Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-LRA Document 1 Filed 07/11/06 Page 1 of 19

,...

F J L EOO"'ISSISS!PP/

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JUL 11 2006

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIP lv -7J.T:r'NG'o~a'W''N.rc,;'<Ee""•_j

JACKSON DIVISION

TANYA BRITTON, JOSEPH CARSON, )

MARILYN CARROLL, CARMEN

)

VASQUEZ and PRO-LIFE

)

MISSISSIPPI,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SHIRLENE ANDERSON, individually )

and in her official capacity as Chief of

)

Police for the City of Jackson, Mississippi; )

ROSEMARY HARPER, individually and )

in her official capacity as a police officer )

for the City ofJackson, Mississippi, and )

JERRY BRISTER, individually and

)

in his official capacity as a police officer )

for the City of Jackson, Mississippi,

)

)

Defendants.

)

COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND DAMAGES

INTRODUCTION

I

This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that

challenges the policies, customs, and/or practices of the City ofJackson whereby police

continually and systematically infringe upon the free speech rights of its citizens by

threatening arrest or citation under various city and state laws, including a Jackson noise

ordinance that was declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by

this Court in 2004, for conduct protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

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2. The unconstitutional policies, customs and/or practices of the City chill and deprive Plaintiffs of their right to free speech, as well as those of third parties not before the Court. Plaintiffs and others have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer irreparable injury to their First Amendment rights absent declaratory and injunctive relief.
3. Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that the challenged policies, customs and/or practices are unconstitutional, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and damages.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3),(4) which confer original jurisdiction on federal district courts in suits to redress the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities as stated in paragraphs I and 2 above. The court may address the declaratory relief requested pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 5. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), because the claims arose in the district.
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Tanya Britton is a citizen ofthe United States and a resident of Brandon, Mississippi. Britton is President of Pro-Life Mississippi. 7. Plaintiff Joseph Carson is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Jackson, Mississippi. 8. Plaintiff Marilyn Carroll is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Milford, Connecticut.
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9. Plaintiff Carmen Vazquez is a citizen of the United States and a resident of West Haven, Connecticut.
10. Plaintiff Pro-Life Mississippi is a non-profit corporation organized and existing under the laws and constitution of the State of Mississippi, and is a corporate entity capable of suing and being sued. Its purpose is to oppose abortion and promote human life and dignity. It has approximately 4,000 active members and supporters.
II. Defendant Shirlene Anderson is Chief of Police for the City of Jackson, Mississippi. She is sued in both her individual and official capacities.
12. Defendant Rosemary Harper is a police officer for the City of Jackson, Mississippi. She is sued in both her individual and official capacities.
13. Defendant Jerry Brister is a police officer for the City of Jackson, Mississippi who acts as the City's special events coordinator. He is sued in both her individual and official capacities.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT 14. Since 1996, Pro-Life Mississippi has held an annual rally on the public ways of Jackson at or near Jackson Women's Health Organization, 2903 N. State St. during which its members and supporters express their views on abortion, pray, and sing. As part of its ministry and peaceful pro-life advocacy, members of Pro-Life Mississippi offer literature and sidewalk counseling to persons approaching the clinic. This is done in an effort to persuade women not to abort their unborn babies by offering alternatives to abortion, including adoption, advice, and emotional support. 15. For years, dating back to well before 1996, the Jackson Police Department has harassed pro-life demonstrators and street preachers on the public ways of the City by
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threatening citation or arrest on trumped up charges such as disturbing the peace, trespass or obstructing traffic. Often, the police have actually cited or arrested demonstrators and street preachers only to have the charges dropped or dismissed before trial. On the rare occasions when these cases have actually gone to trial, the pro-life demonstrators and street preachers have usually been found not guilty.
16. In 2006, Pro-Life Mississippi intends to coordinate its annual event with a national event sponsored by Operation Save America, a national pro-life ministry. The event will occur on the public ways of Jackson during the period July 1S-21, 2006.
17. Plaintiff Tanya Britton ("Britton") is a Christian who possesses the firm belief that abortion is morally wrong and sinful. She believes it is her duty to God to publicly oppose abortion.
18. Plaintiff Joseph Carson ("Carson") is a Christian who believes it is his duty to God to openly proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ. He fulfills this duty through open-air preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ on the public ways.
Events of December 12, 2005 19. On or about December 12, 2005, Carson and another gentleman were engaged in un-amplified street preaching on the public streets of downtown Jackson when they were approached by several Jackson police officers. The officers stated that Carson and his associate were being too loud and in violation of the City's noise ordinance. The officers then said they needed a permit. 20. The officers further told Carson that without a permit he could not remain on the street comer and that, if he continued to preach without a permit, he would be arrested.
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21. The officers then said Carson had to let Officer Brister know of his plans before "you do anything, before anything goes on in the city."
22. Carson and his associate then went to the Jackson Police Department to inquire about a permit. They were referred to Defendant Officer Jerry Brister ("Brister"). Brister showed them Jackson Code of Ordinances§§ 54-86 through 54-91 (regulating noise) and told them they needed a permit.
23. Sections 54-86 through 54-91 of the Jackson Code were declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by consent judgment entered on August 4, 2004 in Baldwin v. City ofJackson, 3:04 CV 545 BN. See Consent Judgment, attached hereto as Ex. 1.
24. Notwithstanding the laws having been declared unconstitutional, Brister told Carson that the City would not issue a permit under the defunct ordinances allowing him to stand on City sidewalks and preach, but if Carson "wanted to go to a park" and talk to people that would probably be "okay".
25. Brister then said "no one has any right to create unnecessary noise." Events of February 27, 2006 26. On Monday, February 27, 2006, several pro-life demonstrators were present at the Jackson Woman's Health Organization located at 2903 North State Street in Jackson. Among those at the clinic that day was Rev. Philip "Flip" Benham of Operation Save America. 27. During the late mominglearly afternoon hours, Rev. Benham and others were on the sidewalk on State street holding pro-life signs. Rev. Benham was also engaged in publicly proclaiming the gospel of Jesus Christ to a small group of individuals
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gathered on the other side of the street in opposition to the pro-life demonstrators. 28. The police were summoned, and soon three police officers arrived, one
young man and two women, one of whom was Defendant Rosemary Harper. 29. The officers threatened Rev. Benham with arrest, telling him he was
"disturbing the peace" by his preaching. Rev. Benham attempted to explain to the officers that he was merely exercising his First Amendment rights to express himself and exercise his religion.
30. Harriet Ashley, another pro-life demonstrator who had been some distance away when the dispute first arose, came over to join in the conversation and try to assist. When Officer Harper learned that Mrs. Ashley sided with Rev. Benham, Harper threatened her with arrest, too.
31. The officers then summoned a superior officer, upon information and belief, Sergeant Otis.
32. When the superior officer arrived and was told by Officer Harper that Rev. Benham was disturbing the police, the superior officer immediately told the officers to arrest them all, without any other question, comment or discussion, and without hearing from the pro-life demonstrators at all.
33. In fact, Sgt. Otis approached Rev. Benham and told him to "keep his mouth shut" and that "anyone who opened their mouth would be arrested" for disorderly conduct. Rev. Benham and the others reluctantly obeyed, and Otis left shortly thereafter.
34. Rev. Benham then ceased preaching in order to avoid arrest. A short time later, Rev. Benham crossed the street in an effort to speak to the small group without having to raise his voice. Officer Harper and another officer rushed over, grabbed Rev.
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Benham and escorted him back to the near side of the street, telling him he was "trespassing" on the sidewalk and again threatening to arrest him.
35. At the same time Rev. Benham was on the State Street side of the clinic, Tanya Britton was located on the Fondren Street side, handing out literature and sidewalk counseling (speaking to women and others approaching the clinic to enter).
36. Officer Harper told Britton that her unwelcome expressive activities constituted "disturbing the peace." When Britton asked for the basis of Harper's charge, Harper replied, "Because I said so."
37. Harper then told Britton she would be arrested if she did not cease sidewalk counseling, notwithstanding that Britton had engaged in the same type of sidewalk counseling in Jackson for several years without incident.
38. Shortly thereafter, a supervising officer arrived on the scene and said, "Arrest them. Arrest them all." Harper then said to Britton, "!am going to get you today." When Britton asked what Harper would be "getting" her for, Harper replied,"! am going to get you for something."
39. Britton then continued to counsel women and distribute literature despite Harper's threat of arrest.
40. Periodically throughout the time pro-life demonstrators were present at the clinic that day, Officer Harper would pull out her handcuffs, jingling them while staring at the pro-life demonstrators. At one point she told Britton, "I am going to get you today."
41. A few minutes later, as Britton was speaking with two individuals in a car after they had voluntarily stopped to listen, Harper and one other officer approached and
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stood behind Britton. 42. When the car pulled away, Harper grabbed Britton's arm, violently jerked
it behind her and said, "I've got you now, you bitch." 43. Harper then placed Britton in handcuffs, charging her with obstructing
traffic. When Britton informed Harper that the handcuffs were too tight, Harper replied, "you haven't got hurt yet." Harper then forced Britton to sit in the back ofthe unventilated police cruiser. While in the cruiser, Britton's wrists became numb and her shoulder began to spasm.
44. Harper then drove Britton to an intake center. While en route, Harper told Britton that she knew her family and that Britton "should be ashamed" of herself for being outside the clinic engaging in pro-life activity.
45. At the intake center, Britton was shackled and placed her in a windowless room for a long period of time. Britton was then taken to Raymond Detention Center in Raymond, Mississippi.
46. Britton was not released until approximately 9:00 p.m. that night. Britton sustained several injuries and bruises as a result of Harper's abusive treatment, and missed work the rest of the week due to the injuries inflicted by Harper.
47. Despite repeated efforts by Britton's attorneys urging the City to drop the charges against her and to address the lawless behavior ofthe Jackson Police Department against pro-life demonstrators, Britton's case was called for trial on June 19, 2006.
48. In preparation for her defense, Britton had five subpoenas issued. On the day of her trial, Britton, her attorneys, and the five witnesses in her defense dutifully reported to court and waited for their case to be called.
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49. After waiting the entire afternoon, and patiently listening as case after case was called and dispensed with, Britton was finally summoned by the prosecuting attorney. By then the formerly crowded courtroom was virtually empty, as it was now after 5:00p.m.
50. The prosecuting attorney moved for a continuance, stating that the arresting officer, Harper, was not available and that he did not even have the case file.
51. When Britton's counsel objected, the court dismissed the charges over the objection of the prosecution.
Events of May 26, 2006 52. On the evening of May 26,2006, Carson and others went to a sidewalk on the public ways ofJackson adjacent to a club called "The Carter" to street preach and display gospel signs. Because the area was noisy, Carson used a small sound amplifier. 53. Upon arriving, Carson and his associates were approached by unknown persons affiliated with the club and told that the sidewalk was private property. Carson then went back home to retrieve a video camera. 54. When Carson returned a short time later, employees of the club told them that the sidewalk was private property. When Carson disagreed, the owner of the club took one of Carson's signs and violently threw it to the ground. The club owner then grabbed the Carson's video camera and took it into the club. 55. Carson then called the police. Coincidentally, apparently in response to someone else's call, another officer arrived and told Carson police had received a complaint about a loudspeaker. The officer, whose Badge No. is 1405, then told Carson he needed a permit to operate a loudspeaker.
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56. When Carson inquired which ordinance required a permit, the officer said he was ')ust following orders" and did not cite to a specific ordinance.
57. This police officer further informed Carson that he would not accept a complaint against the club owner for the taking of the video camera, and told Carson he could not press charges.
Upcoming event 58. Plaintiffs Marilyn Carroll ("Carroll") and Carmen Vazquez ("Vazquez") are Christians who possesses the firm belief that abortion is morally wrong and sinful. They believe it is their duty to God to publicly oppose abortion. In fulfillment of this duty, they often travel to different states to engage in abortion demonstration and sidewalk counseling. 59. Carroll and Vazquez intend to engage in oral advocacy and sidewalk counseling on the public ways of Jackson during the period July 15-21, 2006. However, Carroll and Vazquez have been informed about the incidents involving Britton, Carson, and Rev. Benham and they fear that they, too, may be arrested or cited if they engage in oral advocacy or sidewalk counseling in Jackson. 60. All Plaintiffs desire and intend to exercise their First Amendment rights to free speech, free association, and free assembly but are chilled and deprived in the exercise of those rights by the actions of police as set forth herein. 61. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the chill on their free speech rights, and this suit for injunction and declaratory judgment are their only means of securing complete and adequate relief. No other remedies would offer Plaintiffs substantial and complete protection from Defendants' unlawful acts,
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policies, customs, and practices. ALLEGATIONS OF LAW
62. All of the acts of Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employees, as alleged herein, were conducted under color and pretense of the ordinances, statutes, regulations, customs, practices, and usages of the City of Jackson and/or State of Mississippi.
63. Defendants' repeated use of inapplicable or stricken laws to stifle the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs constitutes policies, practices, customs, and usages sufficient to impose municipal liability.
64. The unlawful actions of police as alleged herein were taken or ratified by final policy makers for the City of Jackson, and thus constitutes policies, practices, customs, and usages sufficient to impose municipal liability.
65. The continued enforcement of the Jackson noise ordinance, §§ 54-86 through 54-91, after it was declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by this Court, constitutes an unlawful policy, practice, custom, or usage sufficient to impose municipal liability.
66. The continued enforcement of the Jackson noise ordinance, §§ 54-86 through 54-91, after it was declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by this Court, demonstrates a lack of adequate training amounting to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and constitutes a policy, practice, custom, or usage sufficient to impose municipal liability.
67. The failure of the City to provide its police with adequate training in the areas of First Amendment rights, use and identification of traditional public fora, and use
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of sound amplification amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and constitutes a policy, custom, or practice of the City of Jackson sufficient to impose municipal liability.
68. The repeated enforcement of the Jackson noise ordinance after it was declared unconstitutional and enjoined by this Court constituted contempt of court.
69. Public streets and sidewalks are traditional public fora for purposes of speech and other expressive activities protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
70. The actions taken by Defendants as alleged herein were extreme and in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs.
71. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable injury to their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the existence and threatened enforcement ofthe challenged policies, customs, and practices of the City absent declaratory and injunctive relief.
72. Third parties not before the Court are chilled in their rights to free speech by the existence of the challenged policies, customs, and/or practices as alleged herein.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech/Free Press/Free Exercise of Religion) 73. Paragraphs I through 72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 74. The City's unlawful enforcement of the stricken noise ordinance hinders and deprives Plaintiffs of their ability to effectively communicate their pro-life message. 75. The City's unlawful and unreasonable use of disturbing the peace laws hinders and deprives Plaintiffs of their ability to effectively communicate their pro-life
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message. 76.

