Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 1 of 80 PageID #: 1

RECEIVED

BY MAIL

•

JUN 2 2 2009 .
, ANl1ED 5TA.W DI~TR.I.CT CouRT
EAUS.TSE.RD~IfSlTrRmICiiT~CTOOUFRM T _£~Af)\l::R.Nf;A5DTIESRINRr:D:crIo\F/If~J\I.LO0N":>CUt:I..

J0\1\r\!<,VAN 0KDE~~:JloBERI
:HooD : MIJ<.E tvttCoRD ·

HEALTli LIN( CoRPO~ATION:

•

AWELL Ponsr CoRPoMTrow·.

·.HAROLD KYER~.,

I

.fud'( SLA~PTE R~

.ALAN iJLAKE ; ,

. Kt-ITH 0cHAFF-R ,:

DEFE~DAt\\T5.

YLA..LNTIFF5 OK.LG-INAL CotvtPLi~.LNT

Co~\E0 NoW PLA_LNTIF~0' :foH~ 'P"-oVAl't0RDEN
PRo ~Se 1 e-+ eLl., ~AND PK.AYS THIS CoLtR1 To AcCEPT
\t-\1.5 Cor--\PLA"LN ~oR l.N~LAtJCTI.VS R LLEF BA.::')S-P ON
.TH\::. Vlc L
k-"_LG-~T L/lNDC.
• WHo I ( \)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 2 of 80 PageID #: 2

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A CIVILLY CoM.M.:LTT£-D RE..'SIDE.NT o\= Ti-\E- f'v1ISsou«:r. Sex~..-tAl

O'FFEND£1<. tREATMENT CENTER (!V\.001' c) OINCE OctobeR zq,

20051

:2. -p[AINTI'Ft- 'f~.DbER.T'L.Hood ..1.5 AN. INDJ.VI-DVAL. Wl-lo I.S A
CITIZ.'EN oF THE STATE ct: MI0.5CJut;:>T; _A,,.,.A T.<; !\so A C:tviL\...Y
LoMfvliTTE D RE6It:>Er-l T oF Ti-tE MI~:'X>tt RI .Se)(U,A.\ 0tf£N.b'E.R 1REAtMEN.t
'z CtNTE.R ( \'v1sOT() 5INCE ~.LALy ND...-. Z004? /

3., "PlAINTIFt= tv\IK..E MCCoRD IS AN t N.DIVJ:.DvAL WlAo .~._~

•

A CITIZEN. c\=" 11-fE. 5TA.tE oF MT5&A.\.RI, ,W IS A.l&J A Crv:r: LLY
ov CoMMITTED RESIDENT THk;: MI5SOu~ 5ex.t...~A.l ot-t=EN.DE'K TI:EATMENT CENT~ (1\16oTc) QINCE TANLAAR'f t31 zoo£,

4 . PlAINTIF'F ~oEPH: M.ILLEi! I.S AN .LtH>IviDvAL W~Ao
Is A CITrz.Et-t oV Ti-\E 5-rATE DF M.r0:solttl, AY\.e IS Al~o A 'PRE-TRIAL .DE~A"t.NEE. "Kt:SLDEf\\T o\= THt= t--\IS':D..tR.L 8e~LU\t
oFFENDt:Y?. TRE.tlTtvt'Et-tT C.ENTER ( tv\SoTc.) OINcE D~;.c.t.MBER
6, Zoo£,

5 . T>lA:.LN.\T'Pr {V\AcoN :DAK'ER J./) AN l..v\.t>.rv .1-DvAL Wt1o Ie:, A
or- PR.E.TR..L.AL DETAlN.E'E RE,SIDEt--tT THE i'iiS5£)..ttl5exu.A.l

cfFENDER "TREATivtENT (ENTER ( tvl()CffL.) 5..LNCE Decel'\BEk:

•

l gi ZOC/71

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£,., PiAINTIIT Ch.A.N(E TYREE I5 Ar-t.iNDIVIDVAL Who I.S
or A Cr:TIZ:EN THE.0TATE OF MISSO\At2.L, A\1\~ I5 .ALso A6:vii..LV
CoMi\ITT'ED 'KE~IDEMT oF THE tv'0:5&x.-ttl ~l offB\lDE~
1tEATMENT CENTER (t'1sorc) SINcE .A.pRrl Z3,Zoo5,

7. 'PlACNTTI=t WALTER ~.LTC.HEY I2> AN 'L.tD.LVIDVAL W~c :cs
AC.1.TIZEN. oF" 11-\E 5TATE o'F MI~l{R.I 1 A~ J:S A\.so Afrvil.I-Y
CotJ\MITTED Rt::SIDENT oF THE. MI50o~.-tRI 0e)(..uA.l OFFENDER
T~l:ATM£NT CENTER (\vt0oTc) \:>INCE M.AY Z4 i zoo6,

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~-- PlA:CN TIFF DAV..Ld 'Bl~OW\1\. J..6 .c\N. It-tD..LVIC>VAL W\A.c IS

A CITI.ZEN or- Tt-U~. .:)TATE oF MLS5oURI i AV\.~ I:s A.l.50 .A.

PK:E.t~IAL DE.TAINt:£ KE.5ID£.NT OF THE tv\.I0.SOu'i!I -SeKUAl
O~FENC>E:R TREAtMl=-NT CENTE~ lt'1.6DTC) 5It-tcE MovE.r·.fBEJ(! l ~

Zoof{l

q_ PlA-INTiff .At\loTHNY AMDNEi+E l:S AN J.Nl)I.VIDVAL w\t..c I~
A CIT..LZEN () F ltfE. ~TATE oF l'-'\.I~SouRI., A\1\d .1.5 Al0o ALrv:tu...y'
CoMMITTED RESI.Dl;.Nl cF 11-lE MI~\.R:t: ~XvlAl OfFENDER
~'EATtvtENT CENTE~ (tv\5ciTC) ~IN.tE MAY 1?, Zooo.

lO, PlArNTIFF RJ..Cl-\ARD lY'ocV\ I~ .A.N l:NDrvioVAL wl.\.c .L:S

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.A. G:TIZ'EN v'F \1-\~ 0CA1E Of MI~O\t\~. A:V\d IS Al6c AC.LvrLLY I
Co\V\l'-'LLTTED .K£8IDENT oF THE tvti.:-)-CX>Lt<KI 8eJlUAl Ol=FENDEf.!.

ltEATrvtt:NT C'EN T-ER ( ~ooTc) ~..LN c ~ePTEMBER- 3, 2004,

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l L 'PLAINTIFF WADE TuRP'I.I'l I 0 ,AN .i.NDIVIDVAL wrto IS A
(ITLZEN OF 1HE. oTAtE o'F tv\I.SSOi..lRI/ AND I5 A\0o A(J..VILlY
CoM.MITTED RE.3It:>ENT 01- Tl-lE Mis:sctiRI 5EX.UAL OFFENDER
-rREATrvfENt CENTER (MoOTC) 3J:NCE QEPTEMBER 26,.2001.,

.l2. D'EFEt\lDANT HEALTH LINK -L5 ,A. Co"RPORATioN THAT IS

IN.Col<tPoRATt.D AND G\PITALIZ.ED Su.BSIDIARV oi=" Wt=.LL POINT,

I.Nc ... kFENDANT HAS ITs PRINCIPAL PLACE oF BtA.si.NE-65

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(HEADQUARTERS) IN 3+. Lou.rs 1 ~u.. ~D ~v BE SERVED
WITH PROCESS l>y OE~VIN.G- I.T-5 REG-ISTERED AG·ENT(N.At'1E At-JD
ADD~ES5 UN-KNowN TO PLAINTLFF ) ..

l3.. DEFENDAI\lTl WELL lbiN.T,It-K., I5 A (6Ri>ORATION vl.NABLE
To B£ FU~ER -LDt:NTIFlED BY PLAIN TIFF OTHE~ 11tA.N !?UN.& HEALTH -Lr:r,n<.~') PARENT Col'-fPAN.V. PLAINTI:Ff ~oPE() FoR 1"\0J;:E IN'FoF!MATior4 ~ECrARDJ:NG:.. THE CoN.NECT:toN .AND DE.&l<EE. oF LrA&LIIY oF EAc.K: CoRro~A-rroN.. To BECot-~\.E AVAILABl-E ntRotA.&H DI0CovE:RV
AND/oR O~tYE~ oF Th£ l.ou.RT.

l4. DEF'El\lDANT HAROL-D MYERS 15 AN INDI:VIDVAL Wtto I.S A CITIZEN

OF THE. STATE oF MIS·SCttU .A.ND I~ EV\PLOV'ED 40 THE "REI~,SME~T

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OITI:C£R oF Tt-lE Cctv'1..?A.NY 1'-tA~vtED HEALTH -LINK. WI-\ICK ARE ,..~l0c I
NAtvlED A,~) A Dt:.FE.NDA\'.\T IN TtilS 5vCLT. TY~FEN.DANT t\'\YER,<:)

BEING- ,~)vlED Bon-t IN H.r::; ..LN t>I VID'-'Lt.\L~ AND GFFIClAL CAPL\CI TI

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AND MA.V BE. 5ERVED PR:tX.ESS AT 11-lE. HEALTH·- LJ:.t..\.l( HEADQ\AA~'T'E~S
IN. 0+. LOl-ti5, Mo. (ADDR:E.~~-:> U.N.KNOwN Tb "Pl.A.INTift:).

l5. DEFENDANT SuMPTE~,IS AN lNDD/IDvAL woo-'-~ A CI.rt.z.Ef-\
oF ThE 5TATE oF MI550lARJ... AND I0 EtvtPLOYF.D A~ A ~E.PI?ESFi·:_rAT:tvE

oF THE CcMPAN.V AAtv\E.D ~EAl-TH -liNK..; Wt-ULH. A.RE A.l:so "-LAKED A...s
A bEF£1\lDA.N:r I.N Tl-U:.5 0\Al:T. DEf"E.N.DANT Sul"\f'tER I~ 1>EING-
:3LAED Bont IN Ht.R l..ND~VIDAAL AND OFI="ICIAL CAl>Ac.IUE-5 AND
fv\.Ay :BE. 5ERVED PRocc.~s :~T THE t-lEALTH-LINl< HEADQAARTEK.S

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LN 0t Lol-U:5, l"'lo. ( _A.bDRESS U.N.KNowt-.t To "PLAn-.!TI.FF) .
\b. DEFENDANT .AlAN J)(AKE., .L0 .AN INDIVIDVAL Wl-lo IS A

Crn:z.E..N.. o\=' 1HE 6TATE oF Mrs.scuRI .A.ND I5 EMPL.ovt.o By

DMH As 11-lE CHIEF OPERAtiNG- OFPICER OF MSOTC, bEFEN.DMT
BlAt:.~ KAY Bb: 0ERVED ·w::cTH -p·~ocE50 .4.r lOtt WEST CoilM-ibiA, FAt<:tvti~G-ToN 1 MI:S30u~:r::. 63640, DEFENDANT BlAKE I0
BUNG- SuED IN lSoTK H\ s IN.D.LVIDIAAL AND OFFTLIAL

CAP.&..ClTIE..S.

Pl. DEFENDANT KE.T Tl-{ -StHAFE~ I5 AN ..LNDI.VIDVAL WHo IS

A CITI-Z.t.N oF THE 6TATE oF MJ..S&x-t~ ANt> -LS EMPLOYED As

11-\E Dil:E:CTOR. ct=' TH.E 1'1Is,_u-t~:!: DEP.d..RT!VlE.I'tT OF MENTAL HEALTH.

•

DEFENDANT tS BEING- !)~tE-D lN "beTH HIS lND::LVL-DIAAL. AN.o
OFFl.CLAL CAPACLTIE._) AND MA.Y .BE. 0ERVC:() WiTH \=>RoC£5~ AT

t?IJ& EAf:lT t.LJVl S!" I TEFTER~.)C\/\ CiTY I rvtc.
/ )'./. I

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18. DEFENDANT *REMIAH N.LXON I~ AN lNDI.VlOUAL Wi-\0 I~
A CI.TI-.z..E.N OF THE STATE oF ML&Sov~RI. .AI'-tD I.S Now THE G-ovERNoR
oF THAT otATE.. DEFENDANT NIXON CAN BE.. 0E..i<VED WITH PRoCE5~
AT THE MI5~0U.RI &TATE CAPITOL, TEFFE.R:)OM Cx.TY, Mr~~l-tU. DEFE.NDANT I& 3Elt>-!G- 5~.-~:.~ IN :BoTH rli'5 .l.NDIVI.DI.A.A.L AND oFFICIAL CAPA.CITY As THE. ATToRNEY GENERA.L oF M.Is~o~.t{U.
1)" f UR~LSDICTION

.{({, THE Cou.RT H.A0 .:fuRISDICTlON OvE.~<:: THE LA\./0~.-a.T l)E.CA..lAS'E

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T\-\E ACTION A~ISES lAI'{DE~ AME~DMENT 5 ONE. oF THE Fu::5T, FouRIH,

Fr.FTH i .SIXTH, EI6-HTH I AND 'FQ<.,li!TEE..i\lTH AiV\Ef\lDt'\.ENTS "'RIG-HT5 TO

Tl-\E UNTIED .STATE5 CoN&TITI.A.TI:o~". tt:DERAL- QlA.EE;TI.ON ~~~~J:IsD.r:CTI.oN.

MAY BE BASED ON A CIVI.L).$1f&Jf11S ACTIOt-J ALLECrThl& VLOLATIOM:)

THE (oEE oF

LA.~. CoNf::.TtTv\.T!.of\1.

biVE.N0 V. 0LX \.At'I\\(NowN

NAMED AG-ENT5; 40.3 \A6 3~8,3cu.-·q7, 4L 5. Ct. lqqq,zoo4-05

(lq'7l)

C. VEN\!E

ZO. VENUE 10 PROPER I-1\l T\-\1.:) DISTRICT LANDER ,28, LA0C

§l3ct \ (6) (2) IN THAT A DLAB-STANTlAL PART 0F THE EVENT5

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OR Otv\LS\')IDN~ G-IvD~G RISE To 1\-\E CLAII'--'t OCCGtRR.ED IN T\-\15 DISTRICT. ALTHOUG-H HEALTH LINK lNC~RPo~~:.ATED IN THE

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, ITS HEADQUARTE~.S ARE LoCATED IN

6T. Loui.6. MI-S.SOLH~-I' AND THE. CITI.Z.E.NSHIP OF Tt'lE N.AKED

I

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Do CONDITIONS lliECf.DE.NJ
2.1~ .AI i CoNDit LONS ?REC..EDENT H-AvE NOT :f>EEN ~RFORME:D-- ' ·
0~ HAVE. !)CC.W.~~E:.D IN \t-\AT SE'RVI:.t.E. HAS NOT B££~ "Pt<:OV.IDtb
1"0 D£\=El\U)AAT 5 ..

Ep l?ALTQ

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22 ~ AT VARIOU6 Tii'1ES 0PE.ClFIC To EACt-\ 'PLAINTIFF J WHICH

TIMES AND DA\ES AR.E. BEI~G GATHERED, DEFENDANT'S MYERS

lt\N.D Su.t1PTI;R.E.NTERED THIS FACILITY- M00TC- .AND ASKED

EACH ?LAINTIFF TO SI.GN IDENTICAL DOClAMENT-5 I WHIC\-\ PLAINTIFF 51 CHARACTERIZE A6 CoNTRACT5 1 Tr\t\1 ALLOw n\E. CoLLECTION o 1- F~.ANDS 1- K.oM 'PLAIN TlFFS' TO BE 1?~YED DIRECTLY

Tc TI-\E .Sou.T\-l'E.A~T MI660LA.RI MENTAL HEALTr\ CENTER, IOtO WEsT

Co\vt~btA.., rARM.:tNG-TON, Mo., 63640, AND APPLIED To TI-\E CoST oF

r'r

'\

THEIR CA.Rt.. AND TK.t.ATfv\EI\lT.

23. ~LAIN TIFF6' .ALLEGE. 11-\~T DEF8~D.ANT 0 I .AlAN DIAK.E..,

KELT\-\ QCHAFE.R., AND TERE.JV\I/\K NIJ\ON HAVE. BEEf'.-l

•

AND ARE A.\JARE. 0 Tr-\'LS 'PAST .AND CoNTINUING bEHAVIOR AND

\-\AVE. AT A tvttr-litvhA.t-.tt G-I..VEN lT THEI~ TACIT APPRovAL~

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1

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24" Ov\ 0~ .A.\-x·-.:\.T Avl(rV..5T 0~ zco'i{ PlAINTIFF .s' VAN0Rt>a..t AND KITCHEl(

BECAM~ Cor-KER.I\l£D Aiocv,\- T\-\£- I5Si-\E oF 6I&t-.1I~& THESe DoCli\MENT0 WITt-\OtAT

.

(

Bf.~E'FIT oF" H-\liji( Cct.v-t,)EL.:'?:l REVIEw, AN.D bvri<LNG- A M.tEL.Lt-.!G- w:r:.Tt-1. DE.Ft.NDANT.S

~YER~ <f;.StAMPIER KAI.SED THLS ..Lf:>:".>vtE AND A5('ED 11-\ESE DEfENDA[\.\T-5 FOR

hARTt-n::R l..N'FuRJ-1\A.\Icv' A.klo1..~T HEALTH LIN ( WHICH DITENDANT5 1 I(EFiA:SED TD 1

ANSWER., PIA.INTIPF AT THI5 "?oiNT, DEClNED To 5IG-M TKESE PAPER..S, t-tow-

F\Jt;:R , PIAI.:NTIFt== VANORDEf\l WA:S ADvi.~ED By'· DEFENL:ANT ~ fv\yfi;:j AV\Q SuMP'rf.RlOWRI:T~ D£'i=EMDANT AlktBLAK.E.

2o. "PIAINTlf'P VAN O~DE:N fo\\owED Tl-\E ADvrcE To CoV\.TACT DEFENDANT
AlAN BtA.K.I::.., PlADJIIFF \IAN O~D~r-.t REC.£TVED A l<E:.S?Ot-t6E. FRcM
•
26. \\-\EN, P\AINTIFF VANOREN WRoTE. AND TRIED To CALL THE PA~l(Hill~
SAINT FRANCCL''=> FAMil't' 6v'I.PP'CRT DIVI~1::o~ oH---LCE, 140 0TAPLES DlttvE, PARK~11L:s, i"1o. 63601, A.sK.ING \-cR INFoRMATION, A.6 PE¥: THE C>l,{GG~5TioN
o\= DEFE\\lDAt--~.1 AlAN 5\A.KE, PtAI.NT.It=<r VA.tJ. OJ;::DE:N ·RELE..IVE:D No At-tswER6
By MAt\ AV\.t:. \-\.1--..~ "Phvll-t: CAlLS WERE Rt:t:ii\.SE.D.

27. o~ ot:: ABOL\i :SEPTEtv\BEfZ. Zoe~ "PlAINT IFF VAN URDEN 1\J::cEIVEC> A
Br:LL oF ~ct,7~0°FKOI"\ 1\-{E_ DFPA\UtvtENT oF MENTAL f4EALTI-\ VlAlr-n-tFF 1
\)AN O~t>EN 11-\'f:N ~)t-\ARED TKLS RES70N,3E W~IH Cn-\ER. 'Pl.AINtlF~5i \;Jr\0

HAD KECE.tVEi> oiJ\/tiLAt.. l)'LLL-~ Avu~ cFFEh.ED TD h:;\lc~,.-..l ltt? WIIH AN

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HIS~)C '-t~ H~NTAL I..NQVlJ:::K.Y LH.!\NNEL ED TI4.KOUL't4 IH't: .SCu.THE.\.:)1

HEALTH

(ENTEg_ 1 lO,C we:_~-\ Cck·<•v.b~A. STht:Er, FA~!N&-ICt-J., t·./\c, 6 3640--.Gctq 7 .AacGv\i\.5

- - \:_',•E!D-_A__j_~'::r:_,t_v_.'~.E_~_t<_.-.,.- .

- -~------

( ~) \

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• Z8. 'Pl AmTl-tt VAN ORDEN 5~AB-":>EQU.ENTLY w~on To The Ac.u:.:x.u..nit-!6-0fF.IC.E. OF THE SoUTHEAST Mrs~ouu MENTAL HEALTH CENTE~ To A5K A&,u1 .SPteit="lc DI5TRIBv;r I:cN e:F 11-\E Fu.\1\.D~ TRYING- To :PE. Cotlt:.C.\£.D .BY PEFEN.DA:t-.rr ~ MYERS AND M:s. 8LA.M.PTEK.

29. "P\AI.NTTt= F

VANO~DEN

Rtat.VED

A6

A

i<t.sPcN.SE.

E.xl1UIT

1
'1) -

.A.

·' ·

LE.TTE.~ 'FRovv\. H.:s. ThELMA Mctv'\A~U6, ActoL.tV\IANT 1, Wl-\0 IDE.NTIF1J.S

KE~6E\F A:!:l THE AC.C.OL-\N\.~ ~E:.CEIVAl3LE 0\.\PE.it\/L.SCR'

.:=::,(). IN 1HIS LtttEI< M~. McM.At.lut:>, CERTifiE.C> 11\A'T At-1v Mot-tEY Ccil'Ec1ED fRo•"\

•

PlAINTI:tF6 D.I.~EC.TU( oR E:vE.N. At:TE~ !HEIR DEATIA, WOvl\d BE IAoED 5rE:LIF.ICAU-Y
Fot:.il Rootv\, AND BoA~<..D"- No MENTI-ON I DrRECTI...'{ oR. lt.JDI:RECTLV WAS

"REGARDING-

II CARE

AN b

11\.EATtVlENT" OF

'?\AINU~ ..5

1 •

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2:>L l.N 'DELEJ'i\BcR 1 ?I.AlNTifF V'AN 0Rl>EN (A.IlED HI-s PIAJ)LIL DEFENt>E~, ~1R.
T\M. B'-'t~D1c.K. ANI> Told HIM Abc""+ HEAlTH LI.Nt( At-tD tiow TIAEI{ CoNtJLACTED THEI~
AL1Io.,.s WITHGuT PIA.IJ...tTIFFo: Arrol<t-tEY<-'5' KV\owleAe, AT THI0 Tit-tE. AttoRney Til"\
BIARt>tc~ INFci:..MED ?tAlt..tTIIT VAN O~EN HE Wou\A hAve To liA.foRM KR. ~M.ETT
QlAeeY\.eR. wrl.o .r.~ THE APPE.LLAIE PvlBI-IC DEF£NDE~ 'BECI\1..-'k-:x~ Bu~D,c.l( WAn N.ovwc-
c: DN To n-u:: KAN<'.)A.[::, Fede~L PvtBU:L DEFENI>i:f.:·:S C'FPJ::(E., 1\;IR.Bvn::.DiO:: DID 11.1\Alk IN Tc
P\AtNTTF\= VAMO~DErJ THE. DcCv\MENT~") oF H£Alil-t LINt(! AND ;:rA::Ctl-\/EXHIBIT5. I 1D AND' EI)

PlAINTIFf VA~~ ORDEN THEN (cNTACTf:D ?vtb 1'\c. Dt.FENDEI<- Lr-"\rv<d::"il

UvLEE.NE~ AT H..r:.a c'FFr.ct: AND E;x;.P\Aw...tED THE EVENT-'::; AND AcTION·':! cF DEfcNj)Al

~~1- t-\ARC~j_) l'::~Wt:K~mAt" p :SUM'i'T~R ci HeAl_

;.1\;ll( Q.k~~~E'··,t>l~,..,A:i£.::.tli';I;1 Ed

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lAAAwARE Of Tt-1.~5E A<:-T~OI\\6 At-to WANTED To 1(1-JCW All..Lv\.F"oRMAt:r.c!" TAAT PLAI.NTIFF VANOR:DE.N HAD ON THE;)E EVENT5,

33. AFiER MAILING- M~. Qi..-\eeV"eR \1-\b. DOC.~AI-'\.E~T5 AND OA l·h.~ 'R:EVI.E.W
of THE~~ DOC.\Afv\~N T.:":>1 P. D. .AttoRV\ey HR. QiAeeY\e~ CcNFE.RMED THAT 1\10~~ oF
HI6 o~ AN.y oF Tl-\£ 'PuB\Ic DEF8\1DER15 foR THE S;J.P. DETAiNEt6 IN 11iE .STAffi
rfr tvtt~tt, HAd AN'C' K\1\.cwle~e At All T\-\AT M5on: WA& HAVING- REAlDEN.T~
SIGN Doc..\MENfS THAT GAve. THE DEFENDANTS MON~'i.BY SI&NI.N.6-0..SC

SHEEr oF PAPE[{ 11-iA.T ALAIHOiUz.ES DEPAirrMENT oF ME.NTAL. HEALTH To

C,oLLE.CT WI.H\Ou.T Ovtl'. PtA:I.NTIFF-51 Pvtblic. DEfENDE~5 11 TilE 5.V.P. TRIAL

TI.Ad~ef.>1 ; OR AVUf oF nu:. 'P\AINTIFFS1 Tu.KOK:S KV'\Cwl~eoR KV'WI.NI:!'lA AY\y

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KINDS oF IVl'FoRMATI.ol.-\. 11-\A.T WO~,;\Id Effic..T 11-\E:)£ PlA.INIIFr-Si IN
THE-SE C.A.."::l'E..S.

3.tl.. AN-D

T\-\E.t-\ P\AT.N.TTFF

v'ANO~<:t>E.N

MET

'WIT\-\

THE.OniER

1
P\AI:N.TJ:i=F-5

NAMED :C.N. mrs CAsE A"u> A5KED P\A1:NTTFF VAt-.LORDE.t-\ To HeLP THEM, hARlHEf:.

51-\E.D \-:r.C.HT oN. THE. 61Ao4~5 oF 6IG-"'I.NG- c~ NoT ~I.GNI.NG- THE 'PAPEt:.Wo~"- w\-\UH
Al>PEA~ED Tc TI-\EM. To BE A. Coe-nMc.T 1 AND Tt-lE RB:ElVIt-.lG- oF BI:.LLS tV(?..
.5'-'lo-\ LARG--& .AM.ovWT.s. See "PLAINTIFF RobE.l'T Hoods
Cot--t~ f\coM DEFENDAt-tcs' t-\AROL"D t--\YER5 WH.o
kPRESE.MTi \-h:. A.LT\-\LT.t.\1(- .A..WE\ l?o.1.J.JT Cot--tPA.NY ExHIBIT•F,
_ _ _ _.c;.A~Nu.D"--""=:EX~·ri_I.BIT 'G'I PLAIN1If E VAN ORDEt-\.5 .:Btu 1_- 2.,; I

35. bt.FEN.DAN.TS\ ~1.\vE INDr.viDIAALLV ANr> Cou.Ec.II\/ELY

.3l-CB.lECT£t> \>LAI-t-tTIFFoTo Ac.TJ..Ot-l..S WHicH VIOLATED \HE E:tc.,:_t-\11\

•

.AJ.;lh.N.D~~NT It-.! IHfl.T THEY r\ANE- ATI'E{Vl?TE.D To CoERCE Pl..A..tNn:;:F

:LN.TD &6-t-ti:N.G- .A .'BINDINC- CcNTRA<-T W~TI-\()\.AT THE. 'lS.EtJt::'FiT t.:f.

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 11 of 80 PageID #: 11

-

•

Co~..-ti'lSt:.LS ADV..LC.E;

#

'\)\AINTlFF:S Gxouwp:S i

Afi)J_~ TliE Cou~6'E- oF ntESE Ev£NT~~ DE'F£N.DANT5 lAS'ED

TACTTCS THAT ARE., tv\.INMALLY 1 J..KMoRAL Af'tt:> .4L5o CRoss
THE LTN~ ot= ATToR:N.b.{- (LLEN.T l(E.LATION.StU.P t\0 WELL A6

tJlAKING- n\~ l:oN~cT VOD::;:, To lt-U::: EXTENT THAT THEY WERE

DIG-Mb.D \..JI.THO\AT \!'UE \="!ALL'{ IN.F=DRM£t> CoN5ENT.

:.B.)T\-\:t;.. FAcT T\-lAT TH~&'£ CoMTI<ACTS AR.t.. Bl:!D~A.G-H.T To "PLALN.T.rFF~

B~ PEOPLE Who 'K'E:..t:u.5t:. \o 'FL-tW-'< ..LDEN.TI:.fY THEM5t:LVES, ~V.I!>E

~\="oRMAT.LOK AlSOt.A.T THEIR £1'-\PLO'{ER (WE.LL"Pon.ry'H£ALTt\ Lu.u~.) ci!.

•

ful\Y Ex. Pl-AIN THE:. Si:Qu.t:.t-lCE. oF 'EVEt--rr6 Wi-\IO-\ Cot-tTK:oL5 THE
PATH ANt> 1:>E5TWA.Tiot-t oF THt. hm.c\6 TN biS'Pv\TE, CoN::>Trn-lrEs

VA\..It::>AT:toN o'F THE 6T&NI'FICANT QLA.t:.STI..oN ~ ot= Wl-\AT .LS

Rt:.)•.W-Y &orne.. ot--t WTTH THt;sE ~.s.

C.)1>LAI:N.TI'l='F5 i ALLEG-E THAT Tttt=. Co LLEC-r.LO~ oF Tl4EoE hA.~s
~ 1>E~SotJ..S Wt-\o AeE. I:.N.VoLVlN.TAR.IL-1( LcMM:trl1~1>1 AND
AC-Al-.N.ST Tl+EIJ2 WI:U-1 VwLAT'E.6 "BoTH Due P~cE~5 ~ \;QUAL PRDTECTrol'l lAKDt=.R ~E LAw ,A...s PRoviDED Fc(R
_LN TKE 'SI:G+lTH AAFN t>tJlb.NT.

D.)

DEFE:Nf)l\NT,)'

•

HEAlTH Ll.NK LOKVURA..T _LOt:-J,·- 1-\. Wt:LLPOltJT

(Oi<I.Jo12:-A\ CtJ; ~A\ZOLD t'-''~\'C. .::~ ,' -~ udY "JUI"IP\EK

(l\)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 12 of 80 PageID #: 12

•

A.\AJ-0 .lSlAte, \(-ciT\-\ 0C\AAF~~~ ::JE~AJ\ NI-X-ON, DEFENbcAWT01

AA_vE VIolATeD ?LAT.NT1.IT~l E..L6'-l-\T+t .A.tvt.BJ'D~P-JT KJ:&t\T5 ::BY'

DEFEND.A..tJTS\ AuiON0 o~ ovcr:ssio~~ i

•

•
( ,l,.;r.)....)\

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 13 of 80 PageID #: 13

•

, F&cT'5 AND 'EYENI'5 1?:< DEFtNDAr,rT si IV\YER5
.A.no ~.,Swv\l?JER, W\-\0 ARE KE?t?::ESENTATIVE5 Fot>
.HEALTH LlNK.-'.J.\ \.v'ELL-pOINT CORPORA.TION 1 WlTK

TH t; MI350L{R.I_ DEPAR:tfvlENT o£ lv1Et~tAL HEALTH,

~LAINTIFF0: ,A,Lll::-D&S

. DEFEND;~NT01 LN TEKVIEW WITH EACH PLAINTiff

·pl A): AINTifF VAr>lORDEtJ i DEFENDAN.T0 MYER-S,
.A!'JD Svuv\PTER·- .ARE Al(oc~E.d To (OtV\E DJ<51Ae

'1vtSOTC [TO CCtv-lE IN5it1e TKEATtv\EWT C£N fER To
:~'\JhAT t\IER WARd 11-\'E-'{ WLS\-\-\AN-EoCORTED], 1
:mt=0~ DEFENDANTS\ AR.E A-lloweJ TO ~tAe~TION

oR- L~u.IRE BAcK. ~LAV\~ o K PER0otJA.L wro~t-1A1ICV\.,

•

-~HESE b£'FErJDANTS~ TE\ \ EACH PLAINTIFF Tr-tA.T

DoE& tJOT 6iG-N THEIRCotJTRAcTo-TKAT DEFENDANTs

WILL

-:B.1

LL

THE.

"?LAI.tJT .LFF

FoK ~ RooM.

AV\c

boARt

'
>

NOT'TREA.\MEt,.JT~~ AV\~ lF 'PlAI.N\-LrF DoE5 NoT SI&t-J

THt.Ik Cot-JTRACTS- 11-\AT AFTER ou.~ I<ELEA~i=-- \JJM:r

EVER. tv'l0\1\.cy (re,s) l .A.~ ENT LTLcD To, TI-\EY o\2:

Tl-\E. l-\EALTl-\LINt(-A WELL PoiNT Ce:MPJ.NYI THEY

,'RE.'\)RESENT, W..LLL TAKE .1-T A WAY FRc,\!V\. PLAW\.lff
.Lf\J .A ColtRT cF LA\i,)i .sol You ( PL...\IJ-JTTtF) ~AA
BesT ~t(-)f 5l&tJ ThE Dcne~ Ll~·\e A""~ G-r::'T DOVER:
,\rJ-.L\inl ,·I

•
(\3)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 14 of 80 PageID #: 14

