CASE−REFERRED,FRENSLEY,MANUAL−FILING,PROTECTIVE−ORDER
U.S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee (Columbia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:18−cv−00033

McNeil et al v. Community Probation Services, LLC et al Assigned to: District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley Case in other court: 6CCA, 19−05262
6CCA, 19−05660 Cause: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/23/2018 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 470 Racketeer/Corrupt Organization Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Karen McNeil

represented by Alexandria Twinem Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Eighth Floor Washington, DC 20009 (202) 894−6126 Email: alexandria@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chirag Badlani Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd. 70 W Madison Street Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 580−0100 Fax: (312) 580−1994 Email: cbadlani@hsplegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David W. Garrison Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC Philips Plaza 414 Union Street Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 244−2202 Fax: (615) 252−3798 Email: dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Anne Rossi Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Eighth Floor Washington, DC 20009 (202) 599−0953 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:18-cv-33

Eric Halperin Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Eighth Floor Washington, DC 20009 (202) 599−0953 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: eric@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 1 of 49

Plaintiff

Jonas Wang Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Eighth Floor Washington, DC 20009 (202) 599−0953 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: jonas@civilrightscorps.org TERMINATED: 06/18/2019
Kate E. Schwartz Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd. 70 W Madison Street Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 580−0100 Fax: (312) 580−1994 Email: kschwartz@hsplegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyle F. Mothershead The Law Office of Kyle Mothershead 414 Union Street Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 982−8002 Email: kyle@mothersheadlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Eighth Floor Washington, DC 20009 (202) 844−4975 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: arandes@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Piers Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd. 70 W Madison Street Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 580−0100 Fax: (312) 580−1994 Email: mpiers@hsplegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott P. Tift Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC Philips Plaza 414 Union Street Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 244−2202 Fax: (615) 252−3798 Email: stift@barrettjohnston.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 2 of 49

Lesley Johnson

represented by Alexandria Twinem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chirag Badlani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David W. Garrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Halperin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonas Wang (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2019

Kate E. Schwartz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Piers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott P. Tift (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell

represented by Alexandria Twinem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chirag Badlani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David W. Garrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Halperin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 3 of 49

Jonas Wang (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2019

Kate E. Schwartz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Piers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott P. Tift (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Indya Hilfort

represented by Alexandria Twinem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chirag Badlani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David W. Garrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Halperin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonas Wang (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2019

Kate E. Schwartz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Piers (See above for address)
Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 4 of 49

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott P. Tift (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Sonya Beard On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/19/2019

represented by Chirag Badlani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David W. Garrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Halperin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonas Wang (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2019

Kate E. Schwartz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Piers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott P. Tift (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon

represented by Alexandria Twinem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chirag Badlani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David W. Garrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:18-cv-33

Elizabeth Anne Rossi Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 599−0953 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 5 of 49

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Halperin Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 599−0953 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: eric@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonas Wang Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 599−0953 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: jonas@civilrightscorps.org TERMINATED: 06/18/2019
Kate E. Schwartz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Piers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott P. Tift (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Community Probation Services, LLC

represented by Andre S. Greppin Moore, Rader, Fitzpatrick and York, P.C. 46 N. Jefferson Ave. P O Box 3347 Cookeville, TN 38501 (931) 526−3311 Fax: (931) 526−3092 Email: andre@moorerader.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:18-cv-33

Daniel H. Rader , IV Moore, Rader, Fitzpatrick and York, P.C. 46 N. Jefferson Ave. P O Box 3347 Cookeville, TN 38501 (931) 526−3311 Fax: (931) 526−3092 Email: danny@moorerader.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 6 of 49

Defendant Community Probation Services, L.L.C.

represented by Andre S. Greppin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel H. Rader , IV (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Community Probation Services

represented by Andre S. Greppin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel H. Rader , IV (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Progressive Sentencing, Inc.

represented by Brandt M. McMillan Tune, Entrekin & White, P.C. 315 Deaderick Street Suite 1700 Nashville, TN 37238 (615) 244−2770 Email: bmcmillan@tewlawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Neil O'Connor Tune, Entrekin & White, P.C. 315 Deaderick Street Suite 1700 Nashville, TN 37238 (615) 244−2770 Fax: (615) 244−2778 Email: toconnor@tewlawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant PSI−Probation II, LLC

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Neil O'Connor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant PSI−Probation, L.L.C.

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Neil O'Connor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 7 of 49

Timothy Neil O'Connor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Timothy Cook

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Neil O'Connor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Giles County, Tennessee

represented by Robyn Beale Williams Farrar & Bates 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 254−3060 Fax: (615) 254−9835 Email: robyn.williams@farrar−bates.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cassandra M. Crane Farrar & Bates 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219 615−254−3060 Fax: 615−254−9835 Email: casey.crane@farrar−bates.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Christopher Williams Williams Law and Mediation Group 120 N. Second Street Pulaski, TN 38478 (931) 363−6500 Fax: (931) 363−8904 Email: cwilliams@newsouthlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/16/2019
Lucy D. Henson Lucy D. Henson, PLLC 118 S Second Street P.O. Box 333 Pulaski, TN 38478 (931) 424−8713 Fax: (931) 424−8715 Email: henson@midsouthlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Patricia McNair

represented by Andre S. Greppin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel H. Rader , IV (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 8 of 49

Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Neil O'Connor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Harriet Thompson

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Neil O'Connor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Kyle Helton

represented by Cassandra M. Crane Farrar & Bates, LLP 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219 615−254−3060 Fax: 615−254−9835 Email: casey.crane@farrar−bates.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robyn Beale Williams Farrar & Bates, LLP 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 254−3060 Fax: (615) 254−9835 Email: robyn.williams@farrar−bates.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Patricia McNair

represented by Daniel H. Rader , IV (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deponent J. Russell Parkes

represented by Heather Cairns Ross Tennessee Attorney General's Office P O Box 20207 Nashville, TN 37202−0207 (615) 741−3491 Email: heather.ross@ag.tn.gov TERMINATED: 03/05/2019

Joseph Paul Ahillen Tennessee Attorney General's Office P O Box 20207 Nashville, TN 37202−0207 (615) 532−2558 Fax: (615) 532−2541 Email: joe.ahillen@ag.tn.gov TERMINATED: 11/29/2018
Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 9 of 49

Deponent Judge Robert Richardson

represented by Donald A. Saulters Ortale Kelley Law Firm 330 Commerce Street Suite 110 P.O. Box 198985 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 256−9999 Email: dsaulters@ortalekelley.com TERMINATED: 03/05/2019

Interested Party
State of Tennessee P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, TN 37202 615−532−1969

Counter Plaintiff Markeyta Bledsoe

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff Harriet Thompson

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff Timothy Cook

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff PSI−Probation, L.L.C.

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff PSI−Probation II, LLC

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff Progressive Sentencing, Inc.

represented by Brandt M. McMillan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Defendant
Sonya Beard On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Chirag Badlani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David W. Garrison Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 10 of 49

Counter Defendant Tanya Mitchell

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Halperin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonas Wang (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2019
Kate E. Schwartz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Piers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott P. Tift (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chirag Badlani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David W. Garrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Halperin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonas Wang (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2019
Kate E. Schwartz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Piers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 11 of 49

Scott P. Tift (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/23/2018
04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018
04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018
04/24/2018
04/25/2018
04/25/2018
04/25/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Markeyta Bledsoe, Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Timothy Cook, Giles County, Tennessee, Patricia McNair, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson (Filing fee $400, Receipt number 0650−2657283), filed by Indya Hilfort, Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, Sonya Beard, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit 1 − CPS−Giles contract, # 3 Exhibit 2 − PSI−Giles contract, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Letter)(mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
2 NOTICE of Corporate Disclosure Statement filing requirement. (mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
3 NOTICE/INFORMATION regarding Consent of the Parties to the Magistrate Judge. (mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
NOTICE TO COUNSEL Elizabeth Anne Rossi, Jonas Wang, Eric Halperin, Matthew J. Piers, Chirag Badlani, Kate Schwartz: WITHIN 21 DAYS, counsel shall file a Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, a Certificate of Good Standing signed by the Clerk of a United States District Court where admitted, and pay a fee of $75.00 (LR 83.01(d)). PHV due by 5/14/2018. (mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
TN State Bar status verified as active for Kyle F. Mothershead. (mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
4 NOTICE of Initial Case Management Conference set for 6/1/2018 at 12:00 PM in Columbia before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. (mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
IL State Bar status verified as active for Matthew J. Piers, Chirag Badlani, and Kate E. Schwartz. (mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
MD State Bar status verified as active for Elizabeth Anne Rossi, DC State Bar status verified as active for Jonas Wang, and DC and MD State Bar status verified as active for Eric Halperin. (mg) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
5 MOTION to Certify Class by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
6 MEMORANDUM in Support of 5 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rossi declaration, # 2 Exhibit Piers declaration, # 3 Exhibit Mothershead declaration, # 4 Attachment Proposed Order)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
7 MOTION for attorney(s) Matthew J. Piers to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2658450) by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Piers, Matthew) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
8 MOTION for attorney(s) Chirag G. Badlani to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2659035) by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Piers, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2018)
9 MOTION for attorney(s) Kate E. Schwartz to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2659046) by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Piers, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2018)
10 MOTION for attorney(s) Elizabeth Rossi to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2659105) by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 12 of 49

04/25/2018 04/26/2018 04/27/2018
04/30/2018
05/18/2018
05/18/2018 05/22/2018 05/24/2018 05/25/2018 05/25/2018 05/25/2018 05/25/2018 05/25/2018

11 MOTION for attorney(s) Jonas Wang to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2659124) by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/25/2018)
12 ORDER: Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motions for Admission Pro Hac Vice for attorneys Matthew J. Piers, Chirag G. Badlani, Kate E. Schwarz, Elizabeth Rossi, and Jonas Wang. Docket Nos. 7−11. The requirements under Local Rule 83.01(d) have been satisfied. Therefore, these Motions are GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 4/26/18. (af) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
13 Summons issued as to Markeyta Bledsoe, Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Timothy Cook, Giles County, Tennessee, Patricia McNair, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. Service copies will be returned to counsel by mail. (mg) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
14 ORDER: This case is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for customized case management in accordance with Local Rule 16.01. Lead counsel for the parties shall attend the initial case management conference. This case shall be set for trial upon completion of the initial case management conference by order of the Court in accordance with the procedures of Local Rule 16.01(d)(5). Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 4/30/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
15 SUMMONS returned executed by Indya Hilfort, Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, Sonya Beard, Tanya Mitchell. Markeyta Bledsoe served on 5/16/2018; Timothy Cook served on 5/16/2018; Patricia McNair served on 5/16/2018; PSI−Probation II, LLC served on 5/16/2018; PSI−Probation, L.L.C. served on 5/16/2018; Progressive Sentencing, Inc. served on 5/16/2018; Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC served on 5/16/2018. (Schwartz, Kate) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
16 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Indya Hilfort, Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, Sonya Beard, Tanya Mitchell. Giles County, Tennessee waiver sent on 4/30/2018. (Schwartz, Kate) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
17 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 05/22/2018)
18 MOTION to Continue Initial Case Management Conference by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
Notice to Filer re DE 18 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, all filings shall include a Certificate of Service and it shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Counsel SHALL FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document using the Certificate event located under Other Documents. (mg) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
19 CERTIFICATE Conformed Certificate of Service filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 18 MOTION to Continue Initial Case Management Conference filed by Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell, Lesley Johnson, Indya Hilfort, Sonya Beard. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by Robyn Beale Williams on behalf of Giles County, Tennessee (Williams, Robyn) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Cassandra M. Crane on behalf of Giles County, Tennessee (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
22 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint,, by Giles County, Tennessee. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 05/25/2018)

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 13 of 49

05/29/2018

TN State Bar status verified as active for Robyn Beale Williams, and Cassandra M. Crane. (mg) (Entered: 05/29/2018)

05/29/2018

23 SUMMONS returned executed by Indya Hilfort, Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, Sonya Beard, Tanya Mitchell. Community Probation Services served on 5/21/2018; Community Probation Services, L.L.C. served on 5/21/2018; Community Probation Services, LLC served on 5/21/2018; Harriet Thompson served on 5/21/2018. (Schwartz, Kate) (Entered: 05/29/2018)

05/29/2018

24 ORDER: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reschedule the Initial Case Management Conference is GRANTED, and continued to October 25, 2018, at 8:30 a.m. in Columbia, Tennessee. If dispositive motions are filed, the case management conference shall be rescheduled. Defendants' Motions for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings are GRANTED. All responsive pleadings are due on or before August 6, 2018. Accordingly, if Motions to Dismiss are filed, Plaintiffs' response is due on or before October 5, 2018, and Defendants' replies on or before October 25, 2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 5/29/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 05/29/2018)

05/29/2018

Reset Hearing: Initial Case Management Conference is reset for 10/25/2018 at 08:30 AM in Columbia before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. (mg) (Entered: 05/29/2018)

05/31/2018 25 NOTICE of Appearance by John Christopher Williams on behalf of Giles County, Tennessee (Williams, John) (Entered: 05/31/2018)

06/01/2018

TN State Bar status verified as active for John Christopher Williams. (mg) (Entered: 06/01/2018)

06/08/2018

26 MOTION for attorney(s) Eric Halperin to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $100 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2687288) by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Halperin certificate of good standing)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/11/2018

D.C. State Bar status verified as active for Eric Halperin. (mg) (Entered: 06/11/2018)

06/11/2018 27 ORDER granting 26 Motion for Eric Halperin to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 6/11/2018. (mg) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/12/2018

28 MOTION Joint Motion to Hold Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference re 6 Memorandum in Support, 5 MOTION to Certify Class by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, Giles County, Tennessee, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/18/2018

29 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel H. Rader, IV on behalf of Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/18/2018)

06/18/2018

30 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 24 Order on Motion for Extension of Time to Answer, Order on Motion to Continue, by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/18/2018)

06/18/2018

31 Supplemental MOTION Hold in Abeyance re 28 MOTION Joint Motion to Hold Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference re 6 Memorandum in Support, 5 MOTION to Certify Class , 5 MOTION to Certify Class by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/18/2018)

06/19/2018

TN State Bar status verified as active for Daniel H. Rader, IV. (mg) (Entered: 06/19/2018)

06/19/2018 32 ORDER: Motion 30 GRANTED for an extension of time to file a response to the Complaint. Any and all responses to the complaint are due August 6, 2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 6/19/2018. (mg) (Entered: 06/19/2018)
Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 14 of 49

06/26/2018 06/27/2018

33 RESPONSE in Opposition re 28 MOTION Joint Motion to Hold Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference re 6 Memorandum in Support, 5 MOTION to Certify Class , 31 Supplemental MOTION Hold in Abeyance re 28 MOTION Joint Motion to Hold Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference re 6 Memorandum in Support, 5 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
34 MOTION for Leave to to File a Reply re 33 Response in Opposition to Motion,, to Hold Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference by Giles County, Tennessee. (Williams, Robyn) (Entered: 06/27/2018)

07/13/2018

35 ***DISREGARD, FILED IN ERROR BY COUNSEL, See D/E # 41 *** AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Indya Hilfort, Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, Sonya Beard, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit CPS Contract, # 2 Exhibit PSI Contract, # 3 Exhibit Letter to Giles)(Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified text on 7/17/2018 (mg). (Entered: 07/13/2018)

07/13/2018

36 Amended MOTION to Certify Class by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/13/2018)

07/13/2018
07/13/2018 07/13/2018 07/13/2018

37 MEMORANDUM in Support of 36 Amended MOTION to Certify Class filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rossi dec, # 2 Exhibit Piers dec, # 3 Exhibit Mothershead dec)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
38 NOTICE of Appearance by David W. Garrison on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Garrison, David) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
39 NOTICE of Appearance by Scott P. Tift on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
40 ORDER: Pursuant to the Administrative Order No. 186, and in consultation with Judge William L. Campbell, Jr., this case is transferred to Judge William L. Campbell, Jr. All previously imposed deadlines and Court dates remain unchanged, pending any further order from the Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 7/13/18. (af) (Entered: 07/13/2018)

07/13/2018

41 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (CORRECTED) by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell as to 35 Amended Complaint (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified text on 7/17/2018 (mg). (Entered: 07/13/2018)

07/13/2018

42 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Indya Hilfort, # 2 Exhibit General Sessions Order, # 3 Exhibit Circuit Court Order, # 4 Exhibit Proposed Order)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/13/2018)

07/13/2018 07/13/2018 07/13/2018 07/13/2018

43 RESPONSE in Opposition re 42 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Violation of Probation)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
44 AFFIDAVIT re 42 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order , 43 Response in Opposition to Motion, by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr: Telephone Conference held on 7/13/2018 re 42 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell, Lesley Johnson, Indya Hilfort, Sonya Beard. The Court GRANTED the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, order to enter. (Court Reporter Patty Jennings.) (ab) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
45 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: It is, therefore, ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, that: Defendant Giles County, its officers, agents, employees, servants, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with

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07/17/2018 07/17/2018 07/18/2018 07/25/2018 07/25/2018 07/26/2018
07/30/2018 07/30/2018 07/30/2018 07/31/2018
07/31/2018

them are hereby enjoined and restrained from enforcing against Plaintiff Hilfort any secured financial condition of release determined without an inquiry and findings concerning ability to pay by an appropriate judicial officer, pending further order of the Court. This TRO is effective upon its issuance on July 13, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., and expires on July 27, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., absent further order of the Court. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 7/13/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ab) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
TN State Bar status verified as active for David W. Garrison, and Scott P. Tift. (mg) (Entered: 07/17/2018)
46 NOTICE of Filing by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 41 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − CPS Contract, # 2 Exhibit 2 − PSI Contract, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Letter to Giles County on Private Probation)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 07/17/2018)
47 Summons issued as to Kyle Helton. Service copies picked−up by counsel. (mg) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
48 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Karen McNeil, Sonya Beard, Tanya Mitchell. Kyle Helton waiver sent on 7/23/2018. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
49 Joint MOTION to Extend Temporary Restraining Order re 45 Order on Motion for TRO,,, by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment − Proposed Order)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
50 ORDER granting 49 Joint Motion to Extend Restraining Order. It is hereby ORDERED that the Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") issued on July 13, 2018 (Doc. No. 45 ) shall be extended, with the addition of language making clear that the TRO is limited to violation−of−probation warrants, until this Court decides whether or not to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction or until the parties reach a resolution resolving this dispute. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 7/26/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) Modified text on 7/30/2018 (mg). (Entered: 07/26/2018)
51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
52 MEMORANDUM in Support of 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Example Warrants Requiring Money Bail, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Example Warrants Alleging Solely Non−Payment)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
53 MOTION to set briefing schedule re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Unopposed Motion to Set Briefing Schedule by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Order)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
54 ORDER: Plaintiffs' initial Motion for Class Certification (Doc. No. 5 ) is DENIED, as moot, in light of Plaintiffs' amended class certification motion. Defendant Giles County, Tennessee's Motion Seeking Leave to File a Reply (Doc. No. 34 ) is GRANTED. Defendants' Motions to Hold Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference (Doc. Nos. 28 , 31 ) are REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for consideration. The Magistrate Judge is directed to enter an order setting a schedule for discovery and briefing relating to the pending class certification motion. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 7/31/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 07/31/2018)
55 NOTICE of Filing by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 52 Memorandum in Support, Notice of Filing Corrected Exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Corrected Exhibit 1 − Warrants Requiring Money Bail,

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# 2 Exhibit 2 − Corrected Exhibit 2 − Warrants Alleging Non−payment)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 07/31/2018)

07/31/2018

56 ORDER: Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 51 ), and Motion to Set Briefing Schedule for Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 53 ). The Motion to Set Briefing Schedule (Doc. No. 53 ) is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to establish briefing deadlines and deadlines for any discovery related to the preliminary injunction hearing, and advise the Court of a target date for the preliminary injunction hearing. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 7/31/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 08/01/2018)

08/06/2018

57 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages on Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Williams, Robyn) (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/06/2018

58 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages on Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Williams, Robyn) (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/06/2018

59 ANSWER to 35 Amended Complaint, 1 Complaint, , ANSWER to 35 Amended Complaint, 1 Complaint, by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair.(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/06/2018

60 ANSWER to 35 Amended Complaint, (Corrected 41 ), First COUNTERCLAIM against Sonya Beard, Tanya Mitchell by Markeyta Bledsoe, Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., PSI−Probation II, LLC, Progressive Sentencing, Inc..(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/06/2018

61 MOTION for Leave to to manually file video exhibit on compact disc re 60 Answer to Amended Complaint,, Counterclaim, by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/06/2018 62 MOTION to Dismiss by Giles County, Tennessee. (Williams, Robyn) Modified on 8/7/2018 (dt). (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/06/2018 63 MEMORANDUM in support of 62 MOTION to Dismiss by Giles County, Tennessee. (Williams, Robyn) Modified on 8/7/2018 (dt). (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/07/2018

64 ORDER granting 61 Motion for Leave to Manually File Compact Disc of Video Recording as Exhibit 1 to the PSI Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 8/7/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/07/2018

65 ORDER granting 57 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 8/7/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/08/2018

66 ORDER: A telephone conference is set for August 22, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. with the undersigned on Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Briefing Schedule for the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 53 ). Counsel for the Plaintiff shall initiate the call, then contact the Court at 615−736−7344. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 8/8/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 08/08/2018)

08/08/2018

RECEIPT of Manual Filing by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, and Harriet Thompson re 64 Order on Motion for Leave to Manually File Compact Disc of Video Recording as Exhibit 1 to the PSI Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim. Compact Disc forwarded to Judge William L. Campbell, Jr chambers on 8/8/2018. (mg) (Entered: 08/08/2018)

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08/08/2018
08/21/2018 08/22/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/28/2018
09/05/2018 09/05/2018 09/05/2018 09/06/2018

67 Transcript filed for dates of July 13, 2018, before Judge William L. Campbell Jr. Court Reporter: Patty Jennings, 615−939−5450, patty_jennings@tnmd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNSEL TO REVIEW THE TRANSCRIPT AND REQUEST REDACTION OF CONTENT CLASSIFIED AS PRIVATE UNDER THE NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF THE BAR, ELECTRONIC AVAILABILITY OF TRANSCRIPTS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, EFFECTIVE MAY 5, 2008, AVAILABLE ON THE COURT'S WEBSITE UNDER THE CM−ECF LINK at: http://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/files/20091201Notice_to_the_Bar_Transcripts.pdf. Intent to Request Transcript Redaction due 8/15/2018. Redaction Request due 8/29/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/10/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/6/2018. (Jennings, Patty) (Entered: 08/08/2018)
68 STATUS REPORT Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Garrison, David) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
69 RESPONSE filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton re 68 Status Report filed by Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell, Lesley Johnson, Indya Hilfort, Sonya Beard . (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 8/27/2018. Order to enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (hv) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
70 MOTION to Dismiss Counterclaim of PSI Defendants by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Garrison, David) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
71 MEMORANDUM in Support of 70 MOTION to Dismiss Counterclaim of PSI Defendants filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell . (Garrison, David) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
72 ORDER: The Court held a status conference with the Parties on August 22, 2018. The County Defendant shall respond to the Plaintiffs' written discovery by September 12, 2018. The Parties are instructed to file additional briefs with the Court on or before September 5, 2018 not to exceed ten (10) pages addressing Plaintiff's requests to depose the two Tennessee state Court judges in this matter. Upon receipt of that briefing, the Court will rule on the issue of what if any additional discovery will be allowed and set a schedule for completion of the briefing on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and recommend a target hearing date. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 8/28/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) Modified text on 8/30/2018 (mg). (Entered: 08/28/2018)
73 MEMORANDUM in Support of 72 Order, Set Deadlines, filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell Additional Brief RE Injunction Discovery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − August 2018 Email Exchange, # 2 Exhibit 2 − September 2018 Email Exchange)(Garrison, David) Modified Text on 9/6/2018 (am). (Entered: 09/05/2018)
74 NOTICE of Filing by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs' Request to Depose Judicial Officals (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
75 MEMORANDUM in Support of 72 Order, Set Deadlines, filed by Giles County, Tennessee . (Crane, Cassandra) Modified Text on 9/6/2018 (am). (Entered: 09/05/2018)
76 MOTION for Leave to FILE STATEMENT OF CORRECTION OF THE RECORD re 75 Memorandum in Support by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Statement of Correction of the Record in Response to Giles Counts Brief, Dkt. No. 75)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/06/2018)

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09/07/2018

77 RESPONSE in Opposition re 76 MOTION for Leave to FILE STATEMENT OF CORRECTION OF THE RECORD re 75 Memorandum in Support filed by Giles County, Tennessee. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018

78 NOTICE of Appearance by Timothy Neil O'Connor on behalf of Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson (O'Connor, Timothy) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/10/2018

TN State Bar status verified as active for Timothy Neil O'Connor. (am) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/10/2018

79 ORDER granting 76 Motion for Leave to File Statement of Correction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/10/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/11/2018

80 AMENDED ANSWER to Plaintiffs' Complaint 41 60 Answer to Amended Complaint,, Counterclaim, by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/14/2018

81 RESPONSE to Motion re 76 MOTION for Leave to FILE STATEMENT OF CORRECTION OF THE RECORD re 75 Memorandum in Support filed by Giles County, Tennessee. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/17/2018

82 ORDER granting 53 Motion to set briefing schedule. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/17/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/20/2018 83 MOTION to Quash Deposition Judge Parkes by J. Russell Parkes. (Ahillen, Joseph) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

09/20/2018 84 MEMORANDUM in Support of 83 MOTION to Quash Deposition Judge Parkes filed by J. Russell Parkes . (Ahillen, Joseph) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

09/21/2018

Notice to Filer re DE 83 & 84 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, all filings shall include a Certificate of Service and it shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Counsel SHALL FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document using the Certificate event located under Other Documents. (am) (Entered: 09/21/2018)

09/21/2018

85 CERTIFICATE of Service filed by J. Russell Parkes re 83 MOTION to Quash Deposition Judge Parkes filed by J. Russell Parkes. (Ahillen, Joseph) Modified Text on 9/25/2018 (am). (Entered: 09/21/2018)

09/21/2018

86 CERTIFICATE of Service filed by J. Russell Parkes re 84 Memorandum in Support filed by J. Russell Parkes. (Ahillen, Joseph) Modified Text on 9/25/2018 (am). (Entered: 09/21/2018)

09/21/2018 87 RESPONSE in Opposition re 83 MOTION to Quash Deposition Judge Parkes filed by Karen McNeil. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 09/21/2018)

09/25/2018 88 MOTION to Quash by Robert Richardson. (Saulters, Donald) (Entered: 09/25/2018)

09/25/2018

89 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash by Robert Richardson. (Saulters, Donald) Modified Text on 9/26/2018 (am). (Main Document 89 replaced on 9/26/2018) (am). (Entered: 09/25/2018)

09/25/2018

90 ORDER denying 83 Motion to Quash. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/25/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/25/2018)

09/25/2018

TN State Bar status verified as active for Joseph Paul Ahillen, Donald A. Saulters. (am) (Entered: 09/25/2018)

09/26/2018 91 RESPONSE in Opposition re 89 MOTION to Quash , 88 MOTION to Quash filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
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09/26/2018

Notice to Filer re DE 89 : The document is scanned and not text searchable. Scanning should only be used for documents not created on your computer. This document does not need to be re−filed unless otherwise directed by the Court. (am) (Entered: 09/26/2018)

09/27/2018

92 ORDER denying 88 Motion to Quash. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/27/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/27/2018)

10/01/2018

93 RESPONSE to Motion re 70 MOTION to Dismiss Counterclaim of PSI Defendants filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 10/01/2018)

10/02/2018

94 ORDER denying as moot 70 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/2/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/02/2018)

10/05/2018

95 Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave to Exceed Page Limit on Memorandum in Opposition of County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by Karen McNeil. (Tift, Scott) Modified Text on 10/9/2018 (am). (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/05/2018

96 RESPONSE in Opposition re 62 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/09/2018

97 ORDER denying as moot 58 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/9/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/09/2018)

10/09/2018

98 ORDER granting 95 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/9/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/09/2018)

10/09/2018

99 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 82 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/09/2018)

10/10/2018

100 ORDER granting 99 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Replies due by 10/20/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 10/10/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/10/2018)

10/11/2018 101 Amended MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 82 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/11/2018)

10/11/2018

102 MOTION to Severance or Separate Trials by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (O'Connor, Timothy) Modified Text on 10/12/2018 (am). (Entered: 10/11/2018)

10/11/2018

103 MEMORANDUM in Support of 102 MOTION to Severance or Separate Trials filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Declaration of Tim Cook, # 2 Exhibit 2− PSI Client Surveys)(O'Connor, Timothy) Modified Text on 10/12/2018 (am). (Entered: 10/11/2018)

10/12/2018

NOTE TO FILER re DE# 103 Exhibit 2: This document is upside down. All documents should be filed so that they may be read without the necessity of rotation. THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BE RE−FILED. (am) (Entered: 10/12/2018)

10/12/2018 104 NOTICE of Filing by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 103 Memorandum in Support, Corrected Exhibit 2
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10/12/2018 10/12/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/16/2018
10/16/2018
10/16/2018 10/16/2018 10/17/2018

(Attachments: # 1 Attachment Exhibit 2− PSI Client Surveys)(O'Connor, Timothy) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
105 MOTION for Hearing re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
106 RESPONSE in Opposition re 105 MOTION for Hearing re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Community Probation Services, LLC. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
107 RESPONSE to Motion re 105 MOTION for Hearing re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
108 REPLY to Response to Motion re 105 MOTION for Hearing re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
109 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 52 Memorandum in Support, by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) Modified Text on 10/16/2018 (am). (Entered: 10/15/2018)
110 RESPONSE in Opposition re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
111 RESPONSE in Opposition re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
112 RESPONSE in Opposition re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
113 NOTICE of Filing by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 110 Response in Opposition to Motion, EXHIBITS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Deposition of Hon. J. Russell Parkes, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Deposition of Hon. Robert Richardson, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Declaration of Markeyta Bledsoe, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Arrest Warrant for Tanya Mitchell)(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
114 NOTICE of Filing by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton re 112 Response in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Deposition Transcript − Judge J. Russell Parkes, # 2 Attachment Deposition Transcript of Judge Robert C. Richardson, Jr., # 3 Exhibit A − Failure to Appear − Hilfort, # 4 Exhibit B − Indictment − Hilfort, # 5 Exhibit C − Order − Hilfort, # 6 Exhibit D − Indictments − Hilfort, # 7 Exhibit E − Dismissal − Hilfort, # 8 Exhibit F − Warrants)(Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
115 ORDER granting 101 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/16/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
116 ORDER granting 109 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/16/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
117 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 105 Motion for Hearing. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction hearing is set for November 27, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. The discovery and scheduling issues raised by the parties in their filings are REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/17/2018.(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

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10/17/2018 10/19/2018 10/19/2018 10/22/2018 10/22/2018
10/22/2018 10/22/2018 10/23/2018
10/24/2018 10/24/2018 10/24/2018 10/24/2018 10/25/2018 10/26/2018

Set/Reset Hearings: Preliminary Hearing set for 11/27/2018 10:00 AM before District Judge William L. Campbell Jr. (am) Modified Text on 10/23/2018 (am). (Entered: 10/18/2018)
118 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
119 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 102 MOTION to Sever by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Schwartz, Kate) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
120 MOTION FOR OUT OF TOWN COUNSEL TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE by Karen McNeil. (Tift, Scott) Modified Text on 10/24/2018 (am). (Entered: 10/22/2018)
121 ORDER granting 118 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Replies due by 11/2/2018. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/22/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
122 ORDER granting 119 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 102 MOTION to Sever. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/22/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
123 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER filed by All Plaintiffs. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
124 REPLY to Response to Motion re 28 MOTION Joint Motion to Hold Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference re 6 Memorandum in Support, 5 MOTION to Certify Class , 34 MOTION for Leave to to File a Reply re 33 Response in Opposition to Motion,, to Hold Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference, 31 Supplemental MOTION Hold in Abeyance re 28 MOTION Joint Motion to Hold Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in Abeyance Until Initial Case Management Conference re 6 Memorandum in Support, 5 MOTION to Certify Class Jointly filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Timothy Cook, Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton, Patricia McNair, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 10/23/2018)
125 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 62 MOTION to Dismiss by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
126 NOTICE of Removal from Certificate of Service by Robert Richardson (Saulters, Donald) Modified Text on 10/25/2018 (am). (Entered: 10/24/2018)
127 ORDER granting 120 Motion FOR OUT OF TOWN COUNSEL TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 10/24/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
128 NOTICE by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 123 Proposed Case Management Order Notice of Filing Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Deadline for the Parties to Move to Amend or to Add Parties (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Initial Case Management Conference held on 10/25/2018. Order to enter. (Tape #25oct2018.) (hv) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
129 ORDER granting 125 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 62 MOTION to Dismiss Replies due by 11/2/2018. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/26/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/26/2018)

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10/30/2018

130 INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: Motions to Amend due by 1/11/2019. Discovery due by 8/30/2019. Dispositive Motions due by 12/20/2019. Telephone Conference set for 8/6/2019 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 10/30/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/30/2018)

11/02/2018 131 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Giles County's Reply in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss by Giles County, Tennessee. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/02/2018)

11/02/2018

132 ORDER SETTING DISCOVERY DEADLINES FOR PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: The Court further orders the following schedule related to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction: 1. The parties shall disclose the identity of witnesses that they intend to call to testify live or via affidavit at the evidentiary at hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction on or before November 5, 2018; and 2. The parties are to complete depositions of any identified witnesses on or before November 20, 2018. Judge Campbell's Order [D.E. 117] is unaffected. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 11/2/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 11/02/2018)

11/02/2018 133 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/02/2018)

11/02/2018 134 REPLY to Response to Motion re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/02/2018)

11/02/2018 135 REPLY to Response to Motion re 62 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/02/2018)

11/05/2018

136 ORDER granting 131 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/5/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 11/05/2018)

11/05/2018

137 ORDER granting 133 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/5/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 11/05/2018)

11/05/2018 138 Witness List Preliminary list for Prelim Inj hearing by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/05/2018)

11/07/2018

139 **DISREGARD FILED IN ERROR** RESPONSE in Opposition re 105 MOTION for Hearing re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Emailed Motion for Suspension of the Rules filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' 11/7/18 emailed request for suspension of the rules)(McMillan, Brandt) Modified on 11/9/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/07/2018)

11/07/2018

140 RESPONSE in Opposition re 105 MOTION for Hearing re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (CORRECTED) Plaintiffs' Emailed Motion for Suspension of the Rules filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' 11/7/18 emailed request for suspension of the rules)(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 11/07/2018)

11/08/2018 141 Plaintiff's RESPONSE in Opposition re 102 PSI DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SEVERANCE OR SEPARATE TRIALS filed by Karen McNeil. (Garrison, David) Modified Text on 11/9/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/08/2018)

11/08/2018

142 PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET A TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE AND RESPONSE TO PSI DEFENDANTS FILING AND REQUEST FOR TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE re 139 Response in Opposition to Motion, 140 Response in Opposition to Motion by Karen McNeil. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Pls. 11/6/18

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email to Defendants, # 2 Exhibit B − Pls. 11/1/18 email to Defense Counsel, # 3 Exhibit C − Pls. Witness List)(Garrison, David) Modified Text on 11/9/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/08/2018)

11/09/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 11/9/2018. Parties contacted the Court during the deposition of one of the plaintiffs; court resolved the issue. No order will enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (hv) (Entered: 11/09/2018)

11/13/2018

143 ORDER denying 142 Motion to Set a Telephonic Conference and Response to PSI Defendants Filing and Request for Telephonic Conference. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/13/18. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 11/13/2018)

11/14/2018

144 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 102 MOTION to Sever by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (O'Connor, Timothy) (Entered: 11/14/2018)

11/14/2018

145 TRIAL MANAGEMENT ORDER: Jury Trial set for 9/22/2020 at 9:00 AM in Columbia before District Judge William L. Campbell Jr. Pretrial Conference set for 9/3/2020 at 1:30 PM in Columbia before District Judge William L. Campbell Jr. Joint Proposed Pretrial Order due by 8/27/2020; Exhibit List due by 8/27/2020; and Witness List due by 8/27/2020. All lawyers who will participate in the trial must attend the pretrial conference. The cost of summoning the jury may be assessed against the parties if a settlement is reached after the Thursday immediately preceding trial. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/14/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) Modified text on 11/15/2018 (mg). (Entered: 11/15/2018)

11/15/2018

146 ORDER granting 144 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Replies due by 11/29/2018. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/15/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw) (Entered: 11/15/2018)

11/19/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 11/19/2018. Parties contacted the court during a deposition. No order to enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (hv) (Entered: 12/05/2018)

11/20/2018 147 First MOTION in Limine re Indya Hilfort prelim inj by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018

148 NOTICE of Filing by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 147 First MOTION in Limine re Indya Hilfort prelim inj Hilfort depo excerpt (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Hilfort depo excerpt)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 149 Witness List by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 150 Exhibit List by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair.. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 151 Second MOTION in Limine re Allison Horn by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 152 Second MOTION in Limine re Allison Horn CORRECTED by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018

153 Witness List & Exhibit List by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Judge Richardson Depo. Designations, # 2 Exhibit Judge Parkes Depo. Designations, # 3 Exhibit Summary of PSI Nonpayment Warrants, # 4 Attachment PSI Nonpayment Warrants 1, # 5 Attachment PSI Nonpayment Warrants 2, # 6 Attachment PSI Nonpayment Warrants 3, # 7 Attachment PSI Nonpayment Warrants 4, # 8 Attachment PSI Nonpayment Warrants 5, # 9 Attachment PSI Nonpayment Warrants 6, # 10 Attachment PSI

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Nonpayment Warrants 7)(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 154 Exhibit List for Hearing on Plaintiff Hilfort's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton.. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 155 Witness List for Hearing on Plaintiff Hilfort's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 156 First MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Outside the Statute of Limitations by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 157 MOTION in Limine ADOPTION OF MOTIONS FILED BY CPS DEFENDANTS by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 158 MOTION to Quash Subpoena for Live Testimony by J. Russell Parkes. (Ross, Heather) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 159 MEMORANDUM in Support of 158 MOTION to Quash Subpoena for Live Testimony filed by J. Russell Parkes . (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Affidavit of Cathy Hanes, # 2 Exhibit Email stream between counsel)(Ross, Heather) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 160 NOTICE of Filing by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton re 154 Exhibit List (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Deposition Designations)(Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 161 Second MOTION in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Morrison Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit Jones Report, # 3 Exhibit Morrison Transcript)(Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 162 Third MOTION in Limine joining in Giles County motions by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018

163 NOTICE of Filing by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 152 Second MOTION in Limine re Allison Horn CORRECTED excerpts of depo of Allison Horn (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Deposition of Allison Horn)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 164 NOTICE of Filing by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 150 Exhibit List depo of Judge Parkes (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 165 NOTICE of Filing by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 150 Exhibit List depo of Judge Parkes CORRECTED (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Judge Parkes depo)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 166 NOTICE of Filing by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 150 Exhibit List depo of Judge Richardson (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Judge Richardson depo)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 167 AFFIDAVIT re 149 Witness List James Mize by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 168 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony and Reports of Expert Witnesses Identified by CPS Defendants by Indya Hilfort. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 169 MOTION in Limine To Prohibit Examination of Probationers Beyond the Scope of Count 15 of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint by Indya Hilfort. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018

170 **DISREGARD ATTORNEY TO REFILE WITH DESCRIPTIONS**Exhibit List by Indya Hilfort. (DISREGARD EXHIBITS 10 & 11 − FILED IN ERROR) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − Declaration of Hilfort, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 5, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 6, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 7, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 8, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 9, # 10 Exhibit Ex. 10, # 11 Exhibit Ex. 11, # 12 Exhibit Ex. 12, # 13 Exhibit Ex.13, # 14 Exhibit Ex. 14, # 15 Exhibit Ex. 15, # 16 Exhibit Ex. 16, # 17 Exhibit Ex. 16A, # 18 Exhibit Ex. 17, # 19 Exhibit Ex. 18, # 20 Exhibit Ex. 19, # 21 Exhibit Ex. 20, # 22 Exhibit Ex. 21, # 23 Exhibit Ex. 22, # 24 Exhibit Ex. 23, # 25 Exhibit Ex. 24, # 26 Exhibit Ex. 25, # 27 Exhibit Ex. 26, # 28 Exhibit Ex. 27, # 29 Exhibit Ex. 28, # 30 Exhibit Ex. 29, # 31 Exhibit Ex. 30, # 32 Exhibit Ex. 31, # 33

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Exhibit Ex. 32, # 34 Exhibit Ex. 33, # 35 Exhibit Ex. 34, # 36 Exhibit Ex. 35, # 37 Exhibit Ex. 36, # 38 Exhibit Ex. 37, # 39 Exhibit Ex. 38, # 40 Exhibit Ex. 39, # 41 Exhibit Ex. 40, # 42 Exhibit Ex. 41, # 43 Exhibit Ex. 42, # 44 Exhibit Ex. 43, # 45 Exhibit Ex. 44, # 46 Exhibit Ex. 45, # 47 Exhibit Ex. 46, # 48 Exhibit Ex. 47, # 49 Exhibit Ex. 48, # 50 Exhibit Ex. 49, # 51 Exhibit Ex. 50, # 52 Exhibit Ex. 51, # 53 Exhibit Ex. 52, # 54 Exhibit Ex. 53, # 55 Exhibit Ex. 54, # 56 Exhibit Ex. 55, # 57 Exhibit Ex. 56 placeholder, # 58 Exhibit Ex. 57, # 59 Exhibit Ex. 58, # 60 Exhibit Ex. 59, # 61 Exhibit Ex. 60, # 62 Exhibit Ex. 61, # 63 Exhibit Ex. 62, # 64 Exhibit Ex. 63, # 65 Exhibit Ex. 64, # 66 Exhibit Ex. 65, # 67 Exhibit Ex. 66, # 68 Exhibit Ex. 67, # 69 Exhibit Ex. 68, # 70 Exhibit Ex. 69, # 71 Exhibit Ex 70, # 72 Exhibit Ex. 71, # 73 Exhibit Ex. 72, # 74 Exhibit Ex. 73)(Garrison, David) Modified on 11/21/2018 (jm). Modified on 11/26/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 171 Plaintiffs' Witness List for the November 27−28,2018 Preliminary Injunction Hearing by Indya Hilfort. (Garrison, David) Modified Text on 11/26/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/21/2018

172 NOTICE of Filing by Indya Hilfort re 170 Exhibit List, Notice of Filing Redacted Exhibits 10 and 11 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Redacted Exhibit 10, # 2 Exhibit − Redacted Exhibit 11)(Garrison, David) Modified Text on 11/26/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

Notice to Filer re DE 170 : Counsel failed to include the mandatory description of the attached exhibits. The exhibits shall be REFILED by filing a Notice of Filing and attaching the exhibits with the mandatory brief description. (EXAMPLE: Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Police Report dated 1/1/06, # 2 Exhibit 2 Unreported Case Smith v. Jones). (am) (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

173 NOTICE of Filing by Indya Hilfort re 170 Exhibit List, NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED EXHIBITS 10 AND 11 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Redacted Exhibit 10 − Indya Hilfort Household Electric Bills dated 7/9/18 to 11/7/18, # 2 Exhibit − Redacted Exhibit 11 − Indya Hilfort House Electric Bill Prepay Activity dated 10/20/18 to 11/19/18)(Garrison, David) Modified Text on 11/26/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

174 First Amended Exhibit List for Preliminary Injunction Evidentiary Hearing by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3 − PSI & Court File for Evan Morris, # 2 Exhibit 4 − PSI & Court File for Crystal Webb)(McMillan, Brandt) Modified Text on 11/26/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

175 NOTICE of Filing by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 174 Exhibit List, Redacted Exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3 − PSI & Court File for Evan Morris (REDACTED), # 2 Exhibit 4 − PSI & Court File for Crystal Webb (REDACTED))(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

176 Exhibit List by Indya Hilfort.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Indya Hilfort dated 7/13/18, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Indya Hilfort 7/10/18 Violation of Probation Arrest Warrant (General Sessions), # 3 Exhibit 3 − Indya Hilfort Order / Disposition dated 12/8/16 (General Sessions), # 4 Exhibit 4 − Indya Hilfort 11/14/17 Violation of Probation Arrest Warrant (General Sessions), # 5 Exhibit 5 − Indya Hilfort Order / Disposition dated 2/22/18 (General Sessions), # 6 Exhibit 6 − Order finding Ms. Hilfort indigent on 6/26/17 (Circuit Court), # 7 Exhibit 7 − Judgment dated 9/25/17 (Circuit Court), # 8 Exhibit 8 − Indya Hilfort Violation of Probation Arrest Warrant dated 11/8/17 (Circuit Court), # 9 Exhibit 9 − Indya Hilfort Revocation Order dated 3/27/18 (Circuit Court), # 10 Exhibit 10 − Indya Hilfort Household Electric Bills dated 7/9/18 to 11/7/18, # 11 Exhibit 11 − Indya Hilfort Household Electric Bill Prepay Activity dated 10/20/18 to 11/19/18, # 12 Exhibit 12 − Indya Hilfort Household Water Bill dated 11/15/18, # 13 Exhibit 13 − Indya Hilfort Title Loan Bill dated 8/17/18, # 14 Exhibit 14 − Indya Hilfort Manpower Deposited Net Pay dated 9/13/18, # 15 Exhibit 15 − Indya Hilfort Pilot Oil Payments dated 10/19/18−11/16/18, # 16 Exhibit 16 − Declaration of Crystal Webb dated 10/25/18, # 17 Exhibit 16A − Summary of information in Crystal Webbs case file, # 18 Exhibit 17 − Crystal Gale Webb 4/18/18 Violation of Probation Arrest Warrant, # 19 Exhibit 18 − Crystal Gale Webb Order /

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Disposition dated 5/3/18, # 20 Exhibit 19 − Crystal Gale Webb Jail Release Report, # 21 Exhibit 20 − Declaration of Elizabeth Bou dated 11/20/18, # 22 Exhibit 21 − Summary Spreadsheet of Sample Cases Involving People Subjected to Wealth−Based Detention Following an Arrest Pursuant to a Violation of Probation Arrest Warrant Issued in 2018, # 23 Exhibit 22 − Summary Spreadsheet Reflecting Information About Ms. Hilforts Violation of Probation Arrest Warrant and Active Violation of Probation Arrest Warrants, # 24 Exhibit 23 − Summary of information in Clinnon Wayne Alexander Sr.s case file, # 25 Exhibit 24 − Case File of Clinnon Wayne Alexander Sr. (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, Revocation Order, Circuit Court docket for 4/23/18, jail release report, arrest report), # 26 Exhibit 25 − Summary of information in James Matthew Allens case file, # 27 Exhibit 26 − Case File of James Matthew Allen (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, Revocation Order, Circuit Court docket for 5/29/18, arrest report, jail release report), # 28 Exhibit 27 − Summary of information in Stacey Jean Blades case file, # 29 Exhibit 28 − Case File of Stacey Jean Blade (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 30 Exhibit 29 − Summary of information in Benjamin Patrick Calverts case file, # 31 Exhibit 30 − Case File of Benjamin Patrick Calvert (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 32 Exhibit 31 − Summary of information in Jonathan Alvin Countss case file, # 33 Exhibit 32 − Case File of Jonathan Alvin Counts (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 34 Exhibit 33 − Summary of information in Malik Rashad Crosss case file, # 35 Exhibit 34 − Case File of Malik Rashad Cross (VOP affidavit (1 of 2), VOP arrest warrant (1 of 3), VOP arrest warrant (2 of 3), Sheriffs Department Release from Custody, jail admission report, VOP affidavit (2 of 2), VOP warrant (3 of 3), jail release report, General Sessions Court Order, Order/Disposition), # 36 Exhibit 35 − Summary of information in Ashlyn Danielle Halls case file, # 37 Exhibit 36 − Case File of Ashlyn Danielle Hall (VOP affidavit (1 of 2), VOP warrant (1 of 2), VOP affidavit (2 of 2), VOP warrant (2 of 2), jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 38 Exhibit 37 − Summary of information in John Lewis Johnsons case file, # 39 Exhibit 38 − Case File of John Lewis Johnson (VOP affidavit (1 of 2), VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition (1 of 2), Order/Disposition (2 of 2), VOP affidavit (2 of 2), # 40 Exhibit 39 − Summary of information in Shannon Lee Johnsons case file, # 41 Exhibit 40 − Case File of Shannon Lee Johnson (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 42 Exhibit 41 − Summary of information in Jonathan Bradley Joness case file, # 43 Exhibit 42 − Case File of Jonathan Bradley Jones (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 44 Exhibit 43 − Summary of information in Ronald LaFreniere case file, # 45 Exhibit 44 − Case File of Ronald LaFreniere (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, Circuit Court docket for 2/26/18, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 46 Exhibit 45 − Summary of information in Sheila Marler case file, # 47 Exhibit 46 − Case File of Sheila Marler (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, appearance bond, jail release report), # 48 Exhibit 47 − Summary of information in Shawn Lamar Mitchell case file, # 49 Exhibit 48 − Case File of Shawn Lamar Mitchell (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 50 Exhibit 49 − Summary of information in Waylon James Parsonss case file, # 51 Exhibit 50 − Case File of Waylon James Parsons (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 52 Exhibit 51 − Summary of information in Wesley Keith Poarchs case file, # 53 Exhibit 52 − Case File of Wesley Keith Poarch (VOP affidavit (1 of 2), VOP arrest warrant (1 of 2), jail admission report, Order/Disposition (1 of 2), Order/Disposition (2 of 2), VOP affidavit (2 of 2), VOP arrest warrant (2 of 2)), # 54 Exhibit 53 − Summary of information in Kimberly Ann Vargass case file, # 55 Exhibit 54 − Case File of Kimberly Ann Vargas (VOP affidavit, VOP arrest warrant, court order, appearance bond, jail release report, Order/Disposition), # 56 Exhibit 55 − Active misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/29/18 and 7/11/18 and requiring secured money bail as a condition of release, # 57 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18 (including all VOP warrants issued between 1/1/2018 and 8/28/18 and produced in discovery, but excluding the active warrants requiring money bail, see Ex. 55) (Document to be Filed in Its Entirety Separately), # 58 Exhibit 57 − Summary of Information in docket sheets (Exs. 58, 59), # 59 Exhibit 58 − Excerpts of Circuit Court docket sheets, # 60 Exhibit 59 − Excerpts of General Sessions docket sheets, # 61 Exhibit 60 − Expert Report of Dr. Michael R. Jones, Ph.D., # 62 Exhibit 61 − Exhibit A to Jones Expert Report (References), # 63 Exhibit 62 − Exhibit B to Jones Expert Report (Curriculum Vitae), # 64 Exhibit 63 − Expert Report of Judge Truman
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Morrison, # 65 Exhibit 64 − Exhibit A to Morrison Expert Report (Biography of Judge Morrison), # 66 Exhibit 65 − Deposition Designations from the Transcript of the Deposition of Defendant Sheriff Kyle Heltonv, # 67 Exhibit 66 − Deposition Designations from the Transcript of the Deposition of Jail Administrator Teresa Mattox (Rule 30(b)(6) representative of Giles County and the Sheriffs Department)vi, # 68 Exhibit 67 − Deposition Designations from the Transcript of Captain Joseph Purvis (Rule 30(b)(6) representative of Giles County and the Sheriffs Department)vii, # 69 Exhibit 68 − Deposition Designations from the Transcript of the Deposition of Judge Robert Richardson, # 70 Exhibit 69 − Deposition Designations from the Transcript of the Deposition of Judge J. Russell Parkes, # 71 Exhibit 70 − Contract between CPS and Giles County dated 3/26/16, # 72 Exhibit 71 − Contract between PSI and Giles County dated 12/14/11, # 73 Exhibit 72 − Letter from Elizabeth Rossi to Janet Vanzant dated 7/5/16, # 74 Exhibit 73 − Settlement agreement in Rodriguez, et al. v. Providence Cmty. Corrs., Inc., Case No. 3:15−cv−1048, ECF 192−5 (Permanent Injunction Agreement))(Garrison, David) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
11/21/2018 177 NOTICE of Filing by Indya Hilfort re 176 Exhibit List,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, NOTICE OF FILING PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 56 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 3, # 4 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 4, # 5 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 5, # 6 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 6, # 7 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 7, # 8 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 8, # 9 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 9, # 10 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 10, # 11 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 11, # 12 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 12, # 13 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 13, # 14 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 14, # 15 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 15, # 16 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 16, # 17 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 17, # 18 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 18, # 19 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 19, # 20 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 20, # 21 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 21, # 22 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 22, # 23 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 23, # 24 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 24, # 25 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 25, # 26 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 26, # 27 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 27, # 28 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 28, # 29 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 29, # 30 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 30, # 31 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 31, # 32 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between
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11/21/2018
11/26/2018 11/26/2018 11/26/2018
11/28/2018 11/28/2018 11/28/2018 11/29/2018