The City's unlawful and unreasonable use of trespass and obstructing

traffic laws hinders and deprives Plaintiffs of their ability to effectively communicate

their pro-life message. 77. The actions of Defendants in hindering and depriving Plaintiffs of their

ability to effectively communicate their message are unconstitutional abridgements of

Plaintiffs' affirmative rights to freedom of speech, free press, and the free exercise of

religion secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. 78. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, policies, customs,

and practices, customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their rights

to free speech. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer,

irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants' conduct.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief against Defendants as hereinafter set

forth in the prayer for relief.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech-Illegal Retaliation)

79. Paragraphs I through 72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by

reference as though pleaded in full.

80. Defendants' harassment, arrests, and threats of arrest were directed at

Plaintiffs while Plaintiffs were engaged in constitutionally-protected speech activities.

Such threats of arrest and harassment constituted unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs'

exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Such retaliation violated Plaintiffs'

affirmative rights to freedom of speech secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments

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to the United States Constitution. 81. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions in retaliating
against Plaintiffs for the assertion and/or exercise of their constitutional rights, Plaintiffs were deprived of their rights to free speech. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants' conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendant as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Peaceable Assembly)
82. Paragraphs 1 through 72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
83. The public streets dedicated to pedestrian and vehicular traffic in Jackson are traditional public fora for speech.
84. The right to peaceably assemble includes and protects the right of Plaintiffs, as members of the body politic, to engage in peaceful advocacy in support of, or in opposition to, matters of public concern, such as the practice of abortion.
85. The harassment, arrests, and threats of arrest as set forth herein were unconstitutional abridgments of Plaintiffs' right to free assembly as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
86. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, policies, practices, and customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their rights to peaceable assembly. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendant's conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendant as
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hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief. FOUTH CAUSE OF ACTION- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (False Arrest)
87. Paragraphs 1-72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
88. The actions of Defendant Harper as alleged herein were intended to detain and confine Plaintiff Britton.
89. Plaintiff Britton was aware of the detention and confinement, and did not consent to them.
90. The detention and confinement were without probable cause. 91. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant Harper's unlawful actions, Plaintiff Britton was injured in her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from false arrest. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Britton prays for the relief set forth below.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Unreasonable Force)
92. Paragraphs I through 72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
93. Defendant Harpers' actions in physically restraining and handcuffing Plaintiff Britton were objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting her.
94. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant Harper's actions, Plaintiff Britton was injured in her constitutional rights to be free from the use of excessive force as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Britton prays for the relief set forth below. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Unreasonable Seizure)
95. Paragraphs I through 72 ofthe Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
96. Defendant Harper's actions in physically restraining, handcuffing, transporting, and placing Plaintiff Britton in detention constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
97. Defendant Harper's actions in physically restraining, handcuffing, transporting, and placing Plaintiff Britton in detention were unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.
98. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant Harper's actions, Plaintiff Britton was injured in her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Britton prays for the relief set forth below. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION- Supplemental State Claim (False Imprisonment)
99. Paragraphs I through 72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
100. Defendant Harper physically restrained, handcuffed, transported, and placed Plaintiff Britton in detention. Such restraint and detention were without Plaintiff Britton's consent and against her will.
101. Defendant Harper's actions in physically restraining, handcuffing, transporting, and placing Plaintiff Britton in detention were unlawful.
102. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Harper's intentional
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conduct, Plaintiff Britton was falsely imprisoned. Further, the actions of Defendant Harper caused Plaintiff Britton to be humiliated and embarrassed; to feel degraded and inferior; and to feel that other people would regard her with aversion or dislike.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Britton prays for the relief set forth below. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION - Supplemental State Claim (Assault)
103. Paragraphs 1-72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
103. Defendant Harper, as alleged herein, forcefully and unexpectedly grabbed Plaintiffs armed and twisted it behind her back.
104. Defendant Harper intended to forcefully grab Plaintiff Britton's wrist, and further intended to cause Plaintiff Britton fear, apprehension, and intimidation.
105. Defendant Harper's forceful grabbing of Plaintiff Britton's wrist caused Plaintiff Britton to fear an imminent unwanted and offensive contact.
106. Defendant Harper's forceful grabbing of Plaintiff Britton's wrist caused Plaintiff Britton to be fearful and apprehensive for her personal safety and bodily integrity, and caused her to feel intimidated.
107. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant Harper's imminent threat of offensive contact, Plaintiff Britton was injured.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Britton respectfully prays for the relief set forth below. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION -- Supplemental State Claim (Battery)
108. Paragraphs 1-72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
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I 09. Defendant Harper, as alleged herein, forcefully and unexpectedly grabbed Plaintiff's armed and twisted it behind her back.
110. Defendant Harper intended to forcefully grab Plaintiff Britton's wrist, and further intended to cause Plaintiff Britton fear, apprehension, and intimidation.
Ill. Defendant Harper's forceful grabbing of Plaintiff Britton's wrist constituted an unwanted and offensive contact.
112. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant Harper's offensive contact, Plaintiff Britton was injured.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Britton respectfully prays for the relief set forth below. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - Supplemental State Claim (Malicious Prosecution)
113. Paragraphs 1-72 of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
114. Plaintiff Britton was criminally prosecuted. 115. Defendant Harper caused Plaintiff Britton to be criminally prosecuted. 101. The criminal prosecution terminated in Plaintiff Britton's favor. 116. The criminal prosecution was without probable cause. I03. Plaintiff Britton suffered injury and darnag as a result of the prosecution. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Britton prays for the relief set forth below.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court: a. Assume jurisdiction over this action; b. Declare that Defendants' actions as alleged herein were unconstitutional; c. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendants from
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threatening or using the enjoined noise ordinance and/or breach of the peace and/or

disorderly conduct laws to inhibit or suppress Plaintiff's peaceful expressive activities;

d. Award Plaintiffs Carson and Britton nominal damages against all

Defendants for the violation of their civil and constitutional rights;

e. Award Plaintiff Britton compensatory damages against Defendants Harper

and City of Jackson for the violation of her civil and constitutional rights;

f. Award Plaintiff Britton compensatory damages against Defendants Harper

for the intentional torts committed against her;

g. Award Plaintiffs Carson and Britton punitive damages against Defendants

Anderson, Harper, and Brister for the violation of their civil and constitutional rights;

h. Award Plaintiff Britton punitive damages against Defendant Harper for

intentional torts committed against her;

1.