• JSo)VLAINTLt:'F VAJ\J0Rb~ .A.LL'E_DG-E~, b£F&JDAtJT tv\'<E~~ VIo\A+ec YlA'iV'-.\Iff~ CoN~\ITLATioV\.A.l l(.t&-l-lT5
LWt>t.R. 11\E £-L&trf AfvlEt\JDM.E£\JT, TAAT ~oRBLP0 INfLIC1Io~"
orr PV\:V\.L5~'v\.ev'-T \HA\ A.RE CR\A.t.L h~ lAV\.V..~UAl i -ntE
~~~\::.. 1 C~L.EL A.V\.~ Lt¥"\~UAL' IS 'TR.'E.A\'ED A.s
~ER.ChA.V\6-ABL-E WJ... Tl-\ i ExTI:rM C'K~Ae l+y ~ IV\. c~eg_
.~D, TH:E '011A- A~ENDM.ENT, ,l\~ ~TRI.C-rLY toRJ)IC>S
Pv\N.L5hM.Et-JT ·w~LcH \r\E)(.t. I0 tJo LAVv'fiAL hxn-toun'
To LY\..~Lic\~

•

Cw) 'PLA1NTlff VA~O"R.DEt'-\ ALLED&E-5 r UffE~DA.NT
0LAtA.Y"Tt:.R VmlA+ed '"PlA!vd-rFF.s Covt~TITlA.T.lONA..l KI&-H.Ts

UNDaTt-\'E E..LC-HT .AtvtEt-JDt-1\'ENT. Tt{A1 foR:E:>lD5 lNFLICTiorJ

.

I

orr HAV\I0~MENT THAT ARE CRvu::l AV\d lAV\lA6UA( I THE

?hRASE I CRuEL AV\d uY\u.\SUA.L I::; TREATeD A.5

IV\.TERCh.AAG-,A.BU= WITH 'ExTf(EtV\ Ll(.u.eltY: I\1\. o-\heg

(;JogD; THE 8Tii .A.KErJDMErJT, Al-so oTj<.J..LTLY to~B..LD5

RtV\I8\t\.MENT Wt\IC.H TrtER.E .L~ rJ 0 LAWFuL Au.TKORlTY

To 1:.-V\.~LICT.

D.) YLA:.LNTlfF VA~ 0KDEN ALL ED&E.S DEfEN.DAMT f

BLA.KE V.LoiA+Ed "PIAIA-\-IrF5 Cow1TITVlTIDtJAL 'KIG+\T..s

•

\AND£1<. THE EL&+\1 ,AMt=rJDtvtENT, Tl-\1\T 'Fo~:B.LD-5 ItvFLrc:Tic~~
oF Pv\.v\I0\r\.\/\AEI.A-t- \""hAT AR.E LK!AE L AV\_~ lA.V\L-t-5\.AA.L. THG

I

P~\~A.:St:. 1 t\2v\AL i:\.v0 lA\1'\v\..:~u.AL1 I ~ Tl(EATE D ,.<\.5

(\4)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 15 of 80 PageID #: 15

• I\1\\ER.C..hAV\G-ABLE 'WITH' EI<:TREM Ctue\YY', .LV\. ~e~
,WoRD i Tt\E sl"h A.M.ENDr-\BJT, }d6o 8TUCTL'{ l=DRB:rt>:) PuV\I0~tv\E.NT W\-\.LCJ\ \+{ERE ..L-5 No LAw~~\.L AwHoRTIY
To IV\.~Lic-, ~

E.)~~LAl.NTit=f VAN ORDEtJ ALLED&Eo( DEFE~DA~T
&J\A'fER VIo \A+e~ -plAirJ-,.LFFS LOtJST.LV\.Tl.DIJA.LRt6+l1S

,\AhlDER THE 'ETG+\T .t\.~ENDM.t:tS1~ THAT toR.'BID0 INtL.LCTiotJ

o'f VL--t\f'\Ie:·>t\tv\£t\lT THAT ARt- L.~~EL AV\~ U.AlA0uAL 1 ThE

:fu~£ i C~lAEL AV\6 I.A.Y\.U-.6\-\AL I6 TREATED <A__~

•

~\ERC.\1\A:V\.G-ABLE

I
'vJ.LTH E;ZTRE.M

l
LRiAt'\ty'

r\1'\ o-tkeR.

wo~t>, THE ~ThAlAAev\.DtJLt:WTi Atso QTRlCTLY tD~D~

P~V\I6h~T W\:\ICJ\ \1\~'E IS ~o LAWtLA.l !~u:n-\ORITY

t"fo Iv<t=LlCT.,

f.)PLAINTIIT VANOR.Dt:I\J A.LLEb&E~f Dt:rEf\iDAtJT

NI)(ON VJ..olAJed PLAIN TED PLAmT.L'FF() CoY\6T.LtATlOI'JAL

RIG-\-\\5 UV\Dt:R THE- EIG+\T .AtJ\EI\lDt·U~.c\)Ti ThAT FoRJSID0

m'\="LlC.TTOt-J o'F PtAvrr0t-\McNT \HAT AKE- (R.~\E L A~ U'V\U.5u.AL,

\1-\-t VhRA.6E IL'RuEL AV\c uV\lA6lAAL' IS T~EAT'ED A::)

~TE'KChAl'\.0-A.:rsL.E

~vTTI-t

1
Ex.TR.EM

LRu.e \ty:

L"- o+L\e~

Wo~D, THE 8'1{-\,AKEt\\DtJtt::NT; .AJso STkLCTLY fOgBrD~

PLtl/'li:.5\t\{'JJ::l\JT W1-\l<.J-t T\-\t:F':E 1-~ r,Jc LAwfvd Au.Tt-\O'KIT'f

-tr0

--
_L\./\_

r L.L ~- ...,._

C -

t

,

(lf:))

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 16 of 80 PageID #: 16

•
37.
•

c; "PLAJ..NTIEF l:iooo , DEFENDANT lV\YEK~
A.ND Su.MWER- .A.K.t .AHowt.6 -ro Co~E I.l~6\~e j\{&JTC

[To CoV\E- It-J0iee Tt\:A.TK'Em CENTl:-R.. To W\-\AT 'E.\JEI(
WARD Tt-lEY WLSH-ut-J- E0COR\EDJ., 11\E~E DEFEN.DA.NT~
A.'Rt. .A.Uowe~ \o ques\I0\1\. OR ·IV\qu.I..R-£1>Ac~ Gi(ound
s oR \>t:..~ONA.L IC\\FO\<-t-'\.A\IoN. I THESE DEt='~I\JbAtJT TELL
.~c.H ?LAit'J\IR= 11-\.AT UOE5 NOT -5.LC-tJ Tt-\UR Lci~KAtr.J­

fTt-\AT Dt.t=Et--tDA.~T 5 W.L.LL tsiLL 11-l'E. 'PLAlhlTifF Fo~

''RootJ\ ~Q fJoARD'\ See (DMtt'_s)(LETTER To PLAINTifF

.
VAN0g]:)EN,

.L ' ~

\

EX.h1b'h: B PAG-E lD,)

NOT {(TlCEATKt:NT,,, AND

IF PLAINTIFF DoES NoT 616-M TI\EIR CotJTRACT5- THAT

AFTER OlAf' KELE.A·~E- ~lltvlT EVE-R MoNEY (I e6) l Al\11.

EN.TITLED To, THEY OR. T\-\E l-\l::ALTH Lif'lK- A WELLPoiNT

Cotvt'PA.NY, 11-\EY REPRE6ENT, WILL Tt\K.t. IT AWAY
FroM ?LA-Lt-.JT.LFF lN A Col-t~ oF LAw, 8o, Vol-\.
( 'PLALN TI~F) I HAc :Be6-r T\ll-5\ 0IG-N ll\t. Dot\:ed LIV\e
A.V\~ CrET j_T OVER w.l..TH. I~

((£)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 17 of 80 PageID #: 17

•

A.) 'PLAINT.L?f Hood ALLED<if.S, DEFENDANT (vt'{ER0
VIolA+ed PlA1V\~tiT6 CvV\.~ lTLr\.[OtJA\ '~:~~'*~ U.V\DER
"""lRE ti&\-\T M'&SDH.ENTI THAT 'fo~~I£>5 IiA.FL-l.CTio~

oF Pli\.\1\I.St-\MEtJT THAT A_g_c_ Ct:LttEL .A.~ Uv\\..\6c.tAL 1 -rnE

Ph'e.A~t-

\
L'K\A'EL

A.ND

I
lAV\lA.5uA.L

I5

TR'EA-rE:D Ao

:I.\1\-rtR.C.\rAY\G-A.fSLE

"'FLTH

1
Ex:Tt:.£t\J\

(

KtAe\ty:

:GA.~eR

WoRD i 1HE <6TH .AM't.t-JDVlENT t AJ~ 6TR~CTLY fueiSI.D:s

fuh.LSt\MENT Wt-\LC.{-\ lH~RE I.S No LAwrvtL AuTHoRITY

TO :r:M.~LI.C.T t

• I>) VLAif\JTit=r Hood A.LLED&E5 r bEFWDAt.JT Ou.t-1 PTE~

VIo\A-\ed 'PL~:x::N-\-~Fr5 CoV\sTITLATm.JAL R1-6+lT-S ut-JD'ER

THE c.LG+lT AAB.ND~ENT, !HAT to~E~Ds k'f'LICTIOI\J

DF ""Pvwa.S\1\KwT THAT,A.R.£ Ctut.L AV\6 LAV\l-{.SLAAl, THE Ph~E
1L'KvlEL .AJA.6 lA.V\U..SlAAL\ IS TR'EATED A~ WERCHIWG-ABLE

WITH

'exTREM

CtLAel+Y:

.l.\1\. o-\1\eR.. WoRb 1

1BE 8'111MkiDMEtJf1

A\5D 0TR:t.C..TLY" t="oi<J3ID~ ?uvu~~\1\t--{f:f\JT WHIC..H 1ftfg£ 1.5 tJo

LAwru.L A.u..-rHDUTY \o kFLicT.

C. ) PlAWT.ITf t-\oec\ ,A..LLEDG-E':), DEFENDANT bLA¥e V.LoLAtec

'PLAINTifF ~T..LTlATl.C\~.AL RrbHT.S U.NDcR l1tE tiGHT

.Autl)DH.E!0T1 THAT 't(;gj)ID-5 ~FL.LCT lOtJ 0~ T't4\JC>I!J--!EtJT ThATARE

t~EL

A~c

u.v\\ACUAL 1 1HE

PHR~E

1
Ct\-tEL

AV'-l

~LAA.Li

..Ls

1l~E.ATED "A..o IV\.T~RCt-lANG-ABLE wr:n-\ i Ex:tREM CbAeltY..i

lV\.. ~ee. wot?.t:>, 11-\E gr~ A.~'lEI\JD~ENt: .AJ5o 01R.Lc.TLY

.

l7

.

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 18 of 80 PageID #: 18

•
tQRBl.D5 Vl-t~.hSt\~E~-r WH.tCt-\ Tl-\EK'S I0 ~0 LA.L-JfiAL
,~lHORT1 Y TO ..l~t- LICT

D.) PLAitJTI.t=F Hood. _AllED&E0, DEt=BJDAkJT 6cMffR

V.LD\A.+e~ \J~A1V\-\-n=r-:s CoV\0\lTu.TIOV\A.L \C.J:G+\T~ lAV\..DER-

T~:-tE EI&+\T _.!,t-J.;:_Nt:tJ~t:.~-rr, -r!U'"t For.:BI.Ds ~\=Lic..TI~-J oF ·

YlAV\TStH/t'El\JTT\-\AT A~E LR\AEL AV'\0 LtV\~UA.L,TI\£ Vh~A_..S'E .lC'KiAEL ~P lANL-t61.AAL' lS TR.EA\ED ;A,.6 lJA.TERL\1\AV\C--At>LE

WITH- 'E>'-T~'E~ L~LAE.\ty: .L\1\ o-\-hee wce.D, 1t\E <6*AMEt.JDMEtuT;

•

ALSo ~n:ICTLV toR'&D5 HAVU6t\t-\EtvT wl:\rcH maE I5 No
LAiNFuL ktTt\OR.LTY \o I~~LTCT I

EJ j)LA:ItJtl~ Hood .AtLED6-E~ I kFENDAt-JT NDOh

VIoLAt'ED PlA1A-h8=~ ~\ITlA\oiV\AL R.I&t\16 LAV\.D~R.

1f\EliG-HT A}lt=NDMENT, TKA:t 'Fo~SID5 ~~LIC.1IOJJ oF·

PvtV\LSt\KBJT Ttl.tf AR'E L~LA.EL .Av-0 uY\lA.-5lAAL, 1\-\E P\t\\?A6E

1L~LAEL

A\1\.6

1
LAV\U.6vtAL

..LS

T~A.TED

.A.~

JiA.lERCl~v\Y\G-Aiale

W.L1\-\

''e.xT~t

1
(Ru.'EL-\:'{ ,

IV\.

otkR

Woe\) , 1Re

~AMBJDMftJT;

:IJ5o 0\UCTLY ~.t.D:S 1\-tii\I~t\NE~JT Wt\IC~ 11{'ERt: Io c\Jc
LAwh.A. L ~Tt\:O~.LT{ To ~'FLTC\ i

•
0 &')

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 19 of 80 PageID #: 19

• 3[
•

PLA1Nl-IfF (V\CCORD

DEFE~D.A.NT0 fv\YER~
I

.AND 0u.vv\.?TER -.A.RE llllowEc\ \o CoM.'E- IJ'-J0 k~e M&'ITc

L10 Cor--fE:. INbide TREATMENT CENTER. TO WI:-\A\ EvER

J. v\/A.'R.D THEY "JISt{ U.V\. -- E5cORT~D THE~E DEFEi\iDANT51 1

AKE At \ol~ed To qu_e6\ J.-C~ 0~ I:v\q\Ax:.RE :tJAcK- GRO£.tl/\:i

OR PER<3::Jt\JAL lV\rORKAT \ ol'-\. \\-\E-6~ DEFENoAt-J\0 T\=LL 1
~J ""PLAlNTlfl? tl-tA-r DDE6 t~OT 0..LC:.-N TH.'E.J.-~ CoN\~A.C\<)

t-HAT DEFEN D.A..N.··r,s WILL JSILL THE 'PLAINTIFF FoR.

11 Koorv'- .A.tJD ·:DoA.Ro'' see (D~u1-5)(LEnEk To VlA.tNITFF

VANORDEN,

Ult\[bft_cB'p,~c,-E

ID

,)

NoT

1 '

TRf.ATHt:-tJ~''.4N 0

IF ?LA-INTT 'IF Doe5 NoT 6.1-GN Tl-tEI.R CotJTRAc1 ~-- THA.T .AFTER OUR f>,ELEA0~WhA\ EvER \J\o~E~('lw) lAM

Et\JTL\ LED To, THEY oR T\-\E \-\t..AL\t\ ~-..r~h( - .r\ WELLPOif\\T

Cot-1'-PA.N'<', lHE~ REP~E6cN1, WILLTA.Ke J._:r A. WA.Y
'rwM '?L.A.l..NTIFf IN A Cou.RT o~ LAw, Sol '{oLA
(PLA..LNTlh), 1-\Ad be~-')\ Tu.S\ ·3J__(~ TKE=. Do-he~ Ll\'\e /\.V\.6 C--e~- ~T 0 VE~ WITH.\"
I

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 20 of 80 PageID #: 20

•

A..) ~LAINTtrF rqcco~D A.LLED&t<\ btFE-NDAtJT MYERs

V1_o lA.ted \JLA.tn-\-I IT0 lcV\()TITvrtiDt~AI 1::1&+\10 U.V\D~R

]HE EIG+\T l\KENDHEl\JT, THAT'f'o'K5TD5 ~IJ.Cfio\1\ oF

WV\I6l-{\..{8\JT THAT ARt= (Rt;\.EL .AY\d LAY\U.-:'SAALI THt Ph~E

i
.

C~EL

~'c

lAV\lA()i.AA.L l

LS

TREATED

A.e> b\\ttCVv\V\G-A.BLE

WITH: \~xT~EM CelAe\ty: IV' o\t~ WogD, ·n\E 81rtAtvt&>U1ENf,

n ,AJ-3o on..LCTL'{ Fo~.LDS Yu.niSt\KEt-ST Wt-\ICH Tl-\B~'i:

~~D LAwFuL .Au:Tt-\oRITY \o lV\.F"LTCT,

•

']), lJLA:wnFF ~lceow A_LLEDG-t.s, D'EFEMDANT ~u\Jt'PTER
V_m\Ated PlAINtiFFS CoY\bTITlATIDNAL hG+\T5 tAMDEg_ THE

f:r&r\1 ,.4;tet.:>Dt1EtJ1, Tl-\AT to~"BID5 ~FLICTIOV\. Df Rtvcr~IAlt{ENT

T\-tAT

An:. CRuEL

And

~L,

1\-\t.

11\~t:

I
L-1\UEL

A~

1
uvmUA.t

10 TKt:ATt:D .A.6 ~c.R.cHA.t..)G-A:BLE Willi 1EXTRt:.M ~uei+Y J'

lV\ ~ef::. Wc~D. TH.E 3Th~Dtv\EtJ\ )J~o 6TRICTLYfo{GBID5 I

Pdf\1-DttME:tJT WHICH Tr\'ERE. I~ tJO LAWfuL 1\u.'"tt\oRI-TY To

l .v\.FLICT;

C.) PLAl:N\IFF ~LLDRD /~LLEDG-ES f DEFEN.DANT SLAte

VIolAtED ?\A.1:.t-J-\1tF6 C::n~\ J.TLATIONA.L ~G+IT5 Ut-JDt=R THE

hG-t·\1 .AM'ENDMEt.JT, THA.T 'FoRviD5 llA..FLL(TIDN Of ~HHtrJT

THAT AKE LR.~.-LEL AtJD LW\k~l,\AL I Tl-l'E Ph.RA-SE' LR.IAEL AV\d UV\USUA.t I

•

I51KEA.TED '~ J_\1\\~RO·\N&,ABL \.Jl:.TH EX.TREJ!t CRu.E\tY ~ _l\'\~E:~

itJcf.(p, THE 31HAJ4END(VLEtJT A\~ ~)TRlCTLV F0FX>lD5 ftiVt~~ht-ift'..iT wtli.cK

Tt\EI\E IS Nc LAWfu,L Al..ttt!-WKIT\1 TO IY\FLICT.
(20)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 21 of 80 PageID #: 21

•

D) ?LAINTIIT lvtCCoRD A.LLEDGE0 PEFENDAJJT 0cHAFER 1 VrotA.tEb "PLADJ+rrr~ CoV\6TITLATmt-JAL RIG-HTo WJDER 1HE

E:r.GHT ~DHENT, 1RAf fO~:Is.lD5 ~\=lrcTlorJ of titni&HM£1\\T

1HAT .~t

Ci:t,tEL

.A.Y\d LmlA3U.AJ

lt\E

Ph\<:AOE IC.~UE.L

A~

•
lAV\USUAL

I

..L6 TREATED A5 ·lv\TE:RLl-'\AY\C-AtLE. WITH '&TREK C~tAeJ\-Y11 L\

ot~e~ Wo~o, W.E ~Tr\AMEND~El\J~ .Al.so 8TR.LC:TLY Fo~..LD..S

H...t.V\.J::5HHEt-JT wl-tiC.l-\ Tr\E~ .L~ ~0 LAwFuL ,At.K\HOR.L-p( To

I~~LTc.T,

t.) T>LA.LNTl.Fr M_c.toKD A.LLED&t:s, DEfE~DANT Nix.oN

•

VrotA.-h:.D PLAINTIFF5 Co\1\a\:tTwio~-JAL RI:&HT5 u.NDE\?. TI-\E

ErG-tiT -~DMB.JT, THAT Fo~IDo ~FLI.CTLON oF H..t\1\IS~MENT

.
1FlA.T AKE

C.~uEL

AV\c

LA\I\u.5UA.L- 1

.
TH'E

Pn.R:A(:)E

I

CRUEL

A.~.

I
U.VLLt.::)UAL

I6 T~EA.\'E.D ,b ~TERC.\1\A.V\6-Ab\e WITH 'FxTi!EM C~L.tEl+Y 1 J.JA I

ot\-teR Wo~D, 11-tE <13'1H_A.Mt(\}DHt.NT 1 ,AJso GTg:.LcT LY f0Rr:>TD5

P~'-l:.0HM.£NT W~IC.H T\-\'i:lCE I_._<) NO LAwfu.L ;\tA.THoi?IT{To

:IV\FL l CT I

•
2l

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 22 of 80 PageID #: 22

•
39. . PLAlN\IFF tv\ILLER .DEFE~D.A.N\6 l'v1YER0 I AND 6vttv\"PT~- .A.RE A.\\owEa To CoM.E- INuide \V\6oTc [To Co~E Iwide TK'E.A.\Kt:NT CENTER To Wt\AT EVsR. WA.R.D 1\-\E'{ W.L~H ·-vt~- E6CoR.TEDJ. T(-\~~'E DEFENDAtSI6' I
ARt: .JJloL-Jec To qvteST..Lo~ o~ ..lv\qu.I-~t: 6.A..c.t<- G-~~ oR

:PE'K&.>t0.A..L :LSFo~MATlON.r Tt\wE DE.\=ENDAtJT 0 TELL

'tAL\:\ vlA.uJT.LIT "THG- DoE.() NOT 0I.G-N 11-\E.Ig Cor..rrf:.ACTS-

T\-\AT DEFEtJDA.NT.S WILL B.LLL T\-\'E PLAI~TIFF Fo~
' 1'Koo\J\ t\.ND fuA.KD\\ See (DM\-\\s) (LETTER To "PLAINTIFF
;VPJJ 0RDE~f E;<_ktb1+-':B'\PA&E fQ ,) NDT ''TR.EA\ME~T:~ AND

•

.LF= "PLA.LNT \t=F Dot:::.-o NoT \SLGN TKE.LR Cor--.rrkALT6-1H~\
AFITR 0~ RELE~E 'vJv-A\ EvER lVtoV\e\{('le~) :CAvV\
ENTlT LED To, 11-tE'( oR. TI4E \-\EAD H LINK.- A.. WC-LLPowT

Co~PANY i ll-\EY kEPRE-0ttJT i vJ:LLL TAKE IT A. WAY FRDVV'
PLAlNTlt'i= _l_N A Cou.RT oF LAw/ ~0,. \(olACPLAI.NTIFF-)1 .t-\A2 be6T ~oT 5I.G-N n-tt. Dottec LTY\e A.Y\Q GE\

_LT OVEK. WTTl-\ ~ ~

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 23 of 80 PageID #: 23

•

A.) ?LAINTIA= MI.LLER ALLEDG-E~I DEFENDAJJT KVER~

V1-c~t£D PLAINTiffS CcV\Sl"I.TvtTio~ ~IC-HT0 U~DER.

lHt. E:t&HT .k1£tJDtvtENT[ THAT to~&D.S ~VLlCTlOtJ OF

fuY\I~H.E{\)T \HA.T A~E CRUEL ~~ UV\\.A.SU.A.L I WE "Ph.'t.4.'3E

l CkuEL AV\d UY\u~UAL' I6 TR.EAT£D A.~ :LA..\EOChAV\&A.fJL£

1
WITti fuRt:t-'\

C~l+v,'

~ert\"'ek:

WoeD,

-nu:. 8'~t\\DHaJT,

A\~o ST~CTL'( FoRBID~ Pu.\'\L:)t\MEN.\ Wl-\ICH 11-\ERE I5 No

:LAWfL-tL .Au.l110R.TIY To I\A.t="LIC.T.

• 1:>.)

PLAINTIFf

lVliLLER

A.LLE.D&£0 1

DEfENDAtJT 3utJlPTER

VIolA.TED PLAINTIFFS CoY\~TITtATioNA.L RI&HT~ uNDER

The UG-HT AM'ENDK&JT; TM1 tof:J)I.D~ Iv\FLICTIDN OF P~AvU:~I\IT

1flAT ARE L.~LCEL A~D UN\ASUAL, THE PI-\~&E I C~L AYJuY\U()UAL'
I~ tREATED .A0 kTER.CHAN&ABLE WITl-\ 1 ~TREK (RueHYJ'

_LV\ o~ ·woRb 1 T\:-\E 811-lAtv\E.~Dtv'lt:NT, A.kso 0n~.ICTLY FOF:B.1.DS
\)u.vUSHt-\El\JT Wi-\I.c\A \HERE I0 NO LAWl='\A.L AlA\HORITY

To ~~Ll.CT,

c~ PLAJ_~rTIFF lVliLLER .ALLt:DGE~\ DEFENDANT :bLAKe

Vro\ATED PLAINTIFF0 CuV\STI-TLtTI.Ot\\AL K.LG-HT() LU'\DEJ(
or TrtE ET&HT .! AMEND~AENT, ntA\ fO~-lD5 k'fLlCTiotJ

PLAV\Ist-ttvt'EtJT Tl-tAT ARE c~~L A.V\c1 LAY\L-~LAAL, THE P!iRA5E

•

1C¥:-u.EL A~d lAY\\A()LlA.L I~ T~EATED .A.6 L-tTE~C.H..ANC-ABLE

1
W.LTti tXTf'tM

(K\Ae\ tY J' .h\ ctkR

Wog.D , 11\E 15-n:A_tv\ENDKE~T,

(23)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 24 of 80 PageID #: 24

• A\.5o STUC.TL'{ Fo£-B.LDS 1>l-tY\.LSl-\M'E~T WHILI-l Ti-lt~S ,~6 No LAW'fVlL .AiATHORI\Y To IY\'flltT.

D.) PLAINTI'FF' fvtiLLER ALLED&t=.~ I DEfEt--lDAIJT ~CHAFER

V.:r.olA+Eb -pLAINTl.FFS Con6TITuTIDtJAL RIG-1-\To UV\DER

lR'E E.LG-HT AJ{ENDtv\ENT THAT FoRbiD& ~FL.LCT.LON oF 1

·pu.V\T0\-\\-1\Er-JT THAT A.'KE C~u.EL .A.Y\6 U.V\U.oUA.L , 11\t: Ph.U6E

''C~u.EL AY\d U.Y\LtE>uAl t Ie, T~EATED A.~. IV\TE~ChAV\G-ABLE

,WITli

'EnR'Etvt

l'KLAE l-h' 1 1

J..\1\. o+heR

Wof!.D ,11{E

gTt\)JU:~DH~

Also 6--n:I.L.\ LY 'Fo~IDS fuY\.L6t-\K.UIT WHICH 11\E'RE I5 tJo

•

'LAW'FtA.L AvctttO\<J.TY To LA.t:LT.CT~

E) PLAIWTTH=" ~liLLE.~ .A.LLEDG-ES, Dt:t:tf\JDAtJT NIXOh

VIoiA+tD 'PLAINTifF:S Cone'JTITU1IOtJAL l:IG-\-\1~ U.V\Dt:~

Ti-lE EI&\-\1 AY\Et-JDMEMT, TAA1 toRBroo IV\'FL1..CTIOtJ oF

.PL-LnT~\-\t--\~~ THAT A.RE CR.uEL .An~ lAV\U0UA.L 1 THE PhRA5E

"Ctzu.EL .A.ND

1
U..:Y\U6UAL

I0

TREATED

AC:> IY\\£RCAAl\l&A"&LE

WI\~ t ExTRE~ LRue.tT'I; IV\c)heR WoRDI Tr\E ~111.AJ.U:~DNEIJT,

Al6o o\R.LCTLY 'foRpiD-S AM:t5t\~ENT Wt--tiCH Tr\El::E 18

1\lo LAWFU-L AU-\\-\ORI1Y To ~'-FL\cT', .

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 25 of 80 PageID #: 25

• 40 . •

PLAINTifF J~AKE\Z . DEFENDANTS' tvtYtiZ·~ I
A'{\c c5LA.tvYPT1=-R- .ARE ~llowe2 ·-ro Cotv\E -LN6'1ce M&>TC [To Cotv'tE lt~6fc\e tRE/(Ttv'\Er0T (EtJIEk To WAAl" ~vEk
wARD \t\E'{ W1-6t-l-l~f\J- t::-SCoRTED]., Tl-\E-SE D~FENDAIJTS\

A'RE .AHoL,Jed To qvte0TlON oR .LV\qu.rK.E J::>.ALi G-Retw\d
OK "PER2ov\AL LV\\=0~\A.TIDY\., \HE3E bci='ENDAN\5 TELL t,l\ c~ Y~ALNT Lff THA1 DoE~ NoT 6IG-N THEIR CuNTRA.C"l~­

mAT D'E'fE-t~D..<\.NT6 W_LLL BILL THE PLAltJTI'fF FoR
'1Roo~ AV\6 :ED.AJ<d,\5ee (DHH~)(LE1TER To PL.AlN1IfF
'Ex + VAtJ 0 RbE~ , h1bi 'B'\PAG-E 1D I ) NoT 11TRtATfv\t.t\)T,'' .A1\J D
'_LF ?LAIIJT t t=F Doe·~ NoT 0~v\ Tt-\EI'\=:.. CotJT~.4cT5 -1HAT
A..FTEi2- OLAR KELEA.oE- \tJiv\.A~ EvEk t"\OtJE'{ (Ye~) l At'-'\

ENT l TLED To 1 THE.'{ OK T~E HEAL\H LifJK- A WELL-Pc>D\.JI

CotAPAJ-.r( T\-\EY 'Kt.PRE()t: t\r\ WT LL TAKe _u A. WA'{ 1

f ~o ~

'PLAIJ\.fl IFF

IN A Lou.RT

0 ~

Y LAlJ 1

S 0

1

001

( 'PLA:wTl~t=- ), HAd 'BesT TuQ-\ QI&tJ mt Do+\edLtvu:'

,A._,t,C. GeT _L\ oveR- vJIT~-\ ~

•
(25)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 26 of 80 PageID #: 26

•

A.) 'P\AL~lFF BAiE~ ALLEDG-El3, DEFENDANT MY£\(~
V:ro\AtED T>LA.IJJTIIT0 CoV\~TI-TUTLONA.L l(I.G-t\10 Luf\DE~
Th~ EICr\-\T AKE~.YDt-{EWT i THAT 'Fof:::.tsiD~ li\FL.LCTION oF

"Put.J..L5l-\Mt.tST THAT A.R.E C'KtA.'EL AY\d UYtlA&uA.Li 1RE PHRA0E

1CKt-tEL At-.)D UV\USUA~ I0 TREATED .Au .Iv\\l::RCi-VJJG-ABLE

W CD · ·.-LT

u
n

l

E,."r·•\-tr>--..E"\""

......I.AE \ LY'dl J'

.I...L....V\ OTI~L""-o'

·\,·..1;OR

"lJ-

r
1

rn:
u •'

-
-.

.

.q.;lHAn.~~-1~..•..1..1N"\vUrl&"ll.L...I,\.I...l1

A\~o 2rtUC:TL'{ FoR"fJI..DS T'-l-UJ..L&t\MW\ WHl.CH 1HERE I~ ~o

LAWFuL A\AT\-\6R...LT'{ To I\1\.\="LI.c.T,

'B.) P\AI.NTIIT BAiER A.LLEDG-E0, D'Effl\DANT 0lA.MPTE'R

•

Vr:..o\AtED \)LAltJTJ:fF"0 CoY\6TTIUTI.oNAL hG-HT0 UMDER

lHE EI&l-\T AME~DMWT, ·\l-lA.T FottBID.S .LnFLICT.LON OF

Pu.NLoHMEr,n l"HAT A~E C.~u.cL A.Y\C U.V\\AUUA.L, THE PH~E
1C.~u.'EL A.v\~ lAV\vt6uA.l' LS TtEA\EP A6 Ih-rt:UM~CTABLE WITH '&Tt?-'EtJ\ L\:UE\\'{ ~' TV' oRe g. WORD, ntE 8~Ma\DMErJT,
A\60 ~\RI..C\L'{ ~o\?f:BTD6 PLA-V"\J6HH.£NT WHICJ\ Tt\ERE l6 No
LA.~uL Au.\\-\O~Tl"Y TO IV\~LIC.T,

C.) T>\AINTliT S.A~£R .AllEC6-E~, D'Et=ENDANT BLA(£ Vr....o\A+t-D 'PLAINr.n=:Fu eo\-~T L TlAT..LOtJAL Ric-t-\Ts i;U.JDER

THE EIG--t\T AHEi\\bMErJTI 1HAT FOR.Br:DS I..:V\'fLlCTION OF

•

'PL-lV'..Lot-\MEIVT T\-lA.T ARE CRu.c..L .AV\6 LANU6iAAL 1 TKE PttRI\6E
'c R\.A£L AwD LA.V\vl~LAA.L1 I.S -ri!EAT'ED A6 ~l't:RG\At..JG-A.BL£

W..LTH

1
&TREM

(\(.LAE.\T'( ~

J... V\.

oi:heR:

Wo\!D, Tl-\E ~1\:\:.AJ{EMDMEtJT,

A\0G 6T'KI.C.TLY ~0\(!..3.1-D5 Pc-tvu.()t\tJ\.ENT wttl-C.~ 1\-\~E I~ tJ 0
LAwfuL .4tT\-\Qt<~TY' TO .inFLl.C1 (Zb)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 27 of 80 PageID #: 27

•
'D.) PLAitJTIFF'BAi.E~ i\.LL'E:DCt\5, b~t-"ENDANT&:HAFER
VIolAtED PLAI~TIIT5 Cov\.oTITuTIOrJA..L RIG-HT-S UV\DER.
Tt\'E EI.&HT .Af'.\EtJD~tl::{\fl, TftAT F'oR.BID0 .Tv-..FLIC.Tlot.J oF
·pvtY\I5t-\ME:tJI THAT .A.i(E CK:uEL .A~ UV\:1.A~!AAL, THE PtfRA8E
'CRu.t.L A.t-JD lAV\IkSUA.L ~~TREATeD A5 IY\-rt.i::Ct-\A..~Al)LE WIT\-\' E}(TREM C.~ut.lTY/ ·-L~ o~el'. WoRDi lt\E cgmJ..Mt.NDM£tJT,
Al5o 6TRICTL'( 'Fo~ID.S ·-y\ANJ..~r\M.WT WHICt\ T~tRE I& tJc
LA\tJ~vlL A.v..T~D~ITY To IY\~L.1.CT,

E.) P\AIN-rj_Ff BAKER A.LLED&E&, DEFENDANT Nix:o~

•

Vr.olAlt:D "PLA1..tJTT.t~5 CoV\STITlATTONAL lttG-HT6 UJ\ DER

\1\E Ei.&t\T A.Ht::.rJDMENT, ThAT foKC>ID0 IV\FLT.CTlOV\ o'f

FLtN .L()t\Jv\.r:NT \1-lAT )J::.E C~UEL Av0 \AV\U.\SUA.L, ThE ?H~{)E
·c~u.t.L AwD tAV\u~tAAL· J._~ ~EATE-D _.A..o IV\TE.~c\-\NJG:ABLE

WITt-\

1
'E)(lR't.('Jl

c~u.'£\...TV

,'

J:V\.ot\.\e~

Wo~D,\HE glhA_MENDKBJT;

A.\~o 51-~ICTLY FoR:BID6 \)iAV\.I.St\tv\.tl.\T Wt\1LH Tl-\t\::.E I() tJo

LAwFIAL A.\A-rt\oRI\Y To IV\FLTC.T, .

•
(27)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 28 of 80 PageID #: 28

•41. •

:rvREE ) "PLATNTlfF

DE~END.ANT0 MYER-~ AV\~

Qu\\'\PTER- ARE A.lloL,.Jtd To Cov>Ae ~Ide M001c [To LoVv\tW~'l~e T~E~~EtJT L&JT!:R. To whA-t EVE£

WARD Tr\E{ WIS\-\-u.v-\- 'i:..-SCoRTtD] ., 1HwE DE.rENDAtJTS(

ARE A.lloweC To 9"''-e:sTiow oR. LA-C)\A-"LkE BAcK 6-R.DUlt\d
OR 1i=R0oMl 1-v'-t=O~TIOY\4 T\-lw:i:: DEfENDAtJT0 TELL I
£Ac._\A "PLAI1\\Tirr TI1A1 Dos..~ NeT 0IC-t\J tt-\EI'K Cof\JTRACLS -1\-\Ar DEFEND~To WILL :DILL THE VLAitJTlffFor?. qKooM Av-.~ BoAKrJ\
{je£ (Dlv'U·\\s)(LE1TER To "\)LA1-NTI.ff VANO~~~ ExWbf+~"~t~)
'NOT '1-REATMtNT~~, A~ n= PLAitJTliT DoEv NoT 0I.G-N TI-\EIR
eo~~T0·-TH.AT A'fTEK ou.~ RELt.A.SE- W'IAAT Ev~ MoNE\{'(~e5)

I AtA EN\J.:TLED \0, lHE'f oR lKE rtEAL\t-\CDJK- A\.JELL Vo:i:NT

CowAN~ TttE REPRE--StNT W3-LL TAKE I1 A wAY F~ol'-'\. YLAI~Tiff

I

I

IN A Cou~ oF LA.wl .So, Yoq (PLAIJ\JTI~F), KAd Be6\ .:[LAS\

61..&-N l"l*E Dortet t~ AV\~ &t..T 1..\ 0\./ER WI1 ti,~

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 29 of 80 PageID #: 29

•

A(J), PLAI-NTIFF TYREE ALLEDGE0, DEFENDAt-JT lv\'{El(-.5 VI.o\A.TED '"PL.AINT.L~t-0 CoV\6\ITUT .LONA.L ~IG+\T6 LA.t-JDER

THt £IG-r\T A.t\Et-JDKENT, Tt-LA.T ~R.o..LD6 l\1\."fLICT..LoW oF

RwT0t\t--18JT THAT ARc Ce:vtEL AV\d lAV\Lt~L 1 1HE Pti'RA.8E

1
CRut.L

.An~

1
UV\\A.OtAAL

:.L~

TttA\'ED

A'0 ~\E~CHANG-ABLE

W.LTH ht.XTR£t-'\. t~u.t.LTY: J:V\0~-~ ~Jr>RD, Mf ~WAHBJDMBJT,

At5D 6TKIC.TL'{ 'fDR'BI.D5 Pu\1\LSl-\M.Etrr WHIC.l11HERt: :::t0 t\lo
-rv LAwt=u.L ALA"Tt-\DR..L To lV\FLLCT,

1) .) to ""PLAitSTIIT 'T\(f(Et _.t\.LLED& i bEt=t.NDANT 6uM.PTEg

•

VI.olA.T\::D PLA:lWTIIT0 CoY\hliTlA.Tio\1\A.L IT&l-\T-5 Ull\Dt:R 11-\'E EICA\T A~l'EtJDM80T, TRAT 1=DR'DID0 IY\t:'LltT.LON

ck 'Pu.VU::.St\t:-fl:NT 11-\AT /~.l:E L'KU~L .4\~ U~USLAA.L, Tt\E

VHkA.<SE 'CJCuEL ,A..Y\.6. LtY\u.SUAL _L~ ~'tATED A~

j_t-JTEw:_t\ANG-ABLE WITH I tXTR'EM. ll::&LTY: _L~~ Wo~D,

l-HE ~Tt\ AH.t:.N"DK'ENT, ~ C:rrRiCTL'/ 'fO~'BTD6 11.-tV\:C.St-\MErJT

ut-\ICK -n-\Eg_E TS tJ o LA.W'fUAL .Au.THD~l-T'( To LA.~LTCf,

C) 'PLA:LNTI~ T'{~EE A.LLE'D&'SS. DEt=EtJDAtJT b\Aie

Vi.o\A\ED "?L.AJ.JJ\Tt='F0 loV'{)TI.\LA.TIOV\AL \2:_L&t\T0 L\nDI:R.

11-tE EIG-HT AK.Et\lbt-.itEuJTI Tt-\AT \De:t:>Ib-5 l\1\\='LTC\ION OF

'Pvt'I/\I.S\:\MENT \t\A\ A~E L~t.L }-.V\6 l,LV\~L.lJ)...Lf 11-\~ "Pt-t~E

•

t (_~ut.L

A~~

1
\.XV\u;:)uJd.

...La \k.t:.AT't:-D

A.s ~-rE~CHANG-ABLE

Wl.1H 'tx-rR'E.M lRv\ELTY 1 LV\.Ot~eR Wo~D, THE '6\\-\Aiv(E~I>NEAJ

1

A\0c .S~ \ CTL'( t="oR6I.b5 "?~.xvc.Lf~\-\MEr0\ ~jt-\LCJ\ 11\'C_~E .iS t\JD

czq)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 30 of 80 PageID #: 30
•

U) ''PLAINT .LF'f Ty,::EE .L\LLED&t.6{ bEFE~bANT &H-AFER
VIolATED PLATJJTIIT() CoV\oTJ~TV\TioV\A.L ~lC-H-r5 \AV\DtR.

1HE E...LG-l-\T .A.tvtEN Dt--\ENT, TKA1 FoRo.L D() l\t\FLICTION oF

'\)uv'\:LSt\t.-\Em ·mAT A.e.£ C?,L.{E.L .A.~".~ ~..~Y\usu.A.L, T\-\E ?HRA~E
' (t<:\AEL A_v,.C LLv\~uA.L! ..L5 T'i!.t:ATcD A~ ~~OVJJG-ABLE

W.L\H

'tt<.Tf:tM

1
CR(,{E.LTY,

~ctkR

WoRDi

1HE

8~..\.\M.CWUMEIJT,

Al5o 6U:IC\L'{ FO~.LD6 \)u\I\I5\-\H.E~ Wttrct\ 1HtRE ·..L5rJo

• • LA1Jh..Ll AuTHO}:::.LTV To IV\.~LIC.T, E.) PLAitJTIFF ~EE ,A.LLED6-£0, D'EF'ENDAtJT Nl-XON.

VIolATED PLAitJTIFF6 C.oV\o'TITLATiuV\A.L h&«T5 tAnDt:R
THE 'E.LC-HT .AHt=.NDMEt\Jff THAT t=o~..1..D& J:~FLl..CTioV\ oF
Pu.V\-:Le:>HMEt-JT T\AA.r AR.t: CRlAEL AV\~ 0\V\lAatA.A.L, 1HE PH~E
•C~u.t:L AY\~ LA.n\...'-..Sl-tAL1 I~ TREATED As I\1\.T'E~OWJ&A"BLE WITH 1'b<TRi::tV!. L'K1.fELTYJ• .:CV\.0~~ WoiCD, 11\E 8\MAHa.IDM8JT; A\so 0\~-L-C.TL{ FoR.~.Lt>S PlAV\L::>HKBJT Wr\TC.t-l Tt'\'ERE I5 ~o

LAWl=VlL .A..u.THo!<I\Y To l..V\'t=LI..C.T,

•
(3o)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 31 of 80 PageID #: 31

VLA.DJTI.t=t=: RlTCt\ EY ) DEFEt'-\DAt·{\~I t-\'<EtcS AtJ~ 0<-At--\PTER-
A.'KE At\ow'i:-6 To lolV\E I.N6'LD'E tv\~\c[1 o Cotv\E DJ~k~e T~A.l MBJT
CEt,.ffE~ To WV\.A-t EVER WARD Tt\EY Wiot-\·-LA~- c6C..oR"Tt:D]..,T\-\£5E

DE.'FENDANT6 'ARE AlloL.Je~ To queaTIOi\.J OR I,/\q\A:t.RE 13N! 6-~o~.\~

o~ "PE~nA..\ J...:~of2.t-i\..b...TJ:ot-.\~ Tt-\E~E DEfENDA~S T~LL E.Ack I PLAIJJTI1="~ 11:-\AT DDE-6 NoT ~J...Gi-t \\"\B.~ (uvq~Acts- TAAT

bE~FJ.,JD,A.r0T6

W..LLL

}).LLL

T\:\E

\>LKlNTI-rr

\=OR

11
Kcol'-t

AV\.d

f>0~R

[)~

see( Dt'\.t\S )(L'ETTER -\0 VLADS\I'f~ V:~O~DEN, 8-kibit'if'Ab-~ ID ,·,

NoT

(

(

~

Tt:::.EATMEJJT,

AV\.~.

l'r

"PLAINTIFf

DoES

NoT

61.&M

Tt-fciR..

CoV'-'\RA..C\6- THAT A.FTEk OLAR KELEA5E- Witv:...T Ev"ER Mo""-EY(ic:

•

I AtJ\. 'ENTITLED TO, Tl-\E'{ OR. THE. 1-\:EALTt-\Lit--JK.-AWELLVoivl\
CoKP.AJJY THE REPRE6EtJT! W..LLL TAKE IT .A WA.Y t-~oM 1
PLAINT..lrr- LJ A Cow::.-r oF LAw, 6o,YolA (PLAJ..NTIFF),

+ t-\A.d besT ::r-V\.sT ~l&-tJ TIAe batted LrV\.e A'IA.C G-e\ ..L ova<.

\;0_LTt-\ ~

See 'Ex:.hlkH+ (t-\ "~
.------~ ---

oF M\<.;R\TC.rtE'( :B\ll, AFTttc 1>A.:Je(33)

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 32 of 80 PageID #: 32

•
A..) 'PLAINTIFF RITC.l-lEY ALLE1)&-E0/ bEFENDA.WT MYEK6
!VIolATED '"PLAI.NTl\1=0 CoV\6\"LTU.\I-oV\.A.L hG+IT6
:UNDE~ TH'E \::_IG-t-tT AM.EtJDKE!\JT, Tti.Kr VoRB..LCAS ~FLICTion
oF PUV\.ISKHt:f\JT THAT AR~ L.~uE.L A~ lAY\~\AA.L, 1HE. PHR..\SE
'CRVlt:.L Avv~ lA.Y\vl6L-tAL' ..L& TI:E...t\TtD A~ k.TERUlAc\lGABLE.
lJITl4 1EI'\REM L'K:lAELTY; .LV\O~eR WORD, THE rn:~Mf!;.Jf)HftS~
Io .A\~ 6TRICTLY 'f"oe.'6.LD:S '"PL-tY'\I.5tHvtEWT WHICH Trft~E rJo
LAwFu.L A\.AThO~T'{ To J::V\.~LI.c..T,

-:B~ ""PLAI~TTFF 'K.ITCi-\E'{ ALLEDG-E0, bEtEt\)DANT

•

·0u..M.PT£R. VIol A.TED PLA.LNTIIT5 LoY\(!j\..L\LA.\ ..LOV\A.L

K.l_G-l-\\0 lAV\bt=K TKc t.T(,+\T At-1\.ENDM'tJ\JT, Tl-lAT toR&D.S

IV\.fLIC\TDIA o\= ~u...vu_6\-\M.Et\JT THAT ARE- CE'tAEL AV\Q.

-m tt\.1\Gt.oUA.\ i

vliRA0E' Ct:u.sL AV\~ LA.Il\i.kSlAAL' I-S

Tf::.'EATED .A.·~ l\/\."\ERC.HAc0C'-ABt-E WITH' fu£Ervl C~UEL-TY',

IV\o~-\l\.e{2.. wo~D. \HE sTh)~\t:oSDMENT Alcv o\RTCTL.-'<

'

I

~oRElD~ \=l..tlt\'1:..5\\-t--\'EJJT Wt-\LCt\ Tt\t:l:E. I~ NO LAwfiLl

A\ATr\onT{ TD I~At-LICT.

C.) 'PLA.LNTl~\= KITcttEV .ALLE:D6Jco, DEi=tf\lD.AV\T b\Ak
V.LOtA.-\-e~ \)L,.\_L[0TIF~6 Cov\.6\ LTc(T OV\AL 'f:IG+IT~ LA\f\D~

1H£ EIG+\T AHENDV\ENT 1 11-\AT FoRBID-S l\1\.FL.LCTIOtJ oF

•

fuv\T.Sr\MEN1 TiiAT ARE C-~uEL And LlYuA-.St-tAL, THt: PH~0E

'c\(.lAEL i\V\d

1
\.AV\\.A..0vlAL

I0

ThEKfED A.6 lV\TEK.C\-\ANG-MLE

\AJTTI:-\

1 &TREM

1
(R_l,t,.'ELTY_.

:Lv\0-t\,._eR

\.A}c~b,

"WE

€'~80DMEr~T

I

(~~2)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 33 of 80 PageID #: 33

•
.Al,::,o 811'.I C..TY FoR.-BID0 ~UV\.w~fv\Ef>,jT WHICK- THE~
I0 NO LAW'F\AL .Au.THOR.ITV TO L\.FLICT,

DJ \)LA.LNTIFt= KITC.\\EY ALLEDG-E0, DEFENDANT

0C:J-\A.FER V1.o\ATED PLAlNT.IfF0 Con~TITUTioY\AL f([GttTu

UV\DER Till: EIG+\T AtvtENDHENT;. T\-\AT 'FoR.!;>.LD0

~FLICTIDN o~ Pu.vx_l_-St-\MENT 11-\AT ARE LRvtEL AY\d

L~V\lA.:SlAAL I THE PHRA6E I CR:iAEL AV\d UY\l-t)V\AL I I5

TREATED

.A.:s

IV\TERG-\AN6A8LE

1
WITH Ex1REM

CRlA.ELTY~·

T V\~eR WoRD, ThE gTt\_Atv\ENDKENT, A(6o 6"TRIC.TLV

•

~oR.BID6 f-uh.L5t\HEtJT WHICJi TttERE I6 tJo LAwF\AL

.A.u.THO R.LTY TO IV\~LI(_T I

E.) 'PLAINTIFF l(.LTCJtEY .4LLED6-E~. DEFB\}bANT NIXON I VIo\ ATED PLAINTI.t=t=S CoY\6TITL-tTiotJAL K:TG+\T..S iAI\lt:>ER
THE EI.G-1-\T AMEND MEN\ 1 THAT 'FoR:BIDC> IV\t='Ll.l..TiDN oF Pu.Y\I6HMtNT Tt-lAT .ARE CRUEL .A.Y\d lA.Y\lA6UAL WE PHRA0E
'CRuEL And lAV\Lt6\AAL' j_Q ll(EATED ,48 lY1TER'CKAN&ABLE
WITH ' EXTR.~iV\. LR\.AELT'(; J..Y\O-theR WoRD, TttE11-\e>.AME~DMENT
A.\5b 0TR.LCTLy ~DRBlD0 Vt.tY\.L-5\:\MENT Wr\ICJ\ 1\-\ERE: _l_Q NO
LAwF~L .A..u.\l\OR..LTV To IrtfLICT,

•

(33)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 34 of 80 PageID #: 34

Department of Mental Health STATEMENT

Consumer Name Walter William Ritchey Account Number 931154

AMOUNT DUE: $57,200.00

AMOUNT PAID:

Walter William Ritchey 1016 W Columbia St Farmington

MO 63640

Send check or money order to:

ATTN: Accounts Receivable 573-218-6819

Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center

1016 West Columbia

Farmington

MO 63640

Statement Date 2/28/2009

Due Upon Receipt

----------------------------------------------------· Please detach and return top portion with your payment.

931154

Consumer Name

Walter William Ritchey

Statement Date: 2/28/2009

Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center

is a facility operated by Missouri Department of Mental Health

Dates
Feb 2009

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL USE

Description

Adjustments

Beginning Balance

CPS State Op Inpatient Ending Balance

Charges Payments
$8,125.00

Balance
$49,075.00
$57,200.00

Please be advised that the amount billed on this statement for services, by the Department of Mental Health, may not reflect the actual cost incurred by the facility to provide these services to you. Most consumers receiving services will be billed according to a "Standard Means Test." which reduces the amount billable to the consumer according to the consumer's ability to pay. If the amount paid under the Standard Means Test is less than the actual cost to the DMH
for the services provided, Section 473.398 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri authorizes the Department of Mental Health to recover the remainder of these unpaid costs from the estate of the consumer after the consumer's death. Accordingly, the amount billed in this statement is not intended to and does not preclude DMH from recovering the balance of its costs from the consumer's estate. If you have questions regarding the amount of your bill and/or the cost of the treatment provided, please contact the Accounting Office of the DIVIH facility providing the treatment services.

Due to the Implementation of a new customer Information and billing system, the Department of Mental Health had suspended the Issuance of billing statements. The development of the new system has now progressed to a point where we are able to resume this function. From this month
forward, you will be receiving monthly statements reflecting the amount owed for services provided by the Department of Mental Health. Reminder letters will also be sent In future months to accounts with past due amounts.

-

Form 305

Run Date: 3/19/2009

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 35 of 80 PageID #: 35

•43. •

:plAINTIFF B~own ,DEFENDM\S ('JlYER~ A\1\.~
SGW\?TER- .A.RE .AllowEd To LoV\E IN-Side ~~TC
[To CoM.E JJJ~1ce TREt\TM.ENT (ENTER. To W~T EVER
WAK.D 'T\-\E'{ W_l_0t\·- LAN- E0CORTt=DJ., THESE bEfENDAt.JT :s'
AtE ,AHu.-0ed To ylA.e6T.LOt-J OR I~I.AlRE l:>ACK. b-RotAv\D
OR ~o;JAJ :G.A.'FORi'·u.:rrotJ .., THESE DErENDA{\)\5 TELL ENJ-\ PLAI~TJ..Ft= 11-\AJ boE0 t-JoT 0I&N TKt:l]c Cot-JTRAcl:~-

11-lA-T DtFENDAtJT5 WILL JSILL ThE "PLAINTJ_'fF FoR

11 l?.oC(V\.

.~V\~

'BoARD,,

0

e

e

(DNH

1
6

)

(

L

E

t

T

E

R

To

VL.AINTiff

VAN 0RDEt0, &.hibr+i?'P&E-lO.)NoT" TREATMENT:' A.V\.cl

?L.A:1..NTIFF DoES NoT &IL:..rJ \\-\ETt<.. CoN\RACT6-lHE AfTER

Ou.R REL'E:A5E- W\;-..A\ EVER tvlot-JEY(\e5) Afvt EN\..LT LED To, 11-\EV oR -n-lE. ~EALTHLINK.-A. wELL ?oiWI LoM'PAt..JY, tHE

R'EPR£SEI'JTI WILL TdE IT A WAy FRo j\1\. -pLAIN\IfF _L(\) A

LOLAR\ oF LAw, ~o~ Yov.... (PLAINIIFt= ), ~Ad l>e6T -r-LAa\ 0..LG-N

tHE Dotted L~V\e A,Nd G-e\

OVER- WJ:.Tl-\ ~

•
(34)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 36 of 80 PageID #: 36

• A.); 'PLAIN11IT ':Bt-owV\ .ALLEDG-ES, DEFENDANT MYER~
·Vro\ ATED PLAINTIFf:) CoV\oTITuTIOY\AL 'Kr:G+-\Tu
LANDE~ THE EI6-HT AMENDfvttNT, THAT FoR&D0 IvxFLICTIDru
oF PLAY\ISHHENT 1HA\ ARE C~lAEL AV\c. UY\\A6UAL, THE Pttf\A6E
'CR\AEL AY\d \.AV\\ASltA.L' I5 TI::EATED A.s Tv\tERCW\NGABLE..
WJ.11\ 1 'ExTRt.M CRuELTY: J...\1\oihe~ Wo~D, 11\£ g~wDMi:tJT;
u .A\ct) \KI-CTLY Fo~ID-5 1\-\n.t.St-\~'E.t--\T WH.LCJ-\ TrtERr I~ NO
LAWFuL A\A\1-\0~lTV TO IV\.tLILT,

•

Be) ?LA.LNTIFF ~{'VWV\ ALLEDG-E:) DEFE~DAJJT 3UMPTER

.

I

VIolATED PLA.LNTIFf<S CoV\6TITU.T.LOt-lAL ~r:&w~ lANDER

tt\E EIG+\T l.ME~DMEI~T, TRAT Fot!.JS.lD·.S LA.fLIC.TI0\1\ oF

PLAV\ISt\M8\JT 11-ll\\ ARE CRuEL AV\c LAY\U5UAL ,1t\t: vt\RI\()E 'tt:.tAEL AY\~ U.V\VL0UAL1 I6 TREA\ED As ~ERCJ\NGA"f>LE

Wl1l\

1
'£t(TREtA

C~ut:t-TY:

IV\o~eR

WoRo,IHE 8'ThAMfNDtJtJ::NT,

A.l6o 6TR.I.CTLV Vo~IDo }\..tV\I6\-\t-{EIJ1 Wl-\ICH 11\'ER£ 15 1~0

.LA.WfLA.L A.u_moR..L\Y IO ~'fLI.CT,

C..) PLAINTifF Brown ALLEDG-ES( DEttNDAt0T BLA(E VIo\A.TED

PLAINTl\=F\5 eo~T L TLATIOV\A..L ~rc.:..l-\-r-s U.I/\DER THE £..1.6-HT

A.Mn0DNCI\IT, \1-\K\ fu~ID5 ~FLICTIDN oF RA:vu:0ttMErJ 11H4T

kt:Ce.U-El- AV\~ LA.V\U~UAL 1 Tl-\E WKA.0f ltwt=L AV\~ UV\u~UAL' IS

•

TR.EA.TED

1
A6

I~TERCr\NC..-ABL'E

WTIH

I
CxTKEtt

I
CRLA£:L\Y1

~o~e.e

WoRD, "THE ~mAwu:rJt>MctJT, A~ 5TKICTL{ to¢DTD5 Atvu:St\Nt:rJr WfUd

~E I6 ~o LAWrvtl- ALA\t\OKLTV To J-v\'FLICT,

(35)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 37 of 80 PageID #: 37

•

D~) 'PLAINTIIT :BtoWV\ ,~~_LLEDG-E~, D'EFENDM\1 0cJ:-\A~ER

\!Io\ATED PLATJSTTPt="5 CoY\8\I-T\ATiot-JA.L KT&\-\1~ Ut--lD'ER

THE EI&HT AM£WDHEtJT, 11\AT 'Fo RNDS IV\'FLICT _i_OfJ DF

Puvu.:St-\MEt\JT THAT A~EUUEL A\f\0 UV\~L, THE 'PHRA.0E

.l CRut:L AV\c UV\lt\:JUAL' T~ T~lt:D As ~1ERlMNG-ABL-E

:'W.LT~

f
'Ex.T!<.EM

I
CRJAtLTY J

lY\n~eR.

WneD1 lHE 3fH;\HEtUDl\.1EtJT,

)JJO 6TRIC1 LY tdR;BIDS HAv'\~-&H\v\£NT WHICH Tt\EtE I~ tJo

LAvJru..L Au.ll\OR.ITY To I\1\t:L l.CT,

E.) ?LAINT-m="EtowV\ A.LLED&E-0, bEFENDAwr NIXoN

•

VIo\A1E.D PLATNTIITu CoY\ST l \ vt\IOtJA.L ·KIGtlT6 lMJDER 11\t. l:-I.C..HT AAEf\JDt-fuJf, 11-\AT ~IDS ~~LICTion oF

PuY\J3.\Ht:tJT THA.T A~ CRLAEL A.V\~ \.A.V\l.k5\.AA.L; -ntE H-tRAoE

1L.\2:\A'EL

AV\c

I
\A'i\\..\.0'--lAL

.L:S ~ATED

A0

kTERCHArJG-ABLE

Wnl-\ •t.xTREtv\ CR\At:L1Y ~· IV\o~~eR WORD, 1HE gT~£ND~£NT,

AlSo 6"\K__LC.TLY \=ORB.L~ ThV\1:-st\\V\tf'JT WHICH 11-t~ n tJo

LAW'l=vtL Au.-rttouTY To IV\~LICT,

•
C3L)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 38 of 80 PageID #: 38

STATE OF MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH

Client Keep This Copy

NOTICE OF COST
I:~----------------------D-A-V--ID------------B-R-O-W-N----------------------4-0-9-7-2-35----------------,
i The charges and cost for - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , Case N o . - - - - - . a client of

637 - Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Cent
------~--------~------------~.rece~ingcareandt~atment

637 - Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Cent

--------..z.~----~t-t man~ ~---------------~~~~-~~-~~+·----·-h~eboond~miMd~~

$

per

E r e and/or treatment effective

•

09/02/2008

- - - - - - - - . The actual cost per month varies according to the services

provided.

OR

- - - - - - - - · $ - - - - - - - - per month for treatment effective

I

I

The actual cost per month is $ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .

Client or Responsible Party is required to provide insurance information.
Failure to release this information will result in the charges to be assessed at actual cost.
Insurance companies will be billed the actual cost of the service(s} provided.
The charges were determined by application of the STANDARD MEANS TEST (Section 630.210, RSMo. and 9 CSR 10-31.011). The cost is the Department of Mental Health's actual cost of providing the services or its cor~tract cost for purchasing the service. The department's cost is recomputed annually. The charge is redetermined annually or at any time it Is known that changes have occurred in the financial ability of the client (or the person responsible tor the client) to pay.
The difference between the cost of care and treatment and the amounts received in payment may be a claim upon the client's estate at death by the Department of Mental Health (Section 473.398, RSMo.).

If you have questions about the cost of care or the amount being charged, contact the facility issuing this notice.

SIGNATURE OF CLIENT OR FINANCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PERSON WITNESS
X
OR
The client or financially responsible person refused to sign this notice in my presence:
OR
This notice was sent by mail on

2
SIGNATURE

DATE DATE

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 39 of 80 PageID #: 39

.. .
STATE OF MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION

Client Keep this Copy

On this _______5__ day of ________9_________2o_o_s_

DAVID

BROWN

' · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - hereby give my consent and authorize the

637- Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Cent to do the following:

To release my medical information to the extent necessary to establish my eligibility to an entitlement, or to establish my claim to public or private health insurance coverage. (Examples: Social Security Administration, Railroad Retirement, Veterans Administration, Civil Service Commission, CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA, Missouri Department of Social Services, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, etc.)

To release my financial information to the extent necessary to establish my eligibility for public assistance from Social Security Administration, Veteran s Administration and the Missouri Department of Social Services.

:c c::!gr. :::'.'J ;::rivate health insurance benefits and authorize my health insurer(s) to pay by benefits direct to the
above-named facility of the Missouri Department of Mental Health.

i

I understand that any monies paid to the Department of Mental Health as a result of this authorization shall be applied to the cost of my care and treatment.

I understand that I may revoke this consent and authorization by the giving of written notice to the above-named facility of the Missouri Department of Mental Health.

PATIENT'S SIGNATURE

SIGNATURE AND RElATIONSHIPS OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY

I request that payment of authorized Medicare benefits be made on my behalf to the above-named facility for

any services furnished me by the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center

. 1

authorize any holder of medical information about me to release to the Health Care Financing Administration and

its agents any information needed to determine these benefits or the benefits payable for related services.

I request payment of authorized Medigap benefits be made to this provider and also authorize any holder of medical information about me to release to the above-named Medigap insurer any information needed to determine benefits payable for services from this provider.

NAME OF MEDIGAP INSURER PATIENTS SIGNATURE SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY

MEOIGAP POLICY NUMBER DATE SIGNED RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT

I
I HICNUMBER

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 40 of 80 PageID #: 40
ExA\V~l)L"~-\\

STATE OF MISSOURI

Client Keep this

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH

Copy

CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION

On this _ _ _ _ _ _ _5_ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _20_0_1__,

MICHAEL

GODDARD

' · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - hereby give my consent and authorize the

Mo Sexual Offender Treatment Center

to do the following:

To release my medical information to the extent necessary to establish my eligibility to an entitlement, or to establish my claim to public or private health insurance coverage. (Examples: Social Security Administration, Railroad Retirement, Veterans Administration, Civil Service Commission, CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA, Missouri Department of Social Services, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, etc.)

To release my financial information to the extent necessary to establish my eligibility for public assistance from Social Security Administration, Veterans Administration and the Missouri Department of Social Services.
3"~ To assign my private health ii·.~urc:~n~ bf;lnefits c111u authorize my health insurer(s) to pay by benefits direct to the
above-named facility of the Missouri Department of Mental Health.

I understand that any monies paid to the Department of Mental Health as a result of this authorization shall be applied to the cost of my care and treatment.

:) , I understand that I may revoke this consent and authorization by the. giving of writtennotice to the above-named

facility of the Missouri Department of Mental Health.

i

PATIENT'S SIGNATURE

SIGNATURE AND RElATIONSHIPS OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY

I request that payment of authorized Medicare benefits be made on my behalf to the above-named facility for

any services furnished me by the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center

.1 i

authorize any holder of medical information about me to release to the Health Care Financing Administration and 1

its agents any information needed to determine these benefits or the benefits payable for related services.

I request payment of authorized Medigap benefits be made to this provider and also authorize any holder of medical information about me to release to the above-named Medigap insurer any information needed to determine benefits payable for services from this provider.

NAME OF MEOIGAP INSURER

®htb•* 'i-J
'FoR 'tb:AMPLE''
MEDIGAP POLICY NUMBER

HICNUMBER

PATIENTS SIGNATURE

OATESIGNEO

SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY

RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 41 of 80 PageID #: 41

VLA.INTIFf AMoNETTE DEFENDANTS lv\'{t:R~ ANd I
5UM.?TER --A~ .A.ll~Ed To Covv'-C: ~~e t--\SoTc

lTc Cot--'\.£ _LN51de TREA\MENT CENTER \o Wl-\A:T EVER WARD Tr\£Y WISt-l-lA.N- E6COk\ 6). Tt1t0E DEFf~-f.!DAtJT6~
I
kE Allowe~ \0 qu.eS\IOI\) oR ~LAIR£ 'B.ALK G-~OlAn6 OR PEJ::::.&>~AL Iv~oRt-\KrTotJ., Tl-\E5"t D£fft{DAt,tf(J TELL tAct\

?LA.LNTl.t=F tHA.\ DoE~ t-Jo-r ~SC6tlll-tEIR Cot-JTl::..t\C\5 -ll-\A1

DEPENDAtJT5

WILL

biLL THE

?t-AL\\Ift=F

~OR

11

WOVv\AV\C.

1
BoAR0'

.See (b~L\-rs) ( LETTeK To vlAINTit=f VAN0Rt:>EtJ1txv\lbif'B'PMe l~)

lJoT f(TR'EATM.ctJ~'\.\;_v-J: ..LF 'PLAimirr D0E3 NoT SIGiJ -rhE.:r:e

CoV\TRACT6- THATA.f-Ta 0\AR. "REU:.A.6E- WM:f EvER

•

!vtot-Jt.:{ (re~) AJ,JL EN1ITLED To, TtlEv ot<-11-n::.l-\tAt.:rHLINK-

A. \.,\JELL~oitJT CoM_~,!..tJ\l, Tr\E KE~6EN\, WILL TAKE TI

A. ·wAY t="Row\. '"?LA:Ll\STrt=F .Lw A CcllR.t" ot= LAW, ~o, You.

( PLA:L10TI~f) , !-\A~ B e_c;\ -.:r\A.C>T 6l6~tJ The bc:A\ed L\ \'\.e

A.~ G-'E.'T

OVER- WIT\-\ \ i

•
(37)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 42 of 80 PageID #: 42

• A~). 'PLAT~IFF AkoNETlE ALLEDG-E~, DEmJ~ M'fER() Vi-olATED PLAIN~o CoAoTDlK\IOV\AL tiG-HTS UtJDPtZ 1\-\'£ E1.&HT AHBvDK'EtJ1, ·mAT 'Foc.:&LD5 IV\~l-LCTIO'v\ of
.FUV\I0HMENT 1HAT A\ZE LR!A'EL AV\C UV\~L i 11-\E PttRA~E 'L'\::lAEL ~e \.A.V\~UA.L1 T6TR.~o A.0 I\1\.-rER(J\A.tVC--A.SU:. t-JT-r-1:-\ 1 ~TREM. LR.u.ELTY~ -~WORD,lHE~iH~I)~,t:~JT,
A\00 ~T~C\LY FORBID~ 'RtV\I0t\fvl'E:tJT Wt\1(H~I~ No
.LAwFuL As.A\\\OK.LTY ·To ~~LTCT;

' BJ 'PLAINTIFf=' ko!\JEITE A.lLEDC-E0, bEFlJJJYWT QuMP1ER

•

\!IolAJED "PLA.UJTIFF0 CoY\-3\ J.TV\TIOtJAL- KIG-t+T6 lAVff>E(<(
THE- ~IG+\T AMENDI'"'\'Et,rt 1H:A.T toRB..LD5 IV\lFLICTI:OtJ ot=

1

Pv1.V\.L6titv\8JT IHA.T lt\Rt 0ct.-LBL AV\0. U.V\U~UAL I THE 1+{~~}::.

'CRuEL AV\d UV\\X:>J.All ..LS TREATED A5 ~TER.CttAJJGA:BLE

Wint 'ExTK~tvt (Ru,ELT'C' ]W)~R. W~D, 11\E gm.AM&JDKBJ~

A\~ &TKIUL'{ t='oRB..LD~ PLAY\I6i·HABJT WilliJ\ Tht:(.E I~ NO

LAWFLAL .A.vctKot.r:TV TO ~\=LICT,

C) ?LAit\JT_Ll=\= AJvto~E\T[ ALLED&£01 DEFENDANT :BLAKE

VIolA.\ED 'P~~ CcV\0\TT\.AfiOVIA.L 'RI.GHTS u.rvo£~ 11\E trG+l1

AM&.Jt>KEN\1 11-\AT\=OR.lSIDSlv\t~lC.DotJ Or PLAV\ISt\-tvtEJvT TAATAR£ ~LAv\~ UY\U0LAAL, THE \1iR_A6E iCRuEL AV\~ UV\~IAA-L J...6

•

TREATED A6

.l"""Tf;_RCi-WJGABL'E

L,JTIH

1
E;(TRE:M

C~<u.t:LTYJI

Iv"'otheR WoRD, THE gm_AJJtENDM.ENT, AI~ 3TllOLY tD~ID~

'PvWmt:U\&S\ Wi-llet\ \1\ERE ..L ::..~ t-JO LAWfi,tL LAWF~AL Au.111oRITVlO I.\1\fLicr;

(33)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 43 of 80 PageID #: 43

•

D.) 'PLATNT.IFF MONETTE .A.LLEDG-E0, DH=ENDMT oc.HAFER
VIo\A.TE.D ~"ftH=6 loV\6UTuTIO.t4AL ..RIG-1-\16 UNDER THE

EIC-HT At-.fE~DMEi'J~ THAT foRBIDS IV\t="LICTIO~\ o'f- 'PtAL'\1:SiiMENf

1H:A.t' ARE

U:uEL

AV\~

1
U.V\U.6LW_,1H£ PKRASE li:UEL

AtJD

UtJv..~I.AAL!

I~ TREATED A6 IV\TE~GWJC.,-ABLE W..LTH ''fxn:.t: (\CUELTY}

IV\.o\\Aeg_ Wo~D~ ·mt.. ~ NA£tSD\-\£f\.IT, A.l.::U Sll:ICTLY tORE>IDS

RuJI-st-H4E~T Wtt.LGt\ -rna:t. .1..~ \\Ju LAWt-lAL At.AmoR:rr'(

10 ~\=Ll.LT I

•

E) "PLA.Lf\\TI_l:\= A~oN'E.TTE ALLEDG-ES, DEFE~DAJ.JT NIXD~
VIotATED PLAI.~Tiff~ CoV\5TITUTiotJAL ~.LG+IT6 L.t~D'ER 11\E EIG-t-\T h-\'ENDI'\EtJT, THAT Fo~rDS TArLILTio"' ol=

P~AV\L6ttr-.1Et.JT -mAT .AR~ (RlA.t.L .AY\~ U.V\\..loUA.\, T\-\E pt\RA.0E
'LW.'EL AV\C U.Y\vu:)lAA.l' _L6 \REATED A~ Iv\1EKC!{MlG-ABLE

W:I:.TH •ExTi(E L~LAcLTY; IV\0-\-~e~ WoRD1 Tl-\E '(;-rnAME:ND~£NT, A.\.so \3TRIC1LY tof2-DTD5 P~AV\Iot\MEtJT Wt-\ICl-t TH-\=.12£ T0

.No LAwFvJ,_ Au.Tr\o~.LTY ·To ~FLI~ .

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 44 of 80 PageID #: 44

•4o~ •

~ TYociN . D'EFENDA.N'T s' tJ\"('E.R:) A'Ad I
~PTE'f!.- Ae£ .A.\ lt>we~ To Cot-1£. IV\.~Stde l'-\50\L.
[ 10 CoiV\'E. INSk~e Tf:EATM.EW\ CE~Tt.~ \c Wl-\A\ EvER
·wAR-D --nAE'l Wist\ -LAN- 1. c5COl(TED T\-\E5E DER:N DMT~~ I
Nt-.4lDL,ved To qu.e.s' -Low oR :CV\Ct\Aie.E BACi..bfutv0 6R-

'PER~oNAL .LNfO\?Jv\A.\ J...OWN, Tl-\E~E Dtttt0D-4'JT5 TEU- EA_ch.

r-r PL A Il\)T

\1-tA.-r DoE6 NoT SIG-~ 11-\t:~ CoV\\~A.CT-5-

11-\AT DEtt.N DANT5 WILLt)ILL Tr\t.. VLAINTIW to~
{1Koot--{ AiAd &ARb\' .3ee (DMH:S)(LETTER. To PLAr:t0\IFf
VANO\CDEJ'-' Ex.~1bt-\:.rB~PAGE iO,) NoT ft TREATMEJJT;'' A.~ 1
I-t= .P\..A:t:"rrrrt: bo LS r-loT &:6-~ 'Tt-\BR CoY\\R.AC\0 -

11-\A\ ;A,.t="TER OIAR ~ELEA~t=.- WY-AT 'EVER. l'v\oi\}E'{(\e.s)

I AM. tNT...LTLEt> To, THEY OR 11\E \-\eA.L\hlitvK- A. WELL

"Po~\.lT Lo\'1\PA.I\J "{; lltE ·RE-PRESEN~ W.1.LL TAKE I \ A.

WA'< 'R<.cM ?LA:ttJT .Lft= ItJ .A. CoL-t~T ot= LA~ 6c, Vo~.t
(PLA]lJTIFF), ~Ao Ees\ ::fU5T ~L~\) Tt\E bottec
L iV\e AvJ:. beT IT 0 Vt:R \,.JI. \ \-\ .~ I

•
(40)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 45 of 80 PageID #: 45

•

A.) 'PLAJ-NTI'ff T'(6otJ ALLEDGE~, DEt=Et'-lDAtJT KYER5

V.LolATED VLADJTIVF5 CoV\6TTTlATTOV\AL UG-HT5
tAtJDE~ T\-\E 'E.LG-1-\T AHt=ND t-1ENT, T~ fo~<:BIIAS IY\.FLl-CTION 0 F HAV\J:Sl-tKEtSt THA.T .ARt: Ll2\At:L AV\~

tmlA.QuAL, ·-rnE PHRA()E '(RLA.t:.L AY\C; \.Av\\A0UAL I6

TREA\l:D

.A~

lit\TE:'KC.t-\-NJ&ABLE

WITH

1
'EXTf,£..Nl

c~~LT'/;

IV\ofue~ WoRD, T\-\'E ~1H~Dtv1ENT, .A\00 0~L'{

toRBID6 -pi.AV\LSttHEtJT Wt\TcJ\ Tt-\Ey:,_t. IS No L4WflAL
AU.\t\OU\Y TO ~\=LICT/

•

:B.) 'PLA.INTIFF TYCDN ALLEDG-t6, bl:-FENDANT 6l-ttJtPTa
\/Io \A1ED PLArtJTIF"F0 CoV\6TITLA\ mtJAL Klfr\-\T-S

LWDE~ 11-\E ElG+\T Afvtt:NDtv\ENT, THA.T foRJSID~ ~FLLCITOtJ

o'f ~LAV\I..6t-\MENT THAT ARE t\2.\At.L AV\~ LA-Y\~c.tAL, 11-\E

'P\\~SE l Cl::tA-EL .A.Y\~ \AY\'-A~\.1\A.L' I~ T\CtATED A'6

.-UA.--rt:RCHA\JG-ABL'E

WIT!-\

1
EXTREM

LR\AELT'( • J...\1\o~e~

WoRD, WE- ~~DMBvT, ).J:)o 6TRICTLV fORBID-S

P~AV\IS\-U-fEl\JT Wr\T Cl\ \\-\eRE .LS ~c LAWFLAL rtu..THDRlTY

TO I\t\\='Ll(T I

C~) 'PLKWTIFF T'{0otJ ALLEDG-w, DEFEtJbAtJT ELAKE-

V.Lo\ATE-D \>LA.ItJTlf'f0 CoV\6ti:.TiA.tiDi\JA.L- 'K:cG-t{~ UWDER

•

11-\E 'EIG-trr.AHE!JDMEN~ THAT toR.B.LDS .l.v\.'fL.LC1T.OV\. 0~ Y\.A\1\3::.0\-\ME!vT Tl-\AT ,A.RE LKlAEL A~ U.V\LA:)LAAL 1 11{b: l~·fKAjE

c 1 L~\EL-

Avv~

1
\AV\v\.St.AA.L-

IS

T~EATED

.~S

~~\-\AtJ&A.:BLE

4l)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 46 of 80 PageID #: 46

• W..l-Tr\ tUTt::::EM C:~.LA.t.LTY '·J-V\.o~ef!. WogD, lt-\E 8'1H
AHENDM.EtJ~ .A.l00 0\R.Ll-TL'{ tQgBID-5 ~~(\)T
WHICH Tt-\ERt: 1:.~ tJo LAwh.AL ALX1110RJ..-rv To ~~LicT,

D~ PLAit'JTI.Ft T'(50Y\ ALLEDG-f.;~, DEff.t.JDANT &~AfER..

\IJ:o\ATED "PLAINTIFF-S Cov\.STI'"f~,KI'I?~ -.}.,L ~-H:T0 LM\DtR

11\-E EIG-HT AMEWDMEtJT, TH-1\T tuRBI-D~ T.v-..FLTtTiorJ oF

·PlAV\I$\MWT 11-\A.T A~ Ceut.L kA6, LAV\\A~UA.L, IH£ PHRAoE

IC. RUEL AV\6 UV\lA~u.AL I ..L6 TREATED ~ l~ IV\'TERC.H:AN&-ABlE

•

WLTI\ 'EXTICEM LR.\AEL-T'( ~ .Lv\D-thei=- WoR.D, 11\E S'111AJtlE~DHENf,
.A\so 0\\<.ICTL'{ fu RB.LOO AtlV\IiS\-\VlEI\JT Wt\Irff 1Hi:RE. IS
tJo LA.wFlA-L .A.u.\1-\t>'RI.TV TD Iv\FLit-1,

E.) ~LALNTI.FF TY60t.J ALLED(T£~, DEFENDANT NIXON
VIo l.A:T'E: D 'PLAINTIFfs CoV\0-r-ITUTiot-JAL 'KIG-H1o lANDER.
TH£. EIG-HT AMt.NDMErJT, THAT FokBID0 InFLICTlOI\J oF
PLAV\TBHMEJJT T\-\AT A~E L\<.I.At.L AV\~ U.Y\~L;\\-\£. PH~0E
'tl:.iAE:L AV\~ L-\.V\U.~uA.L1 .1..0 TREATED Af:J IATE.RC~G-ABLE:
w_Lm 't:x.n:Etvl LRl.-tELTY: ~okR.. WoRD, THE f<iHJ\t.{Et.JDMEN"G
i\\&> On:.ICTLY toi2.BID6 '?uV\L:SHMBJT WHICH 11-\Ei:.E 1.0
NO LA.wt=uL .A\.AT\-\oRI"TY 10 IY\FLLCT,
•

(42.)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 47 of 80 PageID #: 47

• 46.
•

6\.A.tv\.\>TER. ·- A.RE Allowe<i To CotV~..E ..Lv~t~e M&o·rc

LTo Lotv\.E ..Lt-J ~ \ &_ n:EA.Tt--~\JT CEt>S \ 't:R- \o \;\JkA.T EVER
W.A.'KD \1-\EY WISt\·- \AtJ- E5c.o~b] ., ll-\t.SE DEft_t-JDAt-JT,:si
A~t. Alb.,Je~ To que~\l.OI\) ok. lw:tLU.~ 'BALK. C'-R.c\.u~ c\!.

~t--J.A.L

~'fO~'-'\ATIOtJ .. Tl-\E~E 1

bE<ft~D.l\NT~

TELL

EA.ch YlA:LNTT \=~ THAT f)(;tz:_::, NoT ~IG-t\J 11\UR

Co,,rTRACT.S -·mA--r bEF~DAtJT-5 WILL b.LLL T~E PlA'ln-rrff

'Fo~ 'tRooM. AV\.c ~oAJ2.b" 0ee(DtvH-t5)(LE1TER \0

~LA:t-t\JTIFf

VAtJ 0RbEN 1

Ex.~\1br-\-:'13\~1o,) NoT,TREATtJtENt;\'

AI/\~ I~ 11-.A.LN Tit=~ boE0 f-,J OT 0IG-N 11\EIR. CoV\"TI:.A_(.T6-

lltAT AFTER Ou~ ~E.LE~'E- ·wh.A.T EVER ivtDl/\eYLie.s)

·l. A~\. ti\JT .LTLEb To. TH:EY 01<:. Tt\E \-\eALTt-\LIN f('·-A vJELL I
l=b.LtJT C.oMPAN V11\E REPRE()ErJT1 W::CLL TAKE I-T A
WAV FRofv\ .PLALt\JT .L\=F I1J A. Co~ oF LA.wi 5o, Vol-l
(PLAJJ\lT.L~t=) i \-\AD lSt:S\ ·.::f~T ~I-C"iJ Tl-\ £. Dottec
l\V\.e Av--..~ &e\ I:"\ OVER ·w.LTH \ (

•
(43)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 48 of 80 PageID #: 48

• ,AJ "PLAlNTI'\=t= TuRPIN ALLEDG-t:-5, DEFEJ!DANT M'f'ER~ V.rolA:tED ~LAINTif~~ ~TITu.TTONAL ~.LG--t-\T5 UV\D~g_
1HE EIG+lT .A.tv\EtJDfv'\\:.t..JTI THAT Fo~IDS I\1\FLILTIDt.J Of
Puv'I.~~M.'CN\ Tl-\AT A~E C:R\Al=-L AV\~ U.V\UUUAL 1 11\E'PH~
I C\C.\AE.L ...\V\6 Uv\U.5lAA.l1 ..L~ TREATED A6 LA1E~CH-Af.JG-ABLE WI.1"H 1 EXTREM t~lA.ELTV ,' IV\cr\-heR Wo~t>, TH:£. cgm
AYtt.NDi'-\ENT1 Al~o QTR.I.L\ LY FO~.LD0 fuV\'ISH:NENT
Wl-\I(\-\ THERE. IS No LAWFuL A.ulHORI\Y To .liA.t=LUT,

e "B) "PL.UNTIIT TtAR?IN ALLED&E5, DEF=Et-JDA.~T0uMPTCR VlDlATED PLATNTI'Ft=8 LoV\OTITu\IoNAL "R.l&t\T() UtJDEe 11-\E: ETC-+\T .AMEND~EtJT, THATFOR:B..LDE) ~FLIC.TioN oF
't:\AVU:Sl-\MBJT THAT ARt. CRu.t.L AND UtJ\A6U.Al, 11-\E PH'e..A.&E
'L~LAEL Avv~ UV\v\>~LAAL' I~ TREATED .A~ ~\t:.'KCHAIJLTABLE
WITH' 'Exl-f(..'\:.\"1 (R.\AoUA~, IV\o-&eR WoRD, THE ~11\:ANaJDt--i&JI,
Abo ~1KI.CTLY FORB1.-Do T1.AV\I0{-{tJ\.EtJT Wt\Ict-\ Tt\Et2E IS ND
LAwfuL A\.XH-\OUT'I{ TO J:v\'FLIC.T i

c) 'PLAn.rrrw Tu.~PIW ALLEDG-t=~/ D'EFE:NDMT BLAie
VID \ATED 'PLAIN\ I IT~ CoY\()\1.-Twiof'1A_L KI:C-t1T0 UtJDER.

1\-\£.~.l&l-\T Atv\ENDM.EN T, mAT ~o~-LD5 IY\t=LIC.TI.otJ oF

PuVU-~~tt&JT ~ARE. (R$L AV'\~ ~L, THE PHRA5E

•

1C.i?:L.lEL AND U.Y\.t..t0u.A.L' I0 TRE:ATE:P Ao ~TERtHANG-ABLE
WITH ' E.x:.IREH LRU.SU.A.L; I\1\o-\-~eR. Wot::D, THE ifH.A.ut:tJDHEtvT,

Al0o ~\RIC\ LV Fbe:.BLD-S Puv\L0t\tv\t=NT W\:\IC.H THERE l5 ~o

C4tt

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 49 of 80 PageID #: 49
•

D.) pl;\n)-\J.S=t= TL-\'RPIJJ ALLEDG-E0, DEFENDAIJT Ctl-\Affi(

'V.Lo\A:tE-o PLAitJTIFFC) loV\o\ITlA\IOV\A.L l(IG+n:s UNDER

or iliE EIG-HT AH.EtJDKEtJT, TH-AT 'Fo~BI::D5 ..1-ht:LIC.T.LOV\

Anc PvtV\I5\-\-KENTTMT A~t. Ct~taL

Ltv\lk'SuAL, WE 'PHKA6E

\:.'RlA'E.L

AV\~

1
vtv\u-SlM.L

J-0

TREATeD

A~ Iv\\ERCH.AtJ&ABLE

WlTl-\ 'Ex.TREK LRIAl::-LTY; ~otheR.. WeRt>, mt. g-mA~EtJDMfNTE

A\0o 6\KI.eTLV t=O~WD~ Pu.V\IS~K£tJT wKTCJ-t THEgv= I:S

•

tJo LAwFvtL ~Tr\ocrTY To IV\.t=LicT,
E.) \)LAJ..NTI:~ T u~"PIIV ALLEDD-l=S, DEFEtJDAWT NIXON

VlDlATED PLAINT J..F'F-5 loV\6T..LTlAT..LOtJAL K1::&H.T0 lAVlDER

1HE EIG-HT AMt;NDME~T, lliAT FoRBID-S ~FLlCTiotJ oF
Pl1V\.L0i:U1t:tJT THAT A~ U2.L-tt.L AV\d UV\\ASV\AL,ll+E 1=1l~ASE.
'L\::\AEL A\A<i U.V\~\.AAL- 1 l~ \"REATED A6 lv\TERttWJGA'Bl-E.
WITt\' 'Ex1KEM CRUELTY; Iv\~e~ Wogb,THE. gTH:A_MtfJD~
;\\~o 6\UCTL'{ ~eBIDS Puv\"LsttHEtJT WKicl-t THE~E rs
~0 LAWFL-'lL AtATHOR.LTY TO I\1'\FLLLT,

•
(45)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 50 of 80 PageID #: 50

4 7~

'DE.n:.NDI\NT61 ~'E ~DJ.VLDU.ALLY AV\d CoLL'ECTIVELY

5t..Lb~ECTED PLAII\JTIF'F0 To AcTIOI\.l5 Wt-\ILH VIoLATED TliE

folA.R\t:{EENTI-\ .A.MtNDMEtJTI A.~ b~Ae \\ote~5 i\.\1\ci

'EqUA.\ PROTl::L.Tl.CrJ~ 5ET- Fo\-!..TH, I.f'J 1HE U.N.LTED

rV\. 6TA.TE6 LOV\5TITLA..1.L()rJ I

1\.\A\ T\-\C.\( HAVe A.t\EM.PTED

To LoERC.'E PLAitJTIF"r= 1-.-..-:o ~I&t-.~WG- A :BWDirJG- lors\~

w.:cTHOV\T TH:E :BENEFIT oF Co"".N&L\~ ADVICE 9

Ao) IV\. THE Co\A'K..S~ oF THE&£ EVENT~, DEFENDA.NT6\

.LASED TACTTC& THAT l\'K'E.-1HDVMALLY, LM.~o~A.L A\1\D ALSo

•

CRo-5~ 1\\E LT~E oF .A.-noRrJE'{- Cl-:.LEt\JT i::ELAT .LO~t\tP A~

WELL Aa MA~G- CoNT~ALT Vo.t..D To T\-\E ExTENT \1-\A.T

THEY WEi::.E Q.LC-NED WDl-\OUT WI.Ac FVlLL'{ ~Fo~HED

C.oV\aEtJ\,

1\) 11-\c FAC.T THAT T\-fb.SE Co~RAcTo A\?:E BRoLAGHT To

PLAit·ST_t_FF:S B''{ ?t:DPLE WHO \(E..'f\A6E TO 'fu.LL"( IDEI\ITIP(

11--\Etv\oELVE,S I ~\<.OV.I.DE :ItJ~oRl\ATIOtJ ABoL\\ 1:1-fEI\( EM.~LOYER
(wELL 'PoitJTjr\EA.LT~ Lr:~K) OR. h.All'{ &~LAW Tr\E6EQLA'E:NCE

or=- EvEtJTS Wt-\J.L~ CoNTRoL~ T\-\E lJATH AtJD DE6TIA1~.1010 o\= T\-\£_ t="I.AV\~5 ~ D-L~P\.,C\ E, LoV\6t.LTvC\E5 VAL.LDATiotJ

OF T\-\E 0IG-tJI.l=.L(.ANT Que(')Tior05 o~ W\-\AT b 'KEt\LLY

•

boTs\lG- ON WITH THEoE FVlv\d,~,

c~) PLA.Lt-.f\.L'H=5 i ALLEG-'E- THAT T\-\E CoLLEC.TIOtJ 0 F Tt\E:5E
(L{£)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 51 of 80 PageID #: 51

•

'fuv\c:~) t=''ROlV\. \Jt~00tJ0 w~o ARE J.JJVDLI.AtSTAklLY CoHMTITED/

w.LLL AV\C:_ .N;.-AI..N6T Tt-\:£j_\<_

I VwLATE0 So\t\- D\Ae ~(~

~0 EQv\.1\_L t=:RoT'E.CT .LO"-\ LAvYDER Tl-t'E LAw A-s ~ov:LbED Fo

:IV'.. \t\E \=oLA-R\l·\E"EtST\-\ At-1EtJDM.Et0T.

HEALlH LitJK CoRPoU\I.DrJ; --A WELL PoiNT

Co~?ORAT lDrJ; l--\ARDLD tv\YER~; ~~Y 0ctM.PTf R

•

.AlA.tJ ~\AlE{ t0c.Dl-t 6c~~ER I ~:~.Ef0\IAt-\ ~IXo~ I DEFENDANT-S 1 \-\AvE VwlA+eD -pLAitJTIFf0\ fou.r:::THEEN1H

AK.t.WDtA.EtVT t_r&-HT6 By bE'FEJ\lDAJJT5 1 ACT IDJJ 6 o\2.

OfJi.T55.LOtJ ~ I

fAL--ri~ AY\~ 1=:VEN1'6 :By DEFEf\lDAtSI0i tv\YER0

:AV'-D0UMf?D::.Y;., WHo.A.RE f;EPRE6ENJ;ATIVE0 toR.

HEALTH LINK -A WELLPonrr lot.PotATiotJI WirH I
Tt\E fv\I&:lOLARI btPAu]'1£NT o~ ~\E('JTALHEALIH.

PLAD\JTIFF6\ ALLED&E

I

bEft-tSPA.NT-5I INTt];VI.EW WITt-\ EACH PLATJJTI Ft='

•

PLllilTLFE VANDRDE~I, DEt=ENDAJJ~5 MY'Q:~
AV\6 5u.MS?TE~- .A~E A\ lov-Jcd To Covv,e .-l.v\.6tde

tJ~00\L LTO Cotv'I.E LV'-5 1 Dt.. ~A.TM8S\ CENtCK.\C)

(47)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 52 of 80 PageID #: 52

•

W\-\A.\ EvE<: WA~D \\-\t:Y J ., WI5l-t -\AN- £5C.oRTED

1Hro£ DEFENDAMT5' ARE.AlloL~eC To qLAeST.LOrJ oR

.l.Y\.q~£ 1J,.~.c( G-RC\AV\d oR. ~~O~A.L ~to~tv\.AT Io~},,

TI-l~ DE'fEl'-.\DANT-.51 TELL EAc"'- \)L..ADJ\l.Ff Tl-\AT

Dot_~ NoT diG-N THEIR Coh\R..A..cT5- ·lf\AT DEFChlDANT.s WILL BJ-LL T\-\E "PLAINTirr Fo~''~0o~. AV\ D 15o~-D\ NDT ''T'KEAJtv\ENT~ AV\~ 1J: PLAI.NTI.tt boE6 NoT

5IG-t-J Tl-\E-JJ:. CoV\TRAC\0 - TAAT A~~ OtAR l::.£LEME -

Wl-\A.T EVER t--\oY\ey('teo) I A~ ENTITLED To, THEY

oR- \\:\E- \-\t.AL-Tt\LitJ(- A WELL\)oj_t.JT LoMPAN\ THEY

•

'KE.PR.EStN\, WILL TA(e IT A. WAY PKol\A. 'PLAwTiff

.~ A.Covt~\ oo;;; LAw, So 1 Yot.A(PLJUJJTitf)) ~A.<i

Ee,sT :fv..oT -SIG-N Tt-H:. Dat\-e6 l-~~ Av~ G-et ..L1 OVef-

WTI\-\, \·

•
(4<6)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 53 of 80 PageID #: 53

•

PL,AlNTlEF VAN ORDEN

A.~ tpLA-r.NTI.FF VAtJORD'E:N .ALLED&B:J, l)EffilDN.rr l"\YER:S
Vr.olAW -plAINTIFf() ~STITVUioiAAL lttG-+\-T-5 LUJDE~
THE t='o~.;t\c::.\1\:~~\\\\rt AMi=tJDK'Et\}T, A~a bLtc: \)r;:..oc.e.:s5 AV\~
~u.A\ PRo-~Ec.TI..Ot>J~ LANDe~ ·THe. LANITED 0TATe.5
CoV\-:')\I.Tu.TIO~ THA\ '?Ro\ECT5 CITIZEt.J~ uF L:t.Ft=1 L.i-B'i=-tzTY i Av\6. ?J:.oPE~ _L~J Tw.F u. t·s:cre:.o 0TATE.~ oF
,f\1'-\r=.-R'I.C.A I r\?!oM I-LLEG-AL G-oveRnMe\1\"TAL Ac..\IOV\0 l

1>.) "PLA1..NTI.."i=t= VA.NO~DEN ALLE\)G-E5, D'EFEtJDANT 0tAKPTE:R

•

VIo~AtED PLArt-.JTIFF() CoV\~TITlATIOt-JAL RIG-l-\T0 LAV\DER. WE
f0u.~TH£ENTH A.tv\'~_1\JDtJlt::NT, AtJD LM.e PR6ce55 A\'\6
~u.l\\ P~oTEC.TIDtJ5 LMJDt:.~ THE u.t-JITED 0TATE0

~6TITIATIDV\ \1-\:A.T P~oTEC\0 LITIZEtJS oF LIFE:,

.LIBERTY, AV\.~ Pt?oPERT{ DJ TH~ LNJITi:D ~TATE5 DF

At-llt:UC..A 1 FRoM ILLt:G-AL C~oveRV\~\AL AcTioV\.S,

C..) 1JLAIN\IFF VANOgDE~ ALLEDG-E~, DEF8SDANT "BLAK.E.

\JiolA+£D 'PLAitJ TIPF5 CoV\STITIA.TioV\AL hc-rn:s UNl::>t:e

THt Fou.R:THE'tt.JTH- A\v\.EtJDMEt\JT AV\c DLAe PRoc..e.ss AY\~ 1
~UA\ \)R.oTEC..TION6 UNDER. TH-E IANTIED ~TAT£0

LoV\6TITU.T.LotJ THA\ 'PRoTECT~ (L"TlZE.NS oF LIFE,

LI.BE~TY, AV\d "PR:oPERTY ·w ThE UNITED 6TA..\E0 oF

•

At'-'l't:RIC.A , FRoiY\ ·ILLEG--AL G--oveR.nH£tJTAL .Ac..T.LOh5,

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 54 of 80 PageID #: 54

• D.) 'PLAlJJTIFF VA~OgpEtJ ALL~DG-E.S, DEFENDANT QCl-\AfE~ VIolAte~ \>LAIN\ 1-FF.S CoV\6\IT~TiorvAL \2::r:.G-HT-S lAl\rJ)E~ Tt\t: Fou.RTHE-ENT\-\ Atv1EtJDMEI\JT, A~ ULAe ~oce-55 A.\1\Q. t_qlM\ ~oTECTI.otJS UNt:>ER THE \.A~ITED .STATE~ CoV\~TI-TLATIOi-.l TrtAT PRoTELTo Cn..LZEtJ5 oF 1-:.t..FE, LIBERTY. AV\~ VR-oPe~T{ :LN \H-E IANITED OTA\E.S ot= AMERICA: , FRotv\. IlLEb-AL C~veRV\~\e\ATAL Acrr:.ot-J.S ,

E.} 'PLAitJ-\IPi= VAr:J0RPEtJ ALLEDC-Eo, 1Js:EtJbANT NIXON

•

VIo\A-ted vLAit--JTIF'FS CoV\:5\TilA\IoML RIC-ttT-.5 uNt>Et!..
l"HE 't:c~HE'Et.JTh AMENDKttJT, .A:V\<i DlAe W~ A\1\~
EqLAA.\ \)R_oTE_CTioN5 UNDER THE U.NITED ~TATE,':J

ConST:CTi.A.TioV\ \KAT PWTECT0 (Iuz£1\J..s oF LIFE,

LTBE~TY, AlA~ PR.oFtRTY ItJ THE L.{tJI:TED QTATE~ oF

AtVlERICA 1 t=Rovvt ILLEG-AL G-oveeNMENTAL AcrioiUS,

•
(jD)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 55 of 80 PageID #: 55

•

PLAINTIFF ldooD

AJ ·-pLAI.NTLff \-\ooD ALLEDG-E~~ DEPENDANT MVERS
Vr.o\Ated PLAINTIFF.:) C.oV\~TT1\ATIDNAL R:r:.&t-rr~ u.tJD£R
lH'E FOtARTH-EEMTH AMENDMENT, AV\C. Dvte \koce6S ~
Equ.A\ ""P~oTECl .L.ON5 lANDER Tl-\E V\.NITED 0TATE-S
c.L CoV\0TI.TlA.TION TH-A\ ?l::DTEC.T.S TlZ.Etv~ oF LIF£,
L.LBE~'{, AN P Pl?.oPERTV ItJ Tl-\E \.AN .LTF D .ST~'. F ~ oF
AMERICA 1 F'ko~\ 'J.:LLEd-AL G-oveA.Y\ME.tJTAL AcTmv~,

].) 'PLAINTifF l-\ooo ALLEDG-E~~ D'EFE~D-~NTou.MPTER

VIo\.A.ted YL.ADJT .L.Ff.S CoV\5\ITLA"TiotJAL ~..LG+ho LAN DEi:::

•

THE mut.~EEtJTH i\.MWDMWT, AtJP bu.e Pi::oC.E6S AV\c\

EqlAA.l ~O\l:.C\IotJ5 UNDEt. THE UN-L.Tt:.D ~TAtE:)

CoV\5TITLATI:ON 11-\AT l>'KoT't:C.T~ CLTLZ.EN-5 oF LIFE,

LIBE.~TY, AtJD Pi::oPt.~y ItJ 'ThE l.A\JITED ~ATE~ oF

At-ActlCA F~\M 1

lLLEG-AL

&oveR.V\MENTAL

AcriDN~,

C.) PLAINTIFF HooD ALLEDG~~\ DcFENDAklT ':BLAKE

VIolA.\ed VLADJ\It=F5 CoA6TlTlATIDr-.lAL RI&t\Tu lANDER

lt\E Fo(.,\~11-\Et.NTH AHEtJDl"'\ENT, .AND blAe 11cocE-S8 Anc

E9LAA\ PRoTECTI.ot-JS LAt-JDl=.~ THE LUJITED 6TA"Tt:.S

Co~ITLATI.OtJ 11-\A.T 'Pf::DTET0 CJ-TI.z.Et.J5 oF LLFE.,

Lr:BERTY; A.V\~ PRDPERTV IN ThE. U.NITE:D .5\ATE5 oF

•

AMER.TIA I 'fi<:.OIV\. I_LLEG-A.L &oveR.N~EIJTAL ALno i\l.S'

(6l)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 56 of 80 PageID #: 56

•
D.) 'PLAINTIFF HooD .A.LLEDG-E0i Dtt=ENDAWT 0cHAFER.
VIoLA-\-e6 PLAitJTrt-F~ loV\6Tl\\t\.TI.OtJAL h&HT~ UIJC>ER
11-t£:. Fou\ZTHEEI-JTH AM'ENDMBJT, AV\~ Due ~oce5.5 AV\0
~V\A\ 1=£oTECTIDN~ UUJDER. TtiE vuSITED 'eJTA\£..5
CoV\STITU.\IoN 11\AT PK0TECT5 Cl\IZEN6 oF LIFE,
LT.BEg_T'f, .A.~ TJKoPE.RT'( .w~ THE 1)~tJ..L.!ED 6TATE.-5 oF A~t=RlCAi F\(()M ..LLLEC:-AL c~veR.nM.ttJ\AL Ac.TiorJ5,

E~) 'PLAINT Lr F l-\ooD ALLED&E0, DEFENDAN-t NIXON

•

VJ..o\A+td lJLAINTIFFo CoNSTITuTIONAL RIG-HTS u~DE~
THE fOu.RTHEENTl-\ .AMENDMENT, A.Y\d Due PRoCeJS AtJd
~LAAt ?ROTECTIOtJS U.tJDER THE lANITED 6TATE0

ComTITUTIO!\l THAT PlZoTECTS LITIZEtJ~ oF LIFt,

LilE\::T'( 1 AV\~ 'Pi:oPERTV IN THE. vt ~ITED ()TATE5 o~
AME~ICA, t='Ro~ ILLEG-AL G-ovet:N M.EJ\JTAL AcT IoN-:5,

•
(5Z)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 57 of 80 PageID #: 57

•
A.)\lrolA'P+eLdAViNLTAIINFTFIFtFJl-C2>CoCRoDY\ASTLILTEUD\IGD-NE0.A1 LD"ERFIECN-DH~ANUtTJCM>EY.~ERs
THE Fou.~l-f£ENTH- AMENDME~T, A.~D Du.e ~c.e65 Ah~
~V\A.\ i=>RoTE..CTIOt-J0 l-\ND£f:. THe UJJDED ~TATE 5
CoN<S\I.TU.\IO~ ·mAT 'PROTE:.C..T0 u-rizEN5 of L..LFE.,
L:r:t:>E"R1"'(! AV\A 'PRDPE'K\\( ..LtJ \HE U..NITED STA1b::> oF
Atv\ERT-CA, fulvt ILLEG-AL G-oveRNMeNTAL A.C1wN0.

:Bo) ~LAINTIFF MCCo'R.D .ALLEDC-E~, DEFENDAt-JT 0LtMPTEfZ

•

VIolAted ·pLAlNTI.FF.S CoY\6TI.TUTIOtJAL h&l-rf~ U.NDER
T\-\E FoLAJZ:Tl-\EENTH .AKEN DMt:f\lT, AY\~ DVI.e VRoce,::)o AV\~
~LAAl ?RoTE.C.TIOtJ~ UtJDE:~ \t\E. LAlJ.LTED 5TA\E6

CorJSTI.TUTlDtJ THAT PRoTECT<S CITizE.tJ6 oF LTF£1
LIBE::RTY, AV\A \)F:oP~ ..LN --n-\c LANTIED bTATe.~ oF

AM.ERUA J f~K.

.l..LL EG-AL

G-oveRV\HENTAL

ACTION~ 1

C.) ·vL.AitJtiFF HCCo~D .t\LLEDG-E~\ DEFENDMJT T5\AJ(E
Vr.olAte<l .PLAI~TIFf0 Con-sTTivtT:CotJAL tl&l4T6 lA.~DE~

Tt\E Fot.ARTHE'ENTH AKENDH'EtST, AV\C. D\Ae PKocet:>S .AV\d
9L.tA.l \)f2:oTECT .LOt--.\0 LANDE~ THE U.tJ:L\'ED 6TA\E~

CoV\6\J.. Tu.TI.oN T\-\AT PR.oTEL.T-5 LII.LZ.EN.J oF LifE,

LII';ERTY, .A.~o "P~oPE~TY Ll\l THE lAN.i-TED C:>TA\Eo oF

•

.A._tvtt:.\::ICA, ~ ILLEG-AL G-ove~Y\t-1\.ENTAL Acr .LeNS,

(53)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 58 of 80 PageID #: 58

• D.} ?LAI~T.LFF tJtCC.oi?.D ALL£DGt:t:>, DEFENDANT 6CHAfE:R V.LolAted ?LAI~TIFt=0 CoN6TIT\AT.LO~AL Kr.G-HTS \ANDER Tl-\E fouR\l{E:'ENTH .AKENDHE~T1 At-JD b'-'te 'PRoce&S AV\C. ;~u.Al ""PRmEuiotJ-s u.~DER. THE tAt-liTED oTATt:(J CoNuTITuTwN TAAT 'P~OTELTe, LD.LZ.Et--\5 oF LLF'E,
LIBeRTY, AA~ P~"PE-RTY IN TH.E \.A~I.TED ~"--<\.~,~ oF
.A.tvtERICA 1 FRot'-1. ....LLLEG--AL &oveRNH.B\TA:L AcTioN~~

E.) VL.~rnTIIT tvtt(ogt> ALLEDG-E0, DEFE~D.ANT l1.IXON VIo\A.+eo 'PLAIWT 1-Ft=() Co~TITlA\IOt-.~AL KIG-t-\m UNDEg.

•

T\iE 'fcn.ARTHt::~l\lTH. .AM.ENDtv'lENT1 AND Dcte 'PRocess An~

~UA.l ~TECT ..LON~ UtJDER. 11\'E uNITED ~TATE~

Cot-J6TITu.TioN WAT PR.oTEtTo C:cTIZ.'ENo oF LL'FE

LLBE.~Y, A"A~ ?RoPER\Y \ N Tr\E lA.N..LTED 6TATE5 oF

.A~EF:ICA i tRaM ILLEG-AL G-oveF!.NMEN1AL .ACTIOI'J6,

•
(b4)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 59 of 80 PageID #: 59

•

'PLAI.NTIIT M.LLL£~

,A..) PLAINtiFF MI.LLER. ,L\.LLED&E~, Ds=E~DANT tv\'(E~~
\}IOlA~ec PLAINTJ-FF~ CoNSTI.TlATIONAL t:r:G-li1S u.N DE~ mE FoLA.f!\HEEN\H .AMENDMENT/ A~ bcte 'P~ocess AY\d.
~lAA\ \)~oTEC.TIOI\D lAtJD'E~ THE l-\NTIED ~TATES
Co~-rrn....t\IoN Th~T ""PRo\E(\ 5 (ITIZEt-JS oF LT.t=E,
L.1.1SERTY, A~ "PR.oPE~TY IN THE L-UJTIED 6TA\PS oF
"Atv\'ER.LCAt' F~t·A ILLEG-AL L~veRNM.t:.i\JTAL Ac.TION5,

~..) PLAINTifF MILLE~ .A.LLtDG-~, DEFENDAtJT ~LAMPTER

e

VIolA+ED PLAINTI\=F5 CoN~TlTU.TIOf'JAL f'IC-t\T3 lANDEg,
mE to\;~Tr\Et.t--~TH AMENDl--1BJT, AV\~ Due VKcx:'65 AV\~

EqlAA~ "PRo-tECTiotJ6 Ut.JDt:.R: THE UNITED 5-rA\t:6

Cot.JSTI.Tl--\TID~ THAT "Pf!.on:.cT~ CITIZ.EN~ oF LIFE,

Lr.BE~V 1 ANd ~o?Ef:..TY ~ W:E I.ANLTED 0TATE.::=)

C'j rpLAINTIFF ~.LLL£~ /~.LLEDG-E~, DEFENDAtJT BlAKE
VIo\Att:D \)LAit-J-\ ..Lt=Fo LoV\.5TITu-r...Lol-0AL Rrc-HT~ u~C>ER. ·\HE Fol-t~THE'ENTH .AM.EtJDtvtl:tJT, AV\~ D"\e ?Roce...S-5 A\1\.~
'E.qLAA\ \)R.OltLTTOI\J0 lAt-JDt:R Tt-\f UMITED OTATE~
lcN6TITlATioN THAT PRo\EC.T6 UTIZ.Et-J6 oF L..LFE,
LTBE~TY, .AV\.c Y~PERTY ItJ THE 0\NIT'ED 6\ATE.6 oF
AME~IT.i\., F'K:c.tv\. _LLL'EG-AL c~veR~tv'lE!JT.A.L AcTIOi\l~ I

• D.) ?LAlN\1\=F MILLER. ALLEDGES, DEFENDANT SCHAFER
Vr.o\Ated \)lA1.N1Iff,') CoV\5\ITvtTict-JAL RJ..C-HT5 u.~ DE~
(.55)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 60 of 80 PageID #: 60

• T\-\'E tolA"K\~E'E.Nm At--\EklDMt:tJT, AV\6. bVt.e ~oce55 AV\C~~.,\A\ PKoTE.CTION5 l.tNDc\2. T\-\'E LANITED 0TATE0 L-l- CoY\0TJ_TLA\ .LON TM1 PROTECT0 T 1-ZfN(j oF LIFE 1 LIBER-TY, AY\~ \)iCoPE~TY I~ 11-tE U~ITED 5TATE0 oF
AMER:lCA, FRo,Vi ..LLLEG-AL &oveR.NtvtE.NTAL A.crioNo I

EJ PL.ATJSTltf MI.LLE~ A.LLEDG-1:0, Drrt.NDA~T ~l/(01\.\

V-rolA+ED PLAIJSTIFFC) CoV\6-u:TiATIONAL 'KI&t-\T~ uND'ER

T\-lE FouiTl-\EEtJTK AMEl'JDMcNT, ANd Due ~cess .A:Y\c

•

~IAA\ 'PROTEC.TION5 UNDER THE LAt--i.LTED ~TATE0
CoY\~TnuTION 11-\AT ""PROTEC.~ LIT..LZEN..S of LIFE,
LIBE~TY, AV\~ ?eoPE~Y l-N THE UNTI£:-D -5TATBS oF

4-tt.:.F:.ICA., t:"RCVV\ ILLEG-AL G-oveRNMEtJTAL AcTIOl\J0,

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 61 of 80 PageID #: 61

•

'PLAINTIFF BAKER.

A.) ''PLAINTIFf bAKE~ ALLED&E~,'DEFENDANT M'{E~~
Vro\AteJ PLAitJTIIT~ CoY\6T~TiA\IO~AL RTG-H\6 U~DB: \HE Fo~t~\\\EENTH .AMBJDMENT, AY\6 Due PRoce~ AV\~
&,tAA.\ '"Psmcc-riot-J\5 UNDt:f::. \1-\t:. L-U.).LTE.D STA\E~
'Co~0-rrTL-\"T:r.ort 1\-\A.T PR.oTEc.:TS C:LTlZ.ENS oF LIFe,
L.L"Bi=i!.T'<'1 AV\2:. \)g_c-pt:Kf'( It\\ Tt\E \ANITED 6\A:tt:·S 0F
A.t-1\ERICA, '\=~tv\ ILLEG-AL c~ve~MC.tJTAL Ac.TI.OtJ0,

BJ 'PLAIJJTIIT ~AKEi<. ALLEDC~~/ btta)DANT 0UMPTE)C

\Jio\Atet 1JLAil\JT-LFF0 Co~TITtATiotJAL RI.&-HT~ UklDER.

•

THE Fo\.,-t~n-fEENTH .AtvtEND~l::~.rr, AV\cl Due ~ce00 k6

EquA.\ "PRoTECT.l.OtJ0 l-WDE~ -rl*t: Ut-JTIED ~1A\E()

CotJ6T.LTlATio~ T~A1 lJRoTec:.T6 CITizE~ oF LIFE, LIBERTY, A~ PRoPt~\Y ..LN THE lANITED 6TA\1=-~ oF

Atv\t:RIC.A. 1 tR.otJt ILLEG-AL &oveRJJKBJTAL A£:TTorJ.S,

C.) 'iJLAINl.Lt=F '"BA.KE~ ALLEDG-'55, DEFE~DN-v'T fJLAKE

VIo\A.te6. PLAniTIIT0 Con5TITwiOtJAL RI&H.To tAtJDE~

Tr\E 'FOvt\'!'.Tt-\EEtJTH .AtvtEtJDfvlENT1 AY\~ Due -p~ AV\c EqtAA\ ~OTECTIDN0 UtJD'Et. THE Ut.JITE:D OTA1"E0

Co~TITLATio~ THAT' \JkoTEtT6 CIT j_zEGJ.S oF Ll:Ft,

or Lio£RT'(1 .Arid ti2oPE\!.lY .l.N Tt-\E U.tJITED ~TA.\E ~

•

AM'EtlC.A., fgol'A lLLH-AL G-oveRNMENTAL AcTio~,

(57)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 62 of 80 PageID #: 62

• D~) 'PLAINTl-FF !>AKE~ ALLEDC-E0, bttt.NDANT ScHAFE~ VIo \A+ed t:'LAimi'Pr-S LoV\5\ITIAT.Ior-JAL Rro-t\T.S Uf\lDE~t
11-\E tDL-t'R\\-\1=-Et-STH AlvfttJDKEtJT, AV\6 Deie ?Ro~ ~~
:EquAl ~OTE.C\ lOt--\5 LtNDE~ 11-\t L-·HJ..LTED 0TATE.:)
CoNc:>TITvtTlotJ Tt-\AT ~TECTo Crr.1.ZEN6 ot= L.LFE.,
LL~E~Y, AV\t \)!CoPE~ IN 1\-\E vttJTIED 6TA\E5 oF
:AtvtERICA 1 \=Rotvt ILLEG-AL G-ovc::t::.NMEi\liA~.- .t~CTlON0,

E.) /PLAitJTlFF EAKER A.LLt=DG-ES, DE\-=BJDAtJT NIXotJ

•

'VIo\Atec \)LAitJTit=Fo LotJ~TITvtTioNAL hb-HT~ Ut-JDEg
11-\E 'Fo~T\-\EENTI:-\ 4tBJDK.E:NT/ ~~ DtA.e f\;::O(f50 k\~
~lAAt ~TE.LTION0 lA~Dl:R Tl-\~ U.~S:t\ED Q\A.TE.5

Co~STil"u.:TION THAT PICVTECTS LT.TlzEt05 oF lii='£,

LI.EtR.1Y, ~ ~oPERTV TtJ -n-\E UtJITED 6TAT£S oF

.A~AERICA t="i20l'A TLLEG-AL G-ovegN~wTAL AcnoV'~

·

I

I

•
(og)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 63 of 80 PageID #: 63

•

PLAINTLEE D'tEE

A.) 'PLAINTl\=f TY~EE ALLEDG-E5( 'DEFENDN-lT tv\YEJ<S V.r.olAted PLA1JJTIIT0 CoY\o\ITu.Tio~AL txGH15 LANDEf:::
1HE fol'l~THY:ENIH .4\t:f\\DMEt.JT, Av0- bLAe T\occ~ Are
E_qu..A..l ~\EC\Io('J~ lA~D'Ei:- THE. U.tJITtD QTATES
CotJ;S\ITuTioN Tt\AT PRo-rECTo CITizr:N0 oF LifE, LIBERTY 1 ~~6 ~ft.R\Y IN 11-\:E lAWTIED 8TA~ 0~
At.AEtlCA, fRo~\. ILLt:.G-A.L Crove~Nt-'\.'E:tJTAL .A..c.TION5,

:Bo) tpLALNTl'H= l'{REE A.LLEDG-E3j UEFENPAtJTGlAtv\PTER

VIO\Ak6 ''PLAINTIFF0 CotJ<ST-lTLAT..LOtJAL l<IGttT~ U~DE~

•

11-\E FoLA'K\HEENTH AKEtJDKE~T, .~"'-6 D\Ae ~ceos -~C. ~u.A.t ~EC\IOI~-5 UtJDER 11-\E \A.NITED 5T"TES

Co~TLTlA.\ l.ON \AAT \)RoTECT5 LTTIZE\--L') oF LIFE1
LIBERTY/ ~~d 'PRo'PER.lY IN T\-\'t \ANlTED 6TA\'ES oF

AMEY:.LCA, t-Rotv\ TLLEGAL G-ovet.NKBJTAL ACTION-51

C) 'PLAil\fT LFF TYREE ALLEDG--E-S/ DEFENDA~T :BLAKE
Vro\Ated PLAI~TIFF0 Co~-JOIITLATTorJAL l<.I.&l-lT~ Uf\JDE~
THE 'F'ou.~Tt-\EENTH AtvtENDHEJ.JT, Ah2 Dv..e 'PR-ocess AV\~

~l-tAl TJ~\£C:t'WtJ6 UNDE~ Tl-\E LtNI.IED 6TATE0

CoV\.sTITiA.IIo,'J -rHAT "PWE.C:ra LI.TizEN6 oF

L I

'FE 1

LI.oE'KT'{, ~6 ~PEtTY ..LN Tt\E t.AWLTED 'E)TATE.S of

•

AY\.E~lCA, ~olv'-- ILLEGAL G-oveR-NMENTAL AcTION0,

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 64 of 80 PageID #: 64

•

b,) rpLALN\ .Lft= \YREE ALU:.DG-t:::\ DEFENDAtJT &HAFER
Vl:DtAJed \)LAINTIFF5 CoV\STITlATiotJ.AL- ~1:.6-HT:) UtJDER
11\E Fol-te.mEEN-rn AMt=.NDMENT, .~ Dvle 'PRocess M~ ~l4A\ "PRc-re.CT..LO~J U.~DE\C T\-\E LA~ITED 6TATES
CoV'\6TITtATIDI--l THAT K?oTEC..T6 L..LTIZW6 of LI.FE/
LI.I~)E~TY, ..L\Y\~ \>i:o\t:ITY IN \Ht: UNITED OTA\1:.6 of .At"tEK.Lc.A:1 ~ ILLEG-AL &ove~N~EtJTAL kTiorJ-51

E~) ~LAINTIFF lYREE- ALLEDG-E&, D~fENDANT NIXON

VlolAted PLAINTIF~ LOV\.5TITu.-riot--\A.L RIG-HT() UNDeg

•

TH.E FOL-t~THEENTH .AHEtJDMEMT, AV\c Pttte ~An~

¥qVA\ \)~\ECTIDN6 UNDEt \l-fE lAtJTIED ~TATE~

CoY\6TLTU.TIDr.J Tl-\A:t PICOTE-CT~ lTIIZ.EtJ~ oF LI.FE,

LIE>Eg.T'{, .~~ 'PRoPERTY lM Tl-\E lA.N..LTED ~1ATe5 oF

.A.H.'£.RT..C.A. 1 F'~otv\ ILLEG-A.L buv'eRtJHEJJTAL .A.cTioi\J0,

•
(bD)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 65 of 80 PageID #: 65

•

PLA.INTIFF KITC\-\EY

A.). 'PLAINTT~\= 'R:LTCr\E\[ .ALLED6-E(\ DEFENDANT MYER..S
VIo\AtEd PL.A..T.NT -LfF~ Cot-.l6TITlA~ALKIG-HT~ UNDEe.
THE fut..t~THEEt-JTH ArtENDMBJT,AV\~ Due T\<oeeos ~~
9vLA\ ~OT'ECTj_QtJ~ Ut.JDa THE lUJITED .STATE.:)
CoMTITVc\TDN TAA\ lkoTEC.T0 CITIZEN~ oF LIFE,
LIBEI2:f\( AV\t \)RoPER\Y l.N \\-\E t{~J~Fr1 ·31-"J"F.) oF
A.Mt:'KLCAr \='R.otv\ ILLEG~A..L &ovetNME.NTAL AcTIOtj-5,

1>.) PLAINTliT \2:ITU-\E'( ALLE-DG-E5, DEFE~DANT 5t.tt--t'PTER

•

Vr_o\AtED PLA.LNT j_~F0 eo~TI-TU.\ .LOJJAL fiG+\T~ UtJDER.
11-\c fou.\?..\KEENTi-1 A.tvtEtJ D~t:NT, AY\c DilLe 'PRcce05 AV\~
~v\A.\ ~ECT l0~0 WJDER Tl-\E U~\E-D ()TA)£:.~

Co~TIT\ATTo~ Tt-lA.T 'PRoTEL\~ LrTizENS oF LIF~r

LIBEKTY AY\~ ~o?t:RT'( IN THE GltJITED 6TAT£~ or (
.A~E¥:.LC.A; FRo~A LLLEG-A.L Gove~~ENTAL AcriotJS(

C.) \)LALNT LFr 'RITCHEY ALLEDG-ES DEKtJD4NTBWE 1 VIo\A~ED \)LATNT \ t=FS Cor-J~T L Tu.\TO~A.L hG+lT-5 lAtJD'tR

1 11-\E tOl-tRll-\EEt-.j""fH .~END'M\:.tS\ AlAe Dvte ~ce~ k~

\:qLtAt ?\::0"\EC.TIO~S UNDEIC 11-\E vtt-J.Lit:D 0T.ATE5

Co~6TLT\A\ .LON Tt-\A\ v~<.on:cro (IT .LZE.~0 of LTt=E I

LTB'E~Y i ~d 'Pt<o?ER\Y 1JJ THI= UNITED Q\A.\E~ OF

•

~\ERI.CA 1 F'~o~ ILLEG-AL CroveQJIVCErJTAL A.c\ -LOt-151

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 66 of 80 PageID #: 66

•

D.). PL.l\TN\T'FF R:r.TC\-\EY A.LLtD&t5/ DtFFMDA~T OC~AFER. Vr.o \AtED ?LALt.JTIFFS Co~\\.K\IONAL h.G~0 u.~DER
1HE tDl-t'RT4£ENT\i .Atvtt:t.JDMENT, A:\1\~ Dl,te ~ce6~ ~~
EqlAA\ ~OTEC\ I.ON6 U.t-.fDI=.~ \l\£ L.-\J..\ \ l"ED ~TA:\E5
CoreTITuTio~ Tr\AT PF::oTEC..\5 CITIZ.ENS of LlFE,
Lr:BEt:::TY, A'Ad PRoPER1Y T.N T\-\E LANITED &ATE-5 oF AtvrE~.LCA.. fRoM ILLEG-AL G-oveK:NtvtENTAL kTI.oNS,
I

~.) ?LAINT.LIT R:r.TCHE'{ ALLED&-E0, bEPENDAtJT NIXDtJ

e

V.LolAJed "PLAl~TIFF~ Co~TUTIONA.L Rr:G-l-\TQ UNf>~
\HE Fouen-tEENTH AMF:_t-JDt-1\EtJT, Al-lD bL-~ ?~ocess A~

~tAA\ 142:oTEC.TlOt-J0 UNDER. \Rc lAWITED 6TATE-.5

Co~T-LTLATION \RAT PRoTECT0 C.1.-riz.ENS o\= LIFE,

L~:cBt:R:\Y, .A.}jb 'PRoPE~\Y IN Tr\E U(\}ITED 81A1ES oF

A.M'EkiC..A. I. f~~\

l.LLE&AL

C~vel<.t--H1EtJ1AL

AtTXD~5 I

•

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 67 of 80 PageID #: 67

•

PLA.INTIIT ]'ROWN

A.}

\)LA.LNTIIT

BRow~'\

ALLED6E8 1

DEFEtJDAtJT

H.VE~0

VIolAtED PLAI~TIIT0 CoN5TI-llATIOt0AL RTGHT5 u~DER

:T\-\E Fou.RTr{E'E-NTl-\ AtvtEN DVLE~JT, AND Due PROCe-SS AV\~

~lAA\ ?RoTELTlON6 C{t.JDE-R. T\-\E U.NI.TED lJTATE0

CoV\&ITLATio N T\-\A.T l=£DTECT~ Cr:T:tZEf\.\0 ot= LIFE1
Li.'B£~\Y, A~ \)\CoPE'KTI IN TH-E lANITED 0\ATE-5 oF

Atv\tuC/'- i \~cA.I\. ILLEGAL GuveR.NtvlENTAL ACTwtJ0,

E.): PLAINTI-FF B~WV\ .A.LLEDG-E~, DEFENDANT OUMPTE~

•

'\fco\AtED PLAINTIFF~ CoNo\ITvt\IOtJAL h&HT0 u~DER.
11\E fou.~\HEEtVTH .~\END~ErJT, .AND Due ?Ro~s AV\~ EquAl ·"PRoTECT J..DN5 lANDE\2- T\4~ lANITED ~TATE0

CoN.sTITlATIOI\J TMT 'PKoTEC.To CnrzEN'5 oF' LIFE,

LI'BE~TY, AV\~ \)RoPEl:TV IN THE lAIJffiD STATES oF
A.tv1E.t(TCA, 'FRoM- ILLEG-AL G-ovet2J\JtvtE~TAL ACT_t_o(\}.5,

C.) PLATJ.JTIFF BEbwn .A.lLEt:&SS, DEFENt>AwT J3lAKE

VrolAtED "PLAit.JTIITo CoNSTI.TvrfioNAL- ""RIG+tT-5 lA.NDEf!.
\liE Fou.R.Tl-\EENTH AM.E~DMENT, AY\6 Dvle P¥:ocess .AY\c_

Equ.At "P~TELT .LOt--J-5 U~DEK. THt:. VlN.LTED 6\ATE0

CoV\5TITLA:T_LOt-.) Tt-tAT PE:oTEC.T-5 C.r:nzEN& oF Lr.FE

I

LIBE£.\Y AV\~ -pRoPER\{ 1

L!'J Tl-\E I.AJJ.LTED 0TATE5 oF

•

AtvtER \ CA, F~o~vt \ LLE&A.L &oveR.NtvtEl\JTAL AcTioN:>,

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 68 of 80 PageID #: 68

•
D) 'PLA!.NTiW 'B~OWV\ ALLED&E~;DEFENDANT 0CAAFEK
VIJJ \Ate~ PLAIN TI.FFS Col'\STITlATr.cnAl h&Hl"O Ut-.)DER
Tl-\E FovUITH-EENTH .At"1EtJDtJlEtJT, AND DtAe ~ce.SS kA<i
~uAl i)J(oTELTI-OtJ~ Ut-JDll. \f\E l-ttrr.TED 5TATE~
CoY\6\ITlATION THA.T P\?oTEtT6 CITIZEN~ oF LIFE,
LIBH:.'TY, .~c ?RoPER.lY ItJ 1Ht:. lA~JTTFD ~~TATF6 OF
AJ{ERICA, ~H TLLt&AL G-oveRt-JHE~TAL .AtUotJ~,

E.) \)LADJTit=F B~wV\ .A.LL£DG-E0, DEFEI\JD.ANT Nl.XON

VIolAte~ '?LAlJJTI\=f~ C.oV\trrir\ATIDtJA.L tiG-Hm Ut.JDL=g_

•

TH-E FOuJ.~TKEENTH AH.ENDMEtJT, AV\c bvte ~(Xe}5 -~

~uAl '"PR.oTEC.\IoM~ UNbE~ Tt-\E. lANITEb Q\ATES

CoV\STITuTwrJ TftAT PRoTECTS LITIZ£N~ oF LIFE,

LTBt.TIV, .~d ?Rot:>E~'( IN \1-\t:. l/\~ITED STATES ot=

AME'KILA, FR~tv\ ILLEG-AL G--o~rnMEr-JTAL .A.c.TIDtJ5,

•
(£4)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 69 of 80 PageID #: 69

•

'PLAltrrlFF AHot0ET1E

A~) 'PL.Al.t'f\ iFF A~tONETTE ALLEDG-ES, DEFfNDANT
KYER~ \!Iol.A.te6 ·-pl!nrrlFF0 ~oTITWIDMAl KICtttJ UNDEl
lHE FoL-tRTHEE~TH AfvtE~D~EN~ ,A.V\~ Dt.Ae T\<oee00 ~6
~uAl ?RDTECTiol)0 LA~DER.\HE ll\t-JITED 0TATE0
COY\STITLATlON lliAT "?KoTELT5 LITIZENS oF Lm/
L.LBE~TY', Av\~ 7Rot=e~1Y 1-N THE. ut.J.crED GTA.TE.S oF
,AHE~ICA1 ti:UVL ·ILLEG-AL G-ove"-NH~TAL Ac_-r LOV\5,

:B) ~LAr~Tl_Fr J\MotJUTE ALLEDC-E~\ DEFENDA(\lT QuKPTE~

•

VroLAtec PLAltJTIFF6LvV\5,..LltATTOnAl hc~.s LHJDE-~
\HE toui2:-l1iEENn-i A~ENDMEtJT, A"'C- 0\A.e ?Rcx::e5S Av,d.
~u.A.l T£olECT lDl\)5 UNDER. lHE U~ITED 6TATE5

COY\5T L TutTiorJ TH-AT "PR..o\ECT0 CLTIZErJ6 oF LIFE,
.l..LBERTY./ ,~6 \)RDPEr:.lY lJj THE UtJITED 6TATE6 oF

A~AEt2.ICA, 'FRof\lt ILLEG-AL G-ovc:R.N~·fEJJTAL AcTioN-5 1

C~ VLADJu;::F Atv1DNETTE ALLED&E.S/ DcFEtJDANr ']lA~

Vro\Ated YL.AINTIFF5 CoV\STITu-rrooAL h&HT-.5 u~DER

-mE \=oure.-rt-tt:a.rn-l AHt:i0DAABJf, Avt~ b~~ ~ocess AV\~

~uAl \)zc)TEC.T l.DtJ0 LANDE~ THE LAtJrlt::D 0TATE5

c_L CoV\ST.LT0\TL()rJ TKA\ PKoTECT5 TIZEN3 0F LifE I

LIB~T'( .A.V\t_ tkoPEt::TY TtJ THE lHJTIED (JTATE6 oF

•

Af.!ltncA, Tho~v~. TLLEC-AL C'llve~.:NMEIJTAt- Aarons,

(£5)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 70 of 80 PageID #: 70

• D.) rpLAINTI+="F Atv\o~ETTE ALLED&Ed/ DErEN~ Scl-\AfER VIDlAtEo PLA-LtJTit-F-5 Co~'\sTITLATiotJAL- trc-trro UNDER Tl-fE FoL\R-.11-lEEtJTli AMEI\)DNJT, AV\C bu.e ?t::oCe5S Av\cl ~lAA.l j)ROTECTTON-5 UNDE~ \HE \At-jiTED O'TAI~ ,3
Con5T.LTvt-r lOtJ 1HA1 \)ROTECT6 Cr:.TIZEN0 oF LIFE/
LI.EERT't' AV\c ?~PeerY IN THE lAillTED <3TATE6 oF I
AtvtE'KICA, F\<.Olvl LLLEC-AL G-oveE:.tjkt:NTAL Ac--r..wn5,

E.) ~LAINTJ_t=~ AtvtoNtTTE ALLEDG-Eo, DEFEND~T NIXotJ

•

VrolAtED PLAINT.LfF6 LoV\51"-LTvtTioi'JAL KIG-HT0 UNt>fR11-lE: Fo\A~TtiEl=.tJTH AHEtJDAtJT; AV\d DLAe v~o A"'6
~\1\A\ PRO\'ECTIOtJS LAWDER: Tr\E LAtJITED STATE;:)

C.OV\3\I.Tvt.TTotJ TI-\A\ ?RoTECT0 LIT -LZB\J-S ot= LI.f£1
LIJ3E-l~.TY1 AV\t -pRofet\'( LJ THE lAtJ-LTED 0TATE.:S oF

AME'KICA, t='ROtVl ILLEG-AL G-ovet:.Ntv\Et0TAL Ac.ti.l)Y\5,

•
(£6)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 71 of 80 PageID #: 71

•
A. 5) rpLAitJT1-Ft= 1Y00tJ ,.L\LLEDG-E<\ DE~EtJb.AtJT MYER-0
VrolAA-e~ ~LA.LNTl_ITS CoV\5TITlAT-Lo~AL 1XC+li5 GUJD~
·mE F"ounrtt=Et.JTH A~EtJDA~T, AV\~ Dute ~ce-s5 AY\~
t?1~Al ~TECTION-3 vUJDEt. THE lAN..LTED GTATE5
Cot.J6TITvCtiOrJ Tt-\AT ?RoTECT5 L.LT .L2EN0 oF Lit:£,
LTB'ERTY/ ,A.V\~ YfCoR:g-p{ ..\._N THE lANl"TED QTAT&.S OF
A~\ERICA I F~oM iLLEG-AL G-oveRNH.EI\JYAL ACTION5,

D~) ?LA.LNTliT T'{O:>~ ALLEDG-E.s, DEFENDANT 0utvtPTER.

VIolA.tEb \)LADJTIIT~ CoV\STil\,tTio~AL )(rc-HT.S U('JDER.

•

T\-\E fuLA~THEENTH ArvtEN[)AWT1 AND DL-1E P~ocess An6

~L.(A.\ ~Tt=C.TIOI\.)6 Ut-JDER. THE. lA~ITED ~TATES

CotJSTITtATI:otJ THAT 'PRoTEcT-S Cr \IZ.Ek}0 DF LIFE,

LIBERTY AV\d -pRoPc.~Y JJ\J THE UtJTIED 0TATE0 oF I
AtJLERIC.A FRoK ILLEG-A.L D-oveR~ MEf\JTAL ACTtD(\)~ I 1

C.) 'PLAINT_Lt:F \Y0QN t\LLEDG-E3, DEFENDMT "J3LA~E

V.LO\.A.+ED PLAT~T i_Ff-5 Con6TITLA.T.wrJAL- 12IG+{T0 UNDE-~

lHE ~U\RTH-EEtJTH AtvtEt-JDANT, AV\t Ulte ''Pic.oceo5 ·.A\1\C

EqV\A\ -pR,o~cTIOwS L-WDcR THE lJN.LTED ~TATE-3

CoN~-lITIATIOtJ Tl-\AT 1>KoTEC.T6 CTTIZENS OF LIFE 1

LIBEI<.TY; _AV\~ WoPERTY lJ\) Tt\:E lA~LTED STATE-S oF

•

AtvtERTtA; \=gotvL l_LLEG-.1\L Gove~tvt~t;A.L Acr-w,v-5

1

(£7)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 72 of 80 PageID #: 72

• D~) ~LAINTL'FF T'(&>N /~LLEDG-E3, DEFE~DANT 0ct-\AFER Vlo lA.td PLAIN-tIFF~ CoN-0T LTU\Io\.JAL \(rG+1T.:s tA.rJD£~ TI\E Fo'-'ttlL{EErJTt4 ,A..M'ENDANT, AY\~ DVle. Thoce.s0 A\t\~ EqtAAl li?oTE.CTlDC\J6 lAtJOE~ 11-\E L\NlTED (3TATE:S
Con6TITI.A\ .LOtJ THAT 'PICOTECT0 Ci:liZEtJ6 OF Lr.FE,
LI"BE'KT'( Avv~ PR-opeRTy T.N THE. LH~TTE!: ~TATE.S oF
AtvtE'KTC.A, ~RoVt ILLEG-AL G-ovc:~\J\.Et-JTAL AcTIOtJ5,

E.) 'PLAINTTFF TV00tJ .A.LLEC>GE.\~\ DEF="E.NDA~T NIXON

VIolA+e~ VLAINTIFF-5 CoN.ST..LTLAT .Lo~A.L 'KIG-HT.s utJC>f~

•

TH:E FnuRTt-\'fi~NTH AfvlEr-JDAt.J~ AV\6 bL-te ?Rece-ss AV\c
~L-LAt Y~"TELTIOtJ~ UNDER. TKE U~LLTED Q\ATt0

CotJ-STLTlATiotJ THAT t=t:oTE:.CT5 CIT lZEN0 oF Lir:-E I

LIBE~TV, A\1\o ·-pRopeRTY IN THE V\tJ..LTED ~TATE.6 oF

.AKt-RTCA, FRDM lLLE.G-AL G-ove~NM.EtJTAL AcTiotJo,

•
(£75)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 73 of 80 PageID #: 73

• A.). ?LAI-NTIIT tlARP-LtJ ALLEDG-EO, DEFENDA.\\T MYEf(::J VIolAtED '?lAINTLIT5 Co~-sTITuuo~AL Rli+tT~ lANDER. THE toL-t~EEt-JTK AMEtJDANT, AV\~ 1)~,\e. 11coce~e. ,~6
EqvtAl fuTECTIOl\Jo LANDE~ --rHE lA~ITED 0TATE0
CoY\0TITiATiotJ ·mAT 1J~1EC..T0 CIT..LZEt\\6 oF LIFE;
•LI.B'E.RTY, A.V\cl P~OPE\::TY lll T\-\E. U~iTED 3TATE0 oF AivtERICA, FRo~ .LL.Lt:G-AL C'Uve~<.NKev,-rAL AcTION6r

J>) ~LAIN TIFF TuRP:DJ ALLEDG-'ES, DEFEf\JDAtJT 0LAM.PTEf;:

VJ-0\AtED "PLA-LWTLIT~ eo~""LTU.TIOrJAL "R.I&rn~ LA~DER

•

·mE tUL-t~'EEtJTtt .A.t-'\BJDANTl ~c_ Dvte fl':.oce5~ AY\t:.

EqtAA\ PROTEtTIDtJC> LANDER \1-\.t. lA~TIED 0TA~5

Co\J5TITu.TI.OtJ THAT ·PltDTE.C..\5 C-:cn:z.EN-5 ot=' LTFE,

LIBERTY, Avv~. VRDPE~TY ItJ Tt\E vUJITED ~TATE5 oF A.~ERIC,~, FRoM LLLEC-AL G-oveRrJMeJJTA.L ..~c.TIDt\l~~

C. ) 'PLAINTiff l\AR:PDJ .ALLEDC-E-5, DEFE~DANT "SlAKe.

Vr-otA\-ED ·PL.AI[\}TIFFo CowoTTilATI.OWAL ~IC~To U~DEl<.

MD '\liE f0u.~TH:E£~TH .A~A.~DANT,

Dv~.e ?Roces~ .Af\~

EquA.\ -pg_O\cCTID~0 UtJDE~ ll\:E UWITED 0TA.TE-5

CoNSTITt.ATLOtJ TMT "P~oTE(T0 C..LTLZt:.fJ6 oF LIFE/

L1.BE'K\Y, ,~c '"PRoPERtY IN THE ut-JITED 6TATES oF

•

AME.~CA, t=Ro('Jl rLLEG:AL G-oveRtJM.eN\AL kTl.Ot\.AS I

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 74 of 80 PageID #: 74

• D. ) 1>LAINT.LFF TLA~PIN .ALLEDG-ES, DEFENDANT 6cHFEK VIolAtED PLAINTj__ 'FF-5 CotJ~:>TIT\.1\.Tioi\.\A..L R.I&-l-\T-5 uw:>Eg_
T~E FoLARTl-\EENTt-l .AMEW DAtJT, ,Av\(1 IM.e ?~oc..e.ss AhC:.
Eqv..A.l ~oTECTibtJo LANDER. 11-\E U.\JTTED ~TATE-S UYf\uTITLATioN THAT 'P~TECT~ LITLZ.El\l6 oF LIFE1
LltsEK\Y, .AV\<l \)RDPERTY ..LN THE- lAtSLTED 0TATG5 or:-
A~E~lcA, 'FK0M l_LLEG-AL &ove£JJ1'vtcNLAL- Ac.TI0~3,

E.)· -pLAI-1\JT LFF TV\R."Pit-J Au-~=.DG-w, DEFENDAIJT ND<.OtJ

.VIOlAtED PLAiN-\I~ CoNSTLTLAT.LONAL 'RI&\-\T5 UNDER:

•

T\-\E futt~HEE.t-rrtt .~DAtJT, ~~ bu.e li:ncess AnC.

~v\Al ~TECT LON~ ~DE'K Tt\:E UltJITEb 0TATE0

~5T.LTLATlOtJ THAT \>F::.oTEtTu (ITl2Ef\)6 oF LIFE,

:LIBE'KTY, .A.V\d_ ?RDKRTY In THE LA~ITED 0TATt=.0 oF

AMERI(A 1 futvt ILL'E.&.AL Guvet:NMEtv'fAL ACTIOtJ5,

•
(70)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 75 of 80 PageID #: 75

•

49. .A.(!) A DIRECT .A..ND p·Ro/\LMATE R83LALT OF="

DEFE.NDA!-.f\5' Co~DLAcT, ~\AINTIIT.:S \-\Ave OufVE.RED

.A.V\6.

(oyy\-t'rnA.e

-\-o ou.~e~

DI6Tt'ES5 1

~lAtvtiLlAT LON,

\).AI.tJ .AV\C A. lo.ss oV:: LlBER:.TY*', 'PlAIN.TIFf5 i-{Ave .Beer'\

AV\~ LoV\\-fY\ue -\-o be .LK:~P~Rl\B\Y HARME-D by 1HE8E

If\}..1\.AR.LE6 .A.V\~ VlA.INTirr-~' t-\.Auro No ACEquATE ~Kt:DY

.A.+ LAw ~R.otv-\ DEFC.NDA.NT51 u~lAwFLAl Conc\\Act .

60.
•

Wt-tEKEFOf'E, ?LAI~TI\=F6 1 Tot\~K. VAJJDRPEtJ,
KO'BERT l-\ooD, tv\IKE MCCoRD, :r-<AJEP\-\ MILL£f;::,
.lvtAto~ BA.i.ER, CHANCE TYREE, WALTER KncJ\EY:
DAVID t)K:DwN, AtJoTl-\t-.lY _A.KolJE1TE, K-.uJ\A.~D TY~l\J I WADE Tvt~""PIN \1<AY T\-\AT Tt\E CDLA.~T EtJTE'K
THE t="ollDwiNG- 0'\C.DE\?..o .~Y\.~ l(ELI.t.~ t

A.) A.. DE.dA.~\o~'{ ::r"U.d~\--\BJT 1HAT lt\E CoV\Cu.LT,

CoY\6.\-t-'oV\~, A.V\.e. ~osecu.To~ FoR 1\\E: ~STATE oF

tJlTS..<)Ot.ttl, A.V\C.. 1>LAIWTifF<5 l MT~SOL-t'RL 6Wt:-
PiAb\tc.. DE.rrEf\JDt:R, k\t \HE ·Tu.d,.Se~~ AV\c \\-\E.

~i::Di::~ \o 5E To\ D Mow Tl-\~6E FAcTs .1\V't

I5Su.e:> To Be E<plA1t..fED AH 11\mLAL~ ~H Av\6

t=.vEe.'< ·-pL.~rt\1 T.L ~-.s' 'ILIFc TDJ\E CoMi'-1DlvtEAlT TRIAL~

•

-mt:_ 0
To MI5_c.X:A..ta::::L QB<.uA.L OFfEN DE£: ~EA\lvt8\JT CEl\l11?K\'
( tv\oOTC) toR TREATfv\QJT best~I.BED w THE Sf(5l\to.

652.18'c Tc 632 . 5i3 uF\Hc 0VP .AcT CoLA~'\\ I.at--2 •. l (7l)

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 1 Filed: 06/22/09 Page: 76 of 80 PageID #: 76

•
r OF" G-RCt-\V\~5 I!\) 11-\1:6 LCMPLA.L~T ot= VIolAteo 0
·CJ~u:e.L A\1\C. UWU.UUAL Pvtv\ \.st\UEtJT \HAT 1.5 A
Vro\A~ioV' oF 11\E EIG+\T A\f\0- ~E:tt:E-NT~ AH£ND~E~.rr oF D\Ae ·p~ess C\ALA5e() oF 1\-\£ ~g AV\~
lAY\TIED 5TA\E5 Cov\5\.L\LATI:O\J\ 9

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(76)

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. HAROLD MEYERS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This purported class action is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The named Plaintiffs are 14 individuals who are, or were, civilly-committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“Department”) Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facility1 at Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (“SMMHC”). In this action commenced on June 22, 2009, they assert numerous violations of the United States and Missouri Constitutions based on the alleged lack of adequate care treatment provided to them. They also challenge the constitutionality of Missouri’s statutory scheme that provides for reimbursement from Plaintiffs and/or their families or estates for the costs of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment. Defendants are 11 state officials responsible for various aspects of SORTS, all sued in

1 Formerly, the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center (“MSOTC”).

their official capacities.2 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss shall be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, and the purported class of approximately 150 SORTS participants, have been civilly committed to the Department for control, care, and treatment, upon a judicial finding that they were sexually violent predators and had “a mental abnormality” such that it was not safe for them to be at large. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have refused to provide any meaningful statutorily-mandated “care and treatment” to Plaintiffs. Rather, according to Plaintiffs, SORTS treats residents with disdain and utilizes practices which are counter-therapeutic and which destroy any hope residents may have of reforming. The care and treatment provided consists virtually exclusively of sporadic and frequently- cancelled group meetings, attended by an employee of SORTS, some of whom are unlicensed and untrained, at which the residents discuss their problems. Furthermore, the facilities used for SORTS residents are mold-infested and unhealthy and unsafe.
2 Defendants are Keith Schaefer, the Director of the Department; Mark Stringer, the Acting Director of Comprehensive Psychiatric Services at SORTS and SMMHC; Felix Vincenz, the Chief Operating Officer of the Division of Comprehensive Psychiatric Services at SORTS and SMMHC; Julie Inman, the former Chief Financial Officers at SORTS and SMMHC; Jay Englehart, the Medical Director at SORTS and SMMHC; Justin Arnett, the Chief Nurse Executive at SORTS and SMMHC; Melissa Ring, the Chief Operating Officer of SMMHC; Alan Blake, the Chief Operating Officer of SORTS; and Judy Sumpter and Harold Meyers, two reimbursement officers of the Department.
2

Plaintiffs allege that at various times specific to each Plaintiff, one or more Defendants or their agents, demanded that they each sign documents allowing the Department and related entities to collect funds from his personal financial account to be paid to SMMHC for his “care and treatment,” at the rate of $325 per day. They allege that two of the named Plaintiffs (John Van Orden and Walter Ritchey) already have received bills from the Department charging them $9,750 and $8,175 per month, respectively, with balances continuing to mount. These reimbursement efforts were undertaken pursuant to Missouri’s statutory scheme that provides that any “person receiving services” from the Department may be made liable for “the fees for services rendered to the person by a residential facility . . .” and that the person receiving services is jointly and severally liable for those fees together with his estate, spouse, and parents.
Plaintiffs claim that the statutory reimbursement scheme, and Defendants’ policies and practices in accordance therewith, violate the “forfeiture of estate” clause of the Missouri constitution; and the bill of attainder, cruel and unusual punishment, excessive fine, equal protection, procedural due process, unreasonable seizure of property, and ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiffs also claim that the inadequate care and treatment provided to them, and to all others similarly situated, violates their substantive due process rights, and renders the reimbursement scheme even more objectionable, as there is no consideration for the amounts that are statutorily collectable, turning Plaintiffs’ civil-commitment into state-imposed punishment.
Plaintiffs state in the Fourth Amended Complaint that “[t]his action seeks prospective relief arising from the plaintiffs’ deprivation of rights under the United States
3

and Missouri Constitutions by defendants.” More specifically, in their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare the statutory reimbursement scheme to be unconstitutional, and to order the return of all property seized from Plaintiffs or their estates or families pursuant to that scheme. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the care and treatment provided by SORTS is constitutionally inadequate. They also seek injunctive relief, enjoining Defendants from seeking to obtain payment for the costs of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment, and to improve the level of care and treatment provided in certain specific ways, such as by hiring trained psychologists and experts in sex offender treatment.
In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that the “forfeiture of estate” and excessive fines clauses only apply to forfeiture/fines that are a direct result of a criminal conviction, which is not the case here; the bill of attainder claims fail as a matter of law because the challenged statutory scheme does not inflict “punishment” on Plaintiffs without a judicial trial; and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to Plaintiffs, who are civilly-committed individuals.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations that they are not receiving adequate care and treatment also fail to state a claim because states have wide latitude in developing treatment regimens for civilly-committed sexual offenders. Defendants next argue that an equal protection challenge to the statutory reimbursement scheme fails because Plaintiffs are not treated differently than similarly situated individuals, and the scheme is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
4

Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have failed to state a substantive due process claim based on the level of care and treatment provided to them, because no “punishment” is involved, and because Plaintiffs have failed to identify a “fundamental right” that is implicated. Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ unlawful-seizure-ofproperty claim fails because there is no allegation that Defendants actually seized any funds from any Plaintiff; and the claims based on the ex post facto clauses in the federal and state constitutions fail because these clauses only pertain to penal statutes, and the reimbursement statutes are civil in nature.
Defendants’ remaining arguments in support of dismissal of the Fourth Amended Complaint are that to the extent Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for amounts collected more than five years prior to the date of the filing this action, or other relief for conduct engaged in during that period, such claims are barred by the statute of limitations; to the extent that the request for the return of property seized constitutes a claim for damages, such claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; Plaintiffs’ challenge to the statutory scheme regarding reimbursement rights from any of Plaintiffs’ estates is not ripe; and one named Plaintiff (David Brown) does not have standing because he was released from SORTS in May 2009.3
3 As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the structure of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10. And Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims is misplaced, as qualified immunity is a defense that is only available to governmental employees sued in their individual capacity. See VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2007).
5

DISCUSSION To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff need only allege facts that permit the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, even if the complaint “strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable” and recovery “very remote and unlikely.” Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2010). Adequacy of Care and Treatment Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”) authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually violent predators,” persons who suffer from a mental abnormality that makes them more likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480, et seq. The SVPA applies to persons who have pled or been found guilty of a sexually violent offense, persons found not guilty of committing a sexually violent offense by reason of mental disease or defect, persons committed as criminal sexual psychopaths, and persons at any time convicted of a sexually violent offense who have committed a recent overt act. Id. §§ 632.480(5)(a) and (b); 632.484.1(1) and (2). The State has a statutory obligation to provide “care and treatment” for persons committed under the SVPA, designed to effect recovery. Id. § 632.495.2 (“If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed to the custody of the director of the department of mental health for control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s
6

mental abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.”); Strutton v. Meade, No. 4:05CV02022 ERW, 2010 WL 1253715, at *35 (E.D. Mo. March 31, 2010).
The proper standard for analyzing Plaintiffs’ claim was set forth as follows in Strutton: “Defendants’ actions in denying [Plaintiffs their] statutory right to treatment will be found unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment if they were so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the conscience.” Strutton, 2010 WL 1253715, at *35 (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 546-47 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a substantive due process claim alleging inadequate treatment for committed sex offender “must focus on the challenged abuse of power by officials in denying [the plaintiff] the treatment regimen that was statutorily mandated and was necessary in order for his condition to improve, and thus for him to advance toward release”)). The question is “how little treatment Defendants can provide before their behavior becomes conscience-shocking and therefore unconstitutional.” Id. at *36. This claim is fact-intensive and will require further development of the record, and is therefore not subject to dismissal at this time.
The Court further agrees with Plaintiffs that their claims for prospective equitable relief for the allegedly continuing unconstitutionally inadequate treatment are not barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s substantive due process challenge based on the failure to provide mandated treatment will be denied.
Plaintiffs’ claim that the level of care and treatment provided constitutes “punishment,” in violation of the due process clause, however, is subject to dismissal for
7

lack of factual support for such a claim. See, e.g., Aune v. Ludeman, No. 09-0015 (JNE/SRN), 2010 WL 145276, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2010).
With respect to the standing of Plaintiff Brown, Plaintiffs allege that Brown was confined at SORTS between November 17, 2008, and May 2009. Jurisdictional issues such as standing must be determined at the time the lawsuit is filed. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808, 814 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Smith v. Norris, 877 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (holding that inmate complaining of unconstitutional prison conditions in his unit continued to have standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief, even though he had been transferred out of unit, where transfer was effectuated subsequent to filing of his complaint), rev’d in part on other grounds, Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 103 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, Defendants’ argument that Brown has no standing to pursue this claim is rejected. Constitutionality of Statutory Scheme for Payment for Services
As noted above, under Missouri law, any “person receiving services” from the Department may be made liable for “the fees for services rendered to the person by a residential facility, day program or specialized service operated or funded by the department.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 630.205.1. The person receiving services is jointly and severally liable for those fees together with “the person’s estate, spouse, parents, if the person is a minor, and any fiduciary or representative payee holding assets for the person or on the person’s behalf.” Id.
The director of the Department is charged with determining “the maximum amount for services which shall be charged in each of the residential facilities . . . operated or
8

funded by the department.” Id. § 630.210.1. When the person who received services dies, “the total amount paid to the decedent or expended upon his behalf . . . shall be a debt due the state or county . . . from the estate of the decedent.” Id. § 473.398. As a seventh class creditor, the State’s debt is paid only after satisfying certain costs, such as funeral expenses, and other debts, such as taxes due to the United States, and after allowing for exempt property, such as the family and homestead allowances. The decision of the Director to seek reimbursement for services rendered may be appealed to the Missouri circuit court, under the Missouri Administrative Procedures Act. Id. § 630.215.3. “The decision of the director in determining the amount to be charged for services to a patient,” may be also reviewed in Missouri circuit court. Id. § 630.120.
The Court finds Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ challenge to this statutory scheme is not ripe for adjudication to be without merit. The claims of Van Orden and Ritchey are clearly ripe for review as payments due have already been assessed as to them. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have alleged that each of them have been pressured, or at least asked, to sign documents that will enable Defendants to collect payments pursuant to the statutes at issue here. As with the claim based upon allegedly unconstitutional treatment, Plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief for the continuing and prospective unconstitutional efforts to charge Plaintiffs or their estates for care and treatment allegedly not provided, are not barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants have not identified any specific acts challenged by Plaintiffs which would fall beyond the applicable five-year limitations period.
9

Plaintiffs have taken wide aim at the state and federal constitutions in asserting that the statutory scheme, on its face or as applied to them, is unconstitutional. The Court concludes that most of the constitutional clauses relied upon by Plaintiffs are unavailing, largely for the reasons posited by Defendants. The “forfeiture of estate” clause of the Missouri Constitution applies to the consequences of criminal convictions, and the “excessive fine” clauses of the state and federal constitutions apply to actions by the government to inflict punishment for criminal offenses. While, as Plaintiffs allege, their civil commitment would not have taken place but for their earlier criminal conviction, the Missouri statutes that allow the Department to seek reimbursement from Plaintiffs and/or their estates do not impose punishment for Plaintiffs’ criminal convictions. Plaintiffs have cited no cases, nor has the Court found any cases, suggesting that these clauses have any applicability to the claims at issue here.
Similarly, the ex post facto clause applies to laws imposing punishment, which is not the case here. See Stanley v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. C2-02-178, 2002 WL 31409435, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2002) (explaining that imposition of co-payment for medical services upon prisoner did not violate ex post facto clause, even though change occurred subsequent to prisoner’s conviction, because co-payment did not impose any additional punishment or risk of punishment). The Court also concludes that application of the reimbursement statutory scheme to Plaintiffs does not implicate their constitutional rights to be free from unlawful seizure of their effects. See Bailey v. Carter, 15 F. App’x 245, 250 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting “illegal search and seizure claim” as to prison’s regulation, pursuant to state law allowing prisons to recover costs of
10

supervision and incarceration from certain offenders, requiring inmates must pay a $3 copayment for certain medical visits). Again, Plaintiffs have cited no cases, nor has the Court found any, suggesting that the federal and state prohibitions against unlawful searches and seizures have applicability here.
A prohibited bill of attainder is a legislative act that applies “either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.” United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). The statutory reimbursement scheme, as written or applied, does not fit this definition. Similarly, the claim that the statutory scheme, as written or applied, constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment,” fails as a matter of law. See Bailey, 15 F. App’x at 250.
Plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge to the statutory reimbursement scheme also fails as a matter of law, as they have pre-deprivation notice and post-deprivation judicial review available as to both the decision to seek reimbursement and the amount sought. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that taking funds from inmates’ accounts to cover medical services did not violate procedural due process where notice and post-deprivation remedies existed).
Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants’ acts in allegedly taking or threatening to take money from Plaintiffs for treatment that was not provided, violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights shall, however, be permitted to proceed. Cf. Stanley, 2002 WL 31409435, at *2 (holding that requiring prisoners to pay for services actually received does not violate due process).
11

This leaves Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. In their Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants treat Plaintiffs differently than other civillycommitted patients of the Department in that Defendants charge a lower fee to patients who were civilly committed due to mental abnormalities not related to sexual conduct, than to patients such as Plaintiffs, whose mental abnormalities were related to sexual conduct, and whose treatment is inferior to that provided to other patients. Plaintiffs allege that there is no rational basis for this difference. While Defendants challenge whether such differences actually exist and whether there is a rational basis for them, these are issues best determined upon further factual development of the record.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to the lack of adequate care and treatment, and as to their equal protection and substantive due process claims based upon Missouri’s statutory reimbursement scheme as applied to Plaintiffs; the motion is GRANTED as to all other aspects of the Fourth Amended Complaint. [Doc. #123]

Dated this 25th day of July, 2011.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 197 Filed: 09/30/11 Page: 1 of 21 PageID #: 1398

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. HAROLD MEYERS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This case involves constitutional challenges by civilly-committed sex offenders to the State of Missouri’s treatment program and cost-reimbursement provisions. The named Plaintiffs are 14 individuals who are, or were, civilly-committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“Department”) Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facility1 at Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (“SMMHC”). Defendants are 11 state officials responsible for various aspects of SORTS, all sued in their official capacities.2 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’

1 Formerly, the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center (“MSOTC”).
2 Defendants are Keith Schaefer, the Director of the Department; Mark Stringer, the Acting Director of Comprehensive Psychiatric Services at SORTS and SMMHC; Felix Vincenz, the Chief Operating Officer of the Division of Comprehensive Psychiatric Services at SORTS and SMMHC; Julie Inman, the former Chief Financial Officer at SORTS and SMMHC; Jay Englehart, the Medical Director at SORTS and SMMHC; Justin Arnett, the Chief Nurse Executive at SORTS and SMMHC; Melissa Ring, the Chief Operating Officer of SMMHC; Alan Blake, the Chief Operating Officer of SORTS; and Judy Sumpter and Harold Meyers, two reimbursement officers of the Department.

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motion for class certification [Doc. No. 143] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. For the reasons set forth below, class certification will be granted. I. BACKGROUND
In their Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged numerous violations of the United States and Missouri Constitutions based on the lack of adequate treatment provided to them as SORTS residents. They also challenged the constitutionality of the Missouri statutory scheme that provides for reimbursement from Plaintiffs and/or their families or estates for the costs of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment. Following the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 192], the only claims remaining are Plaintiffs’ claims (1) that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to the lack of adequate care and treatment, and (2) that Missouri’s statutory reimbursement scheme as applied to Plaintiffs violates their rights to equal protection and substantive due process. [Doc. No. 192]
Plaintiffs, acting in behalf of current and future and certain past residents of SORTS, seek certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 of two classes: the “Treatment Class” and the “Charging Class.”
The “Treatment Class” includes persons who are or will be residents of SORTS of the State of Missouri as a result of civil commitment or who will be detained at SORTS pending civil commitment. The named Plaintiffs for the Treatment Class are John R. Van Orden, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, Anthony Amonette, Richard Tyson, and Wade A. Turpin. The members of this class seek relief related to the treatment or lack of treatment provided to SORTS
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residents. Generally, Plaintiffs allege that the treatment provided during their confinement at SORTS is so grossly inadequate as to amount to a violation of their rights to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The “Charging Class” includes all current, former and future residents of SORTS, and their estates, heirs, assignees, descendants, and personal representatives, that have been or will be billed or charged for care, treatment, room or board by SORTS or by the SMMHC. The Charging Class includes the same representative Plaintiffs as the Treatment Class with the addition of Plaintiff David Brown, a former resident.
A. The SORTS Statutory Scheme Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”) authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually violent predators,” defined as persons who suffer from a mental abnormality that makes them more likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480, et seq. The SVPA applies to persons who have pled or been found guilty of a sexually violent offense, persons found not guilty of committing a sexually violent offense by reason of mental disease or defect, persons committed as criminal sexual psychopaths, and persons at any time convicted of a sexually violent offense who have committed a recent overt act. Id. §§ 432.480(5)(a) and (b); 632.484.1(1) and (2). Pursuant to the SVPA, an individual may be committed to the custody of the Department for an indefinite period of time, during which the State has an obligation to provide “care and treatment” designed to effect recovery. Id.§ 632.495 (“If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed to the custody of the director of the
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department of mental health for control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.”); Id. § 632.495; Strutton v. Meade, No. 4:05CV02022 ERW, 2010 WL 1253715, at *35 (E.D. Mo. March 31, 2010).
Under Missouri law, any “person receiving services” from the Department may be made liable for “the fees for services rendered to the person by a residential facility, day program or specialized service operated or funded by the department.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 630.205.1. The person receiving services is jointly and severally liable for those fees together with “the person’s estate, spouse, parents, if the person is a minor, and any fiduciary or representative payee holding assets for the person or on the person’s behalf.” Id. The director of the Department is charged with determining “the maximum amount for services which shall be charged in each of the residential facilities . . . operated or funded by the department.” Id. § 630.210.1. When the person who received services dies, “the total amount paid to the decedent or expended upon his behalf . . . shall be a debt due the state or county . . . from the estate of the decedent.” Id. § 473.398. As a seventh class creditor, the State’s debt is paid only after satisfying certain costs, such as funeral expenses, and other debts, such as taxes due to the United States, and after allowing for exempt property, such as the family and homestead allowances. The decision of the director to seek reimbursement for services rendered may be appealed to the Missouri circuit court, under the Missouri Administrative Procedures Act. Id. § 630.215.3. “The decision of the director in determining the amount to be charged for services to a patient,” may be also reviewed in Missouri circuit court. Id. § 630.120. The
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State of Missouri successfully collects reimbursement for services and room and board charges under this statutory authority.
B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations with Respect to the Treatment Class Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have refused to provide any meaningful statutorily-mandated “care and treatment.” Rather, according to Plaintiffs, SORTS treats residents with disdain and utilizes practices that are counter-therapeutic and that destroy any hope residents may have of reforming. Plaintiffs allege that the care and treatment provided consists almost exclusively of sporadic and frequently-cancelled group meetings, attended by employees of SORTS, some of whom are unlicensed and untrained, at which residents discuss their problems. Plaintiffs further allege that, since the inception of SORTS a decade ago, not a single resident has been released as a result of the treatment received at SORTS. In essence, Plaintiffs assert that the treatment provided at SORTS fails to fulfill their statutory right to “care and treatment” and violates their constitutional right to a treatment that provides a realistic possibility of release. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the care and treatment provided by SORTS is constitutionally inadequate, and injunctive relief requiring the Department to improve the level of care and treatment provided in certain specific ways, such as by hiring trained psychologists and experts in the treatment of sex offenders. C. Plaintiffs’ Allegations with Respect to the Charging Class Plaintiffs allege that at various times specific to each Plaintiff, one or more Defendants or their agents, demanded that he sign documents allowing the Department
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and related entities to collect funds from his personal financial account to be paid to SMMHC for his “care and treatment,” at the rate of $325 per day. They allege that two of the named Plaintiffs, Van Orden and Ritchey, already have received bills from the Department charging them $9,750 and $8,175 per month, respectively,3 with balances continuing to mount. The Department undertakes these collection and reimbursement efforts pursuant to Missouri’s statutory scheme that provides that any “person receiving services” from the Department may be made liable for “the fees for services rendered to the person by a residential facility,” and that the person receiving services is jointly and severally liable for those fees together with his estate, spouse, and parents. Plaintiffs assert that this scheme violates their due process rights and that the inadequate care and treatment provided to them and to all others similarly situated renders the reimbursement scheme even more objectionable, as there is no consideration for the amounts that may be collected under the statute. Plaintiffs also assert that all SORTS residents are treated differently than other persons civilly committed for other mental health issues, in violation of their equal protection rights. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from seeking to obtain reimbursement for the costs of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment at SORTS.
D. Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to Class Certification Several of the arguments Defendants raise in opposition to class certification are no longer pertinent, as they are directed at claims in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended
3 In their opposition memorandum, Defendants assert that they apply a “Standard Means Test” to determine the amounts owed by each resident, based on the individual’s income and assets.
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Complaint that have since been dismissed by the Court. [Doc. No. 192] As such, this Court will address only those objections directed to the remaining claims.
Defendants object to certification of both the Treatment Class and the Charging Class on the grounds that they are overly broad. Defendants contend that the Treatment Class is overly broad because it includes pretrial detainees, and that the Charging Class is overly broad because it includes former and future, as well as current SORTS residents and their estates, heirs, assignees, descendants, and personal representatives. With respect to the Treatment Class, Defendants also assert that because proposed class members committed to SORTS may suffer different “mental abnormalities,” the proposed members of the Treatment Class lack the commonality and typicality necessary for class certification. II. SCOPE OF THE CLASSES
A. “Future” SORTS Residents The Court agrees with Defendants’ assertion that both proposed classes are overlybroad and should not include “future” SORTS residents. Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief which, if granted, would presumably apply to future SORTS residents. Therefore, the inclusion of “future” SORTS residents in the proposed classes is redundant and unnecessary, and could unduly complicate the proceedings. The Court will modify the proposed class definitions to restrict the classes to those who are, or will be during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS.
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B. Non-SORTS Residents Plaintiffs propose that the Charging Class include the “estates, heirs, assignees, descendants, and personal representatives” of SORTS residents. The statutory scheme under which the Department may seek reimbursement for services makes these individuals jointly and severally liable with SORTS residents for those services. However, the inclusion of these individuals in the statute does not make it necessary to include them in the Charging Class. The prospective injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek would, if granted, address the issue of joint and several liability under the statutory scheme. Including these individuals in the proposed class would be unduly cumbersome and is not necessary to achieve the result Plaintiffs seek. Therefore, the Court will modify the proposed definition of the Charging Class to exclude the reference to “estates, heirs, assignees, descendants, and personal representatives.” C. Pretrial Detainees The Court also agrees with Defendants’ assertions that the inclusion of pretrial detainees within the proposed class destroys commonality. The Eighth Circuit has stated that “pretrial detainees are entitled to at least as much protection” as convicted offenders with respect to the provision of adequate medical treatment. Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating, in the context of a claim for inadequate medical treatment, that the Fourteenth Amendment provides at least as much protection to pretrial detainees as the Eighth Amendment does to prisoners). However, the fact that pretrial detainees are entitled to at least as much protection does not mean that the programs offered to pretrial detainees are similar or that the objectives of those programs are
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similar -- or should be similar -- to the programs offered to the civilly-committed residents.
Indeed, in this case certain factors readily distinguish pretrial detainees housed at SORTS from those SORTS residents who have been adjudicated “sexually violent predators” within the meaning of the statute. For example, pretrial detainees are not subject to indefinite confinement at SORTS, but are released upon a showing that they do not meet the definition of sexually violent predator. By contrast, SORTS residents who have been adjudicated sexually violent predators will not be released until they have received sufficient treatment to ensure that it is “safe for them to be at large.” Regardless of the adequacy of the treatment available for them, pretrial detainees will be released from SORTS due to either an acquittal at trial or a conviction. The same is not true for persons deemed sexually violent predators. Assessing the adequacy of the treatment provided for pretrial detainees would involve different questions and considerations not relevant to civilly-committed SORTS residents. Accordingly, the Court concludes that pretrial detainees should be excluded from the proposed Treatment Class.
The Court shall analyze the propriety of class certification with the classes as narrowed herein. III. STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiffs move for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When considering a Rule 23 motion for class certification, a court must first determine if: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of
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the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a). The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that class litigation
is an “exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the
individual named parties only.” General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)
(quotation omitted). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that the class should be
certified and that each requirement of Rule 23 is satisfied. Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d
255, 258 (8th Cir. 1994). In addition, class certification is proper only if the court
determines “after a rigorous analysis” that all the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met.4
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161; Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2006).
In addition to the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the proposed class also must
satisfy one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs assert, and Defendants do not
disagree, that Rule 23(b)(2) applies to the proposed classes. The Eighth Circuit has
4 Even if all the requirements of Rule 23 are met, where the sole form of relief sought is equitable, and such relief, if granted, will benefit all members of the putative class, a court has limited discretion to deny class certification. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972) (vacated as moot, 93S.Ct. 66 (1972)); Sutter v. Crawford, No. 06-4032CV W FHS , 2007 WL 188451, at *1 (W.D., Mo. January 23, 2007) (denying class certification and finding the argument that injunctive relief would benefit all members of the proposed class more persuasive than the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy certain requirements of Rule 23(a)); Women’s Health Ctr. v. Webster, 670 F. Supp. 845, 852 (E.D. Mo. 1987); aff’d 871 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) (declining to certify class action where some, but not all, of the requirements of Rule 23 were met and the prospective equitable relief requested would benefit all members of the potential class); but see Pottinger v. City of Miami, 720 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (declining to exercise its limited discretion to deny certification where prospective equitable relief would arguably benefit all members of the prospective class).
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expressed a preference for a liberal reading of Rule 23(b)(2) in the context of civil rights suits. Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1378 (8th Cir. 1980).
Finally, in addition to the requirements set forth above, considerations of comity apply to the class certification determination. The Eighth Circuit has held that courts reviewing motions for class certification in actions seeking injunctive relief against State agencies must be “‘constantly mindful of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.’” Elizabeth M., 458 F.3d at 784 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976)).
A. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” To be “impracticable” does not mean that joinder must be impossible, but it does require a showing that it would be extremely difficult or inconvenient to join all members of the class.” Morgan v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 355 (E.D. Mo. 1996). The Eighth Circuit has established no specific rule as to the necessary size of a class, but has directed courts to consider several factors in determining whether joinder is feasible: the number of persons in the class, the nature of the action, the size of the individual claims, the inconvenience of trying individual suits, and any other factor relevant to the practicability of joining all the class members. Emanuel v. Marsh, 828 F.2d 438, 444 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Paxton v. Union Nat. Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982)). Upon consideration of these factors, the Court concludes that each of the two proposed classes satisfies the numerosity requirement. At a minimum, the Treatment
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Class would consist of approximately 150 members, the number of residents at SORTS at any one time. The Charging Class would be at least as large, potentially including past SORTS residents as well. It is clear that joining each of the putative plaintiffs individually and trying separate suits for each would be wasteful, duplicative, and time consuming. And, if each of the Plaintiffs’ claims were tried individually, much of the evidence and many of the witnesses would be the same in each case, constituting a waste of judicial resources. Therefore, in this case joinder is “impracticable” and the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied.
B. Commonality Commonality, as required by Rule 23(a)(2), will be found where the legal questions linking class members are substantially related to the resolution of the litigation. The mere presence of factual differences will not defeat the maintenance of a class action if there are common questions of law uniting the class members’ claims. DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171,1174 (8th Cir. 1995); Coley, 635 F.2d at 1378; Glen v. Fairway Indep. Mortg. Corp., 265 F.R.D. 474, 478 (E.D. Mo. 2010). As the Eighth Circuit held in Paxton, commonality “does not require that every question of law or fact be common to every member of the class … and may be satisfied, for example, where the question of law linking the class members is substantially related to the resolution of the litigation even though the individuals are not identically situated.” Paxton, 688 F.2d at 561 (quotation omitted). While Plaintiffs must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, they need not show that all issues raised by the dispute are common. Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1334 (8th Cir.
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1974). Furthermore, not every class member need be affected by a statute, administrative practice, or institutional condition in an identical manner. Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1988) (reversing a denial of class certification where the district court found that the named plaintiffs, inmates at a state prison challenging conditions of confinement, were all subject to the same conditions even though they may not all have suffered the same injuries).
Applying these standards to Plaintiffs’ proposed classes, the Court finds that both classes, as modified by the Court, satisfy the commonality requirement. With respect to the Treatment Class, the predominant fact issues include: the types of treatment provided at SORTS; how often that treatment is available and to whom; the training and qualifications of the treatment providers; what treatments, if any, have been shown to be effective to permit sexually violent predators to safely return to society; the requirements of the SORTS program; and what treatments facilitate progression through the levels of the program toward release. The predominate legal issue is whether the program provided is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience. With respect to these issues the similarities between SORTS residents predominate over any differences that may exist with respect to particular residents. It is true that differences between class members, such as length of confinement, progress shown under the existing treatment regimen, and the willingness and cooperation evinced by particular SORTS residents may exist and may affect the efficacy of the existing treatment regimen for a particular individual. But these differences are not relevant to the basic question raised by
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Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim: whether the treatment presently provided is so minimal as to shock the conscience.
Nor does the fact that SORTS residents may evince differing mental abnormalities destroy commonality. The adequacy of treatment when measured at the level of substantive due process does not hinge upon the underlying mental conditions of the named Plaintiffs and the proposed class members, or upon differences between them. “Defendants’ actions in denying [Plaintiffs their] statutory right to treatment will be found unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment if they were so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the conscience.” Strutton, 2010 WL 1253715, at *35 (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 546-47 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a substantive due process claim alleging inadequate treatment for committed sex offender “must focus on the challenged abuse of power by officials in denying [the plaintiff] the treatment regimen that was statutorily mandated and was necessary in order for his condition to improve, and thus for him to advance toward release”)). The question is “how little treatment Defendants can provide before their behavior becomes conscience-shocking and therefore unconstitutional.” Strutton, 2010 WL 1253715 at *36.
Commonality requires that “the harm complained of be common to the members of the class,” not that each class member evince “precisely the same injuries.” Hassine, 846 F.2d at 177. Here, the “harm complained of” is the failure of the Department to provide a level of care and treatment designed to effect recovery. In light of the applicable legal standard, this harm is common to all potential class members regardless of the nature of their underlying “mental abnormality.”
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 197 Filed: 09/30/11 Page: 15 of 21 PageID #: 1412 The case with respect to the Charging Class is even more clear. Plaintiffs and the
class members they seek to represent are all subject to the same statutory scheme which authorizes the Department to seek reimbursement from SORTS participants for services they allege to be inadequate or nonexistent.
Defendants contend that because the Department does not impose a flat fee for services, but applies a “means test” to determine the amounts charged, the named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Charging Class lack the required commonality. The fact that class members are assessed differing amounts for services received will not destroy commonality. Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that commonality is required as to the elements necessary to make out a prima facie case, but not for issues like damage calculations); DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1174.
The Court also rejects Defendants’ assertions that “former” resident of SORTS should be excluded from the proposed Charging Class. Defendants contend that the exclusion of former residents is proper because they will be unable to demonstrate that they share a common injury with the named Plaintiffs unless there has been a showing that the Department has, or will, seek reimbursement for services from former SORTS residents. This argument misses the point. Commonality between the named Plaintiffs and former SORTS residents arises from the fact that they are all subject to the same statutory scheme that authorizes the Department to seek reimbursement, whether or not it has chosen to do so in a particular instance. DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1174.
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C. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” The Eighth Circuit has said that the requirement of “typicality” under Rule 23(a)(3) means that there are “other members of the class who have the same or similar grievances as the Plaintiff[s].” Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). The named Plaintiffs and the class members may be said to have similar grievances if they have been subjected to the same allegedly unlawful treatment.5 Rentschler v. Carnahan, 160 F.R.D. 114, 116 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that the typicality requirement was satisfied where the named plaintiffs and the putative class members were subjected to the same policies and conditions and their claims were “all based on the same legal theories, the same arguments of unconstitutionality”). Here, the typicality requirement is satisfied with respect to the Treatment Class. The named Plaintiffs and the putative class members allege that they have been and continue to be subjected to the same allegedly unlawful policies and conditions at SORTS. See Rentschler, 160 F.R.D. at 116. Further, the named Plaintiffs represent the various coded treatment classifications assigned as part of the SORTS program. The allegations of inadequate treatment arise out of the same course of conduct and are based on the same legal theories. Id. The same is true of the Charging Class. Both the named
5 “The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). Thus, “a finding of commonality frequently supports a finding of typicality.” Von Colln v. County of Ventura, 189 F.R.D. 583, 591 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 197 Filed: 09/30/11 Page: 17 of 21 PageID #: 1414 Plaintiffs and the absent class members are subject to the application of a statutory process which charges them for services they allegedly have not received, and are allegedly charged in a manner different from other civilly-committed mental health residents. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the typicality requirement is satisfied.
D. Adequate Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” The adequacy requirement has two components: “(1) the class representatives’ interests [must be] coextensive with and not antagonistic to those of the unnamed class members; and (2) the plaintiffs’ counsel must be fully competent to prosecute the action as a class action.” Rentschler, 160 F.R.D. at 116-17. The first component, coextensiveness, “refers to shared objectives and shared legal and factual positions.” Id. at 117. “Plaintiffs seeking to represent a class need not show that all class members agree with them.” Hedge v. Lyng, 689 F. Supp 884, 890 (D. Minn. 1987). In the absence of “a real probability of a conflict which goes to the very subject matter of the litigation,” antagonistic interests sufficient to defeat class certification will not be found. Rentschler, 160 F.R.D. at 116-17; see, e.g., Hedge, 689 F. Supp. at 890 (holding that a “bald assertion” that some of the proposed class members might disagree with the plaintiffs was not sufficient to demonstrate antagonistic interests). With respect to both the Treatment Class and the Charging Class, the Court concludes that the interests of the named Plaintiffs and the putative class members are sufficiently coincident to insure that Plaintiffs will vigorously assert the rights of the class. Id. at 891.
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 197 Filed: 09/30/11 Page: 18 of 21 PageID #: 1415 In addition, the Court finds no indication that Plaintiffs’ attorneys are anything
other than “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation” as required by Rule 23 (a)(4). Id. at 890 (quoting Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247(3d Cir. 1975)). The qualifications of Plaintiffs’ attorneys as experienced and knowledgeable advocates are not in dispute and, therefore, the second component of the adequacy requirement is satisfied. See Linquist v. Bowen, 633 F. Supp. 846, 859-60 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
E. Rule 23(b)(2) Once the four threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a court must determine whether the suit is one of the types of class actions permitted under Rule 23(b). As noted above, the parties agree that the category applicable to the relief sought by each of the two proposed classes is Rule 23(b)(2). A class action is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The Treatment Class and the Charging Class are proper Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Defendants, SORTS administrators, established the policies and practices at SORTS and direct the treatment of SORTS residents and detainees. By implementing an allegedly unconstitutional program and by enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional reimbursement scheme, they “have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.”
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 197 Filed: 09/30/11 Page: 19 of 21 PageID #: 1416 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Accordingly, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.
F. Comity Mindful of the Eighth Circuit’s cautionary language in Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, the Court has weighed the ramifications of certifying the proposed classes, and in particular the possibility that the exercise of its equitable powers might intrude upon the “State’s administration of its own laws.” Elizabeth M., 458 F.3d at 784 (quotation omitted). Upon careful consideration, the Court concludes that this case and these circumstances are distinguishable from those found in Elizabeth M. In that case, the class action plaintiffs sought “sweeping injunctive relief” which, if granted, would have insinuated the district court in the minutiae of numerous detailed programs governing “nearly every facet” of the operations of three residential mental health facilities. Id. Here, the Court confronts two basic issues: whether SORTS residents are deprived of meaningful treatment designed to effect recovery to a degree that offends the Fourteenth Amendment; and whether the Department may seek reimbursement for services that Plaintiffs allege were grossly inadequate, never provided, or provided in a manner that improperly differs from other civilly-committed residents. The Court recognizes the possibility that even its consideration of these more focused issues has the potential to lead to inappropriate involvement in the day-to-day operations of SORTS, but believes such concerns can be addressed at a later stage of these proceedings if they prove to be problematic.
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 197 Filed: 09/30/11 Page: 20 of 21 PageID #: 1417 The Eighth Circuit has recognized that “a court’s inquiry on a motion for class
certification is ‘tentative,’ ‘preliminary,’ and ‘limited.’” In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liability Litigation, 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11(1978)). In light of this uncertainty and the Court’s determination to avoid inappropriate involvement in the State’s concerns, the Court will certify these classes, but reserve the right to decertify or redefine them at the close of discovery when the factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claims is more fully developed. This course of action gives due recognition to the fact that class certification decisions are “necessarily prospective and subject to change,” as they are generally made before the close of discovery. In re Zurn, 644 F.3d at 614. IV. NOTICE TO THE CLASSES
Although Rule 23 does not mandate notice requirements when a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(2), courts have exercised their discretion under Rule 23(c)(2)(A) to require notice. See e.g., Jones v. Nova Star Fin., Inc., 257 F .R. D. 181, 194 (W.D. Mo. 2009) (finding discretionary notice to class members in a 23(b)(1) action appropriate). In determining whether to require notice when notice is discretionary, courts have considered the interests of class members to be notified and whether notice costs would “deter the pursuit of class relief.” Id. The parties have not provided the Court with a proposed form of notice. Accordingly, the Court will direct the parties to succinctly brief the notice issue to assist the Court in its notice determination.
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CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification should be granted, certifying a “Treatment Class” and a “Charging Class.” The “Treatment Class” shall include persons who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS of the State of Missouri as a result of civil commitment. The “Charging Class” shall include all persons who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action residents, and former residents, of SORTS of the State of Missouri as a result of civil commitment, and who have been, or will be, billed or charged for care, treatment, room or board by SORTS or by the SMMHC. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [Doc. No. 143] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file no later than October 12, 2011, their brief in support of their proposed form of notice, and Defendants shall file their response to Plaintiffs’ brief not later than October 24, 2011.

Dated this 30th day of September, 2011.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 1 of 196 PageID #: 2073

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN R. VAN ORDEN, JOSEPH MILLER, )

MICHAEL MCCORD, MACON BAKER, )

CHANCE TYREE, WALTER W. RITCHEY, )

DAVID BROWN, ANTHONY AMONETTE, )

RICHARD TYSON, WADE A. TURPIN, )

MATTHEW KING, AND ANDREE COKES )

ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL )

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

KEITH SCHAFER, RICK GOWDY, JOSEPH )

PARKS, M.D., ROBERT REITZ, MELISSA )

RING, JULIE INMAN, LINDA MOLL,

)

HAROLD MEYERS, JUDY SUMPTER,

)

DAMAN LONGWORTH, ALAN BLAKE, )

JAY ENGLEHART, M.D., MARK

)

STRINGER, DONNA AUGUSTINE, DAVE )

SCHMITT, JUSTIN ARNETT, MARTY

)

MARTIN-FORMAN, IAN FLUGER,

)

SHERRY LEE, ERICKA L. KEMPKER,

)

KRISTINA BENDER-CRICE, AND THE )

DOE DEFENDANTS.

)

Case No. 4:09-cv-00971 AGF
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO
42 U.S.C. 1983, RELATED CLAIMS AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT COME NOW Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette, Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, Matthew King, and Andree Cokes, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (collectively hereinafter “the plaintiffs”) and for their Fifth Amended Complaint against Defendants Keith Schafer, Rick Gowdy, Joseph Parks, M.D., Melissa Ring, Julie Inman, Linda Moll, Harold Meyers, Judy Sumpter, Daman Longworth, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, M.D., Mark

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 2 of 196 PageID #: 2074
Stringer, Donna Augustine, Dave Schmitt, Justin Arnett, Marty Martin-Forman, Ian Fluger, Sherry Lee, Ericka L. Kempker, Kristina Bender-Crice, and the Doe defendants (collectively “the defendants”) state the following:
Introduction 1. Mismanaged, underfunded, understaffed, and in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions and Missouri statutory law, the Missouri Department of Mental Health (“DMH”) Program known as The Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Service (“SORTS”) is government at its worst. 2. As a result, the DMH, has put the citizens of Missouri at great risk and created the circumstances and claims, as set forth hereinafter, that 200 or more convicted rapists, child molesters, and other sexually violent predators must be immediately discharged at large without any restrictions or control pursuant to the relief sought in this Case. 3. The flawed calculus of the DMH in the operation of SORTS arose out of the belief that the imprisonment of those branded as sexually violent predators were so reviled that no one would notice nor care when tucked away in Farmington, Missouri. As often occurs when government steps so far over the line in its treatment of those that it reasons are at the bottom rung of society, such behavior is ultimately exposed and the consequences are immeasurably more injurious than if public officials had played by the rules at the beginning and had the courage to do the right thing. 4. SORTS is thus so far gone that it is irretrievably broken, cannot be salvaged and thus must immediately be shut down and all of its inhabitants set free. The constitution demands no other relief. 5. Paradoxically, the SORTS website states the following as its Mission, Vision, and Values:
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MISSION: Protect public safety by rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a respectful, safe and secure setting. VISION: “Offering hope, recovery, rehabilitation and support to live fulfilling lives.” VALUES: People Deserve: Dignity, understanding, to be safe, to make decisions for themselves, hope, positive outcomes. We value: Respect, Cultural Competency, Teamwork and team members, Consumer opinions and input, Encouragement and Best Practices.
At one time, SORTS even claimed that its treatment program was “state of the art.” Now, internal documents show that boast was just that and that DMH leaders can only hope to create such a program, somehow, sometime, with ill defined, unfocused words without action, activity without results or any accountable plan and execution. At one point, Felix Vincenz, who served as DMH Director of Psychiatric Care, when advised about a critical lack of space for the residents to live and be treated could only respond to this disaster by stating, “Yikes, any suggestions?”
6. Overcrowding has continually plagued SORTS and in a December, 2009 document (Exhibit 1 attached hereto) produced by the DMH in this case (a memo entitled “SORTS Census, Bed Space and Funded Bed Projections – December, 2009”), the consequences of that problem were described with these observations:
“…in the current environment overcrowding results in practices that are violations of accreditation and life/safety standards, thereby placing accreditation efforts at risk. In addition, an unfunded ward lacks the staff needed to provide treatment, housekeeping, clerical and support services are not available, placing an additional burden on existing staff, thereby diluting services for several months. This is all the more problematic as allegations of overcrowding and inadequate services are the subject of
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conditions of confinement lawsuits by residents.” (Emphasis added).
7. As is set forth in detail below, the website pledges and declarations are so untrue that publishing them to the world representing them to be factual, only heightens the merits of the claim, as asserted in this Case, that SORTS is a fraud and its true mission misrepresented. In fact, following discovery in this case of sometimes “encrypted” emails, long since hidden in prior litigation in this federal district and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the real story emerges. What is now known is that when spanning the fourteen plus years of the operation of SORTS, it is now provable by competent evidence that the program was admittedly “bad” and “inadequately funded” at the start, had major problems during the middle years (underfunded, overcrowded, unjustified suspension of treatment, and the like), and in the recent years, subject to the same ills as noted by professionals hired just last year to try to reform, without success, SORTS. In short, SORTS (or as it called itself in the past, MSOTC) was from the start, continued throughout and still is a publicly run disaster, where the blame for such a mess falls at the feet of the highest levels of state government. What follows is a shocking display of government at its ghastliest, abusing the trust of the public, and causing more harm than good. These candid emails, which the DMH never thought would see the light of day, make a number of startling revelations, including this 2009 communication (Exhibit 2 attached hereto) by the Director of the DMH, Keith Schafer, who wrote:
“No one has ever graduated from [SORTS} and somewhere down the line, we have to do that or our treatment processes become a sham.” Keith Schafer, Ed.D. Director Department of Mental Health
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 5 of 196 PageID #: 2077 More than five years later, still no one “has ever graduated;” not because they are not deserving, but because SORTS is a prison and the treatment processes are and have always been “a sham.”
8. Even when compared to other states that have a SORTS like program, Missouri and its DMH are pitiful as illustrated by the following graph showing Missouri SORTS zero releases and other states achieving higher numbers; some materially so.
The End Game - Create a Prison Disguised as a Mental Health Facility 9. Plaintiffs occupy one of the lowest stations in society (the convicted sex offender) yet their rights after the completion of their sentences under the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections are no less inviolate and their liberty no less important than the rights and liberties of the remainder of society. It is only by this Court’s intervention that plaintiffs’ constitutional rights may be vindicated, thus necessitating this action.
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10. In 1998, then Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan wrote a letter to members of the General Assembly urging the legislative body to adopt a system of laws that would continue to incarcerate persons who had completed their sentences for their convictions of various sex offenses. Governor Carnahan noted in that communication that the General Assembly had two years earlier passed laws strengthening the sentencing options for persons convicted of sex crimes. But he lamented that those longer sentences could not be applied retroactively to those previously convicted. So, he urged the General Assembly to adopt laws that would allow those persons convicted of sex offenses that carried, at the time, lesser sentences to be held in “the criminal justice system” as civil committees.
11. He noted that a then recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Kansas v. Hendricks, had found such civil commitment laws to be constitutional. He urged that those laws, at the time found to be constitutional in theory (but not as applied and as is now known after 14 years of the operation of SORTS), could be used to plug the gap, so to speak, between those sex offenders, like the plaintiffs and class members, who had served their time, but could remain imprisoned indefinitely as civil committees in the custody, not of the Department of Corrections, but instead in the custody and control of the DMH. Governor Carnahan made no mention that these civil committees, the plaintiffs and class members in this case, had a constitutional right to treatment so as to have a reasonable opportunity, following treatment, to be released. That was not the focus. In retrospect and reading between the lines of the Governor’s letter, the focus was on locking up these persons, characterizing these persons as not being mentally ill, but having instead a “mental abnormality” that would allow the judicial system to conclude that they presented a risk of reoffending.
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12. Almost a decade later this very strategy was reinforced and acknowledged in a memo dated March 24, 2008 (Exhibit 3 attached hereto) that Keith Schafer wrote to the General Assembly in which he stated, with remarkable consistency with the goal that Governor Carnahan wanted to accomplish, these words:
“The “end game” related to MOSOTC is as follows: Avoid building new facilities for Sexual Predators as long as possible. New tougher sentencing laws will ultimately reduce the number of referrals to DMH, but this impact will not be felt until at least 10 years from now.”
Today, more than five years after Director Schafer wrote about the “end game” for SORTS, proof has now surfaced that confirms what any commons sense person already knew intuitively.
13. And fundamentally and at its core, that proof, albeit imperfectly coded in the Governor’s message to the General Assembly 14 years ago, but much more understandable today, can best be summarized with these words:
SORTS IS A PRISON DISGUISED AS A MENTAL HEALTH FACILITY AND THE INTENT IS TO LOCK UP THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CLASS WITH NO GENUINE INTENT TO TREAT AND RELEASE. ANY TREATMENT IS THUS A PRETEXT FOR WAREHOUSING IN VIOLATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ AND THE CLASS MEMBERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO BE FREE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 14. This conclusion is irrefutable and all those DMH employees involved with SORTS, either by reading this Fifth Amended Complaint or learning of these allegations, will then be on express, implied or constructive notice and their employment at SORTS makes them complicit in this unlawful conduct and subject to being joined in this lawsuit, converting them
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from anonymous Doe defendants to defendants expressly identified by name and thereby forever linked to SORTS.
15. In 2006, an Assistant Attorney General presumably inadvertently divulged the State’s intent in a federal court filing (Exhibit 3A attached hereto) opposing a writ of habeas corpus brought by Wade Turpin, now a plaintiff in this case, asserting that:
“Turpin is currently imprisoned in the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center [the former name of SORTS] in Farmington.” (Emphasis added).
16. Missouri law provides that plaintiffs and the other class members unequivocally have “the right to be treated with dignity as human beings” and the DMH, in documents discovered in this case has acknowledged that that “right can never be limited.”
17. Moreover, those present SORTS employees, who are licensed health care providers, have additional ethical duties beyond the constitution and other laws. This includes duties pronounced by the NAHO Code of Ethics and Standards for Practice for Healthcare Quality Professionals (adopted by DMH) that imposes this obligation to the plaintiffs and the other members of the class:
“Healthcare Quality Professionals promote the dignity of the profession and are committed to practicing the profession with honesty, integrity, and accountability . . . respecting all laws and refusing to participate in or conceal any unethical, false, fraudulent, or deceptive activity. [Their] primary commitment is to the health, wellbeing, and safety of patients. They must take appropriate actions regarding any instances of incompetent, unethical, illegal, or impaired practice. They work to promote change that encourages the reporting of events that may result in actual or potential harm to patients or others.”
18. Psychiatry possesses an inherent capacity for abuse that is greater than in other areas of medicine. A genuine diagnosis of mental disease can, under appropriate circumstances and proper intentions, legitimately give the state license to detain persons against their will and insist upon treatment and forced commitment both in the interests of the person committed and
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in the broader interests of society. On the other hand, SORTS, now with maximum security facilities at the Missouri cities of Farmington and Fulton, treats residents with disdain, applying dehumanizing and infantilizing practices which are counter-therapeutic, which are hardly “Best Practices” or “State of the Art,” and which destroy any hope residents may have of reforming, overcoming their mental abnormalities, and rehabilitating their lives in society.
19. As one indication of the failures of SORTS, not one person has been unconditionally released or realistically and genuinely released even conditionally that allows them to reside in conditions other than maximum security. There is absolutely no “hope,” “recovery,” “rehabilitation,” or “support,” and, as a result, there have been no “positive outcomes.” The American Psychiatric Association Task Force report on the issue presented “a blistering critique” of SVP programs and demonstrated how “psychiatric commitment is being misused to cover a sentencing loophole created by the legal system [the very loophole Governor Carnahan proposed be closed]. [The SVP] process has been viewed as a perversion of legitimate psychiatric commitment, a violation of civil rights, and a dangerous precedent for the possible misuse of psychiatry to squelch other behaviors that have been regarded falsely as psychiatric problems….” Allen Frances & Shoba Sreenivasan, Sexually Violent Predator Statutes: The Clinical/Legal Interface, PSYCHIATRY TIMES (Dec. 1, 2008). The psychiatric community has also been critical of SVP programs using “definitions of mental illness that have no basis in psychiatry.” Jennifer Jason, Beyond No-Man’s Land: Psychiatry’s Imprecision Revealed by its Critique of SVP Statutes as Applied to Pedophilia, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1319 (2010).
20. Bolstered and emboldened by a “victory” in a lawsuit styled Strutton v. Meade, which was decided in favor of the DMH by the Federal District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri and then affirmed by the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, SORTS and the DMH now
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believe that they answer to no one in their operation of SORTS and are free to implement the “end game” described above.
21. In fact, this case law house of cards built on discovery mischief, captioned Strutton v. Meade, is flawed legal precedent, perpetrated by the DMH, regrettably failing to understand what history consistently teaches – that public officials who violate the constitution will eventually be held accountable and that the truth will win out. Through compulsory legal process in this case, documents have been discovered that were buried by the DMH in Strutton v. Meade, with the erroneous claim that emails had been inadvertently purged from its computers and servers and were no longer available or protected by a bad faith assertion of peer review immunity.
22. In most, but not all cases, SORTS residents have been found by jurors in the state of Missouri to have “mental abnormalities” that prevent them from exercising judgment in sexual matters such that their release would create a safety hazard. As a result of such a finding, Missouri courts order the DMH to provide their care and treatment in theory in a manner that would allow them to overcome their mental abnormalities and behave normally in society.
23. Despite specific court orders requiring them to provide SORTS residents with care and treatment, defendants require plaintiffs to pay for their care and treatment themselves. The statutory scheme outlined below, however, deprives SORTS residents of their constitutional rights under the Federal and Missouri constitutions, rights that are fundamental to the American system of jurisprudence such as due process, equal protection, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to leave their heirs their estate and savings when they die.
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24. Disregarding constitutional requirements of treatment for the civilly committed, disregarding court orders requiring it to provide care and treatment, and notwithstanding the fact that they are requiring plaintiffs to pay for care and treatment, defendants systemically and unequivocally have refused to provide any meaningful care and treatment to plaintiffs.
25. Alan Blake, the former and longtime Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, wrote many candid emails to his superiors revealing that while he hardly is a champion for civil liberties and constitutional reverence, he did fight, for whatever motivations he might have had, with his DMH Central Office superiors for more resources, for SORTS, warning of the consequences of their failure to do so. Unfortunately, Mr. Blake, having lost the fight did not then do the right thing and “blow the whistle” on the disaster that he tried to manage. But for presumably a bureaucratic mentality and mindset long steeped in the grip of risk avoidance coupled by a fear of adverse consequences of a decision to advocate release of the residents and the maintenance of security of SORTS residents, and fear of litigation, Mr. Blake did a fair job in trying to do some things that happened to be consistent with the constitutional and statutory duties of the DMH in the operation of SORTS. His emails thus give a clearer picture than anything to date that confirms what all intuitively know to be the truth – that SORTS exists to warehouse and pretends to ostensibly treat the Residents, just enough so that the courts, without being told the truth, defer to questions of professional judgment by those SORTS health care practitioners, who were trusted to do their duty, but failed to so. What then do these electronics communications tell us of the SORTS story?
As Always and at the End of the Proverbial Day, the Defendants’ Email Trial Discloses the Wretched Reality of SORTS
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26. From time to time, Alan Blake made these telling observations in various emails
(See Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 attached hereto) that he authored while serving as Chief Operating
Officer of SORTS:
“Unfortunately DMH is not will to applying [sic] the values it espouses or things would be different.
The state keeps trying to get by on the cheap. (Emphasis added).
This is no way to manage a system. Our facility has passed NWPRC [another DMH facility in Northwest Missouri] in census, and we have half the infrastructure and support. We are [a] disaster waiting to happen. We have older residents with major physical issues. We have a good full time general physician (by luck only), but we do not have the capacity to operate a skilled nursing facility or hospital wing. Conditional release of sex offenders, much less sexually violent predators, to a skilled nursing setting has recently been a state controversy. I fear are going to have some major care failure that will contribute to my early retirement.”
* * *
“For many years we have been operating based on a decision that we could not ask for the numbers needed. We keep slowly pulling resources from APS and the region.
We are also now vulnerable to claims that we offer inferior treatment in that we are not staffed at a similar rate to other areas of the facility and thereby are providing inadequate treatment. The next lawsuit discovery may well ask from the whole facility and disparities will be evident to a good attorney.” (Emphasis added).
* * *
“I have a worried sense that the budget is being driven by Steve and the money people, not by policy and need.
I estimate we will be over census before the ward is funded.
I continue to be concerned that this ongoing minimal funding keeps us on the edge of adequate and inadequate, and in a federal court’s view, even our adequate may be inadequate enough for an adverse ruling.”
* * *
“I must protest [an email to Felix Vincenz regarding budget cuts].
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If we move 3 wards out, we might get by with in 09, but we are averaging 20 referrals yearly for the past 3 years, and we anticipate…
As it is I am starting to have problems keeping management staff from getting discouraged and giving up. They are worn out, frustrated distressed and wearing out. (I try to have them take off to make up for all the extra hours because of the sign of burn out, but then they get further behind and adds to their sense of failure.) Because of the risk level and lack of experienced staff, we are considering changing our schedules so a senior manager is on duty evenings again, another way resulting in getting further behind.
Having reasonable resources is all they want. The comment at our risk management meeting was, “We are the DMH redheaded stepchild and they don’t care if we fail.” In arguing against that view, the reply is that what “they” do to let us do our job is what tells, not what is said. There is a lot of unhappiness here.” (Emphasis added).
