23/2015)

01/23/2015 1662 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1634 − Return to Sender − Not at this Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 01/23/2015)

01/23/2015 1663 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1631 − Return to Sender − Not at this Address" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 01/23/2015)

01/28/2015 1664 Mail Returned re: 1653 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, not delivered to Mark A. Ciavarella. (bg) (Entered: 01/28/2015)

01/28/2015 1665 Mail Returned re: 1655 Order on Motion in Limine, not delivered to Mark A. Ciavarella. (bg) (Entered: 01/28/2015)

01/28/2015 1666 Mail Returned re: 1640 Order on Motion to Change Venue, not delivered to Mark A. Ciavarella. (bg) (Entered: 01/28/2015)

01/28/2015 1667 Mail Returned re: 1645 Order on Motion to Seal, not delivered to Mark A. Ciavarella. (bg) (Entered: 01/28/2015)

02/20/2015 1668 Letter from Lauren C. Fantini, Esquire . (Fantini, Lauren) (Entered: 02/20/2015)

02/26/2015 1669 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1654 "Return to Sender" Mail sent to Mark A. Ciavarella (ga) (Entered: 02/26/2015)

02/27/2015 1670 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen M Sinaiko on behalf of Robert J Powell, Vision Holdings, LLC (Sinaiko, Stephen) (Entered: 02/27/2015)

02/27/2015 1671 Letter from Stephen M. Sinaiko . (Sinaiko, Stephen) (Entered: 02/27/2015)

03/02/2015

SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM emailed to Stephen Sinaiko (lg) (Entered: 03/02/2015)

03/02/2015

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Attorney Stephen Sinaiko previously admitted in this case; no further paperwork necessary. (lg) (Entered: 03/02/2015)

03/02/2015 1672 ORDER : Motion for preliminary approval to be filed on or before 3/6/15. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/2/15. (jam) (Entered: 03/02/2015)

03/06/2015 1673 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for the Brief in Support of the Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/06/2015)

03/06/2015 1674 ORDER granting 1673 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of the Motion for Preliminary Approval not to exceed 50 pages or 12,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/6/15 (jam) (Entered: 03/06/2015)

03/10/2015 1676 MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1−2)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/10/2015)

03/10/2015 1677 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1676 MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/10/2015)

03/23/2015 1678 Letter from David S. Senoff . (Senoff, David) (Entered: 03/23/2015)

03/24/2015

1679

***WITHDRAWN. SEE ORDER DATED JULY 24, 2015 (Doc. 1695)***BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1676 MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s),

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# 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Exhibit(s), # 11 Exhibit(s), # 12 Exhibit(s), # 13 Exhibit(s), # 14 Exhibit(s), # 15 Exhibit(s), # 16 Exhibit(s), # 17 Exhibit(s), # 18 Exhibit(s), # 19 Exhibit(s), # 20 Exhibit(s), # 21 Exhibit(s), # 22 Exhibit(s), # 23 Exhibit(s), # 24 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) Modified on 7/24/2015 (jam). (Entered: 03/24/2015)

03/24/2015

1680

***WITHDRAWN. SEE ORDER DATED JULY 24, 2015 (Doc. 1695)*** MOTION To Enforce Settlement Agreement or to Suspend Obligations and to Indemnify by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Nonconcurrence, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) Modified on 7/24/2015 (jam). (Entered: 03/24/2015)

03/24/2015

1681

BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1680 MOTION To Enforce Settlement Agreement or to Suspend Obligations and to Indemnify filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Word Count, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Exhibit(s), # 11 Exhibit(s), # 12 Exhibit(s), # 13 Exhibit(s), # 14 Exhibit(s), # 15 Exhibit(s), # 16 Exhibit(s), # 17 Exhibit(s), # 18 Exhibit(s), # 19 Exhibit(s), # 20 Exhibit(s), # 21 Exhibit(s), # 22 Exhibit(s), # 23 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/24/2015)

03/24/2015 1682 AMENDED DOCUMENT by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. Amendment to 1681 Brief in Support,, to add tables of content and authorities. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Word Count)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/24/2015)