Award Plaintiffs their costs oflitigation, including reasonable attorneys'

fees and expenses, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

j. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems necessary and

proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael J. DePrimo, MS Bar # I 0813 AMERICAN FAMILY ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR LAW & POLICY P.O. Drawer 2440/100 Parkgate Drive Tupelo, MS 38803 (662) 680-3886
Attorneys for all Plaintifft
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 Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-LRA Document 24 Filed 11/22/06 Page 1 of 25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION

TANYA BRITTON, JOSEPH CARSON, )

and PRO-LIFE MISSISSIPPI, on its

)

own behalf and on behalf of its members, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. 3:06cv374 WHB-JAS

)

v.

)

)

SHIRLENE ANDERSON, individually )

and in her official capacity as Chief of

)

Police for the City of Jackson, Mississippi; )

ROSEMARY HARPER, individually and )

in her official capacity as a police officer )

for the City of Jackson, Mississippi,

)

JERRY BRISTER, individually and

)

in his official capacity as a police officer )

for the City of Jackson, Mississippi,

)

LIEUTENANT JESSIE ROBINSON, )

individually, and PIETER TEEUWISSEN, )

individually,

)

)

Defendants.

)

________________________________________________________________________

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND DAMAGES ________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

1

This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that challenges

the policies, customs, and/or practices of the City of Jackson whereby police continually

and systematically infringe upon the free speech rights of citizens by threatening arrest or

citation or by actually arresting or citing them under various city and state laws, including

a Jackson noise ordinance that was declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further

enforcement by this Court in 2004, for conduct protected by the First and Fourteenth

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Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2.

The unconstitutional policies, customs and/or practices of the City chill and

deprive Plaintiffs of their right to free speech, as well as those of third parties not before

the Court. Plaintiffs and others have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer

irreparable injury to their First Amendment rights absent declaratory and injunctive relief.

3. Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that the challenged policies, customs and/or

practices are unconstitutional, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and damages.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4.

This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343(a)(3),(4) which confer original jurisdiction on federal district courts in suits to

redress the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities as stated in paragraphs 1 and

2 above. The court may address the declaratory relief requested pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

2201 and 2202.

5. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), because the claims arose in the district.

IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Tanya Britton is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Brandon,

Mississippi. Britton is President of Pro-Life Mississippi.

7. Plaintiff Joseph Carson is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Jackson,

Mississippi.

8. Plaintiff Pro-Life Mississippi is a non-profit corporation organized and existing

under the laws and constitution of the State of Mississippi, and is a corporate entity

capable of suing and being sued. Its purpose is to oppose abortion and promote human