* * *
“[In turn, Vincenz responds] If we reduce treatment to 1½ per week, we can greatly reduce needing to hire more psychologists and social workers.
With the lawsuit(s), census, pressures associated with the detainee moves, and anticipatory stress associated with JCAHO/CMS accreditation. I can well appreciate that your staff feel beleaguered and besieged.
Asking for additional FTE in today’s fiscal environment is a virtual nonstarter.”
* * *
“[Blake replies] You are right. It is a huge request. It is unreasonable because prior (to your present position) requests were unreasonably low and inadequate.
It is the request to do it right (or at least closer). We have been getting farther and farther behind. That is why I initiated the behavioral health structure in order to reduce the impact of the inadequate funding of this facility for YEARS, and find a way to operate for less.
If we are to seek accreditation with current staffing levels and patterns, we will need to significantly reduce treatment to assure that assessments, documentation and treatment plans are in place.”
* * *
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“In further follow-up to discussions regarding the impact of the House core cut to MSOTC I offer these thoughts:
Expense will increase Dr. Englehart will withdraw services from the facility due to ethical concerns, and we will not have a means to offer psychiatric services as the ANP will no longer be allowed to practice without a psychiatrist sponsor. Being unable to offer psychiatric services opens us to a lawsuit for substandard care, as well as [sic] we will have several persons in psychiatric crisis and by law unable to refer to a DMH facility.
All this opens us to a federal lawsuit for providing substandard care. A successful lawsuit in this area will cost the state millions.
However, this again places the Department at risk of legal action regarding substandard care.
The facility will take on the effect of a prison and be in violation of Supreme Court rulings. The residents will likely initiate legal action for which the department and state will have difficulty mounting a defense.” (Emphasis added).
* * *
In a series of emails by and between Alan Blake and a colleague (who runs a
SORTS Program in another state – Exhibits 9 and 10 attached hereto) dated
November 15, 2007, the colleague observes:
“The whole mess is a bad situation all around. Not that I have a lot of sympathy for sex offenders, but I think the net has been cast way too wide, and, US Supreme Court notwithstanding, I think that locking people up after they’ve served their sentences is just wrong. If we want to keep them out of circulation, pass the laws that will keep them in prison. It’s more honest. And as you point out, the community doesn’t want them and can successfully keep them out. Seems shortsighted to me.”
To which Blake replies and without disagreeing:
“It is very short sighted, very expensive, and there is little effort to identify potential offenders and seek to intervene before there are offenses. I will say that we are making progress with some of our fellows. Others…”
* * *
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“We are so far from JCAHO that I cannot conceive of it. For lawsuits, we have had over 50 filed – mostly [but not all] frivolous.”
* * *
In other emails (Exhibits 11 and 12 attached hereto) Blake writes:
“We have been trying to find how to make a $600,000 core reduction and the ramifications.
[If that happens] most nursing and medical staff will leave, and most professional staff will follow. At that point we become a prison.” (Emphasis added).
* * *
I am nagging you about the SVP DOR and getting it in place. We have a challenge from Tim Burdick [then a public defender in Missouri, who represented SORTS residents] regarding the constitutionality of the release process and our lack of movement thereof. I have asked Sheila to fax a copy to you.
Not having a procedure in place strengthens his argument, in addition to not having given agreement to any petition. Some of our inaction at this level is because we don’t have a procedure, although we are getting ready to look at three residents for a conditional release path. (It would be helpful to have a step down unit in the fence and a cottage outside, but we don’t have the funds for the step down unit any more, and SMMHC tells me they have full cottages.)” (Emphasis Added).
* * *
DMH memo (Exhibit 13 attached hereto) about SORTS for FY 2009 budget discussions and analysis states the following:
“Psychiatric inpatient facilities are backing up, admitting far more commitments than discharges. This, in turn, clogs acute care facilities, which must hold patients longer who are awaiting admission into state long-term psychiatric care. This system “constipation” forces state facilities to operate beyond 100% of capacity for long periods of time, exhausting staff, causing staff overtime and high turnover rates, and inevitably increasing the risk of staff injuries and patient abuse and neglect.”
*** In an email dated as recently as October of 2012 (Exhibit 14 attached hereto), Dr. Jay Englehart, the Medical Director of the SMMHC (which includes SORTS) warns about a CO directed effort to try to overcome the shortage of physicians and save money by the hiring of Psychiatric APN’s noting
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“that this is “…the model which the prisons are moving toward, but I really do not want have [sic] a standard of care or staffing which is equal to that of the prisons. I hope we are better than that.” (Emphasis added).
*** In an undated email (Exhibit 15 attached hereto), but likely authored in August of 2005, Dr. Jonathan Rosenboom, at the time Director of Behavioral Services for SORTS noted: “Finally, I am often struck by the unsettling conclusion that direct patient care is one of the last priorities when stacked against all of the other expectations. (Emphasis Added).
27. Nor do the dollar numbers lie. The DMH spends less money on SORTS (“the redheaded stepchild” of the DMH) than it does on any other facility for which it has responsibility and jurisdiction to operate.
28. The DMH computes, from time to time, a dollar number that it calls “Cost Per Bed Day.” This is a key financial metric within the DMH and illustrates conclusively that SORTS (or as it was formerly named, MSOTC), “…keeps trying to get by on the cheap,” as Mr. Blake complained. All other programs are allocated substantially more dollars than SORTS.
29. Paradoxically, the DMH attempts to justify the failure to discharge residents on the grounds that sex offenders are the most difficult to treat and therefore less likely to be
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 17 of 196 PageID #: 2089 “cured.” But all that excuse achieves is the obvious rebuttal that the DMH should then be spending more money on SORTS than other programs, especially given that SORTS is a “close call” constitutionally as a result of its severe liberty deprivations. 30. Nor does the DMH perform much better in comparison to what it spends on SORTS verses spending by other states for their SORTS programs as illustrated by the following internal chart prepared by the DMH.
31. Yet another financial metric, shown in the below chart, reveals that SORTS allocates only 15% of its budget on “Treatment Staff” verses, for example, “Unit Security,” which is allotted 42% of the budget, almost three times as many dollars.
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Or as Alan Blake wrote in an email to the Central Office of the DMH:
“…we cost $200-$220 per day per consumer when the other long term facilities cost much more.
32. Admittedly, part of the deleterious resource shortfall for SORTS arises out of resistance by the General Assembly to fund SORTS at levels that meet equal protection of the laws and other requirements of the constitution. No one likes SVP’s, especially legislators. But this misplaced attitude cannot excuse underfunding what elected officials and DMH leadership might view as an unpopular state run program and consequently forgive adherence to the constitution and statutory law and their obligation to uphold both rules of law. The DMH appears to be committed to building more space to warehouse SORTS residents in anticipation of a growing population, but that commitment is not extended to spending money to better fund treatment methods and practices that will lead to release.
33. Moreover, the DMH is reticent in seeking greater funding from the General Assembly, concerned that its other programs will not be funded. The problem in some years is the perplexing and continuing resistance by the General Assembly to accept that SORTS cannot constitutionally exist as a prison or a jail. That attitude manifested itself in this internal email exchange amongst SORTS officials in 2009 (Exhibit 16 attached hereto) about a request by the Missouri House for a cost comparison between the Texas SVP Program and the current Missouri SORTS program:
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“…they [meaning the House Committee] want the cost for doing SVP on the Texas model vs. keeping SVP committees in jail or prison. They didn’t seem able to hear our explanation that keeping SVP committees indefinitely in a jail or prison environment (cells) would lead to constitutional challenges.” (Emphasis added).
34. The budget process is further corrupted to the prejudice of the rights of the plaintiffs and the class members because the DMH, again pandering to the powerful Senate and House appropriations committee members, wrongfully committed to certain members to “keep them in the loop” about potential conditional releases of SORTS residents. This was improper and a further breach of the teachings of Kansas v. Hendricks. No one sitting on the United States Supreme Court at the time Hendricks was decided would have envisioned that somehow state legislators would have a “say,” albeit informally as to whether residents would be released or be alerted in advance that a resident release was under consideration. Not even the faulty statutory scheme that birthed SORTS would have dared to overtly include legislators in the release process. The following email (Exhibit 17 attached hereto) confirms that SORTS represents a political compromise at the expense of civil liberties.
Email from Julie Inman, SORTS CFO to Senior DMH management.
“Senator Lembke – Sen. Engler talked about his concerns with Senator Lembke and the fact that Sen. Lembke “hates” SORTS. He says he has his hands full trying to defend the program. (Emphasis added.) Rep. Tilley hasn’t been hearing concerns from folks the way that Senator Engler has. Alan again talked about the process and that we would be sure to include him, Senator Engler, and others in the conversation when approval for a person to petition the court is to be given by the Director and before any court hearings.”
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 20 of 196 PageID #: 2092 35. SORTS places each resident at one of four risk levels. They are “High Risk,”
“Moderate Risk,” “Low Risk,” and “No Apparent Risk.” Almost half of the residents at Farmington (and presumably the numbers at Fulton are at or about the same level), are rated by SORTS personnel as “No Apparent Risk.”
36. Yet all residents are incarcerated in the maximum security facilities at Farmington and Fulton. These “No Apparent Risk” residents, under long standing and readily recognizable sex offender treatment professionals and standards should be housed in the Least Restrictive Alternative (“LRA”).
37. The following numbers and percentages reveal the failure of the DMH to comply with this elementary mental health treatment standard and confirm that substantial percentages of SORTS residents should not be incarcerated under maximum security conditions, since they present “No Apparent Risk.”
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Three years ago, SORTS completed what it calls an “Annex,” which allowed beds for eight residents and was touted as an LRA. It was not funded until 2013 and is still not yet being used as an LRA. At this time no residents have been assigned to the Annex. Tellingly, the structure itself was constructed inside “the wire.” The most current number of “No Apparent Risk” residents, according to information provided to plaintiffs’ counsel, is approximately 37% of the residents. Presumably if SORTS is effectively treating residents and treatment is not a sham, the number should be trending upward, although given the arbitrary and subjective process used by SORTS to classify residents, once challenged in this lawsuit and thus putting SORTS on notice, the number can be anything SORTS determines it to be consistent with what is most defensible in this lawsuit.
38. Even putting aside the fact that a significant number of SORTS residents present “No Apparent Risk” and that the LRA standard has been violated, internal documents show that
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SORTS, purely as a budget saving ploy, as far back as 2008-2009 contemplated transferring as many as 24 residents to the St. Louis Psychiatric Rehabilitation Center (“SLPRC”), an LRA. This budget maneuver had nothing to do with care and treatment or adherence to the LRA standards. It was motivated solely to save money and yet, it also showed a ready recognition at the most senior levels of DMH management that a significant number of SORTS residents would and could have been moved to an LRA solely to save money; not for therapeutic reasons; not to satisfy the constitutional requirements that SVP’s should be released if they no longer posed a danger; and not in consideration of security concerns.
39. This reality is described in multiple emails by and amongst Alan Blake, Felix Vincenz, Rick Gowdy, and Keith Schafer. It was defendant Schafer who initiated the gambit and who thus recognized that he and his senior management staff would readily allow SORTS residents to be released or housed in an LRA that was substantially less restrictive than the maximum security, double razor wired facility at Farmington. The plan was not implemented and so those 24 SORTS residents remained locked up at Farmington, unaware that the Director of the DMH could have allowed them to be transferred to SLPRC five to six years ago. Instead, they continue to be held in maximum security. In addition, the state court judges to whom annual reports are required by law to be sent about whether or not a resident should continue to be held at SORTS were not advised in those reports of the internal DMH belief about the unlucky 24. Here is the email trail (Exhibit 18 attached hereto) that documents the secret discussion about this DMH plan.
MSOTC and Aged/Infirm “Keith spoke with me yesterday afternoon about the possibility of selecting some 16 aged/infirm consumers from SORTS and developing a community alternative, demonstrating that as a strategy for saving about 36% of the costs of a ward and reduce expansion costs for
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another ward, and buying us a little breathing space in terms of census. Set up a meeting for the three of us to discuss this.
A projected population of 41 over the age of 65 in the next five years, and 92 in the next 10 years. If these numbers are accurate, we will need skilled care areas in the Hoctor building, which is planned in Hoctor central, as well as a new building and group homes. Higher levels of nursing care are best delivered in ward-type atmosphere, and intermediate levels of nursing care could more likely be delivered in a cottage-type setting.
However, this does not include potential offsets due to charging the consumers “rent” and expecting them to cover some portion of their outside services.
The attached document contains one tab that shows the cost of one Hoctor ward and a tab which shows the estimated cost of 16 residents in a group home setting.
Per staff on Hoctor it appears we only have 6 qualifying for SNF on Hoctor 1 per the criteria. I just asked if there are any others in the facility, and hope they may find some more.
At this time SNF candidates include: 6 men. Schottel Wheeler Arthur Bonine Woods Coffman
[Blake writes] I am told we will have the SNF [Skilled Nursing Facility] number in about 45 minutes, and a list of names shortly after, as staff are reviewing with the idea we are estimating on having a nursing unit internally at the SNF level in a new building.
Currently we believe we can find 16 that could be place in the SLPRC option. We have a pool of 24 from which we can get the 16. The top 5 could go today to the SLPRC setting (and pass then neighbor test easily), if we had the court orders and conditions to go to SLPRC. The rest may need greater support/treatment, but don’t represent a risk to the community in terms of compliance and appreciation of their situation. The setting would likely enhance their treatment and provide motivation. A few would be best engaged in the work program at SLPRC, and the focus would be on learning to live in a supported setting. (A couple of them would make better employees at SLPRC than SLPRC has currently. Certainly they would be good peer counselors.) (Emphasis added).
I just did some rough numbers related to earning potential for these individuals: I assumed minimum wage and full time employment for all 16 individuals (which is a large stretch) see below:
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As you can see, if we allow each person to maintain a $60 per month personal allowance and then take the rest of their funds for expenses we would generate a total of $193,568. This would increase the total savings to $291,793.”
40. One of the few documents discovered in Strutton (most likely because it was an
email exchange between two former SORTS employees and thus beyond the control of the DMH
to suppress it) provides this candid view of SORTS (Exhibit 19 attached hereto):
“I am glad you love your job. To me it sounds like a dream job. As for me, well I struggled with whether or not to leave [SORTS], but I think it is going to get worst [sic] before it gets better. They stopped almost all treatment. The only thing continuing was process groups and we were told they could be interfered with if they felt it was needed. I expressed my concern that the legislation that allowed us to exist was based on treatment being provided, but they hope to be able to increase treatment before that is caught by the wrong people….It really is getting bad at [SORTS].” (Emphasis added).
The other replies with these candid observations:
“….I’m hearing the same thing from everybody that contacts me. I wish I could do something to help them. But, all I can do is pray. I feel so incredibly sad. I worked so incredibly hard to develop that program, but I could see it being destroyed. I just could not tolerate watching it any longer. I feel so sad for the residents.
41. Moreover, as a matter of policy, SVP Programs have largely been unsuccessful,
expensive (except in Missouri), and a perversion of psychiatry, and consequently, in some states,
efforts at reform are in the wind. Even at an institution as dysfunctional as SORTS-Missouri, the
topic is under discussion as shown by this email:
Email from SORTS staff psychologist Dr. Sujatha Ramesh dated July 22, 2013 to Jay Englehart, M.D. and Dr. Davinder Hayreh with attached study done by the chief researcher of the Department of Corrections Minnesota.
“Interesting. Thought it might peek your interest.”
Most civilly detained sex offenders would not reoffend, study finds. (Emphasis added).
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At least three out of every four men being indefinitely detained as Sexually Violent Predators in Minnesota would never commit another sex crime if they were released. That’s the conclusion of a new study by the chief researcher for the Department of Corrections in Minnesota, the state with the highest per capita rate of preventive detention in the United States. The problem for the field of forensic psychology is that forensic assessment procedures have astronomical rates of false positives, or over-predictions of danger, and it is difficult to determine which small proportion of those predicted to reoffend would actually do so. Ironically, as noted by other researchers, by the time an offender has done enough bad deeds to be flagged for civil commitment, his offending trajectory is often on the decline. Like other criminals, sex offenders tend to age out of criminality by their 40s, making endless incarceration both pointless and wasteful.
***
42. In sum, the Research Director of the Minnesota Department of
Corrections, Dr. Grant Duwe, concluded:
“…existing research indicates the vast majority of sex offenders, including those with a relatively high sexual recidivism risk, can be safely managed in the community.” (Emphasis added).
Duwe’s research further confounds efforts to sustain a sound empirical basis for the continued
operation of SORTS. All health care providers in the employ of SORTS and licensed to practice
their professions are obliged to be current on medical research and to react and respond in the
best interests of their patients, speak out, and take other proactive steps as the case for SVP
Program weakens and comes under attack as not being truly efficacious and lacking an empirical
basis for its viability. Until 2012, SORTS participated in a survey, with other states, of the SVP
civil commitment programs. It did not participate in 2012 because the comparison with other
state programs was so bleak that SORTS did not want to be part of the survey. The survey is
sponsored by the Sexual Offender Civil Commitment Programs Network (“SOCCPN”). With
about 17 of 20 “SVP states” reporting outcomes, the annual surveys of programs have some
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empirical basis. The 2011 Annual Survey reports that 75 more men had been fully released and there was no reported sexual or non-sexual recidivism. The 2012 Annual Survey reported that four “clients” were known to have sexually reoffended out of an apparent total of 159 discharges.
The Plaintiffs 43. Plaintiffs, sometimes called “residents,” “patients,” or “consumers” by the DMH, are in reality prisoners, incarcerated at all times mentioned herein in the custody of the DMH either as civilly committed individuals or detained and awaiting a civil commitment trial. Plaintiffs are currently confined in maximum security DMH operated facilities within rows of razor wires in the Missouri cities of Farmington or Fulton. Somehow, contrary to the requirements of Kansas v. Hendricks, plaintiffs, as “civilly committed sexually violent predators” have become a new class of citizens with markedly diminished civil rights. 44. Plaintiff John R. Van Orden is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of SORTS located in Farmington, Missouri (“SORTS-Farmington”). He has been confined at SORTS since October 29, 2005. He was civilly committed on May 17, 2007 in the Circuit Court for Webster County. 45. Plaintiff Joseph Miller is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of SORTS-Fulton. He has been confined at SORTS-Farmington and more recently SORTS-Fulton since October 29, 2005. He was civilly committed on May 17, 2007 in the Circuit Court for Webster County. 46. Plaintiff Macon Baker is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He has been confined at SORTS and then at the Ste. Genevieve County jail as a detainee since December 18, 2007. Mr. Baker has a pending civil commitment case, cause number 07PS-PR03273, in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County and since completing his sentence for his criminal conviction has been detained in maximum security, locked down in a cell for 23 hours day and night for almost
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six years. He has been tried three times by the state in an effort to civilly commit him to SORTS; each time the jury could not come to a verdict. He is scheduled to once more be tried on the civil commitment petition brought by the State.
47. Plaintiff Chance Tyree is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of the SORTS. He has been confined at SORTS-Farmington and more recently at SORTS-Fulton since April 23, 2005. He was civilly committed in the Circuit Court for Cole County on June 19, 2008. In the Judgment and Commitment order signed on June 19, 2008, the Court ordered that Mr. Tyree “is committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Mental Health for control, care and treatment until such time as Respondent’s mental abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be at large” and further ordered that he “shall be kept in a secure facility.” The Judgment and Commitment Order does not require Mr. Tyree to pay any costs or expenses associated with his care and treatment; in fact, it specifically orders the Department of Mental Health to provide such care and treatment as is appropriate and necessary to treat his mental abnormality and, at a minimum by implication, bars payment by Mr. Tyree.
48. Plaintiff Walter W. Ritchey is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of the SORTS-Fulton. He has been confined at SORTS-Farmington and more recently at SORTS-Fulton since May 24, 2006. He was civilly committed in the Circuit Court for Jackson County on February 3, 2009. In the Judgment and Commitment order signed on February 3, 2009, the Court ordered that Mr. Ritchey “is committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Mental Health for control, care and treatment until such time as Respondent’s mental abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be at large” and further ordered that he “shall be kept in a secure facility.” The Judgment and Commitment Order does
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not require Mr. Ritchey to pay any costs or expenses associated with his care and treatment; in fact, it specifically orders the Department of Mental Health to provide such care and treatment as is appropriate and necessary to treat his mental abnormality and, at a minimum by implication, bars payment by Mr. Ritchey.
49. Plaintiff David Brown is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He was confined at SORTS between November 17, 2008 and May, 2009, without the benefit of a trial. In May 2009, a jury in St. Louis City determined that Mr. Brown should not be civilly committed. He was released and now resides in the St. Louis area.
50. Plaintiff Anthony Amonette is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of the SORTS. He has resided at SORTS-Farmington since May 17, 2000. He was first confined to SORTS on September 18, 2001, without a trial. It was not until October 16, 2003, that he was formally civilly committed by the Circuit Court for St. Francois County, in Cause No. 24H060000387. In the Judgment and Commitment order signed on October 16, 2003, the Court ordered that Mr. Amonette “is committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Mental Health for control, care and treatment until such time as Respondent’s mental abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be at large” and further ordered that he “shall be kept in a secure facility.” The Judgment and Commitment Order does not require Mr. Amonette to pay any costs or expenses associated with his care and treatment; in fact, it specifically orders the Department of Mental Health to provide such care and treatment as is appropriate and necessary to treat his mental abnormality and, at a minimum by implication, bars payment by Mr. Amonette.
51. Plaintiff Richard Tyson is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of the SORTS. He has been confined at SORTS-Farmington since
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September 3, 2004. He was civilly committed in the Circuit Court for Jackson County on December 9, 2005. In the Judgment and Commitment order signed on December 9, 2005, the Court ordered that Mr. Tyson “is committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Mental Health for control, care and treatment until such time as Respondent’s mental abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be at large” and further ordered that he “shall be kept in a secure facility.” The Judgment and Commitment Order does not require Mr. Tyson to pay any costs or expenses associated with his care and treatment; in fact, it specifically orders the Department of Mental Health to provide such care and treatment as is appropriate and necessary to treat his mental abnormality and ,at a minimum by implication, bars payment by Mr. Tyson.
52. Plaintiff Wade A. Turpin is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of the SORTS. He has been confined at SORTS-Farmington and more recently SORTS-Fulton since September 26, 2001. Mr. Turpin was civilly committed on February 26, 2004 in the Circuit Court for Cass County, in cause number CV-201-226P. In the Judgment and Commitment Order signed February 26, 2004, Judge Thomas Campbell ordered that Mr. Turpin was “committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Mental Health for control, care and treatment until such time as Respondent’s mental abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be at large” and ordered that Mr. Turpin “shall be kept in a secure facility.” The Judgment and Commitment Order does not require Mr. Turpin to pay any costs or expenses associated with his care and treatment; in fact, it specifically orders the Department of Mental Health to provide such care and treatment as is appropriate and necessary to treat his mental abnormality and, at a minimum by implication, bars payment by Mr. Turpin.
53. Plaintiff Matthew King is a citizen of the State of Missouri. He is a civilly committed resident of SORTS-Farmington.
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54. Andree Cokes is a citizen of the State of Missouri. His is civilly committed resident of SORTS-Farmington.
The Defendants 55. Defendant Keith Schafer, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is the Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health, and is sued in his official capacity. He is responsible for and has been directly involved in the violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights as described in this Fifth Amended Complaint. His office is located at 1706 E. Elm St., P.O. Box 687, Jefferson City, MO 65102 (sometimes referred to herein as either “the Central Office” or “the CO”). At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein, was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Schafer acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally protected rights. 56. Defendant Rick Gowdy, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is the Director of Forensic Psychiatry for the DMH and is intimately involved in SORTS issues and evaluations of detainees. He is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Gowdy acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights. 57. Defendant Joseph Parks, M.D., a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is the Chief Clinical Officer of the Office of the Director at the Central Office of the DMH and is intimately involved with SORTS. He serves as the DMH’s senior clinical leader, provides
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leadership and mentoring to DMH clinical staff and establishes and promotes professional, clinical, and ethical values and standards to which all clinical staff are expected to adhere. He also promotes quality of care and is responsible for establishing and maintaining the department’s standards of care on both clinical and programmatic levels. Dr. Parks is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Parks acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
58. Defendant Robert Reitz, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is the Director of Psychiatric Facilities and also Chief Executive Officer of the Fulton State Hospital, which includes the SORTS program within the hospital. He is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Reitz acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
59. Defendant Melissa Ring, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is or was the Chief Operating Officer of Adult Psychiatric Services at the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (“SMMHC”), as well as the Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, or, at minimum has a managerial and operational responsibility at SORTS and is sued in her official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, she acted under color of law and her conduct as described herein, was within her official capacity with the requisite state action. SORTS is a division or office of the
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SMMHC. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Ring acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
60. Defendant Julie Inman, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is the Regional Executive Officer of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (“SMMHC”) and is sued in her official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, she acted under color of law and her conduct as described herein, was within her official capacity with the requisite state action. SORTS is a division or office of the SMMHC. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Inman acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
61. Defendant Linda Moll, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is the Director of Treatment Services, Adult Psychiatric Service at SMMHC and is sued in her official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, she acted under color of law and her conduct as described herein, was within her official capacity with the requisite state action. SORTS is a division or office of the SMMHC. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Moll acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
62. Defendants Harold Myers and Judy Sumpter operate, day to day, the efforts to obtain reimbursement from the plaintiffs and the members of the class, the cost of SORTS residents’ room and board and treatment. Myers is the Reimbursement Officer for SMMHC.
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Sumpter’s title is uncertain, but she too works for the DMH and specifically at the SMMHC. Upon information and belief (because personnel seemingly change from day to day at SORTS and the SMMHC) Myers and Sumpter are under the supervision of the Chief Financial Officer of the SMMHC, Daman Longworth. All are sued in their official capacity, but only for the actions, claims, and relief asserted in Count II of this Fifth Amended Complaint. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, they acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
63. Defendant Alan Blake is the former Chief Operating Officer of SORTS and now serves as a consultant (officially and unofficially) and is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein, was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Blake acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
64. Defendant Jay Englehart, MD is the Medical Director at SMMHC and thus SORTS, as well, and is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein, was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Englehart acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
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65. Defendant Mark Stringer is the Director of Behavioral Services of the DMH and a Division Director, which includes responsibility for a number of facilities within the DMH, included, at a very senior level, SORTS. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein, was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Stringer acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
66. Defendant Donna Augustine is the Interim Chief Operating Officer of Adult Psychiatric Services at the SMMHC, including SORTS and she is sued in her official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, she acted under color of law and her conduct as described herein, was within her official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Augustine acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
67. Defendant Dave Schmitt is Quality Improvement Director for SMMHC. He is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein, was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Schmitt acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
68. Defendant Justin Arnett is the Chief Nurse Executive for Adult Psychiatric Services at SMMHC, which includes SORTS. He is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein, was within his
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official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Arnett acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
69. Defendant Marty Martin-Forman is the Chief Operating Officer of the Fulton State Hospital, which includes the SORTS program located at Fulton. He (she) is sued in his (her) official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he (she) acted under color of law and his (her) conduct as described herein, was within his (her) official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Martin-Forman acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
70. Defendant Ian Fluger, a resident and citizen of Missouri, is Program Coordinator for SORTS Fulton. He is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, he acted under color of law and his conduct as described herein, was within his official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Fluger acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
71. Defendant Sherry Lee, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is the Chief Nurse Executive for Fulton State Hospital, which includes SORTS and is sued in her official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, she acted under color of law and her conduct as described herein, was within her official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of
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the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Lee acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
72. Ericka L. Kempker, a licensed psychologist and resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is an employee of the DMH and SORTS and prepares and authors the SVP Statute required and court ordered individual annual reviews of the plaintiffs and the members of the class, and has done so since on or about April of 2011. At all times pertinent herein, she acted under color of law and her conduct as described herein, was within her official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Kempker acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
73. Defendant Kristina (“Krissy”) Bender-Crice, a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, is a Unit Program Supervisor at SORTS and is sued in her official capacity. At all times pertinent herein, she acted under color of law and her conduct as described herein, was within her official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, Bender-Crice acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights. In particular, she is sued, in part, because she is a managerial level SORTS employee at the front lines of treatment and exemplifies the mindset of SORTS professionals that resist reform and labels those who do attempt, although doomed to failure, “morons.” See Exhibit 28 attached hereto. At the top of the DMH, there exists the Director, who will not change SORTS and at the lower end of
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management there are those like Bender-Crice, who likewise are staunch and arrogant in impeding reform.
74. Defendants John Doe and Jane Doe (collectively “the Doe defendants”), whose true names are unknown, are residents and citizens of the State of Missouri, who have been responsible for violating plaintiffs’ rights in connection with incidents described in this complaint as actors for the state. The Doe defendants are past, present, or future employees, vendors, and independent contractors of the DMH, whose names and identities are not known to the plaintiffs at this time, but who have in the past or will during the course of this case act under color of law and their conduct as described herein were within their official capacity with the requisite state action. In depriving plaintiffs of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Federal and Missouri Constitutions, the Doe defendants acted willfully and maliciously, with evil motive and intent, and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights.
75. Defendants named above are being sued in their official capacities. At all times relevant hereto, all defendants were acting under color of state law and acted in concert with each other, aided and abetted each other in the commission of the acts and conduct giving rise to the claims asserted herein and each was an agent of the other, so that the actions of any one defendant created vicarious liability for the other defendants. Moreover, their conduct and behavior as alleged herein will shock the conscience of the court.
Jurisdiction and Venue 76. This is a civil action authorized by the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on violations of their federal constitutional rights, including the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs’ further allege supplementary claims under the Missouri State Constitution, other state laws, and administrative rules and internal
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DMH policies. This Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201 as an actual controversy exist regarding the rights, privileges and immunities to which Plaintiff is entitled. Moreover, pursuant 28 U.S.C. §2201, this Court has authority to grant injunctive relief and any other necessary and proper relief that is deemed just and proper by the Court. Plaintiffs further seek monetary, compensatory and punitive damages.42 U.S.C. § 1983 to address the deprivation, under Color of State Law, of rights secured by the Bill of Rights of the United States.
77. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (1), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (2), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (3), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (4), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims under Missouri law based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as the state law claims are so related to the federal claims that they form part of the same case and controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
78. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant, in that, among other things, they are employees of the state of Missouri or facilities or agencies of the state of Missouri that are located within Missouri. Moreover, the defendants regularly and routinely conduct business in Missouri, working primarily at either the cities of Jefferson City, Farmington, or Fulton. Finally, the defendants initially named in the Complaint and subsequent amendments thereto, other than this one, have voluntarily submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction and thereby waived any objection to personal jurisdiction.
79. The relevant acts and omissions occurred in the Eastern District of Missouri. Therefore, venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2).
Class Action Certification 80. On September 30, 2012, this Court entered a Certification Order certifying a “Treatment Class,” defined as “persons who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action,
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residents of SORTS of the state of Missouri as a result of being civilly committed,” and a “Charging Class,” defined as “all persons who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action residents, and former residents, of SORTS of the State of Missouri as a result of civil commitment, and who have been, or will be, billed or charged for care, treatment, room or board by SORTS or by the SMMHC.” In doing so, this Court recognized that the predominate common questions of the class were and are: (1) whether SORTS is a prison disguised as mental health facility in violation of, inter alia, the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting cruel and usual punishment and additional jeopardy after having once been punished for the same crime or crimes ; (2) whether the treatment at SORTS is a pretext for warehousing the plaintiffs without adequate treatment so as to prevent them from having a reasonable opportunity to be released; (3) whether the mental health treatment and care provided by defendants or those acting under their control or direction comports with Constitutional requirements; and (4) whether the scheme to charge class members for their own care and treatment is consistent with the United States and Missouri Constitutions.
The Missouri Law That Spawned SORTS 81. The representative Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed class have been or continue to be confined at SORTS pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute §§ 632.480 through 632.513, sometimes called the “Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act” or “MSVPA.”. The statutory scheme outlines the commitment process for all members of the proposed class. §§ 632.483-495 RSMo. (Whether it is followed substantively and faithfully post commitment is, of course, the key factual issue in this litigation). 82. When a prisoner found guilty of a sexually violent crime is suspected of meeting the criteria of a sexually violent predator (“SVP”), the agency with jurisdiction provides notice to the Attorney General within 360 days prior to the prisoner being released from prison. § 632.483.
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A potential SORTS resident is evaluated by the Prosecutor’s Review Committee and a multidisciplinary team established by the Department of Corrections and Department of Mental Health. § 632.483. Tellingly, the Prosecutor’s Review Committee can overrule the multidisciplinary team’s determination and recommendation, creating a law enforcement bias to the process that, together with other aspects of the process and as it is applied, renders this statutory scheme and the way it is applied unconstitutional under both the United States and Missouri Constitutions. If the State Department of Mental Health determines that the person is a “sexually violent predator” as defined by the statute, the Director of Mental Health forwards a request for a petition for commitment to be filed in the probate division of the circuit where the individual was convicted of the offense for which he was committed to the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. § 632.486 RSMo. A copy of the petition is forwarded to a multidisciplinary team. Id.
83. A court then determines whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release. § 632.489 RSMo. If the court finds that probable cause does exist, it must order that the individual remain in maximum security custody pending trial to determine whether the individual is a sexually violent predator. Id. If the court or jury determines by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually violent predator, the individual is committed to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health for treatment and confinement in a facility designated by the Director of Mental Health. § 632.495. During the trial, the State consistently takes the position that no evidence is permitted to be offered by the defendants about the real facts regarding what is occurring in the SORTS Program, including the fact that no one has been released, unconditionally. At the same time, the State argues to the jury that the defendant, if
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committed, will receive treatment, failing to also disclose to the jury that the treatment is a pretext and sham for imprisoning the committee.
84. All individuals who have had a probable cause hearing and/or been committed pursuant to the statutory scheme are confined at and become a resident of SORTS. The resident then is entitled, by law, to an annual review, to be done objectively and in good faith, to determine whether the mental condition the resident allegedly has will require that he remain confined or be conditionally released. § 632.498 RSMo. Again, whether that annual review has any meaning and is conducted in good faith and consistent with the professional standards of psychiatry is an issue of fact that plaintiffs request be litigated fully and completely in the trial of this matter after full and complete discovery.
85. The Missouri State Legislature enumerated rights to persons committed in any mental health facility in § 630.110 and § 630.115 RSMo. The state then authorized the Department of Health to promulgate rules related to patient’s rights described in § 630.110 and § 630.115 RSMo. § 630.135 RSMo. The Department of Mental Health lists the “Rights Which Cannot Be Limited” on its website at http://dmh.mo.gov/cps/ClientRights/ClientRights.htm, declaring:
Each individual has basic rights to humane care and treatment that cannot be limited under any circumstances. The following rights apply to all settings: 1. To receive prompt evaluation, care and treatment; 2. To receive these services in the least restrictive environment; 3. To receive these services in a clean and safe setting; 4. To not be denied admission or services because of race, gender, sexual preference, creed, marital status, national origin, disability or age;
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5. To confidentiality of information and records in accordance with federal and state law and regulation; 6. To be treated with dignity and addressed in a respectful, age appropriate manner; 7. To be free from abuse, neglect, corporal punishment and other mistreatment such as humiliation, threats or exploitation; 8. To be the subject of an experiment or research only with one’s informed, written consent, or the consent of an individual legally authorized to act; 9. To medical care and treatment in accordance with accepted standards of medical practice, if the certified substance abuse or psychiatric program offers medical care and treatment; and 10. To consult with a private, licensed practitioner at one’s own expense. (Emphasis Added).
86. These “Rights” do not merely provide as this Court will hear the defendants argue in this case and as they always argue in similar lawsuits, that care and treatment need only be at some level that “does not shock the conscience of the court.” And how can a program that publishes these seemingly commendable standards have failed to have one person successfully complete the program and be released?
87. The Department of Mental Health Director enumerates “prompt . . . treatment” and “treatment in accordance with accepted standards” in the first and ninth rights respectively. These rights are not listed in the “Client’s Rights” Department Operating Regulations, DOR 2.205 effective March 1, 2006, which are the procedures used by facilities. The SORTS Handbook lists the rights as, “Residents are MSOTC and DMH clients. Thus, you are entitled to the following without limitation… to the extent that the facilities, equipment and personnel are available, to medical care and treatment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical practice . . . to receive prompt evaluation, care and treatment.” Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center Handbook 43 (July 3, 2002) (Emphasis Added). Of course, the
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obvious qualifier “to the extent . . . available” is meaningless and cannot comport with the Supreme Court’s mandate that adequate treatment be provided in all instances, not “to the extent . . . available.” From that perspective alone, the written description of the SORTS program violates the obligations of the defendants to administer the SORTS program consistent with the Constitution of the United States and Missouri.
The Prison Known as SORTS 88. From the time of Governor Carnahan to the present, defendants justify SORTS and the confinement of the plaintiffs and the member of the class by citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1996), where the Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of civil commitment laws relating to sexual offenders in a narrow 5-4 decision based on a hypothetical, superficial analysis of a relatively new statute. 89. But conspicuously, the Supreme Court did not have the benefit of a full, complete, and long period of an expansive evidentiary record. Now, 14 years after SORTS was established, this Court has the benefit of experience to guide its decision. That experience—i.e., SORTS’s failure to successfully treat even a single patient such that he can be released—will inform this Court’s decision in a way that renders the superficial analysis of statutory language in Hendricks largely irrelevant or for that matter, as noted in earlier passages of this Complaint, the lack of precedential value of the Strutton case. As Justice Holmes observed many years ago, “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/books/ holmes/claw03.htm. The logical review of statutory language is one thing, but the actual experience of the parties under that system and the statute’s implementation and application must define the Court’s decision in this case.
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90. In looking back at the early days of SORTS, the defendants and other DMH employees associated with SORTS made these observations (again only recently disclosed in this case and hidden in Strutton):
In an email from Ann Dirks-Linhorst on February 6, 2002 (Exhibit 20 attached hereto), she wrote to Rick Gowdy, Marty Bellew-Smith and Victoria Johnson, these words: I know that yesterday you indicated that you all had inherited a ‘bad’ program.” (Emphasis added).
***
“In Minutes (Exhibit 21 attached hereto) of a May 22, 2001 SORTS Staff Meeting, it was noted that “SVP was not budgeted adequately.” (Emphasis added).
So, the internal and secret DMH records indicate that from the very start, it was acknowledged among top echelon management and health care providers that SORTS was a “bad” program that was not “budgeted adequately” and that even the most elementary and critical standards of an SVP Program did not exist at SORTS. Yet the DMH persisted with the program as it was then and is now, without any material changes to meet constitutional and statutory requirements. The only thing that SORTS has done well is fulfill what appears to be its covert mission – the “end game” of warehousing the residents. In that respect and perversely it has been a great success.
91. At some point in time, an as yet unidentified SORTS official reviewed certain “Sex Offender Treatment Program Standards and Measures” that were established by a respected accrediting body named The Special Commitment Center and published in August of 2000. In insightful, but devastating handwritten notes that are depicted below and were made by the official as he or she reviewed these Standards, he assessed whether SORTS “measured up.” The person’s candid comments surfaced on two key standards – the need for a credible program to have a “transition [i.e. release/discharge] component” and secondly regular “feedback…to
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 46 of 196 PageID #: 2118 participants [the SORTS residents]. As to the first, “the transition component, which is necessary to achieve “a core purpose of sex offender treatment… [of] the eventual release of persons…and establish program credibility,” the official wrote:
“We don’t have this at all as best I can see & need to develop it.” (Emphasis added).
As to the second standard, The Special Commitment Center remarked that “feedback to participants” is critical to “motivation,” “proper risk assessment” and” decision-making.” As to that standard, the official assessed SORTS’ compliance with these observations:
“Needs major work.”
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Perhaps sensing that these quotes and others referenced throughout this Complaint were predictive of the future reality of SVP Programs, the psychiatric community has consistently and vigorously opposed programs like SORTS at the start and later then pressed for fundamental reform, when it was apparent that these programs were failing, pointless, wasteful, and detrimental to the mental wellbeing of the residents. As often happens, the only place where reform can take place is through judicial intervention, as Alan Blake noted in a more earthy way when he was inadvertently overheard to whisper in a Jackson County, Missouri Circuit Court room during a hearing on a conditional release of a SORTS resident in 2012:
“We wouldn’t be here, but for that f……lawsuit.”
The “lawsuit” to which he was referring? – this CASE. Throughout the history of SORTS the fixation and obsession on the filing of lawsuits is palpable. One wonders what SORTS would be like if the federal courthouse was not open.
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92. Justice Kennedy acknowledged in his concurring opinion in Hendricks that future
courts will need to assess the psychiatric underpinnings for civil commitment of sexual offenders
because “if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid
basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate
it.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373.
93. Then Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court Michael Wolff wisely noted in
his concurring opinion in In re Care & Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. 2003):
The purposes of civil commitments are incapacitation-to protect society or the patient-and treatment. The idea behind such confinements is that a patient is “sick” and dangerous, that he must be locked up to be treated, and that when he gets “well,” he will be released.
While the statutory scheme is constitutional as written, I am doubtful about its constitutionality as applied. I concur in these cases, however, because I believe we should defer the constitutional questions to another day after seeing how the “sexually violent predator” law works in practice. The practices of the state over the next few years will show whether there is a meaningful attempt to treat those previously determined to be sick and dangerous, or whether these offenders will simply be warehoused without treatment and without meaningful efforts to re-integrate them into society. (Emphasis added.)
For those labeled as “sexually violent predators,” the question is whether this confinement is likely to be a life sentence, without meaningful treatment, and without an attempt to tailor the infringement on liberty to that needed to effect treatment and to protect society. . . .
Most importantly, the state must show through its confinement and treatment under the statute that the statute serves a proper nonpunishment purpose. A principal premise of their confinement is treatment. If an inmate is at all susceptible to treatment, the state has a duty to provide that treatment. If the state simply warehouses these men, without appropriate treatment and without a meaningful means to achieve re-integration with society-rights that are accorded to other mental patients-their constitutional rights will be violated. . . . [I]f this statute is used simply to impose life sentences of confinement based upon a labeling of the inmates’ thoughts; this Court will have a constitutional duty to take another look. (Emphasis added.)
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94. Thus this case seeks to answer the questions asked and concerns poised by Justice Kennedy and by Chief Justice Wolff. Both were concerned that the statutes which appeared constitutional on their face would in the end be implemented in a manner that demonstrated that the purported treatment provisions of the statutes were merely a sham or pretext, and that the true intent of the statutes was to warehouse sexual offenders after they have served their sentences. Their concerns were justified. Moreover, what would Justice Kennedy or Chief Justice Wolff have said if they knew that some 14 years after SORTS was begun, the release rate for Missouri would be zero?
95. SORTS is modeled after a maximum security penitentiary in many ways, but in other ways its practices are harsher and more restrictive of civil liberties than prisons. SORTS cannot be independently accredited as a standalone mental health facility by the “Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organization,” whereas nearly all other treatment facilities in the state of Missouri are accredited. Instead, the DMH has grafted SORTS onto the SMMHC, not with the intent that the two should operate collaboratively or in any sense together for the better of mental health treatment, but purely as an artifice to gain accreditation and help pay for the costs of SORTS. Yet, in every other unwholesome sense, SORTS stands alone and has different priorities and missions.
96. In 2013, against a backdrop of this litany of failings summarized by 14 years of no one being found to be cured or healed, the number one initiative for SORTS was not patient driven, i.e. “Why has no one been released and how can we hold ourselves out as health care providers to these men?” Instead, the priority for SORTS was inward and selfish - protection of staff; not treatment, not neglect or abuse of the residents, not releases, or better living conditions, not human dignity, or endeavoring to achieve a state of the art facility or fix SORTS’ sorry
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record. Ironically, perhaps the SORTS leadership and staff sensed that they were operating a prison, providing “treatment” as a pretext and sham, and that they genuinely should be fearful for their own safety given what they knew they had done to the residents of SORTS. After all, who are humanity’s most desperate and condemned souls, but those, who have no hope and many of whom had their psyche damaged over the years behind “the wire?”
97. Despite the purported focus of SORTS on resident treatment, and not on their punishment, SORTS operated and still operates under arbitrary, counter-therapeutic rules that are more restrictive than being confined in prison under the authority of the Missouri Department of Corrections, such as:
(a) SORTS Residents are compelled to wear full restraints, including: handcuffs, leg irons, and a waist chain belt anytime they are required to leave the secured area.
(b) Residents are subjected to unwarranted searches of the body without reasonable suspicion being established. Unannounced searches of a Resident’s living area occur often and result in a complete minute search of a Resident’s property looking for “contraband,” which, under the rules can include dental floss and tea bag strings. SORTS staff minimizes assaults and confrontations among the Residents, and instead are consumed with their own safety.
(c) Prisoners may visit the library, gym, or yard anytime per day, seven days per week. Depending on the resident’s level, SORTS permits residents to visit the library and gym only one or two hours per week.
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(d) Prisoners may sleep as late as they wish, whereas SORTS residents must be awake by 7:00 AM every day.
(e) Prisoners may decide for themselves if they will eat a particular meal, and are allowed to skip meals if they deem it appropriate. On the other hand, SORTS residents must attend all meals, without exception.
(f) In prison, one may spend $300 per month, $75 per week, on items from the canteen, whereas a SORTS resident may spend $10 to $50 per month depending on his level.
(g) Prisoners may store their own items; SORTS residents can only request one drink and two food items per day, but SORTS staff maintains custody of all other items.
(h) Prisoners may cook and eat in their room; SORTS residents may not have food or drinks in their rooms.
(i) Prisoners may bathe as often as they deem appropriate and for as long as they like if no one is waiting. In SORTS, a resident is allowed one timelimited shower per day without exception.
(j) SORTS has a much more restrictive curfew policy than prison, and even sets bedtimes for residents.
(k) In prison, you may buy your own television, stereo, and typewriter. In SORTS, you must share a television with others in your day room. Typewriters are prohibited at SORTS.
(l) Prisoners may have 100 postage stamps, whereas SORTS residents are permitted no more than 10 stamps at a time.
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(m) Prisoners may walk freely to meals, while SORTS residents must be escorted.
(n) In prison, staff count prisoners five times a day; in SORTS, staff conduct counts every 15 minutes.
(o) Prisoners have two men to a room and may choose roommates to a certain extent, whereas SORTS residents have up to 4 men to a room and the SORTS management determines with whom residents room.
(p) Prisoners may have a key to their room, depending on their level, whereas SORTS residents do not have a key to their room regardless of level.
(q) Whereas prisoners may have visitors four days per week without advanced notice, SORTS allows visits only on weekends and requires advance notice of two weeks.
(r) Silly and maddening restrictions on the length of dental floss and whether tea bags with strings are “contraband.”
98. The holding in Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 344 F. Supp. 373, (M.D. Ala.1972) demonstrates the minimum constitutional standard for confinement in treatment centers. The U.S. Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 73 L. Ed 2d 428(1982) referred to Wyatt v. Stickney as a controlling case regarding constitutional standards for civil commitment. The Eighth Circuit in Coley v. Clinton, 635 F. 2d 1364, 1375 (8th Cir. 1980) has adopted and recognized these rights. In Wyatt, the court stated: “The Patients for the most part, were involuntarily committed through non-criminal procedures and without the constitutional protections that are afforded Defendants in criminal proceedings. When Patients are so committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a
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constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as well as give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition. Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required. ‘Treatment efforts must be directed to that aspect of his behavior which caused him to be classified as dangerous so that he has a reasonable opportunity to be eventually discharged from maximum security confinement. To hold otherwise would certainly ‘transform the hospital into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense.’”
99. SORTS, unlike the treatment programs described in Wyatt, does not offer a realistic opportunity to be cured, improve patients’ condition or be released. In SORTS, the plaintiffs and other class members are held in penitentiary conditions that violate their constitutional rights. The treatment program offered falls short. In fact, in its 14 year history only three Residents have been granted a conditional release and a reasonable inference is that that was done only because this lawsuit was filed. Moreover, the conditional releases have so many impossible and burdensome conditions that the conditions literally swallow any benefits of release. Those three individuals, who were released, return nightly to the maximum security confinement of SORTS behind the two rows of razor wire, instead of the Least Restrictive Alternative.
100. The real mission of SORTS is institutionalization, preventative, indefinite detention and punishment. There is no rehabilitative purpose and SORTS is actually counter therapeutic. SORTS residents not only receive no real treatment for their mental abnormalities, their civil commitment to such a deficient system leaves them embittered, without hope of recovery, with little chance of successful re-entry into society, and worsens their overall psychological status and well-being.
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101. The one time Director of Behavioral Services at SORTS, Dr. Jon Rosenboom,
described the plight and predicament of the SORTS residents in this email (Exhibit 22 attached
hereto):
“From a natural progression in the treatment of our more advanced residents, some increased responsibility and personal freedom is crucial. We now have 4-6 residents within 1-2 years of a recommendation to CO for partial conditional release. After over 7 years of these individual’s treatment and progress, they continue to be supervised 24/7, have no personal monies on their person, cannot buy a soda or candy bar from vending machines that they pass 10 times a day, and have now lost a good deal of the benefits of personalization of their room through the life safety interpretations/restrictions associated with TJC accreditation. They are becoming more institutionalized and the potential that their work in treatment will bring fruit is subject to fading.” (Emphasis added).
102. In addition, Mary Weiler, then SORTS Director of Social Services, in a plea for
help to other officials operating SORTS programs in other states wrote in an email (Exhibit 23
attached hereto):
“We are moving toward conditional release of several residents. All of these men have been out of mainstream society (jail, prison, SVP residential treatment) for at least 20 years. I would appreciate references to articles or other resources that would be helpful in teaching reintegration skills to these men (i.e. imagine the changes in telephonic communication over 20 years!). Thank you.”
103. In 2006, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that “ Neither the Supreme Court
nor this court has determined the extent to which the Constitution affords liberty interests to
indefinitely committed dangerous persons under the Matthews balancing test. Since a person has
been civilly committed as a dangerous person, his liberty interests are considerably less than held
by members of a free society. As compared to a prison inmate, however, a committee was
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement. Civilly committed sex
offenders retain certain rights. In particular, they have a right to receive treatment or other
training that will give them an opportunity to regain some or all of their rights to liberty.”
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104. So long as genuine treatment that affords a reasonable opportunity for release and honest, full disclosure periodic review are provided in good faith and with candor, civil commitment laws do not violate offenders’ fundamental rights to liberty and Due Process. While civilly committed sex offenders therefore, have a right to adequate treatment. In Missouri, the SORTS treatment program has so departed from minimal professional standards that the treatment professionals could not have based their treatment decisions on their professional judgment. Some of the conditions as documented in DMH records ultimately disclosed in this case, but not in earlier litigation include inadequate staffing, inadequate training of staff regarding the clinical mission of the facility, the lack of individualized treatment, the absence of arrangements for residents to transition to being released, inadequate provisions to allow their families to participate in treatment, no effort to place residents in the Least Restrictive Alternative and a punitive treatment environment. As a result, it is important that any civil commitment program for sex offenders offer adequate treatment to those in the program so as to enable them to be released in a meaningful way. Failure to do so permits an express finding that inadequate treatment is being provided or that the purpose of the program is punitive rather than to rehabilitate.
105. Despite the superficial justifications supplied by the State, “care and treatment” is essentially non-existent at SORTS. There is, in fact, no “care and treatment” provided to SORTS in any realistic sense and, to the extent, the defendants undertake to provide care and treatment to effect a “cure” of the alleged mental abnormalities of the plaintiffs and the other class members, it is a pretext for imprisoning the plaintiffs and the other class members in violation of, most notably, their rights as defined by the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, its
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counterpart in the Missouri constitution, and the statutory requirements of Missouri law that created the legal structure for SORTS and defined its purpose and mission.
106. SORTS established “progress” levels, wherein residents are classified using a color-coded system, in order to portray to residents and to the outside world the illusion that residents have some hope of “recovery” as a result of the “care and treatment” received at SORTS. The system is in practice and effect nothing more than a disciplinary device used by SORTS to keep residents in line and to prevent behavioral disruptions. It has nothing to do with psychological or psychiatric care, treatment, or progress relating to a resident’s “mental abnormality.” SORTS has an undocumented, unofficial policy to utilize certain of its staff, who have the temperament, guile, callousness, malice, and will to carry out a covert strategy to target residents that are making progress and getting close to what objectively would qualify them for Least Restrictive Alternatives (“LRA”) and integration into the outside world and, then, through stringent, unreasonable and calculated enforcement of the myriad of silly and petty rules and the wizardry of psychiatry, to cause those residents to be set up for failure, artificially demoted, and thereby maintain them in custody all as part of the intent to warehouse.
SORTS Tries a New Program – Called SOS 107. In 2012, SORTS began introducing what its leadership heralded as a new treatment program on a piecemeal trial basis. It was called the Safe Offender Strategies Program or ironically “SOS.” 108. While it was a new program to SORTS, it was not a new program for DMH. It had existed in the Fulton State Hospital (sometimes called “Fulton Proper”) since approximately 2007 (internal documents confirm this with the words “…it’s what the rest of the hospital [meaning DMH] has been doing since ’07 at Fulton, but not Farmington”), found to be efficacious in treating sex offenders diagnosed with mental illnesses, not mental “abnormalities,”
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the statutorily defined standard used to justify incarceration of those sentenced to SORTS and criticized by the APA and others as not really a diagnosable illness.
109. SOS was also used as a treatment modality at the Adult Psychiatric Services side of the SMMHC starting in approximately 2009.
110. SOS was conceived by the then Director of Sex Offender Treatment Programing at the Fulton State Hospital, a DMH employed psychologist (now a DMH consultant) and used by her and other DSM health care providers at Fulton Proper with remarkable success at achieving releases. During that five year period, those who were in charge of the day to day operations of SORTS had actual knowledge that SOS, a treatment program for sex offenders, was in place and successfully treating those sex offenders in Fulton Proper.
111. During the five years that SOS was used at “Fulton Proper” the DMH employee in charge of the program testified in 2012 as follows:
“And I know that over the course of the five years that we’ve been doing Safe Offender Strategies, there have been 150-some-odd clients that have received that treatment at Fulton Proper for at least one year and of those about 95 have been released from Fulton.”
112. Blake and Jon Rosenboom, the then Director of Behavioral Services at SORTS in those years had expressly rejected SOS and rebuffed overtures by the Fulton State Hospital health care providers using SOS. At one point, according to deposition testimony by the Director of Sex Offender Treatment at Fulton, she was told by Dr. Rosenboom that:
“I hear that you are developing a treatment manual and I am here to tell you that we want nothing to do with it.”
But Blake and Rosenboom either knew that the SOS treatment regime was efficacious or failed to adequately and objectively assess SOS. What was remarkable about SOS was that it was being used at “Fulton Proper” to treat sex offenders, who had been diagnosed with mental illnesses and then were released with promising low recidivism rates.
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113. SORTS clung to a sex offender treatment program that later, when SOS was introduced to SORTS, was described in the Farmington SOS Patient Handbook (Exhibit 24 attached hereto) with this candor:
“Traditional sex offender treatment programs [meaning Missouri SORTS as it was run for 14 years] have utilized harsh, punitive, and confrontational approaches for dealing with sex offending behavior…..” (Emphasis added).
It was almost as if the mentality of SORTS was so dysfunctional that those who were writing the “Farmington SOS” manual could not grasp the implications of what they were writing – that the movement away from the old treatment modes to SOS meant that SORTS had been using the, in the words of Exhibit 24, “harsh, punitive, and confrontational approaches” that resulted in “…clients [not] consistently benefitting from such approaches” for 14 years. And so SORTS proposed to start over as if there would be no consequences for running a program that imprisoned residents using not only a treatment program that might not have been genuinely in place, but one that was admittedly, under the best of circumstances, “harsh” and “punitive” and did not work. In doing so, SORTS engaged in the all too familiar tactic, that once having been found to have violated the civil rights of its citizens, government attempts to escape the consequences by changing its practices in the hope that the courts will rule that the wrongdoing has stopped and the legal wrong mooted. The DMH uses this artifice often, but efforts to do so given what has been unearthed in this case by discovery, should be rejected. Instead, the DMH and the defendants must be held accountable and the mischief enjoined. Recently, Dr. Carich told a group of residents that even with the reforms he was attempting to introduce, the expectation was that SORTS residents would have to held in custody for 6-10 years before having any chance at release. Additionally, in SORTS-Farmington training materials (Exhibit 24 attached hereto) in which SOS was introduced in March of 2013, these uncomplimentary
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comments were made about the old sex offender treatment methods – methods, which failed to
yield any discharges for 14 years:
“Sex offending clients have not consistently benefitted from such approaches, which often have had difficulty with client compliance and lasting treatment effects. Therefore, Safe Offender Strategies [SOS] is based on the fundamental premise that people with deficits in self-regulatory functioning will sometimes engage in maladaptive behaviors in order to regulate themselves….These persons will continually struggle with effectively and safely managing their sexual urges emotions, beliefs and expectations, and interactions with other people. These are the clients for whom Safe Offender Strategies was developed.” (Emphasis added).
Another Farmington based SORTS insider offered these written observations (Exhibit 25 attached) about SOS and its pluses following his visit to Fulton to observe SOS:
“Our trip to Fulton was quite educational…and were able to see the entire core process of SOS….There was a distinct ambience notable upon entry to the wards….The language of the staff and residents was one of the DBT – origin, speaking of skills used, skills that could be used, and no talk of thinking errors, or other CBT carryovers from other programs….
***
The staff and residents were interacting as one large treatment team, or treatment community, and we could detect no “us – verses – them” attitudes on either part….The residents report ‘staff talks to us, like people, and treat us like human beings.’”
***
“We have to be careful to not fall back into the CBT/correctional format, as my history for example, was MoSOP-based in Corrections, then repeated here….
Their staffing, of course, makes us drool.”
***
“In summary, the benefits of our program [meaning Farmington SORTS] can realize from what we and the other staff attending have learned can also be divided into two programs”
The whole staff need[s] to get on board regarding respect and humankind’s intrinsic nature of being.”
***
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“While everything we learned at Fulton is obviously approved by the Department of Mental Health, we need as a staff to get away from the attitude of ‘we can’t do it here in Farmington because…’ and move on to ‘how do we get this done here and in the near future?’”
*** “[A key] is how the humanity of all is respected.”
114. In sum, since 2007, the DMH has been operating a relatively successful sex offender treatment program at Fulton that has resulted in substantial numbers of releases over a five year period or, at least transfers of patients to Less Restricted Alternatives, including cottages and nursing homes – patients, who were more sick with diagnoses recognized officially by psychiatry than the great majority of SORTS residents, who were found to have something called mental abnormalities, a term that has no meaning in psychiatry, but by definition under the law is substantially less serious than mental illness. Yet, not only did those in charge of the SORTS program not implement a successful program, they expressly rejected it for the reason that the clandestine purpose of SORTS, it’s end game, was and is to warehouse the residents of SORTS. Somehow, because one program was in Fulton and another in Farmington, the fuzzy logic of the DMH was that this was acceptable.
115. Any efforts at reform are tardy, insincere, and done because of this “f…….lawsuit.”
116. Following Alan Blake’s retirement in 2012, the DMH hired Dr. Mark Carich for the position of Director of Treatment Services for SORTS, heralding him in the hiring announcement as a “pioneer in sex offender treatment programs.” From South Carolina, where he had retired, Mr. Blake offered this advice via email (Exhibit 26 attached hereto) to Dr. Carich soon after he started at SORTS:
“Sheila [meaning Sheila Light, a long time administrative assistant at SORTS] knows where the bodies are buried. Take good care of her.”
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117. Upon being employed, Dr. Carich familiarized himself with SORTS and, not surprisingly, came to some unflattering conclusions about its “treatment program.” He noted that a critical goal of SORTS or any SVP treatment program “…is to shift [mental] states from dysfunctional to functional.” When a colleague from another state SVP Program sought from Dr. Carich something as fundamental as the SORTS’ “goals grid” for residents and treating staff, he had to acknowledge in an email as recently as July of 2013 (Exhibit 27 attached hereto) that he could not provide the grid because in his words:
“The current goals grid is dysfunctional & is why we are developing something new.”
How important are functional goals to Dr. Carich? In his words:
“The goals are directly or indirectly related to dynamic risk factors associated in varying degrees with risk and recidivism.”
Paradoxically, the very thing that Dr. Carich noted was so critical to treatment – the shifting of the resident from a dysfunctional state of mind to a functioning one - was a major fault of the SORTS program itself; a program that can only exist by law if it presents a realistic chance of release and yet its goals were judged to be “dysfunctional” by the recently hired Director of Treatment Services.
118. So appropriately, as the new hire and filled with optimism and faith in his ability to make a difference, Dr. Carich called for changes, not realizing that all the plans, new manuals, new treatment regimes, goals, and modalities, and similar measures that he might author could not turn around 14 years of a dysfunctional institution. Today he is left with a stack of power points and manuals and new beginnings and missions and visions and futile, but good intentions, all of which are inconsistent with the “end game” of warehousing.
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119. At another time in presenting his vision for reform, Dr. Carich called upon the SORTS therapists to alter their focus and view of their relationship with the residents, urging them to take “responsibility to create context for change” by the resident and was so bold as to press for the perspective that “The Responsibility for change [lies] equally between the therapist and client.” In an email (Exhibit 28 attached hereto, one long time professional staff member called him a:
“…moron! I have officially given up on this guys [sic] ability to do ANYTHING!!”
Further highlighting the disgraceful state of SORTS and the problem with identifying patient goals, in an August of 2013 email (just seven months ago and after SORTS had been in “business” for almost a decade and a half), Dr. Jay Englehart, M.D., the Medical Director at SMMHC (wherein, as noted above, SORTS is assigned) acknowledged in an email (Exhibit 29 attached hereto) this candid remark:
“Unfortunately, we [meaning SORTS] do not have a good, comprehensive risk assessment and needs analysis document on each patient which summarizes the goals of their treatment and [his emphasis] their individual traits which lead to risk. The ITP does some of this, at least on the goals side, but we don’t have an ongoing needs assessment which deals with highly individualized risk into which we can fit some of the states people are in when they commit a violation.” [Emphasis Added].
Constitutional Violations Arising from SORTS being a Prison, not a Mental Health Facility 120. SORTS, for the reasons previously plead in this Fifth Amended Complaint, is a
prison and not a mental health facility because the DMH and the defendants are warehousing the
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plaintiffs and the class, either intentionally or through sloth and lack of commitment to treat. Moreover, the treatment is a sham to cover that intent, or, in the alternative, treatment is so defective and devoid of any meaningful effort to meet SVP treatment standards and professional health care standards that there is no meaningful opportunity for the plaintiffs and the class to be ever released. Fundamentally, this is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and common or related rights under the Missouri Constitution, as well as Missouri statutory law, in that the defendants and those in concert with them operate the SORTS program so that it is cruel and unusual punishment and/or double jeopardy for the reason that the plaintiffs and the class have already been punished for their convictions in the criminal justice system, served their sentences, and been discharged by the Missouri Department of Corrections, only to be detained by an illegal and constitutionally defective process that then lands them in the custody of the DMH under maximum security indefinitely with no realistic prospect for release and the very real potential that their mental health could be negatively compromised. If ever released, it is so conditional that it is meaningless and amounts to, at best, lifetime parole. Having been “institutionalized” by SORTS, failure and a return to SORTS or prison is likely. This should, taken as a whole, be shocking to the conscience of the Court.
121. The DMH and the defendants have an obligation to provide adequate treatment for SORTS residents regardless of their intent, excuses, or reasons. Those obligations arise as follows:
(a) From the Missouri and United States Constitutions, as well as from Missouri statutory laws, i.e. Sections 632.483-495 RSMo., as well as the Commitment Orders for each resident, to provide adequate and genuine treatment for the mental abnormalities suffered by the residents.
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(b) The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to provide civilly committed persons with access to mental health treatment that is at least minimally adequate and gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions to improve so that they can be released. Further, because the plaintiffs and others similarly situated are not prisoners, they are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.
(c) Even if the State claims that the SORTS program is “civil” in nature, its civil status merely increases the burden on the State to provide adequate treatment. “Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-322 (1982).
(d) Defendants, in their official capacities, are collectively responsible for the policies and procedures controlling the manner and method of plaintiffs’ confinement and manner and method of their mental health treatment.
122. This Complaint attempts to list the most prominent, but certainly not all, of the constitutional inadequacies of the treatment program at SORTS. Discovery in this case will tell the tale of all the myriad inadequacies in treatment suffered by persons confined to SORTS.
123. A constitutionally adequate treatment program requires individualized treatment, a demonstrated method for improvement and release, exercising judgment within the bounds of accepted professional standards, offer a realistic opportunity to be cured or improve the mental condition for which they are confined, offer less restrictive alternatives to residents to provide a
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path toward eventual release, and oversight by independent experts. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1383, 1402 (2008).
124. Consequently, in the alternative to the claim that the DMH and the defendants intentionally set out to create a prison disguised as a mental health facility and intended to use treatment as pretext and a sham, plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are being denied meaningful mental health care treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions materially to improve because, among other things, defendants have failed:
(a) To properly train staff regarding the treatment of mental abnormalities relating to sex;
(b) To provide a treatment program that includes individualized care and treatment, including individual meetings with psychologists, psychiatrists, clergy, and other experts in mental health;
(c) To provide a coherent and meaningful individualized treatment program for each resident with understandable goals and a road map showing steps necessary for improvement and release;
(d) To make adequate provisions for the participation of detainees’ family members in rehabilitation efforts, including permitting family visits with reasonable frequency and ensuring telephone access to residents;
(e) To draft and implement fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans;
(f) To afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for educational, religious, vocational, and recreational activities;
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(g) To provide adequate funds for treatment programs; (h) To cease requiring, as a precondition to participation in the meager and
inadequate “treatment” offered to residents, and therefore, as a predicate to release, that plaintiffs and all other similarly situated residents to admit to a laundry list of real and imagined crimes for which they were not convicted, and thereby place themselves in jeopardy of future criminal prosecution for other crimes in violation of the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, or impair their ability to convince the supervising courts that they are entitled to be released; and (i) To institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality. (j) To adopt and faithfully implement the Sex Offender Treatment Program Standards and Measures promulgated in August of 2000 by The Special Commitment Center Sex Offender Treatment Program. 125. Defendants’ failure to provide constitutionally adequate treatment is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards and demonstrates that the defendants do not base their treatment decisions on such professional judgment. And the defendants are well aware of that duty. In a 2005 memo to the General Assembly, DMH officials reminded the Missouri legislature of the requirements to legally operate SORTS:
Memo from the DMH to the Missouri House and Senate Appropriations staff responding to October 25, 2005 Request for Information on MSOTC. “Thus, in order for such commitments to pass constitutional scrutiny, the Department must provide care and treatment that is consistent with
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existing professional standards and practice, and consistent with case law.”
126. Defendants, both in creating and instituting rules within SORTS and the DMH, as well as through the statutory scheme that initially created the SVP civil commitment program and as subsequently amended by the General Assembly and signed into law, so that regardless of what a SORTS Resident does, he will only be conditionally released and never discharged, erect one arbitrary barrier after another to prevent plaintiffs from progressing to the point where the program will recommend their release, including, in some instances, pressuring participants in the program to confess to crimes which they did not commit as evidence of their treatment progress.
127. This Court has wide latitude in entering and enforcing equitable relief concerning the conditions at SORTS. Plaintiffs and the class seek immediate release from SORTS and the custody of the DMH. Plaintiffs also seek the dismantling and end to the SORTS Program and an injunction and declaration that the DMH and the defendants and those in concert with them have acted unconstitutionally, most importantly, in violation, as described heretofore in subjecting them to cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy, as well as outright defiance and disobedience of the mandate of Missouri statutes.
128. In the alternative, and if the Court determines not to outright release the plaintiffs and the class and give them their freedom, the plaintiffs seek the remedies and relief the same as or similar to those described in the leading case on this subject Turay v. Weston, No. C91-64WD (W.D. Wash. June 6, 1994). In that case Federal District Judge William L. Dwyer, of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington entered an injunction (the “Turay Injunction”).
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(a) In the Turay Injunction, Judge Dwyer required the State of Washington to provide adequate treatment for inmates at Washington’s Special Commitment Center (“SCC”), including the following: (i) Adopting and implementing a plan for hiring and training competent therapists; (ii) Implementing strategies to rectify the lack of trust between the residents and SCC staff; (iii) Implementing a treatment program that involved residents’ spouses and family members and contained other generally accepted therapy components; (iv) Developing individual treatment plans for each resident to measure progress; and (v) Providing an expert in sex offender treatment to supervise and consult with SCC staff.
(b) Because Washington officials were slow in complying with the Turay Injunction, the district court subsequently appointed a special master, to oversee the SCC and provide the court with periodic reports regarding the SCC’s compliance. Four years after entering the initial injunction, Judge Dwyer conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued an order demanding that the SCC:
(a) Carry out additional staff training at the SCC, with new residential care staff to finish the orientation training before beginning work on the unit, residential care and clinical staff to complete mental health training within four months of commencing their employment, and advanced training on the treatment of sexual deviance to be provided.
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(b) Provide a coherent and individualized treatment program for each resident complete with understandable progress goals and a road map showing the way to improvement and release, such plan to include the components recognized as necessary for maximum treatment potential.
(c) Make adequate provision for participation by residents' families in rehabilitation efforts, including setting aside a room for visits by family members, permitting family visits with reasonable frequency and allowing prompt telephone access to residents in cases of family emergency, consistent with security.
(d) Pending the construction of a separate treatment-oriented facility, to reduce the negative effects of the current connection with MICC by taking the following steps:
(1) Eliminate the routine strip searches of SCC residents following every visit;
(2) Eliminate the monitoring of residents’ telephone calls and the bar on outgoing calls (other than collect);
(3) Negotiate with MICC management to obtain better meal and activity schedules, and to eliminate harassment of residents by prisoners;
(4) Acquire more adequate space within the MICC complex, e.g., by taking over all of a unit when new space is needed, with yard space adjacent thereto.
(e) To improve the treatment environment in the following respects:
(1) Use new living space to provide some separation between residents in treatment and those who have harassed treatment recipients;
(2) Draft and implement fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans; and
(3) Afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for educational, religious, vocational/work, and recreational activities.
(f) To initiate and implement program oversight both by an internal review process and by an external body, either through a licensing organization or another entity.
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(g) In the foregoing respects, and in others previously ordered, to take all reasonable steps to bring a constitutionally adequate program into reality rather than merely describing it on paper. 129. In making these findings and ordering the institution of these remedies, Judge Dwyer recognized a heightened duty on the State, when persons who have served their time for their criminal conduct are then subject to “civil commitment” because of “mental abnormalities.” Moreover, indefinite sentences are particularly dangerous when grounded upon potentially illdefined psychiatric findings.
Annual Reports to the Courts – Misleading and Untruthful 130. As previously described above in this Fifth Amended Complaint, the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act and more specifically § 632.498 RSMo. requires that Director Schafer or his designee to provide a “yearly report” to “the court that committed” the SORTS’ resident of his “mental condition.” Since April of 2011, Defendant Erica L. Kempker, Psy.D, licensed by the state of Missouri as a Psychologist has had the primary duty of completing these yearly reports. Upon receipt of the report, the court is then required by law to “…conduct an annual review of the status of the committed person.” The report must, of course, be honest and exact and have full disclosure because, as Dr. Carich commented:
“The key point is completing an assessment of the patient’s progress or lack of progress and sending the report to the court.”
131. If the report, in assessing “the progress or lack of progress,” is not honest and accurate then whether the patient is progressing or not is a faulty, unreliable judgment or is based upon factors that are not within the control of the patient (more correctly the plaintiffs and the class members) or (even more cruel and injurious) that the DMH is impeding the progress of the patient. So, each report, since the beginning of SORTS, has not been truthful and accurate because the courts assume in reviewing the annual reports that the committed person is receiving
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treatment. Whereas the truth is that SORTS is a prison disguised as a mental health facility and
the DMH fails to tell the courts any or all of the following undisputed facts that buttress that
conclusion:
That Director Schafer has stated that “No one has ever graduated from [SORTS] and somewhere down the line, we have to do that or our treatment processes become a sham.”
That Director Schafer has stated that “The ‘end game’ related to
MOSOTC is to[a]void building new facilities for Sexual Predators as long
as possible. New tougher sentencing laws will ultimately reduce the number of referrals to DMH, but this impact will not be felt until at least
10 years from now.”
That, from time to time, Alan Blake, the former COO of SORTS, has offered these opinions and facts about SORTS:
“Unfortunately DMH is not will to applying [sic] the values it espouses or things would be different.”
“The state keeps trying to get by on the cheap.”
“We are [a] disaster waiting to happen.”
“I fear [we] are going to have some major care failure that will contribute to my early retirement.”
“We are also now vulnerable to claims that we offer inferior treatment in that we are not staffed at a similar rate to other areas of the facility and thereby are providing inadequate treatment.”
“I have a worried sense that the budget is being driven by Steve and the money people, not by policy and need.”
“I continue to be concerned that this ongoing minimal funding keeps us on the edge of adequate and inadequate, and in a federal court’s view, even our adequate may be inadequate enough for an adverse ruling.”
“As it is I am starting to have problems keeping management staff from getting discouraged and giving up. They are worn out, frustrated distressed and wearing out.”
“We are the DMH redheaded stepchild and they don’t care if we fail.”
“We have been getting farther and farther behind. That is why I initiated the behavioral health structure in order to reduce the impact
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of the inadequate funding of this facility for YEARS, and find a way to operate for less.”
“If we are to seek accreditation with current staffing levels and patterns, we will need to significantly reduce treatment to assure that assessments documentation and treatment plans are in place.”
“All this opens us to a federal lawsuit for providing substandard care. A successful lawsuit in this area will cost the state millions.”
“However, this again places the Department at risk of legal action regarding substandard care.”
“The facility will take on the effect of a prison and be in violation of Supreme Court rulings. The residents will likely initiate legal action for which the department and state will have difficulty mounting a defense.”
“We are so far from JCAHO [accreditation] that I cannot conceive of it. For lawsuits, we have had over 50 filed – mostly [but not all] frivolous.”
“We have been trying to find how to make a $600,000 core reduction and the ramifications.”
“[If that happens] most nursing and medical staff will leave, and most professional staff will follow. At that point we become a prison.”
Or Jon Rosenboom’s observation:
“Finally, I am often struck by the unsettling conclusion that direct patient care is one of the last priorities when stacked against all of the other expectations.”
Or Dr. Joseph Park’s insights:
“Psychiatric inpatient facilities are backing up, admitting far more commitments than discharges. This, in turn, clogs acute care facilities, which must hold patients longer who are awaiting admission into state long-term psychiatric care. This system “constipation” forces state facilities to operate beyond 100% of capacity for long periods of tie, exhausting staff, causing staff overtime and high turnover rates, and inevitably increasing the risk of staff injuries and patient abuse and neglect.”
Or Dr. Jay Englehart, the Medical Director of the SMMHC (which includes SORTS) warning
about a CO directed effort to try to overcome the shortage of physicians and save money by the
hiring of Psychiatric APN’s noting that this is…
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“…the model which the prisons are moving toward, but I really do not want have [sic] a standard of care or staffing which is equal to that of the prisons. I hope we are better than that.
Or the candid admission as far back as 2002 by Ann Dirks-Linhorst that:
“I know that yesterday you indicated that you all had inherited a ‘bad’ program.”
Or the unknown SORTS employee, who acknowledged that SORTS had no release/integration program in place, nor did it account for the need to have LRA’s.
132. Consequently, the state courts have been for over 14 years and are currently deprived of all the facts in these annual reports and lead to believe by the DMH that SORTS is meeting its statutory and constitutional mandate. In turn, the “annual review” of the courts to objectively determine if the committed person should continue to remain in DMH custody and not be released, either conditionally or otherwise, is compromised and results in a decision based upon insufficient or misleading facts in contravention of § 632.498 RSMo. In turn, the committed person does not receive due process that includes a full and fair review by a court that is not presented with an accurate annual report. Thus the annual review process is corrupt and the courts, unknowingly, are making decisions about continuing commitments without all the facts and with the wrong facts.
Constitutional Violation of the “Care and Treatment” Reimbursement Program 133. Under the statutory regime imposed upon plaintiffs, SORTS residents are paying
for adequate treatment, which is a fundamental prerequisite to any civil commitment program. Without adequate treatment providing a path to their potential release, the civil commitment becomes state-imposed punishment lacking individual procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution and state statutory law.
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134. Even if this Court concludes that the State has the legal and constitutional ability to charge SORTS residents, their families, and their estates, for the supposed “care and treatment,” there has been a failure of consideration and any charge must be rescinded. Reimbursement for “care and treatment” is not owed by the plaintiffs and the class or their families when the truth is that SORTS is a prison and not a mental health facility because the DMH and the defendants are warehousing the plaintiffs and the class, either intentionally or through sloth and with no intent to genuinely treat. Moreover, the treatment is a sham to cover that intent, or, in the alternative, treatment is so defective and devoid of any meaningful effort to meet SVP treatment standards and professional health care standards that there is no meaningful opportunity for the plaintiffs and the class to be released ever. The right to reimbursement by the DMH, whether it is constitutionally or statutorily grounded, is lost under those circumstances. No collections or reimbursement should be allowed in the future, any accrual of debt should be cancelled, and all monies collected should be repaid with interest.
135. The statutory framework, and the defendants’ policies, practices, and conduct, violate several provisions of the United States and Missouri Constitutions, both facially and as applied, as well as Missouri statute.
136. Cruel and Unusual Punishment (a) By confining an individual against his will, the Government assumes the responsibility to provide for that person’s welfare. As the Supreme Court has explained: [W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being. The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care
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for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. (DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (internal citations omitted)). (b) Similar to the Supreme Court’s mandate, the courts ordering civil
commitment ordered the Department of Mental Health, not the individual patient, to provide for the patient’s care and treatment. (c) The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” and double jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. (d) The Court should also exercise its own independent judgment about the acceptability of the practice to hold that it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562-63 (2005). (e) The actions of defendants have been wanton, evinced a deliberate indifference to the rights of plaintiffs, and the defendants knew of and disregarded the threats to defendants’ rights. (f) The actions of defendants violate basic standards of decency and are cruel. (g) The actions of defendants are also unusual. (h) As an unfortunate consequence of the supposed “care and treatment,” the SORTS program actually worsens the mental abnormality and psychological conditions suffered by residents, further compounding the cruel nature of the punishment.
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(i) The failure to provide care and treatment, and defendants’ placing unreasonable conditions on the provision of care and treatment, violate the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
137. Equal Protection (a) The United States Constitution prohibits any state from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend XIV. (b) The Missouri Constitution provides that “all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry” and “that all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law.” Mo. Const., art. I, § 2. (c) The policies, practices, and conduct of defendants treat plaintiffs differently than they treat other civilly committed patients of the Department of Mental Health. (d) Among other things, defendants do not charge the same or similar fee to patients who were civilly committed due to mental abnormalities not related to sex. There is no rational basis for charging civilly committed patients with mental abnormalities relating to sex but not charging civilly committed patients with mental abnormalities not relating to sexual conduct. The fees, rather, are imposed against plaintiffs and other civilly committed patients with mental abnormalities relating to sex out of a desire to exact punishment for the sexual nature of the mental abnormality with which plaintiffs have been thought to suffer.
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(e) Moreover, defendants do not charge the same or similar fee to inmates of jails who have been convicted of crimes, even criminals convicted of crimes relating to sex. There is no rational basis for charging civilly committed patients with mental abnormalities relating to sex more than the State of Missouri charges criminal convicts. The fees, rather, are imposed against plaintiffs and other civilly committed patients with mental abnormalities relating to sex out of a desire to exact punishment for the sexual nature of the mental abnormality with which plaintiffs have been thought to suffer.
(f) In addition, the fees are imposed without regard to what services, care, or treatment, is provided to an individual patient. There is no rational basis for charging a patient more than the actual cost of the care and treatment provided to that individual patient. In addition, the alleged “care and treatment” claimed by defendants to be provided to plaintiffs is inadequate or nonexistent and there is no genuine effort by the defendants to expend medical resources to “cure” the plaintiffs. Instead, the civil commitment is simply another punitive measure imposed on the plaintiffs after they have completed their respective sentences for the crimes for which they were charged and convicted. In addition, to the extent plaintiffs are provided medical treatment to bring about a cure, such treatment is insubstantial and inferior to the treatment provided to others under the care of the Missouri Department of Mental Health, who are civilly committed for mental abnormalities unrelated to sex. In fact, defendants have
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conditioned the receipt and quality of care and treatment on the plaintiffs’ willingness to comply with the deprivation of their constitutional rights. Moreover, defendants have even used the supposed “care and treatment” programs to intimidate and suppress the exercise of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the filing of this and other lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of their treatment. (g) As such, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants deprive plaintiffs of the equal protection of the law, in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions. 138. Procedural Due Process (a) The United States Constitution provides that individuals are entitled to “due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV. (b) The Missouri Constitution provides that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Mo. Const., art. I, § 10. (c) The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. (d) Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in their money and in the money of their family and those property interests have been taken from the defendants without due process of law. (e) Plaintiffs have not been provided a reasonable opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner concerning the fees imposed for care and treatment.
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(f) In fact, defendants and their agents have refused to answer even the simplest and most straight-forward of questions posed by the plaintiffs concerning this program and its failure to comply with the United States and Missouri Constitutions and its failure even to comply with the statutory framework.
(g) Defendants and their agents have refused to allow plaintiffs to contact attorneys before signing forms, have refused to allow plaintiffs to read the forms and documentation fully and comprehensively, and have sought to deprive them of any meaningful way of challenging the fees imposed on them.
(h) Moreover, the civil commitment is simply another punitive measure imposed on the plaintiffs after they have completed their respective sentences for the crimes for which they were charged and convicted. In addition, to the extent plaintiffs are provided medical treatment to bring about a cure, such treatment is insubstantial and inferior to the treatment provided to others under the care of the Missouri Department of Mental Health, who are civilly committed for mental abnormalities unrelated to sex. In fact, defendants have conditioned the receipt and quality of care and treatment on the plaintiffs’ willingness to comply with the deprivation of their constitutional rights. Moreover, defendants have even used the supposed “care and treatment” programs to intimidate and suppress the exercise of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the filing of this and other lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of their treatment.
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(i) As such, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants deprive plaintiffs of due process of the law, in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.
139. Substantive Due Process (a) The due process clauses prevent a civilly committed patient from being punished prior to any adjudication of criminal guilt. (b) The policies, practices, and conduct of defendants are not calculated to effectuate the detention or the purposes of detention as described in the court orders committing the plaintiffs to civil detention. (c) The due process clauses further prevent a civilly committed patient from being punished by the Department of Mental Health in contravention of the court order mandating that he be civilly committed. (d) As explained above, the court orders uniformly require the Department of Mental Health to provide the care and treatment of plaintiffs. The orders make no mention of any obligation or requirement that plaintiffs pay for their own care and treatment. Moreover, the civil commitment is simply another punitive measure imposed on the plaintiffs after they have completed their respective sentences for the crimes for which they were charged and convicted. In addition, to the extent plaintiffs are provided medical treatment to bring about a cure, such treatment is insubstantial and inferior to the treatment provided to others under the care of the Missouri Department of Mental Health, who are civilly committed for mental abnormalities unrelated to sex. In fact, defendants have conditioned the
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receipt and quality of care and treatment on the plaintiffs’ willingness to comply with the deprivation of their constitutional rights. Moreover, defendants have even used the supposed “care and treatment” programs to intimidate and suppress the exercise of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the filing of this and other lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of their treatment. (e) Defendants’ actions violate the court orders imposing the requirement of civil commitment and violate the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to due process of law. (f) As such, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants deprive plaintiffs of due process of the law, in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions. 140. Protection against Unreasonable Seizure of Property (a) The United States Constitution provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (b) The Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Mo. Const., art. I, § 15. (c) Defendants have unlawfully seized plaintiffs’ property by meaningfully interfering with plaintiffs’ possessory interests in their property.
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(d) The policies, practices, and conduct of defendants amount to an unreasonable and unconstitutional seizure of money, in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.
141. Ex Post Facto Clause (a) The United States Constitution prevents any state from passing an ex post facto law. U.S Const., art. I, § 10. (b) The Missouri Constitution provides that “no ex post facto law . . . can be enacted.” Mo. Const., art. I, § 13. (c) At the time plaintiffs were civilly committed, perhaps the Court could have imposed conditions on their confinement, including the payment of fines, and the payment of costs and expenses of their care and treatment. (d) The courts ordered the Department of Mental Health to provide for the plaintiffs’ care and treatment. (e) The care and treatment fees were only later imposed by the defendants, in a manner that increases the burdens of the civil commitment substantially. (f) These care and treatment fees were imposed upon plaintiffs and their families after they had fully served their criminal sentences. (g) Section 630.205, by requiring payment of excessive fines and exorbitant costs and expenses for their care and treatment, was enacted and applied to civilly committed patients for punitive purposes. (h) Section 630.205 is an ex post facto law because it adds a new punishment for plaintiffs’ crimes in addition to the punishment already imposed upon
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plaintiffs in the criminal proceeding in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions. (i) The imposition of the fees and fines on plaintiffs after their courts determined not to impose such fees and fines amounts to a retroactive imposition of law, in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions. Count I – Deprivation of Rights Guaranteed by the United States and Missouri Constitution and Prayer for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 142. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 141. 143. Federal law provides that every person who, under color of state law, custom, or practice, subjects any other person to deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable at law, in equity, and in any other proceeding necessary to obtain redress for such deprivation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 144. All defendants were acting pursuant to state law and were acting under color of state law at all pertinent times. 145. The federal and state constitutional deprivations outlined herein were caused by the exercise of rights and privileges created by the State, by a rule of conduct imposed by the State, or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and all defendants may fairly be said to be state actors. 146. As established above, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants amount to a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Constitutions and laws of the United States and Missouri.
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147. The defendants’ conduct threatens a protected interest of the plaintiffs and class members in that the conduct complained of herein resulted in an unlawful loss of their liberty rights, most notably to be free of cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy. The Missouri SORTS Program simply does not meet the constitutional standards required by Kansas v. Hendricks, a 5-4 decision and fragile precedent that requires the state to meet extraordinary standards in order to pass constitutional muster.
148. Each and every defendant had actual knowledge of the policies, practices, and conduct at issue, as well as what the law requires of them as state actors in their operation and management of the SORTS Program.
149. The conduct of the defendants is truly irrational, arbitrary, capricious, pursued in bad faith, and done with the intent to punish plaintiffs and the class members and to punish them twice.
150. Plaintiffs seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to protect their rights and to prevent any further deprivation of rights by defendants.
151. Plaintiffs have standing to obtain an injunction because, among other things, plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are being and will be deprived by the continuation of the challenged conduct of defendants.
152. As established above, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants have deprived and will deprive plaintiffs and the class members of their constitutional rights, both under the United States and Missouri Constitutions.
153. Defendants know that their policies, practices, and conduct deprive plaintiffs and the class of their constitutional rights in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions, yet they persist and refuse to abate said conduct.
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154. The challenged action is presently occurring and certain to occur in the immediate future.
155. Plaintiffs will continue to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. 156. Defendants will suffer no harm if an injunction issues. 157. The balance of harms weighs in favor of entry of an injunction. 158. It is in the public interest to enter an injunction that prevents defendants from continuing to deprive plaintiffs and the class of their rights as secured by the United States and Missouri Constitutions. 159. No previous injunctive relief has been awarded with respect to this matter. 160. Defendants’ ongoing actions in violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions present an actual and existing controversy regarding the claim by the plaintiffs and the class that the DMH and the defendants intentionally set out to create a prison disguised as a mental health facility and intended to use treatment as a pretext and a sham to indefinitely incarcerate the plaintiffs and the class in a maximum security, penal environment with no reasonable opportunity to ever be unconditionally released. As a consequence, plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are being punished in a cruel and unusual way, subject to double jeopardy for the same criminal conviction, and denied meaningful mental health care treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions materially to improve and to then be released. 161. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment, and is complementary to the injunctive relief requested below. 162. This Court’s intervention is necessary to declare the rights and other legal relations of the interested parties.
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163. Plaintiffs have standing to obtain a declaration of their rights because plaintiffs and defendants are in a dispute regarding their rights.
164. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class respectfully request this Court to enter its decree and judgment on Count I of their Fifth Amended Complaint, including findings of fact and conclusions of law against the defendants and those acting in concert, which result in the following remedies and relief by way of a preliminary and permanent injunction and declaratory relief:
(a) Dismantle and close down SORTS and the Farmington and Fulton facilities and order the immediate discharge of all SORTS residents and detainees, so that they are unconditionally free and in conjunction therewith enter a mandatory injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction immediately and unconditionally releasing the plaintiffs and the certified class of SORTS residents from being held in custody of the DMH at the SORTS facilities with no further obligation or duties to SORTS, the DMH, and the statutory scheme that was used to imprison the plaintiffs and the other class members, both residents and detainees;
(b) Declare the statutory scheme that set up the SVP Civil Commitment unconstitutional, to wit §§ 632.480 through 632.513 RSMo., sometimes called the “Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act” or “MSVPA.”,
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facially and as applied to plaintiffs and the class on the grounds that it is a pretext for warehousing and a prison disguised as a mental health facility that can thus no longer be operated and can no longer imprison present and future residents and detainees in the custody of the DMH and is thus unenforceable, void, and of no effect; (c) Preliminarily during the pendency of this Case and thereafter permanently enjoin the SVP Civil Commitment Program, including the detaining and evaluation of those about to be released from the custody of the Department of Corrections, having once completed their prison sentences, as well as the conduct by the DMH of subsequent judicial proceedings, quasi-judicial proceedings, and governmental sponsored meetings of DMH employees, independent contractors retained as psychiatric experts and prosecuting attorneys acting as evaluators, to determine the eligibility of detainees to be subject to the filing of a civil commitment petition and subsequent prosecution in a civil commitment trial, wherein the State of Missouri seeks to commit detainees to the custody of the DMH and SORTS or any other similar program; (d) Declare that §§ 473.398, 473.399, 630.205, 630.215, 630.305, RSMo, violate the United States Constitution and are thus unenforceable, void, and of no effect; (e) Declare that §§ 473.398, 473.399, 630.205, 630.215, 630.305, RSMo, violate the Missouri Constitution and are thus unenforceable, void, and of no effect;
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(f) Declare that the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants deprived plaintiffs and the class of their rights and liberties under the United States and Missouri Constitutions;
(g) In the alternative, declare unconstitutional the adequacy of the “care and treatment” provided to plaintiffs by defendants at SORTS and the conditions of their confinement;
(h) Declare that the “care and treatment” and “room and board” are inadequate, penal in nature, and not reasonably related to the rehabilitation of plaintiffs and to the treatment of their mental abnormalities and that the inadequacy of the “care and treatment” provided to plaintiffs renders unconstitutional the conditions of their confinement and must be remedied and reformed by the DMH to comply with constitutional standards;
(i) Enjoining defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction by personal service or otherwise from engaging in the conduct alleged in this Complaint and from enforcing and applying to plaintiffs and others similarly situated the provisions of §§ 473.398, 473.399, 630.205, 630.215, 630.305, and 632.483-495 RSMo;
(j) Pursuant to the authority granted by F.R.P.C. 54 appoint a neutral, qualified, and objective special master and medical monitor with superior expertise and experience in the law, civil rights matters and the care and treatment of SVP’s to oversee defendants’ compliance with the aforesaid
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injunctive relief, with the constitutional requirements described in this Complaint, and to report the status and implementation to the Court, with the appropriate powers and duties to bring about full, complete, and with urgency implementation of the injunctive relief; (k) In the alternative, with oversight, authority, and powers by the aforesaid special master and medical monitor to the fullest extent permitted by F.R.C.P. 54, answerable only to the Court, enter a mandatory injunction requiring defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise to fully, completely, and with urgency undertake and implement the following requirements, obligations, duties, and mandate:
- Operate SORTS as a mental health facility and not as a prison; - Operate SORTs with the intent to treat and release and not to
imprison and warehouse; - Establish a “cap” on the time that a resident can be held in the
custody of the DMH pursuant to the SORTS laws to not exceed three years, or whatever term the Court deems reasonable and appropriate; - Faithfully, equally, and fairly implement the same conditions for treatment and standards, procedures, and policies for release as those DMH patients held in custody pursuant to - programs that were established by nonSORTS statutes:
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- Cease informal “alerts” and “heads up” to members of the General Assembly about planned releases of residents and eliminate inappropriate communications with the General Assembly, inconsistent with treatment and care and ending unwarranted, politically motivated intrusion;
- Practice what SORTS preaches and create and maintain a state of the art program and create a culture where people want to be;
- Expend the same resources for SORTS as for other DMH facilities and programs and cease treating SORTS as a “red headed step child;”
- Adopt and implement a plan for hiring and training competent, ethical psychological and psychiatric counselors and therapists;
- Employ an adequate number and quality of medical doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, behavioral therapists, clergy, and other professional staff and provide SORTS residents meaningful access to such staff;
- Terminate all unlicensed or untrained staff, and staff determined by the special master or medical monitor to be incompetent or unable or incapable of providing ethical, up to date, adequate, truly therapeutic, and humane care and treatment to the residents;
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- Implement a treatment program that involves individual counseling sessions and contains other generally accepted therapy components;
- Develop individual treatment plans for each resident to measure progress based on psychological and psychiatric, medically-relevant criteria rather than on day-to-day disciplinary issues, and which provides understandable progress goals and a road map showing the way to improvement and release, such plan to include the components recognized as necessary for maximum treatment potential;
- Hire or contract with a qualified and competent expert in sex offender treatment to supervise and consult with SORTS staff;
- Satisfy professional standards relating to credentialing, staff training and supervision, including employing program staff who are adequately trained to provide residential care and treatment components, clinical direction and supervision consistently provided by qualified professionals, staff who understand the treatment model, structure, ethical obligations, and their roles, and treatment planning and clinical decisions consistent across and among patients and residents of SORTS;
- Establish treatment programs that are individualized, comprehensive, and based on “Best Practices”;
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- Establish safeguards including systematic measures of progress and ongoing monitoring of services to ensure quality and consistency;
- Establish a treatment facility housed in a mold-free environment;
- Establish and provide a treatment-oriented facility under the Least Restrictive Alternative with adequate space for living, treatment, other activities, and for separation among resident groups;
- Treat residents with respect and offer meaningful and genuine opportunities to have resident grievances addressed;
- Address long-term health and other behavioral and emotional needs of the residents;
- Establish a mental health program that is medically-based and consistent with psychological and psychiatric standards of care, including the “Sex Offender Treatment Program Standards and Measures” as adopted by The Special Commitment Center Sex Offender Treatment Program Standards and Measures;
- Protect residents’ privacy and medical information rights; - Establish testing programs to objectively and fairly measure the
progress of residents, including but not limited to the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide, the Sexual Violence Risk-20, the Rapid Risk Assessment for
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Sex Offence Recidivism, STATIC-99, STATIC 2002, the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool - Revised, the Sex Offender Needs Assessment Rating, and the Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised; - Ensure that the SORTS program has external oversight through an authoritative licensing and accreditation organization widely-respected in the field of sexual disorder treatment; - Establish a system of external peer review to ensure the quality and effectiveness of the SORTS treatment program; - Implement strategies to rectify the lack of trust between the residents and SORTS staff; - Implement a treatment program that involves residents’ spouses and family members and contains other generally accepted therapy components; - Make adequate provision for participation by residents’ families in rehabilitation efforts, including setting aside a room for visits by family members, permitting family visits with reasonable frequency and allowing prompt telephone access to residents in cases of family emergency, consistent with security; - Eliminate the treatment of SORTS residents as if they were criminal prisoners in the custody of the Department of Corrections, such as banning strip searches unless absolutely
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necessary for safety, eliminating monitoring of residents’ telephone calls and meetings with non-residents, eliminating harassment of residents by SORTS staff, allowing at least the amount of outdoor recreation time as permitted in prison if not more, ending the policy of monitoring each resident every 15 minutes especially where such policy requires an invasion of privacy in the shower or toilet stall, and allowing complete access to telephone services; - Afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for educational, religious, vocational/work, and recreational activities, including the right to contribute money to religious institutions; - Develop and implement a plan to integrate residents into society, including realistic, not overly restrictive, conditional release programs, and take all reasonable steps to implement that plan in a timely manner; - Faithfully require the adherence by all SORTS health care providers to the NAHO Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice for Healthcare Quality Professionals and discipline those who violate the Code; - Eliminate overcrowding; - Provide more timely, consistent treatment, less downtime, and eliminate repeated therapy session cancellations;
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- Accurately and fully disclose to the Missouri circuit courts the status of the progress of residents committed to SORTS and honestly provide to those courts the residents’ true status with respect to their mental abnormalities and risk of reoffending;
- Develop and implement a plan and take all reasonable steps to bring a constitutionally adequate program into reality rather than merely describing it on paper;
- Develop and implement a plan to insure full and complete compliance with the aforesaid reforms and remedies, including the right level of funding;
- Stop the deliberate, casual, “slow walk” of treatment and instead accelerate the pace of treatment; and
- Periodically, as required by the Court and with recommendations and reports by the special master and the medical monitor on the compliance by the DMH and the defendants of the above injunctive requirements to report the status and implementation to the Court, with the appropriate powers and duties to bring about full and complete implementation of the injunctive relief in a speedy matter, or failing that to recommend to the Court the dismantling and closing of SORTS and the Farmington and Fulton facilities and ordering the immediate discharge of all SORTS residents and detainees, so that they are unconditionally free and in
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conjunction therewith enter a mandatory injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction immediately and unconditionally releasing the plaintiffs and the certified class of SORTS residents from being held in custody of the DMH at the SORTS facilities with no further obligation or duties to SORTS, the DMH, and the statutory scheme that was used to imprison the plaintiffs and the other class members, both residents and detainees; (l) Awarding plaintiffs and their counsel all attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs herein; and (m) Award such other and further relief the Court deems appropriate. Count II – Deprivation of United States and Missouri Constitutional Rights and Prayer for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 165. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 141. 166. All defendants were acting pursuant to state law and were acting under color of state law at all pertinent times. 167. The deprivations outlined herein were caused by the exercise of rights and privileges created by the State, by a rule of conduct imposed by the State, or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and all defendants may fairly be said to be state actors. 168. As established above, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants amount to a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal and Missouri Constitutions and laws of the State of Missouri.
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169. The defendants’ conduct threatens a protected property interest of defendants in that the conduct seizes plaintiffs’ pensions, disability benefits, personal funds and other assets, as well as the funds and assets of their relatives.
170. Each and every defendant had actual knowledge of the policies, practices, and conduct at issue.
171. The conduct of defendants is truly irrational, arbitrary, capricious, pursued in bad faith, and done with the intent to punish plaintiffs.
172. Defendants’ ongoing actions in violation of the Federal and Missouri Constitutions present an actual and existing controversy regarding the reimbursement and payment of expenses from plaintiffs to defendants purportedly to pay the costs of “care and treatment.”
173. The controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment, and is complementary to the injunctive relief requested below.
174. This Court’s intervention is necessary to declare the rights and other legal relations of the interested parties.
175. Plaintiffs have standing to obtain a declaration of their rights because plaintiffs and defendants are in a dispute regarding their rights.
176. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to enter its decree and judgment in favor of said plaintiffs and the class on Count II of said plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint, findings of fact and conclusions of law against the defendants and those acting in concert, which result in the following remedies and relief by way of a permanent injunction and declaratory relief:
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(a) Declare unconstitutional, facially and as applied to plaintiffs and the class, the statutory scheme and conduct described herein relating to the reimbursement, payment and collection of “care and treatment” costs;
(b) Order the return of all property seized by defendants from plaintiffs, their estates, or their families relating to that program and declare that no collections should be allowed in the future, any accrual of debt should be cancelled, and all monies collected should be repaid with interest.;
(c) Declare unconstitutional, facially and as applied to plaintiffs and the class, the adequacy of the “care and treatment” provided to plaintiffs by defendants at SORTS and the conditions of their confinement and thus unenforceable, void, and of no effect;
(d) Declare the statutory scheme that set up the SVP Civil Commitment unconstitutional, facially and as applied to plaintiffs and the class, a pretext for warehousing and a prison disguised as a mental health facility that can no longer be operated;
(e) Declare that §§ 473.398, 473.399, 630.205, 630.215, 630.305, RSMo, violate the United States Constitution and are thus unenforceable, void, and of no effect;
(f) Declare that §§ 473.398, 473.399, 630.205, 630.215, 630.305, RSMo, violate the Missouri Constitution and are thus unenforceable, void, and of no effect;
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(g) Declare that the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants deprived and will in the future deprive plaintiffs and the class of their rights and liberties under the United States and Missouri Constitutions;
(h) Declare that any and all forms or agreements signed pursuant to the program, policies, practices, and conduct of defendants, are not contracts, and do not bind plaintiffs, their families, or their estates, and may not be used by defendants to obtain money, other assets, and pensions and other benefits and disability awards from plaintiffs, their families, or their estates;
(i) Declare that the “care and treatment” and “room and board” are inadequate, penal in nature, and not reasonably related to the rehabilitation of plaintiffs and to the treatment of their mental abnormalities;
(j) Declare that that the inadequacy of the “care and treatment” provided to plaintiffs invalidates the charges extracted from them for failure of consideration;
(k) Declare that the inadequacy of the “care and treatment” provided to plaintiffs renders unconstitutional, facially and as applied to plaintiffs and the class, the conditions of their confinement and must be remedied and reformed by the state to comply with constitutional standards;
(l) Enter a mandatory injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction immediately unconditionally releasing the plaintiffs and the
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certified class of SORTS residents from being held in custody of the DMH at the SORTS facilities with no further obligation or duties to SORTS, the DMH, and the statutory scheme that was used to imprison the plaintiffs and the other class members and thereby, as a practical matter, eliminate any need for the defendants to seek reimbursement for “care and treatment;” (m) Enjoining defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction by personal service or otherwise from engaging in the conduct alleged in this Complaint, from enforcing and applying to plaintiffs and others similarly situated the provisions of §§ 473.398, 473.399, 630.205, 630.215, 630.305, RSMo; (n) Requiring defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction by personal service or otherwise to immediately cease and desist any and all efforts, plans, practices, policies, and conduct which would seek to obtain the costs of care and treatment from plaintiffs, their families, or their estates; (o) Awarding plaintiffs and their counsel all attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs herein; and (p) Award such other and further relief the Court deems appropriate. Count III – Violations of §§ 632.483-495 RSMo. and Prayer for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
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177. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 141.
178. All defendants were acting pursuant to state law and were acting under color of state law at all pertinent times.
179. The deprivations outlined herein were caused by the exercise of rights and privileges created by the State, by a rule of conduct imposed by the State, or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and all defendants may fairly be said to be state actors.
180. As established above, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants amount to a deprivation of rights and privileges under §§ 632.483-495 RSMo. granted and guaranteed by the laws of the State of Missouri and only allow the plaintiffs and the members of the class to be detained and civilly committed in the SORTS Program if the statutes are obeyed and not violated.
181. Instead, defendants have violated and are violating the requirements of §§ 632.483-495 RSMo. by using the rights granted them to illegally detain and civilly commit convicted sex offenders in the custody and control of the DMH. More specifically, the statutory scheme that allows such detention and civil commitment is a pretext for warehousing convicted sex offenders, including the plaintiffs and the members of the class, so that they are illegally incarcerated in a prison disguised as a mental health facility that can thus no longer be operated and can no longer imprison present and future residents and detainees in the custody of the DMH and is thus unenforceable, void, and of no effect. Any efforts at treatment, as required by the statutes of the state of Missouri, are a sham and a pretext, not designed nor intended to be real and genuine so as to present a realistic opportunity for release of the plaintiffs and the class members.
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182. All defendants were acting pursuant to state law and were acting under color of state law at all pertinent times.
183. The state law statutory violations and deprivations outlined herein were caused by the exercise of rights and privileges created by the State, by a rule of conduct imposed by the State, or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and all defendants may fairly be said to be state actors.
184. As established above, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants amounts to a deprivation of a right guaranteed and granted by statutes of the state of Missouri and an outright violations of those statutes.
185. The defendants’ conduct threatens a protected interest of the plaintiffs and class members in that the conduct complained of herein resulted in and continues to result in an unlawful violation of Missouri statutory law that requires the Missouri SORTS Program to comply with §§ 632.483-495 RSMo.
186. Each and every defendant had actual knowledge of the policies, practices, and conduct at issue, as well as what the law requires of them as state actors in their operation and management of the SORTS Program.
187. The conduct of defendants is truly irrational, arbitrary, capricious, pursued in bad faith, and done with the intent to punish plaintiffs and to punish them twice.
188. Plaintiffs seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to protect their rights and to prevent any further deprivation of rights by defendants and violations of the statutes.
189. Plaintiffs have standing to obtain an injunction because, among other things, plaintiffs’ statutory rights are being and will be deprived by the continuation of the challenged conduct of defendants.
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190. As established above, the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants have deprived and will deprive plaintiffs and the class of their statutory rights under Missouri law, including genuine treatment with adequate resources and staffing and the resultant honest and professional judgment of qualified health care providers to recommend the release of the plaintiffs and the members of the class, who are objectively and genuinely entitled to consideration of such a recommendation.
191. Defendants know that their policies, practices, and conduct deprive plaintiffs and the class of their statutory rights in violation of §§ 632.483-495 RSMo., yet they persist and refuse to abate said conduct and obey the law.
192. The challenged action is presently occurring and certain to occur in the immediate future.
193. Plaintiffs will continue to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. 194. Defendants will suffer no harm if an injunction issues. 195. The balance of harms weighs in favor of entry of an injunction. 196. It is in the public interest to enter an injunction that prevents defendants from continuing to deprive plaintiffs and the class of their rights as secured by §§ 632.483-495 RSMo. 197. No previous injunctive relief has been awarded with respect to this matter. 198. Defendants’ ongoing actions in violation of Missouri statutory laws present an actual and existing controversy regarding the claim by the plaintiffs and the class that the DMH and the defendants intentionally set out to create a prison disguised as a mental health facility and intended to use treatment as a pretext and a sham to indefinitely incarcerate the plaintiffs and the class in a maximum security, penal environment with no reasonable opportunity to ever be unconditionally released.
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199. The controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment, and is complementary to the injunctive relief requested below.
200. This Court’s intervention is necessary to declare the rights and other legal relations of the interested parties.
201. Plaintiffs have standing to obtain a declaration of their rights because plaintiffs and defendants are in a dispute regarding their rights.
202. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to enter its decree and judgment, findings of fact and conclusions of law against the defendants and those acting in concert in favor of the plaintiffs and the class on Count III of the Fifth Amended Complaint, which result in the following remedies and relief by way of a permanent injunction and declaratory relief:
(a) Dismantle and close down SORTS and the Farmington and Fulton facilities and order the immediate discharge of all SORTS residents and detainees, so that they are unconditionally free and in conjunction therewith enter a mandatory injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction immediately unconditionally releasing the plaintiffs and the certified class of SORTS residents from being held in custody of the DMH at the SORTS facilities with no further obligation or duties to SORTS, the DMH, and the statutory scheme that was used to imprison the plaintiffs and the other class members, both residents and detainees;
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(b) Preliminarily during the pendency of this case and thereafter permanently enjoin the operation of the SVP Civil Commitment Program adopted and authorized by §§ 632.480 through 632.513 RSMo., sometimes called the “Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act” or “MSVPA.,” the detaining and evaluation of those about to be released from the Department of Corrections, having once completed their prison sentences as well as the conduct by the DMH of subsequent judicial proceedings, quasi-judicial proceedings, and governmental sponsored meetings of DMH employees, independent contractors retained as psychiatric experts and prosecuting attorneys acting as evaluators, to determine the eligibility of detainees to be subject to the filing of a civil commitment petition and subsequent prosecution in a civil commitment trial, wherein the State of Missouri seeks to commit detainees to the custody of the DMH and SORTS or any other similar program;
(c) Declare that the policies, practices, and conduct of defendants deprived plaintiffs of their rights and liberties under the statutory laws of the state of Missouri, including the breach and violation of the requirements set forth in §§ 632.483-495 RSMo.;
(d) In the alternative, declare the adequacy of the “care and treatment” provided to plaintiffs by defendants at SORTS and the conditions of their confinement violate §§ 632.483-495 RSMo. in that the DMH and the defendants intentionally set out to create a prison disguised as a mental health facility and intended to use treatment as pretext and a sham to
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indefinitely incarcerate the plaintiffs and the class in a maximum security, penal environment with no reasonable opportunity to ever be unconditionally released; (e) Declare that the “care and treatment” and “room and board” are inadequate, penal in nature, and not reasonably related to the rehabilitation of plaintiffs and to the treatment of their mental abnormalities; that the inadequacy of the “care and treatment” provided to plaintiffs renders the DMH and the defendants in violation of §§ 632.483-495 RSMo. with respect to the conditions of confinement and treatment of the plaintiffs and the class members that must be remedied and reformed by the state to comply with the statutory requirements and standards; (f) Enjoining defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction by personal service or otherwise from engaging in the conduct alleged in this Complaint, from enforcing and applying to plaintiffs and others similarly situated the provisions of §§ 473.398, 473.399, 630.205, 630.215, 630.305, RSMo; (g) Pursuant to the authority granted by F.R.P.C. 54 appoint a neutral, qualified, and objective special master and medical monitor with superior expertise and experience in the law, civil rights matters and the care and treatment of SVP’s to oversee defendants’ compliance with the aforesaid injunctive relief, with the requirements §§ 632.483-495 RSMo., and to report the status and implementation to the Court, with the appropriate
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powers and duties to bring about full, complete, and with urgency implementation of the injunctive relief; (h) In the alternative, with oversight, authority, and powers by the aforesaid special master and medical monitor to the fullest extent permitted by F.R.C.P. 54, answerable only to the Court, enter a mandatory injunction requiring defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise to fully, completely, and with urgency undertake and implement the following requirements, obligations, duties, and mandate, all of which are consistent with the express and implied requirements and intent of §§ 632.483-495 RSMo.:
- Operate SORTS as a mental health facility and not as a prison; - Operate SORTs with the intent to treat and release and not to
imprison and warehouse; - Establish a “cap” on the time that a resident can be held in the