03/25/2015 1683 CERTIFICATE of by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1682 Amended Document, Service to Coorect Date. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/25/2015 1684 CERTIFICATE of by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1680 MOTION To Enforce Settlement Agreement or to Suspend Obligations and to Indemnify to correct date. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/25/2015 1685 CERTIFICATE of by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC re 1679 Brief in Opposition,, to correct date. (Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/26/2015 1686 NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a CONFERENCE CALL has been scheduled for THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 2015 at 10:00 AM. Plaintiff's counsel shall be responsible for initiating the call. (jam) (Entered: 03/26/2015)

03/30/2015

DOCKET ANNOTATION: As counsel and parties in this action are many, counsel are urged to verify that their contact information on the docket and in ECF is up to date and that all co−counsel listed are still active in the case and that *their* contact information is correct on the docket; Please file the appropriate withdrawals of counsel and/or substitutions of counsel for those no longer associated with the case, or have contact information corrected. Thank you.For toll−free ECF telephone support, you may call the divisional office nearest to you during regular business hours:Scranton: 866−263−8479 Harrisburg: 866−333−3261 Williamsport: 866−736−3914 (ep) (Entered: 03/30/2015)

04/02/2015

1688

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiffs shall file an omnibus brief, not to exceed 20 pages, responding to Provider Defendants' submissions on or before 4/24/15. (2) Powell Defendants may file an omnibus brief, not to exceed 20 pages, responding to Provider Defendants submissions on or before 4/24/15. (3) provider Defendants may file reply briefs, not exceeding 20 pages, responding to Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants' submissions on or before 5/18/15. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/2/15. (jam) (Entered: 04/02/2015)

04/24/2015

1689

***WITHDRAWN. SEE ORDER DATED JULY 24, 2015 (Dco. 1695)***BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1680 MOTION To Enforce Settlement Agreement or to Suspend Obligations and to Indemnify and Memorandum of Law in Response to Provider Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Powell Settlement filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs,

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09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−D, # 2 Exhibit(s) E−G)(Senoff, David) Modified on 7/24/2015 (jam). (Entered: 04/24/2015)

04/28/2015 1690 Letter dated 4/22/15 to the Court from Kia Thomas re: lack of son's participation in settlement. (jam) (Entered: 04/28/2015)

05/18/2015

1691

REPLY BRIEF re 1680 MOTION To Enforce Settlement Agreement or to Suspend Obligations and to Indemnify filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 certificate of page count, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Exhibit(s), # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Exhibit(s), # 10 Exhibit(s))(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 05/18/2015)

05/28/2015

1692

SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing will be held on Provider Defendants' Objection to the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Doc. 1679) and Provider Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement, or, in the Alternative, to Suspend Obligations (Doc. 1680) on MONDAY, JULY 13, 2015 at 10:30 AM, Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/28/15. (jam) (Entered: 05/28/2015)

06/05/2015 1693 MOTION to Continue July 13, 2015 Hearing by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 06/05/2015)

06/08/2015

1694

RE−SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing previously scheduled for July 13, 2015, is postponed until Tuesday, July 21, 2015 at 10:30 a.m., at the Max Rosenn United States Courthouse, 197 S. Main Street, Wilkes−Barre, PA.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/8/15. (ga) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

07/20/2015 1695 MOTION for Leave to File by Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/20/2015)

07/20/2015 1696 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1695 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC.(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 07/20/2015)

07/24/2015 1697 NOTICE by Powell Law Group, P.C. , Robert J. Powell, and Vision Holdings LLC of No Objection to Provider Defendants' Motion for Leave to Provide Notice (Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 07/24/2015)

07/24/2015

1698

SCHEDULING ORDER: ORDER granting Motion for Leave to Provide Notice Pursuant to 28 USC:1715 To Appropriate Federal or State Officials of the Master Settlement Agreement Among the Provider Defendants and Class Members, etc. (See Order for specific details). FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will hold a hearing into the appropriate federal and state officials objections to the Provider Defendants' MSA, if any, on DECEMBER 16, 2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom Number 3, Max Rosenn Federal Courthouse, Wilkes−Barre, PA. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/24/15. (jam) (Entered: 07/24/2015)

