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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

EARL SAMPSON; TOREE M. DANIELS; BRANDON SPIVEY; ANTHONY LOWERY; FLOYD HALL, JR.; ROSS PICART; RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH; KENNETH CRANE; YVENSONNE MONTALE; OMAR DEAN; and ALI AMIN SALEH;
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS; OLIVER G. GILBERT, III; SHIRLEY GIBSON; DR. DANNY O. CREW; MATTHEW BOYD; PAUL MILLER; ANTHONY CHAPMAN; TIMOTHY ADAMS; CARLOS AUSTIN; WILLIAM BAMFORD; TERRANCE BARMORE; ALEX BARNEY; ALVIN BERNARD; JESSIE BROWN; DELROY BURGESS; EDWARD CASTELLI; RANDY CARPENTER; RYAN CLIFTON; CARLTON COLEMAN; TOM DAMIANI; WILLIAM DUNASKE; PETER EHRLICH; JEFFREY ENGERS; SHAWN EUBANKS; RAUL FERNANDEZ; ERIK GLEASON; ANDREW GREGOIRE; BRIAN GREGORY; JAMES HARRIS; DIANA HEDRICK; JEFFREY HOHENDORF; ANITA HOPSON; MICHAEL HORN; BUDDY HUNHOLZ; MIGUEL IRIZARRY; WANDA JACKSON; NICHOLAS JACOBS; RICHARD JESSUP; SHIRLEY JONES-GRAY; NELLY JOSEPH; ALEX JUDON; HEATHER KIDDER; STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY; DEVIN LUCIUS; MICHAEL MALONE; CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ; SHONADEE MCNEIL; JASON MOORE; ALEXANDER MORTON; JOSEPH NARGISO;

CASE NO.:

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WIREN NORRIS; BARBARA PALMER; HENRY PAYOUTE; ONASSIS PERDOMO; SAUL PEREZ; HUBERT PIERRE; JEREMY PILONE; KEVIN PINKNEY; ARTHUR PRINCE; LAWRENCE RICHARDSON; JAVIER ROMAGUERA; EDWIN ROSADO; JOSE ROSADO; STACEY ROVINELLI; MICHAEL RUIZ; JEAN SAINT-LOUIS; JIMY SANCHEZ; MARTIN SANTIAGO; JOSEPH SCHAEFFER; ANGEL SEARY; ALBERTO SEDA; CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN; TALIBAH SIMMONS; JONATHAN STARK; KEVIN TAMAYO; EDDO TRIMINO; JAINA UCANAN; CARLOS VELEZ; VICTOR VELEZ; SCOTT WHITE; WILLIAM WAGENMANN; EDWARD WAGNER; MICHAEL WAGONER; EUGENE WILLIAMS; RUFUS WILLIAMS; MICHAEL WRIGHT; JOSEPH ZELLNER; and UNKNOWN JOHN DOE OFFICERS;
Defendants. _______________________________________________/
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Table of Contents
JURISDICTION AND VENUE................................................................................................... 7 PARTIES ....................................................................................................................................... 8 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS .................................................................................................... 20 EARL SAMPSON ....................................................................................................................... 24
Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ..................................................................................................................................... 27 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ................ 28 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment................................ 29 State Law Claim for Civil Battery............................................................................................. 31 State Law Claim for False Arrest............................................................................................. 32 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 34 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ............................................................................. 35 TOREE DANIELS...................................................................................................................... 36 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ..................................................................................................................................... 38 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ................ 40 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment................................ 41 State Law Claim for Civil Battery............................................................................................. 42 State Law Claim for False Arrest .............................................................................................. 44 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 45 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ............................................................................. 46 BRANDON SPIVEY................................................................................................................... 48 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ..................................................................................................................................... 49 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ................ 50 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment................................ 52 State Law Claim for Civil Battery............................................................................................. 53 State Law Claim for False Arrest .............................................................................................. 54
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State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 56 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ............................................................................. 57 ANTHONY LOWERY ............................................................................................................... 58 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ..................................................................................................................................... 60 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ................ 61 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment................................ 62 State Law Claim for Civil Battery............................................................................................. 64 State Law Claim for False Arrest .............................................................................................. 65 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 66 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ............................................................................. 68 FLOYD HALL, JR. .................................................................................................................... 69 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ..................................................................................................................................... 70 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ................ 72 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment................................ 73 State Law Claim for Civil Battery............................................................................................. 74 State Law Claim for False Arrest .............................................................................................. 76 State Law Claim for Civil Theft................................................................................................ 77 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 78 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ............................................................................. 79 ROSS PICART............................................................................................................................ 81 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ..................................................................................................................................... 82 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ................ 84 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment................................ 85 Claim for Excessive Use of Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment .............................. 87 Claim for Second Excessive Use of Force in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment .......... 88 State Law Claim for Civil Battery............................................................................................. 89
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State Law Claim for False Arrest .............................................................................................. 91 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 92 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ............................................................................. 94 RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH ............................................................................................ 95 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ..................................................................................................................................... 97 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ................ 99 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment.............................. 101 Claim for Excessive Use of Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ............................ 102 State Law Claim for Civil Battery........................................................................................... 104 State Law Claim for False Arrest ............................................................................................ 106 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress .......................................... 107 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ........................................................................... 108 KENNETH CRANE ................................................................................................................. 110 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ................................................................................................................................... 111 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .............. 112 Claim for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment.............................. 114 State Law Claim for Civil Battery........................................................................................... 115 State Law Claim for False Arrest ............................................................................................ 116 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress .......................................... 118 State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution ........................................................................... 119 YVENSONNE MONTALE...................................................................................................... 120 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ................................................................................................................................... 121 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .............. 123 State Law Claim for Civil Battery........................................................................................... 124 State Law Claim for False Arrest ............................................................................................ 126 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress .......................................... 127
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OMAR DEAN............................................................................................................................ 129 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ................................................................................................................................... 129 Claim for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .............. 131 State Law Claim for Civil Theft.............................................................................................. 132 State Law Claim for Civil Battery........................................................................................... 133 State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress .......................................... 134
ALI AMIN SALEH................................................................................................................... 136 Claim for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ................................................................................................................................... 137 State Law Claim for Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship .............................. 139
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS ......................................... 140 Claim against the City of Miami Gardens for Violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment........................................................ 140
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
Plaintiffs, EARL SAMPSON, TOREE M. DANIELS, BRANDON SPIVEY, ANTHONY LOWERY, FLOYD HALL, JR., ROSS PICART, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, KENNETH CRANE, YVENSONNE MONTALE, OMAR DEAN, and ALI AMIN SALEH, by and through undersigned counsels, sue the above-named Defendants and allege, upon facts, information, and belief, the following:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1.

This action is brought under 42 U .S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and 1988.

Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U .S.C. § 1331 and 28 U .S.C. §§ 1343 (a)(3) and (4), as this

action seeks redress for the violation of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional and Civil Rights.

2.

Pendent and supplemental jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

for this Court to decide claims that may arise under state law.

3.

Venue is properly brought in the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b) and (c) because it is the district in which all of the events or omissions establishing the

Plaintiffs’ claims occurred.

4.

Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2201 and 2202 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57.

5.

This Court has authority to award costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §

1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

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6.

Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim with the Defendant, City of Miami Gardens,

under the Tort Claims Act of Florida. Over six months have elapsed since filing the Notice of

Claim, which has not been compromised or settled by Defendants. A copy of said Notice is

attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “A”.

PARTIES 7. Plaintiff, EARL SAMPSON (“Mr. SAMPSON”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

8.

Plaintiff, TOREE M. DANIELS (“Ms. DANIELS”), is a black female who, at all

times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

9.

Plaintiff, OMAR DEAN (“Mr. DEAN”), is a black male who, at all times material

hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

10. Plaintiff, FLOYD HALL JR. (“Mr. HALL, JR.”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

11. Plaintiff, ROSS PICART (“Mr. PICART”), is a black Hispanic male who, at all

times material hereto, was a resident of Hallandale, Florida, and worked in Miami Gardens,

Florida.

12. Plaintiff, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH (“Mr. SMITH”), is a black male who,

at all times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

13. Plaintiff, ANTHONY LOWERY (“Mr. LOWERY”), is a black male who, at all

times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

14. Plaintiff, KENNETH CRANE (“Mr. CRANE”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

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15. Plaintiff, BRANDON SPIVEY (“Mr. SPIVEY”), is a black male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.
16. Plaintiff, YVENSONNE MONTALE (“Mr. MONTALE”), is a b lack male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.
17. Plaintiff, ALI AMIN SALEH (“Mr. SALEH”), is a Hispanic/Middle Eastern male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Pembroke Pines, Florida and owner of the Quick Stop Convenience Store located at 3185 NW 207th Street, Miami, Florida 33056 (“QUICKSTOP”).
18. Defendant, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS (“CITY”), is a municipality duly incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The CITY established and maintains the Miami Gardens Police Department (“MGPD”), as a constituent department or agency. The CITY is responsible, through its officers, employees, servants, and agents, for enforcing the regulations of the CITY and for ensuring that its officers, employees, servants, and agents obey the laws of the State of Florida and the United States.
19. Defendant, MAYOR OLIVER G. GILBERT, III (“MAYOR GILBERT”), is or was, at all times material hereto, the current Mayor since 2012 and a final policymaker of the CITY. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
20. Defendant, FORMER MAYOR SHIRLEY GIBSON (“FORMER MAYOR GIBSON”), was, at all times material hereto, Mayor of the CITY from 2003 through 2012, and a final policymaker prior to MAYOR GILBERT taking office in 2012. She is sued in her official and individual capacities.
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21. Defendant, CITY MANAGER DR. DANNY O. CREW (“CITY MANAGER CREW”), is or was, at all times material hereto, the City Manager, Chief Administrator, and a final policymaker of the CITY. He is sued in his individual capacity.
22. Defendant, CHIEF MATHEW BOYD (Badge No. 100-001) (“CHIEF BOYD”), was, at all times material hereto, the Chief of Police and a final policymaker for the CITY with supervisory authority over all officers and operations of MGPD, including responsibility for training, recruiting, and managing all MGPD officers. He is sued in his official and individual capacities.
23. Defendant, DEPUTY CHIEF PAUL MILLER (Badge No. 100-004) (“DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER”), was, at all times material hereto, the Deputy Chief of Police. DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER directly oversees the day-to-day operations of MGPD’s three divisions and serves as acting chief during the absence of CHIEF BOYD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
24. Defendant, MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN (Badge No. 100-014) (“MAJOR CHAPMAN”), was, at all times material hereto, Major of Criminal Investigations and part of MGPD command staff. He is sued in his individual capacity.
25. Defendant, CAPTAIN GARY SMITH (Badge No. 100-048) (“CAPTAIN SMITH”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Captain with MGPD. At all times material hereto CAPTAIN SMITH is or was assigned to the internal affairs unit and was an employee of the MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
26. Defendant, SERGEANT TIMOTHY ADAMS (Badge No. 100-049) (“ADAMS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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27. Defendant, CARLOS AUSTIN (Badge No. 100-296) (“AUSTIN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
28. Defendant, SERGEANT, WILLIAM BAMFORD (Badge No. 100-035) (“BAMFORD”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
29. Defendant, TERRANCE BARMORE (Badge No. 100-196) (“BARMORE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
30. Defendant, ALEX BARNEY (Badge No. 100-307) (“BARNEY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
31. Defendant, ALVIN BERNARD (Badge No. 100-327) (“BERNARD”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
32. Defendant, JESSIE BROWN (Badge No. 100-274) (“BROWN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
33. Defendant, DELROY BURGESS (Badge No. 100-155) (“BURGESS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
34. Defendant, EDWARD CASTELLI (Badge No. 100-325) (“CASTELLI”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
35. Defendant, RANDY CARPENTER (Badge No. 100-151) (“CARPENTER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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36. Defendant, RYAN CLIFTON (Badge No. 100-276) (“CLIFTON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
37. Defendant, CARLTON COLEMAN (Badge No. 100-142) (“COLEMAN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
38. Defendant, SERGEANT TOM DAMIANI (Badge No. 100-046) (“DAMIANI”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a sergeant and/or an officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
39. Defendant, SERGEANT WILLIAM DUNASKE (Badge No. 100-311) (“SERGEANT DUNASKE”), was, at all times material hereto, a sergeant and/or an officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
40. Defendant, PETER EHRLICH (Badge No. 100-278) (“EHRLICH”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
41. Defendant, JEFFREY ENGERS (Badge No. 100-181) (“ENGERS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
42. Defendant, SHAWN EUBANKS (Badge No. 100-247) (“EUBANKS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
43. Defendant, RAUL FERNANDEZ (Badge No. 100-224) (“FERNANDEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
44. Defendant, ERIK GLEASON (Badge No. 100-221) (“GLEASON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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45. Defendant, ANDREW GREGOIRE (Badge No. 100-331) (“GREGOIRE”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
46. Defendant, BRIAN GREGORY (Badge No. 100-326) (“GREGORY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
47. Defendant, JAMES HARRIS (Badge No. 100-132) (“HARRIS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
48. Defendant, SERGEANT, DIANA HEDRICK (Badge No. 100-295) (“HEDRICK”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
49. Defendant, SERGEANT JEFFREY HOHENDORF (Badge No. 100-203) (“HOHENDORF”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a S ergeant and/or a p olice officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
50. Defendant, ANITA HOPSON (Badge No. 100-249) (“HOPSON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
51. Defendant, MICHAEL HORN (Badge No. 100-242) (“HORN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
52. Defendant, SERGEANT BUDDY HUNHOLZ (Badge No. 100-027) (“SERGEANT HUNHOLZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a S ergeant and/or police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
53. MIGUEL IRIZARRY (Badge No. 100-161) (“IRIZARRY”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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54. Defendant, WANDA JACKSON (Badge No. 100-133) (“JACKSON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
55. Defendant, NICOLAS JACOBS (Badge No. 100-229) (“JACOBS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
56. Defendant, RICHARD JESSUP (Badge No. 100-134) (“JESSUP”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
57. Defendant, SHIRLEY JONES-GRAY (Badge No. 100-280) (“JONES-GRAY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
58. Defendant, NELLY JOSEPH (Badge No. 100-335) (“JOSEPH”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
59. Defendant, ALEX JUDON (Badge No. 100-253) (“JUDON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
60. Defendant, SERGEANT, HEATHER KIDDER (Badge No. 100-261) (“KIDDER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a S ergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
61. Defendant, SERGEANT STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY (Badge No. 100-043) (“SERGEANT KOLACKOVSKY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a S ergeant with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
62. Defendant, DEVIN LUCIUS (Badge No. 100-329) (“LUCIUS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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63. Defendant, MICHAEL MALONE (Badge No. 100-136) (“MALONE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
64. Defendant, CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ (Badge No. 100-267 (“MARTINEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
65. Defendant, SHONADEE MCNEIL (Badge No. 100-165) (“MCNEIL”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
66. Defendant, JASON MOORE (Badge No. 100-244) (“MOORE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
67. Defendant, ALEXANDER MORTON (Badge No. 100-286) (“MORTON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
68. Defendant, SERGEANT JOSEPH NARGISO (Badge No. 100-141) (“SERGEANT NARGISO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
69. Defendant, SERGEANT WIREN NORRIS (Badge No. 100-245) (“NORRIS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
70. Defendant, BARBARA PALMER (Badge No. 100-140) (“PALMER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
71. Defendant, HENRY PAYOUTE (Badge No. 100-330) (“PAYOUTE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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72. Defendant, ONASSIS PERDOMO (Badge No. 100-153) (“PERDOMO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
73. Defendant, SAUL PEREZ (Badge No. 100-237) (“PEREZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
74. Defendant, HUBERT PIERRE (Badge No. 100-207) (“PIERRE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
75. Defendant, SERGEANT, JEREMY PILONE (Badge No. 100-168) (“PILONE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
76. Defendant, KEVIN PINKNEY (Badge No. 100-254) (“PINKNEY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
77. Defendant, ARTHUR PRINCE (Badge No. 100-190) (“PRINCE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
78. Defendant, LAWRENCE RICHARDSON (Badge No. 100-169) (“RICHARDSON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
79. Defendant, JAVIER ROMAGUERA (Badge No. 100-216) (“ROMAGUERA”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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80. Defendant, EDWIN ROSADO (Badge No. 100-172) (“E. ROSADO” or “ROSADO, E.”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
81. Defendant, JOSE ROSADO (Badge No. 100-171) (“J. ROSADO” or ROSADO, J.”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
82. Defendant, SERGEANT STACEY ROVINELLI (Badge No. 100-192) (“ROVINELLI”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
83. Defendant, MICHAEL RUIZ (Badge No. 100-321) (“RUIZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
84. Defendant, JEAN SAINT-LOUIS (Badge No. 100-131) (“SAINT-LOUIS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
85. Defendant, JIMY SANCHEZ (Badge No. 100-289) (“SANCHEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
86. Defendant, SERGEANT MARTIN SANTIAGO (Badge No. 100-174) (“SANTIAGO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
87. Defendant, JOSEPH SCHAEFER (Badge No. 100-298) (“SCHAEFER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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88. Defendant, ANGEL SEARY (Badge No. 100-246) (“SEARY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
89. Defendant, ALBERTO SEDA (Badge No. 100-314) (“SEDA”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
90. Defendant CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN (Badge No. 100-255) (“SHUMAN”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
91. Defendant, TALIBAH SIMMONS (Badge No. 100-194) (“SIMMONS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
92. Defendant, JONATHAN STARK (Badge No. 100-144) (“STARK”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
93. Defendant, KEVIN TAMAYO (Badge No. 100-332) (“TAMAYO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
94. Defendant, EDDO TRIMINO (Badge No. 100-291) (“TRIMINO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
95. Defendant, JAINA UCANAN (Badge No. 100-272) (“UCANAN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
96. Defendant, CARLOS VELEZ (Badge No. 100-178) (“C. VELEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
97. Defendant, VICTOR VELEZ (Badge No. 100-324) (“V. VELEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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98. Defendant, SERGEANT SCOTT WHITE (Badge No. 100-045) (“WHITE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or an officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
99. Defendant, WILLIAM WAGENMANN (Badge No. 100-139) (“WAGENMANN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
100. Defendant, SERGEANT, EDWARD WAGNER (Badge No. 100-034 (“WAGNER”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
101. Defendant, MICHAEL WAGONER (Badge No. 100-213) (“WAGONER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
102. Defendant, EUGENE WILLIAMS (Badge No. 100-293) (“WILLIAMS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
103. Defendant, SERGEANT RUFUS WILLIAMS (Badge No. 100-029) (“R. WILLIAMS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
104. Defendant, MICHAEL WRIGHT (Badge No. 100-219) (“WRIGHT”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
105. Defendant, JOSEPH ZELLNER (Badge No. 100-222) (“ZELLNER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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106. Defendants, UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS (“UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES”), who are or were, at all times material hereto, police officers or supervisors with MGPD. They are sued in their individual capacities.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
107. This is a civil rights action in which named Plaintiffs seek relief for Defendants’ violations of their rights, privileges, and immunities as guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U .S.C § 1983; the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000(d), et seq. (“Title VI”); the Equal Protection Clause; and the constitution and laws of the State of Florida.
108. Defendants have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage and, sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, arrests and prosecutions of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment.
109. In addition, this pattern and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting said actions, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims of this racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males.
110. MGPD’s widespread constitutional abuses are a r esult of, and are directly and proximately caused by, policies, practices, and/or customs devised, implemented, and enforced
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by the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD.
111. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD have acted, and continue to act, with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those who come into contact with MGPD officers by: (a) failing to properly screen, train, and supervise MGPD officers; (b) inadequately monitoring MGPD officers during and after stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; (c) failing to sufficiently discipline MGPD officers who engaged in constitutional abuses, and (d) encouraging, sanctioning, and failing to rectify MGPD’s unconstitutional practices.
112. The constitutional abuses are a result of either unconstitutional policies, or policies that, while constitutional on their face, are implemented in such a way that violate constitutionally protected rights. Additionally, all constitutional abuses have occurred under the color of authority by MGPD officers.
The Policies (a) Quotas Policy 113. MGPD final policymakers have created, implemented, and are continuing to enforce an illegal system of quotas (“Quota Policy”) requiring officers to issue a specific amount of citations, field contact reports, and arrests per month. The CITY is aware of and has tacitly approved the Quota Policy. 114. The Quota Policy evaluates officers’ productivity exclusively on t he quantity of arrests, citations, and field contact reports submitted, instead of officers’ adherence to constitutional practices, involvement in the community, etc.. Officers are rewarded with
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incentives, benefits, raises, and/or promotions if these arbitrary quotas are met or exceeded. Contrastingly, officers who do not meet the monthly quotas are not only reprimanded but are routinely disciplined and demoted.
115. From 2008 through 2013, the unconstitutional Quota Policy became CITY policy, practice, and/or custom. The Quota Policy was enacted by CHIEF BOYD who is a CITY final policymaker for law enforcement purposes. Further, the CITY was put on notice of the Quota Policy by concerned officers, and failed to rectify the issue.
116. The Quota Policy has directly and proximately led MGPD officers to engage in a pattern and practice of police misconduct resulting in countless race-based and/or national origin-based stops. During the course of these stops, MGPD officers have committed thousands of unconstitutional searches, seizures, and false arrests, causing Plaintiffs to suffer continuous injuries.
117. The pressure to perform under the Quota Policy is so pervasive, that many times MGPD officers fabricate field contact reports with CITY residents who were actually incarcerated or at another location being stopped by other officers at the time the officers allegedly made contact.
(b) Zero Tolerance Zone Policy 118. In addition to the Quota Policy, MGPD has enacted a “ Zero Tolerance Zone” Policy which, although constitutional on its face, has been, and continues to be, applied in such a way that violates the constitutional rights of CITY residents, including named Plaintiffs. 119. The alleged purpose of the policy is to reduce the number of individuals who are seen trespassing and loitering on private property without legitimate business. The policy asks
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local businesses to complete an affidavit and post a sign on their properties which states that the business owner allows MGPD officers to act on their behalf in their absence.
120. MGPD officers have used the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, enacted by the CITY and its final policymakers, to illegally stop-and-frisk, search, seize, and arrest named Plaintiffs while visiting local businesses. This includes businesses which have not enrolled, or previously enrolled but have withdrawn enrollment, in the Zero Tolerance Zone program.
121. In many instances, MGPD officers have illegally stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested named Plaintiffs, and other CITY residents, while the business owner was present and affirmatively requesting the officers not take any action.
122. The CITY and its final policymakers were on notice that MGPD officers were, and are, using the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy to conduct unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests and have failed to rectify the issue.
(c) Racial Targeting Policy 123. Lastly, MGPD officers have used, and continue to use, race and/or national origin for the purpose of stopping, frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting principally black males. Specifically, through information and belief, MGPD has directly ordered its officers to stopand-frisk black males, ages fifteen through thirty, without reasonable articulable suspicion of criminality (“Racial Targeting Policy”). 124. The Racial Targeting Policy was implemented and ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker, and was tacitly approved by the CITY. The policy, which is unconstitutional on its face, impermissibly uses race and/or national origin and age, not reasonable articulable suspicion, as the determinative factor in initiating police interaction.
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125. From 2008 through 2013, this policy has resulted in countless field contact reports of investigatory stops which were conducted pursuant to this policy, without any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminality.
126. All of the foregoing unconstitutional and illegal violations were conducted by MGPD police officers under the color of law.
127. Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that the policies, practices, and/or customs described herein violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing such polices, practices, and/or customs. In addition, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for violations of their constitutionally protected rights. Plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO EARL SAMPSON
128. Mr. SAMPSON is a twenty-eight year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for approximately thirteen years. Mr. SAMPSON has been an employee of the QUICKSTOP since October 2011.
129. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from 2008 t o 2013, Mr. SAMPSON was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested 288 times within the CITY and by MGPD officers —the equivalent of roughly once every week for four years. In all 288 instances, an investigatory stop was performed by MGPD officers who checked Mr. SAMPSON for outstanding warrants.
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130. Well over 200 of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests occurred without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required by law.
131. Out of the 288 times Mr. SAMPSON was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested only sixty-three times. Out of the sixty-three arrests, thirty arrests resulted in no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or the Court dismissing the case for lack of probable cause at bonds. Twenty-seven of the remaining convictions are currently subject of a pending motion to vacate the convictions on t he basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence of actual innocence. The motion is scheduled to be heard in state court in mid-December, 2013.
132. The twenty-seven convictions were all based on charges for trespassing at the QUICKSTOP. During the course of all twenty-seven arrests, Mr. SAMPSON was either at the QUICKSTOP with full permission from the owner, Mr. SALEH, or was working at the QUICKSTOP. On several occasions Mr. SAMPSON was arrested for trespassing while working stocking the shelves or taking out the garbage at the QUICKSTOP.
133. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of law, were involved in at least one of the more than 288 stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: ADAMS, BAMFORD, BARMORE, BARNEY, BERNARD, BROWN, BURGESS, CARPENTER, CASTELLI, CLIFTON, DAMIANI, DUNASKE, EHRLICH, ENGERS, GLEASON, GREGOIRE, HEDRICK, HOHENDORF, HOPSON, HORNE, HUNHOLZ, JACKSON, JACOBS, JESSUP, JONESGRAY, KIDDER, KOLACKOVSKY, LUCIUS, MALONE, MARTINEZ, MCNEIL, MORTON, NARGISO, NORRIS, PAYOUTE, PERDOMO, PEREZ, PILONE, PINKNEY, ROBINSON, ROMAGUERA, ROSADO, E., ROSADO, J., ROVINELLI, RUIZ, SAINT-
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LOUIS, SANCHEZ, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEARY, SEDA, SHUMAN, STARK, TRIMINO, UCANAN, C. VELEZ, V. VELEZ, WAGENMANN, WAGNER, WAGONER, WHITE, WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS, R., and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SAMPSON OFFICERS.”
134. The following named Defendants, all of who were acting under the color of law, were involved in at least one of the sixty-three arrests: BARNEY, CARPENTER, DUNASKE, FERNANDEZ, GLEASON, HARRIS, HORN, HUNHOLZ, JUDON, MALONE, MARTINEZ, MORTON, NARGISO, PALMER, PERDOMO, PINKNEY, PRINCE, ROSADO, J., SAINTLOUIS, SANCHEZ, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEARY, SHUMAN, STARK, TRIMINO, UCANAN, C. VELEZ, WAGONER, WILLIAMS, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS.”
135. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the SAMPSON OFFICERS and SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS.
136. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the SAMPSON OFFICERS, and the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS constitute a continuing violation of Mr. SAMPSON’s constitutional rights.
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COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 137. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges paragraphs 1-136 as if fully set forth herein. 138. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SAMPSON was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, each of these stopand-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 139. A reasonable police officer would not have believed there existed reasonable articulable suspicion to stop-and-frisk, and/or probable cause to search and arrest Mr. SAMPSON in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the SAMPSON OFFICERS at the time of the incidents. 140. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the SAMPSON OFFICERS deprived Mr. SAMPSON of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth Amendment. 141. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SAMPSON has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. 142. The acts of the SAMPSON OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SAMPSON to an award of punitive damages.
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143. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the SAMPSON OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SAMPSON OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 144. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges paragraphs 1-143 as if fully set forth herein. 145. The SAMPSON OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SAMPSON without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 146. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. SAMPSON was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the SAMPSON OFFICERS in this action. 147. As a r esult of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. SAMPSON without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause the SAMPSON OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
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148. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the SAMPSON OFFICERS deprived Mr. SAMPSON of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
149. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SAMPSON has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
150. The acts of the SAMPSON OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SAMPSON to an award of punitive damages.
151. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the SAMPSON OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SAMPSON OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 152. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges paragraphs 1-151, as if fully set forth herein. 153. Mr. SAMPSON was arrested a t otal of sixty-three times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SAMPSON was commenced.
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154. The SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON in at least one of the sixty-three arrests.
155. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SAMPSON in thirty of those arrests. Specifically, in thirty of the instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. SAMPSON or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
156. Twenty-seven of the remaining convictions, are currently the subject of a pending motion to vacate the convictions on the basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence of actual innocence. The motion is scheduled to be heard in state court in mid-December, 2013.
157. In summary, fifty-seven original proceedings commenced by the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS were commenced absent probable cause.
158. The SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SAMPSON fifty-seven times – twenty-seven arrests while he was working or at his place of employment – without arguable probable cause. In every instance, the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SAMPSON but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him anyway.
159. Mr. SAMPSON suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SAMPSON was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignment to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper
COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Civil Battery 160. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, set forth above. 161. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 159, as if fully set forth herein. 162. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS, in illegally searching and arresting Mr. SAMPSON, was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SAMPSON. 163. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 164. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the batteries committed by the SAMPSON OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. SAMPSON, in that the civil batteries was intentional, was committed within the course and scope of the SAMPSON OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
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165. As a direct and proximate result of the batteries detailed above, Mr. SAMPSON suffered bodily injury which resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SAMPSON will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SAMPSON OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for False Arrest 166. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a co mmon nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 167. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 165, as if fully set forth herein. 168. The conduct of the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 169. Mr. SAMPSON was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him fifty seven times without legal authority.
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170. The conduct of the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS resulted in repeated false arrests of Mr. SAMPSON, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
171. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrests of Mr. SAMPSON in that the false arrests were intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and were committed within the course and scope of the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
172. As a d irect and proximate result of the false arrests detailed above, Mr. SAMPSON suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SAMPSON will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 173. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, set forth above. 174. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 172, as if fully set forth herein. 175. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS, in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SAMPSON countless times without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 176. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 177. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. SAMPSON is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident. 178. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the intentional infliction of emotional distress committed by the SAMPSON OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. SAMPSON, in that the intentional infliction of emotional distress was intentional, was
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committed within the course and scope of the SAMPSON OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SAMPSON OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Malicious Prosecution 179. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 180. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 178, as if fully set forth herein. 181. Mr. SAMPSON was arrested a t otal of sixty-three times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SAMPSON was commenced. 182. Defendants, SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS, were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON at least once out of the sixty-three times. 183. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SAMPSON. Specifically, in thirty of the instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. SAMPSON or the Court dismissed the charges.
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184. Twenty-seven of the remaining convictions are currently the subject of a pending motion to vacate the convictions on the basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence of actual innocence. The motion is scheduled to be heard in state court in mid-December, 2013.
185. In summary, fifty-seven original proceedings commenced by the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS were commenced absent probable cause.
186. The SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SAMPSON fifty-seven times – twenty-seven arrests while he was working or at his place of employment – without probable cause. In every instance, the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SAMPSON but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him anyway.
187. Mr. SAMPSON suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SAMPSON was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO TOREE M. DANIELS
188. Ms. DANIELS is a thirty-five year old black female who has been a r esident of the CITY for her entire life.
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189. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from February 2008 to January 2013, Ms. DANIELS was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested at least 180 times within the CITY and by MGPD officers — equivalent to roughly once every 4.08 days for nearly five years. In all instances, an investigatory stop was performed by MGPD officers who checked Ms. DANIELS for outstanding warrants.
190. Well over 200 of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests occurred without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required by law.
191. Out of the 180 times Ms. DANIELS was stopped by MGPD officers, she was arrested only fifty-five times. Out of the fifty-five arrests, twenty-three resulted in no a ction being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or the charges were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
192. Similar to Mr. SAMPSON, many of Ms. DANIELS’ contacts with MGPD officers took place while at the QUICKSTOP where, again, the owner, Mr. SALEH, had given her full permission to be on the premises.
193. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the 180 stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests: ADAMS, BAMFORD, BARNEY, CARPENTER, CLIFTON, DAMIANI, DUNASKE, EUBANKS, GREGOIRE, HARRIS, HEDRICK, HOHENDORF, HORN, HUNHOLZ, IRIZARRY, JACKSON, JUDON, KIDDER, KOLACKOVSKY, MALONE, MARTINEZ, MOORE, NARGISO, NORRIS, PALMER, PAYOUTE, PERDOMO, PEREZ,, PILONE, PINKNEY, ROMAGUERA, ROVINELLI, RUIZ, SAINT-LOUIS, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEDA, SHUMAN, SIMMONS, STARK, UCANAN, V. VELEZ, WAGENMANN, WAGNER,
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WAGONER, WILLIAMS, R., and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be referred to as “DANIELS OFFICERS”.
194. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under the color of law, were involved in at least one of the fifty-five arrests: BARNEY, CARPENTER, HARRIS, MALONE, MOORE, PALMER, RUIZ, SEDA, SIMMONS, STARK, UCANAN, V. VELEZ, WAGENMANN, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be referred to as “DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS”.
195. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the DANIELS OFFICERS and DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS.
196. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the DANIELS OFFICERS, and the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS constitute a continuing violation of Ms. DANIEL’s constitutional rights.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 197. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 188 through 196 as if fully set forth herein.
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198. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Ms. DANIELS was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable. Moreover, each of these stop-andfrisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on t he basis of race and/or national origin.
199. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Ms. DANIELS in light of clearly established law and information possessed by the DANIELS OFFICERS at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests.
200. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the DANIELS OFFICERS deprived Ms. DANIELS of her constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth Amendment.
201. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Ms. DANIELS has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
202. The acts of the DANIELS OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Ms. DANIELS to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the DANIELS OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT II Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 203. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 188 through 196 as if fully set forth herein. 204. The DANIELS OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Ms. DANIELS without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on her race and/or national origin. 205. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Ms. DANIELS was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the DANIELS OFFICERS in this action. 206. As a result, of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Ms. DANIELS without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the DANIELS OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 207. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the DANIELS OFFICERS deprived Ms. DANIELS of her constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 208. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Ms. DANIELS has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
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209. The acts of the DANIELS OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Ms. DANIELS to an award of punitive damages.
210. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the DANIELS OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, requests judgment against Defendants, , CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the DANIELS OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 211. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 188 through 196 as if fully set forth herein. 212. Ms. DANIELS was arrested approximately fifty-fives times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Ms. DANIELS was commenced. 213. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS at least once out of the fifty-five times. 214. The termination of twenty-three original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Ms. DANIELS. Specifically,
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in twenty-three instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the charges against Ms. DANIELS finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
215. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Ms. DANIELS twenty-three times without probable cause. In every instance, the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Ms. DANIELS but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest her anyway.
216. Ms. DANIELS suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a r esult of the original proceedings. Ms. DANIELS was incarcerated following her arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if she could not post her monetary bond and was therefore seized in violation of her Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Civil Battery 217. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 218. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 188 through 196 as if fully set forth herein.
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219. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Ms. DANIELS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and intended to cause a h armful or offensive contact with the person of Ms. DANIELS.
220. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
221. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the batteries committed by the DANIELS OFFICERS upon the person of Ms. DANIELS, in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
222. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Ms. DANIELS suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Ms. DANIELS will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the DANIELS OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for False Arrest 223. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 224. Plaintiff, Ms., DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 188 through 196 as if fully set forth herein. 225. The conduct of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 226. Ms. DANIELS was unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty against her will when the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested her thirty-three times without legal authority. 227. The conduct of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Ms. DANIELS, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances. 228. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrests of Ms. DANIELS in that the false arrests was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and were committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
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229. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests detailed above, Ms. DANIELS suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Ms. DANIELS will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 230. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 231. Plaintiff, Ms., DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 188 through 196 as if fully set forth herein. 232. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Ms. DANIELS over 180 times, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 233. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
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234. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the infliction of intentional emotion distress upon Ms. DANIELS in that the infliction of the intentional emotional distress was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and were committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
235. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Ms. DANIELS is afraid to walk around her own neighborhood, and afraid to enjoy her life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the DANIELS OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Malicious Prosecution 236. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 237. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 188 through 196 as if fully set forth herein.
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238. Ms. DANIELS was arrested a total of fifty-five times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Ms. DANIELS was commenced.
239. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS at least once out of the fifty-five times.
240. The termination of twenty-three original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Ms. DANIELS. Specifically, in twenty-three of the instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Ms. DANIELS or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
241. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Ms. DANIELS twenty-three times without probable cause. In every instance, the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause and or arguable probable cause to arrest Ms. DANIELS but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest her anyway.
242. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the malicious prosecution of Ms. DANIELS in that the malicious prosecution was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and were committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
243. Ms. DANIELS suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Ms. DANIELS was incarcerated following her arrests or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if she could not post her monetary bond.
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WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the DANIELS OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO BRANDON SPIVEY
244. Mr. Spivey is a t wenty-four year old black male who has been a r esident of the CITY for his entire life.
245. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from February 2008 to January 2013, Mr. SPIVEY was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, at least fifty times within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
246. Out of the fifty times Mr. SPIVEY was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested only fourteen times. Out of the fourteen arrests, six arrests resulted in no action by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
247. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the fifty stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, or arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: DUNASKE, ENGERS, HARRIS, HOHENDORF, HUNHOLZ, JESSUP, JUDON, KOLACKOVSKY, NARGISO, PERDOMO, PILONE, ROVINELLI, SANTIAGO, SEDA, TRIMINO, UCANAN, V. VELEZ, WAGENMANN,
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WAGONER, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES. For consistency and clarity, the abovereferenced officers will be collectively referred to as "the SPIVEY OFFICERS".
248. The following named Defendants, all of who were acting under the color of law, were involved in at least one of the six arrests: TRIMINO, UCANAN, WRIGHT, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as "the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS."
249. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the SPIVEY OFFICERS, and the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. SPIVEY’s constitutional rights.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 250. Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 244 through 249, as if fully set forth herein. 251. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SPIVEY over fifty times in five years, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable. Moreover, each of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 252. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. SPIVEY in light of clearly established law
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and information possessed by the SPIVEY OFFICERS at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests.
253. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, the SPIVEY OFFICERS, deprived Mr. SPIVEY of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
254. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SPIVEY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
255. The acts of Defendants, the SPIVEY OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SPIVEY to an award of punitive damages.
256. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, P laintiff is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SPIVEY OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 257. Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 244 through 249, as if fully set forth herein.
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258. The SPIVEY OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SPIVEY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
259. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. SPIVEY was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the SPIVEY OFFICERS in this action.
260. As a result, MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. SPIVEY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the SPIVEY OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
261. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the SPIVEY OFFICERS deprived Mr. SPIVEY of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
262. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SPIVEY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
263. The acts of the SPIVEY OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SPIVEY to an award of punitive damages.
264. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the SPIVEY OFFICERS.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SPIVEY OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 265. Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 244 through 249, as if fully set forth herein. 266. Mr. SPIVEY was arrested a total of fourteen times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SPIVEY was commenced. 267. Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY at least once out of the fourteen times. 268. The termination of six original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SPIVEY. Specifically, in six of the instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the case against Mr. SPIVEY finding the arrests were made without probable cause. 269. Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. SPIVEY six times without probable cause. In all instances, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SPIVEY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
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270. Mr. SPIVEY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SPIVEY was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Civil Battery 271. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 272. Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 244 through 249, as if fully set forth herein. 273. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. SPIVEY was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SPIVEY. 274. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 275. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the batteries committed by the
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SPIVEY OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. SPIVEY, in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
276. In the alternative, the conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, or negligent, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. SPIVEY.
277. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Mr. SPIVEY suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SPIVEY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SPIVEY OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for False Arrest 278. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 279. Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 244 through 249, as if fully set forth herein.
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280. The conduct of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
281. Mr. SPIVEY was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him six times without legal authority.
282. The conduct of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. SPIVEY, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
283. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrests of Mr. SPIVEY in that the false arrests were intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
284. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. SPIVEY suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SPIVEY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 285. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 286. Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 244 through 249, as if fully set forth herein. 287. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SPIVEY at least fifty times, was intentional, negligent, or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 288. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 289. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the infliction of intentional emotion distress upon Mr. SPIVEY in that the infliction of the intentional emotional distress was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and were committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action. 290. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. Spivey is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Malicious Prosecution 291. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 292. Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 244 through 249, as if fully set forth herein. 293. Mr. SPIVEY was arrested a t otal of fourteen times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SPIVEY was commenced. 294. The SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY at least once out of the fourteen times. 295. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SPIVEY. Specifically, in six of the instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. SPIVEY or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
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296. The SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SPIVEY six times without probable cause. In all instances, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SPIVEY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
297. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the malicious prosecution of Mr. SPIVEY in that the malicious prosecution was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and were committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
298. Mr. SPIVEY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SPIVEY was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignment to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO ANTHONY LOWERY
299. Mr. LOWERY is a forty-nine year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for forty-two years.
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300. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from 2008 to 2013, Mr. LOWERY was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, at least nine times within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
301. Out of the nine times Mr. LOWERY was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested five times. Out of the five arrests, all arrests resulted in no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
302. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the nine stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: the DUNASKE, JACOBS, KOLACKOVSKY, PALMER, PERDOMO, SAINT-LOUIS, WAGONER, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “LOWERY OFFICERS".
303. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of law, were involved in at least one of the five arrests: DUNASKE, JACOBS, PERDOMO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the abovereferenced officer will be collectively referred to as the “LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS".
304. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the LOWERY OFFICERS and the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS constitute a continuing violation of Mr. LOWERY’s constitutional rights.
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COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 305. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 299 through 304, as if fully set forth herein. 306. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. LOWERY approximately nine times in five years, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, each of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 307. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. LOWERY in light of clearly established law and information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests. 308. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the LOWERY OFFICERS, deprived Mr. LOWERY of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 309. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. LOWERY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. 310. The acts of the LOWERY OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. LOWERY to an award of punitive damages.
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311. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the LOWERY OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 312. Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 299 through 304, as if fully set forth herein. 313. The LOWERY OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. LOWERY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 314. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. LOWERY was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the LOWERY OFFICERS in this action. 315. As a result, MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. LOWERY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the LOWERY OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
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316. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the LOWERY OFFICERS deprived Mr. LOWERY of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
317. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. LOWERY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
318. The acts of the LOWERY OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. LOWERY to an award of punitive damages.
319. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the LOWERY OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the LOWERY OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 320. Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 299 through 304, as if fully set forth herein. 321. Mr. LOWERY was arrested a total of five times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. LOWERY was commenced.
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322. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY at least once out of the five times.
323. The termination all original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. LOWERY. Specifically, all five of the instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the case against Mr. LOWERY finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
324. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. LOWERY five times without probable cause. In all instances, the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause and/or arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. LOWERY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
325. Mr. LOWERY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. LOWERY was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Civil Battery 326. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 327. Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 299 through 304, as if fully set forth herein. 328. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. LOWERY was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. LOWERY. 329. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 330. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the batteries committed by the LOWERY OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. LOWERY, in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the LOWERY OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action. 331. In the alternative, the conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS, were intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and/or negligent, and to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. LOWERY. 332. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Mr. LOWERY suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of
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enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. LOWERY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the LOWERY OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for False Arrest 333. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 334. Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 299 through 304, as if fully set forth herein. 335. The conduct of the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 336. Mr. LOWERY was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him five times without legal authority. 337. The conduct of the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. LOWERY, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even
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arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
338. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrests of Mr. LOWERY in that the false arrests were intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and were committed within the course and scope of the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
339. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. LOWERY suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. LOWERY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 340. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional inflictions of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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341. Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 299 through 304, as if fully set forth herein.
342. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. LOWERY nine times, was intentional, negligent, or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
343. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
344. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the intentional inflictions of emotional distress committed by the LOWERY OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. LOWERY, in that intentional inflictions of emotional distress were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the LOWERY OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
345. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. LOWERY is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the LOWERY OFFICERS together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Malicious Prosecution 346. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 347. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 299 through 304, as if fully set forth herein. 348. Mr. LOWERY was arrested a t otal of five times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. LOWERY was commenced. 349. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY at least once out of the five times. 350. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. LOWERY. Specifically, all instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. LOWERY or the charges were dismissed by the Court, finding the arrests were made without probable cause. 351. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. LOWERY five times without probable cause. In all instances, the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. LOWERY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time. 352. Mr. LOWERY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. LOWERY was incarcerated following his arraignments to await trial.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO FLOYD HALL, JR.
353. Mr. HALL, JR. is a fifty-three year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for forty-nine years.
354. From 2008 to 2013, Mr. HALL, JR. was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, approximately forty-six times within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
355. Out of the approximately forty-six times Mr. HALL, JR. was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested fourteen times. Out of the fourteen arrests, all resulted in either no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
356. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the forty six stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: CARPENTER, DUNASKE, HARRIS, PALMER, PERDOMO, PINKNEY, KOLACKOVSKY, JACKSON, EHRLICH, J. ROSADO, NARGISO, NORRIS, BAMFORD, ROVINELLI, SAINT-LOUIS, SANTIAGO, SHUMAN, TRIMINO, C. VELEZ, V. VELEZ, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For
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purposes of clarity and consistency, the above-reference officers will be collectively referred to as the “HALL, JR. OFFICERS".
357. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under the color of law, were involved in the at least one of the fourteen arrests: COLEMAN, HARRIS, JUDON, PALMER, PERDOMO, PINKNEY, KOLACKOVSKY, JACKSON, EHRLICH, J. ROSADO, NARGISO, NORRIS, BAMFORD, ROVINELLI, SAINT-LOUIS, SHUMAN, C. VELEZ, V. VELEZ, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS".
358. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS and the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. HALL, JR.’s constitutional rights.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, JR., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 359. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein. 360. The conduct of Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. HALL, JR. approximately forty-six times, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable
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probable cause. Moreover, each of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
361. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. HALL, JR. in light of clearly established law and information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests.
362. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS, deprived Mr. HALL, JR. of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
363. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. HALL, JR. has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
364. The acts of Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. HALL, JR. to an award of punitive damages.
365. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, P laintiff is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Mr. HALL, JR. requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the HALL JR. OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 366. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein. 367. Defendants have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. HALL, JR. without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 368. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. HALL, JR. was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by Defendants in this action. 369. As a r esult of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. HALL, JR. without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the HALL JR. OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 370. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the HALL JR. OFFICERS deprived Mr. HALL JR. of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 371. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. HALL JR. has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
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372. The acts of the HALL JR. OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. HALL JR. to an award of punitive damages.
373. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the HALL JR. OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the HALL JR. OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 374. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein. 375. Mr. HALL, JR. was arrested a total of fourteen times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. HALL, JR. was commenced. 376. The HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. at least once out of the fourteen times. 377. The termination all original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. HALL, JR.. Specifically, in all
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fourteen instances either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the case against Mr. HALL, JR. finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
378. The HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. HALL, JR. fourteen times without probable cause. In every instance, the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. HALL, JR. but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
379. Mr. HALL, JR. suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. HALL, JR. was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR. requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, JR. for Civil Battery 380. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 381. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein..
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382. The conduct of the HALL, JR. OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. HALL, JR. was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. HALL, JR.
383. The conduct of the HALL, JR. OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
384. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the batteries committed by the HALL, JR. OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. HALL, JR. in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the HALL JR. OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
385. In the alternative, the conduct of the HALL, JR. OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, or negligent, and to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. HALL, JR.
386. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Mr. HALL, JR. suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. HALL, JR. will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the HALL, JR. OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for False Arrest 387. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 388. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein. 389. The conduct of the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 390. Mr. HALL, JR. was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him fourteen times without legal authority. 391. The conduct of the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. HALL, JR., as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances. 392. The conduct of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrests of Mr. HALL, JR. in that the false arrests were intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and were committed within the course and scope of the HALL, JR. ARRESTING
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OFFICERS' employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
393. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. HALL, JR. suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. HALL, JR. will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, JR. for Civil Theft 394. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 a nd 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein. 395. On Nov 15, 2013, Defendants DUNASKE and SANTIAGO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, knowingly, wantonly, improperly, negligently, and illicitly took a Taser belonging to Mr. HALL, JR. with the intent to permanently deprive MR. HALL, JR. of his right to said property. 396. At the time, Defendants DUNASKE, SANTIAGO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, who were acting under color of authority, were engaging in a pattern of
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illegal acts, which included, but were not limited to: false arrest, false imprisonment and unlawful search and seizure against and to the detriment of Mr. HALL, JR.
397. The taking of Mr. HALL, JR.’s property constituted civil theft. WHEREFORE Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, JR. for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 398. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 399. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 a nd 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein 400. The conduct of the HALL JR. OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. HALL, JR. fourteen times, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 401. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in civilized community.
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402. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the intentional inflictions of emotional distress committed by the HALL JR. OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. HALL, JR., in that intentional inflictions of emotional distress were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the HALL JR. OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
403. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. HALL, JR. is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the HALL, JR. OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VIII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Malicious Prosecution 404. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 405. Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 353 through 358, as if fully set forth herein.
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406. Mr. HALL, JR. was arrested a total of fourteen times from 2008 to 20fourteen. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. HALL, JR. was commenced.
407. The HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. at least once out of the fourteen times.
408. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. HALL, JR. Specifically, in all fourteen instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. HALL, JR. or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
409. The HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. HALL, JR. fourteen without probable cause. In all instance, the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. HALL, JR. but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
410. Mr. HALL, JR. suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. HALL, JR. was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond trial.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR., respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO ROSS PICART
411. Mr. PICART is a thirty-four year old black male. Mr. PICART has been an employee of the QUICKSTOP since 2005.
412. On December 21, 2012, M r. PICART was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested approximately seven times without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES. The incident resulted in excessive use of force by MGPD officers.
413. On December 21, 2012, Mr. PICART was working at the QUICKSTOP during his normal shift. Prior to closing the QUICKSTOP, Mr. PICART was approached by MGPD officers and asked to produce identification. Mr. PICART advised MGPD officers that he did not have identification but that he was an employee of the QUICKSTOP and could call the owner, Mr. SALEH, to verify his employment.
414. Mr. PICART entered the QUICKSTOP and used his cellular phone to call the owner, Mr. SALEH. At that point, MGPD officers followed him behind the store counter, forcefully grabbed him by the arm, and escorted him outside of the premises.
415. While outside the premises, Mr. PICART was unlawfully searched, without consent or probable cause, thrown to the ground, and placed under arrest.
416. MGPD officers proceeded to unlawfully search the QUICKSTOP and found a firearm - owned by and registered to Mr. SALEH — under the counter and concealed from plain view. Mr. PICART was subsequently charged with possession of a concealed firearm
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although MGPD officers knew it did not belong to him and had no b asis to believe that Mr. PICART was even aware the firearm was there.
417. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the December 21, 2 012 incident, either directly or through tacit approval: the, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
418. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. PICART’s constitutional rights.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 419. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein. 420. The conduct of Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. PICART was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 421. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. PICART in light of clearly established law
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and information possessed by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests.
422. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, deprived Mr. HALL, JR. of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
423. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. PICART has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
424. The acts of Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. PICART. to an award of punitive damages.
425. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, P laintiff, Mr. PICART is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 426. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418 as if fully set forth herein. 427. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-andfrisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. PICART without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 428. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. PICART was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action. 429. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. PICART without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 430. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. PICART of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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431. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. PICART has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
432. The acts of the DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. PICART to an award of punitive damages.
433. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 434. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein. 435. The unlawful arrest which took place on December 21, 2012 resulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. PICART.
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436. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were all the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. PICART.
437. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. PICART constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. PICART. Specifically, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. PICART finding the arrest was made without probable cause.
438. Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. PICART without probable cause. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. PICART but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
439. Mr. PICART suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. PICART was incarcerated and eventually had to seek legal counsel to prevent him from being charged with the crimes improperly begun and facilitated against him by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT IV Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Excessive Use of Force
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 440. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein. 441. On December 21, 2012, Mr. PICART was working at the QUICKSTOP during his normal shift. Mr. PICART was not engaged in any criminal activity. 442. Mr. PICART entered the QUICKSTOP and attempted to use his cellular phone to call the owner, Mr. SALEH. At that point, DUNASKE followed him behind the store counter, forcefully grabbed him by the arm, and escorted him out of the premises. 443. Mr. PICART did not actively resist arrest or attempt to evade arrest by fighting. Notwithstanding Mr. PICART’s cooperation, he was unlawfully searched, without consent or reasonable articulable suspicion, violently thrown to the ground, and placed under arrest. 444. Mr. PICART did not pose any immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. 445. The use of force was unreasonable and negligent under the circumstances resulting in multiple injuries to Mr. PICART and violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 446. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT V Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Second Excessive Use
of Force in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 447. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein. 448. On December 21, 2012, Mr. PICART was working at the QUICKSTOP during his normal shift. Prior to closing the QUICKSTOP, Mr. PICART was approached by DUNASKE and asked to produce identification. Mr. PICART advised DUNASKE that he did not have identification but that he was an employee of the QUICKSTOP and could call the owner, Mr. SALEH, to verify his employment. 449. Mr. PICART entered the QUICKSTOP and used his cellular phone to call the owner, Mr. SALEH. At that point, DUNASKE followed him behind the store counter, forcefully grabbed him by the arm, and escorted him out of the premises. 450. While outside the premises, Mr. PICART was unlawfully searched, without consent or reasonable articulable suspicion, thrown to the ground, and placed under arrest. 451. The use of force was malicious and grossly negligent under the circumstances resulting in multiple injuries to Mr. PICART. Specifically, Mr. PICART suffered severe
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lacerations on his back. This malicious application of force resulted in a substantive due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment — the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest.
452. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Civil Battery 453. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 454. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein. 455. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. PICART was intentional,
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malicious, wanton and willful and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. PICART.
456. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
457. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the battery committed by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. PICART, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
458. In the alternative, the conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, or negligent, and to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. PICART.
459. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. PICART suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. PICART will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and
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UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for False Arrest 460. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 461. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein. 462. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 463. Mr. PICART was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS arrested him without legal authority. 464. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS constituted a false arrest of Mr. PICART, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. 465. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrest of Mr. PICART in that the false arrest was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN
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DOE OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
466. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. PICART suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. PICART will suffer such losses in the future.
467. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VIII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 468. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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469. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein.
470. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. PICART, was intentional, negligent, or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
471. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
472. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the intentional inflictions of emotional distress committed by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS upon t he person of Mr. PICART, in that intentional inflictions of emotional distress were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
473. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. PICART is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
474. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT IX Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Malicious Prosecution 475. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 476. Plaintiff, Mr. PICART, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 411 through 418, as if fully set forth herein. 477. The unlawful arrest which took place on December 21, 2012 resulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. PICART. 478. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were all the legal cause of the original proceedings against MR. PICART. 479. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. PICART constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. PICART. Specifically, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. PICART finding the arrest was made without probable cause. 480. Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. PICART without probable
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cause. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. PICART but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
481. Mr. PICART suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. PICART was incarcerated and eventually had to seek legal counsel to prevent him from being charged with the crimes improperly begun and facilitated against him by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
482. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the malicious prosecution of Mr. PICART in that the malicious prosecution was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and were committed within the course and scope of the PICART ARRESTING OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH
483. Mr. SMITH is a twenty-six old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for his entire life.
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484. On February 7, 2013, M r. SMITH was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by MGPD officers. The incident with MGPD officers resulted in an excessive use of force.
485. Mr. SMITH was on t he QUICKSTOP property drinking an allegedly alcoholic beverage. He was approached by MGPD officers who asked for his identification and poured out the contents of the beverage. Simultaneously, MGPD officers performed a full search of Mr. SMITH’S person without consent and without reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.
486. After the unlawful search, Mr. SMITH was released, at which time he attempted to walk into the QUICKSTOP to purchase water. MGPD officers instructed him not to enter the QUICKSTOP – which was open to the public at the time. MGPD officers again requested Mr. SMITH’s identification and when he asked “why?” he was thrown, head-first, into a steel door, handcuffed, picked up, and thrown against the police car.
487. After several minutes of physical detainment, he was released and issued a Promise to Appear for possession of an open container. Subsequent to the arrest, MGPD officers failed to complete a Use of Force Report as required by MGPD policy and Florida law.
488. The Court subsequently dismissed the open container charge. 489. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved at least one of the seven stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
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490. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of MR. SMITH’s constitutional rights.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 491. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein. 492. The conduct of Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SMITH on seven separate instances, including February 7, 2013, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 493. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. SMITH in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, at the time of the incidents. 494. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and
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UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, deprived Mr. SMITH of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
495. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SMITH has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
496. The acts of Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SMITH to an award of punitive damages.
497. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, P laintiff is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
498. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 499. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490as if fully set forth herein. 500. RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SMITH without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 501. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. SMITH was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action. 502. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. SMITH without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 503. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN
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DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. SMITH of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
504. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SMITH has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
505. The acts of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SMITH to an award of punitive damages.
506. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT III Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 507. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein. 508. The unlawful arrest which took place on F ebruary 7, 2013 r esulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SMITH. 509. RUIZ, TAMAYO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES were all the legal cause of the original proceeding against MR. SMITH. 510. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. SMITH constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SMITH. Specifically, the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrest was made without probable cause. 511. RUIZ, TAMAYO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SMITH without probable cause. Defendants RUIZ, TAMAYO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SMITH but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him. 512. Mr. SMITH suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SMITH was arrested, to await bond hearings and/or arraignment and was therefore seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights. 513. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned,
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encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline RUIZ, TAMAYO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Excessive Use of Force
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 514. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein. 515. On February 7, 2013, M r. SMITH was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. 516. The incident with RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS resulted in an excessive use of force. 517. Mr. SMITH was on t he QUICKSTOP property drinking an allegedly alcoholic beverage. He was approached by RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS who asked for his identification and poured out the contents of the beverage. Simultaneously, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS
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performed a full search of Mr. SMITH’S person without consent and without reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.
518. After the unlawful search, Mr. SMITH was released at which time he attempted to walk into the QUICKSTOP to purchase water. RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS instructed him not to enter the QUICKSTOP – which was open to the public at the time. RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS again requested Mr. SMITH’s identification and when he asked “why?” he was thrown, head-first, into a steel door, handcuffed, picked up, and thrown against the police car.
519. After several minutes of physical detainment, he was released and issued a Promise to Appear for possession of an open container. Subsequent to the arrest, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS failed to complete a Use of Force Report as required by MGPD policy and Florida law.
520. The use of force was unreasonable and negligent under the circumstances resulting in multiple injuries to Mr. SMITH and violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
521. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS .
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages,
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punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Civil Battery 522. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 523. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein. 524. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. SMITH was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and/or negligent, and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SMITH. 525. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 526. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the battery committed by RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. SMITH, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of RUIZ, TAMAYO,
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MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
527. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. SMITH suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SMITH will suffer such losses in the future.
528. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for False Arrest 529. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 530. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein. 531. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 532. Mr. SMITH was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES arrested him without legal authority. 533. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES constituted false arrests of Mr. SMITH, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. 534. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrest of Mr. SMITH in that the false arrest was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
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535. As a d irect and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. SMITH suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SMITH will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 536. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 537. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein. 538. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SMITH as well as using unjustified force upon him, was intentional, negligent, or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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539. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
540. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. SMITH is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to the store, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
541. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VIII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Malicious Prosecution 542. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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543. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein.
544. The unlawful arrest which took place on F ebruary 7, 2013 r esulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SMITH.
545. RUIZ, TAMAYO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES were all the legal cause of the original proceeding against Mr. SMITH.
546. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. SMITH constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SMITH. Specifically, the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrest was made without probable cause.
547. RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES operated with malice in arresting Mr. SMITH without probable cause. Defendants knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SMITH but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him.
548. Mr. SMITH suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SMITH was incarcerated following his arrest and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial.
549. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline RUIZ, TAMAYO ,and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or
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UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO KENNETH CRANE
550. Mr. CRANE is a forty six year old black male who has resided in the CITY for his entire life.
551. Mr. CRANE was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY by MGPD officers.
552. On November 23, 2012, Mr. CRANE was riding his bicycle to the QUICKSTOP when he was stopped without reasonable suspicion, and subsequently searched and arrested without probable cause by MGPD officers.
553. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the November 23, 2012 search, seizure, and arrest, either directly or through tacit approval: the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, TRIMINO, SANTIAGO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. CRANE’s constitutional rights.
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COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 554. Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 550 through 553, as if fully set forth herein. 555. The conduct of Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. CRANE on November 23, 2012, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 556. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. CRANE in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the incidents. 557. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, deprived Mr. CRANE of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 558. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. CRANE has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. 559. The acts of Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. CRANE to an award of punitive damages.
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560. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
561. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 562. Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 550 through 553 as if fully set forth herein. 563. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. CRANE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
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564. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. CRANE was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action.
565. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. CRANE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
566. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. CRANE of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
567. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SAMPSON has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
568. The acts of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. CRANE to an award of punitive damages.
569. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS
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WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 570. Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 550 through 553, as if fully set forth herein. 571. The unlawful arrest which took place on N ovember 23, 2012 r esulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. CRANE. 572. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were all the legal cause of the original proceeding against MR. CRANE. 573. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. CRANE constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. CRANE. Specifically, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. CRANE. 574. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. CRANE without probable cause. Defendants knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. CRANE but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him.
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575. Mr. CRANE suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. CRANE was incarcerated prior to his arraignment to await trial and therefore seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Civil Battery 576. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 577. Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 550 through 553, as if fully set forth herein. 578. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in illegally searching and arresting Mr. CRANE was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and/or negligent, and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. CRANE. 579. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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580. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the battery committed by DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, upon the person of Mr. CRANE, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
581. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. CRANE suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. CRANE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for False Arrest
582. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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583. Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 550 through 553, as if fully set forth herein.
584. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
585. Mr. CRANE was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, arrested him without legal authority.
586. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constituted false arrest of Mr. CRANE, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrest of Mr. CRANE in that the false arrest was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
587. As a d irect and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. CRANE suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. CRANE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON,
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CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VI Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 588. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 589. Plaintiff, MR. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 550 through 553, as if fully set forth herein. 590. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. CRANE was intentional, negligent, or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 591. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 592. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
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593. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. CRANE is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, TRIMINO, HARRIS, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT VII Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Malicious Prosecution 594. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 595. Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 550 through 553, as if fully set forth herein. 596. Mr. CRANE was arrested a t otal of one time in 2012. In the instant case, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. CRANE was commenced. 597. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were all the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. CRANE. 598. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. CRANE constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. CRANE. Specifically, the State
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Attorney’s Office took “no action” or dismissed the case against Mr. CRANE finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
599. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. CRANE without probable cause. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. CRANE but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him.
600. Mr. CRANE suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. CRANE was incarcerated following his arraignment to await trial.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO YVENSONNE MONTALE
601. Mr. MONTALE is an eighteen year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for two years.
602. Mr. MONTALE was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, without reasonable suspicion within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
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603. On August 13, 2012, Mr. MONTALE was riding his bicycle to the QUICKSTOP where he was stopped without reasonable suspicion and subsequently searched without probable cause.
604. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the August 23, 2012, search, and seizure, either directly or through tacit approval: the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
605. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. MONTALE’s constitutional rights.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. MONTALE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 606. Plaintiff, MR. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 601 through 605, as if fully set forth herein. 607. The conduct of Defendants, GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. MONTALE on August 13, 201 2, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, the stop-and-frisks, search, seizure, and/or arrest were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
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608. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to search Mr. MONTALE in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the incidents.
609. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, deprived Mr. MONTALE of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
610. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. MONTALE has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
611. The acts of Defendants, GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. MONTALE to an award of punitive damages.
612. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline GREGORY and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES.
613. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, P laintiff is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages,
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punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. MONTALE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 614. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 601 through 605, as if fully set forth herein. 615. GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. MONTALE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 616. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. MONTALE was, and continues to be, a t arget of racial profiling by GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action. 617. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. MONTALE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 618. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. MONTALE of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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619. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. MONTALE has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
620. The acts of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. MONTALE to an award of punitive damages.
621. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for Civil Battery 622. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 623. Plaintiff, Mr. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 601 through 605, as if fully set forth herein.
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624. The conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. MONTALE was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. MONTALE.
625. The conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
626. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the battery committed by GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. MONTALE, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
627. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. MONTALE suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. MONTALE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for False Arrest 628. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 629. Plaintiff, Mr. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 601 through 605, as if fully set forth herein. 630. The conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 631. Mr. MONTALE was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS arrested him without legal authority. 632. The conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS constituted false arrest of Mr. MONTALE, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD are responsible for the false arrest of Mr. MONTALE in that the false arrest was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious, and/or negligent, and was committed within the course and scope of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
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633. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrest alleged above, Mr. MONTALE suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. MONTALE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 634. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 635. Plaintiff, Mr. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 601 through 605, as if fully set forth herein. 636. The conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. MONTALE was intentional, negligent, or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 637. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
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638. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline GREGORY and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES.
639. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. MONTALE is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO OMAR DEAN
640. Mr. DEAN is 39 year old black male who resided in the CITY for over 10 years of his life.
641. On July 13, 2012, M r. DEAN was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, without reasonable suspicion within the CITY by MGPD Officer MALONE.
642. Mr. DEAN was walking in front of the QUICKSTOP with a plastic bag of Red Bull cans. Without reasonable suspicion or warning, MALONE approached Mr. DEAN and performed a complete search of his person and possessions.
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643. During the unlawful search, MALONE confiscated the bag containing Red Bull cans, threw the contents on the pavement, and then proceeded to hand out Mr. DEAN’s property to pedestrians.
644. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the July 13, 2012, stop-and-frisk, search, and seizure, either directly or through tacit approval: the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
645. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UN IDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. DEAN’s constitutional rights.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. DEAN, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 646. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 640 through 645, as if fully set forth herein. 647. The conduct of Defendant, MALONE, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, Mr. DEAN on July 13, 2012, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, and/or seizure was performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
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648. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk or seize and search Mr. DEAN in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by MALONE, at the time of the incidents.
649. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendant, MALONE deprived Mr. DEAN of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
650. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. DEAN has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
651. The acts of Defendant, MALONE, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. DEAN to an award of punitive damages.
652. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline MALONE.
653. Pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1988, P laintiff, Mr. DEAN is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT II Individual Claim of Mr. DEAN, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 654. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 640 through 645, as if fully set forth herein. 655. MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-andfrisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. DEAN without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 656. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. DEAN was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action. 657. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. DEAN without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 658. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. DEAN of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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659. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. DEAN has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
660. The acts of MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. DEAN to an award of punitive damages.
661. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, MAJOR CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Civil Theft 662. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 640 through 645, as if fully set forth herein. 663. On July 13, 2012, Defendant, MALONE, knowingly, wantonly, improperly and illicitly took red bull energy drinks belonging to MR. DEAN with the intent to permanently deprive MR. DEAN of his right to said property.
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664. At the time, Defendant, MALONE, who was acting under color of authority was engaging in a pattern of illegal acts, which included, but was not limited to: false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful search and seizure against and to the detriment of MR. DEAN.
WHEREFORE Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages as provided by Florida Statute § 772.11, punitive damages as deemed appropriate, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Civil Battery 665. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 666. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 640 through 645, as if fully set forth herein. 667. The conduct of MALONE in illegally searching and seizing Mr. DEAN was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and/or negligent, and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. DEAN. 668. The conduct of MALONE was committed within the course and scope of his employment with MGPD. 669. Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the battery committed by
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MALONE upon the person of Mr. DEAN, in that the civil battery was intentional, was committed within the course and scope of MALONE’S employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
670. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline MALONE.
671. As a direct and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. DEAN suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. DEAN will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT V Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 672. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a co mmon nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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673. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 640 through 645, as if fully set forth herein.
674. The conduct of MALONE in stopping, searching, and seizing, Mr. DEAN was intentional, negligent, or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of his employment with MGPD.
675. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
676. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline MALONE and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
677. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. DEAN is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a former CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AS TO ALI AMIN SALEH
678. Mr. SALEH has been the owner of the QUICKSTOP located in the CITY since 1999.
679. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from 2008 t o 2013, Mr. SALEH’s QUICKSTOP was unlawfully searched without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, numerous times by MGPD officers.
680. In addition, MGPD officers have engaged in a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting patrons of his QUICKSTOP while they are on the premises for loitering or trespassing. Mr. SALEH has repeatedly informed MGPD officers that QUICKSTOP patrons are on the premise with his full permission and authority — information which MGPD officers routinely disregard.
681. The actions taken by MGPD officers are interfering with Mr. SALEH’s relationship with his customers, and have severely curtailed sales at the QUICKSTOP.
682. Mr. SALEH has filed several complaints with MGPD regarding the conduct of its officers; however, no action has been taken to rectify the issue.
683. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the above-referenced unconstitutional and illegal conduct: ADAMS, BAMFORD, BARMORE, BARNEY, BERNARD, BROWN, BURGESS, CARPENTER, CASTELLI, CLIFTON, DAMIANI, DUNASKE, EHRLICH, ENGERS, EUBANKS, GLEASON, GREGOIRE, GREGORY, HARRIS, HEDRICK, HOHENDORF, HOPSON, HORN, HUNHOLZ, IRIZARRY, JACKSON, JACOBS, JESSUP, JONES-GRAY,
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JUDON, KIDDER, KOLACKOVSKY, LUCIUS, MALONE, MARTINEZ, MCNEIL, MOORE, MORTON, NARGISO, NORRIS, PALMER, PAYOUTE, PERDOMO, PEREZ, PILONE, PINKNEY, ROBINSON, ROMAGUERA, ROSADO, E., ROSADO, J., ROVINELLI, RUIZ, SAINT-LOUIS, SANCHEZ, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEARY, SEDA, SHUMAN, SIMMONS, STARK, TAMAYO, UCANAN, C. VELEZ, V. VELEZ, WAGENMANN, WAGNER, WAGONER, WHITE, WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS, R. and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the abovereferenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SALEH OFFICERS.”
684. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD, either encouraged, authorized, tacitly approved or were deliberate indifferent to the unconstitutional misconduct engaged in by the SALEH OFFICERS.
COUNT I Individual Claim of Mr. SALEH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 685. Plaintiff, Mr. SALEH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 678 through 684, as if fully set forth herein. 686. The conduct of the SALEH OFFICERS in searching the QUICKSTOP owned by Mr. SALEH, or his patrons walking in and out of the QUICKSTOP was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause.
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687. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the QUICKSTOP in light of clearly established law and information possessed by the SALEH OFFICERS at the time of the searches.
688. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, the SALEH OFFICERS deprived Mr. SALEH of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
689. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SALEH has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
690. The acts of Defendants, the SALEH OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SALEH to an award of punitive damages.
691. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged and/or failed to supervise and discipline the SALEH OFFICERS.
692. Pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1988, P laintiff, Mr. SALEH is entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney fees as part of Plaintiff’s costs
WHEREFORE, Mr. SALEH requests judgment against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD and the SALEH OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT II Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SALEH for Tortious
Interference with a Business Relationship 693. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for tortious interference with a business relationship. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 694. Plaintiff, Mr. SALEH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 678 through 684, as if fully set forth herein. 695. The conduct of the SALEH OFFICERS, in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting actual patrons of the QUICKSTOP, without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, both inside store and in its parking lot, was intentional and unjustified and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 696. As a d irect and proximate result of the tortious interference with a b usiness relationship detailed above, Mr. SALEH has suffered financial harm to the profitability of his business. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SALEH will suffer such losses in the future. 697. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW and CHIEF BOYD, are responsible for the tortious interference with a business relationship committed by the SALEH OFFICERS upon the business of Mr. SALEH, in that the interference was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of the SALEH OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. SALEH respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, and the SALEH OFFICERS, together with prejudgment interest on all economic losses, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS COUNT I
Claim of all Named Plaintiffs, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of Miami Gardens for Violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 698. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 697 as if fully set forth herein. 699. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage, and sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment. 700. In addition, this pattern and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting a stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims of such racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males.
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701. The policies, fully described in the General Allegations of this Complaint, supra ¶¶ 107— 127, include the Quotas Policy, Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy all of which are ether unconstitutional on their face or are enforced in such a way which violates the constitutional rights of CITY residents, including named Plaintiffs.
702. The Quotas Policy and Racial Targeting Policy are not written or formally adopted policies but are so pervasive and longstanding that they have become the force of law, or at a minimum, the moving force behind the deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
703. The Zero Tolerance Zone Policy was jointly enacted by the CITY and MGPD. As previously stated, although the policy is not unconstitutional on i ts face, MGPD officers are abusing the policy and using it as a vehicle to illegally stop, search, and arrest CITY residents without reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause.
704. MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting the Plaintiffs without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
705. As a co nsequence, the constitutional abuses thrust upon t he Plaintiffs were, and are, directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs devised, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned by the CITY and its final policymakers in: (a) failing to properly screen, train, and supervise MGPD officers; (b) inadequately monitoring MGPD officers during and after stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; (c) failing to sufficiently discipline MGPD officers who engaged in constitutional abuses, and (d) encouraging, sanctioning, and failing to rectify MGPD’s unconstitutional practices.
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706. These informal policies were enacted and sanctioned by CHIEF BOYD, a f inal policymaker for law enforcement purposes. The failure of supervising officer's to identify and address these abuses as such, rather than signing their approval to them, has compounded the abuses.
707. Moreover, the CITY has been on notice — through communications from concerned officers — of MGPD officers’ unlawful practices but has failed to train, supervise, discipline, and/or adequately screen the violating officers.
708. This failure to train, supervise, discipline, and/or adequately correct the violating officers has amounted to a deliberate indifference that has allowed continued, unabated conduct and improper decisions to be made by these officers in violation of the Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights.
709. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced policies, practices, and/or customs, all Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendant, the CITY, and requests that the Court finds and awards as follows:
1) That the Miami Gardens policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Title VI, and the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida; 142
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2) That the Miami Gardens policy, practice, and/or custom was implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned by the CITY and its final policymakers in: a. failing to properly screen, train, and supervise MGPD officers; b. inadequately monitoring MGPD officers during and after stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; c. failing to sufficiently discipline MGPD officers who engaged in constitutional abuses, and d. encouraging, sanctioning, and failing to rectify MGPD’s unconstitutional practices.
3) That injunctive relief be issued enjoining the MGPD from continuing its policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, and in particular serving to: a. Further enjoin the MGPD from continuing the use of quotas for arrests (quotas policy); b. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of a zero tolerance policy to conduct unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; and c. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of the Racial Targeting Policy to use racial and/or national origin profiling to make unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests.
4) That the CITY, Mayor, City Manager, and Police shall institute and implement improved policies and programs with respect to training, discipline and promotion designed to 143
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eliminate the MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stops-and-
frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests.
5) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable to
be determined at trial;
6) Award Plaintiffs punitive damages in an amount designed to punish and deter the
reprehensible conduct of the CITY, to be determined at trial.
7) Award all Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec.1920 and 1988; and
8) Award and such other relief as this Court deems just, proper, and equitable, including further injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the interests of justice. Dated: November 26, 2013.
Respectfully Submitted:
REYES LAW GROUP, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 2924 Davie Road, Suite 102 Davie, Florida 33314-1602 O: 954-369-1993 Fax: 888-315-6291 Primary: Eservice@reyeslegal.com Secondary: Carlos@ReyesLegal.com
Stephan@ReyesLegal.com
__/s/_Carlos J. Reyes_______ CARLOS J. REYES, ESQ. FL Bar No. 755079
__/s/_Stephan Lopez________ STEPHAN LOPEZ, ESQ. FL Bar No. 76959
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