1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 32, # 33 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 33, # 34 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 34, # 35 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 35, # 36 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 36, # 37 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 37, # 38 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 38, # 39 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 39, # 40 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 40, # 41 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 41, # 42 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 42, # 43 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 43, # 44 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 44, # 45 Exhibit 56 − Additional misdemeanor violation−of−probation warrants issued between 1/4/16 and 9/19/18, Part 45)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
178 ORDER: The hearing to consider Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 51) is scheduled to begin on November 27, 2018. On November 20, 2018, the parties filed numerous motions and other documents regarding the hearing. Because the issues raised by the motions cannot meaningfully be resolved prior to the date set for the hearing, the hearing is CANCELLED. The Court will hold a telephonic conference call on November 28, 2018, at 11:00 a.m. to reschedule the hearing. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/21/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
179 Brief on Standing to Move to Quash Subpoena by J. Russell Parkes re 178 Order (Ross, Heather) Modified Text on 11/26/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/26/2018)
180 BRIEF to Oppose Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 178 Order. (Rader, Daniel) Modified Text on 11/27/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/26/2018)
181 BRIEF on the Issue of Standing to Participate in the Preliminary Injunction Hearing filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 178 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Email from Plaintiffs' Counsel Regarding Scope of Probationers' Testimony)(McMillan, Brandt) Modified Text on 11/27/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/26/2018)
182 BRIEF filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 181 Brief (non−appeal), 180 Brief (non−appeal), 178 Order. (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified Text on 11/29/2018 (am). (Entered: 11/28/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr: Telephone Conference held on 11/28/2018. Preliminary Injunction hearing set for January 31, 2019, order to enter. (Court Reporter Patty Jennings.) (ab) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
183 ORDER: Motion Hearing set for 1/31/2019 10:00 AM in Courtroom A826 before District Judge William L. Campbell Jr. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/28/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
184 REPLY filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 102 Motion to Sever, filed by PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Markeyta Bledsoe, Harriet Thompson, Timothy Cook, Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, PSI−Probation II, LLC, Progressive Sentencing, Inc.. (O'Connor, Timothy) (Entered: 11/29/2018)

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12/10/2018 12/11/2018 12/12/2018 12/12/2018 12/12/2018 12/12/2018 12/18/2018 12/18/2018
12/18/2018
12/18/2018 12/18/2018 12/18/2018

185 NOTICE by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 134 Reply to Response to Motion CORRECTED Reply Brief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Corrected Reply Brief, # 2 Exhibit B − REDLINED Corrected Reply Brief)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 12/10/2018)
186 MOTION to Quash by Robert Richardson. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Memo of Law, # 2 Exhibit Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit Case law)(Saulters, Donald) (Entered: 12/11/2018)
Notice to Filer re DE 186 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, all filings shall include a Certificate of Service and it shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Counsel SHALL FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document using the Certificate event located under Other Documents. (am) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
Notice to Filer re DE 186 : The document is scanned and not text searchable. Scanning should only be used for documents not created on your computer. This document does not need to be re−filed unless otherwise directed by the Court. (am) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
187 Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief Regarding Private Defendants' Standing to Participate in Preliminary Injunction Proceedings filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 183 Order, 182 Brief (non−appeal). (Tift, Scott) Modified Text on 12/13/2018 (am). (Entered: 12/12/2018)
188 PSI Defendants' Supplemental Brief on the Issue of Standing to Participate in the Preliminary Injunction Hearing filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 182 Brief (non−appeal). (McMillan, Brandt) Modified Text on 12/13/2018 (am). (Entered: 12/12/2018)
189 RESPONSE in Opposition re 186 MOTION to Quash filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Email Exchange with Judge Richardson's Attorney, # 2 Exhibit B − Email Exchange with Judge Richardson's Attorney)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
190 RESPONSE in Opposition re 158 MOTION to Quash Subpoena for Live Testimony filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Subpoena to Judge Parkes, # 2 Exhibit B − Email Exchange with Judge Parkes's Attorney, # 3 Exhibit C − Email Exchange with Judge Parkes's Attorney, # 4 Exhibit D − Email Exchange with Judge Parkes's Attorney, # 5 Exhibit E − Excerpt of Judge Parkes's Deposition Transcript)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
191 RESPONSE in Opposition re 147 First MOTION in Limine re Indya Hilfort prelim inj, 162 Third MOTION in Limine joining in Giles County motions, 152 Second MOTION in Limine re Allison Horn CORRECTED, 157 MOTION in Limine ADOPTION OF MOTIONS FILED BY CPS DEFENDANTS, 161 Second MOTION in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony, 156 First MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Outside the Statute of Limitations filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
192 RESPONSE in Opposition re 169 MOTION in Limine To Prohibit Examination of Probationers Beyond the Scope of Count 15 of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
193 RESPONSE in Opposition re 168 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony and Reports of Expert Witnesses Identified by CPS Defendants filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
194 RESPONSE in Opposition re 169 MOTION in Limine To Prohibit Examination of Probationers Beyond the Scope of Count 15 of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 12/18/2018)

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12/18/2018 12/19/2018 01/03/2019
01/07/2019
01/07/2019 01/09/2019 01/10/2019
01/10/2019 01/10/2019 01/10/2019 01/24/2019 01/24/2019 01/25/2019

195 RESPONSE in Opposition re 169 MOTION in Limine To Prohibit Examination of Probationers Beyond the Scope of Count 15 of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
196 REPLY to Response to Motion re 158 MOTION to Quash Subpoena for Live Testimony filed by J. Russell Parkes. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Affidavit of Cathy Hanes)(Ross, Heather) (Entered: 12/19/2018)
197 ORDER: Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 51). The Court has set the Motion for hearing on January 31, 2019, and if necessary, to continue on February 1, 2019. (Doc. No. 183). Through the Motion, Plaintiffs seek preliminary injunctive relief on Count 15 of their Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 41). In that Count, Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleges Defendants Giles County and Sheriff Kyle Helton violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 1/3/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/03/2019)
198 ORDER denying 147 Motion in Limine; denying 151 Motion in Limine; granting 152 Motion in Limine; denying 156 Motion in Limine; granting 157 Motion in Limine; denying 161 Motion in Limine; denying 162 Motion in Limine. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 1/7/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
199 ORDER denying 158 Motion to Quash; denying 186 Motion to Quash. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 1/7/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
200 NOTICE by Robert Richardson (Saulters, Donald) (Entered: 01/09/2019)
Notice to Filer re DE 200 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, all filings shall include a Certificate of Service and it shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Counsel SHALL FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document using the Certificate event located under Other Documents. (am) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
Notice to Filer re DE 200 : The document is scanned and not text searchable. Scanning should only be used for documents not created on your computer. This document does not need to be re−filed unless otherwise directed by the Court. (am) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
201 CERTIFICATE of service filed by Robert Richardson re 200 Notice (Other) filed by Robert Richardson. (Saulters, Donald) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
202 NOTICE by J. Russell Parkes Request Timing of Testimony Jan. 31 2019 at 1 p.m. (Ross, Heather) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
203 First Amended Exhibit List by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified Text on 1/25/2019 (am). (Entered: 01/24/2019)
204 Proposed Findings of Fact by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
205 NOTICE of Filing by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 203 Exhibit List (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 76 − Lesley Johnson CPS Probation Rules, # 2 Exhibit 77 − Indya Hilfort Probation Order, # 3 Exhibit 78 − James McElrath PSI Probation Rules, # 4 Exhibit 79 − Eliza Leigh Bass VOP Warrant and Revocation Order, # 5 Exhibit 80 − Timothy Wade Beegle VOP Warrant and Revocation Order, # 6 Exhibit 81 − Tammy Michelle Hampton VOP Warrants and Revocation Order, # 7 Exhibit 82 − Lesley Johnson Probation Order, # 8 Exhibit 83 − Wesley Poarch Order, # 9 Exhibit 84 − Tanya Mitchell 9−19−18 VOP ROR Arrest Warrant)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 01/25/2019)

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01/25/2019

206 NOTICE of Filing by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell Refiling Exhbits 65, 66, and 67 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 65 − Sheriff Kyle Helton Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 66 − Teresa Mattow Transcript, # 3 Exhibit 67 − Joseph Purvis Transcript)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 01/25/2019)

01/25/2019 207 Proposed Findings of Fact Corrected by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/25/2019)

01/25/2019 208 MOTION Transfer Location of Hearing to Columbia, TN; Alternatively, begin Hearing at 9 a.m. by J. Russell Parkes. (Ross, Heather) (Entered: 01/25/2019)

01/28/2019

209 ORDER granting 208 Motion Transfer Location of Hearing to Columbia, TN; Alternatively, begin Hearing at 9 a.m. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 1/28/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/28/2019

Set/Reset Hearings: Motion Hearing reset for 1/31/2019 09:00 AM in Courtroom A826 before District Judge William L. Campbell Jr. (am) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/30/2019 210 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel H. Rader, IV on behalf of Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019 211 NOTICE by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell Joint Notice of Authenticity and Admissibility Agreements and Disputes (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019

212 Plaintiffs' and County Defendants' Joint Stipulated Facts re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified Text on 1/31/2019 (am). (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019

213 Joint Notice of Agreed Factual Stipulations Concerning Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified Text on 1/31/2019 (am). (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/31/2019

214 OBJECTIONS to Purported Stipulations and Findings of Fact filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 212 Stipulation, 197 Order, 211 Notice (Other), 213 Notice (Other). (Rader, Daniel) Modified Text on 2/4/2019 (am). (Entered: 01/31/2019)

01/31/2019

TN State Bar status verified as active for Andre S. Greppin. (am) (Entered: 01/31/2019)

01/31/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr: Motion Hearing held on 1/31/2019 re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell, Lesley Johnson, Indya Hilfort, Sonya Beard. Order to enter. (Court Reporter Patty Jennings.) (ab) (Entered: 01/31/2019)

01/31/2019 215 WITNESS/EXHIBIT LIST prepared by Angie Brewer Deputy Clerk. re: Motion Hearing held on 1/31/2019 before District Judge William L. Campbell.(am) (Entered: 01/31/2019)

01/31/2019

216 OBJECTIONS to Unilaterial Fact Stipulations filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 212 Stipulation, 213 Notice (Other). (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 01/31/2019)

02/01/2019

217 ORDER: The pending objections 214 , filed in contravention of the Court's prior ruling, are similarly unhelpful, and are OVERRULED. Counsel for Defendants Giles County and Sheriff Kyle Helton is fully capable of representing her clients without the assistance of counsel for the private defendants. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 2/1/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

02/04/2019 218 Transcript filed for date of January 31, 2019, before Judge William L. Campbell Jr. Court Reporter: Patty Jennings, 615−939−5450, patty_jennings@tnmd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court
Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 32 of 49

Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNSEL TO REVIEW THE TRANSCRIPT AND REQUEST REDACTION OF CONTENT CLASSIFIED AS PRIVATE UNDER THE NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF THE BAR, ELECTRONIC AVAILABILITY OF TRANSCRIPTS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, EFFECTIVE MAY 5, 2008, AVAILABLE ON THE COURT'S WEBSITE UNDER THE CM−ECF CASE INFO LINK, GENERAL INFORMATION, ELECTRONIC TRANSCRIPTS NOTICE. Intent to Request Transcript Redaction due 2/11/2019. Redaction Request due 2/25/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/7/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/6/2019. (Jennings, Patty) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/05/2019 219 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Agreed Protective Order)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 02/05/2019)

02/06/2019 220 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 2/6/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 02/06/2019)

02/06/2019 221 PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re Motion Hearing,. (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified Text on 2/7/2019 (am). (Entered: 02/06/2019)

02/06/2019

222 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OPPOSING PLAINTIFF HILFORT'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION re 51 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction SUPPLEMENTAL filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) Modified Text on 2/7/2019 (am). (Entered: 02/06/2019)

02/08/2019

223 NOTICE of Filing by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell Notice of Filing of Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact, # 2 Exhibit B − Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/08/2019)

02/14/2019 224 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 2/14/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 02/14/2019)

02/14/2019

225 ORDER granting 51 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 2/14/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 02/14/2019)

02/15/2019

226 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 2/21/2019 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 2/15/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 02/15/2019)

02/20/2019 227 NOTICE by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 226 Order,, Set Hearings, Notice of Issues to be Addressed at Scheduling Conference (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 02/20/2019)

02/20/2019

228 NOTICE by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson Issues to Discuss at Scheduling Conference (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 02/20/2019)

02/21/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 2/21/2019. Order to enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (hv) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/21/2019 229 ORDER: Motions to Amend due by 5/30/2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 2/21/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/22/2019 230 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 36 Amended MOTION to Certify Class by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya

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03/01/2019 03/01/2019 03/05/2019 03/05/2019
03/11/2019
03/11/2019 03/12/2019 03/13/2019 03/18/2019 03/20/2019 03/25/2019 03/25/2019

Mitchell. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 02/22/2019)
231 RESPONSE in Opposition re 5 MOTION to Certify Class , 36 Amended MOTION to Certify Class filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
232 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 36 Amended MOTION to Certify Class by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
233 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 3/25/2019 01:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 3/5/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
234 ORDER denying 28 Motion to Hold the Class Certification Motion in Abeyance until the Initial Case Management Conference; denying 31 Motion to Hold the Class Certification Motion in Abeyance until the Initial Case Management Conference; denying 36 Motion to Certify Class; denying 169 Motion in Limine; denying 230 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply; denying 232 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 3/5/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
235 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Pending before the Court are PSI Defendants' Motion for Severance or Separate Trials (Doc. No. 102), and the Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition (Doc. No. 141). Through the Motion, the PSI Defendants seek to sever all claims against them from all claims against the other defendants. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is DENIED. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 3/11/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/11/2019)
236 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 3/11/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/11/2019)
237 ORDER: Settlement Conference set for 3/18/2019 09:30 AM in Courtroom 783 before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 3/12/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
238 CORRECTED ORDER: Settlement Conference set for 4/18/2019 09:30 AM in Courtroom 783 before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 3/13/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
239 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 225 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 224 Memorandum Opinion of the Court by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0650−2874812. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 03/18/2019)
USCA Case Number 19−5262 for 239 Notice of Appeal filed by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. Case Manager Patricia J. Elder. (am) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 3/25/2019. Order to enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (hv) (Entered: 03/25/2019)
240 AGREED ORDER: Based on the agreement of the Plaintiffs and the County Defendants, as well as the discussion presented to the Court during the March 25, 2019 telephonic discovery conference, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the County Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs' Third and Fourth Requests for Production of Documents on or before April 8, 2019, with rolling productions beginning earlier to the extent feasible. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 3/25/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/25/2019)

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04/01/2019 241 MOTION to Substitute Party , MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 04/01/2019)

04/01/2019

242 MEMORANDUM in Support of 241 MOTION to Substitute Party MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Sonya Beard, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Redline of Second Amended Complaint)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 04/01/2019)

04/04/2019

243 ORDER a settlement conference is set for April 18, 2019 in this case. Lead attorneys for all defendants and principals with settlement authority are required to attend. (DE 238) In order to have a better understanding of this case a telephone conference with the attorneys is set for April 15, 2019 at 4:00 PM. Parties should, if possible, submit a short version of their position papers by noon that day. This case is already over 240 docket entries with a lot of territory yet to cover. It will never be easier or cheaper to resolve that at the settlement conference. Call in number is 877−873−8017 code 1958322# (JBB) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

04/05/2019

Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 4/15/2019 04:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. (am) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

04/15/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Telephone Conference held on 4/15/2019. (Time in Court: 30 minutes) (rd) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

04/18/2019 244 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019

246 NOTICE of Filing by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment Depo of Judge Parkes (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Judge Parkes depo)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019

247 NOTICE of Filing by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment Judge Richardson depo (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Judge Richardson depo)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019 248 DECLARATION of Joel Colton filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re: 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019

249 DECLARATION of Patricia McNair filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re: 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019

250 STATEMENT of facts to which there is no dispute filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair in support of 245 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019 251 MEMORANDUM in Support of 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair . (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Settlement Conference held on 4/18/2019. Order to enter. (rd) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

04/19/2019 252 ORDER: The undersigned Magistrate Judge conducted a settlement conference in this case on April 18, 2019. Although the parties negotiated in good faith, they did not agree upon a settlement satisfactory to all parties. There is nothing further to be done by the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this case. Therefore, the Clerk is directed to return the file to Magistrate Judge Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 4/19/2019. (am) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
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04/19/2019

253 ORDER granting 241 Motion to Substitute Party and Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 4/19/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

04/19/2019

254 ORDER: According to the Case Management Order filed on October 30, 2018, the Response is due within 35 days of the filing of the Motion, and any Reply shall be filed within 14 days of the filing of the Response. Docket No. 130. Any filings made related the Motion for Summary Judgment (for extensions of time, exceed the page limits, seal documents, or make manual filings) shall be considered by the Honorable William L. Campbell, Jr., District Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 4/19/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

04/22/2019

255 ORDER granting 244 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 4/22/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 04/23/2019)

04/23/2019

256 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI−Probation II, LLC; PSI−Probation II, L.L.C. Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC; Timothy Cook, Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton, Patricia McNair, Markeyta Bledsoe, Harriet Thompson, filed by Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, Tanya Mitchell, Indya Hilfort, and Lucinda Brandon.(am) (Entered: 04/23/2019)

05/13/2019 257 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Adjust Other Case Management Deadlines Accordingly by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Tift, Scott) (Entered: 05/13/2019)

05/22/2019

258 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Response to CPS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Schwartz, Kate) Modified Text on 5/28/2019 (am). (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/23/2019 259 ORDER: 258 MOTION GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs may file up to 15 additional pages, for a total of no more than 40 pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 5/23/2019. (mg) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/23/2019

260 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, CPS Defendants Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/23/2019

261 AFFIDAVIT re 260 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, CPS Defendants Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Garrison, David) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/23/2019 262 RESPONSE in Opposition re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Garrison, David) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/23/2019 263 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 262 Response in Opposition to Motion NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBITS (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit Contract between Giles County and CPS, # 3 Exhibit Contract between Giles County and PSI, # 4 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for April Ross, # 5 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Karen McNeil, # 6 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Lorenzo Perez, # 7 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Dillon Stinnet, # 8 Exhibit Excerpts from the Oct. 2, 2018, deposition of Giles County General Sessions Judge Robert C. Richardson, # 9 Exhibit Receipt provided by CPS to named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, dated April 5, 2016, # 10 Exhibit Receipt provided by CPS to named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, dated May 2, 2017, # 11 Exhibit Probation Order, listing CPSs Rules of Probation; signed by named Plaintiff Lesley Johnson and a CPS−employed probation officer, # 12 Exhibit
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05/23/2019 05/23/2019

Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Kiona Fitzpatrick, # 13 Exhibit Violation−of−probation warrants issued on the basis of CPS Defendants allegations against named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil and Indya Hilfort, # 14 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Eddy Parrish, # 15 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Arnell Smith, # 16 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Anthony Ward, # 17 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Raymond Watson, # 18 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Lesley Johnson, # 19 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Robert Prier, # 20 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Brandy Sallisky, # 21 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Ashley Prosser, # 22 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Tara Westbrook, # 23 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Justin Barnhill, # 24 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Teresa Parsons, # 25 Exhibit Excerpts from the Oct. 2, 2018, deposition of Giles County Circuit Court Judge J. Russell Parkes, # 26 Exhibit Affidavit of named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, dated May 17, 2019, # 27 Exhibit Affidavit of named Plaintiff Karen McNeil, dated May 17, 2019, # 28 Exhibit Affidavit of named Plaintiff Lesley Johnson, dated May 14, 2019, # 29 Exhibit Sample court order, # 30 Exhibit Sample court orders sentencing people convicted of misdemeanor offenses to six months, # 31 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Joseph Vannatter, # 32 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Normonta Smith, # 33 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Dennis Payne, # 34 Exhibit Sample violation−of−probation arrest warrants issued solely on the basis of CPSs allegations of nonpayment, # 35 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Tammy Hampton; cost bill for Tammy Hampton, # 36 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Steven Head; cost bill for Steven Head, # 37 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for David Chatman; sentencing order for David Chatman, # 38 Exhibit CPS Supervision Report forms completed by named Plaintiffs Lesley Johnson, Indya Hilfort, and Karen McNeil when they reported for probation meetings, # 39 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Sanya Green, # 40 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for James Davis, # 41 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Robert White, # 42 Exhibit Records reflecting electricity bills for named Plaintiff Indya Hilforts household and that Ms. Hilforts electricity was cut off several times in October and November 2018, # 43 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Tim Millican, # 44 Exhibit Excerpts from the Nov. 13, 2018, deposition of Giles County Jail Administrator Teresa, # 45 Exhibit Excerpts from the Nov. 13, 2018, deposition of Giles County Sheriff Kyle Helton, # 46 Exhibit Affidavit of Crystal Webb, dated Oct. 25, 2018, # 47 Exhibit Probation notes from the CPS probation file for Valerie Tollison, # 48 Exhibit Unsupervised Probation Agreement, # 49 Exhibit Receipt List Summary by Office showing revenue received by the Giles County CPS probation office in 2018, # 50 Exhibit Order / Disposition extending named Plaintiff Karen McNeils supervised probation until costs / fees paid in full, # 51 Exhibit Order / Disposition extending named Plaintiff Indya Hilforts supervised probation until all fines, costs and fees are paid in full., # 52 Exhibit CPS Liability Insurance Policy, # 53 Exhibit Order / Disposition for named Plaintiff Karen McNeil, dated April 28, 2016, # 54 Exhibit Fees Summary for named Plaintiff Karen McNeil, dated Dec. 22, 2016, # 55 Exhibit Fees Summary for named Plaintiff Lesley Johnson, dated Feb. 9, 2017, # 56 Exhibit Grand Jury indictments from Lawrence County, Tenn., issued for named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on June 28, 2018, # 57 Exhibit Sentencing Order from Lawrence County for named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, issued on January 7, 2019, showing that she received no jail time to the offenses for which she was indicted on June 28, 2018, # 58 Exhibit CPS Supervision Fee Exemption Form)(Garrison, David) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
264 STATEMENT of facts Plaintiffs Counter−Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell in support of 250 Statement of facts. (Garrison, David) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
265 Plaintiffs' Response to CPS Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts filed by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell in support of 250 Statement of facts. (Garrison, David) Modified Text on 5/28/2019 (am). (Entered: 05/23/2019)

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05/24/2019 05/28/2019
05/29/2019 05/29/2019 05/29/2019 05/30/2019 05/31/2019 06/04/2019 06/04/2019 06/06/2019 06/06/2019
06/06/2019 06/06/2019
06/13/2019 06/13/2019

266 RESPONSE in Opposition re 257 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Adjust Other Case Management Deadlines Accordingly filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Greppin, Andre) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
267 RESPONSE in Opposition re 257 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Adjust Other Case Management Deadlines Accordingly filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
268 ANSWER to 256 Second Amended Complaint, by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson.(McMillan, Brandt) Modified Text on 5/31/2019 (am). (Entered: 05/29/2019)
269 ANSWER to 256 Second Amended Complaint, by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair.(Rader, Daniel) Modified Text on 5/31/2019 (am). (Entered: 05/29/2019)
270 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 256 Amended Complaint, by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton. (Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 05/29/2019)
271 ORDER granting 270 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer the 256 Amended Complaint. Responsive Pleading is due on or before June 5, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 5/30/19. (dt) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
272 REPLY to Response to Motion re 257 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Adjust Other Case Management Deadlines Accordingly filed by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Schwartz, Kate) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
273 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Lucinda Brandon by Progressive Sentencing, Inc..(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
274 NOTICE of Filing by Progressive Sentencing, Inc. Proof of Service of Subpoena on Tenn. Dept. Probation & Parole (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
275 REPLY to Response to Motion re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Greppin, Andre) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
276 Response to Plaintiffs' Counter−Statement of Undisputed Facts filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair in support of 264 Statement of facts, 245 Motion for Summary Judgment, 265 Statement of facts,. (Greppin, Andre) Modified Text on 6/7/2019 (am). (Entered: 06/06/2019)
277 ORDER denying as moot 62 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 6/6/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
278 RESPONSE in Opposition re 260 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, CPS Defendants Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs' Improperly−Named Rule 56(d) Motion) filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Greppin, Andre) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
279 ORDER granting 257 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 6/13/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 06/13/2019)
280 ORDER: Discovery due by 11/4/2019. Dispositive Motions due by 4/6/2020. Case Management Conference by Telephone set for 11/20/2019 at 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 6/13/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 38 of 49

06/13/2019 06/13/2019
06/14/2019
06/17/2019 06/18/2019 06/19/2019 06/20/2019 06/24/2019 06/28/2019 06/28/2019 06/28/2019 06/28/2019

281 PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' re 260 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, CPS Defendants Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Karen McNeil. (Garrison, David) Modified Text on 6/17/2019 (am). (Entered: 06/13/2019)
282 MOTION for Leave to FILE SURREPLY IN OPPOSITION TO CPS DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 245 MOTION for Summary Judgment PLAINTIFFS' by Karen McNeil. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment − [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY IN OPPOSITION TO CPS DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, # 2 Attachment − PLAINTIFFS' [PROPOSED] SURREPLY IN OPPOSITION TO CPS DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)(Garrison, David) Modified Text on 6/17/2019 (am). (Entered: 06/13/2019)
283 ORDER: In the interests of judicial efficiency, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' Motion (Doc. No. 260 ) should be GRANTED. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 245 ) is DENIED, without prejudice to refiling at the close of relevant discovery. For these same reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Opposition to CPS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 282 ) is DENIED, without prejudice to refiling at an appropriate time. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 6/14/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 06/14/2019)
284 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Wang, Jonas) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
285 ORDER granting 284 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jonas Wang terminated. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 6/18/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 06/18/2019)
286 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 283 Order on Motion for Leave,,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,, by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0650−2937057. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/19/2019)
287 USCA Case Number 19−5660 for 286 Notice of Appeal, filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair, Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C. (am) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
288 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 6/28/2019 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 6/24/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 06/24/2019)
289 MOTION to Stay re 286 Notice of Appeal, by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Greppin, Andre) (Entered: 06/28/2019)
290 MEMORANDUM in Support of 289 MOTION to Stay re 286 Notice of Appeal, filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair . (Greppin, Andre) (Entered: 06/28/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 6/28/2019. Order to enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (Hearing lasted :45)(hv) (Entered: 06/28/2019)
291 ORDER: The Court held a status conference with the Parties on June 28, 2019, to discuss matters related to the production of certain Electronically Stored Information (ESI) produced by the Defendant, Community Probation Services (CPS) at the request of Plaintiffs in this matter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 6/28/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 07/01/2019)

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07/12/2019

292 RESPONSE in Opposition re 289 MOTION to Stay re 286 Notice of Appeal, AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CERTIFY CPS'S APPEAL AS FRIVOLOUS filed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Email dated 7.10.19)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 07/12/2019)

07/19/2019

293 MOTION for attorney Laura Gaztambide Arandes to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $100 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2955299) by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Arandes Certificate of Good Standing)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/19/2019)

07/19/2019

294 REPLY to Response to Motion re 289 MOTION to Stay re 286 Notice of Appeal, filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Email from Plaintiff's counsel)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 07/19/2019)

07/22/2019

DC State Bar status verified as active for Laura Gaztambide Arandes. (am) (Entered: 07/22/2019)

07/23/2019

295 ORDER granting 293 Motion for Laura Gaztambide Arandes to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Kirk L. Davies on 7/23/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(Davies, Kirk) (Entered: 07/23/2019)

07/29/2019

296 ORDER: Pending before the Court are the CPS Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of CPS Defendants' Qualified Immunity Appeal (Doc. No. 289), Plaintiffs' Response and Motion to Certify CPS's Appeal as Frivolous (Doc. No. 292), and the CPS Defendants' Reply (Doc. No. 294). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Stay (Doc. No. 289) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify CPS's Appeal as Frivolous Doc. No. 292) is DENIED. Accordingly, discovery is stayed as to the CPS Defendants. The Magistrate Judge is directed to determine whether discovery involving the other parties can proceed in the absence of participation by the CPS Defendants. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 7/29/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 07/29/2019)

08/02/2019

297 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 8/16/2019 01:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 8/2/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 08/02/2019)

08/13/2019

298 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Third Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Third Amended Complaint redlined)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/13/2019)

08/14/2019

299 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Summary Judgment by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/14/2019)

08/14/2019

300 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/14/2019)

08/14/2019 301 MEMORANDUM in Support of 300 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Lucinda Brandon, # 2 Exhibit 12/03/2012 Tennessee Conviction Record, # 3 Exhibit Lucinda Brandon Waiver of Trial by Jury, # 4 Exhibit 9/24/2015 Probation Order (Lucinda Brandon), # 5 Exhibit 9/16/2016 Probation Violation Warrant (Lucinda Brandon), # 6 Exhibit 11/10/2016 Probation Violation Order (Lucinda Brandon), # 7 Exhibit PSI Probation Notes for Lucinda Brandon, # 8 Exhibit Redwood Toxicology Report (Lucinda Brandon), # 9 Exhibit 1/26/2017 drug screening record (Lucinda Brandon), # 10 Exhibit 9/7/2016 Certificate of Completion, # 11 Exhibit 2/13/2017 Probation Violation Warrant (Lucinda Brandon), # 12 Exhibit 3/30/2017 Case Status Order, # 13 Exhibit Harrit Thompson's Resignation Letter, # 14 Exhibit Markeyta Bledsoe New Employee
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Documents, # 15 Exhibit 5/18/2017 Order of Dismissal (Lucinda Brandon), # 16 Exhibit 6/12/2017 Tennessee Probation Violation, # 17 Exhibit 11/30/2017 Conviction Record for Meth Sale (Lucinda Brandon), # 18 Exhibit Deposition of Tanya Mitchell, # 19 Exhibit Order of Probation (Tanya Mitchell), # 20 Exhibit 4/14/2010 Probation Violation Lawrence County (Lucinda Brandon), # 21 Exhibit 4/15/2016 TDOC Drug Test Report, # 22 Exhibit Probation Violation Warrant (Tanya Mitchell), # 23 Exhibit Order of Dismissal (Tanya Mitchell), # 24 Exhibit PSI Probation Notes for Tanya Mitchell, # 25 Attachment Table of Contents, # 26 Attachment Table of Claims)(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/14/2019)

08/14/2019

302 STATEMENT of facts for Summary Judgment filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson in support of 300 Motion for Summary Judgment. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/14/2019)

08/16/2019

303 NOTICE of Filing by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson re 297 Order,, Set Hearings, Excerpts of Plaintiffs' Depositions and Tenn. Code Ann. 40−35−303(i)(3) (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/16/2019)

08/16/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 8/16/2019. Order to enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (Hearing lasted :45)(hv) (Entered: 08/20/2019)

08/20/2019

304 ORDER: The Court held a telephone status conference with the Parties on August 16, 2019 to discuss the status of discovery in light of Judge Campbell's Order staying discovery as to the CPS Defendants. Judge Campbell's Order directed the undersigned to determine whether any discovery involving the other parties can proceed in the absence of the participation of the CPS Defendants. Docket No. 296. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 8/20/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 08/20/2019)

08/27/2019

305 RESPONSE in Opposition re 298 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpt−Statement of Issues at 6th Circuit)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 08/27/2019)

08/28/2019

306 RESPONSE in Opposition re 298 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 08/28/2019)

08/28/2019

307 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 300 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/28/2019)

08/28/2019

308 MEMORANDUM in Support of 307 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 300 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Attorney Kate Schwartz, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Matthew Kimbrough probation file, # 3 Exhibit 2 − November 2015 emails, # 4 Exhibit 3 − October 2017 emails, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Excerpts from deposition of Lucinda Brandon, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Lucinda Brandon electronic probation file, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Excerpts from Lucinda Brandon paper probation file, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Excerpts from deposition of Tanya Mitchell, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Tanya Mitchell probation file)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/28/2019)

08/28/2019

309 MOTION to Hold Briefing on PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment in Abeyance Pending a Ruling on Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion (Expedited) by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/28/2019)

09/03/2019 310 REPLY to Response to Motion re 298 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint filed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell.

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 41 of 49

(Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 09/03/2019)

09/09/2019

311 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 9/18/2019 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/9/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/09/2019)

09/12/2019

312 RESPONSE in Opposition re 307 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 300 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 12−20−2018 letter PSI Initial Document Production, # 2 Exhibit 2−7−2019 Letter with discovery supplement, # 3 Exhibit 5−17−2019 letter with discovery supplement, # 4 Exhibit 5−29−2019 letter with discovery supplement, # 5 Exhibit 5−31−2019 letter with discovery supplement, # 6 Exhibit 6−4−2019 with discovery supplement, # 7 Exhibit 8−23−2019 letter with discoveyr supplement, # 8 Exhibit 9−11−2019 letter with discovery supplement, # 9 Exhibit 9−11−2019 (second) letter with discoveyr responses, # 10 Exhibit 9−12−2019 letter with discovery responses, # 11 Exhibit 9−12−2019 (second) letter with 10th supplementation of discovery responses)(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 09/12/2019)

09/12/2019

313 RESPONSE in Opposition re 309 MOTION to Hold Briefing on PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment in Abeyance Pending a Ruling on Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion (Expedited) filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 09/12/2019)

09/13/2019

314 ORDER denying as moot 298 Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/13/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/13/2019)

09/13/2019

315 REPLY to Response to Motion re 309 MOTION to Hold Briefing on PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment in Abeyance Pending a Ruling on Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion (Expedited) filed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 09/13/2019)

09/13/2019

316 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 307 Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion to Deny, or Defer Considering,PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment ; granting in part and denying in part 309 Plaintiffs'Expedited Motion to Hold Briefing on PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgmentin Abeyance Pending a Ruling on Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 9/13/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/13/2019)

09/18/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Telephone Conference held on 9/18/2019. Order to enter. (Tape #Not Recorded.) (Hearing lasted :45)(hv) (Entered: 09/18/2019)

09/18/2019

317 ORDER: The Court held a telephone conference with the Parties on September 18, 2019, to discuss several discovery related issues the Parties have been unable to reach an agreement on to date. The issues in dispute mainly concern the County and PSI Defendants' responses to discovery request and production of Electronically Stored Information (ESI). While the Parties have engaged in a good faith effort to complete the discovery and Defendants have provided many responsive documents, there remain outstanding issues to address. With respect to the County Defendants, the Parties agree that they will provide responses to Plaintiff's written discovery requests on or before September 30, 2019. County Defendants will also provide additional email production on or before October 7, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/18/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 09/18/2019)

09/19/2019 318 RESPONSE in Opposition re 307 MOTION to Deny, or Defer Considering, PSI Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment re 300 MOTION for Summary Judgment −−−−−−−−−−AMENDED−−−−−−−−−− filed by Markeyta Bledsoe,
Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 42 of 49

10/03/2019
10/03/2019 10/03/2019
10/08/2019 10/10/2019
10/16/2019 10/16/2019 10/21/2019 10/21/2019 10/21/2019 10/21/2019

Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 09/19/2019)
319 MOTION to Compel by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Joint Discovery Statement and Certification of Counsel, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests and PSI Defendants' Responses, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Mar. 5, 2019 Letter, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Plaintiffs' Mar. 25, 2019 Rule 37 Letter, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Email chain ending June 21, 2019, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Plaintiffs' Revised Proposed Search Terms, # 7 Exhibit 6 − July 25, 2019 Email, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Aug. 23, 2019 Letter, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Sept. 3, 2019 Email, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Sept. 18 and 25, 2019 Emails)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
320 First MOTION to Stay Discovery Email Discovery Pending a Ruling on PSI Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
321 MEMORANDUM in Support of 320 First MOTION to Stay Discovery Email Discovery Pending a Ruling on PSI Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2020 Civil Rights Corps Vision Statement, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Tim Cook, # 3 Exhibit Joint Discovery Dispute Statement)(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
322 NOTICE of Change of Address by Elizabeth Anne Rossi (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/08/2019)
323 RESPONSE in Opposition re 320 First MOTION to Stay Discovery Email Discovery Pending a Ruling on PSI Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − 9.9.19 Email from B. McMillan, # 2 Exhibit B − Emails ending 6.10.19, # 3 Exhibit C − PSI Defendants Response to Second Requests for Production, # 4 Exhibit D − Emails ending 10.8.19)(Tift, Scott) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
324 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Unopposed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
325 RESPONSE in Opposition re 319 MOTION to Compel filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
326 RESPONSE in Opposition re 300 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
327 STATEMENT of facts Counter−Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Filed In Support of Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to PSI's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell in support of 326 Response in Opposition to Motion. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
328 STATEMENT of facts Response to PSI Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Filed In Support of Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to PSI's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell in support of 326 Response in Opposition to Motion. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
329 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 328 Statement of facts, 327 Statement of facts, 326 Response in Opposition to Motion (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Appendix A − Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 1−Contract between Giles County and PSI, # 3 Exhibit 2−Contract between Giles County and CPS, # 4 Exhibit 3−Excerpts from the October 2, 2018 deposition of Giles County General Sessions Judge Robert C. Richardson, # 5 Exhibit 4−Order of Probation and PSI Probation Rules, # 6 Exhibit 5−Excerpts from the October 2, 2018 deposition of Giles County Circuit Court Judge J. Russell Parkes, # 7 Exhibit 6−Sample court orders sentencing

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 43 of 49

people convicted of misdemeanor offenses to probation, # 8 Exhibit 7−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Richard Heimberger and email exchange dated November 20, 2017, # 9 Exhibit 8−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Krista Heffner−Cannon and email exchange ending January 12, 2018, # 10 Exhibit 9−Excerpts from the June 27, 2019 deposition of named Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon, # 11 Exhibit 10−Excerpts from the February 8, 2019 deposition of named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)

10/21/2019

330 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 11−Excerpts from the PSI probation file for Norman Nelson, # 2 Exhibit 12−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Brandy Collis, # 3 Exhibit 13−Probation notes from the PSI probation files for Howard Lane Belton III, Kathy Lee Minor, and John David Wilburn, # 4 Exhibit 14−PSI "Order" converting a probationer from supervised probation to unsupervised probation, # 5 Exhibit 15−Probation notes and sentencing order from the PSI probation file for Christopher Brown, # 6 Exhibit 16−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Laura Zavala, # 7 Exhibit 17−Probation notes and excerpts from the PSI probation file for named Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon, # 8 Exhibit 18−Application for Indigency and accompanying letter from Kristi Gatlin, dated October 31, 2018, # 9 Exhibit 19−Unsigned Order of Probation for Tanya Mitchell, # 10 Exhibit 20−Probation notes and violation−of−probation warrant from the PSI probation file for Mason Fuson)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)

10/21/2019

331 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21−Letter to Christopher Bishop from PSI probation, # 2 Exhibit 22−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Barbara Adams, # 3 Exhibit 23−Probation notes and violation−of−probation warrant from the PSI probation file for Roger Dickey, # 4 Exhibit 24−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Spurgeon Coleman, # 5 Exhibit 25−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Douglas Sena, # 6 Exhibit 26−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Michael Justice, # 7 Exhibit 27−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Robert Morgan, # 8 Exhibit 28−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Kevin Williams, # 9 Exhibit 29−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Richard Henson, # 10 Exhibit 30−PSI Procedures Manual dated November 30, 2018)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)

10/21/2019

332 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 31Probation notes from the PSI probation file to Joshua Holt and email exchange dated August 23, 2017, # 2 Exhibit 32Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Chelsie Turner, # 3 Exhibit 33Email exchange ending February 8, 2018, # 4 Exhibit 34Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Christopher Mitchell and email exchange dated July 26, 2017, # 5 Exhibit 35Email dated January 21, 2016, # 6 Exhibit 36Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Matthew Cook and email exchange ending July 12, 2017, # 7 Exhibit 37Probation notes and "Court Notes" dated November 20, 2014 from the PSI probation file for Travis Clark, # 8 Exhibit 38Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Justin Niemeyer, # 9 Exhibit 39PSI managers meeting notes, # 10 Exhibit 40Email exchange dated February 13, 2018)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)

10/21/2019

333 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 41−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Pamper Me Fears, # 2 Exhibit 42−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Christopher Gilbert, # 3 Exhibit 43−Sample of violation−of−probation warrants issued on the basis of PSI Defendants allegations, # 4 Exhibit 44−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Brandy Moore, # 5 Exhibit 45−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Tamicka Cummings, # 6 Exhibit 46−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for James Hicks, # 7 Exhibit 47−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Kacey Nickens, # 8 Exhibit 48−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Jenny West, # 9 Exhibit 49−PSI intake and reporting forms for named Plaintiffs Lucinda Brandon and Tanya Mitchell, # 10 Exhibit 50−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Travis Foster)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)

10/21/2019

334 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 51−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Tamala Mashburn, # 2 Exhibit 52−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Robert Willison, # 3 Exhibit 53−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for John Johnson,

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 44 of 49

10/21/2019
10/21/2019 10/21/2019
10/24/2019 10/28/2019 10/29/2019

# 4 Exhibit 54−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Patricia Gardner, # 5 Exhibit 55−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Sheila Van Est, # 6 Exhibit 56−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Billy Cosby, # 7 Exhibit 57−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Mark Cochran, # 8 Exhibit 58−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Alison Bowen, # 9 Exhibit 59−Probation notes and excerpts from the PSI probation file for Michael Daniel, # 10 Exhibit 60−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Curtis Humphrey)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
335 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 61−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Robert Boyd, # 2 Exhibit 62−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for George McKinley, # 3 Exhibit 63−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Roslyn Bryant, # 4 Exhibit 64−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Erskine Anderson, # 5 Exhibit 65−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Melanie Bogle and email exchange dated August 23, 2017, # 6 Exhibit 66−Email exchange ending September 11, 2018, # 7 Exhibit 67−Probation notes and receipt from the PSI probation file for Eliza Leigh Bass, # 8 Exhibit 68−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Candise Janay Covey and email exchange ending February 10, 2017, # 9 Exhibit 69−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Sharon Jones, # 10 Exhibit 70−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Evan Morris)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
336 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 71−Excerpts from the November 13, 2018, deposition of Giles County Jail Administrator Teresa Mattox, # 2 Exhibit 72−Excerpts from the November 13, 2018, deposition of Giles County Sheriff Kyle Helton, # 3 Exhibit 73−Selection of "Court Notes" from PSI probation files, # 4 Exhibit 74−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Marcus Marsh, # 5 Exhibit 75−PSI instructions to managers regarding Collection Rate Reporting, # 6 Exhibit 76−Email exchange ending July 2, 2014, # 7 Exhibit 77−Email exchange dated August 1, 2014, # 8 Exhibit 78−PSI "Scoreboards" and other data sheets, # 9 Exhibit 79−Email dated November 3, 2014, # 10 Exhibit 80−PSI probation officer audits)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
337 NOTICE of Filing by Lucinda Brandon, Tanya Mitchell re 329 Notice (Other),,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 81−PSI Profit and Loss sheet − Pulaski office, # 2 Exhibit 82−Email exchange dated November 25, 2015, # 3 Exhibit 83−Email exchange dated July 6, 2016, # 4 Exhibit 84−Agreement between PCC and CPS, # 5 Exhibit 85−Probation notes from the PSI probation file for Dylan Holt, # 6 Exhibit 86−Email dated October 4, 2017, # 7 Exhibit 87−Named Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon's Second Supplemental Responses to PSI Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, # 8 Exhibit 88−Probation notes and excerpts from the PSI probation file for named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell, # 9 Exhibit 89−Retainer of named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell as a client, dated December 21, 2017, # 10 Exhibit 90−PSI insurance policy, # 11 Exhibit 91−Richardson v. Green (unpublished opinion), # 12 Exhibit 92−PSI Procedures Manual dated October 24, 2017, # 13 Exhibit 93−PSI Procedures Manual dated June 17, 2010, # 14 Exhibit 94−Email indicating Admin Fee covers Drug Screens dated August 3, 2018, # 15 Exhibit 95−Emails regarding Tanya Mitchell Fee Reduction Application dated October 19, 2018)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
338 ORDER granting 324 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 10/24/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/24/2019)
339 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 10/28/2019)
340 ORDER granting 319 Motion to Compel; denying 320 Motion to Stay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 10/29/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 10/29/2019)

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11/03/2019 11/04/2019 11/04/2019 11/04/2019
11/14/2019 11/20/2019 12/12/2019 12/16/2019 12/23/2019 01/08/2020 01/14/2020 01/15/2020 01/15/2020
01/16/2020 01/19/2020

341 Second MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages (an 11−page Reply Brief) by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 11/03/2019)
342 ORDER granting 341 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 11/4/2019. (am) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
343 REPLY to Response to Motion re 300 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
344 STATEMENT of facts PSI's Response to Counter Statement of "Facts" filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson in support of 327 Statement of facts,. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
345 ORDER granting 339 Motion to Modify Case Management Deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 11/14/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jm) (Entered: 11/15/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Case Management Conference by Telephone held on 11/20/2019.(Hearing lasted :33 minutes) (vk) (Entered: 12/04/2019)
346 MOTION to Substitute Attorney by Giles County, Tennessee. (Henson, Lucy) (Entered: 12/12/2019)
347 ORDER granting 346 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Attorney John Christopher Williams terminated. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 12/16/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 12/16/2019)
348 INFORMATION COPY from 6CCA: THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district court and was argued by counsel. IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mandate to Issue. (am) (Entered: 12/26/2019)
349 MOTION for attorney Alexandria Twinem to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $100 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−3062663) by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Twinem Certificate of Good Standing)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/08/2020)
350 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 1/21/2020 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 1/14/2020. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
DC State Bar status verified as active for Alexandria Twinem. (am) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
351 MANDATE of USCA as to 239 Notice of Appeal, filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair, Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C. Pursuant to the court's disposition that was filed 12/23/2019 the mandate for this case hereby issues today. (am) Modified Text on 1/21/2020 (am). (Entered: 01/15/2020)
352 ORDER granting 349 Motion for Alexandria Twinem to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Kirk L. Davies on 1/16/20. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(Davies, Kirk) (Entered: 01/16/2020)
353 MOTION to Modify Case Management Deadline by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 01/19/2020)

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01/21/2020
01/21/2020 01/21/2020 01/21/2020 01/22/2020 01/24/2020 01/31/2020 01/31/2020 01/31/2020 02/11/2020 03/25/2020
04/13/2020 05/14/2020
05/27/2020

NOTICE TO FILER re DE# 353 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, Certificates of Service shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Counsel did not include all Counsel on the certificate of service. Please FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document. (am) (Entered: 01/21/2020)
354 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell re 353 MOTION to Modify Case Management Deadline (Corrected) (Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 01/21/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Case Management Conference by Telephone held on 1/21/2020. (Hearing lasted 00:27)(ms) (Entered: 01/21/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Case Management Conference by Telephone held on 1/21/2020. (Hearing lasted 00:57)(ms) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
355 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 1/31/2020 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 1/22/2020. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/22/2020)
356 ANSWER to 256 Amended Complaint, by Giles County, Tennessee, Kyle Helton.(Crane, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
357 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Case Management Conference by Telephone held on 1/31/2020. (Hearing lasted 00:50)(ms) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
358 ORDER granting 299 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 1/31/2020. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
359 ORDER: The Court held a telephone conference with the Parties on January 31, 2020 to discuss various outstanding discovery disputes. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 1/31/2020. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
360 NOTICE by Sonya Beard, Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil Under Rule 5.1 to Tennessee Attorney General (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Letter to Attorney General)(Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 02/11/2020)
361 ORDER denying 300 Motion for Summary Judgment. Given the need for participation by the CPS Defendants in the Court's consideration of the issues raised in the pending summary judgment motion, the Court declines to rule on those issues at this time. Accordingly, the PSI Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 300) is DENIED, without prejudice to refiling when the CPS Defendants' appeal has been resolved. At that time, the defendants may file renewed motions for summary judgment. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 3/25/2020. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
362 NOTICE by State of Tennessee re 360 Notice (Other) Notice of Intent Not to Intervene (Shew, Dianna) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
363 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Renewed) by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Sixth Circuit Mandate Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc, # 2 Exhibit 5/13/2020 Email Confirming Plaintiffs will not appeal to US Supreme Court)(McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 05/14/2020)
364 INFORMATION COPY from 6CCA. We affirm. MANDATE TO ISSUE. (bs) (Entered: 05/27/2020)

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05/27/2020 05/29/2020

365 MANDATE of USCA as to 286 Notice of Appeal, filed by Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair, Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C. (bs) (Entered: 05/27/2020)
366 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 363 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Renewed) by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Emails regarding scheduling conference)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/29/2020)

06/02/2020

367 ORDER granting 366 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. The Motion for Extension (Doc. No. 366) is GRANTED as follows: The Court's stay (Doc. No. 296) is lifted, and the Court REFERS to the Magistrate Judge the scheduling of responses and replies in connection with the PSI Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 366). The Magistrate Judge shall also set appropriate schedules for filing and briefing any dispositive motions to be filed by the other defendants. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 6/2/2020. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 06/02/2020)

06/03/2020

368 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 6/4/2020 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 6/3/2020. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) (Entered: 06/03/2020)

06/03/2020 06/03/2020 06/03/2020 06/03/2020

369 MOTION to Dismiss by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/03/2020)
370 MOTION to Stay re 369 MOTION to Dismiss Motion to Stay Discovery by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/03/2020)
371 MEMORANDUM in Support of 369 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair . (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/03/2020)
372 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Emails)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/03/2020)

06/03/2020

373 MEMORANDUM in Support of 370 MOTION to Stay re 369 MOTION to Dismiss Motion to Stay Discovery filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair . (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/03/2020)

06/04/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley: Case Management Conference by Telephone held on 6/4/2020. (Hearing lasted 00:54)(ms) (Entered: 06/04/2020)

06/04/2020 06/04/2020 06/04/2020
06/05/2020

374 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair. (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/04/2020)
375 MEMORANDUM in Support of 374 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair . (Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/04/2020)
376 DECLARATION of Natalie Oakley Circuit Ct Clerk filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re: 374 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Orders re Indya Hilfort)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/04/2020)
377 DECLARATION of Joel Colton filed by Community Probation Services, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, LLC, Patricia McNair re: 374 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Termination letter, # 2 Exhibit Giles Co Contract)(Rader, Daniel) (Entered: 06/05/2020)

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 48 of 49

06/10/2020 06/10/2020 06/11/2020 06/17/2020

378 MOTION Motion for a Status Conference or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay Deadlines and Issue a Scheduling Order to Streamline Dispositive Motion Practice by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Case Management Schedule including unified deadlines for briefing dispositive motions)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/10/2020)
379 RESPONSE in Opposition re 378 MOTION Motion for a Status Conference or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay Deadlines and Issue a Scheduling Order to Streamline Dispositive Motion Practice filed by Markeyta Bledsoe, Timothy Cook, PSI−Probation II, LLC, PSI−Probation, L.L.C., Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Harriet Thompson. (McMillan, Brandt) (Entered: 06/10/2020)
380 REPLY to Response to re 378 MOTION Motion for a Status Conference or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay Deadlines and Issue a Scheduling Order to Streamline Dispositive Motion Practice filed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/11/2020)
381 RESPONSE in Opposition re 370 MOTION to Stay re 369 MOTION to Dismiss Motion to Stay Discovery filed by Lucinda Brandon, Indya Hilfort, Lesley Johnson, Karen McNeil, Tanya Mitchell. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/17/2020)

Case: 1:18-cv-33 As of: 06/17/2020 05:14 PM CDT 49 of 49

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE — COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, TANYA MITCHELL, INDYA HILFORT, and SONYA BEARD, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC; COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, L.L.C.; COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES; PROGRESSIVE SENTENCING, INC.; PSI-PROBATION II, LLC; PSIPROBATION, L.L.C.; TENNESSEE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC; TIMOTHY COOK; GILES COUNTY, TENNESSEE; PATRICIA MCNAIR; MARKEYTA BLEDSOE; HARRIET THOMPSON,
Defendants.