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life and dignity. It has approximately 4,000 active members and supporters, many of whom were involved in the activities complained of herein. 9. Defendant Shirlene Anderson is Chief of Police for the City of Jackson, Mississippi. She is sued in both her individual and official capacities. 10. Defendant Rosemary Harper is a police officer for the City of Jackson, Mississippi. She is sued in both her individual and official capacities. 11. Defendant Jerry Brister is a police officer for the City of Jackson, Mississippi who acts as the City’s special events coordinator. He is sued in both his individual and official capacities. 12. Lt. Jessie Robinson is a police officer for the City of Jackson. He is sued in his individual capacity. 13. Pieter Teeuwissen is an Assistant City Attorney for the City of Jackson. He is sued in his individual capacity.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT 14. Since 1996, Pro-Life Mississippi has held an annual rally on the public ways of Jackson at or near Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 2903 N. State St. during which its members and supporters express their views on abortion, pray, and sing. As part of its ministry and peaceful pro-life advocacy, members of Pro-Life Mississippi offer literature and sidewalk counseling to persons approaching the clinic. This is done in an effort to persuade women not to abort their unborn babies by offering alternatives to abortion, including adoption, advice, and emotional support. 15. For years, dating back to well before 1996, the Jackson Police Department has harassed pro-life demonstrators and street preachers on the public ways of the City by
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threatening citation or arrest on trumped up charges such as disturbing the peace, trespass or obstructing traffic. Often, the police have actually cited or arrested demonstrators and street preachers only to have the charges dropped or dismissed before trial. On the rare occasions when these cases have actually gone to trial, the pro-life demonstrators and street preachers have usually been found not guilty. 16. In 2006, Pro-Life Mississippi coordinated its annual event with a national event sponsored by Operation Save America, a national pro-life ministry. The event took place on the public ways of Jackson during the period July 15-21, 2006. 17. Plaintiff Tanya Britton (“Britton”) is a Christian who possesses the firm belief that abortion is morally wrong and sinful. She believes it is her duty to God to publicly oppose abortion. 18. Plaintiff Joseph Carson (“Carson”) is a Christian who believes it is his duty to God to openly proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ. He fulfills this duty through open-air preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ on the public ways.
Events of December 12, 2005 19. On or about December 12, 2005, Carson and another gentleman were engaged in un-amplified street preaching on the public streets of downtown Jackson when they were approached by several Jackson police officers. The officers stated that Carson and his associate were being too loud and in violation of the City’s noise ordinance. The officers then said they needed a permit. 20. The officers further told Carson that without a permit he could not remain on the street corner and that, if he continued to preach without a permit, he would be arrested. 21. The officers then said Carson had to let Officer Brister know of his plans before
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“you do anything, before anything goes on in the city.” 22. Carson and his associate then went to the Jackson Police Department to inquire about a permit. They were referred to Defendant Officer Jerry Brister (“Brister”). Brister showed them Jackson Code of Ordinances §§ 54-86 through 54-91 (regulating noise) and told them they needed a permit. 23. Sections 54-86 through 54-91 of the Jackson Code were declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by consent judgment entered on August 4, 2004 in Baldwin v. City of Jackson, 3:04 CV 545 BN. 24. Notwithstanding the laws having been declared unconstitutional, Brister told Carson that the City would not issue a permit under the defunct ordinances allowing him to stand on City sidewalks and preach, but if Carson “wanted to go to a park” and talk to people that would probably be “okay”. 25. Brister then said “no one has any right to create unnecessary noise.”
Events of February 27, 2006 26. On Monday, February 27, 2006, several pro-life demonstrators were present at the Jackson Woman’s Health Organization located at 2903 North State Street in Jackson. Among those at the clinic that day was Rev. Philip “Flip” Benham of Operation Save America. 27. During the late morning/early afternoon hours, Rev. Benham and others were on the sidewalk on State Street holding pro-life signs. Rev. Benham was also engaged in publicly proclaiming the gospel of Jesus Christ to a small group of individuals gathered on the other side of the street in opposition to the pro-life demonstrators. 28. The police were summoned, and soon three police officers arrived, one young
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man and two women, one of whom was Defendant Rosemary Harper. 29. The officers threatened Rev. Benham with arrest, telling him he was “disturbing the peace” by his preaching. Rev. Benham attempted to explain to the officers that he was merely exercising his First Amendment rights to express himself and exercise his religion. 30. Harriet Ashley, another pro-life demonstrator who had been some distance away when the dispute first arose, came over to join in the conversation and try to assist. When Officer Harper learned that Mrs. Ashley sided with Rev. Benham, Harper threatened her with arrest, too. 31. The officers then summoned a superior officer, upon information and belief, Sergeant Otis. 32. When the superior officer arrived and was told by Officer Harper that Rev. Benham was disturbing the police, the superior officer immediately told the officers to arrest them all, without any other question, comment or discussion, and without hearing from the pro-life demonstrators at all. 33. In fact, Sgt. Otis approached Rev. Benham and told him to “keep his mouth shut” and that “anyone who opened their mouth would be arrested” for disorderly conduct. Rev. Benham and the others reluctantly obeyed, and Otis left shortly thereafter. 34. Rev. Benham then ceased preaching in order to avoid arrest. A short time later, Rev. Benham crossed the street in an effort to speak to the small group without having to raise his voice. Officer Harper and another officer rushed over, grabbed Rev. Benham and escorted him back to the near side of the street, telling him he was “trespassing” on the sidewalk and again threatening to arrest him.
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35. At the same time Rev. Benham was on the State Street side of the clinic, Tanya Britton was located on the Fondren Street side, handing out literature and sidewalk counseling (speaking to women and others approaching the clinic to enter). 36. Officer Harper told Britton that her unwelcome expressive activities constituted “disturbing the peace.” When Britton asked for the basis of Harper’s charge, Harper replied, “Because I said so.” 37. Harper then told Britton she would be arrested if she did not cease sidewalk counseling, notwithstanding that Britton had engaged in the same type of sidewalk counseling in Jackson for several years without incident. 38. Shortly thereafter, a supervising officer arrived on the scene and said, “Arrest them. Arrest them all.” Harper then said to Britton, “I am going to get you today.” When Britton asked what Harper would be “getting” her for, Harper replied, “I am going to get you for something.” 39. Britton then continued to counsel women and distribute literature despite Harper’s threat of arrest. 40. Periodically throughout the time pro-life demonstrators were present at the clinic that day, Officer Harper would pull out her handcuffs, jingling them while staring at the pro-life demonstrators. At one point she told Britton, “I am going to get you today.” 41. A few minutes later, as Britton was speaking with two individuals in a car after they had voluntarily stopped to listen, Harper and one other officer approached and stood behind Britton. 42. When the car pulled away, Harper grabbed Britton’s arm, violently jerked it behind her and said, “I’ve got you now, you bitch.”
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43. Harper then placed Britton in handcuffs, charging her with obstructing traffic. When Britton informed Harper that the handcuffs were too tight, Harper replied, “you haven’t got hurt yet.” Harper then forced Britton to sit in the back of the unventilated police cruiser. While in the cruiser, Britton’s wrists became numb and her shoulder began to spasm. 44. Harper then drove Britton to an intake center. While en route, Harper told Britton that she knew her family and that Britton “should be ashamed” of herself for being outside the clinic engaging in pro-life activity. 45. At the intake center, Britton was shackled and placed her in a windowless room for a long period of time. Britton was then taken to Raymond Detention Center in Raymond, Mississippi. 46. Britton was not released until approximately 9:00 p.m. that night. Britton sustained several injuries and bruises as a result of Harper’s abusive treatment, and missed work the rest of the week due to the injuries inflicted by Harper. 47. Despite repeated efforts by Britton’s attorneys urging the City to drop the charges against her and to address the lawless behavior of the Jackson Police Department against pro-life demonstrators, Britton’s case was called for trial on June 19, 2006. 48. In preparation for her defense, Britton had five subpoenas issued. On the day of her trial, Britton, her attorneys, and the five witnesses in her defense dutifully reported to court and waited for their case to be called. 49. After waiting the entire afternoon, and patiently listening as case after case was called and dispensed with, Britton was finally summoned by the prosecuting attorney. By then the formerly crowded courtroom was virtually empty, as it was now after 5:00
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p.m. 50. The prosecuting attorney moved for a continuance, stating that the arresting officer, Harper, was not available and that he did not even have the case file. 51. When Britton’s counsel objected, the court dismissed the charges over the objection of the prosecution.
Events of May 26, 2006 52. On the evening of May 26, 2006, Carson and others went to a sidewalk on the public ways of Jackson adjacent to a club called “The Carter” to street preach and display gospel signs. Because the area was noisy, Carson used a small sound amplifier. 53. Upon arriving, Carson and his associates were approached by unknown persons affiliated with the club and told that the sidewalk was private property. Carson then went back home to retrieve a video camera. 54. When Carson returned a short time later, employees of the club told them that the sidewalk was private property. When Carson disagreed, the owner of the club took one of Carson’s signs and violently threw it to the ground. The club owner then grabbed the Carson’s video camera and took it into the club. 55. Carson then called the police. Coincidentally, apparently in response to someone else’s call, another officer arrived and told Carson police had received a complaint about a loudspeaker. The officer, whose Badge No. is 1405, told Carson he needed a permit to operate a loudspeaker. 56. When Carson inquired which ordinance required a permit, the officer said he was “just following orders” and did not cite to a specific ordinance. 57. This police officer further informed Carson that he would not accept a complaint
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against the club owner for the taking of the video camera, and told Carson he could not press charges.
Events of July 14-21, 2006 58. When Operation Save America and Plaintiff Pro-Life Mississippi gathered for their annual event on Friday, July 14, 2006, a group of about twelve (12) of them gathered on the public sidewalk in Jackson and began to express themselves to passersby. No less than seven (7) police cruisers descended upon them and ordered them to cease their expressive activities on the pretense that they needed a special events permit even to gather on the sidewalk. The protesters reluctantly complied and left the public way. 59. On Saturday, July 15, 2006, Defendants once again forced Plaintiffs to shut down their expressive activities. On this occasion, Lt. Jessie Robinson, the ranking JPD officer, ordered a group of Plaintiffs to take down their sound system outside the abortion clinic. 60. Lt. Robinson informed them that they would be in violation of the City sound ordinance if they did not. The sound ordinance was declared unconstitutional in 2004. 61. Again, on Sunday, July 16, 2006, Defendants confiscated Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected signs, which were peacefully being displayed on the public sidewalk. Once again, Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs were required to obtain a permit, either under the special events ordinance or the sign ordinance, Code §§ 102-26 et seq., before even displaying signs. 62. On that same day, Sunday, July 16, Phillip Carnaggio, an 80 year old man, was arrested without warning for holding a small sign on the public ways. At no time did Mr. Carnaggio obstruct traffic, either vehicular or pedestrian. The citation he was issued failed to indicate the nature of his violation, stating only, “Violation of City.”
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63. Also on Sunday, July 16, one of the Plaintiffs, Adam Tennant, was attacked by numerous pro-abortion counter-protestors, while in his vehicle in the parking lot of the Universalist Unitarian Church of Jackson. 64. The attack, which caused significant damage to his vehicle and which placed Mr. Tennant in imminent fear of his life, took place under full view of several police officers and the Assistant City Attorney, Pieter Teeuwissen. Despite the obvious violation of the law and of the rights of Mr. Tennant, neither the police nor Mr. Teeuwissen took any measures either to stop the assault or to investigate the crime. 65. In fact, when Mr. Tennant said that he wanted to press charges, the police responded that they were not sure they could do anything, but that they would “take” Mr. Tennant for trespassing. 66. Mr. Tennant’s repeated requests that the police dust his windshield, which had plainly visible fingerprints of one of the criminals left on it, were refused. 67. Mr. Tennant also proceeded to point out the perpetrators to the police. Nevertheless, they continued to refuse to take any action against them. 68. Also on Sunday, July 16, the police arrested several pro-life protestors, including Calvin Zastrow, Dr. Patrick Johnston, and Ronald Brock, because they did not have a special events permit, even though the protestors were on the public rights of way and engaged in the exercise of their First Amendment rights. 69. Mr. Brock was stopped for driving his truck through a residential neighborhood and told that he was in violation of the special events ordinance and needed a permit. The truck contained signs and pro-life messages. 70. When Mr. Brock asked for a copy of the ordinance, and insisted that no law could
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rightfully prohibit his activities, Lt. Robinson of the JPD told Mr. Brock that he could obtain a copy of the law inside a police truck parked nearby. Lt. Robinson was lying, and intended to coax Mr. Brock into the truck in order to arrest him. 71. Mr. Brock, relying on the representations of Lt. Robinson, followed him and several other officers into the truck. He was immediately arrested, booked and released. 72. When Mr. Brock confronted Lt. Robinson with his deceit and said, “You lied to me,” Lt. Robinson replied, “Yep.” After Mr. Brock drove away, he was stopped yet again, and threatened that if he came back his truck would be seized and impounded. 73. On Monday morning, July 17, 2006, when Plaintiffs peacefully took up positions on the public sidewalks with their signs, several pro-life demonstrators were arrested, and others were forced to shut down their expressive activities on the public ways of the City. In addition, Plaintiffs’ signs were confiscated. 74. When Plaintiffs asked that their signs be returned, they were refused, and told the signs were “evidence.” 75. Despite the assertion that the signs were to be used as evidence, when several of the Plaintiffs obtained discovery from the City in defense of their municipal court proceedings, the City failed to list the signs as evidence. 76. Rev. Ed Martin, who carries a large wooden cross as part of his pro-life ministry, was arrested and charged with violating the City sign ordinance, even though he did not have a sign. 77. Other pro-life protestors were arrested simply because they were on the wrong side of the street, across from the State Street abortion clinic. They were told that because someone had obtained a permit to be on the near side of the street, in front of the
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clinic, that therefore they were not allowed to be on the opposite side of the street. 78. Only minutes after the pro-life protestors were arrested, several pro-abortion protestors took up the very spot where the pro-lifers had been, held signs and yelled derogatory comments at the pro-life protestors. The police, standing nearby, did nothing, despite the fact that the pro-abortion protestors did not have a permit to be there, either. 79. Later that week, the police officers removed their name tags and covered their badge numbers when dealing with the pro-life protestors. When asked to identify themselves, they refused, stating that they were under orders not to reveal their identities. 80. Upon information and belief, all of these actions were undertaken at the specific direction of Chief Anderson. 81. Also later during the week of July 17, 2006, when as few as two pro-life protestors attempted to hold signs on the public sidewalks in the City they were ordered to remove them on penalty of arrest. The officers issuing these orders cited either or both of the special events ordinance or the sign ordinance. 82. All Plaintiffs desire and intend to exercise their First Amendment rights to free speech, free association, and free assembly but are chilled and deprived in the exercise of those rights by the actions of police as set forth herein. The unconstitutional actions of Defendants continue to this day against peaceful citizens seeking only to exercise their First Amendment rights. 83. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the chill on their free speech rights, and this suit for injunction and declaratory judgment are their only means of securing complete and adequate relief. No other remedies would offer Plaintiffs substantial and complete protection from Defendants’ unlawful acts, policies,
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customs, and practices. Actions of Chief Anderson and Assistant City Attorney Teeuwissen
84. Counsel for Plaintiffs wrote City Attorney Sara O’Reilly Evans, Assistant City Attorney Pieter Teeuwissen, and Chief Anderson on several occasions between March 2 and July 15, 2006, complaining about the treatment of pro-life demonstrators, informing them as to the law governing First Amendment rights, and alerting them of constitutional violations by the JPD. 85. In response, Mr. Teeuwissen assured counsel that the City would respect the First Amendment rights of the Plaintiffs. In fact, upon information and belief, Mr. Teeuwissen and Chief Anderson devised a policy or plan and then instructed officers of the JPD in ways to infringe the First Amendment rights of the Plaintiffs. 86. To that end, Chief Anderson and Mr. Teeuwissen organized a meeting on or about July 12, 2006, at the Jackson Police Training Academy, specifically to instruct JPD officers on how to deal with pro-life protestors at the upcoming national event of Operation Save America and Pro-Life Mississippi. 87. The session was co-sponsored by Planned Parenthood of America, National Abortion Federation of America, among others, and was attended by virtually all JPD officers. 88. When Plaintiffs learned of the meeting and tried to attend, they were rebuffed. 89. Upon information and belief, at the training session JPD officers were instructed in how to arrest and cite pro-life protestors on the slightest pretext, including use of the unconstitutional sound ordinance, claims of obstructing traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) even when no such traffic was present, and a zero-tolerance policy for any pro-life
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activity outside the narrow confines of the locations for which a special events permit had

been obtained.

90. Defendants’ unlawful seizure and retention of Plaintiffs’ signs was, upon

information and belief, directed specifically by Defendants Teeuwissen and Anderson,

and intended to inhibit Plaintiffs’ continued exercise of their First Amendment rights.

92. Many of the arrests and unlawful activities detailed above took place I the

presence and under the direct supervision of Defendant Teeuwissen.

ALLEGATIONS OF LAW

92. All of the acts of Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employees, as

alleged herein, were conducted under color and pretense of the ordinances, statutes,

regulations, customs, practices, and usages of the City of Jackson and/or State of

Mississippi, unless otherwise specified.

93.

Defendants’ repeated use of inapplicable or stricken laws to stifle the First

Amendment rights of Plaintiffs constitutes policies, practices, customs, and usages

sufficient to impose municipal liability.

94. The unlawful actions of police as alleged herein were taken or ratified by final

policy makers for the City of Jackson, and thus constitutes policies, practices, customs,

and usages sufficient to impose municipal liability.