EARL SAMPSON; TOREE M. DANIELS; BRANDON SPIVEY; ANTHONY LOWERY; FLOYD HALL, JR.; ROSS PICART; RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH; KENNETH CRANE; YVENSONNE MONTALE; OMAR DEAN; and ALI AMIN SALEH;
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS; OLIVER G. GILBERT, III; SHIRLEY GIBSON; DR. DANNY O. CREW; MATTHEW BOYD; P AUL MILLER; ANTHONY CHAPMAN; TIMOTHY ADAMS; CARLOS AUSTIN; WILLIAM BAMFORD; TERRANCE BARMORE; ALEX BARNEY; ALVIN BERNARD; JESSIE BROWN; DELROY BURGESS; EDWARD CASTELLI; RANDY CARPENTER; RYAN CLIFTON; CARLTON COLEMAN; TOM DAMIANI; WILLIAM DUNASKE; PETER EHRLICH; JEFFREY ENGERS; SHAWN EUBANKS; RAUL FERNANDEZ; ERIK GLEASON; ANDREW GREGOIRE; BRIAN GREGORY; JAMES HARRIS; DIANA HEDRICK; JEFFREY HOHENDORF; ANITA HOPSON; MICHAEL HORN; BUDDY HUNHOLZ; MIGUEL IRIZARRY; WANDA JACKSON; NICHOLAS JACOBS; RICHARD JESSUP; SHIRLEY JONES-GRAY; NELLY JOSEPH; ALEX JUDON; HEATHER KIDDER; STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY; DEVIN LUCIUS; MICHAEL MALONE; CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ; SHONADEE MCNEIL; JASON MOORE; ALEXANDER MORTON; JOSEPH NARGISO; CHERRI NETTLES;

CASE NO.: 1 3-24312-CIVGRAHAM

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WIREN NORRIS; BARBARA PALMER; HENRY PAYOUTE; ONASSIS PERDOMO; SAUL PEREZ; HUBERT PIERRE; JEREMY PILONE; KEVIN PINKNEY; ARTHUR PRINCE; LAWRENCE RICHARDSON; JAVIER ROMAGUERA; EDWIN ROSADO; JOSE ROSADO; STACEY ROVINELLI; MICHAEL RUIZ; JEAN SAINT-LOUIS; JIMY SANCHEZ; MARTIN SANTIAGO; JOSEPH SCHAEFFER; ANGEL SEARY; ALBERTO SEDA; CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN; TALIBAH SIMMONS; JONATHAN STARK; KEVIN TAMAYO; EDDO TRIMINO; JAINA UCANAN; CARLOS VELEZ; VICTOR VELEZ; SCOTT WHITE; WILLIAM WAGENMANN; EDWARD WAGNER; MICHAEL WAGONER; EUGENE WILLIAMS; RUFUS WILLIAMS; MICHAEL WRIGHT; JOSEPH ZELLNER; and UNKNOWN JOHN DOE OFFICERS;
Defendants. _______________________________________________/
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Table of Contents
AMENDED..................................................................................................................................... 7 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES.................................................................................................... 7 JURISDICTION AND VENUE ..................................................................................................... 7 PARTIES ........................................................................................................................................ 8 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS ....................................................................................................... 20
The Policies ............................................................................................................................... 22 Earl Sampson............................................................................................................................. 25 Toree Daniels ............................................................................................................................ 28 Brandon Spivey ......................................................................................................................... 30 Anthony Lowery ....................................................................................................................... 31 Floyd Hall, Jr............................................................................................................................. 32 Ross Picart................................................................................................................................. 34 Roderick DeWayne Smith......................................................................................................... 35 Kenneth Crane........................................................................................................................... 36 Yvensonne Montale................................................................................................................... 37 Omar Dean ................................................................................................................................ 38 Ali Amin Saleh.......................................................................................................................... 39 FEDERAL MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIMS ........................................................................ 41 All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens ......................................................... 41 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourth Amendment ....................................................... 41 All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens ......................................................... 44 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment ................................................ 44 FEDERAL SUPERVISORY LIABILITY CLAIMS ................................................................... 47 FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS .................................................... 51 Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON,........................................................................................ 52 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ........................................................................................ 52
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Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 53 Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ..................................................................................... 54 Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 56 Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the ......... 57 Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment........................................................... 57 Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ..................................................................................... 58 Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 59 Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the............. 60 Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment........................................................... 60 Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ......................................................................................... 62 Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 63 Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 64 Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ..................................................................................... 65 Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 66 Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 67 Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ..................................................................................... 69 Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 70 Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 71
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Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ......................................................................................... 73 Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Excessive Use of Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ......................................................................................... 74 Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 75 Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 76 Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ......................................................................................... 78 Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Excessive Use of Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ......................................................................................... 79 Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE,Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 80 Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 81 Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment ......................................................................................... 83 Individual Claim of Mr. MONTALE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.................................. 84 Individual Claim of Mr. MONTALE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 85 Individual Claim of Mr. DEAN,Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 87 Individual Claim of Mr. DEAN, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..................................................................... 88 Individual Claim of Mr. SALEH,Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures ............................................. 89 STATE LAW CLAIMS ................................................................................................................ 90 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Civil Battery ............................................ 90 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for False Arrest ............................................. 91
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Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ................................................................................................................................................... 93 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Malicious Prosecution ............................. 94 Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Civil Battery.............................................. 95 Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for False Arrest ............................................... 97 Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ................................................................................................................................................... 98 Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Malicious Prosecution .............................. 99 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Civil Battery............................................... 100 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for False Arrest ................................................ 102 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress103 COUNT FORTY-NINE .......................................................................................................... 104 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Malicious Prosecution................................ 104 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Civil Battery........................................... 105 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for False Arrest ............................................. 107 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ................................................................................................................................................. 108 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Malicious Prosecution............................. 109 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Civil Battery ............................................ 110 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for False Arrest.............................................. 111 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Conversion............................................... 113 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ................................................................................................................................................. 113 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Malicious Prosecution ............................. 114 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Civil Battery............................................... 115 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for False Arrest ................................................ 117 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ................................................................................................................................................. 118 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Malicious Prosecution................................ 119 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Civil Battery ................................................ 121
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Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for False Arrest.................................................. 123 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 124 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Malicious Prosecution ................................. 125 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Civil Battery ............................................... 126 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for False Arrest................................................. 127 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress129 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Malicious Prosecution ................................ 130 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for Civil Battery ......................................... 131 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for False Arrest........................................... 132 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ................................................................................................................................................. 134 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Conversion .................................................... 135 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Civil Battery.................................................. 135 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress . 137 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SALEH for Tortious ....................................................... 138 Interference with a Business Relationship .............................................................................. 138
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
Plaintiffs, EARL SAMPSON, TOREE M. DANIELS, BRANDON SPIVEY, ANTHONY LOWERY, FLOYD HALL, JR., ROSS PICART, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, KENNETH CRANE, YVENSONNE MONTALE, OMAR DEAN, and ALI AMIN SALEH, by and through undersigned counsels, sue the above-named Defendants and allege, upon facts, information, and belief, the following:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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1.

This action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 (a)(3) and (4), as this action seeks redress for the violation

of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional and Civil Rights.

2.

Pendent and supplemental jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

for this Court to decide claims that may arise under state law.

3.

Venue is properly brought in the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b) and (c) because it is the district in which all of the events or omissions establishing the

Plaintiffs’ claims occurred.

4.

Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2201 and 2202 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57.

5.

This Court has authority to award costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §

1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 with respect to Plaintiffs’ Constitutional claims.

6.

Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim with the Defendant, City of Miami Gardens,

under the Tort Claims Act of Florida. Over six months have elapsed since filing the Notice of

Claim, which has not been compromised or settled by Defendants. A copy of said Notice is

attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “A”.

PARTIES 7. Plaintiff, EARL SAMPSON (“Mr. SAMPSON”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

8.

Plaintiff, TOREE DANIELS (“Ms. DANIELS”), is a black female who, at all

times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

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9.

Plaintiff, OMAR DEAN (“Mr. DEAN”), is a black male who, at all times material

hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

10. Plaintiff, FLOYD HALL JR. (“Mr. HALL, JR.”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

11. Plaintiff, ROSS PICART (“Mr. PICART”), is a black Hispanic male who, at all

times material hereto, was a resident of Hallandale, Florida, and worked in Miami Gardens,

Florida.

12. Plaintiff, RODERICK SMITH (“Mr. SMITH”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

13. Plaintiff, ANTHONY LOWERY (“Mr. LOWERY”), is a black male who, at all

times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

14. Plaintiff, KENNETH CRANE (“Mr. CRANE”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

15. Plaintiff, BRANDON SPIVEY (“Mr. SPIVEY”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

16. Plaintiff, YVENSONNE MONTALE (“Mr. MONTALE”), is a b lack male who,

at all times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

17. Plaintiff, ALI AMIN SALEH (“Mr. SALEH”), is a Hispanic/Middle Eastern male

who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Pembroke Pines, Florida and owner of the

Quick Stop Convenience Store located at 3185 NW 207th Street, Miami, Florida 33056

(“QUICKSTOP”).

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18. Defendant, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS (“CITY”), is a municipality duly incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The CITY established and maintains the Miami Gardens Police Department (“MGPD”), as a constituent department or agency. The CITY is responsible, through its officers, employees, servants, and agents, for enforcing the regulations of the CITY and for ensuring that its officers, employees, servants, and agents obey the laws of the State of Florida and the United States.
19. Defendant, MAYOR OLIVER G. GILBERT, III (“MAYOR GILBERT”), is or was, at all times material hereto, the current Mayor since 2012 and a final policymaker of the CITY. He is sued in his individual capacity.
20. Defendant, FORMER MAYOR SHIRLEY GIBSON (“FORMER MAYOR GIBSON”), was, at all times material hereto, Mayor of the CITY from 2003 through 2012, and a final policymaker prior to MAYOR GILBERT taking office in 2012. She is sued in her individual capacity.
21. Defendant, CITY MANAGER DR. DANNY O. CREW (“CITY MANAGER CREW”), is or was, at all times material hereto, the City Manager, Chief Administrator, and a final policymaker of the CITY, pursuant to the CITY’S Charter, as to the hiring, promotion, supervision, and removal of all employees of the MGPD, and as to the implementation of all CITY laws. He is sued in his individual capacity.
22. Defendant, CHIEF MATTHEW BOYD (Badge No. 100-001) (“CHIEF BOYD”), was, at all times material hereto, the Chief of Police and a final policymaker for the CITY with supervisory authority over all officers and operations of MGPD, including responsibility for training, recruiting, and managing all MGPD officers. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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23. Defendant, DEPUTY CHIEF PAUL MILLER (Badge No. 100-004) (“DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER”), was, at all times material hereto, the Deputy Chief of Police. DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER directly oversees the day-to-day operations of MGPD’s three divisions and serves as acting chief during the absence of CHIEF BOYD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
24. Defendant, MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN (Badge No. 100-014) (“MAJOR CHAPMAN”), was, at all times material hereto, Major of Criminal Investigations and part of MGPD command staff. He is sued in his individual capacity.
25. Defendant, CHERRI NETTLES (Badge No. 100-175) (“NETTLES”) was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
26. Defendant, SERGEANT TIMOTHY ADAMS (Badge No. 100-049) (“ADAMS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
27. Defendant, CARLOS AUSTIN (Badge No. 100-296) (“AUSTIN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
28. Defendant, SERGEANT, WILLIAM BAMFORD (Badge No. 100-035) (“BAMFORD”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
29. Defendant, TERRANCE BARMORE (Badge No. 100-196) (“BARMORE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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30. Defendant, ALEX BARNEY (Badge No. 100-307) (“BARNEY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
31. Defendant, ALVIN BERNARD (Badge No. 100-327) (“BERNARD”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
32. Defendant, JESSIE BROWN (Badge No. 100-274) (“BROWN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
33. Defendant, DELROY BURGESS (Badge No. 100-155) (“BURGESS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
34. Defendant, EDWARD CASTELLI (Badge No. 100-325) (“CASTELLI”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. H e is sued in his individual capacity.
35. Defendant, RANDY CARPENTER (Badge No. 100-151) (“CARPENTER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
36. Defendant, RYAN CLIFTON (Badge No. 100-276) (“CLIFTON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
37. Defendant, CARLTON COLEMAN (Badge No. 100-142) (“COLEMAN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
38. Defendant, SERGEANT TOM DAMIANI (Badge No. 100-046) (“DAMIANI”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a sergeant and/or an officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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39. Defendant, SERGEANT WILLIAM DUNASKE (Badge No. 100-311) (“SERGEANT DUNASKE”), was, at all times material hereto, a sergeant and/or an officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
40. Defendant, PETER EHRLICH (Badge No. 100-278) (“EHRLICH”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
41. Defendant, JEFFREY ENGERS (Badge No. 100-181) (“ENGERS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
42. Defendant, SHAWN EUBANKS (Badge No. 100-247) (“EUBANKS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
43. Defendant, RAUL FERNANDEZ (Badge No. 100-224) (“FERNANDEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
44. Defendant, ERIK GLEASON (Badge No. 100-221) (“GLEASON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
45. Defendant, ANDREW GREGOIRE (Badge No. 100-331) (“GREGOIRE”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
46. Defendant, BRIAN GREGORY (Badge No. 100-326) (“GREGORY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
47. Defendant, JAMES HARRIS (Badge No. 100-132) (“HARRIS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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48. Defendant, SERGEANT, DIANA HEDRICK (Badge No. 100-295) (“HEDRICK”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
49. Defendant, SERGEANT JEFFREY HOHENDORF (Badge No. 100-203) (“HOHENDORF”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a S ergeant and/or a p olice officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
50. Defendant, ANITA HOPSON (Badge No. 100-249) (“HOPSON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
51. Defendant, MICHAEL HORN (Badge No. 100-242) (“HORN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
52. Defendant, SERGEANT BUDDY HUNHOLZ (Badge No. 100-027) (“SERGEANT HUNHOLZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a S ergeant and/or police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
53. MIGUEL IRIZARRY (Badge No. 100-161) (“IRIZARRY”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
54. Defendant, WANDA JACKSON (Badge No. 100-133) (“JACKSON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
55. Defendant, NICOLAS JACOBS (Badge No. 100-229) (“JACOBS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
56. Defendant, RICHARD JESSUP (Badge No. 100-134) (“JESSUP”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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57. Defendant, SHIRLEY JONES-GRAY (Badge No. 100-280) (“JONES-GRAY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
58. Defendant, NELLY JOSEPH (Badge No. 100-335) (“JOSEPH”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
59. Defendant, ALEX JUDON (Badge No. 100-253) (“JUDON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
60. Defendant, SERGEANT, HEATHER KIDDER (Badge No. 100-261) (“KIDDER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in his individual capacity.
61. Defendant, SERGEANT STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY (Badge No. 100-043) (“SERGEANT KOLACKOVSKY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a S ergeant with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
62. Defendant, DEVIN LUCIUS (Badge No. 100-329) (“LUCIUS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
63. Defendant, MICHAEL MALONE (Badge No. 100-136) (“MALONE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
64. Defendant, CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ (Badge No. 100-267 (“MARTINEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
65. Defendant, SHONADEE MCNEIL (Badge No. 100-165) (“MCNEIL”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
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66. Defendant, JASON MOORE (Badge No. 100-244) (“MOORE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
67. Defendant, ALEXANDER MORTON (Badge No. 100-286) (“MORTON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
68. Defendant, SERGEANT JOSEPH NARGISO (Badge No. 100-141) (“SERGEANT NARGISO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
69. Defendant, SERGEANT WIREN NORRIS (Badge No. 100-245) (“NORRIS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
70. Defendant, BARBARA PALMER (Badge No. 100-140) (“PALMER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
71. Defendant, HENRY PAYOUTE (Badge No. 100-330) (“PAYOUTE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
72. Defendant, ONASSIS PERDOMO (Badge No. 100-153) (“PERDOMO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a p olice officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
73. Defendant, SAUL PEREZ (Badge No. 100-237) (“PEREZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
74. Defendant, HUBERT PIERRE (Badge No. 100-207) (“PIERRE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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75. Defendant, SERGEANT, JEREMY PILONE (Badge No. 100-168) (“PILONE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
76. Defendant, KEVIN PINKNEY (Badge No. 100-254) (“PINKNEY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
77. Defendant, ARTHUR PRINCE (Badge No. 100-190) (“PRINCE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
78. Defendant, LAWRENCE RICHARDSON (Badge No. 100-169) (“RICHARDSON”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
79. Defendant, JAVIER ROMAGUERA (Badge No. 100-216) (“ROMAGUERA”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
80. Defendant, EDWIN ROSADO (Badge No. 100-172) (“E. ROSADO” or “ROSADO, E.”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
81. Defendant, JOSE ROSADO (Badge No. 100-171) (“J. ROSADO” or ROSADO, J.”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
82. Defendant, SERGEANT STACEY ROVINELLI (Badge No. 100-192) (“ROVINELLI”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a sergeant with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
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83. Defendant, MICHAEL RUIZ (Badge No. 100-321) (“RUIZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
84. Defendant, JEAN SAINT-LOUIS (Badge No. 100-131) (“SAINT-LOUIS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
85. Defendant, JIMY SANCHEZ (Badge No. 100-289) (“SANCHEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
86. Defendant, SERGEANT MARTIN SANTIAGO (Badge No. 100-174) (“SANTIAGO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
87. Defendant, JOSEPH SCHAEFER (Badge No. 100-298) (“SCHAEFER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
88. Defendant, ANGEL SEARY (Badge No. 100-246) (“SEARY”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
89. Defendant, ALBERTO SEDA (Badge No. 100-314) (“SEDA”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
90. Defendant CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN (Badge No. 100-255) (“SHUMAN”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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91. Defendant, TALIBAH SIMMONS (Badge No. 100-194) (“SIMMONS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
92. Defendant, JONATHAN STARK (Badge No. 100-144) (“STARK”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
93. Defendant, KEVIN TAMAYO (Badge No. 100-332) (“TAMAYO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
94. Defendant, EDDO TRIMINO (Badge No. 100-291) (“TRIMINO”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
95. Defendant, JAINA UCANAN (Badge No. 100-272) (“UCANAN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. She is sued in her individual capacity.
96. Defendant, CARLOS VELEZ (Badge No. 100-178) (“C. VELEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
97. Defendant, VICTOR VELEZ (Badge No. 100-324) (“V. VELEZ”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
98. Defendant, SERGEANT SCOTT WHITE (Badge No. 100-045) (“WHITE”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a sergeant and/or an officer with MGPD. H e is sued in his individual capacity.
99. Defendant, WILLIAM WAGENMANN (Badge No. 100-139) (“WAGENMANN”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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100. Defendant, SERGEANT, EDWARD WAGNER (Badge No. 100-034 (“WAGNER”) is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
101. Defendant, MICHAEL WAGONER (Badge No. 100-213) (“WAGONER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
102. Defendant, EUGENE WILLIAMS (Badge No. 100-293) (“WILLIAMS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
103. Defendant, SERGEANT RUFUS WILLIAMS (Badge No. 100-029) (“R. WILLIAMS”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a Sergeant and/or a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
104. Defendant, MICHAEL WRIGHT (Badge No. 100-219) (“WRIGHT”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
105. Defendant, JOSEPH ZELLNER (Badge No. 100-222) (“ZELLNER”), is or was, at all times material hereto, a police officer with MGPD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
106. Defendants, Unidentified JOHN DOE OFFICERS (“JOHN DOES”), who are or were, at all times material hereto, police officers or supervisors with MGPD. They are sued in their individual capacities.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 107. This is a civil rights action in which named Plaintiffs seek relief for Defendants’ violations of their rights, privileges, and immunities as guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of
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1871, 42 U .S.C § 1983; the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the laws of the State of Florida.
108. Defendants have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage and, sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, arrests and prosecutions of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment.
109. In addition, this pattern and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting said actions, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims of this racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males.
110. MGPD’s widespread constitutional abuses are a result of, and are directly and proximately caused by, policies, practices, and/or customs devised, implemented, and enforced by the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD.
111. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD have acted, and continue to act, with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those who come into contact with MGPD officers by: (a) failing to properly screen, train, and supervise MGPD officers; (b) inadequately monitoring MGPD officers during and after stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; (c) failing to
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sufficiently discipline MGPD officers who engaged in constitutional abuses, and (d)

encouraging, sanctioning, and failing to rectify MGPD’s unconstitutional practices.

112. The constitutional abuses are a result of either unconstitutional policies, or

policies that, while constitutional on their face, are implemented in such a way that violate

constitutionally protected rights. Additionally, all constitutional abuses have occurred under the

color of authority by MGPD officers.

(a) Quotas Policy

The Policies

113. MGPD final policymakers have created, implemented, and are continuing to

enforce an illegal system of quotas (“Quota Policy”) requiring officers to issue a specific

amount of citations, field contact reports, and arrests per month. The CITY is aware of and has

tacitly approved the Quota Policy.

114. The Quota Policy evaluates officers’ productivity exclusively on t he quantity of

arrests, citations, and field contact reports submitted, instead of officers’ adherence to

constitutional practices, involvement in the community, etc. Officers are rewarded with

incentives, benefits, raises, and/or promotions if these arbitrary quotas are met or exceeded.

Contrastingly, officers who do not meet the monthly quotas are not only reprimanded but are

routinely disciplined and demoted.

115. From 2008 through 2013, the unconstitutional Quota Policy became CITY policy,

practice, and/or custom. The Quota Policy was enacted by CHIEF BOYD who is a CITY final

policymaker for law enforcement purposes. Further, the CITY was put on notice of the Quota

Policy by concerned officers, and failed to rectify the issue.

