-.

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53

"

Filed 02/08/2007 Page 1 of 17

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EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

Attorney General of the State of California

2 DAVID S. CHANEY

Chief Assistant Attorne~ General

3 FRANCEST.GRUND·R

Senior Assistant AttorneiNGeneral

4 MICHELLE DES JARD S

Su~ising D~uty Attorney General

o 5 JO F.BAZ N StateBarAttorney l70l65 Deputy Attorne&, eneral

6

300 Sout Spri~ Street, Suite 1702

7

TLoelsepAhnogneel:es~2C13)

90013 897-2181

Facsimile: ( 13) 897-2810

8

E-mail: John.Bazan@doj.ca.gov

FllxD

CLERK. U.S DISTRICT COURl

t::~

FEB - 82007

.UJ
.-'-0,-"->

<tf

l.i

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

0")

BY

DEPUTY

2~ PriNity
Send Enter Closed
J5-S/J5-6 J5-2/J5-3 Scan Onl),-

9 Attorneys for Defendants John Laudeman and Jeanne S. Woodford

10

BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP

11 STEPHEN ZAK SMITH, SBN 228913

355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 4400

12

LOe~l.EApnhgOe~lees(2C13A)

90071 680-6400

13 . as§.!,JTIile: (213) 680-6499

<.:

14- -McARK . ROSENBAUM SBN 59940

PEtER JbELIASBERG, SBN 189110

I , .A:cr.;tJ F UNDATION OF

1~ I:~SlQ~DBT~'EerRlyNBCoAulLeIvFaOrdRNIA

~:;;;:;

~'QS An e\es CA 90026 _' :Ieph ne:i"213) 977-9500

18 '. acsur..u, le: (213) 250-3919

Attorneys for Plainti ff 19 BILLY SOZA WARSOLDIER

20

21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

22

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

23 BILLY SOZA WARSOLDIER, et ai, Case No. Civ. 04-02233-RSWL (RZx)

24

Plainti ffs,

25

v.

26 JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,
27 Defendants.
28

Notice of Settlement and Stipulated Request to Vacate Scheduling Order, Continue Pre-Trial Conference and Trial; and [P.!: i : S I d) Order
DOCKETED ON CM
t .FEB - 9 2007
B~ ,'-,"'w/co_ 145

'--

---~>==============================================================-
Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 2 of 17

1

Notice of Settlement and Stipulated Request to Vacate Scheduling Order _
and Continue Proceedings for 10 Days to Allow Parties to Execute Terms Of

2

Settlement Agreement and File Stipulation of Dismissal

;;

A.

3

The parties have reached a settlement agreement in the above-captioned5

I,)

4 matter, an unsigned copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The parties

5 expect to have obtained all signatures by, at latest, February 8, 2007. That

{

6 settlement contains certain provisions that cannot immediately be executed. The

7 settlement also provides that the Plaintiff wi1\ dismiss the matter with prejudice
~
8 upon execution of one provision of the agreement, which will be completed within

9 approximately 90 days. In addition, the Court's most recent scheduling order

10 contains dates, such as the pre-trial conference on February 12,2007, and the trial

11 on March 6, 2007, which will pass before one provision of the agreement, which is

12 a pre-condition to dismissal, has been satisfied.

13

Accordingly, the parties STIPULATE, and respectfully request that the

14 Court VACATE the September 1,2006, JOINT STIPULATION AND ORDER

15 TO CONTINUE TRIAL, DISCOVERY AND MOTIONS CUT-OFF DATES.

16

The parties further STIPULATE and respectfully request that the Court

FINAL

qAM 'Eun'

17

CONqTAIIN'1 UE

theADre-trial Ir

conference

until

June

4,

2007Aand

the,f"ial

until

June

25,

18 200~ to allow the parties to execute one of the terms of the settlement agreement

19 and file a stipulation of dismissal.