95. The continued enforcement of the Jackson noise ordinance, §§ 54-86 through 54-

91, after it was declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by this

Court, constitutes an unlawful policy, practice, custom, or usage sufficient to impose

municipal liability.

96. The continued enforcement of the Jackson noise ordinance, §§ 54-86 through 54-

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91, after it was declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by this Court, demonstrates a lack of adequate training amounting to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and constitutes a policy, practice, custom, or usage sufficient to impose municipal liability. 97. The failure of the City to provide its police with adequate training in the areas of First Amendment rights, use and identification of traditional public fora, and use of sound amplification amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and constitutes a policy, custom, or practice of the City of Jackson sufficient to impose municipal liability. 98. The repeated enforcement of the Jackson noise ordinance after it was declared unconstitutional and enjoined by this Court constituted contempt of court. 99. Public streets and sidewalks are traditional public fora for purposes of speech and other expressive activities protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 100. The actions taken by Defendants as alleged herein were extreme and in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs. 101. The special events ordinance, Code §§ 14-176 et seq., is unconstitutional on its face, as it purports to reach peaceful expressive conduct by a few individuals on a public sidewalk. Further, even if the special events ordinance did reach Plaintiffs’ activities, it contains an express exclusion for activities such as Plaintiffs’, which are “restricted to marching on sidewalks, and crossing streets only at pedestrian crosswalks in accordance with traffic regulations and controls.” § 14-180(3). 102. The special events ordinance is unconstitutional as applied against the actions of
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Plaintiffs. 103. The sign ordinance, Code §§ 102-26 et seq., is unconstitutional on its face and as applied against the actions of Plaintiffs. 104. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable injury to their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the existence and threatened enforcement of the challenged policies, customs, and practices of the City absent declaratory and injunctive relief. 105. Third parties not before the Court are chilled in their rights to free speech by the existence of the challenged policies, customs, and/or practices as alleged herein.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 (Free Speech/Free Press/Free Exercise of Religion)
Noise/Sound Ordinance 106. Paragraphs 1 through 105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 107. The City’s unlawful enforcement of the stricken noise/sound ordinance hinders and deprives Plaintiffs of their ability to effectively communicate their pro-life message. 108. The City’s unlawful enforcement of the stricken noise ordinance was willful and intentional. 109. The City’s unlawful and unreasonable use of trespass and obstructing traffic laws hinders and deprives Plaintiffs of their ability to effectively communicate their pro-life message. 110. The actions of Defendants in hindering and depriving Plaintiffs of their ability to effectively communicate their message are unconstitutional abridgements of Plaintiffs= affirmative rights to freedom of speech, free press, and the free exercise of religion,
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secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 111. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions, policies, customs, and practices, customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants= conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief against Defendants as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 (Free Speech-Illegal Retaliation)
112. Paragraphs 1 through 105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 113. Defendants= harassment, arrests, and threats of arrest were directed at Plaintiffs while Plaintiffs were engaged in constitutionally-protected speech activities. Such threats of arrest and harassment constituted unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs= exercise of constitutionally protected rights. The retaliation violated Plaintiffs= affirmative rights to freedom of speech secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 114. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions in retaliating against Plaintiffs for the assertion and/or exercise of their constitutional rights, Plaintiffs were deprived of their rights to free speech. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants’ conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendants as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 (Peaceable Assembly)
115. Paragraphs 1 through 105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 116. The public streets dedicated to pedestrian and vehicular traffic in Jackson are traditional public fora for speech. 117. The right to peaceably assemble includes and protects the right of Plaintiffs, as members of the body politic, to engage in peaceful advocacy in support of, or in opposition to, matters of public concern, such as the practice of abortion. 118. The harassment, arrests, and threats of arrest as set forth herein were unconstitutional abridgments of Plaintiffs’ right to free assembly as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 119. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions, policies, practices, and customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their rights to peaceable assembly. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendant=s conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendants as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech/Free Press/Free Exercise of Religion/Freedom of Assembly)
Special Events Ordinance 120. Paragraphs 1-105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 121. The Jackson special events ordinance, Code §§ 14-176 et seq., on its face and as applied, is an unconstitutional abridgement of Plaintiffs’ affirmative rights to freedom of
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speech, free press, the free exercise of religion, and the freedom of assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 122. The special events ordinance is a substantially overbroad restriction on free speech, reaching as few as one or two citizens peaceably exercising their First Amendment rights. 123. The special events ordinance is an impermissible prior restraint on constitutionally protected expressive activities, including peaceable assembly, hand-tohand distribution of literature, oral speech, silent prayer, and political protest on public streets and sidewalks. 124. The special events ordinance is not a narrowly tailored time, place, and manner regulation on speech; it does not serve significant governmental interests; and it does not leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 125. The special events ordinance fails to define key terms with sufficient specificity, fails to provide for prompt judicial review in the event a permit is erroneously denied, fails to allow for spontaneous events, imposes an unconstitutional restraint by virtue of the inordinate advance notice and application requirements, and in general invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 126. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions, policies, practices, and customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants’ conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendant as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech/Free Press/Free Exercise of Religion)
Sign Ordinance 127. Paragraphs 1 through 105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 128. The Jackson sign ordinance, Code §§ 102-26 et seq., is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. 129. The Jackson sign ordinance is a content-based, vague and overbroad prior restraint on constitutionally protected expressive activities, including free speech, free press and the free exercise of religion on the public streets and sidewalks. 130. The Jackson sign ordinance arbitrarily and capriciously exempts certain types of signs from its ambit, such as temporary residential signs, while subjecting other equally harmless signs, such as Plaintiffs’ pro-life signs, to its prohibitions and restrictions. 131. The Jackson sign ordinance unconstitutionally favors certain types of commercial speech over non-commercial speech such as that of Plaintiffs. 132. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions, policies, practices, and customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants’ conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendant as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection)
133. Paragraphs 1 through 105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full.
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134. Plaintiffs have been singled out for harsh and excessive treatment under the laws and policies of Defendants, while others engaged in virtually identical activities, such as the pro-abortion protestors, have been allowed to conduct their activities without fear of punishment or reprisal by Defendants, and even to disrupt with impunity the permitted activities of Plaintiffs. 135. The actions of Defendants as set forth above constitute an unconstitutional violation of Plaintiffs rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 136. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions, policies, practices, and customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants’ conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendant as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech/Free Press/Free Exercise of Religion)
Seizure of Signs 137. Paragraphs 1 through 105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 138. Defendants’ seizure and retention of Plaintiffs’ signs was an unconstitutional infringement of Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech, free press and the free exercise of their religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 139. Defendants’ continued refusal to return Plaintiffs’ signs on the claim that they
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constitute evidence of a crime is a pretext designed to deprive Plaintiffs of their ability to use the signs in the exercise of their First Amendment rights. 140. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions, policies, practices, and customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants’ conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendant as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment) Seizure of Signs
141. Paragraphs 1 through 105 above are incorporated herein by reference as though pleaded in full. 142. Defendants’ seizure and retention of Plaintiffs’ signs was an unconstitutional infringement of Plaintiffs’ rights against unreasonable seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 143. Defendants’ continued refusal to return Plaintiffs’ signs on the claim that they constitute evidence of a crime is a pretext designed to deprive Plaintiffs of their property. 144. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= actions, policies, practices, and customs as alleged herein, Plaintiffs are chilled and deprived of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendants’ conduct.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for relief against Defendant as hereinafter set forth in the prayer for relief.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court: a. Assume jurisdiction over this action; b. Declare that Defendants’ actions as alleged herein were unconstitutional; c. Declare the Jackson special events ordinance, Code §§ 14-176 et seq., unconstitutional both on its face and as applied against Plaintiffs; d. Declare the Jackson sign, Code §§ 102-26 et seq., unconstitutional both on its face and as applied against Plaintiffs; e. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendants from threatening or using the enjoined noise ordinance and/or breach of the peace and/or disorderly conduct laws to inhibit or suppress Plaintiffs’ peaceful expressive activities; f. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendants from threatening or using the special events ordinance to inhibit or suppress peaceful expressive activities; g. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendants from threatening or using the sign ordinance to inhibit or suppress peaceful expressive activities; h. Award Plaintiffs nominal damages against all Defendants for the violation of their civil and constitutional rights; i. Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages for the seizure and retention of their signs; j. Award Plaintiffs punitive damages against Defendants Anderson, Harper, Brister, Robinson, and Teeuwissen for the violation of their civil and constitutional
24

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-LRA Document 24 Filed 11/22/06 Page 25 of 25

rights;

k. Declare Defendants in contempt of court for their willful disregard of this

Court’s order declaring the City sound ordinance unconstitutional;

l. Order Defendants to return Plaintiffs’ signs to them;

Award Plaintiffs their costs of litigation, including reasonable attorneys= fees and

expenses, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1988; and

m.

Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems necessary and

proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Stephen M. Crampton Stephen M. Crampton, MS Bar #9952 Michael J. DePrimo, MS Bar # 10813 AMERICAN FAMILY ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR LAW & POLICY P.O. Drawer 2440/100 Parkgate Drive Tupelo, MS 38803 (662) 680-3886
Attorneys for all Plaintiffs

25

 
 Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 1 of 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION

TAYNA BRITTON; JOSEPH CARSON; MARILYN CARROLL; CARMEN VASQUEZ; and PRO-LIFE MISSISSIPPI

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06cv374-WHB-JCS

SHIRLENE ANDERSON, individually and in her capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Jackson, Mississippi; ROSEMARY HARPER, individually and in her capacity as a police officer for the City of Jackson, Mississippi; JERRY BRISTER, individually and in his capacity as a police officer for the City of Jackson, Mississippi

DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER This cause is before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss filed by Shirlene Anderson and Jerry Brister. Both of these defendants move to have the claims alleged against them in their individual capacities dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis of immunity. The Court has considered the Motions, Responses, attachments to each, and supporting and opposing authority and finds that both Motions should be denied.