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116. The Quota Policy has directly and proximately led MGPD officers to engage in a pattern and practice of police misconduct resulting in countless race-based and/or national origin-based stops. During the course of these stops, MGPD officers have committed thousands of unconstitutional searches, seizures, and false arrests, causing Plaintiffs to suffer continuous injuries.
117. The pressure to perform under the Quota Policy is so pervasive, that many times MGPD officers fabricate field contact reports with CITY residents who were actually incarcerated or at another location being stopped by other officers at the time the officers allegedly made contact.
(b) Zero Tolerance Zone Policy 118. In addition to the Quota Policy, MGPD has enacted a “ Zero Tolerance Zone” Policy which, although constitutional on its face, has been, and continues to be, applied in such a way that violates the constitutional rights of CITY residents, including named Plaintiffs. 119. The alleged purpose of the policy is to reduce the number of individuals who are seen trespassing and loitering on private property without legitimate business. The policy asks local businesses to complete an affidavit and post a sign on their properties which states that the business owner allows MGPD officers to act on their behalf in their absence. The Zero Tolerance Zone Policy was enacted by the City Council on O ctober 24, 2007, a s part of Ordinance No. 2007-22-128, currently codified at Section 14-59 of the CITY’S Code of Ordinances. M oreover, the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy was thereafter disseminated to the public at large through the MGPD website, at the following URL: http://miamigardenspolice.org/volunteer.htm .
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120. MGPD officers have used the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, enacted by the CITY and its final policymakers, to illegally stop-and-frisk, search, seize, and arrest named Plaintiffs while visiting local businesses. This includes businesses which have not enrolled, or previously enrolled but have withdrawn enrollment, in the Zero Tolerance Zone program.
121. In many instances, MGPD officers have illegally stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested named Plaintiffs, and other CITY residents, while the business owner was present and affirmatively requesting the officers not take any action.
122. The CITY and its final policymakers were on notice that MGPD officers were, and are, using the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy to conduct unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests and have failed to rectify the issue. MAYOR GILBERT has reaffirmed the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy in public statements in November 2013.
(c) Racial Targeting Policy 123. Lastly, MGPD officers have used, and continue to use, race and/or national origin for the purpose of stopping, frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting principally black males. Specifically, through information and belief, MGPD has directly ordered its officers to stopand-frisk black males, ages fifteen through thirty, without reasonable articulable suspicion of criminality (“Racial Targeting Policy”). This directive was issued at roll call by MAJOR CHAPMAN, and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER knew of this directive and did not countermand it. 124. The Racial Targeting Policy was implemented and ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker, and was tacitly approved by the CITY. The policy, which is unconstitutional on its face, impermissibly uses race and/or national origin and age, not reasonable articulable suspicion, as the determinative factor in initiating police interaction.
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125. From 2008 through 2013, this policy has resulted in countless field contact reports of investigatory stops which were conducted pursuant to this policy, without any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminality.
126. All of the foregoing unconstitutional and illegal violations were conducted by MGPD police officers under the color of law.
127. Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that the policies, practices, and/or customs described herein violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing such polices, practices, and/or customs. In addition, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for violations of their constitutionally protected rights. Plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Earl Sampson
128. Mr. SAMPSON is a twenty-eight year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for approximately thirteen years. Mr. SAMPSON has been an employee of the QUICKSTOP since October 2011.
129. Over the course of four years, spanning from 2008 to 2012, Mr. SAMPSON was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested 288 times within the CITY and by MGPD officers —the equivalent of roughly once every week for four years. In all 288 instances, an investigatory stop was performed by MGPD officers who checked Mr. SAMPSON for outstanding warrants. A chart showing a l arge sampling of these incidents (with dates, times, descriptions, and names of involved officers) is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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130. Well over 200 of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests occurred without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required by law.
131. Out of the 288 times Mr. SAMPSON was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested only sixty-three times. Out of the sixty-three arrests, thirty arrests resulted in no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or the Court dismissing the case for lack of probable cause at bonds. And of the remaining twenty-seven convictions, they are currently subject of a pending motion to vacate all the convictions on the basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence of actual innocence.
132. The twenty-seven convictions were all based on charges for trespassing at the QUICKSTOP. During the course of all twenty-seven arrests, Mr. SAMPSON was either at the QUICKSTOP with full permission from the owner, Mr. SALEH, or was working at the QUICKSTOP. On several occasions Mr. SAMPSON was arrested for trespassing while working stocking the shelves or taking out the garbage at the QUICKSTOP.
133. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of law, were involved in at least one of the more than 2 88 stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: ADAMS, BAMFORD, BARMORE, BARNEY, BERNARD, BROWN, BURGESS, CARPENTER, CASTELLI, CLIFTON, DAMIANI, DUNASKE, EHRLICH, ENGERS, GLEASON, GREGOIRE, HEDRICK, HOHENDORF, HOPSON, HORNE, HUNHOLZ, JACKSON, JACOBS, JESSUP, JONESGRAY, KIDDER, KOLACKOVSKY, LUCIUS, MALONE, MARTINEZ, MCNEIL, MORTON, NARGISO, NORRIS, PAYOUTE, PERDOMO, PEREZ, M., PEREZ, S., PILONE, PINKNEY, ROBINSON, ROMAGUERA, ROSADO, E., ROSADO, J., ROVINELLI, RUIZ,
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SAINT-LOUIS, SANCHEZ, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEARY, SEDA, SHUMAN, STARK, TRIMINO, UCANAN, VELEZ, C., VELEZ, V., WAGENMANN, WAGNER, E., WAGONER, WHITE, WILLIAMS, E., WILLIAMS, R., and Unidentified JOHN DOE OFFICERS . For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SAMPSON OFFICERS.”
134. The following named Defendants, all of who were acting under the color of law, were involved in at least one of the sixty-three arrests: BARNEY, CARPENTER, DUNASKE, FERNANDEZ, GLEASON, HARRIS, HORN, HUNHOLZ, JUDON, MALONE, MARTINEZ, MORTON, NARGISO, NETTLES, PALMER, PERDOMO, PINKNEY, PRINCE, ROSADO, J., SAINT-LOUIS, SANCHEZ, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEARY, SHUMAN, STARK, TRIMINO, UCANAN, VELEZ, C., WAGONER, WILLIAMS, E., and Unidentified JOHN DOE OFFICERS . For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS.”
135. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the SAMPSON OFFICERS and SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS.
136. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the SAMPSON OFFICERS, and the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS constitute a continuing violation of Mr. SAMPSON’s constitutional rights.
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Toree Daniels
137. Ms. DANIELS is a thirty-five year old black female who has been a r esident of the CITY for her entire life.
138. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from February 2008 to January 2013, Ms. DANIELS was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested at least 200 times within the CITY and by MGPD officers — equivalent to roughly once every 9 days for nearly five years. In all instances, an investigatory stop was performed by MGPD officers who checked Ms. DANIELS for outstanding warrants. A chart showing a large sampling of these incidents (with dates, times, descriptions, and names of involved officers) is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
139. Well over 200 of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests occurred without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required by law.
140. Out of the 200 times Ms. DANIELS was stopped by MGPD officers, she was arrested only fifty-five times. Out of the fifty-five arrests, twenty-three resulted in no a ction being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or the charges were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
141. Similar to Mr. SAMPSON, many of Ms. DANIELS’ contacts with MGPD officers took place while at the QUICKSTOP where, again, the owner, Mr. SALEH, had given her full permission to be on the premises.
142. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the 200 stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and
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arrests: ADAMS, BAMFORD, BARNEY, CARPENTER, CLIFTON, DAMIANI, DUNASKE, EUBANKS, GREGOIRE, HARRIS, J., HEDRICK, HOHENDORF, HORN, HUNHOLZ, IRIZARRY, JACKSON, JUDON, KIDDER, KOLACKOVSKY, MALONE, MARTINEZ, MOORE, NARGISO, NORRIS, PALMER, PAYOUTE, PERDOMO, PEREZ, S., PILONE, PINKNEY, ROMAGUERA, ROVINELLI, RUIZ, SAINT-LOUIS, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEDA, SHUMAN, SIMMONS, STARK, UCANAN, VELEZ, V., WAGENMANN, WAGNER, WAGONER, WILLIAMS, R., and JOHN DOE OFFICERS 1-187. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be referred to as “DANIELS OFFICERS”.
143. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under the color of law, were involved in at least one of the fifty-five arrests: BARNEY, CARPENTER, HARRIS, J., MALONE, MOORE, NETTLES, PALMER, RUIZ, SEDA, SIMMONS, STARK, UCANAN, VELEZ, V., WAGENMANN, and Unidentified JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be referred to as “DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS”.
144. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the DANIELS OFFICERS and DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS.
145. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the DANIELS OFFICERS, and the
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DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS constitute a continuing violation of Ms. DANIEL’s constitutional rights.
Brandon Spivey
146. Mr. Spivey is a t wenty-four year old black male who has been a r esident of the CITY for his entire life.
147. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from February 2008 to January 2013, Mr. SPIVEY was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, at least fifty times within the CITY and by MGPD officers. A chart showing a large sampling of these incidents (with dates, times, descriptions, and names of involved officers) is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
148. Out of the fifty times Mr. SPIVEY was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested only fourteen times. Out of the fourteen arrests, six arrests resulted in no action by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
149. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the fifty stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, or arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: DUNASKE, ENGERS, HARRIS, HOHENDORF, HUNHOLZ, JESSUP, JUDON, KOLACKOVSKY, NARGISO, PERDOMO, PEREZ, M. PILONE, ROVINELLI, SANTIAGO, SEDA, TRIMINO, UCANAN, VELEZ, V., WAGENMANN, WAGONER, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES. For consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SPIVEY OFFICERS."
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150. The following named Defendants, all of who were acting under the color of law, were involved in at least one of the six arrests: TRIMINO, UCANAN, WRIGHT, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS."
151. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the SPIVEY OFFICERS, and the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. SPIVEY’s constitutional rights.
Anthony Lowery
152. Mr. LOWERY is a forty-nine year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for forty-two years.
153. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from 2008 to 2013, Mr. LOWERY was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, at least nine times within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
154. Out of the nine times Mr. LOWERY was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested five times. Out of the five arrests, all arrests resulted in no action being taken b y the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
155. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the seven stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: the DUNASKE, JACOBS, KOLACKOVSKY,
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PALMER, PERDOMO, SAINT-LOUIS, WAGONER, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “LOWERY OFFICERS".
156. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of law, were involved in at least one of the five arrests: DUNASKE, JACOBS, PERDOMO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the abovereferenced officer will be collectively referred to as the “LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS".
157. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the LOWERY OFFICERS and the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS constitute a continuing violation of Mr. LOWERY’s constitutional rights.
Floyd Hall, Jr.
158. Mr. HALL, JR. is a fifty-three year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for forty-nine years.
159. From 2008 to 2013, Mr. HALL, JR. was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, approximately forty-six times within the CITY and by MGPD officers. A chart showing a large sampling of these incidents (with dates, times, descriptions, and names of involved officers) is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
160. Out of the approximately forty-six times Mr. HALL, JR was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested fourteen times. Out of the fourteen arrests, all resulted in either no
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action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
161. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the forty-six stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: CARPENTER, DUNASKE, HARRIS, PALMER, PERDOMO, PINKNEY, KOLACKOVSKY, JACKSON, EHRLICH, ROSADO, NARGISO, NORRIS, BAMFORD, ROVINELLI, SAINT-LOUIS, SANTIAGO, SHUMAN, TRIMINO, VELEZ, C., VELEZ, V. VELEZ, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of clarity and consistency, the above-reference officers will be collectively referred to as the “HALL, JR. OFFICERS".
162. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under the color of law, were involved in the at least one of the twelve arrests: COLEMAN, HARRIS, JUDON, PALMER, PERDOMO, PINKNEY, KOLACKOVSKY, JACKSON, EHRLICH, ROSADO, NARGISO, NORRIS, BAMFORD, ROVINELLI, SAINT-LOUIS, SHUMAN, VELEZ, C., VELEZ, V., and unidentified JOHN DOE OFFICERS. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS".
163. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS and the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. HALL, JR.’s constitutional rights.
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Ross Picart
164. Mr. PICART is a thirty-four year old black male. M r. PICART has been an employee of the QUICKSTOP since 2005.
165. On December 21, 2012, M r. PICART was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES. The incident resulted in excessive use of force by MGPD officers.
166. On December 21, 2012, Mr. PICART was working at the QUICKSTOP during his normal shift. Prior to closing the QUICKSTOP, Mr. PICART was approached by MGPD officers and asked to produce identification. Mr. PICART advised MGPD officers that he did not have identification but that he was an employee of the QUICKSTOP and could call the owner, SALEH, to verify his employment.
167. Mr. PICART entered the QUICKSTOP and used his cellular phone to call the owner, Mr. SALEH. At that point, MGPD officers followed him behind the store counter, forcefully grabbed him by the arm, and escorted him outside of the premises.
168. While outside the premises, Mr. PICART was unlawfully searched, without consent or probable cause, thrown to the ground, and placed under arrest.
169. MGPD officers proceeded to unlawfully search the QUICKSTOP and found a firearm - owned by and registered to Mr. SALEH — under the counter and concealed from plain view. M r. PICART was subsequently charged with possession of a concealed firearm
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although MGPD officers knew it did not belong to him and had no b asis to believe that Mr. PICART was even aware the firearm was there.
170. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the December 21, 2 012 incident, either directly or through tacit approval: DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
171. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. PICART’s constitutional rights.
Roderick DeWayne Smith
172. Mr. SMITH is a twenty-six old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for his entire life.
173. On February 7, 2013, M r. SMITH was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by MGPD officers at least seven times with one incident resulting in an excessive use of force at the hands of MGPD officers. The incidents occurred between January
174. Mr. SMITH was on t he QUICKSTOP property drinking an alcoholic beverage. He was approached by MGPD officers who asked for his identification and poured out the contents of the beverage. Simultaneously, MGPD officers performed a full search of Mr.
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SMITH’S person without consent and without reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.
175. After the unlawful search, Mr. SMITH was released, at which time he attempted to walk into the QUICKSTOP to purchase water. M GPD officers instructed him not to enter the QUICKSTOP – which was open to the public at the time. MGPD officers again requested Mr. SMITH’s identification and when he asked “why?” he was thrown, head-first, into a steel door, handcuffed, picked up, and thrown against the police car.
176. After several minutes of physical detainment, he was released and issued a Promise to Appear for possession of an open container. S ubsequent to the arrest, MGPD officers failed to complete a Use of Force Report as required by MGPD policy and Florida law.
177. The Court subsequently dismissed the open container charge. 178. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved at least one of the seven stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests, either directly or through tacit approval: RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. 179. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of MR. SMITH’s constitutional rights.
Kenneth Crane
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180. Mr. CRANE is a forty six year old black male who has resided in the CITY for his entire life.
181. Mr. CRANE was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY by MGPD officers.
182. On November 23, 2012, Mr. CRANE was riding his bicycle to the QUICKSTOP when he was stopped without reasonable suspicion, and subsequently searched and arrested without arguable probable cause by MGPD officers.
183. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the November 23, 2012 search, seizure, and arrest, either directly or through tacit approval: the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DUNASKE, TRIMINO, SANTIAGO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. CRANE’s constitutional rights.
Yvensonne Montale
184. Mr. MONTALE is an eighteen year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for two years.
185. Mr. MONTALE was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, without reasonable suspicion within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
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186. On August 13, 2012, Mr. MONTALE was riding his bicycle to the QUICKSTOP where he was stopped without reasonable suspicion and subsequently searched without probable cause.
187. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the August 13, 2012, search, and seizures, either directly or through tacit approval: the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
188. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. MONTALE’s constitutional rights.
Omar Dean
189. Mr. DEAN is 39 year old black male who resided in the CITY for over 10 years of his life.
190. On July 13, 2012, M r. DEAN was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, without reasonable suspicion within the CITY by MGPD Officer MALONE.
191. Mr. DEAN was walking in front of the QUICKSTOP with a plastic bag of Red Bull cans. Without reasonable suspicion or warning, MALONE approached Mr. DEAN and performed a complete search of his person and possessions.
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192. During the unlawful search, MALONE confiscated the bag containing Red Bull cans, threw the contents on the pavement, and then proceeded to hand out Mr. DEAN’s property to pedestrians.
193. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the July 13, 2012, stop-and-frisk, search, and seizure, either directly or through tacit approval: the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
194. The acts and omissions of the CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constitute a continuing violation of Mr. DEAN’s constitutional rights.
Ali Amin Saleh
195. Mr. SALEH has been the owner of the QUICKSTOP located in the CITY since 1999.
196. Over the course of four years, spanning from 2008 t o 2012, Mr. SALEH’s QUICKSTOP was unlawfully searched without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, numerous times by MGPD officers.
197. In addition, MGPD officers have engaged in a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting patrons of his QUICKSTOP while they are on t he premises for loitering or trespassing. Mr. SALEH has repeatedly informed MGPD
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officers that QUICKSTOP patrons are on the premise with his full permission and authority — information which MGPD officers routinely disregard.
198. The actions taken by MGPD officers are interfering with Mr. SALEH’s relationship with his customers, and have severely curtailed sales at the QUICKSTOP.
199. Mr. SALEH has filed several complaints with MGPD regarding the conduct of its officers; however, no action has been taken to rectify the issue.
200. The following named Defendants, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in at least one of the above-referenced unconstitutional and illegal conduct: ADAMS, BAMFORD, BARMORE, BARNEY, BERNARD, BROWN, BURGESS, CARPENTER, CASTELLI, CLIFTON, DAMIANI, DUNASKE, EHRLICH, ENGERS, EUBANKS, GLEASON, GREGOIRE, GREGORY, HARRIS, HEDRICK, HOHENDORF, HOPSON, HORN, HUNHOLZ, IRIZARRY, JACKSON, JACOBS, JESSUP, JONES-GRAY, JUDON, KIDDER, KOLACKOVSKY, LUCIUS, MALONE, MARTINEZ, C., MCNEIL, MOORE, MORTON, NARGISO, NORRIS, PALMER, PAYOUTE, PAYOUTE, PERDOMO, PEREZ, M., PEREZ, S., PILONE, PINKNEY, ROBINSON, ROMAGUERA, ROSADO, E., ROSADO, J., ROVINELLI, RUIZ, SAINT-LOUIS, SANCHEZ, SANTIAGO, SCHAEFER, SEARY, SEDA, SHUMAN, SIMMONS, STARK, TAMAYO, UCANAN, VELEZ, C., VELEZ, V., WAGENMANN, WAGNER, WAGONER, WHITE, WILLIAMS, E., WILLIAMS, R. and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES. For purposes of consistency and clarity, the above-referenced officers will be collectively referred to as the “SALEH OFFICERS.”
201. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD, either encouraged, authorized, tacitly approved or
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were deliberate indifferent to the unconstitutional misconduct engaged in by the SALEH OFFICERS.
FEDERAL MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIMS
COUNT ONE All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourth Amendment 202. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 201 as if fully set forth herein. 203. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage, and sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment. 204. In addition, this pattern and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting a stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The victims of such racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males, members of a protected class. 205. The policies, fully described in the General Allegations of this Complaint, supra ¶¶ 107— 127, include the Quotas Policy, Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy all of which are ether unconstitutional on their face or are enforced in such a way which violates the constitutional rights of CITY residents, including named Plaintiffs.
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206. The Quotas Policy and Racial Targeting Policy are unwritten policies that they have become the moving force behind the deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. These informal policies were enacted and/or ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
207. The Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, a written policy, was jointly enacted by the CITY and MGPD. As previously stated, although the policy is not unconstitutional on its face, MGPD officers are abusing the policy and using it a s a vehicle to illegally stop, search, and arrest CITY residents without reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause.
208. The adoption and implementation of the Quotas Policy, the Racial Targeting Policy, and the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy was the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, and the proximate cause of the violation of those rights.
209. These informal policies were enacted and sanctioned by CHIEF BOYD, a f inal policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
210. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced policies, all Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendant, the CITY, and request that the Court finds and awards as follows:
1) That the Miami Gardens policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 42
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2) That injunctive relief be issued enjoining the MGPD from continuing its policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, and in particular serving to: a. Further enjoin the MGPD from continuing the use of quotas for arrests (Quotas Policy); b. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of a Zero Tolerance Zone Policy to conduct unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; and c. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of the Racial Targeting Policy to use racial and/or national origin profiling to make unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests.
3) That the City, Mayor, City Manager, and Police Department shall institute and implement improved policies and programs with respect to training, discipline and promotion designed to eliminate the MGPD’s policies of unconstitutional stops-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests.
4) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable to be determined at trial;
5) Award all Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1988; and
6) Award and such other relief as this Court deems just, proper, and equitable, including further injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the interests of justice. 43
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COUNT TWO All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment 211. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 201 as if fully set forth herein. 212. The CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, and CHIEF BOYD have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage, and sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment. 213. In addition, this pattern and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting a stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims of such racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males, members of a protected class. 214. The Racial Targeting Policy described in the General Allegations is unconstitutional on its face, violating the rights of CITY residents, including the named Plaintiffs, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 215. The Quotas Policy and Racial Targeting Policy are unwritten policies enacted and/or ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
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216. The Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, a written policy, was jointly enacted by the CITY and MGPD. As previously stated, although the policy is not unconstitutional on its face, MGPD officers are abusing the policy and using it as a vehicle to illegally stop, search, and arrest CITY residents without reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause.
217. The adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy, in conjunction with the Quotas Policy and the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, was the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the proximate cause of the violation of those rights.
218. The Racial Targeting Policy was enacted and/or ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
219. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced policies, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendant, the CITY, and request that the Court finds and awards as follows:
1) That the Miami Gardens policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
2) That injunctive relief be issued enjoining the MGPD from continuing its policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, without
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reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, and in particular serving to:
a. Further enjoin the MGPD from continuing the use of quotas for arrests (Quotas Policy);
b. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of a Zero Tolerance Zone Policy to conduct unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; and
c. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of the Racial Targeting Policy to use racial and/or national origin profiling to make unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests.
3) That the City, Mayor, City Manager, and Police Department shall institute and implement improved policies and programs with respect to training, discipline and promotion designed to eliminate the MGPD’s policies of unconstitutional stops-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests.
4) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable to be determined at trial;
5) Award all Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1988; and
6) Award and such other relief as this Court deems just, proper, and equitable, including further injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the interests of justice.
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FEDERAL SUPERVISORY LIABILITY CLAIMS
COUNT THREE All Named Plaintiffs Against MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON,
and CITY MANAGER CREW Supervisory Liability
42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourth Amendment 220. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 201 as if fully set forth herein. 221. MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, and CITY MANAGER CREW, at all times material hereto, are official decision-makers with respect to the drafting and adoption of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy. 222. MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, and CITY MANAGER CREW were placed on notice that the adoption and implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy resulted in widespread abuse of the Fourth Amendment rights of CITY residents, including all named Plaintiffs, in that innumerable persons were stop-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion. Nonetheless, these supervisors failed to take any corrective action to remedy these abuses, such as supervision, monitoring, and disciplinary measures to prevent unconstitutional implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy. 223. These supervisors’ adoption of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, coupled with their failure to take corrective action, proximately caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. 224. As a direct and proximate result of these supervisors’ failure to take corrective action, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will
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continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendants, MAYOR GILBERT, FORMER MAYOR GIBSON, and CITY MANAGER CREW, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT FOUR All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD
Supervisory Liability 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourth Amendment 225. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 201 as if fully set forth herein. 226. CHIEF BOYD, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy. 227. CHIEF BOYD, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Quotas Policy. 228. CHIEF BOYD, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy. 229. CHIEF BOYD was placed on notice that the adoption and implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, the Quotas Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy resulted in widespread abuse of the Fourth Amendment rights of CITY residents, including all named Plaintiffs, in that innumerable persons were stop-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion. Nonetheless, CHIEF BOYD failed to take any corrective action to remedy these abuses, such as supervision, monitoring, and disciplinary
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measures to prevent unconstitutional implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, the Quotas Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy.
230. CHIEF BOYD’S adoption and/or implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, the Quotas Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy, and his failure to take corrective action when placed on notice of widespread abuses, were the proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
231. As a direct and proximate result of CHIEF BOYD’S adoption and/or implementation of these policies and failure to take corrective action, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendant, CHIEF BOYD, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT FIVE All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER
Supervisory Liability 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment 232. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 201 as if fully set forth herein. 233. CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, at all times material hereto, were official decision-makers with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy. 234. CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER knew or should have known that the Racial Targeting Policy is unconstitutional on its face under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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235. Furthermore, CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER were placed on notice that the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy resulted in widespread abuse of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of CITY residents, including all named Plaintiffs, in that innumerable persons were stop-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested based on race and/or national origin without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion. Nonetheless, CHIEF BOYD failed to take any corrective action to remedy these abuses, such as supervision, monitoring, and disciplinary measures to prevent unconstitutional implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy.
236. CHIEF BOYD’S and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER’S adoption and/or implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy, and their failure to take corrective action when placed on notice of widespread abuses, were the proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.
237. As a direct and proximate result of CHIEF BOYD’S and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER’S adoption and/or implementation of these policies and failure to take corrective action, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendants, CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT SIX 50
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All Named Plaintiffs Against MAJOR CHAPMAN Supervisory Liability
42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment 238. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 201 as if fully set forth herein. 239. MAJOR CHAPMAN, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy. 240. MAJOR CHAPMAN knew or should have known that the Racial Targeting Policy is unconstitutional on its face under the Fourteenth Amendment. 241. MAJOR CHAPMAN directed unlawful acts by subordinate police officers by instructing them during roll call to stop all black males between the ages of 15 and 30. 242. MAJOR CHAPMAN’S direction of unlawful acts by subordinate police officers was the proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. 243. As a direct and proximate result of MAJOR CHAPMAN’S direction of unlawful acts, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendant, MAJOR CHAPMAN, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS
COUNT SEVEN
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Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
244. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges paragraphs 1 through 136 as if fully set forth herein.
245. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SAMPSON was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, each of these stopand-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
246. A reasonable police officer would not have believed there existed reasonable articulable suspicion to stop-and-frisk, and/or probable cause to search and arrest Mr. SAMPSON in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the SAMPSON OFFICERS at the time of the incidents.
247. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the SAMPSON OFFICERS deprived Mr. SAMPSON of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth Amendment.
248. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SAMPSON has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
249. The acts of the SAMPSON OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SAMPSON to an award of punitive damages.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, the SAMPSON OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT EIGHT Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 250. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 136 as if fully set forth herein. 251. The SAMPSON OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SAMPSON without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 252. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. SAMPSON was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the SAMPSON OFFICERS in this action. 253. As a r esult of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. SAMPSON without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause the SAMPSON OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 254. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the SAMPSON OFFICERS deprived Mr. SAMPSON of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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255. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SAMPSON has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
256. The acts of the SAMPSON OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SAMPSON to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, the SAMPSON OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT NINE Individual Claim of Mr. SAMPSON, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 257. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges paragraphs 1 through 136, as if fully set forth herein. 258. Mr. SAMPSON was arrested a t otal of sixty-three times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SAMPSON was commenced. 259. The SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON in at least one of the sixty-three arrests. 260. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SAMPSON in thirty of those arrests. Specifically, in thirty of the instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action”
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against Mr. SAMPSON or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
261. And of the remaining twenty-seven convictions, they are currently subject of a pending motion to vacate all the convictions on the basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence of actual innocence.
262. In summary, fifty-seven original proceedings commenced by the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS were commenced absent probable cause.
263. The SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SAMPSON fifty-seven times – twenty-seven arrests while he was working or at his place of employment – without arguable probable cause. In every instance, the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SAMPSON but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him anyway.
264. Mr. SAMPSON suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SAMPSON was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignment to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper
COUNT TEN
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Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
265. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 137 through 145 as if fully set forth herein.
266. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Ms. DANIELS was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable. Moreover, each of these stop-andfrisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on t he basis of race and/or national origin.
267. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Ms. DANIELS in light of clearly established law and information possessed by the DANIELS OFFICERS at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests.
268. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the DANIELS OFFICERS deprived Ms. DANIELS of her constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth Amendment.
269. As a d irect and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Ms. DANIELS has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
270. The acts of the DANIELS OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Ms. DANIELS to an award of punitive damages.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS requests judgment against Defendants, the DANIELS OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT ELEVEN Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 271. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 137 through 145 as if fully set forth herein. 272. The DANIELS OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Ms. DANIELS without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on her race and/or national origin. 273. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Ms. DANIELS was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the DANIELS OFFICERS in this action. 274. As a result, of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Ms. DANIELS without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the DANIELS OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class. 275. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the DANIELS OFFICERS deprived Ms. DANIELS of her constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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276. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Ms. DANIELS has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
277. The acts of the DANIELS OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Ms. DANIELS to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, requests judgment against Defendants, the DANIELS OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWELVE Individual Claim of Ms. DANIELS, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 278. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 137 through 145 as if fully set forth herein. 279. Ms. DANIELS was arrested approximately fifty-fives times from 2008 t o 2012. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Ms. DANIELS was commenced. 280. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS at least once out of the fifty-five times. 281. The termination of twenty-three original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Ms. DANIELS. Specifically, in twenty-three instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the charges against Ms. DANIELS finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
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282. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Ms. DANIELS twenty-three times without probable cause. In every instance, the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Ms. DANIELS but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest her anyway.
283. Ms. DANIELS suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Ms. DANIELS was incarcerated following her arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if she could not post her monetary bond and was therefore seized in violation of her Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants, the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTEEN Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 284. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 146 through 151, as if fully set forth herein. 285. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SPIVEY over fifty times in five years, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable. Moreover, each of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
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286. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. SPIVEY in light of clearly established law and information possessed by the SPIVEY OFFICERS at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests.
287. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, the SPIVEY OFFICERS, deprived Mr. SPIVEY of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
288. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SPIVEY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
289. The acts of Defendants, the SPIVEY OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SPIVEY to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants, the SPIVEY OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT FOURTEEN Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 290. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 146 through 151, as if fully set forth herein.
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291. The SPIVEY OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SPIVEY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
292. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. SPIVEY was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the SPIVEY OFFICERS in this action.
293. As a result, MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. SPIVEY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the SPIVEY OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
294. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the SPIVEY OFFICERS deprived Mr. SPIVEY of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
295. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SPIVEY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
296. The acts of the SPIVEY OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SPIVEY to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. SPIVEY, requests judgment against Defendants, the SPIVEY OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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Individual Claim of Mr. SPIVEY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
297. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 146 through 151, as if fully set forth herein.
298. Mr. SPIVEY was arrested a total of fourteen times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SPIVEY was commenced.
299. Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY at least once out of the fourteen times.
300. The termination of six original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SPIVEY. Specifically, in six of the instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the case against Mr. SPIVEY finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
301. Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. SPIVEY six times without probable cause. In all instances, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SPIVEY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
302. Mr. SPIVEY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SPIVEY was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY requests judgment against Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT SIXTEEN Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 303. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 152 through 157, as if fully set forth herein. 304. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. LOWERY approximately seven times in five years, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, each of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 305. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. LOWERY in light of clearly established law and information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests. 306. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the LOWERY OFFICERS, deprived Mr. LOWERY of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 307. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. LOWERY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
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308. The acts of the LOWERY OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. LOWERY to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, requests judgment against Defendants, the LOWERY OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT SEVENTEEN Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 309. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 152 through 157, as if fully set forth herein. 310. The LOWERY OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. LOWERY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin. 311. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. LOWERY was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the LOWERY OFFICERS in this action. 312. As a result, MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. LOWERY without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the LOWERY OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
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313. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the LOWERY OFFICERS deprived Mr. LOWERY of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
314. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. LOWERY has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
315. The acts of the LOWERY OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. LOWERY to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. LOWERY, requests judgment against Defendants, the LOWERY OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT EIGHTEEN Individual Claim of Mr. LOWERY, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 316. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 127 and 152 through 157, as if fully set forth herein. 317. Mr. LOWERY was arrested a total of five times from 2008 t o 2013. I n each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. LOWERY was commenced. 318. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY at least once out of the five times. 319. The termination all original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. LOWERY. Specifically, all five of the
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instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the case against Mr. LOWERY finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
320. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. LOWERY five times without probable cause. In all instances, the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause and/or arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. LOWERY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
321. Mr. LOWERY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. LOWERY was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY requests judgment against Defendants, the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT NINETEEN Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 322. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein. 323. The conduct of Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. HALL, JR. approximately 13 times, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause.
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Moreover, each of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
324. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. HALL, JR. in light of clearly established law and information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests.
325. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS, deprived Mr. HALL, JR. of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
326. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. HALL, JR. has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
327. The acts of Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. HALL, JR. to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Mr. HALL, JR. requests judgment against Defendants, the HALL JR. OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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328. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein.
329. Defendants have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. HALL, JR. without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
330. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. HALL, JR. was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by Defendants in this action.
331. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. HALL, JR. without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, the HALL JR. OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
332. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, the HALL JR. OFFICERS deprived Mr. HALL JR. of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
333. As a d irect and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. HALL JR. has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
334. The acts of the HALL JR. OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. HALL JR. to an award of punitive damages.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR., requests judgment against Defendants, the HALL JR. OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-ONE Individual Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr., Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious
Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 335. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein. 336. Mr. HALL, JR. was arrested a total of fourteen times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. HALL, JR. was commenced. 337. The HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. at least once out of the fourteen times. 338. The termination all original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. HALL, JR. Specifically, in all fourteen instances either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or the Court dismissed the case against Mr. HALL, JR. finding the arrests were made without probable cause. 339. The HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. HALL, JR. fourteen times without probable cause. In all instance, the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. HALL, JR. but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time. 340. Mr. HALL, JR. suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. HALL, JR. was incarcerated following his arrests and/or
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arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond and therefore seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mr. HALL, JR. requests judgment against Defendants, the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-TWO Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 341. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 164 through 171, as if fully set forth herein. 342. The conduct of Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. PICART was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrests was performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 343. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. PICART in light of clearly established law and information possessed by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS at the time of the stop-and-frisks and/or arrests. 344. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS , deprived Mr. HALL, JR. of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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345. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. PICART has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
346. The acts of Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. HALL, JR. to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-THREE Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 347. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1through 127 and 164 through 171 a s if fully set forth herein. 348. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-andfrisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. PICART without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
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349. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. SAMPSON was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by the DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action.
350. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. PICART without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
351. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. PICART of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
352. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. PICART has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
353. The acts of the DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. PICART to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-FOUR 72
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Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
354. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 164 through 171, as if fully set forth herein.
355. The unlawful arrest which took place on December 21, 2012 resulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. PICART.
356. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were all the legal cause of the original proceedings against MR. PICART.
357. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. PICART constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. PICART. Specifically, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. PICART finding the arrest was made without probable cause.
358. Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. PICART without probable cause. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. PICART but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
359. Mr. PICART suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. PICART was incarcerated and eventually had to seek legal counsel to prevent him from being charged with the crimes improperly begun and facilitated against him by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART requests judgment against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-FIVE Individual Claim of Mr. PICART, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Excessive Use of Force
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 360. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 164 through 171, as if fully set forth herein. 361. On December 21, 2012, Mr. PICART was working at the QUICKSTOP during his normal shift. Mr. PICART was not engaged in any criminal activity. 362. Mr. PICART entered the QUICKSTOP and attempted to use his cellular phone to call the owner, Mr. SALEH. At that point, DUNASKE followed him behind the store counter, forcefully grabbed him by the arm, and escorted him out of the premises. 363. Mr. PICART did not actively resist arrest or attempt to evade arrest by fighting. Notwithstanding Mr. PICART’s cooperation, he was unlawfully searched, without consent or reasonable articulable suspicion, violently thrown to the ground, and placed under arrest. 364. Mr. PICART did not pose any immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. 365. The use of force was unreasonable under the circumstances resulting in multiple injuries to Mr. PICART and violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-SIX Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 366. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 483 through 490, as if fully set forth herein. 367. The conduct of Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SMITH on February 7, 2013 , was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 368. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. SMITH in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, at the time of the incidents. 369. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and
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UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, deprived Mr. SMITH of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
370. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SMITH has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
371. The acts of Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SMITH to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH requests judgment against Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-SEVEN Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 372. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 172 through 179 as if fully set forth herein. 373. RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SMITH without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
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374. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. SMITH was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action.
375. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. SMITH without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
376. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. SMITH of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
377. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SMITH has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
378. The acts of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SMITH to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON requests judgment against Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and
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UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 379. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 172 through 179, as if fully set forth herein. 380. The unlawful arrest which took place on F ebruary 7, 2013 r esulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SMITH. 381. RUIZ, TAMAYO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES were all the legal cause of the original proceeding against MR. SMITH. 382. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. SMITH constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SMITH. Specifically, the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrest was made without probable cause. 383. RUIZ, TAMAYO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SMITH without probable cause. Defendants RUIZ, TAMAYO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SMITH but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him. 384. Mr. SMITH suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SMITH was arrested, to await bond hearings and/or arraignment and was therefore seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
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WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH requests judgment against Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWENTY-NINE Individual Claim of Mr. SMITH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Excessive Use of Force
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 385. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 172 through 179, as if fully set forth herein. 386. On February 7, 2013, M r. SMITH was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS. 387. The incident with RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS resulted in an excessive use of force. 388. Mr. SMITH was on t he QUICKSTOP property drinking an alcoholic beverage. He was approached by RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS who asked for his identification and poured out the contents of the beverage. Simultaneously, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS performed a full search of Mr. SMITH’S person without consent and without reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause. 389. After the unlawful search, Mr. SMITH was released at which time he attempted to walk into the QUICKSTOP to purchase water. RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS instructed him not to enter the QUICKSTOP – which was open to the
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public at the time. RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS again requested Mr. SMITH’s identification and when he asked “why?” he was thrown, head-first, into a steel door, handcuffed, picked up, and thrown against the police car.
390. After several minutes of physical detainment, he was released and issued a Promise to Appear for possession of an open container. Subsequent to the arrest, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS failed to complete a Use of Force Report as required by MGPD policy and Florida law.
391. The use of force was unreasonable under the circumstances resulting in multiple injuries to Mr. SMITH and violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH requests judgment against Defendants, CITY, MAYOR GILBERT, MAYOR GIBSON, CITY MANAGER CREW, CHIEF BOYD, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 392. Plaintiff, MR. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 180 through 183, as if fully set forth herein. 393. The conduct of Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. CRANE on November 23, 2012, was performed under color of law and without
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reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
394. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. CRANE in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the incidents.
395. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, deprived Mr. CRANE of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
396. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. CRANE has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
397. The acts of Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. CRANE to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE requests judgment against Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY-ONE Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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398. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 180 through 183 as if fully set forth herein.
399. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. CRANE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
400. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. CRANE was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action.
401. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. CRANE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
402. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. CRANE of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
403. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SAMPSON has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
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404. The acts of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. CRANE to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE requests judgment against Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY-TWO Individual Claim of Mr. CRANE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for Malicious Prosecution
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment 405. Plaintiff, MR. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 180 through 183, as if fully set forth herein. 406. The unlawful arrest which took place on N ovember 23, 2012 r esulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. CRANE. 407. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were all the legal cause of the original proceeding against MR. CRANE. 408. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. CRANE constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. CRANE. Specifically, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. CRANE. 409. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. CRANE without probable cause. Defendants
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knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. CRANE but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him.
410. Mr. CRANE suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. CRANE was incarcerated prior to his arraignment to await trial and therefore seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE requests judgment against Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY-THREE Individual Claim of Mr. MONTALE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 411. Plaintiff, MR. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 184 through 188, as if fully set forth herein. 412. The conduct of Defendants, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. MONTALE on August 13, 201 2, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Moreover, the stop-and-frisks, search, seizure, and/or arrest were performed on the basis of race and/or national origin. 413. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk and/or probable cause to search Mr. MONTALE in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by Defendant officers at the time of the incidents.
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414. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, Defendants GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, deprived Mr. MONTALE of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
415. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. MONTALE has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
416. The acts of Defendants, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, grossly negligent, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. MONTALE to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE requests judgment against Defendants, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY-FOUR Individual Claim of Mr. MONTALE, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 417. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 184 through 188, as if fully set forth herein. 418. GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. MONTALE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
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419. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. MONTALE was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action.
420. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. MONTALE without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
421. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. MONTALE of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
422. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. MONTALE has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
423. The acts of GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. MONTALE to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE requests judgment against Defendants, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY-FIVE
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Individual Claim of Mr. DEAN, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
424. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 189 through 194, as if fully set forth herein.
425. The conduct of Defendant, MALONE, in stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, Mr. DEAN on July 13, 2012, was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion. Moreover, the stop-and-frisk, search, and/or seizure was performed on the basis of race and/or national origin.
426. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk or seize and search Mr. DEAN in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by MALONE, at the time of the incidents.
427. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, Defendant, MALONE deprived Mr. DEAN of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
428. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. DEAN has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
429. The acts of Defendant, MALONE, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. DEAN to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendants, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY-SIX 87
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Individual Claim of Mr. DEAN, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
430. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 189 through 194, as if fully set forth herein.
431. MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS have implemented and enforced a policy, practice and/or custom of stoppingand-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. DEAN without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause and, instead, based solely on his race and/or national origin.
432. There is direct, circumstantial, and/or statistical evidence that Mr. DEAN was, and continues to be, a target of racial profiling by MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MALONE, AND UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in this action.
433. As a result of MGPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom (specifically, the Racial Targeting Policy) of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting Mr. DEAN without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS intentionally discriminated against a member of a protected class.
434. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS deprived Mr. DEAN of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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435. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. DEAN has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
436. The acts of MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SAMPSON to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendants, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THIRTY-SEVEN Individual Claim of Mr. SALEH, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 437. Plaintiff, Mr. SALEH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 127 and 195 through 201, as if fully set forth herein. 438. The conduct of the SALEH OFFICERS in searching the QUICKSTOP owned by Mr. SALEH, or his patrons walking in and out of the QUICKSTOP was performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. 439. A reasonable officer would not have believed there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the QUICKSTOP in light of clearly established law and information possessed by the SALEH OFFICERS at the time of the searches. 440. As a d irect and proximate result of such acts, the SALEH OFFICERS deprived Mr. SALEH of his Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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441. As a direct and proximate result of referenced constitutional abuses, Mr. SALEH has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. The acts of Defendants, the SALEH OFFICERS, were intentional, deliberate, wanton, malicious, reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Mr. SALEH to an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SALEH requests judgment against Defendants, the SALEH OFFICERS for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
STATE LAW CLAIMS COUNT THIRTY-EIGHT Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Civil Battery 442. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 136, as if fully set forth herein. 443. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, set forth above. 444. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS, in illegally searching and arresting Mr. SAMPSON, was intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SAMPSON. 445. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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446. The CITY is responsible for the batteries committed by the SAMPSON OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. SAMPSON, in that the civil batteries were intentional, and were committed within the course and scope of the SAMPSON OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
447. In the alternative, the conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. SAMPSON.
448. As a direct and proximate result of the batteries detailed above, Mr. SAMPSON suffered bodily injury which resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SAMPSON will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against the SAMPSON OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT THIRTY-NINE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for False Arrest 449. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 136, as if fully set forth herein. 450. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
91 ______________________________________________________________________________
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451. The conduct of the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
452. Mr. SAMPSON was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him sixty-three times without legal authority.
453. The conduct of the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS resulted in repeated false arrests of Mr. SAMPSON, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
454. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. SAMPSON in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
455. In the alternative, the conduct of the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
456. As a d irect and proximate result of the false arrests detailed above, Mr. SAMPSON suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SAMPSON will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against
92 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Defendants, the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 457. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 136, as if fully set forth herein. 458. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, set forth above. 459. The conduct of the SAMPSON OFFICERS, in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SAMPSON countless times without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 460. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 461. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. SAMPSON is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
93 ______________________________________________________________________________
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462. The intentional infliction of emotional distress was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of the SAMPSON OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the SAMPSON OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-ONE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for Malicious Prosecution 463. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 136, as if fully set forth herein. 464. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 465. Mr. SAMPSON was arrested a t otal of sixty-three times from 2008 t o 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SAMPSON was commenced. 466. Defendants, SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS, were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON at least once out of the sixty-three times. 467. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. SAMPSON constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SAMPSON. Specifically, in thirty of the instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. SAMPSON or the Court dismissed the charges.
94 ______________________________________________________________________________
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468. And of the remaining twenty-seven convictions, they are currently subject of a pending motion to vacate all the convictions on the basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence of actual innocence.
469. In summary, fifty-seven original proceedings commenced by the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS were commenced absent probable cause.
470. The SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SAMPSON fifty-seven times – twenty-seven arrests while he was working or at his place of employment – without probable cause. In every instance, the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SAMPSON but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him anyway.
471. Mr. SAMPSON suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SAMPSON was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the SAMPSON ARRESTING OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-TWO Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Civil Battery 472. Plaintiff, Ms. DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 137 through 145 as if fully set forth herein.
95 ______________________________________________________________________________
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473. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
474. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Ms. DANIELS was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Ms. DANIELS.
475. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
476. Defendants, the CITY, is responsible for the batteries committed by the DANIELS OFFICERS upon the person of Ms. DANIELS, in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
477. In the alternative, the conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Ms. DANIELS.
478. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Ms. DANIELS suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Ms. DANIELS will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against the
96 ______________________________________________________________________________
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DANIELS OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-THREE Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for False Arrest 479. Plaintiff, Ms., DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 137 through 145 as if fully set forth herein. 480. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 481. The conduct of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 482. Ms. DANIELS was unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty against her will when the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested her thirty-three times without legal authority. 483. The conduct of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Ms. DANIELS, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances. 484. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Ms. DANIELS in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
97 ______________________________________________________________________________
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485. In the alternative, the conduct of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
486. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests detailed above, Ms. DANIELS suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Ms. DANIELS will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damage against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-FOUR Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 487. Plaintiff, Ms., DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 137 through 145 as if fully set forth herein. 488. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 489. The conduct of the DANIELS OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Ms. DANIELS over 180 times, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
98 ______________________________________________________________________________
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490. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
491. The infliction of the intentional emotional distress was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and was committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
492. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M s. DANIELS is afraid to walk around her own neighborhood, and afraid to enjoy her life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the DANIELS OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-FIVE Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for Malicious Prosecution 493. Plaintiff, Ms., DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 137 through 145 as if fully set forth herein. 494. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 495. Ms. DANIELS was arrested a total of fifty-five times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Ms. DANIELS was commenced. 496. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS at least once out of the fifty-five times.
99 ______________________________________________________________________________
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497. The termination of twenty-three original proceedings against Ms. DANIELS constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Ms. DANIELS. Specifically, in twenty-three of the instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Ms. DANIELS or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
498. The DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Ms. DANIELS twenty-three times without probable cause. In every instance, the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause and or arguable probable cause to arrest Ms. DANIELS but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest her anyway.
499. The malicious prosecution was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and was committed within the course and scope of the DANIELS ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
500. Ms. DANIELS suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Ms. DANIELS was incarcerated following her arrests or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if she could not post her monetary bond.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the DANIELS OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-SIX Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Civil Battery 501. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 146 through 151, as if fully set forth herein.
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502. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
503. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. SPIVEY was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SPIVEY.
504. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
505. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the batteries committed by the SPIVEY OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. SPIVEY, in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
506. In the alternative, the conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. SPIVEY.
507. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Mr. SPIVEY suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SPIVEY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against the SPIVEY OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
101 ______________________________________________________________________________
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COUNT FORTY-SEVEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for False Arrest 508. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 146 through 151, as if fully set forth herein. 509. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 510. Mr. SPIVEY was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him six times without legal authority. 511. The conduct of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. SPIVEY, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances. 512. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. SPIVEY in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action. 513. In the alternative, the conduct of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 514. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. SPIVEY suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life,
102 ______________________________________________________________________________
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lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SPIVEY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-EIGHT Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 515. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 146 through 151, as if fully set forth herein. 516. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 517. The conduct of the SPIVEY OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SPIVEY at least 50 times, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 518. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 519. The infliction of the intentional emotional distress was intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious and was committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY OFFICERS employment with MGPD.
103 ______________________________________________________________________________
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520. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. Spivey is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FORTY-NINE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for Malicious Prosecution 521. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 146 through 151, as if fully set forth herein. 522. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 523. Mr. SPIVEY was arrested a total of fourteen times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SPIVEY was commenced. 524. The SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY at least once out of the fourteen times. 525. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. SPIVEY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SPIVEY. Specifically, in six of the instances, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. SPIVEY or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
104 ______________________________________________________________________________
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526. The SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. SPIVEY six times without probable cause. In all instances, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SPIVEY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
527. The malicious prosecution was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
528. Mr. SPIVEY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SPIVEY was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignment to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Civil Battery 529. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 152 through 157, as if fully set forth herein. 530. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
105 ______________________________________________________________________________
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531. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. LOWERY was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. LOWERY.
532. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
533. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the batteries committed by the LOWERY OFFICERS upon t he person of Mr. LOWERY, in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the LOWERY OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
534. In the alternative, the conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS, was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. LOWERY.
535. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Mr. LOWERY suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. LOWERY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, the LOWERY OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-ONE
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Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for False Arrest 536. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 152 through 157, as if fully set forth herein. 537. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 538. Mr. LOWERY was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him five times without legal authority. 539. The conduct of the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. LOWERY, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances. 540. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. LOWERY in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action. 541. In the alternative, the conduct of the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 542. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. LOWERY suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life,
107 ______________________________________________________________________________
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lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. LOWERY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-TWO Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 543. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 152 through 157, as if fully set forth herein. 544. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 545. The conduct of the LOWERY OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. LOWERY seven times, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 546. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 547. The intentional inflictions of emotional distress were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the LOWERY OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
108 ______________________________________________________________________________
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548. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. LOWERY is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the LOWERY OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-THREE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for Malicious Prosecution 549. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 152 through 157, as if fully set forth herein. 550. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 551. Mr. LOWERY was arrested a total of five times from 2008 t o 2013. I n each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. LOWERY was commenced. 552. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY at least once out of the five times. 553. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. LOWERY constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. LOWERY. Specifically, all instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. LOWERY or the charges were dismissed by the Court, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
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554. The LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. LOWERY five times without probable cause. In all instances, the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. LOWERY but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
555. Mr. LOWERY suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. LOWERY was incarcerated following his arraignments to await trial.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the LOWERY ARRESTING OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-FOUR Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Civil Battery 556. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein.. 557. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. S uch claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 558. The conduct of the HALL, JR. OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. HALL, JR. was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. HALL, JR. 559. The conduct of the HALL, JR. OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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560. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the batteries committed by the HALL, JR. OFFICERS upon t he person of Mr. HALL, JR. in that the civil batteries were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the HALL JR. OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
561. In the alternative, the conduct of the HALL, JR. OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. HALL, JR.
562. As a d irect and proximate result of the batteries alleged above, Mr. HALL, Jr. suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. HALL, JR. will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-FIVE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for False Arrest 563. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein. 564. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a co mmon nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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565. Mr. HALL, JR. was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS arrested him twelve times without legal authority.
566. The conduct of the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. HALL, JR., as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. E ach arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
567. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. HALL, JR. in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS' employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
568. In the alternative, the conduct of the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
569. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. HALL, JR. suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. HALL, JR. will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, the HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT FIFTY-SIX Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Conversion 570. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein. 571. On November 15, 2013, Defendants DUNASKE and SANTIAGO and JOHN DOE OFFICERS 1-187, knowingly, wantonly, improperly, illicitly, and without authorization took a Taser belonging to Mr. Hall information with the intent to permanently deprive MR. HALL, JR. of his right to said property. 572. At the time, Defendants DUNASKE, SANTIAGO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, who were acting under color of authority, were engaging in a pattern of illegal acts, which included, but were not limited to: false arrest, false imprisonment and unlawful search and seizure against and to the detriment of MR. HALL, JR. 573. The taking of MR. HALL, JR.’s property constituted conversion. WHEREFORE Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, CITY, or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants, HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, costs of this action against Defendants and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-SEVEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 574. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein. 575. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional
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Infliction of emotional distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
576. The conduct of the HALL JR. OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. HALL, JR. 13 times, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
577. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in civilized community.
578. The intentional inflictions of emotional distress were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the HALL JR. OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
579. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. Mr. HALL, JR., is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the HALL, JR. OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-EIGHT Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for Malicious Prosecution 580. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 158 through 163, as if fully set forth herein. 581. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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582. Mr. HALL, JR. was arrested a total of fourteen times from 2008 to 2013. In each instance, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. HALL, JR. was commenced.
583. The HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS were each the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. at least once out of the fourteen times.
584. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. HALL, JR. constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. HALL, JR. specifically, in all fourteen instances, either the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. HALL, JR. or the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
585. The HALL, JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS operated with malice in arresting Mr. HALL, JR. twelve without probable cause. In all instance, the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. HALL, JR. but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
586. Mr. HALL, JR. suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. HALL, JR. was incarcerated following his arrests and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial if he could not post his monetary bond trial.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR., respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, the HALL JR. ARRESTING OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTY-NINE
Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Civil Battery
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587. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 164 through 171, as if fully set forth herein.
588. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
589. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. PICART was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. PICART.
590. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
591. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. PICART, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
592. In the alternative, the conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, and to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. PICART.
593. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. PICART suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of
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enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. PICART will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for False Arrest 594. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 164 through 171, as if fully set forth herein. 595. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 596. Mr. PICART was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS arrested him without legal authority. 597. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS constituted a f alse arrest of Mr. PICART, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. 598. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. PICART in that the false arrest was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO,
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TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
599. In the alternative, the conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
600. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. PICART suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. PICART will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-ONE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 601. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 164 through 171, as if fully set forth herein. 602. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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603. The conduct of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. PICART, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
604. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
605. The intentional inflictions of emotional distress were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
606. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. PICART is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-TWO Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Malicious Prosecution 607. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 164 through 171, as if fully set forth herein.
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608. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
609. The unlawful arrest which took place on December 21, 2012 resulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. PICART.
610. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS were all the legal cause of the original proceedings against MR. PICART.
611. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. PICART constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. PICART. Specifically, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” against Mr. PICART finding the arrest was made without probable cause.
612. Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. PICART without probable cause. DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. PICART but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to arrest him each time.
613. Mr. PICART suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. PICART was incarcerated and eventually had to seek legal counsel to prevent him from being charged with the crimes improperly begun and facilitated against him by DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS.
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614. The malicious prosecution was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of the SPIVEY ARRESTING OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, DUNASKE, SANTIAGO, TRIMINO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-THREE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Civil Battery 615. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 172 through 179, as if fully set forth herein. 616. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 617. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. SMITH was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SMITH. 618. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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619. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. SMITH, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
620. In the alternative, the conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. SMITH.
621. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. SMITH suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SMITH will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-FOUR
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Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for False Arrest 622. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 172 through 179, as if fully set forth herein. 623. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 624. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 625. Mr. SMITH was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES arrested him without legal authority. 626. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES constituted false arrest of Mr. SMITH, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. 627. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. SMITH in that the false arrest was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action. 628. In the alternative, the conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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629. As a d irect and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. SMITH suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SMITH will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-FIVE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 630. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 172 through 179, as if fully set forth herein. 631. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 632. The conduct of RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. SMITH as well as using unjustified force upon him, was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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633. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
634. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. SMITH is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to the store, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, MALONE, BAMFORD, HARRIS, SANTIAGO, PINKNEY, ROVINELLI, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-SIX Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Malicious Prosecution 635. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 172 through 179, as if fully set forth herein. 636. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 637. The unlawful arrest which took place on F ebruary 7, 2013 r esulted in the commencement of an original judicial proceeding against Mr. SMITH. 638. RUIZ, TAMAYO and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES were all the legal cause of the original proceeding against MR. SMITH.
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639. The termination of the original proceeding against Mr. SMITH constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. SMITH. Specifically, the Court dismissed the charges, finding the arrest was made without probable cause.
640. RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES operated with malice in arresting Mr. SMITH without probable cause. Defendants knew they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. SMITH but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him.
641. Mr. SMITH suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. SMITH was incarcerated following his arrest and/or arraignments to await bond hearings and/or trial.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, RUIZ, TAMAYO, and/or UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOES, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-SEVEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Civil Battery 642. Plaintiff, MR. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 180 through 183, as if fully set forth herein. 643. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. S uch claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 644. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in illegally searching and arresting Mr. CRANE was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. CRANE.
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 127 of 141
645. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
646. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, upon the person of Mr. CRANE, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
647. In the alternative, the conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. Crane.
648. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. CRANE suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. CRANE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-EIGHT Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for False Arrest
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 128 of 141
649. Plaintiff, MR. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 180 through 183, as if fully set forth herein.
650. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
651. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
652. Mr. CRANE was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, arrested him without legal authority.
653. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, constituted false arrest of Mr. CRANE, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause.
654. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. CRANE in that the false arrest was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
655. In the alternative, the conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
128 ______________________________________________________________________________
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656. As a d irect and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. CRANE suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. CRANE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTY-NINE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 657. Plaintiff, Mr. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 t hrough 127 and 180 through 183, as if fully set forth herein. 658. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 659. The conduct of DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. CRANE was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 660. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
129 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 130 of 141
661. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. CRANE is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, DUNASKE, TRIMINO, HARRIS, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTY Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for Malicious Prosecution 662. Plaintiff, MR. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 180 through 183, as if fully set forth herein. 663. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for malicious prosecution. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 664. Mr. CRANE was arrested a total of one time in 2012. In the instant case, an original judicial proceeding against Mr. CRANE was commenced. 665. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, were all the legal cause of the original proceedings against Mr. CRANE. 666. The termination of the original proceedings against Mr. CRANE constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of Mr. CRANE. Specifically, the State Attorney’s Office took “no action” or dismissed the case against Mr. CRANE finding the arrests were made without probable cause.
130 ______________________________________________________________________________
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667. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, operated with malice in arresting Mr. CRANE without probable cause. DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS knew they lacked probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. CRANE but, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to nevertheless arrest him.
668. Mr. CRANE suffered, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of the original proceedings. Mr. CRANE was incarcerated following his arraignment to await trial.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against DUNASKE, HARRIS, TRIMINO, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTY-ONE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for Civil Battery 669. Plaintiff, MR. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 t hrough 4 and 6 t hrough 127 and 184 through 188, as if fully set forth herein. 670. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 671. The conduct of GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in illegally searching and arresting Mr. MONTALE was intentional, and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. MONTALE. 672. The conduct of GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
131 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 132 of 141
673. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS upon the person of Mr. MONTALE, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
674. In the alternative, the conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. MONTALE.
675. As a d irect and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. MONTALE suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. MONTALE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTY-TWO Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for False Arrest 676. Plaintiff, MR. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 t hrough 4 and 6 t hrough 127 and 184 through 188, as if fully set forth herein.
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 133 of 141
677. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
678. The conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
679. Mr. MONTALE was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when GREGORY, and JOHN DOE OFFICERS 1-187arrested him without legal authority.
680. The conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS constituted false arrest of Mr. MONTALE, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause.
681. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. MONTALE in that the false arrest was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS EMPLOYMENT with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
682. In the alternative, the conduct of GREGORY and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS was intentional, willful, wanton, and/or malicious, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
683. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrest alleged above, Mr. MONTALE suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. MONTALE will suffer such losses in the future.
133 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 134 of 141
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTY-THREE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress 684. Plaintiff, MR. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 t hrough 4 and 6 t hrough 127 and 184 through 188, as if fully set forth herein. 685. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 686. The conduct of GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting Mr. MONTALE was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 687. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 688. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. MONTALE is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a CITY resident.
134 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 135 of 141
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, GREGORY, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTY-FOUR Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Conversion 689. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 189 through 194, as if fully set forth herein. 690. On July 13, 2012, D efendant, MALONE, knowingly, wantonly, improperly, illicitly, and without authorization took Red Bull energy drinks belonging to MR. DEAN with the intent to permanently deprive MR. DEAN of his right to said property. 691. At the time, Defendant, MALONE, who was acting under color of authority, was engaging in a pattern of illegal acts, which included, but was not limited to: false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful search and seizure against and to the detriment of MR. DEAN. WHEREFORE Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendant, the CITY, for compensatory damages; or in the alternative, judgment for compensatory and punitive damages against MALONE and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS; reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT SEVENTY-FIVE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Civil Battery 692. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 189 through 194, as if fully set forth herein.
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 136 of 141
693. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
694. The conduct of MALONE in illegally searching and seizing Mr. DEAN was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. DEAN.
695. The conduct of MALONE was committed within the course and scope of his employment with MGPD.
696. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by MALONE upon the person of Mr. DEAN, in that the civil battery was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of MALONE’S employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
697. In the alternative, the conduct of MALONE was intentional, malicious, wanton and willful, to the detriment of the health, safety, and welfare of Mr. DEAN.
698. As a direct and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. DEAN suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. DEAN will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendant, the CITY, for compensatory damages; or in the alternative, judgment for compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS; costs of this action, and trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTY-SIX 136
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 137 of 141
Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
699. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 127 and 189 through 194, as if fully set forth herein.
700. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
701. The conduct of MALONE in stopping, searching, and seizing, Mr. DEAN was intentional or reckless and was committed within the course and scope of his employment with MGPD.
702. The conduct was outrageous — going beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
703. The conduct caused, and continues to cause, severe emotional distress. M r. DEAN is afraid to walk around his own neighborhood, afraid to go to work, and afraid to enjoy his life as a former CITY resident.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN respectfully requests compensatory damages and punitive damages against Defendants, MALONE, and UNIDENTIFIED JOHN DOE OFFICERS, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper, costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTY-SEVEN
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 138 of 141
Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SALEH for Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship
704. Plaintiff, Mr. SALEH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 t hrough 127 and 195 through 201, as if fully set forth herein.
705. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for tortious interference with a business relationship. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
706. The conduct of the SALEH OFFICERS, in stopping, searching, seizing, and/or arresting actual patrons of the QUICKSTOP, without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause, both inside store and in its parking lot, was intentional and unjustified and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
707. As a d irect and proximate result of the tortious interference with a b usiness relationship detailed above, Mr. SALEH has suffered financial harm to the profitability of his business. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SALEH will suffer such losses in the future.
708. The CITY is responsible for the tortious interference with a business relationship committed by the SALEH OFFICERS upon the business of Mr. SALEH, in that the interference was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of the OFFICERS’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SALEH respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; or in the alternative, compensatory and punitive damages against
138 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 139 of 141
Defendants, the SALEH OFFICERS; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.

