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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH -JMF Document 1028 Filed 02/23/76 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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CIVIL ACTION NO. __________________________
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

JOY EVANS, by and through her

JOSEPH SCATES, by and through his

fl

parents and next friends, BETTY JANE EVANS and HAROLD G. EVANS 4962 12th Street, N.E.

mother and next friend, VICTORIA SCATES 5908 Southern Avenue, S.E.

,Washington, D.C. 20017,

Washington, D.C. 20019

VENITA FELTON, by and through her mother and next friend, THERESSA FELTON 114 Joliet Street, S.W. #A Washington, D.C. 20032,

WILLIAM BROWN, by and through his mother and next friend, RETHA
BROWN 1216 Shepherd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20011

CHRISTINE EXTON, by and through her mother and next friend,
ALICE DE GRAFFENREIDT 3359 DuBois Place, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20019,

JOHN KENNEDY, Jv.~,by and through his mother and next friend, MARY
M. MUSE
2043 Gale Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20018,

Plaintiffs,

v

WALTER E. WASHINGTON, individually and in his capac,ity as Mayor of the District of Columbia District Building, 14th and E Streets, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001,
JOSEPH P. YELDELL, individually and in his capacity as Director of the Department of Human Resources for the District of Columbia 1350 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004,
JEFFERSON R. McALPINE, M.D., individually and in his capacity as Administrator of the Mental Health Administration, Department of Human Resources for the District of Columbia 1350 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004,

I LEONARD W. ALLEN, M.D., indivi-
dually and in his capacity as ~ Chief of the Bureau of Developmental Disabilities, Department 0 Human Resources for the District of Columbia 1350 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004,
ROLAND J. QUEEN, individually and in his capacity as Director of Forest Haven, at the District of Columbia Children's Center at Laurei, Maryland, under the Dep ment of Human Resources for the District of Columbia 1350 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004,

Defendants.

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH -JMF Document 1028 Filed 02/23/76 Page 2 of 17
Come now the plaintiffs and for their cause of action allege the following:
I STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1. This is a class action seeking declaratory, injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the named plaintiffs and all other similarly situated residents of Forest Haven, an institution estabIi shed for the custody, care; education, training and treatment of substantially retarded persons of the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs allege that they and all others similarly situated are not receiving a constitutionally minimal level of habilitation, a term which incorporates care, treatment, education and training. The treatment, services and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the individual, and should be provided in a setting which is least restrictive of the individual's personal liberty. Plaintiffs assert that every individual at Forest Haven has pot en. tial for greater development and that the capacities of each resident are not presently being developed to their fullest. Plaintiff further assert that Forest Haven presently provides only the most meager custodial care which, while a prerequisite for habilitation, does not accomplish the goals of habilitation.
II JURISDICTION 2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.s1331. Claims involved herein arise under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. §600l et. seq. as amended. Such claims exceed $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs. This Court has pendent jurisdiction to hear claims that may arise under 32 D.C. Code §601 et. seq.
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II

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III DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
3. An actual, substantial controversy now exists between PLAINTIFF
and DEFENDANTS in that PLAINTIFFS contend that the conduct of DEFENDANTS is unlawful and unconstitutional. DEFENDANTS have deliberately subjected PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent to inadequate, improper and impermissible conditions, care and treatment. Furthermore, and in derogation of their rights so secured by law,
EFENDANTS have failed to provide PLAINTIFFS with training and education appropriate to their needs. Unless there is a declaration of the rights of the PLAINTIFFS and of the members of the class the represent, these unlawful acts, practices and omissions of DEFEN-
ANTS will continue. This Court may issue a declaratory judgment ursuant to 28 U.S.C.§§2201 and 2202.
IV INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
4. PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent have suffered and will
continue to suffer irreparable harm, injury and loss, for which they have no adequate remedy at law, unless DEFENDANTS are restrain ed from continuing the acts, practices and omissions referred to herein, and unless DEFENDANTS are required to take affirmative actions to dissipate the effects of their unlawful behavior. The Court may issue an injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
V PLAINTIFFS 5. PLAINTIFF JOY EVANS, age 17, brings this action by and through her parents and next friends BETTY JANE EVANS and HAROLD G. EVANS. PLAINTIFF EVANS has been a resident of Forest Haven by civil order of the court since April 1967. PLAINTIFF EVANS suffers from several physical disabilities associated with the disease which has caused her retardation. Especially troublesome are heart complica-
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ions, liver damage, and a hernia. These conditions combine to reuire that PLAINTIFF EVANS be treated in a special manner different from other persons at Forest Haven. Such a treatment program does ot exist.
During her first few months of residency at Forest Haven, PLAI TIFF EVANS sustained numerous injuries. In addition, it was necessary for her to be treated by the family's personal physician for an ulcerated skin condition caused by her being restrained on a urine-covered mattress. This condition was neither diagnosed nor treated by medical staff at Forest Haven. In September 1968, PLAIN TIFF EVANS was hospitalized at D.C. General Hospital with several injuries whose origin was attributed first to the staff and later to other residents. PLAINTIFF EVANS was discharged from D.C. Gener al Hospital to the care of her parents in November 1968, and she remained at her parents' home until June 1970, when she was returne to Forest Haven. She has since that time suffered lacerations, scratches and bruises, apparently inflicted by other residents. Although she has received one dental examination during her residency at Forest Haven, PLAINTIFF EVANS has received no dental treat ment whatsoever.
PLAINTIFF EVANS has had the benefit of approximately eight months of education and training during her residency at Forest Haven; this took place from approximately January through August 1975. She has received no other substantive education or training before or since that time. To the best of her parents' knowledge, there exists no treatment plan of any kind for PLAINTIFF EVANS.
6. PLAINTIFF VENITA FELTON, age 26, brings this action by and through her mother and next friend, THERESSA FELTON. PLAINTIFF FELTON was admitted to Forest Haven by civil court order in May 1955. She remained there until 1965, when she was transferred to
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St. Elizabeth's Hospital. She was returned to Forest Haven in 1970, and was again transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in 1971; she remained there until 1973. She has resided at Forest Haven since 1973.
Prior to her initial commitment to Forest Haven in 1955, PLAIN TIFF FELTON was able partially to fend for herself, including putting on her socks, brushing her hair, getting drinks of water, and attempting to use the toilet. She has now regressed in all of thes areas, although records of her stays at St. Elizabeth's Hospital indicate that she made some progress in some of these areas during her time there.
PLAINTIFF FELTON has been restrained on several occasions. She has suffered various injuries caused by bed strap restraints. On at least three occasions, PLAINTIFF FELTON suffered burns, bruises and lacerations over various parts of her body. PLAINTIFF FELTON has received no dental care whatsoever while a resident at Forest Haven. PLAINTIFF FELTON is so heavily and continually sedated with medication that she often falls asleep during the day. There exists no individual treatment or educational plan for PLAINTIFF FELTON.
Some of PLAINTIFF FELTON's transfers to and from the D.C. Children's Center and St. Elizabeth's Hospital were made without the mother's knowledge or consent.
7. PLAINTIFF CHRISTINE EXTON, age 30, brings this action by and through her mother and next friend, ALICE DE GRAFFENREIDT. PLAINTIFF EXTON was admitted to Forest Haven by civil court order in 1959. She has resided there since that time. When she lived at home, PLAINTIFF EXTON could eat with a fork or spoon; now she eats with her hands. In many other ways, PLAINTIFF EXTON has regressed mentally and physically since residing at Forest Haven.
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH -JMF Document 1028 Filed 02/23/76 Page 6 of 17
During her residency at Forest Haven, PLAINTIFF EXTON has suffered numerous physical injuries, including a torn ear, apparent ly caused by another resident. She has suffered from an apparent nutritional disorder and required hospitalization in May 1975, in order to treat extensive dental problems. PLAINTIFF EXTON frequent ly appears jittery and nervous as a result of over-medication. PLAINTIFF EXTON has been allowed, along with other women in her unit, to remain nude in the presence of male counselors and staff. PLAINTIFF EXTON has not received any training whatsoever, or any mental health treatment during her residency at Forest Haven.
8. PLAINTIFF JOSEPH SCATES, age 21, brings this action by and through his mother and next friend, VICTORIA SCATES. PLAINTIFF SCATES was admitted to Forest Haven by civil court order in 1969; he has resided there since that time. Before his residency began at Forest Haven, PLAINTIFF SCATES was able to bathe himself and spell simple words; now he has lost these skills. Although he was a lively and active child before 1969, he is now generally sleepy and listless, apparently due to heavy sedation. He is presently not attending school an~ is not receiving any form of education or
v
treatment. PLAINTIFF SCATES has suffered welts and bruises on his legs as
the result of beatings; his teeth were knocked into his gums in 1974. In 1974, PLAINTIFF SCATES's arms and shoulders received cigarette burns. During the summer of 1975, he suffered severe burns as the result of hot water being sprayed on him in the shower room. The mother has never been notified of these injuries to her son by officials at Forest Haven, but discovered them when she visited him there. In at least one instance, PLAINTIFF SCATES was treated by a private phYSician at the initiative of his mother. PLAINTIFF SCATE ' teeth are presently in. need of dental care.
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9. PLAINTIFF WILLIAM BROWN, age 13, brings this action by and
through his mother and next friend, RETHA BROWN. PLAINTIFF BROWN was committed to Forest Haven by civil court order in 1967. While he has not resided at Forest Haven continuously, he has spent substantial periods of time there. Prior to his more recent residency at Forest Haven, PLAINTIFF BROWN could read at the third grade leve , hang up his own clothing, and cook simple meals. He has now significantly regressed in his abilities to do these tasks.
PLAINTIFF BROWN has experienced heightened sexual impulses as he approached adolescence. While at Forest Haven, he was denied social contact with females. He developed aggressive homosexual tendencies and began to think of himself as a female. PLAINTIFF BROWN did not receive any counseling or treatment during his residency at Forest Haven, except on one occasion in December 1974. The lack of recreational or other therapy has caused PLAINTIFF BROWN to become overly concerned with sex.
During PLAINTIFF BROWN's second residency at Forest Haven, his mother's visiting privileges were restricted to Sunday. He was provided by staff at Forest Haven with clothing which was ragged or too small. New clothing brought him by his mother disappeared. PLAINTIFF BROWN was continually denied enough food considering his height and weight.
10. PLAINTIFF JOHN KENNEDY, Jr., age 23, brings this action by an through his mother and next friend MARY M. MUSE. PLAINTIFF KENNEDY was committed to Forest Haven by civil court order in approximately 1960. He resided there until approximately 1968, when he was put on an extended leave status. His mother was told to keep him as long as she could control him. He has been returned to Forest Haven several times in the past few years. PLAINTIFF KENNEDY is presently confined in Lorton Reformatory.
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PLAINTIFF KENNEDY received psychological testing at the time 0 his admission to Forest Haven; he has received no testing since tha time. While a resident at Forest Haven, PLAINTIFF KENNEDY received no educational, vocational, or other training, or any mental health treatment. In addition, PLAINTIFF KENNEDY experienced problems with the staff and was punished with extended periods of confinemen in a separate residence.
Since PLAINTIFF KENNEDY has been placed on extended leave, his mother has made extensive efforts through Forest Haven, as well as through the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation and several other sources, to secure vocational and educational training for he son. During this time, DEFENDANTS have failed to provide PLAINTIFF KENNEDY with suitable training and treatment. As a result, PLAINTIFF KENNEDY has been left on his own and has developed a criminal record. DEFENDANTS claim that there is no program to help their ward, PLAINTIFF KENNEDY. Because of this claim, PLAINTIFF KENNEDY has been ordered by a court to be transferred to a federal rehabili tation center in Springfield, Missouri.
VI DEFENDANTS 11. DEFENDANT WALTER E. WASHINGTON is sued individually and in his official capacity as Mayor of the District of Columbia. He exercises overall responsibility for the operation of all public institutions.
12. DEFENDANT JOSEPH P. YELDELL is sued individually and in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Resources. He conducts comprehensive planning with respect to his office and coordinates the activities and programs for the health services in the District of Columbia.
13. DEFENDANT JEFFERSON R. McALPINE, M.D., is sued indiVidually and in his official capacity as Director of the Mental Health Ad-
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ministration. As such, he is responsible for providing the supervision and control of public facilities pertaining to the mental health of the citizens of the District of Columbia.
14. DEFENDANT LEONARD W. ALLEN, M.D., is sued individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Bureau of Developmental Disabilities, in the Department of Human Resources for the District of Columbia. He is responsible for oversight of the development of facilities and programs for those citizens of the District of Colum bia who have developmental disabilities.
15. DEFENDANT ROLAND J. QUEEN is sued individually and in his offi cial capacity as Superintendent of Forest Haven. As such, he is th chief executive officer of the institution and is charged with the responsibility for its overall operation.
VII
CLASS ACTION
16.
a. PLAINTIFFS bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is brought on behalf of all residents of Forest Haven both past and present, who could bene fit from individual treatment and educational programs appropriate to their needs. The class consists of over 1,000 members and is so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. The named PLAINTIFFS will adequately represent the class as a whole.
b. The claims, age, sex and capacity to benefit from habilitation, including suitable care, treatment, education and training of the named individual PLAINTIFFS, are not precisely identical to each class member. Nevertheless, they are typical and representative of the claims and characteristics of the members of the class. Therefore, the named PLAINTIFFS will adequately represent the interests of all class members.
c. DEFENDANTS have acted or refused to act on grounds general y applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief
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and/or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.
d. The questions of law and fact common to the class include questions whether the acts, practices, omissions and conditions perpetrated by DEFENDANTS are unconstitutional and impermissible.
e. For the foregoing reasons, it is apparent that a class action is the most appropriate method for adjudicating the claims raised in this action.
VIII STATEMENT OF FACTS
17.
a. Forest Haven is located in Maryland, twenty-two miles northeast of Washington, D.C. It was built in 1925, and consists of seventeen one- and two~storey buildings in various stages of disrepair and neglect.
b. The least severely retarded residents live in cottages. The most severely retarded residents live in the Curley Building which accommodates approximately two hundred people.
c. The approximately 1050 residents are overwhelmingly black and from low-income backgrounds. The ages parallel those of the community at large, while intellectual functioning ranges from very low to nearly normal. Segregation of the sexes is strictly maintained; partly as a result, homosexuality flourishes.
d. All of the named PLAINTIFFS and almost all of the other residents of Forest Haven have been committed there by order of a civil court.
18. While the purpose of commitment to Forest Haven includes trea ment, education and training, residents receive virtually no treat ment. No comprehensive habilitation program is designed at the time of admission or at any subsequent time to meet the individual treatment, educational and custodial needs of each resident. This
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is true for the residents with other special needs in addition to mental retardation, as well as for those whose needs derive solely from retardation. Frequently, social and personal care skills acquired prior to admission to Forest Haven are lost as a result of a lack of any habilitation programs.
19.
a. Doors are often locked without reason so that the residents' movements are unduly restricted. Residents are forced there by to regard themselves as prisoners rather than as people in need of special care and treatment.
b. Many Forest Haven residents live in buildings and cottages which are extremely old and poorly designed, creating both fire and safety hazards. Many structures are filthy; only emergency maintainance is performed. Dim lights, broken steps and falling paint add to the depressing atmosphere. The buildings are often either too hot or too cold for the health and comfort of residents.
c. The areas in --which most residents live are sparsely furnished and are strikingly devoid of lamps, sofas, rugs, comfortable chairs, pictures, magazines, books, toys, games and the other accoutrements of normal living.
d. Many residents are required to sleep in large, 20-person, barren dormitories; beds have little space between them. Residents have no privacy and no place to keep personal possessions because these large rooms lack partitions and closets.
e. Toilets often do not have seats. There are generally no walls, partitions or curtains between toilets. In some buildings the toilet facilities are kept locked.
f. Residents are often locked in isolation rooms without furnishings other than a vinyl mattress. These rooms lack material 0 the walls and on the floor which would adequately protect their residents from inadvertent or self-inflicted injury.
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g. Dining room facilities are so unsanitary as to discourage any normal person from eating there.
h. Residents or their families often find themselves forced to buy soap and other supplies because of the extreme shortage of supplies provided the residents by officials at the institution.
20. a. Inadequate staffing at Forest Haven results in the resi-
dents being provided with only marginally adequate custodial care. b. Some residents have been beaten or physically abused by
Forest'Haven staff; other residents have been beaten or abused, either physically or sexually, by their peers.
c. Because of inadequate staffing at Forest Haven, only a fe residents have any opportunity to engage in any kind of schooling, training, recreational or vocational experiences. The vast majority of residents spend their days at Forest Haven in forced inactivity. Many are over-medicated and exhibit such behavior as head nodding and/or body posturing. These behaviors are more the resul of prolonged deprivation than of mental retardation.
d. The number of employees authorized for Forest Haven is markedly inadequate. There are numerous vacancies as a result of job freeze instituted by DEFENDANTS. Many staff members have left Forest Haven and the institution has not been permitted by those DEFENDANTS to fill the vacancies, a situation unlike that in some other departments within the District of Columbia.
e. In addition, Forest Haven experiences a very high absente rate. As a result, the number of staff members available to care for residents on a daily basis is substantially less than that listed in the employment records.
f. Forest Haven does not provide an adequate in-service trai ing program for its existing employees. The absence of such a pro gram diminishes the effectiveness of the staff which remains.
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21. a. Forest Haven does not employ sufficient medical and clini-
cal personnel to provide adequate physical and mental health care for its residents.
b. Drugs are frequently used to control patients who are difficult to manage; medication is often administered by unlicensed attendants without medical training. Physi'cal restraints such as straight-jackets and wrist straps are used to excess.
c. Some residents are not promptly treated for their injuries and illnesses. In some cases, no treatment has been given despite requests for it by the residents or their parents. There is apparently no continuing program of health care Dr prevention, including initial and annual medical, dental and developmental examinations.
d. Dental care is totally inadequate and programs of preventive dental treatment appear to be completely lacking.
e. Residents are not provided an adequate, nutritious and well-balanced diet. Many residents do not get enough to eat; some are unable to eat enough because they are unable to feed themselves. Some residents are not provided with eating utensils.
f. Forest Haven has yet to compile adequate, complete records
on every resident. Sucn records that do exist do not necessarily
include the resident's admission history, medical, dental and developmental diagnosis and progress, or the therapeutic and education al goals and achievements during her/his residency at Forest Haven.
g. Neither residents nor their parents are notified in writing of their rights and responsibilities when the resident is admitted to Forest Haven, or at any subsequent time. Major decisions concerning residents are often made by Forest Haven officials without consulting with the parents or the residents.
22. After-care and rehabilitation programs and vocational training for former residents of Forest Haven are non-existent. This result
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in severe difficulty for both the former resident and for the parent as each tries to integrate the former resident into the community at large.
23. The District of Columbia Government has budgeted for, and the Congress of the United States has approved, a plan under which Forest Haven's annual budget would be increased from $8 million to $16 million for personnel, supplies, and programs, over an eightyear period beginning in the 1974 fiscal year. Congress approved this increase because of widespread protest over conditions at the institution. So far only $675,000 of the new funds have materialized over the past two years, despite the fact that $1.2 million the first year and $2.2 million the second year have been authorized.
24. The Department of Human Resources has either failed to apply for or is ineligible to receive grants from the United States government because of its failure to spend the monies authorized by the actions detailed in paragraph 23 herein. Grants or other funds which might have been available were not in fact forthcoming because the institution failed to comply with appropriate standards.
IX FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 25. As a first cause of action, PLAINTIFFS allege as follows: PLAINTIFFS incorporate by reference paragraphs 17 through 24. The conditions, practices and omissions alleged in paragraphs 17 through 24 constitute a denial of rights guaranteed PLAINTIFFS under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
X SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 26. As a second cause of action, PLAINTIFFS allege as follows: PLAINTIFFS incorporate by reference paragraphs 17 through 22.
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The conditions, practices and omissions alleged in paragraphs 17 through 22 constitute a denial of rights guaranteed PLAINTIFFS under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
XI THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 27. As a third cause of action, PLAINTIFFS allege as follows: PLAINTIFFS incorporate by reference paragraphs 17 through 22. The conditions, practices and omissions alleged in paragraphs 17 through 22 constitute a denial of rights guaranteed PLAINTIFFS under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
XII FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 28. As a fourth cause of action, PLAINTIFFS allege as follows: PLAINTIFFS incorporate by reference paragraphs 17 through 22. The conditions, practices and omissions alleged in paragraphs 17 through 22 constitute a violation of rights guaranteed PLAINTIFFS under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
XIII FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 29. As a fifth cause of action, PLAINTIFFS allege as follows: PLAINTIFFS incorporate by reference paragraphs 17 through 22. The conditions, practices and omissions alleged in paragraphs 17 through 22 constitute a violation of rights guaranteed PLAINTIFFS under the "Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act," 42 U.S.C.§6001 et. seq. as amended.
XIV SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 30. As a sixth cause of action, PLAINTIFFS allege as follows: PLAINTIFFS incorporate by reference paragraphs 17 through 22. The conditions, practices and omissions alleged in paragraphs 17 through 22 constitute violations of 32 D.C. Code §601 et. seq.
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XV
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS, on behalf of themselves and the class they represent, respectfully pray for the following relief: 1. That the Court enter a judgment declaring that Forest Haven does not meet constitutionally minimum standards of adequate habilitation, including care, treatment, education and training. That it further declare that the acts and omissions complained of herein violate the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C.§6001 et. seq. and 32 D.C. Code §601 et. seq. 2. That the Court permanently enjoin DEFENDANTS from continuing to operate Forest Haven in a manner which violates the rights of its residents and that the Court require DEFENDANTS to provide for the residents of Forest Haven, such appropriate and additional habilitation as may be necessary to prevent further regression and deterioration they have suffered as a result of being residents at Forest Haven.
3. That the Court maintain continuing jurisdiction of this case. 4. That PLAINTIFFS be ~warded the costs of this proceeding. 5. And that the Court order further relief as it deems just and
proper. Respectfully submitted,
JOY EVANS, et. al., Plaintiffs.
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BY~~' ~

ROBERT S. CATZ

7

HOWARD S. SCHER

GERALD J. WEIN

RICHARD S. McMILLIN

Urban Law Institute, Inc.

Antioch School of Law

1624 Crescent Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 265-9500

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

EBRUARY 23, 1976

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 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH -JMF Document 799 Filed 03/30/06 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TIlE DISTruCT OF COLUMBIA

JOy BVANS, et a1., Plaintiffs,
UNITED STATES OF AMERlCA, Plaintiff-Intervenors v.

Civil No.: 76-293 ESH

FILED
MAR 3 I) 2006
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON. CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

CONSENT JUDGMENT

This Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding Plaintiffs' claims

for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for legal work performed during the period of November

1,2004 through May 1,2005. Having reached an agreement regarding the amount to be paid by

the Defendants for such fees, costs and expenses, the below-referenced counsel have jointly

requested that the Court enter tlns Consent Judgment, which reflects the agreement.

.P.. '\ Upon consideration ofthe agreement ofthe parties, it is by the Court 111is

day

AM of YV)C.

,2006

ORDERED that the Defendants shall pay University Legal Services the sum of one

hundred fifty-three thousand and seven hundred thirty-three dollars ($153,733) iln complete

settlement of Plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs for work perfonned during the period

ofNovember 1, 2004 11Jrough May 1, 2005; and it is

FURTEIER ORDERED that payment of the above-referenced amounts shall be made

witbiIl tlUlty (30) calendar days ofentry ofthis Order. Ifthis amount is not paid in full within

thitty (30) calendardays, it will bear interest atthe rate established by 28 U.S.C. §1961 from the

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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH -JMF Document 799 Filed 03/30/06 Page 2 of 2 •

date of1his Order.

Date:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Copies to:

Cathy Costanzo, MA Bar No. 553813 Center for Public Representation 22 Green Street Northampton, MA 01060
Sandy Bel11stein, D.C. Bar No. 455355 University Legal Services 300 I Street, N .E., Suite 202 Washington, DC 20002
Joseph B. Tulman, D.C. Bar No. 297671
UDC David A. Clarke School ofLaw 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Building 38, Room 207 Washington, DC 20008
Richard J. Farano, D.C. Bar No. 424225 United States Depariulent of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Unit 950 PelIDsylvania Ave., NW PAB Room 5020 Washington, DC 20530-0001
Richard S. Love, D. C. BarNo. 340455 Maria C. Amato, D.C. Bar No. 414935 Office ofthe Attorney General 441 4th Street, NW, Room 6S059 Washington, DC 20001

2

 
 Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

714 F.Supp.2d 116 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v. Adrian FENTY, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 76-0293 (ESH). | June 1, 2010.
Synopsis Background: Residents of institution for persons with developmental disabilities brought class action against city, among others, alleging they received constitutionally deficient care, treatment, education, and training. Special Masters issued a report recommending appointment of an independent compliance administrator to ensure that defendants achieve compliance with orders requiring defendants to provide residents with habilitative care and treatment. Defendants filed objections to factual findings and conclusions of law in the Special Masters’ report.
Holdings: The District Court, Ellen Segal Huvelle, J., held that:
[1] Special Masters did not apply wrong legal standard;
[2] Special Masters did not err by relying on Court Monitor’s reports and rejecting testimony of defendants’ expert;
[3] Special Masters were within their discretion in excluding declaration submitted by defendants;
[4] Special Masters were within their discretion in relying on a report authored by city agency;
[5] Special Masters did not err by relying on an exhibit that was offered by residents post-trial, but subsequently stricken on defendants’ motion; and
[6] Special Masters did not err by failing to consider information provided subsequent to the hearing.
Ordered accordingly.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*118 Cathy E. Costanzo, Northampton, MA, Stephen F. Hanlon, Laura A. Fernandez, Paul J. Kiernan, Holland & Knight, LLP, Sandra J. Bernstein, University Legal Services, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
John A. Henderson, Samuel Robert Bagenstos, William G. Maddox, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, District Judge.
In this over 30-year old case concerning the constitutional rights of developmentally-disabled individuals in the District of Columbia who were formerly institutionalized at Forest Haven, the Court has before it a Report and Recommendation from the Special Masters, concluding that as of December 2008, defendants remained *119 in “serious noncompliance” with the Court’s remedial orders and recommending the appointment of an Independent Compliance Administrator to ensure that they achieve compliance forthwith. (Special Masters’ Report and Recommendation Regarding A Remedy For Defendants’ Noncompliance With Court Orders at 3, Aug. 14, 2009 [“2009 Special Masters’ Report”].) Defendants have filed objections to the Report’s factual findings and conclusions of law, which the Court will address herein. Defendants’ objections to the recommended remedy and the Court’s ultimate decision as to remedy will be the subject of a separate opinion.
BACKGROUND
In a recent opinion, the Court summarized the critical facts and lengthy procedural history of this litigation. Evans v. Fenty, Civil Action No. 76-0293, 2010 WL 1337641 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2010) [“April 2010 Opinion”].1 To avoid unnecessary repetition, the Court will rely on this earlier opinion and will limit itself to an abbreviated
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Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

summary of the background of this case, as it relates to the issues presented herein.

1

In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court denied

defendants’ motions to vacate all existing remedial

orders and to dismiss the case in its entirety. (See

Order, Apr. 7, 2010.)

In 1978, this Court found that the conditions in which plaintiffs were living violated their constitutional rights and ordered defendants to take a series of actions to remedy those violations. Id. at *2. In March 2007, many years and many supplemental orders later, see id. at *2-*8, the Court found that defendants were in “systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance” with the Court’s prior Orders in three critical areas: health, safety and welfare. Id. at *9 (quoting Evans v. Fenty, 480 F.Supp.2d 280, 325 (D.D.C.2007) [“March 2007 Liability Opinion”] ). Following the issuance of this opinion, the Special Masters were directed to “conduct proceedings relating to the necessity for remedial relief, including, as needed, discovery, hearings, mediation and settlement negotiations” and, “[a]t the conclusion of such proceedings ... [to] issue a report to the Court making recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations regarding appropriate remedies.” Id. at *11 (quoting Supp. Order of Reference, May 3, 2007).
The Special Masters issued their final Report and Recommendation in August 2009, concluding that, as of December 2008, “plaintiffs had proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendants continue to be in serious noncompliance with critical provisions of outstanding court orders” addressing plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to health, safety and welfare, and recommending the appointment of an “Independent Compliance Administrator” to ensure that the defendants, within a reasonable period of time, achieve compliance with these orders and bring an end to this more than 30-year old litigation. (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 3; see also April 2010 Opinion, 2010 WL 1337641, at *14-*17 (summarizing Special Masters’ factual findings and conclusions of law).) Pursuant to the Supplemental Order of Reference, both parties were permitted to “file objections to (or file a motion to adopt or to modify)” the 2009 Special Masters Report, but “[f]ailure to timely object” would be “deemed a waiver of any objection.” (Supp. Order of Reference at 4.)
Defendants filed a limited number of objections to the

factual findings and conclusions of law in the 2009 Special Masters’ Report. (See Mem. in Support of Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Vacate Consent Orders and To Dismiss Action at 57-60 & *120 Ex. 23, Oct. 7, 2009 [“Defs.’ Mem.”]; Defs.’ Consolidated Reply in Support of Mot. to Vacate Consent Orders and To Dismiss Action at 18-23, Dec. 2, 2009 [“Defs.’ Reply”].)2 The defendants devoted only three pages of their brief to their objections, wherein they identified the following three objections: (1) that the Special Masters “utilized the incorrect legal standard” in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne v. Flores, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 174 L.Ed.2d 406 (2009) (Defs.’ Mem. at 57-58); (2) that the Special Masters erroneously relied on the Court Monitor’s Reports to make “systemic conclusions” (id. at 58-59); and (3) that the Special Masters erroneously rejected evidence regarding “current progress.” (Id. at 60.) In an exhibit attached to their brief, defendants offer “additional objections” to those identified in their memorandum (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 23),3 including that the Special Masters (1) erroneously relied on a report issued by the District of Columbia Health Resources Partnership in December 2007 (“DCHRP Report”) (id., Ex. 23, ¶ 8); (2) erroneously struck the October 8, 2008 Declaration of Kathy Sawyer (id., Ex. 23, ¶ 9); and (3) in addressing the issue of bad faith, erroneously cite to an exhibit offered by plaintiffs but stricken on defendants’ motion. (Id., Ex. 23, ¶ 10.) In Exhibit 23, defendants also elaborate on their objections to specific findings based on both the record before the Special Masters and “current evidence.” (Id., Ex. 23, ¶¶ 20-75.) Agreeing with the Special Masters’ Report, plaintiffs ask the Court to reject defendants’ objections and affirm and adopt the Report. (Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Objections to the Special Masters’ Report & Recommendation, and Opp’n to their Mot. to Vacate All Prior Orders and Dismiss the Case at 4-16, Nov. 6, 2009 [“Pls.’ Opp’n”].)

2

Defendants also opposed the imposition of any remedy,

while plaintiffs advocated in favor of the recommended

remedy. As noted supra, the Court will address herein

defendants’ objections to the Special Masters’ findings

of fact and conclusions of law but not the proposed

remedy.

3

The Court notes that defendants’ decision to include

certain substantive objections to the 2009 Special

Masters’ Report only in an “Exhibit” to their

memorandum (see Defs., Mem., Ex. 23) does not

comport with the Court’s clearly-stated direction to

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Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

address in one consolidated brief, their Rule 60(b)(5) legal argument, their objections to the Special Masters’ findings of fact and conclusions of law, and their equitable arguments as to what, if any, remedy should be imposed. (See 8/19/09 Tr. at 16-17.) Nonetheless, the Court will consider the additional objections set forth in Exhibit 23. The Court will not, however, consider evidentiary objections merely “incorporated by reference” but not substantively addressed (see Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 23, ¶ 8) (“Defendants incorporate by reference each and every evidentiary objection made at the hearing in this matter and in their submissions to the Court (see Docket Nos. 1026, 1044, 1066, 1080, 1083”)), as the Supplemental Order of Reference expressly states that any objection to the Special Masters’ Report “shall specifically identify the portions of the order, or report containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations for remedial action, to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.” (Supp. Order of Reference at 4.)

The Court heard oral argument on defendants’ objections on December 17-18, 2009. During the argument, the Court directed defendants’ counsel to address, in addition to its legal argument, each and every specific objection that it wanted the Court to consider. (12/17/09 Tr. at 120.)4 *121 Counsel for the District limited her objections to (1) the Special Masters’ dismissal of defendants’ expert, Dr. John Sumner (id.); (2) the Special Masters’ reliance on the Court Monitor’s Reports (id. at 127); (3) the admission of the DCHRP Report (id. at 120); and (4) the exclusion of the Sawyer declaration. (Id. at 122-24).

4

At oral argument, the Court emphasized that it would

only consider those objections that the District

specifically identified and addressed in open court:

EFROS: I’m just going to hit the higher points.

THE COURT: No. You are going to hit what I

have to decide. I’m not having you incorporate

anything by reference and assume that I am going

to know.

(12/17/09 Tr. at 120.)

Accordingly, defendants’ objections raise the following questions: (1) did the Special Masters apply the wrong legal standard (Section II.A); (2) did the Special Masters err by relying on the Court Monitor’s Reports and rejecting the testimony of Dr. Sumner (Section II.B, infra); (3) did the Special Masters err by excluding the October 8, 2008 Sawyer Declaration (Section II.C); (4) did the

Special Masters err by relying on the December 2007 DCHRP Report (Section II.D); (5) did the Special Masters’ err by citing to a stricken exhibit (Section II.E); and (6) does current evidence render any of the Special Masters’ findings or conclusions erroneous (Section II.F)? Each will be analyzed seriatim.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW As set forth in the Supplemental Order of Reference, the Court reviews de novo “all objections to the Masters’ proposed findings of fact” and “all objections to conclusions of law made or recommended by the Masters” and reviews for abuse of discretion the disposition of any procedural issues. (Supp. Order of Reference at 4.)
II. DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS
A. Wrong Legal Standard [1] Defendants’ first objection to the 2009 Special Masters Report is that the Special Masters applied the wrong legal standard. They assert that “the Special Masters employ the very type of logic that the Supreme Court repudiated in Horne: namely they focus narrowly on whether the District has complied with the specifics of particular court orders, to the exclusion of any analysis of whether the District ‘is now fulfilling its [legal] obligation by new means.’ ” (Defs.’ Mem. at 57 (quoting Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2589)). Thus, they contend, the Special Masters’ “conclusions simply cannot be utilized.” (Id. at 58.)
Defendants based their motion to vacate all existing orders on this same legal argument, which the Court has already rejected. See April 2010 Opinion, 2010 WL 1337641, at *33-*38 (“as long as the obligations voluntarily assumed by defendants flow from constitutional violations, this Court may not rewrite the existing consent orders so as to reduce defendants’ promise to some ill-defined constitutional floor”). Accordingly, the Special Masters properly focused on the task they were given-to determine whether the defendants remained in noncompliance with existing court orders.
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Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)
B. Use of Court Monitor Reports as Evidence [2] Defendants also objected to the Special Masters’ conclusion that the Court Monitor’s reports are “reliable evidence of the defendants’ overall performance with respect to their obligations under court orders.” (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 18.) Defendants challenge this conclusion on the ground that, according to their expert, the information in the reports is “not based on statistically significant samples” and is not “benchmarked against what may be expected to be normal across the country” (Defs.’ Mem. at 58-59; 12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 375-79.) The relevant facts are as follows.
*122 Pursuant to the 1978 Consent Order, defendants hired an expert, then called a Developmental Disabilities Professional (DDP), to assist “in coordinating and carrying out the implementation of the provisions of [the 1978 Order].” See Evans v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C.1978). The Order further provided that:
The DDP in conjunction with the defendants shall have the duty, obligation and responsibility to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor the implementation of this and any further Order of the Court. The DDP through the Director of DHR shall until further Order of this Court file a verified report every ninety (90) days from the date of appointment of the DDP detailing the status and progress of the defendants in the implementation of this and any further Order of the Court.
Id. In November 2000, the DDP was replaced, at the parties’ joint request, with an independent Court Monitor. (Order Regarding the Appointment of an Independent Court Monitor, Nov. 21, 2000 [“11/21/00 Order”].) Since that time, the Court Monitor’s duties have included “observing, monitoring, reporting findings, and making recommendations to the parties, the Special Master, and the Court regarding implementation of the Court’s Orders, and to submit quarterly reports on defendants’ ‘compliance’ with the Court’s Orders.” April 2010 Opinion, 2010 WL 1337641, at *5 (quoting 11/21/00 Order at 2-5). In addition, the “findings, recommendations and reports of the Court Monitor ... may be introduced as evidence when relevant and admissible in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (11/21/00 Order at

5.)
Between November 2006, the close of the record for the liability phase, and December 2008, the close of the record for the proceedings before the Special Masters, the Court Monitor filed six Quarterly Reports, all of which were admitted without objection at the trial before the Special Masters. (Special Masters’ Final Pretrial Order, Att. A, at 15, Nov. 28, 2008.)5 During that same time period, defendants rejected the Court Monitor’s proposal for more comprehensive monitoring to assess compliance with the Court’s orders. (Defs.’ Notice Concerning Proposed Comprehensive Monitoring at 2, Nov. 21, 2007); see also April 2010 Opinion, 2010 WL 1337641, at *12-*13.

5

(Court Monitor’s Quarterly Report, January 26, 2007

(review of 76 randomly selected class members from

the at-risk list); Court Monitor’s Quarterly Report,

April 19, 2007 (review of 79 class members, including

review of healthcare for 36 randomly selected class

members and seven class members selected due to

identified concerns); Court Monitor’s Quarterly Report,

August 2, 2007 (review of health care provided to 37

class members, including 19 who were receiving one or

more psychotropic drugs); Court Monitor’s Quarterly

Report, January 10, 2008 (monitored healthcare to a

sample of 59 class members); Court Monitor’s

Quarterly Report, May 8, 2008 (72 reviews, including

25 class members jointly selected with the District

pursuant to the September 12, 2007 Consent Order);

Court Monitor’s Quarterly Report, September 10, 2008

(reviewed 70 randomly selected class members).)

At the trial before the Special Masters, however, defendants offered an expert witness, Dr. John Sumner, a statistician with the District of Columbia Department of Health, whom defendants asked to “analyze the methodology used by the Court Monitor’s Office in its Quarterly Reports and to determine whether that methodology provides a representative sample that can fairly measure compliance with the mandates of the 2001 Plan.” (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 26, Att. 1, ¶ 4 (Sumner Decl., October 8, 2008) [“10/8/08 Sumner Decl.”] ) Sumner concluded that the “the information in the *123 [Court Monitor’s] Quarterly Reports is essentially anecdotal, and ... informative as it pertains to a particular individual, at a particular point in time” but “cannot be relied upon for determining the degree of compliance with the mandates of the 2001 Plan.” (10/8/08 Sumner Decl. ¶ 6.) More specifically, Sumner rejected the Court Monitor’s Reports as a means to measure defendants’ compliance
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Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

with court orders for two reasons: (1) because the samples “do not meet the minimum sample size criteria (86 members) as required by statistical sampling theory” (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 26, Att. 3, ¶ 4 (Sumner Supp. Decl., Nov. 11, 2008) [“11/11/08 Sumner Supp. Decl.”] ); and (2) because the Court Monitor “does not attempt to benchmark the levels of non-compliance found in the DDS programs” to “levels of noncompliance to be found in a theoretical national average.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
The Special Masters’ rejected Sumner’s conclusion that these alleged flaws in the Court Monitor’s methodology rendered the information in the Reports of no evidentiary value. (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 9-18.) Defendants object to this ruling on the ground that Sumner’s “education and experience make him eminently more qualified than the Special Masters to determine what data provide a sufficient basis for systemic conclusions and what analytical value (if any) should be assigned to the Court Monitor’s reports.” (Defs. Mem., Ex. 23, ¶ 6.) Accordingly, they maintain that Sumner’s criticisms of the Court Monitor’s methodology were improperly rejected by the Special Masters.
Sumner’s first criticism of the Court Monitor’s methodology relates to sample size. In Sumner’s opinion, the minimum sample size that should be used in this case is 86 because that is the size that allows for a 90% confidence level, i.e., an error rate of 10%, in a population of approximately 600.6 (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 26, Att. 2, at 4 [“Sumner Expert Opinion”].) In his opinion, “the use of samples smaller than this number runs a very significant risk of not being representative of the population” (id.), and does not “meet the minimum sample size criteria (86 members) as required by statistical sampling theory, to enable the court to draw inferences about DDS’s overall compliance with the service requirements of the Evans Class ..., as represented by the relevant court orders and the 2001 Plan.” (11/21/08 Sumner Supp. Decl. ¶ 3.)

6

According to the most recent report from the Court

Monitor, there are currently 592 class members. (Court

Monitor’s Quarterly Report at 8, May 5, 2010.)

The Special Masters rejected Sumner’s opinion that only a statistically significant sample could be used to evaluate defendants’ compliance. The Court agrees. As the Special Masters put it-Sumner “mistakenly believes that a legal determination of compliance can only be based on strict, orthodox, statistical analysis as he understands it.” (2009

Special Masters’ Report at 13.) To the contrary, as even Sumner recognized, the Court Monitor’s Reports have “a lot of value” for determining whether defendants are meeting specific criteria in the court orders. (Id. at 13 (citing 12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 387).) Moreover, as Sumner also acknowledged, the Court Monitor’s surveys over the years can be used “to track trends in terms of ... specific criteria” in the court orders (12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 389), and the information therein could support a general “qualitative opinion based on recurrent observations.” (Id. at 379-80.)
The Court Monitor’s office, operating as an independent entity, has been reviewing class members and submitting quarterly reports to the Court since 2000. (Order *124 Regarding the Appointment of an Independent Court Monitor (Nov. 21, 2000).) In just the three years preceding Sumner’s report, the Monitor reviewed the health care of 355 class members (57% of the class at the time) at least once, and 15% of those more than once. (12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 370.) Even if it were arguable that the findings are not generalizable to the class as a whole,7 the number of class members reviewed, and the information discovered through those reviews, are material facts properly considered by the Special Masters in assessing defendants’ compliance with existing court orders.

7

Prior to September 2008, the findings in the Court

Monitor’s Reports were

intended to present the Court and the parties with a

current snapshot of health care services being

provided to class members, of whom most have

been identified as ‘at risk’ for serious health and/or

behavioral concerns. It is important to note that

each group of reviews provides a separate

‘snapshot’ of the care, treatment, and services

provided to the individuals in the sample at the

time of the reviews. The findings are not based on

statistically significant samples. Any differences

across points in time are provided for reference.

Data are not analyzed to identify trends.

(Court Monitor’s Quarterly Report at 5, May 8,

2008.) In the September 2008 Report, the Court

Monitor used a sample of 70 class members, which

was the number the Court Monitor’s office

determined, using an on-line sample size calculator,

would provide a representative sample. (Court

Monitor’s Quarterly Report at 2, Sept. 10, 2008.)

According to Sumner, when he used the same online

sample size calculator, he came up with a sample

size of 83. (Sumner Supp. Decl. ¶ 4.)

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Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

Sumner’s second criticism of the Court Monitor’s methodology is that it does “not attempt to benchmark the levels of non-compliance found in the DDS programs” against a “theoretical national average.” (Sumner Supp. Decl. ¶ 8; 12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 375.) In his opinion, such a comparison is necessary “in order to determine whether [the Court Monitor’s] findings are reasonable and fair” (12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 375) and, therefore, reliable evidence from which to draw conclusions about defendants’ compliance. (Id. at 385.)

The Special Masters concluded that “Dr. Sumner’s testimony on this subject, though interesting, has no bearing on the weight to be placed on the Court Monitor’s reports in this proceeding.” (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 12.) In their view, Sumner “seemed to confuse the use of the Court Monitor’s findings to determine compliance with court-ordered standards with the use of the court monitor’s findings to determine whether the District’s implementation of its obligations measured up to national norms and standards.” (Id. at 11.) The Court agrees. As the Special Masters observed, “the District is bound to meet the standards established by the court orders.” (Id. at 12.) And contrary to defendants’ suggestion, “the reasonableness of a particular court order or objective” (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 23, ¶ 14) was not a question before the Special Masters-and nor is it before the Court. The Court Monitor is not responsible for determining compliance with court orders; rather, she is to “gather factual information about defendants’ implementation efforts and to report it to the Court.” (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 12 (citing 11/21/00 Order at 3).) This is precisely what the Court Monitor has done. The absence of any benchmarking to “theoretical national norms” does not undermine the evidentiary value of the information provided by the Court Monitor.

In rejecting Sumner’s conclusion about the evidentiary value of the information in the Court Monitor’s Reports, the Special Masters also relied on the fact that

[m]any of the Court Monitor’s

findings are consistent with

deficiencies identified *125 in the

reports

of

independent

investigation conducted by the

Columbus Organization into class

member deaths as well as in survey

reports of the Health Regulations

and Licensing Administration

(“HRLA”), and reinforced by the

conclusions reached by the District of Columbia Health Resources Partnership (“DCHRP”), funded by the defendants, following its own analysis of the District’s healthcare system.

(Id. at 17.) The Court agrees with the Special Masters that

[t]he consistency of the Court

Monitor’s findings with these other

independent sources of information

indicate that, despite the

defendants’ criticisms of the

Monitor’s methodology, the

observations are substantially

accurate and reliable evidence of

the

defendants’

overall

performance with respect to their

obligations under court orders.

(Id.)

In addition, when given the opportunity to do so in November 2007, defendants declined to support the Court Monitor’s proposal for “comprehensive” monitoring; defendants have failed to submit any evidence obtained using their proposed methodology; the sample size used by the Court Monitor usually exceeded 10%, the standard sample size called for by the 2001 Plan to assess compliance (see, e.g., 2001 Plan at 17, 23, 27); and, ironically, defendants have relied on a 10% sample size in citing favorable data to the Court. (See Notice of Filing, Ex. 2, at 16, Dec. 15, 2009 (Report of the District of Columbia Department on Disability Services for the Period of February 1, 2009 through April 30, 2009).) Accordingly, the Court concludes that defendants’ objection to the Special Masters’ use of information from the Court Monitor’s reports is not well-founded.

As was the case in 2007, the Court reaffirms its conclusion that the Court Monitor “has reviewed randomly-selected subsets of class members quarter after quarter, and her findings are remarkably consistent in many respects. These reviews provide significant data with respect to defendants’ overall performance under the 2001 Plan.” Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 297.

C. Declaration of Kathy Sawyer 6

Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

[3] Defendants’ next objection is to the Special Masters’ Order granting plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Declaration of Kathy Sawyer.8 (See Special Masters’ Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Pls.’ Mot. to Strike, Feb. 2, 2009 [“2/2/09 Order”].) The Court reviews this procedural ruling for abuse of discretion.

8

Sawyer was the Interim Administrator of the Mental

Retardation and Developmental Disabilities

Administration (“MRDDA”) from June 19, 2006

through December 29, 2006, Interim Director of the

Department on Disability Services (“DDS”) from

January 2007 through June 2, 2007, Evans Compliance

Officer from June 2, 2007 through September 30, 2008,

and a consultant to DDS until December 31, 2008.

The material facts are as follows. On May 19, 2008, this Court entered a Scheduling Order which provided that if “live witnesses will be called,” the direct testimony must be presented by affidavit or deposition excerpts. (Scheduling Order at 2, May 19, 2008.) On October 8, 2008, pursuant to the Special Masters’ Pretrial Order, the parties exchanged written testimony in the form of declarations of witnesses they intended to call at trial. Defendants identified Sawyer as a witness and submitted her direct testimony in the form of a declaration. (See Defs.’ Notice of Filing of Direct Testimony, Oct. 8, 2008; Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 30 (Sawyer Decl., Oct. 8, 2008) [“10/8/08 Sawyer Decl.”].) On October 28, 2008, the parties filed their *126 Joint Pretrial Statement, which identified Sawyer as a witness to be called by the defendants and allotted 120 minutes for plaintiffs’ cross-examination of her. (Joint Pretrial Statement at 10, Oct. 28, 2008.) On November 28, 2008, the Special Masters issued their Final Pretrial Order, which identified Sawyer as a fact witness whose “[d]irect testimony ... will be presented by Declaration or excerpts from depositions, which have been exchanged.” (Special Masters’ Final Pretrial Order at 6, Nov. 28, 2008 (emphasis added).)
On the third and last day of the trial, however, defendants decided, without prior notice to plaintiffs or the Special Masters, not to call Sawyer as a witness and, therefore, they withdrew her October 8, 2008 Declaration. (12/12/08 Trial Tr. at 129.) Plaintiffs, in response, requested permission to file deposition designations for Sawyer as a substitute for the “testimony that ... we would have elicited in court had she been called as a witness, and that we would have listed as designated testimony had we known she was not going to be proffered for trial.” (Id. at 132-33.) The Special Masters, over defendants’ objection,

granted plaintiffs’ request, explaining that “fairness” required it because they had already read the Sawyer Declaration in preparation for the trial. (Id. at 146.). However, they also granted defendants the right to respond with counter-designations from either Sawyer’s deposition or, if deposition excerpts did not adequately cover the matters they wanted to respond to, “portions” from her Declaration to “round out the picture.” (Id.)
On December 19, 2008, plaintiffs submitted to the Special Masters their deposition designations for Sawyer. (Notice of Filing, Dec. 19, 2008; Defs.’ Reply, Ex. 5, Dec. 2, 2009.) In response, defendants submitted counter-designations from Sawyer’s deposition and the entirety of her October 8, 2008 Declaration. (Notice of Filing, Jan. 5, 2009.) On January 8, 2009, plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Sawyer’s October 8, 2008 Declaration and certain portions of the defendants’ deposition designations, arguing that defendants had “far exceeded” the Special Masters’ ruling. (Pls.’ Motion to Strike at 1, Jan. 8, 2009.) Defendants responded that plaintiffs’ motion should be denied because admission of the Sawyer Declaration would not cause undue prejudice to the plaintiffs. (Amended Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Strike Kathy Sawyer’s Decl. and Dep. Testimony at 1, Jan. 21, 2009.) The Special Masters granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike as to the Sawyer Declaration, but denied it as to the deposition designations. (2/2/09 Order at 1.) They explained their ruling as follows:
The Special Masters find that Defendants’ effort to introduce as an exhibit the entire Declaration of Ms. Sawyer while preventing the Plaintiffs from cross examining her would be manifestly unfair. Defendants had an opportunity to put the Declaration in the record as the direct, sworn testimony of their designated fact witness at trial. They chose not to do so. The Declaration was prepared by Defendants as her direct testimony, and represented to the Plaintiffs and the Special Masters as the testimony that their witness would adopt at trial. The Defendants having withdrawn the Declaration and having precluded its introduction as direct testimony, it would be unfair to permit the Declaration to become part of the post-trial record and deprive Plaintiffs of the opportunity to cross examine Ms. Sawyer with regard to it.
Defendants were clearly instructed by the Special Masters to file only “portions of her statement” not covered in Defendants’ responsive deposition excerpts that were needed to “round out the picture for us.” Submission of the entire *127 Declaration is not
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Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

responsive to that directive and the Special Masters will not now try to determine what parts of the Declaration, if any, are needed to round out the picture. That task was given to Defendants. They did not do it.
(Id. at 7 (internal citations omitted).) However, to address defendants’ complaint that the Special Masters’ approach deprived them of the right to question Sawyer, the Special Masters granted defendants permission to refile the Declaration as direct testimony “on the condition that the witness be made available for cross-examination.” (Id. at 1, 8.)
Defendants timely filed objections to the Special Masters’ ruling (see Defs.’ Objections to the Special Masters’ Order Granting Pls.’ Motion to Strike the Declaration of Kathy Sawyer, Feb. 18, 2009)9 and now argue that “[i]t was plain error for the Special Masters to grant Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Sawyer Declaration.” (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 23, ¶ 9.) They argue that they “submitted the entire Sawyer Declaration, which is only eight (8) pages long, because it is entirely responsive to the subject matter of Plaintiffs’ deposition designations.” (Id.) They further argue that its admission would not have prejudiced the plaintiffs, but that its exclusion was “particularly prejudicial and egregious [to defendants] because Plaintiffs had advance knowledge of its contents, which allowed them to precisely tailor their deposition excerpts to rebut it before Defendants had an opportunity to submit any portion of it for admission.” (Id.)

9

Defendants did not seek to refile the Declaration as

direct testimony.

During oral argument the Court asked the defendants to expound on how the exclusion of the Sawyer Declaration was “harmful.” (12/17/09 Trial Tr. at 122.) Defendants responded that because the Declaration was excluded, the Special Masters’ report “reflects a very one-sided view of Ms. Sawyer’s testimony. It reflects abstracts from the deposition of Kathy Sawyer that were selected by plaintiff.” (Id.) The Court pointed out that the defendants’ counter-designations from her deposition were in the record and again pressed defendants to identify “specifically [w]hat was prejudicial to the defendant ... line[ ] by line[ ].” (Id. at 123.) Following this instruction, the following colloquy took place:
MS EFROS: What we did not get in was Kathy Sawyer’s testimony as to-which is reflected in her

declaration, as to the status of various programmatic changes at the agency. And-
THE COURT: You didn’t get Ms. Nuss to do any of that?
MS. EFROS: We did.
THE COURT: Okay. What did you suffer as a result of not being able to put the whole ...
What specific prejudices did the District suffer, i.e., facts that they should have had in the record that they didn’t get in the record that makes their report and recommendation wrong? That’s what objections are.
MS. EFROS: I understand, Your Honor. I think what we did not get in the record is additional evidence from Ms. Sawyer that would have supported the evidence we produced at the hearing as to the status of various programmatic changes at the agency, including Ms. Sawyer’s opinion, so to speak, lay opinion, as to what remedy, if any, should be imposed upon the District at this time.
(Id. at 123-24.)
Thus, defendants’ contention that the exclusion of the Sawyer Declaration was prejudicial depends upon whether “additional evidence from Ms. Sawyer as to the *128 status of various programmatic changes at the agency” and her “lay opinion, as to what remedy, if any, should be imposed upon the District” could have affected the Special Masters’ findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to defendants’ compliance, or lack thereof, with existing Court orders. Defendants’ claim of prejudice is unconvincing.
In the first place, Sawyer’s declaration testimony on these issues would not have made any difference. The excerpts from Sawyer’s deposition that defendants counter-designated, and that the Special Masters admitted, include Sawyer’s testimony on both the status of certain programmatic changes (see Sawyer Dep., Aug. 8, 2008, at 280-282, 298-300) and her opinion on the possible remedies proposed by the plaintiffs. (See id. at 282-293). Moreover, as defendants acknowledge, Ms. Nuss testified about the “status of various programmatic changes” (see Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 13 (Nuss Decl., Oct. 8, 2008); 12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 234-363; 12/17/09 Tr. at 124). Accordingly, because Sawyer’s declaration testimony on these issues would have been “needless presentation of cumulative
8

Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)
evidence,” Fed.R.Evid. 403, its exclusion could not have been prejudicial to defendants.

D. DCHRP Report [4] Defendants’ next objection is that the Special Masters “rely on a report authored by the District of Columbia Health Resources Partnership (“DCHRP”).” (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 23, ¶ 8.)
The material facts are as follows. In September 2007, the parties agreed to a short-term order focusing on two specific goals: increasing the number of providers and improving the health and safety of class members. (Order at 1, Sept. 12, 2007 [“2007 90-Day Consent Order”] (discussed in April 2010 Opinion), 2010 WL 1337641, at *12). Pursuant to that order,10 DCHRP, “reviewed the health care records of 25 at-risk class members in order to identify deficiencies in care, take corrective action and make systemic recommendations.” (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 35). DCHRP’s final report was issued on December 30, 2007 (“2007 DCHRP Report”).11 (Id.) Defendants proceeded to submit the DCHRP Report to the Special Masters as evidence of their compliance with the 2007 90-Day Consent Order.

10

Section 2(a) of the 2007 90-Day Consent Order

provides that:

Within 14 days of the effective date of this Order,

the defendants shall adopt a methodology for

identifying High Health Risk class members. By

November 1, 2007, the defendants shall complete

needs assessments of all Evans class members

utilizing the Support Intensity Scale (“SIS”) and

shall apply the methodology for systematically

identifying High Health Risk Class Members. The

defendants, in collaboration with the D.C.

Healthcare Resources Partnership (“DCHRP”),

shall apply such methodology to update the

current listing of at-risk class members. The Court

Monitor shall be given an opportunity to review

and give input into the methodology prior to its

implementation.

2007 90-Day Consent Order at 2.

11

See Health Resources Partnership, Georgetown

University Center for Child and Human Development,

Report of Clinical Review on 25 Class

Members-Special Master’s Order September 12, 2007,

Dec. 30, 2007.

In the 2009 Special Masters’ Report, the 2007 DCHRP Report is cited in the section summarizing the Special Masters’ findings as to the “mental and behavioral health care” provided to plaintiffs. (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 34-41.) Noting that the 2007 DCHRP Report concludes that the area in the most need of intervention is mental health care (2007 DCHRP Report at 84), they cite the Report as evidence supporting two of their underlying findings: *129 (1) that there remained a “[l]ack of access to sufficient psychiatric and psychological services” (id. at 35-36); and (2) that there remained a problem with “[i]mproper professional practices that are inconsistent with professional standards.” (Id. at 36-37.) Based on these and other findings, the Special Masters concluded that “plaintiffs have proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendants continue to be in non-compliance with above-referenced outstanding court orders with regard to their obligation to provide adequate mental and behavioral health care.” (Id. at 41.)
Defendants object to the Special Masters’s reliance on the DCHRP Report on the ground that it “was neither offered into evidence nor admitted as such at trial,” and it does not “represent current ongoing practices or conditions, which are most relevant to the question of what remedy, if any, is necessary.” (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 23, ¶ 8.) During oral argument, defendants specified that they objected to the use of the DCHRP 2007 Report because “[i]t did not reflect the current status of psychiatric and psychological services that were being provided” and because it was “used it to address improper professional practices” that “as of the time of the hearing ... had changed dramatically.” (12/17/09 Tr. at 121-122.)
The Court finds defendants’ objections to the use of the 2007 DCHRP Report unpersuasive. First, as plaintiffs point out, the DCHRP 2007 Report is already part of the record before the Court. The fact that defendants submitted it as evidence of their compliance with the 2007 90-Day Consent Order does not preclude the Special Masters or the Court from considering it for other purposes.12

12

Nor does the fact that the defendants have objected to

the 2008 Special Masters’ Report on defendants’

compliance with the 2007 90-Day Consent Order

undermine the evidentiary value of the DCHRP 2007

Report. The Special Masters did not rely on their 2008

Report in preparing the Report now under consideration

and, although defendants have renewed their objections

to the 2008 Special Masters’ Report (see Defs.’ Reply

9

Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)
at 22 n. 26), they nowhere suggest that the Court’s ruling on those objections bears on their objections to the 2009 Special Masters’ Report, and thus, the Court finds that it would serve no useful purpose to address the myriad of objections to the 2008 Report.
Second, in each instance, the DCHRP 2007 Report is only one piece of the evidence cited by the Special Masters to support their finding. For example, the Special Masters found a “lack of access to sufficient psychiatric and psychological services” based in part on the DCHRP Report, but they also relied on the testimony of defendants’ expert witness, Dr. David Jackson, “who reviewed several aspects of health care provided to class members and others [and] concurred that there was a serious lack of mental health services for class members” due, “in large part ... [to] the lack of mental health services in the inner city in the District (and in most other large urban centers).” (Id. at 34-36.) Similarly, the Special Masters found “[i]mproper professional practices that are inconsistent with professional standards” based in part on the DCHRP Report, but also based on other evidence, including the Court Monitor Reports, and Columbus death investigation reports.
Third, the findings at issue are only two of six findings that underlie the Special Masters’ conclusion. The Special Masters also found that “recommmended clinical therapies [were] not being implemented” (id. at 37); a “failure to integrate the use of psychotropic medications into an overall treatment plan (id. at 38); a “failure to obtain informed consent and approval from Human Rights Committees for use of these restrictive measures (id. at 39); and *130 a “lack of monitoring of the usage and side effects of pschotropic medications. (Id. at 40.)
Finally, defendants fail to identify any countervailing evidence in the record before the Special Masters that they failed to consider. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the defendants’ objection to the Special Masters’ reliance on the 2007 DCHRP Report is not well-founded.
E. Reliance on Stricken Exhibit [5] The defendants’ next objection is to the Special Masters’ citation of an exhibit that was offered by plaintiffs post-trial, but subsequently stricken on defendants’ motion. (Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 23, ¶ 10, p. 4-5.) The exhibit in question is a declaration which the Special Masters describe as the basis for plaintiffs’ claim

that the [d]efendants have repeatedly filed erroneous and misleading reports and declarations with the Court each month for [the] 11 month period from January through November 2008 in which they claimed to be in compliance with Court orders regarding timely payments, while there were in fact significant delays which negatively impacted class members.
(2009 Special Masters’ Report at 118.)
The Special Masters granted defendants’ motion to strike all references to vendor payment reports filed after the end of the trial on December 12, 2008 and to declarations filed after December 12, 2008 regarding vendor payment reports. (Special Masters’ Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Defendants’ Motion To Strike Evidence Not Presented At Trial And To Exclude The Special Masters’ Findings Regarding The September 12, 2007 Order at 3-4, Mar. 17, 2009.) Nonetheless, defendants’ objection is not well-founded. First, after describing this exhibit as part of the evidence cited by the plaintiffs to support a finding of “bad faith,” the Special Masters expressly state that, because it was stricken from the record, they did “not consider[ ] it in making our findings and conclusions on this point.” (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 118-19 & 119 n. 115.) Moreover, the Specials Masters ultimately concluded that plaintiffs have not carried the burden of proving bad faith. (Id. at 119) (“Mere errors in documents filed, without evidence of an intention to mislead, are not sufficient to carry the burden of proof of bad faith. There is no persuasive evidence of such an intention. Chronic inability is not the same as deliberate efforts to mislead the court. We do not find bad faith by the Defendants.”). Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the Special Masters erred in citing to a stricken exhibit, any error was harmless.
F. Current Evidence [6] Defendants’ final objection to the Report and Recommendation is that the Special Masters failed to consider “information provided subsequent to the hearing” in December 2008. (Defs.’ Mem. at 60.) They argue that “the Special Masters had an obligation to consider the latest developments in the District’s provision of services to class members, developments that are outlined in summary form in Laura Nuss’s most
10

Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)
recent declaration filed with the Court on June 15, 2009, and cited to the Special Masters in Defendants’ Comments to the Masters’ Draft Report.” (Id.) Their failure to do so, defendants assert, means that their “recommendation of a remedy” is “based on stale facts, nonexistent problems, and a record long since closed” and that it “cannot withstand a de novo review by this Court.” (Id.) This contention, even considered in light of the current information that has been *131 made available to the Court from a variety of sources, cannot be sustained.
In March 2007, the Court issued its opinion on liability, concluding, based on a record that closed in November 2006, that defendants were in “systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance with many of the Court’s Orders.” Evans v. Fenty, 480 F.Supp.2d at 325. Following that determination, the Special Masters were directed to “make findings and recommendations to the Court that address, inter alia, the current status of defendants’ compliance, what are the available options for curing the identified deficiencies, and whether a receivership is the most effective and efficient remedy available to the Court.” Id. at 326. In the fall of 2007, defendants declined the opportunity to develop a protocol for comprehensive monitoring by the Court Monitor because, in their view, conditions had not “so fundamentally changed at this point that such comprehensive monitoring is appropriate.” (Defs.’ Notice Concerning Proposed Comprehensive Monitoring at 2, Nov. 21, 2007.) In December 2008, the trial before the Special Masters took place. After the trial, the Special Masters closed the record and prepared their draft report, which was circulated to the parties that spring and, after considering the parties’ objections and comments, submitted to the Court in August 2009. Based on an extensive record that covered the period from November 2006 through the end of 2008, the Special Masters concluded that “plaintiffs had proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendants continue to be in serious noncompliance with critical provisions of outstanding court orders” addressing plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to health, safety and welfare. (2009 Special Masters’ Report at 3; see also April 2010 Opinion, 2010 WL 1337641, at *14-*17 (summarizing Special Masters’ factual findings and legal conclusions).)
Defendants fault the Special Masters for basing their conclusions on a record that closed in December 2008. As a practical matter, in order to carry out their job, the Special Masters had to pick a point in time to “close” the record and prepare their report. Thus, the mere fact that the Report’s findings and conclusions do not take into account developments that post date December 2008 does

not render them erroneous. However, because the ultimate question is an equitable one, current evidence has not been ignored by the Court. But, the critical question remains whether the additional information now in the record, covering the period from January 2009 to the present, is so significantly different from the facts as found by the Court in 2007 and the Special Masters in 2008 that it negates the need for remedial relief.13 It is not.

13

To the extent defendants’ objections do not challenge

the Special Masters’ findings or conclusions as to

defendants’ noncompliance, but merely challenge the

likely effectiveness of their remedial recommendation,

those arguments will not be addressed herein.

In the first place, plaintiffs have never had the opportunity to scrutinize or challenge the post-December 2008 evidence now relied on by defendants. More importantly, if the Court considers all the reports and declarations that post date December 2008, the District’s progress has been checkered, at best. While there is change in the organizational structure, and evidence of progress in many areas, there are still flagrant examples of significant problems with the delivery of service to the class members.
For example, although the District has increased the number of providers, and instituted a “Provider Certification Review” process, provider problems persist. In just the past year, the District has filed *132 petitions for receivership against two providers, Individual Development, Inc. (“IDI”) and Westview Medical & Rehabilitation Services, P.C. Inc. (“Westview”), and a third provider who would have faced such a petition, Center for Social Change (“CSC”), instead chose to terminate its services. (Court Monitor’s Quarterly Report at 3-4, 8-9, May 5, 2010 [“5/5/10 Court Monitor Rep.”].)14 Together, these three providers operated 13 residential sites and served 59 class members.15 (Id. at 4, 8, 9.) While defendants are to be commended for finally taking decisive action against inadequate providers, the circumstances that led to the need for action cannot be ignored.

14

The petition for receivership against IDI, filed on

October 5, 2009, sought a receiver to oversee the

day-to-day operation of two of IDI’s ICF sites. District

of Columbia v. Individual Development, Inc., Civil

Action No. 7399-09. On October 28, 2009, the District

and IDI entered into a settlement agreement covering

11

Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)

all 11 ICF sites operated by IDI.

15

IDI presently operates 10 residential ICF facilities and

serves 50 class members (5/5/10 Court Monitor Rep. at

4); Westview operates two residential ICF facilities,

serving 5 class members (along with 6 non-class

members) (id. at 9); and CSC operates one

waiver-funded residential site serving 4 class members

(and one non-class member). (Id.)

Westview has been a longtime provider in the District and, according to the Court Monitor, a subject of “continuing concern.” (Id. at 2.) The most recent Court Monitor’s report documents that there is a class member at a Westview site who was prescribed 10 different psychotropic medications (id. at 9), and another class member who was subject to abuse by a staff member. (Id. at 13.) CSC came in as a provider in September 2008 to take over a troubled site that Westview had been operating. (Id. at 8.) Yet, one of the class members residing at the CSC site experienced such severe weight loss in just the past year that IMEU investigated and found neglect. (Id. at 11.) And, in January 2010, when CSC staff took its 5 female residents (4 class members) to a beauty school for haircuts, the heads of all the women were shaved. Three of the women had to be restrained while the shaving occurred. Under DDA policies, according to the Court Monitor, this constituted “psychological abuse and unauthorized restraint.” (Id. at 12.) Indeed, such serious problems continued under CSC that the District was prepared to take action against it had it not terminated its services. Finally, as of May 5, 2010, there were 33 residential sites operated by 18 providers on the “Watch List,” which also suggests persistent problems. (Id. at 6.).
Defendants have made substantial strides in steadily increasing the number of class members enrolled in the Home and Community Based Waiver. As of May 5, 2010, 350 class members were receiving residential services under the Waiver, an increase of 46 since September 2008. (Id. at 7; Court Monitor Report at 5, Sept. 1, 2008 (304 on waiver)). However, enrolling a class member in the waiver does not guarantee the quality of the services provided. For example, in June 2009, one relatively new waiver provider, EBED, was given a rating of “needs improvement” under DDA’s new provider certification review process (Id. at 8.) EBED operates two waiver-funded sites, housing 5 class members (and 2

non-class members). (Id.) The District has recently issued a contract to Liberty Health Care to review residential services provided under the waiver. (5/5/10 Court Monitor Rep. at 7.) During the status conference on May 7, 2010, the Court learned that the plan is for Liberty to review all 88 providers within one year and that 10 reviews had already completed at that time. (5/7/10 Hr’g Tr. at 51-52.) However, the results of Liberty’s reviews had not yet been provided to the *133 Court Monitor, making it impossible to know whether this new process will function as intended and/or reveal problems among the waiver providers.
In the critical area of health care, again there have been improvements, but problems remain. To date, the Court Monitor has conducted comprehensive health reviews for 383 class members. (Id. at 10.) Over time the data shows consistent problems in a number of areas. (5/5/10 Court Monitor Rep. at 16 (chart comparing health care indicators over time).) For example, the Court Monitor’s data shows less than 50% compliance in each of the following categories since April 2007: “nursing assessments meet professional standards”; “clinical therapy recommendations are implemented”; “competent and consistent monitoring of the side effects of psychotropic medications.” (Id. at 16). And in none of the other categories are the numbers consistently high or even consistently trending upward. (Id.)
Similarly, in the area of safety, the current data is mixed. Quality Trust’s annual report, which covered the period October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009, identified their “biggest concern” as “the failure of the IMEU (Incident Management & Enforcement Unit) of DDA to complete investigations of Serious Reportable Incidents (SRI’s) in the timeframe required by DDA policy.” (QT Report at 1.) As of April 1, 2010, there were 94 investigations due and not yet received for class members, 31 of these were for Level 1 incidents, which include allegations of abuse and neglect, serious physical injury and theft. (5/5/10 Court Monitor Report at 24.) Level 2 incidents include 911 calls, emergency inpatient hospitalizations, improper use of restraints, missing person, medication error, and attempt or threat of suicide. (Id.) Defendants plan to transition the investigation of Level 2 incidents from DDA to the providers. (Id.) Although in the end that change may comport with “best practice” (5/7/2010 Hr’g Tr. at 43-44) and, thus, lead to better outcomes, it has not yet been successfully implemented.
While these few examples above do not reflect all of the
12

Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (2010)
“current evidence,” they are illustrative of the fundamental flaw in defendants’ argument. While everyone would agree that progress has been made, it is also beyond dispute that much remains to be done; the necessary outcomes for the class members have yet to be achieved and even considering all available evidence as of this date, the Court has insufficient reason to question the reliability and accuracy of the Special Masters’ conclusions.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court rejects defendants’ objections to the 2009 Special Masters’ Report and adopts their recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to remedial relief to ensure that defendants achieve compliance.

13

 
 Evans v. Gray, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)

2012 WL 5305790 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, and
United States of America, Plaintiff–Intervenor, v.
Vincent GRAY, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 76–293(ESH). | Oct. 26, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Cathy E. Costanzo, Northampton, MA, Stephen F. Hanlon, Laura A. Fernandez, Paul J. Kiernan, Sandra J. Bernstein, University Legal Services, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
John A. Henderson, Samuel Robert Bagenstos, William G. Maddox, Cathleen Siobhan Trainor, U.S. Department Of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor.
Maria-Claudia T. Amato, Corporation Counsel for the District Of Columbia, Ellen A. Efros, Grace Graham, Office Of The Attorney General, Martha J. Mullen, Office Of The Attorney General for the District Of Columbia, Robert C. Utiger, DC Attorney General, John D. Dodge, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Opinion
ORDER
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, District Judge.

*1 Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted four report and recommendations regarding defendants’ compliance with three of the nine areas specified therein: staff training, safeguarding personal possessions, and adequate budget. See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Staff Training–Part I, July 6, 2012 [ECF No. 1318]; Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Safeguarding Personal Possessions, Sept. 26, 2012 [ECF No. 1336]; Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Staff Training–Part II, Sept. 28, 2012 [ECF No. 1338]; Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Adequate Budget, Oct. 5, 2012[ECF No. 1341]. The Special Master recommends that the Court find that the defendants are in compliance in each of these areas. During today’s status conference, the parties confirmed that no objections would be filed with respect to any of these reports. Accordingly, it is hereby

1

The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No.

1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No.

1204].

ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Staff Training–Part I [ECF No. 1318], the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Safeguarding Personal Possessions [ECF No. 1336], the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Staff Training–Part II [ECF No. 1338], and the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Adequate Budget [ECF No. 1341].

1

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 480 Filed 06/07/01 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOY EVANS, et al. Plaintiffs,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenors
v. ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, et al.
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 76-293 ESH

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

FILED
JUN 0 7 2001

CONSENT ORDER

On March 30,2001, the Court entered, as an Order and Judgment of the Court, the

Consent Order signed by the parties on March 4, 2001. This Consent Order resolved "all issues

related to Defendants' past non-compliance with the Orders in this case" (Consent Order at p. 2),

with certain exceptions. Those exceptions included, inter alia, any "claim[] regarding University

Legal Services, Inc., Protection and Advocacy Program's costs, expenses and attorneys' fees in

this case that may have arisen prior to the date of this Order, subject to any available defenses or

objections raised by Defendants." (Order at p. 2, § II A).

Pursuant to that Consent Order, on April 9 2001, the parties advised the Court that they
'"
have reached an agreement regarding the schedule for the filing of a petition for Plaintiffs'

attorney's fees and costs, and Defendants' filing of any opposition thereto. On April 13,2001,

the Court entered that consent agreement as a Consent Order.

1

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 480 Filed 06/07/01 Page 2 of 3

The parties now advise the Court that they request additional time for the filing of Plaintiffs' fee petition and Defendants Opposition, and request that the Court enter the following as an Order.
1. Plaintiffs Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs shall be filed on or before August 20,2001.
2. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs shall be filed within forty five (45) days of the filing of Plaintiffs' Petition.

~b.-
It is so agreed, this _ _v_ _ _ __ day of June, 2001.
Respectfully Submitted, ANDALMAN & FLYNN, P.c.

~c~~~
ll10tt Andalman, D.C. Bar No. 415404 Daniel A. Katz, D.C. Bar No. 447412 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 604 Silver Spring, MD 20910 (301) 563-6685 Counsel for Plaintiffs

Robert Utiger, D.C. Bar No. 437130 Deputy Corporation Counsel Maria C. Amato, D.C. Bar No. 414935 Senior Counsel for the Equity Division 441 4th Street, NW, Room 6S059 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724-6642

/rJL--
It is so ORDERED, this _--",LY=-__ day of

s L/~~ )tu,c«
-----~.~-~~------~~
ELLEN S. HUVELLE United States District Judge
2

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 480 Filed 06/07/01 Page 3 of 3
Copies to: Kelly Bagby, D.C. Bar No. 462390 University Legal Services 300 I Street, N.E., Suite 202 Washington, DC 20002 Joseph B. Tulman, D.C. Bar No. 297671 UDC David A. Clarke School of Law 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Building 38, Room 207 Washington, DC 20008 Elliott Andalaman, D.C. Bar No. 415404 Daniel A. Katz, D.C. Bar No. 447412 Andalman & Flynn, P.C. 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 604 Silver Spring, MD 20910 Richard J. Farano, D.C. Bar No. 424225 United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Unit 601 D Street, NW, Room 5118 Washington, DC 20004 Robert Utiger, D. C. Bar No. 437130 Maria C. Amato, D.C. BarNo. 414935 Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, NW, Room 6S059 Washington, DC 20001
schedulmg consent order 2 wpd
3

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 496 Filed 09/25/01 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOY EVANS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI., )

)

Defendants.

)

)

---::::cc---_
FILED
SEP 2 5 2001
CA No. 76-293 (ESH)

Upon consideration of the joint motion of the parties and with the consent of the
defendants it is this ~day of September 200 1, hereby

ORDERED that defendants shall pay the sum of$30,463.32 to St. John's Community

Services and it is further

ORDERED that payment is to be made within 45 days of the date of this order and that

interest on the amount due shall run from August 1, 200 1 until the date paid.

SO ORDERED

~'/LO-r- S' J)-LK)l

~

"-

Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle

United States District Judge

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 496 Filed 09/25/01 Page 2 of 2
Copies to:
Joseph B. Tulman, Esquire UDC David A. Clarke School of Law 4200 Connecticut Ave., NW Bldg. 38, Room 207 Washington, DC 20008
Kelly Bagby, Esquire Counsel for Plaintiffs University Legal Services 300 I Street, NE, Suite 202 Washington, DC 20002
Maria Amato, Esquire Senior Counsel for the Task Force on Major Equity Litigation Government of the District of Columbia Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 Fourth Street, NW, 6th Floor Washington, DC 20001

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 570 Filed 07/18/02 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOY EVANS, et aI.,

Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenors v.
ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, et aI., Defendants.

Civil No.: 76-293 ESH
FILED

JUt

:;

ti
~,

:
I

L'I(J,c'

lMVUI.tlaaBllJn"'tf9Jf8ot.·ft~H:8~JI~,

CONSENT JUDGMENT

This Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding Plaintiffs' claims

for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for legal work performed during the period of January

1999 through March 30, 2001. Having reached an agreement regarding the amount to be paid by

the Defendants for such fees, costs and expenses, the below-referenced counsel have jointly

requested that the Court enter this Consent Judgment, which reflects the agreement. The parties

agree that this settlement shall not be construed to apply to or affect in any way the treatment of

future claims for attorneys' fees and costs.

,__f'_ Upon consideration of the agreement of the parties, it is by the Court this __

day

of _---.::J""'--I!,Ll,A.L.(J-t---' 2002;
ORDERED that the Defendants shall pay University Legal Services the sum of two

hundred ninety-five thousand dollars ($295,000.00) in complete settlement of Plaintiffs' claim

for attorneys' fees and costs for work performed during the period of January 1999 through

March 30,2001; and it is

1

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 570 Filed 07/18/02 Page 2 of 2

FURTHER ORDERED that payment of the above-referenced amounts shall be made within thirty (30) calendar days of entry of this Order. If this amount is not paid in full within thirty (30) calendar days, it will bear interest at the rate established by 28 U.S.c. §1961 from the date of this Order.

Date: --4--f-----'-'L~=-----Copies to:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUD

Elliott Andalman, D.C. Bar No. 415404 Daniel A. Katz, D.C. Bar No. 447412 Andalman & Flynn, P.C. 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 604 Silver Spring, MD 20910
Kelly Bagby, D.C. Bar No. 462390 Regan Bailey, D.C.Bar No. 465677 University Legal Services 300 I Street, N.E., Suite 202 Washington, DC 20002
Joseph B. Tulman, D.C. Bar No. 297671 UDC David A. Clarke School of Law 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Building 38, Room 207 Washington, DC 20008

Richard J. Farano, D.C. Bar No. 424225 John Henderson, D.C. Bar No. 268239 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Unit 601 D Street, NW, Room 5118 Washington, DC 20004
Robert Utiger, D. C. Bar No. 437130 Maria C. Amato, D.C. Bar No. 414935 Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, NW, Room 6S059 Washington, DC 20001

F:\WDocs\CLlENTS\Evans.joy\pleadmgs\AttyfeeConsentJmt Ord doc

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 578 Filed 08/22/02 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOY EVANS, et aI., Plaintiffs,
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil Action No. 76-293 (ESH)

)

)

)

) )

FILED

)

)

AUG 2 2 2002

)

NANCY MAYEA WHITIINGWN. C~

)

U.8. DISTRICT COURT

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure Rule 41(a), Plaintiffs hereby seek that the Court

dismiss without prejudice Plaintiffs' Request for an Expedited Hearing Before the Special

Master to Resolve Protection from Harm Issues and Motion for an Order for Defendants to Show
~ ~ 66'<C 'I Cd)::! S5(f.-~.J
Cause Why They Should Not be Held in Contempt filed on June 12, 2002. In that pleading,
r1
Plaintiffs sought immediate resolution of situations affecting class members William, Donnelly

and Joyce and the class members residing in D Street, E Street and 5th Street as well, as systemic

relief related to the class as a whole. In consideration of the Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal, the

Defendants shall provide to the Special Masters, the Court Monitor, the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-

Intervenor by September 9, 2002 a detailed schedule of the time frames and action steps for

implementing any outstanding requirements in the 2001 Evans Plan for Compliance and

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 578 Filed 08/22/02 Page 2 of 5
Conclusion related to its Quality Assurance Program as described in section D (2) of the plan. Further, Defendants shall:
1. Complete the actions and achieve the outcomes contained in the attached remedial plan (Attachment 1,jUed under seal) for the class members identified therein within the time frames identified for each actions and outcome;
2. Conduct unannounced site visits at least one time a week for each class member and document the status of progress toward each required step and outcome identified in Attachment 1. The unannounced site visits will include, at a minimum, interviews with staff, observation of staff and the consumer, review of the records and other documentation and the implementation of all services;
3. Monitor the remedial measures taken by the care providers relied upon to care for the eleven class members as identified in Attachment 1, provide feedback on issues/problems identified as a consequence of their monitoring and take appropriate corrective actions when necessary;
4. Provide to Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-Intervenor and the Court Monitor bi-weekly status reports on the progress of the Remedial Plan with supporting documentation from both the care provider and the Defendants.
The parties agree that this Court shall maintain jurisdiction over this Settlement Agreement.
2

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 578 Filed 08/22/02 Page 3 of 5

Respectfully submitted the 19th day of August 2002,

l:ndan~

University Legal Services, Inc. 220 I Street, NE, Suite 130 Washington, D.C. 20002 202/547-0198
W~y,~~/~
Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff Class University Legal Services, Inc. 220 I Street, NE, Suite 130 Washington, D.C. 20002 202/547-0198
~lm?'~:J:~- )f-6
Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff Class University of the District of Columbia David A. Clark School of Law 4200 Connecticut Ave., Building 38 Washington, D.C. 20008 202/274-7317

Maria Amato: No. 414935 Senior Counsel Equity Division Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, NW, 6th Floor Washington, D.C. 20001 202/724-6642

3

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 578 Filed 08/22/02 Page 4 of 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Kelly Bagby, Esq., hereby certify that on the 19th day of August 2002, a copy of the foregoing Settlement Agreement was sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Joseph B. Tulman, Esq. U.D.C. David A. Clark School of Law Building 38, Room 207 4200 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20008
Maria Amato, Esq. Office of Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, N.W., 6th Floor Washington, D.C. 20001
Richard Farano, Esq. John Henderson, Esq. United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section P.O. Box 66400 Washington, D.C. 20035-6400
Jane Haddad Bill Jones Evans Monitoring Program 817 Varnum Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20017
Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. Special Master 1100 New York Avenue, NW West Tower, Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005
Clarence Sundram, Esq. Special Master 28 Tierney Drive Delmar, NY 12054
4

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 578 Filed 08/22/02 Page 5 of 5
ATTACHMENT 1 FILED UNDER SEAL
CONFIDENTIAL

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

JOY EVANS, et ai., Plaintiffs,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v.
ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, et at., Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 76-293 (ESH)

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ORDER

Before the Court is the submission by Court Monitor, Jane Haddad, Psy.D., of her request

that the Court issue an order reflecting an increase in the annual budget for the Evans Monitoring

Office. On March 29,2001, Judge Stanley S. Harris approved the Court Monitor's proposed

annual budget commencing October 1, 2001 and ordered that an amount of$711,458.00 be paid

into the Court's Registry by defendants on October 1, 2001, and each succeeding October 1 until

the Court's Order was amended or vacated. By letter dated September 11, 2002 (see Attachment

A), the Court Monitor informed the Court that plaintiffs, defendants, and plaintiff-intervenor, the

United States, have reviewed and approved a proposed annual budget for Fiscal Year 2003 for

the Monitoring Office (see Attachment B), and the parties have agreed to an increase in the

Monitoring Office's annual budget from $711,458.00 to $834,567.00.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Section II of the Court's Order, dated March 29, 2001, is AMENDED;

it is

<oltJ({,

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 2 of 9

FURTHER ORDERED that on October 1, 2002, and on each succeeding October 1 until this order is amended or vacated, defendants shall deposit the sum of Eight Hundred ThirtyFour Thousand and Five-Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars ($834,567.00) into the Registry of the Court, as payment of the costs ofthe Court Monitor; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall pay the Court Monitor the sum of Two Hundred Eight Thousand and Six-Hundred Forty-One Dollars and Seventy-Five Cents ($208,641.75) at the beginning of each quarter in accordance with the terms set forth in the Court's Consent Order, dated March 29,2001.

SO ORDERED.

I;. 1/ Date: Cf

0 2--

£!~ c J HUG!~
Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle
United States District Judge

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 3 of 9
ATTACHMENT A

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 4 of 9

Evans Monitoring Office Jane Haddad and Associates, Inc.
817 Varnum Street NE Washington DC 20017 Phone: 202-832-6860
Fax: 202-832-2180

September 11, 2002

Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle United States District Court For the District of Columbia United States Courthouse 333 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001

Dear Judge Huvelle,

Re: Evans v. Williams Civil Action No.1 :76-00293 (ESH)

The Consent Order signed by Judge Stanley S. Harris and filed March 28, 2001 established the Monitoring Office's annual budget commencing October 1, 2001. While the Monitoring Office has been able to maintain operations within the established budget during FY2002, compliance with the budget has required significant changes in how proposed funds were allocated.

A Monitoring Office budget for FY2003, which is based on experience rather than the assumptions of the FY2002 budget, has been submitted to all parties for review and comment. The defendants, plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor have approved an increase in the Monitoring Office budget from $711,458 to $834,567. A detail of the proposed FY2003 budget as compared to the FY2002 budget and rationale for the modifications is attached.

I am requesting a Court Order reflecting the increased budget for the Monitoring Office in FY2003. The new budget would require the defendants to deposit the sum of $834,567 into the Registry of the Court on October 1, 2002 for payment of the costs of the Court Monitor. Payments of $208,641.75 would be paid to the Monitoring Office by the Clerk of the Court at the beginning of each quarter in accordance with the present Consent Order.

Thank you for consideration of my request. Please contact me if clarification is needed.

Respectfully submitted,
( /h~//ad~~~, ZJ.
£e-~addad, Psy.D. "
Evans Court Monitor

Attachment

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 5 of 9
cc: Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. Co-Special Master Clarence Sundram, Esq., Co-Special Master Joseph B. Tulman, Esq., Counsel for the Plaintiffs Kelly Bagby, Esq., Co-Counsel for the Plaintiffs Regan Bailey, Esq., Co-Counsel for the Plaintiffs Richard Farano, Esq., Counsel for the Plaintiff-Intervenor John Henderson, Esq. Counsel for the Plaintiff-Intervenor Michelle Svonkin, Esq., Counsel for the Plaintiff-Intervenor Maria Amato, Esq., DC Corporation Counsel George Valentine, Esq., Department of Human Services Carolyn Colvin, Director, Department of Human Services Delores Shepherd, Chief Financial Officer, Department of Human Services

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 6 of 9
ATTACHMENT B

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 7 of 9

PROPOSED ANNUAL EVANS MONITORING BUDGET (October 1, 2002 - September 30, 2003)

PERSONNEL COSTS
Court Monitor (180 days at $1000/day) Initial budget assumed that Monitor would only work on Evans 2 to 3 days a week or 120 days a year. This proved unrealistic. Estimate of 180 days or 15 days a month is conservative.
Monitoring Office Monitoring Coordinator/Oversight Senior Monitors (1 at $48,000) Monitor (2 @ $41,000) Administrative Assistant
Last budget inaccurately indicated prior salary of Administrative Assistant; was $35,000 not $30,000. Need to adjust salaries based on significant job duties and increased expertise.
Employee Related Expenses: Payroll Taxes, Worker's Compensation, Health Insurance, Retirement (28% of Salaries or $230,400) Need to increase % from 26 to 28 to account for increased insurance costs.
Expert Monitoring and Consultation Nursing (48 days @ $600/day)
Physician (18 days @ $1000/day)
Behavioral/Psychology (36 days @ $1000/day)
Psychiatrist (18 days @ $1200/day)
Speech Therapist (18 days @ $600/day)
Physical Therapist (12 days @ $600/day)
Quality Assurance Consultant (18 days @ $600/day)
TOTAL Overall amount was adequate but need flexibility on choosing the disciplines needed. Confident that use of consultants past year was acceptable but did not follow the proposed budget as far as the disciplines included.
TOTAL PERSONNEL COSTS

BUDGET (10/1/01 9/30/02)
120,000
60,000 86,000 38,000 30,000
55,640
28,800 18,000 36,000 21,600 10,800 7,200 10,800 133,200
$522,840

PROPOSED BUDGET (10/1/02 9/30/03) 180,000 62,400 48,000 82,000 38,000
64,512
133,200
$608,112

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 8 of 9

TRAVEL COSTS
Court Monitor (50 trips @$200: car expenses to drive from VA; local travel expenses; meals; lodging not reimbursable) Increased number of trips because experience indicates that presence in DC is required most weeks.
Monitoring Office Staff Local Travel (4 staff: 300 miles/month @ $.35/mile)
Expert Monitoring and Consultation (Total of 168 days) Local Consultants (96 days @ $50) Other Consultants (21 trips @ $1200) TOTAL
Local travel costs have been minimal so were eliminated.
TOTAL TRAVEL EXPENSES

BUDGET (10/1/01 9/30/02)
8,000
5,040
4,800 25,200 30,000
$43,040

OFFICE/ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
Office Rental: ($6,000 per month) Rental increased to permit co-location with the Quality Trust with flexibility to ensure parking for staff.
Office Telephone Expenses (Phones/Internet Access)
Experience has been that phone use is $700 a month, Internet access is $25 a month, and lease of phones is $250 a month.
Cell Phones (4 @ $500)
Lease of Copy Machine
Actual lease of copy machine is $250 a month plus supplies.
Postage
Experience has been postage/Fed-Ex is $200 a month.
Office Supplies/Document Preparation
Experience has been that supplies, etc. is $600 a month.
Computer Service Contracts Cost of contract was much more than estimated, $6000, so did not purchase. Ended up spending $6500 in service calls for first 8 months of this Fiscal Year so need to contract.
Monitor's Administrative Expenses (Telephone/Supplies) Have not, and will not, charged for telephone calls from home but cost of supplies has been $100 a month
TOTAL OFFICE/ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

60,000
8,000 2,000 1,500 1,000 6,000 1,500
900 $80,900

PROPOSED BUDGET (10/1/02 9/30/03)
10,000
5,040
25,000 $40,040
72,000
11,700 2,000 3,500 2,400 7,200
6,000
1,200 $106,000

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 588 Filed 09/20/02 Page 9 of 9

ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT -10% of Proposed Expenses (Payroll processing; develop/administer benefit program; liability insurance, taxes, temporary services, staff recruitment/development, etc. Monitor only bills for actual expenses of administrative oversight services.)
MOVING COSTS Cost of moving the office and establishing communication lines was originally estimated at $5000; this was not realistic.
TOTAL BUDGET

BUDGET (10/1/01 9/30/02) $64,678
$711,458

PROPOSED BUDGET (10/1/02 9/30/03)
$75,415
$5,000
$834,567

Monitor will retain management authority to adjust expenditures among budgeted items as long as total expenditures remain within overall amount approved by the Court.

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 628 Filed 03/27/03 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOY EVANS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenors v.
ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, et al.,

Civil No.: 76-293 ESH
FILE 0
MAR 272003

Defendants.

CONSENT JUDGMENT

This Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding Plaintiffs' claims

for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for legal work performed during the period of April 2001

through September 30,2001. Having reached an agreement regarding the amount to be paid by

the Defendants for such fees, costs and expenses, the below-referenced counsel have jointly

requested that the Court enter this Consent Judgment, which reflects the agreement. The parties

agree that this settlement shall not be construed to apply to or affect in any way the treatment of

future claims for attorneys' fees and costs.

& 7 Upon consideration of the agreement of the parties, it is by the Court this

day

01urw, of

2003;

ORDERED that the Defendants shall pay University Legal Services the sum of eighty

five thousand dollars ($85,000.00) in complete settlement of Plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees

and costs for work performed during the period of April 2001 through September 30, 2001; and

it is

1

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 628 Filed 03/27/03 Page 2 of 2
FURTHER ORDERED that payment of the above-referenced amounts shall be made within thirty (30) calendar days of entry of this Order. If this amount is not paid in full within thirty (30) calendar days, it will bear interest at the rate established by 28 U.S.C. §1961 from the date ofthis Order.

Copies to: Elliott Andalman, D.C. Bar No. 415404 Daniel A. Katz, D.C. Bar No. 447412 Andalman & Flynn, P. C. 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 604 Silver Spring, MD 20910
Kelly Bagby, D.C. Bar No. 462390 Regan Bailey, D.C.Bar No. 465677 University Legal Services 300 I Street, N.E., Suite 202 Washington, DC 20002
Joseph B. Tulman, D.C. Bar No. 297671 UDC David A. Clarke School of Law 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Building 38, Room 207 Washington, DC 20008

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Richard J. Farano, D.C. Bar No. 424225 John Henderson, D.C. Bar No. 268239 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Unit 601 D Street, NW, Room 5118 Washington, DC 20004
Robert Utiger, D. C. Bar No. 437130 Maria C. Amato, D.C. Bar No. 414935 Office of the Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, NW, Room 6S059 Washington, DC 20001

F:IWDocsICLlENTSIEvans joylpJeadmgslAUyfeeConsentlmt2.0rd doc

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 1 of 75
EXHIBIT 3

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 2 of 75
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
2001 PLAN FOR COMPLIANCE AND CONCLUSION OF
EVANS V. WILLIAMS
SUBMITTED BY
MARGARET G. FARRELL
SPECIAL MASTER WITH THE COLLABORATION, COOPERATION AND AGREEMENT OF
THE PARTIES IN THIS ACTION
JANUARY 2001

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 3 of 75

Table of Contents

Introduction

5

The Plan Structure

6

A. Goal-- Appropriate individualized habilitation and treatment in the community in the least

separate, most integrated and least restrictive settings. (1978 Final Judgment and Order. section ,

I.1, 1.3)

11

1. Individualized Habilitation Plans

11

a. Related Court Orders

11

b. Necessarv Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

12

c. Time Frames for Implementation

14

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

15

e. Standard of Compliance

16

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

16

2. Provision of Residential, Vocational and Dav Services

17

a. Related Court Orders

17

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

18

c. Time Frames for Implementation

19

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

19

e. Standard of Compliance

19

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

20

3. Staff Training

20

a. Related Court Orders

20

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

21

c. Time Frames for Implementation

21

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

22

e. Standard of Compliance

23

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

23

4. Restricted Control Procedures (Includes medications, use of restraints and time-out)

23

a. Related Court Orders

23

b. Necessary Tasl;;s to Implement the Court Orders

24

c. Time Frames for Implementation

25

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

25

e. Standard of Compliance

27

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

27

B. Goal-- Consumers must be kept free from harm (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section l.2)

27

a. Related Court Orders

27

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

28

c. Time Frames for Implementation

31

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

31

e. Standard of Compliance

32

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

32

C. Goal-- Safeguarding each consumer==s personal possessions (1978 Final Judgment and Order,

section II.7.G; 1983 Consent Order, section VII) 33

a. Related Court Orders

33

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 4 of 75

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

33

c. Time Frames for Implementation

34

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

34

e. Standard of Compliance

35

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

35

D. Goal B Monitoring B (1978 Final Judgment & Order, section Il.5.d) 35

L Case Management

35

a. Related Court Orders

35

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

37

c. Time Frames for Implementation

37

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

38

e. Standard of Compliance

38

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

38

2. Quality Assurance Program & Fiscal Audits

38

a. Related Court Orders

39

b. Necessary Tasl;;s to Implement the Court Orders

39

c. Time Frames for Implementation

41

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

42

e. Standard of Compliance

42

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

42

3. External Monitoring

43

a. Related Court Orders

43

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Order

43

c. Time Frames for Implementation

49

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

50

e. Standard of Compliance

51

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

51

E. Goal--Advocacv for Consumers-- (1978 Final Judgment & Order, section II.7.d; Court Order,

February 10, 1999)

51

a. Related Court Orders

51

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

52

c. Time Frames for Implementation

53

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for netermining Compliance

54

e. Standard of Compliance

55

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

55

F. Goal-- Adequate Budget B (1981 Court Order, section 2.d)

55

a. Related Court Orders

55

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

56

c. Time Frames for Implementation

57

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for netermining Compliance

58

e. Standard of Compliance

58

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

58

G. Goal-- Timely Pavment of Vendors B (1983 Consent Order, section lX.lO: 1996 Remedial Plan,

section I.H) 58

a. Related Court Orders

58

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

61

3

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 5 of 75

c. Time Frames for Implementation

61

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

61

e. Standard of Compliance

61

f. Method of Assessing Compliance

61

H. ESSENTIAL SYSTEMIC CONDITIONS

62

A. Medicaid Reforms

62

B. Legislation

64

Appendix--EVANS LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES

67

4

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 6 of 75
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PLAN FOR COMPLIANCE & CONCLUSION OF
EVANS V. WILLIAMS
In his February 10, 1999 Order, Judge Stanley Harris ordered the Special Master, in cooperation and conjunction with the parties, if possible, to develop a plan for the conclusion of this action, addressing the disposition of the fines paid by defendants and including suggestions for post-litigation mechanisms to ensure the protection of the plaintiff class' continuing interests in adequate habilitation. Evans v. Williams, 35 F. Supp.2d 88, 97 (D.D.C. 1999).2
Among other things, the Plan is to address: a. A summary and articulation of the goals of this lawsuit; b. The status of compliance with various Court Orders; c. The quality assurance methods to be developed and implemented by the
defendants to monitor the performance of public and private providers of service;
1 THIS PLAN WAS CONCEIVED, SHAPED, AND DRAFTEDSIGNIFICANTLYBYEXPERTTO THE SPECIAL MASTER,
CLARENCE/ SUNDRAM, FORMER CHAIRMANOF THE NEW YORKSTATE COMMISSION ON QUALITYOF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED, WHO WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE SPECIAL MASTER AND PARTIES OVER THE TWO YEARS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT.
2 THE EXISTING ORDERS IN THIS CASE ONLYREFERENCE THE EVANS CLASS MEMBERS (I.E., THOSE INDIVIDUALS WID HAVE AT ONE TIME RESIDED AT FOREST HAVEN), AND THEREFORE, DO NOT INCLUDE ALL INDIVIDUALS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN DEFENDANTS' SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS HAVE EXPRESSLY AGREED NOT TO CREATE A BIFURCATED SYSTEM OF SERVICES FOR ITS CITIZENS WITHDEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, AND THEREFORE, HAVE AGREED TO IMPROVE SERVICES WITHINTHEIR SYSTEM AND TO PROVIDE THE &\ME LEVEL OF SERVICE> TO CLASS AND NON-CLASS MEMBERS. As A
RESULT, THIS PLAN REFERS TO "CONSUMERS" RATHER THAN "CLASS MEMBERS"
THROUGHOUT. CONSUMERS SHALL REFERTO ALL INDIVIDUALS WITH DEVElOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INCLUDING ALL EVANS CLASS MEMBERS, THAT THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT AND DEFEND\NTS SERVE IN THEIR SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. THIS NOMENCLATURE DOES NOI' EXPAND THE COURT=S JURISDICTION TO NCN-CLASS MEMBERS.
5

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 7 of 75
d. The standards, including outcomes standards to be developed and implemented by defendants, that should be used to determine defendants' continued compliance with Court-ordered requirements, and the way in which compliance with such standards should be measured;
e. The degree of compliance that should be required with each of the standards recommended;
f. The steps necessary to establish permanent, objective, efficient, and effective post-termination monitoring of the programs serving consumers by independent entities; and
g. The steps necessary to coordinate existing mechanisms and to develop needed mechanisms for the advocacy of the interests of consumers on an individual and community-wide basis.
THE PLAN STRUCTURE
The Plan has the following structure:
1. It recognizes that there is already in place a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction recognizing a federal constitutional right to receive individualized habilitative care and treatment in the least separate, most integrated, and least restrictive settings, and to be kept free from harm. It also recognizes that there are Court Orders, which are outdated or no longer relevant, which need to be disposed of. 3
2. Under each of the broad goals of the Court Orders, it summarizes the specific provisions of outstanding Court Orders that must be complied with as they relate to these broad goals. These Court Orders are grouped so that all related Court Orders are included under the goal to which they most closely relate. The Plan then identifies the specific actions that must be taken by the defendants to come into compliance with this group of outstanding Court Orders. These actions fall into three broad categories:
a. Changes in the service delivery system; b. Creation and permanent funding of an independent External Monitoring Body;4 and c. Creation and permanent funding of legal representation and lay advocacy services.
3 THE PARTIES SHALL ATTEMPT TO REACHAGREEMENT ON WHAT ORDERS liMYBE VACATED AND SHALL SUBMITA JOINT MOTION TO THAT EFFECT TO THE COURT.
4 As DESCRIBED MORE FULLYIN SECTIOND.3 OF THE PLAN, THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT
THIS EXTERNAL MONITORING BODY WILL BE THE QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABiliTIES, INC., A DURABLE, INDEPENDENT, NONPROFITAGENCY{HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO ASA QUALITY TRUST.@}
6

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 8 of 75
The Plan attempts to define with reasonable specificity the actions that are necessary to meet the requirements of the Court Orders. In many areas, the actions include the adoption of new policies and procedures and staff training to address particular issues. The Plan could approach these issues in different ways. One option is to provide for detailed prescriptions of what the policies and procedures and staff training ought to contain. The shortcoming of this approach is that it significantly restricts the room for judgment by those responsible for managing the system. An alternative approach that the Plan adopts is to provide for an open and accessible process of policy-making, where the parties and experts that they recommend, have a meaningful opportunity to provide input into proposed policies and training initiatives prior to their adoption and dissemination, and that the defendants give careful consideration to such input. In each section of the Plan where a need for new or revised policies and procedures is identified, the Plan requires that the process of policy-making will involve close collaboration with the plaintiffs5 and the plaintiff-intervenor, and experts whom they recommend, prior to the adoption of these policies and procedures. However, the final decision about the policies and procedures and training programs will remain with the defendants, understanding that if they fail to address serious concerns raised by the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor, this may result in compliance issues down the road.6 In the final analysis, it is compliance with the specific outcome criteria that is required (see paragraph 4 below), and the tasks identified are a means to this end.
3. For each set of actions, a timetable for implementation is established. These timetables recognize up to three stages of implementation and establish interim time frames for each stage to enable the parties and the Special Master to monitor the defendants= progress in the implementation process. The parties anticipate that periodic progress reports to the Special Master will be required as the process of implementation progresses, and that status conferences will be scheduled with the Court at least bi-monthly, and more frequently as the Special Master or the Court determines to be warranted. Thirty days prior to the scheduled date for a status conference, the Special Master will establish an agenda for the conference, and require a written progress report from the defendants on the items on the agenda. Such progress report will be provided within 14 days, with copies to the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor. The plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor will have 10 days from the receipt of the progress report to file any comments on such report with the Special Master, with copies to the defendants.
4. For each set of actions, the Plan identifies specific outcome criteria for determining compliance with the related group of Court Orders. These criteria put the parties on notice about the results that must be achieved to satisfy the standard of compliance. Thus, while it is the intent of the parties to monitor the timely implementation of the specific tasks that have been identified as necessary for implementation of the Court Orders in each section, the ultimate
test ofcompliance will be in sati.ifjing all ofthe related outcome criteria. The parties agree that if the Court
finds that defendants have satisfied the outcome criteria, the defendants will also be in compliance with the related Court Orders pursuant to this Plan, and the Court may vacate the
5 THROUGHOUT THIS PLAN, THE TERMAPLAINTIFFS@ IS INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE
PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR, THE UNITED STATES. 6 SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES AND TRAINING ALSO REQUIRES THAT OTHER INTERESTED STAKEHOLDERS HA VB ACCESS TO THE PROCESS AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO HA VB THEIR CONCERNS HEARD AND CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPING POLICYAND TRAINING INITIATIVES AND PLANNING THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.
7

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 9 of 75
related Court Orders subject to the provisions in paragraph 7 below. The failure of the defendants to implement the actions identified in the Plan as necessary to meet the requirements of the related Court Orders is also evidence of noncompliance with those Court Orders. In any event, pursuant to paragraph 7 below, the Court will ultimately decide whether or not the defendants have complied with the outcome criteria.
5. Measuring compliance does not lend itself to a mathematically precise formula. The measure of compliance depends on the nature of the interest at stake and the degree to which the defendants= noncompliance affects that interest.? It is evident that some of the Court Orders are of more importance to the protection of critical interests of plaintiffs than others and therefore will require a higher threshold of demonstrated compliance.
For each set of actions, the Plan assigns a standard of compliance, consistent with the Court Order ofFebruary 10, 1999. 8 The three threshold levels proposed are:
1) Full Compliance. This threshold level essentially requires full compliance (95 percent) with specific, objectively measurable requirements contained in the Court Order itself.9 Where there is specificity in the Court Order, obviously it cannot be disregarded lightly. This threshold anticipates that the defendants will completely meet these specific legal obligations, although it would give the Court and the Special Master discretion to disregard minor and inconsequential failures of total compliance which: (i) do not affect substantial interests of the plaintiff class; and (ii) are due to genuinely unanticipated or unforeseeable circumstances; or (iii)
7FORTIN V. COMMISSION OF MASS. DEP=T OF PUB. WELFARE, 692 F .2D 790, 795 (tsT CIR. 1982); jOSEPHA. BY WOLFE V. N.M. DEP=T OF HUMAN SERVICES, 69 F.3D 1081 (lOTH CIR. 1995), CERT. DENIED, 517 U.S.1190 (1996).
8 THIS PROVISION OF THE PLAN HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ON-GOING AND SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSIONBETWEEN THE PARTIESAND THE SPECIAL MASTER AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PARTIES DID NOT REACH AN AGREEMENT ON IT. THE POSITION OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND PLAINTIFFINTERVENOR IS THAT THERE SHOUW BE TWO LEVELS OF COMPLIANCE: FULL (100PERCENT}AND HIGH (90 PERCENT). THE DEFENDANTS ACCEPT THE THREE TIERED STRUCTURE AND RECOMMEND DIFFERENT THRESHOW LEVELS FOR COMPLIANCE: FULL (85 PERCENT): HIGH (80 PERCENT}AND SIGNIFICANT(75PERCENT). AFTER CAREFULLYCONSIDERING THEPOSITIONS OF THE PARTIES, THE SPECIAL MASTER RECOMMENDS THE STRUCTURE AND THRESHOW LEVELS CONTAINED IN THE PLAN. 9 THIS THRESHOW IS SETAT95PERCENT TO ACCOMMODATE THE DEFENDANTS= CONCERN NOT TO BE PENALIZED FOR OCCASIONAL AND TEMPORARYSLIPPAGE IN TOTAL COMPLIANCE LEVELS.
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 10 of 75
are due to the actions of independent actors outside the control of the defendants which occurred despite the best good faith efforts of the defendants. Generally speaking, this level of compliance will be expected in implementing the structural aspects of the Court Orders which are essential conditions to implementing the programmatic aspects of the Court Orders.
2) High Compliance. This threshold requires compliance with the indicator at a rate generally exceeding 90 percent compliance. Where instances of noncompliance with the indicator are found, none can involve a serious and substantive violation of the Court Order with significant adverse impact upon class members (i.e., actual harm or a serious, risk of harm) in the judgment of the Court and Special Master (e.g., excusable noncompliance may involve failure to comply with documentation or some aspect of process, without significant adverse impact). Generally speaking, this level of compliance will be expected for important programmatic aspects of the Court Orders.
3) Significant Compliance. This threshold requires compliance with the indicator at a rate generally exceeding 80 percent compliance. Where instances of noncompliance with the indicator are found which involve a serious and substantive violation of the Court Order with significant adverse impact upon class members, this threshold may nevertheless be met if, in the judgment of the Court and Special Master, these instances were sporadic or isolated in nature and prompdy addressed by effective corrective action.
6. The Plan identifies the method by which the Special Master, and ultimately the Court, will assess compliance for each set of outcome criteria. Thus, the parties will be aware at the outset of the manner in which different types of data will be evaluated in determining whether the standard of compliance has been met as to particular areas of the Court Orders.
7. The Plan provides that as the implementation process proceeds, defendants will utilize information generated from internal monitoring processes to determine when they believe they have met the standards for compliance with the identified outcome criteria for each set of actions related to a group of Court Orders. At this point, defendants shall approach the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor to see if they concur that there is compliance with the set of actions and outcome criteria. If there is no agreement, the defendants can move the Special Master for a finding of compliance as to these Court Orders and can seek to have the related Court Orders vacated and dismissed.10 In doing so, the defendants, who have the burden of proof of establishing compliance, will offer evidence of compliance with the outcome criteria. If the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor do not challenge the evidence of compliance within 30 days, the parties may move joindy for an Order vacating and dismissing the related Court Orders. The plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor may contest the contention of compliance within 30 days, by filing written reasons for their objections with the Special Master. After such filing, the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor will have an additional 45 days to submit evidence in
10 IN FREEMAN V. PITTS, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HEW THAT
FEDERAL COURTDECREES CANBE TERMINATED INSTAGES. INDEALING WITHA LONG-STANDING SCHOOL DESEGREGATIONCASE, ITAPPROVED THE PARTIALDISMISSAL OFPORTIONS OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS IN COMPLIANCE, WHILE RETAININGJURISDICTION OVER NON-COMPLIANTASPECTS OF THE COURT ORDERS.
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support of their objections. The plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor shall have the right to access all persons, residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, documents, records and materials necessary to determine if defendants have complied with existing Orders in this case or the provisions of this Plan that are related to class members or the care and/or services provided to class members in this case. Such access shall include all departmental and/or individual class member records. The Special Master shall schedule a hearing on the issue of compliance and may retain independent consultants to evaluate the status of compliance. If independent consultants are retained by the Special Master, upon receipt of the report of the independent consultants, the parties will have 30 days to file their comments. Any party may challenge the fmdings and conclusions of these consultants, leading to a fact-fmding hearing before either the Special Master or the Court. Upon the conclusion of such hearings, the Special Master shall present the Court with proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. The ultimate decision on whether particular Court Orders are to be vacated and/or whether this case is to be dismissed rests with the Court and not the Special Master. Unless there is a joint motion to vacate particular Court Orders, no Court Order shall be vacated without a hearing before the Court at which evidence of compliance with the Order is provided.
8. The Plan anticipates that, over time, the defendants will implement all of the required actions and meet the specified outcome criteria in order to successfully move the Court to vacate and dismiss the related Court Orders, except the declaratory judgment on the constitutional rights of the consumers to receive individualized habilitation in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive environment and to be protected from harm. It is also anticipated that in the course of implementation, the existing District of Columbia statutes will be revised and a new set of updated legal standards will be adopted, incorporating the goals of the Court Orders, and will be enforceable in Superior Court and that plaintiff class members will have access to legal representation services as described in the Plan to enforce their rights. The permanent injunctions shall not be vacated until all other Orders are vacated.
9. The Plan itself generally is not intended to be an enforceable document. However, class members have a great interest in ensuring that the agreed upon actions identified in this Plan are in fact implemented effectively and in a timely manner by the defendants to secure the benefits and protections provided for by the Court Orders. Until the Plan is implemented and the compliance standards are met as described above and related Court Orders are vacated and dismissed as provided for in the Plan, the underlying Court Orders continue to remain enforceable in federal court. More specifically, in the event that the defendants do not implement the provisions of this Plan effectively and on a timely basis, plaintiffs and plaintiffintervenor retain the right to seek appropriate judicial relief, based on this evidence of noncompliance with the Court Orders, including Orders requiring specific performance of the Plan.
10. Once the Court Orders are vacated and dismissed, as described in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, the Plan anticipates that the Quality Trust will assume full monitoring responsibilities for class members and that any cases involving individual rights violations will be litigated in Superior Court under District of Columbia statutes and with the assistance of the legal representatives and lay advocates provided under the Plan. The Plan does not anticipate that plaintiffs or the plaintiff-intervenor will seek recourse to the federal court to litigate individual violations of rights in this case pursuant to the declaratory judgment which will remain unless:
10

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 12 of 75 (1) there are systemic violations of the declaratory judgment; or (2) legal remedies are unavailable in Superior Court (e.g., due to repeal of the statutes); or (3) there is a failure to adequately fund the Quality Trust pursuant to the Consent Order dated January 19, 2001.
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A. GOAL11 -APPROPRIATE INDIVIDUALIZED HABILITATION AND TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNITY IN THE LEAST SEPARATE, MOST INTEGRATED AND
LEAST RESTRICTIVE SETTINGS. (1978 FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, SECTION, 1.1, L3) 1. Individualized Habilitation Plans
i. Defendants shaD develop andprovide for each class member a written individualizedhabilitationplan, based upon individualizedassessments and formulated in accordance with professionalstandards (as set forth in theJoint Commission on Accreditation ofHospitals, Accreditation Council for Services For Mentally Retardedand otherDevelopmentally DisabledPersons, Standards for Services for DevelopmentallyDisabled Individuals [1977]) with theparticipation ofthe retardedperson, his or her parents, guardian, advocate, and parent surrogate ifthere is one; and toprovide for each an individualizedhabilitationprogram designed in accordance with the plan, to provide annualperiodic review ofthe plan andprogram, and the opportunity to each member oftheplaintiff class andhis orherparent, guardian, advocate, and surrogateparent, if there is one, to participate in such review. (1978 Finaljudgment and Order, Section IL5.A a; 1983 Consent Order, section Ll) Defendants shaD ensure that each consumer's assessment andhabilitationplan are revised annually. (1981 Consent Order, section 2.a)
ii. Priority in implementing IHPs shaD be given to class members who have been identified as Aassaultive, self-injurious, self-abusive, mentally ill, or who have acute medical needs or identified needs for physical rehabilitative services (e.g., physical therapy, occupational therapy, surgery).@ (1981 Consent Order, section 2.e)
111. Services requiredby consumers shaDbe identifiedin writingin fuU in aU assessments and habilitation plans, whether or not such services are currendy available. Defendants shaDspecify which consumers need particular services that are not being provided. This "needs assessment" shaD be continuously updated, showing the additional resources, including staff, supplies andequipment, and transportation resources required by consumers, and shaD be issued to the parties every six months. Every six months, defendants shaD compile and submit to the Special Master, the Monitor and the parties an overall assessment ofaggregate consumer habilitation needs; a recitation of the kind of services required to meet the habilitation needs of the consumer as indicatedin their IHPs, and a list ofaUhabilitation needs
11 THE COURT ORDER OF FEBRUARY10, 1999REQUIRES THAT, IN PREPARING THIS PLAN, THE SPECIAL MASTER MUSTARTICULATE THE GOALS OF THIS LAWSUIT (35 F. SUPP.2D AT 97-98).
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indicatedin the IHPs for which service has not been provided oris not available. (1981 Consent Order, section 2.c.; 1983 Consent Order, sections L2, L3; 1996 Remedial Plan, section III)
iv. Defendants shall ensure that IHPs are disseminated in a timely fashion, i.e., within 30 days of the IHP team meeting. To that end, defendants shaD purchase, lease or contract for sufficient copying capacity to make individualized habilitation plans or an accurate summary indicating any changes in the IHP since the last review, available to persons concemed with a provision of services to class members, including the SpecialMaster, the Court Monitor, the family ofthe class member, dayprogram providers and residentialproviders. (1996 Remedial Plan, section Ill)
v. On or before October 31, 1996, defendants shaD submit to the Special Master a simplified, reduced, unifonn andautomatedISP to be used for aU MRDDA clients, that pennit ready comparison of the needs identified and the services provided to meet those needs. (1996 Remedial Plan, section 4)
vi. Defendants shaD annually provide the Court Monitor and plaintiffs with a list ofnames ofaU class members, the dates they are to be assessed or to have IHPs revised, name of case managers and organizations involvedin assessments andIHPs. (1983 Consent Order, section VL1)
vii. Defendants shaDprovide aprogram ofmedical, dental andhealth related services for class members which provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care for physical iUness or injury. AU injuries and iUnesses which require a doctor=s attention shaD be immediately reported to the class member=s parent or guardian. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section IIL14. j.)
VJJJ. Defendants shaD provide each physicaUy handicapped class member with individualizedadaptive equipment as needed, including wheelchairs, walkers, braces, feeding apparatus, and auxiliary sensory devices such as hearing aids. Each and every class member shaD be immediately evaluated to ascertain the need for such equipment. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.k)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

1.

An ISP12 will be developed and reviewed annually for each consumer,

12 THE TERM ISP (INDIVIDUALIZED SERVICE PLAN} IS USED INTERCHANGEABLY WITH THE OWER TERM, IHP (INDIVIDUALIZED HABiliTATION PLAN}, WHICH IS USED IN THE COURT ORDERS, TO REFLECTA MORE CURRENTPROFESSIONAL APPROACH TO PROVIDING SERVICES AND SUPPORTS TO INDIVIDUALS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABiliTIES IN COMMUNITYSETTINGS.
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with the participation of the consumer, his or her family members and/or guardian, advocates, attorneys, residential and day program staff members, and appropriate clinical personnel, who know the consumer. Other participants may be included upon the invitation ofthe consumer or his/her legal guardian.

ii.

All members of the ISP team, including consumers, will be offered

training in the development of ISPs.

111. Each ISP will specify individualized objectives of the plan in terms of measurable outcomes.

tv. Each annual ISP plan or review will identify the consumer=s service, support and protection needs regardless of availability, and will be modified by the team as needs and circumstances change, or to reflect the consumer=s expressed wishes, where known, and implemented prompdy. The ISP will be disseminated to all the members of the team and placed in the consumer=s chart within 30 days of the planning meeting.

v.

The District will develop procedures for including in each ISP an

assessment of the individual consumer =s need for medical and dental

care and the means for securing such services within professionally

acceptable timeframes.

v1. The District will develop procedures and time frames for assessing the needs of consumers for the acquisition or repair of adaptive equipment, streamlining the approval process, obtaining necessary funds to purchase or lease such equipment and, providing such equipment to the consumer within 60 days from the date the need is determined. In cases where the adaptive equipment or repair services required by the consumer is not readily available due to special needs, the District will make all reasonable efforts to provide such equipment or repair services as soon as possible.

vu. The District will develop a computerized information system to aggregate information regarding needs identified in the ISP process and disseminate such information as described below.

A. The District will develop a computerized software system for developing ISPs and aggregating information about consumer needs for the purposes of planning and budget making.

B. The District will purchase and distribute computers and software for use by case managers in the preparation of ISPs.

C. The District will train case managers and other staff responsible for the development of ISPs in the new

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computerized process. c. Time Frames for Implementation Stage I -- 90 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
The Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration [hereinafter MRDDA] 13 will disseminate procedures relating to the acquisition and repair of adaptive equipment as described above. The District will disseminate to all providers and case managers procedures for including in each ISP an assessment of the individual consumer=s need for medical and dental care and the means for securing such services within professionally acceptable time frames. Stage II --October 1, 2001 MRDDA will develop and test the software system for the computerized ISP system to accomplish the tasks described above. MRDDA will ensure that case managers have computers and software required to automate the preparation of the ISPs and the aggregation of data in the ISPs, and will begin providing training to staff in using the new system. The computerized system will be phased in beginning with the ISP revisions that are scheduled after October 1, 2001. Stage III -- FY 2002 (October 1, 2002) All consumer ISPs are computerized. MRDDA will use the data from the computerized ISP system for the purpose of aggregating unmet consumer needs in planning for the system overall and in budget making.
13 AT THE TIME THE PLAN WAS WRITTEN, MRDDA WAS THE ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE DISTRICT
GOVERNMENT THAT HAD THE PRIMARYRESPONSIBILITYFOR THE PROVISION OFSERVICESAND SUPPORTS TO CONSUMERS. SHOULD THE LOCUS OF THESE RESPONSIBILITIES CHANGE AS A RESULT OF A GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION OR A TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITIES, THE DEFENDANTS WILL
CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO MRDDA IN THIS
PLAN.
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d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance 14
i. Consumers will have ISPs developed or revised in accordance with professional standards at least annually, and reviewed whenever there is a significant change in circumstances, based upon individualized assessments, with the active participation of the consumer, case manager, advocate, staffwho know the consumer best and any available family members or guardians, at a minimum. ISPs will be disseminated to members of the planning team and placed in the consumer=s chart within 30 days of the planning meeting. Defendants shall notify the Court Monitor and the counsel for the plaintiffs of the dates of the assessments and the ISP meetings for all class members on an annual basis. The defendants shall notify parents/guardians when serious injuries or serious illness require a doctor=s attention.
ii. ISPs will be computerized.
iii. Consumers receive the services and supports identified in the ISP on a timely basis in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive environment. ISPs must address the consumers= need for suitable living arrangements, together with community-based day programs and services; employment as appropriate; recreation; medical, dental and health and mental health services which provide for accessibility, quality and continuity of care. If the person has decision-making incapacity, the ISP will provide for decision-making by a guardian or other appropriate surrogate decision-maker. For persons with physical disabilities, the ISP must provide for individualized adaptive equipment, as needed, based on appropriate professional evaluations of the need for such equipment.
(A) An assessment of the need for adaptive equipment is completed within 30 days of a request therefor.
(B) Acquisition and repair of adaptive equipment occur within 60 days from the date the need is determined, unless the District can demonstrate that the acquisition or repair of the adaptive equipment in a specific case was not reasonably possible due to circumstances outside its control, such as lack of availability of the equipment or repair service needed. In such cases, the District will make all reasonable efforts to provide such equipment or repair services as soon as possible.
(C) Medical and dental services are being provided within professionally acceptable timeframes.
J4 THE FEBRUARY 10,1999 ORDER REQUIRES THE PLAN TO PROVIDE FOR ATHE STANDARDS,
INCLUDING OUTCOMESTANDARDS TO BEDEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED BYTHE DEFENDANTS, THAT SHOULD BE USED TO DETERMINE THE DEFENDANTS= CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH
COURT-ORDERED REQUIREMENTS • .•. @ID. AT 98.
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 18 of 75
iv. All unmet needs of consumers are clearly identified in their ISPs whether or not such services are currently available. An action plan formulated in accordance with professional standards is developed and implemented to meet those needs within professionally acceptable timeframes.
v. An accurate needs assessment based on needs identified in individual class members= ISPs is completed and submitted every six months, and utilized in the defendants= planning process.
vi. Unmet needs will be aggregated and specific systemic plans, including necessary funding, will be developed and implemented within the next budget cycle. vu. The completeness and appropriateness of all ISPs will be subject to Quality Assurance reviews at least annually.
viii. In the event that private providers do not comply with these performance expectations in paragraphs (i)-(iv), appropriate authorities within the District of Columbia government will take action necessary to ensure provider compliance, including the provision of technical assistance, or will impose sanctions designed to assure compliance, including, where necessary, termination of provider agreements, contracts and licenses, fmes and termination of reimbursement arrangements.
e. Standard of Compliance 15
High Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance l!i
1. Review the computerized database to verify that annual ISP plans/reviews have been completed; that unmet needs have been identified; and that such needs have been incorporated into planning and budgeting processes.
u. Review Quality Assurance documents regarding compliance with ISP standards and for documentation of corrective actions, disciplinary actions and enforcement actions taken as needed to correct any identified problems.
15 THE FEBRUARY10, 1999 ORDER PROVIDES THAT THE PLAN SHOULD IDENTIFYATHE DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE THAT SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR EACH OF THE STANDARDS RECOMMENDED.@ /D. 16 IT ALSO PROVIDES THAT THE PLAN SHOULD IDENTIFYATHE WAYIN WHICH COMPLIANCE WITH SUCH STANDARDS SHOULD BE MEASURED.@ /D.
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111. Direct observation of a random sample of 10 percent of consumers= residential and day programs,17 record reviews and interviews18 with consumers and families/guardians to determine the adequacy and appropriateness of their ISPs and services and supports provided to these persons.
1v. Conduct interviews with case managers and advocates assigned to consumers in the sample above regarding the adequacy of the ISP process and the availability and appropriateness of services to consumers. Interviews with the Quality Trust staff should be included in the process.
2. Provision of Residential. Vocational and Day Services a. Related Court Orders
i Defendants must provide the class members with community living arrangements suitable to each, together with such community-based dayprograms andservices in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive community settings. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IL5. b)
17 IN THIS AND OTHER SECTIONS OF THE PLAN WHERE SAMPLE SIZES ARE DESCRIBED, WHEN IT IS
NECESSARYTOASSESS THE SERVICESAND SUPPORTS TO SUBSETS OFCONSUMERS WHERE THENUMBERS IN THE SUBSETARE TOO SMALL FOR RANDOMSAMPliNG TO BEANAPPROPRIATEMETHODOLOGY, PURPOSIVE
NON-RANDOMSELECTION OFA SAMPLE OFATLEAST25 CASES WILL BE UTiliZED TO ASSESSSERVICESAND
SUPPORTS TO CONSUMERS IN THE SUBSET. SUCH SUBSETS SHALL INCLUDE: PERSONS NEEDING ADAPTIVE TECHNOLOGY; PERSONS FOR WHOMRESTRICTIVE CONTROL PROCEDURESARE USED; PERSONS WHORES/DE IN NURSING HOMES OR OTHER LARGE FACiliTIES; PERSONS INVOLVED IN ASERIOUS INCIDENTS;@ AND PERSONS AATRISK@ DUE TO SERIOUS MEDICAL CONDITIONS. 18 WHERE INTERVIEWS ARE INCLUDED AMONG THE METHODS OFASSESSING COMPliANCE, THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEWS IS TO INFORM THE REVIEWERS OF ISSUES OR CONCERNS THAT REQUIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION. THE INTERVIEWS AM YGUIDE THE REVIEWERS TO EXAMINE PARTICULAR DOCUMENTS OR OTHER SOURCES OFINFORAMTION THATARERELEVANTTO THE ISSUE OF COMPliANCE. THE REVIEWERS SHALL AMKE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF ASSERTIONS AMDE BY RESPONDENTS IN THE COURSE OFINTERVIEWS.
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ii.No more than eight (8) mentai!J retardedpersons shall be housed in a community
living arrangement. Independent evaluation is required if Defendantsfind medical needs requireplacement in afacility ofmore than 8persons. (1918 FinalJudgment
and Order, section II.5.c)

ttt.

Defendants shallprovide at leastfive hours ofprogramming dai!J to class

members. Independent evaluation is required for those residents not receivingfive

hours ofprogramming, with aprqjected date for the initiation ofthis requirement.

(1983 Consent Order, section VIII.4)

iv.

In addition to the programming requirements, defendants shall implement a

comprehensive recreation program for consumers. (1983 Consent Order, section

VIII.6)

v. Defendants shall plan to provide opportunities for alternative emplqyment as necessary and appropriate, including training for emplqyment in community programs. (1918 Final Judgment and Order, section II.l. h)

vi.

No class member shall be fed in a'!)' position less than the maximum

upright position consistent with his or her capabilities and handicaps. (1918 Final

Judgment and Order, section III.14.m)

vii.

Each consumer shall receive a nourishing, well-balanced diet and assistance

in development ofproper eating habits. Denial ofa nutritionallY adequate diet shall

not be used aspunishment. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section III.14.~

VJJJ. No class member shaD be denied habilitative programming as apunishment. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.o)

ix.

All class members shaD be provided with aU reasonable

opportunities for visitation, for telephone communication, and to

send and receive mail (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section

IIL14.p)

b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

1. The District will develop criteria and placement procedures for nursing home placements and discharges, and provide the plaintiffs and plaintiffintervenor an opportunity to review and comment on these criteria and procedures prior to fmalization. Community alternatives will be used whenever possible for consumers with complex medical needs.
u. A plan will be developed for the placement of persons, identified as being inappropriately served in nursing homes, day programs and employment programs into less restrictive, more integrated and appropriate community settings.
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111. The plan will be implemented in compliance with the procedures and criteria.
c. Time Frames for Implementation
Stage I B90 Days Following Filing of the Plan with the Court
Implement paragraph i.
Stage II B120 Days Following Filing of the Plan with the Court
Implement paragraph ii. Stage III B240 Days Following Filing of the Plan with the Court
Implement paragraph iii. d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance
1. All class members are served in residential and day or employment programs that are the least restrictive, most integrated settings appropriate to their needs. Class members also are provided with adequate supports to allow their participation in recreation and social activities in their communities.
11. No consumers are placed in or remain in large institutions or nursing homes inappropriately, or because appropriate community alternatives are not available.
111. Any placements into nursing homes or any other residential facilities serving more than eight people are preceded by an independent evaluation which supports such a placement.
1v. Class members are fed according to their individual needs by adequately trained staff.
v. Each class member has access to an adequate and nourishing diet. Class members have access to visitors, telephones and mail.
v1. In the event that private providers do not comply with these performance expectations, appropriate authorities within the District of Columbia government will take action necessary to ensure provider compliance, including the provision of technical assistance, or will impose sanctions designed to assure compliance, including, where necessary, termination of
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 22 of 75

provider agreements, contracts and licenses, fines and termination of reimbursement arrangements. e. Standard of Compliance
High Compliance f. Method of Assessing Compliance
Review of all placements of consumers in nursing homes and a 10 percent random sample of consumers in large congregate day programs and in residential programs to determine whether the placements comply with the criteria and procedures adopted in compliance with the Plan. 3. Staff Training a. Related Court Orders

i. Defendants shaDinsure that aU BCS [Bureau ofCommunity Services} staffare trained in the concepts ofdelivery ofservices in the community and philosophy ofnormalization for mentaUy retarded persons. (1983 Consent Order, section IX9)

ii

Defendants shaD require aU staff currently assigned to any

residential setting in which class members have been placed to attend

trainingprograms designed orapprovedby the defendants andcomplete

its training on or before September 301983. Thereafter, defendants shaD

require aU such staff to receive this training before commencing their

duties. (1983 Consent Order, section 9.8) Appropriate trainingprograms

for aU staffshaD be developed and implemented. Such programs shaD

help ensure that each consumeris provided with habilitation and care in

a safe, humane environment. (1978 Finaljudgment and Order, section

IIL14.s; 1983 Consent Order, section IX8; 1981 Consent Order, section

1.h)

111.

Defendants shaDsubmit a report to the CourtMonitor and to the

plaintiffs and the United States each quarter describing the training to be

provided in the next quarter for aU direct care staff, listing the staffwho

are to attend such training. (1983 Consent Order, section VIIL 7; 1981

Consent Order, section 1.h)

iv.

Defendants shaD recruit, hire and train a sufficient number of

qualified community staffto prepare individual community habilitation

plans for each consumer and upon completion ofsuch plans to assist in

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the execution of the responsibility to create, develop, maintain and monitor the communityliving arrangements, programs and otherservices required (1978 Finalfudgment and Order, section IL7.c)
v. Training programs shall be provided to staff who administer drugs to class members. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.g)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

i. The District will commence an emergency short-term training program for the staff of at-risk community providers to develop basic skills and competencies in the staff of such programs. The District will work with the plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenor and appropriate experts in designing the curriculum for this training program.
ii. The District will develop and implement an on-going training program with the involvement of plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenor, experts and stakeholders, for all staff working within the mental retardation and developmental disabilities services delivery system in order to develop the skills and competencies required to provide services meeting the standards applicable to the programs in which they work.
iii. The District will identify regulatory and contractual mechanisms needed to ensure that all Community Support Workers receive the required training.
iv. Department of Human Services and Department of Health Office of General Counsel will work with the plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor to develop any necessary legislation regarding training and certification of personnel who work with individuals with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities for submission to the City Council.
c. Time Frames for Implementation

Stage I B 120 Days Following Filing of the Plan with the Court

1. The District will identify, through surveys or otherwise, the number, educational level, qualifications and general experience of community-based workers to receive training. The District will identify the curriculum to be used and the training organization to be responsible for the training.

11. Begin training for case managers.

Stage II B270 Days Following Filing of the Plan with the Court

The defendants shall:

1.

Identify funding for staff training, including appropriated funds, public and

private grants and provider contributions.

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11.

Prepare and propose detailed Comprehensive System of Personnel

Development program.

111. Ensure that all MRDDA case managers have received initial training.

1v. Determine the frequency of required refresher training/advanced training for support workers.

v.

Establish a pre-determined number of annual continuing education credits to

maintain professional certification.

v1. Identify regulatory and contractual mechanisms needed to ensure that all Community Support Workers receive the required training.

vii. Propose any necessary legislation regarding training and certification of personnel who work with individuals with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities for submission to the City Council.

v111. Develop mechanisms for enforcement (contract language, rules, regulations, policies and procedures) of basic training requirements for support workers.

1X. Begin direct care staff training on a regular, long-term basis.

Stage III B360 Days Following Filing of the Plan with the Court

1.

The defendants shall begin the Training Certification Program.

11.

All currendy employed Community-Based Support Workers trained.

111. Refresher/Advanced training courses begin for community based support workers.

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

i. The District has a system in place to ensure that all new employees assigned to residential and day treatment programs attend orientation and preliminary skill-training prior to assignment to a work site. All staff, including transportation staff, must receive on-going training throughout the course of their employment to develop, acquire or maintain the knowledge and skills required for their positions. No staff person may be permitted to undertake any direct care duties or responsibilities with consumers without direct supervision until they complete training and acquire required competence and pass competency tests.
ii. All staff employed by the District and provider agencies will have attended required training programs and satisfactorily demonstrated competence in the skills

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required for the positions they hold (e.g., by passing a post-training test or evaluation to demonstrate the acquisition of the required skills).
iii. All employees who are authorized to administer drugs are credentialed to do so after attending training programs and demonstrating their competence in the skills required for this responsibility (e.g., by passing a post-training test or evaluation to demonstrate the acquisition of the required skills).
iv. All case managers are trained in individualized service planning and demonstrate competence in the skills required for their positions (e.g., by passing a posttraining test or evaluation to demonstrate the acquisition of the required skills). e. Standard of Compliance
High Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance
1. Review of documents to verify staff attendance at tra101ng and evidence of acquisition of competencies in the skills taught (e.g., passing scores in post-training tests).
11. Review of grievances and unusual incident reports and related investigations and other quality assurance documents to determine whether lack of training is identified as a cause of incidents and grievances, and if so, whether corrective actions were taken and were adequate.
111. Interview a random sample of 10 percent of consumers, their families, guardians and staff of the residential and day treatment programs regarding training issues.
1v. Interview a random sample of advocates and case managers assigned to the consumers in the sample regarding staff competencies.
4. Restricted Control Procedures (Includes medications. use of restraints and time-out)
a. Related Court Orders
i. Written policies and procedures goveming the safe administration and handling ofmedications shaDbe established. (1978 andFinaljudgment and Order, section IIL14.h)
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II. Administering excessive or unnecessary medications to class members is prohibited. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.d)
iii Using medications as punishment, for the convenience ofstaff, as a substitute for programming, or in quantities that interfere with a class member's individual developmentalprogram is prohibited. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section IIL14.e.)
iv. Monitoring ofeach class member-s medications andprovision for at least monthly review by a physician ofeach resident=s medication are required (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.i)
v. Only appropriately trained and qualified staffare permitted to administer drugs to class members. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.)
vi. Administering drugs to class members on a PRN basis is prohibited. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.h)
vii. Aversive behavior modification techniques shall not be employed on any resident. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.n)
VIII. Use ofseclusion for anypurpose is prohibited. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.b)
IX. Use ofPhysicalRestraints or "timeout" as punishment, for the convenience ofstaff, or as a substitute for a habilitation program is prohibited. Physical restraint and time outprocedures shaD be applied only over shortperiods of time in conjunction with otherspecifiedprogrammedactivities as set forth in the consumer's individualizedhabilitationplan, onlyifaltemative techniques have failed and only ifit imposes the least restriction consistent with its purpose. Physical restraint shall be employed only when absolutely necessary to protect consumers from injuries to themselves or to prevent injuries to others. There shaD be no PRN restraint orders and orders for restraint shallnot be in force longer than 12hours. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IIL14.c)
x. A residentplacedin restraints shaD be checked at least every 30 minutes by appropriately trained staff and a record kept of such checks. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section IIL14.c)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders 19
An important part of individual service planning is the proper consideration and oversight of the use of psychotropic medication, time out and restraints (referred to as Restricted Control Procedures) as responses to challenging behaviors which may be exhibited by
19 CONSISTENT WITH THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THIS PLAN, THE DETAILED PROVISIONS OF THE POLICYARE NOT SPECIFIED, RELYING INSTEAD ON SPECIFIC OUTCOME MEASURES.
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MR/DD consumers with cognitive disabilities. It is necessary to assure that appropriate medication is provided when needed and that unnecessary, excessive, and inappropriate medications are not used. (Seclusion of MR/DD consumers is expressly forbidden due to its clinical inappropriateness for this population.)
The defendants shall develop written policies and procedures that address the circumstances under which Restricted Control Procedures may be used and the safeguards that will be in place to prevent misuse or overuse of such procedures. In developing such policies and procedures, the defendants shall obtain such technical assistance and consultation as may be necessary from experts with experience in the provision of behavioral, neurological and psychiatric care to persons with developmental disabilities. In selecting the experts, the defendants shall consult with the plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenor and the Special Master. The experts shall have access to and review available information from the Court Monitor and other sources regarding the existing conditions within the defendants= system that the policies and procedures are intended to address.

c. Time Frames for Implementation

Stage I B90 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court

The defendants shall:

1.

Draft written policies, with opportunity for review and comment by the

plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor.

11.

Identify training needs of professional and direct care staff.

ill. Develop a list of competent behavioral support professionals who are available to providers and disseminate it to providers and case managers.

Stage II B 180 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court

1.

These policies and procedures are being implemented in ISPs as they come

up for renewal/revision.

11.

A training curriculum on Restricted Control Procedures is developed and

integrated into the staff training program required by the Plan.

ill. A Review Committee is appointed, which includes representation from families, advocates and providers, to review all uses of Restricted Control Procedures and procedures developed for its operation.

Stage III B 240 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court

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i.

The policies and procedures are fully implemented.

11.

The Review Committee is reviewing all uses of Restricted Control procedures

and reporting any concerns to appropriate District agencies.

d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

1. All MR/DD consumers for whom Restricted Control Procedures are used have individualized behavior support plans. Control procedures are used when alternative techniques have failed and only when they are determined to be the least restrictive alternatives. Such behavior support plans clearly identify the proactive, positive approaches that will be used to minimize and/or ameliorate the need for control procedures. No consumers are subject to PRN medication, seclusion, time-out, or use of aversives. If consumers are restrained, they will be checked every 30 minutes and a record kept contemporaneously with the check.
11. Defendants have developed and implemented a policy governing the safe administration and handling of medications.
111. When medication is used for sedation prior to medical appointments, desensitization plans describing the positive, proactive approaches that will be utilized to reduce the need for sedation, will be implemented.
1v. All individualized behavior support plans will contain documentation, including a functional analysis of the target behavior and that adequate behavioral data was collected and considered prior to determining that Restricted Control Procedures are the least intrusive measures to address the specific behaviors, and authorizing the use of such procedures.
v. In all cases where psychotropic medications are used, there is documentation in the record of a mental health diagnosis (DSM-IV), of the intended effects and side effects of the medication, informed consent or substituted consent, and a termination date for the prescription of not more than 30 days. The prescribing physician receives regular information regarding the effects of the medication to enable him/her to make a decision to reduce or discontinue the medication as warranted.
v1. All persons who initiate the use of Restricted Control Procedures meet credentialing requirements and have met the training requirements in the policy.
vii. All the direct care staff who support consumers for whom Restricted Control Procedures have been ordered meet the training requirements in the Restricted Control policy, and have been trained on the individual behavior management plans. All such staff have received training in positive means of managing behavior.

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v111. All cases in which Restricted Control Procedures have been initiated are reviewed quarterly by a Review Committee and the results of such review are sent to the Court Monitor and Quality Trust.
lX. In all cases where Restricted Control Procedures ate initiated, the Court Monitor and Quality Trust and the consumer=s family or guardian are notified of such usage immediately but no later than within 24 hours of the initiation.
x. When monitoring uncovers noncompliance with the policies by providers, prompt corrective action is taken to remedy the noncompliance. In the event of noncompliance that threatens the safety ot well being of a consumer, the defendants will take whatever immediate action is necessary to protect the consumer, and to correct the deficiency including, where necessary, imposing sanctions to assure compliance, and/or termination of provider agreements, contracts and licenses.
e. Standard of Compliance
High Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance
i. Document review of a random sample of 10 percent of the cases, or 25 cases, whichever is more (see footnote 17), in which Restricted Control Procedures were used, to determine compliance with the policy.
ii. Interviews with case managers and advocates assigned to the sample cases in which Restricted Control Procedures were utilized.
iii. Interviews of the persons in the sample for whom Restricted Control Procedures were used, including interviews with their residential and day program staff, parents or guardians, and the clinicians who ordered the use of the control procedure.
B. GOAL-- CONSUMERS MUST BE KEPT FREE FROM HARM (1978 FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, SECTION 1.2)
a. Related Court Orders
i. Defendants shall ensure that consumers who require 1:1 staffing are provided with such coverage when needed. (1983 Consent Order, section III. 7)
ii. Acts of physical or psychological abuse, neglect or mistreatment
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including but not limited to assaults,fractures, cuts, bruises, abrasions, burns, bites, lacerations, drug overdoses and verbal abuse are prohibited. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section IIL14.a)
iii. Each and every alleged incident of abuse, neglect, or mistreatment shall be promptly investigated and a report made. The manner and mechanism ofsuch investigation shall be developed and established by the defendants. A chronological compilation ofthe above reports shall be maintained by the defendants and made available to the Master and the parties. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section III.14.a)
iv. The human-rights committee shall receive copies of all completed unusual incident reportingforms on a weekly basis. Defendants shall report to the committee all actions taken pursuant to any unusual incident report. (1983 Consent Order, section V.2)
v. Defendants shall submit to the Court Monitorfor review and approval their unusual incident reportingform and the procedures undertaken by defendants pursuant to any unusual incident report. The Court Monitor shallprovide recommendations to the defendantsfor revision,
if any, on this form and of the defendant=s procedures, within thirty
days after submission. (1983 Consent Order, section V.1)
vi. A community advisory board is to investigate, monitor and evaluate complaints. (1978 Final Judgment and Order)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders
1. The defendants will develop and disseminate to all entities contracted with the District of Columbia to provide services and supports to consumers with mental retardation and developmental disabilities, including residential providers, day treatment programs, and community provider agencies, as well as MRDDA and Department of Health staff and the police written policies that define the types of incidents to be reported; specify how and when staff are to report and record the incidents properly and who is to be notified; specify how staff are to respond to immediately protect the consumers; ensure notification of consumer advocates, family members and court-appointed attorneys of serious incidents; and identify a floor of basic protections for consumers that cannot be breached (defined as abuse and neglect). Defendants shall provide plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor an opportunity to review and comment upon such policies and procedures before they are finalized and disseminated.
n. The defendants will develop and disseminate a uniform written incident reporting form to all entities contracted with the District of Columbia to
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provide services and supports to consumers with mental retardation and developmental disabilities, including residential providers, day programs, and community provider agencies, as well as MRDDA and Department ofHealth staff and the police. Defendants shall provide plaintiffs and plaintiffintervenor an opportunity to review and comment upon such form before it is finalized and disseminated.
iii. The defendants will establish within the District of Columbia Government, and publicize to all entities or individuals that serve MRDD consumers, a 24hour, 7-day a week telephone number for the reporting ofconsumer incidents wherever they occur, that will be staffed by personnel trained to handle unusual/serious and other incidents, and screen and refer matters promptly to appropriate persons and agencies.
IV. The defendants will develop an adequate and appropriate intake process for incidents within MRDDA and an emergency response protocol.
v. The defendants will develop a computerized system where all residential and day treatment providers can report incidents on-line.
v1. The defendants will develop specific written protocols for the conduct of investigations of the category of incidents designated as ASerious® in the policy. The written protocols shall provide for prompt, thorough investigations by trained personnel ofthese incidents and recommend what, if any, corrective or disciplinary action should be taken by whom and within what time frame. The written protocols shall designate the types of incidents that must be investigated by an independent entity as well as those types of incidents that internal trained personnel can investigate.
vii. The written protocols shall designate one entity to be responsible for the independent investigation of serious incidents and the oversight of any other internal investigations. The written protocols shall specify the investigation protocol as well as the report format, including requirements for the implementation of corrective action recommendations, if any. The written protocols shall specify the responsibilities of case managers and other monitoring entities for timely follow-up monitoring of the situation and the corrective action steps, if any, required to ensure the safety and welfare ofthe consumers. The written protocols shall specify the timeframes for the completion of any investigation, the completion and filing of any investigation report, and the implementation ofcorrective and/or disciplinary action recommendations, if any. The written protocols shall specify that trained investigators shall conduct all investigations.
vm. The defendants will develop a data system within MRDDA capable of aggregating information about consumer incidents, incident reporting, investigations, the investigation process and status, and the implementation of
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corrective action recommendations and/or results of any investigation. The defendants will develop a written protocol that specifies the types of management reports that are to be generated by the data system to ensure that MRDDA, DHS and DOH administrators are provided with the aggregate data they require (on incidents, incident reporting, investigations, the investigation process and status, and follow-up steps for implementation of corrective action recommendations, if any) to inform decision-making and protect the consumers.
IX. The defendants will provide an effective quality assurance system to ensure the regular, independent review of incident reporting, investigations, identification of the causes of and contributing factors to the incident, and implementation of any necessary corrective actions to protect consumers from harm. Such a system shall ensure that providers are made aware of problematic trends and that corrective action is taken on an individual consumer level, provider-specific level, as well as systemic level, when necessary. Processes shall be included to ensure that, when necessary, action is taken with regard to changing placements, providing additional training or technical assistance to staff, or regarding the providers' licenses and contracts to ensure the safety of consumers.
x. The defendants will provide initial training on proper incident reporting to providers, direct care staff, administrators, investigators and case managers and periodically reinforce that training through case-specific continuing education.
xi. The defendants will provide competency-based training to investigators and their supervisors on the proper conduct of investigations with respect to incidents that involve people with developmental disabilities, the proper writing and development of investigation reports, and the proper follow-up mechanisms with regard to promptly implementing corrective actions.
xii. The defendants will develop cooperative agreements with entities such as the Police and Fire Departments, the Medical Examiner's Office, the Department ofHealth, the Adult Protective Services System, the Office oflnspection and Compliance, and other relevant entities with regard to incident reporting, the conduct of investigations, and the follow-up and implementation ofcorrective and/or disciplinary action recommendations, if any.
xm. Within seven days of completion, defendants will submit investigation reports and corrective action plans to the Court Monitor, the Quality Trust and the Human Rights Committee for review of the adequacy of the investigation and implementation of recommendations regarding corrective and disciplinary action.
XIV. Each quarter, the defendants will disseminate to the Court Monitor and
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the Quality Trust aggregate and specific information about the overall performance of the system in protecting the health and safety of MRDD consumers.
c. Time Frames for Implementation

Stage I B90 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
Paragraphs i-iv, vi-vii, & x.
Stage II B120 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
Paragraphs viii, xi-xiv.
Stage III B270 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court Paragraphs v & ix.
d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

1.