08/10/2015

1699

ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDING NOTICE and SCHEDULING ORDER: Upon consideration of the Motion for Preliminary Approval (Doc. 175) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Court preliminiarily aproves the Agreement and proposed Settlement set forth therein. Final Approval Hearing set for 12/16/2015 10:00 AM in Wilkes−Barre − Courtroom 3 before Honorable A. Richard Caputo. See Order for additional details, dates and information.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/10/15. (jam) (Entered: 08/10/2015)

09/16/2015 1700 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Lourdes M. Rosado terminated on behalf of H.T. Plaintiffs 09−357. (Rosado, Lourdes) (Entered: 09/16/2015)

10/13/2015 1701 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of the Motion for Final Approval of the Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Fantini, Lauren) (Entered: 10/13/2015)

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10/13/2015 1702 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Fees and Costs by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Fantini, Lauren) (Entered: 10/13/2015)

10/14/2015 1703 ORDER granting 1702 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of Motion for Award of Fees and Costs not to exceed 30 pages or 10,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/14/15 (jam) (Entered: 10/14/2015)

10/14/2015 1704 ORDER granting 1701 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs may file a Brief in Support of Motion for Final Approval not to exceed 60 pages or 15,000 words. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/14/15 (jam) (Entered: 10/14/2015)

11/25/2015 1705 MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/25/2015)

11/25/2015

1706

BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Plaintiffs Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Settlement re 1705 MOTION for Settlement and Class Certification filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−J, # 2 Exhibit(s) K−M)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/25/2015)

11/25/2015 1707 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/25/2015)

11/25/2015 1708 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1707 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−E, # 2 Exhibit(s) F−I)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 11/25/2015)

12/15/2015 1709 Unopposed MOTION Leave to Finalize Settlement Between Plaintiffs and the Provider Defendants by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/15/2015)

12/16/2015 1711 Proposed Order by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Provider Defendants). (Cook, Todd) (Entered: 12/16/2015)

12/17/2015

1712

COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by K. Yeager of Hearing on approval of settlement before Judge Caputo on 12/16/15. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Caputo on 12/16/15. By s/ K. Yeager. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/17/2015 1713 Proposed Order by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. . (Senoff, David) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/17/2015 1714 ORDER granting final approval of the Provider Defendants settlement and dismissal of all claims against the Provider Defendants. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/17/15. (jam) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/21/2015

1715

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1676 MOTION for Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−630, 1707 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/21/15. (jam) (Entered: 12/21/2015)

12/21/2015 1716 ORDER granting 1676 Motion for Settlement; granting 1705 Motion for Settlement; granting 1707 Motion for Attorney Fees. See ORder for specific details. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/21/15 (jam) (Entered: 12/21/2015)

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12/21/2015 1717 ORDER granting 1709 MOTION for Leave to Finalize Settlement Between Plaintiffs and the Provider Defendants. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/21/15 (jam) (Entered: 12/21/2015)

12/23/2015 1718 REVISED FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT. See Order for specific details.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/22/15. (jam) (Entered: 12/23/2015)

02/04/2016 1719 MOTION for Consideration Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filing of Proof of Claim on Behalf of Represented Plaintiff and Class Member Maurisa Dunbar by Maurisa Dunbar. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 02/04/2016)

02/04/2016

1720

Amended MOTION for Consideration AMENDED PETITION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF TO CONFIRM TIMELY FILING OF PROOF OF CLAIM ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBER MAURISA DUNBAR by Maurisa Dunbar. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF CONCURRENCE, # 2 Proposed Order)(Dyller, Barry) (Entered: 02/04/2016)

02/05/2016 1721 ORDER granting 1720 Amended Petition for Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filing of Proof of Claim on Behalf of Represented Plaintiff and Class Member Maurisa Dunbar.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/5/16 (jam) (Entered: 02/05/2016)

02/19/2016 1722 MOTION Confirm timely filed Proof of Claim forms as properly completed on behalf of named Plaintiffs, process those claims, and pay the appropriate settlement funds pursuant to the criteria. by Deborah May, Dana Shumway, D.S. a minor by Kipp Sebo. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 1)(Albert, James) (Entered: 02/19/2016)