Case No. ____________
COMPLAINT—CLASS ACTION JURY DEMAND

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. NATURE OF THE ACTION ............................................................................................ 3 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................ 9 IV. THE PARTIES................................................................................................................... 9
A. Plaintiffs ................................................................................................................. 9 B. Defendants ........................................................................................................... 10 C. Alter Ego Allegations .......................................................................................... 14 V. DEFENDANTS’ CONSPIRACY TO OPERATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR-PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM BY EXTORTION ........................................... 15 A. The Contracts ....................................................................................................... 16 B. The Companies’ Practices Are Materially Indistinguishable .............................. 17 C. The System of Private Probation in Giles County ............................................... 18 D. The Process for Notifying the Court of Alleged Non-Compliance ..................... 31 E. Revocation Proceedings ....................................................................................... 35 F. When a Person Pays Her Debts in Full ................................................................ 37 VI. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBJECTED TO DEFENDANTS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR-PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM .......................................................................... 38 A. Plaintiff Karen McNeil ........................................................................................ 38 B. Plaintiff Lesley Johnson....................................................................................... 46 C. Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell ....................................................................................... 49 D. Plaintiff Indya Hilfort .......................................................................................... 51 E. Plaintiff Sonya Beard ........................................................................................... 55 VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ................................................................................ 59 B. Class Definitions .................................................................................................. 59 C. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(a) Are Satisfied ..................................................... 60 D. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) Are Satisfied ............................... 63 VIII. CLAIMS .......................................................................................................................... 65

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COUNT 1: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (C) AND (D)
BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL AND LESLEY JOHNSON ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND PATRICIA MCNAIR FOR DAMAGES. ................................... 65
COUNT 2: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) AND (D)
BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS SONYA BEARD AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND MARKEYTA BLEDSOE FOR DAMAGES ............................... 70
COUNT 3: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) AND (D)
BY NAMED PLAINTIFF SONYA BEARD ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND HARRIET THOMPSON FOR DAMAGES ...................................................................................... 75
COUNT 4: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) AND (D)
BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND MARKEYTA BLEDSOE FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF ................................................. 81
COUNT 5: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES. .................................................................... 86

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COUNT 6: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ........................................................................................................................... 89
COUNT 7: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS SONYA BEARD AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES. .......................................................................................... 91
COUNT 8: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ........................................................................................................................... 94

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COUNT 9: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS FOR DAMAGES. ............................................................................................................ 96
COUNT 10: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ........................................................................................................................... 98
COUNT 11: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF SONYA BEARD AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES. .......................................................................................... 99

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COUNT 12: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ......................................................................................................................... 101
COUNT 13: DEFENDANTS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BY PLACING AND KEEPING PEOPLE ON SUPERVISED PROBATION SOLELY BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY COURT DEBTS AND PROBATION SUPERVISION FEES
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES ................................................................... 102
COUNT 14: DEFENDANTS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BY PLACING AND KEEPING PEOPLE ON SUPERVISED PROBATION SOLELY BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY COURT DEBTS AND PROBATION SUPERVISION FEES
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF .......................................................................................................................... 103
COUNT 15: DEFENDANTS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BY PLACING AND KEEPING PEOPLE ON SUPERVISED PROBATION SOLELY BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY COURT DEBTS AND PROBATION SUPERVISION FEES
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF SONYA BEARD ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES. .................... 104

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COUNT 16: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL AND LESLEY JOHNSON ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS FOR DAMAGES ..................................... 105 COUNT 17: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS SONYA BEARD AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI FOR DAMAGES ...................................... 106 COUNT 18: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF................................................................................................... 107 COUNT 19: ABUSE OF PROCESS
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST GILES COUNTY, CPS, AND DEFENDANT MCNAIR FOR DAMAGES ....................................................... 107 COUNT 20: ABUSE OF PROCESS
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILAR SITUATED AGAINST GILES, CPS, AND DEFENDANT MCNAIR FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF ...................................... 109 COUNT 21: ABUSE OF PROCESS
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS SONYA BEARD AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST GILES COUNTY, PSI, AND DEFENDANTS BLEDSOE AND THOMPSON FOR DAMAGES ............................ 110 COUNT 22: ABUSE OF PROCESS
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST GILES COUNTY, PSI, AND DEFENDANT BLEDSOE, FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF......... 111

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COUNT 23: CIVIL CONSPIRACY
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS SONYA BEARD AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS PROGRESSIVE SENTENCING, INC., PSI-PROBATION II, LLC, PSI-PROBATION, L.L.C., TENNESSEE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC, AND TIMOTHY COOK FOR DAMAGES ........................................................................................................... 112
COUNT 24: CIVIL CONSPIRACY
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC, COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, L.L.C., AND COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES........................ 115
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................................ 117
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ..................................................................................................... 118