All incidents (as defined in District of Columbia regulations and policies) are

reported in accordance with the policy. Abuse, neglect and mistreatment are

clearly prohibited by defendants= policies and procedures.

11. Family members and/or guardians, the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust are notified of all serious incidents (as defmed in the District of Columbia policies) within 24 hours of the defendants becoming aware of such incidents.

111. All serious incidents are reported within the timeframe established by the policies, and thoroughly investigated by trained investigators. All other incidents are investigated in accordance with the policy requirements.

1v. Investigation reports identify appropriate preventive, corrective and disciplinary actions needed to protect MRDD consumers from harm.

v. All serious incident investigation reports are reviewed by quality assurance staff in MRDDA. All other incidents are reviewed for patterns and trends by quality assurance staff in MRDDA / and the Human Rights Committee.

v1. For all serious incidents, case managers follow up on recommendations and ensure that there is prompt implementation of appropriate preventive, corrective or disciplinary action, and document their actions. For all incidents, case managers follow up to ensure that all consumers are safe and protected from harm. Based upon the quality assurance review of patterns and trends of consumer incidents, MRDDA shall ensure that there is prompt implementation

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of whatever preventive, corrective or disciplinary actions are necessary to protect the consumers from harm. vii. The appropriate licensing/contracting agency is informed of all serious incidents and of the outcomes and recommendations for preventive and corrective action from all investigations, and takes appropriate action for prevention and correction.

v111. The Court Monitor and the Quality Trust receive incident reports of all serious incidents and all the final investigation reports, as well as all recommendations for preventive and corrective action. Each quarter, the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust receive aggregate reports on patterns and trends for all other incidents.

lX. Incident reporting is on-line in 90 percent of residential and day treatment provider sites.

x.

In the event that private providers do not comply with these

performance expectations, appropriate authorities within the District

government will take whatever immediate actions are necessary to protect

consumers, and take such further actions as may be necessary to correct the

deficiency, including but not limited to the provision of training or technical

assistance to provider staff, and/or the imposition of sanctions designed to

assure compliance, including, where necessary, termination of provider

agreements, contracts and licenses.

xt.

Class members are provided with one-to-one staffing when required by

their ISP.

e. Standard of Compliance

High Compliance f. Method of Assessing Compliance

i. Review a 10 percent random sample of serious and other incident reports and the related investigations, Quality Assurance documents, Human Rights Committee minutes, reports to the External Monitoring Agency, documentation of case manager follow up of the implementation of recommendations, and documentation of the implementation of sanctions where warranted.
ii. Interview case managers and advocates assigned to the consumers involved in the incidents in the sample above, regarding compliance with the policy.
iii. Review documents and interview staff at 10 percent sample of residential and day program sites to ensure that all incidents are being reported in compliance with the policy.

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C. GOAL- SAFEGUARDING EACH CONSUMER=S PERSONAL POSSESSIONS (1978 FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, SECTION][. 7. G; 1983 CONSENT ORDER, SECTION VII)
a. Related Court Orders
i. Defendants shaDsubmit a plan to safeguard each class membet=s personal possessions including money, including but not limited to provision for depositing each class membet=s funds in an interest-bearing accountand for withdrawal such funds. (1978 Finaljudgment and Order, section IL7.G.)
11. Defendants shaDprovide the Court Monitor andplaintiffs each year a report detailing status ofthe defendant=s= plan for safe keeping the funds ofaU class members. (1983 Consent Order, section VII)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders
1. Defendants, in consultation with plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor, shall develop and implement an overall plan to safeguard consumer funds including to ensure that consumers eligible for benefits such as SSI funds actually receive them.
11. In order to safeguard consumer funds, the District of Columbia will revise its policies and procedures related to the handling of consumer funds, including but not limited to the District's role as representative payee for consumers and its oversight of funds in that capacity, and private providers' role in the management of consumer funds. Defendants shall provide plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor an opportunity to review and comment upon such policies and procedures before they are finalized and disseminated. The policies will ensure that each ISP also contains an Individual Financial Plan (IFP). The policies and procedures will be disseminated to case managers, residential providers, families and consumers, as well as the Special Master, the Court Monitor, and counsel for plaintiffs and the plaintiffintervenor.
111. In all cases where the District is the representative payee for an individual, the District government shall consolidate all trust and investment consumer accounts managed by the District government for individual consumers into a single interestbearing account and establish individual sub-accounts for each consumer. The defendants will be responsible for implementing the reforms.
1v. In all cases where there are community accounts where the District is the representative payee for an individual, the District shall eliminate the delay in depositing SSI personal allowance funds by making monthly electronic deposits of personal allowances into individual consumer accounts. Monthly statements for each imprest account will be sent to the Chief Financial Officer for the District of
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Columbia who will promptly approve individual expenditures recommended by MRDDA.
v. In consultation with the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor, defendants will develop a plan to determine any amounts owed to consumers for a period of ten years from the date of the filing of this Plan, as well as the method of payment. Defendants shall compensate each consumer in full for all past-due interest owed them and for any funds never paid to any consumer.
v1. Annual audits of all consumer accounts will be conducted hereafter at the defendants= expense by an auditor independent ofMRDDA and DHS. Such audits will be sent to the consumers, the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust.
vii. Defendants shall conduct an investigation into the burial accounts for all consumers, including an inquiry into whether these funds are properly accounted for and invested. The defendants shall report the results of this investigation to the Special Master, the plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor.
c. Time Frames for Implementation
Stage I B120 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
Implement paragraphs i - iv above.
Stage IIB210 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
Implement paragraphs v and vii above.
Stage III B360 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
Implement paragraph vi above.
d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance
1. All consumers have individual consolidated, interest-bearing accounts. 11. All consumers' funds are deposited into their accounts monthly via electronic
deposit.
111. Consumers are remunerated in full for all monies to which they are entitled.
1v. Consumers= funds and personal possessions are safeguarded. v. All ISPs have an individual fmancial plan that accurately reflects each
consumer's fmancial status and describes a plan for the use of existing and/or anticipated funds based on the individual's preferences. IFPs also describe the supports each consumer requires to manage his/her funds in the least restrictive manner possible.
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v1. All consumers have an identified accountable representative payee to manage social security benefits and personal allowances, if they are deemed incapable of managing their own finances. The ISP should specifically address the consumers= ability to manage their own finances, and make provision for a representative payee if one is needed.
vii. Annual audits are performed of each consumer=s account and the results forwarded to the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust.
e. Standard of Compliance
Significant Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance
Review of relevant documentation for a random sample of 10 percent of the consumers= accounts, including ISPs and IFPs.
D. GOAL B MONITORING B (1978 FINAL JUDGMENT & ORDER, SECTION 1L5.D)
1. Case Management
a. Related Court Orders
i. Defendants shaD maintain within the BCS enough case manager positions to insure a minimum of one case manager for every 60 clients. This ratio excludes case managers assigned to intake or supervisory positions. (1983 Consent Order, Section IIL9) If the defendants should fail to provide sufficient case managers to come into compliance with the requiredratio, the Court wiDlevy a coercive civil fine of$1,000 a day untildefendants can establish that they are in compliance with the required ratio. (1996 RemedialPlan, section II)
ii. Defendants shaD provide aU necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that communitylivingarrangements, programs and supportive community services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section IL5.d)
111. Defendants shaD recruit, hire and train a sufficient number of qualified community staff to prepare individual community habilitation plans for each consumer and upon completion ofsuch
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plans to assistin the execution ofthe responsibility to create, develop, maintain andmonitor the communitylivingarrangements, programs and otherservices required. (1978 Finaljudgment and Order, section IL7.c)
iv. EveJy three months, defendants shaDsubmit to the CourtMonitor the list ofeach case manager employed by or under contract with the MRDDA, and the names and/or other identifying indicia of the clients assigned to each case manager, including MRDDA clients who are not members ofplaintiffclass. (1996 Remedial Plan, section II)
v.Defendants shaD obtain by September30, 1996, the case management services that wiDbeprovided by atleast four additional fuD-time case managers to bring the total to 29. (1996 Remedial Plan, section II)
VI. The defendants shaD exert theirmaximum efforts to liD each staff vacancy at the Bureau ofCommunity Services within sixty days from the time such vacancy occurs. Vacancies shaDbe filled with qualified personneL (1981 Consent Order, section LA)
vii. The defendants shaD continuaDy maintain a listing of staff vacancies which wiD be available to the parties and the Court Monitor. (1981 Consent Order section Lb) Defendants shaDprovide notice to the Court Monitor ofa vacancy or new position within 10 days andgive a status report on actions taken to liD them within 30 days. (1983 Consent Order, section IIL4)
viii. If vacancies are not fiDed within 60 days, defendants shaD make maximum efforts to secure equivalentservices from Medicaid vendors or other qualified individuals. (1981 Consent Order, Section L C.) If necessary, defendants shaDseekre-programming offunds budgeted for vacant staff positions to cover the cost of contracts for such equivalent services. (Section LE.) Ifthe vacancyis filled by contract orMedicaid vendor agreement, the defendants shaDinfonn the Court Monitor that such has occurred and shaD specify the position the contracted-for employee has fiDed (1983 Consent Order, section IlLS)
ix. No recruitment hiring restriction ofany kind shaD be imposed upon staff vacancies within the Bureau of Community Services without prior or simultaneous notice to the parties, specifying the tenns and duration ofthe restriction. (1981 Consent Order, section LF.)
x. Defendants shaD submit to the Court Monitor and the plaintiffs eveJy thirty days a list ofaUpositions in BCS, byjob title, the name of the employee filling each position currendy, and location of each assignedposition. The defendants shaDindicate on thatlist aU vacant
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positions, the service area to which the position is assigned, and the date such vacancy occurred. (1983 Consent Order, section //L3)
xi. Defendants shaD request sufficient personnel to pennit the expeditious processing ofthe contract documents and adhere to the time frames for processing contracts and request for proposals for supplies, equipment and services benefiting class members. (1981 Consent Order, section VI)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders
i. MRDDA will develop procedures to ensure that case managers are informed of recommendations made as a result of all quality assurance/quality improvement activities including incident investigations, to enable them to monitor the implementation of the recommendations in the course of performing their duties.
ii. The MRDDA budget will provide for a case manager ratio of 1:30 and, within that ratio, may create lower ratios for individual case managers based on a determination of the intensity of needs for case management services by the consumers on the caseload. MRDDA will ensure that all case managers receive competency-based training to carry out their responsibilities prior to being assigned responsibility for individual consumers. (See Section A.3. d. supra.)
iii. MRDDA will require case managers to conduct a minimum of eight monitoring visits a year and ftle reports regarding compliance with ISPs and health/safety issues based upon these visits.
c. Time Frames for Implementation
Stage I B 60 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
MRDDA will develop criteria for lower caseloads for case managers based upon intensity of consumer needs, with the opportunity for the plaintiffs and the plaintiffintervenor to review and comment upon the proposed criteria prior to its implementation.
Stage II B 120 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
i. Additional case manager positions needed to meet the above ratios will be created and assigned.
ii. Additional case managers are hired, trained and deployed to meet the ratio of 1:30.
iii. Internal procedures are created for prompt ftlling of vacancies in order to maintain the ratio of 1:30.
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d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance
1. Case managers and their supervisors have successfully completed the required competency-based training. Case managers participate in the development of the ISPs for all consumers on their caseload.
11. Case managers ensure that the consumers on their caseload receive all of the services and supports identified on the ISPs, and where problems are encountered in obtaining access or in the quality or timeliness of the receipt of services and supports, that they document them, attempt to resolve them and, where appropriate, make prompt referrals to the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust for assistance in resolving the problem expeditiously.
111. In all cases where a consumer on their caseload has been the subject of an incident or a recommendation for corrective or preventive action, the case manager follows up to ensure implementation ofappropriate actions for the safety and protection of the consumer.
1v. Defendants maintain a case management caseload of 1:30. Defendants may create lower ratios for individual case managers based on a determination of the intensity of needs for case management services by the consumers on the caseload.
v. When there are vacancies in case management positions that increase the case management ratio above 1:30, defendants will notify the Special Master and the parties of the vacancies and of the steps they have taken or will take to fill the vacanc1es.
e. Standard of Compliance
High Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance
i. Review the case manager roster to determine compliance with the caseload ratiosand with criteria for assignment of individual case managers to lower ratios.
ii. Review training logs to determine that all case managers have completed required training and demonstrated required competencies.
iii. Review the records of a random sample of 10 percent of the consumers served to determine the adequacy of case manager services, interview the advocates assigned to these persons, as well as residential and day program staff and families/ guardians.
2. Quality Assurance Program & Fiscal Audits
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a. Related Court Orders

1. Defendants are enjoined to provide aU necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that community living arrangements, programs and supportive community services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained (1978 Finaljudgment and Order, section IL5. D.)
ii. Defendants shallprepare aplan for the creation, development andmaintenance of mechanisms to monitor a system of community services to assure the community living arrangements, programs and other services of necessary quality and quantity are continuously provided to class members in the least separate, most integrated, least restrictive settings. The plan is to include, but not be limited to, the provision ofadvocates to assist in protecting the rights of the class. (1978 Finaljudgment and Order, section IL7.d)
iii Defendants shaDretain the services ofconsultants to assist them in developing a system of monitoring community residences and day programs, utilizing standard evaluation instruments. (1998 Consent Order, section IX6)
iv. The Bureau of Community Services and the Developmental Disabilities Professional shaD regularly monitor each and every community placement to ensure thatresidentialarrangements andprogrammingareprovidedappropriate to the individuals needand shaD document the results ofsuch monitoring. (1981 Consent Order, section 4.D)
v. HCF auditors shaDconduct desk audits ofprovideraccounts atleast once ayear, andshaDconduct field audits as requiredby federal regulations, every thirdyear. Field audits may not be conducted more than every three years unless, in the professional judgment of HCF, circumstances indicate that and on-site, extensive audit is necessary to detennine provider's reasonable costs. (1996 RemedialPlan, section 1. C)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

The defendants will implement a quality assurance/quality improvement system for MRDDA consumers that is designed to monitor and ensure the safety and well-being of the consumers, assure that the services and supports provided to them are consistent with individualized service plans, and delivered on a timely basis by competent and welltrained staff and other providers. Defendants shall provide plaintiffs and plaintiffintervenor an opportunity to review and comment upon each of the policies and procedures described below before they are finalized and disseminated. Specifically, MRDDAwill:

z.

Monitor compliance with !icensing/contractlaccreditationlcertification standards

The defendants will develop and implement policies, procedures and protocols for

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periodic monitoring of residential and day program providers for compliance with required licensing or certification standards, contract requirements, and fmancial reporting requirements, and ensure that adequate trained and qualified staff are assigned to perform these functions.

The defendants will develop a protocol for interagency sharing of critical information regarding the performance of providers which could affect the safety and well-being of consumers, in order to facilitate cooperative enforcement efforts between agencies bearing responsibility for oversight of provider operations.

The defendants will develop policies and procedures to protect consumers when there is an imminent risk of harm due to private providers= noncompliance with performance expectations. Such policies and procedures will provide for measures to correct the deficiency, including training and technical assistance for provider staff, and/or the use of sanctions to ensure compliance with standards including the termination ofprovider agreements, contracts and licenses.

The defendants will develop an annual plan for monitoring of specific areas of

performance of providers (e.g., use of psychotropic medications).

tt.

Incident reporting and investigation (see Goal B above)

ttt. Complaints andgrievancesfrom consumers. families and advocates

The defendants will develop user-friendly procedures for the receipt and resolution of complaints and grievances from consumers, families and advocates.

The procedures will address the process for filing complaints and grievances, the time frame for investigation and resolution, the procedures for appealing the results, and involvement of advocates in assisting consumers and families.

A database of grievances and their resolutions will be maintained, and periodic reports prepared. A copy of such reports will be sent to the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust at least annually.

tv. Fatality review process

The defendants will require the reporting of all deaths as serious incidents.

Deaths of consumers will be investigated to determine the cause of death, the circumstances of the death and the factors which may have contributed to the death, as well as any preventive or corrective action that appears warranted to address any issues that may have been identified during the investigation. The investigations will result in written reports which include findings and recommendations.

The District will provide for an interdisciplinary Fatality Review Committee which includes the physicians, nurses and other clinical specialists, and include persons who are independent of the developmental disabilities service system. The Committee shall have access to the report of the investigation into the death and shall make such written

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recommendations as may appear warranted based upon its review of the circumstances of death.

The District will adopt procedures to ensure that any recommendations emanating from a fatality review process are implemented, and are subject to follow-up monitoring by case managers.

v.

Case management (fee Goal D. 1. above)

c. Time Frames for Implementation

Stage I B 90 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
1. Quality assurance/quality improvement policies, procedures and protocols are written/revised and adopted.
11. Quality assurance staff are assigned to their positions and receive necessary training.
111. Additional staffmg needs and funding are identified for incorporation in the next year's budget request.
1v. Paragraphs (b)(i) and (iv) are implemented.
Stage II B 180 Days Following the Filing of the Plan with the Court
1. The additional staff and funding is made available, staff are trained and deployed.
11. The quality assurance program begins to produce reports as a result of the activities identified above.
111. Recommendations made as a result of the quality assurance activities are implemented and monitored.
1v. An annual plan for quality assurance monitoring is developed and implemented.
v. Paragraph (b) (iii) is implemented.
v1. Desk and field audits of provider accounts are conducted to determine provider costs.
Stage III -- March 31, 2002
The quality assurance program has adequate and stable staff, and is able to identify and correct incipient problems. d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

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1. All deaths are reported to and reviewed by the Fatality Review Committee.
11. Recommendations from the Fatality Review Committee for preventive and corrective actions are followed up, implemented and documented.
111. An annual plan of monitoring is prepared and implemented, monitoring the safety, quality and effectiveness of services and supports to consumers. Quality Assurance recommendations for prevention, correction and improvement are implemented and documented.
1v. Implementation of the Quality Assurance recommendations is monitored by quality assurance staff or case managers and is documented.
v. When monitoring uncovers noncompliance with required standards by providers, prompt corrective action is taken to remedy the noncompliance. In the event of serious noncompliance that threatens the safety or well-being of consumers, the defendants will take whatever immediate actions are necessary to protect consumers. Such actions shall include measures to correct the deficiency, including training and technical assistance for provider staff, relocation of consumers to appropriate short-term respite facilities which can provide for individual support and service needs, and their health and safety, and/or the use of sanctions to ensure compliance with standards including the termination of provider agreements, contracts and licenses.
Vl. In addition, see the section on Protection from Harm and case management.
e. Standard of Compliance
High Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance
i. Review of Quality Assurance documents (i.e., aggregate reports, recommendations made by Quality Assurance staff and committees, documentation of follow up action for prevention and correction, Fatality Review Committee minutes and reports, etc.).
ii. Review of the annual Quality Assurance plan and implementation activities.
iii. Review of corrective and enforcement actions initiated as a result of Quality Assurance activities.
iv. Interviews with case managers and advocates assigned to a random sample of 10 percent of the consumers, as well as consumers, families and guardians, regarding the Quality Assurance program.
3. External Monitoring
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a. Related Court Orders

1. Defendants shall identify and retain the expert full-time services of a Court Monitor to assist them and the Court in coordinating and carrying out the implementation ofthe provisions ofthis Order. The Court Monitor shallreport direcdy to the director ofthe Department ofHuman Services who shall make available to the Court Monitor appropriate professional and other resources, including consultants as are necessary and appropriate to execute the Courts= Order. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IL6)
11. The Bureau of Community Services and the Court Monitor shall regularly monitor each and every community placement to ensure that residential arrangements andprogramming areprovidedappropriate to the individuals need and shall document the results ofsuch monitoring. (1981 Consent Order, section 4.D)
iii. The Court Monitor in conjunction with the defendants shall have the duty, obligations and responsibility to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor the implementation ofthis and any further order ofthe Court. The Court Monitor shall report every 90 days on the status and progress ofthe defendants in the implementation of the Court Orders. The defendants shall assist the Court Monitor in securing access to aUpremises, records, documents, class members and other necessary infonnation to assure that the provisions ofthis Order are carried out. (1978 FinalJudgment and Order, section IL6)
IV. The Court Monitor shall verify defendants= compliance with the Court=s Consent Orders by evaluating a random sample ofatleast 100 IHPs each year to detennine whether such individual assessments and IHPs meet professional standards, as required by Court Orders. (1996 Remedial Plan, section III)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders

The parties have reached an agreement on a Court Order providing for the appointment and funding of an Independent Court Monitor to continue to monitor the implementation of the prior Orders in this case. The parties have also reached an agreement on the creation, structure and funding of a durable, independent External Monitoring agency, the Quality Trust, as well as the provision of legal services and lay advocacy for consumers. This agreement has been incorporated into a Consent Order and Setdement Agreement and ftled with the Court on January 19, 2001. The substance of the agreement is as follows:

I.

Structure of the Quality Trust

A. The parties agree to the creation of an independent, nonprofit organization to be named the AQuality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc.@

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B. The Quality Trust is to be incorporated as an independent entity to insulate it from control by the parties.

C. The Quality Trust will provide, inter alia, monitoring, legal services and lay advocacy services for consumers20 in the District of Columbia= s service delivery system.

D. The bylaws of the Quality Trust shall provide that the QualityTrustwillhave an independent Board of Directors and a body of non-voting members. The Mayor shall appoint the initial board from a list of nominees jointly developed by defendants, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor. Each nominee on the list of proposed board members shall be agreed to by all parties. The Board shall thereafter be selfperpetuating. Specifically:

1. The composition and responsibilities of the Board will be established by the organization=s bylaws and will include the following:

a. Each director shall be a natural person of adult age. A director need not be a citizen of the United States. At least eight members of the Board must be residents of the District of Columbia.

b. The initial Board of Directors shall consist of the directors named in the QualityTrust=s Articles of Incorporation and shall hold office until their successors have been duly appointed and qualified. c. At all times following the appointment of the first full thirteen member Board of Directors, the full Board of Directors shall consist of thirteen adult persons designated as follows:

i.

Two family members of people with mental retardation and/or

developmental disabilities. The initial terms of family members shall be two years,

and all subsequent terms shall be three years;

211 THE TERM A CONSUMERS@ REFERS TO ALL RECIPIENTS AND APPLICANTS FOR SERVICES FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBJA=S SERVICE DELIVERYSYSTEMFOR INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES. THE EVANS CLASS MEMBERS (f.E., THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE AT ONE TIME RESIDED ATFORESTHAVEN} COMPRISEA SUBSET OF THIS OVERALL GROUP OF CONSUMERS. THE DEFENDANTS DESIRE NOT TO CREATE A BIFURCATED SYSTEM OF SERVICES FOR ITS CITIZENS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, AND THEREFORE, AGREE THAT THE QUALITY TRUST=S SCOPE OFACTIVITIES SHALL INCLUDE REVIEWOF SERVICES TO CLASS MEMBERS AND NON-CLASS MEMBERS. THE EXTENSION OF THE QUALITY TRUST FUNCTIONS TO CLASS MEMBERS AND NON-CLASS MEMBERS DOES NOT EXTEND THE COURT=SJURISDICTION TO NON-CLASS MEMBERS.

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ii.

Two non-legal advocates for persons who have mental retardation and/or

developmental disabilities. The initial terms of the non-legal advocate members

shall be two years, and all subsequent terms shall be three years;

111. Three persons who have mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities. The initial terms of these members shall be one year, and all subsequent terms shall be three years;

iv. Two professionals with at least ten years background in a service delivery system for people who have mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities. The initial terms of professional members shall be three years and all subsequent terms shall be three years;

v. Two attorneys licensed to practice law. The initial terms of attorney members shall be three years, and all subsequent terms shall be three years; and

vi. Two citizens residing in the District of Columbia. The initial terms of citizen members shall be one year, and all subsequent terms shall be three years.

d. Following the initial term of each Board member, the remaining Board members whose terms are not ending will vote to replace the departing Board member. A majority vote of those remaining Board members is required to fill a vacancy. Further, the Board member must replace a departing board member with an adult person who fits the designated category (e.g., family member, non-legal advocate, person with mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities, professional with ten years experience, attorney, citizen residing in the District of Columbia) of the departing Board member. A member may succeed himself or herself. A Board member may resign prior to the expiration of the full term. If a Board member resigns prior to the expiration of the full term, the other members shall replace that member for the remainder of the unexpired term through the voting process outlined in this section. Votes regarding the appointment, removal, or replacement of a member of the Board of Directors may not be delegated to a committee of the Board.

2. The Quality Trust will be a member organization with non-voting members. The nonvoting members shall be District of Columbia residents with mental retardation, as well as people with other developmental disabilities, who are applicants for or are receiving protections, supports and services in the District of Columbia=s developmental disabilities service delivery system, and all Evans class members.

B. The Quality Trust=s scope of activities shall include review of services to all Evans class members as well as non-class members, who are applicants for or are receiving protections, supports and services in the District of Columbia=s developmental disabilities service delivery system. Pursuant to the Consent Order dated January 19,2001, [hereinafter referred to as AConsent Order®] and the Settlement Agreement dated January 19, 2001, [hereinafter referred to as the ASettlement Agreement®] the Quality Trust will monitor the protections, services and supports provided to these individuals and offer legal services and provide lay advocacy services to these consumers.

II. Functions of the Quality Trust

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In general, the Quality Trust shall advance the individual and collective interests of consumers with developmental disabilities, and in particular Evans class members; monitor the health, safety and welfare of these consumers; and monitor the services and supports provided to these consumers. The Quality Trust shall also provide for individual and/or collective legal services and lay advocacy services for consumers as set forth in greater detail below. The Board of Directors shall periodically determine how to apportion its resources among monitoring, legal representation services and lay advocacy or other strategies, consistent with the Quality Trust=s mission and functions, to advance the individual and/or collective interests of consumers with developmental disabilities, and in particular Evans class members. This process shall be informed by the Defendants= and/or the District of Columbia=s level of compliance with this Plan.

Monitoring

The Quality Trust shall create a Monitoring Unit which shall:

1.

Develop an annual monitoring plan with input from the parties, consumers,

families, providers and advocates.

2.

Monitor the adequacy, safety and quality of consumers= residential and

habilitation programs and supports.

3.

Receive and review all serious incident reports and investigation reports of

serious incidents, with regard to consumers from the District=s Mental

Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration (AMRDDA®) or its

successor, including deaths, and aggregate information regarding all incidents.

4.

Write annual reports, and, in addition, such other periodic reports as the Quality

Trust may determine to be necessary. Such reports are to be made public and

provided to: (A) the Special Master and the parties= counsel ofrecord (until this

case is no longer subject to Court supervision); (B) the defendants and/or the

branches of the District of Columbia, including the Departments of Human

Services and Health (or their successors), the Chief Financial Officer and the

Mayor; and (C) the District of Columbia Council. The reports shall make

observations with regard to the adequacy of the protections, services, and

supports provided to consumers and offer recommendations for any needed

improvements. The defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall respond

prompdy to these reports in writing, including specific corrective action steps

they will implement or have implemented, along with timelines if the actions

have not been implemented, to address current problems.

5.

Receive and review information with regard to the District of Columbia budget

requests for MRDDA or its successor sufficient to permit its timely monitoring

and comment about District of Columbia budget decisions affecting consumers.

6.

Annually inform the defendants and/or the District of Columbia of the

consumer needs, based on information collected during monitoring activities, in

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a timely manner, to permit such information to be considered in developing the District of Columbia=s proposed budget for the service delivery system for individuals with developmental disabilities for the following Fiscal Year.

7.

Apply at least the following standards in its monitoring and reviews: (A) the

specific outcome criteria developed as part of the Evans 2001 Plan; (B)

certification and private accreditation standards; (C) the District of Columbia=s

own standards including licensing requirements; (D) Medicaid and Medicare

regulations and conditions of participation; and (E) the District of Columbia=s

performance standards in private provider contracts.

8.

Be physically co-located with the Evans Independent Court Monitor so as to

enhance communication regarding monitoring activities in order to avoid

redundancy, until the Evans case is no longer subject to regular Court

supervision. The Independent Court Monitor shall remain direcdy responsible

to the Court, and not to the Quality Trust. As each Evans Order is vacated by

the Court, monitoring of corresponding operations shall be transferred from the

Independent Court Monitor to the Quality Trust, and shall no longer be subject

to Court supervision.

III. Quality Trust=s Right to Access and Information
A. The employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access to information that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing the monitoring and lay advocacy duties described in the Settlement Agreement. More specifically, the employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access to consumers, and their residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, documents, records (including medical and departmental) and other materials that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing the duties of the Quality Trust=s monitoring and lay advocacy functions. The Quality Trust may obtain copies of the aforementioned documents, records, and other materials. The defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with information upon request relevant to individual supports and services provided in the District of Columbia=s service delivery system and the Quality Trust may request written responses from the defendants and/or the District of Columbia in this regard. Advance notice of any visit or inspection by the Quality Trust shall not be required. Representatives of the Quality Trust may conduct private interviews and meetings with any individual including employees, contractors or agents of the District of Columbia, as well as all provider staff. The defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall require its employees, contractors, agents, as well as provider staff, to cooperate with the Quality Trust representatives.
B. Attorneys who provide direct legal representation of consumers under a contract or other arrangements with the Quality Trust shall have the right to access their clients= records and any and all information regarding their clients that flow from their attorneyclient relationship. In litigation involving the defendants and/or the District of Columbia, attorneys shall comply with the applicable rules of discovery and procedure.

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C. The Quality Trust shall safeguard the information obtained pursuant to paragraph liLA, as required by all applicable laws and Court Orders protecting the confidentiality of such information.

D. The defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall keep the Quality Trust informed in a timely fashion of relevant budgetary information regarding MRDDA or its successor. The areas about which the defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide information to the Quality Trust include the following:

1. The portions of the budget that address specific consumer needs for residential and day program services, equipment, medical and clinical care, etc.;

2. The portions of the budget that address system needs for managing, monitoring, and overseeing the system of services for consumers;

3. The portions of the budget that address any capital appropriations that may be
required to meet the needs of the consumers (e.g., for construction or
renovation of program sites, or residences);

4.

The amount of the appropriation being requested by the Mayor from the City

Council to meet consumer needs;

5.

The fmal appropriation; and

6. The District of Columbia Department of Health=s proposed and actual budgets which include the District of Columbia=s share of payments to Medicaid providers.

IV. Funding

The provisions of this section are subject to the Court=s approval of the Consent Order flied on January 19,2001.

A.

The defendants and/or the District of Columbia agree to pay the sum of eleven million

dollars for deposit into an interest-bearing fund for the exclusive use of the Quality

Trust.

B. Within 30 days of the filing of the Setdement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, as their initial annual payment, defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds in the amount of two million dollars, prorated for the balance of the District of Columbia=s Fiscal Year 2001 which ends on September 30,2001. On or before October 1, 2011, defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with the difference between two million dollars and the prorated amount paid in Fiscal Year 2001 pursuant to the terms of this paragraph (in Year 2000 dollars).

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C. Commencing October 1, 2001, for a period of five years, or until September 30,2006, the defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds of no less than two million dollars per year (all in Year 2000 dollars).

D. Commencing October 1, 2006, for a period of five years, or until September 30,2011, the defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds in the amount of 1.9 million dollars in Year 2006, 1.8 million dollars in Year 2007, 1.7 million dollars in Year 2008, 1.6 million dollars in Year 2009, and 1.5 million dollars in Year 2010 (all in Year 2000 dollars).

E. The defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide annual operating funding to the Quality Trust on or before October 1 of each Fiscal Year for which the funds are intended (Fiscal Years 2001 to 2011), or as soon thereafter as the budget process will allow.

Nothing in this Plan is intended to preclude any party or the Board of Directors of the Quality Trust from advocating for funds to increase those available to the Quality Trust above two million dollars in Year 2000 dollars in any given year.

The District may seek to recoup expenditures for these programs to the extent authorized by law from the Medical Assistance program (fitle XIX of the Social Security Act).

c. Time Frames for Implementation

Stage I -- 30 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court

Within 15 days of the entry of the Consent Order, the Quality Trust shall be incorporated as a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) corporation under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act, approved August 6, 1962 (76 Stat. 265; D.C. Code 1 29501 et seq.).

Stage II -- 90 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court

1.

The initial board of directors of the Quality Trust will be appointed by the

Mayor from a list jointly developed by the parties.

11.

Defendants and/or the District of Columbia will pay the sum of eleven million

dollars into an interest-bearing fund for the exclusive use of the Quality Trust.

111. Within the specific timeframes established in the Consent Order, the defendants and/or the District of Columbia will transfer annual operating funds in the amount of two million dollars, prorated for the balance of the District of Columbia=s Fiscal Year 2001 which ends on September 30, 2001.

1v. The Board of Directors of the Quality Trust establishes qualifications and salaries for the Executive Director and other positions to be filled permanently.

Stage III -- 180 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court

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1. The Quality Trust Board will hire an Executive Director.
11. The Quality Trust Executive Director and Board will develop a budget for operations and commence hiring staff.
iii. The Quality Trust will commence monitoring responsibilities.
1v. The Quality Trust will determine whether to directly provide or contract for lay advocacy services.
v. The Quality Trust will commence negotiations with an appropriate legal service provider for the provision of legal representation services for consumers.
d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

i. Creation of the Quality Trust and payment of $11 million plus an annual contribution for operating funds as specified in the Consent Order.

ii.Appointment of a board of directors by the Mayor from a list jointly developed by the parties.

111.

Enactment of legislation as needed to empower the Quality Trust, the legal

representation service and the lay advocacy program to carry out the functions,

powers and duties described in this Plan, or the accomplishment of the objectives of

such legislation by alternative means.

iv.

The Quality Trust and its components have access to the facilities, people

and information required to carry out their functions.

v. The parties will ensure that the Quality Trust complies with the Settlement Agreement filed on January 19,2001.

vi.

The defendants and/or the District of Columbia respond promptly in

writing to the reports of the Quality Trust, including specific action steps they have

implemented or will implement, if any. After appropriate investigation, if the

defendants and/or the District of Columbia do not intend to take remedial action,

they shall inform the Quality Trust of the reasons for their decision. If the defendants

and/or the District of Columbia determine that they will take remedial action, they

shall inform the Quality Trust of the timelines for taking such action.

e. Standard of Compliance

Full Compliance f. Method of Assessing Compliance

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i. Verify that the Quality Trust has been created, staffed, funded as required by the Consent Order and adequately empowered by law to carry out its functions.
ii. Interview a sample of staff of the Quality Trust, the lay advocacy program and the legal representation service to ascertain that they have adequate access to facilities, people and information to perform their functions.
E. GOAL --ADVOCACY FOR CONSUMERS-- (1978 FINAL JUDGMENT & ORDER, SECTIONII. 7.D; COURT ORDER, FEBRUARY 10, 1999)
a. Related Court Orders
i Defendants shaDrequest each attomeyrepresenting class members to reportany deficiencies found in the implementation oftheir clients= IHPs to the clients= case managers at MRDDA and to the Court Monitor. (1996 Remedial Plan, section III)
ii. Defendants shaD infonn attomeys appointed to represent class members in Superior Court commitment proceedings that they are responsible for representing their clients= rights under the Evans Consent Orders and any applicable District ofColumbia legislation. (1996 Remedial Plan, section III)
iii Defendants wiDcreate, develop andmaintain mechanisms to monitor the system ofcommunity services to assure that communityliving arrangements, programs and other services of the necessary quality and quantity are continuously provided to consumers in the least separate, most integrated, least restrictive community settings, whichplan shaDinclude, butnotbelimited to, theprovision ofadvocates to assist in the protection of the rights ofeach consumer. (1978 Finalfudgment and Order, section IL7.d)
iv. The SpecialMasterY shaD develop andrecommend to the Court aplan Y which shaD include Y individual and community advocacy. The steps necessary to coordinate existing mechanisms and to develop needed mechanisms for the advocacy ofthe interests ofthe class members, on an individualandcommunitywide basis, in compliance with Court-ordered requirements, including but not limited to the use of court-appointed attomeys, guardianships, and medical decision-makingprocedures for class members. (February 10, 1999 Court Order)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders
i. Legal Representation Services
The Quality Trust shall not provide direct legal representation to any individual but may contract with or otherwise arrange for legal representation services for consumers from other
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independent legal service providers. The scope and content of the contract or other arrangement will be negotiated by the Quality Trust and the provider. The Quality Trust shall oversee the performance of the provider under the contract or other arrangement to ensure that consumers are getting the legal representation services they require. The Quality Trust shall:

1. Make legal representation services available to any consumer who is need of representation. The Quality Trust=s legal representatives are authorized to take whatever steps are necessary and appropriate to represent their clients, including but not limited to negotiations, litigation, advocacy or otherwise resolving the consumer=s concerns to the satisfaction of the consumer or his/her legal representative.

2. Work to raise the level of advocacy amongst court-appointed attorneys by, for example, providing training, drafting model pleadings and developing in-house appellate advocacy capacity. The Quality Trust=s legal representatives will supplement (not replace) the existing pool of attorneys appointed by Superior Court and will seek to be appointed in cases of Evans class members who have heretofore been deprived competent representation.

11.

Lay Advocacy

Because some of the advocacy needs of the consumers do not require the services of an attorney and can be provided more effectively and less expensively through the availability of lay advocates, the Quality Trust will create a lay advocacy program which shall provide the following services:

1. Attend ISP and other team meetings for consumers for whom they are responsible and advocate for the needs and choices of the consumers at these meetings. The advocates will attempt at all times to facilitate the consumer=s self-expression, or in the alternative, will consult with duly appointed representatives or surrogate decision-makers, where appropriate.

2.

Regularly interact with the case managers of the consumers on their caseloads to

keep abreast of any issues impacting on the protections, services and supports

provided to consumers.

3.

Receive and review serious incident reports and investigation reports for

consumers for whom they are responsible, and advocate for the consumers=

safety and well-being in the course of such investigations.

4.

Receive and review all monitoring reports related to the consumers on their

caseloads and follow up to ensure that necessary corrective action is taken.

5.

Periodically visit consumers receiving residential and day treatment services to

ensure that consumers are safe and satisfied with the services and supports they

are receiving and that the services and supports are adequate to meet the

individualized needs of the consumers.

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6. Advocate on behalf of individuals and/or groups of consumers to ensure that their complaints are investigated in a timely fashion and that the consumers are satisfied with the resolution. In the event that the time frames required for resolution are not complied with or that the proposed resolution is otherwise unsatisfactory, the advocate shall consult with the consumer(s), or other appropriate decision-maker, to determine the appropriate course of action.

a.

The lay advocacy program and the legal services component shall

establish a program to facilitate the immediate referral and coordination

of cases requiring the assistance of an attorney.

b.

Consumers may seek immediate referral to the legal services component

from the lay advocacy program.

7.

Attend court hearings for the consumers on their caseloads and work with the

assigned attorneys in ensuring that consumers= needs for protections, services

and supports are met.

8.

Some consumers will have family members, guardians or friends who will serve

as their advocates while others will rely on the services of paid lay advocates.

The advocacy program will provide training not only to the lay advocates, but

also to such volunteer advocates.

9.

This advocacy program will supplement (not replace) the existing pool of

advocates acting on behalf of family, friends, or those appointed by Superior

Court or appointed pursuant to existing Orders in this case. The lay advocacy

program will prioritize cases of consumers who heretofore have not received

advocacy services.

c. Time Frames for Implementation

Stage IC180 Days from the filing of the Plan
i. The Quality Trust will determine the scope of the contract for legal representation services and commence negotiation with qualified providers of legal services.
ii. The Quality Trust determines the staffing and organization of the lay advocacy program. iii. Legislation needed to implement the legal representation and lay advocacy programs is developed cooperatively by the parties (other than the plaintiff-intervenor) and submitted to the City Council.
Stage II B240 Days from the filing of the Plan
1. The Quality Trust determines whether to directly provide or contract for lay advocacy services. The Quality Trust or the contractor commences hiring of lay advocates.
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11. The Quality Trust develops a training program for the lay advocates which will also be available to advocates appointed by the Superior Court as well to family members and others who serve as volunteer advocates.
ill. The Quality Trust identifies class members and other consumers who do not have access to advocates and legal representatives and brings this need to the attention of the Superior Court.
1v. The Quality Trust enters into a contract for legal representation services. v. Necessary legislation is enacted, or the accomplishment of the objectives of such
legislation by alternative means.
Stage III -- 360 Days from the filing of the Plan
1. The legal representation service and the lay advocacy program are funded, staffed and operational.
11. All lay advocates employed by the Quality Trust have received training to perform their duties.
ill. The Quality Trust has advocated with the Superior Court for the steps necessary to ensure that every consumer who has the right to legal representation has access to such representation, and that a lay advocacy program is available to provide such advocacy to each consumer who has a right to such advocacy.
d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance
1. Creation of the Quality Trust and payment of $11 million plus an annual contribution for operating funds as specified in the Consent Order filed on January 19, 2001.
11. Legislation needed to empower the legal representation service and the lay advocacy program to carry out the functions, powers and duties described above is enacted, or the accomplishment of the objectives of such legislation by alternative means.
ill. The Quality Trust and its components have access to the facilities, people and information required to carry out their functions.
1v. The parties will ensure that the Quality Trust complies with the Setdement Agreement filed on January 19, 2001.
v. The defendants and/or the District of Columbia respond prompdy in writing to the reports of the Quality Trust, including specific action steps they have implemented or will implement, if any. After appropriate investigation, if the defendants and/or the District of Columbia do not intend to take remedial action, they shall inform the Quality Trust of the reasons for their decision. If the defendants and/or the District
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of Columbia determine that they will take remedial action, they shall inform the Quality Trust of the timelines for taking such action.
e. Standard of Compliance
High Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance
i. Verify that the Quality Trust has been created, staffed, funded and adequately empowered by law.
ii. Verify that the Legal representation service and lay advocacy programs have been created, funded, staffed and legally empowered to perform the functions described in the Plan.
iii. Interview a sample of staff of the Quality Trust, the lay advocacy program and the legal representation service to ascertain that they have adequate access to facilities, people and information to perform their functions.
F. GOAL- ADEQUATE BUDGET B (1981 COURT ORDER, SECTION 2.D)
a. Related Court Orders
i Each fiscal year, the defendants shaD submit to the parties and the Court a report which shaDdetail the resources affecting class members (including the numbers and types of staff, the amounts and types of supplies and equipment, the numbers and types of vehicles, and all other resources provided for in the budget submission) which the budget wouldprovide if fully funded The report shaD be accompanied by the most recent needs assessment and shaD be in a fonnat which pennits ready comparison of resources needed versus the resources sought. If the budget seeks less resources than needed by class members, the report shaDexplain the reason therefor and how and at what future date the defendants propose to obtain the additionalresources required Nothing herein shaDpreclude theplaintiffs from contending at any time that defendants are required, at that time, to seek sufficient resources to meet all identified needs. (1981 Court Order, section 2.d)
11. Ifthe plaintiffs or the Court Monitor believe that the report is not complete, the defendants must re-submit the report in an agreed-upon fashion within fifteen days. (1983 Consent Order, section IL3.)
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iii. EveJ.y sixmonths, MRDDA shaD compile andshaDsubmit to theparties, the CourtMonitor and the SpecialMaster: 1) an overaUassessmentofMRDDA 's aggregate client habilitation needs; 2) a recitation of the kind ofservices required to meet the habilitation needs ofthe MRDDA clients, as indicated in their IHPs; and 3) a listing ofaUhabilitation needs indicatedin the IHPs of MRDDA clients for which service has not been provided or is not available. (1996 Remedial Plan, section III)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders
The defendants will keep plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenor, the Court Monitor, the Special Master and the Quality Trust informed in a timely fashion about at least three different types of the budget information, in order to provide them with the opportunity to advocate on behalf of the needs of consumers before appropriate officials in the Executive and Legislative branches of the District government.
A. The portions of the budget that address specific consumer needs for residential and dqy program
services, equipment, medical and clinical care, etc. These specific consumer needs should be identified in the ISP process, and aggregated in order to enable the defendants to determine the appropriations that would be required to meet the identified needs of consumers. (See Goal A (1) above.) For budgetary purposes, it is important that the aggregation of needs occurs early enough in the budget cycle so that the parties can be informed of the amount of the appropriation that will be required to meet the identified needs of the consumers.
B. The portion of the budget that addresses !)'Stem needs for managing, monitoring and overseeing the !)'Stem ofservices to consumers. These needs would include appropriations for the support of
staff who perform quality assurance, investigations, management information, and monitoring and case management functions. The determination of needs should be based upon agreed-upon staffing ratios for these functions, similar to the ratios for the case management function. Such ratios would permit an objective process of determination of need, and permit external review of adequacy of the budget using objective criteria, by the Court Monitor, plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenor and by the Quality Trust and its lay advocacy program. Also included would be the staffmg needs of the MRDDA Administrator=s office to perform the various policy-making and policy-executing functions of the office, as well as other administrative needs.
C. Theportion ofthe budget that addresses a'!Y capital appropriations that mqy be required to meet the needs ofthe consumers (e.g.,for construction or renovation ofprogram sites, or residences).
Specifically, the plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenor, Special Master, and Court Monitor will be informed of:21
1. The total amount of the appropriation that would be required under paragraphs A, B and C;
21 THE QUALITY TRUST=S ACCESS TO BUDGET INFORMATION IS ADDRE5SED EARLIER IN THEPLAN UNDER GOALD.3.B. SECTIONIII.D ON P. 47.
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2. The amount of the appropriation that will be requested by the MRDDA in its budget request within the Department of Human Services, prior to the submission of the MRDDA budget request;
3. The amount of the appropriation being requested from the Mayor=s Office of Management and Budget by the Department of Human Services and other units of the District Government for services to MRDDA consumers;
4. The amount of the appropriation being requested by the Mayor from the City Council to meet the needs identified in paragraphs A, B, & C; and
5. The final appropriation that will be available to meet the needs identified in paragraphs A, B, & C, as well as the means that will be used to meet these needs if the appropriation is less than that initially determined to be necessary.
c. Time Frames for Implementation
Stage I B120 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court
1. Defendants will develop a set of data driven criteria for the staffmg needs described in paragraph B.
11. Defendants will develop a fiscal calendar to implement this process in the next budget cycle.
Stage II B 180 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court
The budget information will be forwarded to the Quality Trust and advocacy agencies as well as the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor.
Stage III B 240 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court
The budget information should be sent to the Quality Trust and advocacy agencies, phasing out the plaintiffs= and plaintiff-intervenor=s routine receipt of this information as the Court Orders are vacated and dismissed.
d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance
i. Defendants will develop the objective criteria for determining staffmg needs for various functions in paragraph B, and will utilize these criteria in formulating budget requests.
ii. The computerized ISP process will be used to aggregate consumers= needs for the purposes of planning and budget making, and these needs will determine the budget requests for services and supports required.
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iii. The defendants will develop a Fiscal Calendar which identifies the dates or time periods within which information about the budget process will be provided to the Special Master, Court Monitor, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor or their successors as described above.
e. Standard of Compliance
Full Compliance
f. Method of Assessing Compliance
Actual provision of this information to the Special Master, Court Monitor, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor or their successors as described above for two successive years, demonstrating that the staffing ratios and computerized ISP process are being utilized to determine the budget for the support of MRDDA consumers.
G. GOAL- TIMELY PAYMENT OF VENDORS B (1983 CONSENT ORDER, SECTION IX1 0; 1996 REMEDIAL PLAN, SECTIONl.B)
a. Related Court Orders
1. Defendants shall submit to the parties and Court a report indicating the time frame within which theypropose to process contracts andrequests forproposals for supplies, equipment, and services benefiting class members. Defendants shaD exert theirmaximum efforts to adhere to the time frames adopted and shaD make available to counsel for theplaintiffs copies ofaUrequests forproposals at the time issuance, and copies ofaU contracts at the time ofexecution. (1981 Consent Order, section 6)
ii. The City Administrator shaD establish a process for the negotiation and final conclusion ofcontracts with aU vendors providing services to class members, so that aU class providers have contracts ofat least one year's duration with the Districtgovemment. Ifthe defendants fail to conclude aU outstanding contract negotiations orsubmit unconcluded contracts to binding arbitration by October 31, 1996, defendants shaD be fined $1,000 per day for each vendor providing services to class members without a contract (not including temporaty contracts). Fines shaDbe deposited with a Clerk ofthe Courtin the defendants' civil fines account. (1996 Remedial Plan, section LE)
iii. Defendants shaDinsure the aU vendors arepaid forgoods andservices no later than thirty days foUowing their submission of acceptable vouchers. (1983 Consent Order, IX10; 1996 Remedial Plan, section LB)
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iv. On or before October 31, 1996, defendants, in conjunction with the plaintiffs and the Special Master, shaD submit to the Court a proposed Order for the timely, predictable payment of Evans class providers. (1996 Remedial Plan, section 4)
. Non-Medicaid..o. avments
v. The defendants shaDinsure that aU vendors arepaid forgoods and services no later than thirty days following their submission ofacceptable vouchers. (1983 Consent Order, IX10) MRDDA shall reject or accept and present to the Controller of the Department of Human Services aU undisputed payment invoices within seven working days ofsubmission by the provider. The DHS Controller shaDaccept orreject such invoices (except that the Controllermaynot reject such invoices due to the unavailability offunds), assign vouchernumbers to the invoices, andpresent the accepted vouchers to the District ofColumbia Treasurer for payment, within five working days of their submission to the Controller by MRDDA. The DC Treasurer or the ChiefFinancial Officer shaD pay aU vouchers submitted by MRDDA and accepted by the DHS Controller within eight working days thereafter. (1996 Remedial Plan, section LB)
VI. The Director or Controller ofthe DHS, or the ChiefFinancial Officer, orhis or her designee, shaDsubmit to the Court (with copies to the CourtMonitorand the Special Master), no later than the last day ofeach month, a signed statement made under oath, containing each ofthe following:
A list ofclass careproviders to whom paymenthas not been made within thirty calendar days of their submission ofacceptable invoices to the MRDDA, or any other agency ofthe District ofColumbia.
A statement that, to the best ofhis orherknowledge, the affianthas made a concerted andgood faith effort to determine the payment status ofaU provider invoices. (1996 Remedial Plan, section L C)
vii. With respect to non-Medicaid pqyments found to be overdue, diftndants shall be assessed a coercive fine rif twice the amount overdue. (1996 Remedial Plan, section I. D)
viii. Coercivefines shall bepaid to the Clerk rifthe Court andplaced in a segregated accountfrom which the Court, at the recommendation rifthe Special Master, mqy orderpqyment to providers. (1996 Remedial Plan, section I.D)
Medicaid bavments ~ 0
zx. With respect to Medicaid pqyments submitted l:ry class providers on or before the fifth dqy rif each month, claims are to be processed l:ry the 15th rifthat month so that the Medicaid check register mqy be tran.iferred to HCF l:ry that date. HCF shall submit the Medicaid check register to the DC Treasurer within seven dqys rifits receipt. The DC Treasurer or the ChiifFinancial Officer shall mail checks to the providers listed on the Medicaid check register as eligible for Medicaid reimbursement, for the full amount rif the reimbursement (or that amount which is undisputed, for reasons other than the
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unavailability offunds), no later than thefifth dqy ofthe next month. (1996 Remedial Plan, section
I. B)
x. The Director or Controller ofthe DHS or the ChiefFinancial Officer shall submit to the Court, with copies to the Court Monitor and the Special Master, no later than the last dqy of each month a signed statement, made under oath and notarized, containing each of the following:
A list of care providers of the class who have not been paid full Medicaid reimbursement within 30 calendar dqys after the submission oftheir invoices to the processing contractor.
A statement that to the best ofhis or her knowledge, the ajjiant has made a concerted andgood faith effort to determine the pqyment status ofallprovider invoices. (1996 Remedial Plan,
section I. C)
xz. At the end of the first month in which defendants report that there are outstanding Medicaid pqyments notpaid within thirry dqys ofsubmission ofan acceptable invoice, defendants shall be assessed a coercivefine of$5,000 a dqy, until the overdue pqyments are made. Civilfines shall be paid to the Clerk ofthe Court andplaced in the segregated accountfrom which the court, at the recommendation of
the Special Master mqy order pqyment to providers. (1996 Remedial Plan, section J.D.)
xzz. If the DHS controller, or the Ciry Administrator, is unable to bring about compliance of the
defendants with this RemedialPlan, he or she shall identify I?J name andposition those individuals in
the District ofColumbia government whose action or inaction precludes defendants= compliance. Such
information shall be provided in a report to the Court, with copies to the parties, the Special Master,
and the Court Monitor, within 30 dqys of each instance of noncompliance. (1996 Remedial Plan,
section IV)
xiii. The Special Master mqy hear the claim of atry class care provider whose undisputed or accepted claim has not been paid I?J the defendants within thirry dqys of the date of submission to the appropriate agenry. The Special Master mqy then recommend to the Courtfindings offact and conclusions oflaw
regarding whether the claimant-provider should bepaid withfundsfrom the civilfines account. (1996 Remedial Plan, section J.D.)
xiv. Defendants shall maintain their vendor hotline and shallprovide accurate, current information to care
providers about the status of the invoices on the vendor hotline to the greatest extent possible, until
defendants demonstrate to the Court that maintaining the vendor hotline is no longer necessary. (1996 Remedial Plan, section I.B)
b. Necessary Tasks to Implement the Court Orders
The defendants continue to report monthly on the timeliness of the Medicaid and nonMedicaid payments, with copies to the Special Master, the Court Monitor and plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor (and when the Quality Trust is created, to the Quality Trust and its lay advocacy program). The report should clearly indicate the payments that have not been made on a timely basis, based on the date of submission of vouchers by vendors.
Defendants will comply with the contracting provisions of the Court Orders.
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c. Time Frames for Implementation

This obligation is immediate and continuing. d. Specific Outcome Criteria for Determining Compliance

1.

Defendants comply with the provisions regarding budgeting.

11.

All payments are made on a timely basis for two consecutive years as required

by the Court Orders.

111. Defendants comply with the contracting provisions of the Court Orders.

e. Standard of Compliance

Full Compliance f. Method of Assessing Compliance
i. Review of a 10 percent random sample of vouchers/requests for payment by Medicaid and non-Medicaid providers. ii. Interviews with representatives of 10 percent of the providers selected at random. H. ESSENTIAL SYSTEMIC CONDITIONS

In addition to the specific actions described above, the parties also discussed several other actions that would assist the District in developing additional options for the cost-effective implementation of the goals of this action -- individualized services in the least restrictive environment to the persons served by the mental retardation and developmental disabilities service delivery system. A. Medicaid Reforms
As the Committee reviewed the present mental retardation and developmental disabilities service system, it became clear that there are significant opportunities to expand the range of services and supports available to consumers and others in need of assistance from MRDDA, while offsetting the cost of this expansion to the District. The vehicle for achieving this result is an amendment to the District=s Medicaid plan to take fuller advantage of options under the Medicaid waiver program. The current Medicaid waiver is narrowly drawn and has thus far served a very limited number of consumers. Unlike almost every state where Medicaid waiver funded services serve more than half of the persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities, in the District, waiver-funded services account for only a small
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handful of consumers. At the same time, the cost of some of the existing programs that could

be eligible for Federal Financial Participation is borne entirely by the District. Thus, the

committee deems it important that the District take fuller advantage of the opportunities

available under the Medicaid waiver.

1.

Medicaid waiver to provide adequate funding of implementation of the Plan

The Planning Committee agreed that the District would direcdy or through contract:

(a) Articulate policy options for the District to carry out purposes ofHome

and Community Based Services (HCBS) and will propose changes in the

waiver to maximize reimbursement and the provision of services and

supports in the least restrictive, most integrated, community-based

settings.

(b) Conduct quality reviews of the provider network to evaluate

appropriateness and timeliness of care and recommend procedures for

Medicaid compliance, potential quality improvement and improved

access to services.

(c) Recommend criteria to assess consumers' level of functioning in order

to determine the appropriate utilization of ICF/MR facilities.

(d) Assess Community Residential Facilities= (CRFs) current compliance

with Medicaid HCBS standards and recommend a plan for qualifying

CRFs for Medicaid reimbursement under the HCBS waiver.

(e) Evaluate first year of HCBS implementation, consumer screening,

utilization management and access to services in order to:

(1) Identify target population and deftne eligibility criteria;

(2) Assess needs of the population and identify alternative

residential and day programs needed;

(3) Develop billing documentation necessary for waiver

(4) Identify consumers who can stay in their current residential

settings, receive the quality of service currendy provided and

qualify for waiver reimbursement, (e.g., CRF residents receiving

appropriate quality of care);

(5) Identify consumers who can stay in their current residential

settings and qualify to receive waiver reimbursable services

when Medicaid waiver quality standards of care are achieved;

(6) Identify consumers currendy residing in ICFs/MR who, in light

of available HCBS, do not need ICF/MR level of care and

recommend a plan for the development of new less intensive

programs or the conversion of existing ICF/MR programs to

less restrictive service models;

(7) Recommend optimal organizational structure and management

policies for implementation of the waiver; and

(8) Develop options regarding the schedule for obtaining federal

2.

Day Treatment

The defendants will:

(a) modify the defmition of day treatment program for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement so as to permit habilitation services to be
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provided in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive community setting appropriate to the needs of each consumers; or

(b) modify the Medicaid waiver so as to include day treatment

programs in such settings.

The District will allocate funds for the performance of these functions direcdy or

through a contract with an appropriate vendor. Funds necessary to implement the

Medicaid recommendations that are adopted by the D.C. government will be secured

through MRDDA and MAA appropriations. Funds necessary to provide waiver

reimbursable services will be secured through Medicaid.

3.

Completion dates

Stage I B 90 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court

1.

Produce plans of improvement for HCFA compliance.

2.

Recommend a plan for quality improvement, performance indicators

and outcome measures.

Stage liB 180 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court

1.

The District will conduct and report findings of an evaluation of the

programmatic effects and the fiscal impact of the reformed waiver.

2.

Defendants will:

(a) Transfer a minimum of 75 people to the waiver and develop a

phase-in schedule for complete implementation and authorize

and complete service plans for people in CRFs who meet levels

of care and service quality criteria and transfer them to the

wa1ver.

(b) Assist providers to convert to HCBS programs and provide

technical assistance, business plans and improvement plans.

Stage III B 240 Days from the Filing of the Plan with the Court 22

Evaluate and expand the waiver to create opportunities for provision of services and

supports in the least restrictive environment.

B.

Legislation

The parties recognize that many of the existing statutes governing services and supports

to persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities require revision and updating

to reflect contemporary approaches to the provision of services and supports. The parties have,

through discussion, developed a set ofLegislative Principles to guide them through the process

of developing and proposing legislation (see Appendix). To this end, the parties intend to work

cooperatively to develop and propose legislation as follows:

1.

Steps needed to effectuate the Plan:

1. Access to services (class members exempted from fund availability

condition);

22 THE PLAINTIFF- INTERVENOR, UNITED STATES, TAKES NO POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OFLEGISLATIONAS REFERENCED IN THE PLAN OR TO THE LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES APPENDED TO THIS DOCUMENT.
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2. Service planning B ISP;

3.

Follow up and tracking;

4. Needs assessment;

5.

Confidentiality; and

6.

Guardian/conservatorship/representative payee provisions.

2.

Funds needed:

The Special Master will hire experts to draft proposed legislation.

3.

Completion dates

Stage I-- January 1. 2000

Identify legislation to be proposed and amended.

Statement of Principles by 12/15/99.

Identify experts for discrete drafting projects.

Special Master will hire experts.

Stage II B60 Days From the Filing of the Plan with the Court

1. Experts to submit drafts to Committee as completed along with short

descriptive rationale for the proposed changes.

2. Committee to review submitted drafts.

3. Defendants to find legislative sponsors.

Stage III B90 Days From the Filing of the Plan with the Court

1. Defendants will write statements setting forth the rationale for each proposed

legislative change.

2. Sponsors will introduce legislative proposals.

3. Defendants will support proposals through written and oral testimony,

responses to information requests and otherwise.

Pursuant to the Court=s February 10, 1999 Order and with agreement of the parties to this action indicated below, the Special Master and the parties submit and recommend approval of the foregoing 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams.

Respectfully submitted,

MARGARET G. FARREll, Esq. Special Master, Evans v. Williams 1100 New York Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 408B4674
For Defendants:
ROBERT R. RIGSBY Corporation Counsel, DC
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 67 of 75
JOHN GREENBAUGH Senior Deputy Corporation Counsel
ROBERT UTIGER, No. 437130 Deputy Corporation Counsel
MARIA C. AMATO, No. 414935 Senior Counsel for the Equity Division 441 Fourth Street, NW Room6S059 Washington, DC 200001 (202) 724-6642
For Plaintiffs:
JOSEPH B. TULMAN, No. 297671 Counsel for Plaintiffs UDC David A. Clark School of Law 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Building 38, Room 207 Washington DC 20008 (202) 274-7317
KELLY BAGBY, No. 462380 Counsel for Plaintiffs University Legal Services 301 I Street, NE, Suite 202 Washington, DC 20002 (202) 547-0198
For Plaintiff Intervenor:
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief Special Litigation Section
ELIZABETH JOHNSON Deputy Chief Special Litigation Section
RICHARD J. FARANO, No. 424225
United States Department ofJustice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section 601 D. Street, NW, Room 5118
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 68 of 75 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 307-3116
#95797vl
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Appendix -EVANS LEGISLATIVEPRINCIPLES
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
1. People with disabilities have the same rights as all other citizens and residents. They will establish, with assistance when necessary, where they want to live, with whom they want to live, and how their time will be occupied.
2. All recipients shall enjoy fundamental rights relative to the provision of services and supports. These fundamental rights, consistent with personal choice, include the right to:
A. Be treated with respect and enjoy personal privacy;
B. Worship in accordance with the individual=s beliefs;
C. Manage one's own financial affairs and assets and if unable to do so, receive regular accounts of all funds belonging to the individual that are held or administered by others;
D. Normal living conditions, including the areas of dress, grooming, movement, sexual expression and relationships, and use of personal time;
F. Be taught skills needed for the tasks of daily living;
G. To have reasonable visits, exercise, communication, diet and nutrition;
H. Receive all services and supports identified in an individual plan for services and supports within a reasonably prompt period of time, including medical, dental, adaptive equipment and other health related services, in a manner which insures accessibility, quality and continuity of care. FREEDOM FROM HARM
3. Individuals shall be free from mental and physical abuse, seclusion and other harm, including clinically inappropriate physical restraint.
4. Chemical restraints shall not be administered on an Aas needed® basis (PRN), and shall be considered a controlled procedure subject to review under District policy governing controlled procedures.
5. Upon reasonable belief that a recipient is at imminent risk of serious harm due to his or her circumstances or situation, the District shall take all steps necessary to immediately protect the individual.
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6. Any individual or entity who subjects an applicant or recipient ofservices to harm or otherwise violates the fundamental rights ofan individual with developmental disabilities shall be subjected to the imposition of civil fines or other appropriate sanctions.
7. The District must refer abuse and neglect to appropriate law enforcement agencies for prosecution under law and shall recommend the enactment of such penal statutes as may be necessary to protect vulnerable adults.z3 INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
8. The needs and desires of the individual shall govern the development of all plans of services and supports. To that end, all District agencies must establish a structure that enables them to coordinate their efforts to facilitate the provision of services appropriate according to the individual=s needs and desires. Coordination contemplates the removal of administrative obstacles for the provision of services for an individual, as well as the transition from one agency=s service system to that of another.
9. All recipients shall receive services and supports in the least restrictive environment, least separate, most integrated that is appropriate to an individual=s needs. Toward this end, each individual shall be offered a choice of services and supports:
(A) in less rather than more structured settings;
23 THE FOLLOWING HAS BEENPROPOSED AS LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN SUCHPENAL STATUTES:
A. ANYPERSON WHO KNOWINGLY OR WILLFULLY OR THROUGH CULPABLE
NEGLIGENCE, FAILS TO DISCHARGEA DUTY TO PROVIDE CAREAND SERVICES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH OFA VULNERABLEADULT (AS DEFINED IN STATUTE} THATA PRUDENTPERSON WOULD DEEMESSENTIAL FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THEADULTIS GUILTYOF CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF THE VULNERABLE ADULT.
B. ANYPERSON WHO INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLYASSAULTS OR
THREATENS TO ASSAULT, UNREASONABLY CONFINES OR INVOLUNTARILY SECLUDESA VULNERABLEADULT (AS DEFINED IN STATUTE} IS GUILTYOF CRIMINAL ABUSE OF THE VULNERABLE ADULT.
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(B) in smaller rather than larger living homes; (C) in independent rather than dependent living situations;
(D) in integrated community settings;
(E) that are consistent with and based upon an individual=s voluntary and informed choices and preferences;
(F) that are culturally and linguistically competent.
10. Each individual shall be presumed to be competent (irrespective of commitment status) and to have capacity to make choices and decisions. An individual with developmental disabilities who lacks cognitive, communicative and educational capacity to make autonomous decisions shall be provided with assistance in making decisions and/or expressing consent.
SUBSTITUTED -TUDGMENT
11. In the event that an individual lacks capacity to make decisions:
A. Assistance in decision making should be the least restrictive intervention
B. Surrogate decision makers must use the substituted judgment standard rather than the best interests standard (i.e.,, the decision should be based on what the person would have decided if the person had capacity, rather than what the surrogate believes to be in the person=s best interest);
C. Limited guardianship is preferable to plenary guardianship;
D. Guardians and other surrogates shall be required to have regular training about the rights, roles and responsibilities of a substitute decision maker;
E. No individual who operates or is an employee of an entity in which an incapacitated person receives treatment, support and services can serve as guardian for the incapacitated person;
F. Guardianships will be reviewed at least semi-annually at which point the guardian will make a report in writing to the Court.
TRAINING
12. Any entity or individual C including administrative and community support staff-providing supports and services will receive training and will be, consistent with this training requirement, demonstrably competent and knowledgeable prior to providing supports and services and at all other times.
13. Any individual providing supports and services shall have demonstrable knowledge of the needs of the individual to whom they provide service and supports, including but not limited to the contents of the individual service plan, the medical needs of the individual and
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other critical information. Persons providing itinerant services (e.g., transportation) will have demonstrable knowledge ofrelevant medical and other health related needs of those individuals to whom services are provided.
14. All District staff with oversight, certification, case management and investigative responsibilities must demonstrate competence in the areas enumerated above in Principle #12.
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS
15. All services required by a recipient shall be identified in full in all assessments and plans of services and supports, whether or not such services are currently available. The District [Administration], moreover, must provide each recipient all supports and services identified in that person=s plan of supports and services within a reasonably prompt period of time.
16. Applicants for services and supports shall be deemed presumptively eligible for services if they have previously received or been identified as eligible for services and supports as a consequence of their developmental disability by a unit of government, including services for special education, rehabilitation services or other vocational rehabilitation services.
17. The Developmental Disabilities Agency under the Department of Human Services is the single point of entry for services for persons with developmental disabilities. It is the lead agency for the provision of all human services for this population. However, statutorily mandated administrative linkages must be created to include coordination between the developmental disabilities agency and:
A. the Commission on Mental Health Services; B. Adult Protective Services; C. the Licensing and Regulatory Administration; D. the Medical Assistance Administration; E. the Rehabilitation Services Administration; F. District of Columbia Public Schools; and G. Child and Family Services Administration.
18. Each person applying for services and supports has the right to notice of eligibility or rejection of their completed application within 30 days, or sooner if reasonably necessary in emergent circumstances. In order to ensure this notification is timely, each applicant will be assigned a lay advocate upon requesting an application or seeking to apply. Denial of an application or a failure to act in a timely fashion upon an application shall trigger the access for the applicant to the grievance procedures, including appeal rights.
19. Any person who was a resident of Forest Haven is entitled to supports and services in perpetuity.
20. To be eligible for supports and services from the District, an individual (other than former residents ofForest Haven) must have a developmental disability, which means a severe and chronic disability of a person which:
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A. Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment of combination of mental and physical impairments;
B. Is manifested before the person attains age 22;
C. Is likely to continue indefinitely;
D. Results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activity:
1. Self-care, 2. Receptive and expressive language, 3. Learning, 4. Mobility, 5. Self-direction, 6. Capacity for independent living, 7. Economic self-sufficiency;
E. Reflects the person=s need for combination and sequence of special interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of life long or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.
ADVOCACY AND MONITORING
21. The Lay advocacy program, External Monitor and any legal representative shall have unfettered access to all entities providing services and supports. They shall also have unfettered access to all relevant information and documents (and shall receive copies upon request) related to the supports and services, including but not limited individual consumer=s incident reports, medical and other records, and non-privileged quality assurance records.
22. The following entities and individuals shall be promptly informed of any serious incidents:
A. The individual=s guardian and conservator; B. The Lay advocacy program; C. The legal representative, when applicable; D. The independent, external monitor; E. Any governmental agency as required by policy or law.
23. The Lay advocacy program shall be promptly provided the names and contact information of all applicants to assist them with the application process.
24. The Lay advocacy program [and the External Monitor] shall receive notice of all complaints ftled with the District=s office assigned to receive and resolve grievances.
25. A competent, comprehensive, and independent external monitoring system shall be developed and fully endowed to monitor compliance with local and federal standards, the
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Orders and decrees of Evans v. Williams, the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams, and these principles. The review shall monitor on a regular basis the availability of services, continuity and coordination of care, coverage and authorization of services, consumer rights, grievance system, sub-contractual relations and delegation, etc.
26. All applicants for services and supports and recipients of services and supports are entitled to the assistance of a lay advocate. A list of applicants will be sent to the Lay advocacy program weekly so that office can assure all applications are completed and that applicants are aware of their rights. Any applicant appealing the denial of, or failure to act in a timely fashion upon, an application for services and supports can access legal representation through the Lay advocacy program. All applicant appeals must originate in the Lay advocacy program.
27. Any recipient of services is entitled to legal representation at any time.
GRIEVANCE SYSTEM
28. The District shall create a grievance system administered by an independent office that meets the following requirements:
A. An applicant for or recipient of supports and services may file a complaint, or, alternatively, any interested party may file a complaint on behalf of an applicant or recipient;
B. Personnel from the independent office shall investigate the substance of the complaint and, to the maximum extent possible, attempt to resolve the matter. A representative from the independent office shall respond in writing to the person filing the complaint within ten days of the filing;
C. The District of Columbia, its agents, contractors and licensees may not subject an individual to discipline, harassment, or retribu.tion for filing or being the subject of a complaint or, in cases when a complaint is substantiated, obtaining corrective action through the grievance system;
D. Although persons making complaints may do so orally, by telephone, or in writing, personnel from the independent office must document all complaints and responses in order to, among other things, demonstrate patterns of rights violations.
29. If the government fails to implement a recipient =s plan of services and supports, or violates any other right under the aggrieved individual may obtain appropriate relief, including the enforcement of the plan, on an expedited basis, through an informal or formal hearing by filing a petition in the Mental Retardation Branch of the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. An aggrieved individual is not required to exhaust any administrative remedies (e.g., filing a complaint with the independent office) prior to petitioning for relief in the Superior Court.
30. A hearing officer or judge presiding in a proceeding in the MR Branch of the Superior Court is authorized to issue appropriate relief, including enforcement of an
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-3 Filed 10/07/09 Page 75 of 75 individual=s plan of services and supports. A hearing officer or judge who finds in favor of the individual shall Order reasonable and appropriate relief in the following form:
A. By directing the District to pay an entity that has provided, is providing, or will provide such services and supports, provided that the relief the Judge or Hearing Officer orders is limited to services available under the District of Columbia Medicaid State Plan or any waiver thereto; and
B. Any other additional relief that is appropriate. ASSESSMENTS OF NEEDS
31. The Administration will issue an annually public report documenting all individuals served by the developmental disabilities system, broken down by type of services and supports received as well as the number of individuals seeking services, their disabilities and the types of services sought. The assessment must also identify the number of recipients awaiting dental or vision care, medical treatment or equipment.
32. The budget for the Administration must be sufficient to meet the needs identified in the needs assessment.
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 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-4 Filed 10/07/09 Page 1 of 26
EXHIBIT4

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-4 Filed 10/07/09 Page 2 of 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOY EVANS, eta!.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

and

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, et al.,

)

____D_e_fe_nd_a_nt_s._____________))

Civil Action No. 76-293 (ESH/JMF)

DECLARATION OF LAURA L. NUSS I, Laura L. Nuss, declare and state as follows: 1. I am competent to testify to the matters set forth herein, and testify based on personal knowledge, information and belief. I. Background Information 2. I hold a Bachelor of Science in Administration of Justice (1981) and a Master of Science in Community Systems Planning and Development (1987), both from the Pennsylvania State University. 3. My experience in the field oflntellectual and Developmental Disability ("IDD") includes learning from the perspective of a family member, private provider and state government official. Specifically, in addition to growing up with my Aunt who had a developmental disability, I served as her personal representative and health care decision maker for the last 20 years of her life.

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-4 Filed 10/07/09 Page 3 of 26

4. The first 15 years of my professional career in this field were spent working for

private organizations developing and operating small community-based residential (ICF/MR and

HCBS waiver funded settings) and vocational services for individuals leaving the Pennhurst

State School and Hospital and the Embreeville State School and Hospital, and for adults who

sought or needed supports outside of the family home. I also served on family and consumer

satisfaction survey teams through the Embreeville Consumer/Family Satisfaction Teams project.

5.

I then moved to state government, serving three years as Branch Chief for the

North Carolina Developmental Disabilities Administration, responsible for the management of

the DD Home and Community-Based Services ("HCBS") waiver serving 6,000 individuals with

a total operating budget of$300 million, department budget matters for a $650 million state

agency serving 12,000 individuals, and systems change initiatives. In that capacity, I

participated in the design and submission of the DD HCBS waiver renewal and rate setting

initiatives.

6. In the state of Connecticut, I served one year as a Connecticut Department of

Mental Retardation Regional Director with comprehensive responsibilities for all case

management, family support, and private and public residential and vocational services serving

3,000 individuals with an operating budget of $85 million. I then served as the state-wide

Director of Strategic Leadership for four years with responsibility for the state Medicaid HCBS

waivers, Quality Assurance and Improvement, StaffDevelopment, and Planning and Information

Technology for the department with a total operating budget of$900 million serving 19,000

individuals. During that tenure, I re-wrote the "Comprehensive" MR/DD waiver for

Connecticut to include self-determination, and wrote a second "Supports" waiver to introduce

innovative in-home and self-directed services for individuals served by the Department, the tenth

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such waiver approved in the country to be designated as an Independence Plus waiver. I cowrote and served as the co-principal investigator for two CMS Systems Change Grants in the amount of$675,000 over a three-year period under the Independence Plus and the Quality Assurance/Quality Improvement under the federal systems change initiatives. Additionally, I played an instrumental role in the settlement of a class action "Waiting List" lawsuit by assisting with the design of a budget initiative totaling $12 million of state funds over a five-year period to serve an additional 750 persons off of the DD waiting list.
7. I have also served as a consultant on Medicaid waiver and quality assurance, and, in that capacity, co-wrote the District of Columbia ("District") DD Medicaid HCBS waiver renewal approved in November 2007. I have presented extensively at professional meetings nationally on quality assurance and improvement designs to meet the CMS Quality Framework requirements, Medicaid waivers, Individual Budgeting and Allocation methodologies, and SelfDetermination subject matter.
8. I was appointed as the Deputy Director of the Department on Disability Services ("DDS"), responsible for the Developmental Disabilities Administration ("DDA''), formerly known as the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA"), effective August 20, 2007. II. Service Coordination/Individual Service Plans
9. DDS/DDA currently employs 71 service coordinators, who are tasked with, among other things, meeting at least annually with individual consumers, their families and/or significant others, and their providers, to gather information in order to develop each consumer's Individual Service Plan ("ISP").
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10. The ISP can be revised or updated more frequently than annually to ensure that changes in an individual's condition and/or needs are taken into consideration in providing services and treatment.
11. On a quarterly basis for the past two years, between 86% and 98% of class members have met personally with their service coordinators. ISPs have been completed on a timely basis for class members on average 90% of the time for the past two years.
12. For the past six (6) years, DDS/DDA has maintained a ratio of one service coordinator to no more than 30 individuals (class and non-class members).
13. In October 2008, DDS/DDA designed and implemented a new ISP format that is built on best practice and organized around the same eight (8) domains that are used throughout the District's planning and performance measurement systems: rights and dignity; safety and security; health and wellness; choice and decision-making; community inclusion; relationships; service planning and delivery; and satisfaction. The ISP itself is now an on-line document that is completed, reviewed, approved, and disseminated via the web application.
14. DDA service coordinators facilitate ISPs meetings and complete the document for all class members regardless of where he or she lives. DDA service coordinators assumed this responsibility for individuals residing in HCBS waiver settings on October 2, 2008 and for individuals residing in ICF/ID settings on August 1, 2009 as planned. III. Home and Community-Based Services Waiver
15. DDA's implementation of the Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services ("HCBS") waiver has enabled the District to redesign its service system to provide expanded integrated-living alternatives and services to consumers.
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16. Through the waiver program, the District is eligible for a federal reimbursement of 70%, which has the effect ofmaximizing more limited local dollars while simultaneously providing more services and supports to the consumers who need them.
17. The HCBS waiver is comprised of the following: Professional Servicesincluding speech, hearing, or language services, occupational and physical therapy, skilled nursing, behavior supports, and less traditional therapy such as dance or drama therapy; Assistive Supports- including emergency response, vehicle modification, and environmental adaptation (such as the addition of ramps or grab bars) without which an individual might need to be institutionalized; Residential Supports- including residential habilitation (housing 4-6 individuals), supported living (housing 1-3 individuals), and in-home support or live-in caregivers that allow a person to live as independently as possible; and Day Supports- including day habilitation to allow individuals to develop skills to support, or further, community integration opportunities, as well as supported employment to enable an individual to live as autonomously as possible through an ability to earn income.
18. Each service under the HCBS waiver is available individually so that each individual has the maximum amount of choice consistent with his or her general support, medical, emotional, and/or physical needs.
19. In September 2008, the District of Columbia submitted an amendment to add skilled nursing and supported living with transportation services to the waiver menu. The amendment also sought to increase the payment rate for physical and occupation therapy and speech and nutrition services in order to improve recruitment efforts of new clinicians to the program. In April 2009, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services ("CMS") approved the amendment, which will be implemented with the passage of :final rulernaking in October 2009.
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20. The District continues to pursue refinements to the HCBS waiver program as part of self-directed continuous quality improvement. During the summer of2009, the District created an HCBS Waiver Advisory Committee to solicit broad stakeholder participation and input on proposed changes. To date, this advisory committee has held three meetings that have led to the preparation of changes to the waiver in the following areas: level of care; service planning and delivery; services; qualifications of providers; health and welfare; fmancial accountability; administrative oversight; and quality management plan. As DDA continues to enhance and refine its services, operations, policies and practices, those changes are subsequently incorporated into the HCBS waiver application for approval by CMS, and to continually update CMS of enhancements in the quality management strategy of the District to meet the six required assurances.
21. The District has demonstrated improvement in the provision of services under the ISPs. For example, for HCBS waiver participants, prior authorizations must be processed in a timely manner in order for services to be offered consistent with the ISPs. In fiscal year 2008, prior authorizations were issued late 70% of the time. In only a year, the District dramatically improved its performance such that in fiscal year 2009, prior authorizations were issued in advance 70% of the time. IV. Recruitment and Retention of Qualified Providers
22. Since January 2009, DDA has successfully recruited five (5) waiver providers, increasing the total number of current waiver providers to 104. Sixty-four (64) percent of all residential services are currently delivered via the waiver program, and more than half of the Evans class is currently enrolled in the waiver.
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23. As of September 1, 2009, there are forty-two (42) Day Habilitation providers, thirty-eight (38) Pre-vocational Services providers, thirty-eight (38) Supported Employment providers, ninety-one (91) Supported Living providers, ninety-four (94) Residential Habilitation providers, forty-five (45) Host Home providers, twenty (20) Live-in Caregiver providers and sixteen (16) Professional Services providers enrolled in the HCBS waiver.
24. In February 2009, DDA developed and implemented a more robust enrollment process, namely the Provider Readiness Review Protocol, to review new provider applicants vigorously through a process of paper application, interview and on-site observation and review to ensure that new applicants in fact were prepared to serve DDA consumers effectively upon enrollment in the program. Since the inception of the enhanced protocol, twenty-seven (27) providers passed this process successfully, two (2) failed, and six (6) have been delayed due to poor performance in the review process. This process significantly improves the process agreed upon in the "September 12, 2007 90 Day Order" as the District no longer needs to be concerned about a sufficient number of providers, but does seek to continually raise the bar on the capacity of these provider organizations to deliver high quality services and supports.
25. The District through DDA and the Department of Health Care Finance ("DHCF") removed three (3) providers from the waiver program in the past 12 months due to performance deficits, providing further evidence that the District's ability and commitment to remove poorlyperforming providers from the DDA service-delivery system. V. Intermediate Care Facilities for the Intellectually Disabled
26. An intermediate care facility for the intellectually disabled ("ICF/ID") in the District serves no more than eight (8) individuals and provides active treatment to those individuals who require more intermediate levels of care. To meet the needs of the extremely
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medically-complex and fragile persons who currently reside in hospital settings, DDA issued a Request for Proposal ("RFP") for a small ICF/ID setting to effectively serve these individuals in the community. The RFP was awarded to Volunteers of America ("VOA''), a national provider that practices person-centered service delivery and specializes in serving medically complex individuals in the District. VOA believes inclusive, personalized services can also be delivered under the ICF/ID model.
27. Many of the individuals served by ICFs/ID are non-ambulatory and have seizure disorders, behavioral support needs, mental illness, visual or hearing impairments, chronic, significant health conditions or a combination of these.
28. · While the District makes every effort to serve as many consumers as possible via the waiver, this alternate housing option must also continue to be made accessible, as these settings at times can be as or more appropriate to serve the more complicated and complex needs of a subset of consumers.
29. Through the efforts ofDDA, DHCF and the Money Follows the Person program, discussed in~ 30, a strategic plan is being fully implemented to reduce all ICF/ID homes to six (6) persons or less to improve the ability ofthese homes to provide more personalized services and supports, close older and non-accessible ICF/ID homes and reduce the overall number of persons receiving services via the ICF/ID program, consistent with the District's goal of treatment in the least restrictive environment. In fiscal year 2009, the number of eight-person homes decreased to s_ix {6) persons or less :from 15 to 12 with a plan on file for DC Healthcare to reduce all of its homes to six (6) or less via the MFP program; nine (9) homes closed or were reduced in size and converted to the HCBS waiver program; and in total the number of
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individuals receiving services through the ICF/ID program decreased by 13% from the start to close of fiscal year 2009, and for class members decreased by 11%. VI. Money Follows the Person Grant
30. In July 2008, CMS awarded the District a three-year, multi-million dollar grant through the Money Follows the Person Rebalancing Demonstration Program ("MFP").
31. This initiative has enabled the District to reduce its reliance on ICFs/ID for people with a wide range of developmental and physical disabilities, as well as older adults and persons with chronic mental illness.
32. The MFP enables the District to receive a 15 percent higher, i.e., from 70% to 85%, Medicaid matching rate for each person whom it assists to a community setting for the first 365 days enrolled in a HCBS waiver and the grant is expected to result in an additional $4 million to $6 million in federal Medicaid funding to the District over the lifetime of the grant. The District uses the higher federal Medicaid match that it receives from the grant to help people who wish to leave intermediate care facilities or nursing homes to move into homes or apartments of their choice, and to provide the Medicaid waiver services that these consumers need to live in the community. This program thus allows individuals to avoid being institutionalized and to exercise far greater choice and control over the essentials of their lives, such as where and with whom to live; what to do during the week and weekend; and what supports to receive and from whom. In addition, individuals in this program are participating in pilots to demonstrate the effectiveness of peer counseling, transition coordination and enhanced primary care coordination.
33. From August 2008 through September 2009, DDS transitioned 43 individuals with developmental disabilities from ICFs/ID to smaller settings including apartments in which
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they live alone or with one or two other persons; there are an additional 29 individuals who are in some phase of exploring the MFP process~ As of March 2009, DDS had offered MFP housing services to another fifteen (15) individuals and their families who declined those services. Some ofthese individuals declined MFP services due to deteriorating health; others were satisfied with their current placements; and still others refused because their families were not supportive of the proposed changes. This program illustrates the District's commitment to deinstitutionalization and individual choice. It allows an individual with IDD to choose his or her environment within a range of professionally acceptable alternatives, rather than imposing a state-selected placement. VII. Health and Welfare
34. With the on-the-ground implementation of the Health Care Agreement ("HCA") initiated in May 2008, DDS has devoted considerable resources and funding exceeding $2.5 million and has successfully improved the quality and quantity of health care offered to consumers.
35. The HCA established a Health Care Quality Initiative ("Initiative") in partnership with George Washington and Georgetown Universities. The Initiative has been able to recruit new providers such as Seton House (affiliated with Providence Hospital), which now provides for the comprehensive psychiatric service needs of more than 100 individuals, and two additional primary care physicians ("PCPs"). A third PCP is now being supported as he begins a homebound visiting practice in District of Columbia Wards 7 and 8.
36. The HCA has also enabled the District to deliver enhanced primary care coordination for individuals considered to be high-risk who are in the waiver, and as a clinicallybased research project, has provided outcome findings and recommendations for further
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enhancements to the District's IDD and overall health care delivery-system as anticipated by the Initiative. Such coordination has occurred for 158 individuals, all class members, since the inception of the program, and was designed to be a proactive strategy for DDS/DDA to track the transition of individuals from the Medical Director ICF/IDD model into the waiver program, identify possible barriers to clinical care, and address any patient safety threats that could emerge as a result of this transition. Select findings of the first year ofthe project included as follows: access to medical services impedes ability to meet timeline requirements established by the IDD service system; access to PCP services during evening and weekend hours contributes to high use of emergency services; PCPs received the pilot project positively to improve communication and support for care coordination; care coordination between the PCP and specialist remains a communication challenge in the fee for service medical model; service coordination understanding of clinical conditions was adequate in most circumstances; and, clinical issues that emerge as significant areas include mobility, fall risks and sub-optimal use of physical therapy. These findings now drive quality improvement initiatives in health care by targeting service coordination training, exploring new health care delivery models with DHCF, and focused interventions targeted toward mobility, fall prevention, and expansion of physical therapy services.
37. George Washington University has also hosted webinars for physicians serving individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities by leading physicians in the field on the following topics during the Initiative to date: Seizure Disorders; Renal Disease; Asthma; Bone Health; and, Wound Care. These webinars are archived and available for viewing for the subsequent 12 months and marketed through the Area Health Education Consortium for the District of Columbia ("AHEC").
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38. The District of Columbia's Health Resource Partnership ("DC HRP") seeks to expand the community health care capacity for individuals with IDD by (1) providing health and mental health services that are accessible; and (2) implementing strategies to promote quality health outcomes. Since January 2009, DC HRP has added eight (8) full-time clinicians, who provide services in homes and day/vocational settings with a focus on quality, technical assistance, and training. In the last roughly six (6) months alone, the DC HRP interdisciplinary
team has completed 1,058 targeted technical assistance requests 41 a range of areas including
occupational and physical therapy, speech, psychology, medicine, health education, and nursing. In addition, the DC HRP medical director has assumed an increasingly active role in facilitating communication exchange between and among PCPs, the hospitals, medical specialists and interdisciplinary team members. This information has been useful in reducing hospital stays, ensuring timely care provision, assisting teams to develop priorities for people with complicated health conditions and competing needs for treatments. This has also helped to educate hospital staff about the needs of people with disabilities and to better understand the community-based system of services and supports.
39. To increase the number of experienced practitioners, DC HRP provides community-wide training in a variety of areas to teach those who serve individuals with IDD how to provide better care. Training includes, for example, "Using Visual Strategies to Prevent and Reduce Behavior Problems," "End of Life Planning," and "Substitute Decision-Making in Healthcare." And in a significant development for the long-term sustainability of the servicedelivery system, for the third consecutive year, Georgetown University family medicine residents must devote a portion of their residency to the health care of adults with IDD, to assist in recruiting providers to this practice area. The additional training to medical students and
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especially residents, specifically addresses the capacity-building and pipeline needs to DC IDD residents. The capacity for PCP panels is currently small and therefore access to care has been increasingly difficult. Without a mechanism to expand the PCP base, reliance on an older workforce of doctors creates unique and multiple service delivery challenges. Without the education efforts through the DC HRP, the current expansion in the provider network would not have become a reality. In order for DC HRP to accomplish the tasks of capacity building, increase in quality care and best practices, a strong training component was required, not only through physician consultation, coordination and technical support, but, educational training for soon-to-be practicing physicians in the local area. The connections and training of area resident family practitioners have allowed for physicians to include our individuals with IDD into their panel. DC HRP successfully recruited several graduates from the Georgetown Family Practice residency programs who also see our patients at community health centers ("CHC").
40. I concur with the recent summary report from Dr. Kim Bullock, DC HRP Medical Director, regarding the effectiveness of the Health Passport. Dr. Bullock stated that "the Health Passport has become a crucial information exchange document for the emergency department and the hospitals. Since the health passport has been implemented, providers have noted its value in providing a concise, clear presentation of the client's medical-related history, current and past. This information has been crucial in the emergency environment, as well as enabling, (1) medication reconciliation for hospitalization, (2) identifying point of contact for agency staff, physician, consultants, case worker, which has facilitated in-hospital correspondence by phone and in writing, (3) improved timing for discharge planning meetings, as well as emergency meetings concerning clinical care, (4) Provided timely information for
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emergency and acute in-hospital clinical decision-making that impacts on interventions, and (5) serves as a life document that has the potential to memorialize the client's health information overtime. Over the last year the health passport has been a portable document accompanying clients to all area hospitals. Providence Hospital has received the largest number of IDD clients, and the positive impact of the Health Passport has been noted by staff and upper-level administration. In the last three months there have been forty (40) patients with complex medical problems either seen in the ED or admitted. In these cases, the health passport has been instrumental in influencing patient's outcomes. The use of a Health Passport has proven to be invaluable in reducing errors, decreasing delays in getting pertinent health information about a complex client to the right person at the right time."
41. DC HRP prepared a report for DDA on Preventative Health Screenings and results from a pilot study of the same for individuals served by DDA in residential settings. In 2005, DDA introduced the use ofHealth Form 1, a document to record preventive health screenings that includes the recommendations of the Preventive Services Task Force ("USPSTF"). This documentation is required in the health records of all individuals receiving residential services funded via the HCBS waiver or ICFs/ID. The USPSTF is an independent panel of experts in primary care and prevention that systematically reviews the evidence of effectiveness and develops recommendations for clinical preventive services.
42. Several entities tracking health care quality cited receipt of preventive health screening and adult immunizations. This includes Health People 2010, the Commonwealth Fund National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, the Agency for Healthcare Research
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and Quality, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (Committee on the State of the USA Health Indicators, Board on Population Health and Public Health Practice) and the federal Department of Health and Human Services (Community Health Status Indicators). Specifically, measures such as detection of hypertension, colorectal cancer screening and breast cancer screening are important measures ofhealth in the District of Columbia due to the high incidence ofhypertension, cardiovascular disease and breast and colon cancer among residents of the District of Columbia. They are far more important indicators than the rating of completion of health management care plans. While health management care plans are important documents for health planning and health care delivery, their usefulness in measuring the extent to which the District of Columbia has advanced in the delivery of essential health care to people receiving services from DDA is severely limited.
43. DC HRP conducted a study of preventive health screenings, namely colorectal cancer, mammography and Pap smears, and clinical breast exams, for individuals served in three (3) agencies. A total of one hundred and forty seven (147) individuals were reviewed, approximately 11% of all individuals served by DDA in residential services. Selected findings demonstrate that these sample screening rates meet and in most instances exceed the national and target rates. This is particularly significant given the barriers to preparation and completion of these invasive procedures. The full report contains recommendations for continued improvements in the District's health care system for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities that will be reviewed by the DDA Quality Improvement Committee for inclusion in the agency's initiatives.
VIII. Payments to Providers
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44. The District has made every effort to pay providers in a timely manner. Ninetyeight percent (98%) of all claims are adjudicated in 30 days.
45. DHCF has moved to a weekly payment cycle, meaning payments are sent out once a week instead of every other week.
46. DDA and DHCF continue weekly conference calls to resolve emerging billing concerns. DHCF provides on-site provider technical assistance, and DDA and DHCF compare billing reports against prior authorizations under the HCBS waiver program to proactively identify potential billing problems prior to significant delays emerging.
47. To further improve financing of services, the District has submitted to CMS a State Plan Amendment that provides an alternative method of determining ICF/ID provider reimbursement. DHCF, the District Medicaid State Agency, worked collaboratively with both DDS/DDA and the providers to develop the new methodology. This alternative moves away from a cost-based reimbursement methodology where providers were locked into rates based on cost caps set at the median cost in 1993 inflated forward. Because the way in which care is provided has changed so much in the interim-for example, minimum wage increases, changes in rent, increases in utility costs, staffing ratio changes-these median cost caps do not reflect the actual cost of care today. The new methodology allows providers to set a price for their services and they are rewarded for reducing cost so long as they continue to provide quality services. IX. Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services ("CMS") Monitoring of DDS
48. CMS is the federal agency that administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs and already provides extensive oversight for services provided by DDS/DDA.
49. The District submits to CMS an annual report (known as the 372 report) that details fiscal and quality performance measures. In addition, CMS will be initiating expanded
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372 quality-reporting in the next fiscal year that mirrors the expanded quality management requirements now found in the HCBS waiver program. CMS also conducts unannounced random audits on various areas of its six (6) assurances, including level of care, service plan, qQalified providers, health and welfare, administrative oversight, and financial accountability. Most recently, in August 2009, DHCF and DDS/DDA were evaluated on Provider Enrollment protocols.
50. From February 2007 to March 2009, CMS engaged in even more intensive monitoring to ensure the then MAA and DDS/DDA's compliance with the federal HCBS waiver requirements. This included monthly written and telephonic monitoring of a corrective action plan in three of the six assurances: Plan of Care; Health and Welfare; and. Administrative Oversight. In March 2009, however, CMS determined that the District had "made major changes in the performance, structure, oversight mechanism, and systems sufficient enough to engage in continuous Quality Improvement ("QI")." To qualify for such a finding, a state must demonstrate a robust system of "discovery, remediation and improvement" in all six assurances. Based on DDS/DDA's "demonstrated effectiveness of the many newly implemented systems to meet the CMS quality requirements," CMS discontinued its intensified monitoring. X. The District's Establishment of An Aggressive Internal Quality-Assurance System
51. DDA's Quality Management Division ("QMD") monitors all aspects of the service-delivery system to ensure compliance with federal and local law, national best practices, and applicable court orders. The QMD focuses on strengthening DDA's ability to discover areas of concern, remediate both discrete and systemic issues, and implement strategies for continuous improvement.
17

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52. The QMD is divided into four (4) functional units: Health and Wellness, Quality Enhancement and Quality Improvement ("QE/QI"), Incident Management and Enforcement ("IMEU"), and Mortality Review. The Health and Wellness Unit supports the health of individuals by providing oversight and support to individuals residing in natural homes, nursing homes, hospitals, and small and mid-sized provider agencies. The oversight includes provision of technical assistance, community outreach, and monitoring ofhealthmanagement care plans, behavior support plans, meal protocols, and other treatment regimes necessary to realize optimal health status and outcomes. In the past quarterly reporting period alone, two (2) individuals were successfully transitioned from nursing homes to community-based residential settings as a result of this focused assistance. The DDA Health and Wellness Unit and the DC HRP as a contractor to DDA work hand-in-hand in these areas across the DDA service delivery system.
53. The Quality Enhancement and Quality Improvement Unit currently uses the Provider Certification Review ("PCR") process as the mechanism that measures provider performance, determines whether the provider/vendor does or does not meet the minimum thresholds for performance, and acknowledges each provider as able to deliver services and supports to people served by DDA. The PCR replaced the Basic Assurance Standards Authorization ("BASA") review and is a far superior tool to evaluate quality. The new PCR process (1) allows for the identification of positive practices and areas for improvement in providers' services and supports; (2) allows for the ability to aggregate, analyze, and compare data from various sources including information from the Department of Health Health Regulation and Licensing Administration ("HRLA"), the IMEU, Service Coordination, Provider Resource Management, Mortality and Fatality Review Committees, and DDS's Contracts Department; and (3) provides evidence that providers are operating in accordance with HCBS
18

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waiver regulations, D.C. Rules and Regulations, and DDS/DDA approved policies. Further, under BASA, only a small sub-set ofliving settings, including ICFs/ID, group homes, and supported living residential service providers, were reviewed. Moreover, only 10% or less of total recipients of the agency were evaluated. In contrast, the PCR is applied to a broader range of providers including in-home supports, host home services, day habilitation, pre-vocational services and supported employment, and expands the sampling methodology to be statistically significant for each service delivered by the provider agency. The implementation of the PCR process is yet another example of the agency's ability to improve the quality assurance capacity of the District. DDS/DDA completed the Request For Proposal ("RFP") process to award the contract to a nationally recognized vendor to assume responsibility for certifying all HCBS waiver providers using the PCR and is pending Council approval. The Quality contract also includes an independent audit of the DDA Service Coordination service delivery, providing the DDA Director and DHCF with an independent performance evaluation of this critical function. A third component ofthis contract includes a 10% sample of all ISPs to assess implementation of all services per the ISP on an annual basis. Both elements are critical performance measures for CMS as described in the DDA Quality Management Strategy, and to provision of services to the Evans class. DDA included these elements for an additional high quality, arm's length source of performance measurement ofDDA service delivery, and did so independent of any direction or requirement from an external party.
54. DDS/DDA recently undertook an initiative to ensure that Quality Improvement Specialists in the Technical Assistance ("TA'') Unit increase the number of unannounced visits and contacts that occur on a monthly basis. The QMD began tracking the number of contacts in August 2008, and since that time, there has been a more than 200% increase in the number of
19

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-4 Filed 10/07/09 Page 21 of 26
monthly contacts (including initial visits, re-visits, unannounced visits, and telephone contact) made by TA staf£ This has allowed the TA Unit to more effectively discover and remediate · issues in a timely manner. Further, QE/QI assumes the responsibility of data integration for all information that reflects provider performance and its impact on people served through the DDA service-delivery system.
55. The IMEU is critical as it provides the mechanism to track and remediate problems, or incidents. There have been several developments implemented by the District that have contributed to the improvement of the investigatory process. These include requiring all investigators to pass LRA Level I certification to improve investigatory skills; assigning investigators to specifip providers enabling each investigator to better recognize trends in the quality of services; providing trainings; and conducting quality assurance review of investigations submitted by providers. In fiscal year 2009, IMEU provided training to more than 20 provider agencies, conducted more than 100 quality assurance reviews, and made approximately 40 technical assistance contacts with providers. In addition, a recent update to the Consumer Information System ("MCIS") allows DDA to track the outcome of an investigation and capture the responsible provider, allowing IMEU to accurately track and trend data for specific providers. Although the role of the District, and all state DD agencies, is to seek to prevent the occurrence of abuse, neglect, theft or a serious injury, these incidents do occur, hence the CMS requirements for a robust system of safeguards for prevention, discovery and remediation. In fiscal year 2009, it is important to note that only 7% of the entire class experienced a substantiated incident of this type.
56. The District also has a mortality-review process (consisting of the Fatality Review Committee "FRC" and the Mortality Review Committee "MRC"), which allows DDS/DDA to
20

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-4 Filed 10/07/09 Page 22 of 26
identify and, as necessary, address potential quality-of-care issues. In fiscal year 2009, the FRC maintained a 90% compliance rate of reviewing all cases within 90 days. Further, as of this filing, DDA's MRC has concluded reviews of all completed death investigations pending in fiscal year 2009.
57. Finally, the HRLA licenses and inspects group homes for persons with developmental disabilities and certifies ICFs/ID. HRLA conducts annual on-site and ad hoc monitoring surveys to ensure that these facilities maintain compliance with District and federal health, safety, sanitation, and habilitative requirements. Regulated facilities include Certified (Federal) Intermediate Care Facilities and Group Homes for Persons with Mental Retardation. XI. Additional Healthcare Agreement Initiatives
58. The Crisis Intervention beds RFP was awarded in the spring of2009, and two (2) beds opened at National Children's Center ("NCC") in August 2009.
59. The Values Based Training Initiative underwent several ''best and final offers" with an award being offered at this writing for implementation in fiscal year 2010.
60. DDS/DDA developed a comprehensive pre-employment competency-based training curriculum, associated tests and new Training Policy to enhance the competency of direct support professionals in day/vocational and residential support services throughout the DDA service delivery system. The new requirements are effective October 12, 2010. The policy, PowerPoint curriculum and competency tests can be accessed on line at www.dds.dc.gov.
61. The District obtained permission from CMS and the State of Connecticut to adopt the Connecticut Level of Need Assessment and Risk Screening tool, which is a web-based database system producing clear person-centered planning assessment results detailing strengths, preferences and support needs in the areas of health and medical supports, behavioral supports,
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Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1138-4 Filed 10/07/09 Page 23 of 26
mental health, mobility, personal care, daily living, comprehension, communication, social life, safety, and caregiver supports. This tool also generates a "risk screening" to assist the individual and the team to systematically ensure that each potential risk has been fully explained, evaluated and addressed by the person and the team, and is clearly documented in the record. The software and user's guide are being modified for the District's use at this time. Training and the roll-out of the tool is scheduled for the first quarter of this fiscal year.
62. As part of the behavioral health initiatives, the DC HRP clinical psychologist works in collaboration with the DDA clinical psychologist on individual, agency and systemic issues. He has introduced the use of a Best Practice Guide. This is a method for working with the individual and their direct support staff to identify strategies that promote well-being, identify when stressors are beginning and how to respond, and identify what to do in the event of a crisis. These simple tools are complementary to the formal behavior support plan, but are easier for the direct support professional ("DSP") to understand. In addition, because the DSP is integral to the development of this tool, they are more likely to remember and follow the outlined strategies. Best Practice Guides was developed for all of the individuals transitioning from St. Elizabeth's to the community, and it has played an important role in transferring the knowledge from the St. Elizabeth's staff to the new residential setting.
63. The clinical psychologist and speech therapist have collaborated on training and technical assistance aimed at increasing the use of visual teaching strategies, which is an essential component of a comprehensive approach for people with autism. The team has also worked with community therapists to increase their skills in identifying autism spectrum disorders, particularly in older adults who may have been misdiagnosed.
22

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64. Health and clinical services training offerings are being developed and held, open to the DDA service delivery system. In the period between July and September 2009 alone, DC HRP developed and hosted 19 different training sessions on best practice topics in health, clinical and behavioral health topics. XII. Inter-Agency Collaboration
65. I have chaired the Mayor's Inter-Agency Task Force on Coordination and Management of the Supports and Services Delivery System for Persons with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, as established by Mayor's Order 2009-119 dated June 25, 2009, having held three (3) meetings to date, to further strengthen the collaboration among agencies. Composed ofhigh-levelleadership from DDS/DDA, DHCF, HRLA, and the City Administrator's Office, the Task Force has established a mission statement, and framework within which to focus problem-solving and initiatives to advance the effectiveness of and innovation in services to persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Goal/Mission Statement: Because of interagency coordination and collaboration, people with intellectual and developmental disabilities ("ID/DD") in the District of Columbia will have the supports and services to live full and meaningful lives. Core Task Force Work Elements: Enhance supports and services options; Expand accessible and affordable housing; Grow meaningful work opportunities; Improve coordination of school to work transitions; Develop age appropriate supports and living options for elders with ID/DD; Expand accessible transportation options; Build an interagency workforce development initiative; Establish an interagency plan for health and wellness; Develop an interagency plan for family supports; Create an interagency early intervention plan (birth to three). This framework addresses a lifespan and inclusive approach to services and supports. Initial topics of collaborative problem-solving leading to improvements
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include work on the Nursing Assistive Personnel Training Regulations, and the MTM 1915(b)4 waiver application to design improved transportation services for persons with IDD/DD in the Medicaid program.
66. The DHCF Medicaid Infrastructure Grant is being used to fund the DDA's participation in the State Employment Leadership Network ("SELN") as evidence of the DHCF's support of an employment first agenda to advance the quality of day and vocational services in the District. DDS/DDA joined the SELN, a cross-state cooperative venture of state developmental disability agencies that are committed to improving employment outcomes for adolescents and adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities. The District is one of only 16 participating states.
67. DHCF, HRLA and DDA are collaborating on a training initiative for ICF/ID providers aimed at improving the quality of services and supports delivered through that residential service option.
68. DHCF, DDS and the District of Columbia Housing Authority have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to improve coordination between the agencies and subsequent access to housing authority vouchers, and to track affordable housing units across the District to facilitate movement to the least restrictive living alternatives. XIII. Conclusion
69. The structure and management staff ofthe DDA has remained in place now for more than one and a half years. I have been in this position for just over two years, two of DDA's three Division Directors for eighteen (18) months, the third has been with the organization for eight (8) months now, and all of the remaining managers have been in place for more than one year. Although to those outside of the District that may seem short-lived, for this
24

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history, it is evidence of a team committed to the residents ofthe District and the Evans class members. It is this team that seeks to continue to fulfill the obligations of the state DD agency to the residents of the District of Columbia without the necessity of further judicial intervention and oversight.
I declare under penalty ofpetjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct to the best ofmy information, knowledge and belief. Executed on October 7, 2009.
Laura L. Nuss, Deputy Director Developmental Disabilities Administration D.C. Department on Disability Services
25

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1259 Filed 05/16/11 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOY EVANS, et af., Plaintiffs
and

FILED
MAY 1 6 2011
Clerk. U,S, District & Bankruptc1 Cl)llt\s tOf the District of ColumbIa

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Civil Action No: 76-293 (ESH/JMF)

Plaintiff-Intervenor, v.

VINCENT C. GRAY, et af.,

Defendants.

CONSENT ORDER AND JUDGMENT This Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding Plaintiffs'

claims for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the above-captioned case for the period April I, 2006 through June 30, 2010. Having reached an agreement regarding the

amount of an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for this period, the parties

jointly request that the Court enter this consent Order and Judgment, which reflects the

agreement. In addition to the conditions referenced in the order below, the parties have also agreed to an annual attorneys' fee cap of $500,000, to commence from the date of

this order. This cap does not limit Plaintiffs' fees if the parties are engaged in active litigation. There is an obligation on both parties to provide notice prior to initiating any

litigation and a requirement that both parties endeavor to resolve differences in the

interest of avoiding litigation.

Upon consideration of the agreement of the parties, it is by the Court hereby:

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1259 Filed 05/16/11 Page 2 of 2

ORDERED, that for the period April I, 2006 through June 30, 2010, the Plaintiffs are awarded $4,000,000 in attorneys' fees and costs; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that defendants will pay $4,000,000 to Center for Public Representation for distribution to Plaintiff counsel according to the following schedule:
• $1 million within 60 days of execution of this order; • $1.5 million as of October 31,2011; • $500,000 as of February 1,2012; and • $1 million as of September 1, 2012 ; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that interest will accrue on the payments made on February 1,2012 and September 1,2012, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1961; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, this Judgment will be in full satisfaction of all of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs in this action for the period April I, 2006 through June 30, 2010; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees for the period April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2010 [Doc. No. 1236] is denied as moot.

Date:

~S~LE 6 JjvVC(~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

2

 
 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (2001)
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v.
Anthony A. WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.
CIV. A. No. 76-293 SSH.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
March 30, 2001.
80 *80 Joseph B. Tulman, University of District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law, Kelly Bagby, University Legal Services, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs or Petitioners.
Richard J. Farano, Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor.
Maria C. Amato, Senior Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, Government of District of Columbia, Task Force, Major Equity Litigation, Washington, DC, for Defendants or Respondents.
Margaret G. Farrell, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Washington, DC, Special Master.
OPINION AND ORDER
HARRIS, District Judge.
On February 10, 1999, the Court issued an Opinion and Order by which it granted the motions of plaintiffs and the United States to find defendants in contempt for their failure to comply with certain earlier Orders in this case. The Court imposed contempt fines of $5,096,340.00 against defendants. In addition, the Court ordered the Special Master, in cooperation and conjunction with the parties, if possible, to develop a plan for the conclusion of this action which would address the disposition of the fines to have been paid by defendants and make suggestions for post-litigation mechanisms to ensure the protection of the plaintiff class' continuing interests in adequate habilitation. Evans v. Williams, 35 F.Supp.2d 88, 97 (D.D.C.1999).
Among other things, the plan was to address:
(1) A summary and articulation of the goals of this lawsuit;
(2) The status of compliance with various Court Orders;
(3) The quality assurance methods to be developed and implemented by defendants to monitor the performance of public and private providers of service;
81 *81 (4) The standards, including outcomes standards to be developed and implemented by defendants, that should be used to determine defendants' continuing compliance with Court-ordered requirements, and the way in which compliance with such standards should be measured;
(5) The degree of compliance that should be required with respect to each of the standards recommended;
(6) The steps necessary to establish permanent, objective, efficient, and effective post-termination monitoring of the programs serving consumers by independent entities; and
(7) The steps necessary to coordinate existing mechanisms and to develop needed mechanisms for the advocacy of the interests of consumers on an individual and community-wide basis.

Defendants appealed the Court's imposition of contempt fines. On March 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed this Court's decision on the majority of the contempt fines. Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292 (D.C.Cir.2000).
Pursuant to the Court's February 1999 Order, under the direction of the Special Master, Margaret G. Farrell, with the assistance of her then-consultant, Clarence J. Sundram, the parties engaged in lengthy negotiations that resulted in a series of agreements that have been presented for acceptance and approval. The documents now before the Court include:
(1) The 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams (hereinafter the Plan);
(2) A Consent Order and accompanying Settlement Agreement, filed on February 2, 2001; and
(3) The Parties' Joint Stipulated Findings of Fact, filed on December 22, 2000.
Taken together, these documents, fashioned collaboratively by the parties who are represented by able and experienced counsel, set forth a careful and detailed blueprint for achieving compliance with the Court's Orders, for the development of permanent and independent mechanisms to safeguard the rights of class members, and for the phased withdrawal of judicial oversight of the District of Columbia's mental retardation system as compliance with the Court's Orders is achieved.
The Stipulated Findings of Fact and the Consent Order 0907with the Settlement Agreement 0907will be sent for publication with this Opinion and Order. The Plan, however, is a 73-page, single-spaced document. It is summarized herein, but shall not be sent for publication.
The 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams
Responding to this Court's Order of February 10, 1999, the Plan identifies the eight goals of the existing Court Orders as follows:
(1) Appropriate individual habilitation in the community in the least separate, most integrated, and least restrictive environment;
(2) Protection from harm;
(3) Safeguarding consumers' personal possessions;
(4) Monitoring the service system;
(5) Advocacy for consumers;
(6) Adequate budget;
(7) Timely payment of vendors; and
(8) Essential systemic conditions.
For each of these broad goals of the prior Court Orders, the Plan identifies clear and measurable expectations of performance by providers of service and by the District of Columbia government. It identifies the relevant Court Orders, the specific tasks that must be performed to implement those Orders, and time frames within which the 82 tasks must be performed. *82 For each set of Court Orders, the Plan identifies specific outcome criteria for measuring compliance therewith. This agreement by the parties on the yardsticks to be utilized in making determinations of compliance provides clear guidance to providers as well as to the District of Columbia government in implementing the Plan. Moreover, the Plan also identifies a specific standard of compliance for each set of Court Orders, and sets forth the methods by which evidence will be collected and evaluated to assess compliance.

The Plan details a process for identifying individualized needs for services and supports, with input from class members, their families or guardians, case managers, clinical professionals and direct care staff, and advocates. It requires the aggregation of information regarding the needs for services and supports to enable its use in planning and budgeting for the overall mental retardation service system. It provides for an explicit opportunity for plaintiffs to review and comment upon the adequacy of proposed budgets to meet the needs of individuals who rely upon the mental retardation system for services and supports. Furthermore, it creates a process for external and independent monitors to have input into the budget-making process based upon their findings during monitoring of the services and supports available to individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities.
The Plan requires a broad range of competency-based training to be provided to staff who deliver services and supports to individuals with metal retardation and developmental disabilities. It also requires that a wide range of policies and procedures be revised and updated to reflect the goals of the Court Orders, in a process that is open and accessible to plaintiffs, the United States, and other interested stakeholders.
The Plan requires audits of the class members' accounts going back for at least ten years and includes a commitment by the District of Columbia government to repay any sums of money that may be owed to them.
The Plan creates several new safeguards for individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities in the District of Columbia. First, it calls for a complete revision of the existing statutes to establish in law the rights that have been declared in the Court's Orders, while also updating the laws, consistent with a set of legislative principles agreed upon by the parties, to reflect contemporary standards and practices. Second, it requires the creation of a new quality assurance program, the implementation of a new procedure for the reporting and investigation of unusual incidents, the creation of a Fatality Review Board, and the adoption of new mechanisms to prevent the misuse or overuse of control procedures such as restraints, time-outs, and psychotropic medications. Third, it recognizes that the enforcement of rights that have been legally declared requires access to effective legal and lay advocacy. A cornerstone of the Plan is the creation of a new, independent, and durable nonprofit agency called the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities (the Quality Trust) and the provision of a method of financing its operations so as eventually to provide for its financial independence from the annual District of Columbia budgeting process.
The Quality Trust will have three essential functions. First, it will provide independent monitoring of the quality of services and supports available to individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities, and serve as an independent voice for consumers in dealing with the District of Columbia government. Second, it will 83 provide lay advocacy to represent *83 consumers with respect to day-to-day issues that affect their quality of life and their access to services and supports, including representation in grievance and administrative proceedings. Third, it will not only provide legal representation for those individuals who have no lawyers but also will be a resource to other legal advocates and help raise the standard of legal representation of individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. Such legal representation and lay advocacy services are intended to supplement, not supplant, the services that already are required by law.
Until this case is terminated, the Court Monitor also will remain as a safeguard for class members. The Plan provides for a close working relationship between the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. As defendants achieve compliance with the outcome criteria in the Plan, and the related Court Orders are vacated, the jurisdiction for monitoring conditions will shift from the Court Monitor to the Quality Trust.
While the Plan is not intended to be an independently enforceable document, the parties do intend that there will be accountability for its implementation. The Plan requires periodic progress reports to the Special Master on its implementation and calls for status conferences with the Court to be scheduled at least bimonthly. The parties agree that if the Court finds that defendants have satisfied the outcome criteria set forth in the Plan, they also will be in compliance with the related Court Orders. Any failure of defendants to implement the tasks identified in the Plan so as to meet the requirements of the related Court Orders would be evidence of noncompliance with those Orders. The Plan provides that until the existing Court Orders are vacated, plaintiffs may seek appropriate judicial relief, including requesting orders requiring compliance with the Order(s) underlying the objectives of the Plan.

Finally, the Plan provides for a phased and orderly withdrawal of judicial oversight of the District of Columbia's management of its mental retardation service system. The mechanisms set forth in the Plan provide that defendants may move the Special Master for a finding of compliance with particular Orders when they believe that they have achieved compliance. Plaintiffs and the United States have the right to object to any such motion and to have an evidentiary hearing before the Special Master. The Special Master then is to submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence introduced during the hearing. If the Court concludes that defendants have achieved compliance, it may vacate and dismiss the related Court Order (s). Once all of the Court Orders are vacated after defendants establish that they have achieved compliance, the declaratory judgment in this case will remain.
The Consent Order and the Settlement Agreement
The Consent Order and the Settlement Agreement (with the latter being Exhibit A to the former) create an external monitoring body to permanently protect the interests of the class members once this case ends.
Consent Order. In the Consent Order, defendants have agreed to fund the Quality Trust with a total of $31.5 million over the next eleven years. Initially, defendants shall endow the Quality Trust with $11 million in order to better ensure its financial independence in carrying out its duties. The $11 million endowment is to be deposited 84 in an interest bearing account for the sole use of the Quality Trust. So that the endowment may grow, defendants *84 have agreed to provide $2 million in annual funding for the exclusive use of the Quality Trust for the first five full years of its existence. During that time, the endowment will be allowed to grow earnings so as to increase the principal. For the next five years, defendants have agreed to fund the Quality Trust with gradually decreasing amounts of annual funding: in 2006, $1.9 million; in 2007, $1.8 million; in 2008, $1.7 million; in 2009, $1.6 million; and in 2010, $1.5 million. If needed during this time, the annual earnings of the endowment's principal may be used as supplementary money to fund the operations of the Quality Trust. Between now and the beginning of the first fiscal year, defendants have agreed to pay to the Quality Trust an additional $2 million, prorated for the period of time left before the start of the fiscal year. Defendants have agreed to provide the Quality Trust with the residual prorated amount in 2011. The Consent Order specifies that all of the monies to be paid are to be paid in Year 2000 dollars. The Consent Order also provides for access rights to facilities, persons, documents, and other materials for the Quality Trust.
In exchange for defendants' endowment and annual funding of the Quality Trust, plaintiffs and the United States have agreed to waive all claims for past contumacious conduct of defendants as of the date of the entry of the Consent Order and approval of the Settlement Agreement. There are important exceptions to this waiver. For example, no matter what the time frame, plaintiffs and the United States have reserved the right to seek claims on class members' behalf related to: the safeguarding and/or management of the benefits, personal possessions, wages, bank accounts, and/or funds of class members; the failure to provide adequate legal representation and lay advocacy services to class members; and claims for damages based on other possible causes of action independent of the Court's Orders. To that end, defendants have agreed to push back the statutory limitation periods, thus enabling class members to bring suits for prior claims as of January 15, 1998. Plaintiffs and the United States retain the right to seek monetary or non-monetary contempt sanctions for defendants' acts after the date of the entry of the Consent Order.
Settlement Agreement. In addition to the Consent Order, the parties have negotiated a separate Settlement Agreement (Exhibit A to the Consent Order). This was necessary for a number of reasons. First, a designated member of the Quality Trust is to sign the Settlement Agreement, so that the Quality Trust will be bound by its terms. Second, the Quality Trust is to exist beyond the life of this class action. Once compliance with the existing Orders is achieved and the case is dismissed, there will be a surviving document that will enable interested parties to hold the Quality Trust accountable for advancing the interests of individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities.
The Settlement Agreement sets forth in detail the structure of the Quality Trust, the control and use of the funds to be provided by defendants, the obligations of the Quality Trust, and the Trust's access rights.

Approval of the Consent Order and the Settlement Agreement
The complaint in this case was filed on February 23, 1976, and it was assigned to Judge John H. Pratt. Judge Pratt granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification on June 3, 1976. On June 16, 1978, Judge Pratt issued a Final Judgment and Order, which unfortunately proved to be about as final as peace in the Balkans. Judge Pratt, long an exceptional jurist as a member of this court, died in 1995, and the case was reassigned to the 85 undersigned on August *85 29 of that year. Margaret G. Farrell was appointed as Special Master on October 1, 1995; Clarence J. Sundram (who had contributed significantly to this case as a consultant) was appointed as coSpecial Master on February 20, 2001.
The dispute seemed intractable until last year, towards the end of which there were commendable and extensive efforts by Mrs. Farrell, Mr. Sundram, and counsel for the parties seeking to resolve the problems faced by all. Those efforts led to the documents now before the Court. The first to have been filed was the Parties' Joint Stipulated Findings of Fact (December 22, 2000), which the Court hereby adopts. After the submission of the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams (February 2, 2001), the Consent Order, of which Exhibit A thereto was the Settlement Agreement, was tendered. The Consent Order was approved conditionally by the undersigned on March 4, 2001, with what has been characterized as a fairness hearing having been scheduled for March 5. Prior to that hearing, proper notice duly having been given, plaintiffs' counsel met extensively with class members (and, where applicable, members of their families) and defendants' counsel met with providers of services to the class members. A hearing was held on March 5. The status of the case then was dealt with fully by the co-Special Masters and by counsel for all parties, and testimony was received from several class members and the president of The Arc of the District of Columbia. No opposition of any sort has been expressed to the very carefully designed proposals for the resolution of this case.
Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a compromise of a class action may not be effectuated without approval of the court. This case is unusual, in that a "final judgment" in plaintiffs' favor was entered more than 20 years ago; the problem has lain in actually meeting the needs of the members of the plaintiff class. The Court commends the co-Special Masters and all counsel not only for resolving their differences, but for the exceptionally thorough manner in which they have agreed upon procedures for dealing with the problems that have persisted for so long. The Court readily concludes that the proposed compromise of the controversy, which will be of substantially greater benefit to the class than would continued litigation over how to deal with past conduct by defendants, is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Accordingly, on consideration of all of the foregoing factors, it hereby is
ORDERED, that the Parties' Joint Stipulated Findings of Fact are adopted. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams is approved as, in effect, a statement of the conditions for the expected vacating of the Court's relevant prior Orders. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the Consent Order formally is entered and the Settlement Agreement attached thereto is approved.
SO ORDERED.
CONSENT ORDER
I. Background
On February 10, 1999, this Court imposed contempt fines of $5,096,340.00 for Defendants' failure to comply with certain Court Orders in this case. Evans v. Williams, 35 F.Supp.2d 88 (D.D.C.1999). On March 31, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded this matter for further 86 proceedings. Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292 (D.C.Cir.2000). The Court of Appeals determined that the *86

contempt fines were criminal in nature and could not be imposed in the absence of appropriate procedural safeguards. Id. at 1297 n. 4.
In order to address the issues still before the Court on remand, the parties have agreed to the following Consent Order. In this Consent Order, the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia agree to endow and annually fund, pursuant to the provisions below, a durable, independent, nonprofit organization that will monitor and advance the individual and collective interests of people with developmental disabilities in the District of Columbia's service delivery system, including Evans class members, in exchange for the waiver of any and all claims for past violations of the Court's Orders in this case as specified in section II of this Consent Order. The specifics of the parties' agreement are set forth below.

II. Resolution of Past Non-Compliance with the Court Orders

The parties have agreed to this Consent Order which resolves all issues related to Defendants' past noncompliance with the Orders in this case, including those related to the Court's February 10, 1999 finding of contempt and the imposition of fines, subject to the following:

A. Except as otherwise stated in this section, the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff-Intervenor agree to waive any and all claims for past violations of the Court's Orders in this case based on Defendants' past non-compliance with the existing Court Orders in this case during the period up to and including the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order. The parties agree that this Consent Order does not affect the previously negotiated Settlement Agreement, dated September 22, 2000, as to the Symbral Foundation and the class members receiving services therefrom. In addition, Plaintiffs do not waive the claim for costs and reimbursement for the care of class member Beverly Sutton. Plaintiffs do not waive claims regarding University Legal Services, Inc., Protection and Advocacy Program's costs, expenses and attorneys' fees in this case that may have arisen prior to the date of this Order, subject to any available defenses or objections raised by the Defendants.

B. The Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor agree to waive any claim for damages based on Defendants' past non-compliance with the existing Court Orders in this case during the period up to and including the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order. However, the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff-Intervenor specifically do not waive any claim they may have for damages or equitable relief due to Defendants' conduct prior the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order, with regard to the following categories of claims only:

1. safeguarding and/or management of the benefits, personal possessions, wages, bank accounts and/or funds of class members;

2. the failure of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to provide legal representation and lay advocacy services as required by the Orders of this Court in this case and by statute (see Title 6 D.C.Code Section 1901 et seq.); and

3. claims by class members for damages or other relief based on causes of action independent of

the Court Orders in this case. In relation to such claims only, Defendants have agreed to waive the

requirements of Title 12 D.C.Code Section 309 for class members who first suffered damages on

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or after January 15, 1998, through the date this Order is *87 entered by the Court, except

Defendants expressly do not waive the requirements of Title 12 D.C.Code Section 309 for claims

brought under wrongful death or survival statutes.

C. Nothing in this Consent Order shall be construed to prevent the Plaintiffs or Plaintiff-Intervenor from seeking equitable relief to remediate current violations (that exist as of the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order) or new violations of this Court's Orders. Evidence of Defendants' conduct prior to the date this Order is entered by the Court shall be admissible in such proceedings, subject to any available defenses or objections raised by Defendants.

D. Nothing in this Consent Order modifies the current Court-ordered fine schedule and process with respect to findings of contempt based on violations of this Court's Orders which may occur after the Court's entry of this Order.
E. The Quality Trust shall not provide direct legal representation to class members with regard to any claims based on violations of the Court Orders in this case which occurred prior to the date this Order is entered by the Court.

III. Creation and Funding of the Quality Trust

A. The parties agree to the creation of an independent, nonprofit organization to be named the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc., (hereinafter "Quality Trust" or "QT").

B. Within 15 days of the Court's entry of this Consent Order, the Quality Trust shall be incorporated as a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) corporation under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act, approved August 6, 1962 (76 Stat. 265; D.C.Code Section 29-501 et seq.). The Quality Trust is to be incorporated as an independent entity to insulate it from control by the parties.

C. The mission and purpose of the Quality Trust is set forth in a Settlement Agreement (attached

as Exhibit A) which is to be signed by the parties and a designated representative of the Quality Trust, who is legally competent to bind the Quality Trust, and filed with this Court.[1] The

Settlement Agreement specifies that the Quality Trust will provide, inter alia, monitoring, legal services and lay advocacy services for individuals with developmental disabilities[2] in the District

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of Columbia's *88 service delivery system.

D. Within 30 days of the filing of the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia agree to pay the sum of eleven million dollars for deposit into an interest bearing fund for the exclusive use of the Quality Trust.

E. Within 30 days of the filing of the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, as their initial annual payment, Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds in the amount of two million dollars, prorated for the balance of the District of Columbia's Fiscal Year 2001 which ends on September 30, 2001. On or before October 1, 2001, Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with the difference between two million dollars and the prorated amount paid in Fiscal Year 2001 pursuant to the terms of this paragraph (in Year 2000 dollars).

F. Commencing October 1, 2001, for a period of five years, or until September 30, 2006, the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds of no less than two million dollars per year (all in Year 2000 dollars). The timing of the annual payment is set forth in paragraph III.H. below.

G. Commencing October 1, 2006, for a period of five years, or until September 30, 2011, the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds in the amount of 1.9 million dollars in Year 2006, 1.8 million dollars in Year 2007, 1.7 million dollars in Year 2008, 1.6 million dollars in Year 2009, and 1.5 million dollars in Year 2010 (all in Year 2000 dollars). The timing of the annual payment is set forth in paragraph III.H. below.

H. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide annual operating funding to the Quality Trust on or before October 1 of each Fiscal Year for which the funds are intended (Fiscal Years 2001 to 2011), or as soon thereafter as the budget process will allow.

I. Nothing in this Consent Order is intended to preclude any party or the Board of Directors of the Quality Trust from advocating for funds to increase those available to the Quality Trust above two million dollars in Year 2000 dollars in any given year.
IV. Quality Trust's Right to Access and Information

A. The employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access

to information that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing

the monitoring and lay advocacy duties described in the Settlement Agreement. More specifically,

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the employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust *89 shall have full

access to consumers, and their residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, documents,

records (including medical and departmental) and other materials that the Quality Trust deems

reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing the duties of the Quality Trust's monitoring

and lay advocacy functions. The Quality Trust may obtain copies of the aforementioned

documents, records, and other materials. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall

provide the Quality Trust with information upon request relevant to individual supports and

services provided in the District of Columbia's service delivery system and the Quality Trust may

request written responses from the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia in this regard.

Advance notice of any visit or inspection by the Quality Trust shall not be required.

Representatives of the Quality Trust may conduct private interviews and meetings with any

individual including employees, contractors or agents of the District of Columbia, as well as all

provider staff. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall require its employees,

contractors, agents, as well as provider staff, to cooperate with the Quality Trust representatives.

B. Attorneys who provide direct legal representation of consumers under a contract or other arrangements with the Quality Trust shall have the right to access their clients' records and any and all information regarding their clients that flow from their attorney-client relationship. In litigation involving the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia, attorneys shall comply with the applicable rules of discovery and procedure.

C. The Quality Trust shall safeguard the information obtained pursuant to paragraph IV.A. above, as required by all applicable laws and Court Orders protecting the confidentiality of such information.

D. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall keep the Quality Trust informed in a timely fashion of relevant budgetary information regarding the District of Columbia's Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA"), or its successor. The areas about which the Defendants and/or District of Columbia shall provide information to the Quality Trust are set forth in greater detail in the Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit A.

V. Conclusion

A. Upon (1) incorporation of the Quality Trust consistent with the terms of this Consent Order, (2)

Court entry of this Consent Order, (3) filing of the Settlement Agreement referenced above with

the Court with signatures from the parties and the Quality Trust, (4) the Defendants' and/or the

District of Columbia's payment of eleven million dollars into an interest-bearing investment fund for

the exclusive use of the Quality Trust as described in paragraph III.D. above, within 30 days from

the date of the filing of the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, and (5) the

Defendants' and/or District of Columbia's initial payment to the Quality Trust within 30 days of the

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filing the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, of the prorated *90 amount of two

million dollars for Fiscal Year 2001 for operating funds of the Quality Trust as described in

paragraph III.E. above, the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor shall comply with the provisions set

forth in section II above, and expressly waive any and all claims for past violations of the Court's

Orders in this case as specified in section II above, based on Defendants' past non-compliance with the existing Orders in this case which occurred during the period up to and including the date of this Court's entry of this Consent Order.
B. The United States does not waive its right to pursue any other claims against the Defendants or the District of Columbia with regard to disputes or claims that involve incidents or events that occurred during any period arising under laws, statutes and regulations other than the existing Court Orders in this case.
WHEREFORE, the parties to this action, having agreed to the provisions in the Consent Order set forth above, and the Court being advised in the premises, this Court hereby GRANTS CONDITIONAL APPROVAL of this Consent Order pending final approval after a fairness hearing pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the parties to this action, having agreed to the provisions in the Consent Order set forth above, and the Court being advised in the premises and having concluded that this Consent Order is a fair resolution of these matters after a fairness hearing held on March 5, 2001, this Consent Order is hereby entered as the ORDER and JUDGMENT of this Court.
EXHIBIT A

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Pursuant to the attached Consent Order, the parties and the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc., (hereinafter the "Quality Trust" or "QT"), hereby agree to the following:
I. Structure of the Quality Trust

A. The bylaws of the Quality Trust shall provide that the Quality Trust will have an independent Board of Directors and a body of non-voting members. The Mayor shall appoint the initial board from a list of nominees jointly developed by Defendants, Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor. Each nominee on the list of proposed board members shall be agreed to by all parties. The Board shall thereafter be self-perpetuating. Specifically:

1. The composition and responsibilities of the Board will be established by the organization's bylaws and will include the following:

a. Each director shall be a natural person of adult age. A director need not be a citizen of the United States. At least eight members of the Board must be residents of the District of Columbia.

b. The initial Board of Directors shall consist of the directors named in the Quality Trust's Articles of Incorporation and shall hold office until their successors have been duly appointed and qualified.

c. At all times following the appointment of the first full thirteen member Board of Directors, the full Board of Directors shall consist of thirteen adult persons designated as follows:

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i. Two family members of people with mental retardation and/or developmental *91 disabilities.

The initial terms of family members shall be two years, and all subsequent terms shall be three

years;

ii. Two non-legal advocates for persons who have mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities. The initial terms of the non-legal advocate members shall be two years, and all subsequent terms shall be three years;

iii. Three persons who have mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities. The initial terms of these members shall be one year, and all subsequent terms shall be three years;

iv. Two professionals with at least ten years background in a service delivery system for people who have mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities. The initial terms of professional members shall be three years and all subsequent terms shall be three years;

v. Two attorneys licensed to practice law. The initial terms of attorney members shall be three years, and all subsequent terms shall be three years; and

vi. Two citizens residing in the District of Columbia. The initial terms of citizen members shall be one year, and all subsequent terms shall be three years.

d. Following the initial term of each Board Member, the remaining Board Members, whose terms are not ending, will vote to replace the departing Board Member. A majority vote of those remaining Board Members is required to fill a vacancy. Further, the Board Member must replace a departing Board Member with an adult person who fits the designated category (e.g., family member, non-legal advocate, person with mental retardation and/or other developmental disability professional with ten years experience, attorney, citizen residing in the District of Columbia) of the departing Board Member. A Board Member may succeed himself or herself. A Board Member may resign prior to the expiration of the full term. If a Board Member resigns prior to the expiration of the full term, the other Board Members shall replace that Board Member for the remainder of the unexpired term through the voting process outlined in this section. Votes regarding the appointment, removal, or replacement of a member of the Board of Directors may not be delegated to a committee of the Board.

2. The Quality Trust will be a member organization with non-voting members. The non-voting members shall be individuals with mental retardation, as well as people with other developmental disabilities, who are applicants for or are receiving protections, supports and services in the District of Columbia's developmental disabilities service delivery system, and all Evans class members.

B. The Quality Trust's scope of activities shall include review of services to all Evans class

members, as well as non-class members who are applicants for or are receiving protections,

supports and services in the District of Columbia's developmental disabilities service delivery system.[1] Pursuant to the attached Consent Order and this Settlement Agreement, the Quality

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Trust will monitor the protections, services *92 and supports provided to these individuals and

offer legal services and provide lay advocacy services to these "consumers." The term

"consumers" refers to all recipients and applicants for services from the District of Columbia's

service delivery system for individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. The

Evans class members (i.e., those individuals who have at one time resided at Forest Haven)

comprise a subset of this overall group of consumers.

II. Control and Use of the Quality Trust Fund

A. The investment fund, created with the eleven million dollars paid by the Defendants and/or District of Columbia pursuant to the attached Consent Order, shall be controlled by the Quality Trust. The Quality Trust shall invest the fund in a reasonable and prudent manner. The Quality Trust shall make reasonable efforts to increase its assets, raise funds and/or find additional resources in order to increase the principal and income of the fund.
B. From the outset, the earnings from the fund shall be reinvested to increase the principal. The earnings of this fund shall not be used to support the operations of the Quality Trust until October 1, 2006. The Quality Trust shall not use the principal to carry out its functions and operations prior

to October 1, 2011. After October 1, 2011, the Quality Trust, by a vote of three-quarters of its Board Members, may utilize a reasonable portion of the principal to support its mission.
C. Nothing in this Settlement Agreement shall preclude the Quality Trust, in accordance with applicable law, from creating a separate corporate entity, consistent with the Quality Trust's mission, to achieve the Quality Trust's operational goals.

III. Obligations of the Quality Trust

In general, the Quality Trust shall: advance the individual and collective interests of consumers with developmental disabilities, and in particular Evans class members; monitor the health, safety and welfare of these consumers; and monitor the protections, services and supports provided to these consumers. The Quality Trust also shall provide for individual and/or collective legal services and lay advocacy services for consumers as set forth in greater detail below. The Board of Directors shall periodically determine how to apportion its resources among monitoring, legal representation services and lay advocacy or other strategies, consistent with the Quality Trust's mission and functions, to advance the individual and/or collective interests of consumers with developmental disabilities, and in particular Evans class members. This process shall be informed by the Defendants' and/or the District of Columbia's level of compliance with the Evans 2001 Plan.

A. Monitoring

The Quality Trust shall create a Monitoring Unit which shall:

1. Develop an annual monitoring plan with input from the parties, consumers, families, providers and advocates.

2. Monitor the adequacy, safety and quality of consumers' residential and habilitation programs and supports.

3. Receive and review with regard to consumers from the District's Mental Retardation and

Developmental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA") or its successor, all of MRDDA's serious

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incident reports and investigation reports of *93 serious incidents, including deaths, and aggregate

information regarding all incidents.

4. Write annual reports, and, in addition, such other periodic reports as the Quality Trust may determine to be necessary. Such reports are to be made public and provided to: (A) the Special Master and the parties' counsel of record (until this case is no longer subject to Court supervision); (B) the Defendants and/or the branches of the District of Columbia, including the Departments of Human Services and Health (or their successors), the Chief Financial Officer and the Mayor; and (C) the District of Columbia Council. The reports shall make observations with regard to the adequacy of the protections, services, and supports provided to consumers and offer recommendations for any needed improvements. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall respond promptly to these reports in writing, including specific corrective action steps they will implement or have implemented, along with timelines if the actions have not been implemented, to address current problems.

5. Receive and review information with regard to the District of Columbia budget requests for MRDDA or its successor sufficient to permit its timely monitoring and comment about District of Columbia budget decisions affecting consumers.

6. Annually inform the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia of the consumer needs, based on information collected during monitoring activities, in a timely manner, to permit such information to be considered in developing the District of Columbia's proposed budget for the service delivery system for individuals with developmental disabilities for the following Fiscal Year.

7. Apply at least the following standards in its monitoring and reviews: (A) the specific outcome criteria developed as part of the Evans 2001 Plan; (B) certification and private accreditation standards; (C) the District of Columbia's own standards including licensing requirements; (D) Medicaid and Medicare regulations and conditions of participation; and (E) the District of Columbia's performance standards in private provider contracts.
8. Be physically co-located with the Evans Independent Court Monitor so as to enhance communication regarding monitoring activities in order to avoid redundancy, until the Evans case is no longer subject to regular Court supervision. The Independent Court Monitor shall remain directly responsible to the Court, and not to the Quality Trust. As each Evans Order is vacated by the Court, monitoring of corresponding operations shall be transferred from the Independent Court Monitor to the Quality Trust, and shall no longer be subject to Court supervision.
B. Legal Services

1. The Quality Trust shall work to raise the level of advocacy among court-appointed attorneys by, for example, providing training, drafting model pleadings and developing in-house appellate advocacy capacity. The Quality Trust's legal representatives will supplement (not replace) the existing pool of attorneys appointed by Superior Court and will seek to be appointed in cases of consumers who have heretofore been deprived competent representation.

2. The Quality Trust shall contract with or otherwise arrange for legal representation services for

consumers. The scope and content of the contract shall be negotiated by the Quality Trust and the

provider. The Quality Trust will oversee the performance of the provider under this contract to

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ensure that the *94 consumers are getting the legal representation services they require.

3. The Quality Trust shall not provide direct legal representation to any individual but may contract or make other arrangements for direct representation from other independent legal services providers. Nothing herein shall preclude lay advocates from assisting consumers in administrative proceedings.

C. Lay Advocacy Services

Because some of the advocacy needs of the consumers do not require the services of an attorney and can be provided more effectively and less expensively through the availability of lay advocates, the Quality Trust will create a Lay Advocacy Program which shall provide the following services:
1. Attend Individual Support Plan ("ISP") and other team meetings for consumers for whom they are responsible and advocate for the needs and choices of the consumers at these meetings. The advocates will attempt at all times to facilitate the consumers' self-expression, or in the alternative, will consult with duly appointed representatives or surrogate decision-makers, where appropriate.
2. Regularly interact with the case managers of the consumers on their caseloads to keep abreast of any issues impacting on the protections, services and supports provided to consumers.
3. Receive and review serious incident reports and investigation reports for consumers for whom they are responsible, and advocate for the consumers' safety and well-being in the course of such investigations.
4. Receive and review all monitoring reports related to the consumers on their caseloads and follow up to ensure that necessary corrective action is taken.
5. Periodically visit consumers receiving residential and day treatment services to ensure that consumers are safe and satisfied with the services and supports they are receiving and that the services and supports are adequate to meet the individualized needs of the consumers.

6. Advocate on behalf of individuals and/or groups of consumers to ensure that their complaints are investigated in a timely fashion and that the consumers are satisfied with the resolution. In the event that the time frames required for resolution are not complied with or that the proposed resolution is otherwise unsatisfactory, the advocate shall consult with the consumer(s), or other appropriate decision-maker, to determine the appropriate course of action.

a. The Lay Advocacy Program and the Legal Services component shall establish a program to facilitate the immediate referral and coordination of cases requiring the assistance of an attorney.

b. Consumers may seek immediate referral to the Legal Services component from the Lay Advocacy Program.

7. Attend court hearings for the consumers on their caseloads and work with the assigned attorneys in ensuring that consumers' needs for protections, services and supports are met.

8. Some consumers will have family members, guardians or friends who will serve as their advocates while others will rely on the services of paid lay advocates. The advocacy program will provide training not only to the lay advocates, but also to such volunteer advocates.

9. This advocacy unit will supplement (not replace) the existing pool of advocates acting on behalf

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of family, friends, or those appointed by Superior Court or *95 appointed pursuant to existing

Orders in this case. The Lay Advocacy Program will prioritize cases of consumers who heretofore

have not received advocacy services.

IV. Quality Trust's Right to Access and Information

A. The employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access to information that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing the monitoring and lay advocacy duties described in the Settlement Agreement. More specifically, the employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access to consumers, and their residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, documents, records (including medical and departmental) and other materials that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing the duties of the Quality Trust's monitoring and lay advocacy functions. The Quality Trust may obtain copies of the aforementioned documents, records, and other materials. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with information upon request relevant to individual supports and services provided in the District of Columbia's service delivery system and the Quality Trust may request written responses from the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia in this regard. Advance notice of any visit or inspection by the Quality Trust shall not be required. Representatives of the Quality Trust may conduct private interviews and meetings with any individual including employees, contractors or agents of the District of Columbia, as well as all provider staff. The Defendants and/ or the District of Columbia shall require its employees, contractors, agents, as well as provider staff, to cooperate with the Quality Trust representatives.
B. Attorneys who provide direct legal representation of consumers under a contract or other arrangements with the Quality Trust shall have the right to access their clients' records and any and all information regarding their clients that flow from their attorney-client relationship. In litigation involving the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia, attorneys shall comply with the applicable rules of discovery and procedure.
C. The Quality Trust shall safeguard the information obtained pursuant to paragraph IV.A., as required by all applicable laws and Court Orders protecting the confidentiality of such information.
D. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall keep the Quality Trust informed in a timely fashion of relevant budgetary information regarding MRDDA or its successor. The areas about

which the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide information to the Quality Trust include the following:

1. The portions of the budget that address specific consumer needs for residential and day program services, equipment, medical and clinical care, etc.;

2. The portions of the budget that address system needs for managing, monitoring, and overseeing the system of services for consumers;

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3. The portions of the budget that address any capital appropriations that *96 may be required to

meet the needs of the consumers (e.g., for construction or renovation of program sites or

residences);

4. The amount of the appropriation being requested by the Mayor from the City Council to meet consumer needs;

5. The final appropriation; and

6. The District of Columbia Department of Health's proposed and actual budgets which include the District of Columbia's share of payments to Medicaid providers.

V. Legislative Principles

The Plaintiffs and the Defendants agree that if the appropriate legislative body does not enact legislation to implement the Legislative Principles (attached to the Evans 2001 Plan), before the end of the 2001 legislative session, the parties will accomplish the objectives of the Principles through alternative means. The United States does not take a position with regard to such proposed and/or pending legislation or to the Legislative Principles attached to the Plan.
VI. Judicial Review

Until the Evans case is dismissed, this Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement as to class members only, with remedies available to the parties to the Settlement Agreement under applicable contract law. Upon dismissal of this action, the Settlement Agreement shall be enforceable as a contract in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
PARTIES' JOINT STIPULATED FINDINGS OF FACT

Dec. 22, 2000

I. Introduction

On February 10, 1999, this Court ordered the Special Master to develop findings of fact with regard to the status of Defendants' compliance with Court Orders in this case. In order to assist the Special Master to comply with this Order, the parties, in order to resolve their differences, avoid costly and unnecessary litigation, and continue their collaborative relationship, have agreed on the following stipulated findings of fact. The stipulations apply to the time period up to and including the date of the statement or report that is the source of the information.
II. Stipulations

GENERAL FINDINGS
1. Issues related to the District of Columbia's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities (hereinafter "District's system") represent one of the most serious breakdowns in the District government over the last two decades. The measure of a society is how it treats its most vulnerable citizens. In this case, the District government failed. Prepared Statement of Anthony A. Williams, Mayor of the District of Columbia (hereinafter "Mayor's Prep. Stmnt."), June 1, 2000 at 1 (Master's Exh. J, June 30, 2000).
2. Mistakes in the District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities cover 20 years of neglect and mismanagement. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 1.
3. The District government is seriously broken from years of disinvestment, mismanagement, poor oversight and neglect. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 1.
4. The breakdown in services to clients with developmental disabilities in the District's system had been 19 years in the making. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 1.
5. The Mayor and his administration were aware of problems in the District's Mental Retardation and 97 Developmental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA") but were not aware that some of the systemic *97
problems could lead to threats to the life and safety of some of the most vulnerable citizens in the District's system. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 2.
6. In spite of some progress in fixing the District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities in recent months, much remains to be done. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 2.
7. Two decades of neglect in the District's system has taken a toll on the clients served in the system. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 3.
8. The District government has fundamentally failed its obligation to disabled persons and their families. Painful experience has taught that the District's MRDDA system is not a system. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 3.
9. The District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities must do a better job assessing risks and being proactive. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 4.
10. The District's support system is a problem that urgently needs to be fixed. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 4.
11. The District government inherited by Mayor Williams was almost completely decimated as a result of years of disinvestment, mismanagement, and poor performance. Prepared Statement of Carolyn N. Graham, Deputy Mayor of the District of Columbia (hereinafter "Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt."), May 22, 2000 at 1 (Master's Exh. K).
12. Problems existed in MRDDA under the present administration. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 2.
13. The District was aware of problems of poor care provided at group homes, systemic failures and other issues as a result of a Washington Post article in February 1999. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 3.
14. MRDDA needed legal representation in guardianship hearings that involve citizens with developmental disabilities. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 4.
15. MRDDA has had trouble getting provider contracts processed in a timely manner. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 5.
16. The problems in the District's support system for individuals with developmental disabilities were even more egregious than originally and subsequently described. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 6.
17. The Mayor issued a report that acknowledged that the District's entire mental retardation and developmental disabilities system was fundamentally unable to deliver even the most basic services. It is definitive that the

current system failed because of a poor design and years of neglect and disinvestment. The District's system intended to address the needs of those with developmental disabilities suffers from fundamental problems. Examples of such fundamental problems in the District's system include; there are no clearly defined quality service standards; there is no quality improvement process; there are no significant penalties for lack of compliance with existing system's requirements; there is fragmentation and poor coordination in government business processes; there is no investment in technology to augment business processes internal and external to government; there is a poorly trained workforce both in and outside of government; there is a highly inconsistent, underpaid workforce external to government; and there are limited supported employment opportunities. Well over sixty percent of the population in the District's community residential facilities ("CRF's") could benefit from such opportunities. The District's system favors high cost institutional-based care as opposed to a system that 98 supports and encourages *98 independence and inclusion. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 7-9.
18. The District's support system requires a major overhaul that will not happen overnight. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 10. While there have been some recent accomplishments, far more remains to be done. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 14.
19. Painful experience has taught that the District government currently lacks the capacity to adequately deliver the services that the individuals with developmental disabilities in the District's system require. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 17.
20. The entire mental retardation and developmental disabilities service delivery system is incapable of providing quality service. Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Service Delivery System, Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children and Families, Jan. 18, 2000 (hereinafter "D.C. Prelim. Rep.") at 1 (emphasis in original).
21. The District's mental retardation and developmental disabilities service delivery system is broken. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 5, 39.
22. The District's system is highly dysfunctional and unable to execute its mission at its most basic level through its current structure and procedures. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
23. After the closure of Forest Haven, compliance with the Evans v. Williams Court-Ordered mandates began to deteriorate. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 11 (fn.5). Many of the requirements of the Evans Court Orders are not being complied with. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14. While Court Orders in the Evans case apply only to a portion of the customers served by MRDDA, there is no programmatic or clinical reason to differentiate between class members and other customers. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.
24. The District is mired in a philosophy of service delivery that is reminiscent of approaches that are more than 20 years old and that consequently, neither MRDDA's mission statement nor its operation reflects the most current philosophy demonstrated nationally in best practice models. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 22.
25. The entire District service delivery system must be redefined and rebuilt. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
26. The need for reform in the District's system ranges from the broadest to the smallest of issues and simply "tinkering around the edges" will not solve the systemic problems in the system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 11.
27. Fixing the District's system requires a combination of short and long-term initiatives that are integrated and coordinated. Previous attempts to analyze and fix problems have been too narrow in scope and did not take into account the overall impact of piecemeal solutions. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 5, 39.
28. MRDDA does not and cannot meet its stated mission which is to serve individuals with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities. Defendants' staffing pattern and approach has been and still is designed to serve only people with mental retardation. MRDDA is not adequately meeting the needs of people with mental retardation and is not capable of effectively meeting the aspect of its mission to serve people with developmental disabilities other than mental retardation. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 21.
29. Upon further review of the system, Defendants re-confirmed their earlier conclusion that communication and 99 coordination between departments and even agencies within departments is inadequate. *99 Addendum to

Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Service Delivery System, Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children and Families, Mar. 2, 2000 (hereinafter "D.C. Addendum Rep.") at 3.
30. There is no single coordinated plan to ensure lifetime support to individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 3.
LEAST RESTRICTIVE COMMUNITY SETTING
31. The District relies on a facility-based model of service delivery that does not lend itself to providing community living and support services that are fully integrated, customer-directed, flexible, cost efficient, and which promote an optimum quality of life. Final Report to the Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the City Administrator, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Operations, Georgetown University Child Development Center, Jan. 18, 2000 (hereinafter "D.C. Georgetown Rep.") at 2.
32. There is a general lack of communication between MRDDA and the Office of Program Operations which results in a lack of coordination in planning to ensure that the appropriate types of facilities are available for the placement of MRDDA clients by MRDDA. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9. Ultimate decision-making in person centered planning rests with MRDDA even though it is "demonstrably ill-equipped" to carry out this function. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 15. There are no structural mechanisms within the District system for people with disabilities and their families to select where and with whom they live; participate in the design of services they receive; determine from whom they receive services; and participate in program evaluation including customer satisfaction surveys. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 15.
33. The District's operating philosophy is the same as it was prior to the closing of Forest Haven resulting in "mini-Forest Havens" rather than a person-centered planning philosophy. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
34. The District's Medical Assistance Administration ("MAA") and MRDDA have failed to implement an effective Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver. The District's commitment to self-determination embodied in person centered planning cannot be met without the funding stream provided by an effective waiver. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 35-36.
35. The lack of an effective home and community based waiver is in itself sufficient to keep the District from effectively implementing person centered planning. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 4.
36. The District does not have a functioning home and community based waiver program. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 8. Defendants acknowledge that the District has "lagged behind" in instituting a fully functional waiver. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 6.
37. The District's competitive procurement process is not suitable for the procurement of service to the MRDDA population in that awarding the contract to the lowest bidder sometimes results in awards that do not support the goals of person centered planning and respect for individual self-determination. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 31.
38. MRDDA and provider managers and supervisors may lack sensitivity to the right of persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities to make choices. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.
100 *100 STAFF TRAINING
39. Formal training programs and requirements for both District and private sector employees are nearly nonexistent in the mental retardation and developmental disabilities service delivery system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3.
40. MRDDA employees have not been provided adequate training for the jobs that they do. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.
41. Residential and transportation provider employees within the District's system have not been provided adequate training for the jobs that they do. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.