02/24/2016 1723 MOTION Rule 60 Relief to Confirm Timely Filed Proof of Claim Forms by E. E., J. W..(Albert, James) (Entered: 02/24/2016)

02/25/2016

1724

ORDER granting 1722 Motion to Confirm Timely Filing of Proof of Claim forms. The Claims Committee is instructed to accept, process and pay based upon forms submitted by Deborah May, Dustin Sebo and Dana Shumway for the purpose of participation in settlement funds. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/25/16 (jam) (Entered: 02/25/2016)

02/25/2016

1725

ORDER granting 1723 Motion to Confirm Timely Filing of Proof of Claim form. The Claims Committee is instructed to accept, process and pay based upon Proof of Claim forms submitted by Ellenita Evans and Jahmel Wadley for participation in settlement funds. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 2/25/16 (jam) (Entered: 02/25/2016)

04/25/2016 1726 *** WITHDRAWN *** See (Doc. 1729). MOTION to Enforce Settlement and For Sanctions by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A−E)(Senoff, David) Modified on 4/29/2016 (jam). (Entered: 04/25/2016)

04/27/2016 1727 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1726 MOTION to Enforce Settlement and For Sanctions filed by Robert J Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, Inc., Vision Holdings, LLC.(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 04/27/2016)

04/28/2016 1729 Praecipe to Withdraw Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Sanctions . (Senoff, David) (Entered: 04/28/2016)

06/01/2016 1730 REQUEST for Status Conference by Angela Rimmer Belanger, Kelly Farmer, Zane Farmer, Joseph Rimmer. (Levin, Daniel) (Entered: 06/01/2016)

06/02/2016 1731 RESPONSE by Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, Western PA Child Care, LLC to 1730 Request for Status conference. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Schneider, Bernard) (Entered: 06/02/2016)

06/14/2016 1732 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Daniel B. Huyett terminated on behalf of PA Child Care, LLC; Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp.; Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Huyett, Daniel) (Entered: 06/14/2016)

06/14/2016 1733 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Donald E. Wieand, Jr terminated on behalf of PA Child Care, LLC; Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp.;

Case: 3:09-cv-286 As of: 06/29/2018 04:37 PM EDT 340 of 341

Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Wieand, Donald) (Entered: 06/14/2016)

06/14/2016 1734 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Marianne J. Gilmartin terminated on behalf of PA Child Care, LLC; Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp.; Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Gilmartin, Marianne) (Entered: 06/14/2016)

06/14/2016 1735 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney James Schwartzman terminated on behalf of PA Child Care, LLC; Mid−Atlantic Youth Services, Corp.; Western PA Child Care, LLC. (Schwartzman, James) (Entered: 06/14/2016)

09/09/2016 1737 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Emily C. Keller terminated on behalf of H.T. Plaintiffs. (Keller, Emily) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/15/2016 1738 Letter dated 9/14/16 to the Court from Attorney Weiss re: status of distribution, proposed order enclosed re: additional expenses. (jam) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/15/2016 1739 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Class Counsel is hereby awarded costs in the amount of $32,659.18 related to the Powell Defendnats Settlement. See Order for additional, specific details and dates. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 9/15/16. (jam) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/22/2016 1740 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc, #1739, "Return to Sender" Mail sent to Benjamin R. Jones (ga) (Entered: 09/22/2016)

11/15/2016 1741 MOTION to Withdraw as Counsel for Robert J. Powell and Vision Holdings, LLC filed by Tobias B. Jacoby, Esq., Stephen M. Sinaiko, Esq. and Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel, LLP.(jam) (Entered: 11/16/2016)

11/16/2016 1742 ORDER granting 1741 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Tobias B Jacoby, Esq., Stephen M Sinaiko, Esq. and Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP terminated. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/16/16 (jam) (Entered: 11/16/2016)

11/23/2016 1743 Mail Returned (Doc #1742) as Undeliverable. Mail sent to Benjamin R. Jones (ao) (Entered: 11/23/2016)

04/28/2017 1744 MOTION to Enforce Settlement and For Sanctions against the Powell Defendants (Revised and Redacted) by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A−N)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 04/28/2017)

