1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3

4

5 ANA RAMIREZ, et al.,

6

Plaintiffs,

7

v.

8 GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.,
9 Defendant.
10

NO. C08-0369 TEH ORDER RE: HEARING ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11

12

On December 4, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class

13 settlement, which Defendant is not expected to oppose. After reviewing the moving papers

14 and settlement agreement, this Court has several initial concerns about the adequacy of the

15 agreement reached by the parties. Counsel shall be prepared to address the following at the

16 January 11, 2010 hearing:

17

1. What are the estimated costs of administering the settlement?

18

2. If all of the estimated 96,000 members submitted a claim, then each class member

19 would receive approximately $15. How can this be characterized as a “substantial financial

20 benefit,” as asserted in the moving papers?

21

3. Why would such a low pay-out be a reasonable settlement in light of the claims

22 alleged in the complaint?

23

4. How will the foreclosure prevention counseling services work? Will $75,000 be

24 adequate to fund counseling for the entire class? Why is it adequate for class members to

25 have access to such counseling only for an unspecified period of time “up to” one year, as

26 provided in the settlement agreement?

27

5. Is it possible to quantify the risk that a future judgment would not be collectible

28 due to Defendant’s financial situation? In evaluating this issue, should the Court consider

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 whether Defendant has any insurance policies from which a settlement or judgment could be

2 paid?

3

6. Even if there were a high risk that a post-trial judgment would not be collectible

4 and Defendant can only afford to pay a limited amount, why should the Court approve a

5 settlement that allocates to attorneys’ fees nearly 45% of the total sum to be paid by

6 Defendant? Although Plaintiffs state that the agreed upon $1.25 million for attorneys’ fees is

7 less than counsel’s lodestar, should the Court consider whether use of such a high number of

8 attorneys by Plaintiffs was an efficient use of resources?

9

7. If the Court ultimately decides not to grant Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

10 approval of the settlement, would referral to a magistrate judge for a further settlement

11 conference be helpful?

12

13 IT IS SO ORDERED.

14

15 Dated: 12/16/09 16

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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22

23

24

25

26

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2

 
 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3

4

5 ANA RAMIREZ, et al.,

6

Plaintiffs,

7

v.

8 GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.,
9 Defendant.
10

NO. C08-0369 TEH ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11

12

This matter came before the Court on June 28, 2010, on the motion for class

13 certification filed by Plaintiffs Ana and Ismael Ramirez and Jorge Salazar (collectively,

14 “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.

15 (“GreenPoint”) violated federal fair lending and housing laws by giving its authorized

16 brokers discretion to mark up the price of wholesale mortgage loans, a policy that led

17 minority borrowers to be charged disproportionately high rates compared to similarly

18 situated whites. They now ask the Court to certify a class of African-American and Hispanic

19 borrowers who obtained wholesale mortgage loans through GreenPoint from 2004 through

20 2007. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.

21

22 BACKGROUND

23

Plaintiffs Ana and Ismael Ramirez and Jorge Salazar each used brokers to obtain

24 wholesale mortgage loans from GreenPoint. In this lawsuit, they challenge GreenPoint’s

25 policy for pricing such loans. In 2005, the Ramirezes refinanced their home in

26 Massachusetts, taking out a $469,000 loan with a 30-year term and a disclosed Annual

27 Percentage Rate, or “APR,” of 6.191 percent. Salizar obtained a $475,000 loan, with a

28 30-year term and disclosed APR of 7.181 percent, by refinancing his home and rental

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 property in San Diego, California in 2006. The Ramirezes were assisted by First Call

2 Mortgage Company, and Salizar used the services of TLN Financial; both were mortgage

3 brokers authorized to originate loans with GreenPoint.

4

In the wholesale market, independent mortgage brokers act as intermediaries between

5 borrowers and wholesale mortgage lenders like GreenPoint. A broker identifies prospective

6 borrowers and facilitates the loan origination process, transmitting a borrower’s application

7 to a lender for a determination of whether or not to fund the loan. Its reliance on brokers

8 enabled GreenPoint to fund mortgages in areas where it had not established any brick-and-

9 mortar retail presence of its own. GreenPoint worked with tens of thousands of authorized

10 brokers when it was in the wholesale mortgage business, which it exited in late 2007.

11 GreenPoint typically sold the wholesale mortgages it funded into secondary markets, where

12 they were repackaged into mortgage-backed securities. The company originated as much as

13 93 percent of its loans through wholesale brokers from 2004 to 2007, and was at one time the

14 fifth largest originator of mortgage loans through the wholesale channel in the United States.

15

The pricing of GreenPoint’s mortgage loans consisted of an objective and a subjective

16 component. GreenPoint relied on objective risk factors – such as FICO score, property

17 value, and loan-to-value ratio – to determine credit parameters and set prices for its loan

18 products. This information was communicated to brokers on a rate sheet listing GreenPoint’s

19 “par” interest rate, which did not result in any broker compensation. That objective

20 component of loan pricing is not at issue here.

21

Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to GreenPoint’s discretionary pricing policy, which

22 governed brokers’ compensation for their services. GreenPoint paid brokers a “yield spread

23 premium” or “rebate” when they set the interest rate higher than par; brokers were also

24 permitted to charge loan origination and processing fees. GreenPoint did not set any

25 objective criteria for the imposition of these higher rates and fees, which were set by the

26 brokers according to their discretion. Brokers were paid more for loans that cost more to the

27 borrower, but their compensation was capped at 5 percent of the loan amount. GreenPoint

28 monitored the fees charged by its brokers to ensure they complied with its policies.

2

1

Plaintiffs contend that the discretionary policy resulted in minority borrowers –

2 defined here to include African Americans and Hispanics – receiving less favorable loan

3 pricing than similarly situated whites. Citing such disparities, Plaintiffs allege that

4 GreenPoint engaged in discriminatory mortgage lending practices in violation of the Equal

5 Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42

6 U.S.C. § 3605.1 They bring these claims under a disparate impact theory, challenging

7 “practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall

8 more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Int’l

9 Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (addressing disparate

10 impact claims in Title VII employment context).2

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11

Plaintiffs now move to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).

12 GreenPoint opposes the motion.

13

14 LEGAL STANDARD

15

Plaintiffs, as the parties requesting class certification, must demonstrate that they have

16 met all four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the requirements of at

17 least one part of Rule 23(b). Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th

18 Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 23(a) allows a class to be

19 certified

20

only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to

21

22

1 The ECOA makes it unlawful “for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction – (1) on the basis of race, color, religion,

23

national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract).” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). The FHA makes it unlawful “for any person or other entity

24

whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or

25

conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).

26

2 This Court previously concluded, in denying GreenPoint’s motion to dismiss, that

27

disparate impact claims are cognizable under both the FHA and ECOA. See Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 48) at 4-6; see also Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.

28

1999) (disparate impact claims allowable under FHA); Miller v. Am. Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact claims allowable under ECOA).

3

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the

2

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class.

3

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. That is, the class must satisfy the

5 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.

6

Rule 23(b) provides for the maintenance of several different types of class actions.

7 Plaintiffs seek to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a showing “that the

8 questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting

9 only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for

10 fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

11

Before certifying a class, a district court must determine that the requirements of Rule

12 23 “are actually met, not simply presumed from the pleadings.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,

13 Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 582 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Court must “perform a rigorous

14 analysis to ensure that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Id. at 581 (citing

15 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982)). Such analysis “will often,

16 though not always, require looking behind the pleadings to issues overlapping with the merits

17 of the underlying claims.” Id. at 594. However, the court may not consider whether the

18 party seeking class certification has stated a cause of action or is likely to prevail on the

19 merits. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). If a district court concludes

20 that the moving party has met its burden of proof, then the court has broad discretion to

21 certify the class. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186.

22

23 DISCUSSION

24

Plaintiffs propose to represent a class defined as “[a]ll African-American or Hispanic

25 persons throughout the United States to whom GreenPoint originated a residential-secured

26 loan in GreenPoint’s wholesale lending channel between January 1, 2004 and January 1,

27 2008.” Pls.’ Mot. at 11. As they request certification under Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs present

28 evidence showing the predominance of common issues and the superiority of a class action,

4

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 in addition to evidence going to Rule 23(a)’s requirements of numerosity, commonality,

2 typicality, and adequacy.

3

GreenPoint’s challenges to the certification of such a class fall in two broad

4 categories. First, GreenPoint argues that the named Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements

5 of typicality and adequacy, because false statements in their loan applications cast doubt on

6 their integrity and subject them to unique defenses. Plaintiffs are also atypical because –

7 according to GreenPoint – they suffered no injury and therefore have no standing, as their

8 financing was superior to that obtained by similarly situated white borrowers. Second,

9 GreenPoint contends that Plaintiffs cannot show either the existence or predominance of

10 common questions. The disparity in loan terms is explained not by race, GreenPoint argues,

11 but by other legitimate variables that Plaintiffs’ expert was unable to account for, such as the

12 amount of work each broker performed for a borrower. Since the inquiry into those other

13 factors would require the Court to examine the loans of each prospective class member,

14 GreenPoint contends that proceeding as a class action would be inappropriate.

15

The Court begins by examining the four elements of Rule 23(a). If Plaintiffs meet

16 those requirements, the Court will move onto the predominance and superiority inquiries

17 under Rule 23(b)(3).

18

19 I. Rule 23(a)

20 A. Numerosity

21

To satisfy Rule 23(a)(1), Plaintiffs must show that “the class is so numerous that

22 joinder of all members is impracticable.” From 2004 through 2007, GreenPoint made at least

23 94,000 loans to African-American and Hispanic borrowers across the United States.

24 GreenPoint does not dispute this figure or the impracticability of joinder, and the Court

25 agrees with Plaintiffs that joinder of all class members would be impracticable. The

26 numerosity requirement is therefore satisfied.

27 //

28 //

5

1 B. Commonality

2

To demonstrate commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), Plaintiffs must “establish common

3 questions of law and fact.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 594 (9th Cir.

4 2010) (en banc) (emphasis in original). “[A]nswering those questions,” on the other hand,

5 “is the purpose of the merits inquiry, which can be addressed at trial and at summary

6 judgment.” Id. It is not necessary that members of the proposed class “share every fact in

7 common or completely identical legal issues.” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th

8 Cir. 2010). Rather, the “existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is

9 sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within

10 the class.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). “The

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11 commonality test is ‘qualitative rather than quantitative’ – one significant issue common to

12 the class may be sufficient to warrant certification.” Dukes, 603 F.3d at 599. For a civil

13 rights claim, commonality is satisfied “where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice

14 or policy that affects all of the putative class members.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849,

15 868 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]ndividual factual differences among the individual litigants or

16 groups of litigants will not preclude a finding of commonality.” Id.

17

To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate impact theory,

18 Plaintiffs would have to show “a significant disparate impact on a protected class caused by a

19 specific, identified . . . practice or selection criterion.” Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1121

20 (9th Cir. 2002).3 Plaintiffs contend that the discretionary policy had a disparate impact on

21 minority borrowers, causing them to receive less favorable loan pricing than similarly

22 situated whites. Although Plaintiffs need not prove their claim at the class certification stage,

23 they need to demonstrate that doing so will hinge on common questions of fact and law.

24

Plaintiffs make this showing through the expert report of Harvard Law School

25 professor Howell E. Jackson (“Professor Jackson”), whose analysis of GreenPoint’s

26 mortgage data leads him to conclude that “minorities paid more for Greenpoint wholesale

27

3 The Court relies in part on disparate impact case law under Title VII of the 1964

28

Civil Rights Act, because “Title VII discrimination analysis” is applied “in examining Fair Housing Act discrimination claims.” Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999).

6

1 mortgage loans than whites with similar risk-characteristics.” Jackson Report (Doc. 178) at

2 6. Relying on the annual percentage rate, or “APR,” as a representation of loan costs,

3 Professor Jackson compares the amount paid by white and minority borrowers for

4 GreenPoint wholesale loans originated from 2004 to 2007. He finds that the mean APR for

5 whites was 69.5 basis points lower than that of African Americans, and 56.5 basis points

6 lower than that of Hispanics.4 However, those raw figures do not account for legitimate

7 factors that could explain such differences. To compare similarly situated whites and

8 minorities, Professor Jackson performs regression analysis, a statistical method that allows

9 him to control for legitimate underwriting characteristics that affect the cost of a loan.5

10 Professor Jackson concludes that the APRs of African Americans are 9.4 basis points, and

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11 those of Hispanics 7.6 basis points, higher than those of similarly situated whites, a

12 difference that cannot be explained by legitimate risk factors or valid business justifications.

13 Critically for purposes of class certification, Professor Jackson’s analysis relies on evidence

14 common to the class and does not require any individualized inquiry.

15

Plaintiffs offer numerous questions of fact and law that are common to the class. The

16 discretionary pricing strategy that they challenge was carried out uniformly, Plaintiffs

17 contend, and its adverse effects were felt in the same way by Plaintiffs and all class members.

18 Whether GreenPoint’s policy resulted in a pricing disparity between white and minority

19 borrowers, whether those disparities are justified by legitimate differences in

20 creditworthiness, and whether less discriminatory alternatives exist are all questions common

21 to the class, according to Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Professor Jackson’s statistical analysis

22 demonstrates that the pricing disparities are class-wide and attributable to GreenPoint’s

23 discretionary policy.

24

GreenPoint, however, disputes Plaintiffs’ ability to establish their claims using

25 common proof. Although Professor Jackson’s analysis was based on GreenPoint’s own data,

26

27

4 A basis point is equal to 1/100th of a percentage point.

28

5 Regression analysis allows Professor Jackson to compare the relationship between a “dependent variable” – here, the APR – and various “explanatory” variables.

7

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 GreenPoint contends that he would have to mine the data of the more than 27,000 brokers

2 who originated the loans at issue here to properly evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims. This is because

3 Professor Jackson cannot account for two key factors that may legitimately explain the price

4 disparities between whites and minorities: the effort a broker exerted on a given borrower’s

5 loan, and the broker’s “pull-through” rate (i.e. how frequently a broker’s submitted loan

6 applications result in funded loans). GreenPoint’s expert, Dr. Marsha J. Courchane (“Dr.

7 Courchane”), asserts that the absence of such data makes it impossible to tell whether

8 legitimate broker fee differentials explain the minority loan disparity. Dr. Courchane, an

9 economist with a Ph.D. from Northwestern University, states that she cannot find evidence of

10 “any pattern of substantive or economically significant disparate impact” when using

11 statistical techniques similar to those of Professor Jackson. Courchane Report (Doc. 182-1)

12 at 5. She argues that the evidence of disparate impact drops to levels that are not

13 “economically significant” when the regression analysis is conducted separately for

14 individual categories of loans; by aggregating the loan products together, Professor Jackson

15 overstates the effect of race and ethnicity. She also demonstrates that minorities were

16 disproportionately represented by brokers with lower pull-through rates, who therefore had to

17 charge more per loan to cover their work on unsuccessful loan applications. GreenPoint

18 argues that these alleged flaws in Professor Jackson’s analysis eviscerate Plaintiffs’ common

19 questions and necessitate inquiry into the individual factors that played into the pricing of

20 each loan. GreenPoint also relies on the expert report of Laura J. Borrelli, a mortgage

21 litigation consultant, who opines that disparate treatment can only be proven by “an

22 extensive, literal loan by loan review of each borrower’s mortgage file,” and not by Professor

23 Jackson’s proposed regression analysis. Borrelli Report (Doc. 182-3) at 11.

24

Professor Jackson, in reply, stands by his conclusion that common methods and proof

25 can be used to demonstrate the disparate impact of GreenPoint’s pricing policies on class

26 members. He points out that the disparities identified by Dr. Courchane’s analysis, while

27 smaller than his own findings, are both statistically and economically significant: a disparity

28 of five basis points would cost a typical African-American borrower $579 more than a

8

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 typical white borrower, and a typical Hispanic borrower $705 more than a typical white

2 borrower, over the first five years of a loan. Three mortgage brokers deposed in this case

3 testified that there was no correlation between the race of a borrower and the amount of work

4 the broker had to perform, providing anecdotal evidence to refute GreenPoint’s contention

5 that the identified disparity could be explained by disparities in broker effort. Having rerun

6 his regressions with new variables to account for GreenPoint’s arguments, Professor Jackson

7 concludes that none of Dr. Courchane’s arguments explain the disparity in mortgage prices

8 for minority borrowers; race and ethnicity remain statistically significant. Plaintiffs also

9 offer rebuttal from Professor Patricia A. McCoy of the University of Connecticut School of

10 Law, who argues that “policies and practices instituted by GreenPoint and a regulatory

11 environment that together were common to the class allowed GreenPoint’s mortgage brokers

12 to overcharge customers in general and to charge even more to black and Hispanic

13 borrowers.” McCoy Report (Doc. 204) at 8.

14

Plaintiffs’ reliance on statistical evidence to fulfill the commonality requirement is

15 well founded in Ninth Circuit precedent. In its recent en banc ruling in Dukes v. Wal-Mart

16 Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the certification of a

17 class of female Wal-Mart employees with respect to allegations that women received lower

18 pay – and fewer promotions – than their male colleagues in violation of Title VII of the 1964

19 Civil Rights Act. In finding commonality, the court relied on factual evidence of a company-

20 wide policy governing pay and promotion decisions and a strong corporate culture vulnerable

21 to gender bias, as well as statistical evidence showing significant disparities between men

22 and women in compensation and promotion that could “be explained only by gender

23 discrimination.” Id. at 599-613. The court observed that it is “well established that

24 plaintiffs may demonstrate commonality by presenting statistical evidence, which survives a

25 ‘rigorous analysis,’ sufficient to fairly raise a common question concerning whether there is

26 class-wide discrimination.” Id. at 603-04. The Ninth Circuit also recognized that “subjective

27 decision making is a ‘ready mechanism[] for discrimination’ and that courts should scrutinize

28 it carefully.” Id. at 612 (quoting Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075

9

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 (9th Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original). Subjective practices that operate to discriminate have

2 been found by courts across the country to “satisfy the commonality and typicality

3 requirements of Rule 23(a).” Id. (quoting Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th

4 Cir. 1993)).

5

As in Dukes, Plaintiffs are challenging a subjective policy that applied to all of

6 GreenPoint’s authorized brokers and, hence, every member of the proposed class – all of

7 whom negotiated their mortgages through brokers subject to the GreenPoint policy. The

8 claims of all class members hinge on a common question: whether GreenPoint’s

9 discretionary pricing policy had a disparate impact on minority borrowers. Plaintiffs propose

10 to answer that question using statistical evidence that, according to Professor Jackson, shows

11 minorities paid more for their loans than similarly situated whites. Plaintiffs’ theory of

12 liability therefore stands on common questions of fact and law. Although GreenPoint casts

13 doubt on the viability of that theory, the Court may not “decline to certify the class on the

14 basis of a mere potentiality” that plaintiffs’ theory of liability will not prevail. United Steel

15 Workers v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2010). “[I]t is the plaintiff’s

16 theory that matters at the class certification stage, not whether the theory will ultimately

17 succeed on the merits.” Dukes, 603 F.3d at 587 (citing United Steel Workers, 593 F.3d at

18 809-10) (emphasis in original).

19

GreenPoint’s arguments amount to an attack on the merits of Professor Jackson’s

20 analysis, which is premature at this stage of litigation. “[D]isputes over whose statistics are

21 more persuasive are often not disputes about whether the plaintiffs raise common issues or

22 questions, but are really arguments going to proof of the merits.” Dukes, 603 F.3d at 591.

23 Only an argument that one party’s statistics are “unreliable or based on an unaccepted

24 method” would have to be resolved at the class certification stage, requiring the Court to

25 “determine whether the potentially problematic statistics [are] even capable of raising a

26 common question.” Id. at 591-92. However, GreenPoint does not fault the reliability of

27 Professor Jackson’s methodology; it simply purports to have a better way. Such “statistical

28 disputes . . . encompass the basic merits inquiry and need not be proved to raise common

10

1 questions and demonstrate the appropriateness of class resolution.” Id. at 594. The

2 commonality requirement is therefore satisfied.6

3

4 C. Typicality

5

Under the “permissive standards” of Rule 23(a)(3), “representative claims are

6 ‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need

7 not be substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.

8 1998). “The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury,

9 whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and

10 whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Hanon v.

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11 Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation

12 omitted). However, “a named plaintiff’s motion for class certification should not be granted

13 if ‘there is a danger that absent class members will suffer if their representative is

14 preoccupied with defenses unique to it.’” Id. (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v.

15 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990)). Although

16 typicality “tend[s] to merge” with the commonality requirement, Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v.

17 Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982), “each factor serves a discrete purpose,” Dukes, 603

18 F.3d at 613 n.37. “Commonality examines the relationship of facts and legal issues common

19 to class members, while typicality focuses on the relationship of facts and issues between the

20 class and its representatives.” Dukes, 603 F.3d at 613 n.37. Plaintiffs represent that their

21 claims are typical because they – like all prospective class members – were subject to and

22 affected by GreenPoint’s discretionary pricing policy. GreenPoint argues that the named

23

24

6 GreenPoint argues that Plaintiffs’ approach exhibits the same flaws that the Fourth Circuit identified when it decertified a class in Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler

25

Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998). The court found that the calculation of lost profits to the plaintiff Meineke franchisees, who were alleging the misallocation of advertising funds

26

by Meineke, was too “dependent upon consideration of the unique circumstances pertinent to each class member.” Id. at 343 (quoting Boley v. Brown, 10 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 1993)).

27

However, the district court there erred by allowing “the jury to calculate lost profits without reference to any” of the many other factors affecting “the profitability of each Meineke

28

franchise.” Id. Here, by contrast, Professor Jackson has accounted for the other variables affecting APR.

11

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 Plaintiffs are not typical for two reasons: they will be preoccupied by unique defenses based

2 on false information included in their loan applications, and they lack standing because they

3 were not harmed by GreenPoint’s pricing policy.

4

5 1. Unique Defenses

6

Ana and Ismael Ramirez both signed or initialed each page of their loan application,

7 including a statement acknowledging the making of false statements to be a federal crime.

8 According to the Ramirezes’ deposition testimony, however, much of the information

9 included in the application was false. The application overstated their monthly income by

10 thousands of dollars, represented Mr. Ramirez as being self-employed when he was

11 unemployed, and listed a bank account balance approximately four times its actual level.

12 Salazar’s application, likewise, overstated his bank account balance by nearly $40,000, and

13 gave an actual gross income one-and-a-half times what he actually earned. Salazar, like the

14 Ramirezes, signed each page of his application, which warns against making false

15 statements.

16

However, there is also ample evidence suggesting Plaintiffs were unaware that

17 misstatements were included in their applications. English is a second language for all three

18 Plaintiffs. Mr. Ramirez can neither read nor write in English; Salazar does not speak

19 English, but can read “a little.” The Ramirezes worked with Kathy Objio, a broker with First

20 Call Mortgage Company, to whom they had given copies of their tax returns and bank

21 statements, and who filled out their loan application over the telephone. The Ramirezes did

22 not read the application before signing it. Salazar testified that he worked with a broker

23 named Jimmy affiliated with TLN Financial, to whom he provided paycheck stubs, bank

24 statements, and other documents. Salazar did not fill out the application himself, and did not

25 know who had. Both Salazar and Mr. Ramirez expressed surprise during their depositions

26 when shown the misinformation on their applications. Salazar responded to the listed

27 balance of his bank account by laughing and saying, “If I had that kind of money, I would be

28 living in Tijuana,” where he is from. Salazar Depo. 11:16-23, 111:21-24. Mr. Ramirez

12

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 expressed outrage at the misrepresentations, repeating, “Oh, my God,” and asking of

2 GreenPoint’s counsel, “Why do these people do this type of thing when they’re not supposed

3 to do it? . . . Why do they say I have my own company, that I’m self-employed? . . . Because

4 this places you in a bad situation, it makes you look like a liar.” I. Ramirez Depo. 25:17-22,

5 28:4-11, 29:21-30:7.

6

GreenPoint argues that the false statements in Plaintiffs’ loan applications subject

7 them to unique equitable defenses such as unclean hands, rendering them unable to satisfy

8 the typicality requirement. Unclean hands is an equitable doctrine that “closes the doors of a

9 court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which

10 he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior” of the other party. Ellenburg

11 v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985). “‘It is fundamental to [the]

12 operation of the doctrine that the alleged misconduct by the plaintiff relate directly to the

13 transaction concerning which the complaint is made.’” Dollar Systems, Inc. v. Avcar Leasing

14 Systems, Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 173 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Arthur v. Davis, 126 Cal. App. 3d

15 684, 693-94 (1981)) (alteration in original).

16

GreenPoint relies on two district court cases from outside the Ninth Circuit to

17 demonstrate the availability of an unclean hands defense for disparate impact claims under

18 the ECOA. In Riggs National Bank v. Linch, a court in the Eastern District of Virginia

19 addressed whether guarantors of a promissory note could raise the ECOA as an affirmative

20 defense in an action to collect on the defaulted note. 829 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Va. 1993).

21 After concluding that the ECOA could not be a basis for invalidating the underlying

22 guarantee, the court – in a footnote – addressed the plaintiff bank’s argument that the

23 “unclean hands” doctrine barred any recovery by a defendant guarantor who had submitted a

24 false financial statement. Id. at 169 n.7. The court concluded that, since the guarantor’s

25 “conduct was knowing and willful, . . . the doctrine of unclean hands would bar [him] from

26 any recovery, even if [the bank] had violated the ECOA.” Id. A court in the Middle District

27 of Florida relied on Riggs in reaching the same conclusion. Beaulialice v. Federal Home

28 Loan Mortgage Corp., No. 8:04-cv-2316-T-24-EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15846, at *31

13

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2007) (“Defendant has shown that Plaintiff misrepresented facts on her

2 application in order to secure the loan, and this deception bars her claims.”).

3

However, the Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that the equitable defense of employee

4 misconduct could not preclude employer liability for violating the Age Discrimination in

5 Employment Act (“ADEA”). In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., the Court

6 overturned the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the question of discrimination was rendered

7 “irrelevant” by after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing that would have, by itself,

8 resulted in her discharge. 513 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1995). The Court observed that the unclean

9 hands defense “has not been applied where Congress authorizes broad equitable relief to

10 serve important national policies.” Id. at 360. The ADEA reflects such a policy, the Court

11 concluded, bearing as its purpose “the elimination of discrimination in the workplace,” and

12 carrying remedies meant to deter discrimination and to compensate those harmed by it. Id. at

13 358. Misconduct could, however, affect the availability of remedies; the employee’s

14 wrongdoing was relevant “to take due account of the lawful prerogatives of the employer in

15 the usual course of its business and the corresponding equities that it has arising from the

16 employee’s wrongdoing.” Id. at 361.

17

“The purpose of the ECOA,” like that of the ADEA, “is to eradicate . . .

18 discrimination,” only in the provision of credit rather than the workplace. United States v.

19 ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 816 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1987). The ECOA also allows

20 the district court to “grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the

21 requirements imposed” under the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c). The declaration of purpose

22 for the FHA is to “provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the

23 United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 3601. As for remedies, in addition to actual and punitive

24 damages, the FHA allows a court to “grant as relief, as the court deems appropriate, any

25 permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order (including an

26 order enjoining the defendant from engaging in such practice or ordering such affirmative

27 action as may be appropriate).” Id. § 3613(c)(1). As the ECOA and FHA both represent

28 Congress’s authorization of “broad equitable relief to serve important national policies,”

14

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360, the unclean hands defense should not be applicable here.

2 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit reached that very conclusion in Moore v. U.S. Department of

3 Agriculture, concluding that “after-acquired evidence of [plaintiffs’] poor credit history” –

4 which would have supplied an independent basis for denying the plaintiffs’ application to

5 purchase a property – “cannot defeat [defendant’s] liability” under the ECOA but “can aid

6 the court in assessing . . . damages.” 55 F.3d 991, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing McKennon

7 v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883-87 (1995)).

8

However, GreenPoint relies on this Court’s ruling in Ganley v. County of San Mateo,

9 No. C06-3923 TEH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26467 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007), to argue that

10 McKennon does not foreclose the unclean hands defense. In Ganley, the Court considered a

11 plaintiff’s motion to strike 22 affirmative defenses raised in the defendant’s answer to a

12 complaint alleging that the plaintiff had been removed from permanent public employment

13 without due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While acknowledging that the

14 Supreme Court had refused to apply the unclean hands doctrine in the ADEA context, the

15 Court observed that “no available case law exists to suggest that the defense is inapplicable

16 in the context of § 1983 actions.” Ganley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26467, at *14. In the

17 absence of “controlling or persuasive precedent to the contrary,” the Court found it “prudent

18 to deny Plaintiff’s motion to strike the defense of unclean hands.” Id. at *14-15.

19

This Court’s ruling in Ganley is distinguishable, however. A motion to strike is only

20 “proper when a defense is insufficient as a matter of law,” which requires that the Court “be

21 convinced that there are no questions of fact, that any questions of law are clear and not in

22 dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the defense succeed.” Id. at *3

23 (internal citations omitted). Given that standard, the Court declined to strike a defense that

24 no court had explicitly held inapplicable to § 1983 actions. The standard here is not nearly as

25 exacting: the Court is assessing whether Plaintiffs may be subject to unique defenses that

26 would diminish their ability to represent the interests of other class members. The Court

27 need not be satisfied that the defense could succeed “under no set of circumstances,” but

28

15

1 rather has to weigh the likelihood of such a defense rendering the named Plaintiffs

2 inadequate class representatives.

3

The threat of an unclean hands defense will not defeat the adequacy of the named

4 Plaintiffs. Whereas this Court in Ganley could find no authority applying McKennon in the

5 § 1983 context, there is a strong basis for concluding that McKennon applies to ECOA.