42. There has been a lack of appropriate training of MRDDA managers and employees. There is no formal training program in place. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 18.
PROTECTION FROM HARM/INCIDENT REPORTING/INVESTIGATIONS
43. There is no formal policy or procedure detailing the difference between an unusual incident report and an "alert," that MRDDA staff had different understandings of these two instruments. Defendants acknowledge that more review of the "alert" process is necessary. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14.
44. There is a lack of basic policies and procedures in the District system. There was no policy to allow employees to call 911 without first getting a supervisor's approval until December 1999. There was no policy to provide for safe transportation of customers in existence prior to late 1999, and that it was developed only after a customer died after being left unattended in a van. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
45. Policies and procedures are often not followed in the District's system. For example, many providers do not provide MRDDA with unusual incident reports within 24 hours and do not submit reports on all incidents that should be reported pursuant to current MRDDA policies. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
46. MRDDA staff do not always track down the outcome of matters referred for action. Once items are referred to other agencies for action, little follow-up is done to determine the status of investigations. This problem is exacerbated by a general failure to share information among involved organizations. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 20.
47. There is a large backlog of unusual incident reports within the Bureau of Program Operations and Contracts ("BPOC") which is to review them and forward them for appropriate action. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 24. Since at least November 1, 1999, all unusual incident reports are not sent to the Office of Inspection and Compliance ("OIC") per current policy requirements. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 25.
48. There has been a lack of appropriate management at the District's Department of Human Services ("DHS") regarding OIC functions. From March to December 1999, more than 600 unusual incident reports were received, yet little action was taken to address workload issues. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 27.
49. The District's Internal Affairs Division ("IAD") has a growing backlog of investigations related to alleged abuses within MRDDA. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 27.
50. DHS' Policies and Procedures for Reporting Unusual Incidents are not always followed with regard to the timely submission of unusual incident reports or currently with the submission of all reports to OIC. The process for submitting incident reports to OIC/IAD is delayed through MRDDA. The delay in receiving notification can hinder an investigation since evidence may be removed or destroyed or persons involved may be moved. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 28.
101 *101 51. There is no formal communication structure between the District's Licensing and Regulation Administration ("LRA"), OIC, and MRDDA and that this lack of communication has created gaps in monitoring and handling routine complaints and incident reports. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
52. There is no formal communication structure that requires providers or clients to report complaints or incidents to LRA. In some cases, complaints and incident reports are never reported to LRA or MRDDA. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
53. OIC does not adequately coordinate with the District's Department of Health ("DOH"), the District's Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"), case managers, or others involved in the incident reporting process. The agencies charged with gathering, disseminating, investigating, and reporting on unusual incident reports do not coordinate or communicate on a routine basis. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
54. MRDDA's unusual incident tracking system does not interface with that of LRA or OIC. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29. Information systems between DOH and DHS or that systems within DOH are not standardized. D.C. Prelim.

Rep. at 29-30. There is no complete file of the complaints and incidents that occur in an individual facility. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 30.
55. There is no automated tracking system in place in the District's system to log the unusual incident reports and track action through disposition. It is difficult to track unusual incidents across all involved agencies. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 30.
56. A lack of investigative powers within OIC and IAD hinders the investigative process. The OIC function is unknown to case managers and vendors who often ask for supervisory clearance before cooperating with an investigation, which delays interviews and document collection and analysis. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 30.
SAFEGUARDING PERSONAL POSSESSIONS
57. MRDDA lacks sufficient internal procedures and automation to accurately account for all funds allocated to client accounts. Customers in the District's system are entitled to personal care allowance of approximately $70.00 per month. Deposits over $50.00 are to be placed in interest bearing accounts and any interest must be credited to that account. After the cost of care allocation is disbursed to providers, MRDDA has no specific procedures in place to ensure that allocations of funding goes directly to the cost of care and personal care. Evidence set forth by a June 1998 DHS audit indicate that at least $73,000.00 is owed to customers. Audits to identify allocations or misuse of funds are disjointed and funds are tracked through agencies that communicate all information through documentary evidence that does not exist in some cases and is not updated in others. Automation between agencies for audit purposes of funds is non-existent and therefore allocations of funds are not able to be tracked or monitored. Budgetary and Financial Analysis of MRDDA, Final Report to Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the City Administrator, Management Analysis, Inc., Jan. 13, 2000 (hereinafter "D.C. MAI Budget Rep.") at 3-6, 7.
58. Community bank accounts are not adequately managed by MRDDA. There is no formal control, monitoring or reporting. MRDDA cannot identify how many such accounts exist, or who has them, how much money is in them, or how they are being managed. MRDDA senior staff and case managers do not have the staff to track these accounts down, and are aware that numerous accounts in the community exist outside the knowledge of MRDDA case managers. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-9.
102 *102 59. The District has no controls in place to monitor community bank accounts of clients. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 37.
60. The District has no controls in place to monitor customer burial accounts. MRDDA has neither procedures for the establishment nor the maintenance of burial accounts and similarly lacks procedures for monitoring or administering any existing accounts. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 37.
61. There is no mechanism in the District's system to effectively monitor the implementation of individual financial plans. Providers often fail to get approval from case managers before withdrawing funds from individual accounts. The District rarely insists upon receipts from providers indicating what was actually bought with the funds. There are inadequate asset control mechanisms in place so that case managers and others can determine what property customers own. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 36.
62. MRDDA does not enforce penalties or monitor providers' transactions associated with client accounts. MRDDA has no formal procedures for review of the providers' financial statements except upon the case managers' inspection of the providers' residence or if the provider sends MRDDA a copy of the bank statements. Documentation of client accounts, balances and transactions are not systematically tracked and therefore MRDDA is unable to ascertain providers' compliance with Federal and District regulations or whether funds have been commingled or expended on unauthorized allocations. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-8.
63. Individual Financial Plans ("IFP's") are not used to manage the disbursement of client funds in the District's system. Because the IFP's serve as general guidelines only, they have little or no relevance in monitoring actual customer expenditures. It would be "impossible" for a case manager to manually review all clients' IFP's to ascertain actual expenditures given the lack of automation and lack of records. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-8.

64. Clients' individual financial plans are not drafted with sufficient or meaningful detail and the monitoring of these plans is inadequate in the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 36.
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMS, MONITORING AND CASE MANAGEMENT
65. Not until December 21, 1999, had the District ever undertaken to conduct an operational review of the entire District system of service delivery to persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities in an attempt to identify systemwide issues. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 1.
66. The management and oversight of both District employees and private sector providers has been inadequate. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
67. Communication and coordination occurs on a limited, ad hoc basis throughout the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
68. In most parts of the District's system, there has been and continues to be a lack of managers with solid management skills and recognized expertise in the mental retardation or developmental disabilities field or other related fields. The common use of acting or temporary managers causes uncertainty in the District's system and inhibits change within the organization, cementing in place antiquated practices. The District's system is unable to move forward without permanent managers in key positions. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3.
69. Both District and private sector employees lack the updated position descriptions, training, and supervision 103 that is consistent *103 with an effective service delivery system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3.
70. In many cases, policy and procedure statements are not available in the District's system. In some cases, policies and procedures are not circulated to employees or are so out of date, that they are useless. Informal communication of policies and procedures during "on the job training" has served to continue a system of bad habits and poor methods. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3-4.
71. All policies and procedures in the District's system are in need of review and revision. Where policies and procedures do not exist, they need to be created in accordance with updated philosophies, processes, and systems. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 4.
72. One of the most striking findings of the Defendants' own operational review of the District's system was the complete lack of communication and coordination within the mental retardation and developmental disabilities service delivery system. Each organization within the system operates in nearly complete isolation from the other organizations. This has resulted in total dysfunction of the service system and the complete lack of leadership systemwide. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 4.
73. Automation is lacking throughout the District's service delivery system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 4.
74. In addition to failures at MRDDA, a multitude of governmental agencies and various levels of governmental oversight all contribute to the District's broken service delivery system. Bureaucratic processes hinder crossagency collaboration. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 10.
75. DHS has failed to take appropriate actions regarding the provision of services to persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14.
76. Top level DHS management responses to issues concerning service provision and quality of care of its MRDDA customers has been both reactive and inadequate. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14-5. Appropriate DHS leadership has been severely lacking in the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 15.
77. There has been a dearth of persons with solid managerial skills in key positions at MRDDA for a number of years which has produced general dysfunction within the entire system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 15.

78. MRDDA has not had an Administrator with an appropriate technical background in either mental retardation or developmental disabilities for approximately six years. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3, 15.
79. Neither the Bureau of Case Management ("BCM") nor the BPOC has a permanent Bureau Chief. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 15.
80. In some cases, persons holding management positions regarding the intake and case management functions have not ensured the existence of appropriate procedures or the adherence to existing procedures in the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.
81. Position descriptions for managers in the District's system are outdated and do not appropriately reflect either the correct tasks or newer philosophies regarding persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.
82. A significant number of MRDDA employees do not have position descriptions suitable for the jobs they perform. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.
83. MRDDA employees have not had adequate supervision. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16. Comments in favorable 104 performance *104 ratings are often inconsistent with such ratings. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16-7.
84. There are insufficient numbers of employees to do the work required in the District's system. Monitoring staff is inadequate; there are no staff trained or qualified to create or review draft legislation, procedures or policies; there are no staff specifically charged with tracking compliance with the multiple Court Orders; and there are only two employees charged with making court appearances that occur almost every day. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.
85. There are insufficient numbers of employees in the District's system to do the work required. As an example, a Court Order in the Evans case requires a ratio of case managers of no more than 1:60 for Evans class members. The District has determined that a more appropriate ratio is 1:30 and is attempting to achieve this ratio for all customers. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17. Case management position descriptions should be modified to reflect the best and current practices in the coordination of services. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 4.
86. There are inadequate methods for background checks on providers and the employees of providers in the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 18.
87. MRDDA neither has the statutory nor administrative authority to require the interagency coordination and collaboration necessary across District governmental agencies. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
88. Case managers do not visit all customers on their caseloads at least once per quarter per MRDDA policy. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
89. There is no document management policy within MRDDA in spite of the fact that all District agencies are to have one. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
90. There is a lack of adequate communication within sections of MRDDA, as well as with other District organizations. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19-20.
91. There is almost no automation used for the intake and case management functions in the District's system. MRDDA as a whole lacks e-mail. Most processes are paper driven. Case managers record their notes by hand. Unusual incident reports are done by hand. A contractor has been hired to develop databases which should allow MRDDA to track such information as demographics of its customer base, the residence of each customer, the status of Individual Habilitation Plans ("IHP's"), incidents involving customers and providers. In addition, this lack of automation contributes to MRDDA failing to comply with Court Orders. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 20.
92. The District's MRDDA Monitoring Unit had been dismantled for years, and although it has recently been reestablished, no written policies exist for this unit. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 23.
93. Two positions that directly affect the administration of LRA (the Director and the Director for State Affairs) are not permanently filled. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 26.

94. District monitoring functions are understaffed. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 27.
95. LRA only provides monitoring at the minimum level required by the United States Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"). This level of monitoring does not support the mission statement of the District's DOH which seeks to assure safe and healthy environments through licensing and regulation, reducing or preventing the risk of disease, dysfunction and premature death. LRA does not perform enough monitoring of facilities to carry out this mission. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 28.
105 *105 96. There is no coordination between the MRDDA monitoring unit and LRA to ensure that inspections performed complement, as opposed to overlap, each other. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
97. The MRDDA monitoring unit does not have an automated way to track inspections. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
98. There have been significant delays in the District's system in negotiating and completing contracts for nonMedicaid services, partly due to significant understaffing. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 32.
99. Medicaid provider agreements and District contracts with providers lack quality controls, effective monitoring provisions, and incentives or disincentives for superior or substandard service. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 32.
100. Twenty-seven District employees have been detailed or reassigned from Forest Haven to MRDDA since 1991 with no current position descriptions or any formal determination that they possess the skills and training to perform the tasks to which they are now assigned. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 32-33.
101. Many, if not most, of the positions at MRDDA lack accurate, up-dated position descriptions. MRDDA supervisors need assistance in proper performance evaluation preparation. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 33.
102. Defendants acknowledge that there is no true system for providing services to MRDDA customers; rather there are a number of agencies that perform functions that impact the MRDD population in relative isolation from each other. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 4.
103. MAA is currently doing no provider reviews to determine if MRDDA customers are receiving the level of care for which MAA is paying. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 4.
104. There is currently no formal procedure that requires coordination between the District of Columbia's Public Schools ("DCPS") and MRDDA when an individual leaves the DCPS system and enters MRDDA's. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 4.
105. There is insufficient staff assigned to conduct utilization reviews to ensure that the appropriate level of care is being provided to customers within the District's system. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9.
106. Based on Defendants own review, written policies and procedures are lacking in the District's system. While many policies and procedures are established by HCFA, the Defendants' review indicated that MAA has not formulated or disseminated internal written policies and procedures. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 10.
107. Automation in the system is outdated in the District's system. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 10.
108. There is a lack of communication between DCPS divisions and between DCPS and MRDDA. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 11.
109. The position description of the Administrator of MRDDA is obsolete and outdated. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 17.
110. The District's CMD is understaffed to protect the rights of people with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 19.
111. The position descriptions for non-licensed MRDDA staff do not cite minimum educational requirements. If MRDDA administrative staff were effectively performing the duties and responsibilities as specified in the position descriptions, the agency would not be experiencing multiple and ongoing crises. A significant proportion of 106 MRDDA's staff is former direct care/service personnel. An analysis of the available forms for these personnel

*106 fails to demonstrate that re-training or continuing education has occurred to provide personnel with the knowledge and competencies required to fulfill current duties and responsibilities. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 23.
112. In a recent review of performance ratings for MRDDA personnel, a majority had no performance ratings. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 24.
BUDGET, TIMELY PAYMENT OF VENDORS
113. Since 1995, the District's budget allocation for CRF's and other non-Medicaid supported services has been reduced as a result of fiscal crises. These funds have yet to be restored to meet current demands. Adjusted for inflation, total spending for services for individuals with mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities in the District declined 2 percent during 1991-1996; nationally during the same period, total spending for individuals with mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities advanced 24 percent in inflation adjusted terms. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 14.
114. The District's budget process is not designed to support MRDDA and customer requirements. There is no effective system in place for identifying MRDDA's actual budgetary requirements in terms of District appropriated funds. MRDDA cannot readily identify its current customer demographics and has no projection of future customer demographics. MRDDA does not track, and is unable to identify costs by customer category. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-1.
115. IHPs are not used as input to project MRDDA resource requirements. The IHPs document the range of services needed by a current customer, and of course, will change over time. Lack of IHP input tends to understate requirements since MRDDA's population is aging. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-2.
116. The budget process begins with the prior year's baseline as the starting point. However, MRDDA has not been providing a fully satisfactory level of service. There are deficiencies in staff training, quality control, case management, and other areas. Yet baseline budgeting tends to perpetuate existing problems and does not provide management with alternatives and associated costs for addressing these issues. Plus, baseline budgeting does not take into account the differential costs of person centered planning or the changing requirements due to changes in the number or mix of clients. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-1, 3-2.
117. Financial tracking and reporting are not adequate for program management purposes in the District's system. MRDDA has no timely tracking of expenditures and does not have a precise picture of funds available at any given point during the fiscal year. Despite the existence of many urgent requirements, the agency significantly underspent its FY 1999 general fund budget by $2.6 million. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-2.
118. MRDDA's appropriated budget is not developed based on any real analysis of the expected expenditures of the agency. Instead, the MRDDA appropriated budget, approximately $24 million per year, is based on no more than guesswork and the use of the prior year's appropriations to estimate budgetary needs. This does not allow for an accurate forecast of expected needs that would support rational policy decisions within the budget development process. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
119. The District does not know what its true cost is to provide services to individual customers, such that 107 attempts to recover cost of care amounts from individual *107 customers may be inappropriate. D.C. Prelim. Rep.
at 36.
120. Fiscal issues have not been appropriately addressed within the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
121. The District does not know the total amount expended to operate the MRDDA program and provide services to the client population. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
122. There is inadequate information exchange between MRDDA and the DHS Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"). D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.

123. MRDDA underspent its budget by approximately $2 million or ten percent of MRDDA's appropriated budget (which excluded Medicaid expenses), in part because the DHS CFO and MRDDA failed to communicate about quarterly budgetary forecasts. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
124. Amounts currently available for case manager trips to visit customers who live outside of the District are insufficient. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
125. The vendor payment system within the District's system is inadequate and should be redesigned. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9.
126. Audits of provider cost data are not timely conducted in the District's system. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9.
127. The total cost of the MRDDA-related programs is not captured by existing financial systems. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-3.
128. Provider contracts in the District's system are vague and overly broad with no uniform provisions governing the maintenance and custodianship over customer accounts and other property. The lack of specific procedural or contractual guidance, either by incorporation or reference, invites all sorts of abuses, and likely preclude the recovery of any misappropriated funds. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-9, 3-10.
129. Provider contracts in the District's system lack specific guidance for noncompliance with applicable regulations or contractual terms and afford no means of recourse for breach by the provider. D.C. MAI Budget Rep. at 3-10.
The following Defendants' reports are referenced above:
A. Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Service Delivery System, Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children and Families, Jan. 18, 2000 (Master's Exh. F).
B. Addendum to Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Service Delivery System, Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children and Families, Mar. 2, 2000 (Master's Exh. I).
C. Final Report to the Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the City Administrator, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Operations, Georgetown University Child Development Center, Jan. 18, 2000 (Master's Exh. L).
D. Budgetary and Financial Analysis of MRDDA, Final Report to Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the City Administrator, Management Analysis, Inc., Jan. 13, 2000 (Master's Exh. H).
Reference to the reports listed above are solely for the purpose of establishing the effective dates of the stipulations. Defendants assert that the references to any of the above reports or statements are not intended to infer that the reports or statements are admissions of the Defendants.
[1] The Settlement Agreement shall not be incorporated into or be a part of this Consent Order. The Consent Order and Settlement Agreement are related documents. The Consent Order sets out the obligations of the parties regarding the endowment and funding of the Quality Trust in exchange for the waiver of certain fines and other liability. The Consent Order is to be adopted by the Court and shall be enforceable for procedures and remedies available for violations of a court order. The Settlement Agreement is an agreement amongst the parties and the Quality Trust which sets forth the Quality Trust's operations and duties in order to ensure that the Quality Trust complies with the parties' agreement regarding its mission and functions. This Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement as to class members only, with remedies available to the parties to the Settlement Agreement under applicable contract law. Upon dismissal of this action, the Settlement Agreement shall be enforceable as a contract in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

[2] This Consent Order provides throughout that the Quality Trust's scope of activities shall include review of services to "consumers" rather than just "Evans class members." "Consumers" refers to all applicants and/or recipients of services of the District of Columbia's developmental disabilities service delivery system. The Evans class members (i.e., those individuals who have at one time resided at Forest Haven) comprise a subset of this overall group of consumers. Defendants desire not to create a bifurcated system of services for its citizens with developmental disabilities, and therefore, agree that the Quality Trust's scope of activities shall include review of services to class and non-class members. This unified system does not extend the Court's jurisdiction to nonclass members.
[1] The extension of the Quality Trust functions to class members and non-class members does not extend the Court's jurisdiction to non-class members.
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 480 F.Supp.2d 280 (2007)
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, and United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v. Adrian M. FENTY, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 76-293(ESH).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
March 30, 2007.
Cathy E. Costanzo, Northampton, MA, Stephen Forney Hanlon, Paul J. Kiernan, Holland & Knight, LLP, Sandra J. Bernstein, University Legal Services, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
John A. Henderson, Richard James Farano, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor.
Ellen A. Efros, Robert C. Utiger, John D. Dodge, Office of the Attorney General, Maria-Claudia T. Amato, Martha J. Mullen, Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HUVELLE, District Judge.
This case was filed more than thirty years ago in an effort to remedy the constitutionally deficient level of care, treatment, education, and training being provided to residents of Forest Haven, the District of Columbia's institution for persons with developmental disabilities, which was closed as a result of this litigation in 1991. Plaintiffs are a class of over 650 former residents of Forest Haven. Defendants are the District of Columbia ("the 281 District") and the Honorable Adrian Fenty, the City's Mayor.[1] The United States *281 is also a party, having been permitted to intervene as a plaintiff in January 1977.[2]
As described in greater detail below, this litigation has resulted in a series of consent orders and remedial plans in which defendants have admitted that class members' constitutional rights have been violated and have agreed to take actions necessary to remedy these constitutional violations. Because these measures have been unsuccessful in achieving desired outcomes for class members in many critical areas, the litigation has also resulted in a series of efforts by plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor to force compliance with the Court's orders through motions for contempt and other relief. Before the Court is the latest such effort. Plaintiffs have moved for an order finding defendants in noncompliance with the prior Court orders and placing the District's Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA") into receivership.[3] At a July 20, 2006, status conference, the Court bifurcated proceedings on the motion into a liability and a remedy phase and directed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact on the liability question, i.e., whether there has been substantial noncompliance with Court orders. (July 20, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 6, 9-10.)[4] This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the Court's factual findings on that issue.
BACKGROUND
This case began in February 1976, when a group of individual plaintiffs filed suit alleging that they and other residents of Forest Haven were not receiving "a constitutionally minimal level of habilitation" (Compl. ¶ 1) and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.[5] The Honorable John H. Pratt, who presided over this case until his death in August 1995, certified a plaintiff class consisting of present, former, and future residents of Forest Haven in June 1976. Following a period of discovery, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of

liability in November 1977. Plaintiffs urged the Court to require defendants to "undertake a phased Court 282 supervised planning process for remedying the statutory and constitutional *282 violations." (Mem. of Law in
Support of Pls.' Mot. for Partial S.J. at 52.) Although defendants objected to plaintiffs' characterization of the conditions at Forest Haven, noting that changes had been implemented following the filing of plaintiffs' lawsuit, defendants acknowledged that "the level of care and habilitation at Forest Haven has never been that which any of the parties to this action desire." (Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Partial S.J. at 2.) Defendants urged the Court to deny the motion and instead to direct counsel for the parties to enter into discussions as to "what further actions can and should be done . . . to better provide for the mentally retarded at Forest Haven." (Id. at 1, 4.)
I. The 1978 Consent Order
On June 14, 1978, Judge Pratt entered a "Final Judgment and Order" (the "1978 Consent Order" or the "1978 Order"), which was consented to by defendants. Evans v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 483 (D.D.C.1978). The Court found that plaintiffs have a federal constitutional right to habilitative care and treatment, to be free from harm, and to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty and to be kept free from harm. Id. at 484.[6] The Court went on to find that violations of these constitutional rights had occurred and ordered extensive permanent injunctive relief, requiring defendants to deinstitutionalize class members and imposing a series of requirements governing virtually all aspects of the District's interim operation of Forest Haven. Id. at 484-90.
With respect to deinstitutionalization, the Court prohibited any further admissions to Forest Haven and ordered defendants to provide all class members with suitable community living arrangements and with the communitybased day programs and services necessary to provide them with minimally adequate habilitation in the most integrated and least restrictive community settings. Id. at 484-85, 488.[7] The Court also ordered defendants, inter alia, to provide each class member with a written individualized habilitation plan and an individualized habilitation program designed in accordance with the plan; to retain a full-time "Developmental Disabilities professional" (later referred to as the "Court Monitor") to assist defendants and the Court in implementing the Consent Order, including reporting to the Court at ninety-day intervals regarding the status and progress of defendants' efforts to do so; and, in conjunction with the Court Monitor, to develop and submit for court approval a detailed implementation plan for the provision of community living arrangements, programs, and services. Id. at 484-87.
With respect to Forest Haven, the Court ordered defendants, again in conjunction with the Court Monitor, to prepare a plan for the interim operation of the facility pending the placement of class members in community 283 living arrangements and set out a series of requirements for the facility's *283 continued operation. Id. at 488-89. Among other things, the Court prohibited all "[a]cts of physical or psychological abuse, neglect or mistreatment of any Forest Haven resident," required the prompt investigation of all such incidents, and required "[a] program of medical, dental and health related services for class members which provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care for physical illness or injury." Id.
II. The 1981 and 1983 Consent Orders
In January 1981, plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor filed motions for contempt and for enforcement of the Court's June 1978 Consent Order. The motions were ultimately withdrawn, and the Court entered a further Consent Order on June 25, 1981 (the "1981 Consent Order" or the "1981 Order"), setting forth a list of agreed-upon measures "necessary to the implementation of this Court's Order of June 14, 1978." Evans v. Barry, No. 76-293, Consent Order at 1 (D.D.C. June 25, 1981).[8] The 1981 Consent Order reaffirmed defendants' obligations under the 1978 Order and imposed a series of further requirements with respect to staffing and staff training at Forest Haven; the provision of individualized assessments and habilitation plans to all class members, including the identification of all services required by class members regardless of the current availability of those services; procurement of necessary supplies and performance of routine maintenance and repairs required for class members' health, safety, and sanitation; outplacement of class members from Forest Haven with appropriate day programs and living arrangements and with adequate case management support; funding for class members; and the timely processing of contracts. See generally id.

Plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor again filed contempt motions in June 1982 that resulted in the entry of a further Consent Order on February 8, 1983 (the "1983 Consent Order" or the "1983 Order"). See Evans, Consent Order at 14 (Feb. 8, 1983). The 1983 Order again affirmed defendants' obligations under the earlier Consent Orders and required defendants to take certain additional steps to implement those Orders. See generally id. The 1983 Order required defendants to ensure that periodic assessments were conducted and that individual habilitation plans were developed for all class members; to prepare an assessment of services required by class members; to address certain budget and staffing issues, including maintenance of the appropriate case manager to class member ratio;[9] and to properly maintain the facilities at Forest Haven. Id. at 2-9. The Order also imposed requirements with respect to the reporting of "unusual incidents" involving class members; safekeeping of class members' funds; programming; and outplacement of class members, including the requirement that all residents of Forest Haven be placed in community settings by the end of Fiscal Year 1988. Id. at 8-14.
III. Closure of Forest Haven
When defendants failed to meet the 1983 Consent Order's September 30, 1988 deadline for the outplacement of 284 all class members, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor *284 again initiated contempt proceedings in July 1989. The
Court did not immediately grant the motion to show cause but instead continued the matter for 120 days to give the parties time to agree to a further consent decree. (Sept. 29, 1989 Hr'g Tr. at 2.) The parties did not agree, however, and after a January 1990 hearing, the Court issued an Order holding the District in civil contempt, observing that it had "no alternative except to find that the District of Columbia has been in consistent and continuing violation of the three Consent Orders [of 1978, 1981 and 1983]." Evans, Order (Jan. 30, 1990). The Court held a sanctions hearing in March 1990 and issued a further Order imposing a schedule for outplacement of the remaining 233 residents of Forest Haven that required all residents to be outplaced by September 30, 1991, and providing for the imposition of fines in the event that defendants failed to meet quarterly outplacement quotas. Evans, Order (Apr. 9, 1990).
In July 1990, while outplacement of the remaining Forest Haven residents pursuant to the Court's April 1990 Order was underway, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor again moved for civil contempt sanctions and damages based on the conditions at Forest Haven.[10] The Court denied the motion in May 1991, finding that the level of medical care at Forest Haven, while imperfect, was adequate to meet the needs of the declining population there, Evans, Mem. Op. & Order at 6 (May 15, 1991), and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Evans v. Kelly, No. 91-5237, 1992 WL 337321, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Nov.1992).[11]
Outplacement of all remaining residents was completed in October 1991.
IV. Appointment of Special Master
Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor next initiated contempt proceedings in March 1995, filing motions for contempt, contempt sanctions, appointment of a special master, and emergency injunctive relief based on defendants' nonpayment of providers of residential and day programming services, failure to maintain the required case manager to class member ratio of one to sixty, mismanagement of class members' personal funds, and nonpayment of the Court Monitor.[12] The Court issued an Order to Show Cause in April 1995, finding the District to be in violation of the three previously-issued Consent Orders, particularly with respect to the payment of care 285 providers, but suspended further contempt *285 proceedings and consideration of the requests for emergency relief to afford the parties an opportunity to devise a viable plan to bring the District into compliance. Evans, Order to Show Cause at 4 (Apr. 21, 1995). Negotiations between the parties proved unsuccessful, and at a May 1995 hearing, the Court found the District to be in contempt. See Evans, Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 2 (Oct. 11, 1995).
In October 1995, the Honorable Stanley S. Harris, to whom the case was reassigned upon Judge Pratt's death, issued formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order of Reference. The Court found the District to be in contempt of the prior Consent Orders in three material respects: (1) by being substantially in arrears on undisputed payments to care providers; (2) by failing to maintain the required case manager to class member ratio; and (3) by failing to provide all class members with "community living arrangements suitable to each, in the

least separate, most integrated and least restrictive community settings, and to provide all class members with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide them with minimally adequate habilitation." Id. at 7-8.[13] Based on the defendants' long history of noncompliance, the Court determined that the appointment of a Special Master was necessary. Evans, Order of Reference at 1-2 (Oct. 11, 1995). The Court appointed Margaret G. Farrell to serve in that capacity and ordered the Special Master to work with the parties to develop and submit a remedial plan through which defendants could purge themselves of the Court's contempt findings. Id. at 2-3.
The Special Master submitted a remedial plan in January 1996, and in August of that year, the Court issued an Order adopting the plan and the Special Master's proposed findings of fact that accompanied it. Evans v. Barry, No. 76-293, 1996 WL 451054, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Aug.2, 1996) (the "1996 Plan"). The Court-ordered 1996 Plan imposed a series of further requirements with respect to the timely payment of care providers, negotiation of longterm provider contracts, maintenance of the required case management ratio, and implementation of class members' individual habilitation plans.[14]Id. at *3-8. The 1996 Plan also provided for imposition of coercive civil fines in the event that defendants failed to meet the Plan's requirements 0907 fines that the Court determined were necessary in light of defendants'"unrelenting contempt" of the Court's prior Consent Orders and "seeming inability to bring themselves into compliance therewith." Id. at *2-8.[15]
286 *286 V. The 2001 Plan
In February 1999, as part of its decision imposing contempt fines, Judge Harris also amended the 1996 Plan to order the Special Master to work with the parties to develop and, recommend to the Court a plan for the conclusion of the litigation and the termination of the Court's jurisdiction in a manner that would ensure that plaintiffs' interests would continue to be protected. Evans, Op. at 18-20 (Feb. 10, 1999). Pursuant to the Court's Order, under the direction of Special Master Farrell, and with the assistance of her then-consultant Clarence L. Sundram,[16] the parties engaged in lengthy negotiations that resulted in a series of agreements intended to achieve compliance with the prior Court Orders, to provide for permanent and independent mechanisms to safeguard the rights of class members, and to permit the phased withdrawal of judicial oversight as compliance with the Court Orders was achieved. See Evans v. Williams, 139 F.Supp.2d 79, 81 (D.D.C.2001). In particular, the parties agreed to and submitted for Court approval: (1) a set of joint stipulated findings of fact regarding the status of defendants' compliance with the outstanding Court Orders; (2) the "2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams" (the "2001 Plan" or the "Plan"); and (3) a Consent Order and accompanying settlement agreement regarding the creation of an external monitoring body to protect the interests of class members and other MRDDA consumers after the end of the case. In March 2001, Judge Harris issued an Opinion and Order approving these agreements. Id. at 85.[17]
The parties' stipulated findings of fact, which the Court adopted, painted a bleak picture as to defendants' record of noncompliance. The findings acknowledged that there had been a "serious breakdown" in the District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities and that the system, which had suffered from years of neglect and mismanagement, "urgently need[ed] to be fixed." Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 96-97; see also, e.g., id. at 98 (noting that District's mental retardation and developmental delivery system was "broken" and needed to be "redefined and rebuilt"). The findings noted that defendants' compliance with the prior Court Orders had 287 deteriorated following the closure *287 of Forest Haven in 1991 and that defendants were not complying with many of the requirements of those Orders. Id at 98. The findings also identified numerous "fundamental problems," including problems with respect to staffing, staff training, and monitoring; management; reporting of and response to unusual incidents; safeguarding of class members' funds; the budgeting process; and the District's Medicaid Home and Community 0907 Based Services waiver. See id. at 98-107.
Intended to remedy these deficiencies and to provide a means for defendants to come into compliance with the outstanding Court Orders, the 2001 Plan was organized thematically around the broad goals of those Orders. The Plan identified the major goals (and sub-goals) of the Orders as follows:
(1) appropriate individualized habilitation and treatment in the community in, the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive settings, including (a) individualized habilitation plans, (b) the

provision of residential, vocational, and day services, (c) staff training, and (d) restricted control procedures (including use of medication, restraints, and time out);

(2) protection from harm;

(3) safeguarding consumers' personal possessions;

(4) monitoring, including, (a) case management, (b) quality assurance and fiscal audits, and (c) external monitoring;

(5) advocacy for consumers;

(6) adequate budget; and

(7) timely payment of vendors.

For each of these goals (and sub-goals), the Plan went on to (a) identify the specific provisions of the existing Court Orders that must be complied with; (b) identify the tasks necessary for defendants to meet the requirements of the relevant Court Orders; (c) establish a time frame for implementation of the identified tasks; (d) identify specific outcome criteria for determining defendants', compliance with the relevant Court Orders; (e) establish a threshold standard of compliance that defendants must meet for the particular Court Orders;[18] and (f) establish a method for assessing compliance. Although the Plan was developed in the context of the Evans case, it referred throughout to "consumers" rather than "class members." This choice of words was intentional and reflected defendants'"express[] agree[ment] not to create a bifurcated system of services for its citizens with developmental disabilities" but to "provide the same level of services to class and nonclass members." (2001 Plan at 5 n. 2.)

The Plan made clear that the measure of defendants' compliance with each group of underlying Court Orders would be whether they had satisfied the specific outcome criteria relating to those Orders. (Id. at 7 ("[W]hile it is the intent of the parties to monitor the timely implementation of the specific tasks that have been identified as necessary for implementation of the Court Orders in each section, the ultimate test of compliance will be in satisfying all of the related outcome criteria.") (emphasis in Plan); see also id. ("[T]he Plan identifies specific outcome criteria for determining compliance with the related group of Court Orders.").) The parties agreed that

288

*288 if the Court finds that defendants have satisfied the outcome criteria, the defendants will also

be in compliance with the related Court Orders pursuant to this Plan, and the Court may vacate

the related Court Orders.

(Id. at 7.) Although compliance with the Court Orders depended on defendants' satisfaction of the outcome criteria rather than their completion of the tasks identified therein (see id.) ("In the final analysis, it is compliance with the specific outcome criteria that is required . . ., and the tasks identified are a means to this end."), the parties also agreed that "[t]he failure of the defendants to implement the actions identified in the Plan as necessary to meet the requirements of the related Court Orders is also evidence of noncompliance with those Court Orders." (Id.)

The Plan contemplated that as defendants satisfied the outcome criteria for particular groups of Court Orders, they would move the Court to have those Orders vacated and dismissed with the ultimate goal that, over time, defendants would

implement all of the required actions and meet the specified outcome criteria in order to successfully move, the Court to vacate and dismiss the related Court Orders, except the declaratory judgment on the constitutional rights of the consumers to receive individualized habilitation in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive environment and to be protected from harm.

(Id. at 9-10.) Although the Plan itself was "not intended to be an enforceable document," the underlying Court Orders, until vacated and dismissed as provided for in the Plan, would "continue to remain enforceable in federal court." (Id. at 10.) In particular, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor "retain[ed] the right to seek appropriate judicial

relief, based on this evidence of noncompliance with the Court Orders, including Orders requiring specific performance of the Plan." (Id.)
The final section of the Plan, captioned "Essential Systemic Conditions," addressed certain other actions to be taken by defendants to assist the District in "developing additional options for the costeffective implementation of the goals of this action 0907 namely, "individualized services in the least restrictive environment to the persons served by the mental retardation and developmental disabilities service delivery system." (Id. at 62.) In particular, the Plan addressed the need to amend the District's Medicaid waiver to expand the number of MRDDA consumers served by the waiver and outlined a series of actions to be taken by District in order to achieve this goal. (Id. at 62-64.) The Plan also set forth certain steps to be taken by the parties and the Special Master to develop and propose legislation to revise and update the existing statutes governing services and supports for persons with developmental disabilities to reflect contemporary approaches. (Id. at 64-65.)
The third component of the series of agreements approved by the Court in March 2001 concerned the creation of the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc. (the "Quality Trust"), a durable, independent, nonprofit organization to "monitor and advance the individual and collective interests of people with developmental disabilities in the District of Columbia's service delivery system." Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 86. In the Consent Order, defendants agreed to endow and annually fund the Quality Trust with a total of 831.5 million over eleven years in exchange for a waiver of all claims for past violations of Court's Orders, subject to certain exceptions. 289 See id. at 85-90. The settlement agreement set forth in detail *289 the structure of the Quality Trust, the control and use of the funds to be provided by defendants, and the Trust's right of access to information. See id. at 90-96. The settlement agreement also described the purpose and obligations of the Quality Trust, which was to be charged with advancing the individual and collective interests of consumers with developmental disabilities and, in particular, Evans class members; monitoring the health, safety, and welfare of consumers and the protections, services, and supports provided to these consumers; and providing for individual and collective legal services and lay advocacy services for consumers. Id. at 92-95.
VI. Post-2001 Plan Developments
Shortly after the 2001 Plan was approved, this case was reassigned to the undersigned upon the retirement of Judge Harris. Since that time, the Court has monitored defendants' progress in implementing the Plan through periodic status hearings and through the Court Monitor's written quarterly reports.
Although it quickly became apparent that compliance would not be achieved within the time frames set forth in the Plan itself (see, e.g., April-June 2001 Monitor's Report at 1 (noting defendants' failure to comply with Plan's completion dates)); in the six years since the Plan's adoption, defendants have made progress in some respects. The Quality Trust has been established, and defendants have endowed and funded the Trust, as required by both the Plan (2001 Plan at 48) and the Consent Order that accompanied it. Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 87. An independent financial review of the District's treatment of funds held in custody for class and nonclass members served by MRDDA for the years 1992 to 2001 was completed, and in June 2004, defendants paid approximately $1.2 million to reimburse class members and other MRDDA consumers for amounts found to be owed to them as a result of that review. (See Special Master's Report, Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order Regarding the Independent Financial Review of Consumers' Funds at 6-7; Evans, Order (Feb. 25, 2004); Defs.' Proposed Findings of Fact ["Defs.' Findings"] at 26.) Defendants have consistently maintained the required ratio of at least one case manager for every thirty class members. (See 2001 Plan ¶¶ D.1.b.2., D.1.d.iv.) Defendants have also developed policies and procedures required by the 2001 Plan and have created systems and structures intended to assist them in achieving the Plan's goals. For example, defendants have established an Incident Management and Investigation Unit ("IMIU"), a quality assurance unit, a training unit, a Fatality Review Committee ("FRC"), and an intake process for the reporting of serious incidents.
Notwithstanding these efforts, problems have persisted with respect to the implementation of defendants' policies and procedures and the effectiveness of defendants' systems and structures. Concerns have repeatedly been raised, for example, with respect to the performance of case managers and providers; the monitoring of health needs and the delivery of health care services; investigations of class member deaths and other serious incidents and the implementation of recommended corrective and preventive actions; and the lack of progress in implementing the Medicaid waiver. Significantly, not one of the underlying Court Orders has been vacated based

on a showing by defendants that they have satisfied the standard for compliance with the related outcome criteria under the 2001 Plan.
290 *290 In January 2004, recognizing that a lack of coordination among the District of Columbia agencies with responsibility for actions necessary to achieve compliance with the 2001 Plan had impeded the timely completion of those actions, the Court ordered the Mayor to assign a Deputy Mayor or other senior official who reported directly to the Mayor to be responsible for the day-to-day efforts of District agencies to achieve compliance with the Plan. Evans, Order at 1-2 (Jan. 21, 2004). The Court further ordered that the Deputy Mayor or other senior official be required to coordinate the efforts of all District agencies "as necessary to secure the timely delivery of appropriate services to class members in compliance with the 2001 Plan and previous [Court Orders],[19] and that the official be required to report periodically to the Special Masters, the Court Monitor, and the Court. Id. at 2-3. Since January 2004, several different individuals have served in this capacity, but as explained herein, bureaucratic bottlenecks still plague the defendants' ability to achieve results.
In the fall of 2005, the parties agreed to a time-limited initiative (the "ninety-day plan") to address some of the more persistent concerns for a subset of class members in need of specialized attention. The ninety-day plan was intended to produce specified improvements, over a period of ninety days, for a limited number of class members and, in the process, to identify and correct some of the systemic barriers that had impeded progress in the past. (See Nov. 28, 2005 Hr'g Tr. at 6; Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 4.) In particular, defendants agreed: (1) to review, revise, and implement health care plans for forty-eight "at-risk" class members; (2) to move forty-six consumers, including thirty class members, from unsafe and inappropriate residential programs into smaller, community-based housing;[20] and (3) to move forty-two class members out of segregated day programs and into supported employment opportunities. (See Nov. 28, 2005 Hr'g Tr. at 6-8; Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 1, 4; U.S. Ex. 6.) When defendants failed to make significant progress towards achieving these goals by the end of January 2006, shortly before the ninety-day period was to expire, the Court directed the parties to negotiate a further Consent Order that would formalize defendants' obligations to address the short-term needs of the identified at-risk class members. (See United States' Notice of the Parties' Failure to Agree at 1, 7-8.) The parties were unable to reach agreement on such an order and so informed the Court in mid-February. (See id.; Pls.' Endorsement of United States' Notice; Def. Anthony Williams's Notice of Filing.) At the conclusion of the ninetyday period, defendants had made only three out of forty-six promised residential placements and only five out of 291 forty-two promised *291 supported employment placements, two of which did not even meet the agreed-upon criteria. (Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 1.) Moreover, although defendants made progress in identifying class members' health care needs, health interventions were not implemented for the forty-eight at-risk class members as promised. (Id.)
VII. Current Procedural Posture
Discouraged by the failure of the ninety-day plan, as well as by the lack of progress under the 2001 Plan, plaintiffs filed the instant motion in May 2006, seeking an order finding defendants in noncompliance with the outstanding Court Orders and placing MRDDA into receivership. The United States, as plaintiff-intervenor, also filed a motion for a finding of contempt. At a status conference on June 29, 2006, the Court ordered the parties to engage in settlement discussions with the goal of agreeing to structural changes that would survive the change in administration at the end of the calendar year. (June 29, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 27, 31.) See also Evans, Order at 1 (June 29, 2006). The Court also directed the parties to establish a discovery schedule and ordered further briefing in response to plaintiffs' argument that the Court need not decide the issue of contempt as a threshold manner. Id. at 1-2.
The Court held a further status conference on July 20, 2006. Although settlement discussions during the preceding weeks had been unsuccessful, the Court encouraged the parties to continue their efforts to reach a settlement. (July 20, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 4.) With respect to the pending motions, the Court indicated that it would not proceed on plaintiff-intervenor's contempt motion, noting that contempt remedies would be ineffective in addressing the kinds of problems that had been identified by the parties (see id. at 29),[21] and bifurcated proceedings on plaintiffs' receivership motion into a "liability" and a "remedy" phase. (Id. at 9.) In the "liability" phase, plaintiffs would be required to show that there had been "systemic, continuous, serious noncompliance"

with Court Orders. (Id. at 6-7, 9, 12.) Only upon a finding of liability would the Court reach the issue of what remedy or remedies should be imposed. (Id. at 9-10, 12.)
The Court directed plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor to submit proposed findings of fact and supporting evidence on the issue of liability by August 7, 2006, and directed defendants to file any evidentiary objections to plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenor's evidence by August 14, 2006. Evans, Order at 1 (July 20, 2006). The parties agreed that all evidentiary objections would be resolved by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola, and that Judge Facciola's rulings would be final. Id. (See also July 20, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 22, 29, 34.) Defendants were directed to submit their proposed findings of fact by September 8, 2006, with evidentiary objections by plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor to 292 be filed by *292 September 15, 2006, and with plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenor's reply to be filed by September 22, 2006.[22]Evans, Order at 1-2 (July 20, 2006).
The Court informed the parties that they would be afforded an opportunity to take discovery, if they so desired, permitting each side a maximum of ten document requests and/or requests for admission, and indicating that additional discovery would be permitted, if necessary, upon agreement of the parties and Magistrate Judge Facciola, following receipt of the opposing party's proposed findings of fact. Id. at 2. (See also July 20, 2006 Hr'g Tr. 11, 16, 27-28, 38-40.) The Court set an evidentiary hearing on the liability phase of plaintiffs' receivership motion for October 2, 2006, and directed the parties to file a joint status report in advance of the hearing to indicate what evidence, if any, each side intended to present. Evans, Order at 2 (July 20; 2006).
After plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor submitted their proposed findings, of fact on liability, defendants objected that given the volume of exhibits submitted and the short time-frame in which to make objections, it was impossible for them to do anything more than object to categories of exhibits. (Defs.' Evidentiary Objections to Ps.' and Pl.-Intervenor's Exs. in Support of Their Respective Proposed Findings of Fact ["Defs.' Objections"] at 2.) Defendants presented their specific evidentiary objections to plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenor's exhibits in chart form, listing each exhibit separately, indicating whether defendants objected to the exhibit and, if so, citing the particular rule of evidence on which the objection was based. Defendants objected to the vast majority of the exhibits based on Rules 802, 402, 805, and 701-705. (See id. at 4-23.) Defendants also made a general hearsay objection, particularly with respect to reports of investigations of class member deaths and serious incidents involving class members and certain quality assurance reports. (See id. at 3.) Analogizing such reports to reports generated in the medical peer review process, which are inadmissible in judicial and administrative proceedings pursuant to D.C.Code § 44-805(a)(1), defendants argued that these reports should likewise be inadmissible in order to avoid chilling the self-improvement process. (See id. at 4.)
On August 30, 2006, Judge Facciola issued a Memorandum Order overruling defendants' objections. With respect to defendants' relevance objections pursuant to Rule 402, Judge Facciola found that the exhibits were "legitimately tendered in support of the proposed findings" and were, therefore, "unquestionably relevant." Evans, 238 F.R.D. 1, 2 (2006).[23] Judge Facciola also overruled defendants' objections based on Rules 701-705 (concerning opinion testimony by lay witnesses and experts), noting that defendants had failed to identify the particular portion or portions of the exhibit that they found objectionable. Id. at 2. As to defendants' hearsay objections, Judge Facciola rejected defendants' argument based on D.C.Code § 44-805, finding the statute to be inapplicable and noting that defendants had not identified any applicable common law privilege. Id. at 2-3. Judge Facciola also found that the reports cited by plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor would be admissible as admissions 293 of a party opponent *293 to the extent that they were created by the District or its agents and that, even if not admissions, they might be admissible under Rule 803(8)(B) and (C). Id. at 2-3. Finally, Judge Facciola observed that given the Court's years of reliance upon the reports, without objection by defendants, to assess defendants' compliance with the Court Orders, defendants could not now argue that the reports should not be used in determining liability. Id. at 3. Although Judge Facciola overruled defendants' "broad brush" objections, which failed to specify which sections of particular reports were objectionable, he gave defendants five days in which to correct this deficiency in a supplemental filing. Id. Defendants did not submit anything further with respect to their evidentiary objections.
When defendants thereafter filed their proposed findings of fact on liability, neither plaintiffs nor plaintiff-intervenor submitted any evidentiary objections. Despite the opportunity to do so, no party chose to engage in discovery, and no party presented any testimony at the hearing on October 4, 2006. See Evans, Minute Order (D.D.C. Sept.

20, 2006). Instead, the Court heard oral argument, from the parties. The Court also held a status conference the following day, at which the Court heard from the Court Monitor and Kathy E. Sawyer, MRDDA's Interim Administrator, as well as from counsel. At the Court's request, the Court Monitor filed a supplemental report on November 29, 2006, addressing the distribution of serious reportable incidents among providers. As is the practice in connection with the Court Monitor's regular quarterly reports, all parties had an opportunity to review and comment on the Monitor's supplemental report before the report was filed with the Court. (See Oct. 4, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 31.)
The Court held a further status hearing on February 6, 2007. The day before that hearing, defendants submitted a notice of filing to inform the Court of their disagreement with certain of the observations in the Court Monitor's January 2007 quarterly report and to apprise the Court of progress they had made since the October 2006 status hearing. (Defs.' Notice of Filing of Supplemental Information in Response to the Court Monitor's Quarterly Report ["Defs.' Notice of Filing"] at 2.) The notice of filing, which was accompanied by affidavits from Ms. Sawyer and from Robert Maruca, the Senior Deputy Director for the Medical Assistance Administration ("MAA") of the District's Department of Health, urged the Court to hold the motions in abeyance in light of the positive developments and the Fenty administration's commitment to the District's newly-created Department of Disability Services ("DDS")[24] and its consumers. (Id. at 10-11.) At the February 6th hearing, the Court rejected this request and indicated that it intended to issue a ruling based on the record as of November 29, 2006, when the Court Monitor filed the supplemental report requested by the Court. (Feb. 6, 2007 Hr'g Tr. at 23-24.) But, as 294 explained more fully herein, the extent of defendants' recent progress in *294 remedying its prior deficiencies will be a critical consideration at the remedy phase.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standard
The issue before the Court at this stage is liability: whether defendants have failed to comply, with the Court's prior Orders in this case. The Court advised the parties at the July 20, 2006 status conference of the standard by which defendants' liability would be assessed. Plaintiffs, as the moving party, must demonstrate that there has been systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance with Court Orders. (July 20, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 6-7, 9-10, 12.) See also Dixon v. Barry, 967 F.Supp. 535, 541, 552-53 (D.D.C.1997) (imposing receivership based on findings that District was "substantially noncompliant with [prior Court Orders]"); Gary W. v. Louisiana, No. 74-2412, 1990 WL 17537, at *32-33 (E.D.La. Feb.26, 1990) (noting state's "persistent[]" inability to "comply substantially" with Court Orders and imposing receivership with respect to demonstrated areas of "protracted non-compliance"); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F.Supp. 628, 630 (M.D.Ala.1979) (imposing receivership based on findings that, in critical areas, state had not achieved substantial compliance with Court Orders).
II. Violations of 2001 Plan as Evidence of Noncompliance With Court Orders
The 2001 Plan incorporates the relevant portions of the existing Court Orders and sets forth an agreed-upon means by which defendants can come into compliance with those Orders.[25] The Plan provides that defendants' failure "to implement the actions identified in the Plan as necessary to meet the requirements of the related Court Orders is . . . evidence of noncompliance with those Court Orders." (2001 Plan at 7.) See also Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 83. The Court is therefore required, as agreed to by the parties, to consider evidence that defendants have failed to perform the "tasks" identified for each set of Court Orders as evidence that defendants have not complied with those Orders.
Defendants argue, however, that plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor cannot rely on defendants' failure to meet the associated "outcome criteria" as further evidence of defendants' noncompliance. (Defs.' Findings at 2-3.) Defendants contend that the 2001 Plan and the Court Order approving it limit the manner in which the Plan may be used as evidence of noncompliance with the related Orders, restricting plaintiffs to evidence regarding defendants' failure to implement the "tasks." (Id. at 2,) The "outcome criteria," according to defendants, are relevant only to the extent that defendants are seeking to exit from and terminate the related Court Orders. (Id. at 3.)

The Court disagrees. Nothing in either the 2001 Plan or the Order approving it limits the evidence plaintiffs may 295 rely on to show that defendants have failed to comply with the underlying Court Orders. *295 As noted, the Plan
specifies that defendants' failure "to implement the actions identified in the Plan as necessary to meet the requirements of the related Court Orders is also evidence of noncompliance with those, Court Orders." (2001 Plan at 7 (emphasis added).) But this in no way suggests that only defendants' performance with respect to tasks may be used as evidence of noncompliance. To the contrary, the use of the word "also" indicates that tasks are not the only aspect of the Plan that may be used in this manner.
In the 2001 Plan, the parties agreed that the measure of defendants' compliance with a particular group of Court Orders would be whether defendants had satisfied the associated outcome criteria. (Id.) The Plan itself thus makes defendants' performance with respect to the outcome criteria relevant to a determination as to whether defendants have complied with the underlying Court Orders. See Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 82 (commenting that in the 2001 Plan, the parties agreed "on the yardsticks to be utilized in making determinations of compliance"). Defendants note that the Plan "is `not intended to be an independently enforceable document.'" (Defs.' Findings at 2 (quoting Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 83); see also 2001 Plan at 10.) Until they are vacated, however, the underlying Court Orders are enforceable. (Id.) See also Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 83. The outcome criteria reflect the parties' agreement as to what the underlying Court Orders require, and the Court may therefore consider defendants' performance with respect to the outcome criteria as evidence regarding defendants' compliance with the underlying Orders. (See 2001 Plan at 10 ("[I]n the event that the defendants do not implement the provisions of the Plan effectively and on a timely basis, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor retain the right to seek appropriate judicial relief, based on this evidence of noncompliance with the Court Orders.").)
It is also appropriate to consider defendants' performance with respect to the Plan's outcome criteria for purposes of the present motion because the outcome criteria are generally independently relevant to the associated Court Orders. For example, the 2001 Plan incorporates the requirement of the 1978 Consent Order that defendants "provide a program of medical, dental and health related services for class members which provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care for physical illness or injury." (2001 Plan at 12 (citing 1978 Consent Order).) The outcome criteria associated with this Court Order, in turn, include the requirement that "[m]edical and dental services are being provided within professionally acceptable timeframes." (Id. ¶ A.1.d.iii.) Whether and to what extent class members are actually receiving needed medical and dental services within professionally acceptable timeframes is unquestionably relevant to whether defendants are, in fact, providing a program of medical, dental, and healthrelated services that provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care. Likewise, whether case managers ensure that class members receive all of the supports and services referenced in their Individual Service Plans, another outcome criterion (id. ¶ D.1.d.ii.), bears directly on whether defendants are providing "all necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that community living arrangements, programs, and supportive community services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained," as required by the 1978 Consent Order. Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485.[26]
296 *296 For these reasons, the Court will consider defendants' performance with respect to the outcome criteria as evidence of defendants' compliance with the related Court Orders.
III. Court Monitor's Reports
Defendants have also argued that the Court should not rely on the Court Monitor's reports, objecting that the data in those reports are unreliable as evidence of defendants' noncompliance with Court Orders because the Court Monitor does not perform a proper statistical analysis. (See Oct. 4, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 70-72.) This objection is unpersuasive.
Prior to the submission of plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenor's proposed findings, the Court established a procedure and time frame for defendants to lodge their evidentiary objections. Evans, Order (July 20, 2006). At the same time, the Court also established a procedure and time frame for the parties to take additional discovery, if they desired to do so. Id. at 2. (See also July 20, 2006 Hr'g Tr. 11, 16, 27-28, 38-40.) Notwithstanding these rulings, defendants did not object to the use of the Court Monitor's findings on grounds of statistical inaccuracy within the

prescribed time period, nor did they seek to depose the Court Monitor or take discovery regarding her methodology.[27]
Moreover, since the first Consent Order was entered in this case in 1978, the parties have agreed that defendants' implementation of the Court's Orders would be monitored by an outside expert who would report to the Court on a regular basis. The 1978 Consent Order required defendants to hire a full-time Court Monitor whose responsibilities were to include "fil[ing] a verified report every ninety (90) days . . . detailing the status and progress of the defendants in the implementation of this and any further Order of the Court." Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485. The provisions of the 1978 Order concerning the role of the Court Monitor were superceded in November 2000, when the Court granted the parties' joint motion for the appointment of an independent Court Monitor, but that later Order, to which the parties agreed, again required the Court Monitor to "regularly monitor the class members' community residential placements and day or other programs to determine Defendants' implementation of this Court's Orders." Evans, Appointment Order at 3 (Nov. 21, 2000); see also id. at 4 (Court 297 Monitor's duties "shall be to observe, *297 monitor, report findings, and make recommendations to the parties, Special Master and the Court concerning the implementation of this Court's Orders"). The November 2000 Order also contemplated that the Court Monitor's reports could be used as evidence, providing that "[t]he findings, recommendations and reports of the Court Monitor may be introduced as evidence when relevant and admissible in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. at 5.
Pursuant to the November 2000 Order, the Court Monitor has submitted regular quarterly reports that reflect the results of her reviews of defendants' progress with respect to randomly selected samples of class members. Although the Court Monitor's findings are subject to review by the parties before her reports are finalized and filed with the Court, see Evans, Appointment Order at 4 (Nov. 21, 2000) (directing Monitor to submit draft report to the parties for comment and directing Monitor to consider the parties' comments before filing a final report with the Court), there is no indication that defendants have objected to her findings. Nor is there any indication that defendants have objected to the Court Monitor's methodology. See id. at 3-4 (directing Monitor to "consult with the parties and the Special Master concerning the methodologies to be used by the Monitor to assess Defendants' compliance with and implementation of Court Orders"). To the contrary, in their own proposed findings, defendants affirmatively rely on the Monitor's findings to show the extent to which they have satisfied certain requirements 0907 the same purpose for which they contend the findings may not be used by plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Defs.' Findings at 3 (citing to Monitor's findings that Individualized Service Plans for 90% of class members reviewed were current).)
In these circumstances, defendants cannot complain that the Court Monitor has not conducted the appropriate statistical analysis. The Monitor has reviewed randomly-selected subsets of class members quarter after quarter, and her findings are remarkably consistent in many respects. These reviews provide significant data with respect to defendants' overall performance under the 2001 Plan and the underlying Court Orders, and these findings will therefore be considered as evidence of whether defendants have complied with Court Orders.[28]
FACTUAL FINDINGS
There is no question that defendants have made progress in some areas under the 2001 Plan. As previously noted, they have funded the Quality Trust's $11 million endowment. They have repaid class members and other MRDDA consumers a total of $1.2 million owed to them for the years 1992 through 2001. They have consistently maintained the required case management ratios. And, as defendants note in their proposed findings, they have developed many policies and procedures required by the Plan and have created systems for implementing the Plan's goals.
Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor, do not dispute that policies and procedures have been adopted or that systems have been created. Rather, plaintiffs challenge the effectiveness of these systems and defendants' failure to 298 adequately implement *298 their existing policies. Plaintiffs contend that in the core areas that have the most direct impact on the day-to-day welfare of class members 0907 the provision of health care, the delivery of services and supports necessary for, habilitation, the provision of case management services, and protection from abuse

and neglect 0907 defendants are not, and have never been, in compliance with the underlying Court Orders, not one of which has been vacated as contemplated by the 2001 Plan.
Although the parties have submitted competing findings of fact, the underlying record, which consists principally of materials generated by the Court Monitor's office or by defendants and their agents, is basically uncontested. Both parties rely on the Court Monitor's quarterly reports and on various other data compilations prepared by defendants. Plaintiffs also rely on reports by the Court Monitor's consultants and on reports of investigations of class member deaths or other serious incidents performed by defendants' own IMIU or by their consultant, the Columbus Organization. Defendants also cite to numerous policies and procedures, manuals, and training materials.
Based on a voluminous but basically uncontested record, the Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendants have failed to comply with existing Court Orders in the core areas of health, safety, and welfare. These failures are systemic in that they affect many class members served by a cross-section of providers and occur throughout defendants' service delivery system. They are serious in that they concern matters that are integral to class members' health, safety, and well-being. And, they are continuous in that the same issues of noncompliance have persisted year after year. Although the Court has organized its findings in terms of these three broad categories (health, safety, and welfare), there is substantial overlap among them. Noncompliance in the area of case management, for example, impacts all three core areas. Notwithstanding defendants' commitment to "provide the same level of service to class and non-class members" (2001 Plan at 5 n. 2), in evaluating defendants' compliance with the Plan as it relates to defendants' compliance with the underlying Court Orders, the Court has, unless otherwise noted, relied exclusively on evidence concerning class members.
I. HEALTH
1. Under the existing Court Orders, defendants are required to provide "[a] program of medical, dental and health related services for class members which provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care for physical illness or injury." Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 489. "Written policies and procedures governing the safe administration and handling of medications" must be established, and medications may be administered only by appropriately trained and qualified staff. Id. Class members' medications must be monitored, with at least monthly review by a physician, and class members must be fed in the maximum upright position consistent with their capabilities and disabilities. Id. Defendants are also required to develop and provide for each class member "a written habilitation plan, based upon individualized assessments and formulated in accordance with professional standards." Id. at 484-85. Individual Habilitation Plans, now known as Individual Support Plans or Individual Service Plans ("ISPs"), 299 [29] must be revised annually, Evans, *299 Consent Order at 4 (June 25, 1981); Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485, and must identify all services required by class members. Evans, Consent Order at 4 (June 25, 1981). Priority in implementing ISPs must be given to "class members who have been identified as assaultive, self-injurious, selfabusive, mentally ill, or who have acute medical needs or identified needs for physical rehabilitation services." Id. at 6. Defendants must also ensure that appropriate training programs for all staff, including staff assigned to residential settings, are developed and implemented. See Evans, Consent Order at 13 (Feb. 8, 1983); Evans, Consent Order at 3 (June 25, 1981); Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 489.
2. Each of the foregoing Court Orders was incorporated into the 2001 Plan. (2001 Plan ¶¶ A.1.a.iii., A.1.a.vii., A.2.a.vi., A.3.a.ii., A.4.a.i., A.4.a.iv., A.4.a.v.) The "tasks" identified in the Plan as necessary to implement these Court Orders require that ISPs identify each class member's service, support and protection needs regardless of availability, that they be modified as the class member's needs and circumstances change, and that they be implemented promptly (id. ¶ A.1.b.iv.); that the District develop procedures for including in each ISP an assessment of the individual consumer's need for medical and dental care and the means for securing such services within professionally acceptable time frames (id. ¶ A.1.b.v.); and that the District develop and implement an ongoing training program for all staff working within the developmental disabilities services delivery system in order to develop the skills and competencies required to provide services meeting the standards applicable to the programs in which they work. (Id. ¶ A.3.b.ii.)

3. The parties agreed, as part of the 2001 Plan, that the measure of defendants' compliance with the foregoing Court Orders (i.e., the "outcome criteria" for these Orders) would include such factors as whether ISPs are developed or revised in accordance with professional standards at least annually and reviewed whenever there is a significant change in circumstances (2001 Plan ¶ A.1.d.i.); whether ISPs address class members' need for medical, dental, and mental health services and provide for decision making by a guardian for class members with decision making incapacity (id. ¶ A.1.d.iii.); whether needed medical and dental services are provided within professionally acceptable time frames (id. ¶ A.1.d.iii.); whether class members are fed according to their individual needs by adequately trained staff (id. ¶ A.2.d.iv.); whether, in the event that private providers fail to comply with performance expectations, including the expectation that medical and dental services will be provided within professionally acceptable time frames, the District takes action to ensure compliance or imposes sanctions designed to ensure compliance, including terminating provider agreements, where necessary (id. ¶ A.1.d.viii.); whether staff employed by the District and provider agencies have attended required training programs and satisfactorily demonstrated competence in the skills required for the positions they hold (id. ¶ 300 A.3.d.ii.), and whether defendants have developed and implemented a policy governing the safe administration *300 and handling of medications. (Id. ¶ A.4.d.ii.)
4. MRDDA has a policy setting forth the guidelines to be used in assessing consumers' medical and dental needs and identifying `the mechanism for securing treatment. (See Defs.' Ex. 9.) Consistent with the requirement of the 2001 Plan that defendants develop procedures for including in class members' ISPs an assessment of their need for medical and dental care, the policy requires that written evaluations from medical and dental professionals be part of MRDDA consumers' ISPs and requires those assessments to address consumers' comprehensive care needs, including primary and long-term needs. (See id. at 2.) The policy requires MRDDA to work with residential providers to ensure that consumers' medical and dental needs are evaluated annually and integrated into ISPs; that residential records are monitored to track appointments, timeliness of service, follow-up visits, consistency, treatment delivery, and documentation of data that impact consumer habilitation (e.g., diet, vital signs, behaviors); that treatment plans are monitored to ensure that quality service is provided by medical and dental providers; and that residential providers actively communicate with physicians and dentists. (See id. at 5-6.) Defendants acknowledge that MRDDA case managers and nurse managers "are responsible for monitoring the medical care provided to class members." (Defs.' Findings at 5.) A separate MRDDA policy addresses the use of psychotropic medications for MRDDA consumers. (See Defs.' Ex. 11.)
5. MRDDA has also developed a "Comprehensive Health Plan" aimed at establishing "effective and consistent health, clinical and behavioral supports for persons with mental retardation across the MRDDA system." (Defs.' Ex. 12 at 2.) As part of this Comprehensive Health Plan, ISPs are required to include a Health Management Care Plan, also known as a Health Risk Management Plan (hereinafter "Health Plan"). (See Defs.' Ex. 12 at 4, 14, 24.) Health Plans also, address the 2001 Plan's requirement that ISPs include an assessment of the consumer's medical needs and the means for securing such services within professionally acceptable time frames. The Health Plan is designed to be "a clear, comprehensive, and, easily understood description of a consumer's health and mental health risks, diagnoses, intervention(s), medical and behavioral history, medication(s), recommended screening(s), and scheduled medical or behavioral events for an MRDDA consumer." (Id. at 24.) Health Plans are to include responses to any identified diagnoses or recommendations, are to be written in "clear basic English so that entries can be easily understood by lay persons," and must identify an implementation procedure (including responsible parties and oversight staff) for each intervention. (Id.; see also id. at 4 (the Health Plan "is similar to a nursing plan except that it is written for lay people, particularly Direct Support Staff, and it explains each intervention or recommendation in detail including documentation requirements").)
6. More recently, defendants have contracted with Georgetown University to form the Health Resources Development Partnership (the "Health Partnership") "to assist the District in its efforts to assure appropriate health care is available to people with developmental disabilities in their communities." (Defs. Ex. 19 at 3.) The Health Partnership has assisted defendants in developing a database of medical providers that serve individuals with developmental disabilities, recruiting new medical providers, conducting trainings and panels for case 301 managers and provider agency staff, and providing technical assistance to provider agencies. (See Defs.' *301 Exs. 21-34.) The Health Partnership has also developed a "health passport," a short document intended to

address the need for a concise method of communicating an individual's health history. (Defs.' Ex. 23 at 6; Defs.' Ex. 36.)
7. Notwithstanding defendants' policies and procedures and the work of the Health Partnership, plaintiffs have presented compelling evidence that there have been, and continue to be, serious problems with the implementation of defendants' policies, with the result that many class members do not receive needed medical care within professionally acceptable time frames as required by the 2001 Plan and the 1978 Consent Order. (2001 Plan ¶¶ A.1.b.iv. (requiring that ISPs, of which Health Plans are a part, be implemented promptly), A.1.d.iii. (requiring that medical and dental services be provided within professionally acceptable time frames).) Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 489 (requiring a program of medical, dental, and health-related services providing for accessibility, quality, and continuity of care).
8. According to MRDDA's own training report for the period from April to June 2006, the vast majority of providers have not completed staff training regarding MRDDA's medical and dental policy, psychotropic medications, or behavior support plans. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 20 (55 out of 64 providers had not completed training about medical/dental policy; 56 out of 65 providers had not completed training about behavior support plans; 53 out of 64 providers had not completed training on psychotropic medication).) Although 85 to 86% of case managers had completed training in these areas, only about half of other relevant MRDDA staff were trained. (Id. (43% of other relevant MRDDA staff were trained regarding medical/dental policy, 51% were trained about psychotropic medications, 48% were trained about behavior support plans).)
9. The Court Monitor repeatedly has found that Health Plans do not reference current health problems and do not provide for appropriate interventions for a substantial proportion of class members reviewed.[30] Sixty-three percent of Health Plans reviewed by the Court Monitor's office between October 2004 and September 2005 did not reference class members' current health problems or provide for appropriate interventions. (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 1, 9.) The statistic improved in the Court Monitor's reviews in the first two quarters of 2006, but even so, Health Plans for 34% and 40% of class members reviewed in those quarters did not reference current health problems or provide for appropriate interventions. (Sept. 24, .2006 Monitor's Report at 15; June 26, 2006 Monitor's Report at 15.) These problems were again present in two-thirds of Health Plans reviewed in the third quarter of 2006. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report 15, 18.) Deficiencies documented by consultants to the Court Monitor during this time period include, for example, Health Plans that failed to reference one class member's "recent emergency abdominal surgery, fistula, and open, draining abdominal wound" (Pls.' Ex. 156(F) (1) at 3); another class member's sexually transmitted disease, pulmonic stenosis, and extensive deep vein thrombosis (Pls.' Ex. 156(A)(17) at 4); and a third class member's substantial weight loss (Pls.' Ex. 156(A)(29) at 302 26).[31] MRDDA's *302 own nursing staff have also, identified major problems in a significant number of Health Plans. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 19 (MRDDA's quarterly reviews identified major problems in over onethird of Health Plans).; June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 15 (major problems in 50% of Health Plans).) As is obvious, Health Plans cannot guide the management of class members' health risks if they do not identify those risks and interventions necessary to address them.
10. Even when health needs are recognized, class members often do not receive prescribed interventions within the appropriate time frames 0907 or at all. Recommendations by primary care physicians and/or specialty care consultants were not acted upon in a timely manner in a majority of cases reviewed by the Court Monitor's office during the past two years. (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 2, 10 (recommendations not acted upon in 56% of the cases reviewed between October 2004 and September 2005); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 16, 19 (recommendations not timely acted upon in 49%, 64%, and 68% of cases reviewed in the first three quarters of 2006, respectively).) Similarly, lab work and/or physician-ordered diagnostic tests and consults were not completed as ordered in a significant number of cases reviewed during this time frame. (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 2, 10 (lab work/test/consults not completed as ordered in 51% of cases reviewed between October 2004 and September 2005); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 14, 19 (lab work/tests/consults not completed as ordered in 45%, 51%, and 38% of cases reviewed in first three quarters of 2006, respectively).) Dining plans, positioning plans, and behavioral plans also are not followed for many class members. (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 2, 11 (dining and positioning plans not followed in 52% of cases reviewed between October 2004 and September 2005; behavioral plans not followed in 40% of cases reviewed); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at

23-24 (dining plans not implemented in 32%, 37%, and 43% of cases reviewed in the first three quarters of 2006; positioning plans not implemented in 42%, 37%, and 60% of cases; behavioral plans not implemented in 35%, 32%, and 47% of cases).)
11. These problems are well documented not only by the Court Monitor but by MRDDA's own nurse managers, who are required to provide quarterly monitoring for class members and other MRDDA consumers identified as having high health risks. (Defs.' Ex. 12 at 4.) MRDDA nurses identified problems in the implementation of Health Plans in two-thirds of the quarterly reviews performed in 2006. (Id. at 19; June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 5, 15.)
12. The same types of problems are also routinely cited in investigations of serious incidents involving class members done by defendants' IMIU and in fatality investigations done by defendant's consultant, the Columbus Organization. For example, physician-prescribed interventions to reduce or eliminate one class member's chronic urinary tract infections were not fully implemented, placing the class member at increased risk of continued infections. (Pls.' Ex. 156(A)(19).) Although a specialist recommended that a lesion with a high probability for 303 cancer be surgically removed following another class member's colonoscopy, the surgery was not performed *303 until eleven months later, and, even then, IMIU investigators were unable to obtain documentation verifying that the surgery had been performed. (U.S. Ex. 21j at 2-3:) A physician's orders that a third class member receive weekly blood tests until the class member "was deemed state" were not followed. (U.S. Ex. 21w.) The provider for another class member "failed to ensure implementation of physicians' orders such as weekly blood level electrolytes and adequate documentation of input and output," and the class member's physical therapy, speech therapy, and occupational therapy programs were not "consistently implemented nor [were] recommendations followed." (U.S. Ex. 21bb; see also U.S. Ex. 11b (colonoscopy recommended in May 2004 was not done until February 2005); Pls.' Ex. 156(H)(13) (no evidence that various ISP recommendations were implemented, including follow up with speciality clinics, nutritional evaluation, monitoring of monthly weights).)
13. Delays in obtaining needed medical care for class members are also the result of defendants' failure to ensure that guardians are appointed for those class members who need them. Delayed medical care due to the lack of a legal guardian has been cited in Columbus mortality investigations for at least five class members in 2005 and 2006. (Pls.' Ex. 52 at 15 (lack of guardian to provide consent delayed class member's surgery four days until surgery was determined to be an emergency); Pls.' Ex. 53 at 15 (due to lack of guardian, screening colonoscopy recommended in April 2005 was not completed prior to class member's death eight months later); Pls.' Ex. 55 at 15 (medical procedures were significantly delayed in at least two instances due to lack of guardian); Pls.' Ex. 56 at 27 (lack of legally appointed guardian resulted in delays in treatment and procedures during class member's hospitalization immediately prior to his death); Pls. Ex. 106 at 13 (lack of a legally appointed guardian created delays and confusion in obtaining consents for medically necessary treatments at "critical time" when class member was hospitalized).) In addition, the FRC has repeatedly recommended that MRDDA "ensure that at a minimum, persons with complex medical issues, terminal illnesses and/or other significant medical compromise have a legal guardian appointed," a process that should be reinforced in the ISP. (Pls.' Ex. 120.)
14. The Court Monitor found that, as of June 2006, there were twenty-eight class members whose medical treatment was pending the appointment of a guardian. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 19.) Defendants admit that, as of September 2006, requests for guardians remained pending in nineteen of the fifty-three cases in which MRDDA has requested guardians since November 2005. (Defs.' Findings at 12-13; Defs.' Ex. 43.) In virtually all of those cases, guardians were requested for medical reasons. (Id.) Yet, in a number of cases, guardian requests were not sent to the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") until months after the case manager was notified of the need for a guardian. (See id. (showing delays of at least three 0907 and as many as nine and a half 0907 months between the date the case manager was notified and the date the request was sent to OAG in sixteen cases); see also Pls.' Ex. 54 at 19 (although need for guardian was "obvious" in July 2001, guardian was not appointed until January 2005); Pls.' Ex. 107 (noting failure to seek guardian for class member determined to be incompetent to make independent and informed decisions); Pls.' Ex. 108 at 10 (guardian never appointed for class member who died in 2004, notwithstanding that guardianship had been explored a decade earlier).)
304

*304 15. The Court Monitor's office and IMIU and Columbus Organization investigators have also documented many other serious deficiencies in the delivery of health care to class members. The Court Monitor found, for example, that provider nursing assessments were not comprehensive and did not address health risk issues for a majority of the class members reviewed during the past two years. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 18 (problem present for 50%, 64%, and 78% of class members reviewed in first three quarters of 2006, respectively); Nov. 3, 2006 Monitor's Report at 10 (problem present in 78% of class members reviewed between October 2004 and September 2005).) Health Plans were not adequately monitored by provider nurses and Qualified Mental Retardation Professionals ("QMRPs") for a similarly large segment of class members during this period. (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 2 (82% of Health Plans reviewed from October 2004 to September 2005 showed no evidence of monitoring by provider nurses); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 16 (Health Plans not adequately monitored by provider nurses in 56%, 52%, and 73% of cases reviewed in the first three quarters of 2006, respectively); June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 5, 15 (60% of Health Plans reviewed in second quarter of 2006 were not adequately monitored by QMRPs); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 18 (three quarters of Health Plans reviewed in third quarter of 2006 were not adequately monitored by QMRPs).) Provider residences for a majority of class members reviewed during this same time frame lacked effective systems for tracking class members' food and fluid intake, tube feedings, seizures, and bowel movements and urine output. (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 2, 15 (systems lacking in homes for 81% of class members reviewed between October 2004 and September 2005); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 17 (systems lacking in residences for 53%, 60%, and 75% of class members reviewed in first three quarters of 2006, respectively).) Moreover, data for these areas were not reviewed by clinicians on a regular basis in a significant portion of cases. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 19 (data not reviewed in two-thirds of cases); June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 15 (data not reviewed in 49% of cases).)
16. These deficiencies have serious consequences for class members. Columbus investigators have questioned whether the deaths of at least five class members might have been prevented if health problems had been managed better. (See U.S. Ex. 11a at 27 (citing the lack of a "well-coordinated effort by [the provider] to comprehensively investigate and address the decedent's weight loss and significant anemia," even though two other class members with similar weight loss issues, also in the provider's care, had died in the past seven months, and nursing staff's failure to adequately assess and monitor the decedent when he exhibited a significant change in status months before his death)); U.S. Ex. 11b at 20 (citing failure of decedent's health care team to "adequately address his risk for morbidity and mortality due to his underweight status and GI and pulmonary diagnoses"); U.S. Ex. 11c at 26 (citing lack of a coordinated effort to "appropriately and comprehensively evaluate, assess, and monitor the decedent when he presented with a change in status" and lack of an "aggressive approach to the decedent's chronic underweight status"); U.S. Ex. 11f at 20-21 (citing failure of provider nursing staff to comprehensively assess or adequately monitor class member when she exhibited a change in status in the week prior to her death); U.S. Ex. 11m at 15 (citing monitoring and other problems associated with the effort to taper decedent's anticonvulsant medication).
305 *305 17. Monitoring failures have also been found to contribute to preventable hospitalizations. For example, IMIU investigators found that one class member's emergency inpatient hospital admission for pneumonia could have been avoided had the provider sought appropriate medical attention when the class member's symptoms manifested themselves more than a month earlier. (Pls.' Ex. 156(A)(18).) Columbus investigators concluded that appropriate monitoring of a class member's thirty-eight-pound weight loss in a ten-month period may have resulted in earlier detection of the class member's gastrointestinal bleeding, which resulted in a fifty-eight-day hospitalization, numerous blood transfusions, and extensive surgery. (Pls.' Ex. 156(A)(3).) Columbus investigators also found that closer monitoring and intervention by provider nursing staff "could very possibly have prevented" problems that resulted in a third class member's emergency room visit and hospitalizations. (Pls.' Ex. 156(A)(9).) Closer monitoring and evaluation of a fourth class member "might have prevented the exacerbation [of] her cellulitis and subsequent hospitalization." (Pls.' Ex. 156(A)(23).)
18. Serious problems also persist with respect to medications. The Court Monitor's reviews over the past two years consistently have found that a majority of class members who receive psychotropic medications do not receive competent and consistent monitoring of the side effects of those medications. (Nov. 3, 2006 Monitor's Report at 2, 11 (monitoring lacking for 82% of class members reviewed); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 15, 19 (monitoring lacking for 60%, 69%, and 53% of class members reviewed in first three quarters of 2006,

respectively).) Medications were not consistently and properly stored, administered or accounted for per acceptable standards of practice in approximately half of cases reviewed during the past year. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 19 (problems in two-thirds of cases reviewed in quarter ending in September 2006); June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 5, 16 (problems in 48% of cases reviewed in quarter ending in June 2006); see also Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 2, 8 (noting pattern of problems with medication administration and reconciliation).)
19. As set forth above, defendants have failed in many significant respect to accomplish the tasks and to achieve the outcome criteria in the 2001 Plan that relate to the Court's Orders regarding the provision of health care and to comply with the terms of the Orders themselves. Defendants' deficient performance with respect to these measures provides ample evidence that defendants have failed to comply with the Court's Order that "[a] program of medical, dental and health related services which provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care is required," as well as with Court Orders requiring development of habilitation plans and programs that incorporate all services needed by class members and implementation of appropriate training programs for all staff. See Evans, Consent Order at 13 (Feb. 8, 1983); Evans, Consent Order at 3-4, 6 (June 25, 1981); Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485, 489.
II. SAFETY
1. In the 1978 Consent Order, the Court recognized that class members' constitutional right to be kept free from harm had been violated. Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 484. To remedy such violations, the existing Court Orders prohibit all acts of "physical or psychological abuse, neglect or, mistreatment" and require that "each and every alleged incident of abuse, neglect or mistreatment . . . be promptly investigated and a report made." Id. at 488; see also 306 Evans, Consent Order at 8 (Feb. 8, 1983) (requiring defendants to *306 submit to the Developmental Disabilities Professional for review and approval their "Unusual Incident Reporting Form and the procedures undertaken by defendants pursuant to any Unusual Incident Report"). Incident reports must be maintained by defendants and made available upon reasonable notice to counsel for plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor and members of the Community Advisory Board. Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 488-89. Defendants must notify the Court Monitor immediately upon the death of a class member, provide the Court Monitor with prompt notice of pending or ongoing investigations of serious incidents involving class members, and forward to the Court Monitor copies of any incident reports related to deaths, autopsies, and/or death summaries of class members, as well as all final reports of investigations that involve class members. Evans, Appointment Order at 4 (Nov. 21, 2000). Defendants must also provide "all necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that community living arrangements, programs and supportive community services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained," Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485, ensure that appropriate training programs for all staff, including staff assigned to residential settings, are developed and implemented, see Evans, Consent Order at 13 (Feb. 8, 1983); Evans, Consent Order at 3 (June 25, 1981); Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 489, and ensure that advocates are provided to assist in the protection of class members' rights. Id. at 486.
2. As part of the 2001 Plan, which incorporates the foregoing Court Orders (2001 Plan ¶¶ A.3.a.ii., B.a.ii., B.a.iii., B.a.v., D.2.a.i., D.2.a.ii.),[32] the parties agreed on numerous "tasks" that defendants must complete in order to implement the Court's Orders. With respect to the reporting of incidents, defendants must develop written policies and a uniform written incident reporting form and must disseminate the incident reporting form and policies to all relevant entities and personnel. (Id. ¶¶ B.b.i., B.b.ii.) Defendants must also establish and publicize a 24-hour hotline for the reporting of consumer incidents, develop an adequate and appropriate intake process, and develop a computerized system that permits residential and day treatment providers to report incidents on-line. ( Id. ¶¶ B.b.iii., B.b.iv., B.b.v.)
3. Defendants must develop specific written protocols for the investigation of incidents designated as "serious," including deaths. (Id. ¶ B.b.vi.; see also id. ¶ D.1.b.iv.) Among other things, such protocols must provide for "prompt, thorough investigations" of these incidents by trained personnel and must specify the time frames for completion of investigations and investigation reports and for the implementation of corrective and disciplinary action recommendations. (Id. ¶¶ B.b.vi., B.b.vii.) Investigation reports and corrective action plans must be submitted to the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust within seven days of completion. (Id. ¶ B.b.xiii.) With respect to consumer deaths in particular, defendants must ensure that such deaths are investigated "to determine the

cause of death, the circumstances of the death and the factors which may have contributed to the death, as well as any preventive or corrective action that appears warranted to address any issues that may have been 307 identified during the investigation." (Id, ¶ D.1.b.iv.) Defendants must also provide for an interdisciplinary *307 FRC that will have access to death investigation reports, make written recommendations based on a review of the circumstances of consumer deaths, and adopt procedures to ensure that recommendations emanating from the fatality review process are implemented and subject to follow-up monitoring by case managers. (Id.)
4. Defendants must develop a data system within MRDDA capable of aggregating information, about consumer incidents, incident reporting, investigations, the investigation process and status, and the implementation of corrective action recommendations and investigation results (id. ¶ B.b.viii.), and they must disseminate aggregate and specific information about the overall performance of the system in protecting the health and safety of consumers to the. Court Monitor and the Quality Trust on a quarterly basis. (Id. ¶ B.b.xiv.) Defendants must also provide an effective quality assurance system to ensure the regular, independent review of incident reporting, investigations, identification of causes of and contributing factors to incidents, and implementation of any necessary corrective actions to protect consumers from harm, and to ensure that providers are made aware of problematic trends and that corrective action is taken on an individual consumer level, a provider-specific level, and a systemic level. (Id. ¶ B.b.ix.) Defendants must provide initial training on incident reporting to providers, direct care staff, administrators, investigators, and case managers; reinforce such training through case-specific continuing education; and provide additional competency-based training to investigators and their supervisors. ( Id. ¶¶ B.b.x., B.b.xi.)
5. The parties agreed, as part of the 2001 Plan, that defendants' compliance with the Court's Orders would be measured in terms of a number of factors, including whether all incidents are reported in accordance with District policy (id. ¶ B.d.i.); whether defendants notify family members and guardians, the Court Monitor, and the Quality Trust of serous incidents within twenty-four hours of becoming aware of such incidents (id. ¶ B.d.ii.); whether serious incidents are reported within the required time frame and thoroughly investigated by trained investigators and whether all other incidents are investigated in accordance with policy requirements (id. ¶ B.d.iii.); whether investigation reports identify appropriate preventive, corrective, and disciplinary actions needed to protect MRDDA consumers from harm (id. ¶ B.d.iv.); whether all serious incident investigation reports are reviewed by MRDDA quality assurance staff and whether quality assurance staff review all other incidents for patterns and trends (id. ¶ B.d.v.); whether case managers follow up on recommendations for all serious incidents to ensure that appropriate preventive, corrective, or disciplinary actions are implemented promptly and document their actions, and whether case managers follow up on all incidents to ensure that all consumers are safe and protected from harm (id. ¶ B.d.vi.); whether MRDDA ensures that necessary preventive, corrective, and disciplinary actions are promptly implemented based on the quality assurance review of incident patterns and trends (id.; see also id. ¶ D.2.d.iii.); whether the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust receive incident reports of all serious incidents, all final investigation reports, and all recommendations for preventive and corrective action, as well as quarterly aggregate reports on patterns and trends for all other incidents (id. ¶ B.d.viii); whether deaths are reported to and reviewed by the FRC (id. ¶ D.2.d.i.); whether recommendations from the FRC for preventive 308 and corrective actions are *308 followed up, implemented, and documented (id. ¶ D.2.d.ii.); and whether, when private providers do not comply with performance expectations, the District takes whatever, immediate actions are necessary to correct the deficiency, including providing training or technical assistance to provider staff or imposing sanctions, including, where necessary, terminating provider agreements, contracts and licenses. (Id. ¶¶ B.d.x., D.2.d.v.)
6. As required by the 2001 Plan, MRDDA policy specifies the types of incidents involving MRDDA consumers that must be reported and designates certain types of incidents, including, for example, consumer deaths, incidents of abuse and neglect, serious physical injuries, serious medication errors, and emergency inpatient hospitalizations, as "serious reportable incidents."[33] (Defs.' Ex. 53 at 2-10.) Serious reportable incidents are investigated by the IMIU. (Defs.' Ex. 57.) The District previously contracted with the Columbus Organization to investigate consumer deaths; however, that contract ended sometime during 2006 and was not renewed due to budget constraints. (Oct. 4, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 79; Oct. 5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 44-45.) Responsibility for death investigations has since been assigned to the IMIU, whose staff was augmented by a registered nurse and a physician to assist in investigations of consumer deaths. (Id.)

Although both the 1978 Consent Order and the 2001 Plan make clear that abuse, neglect, and mistreatment of class members are prohibited, Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 488; (2001 Plan ¶ B.a.ii. (incorporating 1978 Consent Order); ¶ B.d.i. (defendants' policies and procedures must "clearly prohibit[]" abuse, neglect, and mistreatment)), incidents of abuse and neglect of class members nevertheless persist. These incidents are well documented by the IMIU. For example, allegations of abuse of class members were substantiated in at least nine cases investigated by the IMIU between January 2005 and June 2006. (See U.S. Exs. 20b, 11o, 11p, 11r, 20c, 11s, 20d, 11t.) An IMIU investigator recommended that a tenth abuse case be closed when the provider staff member involved was criminally charged with abuse of a vulnerable adult based on allegations that she had struck a class member in the face, injuring him in the eye. (U.S. Ex. 20a.) Moreover, IMIU investigators made findings of provider neglect or negligence, or concluded that indicia of neglect were present,[34] in at least fifty-six cases 309 involving class members that were investigated during this same time period. *309 (See U.S. Exs. 2, 11u-11y, 21a21ww, 21yy.) These cases include a provider staff member who pled guilty to criminal negligence of a vulnerable adult for seating a class member in scalding bath water that had been improperly heated on a stove top, causing second degree burns to the class member's buttocks and legs (U.S. Exs. 1, 2), as well as incidents in which provider staff failed to adequately supervise class members, leaving them at risk of injury (see, e.g., U.S. Exs. 21a, 21e), failed to timely seek or provide medical care for class members (see, e.g., U.S. Exs. 21d, 21h, 21k), or otherwise failed to address class members' needs (see, e.g., U.S. Ex. 21p). These problems are widespread among providers, involving class members served at twenty-three different provider sites. (See Nov. 29, 2006 Monitor's Report at 33-34.)
8. The Court Monitor has also provided recent data regarding serious incidents. Between October 1, 2005 and August 31, 2006, a total of 230 serious incidents involving both class and non-class members were reported. (Id. at 6.) As of November 2006, defendants had investigated 166 of those incidents, and ninety-six incidents had been substantiated. (Id.) Of the ninety-six substantiated incidents, thirty-six involved incidents of abuse and neglect. (Id. at 7.)[35] These incidents occurred at fourteen different provider sites. (Id. at 9.)
9. Defendants have adopted internal investigative protocols for the IMIU, which require IMIU investigative reports to be completed, including supervisory review, within forty-five work days. (Defs.' Ex. 57.) Despite this requirement, serious reportable incidents, including deaths, are not investigated in a timely manner in many instances. Although defendants had reduced the backlog of overdue serious incident investigations for class members to two as of November 3, 2005 (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 15), there were seventy-one overdue investigations for class members, including four overdue death investigations, three months later in February 2006. (Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13.) There were 107 overdue serious incident investigations for class members as of May 2006 (Pls.' Ex. 132), and ninety-two overdue investigations, including eight overdue death investigations, as of June 2006. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report.) And while the extent of defendants' backlog of overdue serious incident investigations as of September 2006 was disputed due to problems reconciling MRDDA's data with the Quality Trust's data, the backlog remained substantial whether one accepts the District's estimate (fifty-nine) or the Court Monitor's estimate (ninety-nine). (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 10.)[36] 310 Investigations of serious *310 reportable incidents are intended to identify those preventive and corrective actions necessary to ensure consumers' heath and safety. (See Defs.' Ex. 53 at 11; 2001 Plan ¶ B.b.vii.) When investigations are delayed, so too are these needed provider interventions. Indeed, the FRC has identified the inability to, timely obtain the information and data required for reviews as one obstacle to the Committee's effective operation. (U.S. Ex. 13 at 3.)
10. Once investigation, reports are completed, defendants must provide them to the Court Monitor within seven days. Evans, Appointment Order at 4 (Nov. 21, 2000). (See also 2001 Plan ¶ B.b.xiii.; Defs.' Ex. 57 at 2.) Yet, there have been serious problems with the accuracy and reliability of the information provided to the Court Monitor's office. In June 2006, the Court Monitor determined that at least one of the Columbus death investigations she had received from the District had been edited to delete information critical of the District prior to being distributed. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 9.) When the Court Monitor thereafter requested that Columbus send copies of certain reports to her directly, Columbus was instructed not to do so, until Special Master Sundram intervened. (Id.) The Court Monitor later determined, by comparing nineteen Columbus death investigation reports received directly from Columbus to those distributed by the District, that in eight of the

investigation reports forwarded by the District, factual information or recommendations had been deleted from the original Columbus document. (Aug. 17, 2005 Monitor's Report at 1.) With one exception, these deletions, which described gaps in case management, delays in obtaining consent for medical procedures, concerns about health care procedures, concerns about autopsy results and procedures, and difficulties in obtaining information critical of the investigation process, were not agreed to by Columbus. (Id.) These significant alterations of death investigation reports call into question the reliability of information provided by defendants, impede the implementation of needed interventions, and compromise defendants' ability to protect other class members from harm. They also constitute clear evidence of defendants' noncompliance with the Court's Orders requiring that death investigations be provided to the Court Monitor. Evans, Appointment Order at 4 (Nov. 21, 2000); Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 488-89. (See also 2001 Plan ¶¶ B.b.xiii., B.d.viii.)[37]
11. The Court Monitor has also repeatedly raised concerns regarding the quality of defendants' investigations. In 311 her December 2004 report, the Court Monitor raised concerns regarding the IMIU's *311 practice of relying on
provider interviews rather than conducting independent interviews of key informants, failure to review other recent incident reports involving the same class member or the concerning the same provider or residence, failure to take into account pertinent documentation that could be obtained from providers, and overall lack of thoroughness. (Dec. 30, 2004 Monitor's Report at 11-12.) Many of these same concerns were still present in September 2006, when the Court Monitor again commented on the failure of IMIU investigators to interview important sources of pertinent information; to review other incidents reports regarding the same class member and provider; and to review other relevant records, including staff logs at the residence, emergency room and hospital discharge summaries, agency nursing notes, and health records for the alleged victim. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 11.)
12. Moreover, defendants do not consistently ensure that appropriate preventive and corrective actions are implemented based on fatality and serious incident investigations. For example, a September 2005 IMIU investigation regarding one class member's series of emergency inpatient hospitalizations within a two-month period recommended that MRDDA assess the class member, who had a long history of noncompliance with diet and medications required to control her diabetes and blood pressure, to determine whether additional supports were warranted to ensure compliance with medical and dietary needs. (Pls.' Ex. 129.) Yet, four months later, MRDDA had failed to identify interventions to address the class member's identified risks and problems, including the lack of nursing services to monitor her diabetes and hypertension. (Pls.' Ex. 130 at 26-27.) This failure by MRDDA is not an isolated incident. A 2005 report regarding the status of IMIU consumer and provider incident recommendations reflected that 463 out of 847 recommendations remained unresolved as of August 2005. (Pls.' Ex. 128.) The Court Monitor has also consistently criticized defendants for failing to review death investigations with providers in a timely manner. In February 2006, the Court Monitor reported that for a period of over one year, defendants repeatedly failed to notify providers of the results of the Columbus mortality investigations, with the result that corrective actions were not even discussed, let alone implemented. (Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13.) As of September 2006, there were at least eleven death investigations 0907 for class member deaths dating back as far as January 2005 0907 that had not been reviewed with the responsible provider. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 12.) As of November 2006, eight of ten Columbus death investigations concerning class member deaths between October 1, 2005 and August 31, 2006 had not been reviewed with providers, though reviews of these death investigations were scheduled to occur between November 2006 and February 2007. (Nov. 29, 2006 Monitor's Report at 11-12.)
13. The serious consequences that flow from defendants' failure to ensure that appropriate corrective and preventive actions are promptly implemented are illustrated by the deaths of three class members who had similar problems with weight loss issues that were not addressed by the same provider over a seven-month period. (See Pls.' Exs. 100, 61, 56.) Following the death of the first class member in November 2004, Columbus investigators raised concerns that the class member's nutritional compromise had not been more aggressively evaluated and managed and that daily monitoring of intake was not apparent, and as a result, they recommended 312 that MRDDA and the provider ensure that *312 individuals exhibiting significant weight issues be "comprehensively evaluated to determine the etiology of the problem and are consistently and appropriately monitored by all relevant clinical disciplines." (Pls.' Ex. 100 at 13.)[38] Yet two months later, when a second class member died after experiencing significant and rapid weight loss, the death investigation again noted the lack of

"an aggressive approach to the [class member's] chronic underweight status." (Pls.' Ex. 61 at 26.) When a third class member died in the care of the same residential provider five months later, the death investigation again noted the lack of a "well-coordinated effort by [the provider] to comprehensively investigate and address the [class member's] weight loss and significant anemia." (Pls.' Ex. 56 at 27.) It is significant that investigators questioned whether the second and third deaths might have been preventable. (Pls.' Ex. 61 at 26; Pls.' Ex. 56 at 27.)
14. Defendants have also failed to implement recommendations for preventive and corrective action by the FRC. The FRC's 2004 Annual Report, issued in April 2005, reflects that 41% of the Committee's recommendations had not been implemented as of that date. (Defs.' Ex. 68 at 1.) Moreover, recommendations issued based on the review of one class member's death are re-issued (sometimes repeatedly) when the same underlying problems are identified in later reviews. For example, the FRC's recommendation, based on the review of a class member's 2002 death, that MRDDA "develop procedures to address coordination of hospital discharge planning, pain management and follow-up of end-of-life care" was re-issued following the review of three separate deaths in October 2005., (See Pls.' Ex. 115.) Although defendants indicated in April 2004 that the Department of Human Services would adopt the FRC's recommendation that MRDDA "incorporate the integration of End of Life issues into consumers' person-centered plans as appropriate" and "develop a training module on End of Life quality issues as part of the person-centered planning curriculum," this same recommendation was also re-issued in October 2005. (See Pls.' Ex. 116.) Similarly, while defendants responded in March 2004 to the FRC's recommendation that "MRDDA ensure that the oversight of clinical reviews and coordination of health care services on medically fragile individuals [be] conducted by appropriate health care professionals," including assigning adequate numbers of staff, this recommendation was re-issued five times in October 2005. (See Pls.' Ex. 117; see also, e.g., Pls.' Ex. 118 (FRC recommendation that MRDDA "develop a general education document highlighting [health care] coordination issues in serving MRDDA customers" for distribution to relevant health care community re-issued five times in October 2005); Pls.' Ex. 120 (FRC's March 2005 recommendation that MRDDA ensure that guardians are appointed for persons with complex medical issues, terminal illnesses, and other significant medical compromise re-issued in two cases in October 2005).) The FRC's repeated re-issuance of these and other recommendations for preventive and corrective action is further evidence of defendants' inability to implement those recommendations.
313 15. Defendants have also failed to ensure that all provider and direct care staff, *313 as well as MRDDA's own case managers, are trained in incident reporting. Defendants' quarterly training report for the period from April to June 2006 reflects that MRDDA has completed staff training regarding incident management for only six out of sixty-four providers. (U.S. Ex. 19 at 6-9.) For most providers, less than half of all direct support staff have been trained. (Id.)[39] Moreover, 36% of MRDDA case managers and 62% of other MRDDA staff have not been trained regarding incident management. (Id. at 9.) Defendants' incident management system cannot function effectively if provider and MRDDA staff do not have the appropriate training.
16. Finally, there is evidence that defendants fail to take appropriate corrective actions when providers do not comply with performance expectations. One of the key concerns identified as the result of a collaborative review of the deaths of four class members and one non-class member undertaken by representatives of MRDDA, the Inspector General's office, the Health Partnership, University Legal Services, and the Court Monitor's office was the "lack of enforcement penalties related to poor professional conduct," including the fact that staff cited for neglect continue to be employed in the system. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 11-12.) At the October 5, 2006 status conference, the Court Monitor observed that she is aware of only three instances in which providers have been sanctioned, all during Ms. Sawyer's tenure with MRDDA, and that, in each instance, action was taken only as a result of documentation filed by the Monitor's office. (Oct. 5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 26.) First, following the Court Monitor's complaints to Ms. Sawyer regarding problems with the administration of medication to one consumer, Ms. Sawyer requested that the Department of Health investigate the matter. (Id.) Second, after the Court Monitor circulated a draft of her September 2006 report, which included a chronology of the serious concerns that had been raised about one residence since 2003, the provider was fined $3,500 for citations noted during a February 2006 licensing visit. (Id. at 26-27.) The Court Monitor also reported that Ms. Sawyer had decided that clients would be moved from the residence, but that had not happened by the time of the hearing. ( Id. at 27.) Third, the Department of Health terminated the provider agreement for one of the residences targeted

in the ninety-day plan, where the Court Monitor had observed clients being neglected and where one non-class member had died.[40] (Id. at 27-28.) The Court Monitor has also expressed concern that there is no evidence that the District sanctions providers for failing to complete their own death investigations, as required. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13.)
17. As set forth above, defendants have failed in many significant respects to accomplish the tasks and outcome criteria associated with the Court's Orders relating to class member safety and to comply with the terms of the 314 Orders themselves. Defendants' performance in the areas discussed above provides ample evidence that *314 defendants have failed to comply with the Court's Orders prohibiting all acts of "physical or psychological abuse, neglect or mistreatment" of class members, Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 488, requiring the prompt reporting and investigation of all such incidents and the prompt dissemination of the reports of such investigations to the Court Monitor and other interested parties, Evans, Appointment Order at 4 (Nov. 21, 2000); Evans, Consent Order at 8 (Feb. 8, 1983); Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 488-89; Evans, requiring the development and implementation of appropriate training programs for all staff, including staff assigned to residential settings, Evans, Consent Order at 13 (Feb. 8, 1983); Evans, Consent Order at 3 (June 25, 1981); Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 489, and requiring defendants to provide necessary monitoring mechanisms. Id. at 485.
III. WELFARE
A. Least Restrictive, Most Integrated Setting
1. The 1978 Consent Order recognized that class members' constitutional right "to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty" had been violated. Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 484. To remedy these violations, the Court ordered defendants to "[p]rovide all class members with community living arrangements suitable to each, together with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide them with minimally adequate habilitation . . . in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive community settings." Id. at 485. Later Court Orders reinforce this requirement. See Evans, Court Order at 10-11 (Feb. 8, 1983) (requiring that class members be provided five hours of daily programming and that a comprehensive recreation program be implemented for class members).
2. The tasks identified in the 2001 Plan as necessary to implement these Court Orders, which the Plan incorporates (2001 Plan ¶¶ A.2.a.i., A.2.a.iii., A.2.a.iv.), include developing criteria and placement procedures for nursing home placements and discharges (id. ¶ A.2.b.i.); using community alternatives whenever possible for consumers with complex medical needs (Id.); and developing and implementing a plan for the placement of persons identified as being inappropriately served in nursing homes, day programs, and employment programs into less restrictive, more integrated and appropriate community settings. (Id. ¶¶ A.2.b.ii., A.2.b.iii.)
3. As part of the 2001 Plan, the parties agreed that the measure of defendants' compliance with the foregoing Court Orders would be, inter alia, whether "[a]ll class members are served in residential and day or employment programs that are the least restrictive, most integrated settings appropriate to their needs" and "are provided with adequate supports to allow their participation in recreation and social activities in their communities" (id. ¶ A.2.d.i. ) and whether "[n]o consumers are placed in or remain in large institutions or nursing homes inappropriately, or because appropriate community alternatives are not available." (Id. A.2.d.ii.)
4. Notwithstanding the plain language of the 1978 Order and the Plan, defendants have admitted that class members are not placed in the least restrictive setting. Testifying at budget hearings before the District's Committee on Human Services in April 2006, former MRDDA Administrator Marsha Thompson admitted that "one of the critical areas where the District is lagging is the failure to place people in the least restrictive setting based on their clinical needs and the agreed-upon service plan." (U.S. Ex. 10 at 5.) Ms. Thompson went on to 315 acknowledge that "[n]o one *315 debates the fact that we have people placed in inappropriate settings." (Id.) These admissions are underscored by defendants' agreement, as part of the ninety-day plan, to move forty-six MRDDA consumers, including thirty class members, into individualized, integrated, less restrictive residential settings. (Nov. 28, 2005 Hr'g Tr. at 6-8; U.S. Ex. 5.) The parties' decision to focus on residential placements as part of the ninety-day plan is particularly significant in light of the plan's purpose to address the "immediate and urgent needs of class members." (Nov. 28, 2005 Hr'g Tr. at 6.) Although a total of forty-six class and non-class members were identified as requiring more appropriate residential placements in November 2005, defendants

had made only three placements at the conclusion of the ninety-day period in February 2006 (Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 1, 6) and no additional placements into more integrated and individualized settings as of June 2006. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 2.)[41]
5. Defendants have submitted a declaration from the Chief of MRDDA's Evans Intensive Case Management Branch I, indicating that commitment orders issued for 157 class members between October 2005 and July 2006 reflect findings by D.C. Superior Court judges that those class members were receiving habilitation by the least restrictive means as defined in D.C.Code § 7-1301.03(16).[42] (Defs.' Ex. 69 ¶ 8; see also Defs.' Ex. 70.) While these findings may indicate that some class members are appropriately placed, defendants have admitted that many are not. (U.S. Ex. 10 at 5 (admitting that placing class members in the least restrictive setting was a "critical area" in which the District was "lagging").)[43]
316 *316 6. Day programs also do not serve class members in the most integrated, least restrictive setting in many instances. In April 2003, the Court Monitor's office found that day programs were more restrictive than required by the functioning of the class members enrolled in such programs, with less than 10% of class members involved in supported employment programs. (Apr. 21, 2003 Monitor's Report at 8.) The Court Monitor's review of seventeen day program sites in 2004 revealed that a majority of day programs were overcrowded and provided segregated services of low intensity and interest to class members. (Oct. 7, 2004 Monitor's Report at 10.) Four of the seventeen day program sites reviewed (24%) provided little substantive activity of any kind, and only two sites (12%) were implementing supported employment. (Id. at 9.) More recently, the parties acknowledged that existing day programs are often inadequate, agreeing that, as part of the ninety-day plan, forty-two class members should be moved "out of segregated day programs, which are both expensive and unproductive," and into "integrated employment or day activities." (See Nov. 28, 2005 Hr'g Tr. at 6, 8; see also Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 1.) Although the parties agreed that these forty-two class members were in need of more integrated, less restrictive day programs, employment was secured for only five class members, and two of the employment placements did not meet agreed-upon criteria. (Id. at 1, 11.)
7. The lack of an effective Medicaid waiver exacerbates the District's inability to meet its obligation to provide all class members with habilitative care and treatment in the least restrictive, most integrated setting. The waiver program was designed to provide noninstitutional, community-based services to individuals with developmental disabilities who otherwise would remain in or be at risk of being placed in a Medicaid facility such as an ICF/MR. See Residential Services for Persons with Developmental Disabilities: Status and Trends Through 2005 ("Residential Services: Status and Trends") at 59 (July 2006), available at http://rtc.umn. edu/risp05. The waiver authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive certain existing Medicaid requirements to allow states to finance noninstitutional services for Medicaid-eligible individuals. Id. at 58. The waiver is thus an important source of federal funding for noninstitutional services and supports as an alternative to institutional care, and the District's inability to implement an effective waiver program has resulted in additional costs being borne by the District and its taxpayers. (See Oct. 5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 53.)
8. Although defendants object that implementation of the waiver is not Court-ordered (Defs.' Findings at 26), defendants have consistently recognized that an effective waiver is necessary for them to meet their obligations under existing Court Orders. Defendants stipulated, in December 2000, that "[t]he District's commitment to selfdetermination embodied in person centered planning cannot be met without the funding stream provided by an 317 effective *317 waiver" and that "[t]he lack of an effective waiver is in itself sufficient to keep the District from effectively implementing person centered planning." Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 99 (joint stipulated findings of fact adopted, by the Court in connection with the 2001 Plan) (emphasis added). Moreover, as part of the 2001 Plan, the parties agreed that the District's existing waiver was too narrowly drawn and served too few consumers and that the District needed to take greater advantage of opportunities available under the waiver in order to implement the goal of providing individualized services in the least restrictive environment to class members and other MRDDA consumers. (2001 Plan at 62; see also Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 14 ("All parties to this case concur that the redesign and implementation of a carefully amended Medicaid waiver is of paramount importance.").)[44]

9. The District's waiver nevertheless remains too limited in terms of the number of enrollees and ineffective in terms of the services actually provided to those who are enrolled. The number of class members enrolled in the waiver has increased slowly over time, with only 219 class members enrolled as of September 2006. (Defs.' Ex. 111.) Even with this increased enrollment, the District still lags far behind other states in utilizing the waiver instead of more restrictive ICF/MRs. See supra note 43. Moreover, those class members who are enrolled in the waiver do not receive all services and do not receive services in the frequency and duration ordered. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 7, 27.) The District's own review of 191 enrolled class members in August 2006 revealed that only 51% of these class members received all of the required services and that 13% did not receive services in the frequency and duration ordered. (Id.) Indeed, some consumers do not receive any of their needed services under the waiver. (See Pls.' Ex. 150 (33 class members did not receive any waiver services as of April 30, 2006; 15 class members did not receive any waiver services as of May 31, 2006); Pls.' Ex. 147 (28 class members did not receive any waiver services as of September 1, 2005).) The lack of an adequate pool of providers also contributes to this problem. (See U.S. Ex. 9 at 13.)
10. The waiver is also still too narrowly drawn in ways that prevent class members from being moved into less restrictive settings. For example, the waiver limits the number of hours that nursing services can be provided in community settings. (See Oct. 5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 15-16.) The waiver thus provides a disincentive for the District to move class members out of ICF/MRs to the extent that they would need nursing services in excess of the cap, as the "extra" nursing services would have to be funded solely by local dollars. (See id.) The Court Monitor has noted that the District recently has made some progress towards amending the waiver, retaining an outside consultant to assist with the amendment of the waiver and drafting needed rule changes. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 27.) However, the failure to take these steps for many years has seriously impeded defendants' progress in moving class members into the least restrictive setting. (See Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's 318 Report at 1, 14 (noting that District *318 had made insufficient progress on the waiver's amendment, including failure to retain a consultant as promised in September 2005).)
11. Residential placements for many class members are also unsuitable in other respects. The Court Monitor has consistently found that a quarter or more of class members reviewed during the past two years live in homes that are not clean, safe, and environmentally pleasant. (See Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 19 (one-third of class members reviewed "d[o] not live in clean, safe or environmentally pleasant homes"); June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 16 (26% of class members reviewed "do not live in clean, safe, and pleasant conditions"); Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 2, 11 (50% of homes reviewed between October 2004 and September 2005 did not evidence clean and safe environments).)[45] As part of the ninety-day plan, seven sites with histories of poor performance and one site at which residents were placed at continuing risk of neglect were selected for remedial effort. (Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 5.) At least three of these substandard homes remained open as of June 2006. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 10.)
12. Nursing home placements also remain problematic. In 2001, defendants adopted a policy and procedure establishing criteria for the use of nursing homes, as required by the 2001 Plan. (Defs.' Ex. 74; see Special Master's Report & Recommendation Regarding Nursing Home Admissions for Class Members ["Special Master's Nursing Home Report"] at 3; 2001 Plan ¶ A.2.b.i.) Notwithstanding this policy, which the Special Master has found to be reasonable as written (Special Master's Nursing Home Report at 5), defendants have continued to place class members inappropriately in nursing homes. (See Pls.' Ex. 13 at 2 (eight of fourteen class members residing in nursing home or acute care hospitals in 2001 were inappropriately placed); Pls.' Ex. 14 (class member inappropriately placed in a nursing home in 2002); Pls.' Ex. 15 (same in 2003); Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 25 (one of five class members in nursing homes reviewed in 2006 did not require nursing home care).) It is particularly troubling that class members remain in nursing home placements even after those placements have been identified as inappropriate. For example, a class member identified as not requiring nursing home care in August 2001 and on three occasions thereafter still remained in the same nursing home placement a year later with "no indication that any actions ha[d] been taken to secure a more appropriate placement." (Pls.' Ex. 14; see also Pls.' Ex. 15 (class member who had been ready for discharge from her nursing home placement since December 2001 remained in that placement in January 2003); Pls.' Exs. 17, 18 & Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 25 (class member identified as needing to move out of his nursing home in the spring of 2006 remained there as of September 2006).).

13. Based on defendants' admission that they have failed to place consumers in the least restrictive setting; defendants' identification, as part of the ninety-day plan, of at least thirty class members who needed to move to 319 more appropriate and *319 integrated settings and at least forty-two class members who needed less restrictive, more integrated day programs; and defendants' failure to implement an effective Medicaid waiver, the Court finds that defendants have not complied with the Court's 1978 Order that all class members be provided with "community living arrangements suitable to each, together with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide them within minimally adequate habilitation . . . in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive community settings." Evans., 459 F.Supp. at 484. Defendants' continued inappropriate placement of class members in nursing homes is also evidence of defendants' noncompliance with this Court Order. (2001 Plan ¶ A.2.d.ii.; see also id. ¶¶ A.2.b.ii., A.2.b.iii.)
B. Individual Support Plans
1. Defendants are required, under the existing Court Orders, to develop and provide for each class member a written ISP based upon individualized assessments and formulated in accordance with professional standards and an individualized habilitation program designed in accordance with the ISP. Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 484-85; see also Evans, Consent Order at 3-4 (June 25, 1981). ISPs must identify all services and supports required by class members regardless of availability and must be reviewed at least annually. Id.; Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485. Priority in the implementation of ISPs must be given to class members identified as assaultive, self-injurious, selfabusive, mentally ill, or having acute medical needs or identified needs for physical rehabilitation services. Evans, Consent Order at 6 (June 25, 1981). The existing Court Orders also require that individualized adaptive equipment be provided to class members who need such equipment, and that all class members be evaluated to assess their needs for such equipment. Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 489.
2. Each of the foregoing Court Orders was incorporated into the 2001 Plan. (2001 Plan ¶¶ A.1.a.i., A.1.a.ii., A.1.a.iii., A.1.a.viii.) The tasks identified in the Plan as necessary to implement these Orders require that ISPs identify class members' service, support, and protection needs regardless of availability, that they be modified as needs and circumstances change, and that they be implemented promptly (id. A.1.b.iv.); that the District develop procedures and time frames for assessing class members' needs for the acquisition or repair of adaptive equipment (id. ¶ A. 1.b.vi.); and that such equipment be provided to consumers within sixty days from the date the need is determined or, in the event that such equipment or repair services are not readily available due to special needs, as soon as possible. (Id. A.1.b.vi.)
3. The agreed-upon measure of defendants' compliance with the foregoing Court Orders includes whether class members receive the services and supports identified in ISPs on a timely basis; whether ISPs provide for individualized adaptive equipment, as needed; whether class members' needs for adaptive equipment are assessed within thirty days of a request; and whether adaptive equipment is provided or repaired within sixty days from the date the need is determined. (Id. ¶ A. 1.d.iii.)
4. ISPs are the means by which class members' constitutional right to habilitative care and treatment in the least restrictive setting is implemented. The ISP "serves as the single document that integrates all supports a person may receive irrespective of where the person resides." (Defs.' Ex. 71 at 3.) The ISP includes measurable goals 320 and objectives for meeting the person's preferences, choices, and desired outcomes and also "addresses the *320 provision of safe, secure, and dependable supports that are necessary for the person's [well-being], independence, and social inclusion." (Id.)[46]
5. The Court Monitor has consistently found ISPs to be current for around 90% of class members reviewed. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 5 (93% of ISPs reviewed were current); June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 14 (90% current); Mar. 31, 2005 Monitor's Report at 3 (83% current); Oct. 7, 2004' Monitor's Report at 7 (90% current); July-Sept. 2003 Monitor's Report at 31 (90% current); July-Sept. 2002 Monitor's Report at 23 (95% current).) These findings indicate that ISPs are being revised annually for most class members, as required by Court Orders and the Plan.
6. Serious problems nevertheless persist in implementing ISPs and thus in ensuring that class members actually receive the services and supports they require. The Court Monitor repeatedly has found that ISPs are not

implemented as written in a substantial number of cases reviewed. (See Nov. 29, 2006 Monitor's Report at 3, 13 (65% of ISPs reviewed not implemented fully as written); June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 4 (45% of ISPs reviewed not implemented fully as written); Mar. 31, 2005 Monitor's Report at 12 (60% of ISPs not implemented as written).) Unless ISPs are implemented, class members do not receive the habilitative care and treatment to which they are entitled under the 1978 Consent Decree and subsequent Court Orders.
7. Failure to fully implement ISPs as written is a problem that cuts across providers. Between July and October 2006, the Court Monitor's office reviewed ISPs for 99 class members served by twenty-four different residential providers. (Nov. 29, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13-24.) ISPs were not fully implemented as written for sixty-three of the class members reviewed, who resided at sixteen of the twenty-four residential providers. (Id.)
8. At the October 2006 hearing, defendants objected to "full implementation" as a measure of compliance given the number of services and supports an ISP may require and the varying level of urgency of those services and supports for a class member's well-being. (See Oct. 4, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 94 (using the example that an ISP might require both that a class member receive insulin and that he be afforded an opportunity to go to the park).) The Court Monitor responded to this concern in her November 2006 report, demonstrating that the services and supports not provided to class members whose ISPs were found not to be fully implemented are indeed serious. In fact, the services and supports most often found to be lacking included clinical assessments and lab work and health-related procedures. (Nov. 29, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13.) Other services and supports found to be lacking included one-to-one staffing required for protection from harm, transportation services, community-based employment, and complete financial plans. (Id.)
9. There is also evidence that ISPs may be inadequate for many class members. For example, 40% of the ISPs 321 reviewed by the Court Monitor's office between July and September 2006 did not *321 include reasonable
training goals and did not accommodate the individual's strengths and level of disability. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 23; see also June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 16 (36% of class members reviewed did not have reasonable and appropriately modified training goals).)
10. MRDDA has developed a policy establishing guidelines for the proper and timely acquisition, replacement, modification, and repair of adaptive equipment. (Defs.' Findings at 12; Defs.' Ex. 38.) Notwithstanding this policy, almost 30% of class members reviewed by the Court Monitor's office between July and October 2006 who needed adaptive equipment did not have it. The necessary equipment included such items as eyeglasses; wheelchairs; a raised toilet seat, bars for the tub, and a shower, seat; hearing aids; electronic communication devices; and dentures. (Nov. 29, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13, 25-27.) In some instances, class members had been without needed equipment for more than a year. (See, e.g., id. at 25 (class member fitted for eyeglasses in June 2005 still did not have them as of September 2006), at 26 (class members still did not have a sport wristband fourteen months after occupational therapist recommended it).) The twenty-one class members who did not have needed adaptive equipment were served by twelve different providers. (Id. at 25-27.)
11. Defendants' failure to fully implement ISPs, as required under the 2001 Plan, is evidence of defendants' noncompliance with the Court's Orders regarding ISPs. (See 2001 Plan ¶¶ A.1.b.iv., A.1.d.iii.) The failure to fully implement ISPs affects a large proportion of class members served by many different providers, and often implicates class members' health and safety needs. Problems with implementation of ISPs have been well documented since at least March 2005 and have continued throughout 2006. The Court finds that defendants' noncompliance in this regard has been systemic, serious, and continuous. The Court also finds that defendants have failed to comply with the Court's Orders regarding adaptive equipment.
C. Case Management
1. The existing Court Orders require defendants to "[p]rovide all necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that community living arrangements, programs and supportive community services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained." Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485. Defendants must recruit, hire, and train "a sufficient number of qualified community staff to prepare individual exit and community habilitation plans for each [class member] . . . and to assist in the execution of the responsibility to create, develop, maintain, and monitor the community living arrangements, programs and other services required." Id. at 486. In particular, defendants must maintain enough case manager positions to meet the required case manager to client ratio.

Evans, Consent. Order at 5 (Feb. 8, 1983); see also Evans, 1996 WL 451054, at *6. Defendants must also ensure that appropriate training programs for staff, including case managers, are developed and implemented. See Evans, Consent Order at 13 (Feb. 8, 1983); Evans, Consent Order at 3 (June 25, 1981); Evans, 459. F.Supp. at 489. Each of these Court Orders is incorporated into the 2001 Plan. (2001 Plan ¶¶ A.3.a.ii., D.1.a.ii., D.1.a.iii.)[47]
322 *322 2. The tasks identified in the 2001 Plan as necessary for defendants to come into compliance with the foregoing Court Orders include developing "procedures to ensure that case managers are informed of recommendations made as a result of all quality assurance/quality improvement activities, including incident investigations, to enable them to monitor the implementation of the recommendations" (2001 Plan ¶ D. 1.b.i.); providing for a case manager to client ratio of one to thirty, or even lower depending upon the intensity of consumer needs (id. ¶ D.1.b.ii.); ensuring that all case managers "receive competency-based training to carry out their responsibilities prior to being assigned responsibility for individual consumers" (Id.); and requiring case managers "to conduct a minimum of eight monitoring visits a year and [to] file reports regarding compliance with ISPs and health/safety issues based on these visits." (Id. ¶ D. 1.b.iii.)
3. As part of the 2001 Plan, the parties agreed that the measure of defendants' compliance with these Court Orders would be whether case managers and their supervisors have successfully completed the required competency based training (id. ¶ D. 1.d.i.); whether case managers participate in the development of ISPs for all consumers on their caseloads (Id.); whether case managers ensure that consumers receive all of the services and supports identified in their ISPs, and document and attempt to resolve problems encountered in terms of access to, or the quality or timeliness of, such services and supports (id. ¶ D.1.d.ii.); whether case managers follow up when a consumer has been the subject of an incident or recommendation for corrective or preventative action to ensure that appropriate actions for the safety and protection of the consumer are implemented (id. ¶ D.1.d.iii.); and whether defendants maintain the required one to thirty case manager to class member ratio. (Id. ¶ D.1.d.iv.)
4. Defendants have consistently maintained the required case manager to class member ratio under the 2001 Plan.
5. Despite having what the Court Monitor has described as some of the smallest caseloads in the country (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 14), MRDDA case managers have consistently failed to visit clients eight times per year, as required under the Plan. In November 2005, the Court Monitor reported that a review of a year's worth of records for eighty-five class members found evidence of the required eight visits for only 39% of class members reviewed. (Id. at 15.) Monitoring tools documenting the required eight visits had been completed for only 31% of class members reviewed.[48] (Id.) Seven months later, in June 2006, the Court Monitor again found that 323 monitoring tools documenting the required eight visits had been completed for only 30% of the sixty-three *323 class members reviewed.[49] (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13.) A total of twenty-four case managers were responsible for the 70% of class members reviewed for whom documentation of the required eight visits was lacking. (Id.) Data provided by the District in response to the Court Monitor's draft. June 2006 report confirmed these findings on a broader scale. MRDDA data for 657 class members indicated that only 27% of class members had eight monitoring tools completed. (Id. at 13-14.) More' recently, the Court Monitor's office and the Quality Trust reviewed case management services provided to 222 randomly selected class members and found that eight visits per year had been documented for 68% of the class members reviewed. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 22.) Although this is certainly an improvement, approximately one-third of the class members reviewed did not receive the required eight visits. (Id.)[50]
6. Case managers have also failed to ensure that class members' ISPs are implemented as written. See supra section III.B. ¶ 6.
7. There is also evidence that case managers fail to take appropriate action when a class member has been the subject of an incident. Although serious incident reports had been filed for thirty-nine of the eighty-five class members reviewed by the Court Monitor's office in late 2005, the case manager's notes referenced the serious incident only about half of the time. (Nov.. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 4, 15.)

8. Defendants' performance with respect to case manager training is also deficient. Defendants highlight the availability of training from MRDDA and through the Health Partnership and emphasize that 85% of case managers who monitor class members have completed training in at least seven of MRDDA's eight cord training areas (i.e., adaptive equipment, behavior support, incident management, ISPs, medical and dental, most integrated settings, psychotropic medications, and quality assurance). (Defs.' Findings at 15; see also Defs.' Ex. 48.) Under the 2001 Plan, however, defendants are required to ensure that "all case managers receive competency-based training to carry out their responsibilities prior to being assigned responsibility for individual consumers." (2001 Plan ¶ D.1.b.ii. (emphasis added).) Yet, of the twenty-six case managers included in defendants' exhibit, only half had completed the required trainings in all eight areas. (Defs.' Ex. 48.) Moreover, according to MRDDA's training report for April to June 2006, 13% of case managers have not been trained in adaptive equipment, ISPs, or most integrated settings (U.S. Ex. 19 at 3, 12, 17); 14% have not been trained in 324 medical and *324 dental or psychotropic medications (id. at 14, 20); 15% have not been trained in behavior support plans or quality assurance (id. at 6, 22); and 36% have not been trained in incident management. (Id. at 9.)
9. Defendants' failure to ensure that case managers complete the required number of visits and that they take appropriate action when a class member has been the subject of a serious incident is evidence of defendants' noncompliance with Court's Orders regarding monitoring and case management. (See 2001 Plan ¶¶ D.1.b.iii., D.1.d.) Defendants' noncompliance in this area affects a significant proportion of class members. Moreover, the Court finds that this noncompliance is serious given case managers' role as "the principal link between the individuals being served and the systems involved in the provision of services." (Defs.' Ex. 63.) As the Court Monitor recently remarked, case managers are the front line safeguards for the client, and eight visits should be some guarantee that someone is looking at the care that is being provided, and, when it is negligent or incomplete or ineffective, is raising that concern to the appropriate official. (Oct. 5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 25.) Defendants' failure to ensure that case managers are properly trained before receiving caseloads is also evidence of defendants' noncompliance with the Court's Orders (see 2001 Plan ¶¶ D.1.b.ii., D.1.d.i.), as is the case managers' failure to ensure that ISPs are fully implemented. (See id. 4 D.1.d.ii.)
CONCLUSION
All of the Court Orders that plaintiffs seek to enforce through this action were agreed to by defendants. Defendants also agreed to the terms of the 2001 Plan. In consenting to the entry of these Orders, and in agreeing to the provisions of the Plan, defendants admitted 0907 in 1978, 1981, 1983, and again in 2001 0907 that the existing system for persons with developmental disabilities in the District of Columbia was seriously flawed. Indeed, defendants stipulated to violations of class members' constitutional rights in the 1978 Consent Order and acknowledged, in the factual findings accompanying the 2001 Plan, that their service delivery system was "broken" and in need of being "redefined and rebuilt." In the Plan, defendants agreed to undertake an ambitious (if not totally unrealistic) course of action to remedy these deficiencies and to come into compliance with the existing Court Orders. Although the Plan itself was not court-ordered, defendants agreed that their compliance with the underlying Orders would be measured based on their ability to achieve the outcomes specified in the Plan and that their failure to, perform the tasks identified in the Plan would be evidence of noncompliance with those Orders.
Following the Plan's adoption, defendants have made significant progress in some areas, including the development of policies and procedures to guide the various components of their service delivery system. The problem is that defendants have been unable to effectively implement these policies and procedures in many important respects and have failed to achieve desired outcomes for many class members in the critical areas of health, safety, and welfare.
As a result of these failings, class members continue to be placed in inappropriate and overly restrictive residential and day programs, rather than in the least restrictive, most integrated settings. Provider and MRDDA staff, including case managers, are not adequately trained, and case managers do not visit class members with 325 the required frequency and do not adequately address deficiencies in class members' *325 care. In many

instances, class members do not receive the needed services and supports that have been identified in their ISPs. Protocols necessary to protect class members' health and safety, such as feeding, positioning, and behavioral plans, are routinely not followed. Health risks are not adequately assessed and monitored for many class members, and recommendations by health care providers are not implemented in a timely manner. While incidents of abuse and neglect of class members persist, defendants have failed to ensure that these and other serious incidents, including class member deaths, are investigated in a timely manner, that the results of such investigations are shared with providers, and that recommended corrective and preventive actions are implemented. Defendants have also compromised the monitoring process by altering death investigation reports.
Defendants' progress in achieving compliance with the Court's Orders has been impeded by a lack of consistent leadership within MRDDA, which is reported to have had ten different directors or acting directors in the past eight years. Progress has also been impeded by a lack of inter-agency coordination within the District's government. This is particularly true with respect to defendants' implementation of the Medicaid waiver, which is administered by the MAA. The Court Monitor has also noted MRDDA's lack of authority to enforce sanctions against providers with a record of poor performance. These types of bureaucratic difficulties led the Court to require Mayor Williams to assign a Deputy Mayor or other senior official to coordinate the efforts of all District agencies with responsibility for actions necessary to achieve compliance with the 2001 Plan. Despite these efforts, the underlying systemic problems remain unsolved.
Based on these findings of fact, the Court concludes that there has been systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance with many of the Court's Orders. Failures have occurred throughout defendants' service delivery system, from providers and case managers to the managerial level. Nor are these failures limited to a few isolated providers or case managers. For these reasons, the Court finds that defendants' noncompliance has been systemic. Defendants' noncompliance has also been continuous: defendants' service delivery system has been wholly inadequate, as documented by the Court Monitor and others, for many years. Finally, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor have presented compelling evidence that defendants' failures jeopardize class members' health, safety, and welfare, contributing to deaths and hospitalizations that defendants' own investigators have found were preventable. The Court therefore finds that defendants' noncompliance with the Court's Orders is serious.
The Court notes that the findings made herein are based on the record as of November 2006, before Mayor Fenty took office. As a result, they do not take into account more recent improvements that have been made by the Fenty administration and under the leadership of Kathy Sawyer, who has agreed to stay on as the Interim Director of the newly-created DDS until June 1, 2007. (Feb. 5, 2007 Declaration of Kathy E. Sawyer ["Sawyer Deer] ¶ 6.) These improvements, largely attributable to Ms. Sawyer's capable leadership, include the successful modification of seven Medicaid waiver rules to be more flexible in meeting consumers' needs, including coordination between the former MRDDA and MAA over a two-month period to finalize the modifications (id. ¶¶ 19-20); the development and execution of a long-contemplated interstate compact needed to facilitate 326 participation in the *326 waiver by providers and consumers residing in the State of Maryland (id. ¶ 21); and the revision of the scope of work in the District's contract with Georgetown to increase the physician and nursing hours devoted to the Health Partnership project. (Id. ¶ 12.) Moreover, to address concerns about the credibility of death investigations performed by the Incident Management and Enforcement Unit ("IMEU") (formerly the IMIU) following the expiration of the Columbus contract, the District has made a commitment to implement an independent death investigation process both to re-do certain death investigations previously completed by the IMEU and to conduct future death investigations. (Defs.' Notice of Filing at 2; Feb. 6, 2007 Hr'g Tr. at 18.) The District is also negotiating to have serious incident investigations completed under the auspices of the District's Office of the Inspector General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit ("MFCU"). (Defs.' Notice of Filing at 2-3.) These recent developments, which do not alter the Court's finding regarding defendants' noncompliance with Court Orders as of November 2006, are encouraging and will be highly relevant to the remedial phase of this action.
With respect to remedy, the plaintiffs contend that a receivership is the only appropriate remedy. The Court is not, at this time, prepared to endorse such an approach, for receivership is not strictly an issue of noncompliance with court orders. Rather, as a "remedy of last resort," receivership "should be undertaken only when absolutely necessary," District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206, 1213 (D.C.1999). The Court's determination whether

other remedies are inadequate and whether receivership remains the only viable option to effectuate compliance with court orders is to be guided by a number of factors, including
(1) `whether there were repeated failures to comply with the Court's orders'; (2) whether further efforts to secure compliance would only lead to `confrontation and delay'; (3) whether leadership is available which can `turn the tide within a reasonable time period'; (4) `whether there was bad faith'; (5) `whether resources are being wasted'; and, (6) `whether a receiver can provide a quick and efficient remedy.'
Id. (quoting Dixon v. Barry, 967 F.Supp. 535, 550 (D.D.C.1997)). Although it is clear based on the tortured history of this case that there have been repeated failures to comply with the Court's Orders, this determination is in no way determinative of the question whether plaintiffs are correct in their argument that a receivership should be imposed. As is clear from the case law, a host of other considerations bear on this issue, and only now, at the remedial stage, is it appropriate for the Court to turn to those considerations.
In order to assist the Court in its consideration of these factors, it will enlist the assistance of the Special Masters, who have ably served in this capacity for many years, to make findings and recommendations to the Court that address, inter alia, the current status of defendants' compliance, what are the available options for curing the identified deficiencies, and whether a receivership is the most effective and efficient remedy available to the Court. To the extent that the Court must revise the Order of Reference entered on October 11, 1995, the parties shall, in consultation with the Special Masters, submit by April 20, 2007, a new order that conforms to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and allows the Special Masters to perform the functions delineated herein. In addition, the parties, with the assistance of the Special Masters, must propose a plan for how they will proceed with 327 respect to *327 the remedy phase. In particular, the parties must consider whether they wish to engage in discovery and/or present evidence to the Special Masters in order to permit them to make findings and recommendations to the Court. The parties shall submit a joint plan for the remedial phase of this litigation that addresses a schedule for proposed discovery, the need for an evidentiary hearing before the Special Masters, and/or a briefing schedule. This plan shall also be filed by April 20, 2007.
In sum, while the Court has found that plaintiffs' motion should be granted to the extent that they have sustained their burden as to liability, the daunting task of finding ways to remedy the problems still remains. In this regard, the Court expects the parties to continue their prior efforts to resolve this matter so that the plight of the class members can be improved as expeditiously as possible, and they will not have to continue to await the outcome of this painfully lengthy and cumbersome litigation.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, plaintiffs' Motion to Find the Defendants in Noncompliance and to Appoint a Receiver [Dkt. # 809] is GRANTED IN PART on the issue of liability; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff-intervenor's Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt [Dkt. # 810] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Mayor Fenty took office in January 2007 and was thereafter substituted as a named defendant. Between 1976 and January 2007, a series of his predecessors in office were named. At the time the case was filed, other District of Columbia officials were also named as defendants; however, those defendants are no longer parties.
[2] Between July 1976 and January 1977, the United States participated in the case as an amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs.
[3] At the same time that plaintiffs filed their receivership motion, the United States moved for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held: in contempt. The Court granted the latter motion to the extent that

defendants were ordered to submit a response. However, as discussed below, the Court has concluded that contempt is not an appropriate mechanism to address defendants' deficient performance.
[4] The exhibits submitted by the parties in support of their proposed factual findings include excerpts from the transcripts of various Court hearings in this case and from various reports by the Court Monitor. For ease of reference, the Court has cited to the hearing transcripts and Court Monitor reports directly, rather than to the parties' exhibits. The Court also notes that certain exhibits submitted by plaintiff-intervenor have been filed under seal to prevent the disclosure of class members' names and other identifying information.
[5] The conditions challenged by plaintiffs included the lack of comprehensive habilitation programs to meet individual needs of residents; the unsafe, unsanitary, and unpleasant condition of the Forest Haven facilities; inadequate staffing, lack of training, and abuse of residents by staff; inadequate medical, dental, and mental health care and nutrition; inadequate recordkeeping; lack of after-care and rehabilitation programs and vocational training for former residents; and inadequate funding.
[6] The Court explained that habilitation "includes, but is not limited to, programs of formal, structured education and training" and that receiving habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty "means living as normally as possible and receiving appropriate individualized services in the community in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive settings." Id.
[7] The Court ordered defendants to provide class members with such community living arrangements, programs, and services "at the earliest possible opportunity" but also set targets for the number of residents to be deinstitutionalized in each of the next three Fiscal Years. Id. at 487-88.
[8] This unpublished Consent Order will hereafter be cited as "Evans, Consent Order at ___ (June 25, 1981)." Citations to other unpublished opinions and orders in this case will follow a similar format.
[9] The 1983 Order required defendants to maintain a case manager to class member ratio of one to sixty. Evans, Consent Order at 5 (Feb. 8, 1983). This ratio was later reduced to one to thirty. (See 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams at 37.)
[10] Also in July 1990, the plaintiffs petitioned the Court for immediate enforcement of the 1978 Consent Order to prevent defendants from placing certain class members in a nursing home rather than in smaller, communitybased placements. The Court denied the motion in November 1990, finding the nursing home placement to be appropriate for the class members in light of their medical needs. Evans v. Barry, 1990 WL 201488, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov.28, 1990).
[11] In November 1990, while the contempt motions were pending, the United States sought to compel the Court to act on the pending motions by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus in the D.C. Circuit. The Circuit Court denied the petition in 1991, finding that the two-month delay between the completion of briefing on the sanctions motion and the filing of the mandamus petition was "not sufficient to establish that [the United States] ha[d] a `clear and indisputable right' to issuance of the writ." In re United States, No. 90-5371, 1991 WL 17225, at *2 (D.C.Cir. Feb.11, 1991).
[12] In addition to seeking an order requiring defendants to remedy these problems and the appointment of a Special Master, the plaintiff parties also requested that the Court order defendants to prepare and file a Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services waiver request to enable the District to obtain financial support for services so that class members could live in less restrictive settings at substantial savings to the District.
[13] The Court also identified as additional areas of concern the provision of adequate medical, dental, and health services; the provision of adequate funding for the Court Monitor; and the safeguarding of class members' personal funds. (Id. at 6-7.)
[14] The Special Master also recommended that defendants be required to apply to the Health Care Financing. Administration for a Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services waiver as part of the remedial plan. Because defendants had submitted a waiver application by the time the Court adopted the 1996 Plan, however, the waiver was not included in that Court-ordered Plan. Id. at *3.

[15] Plaintiffs thereafter moved for sanctions under the 1996 Plan, and the Court ultimately granted the motion, ordering defendants to pay approximately $5 million in fines based on their failure to comply with the purgation conditions of the 1996 Plan and failure to purge the 1995 and 1996 findings of contempt. Evans, Judgment (Feb. 10, 1999), 35 F.Supp.2d 88. The imposition of contempt fines was later reversed by the D.C. Circuit on the ground that the fines amounted to a criminal sanction that could not be imposed without a criminal trial. Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292 (D.C.Cir.2000).
[16] Mr. Sundram was appointed as Co-Special Master in February 2001. Evans, Order (Feb. 20, 2001).
[17] In November 2000, shortly before these agreements were submitted for Court approval, the Court entered an Order granting the parties' joint motion for the appointment of an independent Court Monitor. Evans, Order Regarding the Appointment of an Independent Court Monitor (hereinafter "Appointment Order") (Nov. 21, 2000). The 1978 Consent Order had required defendants to retain a Court Monitor (then known as the Developmental Disabilities Professional) but provided that the Monitor would report to the Director of the District's Department of Human Resources. Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485. To comply with the Consent Order, defendants had hired a Court Monitor through a contract with a community provider, with the result that the person employed as the Court's Monitor was also employed as a contractor of the District. Evans, Appointment Order at 1 (Nov. 21, 2000). Finding this contractual arrangement to be inappropriate, the Court created an independent Court Monitor's office that was to be directly responsible to the Court. Id. at 2. The Order specified that the duties of the Court Monitor were to include observing, monitoring, reporting findings, and making recommendations to the parties, the Special Master, and the Court regarding implementation of the Court's Orders, and in order to perform these duties, the Monitor was granted broad access "to the persons, residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, documents, records, personnel and materials the Monitor deems necessary or appropriate in performing [her duties]." Id. at 4-5.
[18] The Plan set three threshold levels of compliance: "full" (95%) compliance, "high" (90%) compliance, and "significant" (80%) compliance, and indicated that the standard of compliance applicable to a particular set of Court Orders was dependent upon the nature of the interest at stake and the degree to which the defendants' noncompliance affected that interest. (2001 Plan at 7-8.)
[19] The Court specified that such efforts were to include the development of necessary memoranda of understanding among agencies; the development of appropriate policies and procedures; the publication of rules and regulations; the drafting and presentation of legislation to the City Council; monitoring provider agency compliance with performance expectations set forth in licensure, certification, or contractual agreements; and the development of effective procedures for the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations as needed to implement the District's obligations under the 2001 Plan. Id. at 2.
[20] The residential component of the ninety-day plan targeted nine residential sites with histories of poor performance or with residents capable of greater independence. (Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 5.) The parties agreed that all residents at these sites, including class members and non-class members, should be relocated to more appropriate settings. (Id. at 6.)
[21] Plaintiff-intervenor argued that a contempt finding would increase the remedial options available to the Court, noting that possible contempt sanctions included admonishment, ordering specific performance of existing Court Orders, issuing additional orders, appointing a monitor and/or a master, and imposing a scheme of fines, as well as appointing a receiver. (Pl. Intervenor's Resp. to the Ct.'s Order of June 29, 2006 at 3-4.) As plaintiff-intervenor acknowledged, however, the Court has already appointed a monitor and two masters in this case, and the Court's prior effort to impose a scheme of fines was struck down by the D.C. Circuit. See Evans, 206 F.3d at 1294-97. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the imposition of fines will ensure compliance with the myriad requirements of the 2001 Plan and existing Court Orders. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff-intervenor's motion.
[22] These dates were later extended at the parties' request:
[23] Judge Facciola noted that whether the exhibits in fact proved what plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor claimed they proved was a different question that went to weight, not admissibility. (Id.)

[24] The DDS was established by emergency legislation on December 20, 2006. Developmental Disabilities Services Management Reform Emergency Amendment Act of 2006, § 103. The DDS was created as a separate Cabinet-level agency to serve consumers formerly served by the MRDDA and the Rehabilitation Services Agency ("RSA"), another entity within the District's Department of Human Services. See id. §§ 105(1), (2). Responsibility for MRDDA consumers was transferred to DDS immediately upon its creation. The legislation contemplates that responsibility for RSA consumers will be transferred to DDS no later than June 30, 2007. See id.
[25] To the extent that defendants contend that they are no longer bound by certain provisions of the 1978 Consent Order contained in the section of that Order captioned "Interim Operation of Forest Haven" (see Defs.' Findings at 4 nn. 5 & 6, 11 n. 9, 16 n. 14), that argument is incorrect. Each of the provisions that defendants contend "no longer relate[s] to the current system of community care" (id. at 4 n. 5) was incorporated into the 2001 Plan as a "specific provision of [the] outstanding Court Orders that must be complied with." (2001 Plan at 6 (emphasis added).) Having reaffirmed their obligations under these Orders in 2001, nearly a decade after Forest Haven was closed, defendants cannot be heard to argue that the Orders apply only to the operation of that facility.
[26] The Court also notes that the distinction that defendants seek to draw between "tasks" and "outcome criteria" is illusory in many instances as the tasks and outcome criteria associated with a particular group of Court Orders often overlap. (Compare, e.g., 2001 Plan ¶ A.1.b.iv. (task requiring that a consumer's Individual Service Plan identify the services and supports needed by the consumer and that Plan be implemented promptly), with id. ¶ A.1.d.iii. (outcome criterion requiring that consumers receive the services and supports identified in their Individual Support Plans in a timely manner); 2001 Plan ¶ A.3.b.ii. (task requiring defendants to develop and implement an ongoing training program for staff working within defendants' service delivery system in order to develop the skills and competencies required to provide services meeting applicable standards), with id. ¶ A.3.d.ii. (outcome criterion requiring that staff employed by the District and provider agencies have attended required training programs and statisfactorily demonstrated competence in the skills required for the positions they hold).)
[27] Defendants made certain evidentiary objections to the Court Monitor's reports relied on by plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor in support of their proposed findings. (See generally Defs.' Objections (Court Monitor reports proffered by plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor as exhibits included in chart of exhibits to which defendants objected).) As noted above, however, those objections were overruled by Judge Facciola, Evans, Mem. Order at 2-3 (Aug. 30, 2006), whose rulings defendants agreed would be final. (See July 20, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 29.)
[28] It is worth noting that the method of assessing compliance with the outcome criteria set forth in the 2001 Plan is, in many instances, a review of a random sample of a specified percentage of class members. (See, e.g., 2001 Plan at 20 (method of compliance includes review of "a 10 percent random sample of consumers in large congregate day programs and in residential programs to determine whether the placements comply with the criteria and procedures adopted in compliance with the Plan").)
[29] The ISP "serves as the single document that integrates all supports a person may receive irrespective of where the person resides." (Defs.' Ex. 71 at 3; see also Defs.' Ex. 12 at 24 (ISPs "describe[] the services and support MRDDA provides to consumers").) The ISP "presents the measurable goals and objectives identified as required for meeting the person's preferences, choices, and desired outcomes" and "addresses the provision of safe, secure, and dependable supports that are necessary for the person's [well-being], independence, and social inclusion." (Defs.' Ex. 71 at 3.)
[30] Each quarter since at least November 2004, the Court Monitor's office has reviewed the health care provided to a subset of class members identified as having high health risks.
[31] Similar deficiencies have been documented by defendants and their consultants in reports of mortality investigations and investigations of serious incidents involving class members. (See, e.g., U.S. Ex. 1 la at 12 (ISP did not list many of class member's serious medical concerns, including his weight loss and anemia); U.S. Ex. 21q (class member's cardiac condition was not adequately addressed in his Health Plan).)