custody of the DMH pursuant to the SORTS laws to not exceed three years, or whatever term the Court deems reasonable and appropriate; - Faithfully, equally, and fairly implement the same conditions for treatment and standards, procedures, and policies for release as those DMH patients held in custody pursuant to programs that were established by nonSORTS statutes:
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- Cease informal “alerts” and “heads up” to members of the General Assembly about planned releases of residents and eliminate inappropriate communications with the General Assembly, inconsistent with treatment and care and ending unwarranted, politically motivated intrusion;
- Practice what SORTS preaches and create and maintain a state of the art program and create a culture where people want to be;
- Expend the same resources for SORTS as for other DMH facilities and programs and cease treating SORTS as a “red headed step child”;
- Adopt and implement a plan for hiring and training competent, ethical psychological and psychiatric counselors and therapists;
- Employ an adequate number and quality of medical doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, behavioral therapists, clergy, and other professional staff and provide SORTS residents meaningful access to such staff;
- Terminate all unlicensed or untrained staff, and staff determined by the special master or medical monitor to be incompetent or unable or incapable of providing ethical, up to date, adequate, truly therapeutic, and humane care and treatment to the residents;
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- Implement a treatment program that involves individual counseling sessions and contains other generally accepted therapy components;
- Develop individual treatment plans for each resident to measure progress based on psychological and psychiatric, medically-relevant criteria rather than on day-to-day disciplinary issues, and which provides understandable progress goals and a road map showing the way to improvement and release, such plan to include the components recognized as necessary for maximum treatment potential;
- Hire or contract with a qualified and competent expert in sex offender treatment to supervise and consult with SORTS staff;
- Satisfy professional standards relating to credentialing, staff training and supervision, including employing program staff who are adequately trained to provide residential care and treatment components, clinical direction and supervision consistently provided by qualified professionals, staff who understand the treatment model, structure, ethical obligations, and their roles, and treatment planning and clinical decisions consistent across and among patients and residents of SORTS;
- Establish treatment programs that are individualized, comprehensive, and based on “Best Practices”;
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- Establish safeguards including systematic measures of progress and ongoing monitoring of services to ensure quality and consistency;
- Establish a treatment facility housed in a mold-free environment;
- Establish and provide a treatment-oriented facility under the Least Restrictive Alternative with adequate space for living, treatment, other activities, and for separation among resident groups;
- Treat residents with respect and offer meaningful and genuine opportunities to have resident grievances addressed;
- Address long-term health and other behavioral and emotional needs of the residents;
- Establish a mental health program that is medically-based and consistent with psychological and psychiatric standards of care, including the “Sex Offender Treatment Program Standards and Measures” as adopted by The Special Commitment Center Sex Offender Treatment Program Standards and Measures;
- Protect residents’ privacy and medical information rights; - Establish testing programs to objectively and fairly measure the
progress of residents, including but not limited to the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide, the Sexual Violence Risk-20, the Rapid Risk Assessment for
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Sex Offence Recidivism, STATIC-99, STATIC 2002, the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool - Revised, the Sex Offender Needs Assessment Rating, and the Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised; - Ensure that the SORTS program has external oversight through an authoritative licensing and accreditation organization widely-respected in the field of sexual disorder treatment; - Establish a system of external peer review to ensure the quality and effectiveness of the SORTS treatment program; - Implement strategies to rectify the lack of trust between the residents and SORTS staff; - Implement a treatment program that involves residents’ spouses and family members and contains other generally accepted therapy components; - Make adequate provision for participation by residents’ families in rehabilitation efforts, including setting aside a room for visits by family members, permitting family visits with reasonable frequency and allowing prompt telephone access to residents in cases of family emergency, consistent with security; - Eliminate the treatment of SORTS residents as if they were criminal prisoners in the custody of the Department of Corrections, such as banning strip searches unless absolutely
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necessary for safety, eliminating monitoring of residents’ telephone calls and meetings with non-residents, eliminating harassment of residents by SORTS staff, allowing at least the amount of outdoor recreation time as permitted in prison if not more, ending the policy of monitoring each resident every 15 minutes especially where such policy requires an invasion of privacy in the shower or toilet stall, and allowing complete access to telephone services; - Afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for educational, religious, vocational/work, and recreational activities, including the right to contribute money to religious institutions; - Develop and implement a plan to integrate residents into society, including realistic, not overly restrictive, conditional release programs, and take all reasonable steps to implement that plan in a timely manner; - Faithfully require the adherence by all SORTS health care providers to the NAHO Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice for Healthcare Quality Professionals and discipline those who violate the Code; - Eliminate overcrowding; - Provide more timely, consistent treatment, less downtime, and eliminate repeated therapy session cancellations;
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- Accurately and fully disclose to the Missouri circuit courts, the status of the progress of residents committed to SORTS and honestly provide to those courts the residents’ true status with respect to their mental abnormalities and risk of reoffending;
- Develop and implement a plan and take all reasonable steps to bring a constitutionally adequate program into reality rather than merely describing it on paper;
- Develop and implement a plan to insure full and complete compliance with the aforesaid reforms and remedies, including the right level of funding;
- Stop the deliberate, casual, “slow walk” of treatment and instead accelerate the pace of treatment; and
- Periodically, as required by the Court and with recommendations and reports by the special master and the medical monitor on the compliance by the DMH and the defendants of the above injunctive requirements to report the status and implementation to the Court, with the appropriate powers and duties to bring about full and complete implementation of the injunctive relief in a speedy matter, or failing that to recommend to the Court the dismantling and closing of SORTS and the Farmington and Fulton facilities and ordering the immediate discharge of all SORTS residents and detainees, so that they are unconditionally free and in
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conjunction therewith enter a mandatory injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Injunction immediately and unconditionally releasing the plaintiffs and the certified class of SORTS residents from being held in custody of the DMH at the SORTS facilities with no further obligation or duties to SORTS, the DMH, and the statutory scheme that was used to imprison the plaintiffs and the other class members, both residents and detainees;
(i) Awarding plaintiffs and their counsel all attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs herein; and
(j) Award such other and further relief the Court deems appropriate.
COUNT IV – Deprivation of Rights Guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Prayer for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
203. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 132.
204. This Count is brought pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) as an alternative claim to Counts I, II, and III of this Complaint against the DMH and the Defendants. The ADA prohibits discrimination in all “services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” including a Public Entity. 42 U.S.C. §12132.
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205. A “Public Entity” as defined by the ADA and case law is a very broad definition and includes “any State or local government and any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997). This “include[s] every possible agency of state or local government.” Id. Hence the ADA applies to state prisons, See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. V. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) and local law enforcement agencies, see Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1998). Quite simply, the ADA’s broad language brings with its scope “‘anything a public entity does.’” Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 118 F.3d 169, 171 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) aff’d 524 U.S. 206 (1998). This includes programs or services provided at jails, prison, and any other “’custodial or correctional institution,’” as well as mental health services and other activities or services undertaken by government. Even convicts do not park their rights against discrimination at the prison gates, much less the Plaintiffs and other residents of SORTS, whom the DMH and the Defendants contend are civil committees and not prisoners.
206. That said, Plaintiffs do not concede their primary claim and argument in this case that SORTS is a prison disguised as a mental health facility. However, if the Court finds SORTS to truly be a mental health facility, then, alternatively, Plaintiffs and the residents of SORTS are victims of discrimination because of their alleged disability in that, inter alia, SORTS is understaffed and underfunded in comparison to other DMH programs. Moreover, the Plaintiffs and the other residents are illegally segregated from other patients and residents treated at DMH facilities, who are treated in a different setting and with different resources that have resulted in far greater releases from confinement than SORTS residents. SORTS residents are held in a maximum security environment instead of in the Least Restrictive Alternative even though, by
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the DMH’s own statistics, fully fifty per cent of the SORTS residents present “no apparent risk.” The practices of the DMH and the Defendants are also thus in violation of the ADA’s integration mandate, which requires that the “services, programs, or activities of a public entity” be provided “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. §325.130(d).
207. Under the ADA, the Plaintiffs and the other residents of the SORTS are thus “qualified individuals,” entitled to be protected from discrimination because of the DMH has branded them as having a “mental abnormality,” which the DMH and the Defendants have conceded is a “disability” under the ADA.
208. Based on Title II and its integration mandate, the United States Supreme Court held that the “unjustified isolation” of persons with disabilities by State and local governments constitutes discrimination under Title II. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). Accordingly, the civil rights of the Plaintiffs and the rest of the SORTS residents have been violated by unnecessary segregation, maybe with only eight possible exceptions (the residents in the Annex), out of 190+ residents in maximum security at the SORTS Farmington and Fulton facilities. Missouri’s statutory scheme as previously described herein is in violation of the ADA, a federal law that, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, preempts state law, including the SVP statutes cited in earlier passages of this Complaint.
Jurisdiction and Venue 209. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1345 (2000). 210. Venue in the Eastern District of Missouri is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 (2000).
The Defendants
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211. The Defendants, as senior management of the DMH, operate and manage, both strategically and day to day, SORTS, and as such have responsibility for the services, treatment programs, procedures, care, rules, regulations, and daily operations provided to the Plaintiffs and the other residents at SORTS.
212. At all times pertinent herein, the Defendants acted in concert with each other, aided and abetted each other in the commission of the acts and conduct giving rise to the claims asserted in Count IV and each was an agent of the other, so that the actions of any one Defendant created vicarious liability for the other Defendants.
The ADA 213. The ADA establishes a broad mandate, contrary to the practices and operations of the DMH and the Defendants and Missouri statutory law, that the Plaintiffs and the other residents of SORTS have the right to live integrated lives, not be segregated, be in custody of the Least Restrictive Alternative, have an equal opportunity for release as other DMH programs and facilities, and have equal monies and resources expended for their care and treatment consistent with monies and resources expended for other patients and residents of DMH programs and facilities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§12101(a)(2), (b)(1)-(2). Title II is part of the ADA’s “clear and comprehensive national mandate” to end the segregation of persons with disabilities in virtually all aspects of American life, including employment, public accommodations, and transportation. See id. §12101. It is the State’s obligation (in this instance the DMH and the Defendants) to fulfill this mandate on behalf of its citizens, whether they receive services during the day or in residential settings at night, and regardless of the severity of their disabilities. The Supreme Court recognized in Olmstead that “social contacts, work options, economic independence, . . . and cultural enrichment” are among the “everyday life activities” severely diminished by unnecessary segregation. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600-01. Yet with SORTS, “one size fits all,”
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and different privileges, housing conditions, and treatment programs are largely immaterial and a sham because SORTS is a prison disguised as a mental health facility and the goal is confinement, not treatment and release.
The ADA as Applied to SORTS – a Dismal Failure to Comply 214. Many of the SORTS residents have been relegated to the SORTS segregated program for as long as a decade and a half. Fully fifty per cent of the residents, as previously alleged, present “No Apparent Risk,” yet they are held in maximum security, segregated from all other patients and residents in the Missouri Department of Mental Health. 215. The DMH and the Defendants have failed to offer SORTS residents the critical transition, vocational, and employment services necessary to make work and participation in post-secondary integrated employment and day settings a reality. The DMH and the Defendants purport to offer transition through a conditional release program, but that is both a failure and an artifice. The DMH and the Defendants, as well as Missouri statutory law, have created so many impossible and burdensome conditions that the conditions literally swallow any benefits of release. Three individuals have supposedly been conditionally released. But each returns nightly to the maximum security confinement of SORTS behind the two rows of razor wire, instead of the Least Restrictive Alternative and the ADA’s integration mandate. 216. The civil rights of people who can and want to receive employment services in the community are violated when they are unnecessarily segregated at SORTS. Likewise, the civil rights of people who can and want to receive day services in the community are violated when they are unnecessarily segregated in facility-based programs. Moreover, as in the context of residential service settings, administering and funding day activity services, including employment services, in integrated settings is not only practicable but has been shown to lower costs over the longer term, and does not fundamentally alter state service systems. To the extent
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the DMH and the Defendants argue that they must follow Missouri law and the SVP statutes in
particular, the answer to that contention is obvious – the Constitution and federal law trump state
law and the DMH and the Defendants know that they cannot hide behind state law requirements
that violate the constitution and federal law. One of the problems with the management of
SORTS is that the DMH General Counsel fails to understand or declines to recognize this
elementary legal position. In some ways, the argument could be made with reason and good
cause that the DMH General Counsel should be named as a Defendant in this case because she is
arguably as complicit as lay management in the operation and management of SORTS and
knows or should know SORTS’ evident shortcomings.
217. The DMH and the Defendants have placed the Plaintiffs and the other SORTS
residents at serious risk of unnecessary segregation because of the lack of integrated transition
services, integrated employment opportunities, and appropriate referrals to prepare residents for
transition into work in integrated settings. The one time Director of Behavioral Services at
SORTS, Dr. Jon Rosenboom, described the implications and risk of unnecessary segregation
SORTS residents in this email in this way:
“From a natural progression in the treatment of our more advanced residents, some increased responsibility and personal freedom is crucial. We now have 4-6 residents within 1-2 years of a recommendation to CO for partial conditional release [interesting that Dr. Rosenboom cannot use the word ‘release’ or ‘conditional release’ without modifying the word or phrase with ‘partial.’] After over 7 years of these individual’s treatment and progress, they continue to be supervised 24/7, have no personal monies on their person, cannot buy a soda or candy bar from vending machines that they pass 10 times a day, and have now lost a good deal of the benefits of personalization of their room through the life safety interpretations/restrictions associated with TJC accreditation. They are becoming more institutionalized and the potential that their work in treatment will bring fruit is subject to fading.” (Emphasis added).
In addition, Mary Weiler, then SORTS Director of Social Services, in a plea for help to other officials operating SORTS programs in other states wrote in an email:
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“We are moving toward conditional release of several residents. All of these men have been out of mainstream society (jail, prison, SVP residential treatment) for at least 20 years. I would appreciate references to articles or other resources that would be helpful in teaching reintegration skills to these men (i.e. imagine the changes in telephonic communication over 20 years!). Thank you.”
218. As a result and as acknowledged with great clarity in the foregoing Rosenboom/Weiler emails, to the extent the DMH and the Defendants have provided employment, vocational, and reintegration skills to SORTS residents it has been counterproductive because it has not been provided in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the residents, in violation of the ADA. Instead, the DMH and the Defendants plan, structure, and administer their system of providing employment, vocational, and day services in a manner that delivers such services primarily in segregated and facility-based day programs, rather than in integrated employment and day settings. Sheltered and facility-based day programs segregate the SORTS resident from community and provide little or no opportunity to interact with person without disabilities, other than paid staff, who now are on notice by the filing of this Complaint that they may be participating in and actively involved in a program that violates the law, ethical medical practices, and their duties and obligations to their patients as licensed health care providers.
219. SORTS’ residents tend to remain in facility-based day activity service programs for years at a time, and the DMH and the Defendants offer very few services and supports to assist the residents to transition back to integrated employment and day settings from segregated employment and day settings. All they get are endless, useless, hopeless, mind numbing group therapy sessions, with repetitive, make work assignments that do not advance treatment or bring about a realistic opportunity to be cured of their alleged disability, a program that is remarkably segregated, different for no useful reason or rationale related to care and treatment and runs counter to a goal of release to the community, all at the same time being severely underfunded,.
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220. In Olmstead, the Supreme Court recognized the harm caused by unnecessary segregation: “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.” Id. At 601.
221. See also Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 322 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In sum, individuals who must enter institutions to obtain Medicaid services for which they qualify may be able to raise successful Title II. . . claims because they face a risk of institutionalization.”) (emphasis added); M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (“An ADA plaintiff need not show that institutionalization is ‘inevitable’ or that she has ‘no choice’ but to submit to institutional care in order to state a violation of the integration mandate[;] [r]ather, a plaintiff need only show that the challenged state action creates a serious risk of institutionalization.”
222. Title II of the ADA states as follows: “no qualified individual with a disability, by reason of such disability, shall be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. §12132. As Congress found, “[I]ntegration is fundamental to the purposes of the ADA. Provision of segregated accommodations and services relegate persons with disabilities to second-class citizen status.” See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 479; see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B at 673 (same); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cr. 1995) (“The ADA is intended to insure that qualified individuals receive services in a manner consistent with basic human dignity rather than a manner which shunts them aside, hides, and ignores them.”).
Summary of Additional Facts Specific to the Claim Under Count IV 223. In their own words as described in more detail elsewhere in this Complaint and presented here in summary form, the following candid, inner DMH communications illustrate
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and prove that the DMH and the Defendants operate and manage an institution that violates the
ADA because the treatment is substandard, is not meaningful, other DMH programs receive
more resources and money, better staffing, have the true intent to treat a disability, do not engage
in impermissible segregation, utilize the principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative, are
committed to community based programs, have genuine release protocols, greater release rates,
and do not discriminate and have differing standards for release within the same or similar
patient base as SORTS:
That Director Schafer has stated that “No one has ever graduated from [SORTS] and somewhere down the line, we have to do that or our treatment processes become a sham.” That Director Schafer has stated that “The ‘end game’ related to
MOSOTC is to[a]void building new facilities for Sexual Predators as long
as possible. New tougher sentencing laws will ultimately reduce the number of referrals to DMH, but this impact will not be felt until at least
10 years from now.”
That, from time to time, Alan Blake, the former COO of SORTS, has offered these opinions and facts about SORTS: “Unfortunately DMH is not will to applying [sic] the values it espouses or things would be different.” “The state keeps trying to get by on the cheap.” “We are [a] disaster waiting to happen.” “I fear [we] are going to have some major care failure that will contribute to my early retirement.” “We are also now vulnerable to claims that we offer inferior treatment in that we are not staffed at a similar rate to other areas of the facility and thereby are providing inadequate treatment.” “I have a worried sense that the budget is being driven by Steve and the money people, not by policy and need.” “I continue to be concerned that this ongoing minimal funding keeps us on the edge of adequate and inadequate, and in a federal court’s view, even our adequate may be inadequate enough for an adverse ruling.”
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“As it is I am starting to have problems keeping management staff from getting discouraged and giving up. They are worn out, frustrated distressed and wearing out.”
“We are the DMH redheaded stepchild and they don’t care if we fail.”
“We have been getting farther and farther behind. That is why I initiated the behavioral health structure in order to reduce the impact of the inadequate funding of this facility for YEARS, and find a way to operate for less.”
“If we are to seek accreditation with current staffing levels and patterns, we will need to significantly reduce treatment to assure that assessments documentation and treatment plans are in place.”
“All this opens us to a federal lawsuit for providing substandard care. A successful lawsuit in this area will cost the state millions.”
“However, this again places the Department at risk of legal action regarding substandard care.”
“The facility will take on the effect of a prison and be in violation of Supreme Court rulings. The residents will likely initiate legal action for which the department and state will have difficulty mounting a defense.”
“We are so far from JCAHO [accreditation] that I cannot conceive of it. For lawsuits, we have had over 50 filed – mostly [but not all] frivolous.”
“We have been trying to find how to make a $600,000 core reduction and the ramifications.”
“[If that happens] most nursing and medical staff will leave, and most professional staff will follow. At that point we become a prison.”
Or Jon Rosenboom’s observation:
“Finally, I am often struck by the unsettling conclusion that direct patient care is one of the last priorities when stacked against all of the other expectations.”
Or Dr. Joseph Park’s insights:
“Psychiatric inpatient facilities are backing up, admitting far more commitments than discharges. This, in turn, clogs acute care facilities, which must hold patients longer who are awaiting admission into state long-term psychiatric care. This system “constipation” forces state facilities to operate beyond 100% of capacity for long periods of tie, exhausting staff, causing staff overtime and high turnover rates, and
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inevitably increasing the risk of staff injuries and patient abuse and neglect.”
Or Dr. Jay Englehart, the Medical Director of the SMMHC (which includes SORTS) warning about a DMH “Central Office” directed effort to try to overcome the shortage of physicians and save money by the hiring of Psychiatric APN’s noting that this is…
“…the model which the prisons are moving toward, but I really do not want have [sic] a standard of care or staffing which is equal to that of the prisons. I hope we are better than that.”
Or the candid admission as far back as 2002 by Ann Dirks-Linhorst that:
“I know that yesterday you indicated that you all had inherited a ‘bad’ program.”
Or the unknown SORTS employee, who acknowledged that SORTS had no release/integration program in place, nor did it account for the need to have LRA’s.
Class Action 224. This case is brought on behalf of a class that consists of all persons who have been, are, or will be confined in the custody of SORTS or have been, are, or will be detained pursuant to consideration by the State as to whether a petition for civil commitment will be filed or if filed then required to wait, in a maximum security, segregated jail, for a civil commitment trial. 225. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The population presently in the custody of SORTS apparently exceeds 200 individuals and is constantly growing larger as new persons are detained before trial and civilly committed. The class of those detained at any particular stage of the civil commitment process as set forth in the Missouri SVP statutes exceeds 50 in number.
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226. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, and these questions predominate over those affecting only individual class members. The predominate common questions are: (1) whether the DMH and the Defendants or those acting under their control or direction discriminate against the Plaintiffs and the other members of the proposed class on the basis of their alleged disability in violation of the ADA; and (2) whether the DMH and the Defendants have violated the due process rights of the Plaintiffs and the proposed members of the class in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
227. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories in that they have all suffered as a result of the practices in violation of the ADA and the United States Constitution as alleged in this Count of the Complaint.
228. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the members of the class. They have no interests antagonistic to the class, and they are represented by counsel, who are competent and experienced in complex civil litigation.
229. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that the DMH and the Defendants, by creating and maintaining the practices alleged in this Count of the Complaint, have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, and, as a result, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the entire class is appropriate.
General Allegations 230. The DMH and the Defendants are obligated to operate SORTS in a manner that does not infringe upon the federal rights, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by other federal law, of individuals residing at SORTS.
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231. The DMH and the Defendants are obligated to provide treatment, supports, and services to individuals residing at SORTS consistent with the ADA and implementing regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213; 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2006).
232. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted or failed to act, as alleged herein, under color of state law.
233. Defendants have failed and are continuing to fail to provide the Plaintiffs and the other SORTS residents with that level of treatment, habilitation and training, including behavioral and related training programs, required by the ADA, necessary to protect the residents’ liberty interests and to ensure their safety and freedom from undue or unreasonable restraint.
234. Defendants have failed and are continuing to fail to ensure that restraints are administered to residents by appropriately qualified professionals in keeping with accepted professional standards, and are not used as punishment, in lieu of treatment, or for the convenience of staff. Defendants have failed and are continuing to fail to supervise adequately residents in restraints to protect them from harm, including the worsening of their mental health as a result of the violations of the ADA and practices contrary to the constitution.
235. SORTS’s treatment, support, and services substantially depart from generally accepted professional standards of care, thereby exposing individuals residing at SORTS to significant risk and, in some cases, to actual harm, including emotional and psychiatric damage.
236. SORTS’s treatment, support, and services substantially depart from generally accepted professional standards of care in the following specific respects, among others:
(a) the provision of adequate psychological and behavioral services; (b) the provision of adequate medical, neurological, and nursing services;
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(c) the provision of adequate psychiatric services; (d) the provision of adequate habilitation and therapy services, including physical
therapy, occupational therapy, speech and language therapy, and other forms of therapy, physical management, nutritional services and related services; and (e) the provision of adequate protections from harm. (f) the failure to provide necessary monetary and nonmonetary resources consistent with the requirements of the ADA and the constitution. (g) the failure to provide necessary monetary and nonmonetary resources equal to that provided to other DMH programs and facilities. (h) the failure to provide the Least Restrictive Alternative. (i) the segregation of the Plaintiffs and other SORTS residents from the community and other DMH patients and residents, who receive better care and treatment and are more likely to be released.
Violations of the Due Process Protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
237. The egregious and flagrant acts and omissions alleged in this Count of the Complaint constitute a pattern or practice that violated the federal rights, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by other federal law, of individuals residing at SORTS.
238. Unless enjoined by this Court, Defendants will continue to engage in the egregious and flagrant acts and omissions set forth in Count IV that deprive the SORTS’s residents of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution of the United States and federal law, and will cause irreparable harm to these residents.
Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
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239. The egregious and flagrant acts and omissions alleged in this Count of the Complaint violate the ADA and implementing regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§1211101-12213, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35.
240. Unless enjoined by this Court, Defendants will continue to engage in the egregious and flagrant acts and omissions set forth in this Count of the Complaint that deprive the residents of SORTS of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by federal law, and will cause irreparable harm to these residents.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to enter its decree and judgment, findings of fact and conclusions of law against the Defendants and those acting in concert in favor of the Plaintiffs and the class on Count IV of the Fifth Amended Complaint, which result in the following remedies and relief by way of a permanent injunction and declaratory relief: (i) Permanently enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, subordinates, successors in office, and all those acting in concert or participation with them from continuing the acts, omissions, and practices set forth in Count IV, and that this Court require Defendants to take such actions as will ensure lawful conditions of institutionalization are afforded to residents of SORTS, including the provision of adequate treatment in the most least restrictive setting appropriate to their individualized needs; (ii) Declaring that the acts, omissions, and practices set forth in Count IV constitute a pattern or practice of resistance to SORTS residents’ rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that those acts, omissions, and practices violate the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Americans With Disabilities Act; and
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(iii) Granting such other and further equitable relief as the Court may deem just and
proper, including an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
ROSENBLUM, SCHWARTZ, ROGERS & GLASS, P.C. BY: /s/Eric M Selig______________________
Eric M. Selig, #40673MO 120 South Central Ave., Suite 130 St. Louis, MO 63105 (314) 862-4332 (314) 862-8050 (facsimile) eselig@rsrglaw.com
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP Daniel O’Toole, #38051MO Christopher R. LaRose, #59612MO Winston E. Calvert, #57421MO 7700 Forsyth, Suite 1800 St. Louis, Missouri 63105 (314) 621-5070 (314) 621-5065 (facsimile) dotoole@armstrongteasdale.com clarose@armstrongteasdale.com wcalvert@armstrongteasdale.com
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF EASTERN MISSOURI
Anthony E. Rothert, #44827MO Grant R. Doty, #60788MO 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, Missouri 63108 (314) 652-3111 tony@aclu-em.org
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of February, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which sent electronic notification of the filing on the same day to all counsel of record.

Joseph Paul Dandurand Attorney General of Missouri 1530 Rax Court P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65109

Mary Delworth Morris Attorney General of Missouri Old Post Office Building P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188

Philip Sholtz Attorney General of Missouri P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188

Katherine S. Walsh Attorney General of Missouri Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188

/s/Eric M. Selig

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SORTS Census, Bed Space and Funded Bed Projections — December 2009
• In FY'09, the in-house census exceeded funded beds. The reduction in funded beds from FY08 to FY09 assumed a rapid placement of in-house detainees in contract detention centers, but placement was delayed by court action and need for statutory change. This has since been obtained and all but 2 detainees have been placed. However, the delay coincided with an unprecedented and unpredicted increase in the number of new SVP commitments to SORTS. This increase in commitments was fueled, in part, by the detainees placed in contract detention centers demonstrating an increased willingness to stipulate to SVP commitments to SORTS. The lack of available beds in FY09 was exacerbated by the reduction in the number of beds on the Hoctor wards to 16 residents per ward to accommodate The Joint Commission standards.
• A new ward was funded for a partial year (7 months) in the FY'10 regular budgeting process. This ward increased SORTS' on paper budged census, but because of the aforementioned census pressures, these beds were occupied by individuals already committed to SORTS and no new capacity was created. This only real change was the placement of PRN staff into regular merit system position codes. At this point, the SORTS complex has only one remaining vacantl6- bed Hoctor ward available for funding in FY 11 to accommodate additional SVP commitments during the Fiscal Year. Presuming historical admission rates, it will be necessary to open the last ward as early as July, 2010, prior to the receipt of any appropriation. In the interim SORS will support the ward by hiring PRN staff and use of overtime. On a practical basis, it would be prudent for the Department to secure funding to open the last Hoctor ward as early in FY11 as possible, preferably July 1, 2010. Although the historical practice has been to appropriate sufficient dollars to allow for a ward to be opened in December, this results in overcrowding, eventually requiring that the ward be opened in advance of the appropriation. Although that has not been significantly problematic prior to efforts to obtain accreditation, in the current environment overcrowding results in practices that are violations of accreditation and life / safety standards, thereby placing accreditation efforts at risk. In addition, an unfunded ward lacks the staff needed to provide treatment, housekeeping, clerical and support services are not available, placing an additional burden on existing staff, thereby diluting services for several months. This is all the more problematic as allegations of overcrowding and inadequate services are the subject of conditions of confinement lawsuits by residents.
• At the current rate of admissions the SORTS wards inside the secure perimeter will be full before the beginning of FY12. Some relief will be provided should the state proceed with planned Capital Improvement projects involving the renovation of the Hoctor first floor central hallway (adding 14 beds) and the construction of an eight step down transition beds under a separate roof. However, this is not likely to be completed before FY12 and will not resolve all bed space needs during FY12 and beyond. Moreover, the conversion of the Hoctor first floor central hallway will result in the losi of significant office space for professional staff, requiring 2 to 3 individuals to share the residual office space.
• The rate of growth may be counteracted by resident conditional releases or discharge because of severe, debilitating, chronic medical conditions. However, the rate of discharges is not anticipated to approach the rate of admissions for many years.

EXHIBIT 1

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Enke, Teri
From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments:
Follow Up Flag: Flag Status:

Vincenz, Felix Monday, June 22,•2009 3:26 PM Reitz, Robert
tate Bond Initiative and New CI Opportunities - Original Instructions
ORE: MSOTC and Aged/Infirm; FW: letter; FSH Size
Follow up Flagged

I think it does make sense, but include it as an option.
From: Reitz, Robert Sent: Monday, June 22, 2009 2:28 PM To: Vincenz, Felix Subject: RE: State Bond Initiative and New CI Opportunities
Working on it, but we potentially have two plans:
1) FTE reductions only — Security, dietary, etc 2) FTE reductions and privatization of perimeter security, dietary, housekeeping, etc.
With fringe in FY10 being as high as it is, does it make sense for us to include a plan for privatization of most nonessential services? Ken thinks there's more than $1M in potential savings if we do.
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Monday, June 22, 2009 2:13 PM To: Reitz, Robert Subject: FW: State Bond Initiative and New CI Opportunities
Remember — I'm needing something on this by the end of the week.
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2009 6:15 PM To: Reitz, Robert; Martin, Marty A.; Adams, Karen; Blake, Alan; Gowdy, Rick; Rosenboom, Jonathan Cc: Carson, Rebecca Subject: State Bond Initiative and New CI Opportunities
Karen/Alan/Jon - Here is the information of which I spoke with Karen and Alan. Just to be clear — this replaces the concept of the 16 bed community option that was attached.
Bob/Marty — Fulton is very much back on the table. However, I need you, Ken and Marty to come up with some projections about how a new Fulton could realize some savings, both in E&E costs, support staff, and potentially, even in some direct care staff. I know Ken and I used to discuss how new air exchange standards zeroed out fuel and utility savings, and how any savings we realized in support staff and wards that allowed for more efficient staffing patters would need to be plowed into enrichment of the existing clinical staff. However, we need to either make that case or demonstrate some savings. At the very least, we need to demonstrate how more efficient ward designs will enable us to save staffing costs associated with watching restrooms and hallways, and even more importantly, in reduced overtime costs. Get on this and give me something within the next 7 to 10 days.
From: Schafer, Keith Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2009 2:58 PM

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TotSchaeperkoetter, Jeff Cc: Harris, Jeff; Miller, Mayme; Luebbering, Linda; DMH.CO Exec Team/Assistants Subject: Bond Initiative
Jeff, Linda, Jeff and Mayme, the Governor's Bond strategy is exciting and exceptionally important to DMH. I can immediately think of three key projects that could make a major difference in our ability to provide good, cost effective services:
Building a new Fulton State Hospital, including a new SW Minimum Security Forensic Facility and a new wing at NWPRC (St Joseph) to reduce Fulton overcrowding: As you know, Design and Construction already has the cost analysis for a new Fulton State Hospital campus. You and we have also done some analysis on the associated Southwest forensic minimum security facility and an additional wing to the Northwest psychiatric rehabilitation center to house individuals now stuck on the Fulton State Hospital Campus. In addition to relieving overcrowding at Fulton and cutting down on staff injuries and the $3 million we are spending annually in overtime there, the new Southwest and Northwest facilities will create 200 good new full time state jobs at a net cost of only $3 million in total GR, or about $15,000 per job (including fringe). The rest of the cost of those jobs will be covered through federal reimbursements.
MOSOTC: We are looking down the barrel of a mandatory $72 million construction project to add necessary space to the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Program in Farmington to handle the 160 person increase in DOC referrals we will experience over the next ten years. As you know, we are maxed out on space at the current MOSOTC facility. Since there is no enthusiasm for an outpatient model like that operated in Texas, we must now plan for the,construction of this facility as soon as possible. We would like to build 140 or so beds built within the razor-wire complex where the current MOSOTC facilities sit. We would also like to think about five or six cluster group homes on the SE Missouri Mental Health Center campus that would allow us to move elderly and medically frail MOSOTC patients to a different level of care. We could carefully staff these homes with a high level of security aides to make sure there is no risk to the community from the elderly and medically fragile MOSOTC patients living in the group homes. For example, we just had an 82 year-old MOSOTC patient die in June from his medical condition. We also need a place where MOSOTC "graduates" can go and live and work. We could reserve a bedroom in each of these group homes for that purpose, hiring the graduates as DMH peer specialists. If they live and work there successfully for a number of years, then we could step them up to probationary outpatient placement. No one has ever graduated from MOSOTC and somewhere down the line, we have to do that or our treatment processes become a sham. The group home cluster is a new concept that we have not previously discussed with your staff or the Governor's Budget Office.
Nevada Habilitation Center: Now that Bellefontaine has been taken care of, the most pressing facility problem on the DD Habilitation Center side is Nevada Habilitation Center. As you know, it is an old, high - Cost campus that does not have group homes like the other habilitation centers. We will be thinking about how we could most-effe -ctively replace that campus through construction that would eventually facilitate us converting the cost of that program to the Home and Community-based Waiver, as was just done in the 2010 budget for Marshall and DDTC. We might actually want to build clusters of group home facilities in Nevada and surrounding cities that total the same number-of. beds now on that single campus.
I know other DMH projects will emerge, but I wanted to give you a heads up to those that most quickly come to mind. We will ask for a meeting with you and your staff in the near future to discuss these further.
Keith Schafer, Ed.D.
Director Department of Mental Health 1706 East Elm, Jefferson City, MO 65102 Phone: 573-751-4970 or 573-751-3070 email: keith.schaferAdm h.mosiov
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to
2
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Gowdy, Rick
From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments:

Schafer, Keith Monday, March 24, 2008 9:55 AM McGinty, Brent; Parks, Joe; Gowdy, Rick; Bax, Bob; Heckemeyer, Jan MOSOTC update DMH Budget Discussion Notes for Senator Nodler 09.doc

I plan to give this to Jim Lembke and Gary Nodler, plus a few other people on the Senate Budget Committee. What do you think?

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1

DMH Budget Discussion Notes for Senator Nodler

and Other Key Senate Budget Committee Members

Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center Budget Items (MOSOTC): DMH has both a 6 month cost to continue item for 17 beds partially funded in '08 budget and a new decision item for 17 additional beds.

Budget Issue Background: DMH is proposing to contract with at least 2 modern county jails for a cluster of cells in each jail for "detainees" referred by DOC through Attorney General's Office. These detainees await adjudication by local courts to determine if they should be civilly committed to DMH for inpatient treatment for sexual predatory behaviors. Over 50 detainees now await adjudication. Time from referral from DOC to adjudication for commitment averages 22 months and has gone as long as 5 years. Current detainees at MOSOTC generally refuse treatment on advice of their defense attorneys and are angry at having completed DOC sentence and now being further detained by DMH. Staff and client injuries generally occur on detainee units.

By the end of FY 2009, MOSOTC buildings will be full and cannot house additional referrals. DMH must either build a new facility within the razor wire confinement area, or implement the jail strategy for detainees. State statute allows jail detentions. Two other states with similar statutes already do this (Kansas and S. Carolina). The Attorney General's office is concerned about increased risk of lawsuits but will support the DMH policy decision.

DMH moved a significant portion of the MOSOTC budget into the "Professional Services" line in FY 2009 to accommodate contract swill local jails. Representative Lembke, not knowing about our plans for jail detention, (DMH had failed to brief him on this) cut significant amounts of money from the Professional Services line for other initiatives. This would preclude our ability to place detainees in jails awaiting adjudication for commitment. Keith Schafer has since briefed Representative Lembke and indicated we would try to protect funding in MOSOTC core and new decision item lines to allow the change. Representative Lembke has indicated this would be consistent with his goals to assure that minimal funding be spent on sexual predators within the parameters of the state's obligation to provide treatment allowing involuntary commitment.

The "end game" related to MOSOTC is as follows:

1. Avoid building new facilities for Sexual Predators as long as possible. New tougher sentencing laws will ultimately reduce the number of referrals to DMH, but this impact will not be felt until at least 10 years from now.
2. Hold Detainees in County jails. This will cost about $70 per day versus the $200 a day at MOSOTC. 3. Reduce staff and client injuries at MOSOTC. 4. In FY 2010, try to move aging MOSOTC committees to other specialized treatment settings. 5. Use any savings to strengthen MOSOTC treatment to get it JACHO accredited. Once accredited,
DMH may be able to bill for federal DISH reimbursement for accredited MOSOTC beds. This could be worth up to $5.0 million to the state's General Fund, greatly offsetting current per-day expenditures at the facility. This is a complicated process that will require DMH to figure out how to create room under its current DISH cap over the next three years.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

WADE TUPRIN,

Petitioner,

v.

Case no. 06CV0761-W-GAF-P

STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,

Respondents.

Response to Order to Show Cause

This Court should deny Turpin's petition for habeas relief because

Turpin defaulted on all of his claims for relief and cannot overcome his

defaults. The Circuit Court of Cass County found Turpin to be a sexually

violent predator and civilly committed him to the Missouri Department of

Mental Health. Turpin is currently imprisoned in the Missouri Sex Offender

Treatment Center in Farmington. The proper respondent in this case is Alan

Blake, the center's chief operating officer. Rule 2(a), Rules Governing §2254

Cases in the United States District Courts. Respondent prays, as an initial

matter, that this Court dismiss the State of Missouri and the Missouri

Attorney General as respondent and substitute Blake as a party respondent.

Turpin raises twelve claims in his petition:

1. The judge in the civil commitment proceeding was biased because

he also heard other prior cases involving Turpin.

Case 4:06-cv-00761-GAF Document 6 Filed 10/30/06 Page 1 of 4

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Chief Operating Officer Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center 1016 West Columbia Street Farmington, Missouri 63640 573-218-7079
alan.blake@dmh.mo.gov

Confidentiality Notice:

This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisciosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. if you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at (573)21 8-7079, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

From: Reynolds, James Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 9:38 AM To: Blake, Alan Subject: RE: Psychiatrist Available — Contact Jeremy Alexander
Alan, that is one of the most depressing emails I've seen in a while. I must bow to your place of honor as the most sucky system right now. l have often felt we at Northwest did more, with less, at least doctor wise than anywhere else. That was hands down true when Woodson was burdening us as well as the main building. At least MSOTC in the old days didn't have to worry about accreditation. But now, it seems you guys have definitely passed us.
In Colorado, and this is easy to research, the major players are all still there, in 1997-1999, the state hospital was woefully understaffed. Then 5 suicides happened in 18 months. I was fortunately not tainted by any, and left in April 99, but over the next three years they had a major class action Federal lawsuit that was finally settled. The legislature then and only then passed legislation increasing line staff on forensics (330 beds) by 64 new FTE's, and ordering the physician FTE's increased immediately from I think 7 ward doctors to 13. Of course, even then I think the other nonforensic divisions were left out, causing considerable friction among employees. But you can only imagine the heartache suffered by the providers who were unfortunate enough to be holding the bag when those bad things occurred, that of course were only in part their fault, if at all.

From: Blake, Alan Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 9:28 AM To: Reynolds, James Subject: RE: Psychiatrist Available — Contact Jeremy Alexander
I am glad to commiserate. You are preaching to the choir. There is no room for a reasonable judgment in good faith that does not turn out, or the best service with the resources available not being enough.

The state keeps trying to get by on the cheap. Major corrective change (and not done very well) when a crisis, tragedy, or major public embarrassment occurs. This is no way to manage a system. Our facility has passed NWPRC in census, and we have half the infrastructure and support. We are a disaster waiting to happen. We have older residents with major physical issues. We have a good full time general physician (by luck only), but we do not have the capacity to operate a skilled nursing facility or hospital wing. Conditional release of sex offenders, much less sexually violent predators, to a skilled nursing setting has recently been a state controversy. I fear are going to have some major care failure that will contribute to my early retirement. (And that is beyond the thug element we are getting from the prison system — I worry about serious assault of residents or employees by one of these fellows that spent years in administrative se•reeation or su ermax in DOC due to assaults and in one case, an in-DOC murder.)

6/26/2007

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yes on these guys, and if they go out and don't get in trouble no one cares_ But if they go out and re-offend, l'm responsible." Needless to say, we didn't invite him back, but it does get you to thinking.
Sorry for long-windedness .
Jim
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 8:03 AM To: Reynolds, James Subject: RE: Psychiatrist Available -- Contact Jeremy Alexander
Given the staff challenges, I try to circulate such information, lest other facilities in need did not receive it. Something has to change for DMH to more easily recruit quality professionals in the future. The department is fortunate to have each one of us, but at time will come that it will be unlikely we may be able to recruit qualified colleagues.
If we would have been allowed to bring David on board we would have snatched him up. We still speak in him in glowing terms. All of us seem to have had a very positive experience with him. Unfortunately DMH is not willinn to applying the values it espouses or things would be different.

Alan Blake, Ms, LP
Chief Operating Officer Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center 1016 West Columbia Street Farmington, Missouri 63640 573-218-7079
alan.blake@dmh.mo.gov

Confidentiality Notice:

This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at (573)218-7079, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

From: Reynolds, James Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 4:24 PM To: Blake, Alan Subject: FW: Psychiatrist Available — Contact Jeremy Alexander
Obviously Alan, as a UT Memphis grad this doctor by definition is a quality prospect. And he/she trained in literally God's country, eastern Tennessee, making for an even more desirable acquisition. Unfortunately for them, fortunately for me, I have no acute need right now. But I very much appreciate you thinking of us. Please feel free to forward any such notices, and I will do the same if you are looking.
P.S. I remain so grateful to you for Dr. Sternberg. He came from this same outfit. I literally think I would not be here right now had he not come along to help me through my critical staffing shortage. I hope he is now in turn

6/26/2007

4:05CV2022 In Camera-7303
SORTS (inn 178R

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Gowdy, Rick
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Attachments:
Importance:

Enke, Teri Tuesday, August 18, 2009 11:05 AM Gowdy, Rick Hartman, Lana FW: New Decision Item Justification for SMMHC/SORTS and TJC FW: SMMHC - SORTS FY11 Decision Items - side discussion; FY11SORTS Positions New Di FTE Justification.xlsx
High

Rick - here are back-up e-mails for the 2:00 meeting today. (Karen, Alan and Julie have already received.)

From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Monday, August 10, 2009 2:01 PM To: Blake, Alan; Adams, Karen; Inman, Julie Cc: Reeves, Steve; Parks, Joe Subject: FW: New Decision Item Justification for SMMHC/SORTS and TJC Importance: High
Per Joe, the increase from $830K to $1.5M is based on 2 facts: 1) The historical ward request never factored in the increased staffing need for TJC —Joe buys this, but Keith does not,
because we claimed that our conversion plan post detainees retained sufficient staff to get TJC accreditation — he'd buy a modest increase to 890K, but nothing beyond this 2) The need to have their ward staffing be equivalent to that of SMMHC —Joe doesn't buy this
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 4:40 PM To: Reeves, Steve; Inman, Julie; Adams, Karen Cc: Parks, Joe; Vincenz, Felix; Schollmeyer, Vicki; Bross, Brad Subject: RE: New Decision Item Justification
For many years we have been operating based on a decision that we could not ask for the numbers needed. We keep slowly pulling resources from APS and the region. At some point we need to compensate or stop pulling lest we begin to create more visible problems for the other side of our (now) house. We are also now vulnerable to claims that we offer inferior treatment in that we are not staffed at a similar rate to other areas of the facility and thereby are providing inadequate treatment. The next lawsuit discovery may well ask from the whole facility and the disparities will be evident.to a good attorney. We need to do TJC level assessment and treatment planning. That takes clinical staff time we have been pushing to be providing treatment. We can pull them from treatment, but then we have a present lawsuit that expects our treatment rate to remain high, and should it not be, our AGs have suggested we may have an adverse ruling. We need adequate staff to run this facility adequately and safely.
From: Reeves, Steve Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 4:08 PM
To: Inman, Julie; Adams, Karen; Blake, Alan Cc: Parks, Joe; Vincenz, Felix; Schollmeyer, Vicki; Bross, Brad Subject: FW: New Decision Item Justification for SMMHC/SORTS and TJC Importance: High
Hi Julie,
1

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Questions for DMH after book review:
What is the 5% inflationary rate for the pharmacy contract based on? This is written into the original contract with our pharmacy provider.
Is the 5% annual increase written into the contract? Yes
These are people/services not medications, correct? Yes
Why is Northwest PRC pharmacy so much higher than the other facilities? There were some staffing changes to the core pharmacy service (not the Advanced Practice portion) at NMPRC. Please see line item 007, third renewal period in the amendment to contract C307128001 (attachment #1). We have also included the complete contract history in regard to NMPRC (attachment #2).
MHD estimates the increase in pregnant women being 6.53%, where does the 11.58% come from? Was it just preliminary information? l5avid
Book 1, p 94, Are all of these part of the current contract agreements? Could any of these go to GR without jeopardizing the relationship? Yes, these payments are covering actual contract provisions such as food service or emergency room services. Therefore, diverting these funds would result in an actual cut to facility budgets.
Book 1 p 257, is this new federal grant funding? How do we get cash to support this reallocation? Funding for the Prevention State Incentive grant has expired, so we are requesting this authority be moved back to ADA Federal Block Grant. This individual was moved to the prevention grant on a timelimited basis, and the funding needs to follow her back to ADA block grant funding. Block Grant cash not used while position was funded with Prevention State Incentive grant were used as one-time funds for prevention programming.
Book 1, p 272 & 273, are we currently doing the detox beds at Truman? Yes, those started on June 15, 2009. We contacted OA B&P on this issue prior to approving.
The federal $ reallocation from adult community to the CPS facility support, how is that being earned, what does it support now? Funding comes mainly from Medicare Part D and CPS operated DD waiver beds. These funds may or may not be available year to year, but DMH was proposing using these funds if available to reduce the likelihood of a GR supplemental request.
What is the difference in FY10's ndi and FY11's ndi for the MSOTC expansion 7 months funding? FY10=830,124 & 17.4 FTE/ FY11=1,040,088 & 20.10 FTE.

11111111111111111

11111=1s=11111s111

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For many, years SORTS has been operating: based on a decision that we couldnot ask forthe _numbers

needed: W- 0e-'keep slowly pulling resources from APS and theregion. At some
compensate or stop pulling lest we ,begin tOcreate'inOre4is problems

,

point weneed to
other side of our

(now)

house. We are alsO now Vulnerable to claiMS:thatiove Offer inferio4treOtthent:in that we are not staffed

at:a similar rate to other areas of the facility andtherebkoiv'providing inadequate treatment.' The next

lawsuit discovery may well ask from the Wholefacility and'theiliipOriFies will be evident' to a gOoed

ottorneY. We need to do TJC level assessment and treatment planning. That takes Clinical Ataffitime we

have been pushing to be providing treatment We can pull thim'Yrimntreatineht,

wehave

present lawsuit that expects our treatment rate to remain high, and

it not be; our

Suggested . we may have an adverse ruling. We need adequatestdff to run thisfacifity adequately

How much net funding did DMH actually get from the DD certification fee? How much for the .5% COLA and how much for the 125 individuals off of the waitlist? Where is the fed draw down on the DD certification fee being spent? DO has not collected any certification fees in FY 2010. The certification fee for FY 2010 will be collected in April/May. The total proceeds collected cannot exceed the current cost of DMH staff performing Certification/Licensure visits. Payroll, fringe and EE costs for Certification/Licensure staff in FY 2010 are projected to be $1.5 million. The .5% COLA was approximately $1.0 million. The remaining certification fee proceeds is planned to support 50% of the Prevention Waiver state shore. Local Senate Bill 40 Boards will pay the other 50% of the state share costs.
Transformation ends 9/29/2010? Do we have inflated authority for FY11? The Transformation Grant will expire in FY 2011. In addition, there will most likely be some carry-over of grant funds. Therefore, we won't have to reduce this appropriation until FY 2012.
Book 1, p 217, How will the ICF/MR switch to group homes affect the UPL? Will we still earn as much? Yes. The funding we receive in our FED fund to support community programs were replaced by GR in the FY 2010 transition changes. Going forward, we will continue to analyze the impact of UPL; however, we do expect to support the GR portion of UPL through FY 2011.

SORTS 0003901

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Gowdy, Rick
From: Sent: To: Subject:

Blake, Alan Thursday, August 06, 2009 12:16 PM Vincenz, Felix • FW: SMMHC - SORTS FY11 Decision Items - side discussion

I ramble again and take advantage of you.

I have a worried sense that the budget is being driven by Steve and the money people, not by policy folks and need. Note that from my estimate, the initiative to have SA in treatment team meetings is essentially not funded, nor is having a career path for SAs. We need at least 3 more SAs, and we don't have enough clinical or support staff to fill the coverage gap (in part because of recruitment and in part because of the need to keep treatment rates up to demonstrate our commitment to the courts to provide care at a constitutionally acceptable level). Please do not let them take out the MHM 1, as we need another unit manager to keep up with all that is going on. I am forgoing a UPS for a LPC (or when we get there, LCSW if one miraculously appears on the doorstep and wants to be a team leader / UPS). My fear is that we can get neither, but I am trying to move toward a reorganization that had clinical team leaders..
Also, this 7 months funding is getting behind the curve in terms that we seem to run out of funded space before the next ward is funded. Even with the detainees gone, I estimate we will be over census before the ward is funded.
I know this is a very difficult budget year, but even when it was not, there was very little catch up. I continue to be concerned that this ongoing minimal funding keeps us on the edge of adequate and inadequate, and in a federal court's view, even our adequate may be inadequate enough for a seriously adverse ruling.
40F L1

Constitutionality of SVP Laws.... I don't think I sent you an article my counterpart in New Hampshire forwarded regarding the SVP laws.
There is a lot of information about the litigation in Washington and how that state got into trouble.

Other headaches, a lawsuit that is requiring more discovery. Fortunately no pro bono attorney, but the learning from other lawsuits on the part of some of the residents is advancing rapidly so that we have to take time to respond. I have to complete some interrogatories and it will take awhile. This one may not make it to court, but the legal questions raised could keep it alive for a bit.

5)44 -/- ./4//

MS, LP

Chief Operating Officer Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Service Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center 1016 West Columbia Street Farmington, Missouri 63640 573-218-7079
alarl.blake@dMh.MO.ROV

NOTE NEW FACILITY NAME Our Values: RESPECT, EXCELLENCE, COMPETENCE, EMPOWERMENT, SAFETY, COMMUNICATION- R-E-C-E-S-C

Confidentiality Notice:

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If we go by hospital standards we need to have nurses on wards. To cover seclusion and restraint, we need adequate medical staff to provide coverage to meet standards.
If we reduce treatment to 1 Y. per week, we can greatly reduce needing to hire more psychologists and social workers. If we went with a psychologist per ward and they were Y. time team leaders / ward administrators, we could eliminate UPSs — if we can get / keep truly qualified psychologists for the SVP population
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 12:08 PM To: Vincenz, Felix Subject: FW: MSOTC FY10 New Decision Items Importance: High

From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Monday, June 30, 2008 8:51 PM To: Blake, Alan Subject: AN: MSOTC FY10 New Decision Items Importance: High

With the lawsuit(s), census, pressures associated with the detainee moves, and anticipatory stress associated with JCAHO/CMS accreditation/certification. I can well appreciate that your staff feel beleaguered and besieged. However, let me assure both you and them how much we appreciate the extraordinary efforts that have been expended, on behalf of your consumers, their families. and the public's trust. You have all done an extraordinary job, and have developed a program that is the source of considerable pleasure and pride that are shared by Rick, Joe, Keith and myself. Please, please convey that to all involved. It is a message I hope to reinforce when Becki and I come and meet with you and your executive team.
Now, having said that, I'm not even sure I follow the request that was submitted, Alan. Back when we were doing the calculation regarding the detainee moves and the impact of converting SA staff positions associated with the detainee wards to professional staff necessary to meet JCAHO certification, we had all agreed that what we were requesting was going to get us there. Asking (or additional FTE in today's fiscal environment is a virtual non-starter. However, I agree that we need to carefully monitor your census. If commitments accelerate like we fear, we will need to do something , first as a supplemental item, then as a cost to continue
Feel free to give me a call at home (I'm off this week) and discuss this further. Also, I assume that this was twixt you and me, so I didn't copy Karen. However, do feel free to cut and paste whatever sections of my reply you'd like her to see.
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Monday, June 30, 2008 12:56 PM To: Vincenz, Felix Subject: RE: MSOTC FY10 New Decision Items

I must protest. I fully believe we will be over census and unable to meet JCAHO standards if we keep doing this 5 month delay. We are at census currently. If we move 3 wards out, we might get by with it in 09, but we are averaging 20 referrals yearly for the past 3 years, and we anticipate a greater number of detainees will stipulate to get out of jail and back to MSOTC.

As it is I am starting to have problems keeping management staff from getting discouraged and giving up. They are worn out, frustrated distressed and wearing out. ( I try to have them take off to make up for all the extra hours because of the signs of bum out, but then they get further behind and adds to their sense of failure.) Because of the risk level and lack of experienced staff, we are considering changing our schedules so a senior manager is on duty evenings and maybe nights. However, if we do that, it is not possible to be in one's office as it is necessary to be on the wards problems solving almost constantly, so again, another way resulting in getting further behind. Having reasonable resources is all they want. The comment at our risk management meeting was, We are the DMH redheaded step child and they don't care if we fail " In arguing against that view, the reply is that what "they" do to let us do our job is what tells.
not what is said. There is a lot of unhappiness here.

From: Inman, Julie Sent: Monday, June 30, 2008 1:20 PM To: Reeves, Steve

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This is confusing. There appears to be some overlap. I think these are the positions included in Julie's email.
We have 1 20 Staff Physician Specialist (psychiatrist) in our current budget. We hoped for another psychiatrist to provide adequate coverage regarding seclusion / restraint, monthly notes, annual assessments, etc.
We are seeking enough nurses to move toward covering all of our wards to allow a RN on every shift, every day. (25.5 for 5 wards or 30.6 for 6 wards — assuming all the detainees left — now we are essentially up to 6 wards and anticipate need the 7 th ward for new committed this year - 35.7 RN Ills). The current budget has 25.5 FTE. (We are also converting 5 of these to RN IVs so we can provide for RN house supervision on evenings, nights and weekends.)
We want an additional general physician due to the many medical coverage issues, as well as to back up when a physician leaves.
We need more clerks to handle the increased volume of medical record documentation.
I want a 3 rd Unit Manager as there is so much going on that the two we have cannot keep up, despite their best efforts and extra hours. The unit managers will be responsible to see that standards are maintained. As it is, the two unit managers spend 75% of their time putting out fires, and have limited time to monitor and take corrective action to meet standards, do performs, supervise, train, oversee unit programming, etc.
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 1:53 PM To: Blake, Alan Subject: FW: MSOTC FY10 New Decision Item Request - Discussion with Alan Importance: High

I'm doing a critical issues paper for MSOTC — I need additional information as to the 11.6 FTEs you thought were needed to get JCAHO accreditation (see Julie's e-mail below). I want to verify that these are above and beyond the 11 FTE in the attachment immediately below, which included meeting both behavioral health and hospital standards when we first talked about the grand plan. If above and beyond, I will need to know: (a) what types of FTE and; (b) the numbers you already have in those same classifications, which I will then inflate with the numbers in the attachment immediately below to determine if I agree with you J
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 10:25 AM To: Vincenz, Felix Subject: RE: MSOTC FY10 New Decision Items

You are right. It is a huge request. It is unreasonable because prior (to your present position) requests were unreasonably low and inadequate.
It is the request to do it right (or at least closer). We have been getting farther and farther behind. That is why I initiated the behavioral health structure in order to reduce the impact of the inadequate funding of this facility for YEARS, and find a way to operate for less. That is why we cost $200 - $220 per day per consumer when the other long term facilities cost much more.
Some of our assumption was that Behavioral Health Standards would be applied back when. We did not assume providing 8 hours per resident per week of SVP specific treatment. Now Hospital Standards are necessary. That adds need for persons to do the additional thing required by JCAHO I CMS (and in a somewhat short period). If we are to seek accreditation with current staffing levels and patterns. we will need to significantly reduce treatment to assure that assessments, documentation and treatment plans are in place. We have greatly streamlined to produce maximum efficiency. The rate of treatment is much greater than most other DMH facilities (and remember, for this suit, psycho-social, education, substance abuse, and almost everything else we do that is therapeutic from your view, does not count per the view presented by the AG.)
We do ITPs every six months. We are proud that our residents participate (if willing), know what goals on their ITP, and are in the discussion as to whether they do or do not meet the goals at the end of each semester, Given the long term nature of the population, every three months is not especially helpful. We have a medical care section for each resident with ongoing medical issues, and it is updated as needed. We are working on a short term mechanism for short term issues. All these we are trying to better integrate. I well be sad to end up doing what the other facilities do, as I think we are doing better for the residents than I've seen in other places.
We do a Comprehensive Social History on the front end, but no annual social histories — we let the annual assessment of mental status cover for all the annual assessments. The annual assessment includes any new social history information, there Is a med / psych update included (usually by our very competent advanced practice nurse). Currently these are done by psychologists and more senior social workers. We do minimal documentation for physicals, etc, and will not meet standards without someone to be assessing and writing those reports.

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Blake, Alan

From: Blake, Alan

Sent: Friday, April 06, 2007 10:10 AM

To:

Inman, Julie

Subject: FW: Ramifications of core cuts for MSOTC

Alan Blake, MS, LP
Chief Operating Officer Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center 1016 West Columbia Street Farmington, Missouri 63640 573-218-7079
alan.blake@dmh.mo.gov
Confidentiality Notice:
This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at (573)218-7079, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Friday, April 06, 2007 8:39 AM To: Blake, Alan Subject: RE: Ramifications of core cuts for MSOTC
The senate was much more understanding and kept the budget item open for further discussion in reconciliation committee with the house. Continue to stay tuned....

From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2007 6:07 PM To: Blake, Alan Subject: RE: Ramifications of core cuts for MSOTC
We're trying to work on something. Stay tuned....
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2007 11:49 AM To: Gowdy, Rick; Vincenz, Felix
6/8/2007

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Page 2 of 3
Cc: Bax, Bob; Henry, Patty Subject: Ramifications of core cuts
In further follow-up to discussions regarding the impact of the House core cut to MSOTC, I offer these thoughts:
Out of the $1.3 E&E not tied to personnel benefits, the roughly $600,000 cut is almost half of the E&E available. There are four major spending items greater than $100,000 in the FY 07 allocation: Medications ($362,850), food / dietary supplies ($268,507), supplies ($162,300) and professional services (contract lab, medical services and other professional services - $ 432,612).
With medication, if we go to a fail first system of going back to the older drugs, there is some savings in the sho run as noted below, but potential major losses and expense in the long run. The savings might amount to $95,000, if our census does not increase (and it is increasing). Expense will increase as Dr. Englehart will withdraw services from the facility due to ethical concerns, and we will not have a means to offer psychiatric services as the ANP will no longer be allowed to practice without a psychiatrist sponsor. Being unable to offer psychiatric services opens us to a lawsuit for substandard care, as well as we will have several persons in psychiatric crisis and by law unable to refer to a DMH facility. (We may be able to refer to a community facility the nearest being Crystal City or Saint Louis, if accepted - for acute care, but we will have a revolving door, and greatly increased expense for hospitalization in a private setting plus DMH staff required to provide 24 / 7 supervision.) All this opens us to a federal lawsuit for providing substandard care. A successful lawsuit in this area will cost the state millions.
Food costs can not be reduced, and are likely to increase due to census increases and inflation.
Professional services may only be reduced by ending a variety of medical and dental services. We are actually over budget at of February ($178,227). We have an individual scheduled for cancer treatments, two scheduled for joint replacement, have changes not received for an individual sent to the ER with a heart attack, then to a medical center for three days in intensive cardiac care (unfortunately he died). Given the time these bills are submitted and paid, some or all may not be process until next fiscal year. We receive reduced cost due to an innovative contract with an insurance company initiated by Dr. Englehart (a significant savings per year). Based on past history we may anticipate several major surgeries in the next year. We will not be able to cover the cost of these surgeries for the E & E appropriation and provide other necessary . operations expenses. We may cap what we will provide, and only allow life saving procedures. In that scenario, we do not fund joint replacement, some cardiac procedures must be managed by medication (by which time we have now cut back on), not provide dentures, hearing aides, etc. However, this again places the Department at risk of legal action regarding substandard care.
Trimming all other areas will not provide any substantial gain, and will reducing the ability of the facility to provide normal and necessary services.
Bottom line is that if the core cut stands, any areas for cut back will substantially impair the operation of the facility. As this occurs, it may realistically be expected that most professional employees will begin to seek employment elsewhere due to ethical and safety issues. The facility will take on the effect of a prison and be in violation of Supreme Court rulings. The residents will likely initiate legal action for which the department and state will have difficulty mounting a defense.
From: McCarver, Mike Sent: Monday, April 02, 2007 10:48 AM To: Blake, Alan Cc: Englehart, Jay; Inman, Julie Subject: RE: Legislative Inquiry
Below is the rough estimate of the savings per month if all the MSOTC patients were switched over to Haloperidol (20mg average dose per day). Haloperidol is an older Antipsychotic medication.

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Blake, Alan
From: Sent: To: Subject:

Blake, Alan Thursday, November 15, 2007 2:29 PM Turner, Marilyn RE: largest hospital for sexually violent predators in turmoil

It is very short sighted, very expensive, and there is little effort to identify potential offenders and seek to intervene before there are offenses.
I will say that we are making progress with some of our fellows. Others...
Alan Blake, MS, LP Chief Operating Officer Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center 1016 West Columbia Street Farmington, Missouri 63640 573-218-7079 alan.blake@dmh.mo.gov
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at (573)218-7079, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.
-----Original Message From: Turner, Marilyn Sent: Thursday, NoVeMber 15, 2007 2:28 PM To: Blake, Alan Subject: RE: largest hospital for sexually violent predators in turmoil
The whole mess is a bad situation all around. Not that I have a lot of sympathy for sex offenders, but I think the net has been cast way too wide, and, US Supreme Court notwithstanding, I think that locking people up after they've served their sentences is, just wrong. If we want to keep them out of circulation, pass the laws that will keep them in prison. It's more honest. And as you point out, the community doesn't want them and can successfully keep them out. Seems shortsighted to me. I'd rather know that they lived down the block instead of knowing that they were under some bridge somewhere. Once again, my opinions are not mainstream. M.
Original Message From: Blake, Alan Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2007 2:21 PM To: Turner, Marilyn Subject: RE: largest hospital for sexually violent predators in turmoil
I met some of the folks from California at a conference in San Diego a couple of weeks ago. This is relatively accurate. The really sad part about the ones released by the court, two of them have not been able to find placement after over a year. The court finally insisted they be released, and consequently, they are homeless.
Alan Blake, MS, LP Chief Operating Officer Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center 1016 West Columbia Street Farmington, Missouri 63640
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Blake, Alan

From: Blake, Alan

Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 10:05 AM

To:

Reynolds, James

Subject: RE: Psychiatrist Available — Contact Jeremy Alexander

We are so far from JCAHO that I can not conceive of it. The Colorado situation is unnerving
For lawsuits, we have had over 50 filed — mostly frivolous. One has made it into federal court. 5 or 6 are still pending. All relate to conditions of confinement. I periodically am best friends with a new assistant attorney general. Dr. Gowdy insists my last name is Vs.
Felix passed the below email from the superintendent at Lamed State Hospital in Kansas on to Rick and me The KC Star had a couple of article on it that you may have read:
From: Mark Schutter (mailto:MES0309@lsh.ks.g9v] Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 8:56 AM To: Joann O'Connor; Vincenz, Felix; Jeff Buttler; Bill Gibson; SCOTT VINIARD; Helen Stevens; Cynthia Kelley; Robert Lee; Dave Hartford Cc: Michelle Robinson; Barbara Mongeau; Pam Melton Subject: SVPSs and Kansas

Secondly, you may have heard that LSH is getting shot at in the media. It is a long

story which I can complete if you care to give me a call at

620-285-4360. To give you a quick sketch, residents of our Sexually Violent

Predator program were able to call and write to CMS, portraying

themselves as seriously abused psychiatric patients.

This resulted in the Kansas

Department of Health and Environment coming out to do a survey under CMS contract,

which turned up housekeeping and water temp issues, and one patient choking death a

few months ago which occurred despite a special dysphagia diet and etc

precautions. We submitted requests for corrections to the facts alleged and

language used, all of which were rejected. No patients from our regular

psychiatric or forensic programs lodged any complaints.

The KDHE then sent the preliminary report to one of the sex predators, who began

contacting the media and this resulted in quite a free for all. The SVPs are

continuing to contact everyone and anyone with complaints, but legislators and the

public are beginning to catch on to who they are dealing with. Last Friday three

SVP's ,managed to call in to a Ks. Public Television show in which legislators took

phone calls from the public on the air - and made more allegations. Quite a

deal!

The Plan of Correction for issues that required attention has been accepted and

is reaching full implementation. KDHE will come back and resurvey within the near

future. We continue to remain in good standing with CMS. The vast majority of

the standards cited were KDHE, not CMS. Call with questions if hearing more about

our experience can be of some help to you in warding off similar issues.

I love my job!!!

Mark

Alan Blake, Ms, LP
6/26/2007

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Page 3 of 3
Estimated savings per month if Haloperidol was used in place of the Atypical Antipsychotic agents: $8,716.27 per month
Estimated costs of discontinuing all the MSOTC PRN medications except for some pain meds: $100-200 per month
As Dr. Englehart mentioned in his e-mail the newer generation Atypical agents have many advantages over the older agents in regard to the side effect protocol. Unfortunately they are very expensive.. JCAHO considers these newer agents the DRUGS OF CHOICE FOR TREATMENT OF PSYCHOTIC PATIENTS.
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Monday, April 02, 2007 10:22 AM To: Gowdy, Rick Cc: Vincenz, Felix Subject: Core Reduction MSOTC
We have been trying to find how to make a $600,000 core reduction and the ramifications. In E & E it is not there. Our total allocated E & E is $1,378,426, not including staff benefits. The only places to reduce are in medical and pharmacy by putting a cap on services, and by going to a fail first system with medications. Medical I Dental as of February is up to $500,000. If we don't have cancer treatments, joint surgery, cardiac by-pass and stents, gall bladder and other similar interventions, even that will not make it up. (and we will be subjectIo a difficult to defend lawsuit). If we would do any thing in this manner, most nursing and medical staff will leave, and most professional staff will follow. At that point we become a prison.
If it comes out of staff, we have major service reductions, thereby slowing any progress toward discharge, and security issues will increase as well in that we will have an increased number of residents with time on their hands.
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Monday, April 02, 2007 9:28 AM To: McCarver, Mike Cc: Englehart, Jay; Inman, Julie Subject: Legislative Inquiry Importance: High
To respond to a legislative inquiry, we need an estimate of costs savings if all MSOTC residents on 2nd generation psychotropic medications are changed back to the earlier psychotropic medications. (perhaps a month estimate?). Additionally, if all PRNI . medications were discontinued (except Tylenol / ibuprophen and similar OTC pain relievers) what might the cost reduction per month be?

6/8/2007

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Gowdy, Rick
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Gowdy, Rick Friday, October 10, 2008 1:52 PM Blake, Alan Shine, Liz; Vincenz, Felix RE: SVP Release DOR

10-10-08.
Dr. Vincenz and I reviewed your proposal and have some questions and suggestions. Since we already have a call scheduled for next week we can discuss this with you then.
Also, I met last week with Scott Johnston of P&P; initially to discuss making sure both P&P and MSOTC are aware of those residents who have ongoing P&P responsibilities, but we also discussed the need to begin to consider supervision of residents on release. It will be essential that P&P is closely involved with your staff in the release process since they will providing monitoring. Remember, with the passage of the lifetime supervision legislation, at some point in the future most MSOTC residents will have an ongoing responsibility to P&P as the result of both their criminal commitment and their civil commitment. We can discuss your working with the local P&P staffs on Thur as well.
Whatever Mr. Burdick's arguments may be, you haven't referred anyone for release because you haven't determined anyone to yet be clinically appropriate. Clearly some of your residents are moving forward in treatment; treatment with this group of sex offenders is difficult and public safety requires a careful, deliberative process.
RNG.
Confidentiality Statement:
CONFIDENTIA Lin. NOTICE: This e-mail comnumitmlion and any attachments may contain conlidential and priviletted information for the use (tithe designated
recipients named above. The designated recipients arc prohibited from redisclosing this intormation to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information alter its stated need has been Urine& Tryon arc not the intended recipient. you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review. disclosure. dissemination, distribution or copying alit or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error. please notify ine immediately by telephone at 573-75i-96 ,17, and destroy all copies (Willis communication and any attachments.

From: Blake, Alan Sent: Friday, October 10, 2008 11:00 AM To: Gowdy, Rick Cc: Shine, Liz; Vincenz, Felix; Rosenboom, Jonathan; Meade, Linda; Weiler, Mary; Light, Sheila; Hartman, Lana Subject: SVP Release DOR
I am nagging you about the SVP DOR and getting it in place. We have a challenge from Tim Burdick regarding the constitutionality of the release process and our lack of movement thereof. I have asked Sheila to fax a copy to you.
Not having a procedure in place strengthens his argument, in addition to not having given agreement to any petition. Some of our inaction at this level is because we don't have a procedure, although we are getting ready to look at three residents for a conditional release path. (It would be helpful to have a step down unit in the fence and a cottage outside, but we don't have the funds for the step down unit any more, and SMMHC tells me they have full cottages.)

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State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2009 Budget Development Cycle July 16, 2006 Page 5
deficiencies resulting in abuse and neglect in Missouri's DMH's service system, including:
• DMH's inability to recruit, train and retain direct care and key clinical staff in both CPS and MRDD facilities. Examples: Marshall Habilitation Center routinely operates with at least 60 direct care staffing vacancies, exhausting available staff through mandatory overtime. The annual turnover rate for psychiatrists and nurses at CPS facilities exceeds 30%. These phenomena are occurring in many other DMH facilities.
• A similar crisis is occurring in DMH contracted community provider agencies, whose starting pay for direct care staff is between $7-8 per hour for direct care staff. (By contrast, DMH pays $10 per hour and still cannot recruit enough direct care staff.)
• MRDD has statewide inconsistencies in eligibility determination, service planning, waiting list criteria, case management and treatment services.
• CPS housing services are inadequate, relying heavily on large, under-funded residential care facilities.
• Hundreds of individuals who are seriously mentally ill or alcohol and/or drug dependent are also chronically homeless.
• MRDD central administration does not have the clinical leadership necessary to assure high quality care in its state operated and community placement programs forcing MRDD to hire expensive consultant companies to perform basic clinical quality control functions.
3. Need for Better Mental Health and Medical Service Interface
According to recent research involving eight states, including Missouri, persons with serious mental illnesses (SMI), on average, will die 25 years earlier than the average American. The majority will die from the same diseases that will also kill most of the rest of us, including complications from diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, COPD, etc. But DMH consumers will die much earlier; many of the reasons are obvious, including poverty, poor nutrition, lack of exercise, and the side effects of powerful psychotropic medications. Frequently, they will die earlier because of uncoordinated medical care. As Dr. Joe Parks, DMH Medical Director, likes to say, 'We probably can't get too excited about eliminating psychiatric symptoms or improving a patient's behavioral functioning by a few points if s/he going to die on us at age 50 from a medical disease we could have treated!" DMH can no longer be content to focus solely on a psychiatric illness without attending to the individual's broader physical health needs. This is equally true of the consumers in ADA and MRDD.
4. Inability of DMH Facilities Efforts to Move Residents to Community Placement:
• Seven of ten residents in state psychiatric facilities are "forensic" patients, either determined incompetent to stand trial for a committed crime, determined not guilty by reason of insanity, or deemed a sexual predator in need of treatment after lengthy stays in a Missouri Corrections facility. Once DMH has treated these patients and deems them ready to leave an institutional facility, their right to community placement is at the committing court's or local prosecutor's discretion. Judges are reluctant to release such patients. As a result, DMH
The Department of Mental Health does not deny employment or services because of race, sex, creed, marital status, religion, national origin, disability or age of applicants or employees.

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State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2009 Budget Development Cycle July 16, 2006 Page 6
psychiatric inpatient facilities are backing up, admitting far more commitments than discharges. This, in turn, clogs acute care facilities, which must hold patients longer who are awaiting admission into state long-term psychiatric care. This system "constipation" forces state facilities to operate beyond 100% of capacity for long periods of time, exhausting staff, causing staff overtime and high turnover rates, and inevitably increasing the risk of staff injuries and patient abuse and neglect.
• A similar problem is now increasingly occurring in state-operated MRDD habilitation centers from forensic referrals, the admission of a younger population with borderline intellectual functioning and severe behaviors or sexual deviancy, and refusal of guardians to allow community placement.
5. Need to Link Critical Mental Health Services to other Human Service Programs
• Approximately 9,700 children are in Children's Division custody. Over 35% been placed in custody becabse of substance abuse (2,900) or alcohol abuse (850) by the parent(s), and some for both. Most children removed believed that they did something wrong that cause their separation from family. All need mental health screening and counseling, while their parents need comprehensive assessment and intensive substance abuse treatment.
• Despite tragedies such as those at Columbine High School and other schools across America, only nine Missouri school districts have qualified mental health professionals serving in a formal school-based mental health program. Seven additional Missouri school districts have written grants for school based mental health services.
• Over 15% of all incarcerated inmates in Missouri Corrections facilities have a diagnosed serious mental illness such as schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, or major depression, not counting persons with substance abuse problems; 75% of these individuals will re-offend and return to Corrections within five years of release. DMH does not yet have coordinated discharge planning and community treatment services available to these individuals.
• Over 75% ofincarcerated inmates have substance abuse problems. One in four known substance abusers that do not get treatment will return to prison within the first year of release, while those who get treatment in prison with continuing care in the community return at a rate of less than 5%.
• One in every 13 admissions to Missouri hospitals are alcohol or other drug related, and over half of those were admitted through emergency rooms. Furthermore, about 22% of psychiatric acute care admissions are persons with substance use disorders. Missouri has only three modified medical detoxification centers that are capable of providing alternatives to hospitalization.
• Over 50% of all incarcerated individuals in the Kansas City Municipal Jail have a serious mental illness, a phenomenon increasingly typical in local jails. Many are homeless. DMH does not provide treatment services, discharge planning, housing supports, or community treatment for these individuals.
The Department of Mental Health does not deny employment or services because of race, sex, creed, marital status, religion, national origin, disability or age of applicants or employees.
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State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2009 Budget Development Cycle July 16, 2006 Page 7
• The Department of Health and Senior Services has noted increasing numbers of eldercare hotline referrals associated with mental disorders or substance abuse problems. DMH and DHSS do not yet have mechanisms to coordinate services needed by these referrals.
6. Special Populations With Unmet Mental Health Needs: The Mental Health Commission, MH Transformation Groups and the DMH Leadership Team have identified four underserved populations with significant unmet mental health needs:
• Missouri Elders with mental health problems like depression, dementia, and substance abuse, which often exacerbate with age, personal loss and complicated medical conditions. Missouri elders comprise 13.5% (800,000) of the state's population and will grow to 20% by 2030.
• Deaf or Severely Hearing Impaired Children and Adults with mental health disorders. 2% of Missourian's are culturally deaf; 1,700 deaf adults have severe mental illness; 500-1,000 deaf children have severe emotional disturbances. DMH has not adequately addressed mental health needs of people who are deaf/severely hearing-impaired.
• Missouri Military Personnel Involved in the Iraq and Afghanistan War: According to information from a study of 205,097 veterans undertaken by the VA and Duke University, 35.7% (73,157) of veterans reported mental health issues. For the 22,000 Missouri troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, this would equate to 7,900 troops who would need mental health services upon de-activation. The Veterans Administration and state mental health agencies have not yet developed interface mechanisms to assure coordination of federal and state services.
• Non-English-speaking Immigrants and Evolving Ethnic Communities: Missouri has experienced in-migration of new ethnic populations, including Hispanics, Bosnians/ Croatians/Serbians, Vietnamese, Arabic, etc. DMH must develop appropriate interpreter services, train clinicians for cultural awareness and recruit mental health professionals and natural support agencies and individuals from ethnic population ranks.
7. DMH Statutory Mandate to Prevent Mental Disorders, Developmental Disabilities and Other Alcohol and Drug Abuse , in Missouri
Missouri DMH is not adequately addressing one of its three statutory missions, that of preventing mental disorders, developmental disabilities and substance abuse (Chapter 630.020 RSMO). There is a perception that prevention is vague and unaccountable, but there examples of specific, measurable prevention objectives that can achieve good outcomes.
• Some developmental disabilities (i.e., fetal alcohol syndrome, spina bifida) can be prevented in children through good prenatal care during pregnancy and by increasing the awareness of the importance of not smoking or using alcohol and other drugs during pregnancy.
• Research shows that children of alcoholic parents are far more likely to become involved in alcohol and drug abuse. We may be able prevent cross-generational substance abuse through preventive education and support for the children of substance abusers.
The Department of Mental Health does not deny employment or services because of race, sex, creed, marital status, religion, national origin, disability or age of applicants or employees.
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State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2009 Budget Development Cycle July 16, 2006 Page 9
• Funding and strategies to retain and support direct care staff, both in community residential settings and in state-operated facility programs;
• Funding/strategies to retain and support key clinical positions in community and DMH facility programs, including psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists and nurses;
• Offender reentry programs for co-occurring MI/SA inmates leaving Corrections; • Specialized services for individuals who are deaf and severely hearing impaired; • Mental health services for children and their families involved in abuse and neglect
situations; • Creation of a DMH training academy of the scope and quality similar to the academies at the
Department of Corrections and the Highway Patrol; • Funding to support direct care staff training costs for the College of Direct Support program. • Specialized treatment and housing supports for homeless, mentally ill and substance
abusing individuals who are "frequent flyers" e.g. who repeatedly frequent emergency rooms and psychiatric inpatient programs; • Funding to provide services to eligible persons with developmental disabilities on the MRDD waiting list, and individuals with mental health problems who are newly Medicaid eligible; • Funding to provide more alcohol and drug treatment on demand; • Funding to promote accreditation of MRDD, CPS and ADA community providers and MRDD state-operated habilitation centers; • Funding for specialized mental health eldercare services; • Funding to promote employment opportunities for DMH consumers; • Funding for the prevention of mental diseases, DD and substance abuse; and • Funding to increase public understanding and attitudes about persons with mental disorders, developmental disabilities and alcohol and drug abuse.
DMH EXECUTIVE TEAM SFY 2009 "PROGRAM REDIRECT" PRIORITIES]
In addition to seeking new funding for DMH priorities, the Executive Team is committed to redirecting funding in existing programs when appropriate. DMH is considering redirect initiatives in the following programs:
The Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Program (MOSOTC): MOSOTC provides treatment for sexual predators that have completed their sentences in the Missouri Department of Corrections and are still deemed a risk to society. Two categories of individuals are housed at MOSOTC. The first are detainees awaiting a court decision regarding whether they should be committed to DMH for treatment of their sexually deviant behaviors. The second are individuals for whom court commitments have already been issued. DMH is considering paying county jails to house detainees awaiting court commitment proceedings. For committed individuals who are elderly or medically fragile, but not yet determined appropriate for community placement, DMH is considering creating a special treatment unit at the state-operated Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (formerly called Farmington State Hospital) for more appropriate treatment.
Conversion of State Operated Acute Psychiatric Centers to Local Community Control: Missouri operates acute psychiatric inpatient beds at Western Missouri Mental Health Center, Metropolitan Psychiatric Center, Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center, and Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center. All these programs are federally designated as "Institutions for Mental
The Department of Mental Health does not deny employment or services because of race, sex, creed, marital status, religion, national origin, disability or age of applicants or employees.
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From: Sent: To: Subject:

Englehart, Jay Monday, October 29, 2012 12:25 PM Wilson, Roy; Young-Walker, Laine RE: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities - concerns about APRNs

I was warned of this slow creep away from physicians when I was the first to hire an ANP back in 2003 I think. I know this is the model which the prisons are moving toward, but I really do not want have a standard of care or staffing which is equal to that of the prisons. I hope we stay better than that.
Jay Englehart, MD Medical Director Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center 1010 West Columbia Street Farmington, MO 63640 Office Phone: 573-218-6708 New Email: jay.englehart@dmh.mo.gov CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573-218-6708, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

Original Message From: Wilson, Roy Sent: Monday, October 29, 2012 11:03 AM To: Young-Walker, Laine Cc: Englehart, Jay Subject: FW: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities - concerns about APRNs

Laine this is a very import issue that should be on this month's agenda. While I believe in the rational use of APRNs, this was originally and remains primarily an issue of Psychiatrists' retention! Roy

Original Message From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 8:47 AM To: Wilson, Roy Subject: FW: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities - concerns about APRNs

fyi

Original Message From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 8:03 AM To: Parks, Joe
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Subject: FW: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities - concerns about APRNs
FYI
Original Message From: Reitz, Robert Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:34 PM To: Martin - Forman, Marty A.; Vincenz, Felix; Javois, Laurent; Young-Walker, Laine Cc: Ring, Melissa Subject: FW: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities - concerns about APRNs
Here are the concerns raised about using APRN's by Dr. Englehart that were mentioned on today's call.
Laine, was wondering if this needs to be another agenda item for next month's medical director meeting?
Original Message From: Englehart, Jay Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 11:06 PM To: Reitz, Robert; Ring, Melissa Cc: Inman, Julie Subject: RE: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities
This all makes me incredibly nervous, and will have far-reaching consequences for our facilities. My concerns are: 1. In order to do this right, the physician supervising the NP needs to have time to do so, and therefore a reduced patient load themselves. This severely cuts into the cost savings realized, especially if we are paying the going rate for NP's. 2. It is difficult for an NP to take on as large a load as a physician unless the level of supervision is high, without compromising patient care some. 3. It is difficult already to recruit psychiatrists who want to work in our institutional setting. We are reducing the pool of candidates substantially by essentially cutting out those who are unwilling to supervise an NP, and any increased salary will be unlikely to offset those reduced numbers with interest, at least at the levels which could be afforded (probably an increase in the $20K range). 4. All of our facilities, from what I can tell, are moving toward an older, psychiatrically and medically sicker population, with multiple problems. This is especially true in the SORTS units. NP training gives them the ability to deal with relatively simple cases, but does not provide the kind of background to oversee complicated cases, of which there will be progressively more, not less. Some of our specialized units staffed for higher medical acuity can help with this, but in more complicated cases, direct psychiatrist involvement will be needed more often as time goes on. This seems to be working against the goal of providing improved overall, person-centered care for the whole range of medical and psychiatric illnesses as we are doing on the outpatient side with our Health Care Homes.
I recognize the budgetary constraints we are living under, and the desire to give the most efficient cost-effective care we can, but we may need to figure out the best way to deploy these second level practitioners to find a better balance between quality and cost than what I see using my current model of having an NP serve in a physician's stead as a team leader, with supervision occurring outside of team meetings, and usually through record review, rather than in direct observation.
Jay
From: Reitz, Robert Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 11:34 AM To: Ring, Melissa Cc: Inman, Julie; Englehart, Jay
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Subject: RE: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities
The PAB recommendation this year was to increase the Health Care Practitioner classification by two ranges, which fell short of our request, but would result in a top end of around $88K if I recall. I've alerted Mark, Joe and James that if we went down this road, we would need to consider using 1%unclassified positions, which would be a departmental priority. We also have discussed recommending to the PAB that the Health Care Practitioner merit position move to unclassified status entirely like we have done with psychiatrists so we don't have to use our 1% positions.
From: Ring, Melissa Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 11:24 AM To: Reitz, Robert Cc: Inman, Julie; Englehart, Jay Subject: RE: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities
What is being done with regard to Nurse Practitioner salaries, my understanding is that is a problem.
Melissa Ring, Ph.D., MHA Chief Operating Officer Southeast MO Mental Health Center;
Phone: (573) 218-6704 Fax: (573) 218-6703
From: Reitz, Robert Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 11:17 AM To: DMH.CO CPS COO's / Admin Assts; DMH.CO CPS Medical Directors Cc: Stringer, Mark; Parks, Joe Subject: RE: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities
Just so folks know, there are 56 Adult Psych/MH, 22 Child-Adolescent Psych/MH Nurse Practitioners, 36 Family Psych/MH Nurse Practitioners, and 2 Psych/MH Nurse Practitioners licensed by the MO Board of Nursing. I did not check to see if these numbers are mutually exclusive. If anyone is interested, I'd be willing to send a letter to some or all regarding opportunities with DMH. Let me know if you're interested.
From: Parks, Joe Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 10:39 AM To: DMH.CO CPS COO's / Admin Assts; DMH.CO CPS Medical Directors Cc: Stringer, Mark; Reitz, Robert Subject: Psychiatric Staffing at DMH Facilities
In view of our increasing difficulty recruiting and retaining psychiatrists to assure adequate staffing at our inpatient facilities DMH director Keith Shafer will consider and authorize raises for psychiatric staff on an individual facility by facility basis under the following methodology. Facilities with psychiatric vacancies may hire a Psychiatric APN and use the net funding difference between the APN salary and the funding from the psychiatric vacancy to provide raises for other psychiatric staff at the facility. Facilities wishing to proceed in this manner should provide a specific proposal showing all current salaries and funded vacant positions currently and what the revised salaries the new APN and psychiatric staff would be following hiring of an APN. Proposals should be forwarded to myself and Mark Stringer, we will review and forward them to Keith who will then obtain final authorization from OA budget office.
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Unknown
To: Cc: Subject:

Bellew-Smith, Marty Blake, Alan RE: Confidential- Please Do Not Forward

I do not believe that this is an issue of forgetting. l am painfully aware of my timeline deficiencies. For me it is an issue of putting out the fire that is burning closest to me.
Despite the fact that we have had several terse communications from clerks and courts, the fact of the matter is that most of the jurisdictions have NOT complained when the report was overdue, some even months overdue. From a pure Skinnerian point of view what does this teach me about this deadline?
However, internal deadlines typically have more immediate and personally unpleasant consequences for impending or missed deadlines, like the Clinical Leads sending out reminder e-mails or the public embarrassment of being unprepared for an ITP or presentation, or just letting down a fellow clinician in our mutual struggle to provide treatment.
Finally, I am often struck by the unsettling conclusion that direct patient care is one of the last priorities when stacked against all of the other expectations for ITPs, ward management duties, court reports, admission mental health assessments, committee work, recruitment, supervision for licensure, new employee training, staff . development, personal development, co-signing progress notes, responding to resident grievances, attending required meetings, reviewing and answering the 100+ e-mail messages received per day, training for the new levels system, etc.
As a former Assistant Superintendent and Deputy Division Director, I am well aware of the management maxim of assigning work and letting people "figure out their way to meet their priorities." Early on, Greg Dale, a big proponent of the Theory X view of employees coached me that employees are cry babies that will complain about any workload. He had also promulgated the opinion that people should work all hours until the job is done, and the administrator has no real obligation to know their supervisees' workload. I accepted that maxim, acted on it in my life, and now one failed marriage later, I disagree.
I can't believe that I am saying this, but everything cannot be a priority at the same time, across all time. As a manager, my responsibility is to know the workload capacity of my human resources and to not over tax that capacity, willingly or carelessly. Crises occur and Herculean efforts are sometimes needed to keep the organization afloat, like stopping all work to write ITPs prior to a survey or getting caught up on duty to warn notifications or having a work stoppage to get late court reports caught up. However, I cannot routinely assign additional duties or inject chaos into the work lives of my employees and expect them to figure it out on their own. I had to recall, that my experience of the organization as an administrator was much different than that of the line clinician. Except for meetings, my work was project oriented. I could carve 4-8 hours, or 2-3 days out of my schedule to respond to the knee-jerk reaction or question of the day from a legislator. That is what administrators do. One day per month at DOC was MoSOP grievance day. I carved the whole day out to sit and read and respond to inmate MoSOP grievances that had reached my level of review. And when I didn't have someone above me doing that to me, I was busy thinking knee jerk things to have my clinicians do on the spur of the moment.

JON

1

EXHIBIT 15

4:05CV2022 In Camera-6553
SORTS n0021 no

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 159 of 196 PageID #: 2231

Jonathan D. Rosenboom, Psy.D., LPICPHSP Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center

From: Bellew-Smith, Marty Sent: Tuesday, August 02, 2005 2:55 PM To: Blake, Alan; Swift, Brenda; Rosenboom, Jonathan; Meade, Linda; Wolf, Deanna; Phillips, Yvette Subject RE:
We need to do something so that people are not forgetting to write their court reports. Liz sounded less than happy.

From: Sent: To: Subject:

Blake, Alan Tuesday, August 02, 2005 2:39 PM Bellew-Smith, Marty; Swift, Brenda; Rosenboom, Jonathan; Meade, Linda; Wolf, Deanna; Phillips, Yvette RE:

It is. Brenda needs access to calendars.

From: Bellew-Smith, Marty Sent: Tuesday, August 02, 2005 2:00 PM To: Swift, Brenda; Rosenboom, Jonathan; Meade, Linda; Wolf, Deanna; Phillips, Yvette Cc: Blake, Alan Subject:
Brenda,
Is there a way to put an automatic pop up reminder of each court report and it's due date on the computers of individuals assigned to do a court report. For example, I'm currently working on Wilkinson (who is due 8/21). But, would it be possible for a reminder to pop up on my screen on 8/8/05 telling me that the report is due in on 8/21 and I'm going to be in hot water if I don't have it in.
I know this is a lot of work for you and don't do it yet, but would it be possible?
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573-218-7044, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

2

4:05CV2022 In Camera-6554

SORTS 0002101

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 160 of 196 PageID #: 2232

Gowdy, Rick
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Parks, Joe Sunday, February 01, 2009 2:29 PM Vincenz, Felix; Reeves, Steve
Rehak, Tom; Gowdy, Rick
RE: House Hearing Follow-Up questions - RICK

No they want the cost for doing SVP on the Texas model vs. keeping SVP commitees in jail or prison. They didn't seem able to hear our explanation that keeping SVP commitees indefinitely in a jail/prison environment (cells) would lead to constitutional challenges.
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Sunday, February 01, 2009 2:14 PM To: Reeves, Steve; Parks, Joe Cc: Rehak, Tom; Gowdy, Rick Subject: FW: House Hearing Follow-Up questions - RICK
I don't have any context for this question. Joe — are they talking broadly about what it costs to provide services on average to someone on an outpatient basis vs. the average cost for someone in jail?
From: Rehak, Tom Sent: Friday, January 30, 2009 8:50 AM To: Gowdy, Rick; Reeves, Steve Cc: Vincenz, Felix Subject: RE: House Hearing Follow-Up questions - RICK
Me too .
From: Gowdy, Rick Sent: Friday, January 30, 2009 8:50 AM To: Reeves, Steve Cc: Rehak, Tom; Vincenz, Felix Subject: RE: House Hearing Follow-Up questions
I need more context to even begin to think about this—I am not sure what that means savings in outpt vs jail or outpt vs prison. Can you or Felix provide some context as to what population this question referenced? The simplest answer would be to find the avg cost of the typical outpt consumer vs about $50 per day for a jail.
From: Reeves, Steve Sent Thursday, January 29, 2009 3:26 PM To: Lyle, John K. (Ken); Bross, Brad; Vincenz, Felix; Rehak, Tom; Gowdy, Rick; Parks, Joe Subject: FW: House Hearing Follow-Up questions
Since each of you has specific knowledge to the questions being asked below, I would appreciate your response to the questions asked in House Hearing this week. Please provide your response to me by COB Monday, Feb 2. Thanks
From: McGinty, Brent Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2009 1:58 PM To: DMH.CO Exec Team/Assistants; Epple, Laurie; Reeves, Steve; Grosvenor, Jeff Cc: Schmidt, Pam; Snider, David; Schollmeyer, Vicki; Hennier, Gale Subject: House Hearing Follow-Up questions
1

EXHIBIT 16

SORTS 0186420

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 161 of 196 PageID #: 2233

Fm n

We have discussed and will be working on the communication strategy over the next week or so.

From: Vincenz, Felix Sent caturrlav, March OS 'CM 11.14 AM

1 of Conditional Release, and

iation regarding the conditional since these WILL be in the
Saturday, March 05

..,,'Conditional Release mcp, nncy 4A,I,YGr0114C N I 049.1,11

1,41IM1.1 3

FYI — looks like Julie and Alan did a nice job, but note Engler's concerns regarding SORTS, rumors of release, lembke's stance, and the budget

ma:1/4%u

From: Inman, Julie

Fro Sent: Frida To: Subject;

with them individually.
ierty transfer of the n't get a word in on and he would make sure we get something to help with this. I don't know what that means but didn't ask as he moved on to discussing SORTS. The land transfer is very important to him, He did state that it will likely take 5 years or more before they can out in the outer road since there is no funding.

will keep his office informed once we have viable candidates for release and the Director will be giving approval for the resident to petition for conditional release.
16 EXHIBIT 17

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 162 of 196 PageID #: 2234

Senator lembke —Sen. Engler talked about his concerns with Senator Lembke and the fact that Sen. Lembke "hates" SORTS. He says he has his hands full trying to defend the program. He stressed the importance of not having these rumors going on during this. • He also asked how things were going since the Acute care closures. I told him we haven't been hearing much lately, we know ERs have seen some increases but it has not been what was expected in most areas within our region. He said that when he spoke with the hospital administrators within the Farmington area that they stated that it was a non- event.
Alan and I met with Rep. Steve Tilley later in the day. Following are the items discussed: Property — l told Rep, Tilley that I understood the need for the outer road and that the land would likely be transferred but that I wanted to pass along our concerns not only with the trail that we use but with the natural barrier this creates for us between the facility and the highway. He stated that once the road goes into place that he would get funds for some type of fencing to go in as a barrier.

- eflalOt: tem

.,-ragstivivra)
Etigtoyitta

50...R...'.T. .S., He :says h

- fi- sfull

having these rumors going on during this.

terrihke . '
ink tc :tiefend the, pr.pgach.. He stressed the importance of not

ledStlYilheraWN, 11-1, u wuuiu uRe any Tilline(114
forward copies of those to you also. Julie

ui aua 11.11J rulon Lvudy d111.2 wm

Julie A. Inman Regional Executive Officer

SORTS H. Rep. Tilley hasn't been hea rwig a-mcerns from folks the way that.Senator Engler has_ Alan agaiii.tai ked

out the wrocess and that we would he sure to include htrn, Senator Engler, and others it the conversation

when approval for a person to petition the court is to be iyen by the Director and before any court hearings.

. . .

T , few

',aft' r. c-ury •sg-..criVY 147f.

ATM; 1 ,1,1. . +. 6V

in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by

federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify of immediately by telephone at

(573)218-6701, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments

17

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 163 of 196 PageID #: 2235

Enke, Teel
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Blake, Alan Wednesday, June 17, 2009 2:21 PM Vincenz, Felix; Gowdy, Rick Rosenboom, Jonathan; Enke, Ted; Hartman, Lana; Light, Sheila RE: MSOTC and Aged/Infirm

I have Thursday morning and Friday except 10-11, and then I am gone for 2 weeks. To move this forward, Jon can push this forward in my absence.
3-) 44 MS, LP
Chief Operating Officer Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center 1016 West Columbia Street Farmington, Missouri 63640 573-218-7079
alan.blakePdmh.mo .eov
Confidentiality Notice:
This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisciosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication In error, please notify me immediately by telephone at (573)218-7079, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2009 1:57 PM To: Gowdy, Rick; Blake, Alan Cc: Parks, Joe Subject: MSOTC and Aged/Infirm
Keith spoke with me yesterday afternoon about the possibility of selecting some 16 aged/infirm consumers from SORTS and developing a community alternative, demonstrating that as a strategy for saving about 36% of the costs of a ward and reduce expansion costs for another ward, and buying us a little breathing space in terms of census. Set up a meeting for the three of us to discuss this.

1
EXHIBIT 18

SORTS 0004463

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 164 of 196 PageID #: 2236

Enke, Teri
From: Sent: To: Subject:

Vincenz, Felix Monday, September 14, 2009 1:20 PM Vincenz, Felix SNF Candidates

- - — -From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 11:10 AM To: Reeves, Steve; Parks, Joe Subject: SNF Candidates
My note: Actually, Alan has now clarified that through the whole facility, we have 27 folks who are presumed to meet LoC option in the DA124 process
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 11:05 AM To: Vincenz, Felix Cc: Inman, Julie; Adams, Karen Subject: FW: SNF, not good news
Per staff on Hoctor it appears we only have 6 qualifying for SNF on Hoctor 1 per the criteria. I just asked if there are any others in the facility, and hope they may find some more.
From: Johns, Kelly Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 11:02 AM To: Blake, Alan Subject:
At this time SNF candidates include: 6 men. Schottel Bonine Coffman Wheeler Arthur Woods

SORTS 0003954

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 165 of 196 PageID #: 2237

Enke, Teri
From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments:
Importance:

Reeves, Steve Thursday, September 10, 2009 11:18 AM Parks, Joe; Vincenz, Felix Budget Numbers RequestedInfoSORTS090909 xlsx
High

I added the cost of the GPS tracking system and 2 FTE Forensic Case Monitors. This brings the total savings down to $98K. I don't think this is going to be worth the headache. See attached below

From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 10:26 AM To: Reeves, Steve; Parks, Joe Subject: FW: Requested SORTS Information Importance: High

Well, the E&E costs cut the projected savings in half, with some unknowns associated with the GPS system. However, this does not include potential offsets due to charging the consumers "rent" and expecting them to cover some portion of their outside services.
From: Inman, Julie Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 10:14 AM To: Vincenz, Felix Cc: Adams, Karen; Blake, Alan Subject: Requested SORTS Information Importance: High

Felix, The attached document contains one tab that shows the cost of one Hoctor ward and a tab which shows the estimated cost of 16 residents in a group home setting.
As I'm sure you are aware, the numbers for the group home setting are our best guesstimates based upon the limited information available. It is really unknown at this time where many of the expenses (food, drugs, etc) would be purchased from and therefore the cost of these items are unknown. Also, there are no expenses shown regarding the cost of GPS tracking devices. This expense needs to be researched further. Please let me know if you have questions or need further information. I am going into a meeting now, however if you email me I can answer questions from email or step out to call if needed. Julie

Julie A. Inman Chief Financial Officer CPS - Southeast Region (573)218-6789 _Lune. inman@dmh.mo. gov
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its
1

SORTS 0003955

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 166 of 196 PageID #: 2238
stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me Immediately by telephone at (573)218-6789, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.
2
SORTS 0003956

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 167 of 196 PageID #: 2239
SMMHC - SEXUAL OFFENDER REHABILITATION AND TREATMENT SERVICES ESTIMATED COST OF ONE HOCTOR WARD 09/09/2009
Costs of 16 Bed Hoctor Ward

Typical Hoctor Ward

Personal Services
Office Support Asst (keybrd) Custodial Worker Security Aide I Security Aide II Registered Nurse III Registered Nurse IV Activity Aide II Psychologist 1 Unit Program Supervisor Clinical Social Work Specialist Mental Health Mgr 1 (Unit Mgr)

FTE 1.00 1.00
14.00 3.00 5.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25

Dollars $24,810 $21,266
$466,186 $105,948 $264,308
$14,172 $25,195 $61,620 $45,652 $46,842 $15,279

Total Personal Service Fringe Rate Fringe Amount
Total PS with Fringe

28.50

$1,091,278 57.71%
$629,777
$1,721,055

Expense and Equipment
Food/Dietary Drugs Other Supplies Lab Medical/Dental Other Services Other Expenses
Total E&E
Total PS, Fringe, and E&E
Cost of SLPRC Group Setting

$ Estimates $35,566 $32,293 $18,728 $1,077 $47,302 $39,559 $12,000
$186,525
$1,907,580
$1,809,354

CPS Southeast Region, 7/28/2011

SORTS 0003957

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 168 of 196 PageID #: 2240

Enke, Teri
From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments:
Importance:

Vincenz, Felix Friday, March 05, 2010 7:24 PM Vincenz, Felix Aging and SORTS FW: SORTS Aging Stets
High

From: Blake, Alan Sent: Friday, March 05, 2010 1:33 PM To: Gowdy, Rick; Light, Sheila Cc: Vincenz, Felix Subject: RE: URGENT Info for 2:30 Meeting
9 definitely medical fragile — needing ongoing nursing / physician attention. Note that some of these persons, if in the community, still need to be in a locked or controlled nursing care facility, even though they have limited physical ability to move about. There is the next level of aging and medically needy; I estimate maybe another 9-12, but would not currently qualify for SNF settings.
As of today we 16 persons 65 or older, with 6 more becoming 65 this year.
As an aside, we are estimating 1/3 of our folks are DD or have cognitive impairments. Many of these might fit in group home settings.
From: Gowdy, Rick Sent: Friday, March 05, 2010 12:02 PM To: Gowdy, Rick; Blake, Alan; Light, Sheila Cc: Vincenz, Felix Subject: RE: URGENT Info for 2:30 Meeting
Just to be clear, I think given the short time we are just looking for answers to the 2 questions below, not to have the documents updated today. I only sent the documents FYI.
From: Gowdy, Rick Sent: Friday, March 05, 2010 11:35 AM To: Blake, Alan; Light, Sheila Cc: Vincenz, Felix Subject: URGENT Info for 2:30 Meeting Importance: High
See below and see attached.
From: Welch, Cathy Sent: Friday, March 05, 2010 11:30 AM To: Gowdy, Rick; Vincenz, Felix Subject: Info for 2:30 Meeting Importance: High
For the meeting at 2:30, Keith wants you to bring along the following info related to SORTS:
1

SORTS 0004078

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 169 of 196 PageID #: 2241 1) How many residents are over the age of 65 2) How many are considered medically fragile.
Thanks.
Cathy Welch
Directors Office Department of Mental Health 1706 East Elm, Jefferson City, MO 65102 Phone: 573-751-4970 or 573-751-3070 Fax: 573-526-7926 E-mail: cathy.welchaislmh.mo.gov
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE- This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisctosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review. disclosure, dissemination. distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573-751-4970, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.
2
SORTS 0004079

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 170 of 196 PageID #: 2242
From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 10:26 AM To: Reeves, Steve; Parks, Joe Subject: FW: Requested SORTS Information Importance: High
Well, the E&E costs cut the projected savings in half, with some unknowns associated with the GPS system. However, this does not include potential offsets due to charging the consumers "rent" and expecting them to cover some portion of their outside services. From: Inman, Julie Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 10:14 AM To: Vincenz, Felix Cc: Adams, Karen; Blake, Alan Subject: Requested SORTS Information Importance: High
Felix, The attached document contains one tab that shows the cost of one Hoctor ward and a tab which shows the estimated cost of 16 residents in a group home setting. « File: RequestedInfoSORTS090909.xlsx » As I'm sure you are aware, the numbers for the group home setting are our best guesstimates based upon the limited information available. It is really unknown at this time where many of the expenses (food, drugs, etc) would be purchased from and therefore the cost of these items are unknown. Also, there are no expenses shown regarding the cost of GPS tracking devices. This expense needs to be researched further. Please let me know if you have questions or need further information. I am going into a meeting now, however if you email me I can answer questions from email or step out to call if needed. Julie
Julie A. Inman Chief Financial Officer CPS - Southeast Region (573)218-6789 iulie. inman@dmh.mo.gov
CONrIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisciosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. if you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at (573)218-6789, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.
2
SORTS 0003959

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 171 of 196 PageID #: 2243

Enke, Ted
From: Sent To: Subject:

Vincenz, Felix Thursday, September 10, 2009 11:03 AM Reeves, Steve; Parks, Joe Candidates for the 16 availabile, SNF option on SORTS campus problematic

From: Blake, Alan Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2009 10:58 AM To: Vincenz, Felix; Adams, Karen Cc: Inman, Julie Subject: RE: SORTS/SLPRC Option for Core Cut Scenario - SNF Criteria

I am told we will have the SNF number in about 45 minutes, and a list of names shortly after, as staff are reviewing with the idea we are estimating on having a nursing unit internally at the SNF level in a new building.

I don't know that we have the physical space or utility connections to double the transition unit.

We will still want a transition place internal to the facility to prepare for any less secure setting.

Currently we believe we can find 16 that could be place in the SLPRC option. We have a pad bf 24 from which we can get the 16. The top 5 could go today to the SLPRC setting (and pass then neighbor test easily), if we had the court orders and conditions to go to SLPRC. The rest may need greater support / treatment, but don't represent a risk to the community in terms of compliance and appreciation of their situation. The setting would likely enhance their treatment and provide motivation. A few would be best engaged in the work program at SLPRC, and the focus would be on learning to live in a supported setting. (A couple of them would make better employees at SLPRC than SLPRC has currently. Certainly they would be good peer counselors.)

Name

DOB

Age DOA

Location

Donaldson, Timothy Williams, Donald Lewis, James Seidt, David Smith, Kenneth Allison, Michael Evans, George Scates, Clifford

/964 963 959 1954 1952 1968 960 958

45 45 50 54 57 41 49 50

02/07/2000 01/04/2002 06/19/2000 12/19/2003 05/04/2000 08/14/2004 10/02/2004 10/16/2000

Blair 2 / 211 /A Blair 2 / 210 /B Blair 2 /212 /13 Blair 2 /203 /B Blair 2 / 205 / B Blair 3 / 314 / B Blair 2 / 207 / A Blair 2 / 201 /A

Shafer, Jamin

1970

39

05/23/1999 Blair 3 /313 /A

Haenchen, Kevin

967

41

04/27/1999 Blair 3 / 306 / B

Fennewald, James

964

45

02/07/2006 Blair 2 / 209 / A

Bowles, Paul

962

47

09/25/2008 Blair 3 / 313 / B

Degeare, Steven
Vanzant, Ricky Norton, Michael

•1961

48

01/08/2003 Hoctor 1 / 168A /

C

0959

49

12/19/2001

Hoctor 4 / 218 / C

957

52

05/17/2001

Blair 2 / 206 / B

Martineau, Lou

956

52

06/16/2005 Blair 2 / 205 / A

Spencer, Nelvin Hodges, Gary

amp 957 957

52 52

01/19/2001 08/03/2005

Blair 3 / 310 / B Blair 3 / 304 / B

SORTS 0003960

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 172 of 196 PageID #: 2244

111•111111.1

> wrote:

---- Original Message --From: alimeal To: all/INIIIM Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2006 5:09 PM Subject: Re: Dakota

Hi gm

I am so sorry to hear about Dakota. I will pray for her recovery, I can clearly understand your concern over her immune system. I think I shared with you that I lost one of my german shepherds to cancer of the spleen. Chemo wasn't an option for her, but they thought they could get it with surgery. DW

I don't know if you were aware, but

owned a pet store for 13 years and dealt with a lot of

animals and of course animal owners. He is personally aware of 6 dogs that went through

chemotherapy for cancer and survived. He said if they catch it early they usually have a much better

success rate than they do with people. Some of the medication they are giving Dakota may be

causing her increased appetite but that will be in her best interest. You were right I do care and

is please keep me informed as to how she is doing. What type of cancer is it? Knowing how you are
with your animals I am sure it was caught early.

It's a cancer developed from her own mast cells. I was in the back yard one Sunday planting bulbs. She was sticking her nose into the process (normal for her). I looked at her and thought I saw a lump. I felt and indeed It was what seemed to be a small lump. I called the next day. Got her in on Tuesday. They did a biopsy and surgery on Wednesday. Between Sunday and surgery, she developed a second one. It turns out the first one only looked small. It was under her passenger side arm. She had her blood tests this morning, but I won't know until tomorrow whether they can give her the next treatment.
• IT is horrible to feel so helpless and want so bad to make things better. I am assuming the doctors
feel very optimistic about her prognosis.

I am glad you love your job. To me it sounds like a dream job. As for me, well I struggled with whether or not to leave MSOTC, but I think it is going to get worst before it gets better. They stopped almost all treatment. The only thing continuing was process groups and we were told they could be interfered with if they felt it was needed. I expressed my concern that the legislation that allowed us to exist was based on treatment being provided, but they hope to be able to increase treatment before that is caught by the wrong people. I have to admit that I miss the work there, I really used to love my job and look forward to going into work. Towards the end it was not very enjoyable. Working with the residents was great, but the politics and games going on were ridiculous. I was willing to try to avoid it and ignore it as long as I was able to continue treatment with the guys, but when that was being stopped and it was impossible to avoid the games it just wasn't worth it. The sad part is when I spoke with you and was hired I had every intention of staying there otherwise I would never have bought my house. I really enjoy working with that population. It really is getting bad at MSOTC.

I'm hearing the same thing from everybody that contacts me. I wish I could do something to help them. But, all I can do is pray. I feel so incredibly sad. I worked so incredibly
go hard to develop that program, but I could see it being destroyed. I just could not tolerate watching
it any longer. I feel so sad for the residents.

DR-02022ERW-#12465

EXHIBIT 19

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 173 of 196 PageID #: 2245
I agree, I feel very sad for the residents as well. I have to believe that someone or some state office will intervene and get things back on track, because MSOTC's existence is necessary for the safety of society. What was difficult for me was that I saw progress in several of the residents and one or two I fear or going to end up backsliding bad. The only two therapists who rarely if ever cancelled their groups were myself and Ie. Without mentioning names one of the others only met twice during a whole trimester and another cancelled between 60 -70% of their groups. The guys were upset by it.
I would like to keep in touch. For now if you want to reach me use my home email or call me at one of the following numbers: hm: 1.111111111111111111.1111111•111111111111111111111111. I will be in touch soon or contact me as you receive more news on Dakota. Thanks for letting me know about her and hang in there.
Ile
I will let you know how she's doing as I find out. If I become a pest about it just tell me you need a break. You know how I get about my animals. They really are a part of my family and I can bore normal people to death with their exploits and difficulties. 11111
I am sure that I am as bad if not worse than you when it comes to animals. I am hoping depending on what my near future holds for me to possibly get a German Shepherd puppy this coming spring. If I do I will try if I can figure out how to do it to send pictures to you. I just figured out how to change the font size and color on this message. Slowly I will become more and more computer literate. <G>
Please feel free to contact me any time you wish. You have the email now and my cell is 111.111 I work at home many days writing. I love writing in my flannel Pi's. Two and some s 3a
days a week Lam out doing evaluations or court work. October has been a busy month. I was hired to do three each month. In October I did ten. There was just an absolute onslaught during the month. Three is the normal load. There literally was not time to go to the bathroom duirng October. I just absolutely love the work. I look forward to getting up every morning. The work is challenging and stimulating. The work is honorable. And, I have been so incredibly surprised by the amount of work I can complete when rm not harrassed or impeded by politics, game playing, socializing, and all
ag that smooshing in offices all day long. I never cease to be amazed at the amount of time people can
fritter away eadi day.
You are right to go from 3 to 10 for the month is a major jump. To be free of politics and game playing is something I strive to be one of these days. I tried to call your cell and left a message. Hope to talk with you soon. Again, I will never be bored by the exploits of your animals and they are members of our families. In my heart I feel that only people who feel that way really should have them. NS
Please keep in touch if you wish.
IONIMINIMMINIMMININNIIMP wrote: I don't need anything. I tried to get in touch with you by email because I wanted to tell you that
my big wolf dog was diagnosed with cancer. I was relatively sure you would care. I had the tumors removed and she has started chemo--weekly for 8 weeks and then every other week for the next 8 weeks. I'm scared about the chemo and her immune system, but there was little choice. Either I gave up and she died very quickly or I tried and maybe just maybe they will be able to save her life. She goes in for blood tests every Tuesday morning and if she passes her blood tests then she can have her chemo on Thursday. She had her first chemo last Thursday and appears to be doing OK.
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She's absolutely ravenous and has tripled her intake of food since the surgery. I've just been feeding her all she wants because I figure with the chemo that she's going to need the best nutrition she can get. She's eating five 22 ounce cans of Pedigree beef or chicken chunks a day and free feeding on Benefial Dry Food. She's not gaining weight. She never had much of an appetite previously and given the tendency of large dogs to get hip problems as they age I'd been pleased that she stayed naturally slim. I figure with the chemo and cancer she is going to need all the good nutrition she can get.
I was puzzled when I contacted you and you didn't respond. Then, I remembered you computer gremlins. I just figured your computer at work was doing what your computer does. I get lots and lots and lots of emails and phone calls from nursing staff, security aids and support staff. The only people I don't hear from are professional staff. I assume that is a function of the fear that has gripped MSOTC. I keep getting these emails and phone calls from very diverse staff telling me that it is REALLY bad. One of them told me that you had resigned. I was shocked. So, I contacted'''. and asked him to please get in touch with you. I figured if you had managed to escape that you had a right to make your own decisions now. I hope things are going well for you.
I absolutely love my job. I recently told my sister that I hope and pray that I will be able to stay healthy enough to work until I'm 70, 75 or 80. I had no Idea life could be like this. I am so incredibly grateful to be allowed to have this job and do this work.
If you want, please stay In touch.
F-
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Gowdy, Rick
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Dirks-Linhorst, Ann Wednesday, February 06, 2002 1:04 PM Bellew-Smith, Marty Gowdy, Rick; Johnson, Victoria RE:

I hate to say that we have trod this ground before, but we have trod this ground before. Lauretta and I had already worked on a policy that did restrict visitors to immediate family children, etc - no cousins, nephews, etc., etc. We did not restrict to only those over 18 - even in mind of the clinical areas. There were determinations made regarding potential therapeutic value or lack thereof. The old policy that we had operated under was SVPTP policy 5.340. There'was even an application form for juvenile visitors. You may want to review it for a starting point.

I know that yesterday you indicated that you all had inherited a "bad" program, but there was a lot of work that had been

done on policies, and a lot of discussion on those topics in the first year. I understand if you want to change decisions that

had already been made, but you may want to at least review prior documents from that first year as a starting point.

—Original Message—

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Bellew-Smith, Marty Wednesday, February 06, 2002 12:44 PM Dirks-Linhorst, Ann Gowdy, Rick; Johnson, Victoria

Ann,

Joe Mangini asked me to get in touch with you.

Joe, Harold, Vickie and I are trying to get the Visitor's Policy/Visiting Security Policy finalized.

I have very strong clinical concerns about the impact of bringing children into a prison setting where they may be further victimized or in any way damaged through exposure to or contact with sex offenders, other criminals or the environment. I do not believe this is a place for children. In my opinion, these children have already been damaged enough and don't need us to be allowing any more damage.

Currently, children visit in a dining room up at FCC. So, they may be exposed to other sex offenders and their families. Depending on staffing, there may have been times when children have been exposed to some of our residents (family and friends) even if they did not have children visiting.

I am aware that individuals have a right to visit their families.

First, may we restrict visits to individuals who are over age 18?

Second, if we must allow children to visit, may we restrict visiting of children under the age of 18 to non-victims who are either the son or daughter (biological or legally adopted) of the resident. Are we required to allow nieces, nephews, cousins, grandchildren, step children, the neighbor children.

1
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STAFF MEETING MINUTES SUBJECT

PAGE NO. 4 DISCUSSION

May'22, 2001 DECISIONS/
ACTIONS

Submitted request to have family send in Playboy magazines Will be discussed by team

so he can masturbate to appropriate fantasies.

and incorporated into

treatment plan.

HH - Level 4 2/9/01

No discussion. Remains on TWR.

TI - Level 1 4/18/01

Does not participate in any form of treatment.

JJ - Level 3 4/16/01

Involved in altercation with others on 5/16/01.
Received order from Public Defender Nancy McKerrow. MO Court of Appeals reversed commitment.

Received 30 days TWR for assault.
Moved to detainee side of ward.

EK - Level 2 4/2/01

Doing okay.

CO - Level 2 4/26/01

Committed rule violation when he was in another resident's room playing a board game. This set off altercation for which others received TWR.

WS - Level 4 12/13/00

Doing okay.

JS - Level 3 12/18/00

Requested level 4.

Denied—does not do homework or apply principles.

DS—Level 3 8/1/00

No discussion.

ET—Level 4 10/13/00

Involved in altercation with others.

Level 4 suspended 30 days and TWR 30 days.

NEW BUSINESS

PHLEBOTOMIST SERVICES

Need to contact MARMC to see if we can contract to provide services.

K. Short contact MARMC

PERSONNEL ISSUES/ KEY CONTROL

SVP was not budgeted adequately. Some CTC positions will be moved to this program. SVP will take responsibility for staffing key control.

Identify staff and cross train.

MATTRESSES

Hospital bed was delivered to SP1. Mattress was taken off regular bed for use on hospital bed.

Order three mattresses for each of the hospital beds.

DIETARY ISSUES

Plastic knives are not provided in the dining room.

V. Johnson request and set up system to count.

Recorded by:

Reviewed by: Victoria Johnson, RN I

4:05CV2022 In Camera-56 44

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5-26-09.
What are the rules across the fence for FCC? Can an FCC inmate be unescorted, for what length of time and what are the procedures? Clearly MSOTC is a treatment facility and our procedures might end up being completely different, but I would like to know what the FCC procedure is before a final decision is made. Also, the comments by Mr. Jordon are well taken and should be discussed.
RNG.
Confidentiality Statement:
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE; This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named shove. Ti PC designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without DUlhorization and are misfired to destroy the information after its mated need has been fulfilled If you are not 11w intended minim. you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review. disclosure. dissemination. distrihtninn or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or stale law. If you have received this communication in error. please notify are immediately by telephone at 373.751 -WO, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

From: Vincenz, Felix Sent: Friday, May 22, 2009 4:43 PM To: Rosenboom, Jonathan; Adams, Karen; Blake, Alan; Gowdy, Rick Subject: FW: Variation for check in for residents
I'm OK with this as well.
From: Adams, Karen Sent: Friday, May 22, 2009 3:43 PM To: Blake, Alan; Vincenz, Felix; Gowdy, Rick Cc: Amsden, Nancy; Bender, Kristina; Jordan, Scott; Rosenboom, Jonathan; Wills, Bob Subject: RE: Variation for check in for residents
Sounds like a reasonable step to me. Not only for the residents involved, but for others seeing the progression and encouraging them toward more freedom as well. I think with the limitations you have described below, I am ok with it.
From: Rosenboom, Jonathan Sent: Friday, May 22, 2009 3:39 PM To: Blake, Alan; Adams, Karen; Vincenz, Felix; Gowdy, Rick Cc: Amsden, Nancy; Bender; Kristina; Jordan, Scott; Wills, Bob Subject: RE: Variation for check in for residents
From a natural progression in the treatment of our more advanced residents, some increased responsibility
and personal freedom is crucial. We now have 4-6 residents within 1-2 years of a recommendation to CO for partial conditional release. After over 7 years of these individual's treatment and progress, they continue to be
supervised 2417, have no personal monies on their person, cannot buy a soda or candy bar from vending
machines that they pass 10 times a day, and have now lost a good deal of the benefits of personalization of their room through the life safety interpretations/restrictions associated with TJC accreditation. They are
becoming more institutionalized and the potential that their work in treatment will bring fruit is subject to fading.
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Friday, May 22, 2009 2:58 PM To: Vincenz, Felix Cc: Gowdy, Rick Subject: RE: Variation for check in for residents
2

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Original Message From: "Weiler, Mary" cMary.Weiler@DMH.MO.GOV > To: Sent. onday , September 29, 2008 6:33 AM Subject: community reintegration
Dear List,
We are moving toward conditional release of several residents. All of these men have been out of mainstream society (jail, prison, SVP residential treatment) for at least 20 years. I would appreciate references to articles or other resources that would be helpful in teaching reintegration skills to these men (i.e. imagine the changes in telephonic communication over 20 years!). Thank you.
Mary T. Weiler, MSW, LCSW,
Director of Social Work , Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center
1016 W. Columbia Street, Farmington, MO 63640
Telephone (573)218-5043
Fax (573)218-7053
E-mail: mary.weiler@dmh.mo.gov
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may .contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to deStroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state•law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573-218-5043, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

EXHIBIT 23

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From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Attachments:

Moll, Linda Friday, January 11, 2013 11:06 AM Anderson, William Arnett, Justin; Ring, Melissa; Carich, Mark SOS Training Presentation Program training slides 2 days FARMINGTON.pptx

Attached please find the slides I used when training staff on the SOS program. These are adapted from the slides Jill used in her 2 1/2 day training with us before we kicked off the program here — as you can tell, I have attributed the presentation to her and added my name only for the elements specific to Farmington. I asked her permission to use her slides and presentation.
The beginning of the presentation covers some basic data about sex offenders, which both she and I have used with new employees. For experienced SORTS employees, I skipped ahead to the information about the SOS program philosophy, basis, etc.
Per my conversations with Emily Davis and Suzan Campanelli, as well as Dr. Hayreh and Genie Bonte, I was more than willing to present on the SOS program philosophy, basis, etc., but would need to turn it over to someone from the current team for details about the current workings of the program. But I'm willing to help in whatever way you need -

Linda Moll, Ph.D., Adult Psychiatric Services Director of Treatment Services SMMHC Director of Psychology 1010 W. Columbia Street Farmington, MO 63640 Phone: (573) 218-6827 FAX: (573) 218-5072 LindadVloWdmh.mo.gov

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573-218-6827/6730, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

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FARMINGTON SOS PATIENT HANDBOOK

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Program Overview
The Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (SORTS) unit at Farmington State Hospital is a program for clients who have been civilly committed under Missouri State Statute 632.480 as Sexually Violent Predators. Clients who reside in the SORTS unit are those with serious histories of violent sexual offending and corresponding mental illnesses (i.e., paraphilias) that increase the likelihood of their criminal sexual behavior. In addition to sex offender treatment, SORTS clients represent a broad range of psychosocial treatment needs, including mental illness, personality psychopathology, trauma, geriatric and medical concerns, intellectual and developmental disabilities, isolation from family members and other supports, substance abuse, and lengthy histories of incarceration and hospitalization.
Safe Offender Strategies is a treatment approach for sexual offenders developed by Jill Stinson, PhD, and Judith Becker, PhD. This approach emphasizes the role of self-regulation and self-regulatory deficits in the development of problematic or illegal sexual behavior. As a treatment, Safe Offender Strategies is a skills-based intervention that facilitates self-monitoring and selfmanagement for sex offending clients in long-term or residential settings. Treatment providers work collaboratively with clients to individualize treatment planning and measure progress in multiple domains of functioning.
Here, Safe Offender Strategies has been expanded and developed as a program, with standards, treatment opportunities, and responses to client behavior that are consistent with the goals and philosophy of the original treatment approach. This program manual contains a description of the philosophy and rationale for treatment, basic assumptions about SORTS clients, stages of commitment and measuring treatment progress, client privileges and responsibilities, consequences, and available treatment programming. An overarching goal is to balance community safety needs with the treatment and support needs of high-risk sexual offenders.
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HOCTOR 2/SOS PROGRAM MISSION
Using the SOS program philosophy, Hoctor 2 seeks to provide progressive therapeutic measures to meet our patients' needs - "meeting patients where they are in treatment using a validating and therapeutic approach to bridge the gap to
recovery".
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Program Philosophy and Rationale for Treatment
Traditional sex offender treatment programs have utilized harsh, punitive, and confrontational approaches for dealing with sex offending behavior. Clients have been assigned treatment goals and coached in techniques to help them avoid potential risks, like contact with potential victims (e.g., women, children), sexual urges, or dysregulated emotional, cognitive, and interpersonal states. Sex offending clients have not consistently benefitted from such approaches, which often have had difficulty with client compliance and lasting treatment effects. Therefore, Safe Offender Strategies represents a departure from these approaches.
Safe Offender Strategies (SOS) is based on the fundamental premise that people with deficits in self-regulatory functioning will sometimes engage in maladaptive behaviors in order to regulate themselves. These behaviors are maladaptive because they are harmful to themselves or others. This sometimes includes sexual behaviors, depending on the person's history, beliefs and cognitive worldview, individual personality traits, opportunity, and reinforcement history. Not all persons with self-regulatory problems become sexual offenders, but some do. These persons will continually struggle with effectively and safely managing their sexual urges emotions, beliefs and expectations, and interactions with other people. These are the clients for whom Safe Offender Strategies was developed.
Individuals with histories of sex offending behavior presumably demonstrate difficulties with self-regulation in several domains. These difficulties arise when the individual experiences dyresgulation (briefly defined as distress or discomfort) and is unable to tolerate or manage it in an effective way. Signs of emotional dysregulation may include intense anger, loneliness, depression, mania, or panic. Indicators of cognitive dysregulation include blame, judgment, rationalization, racing thoughts, problem-solving deficits, or delusional beliefs. Interpersonal dysregulation can include arguing, lying, manipulating, or isolating oneself from others. Finally, behavioral dysregulation is more observable and is often related to maladaptive behavior, such as impulsivity, substance abuse, and aggression. Clients in sex offender treatment often display unique combinations of dysregulation and self-regulatory deficits, thereby creating the need for individualized treatment interventions.
In treatment, clients need to learn a combination of strategies for risk management and adaptive self-regulation. This is broadly accomplished
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through self-monitoring, skills training, support, and fostering a sense of selfefficacy and commitment to change. The treatment process begins with assessing client readiness and engagement and ends with client selfmanagement and consistent use of adaptive regulatory strategies to cope with dysregulation in the moment. Along the way, clients develop their own individualized plan for coping with their dysregulation and their sexual urges. Diverse programming opportunities help them develop functional and adaptive skills, supportive and healthy relationships with others, and future goals that enhance their lives.
Clients in the SORTS unit are long-term, high-risk sexual offenders. They often have lengthy histories of problematic sexual behaviors, unhealthy relationships with others, and other difficulties with mental illness, substance abuse, and incarceration and hospitalization. The SOS program assumes that clients will need long-term care and treatment to address the complexity of their behavioral problems and self-regulatory deficits. Treatment programming is designed to address these needs gradually and comprehensively, with ample opportunity for clients to practice newly learned skills and abilities in their current milieu on a daily basis.
Treatment providers and staff members for the SOS program work collaboratively with clients to develop treatment goals that are most relevant to them, that reflect their current commitment to treatment and treatment needs, and that will ultimately help them move toward more effective selfmanagement. It is understood that each client's attainable level of selfmanagement varies dependent on health factors, adaptive functioning level, available social support in other settings, and risk of future sexual offending. Treatment providers work with each client where he (or she) is at and acknowledge the difficulty of making widespread and lasting change in so many areas of the client's life. Strategies for effectively working with clients to enhance self-monitoring and self-management include validation, behavioral chain analysis, and skills building. Other therapeutic principles that are central to the SOS program include Motivational Interviewing and restorative justice.
Clients involved in the SOS program are expected to make progress at their own pace and with their own (reasonable) goals. Stages of client progress and corresponding programmatic privileges and restrictions are based on the client's level of commitment to change and active participation in treatment efforts. As clients become more committed, more self-aware of their treatment
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needs, and more skilled at self-management, they will be given greater opportunity to exercise newly learned adaptive strategies in their daily environment. Problems with behavior, treatment engagement, and interactions with staff and peers are somewhat expected, given the complexity of their needs and the long-term nature of program intervention. This is not to say that such acts are passively condoned - there are consequences for clients when they exhibit maladaptive strategies or behaviors. Many of these are dealt with in treatment and within the context of their relationships with staff and other clients so that they may serve as learning opportunities for the future.

The most important thing to know about SOS is the concept of dysregulation. Dysregulation is just what it sounds like - a state of feeling somehow, out of balance ("Things are not okay") to the point of intense discomfort or distress, to the point where the person can't take it anymore. Everyone experiences dysregulation of some kind, at some point in their life, and pretty much everyone, at some point in their life, deals with it in a way that isn't particularly effective or doesn't have a great outcome.

There are four types of dysregulation discussed in the SOS program:

Emotional D , sre : lation Anger Loneliness

Cognitive D sre ulation Blame Jud ment

Interpersonal D sre lation Ar • in

Behavioral D sre ulation
Substance abuse

De •ression

Rationalization

A: • ression

Mania Panic

Racin: thou hts Delusions

Isolatin: Makin: threats

Sexual offendin: Suicidal behavior

Problem solving deficits

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From: Sent: To:
Subject: Attachments:

Labundy, Jim Thursday, November 15, 2012 7:41 AM Adams, Maria; Bender-Crice, Kristina; Bonte, Eugenie; Bress-Scroggins, Jean; Carich, Mark; Chamberlain, Christopher; Chilton, Vickie; Edgar, Evelyn; Fenwick, Sandy; Hayreh, Davinder; Labundy, Jim; Sanchez, Andrew Emailing: Fulton tripLatestl Fulton tripLatestl.doc

The message is ready to be sent with the following file or link attachments: Fulton tripLatestl
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EXHIBIT 25
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Fulton trip, November 2012:
Our trip to Fulton was quite educational, and well worth the time and expense. We were able to participate in all of the groups and activities that were unavailable prior, and were able to see the entire core process of SOS. We were also able to have adequate time with the director and unit managers, to ask individual clinical and process questions, and to ask about the things we observed. Our observations seem to fall into two categories:
1. Ambience/Atmosphere: There was a distinct ambience notable upon entry to the wards. Fulton is fortunate to have bright white open cheery wards, very spacious with wide hallways, and large, white, open rooms with many Windows. This afforded sunlight to wash throughout, adding to the ambience. The hillside visible through the windows was of green countryside, adding to a peaceful view. Staff and residents are on a first name basis, and that seem to add to a more pro-social atmosphere for all. The language of staff and resident was one of the DBT - origin, speaking of skills used, skills that could be used, and no talk of thinking errors, or other CBT carryovers from other programs. There was not a sense of policing the residents, but one of interacting and attempting to help them find the skills needed for whatever was currently operative. The staff and the residents were interacting as one large treatment team, or treatment community, and we could detect no "us - versus them" attitudes on either part. The residents report" staff talks to us, like people, and treat us like human beings." They have simplified a lot of interactive strategies, for example TV scheduling: whoever is in the TV room at the time of choices to be made will determine the program for that time; only stage for and above can vote on what is watched, but all may view it. Restorative Justice was a simple process we could readily begin. They allow for directly addressing an individual

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culprit for whatever transgression has occurred, and not punishing the whole group. These two arenas alone have solved a lot of staff/resident discord. Their belief is that people who are scheduled for group should be responsible to go to group. Being a long-term treatment program, eventually the lack of responsibility is contained within the staging levels. Incentives truly meaningful. It was no surprise that their use of the work program has been phenomenal. Level III can begin working with a lower number of hours, and more hours are appropriated as staging levels increase. It is fairly simplistic to achieve a level V, but they have never moved anyone to level VI at this point. That seems to be where "the rubber hits the road". That incentive, working, has an overriding impact, a positive one, in all of their programming. Ironically, we visited the work program to see how it operates and ask questions, and their whole program could fit in our Hoctor 6 day hall! Space is not the issue, as I was led to believe. Another small area that was quite impressive was there use of first names for staff and residents; it altered the negative history from prior treatment and/or incarceration. Many of those simple little characteristics in their programming added up to a huge difference in ambience, all in a positive direction.
2. Clinical: We felt validated regarding the clinical formats we are working towards, and have actually been developing from our own treatment histories and backgrounds. We have to be careful to not fall back into the CBT/correctional format, as my history for example, was MoSOP-based in Corrections, then repeated here, but my years of outpatient treatment before that allowed me the latitude of including systems theory and Bowenian family systems theory, expanding the therapeutic process a great deal. I saw this influence with Jill's writing, as the

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systemic overtones of her formatting the groups for specific interaction soon became evident. What we are doing now approximates that more than the correctional models still using CBT as a format. Our current approach to chaining, self-regulation, self-monitoring, and the SOS groups, are falling close to where Jill wanted to go with SOS. Some tweaking will still be needed, but this may be the simpler areas to accomplish. They also see anger management as part of their core process program, and life skills, also. We'll be interested in tweaking some of the groups for the January semester.
Their staffing, of course, made us drool. There are two licensed clinicians in every group, minimally, more in many. Mike, the director of all programming, is a clinical social worker, and the two unit managers are also licensed clinicians, one a psychologist and one a clinical social worker. The third ward they are now in process of developing has another clinical social worker for its unit director. The SA's seem to run the Ward on day-to-day basis, with an SA-2 on days and evenings, with the nurse more in the background. Why this was so was not questioned, nor revealed, but their general over-all organizational chart would resemble ours in most ways visible-not surprising, as both are DMH inpatient programs, longterm. They have a psychiatrist who is part of the treatment team and was at the morning meetings that resemble ours at 8:30 AM. Ironically, one day it took 15 minutes and the other day at almost 30 minutes, that that was for doing all three wards! It may be a sign we all do talk too much! They also have an internist, functioning much the same as our own.

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In summary, the benefits our program can realize from what we and the other staff attending have learned can also be divided into two categories:
1. program specific/within Ward: some of the tweaks that appear needed can be handled by the staff assigned to the Ward, as it doesn't change any policies or procedures, so that mandates may be carried out in a true SOS - fashion. The whole staff need to get on board regarding respect and humankind's intrinsic nature of being. It would help for all staff and residents to change to a first name basis; patients report that this staff "listens to and talks with them, not AT them". Men can shake hands, as this is allowed.
2 Some changes may come with a consultation from administration. While everything we learned at Fulton is obviously approved by the Department of Mental Health, we need as a staff to get away from the attitude of "we can't do it here in Farmington because..." and move on to "how do we get this done here and in the near, near future?". After meeting with Mike and his staff, it appears that many of our problems stem from how far we were lead to vary from Jill's original program intension; seeing how the program works in action, and now having her book as a guide for action, limits could possibly be only those we do not see as opportunities.
What must be understood is that it is almost impossible to capture the true essence of what is different in the program's, in that it is primarily one of attitude, a true sense of community with staff and residents, and how the humanity of all is respected. The functional part of the programs roll out naturally from their basic assumptions about what truly enables transformative change.

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From: Sent: To: Subject:

Blake, Alan Tuesday, June 12, 2012 7:41 PM Carich, Mark RE: How is the new job going?

Yiou can tell her I drank both of them.
You might see if the state will pay for a membership to Sex Offender Civil Commitment Network (SOCCPN). That is the organization for the state SVP programs. It is a great group of folks. I think you would find several things they do of considerable interest, especially regarding research and other aspects that would be very publishable. They have a website you can google. I suspect you already know a few members.
From: Carich, Mark Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2012 5:29 PM To: Blake, Alan Subject: Re: How is the new job going?
Glad I'm here. Sujatha. Says u owe her two bottles of wine. Mark
From: Blake, Alan Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2012 05:22 PM To: Carich, Mark Subject: How is the new job going?
Mark, I hope all is going well as you are settling in. I suspect there are probably things that have come up where you wonder "what was he thinking?" If I can be of any help or want my take on things, please feel free to call. 636-5440174. Sheila knows where the bodies are buried. Take good care of her. She did a wonderful job of taking care of me. Bob Wills is also a wealth of good judgment and a good sounding board. There are a number of unique personalities there, but hard working and committed to good service. I am glad to know that a person with your knowledge and stature is there to take SORTS to the next level and that my friends and collegues are in good hands.
Alan Blake

EXHIBIT 26
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 192 of 196 PageID #: 2264

From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments:

Carich, Mark Tuesday, July 16, 2013 10:50 AM Hebert, Jannine M (DHS) RE: [SOCCPN] request Oa EvaluatingTherapeuticChange-FULL-Final handout.ppt; Oa_Evaluating_Therapeutic_Change_Appendix_HDOUTLppt; MEANINGFUL RISK FACTORS 2011.doc; Dynamic Risk (Recovery) Factors.ppt; Risk_Assessment_Applications_to_Treatmentll.ppt

It is the Schwartz series on corrections sex offender tx. 2008 edition might be vol. 6 don't remember-- it was on eval tx. progress based on our atsa presentation which are enclosed. The current goals grid is dysfunctional & is why we are developing something new. Once I locate it I will send it to you.

Original Message From: Hebert, Jannine M (DHS)401111111111111111111 Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2013 10:09 AM To: Carich, Mark Subject: RE: [SOCCPN] request

Thanks, Mark. Yes, I have volume III of the sexual predator in my office and the others are at home. I will look up 2008 edition. Would you be willing to share your grid with me? I won't plagiarize or disseminate it, I am trying to get a general perspective of the world out there. I appreciate it.

Original Message From: Carich, Mark [mailto:Mark.Carich@dmh.mo.gov] Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2013 10:03 AM To: Hebert, Jannine M (DHS) Subject: RE: [SOCCPN] request

We published a chapter on this with B. Schwartz 2008 on this topic. Currently we are using a goal grid, however, we are changing it up. I have been studying these issues since 1989 or before & it is still a work in progress.

Original Message From: Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2013 9:14 AM
To: ININISMIIIIIMIN
Subject: [SOCCPN] request

Hi All I am looking for examples of how other sex offender civil commitment programs measure client treatment progress or change. If you could share any policies, internally developed tools or program descriptions that capture this it would be greatly appreciated. Is anyone using the VRS-SO or the SOCQ? Hope everyone is having a lovely summer! Thanks so much.

Jannine Hebert MA, LP MSOP Executive Clinical Director 444 Lafayette Road North St. Paul, MN 55155-0992
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EXHIBIT 27

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 193 of 196 PageID #: 2265
651.431.4377 651.207.3336 (BB) Caution: This e-mail and attached documents, if any, may contain information that is protected by state or federal law. E-mail containing private or protected information should not be sent over a public (nonsecure) Internet unless it is encrypted pursuant to DHS standards. This e-mail should be forwarded only on a strictly need-to-know basis. If you are not the intended recipient, please: (1) notify the sender immediately, (2) do not forward the message, (3) do not print the message and (4) erase the message from your system.
A blank message to these addresses performs the following SOCCPN-on@mail-list.com gets you on the list. SOCCPN-offPmail-list.com gets you off the list. SOCCPN-switch@nnail-list.conn toggles you to/from the fancy digest version. SOCCPN-vacationPmail-list.com toggles you to/from the vacation list.
To change your email address, send a message to SOCCPN-changePnnail-list.com with your old address in the Subject: line
Post your message to the list by sending it to SOCCPNPmail-list.com . To contact the list owner, send your message to SOCCPN-list-owner@mail-Iist.com . mail-list.com 1302 Waugh Dr. #438 Houston, Texas 77019 USA This message was sent to 97 subscribers. To unsubscribe, switch to/from digest, get on/off vacation, or change your email address, click here. <http://cgi.mail-list.com/u?ln=soccpn&nm=mark.carich%40dmh.mo.gov >
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 194 of 196 PageID #: 2266

From: Sent: To: Subject:

Bender-Crice, Kristina Thursday, January 10, 2013 3:36 PM Kempker, Ericia; Wiedau, Kelly RE: one quick paragraph

That guy is a moron! I have officially given up on this guys ability to do ANYTHING!!

Krissy Bender M.S. Unit Program Supervisor SOUTHEAST MISSOURI MENTAL HEALTH CENTER Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services Division 1016 W. Columbia St Farmington, MO 63640 573-218-6122 Office 573-218-5033 Fax
kristina.benderPdmh.mo.gov

Arri ve-kin COtimseiin g
Assoc iat ion
MISSION: To improve mental health of those we serve with a com-mitment to excellence in all we do. VISION: "Working together to be the premier provider of Hope, Rehabilitation, and Recov-ery to achieve fulfilling lives."
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573-218-6122, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.

From: Kempker, Ericia
Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2013 10:09 AM
To: Wiedau, Kelly; Bender-Crice, Kristina Subject: RE: one quick paragraph
How have you been? Talk to Krissy about Mark and his comments about me © She'll know what I'm talking about.

Ericia L. Kempker, Psy.D. Licensed Psychologist SVP Evaluator/Certified Forensic Examiner
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EXHIBIT 28

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 195 of 196 PageID #: 2267

From: Sent: To:
Subject:

Englehart, Jay Monday, August 12, 2013 2:25 PM Ring, Melissa; Amsden, Nancy; Anderson, William; Arnett, Justin; Carich, Mark; Clopper, Terry; Fletcher, Kevin; Forsythe, Cindy; Hackathorn, Cynthia; Hayreh, Davinder; Jackson, Dean; Light, Sheila; Longworth, Damon; Ramesh, Sujatha; Russell, Richard; Semar, Janine; Stienkemeyer, Robert; Swift, Brenda (SORTS); Walton (Adams), Andrea; Wills, Bob RE: violations procedure

I agree that we are boxed into a corner at times and that the use of violations is not always therapeutic and may at times not be fairly applied. However, there are a number of problems that were seen when the clinicians were involved in making a clinical decision to uphold a violation, and front line staff were given more discretion in deciding what was and what was not a violation. There have also been times both when staff did not tell patients about a violation, and therefore there were no consequences paired with receiving the violation, or when there was an automatic process (such as that used in prison) of appeal where any consequence is delayed by up to a week, which also does not optimize any possible behavioral effects of receiving the consequence. A warning system we had at one point did not work because the most difficult patients would space out their negative behaviors so that no staff member witnessed them more than once, and because we were not tracking warnings, there was no way for subsequent staff members to know that patient had already been warned multiple times.
For me, there are two goals of having a violation system: 1) Having a central place where all "at risk" behaviors can be accessed and assessed for current security risk purposes and for clinical needs assessment; 2) Having a more or less objective system which depends less on clinical acumen and/or countertransference factors than our other judgments;
This kind of "objective" system is especially needed in the type of population we have at SORTS and are increasingly getting at APS: a group where many either have antisocial traits or frank psychopathy or have long periods of institutionalization where they have developed strategies for getting what they feel they need.
So, the question becomes one of willful behavior vs. behavior which can respond to treatment, which is what I think Dr. Ring is getting at below. Unfortunately, we do not have a good, comprehensive risk assessment and needs analysis document on each patient which summarizes the goals of their treatment and their individual traits which lead to risk. The ITP does some of this, at least on the goals side, but we don't have an ongoing needs assessment which deals with highly individualized risk factors into which we can fit some of the states people are in when they commit a violation.
So, I would propose a slightly different approach . . . keep the violation system as it is, but change the risk level system so that it is not so dependent upon violations to assess risk. For instance, two recent moves from Blair as a result of intolerable violations were unnecessary in my view, not because the violations were not intolerable, but because the risks involved given their histories did not require that they be moved to a new environment that was marginally more secure. The violation required that particular consequence however, because we just count them. The violations were however, huge clinical issues, which would keep them from progressing toward discharge until addressed and new skills developed.
This is a very, very long response to a very brief suggestion, but the history of the system is important, as are the goals, so I thought I needed to talk about both. Sorry.

chart, MD Director nheast Missouri L

ea -I Center

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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 258 Filed: 02/19/14 Page: 196 of 196 PageID #: 2268
0 West Columbia Street Farmin:Iton. MO 63640 Office Phone: 573-218-6708 New Email: jay.englehart@dmh.mo.gov
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573-218-6708, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments.
From: Ring, Melissa Sent: Friday, August 09, 2013 11:51 AM To: Amsden, Nancy; Anderson, William; Arnett, Justin; Carich, Mark; Clopper, Terry; Englehart, Jay; Fletcher, Kevin; Forsythe, Cindy; Hackathorn, Cynthia; Hayreh, Davinder; Jackson, Dean; Light, Sheila; Longworth, Damon; Ramesh, Sujatha; Russell, Richard; Semar, Janine; Stienkemeyer, Robert; Swift, Brenda (SORTS); Walton (Adams), Andrea; Wills, Bob Subject: violations procedure
I have been studying this issue some in light of how we are sometimes "boxed in" by our violations procedures. One thing I studied is the procedures used by Wisconsin- also attached- which puts the emphasis on the sanctions or what is done about the behavior (which would be a violation in our lingo) In my brief dealings with contentious violations the issue is usually not whether the behavior occurred or not but what the sanction or consequence should be. BUT, the way we have written the policy, IF the behavior occurred the consequences are prescribed so about all you could do is say it happened, did not happen or happened by did not meet the definition (Whether or not to uphold, expunge or modify the violation) In thinking about this (and having read the new DOR on the exceptions committee), I wonder whether the team review process could be addressing not whether it happened but what the consequence should be and the consequence would be determined in light of mitigating factors, whether the same behaviors have been problematic, and any repairs or processing accomplished. Perhaps there could be an upheld violation but a waiver.... Just an idea.
The language could be something along the lines of.... The patient's treatment team reviews all reported violations using a just culture assessment of whether the behavior was a mistake, drift from usual behaviors, or willful or reckless disregard of expectations. The team also considers the patients response to the behavior and past history of the same of similar problems. Staff members are not required to impose a consequence for all violations of rules. The staff member may inform the patient that his behavior violated unit rules and discuss the patient's behavior with him Depending on the situation, staff may counsel the patient. Counseling is intended to help the patient identify the goal of his behavior, understand the impacts of that behavior, identify appropriate alternatives, evaluate the benefits of those alternatives, and challenge the patient to choose among them. Warnings are intended to help patients identify and modify their behavior so they avoid consequences. Consequences may involve restrictions of privileges or adjusting the patient's risk rating level.
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAEFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This putative class action is before the Court on Defendants’ motions (Docs. No. 273 & 330) to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The named Plaintiffs are individuals who are, or were, civillycommitted residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“Department”) Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”)1 facilities in Farmington and Fulton, Missouri. Plaintiffs commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on June 22, 2009, asserting numerous violations of the United States and Missouri constitutions based on the alleged lack of adequate care and treatment provided to them. They also challenge the constitutionality of Missouri’s statutory scheme that provides for reimbursement from Plaintiffs and/or their families or estates for the costs of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment. Defendants are state officials responsible for various aspects of SORTS, all sued solely in

1 Formerly, the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center (“MSOTC”).

their official capacities.2 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss
shall be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The Court previously granted in part and denied in part a nearly identical motion to
dismiss brought by Defendants in response to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc.
No. 192.) Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 117) claimed that the statutory
reimbursement scheme, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 630.205 et seq., and Defendants’ policies and
practices in accordance therewith, violated the “forfeiture of estate” clause of the Missouri
constitution; and the bill of attainder, cruel and unusual punishment, excessive fine, equal
protection, procedural due process, substantive due process, unreasonable seizure of
property, and ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiffs further
2 Defendants are Keith Schaefer, Director of the Department; Rick Gowdy, Director of Forensic Psychiatry for the Department; Joseph Parks, Chief Clinical Officer of the Office of the Director at the Department; Robert Reitz, Director of Psychiatric Facilities and Chief Executive Officer of Fulton State Hospital; Melissa Ring, Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, which is a division or office of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (“SMMHC”); Julie Inman Regional Executive Officer of SMMHC; Linda Moll, Director of Treatment Services at SMMHC; Alan Blake, former Chief Operating Officer of SORTS; Jay Englehart, Medical Director at SMMHC and SORTS; Mark Stringer, Director of Behavioral Services of Department; Donna Augustine, Interim Chief Operating Officer of SMMHC; Dave Schmitt, Quality Improvement Director of SMMHC; Justin Arnett, Chief Nurse Executive of SMMHC; Marty Martin-Forman, Chief Operating Officer of Fulton State Hospital; Ian Fluger, Program Coordinator for SORTS; Sherry Lee, Chief Nurse Executive for Fulton State Hospital; Kristina Bender-Crice, Unit Program Supervisor of SORTS; Ericka L. Kempker, psychologist for the Department; and Judy Sumpter and Harold Meyers, two reimbursements officers of the Department. Plaintiffs added George Lombardi, Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections, as a Defendant on July 8, 2014. (Docs. No. 302 & 315). Lombardi has filed a separate motion to dismiss, adopting all of the arguments raised by his co-Defendants. (Doc. No. 330). Finally, Plaintiffs assert claims against “Doe Defendants,” who are unidentified past, present, or future employees, vendors, and independent contractors of the Department, sued in their official capacities, for having some responsibility for the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights.
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claimed that the inadequate care and treatment provided to them violated their substantive due process rights, and rendered the reimbursement scheme even more objectionable, as there was no consideration for the amounts that were statutorily collectable, turning Plaintiffs’ civil commitment into state-imposed punishment. Plaintiffs brought their claims on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, and sought as relief a declaration that the care and treatment provided by SORTS, and the statutory reimbursement scheme for such treatment, were unconstitutional; an order enjoining Defendants from seeking to obtain payment for the costs of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment and requiring Defendants to improve the level of care and treatment provided in certain specific ways, such as by hiring trained psychologists and experts in sex offender treatment; and an order returning all property seized from Plaintiffs or their estates or families pursuant to the statutory reimbursement scheme.
In ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, the Court rejected the following procedural challenges raised by Defendants: that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the statutory reimbursement scheme was not ripe because Plaintiffs did not allege that Defendants had actually enforced any claim for reimbursement; that to the extent Plaintiffs’ request for return of property seized constituted a claim for damages, such claim was barred by the doctrines of qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity; and that Plaintiff David Brown lacked standing because he no longer resided at SORTS. (Doc. No. 192 at 5.) The Court held that because Plaintiffs alleged injury on a continuing basis, their claims were not barred by the statute of
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limitations. (Id. at 7, 9.) The Court likewise found that Defendants’ ripeness argument was without merit because “Plaintiffs have alleged that each of them have been pressured, or at least asked, to sign documents that will enable Defendants to collect payments pursuant to the statutes at issue here.” (Id. at 9.) Further, the Court rejected Defendants’ qualified immunity defense as unavailable to governmental employees sued solely in their official capacities, as here. (Id. at 5 n.3.) Finally, the Court held that standing is determined at the time the lawsuit was filed, and Plaintiff Brown’s confinement at SORTS at that time gave him standing to pursue his claims. (Id. at 8.)
Regarding Defendants’ substantive arguments that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint failed to state a claim based on inadequate treatment and care, the Court held that Plaintiffs’ claims that the treatment provided to them, or lack thereof, violated their substantive due process rights was a “fact-intensive” claim, which required further development of the record and was therefore not subject to dismissal at that time. (Doc. No. 192 at 7.) However, the Court found that “Plaintiffs’ claim that the level of care and treatment provided constitutes ‘punishment’” was “subject to dismissal for lack of factual support for such a claim.” (Id. at 7-8.)
Regarding Plaintiffs’ claims that the statutory reimbursement scheme was unlawful, the Court agreed that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint failed to state a claim under the “forfeiture of estate” clause of the Missouri constitution and the excessive fine clauses of the federal and state constitutions because these clauses apply only to actions by the government to inflict punishment for criminal offenses. (Doc. No. 192 at 10.) Likewise, the Court held that the reimbursement scheme did not implicate the bill of attainder, ex post
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facto, unlawful search and seizure, or cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the federal or state constitutions. (Id. at 10-11.) The Court further held that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge to the statutory reimbursement scheme failed as a matter of law because of the pre-deprivation notice and post-deprivation judicial review procedures available under the relevant statute, as to both the decision to seek reimbursement and the amount sought. (Id. at 11.) However, the Court permitted Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection claims regarding the reimbursement scheme to go forward, as these claims were “best determined upon further factual development of the record.” (Id. at 11-12.)
Following the Court’s ruling, the only claims remaining in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint were (1) that Defendants’ lack of adequate care and treatment violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, and (2) that Missouri’s statutory reimbursement scheme as applied to Plaintiffs violated their substantive due process and equal protection rights. The Court thereafter granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, certifying two classes: (1) a “Treatment Class” consisting of persons who are or will be residents of SORTS during the pendency of this action, and who seek relief related to the treatment or lack of treatment provided to SORTS residents; and (2) a “Charging Class” consisting of persons who are or will be residents of SORTS during the pendency of this action, and former SORTS residents, who have been or will be billed or charged for their care, treatment, room, or board at SORTS. (Doc. No. 197.)
On February 6, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint. (Doc. No. 255.) Plaintiffs asserted that “the heart of the claims” had not been changed, but Plaintiffs sought to plead new facts gathered from Defendants’ internal
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documents; to add a new, alternative claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and to add and drop certain parties. (Id.) Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for leave, and the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion. (Doc. No. 257.)
Plaintiffs filed their Fifth Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 258) on February 19, 2014. Plaintiffs continue to assert the claims that survived the last motion to dismiss, namely, that Defendants’ inadequate care and treatment of Plaintiffs violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, and that the statutory reimbursement scheme violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection rights. Plaintiffs also replead some of their dismissed claims, namely, that the statutory reimbursement scheme violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the cruel and unusual punishment, procedural due process, unreasonable seizure of property, and ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. (Id. at 74-83.) Plaintiffs do not replead the dismissed “forfeiture of estate,” bill of attainder, or excessive fines claims. But Plaintiffs add claims that the inadequate care and treatment they received constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and, alternatively, that the care and treatment provided at SORTS, as compared to other Department programs, violates the ADA.
Defendants brought the instant motion to dismiss on April 22, 2014, and newlynamed Defendant George Lombardi filed a separate motion to dismiss on August 25, 2014, adopting all of the arguments of his co-Defendants. (Docs. No. 273 & 330.) Defendants raise nearly identical arguments as they raised in response to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. Specifically, Defendants reassert each of the procedural bars they raised in their
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last motion to dismiss, including the statute of limitations, ripeness doctrine, qualified immunity, and Eleventh Amendment immunity. And Defendants again challenge the standing of one Plaintiff, this time Macon Baker, whom Defendants allege was released from SORTS and was not charged any money for any treatment received at SORTS.
Defendants also reassert many of their substantive challenges to Plaintiffs’ claims. Specifically, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to the statutory reimbursement scheme fail to state an equal protection claim because Plaintiffs are not treated differently than similarly situated individuals, and the scheme is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; fail to state a substantive due process claim because no “fundamental right” is implicated; fail to state a procedural due process claim because the statute provides adequate notice and judicial review procedures; fail to state an unreasonable seizure of property claim because Plaintiffs do not allege Defendants actually seized any property from Plaintiffs; and fail to state an ex post facto claim because the reimbursement statute is civil, not penal.
Defendants also argue that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to Plaintiffs’ care and treatment or reimbursement claims because Plaintiffs are civilly, rather than criminally, committed.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ new and alternative ADA claim fails as a matter of law because the ADA only requires a reasonable accommodation for a plaintiff’s disability, and “[a] reasonable accommodation has been given to Plaintiffs in the form of a sexual offender program to assist them[.]” (Doc. No. 276 at 25.)
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DISCUSSION To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s allegations must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The reviewing court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor, but it is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). A court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” and consider the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Group, 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Procedural Challenges As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendants’ statute of limitations, ripeness, immunity, and standing challenges for the same reasons it did so previously. Plaintiffs’ claims allege inadequate treatment and unlawful efforts to seek reimbursement on a continuing basis, and as such, are not barred by the statute of limitations. See Lake St. Louis Cmty. Ass’n v. Oak Bluff Preserve, 956 S.W.2d 305, 309-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (“Missouri recognizes the continuing or repeated wrong rule,” under which “the wrong may be said to continue from day to day, and to create a fresh injury from day to day.”) (citations omitted). Likewise, Defendants’ ripeness arguments continue to be without merit, as Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are actively seeking to obtain reimbursement. See South Dakota Mining
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Ass’n v. Lawrence Cty., 155 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff does not have to await consummation of threatened injury before bringing a declaratory judgment action. Instead, an action is ripe for adjudication if the plaintiff faces injury that is certainly impending,” meaning plaintiffs “have shown a realistic danger of sustaining an immediate, direct injury as a result of the operation or enforcement of the challenged [provision].”) (citations omitted). Further, as the Court previously explained, Defendants cannot claim qualified immunity, as that defense does not apply to governmental employees sued solely in their official capacities, as here. See VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2007). Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity argument also fails because the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against state officials for prospective equitable relief, including monetary awards that are “restitutionary in nature” or are “incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief,” as the return of any improperly seized property would be here. Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 977 (8th Cir. 1999). Finally, the Court rejects Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiff Macon Baker’s standing because Plaintiffs allege that Baker was detained at SORTS on the date the lawsuit was filed, and, as the Court has already held, that is the date on which jurisdictional issues such as standing are determined. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808, 814 (8th Cir. 2006). Adequacy of Care and Treatment
This Court has already held, and Defendants do not appear to challenge, that Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim that the lack of adequate care and treatment at SORTS violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint only pleads more detailed facts in support of this claim.
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However, the Court agrees with Defendants that the inadequate care and treatment claim is more properly addressed under the Fourteenth Amendment than the Eighth Amendment. See Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth, Amendment applies to civilly committed individuals). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims that the inadequate care and treatment they received violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy. In doing so, the Court recognizes that “[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, civilly-committed persons . . . are entitled to at least as great protection as that afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.” Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Statutory Reimbursement Scheme
For the same reasons discussed in ruling on Defendants’ last motion to dismiss, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims that the statutory reimbursement scheme violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the cruel and unusual punishment, procedural due process, unreasonable seizure of property, and ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions, but the Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims that the reimbursement scheme violates their substantive due process and equal protection rights.
The additional factual details pled in Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint do not alter the Court’s prior conclusion that the statutory reimbursement scheme here does not implicate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizure of property, cruel and unusual punishment, or ex post facto laws. See Bailey v. Carter, 15 F. App’x 245, 249-50 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting similar “illegal search and seizure” and “cruel and unusual
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punishment” claims regarding state law allowing prisons to recover costs of supervision and incarceration from certain offenders); Stanley v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. C2-02178, 2002 WL 31409435, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2002) (explaining that imposition of co-payment for medical services upon prisoner did not violate ex post facto clause, even though change occurred subsequent to prisoner’s conviction, because co-payment did not impose any additional punishment or risk of punishment). Nor does the reimbursement scheme violate procedural due process because, as the Court previously held, the statute provides Plaintiffs with pre-deprivation notice and post-deprivation judicial review procedures as to both the decision to seek reimbursement and the amount sought. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 630.210, 630.215; see also Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that taking funds from inmates’ accounts to cover medical services did not violate procedural due process where notice and post-deprivation remedies existed).
However, the Court will allow, as it did previously, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection challenges to the reimbursement scheme to proceed past the pleading stage. Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants violated their fundamental rights by taking or threatening to take money from them for treatment that was not adequately provided, and that Defendants treat SORTS residents differently than other civillycommitted residents by charging SORTS residents higher fees for inferior treatment without any rational basis for such differences, continue to state plausible claims that will benefit from further development of the record.
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Alternative ADA Claim The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, plaintiffs must allege (1) they are qualified individuals with a disability; (2) they were excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, or were otherwise discriminated against; and (3) such exclusion, denial or discrimination was because of the disability. Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1998).
The Supreme Court has held that “undue institutionalization” and “unjustified segregation of persons with disabilities” may qualify as a form of discrimination under the ADA. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597-600 (1999). However, the state must only employ “reasonable modifications to avoid discrimination” and need not employ modifications that “entail a fundamental alteration of the States’ services and programs.” Id. at 603; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). In Olmstead, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]f, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard would be met.” 527 U.S. at 605-06.
Plaintiffs allege that under the ADA, they have the right to live integrated lives, to not be segregated, to be in the custody of the least restrictive alternative for commitment,
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and to be treated equally to civilly committed residents of other Department programs with respect to opportunities for release and resources expended for care and treatment. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated these rights under the ADA by unjustifiably institutionalizing even those Plaintiffs whom Defendants conceded presented “no apparent risk” (Doc. No. 258 at 21, 118), and by failing to provide Plaintiffs with the same access to funding, treatment, and opportunities for release provided to other Department residents committed for non-sex-related mental disabilities. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ own statements that “no one has ever graduated from [SORTS]” (Id. at 122) demonstrates that Defendants do not have a “comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings” as contemplated by Olmstead.
Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs are persons with disabilities as defined by the ADA or that they qualify for the benefit of non-discriminatory care and treatment under the ADA. However, Defendants dispute that the care and treatment they provide to Plaintiffs is discriminatory. Defendants argue that the ADA only requires “reasonable accommodations” in policies, practices, or procedures in order to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, and that the SORTS program itself is such a reasonable accommodation. Defendants do not address Plaintiffs’ allegations of discrimination based on unequal access to funding, treatment, and opportunities for release as other civilly committed residents of the Department with non-sex-related mental disabilities.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations that they are being unjustifiably institutionalized even when they present “no apparent risk,” without an effective working plan for placing them in less restrictive settings, and that they are not afforded the same
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access to treatment and opportunities for release as other civilly committed residents, state a

plausible claim for disability discrimination under the ADA. See Ireland v. Anderson, No.

3:13–cv–3, 2014 WL 3732014, at *10 (D.N.D. July 25, 2014) (Plaintiffs’ allegations that

“[a]fter commitment [individuals found to be “sexually dangerous” under state statute] have

fewer services, facilities, and privileges than inmates and more restrictions than other civilly

committed individuals” were sufficient “to state a plausible claim under Title II of the

ADA.”). Whether Plaintiffs’ requests for alterations in funding, treatment, and

opportunities for release or transfer to less restrictive settings constitute “reasonable

accommodations” to avoid discrimination or are, alternatively, “fundamental alterations” of

the state’s services and programs are fact-intensive issues that require further development

of the record.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fifth

Amended Complaint are DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim

based on lack of adequate care and treatment, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal

protection claims based on Missouri’s statutory reimbursement scheme, and Plaintiffs’

alternative disability discrimination claim under the ADA; the motions are GRANTED as

to all other aspects of Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint. (Docs. No. 273 & 330.)

Dated this 17th day of October, 2014.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAEFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ uncontested motion (Doc. No. 355) to bifurcate the trial by first conducting a separate trial on the question of whether Defendants are liable for the claims asserted by Plaintiffs, and if Plaintiffs prevail, then conducting a second trial to determine the appropriate remedies and relief, including further reports and recommendations from appointed experts. For the reasons set for the below, the motion shall be granted.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, current and former civilly-committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“Department”) Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”)1 facilities, brought this putative class action asserting numerous violations of the United States and Missouri constitutions, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act, based on the alleged lack of adequate care and treatment provided to them. They also
1 Formerly, the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center (“MSOTC”).

challenge the constitutionality of Missouri’s statutory scheme that provides for reimbursement from Plaintiffs and/or their families or estates for the costs of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief.
In support of their uncontested motion to bifurcate the trial, Plaintiffs assert that bifurcation will serve judicial economy and promote settlement because if liability is found in phase one, the parties may reach agreement on an appropriate remedy and avoid the need for expensive expert discovery and recommendations regarding the scope of relief. Alternatively, if liability is not found, there will be no need for presentation of evidence regarding the scope of relief. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that bifurcation will not prejudice Defendants, as Defendants do not object to Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate.
DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that the Court, “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize,” may “order a separate trial of one or more separate issues[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). District courts are given “considerable latitude in deciding the most efficient and effective method of disposing of the issues in a case, so long as a party is not prejudiced.” Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods. of St. Louis, Inc., 64 F.3d 1202, 1209 (8th Cir. 1995). Factors to consider in determining whether bifurcation is appropriate include “the separability of the issues; simplification of discovery and conservation of resources; prejudice to the parties; and the effect of bifurcation on the potential for settlement.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, No. 4:00-CV-1073 (CEJ), 2006 WL 1026992, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2006) (citation omitted).
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In this case, the Court finds that bifurcation is warranted because the issues of liability and damages are separable, bifurcation may promote settlement and will likely conserve resources, and as Defendants do not object to bifurcation, no party will be prejudiced.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to bifurcate trial is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 355.) The current trial setting in this case shall be limited to a trial on the question of whether Defendants are liable for the claims asserted by Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs prevail on any claim, then the Court shall order the parties to submit a proposed schedule for a second trial to determine the appropriate remedies and relief.

Dated this19th day of December, 2014.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. HAROLD MYERS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. No. 345) to reconsider the Court’s October 17, 2014 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 338) granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy claims. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion shall be denied.
BACKGROUND This class action, filed by civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities, raises constitutional and statutory challenges regarding (1) the care and treatment, or lack thereof, provided to SORTS residents by state officials; and (2) the state’s statutory scheme requiring reimbursement from SORTS residents for the costs of their allegedly inadequate care and treatment. On October 17, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth amended complaint (the “complaint”). Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted several 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, and an alternative claim under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged their care and treatment at SORTS on substantive due process, cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and ADA grounds; and they challenged the state’s reimbursement scheme on substantive due process, equal protection, procedural due process, unreasonable seizure of property, and ex post facto grounds. The Court held that Plaintiffs’ complaint stated substantive due process and ADA claims for lack of adequate care and treatment, and substantive due process and equal protection claims for unlawful reimbursement. (Doc. No. 338.) However, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ other claims.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy claims, the Court held that, because Plaintiffs are civilly, rather than criminally, committed, their inadequate care and treatment allegations should be addressed under the Due Process Clause, rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Double Jeopardy Clauses, of the U.S. Constitution. Id. Plaintiffs challenge that ruling in their motion for reconsideration.
According to Plaintiffs, SORTS is a prison disguised as a mental health facility, and its purpose is to punish, not treat. Plaintiffs argue that the punitive nature of SORTS brings Plaintiffs’ claims within the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Double Jeopardy Clauses.
DISCUSSION A “district court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify an interlocutory order any time prior to the entry of judgment.” K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be revised
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at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims[.]”). Thus, district courts have substantial discretion in ruling on motions for reconsideration. However, in general, “[m]otions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs were committed to SORTS facilities under Missouri’s sexually violent predator (“SVP”) statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. 632.480 et seq. The Missouri Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “Missouri’s SVP statute is civil in nature.” Elliott v. State, 215 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Mo. 2007); Holtcamp v. State, 259 S.W.3d 537, 540 (Mo. 2008) (“The sexually violent predator law does not impose punishment, but rather is rehabilitative.”); In re Care and Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, (Mo. 2003) (Wolff, J., concurring) (finding the Missouri SVP statutory scheme is civil in nature and “constitutional as written”). In doing so, these courts have reasoned that Missouri’s SVP statute is “[f]or all relevant purposes” the “same” as the Kansas SVP statute, which was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) as a valid civil commitment statute. Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 790-91 (Mo. 2002); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 36169 (finding Kansas SVP statute civil in nature and therefore rejecting plaintiff’s double jeopardy claim).
Plaintiffs do not challenge these rulings. Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that civil commitment statutes such as Missouri’s SVP statute are valid “[s]o long as genuine treatment that affords a reasonable opportunity for release and honest, full disclosure periodic review are provided in good faith and with candor,” and Plaintiffs do not contest
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that Missouri’s SVP statute, at least on its face, provides for these conditions. (Doc. No. 258 at 55.) But Plaintiffs seize on concurring opinions in the state and federal cases discussed above, which caution that if, in implementing an SVP statute, the state makes no “meaningful attempt to treat” civilly committed individuals and instead simply “warehouse[s]” these individuals “without treatment and without meaningful efforts to reintegrate them into society,” the state SVP statute, as applied, would not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Norton, 123 S.W.3d at 176 (Wolff, J., concurring); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“On the record before us, the Kansas civil statute conforms to our precedents. If, however, civil confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, . . . our precedents would not suffice to validate it.”). Plaintiffs’ complaint quotes extensively from these concurring opinions. See, e.g., Doc. No. 258 at 48-49.
In line with these concurring Justices’ warnings regarding the potential for unconstitutional implementation of facially a valid SVP statute, Plaintiffs argue that the “actual experience of the parties under [the Missouri SVP] system and the statute’s implementation and application must define the Court’s decision in this case.” (Doc. No. 258 at 44.) Thus, Plaintiffs define “the key factual issue” in this case as “[w]hether the [Missouri SVP statute] is followed substantively and faithfully post commitment[.]” Id. at 40. Plaintiffs argue that it is not, because SORTS “does not offer a realistic opportunity to be cured, improve patients’ condition or be released,” and instead holds Plaintiffs “in penitentiary conditions that violate their constitutional rights.” Id. at 53.
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The Supreme Court has held that an SVP statute found to be civil in nature by the state’s highest court is not subject to as-applied challenges under the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses based on the state’s implementation of the statute and its treatment, or lack thereof, of particular detainees. Selig v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001). In Selig, as in this case, the state SVP statute at issue had been found to be civil in nature by the state’s highest court, a direct attack on that decision was not before the Court, and the state statute was, in any event, nearly identical to the SVP statute upheld in Hendricks. Id. at 264. Under these conditions, the Court held, “[t]he civil nature of [the] confinement scheme [could not] be altered based merely on vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute.” Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs could not raise double jeopardy or ex post facto claims, which hinge on whether the statute at issue is civil or criminal in nature, based on the conditions of their confinement and treatment. Id. at 263.
By contrast, the Selig Court recognized that the conditions of confinement under a state SVP statute could give rise to a due process claim. Id. at 265 (holding that, in light of the civil nature of the SVP statute at issue, “due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed,” including the purpose “to treat”). Id. at 265.
Likewise, numerous courts have held that claims regarding the constitutionality of a state’s implementation of its civil commitment statutes, including claims nearly identical to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case alleging that the conditions of confinement amount to punishment, fall within the scope of the Due Process Clause, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Double Jeopardy Clauses. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325
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(1982) (holding that a claim regarding defendants’ failure to provide a civilly committed individual with appropriate treatment was more properly analyzed under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, and that the “jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 580-84 (1979) (holding that “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law,” and by showing “an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials,” or “a restriction or condition [that] is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal” such that a punitive purpose may be inferred, a plaintiff may prevail on a due process claim); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that notwithstanding Selig’s holding that “a sexually violent predator law was not subject to as-applied Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy challenges based on the lack of treatment received by a particular detainee,” such laws are subject to Due Process challenges when the conditions of commitment “amount to punishment”); Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916, 927 (D. Minn. 2014) (holding that where “the heart of Plaintiffs’ Complaint” was that “Minnesota’s civil commitment scheme for sex offenders constitutes a punitive system of preventive detention,” plaintiffs’ claim properly fell under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Aune v. Ludeman, No. CIV 09-0015 JNE SRN, 2010 WL 145276, at *10 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2010) (granting defendants judgment on the pleadings on cruel and unusual punishment claims brought by persons civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, and holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply).
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In any event, as the Court specifically noted in its Memorandum and Order, the Due Process Clause affords the civilly committed Plaintiffs at least as great protection as the Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Double Jeopardy Clauses afford those criminally convicted. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (recognizing that conditions that would amount to “cruel and unusual punishment” for convicted criminals under the Eighth Amendment necessarily violate the due process rights of “the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all”); Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Under the Fourteenth Amendment, civilly-committed persons, like pretrial detainees, are entitled to at least as great protection as that afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.”); Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (holding that under the Due Process Clause, “[a]t a bare minimum, . . . an individual detained under civil process—like an individual accused but not convicted of a crime—cannot be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment”)(citation omitted); Aune, 2010 WL 145276, at *4 (holding that civilly committed patients’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are “at least as extensive as the Eighth Amendment rights of the criminally institutionalized”).
CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, and those stated in the Court’s October 17, 2014 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 338), the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Defendants’ implementation of the Missouri SVP statute, and the conditions of Plaintiffs’ confinement thereunder, state valid due process claims, but not cruel and unusual punishment or double jeopardy claims. Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. (Doc. No. 345.)

Dated this 10th day of February, 2015.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on the motion (Doc. No. 351) for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants Keith Schafer, Rick Gowdy, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Julie Inman, Linda Moll, Harold Meyers, Judy Sumpter, Daman Longworth, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Donna Augustine, Dave Schmitt, Justin Arnett, Marty Martin-Forman, Ian Fluger, Sherry Lee, Ericka L. Kempker, and Kristina BenderCrice (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs in this class action are civilly committed residents of Missouri’s Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities. They assert claims against Defendants in their official capacities as current or former employees of the Missouri Department of Mental Health (“DMH”). Plaintiffs challenge the care and treatment they received at SORTS and the reimbursement sought for that treatment. Defendants seek summary judgment solely on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding reimbursement. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND This class action raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., challenging (1) the care and treatment, or lack thereof, provided to individuals civilly committed to SORTS after being declared sexually violent predators (“SVPs”) under Missouri’s SVP statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.480 et seq.; and (2) Missouri’s statutory scheme requiring reimbursement from SORTS residents, or their families or estates, for the cost of their allegedly inadequate care and treatment, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 630.205-630.220; 473.398-473.399. Defendants seek summary judgment solely on the latter claims, regarding reimbursement. Plaintiffs challenge the reimbursement scheme on substantive due process and equal protection grounds. They seek to have the reimbursement statutes declared unconstitutional as applied, to enjoin Defendants from seeking reimbursement from Plaintiffs, and to have any property seized by Defendants under the reimbursement statutes returned to Plaintiffs or their estates. In support of their substantive due process claim, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated their fundamental rights by taking or threatening to take money from them for care and treatment that was withheld, inadequately provided, and/or punitive in nature. As evidence of their allegations of constitutionally deficient treatment, Plaintiffs point to correspondence among DMH employees, including some of the Defendants, expressing serious concerns regarding overcrowding, understaffing, underfunding, and low or nonexistent “graduation” rates at SORTS. See Doc. No. 370-1. Defendants dispute this evidence and offer affidavits of DMH employees testifying as to the adequacy of treatment at SORTS.
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In support of their equal protection claim, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants treat SORTS residents differently than other civilly-committed residents by charging SORTS residents higher fees for inferior treatment, without any rational basis for such differences.
The evidence of record, including the deposition of Brent McGinty, the DMH’s former Deputy Director of Administration, establishes that, at all relevant times, the DMH has employed a uniform process for calculating the amount of money sought from civilly committed residents, regardless of whether they were committed to SORTS or other facilities. The DMH first calculates a per diem rate for each facility. The per diem rate takes into account the facility’s total expenditures, including centralized overhead costs and facility-specific costs for services such as “psychiatric treatment” and rehabilitation. See Doc. Nos. 353 at 2-3 & 353-1 at 18-22. For fiscal year 2012, the per diem rate for the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center, of which SORTS is a part, was $506 per day. (Doc. No. 353-1 at 20.) The DMH then adds to the per diem rate any individualized costs associated with the resident being charged, such as the cost of the resident’s medicine or laboratory work. Id. at 28.
The DMH does not seek reimbursement from residents who do not have the ability to pay. The DMH determines ability to pay using a Standard Means Test Financial Questionnaire.1 From the time SORTS opened in 1999 until October 2012, the DMH
1 Prior to the fall of 2011, the DMH required income verifications from residents, but now, DMH reimbursement officers take a resident’s word that he has zero ability to pay unless the officers have reason to doubt the resident. Reimbursement officers also used to treat residents who refused to complete a Standard Means Test Financial Questionnaire as fully able to pay, but the DMH now treats these residents as having zero ability to pay.
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collected a total of $113,100.08 from SORTS residents under the reimbursement statutes. It is unclear how much money has been collected since 2012.2
Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim regarding reimbursement because Plaintiffs cannot show that their fundamental rights have been violated or that Defendants’ conduct was shocking to the contemporary conscience. Defendants assert that “[s]ince Plaintiffs are receiving both psychiatric and residential services from DMH, DMH is authorized by law to seek reimbursement.” (Doc. No. 352 at 11.) Defendants argue that the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ care and treatment is “a separate question under the complaint.” Id. at 10. In any event, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs present no evidence that the treatment they receive is conscience shocking or disproportionate to the need presented.
Defendants also argue that summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim regarding reimbursement because Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants treat SORTS residents differently than other civilly committed residents. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence that Defendants charge lower fees to non-SORTS residents or treat non-SORTS residents better than SORTS residents.
2 McGinty’s successor, Daniel Haug, submitted affidavits regarding the amount of money collected from SORTS residents from 2012 to the present. Haug’s initial affidavit, submitted in connection with Defendants’ opening summary judgment brief, stated that the DMH collected an additional $143,980.98 from SORTS residents, such that the total amount of money collected from SORTS residents from the facility’s opening in 1999 until the present would be $257,081.76. (Doc. Nos. 353-3 at 2 & 370 at 7.) However, in a second affidavit attached to Defendants’ reply brief, Haug states that “an error was found” in his previous calculation, and “the actual amount collected from SORTS residents for their cost for care since the program began to present is $130,866.00.” (Doc. No. 374-3 at 2.)
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Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on both claims because Plaintiffs cannot show that, in seeking reimbursement, Defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants should be denied summary judgment because there are material factual disputes as to the nature of the care and treatment provided to SORTS residents, and as to the differences in treatment of and reimbursement sought from SORTS residents as compared to other civilly committed residents.
Plaintiffs also argue that qualified immunity does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims, which are asserted against Defendants solely in their official capacities and solely for injunctive and declaratory relief.
DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be entered “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). “The nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Briscoe v. Cnty. of St. Louis, Mo., 690 F.3d 1004, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendants’ request for qualified immunity. As the Court has now repeatedly held in this case, qualified immunity does not apply to governmental employees sued solely in their official capacities and solely for equitable
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relief, as here. See VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775, 777-79 (8th Cir. 2007); Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1994) (“There is no dispute that qualified immunity does not apply to claims for equitable relief, and that state officials may be sued in their official capacity for equitable relief.”) (citations omitted); Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 977 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a monetary award may be deemed an equitable remedy if the award is “restitutionary in nature” or “incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief”).
The Court also disagrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ care and treatment allegations are “separate” from their claims challenging reimbursement. To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim regarding reimbursement encompasses, and is entirely dependent on, their care and treatment allegations. That is, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated their substantive due process rights by seeking reimbursement for constitutionally deficient care and treatment.
Substantive due process “protects individuals against two types of government action”: action that “shocks the conscience,” and action that “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (citations omitted); see also Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 557-58 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that although there is no “fundamental due process right to sex offender treatment,” substantive due process requires courts to consider “whether the state action . . . was so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the conscience”). Plaintiffs argue that not only is the allegedly inadequate and/or punitive treatment of SORTS residents conscience shocking, but so is the fact that Defendants charge SORTS residents, if they are able to pay, more than $506 per day for such treatment. Although Defendants dispute the nature and level of
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treatment provided, this dispute only evidences a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the care and treatment provided to SORTS residents is so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the conscience. If so, then the fact that Defendants ask SORTS residents to pay hundreds of dollars a day for such treatment may also shock the conscience.
Thus, unresolved factual questions regarding the nature and level of treatment provided at SORTS preclude summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims regarding both care and treatment and reimbursement. See Strutton v. Meade, No. 4:05CV02022 ERW, 2008 WL 4534015, at *20 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2008) (denying summary judgment on civilly committed sex offender’s substantive due process claims regarding failure to provide adequate treatment where factual questions remained as to whether contested actions were conscience shocking); Karsjens v. Jesson, No. CIV. 11-3659 DWF, 2015 WL 420013, at *9-10, 12-13 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2015) (same).
But the Court reaches a different conclusion with respect to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. “In general, the Equal Protection Clause requires that state actors treat similarly situated people alike.” Bogren v. Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 408 (8th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs base their equal protection claim on allegations that Defendants treat SORTS residents differently than other civilly committed residents by charging SORTS residents higher fees and providing SORTS residents inferior treatment in exchange for those fees.
However, Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence in support of their allegations of differences in fees or treatment. It is undisputed that the DMH calculates the amount of reimbursement sought from SORTS residents the same way it does for non-SORTS residents.
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And Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence of the nature or level of treatment of non-SORTS residents. Plaintiffs’ evidence relates only to the care and treatment of SORTS residents. This evidence may support Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim regarding reimbursement sought for inadequate treatment. But it does not support Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim because it says nothing about whether non-SORTS residents from whom reimbursement was sought received adequate treatment. Because Plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence showing a genuine issue for trial regarding their equal protection claim, the Court will grant Defendants summary judgment on that claim.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim regarding the reimbursement statutes, and DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim regarding the reimbursement statutes. (Doc. No. 351.)

Dated this 20th day of March, 2015.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM OPINION This class action is before the Court following a bench trial to address Plaintiffs’ claims in their Fifth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs are civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“DMH”) Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities, who have been declared sexually violent predators (“SVP”) under Missouri’s SVP Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480–632.525. Plaintiffs state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the SVP Act is unconstitutional as written and as applied to SORTS, and that the reimbursement sought by the state from SORTS residents is also unconstitutional. Parties Plaintiffs are civilly committed residents of SORTS, who were committed to the custody of the DMH by a judgment of a Missouri circuit or probate court, pursuant to the SVP Act. On September 30, 2011, the Court certified this case as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The Court certified two classes: (1) a “Treatment Class” consisting of persons who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action,

residents of SORTS as a result of civil commitment, and (2) a “Charging Class” consisting of persons who were, are, or will be, during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS as a result of civil commitment, and who have been, or will be, billed or charged for care, treatment, room, or board by SORTS.
On the last day of trial, the parties informed the Court of their agreement that named Plaintiffs Macon Baker, David Brown, Joseph Bowen, and William Murphy are not members of the Treatment Class because they were solely pre-trial detainees,1 and that as such, their claims relating to treatment are moot. Baker and Brown were never committed to SORTS because a jury found that they did not meet the criteria of an SVP. And as of the last day of trial in this case, Bowen and Murphy had not been committed to SORTS and were awaiting a civil commitment trial to determine whether they met the criteria of an SVP. Other than these four individuals, all Plaintiffs are currently civilly committed at one of two SORTS facilities in Farmington and Fulton, Missouri.
Defendants are executives or employees of SORTS and the DMH, and all are sued solely in their official capacities.
Defendant Keith Schafer is the Director of the DMH. Defendant Mark Stringer is the Director of the DMH’s Division of Behavioral Health. Defendant Richard Gowdy is the Deputy Director of the DMH’s Division of Behavioral Health and the former Director of the DMH’s Forensic Services. Defendant Joseph Parks is the former Chief Clinical Officer of the DMH’s Office of Director. Defendant Robert Reitz is the Director of the DMH’s
1 The Court explicitly excluded pre-trial detainees from the Treatment Class. (Doc. No. 197 at 9.)
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Psychiatric Facilities and Chief Executive Officer of Fulton State Hospital, which houses SORTS-Fulton. Defendant Melissa Ring is the former Chief Operating Officer of Adult Psychiatric Services (“APS”) at the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (“SMMHC”), whose responsibilities included supervision of SORTS-Farmington. Defendant Alan Blake is the former Chief Operating Officer of SORTS and is currently a SORTS consultant. Defendant Jay Englehart is the Medical Director of the SMMHC and the Director of Treatment Services for SORTS-Farmington. Defendant Julie Inman is the Regional Executive Officer of the Southeast Region of the DMH, which includes the SMMHC and SORTS. Defendant Linda Moll is the Director of Behavioral Treatment Services, APS at the SMMHC. Defendants Harold Myers and Judy Sumpter are reimbursement officers at the SMMHC. Defendant Damon Longworth is the Chief Financial Officer of the SMMHC. Defendant Donna Augustine is the Director of Social Work at the SMMHC. Defendant David Schmitt is the Chief Operating Officer of the SMMHC, and the former Quality Improvement Director of the SMMHC. Defendant Justin Arnett is the Chief Nurse Executive of the SMMHC. Defendant Marty Martin-Foreman is the Chief Operating Officer of Fulton State Hospital. Defendant Ian Fluger is the Program Treatment Coordinator of SORTS-Fulton. Defendant Sherry Lee is the Chief Nurse Executive of Fulton State Hospital. Defendant Kristina Bender-Crice is a Unit Program Supervisor at SORTS-Farmington. Defendant Erica Kempker is a former employee of SORTSFarmington.
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Proceedings Plaintiffs claim that that the SVP Act on its face and as applied to the SORTS
treatment program violates the Due Process Clause, and that the reimbursement sought by the state from SORTS residents also violates the Due Process Clause.2 Plaintiffs assert two types of as-applied claims regarding treatment. First, Plaintiffs claim that particular modalities of treatment at SORTS are inadequate due to staff and funding shortages. Second, Plaintiffs claim that the entire SORTS treatment program is a sham because, in its 16 years of operation, SORTS has neither established the risk assessment and release procedures contemplated by the SVP Act, nor successfully treated and released, following such treatment, any residents back into the community.
After extensive informal and formal discovery, the Court, on December 19, 2014, granted Plaintiffs’ uncontested motion to bifurcate the trial into two phases: liability and remedy. (Doc. No. 358.) An eight-day trial solely on the issue of liability was held beginning on April 21, 2015.
Four expert witnesses testified at trial. Clinical psychologist Brian Abbott, Ph.D., and licensed clinical social worker David Prescott testified for Plaintiffs. Dr. Abbott has extensive experience in developing, implementing, and reviewing treatment programs for sex offenders, and in conducting forensic evaluations of individuals civilly committed as SVPs. Prescott formerly served as Treatment Assessment Director of Wisconsin’s SVP
2 Plaintiffs do not challenge their initial commitment. Moreover, Plaintiffs previously asserted an alternative claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, but they voluntarily dismissed that claim before trial.
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program, and he, too, has extensive experience in developing, assessing, and providing training regarding SVP treatment programs around the country, including at SORTS. Prescott also formerly served as a board member and president of the national Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (“ATSA”), and he currently serves on the board of directors of the national Sex Offender Civil Commitment Providers’ Network (“SOCCPN”).
Clinical psychologist Anita Schlank, Ph.D., and forensic psychiatrist Angeline Stanislaus, M.D., testified for Defendants. Dr. Schlank is the Clinical Director of Virginia’s SVP civil commitment program. She has provided sex offender evaluation and treatment for approximately 30 years, formerly served as the Clinical Director of Minnesota’s SVP civil commitment program, and has served as a consultant for several other SVP civil commitment programs around the country, including SORTS. She also serves on the board of directors of SOCCPN. Dr. Stanislaus is the Chief Medical Director of Adult Services for the DMH, and she oversees the two hospitals in which the SORTS facilities are housed. Dr. Stanislaus also has several years of experience in conducting forensic evaluations of civilly committed sex offenders in Illinois and has testified as an expert witness in numerous civil commitment trials.
The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are entered based on the entire record, including the trial testimony and exhibits, and the parties’ post-trial briefs. As set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have proved their claims in part.
SUMMARY OF DECISION Missouri’s SVP Act permits the state to involuntarily detain individuals outside of the criminal justice system, potentially indefinitely, under a civil commitment process
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designed to protect the public from persons who suffer from severe mental abnormalities and who are dangerous. Unlike criminal systems, which punish individuals for past criminal conduct, civil commitment systems such as SORTS involuntarily confine individuals who have in many cases already served complete prison sentences for their crimes, but who, by reason of mental illness or abnormality, are deemed likely to commit acts of violence in the future.
Where so significant a restriction of an individual’s liberty is at issue, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the nature and duration of the confinement bear some reasonable relation to the confinement’s non-punitive, civil purpose. Thus, the state must ensure that it civilly confines individuals only so long as they are both mentally ill and dangerous. If confinement continues beyond that time, or if it imposes restrictions that are so excessive as to indicate the forbidden purpose to punish, it becomes unconstitutional.
The evidence at trial did not establish that the SVP Act is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or that the particular treatment modalities at SORTS are so lacking as to violate the Due Process Clause. Nor did the evidence establish that the state’s reimbursement scheme is unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court will deny relief with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the SVP Act on its face, challenging the constitutional adequacy of the SORTS treatment modalities, and challenging the state’s reimbursement scheme.
However, the overwhelming evidence at trial—much of which came from Defendants’ own experts—did establish that the SORTS civil commitment program suffers
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from systemic failures regarding risk assessment and release that have resulted in the continued confinement of individuals who no longer meet the criteria for commitment, in violation of the Due Process Clause. This case will proceed to the remedy phase to determine appropriate relief regarding these specific, as-applied constitutional deficiencies.
FINDINGS OF FACT History of Missouri’s SVP Act and SORTS
Twenty states, including Missouri, have enacted laws permitting the civil commitment of sex offenders. Thirty states have no such law. Missouri’s SVP Act became effective on January 1, 1999. SORTS, previously known as the Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program and later, the Missouri Sex Offender Treatment Center, opened just a few days later, on January 4, 1999.
There are now two SORTS facilities. The first was opened in 1999 at the SMMHC in Farmington, Missouri. During the first decade of its operations, no residents were released from the SORTS-Farmington facility. In mid-2009, SORTS was running out of space for residents, and began to explore options, including the development of a community alternative for the aged and infirm and the opening of group homes. Another option considered was the conditional release of 8 to 16 residents to cottages at the St. Louis Psychiatric Rehabilitation Center (“SLPRC”), a secure facility that is somewhat less restrictive than SORTS, and a group of individuals thought suitable for such release was identified. None of these options was pursued, however. Instead, in 2010, the state provided further funding which was used to expand the program at SORTS-Farmington, and to open a new SORTS facility at Fulton State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri.
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Both the SMMHC and Fulton State Hospital divide their hospital space between SORTS and other divisions for mentally ill persons, including criminal sex offenders who have not been declared SVPs under the SVP Act. At the SMMHC, the non-SORTS division is known as APS. At Fulton State Hospital, the non-SORTS division is known as “Fulton Proper.” The SORTS facilities in both hospitals are considered to be either maximum security or high security facilities, with razor wire fences patrolled by armed guards. There are separate wards within each of the SORTS facilities for aged and infirm residents.
In the fall of 2013, SORTS-Farmington opened a facility within its secure perimeter known as the “Annex.” The Annex is a step-down unit, with space for up to eight residents, and is a somewhat less restrictive, group-home-type setting, that is behind the razor wire fence of SORTS-Farmington. There are currently five residents living in the Annex. Evidence was presented with respect to three of these residents, each of whom has obtained a court order finding that he no longer meets the criteria for commitment and is therefore entitled to conditional release.
One such resident, James Lewis, received a court order for conditional release in January, 2012, after successfully completing the SORTS treatment program. Although SORTS treatment providers recommended his conditional release, they requested that his release be “without discharge.” In the absence of any facilities to accommodate such a release, Lewis remained confined in the main ward of SORTS for a little over a year, until the Annex was opened.
The other two Annex residents who obtained conditional release orders are Donald Williams and James Fennewald. Both obtained conditional release orders “without
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discharge,” at the request of SORTS treatment providers, in 2013 and late 2014, respectively.
Although treatment programs have been on-going at both facilities, and a number of residents have progressed through the designated treatment programs, no procedures or placement options for community reintegration have been established. Only two residents have ever been reintegrated into the community after civil commitment to SORTS, but neither was released as a result of successfully completing the treatment program.
As discussed more fully below, the two residents released into the community after commitment to SORTS were DeWayne Arthur and Ronald Gibson. Neither the DMH nor SORTS was involved in either of these releases. Arthur was civilly committed but never received treatment at SORTS. Because of Arthur’s medical frailty, Missouri’s Attorney General reached an agreement with Arthur’s attorney to discharge Arthur to a skilled nursing facility immediately after his commitment. The DMH and SORTS were not involved in this negotiation. Gibson spent more time at SORTS, but because he was aged and suffering from dementia, he was conditionally released by a court in 2010. This release was opposed by the DMH and SORTS. Expert witnesses from both sides and Defendant Jay Englehart, M.D., Director of Treatment Services for SORTS-Farmington, all agreed at trial that neither the Arthur nor Gibson releases could be credited to the success of the SORTS treatment program. No other SORTS resident has been released into the community, and Missouri is at the bottom of SVP programs nationally in this respect.
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At the time of trial, there were approximately 200 individuals confined at SORTS under the SVP Act, including several residents over the age of 65 and others who are physically infirm. Both SORTS facilities are at or near maximum capacity. Missouri’s SVP Act
The SVP Act defines an SVP as “any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility” and who has either (a) pled guilty, been found guilty, or been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a sexually violent offense; or (b) has been committed as a criminal sexual psychopath pursuant to another Missouri statute. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.480(5).
Among sex offenders, individuals civilly committed as SVPs are considered to pose the highest risk of sexually reoffending. However, evidence was credibly presented that recidivism rates for sex offenders generally may be overstated.3
When a prisoner found guilty of a sexually violent crime is suspected of meeting the criteria of an SVP, the agency with jurisdiction provides notice to Missouri’s Attorney General within 360 days prior to the prisoner’s release. Id. § 632.483. The person is then evaluated by a prosecutors’ review committee and a multidisciplinary team established by
3 For example, a 2013 review of Florida’s SVP program authored by one of Defendants’ experts, Dr. Schlank, reported that the recidivism rate for released Florida SVPs was only 3.6%. (Pls.’ Ex. 131 at 23.) Dr. Schlank and one of Plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Abbott, both testified that persons civilly committed under Florida’s SVP program are similar in diagnoses and dangerousness to persons committed under Missouri’s SVP Act. Plaintiffs also presented evidence of at least some statistics showing that sex offenders have the lowest rates of recidivism among five categories of felony offenders in Missouri, and that the rate of recidivism drops dramatically as sex offenders age beyond 60 years.
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Missouri’s Department of Corrections (“DOC”), which includes psychiatrists and psychologists from both the DOC and the DMH, to assess whether the person meets the definition of an SVP. Id. If the prosecutors’ review committee determines by a majority vote that the person meets the definition of an SVP, the Attorney General may file a petition in the probate division of the circuit court alleging that the person is an SVP, stating sufficient facts to support such an allegation, and also attaching a copy of the multidisciplinary team’s assessment. Id. § 632.486. The court then holds a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person is an SVP, and if so, the person is held in secure custody until the time of trial. Id. § 632.489. The person has the right to counsel at the probable cause hearing and at trial. Id. §§ 632.489-632.492.
If at trial, the court or a jury by unanimous verdict determines “by clear and convincing evidence” that the person is an SVP, the person is “committed to the custody of the director of the [DMH] for control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.” Id. § 632.495.2. The SVP Act provides that civilly committed persons “shall be kept in a secure facility designated by the director of the [DMH] and such persons shall be segregated at all times from any other patient under the supervision of the director of the [DMH].” Id. § 632.495.3.
Once a person has been civilly committed under the SVP Act, the director of the DMH or his “designee” must evaluate the person’s “mental condition” once a year, and must provide the “yearly report” to the court that committed the person. Id. § 632.498.1. However, nothing in the SVP Act prohibits or prevents the DMH from providing more frequent updates to the court.
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There are two methods by which a person civilly committed as an SVP may obtain release. First, “[i]f the director of the [DMH] determines that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, the director shall authorize the person to petition the court for release.” Id. § 632.501 (emphasis added). The court then holds a hearing at which the state bears the burden of proof to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that “the committed person’s mental abnormality remains such that the person is not safe to be at large and if released is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Id. § 632.498.5(3); see also In re Care and Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Mo. 2007). If the state fails to make this showing, the person is entitled to conditional release. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.498.5(3).
Second, the SVP Act allows persons to file petitions for release without the DMH director’s authorization,4 but petitions filed without the director’s approval are subject to heightened requirements. For example, petitions filed without the director’s approval are subject to a frivolity review by the court and may be denied without a hearing. Id. § 632.504. Moreover, if a petition filed without the director’s approval has been found to be frivolous or has been previously denied, the court must deny any subsequent petition “unless the petition contains facts upon which a court could find the condition of the petitioner had so changed that a hearing was warranted.” Id.
4 The SVP Act requires that the director of the DMH provide committed individuals with an annual written notice of the individual’s right to petition the court for release over the director’s objection, and a form containing a waiver of that right. The director must forward the notice and waiver form to the court with the annual report. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.498.2.
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Finally, if a petitioner filing for release without the director’s approval survives the frivolity review and is granted a hearing,5 the petitioner is subject to an extra step that is not required for petitions authorized by the director. In this extra step, the petitioner has the burden to demonstrate by a “preponderance of the evidence,” that he “no longer suffers from a mental abnormality that makes [him] likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if released.” Id. § 632.498.4. Only if a petitioner can make this threshold showing will the court set a trial on the issue. At trial, the burden of proof then switches to the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that “the committed person’s mental abnormality remains such that the person is not safe to be at large and if released is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Id. § 632.498.5(3). If the state fails to meet this burden, the person is entitled to conditional release. Id.
Section 632.505 of the SVP Act, governing conditional release, provides: Upon determination by a court or jury that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, the court shall place the person on conditional release pursuant to the terms of this section. The primary purpose of conditional release is to provide outpatient treatment and monitoring to prevent the person’s condition from deteriorating to the degree that the person would need to be returned to a secure facility designated by the director of the [DMH]. Id. § 632.505.1. This section requires the DMH to “develop a conditional release plan which contains appropriate conditions for the person to be released,” and which addresses the “person’s need for supervision, counseling, medication, community support services, residential services, vocational services, and alcohol and drug treatment.” Id. § 632.505.2.
5 At this initial hearing, the petitioner has the right to have an attorney represent him, but the petitioner is not entitled to be present. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.498(4).
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The DMH must submit the proposed plan for conditional release to the court. Id. The reviewing court then determines the conditions that it “deems necessary to meet the person’s need for treatment and supervision and to protect the safety of the public.” Id. § 632.505.3. Section 632.505 lists 21 conditions to which conditionally released persons “shall be subject,” such as maintaining a residence approved by the DMH; not having contact with any child without specific approval by the DMH; not consuming alcohol or controlled substances; not leaving the state without permission of the DMH; and submitting to electronic monitoring, which may be based on technology that identifies and records a person’s location at all times. Id. This section also permits the court to add other conditions that it deems “necessary to meet the person’s need for treatment and supervision and to protect the safety of the public.” Id. However, the section also provides that the court “may modify conditions of release upon its own motion or upon petition of the [DMH], the [DOC], or the person on conditional release.” Id. § 632.505.6. Moreover, although conditionally released persons may have to maintain a residence approved by the DMH, they are not required to be segregated from other mental health patients. Id. § 632.495.3.
Individuals civilly committed to SORTS may also have to reimburse the state for any care and treatment provided by the DMH. Missouri Revised Statutes § 630.205.1 provides that a “person receiving services and the person’s estate, spouse, parents, if the person is a minor, and any fiduciary or representative payee holding assets for the person . . . are jointly and severally liable for the fees for services rendered to the person by a residential facility[.]” Id. § 630.205.1. The director of the DMH determines the “maximum amount for services which shall be charged in each of the residential facilities” and applies a “standard
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means test” in determining the amount to be charged. Id. § 630.210.1. The SVP Act also provides that conditionally released persons may be required to pay “fees to the [DMH] and the [DOC] to cover the costs of services and monitoring,” as a condition of release. Id. § 632.505.3(18). However, the reimbursement provisions state that “[n]o person who is domiciled in Missouri shall be denied services from a [DMH] facility because of an inability to pay for such services on the part of the individual, the spouse, or the parents.” Id. § 630.205.4. SORTS Treatment Program
SORTS has historically maintained a vision and mission of “no more victims,” and at one point, the SORTS treatment manual stated that residents were to remain in the custody of the DMH until it was determined that the resident “will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged.” (Pls.’ Ex. 123 at 40.) These statements, which essentially require a complete absence of risk before a resident will be released, are inconsistent with the SVP Act’s requirements. They are also unrealistic. Evidence was credibly presented that no adult male has a 0% risk of committing an act of sexual violence.
Both SORTS-Farmington and SORTS-Fulton are accredited, as part of their respective hospitals, pursuant to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, also known as the “Joint Commission.” The SMMHC, including SORTSFarmington, passed the Joint Commission’s survey performed in 2012, which reviewed, among other things, the facility’s staffing levels, treatment standards, security, and emergency preparedness.
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SORTS also strives to adhere to national guidelines published by ATSA for the assessment, treatment, and management of male sexual abusers. These guidelines recommend that confinement and treatment may be necessary for a small group of chronic, violent, or predatory offenders; that sexual predator assessments should be conducted using empirically validated risk assessment instruments and measures; that civil commitment should be reserved for sex offenders who are found to pose the highest threat to public safety; that civil commitment should be viewed as one part of a comprehensive continuum of responses to sexual offending behavior; that treatment should be consistent with current research and professional standards and should reflect an individual’s qualifying mental disorders, relative risk, and needs; and that treatment should be assessed each year to evaluate progress. (Defs.’ Ex. S.)
If SORTS residents consent to treatment, an individualized treatment plan is developed for them, and it is updated annually. Treatment teams consist of a psychiatrist, a medical doctor, a psychologist, a social worker, a nurse, a unit manager, a recreational or vocational therapist, and a security aide. Treatment teams meet weekly to discuss progress of each resident and to adjust treatment plans as needed.
There are two types of SVP treatment provided to SORTS residents. SORTSFarmington residents primarily receive Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (“CBT”). The CBT model was built on the idea that dysfunctional behavior is a result of dysfunctional thoughts. Therefore, CBT treatment focuses on changing residents’ way of thinking. The CBT program offers residents six to eight hours per week of sex-offender-specific process groups, also known as core groups, to address dynamic risk factors associated with sexual
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offenses. These core process groups are led by either psychologists with doctoral or masters’ degrees, or licensed social workers or counselors. There are on average eight residents per group. Residents are also offered two hours of psychoeducational groups per week. Finally, individual psychotherapy is provided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the needs of the individual resident.
SORTS-Fulton residents primarily receive Safe Offender Strategies (“SOS”) treatment. The SOS program was introduced to SORTS-Fulton in 2012, as an option for SORTS residents who were resistant to treatment under the CBT model, including some intellectually disabled residents. The SOS program has been used in the non-SORTS Fulton Proper division of Fulton State Hospital since 2007. One ward at SORTS-Farmington has also recently begun providing SOS treatment.
The SOS model was built on the idea that dysfunctional behavior is the result of an individual’s emotional dysregulation, or poor response, to particular stressors. SOS treatment therefore focuses on identifying the stressors leading to an individual’s dysregulation, and equipping the individual with the skills he needs to recognize and respond more appropriately to those stressors. Like CBT, SOS also relies primarily on group therapy intervention, and each resident receives eight to ten hours per week of group therapy. SOS groups meet two times per week to discuss and practice the concepts and strategies in the SOS treatment manual. Moreover, residents in the SOS program are offered once-a-week self-monitoring groups and behavioral analysis groups to address selfmonitoring practices and treatment-related problem behaviors, respectively. Finally, the
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SOS program offers psychosexual rehabilitation therapy, which includes groups addressing self-regulation, anger management, life skills, substance abuse, and restorative justice.
The guiding principle for both treatment programs is the risk-needs-responsivity (“RNR”) principle. The RNR principle helps SORTS staff plan treatment in response to a patient’s learning style and risk factors. The risk principle suggests that offenders at higher risk for reoffending will benefit most from higher levels of intervention, including highintensity treatment. The needs principle suggests that only those facts associated with reductions in recidivism should be targeted in intervention. The responsivity principle suggests that the treatment program should be matched to individual patient characteristics. The ATSA guidelines support the use of RNR-based treatment.
Both the CBT and SOS treatment programs are organized into phases of indeterminate length. The CBT program used at SORTS-Farmington has four phases. Phase I focuses on pre-engagement and engagement; Phase II on cognitive restructuring; Phase III on emotional integration; and Phase IV on community reintegration. The CBT program also employs color-coded patient levels based on similar concepts: Grey – preengagement, meaning that the patient is not interested in change or treatment; Red – prerecognition, meaning that the patient does not recognize that there is a problem or does not feel that he needs treatment; Yellow – recognition, meaning that the patient sees that he has some problems but is not fully committed to addressing them; Blue – planning I, meaning that the patient is making a decision about how to enter treatment and generally attends and participates in treatment; Green – planning II, meaning the patient is making a decision about how to focus his treatment and generally attends and participates in treatment; Purple
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– action, meaning that the patient is actively working in treatment and has made progress; and Gold – maintenance, meaning that the person is fully self-managing or is ready for selfmanagement. The SOS program, used primarily at SORTS-Fulton, has seven stages that correspond roughly with the color-coded patient levels discussed above: Stage 1 – preengagement; Stage 2 – pre-recognition; Stage 3 – recognition; Stages 4 and 5 – planning; Stage 6 – action; and Stage 7 – maintenance.
Residents in both programs may move up and down between levels as they progress or regress in treatment. The evidence demonstrated that the number of sex-offender-specific treatment hours offered by SORTS and the utilization of a phased treatment system are consistent with the standards of other SVP treatment programs.
SORTS has historically suffered from staffing and budget shortages, resulting in group cancellations. These deficiencies were reviewed in another case in this District, but were found in 2010 not to render treatment at SORTS so lacking as to violate the Constitution. Strutton v. Meade, No. 4:05CV02022 ERW, 2010 WL 1253715 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2010). The bulk of the evidence presented by Plaintiffs regarding their claim that treatment modalities at SORTS are inadequate was evidence from this pre-2010 timeframe.
By contrast, Defendants’ evidence established that SORTS has improved its treatment programs since 2010, and many aspects of the SORTS treatment programs now conform to accepted standards in the field of residential sex offender treatment. Dr. Schlank testified that the level of staffing at the SORTS facilities is now adequate and exceeds the level of staffing at the SVP program in Virginia, and Plaintiffs offered little contrary evidence. The evidence also established that treatment groups are now rarely, if ever,
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canceled. Finally, as a result of changes made in the last year, SORTS treatment programs no longer focus on consequences for minor rule violations. Under previous clinical directors, even minor infractions could affect a resident’s progression through the levels of treatment. But SORTS changed this protocol in 2014, and it now focuses on treatmentrelated behaviors in evaluating treatment progress.
Treatment participation rates at SORTS are high, with approximately 97% of residents participating. The stated goal of both treatment programs is to treat and safely reintegrate committed individuals back into the community.
Defendants’ own expert and DMH executive, Dr. Stanislaus, testified that, although she believes treatment at SORTS is adequate, progression through the various levels of the SORTS treatment programs is tortuously slow. Less than 5% of SORTS-Fulton residents have reached Stage 6 of the SOS treatment program, and none has reached Stage 7. Some residents at SORTS-Farmington, which has been open much longer, have progressed further in treatment. Approximately 31 residents have reached the second-highest Purple level, and 8 residents have reached the highest Gold level. Notwithstanding the progress of these residents in treatment, none has been reintegrated into the community as the treatment manual envisions, and no procedures or placement options for community reintegration have been established.
Though testifying for Defendants, in Dr. Schlank’s opinion, SORTS’ lack of clear guidelines for treatment completion or projected timeframes for phase progression impedes the motivation of committed individuals to participate meaningfully in treatment for purposes of reintegration into the community. Dr. Schlank testified that other SVP
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programs that are more successful in releasing residents back into the community, such as the Virginia SVP program for which she serves as Clinical Director, have established clear timeframes within which, if residents consistently demonstrate all behavioral goals within a phase, residents will progress to the next phase of treatment. Establishing such timeframes provides clarity to residents and staff, instills hope in residents, guards against treatment providers’ unconscious biases, and avoids “raising the bar” for release.
The evidence also established that there are several other areas for improvement in the SORTS treatment programs. These include increasing communication and coordination between SORTS-Farmington and SORTS-Fulton, adapting treatment program materials to meet the needs of developmentally disabled residents, and maintaining consistency in treatment protocols. SORTS Risk Assessment
A licensed doctoral level psychologist employed by SORTS performs the annual assessments of the mental condition of SORTS residents, also known as annual reviews, which, as noted above, are required by the SVP Act. The person who conducts these assessments—the annual reviewer—is not part of the resident’s treatment team. Rather, each SORTS facility is assigned one annual reviewer for all residents. The SORTS annual reviewers previously did not interview the residents as part of their review, but in light of ATSA guidelines recommending such interviews, the annual reviewers began conducting resident interviews sometime within the last year.
The annual reviewers most commonly use the Static-99R as an actuarial risk assessment tool. The Static-99R is a risk assessment tool that measures static factors, which
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are generally unchangeable in nature, such as the individual’s prior sexual offenses. Only recently—just a few months before trial began in this case—did SORTS begin training its annual reviewers on non-static instruments used to objectively assess progress in treatment, such as the Sex Offender Treatment and Progress Scale (“SOTIPS”). No empirical research has been conducted as to the accuracy of SOTIPS, and it has not been studied in connection with SVP residents. Dr. Stanislaus acknowledged that it will take at least two more years before SORTS can assess the usefulness of SOTIPS as a dynamic risk assessment tool.
Every annual review performed by SORTS and submitted to the courts includes a forensic opinion, meaning that the reviewer applies his or her professional opinion about the mental condition of the SORTS resident to the provisions of the SVP Act. Though not required by the statute, the annual reviewers also make a recommendation regarding whether the person continues to meet the statutory criteria for civil commitment.
The evidence established that these annual reviews are the primary tool that courts use to evaluate whether a civilly committed person continues to satisfy the criteria for commitment, or instead, whether the person should be conditionally released. Several witnesses, including Susan Elliott and Charles Banks, both Missouri public defenders in the civil commitment defense unit, credibly testified that it is nearly impossible to successfully petition for conditional release without an annual review from SORTS recommending such release. Corroborating this testimony was the evidence that, in the 16 years since the SVP Act was enacted, only two SORTS residents have been released without the support of a SORTS annual review, one of whom was never treated by SORTS.
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Notwithstanding the importance of these annual reviews, the annual reviewers at both SORTS-Farmington and SORTS-Fulton receive no legal training in understanding or applying the SVP Act’s criteria for conditional release. As a result, they have misunderstood and been confused about how to apply the statutory criteria. Even Defendants’ expert, Dr. Schlank, concluded that that the annual reviewer at SORTS-Fulton did not know how to apply the statutory criteria for risk assessment. For example, Dr. Schlank stated in her expert report that in an interview with him, the SORTS-Fulton annual reviewer6 indicated that he believed he could not recommend a resident for conditional release “even if a resident appeared to present little to no risk of sexual reoffending” unless he could testify that the resident’s “mental abnormality had significantly changed.” (Pls.’ Ex. 3 at 6.) The SORTS-Fulton annual reviewer also indicated that he was unsure whether two years of “consistent, positive behavior” by a resident was a long enough period of time to indicate that the residents’ mental abnormality had changed. Id. Dr. Schlank concluded that if SORTS annual reviewers addressed “the question of whether there is a continued need for secure, inpatient treatment rather than whether a mental abnormality has changed, . . . Missouri [would] be much more successful in the conditional release of clients into the community.” (Pls.’ Ex. 3 at 5.)
Likewise, the annual reviewer at SORTS-Farmington, psychologist Sujatha Ramesh, Ph.D., admitted that she has not received any legal training or guidance regarding how to interpret the SVP Act. And although she has a doctorate degree in counseling psychology, she is not a forensic psychologist. Thus, Dr. Ramesh provides a forensic opinion in her 6 The SORTS-Fulton annual reviewer did not testify at trial.
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annual reviews based solely on her own interpretation of the SVP Act’s criteria for conditional release, including her own reading and understanding of Missouri Supreme Court caselaw interpreting the SVP Act.
Dr. Stanislaus, too, admitted that the SORTS annual reviewers do not understand and consistently apply the legal standards for risk assessment under the SVP Act. Dr. Stanislaus testified that her goal, at some unspecified point in the future, is to get the annual reviewers from both facilities together and to develop a unified clinical interpretation of the SVP Act’s risk assessment criteria. However, at the time of trial, no such training had taken place.
The evidence also established that the annual reviews at SORTS fail to include highly relevant information, such as the opinions of SORTS treatment providers regarding residents’ lowered risk and potential for conditional release.
As early as June of 2009, Defendant Schafer, Director of the DMH, discussed the possibility of selecting 16 aged and infirm SORTS residents and developing a community alternative for these residents as a cost-saving measure. (Pls.’ Ex. 88.) Around the same time, Director Schafer emailed others within DMH and the Governor’s office to “think about five or six cluster group homes on the SE Missouri Mental Health Center campus that would allow us to move elderly and medically frail [SORTS] patients to a different level of care.” (Pls.’ Ex. 89 at 2.) The email noted that SORTS just had an 82-year old resident die from his medical condition. Id. Likewise, Defendant Alan Blake, former Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, exchanged several emails with other SORTS and DMH officials regarding whether some residents could be transferred out of SORTS in 2009.
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These emails were sent because SORTS was running out of space for residents, and the DMH was not sure whether money from the state would be available to expand SORTS to meet capacity needs. The evidence established that Blake and others at this time considered moving residents who were aged or infirm out of SORTS and to skilled nursing facilities. See, e.g., Pls.’ Exs. 80 & 88. SORTS had, at the time, 15 residents who were 65 or older. (Pls.’ Ex. 80.) In one email, Blake identified six residents who could be transferred to a skilled nursing facility, and in another email, Blake identified nine “definitely medical fragile” residents for transfer who needed “ongoing nursing / physician attention,” but stated that some of the nine “if in the community, still need to be in a locked or controlled nursing care facility, even though they have limited physical ability to move about.” (Pls.’ Exs. 90 & 93.)
Another option discussed in these 2009 emails was to conditionally release 8 to 16 residents to less restrictive cottages at the SLPRC. (Pls.’ Ex. 80.) Blake and others at SORTS and the DMH believed that releasing residents to cottages at SLPRC would save the state money, and would also be “the right thing to do,” since it would “create a discharge option” for SORTS residents. Id. In these emails, Blake stated that SORTS had a pool of at least 24 residents, some of whom are identified in the emails by name, who were candidates for conditional release to such cottages; that the “top five” of these residents “could go today to the SLPRC setting” and easily pass the “neighbor test”; and that the rest “may need greater support / treatment, but don’t represent a risk to the community in terms of compliance and appreciation of their situation.” (Pls.’ Ex. 79.)
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Blake believed that the individuals identified in the emails as candidates for transfer to the SLPRC cottages presented a lower risk than other SORTS residents. Blake also testified that his reference to the “neighbor test,” although not a clinical or scientific term, meant that people would have been comfortable having these individuals as neighbors in the SLPRC setting, even knowing their background. However, Blake noted that the conditional releases may not have been approved unless more security accommodations, such as fences, were added to the cottages. In any event, the proposed conditional release of residents to SLPRC cottages or to skilled nursing facilities was not implemented because, as discussed above, SORTS received more money from the state in 2010 to open SORTS-Fulton and to expand SORTS-Farmington.
The residents identified in these emails as presenting a lower risk, due to their treatment progress or their age and infirmity, were not informed that SORTS officials had identified them as candidates for conditional release. Nor was their lower risk mentioned in their annual reviews in 2009, including annual reviews written by Blake just days after he sent these emails. Rather, the annual reviews of these residents in 2009, and for years thereafter, stated that the residents continued to meet the criteria for commitment and should not be conditionally released. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that the sort of information contained in the emails discussed above, regarding the lowered risk of certain residents, should have been included in the residents’ annual reviews.
Four of the residents identified as candidates for conditional release to the cottages were ultimately conditionally released, but not until three or four years later and not to
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cottages but to the Annex. Four of the aged and infirmed residents identified as candidates for conditional release to a skilled nursing facility died while still confined at SORTS. Director Authorization for Release
The director of the DMH has not authorized a single SORTS resident to petition for conditional release in the 16 years since the SVP Act was enacted, even though SORTS treatment providers and annual reviewers have found several residents to meet the statutory criteria for conditional release.
The evidence established that the process to obtain director authorization for conditional release petitions is unduly lengthy and laden with unnecessary procedures. Blake acknowledged that in 2010—a decade after the SVP Act was enacted—the DMH had not developed clear procedures for obtaining director approval for a conditional release petition. Blake sent at least two proposals for director approval as early as 2010 for individuals he believed met the criteria for conditional release into the community, and for whom he submitted annual reviews so stating. However, the director of the DMH did not approve either of these petitions for conditional release. One of the individuals was Donald Williams, who, as more fully discussed below, eventually filed a petition for conditional release over the director’s objection and obtained a conditional release order in 2013. And notwithstanding the conditional release order, Williams still resides in the Annex, behind the secure perimeter of SORTS.
In 2011, the DMH finally adopted a policy for obtaining director approval, but this policy established at least three levels of approval within the DMH before the director would even consider authorizing a resident’s petition for conditional release. Dr. Englehart
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admitted that he is not sure how long it would take to get through all three steps for director approval because it has never been done.
Only once in 16 years has a resident gotten past the first step of the three-step process for director approval. This was Michael Allison, who undisputedly met the statutory criteria for conditional release, and who received an annual review recommending his conditional release in December 2014. Rather than filing a petition for conditional release over the director’s objection and subjecting his client to the two-step process to receive a trial, Allison’s public defender requested that the director of the DMH comply with Missouri Revised Statutes § 632.501 and authorize Allison to petition for conditional release. However, it took months to get to the final level of the self-imposed three-level process, and then the process was stalled indefinitely because one official in the chain—a facility director—was out of the office due to a family emergency. Dr. Englehart testified that when the process for director approval for Allison got “stuck” because the facility director was out of the office, no one was sure how to “unstick” it. Accordingly, as of the date of trial, several months after SORTS’ own annual reviewer and treatment providers declared that Allison met the criteria for conditional release, the director of the DMH still had not authorized Allison to petition for conditional release, and Allison was still confined in maximum security conditions at SORTS.
Further, if a resident files a petition for conditional release without director approval, even if SORTS annual reviewers and officials support the petition, the DMH—for reasons that were not explained—halts the process to obtain director approval altogether. There has
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been some discussion at the DMH of speeding up the process for director approval, but as of the date of trial, no such changes had taken place. The Annex and Conditional Releases
In the fall of 2013, several years after this lawsuit was filed, SORTS-Farmington opened the Annex. The Annex is designed for residents in the last phase and highest level of treatment, to help them develop the skills that they will need to cope and progress in the community. Annex residents share a living area, kitchen, and bedrooms; cook a weekly meal on their own; and are eventually able to earn passes to go on escorted or unescorted trips outside the facility. However, the Annex is behind the razor wire fence of SORTSFarmington.
The three Annex residents discussed at trial who have obtained conditional release orders did so over the objection of the director of the DMH, but with the support of SORTS annual reviewers. Their orders of conditional release were obtained after a preponderance hearing and then a full trial, in which a court or jury found that they are no longer likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released—i.e., that they no longer meet the criteria for civil commitment. However, at the request of the DMH, the orders added the condition that the release is “without discharge” from SORTS and that the residents must reside at the Annex indefinitely. Some of these residents are permitted to leave the secure perimeter of the Annex during the day, either unescorted or accompanied by SORTS security staff, to work at jobs in the community, to go grocery shopping, or to simply walk around the perimeter of SORTS-Farmington, outside the razor wire fence. However, all residents return to the Annex at night. SORTS-Fulton does not currently have a step-down unit such
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as the Annex, but evidence was presented that the DMH plans to develop an Annex-like facility at SORTS-Fulton in the future.
Experts for both sides in this case agreed that “conditional release,” in the context of similar SVP civil commitment programs around the country, means that the treated patient actually lives in the community. Moreover, the evidence established that the Annex cannot be considered a least restrictive alternative (“LRA”) as that term is understood by SVP civil commitment programs in other states because residents still live in a high-security setting, behind a razor wire fence, and are not integrated into the community.
Dr. Schlank testified that a step-down unit such as the Annex is ideal to ease residents’ transition from institutionalization to release, and that she wished the Virginia SVP program had such a step-down unit. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ expert Prescott acknowledged that a step-down unit inside a secure facility is a “good start” to the release process.
The problem, however, is that residents get stuck in the Annex, and never complete the transition to release. By contrast, Dr. Schlank’s SVP program in Virginia has successfully treated and conditionally released more than 100 residents from its SVP civil commitment program into the community. The average commitment time prior to release in Virginia was at one time 54 months and may have decreased since then. Likewise, Wisconsin’s SVP program, for which Prescott previously served as Treatment Assessment Director, had successfully treated and conditionally released approximately 150 residents into the community as of 2014. Both the Virginia and Wisconsin programs have departments devoted to actively managing conditional releases into the community,
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including developing community resources and contracting with community service providers. SORTS has no such department or staff dedicated to release into the community.
Experts from both sides, as well as SORTS officials, acknowledged that SORTS residents are similar to persons civilly committed under SVP statutes in other states, including Virginia and Wisconsin. Yet, with the exception of two residents who, as discussed above, were released with no involvement or support from SORTS or the DMH, SORTS has not conditionally released a resident into the community in 16 years.
Moreover, neither SORTS-Farmington nor SORTS-Fulton has an LRA option outside the secure perimeter and/or in a community setting. The evidence established that there are residents at SORTS, including some in the Annex, who could be safely placed in the community or in a less restrictive facility outside the secure perimeter of SORTS. These include aged and infirm residents, as well as residents who have successfully completed all treatment phases within the SORTS facilities. Blake admitted that SORTS and DMH officials have known of the need to look for community housing options since at least 2009 or 2010, by which time Blake had already identified candidates for conditional release into the community. Blake further admitted that, while he was Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, he made several proposals to the DMH for community housing options for conditionally released residents but that he was told that such options would not be included in the state budget. Every year since then, SORTS has requested money to be placed in the state’s budget for establishing cottages in the community, in order to implement the community reintegration phase of both SORTS treatment programs. However, the
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Governor of Missouri has never included such budget requests in his proposals to the state legislature and has not done so this year.
Like treatment, the “conditional release” process at SORTS is organized into phases. Specifically, there are 11 steps to the conditional release process at SORTS: Step 1 – unlimited ground pass inside the secure perimeter; Step 2 – escorted ground pass outside the secure perimeter; Step 3 – escorted community trips; Step 4 – unescorted ground pass outside the secure perimeter; Step 5 – employment; Step 6 – unescorted community trips of one hour; Step 7 – community support plan; Step 8 – up to 12-hour day trips with security personnel supervision inside St. Francois County, Missouri; Step 9 – up to 6-hour day trips with DMH transport outside of St. Francois County; Step 10 – up to 48-hour visits with security personnel supervision in and out of St. Francois County; and Step 11 – up to 96hour visits with security personnel supervision in and out of St. Francois County.
Dr. Englehart admitted that, according to even the most recent SORTS treatment manual, it should take a resident approximately 12 to 18 months to progress through all of the steps from conditional release “without discharge” to conditional release “with discharge” into the community. But in reality, no conditionally released SORTS resident has been discharged into the community within that timeframe—or at all.
For example, Lewis was the first SORTS resident to successfully complete treatment and obtain a conditional release order, in January, 2012. At the time of his conditional release hearing, Defendant Blake represented to the court that Lewis’s transition to full release into the community would take approximately 12 to 18 months to complete. However, at the time of trial—more than three years after Lewis was found to no longer
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meet the criteria for commitment—Lewis still resided at the Annex, within the secure perimeter of SORTS. Although evidence was presented that beginning in 2014, two years after obtaining a conditional release order, Lewis was allowed to obtain a job and spend some unescorted time working in the community during the day, he returned to SORTS at night. There was testimony that SORTS has been looking for housing within the community for Lewis, but as of the date of trial in this case, no such housing had been found.
Likewise, two other Annex residents, Williams and Fennewald, have obtained conditional release orders. These residents are permitted to spend some escorted or unescorted time outside of SORTS but must return to the Annex at night. SORTS also temporarily suspended Williams from his limited unescorted trips because of a rule violation (Williams had a facility phone on an unescorted pass and used the phone to call his family). But Williams’s privileges were restored, according to Defendants, after he cooperated in treatment and used his risk management plan to process the violation.
Finally, another SORTS resident, Tim Donaldson, obtained a conditional release order but does not reside in the Annex. Donaldson was conditionally released “without discharge” over the director of the DMH’s objection but with the support of SORTS annual reviewers in May 2013. Despite the court’s finding that he no longer met the criteria for commitment, Donaldson remained confined at SORTS and was still required to wear leg restraints. Following a disagreement between Donaldson and his probation officer regarding whether he would be able to spend time with his grandchildren—a permitted condition of his conditional release order—SORTS suspended some of the limited freedoms
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Donaldson had been granted, such as escorted walks outside the secure perimeter of SORTS. Even a year after Donaldson’s “conditional release,” the most freedom Donaldson had was to go on one-hour walks, escorted by a guard, outside the perimeter of SORTS, and he had not been allowed into the community. Donaldson’s public defender, Susan Elliott, testified that these restraints upset and angered Donaldson because he felt proud that he made it through the treatment program, which he took seriously, and he felt that the restrictions were unwarranted.
Then, in May 2014, SORTS personnel found that Donaldson acted out inappropriately in treatment, and subsequently moved Donaldson away from the Annex and back to another secure ward of SORTS-Farmington, moved Donaldson back a patient level, and also suspended Donaldson from treatment. SORTS did not seek court approval before making these changes. Elliott filed a motion to modify Donaldson’s conditions of release because she did not believe that SORTS could make these changes unilaterally, and because she also believed that Donaldson should be released into the community. The court found that the DMH could not force Donaldson to live at SORTS indefinitely after his conditional release and directed Elliott to draft an order that included a plan for Donaldson’s release into the community within 90 days. Shortly thereafter, the DMH moved to revoke Donaldson’s conditional release.
At a hearing in January 2015, the court rejected the state’s petition to revoke Donaldson’s conditional release, finding that Donaldson’s failure to participate fully in treatment may have violated a condition of his release but was insufficient to revoke Donaldson’s conditional release. (Pls.’ Ex. 114.) The court further found that “reasonable
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efforts to implement the previous order have not been undertaken by the State,” ordered the DMH to conditionally release Donaldson by June 8, 2015, and ordered the DMH to find suitable housing for Donaldson to effect this conditional release. Id. Elliott testified that the court indicated at the hearing that “conditional release” meant that Donaldson should be released into the community. But as of the date of trial, the DMH had not complied with the court’s order, and no effort had been made to release Donaldson into the community. Donaldson still remained confined at SORTS-Farmington, in a maximum security setting, and had not even been returned to the Annex.
Each of the so-called conditionally released residents discussed above—Lewis, Williams, Fennewald, and Donaldson—appears on the list prepared by Blake in 2009 as a resident who could be moved to a less restrictive setting at SLPRC, and Blake testified at trial that three of them—Lewis, Williams, and Donaldson—could have passed the neighbor test in 2009.
It is important to note that none of the witnesses at trial suggested that individuals civilly committed as SVPs could not successfully be treated. To the contrary, Defendants’ witnesses believed that SORTS is, in fact, capable of providing effective treatment. And nearly every witness to testify agreed that conditional release into the community is part of treatment. Indeed, community reintegration is the last phase of both SORTS treatment programs, and the SORTS treatment manual explicitly contemplates community housing like cottages or apartments outside the secure perimeter. Yet Dr. Englehart and the Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, Defendant Schmitt, both admitted that, as of the date of trial,
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SORTS still had no plans or procedures in place for releases—conditional or otherwise— into the community.
In the words of Defendant’s own expert, Dr. Schlank, “the failure [of SORTS] to discharge clients is a significant problem, and there appears to be both some systemic difficulties and some characteristics of the program which may contribute to the failure to be released into the community.” (Pls.’ Ex. 3 at 3.) Dr. Schlank acknowledged that “[w]hile much about the Missouri SVP program is quite consistent with components of other SVP programs, it is concerning that in fifteen years no client has been conditionally released into the community. This fact has led to a sense of hopelessness, not only in clients, but also in staff.” Id. at 4. Likewise, Defendants’ other expert, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that the ATSA guidelines, on which she based her opinion that treatment at SORTS was adequate, do not support the length of time that Missouri keeps individuals waiting for release into the community.
Director Shafer foresaw these sentiments in an internal email sent in 2009, a decade after SORTS was created, in which he stated that “[n]o one has ever graduated from [SORTS] and somewhere down the line, we have to do that or our treatment processes become a sham.” (Pls.’ Ex. 89 at 3.) Likewise, Dr. Fluger, the Program Coordinator at SORTS-Fulton, admitted that if no one is released from an SVP civil commitment treatment program into the community within 10 years, the “logical conclusion” is that treatment is a “sham.”
Missouri is at the bottom of SVP programs nationally in terms of conditional releases into the community, and other states successfully release many more persons into the
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community. And even Missouri successfully treats and releases non-SORTS sex offenders with similar, but not identical, diagnoses and offense histories as individuals civilly committed as SVPs. For example, psychologist and co-developer of the SOS treatment program, Jill Stinson-McKnight, Ph.D., testified that as of 2012, approximately 95 of the 150 non-SORTS residents that received treatment under the SOS program in Fulton Proper were successfully released into the community with promisingly low recidivism rates. These residents were not determined to be SVPs under the SVP Act, but at least some had been confined pursuant to Missouri’s now-repealed Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Law. Similarly, at the non-SORTS APS division of the SMMHC in Farmington, sex offender residents have been successfully released or moved to LRAs within the community after treatment.
The evidence clearly established that the lack of releases at SORTS has resulted in pervasive hopelessness. Nearly every witness who testified at trial, including several Defendants and both of Defendants’ expert witnesses, agreed that SORTS residents and staff have expressed severe hopelessness and that there is a perception among committed individuals that the only way out of SORTS is to die. This hopelessness is countertherapeutic and impedes the treatment progress of SORTS residents. Aged and Infirm Residents
As discussed above, the DMH and SORTS have been aware since at least 2009 of an aging population of civilly committed men within SORTS, including men whose progressive infirmities significantly reduced their risk to the public and made them candidates for conditional release to skilled nursing facilities.
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In 2012, Dr. Englehart proposed pursuing conditional releases for two such aged and infirm residents, Marvin Morton and James Purk. Dr. Englehart noted that the physical disabilities of these residents lowered their risk to the public. (Pls.’ Ex. 95 at 3.)
Over the next 15 months, Purk was hospitalized five times for chronic progressive pulmonary fibrosis and other medical conditions, which required that he be on constant oxygen support and which resulted in his extreme intolerance for physical movement. The evidence established that Purk’s long history of failing health and total incapacity was well known by SORTS leadership and that Purk told staff that he did not want to die at SORTS.
In an email sent to SORTS and DMH officials on January 14, 2014, Dr. Englehart stated that it was his opinion that Purk’s “extreme intolerance of exercise (even before [his most recent] hospitalization) makes him a low risk to re-offend, even with only minimal safeguards.” (Pls.’ Ex. 96 at 1.) Therefore, Dr. Englehart recommended that Purk be moved to a nursing facility rather than back to SORTS. Id. Purk’s final hospitalization began on January 31, 2014, and he remained hospitalized until his death on February 8, 2014, still a civilly committed resident of SORTS. Purk’s death was anticipated by SORTS. (Pls.’ Ex. 102.)
Notwithstanding that SORTS’ own Director of Treatment believed that Purk’s risk was so low that he should be conditionally released to a nursing facility, Purk’s last annual review recommended that he remain committed. On February 6, 2014, two days before Purk passed away, Defendant Erica Kempker, Psy.D., psychologist and former annual reviewer at SORTS-Farmington, prepared Purk’s annual review. Dr. Kempker did not interview Purk and, in the first draft of her annual review, Dr. Kempker made little mention
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about Purk’s failing health condition except to note that in early 2013, Purk was admitted to an outside medical facility for respiratory failure, hyponatremia, and chronic renal insufficiency, but that he had made a “remarkable recovery.” (Pls.’ Ex. 98 at 4.)
Later in the day on February 6, 2014, Dr. Kempker learned of Purk’s most recent hospitalization and edited her annual review of him. The final annual review, submitted by Dr. Kempker to SORTS leadership on February 7, 2014, the day before Purk died, added statements about Purk’s “dire health” and readmissions to hospitals, but nevertheless concluded that Purk continued to suffer from pedophilia; that there was no evidence that Purk’s mental abnormality had significantly changed since his commitment; and that Purk should continue to be committed. (Pls.’ Ex. 101.) Likewise, the director of the DMH did not authorize Purk to petition for release.
One month after Purk passed away, Dr. Englehart recommended to Dr. Ramesh— who had replaced Dr. Kempker as the annual reviewer at SORTS-Farmington—that they should pursue conditional release of the other aged and infirm SORTS resident he identified back in 2012, Marvin Morton. Morton had been incapacitated since at least 2012. Morton’s public defender, Charles Banks, offered compelling testimony that it was apparent from his first meeting with Morton in late 2011 that Morton could barely breathe and was confined to a wheelchair, and that in every meeting with Morton between 2011 and 2014, Morton’s condition deteriorated, to the point where Morton was eventually unable to get out of bed.