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I. INTRODUCTION 1. This class action lawsuit challenges systemic constitutional and statutory violations
and an illegal extortion scheme in Giles County, Tennessee, which has allowed two for-profit companies—Community Probation Services, LLC and PSI Probation, LLC—to transform the County’s misdemeanor probation system into a machine for generating their own profit on the backs of Giles County’s most impoverished residents.1 The named plaintiffs and the members of the putative plaintiff classes (collectively “Plaintiffs”) in this case live in poverty and were assigned to supervised probation with one of the Defendant companies. They are victims of the Defendants’ conspiracy to extract as much money as possible from impoverished misdemeanor probationers through a pattern of illegal racketeering activity, including threats of arrest and jailing, physical confinement, and extended periods of supervised probation due to nonpayment of debts owed to the court and to the private companies.
2. The goal of CPS and PSI (collectively, the “private companies” or the “companies”) is to maximize their own profits by acting as probation officers for the purpose of collecting fines, costs, fees, and litigation taxes2 (these legal financial obligations will be referred to collectively as “court debts”) owed to the court following convictions for minor misdemeanor offenses. Pursuant to their respective contracts with the County (the “Contracts”), the companies add their own fees and surcharges on top of those court debts and continue to supervise the collection of even greater amounts of money from probationers who cannot afford to pay their debts. These fees and
1 As alleged herein, PSI Probation operates through at least one individual and four legal entities—including Defendants Timothy Cook, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Service, LLC, PSI-Probation L.L.C., and PSI-Probation II, LLC—all of which are alter egos of each other for purposes of Tennessee law. CPS Probation operates through at least three legal entities—including Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation Services—which are alter egos of each other for purposes of Tennessee law. 2 Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-602(a) (“There is levied a privilege tax on litigation instituted in this state, of twenty-nine dollars and fifty cents ($29.50) on all criminal charges, upon conviction or by order.”).
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surcharges—which probationers pay directly to the companies—are the companies’ only sources of revenue under their Contracts.
3. The supervision the companies provide, however, consists almost exclusively of continuous and repeated threats of jailing, humiliating abuses of power such as invasive drug screens during which employees of the companies observe probationers urinating (and the companies, in their discretion, then charge fees for each drug test that they decide to administer), and repeated revocations and extensions of probation for not making payments that the companies and their employees (“private probation officers” or “for-profit probation officers”; collectively, the companies and their employees are referred to as “Private Defendants”) know the probationers cannot afford. All of this occurs while the companies continue to impose additional monthly fees and surcharges, and the probationers’ debts mount.
4. In addition to providing substantial revenue to the County, the contractual arrangements give Giles County’s private probation officers, who should be neutral officers of the court, a direct financial stake in every aspect of misdemeanor probation supervision. This financial conflict of interest, baked into the companies’ contracts with the County and the companies’ written and unwritten policies, causes a cycle of debt; arrest and jailing for inability to pay that debt; additional fees for those arrests; repeated revocation and extension of supervised probation for nonpayment; and crushing, inescapable poverty.
5. As a result of these extortionate enterprises, individuals who are supervised by the companies, including the named plaintiffs, have lost homes, jobs, and personal belongings; suffered severe medical problems, sold their blood plasma, and gone without food, clothing, and medicine for themselves and their children; taken out high-interest loans and borrowed money from friends and family members who are themselves struggling to afford the basic necessities of life; and diverted public benefits—including social security disability checks, or whatever minimal
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income they have—to instead pay the escalating supervision fees that the companies demand under threat of arrest and jailing. These policies and practices have trapped Plaintiffs and hundreds of people like them in Giles County in a web of fear and panic for years.
6. The companies’ user-funded model of probation—in which the probation officer’s only sources of income and profit under the Contracts are the payments made by the impoverished probationers the County assigns to them for probation supervision—violates the Constitution and has no place in our legal system. This lawsuit seeks to recover damages from the alleged wrongdoers here, disgorge their ill-gotten profits, and to end the practice of for-profit misdemeanor probation in Giles County administered by private companies with financial incentives to place and keep persons on probation. II. NATURE OF THE ACTION
7. Giles County contracted to give control of its misdemeanor probation system to two private, for-profit companies—CPS and PSI—by entering into separate contracts with each company. See Ex. 1 (contract between Giles County and CPS); Ex. 2 (contract between Giles County and PSI).
8. The Contracts provide for a user-funded model of probation, in which probationers must pay—under threat of arrest, jailing, and repeated revocation and extension of their probation—a variety of fees and surcharges to the company in addition to their court debts. The Contracts specify that CPS and PSI must earn their revenue and profit solely and directly from payments by the people they supervise.
9. CPS and PSI repeatedly threaten misdemeanor and traffic probationers with arrest and physical confinement if they do not make payments. The Private Defendants tell probationers that nonpayment will result in the company “violating” them—i.e., alleging to the court in a sworn
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statement that the probationer has violated a condition of probation and asking the court to issue
an arrest warrant or a citation warrant.
10. The Private Defendants further tell probationers that “violations” for nonpayment
will result in extended periods of “pay-only” probation,3 during which periods4 probationers
accrue more fees owed to the companies, including monthly supervision fees and discretionary
drug testing fees, and that non-compliance with other conditions of probation—and sometimes
nonpayment—will result in jail time in addition to revocation and extension of pay-only probation.
11. In fact—and Defendants never disclose this to Plaintiffs—under federal and
Tennessee law, only willful nonpayment can constitute a violation of probation.5 As a matter of
policy and practice, the companies train their employees not to inform probationers of this law and
their basic rights. Defendants routinely threaten to seek violation-of-probation warrants for
probationers who are too poor to make a payment, or whose payments fall short of what the
probation officer demanded, without verifying that the nonpayment was willful.
3 “Pay-only probation” refers to a period of supervised probation during which the person is supervised only because she has not paid all of the court debt. Pay-only probation ends only when a person has paid court debts in full. See Human Rights Watch, Profiting From Probation: America’s ‘Offender Funded’ Probation Industry (2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offender-funded-probationindustry (“Pay only probation is an extremely muscular form of debt collection masquerading as probation supervision, with all costs billed to the debtor.”); Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc., New Yorker (June 23, 2014), available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc. 4 Terms of probation in Giles County are usually the maximum allowable under Tennessee law: 11 months and 29 days, referred to locally as “11/29.” The most common sentence includes jail time of 11 months and 29 days, suspended for 11 months and 29 days. When Defendants revoke and extend a person’s probation, they typically require the person to also serve some amount of their jail sentence, and then extend the probationary period for an additional 11/29. Therefore, following revocation and extension, the possibility of extensive jail time, albeit shortened by the amount of time the person served for the violation, looms for the probationer who cannot pay or violates any of the company’s other rules or conditions. 5 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(i)(3) (2017) (nonpayment of supervision fees must be willful to be grounds for probation revocation); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 770 n.13 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), appeal dismissed (Mar. 15, 2016) (“Defendants’ probation scheme is the functional equivalent of what Bearden prohibits: probation revocation due to nonpayment without an indigency inquiry.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(a) (2017) (nonpayment of court fines must be willful to be grounds for criminal contempt); State v. Dye, 715 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tenn. 1986) (reversing revocation of probation because lower court did not determine that nonpayment of restitution was willful).
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12. A person may be assigned to supervised misdemeanor probation by either the General Sessions Court or the Circuit Court in Giles County. The General Sessions Court issues citation warrants when the allegation is solely nonpayment. These warrants do not authorize arrests. The Circuit Court, however, issues arrest warrants solely for nonpayment. Those warrants authorize arrest and typically state that a secured money bail amount is required for release after arrest.
13. Although the citation warrants that probation officers seek alleging solely nonpayment for General-Sessions probationers do not authorize arrest, most probationers do not know that and believe—based on the threats of the Private Defendants—that if they do not to pay the company, they will be arrested and taken to jail.
14. Moreover, warrants for multiple alleged violations including nonpayment do authorize arrest. Such warrants typically have either a pre-set money bond in an amount determined without individualized consideration of the arrestee’s ability to pay, or a requirement to “hold” the arrestee in jail until her probation-revocation hearing, which does not take place until up to ten days after arrest.
15. The Contracts give the companies enormous discretion, including authorizing them to notify the court of alleged non-compliance with conditions of probation, seek and prepare probation revocation warrants, act as the main witness and present evidence at revocation proceedings, confer with judges and prosecutors on bond amounts for violation-of-probation warrants and whether a person arrested for an alleged violation of probation should be detained until the revocation hearing, and recommend sentences and sanctions. The Contracts give the companies discretion to determine how much a probationer must pay on each reporting day, how frequently the probationer must report, and (in the case of CPS) how much of each payment the
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company will keep for itself before paying the court. All of these discretionary decisions are communicated by the Private Defendants under threat of arrest for noncompliance.
16. The Contracts permit CPS and PSI to petition for revocation of probation solely for nonpayment, and to seek the arrest and jailing of probationers and petition for extension of probation for people who have not paid all of the accumulated fees and costs, but have already paid enough money to cover the entirety of their original court debts.
17. In their efforts to generate greater revenue, the individual probation officer defendants regularly make sworn statements of fact that they know are false and knowingly omit material facts when seeking warrants solely for nonpayment of court costs and probation fees. As a matter of policy and practice, the Private Defendants consistently omit critical facts—such as that a person who did not make payments survives on disability income. They seek warrants that are facially insufficient to justify a revocation of probation as a matter of law because the Private Defendants never allege that probationers willfully refused to pay, i.e., that they have refused to pay even though they are able to do so.
18. Defendants know that the vast majority of CPS and PSI probationers are only on supervised for-profit probation because they are indigent and cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees in one lump sum. Nonetheless, they regularly participate in probationrevocation hearings that result in the revocation and extension of supervised probation due solely to nonpayment, without conducting an inquiry into the probationer’s ability to pay, and without findings that the nonpayment was willful. Revocations for nonpayment typically result in an extension of probation for another period of 11 months and 29 days, and result in saddling the probationer with additional court debts and company fees and surcharges, continuing the cycle of debt, arrest, for-profit probation supervision, jail, and more debt.
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19. Each Contract creates an actor within the Giles County legal system that is
fundamentally incompatible with constitutional law: a probation officer who is supposed to be
neutral, but instead has a direct financial stake in every decision and outcome in every individual’s
probation case. This arrangement violates basic notions of due process, neutrality, and fairness.
20. Defendants’ extortion scheme constitutes a systematic violation of constitutional
rights calculated to generate significant profits every year for the companies and to provide
substantial revenue to the County.
21. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief for
themselves and all others similarly situated.
22. The allegations in this case are materially indistinguishable from those in Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc., 3:15-cv-01048 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), a class-action lawsuit that raised identical federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
and constitutional claims against nearby Rutherford County, Tennessee and a now-defunct private probation company, PCC, Inc.6 Soon after Rodriguez was filed, PCC, Inc. ended its operations in Giles County, in Tennessee, and throughout the entire country.7
23. When PCC, Inc. left Giles County, one of the Defendant probation companies in
this case—CPS—began operating in Giles County in its place. CPS moved into the old PCC, Inc.
offices, assumed the accounts for probationers whom PCC, Inc. had previously supervised, hired
6 PCC, Inc. was also operating in Giles County at the time the company’s conduct in Rutherford County was challenged by Plaintiffs in Rodriguez. 7 The federal court recently granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement, through which PCC, Inc. agreed to pay $14 million and Rutherford County agreed to pay $300,000 to the people who were on supervised probation during the four-year statute of limitations applicable to the RICO claim. See Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., Case 3:15-cv-01048, Dkt. 197, Order Granting Second Unopposed Motion to Approve Notice of Class Action Settlement Agreement, Set Hearing Date, and Authorize Notice to Class Members (Jan. 2, 2018). Rutherford County also agreed to make significant changes to its probation system, including never again contracting with a for-profit, private probation company, waiving fees for indigent probationers, and ending pay-only probation.
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PCC, Inc.’s former employees—including Defendant Patricia McNair—and implemented
identical debt-collection practices. PSI, which has been operating in Giles County for more than
four years, engages in materially the same extortionate and unconstitutional conduct.
24. Defendants’ policies and practices in this case are materially identical to those at
issue in Rodriguez, and a court in this District has already issued two detailed memorandum opinions concluding that such policies and practices violate the United States Constitution.8 Giles
County has been on notice that its private probation practices violate Tennessee law, federal
statutes, and the United States Constitution since at least July 5, 2016—when Giles County
Executive, Janet Vanzant, received a letter summarizing the Rodriguez allegations and the two
federal court rulings, see Ex. 3.
25. Like Rodriguez, this civil rights action is brought under RICO, the United States
Constitution, and Tennessee law to stop the Defendants from continuing to operate racketeering
enterprises that extort money from some of the most impoverished people in Giles County, and to
prevent the Defendants from continuing to misuse the probation system for profit.
26. Plaintiffs bring this civil rights action on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated seeking the vindication of their fundamental rights, compensation for the
violations that they suffered, punitive damages to punish the private probation company
8 See Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (holding that it violates the Equal Protection Clause to treat government debtors more harshly than debtors who owe debts to private companies; holding that it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to keep impoverished probationers on supervised probation solely because of their inability to make monetary payments; holding that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to arrest misdemeanor probationers solely for nonpayment; holding that it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to jail probationers solely because they cannot afford to pay secured money bail); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (granting Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction enjoining Rutherford County from detaining misdemeanor arrestees who cannot afford the predetermined money bail amount required for release following an arrest for allegedly violating probation; holding that it violates equal protection and due process to keep an impoverished misdemeanor probationer in jail after arrest and prior to a probation-revocation hearing due to her inability to pay a pre-determined secured money bail amount). Plaintiffs in this case raise many of the same federal constitutional claims that were litigated in Rodriguez.
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Defendants and to deter all Defendants from similar misconduct in the future, and injunctive and declaratory relief to protect them against future violations. III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
27. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367(a) (over the state law claims because they are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution).
28. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. IV. THE PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs 29. Plaintiff Karen McNeil is 53 years old and lives in Giles County with a friend in a mobile home outside of Pulaski. She has four adult children. Ms. McNeil was subjected to supervised probation with Defendant CPS from March 2016 until October 2017. She was previously supervised on probation by PCC, Inc. from November 2015 until March 2016. For the entire period of supervised probation with both CPS and PCC, Inc., Defendant McNair was the probation officer to whom Ms. McNeil primarily reported. 30. Plaintiff Lesley Johnson is a 35-year-old single mother of two children who lives in Mississippi. She previously lived in Baldwin County, Alabama, where she resided during the period she was on CPS probation. Ms. Johnson was subjected to supervised probation with Defendant CPS from February 2017 to August 2017. During her period of supervised probation with CPS, Defendant McNair was the probation officer to whom Ms. Johnson primarily reported.
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31. Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell is 53 years old and lives in Giles County, in a mobile home with her daughter, Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, and her four grandchildren (Ms. Hilfort’s children). Ms. Mitchell has been subjected to supervised probation with Defendant PSI since September 2017. For the entire period of supervised probation with PSI, Defendant Bledsoe has been the probation officer to whom Ms. Mitchell reports.
32. Plaintiff Indya Hilfort is a 27-year-old single mother of four children under the age of 10. She lives with them and her mother, Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell, in a mobile home in Giles County. Ms. Hilfort has been subjected to supervised probation with Defendant CPS since September 2017. She was previously supervised on probation by PCC, Inc. in 2015. For the entire period of supervised probation with CPS, Defendant McNair is the probation officer to whom Ms. Hilfort primarily reports.
33. Plaintiff Sonya Beard is a 39-year-old woman who lives in Lawrence County, adjacent to Giles County. Ms. Beard was subjected to supervised probation with Defendant PSI between June 2016 and December 2017. During her period of supervised probation with PSI, Defendants Thompson and Bledsoe were the probation officers to whom Ms. Beard primarily reported.
B. Defendants 34. Defendant Community Probation Services, LLC is a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. Community Probation Services, LLC is headquartered in Crossville, Tennessee, and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 2015 when it formed via conversion of Defendant Community Probation Services. 35. Defendant Community Probation Services is a for-profit general partnership organized in Tennessee on January 1, 2014, and headquartered in Crossville. On October 15,
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2015, Community Probation Services filed a Certificate of Conversion with the Tennessee Secretary of State, converting itself into Defendant Community Probation Services, LLC.
36. Defendant Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. 9 Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was headquartered in Crossville, Tennessee. The company was known as “PSIProbation, L.L.C.” until it changed its name to Community Probation Services, L.L.C. effective January 1, 2008. Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was terminated on April 25, 2014.
37. Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, and Community Probation Services, L.L.C. are collectively referred to herein as “CPS.”
38. Defendant Progressive Sentencing, Inc. is a for-profit corporation incorporated and registered to do business in Tennessee. Progressive Sentencing, Inc. is headquartered in Cookeville and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 1991.
39. Defendant PSI-Probation, L.L.C. was a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. PSI-Probation, L.L.C. was headquartered in Cookeville and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 1999. Effective January 1, 2008, PSI-Probation, L.L.C. changed its name to “Community Probation Services, L.L.C.” Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was terminated on April 25, 2014.
40. Defendant PSI-Probation II, LLC was a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. PSI-Probation II, LLC was headquartered in Cookeville, and operated in the State of Tennessee since 2005. PSI-Probation II, LLC was administratively dissolved on August 6. 2017.
9 “Community Probation Services, LLC” and “Community Probation Services L.L.C.” are distinct entities. The use or absence of periods in “LLC” are intentional throughout the complaint.
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41. Defendant Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC is a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC is headquartered in Cookeville, and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 2002.
42. Defendant Timothy Cook is a citizen and resident of Cookeville, Tennessee. Defendant Cook is or was the owner, member, organizer, partner, and/or president of Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation, L.L.C., PSI-Probation II, LLC, and Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC.
43. Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation, L.L.C., PSI-Probation II, LLC, and Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC are collectively referred to herein as “PSI,” the name that local probationers and court staff use to refer to the company in Giles.
44. Both CPS and PSI generate their income from supervision fees and surcharges that Defendants require misdemeanor probationers to pay to the companies, pursuant to contracts signed by the Giles County Executive on behalf of the County. See Exs. 2, 3.
45. Pursuant to the Contracts, the County pays nothing for the companies’ services. Ex. 1 at 4; Ex. 2 at 3.
46. Instead, the Contracts require the County to refer misdemeanor probation supervision to the companies, which provide probation supervision services at no charge to the County, extracting their revenue exclusively through various fees charged to probationers. Ex. 1 at 4, Ex. 2 at 3.
47. Defendant Giles County is a local government entity organized under the laws of the State of Tennessee. Its officials are responsible for, among other things, operating the County jail, prosecuting misdemeanor and traffic offenses, providing for a lawful probation supervision system, and supplying adequate indigent defense services.
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48. Defendant Patricia McNair is a probation officer employed by CPS. Defendant McNair supervises Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort. She previously supervised Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil and Lesley Johnson. She is sued in her personal and official capacities.
49. Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe is a probation officer employed by PSI. She supervises Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell. She previously supervised Named Plaintiff Sonya Beard. She is sued in her personal and official capacities.
50. Defendant Harriet Thompson was a probation officer employed by PSI. She previously supervised Named Plaintiff Sonya Beard. She is sued in her personal and official capacities.
51. Defendants McNair, Thompson, and Bledsoe have used their discretion as probation officers to determine how frequently probationers have to report, the means by which probationers must report (e.g., in person or by phone), whether and when to seek an arrest warrant based on a purported violation of probation and on what basis or bases, what disposition to recommend to the court following a revocation proceeding, how frequently to subject probationers to drug tests, and every other discretionary probationary decision discussed in this Complaint. Defendant McNair uses her discretion as a CPS probation officer to allocate payments from probationers to pay the company first and court debts second and whether and when to convert individuals’ probation from supervised to unsupervised.
52. Defendants CPS, PSI, McNair, Thompson, and Bledsoe perform a traditional government function and were acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this case.
53. Defendants McNair, Thompson, and Bledsoe acted as agents of their employers at all times relevant to this case.
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C. Alter Ego Allegations 1. CPS Defendants
54. Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation Services constitute alter egos of each other. These Defendant entities have been used in contravention of public policy—namely contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested companies to serve a traditional government function, which Defendants abused to extort payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law. These Defendant entities also use the same office or business location, employ the same employees, and do not maintain arms-length relationships. Unless otherwise specified, all references to “CPS” herein refer to all current and former legal entities through which CPS operates and has operated in the State of Tennessee during the Class periods.
2. PSI Defendants 55. Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation L.L.C., PSI-Probation II, LLC, and Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC constitute alter egos of each other. These Defendant entities have been used in contravention of public policy—namely contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested companies to serve a traditional government function, which Defendants abused to extort payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law. These Defendant entities also use the same office or business location, employ the same employees, and do not maintain arms-length relationships. Unless otherwise specified, all references to “PSI” herein refer to all current and former legal
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entities through which PSI operates and has operated in the State of Tennessee during the Class periods. V. DEFENDANTS’ CONSPIRACY TO OPERATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR-
PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM BY EXTORTION 56. Giles County and the Private Defendants, operating pursuant to the Contracts between the companies and the County, conspired to use the County’s probation system to collect court debts owed to the County by misdemeanor offenders, as well as to collect fees owed solely to the private companies, using unlawful extortion, threats of arrest and jailing, physical confinement, and improper and fraudulent legal process. 57. By establishing a purely user-funded probation system, Defendants created financial incentives for the companies to use their access and perceived access to the County’s courts, law enforcement officers, and jail to engage in extortionate and unconstitutional policies and practices, described in detail below. All Defendants, including County officials, are aware of and complicit in each of these policies and practices. 58. Pursuant to the County’s contracts with the companies, for-profit supervised probation thus serves almost exclusively as a mechanism for collecting post-judgment court debts from individuals who are poor, and as a mechanism to generate and extort additional income for the companies through coercive and unlawful means not available to any private creditor under state or federal law. These policies and practices devastate the lives of hundreds of misdemeanor probationers in Giles County every year, and have done so for more than a decade. 59. Probation need not be a cash-collection tool. For example, Defendants have at their disposal the option to convert misdemeanor court and probation debts into civil judgments, which would allow the County to collect debts while observing constitutional and statutory safeguards. 60. Defendants know these options exist: they occasionally terminate the probation of a person who has been on pay-only supervised probation for several years and permit the person’s
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debts to be treated as civil judgments in accordance with Tennessee law. However, Defendants rarely use this option, choosing instead, as a matter of policy, to use threats, arrest, jailing, and endless cycles of supervised probation to extort payments from impoverished people.
A. The Contracts 1. CPS
61. CPS signed its contract with Giles County on March 16, 2016, after PCC, Inc.— which operated in Giles for more than a decade until it was sued for materially the same policies challenged in this Complaint—left the private probation business.
62. After PCC, Inc. left Giles, CPS moved into the former PCC, Inc. offices, began supervising PCC, Inc.’s former probationers, and hired PCC, Inc.’s former employees, including defendant Patricia McNair.
63. The Contract between CPS and Giles County empowers the company to determine how much money a probationer must pay in supervision fees, surcharges, and court costs and on what dates in order to avoid a violation-of-probation arrest warrant or citation warrant being issued.
64. The Contract requires the company to collect court debts and fees generated for the company and to decide how much of the money collected should be remitted to the court, and how much should be used to pay itself. Ex. 1.
65. CPS is also required by the Contract to prepare arrest warrants for violations of probation, confer with the judge and prosecutor about cases, provide testimony and evidence at revocation hearings, and decide whether and when to report non-compliance to the Court.
2. PSI 66. PSI has been providing private probation services in Giles County since at least December 14, 2011, when the County and PSI signed the operative Contract. See Ex. 2.
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67. The Contract gives PSI the power to monitor, collect, and levy its own additional payments, enforce compliance with conditions, report non-compliance (including through sworn affidavits for arrest warrants and citation warrants), and confer privately with the prosecutor and judges on cases.
68. In exchange, the County agreed to assign cases to private for-profit supervised probation with PSI.
B. The Companies’ Practices Are Materially Indistinguishable 69. The companies operate in the same way in all material respects. The only apparent difference is that probationers with PSI make payments on their court debt directly to the court and pay only their probation fees to the company, while probationers with CPS typically pay their court debts to the company in addition to the probation fees. CPS then remits some portion of those payments to the court. 70. In pursuit of generating revenue for themselves and the County, all of the Private Defendants decide how much money a probationer owes to them each week to avoid violating their probation and how frequently the probationer must report and make payments; both companies monitor probationers’ payments of court debts and probation fees, and both companies consider mere nonpayment of either court debts or probation fees to be a violation of probation that justifies revocation; both companies engage in a pattern and practice of threatening indigent probationers with arrest, jailing, and extension of supervised probation if they do not pay probation fees or court debts, refuse to submit to costly and invasive drug tests at the discretion of the companies, or do not comply with any of the companies’ other vague and onerous conditions; and both companies file sworn affidavits with the court seeking warrants, informing the court that the person did not make payments as required, without first determining that the person willfully
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refused to pay, and even when they know the person did not pay only because she was too poor to pay.
C. The System of Private Probation in Giles County 1. The Process for Assigning Misdemeanor Offenders to Private Probation
71. In Giles County, misdemeanor and traffic cases are typically handled in General Sessions Court. A person may plead guilty to a misdemeanor offense in the Circuit Court if the charge was originally filed as a felony.
72. Individuals sentenced to probation are assessed a variety of fines (as punishment for the offense) and fees (which are used to pay for municipal services), court costs, and litigation taxes10 without regard for the person’s ability to pay.11
73. A misdemeanor defendant is never told at the time of pleading guilty how much he or she will owe. During one recent docket, a person who was pleading guilty asked the judge, “What are my costs and fines?” The judge responded, “I don’t know.”
74. A misdemeanor defendant is typically sentenced to either 11 months and 29 days in jail suspended for 11 months and 29 days of probation, or to six months in jail, suspended for six months of probation. Sometimes the sentence includes several days or a month in jail in addition to the suspended sentence and probation.
75. As a matter of policy, every person convicted of a misdemeanor offense in General Sessions Court is required to pay at least $25 every week toward their court debts as a condition of probation, regardless of ability to pay. People convicted of misdemeanors in Circuit Court are required to pay at least $50 every month.
10 Restitution—which is a payment made to a victim of an offense in compensation for the harm caused—is also sometimes required. 11 Under Tennessee law, court debt may be collected in the same manner as a civil judgment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(a).
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76. In every General Sessions case, a pre-printed “Order” is entered at the sentencing hearing, purporting to find that every single misdemeanor probationer “stated in open court that he/she is financially capable of paying $25 per week.” But, the statements are coerced since people charged with misdemeanor offenses believe that they must agree to make payments, or else they risk being sentenced to jail instead of probation.
77. Many misdemeanor defendants who state on the record that they are able to pay $25 each week are extremely poor. Many of them survive only on social security disability payments or other means-tested government benefits, and struggle to meet the basic necessities of life. They cannot in fact make the weekly payments without foregoing basic necessities or falling even deeper into debt.
78. Everyone involved in the process of assessing and collecting court debts, including the County and the Private Defendants, knows that the “Orders” purporting to find every person charged with a misdemeanor financially able to pay $25 per week are based, in many cases, on coerced statements: Defendants possess information about the probationers’ finances, and are present in the courtroom when fees are assessed and the purported colloquy occurs, and many probationers were found indigent for purposes of appointing counsel.
79. In some rare cases, a person will ask for a lower weekly payment during sentencing, but these requests are routinely denied.
80. The sole General Sessions judge routinely threatens people he sentences to probation that if they do not pay, their probation could be revoked and extended, saying words to the effect of, “I don’t want to see you back here on a violation, much less a violation for nonpayment.”
81. In many cases, people owe so much money that they will be unable to pay it all off at a rate of $25 per week within the probation period.
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82. Under Tennessee law, community service can be an alternative to a requirement to pay court costs. The County could suspend court debts upon the successful completion of community service, but community service is typically not affirmatively offered to impoverished probationers as an alternative to payment.
83. Additional rehabilitative conditions of probation are rarely required. But when people are required to complete such classes as a condition of probation, the probationers must travel to and pay for them.
84. Pursuant to the companies’ contracts with the County, any misdemeanor offender who is sentenced to probation must be assigned to be supervised by either CPS or PSI.
85. According to policy and practice, and by agreement or acquiescence of all Defendants, assignments to supervised probation alternate between each company so that each company is assigned approximately the same number of new probationers.
86. In many cases, people are sentenced to a minimum period of supervised probation, during which time the person must report to the company, submit to drug tests any and every time the company decides to conduct them, and make regular payments of court costs and probation fees under threat of arrest and revocation. After the minimum period of supervision, the probation can be converted to unsupervised if all court costs and probation fees have been paid.
87. In some cases, there is no required minimum period of supervised probation, and probationers are informed that they will be “supervised until paid in full.” People who can afford to pay in full are permitted to pay their court costs at their first probation meeting, along with a $45 probation fee for the single visit, and then, if the person was assigned to CPS, the company will notify the court to convert the person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation. If the person was assigned to PSI, the Court Clerk’s office is responsible for closing the probationer’s account.
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88. Those who are sentenced to “supervised probation until paid in full” and cannot afford the full court debt must continuously report to the Private Defendants, submit to invasive drug tests, and pay supervision fees to the companies. They face arrest warrants, revocation, additional fees, and extension of their for-profit supervised probation, and thus additional supervision fees, if they have not paid all of their court costs and probation fees by the end of their probationary period.
2. Conditions of Probation 89. Upon assignment to supervised probation, probationers are required to have an initial meeting with a CPS or PSI representative present in the courtroom. 90. In General Sessions Court, Defendants Bledsoe and McNair sit at desks to the right of the judge’s bench while the court is in session. On their desks are stacks of documents entitled “Misdemeanor Sentence.” These forms are pre-signed by the General Sessions judge. On the day of conviction, the probation officer will check off applicable conditions of probation, including the amount of money the person must pay each week in court costs, and the amount she must pay each month as a supervision fee to the company, and any “special conditions,” such as classes provided by third party contractors who charge a fee. 91. If a probationer cannot afford to pay the fee required for the class, then she cannot take the class. If a person does not take the class, she cannot satisfy the conditions of her probation, and her probation will be revoked and extended. As a matter of policy, the County and the companies do not provide any mechanism for waiving the fee. 92. The forms also indicate how frequently the probationer must report, and whether she must report in person or by phone. One of the individual Defendant probation officers fills out the portion of the forms relating to the probationer’s reporting requirements at her own discretion.
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93. Probationers are also required by Defendants McNair and Bledsoe, and previously by Defendant Thompson, to sign a company-specific, standard document agreeing to abide by general “Rules” of probation.
94. A set of these Rules were designed by each company and agreed to by the County. 95. CPS requires probationers to agree to each of the following conditions on penalty of arrest and revocation of probation for failure to obey:
a. To pay all court debts and probation fees. b. To “[p]ay probation fees, and drug screen fee as instructed”; c. To submit to random drug tests and pay for them; d. To “make a full and truthful report to my probation officer . . . as directed by the officer . . .”; e. To avoid consuming any “intoxicants”; and f. To notify the private probation company “BEFORE changing my address or employment.” 96. The document distributed to people assigned to CPS supervision listing the Rules is entitled “Probation Order,” which gives it the imprimatur of the court. However, it is signed only by the private probation officer and the probationer. It states that “[v]iolation of any of the terms of Probation may be sufficient cause for revocation of Probation.” 97. PSI’s rules are similar. They require probationers to agree to abide by each of the following conditions on penalty of arrest and revocation of probation for failure to obey: a. To pay probation fees “in a timely manner”; b. To submit to random drug tests “as required by the probation officer” and to pay for those tests;
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c. To permit any for-profit probation officer and any law enforcement officer to search their bodies, homes, cars, and personal belongings at any time, in any place, and without a search warrant;
d. To “not keep late or unusual hours”; e. To “not associate with any person who is known to be involved in criminal activity”; f. To not leave the State of Tennessee without the for-profit probation officer’s permission; g. To “not use any alcoholic beverage to the point that you may be arrested or charged with a criminal offense”; and h. To notify the private probation company “before changing address or employment.” 98. The County and the companies require probationers to agree to submit to and pay for suspicionless drug tests at any time, even when their underlying charge has nothing to do with drugs or alcohol, and even when the person has no history of substance abuse. Refusing to take a drug test constitutes a violation of probation. 99. The companies charge for the drug tests, and the cost gets added to the probationer’s debts to the company. The company charges orders of magnitude more for each portable drug test than the company spends, making drug testing one of the most profitable aspects of the companies’ business. 100. Although CPS writes in its rules that it charges $45 every six months for drug tests, many probationers are charged for every single drug test, which occur much more frequently than once every six months. The cost of each drug test varies. Probation officers typically charge $35
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or $45 per test, but sometimes they will accept $20, and sometimes they will require the probationer to pay as much as $90.
101. PSI also exercises its discretion to charge varying amounts for drug tests, typically ranging from $20 to $45. The company sometimes charges for every drug test, and other times charges a lump sum for some period of time, regardless of the number of drug tests actually conducted during that time period.
102. The companies use drug-testing kits, which they administer in the office, that purport to provide immediate results without laboratory analysis.
103. If probationers wish to have the results of the in-office test verified by a lab, as a matter of each company’s policy, the probationer must make another payment to the private company, which sends the sample to a lab for the confirmatory test. In at least one case, CPS charged a probationer $120 for the confirmatory testing.
104. The Private Defendants drug test probationers more frequently near the end of their supervised probation periods because they can earn significantly more profit if there is a reason to revoke and extend the person’s supervised probation: by increasing drug tests—and charging the associated fees—just as someone’s probation is about to end, the companies make it more likely that the person will violate a condition of probation by testing positive for drugs, refusing to submit to the drug test, or being unable to pay for the drug test, and their probation will be revoked and extended, resulting in more fees for the company.
105. If a probationer who is being supervised by PSI tests positive in a drug test for the first time, then Defendant Bledsoe (and previously Defendant Thompson), in her discretion may permit the probationer to pay for and participate in a 12-hour drug education class—which costs $75—to avoid a violation-of-probation warrant. The amount is not waivable.
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106. If the person cannot afford to pay for the class, then she cannot take it, and Defendant Bledsoe (and previously Defendant Thompson) will seek an arrest warrant for violation of probation.
3. Reporting 107. Both companies run their Giles County probation operations out of offices located within a block of the Giles County Courthouse in Pulaski. 108. CPS has one primary reporting day for adult probationers each week, and most CPS supervised adult probationers are required to report to their probation officer on that day. 109. Probationers assigned to PSI report throughout the week, except Thursday, when Defendant Bledsoe is in court for the misdemeanor docket. 110. The companies decide how frequently a person must report and whether they must report in person or by phone. The companies typically require probationers to report every week, every other week, or every month. 111. The probation officers routinely allow a person to report less frequently if she has been making regular payments. 112. But if a probationer cannot make payments, or the probation officer decides in her discretion that the payments are too small, the private probation officer routinely requires the person to report more frequently. 113. The main purpose of each probation meeting is for probationers to make payments to the probation officer. 114. Non-reporting is deemed to be a violation of probation, and the company employee, in her discretion, can seek an arrest warrant, which she knows will have either a predetermined secured monetary bail amount or an instruction to “hold” the arrestee, i.e., to detain the arrestee in jail until her court date, or otherwise notify the court of non-reporting.
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115. Pursuant to policy and practice, during the meetings, the probationer reports the amount she paid to the company that day, and is asked to report any contacts with law enforcement. As a matter of policy, Defendants Bledsoe and McNair—and previously Defendant Thompson— make no investigation or inquiry into the reasons that a person does not report and, when probationers offer reasons, Defendants ignore them.
116. The supervision meetings typically last only five minutes, or sometimes ten if the private probation officer decides to require a drug test.
117. For those who report to CPS by phone, the company’s written rules instruct individuals to simply “LEAVE VOICE MAIL” that covers four things: (1) the probationer’s name; (2) contact information and employment status; (3) whether the probationer has had contact with law enforcement (if yes, then “when and where”); and (4) whether the probationer has sent in a payment to CPS and if not, then when the person intends to pay. There is no option to speak with a probation officer instead of leaving a message.
118. PSI tells probationers it supervises by phone that they must fax in a form every week or every other week and must call at the same interval on Wednesdays or Fridays to speak with an employee. The form requires the probationer to state her name, address, place of employment (if employed), and whether she has been arrested or “questioned” by police since her last reporting date. The form also requires the probationer to state when she will pay the court and how much, and to state when she will pay PSI the supervision fee. The probationer must state whether she is “familiar with all conditions/rules of my probation” and attest as to whether “except where noted above, and [sic] have fully obeyed them.”
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4. Defendants Threaten Probationers with Arrest and Jailing for Nonpayment
119. The for-profit probation officers tell the probationers they supervise that they must make regular payments of probation fees and surcharges to the company supervising them and must also make regular payments on their court costs.
120. If the probationer is behind on her payments, the probation officer will threaten her with arrest, jailing, revocation, and/or extension of supervised probation, telling her that she will be “violated” if she does not bring enough money the next time, or the probation officer may inform the probationer that a citation warrant or an arrest warrant has already been issued or will be issued for nonpayment.
121. As a matter of policy and practice, the Private Defendants tell probationers that, if they violate their probation, they could be sent to jail for the entire suspended sentence of 11/29 following even a first or second violation.
122. Sometimes, the probation officer’s threats are subtler or implicit. Defendants Bledsoe and McNair, and previously Defendant Thompson, sometimes inform probationers simply that they “must pay” a certain amount of money at their next meeting, or they inform them of the total amount due before the end of the 11/29 term of probation, meaning that if the probationers do not pay the amount required, they will be arrested and their probation will be revoked and extended.
123. The private probation officers have discretion to seek warrants for nonpayment when a person does not pay whatever amount the probation officer demands. They tell probationers that they will be “violated” if they do not pay.
124. The Private Defendants often tell probationers that they will extend the probationers’ probation to allow more time to pay, instead of requiring the probationer to serve her entire suspended sentence in jail.
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125. Probationers must also pay for the drug tests the companies require them to submit to, and the company employee can require probationers to be tested for drugs any and every time they report.
126. Under federal and Tennessee law, only willful nonpayment can constitute a violation of probation.12 As a matter of policy and practice, the companies train their employees not to inform probationers of this law and their basic rights. Defendants routinely threaten to seek violation-of-probation warrants for probationers who are too poor to make a payment, or whose payments fall short of what the probation officer demanded, without verifying that the nonpayment was willful.
127. The Private Defendants know that the probationers they supervise are impoverished because the companies require probationers to state their source of income on company intake forms. Many probationers report that they are unemployed, have no income, rely on friends or family for housing and financial support, or have income only from public benefits such as unemployment, veteran’s benefits, disability, or food stamps.
128. Many probationers divert their food stamps and disability checks to pay their court debts and probation fees. Many miss rent payments and go without heat or electricity for their homes, gas for their cars, and food for themselves and their families in order to pay their court debts and probation fees.
5. Defendants Refuse to Waive Fees and Costs a. CPS waiver process
129. The CPS Probation Rules state, “Please DO NOT ask the Probation Officer to change the amount of your payments or the date the Judge ordered you to pay your cost by, because only the Judge can make those type of changes.”
12 See supra note 5.
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130. Notwithstanding this written admonition, CPS does have a “Supervision Fee Exemption Form” that probationers can complete—although the company, as a matter of policy and practice, never affirmatively offers the form. Sometimes, Defendant McNair, at her discretion, provides the form when a probationer specifically asks for it. Other times, Defendant McNair or another CPS employee tells the probationer that no such form exists, or that the company has no power to waive costs and fees.
131. The form requires the probationer to provide amounts paid per month toward various “Bills.” The form asks for the probationer’s income per month, but not whether the probationer receives government benefits, is employed, unable to work, or whether she must support children or other family members.
132. The form also asks for the probationer’s spouse’s income, as well as “Other Forms of Income (boyfriend, girlfriend, child support, food stamps, etc…).” The form then requires that these sources of income be added together to reach a “Total Average Income Per Month” from which the probationer’s “Total Average Bills Per Month” will be deducted to determine the “Average Balance Left Per Month.”
133. Although they are under no legal obligation to do so, in practice, friends and family of probationers, who are often themselves living in poverty, frequently contribute whatever money they have to help pay the companies so that the probationer can avoid being arrested and jailed for not paying. The “fee exemption” form allows an individual probation officer to recommend various outcomes to the “Probation Manager,” including that the waiver be disapproved, that the person’s fees be reduced, that some of the person’s fees be waived, or that the “balance owed” be waived (presumably the person would incur additional probation fees going forward).
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134. Over the course of an 18-month investigation, including interviews with more than one hundred people supervised by CPS, undersigned counsel has not encountered any CPS probationer whose court debt or probation fees were reduced or waived by the company.
b. PSI Waiver Process 135. PSI similarly fails and refuses, as a matter of policy, to inform probationers about the option of seeking a fee waiver or reduction. 136. If a probationer who is being supervised by PSI requests a fee waiver or reduction form, Defendant Bledsoe, and previously Defendant Thompson, sometimes provide, in her discretion a lengthy, 10-page “Application for Indigency.” 137. The form requires that the probationers provide detailed information about their income and assets, and the income and assets of any other members of their household, and that the probationer provide various documents including an identity card, proof of housing costs, proof of immigration status (“not required if you were born in the US”), and proof of earned income. The Application further requests proof of “Unearned Income,” such as award letters showing proof of social security, veteran’s, unemployment, or retirement benefits. Probationers may also be required to produce “proof of pregnancy and due date if someone in your household is pregnant.” The company’s General Manager determines whether to waive fees. 138. The onerous documentation requirements function as a deterrent for probationers, many of whom do not have stable housing or filing systems for the paperwork the company demands. Additionally, the time and expense (e.g. gas money) required for gathering the documents can function as a further deterrent. 139. The probationer then submits the form and supporting documentation to her probation officer, who sends it to the PSI Headquarters in Cookeville for review. Defendant
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Bledsoe, and previously Defendant Thompson, state that they have no authority to waive the fees themselves.
140. It can take weeks or months for a waiver decision to be made. In the meantime, the probationer is required to continue reporting and making payments.
141. Before any fees will be waived, the probationer must pay for and pass a drug screen according to PSI policy.
c. The County Refuses to Waive Costs and Fees 142. According to the clerk’s office, there is no mechanism to ask the General Sessions judge to reduce or waive fees. One clerk explained, “Otherwise, everyone would do that.” Instead, when someone gets to the end of their probation and has not paid everything they owe to the court and the company, the person’s probation is extended, and additional costs are assessed against the probationer. D. The Process for Notifying the Court of Alleged Non-Compliance 143. The companies have a financial stake in using alleged rule violations to extract more payments from probationers. They have an incentive to use the reporting and revocation process to maximize their revenues. 144. They also have a financial stake in advising the judge to issue violation-ofprobation warrants and to revoke and extend the person’s probation. 145. The Private Defendants have the power to manufacture “probation violations” by setting rules and then claiming that a probationer broke those rules, or by interpreting vague standard rules and conditions in a way that generates a violation. 146. The companies rely on the vagueness of the rules and conditions to threaten probationers and create a culture of fear in which probationers believe that the company can find a way to “violate” their probation whenever it wants if the company wants more money.
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147. The companies use their control over the process of notifying the court of alleged violations to overlook certain violations—i.e., a positive drug screen—if a person is making payments to the company, and to threaten other people that, if they do not pay, the company will use its discretion to petition the Court for revocation for a technical violation if they do not come up with money.
148. Company employees are also authorized to recommend that the court issue an arrest warrant with a secured financial condition on it or with a “hold” on it (requiring the Sheriff to detain the arrestee prior to a probation-revocation hearing), or to request that the person be released without an up-front payment prior to a revocation hearing.
1. When the Alleged Violation Is Solely Non-Payment 149. Probationers placed on PSI and CPS supervised probation are told from the moment they are placed on probation that payment is a required condition of probation. 150. Probation orders for CPS explicitly state that “[f]ailure to pay court cost as instructed at any time by the Probation Officer or the Court can result in a violation of probation.” 151. The private probation officers have discretion to violate a person for nonpayment the first time she does not pay the amount the company demands, and to seek a citation or arrest warrant. 152. They also have discretion to accept a partial payment of the amount required or give the person time to come up with the money instead of seeking a warrant. 153. The Private Defendants regularly threaten probationers in person that they will inform the court of their nonpayment and ask the court to issue a warrant if the probationer does not make a payment, or if the payment is not big enough. 154. The companies have a policy of not informing probationers that, under Tennessee and federal law, their probation cannot be revoked unless nonpayment is willful.
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155. Perversely, the Private Defendants view probationers who receive monthly public benefits as a steady stream of income and frequently tell probationers that they will delay “violating” those probationers until after their disability checks arrive, giving the probationers an opportunity—by using money from their means-tested public benefits payments—to make a payment to the company and avoid arrest. (Federal law prohibits the Defendants from explicitly garnishing such federal benefits.)
156. Defendant private probation officers frequently tell probationers that revocation and extension for another term of “user-funded” supervised probation is the common penalty for nonpayment of court debt and probation fees.
157. To report a violation for nonpayment, the companies seek warrants from the courts. 158. General Sessions Court issues citation warrants which do not authorize arrest. Instead of being arrested, the person will be told to report to court the following Thursday for the misdemeanor violation-of-probation docket. 159. Circuit Court warrants for nonpayment authorize arrest, and employees of the Giles County Sheriff’s Office routinely arrest and jail people who are alleged by the private companies to have violated their probation solely by not making payments while on supervised probation out of Circuit Court. These arrest warrants include a preset money bail amount, printed on the arrest warrant. 160. Company employees often seek arrest or citation warrants for nonpayment as a means of coercing additional payments from probationers: probation officers inform probationers that a warrant has issued, but tell the probationer that they will have the warrant recalled if the probationer makes the payment in full. 161. When a probation officer asks the court to recall a warrant because a probationer has paid whatever amount the company demanded, the court always recalls the warrant.
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162. The Private Defendants have a pattern and practice of threatening to seek probationviolation warrants based solely on nonpayment.
163. Defendants use the Circuit Court arrest warrants for nonpayment to “send a message” to other probationers that they must pay or the same thing (arrest and jailing) will happen to them.
164. When probationers are arrested—even just for nonpayment—their mugshots typically appear in the local paper, Hard Times, which is sold at gas stations. Friends, family members, neighbors, and coworkers of probationers often find out about arrests and probation violations this way.
2. When the Alleged Violation is Non-Compliance with a Substantive Condition of Probation
165. Arrest warrants for alleged violations other than nonpayment typically have a monetary amount preprinted on them that must be paid before the probationer can be released following arrest.
166. The companies and their employees know that arrest warrants for alleged violations of probation are typically issued with a secured financial condition of release pre-printed on the warrant and determined without an individualized inquiry into the arrestee’s ability to pay. The companies and their employees also know that the County has a policy of detaining arrestees who cannot afford the money bail amount for up to ten days before bringing them to court for a probation-revocation hearing and that, as a result, arrests for alleged violations of probation routinely result in the person’s lengthy confinement before any opportunity to contest the for-profit probation officer’s allegations of a violation of probation.
167. Because the vast majority of probationers are impoverished and struggle to pay for basic necessities, many remain in jail following an arrest for an alleged violation of probation.
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168. After a warrant issues, the Private Defendants routinely instruct probationers to avoid the town of Pulaski—except for when they have to come to the probation office to make payments—as a way of evading arrest by law enforcement officers. The companies also instruct probationers, however, to continue to make payments on their probation fees. In this way, the companies continue making money while the person waits to be arrested or prepares to surrender to the jail.
169. Probationers have good reason to fear detention in the Giles County Jail. The jail is an abusive, dangerous, and unhealthy place. Guards have referred to women inmates as “dogs,” and inmates routinely receive only two, nutritionally inadequate meals each day. The jail is so overcrowded that people often sleep on the floor. At least one probationer was recently confined with four other women to a jail cell meant for two.
170. Jail officials often withhold medication from inmates, even when the medicine is prescribed and the inmate herself has provided the medication to the jail to dispense.
E. Revocation Proceedings 171. Probationers who are arrested for allegedly violating their probation and who were unable to pay money bail to secure release are transported from the jail to the Giles County courthouse in orange jumpsuits and shackles. Arrestees who were able to pay the money bail required for release also appear on that docket. 172. In the General Sessions court, probationers who are in County custody are seated in the courtroom behind a one-way panel that enables them to see the courtroom, while no one in the courtroom can see them. 173. Probationers accused of violating their probation will be given a few minutes to consult with a public defender if they wish.
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174. Often a person can get out of jail that day if she agrees to revocation and extension of her supervised for-profit probation term.
175. The individual private probation officer defendants sit in the courtroom at tables next to the judge during court proceedings, including probation-revocation proceedings.
176. The contracts explicitly permit the companies to confer with judges, court staff, and the County prosecutors on individual cases.
177. Company employees engage in ex parte conversations about probationers with judges and prosecutors before, during, and after revocation-of-probation hearings, including recommending revocation, recommending a particular sentence, and offering evidence, which routinely consists solely of the probation officer’s allegations.
178. The for-profit probation officers provide testimony and make recommendations about the appropriate disposition of a revocation hearing, including urging the judge to sentence the person to jail and extend the person’s term of for-profit supervised probation.
179. The companies’ allegations are routinely the only basis provided to support revocation.
180. During revocation proceedings, company employees routinely withhold the true reasons for the violations the company has alleged. In particular, they routinely withhold relevant material information and evidence concerning ability to pay. For example, as they do with applications for arrest warrants, company employees withhold from the judge the fact that the person did not pay because the person could not afford to pay.
181. The Private Defendants typically recommend some time in jail in addition to extension of supervised probation for every violation of misdemeanor probation. These penalties help the companies ensure that their threats to jail probationers who do not pay enough money are
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credible and help to convey to probationers that the company is correct when it describes the influence that it wields over the local probation system.
182. Arrests and revocation lead to additional court debts being added to the probationers’ existing debts.
183. As a result of Defendants’ policies and practices, probationers end up on supervised probation with a private company for years because they cannot afford to make payments.
184. It is the policy, pattern, and practice of the Private Defendants and Giles County not to inform probationers that their ability to pay is a critical issue at any revocation proceeding concerning their nonpayment. As a result, their probation is revoked and extended without anyone ever determining that nonpayment was willful.
F. When a Person Pays Her Debts in Full 185. Desperate to get off of supervised probation, probationers will sometimes use their tax refunds, an entire social security check, payday loans, money from selling blood plasma, proceeds from selling personal items, or money loaned from family and friends to pay off their debts to the company and the court. 186. PSI and CPS have different policies and practices that apply when someone has paid her court debts in full. 187. The supervised probation of a person who is being supervised by CPS will not end unless and until the company itself decides to convert the person’s supervised probation to unsupervised. 188. When a person pays off her debt in full, CPS issues an “Order” informing the probationer that her supervised probation is over and that she is now on unsupervised probation. These “Orders” are signed only by the individual CPS employee. No judge reviews the decision
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to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised. And the judge does not sign the “Order.”
189. When CPS converts an individual’s probation from supervised to unsupervised, the probationer is no longer required to report to the company, pay additional fees to the company, submit to costly drug tests, or suffer additional restraints on her liberty imposed by the company.
190. The final decision to make this conversion rests entirely with CPS, which has a direct financial stake in delaying conversion.
191. Because people who are supervised by PSI make payments on their court debts directly to the court clerk, the clerk’s office knows before PSI does when a person is eligible for unsupervised probation. When that happens, the clerk’s office notifies PSI, and PSI puts a “hold” on collection of the supervision fees. The person is no longer required to report to PSI or to submit to the company’s conditions of probation.
192. Giles County’s contractual agreements with the Defendant companies have turned the Giles County misdemeanor probation system into a mechanism for generating profit for private benefit and coercing collection of court debts for the County in a way that violates Tennessee and federal law governing debt collection.
193. Pursuant to the Contracts, financial incentives permeate every decision made before and during the probation period, leading to systemic violations of Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.
194. The Private Defendants earn hundreds of thousands of dollars from this extortion scheme each year. The County collects hundreds of thousands in court debts each year. VI. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBJECTED TO DEFENDANTS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR-PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM A. Plaintiff Karen McNeil 195. Karen McNeil is 53 years old and lives in Giles County with a friend in a mobile home outside of Pulaski. She has four adult children.
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196. Ms. McNeil was subjected to supervised probation with CPS from March 2016 until October 2017. She was previously supervised on probation by PCC, Inc. from November 2015 until March 2016. For the entire period of supervised probation with both CPS and PCC, Inc., Defendant McNair was the probation officer to whom Ms. McNeil primarily reported.
197. Ms. McNeil has an eighth grade education. She cannot read or write at an adult level and is functionally illiterate.
198. Ms. McNeil lives in poverty and struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. She has no bank account, real estate interest, or other assets. She depends on Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and food stamps to survive.
199. Ms. McNeil is not employed. She last worked about twenty years ago, as a traffic flagger. While on the job, she was hit by a truck and sustained severe back injuries that have prevented her from working regularly ever since. Due to her medical conditions and the accident, Ms. McNeil suffers from serious chronic pain.
200. Ms. McNeil faces additional health challenges that impede her day-to-day life, including chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (“COPD”), cancer, and fibromyalgia. She has had multiple major surgeries. At times, she must use an oxygen tank and a cane for walking.
201. Ms. McNeil pled guilty on November 19, 2015 to driving on a revoked license, a misdemeanor offense, and was sentenced to probation for 11 months and 29 days, with a minimum of four months’ supervised probation. The Court assessed $426 in fines and fees and ordered her to pay $25 each week in court costs and fines, $45 a month in supervision fees, and $45 for each drug test. After four months, Ms. McNeil’s supervised probation could have been converted to unsupervised probation, but only if her court costs and probation fees were paid in full.
202. At no point was Ms. McNeil ever able to afford these payments without sacrificing the basic necessities of life.
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203. Throughout Ms. McNeil’s probation—whether the company supervising Ms. McNeil was PCC, Inc. or CPS—she endured Defendant McNair’s perpetual threats of arrest and jailing for nonpayment. Ms. McNeil lived in constant terror that she would be arrested and, given her serious medical issues, she reasonably feared she would die if sent to jail.
204. Defendant McNair repeatedly forced Ms. McNeil to undergo invasive and humiliating drug tests throughout her probation with CPS. Pursuant to company policy, during each drug screen, Defendant McNair forced Ms. McNeil to leave the bathroom door open while Defendant McNair observed Ms. McNeil urinating into a cup to produce a sample to be tested. Anyone walking down the hallway could see Ms. McNeil urinating. On one occasion, Defendant McNair invited a male CPS employee to watch Ms. McNeil urinate.
205. CPS required Ms. McNeil to pay $45 for each drug test. Because she could not afford that amount up-front, it was added to the total debt owed to CPS.
206. On April 19, 2016, while on supervised probation solely because Ms. McNeil had been unable to pay her court costs and fines in full, Ms. McNeil was arrested for a misdemeanor offense.
207. The following day, in accordance with CPS company policy, Defendant McNair filed an affidavit, swearing to the court that Ms. McNeil violated a condition of probation because she was “charged and arrested” for a new misdemeanor offense. A violation-of-probation arrest warrant was issued, stating that a $1,000 money bail amount, predetermined without an inquiry into or findings concerning her ability to pay, would be required for Ms. McNeil’s release following arrest.
208. While Ms. McNeil was in jail, Sheriff’s deputies served the violation-of-probation warrant. On April 23, a friend signed a contract with a commercial bonding agent to secure Ms. McNeil’s release.
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209. On April 28, 2016, Ms. McNeil pled guilty to the new misdemeanor offense and to the alleged violation of probation. Ms. McNeil was sentenced to 45 days in jail for violating probation, and a concurrent 30 days in jail for the new offense. She was informed that her probation would be reinstated after she completed 45 days in jail.
210. While Ms. McNeil was in jail serving the sentence, jail employees refused to administer Ms. McNeil’s prescription pain medication. They told her that her only option would be to purchase two ibuprofen pills for two dollars at the commissary. She could not afford the medicine. Ms. McNeil attempted to seek help from a nurse, but the guards required her to fill out a “nurse request” form, which Ms. McNeil could not do on her own given her limited reading and writing abilities. The guards refused to help her complete the form, made fun of her, and called her “stupid” because she could not read or write.
211. Due to overcrowding, Ms. McNeil had to sleep on the floor of her jail cell, which aggravated her chronic back pain.
212. When she was released from jail, her for-profit supervised probation was reinstated, and she incurred additional court costs and fees.
213. Because she was so afraid of being arrested and jailed for nonpayment, throughout her entire term of supervised probation, Ms. McNeil often chose to pay the company rather than purchase the medication she needs to treat chronic pain, pay her electricity bill, or pay rent. Ms. McNeil’s electricity was shut off because she made payments to CPS instead of paying her utility bill. She became homeless in significant part because she paid the company instead of her rent. Ms. McNeil slept in a tent by a creek in July 2016.
214. During a probation meeting after losing her home, Ms. McNeil told Defendant McNair that she was sleeping by the creek. Defendant McNair demanded money anyway, saying, “We still gotta have payment.”
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215. After about three months of homelessness, Ms. McNeil found a place to live. 216. Throughout all of this, Ms. McNeil continued to report to CPS. But because Ms. McNeil’s driver’s license is suspended due solely to her inability to pay court costs, she cannot lawfully drive. She therefore sometimes walked over a mile with her oxygen tank, including on hot summer days, to the CPS office. 217. Ms. McNeil missed some appointments around that time because she could not find a ride and was unable to walk all the way to the probation office because of her disability. When she was unable to report in person, she called the office, but no one answered the phone or returned her messages. 218. In October 2016, Defendant McNair again sought a violation-of-probation arrest warrant, alleging that Ms. McNeil did not report on four occasions and did not “pay all required supervision fees, court fines and court cost.” Defendant McNair did so even though she knew that Ms. McNeil was living in desperate poverty, could not afford the costs and fees, and was physically unable to walk to the probation office or to find someone to drive her. 219. The violation-of-probation arrest warrant stated that Ms. McNeil would be required to pay a predetermined secured financial condition of $1,500 to secure release. 220. After the warrant issued, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil that there was an active warrant for her arrest, and instructed Ms. McNeil to “stay low” to avoid law enforcement, but also insisted that Ms. McNeil continue to make payments to CPS by mail. 221. Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil that she would “get the judge to dismiss the charges” if Ms. McNeil paid all of her fees and debts to CPS. 222. On November 15, 2016, Ms. McNeil was arrested on the violation-of-probation arrest warrant and kept in jail for one day before a friend loaned her the money to pay the bond amount.
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223. On December 22, 2016, Ms. McNeil appeared in General Sessions court for a probation-revocation hearing and pled guilty to the alleged violations, including nonpayment of fees and costs. Ms. McNeil’s probation was revoked without any inquiry into the reasons for nonpayment or her ability to make payments. She was sentenced to another 45 days in jail for nonpayment and non-reporting, followed by an extension of probation for six months, until June 22, 2017, including supervision by the private company “until costs/fines paid in full,” and the addition of more costs and fees.
224. Ms. McNeil continued to report to probation, and the company continued threatening her with arrest and jailing if she did not make payments. Because she was scared of being sent to jail again for nonpayment, Ms. McNeil paid the company instead of her rent.
225. In March 2017, because she made payments to CPS, she could no longer afford the rent where she had been living and moved into a one-room mobile home with a friend and another roommate. After a few months, Ms. McNeil moved in with another friend, who lives in a different mobile home.
226. Throughout her probation, Ms. McNeil repeatedly told Defendant McNair that she was struggling to pay for food, housing, utilities, and other basic necessities and could not afford the payments required. In response, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil to “go pick up cans” to pay her court debt and fees.
227. During an April 2017 reporting date, Defendant McNair threatened Ms. McNeil with “ninety days in jail” if she did not pay, warning Ms. McNeil that she might seek an arrest warrant before Ms. McNeil’s probation ended, since “it looks like you won’t have it paid.”
228. Neither Defendant McNair nor anyone else at CPS ever informed Ms. McNeil that she could seek a waiver or reduction of her payments or that it violates the law to seek revocation of probation solely for nonpayment. In fact, when Ms. McNeil asked Defendant McNair to waive
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her supervision fees because she could not both pay the company and also pay for basic necessities, Defendant McNair told her that she had no power to waive or reduce the fees. Ms. McNeil asked Defendant McNair if the court could waive or reduce her payments, and Defendant McNair told her that was not possible.
229. Throughout her probation, Ms. McNeil was terrified that she would be arrested and jailed. Every time a car pulled up to her trailer, she would startle, fearing that the police had arrived to arrest her for nonpayment.
230. On May 2, 2017, Ms. McNeil made a $120 payment to CPS, which she scraped together from her social security disability benefits and money from friends. Defendant McNair, in her discretion, allocated $60 of the payment to supervision fees and $60 to court debts (with a remaining balance of $265). Defendant McNair wrote on Ms. McNeil’s payment receipt that Ms. McNeil would owe more than $500 the next time she reported, and told Ms. McNeil that she would seek an arrest warrant if Ms. McNeil did not pay the full amount by the end of her probation period in June.
231. On June 6, 2017, Ms. McNeil reported to CPS. When she arrived at the company’s office, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil to submit to a drug test and instructed a male CPS employee to accompany Ms. McNeil to the bathroom to observe Ms. McNeil urinate. After Ms. McNeil submitted to the drug screen, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil that she had tested positive for a controlled substance.
232. On June 30, 2017, Ms. McNeil attended her son’s graduation from a G.E.D. program. He was incarcerated at the time, so she went to the jail for the ceremony. When Ms. McNeil arrived at the jail, Giles County Sheriff Helton told her that a warrant had been issued for her arrest. The violation-of-probation warrant was based on CPS’s allegations that Ms. McNeil tested positive for drugs and did not pay $215 in court costs. (It is unclear how the company
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calculated that Ms. McNeil owed $215 in court costs given that a receipt from June 6, 2017 states that Ms. McNeil paid $60 and had a “balance” of $265.) He told Ms. McNeil to return to the jail the following day, which she did.
233. On July 1, Ms. McNeil was booked into the jail because she could not afford to pay the $2,500 secured financial condition of release that was pre-printed on the violation-of-probation arrest warrant.
234. Ms. McNeil was released later that day after a friend paid a $300 nonrefundable fee to a commercial bonding agent who then posted her bond. Ms. McNeil used about half of her next disability check to repay her friend. As a result, Ms. McNeil could not afford some of her medications or any of her probation fees that month.
235. A jail employee told Ms. McNeal to appear in court for the alleged violations of probation on July 27, 2017. At that court date, she was told to come back on August 17, 2017. Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil to continue reporting and paying probation fees in the meantime.
236. On August 17, 2017, Ms. McNeil appeared in court for a violation-of-probation hearing. Her probation was revoked, and she was sentenced to 65 days in jail.
237. Upon her release from jail, the County and CPS finally released her from probation. 238. CPS, McNair, and the County knew at all times that Ms. McNeil was impoverished and that her only income came from social security benefits: Ms. McNeil provided her financial information to CPS repeatedly on forms and during meetings, and to the court when she sought appointed counsel.
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B. Plaintiff Lesley Johnson 239. Lesley Johnson is a 35-year-old single mother of two children, ages 11 and 13. She lives in Mississippi, and previously lived in Baldwin County, Alabama, where she resided during the period she was on CPS probation. 240. Ms. Johnson performed manual labor for a Mercedes-Benz factory in Giles County. She lives paycheck to paycheck and struggles to provide basic necessities for herself and her children. 241. In 2015, Ms. Johnson received a traffic ticket in Baldwin County, Alabama. She was unable to pay the ticket, and her driver’s license was suspended as a result. 242. On September 6, 2016, Ms. Johnson was charged in Giles County with driving on a suspended license, a misdemeanor offense. She was found indigent and legal counsel was appointed. Ms. Johnson was assessed a $100 “public defender fee” and a $50 fee for the “attorney indigent admin fee.” 243. On February 9, 2017, Ms. Johnson pled guilty. She was sentenced to six months of probation, assessed $331 in court debt, and assigned to CPS for supervision “until paid in full,” meaning that as soon as she paid her court costs in full, her supervised probation would be converted to unsupervised probation. Because she could not afford the payments, she was subject to all of the conditions of supervised probation throughout her entire probation term. 244. On the day she was sentenced, Ms. Johnson was told to speak with Defendant McNair, who was seated in the courtroom at a desk labeled “CPS, LLC” to the right of the judge. Defendant McNair instructed Ms. Johnson to bring $45 for a supervision fee, $35 for a drug screen, and $25 for court costs to her first probation reporting date, “or it will be a violation.” Ms. Johnson believed that a “violation” would mean jail time.
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245. Ms. Johnson began reporting as required every two weeks and made whatever payments she was able to make whenever she could. Her probation meetings lasted less than ten minutes. At each meeting, she completed paperwork about her employment, and Defendant McNair asked her for a payment.
246. On April 11, 2017, Ms. Johnson paid CPS $55. Defendant McNair exercised her discretion to allocate $22 to pay for drug testing and $23 to court debts. On April 25, 2017, Ms. Johnson paid $60. Defendant McNair allocated $30 to probation supervision fees and $30 to court costs.
247. While on supervised probation, Ms. Johnson routinely had to choose between paying the private company—so she could avoid being arrested and jailed, and her probation revoked and extended—and meeting the basic necessities of life, such as buying food and clothes for her children. Sometimes, she could not afford her rent because she instead paid CPS.
248. Paying the company made it even more difficult for Ms. Johnson to make ends meet. To survive, Ms. Johnson used an application on her cell phone to “borrow” from her next paycheck so she could purchase basic necessities. To feed her children, she relied on donated food from her church.
249. Ms. Johnson was terrified she would lose her children if she was jailed for nonpayment.
250. Fearing that her probation would be revoked if she fell behind on payments, Ms. Johnson repeatedly told Defendant McNair that she could not afford the payments. The first time Ms. Johnson told Defendant McNair that she could not pay, Defendant McNair replied by threatening Ms. Johnson with a “violation” and “120 days in jail” if she did not pay the full amount owed by the end of her probation term.
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251. At another probation meeting, Defendant McNair told Ms. Johnson that nonpayment would lead to an extension of her term on supervised probation. When Ms. Johnson asked if an extension meant that she would continue to have to pay $45 per month in supervision fees, Defendant McNair confirmed that it did.
252. Sometimes, Defendant McNair required Ms. Johnson to submit to a drug test— each of which generated more profit for the private company—even though Ms. Johnson’s offense of conviction had nothing to do with drugs.
253. CPS, McNair, and the County were at all times aware of Ms. Johnson’s indigency— because Ms. Johnson repeatedly told Defendant McNair that she could not afford the payments— but did not reduce or waive any of her fees. The company never informed Ms. Johnson of a process for seeking a waiver or reduction of her costs and fees, or that it was illegal to jail her solely for nonpayment.
254. On July 11, 2017, Defendant McNair informed Ms. Johnson that her probation term, which was scheduled to end on August 8, 2017, would end only if she paid her remaining court debts and probation fees by that date. When Ms. Johnson asked what would happen if she did not have the money to pay, Defendant McNair said the judge would extend her supervised probation for another six months.
255. Also on July 11, Defendant McNair demanded that Ms. Johnson to submit to a drug test and insisted that she watch, humiliating Ms. Johnson while she urinated.
256. Ms. Johnson told CPS that she believed it was unfair to keep her on probation only because she could not afford to pay. Defendant McNair responded that if Ms. Johnson had simply paid up-front, she would have been placed on unsupervised probation.
257. Because she was so afraid of being arrested and jailed for nonpayment, and of remaining on supervised probation, Ms. Johnson sold her television and laptop—which her
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children need to do homework—so that she could make a lump sum payment to CPS and terminate her probation.
258. On August 8, 2017, Ms. Johnson paid CPS $331 to satisfy all remaining CPS fees and court debt. In total, she had paid $340 in probation fees to CPS which is more than she owed and paid in court debts.
259. When her probation was terminated, Ms. Johnson told a CPS employee that she had to sell her belongings to make the final payment. The probation officer chuckled in response.
260. The only reason Ms. Johnson spent any time on supervised probation was because she was too poor to afford her court costs and probation fees when she was sentenced. But for her poverty, she could have avoided the entire six months of supervision, including threats of arrest and jailing, onerous conditions, and invasive and humiliating drug tests.
C. Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell 261. Tanya Mitchell is 53 years old and lives in Giles County, in a mobile home with her daughter, Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, and four grandchildren (Ms. Hilfort’s children). 262. Ms. Mitchell is currently unemployed, and her sole income is from food stamps. She has not worked since 2012, when she was employed as a home healthcare worker, and relies on family and friends for financial support. 263. Ms. Mitchell has multiple serious medical conditions, including fibromyalgia and gout, that prevent her from working. As a result, Ms. Mitchell struggles to provide basic necessities for herself and her household. 264. The electricity in her trailer home has been disconnected for several days in the past few months because she could not afford to pay the bill.
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265. On September 25, 2017, Ms. Mitchell pled guilty in Giles County Circuit Court to a misdemeanor charge. She was sentenced to probation for 11 months and 29 days, assessed $750 in court fines and fees, and ordered to pay at least $50 per month in supervision fees.
266. Ms. Mitchell was assigned to PSI for probation “supervision,” and met with Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe immediately after being sentenced to probation. Defendant Bledsoe told Ms. Mitchell that the terms of her probation included bi-weekly, in-person reporting, drug tests that would be administered whenever the probation company wanted, and payment of a $45 per month probation supervision fee.
267. Defendant Bledsoe told Ms. Mitchell that she was required to make a payment of $83.75 the first time she reported for probation.
268. Ms. Mitchell reported to probation for the first time on October 9, 2017, as instructed by Defendants PSI and Bledsoe. Ms. Mitchell’s family and friends gave her money so she could pay the $83.75 the company demanded.
269. Ms. Mitchell has made every reporting date required. She asks family and friends to give her money, including friends from out of state who frequently send her money, so she can make partial payments when she reports to probation because she is afraid she will be arrested and jailed, and her probation revoked and extended, if she does not pay the company. She has not made any payments to the court so she still owes the full amount of court debt she owed when she was initially placed on probation.
270. To pay PSI, Ms. Mitchell has forgone medicine for her many conditions because she cannot afford to pay both PSI and purchase her prescriptions.
271. Defendant Bledsoe has, in her discretion, allowed Ms. Mitchell to report monthly instead of every two weeks because Ms. Mitchell typically makes a payment to PSI toward her
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supervision fee. But Defendant Bledsoe conveyed to Ms. Mitchell that if she stops making payments to PSI, Defendant Bledsoe will require her to report more frequently.
272. To avoid having to report in-person more frequently—which is difficult for Ms. Mitchell because she does not have money to pay for gas—Ms. Mitchell pays the company’s fees, and has been unable to make any payments toward her court debt.
273. Defendant Bledsoe has drug tested Ms. Mitchell, and watched Ms. Mitchell through an open door while Ms. Mitchell urinated.
274. Defendant Bledsoe has repeatedly told Ms. Mitchell that she must make a payment every month, even if Ms. Mitchell is unable to pay the full amount due.
D. Plaintiff Indya Hilfort 275. Indya Hilfort is a 27-year-old single mother of four children under the age of 10. She lives with them and her mother, Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell, in a mobile home in Giles County. 276. Ms. Hilfort is currently unemployed, struggles to find employment, and has no income. She lost her job at a factory in December 2017, after being hospitalized for the flu. Ms. Hilfort struggles to meet the basic necessities of life, including providing food, clothing, and shelter for herself and her children. Prior to moving in with her mother, Ms. Hilfort was homeless. 277. On December 8, 2016, Ms. Hilfort pled guilty in General Sessions Court to a misdemeanor charge. 278. Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to a jail term of 11 months and 29 days, to be suspended for a probationary term of 11 months and 19 days after serving ten days in jail. Ms. Hilfort was assessed $565.50 in court costs, fines, and taxes. She was assigned to supervised probation for a minimum of four months, after which time she would be eligible for unsupervised probation, but only if she had paid her court costs and probation fees in full.
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279. Due to a clerical error, Ms. Hilfort was not initially assigned to supervision with either company, and so she did not report to either company for the first eight months of her probationary period.
280. The clerical error was resolved in August 2017. Ms. Hilfort began reporting to CPS in September.
281. On September 25, 2017, Ms. Hilfort pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge in Circuit Court. She was assessed $1,487.50 in court costs, fines, taxes, and restitution. Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days on supervised probation and assigned to CPS.
282. CPS therefore supervises Ms. Hilfort on two concurrent probation cases. 283. Ms. Hilfort met with Defendant McNair immediately after being sentenced in the second case. Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort that the conditions of her probation included inperson reporting every two weeks, drug tests to be administered in the discretion of the for-profit probation officer (even though neither charge involved drugs), and monthly payments of $45 for a probation supervision fee. Defendant McNair also informed Ms. Hilfort that if she paid off her court and probation fees and did not violate her probation in the first four months, CPS would place her on unsupervised probation for her Circuit Court probation case, as with her General Sessions probation case. 284. Ms. Hilfort cannot afford to pay the supervision fees or court debt. To make ends meet, Ms. Hilfort relies on money from family members. 285. Ms. Hilfort asked Defendant McNair for a supervision fee waiver form on March 5, 2018. Defendant McNair did not provide one. Instead, she suggested that Ms. Hilfort pay probation fees from a tax refund or that Ms. Hilfort request an extension of probation (to avoid arrest, jailing, and formal revocation of probation), which, of course, would result in additional fees and prolonged supervision requirements.
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286. Defendant McNair previously supervised Ms. Hilfort for a period of 11 months and 29 days, from June 2015 (while Defendant McNair was employed by PCC, Inc.), to June 2016 (Defendant McNair was hired by CPS, LLC in March 2016). During this period of supervision, Defendant McNair threatened Ms. Hilfort with jail if she did not pay her supervision fees. Shortly before the supervision period was supposed to end, Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort to pay her CPS supervision fees in full by noon the next day or go to jail. Fearing jail, Ms. Hilfort sold car tires and borrowed money from her boyfriend to pay her supervision fees. After Ms. Hilfort paid in full, Defendant McNair did not seek a violation-of-probation warrant.
287. Because of this experience and Defendant McNair’s continued insistence on receiving payment, Ms. Hilfort fears that her probation will be revoked and extended, and that she will be arrested and jailed, if she does not pay off her supervision fees before her probation term ends.
288. Defendant McNair has informed Ms. Hilfort that if she does not pay her debts in full by the end of her probation term, CPS will “violate” her, and Ms. Hilfort’s probation supervision will be extended. Ms. Hilfort understands a probation violation to mean jailing.
289. Defendant McNair (while employed with CPS) drug tested Ms. Hilfort on November 7, 2017, even though Ms. Hilfort’s offenses had nothing to do with drugs or alcohol. At this point in time, Ms. Hilfort was on pay-only supervised probation in her general-sessions case.
290. The drug screen came back positive and Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort that the company would seek an arrest warrant alleging to the court that Ms. Hilfort violated her probation. Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort that she would be required to pay a $2,500 secured financial condition of release after arrest.
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291. On November 8, 2017, Defendant McNair sought an arrest warrant by filing an affidavit alleging violation of Ms. Hilfort’s Circuit Court probation for the positive drug screen.
292. On November 14, 2017, Defendant McNair sought an arrest warrant by filing an affidavit alleging violation of Ms. Hilfort’s General Sessions probation for the same positive drug screen.
293. On February 6, 2018, Ms. Hilfort was arrested on the violation-of-probation warrants. A friend who is a bondsman posted her bond the same day and loaned her the $250 normally required up-front as a nonrefundable premium. Her friend is allowing her to pay him back in installments over time.
294. On February 22, 2018, Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to 60 days in jail for her General Sessions violation of probation, and her probation was revoked and extended for an additional 11 months and 29 days of pay-only probation.
295. At sentencing, when the General Sessions court asked if she could pay $25 a week on her newly-imposed court fines and fees, she said “yes” after being informed by her public defender that if she did not agree to make the weekly payment, the County would jail her that day, instead of allowing her two weeks to prepare for her 60-day jail sentence.
296. Ms. Hilfort reported to jail on March 19, 2018 to begin serving her 60-day sentence. Her mother, Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell, is taking care of Ms. Hilfort’s four young children. Ms. Hilfort is scared that something may happen to her kids if her mother becomes sick while Ms. Hilfort is in jail. Ms. Mitchell recently spent several days in the intensive care unit for cardiac problems in March 2018, and those health issues could recur at any time.
297. On March 27, 2018, Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to 60 days in jail for violating probation in the Circuit Court case, to be served concurrently with her sentence in the General
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Sessions case. Her probation was revoked for her Circuit Court case and extended for an additional period of up to 11 months and 29 days.
E. Plaintiff Sonya Beard 298. Sonya Beard is a 39-year-old woman who lives in Lawrence County, adjacent to Giles County. Ms. Beard is unable to work due to her disabilities and depends on Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) to survive. 299. Ms. Beard’s license was revoked due to unpaid court costs and fines, and unpaid traffic tickets. 300. On June 9, 2016, Ms. Beard pled guilty to driving on a revoked license in Giles County General Sessions Court. She was deemed indigent and appointed a public defender. 301. Ms. Beard was sentenced to probation for 11 months and 29 days. 302. Ms. Beard was assigned to PSI for probation supervision. She was assessed $745 in court costs, fines, and litigation taxes and required to pay $25 each week toward the debt, beginning on June 24, 2016. 303. Ms. Beard met with Defendant Thompson immediately after being sentenced to probation. Defendant Thompson told Ms. Beard that the terms of her probation included weekly, in-person reporting, drug tests to be administered at the discretion of the for-profit probation officer, and payment of $45 each month as a probation supervision fee. 304. Defendant Thompson drug tested Ms. Beard every one or two months. These drug tests occurred on the days Ms. Beard was unable to make a payment. If Ms. Beard provided some payment, Defendant Thompson did not administer a drug test, but would ask Ms. Beard whether she could pass a drug test if tested that day. 305. During every drug test, which were imposed at Defendant Thompson’s discretion, Defendant Thompson watched Ms. Beard urinate.
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306. Ms. Beard told Defendant Thompson that she was barely surviving on her disability benefits and that it would be difficult for her to pay the supervision fee. Ms. Beard asked Defendant Thompson to waive the supervision fee. Defendant Thompson told her that she could not. Defendant Thompson did not offer the PSI fee exemption form or mention the fact that it exists.
307. Ms. Beard had to use her disability income to pay probation fees instead of purchasing necessary items, such as food and hygiene supplies.
308. Ms. Beard told Defendant Thompson that she had difficulty reporting in-person because her license was suspended and she could not drive, and it was often impossible to get a ride to the probation office. Ms. Beard told Defendant Thompson that she could not afford to pay $10 or $15 for a ride to the probation office every week.
309. On the days Ms. Beard could not report in-person, she called and told Defendant Thompson or a receptionist that she would not be able to report.
310. Defendant Thompson eventually allowed Ms. Beard to report by phone, which required Ms. Beard to fax PSI a reporting form and have a phone conversation about the contents of the reporting form with a PSI employee.
311. Despite this arrangement, Defendant Thompson, and later, Defendant Bledsoe, repeatedly sought violation-of-probation arrest warrants for Ms. Beard, alleging that she violated her probation by not reporting and not paying.
312. On September 1, 2016, Defendant Thompson sought an arrest warrant for Ms. Beard for allegedly not paying and not reporting. The warrant was issued that day and purported to order the Sheriff to “hold” Ms. Beard, which meant that upon arrest, Ms. Beard could not be released and would be detained for up to 10 days before being brought to court to see a Judge.
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313. Ms. Beard was arrested on October 10, 2016 pursuant to this warrant and detained without a hearing until October 20, 2016.
314. On October 20, 2016, Ms. Beard appeared in Giles County General Sessions Court in shackles and an orange jumpsuit, pursuant to Giles County policy and practice for misdemeanor arrestees who are detained prior to a court hearing. Ms. Beard told the judge that she could not pay her supervision fees because she was on a fixed income and it was difficult for her to report in-person for supervision because her license was revoked. The court did not respond to Ms. Beard’s statement and she pled guilty to violating her probation.
315. She was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with credit for the 10 days she spent in jail before her revocation hearing, and her probation was reinstated. She was ordered to pay at least $25 weekly towards the additional court debts for the violation-of-probation charge. While in jail, Ms. Beard’s SSDI payments, which constitute her only source of income, were suspended.
316. After serving her sentence, Ms. Beard continued to report and pay fees to PSI, both of which were hugely burdensome because of her inability to drive and lack of income other than disability payments.
317. Ms. Beard asked the company again whether there was any way her fees could be waived, and Defendant Thompson told her that there was not.
318. Defendant Thompson sought another arrest warrant on February 3, 2017 alleging that Ms. Beard violated her probation by not paying, not reporting, and for being arrested for a misdemeanor offense. The warrant again had a “hold” on it.
319. Ms. Beard was arrested on March 8, 2017 on the violation-of-probation warrant. She was detained without bail in the Giles County Jail until March 15, 2017.
320. On March 15, 2017, Ms. Beard pled guilty to violating her probation by not paying, not reporting, and by being arrested for driving on a revoked license. She was sentenced to 75
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days in jail. Her probation was reinstated and “extended 6 months or until fines & costs satisfied in full.” Once again, while in jail, Ms. Beard’s SSDI income was suspended.
321. Ms. Beard was released from Giles County jail on July 8, 2017. 322. After July 2017, Ms. Beard began reporting to Defendant Bledsoe. Ms. Beard told Defendant Bledsoe repeatedly that she could not afford to make the payments the company demanded, and that she struggled to report because she could not drive. 323. Ms. Beard repeatedly explained to Defendant Bledsoe that she had difficulty reporting in person due to her revoked license and difficulty paying because she survived on disability benefits. Defendant Bledsoe demanded payment and in-person reporting regardless. 324. Two months later, on September 12, Defendant Bledsoe sought a violation-ofprobation citation warrant for Ms. Beard, alleging solely that Ms. Beard did not make payments toward her court debts and supervision fees. 325. On November 21, 2017, Defendant Bledsoe sought an amended violation-ofprobation warrant for Ms. Beard alleging non-reporting in addition to nonpayment. Due to the additional allegation of non-reporting, and pursuant to Defendants’ policy and practice, the amended warrant, which issued the same day, instructed the jail to “hold” Ms. Beard after arrest. 326. The warrant was executed on November 30, 2017, while Ms. Beard was in jail in Lawrence County. Again, Ms. Beard’s SSDI payments were suspended. Each time the private company alleged that Ms. Beard violated her probation, and Ms. Beard was arrested on a violationof-probation warrant, Ms. Beard’s court debts grew, but her only source of income was cut off while she was in jail. 327. She was transferred to Giles County on November 30 and taken to General Sessions Court for a hearing. At the hearing on November 30, the judge concluded that Defendant Bledsoe’s
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allegation that Ms. Beard violated probation by not reporting was baseless, given that Ms. Beard did not report because she was incarcerated
328. At the hearing, Ms. Beard was informed that if she accepted a sentence of at least 60 days in jail for nonpayment, her probation would be terminated. She asked if she could have a few weeks to come up with the money to avoid imprisonment, and the court agreed to give her until December 21, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. to come up with the money.
329. Defendant Bledsoe told Ms. Beard that she would do jail time if she did not pay in full by December 21.
330. Ms. Beard owed a combined $1,025 to the court and PSI. 331. Ms. Beard reasonably feared that if she did not pay, she would again have to spend time in jail. 332. Desperate to avoid jail, Ms. Beard borrowed $1,025 from a friend and paid off her debts in full on December 21, 2017. At the December 21 hearing, the probation-violation allegation against Ms. Beard for nonpayment was dismissed. The order and disposition form stated that the reason for dismissal was that “fees and costs are paid in full.” VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 333. The named Plaintiffs bring this action as a Class Action pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. B. Class Definitions 334. The Classes are defined as follows:
a. Damages Class All persons who, since April 23, 2014, and until the trial of this cause, (1) have incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) have been assigned to be supervised on probation in
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that case by Community Probation Services, LLC, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., or Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC.
b. Declaratory and/or Injunctive Relief Class13 All persons who, at any time since April 23, 2014, (1) have incurred, or will incur, courtimposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) are currently being supervised, or will be supervised, on probation in that case by Community Probation Services, LLC, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSIProbation II, LLC, PSI Probation, L.L.C., or Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC. 335. The names, case numbers, probation documents, dates of imprisonment, financial receipts, and relevant records of the class members are in Defendants’ possession and are easily ascertainable. C. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(a) Are Satisfied 336. Numerosity. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) are satisfied in that there are too many Class Members for joinder of all of them to be practicable. On information and belief, the Declaratory and Injunctive Class includes over 200 members at any given time, and the Damages Class includes thousands of members. The Classes, as defined above, meet the numerosity requirement. 337. Commonality. The claims of the Class members raise numerous common issues of fact and/or law, thereby satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). These common legal and factual questions—the answers to which will drive resolution of the litigation—may be determined
13 Named Plaintiffs Indya Hilfort and Tanya Mitchell seek certification of this Declaratory and/or Injunctive Relief Class. Even in the event that Plaintiffs Hilfort and Mitchell complete their probation sentences while this action is pending, they may nonetheless continue to advance the interests of such a class. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980). Those who still owe debts to Defendants or who will incur such debts will be subjected to the same material ongoing policies and practices absent the relief sought in this Complaint.
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without the necessity of resolving individualized factual disputes concerning any Class Member, and include, but are not limited to, the following questions:
Common Questions a. Whether Giles County’s decision to abandon the tradition of engaging a
neutral probation officer and instead contract with a for-profit, user-funded probation officer that has the same duties and powers of a traditional probation officer and also has a personal financial interest in the management and outcome of every case it supervises violates federal law;
b. Whether a contract creating a probation company with a direct financial stake in the management and outcome of every probationer’s case it supervises violates state law;
c. Whether a government and private actors can place and keep people on onerous probation plans that involve extra fees and serious intrusions on liberty based on a person’s poverty;
d. Whether a government and a private company, working together, can circumvent state debt-collection protections and engage in practices that no private creditor could lawfully undertake;
e. Whether it is lawful to use legal process purportedly concerning probation violation and probation judgments with a motive to earn profit;
f. Whether the policies and practices of the Private Defendants violate the constitutional and statutory rights of Plaintiffs and the putative classes;
g. Whether the conduct of the Private Defendants violates the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq.;
h. Whether Defendants have imposed imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revocation or withholding of drivers’ licenses, intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on individuals’ liberty;
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i. Whether Defendants have placed and kept individuals on supervised probation solely because they could not afford to pay their court debts and probation fees without an inquiry to determine whether or not their failure to pay was willful;
j. Whether Defendants have failed to inform probationers of their right to a determination by a neutral officer of probationers’ ability to pay court costs, fines, and fees;
k. Whether Defendants have taken and converted to their own use monetary payments to which they had no legal right; and
l. Whether Defendants have sought arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional fees.
338. These and numerous other common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set of policies and practices: the for-profit contractual relationships between the County and the companies that govern misdemeanor probation supervision practices. The Defendants operate this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day. The material components of the scheme do not vary from Class member to Class member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the classes are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek.
339. Typicality. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the unnamed Class members because they have a common factual source and rest upon the same legal and remedial theories, thereby satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a)(3). For example, the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiffs and all Class members were injured by the same wrongful practices in which Defendants engaged, namely failing to comply with the basic constitutional and statutory provisions detailed below.
340. Adequacy of Representation. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are satisfied in that each named Plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the litigation to prosecute its claims vigorously
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on behalf of the Class members, and each named Plaintiff’s interests are aligned with those of the proposed Classes. There are no defenses of a unique nature that may be asserted against any named Plaintiff individually, as distinguished from the other members of the Classes, and the relief sought is common to the Classes. No named Plaintiff has any interest that is in conflict with or is antagonistic to the interests of the members of the Class, and no named Plaintiff has any conflict with any other member of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation to represent them and the Classes in this litigation.
341. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Civil Rights Corps and Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym Ltd., and Attorney Kyle Mothershead, all of whom have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law.
342. Counsel have devoted a significant amount of time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with Defendants’ scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it.
343. The interests of the members of the Classes will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
D. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) Are Satisfied 344. Class action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up their probation and debt-collection scheme, have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Declaratory/Injunctive Class. Thus, a declaration that people in the Declaratory/Injunctive Class are entitled, as a matter of federal law, to a neutral probation officer without a personal financial conflict of interest in their cases would benefit every member of the proposed Class. The same applies to legal rulings on the other claims, including: that the Contracts are void; that the arrangement and the Defendants’ policies violate
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the Equal Protection Clause by imposing onerous probation conditions due to poverty and by imposing debt-collection methods far more onerous than any private creditor could lawfully impose; that CPS and PSI abuse process by commandeering specific legal processes for the ulterior motive of earning profit; and that the policy, pattern, and practice of threatening to arrest and jail people for nonpayment (and actually doing so), and threatening to revoke and extend their supervised probation term (and actually doing so), without informing them of their rights or inquiring into their ability to pay constitutes an extortion enterprise in blatant violation of racketeering laws.
345. Injunctive relief compelling the Defendants to comply with Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights will similarly protect each member of the Declaratory/Injunctive Class from being again subjected to the Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices with respect to the debts that they still owe and protect those who will incur such debts in the future from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class seeking equitable relief is appropriate.
346. Class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate because common questions of law and fact predominate in this case. This case turns, for every Plaintiff, on what Defendants’ policies and practices are and on whether those policies are lawful.
347. The common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Damages Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. Class-wide treatment of liability is a far superior method of determining the content and legality of the Defendants’ policies and practices than individual suits by hundreds or thousands of Giles County residents. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the amount of time that a person was subjected to the unlawful scheme and the amount of money extorted from them. Determining damages for individual class
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members can thus typically be handled in a ministerial fashion based on easily verifiable records in the Defendants’ possession. If need be, individual hearings on class-member specific damages based on special circumstances and particular hardships endured as a result of Defendants’ extortion scheme can be held after class-wide liability is determined—a method far more efficient than the wholesale litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits.
348. Plaintiffs make the following claims, and seek the following relief and hereby demand a jury trial in this cause for all matters so appropriate. VIII. CLAIMS
COUNT 1: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) and (d) By Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil and Lesley Johnson on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated against CPS and Patricia McNair for damages. 349. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–348. 350. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against CPS and Patricia McNair, and not Giles County. 351. Plaintiffs are “persons” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c). 352. Defendant CPS is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 353. Defendant Patricia McNair is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
1. The CPS RICO Enterprise 354. CPS and Defendant McNair, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of
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18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“CPS RICO Enterprise”). The CPS RICO Enterprise is an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by CPS without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay.
355. The CPS RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constitute a portion of the profits received by Defendants CPS and McNair pursuant to this operation, which are collected through threats of probation revocation and jailing. Moreover, Defendants CPS and McNair extort on a mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers otherwise would have spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants CPS and McNair also use electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with CPS probationers and to extort payment, including, for example, CPS’s written policies that payment must be sent through U.S. mail for probationers who are required to report by phone.
356. The members of the CPS RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit. 357. Defendants CPS and McNair have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 358. Defendants CPS and McNair have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 359. Specifically, Defendants CPS and McNair conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the CPS RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951;
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b. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and c. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. 2. Predicate Acts 360. Defendants CPS and McNair have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money. 361. Defendants CPS and McNair, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, have threatened Plaintiffs that if they do not agree to pay money to the companies they: (a) will be arrested; (b) will be accused by the companies of violating the conditions of probation; (c) will face testimony by the companies against them regarding nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including inability to pay); (d) will have their probation revoked; (e) will be sent to jail; (f) will have their probation extended; and (g) will be charged additional fees. 362. These threats are inherently wrongful because they are motivated out of a desire to extort, because they are premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victims, and because they are demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract. 363. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiffs paid the fees demanded by Defendants CPS and McNair even though doing so has resulted in great personal suffering.
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 364. Defendants CPS and McNair, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiffs with their consent, which consent was induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act).
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365. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and prevented Plaintiffs from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
b. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-14-112 366. Defendants CPS and McNair themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from the Plaintiffs and impaired their exercise of their state and federal rights.
c. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 367. Defendants CPS and McNair, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiffs, with intent to deprive them of this money and the enjoyment of their state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 368. Defendants CPS and McNair used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants CPS and McNair used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 369. Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the CPS contract and continuing through the present with respect to hundreds
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of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts are part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business.
370. The racketeering acts of Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees by CPS without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights.
371. The racketeering acts of Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs, among other things, were required to pay fees to Defendants CPS and McNair, and paid those fees because of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, Plaintiffs were subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing their federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions.
372. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants CPS and McNair, County officials, and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise.
373. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, through the CPS RICO Enterprise, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiffs specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor probation supervisees assigned to CPS.
374. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of CPS, McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise were committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the Plaintiffs assigned to CPS supervised probation who cannot afford to pay their entire
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fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they are eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees and court debts to the company.
4. Injury 375. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs assigned to CPS-supervised probation suffered injuries to their property. These Plaintiffs were required to pay probation fees and surcharges to CPS, and they were forced to continue paying these fees even when they could not afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to themselves and their families. 376. These Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
COUNT 2: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) By Named Plaintiffs Sonya Beard and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated against PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe for damages
377. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–376. 378. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and not Giles County. 379. Each of the Plaintiffs is a “person” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c). 380. Defendant PSI is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
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381. Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
1. The PSI RICO Enterprise 382. Defendants PSI, Timothy Cook, and Markeyta Bledsoe, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“PSI RICO Enterprise”). The PSI RICO Enterprise is an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PSI and without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay. 383. The PSI RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constitute a portion of the profits received by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe pursuant to this operation, which are collected through threats of violations and jailing. Moreover, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe extort on a mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers would have otherwise spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe also use electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with PSI probationers and to extort payment. This includes PSI’s policy that reporting forms must be faxed through for probationers who are required to report by phone. 384. The members of the PSI RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit. 385. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are or were associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
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386. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
387. Specifically, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the PSI RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
388. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 389. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and 390. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
2. Predicate Acts 391. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money. 392. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, threatened Plaintiffs that if they did not agree to pay money to the company they: (a) would be arrested; (b) would be accused by the company of violating the conditions of probation; (c) would face testimony by the company against them regarding nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including an inability to pay); (d) would have their probation revoked; (e) would be sent to jail; (f) would have their probation extended; and (g) would be charged additional fees. 393. These threats are inherently wrongful because they were motivated out of a desire to extort, because they were premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victim, and because they were demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
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394. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiffs have paid the fees demanded by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe even though doing so resulted in great personal suffering.
b. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 395. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiff with her consent, which consent has been induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 396. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and have prevented Plaintiffs from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore have affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
c. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-14-112 397. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from the Plaintiffs and impaired their exercise of their state and federal rights.
d. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 398. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiffs, with intent to deprive them of this money and the enjoyment of their state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 399. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants PSI and Markeyta
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Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 400. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the Contract and continuing through the present with respect to hundreds of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts are part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 401. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees by PSI without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights. 402. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs have, among other things, been required to pay fees to Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and paid those fees because of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, Plaintiffs have been subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing their federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions. 403. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, County officials, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise.
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404. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, through the PSI RICO Enterprise, have directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiffs specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor supervisees assigned to PSI.
405. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have been committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the named Plaintiff and, more generally, PSI probationers who are or were unable to afford to pay their entire fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they would be eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees to the company and court debts.
4. Injury 406. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property. Plaintiffs have been required to pay probation fees and surcharges to PSI, and have been forced to continue paying these fees even when they could not afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to themselves and their families. 407. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
COUNT 3: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) By Named Plaintiff Sonya Beard on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
against PSI and Harriet Thompson for damages 408. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–407.
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409. Plaintiff’s claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, and not Giles County.
410. Plaintiff is a “person” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c).
411. Defendant PSI is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
412. Defendant Harriet Thompson is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
1. The PSI RICO Enterprise 413. Defendants PSI, Timothy Cook, and Harriet Thompson, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constituted an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“PSI RICO Enterprise”). The PSI RICO Enterprise was an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PSI and without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay. 414. Harriet Thompson was employed by PSI at all times within the statute of limitations until July 2017. 415. The PSI RICO Enterprise was engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constituted a portion of the profits received by Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson pursuant to this operation, which were collected through threats of violations and jailing. Moreover, Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson extorted, on a mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers would have otherwise spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants PSI and
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Defendant Thompson used electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with PSI probationers and to extort payment. This includes PSI’s policy that reporting forms must be faxed through for probationers who are required to report by phone.
416. The members of the PSI RICO Enterprise functioned as a continuing unit. 417. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they were associated with an enterprise that was engaged in, or the activities of which affected, interstate commerce and, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 418. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 419. Specifically, Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the PSI RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1): 420. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 421. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and 422. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
2. Predicate Acts 423. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money. 424. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, threatened Plaintiff that if she did not agree to pay money to the company she: (a) would be arrested; (b) would be accused by the company of
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violating the conditions of probation; (c) would face testimony by the company against her regarding nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including an inability to pay); (d) would have her probation revoked; (e) would be sent to jail; (f) would have her probation extended; and (g) would be charged additional fees.
425. These threats are inherently wrongful because they were motivated out of a desire to extort, because they were premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victim, and because they were demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
426. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiff paid the fees demanded by Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson even though doing so resulted in great personal suffering.
b. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 427. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiff with her consent, which consent was induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 428. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and prevented Plaintiff from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
c. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-14-112 429. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise, obtained by threat fees from the Plaintiff and impaired her exercise of her state and federal rights.
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d. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 430. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiff, with intent to deprive her of this money and the enjoyment of her state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 431. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 432. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the Contract with respect to hundreds of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts were part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 433. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson and the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise had a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees by PSI without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights. 434. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiff: Plaintiff, among other things, was required to pay fees to Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, and she paid those fees as a result of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover,
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Plaintiff was subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing her federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions.
435. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise.
436. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, through the PSI RICO Enterprise, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiff specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor supervisees assigned to PSI.
437. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise were committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the named Plaintiff and, more generally, PSI probationers who were unable to afford to pay their entire fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they would be eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees to the company and court debts.
4. Injury 438. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiff suffered injuries to her property. Plaintiff was required to pay probation fees and surcharges to PSI, and she was forced to continue paying these fees even when she could not afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to herself and her family. 439. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
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COUNT 4: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) By Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
against PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe for equitable relief 440. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–439. 441. Plaintiff’s claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and not Giles County. 442. Plaintiff is a “person” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c). 443. Defendant PSI is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 444. Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
1. The PSI RICO Enterprise 445. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“PSI RICO Enterprise”). The PSI RICO Enterprise is an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PSI and without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay. 446. The PSI RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constitute a portion of the profits received by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe pursuant to this operation, which are collected through threats of violations and jailing. Moreover, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe extort on a
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mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers would have otherwise spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe also use electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with PSI probationers and to extort payment. This includes PSI’s policy that reporting forms must be faxed through for probationers who are required to report by phone.
447. The members of the PSI RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit. 448. Defendants PSI Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are or were associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 449. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 450. Specifically, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have conducted or participated in and have conspired to conduct the affairs of the PSI RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1): 451. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 452. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and 453. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
2. Predicate Acts 454. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money.
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455. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, have threatened and continue to threaten Plaintiff that if she does not agree to pay money to the companies she: (a) will be accused by the companies of violating the conditions of probation; (b) will face testimony by the companies against them regarding nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including an inability to pay); (c) will have her probation revoked; (d) will have her probation extended; and (e) will be charged additional fees.
456. These threats are inherently wrongful because they are motivated out of a desire to extort, because they are premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victims, and because they are demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
457. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiff has paid the fees demanded by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe even though doing so has resulted in great personal suffering.
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 458. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiff with her consent, which consent has been induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 459. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and prevented Plaintiff from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
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b. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code § 39-14-112 460. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiff and impaired her exercise of her state and federal rights.
c. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 461. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiff, with intent to deprive her of this money and the enjoyment of her state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 462. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 463. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the Contract and continuing through the present with respect to hundreds of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts are part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 464. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees
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by PSI without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights.
465. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiff: Plaintiff has, among other things, been required to pay fees to Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and paid these fees because of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, Plaintiff has been subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing their federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions.
466. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, County officials, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise.
467. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, through the PSI RICO Enterprise, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiff specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor supervisees assigned to PSI.
468. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise are committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the named Plaintiff and, more generally, PSI probationers who cannot afford to pay their entire fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they are eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees to the company and court debts.
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4. Injury 469. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiff has suffered injuries to her property. Plaintiff has been required to pay probation fees and surcharges to PSI, and she has been forced to continue paying these fees even when she cannot afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to herself and her family. 470. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
COUNT 5: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiffs’ Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS and
Giles County for damages. 471. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-470. 472. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 473. CPS, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiffs are unfairly deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
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474. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and, critically, made the resolution of Plaintiffs’ cases contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities.
475. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, CPS and its employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether and when to initiate revocation proceedings.14 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
476. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The
14 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
477. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
478. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved, unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
479. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiffs’ rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving people of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in the policies and practices as described above.
480. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
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COUNT 6: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiff’s Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated against CPS and Giles County for equitable relief. 481. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-480. 482. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 483. CPS, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiff is unfairly deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. 484. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and, critically, made the resolution of Plaintiff’s case contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities. 485. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, CPS and its employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether
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and when to initiate revocation proceedings.15 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
486. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
487. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
488. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved,
15 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
489. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiff’s rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving someone of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendants caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in the policies and practices as described above.
490. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT 7: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiffs’ Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Sonya Beard and Tanya Mitchell on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for damages.
491. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-490. 492. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 493. PSI, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures
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enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiffs are unfairly deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
494. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and, critically, made the resolution of Plaintiffs’ cases contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities.
495. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, PSI and their employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether and when to initiate revocation proceedings.16 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
496. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding
16 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
497. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
498. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved, unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
499. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiffs’ rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving people of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
500. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
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COUNT 8: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiff’s Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for equitable relief. 501. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-500. 502. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
503. PSI, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiff is unfairly deprived of her constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
504. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and, critically, made the resolution of Plaintiff’s case contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities.
505. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, PSI and its employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether
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and when to initiate revocation proceedings.17 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
506. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
507. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
508. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved,
17 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
509. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiff’s rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving someone of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
510. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT 9: Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts
Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to
Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and
Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS for damages.
511. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-510. 512. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 513. The United States Supreme Court has held that when governments seek to recoup costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection
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solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
514. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerced payment of debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or suspended drivers’ licenses,18 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiffs’ liberty, the County and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiffs of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
515. Many people like the Plaintiffs who owe money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment.
516. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
18 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt)
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COUNT 10:
Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against CPS and Giles County for equitable relief. 517. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-516.
518. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and
the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
519. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup
costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their
access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection
solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
520. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerce payment of
debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on
standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment,
repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses,19 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiff’s liberty, the County
19 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing court debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt).
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and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the
prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other
Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiff of these
protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are
subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
521. Many people like the Plaintiff who owe money to the County have to borrow
money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to
pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other non-
government creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their
repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment. 522. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination
and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws. COUNT 11:
Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Sonya Beard and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for
damages. 523. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-522.
524. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and
the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 525. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup
costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their 99
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access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
526. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerce payment of debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses,20 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiffs’ liberty, the County and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiffs of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
527. Many people like the Plaintiffs who owe money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment.
528. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
20 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt).
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COUNT 12:
Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for equitable relief. 529. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-528.
530. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and
the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
531. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup
costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their
access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection
solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
532. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerce payment of
debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on
standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment,
repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses,21 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiff’s liberty, the County
and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the
21 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt).
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prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiff of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
533. Many people like the Plaintiff who owe money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment.
534. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
COUNT 13: Defendants Violate Equal Protection and Due Process by Placing and Keeping People on
Supervised Probation Solely Because They Cannot Afford to Pay Court Debts and Probation Supervision Fees
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS and
Giles County for damages 535. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-534. 536. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 537. Giles County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation with the CPS Defendants solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without an inquiry to determine whether the
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failure to pay was willful. If a probationer can afford to pay her court debts in full, she will not be subjected to supervised probation by the private companies (sometimes, Defendants permit a probationer to purchase her way off of supervised probation only after a minimum period of time, typically four months, on supervised probation has passed). If the person is too poor to pay, the County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of keeping that person on supervised probation, including forcing the person to abide by conditions agreed upon by the companies and the County that seriously restrict the person’s liberty and that subject the person to arrest and jailing if those conditions, as interpreted by the For-Profit Probation Defendants (including payment of extra fees to the company) are violated.
538. The County has the ability to collect outstanding debts directly from the Plaintiffs by allowing them to make payments directly to the court or by using other debt-collection practices that are legal under Tennessee law.
539. This policy and practice of altering punishment based solely on wealth status violates Due Process and Equal Protection.
COUNT 14: Defendants Violate Equal Protection and Due Process by Placing and Keeping People on
Supervised Probation Solely Because They Cannot Afford to Pay Court Debts and Probation Supervision Fees
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against CPS and Giles County for equitable relief 540. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-539. 541. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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542. Giles County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation with the CPS Defendants solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without an inquiry to determine whether the failure to pay was willful. If a probationer can afford to pay her court debts in full, she will not be subjected to supervised probation by the private companies (sometimes, Defendants permit a probationer to purchase her way off of supervised probation only after a minimum period of time, typically four months, on supervised probation has passed). If the person is too poor to pay, the County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of keeping that person on supervised probation, including forcing the person to abide by conditions agreed upon by the companies and the County that seriously restrict the person’s liberty and that subject the person to arrest and jailing if those conditions, as interpreted by the For-Profit Probation Defendants (including payment of extra fees to the company) are violated.
543. The County has the ability to collect outstanding debts directly from the Plaintiff by allowing her to make payments directly to the court or by using other debt-collection practices that are legal under Tennessee law.
544. This policy and practice of altering punishment based solely on wealth status violates Due Process and Equal Protection.
COUNT 15: Defendants Violate Equal Protection and Due Process by Placing and Keeping People on
Supervised Probation Solely Because They Cannot Afford to Pay Court Debts and Probation Supervision Fees
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Sonya Beard on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for damages.
545. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-544. 546. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and
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the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
547. Giles County and the PSI Defendants have a policy and practice of placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation with the Private Defendants solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without an inquiry to determine whether the failure to pay was willful. If a probationer can afford to pay her court debts in full, she will not be subjected to supervised probation by the private companies (sometimes, Defendants permit a probationer to purchase her way off of supervised probation only after a minimum period of time, typically four months, on supervised probation has passed). If the person is too poor to pay, the County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of keeping that person on supervised probation, including forcing the person to abide by conditions agreed upon by the companies and the County that seriously restrict the person’s liberty and that subject the person to arrest and jailing if those conditions, as interpreted by the For-Profit Probation Defendants (including payment of extra fees to the company) are violated.
548. The County has the ability to collect outstanding debts directly from the Plaintiff by allowing her to make payments directly to the court or by using other debt-collection practices that are legal under Tennessee law.
549. This policy and practice of altering punishment based solely on wealth status violates Due Process and Equal Protection.
COUNT 16: Unjust Enrichment Brought by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil and Lesley Johnson on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS for damages 550. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege as if fully set forth herein all factual allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-549.
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551. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq.
552. CPS Defendants took and converted to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members. Defendants extracted those funds in violation of Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Defendants had no legal right to Plaintiffs’ money and took these funds in violation of state law as related above. Under the circumstances presented here, Defendants’ retention of Plaintiffs’ money would result in unjust enrichment.
COUNT 17: Unjust Enrichment Brought by Named Plaintiffs Sonya Beard and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against PSI for damages 553. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-552. 554. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 555. PSI Defendants took and converted to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members. Defendants extracted those funds in violation of Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Defendants had no legal right to Plaintiffs’ money and took these funds in violation of state law as related above. Under the circumstances presented here, Defendants’ retention of Plaintiffs’ money would result in unjust enrichment.
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COUNT 18: Unjust Enrichment Brought by Named Plaintiffs Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against PSI for equitable relief 556. Plaintiff incorporates herein and re-allege as if fully set forth herein all factual allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-555. 557. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 558. PSI Defendants took and converted to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiff and proposed Class Members. Defendants extracted those funds in violation of Plaintiff’s federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Defendants had no legal right to Plaintiff’s money and took these funds in violation of state law as related above. Under the circumstances presented here, Defendants’ retention of Plaintiff’s money would result in unjust enrichment.
COUNT 19: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Giles County, CPS, and Defendant McNair for damages 559. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-558. 560. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq.
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561. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999).
562. When probationers are unable to pay what CPS demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, CPS participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts.
563. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when it knows that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed.
564. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
565. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
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COUNT 20: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and all others similar situated against Giles, CPS, and Defendant McNair for equitable relief 566. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-565. 567. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 568. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999). 569. When probationers are unable to pay what CPS demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, CPS participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts. 570. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when it knows that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed. 571. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior
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motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
572. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
COUNT 21: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiffs Sonya Beard and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Giles County, PSI, and Defendants Bledsoe and Thompson for damages 573. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-572. 574. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 575. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999). 576. When probationers are unable to pay what PSI demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, PSI participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts.
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577. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when it knows that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed.
578. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
579. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
COUNT 22: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against Giles County, PSI, and Defendant Bledsoe, for equitable relief 580. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-579. 581. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 582. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999).
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583. When probationers are unable to pay what PSI demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, PSI participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts.
584. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when they know that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed.
585. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
586. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
COUNT 23: Civil Conspiracy Brought by Named Plaintiffs Sonya Beard and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, and Timothy Cook
for damages 587. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-586. 588. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107,
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and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq.
589. Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, and Timothy Cook acted in concert to accomplish the common and unlawful purposes of:
a. Acting under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs and other probationers of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States without due process of law by:
i. Placing private, non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases in a position to dictate the outcome of those cases;
ii. Using imprisonment, threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses, intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on probationers’ liberty to collect debts owed to the County;
iii. Placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without determining whether the failure to pay was willful;
iv. Permitting non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the drug testing of probationers to determine how many drug tests a probationer must endure and pay for, and when the probationer must take those drug tests;
v. Taking and converting to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed class members to which Defendants had no legal right; and
vi. Abusing the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees.
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590. Defendants accomplished their common design via the unlawful means of contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested individuals to serve a traditional government function, and extorting payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law.
591. The conspiracy had a common design, jointly and knowingly established by Defendants acting through their agents and employees.
592. Defendants knew or should have known that Tennessee and federal law require individual consideration of each Plaintiff or proposed Class Member’s ability to pay such court fines, costs, and fees, that placing and keeping a person on supervised probation solely for nonpayment of such civil debts violates Tennessee and federal law, and that Tennessee and federal law provide Plaintiffs and proposed class members with the right to have their probation supervised by a neutral officer of the court.
593. Defendants knew of each other’s common intent to contract with the County and subject Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members to onerous conditions of probation in violation of Tennessee and federal law. Defendants also knew that their wrongful actions would inflict injury upon the targets of the conspiracy, including Plaintiffs Tanya Mitchell and Sonya Beard.
594. The conspiracy among Defendants was a proximate and legal cause of harm to Plaintiffs and proposed class members. If Defendants had abided by the laws requiring probation officers to be free of financial conflicts of interest and prohibiting the use of supervised probation, arrest, and jailing to coerce payment from indigent individuals, Plaintiffs and proposed class members would not have suffered the unlawful deprivations of liberty and property described herein. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their actual damages, plus costs, attorneys’ fees, and pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest.
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COUNT 24: Civil Conspiracy Brought by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation Services 595. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-594. 596. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 597. Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation services acted in concert to accomplish the common and unlawful purposes of: a. Acting under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs and other probationers of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States without due process of law by: i. Placing private, non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases in a position to dictate the outcome of those cases; ii. Using imprisonment, threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses, intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on probationers’ liberty to collect debts owed to the County; iii. Placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without determining whether the failure to pay was willful;
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iv. Permitting non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the drug testing of probationers to determine how many drug tests a probationer must endure and pay for, and when the probationer must take those drug tests;
v. Taking and converting to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed class members to which Defendants had no legal right; and
vi. Abusing the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees.
598. Defendants accomplished their common design via the unlawful means of contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested individuals to serve a traditional government function, and extorting payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law.
599. The conspiracy had a common design, jointly and knowingly established by Defendants acting through their agents and employees.
600. Defendants knew or should have known that Tennessee and federal law require individual consideration of each Plaintiff or proposed Class Member’s ability to pay such court fines, costs, and fees, that placing and keeping a person on supervised probation solely for nonpayment of such civil debts violates Tennessee and federal law, and that Tennessee and federal law provide Plaintiffs and proposed class members with the right to have their probation supervised by a neutral officer of the court.
601. Defendants knew of each other’s common intent to contract with the County and subject Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members to onerous conditions of probation in violation of
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Tennessee and federal law. Defendants also knew that their wrongful actions would inflict injury upon the targets of the conspiracy, including Plaintiffs Tanya Mitchell and Sonya Beard.
602. The conspiracy among Defendants was a proximate and legal cause of harm to Plaintiffs and proposed class members. If Defendants had abided by the laws requiring probation officers to be free of financial conflicts of interest and prohibiting the use of supervised probation, arrest, and jailing to coerce payment from indigent individuals, Plaintiffs and proposed class members would not have suffered the unlawful deprivations of liberty and property described herein. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their actual damages, plus costs, attorneys’ fees, and pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs request that this Court issue the following relief: A. An order certifying the classes described above; B. A declaratory judgment that subjecting the Plaintiffs to Defendants’ conduct as alleged in the Counts listed above is unlawful; C. An order and judgment permanently enjoining the Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional and illegal policies and practices against the Plaintiffs and the injunctive class of similarly situated people; C. A declaratory judgment that the contracts at issue are void; D. A judgment compensating the Plaintiffs and the class of similarly situated people they represent for the damages they suffered as a result of the Defendants’ unconstitutional and unlawful conduct; E. A judgment granting the treble and punitive damages authorized by statute based on the Defendants’ willful and egregious violations of the law; F. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42
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U.S.C. § 1988 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all claims so triable.