[32] The Plan does not incorporate the Court's Order regarding the appointment of an independent Court Monitor, which was entered just before the Plan was submitted for court approval.
[33] Under MRDDA's policy an incident is "[a]n event that results in harm or risk of harm to an. MRDDA consumer." (Defs. Ex. 53 at 2.) A "reportable incident" is a significant event or situation involving a consumer that must be reported to designated authorities within a provider agency for review and internal investigation. (Id.) A "serious reportable incident" is an incident that, due to its significance or severity, requires "immediate notification to, and possible investigation by, external authorities, in addition to internal review and investigation by the provider agency." (Id.)
[34] MRDDA policy defines neglect as "[t]he failure to provide sufficient, consistent, or appropriate services, treatment, or care that harms or jeopardizes the customer's health, safety, or welfare, such as: (1) [t]he failure to report or act on health problems of the customer or changes in his or her health condition; (2) [l]ack of attention to the physical needs of a customer, including personal care, hygiene, meals or appropriate nutrition, shelter, and safety; (3) [f]ailure to carry out a plan of treatment or care prescribed by a physician or health care professional; (4) [f]ailure to provide services or supports as indicated by the individual's plan of care; or (5) [f]ailure to provide proper supervision to the consumer as required within a plan or by a court." (Defs.' Ex. 53 at 6.)
[35] Forty-three of the remaining substantiated serious incidents included in the Court Monitor's data involved serious physical injuries, and four involved serious medication errors. (Id. at 7.) It is possible that some of these incidents also involved instances of provider neglect. In a number of the IMIU reports that the parties have provided to the Court, for example, investigations regarding class members' serious physical injuries have found evidence of negligence on the part of providers and provider staff in connection with those injuries. (See, e.g., U.S. Ex. 21b (finding day program provider to have been negligent in ensuring that class member was kept safe from harm based on failure to provide class member with proper assistance in using the bathroom); U.S. Ex. 21c (finding provider and provider staff to have been negligent in connection with serious physical injury suffered by class member who fell in the shower where staff failed to use a bath chair that had been purchased to prevent injuries).)
[36] The backlog of investigations of serious incidents is far more substantial for non-class members. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 18 (reporting a backlog of 211 overdue incident reports, including six overdue death reports, for non-class members)); Pls.' Ex. 132 (backlog of 196 overdue investigations for non-class members as of May 2006); Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13 (backlog of 298 overdue investigations, including 14 overdue death investigations, for non-class members); Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 15 (backlog of 228 overdue investigation reports for non-class members). As the Court Monitor has recognized, "[t]he lack of timely investigation into the serious reportable incidents filed regarding non-class members erodes the protection from harm for class members," who share the same residences and have the same staff as non-class members, as "the failure to rectify the problem affecting one person in a residence exposes other people in the house to the same risk." (Id. at 15-16.)
[37] The Court Monitor has also commented on the lack of death and serious incident investigation reports received by her office on a number of occasions. (March 31, 2005 Monitor's Report at 15 (no Columbus investigations received by Court Monitor's office between September 2004 and March 2005); June 22, 2006 Court Monitor's Report at 8 (no IMIU investigation reports received by Court Monitor's office or Quality Trust between April 5, 2006 and June 1, 2006).)
[38] The Court Monitor had filed an alert in May 2004, eight months before this class member's death, informing MRDDA that the class member's eating protocol and nutritionist-prescribed diet were not being followed. (Nov. 3, 2005 Monitor's Report at 9.) Although MRDDA reported that the alert was resolved in May 2004, that was not the case, as the subsequent death investigation revealed.
[39] Of the fifty-eight providers whose staff had not been fully trained, forty-seven had completed training for less than half of all direct support staff, and eleven had completed training for half or more of all such staff. (U.S. Ex. 19 at 6-9.)

[40] Although the Court Monitor regarded the termination of this provider agreement as appropriate, she raised concerns about the manner in which the termination was carried out, which resulted in the, five residents being moved without transition planning or preparation, including two class members who went to day programs not knowing that they would not be returning to the same residence. (Id. at 27-28.)
[41] Additional placements of individuals targeted to move under the ninety-day plan had been made by October 2006; however, the number of class members and other MRDDA consumers who were moved is disputed. ( Compare Oct. 5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 29 (Court Monitor indicated that only three additional placements (for a total of six) had been made), with id. at 59 (Interim MRDDA Administrator indicated that a total of fifteen individuals, including thirteen class members, had been moved).) Even if the correct number is fifteen, it is clear that the District has still fallen far short in moving even the forty-six most needy MRDDA consumers who were identified in the ninety-day plan for immediate placement.
[42] D.C. Code § 7-1301.03(16) defines the term "[l]east restrictive alternative" as "that living and/or habilitation arrangement which least inhibits an individual's independence and right to liberty," including arrangements that move an individual from "[m]ore to less structured living," "[l]arger to smaller facilities," "[l]arger to smaller living units," "[g]roup to individual residences," "[s]egregated from the community to integrated with community living and programming," and "[d]ependent to independent living." According to defendants, approximately 80% of class members are committed. (Defs.' Findings at 21.) Under D.C. law, persons committed to a facility are required to be reviewed in a court hearing annually to determine whether commitment should be continued, D.C.Code § 7-1304.11(a), including that commitment to the facility "would be the least restrictive means of providing habilitation." D.C.Code § 7-1303.04(b)(4). It is unclear, however, whether in making this determination the Court considers all possible alternatives to individual's current living situation or only those alternatives that are presently available.
[43] Plaintiffs contend that defendants' failure to place class members in the least restrictive setting is also evidenced by the fact that more than half of class members live in Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded ("ICF/MRs"), facilities that house and provide institutional care and services for up to eight individuals. ( See Oct. 5, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 4-5 (366 out of 659 class members (55%) were living in ICF/MRs as of October 2006); Defs.' Ex. 74 at 2 (defining ICF/MR).) Plaintiffs contend that, by definition, ICF/MRs are not the least restrictive setting because the vast majority of class members are capable of receiving more individualized services in a smaller, noninstitutional setting. (See Oct. 4, 2006 Hr'g Tr. at 22.) National trends with respect to the number of persons living in ICF/MRs versus the number of persons receiving noninstitutional services under the Medicaid Health and Community-Based Services waiver program provide some support for plaintiffs' position. See Residential Services for Persons with Developmental Disabilities: Status and Trends Through 2005 at 4, 59 (July 2006), available at http://rtc.umn.edu/ risp05 (noting that the number of people receiving noninstitutional, community-based services under the waiver nationwide was more than four times the number of people living in ICF/MRs as of June 30, 2005).
[44] The waiver and its potential to assist defendants in meeting their court-ordered obligations have been recognized by the parties since at least the mid-1990s, when the Special Master recommended that defendants be required to submit a waiver application as part of the proposed 1996 Remedial Plan. Defendants submitted a waiver application before the 1996 Plan was adopted by the Court; hence, this requirement ultimately was not included in that Plan. Evans, 1996 WL 451054, at *3.
[45] Poor living conditions documented by the Court Monitor and MRDDA's own Office of Quality Assurance include, for example, one class member's "rodent, cockroach and fly infested apartment with serious structural damage" (Feb. 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13) and another residence found to be dirty with rusty cooking appliances, broken and outdated furniture, loose and protruding bathroom tile, mildew, and a basement in "deplorable condition" with an inoperable furnace. (Pls.' Ex. 7.)
[46] ISPs are to be developed by a planning team consisting, at a minimum, of the class member, his or her parent or guardian, if any, and the MRDDA case worker. (Id. at 4; see also Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 485.) The ISP planning team may also include nutritionists, occupational therapists, physical therapists, psychologists, social

workers, or other clinicians; family members; direct care staff from the person's day, work, and residential programs; and the person's attorney. (Defs.' Ex. 71 at 4-5.)
[47] In addition, community placements must be regularly monitored by MRDDA and by the Developmental Disabilities Professional (now known as the Court Monitor) "to ensure that the residential arrangements and programming provided are appropriate to the individual's needs," and the results of such monitoring must be documented. Evans, Consent Order at 8 (June 25, 1981).
[48] Case managers are required to complete a monitoring tool for each client visit to document the visit. (Defs.' Findings at 14; Pls.' Ex. 97 at 3.) According to the Court Monitor, these monitoring tools are the only documents that can be reviewed to determine compliance with case management requirements. (June 22, 2006 Monitor's Report at 13; see also Pls.' Ex. 97 at 3 (supervisors obtain signature pages of case managers' completed monitoring tools to determine frequency of visits).) Thus, it cannot be conclusively determined from the data whether a case manager is failing to visit the client the required number of times per year or is not completing the appropriate documentation. In either case, it cannot be concluded that defendants are fulfilling the requirements of the 2001 Plan with respect to client visits.
[49] In response to the Court Monitor's draft June 2006 report, the District maintained that monitoring tools had in fact been completed for seven additional class members but were not reflected in the data the Court Monitor relied upon because the tools had not yet been entered into MRDDA's computer system. (Id. at 13.) However, the Court Monitor concluded, based on the information provided by the District, that eight monitoring tools had been completed for only one of the seven additional class members. (Id.)
[50] Defendants assert that, effective January 1, 2006, MRDDA changed its case management policy to require case managers to visit clients at least monthly for a total of twelve visits per year. (Defs.' Findings at 16; Defs.' Ex. 52.) Defendants do not suggest that case managers are in compliance with this policy. Nor could they. The Court Monitor's September 2006 report reflects that twelve case manager visits per year were documented for only 50% of 100 randomly selected class members. (Sept. 24, 2006 Monitor's Report at 22.) As noted, one-third of the 222 class members reviewed by the Court Monitor's office and the Quality Trust did not even receive eight visits. (Id.)
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 701 F.Supp.2d 126 (2010)
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v. Adrian FENTY, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 76-0293 (ESH).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
April 7, 2010.
128 *128 Cathy E. Costanzo, Northampton, MA, Stephen Forney Hanlon, Paul J. Kiernan, Holland & Knight, LLP, Laura A. Fernandez, Sanford Wittels & Heisler, LLP, Sandra J. Bernstein, University Legal Services, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
John A. Henderson, William G. Maddox, Cathleen Siobhan Trainor, U.S. Department of Justice, Samuel Robert Bagenstos, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Washington, DC, for PlaintiffIntervenor.
Ellen A. Efros, Office of the Attorney General, Maria-Claudia T. Amato, Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, Martha J. Mullen, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Robert C. Utiger, DC Attorney General, Sarah Ann Sulkowski, Office of the Attorney General, DC, Grace Graham, Office of the Attorney General, John D. Dodge, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Peter J. Nickles, DC Government, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, District Judge.
In 1976, residents of Forest Haven, then the District of Columbia's institution for persons with developmental disabilities, filed this class action alleging that they were receiving constitutionally-deficient care, treatment, education, and training. In 1978, the Court entered a consent decree pursuant to which defendants agreed that plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated and that they would take certain actions to remedy those violations.[1] A series of consent orders and remedial plans followed in which defendants admitted that they were 129 still violating class *129 members' constitutional rights and agreed to take additional actions to remedy those constitutional violations. The last such consent order and remedial plan was entered into in 2001, when the parties jointly agreed to a Plan for Compliance, pursuant to which defendants could demonstrate compliance with the Court's orders and terminate the litigation.
In 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion to find defendants in noncompliance and to appoint a receiver. On March 30, 2007, the Court granted that motion in part, concluding, based on extensive factual findings, that there had been "systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance with many of the Court's Orders." Evans v. Fenty, 480 F.Supp.2d 280, 325 (D.D.C. 2007) ("March 2007 Liability Opinion"). With respect to remedy, the Court asked the Special Masters to assist by making findings and recommendations to the Court that address, inter alia, "the current status of defendants' compliance, what are the available options for curing the identified deficiencies, and whether a receivership is the most effective and efficient remedy available to the Court." Id. at 326.
Now before the Court is the Special Masters' Report and Recommendation, which concludes that, as of December 2008, defendants were still in noncompliance with the Court's orders and recommends the appointment of an "Independent Compliance Administrator" to bring defendants into compliance and to end to this litigation. (Special Masters' Report and Recommendation Regarding A Remedy For Defendants' Noncompliance With Court Orders at 128, Aug. 14, 2009 ["2009 Special Masters' Report"].) Defendants have

filed limited objections to the report and oppose the imposition of the proposed remedy;[2] plaintiffs have no objections to the report and ask that the Court adopt the findings of the Special Masters and their recommended remedy. Also before the Court is a motion the District filed, after the Special Masters concluded their proceedings in January 2009, to vacate all consent orders and to dismiss the entire case. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motion to vacate and dismiss will be denied. The Court will address, in a future memorandum opinion and order, defendants' objections to the Special Masters' Report and Recommendations.
BACKGROUND
130 The lengthy procedural history of this litigation prior to March 30, 2007, will not *130 be repeated here, as it was fully summarized in the Memorandum Opinion filed on that date. See Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 281. Certain events, however, are relevant to defendants' pending motions and will be briefly noted below, followed by a more detailed summary of the facts and procedural history that post-date that decision.[3]
I. KEY EVENTS PRIOR TO THE MARCH 30, 2007 LIABILITY OPINION
A. 1978 Final Judgment and Order
On June 14, 1978, the Court[4] entered a "Final Judgment and Order" providing for permanent injunctive relief. Evans v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 483 (D.D.C.1978) ("1978 Consent Order"). The 1978 Consent Order was premised on the recognition, which was consented to by the parties, that plaintiffs had federal constitutional rights under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment "to be kept free from harm" and "to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty" and that "violations of [those] federal constitutional rights... have occurred." Id. at 484. To remedy those violations, the 1978 Consent Order required defendants and their successors to take a number of specific actions, see id. at 484-90, that, loosely classified, fell into three categories: health care, safety, and welfare/habilitation. Defendants "consented to the entry of [the 1978 Consent Order] so as to assure protection of the rights of plaintiffs." Id. at 484.
B. 1981 Consent Order
In 1981, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor filed motions for contempt, based on defendants' noncompliance with the 1978 Consent Order. Those motions led to the entry of a second Consent Order, which supplemented defendants' obligations under the 1978 Consent Order with a list of agreed-upon "measures necessary to the implementation of this Court's Order of June 14, 1978." (Consent Order at 1, June 25, 1981 ["1981 Consent Order"].) The 1981 Consent Order did not revisit the legal conclusions of the 1978 Consent Order nor did it "release defendants from their obligations" thereunder. (Id. at 10.) Rather, the parties came to an agreement that defendants needed to take additional measures to assure protection of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The agreed-upon measures supplemented defendants' obligations in each area addressed by the 1978 Consent Order0907health, safety and welfare/habilitation. (Id. at 1-10.)
C. 1982 Supreme Court Decision (Youngberg v. Romeo)
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), addressing for the first time the constitutional rights of an individual who had been involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded. As discussed infra, defendants' motion to vacate is based in part on the Youngberg decision and defendants' contention, made for the first time in the 28 years since Youngberg was 131 decided, that Youngberg changed the law and established that the 1978 Consent *131 Order rested on "extraconstitutional" rights.

D. 1983 Consent Order
In 1982, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor again filed motions for contempt, which led to the entry of a third Consent Order. (Consent Order, Feb. 8, 1983 ["1983 Consent Order"]). The 1983 Consent Order similarly did not revisit the legal conclusions of the 1978 Consent Order nor did it release defendants from their obligations under prior orders; it merely added to those obligations "to assist in the implementation of those orders." (Id. at 14-15.) Again, the agreed-upon measures supplemented defendants' obligations in each area addressed by the 1978 Consent Order0907health, safety and welfare/habilitation. (Id. at 2-14.)
E. 1990 Contempt Order
In 1989, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor again filed motions for contempt. In 1990, the Court issued an Order holding the District in civil contempt based on its "consistent and continuing violation of the three Consent Orders [of 1978, 1981 and 1983]." Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 284 (quoting Order, Jan. 30, 1990 ["Jan.1990 Contempt Order"].) After a sanctions hearing, the Court issued an Order that, inter alia, required defendants to complete the outplacement of the 233 plaintiffs remaining at Forest Haven by September 30, 1991. Id. (citing Order, Apr. 9, 1990 ["Apr.1990 Contempt Order"]). By October 1991, all plaintiffs had been moved from Forest Haven and the institution was closed.
F. 1995 Contempt Order, Appointment of Special Master, 1996 Remedial Plan
In 1995, four years after the closure of Forest Haven, plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor filed motions for contempt, for remedial sanctions and for appointment of a Special Master. After two hearings, the Court again found the District to be in contempt based on "clear and convincing evidence, including defendants' conceded violations, that the District is not in compliance with the consent orders in this case...." (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 7, Oct. 11, 1995 ["1995 Contempt Order"].) In its decision, the Court[5] observed that as of 1995, it had "entered numerous orders, including consent orders between the parties, to safeguard the rights of class members and ensure their adequate and appropriate habilitation." (Id. at 1.) The Court further noted that "[d]efendants admit that the District has a continuing responsibility to provide the class members with habilitation in accordance with their needs" and "admit that they also are required to provide adequate medical care, psychological care, day programming, community residential placements and other support systems as set forth in the class members' [individual habilitation plans]." (Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).) The Court proceeded to find the District in contempt because it (1) was delinquent in ensuring timely payment of providers, in violation of the 1983 Consent Order; (2) permitted inadequate case manager ratios, in violation of the 1983 Consent Order; and (3) offered inadequate "community living arrangements" and "community-based day programs and services as 132 are necessary to provide them with minimally adequate habilitation," in *132 violation of the 1978 Consent Order. (Id. at 7-8.)
The Court further found that defendants' "history of noncompliance, compounded by the complicated and factually elusive nature of the matters under consideration," required the appointment of a "Special Master" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to "evaluate and ensure defendants' compliance with the Court's Orders and Consent Decrees ... and to recommend remedies for any deficiencies in defendants' compliance with the Orders." (Order of Reference at 2, Oct. 11, 1995 ["1995 Reference Order"].)[6]
In August 1996, the Court, based on a Report and Recommendation from the Special Master, adopted a "Remedial Plan," designed "to enable defendants to come into compliance with the terms of this Court's multiple Consent Orders" and to establish the conditions by which defendants could purge their civil contempt. Evans v. Barry, No. 76-CV-293, 1996 WL 451054, at *1-*2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1996) ("1996 Order & Remedial Plan"). In adopting the Remedial Plan, the Court observed that

[d]efendants have, for over two years, chronically and unapologetically violated the terms of nearly every aspect of this Court's multiple Consent Orders. Defendants' unrelenting contempt of this Court's orders, and their seeming inability to bring themselves in compliance therewith, have created chaos for the care providers vested with day-to-day responsibility for the members of this plaintiff class. The plaintiffs comprising this class, as defendants well know, are ill-equipped to adjust to or defend against the city's failure to assist their care providers in giving them the care and treatment they desperately need.
Id. at *2. The Court also warned defendants that:
the point has been reached beyond which this Court will not tolerate further and continuing incidences of contempt by defendants. Any further noncompliance with this Court's longstanding Consent Orders, and noncompliance with the Remedial Plan issued this date, must be expected by defendants to result in serious consequences.
Id. The remedial plan concerned defendants' obligations in each area addressed by the 1978 Consent Order0907health, safety and welfare/habilitation. Id. at *3-*8
G. 1999 Sanctions Order

In April 1997, less than a year after the Court adopted the 1996 Remedial Plan, plaintiffs moved for sanctions based on the District's admitted failure to pay providers within 30 days, as required under that Plan. In February 1999, the Court granted the motion and imposed a $5 million fine on defendants.[7]Evans v. Williams, 35 F.Supp.2d 88 (D.D.C.1999). As part of that decision, the Court modified the 1996 Remedial Plan to order the Special Master to work with the parties to "develop and recommend to the Court a plan for the conclusion of the [litigation]" and the termination of the Court's jurisdiction in a manner that would ensure that plaintiffs' interests would continue to be protected. Id. at 97. As envisioned by the Court, the plan would include "recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the following topics":

133

*133 a. Goals. A summary and articulation of the goals of this lawsuit as reflected in the 1978 and

1983 Consent Orders, the 1996 Remedial Plan, and all other Court-ordered obligations (hereafter

collectively "Court-ordered requirements").

b. Current compliance. An evaluation of existing programs to determine the extent of defendants' compliance with requirements for the protection of the health and safety of the plaintiff class and their effectiveness in meeting the goals described in subparagraph a, including but not limited to the provision of necessary medical and other health services and the compliance of private vendors with District of Columbia licensing and payment requirements governing community residence facilities, intermediate care facilities, foster care, day treatment programs, day programs, employment programs, representative payment and guardianship.

c. Adequate habilitation. The extent of defendants' compliance with Court-ordered requirements for the provision of adequate habilitation in the least restrictive setting and their effectiveness (strengths and weaknesses) in meeting the goals described in subparagraph a, including individual habilitation planning, individual financial planning, case management, appropriate residential services, adequate habilitation services, and the safeguarding of client funds.

d. Payment of providers. The extent of defendants' compliance with Court-ordered requirements for the timely payment of private providers who provide the plaintiff class with appropriate residential services, day treatment programs, vocational and supported employment services, day programs, medical, mental health, dental, and other services required by the Court.

e. Quality assurance. The quality assurance methods to be developed and implemented by defendants to monitor continually the performance of public and private providers of service in meeting the goals of the suit.

f. Standards and compliance measurement. The standards, including outcome standards to be developed and implemented by defendants, that should be used to determine defendants' continued compliance with Court-ordered requirements, and the way in which compliance with such standards should be measured.
g. Substantial compliance standards. The degree of compliance that should be required with each of the standards recommended.
h. Permanent monitoring. The steps necessary to establish permanent, objective, efficient, and effective post-termination monitoring of the programs serving class members by independent entities (for example, private accreditation services and independent monitoring bodies).
I. Individual and community advocacy. The steps necessary to coordinate existing mechanisms and to develop needed mechanisms for the advocacy of the interests of class members, on a[n] individual and community-wide basis, in compliance with Court-ordered requirements, including but not limited to the use of court-appointed attorneys, guardianships, and medical decisionmaking procedures for class members.
Id. at 97-98.
H. Appointment of Independent Court Monitor
In November 2000, the Court entered an Order granting the parties' joint motion for the appointment of an independent Court Monitor. (Order Regarding the Appointment of an Independent Court Monitor, Nov. 21, 2000.) 134 The Order specified that the duties of the Court Monitor were *134 to include observing, monitoring, reporting findings, and making recommendations to the parties, the Special Master, and the Court regarding implementation of the Court's Orders, and to submit quarterly reports on defendants'"compliance" with the Court's Orders. (Id. at 2-5.) The Order also provided that the "findings, recommendations and reports of the Court Monitor ... may be introduced as evidence when relevant and admissible in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence." (Id. at 5.) In order to perform these duties, the Monitor was granted broad access "to the persons, residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, documents, records, personnel and materials the Monitor deems necessary or appropriate in performing [her duties]." (Id. at 4.)[8]
I. 2001 Opinion and Order: Joint Stipulated Findings of Fact; Plan for Compliance; Consent Order and Settlement Agreement
In 2001, after "lengthy negotiations"0907 almost two years of work by the Special Master, the parties, and an expert to the Special Master0907the parties came to a series of agreements that "set forth a careful and detailed blueprint for achieving compliance with the Court's Orders, for the development of permanent and independent mechanisms to safeguard the rights of class members, and for the phased withdrawal of judicial oversight of the District of Columbia's mental retardation system as compliance with the Court Orders [wa]s achieved." Evans v. Williams, 139 F.Supp.2d 79, 81 (D.D.C.2001) ("2001 Consent Order"). Upon consideration of these agreements, the Court, on March 30, 2001, (1) adopted the Parties' Joint Stipulated Findings of Fact, id. at 96-107;[9] (2) approved the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams, id. at 85 ("2001 Plan");[10] and (3) entered a Consent Order, with a Settlement Agreement attached thereto. Id. at 85-96. Two aspects of these agreements remain critically important today: the 2001 Plan to achieve compliance and the creation of the Quality Trust in exchange for plaintiffs' waiver of claims on noncompliance.
135 *135 1. 2001 Compliance Plan
The 2001 Plan started from the premise "that there is already in place a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction recognizing a federal constitutional right to receive individualized habilitative care and treatment in the

least separate, most integrated, and least restrictive settings, and to be kept free from harm." (2001 Plan at 6.) The Plan then identified (as the Court's 1999 Order had requested) the agreed-upon "goals" of the existing Court orders. According to the Plan, the parties agreed that existing Court Orders embodied eight goals:
(1) Appropriate individual habilitation in the community in the least separate, most integrated, and least restrictive environment;
(2) Protection from harm;
(3) Safeguarding consumers' personal possessions;
(4) Monitoring the service system;
(5) Advocacy for consumers;
(6) Adequate budget;
(7) Timely payment of vendors; and
(8) Essential systemic conditions.
Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 81.[11] For each goal (or subgoal), the Plan identified the "relevant Court Orders," the "specific tasks that must be performed to implement those Orders," the "time frames within which the tasks must be performed," the "specific outcome criteria for measuring compliance," the "standard of compliance," and the "methods by which evidence will be collected and evaluated to assess compliance." Id. at 81-82.
The Court approved the 2001 Plan "as, in effect, a statement of the conditions for the expected vacating of the Court's relevant prior Orders." Id. at 85. It was anticipated that
[w]hile the Plan is not intended to be an independently enforceable document, the parties do intend that there will be accountability for its implementation. The Plan requires periodic progress reports to the Special Master on its implementation and calls for status conferences with the Court to be scheduled at least bimonthly. The parties agree that if the Court finds that defendants have satisfied the outcome criteria set forth in the Plan, they also will be in compliance with the related Court Orders. Any failure of defendants to implement the tasks identified in the Plan so as to meet the requirements of the related Court Orders would be evidence of noncompliance with those Orders. The Plan provides that until the existing Court Orders are vacated, plaintiffs may seek appropriate judicial relief, including requesting orders requiring compliance with the Order(s) underlying the objectives of the Plan.
Id. at 83.
2. Creation of the Quality Trust
The Consent Order and attached Settlement Agreement provided that, in exchange for the plaintiffs waiving "any and all claims for past violations of the Court's Orders," the District would "endow and annually fund ... a durable, independent, nonprofit organization that will monitor and advance the individual and collective interests of people with developmental disabilities in the District of Columbia's service delivery system." Id. at 86. Defendants agreed 136 to fund the organization, denominated the Quality Trust, with a total of $31.5 million over eleven years.[12]*136 Ultimately, the goal was for the Quality Trust to be "an external monitoring body to permanently protect the interests of the class members once this case ends." Id. at 83.

* * *
The 2001 agreements, which the Court accepted and adopted, contemplated that as defendants satisfied the outcome criteria in the 2001 Plan for particular groups of Court Orders, they would move the Court to have those Orders vacated and dismissed with the ultimate goal that, over time, defendants would
implement all of the required actions and meet the specified outcome criteria in order to successfully move the Court to vacate and dismiss the related Court Orders, except the declaratory judgment on the constitutional rights of the consumers to receive individualized habilitation in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive environment and to be protected from harm.
(2001 Plan at 9-10 (emphasis added).) Once the Court orders were vacated and dismissed, the plaintiffs agreed that they would not "seek recourse to the federal court to litigate individual violations of rights in this case pursuant to the declaratory judgment which will remain unless: (1) there are systemic violations of the declaratory judgment; or (2) legal remedies are unavailable in Superior Court (e.g., due to repeal of the statutes); or (3) there is a failure to adequately fund the Quality Trust pursuant to the Consent Order dated January 19, 2001." (Id.)
Since 2001, however, defendants have not invoked the procedures set forth in the 2001 Plan, to which they agreed, to vacate any Court Orders based on their implementation of the necessary tasks and satisfaction of the specified outcome criteria.[13] Accordingly, the Court Orders "continue to remain enforceable in federal court." ( Id.) Moreover, even though the 2001 Plan itself was "not intended to be an enforceable document," the parties agreed that plaintiffs "have a great interest in ensuring that the agreed upon actions identified in this Plan are in fact implemented effectively and in a timely manner by defendants to secure the benefits and protections provided for by the Court Orders," and provided, therefore, that "in the event that defendants do not implement the provisions of this Plan effectively and on a timely basis, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor retain the right to seek appropriate judicial relief, based on this evidence of noncompliance with the Court Orders, including Orders requiring specific performance of the Plan." (Id.)
J. 2004 Order
In 2004, after several years of receiving discouraging monitor reports on the implementation of the 2001 Plan, this Court[14] issued an order to address the "need for greater coordination among District of Columbia agencies which have responsibilities for actions that are necessary to achieve compliance with the 2001 Plan." (Order at 1, 137 Jan. 21, 2004 ["2004 Coordination Order"].) *137 As described therein, the parties had met with the Court on December 12, 2003, and agreed that "the current lack of such coordination has impeded the timely completion of necessary tasks identified in the 2001 Plan." (Id. at 1-2.) The 2004 Order reiterated that the District remained subject to the Court's previous orders, which were issued "to effectuate the rights of class members to adequate habilitation in a manner least restrictive of their liberty" and that the purpose of the 2001 Plan was to require defendants to take certain actions to achieve compliance with those orders. (Id. at 1.) The Order required, inter alia, that the Mayor appoint a Deputy Mayor or other senior official "to be responsible for the day-to-day efforts of District of Columbia agencies to achieve compliance with this Court's orders and the 2001 Plan." (Id. at 2.) That individual was to "have the necessary authority to supervise and direct the activities of" and "coordinate the efforts of all District of Columbia agencies" as necessary to "carry out their obligations under the 2001 Plan and previous orders of this Court," and was to "cooperate with and report periodically to the Special Masters and Court Monitor on defendants' progress," and "appear before this Court at each status conference and report to the Court on behalf of defendants regarding the status of defendants' compliance with the 2001 Plan and orders of this Court." (Id. at 3.)[15]

II. MOTION FOR RECEIVERSHIP: LIABILITY PHASE
In May 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Court to find defendants in noncompliance with the outstanding Court Orders and to place the District's Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA") into receivership.[16] The Court bifurcated proceedings into a "liability" and a "remedy" phase. Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 291 ("March 2007 Liability Opinion").
While the liability phase was ongoing, several notable events occurred. On December 20, 2006, the "Developmental Disabilities Services Agency," later renamed the "Department on Disability Services," was established by emergency legislation as a separate Cabinet-level agency to serve consumers formerly served by the MRDDA, including the Evans class members. Developmental Disabilities Services Management Reform Emergency Amendment Act of 2006, §§ 103, 105(1), (2). In January 2007, Adrian Fenty took office as Mayor for the District of Columbia. On February 5, 2007, defendants asked the Court to delay its liability ruling in light of the new administration's "commitment to DDS and its consumers" and its newly adopted "Systems Improvement Plan" in order "to allow sufficient time for the DDS to appropriately address the continuing concerns of the Court, the Monitor, the Department of Justice, and plaintiffs." (Defs.' Notice of Filing of Supplemental Information in Resp. to the Ct. Monitor's Quarterly Report at 10, Feb. 5, 2007.) In making its request, the District indicated that it was "cognizant that much remains to be done to bring DDS into compliance with outstanding court orders and 138 the 2001 Plan," but promised the Court that the "Fenty Administration is fully committed *138 to the success of the new agency, the delivery of improved services and care to the consumers served by the agency, and compliance with the 2001 Plan." (Id. at 8.) At a status hearing the next day, the Court rejected this request and indicated that it intended to issue its liability ruling based on the record as of November 29, 2006, when the Court Monitor had filed her supplemental report as requested by the Court, but that information about improvements and accomplishments after that date would be considered in any remedy phase. (Hr'g Tr. at 23-24, Feb. 6, 2007.)
On March 30, 2007, the Court issued its liability ruling, concluding that plaintiffs had met their burden to show that there had been "systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance" with the Court's prior Orders. Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 325.
A. Findings: Health, Safety and Welfare
The Court organized its findings in terms of these three broad subject areas: health, safety and welfare. Based on a record that closed in November 2006, the Court found that
plaintiffs have demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendants have failed to comply with existing Court Orders in the core areas of health, safety, and welfare. These failures are systemic in that they affect many class members served by a cross-section of providers and occur throughout defendants' service delivery system. They are serious in that they concern matters that are integral to class members' health, safety, and well-being. And, they are continuous in that the same issues of noncompliance have persisted year after year.
Id. at 298. A brief summary of the Court's findings follows.
In the category of "health," the Court found that:
defendants have failed in many significant respects to accomplish the tasks and to achieve the outcome criteria in the 2001 Plan that relate to the Court's Orders regarding the provision of health care and to comply with the terms of the Orders themselves. Defendants' deficient performance with respect to these measures provides ample evidence that defendants have failed to comply with the Court's Order that "[a] program of medical, dental and health related services which provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care is required," as well as with Court Orders requiring development of habilitation plans and programs that incorporate all services needed by class members and implementation of appropriate training programs for all staff.

Id. at 305 (citations omitted).

In the category of "safety," the Court found that:

defendants have failed in many significant respects to accomplish the tasks and outcome criteria

associated with the Court's Orders relating to class member safety and to comply with the terms

of the Orders themselves. Defendants' performance in the areas discussed above provides ample

evidence that defendants have failed to comply with the Court's Orders prohibiting all acts of

"physical or psychological abuse, neglect or mistreatment" of class members, requiring the prompt

reporting and investigation of all such incidents and the prompt dissemination of the reports of

such investigations to the Court Monitor and other interested parties, requiring the development

and implementation of appropriate training programs for all staff, including staff assigned to

139

residential settings, and requiring defendants to *139 provide necessary monitoring mechanisms.

Id. at 313-314 (citations omitted).

Finally, in the category of "welfare," the Court found that defendants were not in compliance in several respects. First, in terms of the "least restrictive, most integrated setting requirement," the Court found that:

defendants have not complied with the Court's 1978 Order that all class members be provided with "community living arrangements suitable to each, together with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide them within minimally adequate habilitation ... in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive community settings."

Id. at 319 (quoting Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 484). The Court also found serious problems in the areas of implementing "individual support plans" ("ISPs") and thus in "ensuring that class members actually receive the services and supports they require," id. at 320, and a failure to comply with orders regarding "adaptive equipment." Id. at 321. Finally, the Court found problems in the area of case management, concluding that:

defendants "fail[ed] to ensure that case managers complete the required number of visits and that they take appropriate action when a class member has been the subject of a serious incident"; "[f]ail[ed] to ensure that case managers are properly trained before receiving caseloads"; and that case managers "fail[ed] to ensure that ISPs are fully implemented."

Id. at 324.

The Court summarized its findings as follows:

As a result of these failings, class members continue to be placed in inappropriate and overly restrictive residential and day programs, rather than in the least restrictive, most integrated settings. Provider and MRDDA staff, including case managers, are not adequately trained, and case managers do not visit class members with the required frequency and do not adequately address deficiencies in class members' care. In many instances, class members do not receive the needed services and supports that have been identified in their ISPs. Protocols necessary to protect class members' health and safety, such as feeding, positioning, and behavioral plans, are routinely not followed. Health risks are not adequately assessed and monitored for many class members, and recommendations by health care providers are not implemented in a timely manner. While incidents of abuse and neglect of class members persist, defendants have failed to ensure that these and other serious incidents, including class member deaths, are investigated in a timely manner, that the results of such investigations are shared with providers, and that recommended corrective and preventive actions are implemented. Defendants have also compromised the monitoring process by altering death investigation reports.

Id. at 324-25. These findings were the basis for the Court's ultimate conclusion that defendants' noncompliance with Court orders had been "systemic, continuous and serious." Id. at 325.

B. Remedy

As for the remedy of receivership sought by the plaintiffs, the Court observed:

Although it is clear based on the tortured history of this case that there have been repeated

failures to comply with the Court's Orders, this determination is in no way determinative of the

140

question *140 whether plaintiffs are correct in their argument that a receivership should be

imposed.

Id. at 326. Rather, receivership is a "remedy of last resort," that "should be undertaken only when absolutely necessary." Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206, 1213 (D.C.1999)).

In light of the complexity of this inquiry, and the fact that "recent developments ... are encouraging and will be highly relevant to the remedial phase of this action," the Court determined that it would "enlist the assistance of the Special Masters, who have ably served in this capacity for many years, to make findings and recommendations to the Court that address, inter alia, the current status of defendants' compliance, what are the available options for curing the identified deficiencies, and whether a receivership is the most effective and efficient remedy available to the Court." Id. at 326. The Court instructed that the "determination whether other remedies are inadequate and whether receivership remains the only viable option to effectuate compliance with court orders is to be guided by a number of factors, including"

(1) "whether there were repeated failures to comply with the Court's orders"; (2) whether further efforts to secure compliance would only lead to "confrontation and delay"; (3) whether leadership is available which can "turn the tide within a reasonable time period"; (4) "whether there was bad faith"; (5) "whether resources are being wasted"; and, (6) "whether a receiver can provide a quick and efficient remedy."

Id. (quoting Jerry M., 738 A.2d at 1213 (quoting Dixon v. Barry, 967 F.Supp. 535, 550 (D.D.C.1997))). The Court's final observation was that "the daunting task of finding ways to remedy the problems still remains. In this regard, the Court expects the parties to continue their prior efforts to resolve this matter so that the plight of the class members can be improved as expeditiously as possible, and they will not have to continue to await the outcome of this painfully lengthy and cumbersome litigation." Id. at 327.

III. MOTION FOR RECEIVERSHIP: REMEDY PHASE

A. Supplemental Order of Reference to the Special Masters

Following the issuance of the March 30, 2007 decision, the parties conferred and jointly agreed on a supplemental order of reference to the Special Masters. (Supp. Order of Reference, May 3, 2007 ["2007 Reference Order"].) The 2007 Reference Order provided, inter alia, as follows:
Both Margaret G. Farrell and Clarence J. Sundram have served as Special Masters in this case for many years under prior Orders of Reference. The Court finds that it is justified and necessary to continue their appointment to assist the Court for as long as the Court deems necessary in this matter.
(Id. at 1.) It further provided that:
The Masters are authorized to conduct proceedings relating to the necessity for remedial relief, including, as needed, discovery, hearings, mediation and settlement negotiations. At the conclusion of such proceedings, the Masters will issue a report to the Court making recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations regarding appropriate remedies.

(Id. at 2.) Following the issuance of the Special Masters' report and recommendations, the parties were to "file objections to (or file a motion to adopt or to modify) such order, report or recommendations." (Id. at 4.) The 141 parties were directed that all objections should "specifically identify *141 the portions of the order, or report containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations for remedial action, to which objection is made and the basis for the objection." (Id.) Finally, the Order provided that this Court would review de novo "all objections to the Masters' proposed findings of fact and recommendations regarding remedial relief" and "all objections to conclusions of law made or recommended by the Masters." (Id.)

B. September 12, 2007 Consent Order ("90-Day Order")

After a quarterly status conference on August 9, 2007,[17] the parties agreed to develop, and the Court ultimately entered, a consent order "setting forth a limited number of concrete, short-term goals related to retaining and increasing the number of qualified providers and improving the health and safety of class members" that the District agreed to achieve "during the three-month period from October 1, 2007, to December 31, 2007." (Order at 1, Sept. 12, 2007 ["2007 90-Day Consent Order"]). Pursuant to that Order, defendants agreed to take a number of specific actions that were focused on these two critical goals. (Id. at 2.) The Special Masters were tasked with determining defendants' compliance with the 2007 90-Day Consent Order, beginning in January 2008. (Id. at 1.)
On August 18, 2008, the Special Masters filed their Report and Recommendation regarding defendants' compliance with the 2007 90-Day Order. (Special Masters' Report & Recommendation Regarding Defs.' Compliance with the Consent Order of Sept. 12, 2007, Aug. 18, 2008 ["2008 Special Masters' Report"].) The 2008 Special Masters' Report concluded that overall defendants "did not demonstrate substantial compliance with six out of the 13 provisions of the Consent Order that they recently agreed-upon, and whose obligations they concede they clearly understood."[18]Id. at 107.

C. Monitoring Compliance

At the same time it issued the 2007 90-Day Consent Order, the Court ordered the parties to "file with the Court the agreed-upon methodology to be used by the Court Monitor to monitor defendants' compliance with the requirements of the 2001 Plan and the existing Court Orders by January 10, 2008." (Minute Order, Sept. 12, 2007). Following the issuance of this Order, the Court Monitor circulated to the parties and the Special Masters a proposed monitoring protocol. On November 21, 2007, defendants filed a notice stating:

By communication of November 16, 2007, faced with the expenditure of substantial resources and

time to develop the above-referenced methodology, Defendants informed the Court Monitor that a

142

meeting to develop a methodology *142 would not be needed since Defendants would not assert

that conditions have so fundamentally changed at this point that such comprehensive monitoring

is appropriate. Accordingly, Defendants expressed the view that there was no need for the

comprehensive monitoring proposed by the Court Monitor and the significant expense attendant

thereto that would be incurred.

(Defs.' Notice Concerning Proposed Comprehensive Monitoring at 2, Nov. 21, 2007 (emphasis added).) By May 2008, a monitoring protocol had still not been agreed upon. Just prior to the status conference set for May 15, 2008, defendants filed a motion to stay discovery during the remedial phase of the case, which was denied by the Court. (Hr'g Tr. at 38, May 15, 2008.) On May 19, 2008, the Court issued a scheduling order to govern the remedy phase.

On June 13, 2008, plaintiffs, in response to the Court's request, filed a summary of the remedies they were seeking. That filing set forth a range of possible remedies, "running from no action by the Court up to courtappointed receivership over the entire Department on Disability Services, with oversight of all District agency functions pertaining to Evans class members and other individuals with developmental disabilities served by the defendants." (Pls.' Filing on Remedies at 1, June 13, 2008.) Among these alternatives, plaintiffs endorsed the

remedy of appointing a "Special Administrator," who would "oversee[] government agencies and functions pertaining to class members until the District achieves substantial compliance with the Court's Orders," but who would not have all the powers of a receiver. (Id. at 3.)
D. Proceedings Before the Special Masters
Following additional discovery and pretrial proceedings, the Special Masters conducted a three-day trial on December 10-12, 2008. Direct testimony from both fact and expert witnesses was presented by declaration or excerpts from depositions. (Special Masters' Final Pretrial Order at 6, Nov. 28, 2008.) All witnesses were subject to live cross-examination. (Trial Tr., Dec. 10, 2008; Trial Tr., Dec. 11, 2008.) Plaintiffs presented the testimony of two fact witnesses[19] and two expert witnesses.[20] Defendants presented the testimony of six fact witnesses [21] and three expert witnesses.[22] In addition, more than 200 exhibits were introduced into evidence. Subsequently, both parties submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as post-trial briefs. The Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities filed an amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion and for 143 the appointment *143 of a Special Administrator. On February 9, 2009, closing arguments were heard by the Special Masters.
E. Districts' Motions to Vacate: April 20, 2009
On April 20, 2009, shortly before the Special Masters issued a draft of their Report and Recommendation, defendants filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) to vacate all consent orders and dismiss the case. Defendants asserted that "[c]ontinued federal-court oversight is no longer equitable, as there is no question that the District has remedied the alleged constitutional and statutory violations that gave rise to the 1978 Consent Order and its progeny" and "there is no reasonable basis for asserting that the District will revert to violating the law if the Court's orders are lifted." (Defs.' Mot. to Vacate Consent Orders and Dismiss Action at 1, Apr. 20, 2009.) For the first time, in a litigation that has been ongoing for more than 30 years and despite repeated promises to comply with the existing Court orders, defendants took the position that their noncompliance was irrelevant to the question of whether the Court should continue enforcing its orders because those orders went "beyond minimum standards necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements." (Id. at 3.) In a minute order filed on May 1, 2009, the Court advised the parties that no opposition to defendants' motion should be filed because it intended to hold it in abeyance until it received the Special Masters' final Report and Recommendation.
F. Special Masters' Report and Recommendations
On May 22, 2009, the Special Masters circulated, as required by the 2007 Supplemental Order of Reference, a draft of their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for comment. In that draft, the Special Masters "recommended that the Court's 2004 Order be amended to provide for a Special Compliance Officer to be jointly appointed by the Court and the Mayor with enhanced authority to coordinate and direct the activities of the various District agencies urgently needed to deliver constitutionally acceptable services to the plaintiff class." (2009 Special Masters' Report at 4.) The draft recommended "that the Court appoint the Deputy Director of DDS/ DDA, Laura Nuss, as the Special Compliance Officer merging in one person the legal responsibility under local law with the responsibilities and authority to be conferred by the Court, to lead defendants' efforts to achieve compliance with the court orders." (Id. at 135.) The Special Masters believed that "this least intrusive, and least expensive, remedy was most likely ... to achieve compliance with Court Orders." (Id. at 4.) However, this remedy "required the Mayor's agreement." (Id.) On July 6, 2009, the parties filed their comments on and objections to the draft report. Defendants' comments indicated that the Mayor would not agree to the proposal to appoint a Special Compliance Officer, making that remedy "no longer a viable one." (Id. at 135.)
On August 14, 2009, the Special Masters filed their final Report and Recommendations, based on the record from November 29, 2006, the close of the record for the liability phase, through December 2008, when they closed the record before them. (Id. at 3.) As described herein, the Special Masters found that "plaintiffs had

proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendants continue to be in serious noncompliance with critical provisions of outstanding court orders" in the areas of health, safety, and welfare. (Id.) They recommended as a remedy the appointment of an "Independent Compliance Administrator accountable only to the Court to supervise 144 *144 and coordinate defendants' serial compliance with individual court ordered obligations so that the suit may be dismissed in three years time or less." (Id. at 4-5).
1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
a. Health
In the area of health, the Special Masters found that defendants were noncompliant in several significant respects. First, regarding medical care, they found that defendants had "failed to completely perform some or all of the following duties": "documenting significant health problems in class members' health management plans; monitoring implementation of health plans; implementing recommendations put forward by class members' physicians and medical specialists and completing lab work and physician-ordered diagnostic tests." (Id. at 26-27.) Thus, they concluded:
The evidence in the record indicates that a significant portion of the plaintiff class have health care needs that are not identified in their health plans. Furthermore, too often needs identified in health plans are not met because health plans are not implemented0907i.e. diagnostic tests, consultations and treatments and follow up appointments are not provided or documented in their health records.
(Id. at 31.) The Special Masters also found "ongoing and significant problems with the delivery of timely and appropriate mental health and behavioral healthcare." (Id. at 35.) These problems included:
a) lack of access to sufficient psychiatric and psychological services; b) improper professional practices that are inconsistent with professional standards; c) recommended clinical therapies not being implemented; d) the failure to integrate the use of psychotropic medications into an overall treatment plan; e) the failure to obtain informed consent and approval from Human Rights Committees for use of these restrictive measures; and f) the lack of monitoring of the usage and side effects of psychotropic medications.
(Id.)[23] Finally, the Special Masters found that "delays in obtaining guardianship for the provision of informed consent for medical and dental treatment of class members... have continued" (id. at 45), sometimes "for months, sometimes more than a year, after the need for a guardian is first identified." (Id. at 50.) As a result, treatment is delayed and class members suffer harmful consequences. (Id. at 49-50.)
Based on these findings, the Special Masters concluded that "plaintiffs have established by clear and convincing evidence" that defendants continue "to be in non-compliance with ... outstanding consent orders" with regard to (1) "class members' health" (id. at 31); (2) "mental and behavioral health care" (id. at 41-42); and (3) timely appointment of guardians. (Id. at 49-50.)
b. Safety and Protection from Harm
The Special Masters found the following problems with respect to defendants' obligations to ensure plaintiffs' safety and protection from harm: (1) "a significant number of untimely investigations" into "serious reportable incidents" and deaths (id. at 52-53); (2) "some IMEU reports continue to fail to thoroughly investigate serious reportable incidents" (id. at 54); (3) except for Level I incidents, "the investigation report format does not inquire 145 about potential causes and contributory factors leading to the incident under investigation" *145 (id. at 56); (4) an inability to "identif[y] and address[] systemic issues arising in investigations" (id. at 57); (5) "numerous instances of providers filing late incident reports or no reports at all, conducting inadequate investigations, or failing to conduct required investigations with no recommendations for or evidence of enforcement actions being taken in

response to these deficiencies" (id. at 60); (6) "[i]ncidents of harm ..., including serious physical injury, physical abuse and neglect" (id. at 60); (7) harm resulting from "delays in treatment due to problems with getting informed consent" (id. at 61); (8) "harm due to inadequate health care management" (id.); and (9) harm resulting from problems with the District's "transportation broker contract." (Id. at 64).
Based on these findings, the Special Masters concluded that "while there are some nascent signs of progress in a few areas," there was "clear and convincing evidence that the problems being experienced by class members in the area of safety and protection from harm are continuing, serious and systemic." (Id. at 67.)
c. Welfare

In terms of court orders concerning plaintiff's "welfare," the Special Masters found the plaintiffs had "not sustained their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence non-compliance with court orders requiring residential placements in less restrictive settings" (id. at 72); with court orders requiring that "all class members have written ISPs containing current habilitation plans, behavioral support plans and health plans" (id. at 78); or with court orders requiring a minimum of eight visits per year by a service coordinator/case manager. (Id. at 82). However, they did find continuing problems in the following areas: (1) segregated day programs with arts and crafts as the primary activity and a lack of opportunity for community experiences (id. at 73-74); (2) supported employment (id. at 74); (3) implementation of ISPs (id. at 77-79); and (4) service coordinators not ensuring that ISPs are fully implemented or following up when they are not. (Id. at 81-84.)
Based on these findings, the Special Masters concluded that there is "clear and convincing evidence" that defendants have "not met their obligation ... to provide adequate habilitation in non-residential, least restrictive, community-integrated settings" (id. at 74), or to "[p]rovide all necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that community living arrangements, programs and supportive community services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained." (Id. at 83-84).

d. Interagency Coordination

As the Special Masters noted,

[a]lthough the primary responsibility for providing timely and effective services and supports to

class members rests with DDS/DDA, the success of this enterprise depends upon the coordinated

efforts of several District agencies, including MAA/DHCF (formerly the Medical Assistance

Administration (MAA) in the Department of Health (DOH) and now the Department of Health Care

Finance (DHCF)), through which most of the funding is provided, the Health Regulation and

Licensing Agency (HRLA) in the DOH, which is responsible for licensing and enforcement with

respect to ICFs/MR, the Office of the Inspector General, which has investigative responsibilities

for Medicaid fraud and abuse, the Office of Attorney General which files petitions for

guardianships in court, and other agencies involved in the personnel, procurement, and budget

146

process... includ[ing] the Office of Contracts and Procurement, which has a *146 significant role in

the contracting process.

(Id. at 84.) As described supra, the 2004 Coordination Order was aimed at improving interagency communication coordination. The Special Masters found that despite evidence of improvement, "[t]here has been little evidence submitted regarding specific compliance with [the 2004 Order]." (Id. at 90.) According to the Special Masters

[w]hat is missing is evidence of leadership or coordination by the Mayor's designee 0907the central point of the order to 0907 give focus, direction and priority to interagency communication and coordination, to identify planned actions of one agency that may adversely affect the mission of another and to take proactive steps to prevent such a consequence. In the absence of evidence of such efforts, the interagency efforts at the staff level between agencies have not been consistently successful, and gaps in communication and coordination have resulted in harm to class members.

(Id. at 90.) Indeed, the Special Masters found that "[t]he evidence is that leaders in the key agencies that have the most significant interagency relationship ... were unaware of the existing court order or of the responsibility of the Mayor's designee in implementing it." (Id. at 92.) These findings led the Special Masters to conclude that
the current lack of awareness by key senior officials of the Order's existence and its requirements, coupled with the absence of evidence of regular interagency meetings or communications with the Mayor's designee regarding significant initiatives, and the evidence of breakdowns in interagency coordination leading to the problems discussed above, are all clear and convincing evidence of ongoing noncompliance with this court order which was that this Court Order has not been implemented as intended to remedy a long-standing problem of lack of interagency coordination.
(Id. at 93.)
2. Remedy

The Special Masters concluded "that the plaintiffs have demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that there is a need for additional remedial measures ordered by the Court." (Id. at 133.) Having been unsuccessful in their attempt to get defendants to agree to their first choice of remedy, and after many years of futile attempts to reach an agreement with the Fenty Administration as to a workable remedy, the Special Masters' final report recommended the appointment of an "Independent Compliance Administrator" who "would be appointed by the Court, be accountable only to the Court and would not hold an executive appointment." (Id. at 134.) As described by the Special Masters, the Independent Compliance Administrator would not have the same powers of a receiver but would

serve as the focal point for the compliance efforts of the defendants and work in close

collaboration with them, resulting in regular submissions of compliance reports as set forth in the

2001 Plan, and phased judicial disengagement from active supervision of the defendants'

developmental disabilities service system within three years. The Independent Compliance

Administrator is not intended to have the powers of a receiver or to generally displace the power

and authority of agency heads or subordinate officers. Rather, the authority and role of the

Independent Compliance Administrator is limited to actions necessary to achieve compliance with

147

the court orders within a three year period. All District *147 agencies and personnel should be

directed to cooperate with the Independent Compliance Administrator. If there is a lack of

cooperation, or resistance or intransigence, the Independent Compliance Administrator should be

required to report it immediately to the Special Masters or the Court.

(Id. at 134-35.)

IV. CURRENT PROCEDURAL POSTURE

At a status conference on August 19, 2009, the Court set a briefing schedule for plaintiffs to respond to defendants' motion for vacatur and dismissal, combined with a timetable for filing objections to the 2009 Special Masters' Report. Pursuant to the Court's order, defendants renewed their motion to vacate the consent orders and dismiss the action and combined it with their objections to the 2009 Special Masters' Report. (Defs.' Renewed Mot. to Vacate Consent Orders and To Dismiss Action, Oct. 7, 2009 ["Defs.' Mot. to Vacate"].) On November 6, 2009, plaintiffs filed their opposition to that motion (combined with their endorsement of the Special Masters' Report and Recommendations (Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Objections to the Special Masters' Report & Recommendation, and Opp'n to their Mot. to Vacate All Prior Orders and Dismiss the Case, Nov. 6, 2009 ["Pls.' Opp'n"]). Plaintiff-intervenor, the United States, and the Quality Trust, as amicus curiae, also filed oppositions to defendants' motion. (Pl. Intervenor's Opp'n to Defs.' Renewed Mot. to Vacate Consent Orders and To Dismiss Action, Nov. 6, 2009; Amicus Curiae Br. of Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc., Nov. 11, 2009 ["Quality Trust Opp'n"].) Defendants filed their reply on December 2, 2009. (Defs.' Consolidated Reply in Support of Mot. to Vacate Consent Orders and To Dismiss Action, Dec. 2, 2009.) On December 17-18, 2009, the Court

heard argument on defendants' motions to vacate and to dismiss and on whether to adopt the 2009 Special Masters' Report. The Court will address herein defendants' motions and will address plaintiffs' request that the Court adopt the 2009 Special Masters' Report in a subsequent memorandum.
ANALYSIS
Defendants have moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), "at the conclusion of a period of monitoring not to exceed three months,[24] to vacate the Consent Order entered on June 14, 1978 ... together with all subsequent remedial orders, and to dismiss the action." (Defs.' Mot. to Vacate at 1.)
Rule 60(b)(5) provides that "the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" if "the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable ...." Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) (emphasis added). Defendants seek relief solely on the ground that enforcing the existing orders prospectively is "no longer equitable." (Defs.' Mot. to Vacate at 4.) Conceding they are not in compliance with existing court orders (see 12/17/09 Tr. at 14-16), defendants nonetheless contend that all court orders should be vacated 148 because they have "remedied the alleged constitutional and *148 statutory violations that gave rise to the 1978 Consent Order and its progeny, and continued federal-court oversight is therefore no longer either equitable or permissible." (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Vacate at 3 ["Defs.' Mem."] (citing Horne v. Flores, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 174 L.Ed.2d 406 (2009)).
A party seeking modification of a judgment or order on the ground that applying it prospectively is no longer equitable "bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992); Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2593. A party seeking relief "may meet its initial burden by showing ... a significant change in either factual conditions or in law." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748 (emphasis added); Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2593. Changed factual conditions may include when "`the objects of the decree have been attained.'" Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2596 (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004)). "To determine the merits of this claim, [a court] `need[s] to ascertain whether ongoing enforcement of the original order [is] supported by an ongoing violation of ... law.'" Id. at 2597 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977)); see also Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 ("The federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.") If the party seeking modification or vacatur can establish that the "objective of the [district court's] order ... has been achieved" and "a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper." Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2595. In the alternative, a significant change in law may warrant modification or vacatur of a decree "when the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 748; see also Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2595 ("[C]ourts must remain attentive to the fact that `federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate [federal law] or does not flow from such a violation.'" (quoting Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282, 97 S.Ct. 2749)).
In considering a request for modification in an institutional reform case, a district court must take a "flexible approach." Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2594; see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381, 112 S.Ct. 748; Frew, 540 U.S. at 441, 124 S.Ct. 899. "A flexible approach allows courts to ensure that `responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials' when the circumstances warrant." Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2595 (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899). "If the State establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should make the necessary changes; where it has not done so, however, the decree should be enforced according to its terms." Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899. Relief is warranted if the significant change "renders continued enforcement `detrimental to the public interest.'" Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2593 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748).
Defendants contend that there has been both a significant change in law and a significant change in factual conditions and that these changes satisfy Horne's requirements for vacatur. Defendants could, of course, obtain

vacatur by complying with the court orders. However, they concede they have not achieved compliance. 149 (12/17/09 Tr. at 20-21.) Nonetheless, they argue that the objects of the court orders *149 have been attained
because (1) the scope of the right to habilitation recognized in the 1978 Consent Order and the many subsequent consent orders is premised on an incorrect understanding of the law, as established by the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Youngberg and, therefore, those parts of the consent orders that are dependent on that definition are "extraconstitutional," (i.e., not based on any constitutional violation) and thus are legally unenforceable; and (2) the remaining parts of the 1978 Consent Order and subsequent consent orders impose requirements that exceed minimal constitutional standards, and thus, under Horne, defendants are entitled to vacatur once they achieve the minimum, which they claim to have done.
Defendants' argument for vacatur fails because (1) Youngberg does not represent a significant change in law (Section I(A)); (2) even if Youngberg constituted a significant change, defendants failed to make that argument within a reasonable time after Youngberg was decided (Section I(B)); (3) no matter how Youngberg is interpreted, it can only support a limited modification of the consent orders (Section I(C)); (4) defendants have misinterpreted Horne when arguing that the objectives of the consent decrees have been met because they have satisfied the constitutional floor (Section II(A)); and (5) defendants have failed to establish that a durable remedy is in place (Section II(B)).
I. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO VACATUR BASED ON A CHANGE IN LAW
A. Youngberg Was Not a Significant Change in Law
According to defendants, Youngberg was a significant change in law because "[i]n its 1978 Consent Order, this Court adopted a much more expansive definition of the Fifth Amendment right to habilitative care and treatment" than Youngberg recognizes or permits. (Defs.' Mem. at 16 n. 13.) Specifically, defendants take issue with the portions of the 1978 Consent Order, to which they agreed, emphasized below:
Each class member has a federal constitutional right, based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty and to be kept free from harm.
Habilitation is the process by which a resident is assisted in acquiring and maintaining those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and social capabilities. Habilitation includes but is not limited to[] programs of formal, structured education and training.
Habilitative care in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty means living as normally as possible and receiving appropriate individualized services in the community in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive settings.
As used in this Order, "integrated" refers to the integration of mentally retarded persons with nonretarded persons in the community.
(Id. (quoting 1978 Consent Order at 2 ¶ 3) (emphases added).) According to defendants, "[t]he portions of this definition emphasized above are not required by the Fifth Amendment's due process clause but, rather, reach far beyond any constitutionally guaranteed minimum." (Id. at 16-17 n. 13) Defendants maintain, for the first time in over 30 years, that they "cannot now be bound by their three-decades-old consent to the use of an overly 150 expansive, *150 erroneous definition." (Id.) Rather, they argue, "this Court should disregard the 1978 Consent Order's incorrect statement of the applicable standard and implement the correct standard, which the District has more than satisfied." (Id. at 17 n. 13.)
It is well-established that a Court can modify or vacate a consent decree based on a significant change in law. In many cases where this type of argument has been raised, it is undisputed that the law has in fact changed, that a

legal basis for the decree has evaporated, and the only question for the Court is whether the change in the legal landscape warrants modification (or vacatur) of the decree. See, e.g., Sys. Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961) ("The parties have no power to require of the court continuing enforcement of rights the statute no longer gives."); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (dissolving injunction pertaining to state parole procedures where subsequent controlling caselaw established that there was no federal due process interest at stake and thus that the "legal theory and analysis upon which the consent decree was formulated was erroneous"); Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc) (vacating consent decree because its "continued enforcement" was "inequitable" where the underlying "substantial claim" under federal law had evaporated); Doe v. Briley, 511 F.Supp.2d 904, 923-26 (M.D.Tenn. 2007) (dissolving consent decree precluding publication of names of persons arrested but not convicted due to Supreme Court decision holding that due process did not protect against stigmatizing publications by law enforcement officials), aff'd, 562 F.3d 777 (6th Cir.2009).
Here, however, the first question for the Court is whether there has in fact been a significant change in the law. See, e.g., United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir.2003) (refusing to modify or vacate consent decree where Supreme Court decision "did not expressly make [the relevant regulation] illegal" even though that "reading might be the only logical extension of the case"); see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. 748 ("To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform litigation.") That is, does the 1978 Consent Order, in defendants' words, use "an overly expansive, erroneous definition" of the right to habilitative care and treatment. (Defs.' Mot. at 14 n. 2.) As explained herein, the answer to this question is simply that defendants cannot argue for vacatur based on a significant change in the law.
1. Youngberg
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court considered "for the first time the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." 457 U.S. at 314, 102 S.Ct. 2452. The plaintiff in Youngberg, Nicholas Romeo, had been involuntarily committed under the laws of Pennsylvania to a state institution. As described in the Supreme Court's decision, he was "profoundly retarded," with "the mental capacity of an 18-month old child, with an I.Q. between 8 and 10," who could not "talk and lack [ed] the most basic self-care skills." Id. at 309, 102 S.Ct. 2452. He had been committed to a state facility at the age of 26 because his mother could no longer care for him after his father's death. After he suffered a number of 151 injuries, both self-inflicted and from other residents, his mother filed a complaint in *151 federal district court. The precise question before the Supreme Court was whether a person involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded had "substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to (I) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training, or `habilitation.'"[25]Id. at 309, 102 S.Ct. 2452.
Based on its prior decisions, the Court concluded, without the need for explication, that the plaintiff's right to safe conditions and right to freedom from bodily restraint were the "core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause," noting that since both rights survived criminal conviction and incarceration, they certainly survived involuntary commitment. Id. at 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (quotations omitted). As for the right to habilitation, the Court had never before considered whether such a right existed or what its scope might be. Ultimately, it held that plaintiff had a right to the habilitation he sought a 0907 right to "minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint." Id. at 319, 102 S.Ct. 2452. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that because the plaintiff "seeks only training related to safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se, even when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom." Id. at 318, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Court added:
It is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and formulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate

training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 319 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 2452.
Having concluded that the plaintiff in Youngberg retained liberty interests in safety, freedom from bodily restraint, and minimally adequate habilitation, the Court addressed the question of how a court should identify possible violations of those rights. It held that whether Romeo's rights had been violated "must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests," but that this balancing "cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or jury." Id. at 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452. Rather, "the proper standard for determining whether a State adequately has protected the rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded" is for a court to "make certain that professional judgment was in fact exercised." Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, the Court concluded, "the State [was] under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional 152 would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability *152 to function free from bodily restraints." Id. at 324, 102 S.Ct. 2452.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and O'Connor, noted that the majority opinion "properly leaves unresolved" "whether respondent has an independent constitutional claim, grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to that `habilitation' or training necessary to preserve those basic self-care skills he possessed when he first entered" the state institution. Id. at 325, 327, 102 S.Ct. 2452. Justice Blackmun opined that "it would be consistent with the Court's reasoning today to include within the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution such training as is reasonably necessary to prevent a person's pre-existing self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment." Id. at 327, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (quotation and citation omitted). As explained by Justice Blackmun,
If a person could demonstrate that he entered a state institution with minimal self-care skills, but lost those skills after commitment because of the State's unreasonable refusal to provide him training, then, it seems to me, he has alleged a loss of liberty quite distinct from 0907and as serious as0907the loss of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. For many mentally retarded people, the difference between the capacity to do things for themselves within an institution and total dependence on the institution for all of their needs is as much liberty as they ever will know.
Id. at 327, 102 S.Ct. 2452.
Thus, contrary to defendants' suggestion, there is absolutely nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg that overrules the 1978 Consent Order and the subsequent orders that were entered both before and after Youngberg regarding plaintiffs' constitutional right "to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty" or the definition of what that right means. Indeed, the Court in Youngberg expressly stated that it was not answering the "difficult question whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se." Id. at 318, 102 S.Ct. 2452.
2. Post-Youngberg Cases
In the almost 30 years since Youngberg was decided, the Supreme Court has not revisited the daunting task of explicating the constitutional rights of the involuntarily-committed developmentally disabled, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has not had the occasion to ever address this issue. Thus, there is no controlling precedent, other than Youngberg, and there is no consensus among the courts regarding defendants' proposed interpretation of Youngberg. On the contrary, courts and judges have reached differing conclusions about Youngberg's scope.
For example, in Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.1986), the court held that plaintiff's rights were violated where she was confined at an institution "in the face of unanimous professional opinion that she should be placed in a far less restrictive environment...." Id. at 87. In a concurring opinion, Judge Edward Becker elaborated on his

view of the scope of the constitutional right to habilitation,[26] which he believed Youngberg did not address. See 153 id. at 92-98 (Becker, J., concurring). In his view, "Youngberg dealt exclusively *153 with training related to
physical restraints; the Court expressly stated that it was neither considering nor ruling on any broader right to habilitation." Id. at 95. Citing Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Youngberg, Judge Becker stated that he also "would endorse the non-deterioration principle," because "[t]he mentally disabled cannot have meaningful autonomy, and hence meaningful liberty, without basic skills; therefore, for the state to allow disabled persons' skills to deteriorate is as sure a denial of their liberty as is their confinement to an institution." Id. at 96. He then went further than Justice Blackmun, endorsing what he called a "[m]odified non-deterioration principle":
the State should be required to provide such a person with at least as much training as would match the improvement that he or she would have experienced if never committed. The reasoning behind this position is analogous to the reasoning supporting the non-deterioration principle: by committing people and preventing them from developing self-care skills, the state is effectively depriving them of the opportunity to develop and exercise their autonomy. This is a deprivation of their due process right to liberty.... [Thus,] involuntarily civilly committed persons have a right to treatment sufficient to develop their self-care skills to at least the level at which they would be if the persons had not been institutionalized.
794 F.2d at 96. As he explained:
Because [the plaintiff's] institutionalization has led to her debilitation, the modified nondeterioration principle requires the state to provide [her] ... with training and treatment sufficient to put her in the position in which she would have been had she never been institutionalized. Because it appears from the numerous, uncontradicted doctors' reports in the record that placement in a [community living arrangement] is the only or best way for [her] to receive the training she is due, I believe she has a right to placement in the [community living arrangement], until she has acquired the skills she would have had had she never been institutionalized.
Id. at 97. Finally, and significantly, Judge Becker's opinion left open "the question whether the involuntarily civilly committed have a right to even greater habilitation than the modified non-deterioration principle would allow." Id. at 98. For example, as noted in the concurring opinion,
[i]t might be argued ... under the theories discussed here or some other theory of habilitation, that the involuntarily civilly committed have a right to as much habilitation as their capacity will allow. Alternatively, one might argue that all involuntarily civilly committed persons are entitled to treatment up to an absolute level, regardless of their status upon entrance to the institution.
Id. at 98 (emphasis added). Thus, according to this circuit judge, Youngberg is merely the starting point for defining the constitutional right to habilitation; it by no means precludes recognition of additional rights for plaintiffs who, unlike the plaintiff in Youngberg, could benefit from more extensive habilitation.
The court's decision in Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F.Supp. 1178, 1184 (W.D.N.C.1988), aff'd, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.1990), is another example of a post-Youngberg case that endorses a broader right to habilitation than 154 defendants advocate here.[27] In Thomas S., the court held *154 that the State of North Carolina was violating the constitutional rights of approximately four hundred mentally retarded persons who were confined in the state's four psychiatric hospitals. The court approved the parties' agreement that in terms of habilitation, "minimum professional standards require developmentally oriented habilitation for persons with mental retardation." Id. at 1192. Such developmental habilitation requires, inter alia; "[a]dequate involvement in community activities," defined as "being as involved as that individual is capable of being at the time"; "a good interdisciplinary evaluation" that provides an "adequate assessment of the individual needs of each class member"; "[p]roperly trained staff"; "[h]umane living conditions," which includes more than "endless days of boredom without variation"; "treat[ment] in as normal a setting as possible" featuring "access to ordinary activities," and the chance "to learn and grow through observing and participating in the commonplace events of daily life," "developmental training and structured programs," including "training in basic self-care skills, community living skills, speech therapy, and vocational services." Id. at 1192-94. The court also found that "[b]ecause vocational activities are often a key to

greater independence and enjoyment of liberty, they are for most class members an essential service to avoid unnecessary restraint." Id. at 1194. The court relied on its finding that there was "professional consensus that developmental, behavior-based treatment called `habilitation' is the appropriate milieu for people with mental retardation." Id. at 1185. Finally, the court found that habilitation "is defined as ... [t]he process by which the staff of an agency assists an individual to acquire and maintain those life skills that enable the individual to cope more effectively with the demands of his or her own person and environmental and social functioning. Habilitation includes, but is not limited to, programs of formal structured education and treatment." Id. at 1184 (quoting Accreditation Council for Services for Mentally Retarded and Other Developmentally Disabled Persons (1981 ed.) (quotation and citation omitted)). Not only did the court recognize a broad right to habilitation, it emphasized that plaintiffs were entitled both to appropriate professional decisionmaking and implementation of those decisions. See id. at 1185 (faulting defendants for not implementing community placement recommendations by treating professionals and noting that "[t]he record is replete with other examples of placement and treatment recommendations being ignored or their implementation being unjustifiably delayed").[28]
Certainly there are cases in which courts applying Youngberg have defined the right to habilitation more narrowly than the Court and the parties did in the 1978 Consent Order. For example, in Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir.1984), the Second Circuit held that the right to freedom from undue restraint included the right to be free from "excess locking of doors, locking of otherwise ambulatory 155 persons into wheelchairs, and failing to put on leg braces for individuals who can walk *155 with their assistance," but it did not include "visiting shops, restaurants and recreational facilities in the outside community." Id. at 1247. It also held that there was no "entitlement to community placement or a `least restrictive environment' under the federal Constitution," and that "[w]here the state does not provide treatment designed to improve a mentally retarded individual's condition, it deprives the individual of nothing guaranteed by the Constitution; it simply fails to grant a benefit of optimum treatment that it is under no constitutional obligation to grant." Id. at 1250; see also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1250-51 (5th Cir.1987) (no "right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment" because "[t]he constitutional minimum standard of habilitation ... relate[s], not to the qualitative betterment of a retarded person's life, but only to the training necessary to afford him safety and freedom from bodily restraint"); Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir.1983) ("With respect to training, Youngberg teaches that, at the most, the class members were entitled to minimally adequate training as is reasonable in light of their interest in freedom of movement and that deference must be shown to the professional judgment of those directing the operation of the institution. Such training as is required, therefore, is training to enhance the ability of the class members to exercise their right to liberty of movement."); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F.Supp. 1243, 1309 (D.N.M.1990) ("no substantive due process right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment and there is no constitutional right to placement in a community setting"), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.1992); S.H. v. Edwards, 886 F.2d 292 (11th Cir.1989) (affirming district court's denial of "plaintiffs' claims for relief in the nature of habilitation in the least restrictive environment in accordance with the recommendation of professional treatment staff" (quotation omitted)).
And then there are cases that fall somewhere in between. For example, in Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F.Supp. 473 (N.D.1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.1983), the court held that
the right to freedom from undue restraint... imposes a standard for the court's determination whether professional judgment is being exercised in the use of medication and physical means to restrain residents. This right obligates the state to provide capable retarded residents with reasonable opportunities to make trips into the outside communities. It also tests the freedoms allowed to residents, such as the opportunity to make small personal decisions concerning what to wear, what to eat, recreation, etc. This right against unreasonable restraint also involves the much discussed question of alternatives to institutionalization, such as community homes. Prior to the Youngberg decision, this court held that the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment secures a right to the least restrictive practicable alternatives to institutionalization. While the Youngberg decision does not directly address this specific right, the Court's analysis indicates that it would reject an absolute right to the least restrictive alternatives.... Following this analysis, this court must conclude that a constitutional right to the least restrictive method of care or treatment exists only insofar as

professional judgment determines that such alternatives would measurably enhance the resident's enjoyment of basic liberty interests.
Id. at 486 (emphasis added; citation omitted). As for "the right to minimally adequate training," the court held that 156 "the *156 resident possesses a right to training only insofar as that training serves to enhance or further that
resident's exercise of basic liberty." Id. at 486-87. Thus, it does not include "training in music or vocational skills," but it does include "training in walking or basic communication ... if the resident could benefit therefrom...." Id. at 487. It also includes "a right to reasonable training which enables the resident to acquire or maintain minimum self-care skills0907skills in feeding, bathing, dressing, self-control, and toilet training." Id. (emphasis omitted). The court also adopted Justice Blackmun's view that the right to training includes training "to enable them to maintain the minimum self-care skills that they possessed when they entered the institution," and based on this view, it held that the "the acquisition and maintenance of those skills [are] essential to the exercise of basic liberties." Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, all that can be said about the post-Youngberg cases, none of which is controlling precedent, is that they disagree about how narrowly Youngberg should be interpreted and even if interpreted narrowly, how it should be applied to everyday situations. This very lack of clarity dooms defendants' suggestion that Youngberg precludes recognition of a constitutional right to habilitation as described in the 1978 Consent Order.
In the end, the critical question in a Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is whether defendants have met their burden to show that Youngberg was a "significant change" in the law. They have not. There is language in Youngberg that arguably contradicts defendants' reading of the case; there is no subsequent Supreme Court decision or postYoungberg decision from our circuit court regarding the meaning of Youngberg; and among those that have addressed it, there is no agreement. In the face of disagreement about what the law is and no controlling precedent, the mere fact that some courts have adopted the interpretation defendants propose here is not sufficient to meet that burden. Moreover, as explained herein, defendants' position that Youngberg is a significant change in law is seriously undermined by the fact that for almost 28 years they have accepted the constitutional standard in the 1978 Consent Order and promised to achieve compliance with court orders based on that standard.
B. Defendants' Argument Regarding Youngberg Was Not Made Within a Reasonable Time
Defendants concede that if Youngberg is not treated as a significant change in law, their motion to vacate must fail.[29] But even if the Court agreed with defendants that Youngberg represented a significant change in the law, that does not ensure success under Rule 60(b)(5).[30]See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. It remains for the Court to decide whether modification in light of that change is warranted. See id. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748. Given 157 the particular (and probably unique) *157 facts of this case, the Court does not believe that the relief sought by defendants is warranted.
Rule 60(b)(5) requires that a motion for modification be made within "a reasonable time." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). "[W]hat constitutes `reasonable time' for a filing under Rule 60(b) depends on the facts of each case." Ingram v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 371 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir.2004); see also McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 849 n. 4 (5th Cir.2004); Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir.1989). Factors to consider include "the length of the delay, the explanations for the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party caused by the delay and the circumstances warranting relief." Associated Builders & Contractors v. Mich. Dep't of Labor, 543 F.3d 275 (6th Cir.2008); see also Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925 (7th Cir.2005) (relevant factors include "the litigants' knowledge of the grounds for relief," "the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and [the consideration of] prejudice [if any] to other parties" (quotations omitted)). Even applying the flexible approach a court must take in considering a Rule 60(b)(5) motion in institutional reform litigation, see Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2594-95; Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381, 112 S.Ct. 748, defendants' Youngberg argument comes decades too late, long after the entry of

countless remedial court orders, many of which defendant agreed to and all of which were relied upon these many years by the Court, the Special Masters, the plaintiffs and the Department of Justice.
The Supreme Court decided Youngberg in 1982, almost 30 years ago. Defendants could have sought modification of the 1978 Consent Order at any time thereafter based on the same argument they make today0907that Youngberg effectively overruled parts of this Court's 1978 consent decree, thereby requiring modification of that decree. And if there was any question that a change in law could provide the basis for modification of a consent decree, that question was answered in 1992 by Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393, 112 S.Ct. 748. Indeed, there have been a number of cases in the intervening years, which defendants rely upon, where parties have sought and courts have agreed that modifications or vacatur based on a change in law was appropriate. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164-65; Evans, 10 F.3d at 480, 482-83; Briley, 511 F.Supp.2d at 927.[31]
Nor is this a case where defendants can justify the delay by claiming that they were "unaware" of the existence of the decree or its impact. Cf. Briley, 511 F.Supp.2d at 912 ("Municipal entities, ... however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence."). To the contrary, defendants have been in Court continually and repeatedly since the 1978 Consent Order defending against plaintiffs' charges of noncompliance, and when their efforts failed for good reason, numerous substantive court orders resulted.[32]
158 *158 The only reason defendants give for their 27-year delay in making their Youngberg argument is that they only just realized that the 1978 Consent Order was based on a "misunderstanding of the governing law." (See 12/17/09 Tr. at 8.) Even assuming such a "mistake" could ever justify a delay of this magnitude, it does not do so here. Defendants cannot make a plausible argument that they, along with everyone else involved in this case, have been operating under a misguided view of the law and only now, with the arrival of a new Attorney General, has the law become clear. (See 12/17/09 Tr. at 19.) Not only did it take 27 years for defendants to realize their purported mistake, during that period, they entered into a number of additional consent orders and agreements that were designed to achieve the constitutional standards enunciated in the 1978 Consent Order. (See 1983 Consent Order; 1995 Reference Order; 2001 Joint Findings of Fact; 2001 Plan; 2001 Consent Order; 2007 90Day Consent Order.) For example, in 1995 defendants "admit[ted] that the District has a continuing responsibility to provide the class members with habilitation in accordance with their needs" and "admit[ted] that they also are required to provide adequate medical care, psychological care, day programming, community residential placements and other support systems as set forth in the class members' [individual habilitation plans]." (1995 Contempt Order at 5-6.) And as recently as September 2007, the current administration under Mayor Fenty agreed to take a number of specific actions, including "recruiting five new providers" and ensuring that the residences operated by these providers, inter alia, "are located close to shops, restaurants, community resources and public transportation, or there is transportation available to class members in order to access these resources"0907 an obligation that clearly flows from the parts of the 1978 Consent Order the District now contends are "extraconstitutional." (2007 90-Day Order at 2.) Moreover, the Court's March 2007 Liability Opinion and the 2009 Special Masters' Report are replete with references to a legal standard that only now does the District find convenient to repudiate. "Modification of a consent decree may be warranted when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous," Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748, but not simply because "it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree." Id. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 748.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, defendants' actions over the past 30 years 0907their repeated representations, promises and agreements0907have led the Court and the plaintiffs to believe that defendants had every intention of complying with the existing orders. For example, in asking the Court in February 2007 to delay its liability ruling, the District stated that it was "cognizant that much remains to be done to bring DDS into compliance with outstanding court orders and the 2001 Plan," but assured the Court that the "Fenty Administration is fully committed to the success of the new agency, the delivery of improved services and care to the consumers served by the agency, and compliance with the 2001 Plan." (Defs.' Notice of Filing of Supplemental Info. in Resp. to the Court Monitor's Quarterly Report at 8, Feb. 5, 2007 (emphasis added).) Again, in May 2008, Peter Nickles, the 159 Attorney General for the District, assured the Court "I am not seeking ... to *159 take away what [the plaintiffs] won." (Hr'g Tr. at 37, May 15, 2008.) But that is exactly what the District seeks to do.

Everyone, including the three judges of this Court, who has struggled with this case for over 30 years has relied on defendants' repeated promises that they intended to comply. Plaintiffs have repeatedly entered into new agreements with defendants. (See, e.g., 1981 Consent Decree, 1983 Consent Decree; 2001 Consent Order; 2001 Plan; 2007 90-Day Consent Order.) Plaintiff have also withdrawn motions to find defendants in noncompliance or in contempt that they might otherwise have successfully pursued. (See, e.g., 1983 Consent Order at 14 (withdrawing motion for contempt); Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 84 (waiving "all claims for past contumacious conduct of defendants as of the date of the entry of the [2001] Consent Order and approval of the Settlement Agreement").)
Moreover, the Court has on numerous occasions endorsed agreements between the parties and adopted them as court orders. (See, e.g., 1981 Consent Decree, 1983 Consent Decree; 2001 Consent Order; 2001 Plan; 2001 Joint Findings of Fact; 2007 90-Day Order.) Judge Stanley Harris's reliance on defendants' stated intention to achieve compliance with existing court orders is especially apparent in his 2001 opinion, wherein he notes that "[t]he dispute seemed intractable until last year, towards the end of which there were commendable and extensive efforts by Mrs. Farrell, Mr. Sundram, and counsel for the parties seeking to resolve the problems faced by all." Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 85. The Court commended the Special Masters and counsel not only for "resolving their differences, but for the exceptionally thorough manner in which they have agreed upon procedures for dealing with the problems that have persisted for so long" and explained that it approved the Plan and adopted the parties' consent order and settlement agreement because it "readily conclude[d] that the proposed compromise of the controversy, which will be of substantially greater benefit to the class than would continued litigation over how to deal with past conduct by defendants, is fair, reasonable, and adequate." Id.; (see also 1995 Contempt Order at 1 (emphasizing that "[a]n integral part of this litigation has been the closure of Forest Haven and the relocation of class members to community living arrangements with adequate habilitation suitable to each class member" and "[t]o this end, the Court has entered numerous orders, including consent orders between the parties, to safeguard the rights of class members and ensure their adequate and appropriate habilitation.").)
In sum, no factor supports a finding that defendants have filed their Rule 60(b)(5) motion, to the extent it is based Youngberg, within a "reasonable time." Defendants have no excuse for their delay; they have repeatedly consented to the constitutional standard as stated in the 1978 Consent Order; they successfully convinced the plaintiffs and the Court on numerous occasions that they intended to comply with the court orders; and the vulnerable class members, their counsel, the Department of Justice and three judges of this Court have relied to their detriment on the District's endless promises.
C. At Most, Defendants' View of Youngberg Supports Only a Limited Modification of the Consent Orders
Even if defendants could argue that Youngberg was a significant change in the law (which they cannot), that argument would support nothing more than a limited modification of the consent orders. In the first place, even if 160 Youngberg changed the *160 law with respect to the scope of the constitutional right to habilitation, that would not undermine the legal basis for the host of provisions in the court orders and the 2001 Plan that relate solely to health care and safety. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (not disputed that plaintiff had "a right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care" and Court held that right to safe conditions and right to freedom from bodily restraint were the "core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause"). Requirements relating to these rights (as opposed to habilitation) are a substantial part of the challenged court orders and the 2001 Plan. (See 1978 Consent Order; Evans, 459 F.Supp. at 484, 488-89; 1981 Consent Order at 6-7; 1983 Consent Order at 4-8; 2001 Consent Order; 2001 Plan; 2007 90-Day Consent Order.) Moreover, these provisions are arguably the most critical and cover areas where defendants have been most deficient. Certainly, in recent years, health and safety have been the primary focus and concern of the Court, the Special Masters, the Court Monitor and the parties. See Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 298-314 (factual findings in March 2007 Liability Opinion regarding health and safety); (2007 90-Day Order (addressing two critical goals: increasing the number of qualified providers and improving the health and safety of class members); 2009 Special Masters' Report at 18-67 (findings and conclusions of law regarding health care, mental and behavioral health care, guardianship,

safety and protection from harm); Court Monitor's Report, June 11, 2009; and Court Monitor's Report, Dec. 10, 2009.)
For example, according to the 2001 Plan, the crux of plaintiffs' right to be kept free from harm is addressed by six specific directives in the 1978 Consent Order and the 1983 Consent Order. (2001 Plan at 27-28). These directives
require conducting timely and thorough investigations into serious incidents, including deaths; identifying causes and contributory factors as well as preventive and corrective actions that appear to be warranted; and ensuring the implementation of recommendations that are made as a result of the investigations. In addition to responding to individual cases, the defendants are required to identify systemic patterns and trends and communicate them to providers to facilitate corrective action for recurrent problems on an individual consumer level, provider level and a systemic level .... [and to] ensure that appropriate training programs for all staff, including staff assigned to residential settings are developed and implemented.
(2009 Special Masters' Report at 50.) In March 2007, this Court found "defendants ha[d] failed in many significant respects to accomplish the tasks and outcome criteria associated with the Court's Orders relating to class member safety and to comply with the terms of the Orders themselves." Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 313. In late November 2007, defendants conceded that as of yet, conditions had not fundamentally changed. (Def.'s Notice Concerning Proposed Comprehensive Monitoring at 2.) And, as of December 2008, the Special Masters found that "there is clear and convincing evidence that the problems being experienced by class members in the area of safety and protection from harm are continuing, serious and systemic." (2009 Special Masters' Report at 67). Thus, no matter how Youngberg is interpreted, it would not excuse defendants from these obligations.
Moreover, even if defendants' overly narrow interpretation of Youngberg were to be adopted, it would only entitle 161 defendants to partial modification of the court *161 orders concerning habilitation. For example, as the 2007
Liability Opinion makes clear, the right to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty, see Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 314-19, is only one aspect of plaintiffs' right to habilitation/ welfare. Plaintiffs are also entitled to "a written ISP based upon individualized assessments and formulated in accordance with professional standards"; "an individualized habilitation program designed in accordance with the ISP"; identification in the ISP of "all services and supports required by class members regardless of availability"; annual review of the ISP; "adaptive equipment" if needed; "enough case manager positions to meet the required case manager to client ratio"; "appropriate training programs for staff, including case managers"; and case managers who ensure implementation of ISPs and take appropriate action after incidents. See id. at 319, 321-22; (see also 2009 Special Masters' Report at 67-75 (same)). Similarly, in the six-page, single-spaced 2007 90-Day Consent Order (which defendants agreed to after the Fenty administration took office), the only provision arguably affected by Youngberg would be the requirement that defendants ensure that residences operated by new providers "are located close to shops, restaurants, community resources and public transportation, or there is transportation available to class members in order to access these resources." (2007 90-Day Consent Order at 2.)
Finally, one of defendants' primary points about Youngberg is that it rejects any right to community placement, but the present record establishes that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants are in noncompliance with the 2001 Plan with respect to moving a significant number of class members into group homes. (See 2009 Special Masters' Report at 72.)[33] For those class members who continue to reside in ICF/MR settings, the Report noted that "there was no evidence submitted to establish that continued placement of all or some subset of these class members in such settings was improper or contrary to a choice made by the class member or an authorized surrogate decision-maker." (Id. at 73.)
In the end, then, defendants' argument that Youngberg changed the law on habilitation would, at most, require partial modification of a limited number of court orders concerning habilitation; it would not affect the legitimacy of any other order, including many critical orders, concerning plaintiffs' health, welfare and safety. But defendants do not seek such a limited modification; rather they make an "all or nothing" argument for vacatur.[34]

162 *162 II. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO VACATUR BASED ON CHANGE IN FACTS
A. Defendants Are Not in Substantial Compliance with Constitutional Requirements
Defendants argue that, even though they have not achieved compliance with the court orders or the 2001 Plan, the objects of those orders have been attained because defendants have satisfied the "constitutional minimum." (Defs.' Mem. at 32 ("District's current system for serving individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities ... patently satisfies class members' Fifth ... Amendment rights to be free from harm and to receive minimally adequate habilitative care and treatment.").) Defendants' argument fails because (1) it rests on a flawed definition of the constitutional minimum; and (2) its rests on an erroneous interpretation of Horne as allowing properly entered consent orders to be vacated, despite defendants' non-compliance with those orders, once defendants achieve the constitutional minimum.
1. Defendants Cannot Provide a Workable Definition of Constitutional Requirements Based on Youngberg
Defendants' argument that they have satisfied the "constitutional minimum" requires that that concept be defined, but defendants' proffered definition is fundamentally flawed. According to defendants, Youngberg establishes as the constitutional minimum that involuntarily committed individuals have only the right to be kept "free from harm" and the right to "minimally adequate habilitation," defined as "such training as may be reasonable in light of [the individual's] liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints." (Def. Mot. to Vacate at 16 (quotations omitted) (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322, 102 S.Ct. 2452). Defendants then baldly assert that they have met this constitutional minimum because "[w]e're exercising professional judgment in the care and treatment of consumers within the class. They're free from harm. And they're getting sufficient training and habilitation so that their liberty interests are protected." (12/17/09 Tr. at 104.)
163 Although the constitutional minimum certainly includes the rights articulated in *163 Youngberg, defendants' argument that no more is required is premised on an error of law. First, as noted, Youngberg did not concern an involuntarily committed person's constitutional right to "food, shelter, clothing, and medical care." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315, 102 S.Ct. 2452. It is indisputable that any constitutional minimum standard must include protection of these rights.[35] Moreover, as these rights were not at issue in Youngberg, Youngberg provides no guidance as to what is required to meet the constitutional minimum with respect to the protection of these rights.
In addition, to the extent defendants contend that the constitutional minimum is met as long as there is a system in place that calls for the exercise of professional judgment (see 12/17/09 Tr. at 103;[36] Defs.' Mem. at 33 ("no credible argument can be made that there is a systemic lack of professional judgment exercised by treating professionals in the IDD system")), that proposition is not supported by Youngberg. Youngberg expressly states that a court must "make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised" in attempting to protect the rights of an involuntarily committed individual. 457 U.S. at 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). As other courts have recognized, in order for this requirement to have any substance, it cannot be met purely at the systemic level; rather, professional judgments must be implemented in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Thomas S., 902 F.2d at 252 (holding that district court properly imposed liability because it "found that many of the decisions of the treating professionals had not been implemented" and "found areas in which the decisions of the treating professional substantially departed from accepted standards"); Halderman v. Pennhurst, 901 F.2d 311, 324 (3d Cir.1990) ("obligations [under the consent decree] clearly run to class members as individuals, not as a group" and thus "substantial compliance must be measured with respect to the services each individual retarded class member is receiving and not with respect to the services received by the class as a whole").

Finally, defendants again ignore, as discussed above, that Youngberg did not address the right to habilitation generally; it decided only that the plaintiff, who was profoundly retarded and would not benefit from any other habilitation, was entitled to the limited habilitation he sought 0907such training as may be reasonable in light of his 164 liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. See Youngberg, *164 457 U.S. at 318, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (because plaintiff "seeks only training related to safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se" (emphasis added)). For all these reasons, the rights recognized by Youngberg are necessary, but not sufficient, to give meaning to plaintiffs' basic constitutional rights.
2. Even If Defendants Have Satisfied Minimum Constitutional Requirements, This Does Not Justify Vacatur Under Horne
The second problem for defendants is that they cannot seek vacatur of all court orders based on Horne. In Horne, the district court concluded, after a trial, that the State of Arizona was violating the requirement in the Equal Educational Opportunities Act ("EEOA") "to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs," 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f), because "the amount of funding the State allocated for the special needs of ELL students ... was arbitrary and not related to the actual funding needed to cover the costs of ELL instruction." Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2589. Pursuant to this judgment, the court ordered the State, inter alia, to "prepare a cost study to establish the proper appropriation to effectively implement ELL programs," "to provide funding that bears a rational relationship to the actual funding needed," and to "appropriately and constitutionally fund" the ELL program. Id. at 2590 (quotations and citations omitted).
The defendants never complied with any of the court's orders, but in 2006 the State Legislature passed a new law that "increased ELL incremental funding [by a fixed amount] (with a 2-year per-student limit on such funding) and created two new funds0907a structured English immersion fund and a compensatory instruction fund to 0907 cover additional costs of ELL programming." Id. at 2590. Based on this new legislation, the state legislature asked the district court to vacate its orders. The district court concluded that Rule 60(b)(5) relief was not warranted because the new law "did not establish a funding system that rationally relates funding available to the actual costs of all elements of ELL instruction." Id. at 2591 (quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that because the original declaratory judgment order centered on the adequacy of ELL incremental funding, relief would be appropriate only if "there are no longer incremental costs associated with ELL programs in Arizona," or if "Arizona had altered its funding model." Id. at 2591-92 (quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the lower courts had erred by looking only to whether the State was fulfilling the specific terms of the judgment instead of considering whether "Arizona is now fulfilling its statutory obligation by new means that reflect new policy insights and other changed circumstances." Id. at 2589. The Court remanded the case with instructions to consider "whether the objective of the District Court's 2000 declaratory judgment order0907i.e. satisfaction of the EEOA's appropriate action standard 0907has been achieved." Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2595 (quotations omitted).
Under Horne and earlier Supreme Court decisions, a motion to vacate, such as defendants have filed here, requires the Court to determine whether the "objective" of the court orders has been attained. Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. 165 at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 ("The federal court must exercise its equitable *165 powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials."); see also LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, "it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved").
Defendants attempt, nevertheless, to read Horne as a new rule of law that equates satisfying the constitutional minimum with attaining the objective of a consent decree. (See Defs.' Mem. at 18 (no ongoing constitutional violations because the "current IDD system administered by DDS/DDA ... not only satisfies but greatly surpasses the minimum constitutional standards established by the Fifth Amendment."); 12/17/09 Tr. at 10-11, 13, 16, 42,

48.) This Court cannot accept this exceedingly broad interpretation of Horne, for Horne cannot mean that when a defendant agrees to a series of measures designed to remedy constitutional violations, these agreements are necessarily unenforceable because the measures exceed some ill-defined constitutional floor.
Unlike Horne, the present case involves a consent decree, not a litigated judgment. A consent decree "`embodies an agreement of the parties' and is also `an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.'" Frew, 540 U.S. at 437, 124 S.Ct. 899 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. 748). "[A] federal consent decree must spring from, and serve to resolve, a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction; must come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings; and must further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based." Id. (citing Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063). "Consent decrees entered in federal court must be directed to protecting federal interests." Id.; see also LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 99-100, 2010 WL 1270202, at *13.
The decision in Horne was obviously motivated by the perceived dangers of long-term judicial involvement in local government institutions, noting that "Rule 60(b)(5) serves a particularly important function in ... `institutional reform litigation'" because "injunctions issued in such cases often remain in force for many years, and the passage of time frequently brings about changed circumstances0907 changes ... in governing law ... and new policy insights0907that warrant reexamination of the original judgment." Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2593. The Court in Horne also noted that "institutional reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns," particularly where they "involve[] areas of core state responsibility" or "ha[ve] the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities." Id. at 2593-94. And in dicta it suggests that these problems are exacerbated in cases governed by consent decrees rather than litigated judgments because consent decrees often "go well beyond what is required" by law, and "thereby `improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.'" Id. at 2594 (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 441, 124 S.Ct. 899).
But in Horne, the Supreme Court also endorsed and cited its prior decisions in Rufo and Frew 0907decisions approving the use of consent decrees in institutional reform cases. See Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2593-95; see also Salazar v. District of Columbia, 685 F.Supp.2d 72, 75-76 (D.D.C.2010) (concluding that Horne "reaffirmed the 166 vitality of [Rufo,] 502 U.S. 367, 368, 112 S.Ct. 748 (1992), the leading case setting *166 forth the standards for modifying a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) in institutional reform cases."); LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 94-95, 99-101, 2010 WL 1270202, at *8, *12-*13 (applying Rufo standards).[37] If, as defendants argue, there is an inherent conflict between Horne and Rufo or Frew, the Supreme Court certainly did not acknowledge it. Thus, this Court is bound by those earlier decisions, and it will not adopt defendants' attempt to use Horne to undermine their holdings. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
Significantly for purposes of the present case, Rufo and Frew establish that a consent decree may appropriately go beyond the bare bones of what a court could order without the local government's consent.[38]See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. 748 ("But we have no doubt that, to `save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation,' [the defendants] could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires (almost any affirmative decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily does that), but also more than what a court would have ordered absent the settlement." (citation omitted)); Frew, 540 U.S. at 437-38, 124 S.Ct. 899 (rejecting argument that consent decree violates the Eleventh Amendment on the ground that "state officials [may agree] to bind state governments to significantly more commitments than what federal law requires"); see also Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (consent decree may properly "provide[] broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial"). Indeed, that is one reason why consent decrees are a valuable tool for resolving such cases. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 167 748 (noting *167 that if plaintiffs enter into a consent decree "[a]t least they will avoid further litigation and perhaps will negotiate a decree providing more than what would have been ordered without the local government's consent"); Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522, 106 S.Ct. 3063 ("Consent decrees are entered into by

parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation." (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971)); see also LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 99-101, 2010 WL 1270202, at *12-*13.
In addition, federal district courts retain the power to enforce consent decrees in institutional reform cases. A consent decree" `embodies an agreement of the parties' and is also `an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.' "See Frew, 540 U.S. at 437, 124 S.Ct. 899 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. 748.) "Federal courts are not reduced to approving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, a consent decree may be enforced." Id. at 440, 124 S.Ct. 899.[39]
Because Horne did not involve a consent decree, it had no occasion to address defendants' claim that all they have to do is satisfy the constitutional minimum as opposed to provisions of a consent decree that arguably exceed the minimum but were agreed to by the parties to cure conditions that flow from constitutional violations. But this very claim was addressed and rejected in Rufo. There, the Supreme Court made clear that where there is a consent decree in place, the legally enforceable obligations are "not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 748. Moreover, "[a] proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor," Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748, and a party cannot "require a court to retrace old legal ground, say, by re-making or rejustifying its 168 original `constitutional decision every time an effort [is] made to enforce or modify'" an order. *168 Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2619 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389-390, 392, 112 S.Ct. 748); see also LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 97-101, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11-*13.
Despite this binding precedent, defendants cite to a number of cases decided since Horne where courts have vacated consent decrees. (See Defs.' Reply at 6 & n. 9; Defs.' Notice of Supplemental Authority, Dec. 9, 2009; Defs.' Notice of Supplemental Authority, Mar. 30, 2010). However, none of the cited cases is analogous to our case, for, in each of them, there were compelling circumstances that supported the termination of the consent decree that are not present here.
In three of the four cases, defendants were found to be in full compliance with the consent decree. In United States v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 663 F.Supp.2d 649 (N.D.Ill.2009), the district court terminated a consent decree that addressed segregation in the Chicago school system based on its determination that defendants had complied in good faith with the consent decree and court orders over a reasonable period of time, had eliminated all vestiges of segregation to the extent practicable, and had demonstrated its good faith commitment to the constitutional rights that were the predicate for intervention. Id. at 654, 660-62. Similarly, in Consumer Advisory Board v. Harvey, No. 91-CV-321-P-S, 697 F.Supp.2d 131, 2010 WL 1037593 (D.Me. Mar. 19, 2010), defendants had "achieved substantial compliance" with the consent decree by meeting the benchmarks set forth in the decree itself. Id. at 134, at *3.[40] Finally, in Basel v. Bielaczyz, No. 74-40135-BC, 2009 WL 2843906 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 1, 2009), the court vacated a consent judgment that was entered to correct the substantial backlog of hearing requests before a state agency after noting that "[i]n the years closely following entry of the consent judgment, there is no suggestion on the docket or by the parties that Defendants were ever held in contempt based on a failure to comply with the consent judgment.... The terms of the consent judgment and the history of apparent compliance suggest that the consent judgment served its purpose, and at some point, the need for the injunction passed." Id. at *7.
In contrast, defendants here have a proven 30-year history of noncompliance. And, in fact, based on the representations of defense counsel at oral argument, there is a serious question as to whether defendants are even trying to comply with these orders.[41]
169 *169 The fourth post-Horne case cited by defendants is also inapposite. In Cleveland Fire Fighters for Fair Hiring Practices v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:00-CV-301, 2009 WL 2602366 (N.D.Ohio Aug. 20, 2009), the district court denied a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to extend the term of a consent decree that had been entered in 1975 to address

discrimination in the hiring practices of the Cleveland Fire Department. Id. at *3, *16. The court declined to extend the decree because if found that (1) defendant City has "extended its best efforts to achieve the hiring goals" in the decree; (2) all parties used their best efforts to produce dynamic change; (3) "changes relating to, among other things, this nation's declining economy have taken place, which could not have been anticipated at the time the [decree] was entered into"0907and (4) "circumstances were ... unforeseen and, hence, despite a good faith effort, the City has not satisfied the goals" in the decree. Id. at *13-*14. The court therefore concluded that "[t]he evidence demonstrates that it was not the City's lack of effort, but rather circumstances beyond its control, that resulted in it falling short of satisfying the goals in the [decree]." Id. at *16. Not only was Cleveland Fire Fighters in a different procedural posture because movants were seeking to extend a decree past an already established termination date, but unlike Cleveland Fire Fighters, the record before the Court does not support a finding that defendants have "extended [their] best efforts" to satisfy the obligations in the consent orders or that there are "circumstances beyond its control" that have caused it to fall short.[42] To the contrary, defendants freely admit that they are determined to seek vacatur and not compliance.[43]
170 *170 Indeed, what the courts did in these cases is similar to the analysis courts engaged in before Horne, which was, in considering whether the objects of a consent decree had been met, to look to whether defendants had in good faith complied with the decree. For example, in Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), the Supreme Court remanded with instructions to the district court to decide "whether the [defendant] had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable." Id. at 249-50, 111 S.Ct. 630. Similarly, in Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 564 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.2009), the court affirmed the district court's decision not to extend a consent decree addressing the day-to-day operations of the Los Angeles County bus system because "the evidence presented supported the district court's finding that the imperfections with respect to load factor targets were de minimis in relation to the overall scheme of things." Id. at 1123. And, in McDonald v. Bowersox, No. 89-1086 C(2), 1995 WL 17013058 (E.D.Mo. Sep. 18, 1995), aff'd, McDonald v. Carnahan, 109 F.3d 1319, 1321-22 (8th Cir.1997), the district court dissolved a consent decree regulating day-to-day life on death row, describing the critical question as whether "the underlying constitutional rights addressed through the decree are ensured through defendants' compliance with the decree's provisions in good faith for a reasonable period of time." Id. at *3.
In none of these cases is there support for defendants' novel proposition that they can attain the objects of the consent orders without complying with their terms as long as they meet some ill-defined "constitutional minimum." See LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 109-11, 2010 WL 1270202, at *20-*21; Johnson v. Sheldon, No. 8:87-CV-369, 2009 WL 3231226, at *7 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 30, 2009) (declining to vacate a consent decree despite defendant's 171 "substantial compliance" and "sweeping modifications *171 and improvements to the community mental health system" where decree specified exit criteria, which defendant had not yet fully satisfied); R.C. v. Walley, 475 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1123 (M.D.Ala.2007) ("termination of consent decree is not appropriate unless the decree's purposes have been fully achieved") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does Horne support this proposition.
Unlike Horne, this case involves a thirty-year series of consent orders whereby the District committed itself to take certain actions to remedy the violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. These consent orders are what gives content to otherwise vague rights and substance to a remedy when those rights are violated.[44]. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has recognized, consent decrees are a valuable tool for resolving litigation 0907with benefits to plaintiffs, defendants and the courts. But if the Court were to permit defendants to walk away from their obligations under the consent orders simply because there is a new administration that believes that all it needs to do is achieve the constitutional floor (whatever that means), that would mean that there would be no future consent decrees involving governmental entities. Plaintiffs would have no incentive to enter into consent decrees if the next administration could attack a prior administration's agreement by saying it promised more than was required. And, courts would be unlikely to approve a consent decree if each new administration could force a retrial based on a claim that the constitutional floor has now been met. While Horne may have provided parameters for court involvement in institutional reform litigation and consent decrees, it did not declare their demise. In light of the continued vitality of Rufo and Frew, and as long as the obligations voluntarily assumed by defendants flow from constitutional violations, this Court may not rewrite the existing consent orders so as to

reduce defendants' promise to some ill-defined constitutional floor. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748; LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 110-11, 2010 WL 1270202, at *21. Accordingly, as defendants concede they are not in compliance with the court orders, they have not satisfied Horne's first requirement of showing that the object of the consent orders has been attained.
B. Defendants Have Not Yet Implemented a "Durable Remedy"
Nor have defendants satisfied Horne's second requirement of showing that a "durable remedy" has been implemented. 129 S.Ct. at 2595. What it means to have a "durable remedy" is a question that Horne does not answer, but at a minimum, a "durable" remedy means a remedy that gives the Court confidence that defendants will not resume their violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights once judicial oversight ends. See LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 110-11, 2010 WL 1270202, at *21; Harvey, 2009 WL 5792159, at *11 (suggesting that a "durable remedy" is the equivalent of having in place "a mechanism for future compliance"). Whether there is a durable remedy thus necessarily depends on the actual impacts or outcomes experienced by the plaintiffs. The Court has to be persuaded that defendants are no longer violating plaintiffs' constitutional rights and that they will "not return 172 to [their] former ways." Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247-48, 111 S.Ct. 630. As was the case in LaShawn, *172 701 F.Supp.2d at 111-12, 2010 WL 1270202, at *22, defendants ask the Court to conclude that it has a durable remedy in place because it has implemented permanent structural changes and will remain subject to extensive monitoring even without judicial involvement.
1. Permanent Structural Changes
Defendants focus on the following permanent structural changes: (1) the establishment of the Department on Disability Services ("DDS") as a cabinet-level department with independent personnel and procurement authority; [45] (2) the creation of the Department of Health Care Finance ("DHCF") as an independent, cabinet-level agency that functions as the single-state Medicaid agency with two (to increase to four) staff dedicated to persons with developmental disabilities; (3) increased interagency cooperation between DDS/DDA and DHCF, including routine weekly telephone calls, staff co-location and extensive collaboration on a number of ongoing projects; (4) increased interagency collaboration between DDS/DDA and the Health Regulation and Licensing Administration ("HRLA"), including sharing findings and conducting joint investigations; and (5) the establishment in July 2009 of a Task Force including representatives from DDS/DDA, DHCF, and HRLA to advise the Mayor regarding all services for individuals with developmental disabilities. (Defs.' Mem. at 37-43.)
These structural changes are all extremely positive developments, but they do not necessarily translate into proof of a durable remedy.[46] All of the changes have occurred within the past year or two, and, especially in view of the fact that this litigation has spanned over 30 years and still defendants have not achieved compliance, it is simply too soon to tell whether they will result in improved outcomes for the plaintiffs, and, if so, whether the improvements will be sustained absent judicial involvement. Even defendants admit that systemic change can take three to five years.[47] (Defs.' Mem.' at 70; Defs.' Mem., Ex. 16, Expert Report of Nancy Thaler, July 14, 2008 ("In no state have problems been solved over night. The full transformation of a system 0907the building of 173 structure and processes and the appointment of *173 strong leaders to manage the way it all works together0907takes several years. Three to five years is the standard time frame assumed to be necessary to turn a system around. Progress, that is evidence of the effort to change things, becomes evident only over time."); see also 12/11/08 Trial Tr. at 353 (Test. of Laura Nuss) ("you don't see the outcomes that you want to see as fast as you would like to see them. You know, this is a historically plagued service system. So I think it is taking time to see the outcomes. But, you know, we still see the bad outcomes for individual issues. But we're also seeing a lot of positive ones").
Moreover, with respect to interagency coordination and collaboration, there have been improvements, but the District's performance has been less than consistent given the problems in this area as recently as December 2008. (See 2009 Special Masters' Report at 129 ("Time has shown that the problems with interagency coordination persist under the Fenty Administration as they had under the previous administration, and have resulted in the same sub-standard conditions, lack of necessary medical care, as well as inappropriate and

ineffective day programs.").) For example, defendants' expert, Nancy Thaler, concluded that it was a failure in interagency communication that caused "[t]he recent decision made by MAA to change the Medical Assistance transportation arrangements [to have] a negative impact on the consumers in the DDA program by limiting their capacity to travel to medical and other appointments." (Defs.' Mem., Ex. 16, Addendum to Expert Report of Nancy Thaler at 11-12, Oct. 7, 2008.) Similarly, as of December 2008, there continued to be problems with obtaining guardianships in a timely fashion. (2009 Special Masters' Report at 45, 49 ("The delays in obtaining guardianship for the provision of informed consent for medical and dental treatment of class members ... have continued in the compliance period," leading to defendants continued inability "to provide class members with medical treatment and health care that is timely, particularly for class members who have acute medical needs.").)
2. Monitoring
The second part of defendants' durable remedy argument is their claim that their performance is subject to extensive monitoring, including monitoring by the Superior Court, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), the Quality Trust, and the District's internal monitoring by the Health Regulation and Licensing Administration ("HRLA") and the four units of DDA's Quality Management Division 0907Health and Wellness, Quality Enhancement and Quality Improvement, Incident Management and Enforcement, and Mortality Review. Unfortunately, there are a number of problems with defendants' contention that this monitoring is proof of a durable remedy.
i. Superior Court As 0907 described by defendants, the Superior Court for the District of Columbia plays a significant 174 role in overseeing plaintiffs.[48] However, *174 the Superior Court's authority is limited to treatment decisions
about individual class members, and although this system has been in place since 1979,[49] significant systemic reforms have not been achieved. Moreover, proposed legislation may signification alter the role of the Superior Court. See D.C. Council, B18-0501, Developmental Disabilities Reform Act of 2009 (introduced Oct. 20, 2009). Thus, although Superior Court reviews individual cases and does play an important role, its job is limited and in light of the pending legislation, the Court can hardly count on its continued involvement.
ii. CMS0907According to defendants, CMS, the federal agency that administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs, "already provides extensive oversight for services provided by DDS/DDA." (Defs.' Mem. at 44.) For example, the District must submit an annual report to CMS that addresses both fiscal and quality performance measures, and CMS conducts "unannounced random audits on various areas of its six assurances, including level of care, service plan, qualified providers, health and welfare, administrative oversight, and financial accountability." (Id. (citing Nuss. Decl. ¶ 4, Oct. 7, 2009) (Ex. 4 to Defs.' Mem.).) In addition, according to defendants, "CMS will be initiating expanded... quality-reporting in the next fiscal year that mirrors the expanded quality management requirements now found in the HCBS waiver program." (Id.) Finally, defendants assert that:
From February 2007 to March 2009, CMS engaged in even more intensive monitoring to ensure the then-MAA and DDS/DDA's compliance with the federal HCBS waiver requirements. This included monthly written and telephonic monitoring of a corrective action plan in three of the six assurances: Plan of Care; Health and Welfare; and Administrative Oversight. In March 2009, however, CMS determined that the District had "made major changes in the performance, structure, oversight mechanism, and systems sufficient enough to engage in continuous Quality Improvement (QI)." To qualify for such a finding, a state must demonstrate a robust system of "discovery, remediation and improvement" in all six assurances. Citing the "demonstrated effectiveness of the many newly implemented systems to meet the CMS quality requirements," CMS discontinued its intensified monitoring.
(Defs.' Mem. at 45 (quoting and citing CMS Letter, March 9, 2009 (Ex. 19 to Defs.' Mem.).)[50] Plaintiff responds that the CMS monitoring "is irrelevant ... [because] CMS monitors all states that participate in the federal Medicaid program. All such states are required to file the type of annual reports that the defendants reference." (Pls.' Opp'n at 82.) But more importantly, CMS does not perform regular on-site audits to determine the quality of care provided to class members and other DDA consumers. According to the DOJ counsel who represents

175 plaintiff-intervenors, *175 the District conducts the on-site reviews of community placements and the regional office of CMS, "as part of their quality review that occurs every five years,... requests evidence from the District that it is meeting all the statutory and regulatory assurances required for CMS." (12/18/09 Tr. at 195.) Given CMS' limited role in conducting on-site visits so that it can assess the impact of the systems on class members, the Court can take little solace from the increased role of CMS, which is a recent development that will not begin until sometime this year and will be a far cry from the type of monitoring that has any direct impact on the day-to-day lives of the plaintiffs.
iii. Quality Trust0907As part of the 2001 Plan and as part of the settlement of the Evans litigation, the Quality Trust was established in 2001 as an quasi-independent entity tasked with providing "monitoring, legal services and lay advocacy services for consumers in the District of Columbia." (2001 Plan at 45 (footnote omitted).) As part of its function, the Quality Trust was to monitor services being provided to the over 1400 non-class members and would eventually take over from the Court Monitor the job of monitoring the Evans class members. (Id. at 46; see also supra pp. 135-37.) Specifically, the Quality Trust is tasked with developing and implementing an annual monitoring plan with input from all stakeholders; reviewing all reports and investigations of serious incidents involving DDS consumers; issuing annual reports; and reviewing and providing input regarding DDS budgeting information. (2001 Plan at 47-48.) However, although defendants point to the Quality Trust as an important monitoring component, the Quality Trust has informed the Court in its most recent filing that the "proposal to transition the monitoring function solely to Quality Trust is premature." (Quality Trust Opp'n at 21; see also id. at 27 ("When adequate structures are in place, and an opportunity for meaningful transition from the Court Monitor has occurred, Quality Trust will be able to assume post-litigation monitoring of the Evans class members along with its current monitoring function.").) The Quality Trust estimates that it will take 12-18 months "to have a meaningful transition." (12/17/09 Tr. at 140.) Given this assessment, the Court cannot yet look to the Quality Trust to support defendants' durable remedy argument.[51]
iv. Internal DDS Quality Assurance System0907According to defendants, "internal monitoring methods will ensure that it sustains the extensive reforms now in place." (Defs.' Mem. at 48). Within the Developmental Disabilities Administration, the Quality Management Division ("QMD") "monitors all aspects of the service-delivery system to ensure compliance with federal and local law, national best practices, and applicable court orders." (Id. (quoting 10/7/09 Nuss Decl. ¶ 51).) The QMD is divided into four functional units: Health and Wellness, Quality Enhancement and Quality Improvement ("QE/QI"), Incident Management and Enforcement ("IMEU"), and Mortality Review. (Defs.' Mem. at 48-50 (quoting 10/7/09 Nuss Decl. ¶ 52).)
176 *176 While improvements in internal monitoring are critical to the existence of a durable remedy, over the lengthy history of this case, defendants' monitoring has been woefully inadequate both in terms of the quality and speed of internal investigations of both deaths and serious incidents involving class members and DDA consumers. This problem has continued through 2009. (See, e.g., Quarterly Report of the Court Monitor at 7, December 10, 2009; Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities Monitoring Unit Annual Report and Data Summary at 1, Oct. 1, 20080907Sept. 30, 2009 (concluding that "progress in improving the systems and supports for people with developmental disabilities in the District of Columbia is mixed.... A more consistent and transparent process for investigating Serious Reportable Incidents at DA is also necessary.... Our data indicates that investigation reports are not being completed consistent with policy.)
The flaws in the District's internal monitoring also became apparent recently when the District had to put into receivership one of its largest providers, Individual Development, Inc. ("IDI"). While the District touts this action as an example of "[t]he new institutional culture and collaborative ethos" of officials from DDA, DHCF, and HRLA (Defs.' Mem. re Alternate Remedy at 5), what it conveniently fails to disclose is that many of the problems with this provider that led to the receivership were uncovered by the Court Monitor and reported by the Court Monitor and the plaintiffs, not by the District's internal monitoring apparatus. (See 12/18/09 Tr. at 239.)
In sum, defendants have not demonstrated a durable remedy as required by Horne. While it is true that the District has made significant strides in the last year or two under new leadership, the Court does not have confidence that the agency's progress is durable and self-sustaining. Accord LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 110-12, 2010 WL 1270202, at *21-*22. As documented by the 2009 Special Masters' Report, the three most recent Court Monitor Reports and the 2009 Quality Trust's Monitoring Unit Annual Report and Data Summary, results are, at

best, uneven, and it is far too soon to determine whether the structural changes, some of which are still in the implementation phase, will have the desired impacts on the safety, health and welfare of the class members.
CONCLUSION
In 1978, the parties agreed, and the Court endorsed that agreement in an Order and Judgment, that plaintiffs had certain constitutional rights, that those rights had been violated, and that to remedy those violations, defendants would have to take certain remedial actions. More than 30 years later, defendants ask the Court to relieve them of those obligations under Rule 60(b)(5) on the grounds that enforcing those promises prospectively is no longer equitable. While defendants certainly have the right to file a 60(b)(5) motion, they have the burden to justify their motion. Defendants have failed: the objectives of the original consent decree and subsequent court orders, as incorporated in the 2001 Plan, have not been achieved and defendants have not demonstrated that the prospective enforcement of the court orders would be inequitable or "detrimental to the public interest." Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2593. Accordingly, defendants' motion for vacatur and dismissal will be DENIED.
[1] Plaintiffs are a class of former residents of Forest Haven. As of December 2009, there were 600 class members (see Court Monitor Report at 2, Dec. 10, 2009); the original class has decreased due to the deaths of class members. The sole remaining defendants are the District of Columbia ("the District") and the Mayor Adrian Fenty (collectively "the District" or "defendants"). The United States is also a party, having been permitted to intervene as a plaintiff in January 1977.
[2] However, on March 29, 20100907only a matter of days before the issuance of this Memorandum Opinion0907defendants, having rebuffed all recent efforts to settle this matter and having resisted offering any alternatives to the Special Masters' proposed remedies unless the remedy promised the swift cessation of Court supervision, filed a proposed alternate remedy for ending this litigation. (See Defs.' Mot. for Consideration of Alternative to Appointment of Independent Compliance Administrator and for Entry of Exit Plan, March 29, 2010 ["Defs.' Mot. for Alternate Remedy"].) Obviously, there has been insufficient time for plaintiffs to respond to this proposal, which, if nothing else, as a matter of fairness, should have been submitted during the remedy phase of this litigation so that the parties, the Special Masters, and the Court could have had some chance to address defendants' new 17-page plan, which, on its face, appears to dramatically depart from the definition of outcomes and measurement of success that were agreed to by the parties when they entered into the 2001 Plan.
[3] Although the Court will address the Special Masters' Report and Recommendation in a separate memorandum opinion and order, many of the relevant facts will be included here as they are also relevant to the pending motion.
[4] The Honorable John H. Pratt presided over this case from its inception until his death in August 1995.
[5] The case was reassigned to the Honorable Stanley S. Harris upon Judge Pratt's death in 1995.
[6] The Court appointed Margaret G. Farrell to serve as Special Master.
[7] The imposition of $5 million in contempt fines was reversed by the D.C. Circuit on the ground that the fines amounted to a criminal sanction that could not be imposed without a criminal trial. Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292 (D.C.Cir.2000).
[8] On January 19, 2001, Dr. Jane Haddad was appointed as the first Independent Court Monitor. After her resignation, effective February 10, 2004, the Court appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, Elizabeth Jones as the Court Monitor. Ms. Jones has continued to serve admirably in that capacity and has been of great assistance to the Court and to the parties.
[9] As previously described by the Court, the joint stipulated findings of fact:
painted a bleak picture as to defendants' record of noncompliance. The findings acknowledged that there had been a "serious breakdown" in the District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities and that the system, which had suffered from years of neglect and mismanagement, "urgently need[ed] to be fixed."

Evans, 139 F.Supp.2d at 96-97; see also, e.g., id. at 98 (noting that District's mental retardation and developmental delivery system was "broken" and needed to be "redefined and rebuilt"). The findings noted that defendants' compliance with the prior Court Orders had deteriorated following the closure of Forest Haven in 1991 and that defendants were not complying with many of the requirements of those Orders. Id. at 98. The findings also identified numerous "fundamental problems," including problems with respect to staffing, staff training, and monitoring; management; reporting of and response to unusual incidents; safeguarding of class members' funds; the budgeting process; and the District's Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services waiver. See id. at 98-107.
Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 286-87.
[10] Clarence Sundram was the expert to the Special Master who "conceived, shaped, and drafted significantly" the 2001 Plan. (2001 Plan at 5 n. 1). He was appointed as a co-Special Master on January 30, 2001. (Order, Jan. 30, 2001.)
[11] The Court's order and opinion included extensive factual findings documenting the District's failure to meet each of the goals. Id. at 97-107.
[12] Of that amount, Quality Trust estimates that the District still has $5 million left to contribute. (Hr'g Tr. at 138, Dec. 17, 2009 ["12/17/09 Tr."].)
[13] As noted above (see supra note 2), defendants have now made half-hearted reference to a limited number of orders that they believe should be vacated (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Alternate Remedy at 3 ["Defs.' Mem. re Alternate Remedy"]), but prior to this, defendants steadfastly maintained that modification was not realistic; instead, all orders must be vacated and the case dismissed. (See infra note 34.)
[14] Shortly after the 2001 Plan was approved, Judge Harris retired and this case was reassigned to the undersigned.
[15] Since January 2004, several different individuals have served in this capacity. Presently, the Mayor's appointee is Peter Nickles, the Attorney General for the District of Columbia. But see infra pp. 145-46.
[16] The United States, as plaintiff-intervenor, also filed a motion for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt. The Court denied that motion on March 30, 2007. (Order, Mar. 30, 2007.)
[17] At the August 9, 2007 status conference, the director of DDS, Judith Heumann, informed the Court that (1) the name of the MRDDA was changing to the Developmental Disabilities Administration ("DDA"); and (2) that Laura Nuss would be the new deputy overseeing the DDA. (Hr'g. Tr. at 5, Aug. 9, 2007.)
[18] On September 15, 2008, defendants filed a motion for an order modifying the 2008 Special Masters' Report to find defendants in compliance with the 2007 90-Day Consent Order. (Defs.' Mot. to Modify the Special Masters' Report & Recommendation, Consistent with Defs.' Objections, to Find Defs. in Compliance with the Consent Order of Sept. 12, 2007, at 1, Sept. 15, 2008.) On October 6, 2008, the Court held this motion in abeyance and to the extent it is necessary to address this motion, it will be done in the Court's opinion regarding defendants' objections to the 2008 Special Masters' Report and Recommendation.
[19] John M. Cook, Executive Director, L'Arche, Inc.; Thomas F. Wilds, member of interagency rate-setting task force.
[20] Martha B. Knisley; Lewis H. Spence, lecturer, Harvard School of Education and Kennedy School of Government (remedy).
[21] Laura L. Nuss, Deputy Director of the Department on Disability Services, responsible for the Developmental Disabilities Administration; John McCarthy, Deputy Director of the Department of Health Care Finance and District of Columbia State Medicaid Director; Kathy Sawyer, former consultant and Interim Director, DDS, former Evans Compliance Officer (through Jan. 31, 2008) and former Interim Administrator, MRDDA; Judith Heumann, Director, DDS; Amy Brooks, President of RCM, a provider agency; Lisa Alexander, M.D., DC HRP.

[22] David L. Jackson, M.D., Ph.D, President, Jackson & Assocs. (2007 mortality review and follow-up on recommendations for improvement); Nancy Thaler, Executive Director, National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services; and John Sumner, Ph.D (statistical analysis).
[23] "About one third of the class members (228) receive psychotropic medications," and "305 class members have behavior support plans." (Id. at 35.)
[24] Under their latest filing, defendants propose the period of court monitoring and supervision to end at the end of 2010. (Defs.' Mot. for Alternate Remedy at 2.). Defendants, however, seek to have the Court accept their alternative remedy while still preserving their rights to appeal the denial of their motion for vacatur and dismissal. (Id. at 2 & n. 2.)
[25] It was conceded by the State of Pennsylvania that the plaintiff "ha[d] a right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care," so the Court limited its inquiry to the narrow question of "whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of movement, and training." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (emphasis added). As discussed infra, this fact is relevant because no matter how Youngberg is interpreted, it has no effect on a host of issues covered by the consent decrees and the 2001 Plan. See infra pp. 160-61.
[26] The judge examined two possible theories of the right to habilitation 0907quid pro quo and parens patriae 0907and concluded that both apply to a person who has been involuntarily committed. Clark, 794 F.2d at 95.
[27] Although the Fourth Circuit stated that it rejected the idea that class members "had a right to treatment in the least restrictive environment," Thomas S., 902 F.2d at 253-54, it also affirmed the district court's order which arguably could not exist absent such a right.
[28] The court in Thomas S. also found that "the conditions and services at the state psychiatric institutions are substantially below minimally accepted professional standard" in part because of "[i]nadequate treatment plans and inadequate documentation of their implementation." Id. at 1197. As discussed herein, the constitutional requirement that professional judgment be exercised in making decisions also requires that those decisions be implemented. See infra pp. ___-___.
[29] At oral argument, the Court asked defense counsel: "If I say the '78 [order] is a correct statement and that the subsequent orders incorporate and flow from [it], what happens then? End of my analysis?" Defendants' counsel replied: "I think it is the end of your analysis, Your Honor." (12/17/09 Tr. at 49.)
[30] As discussed infra, defendants also ignore the fact that even if the Court accepts their Youngberg argument, it would justify, at most, partial modification of some court orders pertaining to plaintiffs' right to habilitation and would have no impact on those portions of the orders, arguably the most critical provisions, which address plaintiffs' constitutional rights to safety and health care. (See infra pp. 163-64.)
[31] Significantly, defendants cannot justify their delay by arguing that Horne is the change in law that they are relying on. In fact, defendants filed their motion even before Horne was decided on June 25, 2009.
[32] (See, e.g., 1981 Consent Order; 1983 Consent Order; Jan. 1990 Contempt Order; Apr. 1990 Contempt Order; Order Denying Motion for Civil Contempt Sanctions, May 15, 1991; 1995 Contempt Order; 1996 Order & Remedial Plan; 2001 Joint Findings of Fact, Consent Order, Plan for Compliance; 2004 Coordination Order; 2007 Order and Opinion on Liability; 2007 90-Day Consent Order; 2008 Special Masters' Report re 90-Day Consent Order; 2009 Special Masters' Report.)
[33] As described in the 2009 Special Masters' Report:
The unchallenged testimony of defendants' witness, Laura Nuss, is that there have been 250 placements into less restrictive environments. Defendants have moved a significant number of class members to apartments and group homes. The evidence during the liability phase of this action was that 55% of class members resided in ICFs/MR (366 of 659 class members, 480 F.Supp.2d at 315 n. 43.) That number is down to a little over 250 class members (approximately 40% of the class), and defendants reasonably expect to accelerate that movement with the further development of the community-based waiver and the Money Follows The Person Grant, which is

expected to further reduce the utilization of ICFs/MR by 60% (Nuss Trial Tr. 275:18-21). Based on these findings of fact, the Special Masters find that plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence non-compliance with court orders requiring residential placements in less restrictive settings.
(Id. at 72.)
[34] (See 12/17/2009 Tr. at 22 ("Your Honor, I do not think there is a middle ground."); id. at 24 ("modification as to the plan would be something that would almost be a futile act").) In defendants' brief, they state that if the Court rejects this option, "[i]n the alternative, the Court should at the very least modify the orders currently in force, to eliminate any provisions that are not reasonably necessary to remedy a current and ongoing constitutional violation." (Defs.' Mem. at 7.) However, if defendants want a modification, it is their burden to show the Court that the modification is narrowly tailored to the change in circumstances. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 748 ("[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree. If the moving party meets this standard, the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance."). Defendants have made no effort to offer a modification suitably tailored to the arguably changed circumstances. ( See 12/17/09 Tr. at 39 ("Your Honor, in all candor, if you do not vacate the orders, we would have to look at them anew and see if any0907 if0907what modifications could be made to them that are realistic.")); see also See LaShawn v. Fenty, No. 89-CV-1754, 701 F.Supp.2d 84, 110-11, 2010 WL 1270202, at *21 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2010) (defendants similarly did not "propose[] a modification tailored to the alleged changed circumstances" leaving the court without "an adequate proposal to consider"). Moreover, they have steadfastly refused to invoke the procedures provided for by the 2001 Plan (see 2001 Plan at 6-10) or under Rule 60(b)(5) for modification or termination of orders that have been achieved or those that are no longer relevant or obtainable.
[35] When asked to explain what a minimal right to medical care encompasses, defense counsel suggested that plaintiffs' right to medical care was limited to the "health implications" of the "very minimal" "duty to keep them safe and free from unreasonable restraints." (12/17/09 Tr. at 100.) As an example of what might be covered, defense counsel suggested "if a person needs certain treatment so that they can be free from unreasonable restraints, yes, that is part of what Youngberg dictates." (Id.) Or, if a person has a tumor, there may be a some duty to act if the person "may not be safe, depending on the invasiveness of the tumor." (Id. at 101.) Not only is it incomprehensible that an involuntarily committed developmentally disabled person is not entitled to more than counsel's meaningless and inadequate level of care, but counsel's inability to provide any workable definition illustrates the inherent difficulty prescribing in the abstract what services are required so that a constitutionally protected right will be something more than a hollow promise.
[36] During oral argument, the Court asked defense counsel whether it mattered if "the healthcare provider's recommendations as to the class members are not implemented in a timely manner," to which counsel responded, "I don't think Youngberg speaks to the timeliness of the matter." (12/17/09 Tr. at 103.)
[37] As noted by Judge Hogan, 701 F.Supp.2d at 100-1, 2010 WL 1270202, at *13, the D.C. Circuit in LaShawn upheld a decree even assuming that it "imposes requirements beyond those of District law." LaShawn A. v. Barry, No. 94-7044, 1996 WL 679301, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Oct. 30, 1996).
[38] Even without consent, a court may impose a remedy that goes beyond ordering defendants to satisfy the constitutional floor. Federal court decrees "exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation," Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282, 97 S.Ct. 2749, but "where ... a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not `exceed' the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the condition that offends the Constitution." Id. (quotation omitted). For example, in Milliken, "[t]he `condition' offending the Constitution is Detroit's de jure segregated school system, which was so pervasively and persistently segregated that the District Court found that the need for the educational components flowed directly from constitutional violations by both state and local officials. These specific educational remedies, although normally left to the discretion of the elected school board and professional educators, were deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed in terms of education had these four components been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from pervasive de jure racial segregation." Id.

Significantly, this same principle was adopted in Horne, where the Court recognized that federal court decrees are not limited to the constitutional floor in awarding relief for a violation of law. Rather, federal court decrees do not "exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that ... flow[s] from such a violation." See Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2595.
[39] As noted by the Supreme Court in Local No. 93:
Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator points out, [p]ublic law settlements are often complicated documents designed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-of-court settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to continuing oversight and interpretation by the court.... A consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling litigation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be easier to channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of a consent decree into a single forum-the court that entered the decree-thus avoiding the waste of resources and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting obligations.... For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become widely used as devices to facilitate settlement.
478 U.S. at 524 n. 13 (quotations and citations omitted).
[40] Notably, Clarence Sundram was the Special Master in Harvey, which had a similar factual history to our case. One key difference, though, is that in his final report to the district court, Special Master Sundram concluded that the defendants were in compliance and the time was ripe for a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to vacate the consent decree. See Final Report of the Special Master, Consumer Advisory Bd. v. Harvey, 2009 WL 5792159, at *11-*12 (D.Me. Oct. 9, 2009).
[41] As explained by defense counsel:
MS. EFROS: I think what matters is, looking at it today, this is not something that this administration embraces. It is not something that this administration necessarily needs to embrace.
THE COURT: It does as long as the orders exist. I'm sorry to tell you that. You may not like to embrace it happily, but there are Court orders out there.
MS. EFROS: That is the purpose of our motion today.
THE COURT: Sure.
MS. EFROS: If you deny our motion, then we're left with an appeal or conforming to the Court order. But the very purpose of our motion today is to say that these orders should be vacated.
THE COURT: Yes. But until and unless they are, you are, I hope, agreeing they bind you?
MS. EFROS: Until they are vacated, we are not consciously ignoring any Court order.
THE COURT: Well, that's not much of a consolation. All you are saying is you are not intentionally committing contempt of Court.
(12/17/09 Tr. at 20-21.)
[42] While defendants refer to the obligations imposed on the District as having become ever more "exacting and onerous" (Defs.' Mot. to Vacate at 2), it is unclear whether defendants argue that any circumstance or obstacle makes the decree "unworkable" or "substantially more onerous." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748; see also NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d 32, 36 (D.C.Cir.2000) ("Compliance over an extended period of time is not in and of itself sufficient to warrant relief.... [P]arties who have successfully sought modification have also established events or changed circumstances which `make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous,' make the decree `unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,' or make `enforcement [of the decree]

detrimental to the public interest.'"). But of course, Rufo teaches that "[i]nternal compliance mechanisms instituted to effectuate the decree ... and hurdles inherent in a consent decree's entry do not count as `obstacles.' "Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d at 35-36 (citing Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748). Moreover, other than a reference to the District's financial situation (see infra note 43), defendants, as in LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 101-2, 2010 WL 1270202, at *14, provide no substance to their conclusory claim that the consent decrees and 2001 Plan should be viewed as "exacting and onerous."
[43] Defendants also argue in passing that the Court must take account of the District's dire economic climate and budget shortfall of $583.5 million. (Defs.' Mem. at 54.) But defendants do not complain about the costs of providing services to the class members, but rather they want to be relieved of the costs associated with the Special Masters, the Court Monitor, the Quality Trust, and the attorneys' fees incurred in litigating this case. (Id. at 55.) While "[f]inancial constraints may not be used to justify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional violations, ... they are a legitimate concern of government defendants in institutional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately considered in tailoring a consent decree modification." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 392-93, 112 S.Ct. 748. However, in this case, as in LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 101-2, 2010 WL 1270202, at *14, defendants have failed to demonstrate that financial circumstances warrant modification.
Most importantly, the District's lengthy history of intransigence and noncompliance have been the major factors in the increased need for monitoring, reliance on Special Masters, and the large costs and fees incurred by plaintiffs and their counsel. Second, the funding of the Quality Trust has almost been completed and is arguably not within the Court's power to modify; the responsibilities of the Special Masters have declined; and the Monitor returned over $180,000 of her budget in an effort to reduce costs. (12/17/09 Tr. at 115.) Third, this litigation has actually resulted in cost savings for the District, since as a result of the efforts of the Court, the plaintiffs, and the Special Masters, many class members and DDA customers have been put on the waiver, thereby shifting costs from the District to the federal government. (Id. at 27-28.) This effort, while now reaching fruition (see supra p. 161), was started long before this administration and thus can hardly be credited only to the efforts of the current leadership. Fourth, as Judge Hogan held, the costs of monitoring are not properly considered to be obstacles. LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 101-2, 2010 WL 1270202, at *14 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (holding that anticipated costs of compliance with an injunctive order are not changed circumstances under Rufo )). Fifth, defendants do not address the impact from the three-year multi-million dollar grant the District received from CMS in July 2008 via its "Money Follows the Person Rebalancing Demonstration Program" (Defs.' Mem. at 27) or the "Medicaid Infrastructure Grant," that was "awarded to DHCF by CMS to improve the DDA's day and vocational service system." (Defs.' Mem. re Alternate Remedy at 7.) Finally, if financial concerns are truly a problem, it is incumbent on the District to propose a specific modification for addressing the shortfall, as opposed to advocating for wholesale dismissal of the case so that the District can escape future court supervision and independent monitoring.
[44] (See Pls.' Opp'n, Ex. 27 (charting flow of orders, starting with the rights recognized in the 1978 Consent Order and then identifying the remedial actions defendants were ordered to take to remedy the violations of those rights).)
[45] Defendants also refer to the fact that "the District has recruited high-quality and dedicated leadership for the new agency" (Defs.' Mem. at 38), which is clearly an important development in this case given the often inadequate and transitory nature of management over the last 30 years. However, as defense counsel conceded during argument, a "durable" remedy cannot depend on the retention of particular personnel. (12/17/09 Tr. at 29 ("I don't think it does depend on Ms. Nuss staying, although we certainly want Ms. Nuss to stay").) Indeed, defendants' recent filing suggests that if the Court imposes the remedy recommended in the 2009 Special Masters' Report, Ms. Nuss will decline to remain in her job. (See Defs.' Mem. re Alternate Remedy at 3-8.)
[46] Similar arguments were raised by the District and rejected by LaShawn, 701 F.Supp.2d at 101-2, 2010 WL 1270202, at *13-*14 and by the D.C. Circuit in Harris Teeter, 215 F.3d at 36, where the Court refused to terminate a consent decree even though defendant had instituted personnel changes and an internal reorganization.
[47] Even in their latest filing, defendants acknowledges that there are remaining systemic weaknesses specific to the District's IDD system: access to high-quality behavioral health services; clinical services, including physical therapy (PT), occupational therapy (OT), speech therapy (SPL), and nutrition services; and transformation of the

legacy facility-based day services to person-centered habilitation and vocational-preparation programs that provide quality habilitative, vocational and community-integrated services appropriate to each consumer's needs and preferences.
(Defs.' Mem. re Alternate Remedy at 11-12.)
[48] According to defendants,
any person brought before the Court (to be admitted or committed to DDS/DDA) has a right to be represented by retained or appointed counsel. See SCR-MRP 11; see also D.C OFFICIAL CODE § 7-1304.12(2) (authorizing fees to be a paid to appointed counsel). Moreover, any interested party has the right to initiate an action in Superior Court to compel DDS to accord persons with IDD the rights afforded them under District law. D.C OFFICIAL CODE § 7-1305.13(a). Indeed, each person committed to DDS/DDA supervision is entitled to an annual judicial hearing to determine whether the person has "benefitted from... habilitation." Id. at § 1304.11(a) (1). These procedures conclusively demonstrate that members of the Evans class have an adequate remedy at law for any potential future failure by the District to provide them with appropriate treatment.
(Defs.' Mem. at 43-44.)
[49] See The Mentally Retarded Citizens Constitutional Rights and Dignity Act of 1978, effective March 3, 1979 (D.C. Law 2-137; D.C. Official Code § 7-1301.02 33 et seq.).
[50] Of course, prior to CMS issuing its Letter of March 9, 2009, the District had been put on a "corrective action plan"0907a program of intensified monitoring0907due to the fact that the District failed to substantially meet three of the six waiver assurances. (Defs. Mem., Ex. 19; see also Court Monitor Rep. at 27, Jan. 26, 2007.)
[51] The District's proposed alternate remedy, set forth in a motion filed just days ago (see supra note 2), the Quality Trust's responsibility for on-the-ground monitoring appears to have shrunk and it is now described as an "active[] members of oversight committees that review findings generated by these systems and initiatives and contribute to recommendations for improvements going forward." (Defs.' Mem. re Alternate Remedy at 13.) Obviously, if its remedy were to be adopted, the Quality Trust's role (despite the District's obligation to fund it with over $30 million) would be reduced to "ad hoc monitoring." (Id., Ex. A at 7.)
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 35 F.Supp.2d 88 (1999)
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v. Anthony A. WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.
No. Civ. 76-293-SSH.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
February 10, 1999.
Joseph B. Tulman, District of Columbia School of Law, Washington, DC, Kelly Bagby, University Legal Services, Washington, DC, for Joy Evans, Venita Felton, Christine Exton, Joseph Scates, William Brown, John Kennedy.
Laurie J. Weinstein, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, Richard James Farano, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
David T. Ralston, Jr., Hopkins & Sutter, Washington, DC, for We Care Projects, Inc.
89*89 Barbara J. Mann, Melvin W. Bolden, Jr., Office of Corporation Counsel, D.C., Washington, DC, for Marion Barry, District of Columbia.
Margaret G. Farrell, Chevy Chase, MD, special master.
OPINION
STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge.
Before the Court are plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, plaintiff-intervenor's memorandum in support thereof, defendants' motion for modification of the 1983 Consent Order, the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the preceding motions, and related pleadings. Also before the Court are defendants' demand for a jury trial and related pleadings. On July 22, 1998, the parties presented their positions to the Court in a hearing on the legal issues pertinent to the pending motions. Upon full consideration of all the pleadings and the entire record, the Court adopts in part, and rejects in part, the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.[1]
Background
Plaintiffs are members of a class consisting of former residents of the long-since closed Forest Haven facility. An integral part of this litigation has been the relocation of the class members from Forest Haven to community living arrangements with adequate habilitation suited to each class member. To this end, the Court has entered numerous orders,

including consent orders agreed to by the parties to safeguard the rights of class members and ensure their adequate and appropriate habilitation.
A Consent Order was entered on February 8, 1983 ("1983 Consent Order"). To help ensure a viable network of private vendors which would provide the class members with appropriate care ("Evans, care providers"), the Consent Order required defendants to pay for goods and services within 30 days of the receipt of an acceptable voucher. Consent Order, Feb. 8, 1983, Section IX, Para. 10. On October 11, 1995, the Court found defendants in contempt of the 1983 Consent Order for failure to make timely vendor payments during the years 1994 and 1995. The Court appointed a Special Master to recommend a plan for purgation of defendants' contempt.
The Special Master submitted a report on January 22, 1996, and a supplemental report on June 17, 1996. On August 2, 1996, the Court issued an Order adopting in large part the Special Master's recommendations. In that Order, the Court updated its October 11, 1995, finding of contempt by concluding that defendants continued to be in contempt between October 11, 1995, and June 17, 1996 (when the Special Master submitted her supplemental report). In the "Order Adopting Proposed Findings of Fact of Special Master," the Court stated in part:
Defendants have, for over two years, chronically and unapologetically violated the terms of nearly every aspect of this Court's multiple Consent Orders. Defendants' unrelenting contempt of this Court's orders and their seeming inability to bring themselves into compliance therewith, have created chaos for the care providers vested with day-to-day responsibility for the members of this plaintiff class....
... Now, the point has been reached beyond which this Court will not tolerate 90*90 further and continuing incidences of contempt by defendants. Any further noncompliance with this Court's longstanding Consent Orders, and noncompliance with the Remedial Plan issued this date, must be expected by defendants to result in serious consequences.
Accompanying that Order, the Court also issued a Remedial Plan ("Remedial Plan"). The Remedial Plan reasserted defendants' obligation (originally imposed in the 1983 Consent Order) to pay acceptable vendors' vouchers within 30 days of their submission (Section I.B). The Remedial Plan also established the conditions by which defendants could purge their civil contempt as adjudicated by the Court's October 11, 1995, and the August 2, 1996, Orders. Section I.D of the Remedial Plan states:
Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED, that should defendants fail to purge their contempt by paying acceptable provider invoices within 30 days of submission, as required by this Remedial Plan, at the end of the first month in which defendants report that there are outstanding Medicaid payments due but not paid within 30 days of submission of an acceptable invoice, defendants shall be assessed a coercive civil fine of $5,000 a day, until the overdue payments are made.... It hereby further is
ORDERED, that with respect to non-Medicaid payments found to be overdue, defendants shall be assessed a coercive civil fine of twice the amount overdue.... It hereby further is

ORDERED, that civil fines shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court and placed in a segregated account, from which the Court, at the recommendation of the Special Master, may order payment to providers.
Such fines are to be calculated by relying upon the information provided by defendants' sworn monthly submissions to the Court (required by Section I.C of the Remedial Plan) listing Medicaid and non-Medicaid vendors who have not been paid within the required 30day time period.
On April 2, 1997, plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions for defendants' alleged violation of the provisions of the Remedial Plan requiring timely payment of Evans care providers.[2] Defendants filed their opposition to plaintiffs' motion for sanctions as well as their own motion for modification of the 30-day payment period which was established by the 1983 Consent Order and reaffirmed by the Remedial Plan.
Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor contend that defendants have conceded, in their sworn submissions to the Court, their failure to comply with the provisions of the Remedial Plan regarding timely payment of vendors, and that sanctions should therefore be imposed. Defendants contend that no sanctions should be imposed because they were unable to comply with the timeliness provisions of the Remedial Plan. Defendants also request modification of both the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan pursuant to Federal Rules 60(b)(5) and (6) to extend the 30-day payment period to 45 days, a proposal which is opposed by both plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor. Defendants further contend that even if sanctions were applicable, the sanctions may not properly be imposed absent a criminal jury trial because the proposed fines allegedly are criminal rather than civil in nature.
Upon consideration of plaintiffs' and defendants' motions, the Special Master filed her Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 26, 1998. The Special Master concluded that defendants owed more than $6 million in fines pursuant to the Remedial Plan.[3] She concluded that half of that amount is due for defendants' failure to purge their 1995 contempt by complying with the timeliness provisions of the 91*91 Remedial Plan. She found that the other half is due for defendants' violation of the Remedial Plan's independent provision reasserting the 1983 Consent Order's requirement that defendants pay uncontested vendors' vouchers within 30 days of submission. Such fines, the Special Master concluded, automatically are triggered by the Remedial Plan's own provisions upon defendants' admission of noncompliance and, thus, no motion by plaintiffs should be necessary to prompt defendants' payment of the appropriate fines. She also proposed amendment of the Remedial Plan to clarify that the fines are automatic and to provide for their implementation. The Special Master also recommended rejecting defendants' motion to modify the 30-day payment period for vendors, as required in the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan.
In addition, the Special Master offered several independent modifications to the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan: (1) changing the amount of the per diem fines for delinquent Medicaid payments and replacing the current fines for delinquent non-Medicaid payments with per diem fines; (2) including a provision that would permit forgiveness of per diem fines assessed for failure to make timely payments if defendants paid vendors within 45 days of the submission of uncontested vouchers; and (3) requiring the Special Master,

within a year of the date of this Opinion, to propose a plan for the disposition of the fines paid by defendants, including suggestions regarding their utilization to establish a mechanism to protect the habilitation interests of the plaintiff class after the hoped-for conclusion of this now 23-year-old lawsuit.
On February 9, 1998, defendants appealed the Special Master's recommendations to this Court. On February 20, 1998, defendants filed a jury demand and their objections to the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Also on that date, plaintiffs filed their response and objections to the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the United States filed a memorandum in support of the Special Master's recommendations.[4] On July 22, 1998, the Court held a hearing on the legal issues raised by the pending motions and the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (and the objections and responses thereto).
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The Court adopts the Special Master's conclusion that defendants owe substantial fines due to their noncompliance with the purgation conditions of the Remedial Plan, and relies on her factual determinations in calculating the amount owed.[5] Thus, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. However, the Court does not adopt the Special Master's position that such fines are automatic in nature and that no action on the part of plaintiffs, plaintiffintervenor, or the Court is necessary to render them due. Accordingly, the Court also declines to accept her recommendation that the Remedial Plan 92*92 be amended to clarify the automatic nature of the fines and to provide an administrative mechanism for their collection. As to defendants' motion for modification of the 30-day period for payment of vouchers, the Court adopts the Special Master's recommendation that it be denied.
The Court also adopts the Special Master's independent suggestions that, for the sake of comparability and efficiency, the per diem fine for delinquent payment of Medicaid vouchers be increased and that the non-Medicaid fine be changed to a per diem fine. Furthermore, the Court adopts her recommendation that the Remedial Plan be amended to permit forgiveness of fines accrued by defendants for failure to make required payments within the 30-day period when payment is made within 45 days of the submission of an uncontested Medicaid or non-Medicaid voucher. Finally, the Court adopts the Special Master's recommendation that the Remedial Plan be amended to require the Special Master to submit a report including suggestions for the disposition of the fines paid by defendants and for steps to bring this extraordinarily protracted litigation to an end, both with the goal of protecting the plaintiff class' habilitation needs.
I. Sanctions
A. The Imposition of Sanctions
It is indisputable that defendants were held in contempt by the Court's Orders of October 11, 1995, and August 2, 1996, for their failure to comply with the timely payment provisions of the 1983 Consent Order. It also is not disputed that the Remedial Plan included

provisions allowing defendants to purge their adjudicated contempt by paying acceptable vouchers within 30 days of their submission, and that the Remedial Plan imposed penalties for noncompliance with the timeliness requirement. Defendants — as indicated by their own sworn submissions to this Court and acknowledged in their pleadings — do not dispute that they failed repeatedly to make timely payments of vendors as required by the Remedial Plan to purge their contempt.
Nonetheless, defendants assert that they should not be subject to sanctions because they were simply incapable of paying all acceptable vouchers within 30 days of their submission, and thus, compliance with the purgation condition requiring timely payment was impossible. They further argue that the proposed sanctions are criminal rather than civil in nature, and, therefore, that they are entitled to criminal procedures prior to the imposition of such sanctions. The Court adopts the Special Master's findings and conclusions in Sections II.E, II.F, and III of her report and thus rejects defendants' contention that changed circumstances render the imposition of sanctions impermissible or unjust. The Court also adopts the Special Master's analysis in Section II.C regarding the nature of the sanctions to be imposed and concludes, as she did, that they are civil rather than criminal in nature and that provision of criminal procedures prior to the imposition of sanctions is thus unwarranted. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants have failed to comply with the purgation conditions of the Remedial Plan and that the imposition of sanctions is warranted for defendants' failure to purge the 1995 and 1996 findings of contempt.[6]
93*93 B. The Nature of the Fines
Plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenor, and the Special Master contend that the Remedial Plan establishes automatic fines for noncompliance with its conditions of purgation or its independent requirement that defendants pay vendors within 30 days of the submission of an acceptable voucher. The Court rejects the characterization of the fines as being automatic. This Opinion requires defendants to pay sanctions for their failure to comply with the Remedial Plan's purgation and payment requirements, thereby ending, as of the date of this Opinion, the period of contempt established by the Court's Order of October 11, 1995, as updated by its August 2, 1996, Order. The imposition of fines after the date of this Opinion therefore would require a future finding of contempt.[7] A new finding of contempt requires notice and a hearing. The automatic imposition of sanctions upon the required submission of statements by defendants indicating any noncompliance with the timeliness provisions of the 1996 Order would present both due process concerns and administrative difficulties.
First, the Court believes that making the fines automatic presents a due process problem. By characterizing the fines as automatic, plaintiffs essentially seek summary imposition of fines for an indirect contempt.[8] The requirement of due process prohibits summary adjudication of indirect contempts. United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). Instead, the party charged with indirect civil contempt must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of sanctions for such conduct. Id. at 827, 828, 114 S.Ct. 2552; Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1127 & n. 5 (3d Cir.1990) (explaining that notice and a hearing before the imposition of contempt sanctions is important so that the "parties have an opportunity to explain the conduct deemed deficient ... and that a record will be available to facilitate appellate

review."). Furthermore, during such civil proceedings, the party moving for contempt bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a court order was in effect, (2) the order required certain conduct by the respondent, (3) and the respondent failed to comply with the court's order. SEC v. Bankers Alliance Corp., 881 F.Supp. 673, 678 (D.D.C.1995). The party facing contempt sanctions must be allowed the opportunity to raise any applicable defenses. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552; Bankers Alliance Corp., 881 F.Supp. at 678 (noting the potential availability of an impossibility defense to a party opposing the imposition of sanctions).
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the automatic imposition of fines would violate the prohibition against summary adjudication of an indirect contempt by depriving defendants of an opportunity to be heard and by eliminating the moving party's burden of demonstrating the propriety of the imposition of sanctions.
Even if no due process concerns existed, the Court would not treat the fines as automatic because of the practical difficulties which would ensue. Imposing automatic fines would shift the burden of several monitoring responsibilities from the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor to the Court, i.e., defendants' compliance with the Remedial Plan, defendants' submission of "automatic fines" to the Clerk's Office, and the correctness of their calculations regarding the amount of fines. If the fines were treated as automatic, the Court would be required to review all of defendants' submissions from March of 1997 94*94 through the present to determine the amount of sanctions due for their violations of the Remedial Plan's timeliness provisions without the benefit of briefing by the parties and analysis by the Special Master. The Court would have to undertake such a review also for the violation of other purgation conditions (such as those regarding case worker/patient ratios). Furthermore, disputes would likely arise regarding the precise amount of sanctions due even if defendants were to submit automatic fines for delinquent payments.
The Court believes that the Special Master's and parties' legitimate desire for quick resolution of motions for sanctions can be balanced with due process concerns by requiring the submission of such motions directly to the Court, which would then refer them to the Special Master for a report when some exceptional condition requires it.[9] Accordingly, the Court concludes that characterization of the fines as automatic would have little practical benefit and would tend to increase the chances of error in the assessment of fines. The Court therefore limits its imposition of fines at this time to the conduct specifically raised as the basis for the imposition of sanctions in plaintiffs' motion.[10]
C. Calculation of Sanctions
Plaintiffs' motion, citing defendants' sworn submissions to the Court, asserts that defendants made delinquent payments to vendors in the months of October, November, and December of 1996 and January and February of 1997. The Court adopts the Special Master's calculations in Section II.D for the number of days that defendants were delinquent in paying Medicaid vouchers and the amount of the overdue non-Medicaid vouchers for this period.[11]
Regarding the Medicaid vouchers, defendants made no overdue payments for the months of October and November. However, their payments were overdue by 13 days in

December, 5 days in January, and 13 days in February, for a total of 31 days. The Remedial Plan provides that a $5,000 per diem fine shall be imposed for each voucher that is not paid within the required 30-day period. Accordingly, the Court imposes $155,000 in civil sanctions for defendants' failure to comply with the purgation conditions established by the Remedial Plan with respect to the timely payment of Medicaid vouchers for the period of October 1996 through February 1997.
Regarding the non-Medicaid vouchers, defendants made 31 late non-Medicaid payments totaling $632,312 in October, 71 late payments totaling $1,141,896 in November, 35 late payments totaling $414,534 in December, 18 late payments totaling $156,678 in January, and two late payments in February totaling $125,250. The total of the late payments during these months is $2,470,670. The Remedial Plan provides that, if defendants make late payments of non-Medicaid vouchers (i.e., more than 30 days after the submission of an acceptable voucher), defendants must pay a fine equaling twice the amount of each voucher. Accordingly, the Court imposes $4,941,340 in civil sanctions on defendants for their failure to pay non-Medicaid vouchers timely during the period October 1996 through February 1997. Therefore, for their delinquent payment of both Medicaid and non-Medicaid vouchers, defendants owe a total of $5,096,340 in civil sanctions. Defendants shall submit such funds to the Clerk of the Court within 90 days of the date of this Opinion.
95*95 II. Modification of the Remedial Plan
The Court adopts the Special Master's findings and conclusions regarding defendants' motion for modification of the Remedial Plan (Section III) and, accordingly, rejects defendants' motion to expand the payment period from 30 days to 45 days. The Court adopts in part, and rejects in part, the Special Master's proposed modifications of the Remedial Plan.
A. Modification To Forgive Fines for Failure to Pay Vendors Within 30 Days When Defendants Make Payment Within 45 Days
The Court adopts the Special Master's recommendation, with slight modification of her proposed language, that the Remedial Plan be modified to permit defendants to purge any future contempt for not paying vendors within 30 days by making payment within 45 days of submission of the vendors' vouchers.[12] See Section IV of the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This modification differs from defendants' motion to modify the 30-day payment period for vendors to allow a 45-day payment period. Under the Court's modification, defendants still are required to make payment within 30 days, but if defendants make payment between the 31st day and the 45th day, defendants will have purged the per diem fines incurred since the 31st day and need not pay any fines. If, however, defendants do not make payment after the 45th day, the defendants will have missed their opportunity to purge their contempt, and the per diem fines will be assessed from the 31st day forward.