20 Dated: Februa 007

21

22

23

24 IT IS SO ORDERED
25

26

RONALD S.W. LEW

'I he Honorable Ronald Lew

27 United States District Judge

28 1- -- "6 - 0 t

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 3 of 17

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 4 of 17

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

1 Attorney General of the State of California

DAVID S. CHANEY

2 Chief Assistant Attorney General

FRANCES T. GRUNDER

3 Senior Assistant Attorney General

MICHELLE DES JARDINS

4 Supervising Deputy Attorney General

JOHN F. BAZAI'k State Bar Attorney 170165 5 Deputy Attorney veneral

300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702

6

Los Angeles CA 90013

Telephone: (213) 897-2181

7

Fax: (213) 897-2810

8

Email: John.Bazan@doj.ca.gov

Attorneys for Defendants John Laudeman and Jeanne S. Woodford 9
BrNGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP 10 STEPHEN ZAKSMITH, SBN 228913
355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 4400 I 1 Los Angeles CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 680-6400 12 FaCSImile: (213) 680-6499

13 PETERJ. ELlASBERG, SBN 189110 ACLU FOUNDATION OF
14 SOUTHERN CALlFORNIA 1616 Beverly Boulevard
15 Los Angeles CA 90026 Telephone: (213) 977-9500
16 Facsmule: (213) 250-3919 17 Attorneys for Plaintiff
BILLY SOZA WARSOLDIER 18

19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

20

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALlFORN!A - WESTERN DIVISION

21

22 BILLY SOZA WARSOLDlER,

NO. CV 04-02238 RSWL (RZx)

23

24

v.

Plaintiff, SETTLMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

25 JEANNE WOODFORD, et aI.,

26 27 28 LAl40J7i 700 I

Defendants.

EXHIBIT A 002

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 5 of 17

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I

This Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims ("Agreement") is made;;:~

~(

2 effective this 31 sl day of January, 2007 by and between Billy Soza Warsoldier t;

3 (hereinafter "Plaintiff'), and the California Department of Corrections and

4 Rehabilitation (hereinafter "CDCR"), representative in interest of K. W. Prunty,

5 Undersecretary, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and John

6 Laudeman, warden of the Adelanto Community Correctional Facility (hereinafter

7 "Defendants"), together referred to as the "Parties." This Agreement is made with

8 reference to the following:

9

RECITALS

10

A. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

II against Defendants in the United States District Court for the Central District of

12 California, Case No. CV 04-02238 RS WL (RZx) (hereinafter "Complaint").

13 Plaintiff alleged that the prison grooming regulations pertaining to hair length set

14 forth in the California Code of Regulations Title 15, section 3062(e), in effect in the

15 years 2003 and 2004, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

16 Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000cc-200cc-5.

17

B. Defendants filed an answer to the complaint that included affirmative

18 defenses.

19

C. Section 3062(e) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations was

20 amended effective January 17,2006.

21

DI. Plainti ff Billy Soza Warsoldier was an inmate at ACCF in Adelanto,

22 California at the time this litigation was filed. He is a Cahuilla Native American

23 who has long practiced the Cahuilla faith. He is a registered member of the Soboba

24 reservation.

25

02. Defendant K. W. Prunty is the Undersecretary of the California

26 Department of Corrections and is sued in his official capacity. I Undersecretary

27

28 1 Mr. Prunty is substituted for the Jeanne Woodford, tormer director of CDC, under FRCP 25(d)( 1).

1.,v~017l700 I

1

EXHIBIT A
003

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 6 of 17

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Prunty is charged by statute with the supervision and management of CDC and it~e
, )
2 facilities and the enforcement of its policies, including the Grooming Policy. C:,

3

03. Defendant John Laudemen is the warden of ACCF and is sued in his

4 official capacity. Warden Laudeman is responsible for the enforcement of CDC

5 policies, including the Grooming Policy, at ACCF.

6

E. CDCR enters into this Agreement on behalf of the named Defendants

7 for the purpose of this Agreement and for no other purpose. The involvement of

8 CDCR in this capacity in no way waives CDCR's immunity under the Eleventh

9 Amendment as to any claims Plaintiff may assert in the event that this settlement, or

10 the claims in the underlying Complaint, are the subject of any future litigation.