Dated: February 6, 2014.

Respectfully Submitted:
REYES LAW GROUP, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 2924 Davie Road, Suite 102 Davie, Florida 33314-1602 O: 954-369-1993 Fax: 888-315-6291 Primary: Eservice@reyeslegal.com Secondary: Carlos@ReyesLegal.com
Stephan@ReyesLegal.com
/s/Carlos J. Reyes CARLOS J. REYES, ESQ. FL Bar No. 755079
/s/Stephan Lopez STEPHAN LOPEZ, ESQ. FL Bar No. 76959

139 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 140 of 141 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 6, 2014, I will electronically file the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served on February 6, 2014, on all counsel identified on the attached Service List, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.
/s/Stephan Lopez STEPHAN LOPEZ, ESQ.
140 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2014 Page 141 of 141
SERVICE LIST
MELISSA JEAN GARCIA, ESQ. STEPHAN LOPEZ, ESQ. CARLOS JOSE REYES, JR., ESQ. REYES LAW GROUP Attorney for all Plaintiffs 2924 Davie Road, Suite 102 Davie, FL 33314 (954) 369-1993 - Telephone melissa@reyeslegal.com stephan@reyeslegal.com Carlos@ReyesLegal.com
HARRIET R. LEWIS, ESQ. LEWIS STROUD & DEUTSCH PL Attorneys for Defendants 1900 Glades Road, Suite 251 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 (561) 826-2800 - Telephone (561) 826-2828 - Facsimile hlewis@lsdlaw.net lsabbatino@lsdlaw.net goldehoff@lsdlaw.net
E. BRUCE JOHNSON, ESQ. SCOTT D. ALEXANDER, ESQ. JOHNSON, ANSELMO, MURDOCH, BURKE, PIPER & HOCHMAN, PA Attorneys for Defendants, City, Gilbert, Gibson, Crew, Boyd, Miller, Chapman, and Smith 2455 E. Sunrise Blvd., Suite 1000 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304 johnson@jambg.com (954) 463-0100 - Telephone (954) 463-2444 - Facsimile
141 ______________________________________________________________________________
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 Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 69 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/06/2014 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. 13-24312-CIV-GRAHAM/GOODMAN EARL SAMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, et al., Defendants.
/ ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants’ multiple Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint [D.E. 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, and 51] and the City of Miami Garden’s Motion to Strike Prayers for Punitive Damages [D.E. 48].
THE COURT has considered the motions, the pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
In response to the Defendants’ motions, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint against all Defendants on February 6, 2014. See [D.E. 56]. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ multiple Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint [D.E. 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, and 51] are DENIED AS MOOT. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the City of Miami Garden’s Motion to Strike Prayers for Punitive Damages [D.E. 48] is DENIED AS MOOT.
1

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 69 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/06/2014 Page 2 of 2 DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 6th day
of March, 2014. s/ Donald L. Graham
DONALD L. GRAHAM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE cc: Counsel of Record
2

 
 Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 80 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/20/2014 Page 1 of 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIV ISION
Case No. l3-24312-CIV-GRAHAM/GOODMAN
EARL SAMPSON , et Plaintiffs ,
CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, et al., Defendants .
/
AMENDED ORDER THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant , City of Miami Gardens', Motion to Dismiss Claims for Common Law Battery , Conversion , and Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship
ED .E. 58)
THE COURT has considered the Motion , the pertinent portions of the record , and is otherwise fully advised in the premises . For the reasons stated below , the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PA RT . 1. FACTUAL & PROCEDURA L BACKGROUND
On November 27, 2013, Earl Sampson , Torre M . Daniels, Anthony Lowery , Floyd Hall, Jr ., Ross Picart , Roderick D . Smith , Kenneth Crane , Yvensonne Montale, Omar Dean , Brandon Spivey , and A li A .
Saleh (collectively referred to as uPlaintiffs'') brought suit against the City of Miami Gardens (hereinafter uthe City''), its current and former mayor, its former city manager , and various
1

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members of its police personnel. (D .E. 12 Plaintiffs allege, inter

alia , violations of

U .S .C . 1983 pursuan t to the Fourth

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause . Id .

The basis of Plaintiffs' suit against the City lies with the City 's

alleged zero tolerance zone , quota , and racial targeting policies ,

which Plaintiffs allege were the cause of numerous unconstitutional

stop-and-frisks and arrests from 2008 to the present. (D.E. at

20-247 D .E. 56 at 20-252. In addition to asserting claims directly

against the City , Plaintiffs also assert violations of 42 U .S .C .

J 1983 (supervisory liability) against Chief Matthew Boyd, Deputy

Chief Paul Miller, and Major Anthony Chapman. ED.E. 561.
Moreover , Plaintiffs assert violations of 42 U .S .C . 5 1983 against

eighty-two (82) individual police officers as well as state law tort claims including : battery , false arrest , intentional

infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution , and

conversion , against the City and indiv idual police officers . Id . Plaintiffs seek damages for the unconstitutional arrests and stop -

and-frisks, as well as injunctive relief halting enforcement of the
City 's policies . Id . A fter a1l named Defendants challenged the sufficiency of

Plaintiffs initial Complaint by moving to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed

their First Amended Complaint on February 6, 2014 . ED.E. 561. In

addition , Plaintiffs voluntarily dism issed their claims against the

current and former mayor , former city manager , and the indiv idual

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police officers leaving only , the City , Chief Matthew Boyd, Deputy
Chief Paul Miller, and Major Anthony Chapman defend against their remaining claims. (D.E . and 77J The remaining Defendants
deny Plaintiffs' allegations and maintain that Plaintiffs' arrests were constitutional , based upon probable cause , and that lawful
force was utilized each time . (D .E. 61J. Furthermore, the City
maintains that has no unconstitutional customs, policies, or practices as alleged by Plaintiffs and now moves to dismiss

Plaintiffs ' claims of battery , Plaintiffs Hall, Jr . and Dean 's claim s of conversion , and Plaintiff Saleh 's claim of tortious

interference with a business relationship . ED.E.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

ï'For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must view

the allegations of the complaint the light most favorable to

Plaintiff , consider allegations of the complaint as true , and

accept all reasonable inferences .' Omar ex rel . Cannon v . Lindsev ,

334 F .3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir . 2003) (citations omitted). However,

the Court does not have to uaccept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation .' Bell Atlantic Corp . v . Twomblv ,

550

544, 555 (2007) '%To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter , accep ted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face .' Ashcroft

v . Icbal, 129 S .Ct . 1937 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted).

For a claim to have facial p lausibility , a plaintiff must plead

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''factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged .'' Id . The plausibility standard 'ïasks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully .'' Id . Therefore ,
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do .'' Id . In addition , the Court may grant a motion to dism iss when , uon the basis of a dispositive issue of law , no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action .'' Marshall Cntv . Bd .
of Educ. v. Marshall Cntv . Gas Distw 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
111 . DISCUSSION A . Conversion The City first argues that is immune from Plaintiffs Hall,
Jr . and Dean 's suit for conversion pursuant to Fla . Stat . 5768.28 (9)(a). Plaintiffs Hall, Jr. and Dean concede that the inclusion of the terms uknowingly ' and uwanton ly'' preclude their respective claims against the City and, in the alternative , argue that further amendment of the Complaint to remove said language will allow their respective claim s for conversion to proceed . In reply , the City maintains that no manner of construction allows Plaintiffs Hall , Jr . and Dean to state a claim of conversion against it because ''the claim itself connotes malice even without the use of the words (knowing, malice, bad faith, etc...)'' and that
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dismissal is warranted . ED .E. 65 at 2). The Court is unpersuaded

by the arguments presented on either side of this issue .

Nonetheless , the Court finds that dism issal is appropriate and that

Fla . Stat. 5768.2849)(a) immunizes the City from Plaintiffs Hall,

Jr . and Dean 's conversion claims .

In order to resolve the issue presented , the Court must

reconcile the plain language of Fla. Stat. 768.28(9)(a) with the

current state of the 1aw in Florida regarding conversion claims .

To that end, Fla . Stat. 5768.28(9)(a) states, relevant part :

The state or its subdivisions shall not be liable in tort for the acts or om issions of an officer, employee , or agent comm itted wh ile acting outside the course and scope of her or his employment or committed in bad faith or w ith malicious purpose or in a manner exh ibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety , or property .

Fla . Stat. 5768.28(9)(a). Florida law historically defined

conversion as ''an unauthorized act which deprives another of his

property permanently or for an indefinite time .'' Small Business

Admin. v . Echevarria, 864 F.supp . 1254, 1262 (S.D . Fla .

1994)(citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co . v . Carib Aviation, Inc., 759

F .2d

(11th Cir. 1985)). In addition, Florida courts have held

that ''the essence of the tort of conversion is a party 's refusal to

surrender the property after demand has been made.'' Id. (citing

Star Fruit Co. v . Eaqle Lake Growers, Incw 160 Fla . 130 (Fla .

1948)(en bancl). However, Florida courts are split on the question

of uwhether a party must in tend to deprive another of its property

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to find conversion.'' Id. (emphasis added).
Like the case at bar , Erie R . Co . v . Tompkins, 307 U .S . 64

(1938) and its progeny requires federal courts uto apply state

substantive 1aw to cases brought under

ancillary

jurisdiction.'' Vacation Break U.S.A., Inc. v. Marketing Response GrD . & Laser Co., Incw l89 F.R .D. 474, 478 (M.D . Fla. 1999)(citing

Cohen v . Office Depot., Incw l84 F.3d 1292, 1295-1296 (11th Cir .

1999)) As such, ''(w2here the highest court in the state has

rendered no decisions on point

this Court must follow the

opinions of Florida 's intermediate courts, unless it is 'convinced

that the highest court would decide otherwise .''' Lahtinen v .

Libertv Int'l Financial Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 351999, *5 (S .D . Fla .

2014). When intermediate court decisions vary, a ufederal court should apply the rule representing the overwhelming weight of

authority .'' Liberty Mut . Ins . Co . v . Electronic Systems , Inc w 813

F.Supp .802, 805 (S.D . Fla. 1993). However, ''when the weight of
'
authority is evenly balanced , the court must make an 'educated

guess' as to how the Florida Supreme Court would resolve the

conflict.'' Echevarria, 864 F .supp . at 1262 (citing Trial Builder

Suprlv Co. v . Reagan, 409 F.2d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir . 1969))1. Confronted with the same issue , other courts in the Southern

District have concluded that intent is a necessary element

lThe newly formed Eleventh Circuit in Bonner v . Citv of Prichard, 66l F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981)(en banc), held that the decisions of the Fifth Circuit delivered prior to October l, 1981 are binding precedent .
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conversion . See Echevarria, 864 F .supp . at 1262 (''The Court has
examined the cases addressing this issue and concludes that if the

Supreme Court chose to revisit the issue , it would not disturb its

prior ru lings holding that intent is a necessary element of

conversion .'o ; see also Lahtinen, 2014 WL at (uAfter careful

consideration , this Court concludes that Florida 's Supreme Court

would - and has - determined that a plaintiff must prove intent in

order to succeed on conversion . Accordingly , intent is a necessary

element

conversion.v). The rationale underpinning this

jurisprudential evolution is that Florida courts now view the
essence of conversion, not simp ly as uthe possession of property by

the wrongdoer, but rather such possession in conjunction with a
present ânten : on the part of the wrongdoer to deprive the person

entitled to possession of the property .'' Brand v . Old Republic

Nat'l Title Ins. Co ., 797 So.2d 643, 646 (F1a. 3d DCA zoolllciting

Senfeld v . Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co . (Cavman ) Ltd w 450 So .2d

1157, 1160-61 (F1a. 3d DCA 1984)(emphasis added); see also Wilson

Cvpress Co . v. Loqan,

Fla .

(Fla . 1935) This rationale

belies the City 's unsupported contention that à claim of conversion

''itself connotes malice even without the use of the words (knowing,

malice, bad faith, etc ..

ED .E. 65 at

In light of the

aforementioned case 1aw and the extensive analyses contained

therein , the Court finds no reason to depart from their holdings

and , a similar fashion , concludes that intent is a necessary

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element of conversion .

Having found intent as a necessary element of conversion , the

Court returns the plain language of Fla . Stat. 5768.28(9)(a)

insofar as the City is immune from the tortious behavior of its

employees ncommitted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in

a manner exhibiting wanton and willfu l disregard of

property .'' Fla. Stat . 5768.28(9)(a). When a term is undefined in
a statute , as in the present case , courts apply its ordinary

meaning . See Taniguchi v . Kan Pacific Saipan , Ltd .,

S .CY . 1997

(2012). As defined, uwillful'' describes an act done voluntarily or intentionally , but not necessarily maliciously . Black 's Law

Dictionarv (9th ed. 2009). Hence, ''intent' is synonymous with uwillful'' and , as a result, Plaintiffs Hall, Jr . and Dean 's claims

for conversion necessarily invoke the sovereign immunity protection

set forth in Fla. Stat. 5768.28 (9)(a). Cf. Zabriskie v . Citv of

Kissimmee, 2010 WL 3927658, *4 (M .D. Fla. zolollholding that

because the 'intent or recklessness conduct ' requirement of an

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 'is the

equivalent of willful and wanton conduct' described in Fla . Stat .

5768.28(9)(a), the claim was barred).
Moreover, Plaintiffs Hall, Jr . and Dean 's reliance on Springer

v . Fla. Deot. Of Natural Resources, 485 So.2d 15 (F1a . 3d DCA 1986)

for the proposition that a claim of conversion can 1ie against a

municipality is of no moment given the curren t state of the law in

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Florida regarding intent being a necessary element of conversion .

Therefore , the Court finds that further amendment of the Comp laint

would be futile and dismissal is warranted . See Marshall Cntv . Bd .

of Educ w 992 F .2d at 1174 7 Coresello v . Lincare , Inc w 428 F .3d

1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly , the City's motion is
GRANTED as to Counts 56 and 74 of Plaintiffs' First Amended

Comp laint .

B . Battery

Next , the City argues that all of the battery claims asserted against it should be dismissed . Plaintiffs concede that the City

is entitled to dism issal of the battery claim s asserted against

by Plaintiffs Samp son, Daniels, Spivey , Lowery , Hall, Crane , and

Montale, as set forth in Counts 38 , 42, 46, 50, 54 , 67, and 71 .

ED.E. 63 at f4). However, Plaintiffs Picart and Smith argue that
their battery claims should stand because they also assert Fourth

Amendment excessive force claims (Counts 25 and 29) against the City . In rep ly , the City argues that Plaintiffs Picart and Smith 's

respective claims for battery (Counts 59 and 63) fail as matter of 1aw and should be dismissed as well .

Under Florida law ,

excessive force is used in an arrest,

the ordinarily protected use of force by a police officer is

transformed into a battery .'' City of M iami v . Sanders , 672 So .2d 46 (Fla . 3d DCA 1996)(citing Mazzilli v . Doud , 485 So .2d 477,
48l (F1a. 3d DCA 1986)). Additionally, ''Ea) battery claim for

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excessive force is analyzed by focusing upon whether the amount of
force u sed was reasonab le under the circumstances .'' Id .tciting Dixon v . State, 101 Fla. 840 (F1a . 1931); Citv of Miami v . Albro, l20 So .2d 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)).
Here , the record is not sufficiently developed for the Court to determine if Plaintiffs Picart and Smith 's battery claim s for excessive force fail as a matter of law . The City relies on City
of Miami, supra, to support its contention that ncourts given Esic)
substantial discretion to an officers's use of force in the field , and only deem force actionable if uclearly excessive ,'' arguably a
higher threshold than the federal objective reasonableness standard
applied in FourtA Amendment cases.'' (D .E. 65 at 3) (emphasis in original) However, the central holding in City of Miami was ''that the sole basis and limit of an arresting officer 's liability in
making a lawful arrest is founded on a claim of battery , in that excessive force was involved in making the arrest .'' Citv of Miami, 672 So .2d at 48 . The case makes no mention of the nclearly excessive'' standard asserted by the City .
Likew ise, the City relies on Nolin v . Isbell , 207 F .3d 1253 , 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) for its assertion that battery claims are disallowed where de minimis force is applied. ED .E. 65). In Nolin, the Eleventh Circuit held that uthe app lication of de minimis force , without more , will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment .'' Nolin , 207 F .3d at 1257.
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However , the City has not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Picart and Smith 's 51983 claim s for excessive force . Instead , the City only moves to dism iss the battery claim s that are , in this instance , supported by Plaintiffs Picart and Smith 's excessive force allegations .
Viewing the First Amended Complaint in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and accepting the factual allegations as truth , the Court finds Plaintiffs Picart and Sm ith have su fficiently stated claim s for battery against the City . Icbal, 129 S .Ct . 1937 . Whether Plaintiffs Picart and Smith will prevail on their respective claims of battery requires further development of the record and a determination of uwhether the amount of force used was reasonable under the circumstances .'' Citv of Miami, 672 So .2d at 46 . Therefore, the Court finds that the City 's arguments against Plaintiffs Picart and Dean 's battery claims, while meritorious, are
more appropriate at the summary judgment stage of litigation.
Consequently , the City 's motion is DENIED as to Counts 59 and 63 of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint .
Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship Lastly , the City moves to dismiss Plaintiff A 1i A . Saleh 's claim for tortious interference with a business relationship . The Court notes that Plaintiff Saleh does not oppose the City 's motion
and agrees to the dismissal his claim. ED.E. at f5)
Accordingly , the City 's motion is GDAHTED as to Count 77 of
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Plaintiffs' First Amended Comp laint . IV . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing , it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant, City of M iam i Gardens' Motion to Dismiss Claims for Common Law Battery , Conversion , and
Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship (D.E . 58) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, per the Plaintiffs ' concessions,
COUNTS 38, 42# 46, 50, 54 , 67, and 71 of the First Amended Complaint are DISMISSED . is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant, City of Miami Gardens' Motion to Dism iss Claims for Common Law Battery , Conversion , and
Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship ED .E . 58) is
GRAHTED as to COUNTS 56 and 74 . It is further ORDERED AND AD JUDGED that COUNTS 56 and 74 are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE . is further ORD ERED ANn ADJUDGED that Defendant, City of M iami Gardens'
Motion to D ism iss Claims for Common Law Battery , Conversion , and
Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship ED.E . 58) is
DENIED as to COUNTS 59 and 63 . It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant, City of M iami Gardens'
Motion to Dismiss Claims for Common Law Battery , Conversion , and
Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship ED .E . 581
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GRANTED as to COUNT 77 . It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that COUNT 77

the First Amended

Complaint ED.E. 56) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff, Ali

Saleh , shall be TERM INATED from this action .

. & f'

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at ' ', Florida , t 1:

day

of March, 2014 .

Counsel of Record

u

-

Donald L . Graham

UN ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

EARL SAMPSON; TOREE M. DANIELS; BRANDON SPIVEY; ANTHONY LOWERY; FLOYD HALL, JR.; ROSS PICART; RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH; KENNETH CRANE; YVENSONNE MONTALE; OMAR DEAN; and ALI AMIN SALEH; ABIR INC., BARAKA J. SHORT,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS; MATTHEW BOYD; DPAefUenLdaMntIsL.LER; ANTHONY CHAPMAN;
_D_e_f_e_n_d_a_n_ts_. _____________________________________/
___________________________________________/

CASE NO.: GRAHAM

13-24312-CIV-

1 ______________________________________________________________________________
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Table of Contents
THIRD THIRD AMENDED ....................................................................................................................... 3 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES.................................................................................................................. 3 JURISDICTION AND VENUE ................................................................................................................... 4 PARTIES ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 7
The Policies............................................................................................................................................... 8 Field Contacts ......................................................................................................................................... 12 Police Dashboard Camera Recordings.................................................................................................... 13 Earl Sampson .......................................................................................................................................... 15 Toree Daniels .......................................................................................................................................... 22 Brandon Spivey....................................................................................................................................... 25 Anthony Lowery ..................................................................................................................................... 31 Floyd Hall, Jr. ......................................................................................................................................... 33 Ross Picart .............................................................................................................................................. 36 Roderick DeWayne Smith ...................................................................................................................... 37 Kenneth Crane ........................................................................................................................................ 40 Yvensonne Montale ................................................................................................................................ 41 Omar Dean .............................................................................................................................................. 42 Ali Amin Saleh and Abir Inc. ................................................................................................................. 44 Baraka Short............................................................................................................................................ 47 FEDERAL MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIMS....................................................................................... 48 All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens ....................................................................... 48 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourth Amendment ..................................................................... 48 All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens ....................................................................... 51 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment .............................................................. 51 All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens ....................................................................... 54 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Failure to Supervise and Discipline – Violation of Fourth Amendment ......... 54 Plaintiff SALEH against the City of Miami Gardens ............................................................................ 56 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – First Amendment Retaliation ........................................................................... 56 FEDERAL SUPERVISORY LIABILITY CLAIMS ................................................................................. 57
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All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD ......................................................................................... 57 Supervisory Liability – Failure to Correct History of Widespread Abuse.............................................. 57 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourth Amendment .................................................................................. 57 All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER ..................................... 58 Supervisory Liability—Failure to Correct History of Widespread Abuse.............................................. 58 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment ........................................................................... 58 All Named Plaintiffs Against MAJOR CHAPMAN .............................................................................. 60 Supervisory Liability—Direction of Unlawful Acts............................................................................... 60 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment ............................................................... 60 All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER ..................................... 61 Supervisory Liability—Failure to Stop Unlawful Acts .......................................................................... 61 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment ........................................................................... 61 STATE LAW CLAIMS .............................................................................................................................. 62 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for False Arrest ........................................................... 62 Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for False Arrest............................................................. 63 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for False Arrest ................................................................ 64 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for False Arrest ............................................................. 65 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for False Arrest.............................................................. 66 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Civil Battery............................................................... 67 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for False Arrest ................................................................ 68 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Civil Battery ................................................................ 70 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for False Arrest.................................................................. 71 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for False Arrest................................................................. 72 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for False Arrest........................................................... 73 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Civil Battery.................................................................. 74 Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SHORT for Civil Battery................................................................ 75
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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Plaintiffs, EARL SAMPSON, TOREE M. DANIELS, BRANDON SPIVEY, ANTHONY LOWERY, FLOYD HALL, JR., ROSS PICART, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, KENNETH CRANE, YVENSONNE MONTALE, OMAR DEAN, and ALI AMIN SALEH, ABIR INC., and BARAKA J. SHORT, by and through undersigned counsels, sue the above-named Defendants and allege, upon facts, information, and belief, the following:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1.

This action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 (a)(3) and (4), as this action seeks redress for the violation

of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional and Civil Rights.

2.

Pendent and supplemental jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

for this Court to decide claims that may arise under state law.

3.

Venue is properly brought in the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b) and (c) because it is the district in which all of the events or omissions establishing the

Plaintiffs’ claims occurred.

4.

Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§

2201 and 2202 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57.

5.

This Court has authority to award costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 with respect to Plaintiffs’ Constitutional claims.

6.

Plaintiffs have filed Notices of Claim with the Defendant, City of Miami Gardens,

pursuant to Section 768.28, Fla. Stat. Copies of said Notices are attached hereto and marked as

Composite Exhibit “A”.
4 ______________________________________________________________________________
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PARTIES 7. Plaintiff, EARL SAMPSON (“Mr. SAMPSON”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

8.

Plaintiff, TOREE DANIELS (“Ms. DANIELS”), is a black female who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

9.

Plaintiff, OMAR DEAN (“Mr. DEAN”), is a black male who, at all times material

hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida. 10. Plaintiff, FLOYD HALL JR. (“Mr. HALL, JR.”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

11. Plaintiff, ROSS PICART (“Mr. PICART”), is a black Hispanic male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Hallandale, Florida, and worked in Miami Gardens,

Florida.

12. Plaintiff, RODERICK SMITH (“Mr. SMITH”), is a black male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

13. Plaintiff, ANTHONY LOWERY (“Mr. LOWERY”), is a black male who, at all

times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida. 14. Plaintiff, KENNETH CRANE (“Mr. CRANE”), is a black male who, at all times

material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

15. Plaintiff, BRANDON SPIVEY (“Mr. SPIVEY”), is a black male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

16. Plaintiff, YVENSONNE MONTALE (“Mr. MONTALE”), is a black male who, at

all times material hereto, was a resident of Miami Gardens, Florida.

5 ______________________________________________________________________________
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17. Plaintiff, ABIR INC., is the corporation that owns the Quick Stop Convenience Store located at 3185 NW 207th Street, Miami, Florida 33056 (“QUICKSTOP”)
18. Plaintiff, ALI AMIN SALEH (“Mr. SALEH”), is a Hispanic/Middle Eastern male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Pembroke Pines, Florida, and is the sole officer, director, and shareholder of Plaintiff, ABIR INC., the corporation that owns the aforementioned QUICKSTOP.
19. Plaintiff, BARAKA J. SHORT (“Mr. SHORT”), is a black male who, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Miramar, Florida, and a business owner in Miami Gardens, FL.
20. Defendant, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS (“CITY”), is a municipality duly incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The CITY established and maintains the Miami Gardens Police Department (“MGPD”), as a constituent department or agency. The CITY is responsible, through its officers, employees, servants, and agents, for enforcing the regulations of the CITY and for ensuring that its officers, employees, servants, and agents obey the laws of the State of Florida and the United States.
21. Defendant, CHIEF MATTHEW BOYD (Badge No. 100-001) (“CHIEF BOYD”), was, at all times material hereto, the Chief of Police and a final policymaker for the CITY with supervisory authority over all officers and operations of MGPD, including responsibility for training, recruiting, and managing all MGPD officers. He is sued in his individual capacity.
22. Defendant, DEPUTY CHIEF PAUL MILLER (Badge No. 100-004) (“DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER”), was, at all times material hereto, the Deputy Chief of Police. DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER directly oversees the day-to-day operations of MGPD’s three divisions and serves as acting chief during the absence of CHIEF BOYD. He is sued in his individual capacity.
6 ______________________________________________________________________________
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23. Defendant, MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN (Badge No. 100-014) (“MAJOR CHAPMAN”), was, at all times material hereto, Major of Criminal Investigations and part of MGPD command staff. He is sued in his individual capacity.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 24. This is a civil rights action in which named Plaintiffs seek relief for Defendants’ violations of their rights, privileges, and immunities as guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C § 1983; the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the laws of the State of Florida. 25. Defendants have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage and, sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, arrests and prosecutions of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment. 26. In addition, this pattern and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting said actions, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims of this racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males. 27. MGPD’s widespread constitutional abuses are a result of, and are directly and proximately caused by, policies, practices, and/or customs devised, implemented, and enforced by the CITY and CHIEF BOYD.
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28. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD have acted, and continue to act, with deliberate

indifference to the constitutional rights of those who come into contact with MGPD officers by:

(a) failing to properly screen, train, and supervise MGPD officers; (b) inadequately monitoring

MGPD officers during and after stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; (c) failing to

sufficiently discipline MGPD officers who engaged in constitutional abuses, and (d) encouraging,

sanctioning, and failing to rectify MGPD’s unconstitutional practices.

29. The constitutional abuses are a result of either unconstitutional policies, or policies

that, while constitutional on their face, are implemented in such a way that violate constitutionally

protected rights. Additionally, all constitutional abuses have occurred under the color of authority

by MGPD officers.

(a) Quotas Policy

The Policies

30. MGPD final policymakers have created, implemented, and are continuing to

enforce an illegal system of quotas (“Quota Policy”) requiring officers to issue a specific amount

of citations, field contact reports, and arrests per month. The CITY is aware of and has tacitly

approved the Quota Policy.

31. Police Chief Stephen Johnson, who was appointed Police Chief for the CITY in

April 2014, appeared on local television station CBS4, on the program “Facing South Florida

with Jim DeFede,” on or about June 8, 2014, and admitted that a Quota Policy was in place during

the administration of his predecessor, Defendant BOYD.

32. The Quota Policy evaluates officers’ productivity exclusively on the quantity of

arrests, citations, and field contact reports submitted, instead of officers’ adherence to

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constitutional practices, involvement in the community, etc. Officers are rewarded with incentives, benefits, raises, and/or promotions if these arbitrary quotas are met or exceeded. Contrastingly, officers who do not meet the monthly quotas are not only reprimanded but are routinely disciplined and demoted.
33. From 2008 through 2013, the unconstitutional Quota Policy became CITY policy, practice, and/or custom. The Quota Policy was enacted by CHIEF BOYD who is a CITY final policymaker for law enforcement purposes. Further, the CITY was put on notice of the Quota Policy by concerned officers, and failed to rectify the issue.
34. The Quota Policy has directly and proximately led MGPD officers to engage in a pattern and practice of police misconduct resulting in countless race-based and/or national originbased stops. During the course of these stops, MGPD officers have committed thousands of unconstitutional searches, seizures, and false arrests, causing Plaintiffs to suffer continuous injuries.
35. The pressure to perform under the Quota Policy is so pervasive, that many times MGPD officers fabricate field contact reports with CITY residents who were actually incarcerated or at another location being stopped by other officers at the time the officers allegedly made contact.
36. The Quota Policy was implemented in part through a practice called the “all out detail” or “F.I. detail,” in which MGPD officers went out to generate field contacts, stop and frisks, and warrant sweeps. In warrant sweeps, MGPD officers randomly stopped individuals to check if they had outstanding warrants, even though the individuals’ behavior was neither criminal nor suspicious.
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37. As an incentive for participating in an “all out detail” or “F.I. detail,” MGPD officers were either paid overtime (time and a half) based on their regular pay rate, or if Federal grant money was available, officers were paid $77.00 per hour and supervisors, $98.00 per hour, to participate in these special details.
(b) Zero Tolerance Zone Policy 38. In addition to the Quota Policy, MGPD has enacted a “Zero Tolerance Zone” Policy which, although constitutional on its face, has been, and continues to be, applied in such a way that violates the constitutional rights of CITY residents, including named Plaintiffs. 39. The alleged purpose of the policy is to reduce the number of individuals who are seen trespassing and loitering on private property without legitimate business. The policy asks local businesses to complete an affidavit and post a sign on their properties which states that the business owner allows MGPD officers to act on their behalf in their absence. The Zero Tolerance Zone Policy was enacted by the City Council on October 24, 2007, as part of Ordinance No. 200722-128, currently codified at Section 14-59 of the CITY’S Code of Ordinances. Moreover, the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy was thereafter disseminated to the public at large through the MGPD website, at the following URL: http://miamigardenspolice.org/volunteer.htm . 40. MGPD officers have used the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, enacted by the CITY and its final policymakers, to illegally stop-and-frisk, search, seize, and arrest named Plaintiffs while visiting local businesses. This includes businesses which have not enrolled, or previously enrolled but have withdrawn enrollment, in the Zero Tolerance Zone program.
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41. In many instances, MGPD officers have illegally stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested named Plaintiffs, and other CITY residents, while the business owner was present and affirmatively requesting the officers not take any action.
42. Pursuant to this Policy, MGPD officers have stopped hundreds to thousands of children, including children of ages 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 years old, and characterized their behavior as suspicious even though it was neither criminal nor suspicious, and have released the children only after running them for wants and warrants.
43. The CITY and its final policymakers were on notice that MGPD officers were, and are, using the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy to conduct unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests and have failed to rectify the issue.
(c) Racial Targeting Policy 44. Lastly, MGPD officers have used, and continue to use, race and/or national origin for the purpose of stopping, frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting principally black males. Specifically, through information and belief, MGPD has directly ordered its officers to stop-andfrisk black males, ages fifteen through thirty, without reasonable articulable suspicion of criminality (“Racial Targeting Policy”). This directive was issued at roll call by MAJOR CHAPMAN, and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER knew of this directive and did not countermand it. 45. The Racial Targeting Policy was implemented and ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker, and was tacitly approved by the CITY. The policy, which is unconstitutional on its face, impermissibly uses race and/or national origin and age, not reasonable articulable suspicion, as the determinative factor in initiating police interaction.
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46. From 2008 through 2013, this policy has resulted in countless field contact reports of investigatory stops which were conducted pursuant to this policy, without any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminality.
47. All of the foregoing unconstitutional and illegal violations were conducted by MGPD police officers under the color of law.
48. Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that the policies, practices, and/or customs described herein violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing such polices, practices, and/or customs. In addition, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for violations of their constitutionally protected rights. Plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Field Contacts
49. MGPD officers frequently filled out Field Contact forms that on their face stated a constitutionally insufficient basis for stopping, frisking, and/or arresting a subject.
50. For instance, many Field Contact forms stated no other basis for a stop than an individual’s presence in a high crime area, even though it has been clearly established law for over three decades that an individual’s presence in a high crime area, standing alone, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that would justify a police officer stopping the individual.
51. Additionally, many Field Contact forms reflected stops based on an individual remaining in a public location, notwithstanding the recognized Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in remaining in a place of one’s choosing.
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52. Many Field Contact forms reflected warnings and/or arrests for trespassing, even though there was no complaint from the property owner about the individual’s presence.
53. MGPD officers used the same boilerplate phrases repeatedly in many Field Contact forms, rather than providing an individualized description of the stops they conducted sufficient to support reasonable articulable suspicion and arguable probable cause.
54. MGPD officers have acknowledged a frequent practice of copying and pasting boilerplate incident descriptions from one Field Contact form to another.
55. MGPD officers prepared Field Contact forms by computer, and the form featured a dropdown menu for filling in the box on the second line of the form labeled “Reason”. When no other category applied, MGPD officers were instructed to select “Suspicious Person” as the reason for the stop.
56. MGPD officers failed to document stops with Field Contact forms. 57. Notwithstanding these and other deficiencies appearing regularly in Field Contact forms, MGPD officers’ immediate supervisors routinely approved the Field Contact forms, and did not discipline subordinate officers for deficiencies in these forms, or for failure to fill out a Field Contact form when required. 58. MGPD officers filled out 99,000 Field Contact forms over the five-year period of 2008 through 2013, in a city with a population of approximately 107,000 as of the 2010 U.S. Census. By contrast, police officers in the City of Miami, with a population of nearly 400,000 as of the 2010 U.S. Census, filled out only 5,000 Field Contact forms during the same time period.
Police Dashboard Camera Recordings
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59. On or about June 12, 2008, the CITY enacted a policy (MGPD 5.4), requiring all

MGPD police vehicles to be equipped with audio/visual recording systems. (See attached MGPD

Policy 5.4 title Video/Audio Recording System attached as Exhibit B.) This policy was revised

on October 23, 2008, and on June 8, 2010.

60. Upon information and belief the City and MGPD, received Federal funding to carry

out the installation of video/audio equipment in their marked police vehicles.

61. According to the MGPD Policy, the following incidents shall be both audibly and

visually recorded: All traffic stops (including, but not limited to, traffic violations, traffic crash

investigations, and assistance to stranded motorists), and all crime interdiction stops.

62. Pursuant to MGPD Policy 5.4 supervisors are responsible for assuring that audio

visual recording devices are working and that the MGPD officers are utilizing them properly.

63. Upon information and belief, BOYD was aware that MGPD officers and

supervisors were disregarding Policy 5.4, which required MGPD officers to record incidents with

their dashboard cameras, including incidents complained of herein. Yet rather than ensuring

compliance, BOYD continued to ignore this policy created to maintain the integrity of MGPD

police officers.

64. BOYD was charged with preserving this evidence, yet MGPD officers and

supervisors were not disciplined for failure to record interactions with their dashboard cameras.

65.

In September 2012, Plaintiffs provided BOYD with video footage recorded by

Plaintiffs highlighting misconduct being committed by MGPD officers in violation of 42 USC

§1983 and the U.S. Constitution, yet BOYD continued to disregard Policy 5.4 and allow officers

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to deliberately not operate their dashboard cameras, or worse, to alter, delete, and destroy the video evidence.
Earl Sampson
66. Mr. SAMPSON is a twenty-eight year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for approximately thirteen years. Mr. SAMPSON has been an employee of the QUICKSTOP since October 2011.
67. Over the course of four years, spanning from 2008 to 2012, Mr. SAMPSON was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested over 288 times within the CITY and by MGPD officers —the equivalent of roughly once every week for four years. In all 288 instances, an investigatory stop was performed by MGPD officers who checked Mr. SAMPSON for outstanding warrants.
68. Well over 200 of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests occurred without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required by law.
69. Out of the 288 times Mr. SAMPSON was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested only sixty-three times. Out of the sixty-three arrests, thirty arrests resulted in no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or the Court dismissing the case for lack of probable cause at bonds. And of the remaining twenty-seven convictions, they are currently subject of a pending motion to vacate all the convictions on the basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence of actual innocence.
70. The twenty-seven convictions were all based on charges for trespassing at the QUICKSTOP. During the course of all twenty-seven arrests, Mr. SAMPSON was either at the
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QUICKSTOP with full permission from the owner, Mr. SALEH, or was working at the QUICKSTOP. On several occasions Mr. SAMPSON was arrested for trespassing while working stocking the shelves or taking out the garbage at the QUICKSTOP.
71. The following are descriptions of a sample of these incidents. 72. On October 15, 2010, at 10:00 a.m., Mr. SAMPSON was sitting outside of the public library on NW 183rd street smoking a cigar. Mr. SAMPSON was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Anita Hopson, who was acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the incident. Officer Hopson detained Mr. SAMPSON despite the lack of any reasonable articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity at the time. Mr. SAMPSON's identification was demanded of him, and he complied and acquiesced to Officer Hopson’s authority. While Officer Hopson checked Mr. SAMPSON's identification information for wants or warrants, she also interrogated him about his reasons for being at the public library. Mr. SAMPSON truthfully told her that he was waiting to meet a friend and that he had no intention to go inside and use the library facilities. Officer Hopson then instructed Mr. Sampson, that he was not allowed to lounge at or around the public library and that he must to leave. Mr. SAMPSON complied with her instruction to leave the area. 73. The North Dade Regional Public Library was open to the public at the time of this incident. The library's posted hours on a Friday are 10:00 a.m. through 6:00 p.m. There was no annotation that anyone from the public library requested that Mr. SAMPSON be removed or trespassed from the grounds. Mr. SAMPSON was illegally detained and interrogated and then improperly trespassed from the public library. MGPD Officer Stacey Rovinelli approved the Field Contact form pertaining to this incident.
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74. On October 19, 2010, around 6:25 p.m., Mr. SAMPSON was at or near the intersection of NW 27th Ave and NW 207th Street. Mr. SAMPSON was not engaged in any criminal activity at the time. There is no annotation on the Field Contact form as to what Mr. SAMPSON was alleged to have been doing at time, and there is also no articulated reasonable suspicion as to his involvement in any criminal activity. Despite this, MGPD Officer Randy Carpenter stopped and detained Mr. SAMPSON, then ordered Mr. SAMPSON to produce his identification information. Mr. SAMPSON acquiesced to his authority and complied. Mr. SAMPSON's identification information was then checked by Officer Carpenter for any wants or warrants, and when that was done Mr. SAMPSON was released. MGPD Officer Buddy Hunholz approved the Field Contact Report and thereby all actions contained therein.
75. On November 3, 2010, around 9:24 p.m., Mr. SAMPSON was standing in front of a residential home at 21099 NW 32nd Ave while walking on his way to the store. Mr. SAMPSON lives a few blocks away from the listed location. While standing for a moment at that location, Mr. SAMPSON was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Alex Barney, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD at the time, despite Officer Barney having no reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. SAMPSON was engaged in criminal activity. Officer Barney ordered Mr. SAMPSON to provide his identification information, and Mr. SAMPSON complied. While Officer Barney was checking Mr. SAMPSON's identification information for wants or warrants, he interrogated Mr. Sampson as to his reason for being in the residential neighborhood, a block from his own residence. Mr. SAMPSON told Officer Barney that he was on his way to the store. Once Defendant BARNEY was done checking Mr. Sampson's identification information and interrogating him, Mr. SAMPSON was released.
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76. At the same exact time on November 3, 2010, Officer Barney, along with Officer Christopher Shuman, managed to observe Mr. SAMPSON three blocks away, at the QUICKSTOP, located at 3185 NW 207th street, standing in front of the store not conducting any business. Officers Barney and Shuman, who were acting in the course and scope of their employment with MGPD at the time, detained and then gave a written arrest to Mr. SAMPSON for trespass after warning. See Miami Gardens Police Case 2010-024632. The QUICKSTOP was open to the public at the time of these incidents. Neither the owner, nor an authorized representative of the owner, had requested that Mr. SAMPSON be removed, trespassed or arrested. Thus, the arrest occurred absent arguable probable cause. The Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office dismissed the case against Mr. SAMPSON.
77. Also on November 3, 2010, one MINUTE later, after being released by Officers Barney and Shuman, Mr. SAMPSON was then detained at the QUICKSTOP by MGPD Officer William Wagenmann for loitering. The annotated address on the Field Contact Report indicates the address of the QUICKSTOP, while the narrative on the Field Contact Report indicates that Mr. SAMPSON was allegedly loitering near Buccaneer Park, which is across the street and has its own address. In approximate terms, the Park is nearly 500 feet from the parking lot of the QUICKSTOP and nearly 1000 feet from the front entrance of the store. Officer Wagenmann approved his own Field Contact Report for his detention of Mr. SAMPSON. MGPD Officer Joseph Nargiso approved the conflicting Field Contact Report and Offense Incident Report authored by Officer Barney detailing his two interactions with Mr. SAMPSON and the written arrest issued. It is physically impossible for all three incidents documented in the Field Contact reports and the Offense Incident Report to have occurred as described therein.
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78. On June 7, 2011, around 4:48 p.m., Mr. SAMPSON was standing near Buccaneer Park, across from the QUICKSTOP. Mr. SAMPSON was detained by MGPD Officer Barney, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD at the time. Officer Barney detained Mr. SAMPSON on the basis that Mr. SAMPSON was in front of this public city park "not participating in any activities." This is not reasonable articulable suspicion or criminal activity. Officer Barney ordered Mr. SAMPSON to produce his identification, and Mr. SAMPSON complied. Once Officer Barney checked Mr. SAMPSON's identification information for wants or warrants, Officer Barney released Mr. SAMPSON. MGPD Officer William Wagenmann approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained therein.
79. On August 26, 2011, at 11:09 p.m., Mr. SAMPSON was in the area of 20699 NW 27th Avenue, near the Race Trac Gas Station, but not at the Race Trac. Mr. SAMPSON was detained by MGPD Officer Michael Horn, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD at the time. Officer Horn did not have any reasonable articulable suspicion for detaining Mr. SAMPSON. Officer Horn ordered Mr. SAMPSON to produce his identification information, and Mr. SAMPSON complied. Once Officer Horn determined that there were no wants or warrants outstanding for Mr. SAMPSON, Mr. SAMPSON was released. Officer Buddy Hunholz approved the Field Contact Report for this incident and thereby everything contained therein.
80. On September 21, 2011, around 12:05 p.m., Mr. SAMPSON was in or around Bunche Park riding a bicycle. Mr. SAMPSON was stopped and detained by Officer Carlos Austin, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time. Officer Austin's stated reason for stopping and detaining Mr. SAMPSON was that Mr. SAMPSON was "riding around
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the Bunche Park area, aimlessly." Officer Austin stopped, detained and searched Mr. SAMPSON to determine that he did not have any drugs or weapons on him. Officer Austin also ordered Mr. SAMPSON to produce his identification information, and Mr. SAMPSON complied. Once Mr. SAMPSON's information came back clear of wants or warrants, he was released. Mr. SAMPSON was illegally stopped, detained and searched without reasonable articulable suspicion. MGPD Officer Joseph Nargiso approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained therein.
81. On January 21, 2012 around 8:52 p.m. Mr. SAMPSON was near the QUICKSTOP when he was stopped by Officer Victor Velez, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD. Officer Velez had no articulable reasonable suspicion that Mr. SAMPSON was engaged in criminal activity at that time. The only stated basis for the stop was a conclusory assertion that Mr. SAMPSON was loitering. Officer Velez ordered Mr. SAMPSON to produce his identification information, and Mr. SAMPSON complied. Officer Velez checked Mr. SAMPSON's identification information for wants or warrants and then released him. The QUICKSTOP was open to the public during the entirety of this incident. Neither the store owner nor an authorized representative of the store owner had requested that Mr. SAMPSON be removed, trespassed or investigated. Officer Mason approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained therein.
82. On February 15, 2012, around 12:40 a.m., Mr. SAMPSON was in an open area behind the QUICKSTOP. Mr. SAMPSON was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Victor Velez, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD at the time. Officer Velez detained Mr. SAMPSON without any reasonable articulable suspicion that he was engaged
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in criminal activity. The only stated basis for the stop was a conclusory assertion that Mr. SAMPSON was loitering. Officer Velez ordered Mr. SAMPSON to produce his identification information, and Mr. SAMPSON complied. Once Officer Velez checked Mr. SAMPSON's identification information for wants and warrants and the check came back negative, Mr. SAMPSON was released. Officer Rufus Williams approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained therein.
83. On August 23, 2012, at 9:03 p.m., MGPD Officers Michael Wagoner, Eddo Trimino, and Martin Santiago arrested Mr. SAMPSON for trespassing, while he was inside the QUICKSTOP. Officer Wagoner walked right past the store owner SALEH, who had already made an Internal Affairs complaint that day because, among other things, MGPD officers kept arresting his employee Mr. SAMPSON for the crime of trespassing while he was working. The QUICKSTOP was open to the public during the entirety of this incident. Neither the store owner nor an authorized representative of the store owner had requested that Mr. SAMPSON be removed, trespassed or investigated. Officer Wagoner arrested Mr. SAMPSON without arguable probable cause for the crime of trespassing. Officer Santiago approved the Offense Incident Report and arrest. After being presented with a video of the incident and a defense witness list, the Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office dismissed the charge against Mr. SAMPSON.
84. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, frisked, and/or arrested Mr. SAMPSON.
85. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. SAMPSON’s constitutional rights.
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Toree Daniels
86. Ms. DANIELS is a thirty-five year old black female who has been a resident of the CITY for her entire life.
87. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from February 2008 to January 2013, Ms. DANIELS was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested at least 180 times within the CITY and by MGPD officers — equivalent to roughly once every 4.08 days for nearly five years. In all instances, an investigatory stop was performed by MGPD officers who checked Ms. DANIELS for outstanding warrants.
88. Well over 200 of these stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests occurred without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required by law.
89. Out of the 180 times Ms. DANIELS was stopped by MGPD officers, she was arrested only fifty-five times. Out of the fifty-five arrests, twenty-three resulted in no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or the charges were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause. Ms. DANIELS has had four convictions vacated, and proceedings are pending to vacate additional convictions.
90. Similar to Mr. SAMPSON, many of Ms. DANIELS’ contacts with MGPD officers took place while at the QUICKSTOP where, again, the owner, Mr. SALEH, had given her full permission to be on the premises. A sampling of the incidents are described in detail below.
91. On October 25, 2010 around 7:00 p.m., Ms. DANIELS was at the QUICKSTOP when she was detained by MGPD Officer Randy Carpenter, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD. Officer Carpenter detained Ms. DANIELS without any
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reasonable articulable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity. Officer CARPENTER ordered Ms. DANIELS to produce her identification information, and Ms. DANIELS complied. Officer Carpenter checked Ms. Daniels’ identification information for wants or warrants, and then released her when she came back clear. The QUICKSTOP was open to the public during the entirety of this incident. Neither the store owner nor an authorized representative of the store owner had requested that Ms. DANIELS be removed, trespassed or arrested. Officer Buddy Hunholz approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained or not contained therein.
92. On June 4, 2011, around 12:38 a.m., Ms. DANIELS was in the 21000 block of N.W. 32nd Avenue, when she was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Javier Romaguera, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD at the time. Officer Romaguera lacked any reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Ms. DANIELS was involved in criminal activity. The annotated reason for his detention was that Ms. DANIELS was hanging out in an area known for narcotics. Officer Romaguera ordered Ms. DANIELS to produce her identification information, and Ms. DANIELS complied. Officer Romaguera checked Ms. Daniels’ identification information for wants or warrants, and then released her. MGPD Sgt. Rufus Williams approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained or not contained therein.
93. On December 17, 2011, around 6:50 p.m., Ms. DANIELS was at the QUICKSTOP. She was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Alex Barney, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD at the time. Officer Barney lacked any reasonable articulable suspicion that Ms. DANIELS was involved in criminal activity at the time. Officer
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Barney gave Ms. DANIELS a written arrest for trespass after warning. The QUICKSTOP was open to the public during the entirety of this incident. Neither the store owner nor an authorized representative of the store owner had requested that Ms. DANIELS be removed, trespassed or arrested. Officer Buddy Hunholz approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained or not contained therein. The case against Ms. DANIELS was dismissed.
94. On May 11, 2012, around 12:30 a.m., Ms. DANIELS was walking about a block from her residence when she was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Henry Payoute, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD at the time, but lacked any reasonable articulable suspicion that Ms. DANIELS was involved in any criminal activity. Officer Payoute ordered Ms. DANIELS to produce her identification information, and she complied. While checking the identification information for wants or warrants, Officer Payoute interrogated Ms. DANIELS about her reason for being out on the public streets. Ms. DANIELS told him that she was just out taking a walk. Officer Payoute ordered Ms. DANIELS to "walk back to her residence and stay off the street corner." Ms. DANIELS was then released. MGPD Sgt. Diana Hedrick approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained or not contained therein.
95. On May 24, 2012, around 2:00 a.m., Ms. DANIELS was just down the road from the twenty four-hour True Value Food Mart when she was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Alvin Bernard, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MGPD. Officer Bernard detained Ms. DANIELS without any reasonable articulable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity. Officer Bernard ordered Ms. DANIELS to produce her identification information, and Ms. DANIELS complied. Officer Bernard checked Ms.
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DANIELS’ identification information for wants or warrants and interrogated her as to her reason for being on the public streets. Ms. DANIELS explained that she was going to the store up the road. Ms. DANIELS was released when the records check came back in the clear. MGPD Sgt. Hedrick approved the Field Contact Report and thereby everything contained or not contained therein.
96. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, frisked, and/or arrested Ms. DANIELS.
97. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Ms. DANIEL’s constitutional rights.
Brandon Spivey
98. Mr. Spivey is a twenty-four year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for his entire life.
99. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from February 2008 to January 2013, Mr. SPIVEY was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, at least fifty times within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
100. Out of the fifty times Mr. SPIVEY was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested only fourteen times. Out of the fourteen arrests, six arrests resulted in no action by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause. Mr. SPIVEY has had four convictions vacated, and proceedings are pending to vacate additional convictions. A
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sampling of these incidents in which Mr. SPIVEY was stopped and/or arrested are described below.
101. On April 25, 2008, around 10:15 a.m., Mr. SPIVEY was stopped and detained while he was walking home from school by MGPD Officer Dagostinis for "acting suspicious." Officer Dagostinis ordered Mr. SPIVEY to produce his identification information, and he complied. While Mr. SPIVEY was detained, his grandmother passed by and stopped. Once Mr. SPIVEY’s identification was cleared, the officer released him to his grandmother. MGPD Officer Hunholz approved the Field Contact Report.
102. On June 11, 2009, around 7:20 p.m., Mr. SPIVEY was just a few blocks away from his house when he was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Rodriguez, who ordered Mr. SPIVEY and Devon Clark, who was present with Mr. SPIVEY, to produce their identification information. Both complied with Officer Rodriguez’s request. Officer Rodriguez checked Mr. SPIVEY’S identification information and then released him. MGPD Officer Prince approved the Field Contact Report.
103. On September 9, 2009, around 5:46 p.m., Mr. SPIVEY was just outside of Buccaneer Park when he was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Coleman. Officer Coleman ordered Mr. SPIVEY to produce his identification information, and he complied. Officer Coleman then searched Mr. SPIVEY and when his identification information and his person were both found to be clear, he was released. MGPD Officer Kolackovsky approved the Field Contact Report.
104. On January 19, 2010, around 9:08 p.m., Mr. SPIVEY was just a few blocks from home when he was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Perdomo. Officer Perdomo did not
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advise Mr. SPIVEY why he was being stopped, but ordered him to produce his identification information, and he complied. While Mr. SPIVEY’s identification information was being checked, Officer Perdomo also searched Mr. SPIVEY’s person without his consent. Once the check of Mr. SPIVEY’S person and his identification information came back clear, he was released. MGPD Officer Kolackovsky approved the Field Contact Report.
105. On May 1, 2010, around 4:00 p.m., Mr. SPIVEY was at the QUICKSTOP when he was detained by MGPD Officer Harris, for sitting on a milk crate. Officer HARRIS ordered Mr. SPIVEY to produce his identification information and he complied. Officer Harris then gave Mr. SPIVEY a written arrest for trespass after warning. MGPD Officer Kolackovsky approved the Offense Incident Report.
106. On November 20, 2010, around 12:48 a.m., Mr. SPIVEY was at the QUICKSTOP when he was detained by MGPD Officer Engers. Officer Engers ordered him to produce his identification information and he complied. While Officer Engers checked Mr. SPIVEY’s identification information he also interrogated him about his purpose for being at the QUICKSTOP, and Mr. SPIVEY replied that he was there waiting for a friend. Mr. SPIVEY was then physically searched without his consent, and subsequently released when his record check was clear. Officer Hohendorf approved the Field Contact Report.
107. On January 20, 2011, around 12:51 a.m, Mr. SPIVEY was at the QUICKSTOP when he was detained by MGPD Officer Eddo Trimino, Officer Jeremy Pilone, and Officer Vega, who were acting in the course and scope of their employment with MGPD at the time, conducting surveillance on the QUICKSTOP. These three MGPD officers detained Mr. SPIVEY without any reasonable articulable suspicion. The annotated reason for the detention was that Mr. SPIVEY
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was walking back and forth in front of the QUICKSTOP, and he did not make a purchase. Officers Trimino, Pilone, and Vega initially approached Mr. SPIVEY outside the store, but he did not wish to speak with them, so they then followed him inside. The officers then detained Mr. SPIVEY, ordering him to produce his identification information, and he complied with the order. Officers Trimino, Pilone, and Vega then issued Mr. SPIVEY a written arrest for trespass after warning and escorted him off the premises.
108. The QUICKSTOP was open to the public during the entirety of this January 20, 2011, incident. Neither the store owner nor an authorized representative thereof had requested that Mr. Spivey be removed, trespassed or arrested, and consequently the MGPD officers did not have arguable probable cause for this arrest. Officer Pilone approved Offense Incident Report 2011-001419 and thereby everything contained or not contained therein. The Miami Dade State Attorney’s Office dismissed the case against Mr. SPIVEY.
109. On April 16, 2011, around 6:45 p.m., Mr. SPIVEY was near Buccaneer Park when he was detained by MGPD Officer Seda. Officer Seda ordered him to produce his identification information and he complied. Officer Seda then checked Mr. SPIVEY’S identification information, and when it was found to be clear he was released. MGPD Officer Williams approved the Field Contact Report.
110. On May 24, 2011, around 4:23 p.m, Mr. SPIVEY was at Buccaneer Park hanging out with some friends. While at the public park, Mr. SPIVEY was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Barrios, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment. Officer Barrios detained Mr. SPIVEY without any reasonable articulable suspicion that he was involved in any criminal activity. The annotated reason for the detention was that Mr. SPIVEY was sitting
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next to the restrooms at Buccaneer Park. Officer Barrios ordered Mr. SPIVEY to produce his

identification information and Mr. SPIVEY complied. Once the record check came back clear,

Mr. SPIVEY was released. MGPD Officer Stacey Rovinelli approved the Offense Incident Report

and thereby everything contained or not contained therein.