6 Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed that question, the Fifth Circuit has – concluding

7 that the unclean hands defense is unavailable. Moore, 55 F.3d at 996. Furthermore, this

8 Court finds that the rationale of McKennon is clearly applicable to the ECOA and the FHA,

9 which – like the ADEA – reflect Congress’s authorization of “broad equitable relief to serve

10 important national policies.” McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360. The unclean hands defense is

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11 therefore inapplicable here, and the false statements in Plaintiffs’ loan applications cannot

12 defeat typicality.7

13

14 2. Standing

15

GreenPoint further argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the typicality requirement

16 because they lack standing to assert a disparate impact claim. Constitutional standing is

17 comprised of three elements: (1) “injury in fact,” (2) “a causal connection between the injury

18 and the conduct complained of,” and (3) a likelihood, rather than mere speculation, “that the

19 injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

20 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). GreenPoint contends

21 that Plaintiffs were not injured by its discretionary pricing policy because they received loans

22 that were priced more favorably than similarly situated white borrowers, in contrast to their

23 allegations that the policy resulted in less favorable terms for minorities. Since typicality

24 requires that the named plaintiffs “have the same or similar injury” as other class members,

25 Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992), GreenPoint insists that

26 Plaintiffs are not typical of the class they seek to represent.

27

7 Even if the defense were applicable, Plaintiffs’ evidence suggests that they were

28

unaware that false statements were included in their applications, in which case they would not have “unclean hands” in the first place.

16

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

This question, like that of commonality, pits the parties’ experts against one another.

2 Plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Jackson, argues that their claims are typical of the class because

3 each “was subject to the same Discretionary Pricing Policy that disproportionately affected

4 minority borrowers.” Jackson Report at 43. However, GreenPoint notes that Professor

5 Jackson only determines that minority borrowers on average paid higher APRs than white

6 borrowers, not that these Plaintiffs did so. Relying on Professor Jackson’s own model, Dr.

7 Courchane found that the Ramirezes’ actual APR of 6.19 percent was lower than that of

8 similarly situated white borrowers (6.48 percent); Salazar’s APR of 7.18 percent was

9 likewise lower than that of comparable whites (7.82 percent). GreenPoint therefore argues

10 that Plaintiffs cannot show that the discretionary policy actually affected them; absent any

11 injury, they lack standing to bring these claims.

12

In reply, Professor Jackson defends his approach, in which “each member of the

13 plaintiff class would be entitled to a measure of damages reflecting an estimate of the

14 average loss to class members.” Jackson Reply at 27. Professor Jackson points out that

15 “there will always be some variation in actual APRs that result in some borrowers getting

16 better loan terms than our models predict.” Id. at 29. Although the named Plaintiffs may

17 have obtained better rates than similarly situated whites, Professor Jackson contends that

18 “absent discriminatory practices, they would likely have had an even lower rate.” Jackson

19 Depo. at 225:15-17. Since the named Plaintiffs were subject to the same policy as other class

20 members, proof of the policy’s disparate impact on the class establishes that Plaintiffs – as

21 members of that class – were injured by that policy, according to Plaintiffs.

22

Determining what price a minority borrower would have paid in a “but for” world is

23 no simple proposition. Although Professor Jackson’s regression model, estimated over

24 hundreds of thousands of observations, indicates that GreenPoint’s policy had a disparate

25 impact on a group of 94,000 minorities, how to predict what any one of those borrowers’

26 rates would have been absent the discretionary policy is subject to debate. Professor Jackson

27 would apply the average effect felt by all minorities to the individual, a methodology that

28 shows injury to Plaintiffs. That approach is consistent with the theory that the individual’s

17

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 APR, while lower than the predicted APR of a similarly situated white borrower, would have

2 been even lower but for GreenPoint’s discretionary policy. Dr. Courchane would only

3 compare the individual to the model’s representation of a similarly situated white borrower,

4 which reveals the named Plaintiffs to be better off than their white counterparts and suggests

5 that they did not suffer the injury of which they complain. Arguments about “whose

6 statistics are more persuasive . . . are really arguments going to proof of the merits,” but an

7 argument that “the other party’s statistics were unreliable or based on an unaccepted method .

8 . . may be an issue the district court would have to resolve” on class certification. Dukes v.

9 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 591-92 (9th Cir. 2010). As neither party argues that the

10 other’s methodology is inherently flawed, the Court need not and cannot choose between

11 them at this stage. Plaintiffs present a viable theory demonstrating that the named Plaintiffs

12 suffered the same injury felt by the other members of the proposed class.

13

The Ninth Circuit confronted a similar typicality issue in Dukes, where it observed

14 that “individual employees in different stores with different managers may have received

15 different levels of pay or may have been denied promotion or promoted at different rates.”

16 Dukes, 603 F.3d at 613. The court concluded, however, that the district court’s finding of

17 typicality was not an abuse of discretion, because “the discrimination they claim to have

18 suffered occurred through alleged common practices – e.g., excessively subjective decision

19 making in a corporate culture of uniformity and gender stereotyping.” Id. Here, similarly,

20 Plaintiffs attribute the alleged discrimination to the discretionary pricing policy, a common

21 practice that governed the pricing of all class members’ mortgages. Since they were subject

22 to that policy, and have advanced a viable theory showing the harm produced by that policy,

23 Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality requirement.

24

25 D. Adequacy

26

The legal adequacy of the class representatives is determined by the resolution of two

27 questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with

28 other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action

18

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.

2 1998). GreenPoint contends that Plaintiffs are inadequate class representatives because the

3 false statements in their mortgage applications call into question their integrity. Relying on

4 Second Circuit authority, GreenPoint stresses that “courts may consider the honesty and

5 trustworthiness of the named plaintiff” on a motion for class certification. Savino v.

6 Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998).

7

GreenPoint acknowledges that “the role of the brokers in perpetuating these

8 falsehoods is not yet clear,” but still insists that “there is ample evidence from which to infer

9 that the Plaintiffs were willing participants in, if not the initiators of, this pattern of

10 deception.” Opp’n at 11. However, the Court cannot conclude on the record before it that

11 Plaintiffs lack the integrity necessary to be adequate class representatives. Plaintiffs’

12 evidence demonstrates that they did not fill out the loan applications that contained the false

13 information, and indeed did not even read the applications before signing them. Professor

14 Jackson has also offered authority showing the “proclivity of mortgage brokers to exploit the

15 ignorance and misunderstandings of individual borrowers.” Jackson Reply at 6.

16

The concerns about Plaintiffs’ integrity raised by GreenPoint are insufficient to bar

17 class certification. The Court is satisfied by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s experience in prosecuting

18 class actions, and has seen no evidence of any disqualifying conflicts of interest between

19 Plaintiffs and other class members. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs are

20 adequate class representatives, which means that all four requirements of Rule 23(a) have

21 been met.

22

23 II. Rule 23(b)(3)

24

Since Plaintiffs have satisfied the four prongs of Rule 23(a), the Court now turns to

25 the two requirements of Rule 23(b)(3): whether common questions predominate, and whether

26 adjudicating the case as a class action is superior to other methods. Both requirements were

27 added to the Federal Rules “to cover cases ‘in which a class action would achieve economies

28 of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly

19

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.’”

2 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)

3 Adv. Comm. Notes to 1966 Amendment).

4

5 A. Predominance

6

Predominance, which “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to

7 warrant adjudication by representation,” is a “far more demanding” standard than Rule

8 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623-24. Rule 23(b)(3)

9 requires the Court to find “that the questions of law or fact common to class members

10 predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Whereas Rule 23(a)(2)

11 is satisfied by the presence of common questions, “Rule 23(b)(3) requires a district court to

12 formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will play out in order to determine

13 whether common or individual issues predominate in a given case.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart

14 Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 593 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation

15 omitted).

16

GreenPoint attacks predominance by resurrecting its arguments against commonality.

17 Here, however, Plaintiffs carry the higher burden of showing not only that common issues

18 exist, but that they predominate. Since legitimate factors can explain the disparities between

19 the APRs of minority and white borrowers, GreenPoint contends that “the only way to

20 proceed here would be to examine each broker and each transaction.” Opp’n at 22. Even if

21 Plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination, “GreenPoint would be entitled to

22 (and would in fact) present evidence on a transaction-by-transaction basis to show that there

23 was not discrimination.” Id.

24

Since the standard for assessing predominance is higher than that of commonality, the

25 Court’s finding of common issues of fact and law does not dictate the result here. Although

26 individualized issues cannot defeat commonality where common issues exist, they can

27 foreclose the conclusion that such issues predominate. Assessing predominance therefore

28

20

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 requires a closer examination of Plaintiffs’ claims and how those claims are to be proven at

2 trial.

3

A plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim under the FHA or the ECOA must

4 establish “‘(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral . . . practices, and (2) a

5 significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular [type] produced by

6 the [defendant’s] facially neutral acts or practices.’” Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d

7 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pfaff v. United States HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir.

8 1996)). To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must “show at least that the defendant’s

9 [policy] had a discriminatory effect.’” Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 745 (quoting Keith v. Volpe, 858

10 F.2d 467, 482 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Budnick, 518 F.3d at 1118 (“A plaintiff need not

11 establish discriminatory intent but the discriminatory impact must be proven; an inference of

12 discriminatory impact is not sufficient.”). “Statistical analysis is admissible to establish

13 disparate impact.” Budnick, 518 F.3d at 1118. To rebut the prima facie case, a defendant

14 must supply “a legally sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason” for the policy, i.e. a “compelling

15 business necessity.” Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 746-47. A defendant charged with discrimination may

16 also “diffuse a prima facie case against him, and hence avoid the need to supply a legally

17 sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason in rebuttal, by successfully challenging the statistical

18 basis of this case.” Id. at 746.

19

Plaintiffs’ claim challenges GreenPoint’s discretionary pricing policy, not the

20 individual actions of its 27,000 authorized brokers. The key question is whether that policy

21 had a disparate impact – whether it fell “more harshly on one group than another and cannot

22 be justified by business necessity.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,

23 335 n.15 (1977). The relevant evidence, as with most disparate impact cases, will focus on

24 “statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those

25 disparities.” Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). Professor

26 Jackson’s analysis provides evidence of the disparate impact on a class-wide basis.

27 Competing explanations for those disparities are examined by way of regression analyses

28 that assess the effect of competing variables. GreenPoint can defend against Plaintiffs’ case

21

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 in two ways: by demonstrating that its discretionary policy had a valid business justification,

2 and by challenging the statistical basis for Plaintiffs’ claim. See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 746-47. In

3 either case, the defense applies across the class. Common questions therefore appear to

4 predominate.

5

However, GreenPoint contends that it will be entitled to present evidence on a broker-

6 by-broker and transaction-by-transaction basis to demonstrate that disparities were based on

7 legitimate, non-discriminatory factors. The work performed by a broker can vary

8 considerably from customer to customer, ranging from filling out a loan application and

9 advising customers about the maximum mortgage they can afford to assisting borrowers in

10 repairing damaged credit. GreenPoint argues that the amount of work a broker expends on

11 an application, and facts particular to each broker – like overhead costs – constitute

12 legitimate variation that may account for the racial and ethnic disparities alleged by

13 Plaintiffs.

14

GreenPoint appears to misapprehend the basis for Plaintiffs’ claim. The brokers are

15 not being sued; GreenPoint is. Plaintiffs identify GreenPoint’s policy as the basis for the

16 disparate impact. Such claims are proven not by sifting through every incident and weighing

17 anecdotal justifications for each, but by considering how a common policy collectively

18 affects a group. The inquiry will focus on “statistical disparities,” not “specific incidents.”

19 Watson, 487 U.S. at 987. Defending against this lawsuit will not require the kind of broker-

20 by-broker assessment GreenPoint envisions. Rather, it will require GreenPoint to

21 demonstrate that its discretionary pricing policy was justified by valid business reasons, or

22 that there was no disparate impact in the first place.

23

At hearing, GreenPoint directed the Court to cases outside the Ninth Circuit in which

24 class certification was denied for claims similar to Plaintiffs’ – alleging racial discrimination

25 in the pricing of car loans – because they faltered at the predominance inquiry. In Rodriguez

26 v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Judge Conlon of the Northern District of Illinois denied class

27 certification with respect to allegations that “Ford Credit’s finance charge policy allows the

28 individual dealerships to impose a higher finance charge markup on Hispanic customers than

22

1 other similarly situated non-Hispanic customers.” No. 01 C 8526, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

2 7280, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002). Although the Rodriguez plaintiffs intended to rely on

3 statistical evidence to establish discrimination, Judge Conlon concluded that they failed to

4 show that “legitimate consideration[s], such as creditworthiness, . . . did not play any role in

5 the interest rate charged to Hispanic customers.” Id. at *15-16. She therefore concluded that

6 “a trial would require an individualized inquiry into the reasons for thousands of credit

7 decisions.” Id. at *16. Here, to the contrary, Professor Jackson’s regression analysis

8 controlled for legitimate factors and – if credited by the finder of fact – forecloses such

9 explanations for minority borrowers’ loan rates.

10

In oral argument, GreenPoint also cited – for the first time – Coleman v. GMAC, in

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11 which Judge Trauger of the Middle District of Tennessee denied certification under Rule

12 23(b)(3) after concluding that common issues did not predominate.8 196 F.R.D. 315 (M.D.

13 Tenn. 2000). The plaintiff in Coleman alleged that she and other African-American

14 borrowers were charged a higher markup for car loans from GMAC than white borrowers.

15 The GMAC pricing system at issue in Coleman was comprised, as here, of two components:

16 an objective “risk-related rate” set by GMAC, as well as a “subjective non risk related

17 markup” determined by the dealers. Id. at 318. Judge Trauger concluded that the plaintiff

18 had failed to establish that individual factors – such as “negotiation skills, buyer preferences,

19 and self-assessment of creditworthiness” – “played no role in whether a finance charge

20 markup was charged and the amount of any such markup.” Id. at 322. Common issues

21 therefore did not predominate, and certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was inappropriate.

22 Again, however, the court’s decision hinged on the plaintiff’s failure to show that legitimate

23 factors did not explain the disparity in loan rates; here, Plaintiffs have made such a showing.

24

25

8 GreenPoint’s counsel did not specify which opinion he was citing: the original district court decision certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(2) but denying Rule 23(b)(3)

26

certification, Coleman v. GMAC, 196 F.R.D. 315 (M.D. Tenn. 2000); the Sixth Circuit’s decision vacating the 23(b)(2) certification, 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002); or the district

27

court’s grant of class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) on remand following amendment of the complaint, 220 F.R.D. 64 (M.D. Tenn. 2004). Since counsel cited the decision for its

28

denial of 23(b)(3) certification, the Court assumes he was referencing the first of those decisions.

23

1 Whether that showing will convince a trier of fact is a question that must await the merits

2 phase.

3

GreenPoint further contends, citing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Schuetz v. Banc One

4 Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004 (2002), that it is impermissible in the Ninth Circuit “to

5 certify a class where analysis of mortgage brokers’ compensation is required.” Opp’n at 20.

6 However, Schuetz has no bearing on the Court’s analysis here. The plaintiff in Schuetz

7 argued that “yield spread premiums”9 were unlawful kickbacks under the Real Estate

8 Settlement Procedures Act, and sought to certify “a class of borrowers whose loan

9 settlements included a yield spread premium payment.” Schuetz, 292 F.3d at 1008. Once it

10 concluded that “[y]ield spread premiums are not illegal per se,” the court found that “whether

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

11 they amount to a prohibited referral in any particular case depends upon the services

12 provided by the broker and the total compensation paid for those services.” Id. at 1014. For

13 that reason, individual issues predominated and class certification was inappropriate. Schuetz

14 does not support GreenPoint’s sweeping conclusion that class certification is never

15 appropriate where broker compensation is at issue.

16

The issue here is not whether the compensation paid to individual brokers was

17 reasonable in individual cases. Rather, the question that Plaintiffs raise is whether

18 GreenPoint’s discretionary pricing policy had a disparate impact on a class of 94,000

19 minority borrowers. Proof of disparate impact is based not on an examination of individual

20 claims, but on a statistical analysis of the class as a whole. Plaintiffs have demonstrated their

21 ability to show – using classwide proof – that GreenPoint’s discretionary pricing policy

22 caused higher rates to be charged to minority borrowers, and that legitimate factors are

23 unable to explain this disparity. To rebut this prima facie case, GreenPoint will have to

24 attack Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis or show a legitimate business justification for its

25 discretionary pricing policy, which will again call for classwide proof. Plaintiffs have carried

26 their burden of showing the predominance of common questions.

27

9 Yield spread premiums are “fees paid by mortgage lenders to mortgage brokers that

28

are based on the difference between the interest rate at which the broker originates the loan and the par, or market rate offered by the lender.” Schuetz, 292 F.3d at 1005.

24

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 B. Superiority

2

The final requirement for certification is “that a class action is superior to other

3 available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

4 23(b)(3). The superiority inquiry “requires determination of whether the objectives of the

5 particular class action procedure will be achieved in the particular case,” which “necessarily

6 involves a comparative evaluation of alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution.” Hanlon

7 v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998). Among the pertinent factors in

8 assessing superiority are “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the

9 prosecution or defense of separate actions” and “the likely difficulties in managing a class

10 action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The superiority inquiry focuses “on the efficiency and

11 economy elements of the class action so that cases allowed under subdivision (b)(3) are those

12 that can be adjudicated most profitably on a representative basis.” Zinser v. Accufix

13 Research Institute, Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001).

14

GreenPoint contends that the class action format would be unmanageable because the

15 Court will have to consider the individual circumstances of each broker and each loan. The

16 Court has already discredited that argument. Plaintiffs demonstrate that a class action is

17 superior for reasons of efficiency and manageability. Professor Jackson calculated an

18 average monetary recovery over five years per loan to be $1,093 for African-American

19 borrowers, and $1,076 for Hispanic borrowers; those numbers decline to $579 and $705,

20 respectively, when he alters his analysis to account for GreenPoint’s critiques. Such amounts

21 are too low for class members to bring individual claims; recovery would only be feasible via

22 class action. The class action is manageable because liability will be determined based on

23 common statistical proof, and remedies can be calculated on a class-wide basis. A class

24 action is therefore superior to other methods for adjudicating these claims.

25

26 III. Rule 23(g)

27

Having determined that Plaintiffs have met Rule 23’s requirements for class

28 certification, the Court must also appoint class counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (“[A] court

25

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 that certifies a class must appoint class counsel.”). On May 19, 2008, the Court appointed

2 the law firms of Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, P.C. (“Bonnett Fairbourn”) and

3 Roddy Klein & Ryan (“Roddy Klein”) to serve as Co-Lead Interim Class Counsel, and the

4 law firm of Chavez & Gertler to serve as Liaison Interim Class Counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

5 23(g)(3); Pre-Trial Order No. 1 (Doc. 53) at 1-2. The Court, finding that these law firms

6 continue to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(g)(1), appoints Bonnett Fairbourn and Roddy

7 Klein as Co-Lead Class Counsel, and Chavez & Gertler as Liaison Class Counsel.

8

9 CONCLUSION

10

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is

11 GRANTED. Plaintiffs have satisfied the four prongs of Rule 23(a), as well as the

12 predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). A class of “[a]ll African-

13 American or Hispanic persons throughout the United States to whom GreenPoint originated a

14 residential-secured loan in GreenPoint’s wholesale lending channel between January 1, 2004

15 and January 1, 2008” is hereby certified. Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, and Jorge

16 Salazar are appointed class representatives. The law firms of Bonnett Fairbourn and Roddy

17 Klein are appointed as Co-Lead Class Counsel, and Chavez & Gertler as Liaison Class

18 Counsel.

19

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the parties shall appear for a case management

20 conference on Monday, August 30, 2010, at 1:30pm. The parties shall file a joint case

21 management statement no fewer than seven days prior to the conference.

22

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24

25 Dated: 7/20/10 26

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

27

28

26

 
 Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page1 of 28

1 Andrew S. Friedman (admitted pro hac vice)
Wendy J. Harrison (CA SBN 151090) 2 BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN, & BALINT, P.C.
3 2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 1000 Phoenix, Arizona 85012
4 Telephone: 602-274-1100
5 Facsimile: 602-274-1199

6 RODDY KLEIN & RYAN Gary Klein (admitted pro hac vice)
7 Shennan Kavanagh (admitted pro hac vice) 727 Atlantic Avenue
8 Boston, MA 02111-2810 Tel: (617) 357-5500, ext. 15
9 Fax: (617) 357-5030 E-mail: klein@roddykleinryan.com

10 [Additional counsel listed on signature page]

11 Co-Lead Class Counsel

12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

13 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

14 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
15

ANA RAMIREZ, ISMAEL RAMIREZ, 16 JORGE SALAZAR, AND EMANUEL
FANNING on behalf of themselves and all 17 others similarly situated,
18 Plaintiffs,
19

20

vs.

21 GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING,
22 INC.,

23 Defendant.
24

25

26

) Case No. 3:08-cv-00369-TEH

)

)

) SECOND AMENDED ) COMPLAINT FOR:

) 1. Violations of the Equal Credit

)

Opportunity Act; 15 U.S.C.

)

§ 1691; and

) ) )

2. Violations of the Fair Housing Act; 42 U.S.C. § 3601.

) CLASS ACTION )

))

) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

)

)

)

)

27

28

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page2 of 28

1

Plaintiffs, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar, and Emanuel Fanning,

2 (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by their

3 undersigned attorneys, allege as follows:

4

INTRODUCTION

5

1.

This is a class action brought by Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other

6 similarly situated minority homeowners, against GREENPOINT Mortgage Funding, Inc.

7 (“GREENPOINT”) under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq.
8 (“ECOA”) and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Plaintiffs seek remedies for
9 themselves and the Class (defined in ¶11, below) for the discriminatory effects of the
10
11 Defendant’s home financing policies and practices.

12

2. As described below, GREENPOINT has established a specific, identifiable and

13 uniform credit pricing system, a component of which, referred to herein as the Discretionary

14 Pricing Policy, authorizes unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an
15 otherwise objective risk-based financing rate. In other words, after a finance rate acceptable to
16 GREENPOINT is determined by objective criteria (e.g., the individual’s credit history, credit
17 score, debt-to-income ratio and loan-to-value ratios), GREENPOINT’s credit pricing policy
18
19 authorizes additional discretionary financing charges and interest rate mark-ups. These

20 subjective, additional finance charges have a widespread discriminatory impact on minority

21 applicants for home mortgage loans, in violation of ECOA and the FHA.

22

3.

GREENPOINT has established policies for retail and wholesale access to its loan

23 products that subject minority financing applicants to a significantly higher likelihood of
24 exposure to discretionary points, fees and interest rate mark-ups. These costs drive up the
25

26 average cost of a mortgage loan made by GREENPOINT to minority applicants.

27

4.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement and restitution of

28 monies disparately obtained from minority borrowers.

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1

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2

5.

Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

3 which confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action arising under federal law.

4

6.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) because a substantial

5 part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ and the Class’ claims occurred in this District, because
6
Defendant is headquartered in this District, and because Defendant regularly conducts business 7

8 in this District.

9

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

10

7. Intradistrict assignment pursuant to Local Rule 3-2(c) is proper in the San

11 Francisco Division as this action arises in San Francisco County and the surrounding counties as

12 Defendant regularly conducts business in this District and is headquartered in Sonoma County.

13 PARTIES

14

8.

Plaintiffs Ana and Ismael Ramirez (“the Ramirezes”) are minority homeowners

15 who reside at 46 Stellman Road, Roslindale, Massachusetts 02131.
16

9.

Plaintiff Jorge Salazar (“Salazar”) is a minority homeowner who resides at 4172

17

18 51st Street, San Diego, California 92105.

19

10. Plaintiff Emanuel Fanning ("Fanning") is a minority homeowner who resides at

20 999 Marshall Road, Apt. 75, Vacaville, CA 95687.

21

11. Defendant, GREENPOINT Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“GREENPOINT”)

22 originated sub-prime mortgage loans for approximately 20 years before closing its residential
23 loan business on August 20, 2007. GREENPOINT is headquartered at 100 Wood Hollow Drive,
24

25 Novato, California, 94945.

26

27

28

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1

FACTS

2 I. MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORICALLY HAS

3

DISCRIMINATED AGAINST MINORITIES

4

12. The mortgage lending industry has a long history of racial discrimination, offering

5 minorities products and terms that are drastically worse than those given to their similarly
6 situated white counterparts. 7
13. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University’s 2005 8
study called “The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage 9
10 Lending,” mortgage lending discrimination today is subtle but pervasive, with minority
11 consumers continuing to have less-than-equal access to loans at the best price and on the best

12 terms that their credit history, income, and other individual financial considerations merit more

13 than three decades after the enactment of national fair lending legislation.
14 14. The passage of civil rights legislation and fair lending laws in the 1960s and
15 1970s brought an end to the most virulent forms of overt racial discrimination in the housing
16 markets, but throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mortgage lenders found more subtle ways to
17
18 discriminate, including maintaining offices only in white neighborhoods and engaging in

19 practices such as redlining (refusing to lend on properties in predominantly minority

20 neighborhoods).

21

15. After such redlining practices were challenged in the 1990s, mortgage lenders

22 changed tactics once again, making loans to minorities, but charging higher interest rates and
23 loan-related fees than they charged to similarly-situated white borrowers. Loan data that
24

25 mortgage lenders must now compile and disclose under the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure

26 Act (“HMDA”) reveals profound loan pricing disparities between minority borrowers and

27 similarly-situated white borrowers.

28

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1

16. The HMDA requires mortgage lenders to report information about the home loans

2 they process each year. In 2005, lenders reported information on more than 30 million home
3 loan applications pursuant to HMDA. In 1989, Congress required lenders to begin disclosing 4
information about mortgage borrowers’ race and ethnicity. In 2004, concerned with potential 5
racial discrimination in loan pricing and recognizing that racial or other types of discrimination 6
7 can occur when loan officers and mortgage brokers have latitude in setting interest rates, the
8 Federal Reserve Board began requiring lenders to also report information concerning rates,

9 points, and fees, charged to borrowers on high-cost loans.

10

17. According to the Federal Reserve, both 2004 and 2005 HMDA data revealed that

11 “Blacks and minority borrowers were more likely . . . to have received higher-priced loans than
12 non-minority whites. . . . [which has] increased concern about the fairness of the lending
13
process.” Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort and Glenn B. Canner, “Higher-Priced Home 14

15 Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, A124, A159 (revised Sept. 18,

16 2006) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf (last viewed

17 March 5, 2008).)

18

18. HMDA data for 2004 reveals profound loan pricing disparities between minority

19 borrowers and non-minority whites even after controlling for borrowers’ gender, income,
20 property location, and loan amount. After accounting for those differences in the 2004 HMDA
21

22 data, minority borrowers were still almost twice as likely to receive a higher-rate home loan as

23 non-minority whites. (http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Testimony-Ernst061306.pdf (last

24 viewed March 5, 2008).) In a speech in 2006, the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Deposit

25 Insurance Corporation, Martin Gruenberg, discussed the 2004 HMDA data and observed that
26 that data “clearly indicated” that minority borrowers are more likely to receive high-cost home
27 loans than are non-minority whites. (http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/
28 2006/chairman/spoct1806.html (last viewed March 5, 2008).)
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1

19. Likewise, HMDA data for 2005 shows that “for conventional home-purchase

2 loans, the gross mean incidence of higher-priced lending was 54.7 percent for blacks and 17.2

3 percent for non-Hispanic whites, a difference of 37.5 percentage points.” Avery, supra, at A159.

4 The situation is similar for refinancings, where there is a difference of 28.3 percentage points
5
between blacks and non-minority whites. Id. at A124, A159. 6

7

20. In 2003, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) released a

8 report on credit discrimination titled, “The Broken System: Discrimination and Unequal Access

9 to Affordable Loans by Race and Age,” that indicated that consumers living in areas with more

10 minority residents are more likely to have mortgages with interest rates higher than the
11 “prevailing and competitive” rates, often because of discrimination in lending. Available at
12 http://ncrc.org/policy/cra/documents/ncrcdiscrimstudy.pdf.
13 21. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) Data for 2006 revealed that black and
14
15 Hispanic borrowers are more likely to obtain higher-priced loans than are white borrowers. The

16 data indicated that black homeowners who received subprime mortgage loans were much more

17 likely to be issued a higher-rate loan than white borrowers with the same qualifications.

18 Available at www.ffiec.gov./hmda. (last viewed February 15, 2008).
19 22. In 2006, the Center for Responsible Lending, a non-profit research organization,
20 uncovered “large and statistically significant” differences between the rates of subprime loans
21 22 offered to blacks and whites, even when income and credit risk were taken into consideration.
23 Compared to their otherwise similarly-situated white counterparts, blacks were 31-34% more

24 likely to receive higher rate fixed-rate loans and 6-15% more likely to receive adjustable-rate

25 loans. “Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages,”
26 available at www.responsiblelending.org.
27 23. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN)
28 released a report entitled “The High Cost of Credit: Disparities in High-priced Refinanced Loans
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1 to minority Homeowners in 125 American Cities,” dated September 27, 2005, that found that

2 “[i]n every metropolitan area where at least 50 refinances were made to African-American
3 homeowners, African-Americans were more likely to receive a high-cost loan than White 4
homeowners.” 5
24. A growing number of research studies and investigations show that significant 6
7 racial disparities still exist. California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., “Paying More for the
8 American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending” (March

9 2007) (http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/2007_Report-2005_HMDA.pdf (last viewed

10 March 5, 2008); Ross, “The Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination” (Revised July
11 2006) (Univ. of Connecticut, Working Paper 2005-19R) (http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
12 working/2005-19r.pdf) (last viewed March 5, 2008).
13 25. In March 2008, the California Reinvestment Coalition, jointly with several other
14
15 non-profit and housing advocacy groups, published another report examining the impact of

16 lending by subprime, high-risk lenders in 7 metropolitan areas – Boston, Charlotte, Chicago,

17 Cleveland, Los Angeles, New York City and Rochester, NY. Among other things, the study

18 showed that subprime high –risk lenders are concentrated in minority neighborhoods. Data
19 supporting this finding demonstrated that subprime high-risk lenders had 20% of the market
20 share in predominantly minority neighborhoods in these metro areas, compared to a 4% market
21 22 share in predominantly white neighborhoods. In addition, over 40% of the loans made by
23 subprime high-risk lenders were in neighborhoods where 80% or more of the residents were

24 minorities. In stark contrast, less than 10% of subprime high-risk lender loans were in areas

25 where less than 10% of the residents were minorities.

26

26. In metro Boston, where the Ramirezes reside, the same study shows that

27 subprime, high-risk lenders had 22% of the home loan market in neighborhoods where more than
28
80% of the residents were minorities, while subprime high-risk lenders had only 5% of the

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1 market for home loans in neighborhoods where less than 10% of the residents were minorities. In

2 6 of the 7 metro areas analyzed, the subprime high-risk lender market share in predominantly

3 minority neighborhoods was at least 3 times the subprime high-risk lender market share in
4 predominantly white neighborhoods. California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., “Paying More
5 for the American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending”
6
7 (March 2008) (http://www.nedap.org/resources/reports.html) (last viewed March 12, 2008).