II However, CDCR agrees that in the event Plaintiff believes that Defendants Prunty

12 or Laudeman or their successors, employees, assigns or anyone acting in concert

13 with them has violated the terms of this settlement agreement, Plaintiff may move

14 in federal court against CDCR to enforce the terms of this agreement through

15 contempt or other means provided by federal law or the Federal Rules of Civil

[6 Procedure. In the event that Plaintiff brings such an enforcement action, CDCR

17 waives any argument, including immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, that

18 Plaintiff cannot enforce this agreement against CDCR and can only enforce it

19 against the individual defendants.

20

F. Without admitting any liability and to avoid the further risk and

21 exposure of protracted litigation and in consideration of the mutual promises

22 contained herein, the Parties enter into this Agreement as follows:

23 .

1.0 SETTLEMENT TERMS

24

In consideration of the terms, conditions, and releases set forth in this

25 Agreement, the Cali fornia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR),

26 On the behalfofthe Defendants, agrees as follows:

27

A. CDCR will not reinstate the former version of the Title IS of the EXHIBIT A

28 LAMOJ717001

2

004

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 7 of 17
.~

':J
.l..J.,,.j California Code of Regulations section 3062(e) that was in place on March 31, ~-"2

( i

2 2004, the date Plainti ff initiated this lawsuit.

Vj

3

B. CDCR will expunge from Plaintiffs record, including records kept on

4 paper, in electronic format, or any other format, all references to violations ofTitie

5 15 of the California Code of Regulations section 3062(e), including, but not limited

6 to, the Rules Violation Reports dated April 20, 2003, May 28,2003, and June 12,

7 2003.

8

C. CDCR will not re-incarcerate Plaintiff based on any past violations of

9 former 15 CCR section 3062(e) incurred by him under prisoner identification

10 number T-82808.

II

D. CDCR will not use or rely on any past violations ofTitie 15 of the

12 California Code of Regulations section 3062(e) in any way with respect to Plaintiff

13 if he is reincarcerated, including but not limited to use of violations ofTitle 15 of

14 the California Code of Regulations section 3062(e) as a factor in deterntining

15 Plaintiffs classification.

16

E. CDCR will pay in the amount of One Hundred and Thirty Thousand

17 dollars ($130,000) to the ACLU Foundation of Southern California as reasonable

18 attorneys fees.

19

2.0 RELEASE AND DISCHARGE

20

2.1 [n consideration for the conditions and payment set forth in Paragraphs

21 1.0 and 3.0, Plaintiff hereby completely releases and forever discharges Defendants

22 and all possible Defendants named and unnamed to include disntissed Defendants,

23 the State of Cali fomi a, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

24 their employees, agents, servants, assigns, and other representatives, from any and

25 all past, present or future claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of action,

26 rights, damages, costs, losses of service, expenses and compensation of any nature

27 whatsoever, whether based on a federal or state civil rights action, tort, contract or

28 LV40J7I7OQI

3

EXHIBIT A

005

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 8 of 17

C::l
1 other theory of recovery, which the Plaintiff could have asserted or alleged, now ;""l;l,~.J
2 has, or which may hereafter accrue or otherwise be acquired, on account of, or ni~

3 in any way grow out of, or which are the subject of the Complaint (and all related

4 pleadings) including without lirritation, any and all known or unknown, suspocted

5 or unsuspected claims for injuries to Plaintiff, which may result from the alleged

6 acts or omissions of the Defendants identified above relating to the version of

7 Section 3062(e) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations existing at the

8 time Plaintiff filed his complaint in this oction and any punishment, loss of good

9 time credits, or any other detriment or liability suffered by Plaintiff as a result of

10 Section 3062(e) of Title 15 of the Cali fornia Code of Regulations.

II

2.2 This release and discharge shall also apply to Defendants, including

12 dismissed Defendants, past, present and future representatives, employees,

13 employers, affi liates, attorneys, predecessors and successors in interest, and assigns

14 and all other persons and agencies of the State of California, California Department

15 of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or otherwise, with whom any of the former have

16 been, are now, or may hereafter be affiliated. The Parties agree that this

17 compromise and settlement constitutes a bar to such claims.