Currently, the provisions of Section I.D of the Remedial Plan articulating sanctions for untimely payments state:
Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED, that should defendants fail to purge their contempt by paying acceptable provider invoices within 30 days of submission, as required by this Remedial Plan, at the end of the first month in which defendants report that there are outstanding Medicaid payments due but not paid within 30 days of submission of an acceptable invoice, defendants shall be assessed a coercive civil fine of $5,000 a day, until the overdue payments are made.
* * * * * *
It hereby further is
ORDERED, that with respect to non-Medicaid payments found to be overdue, defendants shall be assessed a coercive civil fine of twice the amount overdue....
These provisions shall be amended to read:[13]
Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED, that should defendants fail to pay acceptable Medicaid invoices within 30 days of their submission, as required by this Remedial Plan, defendants shall be assessed a coercive fine of $10,000 a day for each day, beginning from the 31st day, that each overdue invoice remains unpaid, except that no fines shall be assessed if payment of such acceptable Medicaid invoices is made on or before the 45th day after the submission of such invoices.
* * * * * *
It hereby further is
ORDERED, that should defendants fail to pay acceptable non-Medicaid invoices within 30 days of their submission, as required by this Remedial Plan, defendants shall be assessed a coercive fine of $1,000 a day for each day that each overdue invoice remains unpaid, except that no fines shall be assessed if payment of such acceptable non-Medicaid invoices is made on or before the 45th day after the submission of such invoices.
96*96 B. Modification of the Amount of the Medicaid Per Diem Fines and the Structure of the non-Medicaid Fines
The Court adopts the Special Master's proposal that the fine provisions of the Remedial Plan be modified to increase the per diem fine for untimely Medicaid payments to $10,000 and to replace the existing sanction for non-Medicaid payments (doubling the amount of

overdue payments) with a per diem fine of $1,000 for each overdue invoice that remains unpaid. The purpose of altering these payments is to make the fines assessed for untimely vendor payments more comparable and efficient.[14] The text of the sanctions provisions as amended appears in the preceding section.
C. Modification of Reporting Requirements
The Court also adopts, as modified, the Special Master's recommendation that defendants' reporting requirements be amended to reflect the preceding modification in the structure of sanctions for untimely payments. Currently, Section I.C of the Remedial Plan requires defendants to submit a sworn statement to the Court each month which includes the following information:
1. A list of care providers for the class who have not been paid full Medicaid reimbursement within 30 calendar days after the submission of their invoices to First Health or another Medicaid processing contractor. The list shall indicate for each unpaid care provider the amount of overdue payment and the number of days by which the payment is overdue.
2. A list of all other class care providers to whom payment has not been made within 30 calendar days of their submission of acceptable invoices to MRDDA, or any other agency of the District of Columbia, for services provided to plaintiffs ordered by the Court's several Consent Orders. As with requirement [1] above, the list shall contain for each care provider the amount of overdue payment and the number of days by which the payment is overdue. (A provider invoice submitted to MRDDA is "overdue" if it has not been paid within 8 working days or 15 calendar days, whichever is longer, after the DHS Controller has assigned the invoice a voucher number.)
Those provisions shall be amended to read as follows:
1. A list of care providers for the class who have not been paid full Medicaid reimbursement within 30 calendar days after the submission of their acceptable invoices to First Health or another Medicaid processing contractor. The list shall indicate for each unpaid care provider the amount of overdue payment and the number of days by which the payment is overdue. The number of days for which each payment — excluding vouchers which were paid within 45 days of submission — is overdue shall be added together by defendants and the resulting total shall be included in an easily identifiable section of defendants' submission. Defendants shall also include a clear and separate statement of any reduction (due to the payment of vouchers within 45 days of their submission since the previous month's statement to the Court) in the total number of days forming the basis for the calculation of any fines for the preceding month.
2. A list of all other class care providers to whom payment has not been made within 97*97 30 calendar days of their submission of acceptable invoices to MRDDA, or any other agency of the District of Columbia, for services provided to plaintiffs ordered by the Court's several Consent Orders. As with requirement 1 above, the list shall contain for each care provider the amount of overdue payment and the number of days by which the payment is overdue. (A provider invoice submitted to MRDDA is "overdue" if it has not been paid within 8 working days or 15 calendar days, whichever is longer, after the DHS Controller has

assigned the invoice a voucher number.) The number of days for which each payment — excluding vouchers which were paid within 45 days of their submission — is overdue shall be added together by defendants and the resulting total shall be included in an easily identifiable section of defendants' submission. Defendants shall also include a clear statement of any reduction (due to the payment of vouchers within 45 days of their submission since the previous month's statement to the Court) in the total number of days forming the basis for the calculation of any fines for the preceding month.
D. Report by the Special Master Regarding the Disposition of the Fines and Closure
Finally, the Court adopts, as modified, the Special Master's recommendation that the Remedial Plan be amended to require her submission of a report within a year of the date of this Opinion — developed, it is hoped, with the full cooperation of all parties — suggesting (1) constructive ways to use the fines owed by defendants and (2) steps toward ending the Court's jurisdiction over this case. Specifically, the Court directs submission of this report by November 1, 1999. The uses for the fines and the steps to be taken by the parties that would permit the Court to terminate the case should be formulated in a way that would protect the interests of the plaintiff class thereafter.
Although defendants object to use of fines owed by defendants stemming from these civil sanctions toward habilitation of the plaintiff class, the Court strongly agrees with the Special Master that such a use is not only permissible, but would be in the interest of all the parties, including defendants. Formulating a plan by means of which plaintiffs' adequate habilitation could be permanently assured would facilitate achieving the end of a case which has been before the Court for over twenty years and has considerably expended the resources and energy of all involved.
Furthermore, the Court finds meritless defendants' contention that requiring the Special Master to submit a report on the disposition of the fines would constitute an impermissible expansion of her authority to supervise remediation. The issuance of such a report easily falls within the "well-established tradition of allowing use of special masters to oversee compliance" with court orders. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 954 (D.C.Cir.1998). Such a report would merely suggest ways in which the coercive fines could be used to implement the goals of the multiple Consent Orders in this case without the continuous, direct supervision of the Court or Special Master.
Accordingly, Section IV of the Remedial Plan is amended to include the following language:
[i]t hereby is
ORDERED, that the Special Master, in cooperation and conjunction with the parties, if possible, shall develop a plan for the disposition of the fines paid by defendants which shall include suggestions for post-litigation mechanisms to ensure the protection of the plaintiff class' continuing interest in adequate habilitation following the conclusion of this lawsuit. It hereby further is

ORDERED, that the Special Master, in cooperation and conjunction with the parties, if possible, shall develop and recommend to the Court a plan for the conclusion of the abovecaptioned action, which shall include recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the following topics:
a. Goals. A summary and articulation of the goals of this lawsuit as reflected in 98*98 the 1978 and 1983 Consent Orders, the 1996 Remedial Plan, and all other Court-ordered obligations (hereafter collectively "Court-ordered requirements").
b. Current compliance. An evaluation of existing programs to determine the extent of defendants' compliance with requirements for the protection of the health and safety of the plaintiff class and their effectiveness in meeting the goals described in subparagraph a, including but not limited to the provision of necessary medical and other health services and the compliance of private vendors with District of Columbia licensing and payment requirements governing community residence facilities, intermediate care facilities, foster care, day treatment programs, day programs, employment programs, representative payment and guardianship.
c. Adequate habilitation. The extent of defendants' compliance with Court-ordered requirements for the provision of adequate habilitation in the least restrictive setting and their effectiveness (strengths and weaknesses) in meeting the goals described in subparagraph a, including individual habilitation planning, individual financial planning, case management, appropriate residential services, adequate habilitation services, and the safeguarding of client funds.
d. Payment of providers. The extent of defendants' compliance with Court-ordered requirements for the timely payment of private providers who provide the plaintiff class with appropriate residential services, day treatment programs, vocational and supported employment services, day programs, medical, mental health, dental, and other services required by the Court.
e. Quality assurance. The quality assurance methods to be developed and implemented by defendants to monitor continually the performance of public and private providers of service in meeting the goals of the suit.
f. Standards and compliance measurement. The standards, including outcome standards to be developed and implemented by defendants, that should be used to determine defendants' continued compliance with Court-ordered requirements, and the way in which compliance with such standards should be measured.
g. Substantial compliance standards. The degree of compliance that should be required with each of the standards recommended.
h. Permanent monitoring. The steps necessary to establish permanent, objective, efficient, and effective post-termination monitoring of the programs serving class members by independent entities (for example, private accreditation services and independent monitoring bodies).
i. Individual and community advocacy. The steps necessary to coordinate existing mechanisms and to develop needed mechanisms for the advocacy of the interests of class members, on a individual and community-wide basis, in compliance with Court-ordered

requirements, including but not limited to the use of court-appointed attorneys, guardianships, and medical decisionmaking procedures for class members.
The Court strongly believes that development of such a plan to utilize the fines and to conclude the Court's jurisdiction over this case would serve the interests of all parties involved.
Conclusion
In sum, the Court imposes civil sanctions on defendants for their failure to comply with the Remedial Plan's conditions of purgation, denies defendants' motion for modification and demand for a criminal jury trial, and amends certain provisions of the Remedial Plan.
[1] This opinion, as would be expected, has been in preparation for some time, and the Court wishes to avoid any further delay in issuing it. Accordingly, it is issued without regard to the motion that plaintiffs filed on February 2, 1999. The release of this Opinion undoubtedly affects the relief sought by the new motion, and the other parties need not respond to that motion with reference to its date of filing. To establish a schedule for pleadings directed to that motion, plaintiffs are directed within 14 days of the date of this Opinion to file a pleading expressing how the new motion is affected by this Opinion and clarifying their current position, following which the other parties may submit responsive pleadings in accordance with the normal scheduling rules.
In connection with the passage of time, although the undersigned never before has made any reference to personal factors in an opinion, he feels constrained to note that two unanticipated hospitalizations, with coronary artery surgical procedures, contributed (along with many other judicial responsibilities) to delaying the completion of this task.
[2] The United States, as plaintiff-intervenor, filed a memorandum in support of plaintiffs' motion for sanctions on April 21, 1997.
[3] The Special Master calculated this amount based on defendants' violations for the period between September 1996 (after the Court's finding of contempt on August 2, 1996) and September 1997. As explained later in this Opinion in footnote 11, the Court calculates its fines based on defendants' violations for a shorter period between the Court's finding of contempt on August 2, 1996, and the filing of plaintiffs' motion for sanctions on April 2, 1997.
[4] On March 6, 1998, the United States and plaintiffs filed oppositions to defendants' jury demand. On March 23, 1998, defendants filed a reply to the United States' and plaintiffs' oppositions to their jury demand and a supplemental memorandum in support of their objections to the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.
[5] The Court notes that defendants briefly allude in their objection to the Special Master's report to their "right" to an evidentiary hearing prior to the imposition of sanctions. It is uncontested that defendants have never requested a formal hearing before the Special Master regarding the pending matters. The Referral Order states in part that "[a]t a hearing before the Court, the parties shall be precluded from submitting evidence to the Court that could reasonably have been submitted to the Special Master." See Oct. 10, 1996, Order of Reference, Para. 18. At the July 22, 1998, hearing on the legal issues raised by the pending motions, defendants failed to point to any evidence which they would introduce — were this Court to hold an evidentiary hearing — which they could not reasonably have presented to the Special Master. Their pleadings also fail to make any such showing. In sum, defendants have failed to establish or even hint at the existence of any evidence which would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing were one to be held. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants' request for an additional opportunity to submit evidence which already has or should have been submitted. The Court notes, however, that it has carefully considered in its decision of the pending motions the evidence properly submitted by defendants in support of their pleadings.
[6] The Special Master characterizes half of the sanctions as being due for failure to purge the contempts adjudicated by the October 11, 1995, Order and the August 2, 1996, Order, and the other half as "new" or "continuing" contempts (of the Remedial Plan's independent timeliness requirement) for which fines are due automatically. Because the Court does not agree with the Special Master's conclusion that the fines provided for by the Remedial Plan are

automatic, it currently imposes fines only for defendants' failure to purge the contempts adjudicated by this Court's 1995 and 1996 Orders and only for the period prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions.
As noted by the Special Master, the language of the Remedial Plan's sanctions provisions regarding timely payment mandates the imposition of specified fines for failure to comply with those purgation conditions. Defendants provide the Court with no persuasive justification for disregarding this mandatory language and permitting them additional opportunities to purge their contempt. The Court concludes that such laxity — after the Court's clear admonition to defendants in its 1996 Order that future noncompliance with the timeliness requirements would result in severe consequences — would effectively negate the coercive effect of such fines. Accordingly, the Court concludes that defendants have failed to comply with the purgation conditions of the Remedial Plan, and that the fines set forth in that Plan are due without the necessity for further proceedings.
[7] Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor are free to move for new findings of contempt for any contemptuous conduct occurring after the date of this Opinion. Under the Remedial Plan, as amended by Section II.A of this Opinion, discussed infra, each instance in which defendants are delinquent in paying provider vouchers within 30 days will be considered a separate contempt, and each failure to pay the vouchers within 15 days thereafter will be considered a failure to purge the contempt.
[8] An indirect contempt is conduct that occurs outside the presence of the court. The classic example of an indirect contempt is the failure of a party to obey a court order, such as the conduct at issue in this case.
[9] See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) regarding referrals to masters. In fact, this procedure was followed with respect to the current motions.
[10] The Court notes that plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor are free to move for sanctions for the period of March 1997 to the date of this Opinion under the original terms of the Remedial Plan. Any contemptuous conduct occurring after the issuance of this Opinion will be subject to the terms of the Remedial Plan, as modified by this Opinion.
[11] As explained in footnote 3, the Court's calculation of fines differs from the Special Master's calculation because it bases the fines on a shorter period of contemptuous conduct beginning from the August 2, 1996, finding of contempt and tolled by plaintiffs' motion for sanctions filed on April 2, 1997. The actual calculation is based on plaintiffs' documentation of delinquent payments from October 1996 to February 1997, which plaintiffs submitted with their motion for sanctions.
[12] Defendants make the wholly unpersuasive assertion that such a modification would constitute an attempt by the Court to amend the Quick Payment Act in violation of the principle of separation of powers. The Court notes that the Special Master clearly (and correctly) stated that the Quick Payment Act does not apply to this case and that she considered it only for guidance in crafting the present modification.
[13] As noted in the following section, the Court also adopts the Special Master's recommendations that the Medicaid per diem fine be increased and that the non-Medicaid fine be changed to a per diem fine.
[14] The Special Master explained in her Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law why the current system of fines creates an illogical result. "In the case of Medicaid invoices, the fines are based on the number of days of delinquency. In the case of non-Medicaid invoices, the fines are twice the amount of overdue payments reported in defendants' monthly statements to the Court.... As a result, defendants' failure to pay large amounts due on Medicaid invoices incurs modest fines of $5,000 per delinquent day regardless of the magnitude of the overdue payments. For example, $2 million in Medicaid payments ten days overdue would incur a fine of $50,000. On the other hand, failure to pay several non-Medicaid invoices can result in relatively large fines based on the amounts overdue and not on the number of days such payments are overdue. For example, three unpaid non-Medicaid invoices totaling $240,000 incur fines of $480,000 if they are one day overdue or ten days overdue, and defendants are still obligated to pay the vendors $240,000." (Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 25.)

 
 Evans v. Williams, 238 F.R.D. 1 (2006)

238 F.R.D. 1 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, and
United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v.
Anthony WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.
CA No. 76-293 (ESH/JMF). | Aug. 30, 2006.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*1 Cathy E. Costanzo, Center for Public Representation, Northampton, MA, Joseph B. Tulman, University of DC David A. Clarke School of Law, Kelly R. Bagby, Sandra J. Bernstein, University Legal Services, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Richard James Farano, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor.
Maria-Claudia T. Amato, Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, Robert C. Utiger, Office of The Corporation Counsel, David T. Ralston, Jr., Lydia Williams, Laura Jean Oberbroeckling, Reed Smith, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge.
I have reviewed Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff Intervenor’s Exhibits in Support of Their Respective *2 Proposed Findings of Fact1 and, as I read them, the defendants2 object to nearly all of the exhibits on the same grounds, i.e., on the basis of Federal Rules of Evidence 802, 402, 805 and 701-705. I am sensitive to how little time the parties have to be ready for the hearing and that the parties are engaged in discovery. So that time can be used as efficiently as possible, I have decided to use this Memorandum Order to overrule the District’s objections.

1

Hereafter “Obj.”

2

Hereafter “the District.”

[1] First, Rule 402 simply states that relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is not. The exhibits plaintiffs and the United States, plaintiff-intervenor, offers are each offered in support of a proposed finding of fact. I have reviewed those findings of fact and they certainly appear to be directed to the issues Judge Huvelle must resolve. Whether the exhibits in fact support the proposed finding of fact made is an open question but if they do they unquestionably have a tendency to “make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable” and are relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Thus, they are legitimately tendered in support of the proposed findings and are unquestionably relevant. Whether they prove what plaintiffs claim they prove is a different question that goes to weight, not admissibility.
[2] Second, Rules 701-705 are the sections of the Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining to opinion testimony by lay witnesses and experts. The reports may contain opinions that fall within these Rules but the District does not identify what portions of the Reports offend these rules. Surely, the portion of the reports that detail facts found or that make recommendations cannot possibly be subject to these rules and the District cannot reasonably expect either me or Judge Huvelle to go through each report guessing what portion the District finds to be objectionable opinion testimony. Rule 103(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the District to state the specific ground of its objection and the District’s objection to an entire report because the District contends that some unspecified portion of it offends one of the Rules on opinion testimony hardly meets this requirement.
Third, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 indicates that hearsay is not admissible while 805 indicates that hearsay within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule “if each part or the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.” Most of the exhibits, however, are reports and their admissibility would be guided by additional principles that the District ignores.
[3] First, insofar as those reports were created by the District or its agents, to include entities retained by it for a specific purpose, the reports are admissions of a party opponent and not hearsay. Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) & (D). Second, even if not admissions, they may be admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8)(B) & (C) as (1) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report or (2) factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. Under the latter exception, the report would be admissible unless the District carried its burden of showing why the
1

Evans v. Williams, 238 F.R.D. 1 (2006)

report was untrustworthy even if the report contains conclusions or opinions. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 170, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988).
[4] Finally, the District objects particularly to certain reports because they “were prepared for a remedial purpose, to identify problems and improve services and agency procedures.” Obj. at 3. Thus, the District argues that they should be privileged, like peer review reports, and not admitted to prove the truth of the statements within them. Id.
But, the statute on which the District relies, D.C.Code § 44-805,3 does not apply here because this case is based on the court’s *3 federal question jurisdiction and a state statute does supply the “rule of decision.” Federal Rule of Evidence 501.4

3

The reference to the D.C.Code is to the version that

appears in Westlaw or Lexis.

4

Note that the statute contains the following significant

exception:

a court may order a peer review body to provide

information in a criminal proceeding in which a

health professional is accused of a felony, if the

court determines that disclosure is essential to

protect the public interest and that the information

being sought can be obtained from no other source

D.C.Code § 44-805(a)(3).

Moreover, Rule 501 requires the court, upon a claim of privilege, to “determine how the issue would have been resolved under the ‘common law.’ ” 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5425 (1980). See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998). The District does not cite any common law precedents

supporting its position.
[5] Moreover, if a privilege obstructing the search for truth is to be recognized then the public good to be advanced by its recognition “should be shown ‘with a high degree of clarity and certainty.’ ” In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting In re Sealed Case (Secret Service), 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C.Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 990, 119 S.Ct. 461, 142 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998)).
For many years, the Court, with the approbation of the parties and without objection by the District, has received the information within these reports to inform itself as to the District’s compliance with the obligations imposed on it by the Court’s orders. The District cannot possibly argue that information made available to the Court for decades without objection should now be privileged and not be used by that Court to determine the facts pertaining to the District’s compliance. If that were to occur, appointing monitors and securing reports pertaining to the District’s compliance would have been a monumental waste of time. No possible good is advanced by the suppression of the reports at issue.
CONCLUSION
The District’s broad brush objections to entire reports, without specifying what sections of the reports are unobjectionable, is of no avail. The crucial question is whether each proposed finding of fact is based on admissible evidence. If the District wants to make that case, it will have to do so as specifically as possible by a written submission to me filed in the next five days.
SO ORDERED.
	  

2

 
 Evans v. Williams, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)

1999 WL 1212884 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff–Intervenor, v.
Anthony A. WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.
No. CIV. 76–293 SSH. | Aug. 20, 1999.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Joseph B. Tulman, Esq., University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law, Kelly Bagby, Esq., Managing Attorney, University Legal Services, Protection and Advocacy Program for the District of Columbia, (Plaintiff–Intervenor), Richard J. Farano, Esq. , Laurie Weinstein, Esq., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs or Petitioners.

Maria Amato, Esq., Barbara Miller, Esq., Assistant Corporation Counsel, Washington, DC, for Defendants or Respondents.

Opinion

WRIT IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS1

1

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b)

abolished the writ of mandamus in the district courts,

“relief ‘in the nature of mandamus’ may still be

obtained through an appropriate action or motion under

the practice prescribed in the federal rules. The

principles that governed the former writ now govern

attempts to secure similar relief.” Sanchez–Espinoza v.

Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208, n.7 (D.C.Cir.1985)

(internal citations omitted). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1361;

Haggard v. Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384, 1385 (6th

Cir.1970); Hammond v. Hull, 131 F.2d 23, 25

(D.C.Cir.1942).

HARRIS, District J.
*1 On February 10, 1999, the Court issued an Order requiring the Special Master, in conjunction with the parties if possible, to develop a report suggesting ways to

use the fines owed by defendants and recommending steps toward ending the Court’s jurisdiction over this 23–year–old case. It was directed that the report be submitted in November 1999. The Court ordered in part that the report include an evaluation of existing programs which are intended to ensure adequate habilitation for the approximately 760 class members, who constitute the remaining persons who were institutionalized based upon mental retardation at the former Forest Haven facility. The report is necessary to the Court in developing a plan to conclude this case.
One area requiring examination is the system of providing individual court-appointed attorneys and advocates for the class members under D.C. Law 2–137. See also Superior Court Rules of Mental Retardation Procedure, R.11. The ability to suggest improvements, however, obviously requires knowledge of the status of the existing system. Currently, plaintiffs’ class counsel do not know the identity of all the class members’ individual court-appointed attorneys, or even if every class member has one. Such information is maintained in the files of the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“Family Division”).
This same information is also required by the Court Monitor in this case in order to monitor compliance with the Court’s August 2, 1996, Remedial Plan. In pertinent part, the Court required defendants to inform the court-appointed attorneys of their clients’ rights under the Evans consent orders and any applicable District of Columbia legislation, and to request them to report any deficiencies in the implementation of their clients’ Individual Habilitation Plans (IHP) to the clients’ case managers at the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration (MRDDA) and to the Court Monitor. See Remedial Plan at 11.
The Court Monitor first attempted to obtain this information in August 1998, and wrote multiple letters, which were unanswered, to Mr. Charles Gaines of the Superior Court’s staff in the Family Division. The Court Monitor had several phone conversations with Mr. Gaines, during which, the Court has been informed, he cited various reasons why he could not provide the requested information, including an overworked staff. Finally, Mr. Gaines provided a list of attorneys’ names. However, the Court Monitor brought to his attention the fact that the list was incomplete, and, upon attempting to contact the listed attorneys, the Court Monitor discovered that many of the attorneys were no longer serving as a court-appointed
1

Evans v. Williams, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)

attorney. The Court Monitor received no response from the Family Division. The Court Monitor then began a laborious process of trying to identify individual attorneys through their on-site visits and some letter-writing to attorneys whom they knew to be serving as court-appointed attorneys. This process, as would be expected, has not resulted in a complete list of attorneys’ names .2

2

The process has revealed, however, that many of the

court-appointed attorneys were not aware of their

clients’ rights under the Evans consent orders, and

some were not even aware of the existence of this class

action.

*2 Plaintiffs’ class counsel then duly requested the necessary information from the Family Division. Independent of the Court’s need for the information, plaintiffs’ class counsel have an inherent interest in contacting the court-appointed attorneys and viewing the Superior Court files in order to represent their clients to best of their ability.3 The Court Monitor accompanied plaintiffs’ class counsel to a meeting with the Presiding Judge of the Family Division. However, the Presiding Judge apparently explained that the information is not available in a compiled format, nor are the files computerized; extracting the information would require examining the individual paper files. Plaintiffs’ class counsel then offered volunteer law students to obtain the information from the files, but was turned down largely because of space and supposed confidentiality concerns.

3

The Court also notes that D.C.Code § 6–1972, which

governs the rights of mentally retarded persons and

access to their records, mandates that “the customer’s ...

counsel ... and any person properly authorized in

writing by the customer, if such customer is capable of

giving such authorization, shall be permitted access to

the customer’s records.” The Court sees no valid reason

why class counsel should not have ready access to these

records; class counsel, after all, do represent each and

every member of the class in all matters related to this

class action

The Special Master then discussed the matter with the Presiding Judge, and on May 14, 1999, made a formal written request for the information. The Presiding Judge responded in a letter dated May 27, 1999, explaining that the Family Division would agree to provide the requested assistance, but taking the position that it would be more

feasible to utilize existing court staff who are familiar with documents and internal procedures needed to verify the accuracy of the information. She calculated that the task would require 168 hours of overtime over a two-week period (four hours of overtime per day for five days per week and eight hours of overtime on two Saturdays for three employees) for a total cost of $2,675. She therefore stated that as soon as the expenditure of such funds was authorized, the Family Division would move forward with the task.
The Court, then apprised of the situation by the Special Master, initiated steps to resolve the situation informally on a personal basis with the Superior Court. The Court and the Presiding Judge agreed upon a meeting in the undersigned’s chambers, which the Presiding Judge did not attend or call to reschedule. The Court again arranged to meet with the Presiding Judge, and, at a meeting in her chambers, the Court explained that it could not authorize $2,675 toward the Superior Court’s provision of the information required, and took the position that the use of volunteer law students as paralegals seemed eminently feasible for all involved. She indicated that she would confer with the Chief Judge of the Superior Court and inform the undersigned of their decision within the next few days. The Court, however, never received a further response.
The Court thereafter called the Presiding Judge again, but was informed that she was on vacation. The Court therefore telephoned the Chief Judge of the Superior Court in its continuing effort to resolve the matter. The Chief Judge indicated that he was generally familiar with the problem, and said that he would discuss the matter with the Director of the Family Division concerning the logistics. He further stated that he would let this Court know the outcome within the next few days. Weeks have passed; to date, however, the Court has received no further contact from anyone in the Superior Court. Thus, despite repeated personal efforts, the Court, to its acute disappointment, has received no effective assistance from the Superior Court in its informal efforts to help achieve enforcement of its February 10, 1999, Order, and the August 2, 1996, Remedial Plan.
*3 Because of their inability to access their own clients’ individual Superior Court records directly, plaintiffs’ class counsel in conjunction with recently acquired pro bono co-counsel have attempted to obtain the information indirectly. On June 29, 1999, they sent out letters to a roster of over a hundred attorneys who serve as court-appointed attorneys. Counsel have received about
2

Evans v. Williams, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)

20 letters back from attorneys who have indicated the class member(s) they represent and their case file numbers. This process, however, is imperfect because a non-response regarding a particular class member does not necessarily mean that the individual does not have an attorney.4 Only the Superior Court has conclusive information as to the class members’ individual representation. Initially, plaintiffs’ co-counsel were able to view their clients’ records, but they later were refused access until they could produce a letter from each court-appointed attorney authorizing such access. When plaintiffs’ co-counsel obtained such letters, they were told that the Family Division was reorganizing its files and that they could access only four files each day.

4

For example, a problem could occur with the mailing or

an error in the address. Notably, between 20 and 30

letters have already been returned as undeliverable.

Given this rather remarkable history, the Court sees no feasible alternative remedy at this stage but to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Under the All Writs Act, “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” The Supreme Court “has repeatedly recognized the power of a federal court to issue such commands under the All Writs Act as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained .” United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977) (upholding federal court order issued pursuant to All Writs Act compelling non-party phone company to cooperate with an order to install pen registers on phones to investigate crimes).
“The All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling. Although that Act empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate.” Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985). The Court finds that no other effective means exists to address specifically the continuing

unwillingness of the Superior Court to provide access to the information required by this Court.
The Court readily concludes that it has the power to issue a writ directed to the Family Division of the Superior Court. “[F]ederal court power under Section 1651 extends to all persons who ‘are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice, ... and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d 268, 277 (3d Cir.1981) (quoting New York Telephone Co, 434 U.S. at 174). The Superior Court obviously is in a position to frustrate the implementation of the Court’s February 10, 1999, Order, because it alone possesses the information needed for determining the status of the system of appointing individual attorneys for the class members. Its unwillingness to provide a complete list of the court-appointed attorneys to the Court Monitor also frustrates the Court’s enforcement of its August 2, 1996, Remedial Plan.
*4 It is also clear that the writ is necessary to “aid the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d at 276. See also Jones v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 964, 967 (3d Cir.1994) (“the writ issued must actually aid the court in the performance of its duties”). In Grand Jury Proceedings, a federal district court issued an order under the All Writs Act to a state court judge, when the state court judge refused to meet with the U.S. Attorney and determine the relevancy of certain grand jury materials; without this information, the federal court could not determine which grand jury materials could be disclosed to the criminal defendant in his federal case. 654 F.2d at 277–278. Similarly here, without the information that the Superior Court possesses, the Court cannot devise a complete plan for concluding this case, because the Special Master and the parties would be unable to evaluate and report upon the conditions of the system of appointing individual attorneys for the class members. The Court Monitor is also unable to assess the defendants’ degree of compliance with the August 2, 1996, Remedial Plan.
The Court finds that issuing this order is reasonable. “The power of federal courts to impose duties upon third parties is not without limits; unreasonable burdens may not be imposed.” New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 171. As plaintiffs’ class counsel has offered to do all of the work through the use of volunteers who would not require any payment, the Family Division primarily would be required only to arrange access to the files so that class
3

Evans v. Williams, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)
counsel may obtain the necessary information regarding the court-appointed attorneys. Any confidentiality concerns can be addressed by requiring the volunteer paralegals to sign a confidentiality agreement. Plaintiffs’ class counsel and legal assistants are expected to work cooperatively with the Family Division. The imposition on the Family Division should be minimal.
Finally, this writ does not implicate concerns about interference with another court’s proceedings. First, the usual federalism concerns that exist between a federal and a state court are not present here. The District of Columbia courts are not state courts, but rather are federal courts created pursuant to Article I of the U .S. Constitution. D.C.Code Ann. § 11–101(2) (1995); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d at 277–78 (upholding writ despite comity concerns between federal and state courts); Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1172 n.4 (10th Cir.1991). Second, this writ is not used as a form of supervisory control of an inferior court’s decision, unlike the more common usage of a mandamus writ; the Court is not directing the outcome of another court’s judgment on an issue or resolution of a case. It is merely requiring that another court provide information that is indispensable to this Court’s administration of a case and that should be readily made accessible to the individuals’ own attorneys anyway. Cf. Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968) (a federal district court has power to issue an order in the nature of mandamus to compel private corporation to allow shareholder to inspect corporate records). The fact that the Family Division is restricting class counsel’s access to their clients’ own files is analytically wholly illogical.
*5 The Court had hoped not to reach the point of issuing a writ pursuant to the All Writs Act. However, given all of the circumstances, the Court sees no other way to end the frustration of the implementation of its February 10, 1999, Order. Accordingly, it hereby is

ORDERED, that H. Edward Ricks, the Director of the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, forthwith shall initiate providing plaintiffs’ class counsel and co-counsel access to the files maintained in the Family Division regarding Evans class members who are committed pursuant to D.C. Law § 2–137.5 (Of course, it is expected that such access shall be provided in a manner which will not be disruptive of the normal day-to-day functioning of the Family Division; counsel and their legal assistants are expected to work cooperatively with Mr. Ricks.) It hereby further is

5

For the Family Division’s convenience, the Court

attaches hereto a list of class members, current as of

April 19, 1999. The list also indicates the last known

court-appointed attorney for selected class members.

The Court notes that class member Patrick Dutch

should be removed from the list, as he died on July 9,

1999, of heatstroke after being left in a van.

ORDERED, that any information obtained from these records shall be held confidential pursuant to the Court’s August 5, 1999, Protective Order.6 It hereby further is

6

Plaintiffs’ court-appointed attorneys have independent

access to these records under D.C.Code § 6–1972.

ORDERED, that service of this writ shall be made promptly by the United States Marshals Service upon Mr. Ricks, with copies thereof to be served by mail upon the parties to this case and upon the Honorable Eugene N. Hamilton, Chief Judge of the Superior Court, and the Honorable Zinora Mitchell–Rankin, Presiding Judge of the Family Division.
SO ORDERED.

4

 
 Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)

1996 WL 451054 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff–Intervenor,
v. Marion BARRY, et al., Defendants.
No. CA 76–293 SSH. | Aug. 02, 1996.
Opinion

ORDER ADOPTING PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT OF SPECIAL MASTER

STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge.
*1 On January 22, 1996, the Special Master appointed by the Court in October 1995 to assist the Court in developing remedies for defendants’ continuing contempt submitted her 90–day remedial plan. Defendants and plaintiffs submitted their comments thereafter. On June 17, 1996, the Special Master submitted a supplement to her January Report, detailing changes that had occurred over the intervening period of time.
Defendants have submitted objections to the Special Master’s Supplemental Report; plaintiff-intervenor has submitted comments to the supplemental report as well. Upon consideration of the Special Master’s January Report and Supplemental Report, and of the entire record, the Court adopts the proposed findings of fact of the Special Master, to be detailed below.1 In addition, and in conjunction with these Findings of Fact, the Court issues this date a Remedial Plan which adopts in great part the recommendations of the Special Master and which, in time, are expected to enable defendants to come into compliance with the terms of this Court’s multiple Consent Orders.

1

The relevant facts in this 20–year–old case are

contained in the Court’s Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law issued on October 11, 1995, and,

to a lesser extent, its Order of Reference appointing

Margaret G. Farrell as Special Master, issued the same

date. Accordingly, the Court will not repeat them here.

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. PAYMENT OF CARE PROVIDERS The Court adopts the Special Master’s proposed findings of fact contained in her January 1996 Report regarding the continued and unacceptable delays in payment of Evans care providers, both those paid through Medicaid and those paid from the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration (MRDDA). In her Supplemental Report, the Special Master adds:
Since the filing of the January 1996 Report, neither Medicaid payments nor payments from MRDDA to Evans providers have met the requirement of the 1983 Consent Order, para. IX, section 10, that defendants pay acceptable invoices within 30 days of their submission.
Suppl.Report at 2. The Supplemental Report does note that defendants “have shortened the time in which they paid many providers and eliminated much of their backlog of overdue payments.” Id. In addition, the Supplemental Report notes that defendants, while providing the Special Master with some information about the status of MRDDA and Medicaid payments, have failed to provide her with accurate (or, in some cases, understandable) documentation chronicling those payments. Suppl.Report, Ex. A.
The Court adopts those further proposed findings of fact contained on pages 3 and 4 of the Special Master’s Supplemental Report regarding defendants’ failure to timely pay Evans care providers. The Court notes especially the Special Master’s representation that, should the District fail to obtain soon from Congress authority to borrow up to $600 million, “defendants will become increasingly unable to make timely payment to Evans providers.” Suppl.Report at 3.
In addition, the Court adopts in full the further proposed findings of fact enumerated in the Special Master’s Supplemental Report, regarding defendants’ concession
1

Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)
that many class care providers (or vendors) do not have contracts with the District of Columbia government. Instead, many care providers have temporary contracts with the city, which expire after 120 days and which must be renewed through MRDDA. On May 2, 1996, the District of Columbia City Administrator revoked the authority of the DHS to contract with private vendors and placed contracting authority with the District’s Procurement Task Force, which reports to the City Administrator. This recent development has thrown, or at the least has the potential to throw, the contracting process into further upheaval. See Suppl.Report at 5–6.
II. CASE MANAGEMENT RATIOS *2 The Court adopts in full the proposed findings of fact set forth by the Special Master in her January Report and her Supplemental Report. In her January Report, the Special Master noted (and defendants do not dispute) that the ratio of case managers to MRDDA clients was far higher than the 1:60 ratio required by multiple Consent Orders in this action. January Report at 17–18. In her Supplemental Report, the Special Master informs the Court that the situation has not changed: defendants still, as of that date, employed the same number of case managers that they did in January. Suppl.Report at 7.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL HABILITATION PLANS The Court adopts in full the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Special Master in her January Report regarding the requirement that defendants develop and regularly review class members’ individual habilitation plans. See January Report at 19–21. (The Supplemental Report included no further or updated proposed findings of fact on this subject.)
IV. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS In addition to her proposed findings and recommendations on specific areas of non-compliance, the Special Master included general recommendations, pursuant to the requirement in the October 11, 1995, Order of Reference, that she include dates in the proposed Remedial Plan by which defendants must satisfy each element of the Plan and specific monetary penalties for non-compliance. See January Report at 23–24; Suppl.Report at 8. The Court adopts in great part the

general recommendations of the Special Master, as detailed in Part IV of the Remedial Plan, issued this date.
V. CONCLUSION Defendants have, for over two years, chronically and unapologetically violated the terms of nearly every aspect of this Court’s multiple Consent Orders. Defendants’ unrelenting contempt of this Court’s orders, and their seeming inability to bring themselves into compliance therewith, have created chaos for the care providers vested with day-to-day responsibility for the members of this plaintiff class. The plaintiffs comprising this class, as defendants well know, are ill-equipped to adjust to or defend against the city’s failure to assist their care providers in giving them the care and treatment they desperately need.
The months since this case was reassigned to the undersigned have been months of transition for the District of Columbia, in which the Financial Control Board and the Chief Financial Officer have been striving to achieve degrees of discipline, competence, and order in the District’s affairs which have been all too lacking. They have been difficult months for the Court, torn between its obligation to assure that the needs of the plaintiff class are met and its awareness that proper responsiveness to those needs has been difficult to achieve. Now, the point has been reached beyond which this Court will not tolerate further and continuing incidences of contempt by defendants. Any further noncompliance with this Court’s longstanding Consent Orders, and noncompliance with the Remedial Plan issued this date, must be expected by defendants to result in serious consequences.
REMEDIAL PLAN
*3 In accordance with the accompanying Order adopting the proposed findings of fact contained in the Special Master’s January Report and Supplemental Report, the Court establishes the following Remedial Plan.
I. REMEDIES FOR DEFENDANTS’ CONTINUING CONTEMPT IN FAILING TO MAKE TIMELY PAYMENT TO CLASS CARE PROVIDERS
2

Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)
A. Medicaid Waiver Application In her January Report, the Special Master recommends that defendants be required to apply to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the United States Department of Health and Human Services for a home-and-community Medicaid waiver, pursuant to Pub.L. 94–35, sec. 2176. In her Supplemental Report, the Special Master informs the Court that defendants submitted an application to HCFA for a home-and-community Medicaid waiver on April 30, 1996. Accordingly, this portion of the Special Master’s recommendations has been satisfied and is not adopted by the Court in this Remedial Plan.
B. Payment of Invoices and Medicaid Reimbursement The Court adopts the Special Master’s recommendations as to requiring timely payment of care providers by MRDDA and by the District of Columbia Health Care Finance Commission (HCF). Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED, that defendants shall pay all acceptable invoices from Evans care providers within 30 calendar days of their submission. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that defendant MRDDA shall reject or accept and present to the Controller of the Department of Human Services (“DHS Controller”), all undisputed payment invoices within seven working days of submission by the Provider. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the DHS Controller shall accept or reject such invoices (except that the DHS Controller may not reject such invoices due to unavailability of funds), assign voucher numbers to the invoices, and present the accepted vouchers to the District of Columbia Treasurer for payment, within five working days of their submission to the DHS Controller by MRDDA. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the D.C. Treasurer, or the Chief Financial Officer, shall pay all vouchers submitted by MRDDA and accepted by the DHS Controller within eight working days thereafter. It hereby further is
ORDERED, with respect to Medicaid payments, that the HCF shall require, consistent with current practice, that claims for Medicaid payment submitted by class providers on or before the fifth day of each month will be processed by First Health Service, Inc. (“First Health”), or any other Medicaid processing contractor, by the fifteenth of that month, so that a Medicaid “check register” may be

transmitted to HCF by that date. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that HCF shall submit the Medicaid “check register” to the D.C. Treasurer within seven days of its receipt from First Health or any other Medicaid processing contractor. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the D.C. Treasurer, or the Chief Financial Officer, shall cut and mail checks to all providers listed on the Medicaid “check register” as eligible for Medicaid reimbursement, for the full amount of that reimbursement (or that amount which is undisputed, for reasons other than unavailability of funds), no later than the fifth day of the next month.2 It hereby further is

2

This means, in effect, that no more than 30 days shall

elapse between a care provider’s submission of a

request for Medicaid reimbursement and the mailing of

a check for the full amount of that reimbursement,

provided that the care provider submits its request on or

prior to the fifth day of the month (and that the amount

is undisputed).

*4 ORDERED, that defendants maintain their Vendor Hotline and shall provide accurate, current information to care providers about the status of their invoices on the Vendor Hotline, to the greatest extent possible, until defendants demonstrate to the Court that maintaining the Vendor Hotline is no longer necessary.

C. Administrative Measures To assure that care providers receive timely payment on their invoices or requests for Medicaid reimbursement, the following steps also shall be taken: It hereby is
ORDERED, that beginning 30 days after the date of this Remedial Plan, the Director or Controller of the DHS, or the Chief Financial Officer, or his or her designee, shall submit to the Court (with copies to the Court Monitor and the Special Master), no later than the last day of each month, a signed statement, made under oath and notarized, containing each of the following:
1. A list of care providers for the class who have not been paid full Medicaid reimbursement within 30 calendar days after the submission of their invoices to First Health or another Medicaid processing contractor. The list shall indicate for each unpaid care provider the
3

Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)
amount of overdue payment and the number of days by which the payment is overdue.
2. A list of all other class care providers to whom payment has not been made within 30 calendar days of their submission of acceptable invoices to MRDDA, or any other agency of the District of Columbia, for services provided to plaintiffs ordered by the Court’s several Consent Orders. As with requirement (a) above, the list shall contain for each care provider the amount of overdue payment and the number of days by which the payment is overdue. (A provider invoice submitted to MRDDA is “overdue” if it has not been paid within 8 working days or 15 calendar days, whichever is longer, after the DHS Controller has assigned the invoice a voucher number.)
3. A statement that, to the best of his or her knowledge, the affiant has made a concerted and good-faith effort to determine the payment status of all provider invoices for court-ordered services in this case, and that the affiant knows of no other undisputed claims for which the District of Columbia owes payment to any vendor providing services to the plaintiff class.
It hereby further is
ORDERED, that HCF auditors shall conduct desk audits of provider accounts at least once a year, and shall conduct field audits, as required by federal regulations, every third year. Field audits may not be conducted more than every three years unless, in the professional judgment of HCF, circumstances indicate that an on-site, extensive audit is necessary to determine a provider’s reasonable costs.
D. Sanctions for Nonpayment of Care Providers The Court adopts the Special Master’s recommendations contained in her Supplemental Report, and, to the extent the recommendations do not conflict, the recommendations contained in her January Report, regarding sanctions for defendants’ failure to timely pay class care providers. Accordingly, it hereby is
*5 ORDERED, that should defendants fail to purge their contempt by paying acceptable provider invoices within 30 days of submission, as required by this Remedial Plan, at the end of the first month in which defendants report that there are outstanding Medicaid payments due but not paid within 30 days of submission of an acceptable

invoice, defendants shall be assessed a coercive civil fine of $5,000 a day, until the overdue payments are made. The amount overdue shall be determined from the sworn submission of the Chief Financial Officer or the Director or Controller of the DHS, or his or her designee, and, if necessary, from supplemental submissions from the Special Master and/or the Court Monitor. (Payments are considered “made” on the date that they are mailed to providers. If, at any time, the Court is informed that defendants are not mailing payments to providers on the date they represent those payments are mailed, the Court will consider setting a prompt contempt hearing for those individuals involved.) It hereby further is
ORDERED, that with respect to non-Medicaid payments found to be overdue, defendants shall be assessed a coercive civil fine of twice the amount overdue. The amount overdue shall be determined from the sworn submission of the Chief Financial Officer or the Director or Controller of the DHS, or his or her designee, and, if necessary, from supplemental submissions from the Special Master and/or the Court Monitor. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that civil fines shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court and placed in a segregated account, from which the Court, at the recommendation of the Special Master, may order payment to providers. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the Special Master may hear the claim of any class care provider whose undisputed or accepted claim, as described in the 1996 Remedial Plan, has not been paid by defendants within 30 days of the date of submission to the appropriate agency. The Special Master may then recommend to the Court findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether the claimant-provider should be paid with funds from the civil fines account. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 71 (“When an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action, that person may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if a party....”).
E. Negotiating Long–Term Contracts with Providers The Court fully adopts the recommendations contained in the Special Master’s Supplemental Report regarding accelerating the negotiation of long-term contracts between the District and class care providers. In addition, the Court adopts the Special Master’s general recommendation, contained at page 24 of her January Report, that defendants be required to renegotiate its
4

Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)
contract with DC Arc for the continued services of the Court Monitor, if this Remedial Plan increases or otherwise modifies the current obligations of the Court Monitor. Accordingly, it hereby is
*6 ORDERED, that the City Administrator, as the individual to whom the city’s Procurement Task Force reports, shall, after consultation with the Special Master and the Court Monitor, establish a process for the negotiation and final conclusion of contracts with all vendors providing services to the Evans class, so that all Evans care providers have contracts of at least one year’s duration with the District government, by October 31, 1996. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that defendants shall conclude contracts with all class care providers by October 31, 1996. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that with respect to any contracts unconcluded by October 31, 1996, defendants shall submit unconcluded contracts to binding arbitration of disputes arising in contract negotiations, before an arbitrator appointed by the Court. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that if defendants fail to conclude all outstanding contract negotiations or submit unconcluded contracts to binding arbitration by October 31, 1996, defendants shall be fined $1,000 per day for each vendor providing services to class members without a contract (not including temporary contracts). Fines shall be deposited with the Clerk of the Court in defendants’ civil fines account, as discussed above. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that to the extent that this Remedial Plan meaningfully modifies the monitoring responsibilities of the Court Monitor, defendants shall renegotiate their contract with DC Arc for the Court Monitor.
II. REMEDIES FOR DEFENDANTS’ CONTINUING CONTEMPT IN FAILING TO MAINTAIN PROPER CASE MANAGEMENT RATIOS AS REQUIRED BY PAST CONSENT ORDERS The Court adopts the Special Master’s recommendations contained in the January Report and the Supplemental Report, although the Court changes the dates by which defendants must come into compliance with the case management ratios set out in past Consent Orders, to account for the passage of time between the Special Master’s submissions and the issuance of this Remedial

Plan. Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED, that no later than September 30, 1996, defendants shall obtain the case management services that would be provided by at least four additional full-time case managers in the MRDDA, to bring the total to 29. Defendants may do so by hiring four full-time case managers as employees of the DHS, or contracting for the private provision of at least four full-time equivalent case management positions. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that by September 30, 1996, defendants shall have achieved the capacity to provide a sufficient number of full-time case managers, or full-time equivalent case managers with whom the city has privately contracted, to create the one-to-sixty ratio of case managers to clients which long has been agreed to and is part of the Consent Orders. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that every three months, beginning October 1, 1996, defendants shall submit to the Court Monitor a list of each case manager employed by or under contract with the MRDDA, and the names and/or other identifying indicia of MRDDA clients assigned to each case manager. (This requirement includes MRDDA clients who are not members of the plaintiff class; without disclosure of every MRDDA client assigned to a case manager, the Court Monitor cannot discern whether defendants are in compliance with the ratio required by this Court’s multiple Consent Orders.) It hereby further is
*7 ORDERED, that if defendants should fail to provide sufficient case managers to come into compliance with the required ratio by September 30, 1996, the Court will levy a coercive civil fine of $1,000 a day, to be paid into the same civil fines account discussed above, until defendants can establish that they are in compliance with the required ratio. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that if defendants are still in non-compliance with the required ratio of case managers to MRDDA clients by October 31, 1996, the civil fine shall increase to $3,000 a day, beginning November 1, 1996.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL HABILITATION PLANS The Court adopts in great part the recommendations of the Special Master contained in the January Report. Accordingly, it hereby is
5

Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)
ORDERED, that no later than sixty days after the date of this Remedial Plan, defendants shall purchase, lease, or contract for sufficient copying capacity to make individual habilitation plans (“IHP’s”), or an accurate summary indicating changes in any IHP since the last review, available to persons concerned with the provision of services to MRDDA clients. Such individuals shall include, but are not limited to, the Special Master, the Court Monitor, family of the class member, day program providers, and residential providers. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that every six months beginning September 30, 1996, MRDDA shall compile and shall submit to the parties, the Court Monitor, and the Special Master:
(1) an overall assessment of MRDDA’s aggregate client habilitation needs;
(2) a recitation of the kind of services required to meet the habilitation needs of the MRDDA clients, as indicated in their IHP’s; and
(3) a listing of all habilitation needs indicated in the IHP’s of MRDDA clients for which service has not been provided or is not available. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that to the greatest extent feasible, defendants shall inform (in writing) attorneys appointed to represent Evans class members in Superior Court commitment proceedings that they are responsible for representing their clients’ rights under the Evans Consent Orders and any applicable District of Columbia legislation. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that to the greatest extent feasible, defendants shall request (in writing) each attorney representing Evans class members to report any deficiencies found in the implementation of their clients’ IHP’s to the clients’ case managers at MRDDA and to the Court Monitor. This request, and the requirement of the preceding sub-part, may be combined in one document to be sent to the attorney. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that to the extent she does not already do so, the Court Monitor shall include in her reports to the Court, a summary of any deficiencies found in the implementation of the IHP’s of Evans class members and any action taken to rectify those deficiencies. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the Court Monitor shall verify

defendants’ compliance with the Court’s Consent Orders by evaluating a random sample of at least 100 IHP’s each year, to determine whether such individual assessments and the IHP’s of which they are a part meet professional standards, including relevant standards of the Accreditation Council (formerly the Accreditation Council for Services for Mentally Retarded and other Developmentally Disabled Persons), as required by the past Consent Orders.
IV. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS *8 The Court adopts the recommendations set forth in the Special Master’s January Report and Supplemental Report, although the Court changes the dates by which defendants must submit to the Court its uniform IHP form and its proposed order for the continuing timely payment of class care providers. Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED, that on or before October 31, 1996, defendants, in conjunction with the plaintiffs and the Special Master, shall submit to the Court a proposed order for the timely, predictable, and full payment of Evans care providers. This requirement does not in any way delay or remove defendants’ obligation to pay Evans vendors within 30 days of submission of acceptable invoices or requests for Medicaid reimbursement, nor does it serve to delay the imposition of sanctions should defendants fail to meet this requirement, as discussed in part I(D) of the Remedial Plan. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that on or before October 31, 1996, defendants shall submit to the Special Master a simplified, reduced, uniform and automated IHP, to be used for all MRDDA clients, that will permit ready comparison of the needs identified and the services provided to meet those needs. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that unless another date for compliance is indicated in this Remedial Plan, with a related amount of coercive civil fine for non-compliance, for failure to meet an obligation under this Remedial Plan after January 1, 1997, defendants shall be subject to a civil penalty of $2,000 per day for each day of violation. (This amount is not to be multiplied by the number of violations.) It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the DHS Controller, or the City Administrator, shall be responsible for supervising defendants’ compliance with the requirements of the Remedial Plan. It hereby further is
6

Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)

ORDERED, that if the DHS Controller, or the City Administrator, is unable to bring about the compliance of defendants with this Remedial Plan, he or she shall identify by name and position those individuals in the District of Columbia government whose action or inaction precludes defendants’ compliance. Such information shall be provided in a report to the Court, with copies to the parties, the Special Master, and the Court Monitor, within 30 days of each instance of noncompliance. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that from the date of this Remedial Plan forward, any party seeking emergency relief from the Court regarding immediate payment of an overdue, acceptable invoice from defendants must present that claim first to the Special Master. It hereby further is

ORDERED, that after an emergency petition for payment is filed with the Court and presented to the Special Master, the Special Master shall hold an informal hearing within three working days of the date the emergency petition is filed. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that within three working days of the date of the hearing on any emergency petition for payment, the Special Master shall file recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the claim with the Court.
*9 SO ORDERED.

7

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1382 Filed 05/01/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

ADRIAN FENTY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of partial compliance with the goal of case management. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Case Management, March 25, 2013 [ECF No. 1374].) Under the 2010 Plan, there are four criteria for determining compliance with the Case Management goal. (Id. at 2.) On January 25, 2013, defendants filed a partial Certification of Compliance with the Special Master, asserting compliance with two of the four criteria ((i) and (iv)). (Id.) The Special Master recommends that the Court find that the defendants are in compliance with these provisions. (Id. at 3.) The

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1382 Filed 05/01/13 Page 2 of 2
parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Case Management Criteria (i) and (iv).

Date: May 1, 2013

/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1391 Filed 06/10/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

ADRIAN FENTY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of partial compliance with the goal dealing with restricted control procedures. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Restricted Control Procedures, April 4, 2013 [ECF No. 1377].) Under the 2010 Plan, there are sixteen criteria for determining compliance with the Restricted Controls goal. (Id. at 2.) On February 16, 2013, defendants filed a partial Certification of Compliance with the Special Master, asserting compliance with nine of the sixteen criteria (criteria (ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (ix), (x), (xii), and (xv)). (Id.) The Special Master recommends that the Court find that the

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1391 Filed 06/10/13 Page 2 of 2
defendants are in compliance with eight of these nine criteria, but recommends that they resubmit the evidence of compliance for the informed consent requirement (criteria ix) along with their certification for the remaining criteria regarding restricted control procedures. (Id. at 3.) The parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Restricted Control Procedures; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with criteria (ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (x), (xii), and (xv), eight of the sixteen criteria for achieving compliance with the goal regarding restricted control procedures.

Date: June 10, 2013

/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1392 Filed 06/10/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

ADRIAN FENTY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of partial compliance with the goal relating to the provision of residential, vocational and day services. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Provision of Residential, Vocational and Day Services, April 19, 2013 [ECF No. 1380].) Under the 2010 Plan, there are six outcome criteria for determining compliance with this goal. (Id. at 1.) On February 1, 2013, defendants filed a partial Certification of Compliance with the Special Master, asserting compliance with four of the six criteria ((ii), (iii) (iv) and (v)). (Id.) After plaintiffs and the United States Department of

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1392 Filed 06/10/13 Page 2 of 2
Justice agreed that compliance has been achieved as to criteria (ii), (iii) and (v), but objected as to criteria (iv), defendants withdrew the Certification of Compliance as to that criteria (iv). The Special Master recommends that the Court find that the defendants are in compliance with the remaining three criteria covered by defendants’ certification of compliance. (Id. at 4.) The parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Provision of Residential, Vocational and Day Services; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with criteria (ii), (iii), and (v), three of the six criteria for achieving compliance with the goal regarding provision of residential, vocational and day services.

Date: June 10, 2013

/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1412 Filed 09/16/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of partial compliance with the goal of protection from harm. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection From Harm, August 15, 2013 [ECF No. 1402].) Under the 2010 Plan, there are 12 criteria for determining compliance with the protection from harm goal. (Id. at 2.) On February 25, 2013, defendants filed a partial Certification of Compliance with the Special Master, asserting compliance with 10 of the 12 criteria and a stated intent to develop Plans of Corrections for the remaining two criteria. (Id.) Subsequently, defendants withdrew the Certification of

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1412 Filed 09/16/13 Page 2 of 2
Compliance as to 5 of the 10 submitted criteria and the parties agreed that substantial compliance had been achieved as to the remaining 5 criteria. The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants are in compliance with these 5 criteria (criteria vi, vii, ix, x and xi). The parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection from Harm [ECF No. 1402]; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with criteria vi, vii, ix, x and xi, 5 of the 12 criteria for achieving compliance with Goal B, Protection from Harm.

Date: September 16, 2013

/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1426 Filed 11/27/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of partial compliance with the goal of individualized habilitation plans (Goal A.1). (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Individualized Habilitation Plans, October 15, 2013 [ECF No. 1418].) Under the 2010 Plan, there are 17 criteria for determining compliance with the goal of individualized habilitation plans. (Id. at 2.) On February 8, 2013, defendants filed a partial Certification of Compliance with the Special Master, asserting compliance with 13 of the 17 criteria and a stated intent to develop Plans of Corrections for the remaining 4 criteria. (Id.) Subsequently,

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1426 Filed 11/27/13 Page 2 of 2
defendants withdrew the Certification of Compliance as to 4 of the 13 submitted criteria and the parties agreed that substantial compliance had been achieved as to the 6 of the remaining 9 criteria. The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants are in substantial compliance with criteria i and xi and partial compliance with criteria viii. The parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Individual Habilitation Plans [ECF No. 1418]; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with criteria i, iv, v, vi, xi, xiii, xiv, and xv, and partial compliance with criteria viii, 9 of the 17 criteria for achieving compliance with Goal A.1, Individualized Habilitation Plans.

Date: November 27, 2013

/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1488 Filed 09/08/14 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of compliance with Goal D.2 – Quality Assurance Program and Fiscal Audits. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Quality Assurance Program and Fiscal Audits, July 23, 2014 [ECF No. 1477] (“R&R”).) Defendants filed their certification of compliance on April 1, 2014. (Id. at 2.) The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants “have substantially complied with the requirements of the 2010 Plan and the underlying court orders with respect to Quality Assurance and Fiscal Audits.” (R&R at 8.) The parties had 30 days to file objections to

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1488 Filed 09/08/14 Page 2 of 2
the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed. Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation,
the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report
and Recommendation Regarding Goal D.2 – Quality Assurance Program and Fiscal Audits [ECF No. 1477]; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with Goal D.2 and the underlying court orders as set forth in the 2010 Plan.

Date: September 8, 2014

/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

and

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,” (“2010 Plan”),1 the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a Report and Recommendation regarding the “Certification of Compliance” submitted by the Director of the Department of Disability Services (“DDS”) as to the remaining seven outcome criteria for Goal B – Consumers Must Be Kept Free From Harm. (Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection from Harm – Part II, Apr. 4, 2014 [ECF No. 1457] (“R&R”).) As explained herein, the Court agrees with the Special Master that defendants have achieved compliance with six of the remaining criteria (i, ii, iii, iv, v, and viii), but have not demonstrated compliance with criterion xii.

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 2 of 11
BACKGROUND
The 2010 Plan groups existing court orders into nine subject areas. For each area, the
Plan sets forth “specific outcome criteria for determining compliance with the related group of
Court Orders,” assigns a standard of compliance (full, high, or significant), and “identifies the
method by which the Special Master, and ultimately the Court, will assess compliance for each
set of outcome criteria.” (2010 Plan at 5-6.) For Goal B–Consumers Must Be Kept Free From
Harm, the 2010 Plan identifies two related court orders and sets forth twelve specific outcome
criteria as to which defendants must meet a “high” standard of compliance.2 (2010 Plan at 20-
21.) The related court orders require that:
i. Acts of physical or psychological abuse, neglect or mistreatment including but not limited to assaults, fractures, cuts, bruises, abrasions, burns, bites, lacerations, drug overdoses and verbal abuse are prohibited. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section III.14.a)
ii. Each and every alleged incident of abuse, neglect, or mistreatment shall be promptly investigated and a report made. The manner and mechanism of such investigation shall be developed and established by the defendants. A chronological compilation of the above reports shall be maintained by the defendants and made available to the Master and the parties. (1978 Final Judgment and Order, section III.14.a).
2 “High Compliance” is defined in the 2010 Plan as follows: This threshold requires compliance with the indicator at a rate generally exceeding 90 percent compliance. Where instances of noncompliance with the indicator are found, none can involve a serious and substantive violation of the Court Order with significant adverse impact upon class members (i.e., actual harm or a serious risk of harm) in the judgment of the Court and Special Master (e.g., excusable noncompliance may involve failure to comply with documentation or some aspect of process, without significant adverse impact). Generally speaking, this level of compliance will be expected for important programmatic aspects of the Court Orders.
(2010 Plan at 6.) 2

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 3 of 11
(2010 Plan at 20.) The twelve outcome criteria that defendants must satisfy for the Court to find
compliance with Goal B are:
i . All incidents (as defined in District of Columbia regulations and policies) are reported in accordance with the policy. Abuse, neglect and mistreatment are clearly prohibited by defendants’ policies and procedures.
ii. Family members and/or guardians, the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust are notified of all serious incidents (as defined in the District of Columbia policies) within 24 hours of the defendants becoming aware of such incidents.
iii. All serious incidents are reported within the timeframe established by the policies, and thoroughly investigated by trained investigators. All other incidents are investigated in accordance with the policy requirements.
iv. Investigation reports identify appropriate preventive, corrective and disciplinary actions needed to protect [DDA] consumers from harm.
v. All serious incident investigation reports are reviewed by quality assurance staff in DDS/DDA. All other incidents are reviewed for patterns and trends by quality assurance staff in DDA and the Quality Improvement Committee.
vi. All deaths are reported to and reviewed by the Fatality Review Committee.
vii. Recommendations from the Fatality Review Committee for preventive and corrective actions are followed up, implemented and documented.
viii. For all serious incidents, case managers follow up on recommendations and ensure that there is prompt implementation of appropriate preventive, corrective or disciplinary action, and document their actions. For all incidents, case managers follow up to ensure that all consumers are safe and protected from harm. Based upon the quality assurance review of patterns and trends of consumer incidents, DDS/DDA shall ensure that there is prompt implementation of whatever preventive, corrective or disciplinary actions are necessary to protect the consumers from harm.
ix. The appropriate licensing/contracting agency is informed of all serious incidents and of the outcomes and recommendations for preventive and
3

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 4 of 11
corrective action from all investigations, and has taken appropriate action for prevention and correction.
x. The Court Monitor and the Quality Trust have received incident reports of all serious incidents and all the final investigation reports, as well as all recommendations for preventive and corrective action. Each quarter, the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust have received aggregate reports on patterns and trends for all other incidents.
xi. Incident reporting is on-line in 90 percent of residential and day treatment provider sites.
xii. In the event that private providers do not comply with these performance expectations, appropriate authorities within the District government will take whatever immediate actions are necessary to protect consumers, and take such further actions as may be necessary to correct the deficiency, including but not limited to the provision of training or technical assistance to provider staff, and/or the imposition of sanctions designed to assure compliance, including, where necessary, termination of provider agreements, contracts and licenses.
(2010 Plan at 20-21.)
Outcome criteria vi, vii, ix, x, and xi were covered by an earlier report and
recommendation. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation regarding Protection from
Harm, Aug. 15, 2013 [ECF No. 1402].) The Special Master concluded that defendants had
satisfied those criteria, plaintiffs filed no objections, and the Court adopted the report and
recommendation. (See Order, Sept. 16, 2013 [ECF No. 1412].)
As for the seven remaining Goal B outcome criteria, the certification process began on
October 28, 2013, when the Independent Compliance Administrator (“ICA”) notified the parties,
the Court Monitor, and the Special Master that the DDS Director intended to file a certification
of compliance for those criteria in 60 days.3 After the Court Monitor and the parties completed
3 After the adoption of the 2010 Plan, the Special Master established procedures for the DDS Director to certify compliance with outcome criteria, for his review of that certification and submission of a report and recommendation to the Court, and for the parties to submit to the
4

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 5 of 11
the required discussion on methodology,4 the Court Monitor, the Quality Trust and the Joint
Monitoring Team began their review. (See Court Monitor’s Report, Review of Goal B:
Court any objections to the report and recommendation. (See Procedure for Director’s Certification of Compliance, Aug. 14, 2012 [ECF No. 1332] (“Certification Procedure”).) In brief, the certification process begins when the Independent Compliance Administrator (“ICA”) notifies the Court Monitor that defendants intend to certify compliance with a specified area of the 2010 Plan in 60 days. (Id. ¶ 1.) The Court Monitor then confers with the parties “to discuss and reach agreement on the methods to be employed in the Joint Monitoring in assessing defendants’ compliance.” (Id. ¶ 2.) The Joint Monitoring, which is conducted jointly by the Office of the Court Monitor, DDS staff, and the Quality Trust, must “adhere to compliance measurement criteria and methodology as set forth in the 2010 Plan.” (Id. ¶ 3.) After the Joint Monitoring is completed, the Court Monitor prepares a written report summarizing the findings, which is provided to the parties, the Special Master and the ICA. (Id.) The DDS Director may then file its Certification of Compliance with the Special Master. (Id. ¶ 4.) Although the parties have agreed that the results of joint monitoring activities will be the primary method for evidencing compliance, the certification may include “additional relevant evidence drawn from various sources including [defendants’] data systems, and licensing, certification and monitoring activities.” (See 2010 Plan at 7.) Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor have 30 days to file any response to the certification (Certification Procedure ¶ 7), and then the Special Master prepares a report for the Court with “findings of fact, conclusions and recommendations.” (Id. ¶ 10.) The parties have 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report in accordance with Section V of the Supplemental Order of Reference. (Id. ¶ 11.)
4 For the Goal B outcome criteria, the 2010 Plan provides three methods for assessing compliance:
i. Review a 10 percent random sample of serious and other incident reports and the related investigations, Quality Assurance documents, Human Rights Committee minutes, reports to the Quality Trust, documentation of case manager follow up of the implementation of recommendations, and documentation of the implementation of sanctions where warranted.
ii. Interview case managers and advocates assigned to the consumers involved in the incidents in the sample above, regarding compliance with the policy.
iii. Review documents and interview staff at a 10 percent sample of residential and day program sites to ensure that all incidents are being reported in compliance with the policy.
For method (i), the parties and Court Monitor agreed that the 10% sample of serious and other incident reports “would focus only on Serious Reportable Incidents, as defined in District policies,” “that the incident investigations would have been completed between June 1, 2013 and
5

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 6 of 11
Protection From Harm, Jan. 17, 2014 (amended Jan. 24, 2014)) [ECF 1457-3] (“Joint Monitoring Report”)).) The final Joint Monitoring Report was provided to defendants on January 24, 2014, and the DDS Director submitted a certification of compliance for Goal B outcome criteria i, ii, iii, iv, v, viii, and xii on January 31, 2014. (Director’s Certification of Compliance, Jan. 31, 2014 [ECF No. 1457-1] (“Certification”).) Plaintiffs’ response agreed that defendants had achieved compliance with criteria i through v, but challenged the certification as to criteria viii and xii. (Pls.’ Resp. to Certification, Mar. 4, 2014 [ECF 1457-2].)
Based on the evidence before him, the Special Master concluded that defendants had achieved compliance with all of the remaining Goal B outcome criteria, except criterion xii. (R&R at 13.) No objections have been filed to his recommendation that defendants be found in compliance with criteria i-v and viii. As for criterion xii, defendants raise several objections to the Special Master’s analysis and have asked the Court to find compliance based on their “substantive arguments and objections to the Report and Recommendation asserted in this
October 28, 2013,” and “that twenty-six incident investigations would be randomly selected for review from this time period.” (Joint Monitoring Report at 3.) They did not agree on the scope of “Quality Assurance documents to be reviewed,” and “the Court Monitor made the decision to review HRLA documents for a period of twelve months (October 28, 2012 to October 28, 2013) in order to ensure sufficient documentation for review.” (Id.) Defendants objected to this decision, but provided the necessary documents to the Court Monitor. (Id.) For method (ii), the parties and Court Monitor agreed that service coordinators (“case managers” is the term used in the 2010 Plan) would be asked three questions from the Joint Monitoring Questionnaire. (Id.) The parties and the Court Monitor discussed the questions to be asked of “advocates” (e.g. family members, guardians, attorneys), but the Court Monitor made the final decision on those questions. (Id.) For method (iii), the parties and the Court Monitor agreed “that the 10% sample of residential sites would not include natural homes and that the 10% sample of day program sites would not include supported employment.” (Id.)
6

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 7 of 11
filing,” their “Certification and the evidence submitted in support thereof,” and the “evidence of compliance in this filing.” (Defs.’ Objections to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection From Harm – Part II, at 6, May 5, 2014 [ECF No. 1463] (“Defs.’ Objs.”).) Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors filed a response to defendants’ objections, agreeing with the Special Master’s recommendation. (Pls.’ & Pl.-Intervenor’s Resp. to Defs.’ Objs. at 4, May 14, 2014 [ECF No. 1465] (“Pls.’ Resp. to Objs.”).) The Court’s review of the Special Master’s recommendation as to criterion xii is de novo. (See 2007 Supplemental Order of Reference ¶ (V)(4) at 4, May 3, 2007 [ECF No. 920] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3)).)
ANALYSIS In light of the parties’ agreement as to Goal B outcome criteria i-v and viii, the sole issue for the Court to address is whether defendants have established compliance with criterion xii. Criterion xii provides: In the event that private providers do not comply with these performance expectations, appropriate authorities within the District government will take whatever immediate actions are necessary to protect consumers, and take such further actions as may be necessary to correct the deficiency, including but not limited to the provision of training or technical assistance to provider staff, and/or the imposition of sanctions designed to assure compliance, including, where necessary, termination of provider agreements, contracts and licenses. In analyzing what this criterion requires, the Special Master concluded that “to support a finding of compliance,” there “must be evidence that when confronted with persistent deficiencies, [d]efendants are vigilant in using the tools at their disposal to improve provider performance” and that “the tools themselves must be tools that work effectively to produce the desired result within a reasonably prompt time, given the severity of the problem to be corrected.” (R&R at 13.) Applying this standard, the Special Master concluded that defendants “have failed to carry their burden of proof of compliance” because even though they have “implemented several
7

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 8 of 11
systems for enforcement of their expectations for providers” and “taken a variety of enforcement actions of varying levels of severity when confronted with deficient practices by providers,” “the evidence does not demonstrate the effectiveness of these systems in correcting deficiencies that affect a substantial number of class members’ interests in protection from harm.” (Id.)
In their objections, defendants argue that the Special Master has read Goal B outcome criterion xii “far too broadly.” As they see it, he has read it “to encompass any provider deficiency such that the defendants’ actions and sanctions activities are deemed ‘ineffective’ because poorly performing providers continue to provide services to class members.” (Defs.’ Objs. at 6.) Although the Court agrees that such a reading would be too broad, it does not believe that defendants have accurately characterized the Special Master’s interpretation. In his Report and Recommendation, the Special Master expressly limits criterion xii to deficiencies relating to the overall goal of protection from harm. (See R&R at 10 (criterion xii “describes the obligation of the [d]efendants for enforcement actions to ensure that providers meet the performance expectations laid out in law and policy for protecting class members from harm” (emphasis added).) And while the Court agrees with defendants that the “performance expectations” referenced in criterion xii must be read in light of the requirements of criteria i-xi and the “incident management system” addressed therein (see Defs.’ Objs. at 8), those expectations should also be construed in light of Goal B’s overall goal of protection from harm and the related orders it seeks to implement. As defendants themselves recognize, Goal B “addresses the sufficiency and efficacy of DDS’s incident management system” (id. at 6 (emphasis added)), and “the overarching ‘core interest of class members’ in Goal B is to ensure that incidents of abuse, neglect and mistreatment are reported, investigated, and reviewed, that recommendations are followed up by the appropriate entity, and that providers who fail to meet
8

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 9 of 11
‘these performance expectations’ are subjected to action to ‘assure compliance.’” (Id. at 8 (quoting R&R at 9-10) (emphasis added).) The Special Master’s interpretation of criterion xii accounts for all of these goals while respecting the parameters of Goal B. Accordingly, the Court does not agree with defendants that the Special Master’s interpretation “requir[es] more than contemplated by Goal B outcome criterion xii.” (Id. at 9.)
Defendants also object to the Special Master’s conclusion that they have not met their burden of showing compliance with criterion xii. Although the record before Court includes evidence that was not before the Special Master,5 the Court reaches the same conclusion. In order for defendants to demonstrate compliance with criterion xii, the record must answer the following question: are there current providers whose deficiencies persist and against whom defendants have not taken appropriate action. The record before the Court and arguments of the parties provide no satisfactory answer to this question. For example, the Special Master and plaintiffs rely heavily on the District’s handling of a former provider, IDI, as evidence that they have not proven compliance. (R&R at 11-12; Pls.’ Resp. to Certification at 7.) However, IDI is no longer a provider and, while defendants’ past actions are not irrelevant, defendants must be allowed to rely on current facts to demonstrate compliance. Another point emphasized by both the Special Master and plaintiffs is that after class members who were served by IDI transitioned to new providers, the problems did not disappear. However, while the change in providers was not a quick “fix,” defendants closely monitored the post-transition situation and the most recent data from the Court Monitor (which was not before the Special Master) shows marked improvement. (See Court Monitor’s Report to the Court at 4-7, June 9, 2014 [ECF No. 1468]
5 Defendants attached to their objections to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation copies of a number of official policies and procedures. (See Defs.’ Objs. Exs. 1-12.)
9

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 10 of 11
(noting that while “continuation of onsite monitoring is essential,” defendants have taken “a number of actions to address the continuing deficiencies” previously identified by the Court Monitor and those actions “have resulted in commendable progress”).)
In the end, in order for defendants to prove that they are taking effective action against providers (who are deficient with respect to the goal of protection from harm), the record must include data showing what deficiencies that have been recently identified among current providers have led to sanctions, and what sanctions, if any, have been imposed, and the efficacy of the sanctions imposed. In addition, plaintiffs first must identify who are the current providers that they consider deficient and against whom they believe defendants have failed to take necessary action, what action(s) should have been taken and when, and if there are existing providers whom plaintiffs believe should be terminated, who are those providers.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection From Harm – Part II [ECF No. 1457]; and it is further ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with Goal B outcome criteria i, ii, iii, iv, v, and viii; and it is further ORDERED that defendants have not yet demonstrated compliance with Goal B outcome criterion xii. The issue of defendants’ compliance with criterion xii is returned to the Special Master to allow him to consult with the parties, the ICA, and the Court Monitor and to develop a
10

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1490 Filed 09/10/14 Page 11 of 11

plan, in accordance with the foregoing opinion, for defendants to resubmit their certification as to criterion xii.

Date: September 10, 2014

/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

11

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1496 Filed 10/20/14 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal A.4 – Restricted Control Procedures. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Restricted Control Procedures – Part II, September 5, 2014 [ECF No. 1487] (“R&R”).) Defendants filed their certification of compliance on April 1, 2014. (Id. at 2.) The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants “have met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to Restricted Control Procedures.” (Id. at 7.) (R&R at 8.) The parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1496 Filed 10/20/14 Page 2 of 2
objections have been filed. Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation,
the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report
and Recommendation Regarding Restricted Control Procedures – Part II [ECF No. 1487]; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal A.4 and the underlying court orders as set forth in the 2010 Plan.

Date: October 20, 2014

/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1502 Filed 11/25/14 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certifications of compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal D.1 – Case Management. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Case Management – Part II, Oct. 22, 2014 [ECF No. 1497] (“R&R”).) The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants have met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to Goal D.1, criteria ii and iii. (Id. at 22.) The parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed.

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1502 Filed 11/25/14 Page 2 of 2
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Case Management – Part II [ECF No. 1497]; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal D.1 (criteria ii and iii) and the underlying court orders as set forth in the 2010 Plan.

Date: November 25, 2014

/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1523 Filed 03/10/15 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

MURIEL BOWSER, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), the Special Master, Clarence J. Sundram, has submitted a report and recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of compliance with the one remaining outcome criterion (criterion xii) for Goal B – Consumers Must Be Kept Free From Harm. (Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection from Harm – Part III, Jan. 17, 2015 [ECF No. 1515] (“R&R”).) The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants have met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to criterion xii. The parties had 30 days to file objections to the Special Master’s report. No objections have been filed.

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1523 Filed 03/10/15 Page 2 of 2
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, the lack of any objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection from Harm – Part III, Jan. 17, 2015 [ECF No. 1515]; it is further
ORDERED that defendants have achieved compliance with Goal B and the underlying Court orders as set forth in the 2010 Plan.

Date: March 10, 2015

/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

2

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

&

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

MURIEL BOWSER, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 76-cv-0293 (ESH)

ORDER Pursuant to the “2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty,”1 (“2010 Plan”), Special Master Clarence J. Sundram has submitted a Report and Recommendation regarding defendants’ certification of compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal A.1, Individualized Habilitation Plans. (See Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Individualized Habilitation Plans – Part II, Dec. 9, 2014 [ECF No. 1506], as amended, see Errata, Jan. 7, 2015 [ECF No. 1510] (“R&R-Part II”); Director’s Certification of Compliance, Evans Goal A.1, Individualized Habilitation Plan (Outcome Criteria ii, iii, vii, viii, ix, x, xii, xvi and xvii), June 30, 2014 (filed with the Court as Exhibit 1 to the

1 The 2010 Plan was filed on July 13, 2010 [ECF No. 1200], and approved on August 10, 2010 [ECF No. 1204].

R&R-Part II [ECF No. 1506-1]) (“Certification-Part II”).) Following the Special Master’s first Report and Recommendation regarding Goal A.1 (see Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Individualized Habilitation Plans, Oct. 15, 2013 [ECF No. 1418] (“R&R-Part I”) and the Court’s Order approving and adopting that Report and Recommendation (see Order, Nov. 27, 2013 [ECF No. 1426]), eight criteria from Goal A.1 remained outstanding in full (ii, iii, vii, ix, x, xii, xvi, xvii), and one criterion (viii) remained outstanding in part. The Special Master now recommends that the Court find that defendants (1) have met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to criteria ii, vii, xvi, and xvii; (2) have achieved partial compliance with respect to criteria iii, viii, x (part C), and xii (parts B-D); and (3) have not met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to criteria ix and the remaining parts of criteria iii, viii, x (parts A, B and part of D), and xii (part A). Plaintiffs have not filed any objections, but defendants challenge the Special Master’s adherence to the 2010 Plan’s threshold for “high” compliance as well as his recommended findings of noncompliance as to criteria viii, x.D, and xii.A. (Defs.’ Objections to the R&R-Part II at 1, Jan. 8, 2015 [ECF No. 1512-1] (“Objections”).) For the reasons explained herein, the Court will partially sustain defendants’ objection as to criteria viii, but will otherwise approve and adopt the pending Report and Recommendation in its entirety.2 I. THRESHOLD FOR “HIGH” COMPLIANCE
Under the 2010 Plan, the standard of compliance for Goal A.1 is “high” (2010 Plan at
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(f)(3) and the 2007 Supplemental Order of Reference in this case, when objections to a special master’s findings of fact and/or recommendations are raised, those findings/recommendations are subject to de novo court review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3); see also 2007 Supplemental Order of Reference ¶ (V)(4) at 4, May 3, 2007 [ECF No. 920].)
2

12),3 which is defined as follows:
This threshold requires compliance with the indicator at a rate generally exceeding 90 percent compliance. Where instances of noncompliance with the indicator are found, none can involve a serious and substantive violation of the Court Order with significant adverse impact upon class members (i.e., actual harm or a serious risk of harm) in the judgment of the Court and Special Master (e.g., excusable noncompliance may involve failure to comply with documentation or some aspect of process, without significant adverse impact). Generally speaking, this level of compliance will be expected for important programmatic aspects of the Court Orders.
(2010 Plan at 6 (emphasis added).)
In defendants’ Certification-Part II, they suggested, for the first time, that the 2010 Plan’s
definition of “high compliance” was too demanding. (Certification-Part II at 3.) They pointed
out therein that they had never “agreed” to a 90% threshold for “high” compliance, that certain
outcome criteria do not lend themselves to numerical analysis, and that requiring 90%
compliance was virtually unprecedented in any intellectual and developmental disability service
delivery system across the country.4 (Certification-Part II at 3.) After an extensive discussion,
the Special Master concluded that, while determining a numerical “rate” of compliance was not
always easy, none of defendants’ concerns merited jettisoning the approach established by the
2010 Plan. (See R&R-Part II at 3-7.)
3 As the parties are well aware, for each of the nine subject areas covered by existing court orders, the 2010 Plan sets forth “specific outcome criteria for determining compliance with the related group of Court Orders,” assigns a standard of compliance (“full,” “high,” or “significant”), and “identifies the method by which the Special Master, and ultimately the Court, will assess compliance for each set of outcome criteria.” (2010 Plan at 5-6.) 4 To support this last point, defendants pointed out that the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (“CMS”) recently decided “to use 86% as the threshold for performance in reviewing quality assurances by states for the Home and Community-Based Services (“HCBS”) waiver program, before requiring a quality improvement project to improve performance.” (R&R-Part II at 3 (citing Certification-Part II at 3).)
3

Defendants now object to the Special Master’s “discussion” of the threshold of compliance, raising the same arguments they made in their certification, and ask the Court for two specific things: (1) that a percentage compliance rate of less than 90% on a particular JMQ question should not be “summarily held as a showing of non-compliance”; and (2) that “the [90%] threshold of [high] compliance can and should be revisited by this Court in evaluating the remaining elements of the 2010 Plan and the underlying court orders in recognition of the progress that has been made as evidenced by the Court orders to date finding compliance with 59 of 70 or more than 84 percent of the outcome criteria in the 2010 Exit Plan.” (Objections at 1213.)
The Court agrees with defendants’ first point, which does not actually conflict with anything said by the Special Master in his Report and Recommendation. The 90% threshold for “high” compliance is to be measured with respect to the outcome criteria in the 2010 Plan; it does not require a score of 90% or above for each individual question on the Joint Monitoring Questionnaire (“JMQ”) assigned to that outcome criterion. Thus, an underlying JMQ score may fall below the 90% threshold without precluding defendants from demonstrating compliance.
As for defendants’ second point, it is not entirely clear what defendants mean by asking the Court to “revisit” the standard for high compliance, but the Court does not believe that any such change is necessary. As defendants acknowledge, “high” compliance at 90% is the standard set forth in the 2010 Plan and approved by the Court, and they maintain that they are not suggesting “that the 90 percent compliance standard should be fully obviated at this late date and a wholesale revision to another standard should be adopted.” (Objections at 10.) As the Special Master notes, “it can hardly be concluded that the subsequent 2010 revision of the 2001 Plan set an unreasonable threshold for demonstrating compliance.” (R&R-Part II at 5.)
4

Moreover, although certain outcome criteria may lend themselves more to quantitative analysis, the Court agrees with the Special Master that that does not render the approach of the 2010 Plan unworkable, but rather that “[i]n interpreting and enforcing compliance, the Court has had no difficulty in assessing whether the evidence proffered by the parties met the obligations embodied in these orders.” (R&R-Part II at 5; see also id. at 4 (“[T]hese thresholds of compliance have been used consistently in the certification process since 2010 by the Court Monitor in the Joint Monitoring review, by the Plaintiffs, by the Independent Compliance Administrator, by the Defendants themselves, by the Special Master and by the Court -- without objection from any party until now.”). Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Special Master that there is no need to alter the 2010 Plan’s requirement that sets 90% as the threshold for achieving a “high” standard of compliance and that all of defendants’ valid concerns can be accommodated within the existing compliance framework. II. CRITERION viii
Criterion viii for Goal A.1 requires that “[c]onsumers receive the services and supports identified in the ISP on a timely basis.” (2010 Plan at 11 (emphasis added).) In the first R&R regarding individual habilitation plans, the Special Master advised defendants to develop a “Plan of Correction” as to criterion viii to address deficiencies with respect to “nutrition, OT [occupational therapy], medical and mental health services.” (R&R-Part I at 14; see R&R-Part II at 22.)5 The Special Master now recommends finding defendants in compliance with criterion viii with respect to nutrition and mental health services, but not in compliance as to occupational
5 The Special Master recommended finding defendants in compliance with respect to other services and supports in the ISP (R&R-Part I at 14), and the Court adopted that recommendation. (Order at 2, Nov. 27, 2013 [ECF No. 1426].)
5

therapy or medical services. (R&R-Part II at 25.) Defendants object to the Special Master’s recommended findings of non-compliance. As explained herein, the Court agrees with defendants that they have demonstrated compliance as to occupational therapy services, but agrees with the Special Master that they have not yet demonstrated compliance as to medical services.
A. Occupational Therapy (“OT”) Services The Special Master’s negative recommendation with respect to OT services appears to rest primarily on the responses to JMQ question 102(B) which asked whether, if recommended by a therapist or ordered by a doctor, there was “a current occupational therapy assessment” in the ISP. (Objections at 19.) Out of a sample size of 4, there was only a single positive response, which suggested that recommendations for follow up OT assessments were completed only 25% of the time. (Id.) Although JMQ question 102(B) was not formally assigned to criterion viii, the Special Master concluded that “deficiencies in completing recommendations for OT assessments during the ISP plan year” were “relevant in assessing the timely delivery of services” under criterion viii. (R&R-Part II at 24.) The Special Master also noted that defendants had “acknowledged the inadequacies of their network of providers to timely deliver some of the required clinical services,” and that there was a lack of evidence to date that defendants’ actions to build capacity pursuant to the Plan of Correction have taken effect or improved the situation. Defendants’ objections to the Special Master’s recommendation with respect to OT services are persuasive. As defendants point out, the evidentiary significance of the 25% score in response to JMQ question 102(B) is questionable given the small sample size. In addition, the Court does not agree with the Special Master that the failure to complete recommended followup assessments is directly relevant to criterion viii. JMQ question 102(B), along with a number
6

of other similar questions, was assigned by the parties to criterion iii, while other JMQ questions were assigned to criterion viii. Criterion iii requires that “ISPs will be based upon individualized assessments” while criterion viii “simply asks whether the services and supports identified in the plan are delivered.” (R&R-Part I at 10.) In the Court’s view, the failure to complete a follow up OT assessment is relevant to criterion iii, which focuses on the content of the ISP, but is not relevant to criterion viii, which focuses on its implementation.6 Finally, in terms of the specific questions about OT services that were assigned to criterion viii, there are two reported scores that fall below 90% (JMQ 118a and JMQ 248a), but defendants address both and identify flaws in the analysis of the underlying data that, if corrected, would bring both numbers close to or above 90%. (See Objections at 20-22.) Accordingly, having considered defendants’ objections and the entire record herein, the Court will reject the Special Master’s recommendation and find defendants in compliance as to the OT services component of criterion viii.
B. Medical Services The Special Master concludes that defendants have not demonstrated compliance with the medical services component of criterion viii based on the low scores in response to JMQ question 81, subparts (b) and (d), the underlying deficiencies that resulted in the negative responses (which were described by plaintiffs in their objections to the certification), and defendants’ failure to counter either the low scores or plaintiffs’ objections with other evidence of compliance: In the face of low compliance scores for some relevant questions on the JMQ relating to healthcare and medical services, and a series of objections to a finding
6 Defendants have not challenged the finding of noncompliance as to the OT services component of criterion iii. In light of the Court’s opinion, the Special Master may wish to revisit his conclusion not to consider the responses to JMQ Question 102(B) in his consideration of any future certification on criterion iii.
7

of compliance in the Plaintiffs’ Response (pp. 7-9), Defendants have not submitted adequate evidence to sustain their burden of proof that the actions that they have taken or are taking have yet produced the outcomes for class members that is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligation to provide the services and supports identified in the ISP on a timely basis.
(See R&R-Part II at 24-25.)
In this instance, the Court agrees with the Special Master’s reasoning and conclusion.
JMQ question 81(b) asks: “Is the individual receiving the services identified in the ISP” with
respect to “medical” services? JMQ question 81(d) asked the same question with respect to
“healthcare” services. The responses indicate that only 82.4% (42/51) of the class members in
the sample were receiving the medical services identified in the ISP, while only 69.2% (36/52)
were receiving the healthcare services identified in the ISP.7 (Certification-Part II at 19, 50-51.)
Defendants suggest that these scores should be discounted because the nature of JMQ question
81 means that a single failure to timely provide an identified medical or healthcare service will
result in a “no” response even if all other identified services are timely provided:
[T]here are a significant number of contributing JMQ measures that can result in a negative response. This question is a ‘summary result’ in the defendants’ view and one that rules the District in compliance (Yes) if found to be 100% correct out of multiple outcome measures, or out of compliance (No) regardless if 14 out of 5 measures were met, or 1 out of 15 measures were met, and as such is not fairly reflective of the defendants’ status of compliance. Thus, if class member John Does has 30 health care needs identified in his ISP (measured by JMQ question 81(d) and of those 30 needs 29 are being addressed, but one is not, then, per the Court Monitor the defendants are out of compliance with JMQ question 81(D) relative to this John Doe. The more appropriate result would be that the defendants are 97% compliant (29/30) with JMQ question 81(d) relative to class member John Doe. It is the academic equivalent of not getting any credit for your work on a mathematics problem even though there was a single mistake in computation. Thus the defendants disagree that JMQ question 81 is a strong indicator of compliance with this outcome criterion and would request that the
7 Although the Plan of Correction for criterion viii refers only to medical services, the applicable JMQ questions distinguish between medical and healthcare services.
8

Court make a finding, based on the defendants’ Plan of correction and whatever weight it deems appropriate to JMQ question 81. (Objections at 23.) In theory, defendants are right about the shortcomings of JMQ question 81 and the arguably reduced significance of negative responses thereto, but they have not made any attempt to establish that any particular “no” response is due only to the failure to provide one out of many medical services in an ISP. Perhaps that information can be gleaned from the existing JMQs, but it is not before the Court. In addition, even without these low scores, the examples of deficiencies cited by plaintiffs remain unrebutted by defendants. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Special Master’s recommendation and find that defendants have not yet demonstrated compliance as to the medical services component for criterion viii. III. CRITERION x.D Critierion x.D provides that “ISPs must address the consumers’ need for . . . medical, dental and health and mental health services which provide for accessibility, quality and continuity of care.” (2010 Plan at 11.) The Special Master has concluded that “the evidence supports a finding of compliance with respect to dental and mental health services, but that the Defendants have failed to carry their burden of proof of compliance with respect to health and medical services” due to the “Joint Monitoring findings regarding deficiencies in preventive services.” (R&R-Part II at 19-20.) Specifically, the Special Master is referring to the responses to JMQ question 148, which asks: “Is there evidence that age and gender appropriate preventative health care is provided in a consistent and current manner?” (R&R-Part II at 1819.) The answer to this question was yes for only 66.5% (33/50) of the class members surveyed. (R&R-Part II at 19.) Defendants attempted to address this low score by submitting to the Special Master a comprehensive report on the health screenings received by over 500 of the Evans class members (see Defs.’ Reply in Support of Certification Ex. 1 (“Short Report: Adherence To
9

Preventive Health Services Study,” Georgetown University Center for Excellence in
Developmental Disabilities (2014) (“Georgetown Report”) (filed with the Court as Exhibit 16 to
the R&R-Part II [ECF No. 1506-16]), but the Special Master concluded that while the
Georgetown Report showed that there “are clearly areas of strong performance regarding
preventive services,” it also confirmed deficiencies in the types of screenings that had led to the
negative responses to JMQ question 148.8
Defendants object, arguing that the Special Master has misinterpreted the data in the
Georgetown Report because “citation to percentages for preventive screenings . . . in the absence
of knowing the risk factors that would otherwise necessitate such screenings for people in the
sample, is not a particularly meaningful measure of whether the ISPs address a person’s need
[for a screening].” (Objections at 16-17.) They further assert that:
The authors of the report have verified that the results in fact did not ascertain whether each person should have had each of the identified screenings but rather was a report of the frequency by which the relevant population is receiving such screenings, and without a deeper analysis of a person’s full health and lifestyle profile a reviewer cannot determine if each screening is required. In the defendants’ view, being held in non-compliance for all health and medical services on the grounds of questionable data regarding preventive health care screenings which the class members receive at a significantly high rate is an overly broad determination.
(Objections at 17.) The weakness in defendant’s argument is twofold. First, they assert that the
authors of the report have “verified” that the screening percentages do not account for whether a
screening was required for that individual, but cite no source to support that assertion. Second,
8 Specifically, the negative responses to JMQ question 148 reflected missed screens for skin cancer, hepatitis, glaucoma, diabetes and liver function (see Pls.’ Resp. to Certification-Part II at 18), while the Georgetown Report showed that of the class members surveyed “only 27.7% received a skin cancer screen; 69.4 % screened for hepatitis B and C; [and] 88.2% for glaucoma.” (R&R-Part II at 19.)
10

that assertion appears to contradict the report itself which presents the data as showing the “proportion of individuals receiving appropriate preventive health screenings.” (Georgetown Report at 3.) In addition, even if defendants’ interpretation of the data in the Georgetown Report is correct, that does not negate the evidence from the JMQ that all necessary screenings were provided (or at least reflected in the ISP) only 63.5% of the time. As defendants bear the burden of proving compliance, the absence of evidence to counter this low score leads the Court to agree with the Special Master that defendants have not yet demonstrated compliance with the medical and health care components of criterion x.D. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Special Master’s recommendation and find that defendants have not yet demonstrated compliance with these components of criterion x.D. IV. CRITERION xii.A
Criterion xii provides that: “For persons with physical disabilities, the ISP must provide for individualized adaptive equipment, as needed, based on appropriate professional evaluations of the need for such equipment.” (2010 Plan at 11.) Subpart A provides that “An assessment of the need for adaptive equipment is completed within 30 days of a request therefor.” (Id.) Despite the lack of objection from plaintiffs, the Special Master concluded that defendants had “not met their burden of proof of compliance with respect to this criterion” because “there are no JMQs addressing this provision, nor is there any other evidence in the record specifically addressing the timeliness of assessments regarding the need for adaptive equipment.” (R&RPart II at 11.) Defendants object on the ground that “[i]n the absence of a disagreement regarding compliance,” the Special Master should not have “intervene[d].” (Objections at 14.) They “respectfully request that the Court disregard the Special Master’s recommendation relative to Goal A.1., outcome criterion xii.A, and enter a finding of the defendants’ compliance for this
11

outcome measure.” (Objections at 14.)
In support of their contention that the Special Master should not have “intervene[d]”
absent an objection from plaintiffs, defendants point to language in the 2010 Plan and in the
Special Master’s order setting forth procedures for the certification of compliance. (See 2010
Plan ¶ 7; Procedure for Director’s Certification of Compliance ¶ 9, Aug. 16, 2012 [ECF No.
1332] (“Procedure Order”).) Paragraph 7 in the 2010 Plan includes the following language:
The Plan provides that as the implementation process proceeds, defendants will utilize information generated from internal monitoring processes to determine when they believe they have met the standards for compliance with the identified outcome criteria for each set of actions related to a group of Court Orders. At this point, defendants shall approach plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor to see if they concur that there is compliance with the set of actions and outcome criteria. If there is no agreement, the defendants can move the Special Master for a finding of compliance as to these Court Orders and can seek to have the related Court Orders vacated and dismissed.
(2010 Plan ¶ 7.) Paragraph 9 in the Procedure Order states:
If the plaintiffs of plaintiff-intervenor object to any portion of the Director’s Certification, the Special Master shall, in consultation with the parties, issue a Scheduling Order to hear and resolve the objection. The procedure for resolution of the objection may include informal conferences with the parties, submission of documentation evidence and briefs, or an evidentiary hearing on the record as the Special Master deems appropriate.”
(Procedure Order ¶ 9.) With respect to criterion xii.A, though, defendants did not obtain
plaintiffs’ concurrence as to compliance prior to their submission to the Special Master.9 (2010
Plan ¶ 7.) Rather, in accordance with the Procedure Order, they submitted their certification of
compliance to the Special Master for his review, plaintiffs filed their response to the certification,
and the Special Master submitted a “Report to the Court with findings of fact and conclusions of
9 Nor have the parties “move[d] jointly for an Order vacating and dismissing the related Court Orders.” (2010 Plan ¶ 7.)
12

law regarding the defendants’ compliance with the relevant provisions of the 2010 Plan and related court orders.” (Procedure Order ¶¶ 8, 10.) Irrespective of whether plaintiffs object to the certification, defendants bear the “burden of proof of compliance” (id. ¶ 5), and the Special Master’s submission of a report is required even if there are no objections to the certification by plaintiffs or plaintiff-intervenor. (Id. ¶ 8.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that even though plaintiffs did not object to defendants’ certification as to criterion xii.A, the Special Master properly “assess[ed] compliance for each set of outcome criteria” submitted to him by defendants and submitted his recommendations to the Court. (2010 Plan ¶ 6.) As the Special Master did not improperly “intervene,” and as defendants suggest no substantive basis for rejecting his recommendation as to criterion xii.A, the Court will adopt this recommendation and find that defendants have not yet demonstrated compliance with criterion xii.A.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, upon consideration of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, defendants’ objections thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS IN PART the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Individual Habilitation Services – Part II, as amended [ECF Nos. 1506, 1510]; it is further ORDERED that the Court SUSTAINS defendants’ objections insofar as the report recommends finding noncompliance as to the occupational therapy services component of Goal A.1, criterion viii; it is further ORDERED that the Court agrees with the Special Master that defendants have achieved compliance with Goal A.1 outcome criteria ii, vii, xvi, and xvii, and have achieved partial compliance with outcome criteria iii [specify], viii (nutrition and mental health services), x (part
13

C), and xii (parts B, C, and D (dental and mental health services)); it is further ORDERED that the Court agrees with the Special Master that defendants have not yet
demonstrated compliance with Goal A.1 outcome criterion ix, the remainder of criterion iii, the medical services component of criterion viii, criterion x (parts A, B and part of D (medical and health services), and criterion xii (part A). It is further
ORDERED that the parties, in conjunction with the Special Master, the Independent Compliance Administrator, and the Court Monitor, shall develop a plan for defendants to resubmit their certifications as to the remaining outcome criteria for Goal A.1.

Date: March 31, 2015

/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

14

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1549 Filed 06/30/15 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOY EVANS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

And

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

MURIEL E. BOWSER, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

-----=~~~-----------------

Civil Action No. 76-cv-293 (ESH)

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CONSENT ORDER

The Court has been apprised that the District of Columbia ("District") and the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, [nc. ("Quality Trust") 1 (collectively, "the Parties") have

conferred regarding the extent to which Quality Trust may provide legal services under the

Settlement Agreement approved and entered by this Court on March 30,2001 [Dkt. No. 472, Ex. A) ("2001 Settlement Agreement").2 That issue is the subject of a Motion for Declaratory

Judgment filed by the District on March 12, 2015 [Dkt. No. 1524], which was fully briefed on

April 6, 2015, and subsequently referred to the Special Master for report and recommendation.

Following negotiations before the Special Master, the Parties reached an agreement regarding the

District's Motion and the relief sought therein. Accordingly, the Parties now jointly request that

1 Quality Trust is an "external monitoring body" created in 2001 "to permanently protect the interests of the [Evans] class members once this case ends," Mar. 30, 2001 Op. & Or. [Dkt. No. 472] at 7; its role and functions relevant to class and non-class members are set forth in the 2001 Settlement Agreement and the Court's March 30, 2001 Consent Order.
2 The Parties acknowledge that their agreement, as set forth herein, will be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the District of Columbia, and will be enforceable, after termination of the Evans matter, in Superior
Court.

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1549 Filed 06/30/15 Page 2 of 4
the Court enter this Settlement Agreement and Consent Order, which resolves all disputed issues regarding the nature and scope of Quality Trust's legal representation, disposes of the District's Motion, and, to the extent necessary, ~larifies, but does not supersede, the 2001 Settlement Agreement and the Court's March 30, 2001 Consent Order. The Special Master submitted a report and recommendation supporting this result.
Upon consideration of the agreement of the Parties, the recommendation of the Special Master, and the entire record, it is hereb): .
ORDERED that, except as otherwise specified in this Order, individuals employed by
Quality Trust to furnish legal services shall refrain from providing direct legal representation3 to any individual, class of individuals, or entity, in any matter, regardless of forum, involving an interest or claim for relief arising from, relating to, or in connection with any support or service administered by the Department of Disability Services ("DDS") or any sub-agency or successor agency thereof, where the District, including any District agency, officer, or employee, is an adverse party; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the foregoing shall not prohibit individuals employed by
Quality Trust to furnish legal services from representing individuals in intervention proceeqings before the Probate Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court, acting a~ court-appointed cOlmsel in commitment and admission proceedings before the Family Court Operations Division, representing individuals in matters arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
3 For the purposes of this Order, "direct legal representation" means any engagement in which a client-lawyer relationship exists, excluding discussions between a lawyer and a prospective client. See D.C. BarR Prof. Conduct 1.6, cmt. 9 ("most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so"); In re Thomas Fortune Fay, Ill A.3d I025, I030 (D.C. 20 IS) ("existence of an attorney-client relation is not solely dependent on a written agreement, payment of fees, or the rendering of legal advice .... [Ethical] obligations ... arise from the establishment of a fiduciary relationship between attorney and client").
2

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1549 Filed 06/30/15 Page 3 of 4

or from contracting with, or otherwise arranging for, outside counsel to provide direct legal

representation in any proceeding; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that, notwithstanding the foregoing, individuals employed by

Quality Trust to provide legal services shall not be prohibited from providing direct legal

representation in matters that are pending as of the date of this Order, so long as the existence of

those matters were disclosed to the District on or before Friday, June 26, 2015; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the foregoing, the District's Motion for

Declaratory Judgment and to Enforce the Settlement Agreement is denied as moot.

SO ORDERED. Dated:

c~/(~~ Hurd[
~:ELLEN S. HUVEii£
United States District Court Judge

ACCEPTED FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BY:
KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia

, 2015
Acting eputy Attorney General Public Interest Divisio~/ _·- ..
_,.,/ /
Y T UST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC. BY:
-f}-tr-f-l---~--:;(_3_ ,2015
ief Executive Officer Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc,

3

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1549 Filed 06/30/15 Page 4 of 4
~//::-7:0::-=-:-4-==U~C-==A~l:tL~Vl~S.____ _ _ on --"2\Jic...a..::A~J'--"'-'---11_..2=--""--Q_ _ _ , 201s
LESLIE A. DAVIS Counsel for Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc.
4

 
 Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

______________________________________________

)

JOY EVANS, et.al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

And

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor

)

)

v

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 76-93 (ESH)

SPECIAL MASTER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PROTECTION FROM HARM—Part II1

Introduction
The 2010 Plan identifies nine topical areas into which existing court orders have been organized for the purpose of assessing the Defendants' compliance, in accordance with the Procedures for Certification of Compliance (Dkt. #1332, filed August 16, 2012). This Certification deals with Protection from Harm. The 2010 Plan establishes a threshold of “high” compliance, generally exceeding 90%.
The Court has previously approved a Report and Recommendation from the Special Master finding that the Defendants had achieved compliance with five of the 12 criteria contained in the 2010 Plan regarding Protection from Harm. (Dkt. # 1412, filed September 16, 2013, regarding outcome criteria vi, vii, ix, x and xi).

1 2010 PLAN FOR COMPLIANCE AND CONCLUSION OF EVANS V. FENTY, Goal D. 1 (Document #1200), (“2010 Plan”); Related Court Orders: 1978 Final Judgment and Order, sections I.2 and III.14.a.
1

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 2 of 14
On January 31, 2014, the Director of the Department on Disability Services ("DDS") submitted a Certification of Compliance with the remaining seven criteria. As has been the case with most of the certifications to date, much of the evidence of compliance is drawn from the results of a joint monitoring process conducted by a team supervised by the Court Monitor with representatives from the Quality Trust and DDS. The joint monitoring process was conducted from mid-November 2013 through mid-January 2014, and generally examined Defendants' performance during the period June 1, 2013 to October 28, 2013. The team reviewed a random sample of 26 investigations of Serious Reportable Incidents (“SRI”) completed during this period, representing a 10% sample of such investigations. The 26 investigations involved 24 class members and 12 provider agencies. In addition, over the Defendant's objection,2 the Court Monitor also obtained and reviewed survey reports from the District's Health Regulations and Licensing Administration (“HRLA”), which has regulatory responsibility over licensed providers, for the period between October 2012 and October 2013. The Court Monitor submitted a report on the joint monitoring findings on January 17, 2014, and an amended report on January 31, 2014. (Appendices 1 and 2, to the Director's Certification of Compliance, “Joint Monitoring Report”)
The 2010 Plan also permits the District of Columbia to submit any additional relevant evidence drawn from various sources including their data systems, and licensing, certification and monitoring activities. (2010 Plan, ¶ 7) The Defendants have done so and included three appendices to the Certification of Compliance. (Appendices #18-20)
Reflecting the overall progress that has been made in meeting the requirements of the 2010 Plan and the underlying court orders, Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-intervenor, the United States Department of Justice, (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) generally concede that the evidence submitted by the Defendants supports a finding that the Defendants have met the compliance standard as to five of the seven criteria covered by this Certification, and limit their objections to the remaining two criteria.
2 The essence of Defendants’ objection is that these documents extend the review period farther backwards from June 1, 2013 to include a period during which Defendants had not claimed to be in compliance.
2

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 3 of 14
Special Master's Findings and Conclusions
In this section, this report will discuss each of the seven criteria, summarize the evidence submitted, the Plaintiffs’ objection, if any, and the Special Master's findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Court.
i. All incidents (as defined in District of Columbia regulations and policies) are reported in accordance with the policy. Abuse, neglect and mistreatment are clearly prohibited by defendants’ policies and procedures.
District law specifically prohibits mistreatment, neglect or abuse in any form, and requires the reporting and investigation of all alleged instances of such behavior. (D.C. Law 2137, codified as amended at DC Official Code §7-1301.01 et seq (2008 Repl.) The requirements of this law are implemented through the Incident Management and Enforcement Policy and the Incident Management and Enforcement Procedure of June 1, 2013. (Appendix #18 to the Director's Certification of Compliance) The results of the Joint Monitoring Questionnaire administered by the monitoring team indicated that 96% of the Serious Reportable Incidents were filed timely. The Joint Monitoring Report identifies one incident that occurred on July 18, 2013 which had not been reported. (Joint Monitoring Report, p. 7)
Plaintiffs agree that the evidence supports a finding of compliance with this criterion. Despite this concurrence, they expressed concern about a few incidents that surfaced in the Monitor's review of HRLA documents but which had not been reported as required by the laws, policies and procedures cited above. Plaintiffs correctly note that the reporting of an incident is an essential first step not only for the correction of the specific underlying problem, but also for preventive measures that might be needed for other consumers in the DDS system.
Despite the occasional instances of noncompliance, the evidence on the whole supports a finding of substantial compliance with this criterion.
ii. Family members and/or guardians, the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust are notified of all serious incidents (as defined in the District of Columbia policies) within 24 hours of the defendants becoming aware of such incidents.
During the joint monitoring process, the monitoring team attempted to contact family members, guardians and attorneys representing class members to determine whether they had
3

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 4 of 14
been informed of SRIs in the sample, within 24 hours of discovery. This process was unsuccessful in producing reliable information regarding the Defendants' level of compliance with this criterion. First, for a variety of reasons, the team was able to reach only a small number of respondents. Second, some of the respondents did not have a clear recollection of when they were informed. Third, the inquiry conflated the question of whether the respondent received notification of the incident, which is what the criterion requires, with an inquiry into whether the respondent was notified of the outcome of the investigation, which is not required by this criterion.
The Defendants concluded that they could not rely upon this evidence to support their Certification of Compliance with this criterion. Instead, they reviewed the available data from the Immediate Response Committee analyzed by the Quality Management Division for the 26 SRIs in the sample, and for all incidents involving class members from June 23, 2013 through January 30, 2014. As a result of this review, Defendants reported that 69% of the sample incidents had a timely notification. From the larger review of all incidents involving class members, 89% had a timely notification, with the performance improving steadily from 23% in June 2013 to in excess of 90% for the months of September, October, November and December 2013. (See, appendices #s 19 and 22 Defendants’ Certification of Compliance) Defendants attribute this improved performance to quality assurance activities that identified the reasons for the initial low level of compliance, followed by staff training and close vigilance of performance and documentation of the notifications made. Despite the success of their efforts in dramatically improving the level of compliance with this criterion, Defendants candidly acknowledge that their efforts have fallen slightly short of the required 90% compliance.
In light of the evidence and the Defendants' acknowledgment, Plaintiffs could advance an argument for a finding of noncompliance. However, they have elected to eschew an insistence on technical compliance and focus on the success achieved by the Defendants' proactive response to the results of their critical self-examination. Although they do not challenge the Certification Compliance with this criterion, Plaintiffs point to continuing examples of cases involving serious incidents where families and guardians of class members were not notified of emergency hospitalizations, and the need for continuing vigilance regarding the required notifications.
4

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 5 of 14
I find that the evidence on the whole supports a finding of substantial compliance with this criterion. However, Defendants are directed to submit to the parties, the Court Monitor and the Special Master quarterly reports for the first two quarters of 2014 regarding the rate of compliance with the requirements for timely notifications of serious incidents.
iii. All serious incidents are reported within the timeframe established by the policies, and thoroughly investigated by trained investigators. All other incidents are investigated in accordance with the policy requirements.
There is some overlap between this criterion and criterion one above regarding the reporting of serious incidents. The joint monitoring data clearly indicates that the Defendants' performance meets the requisite compliance threshold. Although the Plaintiffs agree that Defendants are in compliance with this criterion, they voice their disagreement with Defendants' policy that assigns responsibility for investigating incidents other than “serious reportable incidents” to providers. Plaintiffs are concerned that “providers cannot or will not conduct effective investigations or produce reports that are critical of fellow staff or their own agencies, as evidenced by their performance in looking at those SRI's for which they are responsible.” (Plaintiffs' Response to Director's Certification of Compliance, March 4, 2014, p. 3, “Plaintiffs’ Response”) In support of their concerns, Plaintiffs cite several examples of deficient investigations performed by providers. (Id. pp.3-4)
Defendants' policies recognize the importance of ensuring timely, competent and credible investigations. All SRIs are investigated by trained investigators employed by DDS/DDA but less serious incidents are assigned to provider agencies for investigation. There is nothing inherently wrong with placing primary responsibility upon a provider agency, which has been entrusted with and paid to provide for the care and safety of class members, to immediately respond to incidents which jeopardize such safety. Such agencies must have the capacity to investigate what went wrong in their programs, to attend to the safety of people who have been entrusted to their care, and to examine root causes of the incident under investigation and to implement preventive, corrective and disciplinary actions as warranted. The case examples cited by the Plaintiffs are reminders of the need to hold providers accountable for the performance of critical functions with which they have been entrusted. Although the Defendants have instituted requirements for competence-based training for provider investigators, these cases demonstrate
5

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 6 of 14
continued shortcomings in some cases. The deficiencies in the provider investigations cited by the Plaintiffs were identified as a result of the review of investigations by the DDS Investigations Management and Enforcement Unit and/or surveillance of provider agency performance by HRLA, which is evidence that providers are being supervised and held accountable for their performance of investigations. This is evidence that Defendants have not made an unfettered delegation to providers of this important responsibility for conducting investigations into incidents of lesser severity, but that there are systems in place to monitor how providers are fulfilling their obligations and to identify and correct deficiencies should they arise.
I find that the evidence supports a finding of substantial compliance with this criterion.
iv. Investigation reports identify appropriate preventive, corrective and disciplinary actions needed to protect MRDD consumers from harm.
The joint monitoring report found that investigations consistently addressed factors that potentially caused or contributed to the occurrence of the incident. Plaintiffs concur that Defendants are in compliance with this criterion. I find the evidence sufficient to substantiate a finding of substantial compliance.
v. All serious incident investigation reports are reviewed by quality assurance staff in DDS/DDA. All other incidents are reviewed for patterns and trends by quality assurance staff in DDA and the Quality Improvement Committee.
This criterion was not subject to the joint monitoring process. In support of the Certification, Defendants have submitted extensive information regarding their quality assurance program. (Director's Certification of Compliance, pp. 17-19) This information describes the manner in which incidents are reviewed for patterns and trends, information submitted to the Quality Improvement Committee, regularly shared with the Plaintiffs and published on the DDS website. Pursuant to the Joint Stipulation on Quality Assurance Documents, Defendants have been submitting on a quarterly basis various reports to the Plaintiffs and the Court Monitor including Quality Management Division Quarterly Report, which addresses Serious Reportable Incidents and other incidents.
Plaintiffs concur that Defendants are in compliance with this criterion. I find the evidence sufficient to substantiate a finding of substantial compliance.
6

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 7 of 14
viii. For all serious incidents, case managers3 follow up on recommendations and ensure that there is prompt implementation of appropriate preventive, corrective or disciplinary action, and document their actions. For all incidents, case managers follow up to ensure that all consumers are safe and protected from harm. Based upon the quality assurance review of patterns and trends of consumer incidents, DDS/DDA shall ensure that there is prompt implementation of whatever preventive, corrective or disciplinary actions are necessary to protect the consumers from harm.
This criterion has three separate requirements. First, that for Serious Reportable Incidents, case managers follow up and document prompt implementation of recommendations. Second, that for all incidents, case managers follow-up to ensure that consumers are safe and protected from harm. Third, that based upon a quality assurance review of patterns and trends of incidents, DDA ensures there is prompt implementation of whatever preventive, corrective or disciplinary actions are necessary to protect consumers from harm.
The joint monitoring process produced relevant data regarding two of the three elements of criterion viii. Question 192 addresses the first element, the follow-up of serious reportable incidents by a compliance specialist4 to ensure prompt implementation of recommendations for appropriate preventive, corrective or disciplinary action, with appropriate documentation. There was 100% compliance. Another question, #276, asks whether there was evidence of follow-up by the service coordinator “within 48 hours.” This produced an 84% compliance score.
Regarding the second element dealing with all incidents, question 193 asks whether the service coordinator followed up to ensure that the individual was safe and protected from harm. It produced a score of 84%.
None of the questions specifically address the third element which addresses quality assurance activities and more systemic preventive and corrective actions to protect consumers from harm, drawn from a review of patterns and trends of incidents. Neither the Defendants' Certification of Compliance nor the Plaintiffs' Response specifically addresses this element of criterion viii. Perhaps this is because there is some degree of overlap between this criterion and
3 Case managers are also referred to as support coordinators. 4 Subsequent to the 2010 Plan, a change in DDS/DDA policy transferred the follow up responsibility from the case manager to a compliance specialist. The parties agreed that the joint monitoring process would review the actions of the compliance specialist instead.
7

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 8 of 14
criteria v and xii, and there is information in the Defendant's Certification that is of relevance to this element. The Defendants' Certification describes how all incidents are aggregated and reviewed for patterns and trends on a quarterly basis, reports are submitted to the Quality Improvement Committee, and recommendations are made for further investigations, inquiries or system improvements. It further describes how the implementation of recommendations is followed up by the work of various committees within DDS/DDA. (pp. 17-19)
The Certification evidence submitted does not discretely address these three elements, but combines them into a single argument about compliance or noncompliance. Defendants argue that the Joint Monitoring Report improperly combined the results of two questions, 193 and 276, and imported the 48 hour timeliness requirement of question 276 to question 193 for the service coordinator's follow-up, resulting in an 84% compliance rate. They argue that without this improper importing, the correct rate of compliance for question 193 is 92%. Second, they argue that for the four cases where it was determined that the support coordinator did not follow-up to ensure that the individual was safe and protected from harm, in two of these cases a DDS nurse did the follow-up, and there was no adverse effect upon the class members. In the other two cases where the service coordinators' follow up occurred outside the 48 hour time frame that had been improperly imported into question 193, the service coordinator nevertheless had followed up within a few days and there was no significant adverse impact upon the class members involved. Finally, Defendants report that DDS has implemented a process whereby service coordination supervisors conduct a daily check of incidents to ensure that proper service coordination of SRIs occurs within 48 hours of the incident.
The Plaintiffs' Response, while continuing to object to the Defendants' methodology of averaging scores, emphasizes that all four of the serious reportable incidents in the sample that did not get proper service coordination pertain to emergency or unplanned inpatient hospitalizations of members, one of whom was involved in two of the four incidents at issue. While agreeing with the Joint Monitoring Report that it was appropriate for DDS nurses to perform follow-up visits in two of the four cases, Plaintiffs argue that it is not a substitute for service coordination.
8

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 9 of 14
Much as the nurses were doing their jobs, service coordinators must perform their jobs. It is critical that class members' service coordinators conduct timely follow-up reviews within two business days of the incident as mandated in the defendant's own policy. Service coordinators, along with their supervisors, must oversee the needs and services of class members, especially when they experience SRI's. (Plaintiffs' Response, p. 6)
It is inevitable in a case that covers so much ground that, despite the best efforts to craft discrete areas of Certifications of Compliance, some of the subject areas and their compliance criteria overlap with others. (See, e.g. overlapping requirements regarding Staffing, Adequate Budget and Case Management. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Staff Training, Dkt. # 1318, July 6, 2012, and Dkt. # 1338, September 28, 2012; Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Adequate Budget, Dkt. #1341, October 5, 2012; Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Case Management, Dkt. #1374, March 25, 2013) It is therefore important to focus in each certification on the core interest of class members that is being addressed. It must be kept in mind that this is a certification about Protection from Harm and not about the performance of case managers, which is the subject of a separate certification. The essential interest of class members that this criterion was intended to protect is their safety. The implementation of recommendations for prevention, correction and discipline furthers that interest in being protected from harm. From that perspective and for this certification, it is of lesser importance to the class member whether critical functions are performed by service coordinators, compliance specialists or DDS nurses – what matters is that these functions are performed in a reasonably timely manner. This is not to say that the performance by case managers of their duties is unimportant –far from it, they are an essential safeguard for class members in a service system where all of the critical responsibilities for service provision have been assigned to private contractors. But this is not the place to evaluate the performance by case managers of their duties.
In two of the cases cited as evidence of noncompliance, the follow-up visit was performed by a nurse while the class member was still in the hospital. In the third case, which is cited as evidence of noncompliance because the service coordinator's visit took place at least two days beyond the 48 hour window for follow-up, the class member was also in the hospital. In each of these cases, the class member was in a location where his or her safety and protection was entrusted to the hospital staff, and there is no evidence that the class member was exposed to
9

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 10 of 14
any additional risk of harm due to inconsequential delays in service coordinator follow-up, or that the follow-up was performed by a nurse rather than the service coordinator. The fourth case cited as evidence of noncompliance involves the failure of a service coordinator to conduct a follow-up visit for a week after the class member had been discharged from an emergency inpatient hospitalization due to blood in her stool. The IMEU made a finding of neglect against the provider direct support and nursing staff for failing to adequately monitor the class member's bowel movements during the time leading up to her hospitalization. In this case, the lack of timely follow-up by the case manager may well have been responsible for a slower response and correction of conditions at the class member's home.
Despite this deficiency, the evidence overall establishes substantial compliance with the requirement that there is follow-up of incidents to ensure that class members are safe and protected from harm, that serious reportable incidents are followed up to ensure the implementation of recommendations for preventive, corrective or disciplinary action, and that Defendants ensure that there is prompt implementation of preventive, corrective or disciplinary actions emanating from quality assurance reviews of patterns and trends of incidents.
xii. In the event that private providers do not comply with these performance expectations, appropriate authorities within the District government will take whatever immediate actions are necessary to protect consumers, and take such further actions as may be necessary to correct the deficiency, including but not limited to the provision of training or technical assistance to provider staff, and/or the imposition of sanctions designed to assure compliance, including, where necessary, termination of provider agreements, contracts and licenses.
This criterion describes the obligation of the Defendants for enforcement actions to ensure that providers meet the performance expectations laid out in law and policy for protecting class members from harm. The Director's Certification of Compliance describes the several systems that are in place to report SRI's to other District agencies with oversight responsibilities, the follow up by the Department of Health Care Finance and through the DDS Provider Certification Review process on recommendations that have been made. It further describes the training and technical assistance that is an outgrowth of monthly Incident Management Coordinators meetings with providers, and the work of the DDA Health and Wellness staff, and
10

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 11 of 14
Quality Improvement Specialist, as well as the annual development of Continuous Improvement Plans by the Provider Resource Management unit for each provider. The certification states:
DDS employs the Do Not Refer List, Enhanced Monitoring, Provisional PCR Certification and Recommendations for Termination of Medicaid Agreements as sanctions designed to assure compliance with DDS policy to ensure protection from harm. During the time frame covered by the joint monitoring team's review, sanctions were necessary for only one provider . ... As a result, . . .was placed on the Do Not Refer and Watch List . . .[and] later remedied the basis for the sanctions and was removed from both of these lists. (Director's Certification of Compliance, pp.19-20)
In their response, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Defendants have developed systems to identify deficiencies and issue sanctions to poorly performing providers, and that they have taken actions against providers consistent with their policies. (Plaintiffs' Response, pp. 7-10) However, their essential objection to the Certification of Compliance for this criterion is that the Defendants' enforcement actions have not been effective and that they “continue to allow providers with demonstrated deficiencies to support class members. As a result, class members' health needs suffer and they are at risk of harm.” (Id., p. 7) After describing a series of longstanding deficiencies at several different provider sites, and the actions taken by the Defendants, Plaintiffs object that “the actions they have taken have still not corrected the deficiencies as required under Goal B.b.xii and class members are still not protected from harm.”(Id., p. 9)
Plaintiffs conclude:
Outcome criterion xii requires more than monitoring and the development of sanctions. It requires swift action to correct deficiencies to ensure that class members are protected from harm. Yet, class members still remain with substandard providers who have demonstrated for far too long that they cannot meet the needs of class members. As a result, class members suffer. Therefore, plaintiff's contest the defendants' certification of compliance with this criterion. (Id. p. 10)
Prominent among the examples cited by the Plaintiffs is the case of Individual Development Inc. (“IDI”), a provider agency with which the Court is familiar as its performance has been the subject of several reports by the Court Monitor and discussion at parties' meetings and status conferences. The long-standing deficiencies at this provider agency, which operated 11 intermediate care facilities and two support living homes and served approximately 42 class
11

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 12 of 14
members, and the lack of success of progressive enforcement actions in achieving durable correction of the problems, eventually led the District to consider legal proceedings to terminate its operations. A report to the Court by the Defendants on April 6, 2012 described the history of enforcement actions which culminated in a plan to transition the operations of IDI to three other providers, and to provide for enhanced independent monitoring during the transitional process (Dkt. #1309-1, April 6, 2012)
Unfortunately, as noted by the Plaintiffs, “Even after these class members transitioned to three well-established providers, they continue to receive the same substandard care as they did when they were supported by IDI.” (Id, p. 7)
The Plaintiffs' Response describes the numerous steps taken by the Defendants to address the ongoing problems affecting the class members after the transition.
1. DDS performed a 45 day review of the class members. 2. On September 30, 2013, DDS issued a Provider Plan of Correction Performance Review
comparing performance of the three providers on key measures to the earlier review. 3. As a result of this review, all three providers were placed on the Do Not Refer list, which
prevents new admissions. 4. The Defendants increased their own monitoring of these homes and provided training and
technical assistance to the three providers. 5. The Court Monitor's review in the fall of 2013 indicated that many of the deficiencies
persisted. 6. IMEU conducted investigations into individual cases of alleged neglect and serious
reportable incidents. 7. HRLA conducted surveys of the homes in October, November and December 2013 and
identified deficiencies in implementing class members' ISPs and health care plans.
The Plaintiffs also cite the example of another provider that supports 36 class members which has been on the Do Not Refer list for 27 months for a variety of problems including continuing concerns about health and wellness and inadequate oversight by management. While placement on this list may have prevented new admissions to this provider for more than two
12

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 13 of 14
years,”it has not protected the class members and DDS consumers stuck in those poorly performing residential placements.” (Id., p. 9)
It is clear from this record that the Defendants have taken a variety of enforcement actions of varying levels of severity when confronted with deficient practices by providers. In the enforcement process, Defendants must be given some latitude in determining the most effective course of action to produce compliance, before invoking drastic options that may require class members to undergo the trauma of a forced relocation or transfer to a new provider and a new staff. As the experience of IDI illustrates, even this option is no guarantor of a successful result. Although responsibility for the class members and other consumers was transferred to other well-established provider agencies, the performance problems persisted.
The question which arises is to what standard should Defendants be held? The obligation to take action to address serious deficiencies cannot be satisfied by a process alone, without regard to the effectiveness of the result it achieves on behalf of vulnerable class of people. Although, on paper, it appears that there is a veritable arsenal of tools available to enforce safety and quality standards applicable to provider agencies, these tools seem to work best with provider agencies that are both competent and strongly motivated to deliver a high level of quality and safety. They have proven less effective, and even ineffective, in environments that have had a prolonged experience of deficient care that has permeated the organization.
To support a finding of compliance, there must be evidence that when confronted with persistent deficiencies, Defendants are vigilant in using the tools at their disposal to improve provider performance. And the tools themselves must be tools that work effectively to produce the desired result within a reasonably prompt time, given the severity of the problem to be corrected. As the language of the criterion states, Defendants must “take such further actions as may be necessary to correct the deficiency.”
Although the Defendants have implemented several systems for enforcement of their expectations for providers, the evidence does not demonstrate the effectiveness of these systems in correcting deficiencies that affect a substantial number of class members' interests in
13

Case 1:76-cv-00293-ESH Document 1457 Filed 04/04/14 Page 14 of 14 protection from harm. I find that the Defendants have failed to carry their burden of proof of compliance with this requirement.
In conclusion, I find that the Defendants have met their burden of proof of compliance as to criteria I, ii, iii, iv, v, and viii, and have failed to meet their burden of proof as to criterion xii.
Pursuant to the Supplemental Order of Reference (Dkt. #920), the parties may file objections to this report within 30 days. /s/________________ Clarence J. Sundram Special Master April 2, 2014
14

 
 EVANS v. WILLIAMS

79

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

templated only a direct method. Under the Secretary's current system, informa­ tion comes from a beneficiary via the SSA and is screened by RCFA to determine if that beneficiary is eligible for a buy-in program. This is a reasonable method of "obtaining information." The relevant data are then made electronically available to the Medicaid program in the state in which the beneficiary resides. This is a reasonable method of "transmitting such information."
When Congress enacts an ambiguous provision within a statute entrusted to the expertise of an agency, it is implicitly dele­ gating to that agency the power to fill in the gaps. County of Los Angeles, 192
F.3d at 1016. 'In section 1395b~, Con­
gress could have defined the specific con­ tours of the: "information, counseling, and assistance" it wished the Secretary to pro­ vide under the Program. In section 154, Congress could have specified what precise steps the Secretary should take under the Method or established a requirement that a certain percentage of qualified beneficia­ ries should be enrolled in the buy-in pro­ grams by a certain date. Congress did not take such action. I am unwilling, in light of this Congressional silence and the Sec­ retary's unique ability to deal with the matters entrusted to his department, to declare that his interpretation of his statu­ tory responsibilities are unreasonable. Unless and until Congress spells out the form of the "counseling, information, and services" to be' provided under section 1393b~ and/or the "method" for collecting and transmitting information regarding newly eligible beneficiaries under section 154, I will defer to the Secretary. Defen­ dants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.

strated injury in fact by means of associ­ ational standing; (2) they have demon­ strated that this. injury is traceable to defendants' conduct; and (3) their inju­ ries would likely be addressed by a fa­ vorable decision. In addition, judicial re­ view is appropriate here because (1) there is no express or implied preclusion of judicial scrutiny in the statute; (2) the statutes provide sufficient "law to apply"; and (3) the relevant pragmatic consider­ ations which guide courts in this Circuit do not weigh against judicial review.
Defendants' remaining Motion for Sum­ mary Judgment will be granted. Under the Chevron test, the relevant details of the statutes are ambiguous and I do not find unreasonable the Secretary's interpreta­ tion of his responsibility to administer those details. An Order consistent with this Opinion shall be issued.
Joy EVANS, et aI., Plaintiffs, 

United States of America, 
 Plaintiff-Intervenor, 
 v. 

Anthony A. WILLIAMS, 
 et aI., Defendants. 

eIV. A. No. 76-293 SSH. 

United States District Court, 
 District of Columbia. 

March 30, 2001. 


CONCLUSION
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be denied. Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claim because (1) they have demon­

In class action challenging conditions at District of Columbia public institution for the mentally retarded, the District Cburt, 35 F.Supp.2d 88, Harris, J., found

80

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

defendants in contempt for failure to com­ ply with Court's orders and imposed more than $5 million in fines, and ordered spe­ cial master to develop plan for conclusion of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, 206 F.3d 1292,. reversed and remanded, ruling that fines were criminal in nature and could not be imposed absent appropri­ ate procedural safeguards. Following re­ mand, parties submitted stipulated find­ ings of fact, special master's plan, and consent order and accompanying settle­ ment agreement providing for funding of trust created to monitor plan compliance and advocate for retarded persons, and providing for waiver of claims for past violations of District Court's orders. The District Court, Harris, J., held that plan addressed in detailed and satisfactory fashion broad goals which Court had laid out.
Plan approved; consent order entered.
Federal Civil Procedure <$=>2397.2 District court would approve special
master's remedial plan in class action chal­ lenging conditions at public institution for the mentally retarded, and enter consent order creating durable and independent monitoring agency to monitor quality of services and advocate for retarded per­ sons; plan addressed in detailed fashion court's broad goals, including revisions to training and policy, creation of quality as­ surance program and incident-reporting procedure, mechanisms for preventing misuse or overuse of restraints and medi­ cations, and periodic progress reports to special master.

Richard J. Farano, Senior Trial Attor­ ney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor.
Maria C. Amato, Senior Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, Government of District of Columbia, Task Force, Major Equity Litigation, Washington, DC, for Defendants or Respondents.
Margaret G. Farrell, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Washington,DC, Special Master.
OPINION AND ORDER
HARRIS, District Judge.
On February 10, 1999, the Court issued an Opinion and Order by which it granted the motions of plaintiffs and the United States to find defendants in contempt for their failure to comply with certain earlier Orders in this case. The Court imposed contempt fmes of $5,096,340.00 against de­ fendants. In addition, the Court ordered the Special Master, in cooperation and con­ junction with the parties, if possible, to develop a plan for the conclusion of this action which would address the disposition of the fines to. have been paid by defen­ dants and make suggestions for post-litiga­ tion mechanisms to ensure the protection of the plaintiff class' continuing interests in adequate habilitation. Evans v. Williams, 35 F.Supp.2d 88, 97 (D.D.C.1999).
Among other things, the plan was to address:
(1) A summary and articulation of the goals of this lawsuit;

Joseph B. Tulman, University of District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law, Kelly Bagby, University Legal Ser­ vices, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs or Petitioners.

(2) The status of compliance with vari­ ous Court Orders;
(3) The quality assurance methods to be developed and implemented by defendants to monitor the performance of public and private providers of service;

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

81

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

(4) The standards, including outcomes standards to be developed and implement­ ed by defendants, that should be used to determine defendants' continuing compli­ ance with Court-ordered requirements, and the way in which compliance with such standards should be measured;
(5) The degree of compliance that should be required with respect to each of the standards recommended;
(6) The steps necessary to establish per­ manent, objective, efficient, and effective post-termination monitoring of the pro­ grams serving consumers by independent entities; and
(7) The steps necessary to coordinate existing mechanisms and to develop need­ ed mechanisms for the advocacy of the interests of consumers on an individual and community-wide basis. .
Defendants appealed the Court's imposi­ tion of contempt fines. On March 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed this Court's decision on the majority of the contempt fines. Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292 (D.C.Cir.2000).
Pursuant to the Court's February 1999 Order, under the direction of the Special Master, Margaret G. Farrell, with the as­ sistance of her then-consultant, Clarence J. Sundram, the parties engaged in lengthy negotiations that resulted in a. series of agreements that have been presented for acceptance and approval. The documents now before the Court include:
(1) The 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams (hereinaf­ ter the Plan);
(2) A Consent Order and accompanying Settlement Agreement, filed on February 2,2001; and
(3) The Parties' Joint Stipulated Find­ ings of Fact, filed on December 22, 2000.
Taken together, these documents, fash­ ioned collaboratively by the parties who are represented by able and experienced

counsel, set forth a careful and detailed blueprint for achieving compliance with the Court's Orders, for the development of permanent and independent mechanisms to safeguard the rights of class members, and for the phased withdrawal of judicial oversight of the District of Columbia's mental retardation system as compliance with the Court's Orders is achieved.
The Stipulated Findings of Fact and the Consent Order-with the Settlement Agreement-will be sent for publication with this Opinion and Order. The Plan, however, is a 73-page, single-spaced docu­ ment. It is summarized herein, but shall not be sent for publication.
The 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams
Responding to this Court's Order of February 10, 1999, the Plan identifies the eight goals of the existing Court Orders as follows:
(1) Appropriate individual habilitation in the community in the least separate, most integrated, and least restrictive environ­ ment;
(2) Protection from harm;
(3) Safeguarding consumers' personal possessions;
(4) Monitoring the service system;
(5) Advocacy for consumers;
(6) Adequate budget;
(7) Timely payment of vendors; and
(8) Essential systemic conditions.
For each of these broad goals of the prior Court Orders, the Plan identifies clear and measurable expectations of per­ formance by providers of service and by the District of Columbia government. It identifies the relevant Court Orders, the specific tasks that must be performed to implement those Orders, and time frames within which the tasks must be performed.

82

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

For each set of Court Orders, the Plan identifies specific outcome criteria for measuring compliance therewith. This agreement by the parties on the yardsticks to be utilized in. making determinations of compliance provides clear guidance to pro­ viders as well as to the District of Colum­ bia government in implementing the Plan. Moreover, .the Plan also identifies a specif­ ic standard of compliance for each set of Court Orders, and sets forth the methods by which evidence will be collected and evaluated to assess compliance.
The Plan details a process for identify­ ing individualized needs for services and supports, with input from class members, their families or guardians, case managers, clinical professionals and direct care staff, and advocates. It requires the aggrega­ tion of information regarding the needs for services and supports to enable its use in planning and budgeting for the overall mental retardation service system. It pro­ vides for an explicit opportunity for plain­ tiffs to review and comment upon the ade­ quacy of proposed budgets to meet the needs of individuals who rely upon the mental retardation system for services and supports. Furthermore, it creates a pro­ cess for external and independent moni­ tors to have input into the budget-making process based upon their findings during monitoring of the services and supports available to individuals with mental retar­ dation and developmental disabilities.
The Plan requires a broad range of com­ petency-based training to be provided to staff who deliver services and supports to individuals with metal retardation and de­ velopmental disabilities. It also requires that a wide range of policies and proce­ dures be revised and updated to reflect the goals of the Court Orders, in a process that is open and accessible to plaintiffs, the United States, and other interested stake­ holders.

The Plan requires audits of the class members' accounts going back for at least ten years and includes a commitment by the District of Columbia government to repay any sums of money that may be owed to them.
The Plan creates several new safeguards for individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities in the District of Columbia. First, it calls for a complete revision of the existing statutes to estab­ lish in law the rights that have been de­ clared in the Court's Orders, while also updating the laws, consistent with a set of legislative principles agreed upon by the parties, to reflect contemporary standards and practices. Second, it requires the cre­ ation of a new quality assurance program, the implementation of a new procedure for the reporting and investigation of unusual incidents, the creation of a Fatality Review Board, and the adoption of new mecha­ nisms to prevent the misuse or overuse of control procedures such as restraints, time-outs, and psychotropic medications. Third, it recognizes that the enforcement of rights that have been legally declared requires access to effective legal and lay advocacy. A cornerstone of the Plan is the creation of a new, independent, and durable nonprofit agency called the Quali­ ty Trust for Individuals with Disabilities (the Quality Trust) and the provision of a method of financing its operations so as eventually to provide for its financial inde­ pendence from the annual District of Co­ lumbia budgeting process.
The Quality Trust will have three essen­ tial functions. First, it will provide inde­ pendent monitoring of the quality of ser­ vices and supports available to individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities, and serve as an independent voice for consumers in dealing with the District of Columbia government. Second, it will provide lay advocacy to represent

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

83

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

consumers with respect to day-to-day is­ sues that affect their quality of life and their access to services and supports, in­ cluding representation in grievance and administrative proceedings. Third, it will not only provide legal representation for those individuals who have no lawyers but also will be a resource to other legal advo­ cates and help raise the standard of legal representation of individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. Such legal representation and lay advocacy services are intended to supplement, not supplant, the serVices that already are re­ quired by law.
Until this case is terminated, the Court Monitor also will remain as a safeguard for class members. The Plan provides for a close working relationship between the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. As defendants achieve compliance with the outcome criteria in the Plan, and the relat­ ed Court Orders are vacated, the jurisdic­ tion for monitoring conditions will shift from the Court Monitor to the Quality Trust.
While the Plan is not intended to be an independently enforceable document, the parties do intend that there will be ac­ countability for its implementation. The Plan requires periodic progress reports to the Special Master on its implementation and calls for status conferences with the Court to be scheduled at least bimonthly. The parties agree that if the Court finds that defendants have satisfied the outcome criteria set forth in the Plan, they also will be in compliance with the related Court Orders. Any failure of defendants to im­ plement the tasks identified in the Plan so as to meet the requirements of the related Court Orders would be evidence of non­ compliance with those Orders. The Plan provides that until the existing Court Or­ ders are vacated, plaintiffs may seek ap­ propriate judicial relief, including request­

ing orders requiring compliance with the Order(s) underlying the objectives of the Plan.
Finally, the Plan provides for a phased and orderly withdrawal of judicial over­ sight of the District of Columbia's manage­ ment of its mental retardation service sys­ tem. The mechanisms set forth in the Plan provide that defendants may move the Special Master for a finding of compli­ ance .with particular Orders when they be­ lieve that they have achieved compliance. Plaintiffs and the United States have the right to object to any such motion and to have an evidentiary hearing before the Special Master. The Special Master then is to submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence introduced during the hear­ ing. If the Court concludes that defen­ dants have achieved compliance, it may vacate and dismiss the related Court Or­ der(s). Once all of the Court Orders are vacated after defendants establish that they have achieved compliance, the declar­ atory judgment in this case will remain.
The Consent Order and the Settlement Agreement
The Consent Order and the Settlement Agreement (with the latter being Exhibit A to the former) create an external moni­ toring body to permanently protect the interests of the class members once this case ends.
Consent Order. In the Consent Order, defendants have agreed to fund the Quali­ ty Trust with a total of $31.5 million over the next eleven years. Initially, defen­ dants shall endow the Quality Trust with $11 million in order to better ensure its financial independence in carrying out its duties. The $11 million endowment is to be deposited in an interest bearing account for the sole use of the Quality Trust. So that the endowment may grow, defendants

84

139 ·FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

have agreed to provide $2 million in annual funding for the exclusive use of the Quality Trust for the first five full years of its existence. During that time, the endow­ ment will be allowed to grow earnings so as to increase the principal. For the next five years, defendants have agreed to fund the Quality Trust with gradually decreas­ ing amounts of annual funding: in 2006, $1.9 million; in 2007, $1.8 million; in 2008, $1.7 million; in 2009, $1.6 million; and in 2010, $1.5 million. If needed during this time, the annual earnings of the endow­ ment's principal may be used as supple­ mentary money to fund the operations of the Quality Trust. Between now and the beginning of the first fiscal year, defen­ dants have agreed to pay to the Quality Trust an additional $2 million, prorated for the period of time left before the start of the fiscal year. Defendants have agreed to provide the Quality Trust with the re­ sidual prorated amount in 2011. The Con­ sent Order specifies that all of the monies to be paid are ,to be paid in Year 2000 dollars. The Consent Order also provides for access rights to facilities, persons, doc­ uments, and other materials for the Quali­ tyTrust.
In exchange for defendants' endowment and annual funding of the Quality Trust, plaintiffs and the United States have agreed to waive all claims for past contu­ macious conduct of defendants as of the date of the entry of the Consent Order and approval of the Settlement Agreement. There are important exceptions to this waiver. For example, no matter what the time frame, plaintiffs and the United States have reserved the right to seek claims on class members' behalf related to: the safeguarding and/or management of the benefits, personal possessions, wages, bank accounts, and/or funds of class mem­ bers; the failure to provide adequate legal representation and lay advocacy services to class members; and claims for damages based on other possible causes of action

independent of the Court's Orders. To that end, defendants have agreed to push back the statutory limitation periods, thus enabling class members to bring suits for prior claims as of January 15, 1998. Plain­ tiffs and the United States retain the right to seek monetary or non-monetary con­ tempt sanctions for defendants' acts after the date of the entry of the Consent Order.
Settlement Agreement. In addition to the Consent Order, the parties have nego­ tiated a separate Settlement Agreement (Exhibit A to the Consent Order). This was necessary for a number of reasons. First, a designated member of the Quality Trust is to sign the Settlement Agreement, so that the Quality Trust will be bound by its terms. Second, the Quality Trust is to exist beyond the life of this class action. Once compliance with the existing Orders is achieved and the case is dismissed, there will be a surviving document that will en­ able interested parties to hold the Quality Trust accountable for advancing the inter­ ests of individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities.
The Settlement Agreement sets forth in detail the structure of the Quality Trust, the control and use of the funds to be provided by defendants, the obligations of the Quality Trust, and the Trust's access rights.
Approval of the Consent Order and the Settlement Agreement
The complaint in this case was filed on February 23, 1976, and it was assigned to Judge John H. Pratt. Judge Pratt grant­ ed plaintiffs' motion for class certification on June 3, 1976. On June 16, 1978, Judge Pratt issued a Final Judgment and Order, which unfortunately proved to be about as final as peace in the Balkans. Judge Pratt, long an exceptional jurist as a mem­ ber of this court, died in 1995, and the case was reassigned to the undersigned on Au­

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

85

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

gust 29 of that year. Margaret G. Farrell the problem has lain in actually meeting

was appointed as Special Master on Octo­ the needs of the members of the plaintiff

ber 1, 1995; Clarence J. Sundram (who class. The Court commends the co-Special

had contributed significantly to this case Masters and all counsel not only for re­

as a consultant) was appointed as co-Spe-' solving their differences, but for the excep­

cial Master on February 20, 200l.

tionally thorough manner in which they

The dispute seemed intractable until last have agreed upon procedures for dealing

year, towards the end of which there were with the problems that have persisted for

commendable and extensive efforts by so long. The Court readily concludes that

Mrs. Farrell, Mr. Sundram, and counsel the proposed compromise of the controver­

for the parties seeking to resolve the prob­ sy, which will be of substantially greater

lems faced by all. Those efforts led to the benefit to the class than would continued

documents now' before the Court. The litigation over how to deal with past con­

first to have been filed was the Parties' duct by defendants, is fair, reasonable, and

Joint Stipulated Findings of Fact (Decem­ ber 22, 2000), which the Court hereby adopts. After the submission of the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of . Evans v. Williams (February 2, 2001), the

adequate.
Accordingly, on consideration of all of the foregoing factors, it hereby is
ORDERED, that the Parties' Joint Stip­

Consent Order, of which Exhibit A thereto ulated Findings of Fact are adopted. It

was the Settlement Agreement, was ten­ hereby further is

dered. The Consent Order was approved conditionally by the undersigned on March 4, 2001, with what has been characterized as a fairness hearing having been sched­ uled for March 5. Prior to that hearing, proper notice duly having been given, plaintiffs' counsel met extensively with class members (and, where applicable, members of their families) and defendants' counsel met with providers of services to

ORDERED, that the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams is approved as, in effect, a state­ ment of the conditions for the expected vacating of the Court's relevant prior Or­ ders. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the Consent Order formally is entered and the Settlement Agreement attached thereto is approved.

the class members. A hearing was held on SO ORDERED.