8

27. Moreover, and importantly, research studies have suggested that borrowers’ credit

9 profiles cannot fully explain why some borrowers, and not others, are saddled with higher cost

10 loans.
11 28. As an example, research by Howell Jackson of Harvard Law School, detailed in
12 the article Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums (Harvard Univ.), H.
13 Jackson and J. Berry, available at
14
15 http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/pdfs/january_draft.pdf (last viewed March 5,

16 2008), concluded that the substantially higher mortgage broker compensation received as the

17 result of yield spread premiums could not fully be explained when controlling for variables

18 associated with creditworthiness.
19 29. In short, a number of researchers have raised “doubts that risk can adequately
20 explain racial differences” in high-cost loans. Bradford, Center for Community Change, “Risk
21 22 or Race? Racial Disparities and the Subprime Refinance Market” (May 2002)
23 (http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/report/

24 report/relfiles/ccc_0729_risk.pdf) (last viewed March 5, 2008). In other words, evidence

25 “suggests that weak borrower credit profiles do not fully explain why some borrowers get stuck
26 with higher-cost home loans.” California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., “Paying More for the
27 American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending” (March
28 2007).
-7SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 II. GREENPOINT’S DISCRETIONARY PRICING POLICY CONTINUES THE

2

PERVASIVE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES IN MORTGAGE

3

LENDING

4

30. For approximately 20 years, GREENPOINT publicly promoted its home

5 financing expertise by means of nationwide advertising campaigns. In its advertisements,

6 GREENPOINT solicited persons to apply for financing with GREENPOINT either in one of its

7 offices or through one of the mortgage brokers whom GREENPOINT had authorized to accept
8
applications on its behalf. 9

10

31. GREENPOINT made home-mortgage loans directly to consumers through its

11 branches in several markets.

12

32. GREENPOINT also made home-mortgage loans that were arranged by its

13 network of mortgage brokers. Those loans were made in reliance on GREENPOINT’s credit-
14 granting policies and with GREENPOINT’s participation.
15 33. Due to GREENPOINT’s policies as to where to place its offices and how to
16 market its products, minority borrowers were more likely than white borrowers to apply for
17
18 credit from GREENPOINT by an application made to an authorized broker rather than one made

19 directly to GREENPOINT.

20

34. Because of the Discretionary Pricing Policy, loans obtained through

21 GREENPOINT’s network of brokers are more expensive to minority homeowners, on average,
22 than loans obtained directly from GREENPOINT.
23 35. A high-APR loan is a loan whose APR is at least three percentage points higher
24
25 than the interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities of the same maturity, at the time the loan was

26 made.

27

36. Based on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) data from the Department

28 of Housing and Urban Development, minorities who borrowed from GREENPOINT between

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1 2004 and 2006 are almost 50% more likely than white borrowers to have received a high-APR

2 loan to purchase or refinance their home.

3

37. While credit differences may explain some part of the disparities in rate and

4 terms, GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy accounts for a significant portion of the
5
disparity. 6

7

38. GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy is unrelated to a borrower’s

8 objective credit characteristics such as credit history, credit score, debt-to-income ratio and loan-

9 to-value ratios and results in charges that are determined on a purely subjective basis and that

10 adversely affect the rate otherwise available to borrowers.

11 39. GREENPOINT provided authorized mortgage brokers with substantial
12 information about its loan programs, rates and credit criteria, as well as its policies for
13
compensating mortgage brokers and correspondent lenders who arrange business for it. 14

15

40. GREENPOINT authorized mortgage brokers who have signed a contract with it

16 to accept applications on its behalf, quote financing rates and terms for loans from it (within the

17 limitations set by GREENPOINT), inform credit applicants of GREENPOINT’s financing

18 options and to originate finance transactions using GREENPOINT’s forms, in accordance with

19 its policies.
20 41.
21

In all of the home mortgage finance transactions at issue, GREENPOINT

22 advanced the funds to make the loans and bears some or all of the risk of default.

23 GREENPOINT provided its loan officers and brokers with credit applications, loan contracts and

24 other required financing forms, as well as instructions on filling out such documents necessary to

25 complete home mortgage transactions.

26

42. After a customer provided credit information to one of GREENPOINT’s loan

27 officers or brokers, GREENPOINT computed a financing rate through an objective credit
28
analysis that, in general, discerned the creditworthiness of the customer.

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1

43. These credit analyses considered numerous risk-related variables of

2 creditworthiness, including credit bureau histories, payment amounts, debt-to-asset ratio,

3 bankruptcies, automobile repossessions, charge-offs, prior foreclosures, payment histories, credit
4 score, debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios and other risk-related attributes or variables.
5 On information and belief, GREENPOINT used these variables to determine a “mortgage score”
6
7 for each credit applicant.

8

44. Based on these objective risk-related variables and the resulting mortgage score,

9 GREENPOINT derived a risk-based financing rate at which it would provide a home mortgage,

10 often called the “Par Rate.” Alternatively, experienced GREENPOINT loan officers, brokers
11 and correspondent lenders could estimate the risk-related Par Rate by referring to the applicant’s
12 credit bureau determined credit score.
13 45. Although GREENPOINT’s initial analysis applied objective criteria to calculate
14
15 this risk-related Par Rate, GREENPOINT then authorized a subjective component in its credit

16 pricing system—the Discretionary Pricing Policy—to impose additional non-risk-related

17 charges. On information and belief, GREENPOINT communicated the applicable Par Rates and
18 authorized discretionary charges to its loan officers and brokers via regularly published “rate
19 sheets.” GREENPOINT published such rate sheets via intranet and internet means.
20 46. The discretionary charges are paid by the customer as a component of the total
21 22 finance charge (the “Contract APR”), without the homeowner knowing that a portion of their
23 Contract APR was a non-risk-related charge.

24

47. Loan officers and brokers had discretion, within the limits set by GREENPOINT,

25 to impose discretionary mark-ups as additional points in interest–”a rate mark-up.” When there
26 was a rate mark-up, GREENPOINT shared the additional income, even if a broker originated the
27 loan.
28

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1

48. GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy, by design, causes persons with

2 identical or similar credit scores to pay different amounts for the cost of credit. As a result of

3 using a subjective pricing component that is designed to charge persons with the same credit
4 profiles different amounts of finance charge, the objective qualities of the initial credit analysis
5 used to calculate the Par Rate are undermined and the potential for race bias becomes inherent in
6
7 the transaction.

8

49. The Discretionary Pricing Policy, although facially neutral (insofar as

9 GREENPOINT uses the same or effectively the same policy for all credit applicants), has a

10 disproportionately adverse effect on minority borrowers compared to similarly situated whites in
11 that minority borrowers pay disparately more discretionary charges (both in frequency and
12 amount) than similarly situated whites. Statistical analysis of discretionary charges imposed on
13 minority and white customers of other mortgage companies that use credit pricing systems
14
15 structured like that of GREENPOINT has revealed that minority borrowers, after controlling for

16 credit risk, are substantially more likely than similarly situated whites to pay such charges.

17

50. Loan officers and brokers were agents of GREENPOINT for the purpose of

18 setting credit price, which was always set based on GREENPOINT’s policy.
19 51. The disparate impact suffered by minority borrowers is a direct result of
20 GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy in that GREENPOINT designed, disseminated,
21 22 controlled, implemented and profited from the Discretionary Pricing Policy creating the disparate
23 impact.

24

52. GREENPOINT has a non-delegable duty to ensure that its mortgage financing

25 structure and policies do not have a disparate impact on legally protected classes, such as
26 minority borrowers. Despite having such a non-delegable duty, GREENPOINT has chosen to
27 use a commission-driven, subjective pricing policy that it knows or should have known has a
28 significant and pervasive adverse impact on minority homeowners.
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1

53. The disparities between the terms of GREENPOINT’s transactions involving

2 minority homeowners and the terms involving white homeowners cannot be a product of chance
3 and cannot be explained by factors unrelated to race, but, instead, are the direct causal result of 4
the use of the discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy. 5
54. There are no legitimate business reasons justifying GREENPOINT’s 6
7 discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy that could not be achieved by a policy that has no
8 discriminatory impact or a greatly reduced discriminatory impact.

9

55. Commission-driven, discretionary pricing systems–such as those in the real estate

10 mortgage industry that are structurally similar to the system utilized by GREENPOINT–have
11 been found to produce significant discriminatory effects. Knowledge concerning the significant
12 and pervasive discriminatory impact of such commission-driven, discretionary credit pricing
13 systems has been widely circulated throughout the financing industry for several years,
14
15 particularly since 1994, as a result of numerous high profile actions by the United States

16 Department of Justice and federal regulatory agencies. GREENPOINT has known or should

17 have known that its credit pricing system causes minority borrowers to pay the Defendant more

18 for mortgage financing than the amounts paid by white customers with identical or effectively
19 identical credit scores. The following various regulatory settlements involved discriminatory
20 pricing policies structurally similar to GREENPOINT’s pricing policy and were widely reported
21
22 through the financing industry:

23

United States v. Blackpipe State Bank, Civ. Act. No. 93-5115 (D. S.D. filed

November 16, 1993)(charging American Indians higher interest rates)

24 United States v. First National Bank of Vicksburg, No. 5:94 CV 6(B)(N) (S.D. Miss.

25

filed Jan. 21, 1994) (charging African-Americans higher interest rates)

26

United States v. Huntington Mortgage Co., No. 1; 95 CV 2211 (N.D. Ohio filed

October 18, 1995)(charging African-Americans higher fees)

27 United States v. Security State Bank of Pecos, No. SA 95 CA 0996 (W.D.Tex. filed

28

October 15, 1995)(charging minority borrowers higher interest rates)

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1

United States v. First National Bank of Gordon, No. CIV-96-5035 (W.D.S.D. filed

April 15, 1996)(charging American Indians higher interest rates)

2

United States v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., No. 96-2279 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 7,

3

1996)(charging African-Americans and minority borrowers higher interest rates)

4

United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. CV-96-6159 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5,

1996)(charging African-Americans, Latinos, women and persons over age 55 higher

5

interest rates)

6 III. GREENPOINT’S DISCRETIONARY PRICING POLICY DISCRIMATED

7

AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

8 Facts Relating To The Ramirezes

9

56. Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez and Ismael Ramirez reside at 46 Stellman Road,

10 Roslindale, Massachusetts 02131.

11

57. In 2005, the Ramirezes sought to refinance their existing home loan to obtain cash

12 and to do construction on their home. The Ramirezes’ former real estate broker, Ms. Santana,
13
referred them to First Call Mortgage Company, Inc. (“First Call”), a mortgage broker. 14

15

58. On August 3, 2005, the Ramirezes entered into a mortgage transaction with

16 GREENPOINT as lender and First Call as broker.

17

59. The Ramirezes’ loan contained a 2.000% one-month “teaser rate” that was set to

18 adjust upwards only immediately as of October 1, 2005 and could potentially reset every month

19 thereafter. The cap on the interest rate is 12.000%.
20 60. The Ramirezes’ loan has a 30-year term and a disclosed APR of 6.191%. The
21
loan amount was $469,000.00. 22

23

61. According to the Ramirezes’ HUD-One Settlement Statement, First Call was paid

24 a $5,276.25 Yield Spread Premium, $4,690.00 in Broker Points, and a $500.00 Processing Fee.

25

62. On information and belief, unbeknownst to the Ramirezes, the contract APR on

26 the mortgage loans was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a
27 totally subjective, discretionary component paid to First Call pursuant to GREENPOINT’s
28 Discretionary Pricing Policy.
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1

63. On information and belief, the Ramirezes were subject to GREENPOINT's

2 Discretionary Pricing Policy.

3

64. On information and belief, the Ramirezes were charged a disproportionately

4 greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly-situated white persons.
5
65. The Ramirezes were not offered less expensive loan products that were available 6

7 to borrowers with his credit characteristics directly under GREENPOINT'S policies.

8 Facts Relating To Mr. Salazar

9

66. Plaintiff Jorge Salazar resides at 4172 51st Street, San Diego, California 92105

10 and maintains a rental property at 4174 51st Street, San Diego, California, 92105.

11

67. In August 2006, Mr. Salazar sought to refinance his home and rental property.

12 Mr. Salazar's tax agent, Alicia Bruche, referred him to GREENPOINT and its authorized broker,
13 TLN Financial.
14
68. On August 17, 2006, Mr. Salazar entered into a mortgage transaction with 15

16 GREENPOINT as the lender and TLN Financial as broker.

17

69. Mr. Salazar's loan has a 30-year term and a disclosed APR of 7.181%. The loan

18 amount was $475,000.00.

19

70. According to Mr. Salazar's HUD-One Settlement Statement, TLN Financial was

20 paid a $2,375.00 Yield Spread Premium on a "POC" basis (i.e., paid outside of closing), a
21 $11,625.00 Origination Fee, and a $1,290 Processing Fee.
22

23

71. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Mr. Salazar, the contract APR on the

24 mortgage loan was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally

25 subjective, discretionary component paid to TLN Financial pursuant to GREENPOINT'S

26 Discretionary Pricing Policy.

27

72. On information and belief, Mr. Salazar was subject to GREENPOINT'S

28 Discretionary Pricing Policy.

-14SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page16 of 28

1

73. On information and belief, Mr. Salazar was charged a disproportionately greater

2 amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly-situated white persons.

3

74. Mr. Salazar was not offered less expensive loan products that were available to

4 borrowers with his credit characteristics directly under GREENPOINT'S policies.
5
Facts Relating To Mr. Fanning 6
75. Plaintiff Emanuel Fanning resides at 999 Marshall Road, Apt. 75, Vacaville, CA 7

8 95687.

9

76. On May 17,, 2006, Mr. Fanning entered into a wholesale mortgage transaction

10 with GREENPOINT as lender. in the face amount of $1,000,000 at a fully indexed rate above

11 7.5%.
12 77. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Mr. Fanning, the contract APR on the
13 mortgage loan was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally
14 subjective, discretionary component paid to his mortgage broker pursuant to GREENPOINT’s
15
16 Discretionary Pricing Policy.

17

78. On information and belief, Mr. Fanning was subject to GREENPOINT'S

18 Discretionary Pricing Policy.

19

79. On information and belief, Mr. Fanning was charged a disproportionately greater

20 amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly-situated white persons.
21 80. Mr. Fanning was not offered less expensive loan products that were available to
22

23 borrowers with his credit characteristics directly under GREENPOINT'S policies.

24

81. Mr. Fanning’s loan resulted in foreclosure.

25

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

26

82. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

27

83. This class action is brought pursuant to ECOA and the FHA by the individual

28 named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all

-15SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page17 of 28

1

All African-American or Hispanic persons throughout the United States to whom

2

GreenPoint originated a residential-secured loan in GreenPoint’s wholesale lending

3

channel between January 1, 2004 and January 1, 2008 (the “class”).

4

84. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules

5 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6

85. “Discretionary Pricing Policy” means GREENPOINT’s policy of authorizing its

7 loan officers, brokers and correspondent lenders to impose subjective, discretionary charges and
8
interest rate mark-ups that are included in the loans they originate. 9

10

86. Plaintiffs do not know the exact size or identities of the proposed Class, since

11 such information is in the exclusive control of GREENPOINT. Plaintiffs believe that the Class

12 encompasses many thousands or tens of thousands of individuals who are geographically

13 dispersed throughout the United States. Therefore, the proposed class is so numerous that
14 joinder of all members is impracticable.
15 87. All members of the Class have been subject to and affected by the same
16 Discretionary Pricing Policy. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class,
17
18 and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These

19 questions include, but are not limited to the following:

20

a. the nature, scope and operations of GREENPOINT’s Discretionary

21

Pricing Policy;

22

b. whether GREENPOINT is a creditor under the ECOA because, for

23

example, in the ordinary course of its business it participates in the

24

decision of whether or not to extend credit to consumers;

25

c. whether GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy is a facially neutral

26

credit pricing system that has effected racial discrimination in violation of

27

ECOA;

28

-16SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page18 of 28

1

d. whether there are statistically significant disparities between the amount of

2

the discretionary charges imposed on minority persons and the amount of

3

the discretionary charges imposed on white persons that are unrelated to

4

creditworthiness;

5

e. whether there are any legitimate business reasons for the Discretionary

6

Pricing Policy, and if so, whether they can be achieved by a credit pricing

7

system less discriminatory in its impact;

8

f. whether the Court can enter declaratory and injunctive relief; and

9

g. the proper measure of disgorgement or damages.

10

88. The claims of the individual named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class

11 and do not conflict with the interests of any other members of the Class in that both the Plaintiffs
12 and the other members of the Class were subject to the same Discretionary Pricing Policy that 13
has disproportionately affected minority homeowners. 14
89. The individual named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests 15
16 of the Class. They are committed to the vigorous prosecution of the Class’ claims and have
17 retained attorneys who are qualified to pursue this litigation and have experience in class

18 actions–in particular, consumer protection and discrimination actions.

19

90. A class action is superior to other methods for the fast and efficient adjudication

20 of this controversy. A class action regarding the issues in this case does not create any problems
21 of manageability.
22
91. In the alternative, GREENPOINT has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 23

24 applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding

25 declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

26

27

28

-17SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page19 of 28

1

TOLLING / CONTINUING VIOLATION

2

92. The Discretionary Pricing Policy described in this Second Amended Class Action

3 Complaint constitutes a pattern or practice of discrimination because, as an integral part of
4 GREENPOINT's business plan, it was the standard operating procedure of GREENPOINT.
5 93. Application of GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy, and the
6
7 accompanying impact on minority borrowers, was not a sporadic, isolated practice, but rather

8 occurred every day that loans were extended, renewed or continued during the Class Period.

9

94. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to challenge the overall adverse impact on minority

10 borrowers wrought by GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy, rather than merely the
11 legality of their individual loans.
12 95. The claims of minority borrowers who obtained mortgage loans GREENPOINT
13 more than two years prior to the initiation of this action are timely. Under the continuing
14
15 violation doctrine, as set out by the Supreme Court in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.

16 363 (1982) and later written into the FHA, a statute of limitations may not bar claims where the

17 Plaintiffs challenge not just one incident, but an unlawful practice that continues into the

18 limitations period.

19 96. GREENPOINT's use of its Discretionary Pricing Policy occurred both before the
20 limitations period and during the limitations period.
21

22

97. There is a substantial nexus between the acts of discrimination occurring within

23 the limitation periods prior to filing suit, and the acts of discrimination before that time. The acts

24 involve the same type of discrimination and are recurring, not isolated events.

25

98. Plaintiffs and the putative class members were exposed to discrimination as

26 members of a group (i.e. minority borrowers of GREENPOINT) that suffered an adverse impact
27 within the limitations period.
28

-18SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page20 of 28

1

99. The subject matter of all of the alleged violations is identical. The violations

2 constitute the same type of discrimination – minority borrowers subjected to the Discretionary

3 Pricing Policy were disparately impacted as described in this Second Amended Class Action

4 Complaint.
5
100. 6

Further, despite the exercise of due diligence, a reasonably prudent person would

7 not have knowledge of GREENPOINT's discriminatory practices more than two years prior to

8 the initiation of this action. The causes of action of the Plaintiffs and putative class members did

9 not accrue until shortly before the filing of this action.

10

101. The nature of GREENPOINT's violations – and the nature of a disparate impact

11 claim – is not such that the act of making a single loan to a borrower has such a degree of
12 permanence as to trigger a reasonably prudent borrower’s awareness of a need to assert his
13
rights. The nature of a disparate impact claim is such that it only manifests itself after a critical 14

15 mass of similar borrowers have the same experience – information that a single borrower would

16 not have access to.

17

102. GREENPOINT's employment of the Discretionary Pricing Policy means that

18 minority borrowers are subjected to increased mortgage-related costs, in the form of higher
19 interest rates and ongoing payments than would be the case in the absence of discrimination.
20 103. Home foreclosures disproportionately occur in predominantly minority
21
22 neighborhoods. See, e.g., Juliana Barbassa, Report: Minorities Hit By Foreclosures, USA

23 Today, March 6, 2008; National Training & Information Center, Preying on Neighborhoods,

24 2007 Foreclosure Update, March 3, 2008 available at http://www.ntic-

25 us.org/images/fullyear2007.pdf.

26

104. On information and belief, many of the putative class members in this action live

27 in predominantly minority neighborhoods.
28

-19SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page21 of 28

1

105. But for the effects of the Discretionary Pricing Policy, i.e., the ongoing higher

2 interest rates and payments, the foreclosure rate among GREENPOINT's minority borrowers
3 would have been lower. 4
106. Minority neighborhoods suffer severe deleterious effects from increased 5
foreclosures. A Woodstock Institute Study has demonstrated that “foreclosures, particularly in 6
7 lower-income neighborhoods, can lead to vacant, boarded-up, or abandoned properties. These
8 properties, in turn, contribute to the stock of ‘physical disorder’ in a community that can create a

9 haven for criminal activity, discourage social capital formation, and lead to further

10 disinvestment…and lower property values for existing residential homeowners.” Dan

11 Immergluck & Geoff Smith, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Effect of Single-Family
12 Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, Woodstock Institute Study (June 2005) available at
13
http://www.nw.org/foreclosuresolutions/reports/documents/TGTN_Report.pdf. 14

15

107. All residents of these neighborhoods suffer from these effects, including many of

16 the putative class members, resulting in injury from GREENPOINT's use of the Discretionary

17 Pricing Policy within the limitations period.

18

108. Additionally, this discrimination has only recently been disclosed and quantified.

19 It has only been in the last several years that mortgage lenders have been required to submit
20 details of their sub-prime home loans under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and that such
21

22 data has been disclosed and studied by experts in the field.

23

109. Moreover, on January 29, 2009, President Obama signed the “Lilly Ledbetter Fair

24 Pay Act of 2009” into law. The legislation effectively overrules Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &

25 Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), a case upon which other Defendants with similar ECOA and
26 FHA claims against them rely to argue that the 2 year statutes of limitation in the ECOA and
27 FHA are not tolled. The Act defines an unlawful employment practice as occurring, inter alia,
28 “each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such
-20SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page22 of 28

1 a [discriminatory] decision or other practice.” The law’s effective date is May 28, 2007 and it

2 applies to all claims pending at that time.

3

110. GREENPOINT's discriminatory conduct was inherently self-concealing.

4 GREENPOINT knew that Plaintiffs and Class Members could not determine the relationship
5
between the terms, fees, and costs of their loans to those available to non-minorities. 6

7 GREENPOINT knew that the terms, fees, and costs provided to minorities, unbeknownst to

8 them, were substantially worse than the loans provided to non-minorities.

9

111. GREENPOINT has not released or provided information about its discrimination

10 against Plaintiffs and Class Members, and has actively and fraudulently concealed its
11 discriminatory practices.
12 112. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and Class Members in the exercise of due
13 diligence could not have reasonably discovered the discriminatory practices, and did not do so
14
15 until just recently. For the reasons alleged above, the members of the Class still do not know that

16 they have been and continue to be injured by GREENPOINT's discriminatory conduct.

17

COUNT ONE

18 DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT

19

(15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 - 1691f)

20

113. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

21

114. ECOA makes it “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any application,

22 with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction—(1) on the basis of race, color, religion,
23 national origin, sex or marital status, or age.” 28 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
24

25

115. GREENPOINT is a creditor as set forth in the ECOA because in the ordinary

26 course of its business, GREENPOINT participated in the decision to extend credit to Plaintiffs,

27 the proposed Class representative herein, and all prospective Class members. 28 U.S.C.

28 § 1691a(e). Moreover, GREENPOINT is a creditor as set forth in the ECOA because it set the

-21SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page23 of 28

1 terms of the credit that was extended to Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representative herein, and

2 all prospective Class members through its Discretionary Pricing Policy. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(l)
3 (defining “creditor” under ECOA as one who “participates in a credit decision, including setting 4
the terms of the credit”). 5
116. GREENPOINT designed, disseminated, controlled, implemented and profited 6
7 from the discriminatory policy and practice alleged herein—the Discretionary Pricing Policy—
8 which has had a disparate economic impact on minority borrowers compared to similarly

9 situated whites.

10

117. All actions taken by the GREENPOINT loan officers and brokers were in

11 accordance with the specific authority granted to them by GREENPOINT and were in
12 furtherance of GREENPOINT’s policies and practices.
13
118. As a result of GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy, GREENPOINT has 14

15 collected more in finance charges from minority borrowers than from similarly situated white

16 persons, for reasons totally unrelated to credit risk.

17

119. GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Equal Credit

18 Opportunity Act.
19 120. Plaintiffs and prospective class members are aggrieved persons as defined in
20 ECOA by virtue of having been subject to GREENPOINT’s discriminatory Discretionary
21
22 Pricing Policy.

23

COUNT TWO

24

DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

25

(42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 – 3619)

26

121. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

27

28

-22SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page24 of 28

1

122. The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in

2 residential real estate-related transactions such as the making or purchasing of loans or providing

3 other financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 3605.
4 123. GREENPOINT engaged in residential real estate-related transactions with respect
5 to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representative herein, and all prospective Class members, by
6
7 extending credit to Plaintiffs and all prospective Class members.

8

124. GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy has resulted in discrimination with

9 respect to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representative herein, and all prospective members of

10 the Class.

11 125. As a result of GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy, GREENPOINT has
12 collected more in finance charges from minority borrowers than from similarly situated white
13
persons, for reasons totally unrelated to credit risk. 14

15

126. GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Fair Housing Act and

16 constitutes actionable discrimination on the basis of race.

17

127. Plaintiffs and the Class are aggrieved persons as defined in FHA by virtue of

18 having been subject to GREENPOINT’s discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy.
19 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
20 WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief:
21 A. Certify this case as a class action and certify the named Plaintiffs herein to be
22 adequate class representatives and their counsel to be class counsel;
23 B. Enter a judgment pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. section
24 3613 declaring the acts and practices of GREENPOINT complained of herein to
25 be in violation of ECOA and the FHA;
26 C. Grant a permanent or final injunction, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(c)
27 and/or 42 U.S.C. section 3613(c), enjoining GREENPOINT and GREENPOINT’s
28 agents, employees, affiliates and subsidiaries from continuing to discriminate
-23-
SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page25 of 28

1

against Plaintiffs and the members of the Class because of their race or national

2

origin through further use of the Discretionary Pricing Policy or any non-risk-

3

related discretionary pricing policy employed by GREENPOINT;

4

D. Order GREENPOINT pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C.

5

section 3613(c) to adopt and enforce a policy that requires appropriate training of

6

GREENPOINT’s employees and its brokers to prevent discrimination;

7

E. Order GREENPOINT pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C.

8

section 3613(c) to monitor and/or audit the racial pattern of its financings to

9

ensure the cessation of discriminatory effects in its home mortgage transactions;

10

F. Order disgorgement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e (c) of all

11

disproportionate non-risk charges imposed on minority borrowers by

12

GREENPOINT’s Discretionary Pricing Policy and order the equitable distribution

13

of such charges, as restitutionary relief, to all appropriate class members;

14

G. Order actual and punitive damages to the Plaintiffs and the class pursuant to 42

15

U.S.C. § 3613(c);

16

H. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts,

17

together with reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(d)

18

and/or 42 U.S.C. section 3613(c); and

19

I. Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court finds

20

necessary and proper.

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-24SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page26 of 28

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 1

2

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

3 DATED this 14th day of December, 2010

4

RODDY KLEIN & RYAN

5

BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN &

6

BALINT, P.C.

7

CHAVEZ & GERTLER LLP

8

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP

9

MILLER LAW LLC

10 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER

11

BARROWAY TOPAZ KESSLER

12

MELTZER & CHECK, LLP

13

/s/ Gary Klein

14

Gary Klein

15

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

16

RODDY KLEIN & RYAN

17

Gary Klein (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

Shennan Kavanagh (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

18

727 Atlantic Avenue

Boston, MA 02111-2810

19

Tel: (617) 357-5500, ext. 15

20

Fax: (617) 357-5030

E-mail: klein@roddykleinryan.com

21

22

Andrew S. Friedman (admitted pro hac vice)

Wendy J. Harrison (CA SBN 151090)

23

BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN, &

BALINT, P.C.

24

2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 1000

25

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Telephone: 602-274-1100

26

Facsimile: 602-274-1199

27

28

-25-

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page27 of 28

1

CHAVEZ & GERTLER, L.L.P. Mark A. Chavez (CA SBN 90858)

2

Nance F. Becker (CA SBN 99292)

Dan Gildor (CA SBN 223027)

3

42 Miller Avenue

4

Mill Valley, California 94941

Tel: (415) 381-5599

5

Fax: (415) 381-5572

6

E-mail: mark@chavezgertler.com nance@chavezgertler.com

7

dgildor@chavezgertler.com

8

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER

9

Stuart T. Rossman (admitted pro hac vice)

Charles Delbaum (admitted pro hac vice)

10

7 Winthrop Square, 4th Flr.

11

Boston, MA 02110 Telephone: (617) 542-8010

12

Facsimile: (617) 545-8028

13

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN

14

& DOWD LLP

John J. Stoia, Jr. (CA SBN 141757)

15

Theodore J. Pintar (CA SBN 131372)

655 West Broadway

16

San Diego, CA 92101-3301

17

Telephone: 619-231-1058

Facsimile: 619-231-7423 18

19

BARROWAY TOPAZ KESSLER MELTZER

& CHECK, LLP

20

Joseph H. Meltzer (admitted pro hac vice)

Donna Siegel Moffa (admitted pro hac vice)

21

Edward W. Ciolko (admitted pro hac vice)

22

Joseph A. Weeden (admitted pro hac vice)

Peter A. Muhic (admitted pro hac vice)

23

280 King of Prussia Road

24

Radnor, PA 19087

Telephone: 610-667-7706

25

Facsimile: 610-667-7056

26

Class Counsel

27

28

-26-

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document233 Filed12/14/10 Page28 of 28

1

MILLER LAW LLC Marvin A. Miller

2

115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910

Chicago, IL 60603

3

Telephone: (312) 332-3400

4

5

6

7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

8

I, Gary Klein, hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing document filed 9 through the ECF system will be electronically sent to the registered participants as

10 identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing, and paper copies will be sent to those indicated as non-registered participants on December 14, 2010.