18

2.3 It is the intention of the Parties that the settlement embodied in this

19 Agreement constitutes a complete release of all claims and a full and final accord

20 and satisfaction of the above-entitled action so as to bar all related, ancillary, or

21 connected actions, liabilities, costs, expenses and attorneys' fees except as stated

22 specifically herein, whether or not known, suspocted, claimed or concealed relating

23 to the version of Section 3062(e) ofTitle 15 of the California Code of Regulations

24 existing at the time Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action and any punishment,

25 loss of good titre credits, or any other detriment or liability suffered by Plaintiff as

26 a result of Section 3062(e) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. This

27 paragraph does not apply to Plaintiffs right to enforce this Agreement.

28 LAI~0J71700.1

4

EXHIBIT A 006

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 9 of 17

t::.

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I

2.4 The Plaintiff acknowledges and agrees that the release and discharge:"

.t[

2 set forth above is a general release. Plaintiff expressly waives and assumes the ris!<l,

3 of any and all claims which exist as of this date, but of which the Plaintiff does not

4 know or suspect to exist, whether through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence,

5 or otherwise relating to the version of Section 3062(e) ofTitle 15 of the California

6 Code of Regulations existing at the time Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action

7 and any punishment, loss of good tirre credits, or any other detriment or liability

8 suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Section 3062(e) of Title 15 of the California

9 Code of Regulations, and which, if known, would rrnterially affect Plaintiff's

10 decision to enter into this Agreement. Plaintiff accordingly waives any and all

II rights based upon the provisions of California Civil Code section 1542 which reads

12 as follows:

13

A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not

14

know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the

release, which, if known to him, must have materially affected his

15

settlement witn the debtor.

16

Plaintiff assumes the risk that the facts or law may be other than Plaintiff 17

believes. It is understood and agreed to by the parties that this settlement is a 18

compromise of a disputed claim, and the settlement is not to be construed as an 19

admission of liability on the part of the Defendants, by whom liability is expressly 20

denied. 21

2.5 The Plaintiff further agrees that Plaintiff has accepted the conditions 22

and payment of amount of monies to his counsel for attorneys' fees stated herein as 23

a complete compromise of any and all claims for attorneys fees and costs for his 24

attorneys the ACLU of Southern California and Bingham, McCutchen LLP. It is 25

understood and agreed to by the parties that the payment set forth in Paragraphs 1.0 26

and 3.0 is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the 27

Defendants, by whom liability is expressly denied.

EXHIBIT A

28 LA/40171100.1

5

007

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 10 of 17

Cl
.l.j.,,1.

1

2.6 Plaintiff expressly assumes and represents that Plaintiff is responsible:

(~r

2 for payment of and will satisty any and all liens and claim of liens against any clairh

3 or cause of action of Plaintiff, except attorney's fees as stated in paragraphs 1.0 and

4 3.0 below.

5

3.0 DISCHARGE OF OBLIGATION

6

The obligation of the CDCR to make payments as stated in Section 1.0 of this

7 Agreement shall be discharged upon the mailing of a valid check in the amount of

8 One Hundred and Thirty Thousand dollars ($130,000) to the address of and made

9 payable to Plaintiffs counsel, the ACLU Foundation of Southern California

10 Payment to be made within 90 days of receipt by the California Department of

II Finance of this Agreement, a Payee Data Record and copy of a Dismissal with

12 Prejudice signed by Plaintiff and his counsel, an unsigned copy of which is attached

13 hereto as Exhibit 1.

14

4.0 COSTS

15

Plaintiff and Defendants shall each bear their own costs.

16

5.0 DELIVERY OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

17

Defendants' counsel will file a copy of the stipulated dismissal with

18 prejudice, an unsigned copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, within 3

19 business days after Plaintiffs counsel has notified Defendants' counsel that the

20 ACLU Foundation of Southem California has received the attorneys fees check

21 described above in Sections 2.0 and 3.0 of this Agreement.