March 5. The status of the case then was

dealt with fully by the co-Special Masters

CONSENT ORDER

and by counsel for all parties, and testimo­

ny was received from several class mem­ I. Background

bers and the president of The Arc of the On February 10, 1999, this Court im­

District of Columbia. Na opposition of posed contempt fines of $5,096,340.00 for

any sort has been expressed to the very Defendants' failure to comply with certain carefully designed proposals for the reso­ Court Orders in this case. Evans v.

lution of this case.

Williams, 35 F.Supp.2d 88 (D.D.C.1999).

Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules On March 31, 2000, the United States

of Civil Procedure, a compromise of a class Court of Appeals for the District of Colum­

action may not be effectuated without ap­ bia Circuit reversed and remanded this

proval of the court. This case is unusual, matter for further proceedings. Evans v.

in that a "final judgment" in plaintiffs' Williams, 206 F.3d 1292 (D.C.Cir.2000).

favor was entered more than 20 years ago; The Court of Appeals determined that the

86

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

contempt fines were criminal in nature and could not be imposed in the absence of appropriate procedural safeguards. Id. at 1297 n. 4.
In order to address the issues still be­ fore the Court on remand, the parties have agreed to the following Consent Order. In this Consent Order, the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia agree to endow and annually fund, pursuant to the provi­ sions below, a durable, independent, non­ profit organization that will monitor and advance the individual and collective inter­ ests of people with developmental disabili­ ties in the District of Columbia's service delivery system, including Evans class members, in exchange for the waiver of any arid all claims for past violations of the Court's Orders in this case as specified in section II of this Consent Order. The spe­ cifics of the parties' agreement are set forth below.
II. Resolution of Past Non-Compli­ ance with the Court Orders
The parties have agreed to this Consent Order which resolves all issues related to Defendants' past non-compliance with the Orders in this case, including those related to the Court's February 10, 1999 fmding of contempt and the imposition of fines, sub­ ject to the following:
A. Except as otherwise stated in this section, the Plaintiffs and the Plain­ tiff-Intervenor agree to waive any and all claims for past violations of the Court's Orders in this case based on Defendants' past non-com­ pliance with the existing Court Or­ ders in this case during the period up to and including the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order. The parties agree that this Consent Order does not affect the previously negotiated Settlement Agreement, dated September 22, 2000, as to the Symbral Foundation and the class members receiving services there­

from. In addition, Plaintiffs do not waive the claim for costs and reim­ bursement for the care of class member Beverly Sutton. Plaintiffs do not waive claims regarding Uni­ versity Legal Services, Inc., Protec­ tion and Advocacy Program's costs, expenses and attorneys' fees in this case that may have arisen prior to the date of this Order, subject to any available defenses or objections raised by the Defendants.
B. The Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Interve­ nor agree to waive any claim for damages based on Defendants' past non-compliance with the existing Court Orders in this case during the period up to and including the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order. However, the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff-Intervenor specifically do not waive any claim they may have for damages or equitable relief due to Defendants' conduct prior the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order, with regard to the following categories of claims only:
1. safeguarding and/or management of the benefits, personal possessions, wages, bank accounts and/or funds of class members;
2. the failure of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to provide legal representation and lay advocacy services as required by the Orders of this Court in this case and by statute (see Title 6 D.C.Code Section 1901 et seq.); and
3. claims by class members for dam­ ages or other relief based on causes of action independent of the Court Orders in this case. In relation to such claims only, Defendants have agreed to waive the requirements of Title 12 D.C.Code Section 309 for class members who first suffered damages on or after January 15, 1998, through the date this Order is

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

87

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

entered by the Court, except Defendants expressly do not waive the requirements of Title 12 D.C.Code Section 309 for claims brought under wrongful death or survival statutes.
C. Nothing in this Consent Order shall be construed to prevent the Plain­ tiffs or Plaintiff-Intervenor from seeking equitable relief to remedi­ ate current violations (that exist as of the date of the Court's entry of this Consent Order) or new viola­ tions of this Court's Orders. Evi­ dence of Defendants' conduct prior to the date this Order is entered by the Court shall be admissible in such proceedings, subject to any available defenses or objections raised by Defendants.
D. Nothing in this Consent Order mod­ ifies the current Court-ordered fine schedule and process with respect to findings of contempt based on violations of this Court's Orders which may occur after the Court's entry of this Order.
E. The Quality Trust shall not provide direct legal representation to class members ,with regard to any claims based on violations of the Court Or­ ders in this case which occurred prior to the date this Order is en­ tered by the Court.

III. Creation and Funding of the Qual­ ity Trust
A. The parties agree to the creation of an independent, nonprofit organiza­ tion to be named the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc., (hereinafter "Quality Trust" or "QT").
B. Within 15 days of the Court's entry of this Consent Order, the Quality Trust shall be incorporated as a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) corporation un­ der the District of Columbia Non­ profit Corporation Act, approved August 6, 1962 (76 Stat. 265; D.C.Code Section -29-501 et seq.). The Quality Trust is to be incorpo­ rated as an independent entity to insulate it from control by the par­ ties.
C. The mission and purpose of the QUality Trust is set forth in a Set­ tlement Agreement (attached as Exhibit A) which is to be signed by the parties and a designated repre­ sentative of the Quality Trust, who is legally competent to bind the Quality Trust, and fIled with this Court.l The Settlement Agreement specifies that the Quality Trust will provide, inter alia, monitoring, legal services and lay advocacy services for individuals with developmental disabilities 2 in the District of Co­

1. The Settlement Agreement shall not be in­ corporated into or be a part of this Consent Order. The Consent Order and Settlement Agreement are related documents. The Con­ sent Order sets out the obligations of the parties regarding the endowment and funding of the Quality Trust in exchange for the waiv­ er of certain fines and other liability. The Consent Order is to be adopted by the Court and shall be enforceable for procedures and remedies available for violations of a court order. The Settlement Agreement is an agreement amongst the parties and the Quali­ ty Trust which sets forth the Quality Trust's operations and duties in order to ensure that the Quality Trust complies with the parties'

agreement regarding its mission and func­ tions. This Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement as to class members only, with remedies available to the parties to the Settlement Agreement under applicable contract law. Upon dismissal of this action, the Settlement Agreement shall be enforceable as a contract in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
2. This Consent Order provides throughout that the Quality Trust's scope of activities shall include review of services to "consum­ ers" rather than just "Evans class members." "Consumers" refers to all applicants and/or recipients of services of the District of Colum­

88

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

lumbia's service delivery system.
D. Within 30 days of the filing of the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, the Defendants ancllor the District of Columbia agree to pay the sum of eleven mil­ lion dollars for deposit into an inter­ est bearing fund for the exclusive use of the Quality Trust.
E. Within 30 days of the filing of the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, as their initial annual payment, Defendants ancllor the District of Columbia shall pro­ vide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds in the amount of two million dollars, prorated for the balance of the District of Colum­ bia's Fiscal Year 2001 which ends on September 30, 2001. On or be­ fore October 1, 2001, Defendants ancllor the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with the dtlference between two million dollars and the prorated amount paid in Fiscal Year 2001 pursuant to the terms of this paragraph (in Year 2000 dollars).
F. Commencing October 1, 2001, for a period of five years, or until Sep­ tember 30, 2006, the Defendants ancllor the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds of no less than two million dollars per year (all in Year 2000 dollars). The timing of the annual payment is set forth in paragraph II1.H. below.
G. Commencing October 1, 2006, for a period of five years, or until Sep­ tember 30, 2011, the Defendants

ancllor the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with annual operating funds in the amount of 1.9 million dollars in Year . 2006, 1.8 million dollars in Year 2007, 1.7 million dollars in Year 2008, 1.6 million dollars in Year 2009, and 1.5 million dollars in Year 2010 (all in Year 2000 dollars). The timing of the annual payment is set forth in paragraph II1.H. below.
H. The Defendants ancllor the District of Columbia shall provide annual operating funding to the QUality Trust on or before October 1 of each Fiscal Year for which the funds are intended (Fiscal Years 2001 to 2011), or as soon thereafter as the budget process will allow.
1. Nothing in this Consent Order is intended to preclude any party or the Board of Directors of the Quality Trust from advocating for funds to increase those available to the Quali­ ty Trust above two million dollars in Year 2000 dollars in any given year.
IV. Quality Trust's Right to Access and Information
A. The employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access to in­ formation that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing the monitoring and lay advocacy duties described in the Settlement Agree­ ment. More specifically, the em­ ployees, contractors and consul­ tants retained by the Quality Trust

bia's developmental disabilities service deliv­ ery system. The Evans class members (i.e., those individuals who have at one time resid­ ed at Forest Haven) comprise a subset of this overall group of consumers. Defendants de­ sire not to create a bifurcated system of ser­

vices for its citizens with developmental dis­ abilities, and therefore, agree that the Quality Trust's scope of activities shall include review of services to class and non-class members. This unified system does not extend the Court's jurisdiction to non-class members.

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

89

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

shall have full access to consumers, and their residences, facilities, buildings,' programs, services, docu­ ments, records (including medical and departmental) and other mate­ rials that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropri­ ate in performing the duties of the Quality Trust's monitoring and lay advocacy functions. The Quality Trust may obtain copies of the aforementioned documents, rec­ ords, and other materials. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with information upon re­ quest relevant to individual sup­ ports and services provided in the District of Columbia's service deliv­ ery system and the Quality Trust may request written responses from the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia in this regard. Advance notice of any visit or in­ spection by the Quality Trust shall not be required. Representatives of the Quality Trust may conduct private interviews and meetings with any individual including em­ ployees, contractors or agents of the District of Columbia, as well as all provider staff. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall require its employees, con­ tractors, agents, as well as provid­ er staff, to cooperate with the Quality Trust representatives.
B. Attorneys who provide direct legal representation of consumers under a contract or other arrangements with the Quality Trust shall have the right to access their clients' rec­ ords and any and all information regarding their clients that flow from their attorney-client relation­ ship. In litigation involving the De­ fendants and/or the District of Co­ lumbia, attorneys shall comply with

the applicable rules of discovery and procedure.
C. The Quality Trust shall safeguard the information obtained pursuant to paragraph IV.A. above, as re­ quired by all applicable laws and Court Orders protecting the confi­ dentiality of such information.
D. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall keep the Quality Trust informed in a timely fashion of relevant budgetary information regarding the District of Columbia's Mental Retardation and Develop­ mental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA"), or its successor. The areas about which the Defendants and/or District of Columbia shall provide information to the Quality Trust are set forth in greater detail in the Settlement Agreement at­ tached as Exhibit A.
V. Conclusion
A. Upon (1) incorporation of the Quali­ ty Trust consistent with the terms. of this Consent Order, (2) Court entry of this Consent Order, (3) fil­ ing of the Settlement Agreement referenced above with the Court with signatures from the parties and the Quality Trust, (4) the De­ fendants' and/or the District of Co­ lumbia's payment of eleven million dollars into an interest-bearing in­ vestment fund for the exclusive use of the Quality Trust as described in paragraph IILD. above, within 30 days from the date of the filing of the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, and (5) the Defendants' and/or District of Co­ lumbia's initial payment to the Qual­ ity Trust within 30 days of the filing the Settlement Agreement signed by the Quality Trust, of the prorat­

90

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

ed amount of two million dollars for Fiscal Year 2001 for operating funds of the Quality Trust as de­ scribed in paragraph IILE. above, the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Interve­ nor shall comply with the provisions set forth in section II above, and expressly waive any and all claims for past violations of the Court's Orders in this case as specified in section II above, based on Defen­ dants' past non-compliance with the existing Orders in this case which occurred during the period up to and including the date of this Court's entry of this Consent Order.

B. The United States does not waive its right to pursue any other claims against the Defendants or the Dis­ trict of Columbia with regard to disputes or claims that involve inci­ dents or events that occurred dur­ ing any period arising under laws, statutes and regulations other than the existing Court Orders. in this case.

WHEREFORE, the parties to this ac­

tion, having agreed to the provisions in the

Consent Order set forth above, and the

Court being advised in the premises, this

Court hereby GRANTS CONDITIONAL

APPROVAL of this Consent Order pend­

ing final approval after a fairness hearing

pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.

J

WHEREFORE, the parties to this ac­ tion, having agreed to the provisions in the Consent Order set forth above, and the Court being advised in the premises and having concluded that this Consent Order is a fair resolution of these matters after a fairness hearing held on March 5, 2001, this Consent Order is hereby entered as the ORDER and JUDGMENT of this Court.

EXHffiITA
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Pursuant to the attached Consent Order, the parties and the Quality Trust for Indi­ viduals with Disabilities, Inc., (hereinafter the "Quality Trust" or "QT"), hereby agree to the following:
I. Structure of the Quality Trust
A. The bylaws of the Quality Trust shall provide that the Quality Trust will have an independent Board of Directors and a body of non-voting members. The Mayor shall appoint the initial board from a list of nomi­ nees jointly developed by Defen­ dants, Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Inter­ venor. Each nominee on the list of proposed board members shall be agreed to by all parties. The Board shall thereafter be self-perpetuat­ ing. Specifically:
1. The composition and responsibilities of the Board will be established by the organization's bylaws arid will include the following:
a. Each director shall be a natural person of adult age. A director need not be a citizen of the United States. At least eight members of the Board must be residents of the District of Columbia. b. The initial Board of Directors shall consist of the directors named in the QUality Trust's Articles of Incor­ poration and shall hold office until their successors have been duly ap­ pointed and qualified. c. At all times following the appoint­ ment of the first full thirteen member Board of Directors, the full Board of Directors shall consist of thirteen adult persons designated as follows:
i. Two family members of people with mental retardation and/or de­

EVANS v; WILLIAMS

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Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

velopmental disabilities. The initial terms of family members shall be two years, and all subsequent terms shall be three years;
ii. Two non-legal advocates for persons who have mental retarda­ tion and/or developmental disabili­ ties. The initial terms of the nonle­ gal advocate members' shall be two years, and all subsequent terms shall be three years;
iii. Three persons who have men­ tal retardation and/or developmen­ tal disabilities. The initial terms of these members shall be one year, and all subsequent terms shall be three years;
iv. Two professionals with at least ten years background in a service delivery system for people who have mental retardation and/or develop­ mental disabilities. The' initial terms of professional members shall be three years and all subsequent terms shall be three years;
v. Two attorneys licensed to prac­ tice law. The initial terms of attor­ ney members shall be three years, and all subsequent terms shall be three years; and
vi. Two citizens residing in the District of, Columbia. The initial terms of citizen members shall be one year, and all subsequent terms shall be three years.
d. Following the initial term of each Board Member, the remaining Board Members, whose terms are not end­ ing, will vote to replace the departing Board Member. A majority vote of those remaining Board Members is required to fill a vacancy. Further, the Board Member must replace a departing Board Member with an

adult person who fits the designated category (e.g., family member, non­ legal advocate, person with mental re­ tardation and/or other developmental disability professional with ten years experience, attorney, citizen residing in the District of Columbia) of the departing Board Member. A Board Member may succeed himself or her­ self. A Board Member may resign prior to the expiration of the full term. If a Board Member resigns prior to the expiration of the full term, the other Board Members shall replace that Board Member for the remainder of the unexpired term through the voting process outlined in this section. Votes regarding the appointment, re­ moval, or replacement of a member of the Board of Directors may not be delegated to a committee of the Board.
2. The Quality Trust will be a member organization with non-voting members. The non-voting members shall be indi­ viduals with mental retardation, as well as people with other developmental dis­ abilities, who are applicants for or are receiving protections, supports and ser­ vices in the District of Columbia's devel­ opmental disabilities service delivery system, and all Evans class members.
B. The Quality Trust's scope of activi­ ties shall include review of services to all Evans class members, as well as non-class members who are ap­ plicants for or are receiving protec­ tions, supports and services in the District of Columbia's developmen­ tal disabilities service delivery sys­ tem.1 Pursuant to the attached Consent Order and this Settlement Agreement, the Quality Trust will monitor the protections, services

1. The extension of the Quality Trust functions to class members and non-class members

does not extend the Court's jurisdiction to non-class members.

r

92

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

and supports provided to these indi­ viduals and offer legal services and provide lay advocacy services to these "consumers." The term "con­ sumers" refers to all recipients and applicants for services from the Dis­ trict of Columbia's service delivery system for individuals with mental retardation and developmental dis­ abilities. ·The Evans class members (i.e., those individuals who have at one time resided at Forest Haven) comprise a subset of this overall group of consumers.
II. Control and Use of the Quality Trust Fund
A. The investment fund, created with the eleven million dollars paid by the Defendants and/or District of Columbia pursuant to the attached Consent Order, shall be controlled by the Quality Trust. The Quality Trust shall invest the fund in a rea­ sonable and prudent manner. The Quality Trust shall make reasonable efforts to increase its assets, raise funds and/or find additional re­ sources in order to increase the principal and income of the fund.
E. From the outset, the earnings from the fund shall be reinvested to in­ crease the principal. The earnings of this fund shall not be used to support the operations of the Quali­ ty Trust until October 1, 2006. The Quality Trust shall not use the prin­ cipal to carry out its functions and operations prior to October 1, 2011. After October 1, 2011, the Quality Trust, by a vote of three-quarters of its Board Merribers, may utilize a reasonable portion of the principal to support its mission.
C. Nothing in this Settlement Agree­ ment shall preclude the QUality Trust, in accordance with applicable law, from 'creating a separate corpo­

rate entity, consistent with the Quality Trust's mission, to achieve the Quality Trust's operational goals.
III. Obligations of the Quality Trust
In general, the Quality Trust shall: ad­ vance the individual and collective inter­ ests of consumers with developmental dis­ abilities, and in particular Evans class members; monitor the health, safety and welfare of these consumers; and monitor the protections, services and supports provided to these consumers. The Quali­ ty Trust also shall provide for individual and/or collective legal services and lay ad­ vocacy services for consumers as set forth in greater detail below. The Board of Directors shall periodically determine how to apportion its resources among monitor­ ing, legal representation services and lay advocacy or other strategies, consistent with the Quality Trust's mission and func­ tions, to advance the individual and/or col­ lective interests of consumers with devel­ opmental disabilities, and in particular Evans class members. This process shall be informed by the Defendants' and/or the District of Columbia's level of compli­ ance with the Evans 2001 Plan.
A. Monitoring
The Quality Trust shall create a Moni­ toring Unit which shall:
1. Develop an annual monitoring plan with input from the parties, consumers, families, providers and advocates. 2. Monitor the adequacy, safety and quality of consumers' residential and ha­ bilitation programs and supports. 3. Receive and review with regard to consumers/ from the District's Mental Retardatio~ and Developmental Disabili­ ties Administration ("MRDDA") or its successor, all of MRDDA's serious inci­ dent reports and investigation reports of

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

93

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

serious incidents, including deaths, and aggregate information regarding all inci­ dents. 4. Write annual reports, and, in addi­ tion, such other periodic reports as the Quality Trust may determine to be nec­ essary. Such reports are to be made public and provided to: (A) the Special Master and the parties' counsel of rec­ ord (until this case is no longer subject to Court supervision); (B) the Defen­ dants and/or the branches of the District of Columbia, including the Departments of Human Services and Health (or their successors), the Chief Financial Officer and the Mayor; and (C) the District of Columbia Council. The reports shall make observations with regard to the adequacy of the protections, services, and supports provided to consumers and offer recommendations for any needed improvements. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall respond promptly to these reports in writing, including specific corrective action steps they will implement or have implement­ ed, along with timelines if the actions have not been implemented, to address current problems.
5. Receive and review information with regard to the District of Columbia bud­ get requests for MRDDA or its succes­ sor sufficient to permit its timely moni­ toring and comment about District of Columbia budget decisions affecting con­ sumers.
6. Annually inform the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia of the consumer needs, based on information collected during monitoring activities, in a timely manner, to permit such infor­ mation to be considered in developing the District of Columbia's proposed bud­ . get for the service delivery system for individuals with developmental disabili­ ties for the following Fiscal Year. 7. Apply at least the following stan­ dards in its monitoring and reviews: (A)

the specific outcome criteria developed as part of the Evans 2001 Plan; (B) certification and private accreditation standards; (C) the District of Colum­ bia's own standards including licensing requirements; (D) Medicaid and Medi­ care regulations and conditions of partic­ ipation; and (E) the District of Colum­ bia's performance standards in private provider contracts.
8. Be physically co-located with the Ev­ ans Independent Court Monitor so as to enhance communication regarding moni­ toring activities in order to avoid redun­ dancy, until the Evans case is no longer subject to regular Court supervision. The Independent Court Monitor shall remain directly responsible to the Court, and not to the Quality Trust. As each Evans Order is vacated by the Court, monitoring of corresponding operations shall be transferred from the Indepen­ dent Court Monitor to the Quality Trust, and shall no longer be subject to Court supervision.
B. Legal Services
1. The Quality Trust shall work to raise the level of advocacy among court­ appointed attorneys by, for example, providing training, drafting model plead­ ings and developing in-house appellate advocacy capacity. The Quality Trust's legal representatives will supplement (not replace) the existing pool of attor­ neys appointed by Superior Court and will seek to be appointed in cases of consumers who have heretofore been de­ prived competent representation.
2. The Quality Trust shall contract with or otherwise arrange for legal rep­ resentation services for consumers. The scope and content of the contract shall be negotiated by the Quality Trust and the provider. The Quality Trust will oversee the performance of the provider under this contract to ensure that the

94

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

consumers are getting the legal repre­ sentation services they require. 3. The Quality Trust shall not provide direct legal representation to any indi­ vidual but may contract or make other arrangements for direct representation from other independent legal services providers. Nothing herein shall pre­ clude lay advocates from assisting con­ sumers in administrative proceedings.
C. Lay Advocacy Services
Because some of the advocacy needs of the consumers do not require the services of an attorney and can be provided more effectively and less expensively through the availability of lay advocates, the Quali­ ty Trust will create a Lay Advocacy Pro­ gram which shall provide the following ser­ vices:
1. Attend Individual Support Plan ("ISP") and other team meetings for consumers for whom they are responsi­ ble and advocate for the needs and choices of the consumers at these meet­ ings. The advocates will attempt at all times to facilitate the consumers' self­ expression, or in the alternative, will consult with duly appointed representa­ tives or surrogate decision-makers, where appropriate. 2. Regularly interact with the case managers of the consumers on their caseloads to keep abreast of any issues impacting on the protections, services and supports provided to consumers. 3. Receive and review serious incident reports and investigation reports for consumers for whom they are responsi­ ble, and advocate for the consumers' safety and well-being in the course of such investigations. 4. Receive and review all monitoring reports related to the consumers on their caseloads and follow up to ensure that necessary corrective action is taken.

5. Periodically visit consumers receiv­ ing residential and day treatment ser­ vices to ensure that consumers are safe and satisfied with the services and sup­ ports they are receiving and that the services and supports are adequate to meet the individualized needs of the con­ sumers.
6. Advocate on behalf of individuals and/or groups of consumers to ensure that their complaints are investigated in a timely fashion and that the consumers are satisfied with the resolution. In the event that the time frames required for resolution are not complied with or that the proposed resolution is otherwise un­ satisfactory, the advocate shall consult with the consumer(s), or other appropri­ ate decision-maker, to determine the ap­ propriate course of action.
a. The Lay Advocacy Program and the Legal Services component shall establish a program to facilitate the immediate referral and coordination of cases requiring the assistance of an attorney.
b. Consumers may seek immediate referral to the Legal Services compo­ nent from the Lay Advocacy Program.
7. Attend court hearings for the con­ sumers on their caseloads and work with the assigned attorneys in ensuring that consumers' needs for protections, ser­ vices and supports are met.
8. Some consumers will have family members, guardians or friends who will serve as their advocates while others will rely on the services of paid lay advocates. The advocacy program will provide training not only to the lay ad­ vocates, but also to such volunteer advo­ cates.
9. This advocacy unit will supplement (not replace) the existing pool of advo­ cates acting on behalf of family, friends, or those appointed by Superior Court or

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

95

Cit. as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

appointed pursuant to existing Orders in this case. The Lay Advocacy Program will prioritize cases of consumers who heretofore have not received advocacy services.
IV. Quality Trust's Right to Access and Information
A. The employees, contractors and consultants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access to in­ formation that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in performing the monitoring and lay advocacy duties described in the Settlement Agree­ ment. More specifically, the em­ ployees, contractors and consul­ tants retained by the Quality Trust shall have full access to consumers, and their residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, docu­ ments, records (including medical and departmental) and other mate­ rials that the Quality Trust deems reasonably necessary and appropri­ ate in performing the duties of the Quality Trust's monitoring and lay advocacy functions. The Quality Trust may obtain copies of the aforementioned documents, rec­ ords, and other materials. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall provide the Quality Trust with information upon re­ quest relevant to individual sup­ ports and services provided in the District of Columbia's service deliv­ ery system and the Quality Trust may request written responses from the Defendants and/or the District of Columbia in this regard. Advance notice of any visit or in­ spection by the Quality Trust shall not be required. Representatives of the Quality Trust may conduct private interviews and meetings with any individual including em­

ployees, contractors or agents of the District of Columbia, as well as all provider staff. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall require its employees, con­ tractors, agents, as well as provid­ er staff, to cooperate with the Quality Trust representatives.
B. Attorneys who provide direct legal representation of consumers under a contract or other arrangements with the QUality Trust shall have the right to access their clients' rec­ ords and any and all information regarding their clients that flow from their attorney-client relation­ ship. In litigation involving the De­ fendants and/or the District of Co­ lumbia, attorneys shall comply with the applicable rules of discovery and procedure.
C. The Quality Trust shall safeguard the information obtained pursuant to paragraph IV.A., as required by all applicable laws and Court Or­ ders protecting the confidentiality of such information.
D. The Defendants and/or the District of Columbia shall keep the Quality Trust informed in a timely fashion of relevant budgetary information regarding MRDDA or its successor. The areas about which the Defen­ dants and/or the District of Colum­ bia shall provide information to the Quality Trust include the following:
1. The portions of the budget that ad­ dress specific consumer needs for resi­ dential and day program services, equip­ ment, medical and clinical care, etc.;
2. The portions of the budget that ad­ dress system needs for managing, moni­ toring, and overseeing the system of services for consumers; 3. The portions of the budget that ad­ dress any capital appropriations that

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139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

may be required to meet the needs of the consumers (e.g., for construction .or renovation of program sites or resi­ dences); 4. The amount of the appropriation be­ ing requested by the Mayor from the City Council to meet consumer needs; 5. The final appropriation; and 6. The District of Columbia Depart­ ment of Health's proposed and actual budgets which include the District of Columbia's share of payments to Medic­ aid providers.

in this case. In order to assist the Special Master to comply with this Order, the parties, in order to resolve their differ­ ences, avoid costly and unnecessary litiga­ tion, and continue their collaborative rela­ tionship, have agreed on the following stipulated findings of fact. The stipula­ tions apply to the time period up to and including the date of the statement or report that is the source of the informa­ tion.
II. Stipulations

V. Legislative Principles

GENERAL FINDINGS

The Plaintiffs and the Defendants agree 1. Issues related to the District of Co­

that if the appropriate legislative body lumbia's system of support for individuals

does not enact legislation to implement the with developmental disabilities (hereinafter

Legislative Principles (attached to the Ev­ "District's. system") represent one of the

ans 2001 Plan), before the end of the 2001 most· serious breakdowns in the District

legislative session, the. parties will accom­ plish the objectives of the Principles through alternative means. The United States does not take a position with regard to such proposed and/or pending legisla­ tion or to the Legislative Principles at­

government over the last two decades. The measure of a society is how it treats its most vulnerable citizens. In this case, the District government failed. Prepared Statement of Anthony A. Williams, Mayor

tached to the Plan.

of the District of Columbia (hereinafter

"Mayor's Prep. Stmnt."), June 1, 2000 at 1

VI. Judicial Review

(Master's Exh. J, June 30, 2000).

Until the Evans case is dismissed, this Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement as to class members only, with remedies available to the parties to the Settlement Agreement under applicable contract law. Upon dis­ missal of this action, the Settlement Agreement shall be enforceable as a con­ tract in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

2. Mistakes in the District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities cover 20 years of neglect and mismanagement. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 1.
3. The District government is seriously broken from years of disinvestment, mis­ management, poor oversight and neglect. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 1.

PARTIES' JOINT STIPULATED 
 FINDINGS OF FACT 

Dec. 22, 2000

4. The breakdown in services to clients with developmental disabilities in the Dis­ trict's system had been 19 years in the making. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 1.

I. Introduction
On February 10, 1999, this Court or­ dered the Special Master to develop find­ ings of fact 'with regard to the status of Defendants' compliance with Court Orders

5. The Mayor and his administration were aware of problems in the District's Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration ("MRDDA") but were not aware that some of the sys­

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

97

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

temic problems could lead to threats to the 14. MRDDA needed legal representation

life and safety of some of the most vulner- . in guardianship hearings that involve citi­

able citizens in the District's system. zens with developmental disabilities. Dep­

Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 2.

uty Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 4.

6. In spite of some progress in fixing the District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities in recent months, much remains to be done. May­ or's Prep. Stmnt~ at 2.
7. Two decades of neglect in the Dis­ trict's system has taken a toll on the clients served in the system. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 3.

15. MRDDA has had trouble getting pro­ vider contracts processed in a timely man­ ner. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 5.
16. The problems in the District's sup­ port system for individuals with develop­ mental disabilities were even more egre­ gious than originally and subsequently described. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 6.

8. The District government has funda­ mentally failed its obligation to disabled persons and their families. Painful experi­ ence has taught that the District's MRDDA system is not a system. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 3.
9. The District's system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities must do a better job assessing risks and being proactive. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 4.
10. The District's support system is a problem that urgently needs to be fixed. Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 4.
11. The District government inherited by Mayor Williams was almost completely de­ cimated as a result of years of disinvest­ ment, mismanagement, and poor perfor­ mance. Prepared Statement of Carolyn N. Graham, Deputy Mayor of the District of Columbia (hereinafter "Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt."), .May 22, 2000 at 1 (Mas­ ter's Exh. K).
12. Problems existed in MRDDA under the present administration. Deputy May­ or's Prep. Stmnt. at 2.
13. The District was aware of problems of poor care provided at group homes, systemic failures and other issues as a
result of a Washington Post article in Feb­
ruary 1999. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 3.

17. The Mayor issued a report that ac­ knowledged that the District's entire men­ tal retardation and developmental disabili­ ties system was fundamentally unable to deliver even the most basic services. It is definitive that the current system failed because of a poor design and years of neglect and disinvestment. The District's system intended to address the needs of those with developmental disabilities suf­ fers from fundamental problems. Exam­ ples of such fundamental problems in the District's system include; there are no clearly defined quality service standards; there is no quality improvement process; there are no significant penalties for lack of compliance with existing system's re­ quirements; there is fragmentation and poor coordination in government business processes; there is no investment in tech­ nology to augment business processes in­ ternal and external to government; there is a poorly trained workforce both in and outside of government; there is a highly inconsistent, underpaid workforce external to government; and there are limited sup­ ported employment opportunities. Well over sixty percent of the population in the District's community residential facilities ("CRF's") could benefit from such oppor­ tunities. The District's system favors high cost institutional-based care as opposed to a system that supports and encourages

98

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

independence and inclusion. Deputy May­ or's Prep. Stmnt. at 7-9.
18. The District's support system re­ quires a major overhaul that will not hap­ pen overnight. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 10. While there have been some recent accomplishments, far more remains to be done. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 14.
19. Painful experience has taught that the District government currently lacks the capacity to adequately deliver the ser­ vices that the individuals with developmen­ tal disabilities in the District's system re­ quire. Deputy Mayor's Prep. Stmnt. at 17.
20. The entire mental retardation and de­ velopmental disabilities service delivery system is incapable of providing quality service. Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Service Delivery System, Gov­ ernment of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children and Families, Jan. 18, 2000 (hereinafter "D.C. Prelim. Rep.") at 1 (emphasis in original).
21. The District's mental retardation and developmental disabilities service delivery system is broken. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 5,39.
22. The District's system is highly dys­ functional and unable to execute its mis~ sion at its most basic level through its current structure and procedures. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
23. After the closure of Forest Haven, compliance with the Evans v. Williams Court-Ordered mandates began to deteri­ orate. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 11 (fn.5). Many of the requirements of the Evans Court Orders are not being complied with. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14. While Court Orders in the Evans case apply only to a portion of the customers served by MRDDA, there is no programmatic or clinical reason to differentiate between

class members and other customers. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.
24. The District is mired in a philosophy of service delivery that is reminiscent of approaches that are more than 20 years old and that consequently, neither MRDDA's mission statement nor its oper­ ation reflects the most current philosophy demonstrated nationally in best practice models. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 22.
25. The entire District service delivery system must be redefmed and rebuilt. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
26. The need for reform in the District's system ranges from the broadest to the smallest of issues and simply "tinkering around the edges" will not solve the sys­ temic problems in the system. D.C. Prel­ im. Rep. at 11.
27. Fixing the District's system requires a combination of short and long-term ini­ tiatives that are integrated and coordinat­ ed. Previous attempts to analyze and fix problems have been too narrow in scope and did not take into account the overall impact of piecemeal solutions. D.C. Prel­ im. Rep. at 5, 39.
28. MRDDA does not and cannot meet its stated mission which is to serve individ­ uals with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities. Defendants' staffing pattern and approach has been and still is designed to serve only people with mental retardation. MRDDA is not adequately meeting the needs of people with mental retardation and is not capable of effectively meeting the aspect of its mission to serve people with developmen­ tal disabilities other than mental retarda­ tion. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 21.
29. Upon further review of the system, Defendants re-confIrmed their earlier con­ clusion that communication and coordina­ tion between departments and even agen­ cies within departments is inadequate.

EVANS v. WILLIAMS

99

Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

Addendum to Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Service Delivery System, Gov­ ernment of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children and Families, Mar. 2, 2000 (hereinafter "D.C. Addendum Rep.") at 3.
30. There is no single coordinated plan to ensure lifetime support to individuals with mental retardation and developmental dis­ abilities. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 3.
LEAST RESTRICTIVE COMMUNITY SETTING
31. The District relies on a facility-based model of service delivery that does not lend itself to providing community living and support services that are fully inte­ grated, customer-directed, flexible, cost ef­ ficient, and which promote an optimum quality of life. Final Report to the Gov­ ernment of the District of Columbia, Office of the City Administrator, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Operations, Georgetown University child Development Center, Jan. 18, 2000 (hereinafter "D.C. George­ town Rep.") at 2.
32. There is a general lack of communica­ tion between MRDDA and the Office of Program Operations which results in a lack of coordination in planning to ensure that the appropriate types of facilities are available for the placement of MRDDA clients by MRDDA. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9. Ultimate decision-making in person centered planning rests with MRDDA even though it is "demonstrably ill­ equipped" to carry out this function. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 15. There are no structural mechanisms within the District system for people with disabilities and their families to select where and with whom they live; participate in the design of services they receive; determine from whom they receive services; and partici­ pate in program evaluation including cus­

tomer satisfaction surveys. D.C. George­ town Rep. at 15.
33. The District's operating philosophy is the same as it was prior to the closing of Forest Haven resulting in "mini-Forest Havens" rather than a person-centered planning philosophy. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
34. The District's Medical Assistance Ad­ ministration ("MAA") and MRDDA have failed to implement an effective Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver. The District's commitment to self-determi­ nation embodied in person centered plan­ ning cannot be met without the funding stream provided by an effective waiver. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 35-36.
35. The lack of an effective home and community based waiver is in itself suffi­ cient to keep the District from effectively implementing person centered planning. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 4.
36. The District does not have a function­ ing home and community based waiver program. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 8. De­ fendants acknowledge that the District has "lagged behind" in instituting a fully func­ tional waiver. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 6.
37. The District's competitive procure­ ment process is not suitable for the pro­ curement of service to the MRDDA popu­
lation in that awarding the contract to the
lowest bidder sometimes results in awards that do not support the goals of person centered planning and respect for individu­ al self-determination. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 31.
38. MRDDA and provider managers and supervisors may lack sensitivity to the right of persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities to make choices. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.

100

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

STAFF TRAINING
39. Formal training programs and re­ quirements for both District and private sector employees are nearly non-existent in the mental retardation and developmen­ tal disabilities service delivery system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3.
40. MRDDA employees have not been provided adequate training for the jobs that they do. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.
41. Residential and transportation pro­ vider employees within the District's sys­ tem have not been provided adequate training for the jobs that they do. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.
42. There has been a lack of appropriate training of MRDDA managers and em­ ployees. There is no formal training pro­ gram in place. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 18.
PROTECTION FROM HARM/INCI­ DENT REPORTING/INVESTIGATIONS
43. There is no formal policy or proce­ dure detailing the difference between an unusual incident report and an "alert," that MRDDA staff had different under­ standings of these two instruments. De­ fendants acknowledge that more review of the "alert" process is necessary. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14.
44. There is a lack of basic policies and procedures in the District system. There was no policy to allow employees to call 911 without first getting a supervisor's ap­ proval until December 1999. There was no policy to provide for safe transportation of customers in existence prior to late 1999, and that it was developed only after a customer died after being left unattend­ ed in a van. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
45. Policies and procedures are often not followed in the District's system. For ex­ ample, many providers do not provide MRDDA with unusual incident reports within 24 hours and do not submit reports on all incidents that should be reported

pursuant to current MRDDA policies. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
46. MRDDA staff do not always track down the outcome of matters referred for action. Once items are referred to other agencies for action, little follow-up is done to determine the status of investigations. This problem is exacerbated by a general failure to share information among in­ volved organizations. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 20.
47. There is a large backlog of unusual incident reports within the Bureau of Pro­ gram Operations and Contracts ("BPOC") which is to review them and forward them for appropriate action. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 24. Since at least November 1, 1999, all unusual incident reports are not sent to the Office of Inspection and Compliance ("OIC") per current policy requirements. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 25.
48. There has been a lack of appropriate management at the District's Department of Ruman Services ("DRS") regarding OIC functions. From March to December 1999, more than 600 unusual incident re­ ports were received, yet little action was taken to address workload issues. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 27.
49. The District's Internal Affairs Divi­ sion ("lAD") has a growing backlog of investigations related to alleged abuses within MRDDA. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 27.
50. DRS' Policies and Procedures for Re­ porting Unusual Incidents are not always followed with regard to the timely submis­ sion of unusual incident reports or current­ ly with the submission of all reports to OlC. The process for submitting incident reports to OIC/IAD is delayed through MRDDA. The delay in receiving notifica­ tion can hinder an investigation since evi­ dence may be removed or destroyed or persons involved may be moved. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 28.

EVANS v. WILLIAMS
Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

101

51. There is no formal communication structure between the District's Licensing and Regulation Administration ("LRA"), OIC, and MRDDA and that this lack of communication has created gaps in moni­ toring and handling routine complaints and incident reports. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
52. There is no formal communication structure that requires providers or clients to report complaints or incidents to LRA. In some cases, complaints and incident reports are never reported to LRA or MRDDA. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
53. orc does not adequately coordinate with the District's Department of Health ("DOH"), the District's Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"), case managers, or others involved in the incident reporting process. The agencies charged with gath­ ering, disseminating, investigating, and re­ porting on unusual incident reports do not coordinate or communicate on a routine basis. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
54. MRDDA's unusual incident tracking system does not interface with that of LRA or orC. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29. Information systems between DOH and DHS or that systems within DOH are not standardized. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29­ 30. There is no complete file of the com­ plaints and incidents that occur in an indi­ vidual facility. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 30.
55. There is no automated tracking sys­ tem in place in the District's system to log the unusual incident reports and track ac­ tion through disposition. It is difficult to track unusual incidents across all involved agencies. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 30.
56. A lack of investigative powers within orc and lAD hinders the investigative process. The orc function is unknown to case managers and vendors who often ask for supervisory clearance before cooperat­ ing with an investigation, which delays in­ terviews and document collection and anal­ ysis. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 30.

SAFEGUARDING PERSONAL POS­ SESSIONS
57. MRDDA lacks sufficient internal procedures and automation to accurately account for all funds allocated to client ac­ counts. Customers in the District's sys­ tem are entitled to personal care allow­ ance of approximately $70.00 per month. Deposits over $50.00 are to be placed in interest bearing accounts and any interest must be credited to that account. After the cost of care allocation is disbursed to providers, MRDDA has no specific proce­ dures in place to ensure that allocations of funding goes directly to the cost of care and personal care. Evidence set forth by a June 1998 DHS audit indicate that at least $73,000.00 is owed to custom­ ers. Audits to identify allocations or mis­ use of funds are disjointed and funds are tracked through agencies that communi­ cate all information through documentary evidence that does not exist in some cases and is not updated in others. Automation between agencies for audit purposes of funds is non-existent and therefore alloca­ tions of funds are not able to be tracked or monitored. Budgetary and Financial Analysis of MRDDA, Final Report to Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the City Administrator, Manage­ ment Analysis, Inc., Jan. 13, 2000 (herein­ after "D.C. MAl Budget Rep.") at 3-6, 7.
58. Community bank accounts are not ad­ equately managed by MRDDA. There is no formal control, monitoring or reporting. MRDDA cannot identify how many such accounts exist, or who has them, how much money is in them, or how they are being managed. MRDDA senior staff and case managers do not have the staff to track these accounts down, and are aware that numerous accounts in the community exist outside the knowledge of MRDDA case managers. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-9.

102

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

59. The District has no controls in place to monitor community bank accounts of clients. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 37.
60. The District has no controls in place to monitor customer burial accounts. MRDDA has neither procedures for the establishment nor the maintenance of buri­ al accounts and similarly lacks procedures for monitoring or administering any exist­ ing accounts. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 37.
61. There is no mechanism in the Dis­ trict's system to effectively monitor the implementation . of individual fmancial plans. Providers often fail to get approval from case managers before withdrawing funds from individual accounts. The Dis­ trict rarely insists upon receipts from pro­ viders indicating what was actually bought with the funds. There are inadequate as­ set control mechanisms in place so that case managers and others can determine what property customers own. D.C. Prel­ im. Rep. at 36..
62. MRDDA does not enforce penalties or monitor providers' transactions associ­ ated with client accounts. MRDDA has no formal procedures for review of the pro­ viders' financial statements except upon the case managers' inspection of the pro­ viders' residence or if the provider sends MRDDA a copy of the bank statements. Documentation of client accounts, balances and transactions are not systematically tracked and therefore MRDDA is unable to ascertain providers' compliance with Federal and District regulations or wheth­ er funds have been commingled or expend­ ed on unauthorized allocations. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-8.
63. Individual Financial Plans ("IFP's")
are not used to manage the disbursement of client funds in the. District's system. Because the IFP's serve as general guide­ lines only, they have little or no relevance in monitoring actual customer expendi­ tures. It would be "impossible" for a case manager to manually review all clients'

IFP's to ascertain actual expenditures giv­ en the lack of automation and lack of rec­ ords. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-8.
64. Clients' individual financial plans are not drafted with sufficient or meaningful detail and the monitoring of these plans is inadequate in the· District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 36.
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMS, MONITORING AND CASE MANAGE­ MENT
65. Not until December 21, 1999, had the District ever undertaken to conduct an operational review of the entire District system of service delivery to persons with mental retardation and developmental dis­ abilities in an attempt to identify system­ wide issues. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 1.
66. The management and oversight of both District employees and private sector providers has been inadequate. D.C. Prel­ im. Rep. at 2.
67. Communication and coordination oc­ curs on a limited, ad hoc basis throughout the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
68. In most parts of the District's system, there has been and continues to be a lack of managers with solid management skills and recognized expertise in the mental retardation or developmental disabilities field or other related fields. The common use of acting or temporary managers causes uncertainty in the District's system and inhibits change within the organiza­ tion, cementing in place antiquated prac­ tices. The District's system is unable to move forward without permanent manag­ ers in key positions. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3.
69. Both District and private sector em­ ployees lack the updated positIon descrip­ tions, training, and supervision that is con­

EVANSv. WILLIAMS
Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

103

sistent with an effective service delivery system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3.
70. In many cases, policy and procedure statements are not available in the Dis­ trict's system. In some cases, policies and procedures are not circulated to employees or are so out of date, that they are useless. Informal communication of policies and procedures during "on the job training" has served to continue a system of bad habits and poor methods. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3-4.
71. All policies and procedures in the Dis­ trict's system are in need of review and revision. Where policies and procedures do not exist, they need to be created in accordance with updated philosophies, pro­ cesses, and systems. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 4.
72. One of the most striking findings of the Defendants' own operational review of the District's system was the complete lack of communication and coordination within the mental retardation and develop­ mental disabilities service delivery system. Each organization within the system oper­ ates in nearly complete isolation from the other organizations. This has resulted in total dysfunction of the service system and the complete lack of leadership system­ wide. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 4.
73. Automation is lacking throughout the District's service delivery system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 4.
74. In addition to failures at MRDDA, a multitude of governmental agencies and various levels of governmental oversight all contribute to the District's broken ser­ vice delivery system. Bureaucratic pro­ cesses hinder cross-agency collaboration. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 10.
75. DRS has failed to take appropriate actions regarding the provision of services to persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14.

76. Top level DRS management respons­ es to issues concerning service provision and quality of care of its MRDDA custom­ ers has been both reactive and inadequate. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 14-5. Appropriate DRS leadership has been severely lacking in the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 15.
77. There has been a dearth of persons with solid managerial skills in key posi­ tions at MRDDA for a number of years which has produced general dysfunction within the entire system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 15.
78. MRDDA has not had an Administra­ tor with an appropriate technical back­ ground in either mental retardation or de­ velopmental disabilities for approximately six years. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 3, 15.
79. Neither the Bureau of Case Manage­ ment ("BCM") nor the BPOC has a perma­ nent Bureau Chief. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 15.
80. In some cases, persons holding man­ agement positions regarding the intake and case management functions have not ensured the existence of appropriate pro­ cedures or the adherence to existing pro­ cedures in the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.
81. Position descriptions for managers in the District's system are outdated and do not appropriately reflect either the correct tasks or newer philosophies regarding per­ sons with mental retardation and develop­ mental. disabilities. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.
82. A significant number of MRDDA em­ ployees do not have position descriptions suitable for the jobs they perform. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16.
83. MRDDA employees have not had ad­ equate supervision. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16. Comments in favorable performance

104

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

ratings are often inconsistent with such ratings. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 16-7.
84. There are insufficient numbers of em­ ployees to do the work required in the District's system. Monitoring staff is in­ adequate; there are no staff trained or qualified to create or review draft legisla­ tion, procedures or policies; there are no staff specifically charged with tracking compliance with the multiple Court Or­ ders; and there are only two employees charged with making court appearances that occur almost every day. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17.
85. There are insufficient numbers of em­ ployees in the District's system to do the work required. .As an example, a Court Order in the Evans case requires a ratio of case managers of no more than 1:60 for Evans class members. The District has determined that a more appropriate ratio is 1:30 and is attempting to achieve this ratio for all customers. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 17. Case management position descriptions should be modified to reflect the best and current practices in the coor­ dination of services. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 4.
86. There are inadequate methods for background checks on providers and the employees of providers in the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 18.
87. MRDDA neither has the statutory nor administrative authority to require the interagency coordination and collaboration necessary across District governmental agencies. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
88. Case managers do not visit all cus­ tomers on their caseloads at least once per quarter per MRDDA policy. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.
89. There is no document management policy within MRDDA in spite of the fact that all District agencies are to have one. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19.

90. There is a lack of adequate communi­ cation within sections of MRDDA, as well as with other District organizations. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 19-20.
91. There is almost no automation used for the intake and case management func­ tions in the District's system. MRDDA as a whole lacks e-mail. Most processes are paper driven. Case managers record their notes by hand. Unusual incident reports are done by hand. A contractor has been hired to develop databases which should allow MRDDA to track such information as demographics of its customer base, the residence of each customer, the status of Individual Habilitation Plans ("IHP's"), in­ cidents involving customers and providers. In addition, this lack of automation con­ tributes to MRDDA failing to comply with Court Orders. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 20.
92. The District's MRDDA Monitoring Unit had been dismantled for years, and although it has recently been reestab­ lished, no written policies exist for this unit. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 23.
93. Two positions that directly affect the administration of LRA (the Director and the Director for State Affairs) are not permanently filled. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 26.
94. District monitoring functions are un­ derstaffed. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 27.
95. LRA only provides monitoring at the minimum level required by the United States Health Care Financing Administra­ tion ("HCFA"). This level of monitoring does not support the mission statement of the District's DOH which seeks to assure safe and healthy environments through li­ censing and regulation, reducing or pre­ venting the risk of disease, dysfunction and premature death. LRA does not per­ form enough monitoring of facilities to car­ ry out this mission. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 28.

EVANS v. WILLIAMS
Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

105

96. There is no coordination between the MRDDA monitoring unit and LRA to en­ sure that inspections performed comple­ ment, as opposed to overlap, each other. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
97. The MRDDA monitoring unit does not have an automated way to track in­ spections. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 29.
9S. There have been significant delays in the District's system in negotiating and completing contracts for non-Medicaid ser­ vices, partly due to significant understaff­ ing. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 32.
99. Medicaid provider agreements and District contracts with providers lack qual­ ity controls, effective monitoring provi­ sions, and incentives or disincentives for superior or substandard service. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 32.
100. Twenty-seven District employees have been detailed or reassigned from Forest Haven to MRDDA since 1991 with no current position descriptions or any formal determination that they possess the skills and training to perform the tasks to which they are now assigned. D.C. Prel­ im. Rep. at 32-33.
101. Many, if not most, of the positions at MRDDA lack accurate, up-dated position descriptions. MRDDA supervisors need assistance in proper performance evalua­ tion preparation. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 33.
102. Defendants acknowledge that there is no true system for providing services to MRDDA customers; rather there are a number of agencies that perform functions that impact the MRDD population in rela­ tive isolation frqm each other. D.C. Ad­ dendum Rep. at 4.
103. MAA is currently doing no provider reviews to determine if MRDDA custom­ ers are receiving the level of care for which MAA is paying. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 4.

104. There is currently no formal proce­ dure that requires coordination between the District of Columbia's Public Schools ("DCPS") and MRDDA when an individual leaves the DCPS system and enters MRDDA's. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 4.
105. There is insufficient staff assigned to conduct utilization reviews to ensure that the appropriate level of care is being pro­ vided to customers within the District's system. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9.
106. Based on Defendants own review, written policies and procedures are lacking in the District's system. While many poli­ cies and procedures are established by HCFA, the Defendants' review indicated that MAA has not formulated or dissemi­ nated internal written policies and proce­ dures. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 10.
107. Automation in the system is out­ dated in the District's system. D.C. Ad­ dendum Rep. at 10.
lOS. There is a lack of communication between DCPS divisions and between DCPS and MRDDA. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 11.
109. The position description of the Ad­ ministrator of MRDDA is obsolete and outdated. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 17.
110. The District's CMD is understaffed to protect the rights of people with mental retardation and other developmental dis­ abilities. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 19.
111. The position descriptions for non­ licensed MRDDA staff do not cite mini­ mum educational requirements. If MRDDA administrative staff were effec­ tively performing the duties and re­ sponsibilities as specified in the position descriptions, the agency would not be experiencing multiple and ongoing cris­ es. A significant proportion of MRDDA's staff is former direct care/service personnel. An analysis of the available forms for these personnel

106

139 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

fails to demonstrate that re-training or continuing education has occurred to provide personnel with the knowledge and competencies required to fulfill cur­ rent duties and responsibilities. D.C. Georgetown Rep. at 23.
112. In a recent review of performance ratings for MRDDA personnel, a majority had no performance ratings. D.C. George­ town Rep. at 24.
BUDGET, TIMELY PAYMENT OF VENDORS
113. Since 1995, the District's budget al­ location for CRF's and other non-Medicaid supported services has been reduced as a result of fiscal· crises. These funds have yet to be restored to meet current de­ mands. Adjusted for inflation, total spending for services for individuals with mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities in the District declined 2 per­ cent during 1991-1996; nationally during the same period, total spending for individ­ uals with mental retardation and/or devel­ opmental disabilities advanced 24 percent in inflation adjusted terms. D.C. George~ town Rep. at 14.
114. The District's budget process is not designed to support MRDDA and custom­ er requirements. There is no effective system in place for identifying MRDDA's actual budgetary requirements in terms of District appropriated funds. MRDDA cannot readily identify its current custom­ er demographics and has no projection of future customer demographics. MRDDA does not track, and is unable to identify costs by customer category. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-1.
115. IHPs are not used as input to pro­ ject MRDDA resource requirements. The IHPs document the range of services needed by a current customer, and of course, will change over time. Lack of IHP input tends to understate require­

ments since MRDDA's population is aging. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-2.
116. The budget process begins with the prior year's baseline as the starting point. However, MRDDA has not been providing a fully satisfactory level of service. There are deficiencies in staff training, quality control, case management, and other ar­ eas. Yet baseline budgeting tends to per­ petuate existing problems and does not provide management with alternatives and associated costs for addressing these is­ sues. Plus, baseline budgeting does not take into account the differential costs of person centered planning or the changing requirements due to changes in the num­ ber or mix of clients. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-1,3-2.
117. Financial tracking and reporting are not adequate for program management purposes in the District's system. MRDDA has no 'timely tracking of expen­ ditures and does not have a precise picture of funds available at any given point dur­ ing the fiscal year. Despite the existence of many urgent requirements, the agency significantly underspent its FY 1999 gen­ eral fund budget by $2.6 million. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-2.
118. MRDDA's appropriated budget is not developed based on any real analysis of the expected expenditures of the agen­ cy. Instead, the MRDDA appropriated budget, approximately $24 million per year, is based on no more than guesswork and the use of the prior year's appropria­ tions to estimate budgetary needs. This does not allow for an accurate forecast of expected needs that would support rational policy decisions within the budget develop­ ment process. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
119. The District does not know what its true cost is to provide services to individu­ al customers, such that attempts to recov­ er cost of care amounts from individual

EVANS v. WILLIAMS
Cite as 139 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2001)

107

customers may be inappropriate. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 36.
120. Fiscal issues have not been appro­ priately addressed within the District's system. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 2.
121. The District does not know the total amount expended to operate the MRDDA program and provide services to the client population. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
122. There is inadequate information ex­ change between MRDDA and the DRS Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"). D.C. Prelim. Rep. at34.
123. MRDDA underspent its budget by approximately $2 million or ten percent of MRDDA's appropriated budget (which ex­ cluded Medicaid expenses), in part because the DRS CFO and MRDDA failed to com­ municate about quarterly budgetary fore­ casts. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
124. Amounts currently available for case manager trips to visit customers who live outside of the District are insufficient. D.C. Prelim. Rep. at 34.
125. The vendor payment system within the District's system is inadequate and should be redesigned. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9.
126. Audits of provider cost data are not timely conducted in the District's system. D.C. Addendum Rep. at 9.
127. The total cost of the MRDDA-relat­ ed programs is not captured by existing financial systems. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-3.
128. Provider contracts in the District's system are vague and overly broad with no uniform provisions governing the mainte­ nance and custodianship over customer ac­ counts and other property. The lack of specific procedural or contractual guid­ ance, either by incorporation or reference, invites all sorts of abuses, and likely pre­ clude the recovery of any misappropriated funds. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-9, 3­ 10.

129. Provider contracts in the District's system lack specific guidance for noncom­ pliance with applicable regulations or con­ tractual terms and afford no means of recourse for breach by the provider. D.C. MAl Budget Rep. at 3-10.
The following Defendants' reports are referenced above:
A. Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Service Delivery Sys­ tem, Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy .Mayor for Children and Families, Jan. 18, 2000 (Master's Exh. F).
B. Addendum to Preliminary Findings on the Mental Retardation and De­ velopmental Disabilities Service De­ livery System, Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children and Families, Mar. 2, 2000 (Master's Exh. I).
C. Final Report to the Government of the District of Columbia, Office of the City Administrator, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Operations, Georgetown University Child Devel­ opment Center, Jan. 18, 2000 (Mas­ ter's Exh. L).
D. Budgetary and Financial Analysis of MRDDA, Final Report to Gov­ ernment of the District of Colum­ bia, Office of the City Administra­ tor, Management Analysis, Inc., Jan. 13, 2000 (Master's Exh. R).
Reference to the reports listed above are solely for the purpose of establishing the effective dates of the stipulations. De­ fendants assert that the references to any of the above reports or statements are not intended to infer that the reports or state­ ments are admissions of the Defendants.

 
 F I L E D THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 


JOY EVANS, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

and

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

Plaintiff~InterVenor,

}

)

}

v.

)

)

)

ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,

)

Defendants.

)

)

)

NOV 2 1 2000
NANGYMAYERWHITTINGTON, CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Civ. No. 76·293 (SSH)

ORDER REGARDING THE APPOINTMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT COURT MONITOR
Upon consideration of the record in this case, and the joint motion of the parties and the recommendation of the Special Master, the Court finds that:
In paragraph 6 of the Court's 1978 Final Judgment and Order (hereinafter "1978 Final Order"), the Court ordered Defendants to retain the full-time, expert services of a person (i.e., the DevelopmentalDisabilities Professional or "OOP") (hereinafter called the "Monitor"), to assist the Court in overseeing the implementation of the provisions of the Order. Specifically, the Court ordered the new entity to "monitor the implementation of this and any further Order of the Court." 1978 Final Order ~ 6. The Court ordered Defendants to give the Monitor full independent access to aU premises, records, documents, class members, personnel and other necessary information to assure that the provisions of the Order are carried out, and the Court ordered that the Monitor report directly to the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Human Resources.
To comply with this Order, Defendants retained the services of [he current Monitor through a contract with a community provider, the District.of Columbia Are, [nco Thus, the current Monitor serves as the Court's Monitor while employed as a contractor of the District of

Columbia.
The current contractual arrangement between the Defendants and the Monitor is not 
 appropriate. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
 FOLLOWS: 

Creation of an Independent Court Monitor's Office
1. In the exercise of its inherent powers, the Court hereby establishes an independent Court Monitor that will be directly responsible to the Court. After consideration of the recommendations of the parties, as described below, the Court will appoint as Court Monitor a person or organization determined by the Court to be qualified to monitor the implementation of this Court's Orders and to carry out other duties related to the monitoring of this Court's Orders. If the parties agree upon the establishment of the Quality Trust which is to be developed pursuant to the 2000 Plan for Compliance and filed with the Court, the Court Monitor shall be physically co-located with the monitoring body of the Quality Trust so as to enhance collaboration with regard to monitoring activities. Although there is to be physical . proximity and collaboration between the Court Monitor and the Quality Trust, the Court Monitor shall remain directly responsible to the Coun, and not to the Quality Trust. The Court Monitor shall continue to monitor Defendants' compliance with existing Court Orders in this case until the case is no longer subject to Court supervision and shall not supplant the systemic monitoring conducted by the Quality Trust. As each Court Order is vacated by the Court, monitoring of corresponding operations shall be transferred from the Court Monitor to the Quality Trust. and shall no longer be subject to Court supervision. The parties and the Court shall consider adjustment to the Court Monitor's annual budget, as Court Orders are vacated in this case, consistent with the procedures set forth in paragraph three of this Order for developing an annual budget.
Selection of the Court Monitor
2. For a period of thirty days after the filing of this Order, the parties, in collaboration with the Special Master, shall endeavor to agree on a candidate (or selection as -the Court Monitor. In the event that the parties are unable to agree upon Ci candidate for the position of Court Monitor, the parties shall each submit to the Court no more than three names and qualifications of candidates for the position. The parties shall submit this information regarding the candidates within seven days after the close of the thirty day negotiation period, The Court shall thereafter make a determination upon consideration of the submissions and positions of the parties.
Submission of the Court Monitor's Budget
3. . Fourteen days following the Court's selection of the Monitor, the parties and the Monitor,
-2­

'.
in collaboration with the Special Master, shall endeavor to agree upon the financial terms and conditions of the Monitor's compensation and reimbursement for expenses, including the cost of administrative overhead, staff and consultants.
In the event that the parties and the Monitor are unable to reach agreement on the financial terms and conditions of the Monitor's compensation and reimbursement, the Monitor shaH submit to the Court, with copics to the Master and the parties, a proposed annual budget. Should any parry object to the proposed annual budget, any party may submit their· objections in writing to the Court within fourteen days of the submission of the Monitor's proposed annual budget. The Court shall thereafter make a determination on the final budget upon consideration of the positions of the parties and the Monitor.
Reimbursement and Payment Provisions
4. The cost of the Coun Monitor, including the cost of any independent experts hired by the Court Monitor as provided herein and in the proposed budget, shall be borne by the
Defendants in this action. The Court Monitor shall notify [he parties of the Monitor's intention to retain experts not less than three business days in advance, except in case of an emergency, when the Monitor shaH provide notice as soon as practible. Defendants shall reimburse aU reasonable expenses incurred by the Court Monitor, independent experts and staff in the course of the performance of their duties, inCludlng but not limited to the remal of office space, office expenses, salaries of staff, telephone expenses, photocopying, travel. data processing, postage and bookkeeping.
5. Defendants shall deposit and maintain in the Registry of this Court the amount of money agreed upon by the parties or ordered by the Court to assure prompt payment of the costs
incurred by the Court Monitor. This deposit ,md all other deposits pursuant to this Order shall
be held in the Court Registry Investment System and shall be subject to the standard registry fee imposed on depositors.
6. The parties and the Court Monitor shall recommend to the Court, within twenty days. following the appointment of the Monitor, a method of periodic payment of the Monitor's expenses.
Responsibilities and Powers of the Court Monitor
7. The Court Monitor shall regularly monitor the class members' commun.ity residential placements and day or other programs to determine Defendants' implementation of this Court's Orders. The Court Monitor shall devote such time as is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the duties and responsibilities of the Cour~ Monitor pursuant to this Order.
8. The Court Monit6r shall consult with the parties and the Special Master concerning the
methodologies to be used by the Monitor to assess Defendants' compliance with and
-3­
P DILl

: '.
implementation of Coun: Orders and shall report to the Court the methodologies that will be used for these purposes and the reasons for adopting those methods. The Court Monitor shall submit a draft written report regarding Defendants' compliance with the Orders in this case to the parties for comment on a quarterly basis. The parties shall h"ave ten days to submit a response to the report to the Court Monitor. The Monitor shall consider the partics' comments and within ten days of receipt of the comments, shall file a final report with the Court, which shall be served upon the parties.
9. The Court Monitor shall have access to the persons, residences, facilities, buildings, programs, services, documents, records, personnel and materials the Monitor deems necessary or appropriate in performing the duties of the Monitor that are related to class members or the care and/or services provided to class members in this case pursuant to existing Orders in this case. Such access shall include all departmental and/or individual class member medical and other records. The Monitor may obtain copies of all such relevant documents, records, and materials. No advance notice of any visit or inspection shall be required.
10. The Court Monitor may conduct confidential interviews and meetings with any class member. The Court Monitor may conduct confidential interviews with Defendants' employees,
as well as all provider staff who directly or indirectly serve class members. In addition, the Court
Monitor may engage in informal conferences with such employees and staff, who shall cooperate with the Court Monitor and respond to all inquiries and requests !related to compliance with existing Court Orders in [his case.
11. Defendants shall provide the Court Monitor information upon request relevant to Defendants' implementation of existing Court Orders. The Court Monicof may require written reports from Defendants or any staff regarding Defendants' compliance. DefendantJShall notify the Court Monitor immediately upon the death of a class member. Defendants shall also provide the Monitor with prompt notice of pending or ongoing investigations of serious unusual incidents involving class members. Defendants shall forward to the Court Monitor copies of any completed incident reports related to deaths, autopsies and/or death summaries of class members as well as all final reports of investigations that involve class membe~s.
12. The Court Monitor may select and employ necessary administrative, clerical and support staff, as well as independent experts, of the Monitor's choosing, to assist the Monitor in fulfilling its responsibilities. The Court Monitor shall notify the parties of the Monitor's intention to retain experts not less than three business days in advance, except in case of an emergency, when notice shall be provided as soon as practicable. The Monitor's staff and experts shall be granted the same degree of accessibility as set forth above for the Monitor.
13. The Court Monitor shall cooperate with the Special Master in carrying out the Master's responsibilities under the Master's Order of Reference and any other duties assigned to the Master by this Court. The duties of the Court Monitor shall be to observe, monitor, report findings, and make recommendations to the parties, Special Master and the Court concerning
-4­

the implementation of this Court's Orders. The Court Monitor shall confer regularly and informally with Defendants on matters relating to compliance. The Court Monitor may have-ex
parte contacts with the parties, the Special Master or the Court at any time.
14. The findings, recommendations and reports of the Court Monitor shall not have the weight of findings and recommendations made pursuant to an Order of Reference under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but may be introduced as evidence when relevant and admissible in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.
15. All actions of the Court Monitor shall be under the direct control and supervision of the Court. The Court Monitor shall not be empowered to direct Defendants or any of their subordinates to take or to refrain from taking any specific action to achieve compliance with
existing Orders in this case. The sole power to direct compliance shall remain with the Court.
16. The Court Monitor shalt be discharged or replaced only upon the Order of this Court. In the event that the Court discharges the Monitor or in the event that the Court Monitor resigns or is no longer able to contintie to serve as the Court Monitor, the parties, in collaboration with the Special Master, shall select a mutually acceptable replacement, as soon as possible, who shall serve in keeping with the provisions of this Order. In the event that the parties are unable to agree on a replacement, they shall submit the names of candidates to the Court which shall make the final determination consistent with the procedures set forth in paragraph two above.
17. This Order shall replace paragraph six of the 1978 Final Order. All other Orders pertaining to the Court's Monitor (referred to in those documents as the Developmental Disabilities Professi.onal or "DDpll) shall remain in effect.

WHEREFORE, the parties to thi.s action having agreed to the provisions in this Order set

forth above, and the Court being advised in the premises, this Order is hereby entered as the

ORDER and JUDGMENT of this Court.

.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 2l-s.+ day of No"cht~'" 2000, at Washington, DC.

-5­

 
 Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 1 of 127
APPEAL,CLOSED,JURY,MEDIATION,REGISTRY
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:76−cv−00293−ESH

EVANS, et al v. FENTY, et al Assigned to: Judge Ellen S. Huvelle Demand: $0 Case in other court: USCA, 10−05109 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Special Master

Date Filed: 02/23/1976 Date Terminated: 05/31/1995 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Margaret G. Farrell Esquire TERMINATED: 07/05/2011

represented by Margaret G. Farrell 4719 Cumberland Avenue Chevy Chase, MD 20815 (301) 654−8638 Email: farrellmg@yahoo.com PRO SE

Special Master Clarence J. Sundram

represented by Clarence J. Sundram QUALITY MATTERS LLC 26 Abbey Road Delmar, NY 12054 (518) 527−1918 Fax: (240) 352−1434 Email: cjsundram@alumni.ksg.harvard.edu PRO SE

Special Master
KATHY E. SAWYER 5532 Ash Grove Circle Montgomery, AL 36116 kathyesawyer@yahoo.com

Plaintiff
JOY EVANS by and through her parents and next friends, Betty Jane Evans and Harold G. Evans

represented by Cathy E. Costanzo CENTER FOR PUBLIC REPRESENTATION 22 Green Street Northampton, MA 01060 (413) 586−6024 Fax: (413) 586−5711 Email: ccostanzo@cpr−ma.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Hanlon HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP 800 17th Street, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 828−1871 Fax: (202) 955−5564 Email: stephen.hanlon@hklaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Adlai Katz LAW OFFICES OF GARY M. GILBERT & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 2 of 127
1100 Wayne Avenue Suite 900 Silver Spring, MD 20910 (301) 608−0880 Fax: (301) 608−0881 Email: dkatz@ggilbertlaw.com TERMINATED: 07/22/2004
Elliott Denbo Andalman ANDALMAN & FLYNN 8601 Georgia Avenue Suite 206 Silver Spring, MD 20910 (301) 563−6685 Fax: (301) 563−6681 Email: eandalman@a−f.net TERMINATED: 07/22/2004
Joseph B. Tulman UNIVERSITY OF DC DAVID A. CLARKE SCHOOL OF LAW 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Building 38, Room 207 Washington, DC 20008−1122 (202) 274−7317 Fax: (202) 274−5583 Email: jtulman@udc.edu TERMINATED: 05/18/2006
Kelly R. Bagby AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION 601 E Street, NW Washington, DC 20049 (202) 434−2103 Fax: (202) 434−2464 Email: kbagby@aarp.org TERMINATED: 01/23/2006
Laura A. Fernandez HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 800 17th Street, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 457−1833 Email: laura.fernandez@hklaw.com TERMINATED: 10/30/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Paul J. Kiernan HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 800 17th Street, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 955−5564 Email: paul.kiernan@hklaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Regan Monica Bailey UNIVERSITY LEGAL SERVICES 4912 Hine Drive Shady Side, MD 20764 (410) 867−3969 Email: rbailey@uls−dc.com TERMINATED: 08/10/2004

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Sharon Yvette Eubanks BORDAS & BORDAS PLLC 7927 Jones Branch Drive #2150 McLean, VA 22102 (202) 440−1484 Email: Seubanks@bordaslaw.com TERMINATED: 11/14/2008

Sandra J. Bernstein UNIVERSITY LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 220 I Street, NE Suite 130 Washington, DC 20002−4362 (202) 547−0198 Fax: 202−547−2662 Email: sbernstein@uls−dc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff VENITA FELTON

represented by Cathy E. Costanzo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Adlai Katz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Elliott Denbo Andalman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Joseph B. Tulman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2006

Kelly R. Bagby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/23/2006

Laura A. Fernandez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/30/2014 PRO HAC VICE

Paul J. Kiernan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Regan Monica Bailey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/10/2004

Sandra J. Bernstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Yvette Eubanks

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(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/14/2008

Plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON

represented by Cathy E. Costanzo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Adlai Katz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Elliott Denbo Andalman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Joseph B. Tulman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2006

Kelly R. Bagby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/23/2006

Laura A. Fernandez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/30/2014 PRO HAC VICE

Paul J. Kiernan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Regan Monica Bailey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/10/2004

Sandra J. Bernstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Yvette Eubanks (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/14/2008

Plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES

represented by Cathy E. Costanzo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Adlai Katz (See above for address)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 5 of 127

TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Elliott Denbo Andalman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Joseph B. Tulman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2006

Kelly R. Bagby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/23/2006

Laura A. Fernandez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/30/2014 PRO HAC VICE

Paul J. Kiernan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Regan Monica Bailey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/10/2004

Sandra J. Bernstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Yvette Eubanks (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/14/2008

Plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN

represented by Cathy E. Costanzo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Adlai Katz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Elliott Denbo Andalman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Joseph B. Tulman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2006

Kelly R. Bagby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/23/2006

Laura A. Fernandez (See above for address)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 6 of 127

TERMINATED: 10/30/2014 PRO HAC VICE

Paul J. Kiernan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Regan Monica Bailey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/10/2004

Sandra J. Bernstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Yvette Eubanks (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/14/2008

Plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY, JR.

represented by Cathy E. Costanzo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen F. Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Adlai Katz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Elliott Denbo Andalman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2004

Joseph B. Tulman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2006

Kelly R. Bagby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/23/2006

Laura A. Fernandez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/30/2014 PRO HAC VICE

Paul J. Kiernan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Regan Monica Bailey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/10/2004

Sandra J. Bernstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sharon Yvette Eubanks

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(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/14/2008

V. Intervenor Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

represented by John A. Henderson U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE P.O. Box 66400 Washington, DC 20035−6400 (202) 514−6261 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurie J. Weinstein U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 252−2527 Fax: (202) 514−8780 Email: Laurie.Weinstein2@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 06/02/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Robert Bagenstos U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of the Assistant Attorney General 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room 5744 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353−9065 Email: samuel.bagenstos@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William G. Maddox U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 601 D Street, NW PHB, #5018 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 514−6251 Email: william.maddox@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cathleen Siobhan Trainor U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 616−9009 Fax: (202) 514−0212 Email: cathleen.trainor@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard James Farano U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Rights Division − Special Litigation Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW PHB − Room 5020 Washington, DC 20530−0001 (202) 307−3116

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Fax: (202) 514−0212 Email: richard.farano@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 06/23/2008

V. Defendant MARION BARRY TERMINATED: 07/14/2000
Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

represented by Barbara J. Mann 903 Hamilton Street, NE Washington, DC 20011−6425 (202) 269−3793 Fax: (202) 269−3707 TERMINATED: 08/16/1999
Barbara A. Miller KELLEY DRYE & WARREN, LLP 3050 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005−5108 (202) 342−8571 Email: bmiller@kelleydrye.com TERMINATED: 03/01/2000
Maria−Claudia T. Amato DC OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2000 14th Street, NW Suite 756 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 671−2037 Fax: (202) 671−2514 Email: maria.amato@dc.gov TERMINATED: 08/01/2006
Melvin W. Bolden , Jr. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 4th Street, NW Room 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−5695 Fax: (202) 727−6014 Email: melvin.bolden@dc.gov TERMINATED: 08/16/1999
represented by Martha J. Mullen OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Civil Litigation Division 441 4th Street, NW One Judiciary Square− 6th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6612 Fax: (202) 730−0635 Email: martha.mullen@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger DC OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 9 of 127
441 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−5168 Email: robert.utiger@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barbara J. Mann (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/1999
Barbara A. Miller (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/01/2000
Chad Alan Naso OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Public Interest Division, Equity Section 441 Fourth Street, NW 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−7854 Email: chad.naso@dc.gov TERMINATED: 05/19/2016
Ellen A. Efros COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Office of the General Counsel 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 4 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 724−7820 Fax: (202) 724−8129 Email: eefros@dccouncil.us TERMINATED: 04/22/2015
Grace Graham OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 600S Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9784 Fax: (202) 741−8892 Email: grace.graham@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
Gregory Martin Cumming OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6627 Fax: (202) 715−7769 Email: gregory.cumming@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffery Thomas Infelise U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 100 F Street, NE Washington, DC 20549 (202) 551−4904

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 10 of 127

Email: infelisej@sec.gov TERMINATED: 08/31/2000

John D. Dodge DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 973−4205 Email: john.dodge@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria−Claudia T. Amato (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/01/2006

Matthew Robert Blecher OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 Fourth Street NW Suite 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9774 Fax: (202) 730−0586 Email: matthew.blecher@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melvin W. Bolden , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/1999

Peter J. Nickles DC GOVERNMENT 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W Suite 300 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 727−1597 Fax: 202−778−5394 Email: peter.nickles@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/14/2011

Sarah Ann Sulkowski OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6627 Fax: (202) 730−1454 Email: sarah.sulkowski@dc.gov TERMINATED: 05/13/2011

Defendant
ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS Mayor, District of Columbia TERMINATED: 02/05/2007

represented by Martha J. Mullen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert C. Utiger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant
ADRIAN FENTY Mayor, District of Columbia

Ellen A. Efros (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2015
John D. Dodge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria−Claudia T. Amato (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/01/2006
represented by John D. Dodge (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha J. Mullen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chad Alan Naso (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/19/2016
Ellen A. Efros (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2015
Grace Graham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
Gregory Martin Cumming (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Robert Blecher (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Interested Party
ELIZABETH L. JONES Court Monitor

represented by Robert Neil Weiner ARNOLD & PORTER KAY SCHOLER LLP 601 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 942−5855 Fax: (202) 942−5999 Email: robert.weiner@apks.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Movant WE CARE PROJECTS,INC
Movant LYDIA WILLIAMS Court Monitor, D.C. ARC, Pratt Monitoring Program TERMINATED: 08/28/2013
Movant ST. JOHN'S COMMUNITY SERVICES
Movant QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.

represented by David T. Ralston , Jr. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP 3000 K Street, NW 6th floor Washington, DC 20007 (202) 295−4097 Fax: 202−672−5399 Email: dralston@foley.com TERMINATED: 07/09/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY
Nicholas George Karambelas SFIKAS & KARAMBELAS 1101 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 7th Floor Washington, DC 20004−2401 (202) 661−4614 Fax: (240) 465−0400 Email: nick@ngklaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by LYDIA WILLIAMS PRO SE
Lydia Williams 817 Varnum Street Suite 145 Washington, DC 20017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Laura Jean Oberbroeckling LAW OFFICE OF BRAD KELLY 7316 Wisconsin Avenue Suite200 Bethesda, MD 20814 (301) 656−7707 Fax: (301) 656−7709 Email: laura.oberbroeckling@rcn.com TERMINATED: 07/11/2013
represented by Leslie Anne Davis CROWELL & MORING LLP 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 624−2727 Fax: (202) 628−5116 Email: ldavis@crowell.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Michael Klise CROWELL & MORING LLP 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004−2595 (202) 624−2629

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 13 of 127

Fax: (202) 628−5116 Email: jmkesq47@verizon.net TERMINATED: 12/19/2013

Movant
COMMUNITY MULTI−SERVICES, INC.

represented by Laura Jean Oberbroeckling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2013

Movant CARECO, INC.

represented by Laura Jean Oberbroeckling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2013

Movant
LT. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY INSTITUTE

represented by Laura Jean Oberbroeckling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2013

Movant
MULTI−THERAPEUTIC SERVICES, INC.

represented by Laura Jean Oberbroeckling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2013

Movant NATIONAL CHILDREN'S CENTER

represented by Laura Jean Oberbroeckling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2013

Date Filed # Docket Text

02/23/1976 1028 COMPLAINT against DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,et al. filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN.(jeb, ) (Entered: 10/23/2008)

11/24/1994

MOTION HEARING before Judge Stanley S. Harris begun and continued to 11/28/95 at 4:30pm. Reporter: R.Weber (emh) (Entered: 12/06/1995)

05/05/1995 1608 ALL PLEADINGS FILED PRIOR TO 5/5/95 WILL BE ON THE PAPER DOCKET (ted) (bj). (Entered: 05/12/1995)

05/05/1995

1 NOTICE OF FILING by intervenor−plaintiff USA of report to the court; Exhibits(2) (ted) (Entered: 05/12/1995)

05/09/1995

2 OPPOSITIONS by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to entry of orders of civil contempt and appointment of a special master and reply to the report to the court of USA; Exhibits(2) (ted) (Entered: 05/12/1995)

05/12/1995

HEARING on Contempt motion by plaintiff, before Judge John H. Pratt, held; The Court finds defendant in contempt; plaintiff and intervenor to submit finding of facts and conclusions of law and remedies within two weeks; defendant has 5 days thereafter to respond. Reporter: Christi Macri (bjl) (Entered: 05/12/1995)

05/26/1995

3 FINDINGS OF FACT and Conclusions of Law filed by plaintiffs . (ted) (Entered: 05/30/1995)

06/05/1995

5 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM (SECOND) by defendants in opposition to the appointment of a special master and objections to the proposed order of reference. (ted) (Entered: 06/06/1995)

06/05/1995

6 OBJECTIONS by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to findings of fact [3−1] (ted) (Entered: 06/06/1995)

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06/06/1995
06/09/1995 06/13/1995
06/13/1995 06/15/1995 06/16/1995 06/23/1995 06/29/1995 07/10/1995
07/31/1995 07/31/1995 08/29/1995 09/21/1995 10/11/1995 10/11/1995
10/20/1995

4 ORDER by Judge John H. Pratt : status hearing set for 9:00 6/9/95; directing that Vernon Hawkins, the Interim Director of the Dept. of Human Services shall appear to explain why the actions promised in his sworn affidavit of 5/9/95, have not been fully implemented; directing the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of this order to Mr. Hawkins. ; (N) (bjl) (Entered: 06/06/1995)
9 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 5/12/95. Reporter: Christi Macri (bjl) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
7 ORDER by Judge Oliver Gasch for John H. Pratt : allowing District of Columbia 10 days to file with the Court certain information regarding vendors; if Monitor's list differs from District's lists of vendors, District will make explanation therefor; opposing parties should respond the District's pleadings within 10 days of filing. (N) (N) (bjl) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
8 MONITOR'S REPORT (bjl) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
STATUS HEARING before Judge John H. Pratt : Reporter: Laura Beasley (bjl) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
10 TRANSCRIPT of hearing before Judge Oliver Gasch filed for date of 6/13/95. Reporter: Laura M. Beasley. (tth) (Entered: 06/19/1995)
11 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC of submission to the court; Attachments(3) (ted) (Entered: 06/28/1995)
12 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 4/20/95. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (ted) (Entered: 06/30/1995)
13 ORDER by Judge John H. Pratt : that the parties to this action shall have 20 days within which to meet independently with Ms. Farrell and that Ms. Farrell shall provide the parties with copies of her curriculum vitae, and make herself available for said interviews and the parties shall file any comments concerning Ms. Farrell's intended appointment with the Court by 7/31/95. The Court will then make a final decision concerning the appointment. (N) (adc) (Entered: 07/10/1995)
14 NOTICE OF FILING by intervenor−plaintiff USA of response to appointment of Margaret G. Farrell as special master. (ted) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
15 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of report to court regarding appointment of special master. (ted) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
CASE REASSIGNED from Judge John H. Pratt to Judge Stanley S. Harris (ted) (Entered: 08/31/1995)
16 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Joseph B. Tulman representing plaintiffs. New address: District of Columbia School of Law, Building 48, Room 7105, 4250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008, (202) 274−7317. (mlp) (Entered: 09/22/1995)
17 FINDINGS OF FACT and Conclusions of Law . (fle) (Entered: 10/13/1995)
18 ORDER OF REFERENCE by Judge Stanley S. Harris: advising that Margaret G. Farrell is appointed as Special Master. The Special Master shall hear, consider, and make recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Special Master shall possess and exercise all powers conferred upon Special Masters. The Special Master shall submit her report within 90 days. The Special Master shall receive compensation not to exceed 100.00 per hour plus all reasonable expenses. The Special Master may employ an associate lawyer in the capacity of a law clerk, whose services shall be charged at an hourly rate. The Special Master's fee shall be assessed or apportioned as justice may require. Other costs incurred by the Special Master shall be equally borne by the parties. Advising the parties that faith shall be exercised in all negotiations between the parties. The power to enforce the Court's Orders and to punish defendants for noncompliance is vested solely in the Court. Directing defendants to deposit the sum of $50,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court as interim payment of costs, within 28 days. (N) (mlp) Modified on 02/08/1996 (Entered: 02/08/1996)
19 MOTION filed by movant WE CARE PROJECTS,INC to intervene as a plaintiff , EXHIBITS: Motion for Preliminary injuncation and temporary restraining order (lpp)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 15 of 127

10/26/1995 10/30/1995 11/02/1995 11/03/1995 11/07/1995 11/14/1995 11/14/1995 11/22/1995 11/22/1995 11/28/1995 11/28/1995 11/30/1995
12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/13/1995 12/20/1995
12/21/1995 12/21/1995

(Entered: 10/25/1995)
20 MOTION filed by intervenor−plaintiff USA to remedy defendants' ongoing comtempt , and for emergency injunctive relief ; Attachments (4) (blj) (Entered: 10/27/1995)
21 TRANSCRIPT of motions hearing before Judge Harris filed for date of 10/20/95. Reporter: Robert M. Weber (bjsp) (Entered: 10/31/1995)
23 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 11/14/95 to respond to United States' motion to remedy defendants' ongoing contempt , and for injunctive relief (tw) (Entered: 11/06/1995)
22 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to remedy defendants' continuing contempt (ks) (Entered: 11/06/1995)
24 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 11/14/95 to respond to United States' motion to remedy defendants' ongoing contempt [23−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (N) (emh) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
25 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 11/28/95 to respond to US' motion to remedy defendants; ongoing contempt , and for emergency injunctive relief (cjp) (Entered: 11/16/1995)
26 RESPONSE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in opposition to US's and plaintiffs motions to remedy defendants' continuing contempt [22−1] and for injunctive relief [23−2] [20−1] (cjp) (Entered: 11/17/1995)
27 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA in opposition to motion to extend time to 11/28/95 to respond to US' motion to remedy defendants; ongoing contempt [25−1] by DC, MARION BARRY . (ks) (Entered: 11/24/1995)
28 REPLY by intervenor−plaintiff USA to response to motion to remedy defendants' ongoing comtempt [20−1], and for emergency injunctive relief [20−2] by USA; Attachments (5) (ks) (Entered: 11/24/1995)
29 RESPONSE (FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL) by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in opposition to motion to remedy defendants' ongoing comtempt [20−1] by USA, motion for emergency injunctive relief [20−2] by USA . (bjsp) (Entered: 11/29/1995)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Stanley S. Harris taken under advisement by plaintiffsssss motion to remedy defendants' continuing contempt [22−1] Reporter: R.Weber (emh) (Entered: 12/06/1995)
30 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : denying as moot, without prejudice motion to remedy defendants' continuing contempt [22−1] by plaintiffs; directing the parties within 21 days to submit briefing to the Court on the legality, feasibility, and desireability of the creation of an escrow fund. (N) (emh) (Entered: 12/06/1995)
31 TRANSCRIPT filed for hearing before Judge Harris for date of 11/24/95. Reporter: Robert M. Weber (mlp) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
32 TRANSCRIPT filed for hearing before Judge Harris for date of 11/28/95. Reporter: Robert M. Weber (mlp) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
DEPOSIT of $50,000.00 cash by defendants (check from D.C. Government) with the Clerk of the Court as interim payment of costs pursuant to Court Order dated 10/11/95; attachment (receipt) (mlp) (Entered: 12/22/1995)
33 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA to order dated 11/30/95 [30−1] requiring analysis of use of an escrow account to ensure compliance with Court Order relating to timely payment of private providers for services to class members (mlp) (Entered: 12/21/1995)
34 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 12/29/95 to file memorandum on the legality, feasibility and desirability of the creation of an escrow account (mlp) (Entered: 12/22/1995)
35 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to order dated 11/30/95 [30−1] regarding the legality, feasibility, and desirability of creating an escrow fund to ensure defendants'

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12/22/1995
12/29/1995 01/02/1996
01/05/1996 01/11/1996 01/19/1996 01/19/1996 01/22/1996 01/23/1996 01/23/1996 01/23/1996 01/24/1996 02/01/1996
02/08/1996 02/08/1996 02/09/1996 02/09/1996

compliance with Court orders requiring timely payment to service providers (mlp) (Entered: 12/22/1995)
36 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting nunc pro tunc motion to extend time to 12/29/95 to file memorandum on the legality, feasibility and desirability of the creation of an escrow account [34−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (N) (emh) (Entered: 01/02/1996)
38 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 1/5/96 to file memorandum on the legality, feasibility and desirability of the creation of an escrow account (mlp) (Entered: 01/02/1996)
37 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the court's registry, from the escrow account in CA.76−293 the sum of $7,180.74 to Margaret G. Farrell for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 01/02/1996)
39 RESPONSE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to order [30−1] on the use of an escrow account to pay vendors (mlp) (Entered: 01/11/1996)
40 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 1/5/96 to file memorandum on the legality, feasibility and desirability of the creation of an escrow account [38−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (N) (emh) (Entered: 01/17/1996)
41 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's Registry, the sum of $4,852.01, to Margaret G. Farrell, for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 01/23/1996)
42 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : allowing the Special Master until 1/25/96, to file the parties proposed remedial plan. (N) (emh) (Entered: 01/23/1996)
45 REQUEST by Special Master to extend time to 1/22/96 to file recommendations for a 1996 remedial plan "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (fiat) (mlp) (Entered: 02/08/1996)
46 STATUS REPORT by Special Master of activities and expenses for October, 1995. "Let this be filed, 1/23/96" Harris, J. (fiat) (mlp) (Entered: 02/08/1996)
47 STATUS REPORT by Special Master MARGARET G. FARRELL of activities and expenses for November, 1995 and notice of intention to hire expert; attachments. "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (fiat) (mlp) (Entered: 02/08/1996)
48 STATUS REPORT by Special Master MARGARET G. FARRELL of activities and expenses for December, 1995. "Let this be filed" Harris, J. (fiat) (mlp) (Entered: 02/08/1996)
43 MOTION filed by intervenor−plaintiff USA for hearing on defendants' continuing non−compliance ; attachment (mlp) (Entered: 01/25/1996)
44 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : that before 5:00pm on Friday, February 9, 1996, defendants shall submit to the Court, counsel for plaintiffs, the Special Master, and the Pratt Monitor, a list of Evans class care providers who receive Medicaid and/or MRDDA payments within the preceding 2 weeks; directing the defendants before 5:00pm on Friday, 2/16/96 to submit to the above, a comprehensive list of all Evans class care providers and a comprehensive breakdown of all payments more than 30 days overdue to all providers. (N) (emh) (Entered: 02/07/1996)
50 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA to special master order of findings and recommendations [49−2] (mlp) (Entered: 02/12/1996)
51 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 2/15/96 to file a memorandum containing comments and objections to the Special Master's January, 1996 Report (mlp) (Entered: 02/12/1996)
49 ORDER filed by Special Master Margaret G. Farrell, Esq.: issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law ; exhibits (8). "Let this be filed, 2/9/96" Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 02/12/1996)
53 RESPONSE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to order dated 2/1/96 [44−1]; attachments (2) (mlp) (Entered: 02/12/1996)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 17 of 127

02/12/1996
02/13/1996 02/15/1996 02/16/1996 03/05/1996 03/06/1996 03/11/1996
03/11/1996 03/11/1996 04/15/1996 04/15/1996 05/09/1996
05/13/1996 05/15/1996 05/21/1996 06/17/1996 06/17/1996 06/21/1996 07/02/1996 07/12/1996

52 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 2/15/96 to file a memorandum containing comments and objections to the Special Master's January, 1996 Report [51−1] by DC, MARION BARRY response to motion(s) due by 2/15/96 ; (N) (lpp) (Entered: 02/12/1996)
54 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's Registry, from the escrow account to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., for services rendered. (N) (emh) (Entered: 02/15/1996)
55 OBJECTIONS by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to special master's January, 1996 Report [49−2]; attachments (mlp) (Entered: 02/16/1996)
56 RESPONSE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to order [44−1]; attachments (5) (mlp) (Entered: 02/20/1996)
58 LETTER from Joseph V. Brady to Margaret Farrell, copy sent to Judge Harris, fiat 3/11/96 (lpp) (Entered: 03/19/1996)
Text not available. (Entered: 03/08/1996)
57 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's Registry, from the escrow account the sum of $912.34 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., and the sum of $500.00 to Robin E. Cooper, each for services rendered. (N) (emh) (Entered: 03/15/1996)
59 LETTER from Karen Clay, Court Monitor, to Judge Harris, dated 3/5/96, Re: Continued Payment Issues, Exhibit (2) (lpp) (Entered: 03/19/1996)
60 STATUS REPORT by special master: Activities and Expenses for February 1996, attachments, fiat (lpp) (Entered: 03/19/1996)
61 STATUS REPORT by special master Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for March, 1996; (fiat) Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 04/16/1996)
62 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk to disburse from the Court's Registry, the sum of $1,926.00 to Margaret Farrell, Esq., Special Master, for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 04/16/1996)
63 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's Registry, from the escrow acount in C.A. 76−293: $1,622.00 to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, MD 20815, for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) Modified on 05/20/1996 (Entered: 05/20/1996)
64 NOTICE OF FILING by special master Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for April 1996, fiat (lpp) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
65 LETTER to Anthony Williams dated 5/10/96 from Richard C. Birkel, PH.D, Kennedy Institute in re: payments to be made; (fiat) Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 05/20/1996)
66 LETTER to Mr. Williams dated 5/16/96 from Richard C. Birkel in re: no payments received yet;(fiat) (emh) (Entered: 05/23/1996)
67 NOTICE OF FILING by special master Margaret G. Farrell of Activities and Expenses for May, 1996;(fiat)Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
68 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk to disburse from the Court's Registry, the amount of $1,574.54 to Margaret G. Farrell for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
69 LETTER dated 5/30/96 to Mr. Williams in re: payment of money;(fiat) Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
71 OBJECTIONS by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to the special master's supplemental report of June, 1996 (st) (Entered: 07/17/1996)
70 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by intervenor−plaintiff USA to to file notice [67−1] by Margaret G. Farrell, attachments (7) (lpp) (Entered: 07/15/1996)

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07/17/1996 07/17/1996 08/02/1996 08/02/1996 08/20/1996 08/21/1996 09/30/1996 10/01/1996
10/08/1996 10/23/1996 10/23/1996 10/25/1996 10/29/1996 10/31/1996 10/31/1996 11/05/1996
11/08/1996 11/12/1996 11/12/1996

72 NOTICE by special master Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for June 1996; (fiat) Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 07/18/1996)
73 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk to disburse from the Court's Registry to Margaret Farrell the sum of $1,212.73, for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 07/18/1996)
74 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : adopting proposed findings of fact of special master. (N) (emh) (Entered: 08/07/1996)
75 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing that the REMEDIAL PLAN be filed in this case and setting forth the terms and conditions of said plan. (N) (N) (emh) (Entered: 08/07/1996)
76 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk to disburse from the Court's registry the amount of $1,056.29 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 08/20/1996)
77 NOTICE by special master Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for July, 1996;(fiat)Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 08/23/1996)
78 RESPONSE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to order in re submission to the Court. [75−1] (st) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
79 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC submitting a list of each case manager employed by or under contract with MRDDA and list of clients assigned to each case manager as part of the Remedial Plan entered by the Court 8/2/96 (st) (Entered: 10/02/1996)
80 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : Directing disbursal of $1,732.00 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., Special Master by the Clerk of the Court from the escrow account in this case. (N) (mon) (Entered: 10/08/1996)
81 NOTICE OF FILING by special master Margaret G. Farrell of Activities and Expenses for September 1996; (fiat)Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 10/24/1996)
82 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account the sum of $802.00 to Margaret G. Farrell for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 10/24/1996)
83 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in accordance with the Remedial plan entered by the Court 8/2/96 (st) (Entered: 10/28/1996)
84 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of a attachment inadvertently ommitted from Exhibit "B" , Affidavit of Deloras Shepherd, in their Submission to the Court; Attachment (1). (ks) (Entered: 10/30/1996)
85 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of their submission to the Court of Exhibits "A" and "B"; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1996)
86 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, defendants to extend time to 11/15/96 to submit their proposed order for the purposes of attempting to resolve the outstanding issues and concerns. (ks) (Entered: 11/01/1996)
87 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting joint motion to extend time to 11/15/96 to submit their proposed order for the purposes of attempting to resolve the outstanding issues and concerns. [86−1] by defendants, plaintiff (N) (emh) (Entered: 11/06/1996)
98 REPORT by defendant DC (st) (Entered: 01/10/1997)
88 NOTICE by special master Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for October, 1996;(fiat) Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 11/13/1996)
89 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry the sum of $2,519.42 to Margaret G. Farrell, special master, for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 11/13/1996)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 19 of 127

11/19/1996 11/25/1996 11/26/1996
12/19/1996 12/20/1996
12/23/1996 01/06/1997 01/06/1997 01/23/1997 01/23/1997 02/04/1997 02/28/1997 03/24/1997
03/24/1997 03/25/1997 03/31/1997 04/01/1997 04/01/1997 04/02/1997 04/14/1997

90 MOTION filed by plaintiff, intervenor−plaintiff, defendant, movant, special master to extend time to 12/13/96 to submit to the Court, the proposed order for the purposes of attempting to resolve the outstanding issues and concerns (st) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
91 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (st) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
92 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 12/13/96 to submit to the Court, the proposed order for the purposes of attempting to resolve the outstanding issues and concerns [90−1] by special master, movant, defendant, intervenor−plaint, plaintiff (N) (emh) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
93 JOINT MOTION (THIRD) by plaintiff, intervenor−plaintiff, defendant, movant, to extend time to 1/13/97 to submit to the Court a " proposed order for the timely, predictable and full payment of Evans care providers" (st) (Entered: 12/20/1996)
94 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting joint motion to extend time to 1/13/97 to submit to the Court a " proposed order for the timely, predictable and full payment of Evans care providers" [93−1] by special master, movant, defendant, intervenor−plaint, plaintiff (N) (fle) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
95 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (st) (Entered: 12/24/1996)
96 NOTICE OF FILING by special master Margaret G. Farrell of Activities and Expenses for November, 1996; (fiat)(n)Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 01/08/1997)
97 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk to disburse from the Court's registry the sum of $2,955 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 01/08/1997)
99 NOTICE OF FILING by special master Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for December, 1996;(fiat)Harris,J. (emh) (Entered: 01/28/1997)
100 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk to disburse from the Court's registry, the amount of $1,565.95 to Margaret G. Farrell for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (emh) (Entered: 01/28/1997)
101 SUBMISSION by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to the Court (st) (Entered: 02/05/1997)
102 STATUS REPORT (SUBMISSIONS) by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by Court 8/2/96 (st) (Entered: 03/03/1997)
103 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : Clerk of Court shall disburse from Court's registry, from escrow account in Civil Aciton No. 76−293: $1,492.28 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. for services rendered and expenses incurred (N) (dbw) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
104 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for January and February 1997. "Let this be filed" (fiat) Harris, J. (st) (Entered: 03/25/1997)
105 SUBMISSION by defendant DC in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by the Court 8/2/96 (st) (Entered: 03/26/1997)
106 MOTION filed by defendant DC to extend time to 4/15/97 to submit the six month needs assessment (st) (Entered: 04/01/1997)
107 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC by Barbara J. Mann (st) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
108 SUBMISSIONS by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC pursuant to the Remedial Plan of 8/2/96 (st) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
109 MOTION filed by plaintiff for sanctions (st) (Entered: 04/03/1997)
110 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 4/28/97 or 10 additional working days to respond to the motion of plaintiffs for

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 20 of 127

04/14/1997 04/17/1997 04/18/1997
04/21/1997
04/22/1997
04/28/1997 05/05/1997 05/05/1997 05/09/1997 05/19/1997 05/23/1997
05/23/1997 05/23/1997
05/23/1997 06/24/1997 06/24/1997
06/24/1997

sanctions (JMF) (Entered: 04/15/1997)
111 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (JMF) (Entered: 04/15/1997)
112 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : referring plaintiffs' motion for sanctions to Special Master, Margaret G. Farrell (N) (dbw) (Entered: 04/17/1997)
113 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting, nunc pro tunc, motion to extend time to 4/15/97 to submit the six month needs assessment [106−1] by DC; District of Columbia shall file the needs assessment required by the Remedial Plan by 4/15/97 (N) (dbw) (Entered: 04/18/1997)
114 MEMORANDUM by intervenor−plaintiff USA in support of the plaintiffs' motion for automatic fines based on defendants' chronic and contiuning failure to pay Evans providers with the thirty days as mandated by the order of this Court; exhibits (1) (JMF) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
115 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 4/28/97 or 10 additional working days to respond to the motion of plaintiffs for sanctions [110−1] by DC, MARION BARRY; response to plaintiffs' motion for sanctions due by 4/28/97 (N) (dbw) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
116 MOTION filed by defendant DC to extend time to 5/6/97 to respond to the motion of plaintiffs for sanctions (JMF) (Entered: 04/29/1997)
117 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 5/6/97 to respond to the motion of for sanctions [116−1] by DC; response to motion due by 5/6/97 (N) (dbw) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
119 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, movant WE CARE PROJECTS,INC of submission to the Court pursuant to Remedial Plan entered on August 02, 1996 defendants submit exhibits "A" and "B". (JMF) (Entered: 05/12/1997)
118 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to modification of the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan requiring payment to all vendors within 30 days ; exhibits (3) (JMF) (Entered: 05/12/1997)
120 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of submission to the court in accordance with the remedial plan entered by the court on August 02, 1996; exhibits (2) (JMF) (Entered: 05/20/1997)
121 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, $834.00 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
122 ACTIVITIES & EXPENSES of Special Master for April, 1997 (fiat) ("Let this be filed") (N) (jeb) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
123 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the sum of $718.00 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esquire for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
124 ACTIVITIES & EXPENSES of Special Master for March, 1997. (fiat) Harris, J. (jeb) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
125 REPLY by intervenor−plaintiff USA to defendants' opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for automatic fines [114−1] by USA; exhibits (1) . (JMF) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
126 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA in opposition to motion to modification of the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan requiring payment to all vendors within 30 days [118−1] by DC, MARION BARRY .; exhibits (2) (JMF) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
127 RESPONSE by defendant to Court's Order dated August 02, 1996 [75−1] (JMF) (Entered: 06/25/1997)

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06/24/1997 06/24/1997 07/16/1997 07/23/1997
07/23/1997 08/11/1997 08/11/1997 08/11/1997 08/11/1997
08/11/1997 08/11/1997
08/28/1997 09/03/1997 09/26/1997 09/30/1997 09/30/1997
10/20/1997 10/20/1997 10/30/1997 10/30/1997

128 REPLY by plaintiff to defendants' opposition to motion for sanctions [109−1] (JMF) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
129 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' in opposition to motion to modification of the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial requiring payment to all vendors within 30 days [118−1] by DC, MARION BARRY . (JMF) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
130 RESPONSE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to Court's order dated August 02, 1996 [75−1]; attachments (1) (JMF) (Entered: 07/16/1997)
131 REPLY by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to plaintiffs' and plaintiff−intervenor's oppositions to motion to modification of the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan requiring payment to all vendors within 30 days [118−1]; attachments (1) (JMF) (Entered: 07/24/1997)
132 SURREPLY by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to plaintiffs' and plaintiff−intervenor's replies to defendants' opposition to motion for sanctions [109−1] by plaintiffs' (JMF) (Entered: 07/24/1997)
133 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding Activities and Expenses for May 1997, (fiat) Harris, J. (jeb) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
134 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry from the escrow account in CA 76−293 the sum mof $1325.00 for services rendered and expenses incurred in May, 1997. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
135 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding the activities and expenses for June, 1997, (fiat) Harris, J. (jeb) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
136 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293 the amount of $414.00 for services rendered and expenses incurred for June, 1997. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
137 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding the activities and expenses for July, 1997, (fiat) Harris, J. (N) . (jeb) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
138 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293 the sum of $849.00 for services rendered and expenses incurred in July, 1997 by Special Master Farrell. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
139 MEMORANDUM by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, submission to the Court. (lkn) (Entered: 08/29/1997)
140 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (JMF) (Entered: 09/04/1997)
141 MEMORANDUM by intervenor−plaintiff USA of submission to the court (JMF) (Entered: 09/29/1997)
142 ACTIVITIES AND EXPENSES REPORT FOR AUGUST 1997 by special master Margaret G. Farrell. "Let this be filed" Harris, J. (fiat) (mlp) (Entered: 10/01/1997)
143 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Cort's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 $2,436.75 to Margaret G. Farrel, Esquire, 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland 20815, for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 10/01/1997)
144 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC (JMF) (Entered: 10/21/1997)
145 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (JMF) (Entered: 10/21/1997)
146 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER of activities and expenses for September 1997: filed by Margaret G. Farrell. "Let this be filed, 10/30/97" Harris, J. (fiat) (mlp) (Entered: 10/30/1997)
147 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, $2,264.75 to

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 22 of 127

11/05/1997 11/17/1997 11/21/1997
11/25/1997 11/25/1997 12/22/1997 12/22/1997
12/23/1997
01/22/1998 01/22/1998 01/23/1998 01/26/1998
02/02/1998 02/03/1998 02/09/1998 02/09/1998

Margaret G. Farrell, Esquire for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 10/30/1997)
148 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC pursuant to Court order August 02, 1996 (JMF) (Entered: 11/06/1997)
149 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell for activities and expenses for October 1997, "let this be filed. (N) Harris, J. (N) (jeb) Modified on 11/19/1997 (Entered: 11/19/1997)
150 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of Court to disburse from the Court's registry from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, $3,019.00 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esquire, 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, MD for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 11/24/1997)
151 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA to the special master's proposed findings and recommendations, dated October 21, 1997, regarding plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and defendants' motion to modify existing Court Orders. (lkn) (Entered: 11/26/1997)
152 OBJECTIONS by defendant DC to special master's proposed findings and recommendations regarding plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and defendants' motin to modify Court Orders (lkn) (Entered: 11/26/1997)
153 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: (Activities and expenses for 11/97) filed by Margaret G. Farrell . "Let this be filed, 12/22/97" Harris, J. (fiat) (mlp) (Entered: 12/22/1997)
154 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in C.A. 76−293, $865.85 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/22/1997)
155 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: rejecting for filing defendants' submission of 11/25/97 setting forth objections to the Special Master's proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law; rejecting for filing plaintiff−intervenor's response to the Special Master's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, submitted on 11/25/97. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/23/1997)
156 REQUEST filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for the interim payments of costs "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 01/26/1998)
157 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: "Activities and Expenses for December, 1997" filed by Margaret G. Farrell. "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 01/26/1998)
158 EXHIBITS of defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (lkn) (Entered: 01/27/1998)
159 RECOMMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT and Conclusions of Law by Special Master regarding plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and defendants' motion for sanctions and defendants' motion for modification of the 1983 Consent Order and the 1996 Remedial Plan requiring payment to all vendors within 30 days. "Let this be filed, 1/26/98" Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 01/28/1998)
160 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, of Exhibits A and B;Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 02/03/1998)
161 MEMORANDUM by defendant DC of submission to the court pursuant to remedial plan entered August 02, 1996 (JMF) (Entered: 02/04/1998)
162 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 2/20/98 to submit objections to the special master's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law (lkn) (Entered: 02/10/1998)
163 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC from the Special Master's Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (lkn) Modified on 02/17/1998 (Entered: 02/10/1998)

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02/17/1998 02/20/1998 02/20/1998 02/20/1998 02/20/1998 03/05/1998
03/06/1998 03/06/1998 03/12/1998 03/12/1998 03/12/1998 03/12/1998
03/12/1998
03/12/1998
03/23/1998

164 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to extend time to 2/20/98 to submit objections to the special master's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law [162−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (N) (mlp) (Entered: 02/17/1998)
165 DEMAND for jury trial by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (lkn) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
166 RESPONSE and OBJECTIONS by plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN, plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY JR. to findings of fact [159−1] (lkn) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
167 MEMORANDUM by intervenor−plaintiff USA in support of the Special Master's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law; Attachments (2). (lkn) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
168 OBJECTIONS by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to the Special Master's recommended findings regarding monetary sanctions and defendants' motion to modify court Orders to provide for 45−day payments; Attachments (5). (lkn) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
169 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion for the interim payments of costs [156−1] by Margaret G. Farrell, within 28 days of the date of this Order, defendants shall deposit the sum of $50,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court as an interim payment of costs and fees; of course, should the proceeding be resolved and terminated, any unused monies would promptly be refunded to defendants (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/05/1998)
170 MEMORANDUM by intervenor−plaintiff USA in opposition to defendants' jury demand (lkn) (Entered: 03/09/1998)
171 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to defendants' jury demand (lkn) (Entered: 03/09/1998)
172 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of exhibits "A" and "B"; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 03/12/1998)
173 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: "Activities and Expenses for January, 1998" filed by Margaret G. Farrell. "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/16/1998)
174 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: "Activities and Expenses for February, 1998" filed by Margaret G. Farrell. "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/16/1998)
175 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293, $3,816.00 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, MD 20815 for services rendered and expenses incurred during the month of December, 1997. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/16/1998)
176 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293, $2,915.15 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, MD 20815, for services rendered and expenses incurred during the month of January, 1998. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/16/1998)
177 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293, $2,672.80 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, MD 20815, for services rendered and expenses incurred during the month of February, 1998. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/16/1998)
178 REPLY by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to plaintiffs' opposition to jury demand [165−1] by DC, MARION BARRY; Exhibit (1). (lkn) (Entered: 03/24/1998)

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03/26/1998 04/03/1998 04/15/1998 04/20/1998 04/20/1998
05/13/1998 06/18/1998
06/18/1998 06/18/1998
06/23/1998 06/30/1998 06/30/1998
07/15/1998 07/15/1998
07/17/1998
07/22/1998

179 EXHIBITS of defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (lkn) (Entered: 03/27/1998)
180 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC of submission to the Court of its quarterly report; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 04/06/1998)
181 RESPONSE by defendant to Court's order dated August 02, 1996 [75−1], order [74−1]; affidavits (1) (JMF) (Entered: 04/16/1998)
182 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell for activities and expenses for March, 1998, (fiat) Harris, J. (jeb) (Entered: 04/21/1998)
183 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry from the escrow account in this action $3,555.00 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esquire for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 04/21/1998)
184 EXHIBITS of defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 05/14/1998)
185 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: based on plaintiffs' and plaintiff−intervenor's motion for sanctions, defendants' motion for modification of the 1983 Remedial Order, the Special Master's Report and Recommendation regarding the preceding motions and related pleadings and defendants' demand for a jury trial and responsive pleadings are set for oral argument on 1:30 7/22/98 in Courtroom 14 (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/19/1998)
186 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell for activities and expenses for the month of May, 1998. "Let this be filed." (fiat) Harris, J. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/19/1998)
187 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, $778.65 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, MD 20815 for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/19/1998)
188 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC pursuant to the Judge's 8/2/96 request that defendants submit exhibits "A" and "B" ; affidavits (2) (copy) ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 06/24/1998)
189 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: of activities and expenses for April, 1998, filed by Margaret G. Farrell. "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/30/1998)
190 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in C.A. 76−293, $2,340.50 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/30/1998)
191 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for June, 1998; attachments. "Let this be filed" Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 07/16/1998)
192 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the court's registry, from the escrow account in this case, $5,550.02 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, Md 20815 for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 07/16/1998)
193 WITHDRAWN IN OPEN COURT BY SPECIAL MASTER ON 7/22/98 −−− NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell, seeking the Court's permission to resign her appointment effective 8/31/98. "Let this be filed." Harris, J. (Fiat) (N) (mlp) Modified on 07/23/1998 (Entered: 07/21/1998)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Stanley S. Harris: Special Master's notice of withdrawal is withdrawn, motion for modification of the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan requiring payment to all vendors within 30 days [118−1] by D.C. and MARION S. BARRY, and motion for sanctions [109−1] by plaintiffs, argued and taken under advisement; defendants to respond to the Special Master's 1/26/98 Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law within 10 days;

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07/29/1998
08/03/1998 08/10/1998 08/12/1998 09/10/1998 09/11/1998 09/11/1998 09/11/1998 09/15/1998 09/23/1998
09/23/1998
09/25/1998 10/01/1998
10/06/1998 10/09/1998
10/27/1998 10/27/1998 10/27/1998
11/25/1998 12/01/1998

Intervenor−Plaintiff USA to respond within 10 days thereafter. Reporter: Vernell Marshall (mlp) Modified on 07/28/1998 (Entered: 07/23/1998)
194 NOTICE OF FILING by special master Margaret G. Farrell requesting permission to retract notice of withdrawal of appointment as special master. "Let the be filed" Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 07/29/1998)
195 OBJECTIONS (SUPPLEMENTAL) by defendant DC to the recommended fines by the special master (st) (Entered: 08/04/1998)
196 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting request of Special Master to retract her notice of withdrawal which was filed 7/17/98. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 08/11/1998)
197 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA to supplemental objection [195−1] by DC (st) (Entered: 08/13/1998)
198 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of Exhibits "A" and "B"; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 09/11/1998)
199 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC pursuant to remedial Plan entered August 02, 1996. (JMF) (Entered: 09/15/1998)
200 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC pursuant to the remedial plan enter August 02, 1996 (JMF) (Entered: 09/15/1998)
201 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC (JMF) (Entered: 09/15/1998)
202 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (lkn) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
203 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell for activities and expenses for July and August, 1998. "Let this be filed, 9/23/98" Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 09/23/1998)
204 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in C.A. 76−293 $2,120.96 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 09/23/1998)
205 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for intervenor−plaintiff USA by Richard James Farano (JMF) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
206 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in accordance with the remedial plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 10/02/1998)
207 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell, activities and expenses for September, 1998; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 10/07/1998)
208 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Cort to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, $5,614.48 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., 4719 Cumberland Avenue, Chevy Chase, MD 20815, for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 10/09/1998)
209 NOTICE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of submission to the Court the Needs Analysis for September, 1998. (lkn) (Entered: 10/28/1998)
210 NOTICE by defendant DC of submission to the Court, the quarterly report on the ratio of case managers to clients; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 10/28/1998)
211 NOTICE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of submission to the court, in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered on August 2, 1996; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 10/28/1998)
212 REPORT by special master Margaret G. Farrell (Activites and expenses for October 1998) (lkn) (Entered: 11/27/1998)
213 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in this case, the sum of $887.45 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esquire for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 26 of 127

12/28/1998 01/19/1999 01/21/1999 01/21/1999 02/02/1999
02/09/1999 02/10/1999 02/10/1999
02/12/1999 02/18/1999 02/19/1999 02/22/1999 02/24/1999 03/09/1999 03/09/1999 03/09/1999

(Entered: 12/01/1998)
214 REPORT of Special Master. (lkn) (Entered: 12/29/1998)
215 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in C.A. 76−293, $1,806.50 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 01/19/1999)
216 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC of quarterly report on the ratio of case managers to clients;Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 01/22/1999)
217 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of remedial plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 01/22/1999)
218 MOTION filed by plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN, plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY JR. for order holding dfts. in contempt , and for order providing for the calculation and paymnent of overdue civil contempt fines , and for order enforcing the permanent injunction , and for order supplementing the special Master's order of reference (bjsp) (Entered: 02/03/1999)
219 MEMORANDUM (REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER) by special master Margaret G. Farrel RE: activities for 1/99 l (bjsp) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
220 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Stanley S. Harris (N) (jeb) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
221 JUDGMENT by Judge Stanley S. Harris : denying motion to modification of the 1983 Consent Order and the Remedial Plan requiring payment to all vendors within 30 days [118−1] by DC, MARION BARRY; , granting motion for sanctions [109−1] by plaintiff; directing the defendants to pay $5,096,340 in civil sanctions for their failure to comply with the purgation conditions relating to timely payment of Evans care providers established by the 8/2/96, Remedial Plan issued by this Court, directing the defendants pay the fines to the Clerk of the Court to be placed in segregated account; modifying I.C, ID and IV of the Remedial Plan. (N) (jeb) Modified on 02/10/1999 (Entered: 02/10/1999)
222 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC submission to the court in accordance with the remedial plan entered by the court on August 2, 1996. (tw) (Entered: 02/16/1999)
223 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan for Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry funds for Special Master. (N) (jeb) Modified on 02/18/1999 (Entered: 02/18/1999)
224 MOTION filed by plaintiff for Kelly Bagby to appear pro hac vice ( University Legal Services 300 I. Street, NE, Suite 202, Washington, DC 20002, (202) 547−0198) (jf) (Entered: 02/22/1999)
225 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan for Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion for Kelly Bagby to appear pro hac vice ( University Legal Services 300 I. Street, NE, Suite 202, Washington, DC 20002, (202) 547−0198) [224−1] by plaintiff (N) (mlp) (Entered: 02/23/1999)
226 MOTION filed by plaintiff for order holding defendants in contempt, providing for the calculation and payment of civil contempt fines, enforcing the permanent injunction and supplementing the special master's order of reference (lkn) (Entered: 02/25/1999)
227 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 4/9/99 to respond to plaintiff's motion for an order holding defendants in contempt (jf) (Entered: 03/10/1999)
228 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in accordance with remedial plan entered by the Court dated 08/02/96. (jf) (Entered: 03/10/1999)
229 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in accordance with remedial plan entered by the Court on 08/02/96. (jf) (Entered: 03/10/1999)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 27 of 127

03/11/1999
03/25/1999 03/30/1999 03/30/1999 03/30/1999 04/07/1999 04/08/1999 04/09/1999 04/12/1999
04/12/1999 04/20/1999
04/20/1999 04/20/1999 04/21/1999
05/05/1999 05/18/1999 05/19/1999 05/27/1999

230 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 4/9/99 to respond to plaintiff's motion for an order holding defendants in contempt [227−1] by DC, MARION BARRY; response to motion due by 4/9/99. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
231 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT in accordance with the Remedial Plan of August 2, 1996, by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC; Exhibits (2). (lkn) (Entered: 03/26/1999)
232 LETTER to Judge Harris, dated 3/29/99, from Kelly Bagby, attorney for pltfs., stating that a motion for temporary restraining order will not be filed 3/29/99, as previously stated. "Let this be filed" Harris, J. (fiat) (N) (mlp) (Entered: 03/30/1999)
233 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC of the Needs Analysis for March, 1999; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
234 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC of quarterly report on the ratio of case managers to clients pursuant to the Remedial Plan entered August 2, 1996; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
235 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC from order [221−1] , entered on: 02/10/99; fee not paid, appeal by government. Copies mailed to counsel. (lkn) (Entered: 04/08/1999)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [235−1] by DC, MARION BARRY to U.S. Court of Appeals (lkn) (Entered: 04/08/1999)
236 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 4/16/99 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for an order holding defendants in contempt (jf) (Entered: 04/12/1999)
237 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion, nunc pro tunc, to extend time to 4/16/99 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for an order holding defendants in contempt [236−1] by DC, MARION BARRY; response to motion due by 4/16/99 ; (N) (lkn) (Entered: 04/12/1999)
USCA # 99−7058 assigned for appeal [235−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (jf) (Entered: 04/13/1999)
238 MEMORANDUM by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in opposition to motion for order holding defendants in contempt, providing for the calculation and payment of civil contempt fines, enforcing the permanent injunction and supplementing the special master's order of reference [226−1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (2) (tb) (Entered: 04/21/1999)
239 DEMAND for jury trial by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (tb) (Entered: 04/21/1999)
240 STATUS REPORT RE: activities and expenses for February and March 1999 by special master Margaret G. Farrell (tb) (Entered: 04/21/1999)
241 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in this case, $1,778.95 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq., for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 04/21/1999)
242 ERRATA RE: correction to a typographical error in memorandum in oppostion to plaintiff's motion for an order holding defendant's in contempt by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (tb) (Entered: 05/06/1999)
243 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: actitivites and expenses for April 1999 filed by Margaret G. Farrell. (tb) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
244 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Registry of the Court from the escrow account the sum of $1,109.70 to the Special Master for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
245 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN, plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY JR. by Kelly Bagby (lkn) (Entered: 05/28/1999)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 28 of 127

06/10/1999 06/14/1999 06/16/1999
06/28/1999 06/28/1999 06/30/1999
07/06/1999
07/19/1999 07/19/1999 07/20/1999
07/22/1999 07/22/1999 07/27/1999 07/28/1999 07/29/1999 07/30/1999 08/05/1999

246 STATEMENT filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell , regarding: activities and expenses for May 1999. (jf) (Entered: 06/11/1999)
247 STATUS REPORT by intervenor−plaintiff USA pursuant to remedial plan entered on 08/02/96 and as modified order of 02/10/99 (jf) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
248 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in this case: $2,314.35 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. for services rendered and expenses incurred. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
250 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expenses for expert (lkn) (Entered: 06/30/1999)
251 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Margaret G. Farrell . New address: Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, PLLC, 1100 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC, 20005−3934, (202)408−4600. (lkn) (Entered: 06/30/1999)
249 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting request of the Special Master for payment of expenses for an expert, Clarence Sundram, to disucss approaches to the development of an exit plan and other issues; directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account, $7,150.35 to Clarence Sundram, 28 Tierney Drive, Delmar, N.Y. 12054 for expert expenses ; within 28 days of the date of this Order, defts. shall deposit the sum of $50,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court as an interim payment of costs and fees; any unused monies remaining at the resolution and termination of this proceeding will be promptly refunded to defts. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 06/30/1999)
252 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Joseph B. Tulman representing plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN, plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY JR.. New address: University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law, Building 38, Room 207,4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20008. (lkn) (Entered: 07/07/1999)
253 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC of quarterly report on the ratio of case managers to clients pursuant to the Remedial Plan entered August 2, 1996. (lkn) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
255 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: regarding activities and expenses for June, 1999, filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (lkn) (Entered: 07/22/1999)
254 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in C.A. 76−293, $3,477.97 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. for services rendered and expenses incurred, and $6,649.90 to Clarence Sundram for expert expenses. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
261 SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL for defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC , substituting Barbara A. Miller for Thomas J. Foltz. (lkn) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
262 MOTION (EMERGENCY) filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC for protective order ; Exhibits (9). (lkn) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
256 ERRATA and clarification of defendant's motion for an emergency protective order filed July 22, 1999, by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (lkn) (Entered: 07/28/1999)
257 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA in opposition to defendants' emergency motion for a protective orderi; Exhibits (12). (lkn) (Entered: 07/29/1999)
258 RESPONSE by plaintiff in opposition to defendants' emergency motion for protective order. (lkn) (Entered: 07/30/1999)
259 REPLY by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to defendant's U.S. opposition to emergency motion for a protective order. (jf) (Entered: 08/01/1999)
260 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting defts.' emergency motion for protective order ; setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal; exhibit (1). (N) (mlp) (Entered:

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 29 of 127

08/06/1999 08/09/1999 08/10/1999 08/13/1999 08/16/1999
08/19/1999 08/19/1999 08/19/1999 08/20/1999
08/23/1999 08/25/1999 08/27/1999 08/31/1999 08/31/1999 09/01/1999 09/02/1999

08/05/1999)
264 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expenses for expert ; attachments (1) (jf) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
263 EXHIBITS "A" and "B" submitted in accordance with the remedial plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996, of defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC (lkn) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
267 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 07/22/98. Reporter: Vernell A. Marshall (lkn) (Entered: 08/16/1999)
266 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC in accordance of remedial plan dated 08/02/96 (jf) (Entered: 08/16/1999)
265 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: within 14 days, defts. shall deposit $50,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court as an interim payment of costs and fees; if defts. do not do so, the Court will issue another Order at that time directing defts. to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the Court's 6/30/99 Order. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 08/16/1999)
268 MOTION filed by plaintiff to clarify, reconsider, modify and/or amend protective Order dated August 5, 1999 (lkn) (Entered: 08/20/1999)
269 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion to clarify, reconsider, modify and/or amend protective Order dated August 5, 1999 [268−1] by plaintiffs (lkn) (Entered: 08/20/1999)
270 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: regarding activities and expenses for July 1999 filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (lkn) (Entered: 08/20/1999)
271 WRIT IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing H. Edward Ricks, the Director of the Family Division of the Superior Court of D.C. to forthwith initiate providing pltfs.' class counsel and co−counsel access to the files maintained in the Family Division regarding Evans class members who are committed pursuant to D.C. 2−137; any information obtained from these records shall be held confidential pursuant to the Court's 8/5/99 Protective Order; service of this writ is to be made promptly by the U.S. Marshals Service upon Mr. Ricks, with copies to be served by mail upon the parties to this case and upon the Honorable Eugene N. Hamilton, Chief Judge of the Superior Court, and the Honorable Zinora Mitchell−Rankin, Presiding Judge of the Family Division; attachment. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 08/20/1999)
272 REQUEST by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for October 1998 through April 1999 ; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 08/24/1999)
273 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of summons and complaint executed on 8/20/99 upon defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS (lkn) (Entered: 08/26/1999)
274 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC to extend time to 10/30/99 to pay the Clerk of the Court for the Special Master's fees (lkn) Modified on 09/14/1999 (Entered: 08/30/1999)
275 MOTION (UNOPPOSED)filed by intervenor−plaintiff USA to disclose its consultants' report to a federal agency (lkn) (Entered: 09/01/1999)
276 SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL for defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC , substituting Barbara A. Miller for Thomas J. Foltz (lkn) (Entered: 09/01/1999)
278 MEMORANDUM by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS in opposition to motion to clarify, reconsider, modify and/or amend protective Order dated August 5, 1999 [268−1] by plaintiffs (lkn) (Entered: 09/02/1999)
277 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to disclose its consultants' report to a federal agency [275−1] by USA; USA may share a copy of its consultants' report with OIG and shall obtain OIG's signature on the "Acknowledgment of Terms of Protective Order" form attached to the Court's 8/5/99 Protective Order. (N) (xx) (Entered: 09/02/1999)

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09/13/1999 09/21/1999
09/22/1999 09/28/1999 09/30/1999 10/01/1999
10/07/1999 10/15/1999 10/15/1999 10/29/1999 11/01/1999
11/01/1999 11/04/1999
11/05/1999 11/17/1999 11/29/1999 11/29/1999 11/29/1999 11/29/1999

279 RESPONSE by plaintiff in opposition to motion to extend time to 10/30/99 to pay the Clerk of the Court for the Special Master's fees [274−1] by DC, MARION BARRY . (lkn) (Entered: 09/14/1999)
280 REPLY by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to plaintiffs' opposition to motion to extend time to 10/30/99 to pay the Clerk of the Court for the Special Master's fees [274−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (lkn) (Entered: 09/22/1999)
281 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (tb) (Entered: 09/23/1999)
282 EXHIBITS of defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, submitted in accordance with the remedial plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 09/30/1999)
283 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC; quarterly report on ratio of case managers to clients pursuant to the Remedial Plan entered august 2, 1996. (lkn) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
284 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing Clerk of the Court to file attached 24 Reports, Addenda, and other correspondences from the Court Monitor relating to the Reports from the period 1/1/95 to 8/30/99 ; attachments (24). (N) (mlp) (Entered: 10/04/1999)
285 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 10/30/99 to pay the Clerk of the Court for the Special Master's fees [274−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (N) (jeb) (Entered: 10/07/1999)
286 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS (jf) (Entered: 10/18/1999)
287 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS pursuant to order of 08/02/96 (jf) (Entered: 10/18/1999)
DEPOSIT into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $260,000.00 pursuant to Court's order dated 08/16/99. (jf) (Entered: 10/31/1999)
288 NOTICE by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of deposit of $260,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court on October 29, 1999, pursuant to Court's Orders of August 16, 1999, and October 7, 1999; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
289 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: Activities and expenses for September, 1999, filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (lkn) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
290 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293 $7,169.47 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq. as compensation and $9,806.00 to Clarence Sundram for expert expenses. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 11/04/1999)
291 ERRATA by defendants to submission to the Court (jf) (Entered: 11/09/1999)
292 MOTION filed by plaintiff to disclose the Department of Justice's counsultant's report to University Legal Services' counsel ; Attachments. (lkn) (Entered: 11/18/1999)
293 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; (Activities and expenses for October, 1999) . (lkn) (Entered: 11/30/1999)
294 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for October, 1999 (lkn) (Entered: 11/30/1999)
295 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for M. Angela Baker, September through October, 1999 (lkn) (Entered: 11/30/1999)
296 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses of Joyce Stanley Batipps for September through October 1999 (lkn) (Entered: 11/30/1999)

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11/30/1999 11/30/1999 12/01/1999 12/06/1999
12/06/1999
12/14/1999
12/14/1999 12/16/1999 12/17/1999 12/17/1999 12/17/1999 12/17/1999 12/17/1999 12/20/1999 12/21/1999

297 STATUS REPORT by special master Margaret G. Farrell (lkn) (Entered: 12/01/1999)
298 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell to extend time to 12/22/99 to file recommendations regarding an exit plan (lkn) (Entered: 12/01/1999)
299 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 12/22/99 to file recommendations regarding an exit plan [298−1] by Margaret G. Farrell (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/01/1999)
300 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to disclose the Department of Justice's counsultant's report to University Legal Services' counsel [292−1] by plaintiffs; University Legal Services may share a copy of the consultants' report with its counsel Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman, LLP ("SBSF"), and shall obtain SBSF's signature on "Acknowledgment of Terms of Protective Order" form attached to the Court's 8/5/99 Protective Order. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/07/1999)
301 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion for payment of expert expenses of Joyce Stanley Batipps for September through October 1999 [296−1] by Margaret G. Farrell, granting motion for payment of expert expenses for M. Angela Baker, September through October, 1999 [295−1] by Margaret G. Farrell, granting motion for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for October, 1999 [294−1] by Margaret G. Farrell, granting motion for payment of expenses for expert [264−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account: $3,265.94 to Margaret G. Farrell, Esq.; $9,811.89 to Clarence Sundram; $830.25 to Joyce Stanley Batipps; and $960.00 to M. Angela Baker. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/07/1999)
302 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris :that defendants' consent motion to disclose all Justice Department's consultants' reports and records of class members to D.C.'s Office of the Inspector General and D.C.'s Metropolitan Police Department is granted; that defendants shall obtain OIG's and MPD's signature on the "Acknowledgment of Terms of Protective Order" form attached to the Court's August 5, 1999, Protective order. (N) (lkn) (Entered: 12/14/1999)
303 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to Disclose all Justice Department's Consultants' Reports and other records to D.C.'s Office of the Inspector General and Metropolitan Police Department (tth) (Entered: 12/15/1999)
304 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by intervenor−plaintiff USA for modification of protective order (tth) (Entered: 12/17/1999)
305 MODIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris granting motion for modification of protective order [304−1] by USA ; setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/17/1999)
306 MOTION filed by intervenor−plaintiff USA for order to disclose its consultants' reports to a federal agency (bjsp) (Entered: 12/20/1999)
307 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for an expedited evidentiary hearing on its motion for reconsideration of the Court's protective order ; exhibit (1) (bjsp) Modified on 12/20/1999 (Entered: 12/20/1999)
309 ERRATA by intervenor−plaintiff USA to the Court RE; the filing of an original signature page to be appended to the joint report on emergency action filed 12/17/99 (bjsp) (Entered: 12/21/1999)
310 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs and defendants RE: the filling of joint report on emergency action ; attachment (bjsp) (Entered: 12/21/1999)
308 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to Disclose all Justice Department's Consultants' Reports and other records to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [303−1] by plaintiff−intervenor, USA (N) (lin) Modified on 03/28/2000 (Entered: 12/21/1999)
311 MEMORANDUM (SUBMISSION TO THE COURT) by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS submitting Exhibits A and B. (tth) (Entered: 12/22/1999)

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12/21/1999 12/22/1999 12/23/1999 12/29/1999 12/30/1999 01/04/2000
01/04/2000 01/11/2000 01/18/2000 01/19/2000 01/19/2000 01/19/2000 01/19/2000 01/20/2000 01/20/2000 01/21/2000
01/21/2000 01/21/2000 01/21/2000

318 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits A and B in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996; Exhibits (2) (tth) (Entered: 01/06/2000)
314 REPORT (RECOMMENDATIONS) OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell to the parties regarding plans for the disposition of fines and conclusion on this action; Exhibits (4). (tth) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
312 MOTION filed by intervenor−plaintiff USA to seal a document that reveals names and addresses of class members (mlp) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
313 CONSENT ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: regarding implementation of remedial measures concerning certain individual class members. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
315 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 1/17/00 to file monthly submission with respect to timely payment of providers (tb) (Entered: 01/03/2000)
316 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 1/17/00 to file monthly submission with respect to timely payment of providers [315−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC, MARION BARRY. (N) (mlp) (Entered: 01/04/2000)
317 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC re: the ratio of case managers to clients; Attachment (1). (tth) (Entered: 01/04/2000)
319 STATEMENT filed , regarding: Acknowledgement of Terms of Protective Order. (tth) (Entered: 01/14/2000)
320 MOTION filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 1/21/00 to file its submission to the Court ; EXHIBIT (SUBMISSION) (tth) (Entered: 01/19/2000)
322 STATEMENT (Submission to the Court) filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, regarding: Exhibit A; Affidavit (1); Attachment (1). (tth) Modified on 01/20/2000 (Entered: 01/20/2000)
323 REQUEST by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses of Joyce Stanley Batipps for October 17 through October 29, 1999 ; Attachment (1) (tth) (Entered: 01/20/2000)
324 REQUEST by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for November 1999 ; Attachment (1) (tth) (Entered: 01/20/2000)
325 STATEMENT filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell , regarding: Special Master's activities and expenses for November 1999. (tth) (Entered: 01/20/2000)
321 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 1/21/00 to file its submission to the Court [320−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC, MARION BARRY (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/20/2000)
407 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendants; attachment (1); affidavit (1) (bjsp) (Entered: 10/05/2000)
326 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293 as follows: $5,128.17 to Margarget G. Farrell, $9,549.50 to Clarence Sundram, and $810.00 to Joyce Stanley Batipps (N) (jaw) (Entered: 01/24/2000)
327 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell of activities and expenses for December 1999. (tw) (Entered: 01/27/2000)
328 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses of Kim Y. Jones for December 1999 ; attachments (2) (tw) Modified on 01/27/2000 (Entered: 01/27/2000)
329 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for December 1999 ; attachment (2) (tw) (Entered: 01/27/2000)

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01/26/2000 01/28/2000 02/02/2000 02/08/2000 02/09/2000 02/09/2000 02/10/2000
02/15/2000 02/18/2000 02/22/2000 02/22/2000 02/22/2000 02/22/2000 02/22/2000 02/24/2000 02/29/2000 03/01/2000 03/06/2000 03/14/2000

330 ERRATA by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC submitting Corrected Submission to the Court; Exhibit (1) (tth) (Entered: 01/28/2000)
331 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 2/15/00 to file its monthly submission to the Court (tth) (Entered: 02/01/2000)
332 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 2/15/00 to file its monthly submission to the Court [331−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC, MARION BARRY (N) (jeb) (Entered: 02/02/2000)
333 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, intervenor−plaintiff and defendants to modify the protective order issued August 5, 1999 (tth) (Entered: 02/09/2000)
335 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; re: revised activities and expenses for December 1999. (jf) (Entered: 02/10/2000)
336 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses of Kim Y. Jones for December 1999 (jf) (Entered: 02/10/2000)
334 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for December 1999 [329−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; granting motion for payment of expert expenses of Kim Y. Jones for December 1999 [328−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; granting the request of the Special Master for payment of her expert expenses as Special Master; directing the Clerk of the court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account said amounts. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 02/10/2000)
337 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC pursuant to Court's order dated 08/02/96 (jf) (Entered: 02/17/2000)
338 SECOND MODIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris ; setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 02/18/2000)
339 STATEMENT filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell , regarding: Special Master's Activities and Expenses for January 2000. (tth) (Entered: 02/24/2000)
340 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for January 2000 (tth) (Entered: 02/24/2000)
341 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses of Kim Y. Jones for January 2000 (tth) (Entered: 02/24/2000)
342 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses of Steven Ney for October and November 1999 (tth) (Entered: 02/24/2000)
343 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses of Robert D. Dinerstein for October through November 1999 (tth) (Entered: 02/24/2000)
344 ORDER re disbursment of payments to Special Master by Judge Stanley S. Harris : (N) (lin) (Entered: 02/24/2000)
345 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 3/15/00 to file its submission to the Court (tth) (Entered: 03/01/2000)
346 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of attorney Barbara A. Miller for DC, attorney Barbara A. Miller for MARION BARRY. (tth) (Entered: 03/02/2000)
347 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to 3/15/00 to file its submission to the Court [345−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC, MARION BARRY (N) (lin) (Entered: 03/06/2000)
348 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant DC by Jeffrey Infelise (bjsp) (Entered: 03/15/2000)

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03/14/2000 03/17/2000 03/29/2000
03/29/2000
03/29/2000 03/29/2000 03/29/2000 04/03/2000 04/03/2000 04/04/2000 04/13/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 05/03/2000 05/03/2000 05/08/2000

349 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by intervenor−plaintiff USA, defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS ; exhibits (2) (bjsp) (Entered: 03/15/2000)
350 LETTER of 3/15/00 to Harris, J. from Lydia Williams (lin) (Entered: 03/20/2000)
351 LETTER dated 3/14/00 to Judge Harris from Lydia L. Williams, Evans Court Monitor, re: verification of D.C. Superior Court's submission of attorneys' and volunteer advocates' information; attachment. (fiat) Harris, J. (N) (jeb) Modified on 03/30/2000 (Entered: 03/30/2000)
352 SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER dated 3/28/00 from Lydia L. Williams, Evans Court Monitor, re: verification of D.C. Superior Court's submission of attorneys' and volunteer advocates' information; attachment. (fiat) Harris, J. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 03/30/2000)
353 LETTER dated 10/26/99 to Judge Harris from Robert C. Downs, President of District of Columbia Arc, Inc. re: submission of report; attachment. (fiat) Harris, J. (jeb) (Entered: 03/30/2000)
354 LETTER dated 3/17/00 to Judge Harris from Lydia Williams, Court Monitor, re: submission of report, (fiat) Harris, J. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 03/30/2000)
355 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to modify the schedule for reporting payment to care providers (tth) (Entered: 03/30/2000)
356 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting Special Master's request for extension of time to file her final recommendations; extending time to 4/28/00. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 04/03/2000)
357 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to modify the schedule for reporting payment to care providers [355−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (jeb) (Entered: 04/03/2000)
358 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell to extend time to file recommended plan for conclusion of this action (bjsp) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
359 STATUS REPORT (SUBMISSION TO THE COURT) by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS pursuant to Court's Order of 8/2/96; Exhibits (2). (tth) (Entered: 04/18/2000)
360 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; Attachment (1). (tth) (Entered: 05/01/2000)
361 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for submission of proposed findings of fact regarding defendant's compliance (tth) (Entered: 05/01/2000)
362 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell: re Special Masters Activities and Expenses for February and March 2000; Attachment (1). (tth) Modified on 05/01/2000 (Entered: 05/01/2000)
363 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for March, 2000 ; Attachment (1) (tth) (Entered: 05/01/2000)
364 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for February 2000 ; Attachment (1). (tth) (Entered: 05/01/2000)
365 ERRATA by special master Margaret G. Farrell of page inadvertenly omitted from the Special Master's Report of Activities and Expenses for February and March 2000; attachment (1) (cjp) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
366 ERRATA by special master Margaret G. Farrell of page ommitted from the special master's activities and expenses report for February and March 2000; attachment (1) (cjp) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
367 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for February 2000 [364−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; granting motion for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for March, 2000 [363−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; granting payment to Special Master for fees and costs

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05/08/2000 05/10/2000 05/12/2000 05/23/2000 06/02/2000 06/07/2000 06/15/2000 06/16/2000 06/16/2000 06/20/2000 06/27/2000 06/30/2000 07/06/2000 07/07/2000 07/14/2000 07/19/2000
07/19/2000 07/19/2000

for February and March 2000; directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
368 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996; Exhibits (2) (tth) (Entered: 05/11/2000)
369 MOTION filed to withdraw Laurie J. Weinstein as attorney for USA (jf) (Entered: 05/12/2000)
370 CERTIFIED COPY of judgment filed in USCA dated 3/31/00, on appeal [235−1], appeal [163−1] , reversing the judgment of USDC OPINION USCA # 99−7058 (mmh) (Entered: 05/16/2000)
371 LETTER dated 5/11/00 and STATUS REPORT by Non Party LYDIA WILLIAMS for period of January, 2000 to March 2000, (fiat) Harris, J. (jeb) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
372 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to withdraw Laurie J. Weinstein as attorney for USA [369−1] (N) (jeb) (Entered: 06/02/2000)
373 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion to extend time to file recommended plan for conclusion of this action [358−1] by Margaret G. Farrell recommendations due by 6/23/00 (N) (lin) (Entered: 06/07/2000)
374 STATUS REPORT by defendants in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by the Court on 8/2/96 defendants submit Exhibits "A" and "B"; Exhibits (2) (tth) (Entered: 06/16/2000)
375 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for May, 2000 ; Attachment (1) (tth) Modified on 06/19/2000 (Entered: 06/19/2000)
376 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding activities and expenses for April and May, 2000. (tth) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
377 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : granting motion for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for May, 2000 [375−1] by Margaret G. Farrell and for Special Master Expenses. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 06/20/2000)
378 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : extending time to 7/3/00 for Special Master to file final recommendations (N) (lin) (Entered: 06/27/2000)
379 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell recommending a plan for the conclusion of this actions; Exhibits (13). (tth) (Entered: 07/03/2000)
380 REQUEST by plaintiffs for remedial action ; (Attachments − FILED UNDER SEAL) (tth) (Entered: 07/07/2000)
381 STATUS REPORT by defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC submitting Exhibits A and B in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996; Exhibits (2) (tth) (Entered: 07/10/2000)
382 OBJECTIONS by defendant ANTHONY WILLIAMS, defendant DC to the Special Master Proposed Findings of Fact [379−1]; Attachments. (tth) Modified on 07/18/2000 (Entered: 07/18/2000)
383 COMMENTS AND OBJECTIONS by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to Special Master's Proposed 2000 Plan for Conclusion [381−1] by DC, MARION BARRY (tth) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
384 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 8/8/00 to file a response to plaintiffs' Request for Relief (tth) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
385 STATEMENT filed by intervenor−plaintiff USA, regarding: Comments with regard to the Special Master's Proposed Report and Plan; Attachments (2). (tth) (Entered: 07/20/2000)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 36 of 127

07/19/2000 07/21/2000
07/26/2000 07/31/2000 08/03/2000
08/08/2000 08/08/2000 08/09/2000 08/11/2000 08/17/2000 08/17/2000 08/17/2000 08/18/2000 08/21/2000
08/22/2000
08/31/2000 09/01/2000

386 STATEMENT filed by plaintiffs, regarding: Points of Clarification to Special Master's Report Recommending Plan for the Conclusion of this Action. (tth) Modified on 07/20/2000 (Entered: 07/20/2000)
387 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to extend time to 8/8/00 to file a response to plaintiffs' Request for Relief [384−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC; response to motion(s) due by 8/8/00 ; (N) (kmk) (Entered: 07/21/2000)
388 SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL for defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS , substituting Robert C. Utiger for Martin L. Grossman (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2000)
389 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that the Special Master shall hold hearings on the findings set fourth on June 30, 2000, Report Recommending a Plan for the Conclusion of this Action. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 07/31/2000)
390 LETTER filed by Lydia Williams, Evans Court Monitor, to Judge Harris requesting additional time to analyze and decipher the various pieces of information recently submitted to her office by the defendants; "Let this be filed", HARRIS, J. (tth) (Entered: 08/07/2000)
391 RESPONSE by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to the Special Master's Nursing Home Report and Response to the Pratt Monitoring Report for October, 1999 to December 1999; Attachments. (tth) (Entered: 08/09/2000)
392 MOTION filed by defendant to extend time to 8/18/00 to file a response to plaintiff's request for relief (lin) (Entered: 08/09/2000)
394 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to extend time to 8/18/00 to file a response to plaintiff's request for relief [392−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC; defendants'response to motion(s) due by 8/18/00 ; (N) (kmk) (Entered: 08/15/2000)
393 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by the Court on August 2, 1996, Defendants submit Exhibits "A" and "B"; Exhibits (2) (tth) (Entered: 08/14/2000)
395 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell: for: June and July 000 activities and expenses (jf) (Entered: 08/18/2000)
396 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for July,2000 (jf) (Entered: 08/18/2000)
397 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for expert expenses for Steven Ney for March, 2000 (jf) (Entered: 08/18/2000)
398 CONSENT MOTION (SECOND) filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 8/28/00 to file response to plaintiffs' request for relief (ab) (Entered: 08/21/2000)
399 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion for expert expenses for Steven Ney for March, 2000 [397−1] by Margaret G. Farrell, granting motion for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for July,2000 [396−1] by Margaret G. Farrell and that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow $10,753.27, payable to Margaret G. Farrell; $4,497.00, payable to Clarence Sundram; $2,120.00, payable to Steven Nay. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 08/22/2000)
400 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to extend time to 8/28/00 to file response to plaintiffs' request for relief [398−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC; that defendants'response to plaintiffs' request for remedial action due by 8/28/00 ; (N) (kmk) (Entered: 08/22/2000)
401 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of attorney Jeffery Thomas Infelise for DC. (jf) (Entered: 09/01/2000)
424 LETTER dated 9/1/00 filed by Lydia Williams to Judge Harris; "Let this be filed", HARRIS, J. (tth) (Entered: 12/01/2000)