11

/s/ Gary Klein

12

Gary Klein

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-27-

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

 
 Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document232 Filed12/10/10 Page1 of 5

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3

4

5 ANA RAMIREZ, et al.,

6

Plaintiffs,

7

v.

8 GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.,
9 Defendant.
10

NO. C08-0369 TEH ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

11

12

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary

13 approval of the class action settlement agreement (“Agreement”) filed with the Court on

14 October 29, 2010. After reviewing the proposed settlement and moving papers, the Court

15 issued an order requiring responses to two questions. The parties timely filed their joint

16 response on December 8, 2010. Having reviewed all of the papers, and in the absence of any

17 opposition, this Court is prepared to grant preliminary approval to the proposed settlement

18 without oral argument. Accordingly, the December 13, 2010 hearing is hereby VACATED,

19 and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

20

1. Defined terms used in this order shall have the same meaning as set forth in

21 section II of the Agreement.

22

2. For purposes of this Action, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction and, for

23 purposes of the settlement only, this Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties,

24 including all Settlement Class Members.

25

3. As provided in paragraph 7.1 of the Agreement, Plaintiffs shall file an amended

26 complaint, the allegations of which shall be deemed denied and disputed by Defendant

27 without need for filing an answer. The amended complaint shall be filed on or before

28 December 20, 2010.

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document232 Filed12/10/10 Page2 of 5

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

4. For the reasons set forth in the Court’s July 20, 2010 Order Granting Plaintiffs’

2 Motion for Class Certification, the Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23 of the

3 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met for the following Settlement Class: All

4 African-American or Hispanic persons throughout the United States to whom GreenPoint

5 originated a residential-secured loan in GreenPoint’s wholesale lending channel between

6 January 1, 2004, and January 1, 2008. This Settlement Class is certified pursuant to Federal

7 Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), and all Settlement Class Members shall have the right to

8 exclude themselves by way of the opt-out procedure set forth below.

9

5. The Court preliminarily approves the Agreement as being fair, adequate, and

10 reasonable and within the range of possible approval, subject to further consideration at the

11 Final Fairness Hearing as set forth below in paragraph 15.

12

6. The Court preliminarily finds that Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez,

13 Jorge Salazar, and Emanuel Fanning fairly and adequately represent the interests of the

14 Settlement Class and therefore designates Plaintiffs as the representatives of the Settlement

15 Class.

16

7. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) and the Court’s prior orders,

17 this Court designates the law firms of Roddy Klein & Ryan; Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman &

18 Balint, P.C.; and Chavez & Gertler LLP as class counsel. In addition, pursuant to Federal

19 Rule Civil Procedure 23(g), this Court also designates the law firms of Robbins Geller

20 Rudman & Dowd LLP; Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check, LLP; and the National

21 Consumer Law Center as counsel for the class.

22

8. The Court authorizes Plaintiffs and Class Counsel to enter into the Agreement

23 on behalf of the Settlement Class, subject to final approval by this Court of the settlement.

24 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel, on behalf of the Settlement Class, are authorized to take all

25 appropriate action required or permitted to be taken by the Settlement Class pursuant to the

26 Agreement to effectuate its terms.

27

28

2

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document232 Filed12/10/10 Page3 of 5

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

9. The Court approves A.B. Data, Ltd. as Settlement Administrator. The costs of

2 notice and settlement administration shall be paid from the Settlement Fund as described in

3 paragraph 3.4(a) of the Agreement.

4

10. The Court finds that the notice provision as set forth in section V of the

5 Agreement constitutes the best notice practicable under the circumstances and shall

6 constitute due and sufficient notice to all persons entitled thereto. This Court approves the

7 form and content of the Direct Mail Notices and claim form attached as Exhibits D and E to

8 the Agreement, except that the procedure for filing objections shall be modified. Rather than

9 requiring class members to send objections to three counsel and the Court, counsel shall meet

10 and confer and select one counsel who shall be responsible for receiving all objections. No

11 other notice shall be required.

12

11. The Court approves the claims procedures set forth in section V of the

13 Agreement. To be treated as valid, claim forms must be postmarked within ninety days of

14 the date of this order.

15

12. Settlement Class Members may opt out of the Settlement Class by submitting a

16 written request for exclusion by mail to the Settlement Administrator, with a postmark no

17 later than seventy-five days after entry of this order. The request must be personally signed

18 by the Settlement Class Member wishing to opt out and must include: (i) the Settlement

19 Class Member’s name, address, and telephone number; (ii) the account number of the

20 Residential Loan(s), if known; (iii) a sentence confirming, under penalty of perjury, that he

21 or she is a Settlement Class Member; and (iv) the following statement: “I request to be

22 excluded from the class Settlement in this case.” No Settlement Class Member, or any

23 person acting on behalf of or in concert or participation with that Settlement Class Member,

24 may exclude any other Settlement Class Member from the Settlement Class.

25

13. All Settlement Class Members who do not opt out from the Settlement Class

26 pursuant to the above procedure shall be bound by all determinations and judgments in this

27 Action concerning the settlement, including, but not limited to, the validity, binding nature

28 and effectiveness of the releases set forth in section IV of the Agreement.

3

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document232 Filed12/10/10 Page4 of 5

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

14. Any Settlement Class Member who does not opt out from the Settlement Class

2 may object to the Agreement and argue that the proposed settlement should not be approved

3 and/or that Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees and costs and Plaintiffs’ request

4 for service awards should be denied. Objections must be postmarked no later than

5 seventy-five days after entry of this order. Settlement Class Members who file written

6 objections may also appear at the Final Fairness Hearing discussed below in paragraph 15.

7 All objections must include: (i) the objector’s name, address, and telephone number; (ii) the

8 account number of the Residential Loan(s), if known; (iii) a sentence confirming, under

9 penalty of perjury, that the objector is a Settlement Class Member; (iv) the factual basis and

10 legal grounds for the objection to the settlement; (v) the identity of witnesses whom the

11 objector may call to testify at the Final Fairness Hearing; and (vi) copies of exhibits intended

12 to be offered into evidence at the Final Fairness Hearing. Copies of all objection papers must

13 be sent to the designated counsel agreed upon by the parties. The designated counsel shall

14 promptly forward copies of any objections received to all other counsel.

15

15. The Final Fairness Hearing shall take place before this Court on April 11,

16 2011, at 10:00 AM. At this hearing, the Court will determine: whether the proposed

17 settlement of the Action on the terms and conditions provided for in the Agreement is fair,

18 adequate, and reasonable as to the Settlement Class Members and should be approved;

19 whether the Judgment, as provided for in the Agreement, should be entered; the amount of

20 fees and costs that should be awarded to Class Counsel; and the amount of the service awards

21 that should be awarded to Plaintiffs, as provided for in the Agreement. The Court will also

22 hear and consider any properly lodged objections at that time.

23

16. Class Counsel shall file their application for attorneys’ fees and costs on or

24 before January 31, 2011.

25

17. The parties shall file a copy of all objections that have been received, as well as

26 the parties’ responses thereto, on or before March 28, 2011. By the same date, the parties

27 shall also file a statement that informs the Court of the number of Settlement Class Members

28 who have opted out of the class.

4

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document232 Filed12/10/10 Page5 of 5

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

18. All proceedings in this Action are stayed pending final approval of the

2 settlement, except as may be necessary to implement the settlement or comply with the terms

3 of the Agreement.

4

19. Pending final determination of whether the settlement should be approved,

5 Plaintiffs, all Settlement Class Members, and any person or entity allegedly acting on behalf

6 of Settlement Class Members, either directly, representatively, or in any other capacity, are

7 preliminarily enjoined from commencing or prosecuting against the Released Parties any

8 action or proceeding in any court or tribunal asserting any of the Released Claims, provided,

9 however, that this injunction shall not apply to individual claims of any Settlement Class

10 Members who timely opt out from the Settlement Class pursuant to paragraph 12 above.

11 This injunction is necessary to protect and effectuate the settlement, this Preliminary

12 Approval Order, and the Court’s flexibility and authority to effectuate this settlement and to

13 enter judgment when appropriate, and is ordered in aid of this Court’s jurisdiction and to

14 protect its judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

15

20. Within fourteen days of the date of this order, Defendant shall file proof of the

16 required notifications under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

17

21. This Court reserves the right to adjourn or continue the date of the Final

18 Fairness Hearing without further notice to Settlement Class Members, and retains jurisdiction

19 to consider all further applications arising out of or connected with the Settlement. This

20 Court may approve or modify the settlement without further notice to Settlement Class

21 Members.

22

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24

25 Dated: 12/10/10 26

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

27

28

5

 
 1 BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN

2

& BALINT, P.C. Andrew S. Friedman (admitted pro hac vice)

3 Wendy J. Harrison (CA SBN 151090)

2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 1000

4 Phoenix, Arizona 85012

5

Tel: (602) 274-1100 Fax: (602) 274-1199

6 E-mail: afriedman@bffb.com

wharrison@bffb.com
7

8

RODDY KLEIN & RYAN Gary Klein (admitted pro hac vice)

9 Shennan Kavanagh (admitted pro hac vice)

727 Atlantic Avenue 10 Boston, MA 02111-02810

11 Telephone: 617-357-5500, ext. 15 Facsimile: 617-357-5030

12 E-mail: klein@roddykleinryan.com

13

kavanagh@roddykleinryan.com

14 Co-Lead Class Counsel

15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

16

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

17

ANA RAMIREZ, ISMAEL RAMIREZ ) Case No. 08-cv-00369-TEH

18 and JORGE SALAZAR, on behalf of

)

19

themselves and all others similarly situated,) CLASS ACTION )

20 21 22

Plaintiffs,

) Judge: Honorable Thelton E. Henderson

vs.

) )

GREENPOINT INC.

MORTGAGE

FUNDING,

) ) )

Date: April 11, 2011 Time: 10:00 a.m. Location: San Francisco
Ctrm. 2, 17th Fl.

23

Defenda nt.

) )

24

25

[PROPOSED] FINAL APPROVAL ORDER

26

27

28

-1-

1

Plaintiffs, on their own beha lf and on behalf of all si milarly situated consumers,

2 submitted to the District Court a Motion forFinal Approval of the Class Action Settlement

3 (“Motion”) seeking fi nal approval of the S tipulation and Agreement of Settlement (the

4 “Settlement”), and the exhibits attached thereto, entered into by and between Plaintiffs and

5 Defendant GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“Defendant” or “GreenPoint”). GreenPoint

6 does not oppose Plaintiffs’ Motion.

7

By Order dated Decem ber 10, 2010, the District Court entered an Order that

8 preliminarily approved the Agre ement and conditionally certified the Settlement Class for

9 Settlement purposes only (“Pr eliminary Approval Order”). On January 31, 2011, C lass

10 Counsel filed their application for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses for review by the

11 Settlement Class. Due and adequate notice having been given to the Settlement Class

12 compliant with the procedures set forth in the Settlement and in the Preliminary Approval

13 Order, this Court having considered all papers filed and proceedings had herein and otherwise

14 being fully informed of the premises, and good cause appearing therefor,

15

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

16

1. This Final Approval Order and Judgm ent incorporates by reference t he

17 definitions in the Settlement, and all terms used herein shall have the same meanings as set

18 forth in the Settlement.

19

2. This Court has jurisdiction over the s ubject matter and, for purposes of this

20 Settlement only, personal jurisd iction over all the Parties, including all Settlement Clas s

21 Members.

22

3. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure, and consistent

23 with due process, this Courthereby approves the Settlement and finds that the Settlement is,

24 in all respects, fair, ju st, reasonable and adequate to the Settlement Class Members. The

25 Parties are hereby directed to perform its terms.

26

4. On July 20, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification

27 (“Class Certification Order”). For the reasons set forth in the Court’s Class Certification

28 Order, the Court finds that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are met

-2-

1 for the Settlement Class. Based on those findings and the papers filed by the Parties during

2 the course of this case, this Court hereby c ertifies, solely for purposes of effectuating this

3 Settlement, the following Settlement Class:

4

All African-American or Hispanic persons throughout the United

States to whom GreenPoint originated a residential-secured loan

5

in GreenPoint’s wholesale lending channel between January 1,

6

2004, and January 1, 2008.

7

The Settlement Class is certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).

8 Settlement Class Members had the right to ex clude themselves b y way of the opt-out

9 procedure set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order.

10

Excluded from the Settlement Class are those persons who validly and timely

11 requested exclusion from the Settlement Class ce rtified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

12 Procedure 23(b)(3) by way of the opt-out procedures set forth in the Preliminary Approval

13 Order (identified in Exhibit 1 here to) (the “Opt-Outs”), together with those persons who

14 requested exclusion from the class after the dead line for exclusion but whos e opt-outs

15 GreenPoint has agreed tohonor (identified in Exhibit 2 hereto) (the “Additional Opt-Outs”).

16

5. For purposes of t his Settlement only, th is Court finds and concludes that:

17 (a) the Settlement Class Members are so numerous that joi nder of all Settlement Class

18 Members is impracticable; (b) there are questoi ns of law and fact common to the Settlement

19 Class Members which predominate over any individual questions; (c) Plaintiffs’ claims are

20 typical of the claims of the Settlement Class; (d) Plaintiffs’ and Class Counsel have fairly

21 and adequately represented a nd protected the interests of all of the Settlement Class

22 Members; and (e) a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

23 efficient adjudication of the c ontroversy, considering: (i) the interests of the Settlemen t

24 Class Members in individually controlling the pr osecution of the separate actions; (ii) the

25 extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contr oversy already com menced by

26 Settlement Class Members; (iii) the desirability or undesirability of continuing the litigation

27 of these claims in this particular forum; and (iv) the difficulties likely to be encountered in

28 the management of the class action.

-3-

1

6. This Court finds that the Notice provided to Settlement Class Members was the

2 best notice practicable and fully satisfied th e requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

3 Procedure, due process, and any other applicable laws.

4

7. This Court has considered and hereby overrules all objections to the Settlement

5 on their merits.

6

8. Subject to retention of jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement, this Court hereby

7 dismisses with prejudice the above-captioned action on the meritsand without costs, except

8 as otherwise provided in the Settlement.

9

9. Plaintiffs and each Settlement Class Member, their respective heirs, executors,

10 administrators, representatives, agents, attorneys, partners , successors, predecessors-in-

11 interest, assigns and allpersons acting for or on their behalf,are deemed to have fully, finally

12 and forever released all claims, causes of action, or liabilities, whether arising under local,

13 state, or federal law, whet her by statute, regulation, contract, com mon law, equity or

14 otherwise, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted,

15 foreseen or unforeseen, actual or continge nt, liquidated or unliquidated, as alleged or as

16 could have been alleged based upon the facts asserted in the Amended Complaint as to the

17 Released Party. Without limiting the foregoing,the Released Claims specificallyextend to

18 claims that Settlement Class Members do not know or suspect to exist in their favor at the

19 time that the Settlement, and the releases contained therein, becomes effective.

20

10. As of t he date of entry of the P reliminary Approval Order, Plai ntiffs and

21 Settlement Class Members are deemed to havewaived Section 1542 of the California Civil

22 Code and any similar or comparable provisions, rights and benefits conferred by the law of

23 any state or territory of the United States or any jurisdiction, and any principle of common

24 law, which provides:

25

A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS

WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT

26

TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF

27

EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR

28

HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.

-4-

1 Plaintiffs and each Settlement Class Memberunderstand and acknowledge the significance

2 of these waivers of California Civil Code Section 1542 and/or of any other applicable law

3 relating to limitations on releases. In conne ction with such waive rs and relinquishment,

4 Plaintiffs and each Settlement Class Member acknowledge that they are aware that they may

5 hereafter discover facts in addition to, or different from, those facts which they now know or

6 believe to be true with respect to the subject matter of the Settlement, but that they release

7 fully, finally and forever all Released Claims, and in furtheranc e of such intention, the

8 release will remain in effect notwithstandi ng the discovery or existence of any suc h

9 additional or different facts.

10

11. By agreement of the Parties, late claims received by the Settlement

11 Administrator on or before the date of this order shall be allowed as if they were timely

12 filed.

13

12. This Court approves an award to be paid from the Settlement Fund to Class

14 Counsel of 25% of the Settlement Fund to taling $3,687,500, plus actual costs of

15 $425,412.04, and service awards of $8,000 for each original named Plaintiff household and

16 $2,000 for each named Plaintiff household added by amendment (plus in terest actually

17 accrued thereon from the date of the Settlement Fund’s creation as described in Section

18 3.4(a) of the Settlement, less a proportionate share of any fees chargedby the escrow holder

19 for maintenance of the Settlement Fund). The service awards shall be in addition to any

20 claims Plaintiffs may have to s hare in the Fund. This Court find s that Class Counsel

21 complied with the requirements the Ninth Circuit set forth inIn re Mercury Interactive Corp.

22 Securities Litigation, 618 F. 3d 988 (9t h Cir. 2010), by allowing class m embers an

23 opportunity to examine Class Counsel’s application for fees and costs prior to the deadline

24 for objecting to the Settlement. This Court, having presided over the above-captioned action,

25 and having considered the materials submitted by Class Counselin support of final approval

26 of the Settlement and their request for attorneys’ fees and costs, finds the award appropriate

27 based on the following factors:

28

a. The Settlement provides substantial benefits for the class.

-5-

1

b. The requested award of attorneys’ fees and expenses is within the

2 range of reasonable fees for similar class action settlements.

3

c. This litigation raised numerous, strongly disputed issues of law and

4 fact, Class Counsel was opposed by highly skilled defense counsel, the litigation was

5 intensely contested through the completion of the Settlement, and there was substantial

6 risk that Plaintiffs would not prevail on some or all of their claims.

7

d. The settlement was negotiated at arms’ length and there is no evidence

8 of collusion. The settlement was reached with the assistance of a qualified, neutral mediator,

9 and the a mount of attorneys’ fees, costs, a nd service awards to be requested was not

10 addressed until after the benefits to class members were resolved.

11

e. By receiving payment from a common fund, Class Counsel’s interests

12 were fully aligned during the settlement negotiation process with those of members of the

13 Settlement Class, such that Class Counsel had appropriate incentives to maximize the size of

14 the common fund.

15

f. The Settlement Administrator shall, accordingly, pay Class Counsel the

16 sum of $3,687,500 in attorneys’ fees, plus actual costs of$425,412.04, from the Settlement

17 Fund on the distribution date set forth in the Settlement.

18

13. This Final Approval Order and Judgment, the Preliminary Approval Order, the

19 Agreement, and any act performed or document executed in furtherance thereof:

20

a. Will not be offered or received against the Released Party as evidence

21 of, or be c onstrued as or deem ed to be ev idence of, any adm ission or concession by the

22 Released Party as to the truth or relevance of any fact alleged by Plaintiffs, the existence of

23 any class alleged by Plaintiffs, the propriety of class certification had this Action bee n

24 litigated rather than settled, or the validity of any claim that has been or could have been

25 asserted in the Amende d Complaint or in any ot her litigation, or the deficiency of any

26 defense that has been or could have been asserted in the Amended Complaint or in any other

27 litigation, or of any liability, negligence, fault, or wrongdoing of the Released Party;

28

-6-

1

b. Will not be offered as or re ceived against the Released Party as

2 evidence of, or construed as or deemed to be evidence of, any admission or concession of

3 any liability, negligence, fault or wrongdoing, orin any way referred to for any other reason

4 as against any of the Parties to the Settlement, in any other civil, criminal or administrative

5 action or proceeding, other than such proceedings as may be necessary to effectuate th e

6 provisions of the Settlement, except that the Released Party may refer to it to effectuate the

7 liability protection granted them thereunder;

8

c.

Will not be deemed an admission by Defendant that it is subject to the

9 jurisdiction of any California court; and

10

d.

Will not be construed against Defendant asan admission or concession

11 that the consideration to be given under the Agreement represents the amount which could be

12 or would have been recovered after trial.

13

14. The Released Party may file the Settlement and/or this Final Approval Order

14 and Judgment in any action thatmay be brought against themin order to support a defense or

15 counterclaim based on principle s of res j udicata, collateral estoppel, release, good faith

16 settlement, judgment bar, reduction, set-off or any other theory of claim preclusion or issue

17 preclusion or similar defense or counterclaim.

18

15. Settlement Class Members, and any person or entity allegedly acting on behalf

19 of Settlement Class Members, either directly, representatively or in any other capacity, are

20 enjoined from commencing or prosecuting ag ainst the Released Party any action or

21 proceeding in any court or tribunal asserting any of the Released Claims, provided, however,

22 that this injunction shall not apply to non-released claims of the Opt-Outs and Additional

23 Opt-Outs.

24

16. Without affecting the finality of this Final Approval Order and Judgment in any

25 way, this Court retains continuing jurisdiction to implement the Agreement and to modify,

26 interpret, enforce, effectuate and administer the Settlement. Class Counsel are to continue in

27 their role to oversee all aspects of the Settlement. Upon notice to Class Counsel, GreenPoint

28 may seek from this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), such further orders or process as

-7-

1 may be necessary to prevent or forestall the assertion of any of the Released Claims in any

2 other forum, or as may be necessary to protect and effectuate the Settlement and this Final

3 Approval Order and Judgment.

4

If an appeal, writ proceeding or other challe nge is filed as to this Final Approval

5 Order and Judgment, and if thereafter the Final Approval Order is not ultimatelyupheld, all

6 orders entered, stipulations made and releases delivered in connection herewith, or in the

7 Settlement or in connection therewith, shall benull and void to the extent provided by and in

UNITED S ALIFORNIA

OURT NORTH

8 accordance with the Settlement.
9
10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
11
12 Dated: 04/12/11 Honorable
13

TATES DISTRICT C IT IS SO ORDERED
United JSudtgaetTeTshheeDltoltinosEtnr. iHHcetneCdnedroseounrrstoJnudge

14 15

ERN DISTRICT OF C

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-8-

Ramirez et al. v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.
Timely Exclusion Requests

Name

1.)

Tonya Horton

2.)

Jesus & Teresa Jimenez

3.)

Antonio Cortez Carlos & Roberta De Jesus

4.)

Genara Caussin

5.)

Nessia Jones

6.)

Rita Thomas

7.)

Sampson Woodson Jr

8.)

Sean Calhoun

9.)

Daniel Duenas

10.)

Thelma Bell

11.)

Maria Romero

12.)

Carla Wall

13.)

Elsa Diaz-Alonso

14.)

Jeannette Molano & Angela Bolanos

15.)

Emma Ruddock

EXHIBIT 1

Ramirez et al. v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.
Untimely Exclusion Requests

Name

1.)

Bryce Rodriguez

2.)

Louise Owens

3.)

Janet Crittenden

EXHIBIT 2

 
 CCasaes:e130:0-80-c1v5-50030679/0-T1E/2H011DoPcuamgee:n1t2o4f81 FiIlDed: 0778/01533/1814 PDakgtEen1troyf: 117
FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUL 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ANA RAMIREZ; et al.,

No. 10-80155

Plaintiffs - Respondents,

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00369-THE

Northern District of California,

v.

San Francisco

GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING,

INC.,

ORDER

Defendant - Petitioner.

Petitioner’s unopposed motion to withdraw petition for permission to appeal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) is granted. The petition is
withdrawn.
FOR THE COURT: MOLLY C. DWYER CLERK OF COURT
By: Kenneth Sogabe Motions Attorney/Deputy Clerk 9th Cir. R. 27-7 General Orders/Appendix A

KS/MOATT

 
 . ~

1.

"

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page1 of 22

CHAVEZ & GERTLER, L.L.P.

Mark A. Chavez (CA SBN 90858) •

2 Nance F. Becker (CA SBN 99292)

3 Dan Gildor (CA SBN 223027)

42 Miller Avenue

4 Mill Valley, California 94941

v,'Tel: Fax: 5 E-mail:

/'

7

(415) 381-5599 (415) 381-5572 mark@chavezgertler.com nance@chavezgertler.com
dgildor@chavezgertler.com

RODDY KLEIN & RYAN

8 Gary Klein (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice)

Shennan Kavanagh (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice)

9 727 Atlantic Avenue

Boston, MA 02111-2810

10 Tel:

(617) 357-5500, ext. 15

Fax: (617) 357-5030

11 [Additional counsel listed on signature page]

12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 13 and the Proposed Class

. . : \"

14 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDL

16

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

17 ANA RAMIREZ and ISMAEL RAMIREZ, on) Case No.

behalf of themselves and all others similarly )

18 situated,

) COMPLAINT FOR:

19
Plaintiffs, 20

21

vs.

) 1. Violations of the Equal Credit

)

Opportunity Act; 15 U.S.c.

)

§ 1691

)

) )

2. Violations of the Fair Housing Act; 42 U.S.C. § 3601

22 GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING,
23 INC.,
24 Defendant.
25

) 3. Violations of the Civil Rights

)

Act, 42 U.S.c. §1981; and

) 4. Violations of the Civil Rights

)

Act, 42 U.S.c. §1982.

»

) CLASS ACTION

)

)

26

) )

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

27

28

ORIGINAL

------------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

.,

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page2 of 22

Plaintiffs, Ana Ramirez and lsmael Ramirez (the "Ramirezes" or "Plaintiffs"), on behalf

2 of themselves and all others similarly situated, by their undersigned attorneys, allege as follows:

3

INTRODUCTION

4

I. This is a class action brought by Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other

5 similarly situated minority homeowners, against GREENPOINT Mortgage Funding, Inc.

6 ("GREENPOINT") under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1691, et seq.

7 ("ECOA") and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.c. § 3601 et Plaintiffs seek remedies for

8 themselves and the Class (defined in ~1O, below) for the discriminatory effects of the

9 Defendants' home financing policies and practices.

10

2. As described below, GREENPOINT has established a specific, identifiable and

11 unifonn credit pricing system, a component of which, referred to herein as the Discretionary

12 Pricing Policy, authorizes unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an

13 otherwise objective risk-based financing rate. In other words, after a finance rate acceptable to

14 GREENPOINT is detennined by objective criteria (e.g., the individual's credit history, credit

15 score, debt-to-income ratio and loan-to-value ratios), GREENPOINT's credit plicing policy

16 authorizes additional discretionary financing charges and interest rate mark-ups. These

17 subjective, additional finance charges have a widespread discriminatory impact on minority

18 applicants for home mortgage loans, in violation of ECOA and the FHA.

19

3. GREENPOINT has established policies for retail and wholesale access to its loan

20 products that subject minority financing applicants to a significantly higher likelihood of

21 exposure to discretionary points, fees and interest rate mark-ups. These costs drive up the

average cost of a mortgage loan made by GREENPOINT to minority applicants.

23

4. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive reliet: disgorgement and restitution of

24 monies disparately obtained from minority borrowers.

25

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

26

5. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

27 which confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action arising under federal law.

28

-1-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page3 of 22

1

6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) because a substantial

2 part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' and the Class's claims occurred in this District,

3 because Defendant is headquartered in this District, and because Defendant regularly conducts

4 business in this District.

5

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

6

7. Intradistrict assignment pursuant to Local Rule 3-2(c) is proper in the San

7 Francisco Division as this action arises in San Francisco County and the surrounding counties as

8 Defendant regularly conducts business in this District and is headquartered in Sonoma County.

9

PARTIES

10

8. Plaintiffs Ana and Ismael Ramirez are minority homeowners who reside at 46

11 Stellman Road, Roslindale, Massachusetts 02131.

12

9. Defendant, GREENPOINT Mortgage Funding, Inc. ("GREENPOINT")

13 originated sub-prime mortgage loans for approximately 20 years before closing its residential

14 loan business on August 20, 2007. GREENPOINT is headquartered 100 Wood Hollow Drive,

15 Novato, California, 94945.

16

FACTS

17 I. MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES HAS HISTORICALLY

18

DISCRIMINATED AGAINST MINORITIES

19

10. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University's 2005

20 study called "The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage

21 Lending," mortgage lending discrimination today is subtle but pervasive, with minority

22 consumers continuing to have less-than-equal access to loans at the best price and on the best

23 tenns that their credit history, income, and other individual financial considerations merit more

24 than three decades after the enactment of national fair lending legislation.

25

11. The passage of civil rights legislation and fair lending laws in the 1960s and

26 1970s brought an end to the most virulent fonns of overt racial discrimination in the housing

27 markets, but throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mortgage lenders found more subtle ways to

28 discriminate, including maintaining offices only in white neighborhoods and engaging in

-2-
CLA~S~S~A~C=T~IO~N~C~O~N=lP~L~A~lN~T--------------

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page4 of 22

practices such as redlining (refusing to lend on properties in predominantly minority

2 neighborhoods).

3

12. After such red lining practices were challenged in the 1990s, mortgage lenders

4 changed tactics once again, making loans to minorities, but charging higher interest rates and

5 loan-related fees than they charged to similarly-situated white borrowers. Loan data that

6 mortgage lenders must now compile and disclose under the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure

7 Act (,'HMDA") reveals profound loan pricing disparities between minority borrowers and

8 similarly-situated white borrowers.

9

13. The HMDA requires mortgage lenders to report infonnation about the home loans

10 they process each year. In 2005, lenders reported infonnation on more than 30 million home

11 loan applications pursuant to HMDA. In 1989, Congress required lenders to begin disclosing

12 infonnation about mortgage borrowers' race and ethnicity. In 2004, concerned with potential

13 racial discrimination in loan pricing and recognizing that racial or other types of discrimination

14 can occur when loan officers and mortgage brokers have latitude in setting interest rates, the

15 Federal Reserve Board began requiring lenders to also report infonnation concerning rates,

16 points, and fees, charged to borrowers on high-cost loans.

17

14. According to the Federal Reserve, both 2004 and 2005 HMDA data revealed that

18 "Blacks and minority borrowers were more likely ... to have received higher-priced loans than

19 non-minority whites.... [which has] increased concern about the fairness of the lending

20 process." Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort and Glenn B. Canner, "Higher-Priced Home

21 Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data," Federal Reserve Bulletin, A124, A159 (revised Sept. 18,

22 2006) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletinl2006/hmda/bu1l06hmda.pdf (last viewed

23 December 19,2007).)

24

15. HMDA data for 2004 reveals protound loan pricing disparities between minority

25 borrowers and non-minority whites even after controlling tor borrowers' gender, income,

26 property location, and loan amount. After accounting for those differences in the 2004 HMDA

27 data, minority borrowers were still almost twice as likely to receive a higher-rate home loan as

28 non-minority whites. (http://www.responsiblelending.orglpdfs/Testimony-Emst061306.pdf (last

-3-

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page5 of 22

viewed December 19,2007).) [n a speech last year, the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Deposit

2 Insurance Corporation, Martin Gruenberg, discussed the 2004 HMDA data and observed that

3 that data "clearly indicated" that minority borrowers are more likely to receive high-cost home

4 loans than are non-minority whites. (http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/

5 2006!chairman/spoctI806.html (last viewed December 19,2007).)