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 2 of 10
I. Factual Allegations and Procedural History
On July 11, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the defendants had impermissibly infringed
upon their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Complaint,
as it relates to Defendant Jerry Brister (“Brister”), alleges:
13. Defendant Jerry Brister is a police officer for the City of Jackson, Mississippi who acts as the City’s special events coordinator. He is sued in both [his] individual and official capacities.
19. On or about December 12, 2005, [Plaintiff Joseph Carson] and another gentleman were engaged in un-amplified street preaching on the public streets of downtown Jackson when they were approached by several Jackson police officers. The officers stated that Carson and his associate were being too loud and in violation of the City’s noise ordinance. The officers then said they needed a permit.
20. The officers further told Carson that without a permit he could not remain on the street corner and that, if he continued to preach without a permit, he would be arrested.
21. The officers then said Carson has to let Officer Brister know of his plans before “you do anything, before anything goes on in the city.”
22. Carson and his associate then went to the Jackson Police Department to inquire about a permit. They were referred to Defendant Officer Jerry Brister. Brister showed them Jackson Code of Ordinances §§ 54-86 through 54-91 (regulating noise) and told them they needed a permit.
23. Sections 54-86 through 54-91 of the Jackson Code were declared unconstitutional and enjoined from further enforcement by
2

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 3 of 10
consent judgment entered on August 4, 2004 in Baldwin v. City of Jackson, 3:04 CV 545 BN. 24. Notwithstanding the laws having been declared unconstitutional, Brister told Carson that the City would not issue a permit under the defunct ordinances allowing him to stand on City sidewalks and preach, but if Carson “wanted to go to a park” and talk to people that would probably be “okay”. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 19-23. Plaintiffs contend that Brister’s actions violated their rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The only specific allegation in the Complaint relating to Defendant Shirlene Anderson (“Anderson”) is: “Defendant Shirlene Anderson is Chief of Police for the City of Jackson. She is sued in both her individual and official capacities.” Compl. at ¶ 11. The Complaint does not cite any actions specifically taken by Anderson, nor does it identify any constitutional rights allegedly infringed upon by Anderson. Brister and Anderson now move for dismissal of the claims alleged against them in their individual capacities on the basis of immunity.
II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “viewed with disfavor” and “rarely granted.” Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). When considering such motion, the Court must
3

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 4 of 10
liberally construe the allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff and accept all pleaded facts as true. Id. quoting Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986)). Although the complaint, “must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery ... or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial,” see Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995), the complaint cannot be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). This same rule applies “when immunity is urged as a defense by a motion to dismiss.” Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).
III. Legal Analysis The defense of qualified immunity is available to state actors, including police officers, who are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity provides a shield from civil liability to officers whose conduct does not reasonably violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183,
4

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 5 of 10
194 (1984). See also Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity generally turns on the objective reasonableness of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.”)(alternations in original)(citations omitted). The defense of qualified immunity, however, only applies to claims alleged against officers in their individual, and not their official, capacities. Foley v. University of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2003).
The Court undertakes a two-step analysis to determine whether a defendant may successfully avail himself to the defense of qualified immunity. First, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of constitutional or statutory rights.1 If such violation is alleged, the Court next considers “whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of Corinth,
1 In cases in which the defendant claims he is entitled to qualified immunity, the complaint must be analyzed under a “heightened pleading requirement.” See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996). Under this standard, a plaintiff is not permitted to plead “bald allegations” and/or “conclusory statements.” Wicks v. Mississippi St. Employment Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1995). Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts “specifically focusing on the conduct” of the defendant which, if proven, would demonstrate that the defendant had violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. Id.
5

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 6 of 10
135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998)(citing Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 108 (5th Cir. 1993) (“When evaluating whether a plaintiff stated a constitutional violation, we look to currently applicable constitutional standards. However, the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct must be measured with reference to the law as it existed at the time of the conduct in question.”))(alterations in original)(quotations and citations omitted). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (finding that qualified immunity shields government officials provided “their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.”)
A. Jerry Brister Plaintiff Carson claims Brister violated his constitutional
rights by continuing to enforce Jackson Code of Ordinances §§ 54-86 through 54-91 after they had been declared unconstitutional. Carson further alleges that Brister refused to issue him a permit (as required by the “defunct ordinances”) thereby preventing him from sidewalk preaching in the City of Jackson. Applying the twostep analysis recited above, the Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to allege a violation of constitutional rights, thus satisfying the first step of inquiry. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942) (recognizing: “Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which
6

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 7 of 10
are protected by the First Amendment ... are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.”).
Likewise, the Court finds that the second step of inquiry is satisfied as the constitutional rights allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the incident, and Brister’s alleged conduct was objectively unreasonable. Again, Brister allegedly informed Carson that the latter needed a permit to preach on city sidewalks under Jackson Code of Ordinances §§ 54-86 through 54-91. As these Ordinances had been declared unconstitutional on August 6, 2004, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ rights with regard to these Ordinances were clearly established on December 12, 2005 – the date on which the alleged incident occurred. The Court additionally finds that any attempt to enforce the Ordinances, once they were declared unconstitutional, would be unreasonable. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979)(“Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.”)
Having conducted the applicable two-step analysis, the Count finds that Brister cannot avail himself of the defense of qualified immunity on the claims alleged against him in his individual capacity, and that his Motion to Dismiss on that basis should be denied.
7

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 8 of 10
B. Shirlene Anderson Supervisory police officials may be held individually liable
for violations of constitutional rights committed by their subordinate officers in cases in which they (1) affirmatively participate in the acts that allegedly caused the violation, or (2) implemented policies that causally resulted in the violation. Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). In the case sub judice, the Complaint does not allege any actions on the part of Anderson, which demonstrate her personal involvement in the conduct underlying the constitutional violations about which Plaintiffs complain. Although Plaintiffs argue that Anderson was “personally aware of and at a minimum ratified, if not actually ordered, the unconstitutional actions of her officers,” see Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2, “Section 1983 does not allow for vicarious liability or respondeat superior as a basis for holding a police chief liable for the acts of h[er] officers.” Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986).
Likewise, the Compliant does not allege that Anderson implemented any policy that causally resulted in the alleged constitutional violations. For example, Plaintiffs allege that City of Jackson police officers receive inadequate training “in areas of First Amendment rights.” While a police chief may be liable under Section 1983 based on her failure to supervise and
8

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 9 of 10
train subordinate officers,2 the Complaint clearly indicates that Plaintiffs seek to hold the City of Jackson liable for the alleged lack of training, not Anderson. See e.g. Compl. ¶¶ 63-67 (claiming that the allegations are “sufficient to impose municipal liability.”)
As there are no allegations that Anderson either affirmatively participate in the acts underlying the complained of constitutional violations or implemented policies that causally resulted in those alleged violations, the Court finds that Anderson would be entitled to have the claims alleged against her in her individual capacity dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs, however, indicate their intent to amend their Complaint to “include more specific allegations as to all Defendants, including Chief Anderson.” Resp. to Mot to Dismiss at 4. The Court finds that the prudent course at this time is to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their Complaint and to allege any additional facts they may have before dismissing the claims against Anderson in her individual capacity. To that end, Plaintiffs will be granted until November 22, 2006, to file an amended complaint. In the event an
2 See Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that to establish Section 1983 liability against a police chief, the plaintiff must show (1) the police chief failed to train or supervise the offending police officer, (2) a causal connection between the failure to train/supervise and the alleged violation of constitutional rights, and (3)that the failure to train/supervise amounts to a deliberate indifference of the plaintiff’s rights).
9

Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-JCS Document 23 Filed 11/08/2006 Page 10 of 10
amended complaint is not filed, the Court will, upon motion, dismiss the claims against Shirlene Anderson in her individual capacity without further briefing on the issue.
IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons: IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion of Jerry Brister to Dismiss [Docket No. 17] is hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion of Shirlene Anderson to Dismiss [Docket No. 18] is hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay previously entered in this case is hereby lifted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint on or before November 22, 2006, if they so desire. In the event an amended complaint is not filed, the claims against Defendant Shirlene Anderson in her individual capacity will be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity, upon motion filed by this defendant, without further briefing on the issue. SO ORDERED this the 8th day of November, 2006.
s/ William H. Barbour, Jr. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10

 
 Case 3:14-cv-00568-CWR-FKB Document 7-1 Filed 08/09/14 Page 1 of 5
Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-L.R/', Document 39 Filed 03/14/2008 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION

TANYA BRITTON, JOSEPH CARSON, )

and PRO-LIFE MISSISSIPPI, on its

)

own behalf and on behalf of its members, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v. )

)

SHIRLENE ANDERSON, individually )

and in her official capacity as Chief of

)

Police for the City of Jackson, Mississippi; )

ROSEMARY HARPER, individually and )

in her official capacity as a police offlcer )

for the City of Jackson, Mississippi,

)

. -JERRY BRISTER, ii!CiiViaually and

)

in his official capacity as a police officer )

for the City of Jackson, Mississippi,

)

LIEUTENANT JESSIE ROBINSON, )

individually, and PIETER TEEUWISSEN,

individually,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 3:06cv374 \YHB-.JAS

CONSENT DECREE

Whereas, all Defendants have been served and appeared herein; and \Vhereas, the parties have reached agreement on all issues between them on the following terms and conditions, without adjudication of any issue of fact or iaw and \Vithout Defendants admitting liability for any of the matters alleged; \Vhereas, this Consent Decree resolves all issues raised in the Amended Complaint and the -pmties accept this Co11senl Decree as final and binding among themselves as to the issues resolved

Case 3:14-cv-00568-CWR-FKB Document 7-1 Filed 08/09/14 Page 2 of 5
Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-LR.J\ Document 39 Filed 03/14/2008 Page 2 of 5

herein. This Consent Decree, being entered with the consent of City, shall not constitute an

admission, an adjudication or a finding on the merits of the case.

Therefore, on joint motion of the Plaintiffs and Defendants,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:

1. This Court bas jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

2. The Amended Complaint stales a claim upon which relief can be granted against the

Defendants. Among other things, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants violated their

constitutional rights by unlawfully enforcing the City of Jackson's noise ordinance (Code §§ 54-86

through 54-91) after it had been found unconstitutional by this Court, unlawfully applying the City's

special events ordinance (Code§§ 14- I76 et seg.) against Plaintiffs, unlawfully applying the City's csign'ordiriance·tEode~§-§CF02"'2t\ et seq.) against-Plaintiffs',- and unlawfully seizingandcrefusi1rgto
return .Plaintiffs' signs:

3. Tl1e(:ityb)' and through its officials, agents, employees,successorsandall pgrsons

in active concert or participation with it shall not engage in any act or practice that has the purpose

-------- ~----

----- -

- --- .