111.

On June 2, 2011, around 2:36 a.m., Mr. SPIVEY was in the vicinity of the

QUICKSTOP and Buccaneer Park when he approached and detained by MGPD Officer Victor

Velez, who was acting within the course and scope of his employment with MGPD. Officer

Velez detained Mr. SPIVEY without any reasonable articulable suspicion. The annotated reason

on the Field Contact Report was a conclusory statement that Mr. SPIVEY was loitering in the

area. Officer Velez ordered Mr. SPIVEY to produce his identification information and he

complied. Once the record check came back clear, Mr. SPIVEY was released. MGPD Officer

Stephen Kolackovsky approved the Offense Incident Report and thereby everything contained or

not contained therein.

112. On August 31, 2011, around 11:00 p.m., Mr. SPIVEY was at the QUICKSTOP

when he was detained by MGPD Officers Onassis Perdomo and Alberto Seda, who were acting

within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. Officers Perdomo and Seda

detained Mr. SPIVEY without any reasonable articulable suspicion, and then gave Mr. SPIVEY

a written arrest for trespass after warning. The QUICKSTOP was open to the public during the

entirety of this incident. Neither the store owner nor an authorized representative thereof had

requested that Mr. SPIVEY be removed, trespassed or arrested, and consequently Officers

Perdomo and Seda had no arguable probable cause to make this arrest. MGPD Officer Rufus

Williams approved the Offense Incident Report and thereby everything contained or not
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contained therein. The Miami-Dade County State Attorney’s Office dismissed the charges against Mr. SPIVEY.
113. On October 23, 2011, around 1:30 p.m., Mr. SPIVEY was in the area of 20800 N.W. 34th Court, a residential neighborhood, when he was approached and detained along with another male, Daryle Hopper, by MGPD Officer Vanderheyden because they were allegedly in an area that had had a recent increase in violent crimes. Officer Vanderheyden ordered Mr. SPIVEY to produce his identification information and he complied. While checking the identification information for wants or warrants, Officer Vanderheyden also searched Mr. SPIVEY, allegedly pursuant to his consent. Mr. SPIVEY either did not consent, or consented under coercion and duress. There was nothing located during this search. Once Mr. SPIVEY’s record check came back clear he was released. MGPD Officer S. White approved the Field Contact Report.
114. On February 13, 2012, around 12:46 a.m., Mr. SPIVEY was driving Jeremiah Brownlee when he was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Horn. Officer Horn ordered him to produce his identification information and he complied. When Mr. SPIVEY’s information was cleared, he was released. MGPD Officer Hunholz approved the Field Contact Report.
115. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, frisked, and/or arrested Mr. SPIVEY.
116. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. SPIVEY’s constitutional rights.
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 101 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/17/2014 Page 31 of 79
Anthony Lowery
117. Mr. LOWERY is a forty-nine year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for forty-two years.
118. Over the course of approximately five years, spanning from 2008 to 2013, Mr. LOWERY was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, at least nine times within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
119. Out of the nine times Mr. LOWERY was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested five times. Out of the five arrests, all arrests resulted in no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause. Some of the incidents are detailed below.
120. On June 11, 2009, Mr. LOWERY was outside of the QUICKSTOP, when MGPD Officer Onassis Perdomo stopped Mr. LOWERY and arrested him for drinking in public, even though he was not drinking in public at that time. MGPD Officer Stephen Kolackovsky reviewed and approved the Offense Incident Report. The State Attorney's Office declined to file charges.
121. On May 18, 2012, MGPD Officer Nicholas Jacobs was on a directed patrol at the QUICKSTOP. Officer Jacobs alleged that Mr. LOWERY was INSIDE of the QUICKSTOP drinking a 12 ounce Bud Light beer, but in fact Mr. LOWERY was not drinking an alcoholic beverage in or near the QUICKSTOP. MGPD Officer Martin Santiago reviewed and approved the Arrest Affidavit and Field Contact Report. The State Attorney's Office declined to file charges.
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122. On June 22, 2012, Mr. LOWERY was at the QUICKSTOP, when MGPD Officers William Dunaske and Jimy Sanchez saw Mr. LOWERY with hair cutting equipment. Plaintiff was detained and his hair cutting tools were seized. Without giving Miranda warnings, Officer Dunaske interrogated Mr. LOWERY about what he was doing. Mr. LOWERY honestly responded that he was just giving a few trims/haircuts, and did not claim that he was charging the two men for trimming up their hair. Officers Dunaske and Sanchez arrested Mr. LOWERY for unlicensed barbering under Chapter 476, Florida Statutes, even though barbering must be done for compensation to be subject to the statutes. The Arrest Affidavit and Offense Incident report were reviewed and approved by Officer Martin Santiago. The State Attorney's Office declined to file charges.
123. On June 10, 2009, Mr. LOWERY was alleged to have been with a group of males who were in an area where shots were fired. There was no allegation that Mr. LOWERY or any of the males that he was alleged to have been with were involved in, or even suspected of being involved in, the shots that were fired. However, field contact was initiated by Officer Perdomo, and Mr. LOWERY was detained. The detention and description provided of the detention was approved by Officer Kolackovsky.
124. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, frisked, and/or arrested Mr. LOWERY.
125. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. LOWERY’s constitutional rights.
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 101 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/17/2014 Page 33 of 79
Floyd Hall, Jr.
126. Mr. HALL, JR. is a fifty-three year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for forty-nine years.
127. From 2008 to 2013, Mr. HALL, JR. was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, approximately forty-six times within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
128. Out of the approximately forty-six times Mr. HALL, JR was stopped by MGPD officers, he was arrested fourteen times. Out of the fourteen arrests, all resulted in either no action being taken by the State Attorney’s Office or were dismissed by the Court for lack of probable cause.
129. On June 23, 2010, around 5:10 p.m., Mr. HALL was right next to the QUICKSTOP when he was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Saint-Louis for being in a “high narcotics area.” Officer Saint-Louis ordered him to produce his identification information, and he complied. Once his identification information was clear, Mr. HALL was allowed to leave. MGPD Officer Kolackovsky approved the Field Contact form for this incident.
130. On September 28, 2010, at approximately 12:15 p.m., Mr. HALL saw police activity in the area of the QUICKSTOP. Since he did not know what was going on, Mr. HALL went towards his house, but was stopped by MGPD Officer Warren. Officer Warren ordered Mr. HALL to produce his identification information, and he complied. After his identification information was checked, Mr. HALL was released. MGPD Officer Wagner approved the Field Contact form for this incident.
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131. On November 12, 2010, around 1 a.m., Mr. HALL was walking just two blocks home from a friend’s house, when he was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Romaguera. Officer Romaguera ordered him to produce his identification information, and he complied. While checking Mr. HALL’s identification, Officer Romaguera asked Mr. HALL why he was out in public, and he explained that he was just walking home from a friend’s house. Officer Romaguera then released him. MGPD Officer Santiago approved the Field Contact form for this incident.
132. On August 10, 2012, around 9:07 p.m., Mr. HALL was at the QUICKSTOP, when he was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Eric. Officer Eric ordered him to produce his identification information, and he complied. While Officer Eric was checking Mr. HALL’s identification for wants and warrants, he asked Mr. HALL why he was at the QUICKSTOP. Mr. HALL replied that he was waiting for his ride due to the rain that was coming through. Once Mr. HALL’s identification came back clear, he was released, and he left the QUICKSTOP as soon as his ride arrived. MGPD Officer Nargiso approved the Field Contact form for this incident.
133. On November 15, 2012, at approximately 11:30 p.m., MGPD Officers William Dunaske, Martin Santiago, and others, stopped Mr. HALL JR., at the QUICKSTOP, without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause. Mr. HALL had been watching a game at the QUICKSTOP. When Mr. HALL JR. exited the store, Officers Dunaske and Santiago, along with other officers, stopped and frisked Mr. HALL, conducted a full search of Mr. HALL, handcuffed him, and removed a Taser from Mr. HALL’s person. Officers Dunaske and Santiago did not generate a police report about this incident, nor did they place the seized property into evidence as required by MGPD policy. Throughout this incident, Officers Dunaske, Santiago,
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and others, were acting within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. Upon Information and belief, Officers Dunaske and Santiago, along with other officers, appropriated the property and permanently deprived HALL of said property. Officer Santiago was the supervisor on scene, at he participated, encouraged, authorized or acquiesced to DUNASKE’s conduct.
134. On July 3, 2013, Mr. HALL was sitting in front of the QUICKSTOP drinking a soda from a KFC cup. An MGPD police squad led by Officers Martin Santiago, Eddo Trimino, and Carlos Velez, arrested Mr. HALL and several other persons for allegedly drinking in front of the Quick Stop. Officer Trimino opened the lid of Mr. HALL’s cup without consent and alleged that Mr. HALL, along with the other co-defendants, was drinking alcoholic beverages. Officer Velez generated a police report indicating that Mr. HALL was drinking a “natural ice” beer, even though no beer was ever photographed or collected as evidence. Officer Velez also mentioned in his report information about his knowledge that Mr. SALEH was suing the MGPD.
135. Mr. HALL and the rest of the defendants were arrested and placed in a transport van. Mr. HALL was searched prior to being placed in the Van and he did not have any drugs on him at the time. After being transported, the transporting Detective Christopher Shuman claimed he found narcotics in the van and attributed said drugs to Mr. HALL. Mr. HALL denied having drugs on his person and claimed that the drugs were planted by the MGPD. After being presented with exculpatory evidence, including video evidence of the illegal search, the Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office did not file charges against Mr. HALL.
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136. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, frisked, and/or arrested Mr. HALL.
137. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. HALL, JR.’s constitutional rights.
Ross Picart
138. Mr. PICART is a thirty-four year old black male. Mr. PICART has been an employee of the QUICKSTOP since 2005.
139. On December 21, 2012, Mr. PICART was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by MGPD officers William Dunaske, Martin Santiago, Eddo Trimino, and others. These officers were acting under color of authority, and were involved in the incident, either directly or through tacit approval. The incident resulted in excessive use of force by MGPD officers.1
140. On December 21, 2012, Mr. PICART was working at the QUICKSTOP during his normal shift. Prior to closing the QUICKSTOP, Mr. PICART was approached by MGPD officers and asked to produce identification. Mr. PICART advised MGPD officers that he did not have identification but that he was an employee of the QUICKSTOP and could call the owner, SALEH, to verify his employment.
1 Mr. PICART’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the individual officers will be re-asserted in a separate lawsuit.
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141. Mr. PICART entered the QUICKSTOP and used his cellular phone to call the owner, Mr. SALEH. At that point, MGPD officers followed him behind the store counter, forcefully grabbed him by the arm, and escorted him outside of the premises.
142. While outside the premises, Mr. PICART was unlawfully searched, without consent or probable cause, thrown to the ground, and placed under arrest.
143. MGPD officers proceeded to unlawfully search the QUICKSTOP and found a firearm - owned by and registered to Mr. SALEH — under the counter and concealed from plain view. Mr. PICART was subsequently arrested for possession of a concealed firearm although MGPD officers knew it did not belong to him and had no basis to believe that Mr. PICART was even aware the firearm was there. The Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office declined to file charges.
144. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers involved in this incident. Indeed, at least one officer, Officer Dunaske, received promotions subsequent to this incident.
145. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. PICART’s constitutional rights.
Roderick DeWayne Smith
146. Mr. SMITH is a twenty-six old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for his entire life. On at least six (6) occasions, Mr. SMITH was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by MGPD officers.
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147. On April 8, 2009, Mr. SMITH was stopped while walking on a public sidewalk, minding his own business, and not engaged in any illegal or criminal activities. MGPD Officer Pinkney (whose name Mr. SMITH learned later from the Field Contact form generated) searched Mr. SMITH’s pockets without consent or a warrant, and ran his name through the system, releasing him when no warrants were revealed.
148. On October 22, 2011, Mr. SMITH was stopped while walking on a public sidewalk, minding his own business, and not engaged in any illegal or criminal activities. MGPD Officer Vega (whose name Mr. SMITH learned later from the Field Contact form generated) searched Mr. SMITH’s pockets without consent or a warrant, and ran his name through the system, releasing him when no warrants were revealed.
149. On June 16, 2012, Mr. SMITH was detained in his own home by an MGPD officer he did not know. The officer searched his pockets without consent or a warrant. The officer demanded identification from Mr. SMITH, even though he knew that Mr. SMITH lived there, and ordered Mr. SMITH to leave the premises. However, the officer ran Mr. SMITH’s name through the system, and released him when no warrants were revealed.
150. On January 14, 2013, Mr. SMITH was stopped by MGPD Officer Michael Malone, and was accused of loitering in front of his own residence, even though Officer Malone knew he lived in the area, and even though Mr. SMITH was not engaged in any criminal or illegal activity. Officer Malone conducted a full search of Mr. SMITH’s person, without consent or a warrant, and ran Mr. SMITH’s name through the system, releasing him when no warrants were revealed.
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151. On February 7, 2013, Mr. SMITH was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY and by MGPD officers. This incident with MGPD officers resulted in an excessive use of force.2
152. On February 7, 2013, Mr. SMITH was on the QUICKSTOP property drinking an alcoholic beverage. He was approached by MGPD officers, including Officer Michael Ruiz and Officer Kevin Tamayo, who asked for his identification and poured out the contents of the beverage. Simultaneously, MGPD officers performed a full search of Mr. SMITH’S person without consent and without reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.
153. After the unlawful search, Mr. SMITH was released, at which time he attempted to walk into the QUICKSTOP to purchase water. Officer Ruiz instructed him not to enter the QUICKSTOP – which was open to the public at the time. MGPD officers again requested Mr. SMITH’s identification and when he asked “why?” Officer Ruiz threw him, head-first, into a steel door, and handcuffed him. Thereafter, Mr. SMITH was picked up, and thrown against the police car.
154. After several minutes of physical detainment, Mr. SMITH was released, and Officer Ruiz issued him a Promise to Appear for possession of an open container. Subsequent to the arrest, neither Officer Ruiz nor Officer Tamayo completed a Use of Force Report as required by MGPD policy and Florida law.
155. The Court subsequently dismissed the open container charge.
2 Mr. SMITH’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the individual officers will be re-asserted in a separate lawsuit.
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156. The February 7, 2013, incident was captured by the QUICKSTOP’s video surveillance cameras.
157. On August 10, 2013, Mr. SMITH was stopped by MGPD Officer Harris, as he was crossing the street, and was not engaged in any criminal or illegal activity. Officer Harris was with a few other MGPD officers, including Sergeant Martin Santiago. Officer Harris conducted a full search of Mr. SMITH’s person, without consent or a warrant, and ran his name through the system, even though he knew Mr. SMITH lived in the area. Mr. SMITH was released after no warrants were revealed.
158. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, frisked, and/or arrested Mr. SMITH.
159. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of MR. SMITH’s constitutional rights.
Kenneth Crane
160. Mr. CRANE is a forty six year old black male who has resided in the CITY for his entire life.
161. Mr. CRANE was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause within the CITY by MGPD officers.
162. On November 23, 2012, Mr. CRANE was riding his bicycle to the QUICKSTOP when he was stopped without reasonable suspicion, and subsequently searched and arrested without probable cause by MGPD officers.
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163. MGPD officers William Dunaske, James Harris, and Eddo Trimino, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the November 23, 2012 search, seizure, and arrest, either directly or through tacit approval.
164. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, frisked, and/or arrested Mr. CRANE.
165. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. CRANE’s constitutional rights.
Yvensonne Montale
166. Mr. MONTALE is an eighteen year old black male who has been a resident of the CITY for two years.
167. Mr. MONTALE was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, without reasonable suspicion within the CITY and by MGPD officers on at least three occasions.
168. On June 6, 2012, at approximately 12:12 a.m., Mr. MONTALE was riding his bicycle when he was detained for no reason by MGPD Officer Jimmy Sanchez and MGPD Sergeant Martin Santiago. These MGPD officers alleged that he did not have lights on his bicycle, even though he in fact had lights on the bicycle. The officers searched Mr. MONTALE’s pockets, ran his name for warrants, and released him.
169. Mr. MONTALE later learned that the MGPD officers prepared a Field Contact form concerning the June 6, 2012, incident in which they claimed they were conducting an investigation.
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170. On June 9, 2012, at approximately 6:36 p.m., while at Buccaneer Park and not engaged in any criminal activity, Mr. MONTALE was detained for no reason by MGPD Officer A. Lawson and some other unknown MGPD officers. The MGPD officers then searched his pockets, ran his name for warrants, and released him.
171. Mr. MONTALE later found out that Officer A. Lawson prepared a Field Contact form for the June 9, 2012, incident, in which he claimed that he was conducting a narcotics investigation, but Mr. MONTALE neither had narcotics nor was he in the company of anyone who had narcotics in their possession.
172. On August 13, 2012, Mr. MONTALE was riding his bicycle to the QUICKSTOP where he was stopped without reasonable suspicion and subsequently searched without probable cause.
173. MGPD Officer Brian Gregory and other MGPD officers, all of whom were acting under color of authority, were involved in the August 13, 2012, search and seizure.
174. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, and seized Mr. MONTALE.
175. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. MONTALE’s constitutional rights.
Omar Dean
176. Mr. DEAN is a 39 year old black male who resided in the CITY for over 10 years of his life. During the period of 2008 through 2013, he was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked,
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searched, seized, without reasonable suspicion within the CITY on at least twenty occasions, and below are descriptions of a sample of these incidents.
177. On April 30, 2009 around 5:44 p.m., Mr. DEAN was at his mother's house visiting with her. He was stopped and detained, in front of his mother, by MGPD Officer Johnson. Officer Johnson stopped and detained him over an anonymous call about a possible wanted person in the area. Officer Johnson ordered Mr. DEAN to produce his identification information and he complied. Officer Johnson checked Mr. DEAN’s identification information and when it came back clear he was released. MGPD Officer Adams approved the Field Contact Report.
178. On March 25, 2010, around 11:02 p.m., Mr. DEAN was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Prince for being suspected of trespassing at the 24 hour True Value Food Store. Officer Prince ordered Mr. DEAN to produce his identification information and he complied. Officer Prince checked Mr. DEAN’s identification information and when everything came back clear, he was ordered to stay away from the True Value Food Store, although no reason was given as to why. MGPD Officer Pilone approved the Field Contact Report.
179. On September 19, 2011, around 9:30 p.m., Mr. DEAN was at the 24 hour True Value Store, in the parking lot, when he was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Richardson as part of an "all out" detail. Officer Richardson ordered him to produce his identification information and he complied. Officer Richardson checked Mr. DEAN’s identification information and when everything came back clear, he was ordered to leave anyway. MGPD Officer Skaggs approved the Field Contact Report.
180. On May 2, 2012, around 12:53 p.m., Mr. DEAN was stopped and detained by MGPD Officer Payoute for walking in an "area known for prostitution and narcotics activity."
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Officer Payoute ordered Mr. DEAN to stop and talk to him, so he did. Officer Payoute then checked Mr. DEAN’s identification information for wants and warrants and subsequently released him. MGPD Officer Hedrick approved the Field Contact Report.
181. On July 13, 2012, Mr. DEAN was unlawfully stopped-and-frisked, searched, seized, without reasonable suspicion within the CITY by MGPD Officer Michael Malone.
182. Mr. DEAN was walking in front of the QUICKSTOP with a plastic bag of Red Bull cans. Without reasonable suspicion or warning, Officer Malone approached Mr. DEAN and performed a complete search of his person and possessions.
183. During the unlawful search, Officer Malone confiscated the bag containing Red Bull cans, threw the contents on the pavement, and then proceeded to hand out Mr. DEAN’s property to pedestrians.
184. Officer Malone and other officers involved in the July 13, 2012, incident were all acting under color of authority.
185. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers who stopped, searched, and seized Mr. DEAN.
186. The acts and omissions of the CITY and CHIEF BOYD constitute a continuing violation of Mr. DEAN’s constitutional rights.
Ali Amin Saleh and Abir Inc.
187. Mr. SALEH has been the owner of the QUICKSTOP located in the CITY since 1999. In 2006, Mr. SALEH incorporated ABIR INC., and ABIR INC. has been the owner of the
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QUICKSTOP since 2006. Mr. SALEH is the sole officer, director, and shareholder of ABIR INC.
188. Over the course of four years, spanning from 2008 to 2012, the QUICKSTOP was unlawfully searched without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause, numerous times by MGPD officers.
189. In addition, MGPD officers have engaged in a policy, practice and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and arresting patrons of his QUICKSTOP while they are on the premises for loitering or trespassing. Mr. SALEH has repeatedly informed MGPD officers that QUICKSTOP patrons are on the premise with his full permission and authority — information which MGPD officers routinely disregard.
190. The actions taken by MGPD officers are interfering with Mr. SALEH’s and ABIR INC.’s relationship with the store’s customers, and have severely curtailed sales at the QUICKSTOP.
191. Mr. SALEH has filed several complaints with MGPD regarding the conduct of its officers; however, no action has been taken to rectify the issue.
192. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD either encouraged, authorized, tacitly approved, failed to supervise and discipline, and/or were deliberately indifferent to the unconstitutional misconduct engaged in by subordinate MGPD officers.
193. On July 28, 2012, at approximately 12:10pm, MGPD Officer Jeffrey Engers walked into the QUICKSTOP and asked to use the bathroom.
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194. Although the Officer was given permission to use the bathroom, he never used the bathroom; instead, Engers unlawfully searched the premises. Engers was acting under color of authority and wearing a MGPD uniform.
195. MR. SALEH did not give Engers consent nor did Engers have probable cause or a search warrant.
196. On August 11, 2012, at approximately 7:57 PM, subsequent to Mr. SALEH’s complaint to MGPD Sergeant Joseph Nargiso about MGPD Officer Carlos Velez’s entry into the QUICKSTOP and unlawful search of the premises, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, Velez came back and told Mr. SALEH he would get him. The incident was captured on video.
197. On December 9, 2012, a few months after MR. SALEH had made an Internal Affairs complaint to MGPD Internal Affairs Investigator Gary Smith against MGPD Officers Carlos Velez, Eddo Trimino, William Dunaske, and Martin Santiago for their harassing behavior towards his patrons and employees, these officers were up to their usual behavior in the parking lot of MR. SALEH’s business, stopping and searching customers without reasonable suspicion and or arguable probable cause.
198. At approximately 11:15 pm on December 9, 2012, MGPD Officers Velez, Trimino, Dunaske, and Santiago, waited for MR. SALEH to get into his vehicle and followed MR. SALEH from the parking lot of his business.
199. These officers conducted a traffic stop on Mr. SALEH’s vehicle, without reasonable suspicion and or arguable probable cause. They searched Mr. SALEH’S vehicle and
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his person. Defendants all stood by at the scene staring MR. SALEH down in intimidating fashion.
200. The traffic stop concluded with MR. SALEH receiving three citations for nonmoving infractions.
201. SALEH had also previously provided (in September 2012) video footage of these officers engaging in police misconduct in front of his business. This traffic stop was pre-textual, not based on reasonable suspicion of criminality or probable cause and/or arguable probable cause, and it was retaliatory.
202. On this date, Officer Dunaske, who had a prisoner in his car, chased after SALEH with the prisoner still in the vehicle to back up Officer Velez.
203. Officer Dunaske drove the wrong way on N.W. 207th Street from the QUICKSTOP, at a high rate of speed, to back up Officer Velez, who had already stopped SALEH. The incident was captured on Officer Dunaske’s dashboard camera (one of only seven videos actually recorded pursuant to MGPD Policy 5.4 and turned over to Plaintiffs).
204. This vehicle stop and all actions taken were in retaliation for Mr. SALEH’s informal complaints, as well as his Internal Affairs complaint against the officers.
205. Officers Velez, Trimino, Dunaske, and Santiago were acting under color of authority, wearing MGPD uniforms and driving MGPD marked police vehicles.
Baraka Short
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206. Mr. SHORT is a 41 year old black male who grew up in Miami Gardens, currently resides in Miramar, FL, and is a managing member of a business, Bugatti Fresh B’s LLC d/b/a Sarah’s Salon & Boutique, located at 3179 N.W. 207th Street, Miami Gardens, FL.
207. From 2008 through 2013, Mr. SHORT has been stopped approximately 40 times by the MGPD, although MGPD officers have prepared Field Contact forms or an Investigative Report for only 4 of these stops.
208. All of the stops were carried out without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required by law, and during these stops, he was frequently searched, seized, and frisked.
FEDERAL MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIMS
COUNT ONE
All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourth Amendment
Official Policies and/or Decisions of Final Policymaker
209. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 209 as if fully set forth herein. 210. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage, and sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment. 211. In addition, this policy and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable
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suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting a stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The victims of such racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males, members of a protected class.
212. The policies, fully described in the General Allegations of this Complaint, supra ¶¶ 30-48, include the Quotas Policy, Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy, all of which are either unconstitutional on their face or are enforced in such a way which violates the constitutional rights of CITY residents, including named Plaintiffs.
213. The Quotas Policy and Racial Targeting Policy are unwritten policies that have become the moving force behind the deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. These informal policies were enacted and/or ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
214. The Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, a written policy, was jointly enacted by the CITY and MGPD. As previously stated, although the policy is not unconstitutional on its face, MGPD officers are abusing the policy and using it as a vehicle to illegally stop, search, and arrest CITY residents without reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause.
215. The adoption and implementation of the Quotas Policy, the Racial Targeting Policy, and the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy was the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, and the proximate cause of the violation of those rights. These informal policies were enacted and sanctioned by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
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216. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced policies, all Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendant, the CITY, and request that the Court finds and awards as follows:
1) That the Miami Gardens policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
2) That injunctive relief be issued enjoining the MGPD from continuing its policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, and in particular serving to: a. Further enjoin the MGPD from continuing the use of quotas for arrests (Quotas Policy); b. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of a Zero Tolerance Zone Policy to conduct unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; and c. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of the Racial Targeting Policy to use racial and/or national origin profiling to make unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests.
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3) That the City, Mayor, City Manager, and Police Department shall institute and implement improved policies and programs with respect to training, discipline and promotion designed to eliminate the MGPD’s policies of unconstitutional stops-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests.
4) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable to be determined at trial;
5) Award all Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
6) Award such other relief as this Court deems just, proper, and equitable, including further injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the interests of justice.
COUNT TWO All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment
Official Policies and/or Decisions of Final Policymaker
217. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 209 as if fully set forth herein. 218. The CITY and CHIEF BOYD have implemented and are continuing to enforce, encourage, and sanction a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests of CITY residents, including Plaintiffs, by MGPD officers — all of which are done without the reasonable articulable suspicion and/or probable cause required under the Fourth Amendment.
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219. In addition, this pattern and practice of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests by MGPD officers utilizes race and/or national origin, not reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the determinative factors in conducting a stop-and-frisk, search, seizure, and/or arrest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims of such racial and/or national origin profiling are principally black males, members of a protected class.
220. The Racial Targeting Policy described in the General Allegations is unconstitutional on its face, violating the rights of CITY residents, including the named Plaintiffs, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
221. The Quotas Policy and Racial Targeting Policy are unwritten policies enacted and/or ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
222. The Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, a written policy, was jointly enacted by the CITY and MGPD. As previously stated, although the policy is not unconstitutional on its face, MGPD officers are abusing the policy and using it as a vehicle to illegally stop, search, and arrest CITY residents without reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause.
223. The adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy, in conjunction with the Quotas Policy and the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, was the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the proximate cause of the violation of those rights.
224. The Racial Targeting Policy was enacted and/or ratified by CHIEF BOYD, a final policymaker for law enforcement purposes.
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225. As a direct and proximate result of the referenced policies, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendant, the CITY, and request that the Court finds and awards as follows:
1) That the Miami Gardens policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, performed under color of law and without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
2) That injunctive relief be issued enjoining the MGPD from continuing its policy, practice, and/or custom of stopping-and-frisking, searching, seizing, and/or arresting, without reasonable articulable suspicion and/or arguable probable cause, and in particular serving to: a. Further enjoin the MGPD from continuing the use of quotas for arrests (Quotas Policy); b. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of a Zero Tolerance Zone Policy to conduct unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests; and c. Further enjoining the MGPD from continuing the use of the Racial Targeting Policy to use racial and/or national origin profiling to make unconstitutional stops and frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests.
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3) That the City, Mayor, City Manager, and Police Department shall institute and implement improved policies and programs with respect to training, discipline and promotion designed to eliminate the MGPD’s policies of unconstitutional stops-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or arrests.
4) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable to be determined at trial;
5) Award all Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
6) Award and such other relief as this Court deems just, proper, and equitable, including further injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the interests of justice.
COUNT THREE All Named Plaintiffs against the City of Miami Gardens 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Failure to Supervise and Discipline – Violation of Fourth
Amendment
226. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 209 as if fully set forth herein. 227. During the period of 2008 through 2013, stops, searches, frisks, and/or arrests without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause were a routine occurrence in the CITY, resulting in widespread violations of Fourth Amendment rights of the Plaintiffs and others. 228. These widespread violations of Fourth Amendment rights were accomplished and/or furthered by the frequent and routine preparation of facially insufficient Field Contact Forms.
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229. These widespread violations of Fourth Amendment rights were also accomplished and/or furthered by MGPD officers’ frequent failure to abide by Departmental policy concerning recording interactions with the public through dashboard cameras.
230. The CITY routinely failed to discipline MGPD officers for failure to properly prepare Field Contact forms, and for failure to record interactions with the public through dashboard cameras, thereby facilitating the continued widespread violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and others.
231. The CITY’s failure to discipline its officers amounted to deliberate indifference to the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and others, and resulted in ratification of the unconstitutional conduct of MGPD officers.
232. As a direct and proximate result of the CITY’S failure to supervise and discipline, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendant, the CITY, and request that the Court finds and awards as follows:
1) Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable to be determined at trial;
2) Award all Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
3) Award and such other relief as this Court deems just, proper, and equitable, including further injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the interests of justice. 55
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COUNT FOUR Plaintiff SALEH against the City of Miami Gardens
42 U.S.C. § 1983 – First Amendment Retaliation
233. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 66, 84, 135, and 188 through 206, as though fully set forth herein.
234. Plaintiff SALEH engaged in constitutionally protected speech when he made informal complaints, as well as a formal complaint to MGPD Internal Affairs, about the misconduct of MGPD officers in and adjacent to the QUICKSTOP.
235. The retaliatory actions of MGPD Officers, including but not limited to verbal threats, a police chase, and issuance of three citations to Mr. SALEH for non-moving violations, would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to exercise his First Amendment rights.
236. Mr. SALEH’s protected speech was the motivating factor behind the retaliatory conduct, and the temporal proximity of the retaliatory conduct to Mr. SALEH’s speech is evidence of the causal connection.
237. The CITY either directly or tacitly approved of, sanctioned, encouraged, and/or failed to supervise and discipline the officers engaging in the retaliatory conduct.
238. As a direct and proximate result of the CITY’s retaliation against Mr. SALEH’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff SALEH requests judgment against Defendant, the CITY, and request that the Court finds and awards as follows:
1) Award Plaintiff compensatory damages in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable to be determined at trial;
2) Award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
3) Award and such other relief as this Court deems just, proper, and equitable.
FEDERAL SUPERVISORY LIABILITY CLAIMS
COUNT FIVE All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD Supervisory Liability – Failure to Correct History of Widespread Abuse U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourth Amendment 239. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 209 as if fully set forth herein. 240. CHIEF BOYD, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy. 241. CHIEF BOYD, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Quotas Policy. 242. CHIEF BOYD, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy. 243. CHIEF BOYD was placed on notice that the adoption and implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, the Quotas Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy resulted in
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widespread abuse of the Fourth Amendment rights of CITY residents, including all named Plaintiffs, in that innumerable persons were stop-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion. Nonetheless, CHIEF BOYD failed to take any corrective action to remedy these abuses, such as supervision, monitoring, and disciplinary measures to prevent unconstitutional implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, the Quotas Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy.
244. CHIEF BOYD’S adoption and/or implementation of the Zero Tolerance Zone Policy, the Quotas Policy, and the Racial Targeting Policy, and his failure to take corrective action when placed on notice of widespread abuses, were the proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
245. As a direct and proximate result of CHIEF BOYD’S adoption and/or implementation of these policies and failure to take corrective action, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendant, CHIEF BOYD, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT SIX All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER
Supervisory Liability—Failure to Correct History of Widespread Abuse U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment
246. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 209 as if fully set forth herein. 58
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247. CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, at all times material hereto, were official decision-makers with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy.
248. CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER knew or should have known that the Racial Targeting Policy is unconstitutional on its face under the Fourteenth Amendment.
249. Furthermore, CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER were placed on notice that the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy resulted in widespread abuse of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of CITY residents, including all named Plaintiffs, in that innumerable persons were stop-and-frisked, searched, seized, and arrested based on race and/or national origin without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion. Nonetheless, CHIEF BOYD failed to take any corrective action to remedy these abuses, such as supervision, monitoring, and disciplinary measures to prevent unconstitutional implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy.
250. CHIEF BOYD’S and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER’S adoption and/or implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy, and their failure to take corrective action when placed on notice of widespread abuses, were the proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.
251. As a direct and proximate result of CHIEF BOYD’S and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER’S adoption and/or implementation of these policies and failure to take corrective action, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendants, CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT SEVEN All Named Plaintiffs Against MAJOR CHAPMAN Supervisory Liability—Direction of Unlawful Acts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment
252. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 209 as if fully set forth herein. 253. MAJOR CHAPMAN, at all times material hereto, was an official decision-maker with respect to the adoption and implementation of the Racial Targeting Policy. 254. MAJOR CHAPMAN knew or should have known that the Racial Targeting Policy is unconstitutional on its face under the Fourteenth Amendment. 255. MAJOR CHAPMAN directed unlawful acts by subordinate police officers by instructing them during roll call to stop all black males between the ages of 15 and 30. 256. MAJOR CHAPMAN’S direction of unlawful acts by subordinate police officers was the proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. 257. As a direct and proximate result of MAJOR CHAPMAN’S direction of unlawful acts, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendant, MAJOR CHAPMAN, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT EIGHT All Named Plaintiffs Against CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER
Supervisory Liability—Failure to Stop Unlawful Acts U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment 258. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through 209 as if fully set forth herein. 259. CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER knew or should have known that the Racial Targeting Policy is unconstitutional on its face under the Fourteenth Amendment. 260. CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER were aware of and failed to countermand MAJOR CHAPMAN’s instruction to subordinate officers during roll call to stop all black males between the ages of 15 and 30. 261. On account of MAJOR CHAPMAN’s instruction, CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER knew that there was a high probability that subordinate officers would act unlawfully by carrying out this unlawful directive, but failed to stop them from doing so. 262. CHIEF BOYD’s and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER’s failure to stop unlawful acts of racial profiling by subordinate police officers was the proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. 263. As a direct and proximate result of CHIEF BOYD’s and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER’s failure to stop unlawful acts of racial profiling by subordinate police officers, the named Plaintiffs, and further, countless CITY residents, have suffered, and will continue to suffer,
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physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against Defendants, CHIEF BOYD and DEPUTY CHIEF MILLER, for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
STATE LAW CLAIMS COUNT NINE
Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SAMPSON for False Arrest 264. Plaintiff, Mr. SAMPSON realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 85, as if fully set forth herein. 265. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 266. The conduct of the MGPD officers who arrested Mr. SAMPSON was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 267. Mr. SAMPSON was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when MGPD officers arrested him sixty-three times without legal authority. 268. The conduct of the MGPD arresting officers resulted in repeated false arrests of Mr. SAMPSON, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
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269. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. SAMPSON in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the MGPD arresting officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
270. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests detailed above, Mr. SAMPSON suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SAMPSON will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SAMPSON respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT TEN Individual State Law Claim of Ms. DANIELS for False Arrest 271. Plaintiff, Ms., DANIELS, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 86 through 97 as if fully set forth herein. 272. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 273. The conduct of the MGPD officers who arrested Ms. DANIELS was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
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274. Ms. DANIELS was unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty against her will when MGPD officers arrested her thirty-three times without legal authority.
275. The conduct of the MGPD arresting officers constituted repeated false arrests of Ms. DANIELS, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
276. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Ms. DANIELS in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the arresting officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
277. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests detailed above, Ms. DANIELS suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Ms. DANIELS will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Ms. DANIELS respectfully requests compensatory damage against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT ELEVEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SPIVEY for False Arrest 278. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 98 through 116, as if fully set forth herein. 279. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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280. Mr. SPIVEY was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when MGPD officers arrested him six times without legal authority.
281. The conduct of the MGPD officers who arrested Mr. SPIVEY constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. SPIVEY, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
282. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. SPIVEY in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the arresting officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
283. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. SPIVEY suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SPIVEY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SPIVEY respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT TWELVE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. LOWERY for False Arrest 284. Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 117 through 125, as if fully set forth herein. 285. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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286. Mr. LOWERY was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when MGPD officers arrested him five times without legal authority.
287. The conduct of the MGPD officers who arrested Mr. LOWERY constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. LOWERY, as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
288. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. LOWERY in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the arresting officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
289. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. LOWERY suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. LOWERY will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. LOWERY respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT THIRTEEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. HALL, Jr. for False Arrest 290. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 126 through 137, as if fully set forth herein. 291. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
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292. Mr. HALL, JR. was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when MGPD officers arrested him twelve times without legal authority.
293. The conduct of the MGPD officers who arrested Mr. HALL, JR. constituted repeated false arrests of Mr. HALL, JR., as the arrests were made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. Each arrest was unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.
294. The CITY is responsible for the false arrests of Mr. HALL, JR. in that the false arrests were intentional and were committed within the course and scope of the arresting officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
295. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. HALL, JR. suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. HALL, JR. will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. HALL, JR. respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FOURTEEN
Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for Civil Battery 296. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 138 through 145, as if fully set forth herein.
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297. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
298. The conduct of Officers William Dunaske, Martin Santiago, Eddo Trimino, and other MGPD officers on December 21, 2012, in illegally searching and arresting Mr. PICART, and employing excessive force to do so, was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. PICART.
299. The conduct of Officers Dunaske, Santiago, Trimino, and other MGPD officers was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
300. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by Officers Dunaske, Santiago, Trimino, and others upon the person of Mr. PICART, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of these officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
301. As a direct and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. PICART suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. PICART will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT FIFTEEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. PICART for False Arrest
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302. Plaintiff, MR. PICART, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 138 through 145, as if fully set forth herein.
303. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
304. Mr. PICART was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when Officers Dunaske, Santiago, Trimino, and others arrested him without legal authority.
305. The conduct of Officers Dunaske, Santiago, Trimino, and others constituted a false arrest of Mr. PICART, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause.
306. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. PICART in that the false arrest was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of these officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
307. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. PICART suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. PICART will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. PICART respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SIXTEEN
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Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for Civil Battery 308. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 146 through 159, as if fully set forth herein. 309. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claim arises from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 310. The conduct of MGPD officers on February 7, 2013, in illegally searching and arresting Mr. SMITH was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SMITH. 311. The conduct of MGPD officers was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 312. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by MGPD officers upon the person of Mr. SMITH, in that the civil battery was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of these officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action. 313. As a direct and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. SMITH suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SMITH will suffer such losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT SEVENTEEN 70
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Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SMITH for False Arrest 314. Plaintiff, Mr. SMITH, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 146 through 159, as if fully set forth herein. 315. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 316. The conduct of Officers Ruiz, Tamayo, and other MGPD officers on February 7, 2013, was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 317. Mr. SMITH was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when Ruiz, Tamayo, and other MGPD officers arrested him without legal authority. 318. The conduct of Ruiz, Tamayo, and other MGPD officers constituted false arrest of Mr. SMITH, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. 319. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. SMITH in that the false arrest was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of these officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action. 320. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. SMITH suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SMITH will suffer such losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Mr. SMITH respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
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COUNT EIGHTEEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. CRANE for False Arrest
321. Plaintiff, MR. CRANE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 160 through 165, as if fully set forth herein.
322. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above.
323. The conduct of MGPD Officers Dunaske, Harris, Trimino, and other MGPD officers on November 23, 2012, was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD.
324. Mr. CRANE was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when Officers Dunaske, Harris, Trimino, and other MGPD officers, arrested him without legal authority.
325. The conduct of Officers Dunaske, Harris, Trimino, and other MGPD officers, constituted false arrest of Mr. CRANE, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause.
326. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. CRANE in that the false arrest was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of these officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
327. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrests alleged above, Mr. CRANE suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life,
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lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. CRANE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CRANE respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT NINETEEN Individual State Law Claim of Mr. MONTALE for False Arrest 328. Plaintiff, MR. MONTALE, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 166 through 175, as if fully set forth herein. 329. This is an action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for false arrest. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 330. The conduct of MGPD Officer Brian Gregory and other MGPD officers on August 13, 2012, was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 331. Mr. MONTALE was unlawfully detained and deprived of his liberty against his will when Officer Gregory and other MGPD officers arrested him without legal authority. 332. The conduct of Officer Gregory and other MGPD officers constituted false arrest of Mr. MONTALE, as the arrest was made without probable cause or even arguable probable cause. 333. The CITY is responsible for the false arrest of Mr. MONTALE in that the false arrest was intentional and was committed within the course and scope of these officers’ EMPLOYMENT with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
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334. As a direct and proximate result of the false arrest alleged above, Mr. MONTALE suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, lost wages, and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. MONTALE will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. MONTALE respectfully requests compensatory damages against Defendant, the CITY; costs of this action and a trial by jury on all issues triable as a matter of right.
COUNT TWENTY Individual State Law Claim of Mr. DEAN for Civil Battery 335. Plaintiff, Mr. DEAN, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 176 through 186, as if fully set forth herein. 336. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 337. The conduct of MGPD Officer Michael Malone on July 13, 2012, in illegally searching and seizing Mr. DEAN was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. DEAN. 338. The conduct of Officer Malone was committed within the course and scope of his employment with MGPD. 339. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the battery committed by Officer Malone upon the person of Mr. DEAN, in that the civil battery was intentional, and was committed within the course and scope of Officer Malone’s employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
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340. As a direct and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. DEAN suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. DEAN will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. DEAN requests judgment against Defendant, the CITY, for compensatory damages; costs of this action, and trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right.
COUNT TWENTY-ONE Individual State Law Claim of Mr. SHORT for Civil Battery 341. Plaintiff, Mr. SHORT, realleges paragraphs 1 through 4 and 6 through 65 and 206 through 208, as if fully set forth herein. 342. This is a cause of action, under the common law of the State of Florida, for civil battery. Such claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth above. 343. The conduct of MGPD officers in illegally searching and seizing Mr. SHORT on various occasions from 2008 through 2013 was intentional and intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Mr. SHORT. 344. The conduct of MGPD officers was committed within the course and scope of their employment with MGPD. 345. Defendant, the CITY, is responsible for the batteries committed by its officers upon the person of Mr. SHORT, in that the civil battery was intentional, and was committed within the
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course and scope of officers’ employment with MGPD, such that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to this action.
346. As a direct and proximate result of the battery alleged above, Mr. SHORT suffered bodily injury and resulted in pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity of enjoyment of life, lost wages and loss of ability to earn money. These injuries and losses are permanent and continuing, and Mr. SHORT will suffer such losses in the future.
WHEREFORE, Mr. SHORT requests judgment against Defendant, the CITY, for compensatory damages; costs of this action, and trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right.

Dated: June 30, 2014.

Respectfully Submitted:
REYES LAW GROUP, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 2924 Davie Road, Suite 102 Davie, Florida 33314-1602 O: 954-369-1993 Fax: 888-315-6291 Primary: Eservice@reyeslegal.com Secondary: Carlos@ReyesLegal.com
Stephan@ReyesLegal.com

/s/Carlos J. Reyes CARLOS J. REYES, ESQ. FL Bar No. 755079
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 101 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/17/2014 Page 77 of 79 /s/Stephan Lopez STEPHAN LOPEZ, ESQ. FL Bar No. 76959
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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 101 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/17/2014 Page 78 of 79 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 30, 2014, I will electronically file the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served on June 30, 2014, on all counsel identified on the attached Service List, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.
/s/Stephan Lopez STEPHAN LOPEZ, ESQ.
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SERVICE LIST MELISSA JEAN GARCIA, ESQ. STEPHAN LOPEZ, ESQ. CARLOS JOSE REYES, JR., ESQ. REYES LAW GROUP Attorney for all Plaintiffs 2924 Davie Road, Suite 102 Davie, FL 33314 (954) 369-1993 - Telephone melissa@reyeslegal.com stephan@reyeslegal.com Carlos@ReyesLegal.com
E. BRUCE JOHNSON, ESQ. SCOTT D. ALEXANDER, ESQ. JOHNSON, ANSELMO, MURDOCH, BURKE, PIPER & HOCHMAN, PA Attorneys for Defendants, City, Boyd, Miller, Chapman 2455 E. Sunrise Blvd., Suite 1000 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304 johnson@jambg.com (954) 463-0100 - Telephone (954) 463-2444 - Facsimile
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 Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 1 of 78

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAM I DIVISION
Case No. l3-243l2-CIV-GRAHAM/MCALILEY
EARL SAMPSON , et
Plaintiffs ,

CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, et al .,
Defendants .
/
OMN IBUS ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant City of Miami

Garden's Motion for Summary Judgment ED .E. 13317 Defendant Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment ED .E . 134) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ED .E. 1481
THE COURT has considered the Motions , the Responses and

Replies thereto , pertinent portions of the record , and is otherwise fully adv ised in the prem ises . For the reasons stated herein ,

Plaintiffs ' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED , and

Defendants ' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED IN PART and

DEN IED IN PA RT .

1. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 27 , 2013, Earl Sampson , Torre M . Daniels , Anthony

Lowery , Floyd Hall ,

Ross Picart , Roderick D . Smith , Kenneth

Crane , Yvensonne Montale, Omar Dean , Brandon Spivey , and A li A .

1

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Saleh (collectively referred to as uPlaintiffs'') initially brought suit against the City of Miami Gardens (hereinafter uthe City''),

its current and former mayor, its former city manager, and various

members of its police personnel. ED .E.

After all named

Defendants challenged the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' initial and

amended pleadings , Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint

on July

2014. (D .E. 10lq. In doing so, Plaintiffs voluntarily

dismissed their claims against the current and former mayor , former

city manager, and eighty-two (82) individual police officers

leaving only , the City , Chief Matthew Boyd , Deputy Chief Paul

Miller, and Major Anthony Chapman (collectively referred to as ''Defendant Officers'') to defend against their claims. ED .E. 75 and

The basis of Plaintiffs ' suit against the City lies with the

City 's alleged Zero Tolerance Zone, Quota , and Racial Targeting

policies , which Plaintiffs maintain were the cause of numerous

unconstitutional stop -and-frisks and arrests by officers of the

Miami Gardens Police Department ('AMGPD'') from 2008 to the filing of

the Third Amended Complaint. (D .E. 1 at 20-24; D .E. 56 at 20-252

Plaintiffs allege , inter alia, violations

42 U .S .C . 5 l983

pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments . Id . Plaintiffs

also assert 5 1983 supervisory liability claims against the

Defendant Officers in their individual capacities. For their

claims, Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for the unconstitutional

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 3 of 78

arrests and stop-and-frisks, as well as injunctive relief halting
enforcement of the City 's policies . Id .

In turn the City denies hav ing any policies that resulted in Plaintiffs' constitutional rights being v iolated . In addition , the

Defendant Officers maintain that Plaintiffs' arrests were

constitutional, based upon probable cause , and that lawful force
was utilized each time. (D .E. 102). After conducting extensive
discovery in this case , the parties have filed cross-motions for

summary judgment for the Court's consideration. The Court will
address the merits of the parties ' Motions below .

II . STANDARD OF REV IEW

The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

56 (a). The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record

demonstrating the absence

genuine issues of material fact .

Celotex Corp . v . Catrett,

323-24 (1986). That burden

is discharged if the moving party shows the Court that there is uan

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.'' I# . at

325 . Once the moving party has discharged its burden , the non -

mov ing party must designate specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue of material fact. Q; . at 324 . Issues of fact are
ugenuine'' if a reasonable fact finder considering the evidence

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 4 of 78

presented could find for the non -moving party . Anderson v . Liberty

Lobbv, Incw 477 U .S. 242, 248 (1986)

111 . DISCUSSION

In their Motions, Defendants argue that they are entitled to

judgment as a matter 1aw because :

Plaintiffs failed

comply with a condition precedent that bars all of their common law

claims; (2) most of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of

lim itations;

Plaintiffs incorrectly seek relief for arrests,

searches , and seizures under the Fourteenth Amendment;

Plaintiffs cannot show any constitutional deprivations; Plaintiffs cannot show the ex istence of any official municipal

policy which was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional

deprivations; (6) Plaintiffs cannot show supervisory liability on

behalf the Defendant Officers ; and

the Defendant Officers

are entitled to qualified immunity .