6

16. Likewise, HMDA data for 2005 shows that "for conventional home-purchase

7 loans, the gross mean incidence of higher-priced lending was 54.7 percent for blacks and 17.2

8 percent for non-minority whites, a difference of 37.5 percentage points." Avery, supra, at A 159.

9 The situation is similar for refinancings, where there is a difference of 28.3 percentage points

10 between blacks and non-minority whites. Id. at A 124, A 159.

11

17. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN)

12 released a repOli entitled "The High Cost of Credit: Disparities in High-priced Refinanced Loans

13 to minority Homeowners in 125 American Cities," dated September 27,2005, that found that

14 "[i]n every metropolitan area where at least 50 refinances were made to African-American

15 homeowners, African-Americans were more likely to receive a high-cost loan than White

16 homeowners."

17

18. A growing number of research studies and investigations show that significant

18 racial disparities still exist. California Reinvcstment Coalition, et aI., "Paying More for the

19 American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending" (March

20 2007) (http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/2007_Report-2005 HMDA.pdf (last viewed

21 December 19, 2007); Ross, "The Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination" (Revised

July 2006) (Univ. of Connecticut, Working Paper 2005-19R) (http://www.econ.uconn.edu/

23 working/2005-19r.pdf) (last viewed December 19,2007).

24

19. Moreover, and importantly, research studies have suggested that borrowers' credit

25 profiles cannot fully explain why some borrowers, and not others, are saddled with higher cost

26 loans. Researchers have raised "doubts that risk can adequately explain racial differences" in

27 high-cost loans. Bradford, Center for Community Change, "Risk or Race? Racial Disparities and

28 the Subprime Refinance Market" (May 2002) (http://www.knowledgeplex.orgikp/report/

-4-

CLASS

COMPLAINT

.

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page6 of 22

reportlrelfiles/ccc 0729_risk.pdf) (last viewed December 19, 2007). In other words, evidence

2 "suggests that weak borrower credit profiles do not fully explain why some borrowers get stuck

3 with higher-cost home loans." California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., "Paying More for the

4 American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending" (March

5 2007).

6 II. GREENPOINT'S DISCRETIONARY PRICI~G POLICY CONTINUES THE

7

PERVASIVE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES IN MORTGAGE

8

LENDING

9

20. For approximately 20 years, GREENPOINT publicly promoted its home

10 financing expertise by means of nationwide advertising campaigns. In its advertisements,

11 GREEN POINT solicited persons to apply for financing with GREENPOINT either in one of its

12 offices or through one of the mortgage brokers whom GREEN POINT had authorized to accept

13 applications on its behalf.

14

21. GREEN POINT made home-mortgage loans directly to consumers through its

15 branches in several markets.

16

22. GREEN POINT also made home-mortgage loans that were arranged by its

17 network of mortgage brokers. Those loans were made in reliance on GREENPOINT's credit-

18 granting policies and with GREENPOINT's participation.

19

23. Due to GREEN POINT's policies as to where to place its offices and how to

20 market its products, minority borrowers were more likely than white borrowers to apply for

21 credit from GREEN POINT by an application made to an authorized broker rather than one made

22 directly to GREENPOINT.

23

24. Because of the Discretionary Pricing Policy, loans obtained through

24 GREEN POINT's network of brokers are more expensive to minority homeowners, on average,

25 than loans obtained directly from GREENPOINT.

26

25. A high-APR loan is a loan whose APR is at least three percentage points higher

27 than the interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities of the same maturity, at the time the loan was

28 made.

-5CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page7 of 22

26. Based on Home .\1ortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") data from the Department

2 of Housing and Urban Development, minorities who borrowed from GREENPOINT between

3 2004 and 2006 are almost 50% more likely than white borrowers to have received a high-APR

4 loan to purchase or refinance their home.

5

27. While credit differences may explain some part of the disparities in rate and

6 terms, GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy accounts for a significant portion of the

7 disparity.

8

28. GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy is unrelated to a borrower's

9 objective credit characteristics such as credit history, credit score, debt-to-income ratio and loan-

10 to-value ratios and results in charges that are determined on a purely subjective basis and that

11 adversely affect the rate otherwise available to borrowers.

12

29. GREEN POINT provided authorized mortgage brokers with substantial

13 information about its loan programs, rates and credit criteria, as well as its policies for

14 compensating mortgage brokers and correspondent lenders who arrange business lor it.

15

30. GREEr-'POINT authorized mortgage brokers who have signed a contract with it

16 to accept applications on its behalf: quote financing rates and terms for loans from it (within the

17 limitations set by GREENPOINT), inform credit applicants of GREENPOINT's financing

18 options and to originate finance transactions using GREENPOINT's forms, in accordance with

19 its policies.

20

31. In all of the home mortgage finance transactions at issue, GREEN POINT

21 <ldvanced the funds to make the loans and bears some or all of the risk of default.

GREENPOINT providcd its loan officers and brokers with credit applications, loan contracts and

23 other required financing forms, as well as instructions on filling out such documents necessary to

24 complete home mortgage transactions.

25

After a customer provided credit information to one of GREENPOINT's loan

26 officers or brokers, GREENPOTNT computed a financing rate through an objective credit

27 analysis that in gencraL discerned the creditworthiness of the customer.

28

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page8 of 22

33. These credit analyses considered numerous risk-related variables of

2 creditworthiness, including credit bureau histories, payment amounts, debt-to-asset ratio,

3 bankruptcies, automobile repossessions, charge-offs, prior foreclosures, payment histories, credit

4 score, debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios and other risk-related attributes or variables.

5 On infonnation and belief, GREEN POINT used these variables to determine a "mortgage score"

6 for each credit applicant.

7

34. Based on these objective risk-related variables and the resulting mortgage score,

8 GREEN POINT derived a risk-based financing rate at which it would provide a home mortgage,

9 often called the "Par Rate." Altematively, experienced GREENPOINT loan officers, brokers

10 and correspondent lenders could estimate the risk-related Par Rate by referring to the applicant's

11 credit bureau detennined credit score.

12

35. Although GREENPOINTs initial analysis applied objective criteria to calculate

13 this risk-related Par Rate, GREENPOINT then authorized a subjective component in its credit

14 pricing system-the Discretionary Pricing Policy-to impose additional non-risk-related

15 charges. On infonnation and belief, GREENPOINT communicated the applicable Par Rates and

16 authorized discretionary charges to its loan officers and brokers via regularly published "rate

17 sheets." GREENPOINT published such rate sheets via Intranet and intemet means.

18

36. The discretionary charges are paid by the customer as a component of the total

19 finance charge (the "Contract APR"), without the homeowner knowing that a portion of their

20 Contract APR was a non-risk-related charge.

21

37. Loan officers and brokers had discretion, within the limits set by GREEN POINT,

22 to impose discretionary mark-ups as additional points in interest-"a rate mark-up." When there

23 was a rate mark-up, GREEN POINT shared the additional income, even if a broker originated the

24 loan.

25

38. GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy, by design, causes persons with

26 identical or similar credit scores to pay different amounts for the cost of credit. As a result of

27 using a subjective pricing component that is designed to charge persons with the same credit

28 profiles ditferent amounts of finance charge, the objective qualities of the initial credit analysis

-7COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page9 of 22
•

used to calculate the Par Rate are undennined and the potential for race bias becomes inherent in

2 the transaction.

3

39. The Discretionary Pricing Policy, although facially neutral (insofar as

4 GREENPOINT uses the same or effectively the same policy for all credit applicants), has a

5 disproportionately adverse effeet on minority borrowers compared to similarly situated whites in

6 that minority borrowers pay disparately more discretionary charges (both in frequency and

7 amount) than similarly situated whites. Statistical analysis of discretionary charges imposed on

8 minOIity and white customers of other mortgage companies that use credit pricing systems

9 structured like that of GREENPOINT has revealed that minority borrowers, after controlling for

10 credit risk, are substantially more likely than similarly situated whites to pay such charges.

11

40. Loan officers and brokers were agents of GREENPOINT for the purpose of

12 setting credit pricc, which was always set based on GREENPOINT's policy.

13

41. The disparate impact suffered by minority borrowers is a direct result of

14 GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy in that GREENPOINT designed, disseminated,

15 controlled, implemented and profited from the Discretionary Pricing Policy creating the disparate

16 impact.

17

42. GREENPOINT has a non-delegable duty to ensure that its mortgage financing

18 structure and policies do not have a disparate impact on legally protected classes, such as

19 minority borrowers. Despite having such a non-delegable duty, GREENPOINT has chosen to

20 use a commission-driven, subjective pricing policy that it knows or should have known has a

21 significant and pervasive adverse impact on minority homeowners.

22

43. The disparities between the tenns of GREENPOINT's transactions involving

23 minority homeowners and the tenus involving white homeowners cannot be a product of chance

24 and cannot be explained by factors unrelated to race, but, instead, are the direct causal result of

25 the use of the discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy.

26

44. There are no legitimate business reasons justifying GREENPOINT's

27 discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy that could not be achieved by a policy that has no

28 discriminatory impact or a greatly reduced discriminatory impact.

-8CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page10 of 22

45. Commission-driven, discretionary pricing systems-such as those in the real estate

2 mortgage industry that are stmcturally similar to the system utilized by GREENPOINT-have

3 been found to produce significant discriminatory efTects. Knowledge conceming the significant

4 and pervasive discriminatory impact of such commission-driven, discretionary credit pricing

5 systems has been widely circulated throughout the financing industry for several years,

6 particularly since 1994, as a result of numerous high profile actions by the United States

7 Department of Justice and federal regulatory agencies. GREENPOlNT has known or should

8 have known that its credit pricing system causes minority borrowers to pay the Defendant more

9 for mortgage financing than the amounts paid by white customers with identical or effectively

10 identical credit scores. The following various regulatory settlements involved discriminatory

11 pricing policies structurally similar to GREENPOINT's pricing policy and were widely reported

12 through the financing industry:

13

United States v. Hispanicpipe State Bank, Civ. Act. No. 93-5115 (D. S.D. filed

November 16, 1993)(charging American Indians higher interest rates)

14

United States v. First National Bank ofVicksburg, No. 5:94 CV 6(B)(N) (S.D. Miss.

15

filed Jan. 21, 1994) (charging African-Americans higher interest rates)

16

United States v. Huntington Mortgage Co., No.1; 95 CV 2211 (N.D. Ohio filed

October 18, 1995)(charging African-Americans higher fees)

17

United States v. Security State Bank of Pecos, No. SA 95 CA 0996 (W.D.Tex. filed

18

October 15, 1995)(charging minority borrowers higher interest rates)

19

United States v. First National Bank of Gordon, No. elV-96-5035 (W.D.S.D. filed

April 15, 1996)(charging American Indians higher interest rates)

20

!Jnited States v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., No. 96-2279 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 7,

21

1996)(charging African-Americans and minority borrowers higher interest rates)

22

United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. CV-96-6J59 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5,

1996)(charging African-Americans, Latinos, women and persons over age 55 higher

23

interest rates)

24 /11

25 II/

26 III

27 III

28 III

~9-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

· '

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page11 of 22

III. GREENPOINT'S DISCRETIONARY PRICING POLICY DISCRIMATED

2

AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

3

46. The Ramirezes reside at 46 Stellman Road, Roslindale, Massachusetts 02131.

4

47. In 2005, the Ramirezes sought to refinance their existing home loan to obtain cash

5 and to do construction on their home.

6

48. The Ramirezes' fonner real estate broker, Ms. Santana, referred them to First Call

7 Mortgage Company, Inc. ("First Call") a mortgage broker.

8

49. First Call did not explain to the Ramirezes that it is mortgage broker. In its initial

9 correspondences with the Ramirezes, First Call referred to the broker handling their loan, Kathy

10 Objio ("Ms. Objio"), as a "loan officer." The Ramirezes believed that First Call was the lender.

11

50. Ms. Objio told the Ramirezes that she could refinance their existing loan with a

12 loan that would be fixed for two years at 2.000%. She also promised the Ramirezes that she

13 could refinance them after the two-year fixed rate period expired.

14

5l. On August 3, 2005, the Ramirezes entered into a mortgage transaction with

15 GREENPOINT as lender and First Call as broker.

16

52. The loan contained a 2.000% one-month "teaser rate" that was set to adjust

17 upwards only immediately as of October 1, 2005 and could potentially reset every month

18 thereafter. The cap on the interest rate is 12.000%.

19

53. The loan has a 30-year tenn and a disclosed APR of 6.191 %. The loan amount

20 was $469,000.00.

21

54. According to the HUO-One Settlement Statement, First Call was paid a $5,276.25

22 Yield Spread Premium, $4,690.00 in Broker Points, and a $500.00 Processing Fee.

23

55. A true and correct copy of the Ramirezes' Truth-in-Lending disclosure provided

24 is attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 1.

25

56. At the time of the transaction, based on their credit scores, the Ramirezes would

26 have qualified with many lenders for a mortgage in the prime-market with limited points and

27 fees. Instead, the Ramirezes received a mortgage with points, fees and charges consistent with a

28 sub-prime loan.

- - . - -... - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1-0- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page12 of 22

57. On infonnation and belief, unbeknownst to the Ramirezes, the contract APR on

2 the mortgage loans was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a

3 totally subjective, discretionary component paid to First Call pursuant to GREENPOINT's

4 Discretionary Pricing Policy.

5

58. On infonnation and belief: the Ramirezes were subject to GREENPOINT's

6 Discretionary Pricing Policy.

7

59. On infonnation and belief: the Ramirezes were charged a disproportionately

8 greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.

9

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

10

60. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

11

61. This class action is brought pursuant to ECOA and the FHA by the individual

12 named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all minority consumers (the "Class") who obtained

13 a GREENPOINT home mortgage loan in the United States between January 1,2001 and the date

14 ofjudgment in this action (the "Class Period") and who were subject to GREENPOINT's

15 Discretionary Pricing Policy pursuant to which they paid discretionary points, fees or interest

16 rate mark-ups in connection with their loan. For the purposes of this Complaint, the tenn

17 "minority" is intended to include black and Hispanic consumers.

18

62. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules

19 23(a) and (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

20

63. "'Discretionary Pricing Policy" means GREENPOINT's policy of authorizing its

21 loan ot1icers, brokers and correspondent lenders to impose subjective, discretionary charges and

22 interest rate mark-ups that are included in the loans they originate.

23

64. Plaintiffs do not know the exact size or identities ofthe proposed Class, since

24 such infonnation is in the exclusive control of GREENPOINT. Plaintiffs believe that the Class

25 encompasses many thousands or tens of thousands of individuals who are geographically

26 dispersed throughout the United States. Therefore, the proposed class is so numerous that

27 joinder of all members is impracticable.

28

-JJ-

CLASS

COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page13 of 22
'.

65. All members of the Class have been subject to and affected by the same

2 Discretionary Pricing Policy. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class,

3 and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These

4 questions include, but are not limited to the following:

5

a.

the nature, scope and operations of GREENPOINT's Discretionary

6

Pricing Policy;

7

b. whether GREEN POINT is a creditor under the ECOA because, for

8

example, in the ordinary course of its business it participates in the

9

decision of whether or not to extend credit to consumers;

10

c.

whether GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy is a facially neutral

11

credit pricing system that has effected racial discrimination in violation of

12

ECOA;

13

d. whether there are statistically signiflcant disparities between the amount of

14

the discretionary charges imposed on minority persons and the amount of

15

the discretionary charges imposed on white persons that are unrelated to

16

creditworthiness;

17

e.

whether there are any legitimate business reasons for the Discretionary

18

Pricing Policy, and if so, whether they can be achieved by a credit pricing

19

system less discriminatory in its impact;

20

f.

whether the Court can enter declaratory and injunctive relief; and

21

g. the proper measure of disgorgement or damages.

22

66. The claims ofthe individual named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class

23 and do not connict with the interests of any other members ofthe Class in that both the Plaintiffs

24 and the other members of the Class were subject to the same Discretionary Pricing Policy that

25 has disproportionately affected minority homeowners.

26 / II

27 III

28 11/

-12-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

...

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page14 of 22

67. The individual named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests

2 of the Class. They are committed to the vigorous prosecution of the Class' claims and have

3 retained attorneys who are qualified to pursue this litigation and have experience in class

4 actions-in particular, consumer protection and discrimination actions.

5

68. A class action is superior to other methods for the fast and efficient adjudication

6 of this controversy. A class action regarding the issues in this case does not create any problems

7 of manageability.

8

69. In the alternative, GREENPOINT has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

9 applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding

10 declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

II

COUNT ONE

12 DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT

13

(15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691t)

14

70. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

15

71. ECOA makes it "unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any application,

16 with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-( I) on the basis of race, color, religion,

17 national origin, sex or marital status, or age." 28 U.S.c. § 1691(a).

18

72. GREENPOINT is a creditor as set forth in the ECOA because in the ordinary

19 course of its business, GREENPOINT participated in the decision to extend credit to Plaintiffs,

20 the proposed Class representative herein, and all prospective Class members. 28 U.S.c.

21 § 1691 aCe). Moreover, GREENPOINT is a creditor as set forth in the ECOA because it set the

22 terms of the credit that was extended to PlaintitTs, the proposed Class representative herein, and

23 all prospective Class members through its Discretionary Pricing Policy. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1)

24 (detining "creditor" under ECOA as one who "participates in a credit decision, including setting

25 the tenns of the credit").

26 III

27 II/

28 /11

-\3-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page15 of 22

73. GREENPOINT designed, disseminated, controlled, implemented and profited 2 from the discriminatory policy and practice alleged herein---the Discretionary Pricing Policy~-

3 which has had a disparate economic impact on minority borrowers compared to similarly

4 situated whites.

5

74. All actions taken by the GREENPOINT loan officers and brokers were in

6 accordance with the specific authority granted to them by GREEN POINT and were in

7 furtherance of GREENPOINT's policies and practices.

8

75. As a result of GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy, GREENPOINT has

9 collected more in finance charges from minority borrowers than from similarly situated white

10 persons, for reasons totally unrelated to credit risk.

11

76. GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Equal Credit

12 Opportunity Act.

13

77. Plaintiffs and prospective class members are aggrieved persons as defined in

14 ECOA by virtue of having been subject to GREENPOINT's discriminatory Discretionary

15 Pricing Policy.

16

COUNT TWO

17

DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OFTHE FAIR HOUSING ACT

18

(42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619)

19

78. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

20

79. The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in

21 residential real estate-related transactions such as the making or purchasing of loans or providing

22 other financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 3605.

23

80. GREENPOINT engaged in residential real estate-related transactions with respect

24 to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representative herein, and all prospective Class members, by

25 extending credit to Plaintiffs and all prospective Class members.

26

81. GREENPOINT' s Discretionary Pricing Policy has resulted in discrimination with

27 respect to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representative herein, and all prospective members of

28 the Class.

-14-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page16 of 22

82. As a result of GREENPOINTs Discretionary Pricing Policy, GREENPOINT has

2 collected more in finance charges from minority borrowers than from similarly situated white

3 persons, for reasons totally unrelated to credit risk.

4

83. GREENPOINTs Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Fair Housing Act and

5 constitutes actionable discrimination on the basis of race.

6

84. Plaintiffs and the Class are aggrieved persons as defined in FHA by virtue of

7 having been subject to GREENPOINTs discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy.

8

COUNT THREE

9

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

10

(42 U.S.C. § 1981)

11

85. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

12

86. 42 U.S.C. section 1981 provides that all persons within the United Sates "shall

13 have the same right in every State to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white

14 citizens."

15

87. Defendant has violated section 1981 by intentionally discriminating against

16 Plaintiffs and Class Members by charging higher interest rates and other fees and costs than were

17 charged to similarly situated non-minority borrowers.

18

88. Defendant unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiffs and Class Members in (i)

19 formation of contracts, (ii) making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, (iii)

20 the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship,

21 and/or (iv) conduct that interferes with the right to establish and enforce contract obligations.

22

89. Defendant's actions violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as the rights of Plaintiffs

23 and the Class under the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the

24 United States.

25

90. Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief and

26 damages, or make whole equitable relief as a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct.

27

91. At no time has Defendant undertaken corrective action to ameliorate its racially

28 discriminatory practices. Defendant continues to reap the profits of its discriminatory practices.

-15CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page17 of 22

Defendant's conduct as alleged herein was intentional, willful, wanton, reckless, malicious,

2 outrageous, or otherwise aggravated beyond mere negligence. Defendant has acted with malice

3 and reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiffs and members of the Class.

4 As a result, Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to punitive damages.

5

COUNT FOUR

6

RACIAL DISCRIMINATIOl\' Il\' VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

7

(42 U.S.C. § 1982)

8

92. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.

9

93. 42 U.S.c. section 1982 provides that all citizens of the United States "shall have

10 the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by White citizens thereof to inherit,

11 purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."

12

94. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class with respect to their

13 home mortgage loans by charging Plaintiffs and the Class higher interest rates and other

14 discretionary fees than Defendant has charged similarly situated non-minority consumers. As a

15 result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class have not had the same right as whites to

16 inherit, purchase, sell, hold, and convey real property. Defendant has thereby violated 42 U.S.c.

17 § 1982.

18

95. Defendant's violation of 42 U.S.c. § 1982 was intentional and malicious.

19

96. As a proximate result of Defendant's violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, Plaintiffs and

20 members of the Class have been injured, and are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief and

21 damages, or make whole equitable relief In addition, Defendant's conduct as alleged herein was

22 intentional, willful, wanton, reckless, malicious, outrageous, or otherwise aggravated beyond

23 mere negligence. Defendants acted with malice and reckless indifference to the federally

24 protected rights of Plaintiffs and members of the Class. As a result, Plaintiffs and members of

25 the Class are entitled to punitive damages.

26 1/1

27 III

28 11/

-16-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page18 of 22

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief:

3

A. Certify this case as a class action and certify the named Plaintiffs herein to be

4

adequate class representatives and their counsel to be class counsel;

5

B. Enter a judgment pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 169Ie(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. section

6

3613 deelaring the acts and practices of GREENPOINT complained of herein to

7

be in violation of ECOA and the FHA;

8

C. Grant a permanent or final injunction, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(c)

9

andlor 42 U.S.C. seetion 3613(c), enjoining GREENPOINT and GREENPOINT's

10

agents, employees, affiliates and subsidiaries from eontinuing to discriminate

11

against Plaintiffs and the members of the Class beeause of their race or national

12

origin through further use of the Discretionary Pricing Policy or any non-risk-

13

related discretionary pricing policy employed by GREENPOINT;

14

D. Order GREENPOINT pursuant to 15 U.S.c. section 1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.c.

15

section 3613(c) to adopt and enforce a policy that requires appropriate training of

16

GREENPOINT's employees and its brokers to prevent discrimination;

17

E. Order GREENPOINT pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.c.

18

section 3613(c) to monitor andlor audit the racial pattern of its financings to

19

ensure the cessation of discriminatory effects in its home mortgage transactions;

20

F. Order disgorgement pursuant to 15 U.S.c. section 1691e (c) of all

21

disproportionate non-risk charges imposed on minority borrowers by

GREENPOINT's Discretionary Pricing Policy and order the equitable distribution

23

of such charges, as restitutionary relief: to all appropriate class members;

24

G. Order actual and punitive damages to the Plaintiffs and the class pursuant to 42

25

U.S.C. § 3613(c);

26

H. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts,

27

together with reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1691e(d)

28

and/or 42 U.S.c. sections 3613(c) and 1988; and

-17-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

· .

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page19 of 22

I.

Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court tInds

2

necessary and proper.

3 DATED this ~~ay of January, 2008

CHAVEZ & GERTLER LLP

4

RODDY KLEIN & RYAN

5

MILLER LAW LLC

6 HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL

7

SHAPIRO LLP

8

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER

9

10

~~

Mark A. C h a v e 2 1

11
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 12

13 MILLER LAW LLC 14 Marvin A. Miller (To be admitted Pro Hac
Vice) 15 Lori A. Fanning (To be admitted Pro Hac
Vice) 16 115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910
Chicago, IL 60603 17 Tel: (312)332-3400
18 HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
19 Thomas M. Sobol (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice)
20 One Main Street, 4th Floor Boston, MA 02142
21 Tel: (617)475-1950 22 Fax: (617) 482-3003

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER Stuart T. Rossman (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice) Charles Delbaum (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice) 77 Summer Street. 10th FIr. Boston, MA 02141 Tel: (617) 542-8010 Fax: (617) 542-8028

23 24 25 26 27 28

-18CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page20 of 22

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

2

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

3

~tay 4 DATED this

of January, 2008

CHAVEZ & GERTLER LLP

5

RODDY KLEIN & RYAN

6

MILLER LAW LLC

7 HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL

8

SHAPIRO LLP

9

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER

10

11

~~

Mark A. Chavez

12
Attorneys for Plaintitls 13

14 Additional counselfor plaint~ffs:

15 MILLER LA W LLC
Marvin A. Miller (To be admitted Pro Hac 16 Vice)
Lori A. Fanning (To be admitted Pro Hac 17 Vice)
115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910 18 Chicago, IL 60603
Tel: (312) 332-3400 19

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER Stuart T. Rossman (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice) Charles Delbaum (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice) 77 Summer Street, 10th Flr. Boston, MA 02141 Tel: (617)542-8010 Fax: (617) 542-8028

20 HAGENSBERMANSOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
21 Thomas M. Sobol (To be admitted Pro Hac Vice)
22 One Main Street, 4th Floor
Boston, MA 02142 23 Tel: (617)475-1950
24 Fax: (617)482-3003

25 26 27 28
-19-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

. .... ....

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document1 Filed01/18/08 Page21 of 22

EXHIBIT 1

CTaIs{eU3:0T8H-cv-10013'69~-JTEEHNDDIoNcuGmeDnIt1SCFLileOd0S1U/18I/{0J81 PSaTgeA22ToEf 2M2 ENT (I~ESP A TransactionST'

DATE:

August 3, 2005

CREDITOR: GrecnPoint Mortgage Funding, fllc.

PROPERTY: 46 Stellman RD, Roslindale, MA 02131.

Loan Number: 0087400008

ANNUAL PlmC(r;NTAGE RATE
T'J~ COSl Df your Gft~dil !ts a ye<.riy fi'ltf.

FINANCE CHARGE
The Qoli.n amount the (;1 cd;1
wm cos! you

6.191 %

$ 626,441.47

Your Munthly payment schedllie will hc:

Number of P·YilU':ruS

Amoullt of PaYlllcnls

Wllcn payments . AII.'IDtlc

Nurnbcl Qf
P"I)'n'lefll~

Amount Financed
The Qmounl of credit provided 10 you 01 un 'lour heh,,![
$ 461,893.20

Total of Payments
The amount yem wiU ha .. e paid oliler you have made: all payment s as scheduled,
$ 1,088,334.67

Total Sale Price
'f1Ic lOla} C(lst of yocr purch.o.se Ql) credit, including Yl)ur d;,lwnpayr.u:nl
or
$ N/A
$ N/A

Amounf of Pa),n'ellts

When Ilayments AreDul!

Nll1'tlberof Paymellrs

Amount of Pnyrn",nls

When PiiYrIlClm Are OUt'

1.733.52

10/01/2005

II

1,733.52

1110\/2005

12

1,863.53

10/0\12006

12

2,003.29

10/01/2007

12

2,153.54

JO/OlJ2008

12

2,315.06

10/0112009

2(}9

3,225.04

10/0112010

3,220.43

09/0112035

Construction 1.0:111: D Ifchet:kcd. this loan provides fbr illtcr~-st-only payments during the COllstruction period. Beginning

,

Variable Rate:

t!.!!l will make pcri~dic intcrcsH:nly pay~ctlts during tile construction period, RJllowcd by ~aymel1ts ofprinclpaJ and interest as schcduk:d above..

0 ICJ If checked, Hns loan cont.ams a variable rate feature. ~ Disclosures about the variable rale feature were prOVided to you earher.

Disclosure

Assumption:

about the variabl" rate fCnlurc arc.....crovided in the alluchcd Variable Rale Disclosure Addendum
Someone buying your property U cannnt, unless otllerwise provided by federal law. t8J may, subject to conditions. be allowed to assume the remaindt

of' the loan on the original (elms.

Security: LMe Chnrge: I'rc llaymcul:

You are giving a security illtcrest in: 46 Stelhnall RD, Roslindale, MA 0213.
D the property bcing purchnscd I2$l YOllr properly.

II' a payment is not received by the end of 15 days alkr the date it is due, you will be charged 3.000 % or the overdue [8] payment D payment (

principal and interest. but not less than U.S. $ .00 and not more than U.S. $ N/A.

If you pay this loan early you D may I2$l 0 will not have 10 puy a penalty. If you payoff an FilA insured loan, on a date other than the rcgul.

0 installment date, YOll may be assessed interest charges until the end of the 11)0nth. You

may he or t8J will not be entitied to a refund of part (,fIr

Deposit: D"1ll9nd:

financc charge.
D If checked, the allnual percentage rate does not take into accollnt your required deposit
o It'c!ieekcd, thi510an has a demand feature:

for ~ny additional informatiull about non..payment, dcfault. allY required payment in full before the scheduled dale, and any prepayment

8/2120056:36:58 AM

Tnlth In Lending Disclosure Statement (I<ES('A Transactiolls) (Mullistate)

G~"'oi" M,,,.,,. """",0,

~iiillilliillllllll"" ~ I11""111111111111111111111

11111111111111111111 1111111111 11111 11111 11111ij)"'""

G P M W D 0 0 8 740 0 008 1 4 9

 
 Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page1 of 35
EXHIBIT 1

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page2 of 35

CONFIDENTIAL~ PREPARED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY PROTECTED BY FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE §408 AND ANALOGOUS STATE RULES OR LAWS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

ANA RAMIREZ, ISMAEL RAMIREZ,

) Case No. 08-cv-00369-TEH (WDB)

JORGE SALAZAR and EMANUEL

)

FANNING on behalf of themselves and all ) CLASS ACTION

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, )

INC.