----··----

or effect of unlawfully inhibiting the exercise of any person's First Amendment rights on the public

sidewalksor rights of way.

4.

The

C. ity-

shall -

e-n-f-o---r-c-e

-the----l-a-w----s,- s-t··atutes,

or
-

ordinances --

in

an

even-handed ----

manner,

not favoring or disfavoring any person or group because of his or its political, religious or

philosophical positions on any issue.

5. The City shall not enforce or threaten to enforce its previously stricken noise

ordinance, Code§§ 54-86 through 54-91.

Case 3:14-cv-00568-CWR-FKB Document 7-1 Filed 08/09/14 Page 3 of 5
Case 3:06-cv-00374-WHB-!_R;\ Document 39 Filed 03/14/2008 Page 3 of 5

6. The City shall not enforce or threaten to enforce its recently adopted noise ordinance,

Code §§ 54-86 through 54-92, unless and until it docs so by means of properly calibrated decibel

meters employed by officers trained in the use of such machines.

7. The City shall, within thirty (30) clays of entry of this Consent Decree, amend its

special events ordinance, Code§§ 14- J76 et seq., in a manner mutually agreeable to counsel for the

City and for the Plaintiffs herein. Said amendments shall address the concerns raised in the

Amended Complaint, including its definitions section (§ 14-178), its exemption section (§ 14-1 80),

its application section(§ 14-181), its action on application section(§ 14-183), and such other sections

as shall be necessary to render the ordinance consistent with the amendments specified herein and

with constitutional requirements.

8.

Tlie City sli:all~ within thirty (30) clays of eriTi'jiofthis ConseWfDecree; amend itssig1i

ordinance, Code§§ 14-176 et seq., in a manner mutually agreeable to counsel for the City and for

the Plaintiffs herein.

9. The City shall not seize signs, literature or other expressive materials from those

involved in the exercise of First Amendment rights, whether needed as evidence or otherwise, unless

all other means short of seizure have been exhausted, including but not limited to photographing or

describing them in written form. In the event seizure of such expressive materials is deemed

necessary, the City shall seize only so many of the materials as are absolutely essential to establish

the type or size of the materials, and shall promptly submit the matter to acourt of appropriate

jurisdiction for determination of the propriety of seizure and/or retention of the materials, and shall

return the materials as soon as practicable, recognizing that they are presumptively protected by the.

First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Case 3:14-cv-00568-CWR-FKB Document 7-1 Filed 08/09/14 Page 4 of 5 Case 3:06-cv-00374-VVHB-LRA Docume11t 39 Filed 03/14/2008
10. The City shall initiate a program of mandatory annual training in First Amendment rights and the response to the exercise of those rights, instructing its law enforcement personnel in respect for such rights. TheC:ity recognizes and agrees to adopt as its ovenicling philosophy that tolerance of such rightsis its primary goaL
11. The City shall, within fourteen (14) clays of entry of this Consent Decree, mail certified checks in the amonnt of $5000 to Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, and Pro-Life l\1ississippi in full settlement of all claims for damages herein.
12. Plaintiffs' counsel hereby waive all claims for attorneys' fees herein. 13. The City shall, within fourteen (14) clays of entry of this Consent Decree, expunge as allowed by statute all criminal records regarding the following arrests and/or convictions of - - - tmllvidmrllrinvolvea iri tl1e-Operat!Oi1 Save America/Pr:o-LlfeMississil5I5tannuaTe\Tenrfrom.hiry f4c21, 2006: Tanya Britton; Phillip Carnaggio: Calvin Zastrow; Dr. Patrick Johnston; Ronald Brock; Rev. Eel Martin; Ester Mann; Harriet Ashley; Clifton Powell; and James Esser. 14. The City further agrees to promptly return all fines imposed against the individuals identified in paragraph 13 above, care of Plaintiffs' counsel, and to dismiss all pending charges against these individuals. 15. The parties shall attempt to resolve informally any disputes that may occur under this Consent Decree. If the parties are unable to reach agreement within thirty (30) clays after a matter has been brought to the attention of one of the parties by another party, the issue may be submitted by either party to the Court for resolution.

Case 3:14-cv-00568-CWR-FKB Document 7-1 Filed 08/09/14 Page 5 of 5 Case 3:06-cv-00374-VVHB-LRA Document 39 Filed 03/14/2008 Page 5 of 5

16. The Court shall retainjuriscliction of this Decree for one year from the elate of entry
of this Consent Decree in Settlement of Claims. This the 14'h day of March, 2008. s/William H. Barbour. Jr. United States District Court Judge

Agreed and Consented to: For the Plaintiffs:

For the Defendants:

/Stephen M. Crampton Stephen M. Crampton, Esq. Liberty Counsel
· -r:o. Box H108
Lynchburg, VA 24506 (800) 671-1776
Allorneysfor all Plaintiffs

/Pieter Teeuwissen Pieter Teeuwissen, Esq. Special Assistant to the City Attorney Office of the City Attorney 455-East Capitot Street P.O. Box 2779 Jackson, MS 39207-2779 (601) 960-1799
Allorneys for all Defendants

 
 Case: 3:06-cv-374 As of: 03/09/2017 12:59 PM CST 1 of 7
STAY,CLOSED,LRA
U.S. District Court Southern District of Mississippi (Northern (Jackson)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:06−cv−00374−WHB−LRA

Britton et al v. Anderson et al Assigned to: District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr Referred to: Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/11/2006 Date Terminated: 03/18/2008 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Tanya Britton

represented by Stephen M. Crampton LIBERTY COUNSEL P. O. Box 11108 Lynchburg, VA 24506−1108 434/592−7000 Fax: 434/592−7700 Email: court@lc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. DePrimo AMERICAN FAMILY ASSOCIATION LAW CENTER P.O. Drawer 2440 Tupelo, MS 38803−2440 (601) 680−3886 TERMINATED: 06/11/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joseph Carson

represented by Stephen M. Crampton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. DePrimo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Marilyn Carroll

represented by Stephen M. Crampton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. DePrimo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carmen Vasquez

represented by Stephen M. Crampton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. DePrimo (See above for address)

Case: 3:06-cv-374 As of: 03/09/2017 12:59 PM CST 2 of 7

TERMINATED: 06/11/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Pro−Life Mississippi

represented by Stephen M. Crampton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. DePrimo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Shirlene Anderson Individually and in her official capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Jackson, MS
Defendant Rosemary Harper Individually and in her official capacity as a police officer for the City of Jackson, MS Defendant Jerry Brister Individually and in his official capacity as a police officer for the City of Jackson, MS Defendant City of Jackson
Defendant Jessie Robinson individually Defendant

represented by Pieter Teeuwissen SIMON &TEEUWISSEN, PLLC 621 East Northside Drive Jackson, MS 39206 601/366−8400 Fax: 601/366−2292 Email: adwoodard@bellsouth.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marvell M. Gordon THE COCHRAN FIRM − Jackson 162 East Amite St., Suite 100 Jackson, MS 39201 601/812−1000 Fax: 601/812−1025 Email: mgordon@cochranfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marvell M. Gordon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marvell M. Gordon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Pieter Teeuwissen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 3:06-cv-374 As of: 03/09/2017 12:59 PM CST 3 of 7

Pieter Teeuwissen individually TERMINATED: 03/14/2008

Pieter Teeuwissen (See above for address)

Date Filed 07/11/2006 07/11/2006 07/17/2006 07/17/2006 07/18/2006
07/19/2006 07/19/2006 07/19/2006 07/19/2006
07/20/2006
07/20/2006 07/20/2006 07/20/2006 07/21/2006
07/21/2006 07/21/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against all defendants ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number JO14020) , filed by Carmen Vasquez, et al. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Lowery, R.) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
Summons Issued as to Shirlene Anderson, Rosemary Harper, Jerry Brister. (Lowery, R.) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(THR, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
3 MEMORANDUM in Support re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll. (THR, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William H. Barbour Jr.: Motion Hearing held on 7/18/2006 re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Pro−Life Mississippi,, Tanya Britton,, Joseph Carson,, Marilyn Carroll,, Carmen Vasquez,− Motion for Preliminary Injunction was denied (Court Reporter Cheri Bond 540−5482.) (Nelson, Ann) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
4 MOTION for Reconsideration re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll. (Crampton, Stephen) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
5 Defendant's Exhibit List by Shirlene Anderson, Rosemary Harper, Jerry Brister.(THR, ) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
6 Plaintiff's Exhibit List by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll.(THR, ) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
7 EXHIBITS P−A, P−B, P−C, P−D, D−1, D−2 by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Shirlene Anderson, Rosemary Harper, Jerry Brister, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll. (exhibits in 1 envelope)(THR, ) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
TEXT ORDER ONLY denying Plaintiffs' 2 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The Motion is denied in accordance with THE stenographically recorded motion hearing before the undersigned which occurred on July 18, 2006. NO FURTHER WRITTEN ORDER SHALL FOLLOW. Signed by Judge William H. Barbour Jr. on 07−20−06. (Turner, Tom) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
8 RESPONSE to Motion re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by City of Jackson. (Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
9 AFFIDAVIT by Jerry Brister. (Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
10 RESPONSE to Motion re 4 MOTION for Reconsideration re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by City of Jackson. (Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
11 REPLY to Response to Motion re 4 MOTION for Reconsideration re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, 10 Response to Motion filed by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll. (Crampton, Stephen) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
12 OPINION AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 4 Motion for Reconsideration . Signed by Judge William H. Barbour Jr. on 7/21/06. (Nelson, Ann) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Pieter Teeuwissen on behalf of City of Jackson (Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 07/21/2006)

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07/28/2006 07/31/2006 07/31/2006 07/31/2006 07/31/2006 08/02/2006 08/03/2006 08/28/2006
08/28/2006 08/28/2006 11/08/2006
11/22/2006 12/05/2006 12/08/2006 12/27/2006 12/29/2006
01/03/2007 01/04/2007 01/09/2007