22

6.0 WARRANTY OF NO RELIANCE UPON REPRESENTATIONS

23

BY OR ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

24

In entering into this Agreement the Plaintiff represents that Plaintiff has not

25 relied upon any representation by Defendants or the CDCR, their attorneys, their

26 agents, or their representatives, regarding the terms and signi ficance of this

27 Agreement, the legal and income tax consequences of this Agreement, or for any

28 LAl40J7i 700 I

6

EXHIBIT A 008

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 11 of 17 .,

C)

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1 advice whatsoever.

;Z,:

<I'

2

7.0 WARRANTY OF CAPACITY TO EXECUTE AGREEMENT t~

3

Plaintiff represents and warrants that no other persons or entities has, or has

4 had, any interest in the claims, demands, obligations, or causes of action referred to

5 in this Agreement, except as otherwise set forth herein; that Plaintiff has the sole

6 right and exclusive authority to execute this Agreement.

7

8.0 GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION

8

This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the

9 laws of the State of California The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce all the

to terms of this Agreement. Plaintiff does not waive any claim for attorneys fees he

11 might have based on a successful motion brought to enforce the terms of this

12 Agreement.

[3

9.0 ENTIRE AGREEMENT AND SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST

14

This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Parties with

15 regard to the matters set forth in it and shall be binding upon and inure to the

16 benefits of the executors, administrators, personal representatives, heirs, successors

[7 and assigns of each.

18

10.0 EFFECTIVENESS

[9

This Agreement shall become effective immediately following execution by

20 each of the Parties or designated representative. The Parties agree that the

21 Agreement may be executed in counter parts or duplicate originals.

22

11.0 REPRESENTATION OF COMPREHENSION OF DOCUMENT

23

In entering into this Agreement the Plaintiff represents the terms of this

24 Agreement have been completely read by him and that the terms of this Agreement

25 are fully understood and voluntarily accepted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff enters into this

26 Agreement freely, voluntarily, in good faith and with the advice of counsel.

27

12.0 MODIFICATIONS TO THE AGREEMENT

28 IAI~OJ71700,1

7
... _ .. - _ . _ -

EXHIBIT A 009

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53
·,

Filed 02/08/2007 Page 12 of 17

Co

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I

Neither this Agreement, nor any provision hereof, may be changed, wai veci~

.

d

2 terminated, or discharged orally, other than by an instrument in writing, signoo bX,:;

3 the Party against whom enforcement of the change, waiver termination, or

4 discharge is sought.

5

13.0 ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS

6

All parties agree to cooperate fully and execute any and all supplementary

7 documents and take all additional actions, which may be necessary or appropriate to

8 give full force and effect to the basic terms and intent of this Agreement.

9

14.0 SEVERABILITY

l O I n the event that any of the provisions or portions of this Sdt!ement

II Agreement is held to be illegal, unenforceable or invalid, the legality, enforceability

12 and validity of the remaining provisions or portions of this Sdtlement Agreement

13 shall remain unaffected.

14

IN WITNESS WHEROF, the Parties have caused this Agreement to be

15 executed by them and by their duly authorized representatives.

16 Plaintiff: Billy Soza Warsoldier 17

18 By:

19

Billy Soza Warsoldier

Date: January 31, 2007

20 21 CDCR Representative for Defendants

22 By:

Date:

23

K.W.Prunty Undersecretary

.

----

24

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

25 Defendant's Attorney: John F. Bazan, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney Generaf
26

27

EXHIBIT A

28 LAi4037 I700.1

8

010

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 13 of 17

By:

Date:

John p, Bazan

2

3 APPROVED AS TO FORM: 4 Plaintiffs Attorneys: ACLU FOUNDAnON OF SO. CAL. 5

6 By: 7
8

Date: Peter J. Eliasberg ACLU Foundation of So. Cal.