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _))

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page3 of 35
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT ................................................................ ! I. RECITALS ............................................................................................................................... ! II. DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................ .3 III. TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT ...........................................................................................5 N. RELEASE AND DISMISSAL.................................................................................................9 V. NOTICE AND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION ......................................................... 10 VI. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, CONFIRMATORY DISCOVERY, AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ..................................................................................................... 13 VII. PRELIMlNARY APPROVAL ORDER AND FlNAL FAIRNESS HEARING ................... 13 VIII. FlNAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AND OTHER CONDITIONS ............................ 18 IX. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT .................................................................................... 19 X. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS ......................................................................................20 Exhibit A -- [Proposed] Final Approval Order Exhibit B -- [Proposed] Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal Exhibit C - [Proposed] Preliminary Approval Order Exhibit D --Direct Mail Notice Exhibit E -- Claim Form Exhibit F -- Amended Complaint

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page4 of 35
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT This Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement ("Agreement") is entered into by and between defendant, GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., ("Defendant" or "GreenPoint") and plaintiffs Ismael and Ana Ramirez and Jorge Salazar and Emanuel Fanning (collectively "Plaintiffs") on behalf of themselves and as putative representatives of the Settlement Class. This Settlement will fully and finally resolve the litigation pending between them in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California styled Ramirez, et al. v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc., Case No. 08-000369 TEH.
I. RECITALS WHEREAS, on January 18,2008, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint in the Northern District of California, which they amended on March 13, 2008; WHEREAS, the Action asserts that GreenPoint violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. ("ECOA"), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), in connection with the pricing of wholesale mortgage loans; WHEREAS, GreenPoint denies any and all facts and claims alleged by Plaintiffs in the Action, and further denies that Plaintiffs or any members of the class they purport to represent have suffered any injury or damage; WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel have conducted an investigation of the legal claims at issue, by review and analysis of more than 43,000 pages of documents and over 675 megabytes of data GreenPoint provided in discovery including, without limitation, data concerning the rates and terms of the loan accounts at issue together with extensive Rule 30(b)(6) depositions on the policies and practices complained of;

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page5 of 35
WHEREAS, the Parties exchanged rounds of expert reports by statistical and industry experts and conducted expert depositions;
WHEREAS, in August, 2009, the Parties had initial settlement negotiations, including a mediation session with the Honorable William Bettinelli (Ret.) of JAMS, and reached a settlement, which they withdrew before preliminary approval by consent of the Parties and the District Court;
WHEREAS, on July 20,2010, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) and certified a class of "all African-American or Hispanic persons throughout the United States to whom GreenPoint originated a residential-secured loan in GreenPoint's wholesale lending channel between January I, 2004 and January I, 2008," Ramirez et al., v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., 2010 WL 2867068 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010), the Court also appointed the law firms of Bonnett Fairboum Friedman & Balint, P .C. and Roddy Klein & Ryan to serve as Co-Lead Interim Class Counsel, and the law firm of Chavez & Gertler to serve as Liaison Interim Class Counsel, id., at *16;
WHEREAS, after the Court's class certification order, the Parties again conducted arm's length settlement negotiations, including a mediation session under the supervision of Edward Swanson, previously appointed as Special Master by the Court;
WHEREAS the Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel have concluded that it would be in the best interests of the Settlement Class to enter into the Agreement in order to avoid the uncertainties of litigation and to assure benefits to the Settlement Class and that the settlement contemplated hereby is fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best interests of all members of the Settlement Class; and
WHEREAS, GreenPoint vigorously and expressly denies all allegations of wrongdoing and liability, and has asserted numerous defenses, but nevertheless desires to settle the Action finally on the terms and conditions set forth herein solely for the purposes of avoiding the burden,
2

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page6 of 35
expense, and uncertainty of continuing litigation, and to obtain the conclusive and complete
dismissal of the Action and release of all Released Claims;
NOW, 1HEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and agreements set forth herein,
it is hereby STIPULATED AND AGREED, subject to the Disttict Court's approval, that each and
every claim that has been alleged, or could have been alleged based on the facts alleged in this
Action, shall be fully and finally settled and compromised and dismissed with prejudice, and shall
be fully discharged and released, upon and subject to the following terms and conditions:
II. DEFINITIONS
2.1 "Agreement" means this Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement. 2.2 "Action" means the above captioned action pending before the Hon. Judge Thelton E. Henderson, in the District Court for the Northern District of California. 2.3 "Amended Complaint" means the complaint to be filed in the District Court as set forth in Section 7.I below. 2.4 "Confidential Information" means any and all documents produced as discovery materials by Defendant or its affiliates, parents or subsidiaries, including, without limitation all loan files, customer information, electronic data, data dictionaries, credit information, policies and procedures, marketing materials, internal memoranda, and other documents produced pursuant to the District Court's protective order, and all reproductions of these discovery materials, whether photocopies, scanned copies, electronic copies, printouts or copies created by any other method of reproduction; and all documents filed with the District Court under seal. Notwithstanding the above, all documents and information described in this paragraph that were filed in the public record during the course of this Action, unless currently under seal, shall not be deemed Confidential Information.
2.5 "Direct Mail Notice" means the method of notice set forth in Section 5.2 below. 2.6 "District Court" means the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division. 2.7 "Equal Credit Opportunity Act" means 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. and its implementing regulation, Regulation B, 12 C.P.R. Part 202. 2.8 "Effective Date" means five (5) business days after the Judgment has become Final. 2.9 "Fair Housing Act" means 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 ~ 2.10 "Final" means the date the Judgment becomes final for all purposes because either (i) no appeal has been filed and the time within which an appeal may be filed has lapsed, or (ii) if a timely
3

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page7 of 35
appeal has been filed, the appeal is finally resolved, with no possibility of further appellate or other review, resulting in final judicial approval of the settlement.
2.11 "Final Approval Order" means the order to be entered by the Disttict Court in the Action finally approving this settlement and resolving all issues between the Parties, as provided for in Section VIII below, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.
2.12 "Final Fairness Hearing" means the hearing at which the Disttict Court will consider and finally decide whether to approve the settlement provided for in this Agreement, enter Judgment and make such rulings as are contemplated by this Agreement.
2.13 "HMDA" means the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801 ~
2.14 "Defendant" means GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.
2.15 "Judgment" means a final judgment and order of dismissal with prejudice to be entered by the Disttict Court concurrently with the Final Approval Order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B.
2.16 "Mediator" means special master Edward Swanson, or if he becomes unable or unwilling to serve, such other person as may be mutually acceptable to the Parties, but in the absence of mutual agreement as to a substitute mediator, such United States Magistrate Judge as may be appointed by the Disttict Court shall serve as "Mediator" for purposes of this Agreement.
2.17 "NCOA" means the National Change of Address system to provide updated address information that works directly with the United States Postal Service.
2.18 "Parties" means Defendant, Plaintiffs and, upon class certification for settlement purposes only as set forth herein, the Settlement Class.
2.19 "Plaintiffs" means named plaintiffs Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar and Emanuel Fanning individually and as putative representatives of the Settlement Class.
2.20 "Plaintiffs' Counsel" and "Class Counsel" mean Roddy Klein & Ryan, Bonnett, Fairboum, Friedman & Balint, P .C., Chavez & Gertler LLP, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check, LLP and the National Consumer Law Center.
2.21 "Preliminary Approval Order" means an order to be entered by the Disttict Court, as provided for in Section 7.2 below, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit C.
2.22 "Released Claims" means the claims released by this Agreement as set forth in Section IV below.
2.23 "Released Party" means Defendant, as well as its current, former and future direct and indirect parent companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, representatives, successors, predecessorsin-interest, related entities and each of their respective officers, directors, employees, attorneys, partners, insurers, vendors (including processing facilities) and assigns and all persons acting for or on their behalf.
4

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page8 of 35
2.24 "Residential Loan" means any residential closed-end real estate secured loan to any Settlement Class Member originated by the Defendant. 2.25 "Settlement Administtator" means A.B. Data Corporation as agreed by the Parties, subject to approval by the District Court. 2.26 "Settlement Class" and "Settlement Class Member" mean, include and refer to Plaintiffs and any other person and/or entity that falls within the definition of the Settlement Class, certified solely for purposes of this settlement, as provided for in Section 3.2 below. 2.27 "Settlement Fund" means the amounts paid as described in Section 3.4 below.
ill. TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT 3.1 Certification Of Settlement Class For Settlement Purposes Only. Defendant maintains that it has valid grounds for appealing the District Court's class certification decision. However, solely for purposes of avoiding the expense and inconvenience of further litigation, Defendant does not oppose the certification for settlement purposes only of the Settlement Class. No agreements made by Defendant in connection with the settlement may be used by Plaintiffs, any Settlement Class Member, or any other person, to establish any of the elements of class certification, other than for settlement purposes. Preliminary certification of a Settlement Class shall not be deemed a concession that certification of a class is appropriate, nor is Defendant estopped from challenging class certification in further proceedings if the settlement is not finally approved. Nor shall this agreement be deemed to limit the Plaintiffs, in the event that the Settlement Class is not certified, from later seeking certification of a different class in any litigation pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. No agreements made by the Plaintiffs in connection with settlement may be used by the Defendant to defend against such certification. 3.2 Definition Of The Settlement Class. Solely for purposes of this Settlement, the Parties agree to preliminary certification of the following Settlement Class:
All African-American or Hispanic persons throughout the United States to whom GreenPoint originated a residentialsecured loan in GreenPoint' s wholesale lending channel between January 1, 2004 and January 1, 2008.
5

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page9 of 35
Based on a review of its records, GreenPoint estimates that under this definition, the Settlement Class includes approximately 94,000 members.
Certification of the Settlement Class will be sought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (b)(3), and all Settlement Class Members shall have the right to exclude themselves by way ofthe opt-out procedure set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order.
3.3 Identification Of The Settlement Class. Settlement Class Members will be identified by Defendant based on the data previously provided to Plaintiffs in discovery. Defendant will, no later than thirty (30) days following entry of an order preliminarily approving the settlement, supplement this data with the name, account number and most recent address available in Defendant's records of each member of the Settlement Class.
3.4 Settlement Fund. a. Distribution Of The Settlement Fund. Defendant will pay fourteen million, seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($14,750 ,000) for the benefit of the Settlement Class (the "Settlement Fund"), such Settlement Fund to be paid within five (5) days of the Effective date. Interest on the Settlement Fund, once created, will accrue for the benefit of the Settlement Fund. The Settlement Fund will be distributed as follows: First, to pay the costs of class notice and settlement administration not previously paid by Defendant; Second, to pay named Plaintiffs' service awards as approved by the District Court; Third, for the foreclosure prevention counseling services described in section 3.5 below; Fourth, to pay attorneys' fees and costs as approved by the District Court;
6

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page10 of 35
Fifth, to be divided pro rata among class members filing claims; and Sixth, if any residual remains because claimants do not timely negotiate their settlement checks or because the Settlement Fund is not otherwise fully expended, said amounts will be paid in equal amounts to the National Counsel of La Raza and the National Urban League in the form of an award in the nature of cy pres to further their existing housing counseling programs. b. No portion of the Settlement Fund will revert to Defendant. c. Payment To Claimants. Valid claims shall be paid within forty-five (45) days after the Effective Date by check mailed to the Claimant at the address provided in the claim form (or to any later forwarding address provided by the Claimant to the Settlement Administrator). If checks are not cashed within six months of the check issue date,,such checks will not be re-issued and the money in question will be distributed instead by way of the cy pres distribution described in Section 3.4(a), supra. d. Quarterly Reports Regarding Distribution Of Settlement Fund. The Settlement Administrator will provide quarterly reports to Class Counsel and counsel for Defendant on the distribution of the Settlement Fund until such time as the Settlement Fund is fully paid to eligible recipients and depleted. e. Credit For Advances On Behalf Of The Settlement Fund. Advances by Defendant of any notice and administration costs or expenses paid directly to the Settlement Administrator prior to the Effective Date are to be treated as contributions to the Settlement Fund as set forth above in Section 3.4(a) and shall be credited in their entirety (100%) towards Defendant's obligation thereunder.
7

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page11 of 35
3.5 Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Services. a. $150,000 of the Settlement Fund will be designated for Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, a national non-profit housing counseling agency, to provide foreclosure prevention counseling to eligible class members who currently have loans originated by Defendant being serviced by ·an entity that either directly or indirectly received a transfer of the servicing rights on the loan from Defendant or a related entity. b. The foreclosure prevention counseling services available to class members will be provided by telephone (through a toll-free number on a national basis). Foreclosure prevention counselors providing services to eligible class members will communicate with class members about the servicer-specific loan modification options available to them (including any available HAMP options). Foreclosure prevention counselors will facilitate foreclosure avoidance by providing options counseling to homeowners who are delinquent on their Defendant originated mortgages and by acting as an intermediary between class members and their respective loan servicers, to ensure that all applications for loss mitigation relief are accurate and complete and submitted properly to servicing entities under the servicing entities' respective guidelines. Foreclosure prevention counselors will be available to assist class members with any follow up issues that may arise in connection with their loss mitigation applications. c. Foreclosure prevention counseling services will be available to class members for up to one year from the Effective Date.
8

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page12 of 35
d. The housing counseling agency shall be strictly limited by the funding agreement to those services described above and shall not be permitted. under any circumstances, to recommend litigation or to offer referrals to lawyers or other parties for litigation.
3.6 Named Plaintiffs' Service Payments: Plaintiffs will apply to the District Court for Named Plaintiff Service Payments in the total amount of no more than $18,000 (to be allocated at no more than $8,000 for each original named plaintiff household and no more than $2,000 for each named plaintiff household added by amendment). Defendant will not oppose such motion. Named Plaintiff Service Payments will be paid from the Settlement Fund provided under paragraph 3.4.
3.7 Attorneys' Fees and Costs: Plaintiffs will apply to the District Court at least twenty (20) days prior to the deadline for filing objections to the Settlement for an award of attorneys' fees in the total amount of no more than 25% of the Settlement Fund provided under paragraph 3.4 plus actual costs in the total amount of no more than $450,000 and Defendant will not oppose such motion. Attorneys' fees and costs, in the amounts awarded by the District Court, will be paid from the Settlement Fund provided under paragraph 3.4.
IV. RELEASE AND DISMISSAL 4.1 Release. As of the Effective Date of the Agreement, Plaintiffs and each member of the Settlement Class, their respective heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, agents, attorneys, partners, successors, predecessors-in-interest, assigns and all persons acting for or on their behalf, shall be deemed to have fully, finally and forever released all claims, causes of action, or liabilities, whether arising under local, state, or federal law, whether by statute, regulation, contract, common law, equity or otherwise, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, foreseen or unforeseen, actual or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, as alleged or as could have been alleged based upon the facts asserted in the Amended Complaint as to
9

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page13 of 35
the Released Party. Without limiting the foregoing, the Released Claims specifically extend to claims that Settlement Class Members do not know or suspect to exist in their favor at the time that the settlement, and the releases contained therein, becomes effective.
This paragraph constitutes a waiver of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code and any similar or comparable provisions, rights and benefits conferred by the law of any state or territory of the United States or any jurisdiction, and any principle of common law, which provide:
A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR. Plaintiffs and each Settlement Class Member understand and acknowledge the significance of these waivers of California Civil Code Section 1542 and/or of any other applicable law relating to limitations on releases. In connection with such waivers and relinquishment, Plaintiffs and each Settlement Class Member acknowledge that they are aware that they may hereafter discover facts in addition to, or different from, those facts which they now know or believe to be ttue with respect to the subject matter of the settlement, but that they release fully, finally and forever all Released Claims, and in furtherance of such intention, the release will remain in effect notwithstanding the discovery or existence of any such additional or different facts. 4.2 Dismissal. Upon entry of the Final Approval Order, Plaintiffs shall take all actions necessary to dismiss this litigation with prejudice.
V. NOTICE AND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION 5.1 Costs Of Notice And Administration. The costs of notice and administration shall be paid from the Settlement Fund as described in Section 3.4 above. Defendant will advance funds to pay reasonable costs of notice and administration, to the extent such costs are payable prior to the
10

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page14 of 35
Effective Date, subject to credit for such payments as against the Defendant's obligations to the Settlement Fund as described in section 3.4, above.
5.2 Class Notice. Direct Mail Notice consistent with the due process requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 shall be provided within thirty (30) days following entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, as follows:
a. Direct Mail Notice, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit D that is approved by the District Court, will be mailed, via rrrst class mail, to Settlement Class Members at the most recent address shown in Defendant's electronic records, as maintained in the ordinary course of business, for the loan at issue. A Spanish translation of the class notice will be printed on the reverse side or at the end of the notice. Addresses will be run once tlrrough the NCOA system prior to mailing. Returned notices will be remailed if they are returned with a postmark date within twenty (20) days of the postmark date of the Direct Mail Notice and contain a forwarding address. Defendant shall have no responsibility with respect to Direet Mail Notices that are retorned undeliverable.
b. The Direct Mail Notice shall include a claim form substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit E that is approved by the District Court.
c. Untimely Claims: To be treated as valid, claims must be made within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. Because the settlement process requires pro rata distribution of a fixed fund pursuant to the Distribution Plan, Claims Forms that are not timely will not be allowed absent relief from the District Court specifically granting allowance prior to Entry of the Final Approval Order.
11

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page15 of 35
d. Claims ofDeceased Persons: Claims of deceased persons will not be allowed unless a claim is submitted by a person authorized to act on behalf of the deceased person's estate together with proof of such authorization.
e. Claims ofJoint Borrowers: Joint borrowers will be treated for the purposes of distribution as if they have a single claim. However, the entire amount of the claim of joint borrowers will be paid to any joint borrower making a claim if only one claim is timely submitted on the joint account. If more than one claim is timely submitted on a joint account, the claim payment will be divided in equal shares among the number of claimants on the joint account.
f. Incomplete or Improper Claims: The Settlement Administrator will have final authority, in consultation with Lead Class Counsel, to disallow any incomplete or improperly filed claims and will send notice of and the reasons for such disallowance, if any, with the reasons therefore, no later than twenty (20) days prior to the hearing set on Final Approval of the Settlement. To the extent that deficiencies in filed claims are not resolved prior to an order entered on final approval of the Settlement, and if no relief from the District Court is obtained by the claimant at the claimant's sole cost and expense, said claim will be permanently and finally disallowed.
g. The notice and claims process shall be administered by the Settlement Administrator.
h. Defendant will be responsible, at its own expense, for compliance with the notice provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") and approval dates will be set in accord with CAFA.
12

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page16 of 35
5.3 Certification To The District Court. No later than five (5) days before the Final Fairness Hearing, the Settlement Administrator and/or its designees shall file a declaration with the District Court verifying that Direct Mail Notice has been provided to the Settlement Class.
VI. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, CONFIRMATORY DISCOVERY, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
6.1 Representations And Warranties. Defendant represents and warrants that, as ofthe date on which this agreement is signed, it is not originating any new wholesale residential real estate secured loans to consumers. If, within one year of the date of final approval of the Settlement, Defendant re-enters the business of originating new wholesale residential real estate secured loans to consumers, Defendant will so notify Class CounseL
6.2 Confirrnatorv Discovery. Defendant will permit reasonable confirmatory discovery with respect to the process by which Defendant identifies class members, which rna)( be made by satisfactory affidavit or declaration concerning the nature and accuracy of those processes.
6.3 Dispute Resolution. The Parties agree to meet and confer in good faith in regard to any dispute relating to the Settlement or to administration of the Settlement. Any dispute that cannot be resolved by the Parties shall be submitted, not earlier than thirty (30) days after written notice of the dispute was first given, to the Mediator for his recommendation as to a resolution. Each of the Parties may seek de novo review of the Mediator's recommendation by way of a motion filed before the District Court.
VII. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER AND F1NAL FAIRNESS HEARING 7.1 Filing Of Amended Complaint. In connection with this settlement, Plaintiffs shall
promptly file an Amended Complaint, to effectuate the objectives of this Agreement and the settlement approval proceedings and Defendant will stipulate to such filing for settlement purposes only. All allegations of the Amended Complaint shall be deemed denied and disputed by Defendant without the necessity of filing an answer. The Amended Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
13

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page17 of 35
7.2 Preliminary Approval Order. Plaintiffs will seek the District Court's approval of this Agreement by filing an appropriate Motion for Preliminary Approval and seeking entry of a Preliminary Approval Order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit C. Defendant will assent to the Motion for Preliminary Approval. The Parties shall cooperate in presenting such papers to the District Court as may be necessary to effectuate the intent and purposes of this Agreement. Among other things, the Preliminary Approval Order shall specifically include the following:
a. A determination that, for settlement purposes only, the Action may be maintained as a class action on behalf of the Settlement Class;
b. A finding that Direct Mail Notice is the only notice required, and that such Direct Mail Notice satisfies the requirements of due process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any other applicable laws;
c. A preliminary finding that this Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate and within the range of possible approval;
d. A preliminary finding that Plaintiffs fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Settlement Class;
e. A preliminary finding that Plaintiffs' Counsel are adequate to act as counsel for the Settlement Class and appointing Plaintiffs' Counsel as counsel to the Settlement Class;
f. A scheduled date for the Final Fairness Hearing, which the Parties shall request be approximately one hundred twenty (120) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, to determine whether there exists any reasonable basis why the settlement should not be approved as being fair,
14

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page18 of 35
reasonable and adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class and why Judgment should not be entered thereon; g. Establishment of a procedure for Settlement Class Members to opt-out of the proposed settlement and setting a postmark deadline of seventy-five (75) days after entty of the Preliminary Approval Order, after which no Settlement Class Member shall be allowed to opt-out of the Settlement Class; h. Establishment of a procedure for Settlement Class Members to object to the proposed settlement and setting a postmark deadline of seventy-five (75) days after entty of the Preliminary Approval Order, after which no Settlement Class Member shall be allowed to object to the proposed settlement; and 1. Entty of a stay of all proceedings in the Action except as may be necessary to implement the settlement or to comply with the terms of the Agreement. 7.3 Denial Of Preliminarv Approval Order. If the District Court fails for any reason to enter the Preliminary Approval Order substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit C or to certify the Settlement Class for settlement purposes consistent with the provisions hereof, and if all Parties do not agree jointly to appeal such ruling, this Agreement shall terminate and be of no further force or effect without any further action by the Parties. In such an event, nothing in this Agreement or filed in connection with seeking entty of the Preliminary Approval Order shall be construed as an admission or concession by Defendant of the allegations raised in the Action, of any fault, wrongdoing or liability of any kind, nor is Defendant estopped from challenging those allegations in further proceedings in the Ramirez Action or in any other action. 7.4 Opt-Out/Requests For Exclusion From Settlement Of Damages Claims. a. Requests For Exclusion. Prospective Settlement Class Members shall be given the opportunity to opt-out of the Settlement Class. All requests by
15

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page19 of 35
Settlement Class Members to be excluded must be in writing and mailed to the Settlement Administrator, postmarked no later than seventy-five (75) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. An appropriate written request for exclusion must be personally signed by the Settlement Class Member and must include: (i) the Settlement Class Member's name, address, telephone number; (ii) the account nnmber(s) of the Residential Loan(s); (iii) an affirmation, that he or she is a Settlement Class Member; and (iv) the following statement: "I request to be excluded from the class settlement in this case." No Settlement Class Member, or any person acting on behalf of or in concert or participation with that Settlement Class Member, may exclude any other Settlement Class Member from the Settlement Class. b. Delivery To Parties/Filing With District Court. The Settlement Administrator shall provide copies of the original requests for exclusion to the Parties by no later than fifteen (15) days after the opt-out deadline. Not later than ten (10) days before the Final Fairness Hearing, the Settlement Administrator shall file with the District Court a declaration that lists all of the opt-outs received. c. Effect. All prospective Settlement Class Members who timely exclude themselves from the Settlement Class will not be eligible to receive any payment pursuant to settlement of the damages claims or be bound by any further orders or judgments in the Action with respect to damages, and will preserve their ability to independently pursue any individual claims for damages they may have against Defendant by filing their own lawsuit or arbitration at their own expense. In the event of ambiguity as to whether a
16

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page20 of 35
Settlement Class Member has requested to be excluded (such as tluough a submission of both a request for exclusion and a claim form), the Settlement Class Member shall be deemed not to have requested exclusion. d. Right To Withdraw For Excessive Opt-Outs. If the number of Settlement Class Members who request exclusion exceeds a number agreed by the Parties ("Opt-out Limit") Defendant may terminate the Agreement in their sole discretion and the Parties shall be returned to the status quo ante as of August 11, 2010 for all litigation purposes, as if no settlement had been negotiated or entered into. If Defendant exercises this right to declare the Agreement void, it shall provide Plaintiffs' Counsel with written notice of this election no later than twenty (20) days after the opt-out deadline. The agreement concerning the Opt-out Limit will be contained in a confidential side letter to this agreement and will be available for in camera inspection by the District Court. The parties agree to maintain the Opt-out Limit and the confidential side letter concerning the Opt-out Limit in strict confidence, except as necessary for in camera review by the District Court and/or otherwise agreed. 7.5 Objections To Settlement. a. Right To Object. Any Settlement Class Member, who has not previously opted-out in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, may appear at the Final Fairness Hearing to argue that the proposed settlement should not be approved and/or to oppose the application of Class Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees and costs and the service awards to Plaintiffs.
17

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page21 of 35
b. Deadline. Any such objection must be filed with the District Court postmarked no later than seventy-five (75) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. Copies of all objections also must be mailed to each of the following, postmarked by the last day to file the objection: Class Counsel: Andrew Friedman, Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C., 2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 1000, Phoenix, AZ 85012 and Gary Klein, Roddy Klein & Ryan, 727 Atlantic Avenue, 2"d Floor, Boston, MA 02111; and counsel for Defendant: Anand S. Raman, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & FlomLLP, 1440 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20005.
c. Content Of Objections. All objections must include: (i) the objector's name, address and telephone number; (ii) the account number of the Residential Loan(s); (iii) a sentence confirming, under penalty of perjury, that he or she is a Settlement Class Member; (iv) the factual basis and legal grounds for the objection to the settlement; (v) the identity of witnesses whom they may call to testify at the Final Fairness Hearing; and (vi) copies of exhibits they intend to offer into evidence at the Final Fairness Hearing.
Vlll. FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AND OTHER CONDITIONS 8.1 Final Approval Order. On a date to be set by the District Court, Plaintiffs will petition the District Court for an order granting final approval of this settlement and entering Judgment in the Action, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. The Final Approval Order will provide:
a. That the Action, for purposes of this settlement, may be maintained as a class action on behalf of the Settlement Class;
18

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page22 of 35

b. That Plaintiffs fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Settlement

Class;

c. That Class Counsel adequately represent Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class;

d. That Direct Mail Notice satisfies the requirements of due process, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and any other applicable laws;

e. That the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate to the Settlement Class

and that each Settlement Class Member shall be bound by the settlement,

including the releases contained in Section 4.1 above;

f. That the settlement represents a fair resolution of all claims asserted on behalf

of the Settlement Class and should fully and finally resolve all such claims;

g. That this Agreement should be, and is, approved;

h. The amount of attorneys' fees, costs and service awards;

i. Confirmation of the Opt-outs from the Settlement;

J.

Overruling of objections, if any;

k. Dismissal, on the merits and with prejudice, of all claims and enjoin all class

members from bringing, joining or continuing to prosecute against the

Released Parties any Released Claims and enter Judgment thereon; and

I. Retention of jurisdiction of all matters relating to the modification,

interpretation, administration, implementation, effectuation and enforcement

of this Agreement and the settlement.