14 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on July 18, 2006 before Judge William H. Barbour. Court Reporter: Cherie G. Bond. (THR, ) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
15 ANSWER to Complaint by City of Jackson.(Gordon, Marvell) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
16 ANSWER to Complaint by Rosemary Harper.(Gordon, Marvell) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
17 MOTION to Dismiss by Jerry Brister. (Gordon, Marvell) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
18 MOTION to Dismiss by Shirlene Anderson. (Gordon, Marvell) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
19 ORDER STAYING CASE pending a ruling on the immunity defense motions of Jerry Brister and Shirlene Anderson. Signed by Judge James C. Sumner on August 2, 2006. (wg, ) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
DOCKET ANNOTATION as to #19. Signed copy of document now attached. (wg, ) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
20 Response in Opposition re 17 MOTION to Dismiss by Jerry Brister. (Gordon, Marvell), 18 MOTION to Dismiss by Shirlene Anderson. (Gordon, Marvell) filed by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll. (Crampton, Stephen) (Entered: 08/28/2006)
21 Rebuttal re 20 Response in Opposition, to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Based on Immunity filed by Jerry Brister. (Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 08/28/2006)
22 Rebuttal re 20 Response in Opposition, to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Based on Immunity filed by Shirlene Anderson. (Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 08/28/2006)
23 OPINION AND ORDER denying Jerry Brister's 17 Motion to Dismiss and denying Shirlene Anderson's 18 Motion to Dismiss. The stay previously entered in this case is hereby lifted. Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint on or before November 22, 2006. In the event an amended complaint is not filed, the claims against Shirlene Anderson, in her individual capacity, will be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity, upon motion filed by defendant, without further briefing on the issue. Signed by Judge William H. Barbour Jr. on 11−8−06. (Lewis, Nijah) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
24 AMENDED COMPLAINT First Amended Complaint against all defendants, filed by Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson.(Crampton, Stephen) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
Summons Issued as to Jessie Robinson, Pieter Teeuwissen, Shirlene Anderson, Rosemary Harper, Jerry Brister. (lbt) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
25 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Linda R. Anderson for all further proceedings. Judge James C. Sumner no longer assigned to case. Signed by Judge Henry T. Wingate on 12/7/06. (cwl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2006)
26 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 24 Amended Complaint by City of Jackson. (Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 12/27/2006)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 26 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer City of Jackson answer due 1/3/2007. NO FURTHER WRITTEN ORDER WILL ISSUE. Signed by Judge Linda R. Anderson on December 29, 2006. (TKR) (Entered: 12/29/2006)
27 City of Jackson Defendants' ANSWER to Amended Complaint by City of Jackson.(Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 01/03/2007)
28 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Shirlene Anderson.(Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
29 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Plaintiffs as to Jessie Robinson served on 12/11/2006, answer due 12/31/2006; Shirlene Anderson served on 12/11/2006, answer due 12/31/2006; Rosemary Harper served on 12/11/2006, answer due 12/31/2006; Jerry Brister served on 12/11/2006, answer due 12/31/2006. (Lowery,

Case: 3:06-cv-374 As of: 03/09/2017 12:59 PM CST 5 of 7

01/11/2007 02/16/2007 02/20/2007 03/05/2007 03/15/2007 03/22/2007
04/26/2007 05/11/2007
05/11/2007 06/07/2007 06/08/2007 06/11/2007
06/11/2007

R.) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
30 Rule 16.1(A) Initial Order Telephonic Case Management Conference set for 2/21/2007 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson. (wg, ) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
31 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Carmen Vasquez, Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson, Marilyn Carroll, as to Pieter Teeuwissen served on 2/12/2007, answer due 3/4/2007. (THR, ) (Entered: 02/20/2007)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephonic Case Management Conference reset for 3/15/2007 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson at the request of counsel for the parties via telephone on this date. (wg, ) (Entered: 02/20/2007)
32 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Pieter Teeuwissen.(Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Linda R. Anderson : Telephonic Case Management Conference held on 3/15/2007. Participants: Stephen M. Crampton, counsel for plaintiffs; and Pieter Teeuwissen, counsel for defendants. A Scheduling Order shall be entered by the Court setting this case for trial on a trial calendar commencing April 7, 2008. (wg, )(20) (Entered: 03/22/2007)
33 SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/7/2008 09:00 AM before District Judge William H. Barbour Jr.. Status/Settlement Conference set for 4/26/2007 at 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson. Amended Pleadings due by 4/15/2007. Discovery due by 12/7/2007. Disclosure due by 3/23/2007. Designate Experts Plaintiff Deadline due by 9/7/2007. Designate Experts for Defendant Deadline due by 10/8/2007. Bench Trial set for trial calendar that begins 4/7/2008 and ends 4/18/2008 before District Judge William H. Barbour Jr.. Joinder of Parties due by 4/15/2007. Motions due by 12/24/2007. Signed by Judge Linda R. Anderson on March 22, 2007. (wg, ) (Entered: 03/22/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status/Settlement Conference reset for 5/11/2007 at 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson at the James Eastland Courthouse, 245 E. Capitol Street, Fifth Floor, Hearing Room 526, Jackson, Mississippi.(wg, ) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Linda R. Anderson : Status/Settlement Conference held on 5/11/2007. Appearances: Stephen M. Crampton, counsel for plaintiff; and Mark McLeod, counsel for defendants. The Court discusssed the present status of the case with counsel for the parties. The Court will set another status conference herein for 6/11/07 at 9:00 AM. (wg, )(30) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference via conference call set for 6/11/2007 at 09:00 AM with Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the call. Telephone number for conference: 601−965−4528. (wg, ) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
34 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Pro−Life Mississippi, Tanya Britton, Joseph Carson (Crampton, Stephen) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
35 NOTICE of Service of Disclosure by City of Jackson (McLeod, Mark) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Linda R. Anderson : Status Conference held on 6/11/2007. Participants: Stephen M. Crampton, counsel for plaintiffs; and Pieter Teeuwissen, counsel for defendants. Counsel for the parties informed the Court that the parties are engaged in settlement neogitations and are working out the terms of a consent decree. Same must be presented to the Jackson City Council. Court will set another status conference for 6/26/2007. (WG)(15) (Entered: 06/11/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/26/2007 at 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the call. Telephone number for conference: 601−965−4528. (WG) (Entered: 06/11/2007)

Case: 3:06-cv-374 As of: 03/09/2017 12:59 PM CST 6 of 7

06/11/2007 06/26/2007
06/27/2007 07/09/2007 07/09/2007
08/21/2007 09/06/2007 09/13/2007
09/13/2007 02/06/2008
02/15/2008
02/15/2008

TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 34 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Michael J. DePrimo terminated for plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Linda R. Anderson on June 11, 2007. No further written order shall be issued. (WG) (Entered: 06/11/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Linda R. Anderson : Status Conference held on 6/26/2007. Participants: Stephen Crampton, counsel for plaintiffs; and Pieter Teeuwissen, counsel for defendants. Parties are continuing their efforts to negotiate a settlement. Presentation to City Council scheduled for July 3. Court will set another status conference herein. (WG)(15) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/9/2007 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call. Telephone number for conference: 601−965−4528. (WG) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
36 ORDER requiring counsel to submit a Status Report due on or before 8/14/2007 at 9:00 AM. Signed by Judge Linda R. Anderson on July 9, 2007. (WG) (Entered: 07/09/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Linda R. Anderson : Status Conference held on 7/9/2007. Participants: Stephen M. Crampton, counsel for plaintiffs; and Pieter Teeuwissen, counsel for defendants. Court inquired of the parties as to status of settlement negotiations. Parties were unable to report that a final resolution has been made. Court will set another status conference for August 14, 2007 at 9:00 AM. (WG)(15) (Entered: 07/09/2007)
37 NOTICE of Filing by City of Jackson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit August 21, 2007 letter)(Teeuwissen, Pieter) (Entered: 08/21/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Telephonic Status Conference set for 9/12/2007 at 09:00 AM with Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the conference call. Telephone number for conference: 601−965−4528 (WG) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
ORDER STAYING CASE per ore tenus motion of counsel for the parties to finalize the terms of an agreement reached herein. Counsel for the parties shall notify the Court on or before November 13, 2007 as to the status of the case if an Order of Dismissal has not been entered prior to said date. Signed by Judge Linda R. Anderson on September 13, 2007. NO FURTHER WRITTEN ORDER SHALL BE ISSUED.(WG) (Entered: 09/13/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Linda R. Anderson : Status Conference held on 9/13/2007. Participants: Stephen M. Crampton, counsel for plaintiff; and Pieter Teeuwissen, counsel for defendants. Counsel requested a 60−day stay of the case to finalize the terms of an agreement reached herein which the Court will grant. (WG) (Entered: 09/13/2007)
TEXT ONLY ORDER setting Status Conference for 2/15/2008 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson regarding stay entered 9/13/2007. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the conference call. Telephone number for conference: 601−965−4528. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on February 6, 2008. NO FURTHER WRITTEN ORDER SHALL BE ISSUED. (WG) (Entered: 02/06/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson: Status Conference held on 2/15/2008. Parties advised the Court that they are in agreement on all material terms. The Court expects the parties to take the steps necessary to consummate the entry of a consent decree herein within 30 days. Another status conference will be set by the Court, but will be cancelled if a consent decree has been entered on the docket on or before 3/17/08. (WG) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephonic Status Conference set for 3/17/2008 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson in the event a consent decree has not been entered in this case before said date. (WG) (Entered: 02/15/2008)

Case: 3:06-cv-374 As of: 03/09/2017 12:59 PM CST 7 of 7

02/19/2008 02/27/2008 03/14/2008
03/14/2008 03/14/2008 03/14/2008
03/18/2008

38 NOTICE of Judge Barbour's March 17, 2008 pretrials, and April 7, 2008 civil trial calendar setting. (Lewis, Nijah) (Entered: 02/19/2008)
Set/Reset Hearings: Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/17/2008 at 09:30 AM before District Judge William H. Barbour Jr. (Lewis, Nijah) (Entered: 02/27/2008)
TEXT ONLY ORDER Cancelling Pretrial Conference set for March 17, 2008 at 9:30 before District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. The Court was notified that the parties have reached an agreement. NO FURTHER WRITTEN ORDER SHALL ISSUE. Signed by District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr on 3−14−08 (Lewis, Nijah) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
39 CONSENT DECREE. Signed by District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr on 3−14−08 (Lewis, Nijah) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
ORAL MOTION to Dismiss by Pieter Teeuwissen (cwl) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
40 AGREED ORDER granting [] Motion to Dismiss. That Pieter Teeuwissen, Esq., is fully and finally dismissed from this cause with prejudice without finding against him in either and individual or official capacity. Signed by District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr on 3/14/08 (cwl) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
41 ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice to all parties. Parties having settled. Signed by District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr on 3/18/08 (THR) (Entered: 03/18/2008)