Dated: April 23, 2018

Respectfully submitted,
s/ Kyle Mothershead Kyle Mothershead, BPR 22953 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 Telephone: (615) 982-8002 Facsimile: (615) 229-6387 kyle@mothersheadlaw.com
s/ Elizabeth Rossi Elizabeth Rossi* (pro hac vice forthcoming) Jonas Wang (pro hac vice forthcoming) Eric Halperin (pro hac vice forthcoming) CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 599-0953 Facsimile: (202) 609-8030 elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org jonas@civilrightscorps.org eric@civilrightscorps.org
s/ Matthew J. Piers Matthew J. Piers (pro hac vice forthcoming) Chirag G. Badlani (pro hac vice forthcoming) Kate E. Schwartz (pro hac vice forthcoming`) HUGHES SOCOL PIERS RESNICK & DYM, LTD. 70 W. Madison St., Suite 4000 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Telephone: (312) 580-0100 Facsimile: (312) 580-1994 mpiers@hsplegal.com cbadlani@hsplegal.com kschwartz@hsplegal.com
*Admitted solely to practice law in Maryland; not admitted in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Proposed Classes

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Equal Justice Under Law

July 5, 2016

601 Pennsylvania Avenue NW South Building — Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20004 www.equaljusticeunderlaw.org erossi@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
(410) 935-3758

Janet Vanzant Giles County Mayor 1 Public Square Pulaski, TN 38478 jpvanzant@energize.net
Dear Ms. Vanzant,

My name is Elizabeth Rossi, and I am an attorney with the non-profit civil rights organization Equal Justice Under Law. We have recently become aware that Giles County is contracting with Community Probation Services and PSI Probation for the provision of misdemeanor probation services. This contract exposes Giles County to enormous civil liability, as user-funded, for-profit probation systems violate federal law.

In October 2015, we filed a class-action lawsuit against Rutherford County and Providence (now Pathways) Community Corrections, Inc., challenging their use of a user-funded, for-profit probation scheme very similar to Giles County’s. This lawsuit was filed in the federal district court for the Middle District of Tennessee, the same federal court that has jurisdiction over Giles County. We won a preliminary injunction in December 2015, which prohibits the County from using secured money bonds on violation-of-probation warrants. The federal court recently denied the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding merit in each of the constitutional claims that were challenged. I have enclosed a copy of these two decisions with this letter. Among its rulings, the Court held that it violates Equal Protection to place or keep an individual on supervised probation solely because the person has not paid her court debts, and that it violates the Fourth Amendment to arrest individuals solely for non-payment.1 Moreover, Tennessee law is clear that probation fees must be waived for the indigent, and our lawsuit alleges that a company that forces probationers to pay fees if they are indigent under the threat of revocation is committing federal criminal and civil RICO violations. If Giles County’s probation scheme employs any of the practices described in this paragraph, the County is vulnerable to suit at any time.
We have also included as a courtesy a letter from the Department of Justice’s top
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 See Opinion Denying Dismissal at 24-31.

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prosecutor for civil rights violations. The letter explains in detail the illegality of certain practices relating to jailing people for their inability to make payments and the illegality of user-funded, for-profit private probation. That letter puts this County and its officials on notice that certain practices are illegal under federal law. Under 18 U.S.C. § 242, government officials who knowingly violate federal constitutional rights can be subject to federal prosecution.
Any user-funded, for-profit probation scheme violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Schemes such as CPS and PSI’s subject probationers to supervision by a probation officer who has a direct financial stake in every supervisionrelated decision, making it impossible for the probation officer to perform her duties with the neutrality the Constitution requires. Virtually every decision the probation officer makes, many of which are discretionary and wholly unreviewable, stands to bring the company more profit. The longer a person is on probation, the more money she must pay and the more profitable the company becomes. Constitutional violations are endemic to these systems, including failure to inquire about probationers’ indigence before imposing and collecting court costs and fees, administering unreliable drug tests that lead to baseless probation violations, obstruction of probationer efforts to file financial assessments, implicitly or explicitly threatening violation for nonpayment, actually arresting and jailing probationers for nonpayment, denying probationers a meaningful opportunity to contest alleged violations, and others. Practices like these have exposed Rutherford County and PCC, Inc. to tremendous financial liability, not to mention the human costs to the residents of that community.
Fundamentally, all user-funded, for-profit probation systems, even those with less egregious practices than these, give rise to a probation officer with conflicting loyalties to money and justice, something which the Constitution cannot tolerate.
Since we sued Rutherford County and PCC, Inc., the two entities have terminated their contract and the County now operates its own probation system in which fines and fees are collected by publicly-employed probation officers free of financial conflicts of interest. We hope to work with you to implement a similar, constitutionally-compliant probation system in Giles County. Please contact me to discuss this important matter, either by email or by phone. I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Elizabeth Rossi, Attorney Equal Justice Under Law (410) 935-3758 erossi@equaljusticeunderlaw.org !
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

NO. 1:18-cv-00033

)

)

JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY

)

)

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Indya Hilfort’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 42). Plaintiff requests the Court issue a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendant Giles County from enforcing against Plaintiff Hilfort any secured financial condition of release determined without an inquiry and findings concerning ability to pay, and requiring the County to release Ms. Hilfort on her own recognizance if she is arrested for an alleged violation of probation. The Court held a telephonic hearing on the request for a temporary restraining order on July 13, 2018. Based on Plaintiff Hilfort’s filings and the parties’ arguments, and for the reasons described at the hearing and set forth below, the request for a temporary restraining order is GRANTED on the terms and conditions stated herein. Through the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 35), five individual plaintiffs seek to bring a class action challenging the operation of Giles County, Tennessee’s misdemeanor probation system, which is run by two for-profit companies – Community Probation Services, LLC (“CPS”) and PSI Probation, LLC (“PSI”) – through contracts with the County. More

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specifically, Plaintiffs allege the goal of the system is to maximize profits for CPS and PSI
through threats of arrest, physical confinement, and extended periods of supervised probation
due to nonpayment of debts owed to the court and to the private companies. More specifically,
concerning the request for temporary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs allege in Count 15 that
Defendants violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as
follows:
560. Defendants have a policy and practice of violating probationers’ substantive right against wealth-based detention by enforcing secured financial conditions of release that are pre-printed on violation-of-probation arrest warrants and that are determined without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without any pre-deprivation process, assessment of alternatives to detention, inquiry into whether the Plaintiffs pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight, or any findings regarding the need for detention in light of any particular government interest. Because the monetary amounts are predetermined without reference to the person’s ability to pay, they operate to detain only those indigent misdemeanor-probationer arrestees who cannot afford them, but without any findings that pre-revocation, wealth-based detention is necessary to meet a compelling government interest. If the Plaintiff could pay the monetary amount, she would be released immediately.
561. These violation-of-probation warrants are routinely issued for the arrest of indigent misdemeanor probationers who, like Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, are supervised on probation only because they cannot afford to pay in full their court costs and probation fees.
(Doc. No. 35, at 116-17).
In her request for a temporary restraining order and supporting Declaration, Plaintiff
Hilfort states that she learned on July 11, 2018, an arrest warrant had been issued for an alleged
violation of her conditions of probation. (Doc. Nos. 42, 42-1). Plaintiff states that, if arrested,
she will be required to pay $2,500 to be released from the Giles County jail, an amount that was
determined without inquiry or findings regarding her ability to pay. Plaintiff further states that
she is indigent, and is responsible for providing for her four children and mother. According to
2
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Plaintiff Hilfort, if she cannot pay the predetermined amount of $2,500, she will be kept in jail until the Thursday after her arrest, when she will have a violation-of-probation proceeding.
In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is to consider: (1) the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017).
Based on the motion, pleadings, declarations, briefs, representations of counsel and the entire record, the Court finds:
(1) Plaintiff Hilfort has demonstrated a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that enforcing secured financial conditions of release that are predetermined on violation-of-probation arrest warrants and are determined without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses;
(2) Plaintiff Hilfort has demonstrated she will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, harm, loss, or damage if injunctive relief is not granted pending a preliminary injunction hearing. Specifically, the Court finds Plaintiff Hilfort will suffer irreparable harm if she is arrested and held in custody until the Thursday after her arrest before she is provided a detention hearing;
(3) The balance of relative harms among the parties weighs in favor of Plaintiff Hilfort and against Defendants. Defendants have not demonstrated any prejudice they will suffer as a result of the requested relief; and
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(4) the public interest will not be harmed by injunctive relief pending a preliminary injunction hearing.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, that: Defendant Giles County, its officers, agents, employees, servants, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them are hereby enjoined and restrained from enforcing against Plaintiff Hilfort any secured financial condition of release determined without an inquiry and findings concerning ability to pay by an appropriate judicial officer, pending further order of the Court.
Given the indigency of Plaintiff Hilfort, the bond requirement is waived. This TRO is effective upon its issuance on July 13, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., and expires on July 27, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., absent further order of the Court. As the Court instructed the parties at the hearing, should Plaintiffs determine they want a preliminary injunction on behalf of Plaintiff Hilfort, or on behalf of other Plaintiffs, they should file an appropriate motion. It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________ WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

NO. 1:18-cv-00033

)

)

JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY

)

)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Motions to Quash (Doc. Nos. 158, 186), filed by Judge J.

Russell Parkes and Judge Robert C. Richardson, Jr., respectively. Through the Motions, the

judges seek to quash subpoenas issued by Plaintiffs for the judges to appear as witnesses at the

hearing on their Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 51).

Through his Motion, Judge Parkes, a Circuit Court Judge for the 22ndJudicial District,

argues the Court should quash the subpoena because it subjects him and his trial court to an

undue burden; fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; and requires him to disclose privileged

information. To support his Motion, Judge Parkes relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

45(d)(3)(A)(i), (iii), and (iv).1

1 Rule 45(d)(3)(A) provides as follows: (d) Protecting a Person Subject to a Subpoena; Enforcement. (3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena. (A) When Required. On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that: (i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply;

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Judge Parkes argues compliance with the subpoena will require him to disclose
information protected by the deliberative-process privilege. In authorizing the deposition of
Judge Parkes and Judge Richardson, Magistrate Judge Frensley considered and rejected this
argument over the course of three separate orders:
Plaintiffs are entitled to a hearing on their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The procedures used to determine the monetary conditions of release are a critical aspect of the proof necessary for the Court to rule on the Motion. It appears that Plaintiffs have sought every means possible to present this evidence to the Court without deposing the individuals mainly by seeking a stipulation of facts or deposing a witness under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For understandable reasons, the County Defendants have been unable to agree to these procedures. Nonetheless, that does not change the importance of this information to the proceedings. Certainly, the judges Plaintiffs seek to depose are the best source of factual information central to the claims asserted. The Court further disagrees with the PSI Defendants position that the depositions are improper under the deliberative process privilege for judicial actors. It does not appear that it is necessary for Plaintiffs to question the judges concerning their mental process in formulating specific official judgments or the reasons motivating them, rather, the facts material to the determination relates solely to the procedures utilized to determine the monetary conditions of release. There does not appear to be any other compelling reason not to require the judges to be deposed for the limited purposes necessary to address the allegations raised in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction related to Count 15 of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to depose the judges on the limited issue of the facts concerning the process of setting the bond amounts for warrants for violation of probation, which are central to the issues raised in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Nothing in the Court’s ruling is intended to require the judges to be deposed for all purposes or preclude further depositions on matters beyond the scope of the limited issues currently before the Court.
(Doc. No. 82, at 4-5).
(ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c);
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden. 5
2
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In the Court’s Order authorizing the deposition of two state court judges in this case, the Court considered both the necessity of the requested depositions and burdens associated with ordering judges to be deposed. While mindful of both the state court judges’ workloads and schedules, it is clear that the testimony sought by Plaintiffs in these depositions is relevant and critical to the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court also considered and rejected the arguments that the deliberative-process privilege would be implicated by the narrow scope of the matters about which the judges are to be deposed. Docket No. 82. As the Plaintiffs note, they have “no need or intention to depose Judge Parkes about his decisions or mental processes in particular cases.” Docket No. 87, p. 2. Plaintiffs further set forth the information they intend to discuss with the witnesses which is what the Court contemplated and considers reasonable and limited:
Plaintiffs seek information about which factors Judge Parkes considers in general when determining conditions of release required following arrest for alleged violation of misdemeanor probation and what information is available to him in general when he considers such factors.
Id.
All depositions are burdensome. However, given the limitations on the scope of these depositions, relevance and importance of the information sought and the Plaintiffs’ agreement to accommodate Judge Parkes schedule in the taking of the deposition, the Court finds the deposition is not unduly burdensome. Judge Parkes, like any witness, will be given adequate time to hear and consider the questions. Furthermore, should the Plaintiffs exceed the scope permitted by the Court and ask questions about specific cases and the mental processes or reasons motivating those decisions Judge Parkes can formulate his answers in such a way as to not reveal information protected by privilege. Thus, the Court believes that there is no compelling reason to order the deposition be conducted through written questions rather than oral deposition.
(Doc. No. 90, at 2-3).
The Court has addressed this specific issue in this case on two occasions. Docket Nos. 82 and 90. The Court has been clear that the facts for which these depositions are taken are relevant and critical to the determination of the issues raised in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court has further noted that this appears to be the only way to obtain the information necessary to present the matters to the Court. The deliberative–process privilege protects the “mental processes” and communications between certain individuals regarding their decisions. It does not prevent discovery of the general procedures utilized or facts and information available from which to make a decision. While it is true that the risk of wandering into protected grounds is greater as the focus narrows on particular cases, that potential alone does not support quashing the subpoena. The
3
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Court has been very clear about the permissible limited scope of the questions that may be asked and from their pleadings, it appears that the Plaintiffs both understand and intend to comply with those limitations. However, should they stray, sitting for the deposition does not constitute a waiver of any privilege.
(Doc. No. 92, at 1-2).
Neither party has cited a controlling Sixth Circuit case on the deliberative-process
privilege, but the Eleventh Circuit, after extensive analysis, has held that the privilege is a
qualified one:
We conclude, therefore, that there exists a privilege (albeit a qualified one, infra) protecting confidential communications among judges and their staffs in the performance of their judicial duties . . .
A party raising a claim of judicial privilege has the burden of demonstrating that the matters under inquiry fall within the confines of the privilege. The judicial privilege is grounded in the need for confidentiality in the effective discharge of the federal judge's duties. In the main, the privilege can extend only to communications among judges and others relating to official judicial business such as, for example, the framing and researching of opinions, orders, and rulings.
Matter of Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of Judicial
Council of Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986). The Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that Plaintiffs’ limited inquiry into the procedures used by the judges to
determine monetary conditions of release does not necessarily implicate the deliberative-process
privilege. A review of the depositions of the judges supports this conclusion. (Doc. Nos. 165,
166). Should Plaintiffs’ questions at the preliminary injunction hearing exceed this limited
inquiry, counsel for the judges and counsel for Defendants will have the opportunity to make
contemporaneous objections.
Judge Parkes alternatively argues that the subpoena should be quashed because it subjects
him and his trial court to an undue burden. When he filed the Motion, the preliminary injunction
hearing had been set for November 27, 2018, and as part of his Motion, Judge Parkes attached
4
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his court schedule for that time. The Court subsequently continued the hearing to January 31, 2019, and if necessary, to continue on February 1, 2019 (Doc. No. 183). In a recent filing (Doc. No. 196), Judge Parkes has attached his court schedule for the new hearing dates.2
To support his argument, Judge Parkes indicates he has a scheduled motion hearing set for January 28, 2019; a criminal trial set for January 28-29, 2019; three criminal trials set for January 29, 2019; two criminal trials set for January 30-31, 2019; and the “regular Maury Chancery day” on February 1, 2019. Plaintiffs argue Judge Parkes’ testimony is important to sustain their burden of proof, and represent their direct examinations of both Judge Parkes and Judge Richardson should take approximately 30 minutes.
This Court is mindful of Judge Parkes’ obligations and the important work of the court in the 22nd Judicial District. On the other hand, the issues in this case are important and potentially far-reaching. In an effort to avoid unnecessary disruption to the litigants scheduled to appear before Judge Parkes on the days affected, the Court will specially set Judge Parke’s testimony to begin as late as 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2019, or as early as 8:00 a.m. on February 1, 2019. Judge Parkes may file a notice with the Court in advance of the hearing stating his preference as to the scheduling of his testimony.
Through his Motion, Judge Richardson, a General Sessions Court Judge for Giles County, Tennessee, argues that his subpoena should be quashed because it subjects him to an undue hardship; he was previously deposed in this case; and he is immune to the subpoena pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-9-101(3).
2 Judge Parkes’ argument that the subpoena does not allow a reasonable time to comply has become moot with the resetting of the preliminary injunction hearing from November 27, 2018 to January 31, 2019.
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Judge Richardson argues his appearance at the hearing will subject him to an undue hardship because the hearing is set for January 31, 2019, a Thursday, and he has a very heavy docket on Thursdays. As with Judge Parkes, the Court will specially set Judge Richardson’s testimony to begin as late as 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2019, or at any time on February 1, 2019. Judge Richardson may file a notice with the Court in advance of the hearing stating his preference as to the scheduling of his testimony.
Judge Richardson also argues the Court should quash the subpoena because Plaintiffs have already taken his deposition. Plaintiffs contend the live testimony of Judge Richardson is important to sustain their burden of proof, and point out that all the defendants have refused to enter into stipulations based on Judge Richardson’s deposition testimony. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of cited authority that the existence of deposition testimony presents a basis for quashing a subpoena for live testimony, the Court is not persuaded by Judge Richardson’s argument.
Finally, Judge Richardson argues he is immune from the federal subpoena based on Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-9-101, which provides as follows:
(a) Deponents exempt from subpoena to trial but subject to subpoena to a deposition are: (1) An officer of the United States; (2) An officer of this state; (3) An officer of any court or municipality within the state; (4) The clerk of any court of record other than that in which the suit is pending; (5) A member of the general assembly while in session, or clerk or officer thereof; (6) A practicing physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, psychologist, senior psychological examiner, chiropractor, dentist or attorney;
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(7) A jailer or keeper of a public prison in any county other than that in which the suit is pending;
(8) A custodian of medical records, if such custodian files a copy of the applicable records and an affidavit with the court and follows the procedures provided in title 68, chapter 11, part 4, for the production of hospital records pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum; and
(9) A licensed clinical social worker, as defined in § 63-23-105 and engaged solely in independent clinical practice, in proceedings in which the department of children's services is the petitioner or intervening petitioner.
(b) If the court grants a motion to quash a subpoena issued pursuant to subsection (a), the court may award the party subpoenaed its reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending against the subpoena.
Plaintiffs argue this state statute cannot confer immunity on a state court judge with
regard to a federal trial subpoena, and cite two cases to support that view. In American National
Property and Casualty Company v. Sutte, 2015 WL 3994452 (E.D. Tenn. July 1, 2015), and
Hawkins v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 6831303 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2006),
the courts rejected the view that this statute exempts Tennessee physicians, under Subsection (a)(6), from a federal trial subpoena.3 Judge Richardson’s Motion provides no basis to adopt a
contrary opinion. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
712, 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985) (“It is a familiar and well-established
principle that the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates state laws that
interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473, 85 S.Ct.
1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (Discussing the “long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe
housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from
comparable state rules.”)
3 In Gunter v. Bemis Co., Inc., 2016 WL 11248523, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2016), the court noted reliance by one of the parties on this statute in arguing the issue of venue, but the court did not address the merits of the argument.
7
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For the reasons set forth herein, the Motions to Quash (Doc. Nos. 158, 186) are DENIED.
It is so ORDERED. ____________________________________ WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8 Case 1:18-cv-00033 Document 199 Filed 01/07/19 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 6041

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COLUMBIA DIVISION

Karen McNeil, et al.,

│

│

Case No. 1:18-cv-33

Plaintiffs,

│

│

District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr.

v.

│

│

Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley

Community Probation Services, LLC, et al.,

│

│

JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

│

__________________________________________________________________________________________

PSI Defendants’ Brief on the Issue of Standing to Participate in the Preliminary Injunction Hearing __________________________________________________________________________________________

Pursuant the Court’s November 21, 2018 order [Doc. No. 178], Defendants Progressive Sentencing,

Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, Timothy Cook,

Markeyta Bledsoe, and Harriet Thompson (collectively, the “PSI Defendants” or “these Defendants”) submit the

following brief:

I.

Standing is a jurisdictional issue that does not govern whether named party defendants can

participate in evidentiary hearings

Standing is a legal doctrine developed to ensure that the federal courts do not exceed the “judicial

Power” the United States Constitution grants them in Article III, section 1. The doctrine prevents the federal

courts from infringing on legislative and executive power by limiting the exercise of judicial power to the cases

and controversies described in Article III, section 2. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016),

as revised (May 24, 2016). Standing is a threshold issue affecting subject matter jurisdiction, almost always

raised to challenge a plaintiff’s right to assert a claim—not to prohibit the participation of specific defendants

from specific hearings. Generally, “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing

[standing].” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Both cases cited by the plaintiffs,1 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) and

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), address the standing of a defendant to appeal an adverse decision from

1 The plaintiffs assert in their Omnibus Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. No. 134] that they “do not believe that CPS and PSI Defendants have standing to contest the Motion for Preliminary Injunction because they lack a legally protected interest relevant to Count 15.” Id. at 1, n. 2.
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a case in which they participated as an intervening defendant, a situation where the defendant is invoking the
federal jurisdiction of the appellate court.
The PSI Defendants are unable to locate any legal authority addressing whether standing is a legal
doctrine that should prohibit only specific named party-defendants from participating in a specific evidentiary
hearing where the the plaintiffs suing them are going to give testimony and present evidence. As such, the PSI
Defendants assert that they have the right to defend themselves by participating in every proceeding in this case.
II. The PSI Defendants nonetheless have standing under traditional analysis
Nonetheless, if the Court considers the PSI Defendants’ standing to participate in the upcoming
evidentiary hearing through standard legal analysis, it is clear that the PSI Defendants do have standing to
participate. The United States Supreme Court has summarized the elements of standing as follows:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756, 104 S.Ct., at 3327; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2210, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–741, n. 16, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368–1369, n. 16, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972);1 and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ ” Whitmore, supra, 495 U.S., at 155, 110 S.Ct., at 1723 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare *561 Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41–42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id., at 38, 43, 96 S.Ct., at 1924, 1926.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)
The only two fact witnesses who are probationers in Giles County that the plaintiffs will call at the
hearing are PSI supervised probationers, who were supervised by named party-defendants Markeyta Bledsoe
and Harriet Thompson.
The PSI Defendants have the fundamental legal right to cross examine these witnesses as necessary.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the right of confrontation (generally applicable in criminal
proceedings under the Sixth Amendment), is also applicable in appropriate civil cases:
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. E.g., ICC v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93—94, 33 S.Ct. 185, 187—188, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913); Willner v.
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Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103—104, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180—1181, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963). What we said in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496—497, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), is particularly pertinent here:
‘Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment * * *. This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, * * * but also in all types of cases where administrative * * * actions were under scrutiny.’
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1970) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In their witness list, the plaintiffs described the “scope” of the probationers’ expected testimony as “the
experience of being detained due to inability to pay money bail required for release after arrest on a VOP
warrant,” Doc. No. 171, p. 2. In a later email from plaintiffs’ counsel, they greatly broadened their expected
testimony as being “limited to the facts surrounding the warrants issued in 2018 that resulted in their detention.”
Exhibit 1, 11/17/2018 email from plaintiffs’ counsel. The truth of the matter is—as all attorneys and judges
know—there is absolutely no way to predict what a witness might say in response to questioning on the stand.
In any event, “the facts surrounding the warrants issued in 2018” clearly include the conduct and statements of
the named PSI Defendants who executed affidavits that resulted in the issuance of an arrest warrant for each of
these witnesses. Prohibiting the PSI Defendants from participating in the hearing where these witnesses will
testify will invade their legally protected interest to cross examine them. The right to participate and question
these witnesses is a concrete, particularized right that is being actually threatened by the plaintiffs’ assertion that
the PSI Defendants not be permitted to participate in the hearing.
Beyond the fundamental right to defend against legal claims, the PSI Defendants will also be harmed if
the Court issues the sought after injunctive relief. If the Court issues the injunctive order sought by the
plaintiffs, then the authority of the PSI Defendants would be greatly diminished. If the court grants the
injunction, and afterwards defendant Markeyta Bledsoe propounds an affidavit to the Court regarding a
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probationer’s violation of a condition of probation, and the Court issues an arrest warrant with a money bond,
and it is not enforced by the Sheriff, then the PSI Defendants authority would be diminished, as would their
ability to fulfill their contractual obligations to the County.
Standing also requires a causal connection between “the injury” and the conduct complained of. Here,
the conduct complained of is the defendants right to defend themselves, and if it is taken away, they will be
injured directly by being rendered powerless to cross examine witnesses who have given testimony adverse to
their positions in the case.
Thirdly, to have standing, a litigant must show that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. Here a favorable decision would be in the form of an order saying the defendants can
participate in the hearing. If this relief is granted, it will completely and immediately redress the depravation of
their fundamental legal right to cross examine witnesses.
It is also important to note that the PSI Defendants do not have the ability to cross examine any
witnesses beyond the scope of the direct examination under Rule 611 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, unless
the Court specifically allows it. See Fed. R. Evid. 611 (b). So, participation by these defendants in the hearing
should not result in prolonged cross examination on issues not before the Court, unless they are brought up by
the plaintiffs during direct examination.
The PSI Defendants also incorporate by reference all arguments for standing made in the briefs filed by
the County and the CPS defendants.
III. Conclusion
Based on the above authorities and argument, the PSI Defendants respectfully request that they be
permitted to participate in the hearing.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Brandt M. McMillan ______ Brandt M. McMillan (BPR No. 025565) Timothy N. O’Connor (BPR No.035276) Tune, Entrekin, & White, P.C. 315 Deaderick St., Ste. 1700 Nashville, TN 37238-1700 p: (615) 244-2770 | f: (615) 244-2778 bmcmillan@tewlawfirm.com toconnor@tewlawfirm.com
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Certificate of Service

The undersigned served this document via CM/ECF on November 26, 2018:

Chirag Badlani Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd. 70 W. Madison Street, Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 580-0100 Fax: (312) 580-1994 cbadlani@hsplegal.com

Kate E. Schwartz Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd. 70 W Madison Street, Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 580-0100 Fax: (312) 580-1994 kschwartz@hsplegal.com

Elizabeth Anne Rossi Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 599-0953 Fax: (202) 609-8030 elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org
Eric Halperin Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 599-0953 Fax: (202) 609-8030 eric@civilrightscorps.org
Jonas Wang Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 599-0953 Fax: (202) 609-8030 jonas@civilrightscorps.org
Scott P. Tift Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC Bank of America Plaza 414 Union Street Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 244-2202 Fax: (615) 252-3798 stift@barrettjohnston.com

Kyle F. Mothershead The Law Office of Kyle Mothershead 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 982-8002 kyle@mothersheadlaw.com
Matthew J. Piers Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd. 70 W Madison Street, Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 580-0100 Fax: (312) 580-1994 mpiers@hsplegal.com
David W. Garrison Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC Bank of America Plaza 414 Union Street Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 244-2202 Fax: (615) 252-3798 dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com
Daniel H. Rader , IV Moore, Rader, Clift & Fitzpatrick, P.C. P O Box 3347 Cookeville, TN 38502 (931) 526-3311 Fax: (931) 526-3092 danny@moorerader.com

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Robyn Beale Williams Cassandra M. Crane Farrar & Bates 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 254-3060 Fax: (615) 254-9835 robyn.williams@farrar-bates.com casey.crane@farrar-bates.com

John Christopher Williams Williams Law and Mediation Group 101 S 1st Street Pulaski, TN 38478 (931) 363-6500 Fax: (931) 363-8904 cwilliams@newsouthlaw.com
/s/ Brandt M. McMillan__ Brandt M. McMillan

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

NO. 1:18-cv-00033

)

)

JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY

)

)

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 51). For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 51) is GRANTED, as follows. Pursuant to Rule 65, it is ORDERED that: Defendant Giles County, the Sheriff, and their officers, agents, employees, servants, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them are enjoined from detaining any person on misdemeanor probation in Giles County based on a secured financial condition of release (i.e., secured bail amount) on a violation of probation warrant if the warrant is not accompanied by a record showing that the condition (i.e., secured bail amount) was imposed after: (1) notice to the arrestee and an opportunity to be heard by an appropriate judicial officer; and (2) findings by that judicial officer concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay, alternatives to secured bail, and whether pre-revocation detention is necessary to meet a compelling governmental interest. The Court exercises its discretion to waive the security required by Rule 65(c). This Preliminary Injunction Order shall remain in effect pending further order of the Court.

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The Court is of the opinion that the parties should participate in a judicial settlement conference within 90 days of entry of this Order. The Magistrate Judge shall issue any necessary orders, including the referral to another Magistrate Judge, regarding the judicial settlement conference.
It is so ORDERED. ____________________________________ WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE — COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, TANYA MITCHELL, INDYA HILFORT, and LUCINDA BRANDON, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC; COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, L.L.C.; COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES; PROGRESSIVE SENTENCING, INC.; PSI-PROBATION II, LLC; PSIPROBATION, L.L.C.; TENNESSEE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC; TIMOTHY COOK; GILES COUNTY, TENNESSEE; PATRICIA MCNAIR; MARKEYTA BLEDSOE; HARRIET THOMPSON; KYLE HELTON,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00033 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Frensley
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT— CLASS ACTION JURY DEMAND