Dr. Ramesh’s annual review of Morton dated March 26, 2014, a year and a half after Dr. Englehart identified Morton as a conditional release candidate, was the first review of Morton to recommend his conditional release. The annual review detailed Morton’s history
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of severe and chronic health problems dating back to 2009. The annual review stated that it was only with considerable difficulty that Morton was able to independently transfer himself in and out of the bed and that Morton had voiced fears of dying and helplessness about his civil commitment and his ongoing medical problems. (Pls.’ Ex. 262 at 8.) Dr. Ramesh’s annual review of Morton concluded that “there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Mr. Morton’s mental abnormality has so changed secondary to pulmonary fibrosis, his age, and a lack of recent inappropriate sexual behavior” and that Morton therefore no longer met the criteria for commitment. Id. at 10. Dr. Ramesh recommended that Morton be conditionally released to a nursing facility in the community, where Morton would have access to better medical care as well as support from his family.
Notwithstanding the SORTS annual reviewer’s recommendation that Morton no longer met the criteria for civil commitment, Director Shafer did not authorize Morton to petition for conditional release. Morton’s public defender, Banks, sought the director’s approval before filing a petition for conditional release on behalf of Morton, in order to avoid the two-step process for petitions filed without approval. After waiting over three months for an authorization that never came, Banks filed the petition for Morton’s conditional release without the director’s approval on July 25, 2014. Dr. Englehart informed Banks that after Morton filed his own petition, the process to obtain Director Shafer’s authorization halted, as a result of internal DMH rules, thereby foreclosing the avenue of director approval. When Banks offered to dismiss Morton’s self-filed petition so that Director Schafer could authorize the petition and speed up the process for conditional release, Dr. Englehart informed Banks that it would take even longer to go through the
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DMH’s three-step process to obtain director approval than it would to proceed with the twostep court hearing process for petitions filed without approval.
The first preponderance hearing for Morton’s petition for conditional release without director approval was held on February 24, 2015. Morton was in the hospital at that time, in a terminal condition. In fact, just prior to the hearing, Dr. Englehart and another SORTS physician made calls to the hospital to determine if Morton was still alive, as the hearing would be moot if Morton passed away before it started. At the preponderance hearing, both Dr. Englehart and Dr. Ramesh testified in favor of Morton’s conditional release. The Attorney General’s office hired an out-of-state expert witness who opined that, notwithstanding Morton’s imminent terminal condition of which the expert was informed, Morton still met the criteria for commitment. The court found that Morton’s physical condition made it unlikely that he would commit an act of sexual violence, and ordered the parties to meet and confer in one month to set the final trial on the petition for conditional release. Morton died the next morning, still a civilly committed resident of SORTS.
Eighteen men have died while civilly committed at SORTS. The evidence established that there have been internal discussions at SORTS for several years regarding adopting a policy or procedure to “fast-track” the conditional releases of medically frail, aging, or incapacitated SORTS residents. Even Defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that the DMH should develop a procedure to fast-track the conditional release of aged and infirm residents whose risk for reoffending has significantly decreased, and that one way to do this would be if her supervisor, Director Shafer, approved petitions for
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conditional release of these residents. But as of the date of trial, no such policy or procedure had been adopted.
The director of the DMH has never authorized an aged, infirm, or medically frail SORTS resident to petition for conditional release, to a skilled nursing facility or otherwise. And as discussed above, in the 16 years since its enactment, only two persons civilly committed under the SVP Act have been conditionally released into the community due to age and infirmity. Both Arthur and Gibson were discharged without the director’s authorization and without a recommendation for release in a SORTS annual review.
SORTS does not have any contracts in place to allow aged and infirmed residents, whom SORTS officials agree no longer meet the dangerousness requirement for commitment, to move to LRAs in the community. The DMH projects a population of 41 residents over the age of 65 at SORTS in the next 5 years, and 92 residents over the age of 65 in the next 10 years. (Pls.’ Ex. 18.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims in Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ evidence with respect to a “small number of individuals,” such as individuals who were considered for conditional release or who are aged and infirm, is not representative of the class and therefore cannot support Plaintiffs’ class claims. The Court disagrees. The evidence with respect to these individuals was used as an example to highlight alleged systemic deficiencies in risk assessment, procedures for
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release, and community reintegration. And Defendants presented no persuasive evidence that the facts presented were not representative of the system as a whole. See Karsjens v. Jesson, No. CIV. 11-3659 DWF/JJK, 2015 WL 3755870, at *25 (D. Minn. June 17, 2015) (“By failing to provide the necessary process, Defendants have failed to maintain the [sex offender treatment] program in such a way as to ensure that all Class Members are not unconstitutionally deprived of their right to liberty.”). Pre-Trial Detainee Plaintiffs
Based on Plaintiffs’ assertions that named Plaintiffs Baker, Brown, Bowen, and Murphy were not committed to SORTS as of the date of trial, and did not fall within the Treatment Class definition in this case, the Court will dismiss the treatment-related claims of these Plaintiffs as moot. However, if the status of Plaintiffs Bowen or Murphy changes such that either is committed to SORTS during the pendency of this action, he will automatically become a member of the Rule 23(b)(2) Treatment Class. See Doc. No. 197 at 2 (defining “Treatment Class” to include persons “who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS of the State of Missouri as a result of civil commitment”). Plaintiffs’ Facial Challenges to the SVP Act
Plaintiffs assert that the SVP Act is facially unconstitutional in two respects: (1) Plaintiffs assert that § 632.498 of the SVP Act unconstitutionally requires a change in abnormality before a committed person may be released, regardless of the person’s reduced dangerousness; and (2) Plaintiffs assert that § 632.505 of the SVP Act, which governs
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conditional release, unconstitutionally fails to provide for full, unconditional release because there is no mechanism for the conditions of release to terminate.7
“[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by establishing that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [state law] would be valid, i.e., that the law is
unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citation omitted). “Facial challenges are disfavored for
several reasons,” including that they “run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial
restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Id. at 450 (citation omitted); see
also Roark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573 F.3d 556, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting this “well-
established principle” and that it “applies with particular force to exercise of a court’s
declaratory judgment discretion where governmental action is involved”) (citation omitted).
7 Plaintiffs also find problematic the SVP Act’s use of different wording to describe the standards for commitment and release. However, they assert that these inconsistencies in language are relevant to their as-applied challenge, not their facial challenge. (Doc. No. 449 at 9 n.3.) In any event, the wording of the SVP Act is nearly identical to the Kansas SVP statute, which the United States Supreme Court upheld against a facial challenge. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352-353, 364 (1997) (upholding the Kansas SVP statute against a facial challenge, where the statute defined an SVP as a person “who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality . . . which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence”; committed SVPs “for control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality . . . has so changed that the person is safe to be at large”; and provided for immediate release when the person is adjudged “safe to be at large”); see also 1994 Kan. Laws Ch. 316, §§ 8, 10 (requiring release of a person civilly committed as an SVP unless the state can prove that the person’s mental abnormality “remains such that the person is not safe to be at large and if released is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence”).
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The United States Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). But it has never held that strict scrutiny applies to civil commitment statutes. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (“Although freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action, that liberty interest is not absolute,” and “[i]t thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty”) (citation omitted); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 117 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “a liberty interest per se is not the same thing as a fundamental right,” and that the Supreme Court “has never applied strict scrutiny to the substance of state laws involving involuntary confinement of the mentally ill”); but see Karsjens, 2015 WL 3755870, at *26 (concluding that strict scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the constitutionality of Minnesota’s SVP civil commitment statute because the plaintiffs’ “fundamental right to live free of physical restraint is constrained by the curtailment of their liberty.”); Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 445 (concluding that Missouri’s SVP Act is “subject to strict scrutiny because it affects the fundamental right of liberty”).
Although it has not applied strict scrutiny to civil commitment statutes, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79 (same). That purpose must not be punitive, as punishment is reserved for the criminal system. Bell
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v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]hile incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for the criminal system alone.”). And a failure to consider or use “alternative and less harsh” restrictions may indicate an unconstitutional purpose to punish. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20. Moreover, “even if [a person’s] involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after th[e] basis [for it] no longer existed.” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
As construed by the Missouri Supreme Court, the purpose for which individuals are involuntarily committed under the SVP Act is to “protect[] society from persons who are likely to commit sexually violent crimes if not committed.” Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 445. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, ordinarily, “[w]e must . . . accept the state court’s view of the purpose of its own law.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995).
Thus, Plaintiffs are correct that the Due Process Clause permits civil commitment of individuals under the SVP Act only so long as they suffer from a mental abnormality and are likely to commit a sexual offense if released. If the state’s commitment scheme allows the confinement of individuals who are no longer likely to offend, regardless of whether there has been any change in their mental abnormality, the scheme will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-76 (“[T]o commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, the State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and convincing evidence the two statutory preconditions to commitment: that
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the person sought to be committed is mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own welfare and protection of others.”) (emphasis added); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (“We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”); Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (“[T]he State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others.”); O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 (“A finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.”).
However, as Plaintiffs themselves emphasize, the Missouri Supreme Court has construed the SVP Act to comport with this requirement of the Due Process Clause. In re Care and Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 446 (Mo. 2007). In Coffman, the Missouri Supreme Court held that “Section 632.498 is presumed to be constitutional,” and the court therefore “reject[ed] the state’s interpretation of [this section] as limiting release to persons whose mental abnormality has changed, regardless of dangerousness” because “[s]uch an interpretation would violate the due process clauses of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.” Id.; see also Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Mo. 2007) (“[D]ue process requires that a person be both mentally ill and dangerous in order to be civilly committed; the absence of either characteristic renders involuntary civil commitment unconstitutional.”).
The Court must consider the Missouri Supreme Court’s limiting construction in evaluating Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the SVP Act. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
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352, 355 (1983) (“In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.”) (citation omitted); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (“[A] state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts.”). As construed by the state court, the SVP Act requires release if a person civilly committed as an SVP is found to be “no longer dangerous, regardless of whether the reason he is no longer dangerous is primarily mental or physical.” Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 446. So limited, the Court concludes that § 632.498 of the SVP Act does not, on its face, violate due process in the manner claimed by Plaintiffs.
Likewise, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ facial challenge regarding § 632.505 of the SVP Act to be without merit. The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ assertions that § 632.505 does not provide a mechanism for the conditions of release to terminate. Section 632.505 provides that the conditions of release may be modified “upon [the reviewing court’s] own motion or upon petition of the [DMH], the [DOC], or the person on conditional release.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.505(6). The Court reads this modification provision to permit the full, unconditional release of civilly committed persons under the SVP Act, upon an appropriate finding by the reviewing court. Therefore, the Court concludes that § 632.505 of the SVP Act is not, on its face, unconstitutional for the reasons claimed by Plaintiffs. The Court will deny Plaintiffs’ requests for relief which seek to declare Missouri’s SVP Act facially unconstitutional.
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Plaintiffs’ As-Applied Challenges to Treatment and Release Procedures at SORTS Although the United States Supreme Court upheld an SVP statute nearly identical to
Missouri’s SVP as facially constitutional, and the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the Missouri SVP Act as facially constitutional, the concurring justices in both high courts expressed doubt as to whether the statutes would be constitutional as applied. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing the case-deciding vote that the Kansas SVP statute was facially constitutional, but cautioning that “[i]f the object or purpose of the Kansas law had been to provide treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere pretext, there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish,” and that if “civil confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, . . . our precedents would not suffice to validate it”); In re Care and Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. 2003) (Wolff, J., concurring) (“While the [Missouri SVP] statutory scheme is constitutional as written, I am doubtful about its constitutionality as applied,” including whether there will be a “meaningful attempt to treat those previously determined to be sick and dangerous, or whether these offenders will simply be warehoused without treatment and without meaningful efforts to re-integrate them into society.”).
As noted above, Plaintiffs assert two types of as-applied constitutional challenges to the SORTS treatment program. First, Plaintiffs claim that treatment modalities at SORTS are inadequate due to staff and funding shortages. Second, Plaintiffs claim that the entire SORTS treatment program is a sham because no appropriate risk assessment and release
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procedures have been established, and no resident has been successfully treated and released back into the community.
The parties strongly dispute the applicable standard of review for these claims. Plaintiffs assert that strict scrutiny applies to both types of as-applied claims. Plaintiffs note that in a case challenging Minnesota’s equivalent of the SVP Act, the district court applied strict scrutiny to the plaintiffs’ claims. See Karsjens, 2015 WL 3755870, at *26. Like Plaintiffs do in their second type of as-applied claim, the plaintiffs in Karsjens challenged the state’s failure to conduct risk assessments and failure to release civilly committed sex offenders. Id. at *29-31. The court in Karsjens found that strict scrutiny governed these systemic challenges to civil commitment because the plaintiffs had a “fundamental right to live free of physical restraint.” Id. at *26. However, Karsjens did not involve any challenge to the adequacy of particular treatment modalities.
Defendants assert that, for both types of as-applied claims, Plaintiffs must satisfy the much higher burden of proving that the state action is so arbitrary and egregious as to shock the conscience. In support of this assertion, Defendants point to Strutton, in which a plaintiff argued that the treatment he received at SORTS was inadequate because of budget and staffing shortages, like Plaintiffs do here in their first type of as-applied claims. Strutton, 2010 WL 1253715, at *35. On review of Strutton, the Eighth Circuit found that because the right of individuals civilly committed as SVPs to mental health treatment originates from the SVP Act, not the Constitution, a substantive due process claim does not arise unless the treatment provided is “so lacking as to shock the conscience.” Strutton, 668
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F.3d at 558. However, Strutton did not involve any systemic challenges to risk assessment or release at SORTS.
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that neither of Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims is subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would only apply if Defendants’ actions implicated a fundamental right. And federal courts are reluctant to expand fundamental rights beyond those declared by the Supreme Court. United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1075 (8th Cir. 2006).
With respect to Plaintiffs’ first type of as-applied claims, regarding adequacy of treatment, the Supreme Court has never held that civilly committed sex offenders have a fundamental right to treatment. Rather, as Defendants correctly assert, any right to treatment arises solely from the SVP Act. Therefore, under precedent binding on this Court, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their first type of as-applied claims unless they prove that the treatment at SORTS is so lacking as to shock the conscience. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 558.
The bulk of the evidence Plaintiffs presented at trial in support of their adequacy-oftreatment claims was evidence of staffing and funding shortages at SORTS prior to 2010. But the Eighth Circuit reviewed the SORTS treatment program, and in 2012 found that although it may have departed from acceptable standards in the field, the treatment was not so lacking as to shock the conscience. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 558. The Court concludes that SORTS treatment providers have worked to improve treatment to some degree since then, and in some areas, there has been significant improvement.
For example, although SORTS continues to struggle with recruitment and funding, the evidence established that SORTS has in the last year managed to adequately staff all
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treatment groups and to reduce treatment group cancelations dramatically. Moreover, Defendants improved treatment methods in the last year by switching the clinical focus from rule violations to more treatment-related behaviors. There are still many areas for improvement, as noted by Dr. Schlank and Plaintiffs’ experts, such as maintaining consistency in treatment protocols, clarifying treatment goals for each phase and level, adapting treatment program materials to better meet the needs of developmentally disabled residents, and improving coordination between SORTS-Farmington and SORTS-Fulton. But the Court cannot say that these areas for improvement render the treatment modalities at SORTS so lacking as to shock the conscience. Therefore, the Court will deny relief with respect to Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges to the treatment modalities at SORTS.
But the Court reaches a different conclusion regarding Plaintiffs’ second type of asapplied claims, relating to risk assessment and release of SORTS residents. These claims raise systemic challenges to the nature and duration of Plaintiffs’ commitment, rather than to the adequacy of the treatment provided to Plaintiffs while committed. And while Plaintiffs may not have a constitutional right to treatment, they do have a constitutional right to avoid undue confinement.
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has never held that this right is a fundamental one, subject to strict scrutiny. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356 (“Although freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action, that liberty interest is not absolute,” and “[i]t thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty”) (citation omitted).
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But it has held that, at the least, the “the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738; Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79 (same).
Thus, Plaintiffs will prevail on their second type of as-applied claims if they can prove that the nature and duration of the commitment of SORTS residents bears no reasonable relation to the non-punitive purpose for which they were committed: to “protect[] society from persons who are likely to commit sexually violent crimes if not committed.” Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 445.
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have clearly met this burden. Upon review of the evidence, the Court concludes that risk assessment and release procedures at SORTS are wholly deficient in three respects. Each of these deficiencies has resulted in the continued confinement of persons who are no longer likely to commit sexually violent offenses, in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause.
The first constitutional deficiency is the manner in which Defendants conduct annual reviews. The evidence at trial established that SORTS annual reviewers have not been applying the correct legal standard when evaluating whether a resident meets the criteria for conditional release. For example, Defendants’ own expert, Dr. Schlank, indicated that the SORTS-Fulton annual reviewer refused to recommend the conditional release of residents who no longer meet the dangerousness requirement for confinement, in violation of Coffman and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 446; see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75. Moreover, Defendants’ other expert, Dr. Stanislaus, acknowledged that the annual reviewers at both SORTS facilities have not been
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consistently applying the correct legal standard for evaluating risk and that training regarding this standard is needed but has not been provided.
“The annual review mechanism ensures involuntary confinement that was initially permissible will not continue after the basis for it no longer exists.” Murrell, 215 S.W. 3d at 105. The Court finds that the improper application of the annual review mechanism in this case has resulted in the continued confinement of individuals beyond the time constitutionally justified.
The second constitutional deficiency is that Defendants are not properly implementing the last phase of the SORTS treatment programs, community reintegration. Evidence offered by Defendants’ own experts suggests that progress through the various treatment phases at SORTS is tortuously slow, and that the lack of clear timeframes for such progress has contributed to the program’s failure to release residents. Moreover, Defendants’ stated goal of treating and safely reintegrating individuals back into the community is observed in theory but not in practice. SORTS admittedly has residents who, because of treatment progress or physical infirmity, have reduced their risk below the standard required for commitment and have been ready for community reintegration for some time. Yet Defendants are not releasing these residents to an LRA within the community, and have not even designed procedures to do so. Instead, Defendants are precluding such releases by imposing extra-statutory hurdles, such as an indefinite “release without discharge” condition, on all conditionally released residents. In short, while the treatment program itself is not a sham, the release portion of the program is.
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Every single outside expert in this case, each of whom has extensive experience with similar SVP civil commitment programs around the country, agreed that “conditional release” means that the treated patient actually lives in the community. Indeed, the SVP Act explicitly states that “[t]he primary purpose of conditional release is to provide outpatient treatment and monitoring to prevent the person’s condition from deteriorating to the degree that the person would need to be returned to a secure facility designated by the director of the department of mental health.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.505.1 (emphasis added).
The Court concludes that the effect of this deficiency has been to turn civil confinement into punitive, lifetime detention of SORTS residents, in violation of the Due Process Clause. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Karsjens, 2015 WL 3755870, at *31 (finding that Minnesota’s civil commitment program for sex offenders was unconstitutionally punitive, as applied, because individuals remained confined even when, as a result of treatment progress or physical infirmity, they had reduced their risk below the level required for commitment).
The third constitutional deficiency is that release procedures at SORTS are not being performed in the manner required by the SVP Act or the Due Process Clause. The evidence at trial established that the director of the DMH has effectively abdicated his duty to authorize petitions for conditional release for persons found not likely to reoffend. The director has not authorized a single person committed under the SVP Act to petition for conditional release. Especially troubling is that Defendants appear to be stalling or blocking director approval of conditional release petitions even where the request for conditional release is supported by SORTS treatment providers and annual reviewers. Again,
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Defendants have imposed extra-statutory hurdles to obtaining director approval, including a three-step process that is futile in practice. No one has ever gotten past the first step, and the only resident to reach the first step was caught in limbo indefinitely because one DMH employee was out of town.
The SVP Act is clear that the director “shall authorize [a] person to petition the court for release” whenever the director determines that the person is no longer “likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.501 (emphasis added). Defendants’ own expert and second-in-command to the director of the DMH, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that obtaining the director’s authorization would fast-track the conditional release process for the lowest-risk residents.
The Court concludes that the director’s failure to comply with the SVP Act has resulted in the continued confinement of persons who no longer meet the criteria for commitment, and amounts to unconstitutional punishment. See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 568, 577 (concluding that the jury properly found a constitutional violation upon receiving evidence that the hospital staff had the power to release a civilly committed mental patient who was no longer dangerous, even if he remained mentally ill, and that the hospital superintendent refused to allow that power to be exercised even though the undisputed testimony at trial demonstrated that the patient posed no danger to others).
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have proved that the SVP Act is unconstitutional as applied to SORTS for the following reasons: (1) Defendants have not performed annual reviews in accordance with the SVP Act, as interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court, and as required by the Due Process Clause; (2) Defendants have not
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properly implemented any program to ensure the least restrictive environment, and have not implemented—or even designed—the community reintegration phase of the SORTS treatment programs; and (3) Defendants have not implemented release procedures, including director authorization for releases, in the manner required by the SVP Act and the Due Process Clause. As nearly every witness who testified in this case agreed, these systemic failures have created a pervasive sense of hopelessness at SORTS that is undermining what little improvement the SORTS treatment programs have made.
The Court notes that, based on the disturbing record presented at trial, it would come to the same conclusions under the shocks-the-conscience standard advocated by Defendants. The Court believes that Plaintiffs’ rights to a system that includes proper risk assessment and release are rights protected by the constitutional guarantee of liberty, not merely state law. But even if these rights were grounded solely in state law, as Defendants appear to argue, the Court would find that Defendants’ nearly complete failure to protect them, as set forth above, is so arbitrary and egregious as to shock the conscience.
The Constitution does not allow Defendants to impose lifetime detention on individuals who have completed their prison sentences and who no longer pose a danger to the public, no matter how heinous their past conduct. “[M]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.” O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. Nor may the SORTS residents’ liberty interests be ignored because it is politically expedient to do so. Substantial changes to the SORTS program must be made, with the support of the DMH and the state, in order to bring the program in line
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with constitutional standards. This case will proceed to the remedies phase to consider what those changes should entail. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Statutory Reimbursement Scheme
The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim regarding the SORTS reimbursement scheme. The Court previously held that Plaintiffs’ treatment-related claims and their reimbursement claim overlapped to some extent, in that if Plaintiffs could prove that the treatment provided to SORTS residents is unconstitutional, they may also be able to prove that charging for such treatment is unconstitutional.
However, the Court never suggested that a finding of liability on the treatmentrelated claims would, per se, demonstrate liability on the reimbursement claim. And here, the evidence shows that Defendants are, in fact, attempting to implement a credible program designed to provide treatment to patients, although it does not continue to the release phase. In order to evaluate whether the reimbursement scheme was unconstitutional, the Court needed some evidence of how the reimbursement scheme is applied and how the charges equate to the treatment provided.
Plaintiffs presented little to no such evidence at trial. For example, the Court was given virtually no evidence to evaluate when, how, how much, and for what SORTS residents are actually charged. And Plaintiffs barely mentioned their reimbursement claims in their post-trial briefs. Given the absence of relevant evidence and argument, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to prove their claim that the reimbursement scheme is unconstitutional. Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ claims
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regarding reimbursement, which were asserted on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and the Charging Class.
CONCLUSION The Court expresses its sincere gratitude to Plaintiffs’ appointed attorneys for their dedicated representation of their clients, and assistance to the Court, in this stage of the case. For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the treatment-related claims of named Plaintiffs Macon Baker, David Brown, Joseph Bowen, and William Murphy are DISMISSED as moot, with the understanding that if the status of these Plaintiffs changes such that they are committed to SORTS during the pendency of this action, they will automatically become members of the Rule 23(b)(2) Treatment Class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480-632.513, is unconstitutional on its face is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480-632.513, is unconstitutional as applied and deprives Plaintiffs and the Treatment Class of their constitutional rights is GRANTED in part, as set forth above. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ prayers for other relief with respect to their as-applied claims regarding risk assessment and release procedures at SORTS will be addressed in the second phase of trial (the “Remedies Phase”). The Court shall hold a
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conference on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 9:30 a.m., to address the schedule and procedures for the Remedies Phase. The Court urges the Attorney General to identify and include in the conference any other individuals, such as the Governor or the Director of the Department of Corrections, who may be necessary or helpful to addressing appropriate relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except as set forth above, Plaintiffs’ prayers for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint, asserted on behalf of themselves and the Treatment and Charging Classes, are DENIED.

Dated this 11th day of September, 2015.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court for consideration of the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a proposed class action settlement under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The settlement agreement proposes injunctive relief to address alleged constitutional violations. The case is somewhat unusual because counsel representing the Plaintiff class have divergent views with respect to the fairness and sufficiency of the proposed settlement. Further, all of the class representatives and most of the class members oppose the settlement. The settlement addresses only the remedial phase of the case, as the Court has already found the statute at issue to be unconstitutional as applied. The Court finds that the proposed settlement agreement contains provisions directed at the main violations found by the Court, and confers many benefits, not the least of which is finality and immediate implementation. Nevertheless, after careful review, the Court finds that certain deficiencies require denial of the proposed settlement and further court proceedings with respect to an appropriate remedy.

BACKGROUND The approximately 225 Plaintiffs in this class action are civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“DMH”) Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities, who have been declared sexually violent predators (“SVPs”) under Missouri’s SVP Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480-632.525. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the SVP Act as written and as applied to SORTS. They named as Defendants various executives and employees of SORTS and the DMH, solely in their official capacities. At the request of the parties, the case was bifurcated for trial, and the Court held an eight-day bench trial on the issue of liability only, beginning on April 21, 2015. At the trial, the Plaintiff class was represented by several attorneys who worked cooperatively and vigorously represented the class. The Court ultimately concluded that the SVP Act was unconstitutional as applied to SORTS in three specific respects, 1 each of which contributed to the civil commitment of individuals beyond the time and scope permissible under the Due Process Clause. (Doc. No. 501.) The first constitutional deficiency the Court found was the manner in which Defendants conducted annual assessments of the mental condition of SORTS residents, known as “annual reviews.” The evidence at trial showed that annual reviews were the primary tool that the state courts used to evaluate whether a civilly committed person continued to satisfy the statutory criteria for commitment. The Court concluded that SORTS officials responsible for conducting annual reviews were not consistently applying
1 The Court denied relief on Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the SVP Act.
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the correct legal standard for evaluating residents’ risk level under the statutory criteria. The Court held that the improper application of the annual review mechanism contributed to the continued confinement of individuals beyond the time constitutionally justified. Id. at 53-54.
The second constitutional deficiency the Court found was with respect to treatment progress and the lack of any community reintegration program. The Court concluded that residents’ progress through the various treatment phases at SORTS was “tortuously slow,” that the “lack of clear time frames for such progress . . . contributed to the program’s failure to release residents,” and that “Defendants’ stated goal of treating and safely reintegrating individuals back into the community [was] observed in theory but not in practice.” Id. at 54. The Court held that the result of these deficiencies was “punitive, lifetime detention of SORTS residents, in violation of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 55.
The final constitutional deficiency the Court found was that the release procedures at SORTS were not being performed in the manner required by the SVP Act or the Due Process Clause. The Court concluded that the Director of the DMH (the “Director”) had effectively abdicated his statutory duty under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.501, which provides that “[i]f the director of the [DMH] determines that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, 2 the
2 As explained in the Court’s opinion on liability, the Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted similar language in the SVP Act to permit civil commitment only if a person is “both dangerous and has some mental illness or abnormality,” and to require release if a resident “can demonstrate that he is no longer likely to commit sexually violent offenses, . . . regardless of whether the reason he is no longer dangerous is primarily mental or physical.” In re Care & Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 446 (Mo. 2007).
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director shall authorize the person to petition the court for release.” 3 The Court held that
the Director had not authorized a single person committed under the SVP Act to petition for
conditional release, and that Defendants were instead stalling or blocking Director
authorization even when SORTS treatment providers and annual reviewers concluded that a
resident qualified for conditional release. The Court held that the Director’s failure to
comply with the SVP Act in this regard contributed to the unconstitutional confinement of
persons who no longer met the criteria for commitment.
The Court held that Plaintiffs’ prayers for injunctive relief with respect to these three
constitutional violations would be addressed in a second phase of trial, the “Remedies
Phase,” initially set for March 30, 2016. However, before trial was held in the Remedies
Phase, the parties jointly moved to stay all proceedings in order to engage in settlement
negotiations. Pursuant to the parties’ joint request and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Court
referred the case to Retired United States Magistrate Judge Mary Ann Medler, who was
approved for recall status, to assist the parties with their efforts to agree to appropriate
remedies.
On May 4, 2016, the parties filed a joint motion to approve and direct notice to the
class of a proposed settlement. Shortly thereafter, the Court learned that the designated lead
3 As explained in the Court’s opinion on liability, petitions filed without the Director’s authorization are subject to heightened requirements, including a frivolity review. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.504 (“Upon receipt of a first or subsequent petition from committed persons without the director’s approval, the court shall endeavor whenever possible to review the petition and determine if the petition is based on frivolous grounds and if so shall deny the petition without a hearing.”). Moreover, if a petition filed without the Director’s authorization has been found to be frivolous or has been previously denied, the court must deny any subsequent petition “unless the petition contains facts upon which a court could find the condition of the petitioner had so changed that a hearing was warranted.” Id.
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class counsel and supporting class counsel (such counsel referred to herein as “class counsel”) believed the proposed settlement was in the best interest of the class. But John H. Quinn, one of the attorneys for the class who took a leading role at the trial, and all but one of the class representatives objected to the proposed settlement.4 After the parties addressed the propriety of proceeding with a proposed settlement not endorsed by the class representatives, the Court, on August 5, 2016, approved the parties’ proposed form of notice and directed notice to the class of the proposed settlement. The Court appointed Mr. Quinn as counsel to represent the class representatives and any other class members who objected to the proposed settlement (Mr. Quinn referred to herein as “objectors’ counsel”).
Class counsel, Defendants, and objectors’ counsel thereafter engaged in further negotiations, which resulted in an amended proposed settlement agreement. (Doc. No. 5911.) Objectors’ counsel continued to oppose the amended proposed settlement on behalf of the class representatives but joined class counsel and Defendants in a request to approve a supplemental notice to the class, advising them of the amended proposed settlement. On September 8, 2016, the Court approved the parties’ proposed supplemental notice and directed supplemental notice to the class of the amended proposed settlement. All class members received notice of the original and amended proposed settlements, and a full and fair opportunity to object to or support the amended proposed settlement.
The matter is now before the Court on the parties’ motion (Doc. No. 689) for final approval of the amended proposed settlement. Approximately 175 of the 225 of the class members (more than 75% of the class), including all of the class representatives, have 4 One of the class representatives initially approved of the proposed settlement, but that class representative later opposed the proposed settlement.
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objected to the amended proposed settlement, largely through objectors’ counsel. One class member has filed a letter in support of the amended proposed settlement.
The Court held a fairness hearing on October 20, 2016, during which the Court heard arguments from Defendants and class counsel in support of the amended proposed settlement and from objectors’ counsel against the amended proposed settlement.5
Based on careful consideration of the amended proposed settlement and objections thereto; the affidavits, testimony, and other evidence of record; and the arguments of counsel, the Court regrettably finds that it must deny the joint motion for final approval of the amended proposed settlement.
DISCUSSION A district court may approve a class action settlement only if it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). “To make the determination, the district court must consider four factors: (1) the merits of the plaintiff’s case weighed against the terms of the settlement, (2) the defendant’s financial condition, (3) the complexity and expense of further litigation, and (4) the amount of opposition to the settlement.” Marshall v. Nat’l Football League, 787 F.3d 502, 508 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “The single most important factor in determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate is a
5 Objectors’ counsel also presented the affidavits of three expert witnesses experienced in the treatment of sexually violent predators; and the affidavits and live testimony of three Missouri public defenders in the civil commitment defense unit, responsible for handling civil commitment cases under the SVP Act. Each of these witnesses offered opinions that, while the amended proposed settlement provides some remedies to improve the SORTS program, it does not adequately address the constitutional violations found by this Court.
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balancing of the strength of the plaintiff’s case against the terms of the settlement.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court will primarily address the first and fourth factors. The remaining factors—Defendants’ financial condition and the complexity and expense of further litigation—are either neutral or do not weigh heavily in favor of approval. Defendants’ financial condition “is not particularly important in [actions that are] not for monetary damages,” such as this one. See Cody v. Hillard, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1059 (D.S.D. 2000). And while it may take time to fashion appropriate injunctive relief and to litigate an appeal, most discovery is complete and this seven-year-old case is not at such an early stage that significant time and money would be saved by settlement.
“Because settlement of a class action, like settlement of any litigation, is basically a bargained exchange between the litigants, the judiciary’s role is properly limited to the minimum necessary to protect the interests of the class and the public.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1388 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).6 “Although a trial court must consider the terms of a class action settlement to the extent necessary to protect the interests of the class, judges should not substitute their own judgment as to optimal settlement terms for the judgment of the litigants and their counsel.” Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 1999). And although the district court “may indicate what modifications would make the settlement acceptable to it, . . . it may not require the parties to submit to these modifications.” Little Rock Sch. Dist.,
6 Of course, this case is different than the norm, as here, the parties and counsel charged with representing the interest of the class do not all agree to the proposed settlement.
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921 F.3d at 1388. Rather, the district court “must consider the proposal as a whole and as submitted. Approval must then be given or withheld.” Id. (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, the parties are commended for attempting to reach an amicable resolution. The amended proposed settlement is the result of hard-fought, arms’ length negotiations carried out with the able assistance of Magistrate Judge Medler. It would provide the class with the considerable benefits of immediate relief (without the delay of a trial and appeal), a waiver of Defendants’ right to appeal the Court’s liability findings, improvement of certain aspects of the SORTS program beyond those the Court found unconstitutional,7 and the appointment of a Special Master and a Monitor to oversee Defendants’ compliance with the settlement’s terms and report to the Court for enforcement purposes.
But on balance, those benefits are outweighed by a few significant gaps in the amended proposed settlement, as noted by the objectors, that prevent the proposed settlement from sufficiently providing a fair, reasonable, and adequate remedy for the constitutional violations found in this case. Therefore, applying the factors above and considering the Court’s role under Rule 23(e), “as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members,” Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975), the Court cannot approve the amended proposed settlement.
The most significant gaps raised by the objectors relate to two of the constitutional deficiencies found by the Court: treatment progress, as it relates to SORTS’ failure to
7 For example, the amended proposed settlement limits Defendants’ ability to seek reimbursement from certain SORTS residents, even though this Court denied Plaintiffs’ claims challenging Defendants’ ability to seek such reimbursement.
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release residents; and the Director’s statutory duty to authorize persons to petition for release if the Director determines that “the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released,” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.501. These gaps, in combination with a few other deficiencies noted by the objectors, cause the Court to deny the motion to approve the amended proposed settlement.
With respect to treatment progress, the amended proposed settlement provides time frames for expected progress through the various treatment phases at SORTS, and it requires Defendants to provide notice to SORTS residents if the residents do not progress according to the expected time frames or if they are moved back a phase in treatment. The notice must explain the reasons for the residents’ failure to progress or their regression, and must identify concrete steps the residents must take to progress. The amended proposed settlement also provides for the appointment of a Special Master and a Monitor with authority to monitor and report to the Court regarding the number of residents completing treatment phases within the expected time frames and whether residents are being given the required notices with respect to treatment progress. These provisions are a very good start to remedying the constitutional defect the Court found with respect to treatment progress.
However, the amended proposed settlement does not require that residents be treated under the least restrictive conditions necessary while receiving treatment. Further, the amended proposed settlement does not provide any clear mechanism for the Special Master, Monitor, or Court to hold Defendants accountable if they impede residents’ treatment progress through community reintegration for reasons unrelated to the purpose for their commitment (namely, their mental condition and dangerousness). Instead, the amended
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proposed settlement provides that, if a resident is moved back in treatment, “the reasons for such action may be challenged by the class member in an appeal to the SORTS Clinical Director, whose decision is final.” (Doc. No. 591-1 at 7.) In other words, Defendants could hold residents back in treatment solely as a pretext for warehousing residents in an effort to avoid releasing anyone—not a wholly implausible proposition, given Defendants’ systematic failure, in the 16 years leading up to the trial in this case, to support the release of any residents, regardless of whether they met the criteria for continued commitment—and the Court would have no clear authority under the amended proposed settlement to remedy the situation.
Given the importance of this aspect of the remedial phase, the Court is also concerned with the amended proposed settlement’s restrictions placed on the Special Master and Monitor. The proposed settlement contains absolute limits of 150 reimbursable hours per year for the Special Master, and 200 reimbursable hours per year for the Monitor. Such limits may prove insufficient, especially in the first years of implementation. Moreover, the duties of the Monitor appear unduly restrictive. At the fairness hearing, the parties confirmed that the Monitor’s authority was limited to a list of items to be monitored contained in Exhibit B to the amended proposed settlement. But while Exhibit B authorizes the Monitor to report on the number of residents completing each treatment phase within the expected timelines, it does not authorize the Monitor to evaluate whether residents are moving through each treatment phase as quickly as is appropriate or whether they are returned to earlier phases for inappropriate reasons. In addition, the amended proposed settlement requires that “[i]f the Special Master’s report concludes that a substantive
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provision is in substantial compliance for two consecutive reports [or one year], the Special Master shall recommend to the Court that the provision no longer be reported on or monitored.” Id. at 10. This may not be appropriate and, in any event, may be difficult to define.
Likewise, with respect to the Director’s duty to authorize persons not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released to petition for release, the amended proposed settlement provides only a partial remedy. The amended proposed settlement imposes a time frame in which the Director must decide whether to authorize a petition for release (80 days from the date of the request for authorization), and states that if the Director fails to make a decision within that time, “the State will not request that the [state] court find a filing by the petitioner to be frivolous pursuant to [Mo. Rev. Stat.] § 632.504.” (Doc. No. 591-1 at 8.) The amended proposed settlement also authorizes the Special Master and Monitor to monitor and report to the Court regarding whether the Director complies with the requirement to render decisions within 80 days.
However, the amended proposed settlement does not provide any clear mechanism for the Special Master, Monitor, or Court to hold the Director accountable if he fails to comply with the substance of § 632.501. In other words, the Director could refuse to authorize a person to petition for release without determining that the person still meets the criteria for civil commitment (a practice this Court has found unconstitutional), and the Court would have no clear authority under the amended proposed settlement to remedy the situation. Arguably, the Director could refuse to authorize petitions for release solely as a pretext to prevent any resident from being released from SORTS.
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The Court also questions the adequacy of the amended proposed settlement’s fiveyear termination provision. This appears to be the part of the amended proposed settlement met with the most vigorous opposition by the objectors. Not all of the objections in this regard warrant denial of the amended proposed settlement. For example, the objectors raised a serious concern that the original proposed settlement could have been read to terminate the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement automatically after five years, even if Defendants had taken no steps to comply with the settlement. However, the amended proposed settlement addresses this issue by plainly providing that if Defendants have not complied with an order for specific performance, termination will be deferred until Defendants comply with that order for specific performance.
Additionally, while the objectors were concerned that the amended proposed settlement does not expressly provide for court-appointed counsel to represent the class members in enforcing the settlement, that concern is unfounded. At the fairness hearing, class counsel (consisting of appointed attorneys and those who voluntarily entered their appearance, such as attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri), stated that they intended to represent the class through the pendency of the case, including for purposes of enforcing the settlement, and that the only reason they did not include an express provision to that effect was that they believed continued legal representation was presumed unless the Court permitted withdrawal (which none of the attorneys had requested). Indeed, the amended proposed settlement expressly provides for the Court’s continued jurisdiction, and references notice to and a continuing role for class counsel in several places. See, e.g., id. at 10. Finally, the objectors’ concern that Defendants will
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revert to their prior patterns immediately upon termination of the settlement does not warrant an arbitrary or unlimited extension of the settlement’s term. The Court cannot assume jurisdiction in perpetuity. See In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 658 (1st Cir. 1993) (“In institutional reform litigation, injunctions should not operate inviolate in perpetuity.”).
Nevertheless, the Court is concerned that the amended proposed settlement’s termination provision creates an unduly adversarial structure. As drafted, the proposed settlement encourages requests for specific performance on issues large and small to prevent termination, as opposed to a reasoned request for termination upon demonstrated substantial compliance. Unnecessary adversarial relations during the course of implementation of the remedial phase are not in the interest of justice and can only serve to further hamper trust between Defendants and the residents, and the development of a proper program focused on treatment and release.
The extensive opposition to the amended proposed settlement also supports a denial of the settlement. A settlement can be fair notwithstanding a large number of objectors and even when all class representatives oppose the settlement. See Marshall, 787 F.3d at 513 (citing Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., 680 F.2d 1225, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s approval of a class action settlement even though both named plaintiffs and 790 of approximately 3,000 members objected to it)). Nevertheless, the number of objectors is a significant consideration, and “at some point objections from the class may become so numerous that in a very real sense it can be said that ‘the class’ has not agreed to the proposal, that counsel’s perceptions of the best interests of the class are faulty, and that approval of the settlement by the district court constitutes an abuse of
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discretion.” Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the district court’s approval of a backpay settlement constituted an abuse of discretion where all active named plaintiffs and 70% of the subclass objected).
Not all of the written objections filed by class members are relevant to this case. See, e.g., Doc. No. 594 (objecting that the SVP Act discriminates against men on the basis of sex, which was not a claim in this case). And some of the objections simply do not warrant denial of the amended proposed settlement, such as the objection raised by many objectors regarding the limitations on the use of the amended proposed settlement agreement as evidence in other cases. But the sheer number of objections, and particularly to the extent that they address the gaps in the amended proposed settlement discussed above, convince the Court that it should withhold approval and allow the Remedies Phase to proceed to a trial.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that class counsel’s motion for final approval of the amended proposed settlement is DENIED. (Doc. No. 689.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 14 days of the date of this Order, the parties shall file a joint proposed schedule for litigation of the Remedies Phase.

Dated this 23rd day of November, 2016.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 786 Filed: 07/06/17 Page: 1 of 13 PageID #: 7789

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JEFF STRINGER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court upon review of the parties’ briefs, invited by the Court, as to whether the Court should reconsider its December 22, 2015 Amended Memorandum Opinion on liability (“Liability Opinion”) in light of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).1 At the request of Plaintiffs, the Court held oral argument on this issue on June 23, 2017. In its Liability Opinion, the Court found that Missouri’s civil commitment statute for sexually violent predators (“SVP Act”), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480-632.525, was unconstitutional as applied to the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“DMH”) Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities. In Karsjens, the Eighth Circuit rejected a substantially similar challenge to the SVP civil commitment statute
1 The Eighth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc in Karsjens on February 22, 2017, and on May 19, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 786 Filed: 07/06/17 Page: 2 of 13 PageID #: 7790
and treatment program in Minnesota. With some reluctance, in light of the extensive proceedings to date, the Court finds that Karsjens compels reconsideration of the Liability Opinion and entry of judgment in favor of Defendants, as Defendants request in their brief.
BACKGROUND The approximately 225 Plaintiffs in this class action are civilly committed residents of SORTS, who have been declared sexually violent predators under Missouri’s SVP Act. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and named as Defendants various executives and employees of SORTS and the DMH, solely in their official capacities. In their Fifth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that the SVP Act was unconstitutional as written and as applied to SORTS, and that the reimbursement sought by the state from SORTS residents was also unconstitutional.2 On September 30, 2011, the Court certified this case as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). After extensive informal and formal discovery, the Court, on December 19, 2014, granted Plaintiffs’ uncontested motion to bifurcate the trial into two phases: liability and remedy. ECF No. 358. The Court held an eight-day bench trial on the issue of liability only, beginning on April 21, 2015. The only claims remaining for trial were that the SVP Act on its face and as applied to SORTS, as well as the reimbursement sought by the state from SORTS residents, violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. In their as-applied challenge to the SVP Act,
2 In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs did not challenge their initial commitment. However, the Court notes that on June 27, 2017, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the civil commitment process under the SVP Act and held, as it has previously, that the commitment process is constitutional. Matter of Care & Treatment of Kirk v. State, No. SC 95752, 2017 WL 2774419, at *2 (Mo. June 27, 2017).
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Plaintiffs claimed that (1) particular modalities of treatment at SORTS were inadequate due to staff and funding shortages, and (2) the entire SORTS treatment program was a sham because, in its 16 years of operation, SORTS had neither established the risk assessment and release procedures contemplated by the SVP Act, nor successfully treated and released any residents back into the community following such treatment.
In its Liability Opinion, the Court denied relief on Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the SVP Act, Plaintiffs’ claim challenging the state’s reimbursement scheme, and Plaintiffs’ asapplied challenge regarding the adequacy of SORTS’ treatment modalities. However, the Court concluded that the SVP Act was unconstitutional as applied to SORTS with respect to certain discrete aspects of risk assessment and release.
The first constitutional deficiency the Court found was the manner in which Defendants conducted annual assessments of the mental condition of Plaintiffs, known as “annual reviews.” The evidence at trial showed that annual reviews were the primary tool that the state courts used to evaluate whether a civilly committed person continued to satisfy the statutory criteria for commitment. The Court concluded that SORTS officials responsible for conducting annual reviews were not consistently applying the correct legal standard for evaluating Plaintiffs’ risk level under the statutory criteria. The Court held that the improper application of the annual review mechanism contributed to the continued confinement of Plaintiffs beyond the time constitutionally justified. ECF No. 501 at 53-54.
The second constitutional deficiency the Court found was with respect to the release portion of the SORTS treatment program and the lack of any community reintegration program. The Court concluded that Defendants’ stated goal of treating and safely
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 786 Filed: 07/06/17 Page: 4 of 13 PageID #: 7792
reintegrating Plaintiffs back into the community was observed in theory but not in practice,
and that the release portion of SORTS was a sham. Id. at 54-55. In particular, the Court
found that SORTS undisputedly had residents who, because of their age and physical
infirmity or because of their treatment progress, had reduced their risk below the standard
required for commitment, but that Defendants consistently opposed the release of such
residents and had not designed any procedures for their community reintegration.
The final constitutional deficiency the Court found was with respect to the release
procedures at SORTS. The Court concluded that the Director of the DMH had effectively
abdicated his statutory duty under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.501, which provides that “[i]f the
director of the [DMH] determines that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released,3 the director shall authorize the person to petition the court for release.”4 The Court found that the Director
had not authorized a single person committed under the SVP Act to petition for conditional
release, and that Defendants were instead stalling or blocking Director authorization even
3 As explained in the Court’s Liability Opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted this language to permit civil commitment only if a person is “both dangerous and has some mental illness or abnormality,” and to require release if a resident “can demonstrate that he is no longer likely to commit sexually violent offenses, . . . regardless of whether the reason he is no longer dangerous is primarily mental or physical.” In re Care & Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 446 (Mo. 2007).
4 As explained in the Court’s Liability Opinion, petitions filed without the Director’s authorization are subject to heightened requirements, including a frivolity review. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.504 (“Upon receipt of a first or subsequent petition from committed persons without the director’s approval, the court shall endeavor whenever possible to review the petition and determine if the petition is based on frivolous grounds and if so shall deny the petition without a hearing.”). Moreover, if a petition filed without the Director’s authorization has been found to be frivolous or has been previously denied, the court must deny any subsequent petition “unless the petition contains facts upon which a court could find the condition of the petitioner had so changed that a hearing was warranted.” Id.
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when SORTS treatment providers and annual reviewers concluded that a resident qualified for conditional release.
In arriving at these conclusions, the Court held that the standard of review for a substantive due process challenge to civil commitment statutes was not strict scrutiny, as Plaintiffs advocated. Rather, the Court applied the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), which held that “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ as-applied claim required a further finding that the constitutional violation was conscience-shocking, as Defendants had argued, the Court found that Defendants’ conduct with respect to risk assessment and release as described above did indeed shock the conscience. ECF No. 501 at 57.
The Court held that Plaintiffs’ prayers for injunctive relief with respect to the constitutional violation found by the Court would be addressed in a second phase of trial, the “Remedies Phase,” initially set for March 30, 2016. However, before trial was held in the Remedies Phase, the parties jointly moved to stay all proceedings in order to engage in settlement negotiations. After extensive negotiations with the assistance of Retired United States Magistrate Judge Mary Ann Medler, a proposed settlement was reached.
Approximately 175 of the 225 of the class members (more than 75% of the class), including all of the class representatives, objected to the proposed settlement and were represented by appointed counsel. Although the Court permitted class members to file letters in support of the proposed settlement, only one class member did so. The objectors,
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through appointed counsel, stated in their briefs and at a fairness hearing before this Court that they understood that the proposed settlement would eliminate the significant risk associated with an appeal of this case, and/or of an adverse decision in the then-pending appeal of Karsjens. But the objectors nevertheless opposed the settlement because it did not fully address the violations found in the Court’s Liability Opinion. On November 23, 2016, after careful consideration of the settlement’s terms and objections thereto, the Court denied the motion to approve the proposed settlement. The Remedies Phase trial was thereafter scheduled for June 12, 2017.
Meanwhile, on January 3, 2017, the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion in Karsjens. The district court in Karsjens had found that the Minnesota civil commitment statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and applied strict scrutiny to both types of claims. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1166, 1170 (D. Minn. 2015). The district court concluded that the statute was facially unconstitutional in a number of respects primarily related to deficiencies in risk assessment and release procedures, which the court found authorized “prolonged commitment, even after committed individuals no longer pose a danger to the public,” and “result[ed] in a punitive effect and application contrary to the purpose of civil commitment.” Id. at 1168-70.
The district court in Karsjens also concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Minnesota’s treatment program (“MSOP”) for reasons again largely related to risk assessment and release, and which also resulted in the plaintiffs “being confined to MSOP beyond such a time as they either meet the statutory reduction in custody criteria or no longer satisfy the constitutional threshold for continued commitment.” Id.at 1170.
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In its findings of fact, the district court specifically found that “MSOP knows that
there are Class Members who meet the reduction in custody criteria or who no longer meet
the commitment criteria but who continue to be confined at the MSOP,” and that “[d]espite
its knowledge that individuals have met the criteria for release, the MSOP has never
petitioned on behalf of a committed individual for full discharge.” Id. at 1164. The district
court then concluded that the Minnesota statute was unconstitutional as applied for the
following reasons:
Defendants do not conduct periodic, independent risk assessments or otherwise evaluate whether an individual continues to meet the initial commitment criteria or the discharge criteria if an individual does not file a petition; (2) those risk assessments that have been performed have not all been performed in a constitutional manner; (3) individuals have remained confined at the MSOP even though they have completed treatment or sufficiently reduced their risk; (4) discharge procedures are not working properly at the MSOP; (5) although section 253D [of the Minnesota statute] expressly allows the referral of committed individuals to less restrictive alternatives, this is not occurring in practice because there are insufficient less restrictive alternatives available for transfer and no less restrictive alternatives available for initial commitment; and (6) although treatment has been made available, the treatment program’s structure has been an institutional failure and there is no meaningful relationship between the treatment program and an end to indefinite detention.
Id.at 1173-74. As with the facial violation, the district found that the as-applied
constitutional violation resulted in “a punitive effect and application contrary to the purpose
of civil commitment.” Id. at 1174. The district court entered injunctive relief to remedy
these deficiencies.
The Eighth Circuit reversed. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit first held that the district
court applied the wrong standard of scrutiny to the plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied
substantive due process claims. Karsjens, 845 F.3d at 407. In particular, the Eighth Circuit
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held that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has characterized civil commitment as a significant deprivation of liberty, it has never declared that persons who pose a significant danger to themselves or others possess a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint.” Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) and Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 116 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
The Eighth Circuit relied on Jackson v. Indiana’s “reasonable relation” test, as did this Court, and held that the proper standard of scrutiny to be applied to the plaintiffs’ facial due process challenge was whether the statute “bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.” Id. at 407-08. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Minnesota statute, on its face, survived this highly deferential reasonable relationship review. Id. at 409.
With respect to the as-applied challenge, the Eighth Circuit held that the proper standard was to require the plaintiffs to demonstrate “both that the state defendants’ conduct was conscience-shocking, and that the state defendants violated one or more fundamental rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Id. at 408 (quoting Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 651 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Bye, J., concurring and writing for a majority on this issue)). To shock the conscience, the Eighth Circuit held that “the alleged substantive due process violations must involve conduct so severe[,] so disproportionate to the need presented, and so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.” Id.
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 786 Filed: 07/06/17 Page: 9 of 13 PageID #: 7797
(citing Moran, 296 F.3d at 647 (quoting In re Scott Cty. Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1166 (D. Minn. 1987)).
The Eighth Circuit held that the grounds upon which the district court relied in finding an as-applied due process violation could not satisfy the conjunctive standard applicable to such a claim. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit denied relief on the as-applied claim. Id. at 410-411.
In their briefs now before the Court, the parties dispute the effect Karsjens has on this Court’s finding of liability with respect to Plaintiff’s as-applied claim challenging riskassessment and release.5 Plaintiffs assert that Karsjens has no effect on the Court’s Liability Opinion because the Court found that Defendants’ conduct was conscience-shocking. Plaintiffs characterize the Eighth Circuit’s statement that as-applied substantive due process claims require both a violation of a fundamental liberty interest and conscience-shocking conduct as dicta. In any event, Plaintiffs argue that Karsjens did not foreclose a finding that “the use of lifetime, punitive detention” implicates a fundamental liberty interest. ECF No. 764 at 8-9.
At oral argument, Plaintiffs also insisted that the Court is free to disregard the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that the Minnesota defendants’ conduct did not shock the conscience. According to Plaintiffs, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this respect was contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) and other cases, because the Eighth Circuit appeared to incorporate an intent-to-harm
5 The parties agree that Karsjens does not affect the Court’s denial of relief on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, including Plaintiffs’ facial challenge.
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Case: 4:09-cv-00971-AGF Doc. #: 786 Filed: 07/06/17 Page: 10 of 13 PageID #: 7798
requirement into the shocks-the-conscience standard, notwithstanding that the state defendants had time to deliberate prior to taking action.
Defendants argue that Karsjens compels reconsideration of the Liability Opinion to the extent it granted relief on Plaintiffs’ as-applied claim. Defendants argue that under Karsjens, Plaintiffs’ as-applied claim is subject to a conjunctive standard requiring conduct that both violates a fundamental liberty interest and shocks the conscience. Defendants contend that, like the Minnesota plaintiffs in Karsjens, Plaintiffs here cannot satisfy the first prong because “the Eighth Circuit held that persons committed pursuant to sexually-violent predator statutes do not possess a fundamental liberty interest in being free of confinement.” ECF No. 765 at 14. Defendants insisted at oral argument that, in light of this holding, even if the state defendants continued to confine civilly committed individuals whom the defendants knew were no longer mentally ill or dangerous, such conduct would not give rise to a substantive due process violation. Rather, Defendants argued, such civilly committed individuals would have to seek relief in the state courts using the procedures available under the state civil commitment statute or assert that such procedures are insufficient in terms of procedural due process.
Defendants further argue that even if a fundamental liberty interest were at stake, the Liability Opinion’s findings with respect to risk-assessment and release “mirror closely the putative deficiencies in the Minnesota program that the Eighth Circuit held to be categorically insufficient to satisfy the conscience-shocking test.” Id. at 17-18. At oral argument, Defendants maintained that the Eighth Circuit’s holding with respect to the shocks-the-conscience test is consistent with prior Eighth Circuit precedent and is binding
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on this Court. For these reasons, Defendants argue that the Court should reconsider the Liability Opinion and enter judgment in favor of Defendants.
DISCUSSION A “district court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify an interlocutory order any time prior to the entry of judgment.” K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007). In particular, reconsideration may be justified in light of an intervening development in the controlling law. See Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. United States, No. 4:03CV861 CDP, 2009 WL 881605, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2009); see also Conrod v. Davis, 120 F.3d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Where the district court believes that an earlier decision was reached in error, it may revisit the decision to avoid later reversal.”) (citation omitted). The Court believes that reconsideration is required here in light of Karsjens. The Eighth Circuit clearly held that “to maintain an as-applied due process challenge, the class plaintiffs have the burden of showing the state actors’ actions were conscience-shocking and violate a fundamental liberty interest.” Karsjens, 845 F.3d at 410 (emphasis added).6 The Eighth Circuit further held that claims substantially similar to the ones alleged here do not
6 As Plaintiffs note, other circuits have appeared to treat the test as disjunctive. See, e.g., Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Substantive due process claims may be loosely divided into two categories: (1) deprivations of a particular constitutional guarantee; and (2) actions that ‘shock the conscience.’”); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 768 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the real issue in substantive due process cases [is]: whether the plaintiff suffered from governmental action that either (1) infringes upon a fundamental right, or (2) shocks the conscience,” and that “the ‘shocks the conscience’ and ‘fundamental liberty’ tests are but two separate approaches to analyzing governmental action under the Fourteenth Amendment”) (emphasis added).
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implicate a fundamental liberty interest. Although these holdings raise troubling questions as to whether civil commitment statutes can ever be challenged on as-applied substantive due process grounds, they are binding on this Court. And they end the Court’s inquiry because, according to Karsjens, without a fundamental liberty interest, Plaintiffs’ as-applied claim fails no matter how shocking the state defendants’ conduct.
In any event, the Court cannot distinguish Defendants’ conduct with respect to risk assessment and release from the conduct of the state defendants in Karsjens, which the Eighth Circuit definitively held was not conscience-shocking. Applying the standard used by the Eighth Circuit in Karsjens,7 the Court may have still held that, at the least, continuing to confine the aged and infirm who are undisputedly no longer dangerous shocks the conscience. But Karsjens precludes such a holding. There, too, the district court found that the state defendants continued to confine individuals known to no longer meet the criteria for commitment, but according to the Eighth Circuit, neither this nor any of the other actions taken by the state defendants was enough to shock the conscience.
The Supreme Court has held that “substantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstances” before determining whether conduct shocks the conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. And as Plaintiffs correctly note, in Lewis, relied heavily upon by the Eighth Circuit in Karsjens, the Supreme Court distinguished circumstances in which “actual deliberation is practical,” such as a “custodial prison situation,” from those in which “decisions [are] necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury
7 In finding Defendants’ conduct conscience-shocking in its Liability Opinion, the Court, under Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850, did not assume the standard required malice or intent to harm.
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of a second change,” such as a prison riot or high-speed chase. Id. at 852-53. The Supreme Court held that, in the former circumstance, “deliberate indifference can rise to a constitutionally shocking level,” whereas in the latter, a “purpose to cause harm” is needed to shock the conscience. Id. at 852-53.
The Karsjens opinion did not discuss this distinction when determining that the Minnesota defendants’ conduct with respect to risk assessment and release of civilly committed individuals did not shock the conscience. Id. at 411. Nevertheless, the opinion “is controlling until overruled by [the Eighth Circuit] en banc, by the Supreme Court, or by Congress.” M.M. ex rel. L.R. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 2008).
CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court’s December 22, 2015 Amended Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 501) is VACATED in part, to the extent that it granted Plaintiffs’ claims in part, and Plaintiffs’ claims are hereby DENIED. All claims against all parties having been resolved, a separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 6th day of July, 2017.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Van  Orden  v.  Schafer,  129  F.Supp.3d  839  (2015)     
  
129 F.Supp.3d 839 United States District Court,
E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.
John VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Keith SCHAFER, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF. |
Signed Sept. 11, 2015. |
As Amended Dec. 22, 2015.
Synopsis Background: Civilly committed residents of Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (DMH) Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (SORTS) facilities, who had been declared sexually violent predators (SVP) under Missouri’s SVP Act, brought class action alleging under § 1983 that SVP Act was unconstitutional as written and as applied to SORTS.

  
[7] reimbursement scheme did not violate substantive due process.
Ordered accordingly.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*841 Anthony E. Rothert, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation, Daniel K. O’Toole, John H. Quinn, III, Ronnie Lee White, II, Scott K.G. Kozak, Christopher Larose, Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Andrew J. McNulty, ACLU of Missouri, Susan S. Kister, Susan Sherberg Kister, Attorney at Law, St. Louis, MO, Eric M. Selig, Rosenblum and Schwartz, Clayton, MO, Gillian R. Wilcox, ACLU of Missouri, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiffs.
Katherine S. Walsh, Philip Sholtz, Mary Delworth Morris, Attorney General of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, Joseph Paul Dandurand, Joel A. Poole, Attorney General of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO, for Defendants.

Holdings: The District Court, Audrey G. Fleissig, J., following bench trial on issue of liability, held that:
[1] claims of named plaintiffs who were pretrial detainees were moot;
[2] section of SVP Act requiring SVP petitioning for release from civil commitment to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, why he should be released, on its face, did not violate due process;
[3] section of SVP Act governing conditional release, on its face, did not violate due process;
[4] as-applied substantive due process claims challenging SORTS treatment program were not subject to strict scrutiny;
[5] treatment received by residents at SORTS was not so lacking due to staffing and funding shortages as to shock the conscience, as would violate substantive due process;
[6] nature and duration of residents’ commitment violated substantive due process; but
        
  

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG, District Judge.
This class action is before the Court following a bench trial to address Plaintiffs’ claims in their Fifth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs are civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“DMH”) Sex Offender *842 Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities, who have been declared sexually violent predators (“SVP”) under Missouri’s SVP Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 632.480–632.525. Plaintiffs state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the SVP Act is unconstitutional as written and as applied to SORTS, and that the reimbursement sought by the state from SORTS residents is also unconstitutional.
Parties Plaintiffs are civilly committed residents of SORTS, who
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were committed to the custody of the DMH by a judgment of a Missouri circuit or probate court, pursuant to the SVP Act. On September 30, 2011, the Court certified this case as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The Court certified two classes: (1) a “Treatment Class” consisting of persons who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS as a result of civil commitment, and (2) a “Charging Class” consisting of persons who were, are, or will be, during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS as a result of civil commitment, and who have been, or will be, billed or charged for care, treatment, room, or board by SORTS.
On the last day of trial, the parties informed the Court of their agreement that named Plaintiffs Macon Baker, David Brown, Joseph Bowen, and William Murphy are not members of the Treatment Class because they were solely pre-trial detainees,1 and that as such, their claims relating to treatment are moot. Baker and Brown were never committed to SORTS because a jury found that they did not meet the criteria of an SVP. And as of the last day of trial in this case, Bowen and Murphy had not been committed to SORTS and were awaiting a civil commitment trial to determine whether they met the criteria of an SVP. Other than these four individuals, all Plaintiffs are currently civilly committed at one of two SORTS facilities in Farmington and Fulton, Missouri.
Defendants are executives or employees of SORTS and the DMH, and all are sued solely in their official capacities.
Defendant Keith Schafer is the Director of the DMH. Defendant Mark Stringer is the Director of the DMH’s Division of Behavioral Health. Defendant Richard Gowdy is the Deputy Director of the DMH’s Division of Behavioral Health and the former Director of the DMH’s Forensic Services. Defendant Joseph Parks is the former Chief Clinical Officer of the DMH’s Office of Director. Defendant Robert Reitz is the Director of the DMH’s Psychiatric Facilities and Chief Executive Officer of Fulton State Hospital, which houses SORTS–Fulton. Defendant Melissa Ring is the former Chief Operating Officer of Adult Psychiatric Services (“APS”) at the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (“SMMHC”), whose responsibilities included supervision of SORTS–Farmington. Defendant Alan Blake is the former Chief Operating Officer of SORTS and is currently a SORTS consultant. Defendant Jay Englehart is the Medical Director of the SMMHC and the Director of Treatment Services for SORTS–Farmington. Defendant Julie Inman is the Regional Executive Officer of the
        
  

  
Southeast Region of the DMH, which includes the SMMHC and SORTS. Defendant Linda Moll is the Director of Behavioral Treatment Services, APS at the SMMHC. Defendants Harold Myers and Judy Sumpter are reimbursement officers at the SMMHC. Defendant Damon Longworth *843 is the Chief Financial Officer of the SMMHC. Defendant Donna Augustine is the Director of Social Work at the SMMHC. Defendant David Schmitt is the Chief Operating Officer of the SMMHC, and the former Quality Improvement Director of the SMMHC. Defendant Justin Arnett is the Chief Nurse Executive of the SMMHC. Defendant Marty Martin–Foreman is the Chief Operating Officer of Fulton State Hospital. Defendant Ian Fluger is the Program Treatment Coordinator of SORTS–Fulton. Defendant Sherry Lee is the Chief Nurse Executive of Fulton State Hospital. Defendant Kristina Bender–Crice is a Unit Program Supervisor at SORTS–Farmington. Defendant Erica Kempker is a former employee of SORTS–Farmington.
Proceedings Plaintiffs claim that that the SVP Act on its face and as applied to the SORTS treatment program violates the Due Process Clause, and that the reimbursement sought by the state from SORTS residents also violates the Due Process Clause.2 Plaintiffs assert two types of as-applied claims regarding treatment. First, Plaintiffs claim that particular modalities of treatment at SORTS are inadequate due to staff and funding shortages. Second, Plaintiffs claim that the entire SORTS treatment program is a sham because, in its 16 years of operation, SORTS has neither established the risk assessment and release procedures contemplated by the SVP Act, nor successfully treated and released, following such treatment, any residents back into the community.
After extensive informal and formal discovery, the Court, on December 19, 2014, granted Plaintiffs’ uncontested motion to bifurcate the trial into two phases: liability and remedy. (Doc. No. 358.) An eight-day trial solely on the issue of liability was held beginning on April 21, 2015.
Four expert witnesses testified at trial. Clinical psychologist Brian Abbott, Ph.D., and licensed clinical social worker David Prescott testified for Plaintiffs. Dr. Abbott has extensive experience in developing, implementing, and reviewing treatment programs for sex offenders, and in conducting forensic evaluations of individuals civilly committed as SVPs. Prescott formerly served as Treatment Assessment Director of Wisconsin’s
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SVP program, and he, too, has extensive experience in developing, assessing, and providing training regarding SVP treatment programs around the country, including at SORTS. Prescott also formerly served as a board member and president of the national Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (“ATSA”), and he currently serves on the board of directors of the national Sex Offender Civil Commitment Providers’ Network (“SOCCPN”).
Clinical psychologist Anita Schlank, Ph.D., and forensic psychiatrist Angeline Stanislaus, M.D., testified for Defendants. Dr. Schlank is the Clinical Director of Virginia’s SVP civil commitment program. She has provided sex offender evaluation and treatment for approximately 30 years, formerly served as the Clinical Director of Minnesota’s SVP civil commitment program, and has served as a consultant for several other SVP civil commitment programs around the country, including SORTS. She also serves on the board of directors of SOCCPN. Dr. Stanislaus is the Chief Medical Director of Adult Services for the DMH, and she oversees the two hospitals in which the SORTS facilities are housed. Dr. Stanislaus also has several years of experience in conducting forensic *844 evaluations of civilly committed sex offenders in Illinois and has testified as an expert witness in numerous civil commitment trials.
The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are entered based on the entire record, including the trial testimony and exhibits, and the parties’ post-trial briefs. As set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have proved their claims in part.

  
Where so significant a restriction of an individual’s liberty is at issue, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the nature and duration of the confinement bear some reasonable relation to the confinement’s non-punitive, civil purpose. Thus, the state must ensure that it civilly confines individuals only so long as they are both mentally ill and dangerous. If confinement continues beyond that time, or if it imposes restrictions that are so excessive as to indicate the forbidden purpose to punish, it becomes unconstitutional.
The evidence at trial did not establish that the SVP Act is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or that the particular treatment modalities at SORTS are so lacking as to violate the Due Process Clause. Nor did the evidence establish that the state’s reimbursement scheme is unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court will deny relief with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the SVP Act on its face, challenging the constitutional adequacy of the SORTS treatment modalities, and challenging the state’s reimbursement scheme.
However, the overwhelming evidence at trial—much of which came from Defendants’ own experts—did establish that the SORTS civil commitment program suffers from systemic failures regarding risk assessment and release that have resulted in the continued confinement of individuals who no longer meet the criteria for commitment, in violation of the Due Process Clause. This case will proceed to the remedy phase to determine appropriate relief regarding these specific, as-applied constitutional deficiencies.

SUMMARY OF DECISION
Missouri’s SVP Act permits the state to involuntarily detain individuals outside of the criminal justice system, potentially indefinitely, under a civil commitment process designed to protect the public from persons who suffer from severe mental abnormalities and who are dangerous. Unlike criminal systems, which punish individuals for past criminal conduct, civil commitment systems such as SORTS involuntarily confine individuals who have in many cases already served complete prison sentences for their crimes, but who, by reason of mental illness or abnormality, are deemed likely to commit acts of violence in the future.
        
  

FINDINGS OF FACT
History of Missouri’s SVP Act and SORTS Twenty states, including Missouri, have enacted laws permitting the civil commitment of sex offenders. Thirty states have no such law. Missouri’s SVP Act became effective on January 1, 1999. SORTS, previously known as the Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program and later, the Missouri Sex Offender Treatment Center, opened just a few days later, on January 4, 1999.
There are now two SORTS facilities. The first was opened in 1999 at the SMMHC in Farmington, Missouri.
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During the first decade of its operations, no residents were released from the SORTS–Farmington facility. In mid–2009, SORTS was running out of space for residents, and began to explore options, including the development of a community alternative for the aged and infirm and the opening of *845 group homes. Another option considered was the conditional release of 8 to 16 residents to cottages at the St. Louis Psychiatric Rehabilitation Center (“SLPRC”), a secure facility that is somewhat less restrictive than SORTS, and a group of individuals thought suitable for such release was identified. None of these options was pursued, however. Instead, in 2010, the state provided further funding which was used to expand the program at SORTS–Farmington, and to open a new SORTS facility at Fulton State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri.
Both the SMMHC and Fulton State Hospital divide their hospital space between SORTS and other divisions for mentally ill persons, including criminal sex offenders who have not been declared SVPs under the SVP Act. At the SMMHC, the non-SORTS division is known as APS. At Fulton State Hospital, the non-SORTS division is known as “Fulton Proper.” The SORTS facilities in both hospitals are considered to be either maximum security or high security facilities, with razor wire fences patrolled by armed guards. There are separate wards within each of the SORTS facilities for aged and infirm residents.
In the fall of 2013, SORTS–Farmington opened a facility within its secure perimeter known as the “Annex.” The Annex is a step-down unit, with space for up to eight residents, and is a somewhat less restrictive, group-home-type setting, that is behind the razor wire fence of SORTS–Farmington. There are currently five residents living in the Annex. Evidence was presented with respect to three of these residents, each of whom has obtained a court order finding that he no longer meets the criteria for commitment and is therefore entitled to conditional release.
One such resident, James Lewis, received a court order for conditional release in January, 2012, after successfully completing the SORTS treatment program. Although SORTS treatment providers recommended his conditional release, they requested that his release be “without discharge.” In the absence of any facilities to accommodate such a release, Lewis remained confined in the main ward of SORTS for a little over a year, until the Annex was opened.
The other two Annex residents who obtained conditional release orders are Donald Williams and James Fennewald.
        
  

  
Both obtained conditional release orders “without discharge,” at the request of SORTS treatment providers, in 2013 and late 2014, respectively.
Although treatment programs have been on-going at both facilities, and a number of residents have progressed through the designated treatment programs, no procedures or placement options for community reintegration have been established. Only two residents have ever been reintegrated into the community after civil commitment to SORTS, but neither was released as a result of successfully completing the treatment program.
As discussed more fully below, the two residents released into the community after commitment to SORTS were DeWayne Arthur and Ronald Gibson. Neither the DMH nor SORTS was involved in either of these releases. Arthur was civilly committed but never received treatment at SORTS. Because of Arthur’s medical frailty, Missouri’s Attorney General reached an agreement with Arthur’s attorney to discharge Arthur to a skilled nursing facility immediately after his commitment. The DMH and SORTS were not involved in this negotiation. Gibson spent more time at SORTS, but because he was aged and suffering from dementia, he was conditionally released by a court in 2010. This release was opposed by the DMH and SORTS. Expert witnesses from both sides and Defendant Jay Englehart, M.D., *846 Director of Treatment Services for SORTS–Farmington, all agreed at trial that neither the Arthur nor Gibson releases could be credited to the success of the SORTS treatment program. No other SORTS resident has been released into the community, and Missouri is at the bottom of SVP programs nationally in this respect.
At the time of trial, there were approximately 200 individuals confined at SORTS under the SVP Act, including several residents over the age of 65 and others who are physically infirm. Both SORTS facilities are at or near maximum capacity.
Missouri’s SVP Act The SVP Act defines an SVP as “any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility” and who has either (a) pled guilty, been found guilty, or been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a sexually violent offense; or (b) has been committed as a criminal sexual psychopath pursuant to another Missouri statute.
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Mo.Rev.Stat. § 632.480(5).
Among sex offenders, individuals civilly committed as SVPs are considered to pose the highest risk of sexually reoffending. However, evidence was credibly presented that recidivism rates for sex offenders generally may be overstated.3
When a prisoner found guilty of a sexually violent crime is suspected of meeting the criteria of an SVP, the agency with jurisdiction provides notice to Missouri’s Attorney General within 360 days prior to the prisoner’s release. Id. § 632.483. The person is then evaluated by a prosecutors’ review committee and a multidisciplinary team established by Missouri’s Department of Corrections (“DOC”), which includes psychiatrists and psychologists from both the DOC and the DMH, to assess whether the person meets the definition of an SVP. Id. If the prosecutors’ review committee determines by a majority vote that the person meets the definition of an SVP, the Attorney General may file a petition in the probate division of the circuit court alleging that the person is an SVP, stating sufficient facts to support such an allegation, and also attaching a copy of the multidisciplinary team’s assessment. Id. § 632.486. The court then holds a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person is an SVP, and if so, the person is held in secure custody until the time of trial. Id. § 632.489. The person has the right to counsel at the probable cause hearing and at trial. Id. §§ 632.489–632.492.
If at trial, the court or a jury by unanimous verdict determines “by clear and convincing evidence” that the person is an SVP, the person is “committed to the custody of the director of the [DMH] for control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.” Id. § 632.495.2. The SVP Act provides that civilly committed persons “shall be kept in a secure facility designated by the director of the [DMH] and such persons shall be segregated at all times from any other patient under the supervision of the director of the [DMH].” Id. § 632.495.3.
*847 Once a person has been civilly committed under the SVP Act, the director of the DMH or his “designee” must evaluate the person’s “mental condition” once a year, and must provide the “yearly report” to the court that committed the person. Id. § 632.498.1. However, nothing in the SVP Act prohibits or prevents the DMH from providing more frequent updates to the court.
There are two methods by which a person civilly
        
  

  
committed as an SVP may obtain release. First, the director of the DMH must provide committed persons with an annual written notice of the person’s right to petition the court for release over the director’s objection.4 Id. § 632.498.2. But petitions filed without the director’s approval are subject to heightened requirements. For example, “[u]pon receipt of a first or subsequent petition from committed persons without the director’s approval, the court shall endeavor whenever possible to review the petition and determing if the petition is based on frivolous grounds and if so shall deny the petition without a hearing.” Id. § 632.504. Moreover, if a petition filed without the director’s approval has been found to be frivolous or has been previously denied, the court must deny any subsequent petition “unless the petition contains facts upon which a court could find the condition of the petitioner had so changed that a hearing was warranted.” Id.
If a petitioner filing for release without the director’s approval survives the frivolity review, he is then subject to the requirements of § 632.498. Under § 632.498.4, the court first holds a hearing at which the petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate by a “preponderance of the evidence,” that he “no longer suffers from a mental abnormality that makes [him] likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if released.” Id. § 632.498.4. If a petitioner can make this threshold showing, the court will set a trial on the issue. At trial, the burden of proof shifts to the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that “the committed person’s mental abnormality remains such that the person is not safe to be at large and if released is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Id. § 632.498.5(3). If the state fails to meet this burden, the person is entitled to conditional release. Id.
The second method by which a person civilly committed as an SVP may obtain release is by obtaining director authorization. “If the director of the [DMH] determines that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, the director shall authorize the person to petition the court for release.” Id. § 632.501 (emphasis added). Director-authorized petitions are not subject to a frivolity review. Section 632.501 provides that “[t]he hearing and trial, if any” for director-authorized petitions “shall be conducted according to the provisions of section 632.398.” Id.
The uncontroverted testimony at the bench trial in this case suggested that the court proceedings would be more streamlined for director-authorized release petitions. This result is perhaps supported by the language “if any” in §
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632.501.
Section 632.505 of the SVP Act, governing conditional release, provides:
Upon determination by a court or jury that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed5 that the person is not *848 likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, the court shall place the person on conditional release pursuant to the terms of this section. The primary purpose of conditional release is to provide outpatient treatment and monitoring to prevent the person’s condition from deteriorating to the degree that the person would need to be returned to a secure facility designated by the director of the [DMH].
Id. § 632.505.1. This section requires the DMH to “develop a conditional release plan which contains appropriate conditions for the person to be released,” and which addresses the “person’s need for supervision, counseling, medication, community support services, residential services, vocational services, and alcohol and drug treatment.” Id. § 632.505.2.
The DMH must submit the proposed plan for conditional release to the court. Id. The reviewing court then determines the conditions that it “deems necessary to meet the person’s need for treatment and supervision and to protect the safety of the public.” Id. § 632.505.3. Section 632.505 lists 21 conditions to which conditionally released persons “shall be subject,” such as maintaining a residence approved by the DMH; not having contact with any child without specific approval by the DMH; not consuming alcohol or controlled substances; not leaving the state without permission of the DMH; and submitting to electronic monitoring, which may be based on technology that identifies and records a person’s location at all times. Id. This section also permits the court to add other conditions that it deems “necessary to meet the person’s need for treatment and supervision and to protect the safety of the public.” Id. However, the section also provides that the court “may modify conditions of release upon its own motion or upon petition of the [DMH], the [DOC], or the person on conditional release.” Id. § 632.505.6. Moreover, although conditionally released persons may have to maintain a residence approved by the DMH, they are not required to be segregated from other
        
  

  
mental health patients. Id. § 632.495.3.
Individuals civilly committed to SORTS may also have to reimburse the state for any care and treatment provided by the DMH. Missouri Revised Statutes § 630.205.1 provides that a “person receiving services and the person’s estate, spouse, parents, if the person is a minor, and any fiduciary or representative payee holding assets for the person ... are jointly and severally liable for the fees for services rendered to the person by a residential facility [.]” Id. § 630.205.1. The director of the DMH determines the “maximum amount for services which shall be charged in each of the residential facilities” and applies a “standard means test” in determining the amount to be charged. Id. § 630.210.1. The SVP Act also provides that conditionally released persons may be required to pay “fees to the [DMH] and the [DOC] to cover the costs of services and monitoring,” as a condition of release. Id. § 632.505.3(18). However, the reimbursement provisions state that “[n]o person who is domiciled in Missouri shall be denied services from a [DMH] facility because of an inability to pay for such services on the part of the individual, the spouse, or the parents.” Id. § 630.205.4.
SORTS Treatment Program SORTS has historically maintained a vision and mission of “no more victims,” and at one point, the SORTS treatment manual stated that residents were to remain in the *849 custody of the DMH until it was determined that the resident “will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged.” (Pls.’ Ex. 123 at 40.) These statements, which essentially require a complete absence of risk before a resident will be released, are inconsistent with the SVP Act’s requirements. They are also unrealistic. Evidence was credibly presented that no adult male has a 0% risk of committing an act of sexual violence.
Both SORTS–Farmington and SORTS–Fulton are accredited, as part of their respective hospitals, pursuant to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, also known as the “Joint Commission.” The SMMHC, including SORTS–Farmington, passed the Joint Commission’s survey performed in 2012, which reviewed, among other things, the facility’s staffing levels, treatment standards, security, and emergency preparedness.
SORTS also strives to adhere to national guidelines published by ATSA for the assessment, treatment, and management of male sexual abusers. These guidelines
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recommend that confinement and treatment may be necessary for a small group of chronic, violent, or predatory offenders; that sexual predator assessments should be conducted using empirically validated risk assessment instruments and measures; that civil commitment should be reserved for sex offenders who are found to pose the highest threat to public safety; that civil commitment should be viewed as one part of a comprehensive continuum of responses to sexual offending behavior; that treatment should be consistent with current research and professional standards and should reflect an individual’s qualifying mental disorders, relative risk, and needs; and that treatment should be assessed each year to evaluate progress. (Defs.’ Ex. S.)
If SORTS residents consent to treatment, an individualized treatment plan is developed for them, and it is updated annually. Treatment teams consist of a psychiatrist, a medical doctor, a psychologist, a social worker, a nurse, a unit manager, a recreational or vocational therapist, and a security aide. Treatment teams meet weekly to discuss progress of each resident and to adjust treatment plans as needed.
There are two types of SVP treatment provided to SORTS residents. SORTS–Farmington residents primarily receive Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (“CBT”). The CBT model was built on the idea that dysfunctional behavior is a result of dysfunctional thoughts. Therefore, CBT treatment focuses on changing residents’ way of thinking. The CBT program offers residents six to eight hours per week of sex-offender-specific process groups, also known as core groups, to address dynamic risk factors associated with sexual offenses. These core process groups are led by either psychologists with doctoral or masters’ degrees, or licensed social workers or counselors. There are on average eight residents per group. Residents are also offered two hours of psychoeducational groups per week. Finally, individual psychotherapy is provided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the needs of the individual resident.
SORTS–Fulton residents primarily receive Safe Offender Strategies (“SOS”) treatment. The SOS program was introduced to SORTS–Fulton in 2012, as an option for SORTS residents who were resistant to treatment under the CBT model, including some intellectually disabled residents. The SOS program has been used in the non-SORTS Fulton Proper division of Fulton State Hospital since 2007. One ward at SORTS–Farmington has also recently begun providing SOS treatment.
*850 The SOS model was built on the idea that
        
  

  
dysfunctional behavior is the result of an individual’s emotional dysregulation, or poor response, to particular stressors. SOS treatment therefore focuses on identifying the stressors leading to an individual’s dysregulation, and equipping the individual with the skills he needs to recognize and respond more appropriately to those stressors. Like CBT, SOS also relies primarily on group therapy intervention, and each resident receives eight to ten hours per week of group therapy. SOS groups meet two times per week to discuss and practice the concepts and strategies in the SOS treatment manual. Moreover, residents in the SOS program are offered once-a-week self-monitoring groups and behavioral analysis groups to address self-monitoring practices and treatment-related problem behaviors, respectively. Finally, the SOS program offers psychosexual rehabilitation therapy, which includes groups addressing self-regulation, anger management, life skills, substance abuse, and restorative justice.
The guiding principle for both treatment programs is the risk-needs-responsivity (“RNR”) principle. The RNR principle helps SORTS staff plan treatment in response to a patient’s learning style and risk factors. The risk principle suggests that offenders at higher risk for reoffending will benefit most from higher levels of intervention, including high-intensity treatment. The needs principle suggests that only those facts associated with reductions in recidivism should be targeted in intervention. The responsivity principle suggests that the treatment program should be matched to individual patient characteristics. The ATSA guidelines support the use of RNR-based treatment.
Both the CBT and SOS treatment programs are organized into phases of indeterminate length. The CBT program used at SORTS–Farmington has four phases. Phase I focuses on pre-engagement and engagement; Phase II on cognitive restructuring; Phase III on emotional integration; and Phase IV on community reintegration. The CBT program also employs color-coded patient levels based on similar concepts: Grey—pre-engagement, meaning that the patient is not interested in change or treatment; Red—pre-recognition, meaning that the patient does not recognize that there is a problem or does not feel that he needs treatment; Yellow—recognition, meaning that the patient sees that he has some problems but is not fully committed to addressing them; Blue—planning I, meaning that the patient is making a decision about how to enter treatment and generally attends and participates in treatment; Green—planning II, meaning the patient is making a decision about how to focus his treatment and generally attends and participates in treatment;
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Purple—action, meaning that the patient is actively working in treatment and has made progress; and Gold—maintenance, meaning that the person is fully self-managing or is ready for self-management. The SOS program, used primarily at SORTS–Fulton, has seven stages that correspond roughly with the color-coded patient levels discussed above: Stage 1—pre-engagement; Stage 2—pre-recognition; Stage 3—recognition; Stages 4 and 5—planning; Stage 6—action; and Stage 7—maintenance.
Residents in both programs may move up and down between levels as they progress or regress in treatment. The evidence demonstrated that the number of sex-offender-specific treatment hours offered by SORTS and the utilization of a phased treatment system are consistent with the standards of other SVP treatment programs.
SORTS has historically suffered from staffing and budget shortages, resulting in *851 group cancellations. These deficiencies were reviewed in another case in this District, but were found in 2010 not to render treatment at SORTS so lacking as to violate the Constitution. Strutton v. Meade, No. 4:05CV02022 ERW, 2010 WL 1253715 (E.D.Mo. Mar. 31, 2010). The bulk of the evidence presented by Plaintiffs regarding their claim that treatment modalities at SORTS are inadequate was evidence from this pre–2010 timeframe.
By contrast, Defendants’ evidence established that SORTS has improved its treatment programs since 2010, and many aspects of the SORTS treatment programs now conform to accepted standards in the field of residential sex offender treatment. Dr. Schlank testified that the level of staffing at the SORTS facilities is now adequate and exceeds the level of staffing at the SVP program in Virginia, and Plaintiffs offered little contrary evidence. The evidence also established that treatment groups are now rarely, if ever, canceled. Finally, as a result of changes made in the last year, SORTS treatment programs no longer focus on consequences for minor rule violations. Under previous clinical directors, even minor infractions could affect a resident’s progression through the levels of treatment. But SORTS changed this protocol in 2014, and it now focuses on treatment-related behaviors in evaluating treatment progress.
Treatment participation rates at SORTS are high, with approximately 97% of residents participating. The stated goal of both treatment programs is to treat and safely reintegrate committed individuals back into the community.
        
  

  
Defendants’ own expert and DMH executive, Dr. Stanislaus, testified that, although she believes treatment at SORTS is adequate, progression through the various levels of the SORTS treatment programs is tortuously slow. Less than 5% of SORTS–Fulton residents have reached Stage 6 of the SOS treatment program, and none has reached Stage 7. Some residents at SORTS–Farmington, which has been open much longer, have progressed further in treatment. Approximately 31 residents have reached the second-highest Purple level, and 8 residents have reached the highest Gold level. Notwithstanding the progress of these residents in treatment, none has been reintegrated into the community as the treatment manual envisions, and no procedures or placement options for community reintegration have been established.
Though testifying for Defendants, in Dr. Schlank’s opinion, SORTS’ lack of clear guidelines for treatment completion or projected timeframes for phase progression impedes the motivation of committed individuals to participate meaningfully in treatment for purposes of reintegration into the community. Dr. Schlank testified that other SVP programs that are more successful in releasing residents back into the community, such as the Virginia SVP program for which she serves as Clinical Director, have established clear timeframes within which, if residents consistently demonstrate all behavioral goals within a phase, residents will progress to the next phase of treatment. Establishing such timeframes provides clarity to residents and staff, instills hope in residents, guards against treatment providers’ unconscious biases, and avoids “raising the bar” for release.
The evidence also established that there are several other areas for improvement in the SORTS treatment programs. These include increasing communication and coordination between SORTS–Farmington and SORTS–Fulton, adapting treatment program materials to meet the needs of developmentally disabled residents, and maintaining consistency in treatment protocols.
*852 SORTS Risk Assessment A licensed doctoral level psychologist employed by SORTS performs the annual assessments of the mental condition of SORTS residents, also known as annual reviews, which, as noted above, are required by the SVP Act. The person who conducts these assessments—the annual reviewer—is not part of the resident’s treatment
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team. Rather, each SORTS facility is assigned one annual reviewer for all residents. The SORTS annual reviewers previously did not interview the residents as part of their review, but in light of ATSA guidelines recommending such interviews, the annual reviewers began conducting resident interviews sometime within the last year.
The annual reviewers most commonly use the Static–99R as an actuarial risk assessment tool. The Static–99R is a risk assessment tool that measures static factors, which are generally unchangeable in nature, such as the individual’s prior sexual offenses. Only recently—just a few months before trial began in this case—did SORTS begin training its annual reviewers on non-static instruments used to objectively assess progress in treatment, such as the Sex Offender Treatment and Progress Scale (“SOTIPS”). No empirical research has been conducted as to the accuracy of SOTIPS, and it has not been studied in connection with SVP residents. Dr. Stanislaus acknowledged that it will take at least two more years before SORTS can assess the usefulness of SOTIPS as a dynamic risk assessment tool.
Every annual review performed by SORTS and submitted to the courts includes a forensic opinion, meaning that the reviewer applies his or her professional opinion about the mental condition of the SORTS resident to the provisions of the SVP Act. Though not required by the statute, the annual reviewers also make a recommendation regarding whether the person continues to meet the statutory criteria for civil commitment.
The evidence established that these annual reviews are the primary tool that courts use to evaluate whether a civilly committed person continues to satisfy the criteria for commitment, or instead, whether the person should be conditionally released. Several witnesses, including Susan Elliott and Charles Banks, both Missouri public defenders in the civil commitment defense unit, credibly testified that it is nearly impossible to successfully petition for conditional release without an annual review from SORTS recommending such release. Corroborating this testimony was the evidence that, in the 16 years since the SVP Act was enacted, only two SORTS residents have been released without the support of a SORTS annual review, one of whom was never treated by SORTS.
Notwithstanding the importance of these annual reviews, the annual reviewers at both SORTS–Farmington and SORTS–Fulton receive no legal training in understanding or applying the SVP Act’s criteria for conditional release. As a result, they have misunderstood and been confused about how to apply the statutory criteria. Even
        
  

  
Defendants’ expert, Dr. Schlank, concluded that that the annual reviewer at SORTS–Fulton did not know how to apply the statutory criteria for risk assessment. For example, Dr. Schlank stated in her expert report that in an interview with him, the SORTS–Fulton annual reviewer6 indicated that he believed he could not recommend a resident for conditional release “even if a resident appeared to present little to no risk of sexual reoffending” unless he could testify that the resident’s “mental abnormality had significantly changed.” (Pls.’ Ex. 3 at 6.) The SORTS– *853 Fulton annual reviewer also indicated that he was unsure whether two years of “consistent, positive behavior” by a resident was a long enough period of time to indicate that the residents’ mental abnormality had changed. Id. Dr. Schlank concluded that if SORTS annual reviewers addressed “the question of whether there is a continued need for secure, inpatient treatment rather than whether a mental abnormality has changed, ... Missouri [would] be much more successful in the conditional release of clients into the community.” (Pls.’ Ex. 3 at 5.)
Likewise, the annual reviewer at SORTS–Farmington, psychologist Sujatha Ramesh, Ph.D., admitted that she has not received any legal training or guidance regarding how to interpret the SVP Act. And although she has a doctorate degree in counseling psychology, she is not a forensic psychologist. Thus, Dr. Ramesh provides a forensic opinion in her annual reviews based solely on her own interpretation of the SVP Act’s criteria for conditional release, including her own reading and understanding of Missouri Supreme Court caselaw interpreting the SVP Act.
Dr. Stanislaus, too, admitted that the SORTS annual reviewers do not understand and consistently apply the legal standards for risk assessment under the SVP Act. Dr. Stanislaus testified that her goal, at some unspecified point in the future, is to get the annual reviewers from both facilities together and to develop a unified clinical interpretation of the SVP Act’s risk assessment criteria. However, at the time of trial, no such training had taken place.
The evidence also established that the annual reviews at SORTS fail to include highly relevant information, such as the opinions of SORTS treatment providers regarding residents’ lowered risk and potential for conditional release.
As early as June of 2009, Defendant Schafer, Director of the DMH, discussed the possibility of selecting 16 aged and infirm SORTS residents and developing a community
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alternative for these residents as a cost-saving measure. (Pls.’ Ex. 88.) Around the same time, Director Schafer emailed others within DMH and the Governor’s office to “think about five or six cluster group homes on the SE Missouri Mental Health Center campus that would allow us to move elderly and medically frail [SORTS] patients to a different level of care.” (Pls.’ Ex. 89 at 2.) The email noted that SORTS just had an 82–year old resident die from his medical condition. Id. Likewise, Defendant Alan Blake, former Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, exchanged several emails with other SORTS and DMH officials regarding whether some residents could be transferred out of SORTS in 2009.
These emails were sent because SORTS was running out of space for residents, and the DMH was not sure whether money from the state would be available to expand SORTS to meet capacity needs. The evidence established that Blake and others at this time considered moving residents who were aged or infirm out of SORTS and to skilled nursing facilities. See, e.g., Pls.’ Exs. 80 & 88. SORTS had, at the time, 15 residents who were 65 or older. (Pls.’ Ex. 80.) In one email, Blake identified six residents who could be transferred to a skilled nursing facility, and in another email, Blake identified nine “definitely medical fragile” residents for transfer who needed “ongoing nursing / physician attention,” but stated that some of the nine “if in the community, still need to be in a locked or controlled nursing care facility, even though they have limited physical ability to move about.” (Pls.’ Exs. 90 & 93.)
*854 Another option discussed in these 2009 emails was to conditionally release 8 to 16 residents to less restrictive cottages at the SLPRC. (Pls.’ Ex. 80.) Blake and others at SORTS and the DMH believed that releasing residents to cottages at SLPRC would save the state money, and would also be “the right thing to do,” since it would “create a discharge option” for SORTS residents. Id. In these emails, Blake stated that SORTS had a pool of at least 24 residents, some of whom are identified in the emails by name, who were candidates for conditional release to such cottages; that the “top five” of these residents “could go today to the SLPRC setting” and easily pass the “neighbor test”; and that the rest “may need greater support / treatment, but don’t represent a risk to the community in terms of compliance and appreciation of their situation.” (Pls.’ Ex. 79.)
Blake believed that the individuals identified in the emails as candidates for transfer to the SLPRC cottages presented a lower risk than other SORTS residents. Blake also testified that his reference to the “neighbor test,”
        
  

  
although not a clinical or scientific term, meant that people would have been comfortable having these individuals as neighbors in the SLPRC setting, even knowing their background. However, Blake noted that the conditional releases may not have been approved unless more security accommodations, such as fences, were added to the cottages. In any event, the proposed conditional release of residents to SLPRC cottages or to skilled nursing facilities was not implemented because, as discussed above, SORTS received more money from the state in 2010 to open SORTS–Fulton and to expand SORTS–Farmington.
The residents identified in these emails as presenting a lower risk, due to their treatment progress or their age and infirmity, were not informed that SORTS officials had identified them as candidates for conditional release. Nor was their lower risk mentioned in their annual reviews in 2009, including annual reviews written by Blake just days after he sent these emails. Rather, the annual reviews of these residents in 2009, and for years thereafter, stated that the residents continued to meet the criteria for commitment and should not be conditionally released. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that the sort of information contained in the emails discussed above, regarding the lowered risk of certain residents, should have been included in the residents’ annual reviews.
Four of the residents identified as candidates for conditional release to the cottages were ultimately conditionally released, but not until three or four years later and not to cottages but to the Annex. Four of the aged and infirmed residents identified as candidates for conditional release to a skilled nursing facility died while still confined at SORTS.
Director Authorization for Release The director of the DMH has not authorized a single SORTS resident to petition for conditional release in the 16 years since the SVP Act was enacted, even though SORTS treatment providers and annual reviewers have found several residents to meet the statutory criteria for conditional release.
The evidence established that the process to obtain director authorization for conditional release petitions is unduly lengthy and laden with unnecessary procedures. Blake acknowledged that in 2010—a decade after the SVP Act was enacted—the DMH had not developed clear procedures for obtaining director approval for a
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conditional release petition. Blake sent at least two proposals for director approval as early as 2010 for individuals he believed met the criteria for conditional release into the community, and for whom he submitted *855 annual reviews so stating. However, the director of the DMH did not approve either of these petitions for conditional release. One of the individuals was Donald Williams, who, as more fully discussed below, eventually filed a petition for conditional release over the director’s objection and obtained a conditional release order in 2013. And notwithstanding the conditional release order, Williams still resides in the Annex, behind the secure perimeter of SORTS.
In 2011, the DMH finally adopted a policy for obtaining director approval, but this policy established at least three levels of approval within the DMH before the director would even consider authorizing a resident’s petition for conditional release. Dr. Englehart admitted that he is not sure how long it would take to get through all three steps for director approval because it has never been done.
Only once in 16 years has a resident gotten past the first step of the three-step process for director approval. This was Michael Allison, who undisputedly met the statutory criteria for conditional release, and who received an annual review recommending his conditional release in December 2014. Rather than filing a petition for conditional release over the director’s objection and subjecting his client to the two-step process to receive a trial, Allison’s public defender requested that the director of the DMH comply with Missouri Revised Statutes § 632.501 and authorize Allison to petition for conditional release. However, it took months to get to the final level of the self-imposed three-level process, and then the process was stalled indefinitely because one official in the chain—a facility director—was out of the office due to a family emergency. Dr. Englehart testified that when the process for director approval for Allison got “stuck” because the facility director was out of the office, no one was sure how to “unstick” it. Accordingly, as of the date of trial, several months after SORTS’ own annual reviewer and treatment providers declared that Allison met the criteria for conditional release, the director of the DMH still had not authorized Allison to petition for conditional release, and Allison was still confined in maximum security conditions at SORTS.
Further, if a resident files a petition for conditional release without director approval, even if SORTS annual reviewers and officials support the petition, the DMH—for reasons that were not explained—halts the process to obtain director approval altogether. There has
        
  

  
been some discussion at the DMH of speeding up the process for director approval, but as of the date of trial, no such changes had taken place.
The Annex and Conditional Releases In the fall of 2013, several years after this lawsuit was filed, SORTS–Farmington opened the Annex. The Annex is designed for residents in the last phase and highest level of treatment, to help them develop the skills that they will need to cope and progress in the community. Annex residents share a living area, kitchen, and bedrooms; cook a weekly meal on their own; and are eventually able to earn passes to go on escorted or unescorted trips outside the facility. However, the Annex is behind the razor wire fence of SORTS–Farmington.
The three Annex residents discussed at trial who have obtained conditional release orders did so over the objection of the director of the DMH, but with the support of SORTS annual reviewers. Their orders of conditional release were obtained after a preponderance hearing and then a full trial, in which a court or jury found that they are no longer likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released—i.e., that they no longer meet the criteria for civil commitment. However, at the request of the *856 DMH, the orders added the condition that the release is “without discharge” from SORTS and that the residents must reside at the Annex indefinitely. Some of these residents are permitted to leave the secure perimeter of the Annex during the day, either unescorted or accompanied by SORTS security staff, to work at jobs in the community, to go grocery shopping, or to simply walk around the perimeter of SORTS–Farmington, outside the razor wire fence. However, all residents return to the Annex at night. SORTS–Fulton does not currently have a step-down unit such as the Annex, but evidence was presented that the DMH plans to develop an Annex-like facility at SORTS–Fulton in the future.
Experts for both sides in this case agreed that “conditional release,” in the context of similar SVP civil commitment programs around the country, means that the treated patient actually lives in the community. Moreover, the evidence established that the Annex cannot be considered a least restrictive alternative (“LRA”) as that term is understood by SVP civil commitment programs in other states because residents still live in a high-security setting, behind a razor wire fence, and are not integrated into the community.
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Dr. Schlank testified that a step-down unit such as the Annex is ideal to ease residents’ transition from institutionalization to release, and that she wished the Virginia SVP program had such a step-down unit. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ expert Prescott acknowledged that a step-down unit inside a secure facility is a “good start” to the release process.
The problem, however, is that residents get stuck in the Annex, and never complete the transition to release. By contrast, Dr. Schlank’s SVP program in Virginia has successfully treated and conditionally released more than 100 residents from its SVP civil commitment program into the community. The average commitment time prior to release in Virginia was at one time 54 months and may have decreased since then. Likewise, Wisconsin’s SVP program, for which Prescott previously served as Treatment Assessment Director, had successfully treated and conditionally released approximately 150 residents into the community as of 2014. Both the Virginia and Wisconsin programs have departments devoted to actively managing conditional releases into the community, including developing community resources and contracting with community service providers. SORTS has no such department or staff dedicated to release into the community.
Experts from both sides, as well as SORTS officials, acknowledged that SORTS residents are similar to persons civilly committed under SVP statutes in other states, including Virginia and Wisconsin. Yet, with the exception of two residents who, as discussed above, were released with no involvement or support from SORTS or the DMH, SORTS has not conditionally released a resident into the community in 16 years.
Moreover, neither SORTS–Farmington nor SORTS–Fulton has an LRA option outside the secure perimeter and/or in a community setting. The evidence established that there are residents at SORTS, including some in the Annex, who could be safely placed in the community or in a less restrictive facility outside the secure perimeter of SORTS. These include aged and infirm residents, as well as residents who have successfully completed all treatment phases within the SORTS facilities. Blake admitted that SORTS and DMH officials have known of the need to look for community housing options since at least 2009 or 2010, by which time Blake had already identified candidates for conditional *857 release into the community. Blake further admitted that, while he was Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, he made several proposals to the DMH for community housing options for conditionally
        
  

  
released residents but that he was told that such options would not be included in the state budget. Every year since then, SORTS has requested money to be placed in the state’s budget for establishing cottages in the community, in order to implement the community reintegration phase of both SORTS treatment programs. However, the Governor of Missouri has never included such budget requests in his proposals to the state legislature and has not done so this year.
Like treatment, the “conditional release” process at SORTS is organized into phases. Specifically, there are 11 steps to the conditional release process at SORTS: Step 1—unlimited ground pass inside the secure perimeter; Step 2—escorted ground pass outside the secure perimeter; Step 3—escorted community trips; Step 4—unescorted ground pass outside the secure perimeter; Step 5—employment; Step 6—unescorted community trips of one hour; Step 7—community support plan; Step 8—up to 12–hour day trips with security personnel supervision inside St. Francois County, Missouri; Step 9—up to 6–hour day trips with DMH transport outside of St. Francois County; Step 10—up to 48–hour visits with security personnel supervision in and out of St. Francois County; and Step 11—up to 96–hour visits with security personnel supervision in and out of St. Francois County.
Dr. Englehart admitted that, according to even the most recent SORTS treatment manual, it should take a resident approximately 12 to 18 months to progress through all of the steps from conditional release “without discharge” to conditional release “with discharge” into the community. But in reality, no conditionally released SORTS resident has been discharged into the community within that timeframe—or at all.
For example, Lewis was the first SORTS resident to successfully complete treatment and obtain a conditional release order, in January, 2012. At the time of his conditional release hearing, Defendant Blake represented to the court that Lewis’s transition to full release into the community would take approximately 12 to 18 months to complete. However, at the time of trial—more than three years after Lewis was found to no longer meet the criteria for commitment—Lewis still resided at the Annex, within the secure perimeter of SORTS. Although evidence was presented that beginning in 2014, two years after obtaining a conditional release order, Lewis was allowed to obtain a job and spend some unescorted time working in the community during the day, he returned to SORTS at night. There was testimony that SORTS has been looking for housing within the community for Lewis, but as of the date of trial in this case, no such housing had
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been found.
Likewise, two other Annex residents, Williams and Fennewald, have obtained conditional release orders. These residents are permitted to spend some escorted or unescorted time outside of SORTS but must return to the Annex at night. SORTS also temporarily suspended Williams from his limited unescorted trips because of a rule violation (Williams had a facility phone on an unescorted pass and used the phone to call his family). But Williams’s privileges were restored, according to Defendants, after he cooperated in treatment and used his risk management plan to process the violation.
Finally, another SORTS resident, Tim Donaldson, obtained a conditional release order but does not reside in the Annex. Donaldson was conditionally released *858 “without discharge” over the director of the DMH’s objection but with the support of SORTS annual reviewers in May 2013. Despite the court’s finding that he no longer met the criteria for commitment, Donaldson remained confined at SORTS and was still required to wear leg restraints. Following a disagreement between Donaldson and his probation officer regarding whether he would be able to spend time with his grandchildren—a permitted condition of his conditional release order—SORTS suspended some of the limited freedoms Donaldson had been granted, such as escorted walks outside the secure perimeter of SORTS. Even a year after Donaldson’s “conditional release,” the most freedom Donaldson had was to go on one-hour walks, escorted by a guard, outside the perimeter of SORTS, and he had not been allowed into the community. Donaldson’s public defender, Susan Elliott, testified that these restraints upset and angered Donaldson because he felt proud that he made it through the treatment program, which he took seriously, and he felt that the restrictions were unwarranted.
Then, in May 2014, SORTS personnel found that Donaldson acted out inappropriately in treatment, and subsequently moved Donaldson away from the Annex and back to another secure ward of SORTS–Farmington, moved Donaldson back a patient level, and also suspended Donaldson from treatment. SORTS did not seek court approval before making these changes. Elliott filed a motion to modify Donaldson’s conditions of release because she did not believe that SORTS could make these changes unilaterally, and because she also believed that Donaldson should be released into the community. The court found that the DMH could not force Donaldson to live at SORTS indefinitely after his conditional release and directed Elliott to draft an order
        
  

  
that included a plan for Donaldson’s release into the community within 90 days. Shortly thereafter, the DMH moved to revoke Donaldson’s conditional release.
At a hearing in January 2015, the court rejected the state’s petition to revoke Donaldson’s conditional release, finding that Donaldson’s failure to participate fully in treatment may have violated a condition of his release but was insufficient to revoke Donaldson’s conditional release. (Pls.’ Ex. 114.) The court further found that “reasonable efforts to implement the previous order have not been undertaken by the State,” ordered the DMH to conditionally release Donaldson by June 8, 2015, and ordered the DMH to find suitable housing for Donaldson to effect this conditional release. Id. Elliott testified that the court indicated at the hearing that “conditional release” meant that Donaldson should be released into the community. But as of the date of trial, the DMH had not complied with the court’s order, and no effort had been made to release Donaldson into the community. Donaldson still remained confined at SORTS–Farmington, in a maximum security setting, and had not even been returned to the Annex.
Each of the so-called conditionally released residents discussed above—Lewis, Williams, Fennewald, and Donaldson—appears on the list prepared by Blake in 2009 as a resident who could be moved to a less restrictive setting at SLPRC, and Blake testified at trial that three of them—Lewis, Williams, and Donaldson—could have passed the neighbor test in 2009.
It is important to note that none of the witnesses at trial suggested that individuals civilly committed as SVPs could not successfully be treated. To the contrary, Defendants’ witnesses believed that SORTS is, in fact, capable of providing effective treatment. And nearly every witness to testify agreed that conditional release into the community is part of treatment. *859 Indeed, community reintegration is the last phase of both SORTS treatment programs, and the SORTS treatment manual explicitly contemplates community housing like cottages or apartments outside the secure perimeter. Yet Dr. Englehart and the Chief Operating Officer of SORTS, Defendant Schmitt, both admitted that, as of the date of trial, SORTS still had no plans or procedures in place for releases—conditional or otherwise—into the community.
In the words of Defendant’s own expert, Dr. Schlank, “the failure [of SORTS] to discharge clients is a significant problem, and there appears to be both some systemic difficulties and some characteristics of the program which may contribute to the failure to be released into the
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community.” (Pls.’ Ex. 3 at 3.) Dr. Schlank acknowledged that “[w]hile much about the Missouri SVP program is quite consistent with components of other SVP programs, it is concerning that in fifteen years no client has been conditionally released into the community. This fact has led to a sense of hopelessness, not only in clients, but also in staff.” Id. at 4. Likewise, Defendants’ other expert, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that the ATSA guidelines, on which she based her opinion that treatment at SORTS was adequate, do not support the length of time that Missouri keeps individuals waiting for release into the community.
Director Shafer foresaw these sentiments in an internal email sent in 2009, a decade after SORTS was created, in which he stated that “[n]o one has ever graduated from [SORTS] and somewhere down the line, we have to do that or our treatment processes become a sham.” (Pls.’ Ex. 89 at 3.) Likewise, Dr. Fluger, the Program Coordinator at SORTS–Fulton, admitted that if no one is released from an SVP civil commitment treatment program into the community within 10 years, the “logical conclusion” is that treatment is a “sham.”
Missouri is at the bottom of SVP programs nationally in terms of conditional releases into the community, and other states successfully release many more persons into the community. And even Missouri successfully treats and releases non-SORTS sex offenders with similar, but not identical, diagnoses and offense histories as individuals civilly committed as SVPs. For example, psychologist and co-developer of the SOS treatment program, Jill Stinson–McKnight, Ph.D., testified that as of 2012, approximately 95 of the 150 non-SORTS residents that received treatment under the SOS program in Fulton Proper were successfully released into the community with promisingly low recidivism rates. These residents were not determined to be SVPs under the SVP Act, but at least some had been confined pursuant to Missouri’s now-repealed Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Law. Similarly, at the non-SORTS APS division of the SMMHC in Farmington, sex offender residents have been successfully released or moved to LRAs within the community after treatment.
The evidence clearly established that the lack of releases at SORTS has resulted in pervasive hopelessness. Nearly every witness who testified at trial, including several Defendants and both of Defendants’ expert witnesses, agreed that SORTS residents and staff have expressed severe hopelessness and that there is a perception among committed individuals that the only way out of SORTS is to die. This hopelessness is counter-therapeutic and impedes the treatment progress of SORTS residents.
        
  

  
Aged and Infirm Residents As discussed above, the DMH and SORTS have been aware since at least 2009 of an aging population of civilly committed *860 men within SORTS, including men whose progressive infirmities significantly reduced their risk to the public and made them candidates for conditional release to skilled nursing facilities.
In 2012, Dr. Englehart proposed pursuing conditional releases for two such aged and infirm residents, Marvin Morton and James Purk. Dr. Englehart noted that the physical disabilities of these residents lowered their risk to the public. (Pls.’ Ex. 95 at 3.)
Over the next 15 months, Purk was hospitalized five times for chronic progressive pulmonary fibrosis and other medical conditions, which required that he be on constant oxygen support and which resulted in his extreme intolerance for physical movement. The evidence established that Purk’s long history of failing health and total incapacity was well known by SORTS leadership and that Purk told staff that he did not want to die at SORTS.
In an email sent to SORTS and DMH officials on January 14, 2014, Dr. Englehart stated that it was his opinion that Purk’s “extreme intolerance of exercise (even before [his most recent] hospitalization) makes him a low risk to re-offend, even with only minimal safeguards.” (Pls.’ Ex. 96 at 1.) Therefore, Dr. Englehart recommended that Purk be moved to a nursing facility rather than back to SORTS. Id. Purk’s final hospitalization began on January 31, 2014, and he remained hospitalized until his death on February 8, 2014, still a civilly committed resident of SORTS. Purk’s death was anticipated by SORTS. (Pls.’ Ex. 102.)
Notwithstanding that SORTS’ own Director of Treatment believed that Purk’s risk was so low that he should be conditionally released to a nursing facility, Purk’s last annual review recommended that he remain committed. On February 6, 2014, two days before Purk passed away, Defendant Erica Kempker, Psy.D., psychologist and former annual reviewer at SORTS–Farmington, prepared Purk’s annual review. Dr. Kempker did not interview Purk and, in the first draft of her annual review, Dr. Kempker made little mention about Purk’s failing health condition except to note that in early 2013, Purk was admitted to an outside medical facility for respiratory failure, hyponatremia, and chronic renal insufficiency, but
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that he had made a “remarkable recovery.” (Pls.’ Ex. 98 at 4.)