Conversely , in their cross-motion for partial summary

judgment, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to judgment as a

m atte r

law because :

no genuine issue of fact exists

regarding the unconstitutionality of the City 's Racial Targeting

Policy and violations of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights ; no genuine issue of fact ex ists as to whether Defendant Chapman

udirected MGPD officers to stop all b lack males from the ages of

fifte en

and thirty

regardless of whether there existed a

reasonable articulable susp icion of crim inality s '

no genuine

4

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 5 of 78
issue of fact remains as to whether Defendants Boyd and M iller were
deliberately indifferent to the Racial Targeting Policy
uimplemented by (Defendant Chapmanq, and the subsequent unlawful
conduct of MGPD officers.'' ED .E. 1482.1
A . Sovereign Immunity & State Law Claims
With respect to Defendants ' first argument in favor of summary
judgment, is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not strictly adhere
to the notice requirements set forth in Florida 's sovereign
immunity waiver statute, Fla. Stat. 5 786.28 (6)(c) (D.E . at
$421 Plaintiffs acknowledge the insufficiency of their prior
notices to the City insofar as they did not include all of their
statutorily required personal information. (D .E . 168) Since strict
adherence is required and discovery is now closed , Plaintiffs are
l The Court notes that Plaintiffs raise a procedural issue in their Response to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, Plaintiffs' argument demonstrates, yet again , a fundamental misunderstanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states: ''A partv may
move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense - or the part of each claim or defense - on which summary judgment is sought.'' Fed.R.CiV.P. 56(a)
(emphasis added). In this case, Plaintiffs assert claims against multiple parties; therefore , each party-defendant is entitled to move for summary
judgment. The same is true for each party-plaintiff. The City, consistent with
its prerogative granted by Rule 56, moved independently for summary disposition of Plaintiffs' claims against it . Likewise , rather than burdening the Court with
duplicative motions, Defendant Officers collectively moved for summary judgment
given the similarity of Plaintiffs' legal claims against them and the record evidence presented . The same is true for Plaintiffs' collective Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against all named Defendants. According to Rule 56, each
Plaintiff could have moved separately for partial summary judgment; however, this would have resulted in an inefficient use of precious judicial resources and would delay the adjudication of their claims.
Moreover , as to Plaintiffs' argument concerning the length of Defendants'
Motions/Memoranda and Statements of Facts and their resulting prejudice, the
Court will consider all pages and materials submitted in support of each motion
for summary judgment, including Plaintiffs' Motion. Therefore, with this
understanding, the Court finds Plaintiffs' procedural arguments to be without merit.
5

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 6 of 78

precluded from correcting their oversight . See Fla . Stat . 5

786.28(6)(d). Therefore, summary disposition is appropriate as to
Plaintiffs' state 1aw claims stated in Counts 9 21 of the Third

Amended Complaint ED.E . 101q.

B . Further Limitations on Review

Defendants next argue that the majority of the incidents
underlying Plaintiffs' claim s are barred by the statute of

limitations for tort actions . Since Plaintiffs acknowledged their

failure to strictly adhere to Fla . Stat.

786 .28 (6) 4c),

Defendants' argument is moot as to Plaintiffs' state 1aw claims .

However , with respect to the numerou s police encounters underlying

their 5 1983 claims, Plaintiffs argue that the continuing tort

doctrine applies and that all incidents , including ones produced in discovery and not specifically pled , should be considered by the

Court . In support of their position , Plaintiffs rely on New Port

Larqo , Inc . v . Monroe Cntv w 7O6 F. Supp . 1507, 1516 (S .D. Fla .

1988) However, the opinion in that case was vacated by Eleventh

Circuit in New Port Larqo, Inc . v . Monroe Cntv .,

F .2d 1488

(11th Cir . 1993). Moreover, the issue in New Port Largo, Inc. was

the application of the statute

lim itations doctrine

the

accrual dates for federal regulatory takings claims, which is

completely inapposite the circumstances of this case . The issue

presented here is whether Florida 's statute of limitations for tort

actions applies to Fourth Amendment claims asserted under 5 1983 .

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 7 of 78

In Wallace v . Kato, the Supreme Court stated that ''lszection

1983 provides a federal cause of action , but in several respects

relevant here , federal 1aw looks to the law of the State in which

the cause of action arose . This is so for the length of the statute

of limitations : It is that which the State provides for personal-

injury torts.'' Wallace, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Under Florida
law , a four-year statute of limitation applies . See Fla . Stat . 5

95.11(3). Here, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants on

Nov em ber

2013. ED .E.

As a result, a11 incidents occurring

prior to November 27, 2009 are time-barred pursuant to Fla . Stat .

5 95.11 (3) Moreover, since they have not formally sought leave to amend, for a fourth time , or to supplement their operative

complaint, the Court will not entertain Plaintiffs' current attempt to expand the pleadings by relying on incidents not specifically

pled in the Third Amended Complaint. See Fed.R .CiV .P . l5(a)(2) and

(d ).

C . Constitutional Limits & Liability under 42 U .S .C . 5 1983

The Fourth Amendment and Police Encounters

According to the text of the Fourth Amendment, ''Et)he right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers , and

effects , against unreasonable searches and seizures , shall not be

v iola ted

U .S . CONST. amend .

In Terrv v . Ohio, 392 U .S .

(1968), the Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally

perm issib le for a police officer to ''stop and briefly detain a

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 8 of 78

person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable

suspicion supported by articulable facts that crim inal activity

'may be afoot ,' even if the officer lacks probable cause .'' U .S . v .

Sokolow, 490 U .S.

(1989) (citing Terrv , 398 U .S. at 30). This

type of police encounter is now known in common legal parlance as

a Terrv stop .

a . Stops

In determining whether a Terrv stop took p lace , the inquiry is

Mwhether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the

officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter .'' Florida

v . Bostick, 5Ol U .S. 429, 436 (1991) see also U .S. v . Mendenhall,

446

(198O)(u EA) person has been 'seized' with in the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of a1l of the

circumstances surrounding the incident , a reasonable person would

have believed that he was not free to leave.'') As the Supreme

Court stressed in Terrv , nltzhe manner in which the seizure and
search were conducted is , of course, as v ital a part of the inquiry

as whether they were warranted at all. The Fourth Amendment

proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of governmental

action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation .'' Terrv ,

at 28 (citing Katz v . U.S ., 389 U .S. 347, 354-356 (1967)). A Terry stop is permissible uwhen the officer has a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person (stoppedl has
been , is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity .'' U .S . v .

8

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 9 of 78

Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (citation omitted). In other words,

'''Et)he officer

must be able to articulate something more

than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch .''' Alabama

v . White, 496 U.S . 325, 329 (1990)(quoting Sokolow, 490 U .S. at

''Reasonable susp icion , like probable cause, is dependent upon b0th

the content of information possessed by police and its degree of

reliability . Both factors - quantity and quality - are considered

in the 'totality of the circumstances the whole picture z' that

must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is

reasonable suspicion .'' Id. at 331 (internal quotation omitted).

Thus, uwhether reasonable suspicion existed is an objective test,

and an officer's subjective intentions or beliefs are immaterial.'

U.S. v. Robinson , 515 F. App 'x

(11th

2013) see also,

Graham v . Connor, 490 U .S. 386, 397 (1989).

b . Frisks

Moreover, during a Terrv stop , ua 1aw enforcement officer, for

his own protection and safety , may conduct a patdown to find

weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the

possession of the person he has accosted .'' Ybarra v . Illinois ,

U .S. 85, 93 (1979). In order uto proceed from a stop to a frisk,

the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped

is armed and dangerous .'' Arizona v . Johnson , 555 U .S . 323 , 326

(2009). frisk is ustrictly 'limited to that which is necessary

for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the

9

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 10 of 78

officer or others nearby .''' Minnesota v . Dickerson , 508 U .S . 366,

373 (lgg3llquoting Terry, 392 U .S. at 26) However, during a frisk

for weapons, if a police officer ''pats down a suspect 's outer

clothing and feels an object whose contour mass makes its

identity immediately apparent Eas contrabandq, there has been no

invasion of the suspect 's privacy beyond that already authorized by

the officer's search for weapons .'' Id . at 375-76 . Indeed , ''if the

object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified
=Id

c. Consensual Encounters

However, unlike Terry stops , consensual police encounters do

not implicate the Fourth Amendment . 'The mere fact that a law

enforcement officer approaches an individual and so identifies

himself , without more, does not result in a seizure .'' U .S . v .

Baker, 290 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002). Likewise, ''even when

officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they

may generally ask questions of that indiv idual ; ask to exam ine the

individuals identification ; and request consent to search his or

her luggage as long as the police do not convey a message that

compliance w ith their requests is required .'' Bostick , 501 U .S . at

434-357 accord INS v . Delgado, 466

(1984)(uEP)olice

questioning , by itself , is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment

violation

(ulnless the circumstances of the encounter are so

intimidating that a reasonable person would have believed he was

10

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 11 of 78

not free to leave if he had not responded.'o . Eleventh Circuit

precedent lists a number of factors to consider in determining

whether a consensual encounter transformed into a ''seizure'' under

the Fourth Amendment . In U .S . v . Perez, the court stated :

Factors relevant to this inquiry include, among other things : whether a citizen's path is blocked or impeded ; whether identification is retained ; the suspect 's age, education and intelligence ; the length of the suspect's detention and questioning ; the number of police officers present ; the display of weapons ; any physical touching of the suspect ; and the language and tone of voice of the police .

Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 778 (11th Cir. zoo6llquoting U .S. v. De La

Rosa, 922 F.2d

(11th Cir . 1991))

Thus, in outlining the permissible scope of Terrv stops and

subsequent frisks as opposed to consensual police encounters, the

Court notes that uthere is no exception for stops of pedestrians

for the general purpose of deterring crime .'' Floyd v . Citv of N .Y .,

959 F. Supp . 2d 540, 568 (S.D .N .Y . 2013). Similarly, nnothing in

Terrv can be understood to allow a generalized 'cursory search for

weapons' or indeed , any search whatever for anything but weapons .''

Id . at 569 (quoting Ybarra, 444 U .S . at 93-94).

2. The Fourteenth Amendm ent & Selective Enforcement

Just as the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable

searches and seizures , the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment mandates that ''lnlo State shall

deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law .'' U .S . CoNsT. amend . XIV 5 1 . This ''is essentially a direction

11

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 12 of 78

that al1 persons similarly situated should be treated alike .'' City

of Cleburne v . Cleburne Liv inq Ctr .. Inc .,

432, 439

(1985). ''The central purpose of (the Clause) is the prevention of

official conduct discrim inating on the basis of race .'' Washington

v . Davis, 426 U.S. 229,

(1976); see also Whren v . U .S.,

U.S . 806, 813 (1996) C'The Constitution prohibits selective

enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.''). A

plaintiff can plead v iolations of the Equal Protection Clause in

three different ways :

a plaintiff can identify a law or policy

that Bexpressly classifies persons on the basis of race i''

a

plaintiff can point to a ''facially neutral 1aw or policy that has

been applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner s' or

a

plaintiff can identify ua facially neutral statute or policy Eand

allege that it) has an adverse effect and that it was motivated by

discriminatory animus .'' Brown v . Citv of Oneonta , N .Y ., 22l F .23d

329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999)(internal quotations and citations omitted).

However , a facially neutral ulaw or other official act, without

regard to whether it reflects a racially discrim inatory purpose, is

Enot) unconstitutional (s)olely because it has a racially disparate

impact.'' Davis, 426 U .S. at 239. Instead, uEp)roof of racially

discriminatory intent or purpose is requ ired to show a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause .'' Villaqe of A rlinqton Heiqhts v .

Metro . Housinq Development Corp w 429 U .S. 252, 265 (1977).

some cases, na clear pattern , unexplainable on grounds

12

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 13 of 78

other than race , emerges from the effect of the state action even

when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face .'' Id . at

266 (citing Yick Wo v . Hopkins, l18 U .S. 356 (1886). The Eleventh

Circuit has recognized that Plaintiffs may bring an equal

protection claim for the selective en forcement of a facially

neutral ordinance , so long as intentional or purposeful

discrimination is shown on the part of the City .2 Campbell v .

Rainbow Citv, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (11th

2006). %'To

prevail (onl a selective enforcement claim based upon a facially

neutral ordinance , Plaintiffs must show

that they were treated

differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that

Defendant ls) unequally applied (thel ordinance for the purpose of

discriminating against Plaintiffs .'' Id . at 1314 . Furthermore ,

nlEdliscriminatory purpose'

implies more than intent as

volition or intent as awareness of consequences . implies that

the decisionmaker

selected or reaffirmed a particular course

of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite ofz'

its adverse effects upon an identifiable group .''' Mccleskv , 48l

U.S . at 298 (quoting Pers. Admin . of Mass. v . Feenev, 442 U .S. 256,

2 In its Motion, the City argues that 'Plaintiffs improvidently seek relief under the Fourteenth Amendment for arrest, search and seizure claims in Counts I and 11 since the Fourth Amendment is a specific textual source of protection, rather
than the generalized notion of substantive due process.'' ED.E. 133 at 25).
Although Plaintiffs utilize similar language in each count , they only assert an
equal protection violation in Count 11 and not Count 1. ED.E. l0l at 5l, $6 217-
2252. Therein, Plaintiffs essentially allege a selective enforcement claim due to ''MGPD officers utilizEing) race and/or national origin . . . as the determinative factors in conducting stops-and-frisks, searches, seizures, and/or
arrests in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'' ED.E. l01 at 52, $ 2l9J.

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 14 of 78

279 (1979)). Additionally, uEalbsent some evidence of racially disproportionate (stops or) arrests compared to the actual incidence of violations by race , there is no basis for inferring

racially selective 1aw enforcement .'' Sw int v . City of Wadley , A1a .,

F.3d 988, 1000 (11th Cir . 1995); accord U.S. v . Bell, 86 F .3d 820, 823 (8th Cir . 1996) C'To establish discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show people of another race violated the 1aw and the law was not enforced against them .'')
3. Liability under 42 U .S .C . ï 1983

Unlike the constitutional strictures noted above , Title 42

U .S .C . 5 1983 does not create any substantive rights for individual

citizens. Albriqht v . Oliver,

(1994). Instead,

it serves as a vehicle for citizen-plaintiffs to vindicate federal

rights that have already been recognized . Id . Specifically , 1983

states, in pertinent part :

Every person who , under color of any statute , ordinance,

regulation, custom , or usage , of any State

. .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law , suit in equity , or other proper proceeding for

redre ss

U .S .C . 5 1983 . According to the Supreme Court's holding in Monell v . Dept . of

Social Svcsw 436 U.S . 658 (1978), local governments are ''persons''
that can be sued under 5 1983 . ''Section 1983 prov ides a fault-based analysis for imposing municipal liability ; therefore , plaintiffs

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 15 of 78

must establish that the city was the person who caused them to be

subjected to their deprivation.'' Depew v. Citv of St. Marys, Ga.,

787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th

1986); id. at 694 (''It when

execution of a government 's policy or custom , whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under 5 1983.''). However, the Supreme

Court also placed lim itations on municipal liability insofar as

ulocal governmentEs) may not be sued under 5 1983 for an injury

solely by its employees or agents .'' Monell, 436 U .S .

694 .

Therefore , Plaintiffs must ultimately prove constitutional

violations resulting from :

an officially promulgated (Cityl

policy or

an unofficial custom or practice of the (Cityl shown

through repeated acts of a final (Cityz policymaker.'' Andrade v .

Miami Dade Cnty w 2011 WL 4345665 at *8 (S .D. Fla . Sept. zollllciting Grech v . Clavton Cntv., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th

Cir. 2003)) see also Depew v. Citv of St. Marvs, Ga ., 787 F.2d

1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (BTo establish (an unofficial! policy

or custom , it is generally necessary to show a persistent and widespread practice . Moreover , actual or constructive knowledge of such

customs must be attributed to the governing body of the

mun icipa lity

However , the custom need not receive formal

approval.'')(citations omitted)
Under either theory , Plaintiffs must :

show that the local

15

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 16 of 78

governmental entity , here the (City) has authority and
responsibility over the governmental function in issue and identify those officials who speak with final policymaking authority for that local governmental entity concerning the act alleged to have caused the particu lar constitutional violation in
issue.'' Grech, F.3d at 1330 (citing Jett v . Dallas Indep. Sch . Distw 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). In the absence of an identified final policymaker , Plaintiffs mu st show that the City itself ''was deliberately indifferent to known and repeated E1 violations
constitutional rights .'' Andrade, 2011 WL 4345665 at *8.

D . Individual Constitutional Violations

With respect to Plaintiffs' 1983 claims, the City and

Defendant Officers argue that Plaintiffs have failed to present

record evidence of individual constitutional violations . Indeed ,

the City and Defendant Officers correctly raise this threshold

issue insofar as nEiqf a person has suffered no constitutional

injury at the hands of the individual police officerz'' the fact

that the City 's or MGPD 'S policies may have authorized or resulted

in unconstitutional stops-and-frisks uis quite beside the point .''

Citv of Los Angeles v . Heller ,

(1986); see

Vinevard v . County of Murray , Ga., 990 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir.

1993) (''only when it is clear that a violation of specific rights

has occurred can the question of 5 1983 municipal liab ility for the

injury arise.'o . By identifying an absence of record evidence on

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 17 of 78

this issue, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to designate specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists to
preclude summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
1 . Earl Sampson

With respect to Mr . Sampson , the lead Plaintiff in this case ,

he alleges MGPD officers uunlawfully stopped-and-frisked , searched ,

seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or arguable

probable cause'' on nine

specific instances dating from October

2010 to August 2012. ED.E. at 16-22, $$ 72-85). However, at his

deposition taken on August 21, 2014 , Mr . Sampson did not recall any

of the incidents alleged in the Third Amended Complaint . During his

deposition , Mr . Sampson testified as follows :

October 152h, 2010 at the library smoking a cigar ; do you remember that?

Q : October 19th, 2010, Officer Carpenter , intersection of 27th and 2072h; do you have any recollection of this incident?
A : No.
November 3rd, 2o1o standing in front of a residential home at 21099 Northwest 32nd Avenue with Officer Barney ; do you have any memory of this?
No .
Q : November 3rd, 2010 , is that the same day ? Yes later that day do you remember having two encounters with the same officer on the same day ?
A : No.

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 18 of 78

Q : June 7th, 2011, Buccaneer Park with Officer Barney , anything you remember about that?
A : No .

We are up to page 20 of your interrogatory answers,
and we are still going through just to see if you
have any recollection of the incidents that were
placed in here from the police reports .

All right . August recall this?

2011 at the Race Trac ; do you

A: No.

Q : September 20th we are on page 22 now . . . Okay do you recall any of these incidents that are listed on page 22 of your interrogatory answers?
A : No.
ED .E. 144-15 at 16-182.
Likewise , the corresponding Field Contact Reports offer very
little information concerning the unconstitutionality of Mr .
Sampson 's encounters with MGPD officers . For examp le , on October
15 , 2010, Officer Hopson made the follow ing remarks :
I observed EMr. Sampsonq sitting on the west wall of the library smoking a cigar. EMr . Sampsonq stated he was waiting on a friend to meet him there. EMr. Sampson)
stated he doesn 't have any intention to use the library .
I informed (Mr.) Sampson to find another location to hang
out at. EMr.) Sampson left the library.No wants/warrants
outstanding .
(D .E. 149-33). Although Officer Hopson's noted reason for
generating the report was a nsusp icious person ,'' there is no
indication that Mr . Sampson was not free to terminate the
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encounter . Bostick , 50l U .S . at 436 7 see also Mendenhall, 446 U .S .

at 554 (%'As long as the person to whom questions are put remains

free to disregard the questions and walk away , there has been no

intrusion upon that person 's liberty or privacy as would under the

Constitution require some particularized and objective

justification.'o .Similarly, on October l9, 2010, Officer Carpenter remarked: uContact was made with Sampson in the area of NW 27thAve/
NW 207th St . Records check revealed no warrants.'' (D .E . 149-33 at

29). On November 3, 2010, Officer Barney remarked : uOn the date and

time observed (Mr. Sampson) standing in front of the listed

address . I approached him and he advised his house was a block away

and he was just going to the store. A complete record check revealed no wants on FCIC/NCIC.' Id. at 31. In the same manner, on

August 26, 2011, Officer Horn remarked : uContact was made with EMr.

Sampson) and a complete record check was conducted with negative

results for any wants on FCIC/NCIC.'' ED.E. 151-4 at Lastly, on

Janu ary

2012, Officer Velez remarked : uWhile patrolling the

area of NW 207th St/ NW 32nd Avew came contact with (Mr.

Sampson) Sampson was observed loitering in this area and was asked

for ID . Routine records checked revealed a valid ID card and no

wants.'' (D .E. 149-37 at 1). Viewing these incidents in a light most

favorable to Mr . Sampson , there simply is no indication that he was

not free to terminate these encounters with MGPD officers . Bostick ,

U .S . at 4367 see also Mendenhall, 446

Pere z ,

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 20 of 78

F .3d at 778 .

Mr . Sampson also maintains that his August 23 , 2012 arrest for

trespass at the Quick Stop violated his constitutional rights since

''Enleither the store owner nor an authorized representative of the

store owner had requested that Mr . Sampson be removed , trespassed ,

or investigated .'' ED .E. 1O1 at

T

According the

narrative the Incident/lnvestigation Report, Officer Wagoner

unoticed another male coming out from within the listed venue 's

front door and quickly identified him as Earl Sampson based on

numerous prev ious encounters and personally known to R .A .D . team

for trespassing on listed store numerous times.'' (D .E. 151-3 at 2) The narrative further states that the nEl)isted venue had posted
'MGPD Zero Tolerance no Trespassing signs''' and that nthe sign was

painted over no longer v isible .'' Id . The narrative concludes by

stating ''Mr. Sampson was arrested Efor trespass after warningq once

again , issued a promise to appear and escorted off the premises .

However, because of previous incidents at this venue , officer knows

a trespass agreement3 exists .'' Id .

In his post-deposition affidavit submitted to explain his lack of recollection , Mr . Sampson states that , on January 28, 2015, he uviewed four videos that refreshed Ehis) memory as to some of Ehis)
encounters with EMGPD) officers.'' ED.E. 149-28 at 2, $ 8).Although
Mr . Sampson 's memory was mostly refreshed on incidents that were

See infra, pgs . 58-60 .

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 21 of 78

not specifically pled , he did recall his police encounter on August
23, 2012 . As to this encounter, Mr . Sampson testified :
Again I was stocking the store, which is part of my job
at the Quickstop. I went outside for less than about 30 seconds to throw out the trash and before I could come back in , the white bald officer arrested me for trespassing . This happened in front of A lex , the owner , who told him that I worked there . Alex then went and comp lained to Internal A ffairs about what they were doing
to me .

(D .E. 149-28 at T

Nonetheless , even if Plaintiff Saleh did not request Mr .

Sampson be removed from the premises or previously revoked his pre-

authorization for trespass by MGPD officers, Mr . Sampson was still

subject to the fifteen

''Stay-Away'' orders entered by the

County Court in and for Miami-Dade County . ED .E . 144-16 at 1-15; 138-122. The earliest one on record is April 2009. Id. at

This particular order directed Mr . Sampson not to hav e contact with

the Quick Stop in person, telephone, or by another individual. Id.

Notably , Judge Pooler did not specify an expiration date for the

order . Id . The last one on record is June

2012 . Id . at

Therein , Judge Mary Jo Francis ordered Mr . Sampson to not have any

contact with the Quick Stop for a period of six

months . Id .

A ssuming each subsequent uStay Away'' order superceded the prior

ones issued , Judge Francis 's order was still active at the time of

Sampson 's arrest on Augu st

2012 . Therefore ,

M GPD

officers had probable cause and arguable probable c ause to a rrest

21

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 22 of 78

Mr. Sampson . See Lee v . Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir.

2002) (Probable cause exists when M the facts and circumstances

within the officer 's knowledge , of which he or she has reasonably

trustworthy information , wou ld cause a prudent person to believe,

under the circumstances shown , that the suspect has committed , is

comm itting , or

about to commit an offense .'f' Moreover,

l&Ea)rguable probable cause exists 'where reasonable officers in the

same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the

Defendant could have believed that probable cause existed to

arrest.''')(internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore,

a police officer 's ulterior motives cannot serve as the basis for

uinvalidatling) police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of
probable cause to believe that a v iolation of law has occurred .''

Whren , 517 U .S . at 811-12 . A s such , Mr . Samp son has failed to come

forward with any record evidence showing a constitutional injury at
the hands of individual police officers and the City and Defendant

Officers are entitled to summary judgment on his claims against
them . Citv of Los Anqeles, 475 U .S . at 799 .

2. Toree M . Daniels

Ms . Daniels alleges she was uunlawfully stopped -and -frisked,

searched, seized, and/or arrested without reasonable suspicion or

arguable probable cause'' by MGPD officers on five (5) specific

instances dating from 2010 to 2012. ED.E. 10l at 22-25, ff 86-972.

In her sworn interrogatory responses dated June

2015, Ms .

22

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 23 of 78

Daniels includes details concerning her police encounters that are

identical to those included in the Third Amended Complaint. (D .E.

142-20 at 12,

and 24) However, due to the lack of factual

specificity regarding her police encounters , the Court is unable to

determine if Ms. Daniels suffered any constitutional injuries. See

Celotex Corr .,

at

(BRu1e 56(e) therefore requires the

nonmoving party to go beyond the p leadings and

ïdesignate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.''').

Notably , during her August l5 , 2014 deposition , Ms . Daniels could

not recall any facts related to the incidents she included in the

Third Amended Comp laint or

her interrogatory responses .

particular , Ms . Daniels's testimony was as follows ;

Q : Okay . October 25 , 2010, 7 :00 p .m ., Officer Carpenter asking for your I .D . Do you remember anything about th at ?
A : No.

June 2011, Trapaga 12 :30 in the morning checked you for wants and warrants from the Quick Stop . Do you rem emb er ?
No .

December l7 , 2011 at 7 :00 at night Officer Barney gave you an arrest for trespass after warning . Do you remember that?4

6 Despite Ms. Daniels's lack of recollection concerning her encounter with Officer Barney on December l7, 2011, her sworn interrogatory response includes
the following statement:

On December 2011, around 6:S0

I was at the Quick Stop . I

23

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 24 of 78

A : No .
Q : Do you know who Officer Barney is?
A : No .
Q : Do you know who Officer Trapaga is?
A : No.

A ll right . May l1, 2012 , 12 :30 a .m . a block from your residence Officer Payoute , P-A-Y -O-U -T-E, asked for your I .D ., asked you what you were doing walking on a public street . Do you remember anything about tha t ?
A: No.
Q : May 24 , 2012, it says here at 2 in the morning you
were just down the street from the True Value when
Officer Bernard came up to you and asked for your I.D . Do you remember anything about that?
A: No.

ED .E. 142-18 at 2l, 23, 25, and 261.

In addition , Ms . Daniels submits a post-deposition affidavit

stating that she rev iewed ''six videos'' that purportedly refreshed

her recollection as to her police encounters at the Quick Stop on

June 26, 2012, July

2012, August 11 , 2012, November l5, 2012,

and December 2O, 2012. ED.E. 167-6). However, Ms. Daniels failed to
plead the specific incidents she refers to in her affidavit . In the

was approached and detained by Officer Barney , who was acting in his official capacity for MGPD at the time. Officer Barney gave me a written arrest for trespass after warning . Officer Hunholtz approved the Field Contact Report .
ED.E. 142-20 at 201. However, Officer Barney's corresponding Complaint/Arrest
Affidavit does not give any details concerning this encounter . Instead, Officer Barney 's affidavit simply lists the charge of Trespass after Warning in violation of Fla. Stat. 5 8l0.O9(l)(A). ED .E. 137-20 at 391. Thus, viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Ms . Daniels, the Court cannot conclude that her encounter and subsequent arrest by Officer Barney violated her constitutional rights .
24

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 25 of 78

Third Amended Complaint, Ms . Daniels only pled police encounters

occurring on October

2010, June 4 , 2011, December 17, 2011, May

2012, and May 24, 2012. (D .E. l01 at 22-25) As a result, Ms.
Daniels fails to come forward with any ev idence that shows she

suffered a constitutional violation by MGPD officers w ith respect

to the incidents specifically p led in the Third Amended Comp laint .

3 . Brandon Spivey

Mr. Spivey alleges thirteen (13) specific instances in which
his constitutional rights were violated ranging from 2008 until
2012. ED.E. 101 at 26, îf 101-1141. As to the incidents alleged on
April 25, 2008, June 11, 2009, and September 9 , 2009, Mr . Spivey is precluded from relying on those to show a constitutional violation because they 1ie outside of the statute of limitations period .
Wallace, 549 U .S. at 387 ; Fla . Stat. 5 95.11 (3).
With respect to his remain ing allegations, Mr . Spivey relies on his sworn interrogatory answers as proof of his constitutional v iolations since he did not give any deposition testimony during
discovery . ED.E. 149-43 at 1-212. However, Mr. Spivey must go
beyond his pleadings and come forward with some evidence showing a genuine issue for trial . Celotex Corp w 477 U .S . at 324 . Upon
review, the majority of Mr. Spivey's interrogatory responses are
identical to the allegations included in the Third Amended Complaint and lack factual specificity indicating constitutional violations, with the exception of two encounters occurring on May

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 26 of 78
24, 2011 and June 2, 2011. (D.E . 149-43 at 8)
As alleged , on May 24 , 2011 , Mr . Spivey uwas at Buccaneer Park hanging out with some friends'' when he was approached and detained by MGPD Officer Barrios without any reasonable articulable
suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity . (D.E . 101 at
! 1102. Mr. Spivey further alleges that after Officer Barrios
checked his identification and after his record check came back clear, he was released . Id . In addition to these allegations , Mr . Spivey 's interrogatory response states that ''Officer Barrios did
not handcuff me but searched my pockets without any consent .'' ED .E. 149-43 at 212.
Likewise, Mr. Spivey alleges that, :1(0)n June 2, 2011, around 2:36 a.m., Ehe) was in the vicinity of the Quickstop and Buccaneer Park when he Ewas) approached and detained by MGPD Officer Victor
Velez' for loitering in the area. ED.E. at $ 111) Mr.
Spivey further alleges that , after providing his identification and comp leting a records check , Officer Velez released him . Id . Mr . Spivey 's interrogatory response is substantially similar to his initial allegations; however, Mr . Spivey adds one critical detail .
Mr. Spivey states that uEwlhile Officer Velez was waiting for my
records check to come back , he searched my pockets without my permission.'' ED .E. 149-43 at 8). Thus, in these instances, Mr. Spivey presents triable issues as to whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by Officers Barrios and Velez when they
26

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 27 of 78

allegedly searched his pockets without consent, arrest, or after conducting a proper stop-and-frisk for weapons and identifying the presence of contraband .

4 . Anthony Lowery

Mr . Lowery alleges four

specific instances in which his

constitutional rights were violated ranging from 2009 until 2012 .

ED.E. 1O1 at 31-32, ff 117-125). As to the incidents alleged on

June

2009 and June

2009 , Mr . Lowery is precluded from

rely ing on those to show a constitutional violation as they 1ie

outside of the applicable statute of limitations period . Wallace ,

549

at

Fla . Stat. 95.11(3).

As to the incident alleged on May

2012, the

Complaint/Arrest Affidavit completed by Officer Jacobs states that

he nobserved EMr. Loweryl drinking a 12 oz. Bud Light beer inside

the Quickstop grocery store.'' ED .E. 138-41. Officer Jacobs also

reported that signs were posted indicating uthat it is illegal to

consume alcoholic beverages within lOO ft . of the store ./'s Id .

Officer Jacobs then checked

see if Mr . Lowery had any

outstanding warrants and released Mr . Lowery ''on his own

recognizance with a Epromise to Appearq.'' Id .

During his deposition on September

2014 , Mr . Lowery

presented inconsistent testimony as to the events that transpired

on May

2012 . First, Mr . Lowery testified that he uwasn 't

5 see infra , note 6. 27

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 28 of 78

drinking beer in the store.'' (D.E . 144-1 at 14). As counsel's

questions continued ,

Lowery changed his testimony and stated

that he could neither remember the incident nor whether he had to

appear in court because of the open container charge . Id . at 15 .

Since the Court is precluded from weighing Mr . Lowery 's credibility

and some of his testimony conflicts with Officer Jacobs 's version

of events , viewing such most favorably to Mr . Lowery , there is a

genu ine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Jacobs's

encounter w ith Mr . Lowery on May 18, 2012 offended the

Constitution . See Anderson v . Libertv Lobbv , Inc ., 477 U .S . 242 ,

255 (1986) C%credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts

are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on

a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.'o .

Regarding the incident alleged on June 22 , 2012 , after being

observed by officers Dunaske and Sanchez with hair-cutting

equipment , Mr . Lowery uwas detained and his hair cutting tools were

seized.'' (D.E. 1O1 at 32, î

Mr. Lowery further alleges that

uEwlithout giving Miranda warnings, Officer Dunaske interrogated

Ehim) about what he was doing.'' Id. To which, Mr. Lowery nhonestly

responded that he was just giving a few trims/haircuts, and did not
claim that he was charging the two men from trimming up their

hair .'' Id . Because he was not being compensated for his barbering,

Mr . Lowery claims that his subsequent arrest violated his

28

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 29 of 78

constitutional rights . Id .

A ccord in g

Officer Dunaske 's narrative

the

Incident/lnvestigation Report , the encounter occurred as follows :

I observed EMr. Lowery) standing next to a black folding
chair holding an electric hair clipper . An additional
hair clipper was on the ground . Both clippers were plugged into a white extension cord that was plugged into
an outlet on the exterior of the storefront . An open
duffel bag containing additional barber equipment was on
the ground next to the chair. An unidentified subject was walking away . . . .A second subject, known to me as
(Lance Ford), was sitting in the chair with cash in his hand. Without prompting, EMr . Ford) told me he knew he
was not supposed to be at the venue but he wished to get
a haircut noting that he had money in hand as if to prove
to me his intentions. I asked (Mr. Lowery) what he was doing. He stated he was just giving a few haircuts. When asked, (Mr. Loweryq could not produce a barber license.

(D .E. 139-10 at During his January 30, 2015 deposition , Mr . Lowery stated that

a gentleman named John Hightower uhad to usher for a funeral the

following day'' and asked him if he uwould just give him a line.'
ED.E. 144-1 at 162. Mr . Lowery testified this was a1l he did prior

Officer Dunaske 's arrival and that uit wasn 't for money .'' Id .

Mr . Lowery then describes the following exchange :

And then they (Officers Dunaske and Sanchez) pull up and then another guy sits in the chair , his name is Lance . . . he sits in the chair and pull out money like, hey , man , can you cut my hair for me?
Eq And I looked up at him like you know I'm not standing up here soliciting . I'm not cutting hair ,
dude . And I said that in front of the cops . What are you doing , I'm not up here cutting hair like that .

29

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 30 of 78
Q: All right. So when the police arrived Lance pulled out money and asked you for a haircut and sat in the chair?
A : Sat right there in the chair . And no one was sitting in the chair at the time when they pulled up and
jumped out with their guns, like they always do,
Lance sits down in the chair . I don 't know if he has got issues with them or whatever , but he sits down an pulled out money .
Id . at 16 . Thereafter , Mr . Lowery adm itted to owning the hair clippers observed by Officer Dunaske and , given the circumstances , stated that he understood why Officer Dunaske thought he was barbering w ithout a license . Id .
V iewing this ev idence in a light most favorable to Mr . Lowery , the Court concludes that Officer Dunaske had probab le cause and arguab le probable cause to detain and arrest Mr . Lowery on the incident in question . See Ferraro , 284 F .3d at 1195 . Thus, Lowery fails to show a constitutional violation as to his June 22 , 2012 encounter with MGPD officers . Nonetheless , as discussed above , there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether O fficer Jacobs had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Mr . Lowery on May l8, 2012 for consuming alcohol within l0O feet of the Quick Stop .
5 . Floyd Hall, Jr.
Mr. Hall alleges six (6) specific incidents in the Third
Amended Complaint . Like other Plaintiffs, Mr . Hall was unable to recall any details concerning his police encounters other than ''he
was stopped'' and MGPD officers nasked Ehimq for identification.''

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 31 of 78
ED .E. 143-6 at 9-111. However, Mr. Hall did recall some details
about his police encounters occurring on November 15 , 2012 and July
3 , 2013 . His deposition testimony concerning the November 15, 2012
encounter was as follows :
Q : Okay . So going by what your complaint says, that is the November 15th, 2012 incident, and that's what I want to ask you about now , okay ?
A : Okay . With the taser incident , I walked out of the
store and then they Eive., MGPD officers) sit there
and ask me for identification . They were asking people as they went along . They sit there and pat me down without no consent from me . Q : Did the officer ask if he could pat you down? A : No, he didn 't . Q : So what did the officer say to you , anything , before patting you down? A : He told me turn around, face the wall, hands on the wall .
@
Q : Did you say, no, I don't want to be searched? A : No , I didn 't Q : Were you asked for permission?
A : No , I was not .
When the officers found the stun gun , what did they do ?
A : They sat there and looked at it , sat there and p layed with it, and then they sent me on my merry way .
ED .E. 143-6 at 12).
addition to his deposition testimony , Mr . Hall submits
video surveillance footage from the night in question . Although
the video is without sound and does not capture the exact moment of

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 32 of 78

Hall 's in itial encounter with MGPD officers, it does show Mr . Hall exiting the Quick Stop and being handcuffed during a search of his person and the contents of his pockets being placed on the hood

of the police cruiser. ED .E. 171 at 6, Exh . AA). The video also

corroborates Mr . Hall's testimony concerning the officers' behavior

after they completed their search and his subsequent release .

As to his arrest for open container and possession of

marijuana on July 3, 2013, Mr. Hall testified as follows:

Q : So this is a police report from Ju ly

2013

incident . Do you recall this incident?

Yes, I do .

In the police report that you read , the reporting

officer says that you were sitting outside the 2O7

Quick Stop convenience store drink a can of -

A : was not sitting outside the convenience store .

What was being said to you? They Ei.e., MGPD officers) was sitting there telling
me I was being - I asked them why I was being arrested? They told me for open container , which
was not an open container. It as Esic) a can of
beer that I just purchased. They stopped and was
talking to somebody , and then they came out and sit there ant told me I was under arrest for open container .
In contrast , Officer Velez gives a different account of his
encounter with Mr . Hall in the narrative section of the
Incident/lnvestigation Report. Therein, Officer Velez states Mr.
Hall hwas sitting outside of the 1207 Quick Stop ' convenience store
drinking a can of 'Natural Ice' beer. (Mr. Ha1l) said he was told
by the owner AKA Alex that was okay to drink outside
32

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 33 of 78

store . Alex was outside and said he had told them to leave

The beer was dumped in the garbage can in front of the store .''

(D.E . 143-8 at 2) The video surveillance footage submitted by Mr . Hall depicts him seated in front of the Quick Stop ; however, it does not show him consuming any beverages. ED .E . l71 at Exh. X).

In his deposition and sworn interrogatory responses, Mr . Hall

admitted that he had ''a small bag of marijuana in (hisq sock for
personal use'' but maintains that uwas uncovered after a search

of (hisl person was conducted without (hisz consent and/or without
a warrant. And Ehe) was arrested illegally , to begin with since Ehe) was not drinking any alcoholic beverages.'' (D.E. 143-6 at l4q Therefore , genu ine issues of material fact exist as to whether Mr . Hall's Fourth Amendment rights were violated with respect to MGPD

officers stop -and-frisk and subsequent search of his person on

November 15, 2012 and whether Officer Velez had probable cause or arguable probable cause to believe Mr . Hall was consuming an alcoholic beverage within 1OO feet of the Quick Stop on Ju ly

2013 .

6 . Ross Picart

Mr . Picart asserts he was uunlawfu lly stopped-and-frisked ,

searched , seized , and arrested without reasonable suspicion or

arguable probable cause

by MGPD officers W illiam Dunaske ,

Martin Santiago , Eddo Trimino , and others'' during an arrest that took place at the Quick Stop on December 21, 2012. ED.E. at 36,

33

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 34 of 78

! 139). However, at his deposition on June 13, 2014, Mr. Picart
testified to the following events :
Q : Okay . So at parts of that day you , Alex , and Earl were al1 in the store together?
A : Yes, sir . Q : And then A lex left around 1 :00 or m idnight and you
and Earl were going to stay until closing? Yes, sir . Okay . Are you aware of any requirements for posting
signs for a store that sells alcohol in Miam i-Dade Coun ty ? Yes. Q : County Ordinance? A : I don 't know . They got signs on the door .

Where is the sign posted? On the door .

Q : Was it there on the night of your arrest?
A : No.
Q : Why was the sign not there? A : Because I was cleaning around the door . So we was
about to close . So I moved the sign so I could clean around there , and I was going to put it back .
ED .E. 144-11 at 12). As such, Officer Dunaske had probable cause
and arguable probable cause to believe an offense - i .e ., City of
Miami Gardens Ordinance violation6 - was being committed . See Fla .

6 Miami Gardens Code of Ordinances No. 2011-03-245 pertinent part :

6-350(1) states,

Posting of Prop erty . The licensee of any package store or food store selling alcoholic beverages shall prominently post in English , Spanish and Haitian Creole on the outside of each entrance and on the inside of the main customer exit of each food store selling alcoholic beverages or package store, a sign with contrasting letters at least two (2) inches tall, stating the following :

1. IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON TO CONSUME , OR POSSESS, IN AN OPEN CONTAINER , ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE IN THIS STORE OR WITHIN 100 FEET

34

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 35 of 78

Stat . 55 562 .14 and 562 .457 see also Ferraro , 284 F .3d at 1195

(Probable cause exists when uAthe facts and circumstances within

the officer's knowledge , of wh ich he or she has reasonably

trustworthy information , would cause a prudent person to believe ,

under the circumstances shown , that the suspect has committed , is

committing , or is about to comm it an offense .r'' Moreover,

'%Ea)rguable probable cause exists Nwhere reasonable officers in the

same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the

Defendant could have believed that probable cause ex isted to

arrest .''')

Furthermore, Officer Dunaske states in his Incident/

Investigation Report that upreviously, Ehe) has been told by

numerous tipsters'' that employees at the Quick Stop carried uguns

and kept guns behind the counter .'' (D .E. 170-2 at

Officer

Dunaske further states that, as a result

Mr . Picart's

Buncooperative demeanor , knowledge of the possib ility of him being

armed, and the fact (he) would not be in direct control of him

OF ANY PART OF THIS STORE . VIOLATORS ARE SUBJECT TO ARREST AND PROSECUTION .
3 . Area of applicability and excep tions. For the purpose of this section, the area within one hundred (100) feet of any property described in this section shall be the area within a one hundredfoot radius of any part of such property , but shall not include any property lawfully used for a private residence or any area where possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages is specifically prohibited or permitted by State law or by any license or permit issued pursuant thereto
See edocs.miamigardens-fl.gov/WebLink8/o/doc/lzo46s/Electronic.aspx
3 5

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 36 of 78

while (he) identified him , (heq decided to conduct a pat down for

weapons .'' Id . at

Thus, Officer Dunsake 's subsequent frisk of

Mr . Picart was within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment . Ybarra ,

444 U .S . at

During this process, however , Officer Dunaske

reported that Mr . Picart ubecame agitated , tried to pull away from

Ehim), and forcefully reached into his right front pant pocket .''

Id . at Then, Officer Dunaske states that he uremoved EMr .

Picart's) hand from his pocket and EMr. Picart) discarded an item

later recovered and determined to be a clear plastic bag containing

marijuanav'' Id.
During his deposition , Mr . Picart's testimony remained

consistent with Officer Dunaske's version of events :

Okay . So at the time they asked to pat you down where
was the marijuana?
A : In my pocket . Q : Did you not want to be patted down because you knew
you had drugs on you ? A : Yeah . Q : You didn 't want them to find it? A : Of course not .
ED.E . 144-11 at 15J. Thus, Mr. Picart fails to show a
constitutional violation resulting from his encounter with Officer
Dunaske . As such , the City and Defendant Officers are entitled to
summary judgment on Mr. Picart's claims against them.
7. Roderick D . Smith
Mr . Smith alleges his constitutional rights were violated by
MGPD officers on five (5) specific occasions ranging from 2009 to

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 37 of 78

2013. ED .E. 10l at 37-40). As for the April 8, 2009 incident, Mr.
Smith is precluded from rely ing on such to show a constitutional violation because it lies outside of the applicable statute of lim itations period . Wallace , 549 U .S . at 387 Fla . Stat .

95.11(3) Moreover, similar to other Plaintiffs, Mr. Smith was

unable to recall the circum stances surrounding his police encounter

occurring on Augu st

2013 . ED .E. 145-7 at

145-13) Also,

counsel failed to elicit any deposition testimony or submit other

record evidence concerning Mr . Sm ith 's encounter with MGPD officers

on January 14 , 2013 .7

As to his October

2011 encounter with MGPD O fficer Vega ,

Mr . Smith testified as follows :

October 22 , 2011 . The next one you mentioned in your interrogatory answers is October 22nd# 2011 . Do you have a copy of the field contact report in front of you ?
A : Yes.

Q : Do you recall any encounter that you had with an officer that date, time and location at 1:00 in the morning?
A : Yes .

1 To

the

extent

counsel

for

Mr .

Smith

committed

a

scrivener 's

error

concerning

the date of his police encounter being January l4, 2013 rather than January 4 ,

2013, Mr. Smith was unable to recall this incident during his deposition. (D.E.

145-7 at 10). In addition, the corresponding Field Contact Report for the January

4 , 2013 encounter does not indicate that Mr . Smith was not free to terminate the

encounter with Officer Malone . Bostick , 5Ol U .S. at 436; see also Mendenhall, 446

U .S . at 554; Perez, 443 F .3d at 778.

3 7

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 38 of 78

Q : Now , where were you when this contact happened with Officer Vega?

Q : Walking by yourself?
A : Yes .
Q : How did Officer Vega make contact with you? A : Just pulled up on me , turned the lights on
flash on me and turned out his car .

put the

Q: So the officer was in a police car?
A: Yes.

Q : Now , who spoke first ; the officer or you ? A : I didn 't speak to him , he spoke to me . Q : What did he say to you? A : Come here .

Q : So the officer said come over and you walked over to the officer?
A : Right . Q: Was the officer out of the police car? A : Yes . At the time, yes . Q : Was the officer next to the police car? A : He walked around the car . He pulled up on 207 . He
walked around . Come here . I walked up to the car , he walked around . Put your hands up .
Q: Al1 right . (sicl After you put your hands up what was the nex t thing the either happened or was said
between the two of you? A : He went in my pocket and he asked me where my ID at .
I 'm like I don 't have no ID .

38

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 39 of 78

Q : He had already asked in your name? A : Not at the time . A fter the fact that he searched me,
then he asked my name and he went back to the car, ran my name . He told me to sit in front of the car and then he came back like , oh , all right , go about your business .
Q : How long did this whole thing take? A : 2O, 25 minutes .

ED .E. 145-7 at 7-82.
contrast , as to the October 22nd events, the corresponding

Field Incident Report completed by Officer Vega states that: ''EMr. Smithq was stopped and detained said location while working
special patrol detail . A records check revealed no wants or

warrants at this time.'' ED .E . 145-91 Given Officer Vega's failure
to state a legal reason for the detention and Mr . Smith 's contrasting version of events, a genuine issue of material facts

exists as to whether Officer Vega 's stop , detention , and alleged search of Mr . Smith 's person violated his Fourth Amendment rights

as outlined in Terrv . Concerning his encounter with MGPD Officers Ruiz and Tamayo on
February 7 , 2013, Mr . Smith alleges that he ''was on the Quick Stop

property drinking an alcoholic beverage . He was approached by MGPD

off ic ers

who asked for his identification and poured out the

contents of the beverage . Simultaneously , MGPD officers performed

a full search of Mr . Smith 's person without consent and without
reasonable articulable suspicion.'' (D.E. l01 at 39, f 152). Mr.
Smith 's deposition testimony was consistent with his allegations .
There, Smith testified that he was not udenying that Ehe) was
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wrong for having a beer

ED .E. 145-7 at 11). Likewise, the

narrative from Officer Ruiz's Incident/lnvestigation Report states:

On 2/7/13 While (sic) on patrol I observed a male later known as Rodrick (sic) Smith drinking outside 3185 N.W .
2O7 St (207th Quick Stop). Upon making contact with Smith I observed that he was drinking a 240z Steel reserve .
Smith stated that he was just chillin and having his
beer . There was a sign posted at the door of the store stating that its illegal to consume liquor w ithin l00 feet from the store . Smith was placed in custody and
later released on a PTA .

ED.E . 145-12 at

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorab le to Mr . Smith ,

the Court finds there was probable cause and arguable probab le

cause to arrest Mr . Smith on February

2013 . See Ferraro , 284

F .3d at 1195 . In addition , O fficer Ruiz did not need consent or

reasonable suspicion to search Mr . Smith 's person because a search

incident to a lawful arrest does not offend the Constitution . See

U .S. v . Robinson, 4l4 U .S. 218, 235 (1973) (''EW)e hold that in the
case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requ irement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that

Amendment.'o . Thus, Mr. Smith fails to assert a constitutional violation with respect to his police encounter on February 2013 . However , as noted above, there is a genuine issue of material fact
as whether Mr . Smith 's Fourth Amendment rights were violated during his encounter with Officer Vega on October 22 , 2011 .

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8 . Kenneth Crane

Mr . Crane asserts one

specific police encounter where his

constitutional rights were violated .

particular , Mr . Crane

alleges that he Bwas riding his bicycle to the Quick Stop when he

was stopped without reasonable suspicion , and subsequently searched

and arrested without probable cause by MGPD officers.'' ED .E. 1O1 at
40, ! 1622. As to this incident, which occurred on November
2012, Mr . Crane testified as follows :

. . . Do you remember it or have you lost memory of the event?
A : I remember - I remember - I remember the officer and I remember where he - what he said to me that night I got off that bike . Before I got off that bike, I remember what he said to me .

Q : Okay . Were you riding a bike at night?
A : Yes, I was .
Q : Your bike did not have a light on it, did it? A : No , it did not . Q : Was it dark?
A : Yes .
Q : Were you aware that at the time there was a law that said if you ride you b ike at night -
A : But it was not - but it was not - but it was not real , real, real dark . It was dark , but it wasn 't real dark .

Q : It was five minutes before seven o 'clock in November, right , 6 :55 p .m . in November?

A : Yeah , okay
ED.E . 142-14 at 8q. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Mr .
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Crane , the Court finds arguable probable cause existed to stop Mr .

Crane for riding a bicycle with out a light at night .8 see Ferraro ,

284 F .3d at 1195 .

As for the subsequent frisk and search of Mr . Crane 's person ,

Officer Trim ino 's narrative states that he ''observed a bulge in

EMr. Crane's) right front pocket. The listed area is a high crime

area where numerous shootings Eand) homicides have occurred .

During my officer safety pat down EMr. Crane) stated 'man I'm to

(sic) old for guns just got some weed in that pocket.' (Mr.

Crane) also smelled of burnt marijuana.'' (D.E. 138-7 at

However , Mr . Crane submits video surveillance footage of his

encounter that contradicts Officer Trimino 's version of the events .

ED.E . 171 at 5, Exh . U). On the video, it appears Officer Trimino

searched the interior

Mr . Crane 's pockets without first

conducting a pat-down frisk for weapons or p lacing h im under

arrest . Thus, O fficer Trimino's conduct at th is point appears to

have exceeded the permissible scope under Terry and intruded upon

Mr . Crane's Fourth Amendment rights . addition , Officer Trimino

did not state in his narrative that he felt an object whose contour

or mass was immediately apparent as contraband . Dickerson , 508 U .S .

at 373 . Further, during his deposition , Mr . Crane repeatedly denied

nEvery bicycle in use between sunset and sunrise shall be equipped with a lamp on the front exhibiting a white light visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the front and a lamp and reflector on the rear each exhibiting a red light visible from a distance of 60O feet to the rear . A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with lights or reflectors in addition to those required by this section.' Fla. Stat. j 316.2065(8).
4 2

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having marijuana on his persop, thereby refuting Officer Trimino's
statement concern ing his admission and the smell of burnt
marijuana. ED.E. 142-142. Therefore, genuine issues of material
fact exist as to whether Officer Trimino 's subsequent search of Mr . Crane's person violated his Fourth Amendment rights .