IX. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 9.1 Non-Approval Of Agreement. This Agreement is conditioned upon final approval

without material modification by the District Court. In the event that the Agreement is not so

approved, the Parties shall return to the status quo ante as of August 11, 2010 as if no Agreement

19

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page23 of 35
had been negotiated or entered into. Moreover, the Parties shall be deemed to have preserved all of their rights or defenses as of August II, 2010 and shall not be deemed to have waived any substantive or procedural rights of any kind that they may have as to each other or any member of the proposed Settlement Class. Likewise, in the event that the Agreement is approved without material modification by the District Court, but is later reversed or vacated on appeal, each of the Parties shall have the right to withdraw from the Agreement and return to the status quo ante as of August II, 2010 for all litigation purposes, as if no Agreement had been negotiated or entered into, and shall not be deemed to have waived any substantive or procedural rights of any kind that they may have as to each other or any member of the proposed Settlement Class.
X. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 10.1 Further Assurance. Each of the Parties shall execute all documents and perform all acts necessary and proper to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. 10.2 Return of Confidential Information and Other Discovery. Plaintiffs' Counsel, on behalf of themselves and any expert witnesses, consultants or others retained by or working in concert with them, acknowledge that during the course of the Action, they have received Confidential Information. Not later than thirty (30) days after the Effective Date, Plaintiffs' Counsel will return all Confidential Information to Defendant and will certify under oath that they and their expert witnesses and consultants and any other individuals to whom they may have provided Confidential Information do not retain any copies or surmnaries or compilations or indices of such information. Within the same time period, Plaintiffs' Counsel will identify for Defendant the expert witnesses, outside consultants, and any other individuals or entities to whom Confidential Information may have been given, and will advise those persons of this requirement and will ensure their compliance with it. Plaintiffs' Counsel also will not use any of the Confidential Information learned or obtained in this Action for any purpose.
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Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page24 of 35
Not later than thirty (30) days after the Effective Date, Plaintiffs' Counsel will return to Defendant all originals and duplicate copies of materials produced or obtained from Defendant in the discovery process of the Action, whether by formal or informal discovery. This will include, but not be limited to, business records, data, proprietary information, and all originals, copies, video tapes or audio tapes of any and all deposition of current or former Defendant employees or witnesses in this Action. This provision is not intended to cover work product of Plaintiffs' Counsel but is intended to cover any documents or other materials that might simply be attached to any work product. Notwithstanding the above, all documents and infonnation described in this paragraph that were filed in the public record during the course of this Action, unless currently under seal, will not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
10.3 Publicity And Non-Disparagement. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel shall refrain from disparaging Defendant. None of the Parties shall issue press releases or communicate with the media regarding this Agreement or the settlement except as set forth herein. Prior to submission of the settlement to the District Court for preliminary approval, the Parties shall work in good faith to develop a joint agreed statement regarding the settlement which may be made publicly available and develop joint agreed responses to likely questions from Settlement Class Members, as well as to provide infonnational materials to be used by the Settlement Administrator. Class Counsel may respond to direct communications from Settlement Class Members regarding the settlement and nothing herein is intended to prevent Class Counsel from providing full and fair advice and counsel to Settlement Class Members. Inquiries other than those from Settlement Class Members seeking legal advice may be responded to only by reference to information contained in the public record and/or agreed upon by the Parties.
10.4 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between and among the Parties with respect to the settlement of the Action. This Agreement supersedes all prior
21

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page25 of 35
negotiations and agreements. The Parties, and each of them, represent and warrant that no other party or any agent or attorney of any of the Parties has made any promise, representation or warranty whatsoever not contained in this Agreement and the other documents referred to in this Agreement to induce them to execute the same. The Parties, and each of them, represent and warrant that they have not executed this Agreement or the other documents referred to in this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation or warranty not contained in this Agreement and the other documents referred to in this Agreement.
10.5 Confidentiality. Any and all drafts of this Agreement and other settlement documents relating to the negotiations between the Parties will remain confidential and will not be disclosed or duplicated except as necessary to obtain preliminary and/or final court approvaL This provision will not prohibit the Parties from submitting this Agreement to the District Court in order to obtain preliminary and/or final approval of the settlement
10.6 Successors And Assigns. The Agreement shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the heirs, successors and assigns of the Parties.
10.7 Competency Of Parties. The Parties, and each of them, acknowledge, warrant, represent and agree that in executing and delivering this Agreement, they do so freely, knowingly and voluntarily, that they had an opportunity to and did discuss its terms and their implications with legal coun~el, that they are fully aware of the contents and effect of the Agreement and that such execution and delivery is not the result of any fraud, duress, mistake or undue influence whatsoever.
10.8 Authority. The person signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant warrants and represents that he or she is authorized to sign on Defendant's behalf. Each of the Plaintiffs has personally signed this Agreement.
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Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page26 of 35
10.9 Modification. No modification of or amendment to this Agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by all Parties hereto or agreed to on the record in the District Court.
10.10 Construction. Each of the Parties has cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. Hence, in any construction to be made of this Agreement, the same shall not be construed against any of the Parties. Before declaring any provision of this Agreement invalid, the District Court shall first attempt to construe the provision valid to the fullest extent possible consistent with applicable precedent so as to find all provisions of this Agreement valid and enforceable. After applying this rule of construction and still finding a provision invalid, the District Court shall thereupon interpret the invalid provision to the fullest extent possible to otherwise enforce the invalid provision. The invalidity of any one provision shall not render this Agreement otherwise invalid and unenforceable unless the provision found to be invalid materially affects the terms of this Agreement after application of the rules of construction set forth in this paragraph.
10.11 No Waiver. The failure of any of the Parties to enforce at any time any provision of this Agreement shall not be construed to be a waiver of such provision, or any other provision, nor in any way to affect the validity of this Agreement or any part hereof, or the right of any of the Parties thereafter to enforce that provision or each and every other provision. No waiver of any breach of this Agreement shall constitute or be deemed a waiver of any other breach.
10.12 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
10.13 Notices/Communications. All requests, demands, claims and other communications hereunder shall: (a) be in writing; (b) be delivered by U.S. Mail and facsimile; (c) be deemed to
23

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page27 of 35
have been duly given on the date received; and (d) be addressed to the intended recipient as set forth below:
If to Plaintiffs or the Settlement Class: Andrew Friedman, Esq. Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P .C. 2901 North Central Avenue Suite 1000 Phoenix, AZ 85012 and Gary Klein, Esq. Roddy Klein & Ryan 727 Atlantic Avenue, 2nd Floor Boston, MA 02111
If to Defendant: Anand S. Raman, Esq. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 1440 New YorkAvenue,N.W. Washington D.C. 20005 Each of the Parties may change the address to which requests, demands, claims or other communications hereunder are to be delivered by giving the other Parties notice in the manner set forth herein. 10.14 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts and, if so executed, the various counterparts shall be and constitute one instrument for all purposes and shall be binding on each of the Parties that executed it, provided, however, that none of the Parties shall be bound unless and until all Parties have executed this Agreement. For convenience, the several signature pages may be collected and annexed to one or more documents to form a complete counterpart. Photocopies of executed copies of this Agreement may be treated as originals.
24

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page28 of 35

Agreed and accepted: Dated: October 12.2010
Dated: October 12.., 2010
Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010
Approved as to form and content:
Dated: October t..b 2010

Aria Ranrirez

O

J(lb2% ~ 0

Ismael Ramirez

Jorge Salazar

Emanuel Fanning

RODDY KLEIN & RYAN

Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010

BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
By_____________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CHAVEZ & GERTLER, L.L.P.
By______________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs

25

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page29 of 35

Agreed and accepted: Dated: October_,2010 Dated: October_,2010
Dated: October j1, 2010
Dated: October_, 2010 Approved as to form and content:
Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: October_, 2010

Ana Ramirez
Emanuel Fanning
RODDY KLEIN & RYAN By_____________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN &
BALINT, P.C. By___________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs CHAVEZ & GERTLER, L.L.P. By____________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

25

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page30 of 35

Agreed and accepted: Dated: October___, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010
Approved as to form and content: Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: October___, 2010

Ana Ramirez Ismae1 Ramirez Jorge Salazar Emanuel Fanning
RODDY KLEIN & RYAN
By_____________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs CHAVEZ & GERTLER, L.L.P. By____________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

25

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page31 of 35

Agreed and accepted: Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010
f- Dated: Octobe~ 2010
Approved as to form and content: Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: October_, 2010

Ana Ramirez Ismael Ramirez
'Salazar ·~. iFa'nndi.ngtd~~~.
RODDY KLEIN & RYAN
By_____________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
BONNETT, FAIRBOURN,FRJEDMAN & BALINf, P.C.
By___________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CHAVEZ & GERTLER, LLP. By_____________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

25

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page32 of 35

Agreed and accepted: Dated: October_, 20 I0 Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010
Approved as to form and content: Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: October_, 2010
Dated: OctoberS, 2010

Ana Ramirez Ismael Ramirez . Jorge Salazar Emanuel Fanning
RODDY KLEIN &RYAN
B y_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
By___________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CHAVEZ & GERTLER, L.L.P.
Attomeys for Plaintiffs

25

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page33 of 35

Dated: October6.2010 Dated: October _ , 201 0 Dated: October_, 20 10 Dated: October_, 2010 Approved as to form and content: Dated: October 5, 2010

N &DOWDLLP
Attorneys for Plaintiffs BARROWAY TOPAZ KESSLER MELTZER
&CHECKLLP By______________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs MILLER LAW L.L.C.
By_______________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
By_______________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Anand S. Raman Raoul D. Kennedy SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER &
FLOMLLP
By ~G'to
Attorneys for Defendant

26

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page34 of 35

Dated: October _, 2010

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP

Dated: OctoberLZ 2010

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
BARROWAY TOP &CHECKLL

Dated: October_, 201 0 Dated: October _, 2010
Approved as to form and content: Dated: October 5, 2010

MILLER LAW L.L.C.
By_______________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
By_______________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Anand S. Raman Raoul D. Kennedy SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER &
FLOMLLP
By l.n·~o···
Attorneys for Defendant

26

Case3:08-cv-00369-TEH Document226-1 Filed10/29/10 Page35 of 35

Dated: October_, 2010 Dated: October_, 2010
--- Dated: October .S, 2010

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
By__________________________ Attorneys for Plaintiffs
BARROWAY TOPAZ KESSLER MELTZER &CHECKLLP
By__________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

_S Dated: October 2010
Approved as to form and content: Dated: October 5, 2010

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Anand S. Raman
Raoul D. Kennedy SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER &
FLOMLLP
Attorneys for Defendant

26

 
 Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 1 of 26
ADRMOP,CLOSED,E−Filing,PROTO,ProSe
U.S. District Court California Northern District (San Francisco) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:08−cv−00369−TEH

Ramirez et al v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. Assigned to: Hon. Thelton E. Henderson Referred to: Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Brazil Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Special Master

Date Filed: 01/18/2008 Date Terminated: 04/12/2011 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Edward Swanson

represented by Edward Swanson Swanson &McNamara LLP 300 Montgomery Street, Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94104 415−477−3800 Fax: 415−477−9010 Email: eswanson@smhlegal.com PRO SE

Plaintiff Ana Ramirez

represented by Andrew S. Friedman Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman &Balint, P.C 2325 E. Camelback Road Suite 300 Phoenix, AZ 85016 602−274−1100 Fax: 602−274−1199 Email: afriedman@bffb.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark Andrew Chavez Chavez &Gertler, L.L.P. 42 Miller Avenue Mill Valley, CA 94941 415−381−5599 Fax: 415−381−5572 Email: mark@chavezgertler.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles Delbaum , National Consumer Law Center 7 Winthrop Square Boston, MA 02110 (617) 542−8010 Fax: Email: cdelbaum@nclc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dan Leo Gildor Chavez &Gertler, L.L.P. 42 Miller Avenue Mill Valley, CA 94941 415−381−5599 Fax: 415−381−5572 Email: dgildor@chavezgertler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donna Siegel Moffa Kessler Topaz Meltzer &Check, LLP

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 2 of 26
280 King of Prussia Road Radnor, PA 19087 (610) 667−7706 Fax: 610−667−7056 Email: dmoffa@ktmc.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward W. Ciolko Kessler Topaz Meltzer &Check, LLP 280 King of Prussia Radnor, PA 19087 610−667−7706 Fax: 610−667−7056 Email: eciolko@ktmc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gary Edward Klein Klein Kavanagh Costello, LLP 85 Merrimac St. 4th Floor Boston, MA 02114 (617) 357−5500 Email: Klein@kkcllp.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Stoia , Jr. Robbins Geller Rudman &Dowd LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101−3301 (619) 231−1058 Fax: (619) 231−7423 Email: jstoia@rgrdlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph H. Meltzer Kessler Topaz Meltzer &Check, LLP 280 King of Prussia Road Radnor, PA 19087 610−667−7706 Fax: 610−667−7056 Email: jmeltzer@ktmc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph A. Weeden Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer &Check, LLP 280 King of Prussia Road Radnor, PA 19807 (610) 667−7706 Fax: (610) 667−7056 Email: jweeden@sbtklaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie E. Hurst Blood Hurst &O'Reardon LLP 701 B Street, Suite 1700 San Diego, CA 92101 619−338−1100 Fax: 619−338−1101 Email: lhurst@bholaw.com TERMINATED: 03/17/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 3 of 26
Lisa Diane Fialco Chavez &Gertler LLP 42 Miller Ave. Mill Valley, CA 94941 415 381−5599 Fax: 415 381−5572 Email: lisa@chavezgertler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lori A. Fanning Miller Law LLC 115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910 Chicago, IL 60603 312−332−3400 Fax: 312−676−2676 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marvin A. Miller Miller Law LLC 115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910 Chicago, IL 60603 312−332−3400 Fax: 312−676−2676 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nance Felice Becker Chavez &Gertler, L.L.P. 42 Miller Avenue Mill Valley, CA 94941 415−381−5599 Fax: 415−381−5572 Email: nance@chavezgertler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Anthony Muhic Kessler Topaz Meltzer &Check, LLP 280 King of Prussia Road Radnor, PA 19087 610−667−7706 Fax: 610−667−7056 Email: pmuhic@ktmc.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shennan Kavanagh Roddy Klein &Ryan 727 Atlantic Avenue, 2nd Floor Boston, MA 02111 (617) 357−5500 ext.12 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart T. Rossman National Consumer Law Center 77 Summer Street, 10th Floor Boston, MA 02141 (617) 542−8010 Fax: (617) 542−8028 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore J. Pintar Robbins Geller Rudman &Dowd LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101−3301 (619) 231−1058

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 4 of 26

Fax: 619−231−7423 Email: TedP@rgrdlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Sobol Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP 55 Cambridge Parkway Suite 301 Cambridge, MA 02142 617−482−3700 Fax: 617−482−3003 Email: tom@hbsslaw.com TERMINATED: 06/22/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy Jacobsen Harrison Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman &Balint, P.C. 2901 North Central Avenue Suite 1000 Phoenix, AZ 85012 602−274−1100 Fax: 602−274−1199 Email: wharrison@bffb.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Ismael Ramirez on behalf of themselves &all others similarly situated

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark Andrew Chavez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles Delbaum , (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dan Leo Gildor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donna Siegel Moffa (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Edward W. Ciolko (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary Edward Klein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John J. Stoia , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph H. Meltzer (See above for address)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 5 of 26

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph A. Weeden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie E. Hurst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/17/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa Diane Fialco (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori A. Fanning (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marvin A. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nance Felice Becker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Anthony Muhic (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stuart T. Rossman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore J. Pintar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Sobol (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy Jacobsen Harrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jorge Salazar

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donna Siegel Moffa (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 6 of 26

Edward W. Ciolko (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gary Edward Klein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Stoia , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph H. Meltzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph A. Weeden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Diane Fialco (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nance Felice Becker Chavez &Gertler LLP 42 Miller Avenue Mill Valley, CA 94941 415−381−5599 Fax: 415−381−5572 Email: nance@chavezgertler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Anthony Muhic (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore J. Pintar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wendy Jacobsen Harrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.

represented by Raoul Dion Kennedy Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &Flom LLP 525 University Avenue Suite 1100 Palo Alto, CA 94301 650−470−4500 Fax: 650−470−4570 Email: raoul.kennedy@skadden.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda M. Raines Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &Flom LLP

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 7 of 26
1440 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005−2111 (202) 371−7000 Fax: Email: amanda.raines@skadden.com TERMINATED: 09/15/2010 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anand S Raman Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &Flom LLP 1440 New York Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20005−2111 202−371−7000 Fax: 202−393−5760 Email: anand.raman@skadden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew L Sandler BuckleySandler LLP 1250 24th Street, NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20037 202−349−8000 Fax: 202−349−8080 Email: asandler@buckleysandler.com TERMINATED: 04/07/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Caitlin M Kasmar 1250 24th Street NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20037 202−349−8000 Email: ckasmar@buckleysandler.com TERMINATED: 04/07/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Colin D. Forbes Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &Flom LLP 1440 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005−2111 (202) 371−7000 Fax: (202) 661−9144 Email: colin.forbes@skadden.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David W. Foster Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &Flom LLP 1440 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005−2111 (202) 371−7000 Fax: (202) 393−5760 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joren Surya Bass Perkins Coie LLP 4 Embarcadero Center Ste. 2400 San Francisco, CA 94111 415−344−7120 Fax: 415−344−7320 Email: jbass@perkinscoie.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 8 of 26

Date Filed 01/18/2008
01/18/2008 01/18/2008
01/18/2008 01/28/2008
01/28/2008 01/28/2008 01/30/2008 02/13/2008 02/14/2008 02/14/2008 02/15/2008
02/19/2008
02/20/2008 02/20/2008

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT for (1) Violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, (2) Violations of the Fair Housing Act, (3) Violations of the Civil Rights Act &(4) Violations of the Civil Rights Act &Jury Trial Demanded − [Summons Issued] against Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., [Filing Fee: $350.00, Receipt Number 34611014790]. Filed by Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/18/2008) (Entered: 01/23/2008)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 01/23/2008)
2 ADR SCHEDULING ORDER: Initial Case Management Conference set for 4/22/2008 at 10:00 AM. &Joint Case Management Statement due 4/15/2008. (Attachments: #(1) EDL Standing Order). (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/18/2008) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/23/2008: # 2 Standing Order for All Judges) (tn, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 01/23/2008)
CASE DESIGNATED for Electronic Filing. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 01/23/2008)
3 APPLICATION of Attorney Gary Klein for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice − [Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611015103] Filed by Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/28/2008) (Entered: 01/30/2008)
RECEIVED ORDER: [Proposed] Order Granting re 3 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 01/30/2008)
4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Filed by Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez ofre 3 Application for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice &[Proposed] Order.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/28/2008) (Entered: 01/30/2008)
5 ORDER GRANTING Application for Admission of Attorney Gary Klein Pro Hac Vice 3 . Signed by Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte. (lmh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/30/2008) (Entered: 02/08/2008)
6 Declination to Proceed Before a U.S. Magistrate Judge by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 2/13/2008) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
7 Declination to Proceed Before a U.S. Magistrate Judge by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. And Request For Reassignment To A United States District Judge. (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 2/14/2008) (Entered: 02/14/2008)
8 CLERK'S NOTICE of Impending Reassignment to U.S. District Judge (lmh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/14/2008) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 7 Declination to Proceed Before a U.S. Magistrate Judge And Request For Reassignment To A United States District Judge (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 2/15/2008) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
10 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Hon. Thelton E. Henderson for all further proceedings. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte no longer assigned to the case.Signed by Executive Committee on 2/19/08. (ha, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/19/2008) (Entered: 02/19/2008)
11 CLERK'S NOTICE: Initial Case Management Conference set for 5/5/2008 at 01:30 PM. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/20/2008) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
12 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE TIME FOR DEFENDANT GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC. TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 2/20/2008) (Entered: 02/20/2008)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 9 of 26

02/20/2008 02/21/2008 02/26/2008 03/06/2008 03/06/2008 03/06/2008 03/06/2008 03/06/2008 03/06/2008 03/06/2008
03/11/2008 03/11/2008 03/11/2008 03/13/2008 03/26/2008

13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez of Summons, Complaint, and other Initiating Documents (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 2/20/2008) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 12 Stipulation and [Proposed] Order To Continue Time For Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. To Respond To Complaint (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 2/21/2008) (Entered: 02/21/2008)
15 STIPULATION AND ORDER to continue time for defendant to respond to complaint. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 02/25/08. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/26/2008) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
16 APPLICATION of Attorney Anand S. Raman for leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611016704] Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
17 [Proposed] Order Granting re 16 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
18 APPLICATION of Attorney Andrew L. Sandler for leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611016703] Filed by DefendantGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
19 [Proposed] Order Granting re 18 Application for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice − [Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611016703] Submitted by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
20 APPLICATION of Attorney Caitlin M. Kasmar for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611016701] Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
21 [Proposed] Order Granting re 20 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
22 PROOF OF SERVICE Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. of re 18 Application for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $210.00, receipt number 34611016703.), re 20 MOTION for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $210.00, receipt number 34611016701), re 21 Proposed Order, re 16 Application for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee$210.00, receipt number 34611016704), re 19 Proposed Order, re 17 Proposed Order. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
23 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 16 Motion for Pro Hac Vice by Anand S. Raman. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/11/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
24 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 18 Motion for Pro Hac Vice by Andrew L. Sandler. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/11/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
25 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 20 Motion for Pro Hac Vice by Caitlin M. Kasmar. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/11/2008) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
26 AMENDED COMPLAINT (First) against Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. Filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 3/13/2008) Modified on 3/13/2008 (feriab, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 03/13/2008)
27 NOTICE of Appearance by Wendy Jacobsen Harrison (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 3/26/2008) (Entered: 03/26/2008)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 10 of 26

03/28/2008
03/28/2008 03/28/2008
03/31/2008 04/01/2008 04/02/2008 04/11/2008
04/11/2008 04/14/2008
04/14/2008 04/15/2008 04/25/2008 04/28/2008 04/28/2008 04/28/2008 04/28/2008 05/02/2008

28 STIPULATION (JOINT) AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE TIME FOR DEFENDANT GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC. TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 3/28/2008) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 28 Stipulation (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 3/28/2008) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
31 MOTION/Application for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice for Andrew S. Friedman ( Filing fee $ 210, receipt number 34611017540) filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: # 1 Receipt)(sv, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/28/2008) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
30 STIPULATION AND ORDER to continue time for defendant to respond to first amended complaint. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 03/31/08. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/31/2008) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
32 Proposed Order re 31 MOTION for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice Andrew S. Friedman ( Filing fee $ 210, receipt number 34611017540) by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (sv, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/1/2008) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
33 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 31 Motion for Pro Hac Vice of Andrew S. Friedman. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/2/2008) (Entered: 04/02/2008)
34 MOTION to Dismiss PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 5/19/2008 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A To Motion To Dismiss, # 2 Proposed Order)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/11/2008) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
35 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO RESCHEDULE THE INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/11/2008) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
36 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 34 MOTION to Dismiss PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/14/2008) (Entered: 04/14/2008)
37 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 35 Stipulation and [Proposed] Order To Reschedule The Initial Case Management Conference (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/14/2008) (Entered: 04/14/2008)
38 STIPULATION AND ORDER rescheduling the Initial Case Management Conference to 5/19/2008 at 10:00 AM. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 04/14/08. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/15/2008) (Entered: 04/15/2008)
39 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to re 34 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit Exhibit 1, #(2) Proof of Service). (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 4/25/2008) (Entered: 04/25/2008)
40 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting − JOINT. (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 4/28/2008) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
41 ADR Certification (ADR L.R. 3−5b) of discussion of ADR options (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 4/28/2008) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
42 NOTICE of need for ADR Phone Conference (ADR L.R. 3−5 d) − JOINT (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 4/28/2008) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 4/28/2008) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
44 Reply to Opposition re 34 MOTION to Dismiss PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF filed byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proof of Service)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 5/2/2008) (Entered: 05/02/2008)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 11 of 26

05/02/2008 05/02/2008 05/05/2008 05/12/2008 05/13/2008 05/14/2008 05/14/2008 05/16/2008 05/16/2008
05/19/2008
05/19/2008 05/19/2008 05/28/2008 05/29/2008 05/29/2008 06/02/2008
06/02/2008 06/24/2008

45 MOTION to Appoint Counsel and Enter Proposed Pre−Trial Order No. 1 filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 5/2/2008) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
46 Proposed Pretrial Order No. 1 by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 5/2/2008) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
47 ADR Clerks Notice Setting ADR Phone Conference on 5/14/08 at 10:30 a.m. Please take note that plaintiff's counsel initiates the call to all parties. (tjs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/5/2008) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
ADR Remark: The ADR Phone Conference has been rescheduled to 5/16/08 at 11:30 a.m. (tjs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/12/2008) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
48 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson denying 34 Motion to Dismiss. The initial case management conference is continued to 05/19/08 at 1:30 PM. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/13/2008) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
49 ADR Certification (ADR L.R. 3−5b) of discussion of ADR options filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Proof of Service)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 5/14/2008) (Entered: 05/14/2008)
50 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew S. Friedman (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 5/14/2008) (Entered: 05/14/2008)
ADR Remark: ADR Phone Conference conducted on 5/16/08 by HAH. (tjs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/16/2008) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
51 Proposed Order PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING CONFIDENTIAL, TRADE SECRET AND PRIVATE CONSUMER INFORMATION. (Attachments: # 1 Proof of Service)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 5/16/2008) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
52 Minute Entry: Initial Case Management Conference held on 5/19/2008 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. Case Management Conference set for 8/25/2008 at 01:30 PM. (not reported) (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 5/19/2008) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
53 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 45 Motion to Appoint Counsel. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/19/2008) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
54 PROTECTIVE ORDER regarding confidential, trade secret and private consumer information. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 05/19/08. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/19/2008) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
55 DEFENDANT'S ANSWER to Amended Complaint byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proof of Service)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 5/28/2008) (Entered: 05/28/2008)
56 NOTICE by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez of Certification to the Court Regarding Document Preservation (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 5/29/2008) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
RECEIVED "SEALED" DOCUMENT: Statement Regarding Preservation of Evidence Submitted by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 06/03/2008)
57 ORDER re: statements regarding preservation of evidence. 53 Order on Motion to Appoint Counsel is modified. The parties' statements regarding preservation of evidence shall not be filed under seal. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 06/02/08. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/2/2008) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
58 NOTICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. of STATEMENT REGARDING PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE (Attachments: # 1 Proof of Service)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 6/2/2008) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
59 APPLICATION of Attorney Lori A. Fanning for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice − [Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611020519] Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/24/2008) (Entered: 06/25/2008)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 12 of 26

06/24/2008 06/24/2008 07/02/2008 07/23/2008 08/18/2008 08/18/2008 08/19/2008 08/25/2008
12/01/2008 12/01/2008 12/03/2008 12/05/2008 12/08/2008
01/16/2009 01/16/2009 01/20/2009 01/23/2009 01/28/2009

60 [Proposed] Order Granting re 59 Application for Admission of AttorneyPro Hac Vice Submitted by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/24/2008) (Entered: 06/25/2008)
61 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez of re 59 Application for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice 60 Proposed Order. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/24/2008) (Entered: 06/25/2008)
62 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 59 Motion for Pro Hac Vice of Lori A. Fanning. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/2/2008) (Entered: 07/02/2008)
63 NOTICE of Appearance by Lisa Diane Fialco on behalf of Plaintiffs (Fialco, Lisa) (Filed on 7/23/2008) (Entered: 07/23/2008)
64 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Subsequent) filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 8/18/2008) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
65 STIPULATION and Proposed Order Authorizing Telephonic Case Management Conference by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 8/18/2008) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
66 STIPULATION AND ORDER authorizing telephonic case management conference. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 08/19/08. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/19/2008) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
67 Minute Entry: Further Case Management Conference held on 8/25/2008 before Thelton E. Henderson. Case Management Conference set for 12/8/2008 at 01:30 PM. (not reported) (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 8/25/2008) (Entered: 08/25/2008)
68 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Second Subsequent Joint) filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 12/1/2008) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
69 Certificate of Interested Entities by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (Raman, Anand) (Filed on 12/1/2008) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
70 STIPULATION and Proposed Order Authorizing Telephonic Case Management Conference by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 12/3/2008) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
71 STIPULATION AND ORDER authorizing telephonic case management conference. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 12/04/08. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/5/2008) (Entered: 12/05/2008)
72 Minute Entry: Further Case Management Conference held on 12/8/2008 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. Further Case Management Conference set for 2/9/2009 at 01:30 PM. (not reported) (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 12/8/2008) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
73 Letter from Plaintiffs re Discovery Issues. (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 1/16/2009) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
74 ORDER REFERRING CASE to a Magistrate Judge for Discovery purposes. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Hendeson on 01/16/09. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/16/2009) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Brazil for Discovery (wh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/20/2009) (Entered: 01/20/2009)
75 Letter from Defendant GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re Discovery Issues. (Raman, Anand) (Filed on 1/23/2009) (Entered: 01/23/2009)
76 MOTION to Compel Defendant to Produce Documents filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. Motion Hearing set for 3/4/2009 01:30 PM in Courtroom 4, 3rd Floor, Oakland. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Proposed Order)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 1/28/2009) (Entered: 01/28/2009)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 13 of 26

01/28/2009 01/29/2009 02/09/2009 02/11/2009
02/18/2009
02/18/2009 02/18/2009 02/18/2009 02/18/2009 02/20/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009

77 Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of 76 MOTION to Compel Defendant to Produce Documents filed byJorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Related document(s) 76 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 1/28/2009) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
78 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Third Subsequent Joint) filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 1/29/2009) (Entered: 01/29/2009)
79 Minute Entry: Further Case Management Conference held on 2/9/2009 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. Case Management Conference set for 4/13/2009 at 01:30 PM. (not reported) (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 2/9/2009) (Entered: 02/09/2009)
80 Memorandum in Opposition re 76 MOTION to Compel Defendant to Produce Documents [DEFENDANT GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS] filed byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Anand S. Raman, # 2 Declaration of Irene D. Gilbert)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 2/11/2009) (Entered: 02/11/2009)
81 MOTION to Compel PLAINTIFFS TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AND RESPONSES TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 3/25/2009 02:00 PM in Courtroom 4, 3rd Floor, Oakland. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A To Motion To Compel, # 2 Declaration of Anand Raman, # 3 Exhibits 1−3 to Declaration of Anand Raman, # 4 [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.'s Motion To Compel Plaintiffs To Produce Documents And Responses To Written Discovery)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 2/18/2009) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
82 MOTION to Seal (Administrative) Civil L.R. 79−5 filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 2/18/2009) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
83 Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of 82 MOTION to Seal (Administrative) Civil L.R. 79−5 filed byJorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Related document(s) 82 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 2/18/2009) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
84 Reply Memorandum re 76 MOTION to Compel Defendant to Produce Documents REDACTED filed byJorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 2/18/2009) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
85 Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of 84 Reply Memorandum REDACTED filed byJorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Press Release, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Sealed, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Sealed)(Related document(s) 84 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 2/18/2009) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
86 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez re 84 Reply Memorandum, 85 Declaration in Support, (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 2/20/2009) (Entered: 02/20/2009)
87 CLERKS NOTICE Continuing Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Hearing: Motion Hearing now set for 3/25/2009 02:00 PM in Courtroom 4, 3rd Floor, Oakland at same time as Defendant's Motion to Compel Hearing.(wdblc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/23/2009)
92 APPLICATION of Attorney Joseph A. Weeden for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice − [Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611029189] Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
93 [Proposed] Order Granting re 92 Application for Admission of AttorneyPro Hac Vice Submitted by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 14 of 26

02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/23/2009 02/24/2009
02/24/2009 02/24/2009 02/24/2009
02/25/2009 02/25/2009

94 APPLICATION of Attorney Peter A. Muhic for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611029198] Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
95 [Proposed] Order Granting re 94 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
96 APPLICATION of Attorney Donna Siegel Moffa for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice − [Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611029191] Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
97 [Proposed] Order Granting re 96 Application for Admission of AttorneyPro Hac Vice Submitted by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
98 APPLICATION of Attorney Joseph H. Meltzer for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611029192] Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
99 [Proposed] Order Granting re 98 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
100 APPLICATION of Attorney Edward W. Ciolko for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611029193] Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
101 [Proposed] Order Granting re 100 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
88 DISREGARD, INCORRECT ATTACHMENT. SEE DOCKET ENTRY 89 FOR CORRECTED ENTRY ORDER by Judge Brazil granting 82 Motion to Seal.(wdblc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/24/2009) Modified on 2/24/2009 (kc, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 02/24/2009)
89 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SEAL re 82 MOTION to Seal filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Signed by Judge Brazil on 2/24/09. (wdblc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/24/2009) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
107 [FILED UNDER SEAL]..REPLY Memorandum in Support of re 76 MOTION to Compel Defendant to Produce Documents Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/24/2009) (Entered: 03/03/2009)
108 [FILED UNDER SEAL]..DECLARATION of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of re 107 REPLY Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant to Produce Documents Filed by Plaintiffs Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez &Ismael Ramirez. (Related document(s) 107 ). (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/24/2009) (Entered: 03/03/2009)
90 Letter from Defendant GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re leave to file a Surreply to Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Surreply To Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Defendant To Produce Documents), # 2 Exhibit B (Proposed Order))(Raman, Anand) (Filed on 2/25/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
91 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO FILE GREENPOINT SURREPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL re 90 Letter, filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. Signed by Judge Brazil on 2/25/09. (wdblc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/25/2009) (Entered: 02/25/2009)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 15 of 26