Later in the day on February 6, 2014, Dr. Kempker learned of Purk’s most recent hospitalization and edited her annual review of him. The final annual review, submitted by Dr. Kempker to SORTS leadership on February 7, 2014, the day before Purk died, added statements about Purk’s “dire health” and readmissions to hospitals, but nevertheless concluded that Purk continued to suffer from pedophilia; that there was no evidence that Purk’s mental abnormality had significantly changed since his commitment; and that Purk should continue to be committed. (Pls.’ Ex. 101.) Likewise, the director of the DMH did not authorize Purk to petition for release.
One month after Purk passed away, Dr. Englehart recommended to Dr. Ramesh—who had replaced Dr. Kempker as the annual reviewer at SORTS–Farmington—that they should pursue conditional release of the other aged and infirm SORTS resident he identified back in 2012, Marvin Morton. Morton had been incapacitated since at least 2012. Morton’s public defender, Charles Banks, offered compelling testimony that it was apparent from his first meeting with Morton in late 2011 that Morton could barely breathe and was confined to a wheelchair, and that in every meeting with Morton between 2011 and 2014, Morton’s condition deteriorated, to *861 the point where Morton was eventually unable to get out of bed.
Dr. Ramesh’s annual review of Morton dated March 26, 2014, a year and a half after Dr. Englehart identified Morton as a conditional release candidate, was the first review of Morton to recommend his conditional release. The annual review detailed Morton’s history of severe and chronic health problems dating back to 2009. The annual review stated that it was only with considerable difficulty that Morton was able to independently transfer himself in and out of the bed and that Morton had voiced fears of dying and helplessness about his civil commitment and his ongoing medical problems. (Pls.’ Ex. 262 at 8.) Dr. Ramesh’s annual review of Morton concluded that “there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Mr. Morton’s mental abnormality has so changed secondary to pulmonary fibrosis, his age, and a lack of recent inappropriate sexual behavior” and that Morton therefore no longer met the criteria for commitment. Id. at 10. Dr. Ramesh recommended that Morton be conditionally released to a nursing facility in the community, where Morton would have access to better medical care as well as support from his family.
        
  

  
Notwithstanding the SORTS annual reviewer’s recommendation that Morton no longer met the criteria for civil commitment, Director Shafer did not authorize Morton to petition for conditional release. Morton’s public defender, Banks, sought the director’s approval before filing a petition for conditional release on behalf of Morton, in order to avoid the two-step process for petitions filed without approval. After waiting over three months for an authorization that never came, Banks filed the petition for Morton’s conditional release without the director’s approval on July 25, 2014. Dr. Englehart informed Banks that after Morton filed his own petition, the process to obtain Director Shafer’s authorization halted, as a result of internal DMH rules, thereby foreclosing the avenue of director approval. When Banks offered to dismiss Morton’s self-filed petition so that Director Schafer could authorize the petition and speed up the process for conditional release, Dr. Englehart informed Banks that it would take even longer to go through the DMH’s three-step process to obtain director approval than it would to proceed with the two-step court hearing process for petitions filed without approval.
The first preponderance hearing for Morton’s petition for conditional release without director approval was held on February 24, 2015. Morton was in the hospital at that time, in a terminal condition. In fact, just prior to the hearing, Dr. Englehart and another SORTS physician made calls to the hospital to determine if Morton was still alive, as the hearing would be moot if Morton passed away before it started. At the preponderance hearing, both Dr. Englehart and Dr. Ramesh testified in favor of Morton’s conditional release. The Attorney General’s office hired an out-of-state expert witness who opined that, notwithstanding Morton’s imminent terminal condition of which the expert was informed, Morton still met the criteria for commitment. The court found that Morton’s physical condition made it unlikely that he would commit an act of sexual violence, and ordered the parties to meet and confer in one month to set the final trial on the petition for conditional release. Morton died the next morning, still a civilly committed resident of SORTS.
Eighteen men have died while civilly committed at SORTS. The evidence established that there have been internal discussions at SORTS for several years regarding adopting a policy or procedure to “fast-track” the conditional releases of *862 medically frail, aging, or incapacitated SORTS residents. Even Defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that the DMH should develop a procedure to fast-track the conditional release of aged and infirm residents whose risk for reoffending has significantly decreased, and that one way to do this
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would be if her supervisor, Director Shafer, approved petitions for conditional release of these residents. But as of the date of trial, no such policy or procedure had been adopted.
The director of the DMH has never authorized an aged, infirm, or medically frail SORTS resident to petition for conditional release, to a skilled nursing facility or otherwise. And as discussed above, in the 16 years since its enactment, only two persons civilly committed under the SVP Act have been conditionally released into the community due to age and infirmity. Both Arthur and Gibson were discharged without the director’s authorization and without a recommendation for release in a SORTS annual review.
SORTS does not have any contracts in place to allow aged and infirmed residents, whom SORTS officials agree no longer meet the dangerousness requirement for commitment, to move to LRAs in the community. The DMH projects a population of 41 residents over the age of 65 at SORTS in the next 5 years, and 92 residents over the age of 65 in the next 10 years. (Pls.’ Ex. 18.)

  
treatment] program in such a way as to ensure that all Class Members are not unconstitutionally deprived of their right to liberty.”).
Pre–Trial Detainee Plaintiffs [1] Based on Plaintiffs’ assertions that named Plaintiffs Baker, Brown, Bowen, and Murphy were not committed to SORTS as of the date of trial, and did not fall within the Treatment Class definition in this case, the Court will dismiss the treatment-related claims of these Plaintiffs as moot. However, if the status of Plaintiffs Bowen or Murphy changes such that either is committed to SORTS during the pendency of this action, he will automatically become a member of the Rule 23(b)(2) Treatment Class. See Doc. No. 197 at 2 (defining “Treatment Class” to include persons “who are, or will be, during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS of the State of Missouri as a result of civil commitment”).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Jurisdiction This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims in Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ evidence with respect to a “small number of individuals,” such as individuals who were considered for conditional release or who are aged and infirm, is not representative of the class and therefore cannot support Plaintiffs’ class claims. The Court disagrees. The evidence with respect to these individuals was used as an example to highlight alleged systemic deficiencies in risk assessment, procedures for release, and community reintegration. And Defendants presented no persuasive evidence that the facts presented were not representative of the system as a whole. See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F.Supp.3d 1139, 1165, No. CIV. 11–3659 DWF/JJK, 2015 WL 3755870, at *25 (D.Minn. June 17, 2015) (“By failing to provide the necessary process, Defendants have failed to maintain the [sex offender
        
  

Plaintiffs’ Facial Challenges to the SVP Act Plaintiffs assert that the SVP Act is facially unconstitutional in two respects: (1) Plaintiffs assert that § 632.498 of the SVP Act unconstitutionally requires a change in abnormality before a committed *863 person may be released, regardless of the person’s reduced dangerousness; and (2) Plaintiffs assert that § 632.505 of the SVP Act, which governs conditional release, unconstitutionally fails to provide for full, unconditional release because there is no mechanism for the conditions of release to terminate.7
[2] [3] “[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the [state law] would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (citation omitted). “Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons,” including that they “run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Id. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (citation omitted); see also Roark v. S. Iron R–1 Sch. Dist., 573 F.3d 556, 564 (8th Cir.2009) (noting
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this “well-established principle” and that it “applies with particular force to exercise of a court’s declaratory judgment discretion where governmental action is involved”) (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). But it has never held that strict scrutiny applies to civil commitment statutes. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (“Although freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action, that liberty interest is not absolute,” and “[i]t thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty”) (citation omitted); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 117, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “a liberty interest per se is not the same thing as a fundamental right,” and that the Supreme Court “has never applied strict scrutiny to the substance of state laws involving involuntary confinement of the mentally ill”); but see Karsjens, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1166, 2015 WL 3755870, at *26 (concluding that strict scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the constitutionality of Minnesota’s SVP civil commitment statute because *864 the plaintiffs’ “fundamental right to live free of physical restraint is constrained by the curtailment of their liberty.”); In re Care & Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo.2007) (concluding that Missouri’s SVP Act is “subject to strict scrutiny because it affects the fundamental right of liberty”).
[4] [5] Although it has not applied strict scrutiny to civil commitment statutes, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (same). That purpose must not be punitive, as punishment is reserved for the criminal system. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]hile incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for the criminal system alone.”). And a failure to consider or use “alternative and less harsh” restrictions
        
  

  
may indicate an unconstitutional purpose to punish. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Moreover, “even if [a person’s] involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after th[e] basis [for it] no longer existed.” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975).
[6] As construed by the Missouri Supreme Court, the purpose for which individuals are involuntarily committed under the SVP Act is to “protect [ ] society from persons who are likely to commit sexually violent crimes if not committed.” Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 445. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, ordinarily, “[w]e must ... accept the state court’s view of the purpose of its own law.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995).
[7] [8] Thus, Plaintiffs are correct that the Due Process Clause permits civil commitment of individuals under the SVP Act only so long as they suffer from a mental abnormality and are likely to commit an act of sexual violence if released. If the state’s commitment scheme allows the confinement of individuals who are no longer likely to commit an act of sexual violence, regardless of whether there has been any change in their mental abnormality, the scheme will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75–76, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (“[T]o commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, the State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and convincing evidence the two statutory preconditions to commitment: that the person sought to be committed is mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own welfare and protection of others.”) (emphasis added); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (“We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’ ”); Addington, 441 U.S. at 426, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (“[T]he State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others.”); O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486 (“A finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.”).
However, as Plaintiffs themselves emphasize, the Missouri Supreme Court has construed the SVP Act to comport with this requirement of the Due Process *865 Clause. Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 446. In Coffman, the Missouri Supreme Court held that “Section 632.498 is
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presumed to be constitutional,” and the court therefore “reject[ed] the state’s interpretation of [this section] as limiting release to persons whose mental abnormality has changed, regardless of dangerousness” because “[s]uch an interpretation would violate the due process clauses of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.” Id.; see also Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Mo.2007) (“[D]ue process requires that a person be both mentally ill and dangerous in order to be civilly committed; the absence of either characteristic renders involuntary civil commitment unconstitutional.”).
[9] The Court must consider the Missouri Supreme Court’s limiting construction in evaluating Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the SVP Act. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (“In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.”) (citation omitted); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975) (“[A] state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts.”). As construed by the state court, the SVP Act requires release if a person civilly committed as an SVP is found to be “no longer dangerous, regardless of whether the reason he is no longer dangerous is primarily mental or physical.” Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 446. So limited, the Court concludes that § 632.498 of the SVP Act does not, on its face, violate due process in the manner claimed by Plaintiffs.
[10] Likewise, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ facial challenge regarding § 632.505 of the SVP Act to be without merit. The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ assertions that § 632.505 does not provide a mechanism for the conditions of release to terminate. Section 632.505 provides that the conditions of release may be modified “upon [the reviewing court’s] own motion or upon petition of the [DMH], the [DOC], or the person on conditional release.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 632.505(6). The Court reads this modification provision to permit the full, unconditional release of civilly committed persons under the SVP Act, upon an appropriate finding by the reviewing court. Therefore, the Court concludes that § 632.505 of the SVP Act is not, on its face, unconstitutional for the reasons claimed by Plaintiffs. The Court will deny Plaintiffs’ requests for relief which seek to declare Missouri’s SVP Act facially unconstitutional.
        
  

  
Plaintiffs’ As–Applied Challenges to Treatment and Release Procedures at SORTS Although the United States Supreme Court upheld an SVP statute nearly identical to Missouri’s SVP as facially constitutional, and the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the Missouri SVP Act as facially constitutional, the concurring justices in both high courts expressed doubt as to whether the statutes would be constitutional as applied. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371–73, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing the case-deciding vote that the Kansas SVP statute was facially constitutional, but cautioning that “[i]f the object or purpose of the Kansas law had been to provide treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere pretext, there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish,” and that if “civil confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, ... our precedents would not suffice to validate it”); In re Care and Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo.2003) (Wolff, J., *866 concurring) (“While the [Missouri SVP] statutory scheme is constitutional as written, I am doubtful about its constitutionality as applied,” including whether there will be a “meaningful attempt to treat those previously determined to be sick and dangerous, or whether these offenders will simply be warehoused without treatment and without meaningful efforts to re-integrate them into society.”).
As noted above, Plaintiffs assert two types of as-applied constitutional challenges to the SORTS treatment program. First, Plaintiffs claim that treatment modalities at SORTS are inadequate due to staff and funding shortages. Second, Plaintiffs claim that the entire SORTS treatment program is a sham because no appropriate risk assessment and release procedures have been established, and no resident has been successfully treated and released back into the community.
The parties strongly dispute the applicable standard of review for these claims. Plaintiffs assert that strict scrutiny applies to both types of as-applied claims. Plaintiffs note that in a case challenging Minnesota’s equivalent of the SVP Act, the district court applied strict scrutiny to the plaintiffs’ claims. See Karsjens, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1165, 2015 WL 3755870, at *26. Like Plaintiffs do in their second type of as-applied claim, the plaintiffs in Karsjens challenged the state’s failure to conduct risk assessments and failure to release civilly committed sex offenders. Id. at 1169–71, 2015 WL 3755870, at *29–31. The court in Karsjens found that strict scrutiny governed these systemic challenges to civil commitment because the plaintiffs had a “fundamental
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right to live free of physical restraint.” Id. at 1165, 2015 WL 3755870, at *26. However, Karsjens did not involve any challenge to the adequacy of particular treatment modalities.
Defendants assert that, for both types of as-applied claims, Plaintiffs must satisfy the much higher burden of proving that the state action is so arbitrary and egregious as to shock the conscience. In support of this assertion, Defendants point to Strutton, in which a plaintiff argued that the treatment he received at SORTS was inadequate because of budget and staffing shortages, like Plaintiffs do here in their first type of as-applied claims. Strutton, 2010 WL 1253715, at *35. On review of Strutton, the Eighth Circuit found that because the right of individuals civilly committed as SVPs to mental health treatment originates from the SVP Act, not the Constitution, a substantive due process claim does not arise unless the treatment provided is “so lacking as to shock the conscience.” Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir.2012). However, Strutton did not involve any systemic challenges to risk assessment or release at SORTS.
[11] As an initial matter, the Court concludes that neither of Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims is subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would only apply if Defendants’ actions implicated a fundamental right. And federal courts are reluctant to expand fundamental rights beyond those declared by the Supreme Court. United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1075 (8th Cir.2006).
With respect to Plaintiffs’ first type of as-applied claims, regarding adequacy of treatment, the Supreme Court has never held that civilly committed sex offenders have a fundamental right to treatment. Rather, as Defendants correctly assert, any right to treatment arises solely from the SVP Act. Therefore, under precedent binding on this Court, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their first type of as-applied claims unless they prove that the treatment at SORTS is so lacking as to shock the conscience. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 558.
*867 [12] The bulk of the evidence Plaintiffs presented at trial in support of their adequacy-of-treatment claims was evidence of staffing and funding shortages at SORTS prior to 2010. But the Eighth Circuit reviewed the SORTS treatment program, and in 2012 found that although it may have departed from acceptable standards in the field, the treatment was not so lacking as to shock the conscience. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 558. The Court concludes that SORTS treatment providers have worked to improve treatment to some degree since then, and in
        
  

  
some areas, there has been significant improvement.
For example, although SORTS continues to struggle with recruitment and funding, the evidence established that SORTS has in the last year managed to adequately staff all treatment groups and to reduce treatment group cancellations dramatically. Moreover, Defendants improved treatment methods in the last year by switching the clinical focus from rule violations to more treatment-related behaviors. There are still many areas for improvement, as noted by Dr. Schlank and Plaintiffs’ experts, such as maintaining consistency in treatment protocols, clarifying treatment goals for each phase and level, adapting treatment program materials to better meet the needs of developmentally disabled residents, and improving coordination between SORTS–Farmington and SORTS–Fulton. But the Court cannot say that these areas for improvement render the treatment modalities at SORTS so lacking as to shock the conscience. Therefore, the Court will deny relief with respect to Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges to the treatment modalities at SORTS.
But the Court reaches a different conclusion regarding Plaintiffs’ second type of as-applied claims, relating to risk assessment and release of SORTS residents. These claims raise systemic challenges to the nature and duration of Plaintiffs’ commitment, rather than to the adequacy of the treatment provided to Plaintiffs while committed. And while Plaintiffs may not have a constitutional right to treatment, they do have a constitutional right to avoid undue confinement.
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has never held that this right is a fundamental one, subject to strict scrutiny. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (“Although freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action, that liberty interest is not absolute,” and “[i]t thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty”) (citation omitted). But it has held that, at the least, the “the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845; Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (same).
[13] Thus, Plaintiffs will prevail on their second type of as-applied claims if they can prove that the nature and duration of the commitment of SORTS residents bears no reasonable relation to the non-punitive purpose for which
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they were committed: to “protect[ ] society from persons who are likely to commit sexually violent crimes if not committed.” Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 445.
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have clearly met this burden. Upon review of the evidence, the Court concludes that risk assessment and release procedures at SORTS are wholly deficient in three respects. Each of these deficiencies has resulted in the continued confinement of persons who are no longer likely to commit sexually violent offenses, in violation of *868 Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause.
The first constitutional deficiency is the manner in which Defendants conduct annual reviews. The evidence at trial established that SORTS annual reviewers have not been applying the correct legal standard when evaluating whether a resident meets the criteria for conditional release. For example, Defendants’ own expert, Dr. Schlank, indicated that the SORTS–Fulton annual reviewer refused to recommend the conditional release of residents who no longer meet the dangerousness requirement for confinement, in violation of Coffman and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 446; see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Moreover, Defendants’ other expert, Dr. Stanislaus, acknowledged that the annual reviewers at both SORTS facilities have not been consistently applying the correct legal standard for evaluating risk and that training regarding this standard is needed but has not been provided.
“The annual review mechanism ensures involuntary confinement that was initially permissible will not continue after the basis for it no longer exists.” Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 105. The Court finds that the improper application of the annual review mechanism in this case has resulted in the continued confinement of individuals beyond the time constitutionally justified.
The second constitutional deficiency is that Defendants are not properly implementing the last phase of the SORTS treatment programs, community reintegration. Evidence offered by Defendants’ own experts suggests that progress through the various treatment phases at SORTS is tortuously slow, and that the lack of clear timeframes for such progress has contributed to the program’s failure to release residents. Moreover, Defendants’ stated goal of treating and safely reintegrating individuals back into the community is observed in theory but not in practice. SORTS admittedly has residents who, because of treatment progress or physical infirmity, have reduced their risk below the
        
  

  
standard required for commitment and have been ready for community reintegration for some time. Yet Defendants are not releasing these residents to an LRA within the community, and have not even designed procedures to do so. Instead, Defendants are precluding such releases by imposing extra-statutory hurdles, such as an indefinite “release without discharge” condition, on all conditionally released residents. In short, while the treatment program itself is not a sham, the release portion of the program is.
Every single outside expert in this case, each of whom has extensive experience with similar SVP civil commitment programs around the country, agreed that “conditional release” means that the treated patient actually lives in the community. Indeed, the SVP Act explicitly states that “[t]he primary purpose of conditional release is to provide outpatient treatment and monitoring to prevent the person’s condition from deteriorating to the degree that the person would need to be returned to a secure facility designated by the director of the department of mental health.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 632.505.1 (emphasis added).
The Court concludes that the effect of this deficiency has been to turn civil confinement into punitive, lifetime detention of SORTS residents, in violation of the Due Process Clause. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Karsjens, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1171, 2015 WL 3755870, at *31 (finding that Minnesota’s civil commitment program for sex offenders was unconstitutionally punitive, as applied, because individuals remained confined even when, as a *869 result of treatment progress or physical infirmity, they had reduced their risk below the level required for commitment).
The third constitutional deficiency is that release procedures at SORTS are not being performed in the manner required by the SVP Act or the Due Process Clause. The evidence at trial established that the director of the DMH has effectively abdicated his duty to authorize petitions for conditional release for persons found not likely to reoffend. The director has not authorized a single person committed under the SVP Act to petition for conditional release. Especially troubling is that Defendants appear to be stalling or blocking director approval of conditional release petitions even where the request for conditional release is supported by SORTS treatment providers and annual reviewers. Again, Defendants have imposed extra-statutory hurdles to obtaining director approval, including a three-step process that is futile in practice. No one has ever gotten past the first step, and the only resident to reach the first step was
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Van  Orden  v.  Schafer,  129  F.Supp.3d  839  (2015)  
  
  
caught in limbo indefinitely because one DMH employee was out of town.
The SVP Act is clear that the director “shall authorize [a] person to petition the court for release” whenever the director determines that the person is no longer “likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 632.501 (emphasis added). Defendants’ own expert and second-in-command to the director of the DMH, Dr. Stanislaus, admitted that obtaining the director’s authorization would fast-track the conditional release process for the lowest-risk residents.
The Court concludes that the director’s failure to comply with the SVP Act has resulted in the continued confinement of persons who no longer meet the criteria for commitment, and amounts to unconstitutional punishment. See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 568, 577, 95 S.Ct. 2486 (concluding that the jury properly found a constitutional violation upon receiving evidence that the hospital staff had the power to release a civilly committed mental patient who was no longer dangerous, even if he remained mentally ill, and that the hospital superintendent refused to allow that power to be exercised even though the undisputed testimony at trial demonstrated that the patient posed no danger to others).
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have proved that the SVP Act is unconstitutional as applied to SORTS for the following reasons: (1) Defendants have not performed annual reviews in accordance with the SVP Act, as interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court, and as required by the Due Process Clause; (2) Defendants have not properly implemented any program to ensure the least restrictive environment, and have not implemented—or even designed—the community reintegration phase of the SORTS treatment programs; and (3) Defendants have not implemented release procedures, including director authorization for releases, in the manner required by the SVP Act and the Due Process Clause. As nearly every witness who testified in this case agreed, these systemic failures have created a pervasive sense of hopelessness at SORTS that is undermining what little improvement the SORTS treatment programs have made.
The Court notes that, based on the disturbing record presented at trial, it would come to the same conclusions under the shocks-the-conscience standard advocated by Defendants. The Court believes that Plaintiffs’ rights to a system that includes proper risk assessment and release are rights protected by the constitutional guarantee of liberty, not merely state law. But even if these rights were grounded solely in state law, as Defendants appear to
        
  

  
argue, the Court would find that Defendants’ *870 nearly complete failure to protect them, as set forth above, is so arbitrary and egregious as to shock the conscience.
[14] The Constitution does not allow Defendants to impose lifetime detention on individuals who have completed their prison sentences and who no longer pose a danger to the public, no matter how heinous their past conduct. “[M]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.” O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486. Nor may the SORTS residents’ liberty interests be ignored because it is politically expedient to do so. Substantial changes to the SORTS program must be made, with the support of the DMH and the state, in order to bring the program in line with constitutional standards. This case will proceed to the remedies phase to consider what those changes should entail.
Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Statutory Reimbursement Scheme [15] The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim regarding the SORTS reimbursement scheme. The Court previously held that Plaintiffs’ treatment-related claims and their reimbursement claim overlapped to some extent, in that if Plaintiffs could prove that the treatment provided to SORTS residents is unconstitutional, they may also be able to prove that charging for such treatment is unconstitutional.
However, the Court never suggested that a finding of liability on the treatment-related claims would, per se, demonstrate liability on the reimbursement claim. And here, the evidence shows that Defendants are, in fact, attempting to implement a credible program designed to provide treatment to patients, although it does not continue to the release phase. In order to evaluate whether the reimbursement scheme was unconstitutional, the Court needed some evidence of how the reimbursement scheme is applied and how the charges equate to the treatment provided.
Plaintiffs presented little to no such evidence at trial. For example, the Court was given virtually no evidence to evaluate when, how, how much, and for what SORTS residents are actually charged. And Plaintiffs barely mentioned their reimbursement claims in their post-trial briefs. Given the absence of relevant evidence and argument, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed
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Van  Orden  v.  Schafer,  129  F.Supp.3d  839  (2015)  
  
  
to prove their claim that the reimbursement scheme is unconstitutional. Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding reimbursement, which were asserted on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and the Charging Class.

  
*871 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 632.480–632.513, is unconstitutional as applied and deprives Plaintiffs and the Treatment Class of their constitutional rights is GRANTED in part, as set forth above.

CONCLUSION
The Court expresses its sincere gratitude to Plaintiffs’ appointed attorneys for their dedicated representation of their clients, and assistance to the Court, in this stage of the case.
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the treatment-related claims of named Plaintiffs Macon Baker, David Brown, Joseph Bowen, and William Murphy are DISMISSED as moot, with the understanding that if the status of these Plaintiffs changes such that they are committed to SORTS during the pendency of this action, they will automatically become members of the Rule 23(b)(2) Treatment Class.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ prayers for other relief with respect to their as-applied claims regarding risk assessment and release procedures at SORTS will be addressed in the second phase of trial (the “Remedies Phase”). The Court shall hold a conference on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 9:30 a.m., to address the schedule and procedures for the Remedies Phase. The Court urges the Attorney General to identify and include in the conference any other individuals, such as the Governor or the Director of the Department of Corrections, who may be necessary or helpful to addressing appropriate relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except as set forth above, Plaintiffs’ prayers for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint, asserted on behalf of themselves and the Treatment and Charging Classes, are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 632.480–632.513, is unconstitutional on its face is DENIED.

All Citations
129 F.Supp.3d 839
  

Footnotes  

  

1  

The  Court  explicitly  excluded  pre-­‐trial  detainees  from  the  Treatment  Class.  (Doc.  No.  197  at  9.).  

  

  

2  

In  this  lawsuit,  Plaintiffs  do  not  challenge  their  initial  commitment.  Moreover,  Plaintiffs  previously  asserted  an  alternative  claim  

  

under  Title  II  of  the  Americans  with  Disabilities  Act,  but  they  voluntarily  dismissed  that  claim  before  trial.     

3  

For   example,   a   2013   review   of   Florida’s   SVP   program   authored  by   one   of   Defendants’  experts,   Dr.   Schlank,   reported   that   the  

  

recidivism  rate  for  released  Florida  SVPs  was  only  3.6%.  (Pls.’  Ex.  131  at  23.)  Dr.  Schlank  and  one  of  Plaintiffs’  experts,  Dr.  Abbott,   both  testified  that  persons  civilly  committed  under  Florida’s  SVP  program  are  similar  in  diagnoses  and  dangerousness  to  persons  

committed   under   Missouri’s   SVP   Act.   Plaintiffs   also   presented   evidence   of   at   least   some   statistics   showing   that   sex   offenders  

have   the   lowest   rates   of   recidivism   among   five   categories   of   felony   offenders   in   Missouri,   and   that   the   rate   of   recidivism   drops  

dramatically  as  sex  offenders  age  beyond  60  years.  

  

4  

The  director  must  forward  the  notice,  and  a  waiver  form,  to  the  court  with  the  annual  report.  Mo.Rev.Stat.  §  632.498.2.  

  

  

5  

As  discussed  infra  p.  864,  the  statute  has  been  construed  by  the  Missouri  Supreme  Court  to  require  both  a  mental  abnormality  

  

and  dangerousness  for  continued  commitment.  See  In  re  Care  &  Treatment  of  Coffman,  225  S.W.3d  439,  446  (Mo.2007);  Murrell   v.  State,  215  S.W.3d  96,  104  (Mo.2007).  

  

     

22  

  

  

Van  Orden  v.  Schafer,  129  F.Supp.3d  839  (2015)  

  

  

  

6  

The  SORTS–Fulton  annual  reviewer  did  not  testify  at  trial.  

  

  

7  

Plaintiffs   also   find  problematic  the   SVP   Act’s   use   of  different   wording   to  describe   the   standards  for  commitment   and   release.  

  

However,  they  assert  that  these  inconsistencies  in  language  are  relevant  to  their  as-­‐applied  challenge,  not  their  facial  challenge.   (Doc.  No.  449  at  9  n.  3.)  In  any  event,  the  wording  of  the  SVP  Act  is  nearly  identical  to  the  Kansas  SVP  statute,  which  the  United  

States  Supreme  Court  upheld  against  a  facial  challenge.  See  Kansas  v.  Hendricks,  521  U.S.  346,  352–353,  364,  117  S.Ct.  2072,  138  

L.Ed.2d   501   (1997)   (upholding   the   Kansas   SVP   statute   against   a   facial   challenge,   where   the   statute   defined   an   SVP   as   a   person  

“who   has   been   convicted   of   or   charged   with   a   sexually   violent   offense   and   who   suffers   from   a   mental   abnormality   ...   which  

makes   the   person   likely  to   engage  in   the   predatory   acts  of   sexual   violence”;   committed   SVPs  “for   control,  care   and  treatment  

until   such   time   as   the   person’s   mental   abnormality   ...   has   so   changed   that   the   person   is   safe   to   be   at   large”;   and   provided   for  

immediate   release   when   the   person   is   adjudged   “safe   to   be   at   large”);   see   also   1994   Kan.   Laws   Ch.   316,   §§   8,   10   (requiring  

release   of   a   person   civilly   committed   as   an   SVP   unless   the   state   can   prove   that   the   person’s   mental   abnormality   “remains   such  

that  the  person  is  not  safe  to  be  at  large  and  if  released  is  likely  to  engage  in  acts  of  sexual  violence”).  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

     

23  

  

  

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant George Lombardi’s motion (Doc. No.

347) for summary judgment. Plaintiffs in this class action are civilly committed residents of

Missouri’s Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities. They

assert claims against several state officials representing the Missouri Department of Mental

Health (“DMH”) and against Lombardi in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri

Department of Corrections (“DOC”). The Court bifurcated the trial into two phases:

liability and remedy. For the reasons set forth below, Lombardi’s motion for summary

judgment shall be granted in part, with respect to liability. However, the Court finds that

Lombardi is a necessary party to the remedy phase.

BACKGROUND

This class action raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., challenging (1) the care and

treatment, or lack thereof, provided to individuals civilly committed to SORTS after being

declared sexually violent predators (“SVPs”) under Missouri’s SVP statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. §

632.480 et seq.; and (2) the state’s statutory scheme requiring reimbursement from SORTS residents for the cost of their allegedly inadequate care and treatment. Plaintiffs seek several forms of declaratory and injunctive relief, including but not limited to, dismantling and closing down SORTS, declaring Missouri’s SVP statute unconstitutional as applied; and permanently enjoining the SVP civil commitment process, including enjoining the proceedings by which persons about to be released from the custody of DOC are detained and evaluated for civil commitment to SORTS.1 See Doc. No. 258.
On July 8, 2014, Plaintiffs added Lombardi, solely in his official capacity, as a Defendant with regard to all aspects of this action. (Doc. Nos. 302 & 315.) This move came after the other Defendants, all DMH officials (the “DMH Defendants”), claimed that joinder of the DOC was necessary to accord any request for relief seeking to enjoin the civil commitment of detainees to SORTS. Specifically, the DMH Defendants argued that the DOC plays a key role in the civil commitment process under the SVP statute, in that the DOC provides notice to the Missouri Attorney General when a person being released from one of its facilities may meet the criteria of an SVP, and at least one representative of the DOC must participate in a multidisciplinary team charged with providing an assessment to the Attorney General regarding whether a person meets the definition of an SVP. See Doc. No. 293 at 14-15 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.483.1). As the DMH Defendants explained, after receiving the multidisciplinary team’s assessment, the Attorney General may file a petition with the probate court for the person’s detention and evaluation, and if the court determines that the person meets the definition of an SVP, it must order the detention and 1 Alternatively, Plaintiffs request that the Court order the DMH to reform the care and treatment provided to SORTS residents in order to comply with constitutional standards.
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transport of the person to a secure facility in the custody of the DMH—in this case, SORTS. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.484.1. Accordingly, the DMH Defendants argued that any form of relief seeking to enjoin the SVP civil commitment process would need to involve the DOC. Plaintiffs responded to this argument by adding Lombardi, in his official capacity as Director of the DOC, as a Defendant in this case.
On December 19, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ uncontested motion to bifurcate the trial in this case by first conducting a trial on the question of whether Defendants are liable for the claims asserted by Plaintiffs, and if Plaintiffs prevail, then conducting a second trial on the question of what relief is appropriate. (Doc. No. 358.)
In his motion for summary judgment, Lombardi argues that neither he nor the DOC has any involvement in the treatment of SORTS residents or the reimbursement sought for that treatment, which are the sole bases of Plaintiffs’ claims.2 In support of his assertion that he is not involved in the actions at issue in this case, Lombardi attaches the affidavit of Matthew Sturm, who states that he has personal knowledge that Lombardi has taken no action, and is not responsible for, the treatment of Plaintiffs or the reimbursement sought from Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 348-1.)
2 Lombardi initially alleged that Plaintiffs’ claims against him were barred by qualified immunity, but in his reply brief, Lombardi concedes that because Plaintiffs seek only injunctive and declaratory relief, rather than money damages, qualified immunity does not apply. Moreover, as this Court has already held, qualified immunity does not apply to governmental employees sued solely in their official capacities, as here. See VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775, 778-79 (8th Cir. 2007).
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Plaintiffs do not dispute that only the DMH, not the DOC, is currently involved in the treatment of SORTS residents and the reimbursement sought for that treatment.3 But Plaintiffs argue that the DOC has “authority” under the SVP statute to provide treatment and seek reimbursement, and that the DOC is also authorized to enter into “interagency agreements” with the DMH for the confinement of SVPs and for the supervision of persons conditionally released from civil commitment. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480(1) (defining “agency with jurisdiction” under the SVP statute as “the department of corrections or the department of mental health”) (emphasis added); 632.495.4 (authorizing contract agreements between DMH and county jails for confinement of SVPs); 632.505.2 (authorizing interagency agreements between DMH and DOC for supervision of conditionally released persons). Plaintiffs contend that this authority may implicate the DOC in Plaintiffs’ claims. However, Plaintiffs concede they have no evidence that the DOC has actually entered into any interagency agreement with the DMH, or that the DOC has ever exercised any authority to participate in treatment or reimbursement.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the DOC’s general involvement in the civil commitment process may also give rise to liability. Plaintiffs note that the DOC is involved in the initiation of the civil commitment process, from the time of an inmate’s release from DOC custody to the time when the Attorney General determines whether to petition the court for an SVP finding.
3 Plaintiffs object to Sturm’s affidavit on the ground that it lacks foundation establishing Sturm’s personal knowledge of the facts contained therein. However, Plaintiffs concede that the DOC is not currently involved in treatment or reimbursement.
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Finally, Plaintiffs argue that, according to the Defendants’ own arguments, Lombardi is a necessary party to afford the complete relief requested by Plaintiffs.
DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be entered “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). “The nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Briscoe v. Cnty. of St. Louis, Mo., 690 F.3d 1004, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “[A] suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Therefore, the real party in interest in Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against Lombardi is the DOC, not Lombardi individually. See Richardson v. Berti, No. 4:12CV543CDP, 2014 WL 2208078, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 28, 2014). The first question in any case alleging liability of a public entity under § 1983 is whether there is a “direct causal link” between the entity’s actions, policies, or customs and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Alexander, 718 F.3d at 766. In other words, the DOC’s liability under § 1983 is limited to those acts for which it is “actually responsible.” Richardson, 2014 WL 2208078, at *3; see also Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 433 (8th Cir.
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1989) (“To establish liability in an official-capacity suit under section 1983, a plaintiff must show either that the official named in the suit took an action pursuant to an unconstitutional governmental policy or custom, . . . or that he or she possessed final authority over the subject matter at issue and used that authority in an unconstitutional manner.”). Similarly, a key question in an ADA claim against a public entity is whether the entity discriminated against, excluded, or denied benefits to Plaintiffs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Plaintiffs concede that the DOC has not engaged in any action directly causing the alleged constitutional and statutory violations in this case regarding treatment and reimbursement. Plaintiffs’ evidence that the DOC had “authority” to participate in treatment and reimbursement, without evidence that the DOC exercised this authority, is insufficient to establish liability against the DOC under either § 1983 or the ADA. See Nix, 879 F.2d at 433; 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Likewise, Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding the DOC’s involvement in the initiation of the civil commitment process fails to give rise to liability. Plaintiffs do not claim that the process by which they are committed to SORTS is unconstitutional. Rather, they claim that the treatment, or lack of treatment, received post-commitment renders the SVP statute unconstitutional as applied. Because Plaintiffs concede that the DOC is not currently involved in implementing the SVP statute post-commitment, their claims against Lombardi fail as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court will grant Lombardi summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to liability.
But, as Plaintiffs correctly note, Lombardi may be a necessary party at the remedy phase of the case. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1)(A), a necessary party
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includes a person in whose absence, “the court cannot accord complete relief among

existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A); see also Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota,

262 F.3d 732, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2001) (considering under Rule 19 whether “the district court

could . . . possibly craft an effective judgment in favor of the Tribe if the government would

not be bound by that judgment due to its non-joinder”); Solis v. Webb, 931 F. Supp. 2d 936,

956-57 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding in the ERISA context that even though an employee stock

ownership plan could not be sued for breach of fiduciary duty, the plan may be joined in

order to obtain the complete relief sought).

The DMH Defendants have previously argued to this Court that if Plaintiffs succeed

in proving liability, the Court cannot accord the complete relief sought by Plaintiffs,

including an injunction to stop the SVP civil commitment process, without joinder of the

DOC. Therefore, the Court will deny Lombardi’s motion for summary judgment to the

extent it relates to the remedy phase of this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant George Lombardi’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED in part, with respect to the liability phase of this case.

(Doc. No. 347.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant George Lombardi shall remain a

party with respect to the remedy phase of this case.

Dated this 11th day of March, 2015.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on the parties’ motions (Doc. Nos. 472 & 473) to reconsider the Court’s Memorandum Opinion (“Opinion”) dated September 11, 2015, which was issued following a bench trial on the first phase of this case—the liability phase. Both sides argue that the Court’s Opinion should be clarified or reconsidered in part. After fully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both motions.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s (“DMH”) Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”) facilities, who have been declared sexually violent predators (“SVP”) under Missouri’s SVP Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480–632.525. In their Fifth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that the SVP Act is unconstitutional as written and as applied to SORTS, and that the reimbursement sought by the state from SORTS residents is also unconstitutional. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ uncontested motion to bifurcate the case into separate trial

proceedings on liability and remedies. An eight-day bench trial solely on the issue of liability was held beginning on April 21, 2015. Following the bench trial, the Court issued the Opinion, which contained extensive findings of fact and which ultimately concluded that the SVP Act was unconstitutional as applied in certain narrowly-defined respects.
The parties now seek reconsideration or clarification of some of the Opinion’s findings. Plaintiffs request clarification of three points. First, on page four of the Opinion, the Court noted that “Plaintiffs do not challenge their initial commitment.” (Doc. No. 467 at 4.) Plaintiffs request that the Court add the words “in this lawsuit” to this sentence. Defendants do not object to this request.
Second, on page 46 of the Opinion, the Court concluded: “Thus, Plaintiffs are correct that the Due Process Clause permits civil commitment of individuals under the SVP Act only so long as they suffer from a mental abnormality and are likely to commit a sexual offense if released.” Id. at 46. Plaintiffs ask that the Court change this language to mirror the standard for commitment under the SVP Act, which references “acts of sexual violence” rather than “sexual offenses.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.498.5(4). Plaintiffs note that there is a legally significant difference between the terms “sexual offense” and “acts of sexual violence.” Defendants disagree.
Third, on pages 51-52 of the Opinion, the Court concluded that “although SORTS continues to struggle with recruitment and funding, the evidence established that SORTS has in the last year managed to adequately staff all treatment groups and to reduce treatment group cancelations dramatically.” (Doc. No. 467 at 51-52.) Plaintiffs request that the Court “include a finding that the ‘struggle’ with recruitment and funding [at SORTS] is ongoing
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and may require further examination or oversight.” (Doc. No. 472 at 2.) Defendants oppose this request and argue that the evidence at trial clearly supported the Court’s finding.
Defendants have also filed a motion for reconsideration. Defendants request that the Court reconsider its conclusion that the SVP Act imposes extra procedural hurdles for petitions for release filed without the authorization of the director of the DMH, as compared to petitions filed with director authorization. The Court held that unauthorized petitions are subject to a frivolity review and may be denied without a hearing. See Doc. No. 467 at 12 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.504). Further, the Court found that if an unauthorized petition has been found to be frivolous or has been previously denied, the trial court must deny any subsequent petition “unless the petition contains facts upon which a court could find the condition of the petitioner had so changed that a hearing was warranted.” Id. Finally, the Court found that, even if unauthorized petitions survive the frivolity review, they are subject to a preliminary hearing, at which the petitioner has the burden to demonstrate by a “preponderance of the evidence,” that he “no longer suffers from a mental abnormality that makes [him] likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if released.” Id. at 13 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.498.4). The Court held that only if a petitioner can make this preliminary showing will the case proceed to trial, at which the burden of proof then switches to the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not entitled to release.
Although Defendants concede that unauthorized petitions are subject to a frivolity review, they argue that this review is akin to the screening of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Moreover, Defendants argue that, other than the frivolity review, the SVP Act’s requirements for unauthorized release petitions are the same as those
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for authorized petitions. Specifically, Defendants argue that both types of petitions are subject to a preliminary preponderance hearing. Plaintiffs respond that both the language of the statute and the evidence at trial support the Court’s conclusion that unauthorized petitions are subject to more procedural requirements than authorized petitions under the SVP Act, and that one of these additional requirements is the preponderance hearing.
DISCUSSION As noted above, the Court bifurcated this case into separate trial proceedings for liability and remedies, and the Opinion dealt only with the first phase of liability. As such, it was not a final order. See Patterson v. City of Omaha, 779 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that “[t]he district court’s bifurcation of issues into separate trial proceedings did not create two separate actions, but merely separated the action into two separate phases” and that judgment entered after the first phase was not a final decision). A “district court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify an interlocutory order any time prior to the entry of judgment.” K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims[.]”). District courts have substantial discretion in ruling on motions for reconsideration. However, in general, “[m]otions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). “A motion for reconsideration is also not the
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appropriate place to tender new legal theories for the first time.” Arnold v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification
The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion as to Plaintiffs’ first two points. Regarding the first point, in noting that Plaintiffs do not challenge their initial commitment, the Court intended to convey that initial commitment was not at issue in this lawsuit. Therefore, the Court will amend the first sentence of footnote two, on page four of the Opinion, to state: “In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs do not challenge their initial commitment.”
Regarding the second point, the Court agrees that there is a distinction between sexual offenses and acts of sexual violence, and that the purpose of the SVP Act is to protect against the latter. See In re Care & Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. 2007) (finding that the purpose for which individuals are involuntarily committed under the SVP Act is to “protect[] society from persons who are likely to commit future sexually violent crimes if not committed”). As the Court previously held, the Due Process Clause requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to this purpose. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Therefore, the Court will amend its conclusion on page 46 of the Opinion to state: “Thus, Plaintiffs are correct that the Due Process Clause permits civil commitment of individuals under the SVP Act only so long as they suffer from a mental abnormality and are likely to commit an act of sexual violence if released.”
However, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ final request to include a finding that the “struggle” with recruitment and funding at SORTS is ongoing and may require further
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examination or oversight. The Court’s finding on pages 51-52 of the Opinion already
reflects that “SORTS continues to struggle with recruitment and funding.” (Doc. No. 467 at
51) (emphasis added.) But the question in this case was whether such deficiencies rendered
treatment modalities at SORTS unconstitutional. The Court found that they did not, and
Plaintiffs have not convinced the Court otherwise. Therefore, the Court finds no basis upon
which to order further examination or oversight of recruitment and funding issues in this
respect.
Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
The Court will grant Defendants’ motion in part. The Missouri Supreme Court once
described the SVP Act’s separate tracks for authorized and unauthorized release petitions as
follows:
There are two methods by which a sexually violent predator can obtain release after he has been committed. First, if the director of the department of mental health determines “that the person's mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released,” then the director must authorize the person to petition the court for release. Section 632.501. The circuit court then holds a hearing where the state has the burden to show that the petitioner should not be released. Id.
Second, if the department of mental health does not conclude that the sexually violent predator should be released, he is nevertheless free to petition for his release at any time. Section 632.498. . . . Under the 2000 version of the statute, the circuit court was required to set a hearing on the petition unless the petition is frivolous, and, if the court determined that there was probable cause to believe that the person should be released, then a trial was to be held. At this trial, which may be by jury, the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person should not be released. Thus, the 2000 statute provided a two-part test: first, the committed person must show probable cause why he should be released; second, the state must show beyond a reasonable doubt why he should not.
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Section 632.498 was amended in 2004. The amendment raises the initial showing that must be made by the sexually violent predator from “probable cause” to a “preponderance of the evidence.” Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 443; see also Care & Treatment of Schottel v. State, 159 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Mo. 2005) (holding that if the director determines that a person qualifies for release, the court holds a hearing at which the burden is on the state to prove otherwise, but that “if the director does not determine that the person qualifies for release, then a different process ensues,” in which the court must hold a “preliminary probable cause hearing” before setting a second hearing at which the burden switches to the state). But as Defendants correctly note, the SVP Act was amended again in 2006. The 2006 amendments changed the burden of proof on the state from “beyond a reasonable doubt” to “clear and convincing evidence.” 2006 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 1290. The amendments also changed the provision governing director-authorized release petitions, § 632.501, to add that “[t]he hearing and trial, if any” on such petitions “shall be conducted according to the provisions of section 632.498.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.501. Section 632.498, in turn, contains several provisions: one requiring annual review of the committed person’s mental condition (§ 632.498.1); one authorizing persons to petition for release over the director’s objection (§ 632.498.2); one describing service requirements for petitions filed over the director’s objection (§ 632.498.3); one describing the committed person’s rights at the preponderance hearing (§ 632.498.4); and one setting forth the requirements for a trial at which the state bears the burden of proof (§ 632.498.5). The Court agrees with Defendants that the 2006 amendment to § 632.501 appears to incorporate both the preponderance hearing and trial provisions of § 632.498. But it is not
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clear what effect the phrase “if any,” in § 632.501, has on these requirements. Plaintiffs suggest that the phrase means that a hearing or trial need not be held, perhaps based on the assumption that the state would not insist on a hearing and trial for director-authorized petitions. And Plaintiffs presented several witnesses at the bench trial in this case, who testified that director authorization streamlines the process to petition for release by cutting short the hearing requirements. Defendants never rebutted this evidence or even crossexamined Plaintiffs’ witnesses on this issue. Rather, Defendants’ own expert admitted that director authorization would fast-track the process to petition for release. And because the director of the DMH has not authorized a single person committed under the SVP Act to petition for release, there was no evidence as to the actual experience of authorized petitioners.
However, to avoid the implication that director-authorization petitions are never subject to a preponderance hearing, the Court will amend pages 12 through 13 of its Opinion to track the language of the SVP Act, as amended. Specifically, the Court will first outline the SVP Act’s procedures for release petitions filed without director authorization, as stated in §§ 632.504 and 632.498. The Court will then clarify that, under § 632.501, the “hearing and trial, if any” for release petitions filed with director authorization “shall be conducted according to the provisions of section 632.498.”
Except as stated above, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to reconsider. Separate and apart from the preponderance hearing requirement, it is undisputed that, as stated in the Opinion, the SVP Act imposes extra procedural hurdles for release petitions filed without director authorization. Defendants concede that unauthorized release petitions
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are reviewed for frivolity and denied without a hearing if frivolous. This is not merely akin to the frivolity review of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, as Defendants contend. Rather, the SVP Act also requires that if an unauthorized release petition has been previously denied, “the court shall deny the subsequent petition unless the petition contains facts upon which a court could find the condition of the petitioner had so changed that a hearing was warranted.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.504. Therefore, the Court will not reconsider its conclusion in the Opinion that release petitions filed without director authorization are subject to more procedural hurdles than those filed with authorization.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for clarification and Defendants’ motion for reconsideration are both GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth above. (Doc. Nos. 472 & 473.) The Court will issue a separate Amended Memorandum Opinion.
_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated this 21st day of December, 2015.
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VAN ORDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. KEITH SCHAFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:09CV00971 AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on the parties’ joint motion (Doc. No. 526) to approve and direct notice to the certified class of the parties’ proposed settlement regarding remedies.1 The Court held a status conference on this motion on May 25, 2016. Shortly before the status conference, the Court learned that class counsel and the class representatives disagreed about whether the proposed settlement was in the best interest of the class. Lead class counsel, Eric Selig, and all supporting class counsel except one attorney (John H. Quinn) informed the Court that they believed the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should proceed to a fairness hearing.2 However, Mr. Quinn objected to the settlement, ultimately on behalf of all of the class representatives.

1 At the parties’ request, the Court bifurcated trial in this case into two phases: liability and remedies. After a bench trial on liability, the Court found that Defendants were liable on some but not all of Plaintiffs’ claims. The parties’ proposed settlement addresses remedies for the claims on which the Court found Defendants liable.
2 At the status conference and in light of the disagreement among class counsel, Mr. Selig also made an oral motion to withdraw as lead class counsel in this case. The Court deferred ruling on the oral motion until it considered the matter.

Before lead class counsel filed the joint motion to approve and direct notice of the proposed settlement to the class, at least one class representative had expressed approval of the proposed settlement. However, that class representative later changed his mind, and at the time of the status conference in this case, all class representatives were opposed to the proposed settlement. The class representatives also, by letter to class counsel, expressed their desire that Mr. Quinn represent them in objecting to the proposed settlement.
At the May 25 status conference, Mr. Quinn expressed a desire to file a short brief regarding whether class counsel had authority to enter the proposed settlement, whether the Court should schedule a fairness hearing, and if so, the proper role going forward for any class counsel who objected to the proposed settlement; and the Court set a deadline for that brief. The Court also permitted any other counsel of record to respond to Mr. Quinn’s brief within one week.
Mr. Quinn has submitted a brief arguing that the motion to approve the proposed settlement notice should be denied but suggesting that, if the proposed settlement proceeds to a fairness hearing, class counsel opposed to the proposed settlement (i.e., Mr. Quinn) should be permitted to represent any objecting class members, including the class representatives. Lead class counsel and Defendants have responded to Mr. Quinn’s brief, arguing that the proposed settlement is authorized and should proceed to a fairness hearing. Lead class counsel also agrees that the Court may appoint Mr. Quinn as counsel for the objecting class representatives
Upon review of the parties’ submissions and for the reasons stated below, the Court is inclined to grant the parties’ joint motion to approve and direct notice to the certified class
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of the proposed settlement. However, the Court will ask the parties to confer and attempt to reach agreement with respect to any changes to the proposed notice that may be necessary in light of this Order. Following any necessary revision to the proposed notice, the Court will grant the parties’ joint motion to approve and direct notice to the certified class of the proposed settlement, and will schedule a fairness hearing on the proposed settlement. The Court will also appoint Mr. Quinn to represent the objecting class representatives, and any other objecting class members who wish to be represented by him, at the fairness hearing.
DISCUSSION “Inherent in any class action is the potential for conflicting interests among the class representatives, class counsel, and absent class members.” Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir. 1995). But “[t]he ultimate responsibility to ensure that the interests of class members are not subordinated to the interests of either the class representatives or class counsel rests with the district court.” Id. Thus, where there is a dispute between class counsel and the class representatives, or among class counsel, as to the course to be followed, including with regard to settlement, the decision “cannot rest entirely with either the named plaintiffs or with class counsel.” Pettway v. Am.Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1177 (5th Cir. 1978). The decision must be left to the district court, which must consider the best interests of the class as a whole. Maywalt, 67 F.3d at 1077; see also Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) §§ 21.641, 21.642 (noting that, although class counsel must “discuss with class representatives the terms of any settlement offered to the class,” neither class counsel nor class representatives have “veto power” over settlement of class actions).
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A district court may approve a class action settlement only if it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). A settlement can be fair notwithstanding a large number of objectors and even when all named plaintiffs oppose the settlement. See Marshall v. Nat’l Football League, 787 F.3d 502, 513 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., 680 F.2d 1225, 1226–27 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s approval of class action settlement even though both named plaintiffs and 790 of approximately 3,000 members objected to it)). In evaluating the fairness of a settlement, “the court should take into account not only the presentations of counsel but also information from other sources, such as comments from class representatives and class members, presentations by objections, [and] the court’s own knowledge of the case . . . .” Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.641.
The Court believes that the best course of action to protect the interests of the class as a whole is to provide notice and a copy of the proposed settlement to the class and to schedule a fairness hearing at which the presentations of counsel and any objections may be heard fully and on the record. However, the Court agrees with Mr. Quinn and lead class counsel that any objecting class representatives should be separately represented at such hearing. See, e.g., Elliott, 680 F.2d at 1226 (affirming approval of class action settlement over objections of the class representatives where the district court held a fairness hearing, objections were heard on the record, and the objecting class representatives were represented by separately retained counsel); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir. 1975) (same).
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The Court also agrees that Mr. Quinn may represent the objecting class representatives, and any other objecting class members who wish to be represented by him,3 at the fairness hearing. “[T]he traditional rules that have been developed in the course of attorneys’ representation of the interests of clients outside of the class action context should not be mechanically applied to the problems that arise in the settlement of class action litigation.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1986). Rather, in deciding whether attorneys who have represented the class may thereafter represent only a faction of the class opposed to a proposed class settlement, the Court must “balanc[e] the interests of the various groups of class members and of the interest of the public and the court in achieving a just and expeditious resolution of the dispute.” Id. Relevant considerations include prejudice to the parties, the ease with which class members could obtain new counsel, the factual and legal complexity of the case, and the time that it would take new counsel to familiarize himself with the proceedings. Id. Given the complexity of the factual and legal issues in this case, the time it would take new counsel to familiarize himself with the proceedings, which have continued over the course of seven years, and the absence of any prejudice identified by the parties, the Court believes that Mr. Quinn should be appointed to represent the objecting class representatives and any other objecting class members who wish to be represented by him.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above,
3 The parties may desire to revise the proposed class notice to reflect that objecting class members are free to retain their own counsel or to request to be represented by Mr. Quinn.
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall confer and attempt to reach agreement with respect to any changes to the proposed class notice that may be necessary in light of this Order, and on or before July 21, 2016, shall file a copy of their proposed revised class notice or, if they cannot reach agreement, their respective positions. Following review and approval of the class notice, the Court will grant the parties’ joint motion to approve and direct notice to the certified class of the proposed settlement, and will schedule a fairness hearing on the proposed settlement.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John H. Quinn, III is appointed as counsel to represent the class representatives who object to the proposed settlement and any other class members who object to the proposed settlement and wish to be represented by Mr. Quinn.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eric Selig’s oral motion to withdraw as lead class counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

Dated this 7th day of July, 2016.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 1 of 106
STAYED,CLOSED,APPEAL,ADR,ADRC,PROTO,TRCK2,U/ADV
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:09−cv−00971−AGF

Van Orden et al v. Healthlink, Inc. et al Assigned to: Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
John R. Van Orden SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

Date Filed: 06/22/2009 Date Terminated: 07/06/2017 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Anthony E. Rothert AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION 906 Olive St. Suite 1130 St. Louis, MO 63101−1448 314−669−3420 Fax: 314−652−3112 Email: trothert@aclu−mo.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole ARMSTRONG TEASDALE, LLP 7700 Forsyth Boulevard Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−621−5070 Fax: 314−621−5065 Email: dotoole@armstrongteasdale.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III SHER CORWIN WINTERS LLC 190 Carondelet Plaza Suite 1100 St. Louis, MO 63105 3147215200 Fax: 3147215201 Email: jquinn@scwstl.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Scherrer ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd. Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105 (314) 340−7625 x237 Email: richard.scherrer@mspd.mo.gov TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronnie Lee White , II GREENSFELDER AND HEMKER, PC 10 S. Broadway Suite 2000 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−335−6844

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 2 of 106
Fax: 314−241−8624 Email: rwhite@greensfelder.com TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott K.G. Kozak ARMSTRONG TEASDALE, LLP 7700 Forsyth Boulevard Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−621−5070 Fax: 314−552−4804 Email: skozak@armstrongteasdale.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew J. McNulty ACLU OF MISSOURI 454 Whittier St St. Louis, MO 63108 847−385−8062 Email: andrew.joseph.mcnulty@gmail.com TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher LaRose ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd. Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−621−5070 Fax: 314−621−5065 Email: clarose@armstrongteasdale.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric M. Selig ROSENBLUM SCHWARTZ, P.C. 120 S. Central Avenue Suite 130 Clayton, MO 63105 314−862−4332 Fax: 314−862−8050 Email: eselig@rsflawfirm.com TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gillian R. Wilcox AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI 406 W. 34th St. Suite 420 Kansas City, MO 64111 816−470−9938 Email: gwilcox@aclu−mo.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1222 Spruce St. Room 8.100 St. Louis, MO 63103 314−539−7918 Fax: 314−539−7895

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 3 of 106

Email: grant.doty@eeoc.gov TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, MO 63108 314−652−3114 Email: jsteffan@aclu−mo.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omri E. Praiss AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION 906 Olive St. Suite 1130 St. Louis, MO 63101−1448 314−652−3114 Email: opraiss@aclu−mo.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister SUSAN SHERBERG KISTER, ATTORNEY AT LAW 42 Almeda Place St. Louis, MO 63135 314−616−0311 Fax: 314 925−8328 Email: skisterlaw@gmail.com TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack BRYAN CAVE LLP One Metropolitan Square 211 North Broadway Suite 3600 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−259−2000 Fax: 314−259−2020 Email: thomasewack@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert CALVERT ADVOCATES 4240 Duncan Ave. Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63110 314−750−4305 Email: w@wcalvert.com TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Robert Hood SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640 TERMINATED: 12/21/2009

represented by James G. Martin DOWD BENNETT, LLP 7733 Forsyth Boulevard Suite 1900 Clayton, MO 63105 314−889−7300 Email: jmartin@dowdbennett.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 4 of 106

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Michael D. McCord SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 5 of 106
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015
Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winston E. Calvert

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 6 of 106

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Joseph Miller SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 7 of 106

Plaintiff
Macon Baker SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015
Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014
represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 8 of 106

Plaintiff
Chance Tyree SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015
Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014
represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 9 of 106

TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Walter W. Ritchey SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 10 of 106
James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015
Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 11 of 106

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
David Brown 2520 Main Street St. Louis, MO 63136

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 12 of 106

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Anthony Amonette SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 13 of 106

TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff Richard Tyson

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 14 of 106

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Wade A. Turpin SORTS Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 15 of 106

Treatment Services 1016 W. Columbia Farmington, MO 63640

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 16 of 106

Plaintiff
Rodney Kapprelian TERMINATED: 02/19/2014

Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014
represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015
Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 17 of 106

Plaintiff Matthew King

Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014
represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 18 of 106

Plaintiff Andre Cokes

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015
Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014
represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan S. Kister

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 19 of 106

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Theodore Ginnery TERMINATED: 02/07/2014

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel K. O'Toole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James G. Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 20 of 106

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher LaRose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gillian R. Wilcox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Scherrer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winston E. Calvert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

Plaintiff
Joseph Bowen Class Representative

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 21 of 106

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015

Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
William Murphy Class Representative

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John H. Quinn , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronnie Lee White , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Kister (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew J. McNulty

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 22 of 106
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric M. Selig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2015
Jessie M. Steffan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omri E. Praiss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Wack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Healthlink, Inc. TERMINATED: 12/21/2009
Defendant Wellpoint TERMINATED: 12/21/2009

represented by Dean John Sauer ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI 1530 Rax Court P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65109 573−751−8807 Email: john.sauer@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronald A. Norwood LEWIS RICE, LLC 600 Washington Suite 2500 St. Louis, MO 63101 314−444−7759 Fax: 314−612−7759 Email: rnorwood@lewisrice.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Paul Dandurand ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI 1530 Rax Court P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65109 573−751−8828 Fax: 573−751−0774 Email: Joe.dandurand@ago.mo.gov TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 23 of 106

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald A. Norwood (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Harold Myers Reimbursement Officer, HealthLink, Individually and Officially

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314−340−7861 Fax: 314−340−7029 Email: Katherine.Walsh@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Sholtz ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314−932−3232 Fax: 314−932−3233 TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey MCMAHON BERGER PC 2730 N. Ballas Road Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63131−3039 314−567−7350 Fax: 314−567−5968 Email: fennessey@mcmahonberger.com TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Old Post Office Building P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314−340−7875 Fax: 314−340−7029

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 24 of 106

Email: mary.morris@ago.mo.gov TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Judy Sumpter Representative, HealthLink, Individually and Officially TERMINATED: 02/19/2014

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Alan Blake Chief Operating Officer, MSOTC, Individually and Officially

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 25 of 106

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Keith Schaefer TERMINATED: 01/27/2017 also known as Keith Schafer TERMINATED: 01/27/2017

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jeremiah Nixon Governor, Individually and Officially TERMINATED: 11/13/2009

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Melissa Ring TERMINATED: 01/30/2017

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 26 of 106

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mark Stringer TERMINATED: 01/30/2017

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Felix Vincenz TERMINATED: 02/19/2014

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 27 of 106

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Karen Adams TERMINATED: 02/19/2014

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Julie Inman

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 28 of 106

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Jay Englehart

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Justin Arnett

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 29 of 106

Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rex P. Fennessey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Rick Gowdy in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Healths Division of Behavioral Health

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65102−0899 573−751−4526 Fax: 573−751−9456 Email: joel.poole@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Joseph Parks M.D. TERMINATED: 01/27/2017

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 30 of 106

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert Reitz

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Linda Moll

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 31 of 106

TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Daman Longworth

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Donna Augustine

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Dave Schmitt

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 32 of 106

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Marty Martin−Forman TERMINATED: 01/30/2017

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ian Fluger TERMINATED: 01/30/2017

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 33 of 106

Defendant Sherry Lee TERMINATED: 02/09/2017
Defendant Ericka L. Kempker
Defendant Kristina Bender−Crice

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 34 of 106

Defendant Doe Defendants TERMINATED: 03/24/2015
Defendant George Lombardi in his official capacity as the Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 01/27/2017

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Henry F. Luepke , III ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI 815 Olive Street Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63101 (314) 340−7652 Email: Bud.Luepke@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip Sholtz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/16/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 35 of 106

Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/09/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Angeline Stanislaus in her official capacity as Chief Clinical Officer of the Missouri Department of Mental Health.

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Poole (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Anne Precythe in her official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections.

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Rikki Wright in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health for the Division of Behavioral Health.

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mark Stringer in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 36 of 106

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
David Schmitt in his official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of Southeast Missouri Mental Health Centers Adult Psychiatric Services.

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Andy Atkinson in his official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of Fulton State Hospital.

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Lee Ann McVay in her official capacity as Program Coordinator at SORTS−Fulton State Hospital.

represented by Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Paul Dandurand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/06/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 37 of 106

Susan Knopflein in her official capacity as Chief Nurse Executive at Fulton State Hospital

Dean John Sauer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine S. Walsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
Armstrong Teasdale LLP Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−621−5070

represented by Scott K.G. Kozak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/22/2009
06/22/2009
06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/23/2009
06/23/2009 07/01/2009 07/01/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against defendants Healthlink, Inc.; Wellpoint; Harold Myers; Judy Sumpter; Alan Blake; Keith Schafer and Jeremiah Nixon with Jury Demand, filed by Richard Tyson; Wade A. Turpin; John R. Van Orden; Robert Hood; Michael D. McCord; Joseph Miller; Macon Baker; Chance Tyree; Walter W. Ritchey; David Brown; and Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits, # 2 Correspondence, # 3 Envelope, # 4 Judge Assignment Label)(WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis jointly filed by Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
3 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
4 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff Michael D. McCord. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
5 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff Joseph Miller. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
6 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff Chance Tyree. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
7 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff Walter W. Ritchey. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
8 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff David Brown. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
9 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
10 Certified Inmate Account Statement filed by Plaintiff Richard Tyson. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
***Complaint Letter Created. This is to advise you that this office has received and filed your complaint and has assigned it the above−referenced case number. (WAF) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
***Complaint Letter Processed (see notice of electronic filing for distribution list) Tue Jun 23 10:01:00 CDT 2009 (admin,) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
11 Letter to Clerk from pltff Tyson Re:request for complete file − (CEL) (Entered: 07/01/2009)
12 Letter to Clerk from pltff Miller Re:request for copy of file (CEL) (Entered: 07/01/2009)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 38 of 106

07/01/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/06/2009 07/08/2009
07/08/2009 07/10/2009 07/15/2009 07/15/2009 07/17/2009 07/17/2009 07/17/2009 07/20/2009 07/20/2009 07/20/2009 07/20/2009

13 Letter to Clerk from pltff Baker Re: reqeust for copies of file − (CEL). (Entered: 07/01/2009)
14 NOTICE of Change of Address by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. Copy forwarded to OSU for further processing. Copy of docket forwarded to David Brown at 2520 Main Street St. Louis, MO 63136. (CSR) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
15 PRO SE MOTION: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS TO DEFENDANTS by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (CSR) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
16 MOTION to Appoint Counsel by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (CSR) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
17 ORDER re 2 , 15 , 16 ORDERED that plaintiffs' joint motion for leave to proceed IFP [Doc. #2] is DENIED, without prejudice.FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall forward to plaintiffs, with a copy of this Order, the court forms entitled "Motion to Proceed without Prepayment of Costs" and "Financial Affidavit−CJA23." FURTHER ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, plaintiffs shall each complete and submit a motion to proceed IFP and affidavit in support. FURTHER ORDERED that, if any plaintiff fails to return a completed form motion within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, the Court will dismiss the complaint as to the plaintiff who fails to comply. If none of the plaintiffs comply with this Order, the Court will dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FURTHER ORDERED that, upon plaintiffs filing the requisite motions to proceed IFP and affidavits in support, the Clerk shall resubmit this matter to the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1915. FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motions for service of process [Doc. #15] andmotion for appointment of counsel [Doc. #16] are denied without prejudice, in light of the aforementioned. ( Response to Court due by 8/8/2009.). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 7/8/09. (Attachments: # 1 Motion for IFP, # 2 CJA 23 Fin. Afdt)(CEL) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Jul 8 10:32:51 CDT 2009 (Lippold, Carrie) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
18 SUPPLEMENT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION to Appoint Counsel by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (CSR) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
19 Letter to pltffs Tyson, Miller and Baker from USDC Re:request for copies docs 11 , 12 and 13 (CEL) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
20 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Walter W. Ritchey. (CLA) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
21 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Michael D. McCord. (Attachments: # 1 Financial Affidavit, # 2 Envelope)(TRC) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
22 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 Financial Affidavit, # 2 Certified Inmate Account Statement, # 3 Envelope)(TRC) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
23 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Financial Affidavit, # 2 Certified Inmate Account Statement, # 3 Envelope)(TRC) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
24 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Robert Hood. (CEL) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
25 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT − CJA 23 by Plaintiff Robert Hood. (CEL) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
26 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Chance Tyree. (CEL) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
27 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT − CJA 23 by Plaintiff Chance Tyree. (CEL) (Entered: 07/20/2009)

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07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/24/2009 07/24/2009 07/27/2009 07/27/2009 08/14/2009 08/31/2009
08/31/2009 08/31/2009 08/31/2009 09/02/2009
09/03/2009 10/07/2009 10/09/2009 10/16/2009

28 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff David Brown. (CSR) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
29 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT − CJA 23 by Plaintiff David Brown. (CSR) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
30 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Richard Tyson. (CSR) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
31 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT − CJA 23 by Plaintiff Richard Tyson. (Attachments: # 1 envelope)(CSR) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
32 Certified Inmate Account Statement by Plaintiff Richard Tyson. (CSR) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
33 MOTION for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit in Support by Plaintiff Wade A. Turpin. (TRC) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
34 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT − CJA 23 by Plaintiff Wade A. Turpin. (TRC) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
35 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Macon Baker. (CLA) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
36 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) by Plaintiff Joseph Miller. (CLA) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
37 Letter to Clerk of Court from Plaintiff John Van Orden Re:Request for Copy of Docket Sheet (copy of Docket Sheet mailed to Plaintiff) (TRC) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
38 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pltff.'s mtns to proceed ifp 33 21 20 30 23 22 24 35 36 26 28 are granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defts. shall reply to pltff.'s claims within the time provided by the applicable provisions. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 8/31/09. (CLA) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Aug 31 08:26:20 CDT 2009 (Abrams, Carrie) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
39 WAIVER OF SERVICE LETTER from clerk As to Defendants: Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Jeremiah Nixon. (CLA) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
40 Summons Issued as to defendant Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint, Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter. (Attachments: # 1 Wellpoint, # 2 H. Myers, # 3 J. Sumpter)(CLA) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
41 ORDER re 18 ORDERED that, Richard B. Scherrer, ARMSTRONG TEASDALE, LLP, One Metropolitan Square, Suite 2600, St. Louis, MO, 63102, phone 314−621−5070, fax314−621−5065, is appointed to represent Plaintiffs in thismatter. The Clerk of the Court shall provide Plaintiffs' newly−appointed counsel with a complete copy of the court file at no cost. Attorney Richard B. Scherrer for Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown and Anthony Amonette added. (copy of file to follow). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 9/2/09. (CEL) (cc: pltffs − Modified on 9/2/2009 (CEL). (Entered: 09/02/2009)
***REMARK − paper copy of file placed in mail today to atty Richard Scherrer (CEL) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
42 ENTRY of Appearance by Ronald A. Norwood for Defendants Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint. (Norwood, Ronald) (Entered: 10/07/2009)
43 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint.(Norwood, Ronald) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
44 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. Harold Myers served on

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 40 of 106

10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009 10/19/2009
10/30/2009 10/30/2009 10/30/2009 10/30/2009 11/02/2009

9/24/2009, answer due 10/14/2009. (CSR) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
45 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. Judy Sumpter served on 9/24/2009, answer due 10/14/2009. (CSR) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
46 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. Wellpoint served on 9/24/2009, answer due 10/14/2009. (CSR) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
47 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. Healthlink, Inc. served on 9/24/2009, answer due 10/14/2009. (CSR) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
48 ENTRY of Appearance by Richard B. Scherrer for Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
49 ENTRY of Appearance by Winston E. Calvert for Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
50 ENTRY of Appearance by Christopher LaRose for Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
51 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend 1 Complaint, by Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
52 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 51 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend 1 Complaint, by Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (LaRose, Christopher) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED GRANTED, ( Amended/Supplemental Pleadings due by 11/13/2009). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 10/19/09. (TRC) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
53 ENTRY of Appearance by Rex P. Fennessey for Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Jeremiah Nixon. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
54 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Jeremiah Nixon Alan Blake waiver signed on 8/31/2009, answer due 10/30/2009; Keith Schafer waiver signed on 8/31/2009, answer due 10/30/2009; Jeremiah Nixon waiver signed on 8/31/2009, answer due 10/30/2009. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
55 MOTION for Extension of: Time to File an Answer or Other Responsive Motion by Defendants Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Jeremiah Nixon. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
56 MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time and for Extension of Time to File an Answer or other Responsive Motion by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
57 Docket Text ORDER: as to Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Jeremiah Nixon Re: 55 MOTION for Extension of: Time to File an Answer or Other Responsive Motion by Defendants Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Jeremiah Nixon. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 41 of 106

11/02/2009
11/13/2009 11/18/2009 11/19/2009 11/24/2009 11/30/2009 12/18/2009 12/18/2009 12/21/2009
12/21/2009 12/21/2009

Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Jeremiah Nixon ; ORDERED DEFENDANTS ORDERED TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 20, 2009, Alan Blake answer due 11/20/2009; Keith Schafer answer due 11/20/2009; Jeremiah Nixon answer due 11/20/2009. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 11/2/09. (TRC) (Entered: 11/03/2009)
58 Docket Text ORDER: as to Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter Re: 56 MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time and for Extension of Time to File an Answer or other Responsive Motion by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter ; ORDERED DEFENDANTS ORDERED TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 20, 2009, Harold Myers answer due 11/20/2009; Judy Sumpter answer due 11/20/2009.. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 11/2/09. (TRC) (Entered: 11/03/2009)
59 AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendant all defendants,Terminating Jeremiah Nixon Jury demand, , filed by Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
60 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 59 Amended Complaint, by Defendants Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint. (Norwood, Ronald) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
61 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 60 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 59 Amended Complaint, by Defendants Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint. ; ORDERED : SO ORDERED − defts granted to 12/18/09 to answer/respond. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 11/19/09. (CEL) (Entered: 11/19/2009)
62 MOTION for Extension of: Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 11/24/2009)
63 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 62 MOTION for Extension of: Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter ; ORDERED SO ORDERED JCH. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 11/30/09. (CLA) (Entered: 11/30/2009)
64 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 59 Amended Complaint, 61 Docket Text Order, by Defendants Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint. (Norwood, Ronald) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
65 MOTION to Add Party, MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint, MOTION to Dismiss Party by Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
66 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 65 MOTION to Add Party, MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint, MOTION to Dismiss Party by Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Scherrer, Richard) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, Robert Hood terminated. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 12/21/09. (new party to be added with filing of amended complaint and Defendants HealthLink and WellPoint will be termed at that time)(TRC) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
67 Docket Text ORDER: as to Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint Re: 64 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 59 Amended Complaint, 61 Docket Text Order, by Defendants Healthlink, Inc., Wellpoint. (Norwood, Ronald) filed by Wellpoint, Healthlink, Inc. ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, Healthlink, Inc. answer due 1/15/2010; Wellpoint answer due 1/15/2010. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 12/21/09. (TRC) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
68 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond To Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 42 of 106

12/21/2009
12/23/2009
01/29/2010 01/29/2010 02/05/2010 02/09/2010 02/11/2010 02/11/2010 02/11/2010 02/12/2010
02/12/2010 02/18/2010 02/19/2010

Schafer. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
69 AMENDED COMPLAINT (SECOND) against defendant Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer,Terminating Healthlink, Inc. and Wellpoint Jury demand, (SECOND), filed by Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Department of Mental Health Statement)(Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
70 Docket Text ORDER: as to Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer Re: 68 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond To Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, Harold Myers answer due 1/29/2010; Judy Sumpter answer due 1/29/2010; Alan Blake answer due 1/29/2010; Keith Schafer answer due 1/29/2010. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 12/23/09. (TRC) (Entered: 12/23/2009)
71 MOTION for Extension of: Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 01/29/2010)
72 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 71 MOTION for Extension of: Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer.; ORDERED :GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 1/29/10. (CEL) (Entered: 01/29/2010)
73 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 69 Amended Complaint, by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 02/05/2010)
74 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 73 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 69 Amended Complaint, by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring. ; ORDERED : SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 2/9/10. (CEL) (Entered: 02/09/2010)
75 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
76 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss)(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
77 ANSWER to 69 Amended Complaint, by Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring.(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
78 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 76 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss)(Fennessey, Rex) filed by Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter ; ORDERED LEAVE GRANTED JCH. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 2/12/10. (CLA) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
79 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 75 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring. (CLA) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
80 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 75 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 02/18/2010)
81 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 80 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 75 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Plaintiffs Richard Tyson, Wade A. Turpin, John R. Van Orden, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Macon Baker, Chance Tyree, Walter W. Ritchey, David Brown, Anthony Amonette. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, Walter

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 43 of 106

02/26/2010 03/15/2010 03/16/2010
03/17/2010 03/17/2010 03/18/2010
03/23/2010 03/25/2010 03/25/2010
04/01/2010 04/05/2010

W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, David Brown, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, ( Response due by 3/17/2010). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 2/19/10. (TRC) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
82 RULE 16 ORDER Joint Scheduling Plan due by 3/15/2010. Rule 16 Conference set for 3/25/2010 10:45 AM in Telephone before Honorable Jean C. Hamilton. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 2/26/10. (CLA) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
83 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Proposed Scheduling Plan ;Proposed extension date March 17, 2010 by Defendants Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 03/15/2010)
84 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 83 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Proposed Scheduling Plan ;Proposed extension date March 17, 2010 by Defendants Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter ; ORDERED SO ORDERED JCH. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 3/16/10. (CLA) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
85 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 79 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 75 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
86 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Proposed). (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
87 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 85 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 79 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 75 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, ( Response to Court due by 4/1/2010.). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 3/18/10. (TRC) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
88 ENTRY of Appearance by Anthony E. Rothert for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
89 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Jean C. Hamilton: Rule 16 Conference held on 3/25/2010 via telephone. Schedule discussed. Case Management Order to issue. (FTR Gold yes or no: No.) (CBL) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
90 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER This case is assigned to Track: 2 (see order for details). Motion to Join Parties due by 5/17/2010. Discovery Completion due by 3/21/2011. ADR Future Reference 3/21/2011. Dispositive Motions due by 4/4/2011. Jury Trial set for 8/1/2011 09:00 AM in Courtroom 16N before Honorable Jean C. Hamilton. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 3/25/10. (TRC) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
91 MOTION to Add Party and to File Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Third Amended Complaint)(Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
92 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 91 MOTION to Add Party and to File Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Third Amended Complaint)(Scherrer, Richard) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 44 of 106

04/05/2010
04/05/2010 04/15/2010 04/15/2010 04/15/2010 04/22/2010 04/26/2010
05/05/2010 05/06/2010 05/06/2010 05/06/2010

Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 4/5/10. (TRC) (Entered: 04/05/2010)
93 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendant Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter, Mark Stringer, Felix Vincenz, Karen Adams, Julie Inman, Jay Englehart, Justin Arnett Amendment to 59 Amended Complaint, 69 Amended Complaint, 1 Complaint, Jury demand, filed by Wade A. Turpin, Walter W. Ritchey, John R. Van Orden, Chance Tyree, Michael D. McCord, Anthony Amonette, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker. Related document: 59 Amended Complaint, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood, 69 Amended Complaint, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, 1 Complaint, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood.(TRC) (Entered: 04/05/2010)
94 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 75 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Harold Myers, Judy Sumpter, Alan Blake, Keith Schafer, Melissa Ring. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter ; ORDERED DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 4/5/10. (TRC) (Entered: 04/05/2010)
95 WAIVER OF SERVICE LETTER from clerk to Missouri Attorney General's Office as to Defendants: Mark Stringer, Felix Vincenz, Julie Inman, Jay Englehart and Justin Arnett. (CBL) (Entered: 04/15/2010)
96 Letter to Plaintiffs' Attorney Richard Scherrer from Clerk of Court USDC re:provision of address for service of defendant Karen Adams. (CBL) (Entered: 04/15/2010)
97 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 93 Amended Complaint,,,, by Defendants Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 04/15/2010)
98 Summons Issued as to defendant Karen Adams. Summons, Form 285 and Complaint provided to United States Marshal for service. (CBL) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
99 Docket Text ORDER: as to Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter Re: 97 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 93 Amended Complaint,,,, by Defendants Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Keith Schafer, Judy Sumpter ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, Alan Blake answer due 5/5/2010; Harold Myers answer due 5/5/2010; Keith Schafer answer due 5/5/2010; Judy Sumpter answer due 5/5/2010. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 4/26/10. (TRC) (Entered: 04/26/2010)
100 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 93 Amended Complaint,,,, by Defendants Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Judy Sumpter. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/05/2010)
101 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Julie Inman, Justin Arnett, Felix Vincenz, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer Julie Inman waiver signed on 4/15/2010, answer due 6/14/2010; Justin Arnett waiver signed on 4/15/2010, answer due 6/14/2010; Felix Vincenz waiver signed on 4/15/2010, answer due 6/14/2010; Jay Englehart waiver signed on 4/15/2010, answer due 6/14/2010; Mark Stringer waiver signed on 4/15/2010, answer due 6/14/2010. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
102 ENTRY of Appearance by Rex P. Fennessey for Defendants Justin Arnett, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Mark Stringer, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
103 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 100 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 93 Amended Complaint,,,, by Defendants Alan Blake, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 45 of 106

05/14/2010 05/14/2010 05/14/2010 05/17/2010 05/17/2010 05/20/2010 05/20/2010 05/20/2010 05/20/2010
05/25/2010 05/28/2010 06/01/2010
06/01/2010

Schaefer, Judy Sumpter.; ORDERED : SO ORDERED − answer due 5/14/10. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 5/6/10. (CEL) (Entered: 05/07/2010)
104 ANSWER to 93 Amended Complaint,,,, by Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz.(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
105 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
106 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Defendants' Suggestions in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Attachments: # 1 Suggestions in Support of Motion to Dismiss)(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
107 MOTION for Extension of: Time to File Motions to Join Additional Parties or Amend the Pleadings by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
108 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 106 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Defendants' Suggestions in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss by Defendants. ORDERED: LEAVE GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 05/17/2010. (CBL) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
109 ENTRY of Appearance by Rex P. Fennessey for Defendant Karen Adams. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
110 MOTION for Leave to Defendant Adams' Motion to Join Other Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Karen Adams. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
111 ANSWER to 93 Amended Complaint,,,, by Karen Adams.(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
112 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 107 MOTION for Extension of: Time to File Motions to Join Additional Parties or Amend the Pleadings by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, (Motion to Join Parties due by 6/1/2010). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 5/20/10. (TRC) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
113 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 110 MOTION for Leave to Defendant Adams' Motion to Join Other Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Karen Adams. (Fennessey, Rex) ORDERED: SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 05/25/2010. (CBL) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
114 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 105 MOTION to Dismiss Case /Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
115 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 114 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 105 MOTION to Dismiss Case /Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) ORDERED: SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 06/01/2010. (CBL) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
116 MOTION to Add Party Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Additional Class Representatives Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Andre Cokes, and Theodore Ginnery and File Fourth Amended Petition by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 46 of 106

06/01/2010
06/02/2010
06/08/2010 06/10/2010 06/11/2010
06/23/2010 06/25/2010 06/25/2010 06/25/2010 06/28/2010

Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
117 AMENDED COMPLAINT Fourth Amended Complaint against defendant Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Healthlink, Inc., Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Jeremiah Nixon, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Wellpoint Amendment to 1 Complaint, Jury Demand demand, Fourth Amended Complaint, filed by Wade A. Turpin, Walter W. Ritchey, Robert Hood, John R. Van Orden, Chance Tyree, Michael D. McCord, Anthony Amonette, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker. Related document: 1 Complaint, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood.(LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
118 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 116 MOTION to Add Party Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Additional Class Representatives Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Andre Cokes, and Theodore Ginnery and File Fourth Amended Petition by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Robert Hood, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) ORDERED: SO ORDERED. (Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Andre Cokes and Theodore Ginnery added. ) Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 06/02/2010. (CBL) (Entered: 06/02/2010)
119 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint 105 is DENIED as moot. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 6/8/10. (TRC) (Entered: 06/08/2010)
120 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 117 Amended Complaint,,, by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 06/10/2010)
121 Docket Text ORDER: 120 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 117 Amended Complaint by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED SO ORDERED. Karen Adams answer due 6/25/2010; Justin Arnett answer due 6/25/2010; Alan Blake answer due 6/25/2010; Jay Englehart answer due 6/25/2010; Julie Inman answer due 6/25/2010; Harold Myers answer due 6/25/2010; Melissa Ring answer due 6/25/2010; Keith Schaefer answer due 6/25/2010; Mark Stringer answer due 6/25/2010; Judy Sumpter answer due 6/25/2010; Felix Vincenz answer due 6/25/2010. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 6/11/10. (TRC) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
122 NOTICE of Change of Address filed by Winston E. Calvert (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 06/25/2010)
124 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint)(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 06/25/2010)
125 ANSWER to 117 Amended Complaint,,, by Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz.(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 06/25/2010)
126 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 124 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 47 of 106

06/28/2010 07/01/2010 07/02/2010
08/12/2010 08/16/2010
09/13/2010 09/30/2010 10/01/2010

Sumpter, Felix Vincenz ; ORDERED: LEAVE GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 06/28/2010. (CBL) (Entered: 06/28/2010)
127 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (CBL) (Entered: 06/28/2010)
128 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint, 127 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 07/01/2010)
129 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 128 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint, 127 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED, (Response to Court due by 8/16/2010). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 7/2/10. (TRC) (Entered: 07/02/2010)
130 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint, 127 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
131 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 130 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint, 127 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED SO ORDERED, (Response to Court due by 9/30/2010). Signed by Honorable Jean C. Hamilton on 8/16/10. (TRC) (Entered: 08/16/2010)
132 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig for all further proceedings. Honorable Jean C. Hamilton no longer assigned to case. Signed by Honorable Catherine D. Perry on 9/13/10. (CEL) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
133 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 09/30/2010)
134 Docket Text ORDER Re: 133 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on October 1, 2010. (SAA)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 48 of 106

10/04/2010 10/12/2010 10/13/2010 10/14/2010 10/14/2010 10/15/2010
10/27/2010 10/28/2010
11/02/2010

(Entered: 10/01/2010)
135 MEMORANDUM Designation of Classes Sought To Be Certified by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
136 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 135 Memorandum, by Defendants Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 10/12/2010)
137 Docket Text ORDER Re: 136 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 135 Memorandum, by Defendants Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on October 13, 2010. (SAA) (Entered: 10/13/2010)
138 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limit in Filing Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 10/14/2010)
139 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 10/14/2010)
140 Docket Text ORDER Re: 138 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limit in Filing Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on October 15, 2010. (SAA) (Entered: 10/15/2010)
141 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 139 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, and For Leave to File Said Motion Out of Time by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
142 Docket Text ORDER Re: 141 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 139 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, and For Leave to File Said Motion Out of Time by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on October 28, 2010. (SAA) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
143 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 11/02/2010)

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11/02/2010 11/16/2010 11/19/2010 11/19/2010 11/22/2010
11/23/2010
11/23/2010 11/24/2010 12/07/2010 12/09/2010 12/09/2010

144 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 143 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 11/02/2010)
145 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 143 MOTION to Certify Class by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
146 MOTION for Extension of Time of: identify expert witnesses and provide expert reports by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 11/19/2010)
147 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 11/19/2010)
148 Docket Text ORDER Re: 147 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on November 22, 2010. (SAA) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
149 Docket Text ORDER Re: 145 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 143 MOTION to Certify Class by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on November 23, 2010. (SAA) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
150 REPLY to Response to Motion re 123 MOTION to Dismiss Case Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
151 ENTRY of Appearance by Grant R. Doty for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Doty, Grant) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
152 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to identify expert witnesses and provide expert reports [Doc. #146] is DENIED without prejudice, subject to refiling upon a determination by the Court that Defendants have improperly failed to produce documents necessary for such identification and reports. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 12/7/2010. (NCL) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
153 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a Status Conference is scheduled for Wednesday, December 15, 2010 at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 12South. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on December 9, 2010. (SAA) (Entered: 12/09/2010)
154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 12/09/2010)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 50 of 106

12/09/2010
12/15/2010
12/15/2010 12/17/2010 12/22/2010 12/28/2010 12/29/2010
12/29/2010 01/07/2011

155 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Plaintiffs' Requests, # 2 Exhibit 2− Defendants' Responses and Objections, # 3 Exhibit 3− 6/28/10 Letter from Rex Fennessey, # 4 Exhibit 4− 11/24/10 Letter from Richard Scherrer)(Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 12/09/2010)
156 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig: Status Conference held on 12/15/2010. Parties present for Status Conference. The Court inquires of counsel for the parties the status of the deadlines imposed by the Case Management Order. Counsel advises the Court of the status of the issue of requests for production of documents. The Court instructs counsel to submit to the Court a proposed scheduling order for the completion of discovery/requests for production of documents, disclosure of expert witnesses, completion of briefing of the class certification motion and the responses to the motion to compel. The parties submitted to the Court a proposed Stipulated Protective Order and it is So Ordered by the Court. (Court Reporter or FTR Gold Operator initials:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold yes or no: No.) (MRC) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
157 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 12/15/2010. (MRC) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
158 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden.. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 12/17/2010)
159 NOTICE by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz re 143 MOTION to Certify Class (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 12/22/2010)
160 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification)(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 12/28/2010)
161 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 160 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification by Defendants Karen Adams, et al., (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification)(Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on December 29, 2010. (AGF) (Entered: 12/29/2010)
162 MEMORANDUM in Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Class Certification re 143 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Defendants Alan Blake, Justin Arnett, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (MRC) (Entered: 12/29/2010)
163 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants shall produce the SORTS Resident Treatment Records for fifty percent (50%) of the residents who have currently provided medical authorization forms on or before March 15, 2011. Defendant shall provide the Sorts Resident Treatment Records for the remainder of the residents who have currently provided medical authorization forms on or before April 15, 2011. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that except as set forth above, the Stipulated Interim Scheduling Order [Doc. # 158 ] is hereby approved and adopted by the Court. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/7/11. (KJS) (Entered: 01/07/2011)

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01/11/2011 01/13/2011 01/14/2011
01/28/2011 02/01/2011 02/02/2011 02/07/2011 02/10/2011

164 TRANSCRIPT proceedings of Status Conference held on 12/15/2010 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Pattis Dunn Wecke, Telephone number 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/1/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/11/2011. (NCL) (Entered: 01/11/2011)
165 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 143 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
166 Docket Text ORDER Re: 165 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 143 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on January 14, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 01/14/2011)
167 REPLY to Response to Motion re 143 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 01/28/2011)
168 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 155 Memorandum in Support of Motion,, 154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 02/01/2011)
169 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 168 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents, by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz (Fennessey, Rex), filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on February 2, 2011. (AGF) (Entered: 02/02/2011)
170 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limit Their Memorandum in Opposition re 154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Jeremiah Nixon, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents)(Fennessey, Rex) Modified docket text on 2/8/2011 (NCL). (Entered: 02/07/2011)
171 Docket Text ORDER Re: 170 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limit Their Memorandum in Opposition re 154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Jeremiah Nixon, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents)(Fennessey, Rex) Modified docket text on 2/8/2011 (NCL). filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Karen Adams, Keith Schaefer, Jeremiah Nixon ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on February 10, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 02/10/2011)

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02/10/2011 02/14/2011 03/02/2011 03/24/2011 04/11/2011
04/11/2011 04/15/2011 04/18/2011
04/19/2011 04/20/2011 05/02/2011 05/03/2011

172 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (KJS) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
173 REPLY to Response to Motion re 154 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
174 MOTION for Leave to Supplement the Record in Support of Their Motion to Compel Defendants' Production of Documents by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 03/02/2011)
175 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Alternative Dispute Resolution. This case is referred to: Mediation Designation of Lead Counsel: Richard Scherrer ADR Completion Deadline due by 5/23/2011. Designation of Neutral due by 4/11/2011. ADR Conference Schedule due by 4/11/2011. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/24/2011. (NCL) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
176 REPORT TO COURT ORDER re 175 Order Referring Case to ADR, of Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel Regarding Status of Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
177 REPORT TO COURT ORDER re 175 Order Referring Case to ADR, by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
178 MOTION for Extension of: Time to Produce Treatment Records by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 04/15/2011)
179 Docket Text ORDER Re: 178 MOTION for Extension of: Time to Produce Treatment Records by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on April 18, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 04/18/2011)
180 MEMORANDUM re 176 Report to Court Order, by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
181 Letter to the Court from Dennis W. Strutton re: Withdrawal from Class (Attachments: # 1 Envelope) (NCL) (Entered: 04/25/2011)
182 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Response to Strutton Motion for Complete Withdrawal and Response Thereto by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 05/02/2011)
183 Docket Text ORDER Re: 182 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Response to Strutton Motion for Complete Withdrawal and Response Thereto by Plaintiffs Anthony

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06/21/2011 06/22/2011
06/23/2011 06/24/2011
07/05/2011 07/15/2011 07/19/2011 07/20/2011 07/25/2011

Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on May 3, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 05/03/2011)
184 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
185 Docket Text ORDER Re: 184 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED. The deadline for completing the mediation conference shall be extended for 60 days, to and including July 22, 2011. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on June 22, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 06/22/2011)
186 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
187 Docket Text ORDER Re: 186 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on June 24, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 06/24/2011)
188 NOTICE of Appointment of Neutral Neutral name: Richard Sher Neutral selected by Parties (enotification to neutral)(LSD) (Entered: 07/05/2011)
189 ORDER In light of the Court's recent Orders modifying deadlines, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the trial date of August 1, 2011 is vacated, and will be reset at a later date. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/15/2011. (NCL) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
190 MOTION for Issuance Of Order Authorizing John Van Orden to Attend Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Martin, James) [Attorney filing error. Incorrect attorney login/password was used to file this document. Attorney of record confirmed the filing error. Modified on 7/20/2011 (MRC).] (Entered: 07/19/2011)
191 ORDER Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Authorizing John Van Orden to Attend Mediation [Doc. #190] on September 22, 2011 is GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/20/2011. (NCL) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
192 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs claim that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to the lack

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08/24/2011 08/26/2011 09/19/2011
09/29/2011 09/30/2011 10/12/2011
11/07/2011 11/09/2011 11/09/2011

of adequate care and treatment, and as to their equal protection and substantive due process claims based upon Missouris statutory reimbursement scheme as applied to Plaintiffs; the motion is GRANTED as to all other aspects of the Fourth Amended Complaint. [Doc. # 123 ] Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/25/11. (KJS) (Entered: 07/25/2011)
193 ENTRY of Appearance by Mary D. Delworth for Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Delworth, Mary) (Entered: 08/24/2011)
194 MOTION for Leave to be Excused Certain Parties from Attending Mediation by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 08/26/2011)
195 ORDER Upon consideration of Defendants' motion and Plaintiffs' concurrence therein, Defendants' Motion for an Order Excusing Certain Parties from Attending Mediation [Doc. #194] on September 22, 2011 is GRANTED. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schafer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, and Felix Vincenz are excused from attending the scheduled mediation in this matter. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/19/2011. (NCL) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
196 ADR COMPLIANCE REPORT by Neutral: Richard P. Sher. Date of Conference: 9/22/2011. The parties participated in good faith. The parties did not achieve a settlement. (NCL) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
197 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER −.....IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification [Doc. No. 143] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file no later than October 12, 2011, their brief in support of their proposed form of notice, and Defendants shall file their response to Plaintiffs' brief not later than October 24, 2011. ( Response to Court due by 10/12/2011.). Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/30/2011. (MRC) (Entered: 10/03/2011)
198 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 197 Memorandum & Order, (Joint Response to Court Order with Proposed Notice to Class Members) by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Notice to Class Members, # 2 Proposed Notice to Class Members − Attachment 1 − Fourth Amended Complaint, # 3 Proposed Notice to Class Members − Attachment 2 − Order of Motion to Dismiss, # 4 Proposed Notice to Class Members − Attachment 3 − Order on Motion for Class Certification)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
199 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' request for approval of the stipulated Notice of Class Action (Doc. No. 198−1) and the parties' proposed plan for distribution of the Notice of Class Action set forth in the Joint Response to Court Order (Doc. No. 198) is GRANTED. The approved Notice of Class Action (Doc. No. 198−1) is attached to this Order. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 11/07/2011. (KSM) (Entered: 11/07/2011)
200 MOTION for Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) Modified docket text on 11/10/2011 (NCL). (Entered: 11/09/2011)
201 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A.

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 55 of 106

11/16/2011 11/17/2011 11/29/2011 11/30/2011 12/02/2011 12/05/2011
12/15/2011 12/16/2011 01/09/2012

Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 11/09/2011)
202 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 11/16/2011)
203 Docket Text ORDER Re: 202 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on November 17, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 11/17/2011)
204 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 11/29/2011)
205 RESPONSE in Opposition re 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
206 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 12/02/2011)
207 Docket Text ORDER Re: 206 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on December 5, 2011. (SAA) (Entered: 12/05/2011)
208 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 12/15/2011)
209 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 208 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on December 16, 2011. (AGF) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
210 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette,

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 56 of 106

01/10/2012
01/12/2012 01/19/2012 03/05/2012 03/13/2012 03/20/2012 03/21/2012
03/30/2012 06/15/2012 06/21/2012

Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 01/09/2012)
211 Docket Text ORDER Re: 210 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on January 10, 2012. (SAA) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
212 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 200 MOTION for Leave to Appointment of Master Pursuant to Rule 53 filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5)(Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 01/12/2012)
213 REPORT TO COURT ORDER re 199 Order, (notification that class notices have been distributed in accordance with plan approved by court) by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/19/2012)
214 Letter to Clerk of Court from Wade A. Turpin (NCL) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
215 MOTION for Leave to Supplement The Record and Briefing in Support of Motion to Compel Defendants' Production of Documents by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
216 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Delworth, Mary) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
217 Docket Text ORDER Re: 216 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Delworth, Mary) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on March 21, 2012. (SAA) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
218 RESPONSE to Motion re 215 MOTION for Leave to Supplement The Record and Briefing in Support of Motion to Compel Defendants' Production of Documents filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
219 Docket Text ORDER: A Status Conference is scheduled for Thursday, June 21, 2012 at 3:00 p.m. in the Chambers of the undersigned. Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on June 15, 2012. (SAA) (Entered: 06/15/2012)
220 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig: Status Conference held on 6/21/2012. − Parties present for Status Conference. Order to issue.

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06/22/2012
07/23/2012 07/24/2012
07/27/2012 08/16/2012 08/27/2012 08/28/2012 09/13/2012 09/19/2012

(Court Reporter:None.)(FTR Gold Operator initials:None.) (FTR Gold: No.) (MRC) (Entered: 06/21/2012)
221 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that on or before July 23, 2012, the parties shall propose to the Court a joint scheduling plan for the resolution of Plaintiffs claims related to reimbursement issues (i.e., the Charging Class claims, as summarized in this Courts September 30, 2011, Memorandum and Order.) (Doc. No. 197, p 5−6.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other proceedings herein, including claims related to treatment issues (i.e., the Treatment Class claims), shall be STAYED until December 1, 2012. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, with agreement of the parties, that all motions now pending before the Court (Doc. Nos. 154, 200, and 215) shall be WITHDRAWN without prejudice to resubmission at a later date, as necessary. (Joint Scheduling Plan due by 7/23/2012.) Signed by Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/22/2012. (NCL) (Entered: 06/22/2012)
222 MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file the following: Joint Scheduling Plan for Resolution of Plaintiff's Claim Related to Reimbursement Issues ;Proposed extension date July 27, 2012 by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 07/23/2012)
223 Docket Text ORDER Re: 222 MOTION for Extension of Time to File ; Extension to file the following: Joint Scheduling Plan for Resolution of Plaintiff's Claim Related to Reimbursement Issues; Proposed extension date July 27, 2012 by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz (Fennessey, Rex) filed by Julie Inman, Felix Vincenz, Justin Arnett, Judy Sumpter, Jay Englehart, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Melissa Ring, Karen Adams, Harold Myers, Keith Schaefer; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on July 24, 2012. (SAA) (Entered: 07/24/2012)
224 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. . (Fennessey, Rex) (Entered: 07/27/2012)
225 ENTRY of Appearance by Philip Sholtz for Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 08/16/2012)
226 MOTION to Substitute Attorney/Law Firm ;attorney or firm Katherine S. Walsh ;substituted for:Rex P. Fennessey by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 08/27/2012)
227 Docket Text ORDER Re: 226 Motion to Substitute Attorney/Law Firm Katherine S. Walsh for Rex P. Fennessey by Defendants Karen Adams, et al.; SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on August 28, 2012. (SAA) (Entered: 08/28/2012)
228 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court shall hold an informal status conference with counsel on Wednesday, September 19, 2012 at 10:30 a.m. in the chambers of the undersigned. Status Conference set for 9/19/2012 10:30 AM in Chambers before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/13/2012. (NCL) (Entered: 09/13/2012)
229 JOINT AMENDED SCHEDULING PLAN by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. Proposed Amended Scheduling Plan. (Walsh, Katherine) Modified docket text on 9/20/2012 (NCL). (Entered: 09/19/2012)

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09/20/2012 11/20/2012 11/29/2012 11/30/2012
03/04/2013
03/05/2013 03/05/2013 03/25/2013 04/19/2013 04/23/2013

230 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Joint Proposed Amended Scheduling Planregarding Resolutions of Plaintiffs' Claims related to Reimbursement Issues (Doc. No. 229) is adopted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case shall be administratively closed, subject to reopening when the parties are in a position to proceed with respect to the Treatment Issues, the resolution of which has been stayed., Terminate Case Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/20/12. (JWJ) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
231 Docket Text ORDER: At the request of the parties, the Court shall hold a Status Conference in the chambers of the undersigned on Thursday, November 29, 2012 at 2:00 p.m. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 20, 2012. (SAA) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
232 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Status Conference held on 11/29/2012 in chambers. (FTR Gold: No.) (NCL) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
233 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all deadlines set forth in the Joint Proposed Amended Scheduling Plan regarding Resolution of Plaintiffs' Claims related to Reimbursement Issues (Doc. No. 229) shall be extended for ninety (90) days. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the previously imposed stay with respect to the Treatment Issues in this cause shall be continued until March 4, 2013, subject to reopening by order of the Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before March 4, 2013, the parties shall file a joint status report informing the Court of their progress toward resolution of this matter. Status Report due by 3/4/2013. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 11/29/2012. (NCL) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
234 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF THE STAY AND STATUS REPORT Joint Report on Status of Settlement by Anthony Amonette, Justin Arnett, Macon Baker, Alan Blake, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Jay Englehart, Theodore Ginnery, Julie Inman, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Walter W. Ritchey, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden, Felix Vincenz. (Calvert, Winston) Docket text modified due to attorney filing error. Modified per chambers. 3/5/2013 (KSM). (Entered: 03/04/2013)
235 ENTRY of Appearance by Joseph Paul Dandurand for Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Dandurand, Joseph) (Entered: 03/05/2013)
236 Docket Text ORDER Re: 234 Motion for Extension of the Stay and Status Report by John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Thge stay previously entered in this case shall be extended to March 25, 2013. On or before March 25, 2013, the parties shall file a report on the status of the settlement. Such report may be filed under seal. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 5, 2013. (SAA) (Entered: 03/05/2013)
237 STATUS REPORT Joint Report of the Parties Regarding Their Progress Toward Settlement by Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
238 STATUS REPORT of the Parties Regarding The Status of Settlement and Other Matters by Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
239 ORDER Upon review of the parties status reports (Doc. Nos. 237 and 238) regarding settlement, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall attempt to resolve any and all pending discovery disputes and to complete document production. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file, not later than Monday, June 24, 2013, a status report advising the Court as to the progress of document production and proposing an amended Case Management Order.Status Report due by 6/24/2013. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/23/13. (JWJ) Modified on 4/24/2013

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06/24/2013 06/24/2013
09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/16/2013
09/17/2013 10/01/2013 11/22/2013 11/25/2013 01/08/2014 01/14/2014
02/06/2014

(JWJ). (Entered: 04/23/2013)
240 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report of Parties Regarding Status of Settlement and Other Matters by John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 06/24/2013)
241 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall participate, in good faith, in a further mediation conference on September 26, 2013, or such other earlier date when they can conduct a conference with Richard Sher as mediator.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within seven (7) days of the completion of the mediation conference, the parties shall file a joint status report, and if the case has not been settled, the parties shall file a shall file a proposed amended Case Management Order within ten (10) days of the completion of the mediation conference. Response to Court due by 9/26/2013. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/24/2013. (KSH) (Entered: 06/24/2013)
242 MOTION for Limited/Special Appearance for Order Authorizing John Van Orden to Attend Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
243 ORDER Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Authorizing John Van Orden to Attend Mediation [Doc. No. 242] on September 26, 2013 is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/10/2013. (NCL) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
244 MOTION for Leave to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Authorizing Matthew King to Attend Mediation by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
245 ORDER Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Authorizing Matthew King to Attend Mediation [Doc. No. 244] on September 26, 2013 is GRANTED. 244 Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/17/13. (KXS) (Entered: 09/17/2013)
246 STATUS REPORT of the Parties Regarding the Status of Settlement by Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
247 ADR COMPLIANCE REPORT by Neutral: Sher, Richard P.. Date of Conference: 9/26/2013. The parties participated in good faith. The parties did not achieve a settlement.(RAK) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
248 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Motion to Withdraw As Counsel and Firm ;attorney/firm Richard B. Scherrer/ by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