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Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 7 II. NATURE OF THE ACTION ............................................................................................ 9 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ...................................................................................... 15 IV. THE PARTIES................................................................................................................. 15
A. Plaintiffs ............................................................................................................... 15 B. Defendants ........................................................................................................... 16 C. Alter Ego Allegations .......................................................................................... 20 V. DEFENDANTS’ CONSPIRACY TO OPERATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR-PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM BY EXTORTION ........................................... 21 A. The Contracts ....................................................................................................... 22 B. The Companies’ Practices Are Materially Indistinguishable .............................. 23 C. The System of Private Probation in Giles County ............................................... 24 D. The Process for Notifying the Court of Alleged Non-Compliance ..................... 38 E. Revocation Proceedings ....................................................................................... 43 F. When a Person Pays Her Debts in Full ................................................................ 44 VI. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBJECTED TO DEFENDANTS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR-PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM .......................................................................... 46 A. Plaintiff Karen McNeil ........................................................................................ 46 B. Plaintiff Lesley Johnson....................................................................................... 53 C. Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell ....................................................................................... 57 D. Plaintiff Indya Hilfort .......................................................................................... 59 E. Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon.................................................................................... 64 VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ................................................................................ 71 B. Class Definitions .................................................................................................. 71 C. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(a) Are Satisfied ..................................................... 72 COMMON QUESTIONS.......................................................................................................... 72 D. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) Are Satisfied ............................... 76 VIII. CLAIMS .......................................................................................................................... 77
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COUNT 1: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (C) AND (D)
BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL AND LESLEY JOHNSON ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND PATRICIA MCNAIR FOR DAMAGES. ................................... 77
COUNT 2: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) AND (D)
BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND MARKEYTA BLEDSOE FOR DAMAGES......................................................... 83
COUNT 3: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) AND (D) BY NAMED PLAINTIFF LUCINDA BRANDON ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND HARRIET THOMPSON FOR DAMAGES ............ 88
COUNT 4: RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) AND (D)
BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND MARKEYTA BLEDSOE FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF ................................................. 93
COUNT 5: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES. .................................................................... 99
COUNT 6: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ......................................................................................................................... 101
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COUNT 7: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS LUCINDA BRANDON AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES. ........................................................................................ 104
COUNT 8: THE USE OF A PRIVATE ACTOR WITH A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROBATION CASE DECISIONS VIOLATES PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL PROBATION OFFICER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ......................................................................................................................... 106
COUNT 9: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS FOR DAMAGES. .......................................................................................................... 109
COUNT 10: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ......................................................................................................................... 111
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COUNT 11: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF LUCINDA BRANDON AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES. ........................................................................................ 112 COUNT 12: DEFENDANTS’ USE OF JAIL, THREATS OF JAIL, AND AN ONEROUS PROBATION SYSTEM TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO THE COUNTY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT IMPOSES UNDULY HARSH AND PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS WHOSE CREDITOR IS THE GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED TO THOSE WHO OWE MONEY TO PRIVATE CREDITORS
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF. ......................................................................................................................... 114 COUNT 13: DEFENDANTS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BY PLACING AND KEEPING PEOPLE ON SUPERVISED PROBATION SOLELY BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY COURT DEBTS AND PROBATION SUPERVISION FEES
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR DAMAGES ................................................................... 115 COUNT 14: DEFENDANTS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BY PLACING AND KEEPING PEOPLE ON SUPERVISED PROBATION SOLELY BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY COURT DEBTS AND PROBATION SUPERVISION FEES
BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS AND GILES COUNTY FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF .......................................................................................................................... 117
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COUNT 15: DEFENDANTS VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS’ EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY JAILING THEM SOLELY BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFORD A MONETARY PAYMENT
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AGAINST THE COUNTY AND THE SHERIFF FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF .......................................................................................................................... 118 COUNT 16: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL AND LESLEY JOHNSON ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST CPS FOR DAMAGES ..................................... 119 COUNT 17: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS LUCINDA BRANDON AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI FOR DAMAGES ...................................... 119 COUNT 18: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST PSI FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF................................................................................................... 120 COUNT 19: ABUSE OF PROCESS
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST GILES COUNTY, CPS, AND DEFENDANT MCNAIR FOR DAMAGES ....................................................... 121 COUNT 20: ABUSE OF PROCESS
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFF INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILAR SITUATED AGAINST GILES, CPS, AND DEFENDANT MCNAIR FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF ...................................... 122 COUNT 21: ABUSE OF PROCESS
BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS LUCINDA BRANDON AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST GILES COUNTY, PSI, AND DEFENDANTS BLEDSOE AND THOMPSON FOR DAMAGES ............................ 123
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COUNT 22: ABUSE OF PROCESS BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFF TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST GILES COUNTY, PSI, AND DEFENDANT BLEDSOE, FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF......... 124
COUNT 23: CIVIL CONSPIRACY BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS LUCINDA BRANDON AND TANYA MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS PROGRESSIVE SENTENCING, INC., PSI-PROBATION II, LLC, PSI-PROBATION, L.L.C., TENNESSEE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC, AND TIMOTHY COOK FOR DAMAGES ........................................................................................................... 126
COUNT 24: CIVIL CONSPIRACY BROUGHT BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, AND INDYA HILFORT ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC, COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, L.L.C., AND COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES........................ 128
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................................ 131 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ..................................................................................................... 131
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I. INTRODUCTION1
1. This class action lawsuit challenges systemic constitutional and statutory violations
and an illegal extortion scheme in Giles County, Tennessee, which has allowed two for-profit
companies—Community Probation Services, LLC and PSI Probation, LLC—to transform the
County’s misdemeanor probation system into a machine for generating their own profit on the
backs of Giles County’s most impoverished residents.2 The named plaintiffs and the members of
the putative plaintiff classes (collectively “Plaintiffs”) in this case live in poverty and were
assigned to supervised probation with one of the Defendant companies. They are victims of the
Defendants’ conspiracy to extract as much money as possible from impoverished misdemeanor
probationers through a pattern of illegal racketeering activity, including threats of arrest and
jailing, physical confinement, and extended periods of supervised probation due to nonpayment of
debts owed to the court and to the private companies.
2. The goal of CPS and PSI (collectively, the “private companies” or the “companies”)
is to maximize their own profits by acting as probation officers for the purpose of collecting fines,
costs, fees, and litigation taxes3 (these legal financial obligations will be referred to collectively as
1 The facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint reflect the facts known to Plaintiffs on information and belief at the time the First Amended Complaint was filed on July 13, 2018. Since that Complaint was filed, named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell’s supervised probation has been terminated. Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort moved for and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order on Count 15, Dkt. Nos. 42, 45, 50. Ms. Hilfort also moved for and was granted classwide preliminary injunctive relief on Count 15. Dkt. Nos. 51, 52, 224, 225. Plaintiffs are unaware at this time of other significant, material changes to facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs’ injunctive claims, except for Count 15, relate back to the date the Complaint was filed; Count 15 relates back to the date the First Amended Complaint was filed. 2 As alleged herein, PSI Probation operates through at least one individual and four legal entities—including Defendants Timothy Cook, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Tennessee Correctional Service, LLC, PSI-Probation L.L.C., and PSI-Probation II, LLC—all of which are alter egos of each other for purposes of Tennessee law. CPS Probation operates through at least three legal entities—including Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation Services—which are alter egos of each other for purposes of Tennessee law. 3 Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-602(a) (“There is levied a privilege tax on litigation instituted in this state, of twenty-nine dollars and fifty cents ($29.50) on all criminal charges, upon conviction or by order.”).
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“court debts”) owed to the court following convictions for minor misdemeanor offenses. Pursuant to their respective contracts with the County (the “Contracts”), the companies add their own fees and surcharges on top of those court debts and continue to supervise the collection of even greater amounts of money from probationers who cannot afford to pay their debts. These fees and surcharges—which probationers pay directly to the companies—are the companies’ only sources of revenue under their Contracts.
3. The supervision the companies provide, however, consists almost exclusively of continuous and repeated threats of jailing, humiliating abuses of power such as invasive drug screens during which employees of the companies observe probationers urinating (and the companies, in their discretion, then charge fees for each drug test that they decide to administer), and repeated revocations and extensions of probation for not making payments that the companies and their employees (“private probation officers” or “for-profit probation officers”; collectively, the companies and their employees are referred to as “Private Defendants”) know the probationers cannot afford. All of this occurs while the companies continue to impose additional monthly fees and surcharges, and the probationers’ debts mount.
4. In addition to providing substantial revenue to the County, the contractual arrangements give Giles County’s private probation officers, who should be neutral officers of the court, a direct financial stake in every aspect of misdemeanor probation supervision. This financial conflict of interest, baked into the companies’ contracts with the County and the companies’ written and unwritten policies, causes a cycle of debt; arrest and jailing for inability to pay that debt; additional fees for those arrests; repeated revocation and extension of supervised probation for nonpayment; and crushing, inescapable poverty.
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5. As a result of these extortionate enterprises, individuals who are supervised by the companies, including the named plaintiffs, have lost homes, jobs, and personal belongings; suffered severe medical problems, sold their blood plasma, and gone without food, clothing, and medicine for themselves and their children; taken out high-interest loans and borrowed money from friends and family members who are themselves struggling to afford the basic necessities of life; and diverted public benefits—including social security disability checks, or whatever minimal income they have—to instead pay the escalating supervision fees that the companies demand under threat of arrest and jailing. These policies and practices have trapped Plaintiffs and hundreds of people like them in Giles County in a web of fear and panic for years.
6. The companies’ user-funded model of probation—in which the probation officer’s only sources of income and profit under the Contracts are the payments made by the impoverished probationers the County assigns to them for probation supervision—violates the Constitution and has no place in our legal system. This lawsuit seeks to recover damages from the alleged wrongdoers here, disgorge their ill-gotten profits, and to end the practice of for-profit misdemeanor probation in Giles County administered by private companies with financial incentives to place and keep persons on probation. II. NATURE OF THE ACTION
7. Giles County contracted to give control of its misdemeanor probation system to two private, for-profit companies—CPS and PSI—by entering into separate contracts with each company. See Ex. 1 (contract between Giles County and CPS); Ex. 2 (contract between Giles County and PSI).
8. The Contracts provide for a user-funded model of probation, in which probationers must pay—under threat of arrest, jailing, and repeated revocation and extension of their probation—a variety of fees and surcharges to the company in addition to their court debts. The
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Contracts specify that CPS and PSI must earn their revenue and profit solely and directly from
payments by the people they supervise.
9. CPS and PSI repeatedly threaten misdemeanor and traffic probationers with arrest
and physical confinement if they do not make payments. The Private Defendants tell probationers
that nonpayment will result in the company “violating” them—i.e., alleging to the court in a sworn
statement that the probationer has violated a condition of probation and asking the court to issue
an arrest warrant or a citation warrant.
10. The Private Defendants further tell probationers that “violations” for nonpayment
will result in extended periods of “pay-only” probation,4 during which periods5 probationers
accrue more fees owed to the companies, including monthly supervision fees and discretionary
drug testing fees, and that non-compliance with other conditions of probation—and sometimes
nonpayment—will result in jail time in addition to revocation and extension of pay-only probation.
11. In fact—and Defendants never disclose this to Plaintiffs—under federal and
Tennessee law, only willful nonpayment can constitute a violation of probation.6 As a matter of
4 “Pay-only probation” refers to a period of supervised probation during which the person is supervised only because she has not paid all of the court debt. Pay-only probation ends only when a person has paid court debts in full. See Human Rights Watch, Profiting From Probation: America’s ‘Offender Funded’ Probation Industry (2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offender-funded-probationindustry (“Pay only probation is an extremely muscular form of debt collection masquerading as probation supervision, with all costs billed to the debtor.”); Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc., New Yorker (June 23, 2014), available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc. 5 Terms of probation in Giles County are usually the maximum allowable under Tennessee law: 11 months and 29 days, referred to locally as “11/29.” The most common sentence includes jail time of 11 months and 29 days, suspended for 11 months and 29 days. When Defendants revoke and extend a person’s probation, they typically require the person to also serve some amount of their jail sentence, and then extend the probationary period for an additional 11/29. Therefore, following revocation and extension, the possibility of extensive jail time, albeit shortened by the amount of time the person served for the violation, looms for the probationer who cannot pay or violates any of the company’s other rules or conditions. 6 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(i)(3) (2017) (nonpayment of supervision fees must be willful to be grounds for probation revocation); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 770 n.13 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), appeal dismissed (Mar. 15, 2016) (“Defendants’ probation scheme is the functional equivalent of what Bearden prohibits: probation revocation due to nonpayment without an indigency inquiry.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(a) (2017) (nonpayment of court fines must be willful to be grounds for criminal contempt); State v. Dye, 715 S.W.2d 36,
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policy and practice, the companies train their employees not to inform probationers of this law and their basic rights. Defendants routinely threaten to seek violation-of-probation warrants for probationers who are too poor to make a payment, or whose payments fall short of what the probation officer demanded, without verifying that the nonpayment was willful.
12. A person may be assigned to supervised misdemeanor probation by either the General Sessions Court or the Circuit Court in Giles County. The General Sessions Court issues citation warrants when the allegation is solely nonpayment. These warrants do not authorize arrests. The Circuit Court, however, issues arrest warrants solely for nonpayment. Those warrants authorize arrest and typically state that a secured money bail amount is required for release after arrest.
13. Although the citation warrants that probation officers seek alleging solely nonpayment for General-Sessions probationers do not authorize arrest, most probationers do not know that and believe—based on the threats of the Private Defendants—that if they do not to pay the company, they will be arrested and taken to jail.
14. Moreover, warrants for multiple alleged violations including nonpayment do authorize arrest. Such warrants typically have either a pre-set money bond in an amount determined without individualized consideration of the arrestee’s ability to pay, or a requirement to “hold” the arrestee in jail until her probation-revocation hearing, which does not take place until up to ten days after arrest.
15. The Contracts give the companies enormous discretion, including authorizing them to notify the court of alleged non-compliance with conditions of probation, seek and prepare probation revocation warrants, act as the main witness and present evidence at revocation
41 (Tenn. 1986) (reversing revocation of probation because lower court did not determine that nonpayment of restitution was willful).
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proceedings, confer with judges and prosecutors on bond amounts for violation-of-probation warrants and whether a person arrested for an alleged violation of probation should be detained until the revocation hearing, and recommend sentences and sanctions. The Contracts give the companies discretion to determine how much a probationer must pay on each reporting day, how frequently the probationer must report, and (in the case of CPS) how much of each payment the company will keep for itself before paying the court. All of these discretionary decisions are communicated by the Private Defendants under threat of arrest for noncompliance.
16. The Contracts permit CPS and PSI to petition for revocation of probation solely for nonpayment, and to seek the arrest and jailing of probationers and petition for extension of probation for people who have not paid all of the accumulated fees and costs, but have already paid enough money to cover the entirety of their original court debts.
17. In their efforts to generate greater revenue, the individual probation officer defendants regularly make sworn statements of fact that they know are false and knowingly omit material facts when seeking warrants solely for nonpayment of court costs and probation fees. As a matter of policy and practice, the Private Defendants consistently omit critical facts—such as that a person who did not make payments survives on disability income. They seek warrants that are facially insufficient to justify a revocation of probation as a matter of law because the Private Defendants never allege that probationers willfully refused to pay, i.e., that they have refused to pay even though they are able to do so.
18. Defendants know that the vast majority of CPS and PSI probationers are only on supervised for-profit probation because they are indigent and cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees in one lump sum. Nonetheless, they regularly participate in probationrevocation hearings that result in the revocation and extension of supervised probation due solely
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to nonpayment, without conducting an inquiry into the probationer’s ability to pay, and without findings that the nonpayment was willful. Revocations for nonpayment typically result in an extension of probation for another period of 11 months and 29 days, and result in saddling the probationer with additional court debts and company fees and surcharges, continuing the cycle of debt, arrest, for-profit probation supervision, jail, and more debt.
19. Each Contract creates an actor within the Giles County legal system that is fundamentally incompatible with constitutional law: a probation officer who is supposed to be neutral, but instead has a direct financial stake in every decision and outcome in every individual’s probation case. This arrangement violates basic notions of due process, neutrality, and fairness.
20. Defendants’ extortion scheme constitutes a systematic violation of constitutional rights calculated to generate significant profits every year for the companies and to provide substantial revenue to the County.
21. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief for themselves and all others similarly situated.
22. The allegations in this case are materially indistinguishable from those in Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc., 3:15-cv-01048 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), a class-action lawsuit that raised identical federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and constitutional claims against nearby Rutherford County, Tennessee and a now-defunct private probation company, PCC, Inc.7 Soon after Rodriguez was filed, PCC, Inc. ended its operations in Giles County, in Tennessee, and throughout the entire country.8
7 PCC, Inc. was also operating in Giles County at the time the company’s conduct in Rutherford County was challenged by Plaintiffs in Rodriguez. 8 The federal court recently granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement, through which PCC, Inc. agreed to pay $14 million and Rutherford County agreed to pay $300,000 to the people who were on supervised probation during the four-year statute of limitations applicable to the RICO claim. See Rodriguez v.
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23. When PCC, Inc. left Giles County, one of the Defendant probation companies in
this case—CPS—began operating in Giles County in its place. CPS moved into the old PCC, Inc.
offices, assumed the accounts for probationers whom PCC, Inc. had previously supervised, hired
PCC, Inc.’s former employees—including Defendant Patricia McNair—and implemented
identical debt-collection practices. PSI, which has been operating in Giles County for more than
four years, engages in materially the same extortionate and unconstitutional conduct.
24. Defendants’ policies and practices in this case are materially identical to those at
issue in Rodriguez, and a court in this District has already issued two detailed memorandum
opinions concluding that such policies and practices violate the United States Constitution.9 Giles
County has been on notice that its private probation practices violate Tennessee law, federal
statutes, and the United States Constitution since at least July 5, 2016—when Giles County
Executive, Janet Vanzant, received a letter summarizing the Rodriguez allegations and the two
federal court rulings, see Ex. 3.
25. Like Rodriguez, this civil rights action is brought under RICO, the United States
Constitution, and Tennessee law to stop the Defendants from continuing to operate racketeering
Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., Case 3:15-cv-01048, Dkt. 197, Order Granting Second Unopposed Motion to Approve Notice of Class Action Settlement Agreement, Set Hearing Date, and Authorize Notice to Class Members (Jan. 2, 2018). Rutherford County also agreed to make significant changes to its probation system, including never again contracting with a for-profit, private probation company, waiving fees for indigent probationers, and ending pay-only probation. 9 See Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (holding that it violates the Equal Protection Clause to treat government debtors more harshly than debtors who owe debts to private companies; holding that it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to keep impoverished probationers on supervised probation solely because of their inability to make monetary payments; holding that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to arrest misdemeanor probationers solely for nonpayment; holding that it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to jail probationers solely because they cannot afford to pay secured money bail); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (granting Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction enjoining Rutherford County from detaining misdemeanor arrestees who cannot afford the predetermined money bail amount required for release following an arrest for allegedly violating probation; holding that it violates equal protection and due process to keep an impoverished misdemeanor probationer in jail after arrest and prior to a probation-revocation hearing due to her inability to pay a pre-determined secured money bail amount). Plaintiffs in this case raise many of the same federal constitutional claims that were litigated in Rodriguez.
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enterprises that extort money from some of the most impoverished people in Giles County, and to prevent the Defendants from continuing to misuse the probation system for profit.
26. Plaintiffs bring this civil rights action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated seeking the vindication of their fundamental rights, compensation for the violations that they suffered, punitive damages to punish the private probation company Defendants and to deter all Defendants from similar misconduct in the future, and injunctive and declaratory relief to protect them against future violations. III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
27. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367(a) (over the state law claims because they are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution).
28. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. IV. THE PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs 29. Plaintiff Karen McNeil is 53 years old and lives in Giles County with a friend in a mobile home outside of Pulaski. She has four adult children. Ms. McNeil was subjected to supervised probation with Defendant CPS from March 2016 until October 2017. She was previously supervised on probation by PCC, Inc. from November 2015 until March 2016. For the entire period of supervised probation with both CPS and PCC, Inc., Defendant McNair was the probation officer to whom Ms. McNeil primarily reported.
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30. Plaintiff Lesley Johnson is a 35-year-old single mother of two children who lives in Mississippi. She previously lived in Baldwin County, Alabama, where she resided during the period she was on CPS probation. Ms. Johnson was subjected to supervised probation with Defendant CPS from February 2017 to August 2017. During her period of supervised probation with CPS, Defendant McNair was the probation officer to whom Ms. Johnson primarily reported.
31. Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell is 53 years old and lives in Giles County, in a mobile home with her daughter, Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, and her four grandchildren (Ms. Hilfort’s children). Ms. Mitchell has been subjected to supervised probation with Defendant PSI since September 2017. For the entire period of supervised probation with PSI, Defendant Bledsoe has been the probation officer to whom Ms. Mitchell reports.
32. Plaintiff Indya Hilfort is a 27-year-old single mother of four children under the age of 10. She lives with them and her mother, Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell, in a mobile home in Giles County. Ms. Hilfort has been subjected to supervised probation with Defendant CPS since September 2017. She was previously supervised on probation by PCC, Inc. in 2015. For the entire period of supervised probation with CPS, Defendant McNair is the probation officer to whom Ms. Hilfort primarily reports.
33. Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon is a 31-year-old single mother of three children under the age of 10 who lives in Lawrence County, adjacent to Giles County. Ms. Brandon was subjected to supervised probation with Defendant PSI between September 2015 and May 2017. During her period of supervised probation with PSI, Ms. Brandon reported primarily to Defendant Thompson. She also reported to Defendant Bledsoe.
B. Defendants 34. Defendant Community Probation Services, LLC is a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. Community Probation Services,
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LLC is headquartered in Crossville, Tennessee, and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 2015 when it formed via conversion of Defendant Community Probation Services.
35. Defendant Community Probation Services is a for-profit general partnership organized in Tennessee on January 1, 2014, and headquartered in Crossville. On October 15, 2015, Community Probation Services filed a Certificate of Conversion with the Tennessee Secretary of State, converting itself into Defendant Community Probation Services, LLC.
36. Defendant Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. 10 Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was headquartered in Crossville, Tennessee. The company was known as “PSIProbation, L.L.C.” until it changed its name to Community Probation Services, L.L.C. effective January 1, 2008. Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was terminated on April 25, 2014.
37. Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, and Community Probation Services, L.L.C. are collectively referred to herein as “CPS.”
38. Defendant Progressive Sentencing, Inc. is a for-profit corporation incorporated and registered to do business in Tennessee. Progressive Sentencing, Inc. is headquartered in Cookeville and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 1991.
39. Defendant PSI-Probation, L.L.C. was a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. PSI-Probation, L.L.C. was headquartered in Cookeville and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 1999. Effective January 1, 2008, PSI-Probation, L.L.C. changed its name to “Community Probation Services, L.L.C.” Community Probation Services, L.L.C. was terminated on April 25, 2014.
10 “Community Probation Services, LLC” and “Community Probation Services L.L.C.” are distinct entities. The use or absence of periods in “LLC” are intentional throughout the complaint.
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40. Defendant PSI-Probation II, LLC was a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. PSI-Probation II, LLC was headquartered in Cookeville, and operated in the State of Tennessee since 2005. PSI-Probation II, LLC was administratively dissolved on August 6. 2017.
41. Defendant Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC is a for-profit limited liability corporation organized and registered to do business in Tennessee. Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC is headquartered in Cookeville, and has operated in the State of Tennessee since 2002.
42. Defendant Timothy Cook is a citizen and resident of Cookeville, Tennessee. Defendant Cook is or was the owner, member, organizer, partner, and/or president of Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation, L.L.C., PSI-Probation II, LLC, and Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC.
43. Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation, L.L.C., PSI-Probation II, LLC, and Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC are collectively referred to herein as “PSI,” the name that local probationers and court staff use to refer to the company in Giles.
44. Both CPS and PSI generate their income from supervision fees and surcharges that Defendants require misdemeanor probationers to pay to the companies, pursuant to contracts signed by the Giles County Executive on behalf of the County. See Exs. 2, 3.
45. Pursuant to the Contracts, the County pays nothing for the companies’ services. Ex. 1 at 4; Ex. 2 at 3.
46. Instead, the Contracts require the County to refer misdemeanor probation supervision to the companies, which provide probation supervision services at no charge to the
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County, extracting their revenue exclusively through various fees charged to probationers. Ex. 1 at 4, Ex. 2 at 3.
47. Defendant Giles County is a local government entity organized under the laws of the State of Tennessee. Its officials are responsible for, among other things, operating the County jail, prosecuting misdemeanor and traffic offenses, providing for a lawful probation supervision system, and supplying adequate indigent defense services.
48. Defendant Patricia McNair is a probation officer employed by CPS. Defendant McNair supervises Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort. She previously supervised Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil and Lesley Johnson. She is sued in her personal and official capacities.
49. Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe is a probation officer employed by PSI. She supervises Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell. She previously supervised Named Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon. She is sued in her personal and official capacities.
50. Defendant Harriet Thompson was a probation officer employed by PSI. She previously supervised Named Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon. She is sued in her personal and official capacities.
51. Defendants McNair, Thompson, and Bledsoe have used their discretion as probation officers to determine how frequently probationers have to report, the means by which probationers must report (e.g., in person or by phone), whether and when to seek an arrest warrant based on a purported violation of probation and on what basis or bases, what disposition to recommend to the court following a revocation proceeding, how frequently to subject probationers to drug tests, and every other discretionary probationary decision discussed in this Complaint. Defendant McNair uses her discretion as a CPS probation officer to allocate payments from
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probationers to pay the company first and court debts second and whether and when to convert individuals’ probation from supervised to unsupervised.
52. Defendants CPS, PSI, McNair, Thompson, and Bledsoe perform a traditional government function and were acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this case.
53. Defendants McNair, Thompson, and Bledsoe acted as agents of their employers at all times relevant to this case.
C. Alter Ego Allegations 1. CPS Defendants
54. Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation Services constitute alter egos of each other. These Defendant entities have been used in contravention of public policy—namely contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested companies to serve a traditional government function, which Defendants abused to extort payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law. These Defendant entities also use the same office or business location, employ the same employees, and do not maintain arms-length relationships. Unless otherwise specified, all references to “CPS” herein refer to all current and former legal entities through which CPS operates and has operated in the State of Tennessee during the Class periods.
2. PSI Defendants 55. Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation L.L.C., PSI-Probation II, LLC, and Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC constitute alter egos of each other. These Defendant entities have been used in contravention of public policy—namely contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested companies to serve a traditional government
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function, which Defendants abused to extort payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law. These Defendant entities also use the same office or business location, employ the same employees, and do not maintain arms-length relationships. Unless otherwise specified, all references to “PSI” herein refer to all current and former legal entities through which PSI operates and has operated in the State of Tennessee during the Class periods. V. DEFENDANTS’ CONSPIRACY TO OPERATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR-
PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM BY EXTORTION 56. Giles County and the Private Defendants, operating pursuant to the Contracts between the companies and the County, conspired to use the County’s probation system to collect court debts owed to the County by misdemeanor offenders, as well as to collect fees owed solely to the private companies, using unlawful extortion, threats of arrest and jailing, physical confinement, and improper and fraudulent legal process. 57. By establishing a purely user-funded probation system, Defendants created financial incentives for the companies to use their access and perceived access to the County’s courts, law enforcement officers, and jail to engage in extortionate and unconstitutional policies and practices, described in detail below. All Defendants, including County officials, are aware of and complicit in each of these policies and practices. 58. Pursuant to the County’s contracts with the companies, for-profit supervised probation thus serves almost exclusively as a mechanism for collecting post-judgment court debts from individuals who are poor, and as a mechanism to generate and extort additional income for the companies through coercive and unlawful means not available to any private creditor under
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state or federal law. These policies and practices devastate the lives of hundreds of misdemeanor probationers in Giles County every year, and have done so for more than a decade.
59. Probation need not be a cash-collection tool. For example, Defendants have at their disposal the option to convert misdemeanor court and probation debts into civil judgments, which would allow the County to collect debts while observing constitutional and statutory safeguards.
60. Defendants know these options exist: they occasionally terminate the probation of a person who has been on pay-only supervised probation for several years and permit the person’s debts to be treated as civil judgments in accordance with Tennessee law. However, Defendants rarely use this option, choosing instead, as a matter of policy, to use threats, arrest, jailing, and endless cycles of supervised probation to extort payments from impoverished people.
A. The Contracts 1. CPS
61. CPS signed its contract with Giles County on March 16, 2016, after PCC, Inc.— which operated in Giles for more than a decade until it was sued for materially the same policies challenged in this Complaint—left the private probation business.
62. After PCC, Inc. left Giles, CPS moved into the former PCC, Inc. offices, began supervising PCC, Inc.’s former probationers, and hired PCC, Inc.’s former employees, including defendant Patricia McNair.
63. The Contract between CPS and Giles County empowers the company to determine how much money a probationer must pay in supervision fees, surcharges, and court costs and on what dates in order to avoid a violation-of-probation arrest warrant or citation warrant being issued.
64. The Contract requires the company to collect court debts and fees generated for the company and to decide how much of the money collected should be remitted to the court, and how much should be used to pay itself. Ex. 1.
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65. CPS is also required by the Contract to prepare arrest warrants for violations of probation, confer with the judge and prosecutor about cases, provide testimony and evidence at revocation hearings, and decide whether and when to report non-compliance to the Court.
2. PSI 66. PSI has been providing private probation services in Giles County since at least December 14, 2011, when the County and PSI signed the operative Contract. See Ex. 2. 67. The Contract gives PSI the power to monitor, collect, and levy its own additional payments, enforce compliance with conditions, report non-compliance (including through sworn affidavits for arrest warrants and citation warrants), and confer privately with the prosecutor and judges on cases. 68. In exchange, the County agreed to assign cases to private for-profit supervised probation with PSI. B. The Companies’ Practices Are Materially Indistinguishable 69. The companies operate in the same way in all material respects. The only apparent difference is that probationers with PSI make payments on their court debt directly to the court and pay only their probation fees to the company, while probationers with CPS typically pay their court debts to the company in addition to the probation fees. CPS then remits some portion of those payments to the court. 70. In pursuit of generating revenue for themselves and the County, all of the Private Defendants decide how much money a probationer owes to them each week to avoid violating their probation and how frequently the probationer must report and make payments; both companies monitor probationers’ payments of court debts and probation fees, and both companies consider mere nonpayment of either court debts or probation fees to be a violation of probation that justifies revocation; both companies engage in a pattern and practice of threatening indigent
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probationers with arrest, jailing, and extension of supervised probation if they do not pay probation fees or court debts, refuse to submit to costly and invasive drug tests at the discretion of the companies, or do not comply with any of the companies’ other vague and onerous conditions; and both companies file sworn affidavits with the court seeking warrants, informing the court that the person did not make payments as required, without first determining that the person willfully refused to pay, and even when they know the person did not pay only because she was too poor to pay.
C. The System of Private Probation in Giles County 1. The Process for Assigning Misdemeanor Offenders to Private Probation
71. In Giles County, misdemeanor and traffic cases are typically handled in General Sessions Court. A person may plead guilty to a misdemeanor offense in the Circuit Court if the charge was originally filed as a felony.
72. Individuals sentenced to probation are assessed a variety of fines (as punishment for the offense) and fees (which are used to pay for municipal services), court costs, and litigation taxes11 without regard for the person’s ability to pay.12
73. A misdemeanor defendant is never told at the time of pleading guilty how much he or she will owe. During one recent docket, a person who was pleading guilty asked the judge, “What are my costs and fines?” The judge responded, “I don’t know.”
74. A misdemeanor defendant is typically sentenced to either 11 months and 29 days in jail suspended for 11 months and 29 days of probation, or to six months in jail, suspended for
11 Restitution—which is a payment made to a victim of an offense in compensation for the harm caused—is also sometimes required. 12 Under Tennessee law, court debt may be collected in the same manner as a civil judgment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(a).
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six months of probation. Sometimes the sentence includes several days or a month in jail in addition to the suspended sentence and probation.
75. As a matter of policy, every person convicted of a misdemeanor offense in General Sessions Court is required to pay at least $25 every week toward their court debts as a condition of probation, regardless of ability to pay. People convicted of misdemeanors in Circuit Court are required to pay at least $50 every month.
76. In every General Sessions case, a pre-printed “Order” is entered at the sentencing hearing, purporting to find that every single misdemeanor probationer “stated in open court that he/she is financially capable of paying $25 per week.” But, the statements are coerced since people charged with misdemeanor offenses believe that they must agree to make payments, or else they risk being sentenced to jail instead of probation.
77. Many misdemeanor defendants who state on the record that they are able to pay $25 each week are extremely poor. Many of them survive only on social security disability payments or other means-tested government benefits, and struggle to meet the basic necessities of life. They cannot in fact make the weekly payments without foregoing basic necessities or falling even deeper into debt.
78. Everyone involved in the process of assessing and collecting court debts, including the County and the Private Defendants, knows that the “Orders” purporting to find every person charged with a misdemeanor financially able to pay $25 per week are based, in many cases, on coerced statements: Defendants possess information about the probationers’ finances, and are present in the courtroom when fees are assessed and the purported colloquy occurs, and many probationers were found indigent for purposes of appointing counsel.
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79. In some rare cases, a person will ask for a lower weekly payment during sentencing, but these requests are routinely denied.
80. The sole General Sessions judge routinely threatens people he sentences to probation that if they do not pay, their probation could be revoked and extended, saying words to the effect of, “I don’t want to see you back here on a violation, much less a violation for nonpayment.”
81. In many cases, people owe so much money that they will be unable to pay it all off at a rate of $25 per week within the probation period.
82. Under Tennessee law, community service can be an alternative to a requirement to pay court costs. The County could suspend court debts upon the successful completion of community service, but community service is typically not affirmatively offered to impoverished probationers as an alternative to payment.
83. Additional rehabilitative conditions of probation are rarely required. But when people are required to complete such classes as a condition of probation, the probationers must travel to and pay for them.
84. Pursuant to the companies’ contracts with the County, any misdemeanor offender who is sentenced to probation must be assigned to be supervised by either CPS or PSI.
85. According to policy and practice, and by agreement or acquiescence of all Defendants, assignments to supervised probation alternate between each company so that each company is assigned approximately the same number of new probationers.
86. In many cases, people are sentenced to a minimum period of supervised probation, during which time the person must report to the company, submit to drug tests any and every time the company decides to conduct them, and make regular payments of court costs and probation
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fees under threat of arrest and revocation. After the minimum period of supervision, the probation can be converted to unsupervised if all court costs and probation fees have been paid.
87. In some cases, there is no required minimum period of supervised probation, and probationers are informed that they will be “supervised until paid in full.” People who can afford to pay in full are permitted to pay their court costs at their first probation meeting, along with a $45 probation fee for the single visit, and then, if the person was assigned to CPS, the company will notify the court to convert the person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation. If the person was assigned to PSI, the Court Clerk’s office is responsible for closing the probationer’s account.
88. Those who are sentenced to “supervised probation until paid in full” and cannot afford the full court debt must continuously report to the Private Defendants, submit to invasive drug tests, and pay supervision fees to the companies. They face arrest warrants, revocation, additional fees, and extension of their for-profit supervised probation, and thus additional supervision fees, if they have not paid all of their court costs and probation fees by the end of their probationary period.
2. Conditions of Probation 89. Upon assignment to supervised probation, probationers are required to have an initial meeting with a CPS or PSI representative present in the courtroom. 90. In General Sessions Court, Defendants Bledsoe and McNair sit at desks to the right of the judge’s bench while the court is in session. On their desks are stacks of documents entitled “Misdemeanor Sentence.” These forms are pre-signed by the General Sessions judge. On the day of conviction, the probation officer will check off applicable conditions of probation, including the amount of money the person must pay each week in court costs, and the amount she must pay each
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month as a supervision fee to the company, and any “special conditions,” such as classes provided by third party contractors who charge a fee.
91. If a probationer cannot afford to pay the fee required for the class, then she cannot take the class. If a person does not take the class, she cannot satisfy the conditions of her probation, and her probation will be revoked and extended. As a matter of policy, the County and the companies do not provide any mechanism for waiving the fee.
92. The forms also indicate how frequently the probationer must report, and whether she must report in person or by phone. One of the individual Defendant probation officers fills out the portion of the forms relating to the probationer’s reporting requirements at her own discretion.
93. Probationers are also required by Defendants McNair and Bledsoe, and previously by Defendant Thompson, to sign a company-specific, standard document agreeing to abide by general “Rules” of probation.
94. A set of these Rules were designed by each company and agreed to by the County. 95. CPS requires probationers to agree to each of the following conditions on penalty of arrest and revocation of probation for failure to obey:
a. To pay all court debts and probation fees. b. To “[p]ay probation fees, and drug screen fee as instructed”; c. To submit to random drug tests and pay for them; d. To “make a full and truthful report to my probation officer . . . as directed by the officer . . .”; e. To avoid consuming any “intoxicants”; and
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f. To notify the private probation company “BEFORE changing my address or employment.”
96. The document distributed to people assigned to CPS supervision listing the Rules is entitled “Probation Order,” which gives it the imprimatur of the court. However, it is signed only by the private probation officer and the probationer. It states that “[v]iolation of any of the terms of Probation may be sufficient cause for revocation of Probation.”
97. PSI’s rules are similar. They require probationers to agree to abide by each of the following conditions on penalty of arrest and revocation of probation for failure to obey:
a. To pay probation fees “in a timely manner”; b. To submit to random drug tests “as required by the probation officer” and to pay for those tests; c. To permit any for-profit probation officer and any law enforcement officer to search their bodies, homes, cars, and personal belongings at any time, in any place, and without a search warrant; d. To “not keep late or unusual hours”; e. To “not associate with any person who is known to be involved in criminal activity”; f. To not leave the State of Tennessee without the for-profit probation officer’s permission; g. To “not use any alcoholic beverage to the point that you may be arrested or charged with a criminal offense”; and h. To notify the private probation company “before changing address or employment.”
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98. The County and the companies require probationers to agree to submit to and pay for suspicionless drug tests at any time, even when their underlying charge has nothing to do with drugs or alcohol, and even when the person has no history of substance abuse. Refusing to take a drug test constitutes a violation of probation.
99. The companies charge for the drug tests, and the cost gets added to the probationer’s debts to the company. The company charges orders of magnitude more for each portable drug test than the company spends, making drug testing one of the most profitable aspects of the companies’ business.
100. Although CPS writes in its rules that it charges $45 every six months for drug tests, many probationers are charged for every single drug test, which occur much more frequently than once every six months. The cost of each drug test varies. Probation officers typically charge $35 or $45 per test, but sometimes they will accept $20, and sometimes they will require the probationer to pay as much as $90.
101. PSI also exercises its discretion to charge varying amounts for drug tests, typically ranging from $20 to $45. The company sometimes charges for every drug test, and other times charges a lump sum for some period of time, regardless of the number of drug tests actually conducted during that time period.
102. The companies use drug-testing kits, which they administer in the office, that purport to provide immediate results without laboratory analysis.
103. If probationers wish to have the results of the in-office test verified by a lab, as a matter of each company’s policy, the probationer must make another payment to the private company, which sends the sample to a lab for the confirmatory test. In at least one case, CPS charged a probationer $120 for the confirmatory testing.
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104. The Private Defendants drug test probationers more frequently near the end of their supervised probation periods because they can earn significantly more profit if there is a reason to revoke and extend the person’s supervised probation: by increasing drug tests—and charging the associated fees—just as someone’s probation is about to end, the companies make it more likely that the person will violate a condition of probation by testing positive for drugs, refusing to submit to the drug test, or being unable to pay for the drug test, and their probation will be revoked and extended, resulting in more fees for the company.
105. If a probationer who is being supervised by PSI tests positive in a drug test for the first time, then Defendant Bledsoe (and previously Defendant Thompson), in her discretion may permit the probationer to pay for and participate in a 12-hour drug education class—which costs $75—to avoid a violation-of-probation warrant. The amount is not waivable.
106. If the person cannot afford to pay for the class, then she cannot take it, and Defendant Bledsoe (and previously Defendant Thompson) will seek an arrest warrant for violation of probation.
3. Reporting 107. Both companies run their Giles County probation operations out of offices located within a block of the Giles County Courthouse in Pulaski. 108. CPS has one primary reporting day for adult probationers each week, and most CPS supervised adult probationers are required to report to their probation officer on that day. 109. Probationers assigned to PSI report throughout the week, except Thursday, when Defendant Bledsoe is in court for the misdemeanor docket. 110. The companies decide how frequently a person must report and whether they must report in person or by phone. The companies typically require probationers to report every week, every other week, or every month.
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111. The probation officers routinely allow a person to report less frequently if she has been making regular payments.
112. But if a probationer cannot make payments, or the probation officer decides in her discretion that the payments are too small, the private probation officer routinely requires the person to report more frequently.
113. The main purpose of each probation meeting is for probationers to make payments to the probation officer.
114. Non-reporting is deemed to be a violation of probation, and the company employee, in her discretion, can seek an arrest warrant, which she knows will have either a predetermined secured monetary bail amount or an instruction to “hold” the arrestee, i.e., to detain the arrestee in jail until her court date, or otherwise notify the court of non-reporting.
115. Pursuant to policy and practice, during the meetings, the probationer reports the amount she paid to the company that day, and is asked to report any contacts with law enforcement. As a matter of policy, Defendants Bledsoe and McNair—and previously Defendant Thompson— make no investigation or inquiry into the reasons that a person does not report and, when probationers offer reasons, Defendants ignore them.
116. The supervision meetings typically last only five minutes, or sometimes ten if the private probation officer decides to require a drug test.
117. For those who report to CPS by phone, the company’s written rules instruct individuals to simply “LEAVE VOICE MAIL” that covers four things: (1) the probationer’s name; (2) contact information and employment status; (3) whether the probationer has had contact with law enforcement (if yes, then “when and where”); and (4) whether the probationer has sent in a
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payment to CPS and if not, then when the person intends to pay. There is no option to speak with a probation officer instead of leaving a message.
118. PSI tells probationers it supervises by phone that they must fax in a form every week or every other week and must call at the same interval on Wednesdays or Fridays to speak with an employee. The form requires the probationer to state her name, address, place of employment (if employed), and whether she has been arrested or “questioned” by police since her last reporting date. The form also requires the probationer to state when she will pay the court and how much, and to state when she will pay PSI the supervision fee. The probationer must state whether she is “familiar with all conditions/rules of my probation” and attest as to whether “except where noted above, and [sic] have fully obeyed them.”
4. Defendants Threaten Probationers with Arrest and Jailing for Nonpayment
119. The for-profit probation officers tell the probationers they supervise that they must make regular payments of probation fees and surcharges to the company supervising them and must also make regular payments on their court costs.
120. If the probationer is behind on her payments, the probation officer will threaten her with arrest, jailing, revocation, and/or extension of supervised probation, telling her that she will be “violated” if she does not bring enough money the next time, or the probation officer may inform the probationer that a citation warrant or an arrest warrant has already been issued or will be issued for nonpayment.
121. As a matter of policy and practice, the Private Defendants tell probationers that, if they violate their probation, they could be sent to jail for the entire suspended sentence of 11/29 following even a first or second violation.
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122. Sometimes, the probation officer’s threats are subtler or implicit. Defendants Bledsoe and McNair, and previously Defendant Thompson, sometimes inform probationers simply that they “must pay” a certain amount of money at their next meeting, or they inform them of the total amount due before the end of the 11/29 term of probation, meaning that if the probationers do not pay the amount required, they will be arrested and their probation will be revoked and extended.
123. The private probation officers have discretion to seek warrants for nonpayment when a person does not pay whatever amount the probation officer demands. They tell probationers that they will be “violated” if they do not pay.
124. The Private Defendants often tell probationers that they will extend the probationers’ probation to allow more time to pay, instead of requiring the probationer to serve her entire suspended sentence in jail.
125. Probationers must also pay for the drug tests the companies require them to submit to, and the company employee can require probationers to be tested for drugs any and every time they report.
126. Under federal and Tennessee law, only willful nonpayment can constitute a violation of probation.13 As a matter of policy and practice, the companies train their employees not to inform probationers of this law and their basic rights. Defendants routinely threaten to seek violation-of-probation warrants for probationers who are too poor to make a payment, or whose payments fall short of what the probation officer demanded, without verifying that the nonpayment was willful.
13 See supra note 5.
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127. The Private Defendants know that the probationers they supervise are impoverished because the companies require probationers to state their source of income on company intake forms. Many probationers report that they are unemployed, have no income, rely on friends or family for housing and financial support, or have income only from public benefits such as unemployment, veteran’s benefits, disability, or food stamps.
128. Many probationers divert their food stamps and disability checks to pay their court debts and probation fees. Many miss rent payments and go without heat or electricity for their homes, gas for their cars, and food for themselves and their families in order to pay their court debts and probation fees.
5. Defendants Refuse to Waive Fees and Costs a. CPS waiver process
129. The CPS Probation Rules state, “Please DO NOT ask the Probation Officer to change the amount of your payments or the date the Judge ordered you to pay your cost by, because only the Judge can make those type of changes.”
130. Notwithstanding this written admonition, CPS does have a “Supervision Fee Exemption Form” that probationers can complete—although the company, as a matter of policy and practice, never affirmatively offers the form. Sometimes, Defendant McNair, at her discretion, provides the form when a probationer specifically asks for it. Other times, Defendant McNair or another CPS employee tells the probationer that no such form exists, or that the company has no power to waive costs and fees.
131. The form requires the probationer to provide amounts paid per month toward various “Bills.” The form asks for the probationer’s income per month, but not whether the probationer receives government benefits, is employed, unable to work, or whether she must support children or other family members.
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132. The form also asks for the probationer’s spouse’s income, as well as “Other Forms of Income (boyfriend, girlfriend, child support, food stamps, etc…).” The form then requires that these sources of income be added together to reach a “Total Average Income Per Month” from which the probationer’s “Total Average Bills Per Month” will be deducted to determine the “Average Balance Left Per Month.”
133. Although they are under no legal obligation to do so, in practice, friends and family of probationers, who are often themselves living in poverty, frequently contribute whatever money they have to help pay the companies so that the probationer can avoid being arrested and jailed for not paying. The “fee exemption” form allows an individual probation officer to recommend various outcomes to the “Probation Manager,” including that the waiver be disapproved, that the person’s fees be reduced, that some of the person’s fees be waived, or that the “balance owed” be waived (presumably the person would incur additional probation fees going forward).
134. Over the course of an 18-month investigation, including interviews with more than one hundred people supervised by CPS, undersigned counsel has not encountered any CPS probationer whose court debt or probation fees were reduced or waived by the company.
b. PSI Waiver Process 135. PSI similarly fails and refuses, as a matter of policy, to inform probationers about the option of seeking a fee waiver or reduction. 136. If a probationer who is being supervised by PSI requests a fee waiver or reduction form, Defendant Bledsoe, and previously Defendant Thompson, sometimes provide, in her discretion a lengthy, 10-page “Application for Indigency.” 137. The form requires that the probationers provide detailed information about their income and assets, and the income and assets of any other members of their household, and that the probationer provide various documents including an identity card, proof of housing costs, proof
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of immigration status (“not required if you were born in the US”), and proof of earned income. The Application further requests proof of “Unearned Income,” such as award letters showing proof of social security, veteran’s, unemployment, or retirement benefits. Probationers may also be required to produce “proof of pregnancy and due date if someone in your household is pregnant.” The company’s General Manager determines whether to waive fees.
138. The onerous documentation requirements function as a deterrent for probationers, many of whom do not have stable housing or filing systems for the paperwork the company demands. Additionally, the time and expense (e.g. gas money) required for gathering the documents can function as a further deterrent.
139. The probationer then submits the form and supporting documentation to her probation officer, who sends it to the PSI Headquarters in Cookeville for review. Defendant Bledsoe, and previously Defendant Thompson, state that they have no authority to waive the fees themselves.
140. It can take weeks or months for a waiver decision to be made. In the meantime, the probationer is required to continue reporting and making payments.
141. Before any fees will be waived, the probationer must pay for and pass a drug screen according to PSI policy.
c. The County Refuses to Waive Costs and Fees 142. According to the clerk’s office, there is no mechanism to ask the General Sessions judge to reduce or waive fees. One clerk explained, “Otherwise, everyone would do that.” Instead, when someone gets to the end of their probation and has not paid everything they owe to the court and the company, the person’s probation is extended, and additional costs are assessed against the probationer.
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D. The Process for Notifying the Court of Alleged Non-Compliance 143. The companies have a financial stake in using alleged rule violations to extract more payments from probationers. They have an incentive to use the reporting and revocation process to maximize their revenues. 144. They also have a financial stake in advising the judge to issue violation-ofprobation warrants and to revoke and extend the person’s probation. 145. The Private Defendants have the power to manufacture “probation violations” by setting rules and then claiming that a probationer broke those rules, or by interpreting vague standard rules and conditions in a way that generates a violation. 146. The companies rely on the vagueness of the rules and conditions to threaten probationers and create a culture of fear in which probationers believe that the company can find a way to “violate” their probation whenever it wants if the company wants more money. 147. The companies use their control over the process of notifying the court of alleged violations to overlook certain violations—i.e., a positive drug screen—if a person is making payments to the company, and to threaten other people that, if they do not pay, the company will use its discretion to petition the Court for revocation for a technical violation if they do not come up with money. 148. Company employees are also authorized to recommend that the court issue an arrest warrant with a secured financial condition on it or with a “hold” on it (requiring the Sheriff to detain the arrestee prior to a probation-revocation hearing), or to request that the person be released without an up-front payment prior to a revocation hearing.
1. When the Alleged Violation Is Solely Non-Payment 149. Probationers placed on PSI and CPS supervised probation are told from the moment they are placed on probation that payment is a required condition of probation.
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150. Probation orders for CPS explicitly state that “[f]ailure to pay court cost as instructed at any time by the Probation Officer or the Court can result in a violation of probation.”
151. The private probation officers have discretion to violate a person for nonpayment the first time she does not pay the amount the company demands, and to seek a citation or arrest warrant.
152. They also have discretion to accept a partial payment of the amount required or give the person time to come up with the money instead of seeking a warrant.
153. The Private Defendants regularly threaten probationers in person that they will inform the court of their nonpayment and ask the court to issue a warrant if the probationer does not make a payment, or if the payment is not big enough.
154. The companies have a policy of not informing probationers that, under Tennessee and federal law, their probation cannot be revoked unless nonpayment is willful.
155. Perversely, the Private Defendants view probationers who receive monthly public benefits as a steady stream of income and frequently tell probationers that they will delay “violating” those probationers until after their disability checks arrive, giving the probationers an opportunity—by using money from their means-tested public benefits payments—to make a payment to the company and avoid arrest. (Federal law prohibits the Defendants from explicitly garnishing such federal benefits.)
156. Defendant private probation officers frequently tell probationers that revocation and extension for another term of “user-funded” supervised probation is the common penalty for nonpayment of court debt and probation fees.
157. To report a violation for nonpayment, the companies seek warrants from the courts.
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158. General Sessions Court issues citation warrants which do not authorize arrest. Instead of being arrested, the person will be told to report to court the following Thursday for the misdemeanor violation-of-probation docket.
159. Circuit Court warrants for nonpayment authorize arrest, and employees of the Giles County Sheriff’s Office routinely arrest and jail people who are alleged by the private companies to have violated their probation solely by not making payments while on supervised probation out of Circuit Court. These arrest warrants include a preset money bail amount, printed on the arrest warrant.
160. Company employees often seek arrest or citation warrants for nonpayment as a means of coercing additional payments from probationers: probation officers inform probationers that a warrant has issued, but tell the probationer that they will have the warrant recalled if the probationer makes the payment in full.
161. When a probation officer asks the court to recall a warrant because a probationer has paid whatever amount the company demanded, the court always recalls the warrant.
162. The Private Defendants have a pattern and practice of threatening to seek probationviolation warrants based solely on nonpayment.
163. Defendants use the Circuit Court arrest warrants for nonpayment to “send a message” to other probationers that they must pay or the same thing (arrest and jailing) will happen to them.
164. When probationers are arrested—even just for nonpayment—their mugshots typically appear in the local paper, Hard Times, which is sold at gas stations. Friends, family members, neighbors, and coworkers of probationers often find out about arrests and probation violations this way.
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2. When the Alleged Violation is Non-Compliance with a Substantive Condition of Probation
165. Arrest warrants for alleged violations other than nonpayment typically have a monetary amount preprinted on them that must be paid before the probationer can be released following arrest.
166. The companies and their employees know that arrest warrants for alleged violations of probation are typically issued with a secured financial condition of release pre-printed on the warrant and determined without an individualized inquiry into the arrestee’s ability to pay. The companies and their employees also know that the County has a policy of detaining arrestees who cannot afford the money bail amount for up to ten days before bringing them to court for a probation-revocation hearing and that, as a result, arrests for alleged violations of probation routinely result in the person’s lengthy confinement before any opportunity to contest the for-profit probation officer’s allegations of a violation of probation.
167. Because the vast majority of probationers are impoverished and struggle to pay for basic necessities, many remain in jail following an arrest for an alleged violation of probation.
168. After a warrant issues, the Private Defendants routinely instruct probationers to avoid the town of Pulaski—except for when they have to come to the probation office to make payments—as a way of evading arrest by law enforcement officers. The companies also instruct probationers, however, to continue to make payments on their probation fees. In this way, the companies continue making money while the person waits to be arrested or prepares to surrender to the jail.
169. When the alleged violation is anything other than nonpayment, probation officers make sworn statements to the court alleging that a violation occurred and petitioning the Court to issue an arrest warrant—which the court always does. These violation-of-probation arrest warrants
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usually have monetary bail amounts on them. Sometimes they say “Hold,” meaning that the person will be detained after arrest until she is taken to court.
170. If a probationer-arrestee is permitted to pay a monetary bail amount to secure release and can afford it, she will be released and ordered to return to the court on a Tuesday for a “first appearance.” If she cannot afford the bail amount, or if she is being detained, the probationerarrestee will be taken to court on a Thursday, typically within 10 days of her arrest. On Thursdays, the General Sessions judge conducts violation-of-probation “hearings”: typically, the prosecutor confers with the public defender or with the probationer herself (if she elected to proceed pro se), the parties complete plea paperwork, and the judge accepts the guilty plea.
171. As a result of these policies and practices, if a person is arrested on a Thursday afternoon and she cannot afford to pay the money bail amount predetermined on her warrant, or if she is ordered detained, she will be kept in jail until Thursday morning without access to a lawyer, without an opportunity to seek less restrictive non-financial conditions of release, and without an opportunity to contest the allegations made by the private company that has a financial stake in the person’s arrest, detention, and revocation.
172. Probationers have good reason to fear detention in the Giles County Jail. The jail is an abusive, dangerous, and unhealthy place. Guards have referred to women inmates as “dogs,” and inmates routinely receive only two, nutritionally inadequate meals each day. The jail is so overcrowded that people often sleep on the floor. At least one probationer was recently confined with four other women to a jail cell meant for two.
173. Jail officials often withhold medication from inmates, even when the medicine is prescribed and the inmate herself has provided the medication to the jail to dispense.
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E. Revocation Proceedings 174. Probationers who are arrested for allegedly violating their probation and who were unable to pay money bail to secure release are transported from the jail to the Giles County courthouse in orange jumpsuits and shackles. Arrestees who were able to pay the money bail required for release also appear on that docket. 175. In the General Sessions court, probationers who are in County custody are seated in the courtroom behind a one-way panel that enables them to see the courtroom, while no one in the courtroom can see them. 176. Probationers accused of violating their probation will be given a few minutes to consult with a public defender if they wish. 177. Often a person can get out of jail that day if she agrees to revocation and extension of her supervised for-profit probation term. 178. The individual private probation officer defendants sit in the courtroom at tables next to the judge during court proceedings, including probation-revocation proceedings. 179. The contracts explicitly permit the companies to confer with judges, court staff, and the County prosecutors on individual cases. 180. Company employees engage in ex parte conversations about probationers with judges and prosecutors before, during, and after revocation-of-probation hearings, including recommending revocation, recommending a particular sentence, and offering evidence, which routinely consists solely of the probation officer’s allegations. 181. The for-profit probation officers provide testimony and make recommendations about the appropriate disposition of a revocation hearing, including urging the judge to sentence the person to jail and extend the person’s term of for-profit supervised probation.
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182. The companies’ allegations are routinely the only basis provided to support revocation.
183. During revocation proceedings, company employees routinely withhold the true reasons for the violations the company has alleged. In particular, they routinely withhold relevant material information and evidence concerning ability to pay. For example, as they do with applications for arrest warrants, company employees withhold from the judge the fact that the person did not pay because the person could not afford to pay.
184. The Private Defendants typically recommend some time in jail in addition to extension of supervised probation for every violation of misdemeanor probation. These penalties help the companies ensure that their threats to jail probationers who do not pay enough money are credible and help to convey to probationers that the company is correct when it describes the influence that it wields over the local probation system.
185. Arrests and revocation lead to additional court debts being added to the probationers’ existing debts.
186. As a result of Defendants’ policies and practices, probationers end up on supervised probation with a private company for years because they cannot afford to make payments.
187. It is the policy, pattern, and practice of the Private Defendants and Giles County not to inform probationers that their ability to pay is a critical issue at any revocation proceeding concerning their nonpayment. As a result, their probation is revoked and extended without anyone ever determining that nonpayment was willful.
F. When a Person Pays Her Debts in Full 188. Desperate to get off of supervised probation, probationers will sometimes use their tax refunds, an entire social security check, payday loans, money from selling blood plasma,
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proceeds from selling personal items, or money loaned from family and friends to pay off their debts to the company and the court.
189. PSI and CPS have different policies and practices that apply when someone has paid her court debts in full.
190. The supervised probation of a person who is being supervised by CPS will not end unless and until the company itself decides to convert the person’s supervised probation to unsupervised.
191. When a person pays off her debt in full, CPS issues an “Order” informing the probationer that her supervised probation is over and that she is now on unsupervised probation. These “Orders” are signed only by the individual CPS employee. No judge reviews the decision to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised. And the judge does not sign the “Order.”
192. When CPS converts an individual’s probation from supervised to unsupervised, the probationer is no longer required to report to the company, pay additional fees to the company, submit to costly drug tests, or suffer additional restraints on her liberty imposed by the company.
193. The final decision to make this conversion rests entirely with CPS, which has a direct financial stake in delaying conversion.
194. Because people who are supervised by PSI make payments on their court debts directly to the court clerk, the clerk’s office knows before PSI does when a person is eligible for unsupervised probation. When that happens, the clerk’s office notifies PSI, and PSI puts a “hold” on collection of the supervision fees. The person is no longer required to report to PSI or to submit to the company’s conditions of probation.
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195. Giles County’s contractual agreements with the Defendant companies have turned the Giles County misdemeanor probation system into a mechanism for generating profit for private benefit and coercing collection of court debts for the County in a way that violates Tennessee and federal law governing debt collection.
196. Pursuant to the Contracts, financial incentives permeate every decision made before and during the probation period, leading to systemic violations of Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.
197. The Private Defendants earn hundreds of thousands of dollars from this extortion scheme each year. The County collects hundreds of thousands in court debts each year. VI. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBJECTED TO DEFENDANTS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR-PROFIT PROBATION SYSTEM A. Plaintiff Karen McNeil 198. Karen McNeil is 53 years old and lives in Giles County with a friend in a mobile home outside of Pulaski. She has four adult children. 199. Ms. McNeil was subjected to supervised probation with CPS from March 2016 until October 2017. She was previously supervised on probation by PCC, Inc. from November 2015 until March 2016. For the entire period of supervised probation with both CPS and PCC, Inc., Defendant McNair was the probation officer to whom Ms. McNeil primarily reported. 200. Ms. McNeil has an eighth grade education. She cannot read or write at an adult level and is functionally illiterate. 201. Ms. McNeil lives in poverty and struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. She has no bank account, real estate interest, or other assets. She depends on Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and food stamps to survive. 202. Ms. McNeil is not employed. She last worked about twenty years ago, as a traffic flagger. While on the job, she was hit by a truck and sustained severe back injuries that have
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prevented her from working regularly ever since. Due to her medical conditions and the accident, Ms. McNeil suffers from serious chronic pain.
203. Ms. McNeil faces additional health challenges that impede her day-to-day life, including chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (“COPD”), cancer, and fibromyalgia. She has had multiple major surgeries. At times, she must use an oxygen tank and a cane for walking.
204. Ms. McNeil pled guilty on November 19, 2015 to driving on a revoked license, a misdemeanor offense, and was sentenced to probation for 11 months and 29 days, with a minimum of four months’ supervised probation. The Court assessed $426 in fines and fees and ordered her to pay $25 each week in court costs and fines, $45 a month in supervision fees, and $45 for each drug test. After four months, Ms. McNeil’s supervised probation could have been converted to unsupervised probation, but only if her court costs and probation fees were paid in full.
205. At no point was Ms. McNeil ever able to afford these payments without sacrificing the basic necessities of life.
206. Throughout Ms. McNeil’s probation—whether the company supervising Ms. McNeil was PCC, Inc. or CPS—she endured Defendant McNair’s perpetual threats of arrest and jailing for nonpayment. Ms. McNeil lived in constant terror that she would be arrested and, given her serious medical issues, she reasonably feared she would die if sent to jail.
207. Defendant McNair repeatedly forced Ms. McNeil to undergo invasive and humiliating drug tests throughout her probation with CPS. Pursuant to company policy, during each drug screen, Defendant McNair forced Ms. McNeil to leave the bathroom door open while Defendant McNair observed Ms. McNeil urinating into a cup to produce a sample to be tested. Anyone walking down the hallway could see Ms. McNeil urinating. On one occasion, Defendant McNair invited a male CPS employee to watch Ms. McNeil urinate.
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208. CPS required Ms. McNeil to pay $45 for each drug test. Because she could not afford that amount up-front, it was added to the total debt owed to CPS.
209. On April 19, 2016, while on supervised probation solely because Ms. McNeil had been unable to pay her court costs and fines in full, Ms. McNeil was arrested for a misdemeanor offense.
210. The following day, in accordance with CPS company policy, Defendant McNair filed an affidavit, swearing to the court that Ms. McNeil violated a condition of probation because she was “charged and arrested” for a new misdemeanor offense. A violation-of-probation arrest warrant was issued, stating that a $1,000 money bail amount, predetermined without an inquiry into or findings concerning her ability to pay, would be required for Ms. McNeil’s release following arrest.
211. While Ms. McNeil was in jail, Sheriff’s deputies served the violation-of-probation warrant. On April 23, a friend signed a contract with a commercial bonding agent to secure Ms. McNeil’s release.
212. On April 28, 2016, Ms. McNeil pled guilty to the new misdemeanor offense and to the alleged violation of probation. Ms. McNeil was sentenced to 45 days in jail for violating probation, and a concurrent 30 days in jail for the new offense. She was informed that her probation would be reinstated after she completed 45 days in jail.
213. While Ms. McNeil was in jail serving the sentence, jail employees refused to administer Ms. McNeil’s prescription pain medication. They told her that her only option would be to purchase two ibuprofen pills for two dollars at the commissary. She could not afford the medicine. Ms. McNeil attempted to seek help from a nurse, but the guards required her to fill out a “nurse request” form, which Ms. McNeil could not do on her own given her limited reading and
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writing abilities. The guards refused to help her complete the form, made fun of her, and called her “stupid” because she could not read or write.
214. Due to overcrowding, Ms. McNeil had to sleep on the floor of her jail cell, which aggravated her chronic back pain.
215. When she was released from jail, her for-profit supervised probation was reinstated, and she incurred additional court costs and fees.
216. Because she was so afraid of being arrested and jailed for nonpayment, throughout her entire term of supervised probation, Ms. McNeil often chose to pay the company rather than purchase the medication she needs to treat chronic pain, pay her electricity bill, or pay rent. Ms. McNeil’s electricity was shut off because she made payments to CPS instead of paying her utility bill. She became homeless in significant part because she paid the company instead of her rent. Ms. McNeil slept in a tent by a creek in July 2016.
217. During a probation meeting after losing her home, Ms. McNeil told Defendant McNair that she was sleeping by the creek. Defendant McNair demanded money anyway, saying, “We still gotta have payment.”
218. After about three months of homelessness, Ms. McNeil found a place to live. 219. Throughout all of this, Ms. McNeil continued to report to CPS. But because Ms. McNeil’s driver’s license is suspended due solely to her inability to pay court costs, she cannot lawfully drive. She therefore sometimes walked over a mile with her oxygen tank, including on hot summer days, to the CPS office. 220. Ms. McNeil missed some appointments around that time because she could not find a ride and was unable to walk all the way to the probation office because of her disability. When
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she was unable to report in person, she called the office, but no one answered the phone or returned her messages.
221. In October 2016, Defendant McNair again sought a violation-of-probation arrest warrant, alleging that Ms. McNeil did not report on four occasions and did not “pay all required supervision fees, court fines and court cost.” Defendant McNair did so even though she knew that Ms. McNeil was living in desperate poverty, could not afford the costs and fees, and was physically unable to walk to the probation office or to find someone to drive her.
222. The violation-of-probation arrest warrant stated that Ms. McNeil would be required to pay a predetermined secured financial condition of $1,500 to secure release.
223. After the warrant issued, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil that there was an active warrant for her arrest, and instructed Ms. McNeil to “stay low” to avoid law enforcement, but also insisted that Ms. McNeil continue to make payments to CPS by mail.
224. Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil that she would “get the judge to dismiss the charges” if Ms. McNeil paid all of her fees and debts to CPS.
225. On November 15, 2016, Ms. McNeil was arrested on the violation-of-probation arrest warrant and kept in jail for one day before a friend loaned her the money to pay the bond amount.
226. On December 22, 2016, Ms. McNeil appeared in General Sessions court for a probation-revocation hearing and pled guilty to the alleged violations, including nonpayment of fees and costs. Ms. McNeil’s probation was revoked without any inquiry into the reasons for nonpayment or her ability to make payments. She was sentenced to another 45 days in jail for nonpayment and non-reporting, followed by an extension of probation for six months, until June
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22, 2017, including supervision by the private company “until costs/fines paid in full,” and the addition of more costs and fees.
227. Ms. McNeil continued to report to probation, and the company continued threatening her with arrest and jailing if she did not make payments. Because she was scared of being sent to jail again for nonpayment, Ms. McNeil paid the company instead of her rent.
228. In March 2017, because she made payments to CPS, she could no longer afford the rent where she had been living and moved into a one-room mobile home with a friend and another roommate. After a few months, Ms. McNeil moved in with another friend, who lives in a different mobile home.
229. Throughout her probation, Ms. McNeil repeatedly told Defendant McNair that she was struggling to pay for food, housing, utilities, and other basic necessities and could not afford the payments required. In response, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil to “go pick up cans” to pay her court debt and fees.
230. During an April 2017 reporting date, Defendant McNair threatened Ms. McNeil with “ninety days in jail” if she did not pay, warning Ms. McNeil that she might seek an arrest warrant before Ms. McNeil’s probation ended, since “it looks like you won’t have it paid.”
231. Neither Defendant McNair nor anyone else at CPS ever informed Ms. McNeil that she could seek a waiver or reduction of her payments or that it violates the law to seek revocation of probation solely for nonpayment. In fact, when Ms. McNeil asked Defendant McNair to waive her supervision fees because she could not both pay the company and also pay for basic necessities, Defendant McNair told her that she had no power to waive or reduce the fees. Ms. McNeil asked Defendant McNair if the court could waive or reduce her payments, and Defendant McNair told her that was not possible.
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232. Throughout her probation, Ms. McNeil was terrified that she would be arrested and jailed. Every time a car pulled up to her trailer, she would startle, fearing that the police had arrived to arrest her for nonpayment.
233. On May 2, 2017, Ms. McNeil made a $120 payment to CPS, which she scraped together from her social security disability benefits and money from friends. Defendant McNair, in her discretion, allocated $60 of the payment to supervision fees and $60 to court debts (with a remaining balance of $265). Defendant McNair wrote on Ms. McNeil’s payment receipt that Ms. McNeil would owe more than $500 the next time she reported, and told Ms. McNeil that she would seek an arrest warrant if Ms. McNeil did not pay the full amount by the end of her probation period in June.
234. On June 6, 2017, Ms. McNeil reported to CPS. When she arrived at the company’s office, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil to submit to a drug test and instructed a male CPS employee to accompany Ms. McNeil to the bathroom to observe Ms. McNeil urinate. After Ms. McNeil submitted to the drug screen, Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil that she had tested positive for a controlled substance.
235. On June 30, 2017, Ms. McNeil attended her son’s graduation from a G.E.D. program. He was incarcerated at the time, so she went to the jail for the ceremony. When Ms. McNeil arrived at the jail, Giles County Sheriff Helton told her that a warrant had been issued for her arrest. The violation-of-probation warrant was based on CPS’s allegations that Ms. McNeil tested positive for drugs and did not pay $215 in court costs. (It is unclear how the company calculated that Ms. McNeil owed $215 in court costs given that a receipt from June 6, 2017 states that Ms. McNeil paid $60 and had a “balance” of $265.) He told Ms. McNeil to return to the jail the following day, which she did.
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236. On July 1, Ms. McNeil was booked into the jail because she could not afford to pay the $2,500 secured financial condition of release that was pre-printed on the violation-of-probation arrest warrant.
237. Ms. McNeil was released later that day after a friend paid a $300 nonrefundable fee to a commercial bonding agent who then posted her bond. Ms. McNeil used about half of her next disability check to repay her friend. As a result, Ms. McNeil could not afford some of her medications or any of her probation fees that month.
238. A jail employee told Ms. McNeal to appear in court for the alleged violations of probation on July 27, 2017. At that court date, she was told to come back on August 17, 2017. Defendant McNair told Ms. McNeil to continue reporting and paying probation fees in the meantime.
239. On August 17, 2017, Ms. McNeil appeared in court for a violation-of-probation hearing. Her probation was revoked, and she was sentenced to 65 days in jail.
240. Upon her release from jail, the County and CPS finally released her from probation. 241. CPS, McNair, and the County knew at all times that Ms. McNeil was impoverished and that her only income came from social security benefits: Ms. McNeil provided her financial information to CPS repeatedly on forms and during meetings, and to the court when she sought appointed counsel. B. Plaintiff Lesley Johnson 242. Lesley Johnson is a 35-year-old single mother of two children, ages 11 and 13. She lives in Mississippi, and previously lived in Baldwin County, Alabama, where she resided during the period she was on CPS probation.
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243. Ms. Johnson performed manual labor for a Mercedes-Benz factory in Giles County. She lives paycheck to paycheck and struggles to provide basic necessities for herself and her children.
244. In 2015, Ms. Johnson received a traffic ticket in Baldwin County, Alabama. She was unable to pay the ticket, and her driver’s license was suspended as a result.
245. On September 6, 2016, Ms. Johnson was charged in Giles County with driving on a suspended license, a misdemeanor offense. She was found indigent and legal counsel was appointed. Ms. Johnson was assessed a $100 “public defender fee” and a $50 fee for the “attorney indigent admin fee.”
246. On February 9, 2017, Ms. Johnson pled guilty. She was sentenced to six months of probation, assessed $331 in court debt, and assigned to CPS for supervision “until paid in full,” meaning that as soon as she paid her court costs in full, her supervised probation would be converted to unsupervised probation. Because she could not afford the payments, she was subject to all of the conditions of supervised probation throughout her entire probation term.
247. On the day she was sentenced, Ms. Johnson was told to speak with Defendant McNair, who was seated in the courtroom at a desk labeled “CPS, LLC” to the right of the judge. Defendant McNair instructed Ms. Johnson to bring $45 for a supervision fee, $35 for a drug screen, and $25 for court costs to her first probation reporting date, “or it will be a violation.” Ms. Johnson believed that a “violation” would mean jail time.
248. Ms. Johnson began reporting as required every two weeks and made whatever payments she was able to make whenever she could. Her probation meetings lasted less than ten minutes. At each meeting, she completed paperwork about her employment, and Defendant McNair asked her for a payment.
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249. On April 11, 2017, Ms. Johnson paid CPS $55. Defendant McNair exercised her discretion to allocate $22 to pay for drug testing and $23 to court debts. On April 25, 2017, Ms. Johnson paid $60. Defendant McNair allocated $30 to probation supervision fees and $30 to court costs.
250. While on supervised probation, Ms. Johnson routinely had to choose between paying the private company—so she could avoid being arrested and jailed, and her probation revoked and extended—and meeting the basic necessities of life, such as buying food and clothes for her children. Sometimes, she could not afford her rent because she instead paid CPS.
251. Paying the company made it even more difficult for Ms. Johnson to make ends meet. To survive, Ms. Johnson used an application on her cell phone to “borrow” from her next paycheck so she could purchase basic necessities. To feed her children, she relied on donated food from her church.
252. Ms. Johnson was terrified she would lose her children if she was jailed for nonpayment.
253. Fearing that her probation would be revoked if she fell behind on payments, Ms. Johnson repeatedly told Defendant McNair that she could not afford the payments. The first time Ms. Johnson told Defendant McNair that she could not pay, Defendant McNair replied by threatening Ms. Johnson with a “violation” and “120 days in jail” if she did not pay the full amount owed by the end of her probation term.