04/28/2017 1745 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1744 MOTION to Enforce Settlement and For Sanctions against the Powell Defendants (Revised and Redacted) filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 04/28/2017)

05/12/2017

1746

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1744 MOTION to Enforce Settlement and For Sanctions against the Powell Defendants (Revised and Redacted) filed by Robert J. Powell, Powell Law Group, P.C., Vision Holdings, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A − Article, # 2 Exhibit(s) B − Article, # 3 Exhibit(s) C − Article, # 4 Exhibit(s) D − Article, # 5 Exhibit(s) E − Article, # 6 Exhibit(s) F − Article)(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 05/12/2017)

05/23/2017 1747 REPLY BRIEF re 1744 MOTION to Enforce Settlement and For Sanctions against the Powell Defendants (Revised and Redacted) filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−K)(Weiss, Sol) (Entered: 05/23/2017)

08/15/2017 1748 MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/15/17. (ga) (ga). (Entered: 08/15/2017)

08/15/2017

1749

ORDER (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs' Revised and Redacted Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Sanctions Against the Powell Defendants (Doc. 1744) is DENIED without prejudice.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/15/17. (ga) (Entered: 08/15/2017)

08/23/2017 1750 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1749 'Return to Sender" Mail sent to Benjamin R. Jones (ga) (Entered: 08/23/2017)

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08/28/2017 1751 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. 1749 "Not At This Address" Mail sent to Michael T. Conahan (ga) (Entered: 08/28/2017)

09/29/2017 1752 MOTION to Interpret the Powell Defendants Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/29/2017)

09/29/2017 1753 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 1752 MOTION to Interpret the Powell Defendants Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−J)(Senoff, David) (Entered: 09/29/2017)

10/13/2017 1754 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 1752 MOTION to Interpret the Powell Defendants Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement filed by Robert J. Powell.(Stallings, Stephen) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/19/2017 1755 REPLY BRIEF re 1752 MOTION to Interpret the Powell Defendants Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement filed by All Plaintiffs, 09−286, All Plaintiffs, 09−291, All Plaintiffs, 09−357, All Plaintiffs, 09−630.(Senoff, David) (Entered: 10/19/2017)

12/07/2017 1756 MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1752 MOTION to Interpret Powell Defendants' Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/7/17. (dw) (Entered: 12/07/2017)

12/07/2017

1757

ORDER (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry). Plaintiffs Motion to Interpret Powell Defendants Master Stipulation and Agreementof Settlement (Doc. 1752) is GRANTED in part and the Net Worth Professionalsevaluation of Robert Powells net worth shall be completed and disclosed to Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants on or before February 6, 2018. IT IS FURTHERORDERED that both Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants shall provide a copy of thisOrder to the Net Worth Professional. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/7/17. (dw) (Entered: 12/07/2017)

03/09/2018

DOCKET ANNOTATION: document 1758 deleted and to be re−filed (cl) (Entered: 03/09/2018)

03/09/2018 1759 DOCUMENT(S) SEALED −Motion to Interpret and Enforce the Powell Defendants' Master Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement− (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support, # 2 Confidential Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Proposed Order) (cl) Modified on 3/14/2018 (dw). (Entered: 03/09/2018)

04/17/2018 1762 ORDER Granting 1761 Document Sealed. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/17/2018. (bg) (Entered: 04/17/2018)

04/26/2018 1766 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1762 Mail sent to Benjamin R. Jones (ga) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

04/26/2018 1767 ORDER Granting 1764 Motion to Seal 1765 Sealed Document.Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 4/26/2018. (bg) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

05/11/2018 1768 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. #1767, "Return to Sender" Mail sent to Benjamin R. Jones (ga) (Entered: 05/11/2018)

06/06/2018

DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document 1769 (Memorandum) was deleted − filed in error. (bg) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/06/2018 1770 ORDER − Memorandum (Doc. 1769) previously filed. Please see Order for deadlines. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/6/2018. (bg) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/18/2018 1771 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Doc. 1770 "Inmate No Longer at this facility" Mail sent to Mark A Ciavarella, Jr. (ga) (Entered: 06/18/2018)