249 MOTION TO OPT OUT OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PER FED R. CIV 23 (a),(d)(2). (Attachments: # 1 Envelope)(RAK) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
250 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Plaintiffs by Richard B. Scherrer and Christopher LaRose and Winston Calvert is GRANTED. [Doc. No. 248.] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eric Selig, of Rosenblum, Schwartz, Rogers & Glass, P.C., 120 S. Central Avenue, St. Louis MO 63105, is appointed as lead counsel to represent Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Daniel K. OToole, Armstrong Teasdale LLC, shall also be appointed to continue to provide support to the litigation on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Anthony Rothert and Grant Doty, of the American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri, shall continue as co−counsel of record. granting 248 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Winston E. Calvert and Richard B. Scherrer terminated Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/14/14. (JWJ) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
251 ENTRY of Appearance by Christopher LaRose for Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (LaRose, Christopher) (Entered: 02/06/2014)

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02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/19/2014 02/19/2014
02/21/2014 03/05/2014

252 ENTRY of Appearance by Daniel K. O'Toole for Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (O'Toole, Daniel) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
253 ENTRY of Appearance by Winston E. Calvert for Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
254 ENTRY of Appearance by Eric M. Selig for Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
255 MOTION for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
256 NOTICE of Death of Class Representative by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Selig, Eric) Modified docket text on 2/7/2014 (NCL). (Entered: 02/06/2014)
257 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 255.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall detach Document No. 255−1 and file it as Plaintiffs' fifth amended complaint herein. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/19/2014. (NCL) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
258 FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendant Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Rick Gowdy, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Linda Moll, Daman Longworth, Donna Augustine, Dave Schmitt, Marty Martin−Forman, Ian Fluger, Sherry Lee, Ericka L. Kempker, Kristina Bender−Crice, Doe Defendants,Terminating Judy Sumpter (Representative, HealthLink, Individually and Officially), Felix Vincenz, Karen Adams and Rodney Kapprelian Amendment to 59 Amended Complaint, 69 Amended Complaint, 93 Amended Complaint,,,, 117 Amended Complaint,,, 1 Complaint, Jury Demand demand,, filed by Wade A. Turpin, Walter W. Ritchey, John R. Van Orden, Matthew King, Chance Tyree, Michael D. McCord, Anthony Amonette, Andre Cokes, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker. Related document: 59 Amended Complaint, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood, 69 Amended Complaint, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, 93 Amended Complaint,,,, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, 117 Amended Complaint,,, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood, 1 Complaint, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Michael D. McCord, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood.(NCL) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
259 WAIVER OF SERVICE LETTER from clerk As to Defendants: Rick Gowdy, Joseph Parks, M.D., Robert Reitz, Linda Moll, Daman Longworth,Donna Augustine, Dave Schmitt, Marty Martin−Forman, Ian Fluger, Sherry Lee, Ericka L. Kempker, Kristina Bender−Crice and the Doe Defendants (NCL) (Entered: 02/21/2014)
260 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Ian Fluger, Ericka L. Kempker, Daman Longworth, Sherry Lee, Donna Augustine, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Rick Gowdy, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, Kristina Bender−Crice Ian Fluger waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Ericka L. Kempker waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Daman Longworth waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Sherry Lee waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Donna Augustine waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Marty Martin−Forman waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Linda Moll waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Rick Gowdy waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Robert Reitz waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Dave Schmitt waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014; Kristina Bender−Crice waiver signed on 2/21/2014, answer due 4/22/2014. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 03/05/2014)

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261 Waiver of Service Returned Unexecuted filed by Joseph Parks as to Joseph Parks. (Walsh, Katherine). Document 260 and Document 261 are the same document both indicate Mr. Parks is no longer employed by the Department of Mental Health. Modified on 3/6/2014 (RAK). (Entered: 03/05/2014)
262 MOTION for Hearing Plaintaiffs' Motion for the Court to Schedule a Status Conference and to Set a Hearing Date for Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
263 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Excess of This District's Local Rule Page Limit by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
264 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
265 Document a duplicate of Doc. # 266 . See Doc. # 266 for Memorandum in Support and Exhibits. MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 264 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Mmemorandum in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) Modified docket text on 3/31/2014 (NCL). (Entered: 03/28/2014)
266 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 264 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3A, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit 11A, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit 12A, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit 13, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit 13A, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit 14, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit 14A, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit 15, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit 15A)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
267 SUPPLEMENTAL re 266 Memorandum in Support of Motion,,, Exhibit 16 by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 17, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 18, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 18A, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 18B, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 18C, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 18D, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 19, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 20)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
268 SUPPLEMENTAL re 267 Supplemental, Exhibit 21 by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 22, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 23, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 24A, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 24, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 25, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 26, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 27, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 28, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 29, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 30 (Part 1), # 11 Exhibit Exhibit 30 (Part 2), # 12 Exhibit Exhibit 30 (Part 3), # 13 Exhibit Exhibit 31, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit 32, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit 33, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit 34, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit 35 (Part 1), # 18 Exhibit Exhibit 35 (Part 2))(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
269 Docket Text ORDER Re: 263 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Excess of This District's Local Rule Page Limit by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 31, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
270 MOTION to Quash by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Kelly S. Wiedau Affidavit)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
271 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 270 MOTION to Quash filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer. (Walsh,

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04/17/2014
04/22/2014 04/22/2014 04/23/2014 04/23/2014 04/24/2014
04/25/2014 04/28/2014 05/01/2014

Katherine) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
272 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (PLEASE SEE MEMORANDUM AND ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file a response to the motion to quash on or before Thursday, April 24, 2014, and Defendants shall file a reply brief on or before Thursday, May 1, 2014.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall also confer and suggest to theCourt a mutually agreeable time on May 8, or May 9, 2014 for a conference call to address the motion to quash. Response to Court due by 4/24/2014. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/17/14. (JWJ) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
273 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
274 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitations by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
275 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 274 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitations, filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, et al. ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 23, 2014. (AGF) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
276 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 273 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (NCL) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
277 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 270 MOTION to Quash Notice of Deposition of Delly S. Wiedau filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 7 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 8 to Memo in Opposition to Motion to Quash Notice of Depo of Kelly S. Wiedau)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
278 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 273 MOTION to Dismiss Case Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Mtoin to Dismiss by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 04/25/2014)
279 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 278 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 273 Motion to Dismiss Case, filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 28, 2014. (AGF) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
280 REPLY to Response to Motion re 270 MOTION to Quash filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 05/01/2014)

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05/05/2014 05/05/2014 05/06/2014 05/08/2014 05/08/2014 05/08/2014 05/08/2014
05/14/2014 05/14/2014 05/21/2014

281 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Winston Calvert by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Calvert, Winston) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
282 MOTION to Expedite Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Memorandum in Support and Motion to Shorten Time by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
283 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court will hold a telephone conference on Defendants motion to quash Doc. No. 270 on Thursday, May 8, 2014, at 11:00 a.m. Counsel should also be prepared to discuss the scheduling of a hearing on Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties shall initiate the call. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/6/2014. (RAK) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
284 Docket Text ORDER Re: 281 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Winston Calvert by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al. (Calvert, Winston) filed by John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 8, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
285 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Status Conference held on 5/8/2014. Parties present for telephone conference regarding scheduling of Preliminary Injunction Hearing. Court Order to issue. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NCL) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
286 [VACATED per Order # 517 .] ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure23(c)(2)(B)(v), that the motion of William Billy Gene Carter to opt out of the class certified in this matter is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 249.) granting 249 Pro Se Motion Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/8/14. (JWJ) Modified on 3/18/2016 (BRP). (Entered: 05/08/2014)
287 ORDER PLEASE SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants shall be permitted limited discovery to prepare for the hearing, in the form of depositions of five of the named Plaintiffs, with each deposition lasting no more than one−half day. Defendants shall have up to and including May 12, 2014, to serve Plaintiffs with interrogatories, or less formal written requests, to ascertain which Plaintiffs Defendants would like to depose. Plaintiffs shall have up to and including May 27, 2014, to respond to the interrogatories/requests. Plaintiff shall then have up to and including June 30, 1014, to complete the depositions. The parties IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before June 30, 2014, the parties shall confer and inform the Court of dates in July 2014 on which they would be ready to proceed with the preliminary injunction hearingshall make good faith efforts to shorten this discovery period. Response to Court due by 6/30/2014. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/8/14. (JWJ) Modified on 5/28/2014 to add docket text (JWJ). (Entered: 05/08/2014)
288 ENTRY of Appearance by John H. Quinn, III for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
289 ENTRY of Appearance by Gillian R. Wilcox for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Wilcox, Gillian) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
290 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 264 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 05/21/2014)

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291 Docket Text ORDER Re: 290 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 264 Motion for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 22, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
292 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitations by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
293 RESPONSE to Motion re 264 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
294 Docket Text ORDER Re: 292 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitations by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 27, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 05/27/2014)
295 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum in Excess of Local Rule Page Limitation in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
296 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 273 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
297 Docket Text ORDER Re: 295 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation − Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum in Excess of Local Rule Page Limitation in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 29, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
298 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 293 Response to Motion, Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
299 Docket Text ORDER Re: 298 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 293 Response to Motion, Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 2, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 9)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
301 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
302 MOTION for Leave to Join Additional Party Plaintiffs and One Additional Party Defendant and Memorandum in Support by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
303 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine)

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06/11/2014
06/12/2014 06/12/2014 06/13/2014 06/24/2014 06/26/2014
06/26/2014 07/01/2014
07/02/2014 07/07/2014 07/07/2014

(Entered: 06/11/2014)
304 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 302 MOTION for Leave to Join Additional Party Plaintiffs and One Additional Party Defendant and Memorandum in Support by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
305 Docket Text ORDER Re: 303 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 300 Motion for Sanctions − Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions − Discovery by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 12, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
306 Docket Text ORDER Re: 304 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 302 Motion for Leave to Join Additional Party Plaintiffs and One Additional Party Defendant and Memorandum in Support by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 12, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
307 REPLY to Response to Motion re 264 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
308 MOTION for Hearing re 300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Scherrer, Richard) (Entered: 06/24/2014)
309 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
310 Docket Text ORDER Re: 309 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 300 Motion for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 26, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
311 RESPONSE to Motion re 302 MOTION for Leave to Join Additional Party Plaintiffs and One Additional Party Defendant and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Doe Defendants, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
312 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion (Doc. No. 308) for oral argument on their motion for sanctions is GRANTED. Oral argument is set for Thursday, July 24, 2014, at 11:00 a.m. (Motion Hearing set for 7/24/2014 11:00 AM before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/2/2014. (NCL) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
313 REPLY to Response to Motion re 302 MOTION for Leave to Join Additional Party Plaintiffs and One Additional Party Defendant and Memorandum in Support Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion t Join Additional Party Plaintiffs and One Additional Party Defendant filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
314 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman,

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07/08/2014
07/11/2014 07/11/2014 07/17/2014 07/17/2014 07/18/2014 07/24/2014
07/24/2014 07/29/2014
07/29/2014 07/29/2014 07/31/2014

Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Affidavit of Rikki Wright, # 2 Exhibit B − Correspondence from Eric Selig to Katherine Walsh dated June 25, 2014, # 3 Exhibit C − Correspondence from Eric Selig to Katherine Walsh dated June 27, 2014)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
315 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to add (1) Joseph Bowen and William Murphy as Plaintiffs and Class Representatives, and (2) George Lombardi, in his official capacity as the Director of the Missouri Department of Correction, as a Defendant with regard to all aspects of this action is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 302 .) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/8/2014. (NEB) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
316 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 314 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion,, by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
317 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 316 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply as to 314 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on July 11, 2014. (AGF) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
318 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
319 RESPONSE to Motion re 300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
320 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 318 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation, filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on July 18, 2014. (AGF) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
321 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: The parties argue their position on the plaintiff's motion for sanctions #300. The Court will deny that motion.The Court will issue an order.Motion Hearing held on 7/24/2014 re 300 MOTION for Sanctions Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Discovery filed by John R. Van Orden. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (JWJ) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
322 ORDER ( SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for sanctions is DENIED without prejudice. (Doc No. 300.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs request for a privilege log as to documents already produced by Defendants is DENIED as moot. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/24/14. (JWJ) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
323 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall docket Mr. Spencer's letter and all attachments as a Request to Withdraw from Class Action, and send copies to Mr. Spencer per his request. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Spencer shall have until August 11, 2014, to advise the Court if he wishes to remain as a class member. If no such request to remain in the suit is filed by that date, the Court shall grant Mr. Spencers request to withdraw from this class action lawsuit. Response to Court due by 8/11/2014. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/29/2014. (NCL) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
324 Request to Withdraw from Class Action filed by Troy Spencer. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope, #(2) Correspondence/Cover Letter) (NCL). Added attachment #2 on 7/30/2014 (NCL). (Entered: 07/29/2014)
***REMARK − Copy of the Court's 7/29/2014 Order Doc. # 323 and a Filed Stamped copy of Doc # 324 Request to Withdraw was mailed to Troy Spencer SORTS, FSH 600 E. 5th Street Fulton, MO 65251. (NCL) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
325 TRANSCRIPT of 321 (Oral Argument) held on 7/24/2014 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained

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through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/21/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/2/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/29/2014. (NCL) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
326 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Spencer's request to withdraw from this class action lawsuit is GRANTED. (Doc No. 324 .). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 08/13/2014. (NEB) VACATED per Order 522 (Entered: 08/13/2014)
327 ENTRY of Appearance by Katherine S. Walsh for Defendant George Lombardi. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
328 ENTRY of Appearance by Mary Delworth Morris for Defendant George Lombardi. (Morris, Mary) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
329 ENTRY of Appearance by Philip Sholtz for Defendant George Lombardi. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
330 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendant George Lombardi. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
331 MOTION for Hearing re 287 Order,,,, 264 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Requests to Set hearing Date for Motion for Preliminary Injunction and to Amend Case Management Order)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
332 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 330 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
333 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for a Hearing (Doc. No. 331) is GRANTED. The Court shall hold a Status Conference on Monday, September 15, 2014 at 2:00 p.m. ( Status Conference set for 9/15/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/9/14. (JWJ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
334 Docket Text ORDER: At the request of Plaintiffs, and with consent of Defendants, the Status Conference previously scheduled for September 15, 2014 is continued to Friday, September 26, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 9, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
335 Docket Text ORDER: The Status Conference is rescheduled for Thursday, October 2, 2014 at 3:00 p.m. in the Courtroom of the undersigned. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 18, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
336 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Status Conference held on 10/2/2014. The parties inform the Court that they came to a Stipulation on the Preliminary Injunction. The parties go over the Stipulation with the Court. The plaintiff will notify the Court if they waive having a Jury Trial. The Parties shall file joint Proposed Scheduling Plane with the Court within 10 days. In light of the Parties Stipulation the plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is deemed Moot (Court Reporter:Gayle Madden.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NCL) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
337 Motion to Amend Case Management Order re 90 Case Management Order, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Amended Case Management Order)(Quinn, John) Modified docket text and event type on 10/17/2014 (SAA). (Entered: 10/16/2014)
338 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint are DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs substantive due process claim based on lack of adequate care and treatment,

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Plaintiffs substantive due process and equal protection claims based on Missouris statutory reimbursement scheme, and Plaintiffs alternative disability discrimination claim under the ADA; the motions are GRANTED as to all other aspects of Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint. (Docs. No. 273 & 330 .) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/17/2014. (NEB) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
339 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Parties present for telephone conference regarding proposed Amended Case Management Order. Parties to submit a new proposed Amended Case Management Order. Telephone Conference held on 10/22/2014. (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
340 MEMORANDUM re 90 Case Management Order, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Amended Case Management Order)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
341 ANSWER to 258 Amended Complaint,,,,,,, by George Lombardi.(Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
342 Docket Text ORDER Re: 337 Motion to Amend Case Management Order re 90 Case Management Order by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED DENIED as moot. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 29, 2014. (SAA) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
343 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following schedule shall apply in this case and it revises any prior case management order in this case, and will be modified only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances (See Order for Complete Details)... Discovery Completion due by 2/2/2015. Dispositive Motions due by 12/12/2014. Bench Trial set for 4/20/2015 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/29/2014. (NEB) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
344 ANSWER to 258 Amended Complaint,,,,,,, by Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter.(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
345 MOTION for Reconsideration and Revise Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment and Double Jeopardy Claims and Memorandum in Support by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 12/01/2014)
346 RESPONSE in Opposition re 345 MOTION for Reconsideration and Revise Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment and Double Jeopardy Claims and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
347 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant George Lombardi. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
348 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant George Lombardi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
349 STATEMENT of Material Facts re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant George Lombardi. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 12/05/2014)

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350 ENTRY of Appearance by Scott K.G. Kozak for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
352 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
353 STATEMENT of Material Facts re 351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A part 1 of 2, # 2 Exhibit A part 2 of 2, # 3 Exhibit B)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
354 ENTRY of Appearance by Ronnie Lee White, II for Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
355 MOTION to Bifurcate Plaintiffs' Uncontested Motion to Bifurcate Trial, by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order Bifurcating Trial)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
356 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 355 MOTION to Bifurcate Plaintiffs' Uncontested Motion to Bifurcate Trial filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
357 MOTION for Protective Order Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order and Memorandum of Law in Support by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
358 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to bifurcate trial is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 355.) The current trial setting in this case shall be limited to a trial on the question of whether Defendants are liable for the claims asserted by Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs prevail on any claim, then the Court shall order the parties to submit a proposed schedule fora second trial to determine the appropriate remedies and relief. re: 355 MOTION to Bifurcate Plaintiffs' Uncontested Motion to Bifurcate Trial filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 12/19/14. (JWJ) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
359 RESPONSE in Opposition re 357 MOTION for Protective Order Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order and Memorandum of Law in Support filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 12/23/2014)
360 MOTION to Compel and for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Respect to Defendant Lombardi's Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Affidavit of John H. Quinn III)(Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 12/24/2014)

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361 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 360 MOTION to Compel and for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Respect to Defendant Lombardi's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 12/24/2014)
362 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 360 MOTION to Compel and for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Respect to Defendant Lombardi's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant George Lombardi. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
363 REPLY to Response to Motion re 360 MOTION to Compel and for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Respect to Defendant Lombardi's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
364 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to compel and for reliefpursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 360.)IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before January 15, 2015, Defendant Lombardi shall produce the following: (1) a complete response to Plaintiffs Request forProduction No. 12, in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2); and (2) a complete privilege log in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the deadline for Plaintiffs response to Lombardis summary judgment motion is extended until February 4, 2015, and the deadline for Lombardis reply brief is extended until February 17, 2015.( Response to Court due by 1/15/2015.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/9/15. (JWJ) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
365 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file the following: response to motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, and Judy Sumpter ;Proposed extension date January 16, 2015 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
366 Docket Text ORDER Re: 365 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File the following: response to motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 12, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
367 NOTICE Withdrawal of Motion for Protective Order: by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden re 357 MOTION for Protective Order Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order and Memorandum of Law in Support (White, Ronnie) (Entered: 01/13/2015)
368 Docket Text ORDER: In light of Plaintiffs' notice of withdrawal (Doc. No. 367), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for protective order (Doc. No. 357 is deemed withdrawn. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 14, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
369 NOTICE Compliance: by Defendant George Lombardi (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
370 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King,

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Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − Affidavit and Attachments)(Doty, Grant) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
371 SUPPLEMENTAL re 370 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − SORTS 309801)(Doty, Grant) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
372 MOTION to Amend/Correct Case Management Order Dated October 29, 2014 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
373 Docket Text ORDER Re: 372 Motion to Amend/Correct Case Management Order Dated October 29, 2014 by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 26, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
374 REPLY to Response to Motion re 351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C, # 2 Exhibit D, # 3 Exhibit E)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
375 NOTICE by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden of Service of Expert Reports (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
***REMARK regarding Notice 375 : In civil actions, discovery and disclosure materials pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, and 36, and the certificates of their service, shall not be filed with the Court except as exhibits to a motion or memorandum. (See Local Rule 26−3.02 located on the court website.) (BRP) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
376 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A − Declaration of Grant R. Doty (with TABs))(Doty, Grant) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
377 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is DENIED. (Doc. No. 345.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 10, 2015. (BRP) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
378 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 364 Order,,, Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant George Lombardi. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
379 Docket Text ORDER Re: 378 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 364 Order Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant George Lombardi; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 18, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
380 REPLY to Response to Motion re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant George Lombardi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B)(Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 02/23/2015)

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381 MEMORANDUM re 376 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, by Defendant George Lombardi. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
382 MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY AND REPORTS OF DAVID PRESCOTT AND BRIAN ABBOTT by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) Modified on 3/17/2015 title of document (JWJ). (Entered: 02/24/2015)
383 MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY AND REPORTS OF DAVID PRESCOTT AND BRIAN ABBOTT re 382 MOTION for Daubert Hearing filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A part 1 of 2, # 2 Exhibit A part 2 of 2, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D)(Walsh, Katherine) Modified on 3/17/2015 to change title of document (JWJ). (Entered: 02/24/2015)
384 ENTRY of Appearance by Susan S. Kister for All Plaintiffs. (Kister, Susan) Modified on 3/2/2015 (BRP). (Entered: 02/26/2015)
385 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Reports of David Prescott and Brian Abbott by Plaintiffs Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
386 Docket Text ORDER Re: 385 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Reports of David Prescott and Brian Abbott by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 2, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
387 RESPONSE in Opposition re 382 MOTION MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY AND REPORTS OF DAVID PRESCOTT AND BRIAN ABBOTT to Exclude the Testimony and Reports of All Plaintiffs' Experts filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Quinn, John) Modified on 3/17/2015 to change document title (JWJ). (Entered: 03/05/2015)
388 MOTION to Amend/Correct 90 Case Management Order, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
389 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to [382 MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY AND REPORTS OF DAVID PRESCOTT AND BRIAN ABBOTT, 383 Memorandum in Support of Motion,, by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Reply to their Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Reports of David Prescott and Brian Abbott)(Walsh, Katherine) Modified on 3/17/2015 to change title of document (JWJ). (Entered: 03/10/2015)
390 Docket Text ORDER Re: 389 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 382 Motion for Daubert Hearing, 383 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 11, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 03/11/2015)

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391 Docket Text ORDER Re: 388 Motion to Amend/Correct 90 Case Management Order by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 11, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
392 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant George Lombardis motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part, with respect to the liability phase of this case. (Doc. No. 347.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant George Lombardi shall remain a party with respect to the remedy phase of this case. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/11/15. (JWJ) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
393 MOTION for Leave to TO FILE A SUR−REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO EXCLUDETHE TESTIMONY OF DAVID PRESCOTT AND BRIAN ABBOTT by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
394 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 393 MOTION for Leave to TO FILE A SUR−REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO EXCLUDETHE TESTIMONY OF DAVID PRESCOTT AND BRIAN ABBOTT filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Communications)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
395 Docket Text ORDER Re: 393 Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Exclude the Testimony of David Prescott and Brian Abbott by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 13, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
396 SURRESPONSE to Motion re 382 MOTION MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY AND REPORTS OF DAVID PRESCOTT AND BRIAN ABBOTT filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Communications)(Quinn, John) Modified on 3/17/2015 title of document (JWJ). (Entered: 03/13/2015)
397 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court shall hold a final pretrial conference on Wednesday, April 15, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. The conference shall begin in chambers. Trial counsel is required to attend and should be prepared to argue any Motions in Limine at that time. Pretrial Conference set for 4/15/2015 09:00 AM before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/13/15. (JWJ) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
398 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall have until March 24, 2015 to show cause why the Doe Defendants should not be dismissed. Failure to comply with this Order shall result in the dismissal of the Doe Defendants. (Show Cause Response due by 3/24/2015.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/17/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
399 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs equal protection claim regarding the reimbursement statutes, and DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs substantive due process claim regarding the reimbursement statutes. (Doc. No. 351 .) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/20/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
400 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to exclude the testimony and reports of David Prescott and Brian Abbott is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. No. 382 .) The motion is GRANTED with respect to Abbott's opinions that the SVP civil commitment process is flawed public policy and biased in favor of commitment. The motion is DENIED in all other

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04/03/2015 04/06/2015

respects. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 20, 2015. (BRP) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
401 MOTION to Dismiss Party Doe Defendants by Plaintiffs Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
402 Docket Text ORDER Re: 401 Motion to Dismiss Party Doe Defendants by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 23, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
403 Consent MOTION for Protective Order Under HIPAA by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Qualified Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit SORTS 0003960, # 3 Exhibit SORTS 0003954, # 4 Exhibit SORTS 0004078)(White, Ronnie) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
***REMARK re Consent Motion 403 : The use of an attorney's electronic filing login and password to file a pleading, motion, memorandum or other document constitutes the signature of that attorney on that document for all purposes, including Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. (See Local Rule 11−2.11 located on the court website.) (NEB) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
404 Consent MOTION to Amend/Correct 343 Case Management Order − Amended,, by Plaintiffs Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
405 QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER UNDER HIPAA IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' counsel shall be authorized to disclose protected health information regarding the SORTS residents identified in Plaintiffs' Motion and attached exhibits, to Plaintiffs' counsel. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/31/15. (JWJ) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
406 Docket Text ORDER Re: 404 Consent Motion to Amend/Correct 343 Case Management Order − Amended by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 1, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
407 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Grant R. Doty by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Doty, Grant) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
408 Docket Text ORDER Re: 407 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Grant R. Doty by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 2, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
409 Joint MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Joint Motion for Leave to File Trial Briefs in Excess of Fifteen Pages by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
410 Docket Text ORDER Re: 409 Joint Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Joint Motion for Leave to File Trial Briefs in Excess of Fifteen Pages by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 3, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 04/03/2015)
411 MOTION for Leave to Uncontested Motion for Order Authorizing John Van Orden and Matthew King to Attend Trial by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/06/2015)

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412 WITNESS LIST by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
413 Exhibit List by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
414 Deposition Designations by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer.. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
415 Proposed Findings of Fact by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
416 Deposition Designations by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden.. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
417 Exhibit List by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
418 TRIAL BRIEF by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
419 Proposed Findings of Fact by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
420 WITNESS LIST by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
421 Stipulation of Uncontested Facts by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
422 Docket Text ORDER Re: 411 Motion for Leave to Uncontested Motion for Order Authorizing John Van Orden and Matthew King to Attend Trial by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 7, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
423 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Telephone Conference held on 4/7/2015. Parties present for telephone conference regarding schedule for upcoming trial. Trial to commence on Tuesday, April 21, 2015. (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
424 ENTRY of Appearance by Andrew J. McNulty for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson,

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John R. Van Orden. (McNulty, Andrew) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
425 MOTION in Limine and Objections to Plaintiffs' Pretrial by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
426 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence at Trial by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
427 OBJECTION to Pretrial re 413 Exhibit List, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. Related document: 413 Exhibit List, filed by Justin Arnett, Daman Longworth, Sherry Lee, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Robert Reitz, Mark Stringer, Alan Blake, Joseph Parks, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Julie Inman, Jay Englehart, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Melissa Ring, Harold Myers, Ericka L. Kempker, Keith Schaefer.(Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
428 OBJECTION to Pretrial re 417 Exhibit List, by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. Related document: 417 Exhibit List, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, William Murphy, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Bowen, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker.(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
429 RESPONSE to Motion re 425 MOTION in Limine and Objections to Plaintiffs' Pretrial filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
430 RESPONSE to Motion re 426 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence at Trial filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
431 RESPONSE to Motion re 425 MOTION in Limine and Objections to Plaintiffs' Pretrial filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
432 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Final Pretrial Conference held on 4/15/2015. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
433 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Upon review of the record and following the final pretrial conference in this case held on the record on April 15, 2015, and for the reasons stated by the Court thereat, the Court sets forth its rulings on the parties' motions in limine and objections to deposition designations as follows: (SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 15, 2015. (BRP) (Entered: 04/15/2015)

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04/20/2015
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04/28/2015 04/29/2015 04/30/2015 04/30/2015 04/30/2015 04/30/2015 05/08/2015
05/27/2015

434 MOTION to Dismiss ADA Claim Without Prejudice by Plaintiffs Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
435 Minute Order. Proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Day 1 of Bench Trial. Representative Plaintiffs, Van Orden & King, present with their counsel. Representative, Defendant Schmitt, present with his counsel. 434 Motion to Dismiss − GRANTED; Bench Trial held on 4/21/2015. (Court Reporter Patti Dunn Wecke.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
436 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Bench Trial resumed but not concluded 4/22/2015 ; day 2. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/23/2015)
437 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Bench Trial resumed but not concluded 4/23/2015 ; day 3. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
438 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Bench Trial resumed but not concluded 4/24/2015 ; day 4. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
440 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Bench Trial resumed but not concluded 4/27/2015 ; day 5. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
439 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law Defendants' Motion for Judgment at the Close of Plaintiffs' Evidence and Suggestions in Support by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
441 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Bench Trial resumed but not concluded 4/28/2015 ; day 6. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
442 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Bench Trial resumed but not concluded 4/29/2015 ; day 7. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
443 Minute Order. Proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: denying 439 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law( Post Trial Brief due by 6/1/2015., Response to Court due by 6/12/2015.); Bench Trial completed on 4/30/2015. (Court Reporter Patti Dunn Wecke.) (NEB) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
444 CLERKS WITNESS LIST as to Bench Trial. (NEB) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
445 CLERKS Exhibit List as to Bench Trial. (NEB) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
446 Exhibit Receipt as to Bench Trial, by Plaintiffs & Defendants. (NEB) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
447 TRANSCRIPT of 443 (NON−JURY TRIAL) Excerpt of Bench Trial (Closing Argument) held on April 30, 2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/29/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/8/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/6/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
448 TRIAL EXHIBITS received volumes 1−4 in paper format by Plaintiffs. At the direction of the Court these exhibits are filed and maintained in paper formate in the Clerk's office. (NEB) (Entered: 05/27/2015)

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449 POST TRIAL BRIEF by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
450 POST TRIAL BRIEF by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
451 Proposed Conclusions of Law by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
452 Proposed Findings of Fact by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
453 TRANSCRIPT of 440 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on APRIL 27, 2015 before Judge AUDREY G. FLEISSIG (EXCERPT OF VOLUME 5). Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 6/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/6/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2015. (BRP) (Entered: 06/02/2015)
454 TRANSCRIPT of 441 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on APRIL 28, 2015 before Judge AUDREY G. FLEISSIG (EXCERPT OF VOLUME 6). Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 6/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/6/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2015. (BRP) (Entered: 06/02/2015)
455 NOTICE by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden re 451 Proposed Conclusions of Law, Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Post−Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Quinn, John) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
456 RESPONSE to Post Trial Brief re 449 Post Trial Brief, by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. Related document: 449 Post Trial Brief, filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, William Murphy, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Bowen, Chance Tyree, David Brown, Walter W. Ritchey, Joseph Miller, Wade A. Turpin, Andre Cokes, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker.(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
457 NOTICE Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Post−Trial Proposed Findings of Fact: by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer re 419 Proposed Findings of Fact, (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
458 PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' POST TRIAL BRIEF by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W.

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Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) Modified docket text on 6/15/2015 (NEB). (Entered: 06/12/2015)
459 MOTION by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden of Supplemental Authority and Request to File Supplemental Briefs (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Karsjens Order)(Quinn, John) Modified document to a motion on 6/18/2015 (NEB). (Entered: 06/17/2015)
460 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file supplemental briefs in light of the opinion issued in Karsjens, et al. v. Jesson, et al., Civil No. 11−3659 (DWF/JJK) is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 459 .) The parties shall have until June 30, 2015 to file any supplemental brief, not to exceed eight (8) pages. No response briefs will be permitted. ( Response to Court due by 6/30/2015.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/18/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 06/18/2015)
461 POST TRIAL BRIEF concerning Karsjens v. Jesson by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Kister, Susan) (Entered: 06/30/2015)
462 POST TRIAL BRIEF by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/30/2015)
***REMARK regarding Post Trial Brief 461 : The use of an attorney's electronic filing login and password to file a pleading, motion, memorandum or other document constitutes the signature of that attorney on that document for all purposes, including Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. (See Local Rule 11−2.11 located on the court website.) (NEB) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
463 SEALED LETTER TO THE COURT . (NEB) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
464 Letter to Timothy Nelson from the Court; response to Sealed Letter (No. 463 ). (NEB) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
465 SEALED Letter from the Court to Rayfield Johnson . (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Attachment Photo)(NEB) (Entered: 08/24/2015)
466 SEALED Letter from the Court to Rayfield Johnson . (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Letter from Johnson)(NEB) (Entered: 08/28/2015)
467 MEMORANDUM OPINION: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the treatment−related claims of named Plaintiffs Macon Baker, David Brown, Joseph Bowen, and William Murphy are DISMISSED as moot, with the understanding that if the status of these Plaintiffs changes such that they are committed to SORTS during the pendency of this action, they will automatically become members of the Rule 23(b)(2) Treatment Class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480−632.513, is unconstitutional on its face is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480−632.513, is unconstitutional as applied and deprives Plaintiffs and the Treatment Class of their constitutional rights is GRANTED in part, as set forth above. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' prayers for other relief with respect to their as−applied claims regarding risk assessment and release procedures at SORTS will be addressed in the second phase of trial (the "Remedies Phase"). The Court shall hold a conference on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 9:30 a.m., to address the schedule and procedures for the Remedies Phase. The Court urges the Attorney General to identify and include in the conference any other individuals, such as the Governor or the Director of the Department of Corrections, who may be necessary or helpful to addressing appropriate relief. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except as set forth above, Plaintiffs' prayers for relief in their Fifth Amended

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10/14/2015 10/15/2015 10/19/2015

Complaint, asserted on behalf of themselves and the Treatment and Charging Classes, are DENIED. (In Court Hearing set for 9/29/2015 09:30 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 11, 2015. (BRP) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
468 ENTRY of Appearance by Jessie M. Steffan for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Steffan, Jessie) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
469 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Remedies Phase Conference held on 9/29/2015. (Court Reporter:P Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (KCB) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
470 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall have until October 5, 2015 to file a joint proposed schedule for addressing the Remedies Phase. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall have until October 13, 2015 to file any motion for reconsideration regarding the Courts September 11, 2015 Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 467). (Response to Court due by 10/5/2015.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/29/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
471 NOTICE by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden re 470 Order, Joint Proposed Schedule − Remedies Phase (Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
472 MOTION to Clarify 467 Memorandum Opinion,,,,,,,, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
473 MOTION for Reconsideration re 467 Memorandum Opinion,,,,,,,, by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
474 ORDER SETTING SCHEDULE FOR REMADIES PHASE − (SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER DETAILS) Bench Trial set for 3/30/2016 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Discovery Completion due by 2/5/2016. In Court Hearing set for 12/21/2015 01:00 PM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Motion in Limine due by 3/21/2016. Pretrial Compliance due by 3/10/2016. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 13, 2015. (MCB) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
475 MOTION for Leave to Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
476 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Telephone Conference held on 10/15/2015 regarding possible appointment of neutral to assist with settlement. (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
477 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 475 MOTION for Leave to Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/19/2015)

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10/30/2015
10/30/2015 11/06/2015 11/09/2015

478 RESPONSE to Motion re 472 MOTION to Clarify 467 Memorandum Opinion,,,,,,,, filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
479 Docket Text ORDER Re: 477 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 475 Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 20, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
480 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 473 MOTION for Reconsideration re 467 Memorandum Opinion,,,,,,,, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memorandum in Opposition)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
481 REPLY to Response to Motion re 472 MOTION to Clarify 467 Memorandum Opinion,,,,,,,, filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
482 Docket Text ORDER Re: 480 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 473 Motion for Reconsideration re 467 Memorandum Opinion by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 27, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
483 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 473 MOTION for Reconsideration re 467 Memorandum Opinion, filed by Plaintiffs. (NEB) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
484 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), that this case is referred to Magistrate Judge Mary Ann Medler to (i) assist the parties with their efforts to agree to appropriate remedies to address this Courts Order finding Missouris statute providing treatment for civilly committed sex offenders to be unconstitutional as applied, and (ii) address such other issues as may hereafter be referred by the Court. IT IS FURTHER OREDERED that counsel for Plaintiffs shall contact chambers to obtain contact information for Judge Medler, and the parties shall promptly contact Judge Medler to arrange an initial meeting.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/29/2015. (KCB) (Entered: 10/29/2015)
485 MOTION for Additional Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden re 475 MOTION for Leave to Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold Plaintiffs' Second Request of Additional Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold (Quinn, John) Modified on 10/30/2015 (NEB). (Entered: 10/30/2015)
486 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 485 MOTION for Additional Time to Respond to 475 Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold, filed by Plaintiffs John Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 30, 2015. (AGF) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
487 MOTION to Withdraw by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Morris, Mary) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
488 Docket Text ORDER Re: 487 Motion to Withdraw by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 9, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 11/09/2015)

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489 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 475 MOTION for Leave to Defendants' Motion to Partially Lift the Litigation Hold filed by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 11/09/2015)
490 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, the parties shall meet and confer with respect to partially releasing the litigation hold. In this meet−and−confer, Defendants shall present to Plaintiffs the specific topics and/or custodians that Defendants propose to release from the hold. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, the parties shall file a joint status report advising the Court of whether the parties have reached an agreement with respect to partially lifting the litigation hold, or if the parties have not reached an agreement, of the parties respective positions on Defendants' proposed release of the specific topics and/or custodians identified in the meet−and−confer. ( Joint Status Report due by 11/24/2015.). Signed by Magistrate Judge Noelle C. Collins on 11/10/2015. (KCB) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
491 MOTION for Leave to File their Reply to Motion for Reconsideration Out of Time by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Defendants' Reply in Regard to their Motion to Reconsider the Court's memorandum Opinion Dated September 11, 2015)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
492 Docket Text ORDER Re: 491 Motion for Leave to File their Reply to Motion for Reconsideration Out of Time by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 25, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
493 REPLY to Response to Motion re 473 MOTION for Reconsideration re 467 Memorandum Opinion, filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, et al. (NEB) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
494 MOTION to Withdraw by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
495 MOTION for Leave to For Order Authorizing Plaintiffs to Attend Mediation by Plaintiffs Matthew King, Joseph Miller, John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
496 Docket Text ORDER Re: 494 Motion to Withdraw by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 30, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
497 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Order Authorizing Plaintiffs John Van Orden, Matthew King, and Joseph Miller to Attend Mediation [Doc 495] is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 12/01/2015. (KCB) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
498 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Phil Sholtz by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, George Lombardi, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz. (Sholtz, Philip) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
499 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 498 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants, by attorney Phil Sholtz, filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Julie Inman, George Lombardi, Harold Myers, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 14, 2015. (AGF) (Entered: 12/16/2015)

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500 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for clarification and Defendants' motion for reconsideration are both GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth above. (Doc. Nos. 472 & 473 .) The Court will issue a separate Amended Memorandum Opinion. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 21, 2015. (BRP) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
501 Amended MEMORANDUM OPINION: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the treatment−related claims of named Plaintiffs Macon Baker, David Brown, Joseph Bowen, and William Murphy are DISMISSED as moot, with the understanding that if the status of these Plaintiffs changes such that they are committed to SORTS during the pendency of this action, they will automatically become members of the Rule 23(b)(2) Treatment Class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480−632.513, is unconstitutional on its face is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs prayer for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that the Missouri Sexually Violent Predators Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480−632.513, is unconstitutional as applied and deprives Plaintiffs and the Treatment Class of their constitutional rights is GRANTED in part, as set forth above. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' prayers for other relief with respect to their as−applied claims regarding risk assessment and release procedures at SORTS will be addressed in the second phase of trial (the "Remedies Phase"). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except as set forth above, Plaintiffs' prayers for relief in their Fifth Amended Complaint, asserted on behalf of themselves and the Treatment and Charging Classes, are DENIED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 22, 2015. (BRP) (Entered: 12/22/2015)
502 MOTION for Relief Granting Joint Interim Remedies Order Appointing 706 Experts by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
***REMARK: The NOTICE Joint Request for an Interim Remedies Order Appointing Rule 706 Experts to Examine Aged/Infirmed/Medically Frail Sorts Residents filed on 12/29/2015 was a duplicate of the motion filed on 12/28/2015 and has been deleted. See motion # 502 for the correct filing. (BRP) (Entered: 12/29/2015)
503 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 502 MOTION for Relief Granting Joint Interim Remedies Order Appointing 706 Experts by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) filed by John R. Van Orden, Anthony Amonette, Theodore Ginnery, William Murphy, Matthew King, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Bowen, Chance Tyree, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Richard Tyson, Macon Baker, Robert Hood ; ORDERED granted under the terms stated in the Motion.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mary Ann L. Medler on 12/29/2015. (MLM) (Entered: 12/29/2015)
504 MOTION for Leave to File Motion for Order Authorizing Plaintiffs to Attend Mediation by Plaintiffs Matthew King, John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
505 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 504 MOTION for Leave to File Motion for Order Authorizing Plaintiffs to Attend Mediation by Plaintiffs Matthew King, John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) filed by John R. Van Orden, Matthew King ; ORDERED granted. Leave to file is granted and John R. Van Orden and Matthew King are hereby authorized to attend mediation on January 20, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mary Ann L. Medler on 1/12/2016. (MLM) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
506 NOTICE DEPOSITION OF THE MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(White, Ronnie) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
507 NOTICE DEPOSITION OF THE MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH: by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David

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01/14/2016 02/19/2016 02/29/2016
03/01/2016
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03/18/2016
03/18/2016

Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(White, Ronnie) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
***REMARK regarding Notices 506 & 507 : Pursuant to Rule 26 − 3.02; In civil actions, discovery and disclosure materials pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, and 36, and the certificates of their service, shall not be filed with the Court except as exhibits to a motion or memorandum. (See Local Rule 26−3.02 located on the court website.) (NEB) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
508 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the deadlines for the parties to file their suggested remedies, with appropriate briefs, affidavits, and exhibits, is extended by 14 days, until March 7, 2016. Opposition briefs shall be filed no later than March 21, 2016, and any reply brief may be filed no later than March 28, 2016. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 02/19/2016. (KCB) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
509 MOTION for Reconsideration re 286 Order on Pro Se Motion, by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
510 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs and William Billy Gene Carter ("Carter"), individually, shall have until March 10, 2016 to file their responses, if any, to Defendants' motion (Doc. No. 509 ) to reconsider its May 8, 2014 Order permitting Carter to opt out of this class action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall hand−deliver a copy of this Order to Carter. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 1, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 03/01/2016)
511 Joint MOTION to Stay by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/01/2016)
512 Docket Text ORDER Re: 511 Joint Motion to Stay by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. The trial setting of March 30, 2016 is VACATED, and the parties shall file a Status Report on or before April 25, 2016. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 2, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
513 RESPONSE to Motion re 509 MOTION for Reconsideration re 286 Order on Pro Se Motion, . (BRP) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
514 RESPONSE to Motion re 509 MOTION for Reconsideration re 286 Order on Pro Se Motion, filed by William Billy G. Carter . (KCB) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
515 RESPONSE to Motion re 509 MOTION for Reconsideration re 286 Order on Pro Se Motion, filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/08/2016)
516 REPLY to Response to Motion re 509 MOTION for Reconsideration re 286 Order on Pro Se Motion, filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
517 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to reconsider this Court's Order permitting Plaintiff William Billy Gene Carter to opt out of this class action is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 509 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court's prior Order permitting the opt−out of Plaintiff William Billy Gene Carter (Doc. No. 286 ) is VACATED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Mr. Carter at the address on file. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 18, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
518 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DIRECTED TO TROY SPENCER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that on or before April 1, 2016, Plaintiff Troy Spencer shall show cause in writing why the Court's Order (Doc. No. 326 ) permitting him to withdraw from this

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class action should not be reconsidered. The parties shall have seven (7) days thereafter to file a reply to Mr. Spencer's response. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Mr. Spencer at the address on file. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall hand−deliver a copy of this Order upon Mr. Spencer. (Show Cause Response due by 4/1/2016.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 18, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
519 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER 518 Order to Show Cause, by Troy Lynn Spencer. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Second Answer, # 2 Exhibit Index, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E−1, # 8 Exhibit E− 2, # 9 Exhibit E− 3, # 10 Exhibit F, # 11 Exhibit G, # 12 Exhibit H −1, # 13 Exhibit H− 2, # 14 Exhibit H− 3, # 15 Exhibit I, # 16 Exhibit J, # 17 Exhibit K, # 18 Exhibit L, # 19 Exhibit M)(NEB) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
520 NOTICE re 519 Response to Court Order. − Troy Spencer mailed three hard copies of his Response to Court Order to the Clerk's Office (See Attached Cover Sheets). The Clerk's Office will not mail out copies, but the Response was forwarded via CM−ECF. (NEB) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
521 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE re 519 Report to Court Order, Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff Troy Lynn Spencer's Answer to this Court's Show Cause Order by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
522 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Courts prior Order permitting the opt− out of Plaintiff Troy Spencer (Doc. No. 326 ) is VACATED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Mr. Spencer at the address on file. (A copy of the Order was mailed to Troy Spencer SORTS, 1016 W. Columbia, Farmingtion MO 63640) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/19/2016. (KCB) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
523 Letter to Clerk of the Court from Troy Spencer re:Order to Show Cause (KCB) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
524 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file the following: status report ;Proposed extension date May 6, 2016 by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
525 Docket Text ORDER Re: 524 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File the following: status report; Proposed extension date May 6, 2016 by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 25, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
526 Joint MOTION for Relief approval of proposed notice of settlement to class, direction for distribution of the approved notice to members of the certified class, and establishment of deadline for the filing of objections, Joint MOTION for Hearing re: fairness of proposed settlement by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − Proposed Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 − Proposed Notice to Class Members)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
527 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Ronnie L. White II by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (White, Ronnie) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
528 Docket Text ORDER Re: 527 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Ronnie L. White II by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 12, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 05/12/2016)

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05/18/2016 05/19/2016 05/19/2016 05/25/2016 05/25/2016
06/06/2016 06/10/2016
06/13/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016

529 MOTION for Leave to Permit Attendance of Van Orden and King at Status Hearing by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Kister, Susan) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
530 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is scheduled for a Status Conference on Wednesday, May 25, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12−South. (Status Conference set for 5/25/2016 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/19/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
531 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' uncontested motion for an Order authorizing Plaintiffs John Van Orden and Matthew King to attend the status hearing set for Wednesday, May 25, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 529 .). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/19/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
532 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Status Conference held on 5/25/2016. US Magistrate Judge Mary Ann Medler and two class representatives are present in the courtroom. The Court hears from counsel regarding the proposed settlement. A portion hearing is conducted ex parte with class representatives, counsel for the plaintiffs, and court staff. Order to issue. (Court Reporter: P. Dunn Wecke.) (FTR Gold: No.) (BRP) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
533 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that John H. Quinn shall have until June 6, 2016 to file a short brief regarding whether class counsel had authority to enter the proposed settlement submitted to the Court on May 4, 2016 (Doc. No. 526 ) such that the Court should schedule a fairness hearing on the proposed settlement, and if so, the proper role going forward for any class counsel who objects to the proposed settlement. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any response to Mr. Quinn's brief shall be filed no later than June 13, 2016. (Brief due by 6/6/2016.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 25, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
534 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 526 Joint MOTION for Relief approval of proposed notice of settlement to class, direction for distribution of the approved notice to members of the certified class, and establishment of deadline for the filing of objectionsJoint MOTION for Hearing re: fairness of proposed settlement filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 06/06/2016)
535 REPLY to Response to Motion re 526 Joint MOTION for Relief approval of proposed notice of settlement to class, direction for distribution of the approved notice to members of the certified class, and establishment of deadline for the filing of objectionsJoint MOTION for Hearing re: fairness of proposed settlement Defendants' Response to Memorandum in Opposition to Joint Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
536 REPLY to Response to Motion re 526 Joint MOTION for Relief approval of proposed notice of settlement to class, direction for distribution of the approved notice to members of the certified class, and establishment of deadline for the filing of objectionsJoint MOTION for Hearing re: fairness of proposed settlement filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
537 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, any attorney of record for the Plaintiffs who has received letters from the class representatives regarding representation shall file such letters ex parte and under seal. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/16/2016. (KCB) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
538 SEALED DOCUMENT re 537 Order, (response of attorneys Rothert, Steffan, and Wilcox) by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Letter, # 2 Letter)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/17/2016)

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06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/20/2016 06/20/2016 06/21/2016 06/21/2016 06/21/2016 06/22/2016 07/07/2016
07/20/2016 07/22/2016 08/03/2016

539 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Letter, # 2 Letter)(Kister, Susan) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
540 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY to Motion re 526 Joint MOTION for Relief approval of proposed notice of settlement to class, direction for distribution of the approved notice to members of the certified class, and establishment of deadline for the filing of objectionsJoint MOTION for Hearing re: fairness of proposed settlement filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) Modified docket text on 6/20/2016 (NEB). (Entered: 06/17/2016)
541 Docket Text ORDER Re: 540 Motion for Leave to File Surreply to Motion re 526 Joint Motion for Relief approval of proposed notice of settlement to class, direction for distribution of the approved notice to members of the certified class, and establishment of deadline for the filing of objections Joint Motion for Hearing re: fairness of proposed settlement; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 20, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
542 SURREPLY to Motion re 526 Joint MOTION for Relief approval of proposed notice of settlement to class, direction for distribution of the approved notice to members of the certified class, and establishment of deadline for the filing of objectionsJoint MOTION for Hearing re: fairness of proposed settlement filed by Plaintiffs. (NEB) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
543 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
544 SEALED DOCUMENT re 537 Order, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Letter)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
545 SEALED DOCUMENT re 537 Order, by Plaintiffs. Received from Jack Quinn. (Attachments: # 1 Letter)(NEB) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
546 Docket Text ORDER Re: 543 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 22, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
547 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall confer and attempt to reach agreement with respect to any changes to the proposed class notice that may be necessary in light of this Order, and on or before July 21, 2016, shall file a copy of their proposed revised class notice or, if they cannot reach agreement, their respective positions. Following review and approval of the class notice, the Court will grant the parties' joint motion to approve and direct notice to the certified class of the proposed settlement, and will schedule a fairness hearing on the proposed settlement. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John H. Quinn, III is appointed as counsel to represent the class representatives who object to the proposed settlement and any other class members who object to the proposed settlement and wish to be represented by Mr. Quinn. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eric Selig's oral motion to withdraw as lead class counsel is DENIED without prejudice. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on July 7, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 07/07/2016)
548 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 547 Memorandum & Order,,,, by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Notice)(Selig, Eric) (Entered: 07/20/2016)
549 SEALED Letter to Counsel from M. Medler. . (A copy of this letter was mailed to attorneys of record.) (NEB) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
550 SEALED Letter to Court and Court Response. . (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(NEB) (Entered: 08/04/2016)

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08/04/2016 08/05/2016
08/09/2016 08/10/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016 08/15/2016 08/15/2016 08/15/2016 08/15/2016 08/16/2016
08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016

551 MOTION for Relief approve revised proposed notice to class members by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 revise)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
552 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties joint motions to approve and direct notice to the certified class of the parties proposed settlement are GRANTED. (Doc. Nos. 526 & 551 .) The Court APPROVES the form and content of the revised proposed class notice (Doc. No. 551 −1), except as follows: [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS]...IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a motion for final approval of the proposed settlement and any briefs in support or in opposition to final approval of the proposed settlement shall be filed on or before October 14, 2016. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement shall be held October 20, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12 South at the Thomas F. Eagleton United States Courthouse, 111 South 10th Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63102. ( In Court Hearing set for 10/20/2016 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 8/5/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
553 SEALED Letter to Court and Court Response . (NEB) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
554 NOTICE OF CURRENT LIST OF OBJECTORS by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) Modified docket text on 8/11/2016 (NEB). (Entered: 08/10/2016)
555 MEMORANDUM re 552 Order,,,, notice that will be provided to class members by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 notice and attachments)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
556 Objection to Proposed Settlement by Larry D. Johnson.(NEB) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
557 Objection to Proposed Settlement by Tom Hurd. (NEB) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
558 Objection to Proposed Settlement by Robert Lieurance. (NEB) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
559 Objection to Proposed Settlement by William G. Carter. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Envelope)(NEB) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
560 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that the Court shall hold a conference with counsel in chambers on Wednesday, August 17, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 8/15/16. (KXS) (Entered: 08/15/2016)
561 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Edgar Holloway. (KXS) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
562 OBJECTION to the settlement agreement by Harry Turner. (KXS) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
563 OBJECTION to the settlement agreement by Brian Craig (copy of docket sheet mailed on 8/16/16). (KXS) (# 1 Attachment, # 2 Affidavit) (KXS). Modified on 8/16/2016 (KXS). (Entered: 08/16/2016)
564 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff William Billy Gene Carters request to be heard and offer testimony at the fairness hearing scheduled in this action is DENIED. (Doc. No. 559 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Mr. Carter at the address on file. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 8/16/2016. (A copy of this Order was mailed to Mr. Carter at the address reflected in document # 559 .)(NEB) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
565 REPORT TO THE COURT (SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS). Signed by Magistrate Judge Mary Ann L. Medler on 08/16/2016. (KCB) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
566 Letter in Support of Proposed Settlement by Richard Croxton. (NEB) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
567 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Defendants Richard J. Foster, Joseph Allen Dodson. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
568 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Daniel Kennemore. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)

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08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/18/2016 08/18/2016 08/22/2016
08/22/2016 08/22/2016 08/22/2016 08/25/2016 08/25/2016 08/25/2016 08/29/2016 08/29/2016 08/30/2016
08/30/2016 08/31/2016 08/31/2016 09/06/2016
09/08/2016

569 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jay T. Nelson. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
570 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Robert Rich. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
571 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by John Morgan. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
572 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Delmar Pouge. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
573 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Joseph Whitnell. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
574 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Thomas Lee Hurd. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
575 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Douglas Eckord. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
576 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Michael D. West. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
577 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Tim Nelson. (KCB) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
578 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Troy Spencer, Kevin Reynolds, Steven Hines, Rodney Swearingin, Aaron Berg, Gabriel Stecker, Clifford Bosworth, and Josh Bushong. (NEB) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
579 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Roger Blum. (NEB) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
580 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Robert Castiglia. (NEB) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
581 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Benard Gerber. (NEB) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
582 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Clifford Scates. (NEB) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
583 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Richard James Giese.(NEB) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
584 PRO SE MOTION TO BE PRESENT AT HEARING/ OBJECTION TO PROPOSED SETTLEMENT by Ralph Booker. (NEB) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
585 PRO SE MOTION TO BE HEARD AT HEARING/ OBJECTION TO PROPOSED SETTLEMENT by Will Doyle. (NEB) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
586 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Quinn, John) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
587 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Ralph Bookers and William Doyles requests to appear and be heard at the fairness hearing scheduled in this action are DENIED. (Doc. Nos. 584 & 585 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copies of this Order upon Mr. Booker and Mr. Doyle at the addresses on file. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 8/30/2016. (A copy of this Order was mailed to Mr. Brooker and Mr. Doyle at the addresses located in doc nos. 584 & 585.)(NEB) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
590 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Steven DeGeare. (NEB) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
588 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jeff McClure. (NEB) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
589 PRO SE MOTION TO BE PRESENT AT HEARING/ OBJECTION TO PROPOSED SETTLEMENT by Wade Turpin, Sr.. (NEB) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
591 Joint MOTION for Relief consider the amended proposed settlement agreement at the fairness hearing, approve a supplemental notice to class members, and direct delivery of the supplemental notice by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 − Amended Proposed Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit Ex 2 − Proposed Supplemental Notice to Class Members)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/06/2016)
592 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' Joint Motion to Consider Amended Proposed Settlement Agreement at Fairness Hearing, Approve Supplemental Notice, and Direct Delivery of Supplemental Notice to Class Members is GRANTED.

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09/08/2016
09/08/2016
09/08/2016
09/09/2016 09/09/2016 09/09/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016

(Doc. No. 591 .) The Court APPROVES the form and content of the supplemental proposed class notice (Doc. No. 591−2), except as follows: [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS.]. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/8/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
593 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Named Plaintiff Wade Turpin's request to appear and be heard at the fairness hearing scheduled in this action is DENIED. (Doc. No. 589 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Mr. Turpin at the address on file. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/8/2016. (A copy of this Order was mailed to Mr. Turpin at the addess on his Motion 589 .) (NEB) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
594 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Timothy Smith, Sr.. (KXS) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
595 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Edgar Holloway IV. (KXS) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
596 OBJECTION by James Underwood. (KXS) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
597 OBJECTION by Robert Castiglia. (KXS) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
598 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 List Of Objectors)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
599 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by William Bradford. (KCB) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
600 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Bobby Ballard. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
601 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Aaron Berg. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
602 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jerry Bilyea. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
603 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Lula Mae Bilyea (Jerry's Mother). (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
604 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Ralph Booker. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
605 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by James Braddy. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
606 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jauier Calleja. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
607 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Bill Carter. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
608 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jonathan Casady. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
609 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Robert Castiglia. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
610 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Steve DeGear. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
611 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Douglas Fillmore Eckard. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
612 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by George Evans IV.(NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
613 OBJECTIONS to proposed settlement by Richard Foster. (Attachments: # 1 Correspondence, # 2 Correspondence)(NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
614 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Lee French. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
615 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Richard Giese. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
616 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Mike Goddard. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
617 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Gerald Head. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
618 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by David Hersh. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)

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09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016

619 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jackie Holtcamp. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
620 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Larry Johnson. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
621 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Kevin Jones. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
622 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Rodney Kaprielian. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
623 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Daniel Kennemore.(NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
624 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Gen Kiehl. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
625 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Lloyd King. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
626 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Matthew King. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment List of Individuals)(NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
627 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Robert Lieurance. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
628 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Lou Martineau. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
629 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jesse Masters. (Attachments: # 1 Correspondence SEALED)(NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
630 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Paul Moerer. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
631 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Vance Ray Moller. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
632 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Dean Morgan. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
633 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jessie Moyers. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
634 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Mark Murrell. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
635 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Timothy Levi Nelson. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
636 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Steve Owens, et al. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
637 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Gregory Parr. (NEB) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/13/2016: # 1 Correspondence) (NEB). (Entered: 09/13/2016)
638 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jason Sapp. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
639 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Clifford Scates, et al. (NEB) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/13/2016: # 1 Correspondence, # 2 Correspondence) (NEB). (Entered: 09/13/2016)
640 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Taiwo Shango. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
641 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Quincy Threats. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
642 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Wade Turpin, et al. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
643 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Chance Tyree. (NEB) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/13/2016: # 1 Correspondence with additional signatures) (NEB). (Entered: 09/13/2016)
644 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by John Van Orden, et al. (Attachments: # 1 Correspondence with additional signatures)(NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
645 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Rick VanZant. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
646 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Gregory Wadleigh. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)

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09/16/2016 09/16/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/21/2016 09/21/2016
09/21/2016
09/21/2016 09/21/2016 09/21/2016 09/22/2016
09/22/2016

647 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Sam Whited. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
648 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Joseph Whitnell. (NEB) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
649 Letter to the Court from John Gormon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits) (KXS) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/13/2016: # 2 Envelope) (KXS). (Entered: 09/13/2016)
650 MEMORANDUM to the Court re: documents 600 − 648 by John Quinn. (NEB) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
651 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Kayleigh O'Hara. (NEB) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
652 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Robert Jerry Loue.(NEB) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
653 MOTION to Amend/Correct by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
654 Docket Text ORDER Re: 653 Motion to Amend/Correct by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 16, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
655 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Mike Goddard. (KCB) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
656 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Brian Craig (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(NEB) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
657 PRO SE MOTION to receive copies of the proposed settlement agreement and the Court's Amended Memorandum and Order. (NEB) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
658 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Edgar B. Holloway, et al. (NEB) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
659 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Jay T. Nelson. (NEB) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
660 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Robert Castiglia. (NEB) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
661 RESPONSE to Motion re 657 PRO SE MOTION filed by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
662 RESPONSE in Opposition re 657 PRO SE MOTION filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
663 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Stanley Schells motion for copies of the proposed settlement agreement and the Courts Amended Memorandum Opinion is DENIED as moot. (Doc. No. 657 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve copies of Doc. No. 661 and this Order upon Mr. Schell at the address on file. (A copy of Doc. No. 661 and this Order mailed to Mr. Schell at address on file.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 09/21/2016. (KCB) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
664 NOTICE of Change of Address filed by John H. Quinn, III. The address has been updated. (Quinn, John) Modified on 9/26/2016 (LMR). (Entered: 09/21/2016)
666 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Ralph Booker(KJS) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
667 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Michael West(KJS) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
665 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment, # 3 Attachment, # 4 Attachment, # 5 Attachment)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
668 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by William Carter (KJS) (Entered: 09/23/2016)

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09/22/2016 09/22/2016 09/23/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/28/2016 09/28/2016 09/30/2016 09/30/2016 10/03/2016 10/04/2016
10/04/2016 10/06/2016 10/07/2016
10/07/2016
10/07/2016 10/11/2016 10/11/2016 10/11/2016

669 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Thomas Hurd. (KJS) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
670 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Brian Craig(KJS) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
671 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Daniel Kennemore(KJS) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
672 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Ralph Books(KJS) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
673 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by John Gormon(KJS) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
674 Letter to Clerk of Court from Edgar Holloway re:file copy. (A copy of document # 658 was mailed to E. Holloway.) (NEB) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
675 MOTION to Appear at Fairness Hearing by Helena Dennert. (NEB) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
676 MEMORANDUM re 675 Motion (response to request to be heard at fairness hearing filed by individual who is not a class member) by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
677 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
678 REPLY to Response to Motion re 675 MOTION filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/03/2016)
679 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that non−class member Helena Dennert's request to appear and be heard at the fairness hearing scheduled in this action is DENIED. (Doc. No. 675 .) However, Ms. Dennert may submit an affidavit setting forth any evidence she wishes the Court to consider in connection with the fairness hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Ms. Dennert at the address on file.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/4/2016. (A copy of his Order was mailed to Ms. Dennert.) (NEB) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
680 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment, # 3 Attachment, # 4 Attachment)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
681 PRO SE MOTION to Appear at Fairness Hearing by Beverly Barrett. (KCB) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
682 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that non−class member Beverly Barrett's request to appear and be heard at the fairness hearing scheduled in this action is DENIED. (Doc. No. 681 .) Although she will not be permitted to offer live testimony, Ms. Barrett may file an affidavit setting forth any evidence she wishes the Court to consider in connection with the fairness hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Ms. Barrett at the address on file.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/7/2016. (A copy of this Order was mailed to Ms. Barrett.) (NEB) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
683 REPORT TO COURT ORDER by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Affidavit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Affidavit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Affidavit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Affidavit, # 12 Affidavit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
684 SEALED DOCUMENT re 683 Report to Court Order, Supplement by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Sealed Exhibits)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
685 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment, # 3 Attachment, # 4 Attachment)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
686 MOTION for Leave to Permit Attendance of Van Orden, King, Tyree and Turpin by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
687 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' uncontested motion for an Order authorizing Plaintiffs John Van Orden, Matthew King, Chance Tyree, and Wade Turpin to attend the fairness hearing set for Thursday, October 20, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. is

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 94 of 106

10/14/2016
10/14/2016 10/14/2016 10/14/2016
10/14/2016 10/14/2016 10/14/2016 10/16/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/20/2016
10/20/2016 10/28/2016 10/31/2016

GRANTED. (Doc. No. 686 .) The parties shall attempt to reach an agreement with respect to any restraints or other security measures necessary for these Plaintiffs' attendance. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/11/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
688 MEMORANDUM re 552 Order,,,, Defendants' Brief in Support of Approving Proposed Settlement Agreement by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
689 MOTION for Relief approve proposed settlement agreement (ECF No. 591−1) by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
690 ADDENDUM to Report to the Court Re: Aged/Infirm SORTS Patients and Rule 706 Experts re 565 Status Report Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mary Ann L. Medler on October 14, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
691 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Attachments: # 1 proposed memorandum in support of motion to approve settlement agreement, # 2 Exhibit ex 1 to memorandum in support of proposed settlement)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
692 SEALED ATTACHMENTS re 690 ADDENDUM to Report to the Court Re: Aged/Infirm SORTS Patients and Rule 706 Experts . (Attachments: # 1 C.B., # 2 C.H., # 3 L.W., # 4 C.H., # 5 W.B., # 6 W.R., # 7 W.B.)(BRP) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
693 SEALED ATTACHMENT 1B re 690 ADDENDUM to Report to the Court Re: Aged/Infirm SORTS Patients and Rule 706 Experts . (Attachments: # 1 A.B., # 2 C.S., # 3 T.H., # 4 R.W., # 5 J.D., # 6 D.F.)(BRP) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
694 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
695 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden of Additional Objections (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment, # 3 Attachment)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/16/2016)
696 Docket Text ORDER Re: 691 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 17, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
697 Docket Text ORDER Re: 694 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 17, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
698 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OFMOTION FOR APPROVAL OF AMENDED PROPOSED SETTLEMENT filed by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette, et al. (NEB) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
699 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Proposed Settlement by John Quinn. (NEB) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
700 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: In Court Hearing held on 10/20/2016. Parties present for Fairness Hearing. Attorney Jack Quinn presents testimony via his witness (see witness sheet). Counsel for all parties present their arguments to the Court. The Court takes the matter under submission. Order to issue. (Court Reporter:R. Fiorino) (FTR Gold: No) (NEB) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
701 CLERKS WITNESS LIST as to Fairness Hearing 10/20/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
702 MOTION for Leave to File A Supplemental Memorandum by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement, # 2 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
703 Docket Text ORDER Re: 702 Motion for Leave to File A Supplemental Memorandum by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Defendants may have until

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10/31/2016 11/04/2016
11/07/2016 11/10/2016 11/18/2016 11/23/2016 11/28/2016 11/29/2016 11/30/2016 11/30/2016
12/01/2016 12/01/2016
12/02/2016

November 10, 2016 to respond. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 31, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
704 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPPOSING THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT by John Quinn. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(NEB) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
705 MEMORANDUM re 704 Supplemental Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Opposing the Proposed Settlement Agreement by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
706 Letter to the Court from Larry Johnson re: case updates/status. (NEB) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
707 Response Letter to Stanley Schell from Judge Fleissig re: Response to Letter to the Court. (Attachments: # 1 Correspondence) (NEB) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
708 TRANSCRIPT ORDER REQUEST for 700 (Fairness Hearing) by Wade A. Turpin for proceedings held on 10/20/2016 court reporter R. Fiorino before Judge Fleissig. (Copy of Request emailed to R. Fiorino) (BRP) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
709 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that class counsels motion for final approval of the amended proposed settlement is DENIED. (Doc. No. 689 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 14 days of the date of this Order, the parties shall file a joint proposed schedule for litigation of the Remedies Phase. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 11/23/2016. (KCB) (Entered: 11/23/2016)
710 SEALED Letter to the Court and Response from Court to Joseph Dodson. . (A copy was mailed to the attorneys of record.) (NEB) (Entered: 11/28/2016)
711 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Susan Kister by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Kister, Susan) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
712 Docket Text ORDER Re: 711 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Susan Kister by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 30, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
713 MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file the following: Joint Proposed Schedule of Litigation for the Remedies Phase ;Proposed extension date December 14, 2016 by Defendants Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Mark Stringer. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
714 Docket Text ORDER Re: 713 Motion for Extension of Time to File; Extension to file the following: Joint Proposed Schedule of Litigation for the Remedies Phase; Proposed extension date December 14, 2016 by Defendants Keith Schaefer, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 1, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 12/01/2016)
715 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Andrew McNulty by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (McNulty, Andrew) (Entered: 12/01/2016)
716 Docket Text ORDER Re: 715 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Andrew McNulty by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 96 of 106

12/08/2016 12/13/2016 12/16/2016 12/20/2016
12/23/2016 01/03/2017 01/11/2017 01/17/2017
01/19/2017 01/20/2017 01/23/2017
01/24/2017
01/24/2017
01/24/2017 01/24/2017

District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 2, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
717 ENTRY of Appearance by Henry F. Luepke, III for Defendant George Lombardi. (Luepke, Henry) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
718 Letter to Judge Fleissig from Robert Lieurance re:living arrangements (KCB) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
719 MOTION for Leave to File Proposed Scheduling Order by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
720 ORDER SETTING SCHEDULE FOR REMEDIES PHASE...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' Motion to Approve Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 719 ) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Court will permit Plaintiffs to request limited additional discovery, and will adopt the parties joint proposed schedule for the remedies phase (Doc. No. 719−1), as modified herein: ( Bench Trial set for 5/8/2017 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 12/20/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 12/20/2016)
721 Letter to the Court from Troy Spencer. (NEB) (Entered: 12/23/2016)
722 Letter to Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig from Bob (last name illegible). (KCB) (Entered: 01/03/2017)
723 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Lead) ;attorney/firm Eric M. Selig by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 01/11/2017)
724 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Eric Seligs motion to withdraw as lead counsel for Plaintiffs is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 723 .) The Court expresses its sincere gratitude to Mr. Selig for his excellent service as lead counsel to date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within the next 7 days, the remaining attorneys representing Plaintiffs shall advise the Court, by letter to chambers, whether they wish to be considered for appointment as lead counsel for Plaintiffs through the conclusion of trial in the Remedies Phase. ( Response to Court due by 1/24/2017.), (Attorney Eric M. Selig terminated.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 01/17/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
726 Letter from Mr. Bob Lieurance re:SORTS Leisure Programs (KCB) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
727 Letter to Audrey G. Fleissig from Bob Lieurance. (KCB) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
728 MOTION for Leave to Enter Appearance by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Wack, Thomas) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
729 MOTION to Substitute Party Anne L. Precythe for Defendant George Lombardi in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections by Plaintiffs Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/24/2017)
730 MOTION to Substitute Party Rikki Wright for Defendant Rick Gowdy in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health for the Division of Behavioral Health by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/24/2017)
731 MOTION to Substitute Party eff Stringer for Defendant Keith Schafer in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/24/2017)
732 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that John H. Quinn III, who is already counsel of record for Plaintiffs, is appointed as lead counsel to represent Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class through the conclusion of trial in the Remedies Phase. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining attorneys of record for Plaintiffs shall continue as

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 97 of 106

01/26/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017
01/27/2017 01/27/2017 01/27/2017
01/28/2017

co−counsel of record. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/24/2017. (NEB) (Entered: 01/24/2017)
733 MOTION to Substitute Party Angeline Stanislaus for Defendant Joseph Parks in His Official Capacity as Chief Clinical Officer of the Missouri Department of Mental Health by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
734 Docket Text ORDER Re: 733 Motion to Substitute Party Angeline Stanislaus for Defendant Joseph Parks in His Official Capacity as Chief Clinical Officer of the Missouri Department of Mental Health by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 27, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
735 Docket Text ORDER Re: 729 Motion to Substitute Party Anne L. Precythe for Defendant George Lombardi in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 27, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
736 Docket Text ORDER Re: 730 Motion to Substitute Party Rikki Wright for Defendant Rick Gowdy in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health for the Division of Behavioral Health by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 27, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
737 Docket Text ORDER Re: 731 Motion to Substitute Party Jeff Stringer for Defendant Keith Schafer in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 27, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
738 MOTION to Substitute Party David Schmitt for Defendant Melissa Ring in her official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Centers Adult Psychiatric Services by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
739 MOTION to Substitute Party Rick Gowdy for Defendant Mark Stringer in His Official Capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Healths Division of Behavioral Health by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
740 Docket Text ORDER Re: 728 Motion for Leave to Enter Appearance by Plaintiffs John R. Van Orden, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 27, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
741 ENTRY of Appearance by Dean John Sauer for Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Doe Defendants, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Healthlink, Inc., Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, George Lombardi, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Jeremiah Nixon, Joseph Parks, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Wellpoint. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
742 SEALED Letter to the Court and Response from Court to Michael Fogle. (A copy was mailed to the attorneys of record.) (NEB) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
743 MOTION to Substitute Party Andy Atkinson for Defendant Marty Martin−Forman in her official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of Fulton State Hospital by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
744 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the trial setting of May 8, 2017 is VACATED, and trial is RESET for Monday, June 12, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. This is a three−week docket. Except as amended herein, the Order Setting Schedule for Remedies Phase (Doc. No. 720 ) shall remain in effect. (Bench Trial set for 6/12/2017 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/27/2017. (NEB) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
745 MOTION to Substitute Party Lee Ann McVay for Defendant Ian Fluger in his official capacity as Program Coordinator at SORTS−Fulton State Hospital by Plaintiff John

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 98 of 106

01/30/2017 01/30/2017 01/30/2017 01/30/2017 01/30/2017 02/03/2017
02/06/2017 02/08/2017 02/09/2017 02/16/2017 03/02/2017 03/09/2017

R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/28/2017)
746 Docket Text ORDER Re: 738 Motion to Substitute Party David Schmitt for Defendant Melissa Ring in her official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Centers Adult Psychiatric Services by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 30, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
747 Docket Text ORDER Re: 739 Motion to Substitute Party Rick Gowdy for Defendant Mark Stringer in His Official Capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Healths Division of Behavioral Health by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 30, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
748 Docket Text ORDER Re: 743 Motion to Substitute Party Andy Atkinson for Defendant Marty Martin−Forman in her official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of Fulton State Hospital by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 30, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
749 ENTRY of Appearance by Thomas E. Wack for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Wack, Thomas) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
750 Docket Text ORDER Re: 745 Motion to Substitute Party Lee Ann McVay for Defendant Ian Fluger in his official capacity as Program Coordinator at SORTS−Fulton State Hospital by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 30, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
751 MOTION to Withdraw , MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Joseph P. Dandurand by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Doe Defendants, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Healthlink, Inc., Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Sherry Lee, George Lombardi, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Jeremiah Nixon, Joseph Parks, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Wellpoint, Rikki Wright. (Dandurand, Joseph) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
752 Docket Text ORDER Re: 751 Motion to Withdraw, Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Joseph P. Dandurand by Defendants Karen Adams, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 6, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
753 MOTION to Substitute Party Susan Knopflein for Defendant Sherry Lee in her official capacity as Chief Nurse Executive at Fulton State Hospital by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
754 Docket Text ORDER Re: 753 Motion to Substitute Party Susan Knopflein for Defendant Sherry Lee in her official capacity as Chief Nurse Executive at Fulton State Hospital by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 9, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
755 NOTICE of Change of Address filed by Anthony E. Rothert. The address has been updated. (Rothert, Anthony) Modified on 2/17/2017 (LMR). (Entered: 02/16/2017)
756 SEALED: Letter to the Court and Response from Court to Kevin Haenchen. . (A copy was mailed to the attorneys of record.) (Attachments: # 1 Letter, # 2 Envelope)(NEB) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
757 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on or before March 24, 2017, Plaintiffs and Defendants shall each file a brief of not more than 20 pages, including relevant argument and citations to any authorities on which the parties rely, advising the Court of what, if any, effect the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017), has on this Court's December 22, 2015 Amended Memorandum

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 99 of 106

03/10/2017 03/16/2017 03/16/2017 03/22/2017
03/24/2017 03/24/2017
03/24/2017
03/28/2017 04/04/2017 04/06/2017 04/18/2017 04/26/2017

Opinion, ECF No. 501. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 9, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 03/09/2017)
758 SEALED Letter from Kevin Haenchen and Response from Court . (Copies mailed to counsel.) (Attachments: # 1 Response from Court)(BRP) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
759 MOTION to Compel Responses To Plaintiff's Supplemental Interrogatories by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
760 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 759 MOTION to Compel Responses To Plaintiff's Supplemental Interrogatories filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
761 RESPONSE in Opposition re 759 MOTION to Compel Responses To Plaintiff's Supplemental Interrogatories filed by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Daman Longworth, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Rikki Wright. (Luepke, Henry) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
762 SEALED Letter to the Court and Response from Court to Troy Spencer. . (A copy was mailed to the attorneys of record.) (Attachments: # 1 Letter)(NEB) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
764 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 757 Order,, by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wack, Thomas) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
765 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 757 Order,, by Defendants Karen Adams, Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Doe Defendants, Jay Englehart, Ian Fluger, Rick Gowdy, Healthlink, Inc., Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Sherry Lee, George Lombardi, Daman Longworth, Marty Martin−Forman, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Jeremiah Nixon, Joseph Parks, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Melissa Ring, Keith Schaefer, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Mark Stringer, Judy Sumpter, Felix Vincenz, Wellpoint, Rikki Wright. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
766 REPLY to Response to Motion re 759 MOTION to Compel Responses To Plaintiff's Supplemental Interrogatories filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
767 SUPPLEMENTAL Request For Pre−Hearing Conference by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/04/2017)
768 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to compel is DENIED. (ECF No. 759 .) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 04/06/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 04/06/2017)
769 MOTION for Leave to Permit Remote Testimony by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 04/18/2017)
770 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall have until May 3, 2017 to file any supplemental brief, of not more than 10 pages, that they wish the Court to consider before deciding whether to reconsider its December 22, 2015 Amended Memorandum Opinion in light of Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in light of the above ruling, the deadlines for the parties to file their suggested remedies shall be extended by seven days, such that the parties suggested remedies with appropriate briefs, affidavits, and exhibits shall be due no later than May 12, 2017; opposition briefs shall be filed no later than May 26, 2017; and any reply shall be filed no later than June 2, 2017. Except as amended herein, the Order Setting Schedule for Remedies Phase shall remain in effect. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/26/2017. (NEB) (Entered: 04/26/2017)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 100 of 106

05/02/2017 05/03/2017
05/03/2017
05/09/2017 05/10/2017 05/15/2017 05/17/2017 05/19/2017
05/24/2017
05/24/2017
05/30/2017 05/30/2017

771 Docket Text ORDER Re: 769 Motion for Leave to Permit Remote Testimony by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 2, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 05/02/2017)
772 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 770 Order,,, and Defendants' Supplemental Brief by Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, Macon Baker, Joseph Bowen, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Theodore Ginnery, Robert Hood, Rodney Kapprelian, Matthew King, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Wack, Thomas) (Entered: 05/03/2017)
773 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 770 Order,,, and Defendants Supplemental Response Brief Supporting Entry of Judgment in Favor of Defendants Under Karsjens v. Piper by Defendants Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Daman Longworth, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Rikki Wright. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 05/03/2017)
774 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the trial setting of June 12, 2017 for the remedies phase of this case is VACATED, to be reset if appropriate after the Court decides whether to reconsider its December 22, 2015 Amended Memorandum Opinion. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 05/09/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 05/09/2017)
775 SEALED Letters to the Court and Response from Court to filers (A copy was mailed to the attorneys of record.) (Attachments: # 1 Letter)(KCB) (Entered: 05/11/2017)
776 MOTION for Leave to File Reply and For Oral Argument by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 05/15/2017)
778 SEALED Letter to Court from Robert Leiurance. (BRP) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
777 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a reply brief and request for oral argument is GRANTED. ECF No. 776 . The parties shall have until May 30, 2017 to file any reply brief, of not more than 10 pages, as to whether the Court should reconsider its December 22, 2015 Amended Memorandum Opinion. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will hold oral argument on this issue on Friday, June 16, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. in Courtroom 12S. The parties shall have 30 minutes per side for argument. (In Court Hearing set for 6/16/2017 01:00 PM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 19, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
779 MOTION to Continue Oral Argument by Defendants Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Daman Longworth, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Rikki Wright. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
780 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to reschedule oral argument is GRANTED. ECF No. 779 . The hearing previously set for June 16, 2017 is continued to Friday, June 23, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12S. The parties shall have 30 minutes per side for argument. (In Court Hearing set for 6/23/2017 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 24, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
781 SUPPLEMENTAL re 777 Order,, Reply to Defendants' Supplemental Brief by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Quinn, John) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
782 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 757 Order,, 777 Order,, Defendants' Third Supplemental Brief Supporting Entry of Judgment in Favor of Defendants Under Karsjens v. Piper by Defendants Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Daman Longworth, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Rikki Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Karsjens Writ

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 101 of 106

06/12/2017 06/13/2017
06/23/2017 07/06/2017
07/06/2017 07/11/2017 07/12/2017 07/13/2017 07/27/2017
07/27/2017 08/01/2017
08/02/2017 08/02/2017 08/09/2017

Petition)(Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
783 MOTION for Hearing For Attendance by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Quinn, John) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
784 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs uncontested motion for an Order authorizing Plaintiffs John Van Orden, Matthew King, Chance Tyree, and Walter Ritchey to attend the hearing set for Friday, June 23, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. is GRANTED. ECF No. 783 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/13/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
785 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: In Court Hearing held on 6/23/2017. Arguments heard from both sides. The Court takes the matter under submission. Order to issue. (Court Reporter:P. Dunn Wecke) (FTR Gold: No) (NEB) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
786 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Courts December 22, 2015 Amended Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 501 ) is VACATED in part, to the extent that it granted Plaintiffs claims in part, and Plaintiffs claims are hereby DENIED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 07/06/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
787 JUDGMENT : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Judgment is entered on behalf of Defendants, and against Plaintiffs. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 07/06/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
788 Document deleted. Entered in Error. Modified on 7/12/2017 (KCB). (Entered: 07/11/2017)
789 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Eric M. Selig by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Selig, Eric) (Entered: 07/12/2017)
790 Docket Text ORDER Re: 789 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Eric M. Selig by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on July 13, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 07/13/2017)
791 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Memorandum in Support by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Joint Motion for Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Excerpts from Missouri Governor's 2017 Budget Proposal for DMH, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Excerpts from 2015 HB No. 10, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Excerpts from 2016 HB No. 2010, # 5 Exhibit 5 − DMH Regulation 4.476, # 6 Exhibit 6 − DMH 2015 Screenshot of Regulations, # 7 Exhibit 7− Defendants' Brief in Support of Approving Proposed Settlement Agreement, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Declaration of Scott K.G. Kozak)(Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
792 MOTION for Hearing re 791 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Memorandum in Support (Request for Oral Argument and/or Evidentiary Hearing) by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. (Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
793 TRANSCRIPT of 785 (Oral Argument) held on 06/23/2017 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/22/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/1/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/30/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 08/01/2017)
794 MOTION to Alter Judgment by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
795 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 794 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
796 RESPONSE in Opposition re 791 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendants Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Daman Longworth, Lee Ann McVay,

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 102 of 106

08/14/2017 08/15/2017
08/16/2017
08/16/2017
08/16/2017 08/23/2017 08/24/2017 08/28/2017 08/28/2017 08/28/2017 08/30/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017

Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Rikki Wright. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
797 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 796 Response in Opposition to Motion, (Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Memorandum) by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. (Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
798 Docket Text ORDER Re: 797 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 796 Response in Opposition to Motion (Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Memorandum) by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on August 15, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
799 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to ALter or Amend the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Dated July 6, 2017 Out of Time by Defendants Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Daman Longworth, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Rikki Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Memorandum and Order Dated July 6, 2017)(Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
800 Docket Text ORDER Re: 799 Motion for Leave to File Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to ALter or Amend the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Dated July 6, 2017 Out of Time by Defendants Harold Myers, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on August 16, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
801 RESPONSE to Motion re 794 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Defendants. (NEB) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
802 REPLY to Response to Motion re 794 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
803 ENTRY of Appearance by Omri E. Praiss for Plaintiffs Anthony Amonette, David Brown, Andre Cokes, Rodney Kapprelian, Michael D. McCord, Joseph Miller, William Murphy, Walter W. Ritchey, Wade A. Turpin, Chance Tyree, Richard Tyson, John R. Van Orden. (Praiss, Omri) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
804 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document (Exhibit A to Reply Memorandum in Support of AT's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs) by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. (Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
805 REPLY to Response to Motion re 791 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Memorandum in Support filed by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
806 SEALED DOCUMENT re 805 Reply to Response to Motion (Exhibit A to Reply Memorandum in Support of AT's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs) by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. (Kozak, Scott) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
807 Docket Text ORDER Re: 804 Motion for Leave to File Sealed Document (Exhibit A to Reply Memorandum in Support of AT's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs) by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on August 30, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
808 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment is DENIED. ECF No. 794 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 18, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
809 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 786 Memorandum & Order, 322 Order, 192 Memorandum & Order,, 377 Memorandum & Order, 392 Memorandum & Order, 709 Memorandum & Order, 400 Memorandum & Order, 501 Memorandum Opinion,,,,,, 768 Memorandum & Order, 808 Memorandum & Order, 399 Memorandum & Order, 787 Judgment − (Case), 500 Memorandum & Order, 467 Memorandum Opinion,,,,,,,,

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 103 of 106

09/22/2017 09/25/2017
09/26/2017
09/26/2017 09/27/2017 09/27/2017 09/29/2017
09/29/2017 10/04/2017
10/05/2017 10/05/2017 10/05/2017

338 Memorandum & Order,, by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. (Entered: 09/18/2017)
810 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Armstrong Teasdale LLP's motion for attorney's fees and costs, and its motion requesting oral argument on the same, are both DENIED. ECF Nos. 791 & 792 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 22, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
811 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Record on Substitution of Party by Defendants Justin Arnett, Andy Atkinson, Donna Augustine, Kristina Bender−Crice, Alan Blake, Jay Englehart, Rick Gowdy, Julie Inman, Ericka L. Kempker, Susan Knopflein, Daman Longworth, Lee Ann McVay, Linda Moll, Harold Myers, Anne Precythe, Robert Reitz, Dave Schmitt, David Schmitt, Angeline Stanislaus, Jeff Stringer, Rikki Wright. (Walsh, Katherine) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
812 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 322 Order, 192 Memorandum & Order,, 768 Memorandum & Order, 377 Memorandum & Order, 392 Memorandum & Order, 808 Memorandum & Order, 399 Memorandum & Order, 400 Memorandum & Order, 500 Memorandum & Order, 338 Memorandum & Order,,. Notice of Appeal filed on 09/18/2017 by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE.(MFG) (Entered: 09/26/2017)
813 Docket Text ORDER Re: 811 Motion to Amend/Correct the Record on Substitution of Party by Defendants Harold Myers, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 26, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 09/26/2017)
814 Initial Notification from USCA for 809 Notice of Appeal, filed by John R. Van Orden USCA Appeal Number: 17−3039(NEB) (Entered: 09/28/2017)
815 Briefing Schedule from USCA for 809 Notice of Appeal, filed by John R. Van Orden USCA Appeal Number: 17−3039 (See attached document for all other deadlines.)(NEB) (Entered: 09/28/2017)
816 MOTION for Relief an order certifying that Plaintiffs appeal is not frivolous (but presents a substantial question) and directing that transcripts of the proceedings on April 15, 2015; April 21, 2015; April 22, 2015; April 23, 2015; April 24, 2015; April 27, 2015; April 28, 2015; April 29, 2015; April 30, 2015; May 25, 2016; October 20, 2016; and June 23, 2017 be prepared for appeal at the cost of the United States by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
817 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 816 MOTION for Relief an order certifying that Plaintiffs appeal is not frivolous (but presents a substantial question) and directing that transcripts of the proceedings on April 15, 2015; April 21, 2015; April 22, 2015; April 23, 2015; April 2 filed by Plaintiff Anthony Amonette. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
818 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Preparation of Transcripts at No Cost is GRANTED. ECF No. 816. Transcripts for the proceedings on April 15, 2015; April 21, 2015; April 22, 2015; April 23, 2015; April 24, 2015; April 27, 2015; April 28, 2015; April 29, 2015; April 30, 2015; May 25, 2016; and October 20, 2016, shall be prepared for the appeal at the cost of the United States. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 4, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
819 TRANSCRIPT ORDER REQUEST for 443 , 437 , 432 , 442 , 435 , 436 , 441 , 440 , 438 (NON−JURY TRIAL) by Anthony Amonette for proceedings held on April 15, 2015 to April 30, 2015 court reporter Patti Dunn Wecke before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
820 TRANSCRIPT ORDER REQUEST for 700 (Fairness Hearing) by Anthony Amonette for proceedings held on October 20, 2016 court reporter R. Fiorino before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
821 TRANSCRIPT ORDER REQUEST for 532 (Motion Hearing) by Anthony Amonette for proceedings held on May 25, 2016 court reporter P. Dunn Wecke before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/05/2017)

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10/17/2017 10/18/2017 10/18/2017 10/20/2017 10/24/2017
10/24/2017 10/25/2017 10/25/2017 11/27/2017 12/04/2017
01/02/2018
01/02/2018
01/02/2018

822 Letter to Judge Fleissig from Richard Croxton re:Settlement Agreement (KCB) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
823 NOTICE Appeal: by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP re 810 Memorandum & Order, (Kozak, Scott) Modified on 10/20/2017 (KCB). (BRP). Modified on 10/23/2017 (BRP). (Entered: 10/18/2017)
824 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 810 Memorandum & Order, by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0865−6198912. (Entered: 10/18/2017)
825 Letter to Richard Croxton from Court (BRP) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
826 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 810 Memorandum & Order,. Notice of Appeal filed on 10/18/2017 by Movant Armstrong Teasdale LLP. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE.(MFG) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
827 Revised Briefing Schedule from USCA for 824 Notice of Appeal filed by Armstrong Teasdale LLP USCA Appeal Number: 17−3093 Transcript due: 12/4/17 (See attached document for all other deadlines.)(KXS) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
828 LETTER from USCA; USCA Appeal #: 17−3319(KCB) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
829 Briefing Schedule from USCA for 824 Notice of Appeal filed by Armstrong Teasdale LLP USCA Appeal Number: 17−3319 (See attached document for all other deadlines.)(KCB) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
830 ORDER of USCA: The court reporter's motion for an extension of time to file the transcript has been granted−in−part. The following revised briefing schedule has been established: [SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS]. USCA Appeal #: 17−3093 (BRP) (Entered: 11/27/2017)
831 TRANSCRIPT of 700 (Fairness Hearing) held on 10/20/2016 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Reagan Fiorino, Reagan_Fiorino@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7989. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/26/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/4/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/5/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 12/04/2017)
832 TRANSCRIPT of 432 (PRETRIAL CONFERENCE) held on 04/15/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
833 TRANSCRIPT of 435 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/21/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
834 TRANSCRIPT of 436 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/22/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 105 of 106

01/02/2018 01/02/2018 01/02/2018 01/02/2018 01/02/2018 01/02/2018 01/02/2018 01/02/2018

835 TRANSCRIPT of 437 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/23/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
836 TRANSCRIPT of 438 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/24/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
837 TRANSCRIPT of 440 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/27/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
838 TRANSCRIPT of 441 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/28/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
839 TRANSCRIPT of 442 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/29/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
840 TRANSCRIPT of 443 (NON−JURY TRIAL) held on 04/30/2015 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
841 TRANSCRIPT (FILED UNDER SEAL) of 532 (STATUS CONFERENCE) held on 05/25/2016 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber P. Dunn Wecke. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
842 TRANSCRIPT of 532 (STATUS CONFERENCE) held on 05/25/2016 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/02/2018)

Case: 4:09-cv-971 As of: 07/19/2018 10:14 AM CDT 106 of 106

01/10/2018 01/10/2018
01/11/2018 01/16/2018
01/24/2018 01/25/2018 01/25/2018 02/05/2018 02/05/2018 02/21/2018 02/22/2018

843 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden re 822 Letter, 825 Letter (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/10/2018)
844 ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court shall hold a telephone conference with counsel on Tuesday, January 16, 2018 at 3:30 p.m., to discuss the deposition designations to be included in the record on appeal. The Court will circulate the dial−in information by email to all counsel. (Telephone Conference set for 1/16/2018 03:30 PM in Telephone before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/10/0218. (NEP) (Entered: 01/10/2018)
845 NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATED CLERK'S RECORD regarding 842 Transcript,, 839 Transcript,, 837 Transcript,, 836 Transcript,, 835 Transcript,, 832 Transcript,, 831 Transcript,, 841 Transcript (FILED UNDER SEAL), 834 Transcript,, 833 Transcript,, 838 Transcript,, 840 Transcript,,.. USCA Appellate Docket Number: 17−3319.(MFG) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
846 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Telephone Conference held on 1/16/2018. Parties present for Telephone Conference regarding the record for depositions read during the bench trial on liability that was held in 2015. The Court hears from counsel. The Court will make available a hard copy of highlighted transcripts that were provided to the Court during the trial and disks containing the same copy of the transcripts. Counsel should try to reach an agreement on what was read during the trial. Parties shall advise the Court whether they agree on the deposition designations or if there are any disputes no later than one week from the date of this hearing. (Court Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984) (FTR Gold: No) (BRP) (Entered: 01/17/2018)
847 NOTICE by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden re 846 Telephone Conference,,, (Quinn, John) (Entered: 01/24/2018)
848 USCA JUDGMENT as to 809 Notice of Appeal, filed by John R. Van Orden. Appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. The appeal is hereby dismissed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 42(b). The Court's mandate shall issue forthwith. (BRP) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
849 MANDATE of USCA as to 809 Notice of Appeal, filed by John R. Van Orden USCA #:17−3319 In accordance with the judgment and pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a), the formal mandate is hereby issued in the above−styled matter. Appeal is Dismissed. (BRP) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
850 EXHIBITS Received: Deposition Designations from Bench Trial held on April 21, 2015 to April 30, 2015. Deposition Designations are on a USB drive and are stored in the Clerk's Office file room. (BRP) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
851 NOTICE Jointly Agreed Deposition Designations: by Plaintiff John R. Van Orden (Quinn, John) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
852 NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATED CLERK'S RECORD regarding 842 Transcript,, 839 Transcript,, 837 Transcript,, 836 Transcript,, 835 Transcript,, 832 Transcript,, 831 Transcript,, 834 Transcript,, 833 Transcript,, 838 Transcript,, 840 Transcript,,.. USCA Appellate Docket Number: 17−3319.(MFG) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
853 NOTICE of Change of Address filed by John H. Quinn, III. (Quinn, John) (The address has been updated in CM/ECF.) Modified on 2/22/2018 (LMR). (Entered: 02/22/2018)