02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 03/04/2009
03/11/2009
03/17/2009
03/20/2009 03/25/2009 03/27/2009 04/03/2009 04/03/2009 04/03/2009

102 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson Granting re 100 Application for Admission of Attorney Edward W. Ciolko for Pro Hac Vice. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/25/2009) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
103 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 2/25/2009 Granting re 98 Application for Admission of Attorney Joseph H. Meltzer Pro Hac Vice.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/25/2009) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
104 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 2/25/2009 Granting re 96 Application for Admission of Attorney Donna Siegel Moffa for Pro Hac Vice.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/25/2009) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
105 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 2/25/2009 Granting re 92 Application for Admission of Attorney Joseph A. Weeden for Pro Hac Vice.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/25/2009) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
106 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 2/25/2009 Granting re 94 Application for Admission of Attorney Peter A. Muhic for Pro Hac Vice.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/25/2009) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
109 Memorandum in Opposition re 81 MOTION to Compel PLAINTIFFS TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AND RESPONSES TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF filed byJorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Klein, Gary) (Filed on 3/4/2009) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
110 Reply Memorandum re 81 MOTION to Compel PLAINTIFFS TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AND RESPONSES TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF filed byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 3/11/2009) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
111 Letter from Plaintiffs re Leave to File A Surreply to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel and a Response to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding's Surreply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Plaintiffs' Surreply to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.'s Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel, # 2 Exhibit B − Plaintiffs' Response to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.'s Surreply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, # 3 Proposed Order)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/17/2009) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
112 CLERKS NOTICE Changing Time of Motion Hearing Motion Hearing set for 3/25/2009 02:30 PM in Courtroom 4, 3rd Floor, Oakland. (hlk, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/20/2009) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
113 Minute Entry: Motion Hearing held on 3/25/2009 before Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Brazil (Date Filed: 3/25/2009). (Tape #FTR 3−25−09.) (wdblc2, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 3/25/2009) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
114 ORDER Following March 25, 2009, Hearing re Discovery Motions by Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Brazil granting in part and denying in part 76 Motion to Compel; denying 81 Motion to Compel (wdblc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/27/2009) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
115 NOTICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. [NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.] (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/03/2009)
116 APPLICATION of Attorney Colin D. Forbes for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611030706] Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
117 [Proposed] Order Granting re 116 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/06/2009)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 16 of 26

04/03/2009 04/03/2009 04/03/2009 04/06/2009 04/07/2009 04/08/2009
04/08/2009 04/08/2009 04/08/2009 04/13/2009 04/13/2009 04/13/2009 05/18/2009 05/26/2009 06/01/2009 07/08/2009

118 APPLICATION of Attorney Amanda M. Raines for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611030706] Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
119 [Proposed] Order Granting re 118 Application for Admission of Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
120 PROOF OF SERVICE Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. of re 117 [Proposed] Order, re 118 Application for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice, re 116 Application for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice &re 119 [Proposed] Order. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
121 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Fourth Subsequent Joint) filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 4/6/2009) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
122 ORDER granting substitution of counsel. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 04/06/09. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/7/2009) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
123 NOTICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. [DEFENDANT GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION PURSUANT TO THE COURTS MARCH 27, 2009 ORDER FOLLOWING MARCH 25, 2009 HEARING RE DISCOVERY MOTIONS] (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/8/2009) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
124 Declaration in Support of 123 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) DECLARATION OF IRENE D. GILBERT filed byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 123 ) (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/8/2009) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
125 Declaration in Support of 123 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) DECLARATION OF WARREN W. TRAIGER filed byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 123 ) (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/8/2009) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
126 Declaration in Support of 123 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) DECLARATION OF ANAND S. RAMAN filed byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 123 ) (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/8/2009) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
127 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 116 Motion for Pro Hac Vice of Colin D. Forbes. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/13/2009) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
128 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 118 Motion for Pro Hac Vice of Amanda M. Raines. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/13/2009) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
129 Minute Entry: Further Case Management Conference held on 4/13/2009 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. Case Management Conference set for 6/1/2009 at 01:30 PM. (not reported) (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 4/13/2009) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
130 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Subpoena served on Corporation Service Company for Capital One Financial Corporation on 04/22/2009, filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 5/18/2009) (Entered: 05/18/2009)
131 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Fifth Subsequent) filed by Jorge Salazar, Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 5/26/2009) (Entered: 05/26/2009)
132 Minute Entry: Further Case Management Conference held on 6/1/2009 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. Case Management Conference set for 9/14/2009 01:30 PM. (not reported) (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 6/1/2009) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
133 STIPULATION [JOINT STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF CLASS CERTIFICATION DEADLINE] by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 7/8/2009) (Entered: 07/08/2009)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 17 of 26

07/10/2009 09/04/2009 09/04/2009 09/09/2009 09/11/2009 09/11/2009 11/09/2009 11/10/2009 12/04/2009
12/04/2009 12/04/2009 12/10/2009 12/10/2009 12/16/2009 01/11/2010

134 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending time until 09/18/09 to file class certification motion. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 07/09/09. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/10/2009) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
135 *** FILED IN ERROR. REFER TO DOCUMENT 136 . *** CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Sixth Subsequent) filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 9/4/2009) Modified on 9/4/2009 (feriab, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 09/04/2009)
136 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Sixth Subsequent) filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 9/4/2009) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
137 CLERKS NOTICE continuing the Further Case Management Conference to 11/16/2009 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/9/2009) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
138 Joint MOTION for Suspension of Pending Litigation Deadlines filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 9/21/2009 10:00 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Klein, Gary) (Filed on 9/11/2009) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
139 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 138 Motion for Suspension of Pending Litigation Deadlines. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/11/2009) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
140 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT (Seventh Subsequent) filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 11/9/2009) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
141 CLERKS NOTICE continuing the Further Case Management Conference until 12/21/2009 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/10/2009) (Entered: 11/10/2009)
142 NOTICE OF MOTION &UNOPPOSED MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 1/11/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order, #(2) Exhibit B, #(3) Exhibit C, #(4) Exhibit D)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 12/4/2009) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
143 NOTICE of Filing of Stipulation &Agreement of Settlement Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar re 142 MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit 1, #(2) Exhibit A−E)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 12/4/2009) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
144 STIPULATION and [Proposed] Order to the filing of a Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Settlement Purposes by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 12/4/2009) (Entered: 12/04/2009)
145 STIPULATION re 141 Clerks Notice to Vacate December 21, 2009 Case Management Conference by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 12/10/2009) (Entered: 12/10/2009)
146 STIPULATION AND ORDER continuing the Case Management Conference to 3/1/2010 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 12/10/09. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/10/2009) (Entered: 12/10/2009)
147 ORDER re: hearing on 142 MOTION for preliminary approval of class settlement. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 12/16/09. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/16/2009) (Entered: 12/16/2009)
148 Minute Entry: Motion Hearing held on 1/11/2010 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. Further Case Management Conference continued to 4/12/2010 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. A further hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement is set for 4/12/2010 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Court Reporter: Kathy Wyatt)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 18 of 26

01/14/2010 02/10/2010 02/10/2010
02/10/2010 02/10/2010 02/12/2010 02/12/2010 02/24/2010 02/25/2010 02/25/2010 03/03/2010 03/03/2010 03/05/2010 03/15/2010
03/15/2010

(rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 1/11/2010) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
149 ORDER appointing discovery master. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 01/14/10. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/14/2010) (Entered: 01/14/2010)
150 NOTICE by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez of Motion and Unopposed Motion to Approve Withdrawal from Settlement Agreement (Becker, Nance) (Filed on 2/10/2010) (Entered: 02/10/2010)
151 MOTION to Withdraw from Settlement Agreement filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. Motion Hearing set for 3/8/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Gary Klein in Support of Withdrawal from Settlement Agreement, # 2 Proposed Order Approving Withdrawal from Settlement Agreement)(Becker, Nance) (Filed on 2/10/2010) (Entered: 02/10/2010)
152 STIPULATION and Proposed Order Shortening Time by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Nance Becker in Support of Stipulation and Proposed Order Shortening Time)(Becker, Nance) (Filed on 2/10/2010) (Entered: 02/10/2010)
153 STIPULATION and Proposed Order to Vacate Stay and to Set Schedule for Further Proceedings by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez. (Becker, Nance) (Filed on 2/10/2010) (Entered: 02/10/2010)
154 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 2/12/2010 Granting re 151 Unopposed MOTION to Approve Withdrawal from Settlement Agreement (fj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/12/2010) (Entered: 02/12/2010)
155 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 2/11/2010 Granting re 153 Stipulation To Vacate Stay &To Set Schedule For Further Proceedings; Exhibit A. (fj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/12/2010) (Entered: 02/12/2010)
156 STIPULATION [JOINT STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF CLASS CERTIFICATION DEADLINES] by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Raman, Anand) (Filed on 2/24/2010) (Entered: 02/24/2010)
157 STIPULATION AND ORDER for extension of class certification deadlines. The motion for class certification shall be heard on 06/28/10 at 10:00 AM. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 02/25/10. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/25/2010) (Entered: 02/25/2010)
**Deadlines Terminated. Set Deadlines/Hearings: Motion for Class Certification due 3/15/2010; Opposition brief due 4/29/2010; Reply brief due 5/31/2010 &the Motion Hearing set for 6/28/2010 at 10:00 AM.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 03/02/2010)
158 APPLICATION of Attorney David W. Foster for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611043085] Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/3/2010) (Entered: 03/04/2010)
159 [Proposed] Order Granting re 158 Application for Admission of AttorneyPro Hac Vice Submitted by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/3/2010) (Entered: 03/04/2010)
160 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting 158 Motion for Pro Hac Vice of David W. Foster. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/5/2010) (Entered: 03/05/2010)
161 NOTICE OF MOTION &MOTION for Class Certification and Memorandum of Points &Authorities in Support Thereof filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 6/28/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/15/2010) (Entered: 03/15/2010)
162 Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of re 161 MOTION for Class Certification Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, B, C, and D, # 2 Exhibit E, # 3 Exhibit F − Part 1, # 4 Exhibit F −

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 19 of 26

03/15/2010 03/15/2010 03/15/2010 03/15/2010 03/16/2010 03/16/2010 03/16/2010
03/17/2010 03/23/2010 03/29/2010 03/29/2010
03/29/2010

Part 2, # 5 Exhibit F − Part 3, # 6 Exhibit G)(Related document(s) 161 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/15/2010) (Entered: 03/15/2010)
163 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION to Seal Exhibits to re 162 Declaration in Support of re 161 MOTION for Class Certification − (Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits A, B, C and D Only) filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/15/2010) (Entered: 03/15/2010)
164 Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of re 163 Administrative MOTION to Seal Exhibits to re 162 Declaration in Support of re 161 MOTION for Class Certification − (Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits A, B, C and D Only) Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Related document(s) 163 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/15/2010) (Entered: 03/15/2010)
165 MOTION to Seal Document − Class Certification Report of Howell E. Jackson filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/15/2010) (Entered: 03/15/2010)
166 Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of re 165 MOTION to Seal Document − Class Certification Report of Howell E. Jackson filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Related document(s) 165 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/15/2010) (Entered: 03/15/2010)
167 *** FILED IN ERROR. REFER TO DOCUMENT 168 . *** MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Leslie E. Hurst filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Pintar, Theodore) (Filed on 3/16/2010) Modified on 3/16/2010 (feriab, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 03/16/2010)
168 NOTICE OF MOTION of Withdrawal of Attorney Leslie E. Hurst &[Proposed] Order Thereon − [CORRECTION OF DOCKET #167]. Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order)(Pintar, Theodore) (Filed on 3/16/2010) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
RECEIVED "SEALED" DOCUMENTS: (1) Memorandum of Points &Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification, (2) Class Certification Report of Howell Jackson &(3) Exhibits A, B, C &D to the Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of Motion for Class Certification re 165 MOTION to Seal Documents −Class Certification Report of Howell E. Jackson Submitted by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
169 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson Granting re 168 Application to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Leslie E. Hurst terminated. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/17/2010) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
170 ORDER re: 163 165 Motions to File Under Seal. The Parties Shall Comply With Civil Local Rule 79−5(d) on or before 03/29/2010. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 03/23/2010. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/23/2010) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
171 NOTICE by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar of Firm Name Change (Pintar, Theodore) (Filed on 3/29/2010) (Entered: 03/29/2010)
172 Declaration of AMANDA M. RAINES in Support of 163 MOTION to Seal Document 162 Declaration in Support, 161 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof (Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits A, B, C and D Only) MOTION to Seal Document 162 Declaration in Support, 161 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof (Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits A, B, C and D Only), 165 MOTION to Seal Document − Class Certification Report of Howell E. Jackson filed byGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Related document(s) 163 , 165 ) (Raines, Amanda) (Filed on 3/29/2010) (Entered: 03/29/2010)
173 Brief re 161 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Related

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 20 of 26

03/29/2010 03/29/2010 03/30/2010
03/30/2010 03/30/2010 03/30/2010 03/31/2010 03/31/2010 04/01/2010 04/01/2010 04/29/2010
04/29/2010

document(s) 161 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/29/2010) (Entered: 03/29/2010)
174 EXHIBITS re 162 Declaration in Support, Exhibit C − Deposition of Burnett K. Jarvis filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Related document(s) 162 ) (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 3/29/2010) (Entered: 03/29/2010)
175 Declaration of Wendy J. Harrison in Support of 165 MOTION to Seal Document − Class Certification Report of Howell E. Jackson filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Related document(s) 165 ) (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 3/29/2010) (Entered: 03/29/2010)
RECEIVED "SEALED" DOCUMENTS: Class Certification Report of Howell E. Jackson (Highlighted Version); Class Certification Report of Howell E. Jackson (Redacted Version); Exhibits A, B, &D to the Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Highlighted Version) &Exhibits A, B &D to the Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Redacted Version) Submitted by Plaintiffs Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez &Jorge Salazar...(tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
[FILED UNDER SEAL]..Class Certification REPORT of Howell Jackson Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar − [HIGHLIGHTED VERSION]. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/30/2010) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
178 [FILED UNDER SEAL]..Class Certification REPORT of Howell Jackson Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar − [HIGHLIGHTED VERSION]. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/30/2010) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
179 [FILED UNDER SEAL]..EXHIBITS A, B, &D to the Declaration of Andrew S. Friedman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar − [HIGHLIGHTED VERSION]. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/30/2010) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
176 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 3/31/2010 Granting re 163 &re 165 Administrative Motions to Seal Documents. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/31/2010) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
177 ORDER Granting Administrative Motion to Seal Documents. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 03/31/2010. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/31/2010) (Entered: 03/31/2010)
180 REDACTION to re 162 Declaration in Support of re 161 Motion for Class Certification, Exhibits A, B and D by Ana Ramirez, Jorge Salazar, Ismael Ramirez. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit B, #(2) Exhibit D)(Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 4/1/2010) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
181 REDACTION to re 161 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof − Class Certification Report of Howell Jackson Filed by Ana Ramirez, Jorge Salazar, Ismael Ramirez. (Friedman, Andrew) (Filed on 4/1/2010) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
182 Memorandum of Points &Authorities in Opposition to re 161 MOTION for Class Certification, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof [DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION] Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−−Part 1 (Expert Report of Marsha Courchane − REDACTED), # 2 Exhibit 1−−Part 2 (Expert Report of Marsha Courchane − REDACTED), *** # 3 Exhibit 2 ( Expert Report of Laura Borelli) FILED IN ERROR. PLEASE SEE DOCKET # 195 . *** )(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/29/2010) Modified on 5/13/2010 (ewn, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 04/29/2010)
183 Declaration of AMANDA M. RAINES in Support of re 182 Memorandum in Opposition to re 161 − [DECLARATION OF AMANDA M. RAINES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO re 161 PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION] Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Redacted Exhibit A−−Part 1, # 2 Redacted Exhibit A−−Part 2, # 3 Redacted Exhibit A−−Part 3, # 4 Redacted Exhibit B−−Part 1, # 5 Redacted Exhibit B−−Part

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 21 of 26

04/29/2010 04/29/2010 04/30/2010 04/30/2010
04/30/2010 04/30/2010 04/30/2010
04/30/2010
05/05/2010 05/05/2010 05/05/2010 05/12/2010

2, # 6 Redacted Exhibit B−−Part 3, # 7 Redacted Exhibit C−−Part 1, # 8 Redacted Exhibit C−−Part 2, # 9 Redacted Exhibit D, # 10 Redacted Exhibit E, # 11 Exhibit F, # 12 Exhibit G, # 13 Exhibit H, # 14 Redacted Exhibit I, # 15 Redacted Exhibit J, # 16 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 1, # 17 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 2, # 18 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 3, # 19 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 4, # 20 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 5, # 21 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 6, # 22 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 7, # 23 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 8, # 24 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 9, # 25 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 10, # 26 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 11, # 27 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 12, # 28 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 13, # 29 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 14, # 30 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 15, # 31 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 16, # 32 Redacted Exhibit K−−Part 17)(Related document(s) 182 ) (Raines, Amanda) (Filed on 4/29/2010) (Entered: 04/29/2010)
184 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL (Civil L.R. 79−5)] Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Raman, Anand) (Filed on 4/29/2010) (Entered: 04/29/2010)
185 DECLARATION OF ANAND S. RAMAN IN SUPPORT OF re 184 DEFENDANTS ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL (Civil L.R. 79−5)] Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 182 , 183 , 184 ) (Raman, Anand) (Filed on 4/29/2010) (Entered: 04/29/2010)
186 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 182, 183, 184 &185 (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 4/30/2010) (Entered: 04/30/2010)
RECEIVED "SEALED" DOCUMENTS: (1) Memorandum of Points &Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Brief &Exhibit 1 in Part Under Seal), (2) Exhibits to Declaration of Amanda M. Raines in Support of the Opposition (Exhibits A,B,C,D,E,I &J), and (3) Exhibits to Declaration of Amanda M. Raines in Support of the Opposition (Exhibit K) Submitted by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 04/30/2010)
187 PROOF OF SERVICE Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. of Under Sealed Documents. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/30/2010) (Entered: 04/30/2010)
191 [FILED UNDER SEAL]...MEMORANDUM in Opposition to re 161 Plaintiffs' MOTION for Class Certification (Brief &Exhibit 1 Filed In Part Under Seal]. Filed by Defendantw Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 161 ). (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/30/2010) (Entered: 05/07/2010)
192 [FILED UNDER SEAL]..EXHIBITS to the Declaration of Amanda M. Raines in Support of re 191 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification. [Exhibits A,B,C,D,E,I &J Filed In Part Under Seal]. Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 191 ) (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/30/2010) (Entered: 05/07/2010)
193 [FILED UNDER SEAL]...EXHIBITS to the Declaration of Amanda M. Raines in Support of re 191 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification. [Exhibit K Filed In Part Under Seal]. Filed by Defendant Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 191 ). (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/30/2010) (Entered: 05/07/2010)
188 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson Granting re 184 Administrative Motion to Seal. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/5/2010) (Entered: 05/05/2010)
189 APPLICATION of Attorney Shennan Kavanagh for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice −[Filing Fee: $210.00, Receipt Number 34611045503] Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez &Jorge Salazar. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/5/2010) (Entered: 05/07/2010)
190 [Proposed] Order Granting re 189 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice Submitted by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez &Jorge Salazar.(tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/5/2010) (Entered: 05/07/2010)
194 ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson Granting re 189 Application for Pro Hac Vice of Shennan Kavanagh. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/12/2010) (Entered: 05/12/2010)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 22 of 26

05/13/2010 05/13/2010 05/25/2010
05/25/2010
05/26/2010 06/14/2010 06/14/2010 06/14/2010 06/14/2010 06/14/2010 06/16/2010 06/22/2010 06/24/2010 06/28/2010

195 Curriculum Vitae &List of Cases Inadvertently Omitted from the Expert Report of Laura J. Borrelli (Docket No. 182−3) − CORRECTION OF DOCKET #[182−3] Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Related document(s) 182 ) (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 5/13/2010) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
196 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. of re 195 CURRICULUM VITAE AND LIST OF CASES INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM THE EXPERT REPORT OF LAURA J. BORRELLI (DOCKET NO. 182−3) (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 5/13/2010) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
197 UNOPPOSED MOTION for Enlargement of Time for Plaintiffs to File a Reply to their re 161 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof Filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 5/25/2010) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
198 Declaration of Wendy J. Harrison in Support of re 197 Unopposed MOTION for Enlargement of Time for Plaintiff to File a Reply to their re 161 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof Fled by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Related document(s) 197 ) (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 5/25/2010) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
199 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson Granting re 197 Unopposed Motion Enlarging Time for Plaintiffs to File a Reply to their Motion for Class Certification. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/26/2010) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
200 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal the Declaration of Shennan Kavanagh in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Proposed Order)(Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 6/14/2010) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
201 Reply to re 182 Opposition to re 161 MOTION for Class Certificationand Memorandum of Points &Authorities in Support Thereof filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 6/14/2010) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
202 Declaration of Wendy J. Harrison in Support of re 201 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Class Certification filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Related document(s) 201 ) (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 6/14/2010) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
203 Declaration of Howell E. Jackson in Support of re 201 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Class Certification (Report) filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Related document(s) 201 ) (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 6/14/2010) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
204 Declaration of Patricia A. McCoy in Support of re 201 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Class Certification (Rebuttal Report) filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Related document(s) 201 ) (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 6/14/2010) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
205 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson Granting re 200 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/16/2010) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
206 NOTICE by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez of Withdrawal of Appearance of Thomas M. Sobol (Sobol, Thomas) (Filed on 6/22/2010) (Entered: 06/22/2010)
207 DOCUMENT E−FILED UNDER SEAL re 205 Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal Declaration of Shennan Kavanagh in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 6/24/2010) (Entered: 06/24/2010)
208 Minute Entry: Motion Hearing held on 6/28/2010 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. The Motion for Class Certification is taken under submission. (Court Reporter: Kathy Wyatt) (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 6/28/2010) (Entered: 06/28/2010)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 23 of 26

06/29/2010
07/20/2010 07/20/2010 08/09/2010 08/10/2010 08/11/2010
08/11/2010
08/12/2010 08/12/2010 08/18/2010 08/23/2010 08/23/2010 08/24/2010

209 Transcript of Proceedings held on 6−28−10, before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Katherine Wyatt, Telephone number 925−212−5224. Per General Order No. 59 and Judicial Conference policy, this transcript may be viewed only at the Clerks Office public terminal or may be purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber until the deadline for the Release of Transcript Restriction.After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Any Notice of Intent to Request Redaction, if required, is due no later than 5 business days from date of this filing. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/27/2010. (kpw, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/29/2010) (Entered: 06/29/2010)
210 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 7/20/2010 Granting re 161 Motion for Class Certification. (tehlc4, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/20/2010) (Entered: 07/20/2010)
***Set Deadlines/Hearings: Case Management Conference set for 8/30/2010 at 1:30 PM.. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
211 MOTION For Order For Approval of Class Notice and Notice Plan and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 9/20/2010 01:30 PM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 8/9/2010) (Entered: 08/09/2010)
212 Renotice motion hearing re Motion for Approval of Class Notice and Notice Plan (Doc. 211) filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 9/20/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 8/10/2010) (Entered: 08/10/2010)
213 DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION &MOTION TO AMEND ORDER TO ALLOW INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS &AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 9/20/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 8/11/2010) (Entered: 08/11/2010)
214 DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION &MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT] filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 9/20/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, #(2) Proposed Order)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 8/11/2010) (Entered: 08/11/2010)
215 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. of re 213 DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND ORDER TO ALLOW INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT] . (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 8/12/2010) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
216 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. of re 214 DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT]. (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 8/12/2010) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
217 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit NOTICE. (tn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/18/2010) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
218 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT Eighth Subsequent and Request for Continuance filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 8/23/2010) (Entered: 08/23/2010)
219 STIPULATION to Stay Litigation Pending Final Approval of Settlement by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 8/23/2010) (Entered: 08/23/2010)
220 ORDER Staying Litigation Pending Final Approval of Settlement. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 08/24/10. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/24/2010) (Entered: 08/24/2010)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 24 of 26

08/24/2010 09/14/2010 09/15/2010 10/08/2010 10/08/2010 10/08/2010 10/29/2010
10/29/2010 11/03/2010
11/03/2010 12/02/2010 12/08/2010
12/10/2010 12/14/2010

221 CLERKS NOTICE continuing the Case Management Conference to 10/18/2010 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/24/2010) (Entered: 08/24/2010)
222 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC., and [Proposed] Order filed by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 9/14/2010) (Entered: 09/14/2010)
223 ORDER re: withdrawal of counsel. Attorney Amanda M. Raines terminated. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 09/14/10. (rbe, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/15/2010) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
224 Ninth Subsequent Joint Case Management Conference Statement and Request for Continuance) filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 10/8/2010) Modified on 10/17/2010 (tn, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 10/08/2010)
225 ORDER continuing case management conference re 224 . Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 10/08/10. (tehlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/8/2010) (Entered: 10/08/2010)
***Deadlines Terminated re 225 Order: Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Telephonic Further Case Management Conference re−set for 11/1/2010 at 1:30 PM..(tn, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 10/17/2010)
226 NOTICE filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar of Filing of Class Action Settlement Agreement and Request that Status Conference be Vacated. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, # 2 Exhibit A−F to Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement)(Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 10/29/2010) (Entered: 10/29/2010)
227 CLERKS NOTICE Vacating CMC for 11/1/10 at 1:30pm. (tmi, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/29/2010) (Entered: 10/29/2010)
228 NOTICE OF MOTION &ASSENTED TO MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 12/13/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Edward Swanson, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Gary Klein, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Wendy J. Harrison, # 4 Exhibit Declaration of Mark Chavez)(Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 11/3/2010) (Entered: 11/03/2010)
229 [Proposed] Preliminary Order re 228 MOTION (Assented) for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof Submitted by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Harrison, Wendy) (Filed on 11/3/2010) (Entered: 11/03/2010)
230 ORDER re 228 Motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. Joint response to the Court's questions to be filed by 12/09/10 at 12:00 noon. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 12/02/10. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/2/2010) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
231 Joint Submission by Plaintiffs and Defendant in Support of Preliminary Approval and Response to the re 230 Court's December 2, 2010 Order filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Gary Klein Supplemental Declaration, with Exhibits 1−4)(Klein, Gary) (Filed on 12/8/2010) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
232 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting re 228 Motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/10/2010) (Entered: 12/10/2010)
233 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.. Filed by Ana Ramirez, Jorge Salazar, Ismael Ramirez. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 12/14/2010) (Entered: 12/14/2010)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 25 of 26

12/21/2010 12/21/2010 01/31/2011
01/31/2011
03/01/2011 03/02/2011 03/23/2011 03/23/2011 03/23/2011
03/23/2011 03/30/2011 04/10/2011 04/11/2011 04/12/2011

234 NOTICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 232 Order on Motion for Settlement PROOF OF NOTIFICATION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DECLARATION OF ANAND S. RAMAN)(Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 12/21/2010) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
235 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. re 234 Notice (Other) (Kennedy, Raoul) (Filed on 12/21/2010) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
236 NOTICE OF MOTION &MOTION for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 4/11/2011 10:00 AM before Hon. Thelton E. Henderson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees)(Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 1/31/2011) (Entered: 01/31/2011)
237 Declaration of Lead Class Counsel in Support of re 236 MOTION for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Friedman Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 2− Klein Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 3− Chavez Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 4− Moffa Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 5− Pintar Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 6− Seligman Declaration, # 7 Exhibit 7− Wolinksy Declaration, # 8 Exhibit 8− Specter Declaration, # 9 Exhibit 9− Bien Declaration, # 10 Exhibit 10− Rothschild Declaration)(Related document(s) 236 ) (Chavez, Mark) (Filed on 1/31/2011) (Entered: 01/31/2011)
238 Plaintiffs' Administrative Motion Re Briefing Schedule For Motion for Final Approval filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order)(Becker, Nance) (Filed on 3/1/2011) (Entered: 03/01/2011)
239 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson Granting re 238 Administrative Motion Re Briefing Schedule for Motion for Final Approval. (tmi, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/2/2011) (Entered: 03/02/2011)
240 Declaration of Christina Peters−Stasiewicz Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 3/23/2011) (Entered: 03/23/2011)
241 Declaration of Shennan Kavanagh Regarding Class Member Objection filed byAna Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Klein, Gary) (Filed on 3/23/2011) (Entered: 03/23/2011)
242 NOTICE OF MOTION &UNOPPOSED MOTION for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. Motion Hearing set for 4/11/2011 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12, 19th Floor, San Francisco before Hon. Thelton E. Henderson. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit 1)(Klein, Gary) (Filed on 3/23/2011) (Entered: 03/23/2011)
243 [Proposed] Final Approval Order re 242 MOTION for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit 1)(Klein, Gary) (Filed on 3/23/2011) (Entered: 03/23/2011)
244 CLERK'S NOTICE: The Motion Hearing and Final Fairness Hearing set for Monday, 4/11/2011 at 10:00 a.m. will be held in courtroom 2 on the 17th floor. (tmi, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/30/2011) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
245 Supplemental Declaration of Christina Peters−Stasiewicz Regarding Settlement Administration re 240 filed by Ana Ramirez, Ismael Ramirez, Jorge Salazar. (Klein, Gary) (Filed on 4/10/2011) (Entered: 04/10/2011)
246 Minute Entry: Fairness Hearing held on 4/11/2011 before Judge Thelton E. Henderson. (Court Reporter: Kathy Wyatt) (tmi, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 4/11/2011) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
247 ORDER Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson granting re 236 Motion for Attorneys' Fees and granting re 242 Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/12/2011) (Entered: 04/12/2011)

Case: 3:08-cv-369 As of: 10/25/2012 07:48 PM PDT 26 of 26

07/13/2011

248 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ORDER. (tnS) (Filed on 7/13/2011) (Entered: 07/13/2011)