9

10

II

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 uV~OJ7I700 1

9

c.'"
zLlJ "i:"I!;r~
u
v)
EXHIBIT A 011

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 14 of 17
!. "

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 15 of 17

:
"

,~

BfNGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP STEPHEN lAK SMITH, SBN 228913 2 355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 4400 Los Angeles CA 90071 3 Telephone: (213) 680-6400 FaCSImile: (213) 680-6499 4
5 MARK D. ROSENBAUM, SBN 59940 PETER J. ELIASBERG, SBN 189110
6 ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
7 1616 Beverly Boulevard Los Angeles CA 90026
8 Telephone: (213) 977-9500 FacsImile: (213) 250-39\9
9 Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 BILLY SOlA WARSOLDIER

II UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
14 BILLY SOlA WARSOLDIER, et ai, Case No. Civ. 04-02233-RSWL (RZx)

15

Plainti ffs,

16
v.
17 JEANNE WOODFORD, et aI.,
18 Defendants.
19

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND [PROPOSEDI ORDER [FRCP 41(a)(I)(ii)1

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
EXHIBIT 1

012

.'.

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 16 of 17

Whereas the parties have entered into a settlement agreement that resolves

2 this matter;

5j...........

3

The parties hereby STIPULATE to dismiss this action with prejudice uncf~r

u

4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a)( I)(ii).

v'

5

The parties further hereby STIPULATE that the Court shall retain

6 jurisdiction over this matter for the sole purpose of enforcing the terms of the 7 settlement agreement. See Kokkonen v. Guardians Life Insurance Co. ofAmerica, 8 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 9

10 11 DATED: February 5, 2007
12

ACLU FOUNDAnON OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

13 By: Peter 1. Eliasberg
14

15 DATED: February 5, 2007

BINGHAM MCCUTHCHEN LLP

16

17 18 19 20
DATED: _ _ _, 2007 21 22 23

By: Stephen Zak Smith Attorneys for and 011 behalfof. Plaintiff. Billy Soza Warsoldier
By: Johri f. Bazan Attorneyfor and on behalfof. all Defendants and CDCR

24 IT IS SO ORDERED
25

26

27 The Honorable Ronald Lew 28 United States District Judge, _ _ _ _ _ _, 2007

EXHIBIT I

013 -2-

Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 53 Filed 02/08/2007 Page 17 of 17
, .

PROOF OF SERVICE

c'J

2

~

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

;,~

3

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am o~er

4 the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my present business address i~:

5 1616 Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90026.

On February 7, 2007, I served the foregoing documents described as:
6

7

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND STIPULATED REQUEST TO VACATE SCHEDULING ORDERtCONTINUE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

8

AND TRIA ; AND [PROPOSED) ORDER

9 on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed

10 envelope addressed as follows:

11

John F. Bazan

12

DeQuty Attorney General 300 South Spring Street;. Suite 1702

13

Los Angeles, CA yOO 13 Tel: (213) 897-2181

14

Fax: (213) 897-2810 Attorney for Defendants

15

(Courtesy copy via email)

16

XX BY MAIL as follows: I caused such enveJope(s) fully prepaid with US

17 Postage to be placed in the United States Mail at Los Angeles, California. I am

18 "readily familiar" with the finn's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the

19 U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los

20 Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion

21 of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or

postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in 22 affidavit.

23

24

XX (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State

of California that the above is true and correct.

25 Executed on February 7, 2007, at Los Angele 26

27

28

yes

 
 Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 58 Filed 07/05/07 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:83
..... -.-

BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LL~; ,
STEPHEN ZAK SMITH, SBN _289 p

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.

2 3
4

355 South Grand Avenue, SUite 4400 CLERK. u.s. DliiTRICT COUR1..::::.....,..:::,;;·"7'···;·,r;7':~'i;;<.

7; . Los Angeles, CA 9007 J
Telephone: (213) 680-6400 Facsllni1e: (213) 680-6499

.
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5

2007

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5 MARK D. ROSENBAUM, SBN 59Gi"ff\ PETER 1. ELIAS BERG SBN 189110

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F CALIFORNIA) DEPUTY

tl:BrY~;S",\~.~:tt·~~.'i;'~;'r·i'..,;:;:;~:i

6 ACLU FOUNDAnON OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
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10 BILLY SOZA WARSOLDIER

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND [P.Iil8P8SlWj ORDER [FRCP 41(a)(1)(ii)]

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Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 58 Filed 07/05/07 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:84

Whereas the parties have .entered into a settlement agreement that resolves

2 this matter;

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The parties hereby STIPULATE to dismiss this action with prejudice under

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4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(])(ii).