254. At another probation meeting, Defendant McNair told Ms. Johnson that nonpayment would lead to an extension of her term on supervised probation. When Ms. Johnson asked if an extension meant that she would continue to have to pay $45 per month in supervision fees, Defendant McNair confirmed that it did.
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255. Sometimes, Defendant McNair required Ms. Johnson to submit to a drug test— each of which generated more profit for the private company—even though Ms. Johnson’s offense of conviction had nothing to do with drugs.
256. CPS, McNair, and the County were at all times aware of Ms. Johnson’s indigency— because Ms. Johnson repeatedly told Defendant McNair that she could not afford the payments— but did not reduce or waive any of her fees. The company never informed Ms. Johnson of a process for seeking a waiver or reduction of her costs and fees, or that it was illegal to jail her solely for nonpayment.
257. On July 11, 2017, Defendant McNair informed Ms. Johnson that her probation term, which was scheduled to end on August 8, 2017, would end only if she paid her remaining court debts and probation fees by that date. When Ms. Johnson asked what would happen if she did not have the money to pay, Defendant McNair said the judge would extend her supervised probation for another six months.
258. Also on July 11, Defendant McNair demanded that Ms. Johnson to submit to a drug test and insisted that she watch, humiliating Ms. Johnson while she urinated.
259. Ms. Johnson told CPS that she believed it was unfair to keep her on probation only because she could not afford to pay. Defendant McNair responded that if Ms. Johnson had simply paid up-front, she would have been placed on unsupervised probation.
260. Because she was so afraid of being arrested and jailed for nonpayment, and of remaining on supervised probation, Ms. Johnson sold her television and laptop—which her children need to do homework—so that she could make a lump sum payment to CPS and terminate her probation.
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261. On August 8, 2017, Ms. Johnson paid CPS $331 to satisfy all remaining CPS fees and court debt. In total, she had paid $340 in probation fees to CPS which is more than she owed and paid in court debts.
262. When her probation was terminated, Ms. Johnson told a CPS employee that she had to sell her belongings to make the final payment. The probation officer chuckled in response.
263. The only reason Ms. Johnson spent any time on supervised probation was because she was too poor to afford her court costs and probation fees when she was sentenced. But for her poverty, she could have avoided the entire six months of supervision, including threats of arrest and jailing, onerous conditions, and invasive and humiliating drug tests.
C. Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell 264. Tanya Mitchell is 53 years old and lives in Giles County, in a mobile home with her daughter, Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, and four grandchildren (Ms. Hilfort’s children). 265. Ms. Mitchell is currently unemployed, and her sole income is from food stamps. She has not worked since 2012, when she was employed as a home healthcare worker, and relies on family and friends for financial support. 266. Ms. Mitchell has multiple serious medical conditions, including fibromyalgia and gout, that prevent her from working. As a result, Ms. Mitchell struggles to provide basic necessities for herself and her household. 267. The electricity in her trailer home has been disconnected for several days in the past few months because she could not afford to pay the bill. 268. On September 25, 2017, Ms. Mitchell pled guilty in Giles County Circuit Court to a misdemeanor charge. She was sentenced to probation for 11 months and 29 days, assessed $750 in court fines and fees, and ordered to pay at least $50 per month in supervision fees.
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269. Ms. Mitchell was assigned to PSI for probation “supervision,” and met with Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe immediately after being sentenced to probation. Defendant Bledsoe told Ms. Mitchell that the terms of her probation included bi-weekly, in-person reporting, drug tests that would be administered whenever the probation company wanted, and payment of a $45 per month probation supervision fee.
270. Defendant Bledsoe told Ms. Mitchell that she was required to make a payment of $83.75 the first time she reported for probation.
271. Ms. Mitchell reported to probation for the first time on October 9, 2017, as instructed by Defendants PSI and Bledsoe. Ms. Mitchell’s family and friends gave her money so she could pay the $83.75 the company demanded.
272. Ms. Mitchell has made every reporting date required. She asks family and friends to give her money, including friends from out of state who frequently send her money, so she can make partial payments when she reports to probation because she is afraid she will be arrested and jailed, and her probation revoked and extended, if she does not pay the company. She has not made any payments to the court so she still owes the full amount of court debt she owed when she was initially placed on probation.
273. To pay PSI, Ms. Mitchell has forgone medicine for her many conditions because she cannot afford to pay both PSI and purchase her prescriptions.
274. Defendant Bledsoe has, in her discretion, allowed Ms. Mitchell to report monthly instead of every two weeks because Ms. Mitchell typically makes a payment to PSI toward her supervision fee. But Defendant Bledsoe conveyed to Ms. Mitchell that if she stops making payments to PSI, Defendant Bledsoe will require her to report more frequently.
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275. To avoid having to report in-person more frequently—which is difficult for Ms. Mitchell because she does not have money to pay for gas—Ms. Mitchell pays the company’s fees, and has been unable to make any payments toward her court debt.
276. Defendant Bledsoe has drug tested Ms. Mitchell, and watched Ms. Mitchell through an open door while Ms. Mitchell urinated.
277. Defendant Bledsoe has repeatedly told Ms. Mitchell that she must make a payment every month, even if Ms. Mitchell is unable to pay the full amount due.
D. Plaintiff Indya Hilfort 278. Indya Hilfort is a 27-year-old single mother of four children under the age of 10. She lives with them and her mother, Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell, in a mobile home in Giles County. She is the only member of the household who is able to work. 279. Ms. Hilfort lost her job at a factory in December 2017, after being hospitalized for the flu. After a stretch of unemployment, Ms. Hilfort obtained a job in mid-June 2018 taking home $350 a week, which is below the federal poverty line to care for herself and four young children. 280. Ms. Hilfort struggles to meet the basic necessities of life, including providing food, clothing, and shelter for herself and her children. Prior to moving in with her mother, Ms. Hilfort was homeless. 281. On December 8, 2016, Ms. Hilfort pled guilty in General Sessions Court to a misdemeanor charge. 282. Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to a jail term of 11 months and 29 days, to be suspended for a probationary term of 11 months and 19 days after serving ten days in jail. Ms. Hilfort was assessed $565.50 in court costs, fines, and taxes. She was assigned to supervised probation for a minimum of four months, after which time she would be eligible for unsupervised probation, but only if she had paid her court costs and probation fees in full.
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283. Due to a clerical error, Ms. Hilfort was not initially assigned to supervision with either company, and so she did not report to either company for the first eight months of her probationary period.
284. The clerical error was resolved in August 2017. Ms. Hilfort began reporting to CPS in September.
285. On September 25, 2017, Ms. Hilfort pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge in Circuit Court. She was assessed $1,487.50 in court costs, fines, taxes, and restitution. Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days on supervised probation and assigned to CPS.
286. CPS therefore supervises Ms. Hilfort on two concurrent probation cases. 287. Ms. Hilfort met with Defendant McNair immediately after being sentenced in the second case. Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort that the conditions of her probation included inperson reporting every two weeks, drug tests to be administered in the discretion of the for-profit probation officer (even though neither charge involved drugs), and monthly payments of $45 for a probation supervision fee. Defendant McNair also informed Ms. Hilfort that if she paid off her court and probation fees and did not violate her probation in the first four months, CPS would place her on unsupervised probation for her Circuit Court probation case, as with her General Sessions probation case. 288. Ms. Hilfort cannot afford to pay the supervision fees or court debt. To make ends meet, Ms. Hilfort relies on money from family members. 289. Ms. Hilfort asked Defendant McNair for a supervision fee waiver form on March 5, 2018. Defendant McNair did not provide one. Instead, she suggested that Ms. Hilfort pay probation fees from a tax refund or that Ms. Hilfort request an extension of probation (to avoid
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arrest, jailing, and formal revocation of probation), which, of course, would result in additional fees and prolonged supervision requirements.
290. Defendant McNair previously supervised Ms. Hilfort for a period of 11 months and 29 days, from June 2015 (while Defendant McNair was employed by PCC, Inc.), to June 2016 (Defendant McNair was hired by CPS, LLC in March 2016). During this period of supervision, Defendant McNair threatened Ms. Hilfort with jail if she did not pay her supervision fees. Shortly before the supervision period was supposed to end, Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort to pay her CPS supervision fees in full by noon the next day or go to jail. Fearing jail, Ms. Hilfort sold car tires and borrowed money from her boyfriend to pay her supervision fees. After Ms. Hilfort paid in full, Defendant McNair did not seek a violation-of-probation warrant.
291. Because of this experience and Defendant McNair’s continued insistence on receiving payment, Ms. Hilfort fears that her probation will be revoked and extended, and that she will be arrested and jailed, if she does not pay off her supervision fees before her probation term ends.
292. Defendant McNair has informed Ms. Hilfort that if she does not pay her debts in full by the end of her probation term, CPS will “violate” her, and Ms. Hilfort’s probation supervision will be extended. Ms. Hilfort understands a probation violation to mean jailing.
293. Defendant McNair (while employed with CPS) drug tested Ms. Hilfort on November 7, 2017, even though Ms. Hilfort’s offenses had nothing to do with drugs or alcohol. At this point in time, Ms. Hilfort was on pay-only supervised probation in her general-sessions case.
294. The drug screen came back positive and Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort that the company would seek an arrest warrant alleging to the court that Ms. Hilfort violated her
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probation. Defendant McNair told Ms. Hilfort that she would be required to pay a $2,500 secured financial condition of release after arrest.
295. On November 8, 2017, Defendant McNair sought an arrest warrant by filing an affidavit alleging violation of Ms. Hilfort’s Circuit Court probation for the positive drug screen.
296. On November 14, 2017, Defendant McNair sought an arrest warrant by filing an affidavit alleging violation of Ms. Hilfort’s General Sessions probation for the same positive drug screen.
297. On February 6, 2018, Ms. Hilfort was arrested on the violation-of-probation warrants. A friend who is a bondsman posted her bond the same day and loaned her the $250 normally required up-front as a nonrefundable premium. Her friend is allowing her to pay him back in installments over time.
298. On February 22, 2018, Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to 60 days in jail for her General Sessions violation of probation, and her probation was revoked and extended for an additional 11 months and 29 days of pay-only probation “until all fines, costs and fees are paid in full,” according to the order.
299. At sentencing, when the General Sessions court asked if she could pay $25 a week on her newly-imposed court fines and fees, she said “yes” after being informed by her public defender that if she did not agree to make the weekly payment, the County would jail her that day, instead of allowing her two weeks to prepare for her 60-day jail sentence.
300. Ms. Hilfort reported to jail on March 19, 2018 to begin serving her 60-day sentence. Her mother, Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell, is taking care of Ms. Hilfort’s four young children. Ms. Hilfort is scared that something may happen to her kids if her mother becomes sick while Ms.
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Hilfort is in jail. Ms. Mitchell recently spent several days in the intensive care unit for cardiac problems in March 2018, and those health issues could recur at any time.
301. On March 27, 2018, Ms. Hilfort was sentenced to 60 days in jail for violating probation in the Circuit Court case, to be served concurrently with her sentence in the General Sessions case. Her probation was revoked for her Circuit Court case and extended for an additional period of up to 11 months and 29 days of pay-only probation “until all fines court costs pd. [sic] in full,” according to the order.
302. On April 26, 2018, three days after the filing of the initial complaint, Giles County released Ms. Hilfort from jail, prior to the completion of her VOP jail sentence, without explanation.
303. On July 9, 2018, Ms. Hilfort was arrested in Lawrence County on a warrant recently issued for an alleged incident from July 2017. Ms. Hilfort borrowed money from a family member to pay a bondsman $300 so that she would be released from the Lawrence County jail. She owes her family member $300 and also owes the bondsman another $300, and committed to repaying both from her next paycheck.
304. On July 10, 2018, Ms. Hilfort informed a CPS probation officer about the arrest, as required by the Rules of Probation.
305. On July 11, 2018, Ms. Hilfort learned that a violation-of-probation arrest warrant had been issued with a $2,500 bond amount on it. She believes that she is being alleged to have violated probation because she was arrested in Lawrence County.
306. Ms. Hilfort will have to pay $2,500, or a $287.50 nonrefundable fee (ten percent of the bond, plus an additional $37.50 fee) to a private bail bonds company, to be released.
307. No one asked Ms. Hilfort if she could afford to pay that amount of money.
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308. Ms. Hilfort cannot afford to pay $2,500 to buy her release from jail in the event that she is arrested. She cannot afford even $287.50. Although she was able to get a job in mid-June 2018, Ms. Hilfort struggles to provide basic necessities for her family, including herself, her four children, and her mother. She currently owes debts totaling nearly $1,000, and cannot afford the electricity bill or groceries. Ms. Hilfort cannot afford to pay any amount of money to get out of jail in Giles County if she is arrested on the violation-of-probation warrant.
309. If Ms. Hilfort is arrested and cannot pay the conditions for her release, she will be kept in jail until, at the earliest, the Thursday after she is arrested, when she will be taken to court for a violation-of-probation hearing.
310. Ms. Hilfort is afraid of being arrested and spending days or weeks in jail because she cannot pay for her release. She believes she will lose her job if arrested and detained in jail, because she has shifts five days a week, on weekdays, and if she is in jail, she will not be able to go to work. Ms. Hilfort will also be separated from her four young children who depend on her.
E. Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon 311. Lucinda Brandon is a 31-year-old single mother of three children under the age of ten. She lives in Lawrence County, Tennessee. 312. Ms. Brandon was on supervised probation with PSI from September 30, 2015 to May 18, 2017. During that time, Ms. Brandon worked at manufacturing plants in Giles, Murray, and Marshall counties in Tennessee. She lived paycheck to paycheck, struggling to pay rent and utility bills and to provide basic necessities, such as clothing, food, and medical care, for herself and her children. Ms. Brandon also experienced periods of unemployment while on supervised probation with PSI. 313. In September and October 2015, Ms. Brandon pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges of driving on a suspended license and one misdemeanor charge of failure to appear for a
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court date for one of the traffic charges. She was sentenced to one period of 11 months and 29 days of supervised probation and two six-month terms of supervised probation. All of these terms ran concurrently.
314. For all three convictions, Ms. Brandon owed a combined total of approximately $1,300 in court costs and $10 in fines. Defendant Thompson instructed her to pay $45 a month to PSI in supervision fees.
315. Defendant Thompson also instructed Ms. Brandon to report to PSI. She began reporting on September 30, 2015, primarily meeting with Defendant Thompson. Ms. Brandon also met twice at the end of her probation with Defendant Bledsoe.
316. From the beginning of her term on supervised probation, Ms. Brandon made payments to the company whenever she could because she was terrified that she would be jailed. Defendant Thompson repeatedly told Ms. Brandon that she would be “violated” if she did not make the payments Defendant Thompson demanded, meaning that she would be arrested and jailed.
317. Defendant Thompson’s insistence on payment was frequent, including around the birthdays of Ms. Brandon’s young children, when Ms. Brandon wanted to provide her children presents. Defendant Thompson repeatedly informed her that if she did not bring in payments, the company would “violate” her.
318. Ms. Brandon sacrificed basic necessities to pay for probation. For example, she was unable to afford rent because she was making payments to PSI. To avoid homelessness, Ms. Brandon and her children moved in with her mother. Ms. Brandon’s mother has physical disabilities and survives on limited government benefits, but Ms. Brandon was forced to rely on her for food and shelter.
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319. While living with her mother, Ms. Brandon continue to struggle to meet the basic necessities of life. When her children were sick and required treatment, Ms. Brandon had to borrow money from family to pay for medicine. She often relied on family to pay for gas, clothes, and food, and frequented a local food pantry so her children could eat. While on probation, Ms. Brandon sometimes ate only one meal a day herself to ensure her kids had enough food.
320. Ms. Brandon repeatedly told Defendant Thompson that she was unable to make the payments the company demanded. Defendant Thompson let her know she had to pay or she would go to jail, telling her repeatedly that making payments is a condition of probation and if she didn’t comply, she would be “violated.”
321. Even though Defendant Thompson knew Ms. Brandon was struggling to make payments and support her family, Defendant Thompson never mentioned the existence of a supervision fee reduction or waiver form and never provided Ms. Brandon such a form. Ms. Brandon had no idea such a form even existed, so she could not ask for it.
322. In February 2016, as Ms. Brandon neared the end of her two six-month supervisedprobation terms Ms. Brandon was scared she would be arrested and jailed for nonpayment. Ms. Brandon decided to use her tax return to pay the remainder of the court debt for the two cases for which her probation was about to end, even though she needed the money for food, rent, and utilities. Instead of paying for those necessities, she paid the County approximately $500. After that payment, Ms. Brandon still owed approximately $500 in court debt for her remaining failure to appear charge. She continued on supervised probation in that case.
323. On June 24, 2016, Defendant Thompson instructed Ms. Brandon that she would have to submit to a drug screen. During this drug screen, as with the others, Defendant Thompson told Ms. Brandon she had to urinate with the door open while Ms. Thompson watched her. Using
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the bathroom while another person watched and in view of anyone who happened to walk down the hallway made Ms. Brandon feel humiliated.
324. Based on the in-house drug-testing kit, Defendant Thompson told Ms. Brandon that she had tested positive for marijuana. In accordance with PSI policy, Defendant Thompson offered Ms. Brandon an opportunity to avoid being arrested and jailed on a violation-of-probation arrest warrant by instead paying for a “Drug Education Program” course that PSI offers in-house and which cost $75—an amount that must be paid up-front to the company before a person can enroll in the class. If Ms. Brandon could pay the amount required to participate in the course, Ms. Brandon would be able to avoid arrest, jailing, and a revocation and extension of her supervised probation. But if Ms. Brandon could not make the payment upfront, she would be prohibited from taking the class, and the company would seek an arrest warrant.
325. Terrified of being arrested, jailed, and separated from her family, Ms. Brandon borrowed money to make a $100 cash payment to PSI on July 13, 2016, instead of paying for food and rent for her family. Defendant Thompson allocated $75 toward the “Class” and $25 to “Supervision.”
326. Ms. Brandon completed the “Drug Education Program” on September 7, 2016. Defendant Thompson, on behalf of PSI, was the “Program Facilitator” of the program. The class took place at the PSI office. Because Ms. Brandon managed to pay the company to take the class, no arrest warrant issued relating to the alleged positive drug screen.
327. Throughout Ms. Brandon’s probation, Defendant Thompson continually instructed Ms. Brandon that she had to make payments to PSI and the court and failure to do so would result in a “violation,” meaning that she would be arrested and jailed.
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328. Ms. Brandon experienced extreme stress and anxiety about the possibility of going to jail simply for inability to pay. She made payments to PSI because she was afraid of going to jail. Ms. Brandon believed her children and her mother would suffer without her income, and she knew she would lose her job if she were arrested and jailed. She was scared that her children being placed in foster care if she went to jail.
329. Defendant Thompson knew, because Ms. Brandon repeatedly told her, that Ms. Brandon had diverted money needed to support herself and her family so that she could make payments to the company and the court. Even so, on September 16, 2016, as Ms. Brandon’s term on supervised probation was ending, Defendant Thompson sought a warrant for Ms. Brandon, alleging that she violated her probation by failing to make payments to the court and the company. Defendant Thompson omitted crucial information from the sworn affidavit alleging nonpayment about Ms. Brandon’s efforts to pay and the hardship she experienced as a result of being required to make payments under threat of arrest and jail. The violation-of-probation warrant states that Ms. Brandon owed PSI $250.00 in fees and $512.50 in court debt.
330. Ms. Brandon appeared in court for a revocation hearing on November 10, 2016. 331. On that day, Ms. Brandon’s probation for her remaining case, a term of 11 months and 29 days, was revoked and extended. Due to the violation, Ms. Brandon’s court debt increased from $512.50 to $618.50. She was told that “probation may be terminated once financial obligation to court is met.” In other words, as soon as Ms. Brandon managed to pay her court debt—which increased to $618.50 as a result of the nonpayment warrant—her probation would be terminated immediately. The probation company led her to believe, contrary to Tennessee law, that she would also have to pay all of her supervision fees before her probation would be terminated.
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332. Ms. Brandon continued to incur more supervision fees as a result of the alleged violation for nonpayment and the resulting revocation and extension. PSI continued to charge her monthly fees that increased her probation debt because she could not afford to pay enough money to get off of probation.
333. On January 26, 2017, while Ms. Brandon was on supervised probation solely because she was unable to make the required payments, Defendant Thompson drug tested Ms. Brandon. Defendant Thompson informed Ms. Brandon that she had tested positive for marijuana on the in-house drug test.
334. On February 13, 2017, Defendant Thompson petitioned for a violation-of-probation arrest warrant, alleging non-reporting, a positive drug screen for marijuana, nonpayment of court debt, and nonpayment of supervision fees to PSI as grounds for violation. The violation-ofprobation arrest warrant stated that Ms. Brandon owed $618.50 in court debt and $355 in fees to PSI.
335. Defendant Thompson failed to include crucial information in the sworn affidavit about the reasons Ms. Brandon missed some appointments. For example, the company’s probation notes show that on many of the dates Ms. Brandon allegedly did not report, she called the probation office and spoke personally with Defendant Thompson to explain that she was unable to report because she did not have any transportation to Pulaski. None of that information was presented in the affidavit Defendant Thompson swore.
336. The money bond on the warrant was set at $1,500 without notice and without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay or the need to detain her prior to a hearing. Ms. Brandon has no idea how the monetary amount was determined, but she knew that if she were arrested, she would have to pay that much money to get out of jail.
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337. Ms. Brandon could not afford to pay $1,500 or even the premium required by a commercial bonding company to get out of jail after arrest. Instead, Ms. Brandon’s mother, who survives on limited government benefits, paid the non-refundable premium of $150 out of her government check to a private bonding company so that Ms. Brandon would not be jailed after arrest. Ms. Brandon’s mother had to forgo basic necessities like food in order to loan Ms. Brandon the money she needed to get out of jail.
338. Ms. Brandon’s court date for the alleged violation of probation was set for March 30, 2017.
339. On March 30, 2017, Ms. Brandon was told by her public defender that the prosecutor wanted her to serve 90 days in jail for the positive drug screen, non-reporting, nonpayment of PSI fees and court debt. Ms. Brandon did not want to go to jail because she did not want to be separated from her children or lose her job. The public defender refused to advocate for a lesser sentence, so Ms. Brandon decided to proceed pro se.
340. Ms. Brandon informed the district attorney that she had just begun a new job the week prior and pleaded for an alternative to jail.
341. Ultimately, Ms. Brandon convinced the General Sessions Court to reset the violation-of-probation revocation hearing to May 18, 2017. In exchange for not being jailed that day, Ms. Brandon agreed to report biweekly to probation, pass at least two drug tests, and pay all fines and costs in full before May 18, 2017, or else serve a 90-day jail sentence.
342. Desperate to avoid jail, Ms. Brandon made payments toward PSI fees and court debt. Ms. Brandon forwent necessities like food, clothes, and gas, to pay the debts, and relied on family members to make ends meet. On May 17, 2017, a day before the deadline to either pay in
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full or go to jail for 90 days, Ms. Brandon made her last payments toward more than $1,000 in combined fees to PSI and court debt.
343. Ms. Brandon’s probation was terminated. VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
344. The named Plaintiffs bring this action as a Class Action pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Class Definitions 345. The Classes are defined as follows:
a. Damages Class All persons who, since April 23, 2014, and until the trial of this cause, (1) have incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) have been assigned to be supervised on probation in that case by Community Probation Services, LLC, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., or Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC.
b. Declaratory and/or Injunctive Relief Class14 All persons who, at any time since April 23, 2014, (1) have incurred, or will incur, courtimposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) are currently being supervised, or will be supervised, on probation in that case by Community Probation Services, LLC, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSIProbation II, LLC, PSI Probation, L.L.C., or Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC.
14 Named Plaintiffs Indya Hilfort and Tanya Mitchell seek certification of this Declaratory and/or Injunctive Relief Class. Even in the event that Plaintiffs Hilfort and Mitchell complete their probation sentences while this action is pending, they may nonetheless continue to advance the interests of such a class. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980). Those who still owe debts to Defendants or who will incur such debts will be subjected to the same material ongoing policies and practices absent the relief sought in this Complaint.
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346. The names, case numbers, probation documents, dates of imprisonment, financial receipts, and relevant records of the class members are in Defendants’ possession and are easily ascertainable.
C. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(a) Are Satisfied 347. Numerosity. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) are satisfied in that there are too many Class Members for joinder of all of them to be practicable. On information and belief, the Declaratory and Injunctive Class includes over 200 members at any given time, and the Damages Class includes thousands of members. The Classes, as defined above, meet the numerosity requirement. 348. Commonality. The claims of the Class members raise numerous common issues of fact and/or law, thereby satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). These common legal and factual questions—the answers to which will drive resolution of the litigation—may be determined without the necessity of resolving individualized factual disputes concerning any Class Member, and include, but are not limited to, the following questions: Common Questions
a. Whether Giles County’s decision to abandon the tradition of engaging a neutral probation officer and instead contract with a for-profit, user-funded probation officer that has the same duties and powers of a traditional probation officer and also has a personal financial interest in the management and outcome of every case it supervises violates federal law;
b. Whether a contract creating a probation company with a direct financial stake in the management and outcome of every probationer’s case it supervises violates state law;
c. Whether a government and private actors can place and keep people on onerous probation plans that involve extra fees and serious intrusions on liberty based on a person’s poverty;
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d. Whether a government and a private company, working together, can circumvent state debt-collection protections and engage in practices that no private creditor could lawfully undertake;
e. Whether it is lawful to use legal process purportedly concerning probation violation and probation judgments with a motive to earn profit;
f. Whether the policies and practices of the Private Defendants violate the constitutional and statutory rights of Plaintiffs and the putative classes;
g. Whether the conduct of the Private Defendants violates the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq.;
h. Whether Defendants have imposed imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revocation or withholding of drivers’ licenses, intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on individuals’ liberty;
i. Whether Defendants have placed and kept individuals on supervised probation solely because they could not afford to pay their court debts and probation fees without an inquiry to determine whether or not their failure to pay was willful;
j. Whether Defendants have failed to inform probationers of their right to a determination by a neutral officer of probationers’ ability to pay court costs, fines, and fees;
k. Whether Defendants have taken and converted to their own use monetary payments to which they had no legal right;
l. Whether Giles County has a policy and practice of using a predetermined schedule to determine the amount of money required to secure post-arrest release;
m. Whether Giles County requires that scheduled amount of money to be paid up front before it will release a person from its jail;
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n. Whether, when, and how any official considers or determines what conditions of pretrial release should be and whether, for example, any official considers ability to pay, makes findings concerning ability to pay, and offers non-financial conditions of release for those unable to pay;
o. What standard post-arrest procedures Giles County performs on misdemeanor arrestees; for example, whether Giles County uses any other alternate procedures for promptly releasing indigent people determined otherwise eligible for release but who are unable to afford a monetary payment;
p. Whether a secured “bail schedule” setting generic amounts of money required up front to avoid post-arrest detention without any inquiry or findings into a person’s ability to pay violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection provisions; and
q. Whether Defendants have sought arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional fees.
349. These and numerous other common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set of policies and practices: the for-profit contractual relationships between the County and the companies that govern misdemeanor probation supervision practices. The Defendants operate this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day. The material components of the scheme do not vary from Class member to Class member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the classes are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek.
350. Typicality. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the unnamed Class members because they have a common factual source and rest upon the same legal and remedial
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theories, thereby satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a)(3). For example, the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiffs and all Class members were injured by the same wrongful practices in which Defendants engaged, namely failing to comply with the basic constitutional and statutory provisions detailed below.
351. Adequacy of Representation. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are satisfied in that each named Plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the litigation to prosecute its claims vigorously on behalf of the Class members, and each named Plaintiff’s interests are aligned with those of the proposed Classes. There are no defenses of a unique nature that may be asserted against any named Plaintiff individually, as distinguished from the other members of the Classes, and the relief sought is common to the Classes. No named Plaintiff has any interest that is in conflict with or is antagonistic to the interests of the members of the Class, and no named Plaintiff has any conflict with any other member of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation to represent them and the Classes in this litigation.
352. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Civil Rights Corps and Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym Ltd., Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, and Attorney Kyle Mothershead, all of whom have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law.
353. Counsel have devoted a significant amount of time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with Defendants’ scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it.
354. The interests of the members of the Classes will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
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D. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) Are Satisfied 355. Class action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up their probation and debt-collection scheme, have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Declaratory/Injunctive Class. Thus, a declaration that people in the Declaratory/Injunctive Class are entitled, as a matter of federal law, to a neutral probation officer without a personal financial conflict of interest in their cases would benefit every member of the proposed Class. The same applies to legal rulings on the other claims, including: that the Contracts are void; that the arrangement and the Defendants’ policies violate the Equal Protection Clause by imposing onerous probation conditions due to poverty and by imposing debt-collection methods far more onerous than any private creditor could lawfully impose; that CPS and PSI abuse process by commandeering specific legal processes for the ulterior motive of earning profit; and that the policy, pattern, and practice of threatening to arrest and jail people for nonpayment (and actually doing so), and threatening to revoke and extend their supervised probation term (and actually doing so), without informing them of their rights or inquiring into their ability to pay constitutes an extortion enterprise in blatant violation of racketeering laws. 356. Injunctive relief compelling the Defendants to comply with Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights will similarly protect each member of the Declaratory/Injunctive Class from being again subjected to the Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices with respect to the debts that they still owe and protect those who will incur such debts in the future from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class seeking equitable relief is appropriate.
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357. Class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate because common questions of law and fact predominate in this case. This case turns, for every Plaintiff, on what Defendants’ policies and practices are and on whether those policies are lawful.
358. The common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Damages Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. Class-wide treatment of liability is a far superior method of determining the content and legality of the Defendants’ policies and practices than individual suits by hundreds or thousands of Giles County residents. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the amount of time that a person was subjected to the unlawful scheme and the amount of money extorted from them. Determining damages for individual class members can thus typically be handled in a ministerial fashion based on easily verifiable records in the Defendants’ possession. If need be, individual hearings on class-member specific damages based on special circumstances and particular hardships endured as a result of Defendants’ extortion scheme can be held after class-wide liability is determined—a method far more efficient than the wholesale litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits.
359. Plaintiffs make the following claims, and seek the following relief and hereby demand a jury trial in this cause for all matters so appropriate. VIII. CLAIMS
COUNT 1: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) and (d) By Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil and Lesley Johnson on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated against CPS and Patricia McNair for damages. 360. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–361.
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361. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against CPS and Patricia McNair, and not Giles County.
362. Plaintiffs are “persons” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c).
363. Defendant CPS is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
364. Defendant Patricia McNair is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
1. The CPS RICO Enterprise 365. CPS and Defendant McNair, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“CPS RICO Enterprise”). The CPS RICO Enterprise is an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by CPS without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay. 366. The CPS RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constitute a portion of the profits received by Defendants CPS and McNair pursuant to this operation, which are collected through threats of probation revocation and jailing. Moreover, Defendants CPS and McNair extort on a mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers otherwise would have spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants CPS and McNair also use electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with CPS probationers
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and to extort payment, including, for example, CPS’s written policies that payment must be sent through U.S. mail for probationers who are required to report by phone.
367. The members of the CPS RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit. 368. Defendants CPS and McNair have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 369. Defendants CPS and McNair have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 370. Specifically, Defendants CPS and McNair conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the CPS RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; b. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and c. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. 2. Predicate Acts 371. Defendants CPS and McNair have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money. 372. Defendants CPS and McNair, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, have threatened Plaintiffs that if they do not agree to pay money to the companies they: (a) will be arrested; (b) will be accused by the companies of violating the conditions of probation; (c) will face testimony by the companies against them regarding
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nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including inability to pay); (d) will have their probation revoked; (e) will be sent to jail; (f) will have their probation extended; and (g) will be charged additional fees.
373. These threats are inherently wrongful because they are motivated out of a desire to extort, because they are premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victims, and because they are demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
374. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiffs paid the fees demanded by Defendants CPS and McNair even though doing so has resulted in great personal suffering.
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 375. Defendants CPS and McNair, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiffs with their consent, which consent was induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 376. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and prevented Plaintiffs from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
b. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-14-112 377. Defendants CPS and McNair themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from the Plaintiffs and impaired their exercise of their state and federal rights.
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c. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 378. Defendants CPS and McNair, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiffs, with intent to deprive them of this money and the enjoyment of their state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 379. Defendants CPS and McNair used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants CPS and McNair used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 380. Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the CPS contract and continuing through the present with respect to hundreds of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts are part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 381. The racketeering acts of Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees by CPS without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights. 382. The racketeering acts of Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs, among other things, were required to pay fees to Defendants CPS and McNair, and paid those fees
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because of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, Plaintiffs were subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing their federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions.
383. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants CPS and McNair, County officials, and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise.
384. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, through the CPS RICO Enterprise, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiffs specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor probation supervisees assigned to CPS.
385. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of CPS, McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise were committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the Plaintiffs assigned to CPS supervised probation who cannot afford to pay their entire fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they are eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees and court debts to the company.
4. Injury 386. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants CPS and McNair and the other participants in the CPS RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs assigned to CPS-supervised probation suffered injuries to their property. These Plaintiffs were required to pay probation fees and surcharges to CPS, and they were forced to continue paying these fees even when they could not afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to themselves and their families.
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387. These Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
COUNT 2: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) By Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
against PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe for damages 388. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–389. 389. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and not Giles County. 390. Each of the Plaintiffs is a “person” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c). 391. Defendant PSI is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 392. Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
1. The PSI RICO Enterprise 393. Defendants PSI, Timothy Cook, and Markeyta Bledsoe, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“PSI RICO Enterprise”). The PSI RICO Enterprise is an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PSI and without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay. 394. The PSI RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and
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Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constitute a portion of the profits received by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe pursuant to this operation, which are collected through threats of violations and jailing. Moreover, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe extort on a mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers would have otherwise spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe also use electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with PSI probationers and to extort payment. This includes PSI’s policy that reporting forms must be faxed through for probationers who are required to report by phone.
395. The members of the PSI RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit. 396. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are or were associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 397. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 398. Specifically, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the PSI RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1): 399. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 400. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and 401. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
2. Predicate Acts 402. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees
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discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money.
403. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, threatened Plaintiffs that if they did not agree to pay money to the company they: (a) would be arrested; (b) would be accused by the company of violating the conditions of probation; (c) would face testimony by the company against them regarding nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including an inability to pay); (d) would have their probation revoked; (e) would be sent to jail; (f) would have their probation extended; and (g) would be charged additional fees.
404. These threats are inherently wrongful because they were motivated out of a desire to extort, because they were premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victim, and because they were demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
405. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiffs have paid the fees demanded by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe even though doing so resulted in great personal suffering.
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 406. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiff with her consent, which consent has been induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 407. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and have prevented Plaintiffs from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore have affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
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b. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-14-112 408. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from the Plaintiffs and impaired their exercise of their state and federal rights.
c. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 409. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiffs, with intent to deprive them of this money and the enjoyment of their state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 410. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 411. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the Contract and continuing through the present with respect to hundreds of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts are part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 412. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees
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by PSI without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights.
413. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs have, among other things, been required to pay fees to Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and paid those fees because of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, Plaintiffs have been subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing their federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions.
414. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, County officials, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise.
415. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, through the PSI RICO Enterprise, have directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiffs specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor supervisees assigned to PSI.
416. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have been committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the named Plaintiff and, more generally, PSI probationers who are or were unable to afford to pay their entire fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they would be eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees to the company and court debts.
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4. Injury 417. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property. Plaintiffs have been required to pay probation fees and surcharges to PSI, and have been forced to continue paying these fees even when they could not afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to themselves and their families. 418. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
COUNT 3: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) By Named Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
against PSI and Harriet Thompson for damages 419. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–420. 420. Plaintiff’s claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, and not Giles County. 421. Plaintiff is a “person” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c). 422. Defendant PSI is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 423. Defendant Harriet Thompson is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
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1. The PSI RICO Enterprise 424. Defendants PSI, Timothy Cook, and Harriet Thompson, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constituted an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“PSI RICO Enterprise”). The PSI RICO Enterprise was an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PSI and without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay. 425. Harriet Thompson was employed by PSI at all times within the statute of limitations until July 2017. 426. The PSI RICO Enterprise was engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constituted a portion of the profits received by Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson pursuant to this operation, which were collected through threats of violations and jailing. Moreover, Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson extorted, on a mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers would have otherwise spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants PSI and Defendant Thompson used electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with PSI probationers and to extort payment. This includes PSI’s policy that reporting forms must be faxed through for probationers who are required to report by phone. 427. The members of the PSI RICO Enterprise functioned as a continuing unit. 428. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they were associated with an enterprise that was engaged in, or the activities of which affected, interstate commerce and, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
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429. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
430. Specifically, Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the PSI RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
431. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 432. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and 433. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
2. Predicate Acts 434. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money. 435. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, threatened Plaintiff that if she did not agree to pay money to the company she: (a) would be arrested; (b) would be accused by the company of violating the conditions of probation; (c) would face testimony by the company against her regarding nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including an inability to pay); (d) would have her probation revoked; (e) would be sent to jail; (f) would have her probation extended; and (g) would be charged additional fees. 436. These threats are inherently wrongful because they were motivated out of a desire to extort, because they were premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victim, and because they were demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
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437. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiff paid the fees demanded by Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson even though doing so resulted in great personal suffering.
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 438. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiff with her consent, which consent was induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 439. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and prevented Plaintiff from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
b. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-14-112 440. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise, obtained by threat fees from the Plaintiff and impaired her exercise of her state and federal rights.
c. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 441. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiff, with intent to deprive her of this money and the enjoyment of her state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 442. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants PSI and Harriet
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Thompson used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 443. Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the Contract with respect to hundreds of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts were part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 444. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson and the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise had a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees by PSI without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights. 445. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiff: Plaintiff, among other things, was required to pay fees to Defendants PSI and Harriet Thompson, and she paid those fees as a result of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, Plaintiff was subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing her federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions. 446. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise. 447. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, through the PSI RICO Enterprise, directed their
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racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiff specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor supervisees assigned to PSI.
448. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise were committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the named Plaintiff and, more generally, PSI probationers who were unable to afford to pay their entire fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they would be eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees to the company and court debts.
4. Injury 449. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants PSI, Harriet Thompson, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiff suffered injuries to her property. Plaintiff was required to pay probation fees and surcharges to PSI, and she was forced to continue paying these fees even when she could not afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to herself and her family. 450. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
COUNT 4: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) By Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
against PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe for equitable relief 451. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–452. 452. Plaintiff’s claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and not Giles County.
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453. Plaintiff is a “person” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c).
454. Defendant PSI is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
455. Defendant Markeyta Bledsoe is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because she is capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
1. The PSI RICO Enterprise 456. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, together with Giles County and other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“PSI RICO Enterprise”). The PSI RICO Enterprise is an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PSI and without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay. 457. The PSI RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because federal dollars, disbursed through federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income Disability and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, constitute a portion of the profits received by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe pursuant to this operation, which are collected through threats of violations and jailing. Moreover, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe extort on a mass scale, from hundreds of private victims, money that those individual probationers would have otherwise spent on purchasing goods and services in interstate commerce. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe also use electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with PSI probationers and to extort payment. This includes PSI’s policy that reporting forms must be faxed through for probationers who are required to report by phone. 458. The members of the PSI RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit.
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459. Defendants PSI Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are or were associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
460. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other and Giles County to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
461. Specifically, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have conducted or participated in and have conspired to conduct the affairs of the PSI RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
462. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 463. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-112; and 464. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
2. Predicate Acts 465. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various probation fees discussed in this Complaint, including the $35 to $45 monthly fee and the variable drug-test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money. 466. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, have threatened and continue to threaten Plaintiff that if she does not agree to pay money to the companies she: (a) will be accused by the companies of violating the conditions of probation; (b) will face testimony by the companies against them regarding nonpayment, but without revealing the reasons for nonpayment (including an inability to pay); (c) will have her probation revoked; (d) will have her probation extended; and (e) will be charged additional fees.
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467. These threats are inherently wrongful because they are motivated out of a desire to extort, because they are premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victims, and because they are demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
468. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiff has paid the fees demanded by Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe even though doing so has resulted in great personal suffering.
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 469. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiff with her consent, which consent has been induced by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 470. Defendants’ activities affected preexisting interstate commerce by extorting federal assistance program money to fund the enterprise. Moreover, the proceeds of these Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce and prevented Plaintiff from purchasing other goods in interstate commerce, and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
b. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code § 39-14-112 471. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiff and impaired her exercise of her state and federal rights.
c. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 472. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiff, with intent
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to deprive her of this money and the enjoyment of her state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law.
473. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of, an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 474. Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since the first implementation of the Contract and continuing through the present with respect to hundreds of probationers in Giles County. These racketeering acts are part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 475. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees by PSI without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights. 476. The racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise have yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to Plaintiff: Plaintiff has, among other things, been required to pay fees to Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, and paid these fees because of these Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, Plaintiff has been subjected to threats of physical confinement and physically intrusive and
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humiliating drug tests for the purpose of generating financial profit for the companies as well as relinquishing their federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions.
477. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe, County officials, and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise.
478. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, through the PSI RICO Enterprise, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Plaintiff specifically, and also more generally all Giles County misdemeanor supervisees assigned to PSI.
479. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise are committed in similar ways, namely: by extorting the named Plaintiff and, more generally, PSI probationers who cannot afford to pay their entire fine, fees, restitution, and costs by the date they are eligible to have their supervised probation converted to unsupervised probation, into paying supervision fees to the company and court debts.
4. Injury 480. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, knowing, and intentional acts of Defendants PSI and Markeyta Bledsoe and the other participants in the PSI RICO Enterprise, as discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiff has suffered injuries to her property. Plaintiff has been required to pay probation fees and surcharges to PSI, and she has been forced to continue paying these fees even when she cannot afford to do so, resulting in economic harm to herself and her family. 481. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
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COUNT 5: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiffs’ Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS and
Giles County for damages. 482. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–483. 483. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 484. CPS, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiffs are unfairly deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. 485. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and, critically, made the resolution of Plaintiffs’ cases contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities. 486. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, CPS and its employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for
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supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether and when to initiate revocation proceedings.15 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
487. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
488. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
15 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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489. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved, unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
490. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiffs’ rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving people of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in the policies and practices as described above.
491. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT 6: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiff’s Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated against CPS and Giles County for equitable relief. 492. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–493. 493. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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494. CPS, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiff is unfairly deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
495. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and, critically, made the resolution of Plaintiff’s case contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities.
496. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, CPS and its employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether and when to initiate revocation proceedings.16 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in
16 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
497. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
498. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
499. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved, unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
500. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiff’s rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving someone of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiff’s
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constitutional rights. Defendants caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in the policies and practices as described above.
501. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT 7: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiffs’ Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Lucinda Brandon and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for
damages. 502. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–504. 503. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 504. PSI, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiffs are unfairly deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. 505. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and,
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critically, made the resolution of Plaintiffs’ cases contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities.
506. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, PSI and their employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether and when to initiate revocation proceedings.17 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
507. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
508. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what
17 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
509. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved, unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
510. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiffs’ rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving people of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
511. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT 8: The Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions Violates Plaintiff’s Right to a Neutral Probation
Officer Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for equitable relief. 512. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–514.
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513. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
514. PSI, its employees, and Giles County enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that permit non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases to dictate the outcomes of those cases. As a direct result of the policies, customs, and/or procedures enacted by these Defendants, Plaintiff is unfairly deprived of her constitutional right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
515. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government officials exercising judicial or enforcement functions from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with two private, for-profit corporations to perform a traditional court function—probation—and, critically, made the resolution of Plaintiff’s case contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of these private entities.
516. Under the Defendant County and Defendant companies’ scheme, PSI and its employees can both influence what conditions are imposed for people assigned to them for supervision, determine whether and when those conditions have been violated, and decide whether and when to initiate revocation proceedings.18 They can make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on technical or perceived violations of those rules or other
18 As noted earlier, people kept on supervised probation because they cannot afford to pay their court debts in full are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call conditions of probation, and which are imposed solely because of individuals’ wealth status.
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conditions. Then, the companies serve as the main witness at the violation proceedings, and often the allegations of employees of the companies are treated as evidence. Finally, the companies meet privately with the district attorney and the judge and recommend a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on supervised probation for an extended period of time (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
517. In contrast to the longstanding, traditional role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—the companies and their employees have a direct financial stake in every decision they make regarding case supervision, enforcement of conditions and rules, and revocation of probation. The companies have a personal financial interest in conducting their functions as probation officers in a way that maximizes their personal profit and not as neutral public court officers.
518. Because these non-neutral actors profit significantly from the decisions about whether to place and keep people on supervised probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide before and during revocation hearings, and what sanction to recommend—including extending the person’s term on supervised probation, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it participates in those decisions.
519. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have had and continue to have an impact on every decision the Private Defendants make. Because these private entities have a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed and resolved, unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the County’s and companies’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
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520. Defendants directly and proximately caused these violations of Plaintiff’s rights. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that depriving someone of property under color of law, without due process or legal authority for the deprivation, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
521. Defendants’ actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights, and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT 9: Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts
Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to
Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and
Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS for damages.
522. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–523. 523. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 524. The United States Supreme Court has held that when governments seek to recoup costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
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525. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerced payment of debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or suspended drivers’ licenses,19 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiffs’ liberty, the County and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiffs of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
526. Many people like the Plaintiffs who owe money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment.
527. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
19 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt)
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COUNT 10:
Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against CPS and Giles County for equitable relief. 528. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–530.
529. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and
the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
530. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup
costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their
access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection
solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
531. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerce payment of
debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on
standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment,
repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses,20 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiff’s liberty, the County
20 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing court debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt).
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and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiff of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
532. Many people like the Plaintiff who owe money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment.
533. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
COUNT 11: Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts
Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to
Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Lucinda Brandon and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for
damages. 534. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–535. 535. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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536. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
537. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerce payment of debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses,21 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiffs’ liberty, the County and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiffs of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
538. Many people like the Plaintiffs who owe money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment.
21 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt).
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539. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
COUNT 12: Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts
Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions on Debtors Whose Creditor is the Government As Compared to
Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated against PSI and Giles County for equitable relief. 540. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–542. 541. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
542. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position—including their access to police, jails, and courts of law—to engage in unduly restrictive methods of collection solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
543. Defendants enacted policies, customs, and/or procedures that coerce payment of debts owed to the government. Not only do the County and the company keep indigent people on standard and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’
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licenses,22 intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on Plaintiff’s liberty, the County and the company take advantage of their control over the machinery of the County jail, and the prosecutorial, court, and police systems, to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The County deprives Plaintiff of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the County are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
544. Many people like the Plaintiff who owe money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means-tested disability checks into money orders to pay the company, and go further into debt to make the payments Defendants demand. Other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail debtors, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for nonpayment.
545. Defendants’ coercive debt-collection system constitutes invidious discrimination and violates fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
COUNT 13: Defendants Violate Equal Protection and Due Process by Placing and Keeping People on
Supervised Probation Solely Because They Cannot Afford to Pay Court Debts and Probation Supervision Fees
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS and
Giles County for damages 546. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–547.
22 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and suspension, and subsequently prevent the reinstatement, of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid court debt and traffic debt, respectively, without informing debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their inability to pay. This practice is the subject of two lawsuits filed by undersigned counsel in the Middle District of Tennessee. Thomas, et al. v. Haslam, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00005 (court debt) and Robinson, et al. v. Purkey, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (traffic debt).
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547. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States, to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
548. Giles County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation with the CPS Defendants solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without an inquiry to determine whether the failure to pay was willful. If a probationer can afford to pay her court debts in full, she will not be subjected to supervised probation by the private companies (sometimes, Defendants permit a probationer to purchase her way off of supervised probation only after a minimum period of time, typically four months, on supervised probation has passed). If the person is too poor to pay, the County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of keeping that person on supervised probation, including forcing the person to abide by conditions agreed upon by the companies and the County that seriously restrict the person’s liberty and that subject the person to arrest and jailing if those conditions, as interpreted by the For-Profit Probation Defendants (including payment of extra fees to the company) are violated.
549. The County has the ability to collect outstanding debts directly from the Plaintiffs by allowing them to make payments directly to the court or by using other debt-collection practices that are legal under Tennessee law.
550. This policy and practice of altering punishment based solely on wealth status violates Due Process and Equal Protection.
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COUNT 14: Defendants Violate Equal Protection and Due Process by Placing and Keeping People on
Supervised Probation Solely Because They Cannot Afford to Pay Court Debts and Probation Supervision Fees
Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against CPS and Giles County for equitable relief 551. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–552. 552. Defendants, under color of state law, caused Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States,
to be deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, without due process of law. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
553. Giles County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation with the CPS Defendants solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without an inquiry to determine whether the failure to pay was willful. If a probationer can afford to pay her court debts in full, she will not be subjected to supervised probation by the private companies (sometimes, Defendants permit a probationer to purchase her way off of supervised probation only after a minimum period of time, typically four months, on supervised probation has passed). If the person is too poor to pay, the County and the Private Defendants have a policy and practice of keeping that person on supervised probation, including forcing the person to abide by conditions agreed upon by the companies and the County that seriously restrict the person’s liberty and that subject the person to arrest and jailing if those conditions, as interpreted by the For-Profit Probation Defendants (including payment of extra fees to the company) are violated.
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554. The County has the ability to collect outstanding debts directly from the Plaintiff by allowing her to make payments directly to the court or by using other debt-collection practices that are legal under Tennessee law.
555. This policy and practice of altering punishment based solely on wealth status violates Due Process and Equal Protection.
COUNT 15: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due Process Rights By Jailing Them
Solely Because They Cannot Afford A Monetary Payment Brought by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County and the Sheriff for equitable relief
556. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–557 above. 557. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses have long prohibited keeping a person in jail because of the person’s inability to make a monetary payment. 558. Defendants have a policy and practice of violating probationers’ substantive right against wealth-based detention by enforcing secured financial conditions of release that are preprinted on violation-of-probation arrest warrants and that are determined without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without any pre-deprivation process, assessment of alternatives to detention, inquiry into whether the Plaintiffs pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight, or any findings regarding the need for detention in light of any particular government interest. Because the monetary amounts are predetermined without reference to the person’s ability to pay, they operate to detain only those indigent misdemeanor-probationer arrestees who cannot afford them, but without any findings that pre-revocation, wealth-based detention is necessary to meet a compelling government interest. If the Plaintiff could pay the monetary amount, she would be released immediately.
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559. These violation-of-probation warrants are routinely issued for the arrest of indigent misdemeanor probationers who, like Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, are supervised on probation only because they cannot afford to pay in full their court costs and probation fees.
COUNT 16: Unjust Enrichment Brought by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil and Lesley Johnson on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against CPS for damages 560. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–567. 561. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 562. CPS Defendants took and converted to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members. Defendants extracted those funds in violation of Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Defendants had no legal right to Plaintiffs’ money and took these funds in violation of state law as related above. Under the circumstances presented here, Defendants’ retention of Plaintiffs’ money would result in unjust enrichment.
COUNT 17: Unjust Enrichment Brought by Named Plaintiffs Lucinda Brandon and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against PSI for damages 563. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–569. 564. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107,
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and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq.
565. PSI Defendants took and converted to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members. Defendants extracted those funds in violation of Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Defendants had no legal right to Plaintiffs’ money and took these funds in violation of state law as related above. Under the circumstances presented here, Defendants’ retention of Plaintiffs’ money would result in unjust enrichment.
COUNT 18: Unjust Enrichment Brought by Named Plaintiffs Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against PSI for equitable relief 566. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–572. 567. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 568. PSI Defendants took and converted to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiff and proposed Class Members. Defendants extracted those funds in violation of Plaintiff’s federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Defendants had no legal right to Plaintiff’s money and took these funds in violation of state law as related above. Under the circumstances presented here, Defendants’ retention of Plaintiff’s money would result in unjust enrichment.
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COUNT 19: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Giles County, CPS, and Defendant McNair for damages 569. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–575. 570. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 571. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999). 572. When probationers are unable to pay what CPS demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, CPS participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts. 573. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when it knows that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed. 574. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior
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motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
575. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
COUNT 20: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiff Indya Hilfort on behalf of herself and all others similar situated against Giles, CPS, and Defendant McNair for equitable relief 576. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–582. 577. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 578. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999). 579. When probationers are unable to pay what CPS demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, CPS participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts.
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580. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when it knows that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed.
581. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
582. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
COUNT 21: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiffs Lucinda Brandon and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Giles County, PSI, and Defendants Bledsoe and Thompson for damages 583. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–589. 584. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 585. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing”
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fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999).
586. When probationers are unable to pay what PSI demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, PSI participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts.
587. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when it knows that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed.
588. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
589. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
COUNT 22: Abuse of Process Brought by Named Plaintiff Tanya Mitchell on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against Giles County, PSI, and Defendant Bledsoe, for equitable relief 590. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–596.
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591. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq.
592. Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999).
593. When probationers are unable to pay what PSI demands, the company files revocation petitions and secures arrest warrants. Moreover, PSI participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte conversations with Giles County prosecutors and judges to secure violation-of-probation judgments. The company refuses to convert a person’s supervised probation to unsupervised probation unless she has paid all of her debts.
594. The company seeks violation-of-probation citation or arrest warrants for nonpayment even when they know that the person did not pay because they were too poor to pay. The company and the County use these warrants as a way to extort additional money from impoverished probationers who are scared of being arrested and jailed.
595. The company and the County engage in all of these activities, and threaten probationers with arrest, jailing, and revocation if they do not make payments, with the ulterior motive of securing the additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each revocation violation.
596. The company also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the
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ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and threatening to seek violation-of-probation warrants to extort money.
COUNT 23: Civil Conspiracy Brought by Named Plaintiffs Lucinda Brandon and Tanya Mitchell on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSIProbation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, and Timothy Cook for damages 597. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–603. 598. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. 599. Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, and Timothy Cook acted in concert to accomplish the common and unlawful purposes of: a. Acting under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs and other probationers of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States without due process of law by: i. Placing private, non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases in a position to dictate the outcome of those cases; ii. Using imprisonment, threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses, intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on probationers’ liberty to collect debts owed to the County;
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iii. Placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without determining whether the failure to pay was willful;
iv. Permitting non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the drug testing of probationers to determine how many drug tests a probationer must endure and pay for, and when the probationer must take those drug tests;
v. Taking and converting to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed class members to which Defendants had no legal right; and
vi. Abusing the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees.
600. Defendants accomplished their common design via the unlawful means of contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested individuals to serve a traditional government function, and extorting payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law.
601. The conspiracy had a common design, jointly and knowingly established by Defendants acting through their agents and employees.
602. Defendants knew or should have known that Tennessee and federal law require individual consideration of each Plaintiff or proposed Class Member’s ability to pay such court fines, costs, and fees, that placing and keeping a person on supervised probation solely for nonpayment of such civil debts violates Tennessee and federal law, and that Tennessee and federal
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law provide Plaintiffs and proposed class members with the right to have their probation supervised by a neutral officer of the court.
603. Defendants knew of each other’s common intent to contract with the County and subject Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members to onerous conditions of probation in violation of Tennessee and federal law. Defendants also knew that their wrongful actions would inflict injury upon the targets of the conspiracy, including Plaintiffs Tanya Mitchell and Lucinda Brandon.
604. The conspiracy among Defendants was a proximate and legal cause of harm to Plaintiffs and proposed class members. If Defendants had abided by the laws requiring probation officers to be free of financial conflicts of interest and prohibiting the use of supervised probation, arrest, and jailing to coerce payment from indigent individuals, Plaintiffs and proposed class members would not have suffered the unlawful deprivations of liberty and property described herein. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their actual damages, plus costs, attorneys’ fees, and pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest.
COUNT 24: Civil Conspiracy Brought by Named Plaintiffs Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, and Indya Hilfort on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation Services 605. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–611. 606. Private Defendants, although acting under color of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not employees of a government entity as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-107, and therefore they are not entitled to state governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Torts Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq.
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607. Defendants Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., and Community Probation services acted in concert to accomplish the common and unlawful purposes of:
a. Acting under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs and other probationers of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States without due process of law by:
i. Placing private, non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the outcome of probationers’ cases in a position to dictate the outcome of those cases;
ii. Using imprisonment, threats of imprisonment, onerous probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses, intrusive drug tests, extra fees, and other restrictions on probationers’ liberty to collect debts owed to the County;
iii. Placing and keeping individuals on supervised probation solely because they cannot afford to pay their court debts and probation fees, without determining whether the failure to pay was willful;
iv. Permitting non-neutral actors with direct pecuniary interests in the drug testing of probationers to determine how many drug tests a probationer must endure and pay for, and when the probationer must take those drug tests;
v. Taking and converting to their own use monetary payments from Plaintiffs and proposed class members to which Defendants had no legal right; and
vi. Abusing the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional “supervision” and “drug testing” fees.
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608. Defendants accomplished their common design via the unlawful means of contracting with the County to allow non-neutral, financially-interested individuals to serve a traditional government function, and extorting payments of court fines, costs, and various fees from Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members using, inter alia imprisonment and threats of imprisonment in violation of Tennessee and federal law.
609. The conspiracy had a common design, jointly and knowingly established by Defendants acting through their agents and employees.
610. Defendants knew or should have known that Tennessee and federal law require individual consideration of each Plaintiff or proposed Class Member’s ability to pay such court fines, costs, and fees, that placing and keeping a person on supervised probation solely for nonpayment of such civil debts violates Tennessee and federal law, and that Tennessee and federal law provide Plaintiffs and proposed class members with the right to have their probation supervised by a neutral officer of the court.
611. Defendants knew of each other’s common intent to contract with the County and subject Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members to onerous conditions of probation in violation of Tennessee and federal law. Defendants also knew that their wrongful actions would inflict injury upon the targets of the conspiracy, including Plaintiffs Tanya Mitchell and Lucinda Brandon.
612. The conspiracy among Defendants was a proximate and legal cause of harm to Plaintiffs and proposed class members. If Defendants had abided by the laws requiring probation officers to be free of financial conflicts of interest and prohibiting the use of supervised probation, arrest, and jailing to coerce payment from indigent individuals, Plaintiffs and proposed class members would not have suffered the unlawful deprivations of liberty and property described
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herein. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their actual damages, plus costs, attorneys’ fees, and pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs request that this Court issue the following relief: A. An order certifying the classes described above; B. A declaratory judgment that subjecting the Plaintiffs to Defendants’ conduct as alleged in the Counts listed above is unlawful; C. An order and judgment permanently enjoining the Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional and illegal policies and practices against the Plaintiffs and the injunctive class of similarly situated people; C. A declaratory judgment that the contracts at issue are void; D. A judgment compensating the Plaintiffs and the class of similarly situated people they represent for the damages they suffered as a result of the Defendants’ unconstitutional and unlawful conduct; E. A judgment granting the treble and punitive damages authorized by statute based on the Defendants’ willful and egregious violations of the law; F. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all claims so triable.
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Dated: April 1, 2019
s/ Elizabeth Rossi Elizabeth Rossi* (pro hac vice) Jonas Wang (pro hac vice) Eric Halperin (pro hac vice) CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 599-0953 Facsimile: (202) 609-8030 elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org jonas@civilrightscorps.org eric@civilrightscorps.org
Kyle Mothershead, BPR 22953 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 Telephone: (615) 982-8002 Facsimile: (615) 229-6387 kyle@mothersheadlaw.com