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09/05/2000 09/06/2000
09/15/2000 09/22/2000 09/22/2000 10/12/2000 10/13/2000 10/23/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/31/2000
11/01/2000 11/03/2000 11/08/2000

402 MOTION (FOURTH) (CONSENT) filed by plaintiffs and defendants to extend time to 9/15/00 nunc pro tunc to file a response to plaintiffs' request for relief (cjp) (Entered: 09/06/2000)
403 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to extend time to 9/15/00 nunc pro tunc to file a response to plaintiffs' request for relief [402−1] by DC, JOY EVANS; Defendants'response to plainitffs' request for Remedial Action due by 9/15/00 ; (N) (kmk) (Entered: 09/07/2000)
404 STATUS REPORT by defendants (jf) (Entered: 09/20/2000)
405 MEMORANDUM (PRAECIPE) by plaintiffs and defendants of their Settlement Agreement resolving Plaintiffs' request for Remedial Action filed July 6, 2000 and withdrawing plaintiffs' request without prejudice. (tth) (Entered: 09/25/2000)
406 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by plaintiffs and defendants; Attachments. (tth) (Entered: 09/25/2000)
408 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: status hearing set for 10:30 12/1/00 ; (N) (kmk) (Entered: 10/12/2000)
409 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC of remedial plan entered on 08/02/96, defendants submit exhibits "A" and "B". (jf) (Entered: 10/18/2000)
410 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant to settlement of plaintiffs' request for remedial action filed on 07/06/00. (jf) (Entered: 10/25/2000)
411 SPECIAL MASTER'S REPORT by special master Margaret G. Farrell for august and septemeber 2000 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/31/2000)
412 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Dale J. Dangremond, MBA for August 2000 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/31/2000)
413 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for William E. Jones for august 2000 ; attachment (bjsp) Modified on 10/31/2000 (Entered: 10/31/2000)
414 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for august and september 2000 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/31/2000)
415 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Robert L. Burgdorf for june through september 2000 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/31/2000)
416 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for payment of expert expenses for Gary D. Champlin, PH.D for august and september 2000 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/31/2000)
417 SPECIAL MASTER'S REPORT by special master Margaret G. Farrell on activities and expenses for august and september 2000; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/31/2000)
418 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: the Special Master has submitted six requests for payment from the account established for payment of the Special Master's fees and costs. ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil action No. 76−293, Payable to: Margaret G. Farrell, Esq, $7,660.01, Clarence Sundram, $16,297.82, Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., $5,560.00, Gary D. Champlin, $16,575.79, William E. Jones, $708.75 and Dale J. Dangremond, MBA, $8,200.00. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 11/02/2000)
419 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding the status of negotiations. (tth) (Entered: 11/03/2000)
425 LETTER dated 11/3/00 filed by Robert C. Downs to Judge Harris; Attachment; "Let this be file", HARRIS, J. (tth) (Entered: 12/01/2000)
420 SUBMISSION TO THE COURT by defendant ; affidavits (2); attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 11/15/2000)

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11/15/2000 11/16/2000 11/16/2000 11/21/2000
12/08/2000 12/12/2000 12/15/2000 12/20/2000 12/22/2000
12/22/2000 12/26/2000 01/03/2001
01/04/2001
01/04/2001 01/05/2001
01/10/2001

STATUS HEARING before Judge Stanley S. Harris: Held. Reporter: Ed Hawkins (kmk) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
421 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, intervenor−plaintiff, defendants, movant, Non Party regarding the appointment of an independent Court monitor (jdm) (Entered: 11/20/2000)
422 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding the appointment of a Court Monitor. (tth) (Entered: 11/21/2000)
423 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting joint motion regarding the appointment of an independent Court monitor [421−1] by defendants, Non Party, movant, defendant, intervenor−plaint, plaintiff; and creation of an Independent Court Monitor's Office , and Selection of the Court Monitor , and Submission of the Court Monitor's Budget , and Reimbursement and Payment Provisions , and Responsibilites and Powers of the Court Monitor (N) (see order for details) (kmk) (Entered: 11/21/2000)
426 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 11/15/00. Reporter: Edward N. Hawkins (tth) (Entered: 12/11/2000)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: status hearing set for 2:00 12/20/00 ; before Judge Stanley S. Harris Courtroom 14 on the Fourth Floor. (kmk) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
427 STATUS REPORT (Submission to the Court) by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/98, defendants Exhibits A and B. Exhibits (2) (tth) (Entered: 12/18/2000)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Stanley S. Harris: Held. Reporter: Gordon Sloysko (kmk) (Entered: 12/20/2000)
428 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris : parties to meet and conclude negotiations by 2:00 PM on 1/12/01; status hearing set for 2:00 PM on 1/12/01; Special Master to file final documents by 1/17/01 if an agreement is reached ; Special Master to file recommended final documents by 1/23/01 if an agreement is not reached (N) (kk) (Entered: 12/22/2000)
429 PARTIES' JOINT STIPULATED FINDINGS OF FACT. (jdm) (Entered: 12/28/2000)
431 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for bill of costs payment of expert expenses for Clarence J. Sundram for April, June, October and November, 2000 ; attachments (bjsp) Modified on 01/04/2001 (Entered: 01/04/2001)
430 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to file their proposals regarding the appointment of the Monitorin orderto allow the parties to continue work on resolving the selection on terms agreeable to both parties until 1/12/01 (jdm) (Entered: 01/04/2001)
432 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account, in CA 76−293, payable to: 1) Mr. Clarence Sundram, 2)Dr. Gary D. Champlin, 3)Mr. Robert L. Burgdorf, 4) Mr. William E. Jones and 5) Ms. Carol Solberg, for the various amounts stated in the order. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 01/04/2001)
434 LETTER dated 11/20/00 from Lydia L. Williams, Director Pratt Monitoring Program to Judge Stanley S. Harris in re: consultants report on behavioral and related supports the Evans Class members. ("LET THIS BE FILED", HARRIS, J.) (kmk) (Entered: 01/09/2001)
433 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion,nunc pro tunc, to extend time to file their proposals regarding the appointment of the Monitor in order to allow the parties to continue work on resolving the selection on terms agreeable to both parties until 1/12/01 [430−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC and the time for the parties to file their proposals for the appoint of a Court Monitor is extended up to and including 1/12/2000 (N) (kmk) Modified on 01/12/2001 (Entered: 01/05/2001)
435 NOTICE OF FILING of the "Nursing Home Placement of Evans Class Members" prepared for Margaret Farrell, Special Master; "Let this be filed", HARRIS, J. (tth)

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01/12/2001 01/12/2001 01/12/2001 01/12/2001 01/19/2001 01/19/2001
01/23/2001 01/23/2001 01/24/2001 01/25/2001
01/30/2001
01/30/2001 02/01/2001 02/02/2001 02/05/2001

(Entered: 01/16/2001)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Stanley S. Harris: Held. status hearing set for 1/19/01 ; Reporter: Susan Tyner (kmk) (Entered: 01/12/2001)
436 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to order [423−1], submitting Plaintiffs' Submission of Candidates for Position of Independent Court Monitor; Attachments. (tth) Modified on 01/17/2001 (Entered: 01/17/2001)
437 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA to order [423−1], submitting United States' Submission of Candidates for the Office of the Independent Court Monitor; Exhibits (2) (tth) (Entered: 01/17/2001)
438 RESPONSE by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to order submitting defendants' proposal for the appointment of a monitor [423−1]; Attachments. (tth) (Entered: 01/17/2001)
439 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: regarding consensus on a plan for closure filed by Margaret G. Farrell. (kmk) Modified on 01/23/2001 (Entered: 01/23/2001)
440 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that Dr. Jame Haddad is apponted the Court Monitor, to be effective 2/1/2001 , and that a transition period therefore shall exist for 90 days after the date that a budget is finalized , and that the current Court Monitor shall continue to be paid at the level of its current budget, and shall continue to have all the responsibilities and powers it currently enjoys until the end of the transition period, absent further order of the Court , and that beginning 2/1/01, Dr. Haddad will also assume all the responsibilites and powers that the current Court Monitor enjoys, as well as those enumerated in Court's 11/21/00, order Regarding the Appointment of an Independent Court Monitor (N) (kmk) (Entered: 01/23/2001)
441 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to file the monthly vendor report until 1/23/01 (jdm) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
442 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (jdm) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
443 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to extend time to file the monthly vendor report until 1/23/01 [441−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC, nunc pro tunc 1/15/01 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
444 STATUS REPORT (Submission to the Court), in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on August 2, 1996, defendants submit Exhibits "A" and "B"; Exhibit A report covers undisputed invoices submitted by class providers by December 7, 2000, and payments were made by January 2, 2001. Exhibit B is a list of class caregivers to whom payments were to be made during the period November 30, 2000, to December 22,2000. (jdm) (Entered: 01/26/2001)
445 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: (notice) advising that Clarence Sundram is appointed as Co− Special Master to serve with the current Special Master, Margaret G. Farrell. The Co−Special Master shall hear, consider, and make recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Special shall possess and exercise all powers conferred upon Masters. The Co−Special Master shall receive compensation not to exceed 200.00. , and unless any party shows cause by 2/14/2001, why it should not be so, the Court will appoint Clarence J. Sundram Co−Special Master in this action. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 02/01/2001)
446 LETTER dated 1/22/01 from Lydia L. Williams, Court Monitor, to Judge Stanley S. Harris. (FIAT., HARRIS, J.) (kmk) (Entered: 02/01/2001)
447 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of December 20, 2000. Reporter: Gordon A. Slodysko (jdm) (Entered: 02/02/2001)
450 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (jdm) (Entered: 02/08/2001)
448 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Regan Monica Bailey (ag) (Entered: 02/06/2001)

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02/07/2001 02/07/2001 02/08/2001 02/09/2001 02/14/2001 02/15/2001 02/20/2001
02/26/2001
03/01/2001 03/07/2001 03/09/2001 03/12/2001 03/12/2001 03/15/2001 03/23/2001 03/23/2001

449 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: Fairness Hearing set for 10:00 3/5/01 in Courtroom 14 , and that the Court approves the Notice to Former Residents of Forest Haven , and that the Court approves the process for the fairness hearing (N) (kmk) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
451 NOTICE by plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN submitted per Courts' order of 2/7/01, proposed notice and process for the Fairness Hearing scheduled for 3/5/01. (kmk) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
453 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER on EXPENSES and ACTIVITIES: filed by Margaret G. Farrell . (jf) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
452 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action 76−293 for Margaret G. Farrell, Clarence Sundram and Steven Ney. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
454 STATEMENT filed by defendant DC, regarding: Submission to the Court; Declarations (2); Exhibit (1). (jdm) (Entered: 02/16/2001)
455 STATUS REPORT letter dated 2/9/01 from Robert Downs of Ther Arc of the District of Columbia, Inc. to Judge Stanley S. Harris−report period 10/2000 to 12/2000. (kmk) (Entered: 02/19/2001)
456 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: advising that Clarence J. Sundram is appointed as a Co−Special Master. The Special Master shall receive compensation not to exceed. The Special Master may employ an associate lawyer in the capacity of a law clerk.l , and that the Co−Special Master shall have all the rights and powers accorded under F. Rule Cv. P. 53, as well as the rights and powers conferred on Special Master Margaret G. Farrell in the Courts' Order of Reference issued on 10/11/95. (N) (kmk) Modified on 02/27/2001 (Entered: 02/21/2001)
457 ORDER by Judge Henry H. Kennedy: that defendant BILZARIAN shall remain incarcerated at the Lake County, Tampa, Florida jail until further order of this Court or Judge Harris , and that this order shall forthwith be faxed to those person shown below. (see order for further details) (N) (kmk) Modified on 02/27/2001 (Entered: 02/27/2001)
458 LETTER dated 8/24/2000 from Mr. Robert C. Downs, President of DC Arc in re: the Court Monitor regarding the Defendant's compliance with the implementation of the provisions of all concent orders of Evans vs. Williams; attachment (1−report) (kmk) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
459 STATEMENT filed by plaintiffs, regarding: plaintiffs' submission regarding notice to members of class and fairness hearing; Exhibits (11). (jdm) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
460 LETTER dated 2/23/2001 to Judge Stanley S. Harris from Jane Haddad, Psy. D. including proposed EVANS Monitoring Budget. (FIAT, HARRIS, J.) (kmk) Modified on 03/28/2001 (Entered: 03/12/2001)
462 LETTER dated 3/7/01 to Judge Stanley S. Harris from Rebecca S. Salon and Phyllis A. Holton, Advisors Project Action. (kmk) (Entered: 03/22/2001)
463 TESTIMONY for the Fairness Hearing before Judge Stanley Harris submitted by Robert C. Downs, President, The Arc of the District of Columbia. ("LET THIS BE FILED", HARRIS, J.) (kmk) (Entered: 03/23/2001)
461 LETTER dated 1/17/2001 to Judge Stanley S. Harris from Robert C. Downs, President of The Arc of the District of Columbia, Inc. (FIAT, HARRIS, J.) (kmk) (Entered: 03/22/2001)
464 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to file the monthly vendor report until 3/23/01 (jdm) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
465 STATEMENT filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, regarding: submissions to the Court; Declarations (2). (jdm) (Entered: 03/26/2001)

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03/28/2001 03/28/2001 03/28/2001 03/29/2001
03/29/2001 03/29/2001 03/30/2001
04/03/2001 04/05/2001 04/05/2001 04/13/2001 04/18/2001

466 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: granting motion to extend time to file the monthly vendor report until 3/23/01 [464−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC and the defendants monthly vendor report is extended to 3/23/01, nunc pro tunc to 3/15/01. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 03/29/2001)
470 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for order requiring defendants to fund the special master's account (jf) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
471 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; activities and time and expenses for January and February 2001 . (jf) Modified on 03/30/2001 (Entered: 03/30/2001)
467 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that the Court Monitor's proposed budget for 2/1/2001 to 9/30/2001 and her proposed annual budget commencing 10/1/2001 are hereby APPROVED , and that within ten days of the filing of this order, the defendants shall deposit the sum of $417,925.00 in the Registry of the Court as payment of the interim costs of the Court Monitor. On, 10/01/2001, and each suceeding October 1 until this order is amended or vacated, the defendants shall deposit the sum of $711,458.00 into the Registry of the Court as payment of the costs of the Court Monitor , and that within seven days of receiving the deposit of $417,925.00 into the Registry, the Clerk of the Court shall pay the Court Monitor the sum of $208,962.50, which the Monitor shall deposit into an interest−bearing account to cover the payroll and other operating expenses of the Monitor's office as detailed in the attached budget , and any of the funds deposited in the Registry of the Court or paid over to the Court Monitor that remain unexpended at the conclusion of the fiscal year on September 30 shall be credited towards the payment due to be made by the Defendants for the for the following fiscal year commencing on October 1, unless otherwise ordered by the Court ; appendix (1) (see order for details) (N) (kmk) Modified on 03/29/2001 (Entered: 03/29/2001)
468 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that the defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA pay to the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court, the sum of $70,000.00 , and that defendants make such payments to the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) business days from the date of this order. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 03/29/2001)
469 ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action 76−293. , and $11, 162.15 payable to Margaret G. Farrell , and $27,572.78 payable Clarence Sundram , and $2,209.00 payable to Gary D. Champlin, PhD. and $2,651.40 payable to Carol Solberg (see order for details. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 03/29/2001)
472 OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Stanley S. Harris: that the parties Joint stipulated Findings of Fact are adopted , and that the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conslusion of Evans and Williams is approved as, in effect, a statment of the conditions for the expected vacating of the Court's relevant prior Orders , and that the Consent Order formally is entered and the Settlement Agreement attached ther to is approved , and consent order ; exhibit (1) (N) (kmk) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
CASE REASSIGNED to Judge Ellen S. Huvelle (tth) (Entered: 04/04/2001)
DEPOSIT in the amount of $417,925.00 into the Registry of the Court by defendants, pursuant to Order dated 3/29/01. (tth) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
473 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN, plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY JR. by Elliott Denbo Andalman, Daniel Adlai Katz (bjsp) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
474 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: motion of plaintiff for attorney's fees and costs due within 60 days <date not set>; defendant's response to motion for attorneys fees due within 45 days of the filing of plaintiffs' petition <date not set> ; (N) (jeb) (Entered: 04/13/2001)
475 MOTION filed by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, and ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 4/18/01 to file the monthly verdor report (ag) (Entered: 04/19/2001)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 42 of 127

04/18/2001 04/20/2001 04/20/2001 04/23/2001
05/16/2001 06/07/2001
06/15/2001 06/19/2001 06/29/2001 07/13/2001 08/10/2001 08/14/2001 08/15/2001
08/20/2001 08/30/2001
09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/05/2001

477 STATEMENT filed by defendant DC , regarding: submission to the Court. ; declaration (1); attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 04/24/2001)
476 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time to 4/18/01 to file the monthly verdor report, nunc pro tunc to 4/15/01 [475−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
DEPOSIT into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $70,000.00, pursuant to Order filed 3/29/01; Attachment (1) (tth) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
478 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to seal a document that reveals names and addresses of class members [312−1] by USA, denying as moot motion for order holding defendants in contempt, providing for the calculation and payment of civil contempt fines, enforcing the permanent injunction and supplementing the special master's order of reference [226−1] by plaintiffsssss (N) (gdf) (Entered: 04/24/2001)
479 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS; declaration (1); affidavit (1); exhibit (1) (tb) (Entered: 05/17/2001)
480 STIPULATED ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: of consent order; that plaintiff's Petition for Attorney's fees and costs shall be filed on or before 8/20/01; defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney's fees and costs shall be filed within forty five (45) days of the filing of plaintiffs' petition (N) (gdf) (Entered: 06/07/2001)
481 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS ; declaration (2) (tb) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: New status hearing set for 10:15 a.m. on 9/20/01 ; Reporter: Beverly Byrne (gdf) (Entered: 06/19/2001)
482 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: RE: time and expenses for March, April, and May 2001 filed by Margaret G. Farrell; attachment (tb) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
483 ERRATA by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to remedial plan entered 8/2/96 of exhibit A & B; exhibits (2) (cjp) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
484 MOTION (UNCONTESTED) filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to transmit confidential documents upon acknowledgement of terms of protective order ; Attachments (3) (ag) (Entered: 08/13/2001)
485 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to transmit confidential documents upon acknowledgement of terms of protective order [484−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
486 (CONSENT) ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting additional time for the filing of Plaintiffs' fee petition and Defendant Opposition, and request that the Court enter the following as an Order; Plaintiff's Petition for Attorney's Fee and Costs shall be filed on or before 11/20/01; Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs shall be filed within forty five (45) days of the filing of Plaintiffs Petition (N) (gdf) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
487 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for June 2001; attachment's. (cas) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
488 NOTICE OF FILING by Plaintiff Class of the Settlement Agreement, approved by this Court on March 19, 2001, that was signed on 8/29/01 by a duly appointed representative of the Board of Directors of the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc. Attachment (1). (tth) (Entered: 08/31/2001)
489 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the Clerk of the Court disburse frome the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
490 MOTION (CONSENT) filed to extend time to 9/4/01, nunc pro tunc to 8/15/01 to file the monthly vendor report ; EXHIBIT (SUBMISSION TO THE COURT) (ag) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
491 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to extend time to 9/4/01, nunc pro tunc to 8/15/01 to file the monthly vendor report [490−1] (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/10/2001)

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09/05/2001 09/17/2001 09/20/2001 09/20/2001 09/21/2001 09/25/2001
10/09/2001 10/09/2001 10/10/2001
10/15/2001 10/17/2001
10/17/2001 10/17/2001 10/22/2001 10/23/2001 10/25/2001
10/26/2001 10/26/2001

493 EXHIBITS (A and B) of defendants DC, and ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS submitted in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Declarations (1); Affidavits (1) (ag) (Entered: 09/19/2001)
492 RESPONSE by defendant DC to order [75−1]; Declarations (1); Affidavits (1); Attachments (1) (ag) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
494 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing payment of $3,024.55 to Special Master Margaret Farrell and payment of $10,871.00 to Clarence J. Sundram, Co−Special Master. (N) (see order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 09/20/2001)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status hearing set for 10:00 a.m. on 11/29/01 Reporter: Gordon Slodysko (gdf) (Entered: 09/20/2001)
495 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, and JOHN KENNEDY JR. for entry of consent order (ag) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
496 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting joint motion for entry of consent order [495−1] by plaintiffs; that defendants shall pay the sum of $30,463.32 to St. John's Community Services; that payment is to be made within 45 days of the date of this order and that interest on the amount due shall run from August 1, 2001, until the date paid (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
DEPOSIT by Anthony Williams and DC in the total amount of $100,000.00 ($50,000.00 each) into the registry pursuant to order filed 9/20/01. (nmr) (Entered: 10/10/2001)
DEPOSIT by Anthony Williams and DC in the amount of $711,458.00 into the registry pursuant to order filed 3/29/01. (nmr) (Entered: 10/10/2001)
497 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the Clerk of the Court disburse to the Court Monitor from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, One Hundred Seventy−Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty−Four Dollars and Fifty Cents ($177,864.50) (N) (gdf) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
498 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; regarding: time and expenses for July and August 2001; attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 10/16/2001)
499 MOTION filed for COMM MULTI−SERVICES, CARECO, INC., JOSEPH KENNEDY INST, MULTI−THERAPEUTIC, NATIONAL CHILDREN, ST JOHN'S COMM SVC to intervene ; EXHIBITS (COMPLAINT, MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION) (nmr) (Entered: 10/18/2001)
500 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time nunc pro tunc to 10/15/01 to file the monthly vendor report (nmr) (Entered: 10/18/2001)
501 EXHIBITS (A and B) of defendants DC, and ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS submitted in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96. (nmr) (Entered: 10/18/2001)
502 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to extend time to 10/17/01,1 nunc pro tunc to 10/15/01 to file the monthly vendor report [500−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 10/23/2001)
503 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 9/20/01. Reporter: Gordon A. Slodysko. (nmr) (Entered: 10/24/2001)
504 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293 $7,386.60 payable to Margaret Farrell, Esquire and $11,026.28 payable to Clarence Sundram. (N) (dcn) (Entered: 10/25/2001)
505 MOTION filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell for guidance regarding hearings on provider payment issues ; Exhibits (3). (nmr) (Entered: 10/29/2001)
506 MOTION filed by movants COMM MULTI−SERVICES, CARECO, INC., JOSEPH KENNEDY INST, MULTI−THERAPEUTIC, NATIONAL CHILDREN, ST JOHN'S COMM SVC to stay proceedings on movants' complaint and motion for preliminary

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10/29/2001 10/29/2001 10/31/2001
11/07/2001 11/08/2001 11/08/2001 11/09/2001 11/13/2001 11/16/2001 11/16/2001 11/19/2001 11/21/2001
11/26/2001
11/27/2001
11/28/2001 11/28/2001

injunction (nmr) (Entered: 10/29/2001)
507 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA to motion to stay proceedings on movants' complaint and motion for preliminary injunction [506−1] by movants. (nmr) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
508 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for intervenor−plaintiff USA by John A. Henderson. (nmr) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
509 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to stay proceedings on movants' complaint and motion for preliminary injunction [506−1] by movants until the Court responds to the Special Masters' Request for Guidance. (N) (pob) (Entered: 10/31/2001)
510 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to Special Master's motion for guidance regarding hearings on provider payment issues [505−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 11/08/2001)
511 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for order directing defendants to pay all outstanding invoices for services and supports for Evans Class Members and to direct their submission to the court ; Declaration (1); C/M 11/8/01 (nmr) (Entered: 11/09/2001)
512 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of Special Master's motion for guidance regarding hearings on provider payment issues [505−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; Exhibits (2); C/M 11/8/01 (nmr) (Entered: 11/09/2001)
513 RESPONSE by intervenor−plaintiff USA to Special Master's motion for guidance regarding hearings on provider payment issues [505−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; Attachment (1) (nmr) Modified on 11/13/2001 (Entered: 11/13/2001)
514 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for September 2001; Attachments; "c/m "11/2/01". (tth) (Entered: 11/14/2001)
515 EXHIBITS (A &B) of defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS submitted in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96. (nmr) Modified on 11/19/2001 (Entered: 11/19/2001)
516 MOTION filed by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time nunc pro tunc to 11/16/01 to file its monthly vendor report (nmr) (Entered: 11/19/2001)
517 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time nunc pro tunc to 11/15/01 to file its monthly vendor report [516−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 11/19/2001)
518 MOTION filed by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, and ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 11/28/01 to oppose plaintiffs' motion for an order directing defendants to pay all outstanding invoices for services and supports for class members and to correct their submission to the court (ag) (Entered: 11/23/2001)
519 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to extend time to 11/27/01 to oppose plaintiffs' motion for an order directing defendants to pay all outstanding invoices for services and supports for class members and to correct their submission to the court [518−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC response to brief due by 11/27/01 ; (N) (gdf) (Entered: 11/26/2001)
520 RESPONSE by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS in opposition to motion for order directing defendants to pay all outstanding invoices for services and supports for Evans Class Members and to direct their submission to the court [511−1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (1) (cas) (Entered: 11/28/2001)
521 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (See order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 11/29/2001)
522 MOTION filed by plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN, plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY JR. to withdraw motion for order directing defendants to pay all outstanding invoices for services and supports for Evans Class Members and to

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11/29/2001 11/29/2001 11/29/2001 12/04/2001 12/06/2001
12/07/2001
12/07/2001 12/14/2001 12/14/2001 12/17/2001 01/07/2002
01/14/2002 01/16/2002

direct their submission to the court [511−1] (cas) (Entered: 11/29/2001)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granted motion to withdraw motion for order directing defendants to pay all outstanding invoices for services and supports for Evans Class Members and to direct their submission to the court [511−1] [522−1] by plaintiffs Status hearing set for 2:00 p.m. on 2/26/02; Reporter: Beverly Byrne (gdf) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
523 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: denying as moot motion for guidance regarding hearings on provider payment issues [505−1] by Margaret G. Farrell (N) (gdf) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
524 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to withdraw motion for order directing defendants to pay all outstanding invoices for services and supports for Evans Class Members and to direct their submission to the court [511−1] [522−1] by plaintiffsssss (N) (gdf) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
525 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER regarding time and expenses for October 2001: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; attachments (cas) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
526 MOTION filed by movant COMM MULTI−SERVICES, movant CARECO, INC., movant JOSEPH KENNEDY INST, movant MULTI−THERAPEUTIC, movant NATIONAL CHILDREN, movant ST JOHN'S COMM SVC to withdraw motion for COMM MULTI−SERVICES, CARECO, INC., JOSEPH KENNEDY INST, MULTI−THERAPEUTIC, NATIONAL CHILDREN, ST JOHN'S COMM SVC to intervene [499−1] (cas) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
527 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to withdraw motion for COMM MULTI−SERVICES, CARECO, INC., JOSEPH KENNEDY INST, MULTI−THERAPEUTIC, NATIONAL CHILDREN, ST JOHN'S COMM SVC to intervene [499−1] [526−1] by movants, withdrawing, without prejudice motion for COMM MULTI−SERVICES, CARECO, INC., JOSEPH KENNEDY INST, MULTI−THERAPEUTIC, NATIONAL CHILDREN, ST JOHN'S COMM SVC to intervene [499−1] (N) (gdf) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
528 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that Mr. Kearney and Mr. Weldon meet with the Special Master to discuss these payment issues on or before December 21, 2001. (N) (gdf) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
530 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (See order for Detail) (gdf) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
531 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing the Clerk of the Court disburse to the Court Monitor from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, One Hundred Seventy−Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty−Four Dollars and Fifty Cents ($177,864.50) (N) (gdf) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
529 EXHIBITS (A and B) of defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS (cas) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
532 STATEMENT filed by plaintiff JOY EVANS, plaintiff VENITA FELTON, plaintiff CHRISTINE EXTON, plaintiff JOSEPH SCATES, plaintiff WILLIAM BROWN, plaintiff JOHN KENNEDY JR., intervenor−plaintiff USA, defendant MARION BARRY, defendant DC, movant WE CARE PROJECTS,INC, special master Margaret G. Farrell, Non Party LYDIA WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, movant COMM MULTI−SERVICES, movant CARECO, INC., movant JOSEPH KENNEDY INST, movant MULTI−THERAPEUTIC, movant NATIONAL CHILDREN, movant ST JOHN'S COMM SVC, regarding: parties' agreement with regard to the independent financial review. (cas) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
533 MONTHLY VENDORS' REPORT by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS in accordance with the remedial plan entered by this court on 8/2/96; exhibits (2) (cas) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
534 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, intervenor−plaintiff, defendants for order authorizing deposit of funds into the court registry and approving payment schedule for the

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01/17/2002 01/18/2002 01/24/2002 01/25/2002 01/31/2002 02/21/2002 02/25/2002 02/26/2002 02/26/2002 03/04/2002
03/12/2002 03/26/2002
04/10/2002 04/11/2002 04/19/2002 04/22/2002 04/23/2002 04/23/2002

Independant Financial Review (nmr) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
535 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; Regarding: Time and expenses for November, 2001; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 01/18/2002)
536 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: authorizing deposit of funds into the court registry and approving payment schedule for the independent financial review (N) (gdf) (Entered: 01/22/2002)
537 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for attorney's fees ; Exhibits (9); FILED UNDER SEAL (nmr) (Entered: 01/25/2002)
DEPOSIT by defendants in the amount of $260,000.00 into the registry of the court pursuant to order of 1/18/02/ (nmr) (Entered: 01/28/2002)
538 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293. (N) (gdf) (Entered: 01/31/2002)
539 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96. (nmr) (Entered: 02/22/2002)
541 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting extension of time for the defendant to filel the monthly vendor report to 2/22/02, nunc pro tunc to 2/15/02 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 02/28/2002)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status hearing set for 2:00 p.m. on 4/25/02 ; Reporter: Beverly Byrne (gdf) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
540 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for November 2001; Attachments (nmr) (Entered: 02/27/2002)
542 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the peding attorney's fee dispute in the above captioned action is refferred for neutural case mediation to commence on 3/4/02 and to conclude by 5/4/02; that counsel and the parties, including personss with settlement authority, shall attend the neutral case mediation session; that the Clerk of the Court is directed to furnish a copy of this Order to the Circuit Executive for the purpose of assigning a neutral who will serve as a mediator (N) (gdf) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
543 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 03/15/2002)
544 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that on April 1, 2002, the Clerk of the Court disburse to the Court Monitor from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, One Hundred Seventy−Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty−Four Dollars and Fifty Cents ($177,864.50) (N) (gdf) (Entered: 03/27/2002)
DEPOSIT by defendants of $75,000 into the court registry, for fees and costs to be incurred by the special masters in this case. (rje) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
545 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for January and February 2002; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 04/12/2002)
546 MOTION filed by defendant to extend time thirty (30) days to file defendants' response to plaintiffs' fee petition (nmr) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
547 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time nunc pro tunc to 4/19/02 to filed the monthly vendor report ; EXHIBIT (SUBMISSION TO THE COURT) (nmr) (Entered: 04/23/2002)
548 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time to 4/19/02, to filed the monthly vendor report, nunc pro tunc to April 15, 2002 [547−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 04/25/2002)
552 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits A and B in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Declaration (1); Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 05/02/2002)

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04/25/2002 04/25/2002
04/25/2002 04/30/2002 05/13/2002 05/15/2002 05/28/2002 06/12/2002
06/13/2002 06/17/2002
06/18/2002
06/25/2002 06/25/2002
06/27/2002
07/01/2002 07/02/2002 07/02/2002

549 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (See order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 04/29/2002)
550 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time to July 08, 2002, to file defendants' response to plaintiffs' fee petition [546−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC response to motion(s) due by 7/8/02 ; (N) (gdf) (Entered: 04/29/2002)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status hearing set for 2:00 7/1/02 ; Reporter: B.Byrne (gdf) (Entered: 04/30/2002)
551 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 05/01/2002)
553 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 05/14/2002)
554 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Declaration (1); Affidavit (1) (nmr) (Entered: 05/16/2002)
555 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for April 2002; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 05/29/2002)
556 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for expedited hearing before the special master to resolve specific protection from harm issues , and for an order for defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt ; Exhibits (24); EXHIBITS FILED UNDER SEAL (nmr) (Entered: 06/13/2002)
557 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by the Court on 8/2/96; Declaration (1); Exhibits (2). (nmr) (Entered: 06/14/2002)
558 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of redacted exhibits to their Motion for an Expedited Hearing Before the Special Master to Resolve Protection from Harm Issues Faced by Class Members and Motion for an Order for Defendants to Show Cause Why They Should Not be Held in Contempt filed 6/12/02; Exhibits (24). (nmr) (Entered: 06/18/2002)
559 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293: $1,925.60 Margaret G. Farrell; $10,432.11 Clarence J. Sundram; $9,340.00 Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. (N) (gdf) (Entered: 06/20/2002)
560 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, intervenor−plaintiff, defendants for a brief stay of plaintiffs' motion for an expedited hearing and motion for an order for defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt (nmr) (Entered: 06/26/2002)
561 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that on July 1, 2002, the Clerk of the Court disburse to the Court Monitor from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, One Hundred Seventy−Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty−Four Dollars and Fifty Cents ($177,864.50) (N) (gdf) (Entered: 06/27/2002)
562 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting joint motion for a brief stay of plaintiffs' motion for an expedited hearing and motion for an order for defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt [560−1] by defendants, intervenor−plaint, plaintiff (N) (gdf) (Entered: 06/27/2002)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status hearing set for 2:00 p.m. on 10/10/02 ; Reporter: Jackie Wood, Miller Reporting (gdf) (Entered: 07/01/2002)
563 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle :that clerk accept for filing under seal the exhibits to the Special Master's 7/1/02 report on provider payment issues (N) (zz) (Entered: 07/02/2002)
564 STATUS REPORT by special master Margaret G. Farrel dated 7/1/02 RE: report on provider payment issuesl ; exhibits (14) FILED UNDER SEAL (zz) (Entered:

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 48 of 127

07/03/2002 07/15/2002 07/15/2002 07/16/2002 07/18/2002
07/22/2002 07/22/2002 07/23/2002 08/05/2002 08/15/2002 08/19/2002 08/21/2002 08/21/2002
08/22/2002 08/28/2002 08/28/2002

07/02/2002)
565 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for 5/02 and prior to 5/02, also request for payment of Special Master Clarence Sundrams invoice for 11/01 not previously submitted.; attachments (2) (bcs) (Entered: 07/05/2002)
566 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibits "A" and "B", in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96. (nmr) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
568 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 07/18/2002)
567 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, defendants for judgment regarding attorney's fees (nmr) (Entered: 07/18/2002)
570 CONSENT JUDGMENT by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the Defendant shall pay University Legal Services the sum of two hundred ninety−five thousand dollars ($295,000.00) in complete settlement of Plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs for work performed during the period of January 1999 through March 30, 2001; that payment of the above referenced amounts shall be made within thiry (30) calendar days of entry of this Order. If this amount is not paid in full within thirty (30) calendar days, it will bear interest at the rate established by 28 U.S.C. 1961 from the date of this Order (N) (gdf) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
569 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, intervenor−plaintiff, defendants for a final two week stay of plaintiffs' motion for an expedited hearing and motion for an order for defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt (nmr) (Entered: 07/23/2002)
571 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
572 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting joint motion for a final two week stay of plaintiffs' motion for an expedited hearing and motion for an order for defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt [569−1] by defendants, intervenor−plaint, plaintiff (N) (gdf) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
573 ORDER directing the Registry of the Court to disburse certain sums by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : (N) (lin) (Entered: 08/05/2002)
574 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to status report of 7/1/02 regarding provider rates [564−1] by Margaret G. Farrell; Exhibits (4) (nmr) (Entered: 08/16/2002)
575 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for June 2002; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 08/20/2002)
576 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that Clerk of Copurt accept for filing underseal the Exhibits to the Special Master's July 1, 2002 Report on Provider Payment Issues. (N) (jwd) (Entered: 08/22/2002)
577 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : dismissing without prejudice motion for expedited hearing before the special master to resolve specific protection from harm issues [556−1] by WILLIAM BROWN, JOSEPH SCATES, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOY EVANS, dismissing motion for an order for defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt [556−2] by WILLIAM BROWN, JOSEPH SCATES, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOY EVANS (N) (whb) (Entered: 08/22/2002)
578 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, "let this be filed." (signed Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle); attachment to agreement filed under seal. (N). (jeb) (Entered: 08/23/2002)
579 TRANSCRIPT filed for status hearing before Judge Huvelle for date(s) of 11/29/01. Reporter: Beverly J. Byrne (nmr) (Entered: 08/28/2002)
580 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 4/25/02. Reporter: Beverly J. Byrne (mpt) (Entered: 08/28/2002)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 49 of 127

08/28/2002 08/28/2002 08/29/2002 09/03/2002 09/05/2002 09/10/2002 09/11/2002 09/16/2002 09/17/2002 09/20/2002
09/30/2002 10/01/2002
10/04/2002 10/10/2002 10/15/2002 10/15/2002

581 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Declaration (1). (nmr) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
DEPOSIT by defendants in the sum of $75,000 into the Registry for fees and costs incurred by the Special Master. (mpt) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
582 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, to extend time to 8/28/02, nunc pro tunc to 8/15/02, to file the monthly vendor report (bcs) (Entered: 08/30/2002)
583 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time to 8/28/02, nunc pro tunc to 8/15/02, to file the monthly vendor report [582−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/05/2002)
584 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing the Clerk of the Court to disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/06/2002)
SCHEDULING NOTICE: status hearing set for 2:00 10/15/02 ; before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle in Courtroom 18 on the 6th floor. (gdf) (Entered: 09/11/2002)
585 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for June 2002; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 09/13/2002)
586 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 09/17/2002)
587 TRANSCRIPT filed of status hearing before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle for date(s) of 7/1/02. Reporter: Jacqueline L. Wood (nmr) (Entered: 09/18/2002)
588 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that Section II of the Court's Order, dated March 29, 2001 is Amended; that on October 1, 2002, and on each succeeding October 1 until this order is amended or vacated, defendants shall deposit the sum of Eight Hundred Thirty−Four Thousand Sixty−Seven Dollars ($834,567.00) into the Registry of the Court, as payment of the costs of the Court Monitor; that the Clerk of the Court shall pay the Court Monitor the sum of Two Hundred Eight Thousand and Six−Hundred Forty−One Dollars and Seventy−Five Cents ($208,641.75) at the beginning of each quarter in accordance with the terms set forth in the Court's Consent Order, dated March 29, 2001 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/26/2002)
589 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
590 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that on October 1, 2002, the Clerk of the Court disburse to the Court Monitor from the Registry of the Court, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293, Two Hundred Eight Thousand and Six−Hundred Forty−One Dollars and Seventy−Five Cents ($208,641.75) (N) (gdf) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
591 MOTION filed by plaintiff for Cathy Costanzo to appear pro hac vice ( Center for Public Representation, 22 Green Street, Northampton, MA 01060, ) ; Affidavit (nmr) (Entered: 10/09/2002)
592 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion for Cathy Costanzo to appear pro hac vice ( Center for Public Representation, 22 Green Street, Northampton, MA 01060, ) [591−1] by plaintiffsssss (N) (gdf) (Entered: 10/11/2002)
593 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 10/16/2002)
DEPOSIT by defendants in the amount of $250,000.00 into the registry of the Court for the fees and costs incurred and to be incurred by the Special Masters in this case in Fiscal Year 2003. (nmr) (Entered: 10/16/2002)

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10/15/2002 10/15/2002 10/18/2002 10/28/2002 11/05/2002 11/13/2002 11/15/2002 11/19/2002
12/02/2002 12/02/2002 12/03/2002 12/19/2002 12/20/2002 01/03/2003 01/06/2003 01/07/2003 01/10/2003 01/13/2003 01/15/2003

594 REPORT 10/15/02 OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell of Report, Recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law on provider payment issues; Exhibits (10) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/16/2002)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : status hearing set for 2:00 12/2/02 ; Reporter: Jackie Wood, Miller Reporting (gdf) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
595 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: regarding time and expenses for September 2002, filed by Margaret G. Farrell; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 10/21/2002)
596 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to special master report, recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law on provider payment issues [594−1] (nmr) (Entered: 10/29/2002)
597 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
598 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for October 2002; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 11/14/2002)
599 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 11/18/2002)
600 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the District of Columbia shall pay Karen McGowan the sum of Twenty−two thousand, five hundred ($22,500); that payment of the above−referenced amount shall be made within ten (10) calendar days of the entry of this Order. In the event that defendants fail to make such payments to plaintiffs within thirty calendar days of this Order, defendants shall pay interest dating back to the date of this Order up to the date of payment at the post−judgment interest rate accrued (N) (gdf) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
601 TRANSCRIPT filed of status hearing before Judge Huvelle for date(s) of 10/15/02. Reporter: Jacqueline L. Wood, Miller Reporting. (nmr) (Entered: 12/03/2002)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : status hearing set for 2:00 12/2/02 ; Reporter: Jon Hundley, Miller (gdf) (Entered: 12/12/2002)
602 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (See Order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 12/04/2002)
603 TRANSCRIPT filed of status hearing before Judge Huvelle for date(s) of 12/2/02. Reporter: Jon Hundley, Miller Reporting (nmr) (Entered: 12/20/2002)
604 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; attachment . (mpt) (Entered: 12/24/2002)
605 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Cour'r registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action 76−293 (N) (See order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
606 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 1/13/03 to filed the monthly vendor report (nmr) (Entered: 01/07/2003)
609 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time to 1/13/03 to filed the monthly vendor report [606−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) nunc pro tunc to 12/15/02 (gdf) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
607 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Affidavits (4); Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 01/13/2003)
608 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding time and expenses for October 2002; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
610 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for attorney's fees ; Exhibits (3); EXHIBIT A FILED UNDER SEAL (nmr) (Entered: 01/16/2003)

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02/03/2003 02/07/2003 02/10/2003 02/10/2003 02/10/2003 02/12/2003 02/13/2003 02/27/2003 02/28/2003 02/28/2003 03/06/2003 03/06/2003 03/11/2003 03/13/2003 03/17/2003 03/18/2003 03/21/2003 03/21/2003 03/26/2003 03/27/2003

611 STATEMENT filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS , regarding: submission to the court.; exhibits (2) (bcs) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
612 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 02/10/2003)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status hearing set for 2:15 p.m. on 4/10/03 ; Reporter: Beverly Byrne (gdf) (Entered: 02/11/2003)
613 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell for activities and expenses for January 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 02/11/2003)
614 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by co−Special Master Clarence J. Sundram regarding activities and expense report for January 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 02/11/2003)
615 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 3/15/03 to file a response to plaintiffs' fee petition (nmr) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
616 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to extend time to 3/15/03 to file a response to plaintiffs' fee petition [615−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC response to brief due by 3/15/03 ; (N) (gdf) (Entered: 02/24/2003)
618 MOTION filed by defendants DC, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time nunc pro tunc to 1/15/03 to file the monthly vendor report ; EXHIBITS (REPORT/SUBMISSION) (nmr) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
617 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting defendant's motion for an enlargement of time to monthly vendor report to 2/27/03, nunc pro tunc to 2/15/03 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
625 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered 8/2/96; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 03/21/2003)
619 REPORT OF CO−SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Clarence J. Sundram regarding activities and expense report for February 2003; Attachments. (nmr) (Entered: 03/07/2003)
620 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the excrow account in the Civil Action 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 03/07/2003)
621 TRANSCRIPT filed of Status Hearing before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle for date(s) of 2/10/03. Reporter: Beveryly J. Byrne (nmr) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
622 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits "A" and "B", pursuant to the Remedial Plan entered 8/2/96; Affidavits (2); Exhibits (2). (nmr) (Entered: 03/14/2003)
623 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding activities and expenses for February 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
624 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 3/28/03 to file defendants' response to plaintiffs' fee petition (nmr) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
Text not available. (Entered: 03/24/2003)
626 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to extend time to 3/28/03 to file defendants' response to plaintiffs' fee petition [624−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
627 MOTION filed by plaintiffs, defendants for judgment regarding attorney's fees (nmr) (Entered: 03/27/2003)
628 CONSENT JUDGMENT by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle directing that the defendants pay University Legal Services $85,000.00 in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs for work performed during the period from April 2001

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04/09/2003 04/09/2003 04/10/2003 04/10/2003 04/11/2003 04/15/2003 05/07/2003 05/07/2003 05/08/2003 05/08/2003 05/22/2003 05/27/2003 05/27/2003 06/03/2003 06/05/2003 06/11/2003 06/12/2003 06/23/2003

through September 30, 2001, and that the payment be made within 30 calendar days of the entry of this Order, with any balance after 30 calendar days to bear interest at the rate established by 28 U.S.C. 1961 from the date of this Order (N) (kk) (Entered: 03/28/2003)
629 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding activities and expense report for March 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 04/10/2003)
630 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by co−special master Clarence J. Sundram regarding activiies and expense report for March 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 04/10/2003)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status hearing set for 1:30 p.m. on 7/11/03 ; Reporter: Beverly Byrne (gdf) (Entered: 04/10/2003)
633 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 04/17/2003)
631 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding status conference. (nmr) (Entered: 04/14/2003)
632 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants DC and ANTHONY WILLIAMS of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Exhibits (2). (nmr) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
634 REPORT OF CO−SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Clarence J. Sundram regarding activities and expense report for April 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) Modified on 05/08/2003 (Entered: 05/08/2003)
635 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 05/08/2003)
636 REPORT OF CO−SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding activities and expenses for April 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) Modified on 05/09/2003 (Entered: 05/09/2003)
637 REQUEST by special master Margaret G. Farrell for an increased hourly rate ; Attachment (1) (nmr) Modified on 05/09/2003 (Entered: 05/09/2003)
638 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 5/22/03, nunc pro tunc, to 5/15/03 to file monthly vendor report ; EXHIBIT (REPORT) (nmr) (Entered: 05/23/2003)
639 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to extend time to 5/22/03, nunc pro tunc, to 5/15/03 to file monthly vendor report [638−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 05/27/2003)
644 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 06/13/2003)
640 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in civil action 76−293 (N) (gdf) (Entered: 06/06/2003)
641 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Clarence J. Sundram regarding activities and expenses for May 2003; attachment. (mpt) (Entered: 06/09/2003)
642 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding activities and expenses for May 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 06/12/2003)
643 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Exhibits (2). (nmr) (Entered: 06/13/2003)
645 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for attorney's fees ; Exhibits (12) (nmr) (Entered: 06/24/2003)

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07/02/2003 07/09/2003 07/11/2003 07/15/2003 07/15/2003 07/16/2003 07/22/2003 07/22/2003 07/22/2003 07/30/2003 08/06/2003 08/08/2003 08/19/2003 08/22/2003 09/04/2003
09/15/2003 09/15/2003 09/16/2003 09/17/2003 09/17/2003

646 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (See Order for Detail) (gdf) (Entered: 07/09/2003)
647 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by defendant DC to special master report on provider payment issues dated 4/10/03 [631−1] (nmr) (Entered: 07/10/2003)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status hearing set for 2:00 p.m. on 11/6/03 ; Reporter: Edward Hawkins (gdf) (Entered: 07/11/2003)
648 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS of Exhibits "A" and "B" in accordance with the Remedial Plan entered by this Court on 8/2/96; Exhibits (2) (nmr) (Entered: 07/16/2003)
649 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 9/8/03 to file response to plaintiff's fee petition (nmr) (Entered: 07/16/2003)
650 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time to 9/8/03 to file response to plaintiff's fee petition [649−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC response to motion(s) due by 9/28/03 ; (N) (gdf) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
651 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 (N) (See Order for Detail) (gdf) (Entered: 07/22/2003)
652 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell regarding activities and expenses for June 2003; Attachment (1). (nmr) (Entered: 07/29/2003)
653 STATEMENT filed by special master Margaret G. Farrell , regarding: 7/11/03 status conference. (nmr) (Entered: 07/29/2003)
654 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action 76−293 (N) (See Order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 08/04/2003)
655 ACTIVITIES AND EXPENSE REPORT by special master Clarence J. Sundram for July 2003. (jf) (Entered: 08/08/2003)
656 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293. (N) (See order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 08/13/2003)
657 TRANSCRIPT filed of status conference before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle for date(s) of 7/11/03. Reporter: Edward N. Hawkins (nmr) (Entered: 08/20/2003)
658 REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER: filed by Margaret G. Farrell; re: activities and expenses report for July 2003 . (jf) (Entered: 08/25/2003)
659 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the excrow account in CA 76−293 for the amount of $5,072.89 payable to Margaret G. Farrell and for the amount of $9,400.07 to Clarence J. Sundram, Special Masters. (N) (kmk) (Entered: 09/08/2003)
661 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS to extend time to 9/15/03, nunc pro tunc to August 15, 2003 to file the monthly vendor report (jf) Modified on 09/24/2003 (Entered: 09/24/2003)
662 STATUS REPORT by defendant DC, defendant ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS; in re: remedial plan entered by this Court on August 02, 1996 (jf) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
660 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendants' to extend time to 10/10/03 to file defendants' response to plaintiffs' fee petition (jf) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
664 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: granting motion to extend time to 9/15/03, nunc pro tunc to August 25, 2003 to file the monthly vendor report [661−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
665 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : granting motion to extend time to 09/30/03 to file defendants' response to plaintiffs' fee petition [660−1] by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC (N) (gdf) (Entered: 09/24/2003)

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09/23/2003 10/09/2003 10/14/2003
10/14/2003
10/16/2003 10/20/2003 10/21/2003 10/24/2003
10/24/2003
10/27/2003 10/27/2003 11/03/2003 11/06/2003
11/07/2003 11/17/2003 12/04/2003 12/04/2003 12/08/2003
12/30/2003 12/30/2003
12/30/2003

663 STATUS REPORT by special master Margaret G. Farrell in re: to activities and expenses report to August, 2003. (jf) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
666 MOTION (CONTESTED) filed by defendants to extend time to 11/17/03 to file a response to plaintiffs' fee petition (jf) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
667 STATUS REPORT by special master Clarence J. Sundram; re: activities and expense report Co−Special Master Clarence J. Sundram August−September 2003, (jf) (Entered: 10/16/2003)
670 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: directing that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in Civil Action 76−293 (N) (See order for detail) (gdf) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
DEPOSIT into the registry of the Court in the amount of $208,641.75 pursuant to Court's Consent order dated 03/29/01. (jf) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
668 RESPONSE by plaintiff in opposition to motion to extend time to 11/17/03 to file a response to plaintiffs' fee petition [666−1] by DC . (jf) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
669 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: denying in part motion to extend time to 11/04/03 to file a response to plaintiffs' fee petition [666−1] (N) (gdf) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
671 STATUS REPORT in accordance with the remedial plan entered by this Court on August 02, 1996, defendants submit exhibits "A" and "B" by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Robert T. Maruca# 2 Affidavit of Deloras Sheperd)(jf, ) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
672 MOTION for Extension of Time to October 24, 2003 nunc pro tunc to October 15, 2003 to file the monthly vendor report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(jf, ) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
Minute ORDER granting 672 Motion for Extension of Time to . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/27/03. (BL, ) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
679 NOTICE of filing of attorneys fees consent order. (jf, ) (Entered: 12/12/2003)
673 ORDER re request for payments by Clarence Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/3/03. (BL, ) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 11/6/2003. Status Conference set for 2/12/2004 02:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter B. Byrne.) (gdf) (Entered: 11/07/2003)
674 ACTIVITIES AND EXPENSE REPORT by Clarence J. Sundram. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(jf, ) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
675 NOTICE by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA of Monthly Vendor Payment Report October 2003 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
676 ORDER re 674 Status Report filed by Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/3/03. (BL, ) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
677 ACTIVITIES & EXPENSE REPORT for November 2003 by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(jf, ) (Entered: 12/05/2003)
678 ACTIVITIES and EXPENSE REPORT for September, October & November 2003 by Co−Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(jf, ) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
680 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 12/30/2003)
681 NOTICE by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA of filing Monthly Vendor Report for December 2003 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Marcura Statement# 2 Exhibit B − Shepherd Statement)(Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 12/30/2003)
Minute ORDER granting 680 Motion for Extension of Time to File . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/30/03. (BL, ) (Entered: 12/30/2003)

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01/05/2004 01/05/2004 01/06/2004 01/21/2004 01/23/2004
01/28/2004 02/02/2004 02/02/2004 02/03/2004 02/05/2004
02/05/2004
02/06/2004 02/11/2004
02/17/2004 02/18/2004
02/18/2004 02/25/2004 03/03/2004 03/07/2004 03/08/2004 03/08/2004 04/06/2004

682 ORDER re payment of Special Master fees and costs. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/2/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 01/05/2004)
683 ORDER. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/5/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 01/05/2004)
684 ACTIVITIES & EXPENSE REPORT for December 2003 by Clarence J. Sundram. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(jf, ) (Entered: 01/07/2004)
685 ORDER re Deputy Mayor and 2001 Plan. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/21/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 01/21/2004)
686 NOTICE of filing Activities and Expense Report for 12/2003 by Special Master Margaret G. Farrell (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Report# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(rje, ) (Entered: 01/27/2004)
687 ORDER . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/28/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 01/28/2004)
688 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
689 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
690 Joint MOTION to Appoint Expert Monitor by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Farano, Richard) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 2/5/2004. Status Conference set for 5/27/2004 02:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter B. Byrne.) (gdf) (Entered: 02/05/2004)
691 ORDER re 684 Status Report filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM, 686 Notice (Other) filed by Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/5/03. (BL, ) (Entered: 02/05/2004)
692 ORDER granting 690 Motion to Appoint Elizabeth Jones as Court Monitor. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/6/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 02/06/2004)
693 RESPONSE to the Special Master's Report, Recommended Findings, Conclusions, and Proposed Order Regarding the Independent Financial Review of Consumers' Funds filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Farano, Richard) (Entered: 02/11/2004)
694 RESPONSE to Special Master's Rpt and Recommendations filed by JOY EVANS. (Bagby, Kelly) (Entered: 02/17/2004)
695 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Monthly Vendor Report# 2 Exhibit A − maruca declarations# 3 Exhibit B − shepherd declarations)(Utiger, Robert) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
Minute ORDER granting 695 Motion for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/18/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
696 ORDER re Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/25/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
697 ORDER re January 2004 expenses for Special Master Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/3/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 03/03/2004)
698 Activities and Expense Report for February 2004 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 3/11/2004 (jf, ). (Entered: 03/07/2004)
699 NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT FILED for status hearing held on dates November 6, 2003. Court Reporter: Beverly J. Byrne (jf, ) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
700 NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT FILED for status hearing held on dates February 05, 2003.Court Reporter: Beverly J. Byrne (jf, ) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
701 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for March 2004 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 4/7/2004 (jf, ). (Entered: 04/06/2004)

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04/06/2004 04/16/2004 04/16/2004 04/20/2004
05/03/2004 05/04/2004 05/20/2004 05/26/2004 05/27/2004
06/12/2004 06/14/2004 06/18/2004 06/21/2004 07/01/2004 07/02/2004 07/13/2004
07/14/2004 07/20/2004 08/03/2004 08/10/2004

702 ORDER . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/6/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 04/06/2004)
703 MOTION for Attorney Fees by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY JR., JOSEPH SCATES. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 04/16/2004)
Minute ORDER granting 703 Motion for Attorney Fees . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/16/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 04/16/2004)
704 NOTICE of filing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Submission of the Court Vendor Report (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Maruca Feb 04# 2 Affidavit Maruca March 04# 3 Affidavit Shepherd Feb 04# 4 Exhibit Shepherd Vendor Feb 04# 5 Affidavit Shepherd March 04# 6 Exhibit Shepherd Vendor March 04)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) Modified on 4/20/2004 (Burgess, Joe). (Entered: 04/20/2004)
705 ORDER . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/3/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 05/03/2004)
706 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) re: Activities and Expense Report for April 2004. Modified on 5/5/2004 (jf, ). (Entered: 05/04/2004)
707 NOTICE by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Monthly Vendor Report May 04 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit # 2 Affidavit)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 05/20/2004)
708 QUARTERLY REPORT for the period of January 1, 2004 to March 31, 2004 to the Court by ELIZABETH JONES, Court Monitor. (Burgess, Joe) (Entered: 05/26/2004)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 5/27/2004. Status Conference set for 10/14/2004 02:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Beverly Byrne.) (gdf) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
709 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for May 2004 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) . (Entered: 06/12/2004)
710 ORDER re 706 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/14/04. (BL, ) Modified on 7/1/2004 (BL, ). (Entered: 06/14/2004)
711 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to the Court's February 24, 2004 Audit Order by JOY EVANS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bagby, Kelly) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
Minute ORDER granting 711 Motion for Extension of Time to pay awardees. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/21/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
712 ORDER re 709 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/1/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
713 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
714 STATUS REPORT Vendor Payments June and July 04 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Maruca Declaration May 04# 2 Affidavit Maruca Declaration June 04# 3 Affidavit Shepherd Declaration and Printout# 4 Affidavit Shepherd Affidavit and Printout)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 07/13/2004)
715 STATUS REPORT re: activities and expenses report Co−Special Master Margaret G. Farrell; January through June 2004 (jf, ) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
716 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel Adlai Katz on behalf of all plaintiffs (Katz, Daniel) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
717 ORDER re 715 Status Report, 713 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 08/03/2004. (lcesh2, ) (Entered: 08/03/2004)
718 NOTICE by JOY EVANS of Withdraw of Appearance of Regan Bailey (Bagby, Kelly) (Entered: 08/10/2004)

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08/11/2004 08/31/2004 09/01/2004 09/01/2004 09/20/2004
09/20/2004
09/20/2004 09/22/2004 10/03/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004
10/15/2004 10/27/2004
10/27/2004 11/01/2004 11/02/2004 11/02/2004 11/15/2004 11/30/2004 12/01/2004

719 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 08/11/2004)
720 Consent MOTION for Attorney Fees by JOY EVANS. (Attachments: # 1)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 08/31/2004)
Minute ORDER granting 720 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/1/2004. (lcesh2, ) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
721 ORDER re 719 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/1/2004. (lcesh2, ) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
722 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Defendants Monthly Vendor Report August 2004 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Monthly Vendor Report July# 2 # 3 Affidavit Monthly Vendor Maruca Decl. Aug. 04)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
723 STATUS REPORT Monthly Vendor Report for Sept. 04 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exh. 1 Monthly Vendor Report Cheeks Affidavit Aug. 04# 2 Affidavit Menthly Vendor Maruca Sept.04)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
Minute ORDER granting 722 Motion for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/20/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
724 NOTICE of Appearance by Sandra J. Bernstein on behalf of all plaintiffs (Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
725 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 10/03/2004)
726 DEPOSIT of Funds in the amount of $ $250,000.00 into the Court Registry for fees and costs incurred and to be incurred by the Special Masters for FY 2005, (receipt #128419) (jf, ) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 10/14/2004. Status Conference set for 1/6/2005 at 02:15 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 10/22/2004)
727 NOTICE Kelly Bagby Withdrawal of Appearance by JOY EVANS (Bagby, Kelly) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
728 ENTERED IN ERROR.....STATUS REPORT Defendants Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Monthly Vendor Report October# 2 Affidavit Monthly Vendor Maruca Affidavit Exh. 1# 3 Affidavit Defendants Monthly Vendor Report Cheeks Affidavit Exh. 2)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) Modified on 10/28/2004 (jf, ). (Entered: 10/27/2004)
729 MOTION for Extension of Time to file monthly vendor report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (to view document, click on link #728) (jf, ) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
730 ORDER re Special Master payment. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/1/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
731 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
Minute ORDER granting 729 Motion for Extension of Time to file monthly reports. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/2/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
732 STATUS REPORT re: Activities and Expense Report for July through October 2004 by Margaret G. Farrell. (jf, ) (Entered: 11/17/2004)
733 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
734 ORDER re Special Master payments. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/1/04. (lcesh2) (Entered: 12/01/2004)

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12/06/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004
01/03/2005 01/06/2005
01/18/2005 01/18/2005 02/03/2005
02/04/2005 03/01/2005 03/09/2005
03/31/2005 04/04/2005 04/07/2005
04/20/2005 04/20/2005
04/20/2005

735 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
736 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report for October, 2004 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 12/13/2004)
Minute ORDER granting 736 Motion for Extension of Time to File Vendor Report.. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/13/04. (BL, ) (Entered: 12/13/2004)
737 STATUS REPORT on Vendor Payments by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exh. 1 Cheeks Affidavit# 2 Affidavit Exh 2 Cheeks October 04# 3 Affidavit Monthly Vendor Maruca Oct. 04# 4 Affidavit Monthly Vendor Maruca Nov. 04)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 12/13/2004)
738 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 01/03/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 1/6/2005. Status Conference set for 4/7/2005 02:15 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 01/10/2005)
739 NOTICE SM's time December 2004 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
740 NOTICE SM's Consolidated expense report for Nov/Dec 2004 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
741 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293 for the amount of $6,276.12 payable to Margaret G. Farrell and for the amount of $22,587.10 payable to Clarence J. Sundram, Special Masters. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/3/05.(lcesh2, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
742 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report Co−Special Master Clarence J. Sundram January 2005 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 2/8/2005 (jf, ). (Entered: 02/04/2005)
743 NOTICE re: activities and expense report for February 2005 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 3/2/2005 (jf, ). (Entered: 03/01/2005)
744 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the Court's registry, from the escrow account in CA 76−293 for the amount of $9,170.12 payable to Clarence J. Sundram, Special Master. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/9/05.(lcesh2, ) (Entered: 03/09/2005)
745 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $5,030 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/31/05. (lcesh2) (Entered: 03/31/2005)
746 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for March, 2005 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) . (Entered: 04/04/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 4/7/2005. Status Conference set for 8/4/2005 02:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Jon Hundley, Miller Reporting) (gdf) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
747 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
748 STATUS REPORT Monthly Vendor Payments for January to April 2005 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exhibit A (1)# 2 Affidavit Exhibit A (2)# 3 Affidavit Exhibit A (3)# 4 Affidavit Exhibit A (4)# 5 Affidavit Exhibit B (1)# 6 Affidavit Exhibit B (2)# 7 Affidavit Exhibit B (3)# 8 Affidavit Exhibit B (4))(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
Minute ORDER granting 747 Motion for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/20/05. (BL, ) (Entered: 04/20/2005)

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05/09/2005 05/09/2005 05/10/2005 05/16/2005 06/03/2005
06/06/2005 06/09/2005 06/16/2005 07/05/2005 07/06/2005 07/06/2005 07/06/2005 07/11/2005 07/28/2005 08/02/2005 08/04/2005
08/09/2005 08/09/2005 08/09/2005

749 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for April 2005 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 5/10/2005 (jf, ). (Entered: 05/09/2005)
750 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $25,050.40 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/9/05. (lcesh2) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
751 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report Jan, Feb, March 2005 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 05/10/2005)
752 STATUS REPORT Monthly Vendor Payment Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exh. 1 Affidavit Yvette Cheeks# 2 Affidavit Exh. 2 Affidavit Maruca)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
754 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on April 7, 2005 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Jon Hundley (MILLER). The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
753 NOTICE re: Activities and and Expense Report May 2005 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 6/7/2005 (jf, ). (Entered: 06/06/2005)
755 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $12,342.82 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/9/05. (lcesh2) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
756 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $6,648.18 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/16/05.(lcesh2) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
757 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,923.39 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/5/05.(lcesh2) (Entered: 07/05/2005)
758 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report for June 15, 2005 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 07/06/2005)
759 NOTICE Monthly Vendor Report for June, 2005 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit Yvette Cheeks# 2 Affidavit Affidavit of Robert Maruca)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 07/06/2005)
Minute ORDER granting 758 Motion for Extension of Time to File to file vendor report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/6/05. (BL) (Entered: 07/06/2005)
760 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 07/11/2005)
761 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
762 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 08/02/2005)
Minute Entryfor proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 8/4/2005. In Chambers Conference set for 9/14/2005 02:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. Status Conference set for 11/10/2005 02:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Edward Hawkins) (gdf) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
763 Consent MOTION for Attorney Fees by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON. (Attachments: # 1)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
764 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $10,863.93 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/9/05. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
Minute ORDER granting 763 Motion for Attorney Fees and approving Consent Judge. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/9/05. (BL) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

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09/01/2005 09/07/2005 09/15/2005
09/20/2005 09/20/2005
09/20/2005 09/22/2005 10/03/2005 10/05/2005 10/24/2005 11/01/2005 11/03/2005 11/03/2005 11/07/2005 11/08/2005 11/28/2005
12/02/2005 12/12/2005

765 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $20,391.60 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/1/05. (lcesh2) (Entered: 09/01/2005)
766 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for August 2005 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 9/8/2005 (jf, ). (Entered: 09/07/2005)
767 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on August 4, 2005 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Edward N. Hawkins. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 09/16/2005)
768 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Reports by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 09/20/2005)
769 STATUS REPORT Monthly Vendor Payment, June, July and August 2005 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Cheeks June Affidavit# 2 Affidavit Cheeks Affidavit July# 3 Affidavit Cheeks Affidavit August 05# 4 Affidavit Maruca June 05# 5 Affidavit Maruca July 05# 6 Affidavit Maruca August 05)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 09/20/2005)
Minute ORDER granting 768 Motion for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/20/05. (BL) (Entered: 09/20/2005)
770 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report April to July 2005 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
771 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for September 2005 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 10/4/2005 (jf, ). (Entered: 10/03/2005)
772 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $7,771.81 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/5/05. (lcesh2) (Entered: 10/05/2005)
773 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $7,743.18 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/24/2005. (lcesh2) (Entered: 10/24/2005)
774 DEPOSIT of Funds in the amount of $ $837,906.00 into the Court's registry pursuant to order dated 02/09/04; (receipt #139459) (jf, ) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
775 ORDER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $17,923.78 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/03/2005. (lcesh2, ) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
777 QUARTERLY REPORT for the period August 1, 2005 − October 15, 2005 by ELIZABETH L. JONES. (REDACTED) (jf, ) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
NOTICE of Hearing:Status Conference reset for 11/28/2005 at 3:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle; vacating the Status Hearing set for 11/10/05. (gdf) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
776 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 11/28/2005. Status Conference set for 3/2/2006 02:30 AM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
778 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 12/02/2005)
779 ORDER re 776 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,312.41 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/12/2005. (lcesh2) (Entered: 12/12/2005)(lcesh2) (Entered: 12/12/2005)

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01/04/2006 01/04/2006
01/12/2006
01/12/2006 01/17/2006 01/29/2006 01/29/2006 02/06/2006
02/07/2006 02/15/2006 02/16/2006 02/16/2006 02/22/2006 03/02/2006 03/06/2006
03/07/2006 03/10/2006
03/23/2006

780 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
781 ORDER re 778 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,618.56 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/04/2006. (Entered: 1/04/2006) (lcesh2) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
782 MOTION for Attorney Fees by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Judgment)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
Minute ORDER granting 782 Motion for Attorney Fees . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/12/06. (BL, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
783 STIPULATION on Quality Assurance Documents by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
784 NOTICE Expense Report Sep, Oct, Nov 2005 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 01/29/2006)
785 NOTICE Proposed Order by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 01/29/2006)
786 ORDER re 780 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $14,078.43 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/06/2006. (Entered: 02/06/2006) (lcesh2) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
787 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for January 2006 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 2/8/2006 (jf, ). (Entered: 02/07/2006)
788 STATUS REPORT Notice of the Parties' Failure to Agree by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Farano, Richard) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
789 NOTICE of Filing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 02/16/2006)
790 NOTICE of Parties' Failure to Agree by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 02/16/2006)
791 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE COURT (JONES, ELIZABETH, COURT MONITOR) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 3/2/2006. No new date set at this time. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
792 ORDER re 784 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,158.74 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/06/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
793 NOTICE re: Activities and Expense Report for February 2006 by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE). (Entered: 03/07/2006)
794 ORDER re 787 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,896.86 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/10/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court will have a hearing relating to Community Alternatives of Washington, D.C. and its Petition for Voluntary Receiver on Monday, March 27, 2006 at 1:45 p.m. The hearing will be held in Courtroom 26 located on the 4th floor of the Annex. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/23/06. (BL) (Entered: 03/23/2006)

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03/23/2006 03/24/2006 03/24/2006 03/27/2006 03/27/2006
03/29/2006
03/30/2006 03/30/2006 03/31/2006 04/03/2006 04/12/2006 04/14/2006 04/24/2006
05/01/2006 05/03/2006
05/04/2006 05/18/2006 05/24/2006 05/24/2006

795 MOTION for Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Marsha Thompson, Administrator, MRDDA# 2 Exhibit Proposed Order)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 3/27/2006 01:45 PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
796 NOTICE of Filing Amended Proposed Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 795 MOTION for Order (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Amended Order)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
797 NOTICE of A Second Amended Proposed Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 795 MOTION for Order (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Second Amended Order Proposed)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 3/27/2006. In Chambers Conference set for 3/31/2006 12:00 PM in Chambers before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. Status Conference set for 6/29/2006 02:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
798 Consent MOTION for Attorney Fees by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
799 CONSENT JUDGMENT granting 798 Motion for Attorney Fees . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/29/06. (gdf) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
800 NOTICE Activities and Expenses by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
MINUTE ORDER finding as moot 795 Motion for Order . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/31/06. (BL) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
801 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
802 NOTICE of Appearance by Paul J. Kiernan on behalf of all plaintiffs (Kiernan, Paul) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
803 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen Forney Hanlon on behalf of all plaintiffs (Hanlon, Stephen) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
804 ORDER re 793 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $19,533.61 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/24/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
805 ORDER re 800 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $16,659.24 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/1/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
806 ORDER re 801 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $21,903.38 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/3/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 05/03/2006)
807 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
808 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOY EVANS. Attorney Joseph B. Tulman terminated. (Tulman, Joseph) (Entered: 05/18/2006)
809 MOTION to Appoint Receiver by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
810 MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support# 2

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05/24/2006
05/24/2006 05/24/2006 05/24/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 06/01/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006

Text of Proposed Order Proposed Show Cause Order# 3 Exhibit 1 − Criminal Press Release# 4 Exhibit 2 − Incident Report# 5 Exhibit 3 − Press Admissions# 6 Exhibit 4 − October Letter to Court# 7 Exhibit 5 − Sundram Correspondence# 8 Exhibit 6 − 90−Day Plan# 9 Exhibit 7 − December Letter to Court# 10 Exhibit 8 − Progress Report# 11 Exhibit 9 − District Quarterly Letter# 12 Exhibit 10 − Council Prepared Testimony# 13 Exhibit 11 − Notice of Seal# 14 Exhibit 12 − District Response to Monitor# 15 Exhibit 13 − FRC Annual Report# 16 Exhibit 14 − Quality Trust Incident Summary)(Farano, Richard) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
811 MEMORANDUM re 809 MOTION to Appoint Receiver filed by WILLIAM BROWN,, JOY EVANS,, VENITA FELTON,, CHRISTINE EXTON,, JOSEPH SCATES,, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 58 Exhibits filed in hard copy# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
812 MOTION to Seal Document in United States' Exhibit 11 by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order to Seal Documents in United States' Exhibit 11)(Farano, Richard) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court is unable to schedule any pretrial conference prior to June 29, 2006 at 2:00 p.m. At that time, the Court will hold a pretrial conference. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/24/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 812 Motion to Seal Document. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/24/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/29/2006 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
813 Consent MOTION for Attorney Fees by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Judgment)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 813 Consent Motion for Attorney Fees . Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/25/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
814 MOTION to Amend/Correct Proposed Order by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Amended Proposed Order)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 814 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/25/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
815 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on March 2, 2006 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Lisa Walker Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
816 ORDER re 807 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $10,104.48 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/5/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
817 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Receivership and Plaintiff−Intervenor's Motion for an Order to Show Cause by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Plaintiff−intervenor's Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in Civil Contempt is granted to the extent that defendants must respond to both plaintiffs' Motion to Find Defendants in Noncompliance and plaintiff−intervenor's Motion for an Order to Show Cause on or before June 12, 2006. The pretrial conference set for June 29, 2006 will commence at 1:30 p.m. (not as previously scheduled at 2:00 p.m.). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/5/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 06/05/2006)

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06/07/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/19/2006
06/22/2006 06/22/2006
06/26/2006 06/27/2006 06/29/2006
06/29/2006 06/29/2006 07/07/2006
07/07/2006 07/07/2006 07/07/2006 07/07/2006 07/10/2006 07/10/2006 07/11/2006

818 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
819 Memorandum in opposition to re 809 MOTION to Appoint Receiver filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
820 Memorandum in opposition to re 810 MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
821 REPLY to opposition to motion re 810 MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix # 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit 3)(Farano, Richard) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
822 Quarterly Report Status Report due by 6/22/2006. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
823 REPLY to opposition to motion re 809 MOTION to Appoint Receiver filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Transcript# 2 Exhibit Quarterly Report# 3 Exhibit Memo# 4 Exhibit Article# 5 Exhibit Transcript# 6 Exhibit Testimony# 7 Exhibit Testimony# 8 Exhibit Plan)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
MINUTE ORDER denying 817 Motion for Extension of Time as moot. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/26/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
824 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(nmw, ) Modified on 6/29/2006 (nmw, ). (Entered: 06/29/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 6/29/2006. Status Conference set for 7/20/2006 01:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 824 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/29/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
825 ORDER. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/29/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
826 ORDER re 818 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,666.67 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/7/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
827 ENTERED IN ERROR.....MEMORANDUM by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Farano, Richard) Modified on 7/10/2006 (jf, ). (Entered: 07/07/2006)
828 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 825 Order of June 29, 2006 filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
829 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
830 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 825 Order dated June 29, 2006 filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (jf, ) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Document No. re 827 Memorandum was entered in error and re−filed by the Clerk's Office under the correct category(jf, ) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
831 NOTICE (notice re activites and expenses April, May June 2006 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings: Mandatory Settlement Conference set for 7/17/2006 09:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola. (SP, ) (Entered: 07/11/2006)

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07/11/2006 07/12/2006 07/13/2006 07/13/2006
07/13/2006 07/14/2006 07/17/2006 07/20/2006
07/20/2006 08/01/2006 08/01/2006 08/01/2006 08/01/2006 08/02/2006 08/02/2006 08/02/2006 08/03/2006 08/03/2006 08/03/2006 08/03/2006

832 ORDER re referral to Judge Facciola for settlement. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 7/11/06. (SP, ) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola for Settlement. (jsc) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
833 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
834 NOTICE Monthly Vendor Reports by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Yvette Cheeks# 2 Affidavit Maruca 1# 3 Affidavit Maruca 2# 4 Affidavit Maruca 3# 5 Affidavit Maruca 4# 6 Affidavit Maruca 5)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 833 Motion for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/13/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
835 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 825 Order and Reply to Submissions of Defendants and Plaintiff−Intervenor filed by JOY EVANS. (Kiernan, Paul) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola : Settlement Conference held on 7/17/2006. (SP, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 7/20/2006. Scheduling order forth coming. 1st Status Hearing set for 9/28/2006 01:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. 2nd Status Conference set for 10/5/2006 02:00 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Rebecca Stonestreet) (gdf) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
836 ORDER. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/20/06. (MC) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
837 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
838 NOTICE Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Moore Affidavit# 2 Affidavit Maruca Affidavit)(Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
839 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Maria−Claudia T. Amato terminated. (Amato, Maria−Claudia) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
840 NOTICE of Appearance by Martha J. Mullen on behalf of all defendants (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 837 Motion for Extension of Time to File Monthly Vendor Report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/2/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
841 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Proposed Findings of Fact by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 841 Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Findings of Fact. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/2/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
842 Interim Report Status Report due by 8/3/2006.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on August 3, 2006. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
843 NOTICE of Appearance by Martha J. Mullen on behalf of all defendants (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
844 NOTICE of Appearance by Martha J. Mullen on behalf of all defendants (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
845 NOTICE of Appearance by Martha J. Mullen on behalf of all defendants (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/03/2006)

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08/03/2006 08/07/2006 08/07/2006 08/07/2006
08/07/2006 08/07/2006 08/07/2006 08/07/2006 08/07/2006 08/08/2006
08/08/2006 08/08/2006 08/09/2006 08/10/2006

846 NOTICE of Appearance by John D. Dodge on behalf of all defendants (Dodge, John) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
847 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion For Enlargement of Time to File Proposed Findings of Fact by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
848 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Motion for Enlargement of Time by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
849 MOTION to Amend/Correct Unopposed Motion for Enlargement of Time by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum of Points and Authorities# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
850 Proposed Findings of Fact by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 15# 2 Exhibit 16# 3 Exhibit 17# 4 Exhibit 18# 5 Exhibit 19)(Farano, Richard) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
851 MOTION to Seal Document U.S. Exhibits 20, 21, 22 by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Farano, Richard) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 848 Motion for Leave to File Amended Motion for Enlargement of Time. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/7/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 847 Motion to Amend/Correct Motion For Enlargement of Time to File Proposed Findings of Fact. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/7/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 851 Motion to Seal Documents. United States' Exhibits 20, 21, and 22 shall be placed under seal. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/7/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 849 Plaintiffs' Amended Unopposed Motion for Enlargement of Time. Plaintiffs shall file their Proposed Findings of Fact and supporting evidence on or before August 11, 2006; defendants shall file their evidentiary objections to the evidence on or before August 18, 2006; defendants shall file their Proposed Findings of Fact and supporting evidence on or before September 14, 2006; plaintiffs and plaintiff−intervenor shall file their evidentiary objections on or before September 21, 2006. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/8/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/08/2006)
852 ORDER re 829 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,230.58 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/8/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/08/2006)
853 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on June 29, 2006 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Lisa W. Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 08/08/2006)
855 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on July 20, 2006 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Rebecca Stonestreet. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
854 ORDER re 831 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $13,600.53 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/10/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 08/10/2006)

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08/11/2006
08/17/2006 08/18/2006 08/30/2006
08/30/2006 09/01/2006 09/01/2006 09/05/2006 09/05/2006
09/08/2006
09/11/2006 09/15/2006 09/15/2006 09/15/2006 09/18/2006 09/18/2006 09/18/2006

856 Proposed Findings of Fact by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Notice Regarding Exhibit Attachments)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
857 Amended Interim Report Status Report due by 8/17/2006.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/17/06. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
858 NOTICE of Defendants' Evidentiary Objections by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,, (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
859 MEMORANDUM ORDER re Defendants' Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenor's Exhibits in Support of Their Respective Proposed Findings of Fact. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 8/30/06. (SP, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola : Telephone Conference held on 8/30/2006. (SP, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
860 First MOTION for Extension of Time to file Defendants' Findings of Fact by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS. (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola : Status Hearing held on 9/1/2006. (Court Reporter Pro Typist.) (ldc, ) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 9/20/2006 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2 before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola. (SP, ) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Defendants' Consent Motion to Enlarge Time in which Defendants May File Their Proposed Findings of Fact 860 is hereby granted; defendants shall file their proposed findings of fact on or before September 18, 2006. A status conference with Magistrate Judge Facciola is hereby scheduled for September 20, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. Prior to that status, plaintiffs shall file any objections to defendants' proposed findings of fact and a proposed plan for any discovery, all of which must be completed prior to their filing of a joint reply on or before September 27, 2006. The parties shall present on September 20, 2006 a list of all witnesses they intend to present at the hearing now scheduled for October 2, 2006. No discovery shall be taken prior to the parties' September 20, 2006 conference with Magistrate Judge Facciola. The status conference previously scheduled for September 28, 2006 is hereby vacated. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/5/2006. (lcesh2) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
861 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on July 20, 2006 before Judge ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE. Court Reporter: Rebecca Stonestreet. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
862 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
863 MOTION for Extension of Time to by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
864 MOTION for Extension of Time to File July Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
865 NOTICE of Submission of Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 863 and 864 Defendants' Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Monthly Vendor Reports. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/18/2006, nunc pro tunc to 8/15/2006. (lcesh3) (Entered: 09/18/2006)
866 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/18/2006)
867 NOTICE of Defendants Filing Paper Exhibits by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/18/2006)

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09/19/2006 09/20/2006 09/20/2006
09/24/2006 09/26/2006 09/27/2006 10/04/2006
10/05/2006 10/10/2006 10/10/2006 10/11/2006 10/23/2006 10/24/2006 10/31/2006 11/02/2006

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola : Telephone Status Conference held on 9/19/2006; Status Hearing scheduled for 09/20/06 is canceled. (Court Reporter Pro Typist.) (ldc, ) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
Remark: Status conference before Judge Facciola set for 9/20/06 at 9:30 has been cancelled. (SP, ) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
MINUTE ORDER: Pursuant to the telephone status conference that was held before Judge Facciola on 9/19/06, the parties have agreed, and Judge Huvelle has consented, to move the hearing originally scheduled for 10/2/06 to 10/4/06. That hearing will begin at 1:30 p.m. and the parties are reminded that only the issue of liability will be addressed. In addition, the parties indicated at the status conference before Judge Facciola that no live witnesses will be called at the hearing before Judge Huvelle and that, therefore, no further discovery is contemplated. Finally, Judge Huvelle has indicated that the parties need not file additional copies of the monitors' reports as exhibits to their submissions, as those reports have already been filed with the court. This also applies to the next monitor's report, which is due on or before 9/25/06. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 9/20/06.(SP, ) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
868 Quarterly Report Status Report due by 9/25/2006.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on September 24, 2006. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 09/24/2006)
869 NOTICE Expense report July − September 2006 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
870 REPLY of Plaintiffs and the United States to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact 866 filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Farano, Richard) . (Entered: 09/27/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Oral Arguments held on 10/4/2006 re 810 MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,, 809 MOTION to Appoint Receiver filed by WILLIAM BROWN,, JOY EVANS,, VENITA FELTON,, CHRISTINE EXTON,, JOSEPH SCATES,, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. Motions taken under advisment. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith.) (gdf) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 10/5/2006. Status Conference set for 2/1/2007 02:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith.) (gdf) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
871 NOTICE of Filing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
872 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
873 ORDER re 862 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,580.82 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/11/2006. (lcesh3) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
874 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Vendor Reports by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
MINUTE ORDER granting 874 defendants' Unopposed Motion to Late File the Monthly Vendor Report. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/24/2006, nuc pro tunc to 10/16/2006. (KF) (Entered: 10/24/2006)
875 ORDER re 869 that the Clerk of Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $6,326.81 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/31/2006. (KF) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
876 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on October 5, 2006 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Lisa Walker Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 11/03/2006)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 69 of 127

11/02/2006
11/06/2006 11/09/2006 11/15/2006 11/29/2006 11/30/2006 11/30/2006 12/07/2006 12/19/2006 12/19/2006 01/02/2007 01/03/2007 01/10/2007
01/16/2007 01/16/2007 01/18/2007 01/18/2007
01/19/2007 01/19/2007

877 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on October 4, 2006 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Lisa Walker Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
878 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
879 ORDER re 872 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $10,474.00 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/9/2006. (KF) (Entered: 11/09/2006)
880 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for October by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
881 Supplemental REPORT to the Court Status Report due by 11/29/2006.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on November 29, 2006. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 11/29/2006)
882 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Co−Special Master Margaret G. Farrell for Activities and Expenses for July and August 2006.(jeb, ) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
883 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Co−Special Master Margaret G. Farrell for Activities and Expenses for October and November 2006, (jeb, ) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
884 ORDER re 878 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $16,995.27 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/7/2006. (KF) (Entered: 12/07/2006)
885 NOTICE of Filing Vendor Reports Nunc Pro Tunc by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
886 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
887 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 01/02/2007)
888 ORDER re 883 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $5,986 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/3/2007. (KF) (Entered: 01/03/2007)
889 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on June 29, 2006 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Lisa Walker Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 01/12/2007)
890 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
891 STATUS REPORT re: Activities and Expense Report for December 2006 by Margaret G. Farrell. (jf, ) (Entered: 01/17/2007)
892 ORDER re 882 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $14,926.50 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/18/2007. (KF) (Entered: 01/18/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court's Order of October 31, 2006 875 is hereby amended to reflect that the payment to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell approved therein was for work performed and expenses incurred in September 2006. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/18/2007. (KF) (Entered: 01/18/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: The Status Conference currently scheduled for February 1, 2007 is hereby VACATED and RESET for February 6, 2007 at 10:30 a.m. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/19/2007. (KF) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 2/6/2007 10:30 AM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 01/22/2007)

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01/22/2007 01/26/2007 01/26/2007 02/05/2007
02/06/2007 02/08/2007 02/09/2007 02/15/2007 02/15/2007 02/20/2007 02/27/2007 02/27/2007 03/04/2007 03/05/2007 03/09/2007 03/12/2007

893 ORDER re 886 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,128.41 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/22/2007. (KF) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
894 NOTICE of Appearance by Ellen A. Efros on behalf of ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
895 Quarterly Court Monitor's REPORT Status Report due by 1/26/2007.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on January 26, 2007. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
896 NOTICE of Filing of Supplemental Information In Response To Court Monitor's Quarterly Report by ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DDS Comments to Monitor's Draft Report# 2 Affidavit Sawyer Declaration# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 1 to Sawyer Decl.# 4 Exhibit Exhibit 2 to Sawyer Decl.# 5 Exhibit Exhibit 3 to Sawyer Decl.# 6 Exhibit Exhibit 4 to Sawyer Decl.# 7 Exhibit Exhibit 5 to Sawyer Decl.# 8 Exhibit Exhibit 6 to Sawyer Decl.# 9 Exhibit Exhibit 7 to Sawyer Decl.# 10 Affidavit Maruca Declaration# 11 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 1# 12 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 2# 13 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 3# 14 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 4# 15 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 5# 16 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 6# 17 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 7# 18 Exhibit Maruca Attachment 8)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 2/6/2007. Status Conference set for 4/26/2007 02:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter William McAllister.) (gdf) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
897 ORDER re 887 that the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $12,051.97 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/8/2007. (KF) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
898 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 02/09/2007)
899 NOTICE Expense Report January 2007 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
900 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
901 ORDER re 891 that the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $4,307 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/20/2007. (KF) (Entered: 02/20/2007)
902 Unopposed MOTION for Attorney Fees by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Fee Petition)(Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
MINUTE ORDER granting 902 Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Order Granting Plaintiffs' Fee Petition. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/27/2007. (KF) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
903 NOTICE Activites and Expense Report February 2007 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 03/04/2007)
904 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on February 06, 2007 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: William D. McAllister. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
905 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
906 ORDER re 898 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $16,741.46 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/12/2007. (KF) (Entered: 03/12/2007)

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03/15/2007 03/19/2007 03/30/2007
03/30/2007
04/04/2007 04/10/2007 04/13/2007 04/16/2007 04/19/2007 04/20/2007 04/20/2007
04/25/2007 04/25/2007
04/26/2007
05/03/2007 05/03/2007 05/07/2007 05/15/2007

907 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
908 ORDER re 899 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $6,643 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/19/2007. (KF) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
909 ORDER granting in part 809 plaintiffs' Motion to Find the Defendants in Noncompliance and to Appoint a Receiver, as to the issue of liability, and denying 810 plaintiff−intervenor's Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/30/2007. (KF) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
910 MEMORANDUM OPINION re 809 plaintiffs' Motion to Find the Defendants in Noncompliance and to Appoint a Receiver and 810 plaintiff−intervenor's Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/30/2007. (KF) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
911 ORDER re 903 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $5,814 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/4/2007. (KF) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
912 ORDER re 905 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,973.36 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/10/2007. (KF) (Entered: 04/10/2007)
913 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 04/13/2007)
914 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 04/16/2007)
915 Court Monitor's Report Status Report due by 4/19/2007.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on April 19, 2007. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 04/19/2007)
916 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Supplemental Order of Reference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
MINUTE ORDER granting 916 the parties' Joint Motion to Enlarge Time in Which to File a Supplemental Order of Reference. The parties shall have up to and including May 4, 2007 to file a supplemental order of reference. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/20/2007. (KF) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Supplemental Order of Reference due by 5/4/2007. (gdf) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
917 NOTICE of Filing of Supplemental Information by ADRIAN FENTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Fenty Administration Reform Plan# 2 Exhibit DDS Organization Work Plan# 3 Exhibit Systems Improvement Plan)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 4/26/2007. Status Conference set for 8/9/2007 02:30 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith.) (gdf) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
918 NOTICE of Filing Supplemental Order of Reference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
920 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER of reference to Margaret G. Farrell and Clarence J. Sundram, Special Masters. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/3/07. (gdf) (Entered: 05/08/2007)
919 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 05/07/2007)
921 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 05/15/2007)

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05/16/2007 05/18/2007 05/24/2007 06/05/2007 06/07/2007 06/08/2007 06/15/2007 06/22/2007
07/05/2007
07/09/2007 07/16/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/09/2007
08/14/2007 08/15/2007
08/29/2007 08/29/2007

922 ORDER re 914 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $5,875 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/16/2007. (KF) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
923 NOTICE of Filing Medicaid and Staffing Update by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 05/18/2007)
924 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
925 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
926 NOTICE Expense report April May 2007 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
927 ORDER re 919 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $17,038.88 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/8/2007. (KF) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
928 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
929 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on April 26, 2007 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 06/25/2007)
930 ORDER re 925 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No.76−293 the amount of $7,229.58 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/5/2007. (lcesh1) (Entered: 07/05/2007)
931 ORDER re 926 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $7,154 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/9/2007. (KF) (Entered: 07/09/2007)
932 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report July 2007 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
933 STATUS REPORT Status Report due by 8/2/2007.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on August 2, 2007. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 8/2/2007. (gdf) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 8/9/2007.Status Conference set for 9/12/2007 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
934 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Reports by ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/14/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties shall meet with the Special Masters to develop and submit for the Court's approval an agreed−upon order setting forth a limited number of concrete, short−term goals relating to retaining and increasing the number of qualified providers and improving the health and safety of class members. The proposed order shall be submitted to the Court on or before September 7, 2007. A status conference is hereby set for September 12, 2007, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 14. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/15/2007. (KF) (Entered: 08/15/2007)
935 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE of Appearance of Peter Nickles by ADRIAN FENTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Efros, Ellen) Modified on 8/29/2007 (jf, ). (Entered: 08/29/2007)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Document No. re 935 Notice (Other) was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading in accordance with LCvR 5.4. (jf, ) (Entered: 08/29/2007)

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08/30/2007 09/11/2007 09/12/2007
09/12/2007
09/12/2007 09/17/2007 09/24/2007 09/24/2007
09/26/2007 10/01/2007 10/12/2007 10/29/2007 10/29/2007
10/30/2007
11/02/2007 11/08/2007 11/08/2007

936 NOTICE of Appearance by Peter J. Nickles on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Nickles, Peter) (Entered: 08/30/2007)
937 NOTICE of Filing of Proposed Order by ADRIAN FENTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 09/11/2007)
Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle : Status Conference held on 9/12/2007.Status Conference set for 1/17/2008 02:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Crystal Pilgrim.) (gdf) (Entered: 09/12/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties shall file with the Court the agreed−upon methodology to be used by the Court Monitor to monitor defendants' compliance with the requirements of the 2001 Plan and the existing Court Orders by January 10, 2008. As soon thereafter as possible, the Court Monitor shall submit to the Court a budget for the proposed monitoring project. A status conference is hereby set for January 17, 2008, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 14. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/12/2007. (KF) (Entered: 09/12/2007)
938 ORDER. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/12/07. (gdf) (Entered: 09/12/2007)
939 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/17/2007)
940 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report, June, July and August 2007 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
941 TRANSCRIPT of Status Hearing held on August 9, 2007 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf, ) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
942 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
943 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
944 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
945 ORDER re 940 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $10,631.68 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/29/2007. (KF) (Entered: 10/29/2007)
946 ORDER re 942 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $29,471.37 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/29/2007. (KF) (Entered: 10/29/2007)
947 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on September 12, 2007 before Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle. Court Reporter: Crystal M. Pilgrim. The public may view the document in the Clerk's Office between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, Monday through Friday. (jf) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
948 ORDER re 943 that the Clerk of Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $16,030.81 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/2/2007. (KF) (Entered: 11/02/2007)
949 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Given the urgency of the matter, defendants must file their objections, if any, to the Special Masters' Report & Recommendation Regarding Court Monitor's Authority to Conduct Proposed Monitoring 949 on or before November 21, 2007. Plaintiff and plaintiff−intervenor must file any response to defendants' objections on or before December 4, 2007. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/8/2007. (KF) (Entered: 11/08/2007)

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11/15/2007 11/21/2007 11/21/2007 11/23/2007
11/29/2007
12/03/2007 12/14/2007 12/17/2007 12/18/2007 12/26/2007 01/04/2008 01/10/2008 01/15/2008 01/15/2008 01/16/2008 01/28/2008 02/05/2008 02/07/2008 02/14/2008 02/15/2008

950 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 11/15/2007)
951 NOTICE Concerning Proposed Comprehensive Monitoring by ADRIAN FENTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
952 NOTICE Comments Concerning Special Masters' Report & Recommendation Regarding Court Monitor's Authority To Conduct Proposed Monitoring by ADRIAN FENTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the Special Masters' Report and Recommendation Regarding Court Monitor's Authority to Conduct Proposed Monitoring 949 and the lack of opposition thereto, as reflected in defendants' comments 952 , the Court affirms the Report and Recommendation. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/23/2007. (KF) (Entered: 11/23/2007)
953 RESPONSE re 951 Notice (Other) Concerning Proposed Monitoring Protocol filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 11/29/2007)
954 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 12/03/2007)
955 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report September, October and November 2007 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 12/14/2007)
956 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
957 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 12/18/2007)
958 NOTICE Special Masters' Order Regarding Procedures for Determining Defendants' Compliance with the Court's September 12, 2007 Order by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 12/26/2007)
959 ORDER re 954 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $10,244.50 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/4/2008. (VT) (Entered: 01/04/2008)
960 Quarterly Court Monitor's ReportStatus Report due by 1/10/2008.. Signed by Ellen S. Huvelle on January 10, 2008. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 01/10/2008)
961 ORDER re 955 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $7,772.41 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/15/2008. (VT) (Entered: 01/15/2008)
962 NOTICE of Filing January 2008 Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 01/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference now set for January 17, 2008 at 2:00 p.m. is hereby vacated and reset for February 6, 2008 at 2:30 p.m. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/16/2008. (VT) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 2/6/2008 02:30 AM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 01/28/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference currently scheduled for February 6, 2008 at 2:30 p.m. is hereby vacated. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 2/5/2008. (VT) (Entered: 02/05/2008)
963 NOTICE Activites and Expense Report for December 2007 and January 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 02/07/2008)
964 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 02/14/2008)
965 NOTICE of Filing Montly Vendor Report for February 2008 by ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Attachments)(Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 02/15/2008)

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03/10/2008 03/17/2008 03/17/2008 03/18/2008 03/26/2008 04/02/2008 04/10/2008 04/15/2008 04/28/2008 05/05/2008 05/07/2008
05/08/2008 05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/13/2008 05/13/2008
05/15/2008 05/15/2008
05/16/2008

966 ORDER re 963 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $8,686.50 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/10/2008. (VT) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
967 ORDER re 964 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $23,180.66 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/17/2008. (VT) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
968 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for March 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: A status conference is hereby set for May 15, 2008, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 14. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/18/2008. (VT) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 5/15/2008 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 03/26/2008)
969 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 04/02/2008)
970 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report February March 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
971 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report and Exhibits A−B for March Payments by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 04/15/2008)
972 NOTICE of Appearance by Grace Graham on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
973 ORDER re 969 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $16,747.00 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/5/2008. (VT) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
974 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen Forney Hanlon on behalf of JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Hanlon, Stephen) Modified on 5/8/2008 (jf, ). (Entered: 05/07/2008)
975 QUARTERLY REPORT Status Report due by 5/8/2008. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 8, 2008. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
976 NOTICE of Filing by ADRIAN FENTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Health Care Agreement)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
977 NOTICE of Appearance by Sharon Yvette Eubanks on behalf of JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Eubanks, Sharon) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
978 ORDER re 970 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $4,591.50 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/13/2008. (VT) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
979 MOTION to Stay Discovery by ADRIAN FENTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Health Care Agreement, # 2 Exhibit Sawyer Declaration 5 13 08, # 3 Exhibit Nuss Declaration 5 13 08, # 4 Exhibit Sawyer Declaration 2 5 07, # 5 Exhibit Proposed Procedural Schedule, # 6 Exhibit Defendants' 5 5 08 Comments to CM's Report)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
980 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for April 2008 by ADRIAN FENTY (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 5/15/2008. Status Conference set for 9/25/2008 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: For the reasons stated in open court on May 15, 2008, Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery 979 is denied. Plaintiffs are ordered to file a listing of all possible remedies that they will be proposing as part of the remedial phase of this

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05/19/2008 05/27/2008 05/28/2008 06/03/2008 06/13/2008 06/16/2008 06/17/2008 06/23/2008 06/23/2008 06/24/2008 06/30/2008 07/03/2008 07/03/2008 07/07/2008 07/08/2008 07/09/2008 07/09/2008 07/09/2008
07/10/2008

litigation on or before June 13, 2008. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/16/2008. (VT) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
981 SCHEDULING ORDER:Status Conference set for 9/25/2008 02:30 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (See Order for detail) Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/15/08. (gdf) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
982 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report April 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
983 NOTICE by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Farano, Richard) (Entered: 05/28/2008)
984 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 06/03/2008)
985 NOTICE Plaintiffs' Filing on Remedies by JOSEPH SCATES (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 06/13/2008)
986 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for May 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
987 NOTICE of Filing Amended Submission for Monthly Vendors Report May 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 06/17/2008)
988 NOTICE of Appearance by William G. Maddox on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Maddox, William) (Entered: 06/23/2008)
989 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Attorney Richard James Farano terminated. (Farano, Richard) (Entered: 06/23/2008)
990 NOTICE of Appearance by Nicholas George Karambelas on behalf of WE CARE PROJECTS,INC (Karambelas, Nicholas) (Entered: 06/24/2008)
991 ORDER re 982 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $16,006.00 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/30/2008. (VT) (Entered: 06/30/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: A status conference is hereby set for July 9, 2008, at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 14. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/3/2008. (VT) (Entered: 07/03/2008)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/9/2008 at 1:30 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 07/03/2008)
992 ORDER re 984 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,299.18 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/7/2008. (VT) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
993 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report, June 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 07/08/2008)
994 Endorsed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney s by WE CARE PROJECTS,INC (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Leave to Withdraw Appearances)(Ralston, David) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
MINUTE ORDER granting 994 Foley & Lardner LLP's and David T. Ralston, Jr.'s Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appearances. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/9/2008. (VT) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 7/9/2008. The court vacates the 9/25/08 status. New Status Conference set for 9/18/2008 02:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Annie Shaw) (gdf) (Entered: 07/10/2008)
995 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 07/10/2008)

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07/11/2008 996 NOTICE Order Regarding July 25, 2008 Status Conference by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

07/15/2008 997 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for July 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 07/15/2008)

07/28/2008

ENTERED IN ERROR.....MINUTE ORDER: The Scheduling Order in this case is hereby modified to reflect that the Pretrial Conference currently scheduled for October 17, 2008 is VACATED and RESET for November 7, 2008. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/28/2008. (VT) (Entered: 07/28/2008)

07/28/2008

MINUTE ORDER: The Scheduling Order in this case is hereby modified to reflect that the Pretrial Conference before the Special Masters currently scheduled for October 17, 2008 is VACATED and RESET for November 7, 2008. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/28/2008. (VT) (Entered: 07/28/2008)

08/08/2008 998 ORDER re 993 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,774.92 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/8/2008. (VT) (Entered: 08/08/2008)

08/11/2008 999 ORDER re 995 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $35,358.89 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/11/2008. (VT) (Entered: 08/11/2008)

08/14/2008 1000 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for August by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/14/2008)

08/15/2008 1001 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 8/18/2008 (td, ). (Entered: 08/15/2008)

08/15/2008

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1001 Notice (Other) was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading. (td, ) (Entered: 08/18/2008)

08/18/2008

NOTICE re 1001 Notice (Other); emailed to cjsundram@alumni.ksg.harvard.edu, cc'd 21 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Please refile document, 2. Select the correct event under Other Documents, then select Report & Recommendations−Special Master. (td, ) (Entered: 08/18/2008)

08/18/2008 1002 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of Special Master Clarence Sundram regarding Defendants' Compliance with the Consent Order of 9/12/07. (jeb, ) (Entered: 08/18/2008)

08/21/2008

MINUTE ORDER: The Scheduling Order 981 is hereby amended to reflect that the parties shall complete the taking of depositions by September 26, 2008. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/21/2008. (VT) (Entered: 08/21/2008)

08/26/2008 1003 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert N. Weiner on behalf of ELIZABETH L. JONES (Weiner, Robert) (Entered: 08/26/2008)

08/29/2008 1004 NOTICE of Filing Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Court Appointed Expert by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/29/2008)

09/08/2008 1005 Special Master's MEMORANDUM ORDER by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) Modified on 9/15/2008 (jf, ). (Entered: 09/08/2008)

09/10/2008 1006 STATUS REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 9/10/2008. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 10, 2008. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 09/10/2008)

09/11/2008

1007

NOTICE of Filing the Report of the District of Columbia Department on Disability Services for the Fiscal Year 2008 for the Period April 1 through August 10, 2008 by ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Report (UNDER SEAL) # 2 Report Attachment 1, # 3 Report Attachment 2, # 4 Report Attachment 3 # (FILED UNDER SEAL) (5) Report Attachment 4, # 6 Report Attachment 5, # 7 Report Attachment 6)(Graham, Grace) Modified on 9/17/2008 (jeb, ) (Entered: 09/11/2008)

09/12/2008 1008 RESPONSE Court Monitor's Quarterly Report filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 09/12/2008)

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09/15/2008 1009 MOTION to Quash Deposition by ELIZABETH L. JONES (Weiner, Robert) (Entered: 09/15/2008)

09/15/2008 1010 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for September 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/15/2008)

09/15/2008 1011 MOTION for Order to Modify the Special Masters' Report & Recommendation, Consistent with Defendants' Objections, to Find the Defendants in Compliance with the Consent Order of September 12, 2007 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 09/15/2008)

09/16/2008 1012 NOTICE by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 09/16/2008)

09/17/2008

1013

MOTION for Order to Redact Certain Portions of Defendants' Recently Filed Report of the District of Columbia Department on Disability Services ("DDS") for the Fiscal Year 2008 For The Period April 1 Through August 10, 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Revised page 16 to Progress Report, # 2 Redacted Exhibit 3 − part one, # 3 Redacted Exhibit 3 − part two)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 09/17/2008)

09/17/2008 1014 RESPONSE Defendants' Comments to the Court Monitor's September 1, 2008 Draft Report filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Comments to the September 1, 2008 Draft Report)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 09/17/2008)

09/17/2008 1015 RESPONSE Defendants Comments To the Court Monitor's Draft April 24, 2008 Report filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Letter from Nuss, # 2 Comments to Draft Report)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 09/17/2008)

09/17/2008

MINUTE ORDER denying 1013 defendants' Motion to Redact Certain Portions of Defendants' Recently Filed Report of the District of Columbia Department on Disability Services ("DDS") for the Fiscal Year 2008 For the Period April 1 Through August 10, 2008. The Court cannot effectuate the request. In the alternative, the Court has placed the report and Attachment 3 under seal. Defendants are ordered to refile the report and Attachment 3 with redactions. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/17/2008. (VT) Modified on 9/22/2008 (gdf, ). (Entered: 09/17/2008)

09/18/2008

MINUTE ORDER granting 1009 the Court Monitor's Motion to Quash Deposition, except that the Court Monitor will respond to a reasonable number of interrogatories limited to the methodology she used in preparing her 2008 reports. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/18/2008. (VT) (Entered: 09/18/2008)

09/18/2008

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 9/18/2008. Denied motion 1009 to quashed. Granting motion 1013 to redact. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 09/22/2008)

09/19/2008 1018 ORDER denying plaintiffs' motion for court appointed expert. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/18/08. (gdf) (Entered: 09/22/2008)

09/22/2008 1016 NOTICE Expense and Activities Report July and August 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 09/22/2008)

09/22/2008 1017 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 09/22/2008)

09/25/2008 1019 Amended MOTION for Order to Redact Certain Portions of Defendants' Recently Filed Progress Report for the Period April 1 through August 10, 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Progress Report (Redacted), # 2 Exhibit 3 (Redacted))(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 09/25/2008)

09/25/2008

1020

NOTICE of Filing of the Redacted Version of the Report of the District of Columbia Department on Disability Services ("DDS") for the Fiscal Year 2008 for the Period April 1 through August 10, 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Redacted Progress Report, # 2 Attachment 1, # 3 Attachment 2, # 4 Attachment 3 (redacted), # 5 Attachment 4, # 6 Attachment 5, # 7 Attachment 6)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 09/25/2008)

09/26/2008

MINUTE ORDER denying as moot 1019 defendants' Amended Motion to Redact Certain Portions of Defendants' Recently Filed Report of the District of Columbia Department on Disability Services ("DDS") for the Fiscal Year 2008 for the Period

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April 1 Through August 10, 2008. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 9/26/2008. (VT) (Entered: 09/26/2008)

10/06/2008

MINUTE ORDER: As stated in open Court on September 18, 2008, the Court will hold 1011 Defendants' Motion to Modify the Special Masters' Report & Recommendation in abeyance. Plaintiffs need not file an opposition to the motion until further order of the Court. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/6/2008. (VT) (Entered: 10/06/2008)

10/08/2008 1021 NOTICE of Filing by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 10/08/2008)

10/08/2008 1022 NOTICE of Filing Direct Testimony by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 10/08/2008)

10/15/2008 1023 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants' Opinion Testimony by JOY EVANS (Kiernan, Paul) (Entered: 10/15/2008)

10/15/2008 1024 MEMORANDUM in support of 1023 Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendants' Opinion Testimony by JOY EVANS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Kiernan, Paul) Modified on 11/12/2008 (jf, ). (Entered: 10/15/2008)

10/15/2008 1025 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for October 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/15/2008)

10/15/2008 1026 First MOTION in Limine to Exclude Opinion Testimony of Martha Knisely and Lewis Spence by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/15/2008)

10/15/2008 1027 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order to Keep the Record Open by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/15/2008)

10/24/2008 1029 ORDER re 1017 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,098.89 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/24/2008. (VT) (Entered: 10/24/2008)

10/24/2008 1030 ORDER re 1016 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $12,426.33 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/24/2008. (VT) (Entered: 10/24/2008)

10/24/2008 1031 NOTICE by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 10/24/2008)

10/28/2008 1032 PRETRIAL STATEMENT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/28/2008)

10/29/2008 1033 Memorandum in opposition to re 1027 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order to Keep the Record Open filed by JOY EVANS. (Kiernan, Paul) (Entered: 10/29/2008)

10/29/2008 1034 Memorandum in opposition to re 1026 First MOTION in Limine to Exclude Opinion Testimony of Martha Knisely and Lewis Spence filed by JOY EVANS. (Kiernan, Paul) (Entered: 10/29/2008)

10/29/2008 1035 Memorandum in opposition to re 1024 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants' Opinion Testimony filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 10/29/2008)

10/31/2008 1036 ORDER re 1027 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order to Keep the Record Open by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) Modified on 11/3/2008 (jf, ). (Entered: 10/31/2008)

11/03/2008

NOTICE OF ERROR re 1036 Notice (Other); emailed to cjsundram@alumni.ksg.harvard.edu, cc'd 22 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Incorrect event used, 2. Entry has been modified as an ORDER to # 1027 ; DO NOT REFILE (jf, ) (Entered: 11/03/2008)

11/03/2008 1037 ORDER denying 1026 Motion in Limine (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/03/2008)

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11/03/2008 1038 ORDER denying 1023 Motion in Limine (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/03/2008)

11/04/2008 1039 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/04/2008)

11/14/2008 1040 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. Attorney Sharon Yvette Eubanks terminated. (Eubanks, Sharon) (Entered: 11/14/2008)

11/17/2008 1041 ORDER re 1031 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $24,405.70 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 11/17/2008. (VT) (Entered: 11/17/2008)

11/17/2008 1042 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for November 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 11/17/2008)

11/28/2008 1043 PRETRIAL ORDER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Rulings on Objections to Plaintiffs' Exhibits)(SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/28/2008)

12/03/2008 1044 NOTICE of Filing Objections to 1043 Special Masters' Rulings by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) . (Entered: 12/03/2008)

12/04/2008 1045 Consent MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Laura Fernandez, :Firm− Holland & Knight LLP, :Address− 2099 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 100, Washington, D.C. 20006. Phone No. − 202−457−1833. Fax No. − 202−955−5564 by JOY EVANS (Kiernan, Paul) (Entered: 12/04/2008)

12/04/2008 1046 REPLY Opposition to Defendants' Filing of Supplemental Testimony and Proposed New Exhibits filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Costanzo, Cathy) Modified on 12/5/2008 (jf, ). Modified on 12/8/2008 (jf, ). (Entered: 12/04/2008)

12/04/2008

MINUTE ORDER granting 1045 Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Admission of Laura Fernandez Pro Hac Vice. Laura Fernandez is admitted pro hac vice to practice before this Court for the purpose of representing plaintiffs in the captioned matter. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/4/2008. (VT) (Entered: 12/04/2008)

12/05/2008 1047 RESPONSE to Defendants' 1044 Objections to Special Masters' Pretrial Order filed by JOY EVANS. (Kiernan, Paul) Modified on 12/5/2008 (jf, ). (Entered: 12/05/2008)

12/05/2008 1048 ORDER re 1039 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $20,745.40 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/5/2008. (VT) (Entered: 12/05/2008)

12/05/2008 1049 REPLY to Plaintiffs' 1046 Opposition to Defendants' Supplemental Testimony and Exhibits filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) . (Entered: 12/05/2008)

12/08/2008 1050 ORDER re 1046 Reply to Document, filed by JOY EVANS, JOHN KENNEDY, JR., WILLIAM BROWN, JOSEPH SCATES, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 12/08/2008)

12/08/2008 1051 REPLY re 1047 to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Objections to the Final Pretrial Order filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) Modified on 12/9/2008 (nmw, ). (Entered: 12/08/2008)

12/09/2008

1052

NOTICE of Objections to the Special Masters' December 8, 2008 Order Regarding the Filing of Supplemental Testimony and Exhibits and Requesting Emergency Review by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 1050 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Nuss December 4 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Nuss October 8 Declaration)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 12/09/2008)

12/15/2008 1053 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Exhibit A to Defendants' Notice of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for December 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 12/15/2008)

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12/15/2008 1054 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for December 2008 with Declaration B by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 12/15/2008)

12/16/2008

MINUTE ORDER granting 1053 defendants' Motion to Enlarge Time in Which to File Exhibit A to Defendants' Notice of Filing Monthly Vendor Report. Defendants shall file Exhibit A on or before January 15, 2009. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 12/16/2008. (VT) (Entered: 12/16/2008)

12/17/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants Exhibit (A) due by 1/15/2009. (gdf) (Entered: 12/17/2008)

12/19/2008 1055 NOTICE of Filing by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 12/19/2008)

12/19/2008 1056 NOTICE Activity and expense report September 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) . (Entered: 12/20/2008)

12/19/2008 1057 NOTICE Activity and expense report October 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 12/20/2008)

12/27/2008 1058 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report November 2008 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 12/27/2008)

12/29/2008 1059 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 12/29/2008)

01/05/2009 1060 NOTICE of Filing by ADRIAN FENTY re 1055 Notice (Other) (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 01/05/2009)

01/08/2009 1061 MOTION to Strike by JOY EVANS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Fernandez, Laura) (Entered: 01/08/2009)

01/15/2009 1062 NOTICE of Filing January 2009 Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 01/15/2009)

01/15/2009 1063 NOTICE of Filing December 2008 Supplemental Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 01/15/2009)

01/16/2009 1064 NOTICE of Filing Amended Vendor Report for December 2008 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 01/16/2009)

01/21/2009

MINUTE ORDER: A status conference is hereby set for March 12, 2009, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 14. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/21/2009. (VT) (Entered: 01/21/2009)

01/21/2009 1065 Memorandum in opposition to re 1061 MOTION to Strike Kathy Sawyer's Declaration and Deposition Designations filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 01/21/2009)

01/21/2009 1066 (AMENDED) Memorandum in opposition to re 1061 MOTION to Strike Kathy Sawyer's Declaration and Deposition Designations by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) Modified on 1/22/2009 (jf, ). (Entered: 01/21/2009)

01/21/2009 1067 ORDER re 1056 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $6,401.80 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/21/2009. (VT) (Entered: 01/21/2009)

01/21/2009 1068 ORDER re 1057 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $8,364.00 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/21/2009. (VT) (Entered: 01/21/2009)

01/22/2009

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 3/12/2009 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 01/22/2009)

01/27/2009 1069 ORDER re 1058 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,096.00 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/27/2009. (VT) (Entered: 01/27/2009)

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01/28/2009 1070 ORDER re 1059 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $34,137.63 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/28/2009. (VT) (Entered: 01/28/2009)

01/28/2009 1071 NOTICE by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 01/28/2009)

01/30/2009 1072 NOTICE of Filing by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 01/30/2009)

01/30/2009 1073 NOTICE of Service of Amicus Curiae Brief on Special Masters and parties by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC. (Klise, Joseph) (Entered: 01/30/2009)

01/30/2009 1074 NOTICE of Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 01/30/2009)

02/02/2009 1075 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 1061 Motion to Strike (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 02/02/2009)

02/03/2009 1076 Proposed Findings of Fact by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Pages 41−92)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 02/03/2009)

02/03/2009 1077 TRIAL BRIEF on Remedies by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 02/03/2009)

02/03/2009 1078 AMICUS BRIEF by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. (nmw, ) (Entered: 02/04/2009)

02/12/2009 1079 NOTICE Expense Report January 2009 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 02/12/2009)

02/17/2009 1080 MOTION to Strike Evidence not Presented at Trial and the Special Masters' Findings of Fact and Recommendations Regarding the September 12, 2007 Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 02/17/2009)

02/17/2009 1081 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for February 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 02/17/2009)

02/18/2009 1082 MOTION for Leave to File Defendants' Post−Trial Brief Regarding Remedy by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 − December 19, 2008 Email, # 2 Attachment − Defendants' Brief Regarding Remedy)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 02/18/2009)

02/18/2009

1083

NOTICE of Defendants' Objections to the Special Masters' Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Kathy Sawyer by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 1075 Order on Motion to Strike (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit One − Trial Transcript Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit Two − Plaintiffs' Deposition Excerpts (Sawyer), # 3 Exhibit Three − Sawyer Declaration)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 02/18/2009)

02/27/2009 1084 REPLY RE 1083 to Defendants' Objections to Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Strike filed by JOY EVANS. (Fernandez, Laura) Modified on 3/2/2009 (nmw, ). (Entered: 02/27/2009)

03/02/2009 1085 ORDER re 1071 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $14,035.20 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/2/2009. (VT) (Entered: 03/02/2009)

03/02/2009 1086 Memorandum in opposition to re 1080 MOTION to Strike Evidence not Presented at Trial and the Special Masters' Findings of Fact and Recommendations Regarding the September 12, 2007 Order filed by JOY EVANS. (Fernandez, Laura) (Entered: 03/02/2009)

03/04/2009 1087 NOTICE Expense and activities report February 2009 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 03/04/2009)

03/05/2009 1088 STATUS REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 3/5/2009. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 5, 2009. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 03/05/2009)

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03/06/2009

1089

ENTERED IN ERROR.....REPLY to opposition to motion re 1080 MOTION to Strike Evidence not Presented at Trial and the Special Masters' Findings of Fact and Recommendations Regarding the September 12, 2007 Order filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) Modified on 3/9/2009 (znmw, ). (Entered: 03/06/2009)

03/06/2009 1090 REPLY re 1083 to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants Objections to the Special Masters' Order Striking the Declaration of Kathy Sawyer filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) Modified on 3/9/2009 (znmw, ). (Entered: 03/06/2009)

03/09/2009 1091 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1080 MOTION to Strike Evidence not Presented at Trial and the Special Masters' Findings of Fact and Recommendations Regarding the September 12, 2007 Order filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/09/2009)

03/09/2009 1092 NOTICE of Filing Report to the Court on Status Reform Initiatives for Health, Safety and Welfare by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/09/2009)

03/09/2009 1093 NOTICE Second Notice of Filing: Defendants' Comments to Court Monitor's March Quaterly Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/09/2009)

03/09/2009 1094 NOTICE Third Notice of Filing Report on DDS August 2008 through January 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/09/2009)

03/12/2009

ENTERED IN ERROR.....PER CHAMBERS.....MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 1011 Defendants' Motion to Modify the Special Masters' Report and Recommendation and 1080 Defendants' Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/12/2009. (VT) Modified on 3/17/2009 (td, ). (Entered: 03/12/2009)

03/12/2009

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 3/12/2009. New Status Conference set for 6/18/2009 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 04/01/2009)

03/16/2009 1095 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 03/16/2009)

03/16/2009 1096 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for March 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/16/2009)

03/16/2009 1097 ORDER re 1079 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $4,489.20 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/16/2009. (VT) (Entered: 03/16/2009)

03/16/2009 1098 Special Master's Order granting 1082 MOTION for Leave to File Defendants' Post−Trial Brief Regarding Remedy by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) Modified on 3/19/2009 (jf, ). (Entered: 03/16/2009)

03/17/2009 1099 ORDER (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 03/17/2009)

03/18/2009 1100 NOTICE of Filing Amended Monthly Vendor Report for March 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 03/18/2009)

03/30/2009 1101 OBJECTIONS re 1098 to Special Masters' Ruling Denying Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Special Maters' Findings Regarding the September 12, 2007 Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) Modified text and link on 3/31/2009 (nmw, ). (Entered: 03/30/2009)

03/31/2009 1102 NOTICE of Appearance by Sarah Ann Sulkowski on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 03/31/2009)

04/02/2009

1103

RESPONSE re 1101 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) Plaintiffs' Opposition to District of Columbia Defendants' Objections to Special Masters' Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Special Masters' Findings Regarding the September 12, 2007 Order filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 04/02/2009)

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04/06/2009 1104 ORDER re 1087 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $7,085.60 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/6/2009. (VT) (Entered: 04/06/2009)

04/10/2009 1105 NOTICE Expense Report March 2009 by Special Master Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 04/10/2009)

04/15/2009 1106 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for April 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 04/15/2009)

04/16/2009 1107 ORDER re 1095 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $13,904.95 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 4/16/2009. (VT) (Entered: 04/16/2009)

04/20/2009 1108 MOTION to Dismiss and to Vacate Consent Orders by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Laura Nuss, # 2 Exhibit CMS Letter, # 3 Declaration David Jackson, # 4 Declaration William Singer, # 5 Declaration Donnell Ferguson)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 04/20/2009)

04/20/2009 1109 MOTION to Vacate orders of reference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Declaration William Singer, # 2 Exhibit Trial Transcript, # 3 Exhibit Status Hearing Transcript 8 9 07, # 4 Exhibit Status Hearing Transcript 5 15 08)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 04/20/2009)

04/30/2009 1110 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by JOY EVANS (Fernandez, Laura) (Entered: 04/30/2009)

05/01/2009

MINUTUE ORDER: The Court is in receipt of 1110 Plaintiffs' Consent Motion for Enlargement of Time. This motion is GRANTED, but the Court intends to hold defendants' motions in abeyance until it has received the Report and Recommendation from the Special Masters. Therefore, no opposition to these motions shall be filed until further order of the Court. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/1/2009. (VT) (Entered: 05/01/2009)

05/04/2009 1111 ENTERED IN ERROR.....Memorandum in opposition to re 1109 MOTION to Vacate orders of reference to the Special Masters filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Maddox, William) Modified on 5/4/2009 (rdj). (Entered: 05/04/2009)

05/04/2009 1112 ENTERED IN ERROR.....Memorandum in opposition to re 1108 MOTION to Dismiss and to Vacate Consent Orders and to Dismiss Action filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Maddox, William) Modified on 5/4/2009 (rdj). (Entered: 05/04/2009)

05/04/2009

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1112 Memorandum in Opposition, 1111 Memorandum in Opposition was entered in error on the request of counsel and said pleadings will not be refiled. (rdj) (Entered: 05/04/2009)

05/07/2009 1113 NOTICE Expense and Activities Report April 2009 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 05/07/2009)

05/11/2009 1114 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 05/11/2009)

05/11/2009 1115 ORDER re 1105 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of 11,227.20 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/11/2009. (VT) (Entered: 05/11/2009)

05/15/2009 1116 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for April 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/29/2009 1117 NOTICE Activites and Expense Report May 2009 by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 05/29/2009)

06/03/2009 1118 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 06/03/2009)

06/08/2009 1119 ORDER re 1113 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of 16,375.20 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/8/2009. (VT) (Entered: 06/08/2009)

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06/11/2009 1120 ORDER re 1114 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $31,908.40 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/11/2009. (VT) (Entered: 06/11/2009)

06/11/2009 1121 STATUS REPORT ORDERCourt Monitor's Quarterly Report Status Report due by 6/11/2009. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 11, 2009. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 06/11/2009)

06/15/2009 1122 NOTICE of filing declaration by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Laura L. Nuss)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 06/15/2009)

06/15/2009 1123 NOTICE of Filing May 2009 Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 06/15/2009)

06/18/2009

Minute Entry for Status Conference held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/18/09 : Further Status Conference scheduled for 8/19/09 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. At that time a briefing schedule will be set, including the filing date of a paginated Administrative Record. (Court Reporter : Catalina Kerr) (kk) (Entered: 06/19/2009)

06/29/2009 1124 ORDER re 1117 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of 33,244.22 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/29/2009. (VT) (Entered: 06/29/2009)

07/06/2009 1125 ORDER re 1118 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $40,322.61 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/6/2009. (VT) (Entered: 07/06/2009)

07/10/2009 1126 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority and Request for Briefing Schedule by ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Copy of Horne)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 07/10/2009)

07/13/2009

ORDER: As the Court indicated at the last status conference, a briefing schedule regarding defendants' pending motions, as well as the Special Masters' Recommendation on Remedy, will be set at the next status conference on August 18, 2009. Defendants' request [Dkt. #1126] for a briefing schedule will be addressed at that time. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/13/2009. (VT) (Entered: 07/13/2009)

07/14/2009 1127 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for July 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 07/14/2009)

07/15/2009

MINUTE ORDER: The Court's July 13, 2009 Order is a text only Order and is hereby amended to reflect that the date of the next status conference is August 19, 2009. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/15/2009. (VT) (Entered: 07/15/2009)

08/04/2009 1128 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE of Appearance by William G. Maddox on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Maddox, William) Modified on 8/5/2009 (jf, ). (Entered: 08/04/2009)

08/05/2009

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Document No. re 1128 Notice of Appearance was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading using their own assigned login/password). (See LCvR 5.4(b) (b) OBTAINING AND USING ELECTRONIC FILING PASSWORD; SIGNATURE;CONSENT TO SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC MEANS) (jf, ) (Entered: 08/05/2009)

08/14/2009 1129 ENTERED IN ERROR AS A DUPLICATE TO #1131.....REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION regarding a remedy for defendants' noncompliance with Court Orders by Special Master Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) Modified to correct docket text on 8/17/2009 (jf, ). Modified on 1/5/2010 (jf, ). (Entered: 08/15/2009)

08/14/2009 1131 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Special Master Regarding a Remedy for Defendants' Noncompliance with Court Orders. (nmw, ) (Entered: 08/17/2009)

08/17/2009 1130 NOTICE of Appearance by Cathleen Siobhan Trainor on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Trainor, Cathleen) (Entered: 08/17/2009)

08/17/2009 1132 NOTICE of Filing August 2009 Vendor Reports by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 08/17/2009)

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08/19/2009

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 8/19/2009. Briefing schedule set: Defendants objections to report and recommendation due by 10/7/2009; Plaintiffs responses due by 11/6/2009; Defendants reply due by 11/24/2009. Next status conference/ motion hearing is set for 12/17/2009 @ 10:00 AM in Courtroom 27A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith) (tj) (Entered: 08/19/2009)

08/27/2009 1133 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 06/18/09; Page Numbers: 1−65. Date of Issuance:08/27/09. Court Reporter/Transcriber Catalina Kerr, Telephone number 202.354.3258, Court Reporter Email Address : catykerr@msn.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 9/17/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/28/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/25/2009.(Kerr, Catalina) (Entered: 08/27/2009)

09/14/2009 1134 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 09/14/2009)

09/15/2009 1135 NOTICE by Margaret G. Farrell Expense Report June, July and August 2009. (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 09/15/2009)

09/15/2009 1136 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for September 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Mullen, Martha) (Entered: 09/15/2009)

10/07/2009 1137 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 10/07/2009)

10/07/2009

1138

Counter MOTION to Vacate CONSENT ORDERS, MOTION to Dismiss by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 1978 Consent Order, # 3 Exhibit 2001 Plan, # 4 Declaration Nuss 10/7/09, # 5 Exhibit March 2009 Status Report, # 6 Declaration McCarthy 10/07/09, # 7 Exhibit March 2009 Court Monitor Report, # 8 Exhibit Testmony (Thaler), # 9 Exhibit Testimony (Nuss), # 10 Exhibit Testimony (McCarthy), # 11 Exhibit Testimony (Alexander), # 12 Exhibit Testimony (Wilds), # 13 Declaration Nuss 10/08/08, # 14 Declaration McCarthy 10/08/08, # 15 Declaration Nuss 06/15/09, # 16 Declaration Thaler 10/07/08, # 17 Exhibit Mayor's Order 2009−119, # 18 Exhibit Testimony (Brooks), # 19 Exhibit CMS Letter, # 20 Declaration Jackson 10/08/08, # 21 Declaration Bushlin 10/05/09, # 22 Declaration Ferguson 04/14/09, # 23 Exhibit Objections to the SM's Report, # 24 Exhibit Status Hearing Transcripts, # 25 Exhibit May 2008 Court Monitor Report, # 26 Declaration Sumner 10/08/08, # 27 Exhibit Quality Management Strategy, # 28 Declaration Thaler 10/07/09, # 29 Exhibit Testimony (Jackson), # 30 Declaration Sawyer 10/08/08, # 31 Exhibit Testimony (Cook), # 32 Exhibit Testimony (Knisley), # 33 Exhibit MOU, # 34 Exhibit Strategic Plan, # 35 Exhibit Plan of Correction, # 36 Exhibit Plan of Correction, # 37 Exhibit Plan of Correction, # 38 Exhibit Notice of Infraction, # 39 Exhibit Letter to Chairman Gray, # 40 Exhibit Transportation Log, # 41 Exhibit Transportation Log, # 42 Exhibit Testimony (Heumann), # 43 Exhibit Proposed Court Order)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 10/07/2009)

10/08/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting 1137 Consent Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 8, 2009. (AG) (Entered: 10/08/2009)

10/08/2009 1139 ERRATA by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1138 Counter MOTION to Vacate CONSENT ORDERS MOTION to Dismiss filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

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(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 10/08/2009)

10/13/2009

MINUTE ORDER finding as moot 1108 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 13, 2009. (AG) (Entered: 10/13/2009)

10/14/2009 1140 ORDER re 1134 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $17,284.57 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 14, 2009. (AG) (Entered: 10/14/2009)

10/14/2009 1141 ORDER re 1135 that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $6,828.00 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 14, 2009. (AG) (Entered: 10/14/2009)

10/15/2009 1142 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for October 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 10/15/2009)

10/23/2009 1143 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants' Renewed Motion to Vacate Consent Orders and Dismiss Action by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Klise, Joseph) (Entered: 10/23/2009)

10/23/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting 1143 Amicus Curiae Quality Trust's Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 1138 Defendants' Renewed MOTION to Vacate CONSENT ORDERS and Dismiss Action: Quality Trusts amicus curiae response to the Defendants Renewed Motion to Vacate Consent Orders and Dismiss Action is due by 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, November 11, 2009. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 23, 2009. (AG) Modified on 10/23/2009 (AG). (Entered: 10/23/2009)

11/06/2009

1144

Memorandum in opposition to re 1109 MOTION to Vacate orders of reference filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− 1995 Order of Reference, # 2 Exhibit 2−2001 Order of Reference, # 3 Exhibit 3−2007 Order of Reference, # 4 Exhibit 4−Appointment of Elizabeth Jones, # 5 Exhibit 5−Declaration of Kaitlin Flynn)(Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 11/06/2009)

11/06/2009 1145 Memorandum in opposition to re 1138 Counter MOTION to Vacate CONSENT ORDERS MOTION to Dismiss filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Maddox, William) (Entered: 11/06/2009)

11/06/2009 1146 Memorandum in opposition to re 1109 MOTION to Vacate orders of reference filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Maddox, William) (Entered: 11/06/2009)

11/06/2009 1147 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, WILLIAM BROWN, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 11/06/2009)

11/06/2009

1148

Memorandum in opposition to re 1138 Counter MOTION to Vacate CONSENT ORDERS MOTION to Dismiss filed by JOY EVANS, VENITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit, # 26 Exhibit, # 27 Exhibit, # 28 Exhibit, # 29 Exhibit, # 30 Exhibit, # 31 Exhibit, # 32 Exhibit, # 33 Exhibit, # 34 Exhibit, # 35 Exhibit, # 36 Exhibit, # 37 Exhibit, # 38 Exhibit, # 39 Exhibit)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 11/06/2009)

11/06/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting 1147 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 6, 2009.(AG) (Entered: 11/06/2009)

11/11/2009 1149 Memorandum in opposition to re 1138 Counter MOTION to Vacate CONSENT ORDERS MOTION to Dismiss filed by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Klise, Joseph) (Entered: 11/11/2009)

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11/13/2009 1150 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by ADRIAN FENTY (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 11/13/2009)

11/13/2009 1151 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for November 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of John McCarthy, # 2 Affidavit of Delicia Moore)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 11/13/2009)

11/16/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting in part and denying in part 1150 Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply re 1138 Defendants' Motion to Vacate Consent Orders and Motion to Dismiss, and 1109 Defendants' Motion to Vacate Orders of Reference. Replies due by Wednesday, December 2, 2009. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 16, 2009. (AG) (Entered: 11/16/2009)

11/16/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Replies due by 12/2/2009. (gdf) (Entered: 11/16/2009)

12/02/2009 1152 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1109 MOTION to Vacate orders of reference filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 12/02/2009)

12/02/2009

1153

REPLY to opposition to motion re 1138 Counter MOTION to Vacate CONSENT ORDERS MOTION to Dismiss filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Hogan Statement, # 2 Declaration Nuss Decl., # 3 Exhibit Supreme Court Tr., # 4 Exhibit Remedy Hearing Tr., # 5 Exhibit Sawyer Dep. Excerpts, # 6 Declaration Sawyer Decl., # 7 Exhibit Defs'. Reply, # 8 Exhibit Verified Complaint (IDI), # 9 Exhibit Ltr from CM, # 10 Exhibit IDI Settlement Agt)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 12/02/2009)

12/03/2009 1154 NOTICE of Filing Report of the District of Columbia Department on Disability Services for the Period May 1, 2009 through October 31, 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 12/03/2009)

12/07/2009

1155

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 8−19−09; Page Numbers: 26. Date of Issuance:12−7−09. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Griffith, Telephone number (202)354−3247, Court Reporter Email Address : Lisa_Griffith@dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 12/28/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/7/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/7/2010.(Griffith, Lisa) (Entered: 12/07/2009)

12/09/2009 1156 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 12/09/2009)

12/10/2009 1157 STATUS REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 12/10/2009. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 10, 2009. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 12/10/2009)

12/11/2009 1158 NOTICE of Appearance by Samuel Robert Bagenstos on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Bagenstos, Samuel) (Entered: 12/11/2009)

12/15/2009 1159 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for December 2009 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of John McCarthy, # 2 Affidavit of Delicia Moore)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 12/15/2009)

12/15/2009

1160

NOTICE of Filing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Response to Quarterly Report, # 2 Exhibit Progress Report, # 3 Exhibit Progress Report Attachment 1, # 4 Exhibit Progress Report Attachment 2, # 5 Exhibit Progress Report Attachment 3, # 6 Exhibit Progress Report Attachment 4)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 12/15/2009)

12/17/2009

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Motion Hearing held on 12/17/2009. Motion Hearing continue to 12/18/09 at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 89 of 127

14, 4th floor. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 12/18/2009)

12/18/2009

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Motion hearing resumed and concluded on 12/18/2009. Memorandum and Opinion to be issued. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 12/18/2009)

01/07/2010 1161 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 01/07/2010)

01/07/2010 1162 NOTICE by Margaret G. Farrell (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 01/07/2010)

01/14/2010 1163 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report for January 2010 by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of John McCarthy, # 2 Affidavit of Delicia Moore)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 01/14/2010)

01/22/2010 1164 ORDER re 1161 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $20,981.25 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 22, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 01/22/2010)

01/22/2010

1165

ORDER re 1162 Notice (Other) filed by Margaret G. Farrell that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,859.00 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 22, 2010. (AG) Modified to correct docket text on 5/21/2010 (AG). (Entered: 01/22/2010)

02/16/2010 1166 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit McCarthy Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Moore Affidavit)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 02/16/2010)

02/19/2010 1167 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOSEPH SCATES (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Opinion)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 02/19/2010)

02/23/2010 1168 RESPONSE re 1167 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 02/23/2010)

03/09/2010

1169

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 12−17−09; Page Numbers: 1−192. Date of Issuance:3−9−10. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Griffith, Telephone number 202−354−3247, Court Reporter Email Address : Lisa_Griffith@dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 3/30/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/9/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/7/2010.(Griffith, Lisa) (Entered: 03/09/2010)

03/09/2010

1170

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 12−18−09; Page Numbers: 193−294. Date of Issuance:3−9−10. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Griffith, Telephone number 202−354−3247, Court Reporter Email Address : Lisa_Griffith@dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at

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ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 3/30/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/9/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/7/2010.(Griffith, Lisa) (Entered: 03/09/2010)

03/12/2010 1171 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit McCarthy Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Moore Affidavit)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 03/12/2010)

03/29/2010

MINUTE ORDER denying 1109 defendants' Motion to Vacate Orders of Reference to the Special Masters: For the reasons stated in open court on December 17 and 18, 2009, and in a Memorandum Opinion to be filed, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Vacate Orders of Reference to the Special Masters is DENIED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 29, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 03/29/2010)

03/29/2010 1172 MOTION for Order Alternative to Appointment of Independent Compliance Administrator and For Entry of Exit Plan by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exit Plan)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 03/29/2010)

03/30/2010 1173 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2010)

03/30/2010

MINUTE ORDER: A status conference will be held on April 7, 2010, at 2 p.m. in Courtroom 14. The Attorney General for the District of Columbia is required to attend the hearing. The plaintiffs need not file a response to motion defendants filed on March 29, 2010, in advance of the Status Conference. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 30, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 03/30/2010)

03/31/2010

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 4/7/2010 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 03/31/2010)

04/01/2010 1174 REPLY re 1173 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY filed by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 04/01/2010)

04/05/2010 1175 NOTICE Expense and activities report January, February and March 2010 (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 04/05/2010)

04/07/2010 1176 MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 1138 Defendants' Renewed Motion To Vacate Consent Orders and To Dismiss Action. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 7, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 04/07/2010)

04/07/2010 1177 ORDER denying 1138 defendants' Renewed Motion To Vacate Consent Orders and To Dismiss Action for the reasons stated in 1176 the accompanying Memorandum Opinion. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 7, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 04/07/2010)

04/07/2010 1178 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE of Appeal by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Sulkowski, Sarah) Modified on 4/8/2010 (znmw, ). (Entered: 04/07/2010)

04/07/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 4/7/2010. Status Conference set for 5/12/2010 02:00 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter: Lisa Hand) (gdf) (Entered: 04/08/2010)

04/08/2010

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that a status conference is set for May 12, 2010, at 2 pm in Courtroom 14. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 8, 2010.(AG) (Entered: 04/08/2010)

04/08/2010

NOTICE OF ERROR re 1178 Notice (Other); emailed to sarah.sulkowski@dc.gov, cc'd 27 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Incorrect event used, 2. Please refile document, 3. Entered in Error; Refile as a Notice of Appeal (under Appeal Documents) and pay the filing fee. (znmw, ) (Entered: 04/08/2010)

04/08/2010 1179 NOTICE OF APPEAL by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 04/08/2010)

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04/09/2010

1180

Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Fee remains to be paid and another notice will be transmitted when the fee has been paid in the District Court re 1179 Notice of Appeal. (dr) Modified on 4/9/2010 to edit Fee Status: The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the fee was an Appeal by the Government (dr). (Entered: 04/09/2010)

04/14/2010 1181 ORDER to Clerk of the Court to disburse on a quarterly basis payment to the Court Monitor's Office in the amount of $200,101.50 from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−0293. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 14, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 04/14/2010)

04/15/2010 1182 MOTION for Mediation by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 04/15/2010)

04/16/2010

USCA Case Number 10−5109 for 1179 Notice of Appeal filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (rdj) (Entered: 04/16/2010)

04/16/2010 1183 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit McCarthy Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Moore Affidavit)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 04/16/2010)

04/19/2010 1184 ORDER (ERRATA) re 1176 Memorandum & Opinion filed on April 7, 2010. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 19, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 04/19/2010)

04/19/2010 1185 RESPONSE re 1182 MOTION for Mediation /Appointment of An Independent Third−Party Mediator filed by JOY EVANS. (Kiernan, Paul) (Entered: 04/19/2010)

04/19/2010 1186 ORDER granting 1182 Defendants' Motion for Mediation. Mediation shall conclude by May 26, 2010. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 19, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 04/19/2010)

04/22/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Mediation to conclude by 5/26/2010. (gdf) (Entered: 04/22/2010)

05/05/2010 1187 NOTICE of Quarterly Report by ELIZABETH L. JONES (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 05/05/2010)

05/12/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 5/12/2010. Status Conference set for 6/1/2010 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith (gdf) (Entered: 05/14/2010)

05/13/2010

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that a status conference is set for June 1, 2010, at 2:30 pm in Courtroom 14. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 13, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 05/13/2010)

05/13/2010

MINUTE ORDER denying 1172 Defendants' Motion for Order: for the reasons stated in open court during the May 12, 2010 Status Conference, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' motion for an order adopting alternative to appointment of independent compliance administrator and for entry of exit plan is DENIED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 12, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 05/13/2010)

05/13/2010

MINUTE ORDER: for the reasons stated in open court during the May 12, 2010 Status Conference, it is hereby ORDERED that the Attorney General of the District of Columbia shall meet with the mediator and plaintiffs' counsel to address whether mediation will continue. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 13, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 05/13/2010)

05/14/2010 1188 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 05/14/2010)

05/21/2010 1189 ORDER re 1175 Notice (Other) filed by Margaret G. Farrell that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $5650.48 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 21, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 05/21/2010)

05/27/2010

MINUTE ORDER re Status Conference: It is hereby ORDERED that the Status Conference presently set for June 1, 2010, is CANCELLED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 27, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 05/27/2010)

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05/28/2010 1190 NOTICE Activities and Expense Report April and May 2010 (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 05/28/2010)

06/01/2010 1191 MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re Special Masters' Report and Recommendation. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 1, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 06/01/2010)

06/01/2010 1192 ORDER adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law in Special Masters' Report and Recommendation for the reasons stated in an accompanying 1191 Memorandum & Opinion. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 1, 2010. (AG) Modified on 6/1/2010 (AG, ). (Entered: 06/01/2010)

06/07/2010 1193 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 06/07/2010)

06/10/2010 1194 NOTICE Special Master's amended expense and activity report for April and May 2010 to correct typographical error. (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 06/10/2010)

06/22/2010 1195 ORDER re 1194 Notice (Other) filed by Margaret G. Farrell that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $6,723.60 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 22, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 06/22/2010)

06/22/2010 1196 ORDER re 1193 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,629.76 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 22, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 06/22/2010)

07/07/2010 1197 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix A, # 2 Appendix Appendix B, # 3 Appendix Appendix C)(SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 07/07/2010)

07/13/2010

1198

ORDER setting hearing re 1197 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (Report and Recommendation): A hearing on the Report and Recommendation is set for August, 10, 2010, at 11:00 a.m. All objections to the adoption of the Report and Recommendation are due to the Court, in writing, by July 30, 2010. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 13, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/13/2010 1199 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/13/2010 1200 2010 Revision of 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty submitted by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (Special Master). "Let this be filed" Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle (jf, ) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/13/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Objections to the adoption of the R&R due by 7/30/2010. Status Conference on the Report and Recommendation set for 8/10/2010 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 14 before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 07/13/2010)

07/16/2010 1201 NOTICE of filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 07/16/2010)

08/03/2010 1202 COMMENT on 2010 Revision of the 2001 Plan for Compliance & Conclusions. "Let this be filed" Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle (jf, ) Modified on 8/5/2010 to change docket text per chambers (jf, ). (Main Document 1202 replaced on 8/5/2010) (zjf, ). (Entered: 08/05/2010)

08/05/2010

NOTICE OF COURTROOM CHANGE Status Conference set for 8/10/2010 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 08/05/2010)

08/09/2010 1203 ORDER re 1199 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $36,538.20 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 9, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 08/09/2010)

08/10/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 8/10/2010. Orders to be entered. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 08/10/2010)

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08/10/2010

1204

ORDER: Approves the 2010 Revision of the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty (ECF No. 1200 ); vacates the court orders listed Appendices B and C to the Special Master's Report and Recommendation (ECF Nos. [1197−2] & [1197−3]). (See Order for details.) Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/10/10. (gdf) Modified on 10/20/2016 to correct cross−references (AG). (Entered: 08/10/2010)

08/10/2010 1205 ORDER: Vacates it previous Order of January 21, 2004 [dkt.#685]. (See Order for detail) Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/10/10. (gdf) (Entered: 08/10/2010)

08/16/2010 1206 NOTICE of Filing Monthly Vendor Report by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 08/16/2010)

08/23/2010 1207 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 4−7−10; Page Numbers: 1−70. Date of Issuance:8−23−10. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Hand, Telephone number 202−354−3269, Court Reporter Email Address : lisa_hand@dcd.uscourts.gov.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 9/13/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/23/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/22/2010.(Hand, Lisa) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

09/08/2010

ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 9/8/2010 (jeb, ). (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/08/2010

ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE of Filing Independent ICA Activity and Expense Report for August 2010 by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 9/8/2010 (jeb, ). (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/08/2010 1208 NOTICE of Filing Independent ICA Activity and Expense Report for August 2010 by KATHY E. SAWYER; (Attachments: # 1 invoice)(jeb, ) (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/08/2010

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Two notices were filed this date without a document. Those have been entered in error on the docket and the notice has been refiled with a document attached.(jeb, ) (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/08/2010 1209 Letter from Kathy E. Sawyer (IC Administrator) re: Proposed Annual Budget FY2011. "Let this be filed" by Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle (jf, ) (Entered: 09/13/2010)

09/13/2010 1210 ORDER re 1208 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $10,128.83 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 13, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 09/13/2010)

09/13/2010

1211

ORDER approving 1209 Proposed Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2011 (Oct. 1, 2010 to Sept. 30, 2011) filed by Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer in the amount of $252,948.00; defendants shall deposit the amount, less any unspent balance from the interim payment of $25,000, within 15 days from today. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 13, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 09/13/2010)

09/23/2010 1212 ORDER re next payment to Court Monitor: Clerk of Court shall reduce the payment to the Court Monitor from the Escrow Account for Civil Action No. 76−cv−0293 for the quarter beginning October 1, 2010, to $20,000. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 23, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 09/23/2010)

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09/23/2010

MINUTE ORDER: it is hereby ORDERED that a status conference is set for December 17, 2010, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 23, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 09/23/2010)

10/01/2010 1213 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Report to the Court Regarding Attorneys' Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 10/01/2010)

10/04/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 1213 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Report to the Court Regarding Attorneys' Fees: it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is hereby GRANTED for the reasons set forth therein; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties confer regarding attorneys fees and report to the Court by November 5, 2010. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 4, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 10/04/2010)

10/08/2010 1214 NOTICE of Filing Independent ICA Activity and Expense Report for September by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) . Modified on 10/13/2010. (ks). (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/14/2010 1215 ORDER re 1214 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,139.40 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 14, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 10/14/2010)

11/04/2010 1216 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/04/2010)

11/05/2010 1217 NOTICE Joint Notice by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 11/05/2010)

11/05/2010

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 12/17/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (AG) (Entered: 11/05/2010)

11/08/2010 1218 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 11/08/2010)

11/10/2010 1219 ORDER re 1216 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,464.13 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 10, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 11/10/2010)

11/18/2010 1220 ORDER re 1218 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $26,341.95 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 18, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 11/18/2010)

11/19/2010 1221 NOTICE by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 11/19/2010)

11/22/2010

MINUTE ORDER re 1221 Notice re plaintiffs' attorneys' fees request for the period of April 1, 2006 − June 30, 2010: as the parties have been unable to resolve the matter of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees request, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiffs shall file a motion for attorneys' fees by January 14, 2011; defendants shall file an opposition by March 11, 2011; and plaintiffs shall file a reply by March 25, 2011. It is further ORDERED that the motion for attorneys' fees is REFERRED as a related matter to Magistrate Judge Facciola for a report and recommendation. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 22, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 11/22/2010)

11/23/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion for Attorneys Fees due by 1/14/2011, Response due by 3/11/2011, Reply due by 3/25/2011. (jth) (Entered: 11/23/2010)

11/23/2010 1222 CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola for Motion for Attorney fees for Report and Recommendation (ls, ) (Entered: 11/24/2010)

12/01/2010 1223 ORDER re referral to Judge Facciola for a report and recommendation on attorney's fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 12/1/10. (SP, ) (Entered: 12/01/2010)

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12/02/2010 1224 NOTICE of Activity for November, 2010 by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 12/3/2010 to add docket text (jf, ). (Entered: 12/02/2010)

12/09/2010 1225 ORDER re 1224 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $17,792.85 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 9, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 12/09/2010)

12/10/2010 1226 Court Monitor's Quarterly ReportStatus Report due by 12/10/2010. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 10, 2010. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 12/10/2010)

12/17/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 12/17/2010. DC to file a Compliance Report by 2/22/2011. Status Conference set for 3/2/2011 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (jth) (Entered: 12/17/2010)

12/23/2010 1227 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 12/23/2010)

12/23/2010 1228 ORDER approving Court Monitor's Budget for Calendar Year 2011 in the amount of $767,674.00. Clerk of Court shall pay Court Monitor from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−0293 the sum of $191,918.50 at the beginning of each quarter. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 23, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 12/23/2010)

12/31/2010 1229 NOTICE Resignation and final expense report (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 12/31/2010)

01/04/2011 1230 ORDER re 1227 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $20,374.51 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 4, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 01/04/2011)

01/06/2011 1231 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/06/2011)