Yvensonne Montale

Mr . Montale asserts three

encounters during which his

constitutional rights were v iolated by MGPD officers in 2012. Of

these three encounters,

were prem ised upon lawfu l stops .

However , based upon record evidence , there are genuine issues of

material fact concerning the constitutionality of the subsequent

searches of Mr . Montale 's person by MGPD officers .

The first encounter complained of occurred on June 2012 . During this encounter , Mr . Montale asserts that he uwas riding his bicycle when he was detained for no reason by MGPD Officer Jimmy
Sanchez and MGPD Officer Martin Santiago.'' (D.E. 1O1 at 41, f 1681.
Montale further alleges that Officers Sanchez and Santiago claimed he had no lights on his bicycle while riding at night when , in fact, his bicycle was equipped with lights . Id . In addition , Mr .

Montale asserts that, subsequent his stop, ''ltlhe officers searched (his) pockets, ran his name for warrants, and released
him .'' Id . However , during his January 30, 2015 deposition , Mr . Montale testified as follows :
Q : A ll right . So , on June 6th on June 6th# the first

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 44 of 78
time you were stopped , you agree with me that at
that time, you did not have a light Eon your bicycle)?
A : Well, I had a light but it wasn 't bright enough, like the battery was dying, so, they stopped me .
Q : Can you tell me without guessing or speculating whether that light you had on June 6th, 2012, that you described as running out of battery and very dim , whether it was visible from a distance of 5O0
feet ? A : No. Q : You don 't know , right? A : I don 't know .
Did you have any lights on the rear of the bike? No . I had a reflector , like a red reflector .
ED .E. 144-5 at 9-11). Thus, Officers Sanchez and Santiago had
probable cause and arguable probable cause to stop Mr . Montale for
riding his bicycle at night without sufficient lighting .g see
Ferraro , 284 F .3d at 1195 .
Notwithstanding , Mr . Montale goes on to describe the events
that occurred after he was stopped :
A 11 right . Which officer came over to and spoke to y ou ?
A : I believe it was Sanchez . Q : Okay . What did he say to you? A : He came up , he told me to put my hands up , searched
my pockets and he detained me; I gave him my ID and he gave me my ID back and he released me a couple minutes after .

9 See

sup ra ,

n ote

8 .

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 45 of 78
Q : How did he do that? A : He told me get off the bike, turn around, he made -
there was a gate there, so , he made me put my hands against the gate and then searched my pockets .
ED .E. 144-5 at
Similarly , Mr . Montale alleged and described a search of his
person by MGPD Officer Lawson after a lawful stop in Buccaneer Park
on June 2012 .
Q : A 11 right . So, what was the first contact Officer Lawson made with you?
He came - first , he put his light and then he called me, he like , you come over here .
Q: He asked you to come over to him?
A : Yeah . Q : Was he in his car at the time? A : No , he stepped out , and them he told me to put my
hands on the hood , he searched me, he searched my pockets . I gave him my ID , he ran my name for
warrants, then couple of minutes later, he just let
me go .
A 11 right . What did he say to you? He like , oh , you can 't be in the park around this
time (i.e ., 7:00 p .m .); I'm like, I'm getting ready
to leave right now , as you can see; and he like , a11 right, go ahead ; and gave me my ID and then I went on my way .
(D .E. 144-5 at 17).
Lastly , Mr . Montale describes his encounter with MGPD Officer
Gregory in front of the Quick Stop on August 13 , 2012 .
Now that brings us to the one that's in the complaint, August 13 , 20127 what happened on that date ?
A : I was on my way to the store . When I got to the store parking lot, I turned off the light on the bike so I won't kill the battery; and then I seen Eofficer
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Gregoryj in the parking lot, and then as soon as I
reach the door , that's when he came ; he pulled up , he called me , he told me to put my hands on the hood of the car and then he searched me , went in my pocket ; and then he asked me for my ID , I gave it to him , he ran it , and he wrote me a ticket for not having the light .

(D .E. 144-5 at 18)

In addition to his deposition testimony , Mr . Montale submits video surveillance footage of his encounter with Officer Gregory in

front of the Quick Stop . ED.E. 171 at Exh . N). Therein, the
video depicts Officer Gregory 's initial encounter with Mr . Montale .

shows Mr . Montale being ordered to place his hands on the hood

of the police cruiser . Id . Then , after handing O fficer Gregory his

identification , Officer Gregory is seen searching Mr . Montale 's

pockets . Id . From this point , the video show s Officer Gregory 's

check for warrants and the issuance of the citation for riding

bike without a light at night . Id .

View ing the evidence in a light most favorable to Mr . Montale ,

there are genuine issues of material fact concerning violations of

his Fourth Amendment rights during the subsequent searches of his

person by MGPD officers on June June 9, and August

2012,

after being lawfu lly stopped for bicycle lighting and ordinance

violations. See Johnson, 555 U .S. at 326 (''ET)o proceed from a stop

to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that

person stopped is armed and dangerous.'o ; Dickerson, 508 U .S. at 373 (A frisk is ustrictly 'limited to that which is necessary for

46

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the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or

others nearby .rz')

l0. Omar Dean

Mr . Dean alleges five

specific police encounters during

which his constitutional rights were violated. ED.E . lO1 at 42-44,

!! 176-1862. Unlike some Plaintiffs, during his deposition,

Dean was able to recall several police encounters, two of which are

of particular concern to the Court . In moderate detail, Mr . Dean identified two police encounters , occurring on May 2 , 2012 and July

2012, that raise genuine issues of fact regarding his constitutional v iolations .

With respect to the July l3, 2012 incident , Mr . Dean testified

as follows :

Q : And then you had an encounter with Officer Malone?
A : Yes . He pulled in behind a car . There was a car in front of the store . He pulled in beh ind the car
like he was going to run the tag, and he jumped out
and he asked me , like , whatcha doing up there . I'm like, man , you know it's raining out there . I'm
waiting for it to stopping (sicq raining . So, he like whatcha got. I was like no, a dude just gave
me some Red Bulls . So he like patted me down . Like, man , I ain 't got nothing in there . You know , what's going on . So he got my ID .

After you told him that someone gave you some Red Bulls he asked for your ID ?
A : Yeah . I gave him my ID . He patted me . As a matter of fact, he went in my pocket and he patted my down . I ain 't have nothing . I gave him my ID .
Q : What do you mean , did he go in your packets or pat the outside of your pockets?
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A : He went in my pockets, patted me down , you know what I mean . He rub my legs, all that, the arms and whatever . Proper procedure . Take my ID , go inside the car .
A : So he ran my name . He comes back and he said , where did you get the Red Bulls again . . . So , he put his hands inside the bag , checked , looked at the . . . cans of Red Bull , put them in the bag and he said I'm donating to the fucking hood , and throw the Red Bulls and they scattered everywhere .

So the ones that didn 't burst , he had the audacity to take them and went and handed them out to the people up to the store .

ED.E . 142-21 at

In addition to his testimony, Mr. Dean submits

video evidence of his encounter with Officer Malone . ED.E. at

Exh. Lq. Although the video is without sound and the majority
of Mr . Dean 's encounter with Officer Malone is off-camera , it shows

Mr . Dean offering his identification to Officer Malone and Officer

Malone immediately attempting to conduct a pat-down search of Mr . Dean person . Id . The video also shows Officer Malone scattering and kicking the contents of a bag prev iously held by Mr . Dean on the ground in front of the Quick Stop . Id .

Regarding Mr . Dean 's police encounter on May deposition testimony was as follows :

2012 , his

Q : According to Officer Payoute , a consensual stop was conducted at which time Dean 's identity was verified and the record checked . Do you recall this encounter that you had?

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 49 of 78
Q : Tell me what happened . A : I was coming , I was leaving getting off the bus an I
was going to her house . And as I 'm walking down the sidewalk , he passed me by one time and he turned back around and he out the high beam on , you know , the thing they turn on the side of the car , the flashlight . I'm like , yo , man , what's up , man . So , he turned around the car and he said where are you going . I 'm going to my friend , girl 's house . It 's
just right up the street. I just got off the bus.
So , he 's like , you got ID on you ? Matter of fact let me pat you down . You got any drugs or weapons on you? I was man , I ain 't got shit on me , man . So I get against the gate and he pats me down . I give him my ID . He gets my ID , comes back in like two , three minutes . And he was like you 're free to fo , have a good night .
Q : How long did this take? A : Maybe five minutes or something like that . . . He
patted me down . . . . He said I was free to go , it's like I was detained again , you know . I had to wait for him to finish . Did he tell you to stay there? Of course, he had my ID , like standing right there
(D .E . 142-21 at 16q. Given Mr. Dean's testimony and record
evidence, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated regarding the stops-and -
frisks and subsequent searches of his person during his encounters
with Officers Malone and Payoute on Ju ly 13, 2012 and May 2 , 2012,
respectively .
Baraka Short
Although Mr . Short did not list any specific instances of his
constitutional rights being violated in the Third Amended

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 50 of 78

Complaint, in his deposition he discussed several encounters with MGPD officers , two of which are of particular concern to the Court .

The first being an encounter that took place on October 2O, 2011. Mr . Short described his encounter with Officer Velez on this date

as follows :

Honestly , that day I was at my salon watching TV , relaxing , listening to the radio . . And we kind of like got caught up with the time . So it got a little late on us . I very rarely leave the
strorefront Esic) too late, because I know that
kind of puts you in the position for Miami Gardens to do what they normally do .

Q : So what on earth were you doing outside the salon at 2 :20 in the morning?

Once it got late we decided that we were going to

leave and call it a night , when we left out and

locked the building (MGPD Officers) rolled

I

immediately stopped with the guy that was with me .

. . , and they told us , uPut your hands behind your

back .'' So I put our hands behind my back , hancuffed

us, threw us on the hood . I 'm continuously telling

him, ''Sir, I'm a business owner here. I'm just now

leaving my business. That's why you just saw me

lock the door .''

His response was, ''I don 't give a fuck . Keep your mouth closed . Do you have anything in your pockets?'' I said no .

A t that moment they went into my pockets , took everything out, put it on the hood . .

Once they conducted their search and realized that there was noting, the took those very tight handcuffs off my wrists and allowed me to leave .

(145-1 at 13) .

In contrast , Officer Velez gives a remarkably different

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 51 of 78

account of his encounter with Mr . Short in the corresponding Field

Contact Report . Therein , Officer Velez states, 'Wh ile patrolling

the area of NW 32nd Ave/NW 207th St., came in Contact with Baraka
Short . Short was observed loitering in the area and was asked for

Routine records checked revealed a valid

card and no

warrants.'' ED .E. 145-33.

Similarly , Mr . Short describes another encounter with MGPD

Officer Jones-Gray on July

2010 in front of his business, which

adjacent to the Quick Stop noted herein. Mr. Short recalled the
following exchange :

Q : A 11 right . So what happened when Officer Jones-Gray approached you?
UID . Don 't move . Have you ever been arrested before?'' Al1 these like questions . I'm like , uWhat's going O n ?M
uWell, don 't ask us questions right now . We 'll be asking the questions'' type of thing , the normal routine, ''Keep your mouth closed . We 'll conduct
business and 1et you know if you're going to jail
or if you 're going free .''
Q: Were you asked to produce ID?
A : Yes.

Were you ever put in handcuffs or put up on a car in this incident?
A : I wasn 't put in handcu ffs, but I was detained . I had to stand up through the crate facing my front
window like this (Indicating), and just stay like
this .

A : I was checked too . After I got checked and I guess they realized , you know , I'm not a threat to them ,
then I was told to just stay there.
Mr . Lopez : Just for the record , Mr . Short stood up and faced the wall and put his hands behind his back .
51

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A : Exactly . Mr . Lopez : Uncuffed , but put his hands behind his back
as in a handcuffed position .

ED .E. 145-1 at

In the corresponding Field Contact Report, Officer Jones-Gray

documented the following remarks , which contrast with Mr . Short 's

deposition testimony: nSubject was sitting on a create in front of

Quick Stop

and did not appear to have a legitimate reason to

present Esicq be at location . Drug offenders are known to frequent

location . Field Interrogation conducted and records check completed

via NCIC. No warrants nor wants. Subject released.'' ED.E. 145-42.

View ing this evidence in a light most favorable to Mr . Short ,

the Court finds genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether

his Fourth Amendment rights were violated during his encounters

with MGPD officers in front of his place of business on July 10,

2010 and October

2011 .

l2 . Ali Amin Saleh & Ab ir, Inc .

Mr . Saleh , as corporate representative for Abir , Inc ., asserts that uthe Quickstop was unlawfully searched without reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause , numerous times by MGPD
officers.'' ED.E . at $ 188) Specifically, Mr. Saleh states
that, uEallthough (Officer Engers) was given permission to use the bathroom, never used the bathroom; instead, (hel unlawfully
searched the premises'' on July 28, 2012. Id. at $ 193-94. Mr.
Saleh substantially testified to this encounter during his

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 53 of 78

deposition as follows :

Q : Tell me what you observed .
A: From the restroom (Officer Engers) decided to go
inside the kitchen cooler , which is a1l the storage
and he start Esicq searching. He pulled his flashlight and started searching . I never went to
confront him, I just watching (sic) him on the
v ideo .
Q : Is this on video?
A : Yes .
Q : Did he seize anything or take anything?
A : Not that I know . I know he searched . Q : So he opened your cooler and went into A : He went into the back cooler with his flashlight and
checking under the counter inside the kitchen area , he checks that area . Q : After that he went back inside the bathroom , he never closed the bathroom door . You can hear he is moving stuff inside the bathroom , like the garbage can , you can hear that he is moving or flipping the
garbage can or whatever . A fter that he never close the bathroom door, remember that . He walking out
Esic), he decided to open the big walk in cooler
too, because he search one, now he is going to search the second one . He opens and looks in , and he close the door and walks out and said thank you for using the bathroom .

ED .E. 144-14 at 2-3). In addition, Mr. Saleh submits video
surveillance footage and still photographs that corroborate his

deposition testimony . ED.E . at Exh. JJ

Accordingly, &'Ea)n individual's right to privacy in his place
of business is not absolute , and 'what is observable by the public

is observable , without a warrant , by the Government inspector as

well.'' Fortson v . Citv of Elberton, 592 F . App'x 819, 822-23 (11th

Cir. 2014)(quoting Marshall v. Barlow 's, Inc w 436 U .S. 307, 315

(1987)) see also U .S . v . Hall,

1091, 1096 (11th

53

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1995) ('AEA) commercial proprietor has a reasonable expectation of

privacy only in those areas where affirmative steps have been taken

to exclude the public.''). Although entry can constitute a search

under the Fourth Amendment uwhen a business owner has a reasonable

expectation of privacy , 'a law enforcement officer may enter a

commercial premises open to the public and observe what is in plain

view .'' Id. at 823 (quoting U .S. v. Various Gamblinq Devices, 478

F.2d 1194, 1200 (5th Cir. 1973)). In addition, law enforcement

officers ''Acan enter onto Ean individual'sq property

in order

to carry out legitimate police business.''' Id. (quoting Coffin v.

Brandau, 642 F .3d 999, 1012 (11th Cir. 2011))

Viewing the record evidence in a light most favorable to Abir ,

Inc ., the Court finds genuine issues of material fact exists as to

whether Officer Engers exceeded the scope of Mr . Saleh 's perm ission

to use the bathroom and impermissibly searched the premises of

Abir , Inc . in violation of the Fourth Amendment .

D . Unconstitutional Policies & Count l

Assuming a reasonable jury finds Plaintiffs Spivey, Lowery,
Hall , Smith , Crane , Montale , Dean , and Abir, Inc .'s constitutional

rights were violated, Plaintiffs must still show : 1:(1) an

officially promulgated Ecity) policy or an unofficial custom or

practice of the (City) shown through repeated acts of a final

Ecity) policymaker.'' Andrade v . Miami Dade Cntv w 2011 WL 4345665

at *8 . In the absence

an identified final policymaker ,

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 55 of 78

Plaintiffs must show that the City itself uwas deliberately

indifferent to known and repeated v iolations of constitutional

rights.'' Id .

this case , Plaintiffs allege that the City had three

distinct policies that are 50th unconstitutional and resulted in

their injuries:

Quota Policy;

Zero Tolerance Zone Policy ;

and (3) Racial Targeting Policy x o (D .E. 10l at 8-12). The City

denies the existence of any unwritten quota or racial targeting

policies . The City also acknowledges its written Zero Tolerance

Zone program , but maintains that it was not used to violate any of

Plaintiffs' constitutional rights .

Quota Policy

Per the Third Amended Complaint, ''MGPD final policymakers

10 plaintiffs also separately take issue with two areas of MGPD police practice :
Field Contacts and Police Dashboard Camera Recordings. (D.E. l0l at 12-151. In particular , Plaintiffs claim that ''MGPD officers frequently filled out Field
Contact forms that on their face stated a constitutionally insufficient basis for
stopping, frisking, and/or arresting a subject.'' Id. at l2, f 49. Similarly,
Plaintiffs assert that, 'upon information and belief, (Chief Boyd) was aware that MGPD officers and supervisors were disregarding Policy 5.4, which required MGPD officers to record incident with their dashboard cameras . . . Yet rather then
ensuring compliance, (Chief Boydq continued to ignore this policy . . . .' Id.
at 14, $ 63. However, neither of these police practices implicate the
Constitution . First, Plaintiffs conflate the differences between Terrv stops-and-
frisks versus consensual encounters as explained above. Although Plaintiffs take issue with the manner in which these field contacts were documented, it takes an
individualized analysis to determine if constitutional violations occurred in each of the 99,000 field contact forms MGPD officers allegedly completed between
2008 and 2013. Id. at l3, f 58. Further, per MGPD policy, field contacts are
consensual in nature and, therefore, do not implicate the Constitution. See ED.E. 140-8) C'Field Interview : A consensual encounter between a police officer and a citizen . A field interview is not based on reasonable suspicion and does not involve any restraint or detention of a citizen.z'). (D.E. 140-82. Second, Plaintiffs have not identified any authority granting them a constitutionally
protected interest in dashboard camera footage . See Andrews v . Flaiz, 2014 WL 4925044, at * 6 (N .D . Ohio Sept. 3O, 2014)7 Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. R0th, 408 U.S. 567, 577 (1972).As a result, Monell liability would not lie based upon these two areas of police practice .

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 56 of 78

created, implemented , and are continuing to enforce an illegal

system of quotas requiring officers to issue a specific amount of

citations , field contact reports , and arrests per month . '' (D .E.

at !

To support the existence of this unwritten policy,

Plaintiffs rely on the testimony of several current and former MGPD

officers, sergeants , and detectives . Interestingly , all MGPD

officers deposed in th is action testified that there was an

admin istrative emphasis p laced on productiv ity numbers related to

the number of citations, arrests, or field contact reports a
particular officer generated on a monthly or annual basis. ED.E .

150-2 at 14-207 150-5 at 30-36; 167-11 at 20-212. However, in
contrast to Plaintiffs' allegations, there was no testimony of a

specific number of citations , field contact reports , and arrests

that officers were required to generate. (D.E. 144-4 at 62-63)
Most informative on this issue was former MGPD Sergeant and current

Officer Jeffrey Mason 's testimony . During his deposition , Officer

Mason testified that : ''As a supervisor, we were ordered to evaluate

on quarterly and yearly annual Esic) evaluations and indicate whether or not officers were meeting the expected quotas based

on the adm inistration 's determination

There wasn't a set

numher , but officers were expected to bring in a high number of

activity

ED .E. 150-1

(emphasis added) As a

baseline for productiv ity , Detective Joel William s testified that

an officer would not be p laced on any corrective action plan so

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 57 of 78

long as they , nat the very minimum , produced one field contact and

one citation per shift per assigned workday .'' ED .E. 150-4 at 3)

Thus , view ing this evidence most favorably to Plaintiffs, Officer

Mason and Detective W illiams's testimony in this regard suggests

the existence of an unwritten quota policy characterized as minimum

standards for officer productiv ity .

On the other hand, the City relies, in part , on the testimony

from its police practices expert , Dr . George P . Alpert, to explain

how the MGPD utilizes officer productivity statistics as a

management tool . his report ,

Alpert states :

Miami Gardens is a department that is managed on
principles of Compstat, and/or evidence based policing,
and one that stresses high levels of officer productivity . In these types of agencies generally , and M iami Gardens specifically , officers are evaluated, in part , on the quantity of their actions including arrests, citations and field contact cards . Additionally , officers
are rewarded for this activity while other activ ity choices , including some types of community involvement,
are not evaluated as importantly when considering rewards , transfers and even promotions . While this strategy is not universally accepted as the best practice , or the dominant management approach , it is a very popular and a common approach among police departments throughout the country .

ED .E. 200-1 at 51.

Moreover, in his deposition, Major Chapman stated that he
never uput pressure on Ehis) captains to put pressure on their
officers to go out and write a certain number of field contacts .''

(D.E . 142-1 at 16) Similarly, at a Community Forum Meeting held on

August 4, 2009, in response to a concern from officers on midnight

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 58 of 78

shifts ubeing told they need to produce 2 tickets per night,''

Deputy Chief Miller was recorded as stating : ''There is not a quota ,

and if anyone is told otherwise, please adv ise those individuals to

make an appointment to speak with him ; erroneous information is circulating , he has personally sat in on recent roll calls , in part

for this very reason . There is a reasonable expectation that

officers can perform at a level consistent with an 11.5 hour

shift.'' ED.E . 152-42 at 18-191 In response to Daryl Owens's question of what is considered ''h ighp', Deputy Chief M iller was

recorded as saying : ''The squad average is exactly that, an average .

someone is falling well below the average or the high , as a superv isor they have the responsibility to address the issue .

That low person diminishes the squad 's overall average .'' Id . at 19 .

A lthough evidence of the MGPD 'S management processes and its emphasis on officer productivity does not , in and of itself, equate

to a policy of quotas, viewing the evidence most favorably to

Plaintiffs, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the City 's alleged unwritten quota policy .

Therefore, the City is not entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' Monell claims premised on its alleged unwritten quota

policy .

2. Zero Tolerance Zone Policy

Plaintiffs also allege that ''MGPD officers have used the Zero

Tolerance Zone Policy ,

illegally stop-and-frisk , search ,

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and seize, and arrest'' them on numerous occasions. (D.E . 1O1 at 10-

To that end ,

is undisputed that

City had a nZero

Tolerance Zone'' trespassing program , codified at Section 14-59,

Miami Gardens Code of Ordinances. ED .E . 137-717 Ord. 2007-22-

55

10-24 -2007; see also Fla . Stat . 55 810.08 and

810 .09. It is also undisputed that this ordinance is con stitutional

on its face . The plain language of the ordinance allows uCity

police officers (to be) pre-authorized in writing by a private

property owner within the city

issue orders to trespassers

directing them to leave the owner's property .'' Id. at (2)(b) The

ordinance also makes nunlawful for any person , who enters on

private property without being authorized , licenced or invited , to

refuse to obey an order to leave the premises given by a police

officer that is pre-authorized to issue such an order .'' Id . at

(2) (d ).

Since there is no dispute regarding the existence of the

policy , in order for municipal liability to attach , Plaintiffs must

show uthat , through its deliberate conduct , the municipality was

the 'moving forcer behind the alleged injurEies) That is, Plaintiff Esq must show that the municipal action was taken with the

requisite degree of culpab ility and must demonstrate direct

causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of

federal rights .'' Bd . of Cntv . Comm 'rs of Brvan Cntv ., Okla . v .

Brown, 52O

397, 4O4 (1997) (emphasis omitted)

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Here, the only stops and or arrests predicated upon the Zero Tolerance Zone policy arise from Plaintiffs Earl Sampson , Toree

Daniels, and Brandon Spivey . The remaining Plaintiffs lack the

causal link between this particu lar policy and their constitutional

injuries because they were searched, stopped-and-frisked, and or

arrested

reasons unrelated to trespassing . However, as noted

above , Plaintiffs Sampson , Daniels , and Spivey failed

show

constitutional injuries resulting from their specific encounters

listed

the Third Amended Complaint . Therefore , the City is

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Monell claim premised
on its Zero Tolerance Zone ordinance .

Racial Targeting Policy

Plaintiffs also allege that the ''MGPD has directly ordered its

officers to stop-and-frisk black males, ages fifteen (15) though

thirty (30), without reasonable articulable suspicion of

criminality.'' (D.E . 1O1 at

is further alleged that Major

Anthony Chapman issued this particular directive during an officer

roll call February 2012 .

In direct contrast to Plaintiffs' assertions, Major Chapman denied ever giving such a directive. ED.E. 149-13 at 11; 138-16 at

4, lî 11-12). Likewise, MGPD Officers Sanchez, Dunaske, and Uncanan denied ever hearing such a directive from Major Chapman in
their respective depositions. ED .E . 144-17 at 97 149-24 at 8; 149-

28 at 9) However, in his post-deposition affidavit, Major Chapman

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attempts to qualify h is remarks by stating : uAccording to our

agency 's analysis of crime statistics ,

the vast majority of

violent crime was committed by African-American males between ages

15-30 . attended role Esic) call and shared the crime statistical
information with the officers, and our focus , based upon crime

statistics , should be directed to the demographic comm itting the

crimes.'' (D.E. 138-16 at $

On the other hand , a number of MGPD officers present during

the February 2012 roll call testified to hearing Major Chapman
issue a directive to focus on A frican-American males between the

ages of fifteen

and thirty (30). Officer Trapaga testified to

hearing Major Chapman issue the directive uto target black males 15

to

because those were the ones that were committing all the

crimes and the high crimes.'' ED .E. 149-18 at l71 Similarly ,

Sergeant Wiren Norris testified that Major Chapman said that he

uwanted F.I.s (i.e., Field Incident/contact Reports) on black males

that was 15 to 30 years

age , that that the people that's

actually involved , you know , in the crimes in Miami Gardens.'' ED .E.

149-19 at

Consistent with Officer Trapaga and Sergeant

Norris 's testimony , Officer Perez stated in his deposition that he

heard Major Chapman say nsome words to the effect of look, guys,
is what it is, who is committing our crimes are black males between

15 and so I want you to go out there and I want to stop and FI

black males between 15 and 30./' ED .E . 149-20 at 7). Likewise, MGPD

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 62 of 78

Officers Dana Lev ine, Jeffrey Mason , Jose Rosendo , and Detective

Joel Williams a1l testified that they heard the same directive from

Major Chapman. ED.E. 149-21 at lO; 149-22 at 5-6; 149-23 at 14927 at 2, $ l4)

Thus , the Court finds a triable issue exists concern ing the

existence

policy

racial profiling based upon crime

statistics . The Court also notes that, of those Plaintiffs who

presented triable issues concerning their constitutional injuries,
only Plaintiffs Spivey , Smith , and Montale are w ithin the age range

effected by the policy . It is undisputed that , at the commencement

of this action, Plaintiff Spivey was 24 years old , Plaintiff Smith

was twenty-six (26) years old, and Plaintiff Montale was eighteen

years old. ED .E . 101). Although the remaining Plaintiffs may

have constitutional injuries, their ages 1ie outside of the range
noted in the alleged policy and therefore lack a causal connection .

Moreover, only Plaintiff Montale presents constitutional injuries
occurring after the date the racial profiling directive was

purportedly issued by Major Chapman.

Assuming a reasonable jury finds a racial profiling policy
existed within the MGPD , Plaintiffs must also prove that the City

itself was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional

violations . Andrade , 2011 WL 4345665 at *8; see also Depew , 787

F.2d at 1499 (uTo establish (an unofficial) policy or custom, it is

generally necessary to show a persistent and w ide -spread practice .

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Moreover , actual or constructive knowledge of such customs must be

attributed to the governing body of the municipality

. However,

the custom need not receive formal approval.'o . This requires

separate proof beyond the mere existence of the policy since Major
Chapman is not considered a final policymaker for the City . See

ED .E . 149-14 at 5 1 .2) (''The City shall have a 'Mayor-council-

Manager' form of government.'').

In addition , the Eleventh Circuit held that order for a

plaintiff to prevail on a n5 1983 claim against a municipality

based upon a ratification theory

'they must demonstrate that

local government policymakers had an opportunity to rev iew the

subordinate 's decision and agreed with 50th the decision and the

decision 's basis

Garvie v . Citv of Ft . Walton Beach ,

Fla ., 366 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2004)(quoting Thomas v .

Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1175 12 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated qn

other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002), reinstated bv,

F .3d 95O

(11th Cir . 2003)).

Here , Plaintiffs rely on the affidavit of Ms . Wanda Gilbert ,

who served as a Community Involvement Specialist and Crime

Intelligence Analyst for twenty -six years w ith the City of Miami

Police Department. (D .E. 149-17) Therein, Ms. Gilbert states that,

hEoln November 4, 2010, Eshe) notified Chief Matthew Boyd, in

writing , about the fabrication of Field Contact Reports , and the

targeting of black males between (15) to thirty

years old,

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copying the City Attorney Sonja Dickens and City Manager Danny 0. Crew./' Id. at 4, $ 23.
Although the gravamen of Ms . Gilbert 's memorandum to Chief

Boyd , City Manager Crew , and City Attorney D ickens centered around

her retaliation and workplace discrimination claims , it did express

concerns about racial profiling . (D .E. 152-43 at 24-262. Under the

heading

nDiscrimination

Based

on

Race

in

V iolation

of

Title

VII ,

42

USC 5 1983 ,'' Ms . G ilbert makes a single statement concerning a

racial targeting policy : nCity targeting black males between ages

of and 30 by stopp ing and questioning blacks . black circuit
court judge was field interrogated while sitting in front of a friend Esic) house that he was helping whose car broke down . This
is clearly racial profiling .'' Id . at

When questioned about h is knowledge of

Gilbert 's

memorandum and the response it received from City administrators ,

Chief Boyd testified as follows :

Let me ask you this, when this whole thing came down about racial profiling, what if anything did Danny Crew do to investigate the allegations that you know ?
A : He came to me and asked me specifically about certain components of it .

A : He asked me if I could explain (the racial profiling assertions made by Ms. Gilbert), and I was able to
explain the things that I had knowledge of, and he was fine with it , because it was a reasonable explanation .
ED .E. 149-10 at 152. Likewise, Officer Jeffrey Mason testified that
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he and other MGPD officers expressed their concerns about racial

profiling to Assistant City Manager , Vernita Nelson , ''who was in

charge

the police department at the time while under the

supervision of Mayor Oliver Gilbert.'' (D.E . 150-1 at 101-1021.

As such , view ing this evidence in a light most favorab le to

Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of

material fact concerning the City 's deliberate indifference and

ratification of the MGPD 'S alleged racial profiling policy .

Therefore, the City 's motion is denied as to Plaintiff's Monell

claim s predicated upon this policy .

E . Selective Enforcement & Count 2

Given the Court 's determ ination on the City 's alleged policies , Plaintiffs are left to focus upon the City 's purported

uadoption and implementation of (a) Racial Targeting Policy'' within
their selective enforcement claim . As noted above , there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the ex istence of this policy . Since Plaintiffs have identified a policy that , if proven , expressly classifies persons of the basis of race , uit is not
necessary to (establish) the existence of a similarly situated
group of non-minority individuals that were treated differently in the investigation of a crime .'' Brown , 221 F .3d at 337. The City 's

policy would then be subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the

uclassification be

justified by a compelling governmental

interest, and (2) narrowly tailored to furthering that interest in

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 66 of 78

order to pass constitutional muster .'' Reese v . Miami-Dade Cntv .,

2009 WL 3762994, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Nov .

zoogltciting Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v . Pena, 515 U .S . 227 (1995)). This analysis

necessarily involves the consideration of whether other individuals

are similarly situated . Brown , F.3d at 337 (''ES)trict scrutiny
analysis in effect addresses the question of whether people of

different races are similarly situated with regard to the law or

policy at issue .'') Moreover, uEtqo prove discriminatory purpose in this context , it is sufficient that plaintiffs simply show race

was a motivating (factor) in the challenged decision making process.'' Reese v. Miami-Dade Cntv w 2009 WL 3762994, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Nov . 1O, 2009)(citing Villaqe of Arlington Heights, 429 U .S.

at 265-66).

As Judge Scheindlin aptly states in Floyd v . City of N .Y .:

There is no question that a person 's race, like a person 's height or weight , is a permissible consideration where a stop is based on a specific description of a suspect . But it is equally clear that it is impermissible
to subject a1l members of a racially defined group to
heightened police enforcement because some members of that group appear more frequently in criminal complaints . The Equal Protection Clause does not permit race-based suspicion .

Flovd , 959 F . Supp . 2d at 603. This is true even if the population

of Miam i Gardens uconsists of more than 75% black citizens,

according to the

Bureau the Census, and the South Florida

Regional Planning Council.'' (D .E . 200-1 at 3). As such, neither

the City nor Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this

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LSSu e .

F . Failure to Superv ise and D iscip line & Count 3

UA 5 1983 failure-to-supervise claim is closely akin to a 5

1983 failure-to-train claim'' and requires a similar analysis .

Waters v . Citv of Geneva,

Supp . 1324, 1336 (M.D . Ala .

2014). Under a failure to train/supervise theory, the City is

liable uonly where the failure to train

supervise) amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights

persons w ith whom the

police come into contact .'' Citv of Canton , Ohio v . Harris, 489 U .S .

378, 388 (1989)). 1'To establish a city's deliberate indifference,

'a plaintiff must present some evidence that the municipality knew

of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the

municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action . ' ''

Lewis, F.3d at 1293 (quoting Gold, 151 F.3d at 1351-52)

Notice can be shown in two ways :

the (Cityq aware

that a pattern of constitutional violations exists, and

nevertheless fails to provide adequate training Eor supervision)

is considered to be deliberately indifferent s' and

udeliberate indifference may be proven without evidence of prior

incident, if the likelihood for constitutional violations is so

high that the need for training wou ld be obvious . '' Id . nPrior

incidents also must involve facts substantially similar to those at

hand order to be relevant to a deliberate-indifference claim . ''

Shehada v . Tavss,

Supp . 2d 1358, 1374 (S.D . Fla .

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zol3llMercado v . City of Orlando, 4O7 F.3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir.

2005)). Moreover, for the City to be held liable for a failure to

supervise , Plaintiffs umust prove that the deficiency in

(supervision) actually caused the police officers' indifference'' to

their constitutional rights. City of Canton , 489

at 392 .

Here , Plaintiffs prem ise their failure to supervise claim on the City 's failure uto discipline MGPD officers for failEingq to properly prepare Field Contact forms, and for fail ling) to record interactions with the public through dashboard cameras.'' ED .E .
at 55, ! 2302. Plaintiffs further assert that by failing to
discipline MGPD officers in this regard, the City ''facilitatledq
the continued widespread v iolation of the Forth Amendment right of Plaintiffs and others .'' Id . However, as mentioned above, Monell liab ility does not lie based upon these two areas of police practice because neither implicate the Constitution or any federally protected rights . See supra , Note 10. Thus, further analysis is not necessary and the City is entitled to summary

judgment on this issue.
G . First Amendment Retaliation & Count 4

In his First Amendment Retaliation claim , Plaintiff Saleh asserts that after he made a nformal complaint to MGPD Internal
Affairs about the misconduct of MGPD officers and adjacent to
the Quick Stop ,'' he was targeted by MGPD officers in the form of uverbal threats, a police chase, and issuance of three citations

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for non-moving violations.'' ED.E. 10l at 56, ! 2352. The City maintains that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because ndiscovery revealed no adverse actions taken against

(Plaintiff Saleh) for engaging in constitutionally protected

speech.'' ED .E . 133 at 25)

Accordingly , in order to state a First Amendment retaliation

claim , uthe commonly accepted formulation requires that a plaintiff

must establish first, that his speech or act was constitutionally

protected ; second , that the defendant's retaliatory conduct

adversely affected the protected speech ; and third , that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the adverse

effect on speech .'' Bennett v . Hendrix,

F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th

Cir. 2005) Moreover, 'la) plaintiff suffers adverse action the

defendant's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a

person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment

rights .'' Id . at 1254 .

'To establish a causal connection , a p laintiff must

demonstrate his or her protected speech was a motivating factor

behind the alleged retaliatory conduct .'' Eisenberg v . Citv of Miami

Beach ,

Supp . 1312, 1323 (S.D . Fla. 2014). In other words,

for the City to become liable for any retaliatory conduct by MGPD

officers, Plaintiff Saleh nmust show that the decision -makers were

aware of the protected conduct , and that the protected activity and the adverse actions were not wholly unrelated .'' Thampi v . Manatee

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Cntv . Bd. Of Commrrs, 384 F. App 'x 983, 990 (11th Cir.

zololtquoting Shannon v . Bellsouth Telecomm ., Incw 292 F.3d

(11th Cir . 2002))

In determining whether protected conduct is a motivating

factor, a plaintiff umust identify a sequence of events from which

'a retaliatory motive can be inferred ,' notw ithstanding other non -

retaliatory motives the defendant may harbor . Eisenberq v . Citv of

Miami Beach,

Supp . 3d 1327, 1344 (S.D . Fla. zol4ltquoting

Lippman v . Citv of Miami, 719 F. Supp . 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D . Fla.

2010)) Further, courts utilize the burden-shifting framework set

forth in Mt . Healthy School Dist. Bd . of Ed . v . Dovle , 4l9 U . S .
274, 287 (1977) to guide the Court's analysis once a motivating

factor is established . Pursuant to the Mt . Healthv analysis :

Eoqnce a the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing

that his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind

any harm , the burden of production shifts to the

defendant . If the defendant can show that he would have

taken the same action in the absence of the protected

activity , he is entitled to prevail

on summary

judgment.

Smith v . Mostlev, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th

2008) (applying the

Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework). In addition, nlc)lose
proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse

action 'is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to

causal connection when there is unrebutted evidence that the

decision-maker did not have knowledge that the Eplaintiff) engaged

in protected conduct .''' Eisenberg , F . Supp . 3d at 1344 (quoting

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Brunqart v . Bellsouth Telecomm ., Incw 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir.

2000)).

Here , the parties do not take issue with respect to Plaintiff

Saleh making constitutionally protected speech in the form of a

police comp laint . It is undisputed that , in late August 2012 ,
Plaintiff Saleh lodged a formal complaint with MGPD Internal

Affairs and revoked Abir , Inc .'s participation in the City 's Zero

Tolerance Zone program . ED .E .

at !(

at $

However , the record is devoid of any ev idence that the City or any

of

decision -makers were made aware of or were deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff Saleh 's comp liant or the underlying bases for Abir , Inc . revoking its trespassing pre-authorization . Se e Sherrod v . Palm Beach Cnty . School Dist ., 424 F . Supp . 2d 1341 ,

1347 (S .D . Fla. zoo6lladdressing whether deliberate indifference is

a viable theory in the context of a 5 1983 claiming retaliation for

having engaged in protected speech). Similarly, there is no record evidence showing that the City or its decision -makers were aware of

Plaintiff Saleh 's police encounter on December

2012 or

subsequent encounter with an officer an unmarked unit. ED .E.

144-14 at

Furthermore , to the extent Plaintiff Saleh presents evidence

of other Plaintiffs and non -parties being arrested in his store

after his

compliant, such instances do not establish a causal

link between his constitutionally protected speech and the

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inference of a retaliatory motive . Eisenberq ,

Supp . 3d at 1344

(S.D. Fla. 2014) This is because Plaintiff Saleh brings the

retaliation claim in his own capacity and , therefore, he cannot

rely on actions taken against others to establish ua sequence of events from which 'a retaliatory motive can be inferred''' against

him. Id. Thus, the City is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff Saleh 's First Amendment retaliation claim .

H . Supervisory Liability & Counts 5-8

In Counts 5-8 , Plaintiffs plead their supervisory liability

claims against the Defendant Officers

their indiv idual

capacities. ED .E. 1O1 at 57-622. Specifically, Count 5 is against Chief Boyd for failing to correct a history of widespread abuse of Plaintiffs ' Fourth Amendment Rights . Count 6 is against Chief Boyd

and Deputy Chief Miller for failing to correct a history of widespread abuse of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Rights . Count

7 is against Major Chapman for his alleged direction of unlawful
acts in violation of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Am endment rights .

Lastly , Count is against Chief Boyd and Deputy Chief Miller for

failing

stop unlawful acts that resulted violations of

Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights . Id .

Supervisory liability under 5 1983 occurs either when the

supervisor upersonally participates''

the alleged

unconstitutional conduct or when there is a ''causal connection

between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 73 of 78

constitutional deprivation .'' Hartlev v . Parnell, l93 F . 3d 1263,

1269 (11th Cir . 1999). The necessary ucausal connection can be

established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible

supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation , and he fails to do so .'' Brown v . Crawford ,

F .2d

667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). MThe deprivations that constitute

widespread abuse sufficient to notify the superv ising official must

be obvious, flagrant , rampant and of continued duration, rather

than isolated occurrences.'' Id .

A lternatively , a causal connection may be established when a

supervisor's ncustom or policy

result Esq deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights'' or when facts support an

inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act

unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and

failed

stop them from doing so .'' Cottone v . Jenne,

F .3d

1352, 1360 (11th

zoo3llquoting Gonzalez v . Reno, 325 F .3d

1228, 1235 (11th Cir . 2003)). BThe standard by which a supervisor

is held liable in Ehis) individual capacity for the actions of a

subordinate is extremely rigorous .'' Id . at 1361 .

With respect to Counts and

is undisputed that Chief

Boyd and Deputy Chief M iller did not personally participate in

Plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations . Therefore ,

Plaintiffs must show a ncausal connection'' through a history of

widespread abuse of Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

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Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 74 of 78

rights that would have put Chief Boyd and Deputy Chief Miller on

notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivations, and show

that they failed to do so . Brown , 9O6 F .2d at

However , of the

Plaintiffs that presented triable issues concerning their alleged

constitutional violations, only

Short and Mr . Saleh filed

formal complaints with the MGPD. ED.E. 138-15; 144-14; 145-11 In

addition , the limited number of encounters stated herein are not

uobvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration'' to provide

the requisite notice Chief Boyd and Deputy Chief Miller of

widespread constitutional abuses . Id .

Since Plaintiffs ' first method of causation fails, Plaintiffs

can also identify a custom or policy that amounted to deliberate

indifference

their constitutional rights by Chief Boyd and

Deputy Chief Miller . Cottone ,

F .3d at 1360 . In an attempt to

show deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs maintain that Chief Boyd

and Deputy Chief Miller were responsible for reviewing a1l Field

Contact Reports, especially after allegations of falsification , yet

failed to do so and failed to hire a statistician

conduct a

further investigation. (D.E. at ! 251. However, per MGPD

policy , Chief Boyd and Deputy Chief Miller were not responsibile

for reviewing Field Contact Reports . According to the MGPD Policy

Manual, Chapter 24.6, ''lsqquad sergeants shall review the

subm issions from their squads at the end of each shift for accuracy

and relevant content.'' (D .E. 137-3 at

Thus, even the Field

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Contact Reports provided evidence of constitutional violations, Plaintiffs have not identified the ''responsible supervisors'' on notice of their deprivations . See Monell, 436 U . S. at 691 (Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated solely on doctrine of resrondeat superior) As a result, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs , Chief Boyd and Deputy Chief
Miller are entitled to summary judgment of Plaintiffs' supervisory
liability claims asserted in Counts and

As for Counts 7 and 8, a genuine issue of material fact exists

as to whether Major Chapman issued a directive to specifically

target African -American males between the ages of fifteen

and

thirty (30) during a February 2012 roll call. The genesis of this

issue of fact is based , in large part , on the testimony of several

MGPD officers who were present during the February 2012 roll call

as well as Major Chapman's explanation that he simply ''shared the
crime statistical information with the officers, and (said) our

focus, based upon crime statistics , should be directed

the

demographic committing the crimes.'' (D.E. 138-16 at f Assuming a reasonable jury decides Major Chapman issued the
directive , then Plaintiffs, specifically Plaintiff Montale, will

have presented facts that usupport an inference that

superv isor

d ire cted

subo rd ina tes

act unlawfu lly or knew that the

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from

doing so.' Cottone v. Jenne,

F.3d at 1360. Although Major

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Chapman maintains that nEalt no time did Ehe) instruct or even
encourage in the slightest way for any officer to make a custodial

detention (i.e ., Terrv stop) without reasonable suspicion or arrest
without probable cause,'' this qualification misses the mark . The focus is on the directive to target a particular racial demographic

identified by crime statistics in the first instance . If proven ,
Major Chapman's directive would constitute racial profiling
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. ED .E . 138-16 at

Flovd , 959 Supp . 2d at 603.

In addition , Plaintiffs present record evidence that Chief Boyd and

Deputy Chief Miller were aware

Major Chapman's alleged

directive. (D.E . 140-4 at 19; 149-175. As such, none of the parties

are entitled to summary judgment on the supervisory liability
claims asserted in Counts 7 and 8 .

1. Qualified Immunity

The last issue raised by the Defendant Officers concerns their

entitlement to qualified immunity . On this point , it is well-

settled that ugovernment officials performing discretionary

functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are

lshielded from liability for civ il damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known . r'' Wilson v .

Layne, 526

609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v . Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). ''If the 1aw was clearly established, the

76

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 77 of 78

immunity

defense

ordinarily

should

fail ,

since

a

reasonab ly

competent official should know the law govern ing his conduct . ''

Harlow ,

at 818-19. ''A court evaluating a claim of qualified

immunity mu st first determ ine whether the p laintiff has alleged the

deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so , proceed to determ ine whether that right was clearly established at

the time of the alleged v iolation .'' Wilson , 526 U . S . at 609 .

However, in Pearson v . Callahan, 555 U .S . 223, 236 (2009), the

Supreme Court indicated that ''judges of the district courts and the

courts

appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound

discretion in deciding which

the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the

circum stances in the particular case .''

In this case , it is undisputed that Defendants were engaged in

discretionary functions in their respective positions at the MGPD .

As noted above, Plaintiffs will bear the burden at trial of proving

their constitutional injuries, which center around MGPD officers
properly conducting stops-and-frisks . If proven , the law governing

the permissible scope of stops-and-frisks was clearly estab lished

the time

the seminal cases of Terry v . Ohio , 392 U .S .

(1968) Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S . (1979), and Minnesota v .

Dickerson, 508 U .S.

(1993). addition , the law was clearly

established concerning selective enforcement and the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race in Whren v .

Case 1:13-cv-24312-DLG Document 213 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 78 of 78

U.S ., 517 U.S. 8O6 (1996) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S . 229 (1976). Assuming Plaintiffs establish their constitutional injuriés, Defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs ' supervisory liability claims stated in Counts 7 and 8 .
IV . CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is hereby

ORD ERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant City of Miami Garden 's

Motion for Summary Judgment ED .E.

is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART . It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUGED that Defendant Officers ' Motion for
Summary Judgment ED .E. 134) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (D .E. 148) is DENIED.
DONEANoORDERED in chambersatMiam' , rida,this77A
of May , 2015 .

DONALD L . GRAHAM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc : A11 Counsel of Record

78

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 1 of 37
CLOSED,CMM,JJO,MEDIATION,REF_DISCOV,REF_SETTLEMENT
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−24312−DLG

SAMPSON et al v. CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS et al Assigned to: Judge Donald L. Graham Referred to: Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley
Ch. Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan (Settlement) Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 11/27/2013 Date Terminated: 07/01/2015 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

EARL SAMPSON

represented by Stephan Lopez Stephan Lopez Law Firm LLC 4000 Hollywood Blvd. Suite 555 S Hollywood, FL 33021 954−843−3509 Fax: 754−551−5400 Email: stephanlaw@outlook.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. McGee & Huskey, P.A. 2850 North Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, FL 33311 954−563−8200 Fax: 954−566−7754 Email: emcgee@mcgeehuskey.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa Reyes Law Group, P.A. 2924 Davie Road, Suite 102 Davie, FL 33314−1602 (954) 369−1993 Fax: 888−315−6291 Email: melissa@reyeslegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. Reyes Law Group, P.A. 150 South Pine Island Road Suite 210 Plantation, FL 33324 954−369−1993 Fax: 1−888−315−6291 Email: eservice@reyeslegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff TOREE M DANIELS

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 2 of 37

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ANTHONY LOWERY

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff FLOYD HALL, JR.