Respectfully Submitted,
Matthew J. Piers (pro hac vice) Chirag G. Badlani (pro hac vice) Kate E. Schwartz (pro hac vice) HUGHES SOCOL PIERS RESNICK & DYM, LTD. 70 W. Madison St., Suite 4000 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Telephone: (312) 580-0100 Facsimile: (312) 580-1994 mpiers@hsplegal.com cbadlani@hsplegal.com kschwartz@hsplegal.com
David W. Garrison, BPR 24968 Scott P. Tift, BPR 27592 BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC Bank of America Plaza 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 Telephone: (615) 244-2202 Facsimile: (615) 252-3798 dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com stift@barrettjohnston.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Proposed Classes

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on April 1, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing Second Amended Complaint with the Clerk of the Court using the CM-ECF System, which caused notice to be sent to all counsel of record who are registered with the CM/ECF system, including the following Counsel for Defendants:

Daniel H. Rader, IV Moore, Rader, Clift & Fitzpatrick, P.C. P O Box 3347 Cookeville, TN 38502 (931) 526-3311 Fax: (931) 526-3092 Email: danny@moorerader.com
Brandt M. McMillan Tune, Entrekin & White, P.C. 315 Deaderick Street Suite 1700 Nashville, TN 37238 (615) 244-2770 Email: bmcmillan@tewlawfirm.com
Timothy N. O’Connor Tune, Entrekin, & White, P.C. 315 Deaderick St., Ste. 1700 Nashville, TN 37238-1700 p: (615) 244-2770 Email: toconnor@tewlawfirm.com
Robyn Beale Williams Farrar & Bates 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 254-3060 Fax: (615) 254-9835 Email: robyn.williams@farrar-bates.com

Cassandra M. Crane Farrar & Bates 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219 615-254-3060 Fax: 615-254-9835 Email: casey.crane@farrar-bates.com
John Christopher Williams Williams Law and Mediation Group 101 S 1st Street Pulaski, TN 38478 (931) 363-6500 Fax: (931) 363-8904 Email: cwilliams@newsouthlaw.com
s/ Scott Tift

Case 1:18-cv-00033 Document 256 Filed 04/23/19 Page 134 of 134 PageID #: 7330

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

NO. 1:18-cv-00033

)

)

JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY

)

)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are various motions in limine filed in advance of the hearing on

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 51). Through their Motion, Plaintiffs

seek preliminary injunctive relief on Count 15 of their Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 41). In

Count 15, Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleges

Defendants Giles County and Sheriff Kyle Helton violated her Fourteenth Amendment due

process and equal protection rights.

By separate Order entered on January 3, 2019 (Doc. No. 197), the Court concluded that

the private defendants who are not named in Count 15 will not be participating in the

adjudication of the request for injunctive relief on that Count. Accordingly, the Court DENIES,

as moot, the following motions filed by the private defendants: Motion in Limine Concerning

Indya Hilfort by Community Probation Services, LLC and Patricia McNair for Hearing on

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. Nos. 147 and 151); Motion in Limine on

Behalf (sic) Concerning Allison Horn by Community Probation Services, LLC and Patricia

McNair for Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 152); and Motion

Case 1:18-cv-00033 Document 198 Filed 01/07/19 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 6029

in Limine Joining in Motions by Giles County by Community Probation Services, LLC and Patricia McNair for Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 162). For the same reason, the Court also DENIES, as moot, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony and Reports of Expert Witnesses Identified by CPS Defendants (Doc. No. 168).
Through the First Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Outside of the Statute of Limitations (Doc. No. 156), Defendants Giles County and Sheriff Kyle Helton seek to exclude all evidence prior to July 11, 2017, which they argue, is one year before the date Plaintiff Hilfort alleges she first learned of her cause of action in Count 15. Defendants cite authority for the proposition that Plaintiff’s claim is governed by a one-year statute of limitation, and for the proposition that the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff has reason to know of the injury. Defendants have not cited any authority indicating the statute of limitations period governs the admissibility of evidence. See, e.g., Black Law Enforcement Officers Assoc. v. City of Akron, 824 F.2d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 1987) (“The statute of limitations is a defense. . . not a rule of evidence. . . [and] has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence.”) Therefore, the First Motion in Limine (Doc. No. 156) is DENIED. The Court expects the parties to make contemporaneous objections at the hearing to evidence they consider to be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible.
Through the Second Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Judge Truman Morrison (Doc. No. 161), Defendants Giles County and Sheriff Kyle Helton argue the Court should exclude the testimony of Judge Truman Morrison, as well as the testimony of Michael R. Jones, Ph.D. Defendants contend the testimony should be excluded because these witnesses have no knowledge of the court system in Tennessee or the demographics and community in Giles County, and do not opine on the necessity of a court’s inquiry into indigency prior to
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setting a secured money bond or law enforcement’s responsibility to determine whether such an inquiry was made by the court. Plaintiff Hilfort argues the testimony of these experts is admissible because it relates to whether money bail advances a legitimate or compelling governmental interest in court appearances and community safety. Based on the parties’ descriptions of the expected testimony of these experts, the Court concludes the testimony is relevant and will aid the Court in deciding the matters at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 702, 704; Hyland v. HomeServices of Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 310, 322 (6th Cir. 2014). Thus, the Second Motion in Limine (Doc. No. 161) is DENIED. Defendants are free to explore, on cross examination and in argument, issues relating to the weight the Court should give such testimony.
In Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Prohibit Examination of Probationers Beyond the Scope of Count 15 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 169), Plaintiff Hilfort seeks to limit any cross examination of herself, as well as witnesses Evan Morris and Crystal Webb, that exceeds the scope of Count 15. Specifically, Plaintiff argues a probationer’s criminal history is not relevant to Count 15, but if relevant at all, should only be admitted through those court records considered by a judge in setting the bail amount. Plaintiff also argues that a probationer’s testimony about his or her personal finances, other than on the date the bail amount is set or subsequent dates on which he or she was detained, is not relevant to the allegations of Count 15. Defendants appear to argue this information is relevant to issues other than whether Plaintiff Hilfort can establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claim in Count 15. Under these circumstances, the Court RESERVES ruling on the Motion (Doc. No. 169) until the preliminary injunction hearing. At that time, Defendants should be prepared to identify the specific issues to which the proposed questions relate.
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In Docket No. 157, Defendants Giles County and Sheriff Kyle Helton “adopt by reference the motions in limine filed in this matter by co-defendant, Community Probation Services, LLC and Patricia McNair [D.E. 147 and 152].” The request to adopt motions is GRANTED.
In Docket No. 147, the defendants seek to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff Hilfort that she is indigent because she invoked her Fifth Amendment rights during her deposition in response to questions about the charges pending against her. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s income from the sale of drugs, the subject of pending charges, may undermine her claim of indigency:
For all we know, Ms. Hilfort makes hundreds of thousands of dollars per year selling drugs; which she may then choose to frivolously spend by using drugs. A person with such a spending habit is not indigent by virtue of their own wrong choices.
Separately, and additionally, if Ms. Hilfort is guilty of these felonies and additional charges (as there appears little doubt she is), then her risk of flight is substantially higher on her probation violation, a critical factor under Tennessee statute in the setting of bond. (Doc. No. 147, at 5). Defendants do not argue, however, that their questions are relevant because judges setting bail amounts require probationers to provide this type of incriminating information about their income or risk of flight. As Defendants have not otherwise identified the specific issues to which the incriminating questions relate, their motion (Doc. No. 147), as adopted, is DENIED. In Docket No. 152, the defendants seek to exclude the testimony of Allison Horn, an employee of Plaintiff’s law firm, on various grounds. In her response, Plaintiff indicates Ms. Horn would be called, if at all, as a rebuttal witness at the hearing. Thus, the motion (Doc. No.
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152), as adopted, is DENIED. In the event Ms. Horn is called to testify, Defendants may raise any objection to her testimony at that time.
It is so ORDERED. ____________________________________ WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

Case No. 1:18-cv-00033

)

Judge Campbell/Frensley

)

)

)

ORDER This class action lawsuit alleges constitutional and statutory violations caused by the use of private companies to provide probation services in Giles County, Tennessee. Docket No. 256 (Second Amended Complaint). Defendants Progressive Sentencing, Inc.; PSI-Probation II, LLC; PSI-Probation, LLC; Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC; Timothy Cook; Markeyta Bledsoe; and Harriet Thompson (“the PSI Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against them should be dismissed. Docket No. 300. Plaintiffs have filed a Response in Opposition. Docket No. 326. This matter is now before the Court upon two Motions, both of which address the issue of outstanding Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) discovery. Plaintiffs have filed a “Motion to Compel PSI Defendants’ Production of Electronically Stored Information Responsive to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests to Produce Documents.” Docket No. 319. The PSI Defendants have filed a Response, in which they adopt by reference the arguments made in their “memorandum of law in support of their first motion to stay email discovery pending a ruling on the PSI Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.” Docket No. 325, p. 1, referencing Docket No. 321. The PSI Defendants have filed a “Motion to Stay Email Discovery Pending a Ruling on

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PSI Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.” Docket No. 320. Plaintiffs have filed a Response in Opposition. Docket No. 323. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion to compel is GRANTED, and the PSI Defendants’ Motion to stay discovery is DENIED.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Discovery Requests and Motions to Compel
Discovery in federal court is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that a party may request production of documents or other tangible items as long as the information sought is within the scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In general, the scope of discovery extends to nonprivileged information that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, regardless of whether the information sought is admissible, that is “proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Rules were amended, effective December 1, 2015, in part to address the alleged costs and abuses attendant to discovery. Under Rule 26, “[t]here is now a specific duty for the court and the parties to consider discovery in the light of its ‘proportional[ity] to the needs of the case . . . .’” Turner v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 3:14-1747, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11133, at *2, (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2016), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The following factors are relevant to a consideration of whether the scope of discovery is proportional:
(1) the importance of the issues at stake in the action, (2) the amount in controversy, (3) the parties’ relative access to relevant information, (4) the parties’ resources, (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and (6) whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (numbering added). “Nevertheless, the scope of discovery is, of course, within the broad discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Carell, No. 3:09-0445, 2011 U.S.
2
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Dist. LEXIS 57435 at *5 (M.D. Tenn. May 26, 2011), quoting Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135
F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After making a good faith effort to resolve a dispute, a party may move for an order
compelling discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). The moving party “must demonstrate that the
requests are relevant to the claims or defenses in the pending action.” Carell, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57435 at *5, quoting Anderson v. Dillard’s, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 307, 309-10 (W.D. Tenn.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If relevancy is shown, the party resisting discovery
bears the burden of demonstrating why the request is unduly burdensome or otherwise not
discoverable under the Federal Rules.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. The Discovery Matters at Issue
1. Relevance
Plaintiffs request the production of:
(1) all ESI resulting from (a) the narrowed ESI search proposed by Plaintiffs on June 19, 2019, and (b) the search of Ms. Downing’s personal email account requested by Plaintiffs on September 18, 2019 . . . and (2) the Missing Documents identified by Plaintiffs on March 25, 2019 . . . .1, 2
Docket No. 319, p. 7 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs contend that the ESI at issue is responsive to
1 Plaintiffs state that Erika Downing is a PSI Regional Manager and ESI custodian, and that they asked the PSI Defendants to search her personal email account for responsive documents “in light of documents produced indicating that she used her personal email account to communicate about topics responsive to Plaintiffs’ Requests.” Docket No. 319, p. 4-5. The PSI Defendants do not dispute these assertions. See Docket No. 321. 2 “The Missing Documents” refers to “51 documents referenced in PSI Defendants’ production that [have] not been produced . . . .” Docket No. 319, p. 3. Plaintiffs assert that the “PSI Defendants do not dispute that they should produce the Missing Documents,” and the PSI Defendants have not contested this assertion. Id. at 7; see Docket No. 321. This Order therefore focuses on the Parties’ arguments regarding the ESI requested; however, because Plaintiffs contend that “[the PSI Defendants’] six-month delay in producing the Missing Documents . . . necessitates an order compelling production,” the Court will rule on the issue of the production of the Missing Documents.
3
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Plaintiffs’ most recently narrowed proposed search terms, and that the PSI Defendants have represented that they have already used these terms to search for documents. Docket No. 319, p. 4. They further contend that the ESI is relevant because “PSI Defendants’ policies and customary practices are critical to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims because Plaintiffs bring those claims pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services . . . which requires proof that formal policies and/or informal customs caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.” Id. at 7, citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Plaintiffs have brought multiple claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell. Docket No. 256 (Second Amended Complaint), p. 100-119. In Monell, the Supreme Court held that “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 436 U.S. at 694. In the context of a sex discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently noted that “[t]o make out their Equal Protection claim, Plaintiffs must show that it was Defendant’s policy to provide less protection to victims of sexual assault than those of other violent crimes . . . .” Doe v. City of Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 493 (6th Cir. 2019). In Doe, the defendant had filed a motion for summary judgment and appeared (to the court) to be attempting to delay producing discovery until a ruling issued on its summary judgment motion. Id. at 496. The Court did not approve of this approach:
Defendant’s delay in producing discovery suggests that it could have been hoping to obtain summary judgment before having to comply in full with Plaintiffs’ discovery requests. Defendant’s repeated assurances that it would comply by May 2016 before it moved for summary judgment in January 2016 further suggests the possibility of a strategic delay motivated by a desire to deprive Plaintiffs of a full opportunity for discovery.
4
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Id. Here, the PSI Defendants are clear that they hope to avoid producing further discovery
until after their Motion for Summary Judgment has been ruled upon. Docket No. 320; Docket No. 321, p. 8. They argue that the ESI at issue is not relevant to their pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Docket No. 321, p. 2, 7-9. But that is not the standard for determining the relevance of discovery materials. Rather, the moving party “must demonstrate that the requests are relevant to the claims or defenses in the pending action.” Carell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57435 at *5. Citing Monell and Doe, Plaintiffs have demonstrated their need for discovery regarding the PSI Defendants’ policies and procedures, and have explained why the PSI Defendant’s original search terms are unlikely to capture such evidence. Docket No. 319, p. 7-8. Plaintiffs contend that the original search essentially used only two terms: “drug” and “fee.” Id. at 8. The PSI Defendants do not dispute this. See Docket No. 231. It seems clear that such a search would be unlikely to return all documents responsive to discovery requests related to the relevant policies and procedures. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the requested ESI is relevant to some of their claims.
2. Undue Burden Because Plaintiffs have established that the requested ESI is relevant, the burden shifts to the PSI Defendants to demonstrate that the requests are unduly burdensome or that the materials are otherwise not discoverable under the Federal Rules. Carell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57435 at *5. To that end, the PSI Defendants argue that this litigation has already been very expensive, and that the expense is a great burden on PSI, a small company. Docket No. 321, p. 1-7. The PSI Defendants describe several negative events that they claim are direct consequences of this litigation, including the loss of contracts, closing offices, and employees who have left their jobs.
5
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Id. at 5-7. What the PSI Defendants have not done is tie any of these events, or potential future consequences, to the specific discovery being requested.3 Instead, all of the PSI Defendant’s concerns are related to the general negative effects of being involved in litigation. In terms of the particular burden of this discovery, the PSI Defendants argue that:
Finally, the email production process would be a tremendous expense to the company that should not be taken lightly. Even when applying the proposed search terms, there are approximately 60,000 emails and attachments that defense counsel will have to review for privilege and relevance. In the context of the above burdens PSI Defendants face, this production, which ultimately may never be needed, is crushing. Id. at 7. The number of emails and attachments, by itself, is not sufficient information to demonstrate undue burden. Because the PSI Defendants have not provided any specific information about the time or money needed to produce the requested ESI, it is difficult to assess how much of a burden production would be; however, several factors weigh against finding that it would be unduly burdensome. First, the PSI Defendants appear to have already searched for and collected the ESI. See Docket No. 321, p. 7 (alluding to 60,000 emails and attachments found when applying the proposed search terms). Second, while they claim that they will have to review all (approximately) 60,000 emails and attachments for relevance and privilege, it is not clear why this would be the case. These are emails that were selected by “applying the proposed search terms.” Id. They are presumptively responsive and relevant – that is the purpose of search terms. The PSI Defendants do not argue against using the proposed search terms, and as discussed above,
3 The Court has also reviewed the Declaration of Tim Cook, the owner of Progressive Sentencing, Inc. and several predecessor entities. Docket No. 321-2. The Court finds that Mr. Cook’s Declaration is devoid of any information regarding the specific burden that would be posed by production of the requested ESI.
6
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they do not contend that the resulting ESI is not relevant to any Party’s claim or defense. Therefore, a relevance review is unnecessary. Regarding privilege, the emails could similarly be culled by using search terms such as the email addresses of the PSI Defendant’s attorneys, and perhaps their names or a few other targeted terms. This should be a relatively brief and inexpensive process that involves minimal extra attorney-hours. Additionally, Plaintiffs have indicated that they are willing to enter into a claw-back or quick-peek agreement, further reducing concerns regarding the accidental production of potentially-privileged materials. See Docket No. 323, p. 5. Because the PSI Defendants do not offer any information about the specific burden of producing this ESI, and its production appears to be a relatively simple and inexpensive matter, the Court finds that the PSI Defendants have not demonstrated that producing the ESI would be an undue burden.
3. Otherwise Not Discoverable Aside from the general expense of the litigation, the PSI Defendants assert several other arguments as to why they should not have to produce the requested ESI. See Docket No. 321. These arguments are primarily related to their pending Motion for Summary Judgment. They argue that it would be more efficient to wait for the Motion for Summary Judgment to be ruled upon, because the ruling may narrow or even eliminate the need for the ESI production. Id. at 7. Further, they essentially argue that this discovery matter is already before the District Judge: “[t]o the extent plaintiff’s [sic] claim any email is essential in responding to the [summary judgment] motion, Judge Campbell has already ordered that plaintiffs should say so in their response to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 8. As discussed above, the standard for whether material is relevant for discovery purposes is not whether it is relevant to a particular motion, but whether it is relevant to any Party’s claim or defense. Thus, it is possible for this ESI to be irrelevant to
7
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the PSI Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (although the Court is not making such a finding), yet still relevant and discoverable in this case. Here, as previously discussed, the Court is persuaded that the ESI is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 42 and Monell. Further, Judge Campbell has made clear that:
All discovery disputes are to be brought before the Magistrate Judge. This Order should not serve as a basis for any failure to comply with discovery obligations. Docket No. 316, p. 3. Therefore, the case should continue to move toward preparation for trial, which includes continuing the production of relevant discovery. The PSI Defendants’ arguments on this point do not persuade the Court that the requested ESI is not otherwise discoverable under the Rules. The PSI Defendants’ other arguments do not deal with whether the material is discoverable, but instead address other factors. The PSI Defendants contend that staying email discovery will not cause any delays in the litigation, because “this case cannot proceed to trial without the depositions of these Defendants, which are stayed pending the CPS Defendants’ appeal to the Sixth Circuit.” Docket No. 321, p. 8. Yet, Plaintiffs argue that they need the ESI in order to defend against the Motion for Summary Judgment. Docket No. 323, p. 7. Additionally, continuing production of ESI discovery increases the chances that all Parties will be prepared to proceed with depositions when the CPS discovery stay is lifted, which will increase efficiency and reduce time lost from the case schedule. The PSI Defendants also contend that there is no risk that any data will be lost if ESI production is halted. Docket No. 321, p. 9-10. Yet, Plaintiffs assert that: (1) four relevant ESI custodians’ email accounts have already been deleted, one of which was deleted after this lawsuit was filed; . . . and (2) PSI’s counsel only purported to issue any written notice to his clients about their duty to preserve evidence this month – 18
8
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months after this lawsuit was filed and only after Plaintiffs’ counsel asked about it in discovery and subsequent Rule 37 communications – and still, to date, PSI Defendants have failed to produce any such written notice to Plaintiffs (or a privilege log reflecting the existence of such written notice) in response to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests. Docket No. 323, p. 9 (citations omitted). Despite the PSI Defendants’ assertions that “the entire email accounts of all possibly relevant PSI employees have been preserved and backed-up” (Docket No. 321, p. 10), an even more certain method of ensuring that no data is lost is to produce the ESI now. Even if the PSI Defendants could guarantee data preservation, this would not be an argument against producing relevant discovery materials where production is not unduly burdensome and the materials are otherwise discoverable under the Rules. Finally, the Court has considered this dispute in light of the proportionality factors set forth in Rule 26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court finds that utilizing all that can be discerned from the information set forth by the Parties (and the marked lack of specific information presented by the PSI Defendants, whose responsibility it is to demonstrate undue burden), the likely benefit of the requested discovery material outweighs its burden or expense.
III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, “Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel PSI Defendants’ Production of Electronically Stored Information Responsive to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories” (Docket No. 319) is GRANTED, and the PSI Defendants’ “Motion to Stay Email Discovery Pending a Ruling on PSI Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 320) is DENIED. The PSI Defendants must produce all ESI resulting from the narrowed ESI search proposed by Plaintiffs on June 19, 2019 and the search of Ms. Downing’s personal email account. The must also produce the “Missing Documents” identified by Plaintiffs on March 25, 2019.
9
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY United States Magistrate Judge

10
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE-COLUMBIA DIVISION

KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, )

TANYA MITCHELL, INDYA HILFORT, )

and SONYA BEARD,

)

On behalf of themselves and all others

)

similarly situated

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, )

LLC; COMMUNITY PROBATION

)

SERVICES, L.L.C.; COMMUNITY

)

PROBATION SERVICES;

)

PROGRESSIVE SENTENCING, INC.;

)

PSI-PROBATION II, LLC; PSI-

)

PROBATION, L.L.C.; TENNESSEE

)

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC;

)

TIMOTHY COOK; GILES COUNTY,

)

TENNESSEE; PATRICIA MCNAIR;

)

MARKEYTA BLEDSOE; HARRIET

)

THOMPSON,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No.: 1:18-cv-00033 JUDGE CAMPBELL/ JUDGE FRENSLEY
JURY DEMAND

BRIEF OF COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, LLC AND PATRICIA MCNAIR CONCERNING STANDING TO OPPOSE
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Comes now the Defendant Community Probation Services, LLC, and Patricia

McNair, pursuant to the District Judge’s order to brief issues of standing (Docket Entry

No. 178). Plaintiff joined Giles County along with the private probation companies and

their employees, including these CPS defendants, into a single suit. By joining all parties

together, Plaintiff has made a unified claim against each of them, which they will as a

practical matter have to defend together at trial. Plaintiff now seeks to unilaterally sever

portions of the case as it suits them, in an entirely unveiled effort to obtain partial relief

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which they then will seek to use as a predicate for relief against the remaining defendants (including CPS). In other words, the Plaintiff wants to obtain a finding now that Giles County has violated the Constitution, so they can use that finding as a predicate for a finding that the co-Defendant probation companies also violated the same portions of the Constitution in the same way – without giving these co-Defendants an opportunity to defend these constitutional principles that are applicable to them in other portions of the same case.
Plaintiff wants the Court to make rulings now that foreclose identical defenses these other defendants will raise later in the same case, without giving these Defendants a fair opportunity to be heard.
Moreover, the Plaintiff has asserted a civil conspiracy claim against the defendants, so they want an adverse finding against Giles County as a predicate for a conspiracy claim against these others. And of course, the Plaintiff will seek prevailing party attorneys’ fees from all defendants for the depositions and other efforts in connection with any portion of the suit on which they prevail.
Fundamentally, though, Plaintiffs have created the clear and unmistakable interest that gives all the remaining defendants indisputable standing: Plaintiffs have incorporated all their allegations, including their “Count 15” allegations, into a civil conspiracy claim against these private co-defendants. As it relates to CPS specifically, those claims are in Count 25. The very first numbered paragraph of Count 25 says: “Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-612.” (See Docket Entry No. 41, page 128 of 133, ¶ 613.). Of course, that paragraph then incorporates all of Count 15 and every other part of the complaint. No one compelled Plaintiff to write their
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suit this way; they did it because they want to tie in everything together. As a result, the defendants all have standing to oppose all relief on all counts, because they have a clear, unmistakable interest in defending themselves from all of the allegations that have been incorporated against them, including those in “Count 15” a/k/a paragraphs 559-562.
Further, the civil conspiracy claim is essentially an attempt to try and create a joint and several liability. To be sure, the CPS Defendants vigorously contest any attempt to impose joint and several liability on them for anything at all. But because Plaintiff elected to allege it, then these Defendants have standing to oppose it at every turn.
Plaintiff alleges, for example, in paragraph 616 (id.): “Defendants accomplished to their common design via the unlawful means of contracting with the County…” They further assert that it is the imprisonment (that is the very subject of “Count 15”) that is the penalty of the “threat” in the supposed extortion scheme. See, id.
Plaintiff undoubtedly wants these defendants to sit quietly and allow them to try and obtain a finding of unconstitutional conduct by the county, only to then turn around and have that supposed unlawful act form a basis for a civil conspiracy by all defendants.
Judge Parkes, an independent state judge familiar with the actual facts in this case, testified briefly in his deposition about some of these selected allegations, and specifically testified in response to the other co-defendant PSI’s questions that Plaintiff lacks a good faith basis for certain assertions:
Q. Do you know of any facts in existence that could provide someone with a good-faith basis to make that allegation?
A. No. (Deposition of Judge Parkes, p. 97, lines 21-24) (filed by all parties).
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But the doctrine of standing does not require Plaintiff’s claims to be strong before a defendant has a right to deny them. Just because Plaintiff cannot genuinely succeed on a civil conspiracy claim does not mean that the CPS Defendants lack standing to oppose the frivolous claim.
Plaintiff also claims “abuse of process” (See “Count 21”) joining Giles County, CPS, and its employee Patricia McNair into this single count, referring to the process that results in the arrest that leads to the detention that is the subject of “Count 15”). (See Docket Entry No. 41, page 122-123 of 133, ¶ 584-590). The “abuse of process” claim and the “Count 15” claims predicated on the resulting detention from the same allegedly abusive process are inextricably intertwined in all respects, not the least of which are damages. These Defendants have standing to ensure no adverse finding as to any portion of this legitimate event.
There are few cases addressing the concept of standing among various defendants simply trying to defend against a Plaintiff’s multiple claims against multiple defendants. One good example can be found in Diamond Services Corp. v. Oceanografia SA de CV, 2013 WL 312368 (W.D. La. 2013). In that case, the Court considered whether one defendant had standing to oppose the entry of default against an unrelated defendant. The Court held that the co-defendant did have standing, explaining:
The first issue this Court must address is whether Oceanografia has standing to oppose the motion filed by Diamond and to seek to set aside the preliminary entry of default against Diamond's co-defendant, CON–Dive. This Court agrees with Oceanografia that standing exists. Although this Court was unable to find cases within the Fifth Circuit so holding, other courts have held a defendant against whom liability has been alleged jointly and/or severally has standing to challenge an entry of default against a co-defendant. In Rodriguez v. Irwin, 2011 WL 737316 (E.D.N.C.2011), the court stated:
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The court found that because the plaintiff had alleged that all the defendants acted jointly and as each other's agents, the appearing defendant had demonstrated an injury in fact and had standing to challenge the entry of default against non-appearing defendants. Similarly, here, a judgment against Chappell is executable against Irwin Naturals by virtue of the theory of joint liability alleged in the amended complaint. Thus, Irwin Naturals has standing to oppose entry of default, because it has shown (1) injury in fact (Irwin Naturals is subject to a default judgment against Chappell), (2) causation (the entry of default judgment against Chappell if not challenged) and (3) redressability (challenging the entry of default may remedy exposure to liability for default judgment).
(internal citations omitted). See also Sack v. Seid, 2002 WL 31409573, at *2 (N.D.Ill.2002) (appearing defendant had standing to challenge entry of default against non-appearing defendants); see also In Re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 n. 32 (7th Cir.1980) (non-defaulted defendants demonstrated injury in fact and had standing to challenge entry of default judgment where alleged joint and several liability subjected the non-defaulting defendants to execution of the default judgment). In the instant case, Diamond alleges in its Second Amended Complaint that Oceanografia and CON–Dive were part of the same “single business enterprise” [Doc. 103, ¶¶ 11 & 31], and Diamond alleges in its Motion for Default Judgment that “CON–Dive and [Oceanografia] are jointly and severally liable for the entire amount owed.” [Doc. 140, pg. 3]. Considering the foregoing, this Court concludes liability has been alleged against Oceanografia and CON–Dive jointly and severally, and Oceanografia therefore has standing to challenge the default judgment entered against its co-defendant, CON–Dive.
Id.
Likewise, the constitutional issues to be decided by this Court relating to
Plaintiff’s claims on “Count 15” govern numerous parts of the case, and denying these
Defendants the opportunity to litigate such rulings practically deprives these Defendants
of arguing the issue later, as this Court obviously will follow its prior rulings to avoid
inconsistency. Thus, the Court will be inclined to uphold whatever conclusion the Court
reaches on these constitutional questions on “Count 15” in other parts of the case.
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Critically, Plaintiff – finally in their reply brief for the first time – explicitly admitted that they really are seeking a finding that “strict scrutiny” applies to the claims relating to “indigence” versus supposed “wealth.” Plaintiff insists on this unsupported standard, notwithstanding the absence of a genuine suspect class, because they know it will be impossible for them to prevail on the appropriate rational basis review. Thus, the Court’s determination on this important question will guide numerous outcomes throughout this case. These Defendants deserve to be heard on these critical issues that affect their own defense throughout the voluminous case.
Plaintiff also asserts in “Count 15” that constitutional law requires advance individualized consideration of a class member’s ability to pay – that is the defect they claim with the Tennessee statutory system concerning the issuance of an arrest warrant for probation violations with bond. That is also separately, precisely what they have alleged against the CPS defendants: “Defendants knew or should have known that Tennessee and federal law require individual consideration of each Plaintiff or proposed Class Member’s ability to pay…” (See Docket Entry No. 41, page 129 of 133,¶ 618). These Defendants have standing to participate in defense of Plaintiff’s arguments on this issue. The same legal questions necessary to resolution of the preliminary injunction involving Giles County are pervasive throughout the case.
In another analogous case from this district, Judge Trauger referred to whether a defendant has “a dog in this fight” to determine whether a co-defendant could participate. Stone v. Marten Transport, LLC, 2014 WL 1666420 (M.D.Tenn. 2014). Judge Trauger explained:
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If the court were to adopt DLS Trucking's position, it could have adverse consequences for Americold and Marten/Pittner, who might be forced to shoulder any blame that might otherwise be assigned to DLS Trucking. Accordingly, if the court were to ignore Americold and Marten/Pittner's arguments and factual challenges out of hand, it could prejudice Americold and Marten/Pittner's substantive right under Tennessee law to assign blame to potentially culpable parties. Because Americold and Marten/Pittner certainly “have a dog in this fight,” the court finds that they have standing to challenge the motion. Id. The Court should clearly find that all defendants “have a dog in this fight” when all of the issues are so inextricably intertwined, and where the Plaintiff made the conscious, elective decision to join all the challenges against all the defendants in the civil conspiracy claim.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that the co-defendants have sufficient standing to oppose Plaintiff’s demands for relief, and particularly permit these defendants to participate in the portions of the case including those where the Court is required to determine the constitutionality of these practices in Tennessee, whether the appropriate review is rational basis or strict scrutiny, and whether the Plaintiff may maintain these claims in any event.
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Respectfully submitted,
MOORE, RADER, FITZPATRICK AND YORK, P. C.
By /s/ Daniel H. Rader IV, BPR 025998 DANIEL H. RADER IV Attorneys for Defendants, Community Probation Services, LLC; Community Probation Services, L.L.C.; Community Probation Services; and Patricia McNair, by special and limited appearance only, P. O. Box 3347 Cookeville, TN 38502 (931-526-3311) B.P.R.No. 025998
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney herby certifies that on November 26, 2018, a true and exact copy of the foregoing pleading was filed electronically. Notice of this filing was sent by operation of the Courts electronic filing system to all parties indicated on the electronic filing receipt. All other parties will be served by regular U.S. mail. Parties my access the filing through the Court’s electronic filing system.
Mr. Chirag Badlani Ms. Kate E. Schwartz Mr. Matthew J. Piers Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym Ltd. 70 W Madison Street Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60602
David W. Garrison Scott P. Tift BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC Bank of America Plaza 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219
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Ms. Elizabeth Anne Rossi Mr. Eric Halperin Mr. Jonas Wang Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006
Mr. Kyle F. Mothershead The Law office of Kyle Mothershead 414 Union Street Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219
Mr. Brandt M. McMillan Tune, Entrekin & White, P.C. 315 Deadrick Street Suite 1700 Nashville, TN 37238
Ms. Cassandra M. Crane Ms. Robyn Beale Williams Farrar & Bates 211 Seventh Avenue, North Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37219
Mr. John Christopher Williams Williams Law and Mediation Group 101 S 1st Street Pulaski, TN 38478
Timothy N. O’Connor Tune, Entrekin, & White, P.C. 315 Deaderick St., Ste. 1700 Nashville, TN 37238-1700 p: (615) 244-2770
Heather Ross Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207 (615) 532-2559
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Joseph Ahillen Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207 (615) 532-2559 D. Andrew Saulters 330 Commerce St., Ste 110 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 256-9999
This the 26th day of November, 2018.
MOORE, RADER, FITZPATRICK AND YORK, P. C.
By /s/ Daniel H. Rader IV, BPR 025998 DANIEL H. RADER IV Attorneys for Defendants, Community Probation Services, LLC; Community Probation Services, L.L.C.; Community Probation Services; and Patricia McNair, by special and limited appearance only, P. O. Box 3347 Cookeville, TN 38502 (931-526-3311) B.P.R.No. 025998
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