01/11/2011 1232 NOTICE Documents filed as record of Special Master proceedings (Farrell, Margaret) (Entered: 01/11/2011)

01/12/2011 1233 ORDER re 1231 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $$12,501.94 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 12, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 01/12/2011)

01/12/2011 1234 ORDER re 1229 Notice filed by Margaret G. Farrell that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $3,496.00 payable to Special Master Margaret G. Farrell. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 12, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 01/12/2011)

01/13/2011 1235 MOTION for Attorney Fees by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOSEPH SCATES (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

01/13/2011

1236

MEMORANDUM re 1235 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by JOY EVANS, WILLIAM BROWN, JOSEPH SCATES, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES. (Attachments: # 1 Table of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1−Summary of Fees & Costs, # 3 Exhibit 2−Summary of Fees, # 4 Exhibit 3−Summary of Costs, # 5 Exhibit 4−Aff. of Costanzo, # 6 Exhibit 5−Aff. of Boundy, # 7 Exhibit 6−Aff. of Schwartz, # 8 Exhibit 7−Aff. of Bernstein, # 9 Exhibit 8−Aff. of Procaccino, # 10 Exhibit 9−Aff. of Hanlon, # 11 Exhibit 10−Aff. of Kiernan, # 12 Exhibit 11−Aff. of Fernandez, # 13 Exhibit 12−Aff. of Burnim, # 14 13−18 Notice of Manual Filing, # 15 Exhibit 19−CPR costs, # 16 Exhibit 20−ULS costs, # 17 Exhibit 21−H&K costs)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

01/14/2011 1237 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Peter J. Nickles terminated. (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 01/14/2011)

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01/18/2011

Status Conference set for 2/8/2011 10:00 AM in Courtroom 6 before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 1/18/2011. (lcjmf1) (Entered: 01/18/2011)

01/31/2011 1238 MOTION to Continue Status Conference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 01/31/2011)

01/31/2011 1239 ORDER denying 1238 Motion to Continue. The status conference will take place as scheduled. The present briefing schedule for the motion on attorneys' fees is suspended. See attached document for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 01/31/2011. (lcjmf1) (Entered: 01/31/2011)

02/01/2011 1240 NOTICE to the Court by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 2/2/2011 to enhance docket text(jf, ). (Entered: 02/01/2011)

02/08/2011

Status Conference set for 3/10/2011 10:00 AM in Courtroom 6 before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola. The briefing schedule continues to be suspended until that time. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 02/08/2011. (lcjmf1) (Entered: 02/08/2011)

02/08/2011

Status Conference re−set for 3/8/2011 12:00 PM in Courtroom 6 before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola. The briefing schedule will continue to be suspended until that time. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 02/08/2011. (lcjmf1) (Entered: 02/08/2011)

02/08/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola: Status Conference held on 2/8/2011. Plaintiff Attorney: Cathy Costanzo, Stephen Hanlon, Laura Fernandez, Paul Kiernan, Sandra Bernstein; Defendant Attorney: Ellen Efros, Grace Graham (Court Reporter Bowles Reporting Services.) (ldc, ) (Entered: 02/08/2011)

02/09/2011 1241 ORDER re 1240 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,780.00 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 9, 2010. (AG) (Entered: 02/09/2011)

02/22/2011 1242 COURT MONITOR'S QUARTERLY REPORT Status Report due by 2/22/2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 02/22/2011. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 02/22/2011)

02/24/2011 1243 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Report to the Court by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Report to the Court)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 02/24/2011)

03/01/2011 1244 NOTICE of Independent Compliance Administrator Activity Report February 2011 by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 3/2/2011 to enhance docket text (jf, ). (Entered: 03/01/2011)

03/02/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 3/2/2011. Status Report due by 4/11/2011. Status Conference set for 5/19/2011 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle.(Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (jth) (Entered: 03/02/2011)

03/07/2011

MINUTE ORDER: The status conference scheduled for March 8, 2011 is hereby VACATED. Counsel will contact Chambers by March 11, 2011 regarding the status of discussions. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 03/07/2011. (lcjmf1) (Entered: 03/07/2011)

03/07/2011 1245 ORDER re 1244 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $19,880.41 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 7, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 03/07/2011)

03/11/2011 1246 NOTICE to Court Regarding Mediation by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 03/11/2011)

03/14/2011

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' 1246 Joint Notice to Court Regarding Mediation, it is hereby ORDERED that parties submit a status report no later than April 29, 2011 regarding the status of negotiations. It is further, hereby, ORDERED

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that the briefing schedule will continue to be suspended until that time, at which time parties will propose a continuation of the briefing schedule, if necessary. SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 03/14/2011. (lcjmf1) (Entered: 03/14/2011)

04/01/2011 1247 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/01/2011)

04/06/2011 1248 ORDER re 1247 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $22,991.60 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 6, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 04/06/2011)

04/08/2011

MINUTE ORDER: Counsel for the District of Columbia has informed the Court that it has received an invoice from JAMS totaling $1,465.75 for mediation services for the period of March 2011. It is hereby ordered that defendants shall make payment in the amount of $1,465.75 payable to JAMS by May 1, 2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 8, 2011.(AG) (Entered: 04/08/2011)

04/11/2011 1249 STATUS REPORT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Draft Mayoral Order 1, # 2 Exhibit Draft Mayoral Order 2)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 04/11/2011)

04/14/2011 1250 NOTICE by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM (SUNDRAM, CLARENCE) (Entered: 04/14/2011)

04/19/2011 1251 NOTICE of Filing, on behalf of the Court Monitor, the Protocol for Additional Enforcement Mechanisms for Providers Whose Performance Poses Potential Risk of Harm to Evans Class Members by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Protocol)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 04/19/2011)

04/28/2011 1252 STATUS REPORT Regarding Attorneys' Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 04/28/2011)

05/02/2011

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' 1252 Status Report, it is hereby ORDERED that parties submit a status report no later than May 13, 2011 regarding the status of negotiations. It is further, hereby, ORDERED that the briefing schedule will continue to be suspended until that time, at which time parties will propose a continuation of the briefing schedule, if necessary. SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on 05/02/2011. (lcjmf1) (Entered: 05/02/2011)

05/02/2011 1253 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 05/02/2011)

05/02/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 5/13/2011 (ldc, ) (Entered: 05/02/2011)

05/09/2011 1254 ORDER re 1253 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $19,034.80 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 9, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 05/09/2011)

05/09/2011

MINUTE ORDER: Counsel for the District of Columbia has informed the Court that it has received an invoice from JAMS totaling $2,895.75 for mediation services for the period of from March 31, 2011 through April 29, 2011. It is hereby ordered that defendants shall make payment in the amount of $ 2,895.75 payable to JAMS by June 15, 2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 9, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 05/09/2011)

05/12/2011 1255 STATUS REPORT by ELIZABETH L. JONES (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 05/12/2011)

05/13/2011 1256 NOTICE of Settlement of Attorneys' Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 05/13/2011)

05/13/2011 1257 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Sarah Ann Sulkowski terminated. (Sulkowski, Sarah) (Entered: 05/13/2011)

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05/13/2011 1258 Joint MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment Regarding Attorneys' Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 05/13/2011)

05/16/2011 1259 CONSENT ORDER AND JUDGMENT, granting 1258 Motion to Approve Consent Judgment. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/16/11. (See Order for Detail) (gdf) (Entered: 05/17/2011)

05/19/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 5/19/2011. Status Conference set for 8/10/2011 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 05/19/2011)

05/19/2011 1260 NOTICE of Filing Mayoral Orders by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Mayoral Order, # 2 Exhibit Mayoral Order)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 05/19/2011)

06/01/2011 1261 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2011)

06/06/2011 1262 ORDER re 1261 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $23,281.40 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 6, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 06/06/2011)

06/16/2011 1263 Mail Returned as undeliverable. sent to John A. Henderson, Esq.; Type of Document Returned: Notice to Court Regarding Mediation by District of Columbia; Resent at new address: Unavailable. (ldc, ) (Entered: 06/16/2011)

06/16/2011 1264 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 06/16/2011)

07/05/2011 1265 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 07/05/2011)

07/11/2011 1266 ORDER re 1265 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $25,761.40 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 11, 2011. (lcesh2) (Entered: 07/11/2011)

07/17/2011 1267 ORDER re 1264 Notice (Other) filed by CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $39,439.02 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 15, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 07/17/2011)

08/01/2011 1268 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 08/01/2011)

08/03/2011 1269 STATUS Quarterly REPORT Status Report due by 8/3/2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 08/03/2011. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 08/03/2011)

08/03/2011 1270 Annual Report to the Court (Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 8/4/2011 to correct docket event (jf, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)

08/03/2011 1271 NOTICE of Filing Department on Disability Services' Report to the Court by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DDS Report)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 08/03/2011)

08/04/2011 1272 NOTICE of Filing by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOSEPH SCATES re 1269 Status Report Order, 1270 Case Remanded to Superior Court, 1271 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Comments)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 08/04/2011)

08/08/2011 1273 ORDER re 1268 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,156.80 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 8, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 08/08/2011)

08/10/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 8/10/2011. Status Conference set for 10/24/2011 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Chantal Geneus) (gdf) (Entered: 08/10/2011)

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09/03/2011 1274 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 09/03/2011)

09/09/2011 1275 ORDER re 1274 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $27,878.67 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 9, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 09/09/2011)

09/16/2011 1276 ORDER re next payment to Court Monitor: the Clerk of Court shall not issue the payment to the Court Monitor from the Escrow Account for Civil Action No. 76−cv−0293 for the quarter beginning October 1, 2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 16, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 09/16/2011)

09/19/2011 1277 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 09/19/2011)

09/26/2011 1278 ORDER re 1277 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram Notice that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $25,300.92 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 26, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 09/26/2011)

10/01/2011 1279 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/01/2011)

10/03/2011 1280 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Letter)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

10/03/2011

1281

VACATED PURSUANT TO ORDER FILED 10/03/11.....ORDER re 1280 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER: Proposed Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2011 (Oct. 1, 2010 to Sept. 30, 2011) filed by Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer in the amount of $274,348.00 is approved; defendants shall deposit the amount within 15 days from today in the Court Registry. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 3, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

10/03/2011

MINUTE ORDER re 1281 Order: it is hereby ORDERED that 1281 Order is VACATED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 3, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

10/03/2011

1282

ORDER re 1280 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER: Proposed Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2012 (Oct. 1, 2011 to Sept. 30, 2012) filed by Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer in the amount of $274,348.00 is approved; defendants shall deposit the amount within 15 days from today in the Court Registry. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 3, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

10/06/2011 1283 ORDER re 1279 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $15,464.13 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 6, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 10/06/2011)

10/14/2011 1284 NOTICE OF FILING THE REPORT OF DEPUTY MAYOR BEATRIZ OTERO by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Otero Report)(Graham, Grace) (Entered: 10/14/2011)

10/17/2011 1285 STATUS REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 10/17/2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 10/17/11. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 10/17/2011)

10/17/2011

1286

VACATED PURSUANT COURT'S MINUTE ORDER 10/18/2011.....ORDER re 1279 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER: Substituting correct invoice for docket entry 1279−1 and ordering the Clerk of Court to disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,402.87 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer to make up the amount still owed for September 2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 17, 2011. (Attachments: # 1 September 2011 Invoice) (AG) Modified on 10/19/2011 (jf, ). (Entered: 10/17/2011)

10/18/2011

MINUTE ORDER re 1286 Order: as the Order to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator filed on October 17, 2011 contained errors, it is hereby ORDERED that the Order is VACATED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 18, 2011.(AG) (Entered: 10/18/2011)

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10/18/2011

1287

AMENDED ORDER re 1279 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER: Substituting correct invoice for docket entry 1279−1 and ordering the Clerk of Court to disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,502.87 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer to make up the amount still owed for September 2011. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 18, 2011.(Attachments: # 1 September 2011 Invoice) (AG) (Entered: 10/18/2011)

10/24/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 10/24/2011. Status Conference set for 2/1/2012 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Chantal Geneus) (gdf) (Entered: 10/25/2011)

10/26/2011

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $ $274,348.00, Receipt Number 4616043264. (jf, ) (Entered: 10/27/2011)

11/01/2011 1288 Notice of filing of Independent Compliance Administrator (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 11/2/2011 to correct docket event (jf, ). (Entered: 11/01/2011)

11/17/2011 1289 ORDER re 1288 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $24,150.51 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 17, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 11/17/2011)

12/01/2011 1290 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/01/2011)

12/06/2011 1291 ORDER re 1290 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $22,244.40 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 6, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 12/06/2011)

12/19/2011 1292 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 12/19/2011)

12/20/2011

1293

ORDER approving Court Monitor's Budget for Calendar Year 2012 in the amount of $564,400.00. Clerk of Court shall pay Court Monitor from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−0293 the sum of $141,100.02 at the beginning of each quarter. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 20, 2011. (AG) Modified on 4/18/2012 (AG). (Entered: 12/20/2011)

01/02/2012 1294 ACTIVITY REPORT for December 2011 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) Modified on 1/3/2012 to correct docket text (jf, ). (Entered: 01/02/2012)

01/03/2012 1295 ORDER re 1292 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $21,924.24 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 3, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 01/03/2012)

01/09/2012 1296 ORDER re 1294 Notice filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,570.00 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 9, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 01/09/2012)

01/12/2012

MINUTE ORDER: Upon request of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the status confernce presently set for February 1, 2012, is CONTINUED until February 16, 2012, at 10 a.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 12, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 01/12/2012)

01/12/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 2/16/2012 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 01/12/2012)

01/17/2012

MINUTE ORDER: it is hereby ORDERED that the status conference presently set for February 16, 2012, is RESCHEDULED for February 14, 2012, at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 17, 2011. (AG) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

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01/17/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 2/14/2012 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

02/02/2012 1297 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 02/02/2012)

02/06/2012 1298 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 02/06/2012)

02/07/2012 1299 Court Monitor's REPORT Status Report due by 2/7/2012. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 7, 2012. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 02/07/2012)

02/08/2012 1300 ORDER re 1297 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $28,723.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 8, 2012. (AG) . (Entered: 02/08/2012)

02/09/2012

MINUTE ORDER: it is hereby ORDERED that the Status Conference presently set for February 14, 2012, is CONTINUED until March 12, 2012, at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 9, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 02/09/2012)

02/09/2012 1301 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE Of Filing of Defendants' Report to the Court by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Efros, Ellen) Modified on 2/13/2012 (jf, ). (Entered: 02/09/2012)

02/09/2012 1302 NOTICE of Filing of Report to Court of Department of Disability Services by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 02/09/2012)

02/10/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 3/12/2012 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 02/10/2012)

02/13/2012 1303 ORDER re 1298 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $9,709.55 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 13, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 02/13/2012)

02/13/2012

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Document No. re 1301 Notice (Other) was entered in error and refiled by counsel. (See Docket Entry 1302 to view document) (jf, ) (Entered: 02/13/2012)

02/17/2012 1304 NOTICE of Filing by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Comments to Defendants' Report to the Court)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 02/17/2012)

03/01/2012 1305 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 03/01/2012)

03/07/2012 1306 ORDER re 1305 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $19,923.00 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 7, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 03/07/2012)

03/12/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 3/12/2012. Status Report due by 3/30/2012. (Court Reporter Chantal Geneus) (gdf) (Entered: 03/13/2012)

04/02/2012 1307 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 04/02/2012)

04/02/2012 1308 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/02/2012)

04/06/2012 1309 NOTICE of Filing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 04/06/2012)

04/09/2012 1310 ORDER re 1307 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $17,484.45 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 9, 2012.(AG) (Entered: 04/09/2012)

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04/09/2012 1311 ORDER re 1308 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $21,041.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 9, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 04/09/2012)

04/23/2012

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the District of Columbia shall deposit $372,481.50 in the Court Registry for the above−captioned case to cover the Court Monitor's budget for Calendar Year 2012. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 23, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 04/23/2012)

04/24/2012

MINUTE ORDER: it is hereby ORDERED that the next Status Conference is set for July 26, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 24, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 04/24/2012)

04/25/2012

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court on 04/23/2012 in the amount of $ $372,481.50, Receipt Number 4616047716 received from the Government of DC. (jf, ) (Entered: 04/25/2012)

05/02/2012 1312 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 05/02/2012)

05/08/2012 1313 ORDER re 1312 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $19,430.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 8, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 05/08/2012)

05/15/2012

MINUTE ORDER: it is hereby ORDERED that the Status Conference presently set for July 26, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. is RESCHEDULED for Tuesday, July 24, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 15, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 05/15/2012)

05/15/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/24/2012 09:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (AG) (Entered: 05/15/2012)

06/01/2012 1314 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2012)

06/06/2012 1315 ORDER re 1314 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,265.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 6, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 06/06/2012)

07/03/2012 1316 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 07/03/2012)

07/03/2012 1317 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/03/2012)

07/06/2012 1318 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/06/2012)

07/09/2012 1319 ORDER re 1316 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $25,161.45 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/9/12. (gdf) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

07/09/2012 1320 ORDER re 1317 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $20,935.56 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/9/12. (gdf) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

07/18/2012

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the time for the Status Conference on July 24, 2012, is changed from 9:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 18, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 07/18/2012)

07/18/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/24/2012 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 07/18/2012)

07/19/2012 1321 Quarterly STATUS REPORT Status Report due by 7/19/2012. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 19, 2012. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 07/19/2012)

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07/19/2012 1322 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 07/19/2012)

07/19/2012 1323 NOTICE of Filing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DDS Report to the Court)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 07/19/2012)

07/20/2012 1324 NOTICE Of Filing by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES re 1323 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' July 19, 2012 Report to the Court)(Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 07/20/2012)

07/24/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 7/24/2012. Status Conference set for 10/26/2012 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Chantal Geneus) (gdf) (Entered: 07/24/2012)

07/27/2012 1325 NOTICE of Proposed Order by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/27/2012)

07/27/2012 1326 Joint MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 07/27/2012)

07/30/2012 1327 ORDER granting 1326 Joint Motion for Order re Attorneys' Fees. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 30, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 07/30/2012)

08/01/2012 1328 ORDER. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/31/12. (See Order for Detail) (gdf) (Entered: 08/02/2012)

08/03/2012 1329 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 08/03/2012)

08/03/2012 1330 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Corrected Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 08/03/2012)

08/08/2012 1331 ORDER re 1330 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $27,020.20 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 8, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 08/08/2012)

08/16/2012 1332 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 08/16/2012)

08/27/2012 1333 NOTICE of Change of Address by Stephen F. Hanlon (Hanlon, Stephen) (Entered: 08/27/2012)

09/02/2012 1334 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Other)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 09/02/2012)

09/11/2012 1335 ORDER re 1334 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $23,500.00 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 11, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 09/11/2012)

09/26/2012 1336 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 09/26/2012)

09/27/2012

1337

ORDER approving proposed Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2013 (Oct. 1, 2012 to Sept. 30, 2013) for the Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer in the amount of $274,348.00. Defendants shall deposit the amount within 15 days from today in the Court Registry. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 27, 2012. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Annual Budget) (AG) (Entered: 09/27/2012)

09/28/2012 1338 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 09/28/2012)

10/01/2012 1339 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/01/2012)

10/01/2012 1340 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 10/01/2012)

10/05/2012 1341 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 10/05/2012)

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10/08/2012 1342 ORDER re 1339 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $24,948.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 8, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 10/08/2012)

10/08/2012 1343 ORDER re 1340 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $28,290.87 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 8, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 10/08/2012)

10/12/2012

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $ 274,348.00, Receipt Number 4616052023 from the Government of the District of Columbia. (jf, ) (Entered: 10/15/2012)

10/18/2012 1344 STATUS REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 10/19/2012. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 18, 2012. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 10/18/2012)

10/22/2012 1345 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/22/2012)

10/26/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 10/26/2012. Status Conference set for 1/17/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold)(gdf) (Entered: 10/26/2012)

10/26/2012 1346 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Special Master's Report and Recommendations re defendants' compliance, see Docket Nos. 1318 1336 1338 and 1341 , are approved and adopted. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 26, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 10/26/2012)

11/07/2012 1347 NOTICE of Change of Address by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/07/2012)

11/07/2012 1348 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/07/2012)

11/07/2012 1349 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 11/07/2012)

11/13/2012 1350 ORDER re 1348 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $24,220.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 13, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 11/13/2012)

11/13/2012 1351 ORDER re 1349 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $11,029.20 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 13, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 11/13/2012)

12/03/2012 1352 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/03/2012)

12/04/2012

1353

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 10/26/2012; Page Numbers: 1−29. Date of Issuance:12/04/2012. Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold, Telephone number 202−354−3242, Court Reporter Email Address : vicki_eastvold@dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 12/25/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/4/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/4/2013.(Eastvold, Vicki) (Entered: 12/04/2012)

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12/10/2012 1354 ORDER re 1352 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $23,749.50. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 10, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 12/10/2012)

12/18/2012 1355 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/18/2012)

12/19/2012 1356 NOTICE Of Withdrawal From Case by JOY EVANS (Hanlon, Stephen) (Entered: 12/19/2012)

12/20/2012 1357 ORDER to Clerk of Court to accept a check from the Court Monitor's Office for unused funds and return the money to the escrow account. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 20, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 12/20/2012)

01/02/2013

DEPOSIT of Funds in the amount of $ $190,000.00, Receipt Number 4616053557 received from The Fieldstone Group. (jf, ) (Entered: 01/03/2013)

01/03/2013 1358 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/03/2013)

01/04/2013

NOTICE OF ERROR re 1358 Notice (Other); emailed to kathyesawyer@yahoo.com, cc'd 29 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. In the future any documents submitted must contain the proper format. See local rules. (td, ) (Entered: 01/04/2013)

01/06/2013

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the status conference presently set for January 17, 2013, is CONTINUED until March 13, 2013, at 10 a.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 6, 2012. (AG) (Entered: 01/06/2013)

01/07/2013

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference reset for 3/13/2013 for 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 01/07/2013)

01/08/2013

MINUTE ORDER: in light of the continuation of the January 17, 2013 Status Conference until March 13, 2013, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' Februrary 13, 2013 deadline to achieve substantial compliance with the 2010 Revised Plan and outstanding court orders is extended until April 1, 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 8, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 01/08/2013)

01/09/2013 1359 ORDER re 1358 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $20,572.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 9, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

01/18/2013 1360 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/18/2013)

01/24/2013

MINUTE ORDER: in light of the continuation of the January 17, 2013 status conference until March 13, 2013 by the minute order of January 8, 2013, it is hereby ORDERED that the deadlines contained in 1328 the August 1, 2012 Order are adjusted as follows: (1) the deadline for the Court Monitor's report on her joint monitoring findings is extended to January 31, 2013; (2) the deadline for the defendants' submission of supplemental plans of compliance is extended to February 15, 2013; and (3) the deadline for approval of such plans by the Independent Compliance Administrator is extended to February 22, 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 24, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 01/24/2013)

01/28/2013 1361 ORDER approving Court Monitor's Budget for Calendar Year 2013 in the amount of $564,400.00. Clerk of Court shall pay Court Monitor from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−0293 the sum of $141,100.00 at the beginning of each quarter. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 28, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/29/2013

MINUTE ORDER: The Clerk shall accept the check issued by the District of Columbia government in the amount of $150,000 to replenish funds available to pay the costs and fees of Evans Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Payment by the District of Columbia of the Special Masters costs and expenses is required under the Courts Order of Reference filed October 11, 1995, and Supplemental Order of Reference filed May 3, 2007. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 29, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 01/29/2013)

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01/29/2013

DEPOSIT of Funds in the amount of $ 150,000.00 by the Government of the District of Columbia pursuant to minute order dated 01/29/2013, Receipt Number 4616054046. (jf, ) (Entered: 02/04/2013)

01/30/2013

MINUTE ORDER re 1361 Order re Court Monitor's Budget for Calendar Year 2013: The Court approved the Court Monitor's Budget for Calendar Year 2013 in the amount of $564,400.00, on January 28, 2013, and further ordered that the "Clerk of Court shall pay Court Monitor from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−0293 the sum of $141,100.00 at the beginning of each quarter." However, on January 2, 2013, the Clerk of Court accepted and deposited funds in the amount of $190,000.00 (Receipt Number 4616053557) from the Court Monitor (doing business as The Fieldstone Group). Accordingly, the District of Columbia is ORDERED to pay to the Clerk of Court in the amount of $374,400.00 (which is the difference between the Court Monitors approved Calendar Year 2013 budget of $574,400.00 and the remaining balance of $190,000.00 recently accepted and deposited). As previously ordered on January 28, 2013, the Clerk of Court shall pay the Court Monitor from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−0293 the sum of $141,100.00 at the beginning of each quarter, unless further instructed by the Court. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 30, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 01/30/2013)

02/01/2013 1362 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 02/01/2013)

02/04/2013 1363 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 02/04/2013)

02/07/2013 1364 ORDER re 1362 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $21,350.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 7, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 02/07/2013)

02/12/2013 1365 ORDER re 1363 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $14,999.86 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 12, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 02/12/2013)

03/01/2013 1366 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Spreadsheet, # 2 Appendix Spreadsheet)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 03/01/2013)

03/04/2013 1367 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 03/04/2013)

03/06/2013 1368 STATUS REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 3/6/2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/6/13. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 03/06/2013)

03/12/2013 1369 ORDER re 1367 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $26,986.00 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 12, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 03/12/2013)

03/12/2013 1370 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 03/12/2013)

03/13/2013

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 3/13/2013. Status Conference set for 6/12/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold) (gdf) (Entered: 03/13/2013)

03/14/2013 1371 NOTICE of Proposed Order by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 03/14/2013)

03/14/2013

1372

ORDER extending up to and including March 14, 2014, the deadline for defendants to submit certifications in accordance with the 1332 Procedure for Directors Certification of Compliance, filed Aug. 16, 2012, demonstrating substantial compliance with the 2010 Revised Plan and the outstanding court orders. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 14, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 03/14/2013)

03/19/2013 1373 TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 3/13/2013; Page Numbers: 1−38. Date of Issuance:3/19/2013. Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold, Telephone number 202−354−3242, Court Reporter Email Address : vicki_eastvold@dcd.uscourts.gov. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the

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transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 4/9/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/19/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/17/2013.(Eastvold, Vicki) (Entered: 03/19/2013)

03/25/2013 1374 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/26/2013

DEPOSIT of Funds in the amount of $ $374,400.00 into the Registry of the Court by District of Columbia, Receipt Number 4616055181. (jf, ) (Entered: 03/27/2013)

04/01/2013 1375 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

04/01/2013 1376 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

04/04/2013 1377 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Director's Certification, # 2 Appendix Joint Monitoring Report, # 3 Appendix Plaintiffs' response)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 04/04/2013)

04/08/2013 1378 ORDER re 1376 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $24,189.50 payable to Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy Sawyer. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 8, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 04/08/2013)

04/08/2013 1379 ORDER re 1375 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of the Court shall disburse from the escrow account in Civil Action No. 76−293 the amount of $18,264.40 payable to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 8, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 04/08/2013)

04/19/2013 1380 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Director's Certification, # 2 Appendix Plaintiffs' Response)(Sundram, Clarence) (Main Document 1380 replaced on 4/19/2013) (jf, ). (Entered: 04/19/2013)

04/30/2013 1381 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/30/2013)

05/01/2013 1382 ORDER adopting and approving 1374 SPECIAL MASTER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE CASE MANAGEMENT (Criteria i and iv). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 1, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 05/01/2013)

05/01/2013 1383 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 05/01/2013)

05/08/2013 1384 ORDER re 1383 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk of Court to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for April 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 8, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 05/08/2013)

06/03/2013

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the Status Conference presently set for June 12, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. is RESCHEDULED to begin at 9:15 a.m. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 3, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 06/03/2013)

06/03/2013

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/12/2013 09:15 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/03/2013)

06/04/2013 1385 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

06/05/2013 1386 QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT Status Report due by 6/5/2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/5/2013. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 06/05/2013)

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06/05/2013 1387 NOTICE OF FILING OF DEFENDANTS REPORT TO THE COURT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants Report to the Court)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 06/05/2013)

06/05/2013 1388 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/05/2013)

06/05/2013 1389 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/05/2013)

06/10/2013 1390 ORDER re 1385 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER: Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for May 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 10, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 06/10/2013)

06/10/2013 1391 ORDER ADOPTING AND APPROVING 1377 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's unopposed Report and Recommendation re Restricted Control Procedures. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 10, 2013. (AG) (Main Document 1391 replaced on 6/17/2013) (jf, ). (Entered: 06/10/2013)

06/10/2013 1392 ORDER ADOPTING AND APPROVING 1380 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's unopposed Report and Recommendation re Provision of Residential, Vocational and Day Services. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 10, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 06/10/2013)

06/12/2013

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 6/12/2013. Next Status Conference set for 9/18/2013 @ 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold.) (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/12/2013)

06/14/2013 1393 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/14/2013)

07/01/2013 1394 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 07/01/2013)

07/01/2013 1398 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Laura J. Oberbroeckling; Type of Document Returned: 1391 Order; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 07/10/2013)

07/03/2013 1395 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/03/2013)

07/09/2013 1396 ORDER re 1394 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for June 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 9, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 07/09/2013)

07/09/2013 1397 ORDER re 1395 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for April to May, 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 9, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 07/09/2013)

07/19/2013

1399

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 6/12/2013; Page Numbers: 1−46. Date of Issuance: 7/10/2013. Court Reporter: Vicki Eastvold. Telephone number: 202−354−3242, Court Reporter Email Address: vicki_eastvold@dcd.uscourts.gov. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 8/9/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/19/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/17/2013.(Eastvold, Vicki) (Entered: 07/19/2013)

08/02/2013 1400 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 08/02/2013)

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08/08/2013 1401 ORDER re 1400 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for July 2013. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 8, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 08/08/2013)

08/15/2013 1402 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Director's Certification of Compliance)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 08/15/2013)

08/27/2013 1403 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Lydia Williams, 817 Varnum St., Suite 145, Washington, DC 20017; Type of Document Returned: 1390 Order; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/28/2013)

08/27/2013 1404 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Lydia Williams, 817 Varnum St., Suite 145, Washington, DC 20017; Type of Document Returned: 1384 Order; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/28/2013)

08/27/2013 1405 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Lydia Williams, 817 Varnum St., Suite 145, Washington, DC 20017; Type of Document Returned: 1391 Order; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/28/2013)

08/27/2013 1406 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Lydia Williams; Type of Document Returned: 6/3/2013 Minute Order; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2013)

08/27/2013 1407 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Lydia Williams; Type of Documents Returned: 1391 and 1392 Orders; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2013)

08/30/2013

MINUTE ORDER: it is hereby ORDERED that the status conference presently set for September 18, 2013, is CONTINUED until October 28, 2013, at 9:30 a.m.; and it is further ORDERED that the deadline for the report from the Deputy Mayor is extended from September 5, 2013, to October 15, 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 30, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 08/30/2013)

08/30/2013

Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Report from Deputy Mayor due by 10/15/2013. Status Conference set for 10/28/2013 09:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2013)

09/03/2013 1408 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 09/03/2013)

09/03/2013 1409 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 09/03/2013)

09/09/2013 1410 ORDER re 1409 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for August 2013. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 9, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 09/09/2013)

09/09/2013 1411 ORDER re 1408 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for June to August, 2013. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 9, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 09/09/2013)

09/16/2013 1412 ORDER ADOPTING AND APPROVING 1402 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's unopposed Report and Recommendation re Protection from Harm. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 16, 2013. (AG) (Main Document 1412 replaced on 9/17/2013) (jf, ). (Entered: 09/16/2013)

10/01/2013 1413 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/01/2013)

10/04/2013 1414 ORDER approving Independent Compliance Administrator's proposed annual budget for FY 2014. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit FY 2014 Budget for Independent Compliance Administrator). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 4, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 10/04/2013)

10/07/2013 1415 ORDER re 1413 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for September 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 7, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 10/07/2013)

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10/08/2013 1416 ORDER directing the Clerk of Court not to issue the Court Monitor's payment for the quarter beginning October 1, 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 8, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 10/08/2013)

10/10/2013 1417 NOTICE to the Court Regarding Payments During Government Shutdown by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 10/10/2013)

10/15/2013

1418

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Defendants' Certification of Compliance, # 2 Appendix Plaintiffs' Response, # 3 Appendix Defendants Amended Certification, # 4 Appendix Rucker Affidavit, # 5 Appendix Defendants' Reply, # 6 Appendix Joint Monitoring report, # 7 Appendix Addendum to Joint Monitoring Report, # 8 Appendix Court Monitor's List of Changes)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 10/15/2013)

10/15/2013 1419 NOTICE of Report of the Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services by ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 10/15/2013)

10/21/2013 1420 QUARTERLY REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 10/21/2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 21, 2013. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 10/21/2013)

10/21/2013 1421 NOTICE of Filing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Report to Court, # 2 Exhibit Do Not Refer List, # 3 Exhibit EM Tracking Report, # 4 Exhibit AE Report, # 5 Exhibit Watch List)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 10/21/2013)

10/23/2013 1422 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Robert Blecher on behalf of All Defendants (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 10/23/2013)

10/28/2013

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 10/28/2013. Next Status Conference set for 2/5/2014 @ 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold) (zmm, ) (Entered: 10/28/2013)

11/01/2013 1423 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/01/2013)

11/04/2013

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Court Registry in the amount of $ 249,909.00, received from Government of the District of Columbia, Receipt Number 4616060344. (rdj) (Entered: 11/05/2013)

11/07/2013 1424 ORDER re 1423 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for October 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 7, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 11/07/2013)

11/23/2013 1425 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 11/23/2013)

11/27/2013 1426 ORDER ADOPTING AND APPROVING 1418 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's unopposed Report and Recommendation re Defendants' Compliance with Goal A.1 of the 2010 Compliance Plan (Individualized Habilitation Plans). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 27, 2013. (AG) (jf, ). (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/29/2013

1427

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 10/28/2013; Page Numbers: 1−68. Date of Issuance: 11/29/2013. Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold. Telephone number 202−354−3242, Court Reporter Email Address : vickieastvold@yahoo.com. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 12/20/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/30/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/27/2014.(Eastvold, Vicki) (Entered: 11/29/2013)

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12/02/2013 1428 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/02/2013)

12/03/2013 1429 ORDER re 1425 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for September and October, 2013. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 3, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 12/03/2013)

12/03/2013 1430 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/03/2013)

12/11/2013 1431 ORDER re 1430 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for November 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 11, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 12/11/2013)

12/19/2013 1432 NOTICE of Appearance by Leslie Anne Davis on behalf of QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC. (Davis, Leslie) (Entered: 12/19/2013)

12/19/2013 1433 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. Attorney Joseph Michael Klise terminated. (Klise, Joseph) (Entered: 12/19/2013)

12/20/2013 1434 NOTICE OF FILING OF DEFENDANTS' REPORT TO THE COURT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Deputy Mayor Beatriz Otero's Report to the Court)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 12/20/2013)

01/01/2014 1435 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/01/2014)

01/08/2014 1436 ORDER re 1435 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for December 2013. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 8, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 01/08/2014)

01/09/2014 1437 ORDER approving Court Monitor's Budget for Calendar Year 2014 and directing the Clerk to pay the Court Monitor $141,100.00 at the beginning of the quarters beginning January 1, 2014, and April 1, 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 01/09/2014)

01/16/2014 1438 Joint MOTION for Order Regarding Attorney's Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 01/16/2014)

01/17/2014 1439 CONSENT ORDER AND JUDGMENT regarding plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs for work performed in this case during the period of May 16, 2011 through May 15, 2012. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/16/2014. (zmm, ) (Entered: 01/17/2014)

01/28/2014 1440 STATUS REPORT ORDER Quarterly Status Report due by 1/29/2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/28/2014. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 01/28/2014)

01/28/2014 1441 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix CertificationStatus Chart, # 2 Appendix Certification Schedule)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/28/2014)

01/29/2014 1442 NOTICE OF FILING OF DEFENDANTS' REPORT TO THE COURT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Report to the Court & Attachments)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 01/29/2014)

01/29/2014

NOTICE OF ERROR re 1442 Notice (Other); emailed to matthew.blecher@dc.gov, cc'd 30 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. FYI − Please do not use all caps for docket text (jf, ) (Entered: 01/29/2014)

01/31/2014 1443 RESPONSE re 1442 Notice (Other) Defendants' Report to the Court filed by JOY EVANS. (Bernstein, Sandra) (Entered: 01/31/2014)

02/03/2014 1444 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 02/03/2014)

02/05/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 2/5/2014. Next Status Conference set for 4/7/2014 @ 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith.) (zmm, ) (Entered:

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 112 of 127

02/05/2014)

02/05/2014 1445 SCHEDULING ORDER: Next status conference set for April 7, 2014, at 10:00 a.m.; reports from the Independent Compliance Administrator and the defendant due by April 1, 2014. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 5, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 02/05/2014)

02/06/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reports outlined in 1445 Order due by 4/1/2014. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/06/2014)

02/06/2014 1446 NOTICE of Proposed Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 02/06/2014)

02/06/2014

1447

ORDER extending up to and including June 30, 2014, the deadline for defendants to submit certifications in accordance with the 1332 Procedure for Directors Certification of Compliance, filed Aug. 16, 2012, demonstrating substantial compliance with the 2010 Revised Plan and the outstanding court orders. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 6, 2014. (AG) Modified on 2/6/2014 to correct date (jf, ). (Entered: 02/06/2014)

02/10/2014 1448 ORDER re 1444 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for January 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 10, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 02/10/2014)

02/10/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants granted up to and including 6/30/2014 to submit certifications in accordance with the Procedure for Director's Certification of Compliance. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/10/2014)

02/10/2014 1449 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 02/10/2014)

02/19/2014 1450 ORDER re 1449 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram Notice that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for November 2013 to January 2014. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 19, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 02/19/2014)

03/04/2014 1451 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 03/04/2014)

03/11/2014 1452 ORDER re 1451 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for February 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 11, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 03/11/2014)

04/01/2014 1453 NOTICE of Filing of Defendants' Report to the Court by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Report to the Court & Attachment)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 04/01/2014)

04/01/2014 1454 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Attachment A, # 2 Appendix Attachment B)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/01/2014)

04/01/2014 1455 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/01/2014)

04/01/2014

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $266,100.00, Receipt Number 4616062941. Received from Government of the District of Columbia to be applied as follows: $125,000.00 for Special Master, Clarence Sundram; $141,100.00 for Court Monitoring, The Fieldstone Group−Elizabeth Jones, Total of $266,100.00 (jf, ) (Entered: 04/02/2014)

04/04/2014 1456 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 04/04/2014)

04/04/2014 1457 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram re 1456 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Errata Director's Certification, # 2 Errata Plaintiffs Response, # 3 Errata Joint Monitoring Report)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 04/04/2014)

04/05/2014 1458 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 04/05/2014)

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04/07/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 4/7/2014. Status Conference set for 6/18/2014 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Bryan A. Wayne) (jth) (Entered: 04/07/2014)

04/07/2014 1459 ORDER re 1455 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for March 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 7, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 04/07/2014)

04/24/2014 1460 ORDER re 1458 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for February 2014 to March 2014. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 24, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 04/24/2014)

04/24/2014

1461

TRANSCRIPT OF 4/7/14 STATUS HEARING before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on April 7, 2014. Page Numbers: 1−13. Date of Issuance: 2/24/14. Court Reporter: Bryan A. Wayne. Telephone number: 202−354−3186. Court Reporter email address: bryanawayne@yahoo.com. For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 5/15/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/25/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/23/2014.(Wayne, Bryan) (Entered: 04/24/2014)

05/01/2014 1462 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 05/01/2014)

05/05/2014

1463

NOTICE of Filing of Defendants' Objections to the Special Masters Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection From HarmPart II by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Objections to the Special Masters Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection From HarmPart II, # 2 Exhibits)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 05/05/2014)

05/07/2014

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the start time for the Status Conference on June 18, 2014, is changed from 10:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 7, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 05/07/2014)

05/08/2014

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/18/2014 09:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (zmm, ) (Entered: 05/08/2014)

05/09/2014 1464 ORDER re 1462 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for April 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 05/09/2014)

05/14/2014

1465

RESPONSE re 1463 Notice (Other), 1463−1 Defandants' Objections to Special Master's Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection from Harm Part II filed by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit, # 26 Exhibit)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 05/14/2014)

05/30/2014 1466 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

06/02/2014 1467 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/02/2014)

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06/09/2014 1468 QUARTERLY REPORT ORDER Status Report due by 6/9/2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 76−293. (JONES, ELIZABETH) (Entered: 06/09/2014)

06/09/2014 1469 ORDER re 1466 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for April 2014 to May 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 06/09/2014)

06/09/2014 1470 ORDER re 1467 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for May 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 06/09/2014)

06/11/2014 1471 NOTICE of Filing of Defendants' Report to the Court by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Report to the Court & Attachment)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 06/11/2014)

06/11/2014 1472 ERRATA by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY 1471 Notice (Other) filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Report to the Court & Attachment)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 06/11/2014)

06/11/2014 1473 NOTICE of Filing of Reports to Court by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Quality Trust Compliance Monitoring Plan, # 2 Quality Trust Compliance Monitoring Table, # 3 Quality Trust Proposed Compliance Monitoring Plan)(Davis, Leslie) (Entered: 06/11/2014)

06/16/2014

MINUTE ORDER: it is hereby ORDERED that the Status Conference presently set for Wednesday, June 18, 2014, is CANCELED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 16, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 06/16/2014)

06/25/2014 1474 ORDER to the Clerk of Court not to issue the quarterly payment for the quarter beginning July 1, 2014, to the Court Monitor in this case. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 25, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 06/25/2014)

07/01/2014 1475 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 07/01/2014)

07/07/2014 1476 ORDER re 1475 Notice filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for June 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/7/2014. (zmm, ) (zmm, ). (Entered: 07/07/2014)

07/07/2014

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Docket entry 1476 edited to add the image of the Order.(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/07/2014)

07/23/2014

1477

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Director's Certification of Compliance, # 2 Exhibit Performance and Quality Management Strategy PowerPoint − Feb. 7, 2013, # 3 Exhibit DDS − DDA Performance and Quality Management Strategy − Mar. 31, 2014, # 4 Exhibit Continuing Quality Improvement Report FY13 Q4 Jul−Sept 2013, # 5 Exhibit Continuing Quality Improvement Report FY14 Q1 Jan−Mar 2014, # 6 Exhibit Performance Management Program Policy and Procedure, # 7 Exhibit Court Monitor's Report − Review of Goal D.2., # 8 Exhibit Plaintiffs Response to QA Certification)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/23/2014)

07/28/2014

1478

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 2−5−14; Page Numbers: 1−53. Date of Issuance:7−28−14. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Griffith, Telephone number (202) 354−3247, Court Reporter Email Address : Lisa_Griffith@dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 8/18/2014. Redacted Transcript

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 115 of 127

Deadline set for 8/28/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/26/2014.(Griffith, Lisa) (Entered: 07/28/2014)

08/01/2014 1479 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 1480 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/07/2014 1481 ORDER re 1480 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for July 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 7, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 08/07/2014)

08/07/2014 1482 ORDER re 1479 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for June 2014 to July 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 7, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 08/07/2014)

08/25/2014 1483 NOTICE of Filing of Proposed Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 08/25/2014)

08/25/2014 1484 ORDER extending appointment of Kathy E. Sawyer as the Independent Compliance Admnistrator until March 31, 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 25, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 08/25/2014)

08/29/2014 1485 ORDER approving budget for Independent Compliance Administrator for August 10, 2014, through March 31, 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 29, 2014. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Budget) (AG) (Entered: 08/29/2014)

09/02/2014 1486 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 09/02/2014)

09/05/2014 1487 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Director's Certification of Compliance)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 09/05/2014)

09/08/2014 1488 ORDER ADOPTING AND APPROVING 1477 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's unopposed Report and Recommendation re Defendants' Compliance with Goal D.2 of the 2010 Compliance Plan (Quality Assurance Program and Fiscal Audits). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 8, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 09/08/2014)

09/09/2014 1489 ORDER re 1486 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for August 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 09/09/2014)

09/10/2014

1490

ORDER adopting 1457 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection from Harm −− Part II (Goal B of the 2010 Compliance Plan); finding defendants in compliance with Goal B outcome criteria i, ii, iii, iv, v, and viii; finding defendants not in compliance with Goal B outcome criterion xii; and remanding criterion xii to the Special Master for further consideration. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 10, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 09/10/2014)

09/11/2014 1491 ORDER amending 1485 Order. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 11, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 09/11/2014)

09/12/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants to deposit $75,775 in the Court Registry by 9/22/2014. (sm, ) (Entered: 09/12/2014)

09/18/2014

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $ $75,775.00, Receipt Number 4616065917 received from the Government of the District of Columbia (jf, ) (Entered: 09/19/2014)

09/19/2014

MINUTE ORDER: Based on the reconciliation of the amounts placed in the Court Registry for the benefit of the Independent Compliance Administrator from August 2010 to July 2014, including the District of Columbia's payment of $75,775 in September 2014, and the amounts invoiced for costs and fees over those same time periods, there remains $51,198.78 deposited in the account but unexpended for

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 116 of 127

services rendered up through July 31, 2014. The District of Columbia has sought and is entitled to reimbursement of this amount. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue a check from the escrow account in the Court Registry in Evans v. Gray (Civil Action No. 76−0293 (ESH)) in the amount of $51,198.78, and made payable to the District of Columbia Treasurer, to reimburse the defendants in this action for the budget surplus from August 2010 to July 2014, which remains unspent in those time periods for the services of Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy E. Sawyer in this litigation. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 19, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 09/19/2014)

10/01/2014 1492 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 10/01/2014)

10/01/2014 1493 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoicd)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/01/2014)

10/09/2014 1494 ORDER re 1493 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for September 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 10/09/2014)

10/09/2014 1495 ORDER re 1492 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Clarence Sundram, Special Master, his fees and expenses for August−September 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 10/09/2014)

10/20/2014

1496

ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING 1487 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's unopposed Report and Recommendation re Defendants' Compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal A.4 of the 2010 Compliance Plan (Restricted Control Procedures − Part II). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 20, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 10/20/2014)

10/22/2014

1497

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Diector's Certification of Compliance re Case Management, # 2 Appendix Director's Certification of Compliance re Case Management Criterion iii, # 3 Appendix Plaintiffs' Response, # 4 Appendix Plaintiffs Response 2, # 5 Appendix Defendants' Reply, # 6 Appendix Director's Addendum, # 7 Appendix Plaintiffs Addendum, # 8 Appendix Court Monitor's Report, # 9 Appendix Court Monitor's report re Goal B)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 10/22/2014)

10/30/2014 1498 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON. Attorney Laura A. Fernandez terminated. (Fernandez, Laura) (Entered: 10/30/2014)

11/02/2014 1499 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/02/2014)

11/10/2014 1500 ORDER re 1499 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for October 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 10, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 11/10/2014)

11/25/2014

1501

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Director's Certification of Compliance, # 2 Appendix Plaintiffs' Response to Director's Certification, # 3 Appendix Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response, # 4 Exhibit Defendant's Ex. 7, # 5 Exhibit Defendant's Ex. 11, # 6 Exhibit Defendant's Ex. 18, # 7 Exhibit Defendant's Ex. 22, # 8 Exhibit Defendant's Ex. 23, # 9 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Ex. 1)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 11/25/2014)

11/25/2014 1502 ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING 1497 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's Report and Recommendation re Defendants' Compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal D.1 of the 2010 Compliance Plan (Case Management − Part II). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 25, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 11/25/2014)

12/02/2014 1503 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/02/2014)

12/06/2014 1504 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 12/06/2014)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 117 of 127

12/09/2014 1505 ORDER re 1503 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for November 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 9, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 12/09/2014)

12/09/2014

1506

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Defendants' Certification of Compliance, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 12 to Defendants' Certification, # 3 Appendix Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Certification, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 2 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 3 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 4 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 5 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 6 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 8 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 10 Exhibit Ex. 10 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 11 Exhibit Ex. 12 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 12 Exhibit Ex. 13 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 13 Exhibit Ex.14 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 14 Exhibit Ex. 15 to Plaintiffs' Response, # 15 Appendix Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response, # 16 Exhibit Ex. 1 to Defendants' Reply)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 12/09/2014)

12/11/2014 1507 ORDER re 1504 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing Clerk to pay Special Master Clarence Sundram his fees and expenses for October and November 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 11, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

01/01/2015 1508 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/01/2015)

01/05/2015

1509

ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING 1501 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's Report and Recommendation re Defendants' Compliance with the remaining outcome criteria for Goal A.2 of the 2010 Compliance Plan (Provision of Residential, Vocational and Day Services − Part II). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 5, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/07/2015 1510 ERRATA by Clarence J. Sundram re 1506 Notice (Other),,, (Sundram, Clarence) Modified on 1/8/2015 (jf, ). (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/07/2015 1511 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/08/2015 1512 NOTICE of Filing of Defendants' Objections to Report & Recommendation Re IHP Part II by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Objections to Report & Recommendation Re IHP Part II)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/13/2015 1513 ORDER re 1508 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for December 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 13, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/13/2015 1514 ORDER re 1511 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing the Clerk of Court to pay Special Master Clarence Sundram his fees and expenses for December 2014. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 13, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/17/2015

1515

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Director's Certification of Compliance, # 2 Appendix Plaintiffs' Response to Director's Certification, # 3 Appendix Court Monitor's Report, # 4 Appendix Special Master's Memorandum, # 5 Appendix ICA's Memorandum re Plan for Re−Submission, # 6 Appendix Evans Providers receiving sanctions, # 7 Appendix Imposition of Sanctions Policy and Procedure, # 8 Appendix Enforcement Actions for DDS Providers, # 9 Appendix Provider Sanctions List, # 10 Appendix Trend Analysis, # 11 Appendix QMD QUI Provider Sanctions Chart)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 01/17/2015)

01/27/2015 1516 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ADRIAN FENTY. Attorney Grace Graham terminated. (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 01/27/2015)

02/01/2015 1517 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 02/01/2015)

02/09/2015 1518 ORDER re 1517 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER that the Clerk of Court is directed to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 118 of 127

and expenses for January 2015. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 9, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 02/09/2015)

03/01/2015 1519 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 03/01/2015)

03/03/2015 1520 Joint MOTION for Order Regarding Attorney's Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 03/03/2015)

03/09/2015 1521 ORDER re 1519 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 9, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 03/09/2015)

03/10/2015

1522

CONSENT ORDER AND JUDGMENT granting 1520 Motion for Consent Order Regarding Attorneys Fees. Ordered that Defendants shall pay to Plaintiffs' counsel the sum of $400,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs incurred during the relevant period. See Order for specifics. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/10/2015. (zmm, ) (Entered: 03/10/2015)

03/10/2015 1523 ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING 1515 Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's Report and Recommendation Regarding Protection From Harm −− Part III. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 10, 2015. (AG) (Main Document 1523 replaced on 3/11/2015) (jf, ). (Entered: 03/10/2015)

03/12/2015 1524 MOTION to Enforce Settlement Agreement ,MOTION for Declaratory Judgment by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Blecher, Matthew). Added MOTION for Declaratory Judgment on 3/13/2015 (jf, ). (Entered: 03/12/2015)

03/20/2015 1525 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 03/20/2015)

03/20/2015 1526 ORDER Extending Appointment of Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy E. Sawyer through December 31, 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 20, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 03/20/2015)

03/25/2015 1527 ORDER approving proposed extension budget for Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy E. Sawyer. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 25, 2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: ICA Extension Budget) (AG, ) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/26/2015

1528

Memorandum in opposition to re 1524 MOTION to Enforce Settlement Agreement MOTION for Declaratory Judgment filed by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Tina M. Campanella In Support of Quality Trust's Opposition)(Davis, Leslie) (Entered: 03/26/2015)

03/31/2015

1529

ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING IN PART Special Master Clarence J. Sundram's Report and Recommendation Regarding Individualized Habilitation Plans − Part II (ECF No. 1506 , as amended by ECF No. 1510 ). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 31, 2015. (AG) (Main Document 1529 replaced on 11/23/2016, but substantively unchanged order) (jf). (Entered: 03/31/2015)

04/06/2015

1530

REPLY to opposition to motion re 1524 MOTION to Enforce Settlement Agreement MOTION for Declaratory Judgment filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Petitioners Response to Agencys Motion, # 2 Exhibit 2 October 3, 2013 Letter from DDS to QT, # 3 Exhibit 3 June 11, 2014 Letter from DDS to QT, # 4 Exhibit 4 February 27, 2015 Letter from DDS to QT)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 04/06/2015)

04/07/2015 1531 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/07/2015)

04/07/2015 1532 ORDER re 1531 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER, Independent Compliance Administrator, directing Clerk to pay fees and expenses for March 2015. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 7, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 04/07/2015)

04/07/2015 1533 ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 1524 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment and to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA is referred to Special Master Clarence J. Sundram for a Report and Recommendation. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 7, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 04/07/2015)

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04/08/2015 1534 RESPONSE re 1524 MOTION to Enforce Settlement Agreement MOTION for Declaratory Judgment Letter to Special Master Clarence Sundram filed by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Davis, Leslie) (Entered: 04/08/2015)

04/08/2015

NOTICE OF ERROR re 1534 Response to motion; emailed to ldavis@crowell.com, cc'd 27 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Incorrect document/case, 2. DO NOT REFILE−−− Counsel should review LCvR5.1 (a) CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE COURT (jf, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)

04/15/2015 1535 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Make Payment of Court−Approved Budget by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 04/15/2015)

04/16/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting 1535 Consent Motion for Extension of Time: Upon consideration of Defendants' Consent Motion to Extend Time to Make Payment of Court− Approved Budget, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall have up to and including April 27, 2015, to make payment to the Clerk of Court as specified in the Court's March 25, 2015 Order. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 16, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/16/2015 1536 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Motion for Declaratory Judgment And To Enforce Settlement Agreement by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Surreply, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Davis, Leslie) (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/16/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting 1536 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File: Upon consideration of Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc.'s Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Opposition to the District of Columbia's Motion For a Declaratory Judgment and to Enforce Settlement Agreement, and the record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that Quality Trust's motion is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 16, 2015. (AG, ) (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/16/2015 1537 SURREPLY to re 1524 MOTION to Enforce Settlement Agreement MOTION for Declaratory Judgment filed by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. (jf, ) (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/22/2015 1538 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Ellen A. Efros terminated. (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 04/22/2015)

04/22/2015

DEPOSIT of Funds on April 21, 2015 in the amount of $ 64,380.70, Receipt Number 4616069639 received from the Government of the District of Columbia. (rdj) (Entered: 04/23/2015)

05/02/2015 1539 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 05/02/2015)

05/03/2015 1540 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 05/03/2015)

05/05/2015

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that a Status Conference in the above−captioned case is set for Tuesday, June 16, at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 10, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 05/05/2015)

05/06/2015

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/16/2015 03:00 PM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (zmm, ) (Entered: 05/06/2015)

05/11/2015 1541 ORDER re 1540 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER, Independent Compliance Administrator, to pay her fees and expenses for April 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 11, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 05/11/2015)

05/11/2015 1542 ORDER re 1539 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram, Special Master, to pay fees and expenses for January − April, 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 11, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 05/11/2015)

06/01/2015 1543 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2015)

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06/08/2015 1544 ORDER re 1543 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator's fees and expenses for May 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 8, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

06/09/2015 1545 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/09/2015)

06/09/2015 1546 NOTICE of Filing of Defendants' Report to the Court by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Defendants' Report to the Court)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 06/09/2015)

06/12/2015 1547 PERIODIC REPORT by USA by QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2015−2015 Monitoring Plan)(Davis, Leslie) (Entered: 06/12/2015)

06/16/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 6/16/2015. Next Status Conference set for 10/6/2015 @ 10:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Annette Montalvo) (zmm) (Entered: 06/16/2015)

06/23/2015 1548 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Settlement Agreement and Consent Order)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 06/23/2015)

06/30/2015 1549 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CONSENT ORDER denying as moot 1524 Motion for Declaratory Judgment and to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. See Order for specifics. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 6/30/2015. (zmm) (Entered: 06/30/2015)

07/01/2015 1550 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 07/01/2015)

07/07/2015 1551 ORDER re 1550 Notice filed by KATHY E. SAWYER to pay fees and expenses of the Independent Compliance Administrator for June 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 7, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 07/07/2015)

07/10/2015 1552 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/10/2015)

07/20/2015 1553 ORDER re 1552 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram, Special Master, to pay fees and expenses for May and June, 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 20, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 07/20/2015)

07/29/2015

1554

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 6−16−2015; Page Numbers: 1−37. Date of Issuance:7−29−2015. Court Reporter/Transcriber Annette M. Montalvo, Telephone number 202−354−3111, Court Reporter Email Address : annette.montalvo@gmail.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 8/19/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/29/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/27/2015.(Montalvo, Annette) (Entered: 07/29/2015)

08/03/2015 1555 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 08/03/2015)

08/11/2015 1556 ORDER re 1555 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk of Court to pay Independent Compliance Administrator Kathy E. Sawyer her fees and expenses for July 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 11, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 08/11/2015)

09/01/2015 1557 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 09/01/2015)

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09/08/2015 1558 ORDER re 1557 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk to pay Kathy Sawyer, the Independent Compliance Administrator, her fees and expenses for August 2015. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 8, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 09/08/2015)

09/10/2015 1559 Joint MOTION for Order Regarding Compliance With Outcome Criterion A.1.b.xii.A by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 09/10/2015)

09/10/2015 1560 ORDER granting 1559 Consent Motion for Order re compliance with outcome criterion A.1.b.xii.A. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 10, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 09/10/2015)

10/02/2015 1561 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

10/06/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 10/6/2015. Further Status Conference set for 12/16/2015 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (Court Reporter Jeff Hook) (zmm) (Entered: 10/06/2015)

10/08/2015 1562 ORDER re 1561 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk of Court to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for September 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 8, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

10/23/2015

1563

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on October 6, 2015; Page Numbers: 1 − 23. Date of Issuance: October 23, 2015. Court Reporter/Transcriber Jeff Hook; Telephone number 202−354−3373. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href=http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/node/2189>Transcript Order Form.</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 11/13/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/23/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/21/2016.(Hook, Jeff) (Entered: 10/23/2015)

11/02/2015 1564 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoive)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/02/2015)

11/03/2015 1565 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/03/2015)

11/10/2015 1566 ORDER re 1565 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for October 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 10, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 11/10/2015)

12/01/2015 1567 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/01/2015)

12/07/2015 1568 ORDER re 1567 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER ORDER directing Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for November 2015. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 7, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 12/07/2015)

12/16/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 12/16/2015. Parties are to propose a date for the next Status Conference. (Court Reporter Barbara De Vico.) (zsm) (Entered: 12/16/2015)

12/16/2015

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that a status conference in the above−captioned matter is set for Tuesday, April 12, 2016, at 10:30 a.m. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 16, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 12/16/2015)

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12/16/2015

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 4/12/2016 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (zmm) (Entered: 12/16/2015)

12/17/2015 1569 NOTICE of Appearance by Chad Alan Naso on behalf of All Defendants (Naso, Chad) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/17/2015 1570 Consent MOTION for Order Extending the Appointment of the Independent Compliance Administrator by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit Proposed Budget, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/17/2015

1571

ORDER granting 1570 Motion for Order Extending Appointment of Independent Compliance Administrator until September 30, 2016, and directing Clerk to disburse $45,000 in funds from the Court Registry Account established for the Court Monitor and to deposit that same amount into the Court Registry Account established for the Independent Compliance Administrator. See order for details and additional information. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 17, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/31/2015 1572 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 12/31/2015)

01/01/2016 1573 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/01/2016)

01/04/2016

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $ 25,000.00, Receipt Number 4616075328 received from Government of the District of Columbia, Department on Disability Services on 12/31/2015 (jf) (Entered: 01/05/2016)

01/07/2016 1574 ORDER re 1573 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER ORDER directing Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for December 2015. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 7, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 01/07/2016)

01/08/2016 1575 ORDER re 1572 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing the Clerk to pay the Special Master Clarence J. Sundram his fees and expense for July through December 2015. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 8, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 01/08/2016)

02/02/2016 1576 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 02/02/2016)

02/02/2016 1577 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Corrected Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 02/02/2016)

02/09/2016 1578 ORDER re 1577 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for January 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on February 9, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 02/09/2016)

03/01/2016 1579 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 03/01/2016)

03/08/2016 1580 ORDER re 1579 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for February 2016. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 8, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 03/08/2016)

03/23/2016

MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the Status Conference presently set for April 12, 2016, is CONTINUED until April 20, 2016, at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on March 23, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 03/23/2016)

04/01/2016 1581 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 04/01/2016)

04/07/2016 1582 ORDER re 1581 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER filed directing Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for March 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 7, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 04/07/2016)

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04/20/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 4/20/2016. New hearing date to be determine. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 04/20/2016)

04/25/2016 1583 Joint MOTION for Order Regarding Attorney's Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2016)

04/26/2016 1584 ORDER granting 1583 Joint Motion for Consent Order re Attorney's Fees. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on April 26, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 04/26/2016)

04/26/2016 1585 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 04/26/2016)

05/01/2016 1586 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 05/01/2016)

05/03/2016 1587 ORDER re 1585 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing the Clerk to pay the Special Master Clarence J. Sundram his fees and expense for January through April 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 3, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 05/03/2016)

05/09/2016 1588 ORDER re 1586 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for April 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 9, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 05/09/2016)

05/19/2016 1589 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Chad Alan Naso terminated. (Naso, Chad) (Entered: 05/19/2016)

06/02/2016 1590 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 06/02/2016)

06/07/2016 1591 ORDER re 1590 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk to pay fees for May 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 7, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 06/07/2016)

07/01/2016 1592 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 07/01/2016)

07/05/2016 1593 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/07/2016 1594 ORDER re 1592 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing Clerk to pay fees for June 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 7, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 07/07/2016)

07/07/2016

1595

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Director's Certification, # 2 Appendix Plan of Compliance, # 3 Appendix Monthly Progress reports, # 4 Appendix ICA Audit Report, # 5 Appendix ICA Certification update, # 6 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Response, # 7 Appendix Plaintiffs' Ex.. 1, # 8 Appendix Plaintiffs' Ex. 2, # 9 Appendix Plaintiffs Ex.. 3, # 10 Appendix Plaintiffs' Ex. 4, # 11 Appendix Plaintiffs' Ex. 5, # 12 Appendix Plaintiffs' Ex. 6, # 13 Appendix Plaintiffs' Ex. 7, # 14 Appendix Plaintiffs' Ex. 8, # 15 Appendix Court Monitor's Report, # 16 Appendix Attachment to Court Monitor's Report)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/07/2016)

07/08/2016

1596

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 4−20−16; Page Numbers: 1−26. Date of Issuance:7−8−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa W GRIFFITH, Telephone number 2023543247, Tape Number: Lisa_Griffith@dcd.uscourts.gov. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href="http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/node/110">Transcript Order Form</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 124 of 127

7/29/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/8/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/6/2016.(Griffith, Lisa) (Entered: 07/08/2016)

07/11/2016 1597 ORDER re 1593 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing Clerk to pay Special Master Sundram his fees and expenses for May and June 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 11, 2016. (AG) Modified on 8/15/2016 (AG). (Entered: 07/11/2016)

07/21/2016 1598 RESPONSE re 1595 Notice (Other),, filed by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES. (Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 07/21/2016)

07/22/2016 1599 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram re 1595 Notice (Other),, (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Defendant's Reply)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 07/22/2016)

07/27/2016 1600 REPLY re 1598 Response to Document filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 07/27/2016)

07/28/2016 1601 NOTICE of Appearance by Gregory Martin Cumming on behalf of All Defendants (Cumming, Gregory) (Entered: 07/28/2016)

08/01/2016 1602 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 08/01/2016)

08/08/2016 1603 ORDER re 1602 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk to pay Independent Compliance Administrator's fees for July 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 8, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 08/08/2016)

08/08/2016 1604 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 08/08/2016)

08/15/2016 1605 ORDER re 1604 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing Clerk to pay Special Master Sundram his fees and expenses for July 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 15, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 08/15/2016)

08/16/2016

1606

NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Director's Certification of Compliance, # 2 Appendix Planitiffs' Response, # 3 Appendix Defendants' Reply, # 4 Exhibit Defendans' Ex. 1, # 5 Exhibit Defendants' Ex. 5, # 6 Exhibit Plantiffs' Ex. 2, # 7 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Ex. 5, # 8 Appendix Court Monitor's Report, # 9 Appendix Court Monitor's Tables)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 08/16/2016)

08/16/2016

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the Special Master's recommendation that the time for parties to file objections to the Special Master's Report and Recommendation regarding Provision of Vocational and Day Services − Part III (ECF No. 1606 ) be extended from 30 to 45 days, it is hereby ORDERED that the the parties shall have until September 30, 2016, to file any objections to the above−referenced report and recommendation. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 16, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 08/16/2016)

08/18/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses to the Report and Recommendation due by 9/30/2016. (hs) (Entered: 08/18/2016)

08/19/2016

MINUTE ORDER: In order to enable the Clerk of Court to pay Special Master Clarence Sundram for the month of July 2016, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk shall disburse $30,000 from the Court Registry account established for the Court Monitor (DDCX176cv00293−02) to be paid into the Court Registry account for the Special Master (DDCX176CV000293−001). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 19, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 08/19/2016)

08/19/2016

1607

ORDER directing the District of Columbia to provide the Clerk of Court with a payment of $20,000 and directing the Clerk to deposit the payment into the Court Registry escrow account established for payment of the Special Master in this case. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 19, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 08/19/2016)

09/01/2016 1609 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 09/01/2016)

09/08/2016 1610 ORDER re 1609 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator's fees for August 2016. See order for

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 125 of 127

details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 8, 2016. (AG) Modified on 10/11/2016 (AG). (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/13/2016

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the Special Master's request that his recommendation that the time for parties to file objections to the Special Master's Report and Recommendation regarding Provision of Vocational and Day Services − Part III (ECF No. 1606 ) be further extended from 45 to 60 days, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall have until October 17, 2016 (which includes two additional calendar days to account for the weekend), to file any objections to the above−referenced report and recommendation. The Court acknowledges that the defendants have been granted an extension up to September 30, 2016, by which to submit to the Special Master the recommended report on the defendants' "efforts to implement meaningful opportunities for class members" in large, congregate day programs. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 13, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 09/13/2016)

09/15/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Objections to R&R due by 10/17/2016 (gdf) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/20/2016 1611 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/27/2016 1612 Consent MOTION for Order Extending the Appointment of the Independent Compliance Administrator by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 09/27/2016)

09/27/2016 1613 ORDER granting 1612 Motion for Order Extending Term of Independent Compliance Administrator and addressing related matters. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 27, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 09/27/2016)

09/27/2016

DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $ $20,000.00, Receipt Number 461606080573, received from the Government of the District of Columbia (jf) (Entered: 09/28/2016)

10/03/2016 1614 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 10/03/2016)

10/03/2016 1615 ORDER re 1611 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing the Clerk of Court to pay Special Master Sundram his fees and expenses for the month of August 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 3, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 10/03/2016)

10/11/2016 1616 ORDER re 1614 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator's fees and expenses for September 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 11, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/13/2016

1617

Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Special Master's Report by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 10/13/2016)

10/13/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 1617 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File: Upon consideration of the Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenor's Consent Motion for Extension of Time, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support thereof and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenor's Consent Motion for Extension of Time is GRANTED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenor's response to the Special Master's Report and Recommendation Regarding Provision of Vocational and Day Services−Part III shall be filed with the Court by October 19, 2016. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 13, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 10/13/2016)

10/14/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Response due by 10/19/2016 (hs) (Entered: 10/14/2016)

10/18/2016 1618 RESPONSE to Special Master's Report & Recommendation filed by WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR, JOSEPH SCATES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 126 of 127

Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Costanzo, Cathy) (Entered: 10/18/2016)

10/25/2016 1619 DEPOSIT of Funds into the Registry of the Court in the amount of $ $25,000.00, Receipt Number 461681301, received from the Government of the District of Columbia (jf) (Entered: 10/26/2016)

10/28/2016 1620 Joint MOTION for Order Regarding Attorney's Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

10/28/2016 1621 ORDER granting 1620 Joint Motion for Order re Attorneys' Fees. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on October 28, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

10/28/2016 1622 REPLY re 1618 Response to Document, filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

11/01/2016 1623 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 11/01/2016)

11/10/2016 1624 ORDER re 1623 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator's fees for October 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on November 10, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 11/10/2016)

11/21/2016 1625 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram re 1598 Response to Document, 1599 Notice (Other), 1600 Reply to Document, 1595 Notice (Other),, (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Defendant's Report, # 2 Appendix Heparitis C Task Force, # 3 Appendix Quality Assurance Review)(Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

12/01/2016 1626 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/07/2016 1627 ORDER re 1626 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER, directing the Clerk to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator's fees for November 2016. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 7, 2016. (AG) (Entered: 12/07/2016)

12/13/2016

1628

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER approving and adopting 1595 Special Master's Report and Recommendation Regarding Individualized Habilitation Plans−Part III; approving and adopting 1606 Special Master's Report and Recommendation Regarding Provision of Residential, Vocational and Day Services−Part III; and setting final hearing in this case for January 10, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 23A. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on December 13, 2016. (AG) (Main Document 1628 replaced on 12/15/2016) (jf). (Entered: 12/13/2016)

12/13/2016

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 1/10/2017 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 23A before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (gdf) (Entered: 12/13/2016)

01/02/2017 1629 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/02/2017)

01/06/2017 1630 Joint MOTION to Vacate Court Orders by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 01/06/2017)

01/09/2017 1631 ORDER re 1629 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk to pay the fees and expenses of the Independent Compliance Administrator for the month of December 2016. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 9, 2017. (AG) (Entered: 01/09/2017)

01/10/2017 1634 ORDER granting 1630 Motion to Vacate. (See Order for Detail). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 1/10/17. (gdf) (Main Document 1634 replaced on 1/12/2017) (zgdf). (Entered: 01/12/2017)

01/10/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle: Status Conference held on 1/10/2017, regarding the closure of the case. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 01/18/2017)

01/11/2017 1632 NOTICE by KATHY E. SAWYER (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Invoice)(Sawyer, Kathy) (Entered: 01/11/2017)

Case: 1:76-cv-293 As of: 11/09/2017 02:46 PM EST 127 of 127

01/12/2017 1633 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 01/12/2017)

01/17/2017 1635 ORDER re 1633 Notice (Other) filed by Clarence J. Sundram directing Clerk of Court to pay Special Master's fees and expenses for Sept. 1, 2016, through January 11, 2017, from the Court Registry account. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 17, 2017. (AG) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017 1636 ORDER re 1632 Notice (Other) filed by KATHY E. SAWYER directing the Clerk of Court to pay the Independent Compliance Administrator her fees and expenses for January 1−11, 2017, from the appropriate Court Registry account. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 17, 2017. (AG) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017

MINUTE ORDER: In order to enable the Clerk of Court to pay Special Master Clarence Sundram his fees and expenses for September 1, 2016, through January 11, 2017, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk shall disburse $5,000 from the Court Registry account established for the Court Monitor (DDCX176cv00293−02) to be paid into the Court Registry account for the Special Master (DDCX176CV000293−001). Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on January 17, 2017. (AG) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/26/2017 1637 NOTICE by Clarence J. Sundram (Sundram, Clarence) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

02/09/2017

1638

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle held on 1−10−17; Page Numbers: 1−45. Date of Issuance:2−9−17. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa W GRIFFITH, Telephone number 2023543247, Tape Number: Lisa_Griffith@dcd.uscourts.gov. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href="http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/node/110">Transcript Order Form</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 3/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/10/2017.(Griffith, Lisa) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/24/2017 1639 Consent MOTION for Disbursement of Funds from Court Registry by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Cumming, Gregory) (Entered: 02/24/2017)

03/02/2017 1640 ORDER granting 1639 Motion for Disbursement of Court Registry Funds. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 3/2/17. (gdf) (Entered: 03/02/2017)

03/03/2017 1641 SEALED DOCUMENT (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) "Let this be filed under seal" signed by Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle on 03/02/2017(zjf) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

05/09/2017 1642 Joint MOTION for Order Regarding Attorney's Fees by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Blecher, Matthew) (Entered: 05/09/2017)

05/10/2017 1643 CONSENT ORDER granting 1642 Joint Motion for Order re Attorneys' Fees. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 10, 2017. (AG) (Entered: 05/10/2017)

 
 99-7058

Page 1

TO ORDER COPIES OF ANY DOCUMENTS LISTED BELOW, CALL WESTLAW COURTEXPRESS 1-877-DOC-RETR (1-877-362-7387) (Additional Charges Apply).

For Opinion See: 206 F.3d 1292

Briefs and Other Related Documents

This docket is current through 12/31/2003. For an updated version of this docket, click UPDATE

Court: Case Title: Appeal From: Date Filed:

US COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DC CIRCUIT EVANS, JOY, ET AL v. WILLIAMS, ANTHONY A., ET AL U.S. DISTRICT COURT 04/12/1999 CASE INFORMATION

Case Number: Fee Status: Case Type: Nature of Suit: Key Nature of Suit:

99-7058 WAIVED-US OR DC GVT. APPEALS 3440 CIVIL RIGHTS: OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS; OTHER FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS (110.45) LOWER COURT INFORMATION

District: Lower Court Docket Number: Trial Judge(s): Court Reporter(s):
Date Filed: Date Order/Judgment: Date NOA Filed:

0090-1 76-CV-293 STANLEY S. HARRIS, US DISTRICT JUDGE CHRISI MACRI LAURA BEASLEY SANTA ZIZZO ROBERT M. WEBER VERNELL A. MARSHALL 02/23/1976 02/10/1999 04/07/1999
NAMES

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99-7058

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Name:
Type: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone:
Name: Type: Attorney: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone: Attorney:
Name: Type: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney:
Name: Type:

JOY EVANS, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, BETTY JANE EVANS AND HAROLD G. EVANS PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE JOHN L. JACOBUS 202-429-6276 STEPTOE & JOHNSON 1330 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20036-1795 202-429-3000
VENITA FELTON PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE JOSEPH B. TULMAN UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 4200 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NW BUILDING 38 ROOM 207 WASHINGTON, DC 20008 202-274-7317 KELLY R. BAGBY 202-547-0198 PATRICIA B. MILLERIOUX 202-547-0198 UNIVERSITY LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 300 I STREET, NE SUITE 202 WASHINGTON, DC 20002 202-547-0198 JOHN L. JACOBUS
CHRISTINE EXTON PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE JOSEPH B. TULMAN KELLY R. BAGBY PATRICIA B. MILLERIOUX JOHN L. JACOBUS
JOSEPH SCATES PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

99-7058

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Attorney: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney:
Name: Type: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney:
Name: Type: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney:
Name: Type: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Attorney Fax:
Name: Type: Attorney: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Attorney: Attorney:
Attorney Fax:

JOSEPH B. TULMAN KELLY R. BAGBY PATRICIA B. MILLERIOUX JOHN L. JACOBUS
JOHN KENNEDY, JR. PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE JOSEPH B. TULMAN KELLY R. BAGBY PATRICIA B. MILLERIOUX JOHN L. JACOBUS
WILLIAM BROWN PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE JOSEPH B. TULMAN KELLY R. BAGBY PATRICIA B. MILLERIOUX JOHN L. JACOBUS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE JOSEPH B. TULMAN KELLY R. BAGBY PATRICIA B. MILLERIOUX LINDA FRANCES THOME 202-514-4706 202-514-8490
ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS DEFENDANT - APPELLANT BILL LANN LEE LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN 275 BATTERY STREET 30TH FLOOR SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3339 MELVIN WILBERFORCE BOLDEN, JR. LUTZ ALEXANDER PRAGER, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CORPORATION COUNSEL 202-727-0431

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

99-7058

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Attorney: Attorney Phone: Attorney Fax: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Attorney Fax: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone: Name: Type: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney: Firm Name: Attorney:
ENTRY #: --
--
--

CHARLES L. REISCHEL, DEPUTY CORPORATION COUNSEL 202-724-5665 202-727-0431 ROBERT R. RIGSBY, CORPORATION COUNSEL 202-727-6248 202-727-0431 OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL (APPELLATE DIVISION) 441 4TH STREET, NW SIXTH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20001 202-727-6252
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEFENDANT - APPELLANT MELVIN WILBERFORCE BOLDEN, JR. LUTZ ALEXANDER PRAGER, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CORPORATION COUNSEL CHARLES L. REISCHEL, DEPUTY CORPORATION COUNSEL ROBERT R. RIGSBY, CORPORATION
COUNSEL

DOCKET PROCEEDINGS

DATE: 05/11/2000

DESCRIPTION:
MANDATE ISSUED TO CLERK, DISTRICT COURT [516470-1] AWAITING REHEARING PETITION CANCELLED. . (EDB)

05/11/2000

PER CURIAM ORDER FILED GRANTING REQUEST FOR COSTS FILED BY ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS [508232-1]. COSTS WILL BE AWARDED TO ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ET AL. IN THE AMOUNT OF $501.64 AND TAXED AGAINST USA. COSTS ARE PAYABLE BETWEEN PARTIES AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO THE CLERK. BEFORE JUDGES SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS, GINSBURG. [ENTRY DATE: 5/11/00] (EDB)

04/03/2000

REQUEST FILED BY APPELLANT ANTHONY A. WILLI-

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AMS, APPELLANT DC BILL OF COSTS [508232-1] . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 4/3/00 . (SHA)

--

03/31/2000

CLERK'S ORDER FILED THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO

WITHHOLD ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE PENDING

DISPOSITION OF ANY TIMELY PETITION FOR REHEAR-

ING. [ENTRY DATE: 3/31/00] (EDB)

--

03/31/2000

OPINION ( 14 PGS ) FOR THE COURT FILED BY JUDGE

SILBERMAN. (EDB)

--

03/31/2000

JUDGMENT FOR THE REASONS IN THE ACCOMPANY-

ING OPINION REVERSING [507426-1] & REMANDING

CASE TO THE USDC [507426-2] BEFORE JUDGES SIL-

BERMAN, WILLIAMS, GINSBURG. [ENTRY DATE:

3/31/00] (EDB)

--

02/14/2000

ORAL ARGUMENT HELD BEFORE SILBERMAN, WILLI-

AMS, GINSBURG . (VEW)

--

02/08/2000

FORM 72 FILED BY ATTORNEY JOHN L. JACOBUS

[495192-1] ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES JOY EVANS, ET

AL. - [495192-2] . (CWC)

--

02/08/2000

FORM 72 FILED BY ATTORNEY LINDA FRANCES

THOME [495191-1] ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE USA

[495191-2] . (CWC)

--

02/07/2000

FORM 72 FILED BY ATTORNEY LUTZ A. PRAGER

[495194-1] ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS WILLIAMS, ET

AL. [495194-2] . (CWC)

--

02/04/2000

PER CURIAM ORDER FILED TO ALLOCATE ORAL AR-

GUMENT TIMES: APET MINUTES- 15 ERES MINUTES- 15

(APPELLEES MAY DIVIDE THEIR TIME AS THEY SEE

FIT) [494198-1], FORM 72 NOTICE OF ATTORNEY AR-

GUING CASE - [494198-2] DUE 2/9/00. [ENTRY DATE:

2/4/00] (CWC)

--

12/03/1999

JOINT APPENDIX (VOLUME II) FILED [481635-1]. COP-

IES: 10. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 12/3/99. (JTH)

--

12/03/1999

REPLY BRIEF FILED BY APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A.

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WILLIAMS, ET AL [481634-1]. COPIES: 15. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 12/3/99. (JTH)

--

11/18/1999

BRIEF FILED BY APPELLEE USA [478098-1] . COPIES: 16 .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 11/12/99 . (SHA)

--

11/12/1999

BRIEF FILED BY APPELLEE'S JOY EVANS, ET AL.,

[476541-1]. COPIES: 15. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE

11/12/99. (JTH)

--

11/10/1999

CLERK'S ORDER FILED GRANTING MOTION TO MODI-

FY THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE FILED BY ANTHONY A.

WILLIAMS, DC [474532-1] [454819-2] APPELLANT'S

REPLY BRIEF NOW DUE ON 12/3/99. [ENTRY DATE:

11/10/99] (CWC)

--

11/03/1999

UNCONTESTED MOTION FILED BY APPELLANTS' AN-

THONY A. WILLIAMS, ET AL., (CERTIFICATE OF SER-

VICE DATED 11/3/99) TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE

[474532-1] THE REPLY BRIEF UNTIL 12/3/99. (STYLED AS

"MOTION TO MODIFY BRIEFING SCHEDULE"). (JTH)

--

10/20/1999

SUPPLEMENT TO [471552-1] THE JOINT APPENDIX

(SUBMITTING MISSING PAGE #'S 416-417) [465864-1]

FILED BY APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ET

AL. (JTH)

--

10/15/1999

CLERK'S ORDER FILED GRANTING MOTION TO MODI-

FY BRIEFING SCHEDULE FILED BY JOY EVANS, VEN-

ITA FELTON, CHRISTINE EXTON, JOSEPH SCATES,

JOHN KENNEDY JR., WILLIAM BROWN [469208-1] ONLY

TO THE EXTENT THAT THE FOLLOWING REVISED

BRIEFING SCHEDULE SHALL NOW APPLY: [454819-2] .

APPELLEE'S BRIEF DUE ON 11/12/99 ; APPELLANT'S

REPLY BRIEF DUE ON 11/26/99. [ENTRY DATE: 10/15/99]

(CWC)

--

10/12/1999

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED BY ATTORNEY PATRI-

CIA B. MILLERIOUX AND KELLY R. BAGBY FOR AP-

PELLEE JOY EVANS, AT AL. [469579-1] . (SHA)

--

10/08/1999

MOTION FILED (5 COPIES) BY APPELLEE JOY EVANS,

ET AL. (CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATED 10/8/99 ) TO

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

99-7058

Page 7

MODIFY BRIEFING SCHEDULE [469208-1]. (SHA)

--

10/06/1999

STATUTORY ADDENDUM FILED BY APPELLANTS' AN-

THONY A. WILLIAMS, ET AL., [468435-1]. COPIES: 15.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 10/6/99. (JTH)

--

10/06/1999

BRIEF FILED BY APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A. WILLI-

AMS, ET AL., [468433-1]. COPIES: 15. CERTIFICATE OF

SERVICE DATE 10/6/99. (JTH)

--

09/27/1999

SUPPLEMENT TO [466496-1] THE JOINT APPENDIX

(ATTACHING MISING PAGE # 174) [465864-1] FILED BY

APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

(CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATED 09/24/99). (JTH)

--

09/27/1999

PER ORDER LODGED MOTION EXTEND TIME [465310-1]

IS FILED. (LEJ)

--

09/27/1999

CLERK'S ORDER FILED GRANTING MOTION LEAVE TO

FILE FILED BY ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC [465311-1]

DIRECTING CLERK TO FILE MOTION EXTEND TIME

[465310-1] GRANTING MOTION EXTEND TIME FILED BY

ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, DC [465310-1] [454819-2] THE

FOLLOWING SCHEDULE SHALL APPLY: APPELLANT'S

BRIEF DUE ON 10/6/99 ; APPELLEE'S BRIEF DUE ON

11/5/99 ; APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF DUE ON 11/19/99.

[ENTRY DATE: 9/27/99] (LEJ)

--

09/24/1999

JOINT APPENDIX FILED BY APPELLANT ANTHONY A.

WILLIAMS, [465864-1] . COPIES: 9 . CERTIFICATE OF

SERVICE DATE 9/24/99 . (SHA)

--

09/22/1999

MOTION FILED (5 COPIES) BY APPELLANT ANTHONY

A. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT DC (CERTIFICATE OF SER-

VICE DATED 9/22/99 ) FOR LEAVE TO FILE [465311-1] A

MOTION EXTEND TIME [465310-1] . (SHA)

--

09/22/1999

MOTION LODGED (5 COPIES) BY APPELLANT AN-

THONY A. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT DC (CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE DATED 9/22/99 ) TO MODIFY BRIEFING

SCHEDULE [465310-1]. (SHA)

--

09/13/1999

CLERK'S ORDER FILED, ON THE COURT'S OWN MO-

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

99-7058

Page 8

TION, REMOVING CASE FROM THE 1/21/00 CALENDAR AND RESCHEDULING ORAL ARGUMENT FOR 2/14/00 AT 9:30 [462959-1] BEFORE JUDGE INITIALS: LHS SFW DHG. [ENTRY DATE: 9/13/99] (CWC)

--

08/20/1999

LETTER SENT CHANGING PANEL FOR ORAL ARGU-

MENT. [457915-1] CASE NOW SCHEDULED BEFORE

JUDGE INITIALS: DBS KLH JWR. (CWC)

--

08/16/1999

NOTICE FILED BY APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A. WILLI-

AMS, ET AL., FINAL TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE

[457031-1]. TRANSCRIPTS ARE COMPLETED/RECEIVED.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 8/16/99. (JTH)

--

08/11/1999

CLERK'S ORDER FILED DIRECTING PPELLANT TO FILE

[456025-1] TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE DUE 8/18/99

AND AT 30 DAY INTERVALS THEREAFTER UNTIL THE

TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND RECEIVED.

[ENTRY DATE: 8/11/99] (SHA)

--

08/06/1999

CLERK'S ORDER FILED TO SCHEDULE ORAL ARGU-

MENT [454819-1] BEFORE JUDGE INITIALS: DBS JWR

MBG ON 1/21/00; ESTABLISHING THE INITIAL BRIEFING

SCHEDULE [454819-2] : APPELLANT'S BRIEF DUE ON

9/29/99 ; APPELLANT'S APPENDIX DUE ON 9/29/99 ; AP-

PELLEE'S BRIEF DUE ON 10/29/99 ; APPELLANT'S REPLY

BRIEF DUE ON 11/12/99. [ENTRY DATE: 8/6/99] (CWC)

--

06/14/1999

NOTICE FILED BY APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A. WILLI-

AMS, ET AL., INTERIM TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE

[442299-1]. NEXT TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE IS DUE

7/14/99. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 6/14/99.

[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT ADVISES THAT ON 6/11/99

A CHECK WAS ISSUED TO COURT REPORTER VERNELL

MARSHALL FOR THE TRANSCRPT OF THE HEARING ON

7/22/98]. (JTH)

--

06/02/1999

NOTICE FILED BY APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A. WILLI-

AMS, ET AL., INTERIM TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE

[441030-1]. NEXT TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE IS DUE

7/2/99. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 6/2/99.

[APPELLANT ADVISES THAT A PURCHASE ORDER HAS

BEEN GIVEN TO V. MARSHALL FOR THE TRANSCRIPT

BUT THAT SHE WANTS PAYMENT IN ADVANCE, AND

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

99-7058

Page 9

THAT APPELLANT ANTICIPATES A CHECK TO BE ISSUED SHORTLY]. (JTH)

--

05/20/1999

NOTICE FILED BY APPELLEES' JOY EVANS, ET AL.,

[437434-1]. (DESIGNATION OF TRANSCRIPT) CERTIFIC-

ATE OF SERVICE DATE 5/20/99. (JTH)

--

05/18/1999

INITIAL SUBMISSIONS FILED BY APPELLEE USA

[436853-1] : CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL . (SHA)

--

05/18/1999

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED BY ATTORNEY LINDA

FRANCES THOME FOR APPELLEE USA [436852-1] .

(SHA)

--

05/13/1999

NOTICE FILED BY APPELLANTS' ANTHONY A. WILLI-

AMS, ET AL., FINAL TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE

[435622-1]. TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR

THIS APPEAL. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DATE 5/13/99.

(JTH)

--

05/13/1999

INITIAL SUBMISSIONS FILED BY APPELLANT AN-

THONY A. WILLIAMS, AND DC [435620-1]: DOCKETING

STATEMENT; CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL; STATEMENT

OF ISSUES; LOWER COURT DECISION; DEFERRED AP-

PENDIX NOTICE (DEFERRED APPENDIX NEEDED = N).

(JTH)

--

05/13/1999

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED BY ATTORNEYS JO

ANNE ROBINSON, LUTZ A. PRAGER AND CHARLES L.

REISCHEL FOR APPELLANTS' DC, AND ANTHONY A.

WILLIAMS [435619-1]. (JTH)

--

05/11/1999

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED BY ATTORNEY JOSEPH

B. TULMAN FOR APPELLEE WILLIAM BROWN, AP-

PELLEE JOHN KENNEDY, APPELLEE JOSEPH SCATES,

APPELLEE CHRISTINE EXTON, APPELLEE VENITA

FELTON, APPELLEE JOY EVANS [435105-1] . (SHA)

--

05/11/1999

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED BY ATTORNEY JOHN L.

JACOBUS FOR APPELLEE WILLIAM BROWN, APPELLEE

JOHN KENNEDY, APPELLEE JOSEPH SCATES, AP-

PELLEE CHRISTINE EXTON, APPELLEE VENITA

FELTON, APPELLEE JOY EVANS [435103-1] . (SHA)

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

99-7058

Page 10

--

05/11/1999

INITIAL SUBMISSIONS FILED BY APPELLEE JOY

EVANS, APPELLEE VENITA FELTON, APPELLEE

CHRISTINE EXTON, APPELLEE JOSEPH SCATES, AP-

PELLEE JOHN KENNEDY, APPELLEE WILLIAM BROWN

[435100-1] : CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL; . (SHA)

--

04/13/1999

CLERK'S ORDER FILED DIRECTING APPELLANT TO

FILE [428994-1]: DOCKETING STATEMENT; CERTIFIC-

ATE OF COUNSEL; STATEMENT OF ISSUES; LOWER

COURT DECISION; ANY PROCEDURAL MOTIONS;

TRANSCRIPT STATUS NOTICE; DEFERRED APPENDIX

NOTICE; APPEARANCE FORM DUE 5/13/99; ANY DIS-

POSITIVE MOTIONS DUE 5/28/99. DIRECTING APPELLEE

TO FILE [428994-2]: CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL; ANY

PROCEDURAL MOTIONS; APPEARANCE FORM DUE

5/13/99; ANY DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS DUE 5/28/99. (SHA)

--

04/12/1999

LETTER SENT ATTORNEY NON-MEMBER LETTER. AP-

PLICATION FOR ADMISSION - DUE 6/11/99 FOR LAURIE

J. WEINSTEIN . . DOCUMENTS SENT: LETTER ATY APPL

FOR ADM [428833-1] . (SHA)

--

04/12/1999

CIVIL-PRIVATE CASE DOCKETED. NOTICE OF APPEAL

FILED BY APPELLANT ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, APPEL-

LANT DC. [428750-1] (SHA)

Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top) •1999 WL 34834054 (Appellate Brief) Appellants' Reply Brief (Dec. 3, 1999) •1999 WL 34834053 (Appellate Brief) Brief for the United States as Appellee (Nov. 18, 1999) •1999 WL 34834052 (Appellate Brief) Brief for Appellees (Nov. 12, 1999) •1999 WL 34834051 (Appellate Brief) Brief for Appellants (Oct. 6, 1999)
TO ORDER COPIES OF ANY DOCUMENTS LISTED ABOVE, CALL WESTLAW COURTEXPRESS 1-877-DOC-RETR (1-877-362-7387) (Additional Charges Apply).
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

 
 JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

This docket is current through 06/03/2014

Current Date: 2/7/2019

Source: US COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DC CIRCUIT

Court:

US COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DC CIRCUIT

Case Title:

JOY EVANS, ET AL v. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL

Appeal From:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Termed:

08/27/2010

Date Filed:

04/14/2010

CASE INFORMATION
Case Number: Fee Status: Case Type: Case Subtype: Nature of Suit: Key Nature of Suit:

10-5109 FEE WAIVED APPEALS CIVIL US, UNITED STATES 2440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL RIGHTS; OTHER FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS (110.45)

LOWER COURT INFORMATION
District: Lower Court Docket Number: Trial Judge(s): Court Reporter(s):
Date Filed: Date Order/Judgment: Date NOA Filed:

0090-1 1:76-CV-00293-ESH ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
LISA GRIFFITH CATALINA KERR 02/23/1976 04/07/2010 04/08/2010

NAMES

JOY EVANS, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, BETTY JANE EVANS AND HAROLD G. EVANS

Type:
1

PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

Attorney: Attorney Phone: Attorney Fax: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone:

PAUL JOSEPH KIERNAN
202-663-7276
202-955-5564
HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP
SUITE 100 800 17TH STREET, NW SUITE 1100 WASHINGTON, DC 20006-6801
202-955-3000

VENITA FELTON
Type: Attorney: Attorney Phone:

PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE PAUL JOSEPH KIERNAN 202-663-7276

CHRISTINE EXTON
Type: Attorney: Attorney Phone:

PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE PAUL JOSEPH KIERNAN 202-663-7276

JOSEPH SCATES
Type: Attorney: Attorney Phone:

PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE PAUL JOSEPH KIERNAN 202-663-7276

WILLIAM BROWN
Type: Attorney: Attorney Phone:
2

PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE PAUL JOSEPH KIERNAN 202-663-7276

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

JOHN KENNEDY, JR.
Type: Attorney: Attorney Phone:

PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE PAUL JOSEPH KIERNAN 202-663-7276

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Type: Attorney: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Attorney: Attorney Phone: Firm Name: Firm Address:

INTERVENOR FOR PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE
R. CRAIG LAWRENCE
U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
(USA) CIVIL DIVISION 555 4TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20530
202-252-2500
MARK LENARD GROSS
202-514-2172
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(DOJ) CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, APPELLATE SECTION 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20530
SASHA M. SAMBERG-CHAMPION, ESQUIRE
202-307-0714
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(DOJ) CIVIL DIVISION, APPELLATE STAFF PO BOX 978, BEN FRANKLIN STATION WASHINGTON, DC 20044

ADRIAN FENTY, MAYOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Type: Attorney: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone:

DEFENDANT - APPELLANT
DONNA M. MURASKY, ESQUIRE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
441 4TH STREET, NW ONE JUDICIARY SQUARE, SIXTH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2714
202-727-3400

3

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

Attorney: Attorney Phone: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone: Attorney: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone:

RICHARD STUART LOVE
202-724-6635
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
441 4TH STREET, NW ONE JUDICIARY SQUARE, SIXTH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2714
202-727-3400
CARL JAMES SCHIFFERLE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
441 4TH STREET, NW ONE JUDICIARY SQUARE, SIXTH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2714
202-727-3400

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Type: Attorney: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Attorney:

DEFENDANT - APPELLANT DONNA M. MURASKY, ESQUIRE RICHARD STUART LOVE 202-724-6635 CARL JAMES SCHIFFERLE

QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.

Type: Attorney: Attorney Phone: Attorney Fax: Firm Name: Firm Address:
Firm Phone:

AMICUS CURIAE FOR APPELLEE JOSEPH MICHAEL KLISE 202-624-2629 202-628-5116 CROWELL & MORING LLP 1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20004-2595 202-624-2500

DOCKET PROCEEDINGS (25)

Entry #:

Date:

4

Description:

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

08/27/2010

CLERK’S ORDER FILED [1262886] ViewBatch Download CONSIDERING STIPULATION [ 1262519-3 ]; THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO NOTE ON THE DOCKET THAT THIS CASE IS DISMISSED. NO MANDATE SHALL ISSUE. [10-5109]

08/25/2010

STIPULATION FILED [1262519] TO DISMISS CASE VOLUNTARILY [105109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

ViewBatch Download

06/24/2010

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION FILED ViewBatch Download [1251712] BY DC AND ADRIAN FENTY TO MOTION TO DISMISS CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION [ 1247469-2 ] [SERVICE DATE: 06/24/2010 BY EMAIL] PAGES: 1620. [10-5109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

06/10/2010

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED [1249058] BY J. MICHAEL KLISE ON BEHALF OF AMICUS CURIAE FOR APPELLEE QUALITY TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC.. [10-5109] (KLISE, JOSEPH)

ViewBatch Download

06/10/2010

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED [1249187] BY SASHA SAMBERGCHAMPION AND CO-COUNSEL MARK GROSS ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE USA. [10-5109] (GROSS, MARK)

ViewBatch Download

06/10/2010

CLERK’S ORDER FILED [1249090] ViewBatch Download GRANTING MOTION TO EXTEND TIME [ 1248838-2 ]; RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION [ 1247469-2 ] NOW DUE ON 06/24/2010 [10-5109]

06/09/2010

CONSENT MOTION FILED [1248838] ViewBatch Download BY DC AND ADRIAN FENTY TO

5

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

EXTEND TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO 06/24/2010. [SERVICE DATE: 06/09/2010 ] PAGES: 1-10. [105109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

06/09/2010

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION FILED ViewBatch Download [1248922] BY USA TO MOTION TO DISMISS CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION [ 1247469-2 ] [SERVICE DATE: 06/09/2010 BY EMAIL] PAGES: 1-10. [10-5109] (SAMBERGCHAMPION, SASHA)

06/09/2010

NOTICE FILED [1248898] BY QUALITYViewBatch Download TRUST FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, INC. OF INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE AS AMICUS CURIAE. [DISCLOSURE LISTING: ATTACHED] [SERVICE DATE: 06/09/2010 ] [105109] (KLISE, JOSEPH)

06/01/2010

MOTION FILED [1247469] BY

ViewBatch Download

WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS,

CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON,

JOHN KENNEDY, JR. AND JOSEPH

SCATES TO DISMISS CASE FOR LACK

OF JURISDICTION (RESPONSE TO

MOTION SERVED BY MAIL DUE ON

06/14/2010) [SERVICE DATE:

06/01/2010 BY EMAIL] PAGES: 11-

15. [10-5109] (KIERNAN, PAUL)

05/14/2010

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED [1244861] BY SASHA SAMBERGCHAMPION ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE USA. [10-5109] (SAMBERG-CHAMPION, SASHA)

ViewBatch Download

05/14/2010

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES,

ViewBatch Download

RULINGS AND RELATED CASES FILED

[1244952] BY DC AND ADRIAN

FENTY [SERVICE DATE: 05/14/2010 ]

[10-5109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

6

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

05/14/2010

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED

ViewBatch Download

[1244954] BY CARL J. SCHIFFERLE

AND CO-COUNSEL RICHARD S. LOVE

ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS DC AND

ADRIAN FENTY. [10-5109]

(SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

05/14/2010

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FILED

ViewBatch Download

[1244957] BY DC AND ADRIAN

FENTY [SERVICE DATE: 05/14/2010 ]

[10-5109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

05/14/2010

UNDERLYING DECISION IN CASE SUBMITTED [1244962] BY DC AND ADRIAN FENTY [SERVICE DATE: 05/14/2010 ] [10-5109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

ViewBatch Download

05/14/2010

CORRECTED CERTIFICATE AS TO ViewBatch Download PARTIES, RULINGS AND RELATED CASES FILED [1244826] BY WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. AND JOSEPH SCATES [SERVICE DATE: 05/14/2010 ] [105109] (KIERNAN, PAUL)

05/14/2010

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES,

ViewBatch Download

RULINGS AND RELATED CASES FILED

[1244863] BY USA [SERVICE DATE:

05/14/2010 ] [10-5109] (SAMBERG-

CHAMPION, SASHA)

05/14/2010

DOCKETING STATEMENT FILED

ViewBatch Download

[1244953] BY DC AND ADRIAN

FENTY [SERVICE DATE: 05/14/2010 ]

[10-5109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

05/14/2010

STATEMENT OF INTENT REGARDING ViewBatch Download APPENDIX DEFERRAL FILED [1244955] BY DC AND ADRIAN FENTY [SERVICE DATE: 05/14/2010 ]

7

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

INTENT: APPXDEFERRED [10-5109] (SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

05/14/2010

TRANSCRIPT STATUS REPORT

ViewBatch Download

[1244960] BY DC AND ADRIAN

FENTY [SERVICE DATE: 05/14/2010 ].

STATUS OF TRANSCRIPTS: FINAL -

ALL TRANSCRIPTS NEEDED FOR THE

APPEAL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED

AND RECEIVED. [10-5109]

(SCHIFFERLE, CARL)

05/13/2010

INCORRECT DOCKET ENTRY-

ViewBatch Download

DISREGARD--CERTIFICATE AS TO

PARTIES, RULINGS AND RELATED

CASES FILED [1244684] BY WILLIAM

BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE

EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN

KENNEDY, JR. AND JOSEPH SCATES

[SERVICE DATE: 05/13/2010 ] [10-

5109]--[EDITED 05/14/2010 BY LMC]

(KIERNAN, PAUL)

05/13/2010

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED [1244680] BY PAUL J. KIERNAN, STEPHEN F. HANLON, LAURA A. FERNANDEZ ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES WILLIAM BROWN, JOY EVANS, CHRISTINE EXTON, VENITA FELTON, JOHN KENNEDY, JR. AND JOSEPH SCATES. [10-5109] (KIERNAN, PAUL)

ViewBatch Download

04/14/2010

US CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. [10-5109]

04/14/2010

CLERK’S ORDER FILED [1239788] DIRECTING PARTY TO FILE INITIAL SUBMISSIONS: APPELLANT DOCKETING STATEMENT DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLANT CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, ETC. DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLANT STATEMENT OF ISSUES DUE

ViewBatch Download

8

JOY EVANS, ET AL V. ADRIAN FENTY, ET AL, 10-5109 (2010)

04/14/2010

05/14/2010. APPELLANT UNDERLYING DECISION DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLANT DEFERRED APPENDIX STATEMENT DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLANT NOTICE OF APPEARANCE DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLANT TRANSCRIPT STATUS REPORT DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLANT PROCEDURAL MOTIONS DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLANT DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS DUE 06/01/2010; DIRECTING PARTY TO FILE INITIAL SUBMISSIONS: APPELLEE CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, ETC. DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLEE ENTRY OF APPEARANCE DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLEE PROCEDURAL MOTIONS DUE 05/14/2010. APPELLEE DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS DUE 06/01/2010 [105109]
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED [1239787] ViewBatch Download BY DC AND ADRIAN FENTY SEEKING REVIEW OF A DECISION BY THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT IN 1:76-CV-00293ESH. ASSIGNED USCA CASE NUMBER [10-5109]

End of Document

9

 
 Evans ex rel. Evans v. Fenty, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)

2010 WL 3447241 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
This decision was reviewed by West editorial staff and not assigned editorial enhancements.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Joy EVANS, by and through her parents and next friends, Betty Jane EVANS and Harold G. Evans,
et al., Appellees v.
Adrian FENTY, Mayor, District of Columbia and District of Columbia, Appellants.
No. 10-5109. | Aug. 27, 2010.
Attorneys and Law Firms

Paul Joseph Kiernan, Esquire, Holland & Knight LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellees.
Donna M. Murasky, Esquire, Deputy Solicitor, Richard Stuart Love, Assistant, Carl James Schifferle, Assistant, Office of the Attorney General, District of Columbia Office of the Solicitor General, Washington, DC, for Appellants.
Opinion
ORDER
*1 Upon consideration of the stipulation for dismissal of this appeal, it is
ORDERED that the Clerk note on the docket that this case is dismissed. No mandate will issue.

1

 
 459 F.Supp. 483 (1978)
Joy EVANS et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v.
Walter WASHINGTON et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 76-0293.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
June 14, 1978.
484 *484 Robert S. Catz, Urban Law Institute of the Antioch School of Law, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.
Susan Goldsmith Daniel, Leonard Rieser, Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Washington, D. C., for plaintiffintervenor.
George T. Masson, Jr., Nancy R. Dorsch, Asst. Corp. Counsels, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER
JOHN H. PRATT, District Judge.
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the responses and submissions filed by all the parties in conjunction therewith, and the record in this action, and it appearing that the defendants during the pendency of this litigation have initiated policies and practices which conform to some of the provisions hereinafter set forth, but that there remain significant deficiencies necessitating this Court's entry of injunctive relief, and it further appearing that the defendants have consented to the entry of this Order and Judgment so as to assure protection of the rights of plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor, therefore, it is, by the Court, this 14th day of June, 1978, ORDERED AND DECREED:
I. DECLARATORY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1. The mentally retarded residents of Forest Haven who constitute the plaintiff class (hereinafter class members) have a federal constitutional right to habilitative care and treatment based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Each class member has a federal constitutional right to be free from harm based upon the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
3. Each class member has a federal constitutional right, based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty and to be kept free from harm.
Habilitation is the process by which a resident is assisted in acquiring and maintaining those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and social capabilities. Habilitation includes but is not limited to, programs of formal, structured education and training.
Habilitative care in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty means living as normally as possible and receiving appropriate individualized services in the community in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive settings.
As used in this Order, "integrated" refers to the integration of mentally retarded persons with nonretarded persons in the community.

4. The Court finds that violations of the federal constitutional rights of class members, as set forth in paragraphs 1 thru 3, supra, have occurred.
II. PROVISION OF COMMUNITY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICES NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT TO THE INDIVIDUALIZED HABILITATION OF CLASS MEMBERS
5. Defendants, their successors, officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert and participation with them are permanently enjoined to:
a) Develop and to provide for each class member a written individualized habilitation plan, based upon 485 individualized assessments *485 and formulated in accordance with professional standards (as set forth in Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Council for Services for Mentally Retarded and other Developmentally Disabled Persons, Standards for Services for Developmentally Disabled Individuals (1977)) with the participation of the retarded person, his or her parents, guardian, advocate, and parent surrogate, if there is one; and to provide for each an individualized habilitation program designed in accordance with the plan, to provide annual periodic review of the plan and program, and the opportunity to each member of the plaintiff class and his or her parent, guardian, advocate, and surrogate parent, if there is one, to participate in such review.
b) Provide all class members with community living arrangements suitable to each, together with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide them with minimally adequate habilitation until such individuals are no longer in need of such living arrangements, programs and/or community services. Such community living arrangements, programs and other services shall be provided in the least separate, most integrated and least restrictive community settings.
c) Develop a Plan of Implementation as referenced at paragraph 7, infra, for the provision of such community living arrangements, programs and supportive services. The community living arrangements to be provided shall in no event house in a single residence more than eight mentally retarded persons; except that if defendants find that the medical needs of certain residents are such as to require, in defendants' estimation, placement in facilities housing more than eight mentally retarded persons, defendants shall (i) identify such residents in the Plan and in the reports provided for in paragraph 6, infra, as the situation may arise and (ii) set forth proposed types of placements for such residents and the rationales therefor.
d) Provide all necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that community living arrangements, programs and supportive community services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained.
e) Defendants shall make every reasonable effort, including seeking such additional funding as may be required, to secure the expert services of an independent private organization for the preparation of a demographic study, to be completed by December 31, 1978, of the capacity of the District of Columbia area to accommodate Forest Haven residents in appropriate community living arrangements. Said study shall include, but not be limited to, the following areas: housing, zoning, land use, population density, concentrations of group living facilities and blighted areas.
6. Defendants shall identify and retain the expert full-time services of a Developmental Disabilities professional (hereafter "DDP") to assist them and the Court in coordinating and carrying out the implementation of the provisions of this Order. The DDP in conjunction with the defendants shall have the duty, obligation and responsibility to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor the implementation of this and any further Order of the Court. The DDP through the Director of DHR shall until further Order of this Court file a verified report every ninety (90) days from the date of appointment of the DDP detailing the status and progress of the defendants in the implementation of this and any further Order of the Court. Defendants, their successors, officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, shall assist the DDP in securing access to all premises, records, documents, class members and other necessary information to assure that the provisions of this Order are carried out.

The DDP shall report directly to the Director of the Department of Human Resources who shall make available to the DDP appropriate professional and other resources, including consultants, as are necessary and appropriate to execute the Court's Order.
486 The defendants shall identify and secure the expert services of the DDP within 80 *486 days of the entry of this Order, and shall submit a plan within 30 days of the date of appointment of the DDP for the staffing and resources to be made available to the DDP. If the staff so identified is not available at that time, defendants will as an interim measure immediately provide equivalent staff to the DDP on a consulting and/or contract basis.
In selecting the DDP, the Director of DHR shall create a three-person search committee to recommend the appointment of the DDP. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor shall jointly select one designee as a member of the three-person search committee. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor shall have the opportunity to review and comment on any proposed selection of the person to serve as DDP, prior to such selection.
7. The DDP and defendants shall prepare and present to the Court for its approval and Order a Plan of Implementation which shall include but not be limited to the following plans:
(a) A plan specifying the quantity and type of community living arrangements programs and other community services necessary for the habilitation of all plaintiffs in the least separate, most integrated, least restrictive community setting, taking into account the existing community services in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area and including specification of the additional residential placements, programs and services necessary, the delineation of responsibility for their creation and maintenance, their funding and a specified time frame for their provision, and the staffing patterns required. The delineation of responsibility for the creation and maintenance of such living arrangements, programs and services shall include specific assignments by activity to specifically identified agents of the defendants.
(b) A plan specifying resources, procedures, and a schedule for individual evaluations and the formulation of individual exit and community habilitation plans required for the habilitation of each member of plaintiff class and for the periodic review of such plans.
(c) A plan for the recruitment, hiring and training of a sufficient number of qualified community staff to prepare individual exit and community habilitation plans for each member of plaintiff class and upon completion of such plans to assist in the execution of the responsibility to create, develop, maintain, and monitor the community living arrangements, programs and other services required.
(d) A plan for the creation, development and maintenance of mechanisms to monitor a system of community services to assure that community living arrangements, programs and other services of the necessary quality and quantity are continuously provided to class members in the least separate, most integrated, least restrictive community settings, which plan shall include, but not be limited to, the provision of advocates to assist in the protection of the rights of each member of plaintiff class.
(e) A plan for the creation of a Community Advisory Board whose responsibility shall include investigating, monitoring and evaluating complaints with regard to the enforcement of the Court's Order. The Board shall make written findings and recommendations quarterly to the DDP and the Director of the Department of Human Resources and to counsel. Membership on the Board shall include, but not be limited to, parents and relatives of class members, chaplains serving Forest Haven residents, representatives of Friends of Forest Haven and of the District of Columbia Association of Retarded Citizens. Members of the Board shall be reimbursed by defendants for their reasonable expenses incurred in carrying out their responsibilities.
(f) A plan for the provision of continuing information to, and for consultation with, members of the class, their parents, guardians, advocates and surrogate parents concerning the effect and implementation of this Court's Order and defendants' plans to provide community-based living arrangements, programs and services to class members.
487 *487 (g) A plan to safeguard each class member's personal possessions, including money, but not limited to, provision for depositing each class member's funds in interest-bearing accounts and for withdrawal of such funds.

(h) A plan to provide opportunities for alternative employment as necessary and appropriate to each employee of Forest Haven, including training for employment in community programs.
8. The defendants in conjunction with the DDP shall within thirty (30) days after the appointment of the DDP report to this Court upon their recommendations as to the proper and necessary schedule for the most prompt submission to the Court of the aforesaid Plan of Implementation as well as the Plan for Interim Operation referenced at paragraph 13, infra. Upon receipt of this schedule the Court shall give the parties an opportunity to be heard thereon.
9. Within not more than one hundred twenty (120) days after the submission of the report referenced in paragraph 8, the date certain to be set by the Court upon receipt of the report mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the defendants in conjunction with the DDP shall file with this Court the plans required at paragraph 7 (a) and 7(b), supra and 13, infra. Upon receipt of these plans the Court shall set the matter down promptly for hearing. Following the adoption of any plan by order of the Court, said plan shall be implemented forthwith.
10. (a) Defendants are enjoined to make every reasonable effort to carry out the deinstitutionalization of at least thirty (30) residents of Forest Haven by the end of Fiscal Year 1978. The deinstitutionalization of a resident shall include the provision of a community living arrangement suitable to that resident, together with such communitybased day programs and services as are necessary to provide the resident with minimally adequate habilitation. The above figure shall not include any DHR-approved residential placements independently developed, created or secured by private individuals or community organizations. Defendants shall, within thirty (30) days following the close of Fiscal Year 1978, submit to all counsel and to the Court a report detailing their compliance with the requirements of this paragraph.
(b) Defendants are enjoined to make every reasonable effort to obtain sufficient funding for, and to carry out, the deinstitutionalization of at least 60 residents of Forest Haven during Fiscal Year 1979. The deinstitutionalization of a resident shall include the provision of a community living arrangement suitable to that resident, together with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide the resident with minimally adequate habilitation. For purposes of this paragraph, the phrase "every reasonable effort" shall include without limitation, reasonable efforts to (i) seek amendments to the FY 1979 executive budget, (ii) seek supplemental budget authorizations and appropriations for FY 1979, and (iii) reprogram and reallocate funds appropriated to the District of Columbia for FY 1979. It is contemplated that funds will be sought for, and expended upon, such increased administrative and support services as are required in order to carry out the deinstitutionalization described herein, as well as upon direct services to those residents who are deinstitutionalized.
(c) Defendants are enjoined to make every reasonable effort to obtain sufficient funding for, and to carry out, the deinstitutionalization of at least an additional 110 residents of Forest Haven during Fiscal Year 1980. All of the provisions set forth in part (b), supra, shall apply, except that the term "FY 1979" shall be replaced by "FY 1980."
(d) At such time as the Plan of Implementation described in paragraph 7, supra, is ordered into effect, defendants shall be released from the requirements of parts (b) and (c), supra.
(e) In deinstitutionalizing class members pursuant to paragraphs (a) through (c), supra, defendants shall comply with the requirements of paragraph 5(c), supra, pertaining to placement in residences housing more than eight 488 persons; except that the *488 phrase "a report to counsel and the Court" shall be substituted for the phrase "the Plan" appearing in that paragraph.
11. Defendants shall make every reasonable effort to provide suitable community living arrangements, programs and the other community services necessary to the habilitation of the individual named plaintiffs at the earliest possible opportunity in a manner consistent with this Order.
12. There shall be no admissions to Forest Haven until further order of this Court.

III. INTERIM OPERATION OF FOREST HAVEN
13. The defendants in conjunction with the DDP shall prepare and present to the Court for its Order a Plan for the Interim Operation of Forest Haven pending the prompt and orderly placement of Forest Haven residents in community living arrangements and programs with the necessary supportive services. The plan shall address, but need not be limited to, the matters referenced in paragraphs 14a-s, infra, any other conditions at Forest Haven which threaten the life, safety or well-being of any Forest Haven resident, and measures to assure that the interim operation of Forest Haven, including all activities therein, is consistent with the prompt provision of living arrangements, programs and services in the community necessary to the habilitation of each Forest Haven resident. Such plans shall include a delineation of responsibility and specific assignments by activity to specifically identified agents of the defendants.
14. Defendants, their successors, officers, agents, servants and employees are enjoined to exert maximum efforts to comply with the following requirements:
(a) Acts of physical or psychological abuse, neglect or mistreatment of any Forest Haven resident, including, but not limited to assaults, fractures, cuts, bruises, abrasions, burns, bites, lacerations, drug overdoses and verbal abuse, are prohibited. Each and every alleged incident of abuse, neglect or mistreatment shall be promptly investigated and a report made. The manner and mechanism of such investigation shall be developed and established by the plan referenced in paragraph 13, supra. A chronological compilation of the above reports shall be maintained by defendants and made available in the manner specified in paragraph 15, infra.
(b) Utilizing seclusion for any purpose is prohibited. Seclusion is defined as the practice of placing a person alone in a locked room.
(c) Employing physical restraints or "time-out" procedures, including the placement of a person alone in a room, as punishment, for the convenience of staff or as a substitute for a habilitation program is prohibited. Physical restraints and time-out procedures shall be applied only over short specified periods of time in conjunction with other specified programmed activities as set forth in the resident's individualized habilitation plan. In addition, physical restraints and time-out procedures shall be applied only if alternative techniques have failed and only if such restraint or time-out procedure imposes the least restriction consistent with its purpose. Physical restraint shall be employed only when absolutely necessary to protect Forest Haven residents from injuries to themselves or to prevent injuries to others. Orders for restraints shall not be in force for longer than 12 hours. There shall be no PRN (pro re nata, as needed) restraint orders. A resident placed in restraint shall be checked at least every thirty minutes by appropriately trained staff and a record of such checks shall be kept. Mechanical restraints shall be designed and used so as not to cause physical injury to the resident and so as to cause the least possible discomfort. Opportunity for motion and exercise shall be provided for a period of not less than 10 minutes during each two-hour period in which restraint is employed. The Plan for Interim Operation of Forest Haven shall set forth in detail a written policy that defines in precise terms the uses of restraint, limitations on the duration of time 489 the technique may be employed, the training and qualifications of staff members who may *489 authorize its use, and a mechanism for monitoring and controlling its use.
(d) Administering excessive or unnecessary medications to class members is prohibited.
(e) Using medication as punishment, for the convenience of the staff, as a substitute for programming, or in quantities that interfere with a class member's individual developmental program, is prohibited.
(f) Only appropriately trained and qualified staff are permitted to administer drugs to class members.
(g) Training programs shall be provided to staff who administer drugs to class members. The nature of such training programs, and the qualifications to be required of staff who administer drugs to residents shall be established in the Plan for Interim Operation of Forest Haven.

(h) Administering drugs to class members on a PRN (pro re nata, as needed) basis is prohibited. Written policies and procedures governing the safe administration and handling of medications shall be established pursuant to guidelines developed in the Plan for Interim Operation of Forest Haven.
(i) Monitoring of each class member's medications and provision for at least monthly reviews by a physician of each resident's medications is required.
(j) A program of medical, dental and health related services for class members which provides accessibility, quality and continuity of care for physical illness or injury is required. The Plan for Interim Operation of Forest Haven shall develop and establish medical, dental and health related services to class members. All injuries or illnesses which require the attention of a physician shall be immediately reported to the class member's parent or guardian.
(k) Individualized adaptive equipment, including, but not limited to, wheelchairs, walkers, braces, feeding apparatus, and auxiliary sensory devices such as hearing aids shall be provided to each physically handicapped class member who needs them. Each and every class member shall be immediately evaluated to ascertain the need for such equipment.
(l) Each class member shall receive a nourishing, well-balanced diet and assistance in development of proper eating habits. Denial of a nutritionally adequate diet shall not be used as punishment.
(m) No class member shall be fed in any position less than the maximum upright position consistent with his or her capabilities and handicaps.
(n) Aversive behavior modification techniques shall not be employed on any resident.
(o) No class member shall be denied habilitative programming as punishment.
(p) Each class member shall be provided with all reasonable opportunities for visitation, for telephone communication, and to send and receive mail.
(q) All class members shall be compensated in accordance with all applicable District of Columbia and federal laws for all labor performed which has economic benefit to Forest Haven.
(r) Every Forest Haven building in use by residents shall be kept clean, odorless, insect-free, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
(s) Appropriate training programs for all staff shall be developed and implemented. Such programs shall deal with, but not be limited to, the matters in subparagraphs a-r, supra, in order to provide each class member with habilitation and care in a safe, humane environment pending his or her placement in community-based living arrangements and programs.
15. Counsel for plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor and their experts and investigators and members of the Community Advisory Board shall, upon reasonable notice, be permitted access by the defendants to all the premises of Forest Haven and to all facilities of the defendants or their agents wherein class members are served and to all pertinent documents and records.
490 16. All bulletins, memoranda, and directives of official policy issued by the defendants *490 in connection with the implementation of this Court's Order shall, upon issuance, be sent to counsel for plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor.
17. Defendants shall give notice of this Order to their successors, officers, agents, and employees affected by the provisions contained herein. Defendants shall also give notice of this Order to the residents of Forest Haven, their parents or immediate relatives, guardians, advocates, and surrogate parents, if any. A copy of such notice(s) shall be provided to counsel for plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor.
18. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as (a) waiving the right of plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor to move this Court at a later time for an Order appointing a Special Master pursuant to Rule 53, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or (b) waiving the right of defendants to move for a declaration that either the plaintiffs or the plaintiff-

intervenor have duties and obligations not heretofore decreed in respect to defendants' efforts to comply with this Order. 19. Jurisdiction is retained by this Court until further Order.
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 206 F.3d 1292 (2000)
Joy EVANS, et al., Appellees, v.
Anthony A. WILLIAMS, et al., Appellants. United States of America, Appellee.
No. 99-7058.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued February 14, 2000. Decided March 31, 2000.
1293 *1293 Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert R. Rigsby, Interim Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Melvin W. Bolden, Jr., Trial Counsel.
John L. Jacobus argued the cause for appellees Joy Evans, et al. With him on the brief were Kelly Bagby and Joseph B. Tulman. Patricia B. Millerioux entered an appearance.
Linda F. Thome, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee United States of America. With her on the brief was Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General.
Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS, and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:
The District of Columbia appeals from an order of the district court imposing contempt fines of $5,096,340 on it for its failure to comply with a consent decree. We agree with appellant that the fine was a criminal sanction that could not be imposed without a criminal trial; we also agree that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to modify the consent decree. We therefore reverse.
I.
This case started back in 1976, when residents of Forest Haven, the District of Columbia's institution for the mentally retarded, brought a class action alleging a panoply of constitutional violations resulting from poor conditions at the facility. Named as defendants were the Mayor and four other District officials (collectively, the "District"), all sued in their official capacities. The United States soon intervened on the side of the plaintiffs.
In 1978, the parties agreed to a consent judgment that called for closing Forest Haven and placing its residents in "community living arrangements." Over the next few years the district court entered additional consent decrees. In 1983 it approved the order that underlies this dispute. That decree governs almost every aspect of the District's treatment of the mentally retarded. In particular, it requires the District to place specified numbers of Forest Haven residents in community institutions and to "insure that all vendors are paid for their goods and services no later than thirty days following their submission of acceptable vouchers."
By the mid-1990s, the District was confronted with financial problems of "horrendous proportions" and faced "its worst crisis in over a century." H.R.REP. No. 96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1995). It was running an annual deficit of over $600 million, and a congressional committee found that "[t]he District of Columbia is insolvent: The City does not have enough cash to pay all of its bills." Id. at 5. The District began missing some of the payment deadlines set out in the consent decree. In April 1995, on the motion of the plaintiffs, the district court issued an order to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt. It ultimately so held but did not impose

sanctions. Instead, it appointed a special master to develop a remedial plan through which the defendants could purge themselves of contempt, and it ordered that the plan include "specific monetary penalties for noncompliance."
The special master completed her report in January 1996 and issued a supplemental report recommending prospective sanctions a few months later. The defendants objected, arguing that the prospective fines proposed were "unduly harsh and punitive" and that delays in making payments were "not due to any unwillingness to pay but due to a cash short fall." But the district court adopted the master's proposed remedial plan with only slight 1294 modifications. *1294 The plan provided that whenever the defendants failed to pay an invoice within thirty days of submission a fine equal to twice the amount of the invoice would be imposed. Services provided by some of the facilities caring for the mentally retarded qualify for Medicaid reimbursement. Because the District made all Medicaid payments for each month at one time, and because the payments due to the care providers averaged approximately $2.8 million per month, a fine equal to twice the amount of any Medicaid arrearage would have been very large. The court therefore applied the doubling fines only to non-Medicaid payments. Late Medicaid payments, regardless of amount, were to result in a fine of $5,000 per day.
The District continued to miss payment deadlines, and in April 1997 the plaintiffs moved for the imposition of sanctions. While the sanctions motion was pending, the District sought to modify the consent decree so that it would require that vendors be paid within 45 days, rather than 30 days. Its motion to that effect included affidavits from the District's financial officials explaining that cash flow problems required a 45-day payment cycle. The court referred both motions to the special master.
The master concluded that the motion for sanctions was unnecessary because the remedial plans made fines automatic. She thought the fines were civil coercive sanctions, so the defendants were not entitled to the protections of criminal procedures. Although she did not formally find that circumstances had changed so as to warrant modifying the order as the defendants requested, she did recommend three changes to the schedule of sanctions which essentially, at least prospectively, gave the District the relief it sought. First, fines for missed payments would be forgiven unless the nonpayment continued until the 45th day. Second, fines for delays in nonMedicaid payments would be reduced to $1,000 per day, regardless of the amount of the payment, and third, fines for delays in Medicaid payments would be increased from $5,000 per day to $10,000 per day.
The District objected to the special master's report and demanded a jury trial. In Evans v. Williams, 35 F.Supp.2d 88 (D.D.C.1999), the district court adopted the special master's factual findings. Although it disagreed with the master's conclusion that the fines were automatic (noting that automatic fines would amount to summary punishment for an indirect contempt, a violation of due process), it granted the plaintiffs' motion to impose fines. The district judge agreed with the special master that the fines were civil rather than criminal. Therefore provision of criminal procedures was unwarranted, and the court rejected the District's objection that changed circumstances had made the imposition of sanctions unjust. It also adopted the special master's conclusions with respect to modification of the order and the remedial plan. But it modified the remedial plan only prospectively from the date of its decision, which was almost two years after the defendants had sought the modification.
The court ordered the District to pay $5,096,340 in fines, and the District appealed.
II.
This case turns entirely on the proper characterization of the contempt fine. Was it civil or criminal? If the fine was criminal then it may be imposed only if the District's noncompliance0907which the District claims was practically unavoidable0907is proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be willful. See United States v. Rapone, 131 F.3d 188, 195 (D.C.Cir.1997). If it was civil the District would have had to show that compliance was impossible to avoid the sanction. Perhaps of even greater significance, if the judge's order is criminal in character (and the fine is serious), then the District is entitled to a jury trial. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968).
1295 Traditionally, whether a contempt is civil or criminal has depended on *1295 the "character and purpose" of the sanction. A sanction is considered civil if it is "remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for

criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court." Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). There also has been a traditional distinction between mandatory and prohibitory orders. The "paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction ... involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command." International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed2d 642 (1994). On the other hand, a fixed term of imprisonment imposed retroactively to punish an act of disobedience is criminal. This distinction has been extended to fines, so that "a per diem fine imposed for each day a contemnor fails to comply with an affirmative court order" is civil, but an unconditional fine imposed "after a finding of contempt is criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance." Id. at 829, 114 S.Ct. 2552.
The District argues that the fines were indisputably not compensatory (a classic aspect of a civil fine), for they were paid to the court and not at all calibrated to the damage caused by the District's conduct. Moreover, the fines, according to the District, were fixed and determinate; there was no opportunity to escape their consequences by altering behavior, i.e., to purge them once they were imposed. In other words, the fines were designed primarily to punish past acts rather than coerce future conduct and therefore should be thought punitive.[1]
Appellees argue instead that the fines should be seen as coercive and therefore civil in character because the schedule of prospective fines was announced in advance. The District therefore had the capacity to avoid the fines, so to speak to purge itself of contempt, by altering its conduct prior to the time the fines accrued. The United States makes a similar argument: the fines "were imposed for each day or month in which the defendants failed to comply with the 30-day payment requirement, and ended once the defendants complied with the requirement." In effect, the government would treat the defendants' contempt as one ongoing systemic problem of noncompliance with the consent decree. Each missed bill payment deadline would be another instance of the ongoing contempt. On this view the fines for missed bill payments were coercive sanctions that were imposed only so long as the defendants remained in contempt and that stopped being imposed once the defendants began to comply.
Recently the Supreme Court in Bagwell had occasion to struggle with the elusive distinction between civil and criminal contempt fines. In Bagwell a state court had imposed fines of $52 million against the United Mine Workers for repeated violations of an injunction prohibiting the union and its members from engaging in illegal picketing practices, including throwing rocks at employees and obstructing access to company facilities. The court had set forth a prospective schedule of fines, which it too had characterized as "civil and coercive," saying that payment "would only be required if it were shown the defendants disobeyed the Court's orders." Id. at 824, 114 S.Ct. 2552. The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the sanctions were criminal and that the union was entitled (due process) to the protections of criminal procedures.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the fines were not compensatory because they were paid to the court and not the company that was injured by the union's conduct. Then, it recognized the futility of 1296 distinguishing between *1296 coercing affirmative acts and punishing prohibited conduct (pointing out, for example, that "an injunction ordering the union: `Do not strike,' would appear to be prohibitory and criminal, while an injunction ordering the union: `Continue working,' would be mandatory and civil"). Id. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 2552. Nor did it attach significance to the fact that the trial court had prospectively announced a schedule of sanctions, reasoning that "the union's ability to avoid the contempt fines was indistinguishable from the ability of any ordinary citizen to avoid a criminal sanction by conforming his behavior to the law." Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 2552. It thought that the fines were most closely analogous to fixed, determinate criminal fines that the union had no chance to purge once imposed.
Appellees' and intervenor's effort to lump together each District action or inaction in a continuous course of noncompliance is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's Bagwell analysis. If their approach governed, the United Mine Workers' contempt would have been treated not as a series of discrete acts but as an ongoing pattern of noncompliance with the order to refrain from violence. Each fine would have been thought imposed not for a particular violent act but as additional coercion (like a per diem fine) for a continuation of the ongoing contempt. Accordingly, drawing upon Bagwell, it is improper to regard the District as capable of purging itself of contempt by

paying a bill before the thirtieth day it 0907 simply was not in contempt until it failed to pay on the thirtieth day. Each missed payment was a separate violation of the consent decree and a separate act of contempt. And for each act of contempt, the District was subjected to a one-time determinate fine; once it was imposed, there was no opportunity to eliminate it through future compliance. To be sure, the District could have avoided liability had it paid each bill before the thirtieth day. But as the Bagwell Court pointed out, this is no different from any citizen's ability to avoid punishment by conforming his conduct to the law.

Appellees also argue that the fines are not large enough to be scrutinized under Bagwell.[2] They do not suggest that a fine of over $5 million is not "serious"0907obviously it is. Instead, they contend that the many smaller fines that make up the $5 million should be evaluated separately. This overlooks the large size even of some of the component fines (for example, a $104,600 bill paid on the 31st day produced a $209,200 fine). More fundamentally, it is at odds with the approach taken by Bagwell, which considered the amount of the total fine. See id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 2552 ("The fines assessed were serious, totaling over $52 million.") (emphasis added); see also NOW v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 660 (D.C.Cir.1994) (Aggregate fine of $193,623 was "large enough to invite our scrutiny under the principles enunciated in Bagwell.").

In any event, it was the nature of the injunction itself, rather than the form or amount of the fines, that appears to have been the key to the Court's determination that the contempt was criminal in character in Bagwell. The Court described the injunction as establishing a "detailed code of conduct," Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 836, 114 S.Ct. 2552, and it was that "consideration" that convinced the Court that the fines were criminal.

1297

The union's sanctionable conduct did not occur in the court's presence or otherwise implicate the court's ability to maintain order and adjudicate the proceedings before it. Nor did the union's contumacy involve simple, affirmative acts, such as the paradigmatic civil contempts examined in Gompers. Instead, the Virginia trial court levied contempt fines for widespread, ongoing, out-ofcourt violations of a complex injunction. In so doing, the court effectively policed petitioners' compliance with an entire *1297 code of conduct that the court itself had imposed. The union's contumacy lasted many months and spanned a substantial portion of the State.

Id. at 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 2552.

In response to the District's claim that the order before us is just the same kind of complex injunction that was before the Court in Bagwell, appellees (and the intervenors) argue that we should see the consent decree as only addressing various simple discrete acts; in other words, they would disaggregate the decree. But, if anything, the decree here is more farreaching than the Bagwell injunction which, after all, did not seek to control the union's business. It only prohibited violence at a strike at one company. Here, by contrast, the decree governs the administration of an entire governmental program in the District of Columbia. It prescribes a complete code of conduct0907 originally covering everything from bill payments to staffing to air conditioning 0907 that the district court has enforced for years. Even the payment requirement has complex elements because the District paid over one hundred non-Medicaid providers each month.

Appellees complain that if sanctions such as these were deemed criminal and not civil, it would be difficult for the court to manage litigation seeking institutional reform. That may well be so. Giving alleged wrongdoers the benefit of a hearing before a neutral factfinder0907particularly a jury is 0907 always in some sense an impediment to judicial power. And it is not surprising that district courts around the country, reluctant to surrender part of their power to coerce obedience to their decrees, have resisted the logic of Bagwell.[3] But as the Supreme Court noted, there are countervailing considerations. When a district judge assumes the responsibility to regulate the activities of a large institution and then seeks to identify and punish violators of his or her injunction, he or she comes perilously close to fusing the powers which our Constitution separates. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831, 114 S.Ct. 2552 ("Unlike most areas of law, ... civil contempt proceedings leave the offended judge solely responsible for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious conduct."). The Court was not unaware that its decision would lay "burdens on courts' ability to sanction widespread, indirect contempts of complex injunctions," id. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 25520907 nor are we. Because the defendants were not given the benefit of criminal procedures, the order imposing the fine must be reversed.[4]

III.
There remains the propriety of the district court's refusal to modify the consent decree. The practical consequence of this issue has been somewhat attenuated by the special master's decision to modify the fine structure, but the question remains relevant because the fines were modified only prospectively. The District still faces the possibility of being fined for late payments made between April 1997 (when it made the motion to modify) and February 1999 (when the fine schedule was modified).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) permits a court to modify a judgment or order when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Appellant argues that under Rufo v. Inmates of 1298 the Suffolk *1298 County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the district court should have granted its motion to modify. Rufo held that the party seeking a modification need not make a "clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions" a 0907 standard that had been applied since United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). It pointed out that flexibility is especially important in institutional reform litigation: "Because [consent] decrees often remain in place for extended periods of time, the likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree is increased." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380, 112 S.Ct. 748. In particular, "[m]odification of a consent decree may be warranted when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous." Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. While a modification should not be granted because of "events that actually were anticipated" by the parties, the party seeking a modification need not show that the changed circumstances were unforeseeable. Id.
To decide whether the District's financial problems were a changed circumstance, we first must answer the antecedent question: changed relative to when? The District looks to the 1983 consent decree, the appellees and the United States to the 1996 remedial plan. But the 1996 remedial plan was designed simply to implement the consent decree and to address the district's failure to make payments in accordance with it. The substantive obligations imposed on the district all stem from the 1983 decree. Our focus might be different if the remedial plan had been based on a comprehensive reexamination of the obligations in the 1983 decree. In that case, it might be thought that the District was obliged to make its claim of financial hardship then. But the aims of the remedial plan were more modest: the judge explained that its purpose was simply "to bring the District into compliance with its outstanding obligations." It is true that the judge also invited the parties to seek appropriate modifications of the consent decree in light of changed circumstances. But even though the District did not in so many words request relief from the 30-day payment requirement, it did object (repeatedly) to being sanctioned for late payments, explaining that it expected to be unable to pay on time. In any event, the parties do not appear to have regarded the remedial plan as a complete solution to all of the problems that had arisen under the consent decree. They thought that the District's financial difficulties still might require a future solution. The special master noted that the possibility of further modifications had been discussed, and the judge observed that the District was in a time of "transition" and its ability to make timely payments might be contingent on the actions of Congress. We therefore think we must look at whether circumstances have changed since 1983 rather than at whether they have altered only in the last few years.
The District makes the obvious point that no one in 1983 anticipated the District's insolvency or its crushing debt burden. And as Rufo explained, "[f]inancial constraints may not be used to justify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional violations, but they are a legitimate concern of government defendants in institutional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately considered in tailoring a consent decree modification." Id. at 392-93, 112 S.Ct. 748. Appellees respond that although this particular financial crisis was not contemplated, the parties certainly had in mind the District's generic inability or refusal to pay the vendors 0907that was the very reason the 30day requirement was part of the consent decree. But Rufo's modification standard does not require absolute unforeseeability. It is enough that the parties did not actually contemplate the changed circumstances. And the crisis of the 1990s was different in kind rather than degree. Moreover, the 30-day payment requirement likely was intended to protect the class members against bureaucratic neglect, not against the District's near-bankruptcy. In 1299 truth, the consent *1299 decree was negotiated with the expectation that the District would be able to pay its bills. Once it could not, circumstances had changed.

The appellees contend that even with the District's financial problems, a 30-day payment schedule is not unreasonable or onerous. But the District submitted affidavits to the contrary, and the district court seems at least implicitly to have resolved this question in its favor, for the effect of its ruling is to give the District the benefit of a 45-day payment schedule, albeit only after February 1999. The judge offered no reason why the District's relief from fines should not extend to the point at which it made the motion 0907nor can we think of one.
We do not of course suggest that a party may be relieved from the obligation to comply with an injunction simply by making a motion for a modification. But here the District claimed that it could not comply, despite making a good faith effort to do so. If true, this should have relieved it from liability. See Tinsley v. Mitchell, 804 F.2d 1254, 1256 (D.C.Cir.1986) ("If a party lacks the financial ability to comply with an order, the court cannot hold him in contempt for failing to obey."). And the district court did not find that the District's claim was wrong. Instead, it adopted the master's report which simply pointed out that the District's financial situation was no worse than at the time the remedial plan was adopted in 1996 a 0907 fact that as we have explained is not relevant.
Nor is the United States correct when it invokes the collateral bar rule of Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967). Walker provides that the invalidity of an injunction is not a defense to contempt, so that a party faced with an invalid injunction must have the injunction modified or vacated; he cannot simply ignore it. The theory behind that rule is rather obvious, but it does not extend to cases where a party is faced with an injunction with which it is unable to comply. Walker cannot justify subjecting the District to liability for the period in which the district court was considering the modification motion.
We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court not to grant the District's motion retroactive to the time at which it was made.
* * *
The order of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
[1] The District does not challenge the per diem fines associated with late Medicaid payments (even to the extent of raising an impossibility defense). We therefore discuss only the doubling fines associated with non-Medicaid payments.
[2] Neither the appellees nor the intervenors argue that, even if the fine is criminal, it is nevertheless "petty" and could be imposed without a jury trial. Cf. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974).
[3] See, e.g., Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 221 (5th Cir.1998) (reversing order "imposing serious criminal sanctions ... via a manifestly civil process"); Mackler Productions, Inc. v. Cohen, 146 F.3d 126 (2d Cir.1998) (reversing a $10,000 punitive fine imposed without criminal procedures); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir.1998) (reversing retroactively imposed per diem fines); In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litigation, 99 F.3d 363 (11th Cir.1996) (reversing an over $13,000,000 punitive fine imposed without criminal procedures).
[4] Because we have determined that the District must be given a criminal trial, we do not address the argument that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the defense of impossibility.
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 Evans v. Barry, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1990)

1990 WL 201488 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs, and
United States of America, Plaintiff–Intervenor v.
Marion BARRY, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 76–293. | Nov. 28, 1990.
Opinion
ORDER
JOHN H. PRATT, District Judge.
*1 We have considered Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff–Intervenor’s Petition for Immediate Enforcement of Permanent Injunction, Defendants’ Opposition thereto, and Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Opposition. Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor seek to set aside the transfers, without prior notice, of five members of plaintiffs’ class from Forest Haven to D.C. Village, a nursing facility. Plaintiffs charge that defendants are in violation of specific provisions of Consent Orders entered by this Court in 1978, 1981, and 1983. More specifically, plaintiffs allege that nursing home placements, such as D.C. Village, are not the most integrated and least restrictive community settings for mentally retarded residents.

Defendants strenuously oppose plaintiffs’ position. They point out that these placements do not violate any of this Court’s previous Orders and emphasize that the medical needs of the five individuals require their placement in a nursing facility such as D.C. Village. Four of these residents are non-ambulatory (as are most of those remaining at Forest Haven) and range in age from 65 to 84 years. Their serious medical needs make the treatment of these needs the proper focus of their habilitation. We agree. For the details of these medical conditions, one has only to examine the affidavit of Reginald F. Wells, Ph.D., pp. 5–8.1 Dr. Wells has pointed out that each of the five residents underwent no less than five screening and evaluation levels prior to, and following, his or her placement at the nursing home, ibid., pp. 2–4.
The objections of plaintiffs to this placement are unrealistic and, in our judgment, completely without merit. Accordingly, it is by the Court this 27th day of November, 1990
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Petition for Immediate Enforcement of Permanent Injunction is denied.

1

Dr. Wells was Superintendent of Forest Haven from

1984 to 1986 and is presently the Acting Administrator

for the Mental Retardation and Developmental

Disabilities Administration, Commission on Social

Services, Department of Human Services of the

Government of the District of Columbia.

1

 
 Evans v. Kelly, 979 F.2d 248 (1992)

Unpublished Disposition 979 F.2d 248
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTADC Rule 28 and FI CTADC Rule 36 for rules regarding the publication
and citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit.
Joy EVANS, et al., Appellants v.
Sharon Pratt KELLY, et al.
No. 91-5237. | Nov. 16, 1992. | Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 26, 1993.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
D.D.C.
AFFIRMED.
Before STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, SENTELLE, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
JUDGMENT
PER CURIAM.
*1 This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties and arguments by counsel. After full review of the case, the court is satisfied that appropriate disposition of the appeal does not warrant an opinion. See D.C.Cir. Rule 14(c).
Appellants purport to be a class of individuals certified by the district court. The notice of appeal specifies, as the “parties taking the appeal” (Fed.R.App.P. 3(c)), “Joy

Evans, et al.” Joy Evans is deceased and the District of Columbia questions whether “et al.” may, in any case, be considered specific enough to comprehend unnamed class members. Compare Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188, 1192 (D.C.Cir.1991); and Ooley v. Schwitzer Div., Household Mfg. Inc., 961 F.2d 1293, 1305-06 (7th Cir.1992); with Rendon v. AT & T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 398 n. 8 (5th Cir.1989); and Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1061 n. 1 (2d Cir.1989). We do not decide if these obstacles to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction should be disregarded when the parties, during many years of litigation, customarily used the same designation as that contained in the notice of appeal to refer to the class, apparently without causing any confusion about the identity of the litigants. It is enough to say that the District’s other arguments, directed to the merits, clearly show that the judgment of the district court cannot be disturbed. As to the district court’s refusal to award class members compensatory relief despite the District’s earlier failure to comply with the consent decrees, Lander v. Morton, 518 F.2d 1084, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1975) (emphasis added), holds only that a court “may award” such relief against a party found in contempt for willful or wanton violation of a court order. Here the district court made no findings concerning the willfulness or recklessness of the District’s violations, which have now ended. The decision not to award damages is thus consistent with Lander. D.C.Code § 6-1973 does not compel a contrary result. The consent decrees do not incorporate this provision of the Code and do not require monetary awards on the basis of it. See J.A. 60, 77. Regardless of whether members of the class might, in separate actions, make out a violation of D.C.Code § 6-1973, the consent decrees did not render the District liable for violating the provision in this case. None of the other challenges to the district court’s judgment persuades us that the court acted outside the limits of its discretion. It is, accordingly
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C.Cir.Rule 15(b)(2).

1

 
 In re U.S., 925 F.2d 490 (1991)

Unpublished Disposition 925 F.2d 490
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTADC Rule 28 and FI CTADC Rule 36 for rules regarding the publication
and citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit.
In re UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner.
No. 90-5371. | Feb. 11, 1991.
WRIT DENIED.
Before WALD, BUCKLEY and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
*1 After oral argument and upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus, the response of the district court and the supplement thereto, the District of Columbia’s answer, and the response of the plaintiffs, it is
ORDERED, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, that the writ of mandamus be denied.
MEMORANDUM
This petition arises out of litigation ongoing since 1976. On June 14, 1978, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a partial summary judgment and entered a consent decree governing virtually every aspect of the District of Columbia’s operation of Forest Haven, an in-patient residence and primary care facility devoted to serving the severely retarded. Evans v. Washington, 459

F.Supp. 483 (D.D.C.1978). In 1981 and 1983, the district court entered consent orders reaffirming its 1978 order and further mandating the placement of all Forrest Haven Residents in community living arrangements by the end of fiscal year 1988.
On July 18, 1989, the United States filed a motion for a contempt judgment against the District for failure to comply with provisions of the consent orders regarding medical care, habilitation programs, staffing, and physical maintenance of the facility. In addition, private plaintiffs, a class of Forest Haven residents, contemporaneously moved that the District be held in contempt for violating the outplacement provisions of the consent orders.
On September 29, 1989, the district court held a hearing on these motions. The court denied both motions for contempt judgments “at least at the present.” The court then directed the parties to negotiate a new consent order, and scheduled a hearing for January 29, 1990.
After the parties failed to agree to the terms of a new consent decree, the court ordered that the District be held in civil contempt and scheduled a hearing on sanctions for March 1, 1990. At the March 1 hearing, the court focused on two matters: 1) the District’s failure to meet the outplacement schedules established in the consent orders, and 2) what sanctions, if any, were appropriate to compel the District to regain Forest Haven’s Medicaid certification. The court declined to address alleged violations concerning medical care, habilitation programs, staffing, and maintenance.
By order filed April 9, 1990, the court set out a quarterly schedule for outplacement of all Forest Haven residents by September 30, 1991, established a system of fines for noncompliance, and held that the District’s failure to regain Medicaid certification was not a violation of the consent orders.
On July 27, 1990, the United States again petitioned the district court to impose sanctions against the District of Columbia for violation of the provisions of the consent orders concerning medical care, habilitation programs, staffing, and physical maintenance. By September 18 of 1990, all briefing was complete in the action. The district court determined that imposition of sanctions against the allegedly bankrupt District government would be of little value and did not further act on petitioner’s motion.
*2 On November 14, 1990, the United States filed a
1

In re U.S., 925 F.2d 490 (1991)
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to act on the government’s motion for a contempt judgment against the District for failure to comply with the consent orders. On November 26, 1990, a special panel of this court ordered the district court and the District of Columbia to respond to the petition within twenty-one days. Following their responses, oral argument was heard.
II.
The United States seeks a writ of mandamus directing the district court to complete adjudication of the government’s motion for contempt filed July 18, 1989, and its petitions for sanctions and injunctive relief filed July 27, 1990. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) authorizes an appellate court to issue a writ of mandamus “to direct a district court to proceed to judgment in a pending case.” Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662 (1978) (plurality opinion). Courts traditionally issue mandamus only in exceptional circumstances “to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
It is clear that “where a district court persistently and without reason refuses to adjudicate a case properly before it, the court of appeals may issue the writ ‘in order that [it] may exercise the jurisdiction of review given by law.’ ” Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661-62 (1978) (citation omitted). “As a means of implementing the rule that the writ will issue only in extraordinary circumstances, ... the party seeking issuance of the writ

[must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, and ... [must] satisfy the ‘burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.” ’ ” Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (citations omitted).
Although the district court states in its response to the petition for a writ of mandamus that the District has committed “all or most of the ... specific violations as claimed by [the United States],” we deny petitioner’s request for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner has not met the criteria for this extraordinary writ to issue. See Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.Cir.1984). Less than two months have elapsed between final briefing in petitioner’s motion to impose sanctions against the District and its petition for a writ of mandamus. This short period of delay is not sufficient to establish that petitioner has a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ.
Nevertheless, we recognize that this is not an ordinary case. The district court specifically states that the District of Columbia is in violation of the medical provisions of the 1978 consent order, and petitioner’s experts testify that the inadequacy of medical care at Forest Haven creates an undue risk of harm to residents. Although we understand that Forest Haven is scheduled to be closed by September of 1991, we are cognizant of the potential risks to residents in the interim. Thus, we are confident that the district court will act with all due haste in holding a hearing and issuing an appealable order. Should the district court fail to complete promptly the adjudication of this matter, the United States will be free to file a new petition.

2