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ROSS PICART

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 3 of 37

RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff KENNETH CRANE

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff YVENSONNE MONTALE

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff OMAR DEAN

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 4 of 37

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff BRANDON SPIVEY

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ALI AMIN SALEH

represented by Stephan Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Jean Ulloa (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Abir Inc., 3185 NW 207 Street Miami, Fl 33056

represented by C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Baraka Short

represented by C. Edward McGee , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Jose Reyes , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 5 of 37

V. Defendant CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS
Defendant MAYOR OLIVER G GILBERT, III TERMINATED: 03/06/2014
Defendant FMR MAYOR SHIRLEY GIBSON TERMINATED: 03/06/2014
Defendant FMR. CITY MGR. DANNY O CREW TERMINATED: 03/06/2014

represented by E. Bruce Johnson Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman, PA International Building 2455 E Sunrise Boulevard Suite 1000 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304−0220 954−463−0100 Fax: 954−463−2444 Email: johnson@jambg.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Harriet R. Lewis Lewis Stroud & Deutsch PL 1900 Glades Road Suite 251 Boca Raton, FL 33431 561−826−2800 Fax: 826−2828 Email: HLEWIS@LSDLAW.NET ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott David Alexander Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & McDuff International Building 2455 E Sunrise Boulevard Suite 1000 PO Box 030220 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304−0220 954−463−0100 Fax: 463−2444 Email: alexander@jambg.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by E. Bruce Johnson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott David Alexander (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by E. Bruce Johnson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott David Alexander (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by E. Bruce Johnson (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 6 of 37

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott David Alexander (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant CHIEF MATTHEW BOYD

represented by E. Bruce Johnson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott David Alexander (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant DEPUTY CHIEF PAUL MILLER

represented by E. Bruce Johnson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott David Alexander (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant MAJOR ANTHONY CHAPMAN

represented by E. Bruce Johnson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott David Alexander (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
SGT. TIMOTHY ADAMS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER CARLOS AUSTIN TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 7 of 37

SGT. WILLIAM BAMFORD TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER ALEX BARNEY TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER ALVIN BERNARD TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER JESSIE BROWN TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER DELROY BURGESS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER EDWARD CASTELLI TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER RANDY CARPENTER TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER RYAN CLIFTON TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER CARLTON COLEMAN TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
TOM DAMIANI TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 8 of 37

Defendant SGT. WILLIAM DUNASKE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER PETER EHRLICH TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER JEFFREY ENGERS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant SHAWN EUBANKS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant RAUL FERNANDEZ TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER ERIK GLEASON TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER ANDREW GREGOIRE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER BRIAN GREGORY TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER JAMES HARRIS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant SGT. DIANA HEDRICK TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 9 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
SGT. JEFFREY HOHENDORF TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER ANITA HOPSON TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER MICHAEL HORN TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
SGT. BUDDY HUNHOLZ TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER MIGUEL IRIZARRY TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER WANDA JACKSON TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER NICHOLAS JACOBS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER RICHARD JESSUP TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER SHIRLEY JONES−GRAY TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 10 of 37

Nelly Joseph TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER ALEX JUDON TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
SGT. HEATHER KIDDER TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Sgt. STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER DEVIN LUCIUS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER MICHAEL MALONE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER SHONADEE MCNEIL TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER JASON MOORE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER ALEXANDER MORTON TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 11 of 37

Defendant SGT. JOSEPH NARGISO TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant SGT. WIREN NORRIS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER BARBARA PALMER TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER Henry Payoute TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER ONASSIS PERDOMO TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant Officer Saul Perez TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER HUBERT PIERRE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant SGT. JEREMY PILONE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER KEVIN PINKNEY TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER ARTHUR PRINCE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 12 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER LAWRENCE RICHARDSON TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER JAVIER ROMAGUERA TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER EDWIN ROSADO TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER JOSE ROSADO TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
SGT. STACEY ROVINELLI TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER MICHAEL RUIZ TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jean Saint−Louis TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER JIMY SANCHEZ TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
SGT. MARTIN SANTIAGO TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 13 of 37

OFFICER JOSEPH SCHAEFFER TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER ANGEL SEARY TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER ALBERTO SEDA TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER TALIBAH SIMMONS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER JONATHAN STARK TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Kevin Tamayo TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
EDDO TRIMINO TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER JAINA UCANAN TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
OFFICER CARLOS VELEZ TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 14 of 37

Defendant OFFICER TERRANCE BARMORE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER VICTOR VELEZ TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant SGT. SCOTT WHITE TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant SGT. WILLIAM WAGENMANN TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant SGT. EDWARD WAGNER TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER MICHAEL WAGONER TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER EUGENE WILLIAMS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant OFFICER MICHAEL WRIGHT TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant Joseph Zellner TERMINATED: 03/14/2014
Defendant John Doe Officers

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 15 of 37

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
RUFUS WILLIAMS TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Officer Cherri Nettles TERMINATED: 03/14/2014

represented by Harriet R. Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/27/2013 11/27/2013 11/27/2013
12/02/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES against All Defendants. Filing fees $ 400.00 receipt number 113C−6270238, filed by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK D SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, ROSS PICART. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
2 Judge Assignment to Judge Donald L. Graham (ail) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
3 NOTICE of Filing Proposed Summons(es) by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY re 1 Complaint, filed by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH. Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party KENNETH CRANE(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party TOREE M DANIELS(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party OMAR DEAN(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party FLOYD HALL, JR(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party ANTHONY LOWERY(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party YVENSONNE MONTALE(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party ROSS PICART(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party ALI AMIN SALEH(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party EARL SAMPSON(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH (pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Jean Garcia added to party BRANDON SPIVEY(pty:pla). (Attachments: # 1 Summon(s), # 2 Summon(s))(Garcia, Melissa) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
4 Summons Issued as to TIMOTHY ADAMS, CARLOS AUSTIN, WILLIAM BAMFORD, TERRANCE BARMORE, ALEX BARNEY, ALVIN BERNARD, MATTHEW BOYD, JESSIE BROWN, DELROY BURGESS, RANDY CARPENTER, EDWARD CASTELLI, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, RYAN CLIFTON, CARLTON COLEMAN, DANNY O CREW, TOM DAMIANI, WILLIAM DUNASKE, PETER EHRLICH, JEFFREY ENGERS, SHAWN EUBANKS, RAUL FERNANDEZ, SHIRLEY GIBSON, OLIVER G GILBERT, III, ERIK GLEASON, ANDREW GREGOIRE, BRIAN GREGORY, JAMES HARRIS, DIANA HEDRICK, JEFFREY HOHENDORF, ANITA HOPSON, MICHAEL HORN, BUDDY HUNHOLZ, MIGUEL IRIZARRY, WANDA JACKSON, NICHOLAS JACOBS, RICHARD JESSUP, SHIRLEY JONES−GRAY, NELLY JOSEPH, ALEX JUDON, HEATHER KIDDER, STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY, DEVIN LUCIUS, MICHAEL MALONE, CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, SHONADEE MCNEIL, PAUL MILLER, JASON MOORE, ALEXANDER MORTON, JOSEPH NARGISO, WIREN NORRIS, BARBARA PALMER, HENRY PAYOUTE, ONASSIS PERDOMO, SAUL PEREZ, HUBERT PIERRE, JEREMY PILONE, KEVIN PINKNEY, ARTHUR PRINCE, LAWRENCE RICHARDSON, JAVIER ROMAGUERA, EDWIN ROSADO, JOSE ROSADO, STACEY ROVINELLI, MICHAEL RUIZ, JEAN SAINT−LOUIS, JIMY

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12/04/2013
12/05/2013 12/18/2013
12/18/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013

SANCHEZ, MARTIN SANTIAGO, JOSEPH SCHAEFFER, ANGEL SEARY, ALBERTO SEDA, CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN, TALIBAH SIMMONS, JONATHAN STARK, KEVIN TAMAYO, EDDO TRIMINO, JAINA UCANAN, CARLOS VELEZ, VICTOR VELEZ, WILLIAM WAGENMANN, EDWARD WAGNER, MICHAEL WAGONER, SCOTT WHITE, EUGENE WILLIAMS, RUFUS WILLIAMS, MICHAEL WRIGHT, JOSEPH ZELLNER. (yha) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
5 NOTICE of Filing Proposed Summons(es) by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY re 1 Complaint, filed by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH (Attachments: # 1 Summon(s))(Garcia, Melissa) (Entered: 12/04/2013)
6 Summons Issued as to CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. (yha) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
7 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer RE: Complaints re 1 Complaint, by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, DANNY O CREW, SHIRLEY GIBSON, OLIVER G GILBERT, III, PAUL MILLER. Attorney Scott David Alexander added to party MATTHEW BOYD(pty:dft), Attorney Scott David Alexander added to party ANTHONY CHAPMAN(pty:dft), Attorney Scott David Alexander added to party CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS(pty:dft), Attorney Scott David Alexander added to party DANNY O CREW(pty:dft), Attorney Scott David Alexander added to party SHIRLEY GIBSON(pty:dft), Attorney Scott David Alexander added to party OLIVER G GILBERT, III(pty:dft), Attorney Scott David Alexander added to party PAUL MILLER(pty:dft). (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
8 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Scott David Alexander on behalf of MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, DANNY O CREW, SHIRLEY GIBSON, OLIVER G GILBERT, III, PAUL MILLER (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
9 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. ALEX BARNEY served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Garcia, Melissa) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
10 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. ALEX JUDON served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Garcia, Melissa) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
11 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. ALEXANDER MORTON served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
12 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. BRIAN GREGORY served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
13 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. CARLTON COLEMAN served on 12/11/2013, answer due

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12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013

1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
14 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
15 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. DELROY BURGESS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
16 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. DEVIN LUCIUS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
17 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. EDWARD CASTELLI served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
18 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. ERIK GLEASON served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
19 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. JAMES HARRIS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
20 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. JEFFREY ENGERS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
21 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. JESSIE BROWN served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
22 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. JIMY SANCHEZ served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
23 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI

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12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013

AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. MICHAEL WAGONER served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
24 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. MIGUEL IRIZARRY served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
25 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. NICHOLAS JACOBS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
26 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. PETER EHRLICH served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
27 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. RICHARD JESSUP served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
28 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. BUDDY HUNHOLZ served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
29 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. HEATHER KIDDER served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
30 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. JEFFREY HOHENDORF served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
31 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. JOSEPH NARGISO served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
32 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. MARTIN SANTIAGO served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)

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12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013

33 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. STACEY ROVINELLI served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
34 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH. TIMOTHY ADAMS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
35 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. TOM DAMIANI served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
36 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. WILLIAM BAMFORD served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
37 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. WILLIAM DUNASKE served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
38 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. WIREN NORRIS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
39 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. SHAWN EUBANKS served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
40 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. SHIRLEY JONES−GRAY served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
41 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. TERRANCE BARMORE served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
42 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. WANDA JACKSON served on 12/11/2013, answer due 1/2/2014. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 12/19/2013)

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12/19/2013 01/06/2014

43 ORDER granting 7 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer RE: Complaints MATTHEW BOYD answer due 1/10/2014; ANTHONY CHAPMAN answer due 1/10/2014; CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS answer due 1/10/2014; DANNY O CREW answer due 1/10/2014; SHIRLEY GIBSON answer due 1/10/2014; OLIVER G GILBERT, III answer due 1/10/2014; PAUL MILLER answer due 1/10/2014.. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 12/19/2013. (yha) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
44 Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by TIMOTHY ADAMS, CARLOS AUSTIN, WILLIAM BAMFORD, TERRANCE BARMORE, ALEX BARNEY, ALVIN BERNARD, JESSIE BROWN, DELROY BURGESS, RANDY CARPENTER, EDWARD CASTELLI, CARLTON COLEMAN, TOM DAMIANI, JEFFREY ENGERS, SHAWN EUBANKS, ANDREW GREGOIRE, BRIAN GREGORY, JAMES HARRIS, DIANA HEDRICK, JEFFREY HOHENDORF, ANITA HOPSON, BUDDY HUNHOLZ, MIGUEL IRIZARRY, WANDA JACKSON, NICHOLAS JACOBS, RICHARD JESSUP, SHIRLEY JONES−GRAY, ALEX JUDON, HEATHER KIDDER, DEVIN LUCIUS, CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, ALEXANDER MORTON, JOSEPH NARGISO, WIREN NORRIS, ONASSIS PERDOMO, HUBERT PIERRE, KEVIN PINKNEY, ARTHUR PRINCE, LAWRENCE RICHARDSON, JAVIER ROMAGUERA, STACEY ROVINELLI, MICHAEL RUIZ, JEAN SAINT−LOUIS, JIMY SANCHEZ, MARTIN SANTIAGO, JOSEPH SCHAEFFER, ANGEL SEARY, ALBERTO SEDA, CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN, TALIBAH SIMMONS, JONATHAN STARK, KEVIN TAMAYO, JAINA UCANAN, CARLOS VELEZ, VICTOR VELEZ, EDWARD WAGNER, MICHAEL WAGONER, EUGENE WILLIAMS, RUFUS WILLIAMS, MICHAEL WRIGHT, JOSEPH ZELLNER. Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party TIMOTHY ADAMS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party CARLOS AUSTIN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party WILLIAM BAMFORD(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party TERRANCE BARMORE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ALEX BARNEY(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ALVIN BERNARD(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JESSIE BROWN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party DELROY BURGESS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party RANDY CARPENTER(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party EDWARD CASTELLI(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party CARLTON COLEMAN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party TOM DAMIANI(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JEFFREY ENGERS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party SHAWN EUBANKS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ANDREW GREGOIRE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party BRIAN GREGORY(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JAMES HARRIS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party DIANA HEDRICK(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JEFFREY HOHENDORF(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ANITA HOPSON(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party BUDDY HUNHOLZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party MIGUEL IRIZARRY(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party WANDA JACKSON(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party NICHOLAS JACOBS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party RICHARD JESSUP(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party SHIRLEY JONES−GRAY(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ALEX JUDON(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party HEATHER KIDDER(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party DEVIN LUCIUS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ALEXANDER MORTON(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JOSEPH NARGISO(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party WIREN NORRIS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ONASSIS PERDOMO(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party HUBERT PIERRE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party KEVIN PINKNEY(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ARTHUR PRINCE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party LAWRENCE RICHARDSON(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JAVIER ROMAGUERA(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party STACEY ROVINELLI(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party MICHAEL RUIZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JEAN SAINT−LOUIS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JIMY SANCHEZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party MARTIN SANTIAGO(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JOSEPH SCHAEFFER(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ANGEL SEARY(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ALBERTO SEDA(pty:dft),

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 21 of 37

01/09/2014
01/09/2014 01/09/2014 01/09/2014 01/09/2014 01/09/2014
01/09/2014 01/09/2014
01/21/2014

Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party TALIBAH SIMMONS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JONATHAN STARK(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party KEVIN TAMAYO(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JAINA UCANAN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party CARLOS VELEZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party VICTOR VELEZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party EDWARD WAGNER(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party MICHAEL WAGONER(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party EUGENE WILLIAMS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party RUFUS WILLIAMS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party MICHAEL WRIGHT(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JOSEPH ZELLNER(pty:dft). Responses due by 1/24/2014 (Lewis, Harriet) (Entered: 01/06/2014)
45 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by SHIRLEY GIBSON, OLIVER G GILBERT, III. Attorney E. Bruce Johnson added to party SHIRLEY GIBSON(pty:dft), Attorney E. Bruce Johnson added to party OLIVER G GILBERT, III(pty:dft). Responses due by 1/27/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
46 Partial ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint with Jury Demand by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. Attorney E. Bruce Johnson added to party CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS(pty:dft). (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
47 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Motion to Dismiss Common Law Claims by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. Responses due by 1/27/2014 (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
48 MOTION to Strike 1 Complaint, Motion to Strike Prayers for Punitive Damages by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. Responses due by 1/27/2014 (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
49 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by MATTHEW BOYD. Attorney E. Bruce Johnson added to party MATTHEW BOYD(pty:dft). Responses due by 1/27/2014 (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
50 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Gary Smith, by ANTHONY CHAPMAN, PAUL MILLER. Attorney E. Bruce Johnson added to party ANTHONY CHAPMAN(pty:dft), Attorney E. Bruce Johnson added to party PAUL MILLER(pty:dft). Responses due by 1/27/2014 (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
51 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by DANNY O CREW. Attorney E. Bruce Johnson added to party DANNY O CREW(pty:dft). Responses due by 1/27/2014 (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
52 RESPONSE in Opposition re 44 Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY. (Lopez, Stephan) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
53 RESPONSE/REPLY to 52 Response in Opposition to Motion, to Dismiss by TIMOTHY ADAMS, CARLOS AUSTIN, WILLIAM BAMFORD, TERRANCE BARMORE, ALEX BARNEY, ALVIN BERNARD, JESSIE BROWN, DELROY BURGESS, RANDY CARPENTER, EDWARD CASTELLI, CARLTON COLEMAN, TOM DAMIANI, WILLIAM DUNASKE, PETER EHRLICH, JEFFREY ENGERS, SHAWN EUBANKS, ERIK GLEASON, BRIAN GREGORY, JAMES HARRIS, DIANA HEDRICK, JEFFREY HOHENDORF, ANITA HOPSON, BUDDY HUNHOLZ, MIGUEL IRIZARRY, WANDA JACKSON, NICHOLAS JACOBS, RICHARD JESSUP, SHIRLEY JONES−GRAY, ALEX JUDON, HEATHER KIDDER, DEVIN LUCIUS, CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, ALEXANDER MORTON, JOSEPH NARGISO, WIREN NORRIS, ONASSIS PERDOMO, HUBERT PIERRE, KEVIN PINKNEY, ARTHUR PRINCE, JAVIER ROMAGUERA, STACEY ROVINELLI, MICHAEL RUIZ, JEAN SAINT−LOUIS, JIMY SANCHEZ, MARTIN SANTIAGO, JOSEPH SCHAEFFER, ANGEL SEARY, ALBERTO SEDA, CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN, TALIBAH SIMMONS, JONATHAN STARK, KEVIN TAMAYO, JAINA UCANAN, CARLOS VELEZ, VICTOR VELEZ, EDWARD WAGNER, MICHAEL

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 22 of 37

01/30/2014
01/31/2014 02/06/2014
02/10/2014 02/10/2014 02/12/2014 02/12/2014 02/12/2014 02/24/2014

WAGONER, EUGENE WILLIAMS, RUFUS WILLIAMS, MICHAEL WRIGHT, JOSEPH ZELLNER. (Lewis, Harriet) (Entered: 01/21/2014)
54 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend 51 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 47 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Motion to Dismiss Common Law Claims, 48 MOTION to Strike 1 Complaint, Motion to Strike Prayers for Punitive Damages, 46 Answer to Complaint, 50 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Gary Smith,, 49 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 45 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 44 Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY. Responses due by 2/18/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
55 ORDER granting 54 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Amended Complaint. Amended Complaint due by 2/6/2014. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 1/31/2014. (ar2) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
56 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of Intent to Sue, # 2 Exhibit Earl Sampson Incidents, # 3 Exhibit Toree Daniels Incidents, # 4 Exhibit Floyd Hall Incidents, # 5 Exhibit Brandon Spivey Incidents)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
57 Partial ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
58 MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Motion to Dismiss Claims for Common Law Battery, Conversion and Tortious Interference With a Business Relationship by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. Responses due by 2/27/2014 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
59 MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by SHIRLEY GIBSON, OLIVER G GILBERT, III. Responses due by 3/3/2014 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
60 MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by DANNY O CREW. Responses due by 3/3/2014 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
61 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
62 Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by TIMOTHY ADAMS, CARLOS AUSTIN, WILLIAM BAMFORD, TERRANCE BARMORE, ALEX BARNEY, ALVIN BERNARD, JESSIE BROWN, DELROY BURGESS, RANDY CARPENTER, EDWARD CASTELLI, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, RYAN CLIFTON, CARLTON COLEMAN, TOM DAMIANI, JOHN DOE OFFICERS, WILLIAM DUNASKE, PETER EHRLICH, JEFFREY ENGERS, SHAWN EUBANKS, RAUL FERNANDEZ, ERIK GLEASON, ANDREW GREGOIRE, BRIAN GREGORY, JAMES HARRIS, DIANA HEDRICK, JEFFREY HOHENDORF, ANITA HOPSON, MICHAEL HORN, BUDDY HUNHOLZ, MIGUEL IRIZARRY, WANDA JACKSON, NICHOLAS JACOBS, RICHARD JESSUP, SHIRLEY JONES−GRAY, NELLY JOSEPH, ALEX JUDON, HEATHER KIDDER, STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY, DEVIN LUCIUS, MICHAEL MALONE, CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, SHONADEE MCNEIL, PAUL MILLER, JASON MOORE, ALEXANDER MORTON, JOSEPH NARGISO, WIREN NORRIS, Cherri Nettles, BARBARA PALMER, HENRY PAYOUTE, ONASSIS PERDOMO, SAUL PEREZ, HUBERT PIERRE, JEREMY PILONE, KEVIN PINKNEY, ARTHUR PRINCE, LAWRENCE RICHARDSON, JAVIER ROMAGUERA, EDWIN ROSADO, JOSE ROSADO, STACEY ROVINELLI, MICHAEL RUIZ, JEAN SAINT−LOUIS,

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 23 of 37

02/27/2014
02/27/2014 02/28/2014 02/28/2014 03/03/2014 03/03/2014
03/06/2014

JIMY SANCHEZ, MARTIN SANTIAGO, JOSEPH SCHAEFFER, ANGEL SEARY, ALBERTO SEDA, CHRISTOPHER SHUMAN, TALIBAH SIMMONS, JONATHAN STARK, KEVIN TAMAYO, EDDO TRIMINO, JAINA UCANAN, CARLOS VELEZ, VICTOR VELEZ, WILLIAM WAGENMANN, EDWARD WAGNER, MICHAEL WAGONER, SCOTT WHITE, EUGENE WILLIAMS, RUFUS WILLIAMS, MICHAEL WRIGHT, JOSEPH ZELLNER. Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party ANTHONY CHAPMAN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party RYAN CLIFTON(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JOHN DOE OFFICERS(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party RAUL FERNANDEZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party MICHAEL HORN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party NELLY JOSEPH(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party STEPHEN KOLACKOVSKY(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party MICHAEL MALONE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party SHONADEE MCNEIL(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party PAUL MILLER(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JASON MOORE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party Cherri Nettles(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party BARBARA PALMER(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party HENRY PAYOUTE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party SAUL PEREZ(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JEREMY PILONE(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party EDWIN ROSADO(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party JOSE ROSADO(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party EDDO TRIMINO(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party WILLIAM WAGENMANN(pty:dft), Attorney Harriet R. Lewis added to party SCOTT WHITE(pty:dft). Responses due by 3/13/2014 (Lewis, Harriet) (Entered: 02/24/2014)
63 RESPONSE/REPLY to 58 MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Motion to Dismiss Claims for Common Law Battery, Conversion and Tortious Interference With a Business Relationship by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
64 NOTICE of Filing Proposed Summons(es) by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
65 REPLY to Response to Motion re 58 MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Motion to Dismiss Claims for Common Law Battery, Conversion and Tortious Interference With a Business Relationship filed by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
66 ORDER/NOTICE of Telephonic Status Conference: Telephonic Status Conference set for 3/19/2014 02:00 PM before Judge Donald L. Graham. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 2/28/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
67 Summons Issued as to Cherri Nettles. (yha) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
68 NOTICE by BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY re 59 MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 60 MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Voluntary Dismissal (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
69 ORDER denying as moot 44 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 45 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 47 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 48 Motion to Strike ; denying as moot 49 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 50 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 51 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/6/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/06/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 24 of 37

03/06/2014 03/13/2014
03/13/2014
03/14/2014 03/14/2014 03/14/2014
03/14/2014 03/17/2014 03/19/2014 03/19/2014 03/19/2014 03/20/2014 03/21/2014

70 ORDER denying as moot 59 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 60 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/6/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
71 NOTICE by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART re 56 Amended Complaint, 62 Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Voluntary Dismissal of Individual claims Without Prejudice (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
72 NOTICE by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART re 56 Amended Complaint, 62 Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS 56 Amended Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice as to Cherri Nettles (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
73 STATUS REPORT JOINT by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
74 NOTICE by TIMOTHY ADAMS Harriet Lewis, Esq.'s Election to Jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge for Final Disposition of Motions (Lewis, Harriet) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
75 ORDER DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE DEFENDANT CHERRI NETTLES re 72 Notice (Other), filed by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, Cherri Nettles terminated. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/14/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
77 ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS TO VARIOUS DEFENDANTS denying as moot 62 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/14/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
76 CONSENT to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
78 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donald L. Graham: Status Conference held on 3/19/2014. Court Reporter: Carly Horenkamp, 305−523−5138 / Carleen_Horenkamp@flsd.uscourts.gov (cf) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
79 ORDER Granting in part and Denying in part 58 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that COUNT 77 of the First Amended Complaint DE 56 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff, Amir A. Saleh, shall be TERMINATED from this action. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/19/2014. (gp) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
Set Hearings per 78 Order. Calendar Call set for 12/10/2014 before Judge Donald L. Graham. Jury Trial set for 12/15/2014 before Judge Donald L. Graham. Pretrial Conference set for 11/12/2014 before Judge Donald L. Graham. (asl) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
80 AMENDED ORDER re 79 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff, ALI AMIN SALEH, shall be TERMINATED from this action. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/20/2014. (gp) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
81 MOTION for Reconsideration re 80 Amended Order, Terminate Parties by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ulloa, Melissa) (Entered: 03/21/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 25 of 37

03/25/2014
03/25/2014
03/25/2014 03/28/2014
04/01/2014 04/01/2014 04/07/2014 04/09/2014 04/09/2014 04/11/2014 04/25/2014
05/09/2014 05/09/2014 06/16/2014 06/26/2014

82 ORDER re 81 MOTION for Reconsideration re 80 Amended Order, Terminate Parties filed by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/24/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
83 SCHEDULING ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL DATES: Pretrial Conference set for 11/12/2014 02:00 PM before Judge Donald L. Graham. Jury Trial set for 12/15/2014 in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. Calendar Call set for 12/10/2014 02:00 PM before Judge Donald L. Graham. Amended Pleadings due by 6/30/2014. Discovery due by 10/3/2014. Joinder of Parties due by 6/30/2014. Motions due by 10/10/2014. Pretrial Stipulation due by 11/7/2014. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/25/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
84 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Mediation. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/25/2014. (yha) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
85 RESPONSE in Support re 81 MOTION for Reconsideration re 80 Amended Order, Terminate Parties filed by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Articles of Incorporation, # 2 Exhibit Annual Report)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
86 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton for Discovery Matters Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/1/2014. (yha) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
87 ORDER OF REFERENCE OF MOTIONS Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/1/2014. (yha) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
88 ORDER OF RECUSAL AND REASSIGNMENT. Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton recused. Case reassigned to Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley for all further proceedings. Motions referred to Chris M. McAliley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton on 4/4/2014. (tpe) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
89 Case Reassignment of Paired Magistrate Judge pursuant to Administrative Order(s) 2013−63 to Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton. Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley no longer assigned to case. Motions referred to Andrea M. Simonton. (vp) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
90 CLERK'S CORRECTED NOTICE of Reassignment of Paired Magistrate Judge. Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton incorrectly assigned to case and is no longer assigned to case. Case and motions are referred to Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley. (vp) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
91 ORDER granting 81 Motion for Reconsideration of Order Terminating Plaintiff Saleh Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/10/2014. (yha) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
92 Second AMENDED COMPLAINT Sampson et al against All Defendants filed in response to Order Granting Motion for Leave, filed by KENNETH CRANE, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART, Abir Inc.,, Baraka Short.(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 04/25/2014)
93 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 05/09/2014)
94 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 05/09/2014)
95 MOTION to Sever by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. Responses due by 7/3/2014 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
96 RESPONSE in Opposition re 95 MOTION to Sever filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 26 of 37

06/30/2014
07/02/2014 07/07/2014
07/17/2014 07/17/2014
07/23/2014 07/31/2014 08/11/2014 08/13/2014
08/14/2014 08/15/2014

LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
97 First MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Third Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit A of Third Amended Complaint, # 3 Exhibit B of Third Amended Complaint, # 4 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
98 REPLY to Response to Motion re 95 MOTION to Sever filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
99 Plaintiff's MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Order Leave to File Sur−reply)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
100 ORDER granting 97 Motion for Leave to File to File Third Amended Complaint. Clerks Notice: Filer must separately re−file the amended pleading pursuant to Local Rule 15.1, unless otherwise ordered by the Judge. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 7/16/2014. (yha) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
101 Third AMENDED COMPLAINT against MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER filed in response to Order Granting Motion for Leave, filed by KENNETH CRANE, Baraka Short, BRANDON SPIVEY, ALI AMIN SALEH, Abir Inc.,, TOREE M DANIELS, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, YVENSONNE MONTALE, FLOYD HALL, JR, ROSS PICART. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
102 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
103 ORDER denying 95 Motion to Sever; denying as moot 99 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 7/31/2014. (ar2) (Entered: 08/01/2014)
104 MOTION to Bifurcate (Separate Trials pursuant to Rule 42(b)) by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. Responses due by 8/28/2014 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 08/11/2014)
105 STRICKEN Plaintiff's MOTION to Compel Better Responses to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production and Incorporated Memorandum of Law by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Responses due by 9/2/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Ulloa, Melissa) Modified to strike per 107 Order on 8/15/2014 (asl). (Entered: 08/13/2014)
106 Unopposed MOTION to Continue (Verified Motion) for Continuance of Trial and Pretrial Deadlines by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. Responses due by 9/2/2014 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
107 PAPERLESS ORDER striking 105 Motion to Compel pursuant to the Honorable Donald Graham's instructions at the status conference on March 19, 2014 [DE 78], and the discovery procedures set forth at DE 86. The parties are directed to meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute. If the parties are unable to resolve the issues, they shall contact the chambers of the undersigned to schedule a discovery conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley on 8/15/2014. (rms) (Entered:

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08/22/2014 08/22/2014 08/27/2014
08/28/2014 09/04/2014
09/05/2014
09/08/2014 09/09/2014 09/09/2014 09/11/2014 09/19/2014 11/26/2014 12/03/2014 12/03/2014

08/15/2014)
108 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 106 Unopposed MOTION to Continue (Verified Motion) for Continuance of Trial and Pretrial Deadlines : Motion Hearing set for Wednesday, 9/3/2014 10:30 AM in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. (cf) (Entered: 08/22/2014)
109 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 08/22/2014)
110 RESPONSE in Opposition re 104 MOTION to Bifurcate (Separate Trials pursuant to Rule 42(b)) filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
111 REPLY to Response to Motion re 104 MOTION to Bifurcate (Separate Trials pursuant to Rule 42(b)) filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
112 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephonic Pretrial Conference set for 4/1/2015 02:00 PM before Judge Donald L. Graham. Trial set for 5/4/2015 in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. Telephonic Calendar Call set for 4/29/2015 02:00 PM before Judge Donald L. Graham. All Discovery due by 1/23/2015. All Pretrial Motions due by 1/30/2015. Joint Pretrial Stipulation due by 2/27/2015. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 9/4/2014. (See order for further deadlines) (jua) (Entered: 09/04/2014)
113 SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Pretrial Conference set for 4/1/2015 before Judge Donald L. Graham. Jury Trial set for 5/4/2015 in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. Calendar Call set for 4/29/2015 02:00 PM before Judge Donald L. Graham. Discovery due by 1/23/2015. Motions due by 1/30/2015. Pretrial Stipulation due by 2/27/2015. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 9/5/2014. (yha) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
114 ORDER; granting in part 106 Defendants' Unopposed and Verified Motion for Continuance of Trial and Pretrial Deadlines; denying as moot 109 Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to Extend Expert Discovery Deadlines. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 9/8/2014. (ral) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
115 ORDER; denying without prejudice 104 Motion for Seperate Trials Pursuant to Rule 42(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 9/9/2014. (ral) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
116 SECOND NOTICE Setting Telephonic Status Conference: Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/1/2014 02:00 PM before Judge Donald L. Graham. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 9/9/2014. (ral) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
117 MOTION to Continue by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. Responses due by 9/29/2014 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
118 ORDER granting in part 117 Motion to Continue. Jury Trial set for 5/13/2015 before Judge Donald L. Graham. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 9/19/2014. (yha) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
119 NOTICE of Change of Address by Carlos Jose Reyes, Jr (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 11/26/2014)
120 PAPERLESS NOTICE Status Conference Re: Case Management Matters set for Tuesday, 12/9/2014 10:00 AM in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. (cf) (Entered: 12/03/2014)
121 NOTICE of Mediator Selection: Hugh Chappell selected.(Chaplin, James) (Entered: 12/03/2014)

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01/05/2015 01/06/2015
01/08/2015 01/15/2015
01/23/2015
01/23/2015
01/27/2015 01/27/2015
01/27/2015 01/27/2015
01/28/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015

122 Witness List Disclosure of Expert Witness by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS.. (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
123 Second Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Reyes, Carlos) Modified title text on 1/7/2015 (asl). (Entered: 01/06/2015)
124 ORDER denying 123 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 1/8/2015. (yha) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
125 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference Hearing held on 12/9/2014 before Judge Donald L. Graham, 1−7 pages, Court Reporter: Diane Miller, 561−514−3728 / Diane_Miller@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/9/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/20/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/20/2015. (dmr) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
126 First MOTION for Leave to File Videos and Color Photos, Exhibits by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
127 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on 9/3/2014 before Judge Donald L. Graham, 1−15 pages, Court Reporter: William Romanishin, 305−523−5558 / Bill_Romanishin@flsd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased by contacting the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/17/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/26/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/27/2015. (br) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
128 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
129 ORDER GRANTING: 126 First MOTION for Leave to File Videos and Color Photos, Exhibits filed by Abir Inc.,, YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, Baraka Short, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 1/27/2015. (cf) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
130 ORDER granting 128 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 1/26/2015. (yha) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
131 First MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
132 ORDER granting 131 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 1/28/2015. (yha) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
133 MOTION for Summary Judgment by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS. Responses due by 2/17/2015 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
134 MOTION for Summary Judgment by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, PAUL MILLER. Responses due by 2/17/2015 (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
135 Statement of: (Combined) of Material Facts in Support of Their Motions for Summary Judgment by ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MATTHEW BOYD, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)

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01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015

136 MOTION to Strike Experts ( Responses due by 2/17/2015), MOTION in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Experts by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ginger Report)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
137 APPENDIX to 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment by ANTHONY CHAPMAN, MATTHEW BOYD, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2, # 3 Appendix 3, # 4 Appendix 4, # 5 Appendix 4A, # 6 Appendix 4B, # 7 Appendix 4C, # 8 Appendix 4D, # 9 Appendix 4E, # 10 Appendix 4F, # 11 Appendix 5, # 12 Appendix 6, # 13 Appendix 7, # 14 Appendix 8, # 15 Appendix 9, # 16 Appendix 10, # 17 Appendix 11, # 18 Appendix 12−1, # 19 Appendix 12−2, # 20 Appendix 12−3)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
138 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 137 Appendix,, (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 13−1, # 2 Appendix 13−2, # 3 Appendix 13−2, # 4 Appendix 14, # 5 Appendix 15, # 6 Appendix 16, # 7 Appendix 17, # 8 Appendix 18, # 9 Appendix 19, # 10 Appendix 20−1, # 11 Appendix 20−2, # 12 Appendix 21, # 13 Appendix 22, # 14 Appendix 23, # 15 Appendix 24, # 16 Appendix 25, # 17 Appendix 26, # 18 Appendix 27, # 19 Appendix 28, # 20 Appendix 29, # 21 Appendix 30) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
139 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 137 Appendix,, Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 31, # 2 Appendix 32, # 3 Appendix 33, # 4 Appendix 34, # 5 Appendix 35, # 6 Appendix 36, # 7 Appendix 37, # 8 Appendix 38, # 9 Appendix 39, # 10 Appendix 40, # 11 Appendix 41) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
140 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Filing Depositions−1 (Attachments: # 1 Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Deposition, # 5 Exhibit 1, # 6 Exhibit 2, # 7 Exhibit 3, # 8 Exhibit 4, # 9 Exhibit 5, # 10 Exhibit 6, # 11 Exhibit 7, # 12 Exhibit 8, # 13 Exhibit 9, # 14 Exhibit 10, # 15 Deposition, # 16 Exhibit 1, # 17 Exhibit 2, # 18 Exhibit 3, # 19 Exhibit 4, # 20 Exhibit 5, # 21 Exhibit 6, # 22 Exhibit 7, # 23 Exhibit 7A, # 24 Exhibit 8) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
141 MOTION in Limine by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Johnson, E.) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
142 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Filing Depositions−2 (Attachments: # 1 Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Affidavit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Designation, # 15 Exhibit 1, # 16 Exhibit 2, # 17 Exhibit 3, # 18 Deposition, # 19 Exhibit 1, # 20 Exhibit 2, # 21 Deposition) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
143 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Filing Depositions−3 (Attachments: # 1 Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3−1, # 5 Exhibit 3−2, # 6 Deposition, # 7 Exhibit 1, # 8 Exhibit 2, # 9 Exhibit 3, # 10 Deposition, # 11 Exhibit 1, # 12 Exhibit 2, # 13 Exhibit 3, # 14 Exhibit 4, # 15 Exhibit 5, # 16 Exhibit 6, # 17 Deposition, # 18 Exhibit 1, # 19 Deposition, # 20 Exhibit 1, # 21 Deposition) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
144 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Filing Depositions−4 (Attachments: # 1 Deposition, # 2 Deposition, # 3 Deposition, # 4 Deposition, # 5 Deposition, # 6 Deposition, # 7 Exhibit 1, # 8 Exhibit 2, # 9 Exhibit 3, # 10 Deposition, # 11 Deposition, # 12 Exhibit 1, # 13 Deposition, # 14 Deposition, # 15 Deposition, # 16 Exhibit 1, # 17

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 30 of 37

01/30/2015
01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015
01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 02/01/2015

Deposition, # 18 Exhibit 1−1, # 19 Exhibit 1−2, # 20 Exhibit 2, # 21 Exhibit 3) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
145 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Filing Depositions−5 (Attachments: # 1 Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Deposition, # 7 Deposition, # 8 Exhibit 1, # 9 Exhibit 2, # 10 Exhibit 3, # 11 Exhibit 4, # 12 Exhibit 5, # 13 Exhibit 6, # 14 Exhibit 7, # 15 Deposition, # 16 Deposition, # 17 Exhibit 1, # 18 Docket Sheet 2, # 19 Exhibit 3, # 20 Deposition) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
146 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Filing FDLE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
147 NOTICE by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER re 135 Statement, 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Filing Incident Reports (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−1, # 2 Exhibit 1−2, # 3 Exhibit 2−1, # 4 Exhibit 2−2) (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
148 Plaintiff's MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY. Responses due by 2/17/2015 (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
149 Statement of: Material Facts by BRANDON SPIVEY, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, YVENSONNE MONTALE re 148 Plaintiff's MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Affidavit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Affidavit AA, # 28 Affidavit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Affidavit EE, # 32 Exhibit FF PT 1, # 33 Exhibit FF PT 2, # 34 Exhibit FF PT 3, # 35 Exhibit FF PT 4, # 36 Exhibit FF PT 5, # 37 Exhibit FF PT 6, # 38 Exhibit FF PT 7, # 39 Exhibit GG, # 40 Exhibit HH, # 41 Exhibit I I, # 42 Exhibit JJ, # 43 Exhibit KK, # 44 Exhibit LL, # 45 Affidavit MM)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
150 NOTICE by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY re 149 Statement,,,, 148 Plaintiff's MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Transcripts Jeffrey Mason Deposition, # 2 Transcripts Wiren Norris Deposition, # 3 Transcripts Dana Levine Deposition, # 4 Transcripts Joel Williams Deposition, # 5 Transcripts Steve Trapaga Deposition, # 6 Transcripts Mike Perez Deposition) (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
151 NOTICE by EARL SAMPSON re 150 Notice (Other), 149 Statement,,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4) (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
153 NOTICE OF CONVENTIONAL FILING Color Photographs and Exhibits in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment per 129 Order, Terminate Motions,, by EARL SAMPSON (yha) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
152 NOTICE by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY re 149 Statement,,,, 148 Plaintiff's MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Concise Statement Ex Q Ex's 1−3 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 2 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 3 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 4 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 5 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 6 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 7 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 8 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 9 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 10 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 11 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 12 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 13 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 14 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 15 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 16 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 17 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 18 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 19 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 20 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 21 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 22 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 23 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q #

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02/03/2015 02/04/2015 02/04/2015
02/05/2015 02/05/2015 02/06/2015 02/11/2015
02/11/2015
02/13/2015
02/17/2015 02/17/2015 02/18/2015

1, # 24 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 25 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 26 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 27 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 28 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 29 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 30 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 31 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 32 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 33 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 34 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 35 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 36 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 37 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 38 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 39 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 40 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 41 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 1, # 42 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q # 2, # 43 Exhibit DE 149 EX Q #3) (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/01/2015)
154 MOTION to Strike Emory Creel as an Expert ( Responses due by 2/20/2015), MOTION in Limine as to Emory Creel as an Expert by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
155 Notice of Mediation Hearing before Mediator, Hugh Chappell filed by Hugh Chappell. Mediation Hearing set for 3/5/2015 10:00 AM (Chaplin, James) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
156 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer as to 135 Statement, 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment City and Individual Defendants' by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
157 ORDER Scheduling Mediation before E. Hugh Chappell Mediation Hearing set for 3/5/2015 10:00 AM Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 2/5/2015. (yha) (Entered: 02/05/2015)
158 Notice of Mediation Hearing before Mediator, Hugh Chappell filed by Hugh Chappell. Mediation Hearing set for 3/4/2015 10:00 AM (Chaplin, James) (Entered: 02/05/2015)
159 ORDER granting 156 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Responses due by 2/18/2015 Replies due by 2/25/2015. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 2/5/2015. (yha) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
160 First MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Response to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
161 Second MOTION for Leave to File DVDS and Color Photographs by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
162 RESPONSE in Opposition re 148 Plaintiff's MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment and RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. Replies due by 2/23/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
163 ORDER granting 160 Plaintiffs' Motion to Exceed Page Limitation as to Concise Statement of Material Facts in Response to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 2/13/2015. (gfw) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
164 ORDER granting 161 Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Videos and Color Prints. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 2/13/2015. (gfw) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
165 RESPONSE in Opposition re 154 MOTION to Strike Emory Creel as an Expert MOTION in Limine as to Emory Creel as an Expert filed by YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 3/2/2015. (Attachments: # 1

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 32 of 37

02/18/2015 02/18/2015
02/18/2015 02/18/2015 02/18/2015 02/18/2015 02/19/2015 02/20/2015

Affidavit S Lopez, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
166 RESPONSE in Opposition re 141 MOTION in Limine , 136 MOTION to Strike Experts MOTION in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Experts Ginger filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 3/2/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Ginger, # 2 Exhibit Ginger Report)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
167 RESPONSE in Opposition re 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts in Response to Defendants' Combined Statements of Facts filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 3/2/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit CC, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit DD, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit EE, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit FF, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit GG, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit HH, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit II, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit JJ, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit KK, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit LL, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit MM, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit NN, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 1, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 2, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 3, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 4, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 5, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 6, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 7, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 8, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 9, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 10, # 23 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 11, # 24 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 12, # 25 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 13, # 26 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 14, # 27 Exhibit Exhibit OO − Part 15)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
168 RESPONSE in Opposition re 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment City of Miami Gardens filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 3/2/2015. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
169 RESPONSE in Opposition re 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment Individual Defendants filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 3/2/2015. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
170 NOTICE by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short re 135 Statement, 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 169 Response in Opposition to Motion, 167 Response in Opposition to Motion,,,,, 168 Response in Opposition to Motion, Notice of filing Appendix (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2) (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
171 NOTICE of filing APPENDIX by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short re 164 Order on Motion for Leave to File (yha) (Entered: 02/19/2015)
172 REPLY to Response to Motion re 136 MOTION to Strike Experts MOTION in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Experts filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/19/2015)
173 REPLY to Response to Motion re 154 MOTION to Strike Emory Creel as an Expert MOTION in Limine as to Emory Creel as an Expert filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Scott Alexander, # 2 Exhibit A to Affidavit)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/20/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 33 of 37

02/20/2015 02/23/2015 02/24/2015 02/25/2015 02/27/2015
03/02/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015
03/11/2015
03/11/2015

174 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer to Summary Judgment Motions by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
175 REPLY to Response to Motion re 148 Plaintiff's MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
176 ORDER granting 174 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motion. Re: 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ANTHONY CHAPMAN, PAUL MILLER, MATTHEW BOYD. Replies due by 2/27/2015. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 2/20/2015. (yha) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
177 REPLY to Response to Motion re 133 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 134 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Witness Disclosures)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
178 PRETRIAL STIPULATION by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Witness Exhibit List)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
179 Exhibit and Witness List by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER.. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
180 FINAL MEDIATION REPORT by Hugh Chappell. Disposition: Case did not settle.(Chaplin, James) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
181 FINAL MEDIATION REPORT by Hugh Chappell. Disposition: Case did not settle.(Chaplin, James) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
182 FINAL MEDIATION REPORT by Hugh Chappell. Disposition: Case did not settle.(Chaplin, James) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
183 MOTION for Order to Show Cause (Verified), MOTION for Sanctions , MOTION to Strike Pleadings and Removing this Case from the Court Docket ( Responses due by 3/26/2015) by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
184 PAPERLESS NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 183 MOTION for Order to Show Cause (Verified) MOTION for Sanctions MOTION to Strike Pleadings and Removing this Case from the Court Docket : Motion Hearing set for Wednesday, 3/11/2015 02:30 PM in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. (cf) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
185 ORDER DIRECTING RESPONSE re 183 MOTION for Order to Show Cause (Verified) MOTION for Sanctions MOTION to Strike Pleadings and Removing this Case from the Court Docket filed by ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER, MATTHEW BOYD, Set/Reset Deadlines as to 183 MOTION for Order to Show Cause (Verified) MOTION for Sanctions MOTION to Strike Pleadings and Removing this Case from the Court Docket.( Responses due by 3/11/2015) Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/9/2015. (yha) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
186 RESPONSE in Opposition re 183 MOTION for Order to Show Cause (Verified) MOTION for Sanctions MOTION to Strike Pleadings and Removing this Case from the Court Docket filed by KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 3/23/2015. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
187 REPLY to Response to Motion re 183 MOTION for Order to Show Cause (Verified) MOTION for Sanctions MOTION to Strike Pleadings and Removing this Case from the Court Docket filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 03/11/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 34 of 37

03/13/2015 03/19/2015 03/30/2015 03/30/2015
03/30/2015
03/30/2015
03/30/2015
04/01/2015 04/01/2015 04/01/2015 04/06/2015 04/06/2015 04/10/2015

188 ORDER Scheduling Settlement Conference for 4/6/2015 at 10:00 AM in Miami Division before Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff. Signed by Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff on 3/13/15. (lml) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
189 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 183 Motion for Order to Show Cause ; granting in part and denying in part 183 Motion for Sanctions; granting in part and denying in part 183 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 3/19/2015. (yha) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
190 Proposed Jury Instructions by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
191 First MOTION for Leave to File Waiver of Appearance Settlement Conference by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Brandon Spivey, # 2 Affidavit Roderick Smith, # 3 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
192 NOTICE by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short re 165 Response in Opposition to Motion, 154 MOTION to Strike Emory Creel as an Expert MOTION in Limine as to Emory Creel as an Expert Supplemental Filing Creel Expert Report (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
193 Proposed Jury Instructions by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
194 NOTICE by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short re 165 Response in Opposition to Motion, 192 Notice (Other), 154 MOTION to Strike Emory Creel as an Expert MOTION in Limine as to Emory Creel as an Expert Notice of Filing Creel Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Creel Report) (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
195 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley: Final Pretrial Conference held on 4/1/2015. (Digital 14:09:08.) (nf) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
196 ORDER granting 191 Motion for Leave to File Waiver of Appearance Settlement Conference Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/1/2015. (yha) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
198 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Chris M. McAliley: Initial Pretrial Conference held on 4/1/2015. Court Reporter: Amy Landry, 305−523−5635 (Digital 14:09:08.) (cf) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
197 ORDER granting 136 Defendants' Motion to Strike or In Limine to Preclude Expert Testimony of James Ginger and Emory Creel; denying 154 Defendants' Second Motion to Strike Proposed Expert, Emory Creel. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/6/2015. (gfw) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
199 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff: Settlement Conference held on 4/6/2015 (10:00AM− 5:30PM). Case not settled. (lw1) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
200 First MOTION in Limine To preclude Expert Testimony George P. Alpert, First MOTION to Strike Expert Testimony of George P. Alpert ( Responses due by 4/27/2015) by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Composite Ex A)(Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 04/10/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 35 of 37

04/14/2015
04/16/2015 04/20/2015 04/28/2015 04/29/2015 05/13/2015
05/13/2015 05/13/2015 05/14/2015

201 ORDER re 200 First MOTION in Limine To preclude Expert Testimony George P. AlpertFirst MOTION to Strike Expert Testimony of George P. Alpert filed by Abir Inc.,, YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, Baraka Short, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, Set/Reset Deadlines as to 200 First MOTION in Limine To preclude Expert Testimony George P. AlpertFirst MOTION to Strike Expert Testimony of George P. Alpert.( Responses due by 4/20/2015) Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/14/2015. (yha) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
202 NOTICE by Abir Inc., re 200 First MOTION in Limine To preclude Expert Testimony George P. AlpertFirst MOTION to Strike Expert Testimony of George P. Alpert, 201 Order, Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings,,,, Supplemental Memo (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
203 RESPONSE in Opposition re 200 First MOTION in Limine To preclude Expert Testimony George P. AlpertFirst MOTION to Strike Expert Testimony of George P. Alpert filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. Replies due by 4/30/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Email from S. Lopez, # 2 Exhibit CV of Dr. Alpert)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
204 ORDER denying 200 Motion in Limine; denying 200 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/22/2015. (yha) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
205 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donald L. Graham: Calendar Call held on 4/29/2015. Trial reset by the Court. Court Reporter: Francine Salopek, 954−769−5657 / Francine_Salopek@flsd.uscourts.gov (cf) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
206 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by C. Edward McGee, Jr on behalf of Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party Abir Inc.,(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party KENNETH CRANE(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party TOREE M DANIELS(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party OMAR DEAN(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party FLOYD HALL, JR(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party ANTHONY LOWERY(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party YVENSONNE MONTALE(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party ROSS PICART(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party ALI AMIN SALEH(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party EARL SAMPSON(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH (pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party BRANDON SPIVEY(pty:pla), Attorney C. Edward McGee, Jr added to party Baraka Short(pty:pla). (McGee, C.) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
207 Plaintiff's MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authority on the Notice Requirements of Plaintiffs' State Law Claims in Opposition to Defendant's, City of Miami Gardens, Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (McGee, C.) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
208 RESPONSE in Opposition re 207 Plaintiff's MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authority on the Notice Requirements of Plaintiffs' State Law Claims in Opposition to Defendant's, City of Miami Gardens, Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law filed by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. Replies due by 5/26/2015. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
209 REPLY to Response to Motion re 207 Plaintiff's MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authority on the Notice Requirements of Plaintiffs' State Law Claims in Opposition to Defendant's, City of Miami Gardens, Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered:

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 36 of 37

05/20/2015
05/21/2015 05/27/2015
05/27/2015
05/27/2015 05/28/2015 05/30/2015
06/03/2015
06/03/2015 06/08/2015
06/09/2015 06/10/2015 06/11/2015 06/12/2015

05/14/2015)
210 ORDER granting conditionally 206 Notice of Attorney Appearance, filed by Abir Inc.,, YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, Baraka Short, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 5/20/2015. (yha) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
211 ORDER denying 207 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 5/20/2015. (asl) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
212 RESPONSE in Opposition re 141 MOTION in Limine filed by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 6/8/2015. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
213 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 133 Defendant City of Miami Garden's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 134 Defendant Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 148 Plaintiffs' Cross−Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See ORDER for details. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 5/27/15. (gfw) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
214 PAPERLESS NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 141 MOTION in Limine : Motion Hearing set for Wednesday, 6/3/2015 02:00 PM in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. (cf) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
215 MOTION for Leave to File /Raise Additional Evidentiary Issue at Upcoming Hearing by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Lawson, # 2 Affidavit of Gregory)(Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 05/28/2015)
216 RESPONSE in Opposition re 215 MOTION for Leave to File /Raise Additional Evidentiary Issue at Upcoming Hearing filed by ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. Replies due by 6/11/2015. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 05/30/2015)
217 PAPERLESS NOTICE of Hearing: TELEPHONIC Calendar Call set for 6/9/2015 11:00 AM in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. Counsel shall contact the Court at 11:00 AM by calling the following toll−free number 1−888−684−8852, enter Access Code Number 3772101 followed by the # sign, and enter Security Code Number 1316 followed by the # sign. (gfw) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
Set/Reset Scheduling Order Deadlines: Calendar Call set for 6/9/2015 11:00 AM in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. (gfw) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
218 First MOTION Request to take Judicial Notice by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 06/08/2015)
219 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Donald L. Graham: Calendar Call held on 6/9/2015. Court Reporter: Francine Salopek, 954−769−5657 / Francine_Salopek@flsd.uscourts.gov (cf) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
220 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff for Settlement Conference Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/10/2015. (yha) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
Set Hearings Settlement Conference set for 6/15/2015 10:00 AM in Miami Division before Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff per 220 Order (yha) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
221 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan for Settlement. Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff no longer assigned as referral judge(s) in case, Order to Vacate re 220 Order Referring Case to Judge Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/11/2015. (yha) (Entered: 06/12/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-24312-DLG As of: 02/06/2019 10:25 PM EST 37 of 37

06/12/2015 06/12/2015 06/22/2015
06/22/2015 06/22/2015 06/22/2015 06/23/2015 06/23/2015 07/01/2015

Reset Hearings Settlement Conference reset for 6/23/2015 09:30 AM in Miami Division before Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan per 221 Order (yha) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
222 ORDER setting settlement conference, (Settlement Conference set for 6/23/2015 09:30 AM in Miami Division before Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan). Signed by Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan on 6/12/2015. (mkr) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
223 Second MOTION for Leave to File Waive Physical Appearance by Abir Inc.,, KENNETH CRANE, TOREE M DANIELS, OMAR DEAN, FLOYD HALL, JR, ANTHONY LOWERY, YVENSONNE MONTALE, ROSS PICART, ALI AMIN SALEH, EARL SAMPSON, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, BRANDON SPIVEY, Baraka Short. (Reyes, Carlos) (Entered: 06/22/2015)
224 ORDER granting 223 Motion for Leave to Waive Plaintiffs Omar Dean and Ross Picart at the June 23, Settlement Conference. A person must be present at the settlement conference with full authority to settle for each plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan on 6/22/2015. (mkr) (Entered: 06/22/2015)
225 ORDER RESCHEDULING SPECIALLY SET JURY TRIAL, Telephonic Calendar Call set for 8/19/2015 10:30 AM and Jury Trial set for 8/31/2015 09:30 AM in Miami Division before Judge Donald L. Graham. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/19/2015. (cf) (Entered: 06/22/2015)
226 MOTION to Preserve Evidence (Video Depo or Video Teleconference of Dr. G. Alpert) by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER. (Alexander, Scott) (Entered: 06/22/2015)
227 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan: Settlement Conference held on 6/23/2015. (Digital 15:25:11.) (cg1) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
228 ORDER notice that the parties reached a full settlement at the settlement conference and requiring the parties to file appropriate documents with the Court by 7/17/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan on 6/23/2015. (mkr) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
229 Notice of Court Practice Upon Notice of Settlement, ORDER CLOSING CASE Motions terminated: 141 MOTION in Limine filed by ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER, MATTHEW BOYD, 218 First MOTION Request to take Judicial Notice filed by Abir Inc.,, YVENSONNE MONTALE, EARL SAMPSON, ALI AMIN SALEH, ROSS PICART, ANTHONY LOWERY, OMAR DEAN, KENNETH CRANE, Baraka Short, TOREE M DANIELS, FLOYD HALL, JR., BRANDON SPIVEY, RODERICK DEWAYNE SMITH, 215 MOTION for Leave to File /Raise Additional Evidentiary Issue at Upcoming Hearing filed by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, PAUL MILLER, MATTHEW BOYD, 226 MOTION to Preserve Evidence (Video Depo or Video Teleconference of Dr. G. Alpert) filed by CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, PAUL MILLER, MATTHEW BOYD. Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/30/2015. (yha)

07/14/2015 07/15/2015

NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014−69. (Entered: 07/01/2015)
230 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice by MATTHEW BOYD, ANTHONY CHAPMAN, CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, PAUL MILLER (Johnson, E.) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
231 ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 7/15/2015. (yha) (Entered: 07/15/2015)