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The parties further hereby STIPULATE that the Court shall retain

6 jurisdiction over this matter for the sale purpose of enforcing the terms of the 7 settlement agreement. See Kokkonen v, Guardians Life Insurance Co. ofAmerica, 8 51] U.S. 375 (1994). 9

10 II DATED: February 5,2007 12 1 <
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ACLU FOUNDA TIO}'l OF SOUTHERN CJ~lbRNIA
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By: Peter J. Eliasberg"-"'"

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BINGHAM MCCUTHCHEN LLP

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By: Stephen Zak Smith

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24 IT IS SO ORDERED
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27 The Honorable Ronald Lew 28 United States District Judge, _ _ _ _ _ _"2007

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Case 2:04__-c!I v-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 58 Filed 07/05/07 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:85

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Whereas the parties h~ve fj\1tered into a settlement agreement that resolves

2 this matter;

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The parties hereby STIPULAIE to dismiss this action with prejudice ~rt.der

4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(I)(ii),

5

The parties further hereby STIPULAIE that the Court shall retain

6 jurisdiction over this matter for the sale purpose of enforcing the terms of the 7 settlement agreement See Kokkonen v, Guardians Life Insurance Co, ofAmerica, 8 511 U,S, 375 (1994), 9

10 11 DATED: February 5, 2007
12

ACLU FOUNDAnON OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

14 15 DATED: February 5, 2007

BINGHAM MCCUTHCHEN LLP

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20 DATED: _ _ _,2007
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By: John F. Bazan Attorney for and on behalfoj; all Defendants and CDCR

24 IT IS SO ORDERED
25

26

RONALD S.W. LEW

~'2001 27 The Honorable Ronald Lew
28 United States District Judge,

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Case 2:04-cv-02233-RSWL-RZ Document 58 Filed 07/05/07 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:86
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U,S, MAIL
Case Name: Billy Soza Warsoldier v, Woodford, ct al.
No.: CV 04-02233 RSWL (RZx)
I declare:
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.
On June 21, 2007, I served the attached STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND IPROPOSED] ORDER by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA 90013, addressed as follows:
Stephen Zak Smith, Esq. Bingham McCutchen - Los Angeles 355 South Grand Avenue, Ste. 4400 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Attorneys for Plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier

Peter J. Eliasberg, Esq. ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1616 Beverly Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90026 Attorneys for Plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Ca1ifomia the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on June 21, 2007, at Los Angeles, California.

M. I. Salvador Declarant

Vv..tL~k Signature

50170196 wpd

 
 Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 1 of 8 (RZx), CLOSED, DISCOVERY, MANADR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division − Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:04−cv−02233−RSWL−RZ

Billy Soza Warsoldier v. Jeanne Woodford et al Assigned to: Judge Ronald S.W. Lew Referred to: Magistrate Judge Ralph Zarefsky Case in other court: 9th CCA, 04−55879 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/31/2004 Date Terminated: 07/05/2007 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Billy Soza Warsoldier

represented by Audrey M Huang Bingham McCutchen 355 S Grand Ave, 44h Fl Los Angeles , CA 90071−3106 213−680−6400 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin E Wizner ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1616 Beverly Blvd Los Angeles , CA 90026−5752 213−977−9500 TERMINATED: 02/20/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mark D Rosenbaum ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 West Eighth Street Los Angeles , CA 90017 213−977−9500 x224 Fax: 213−977−5297 Email: mrosenbaum@aclu−sc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nora C Cregan Bingham McCutchen 355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 4400 Los Angeles , CA 90071 213−680−6400 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1616 Beverly Boulevard Los Angeles , CA 90026−5752 213−977−9500 Email: peliasberg@aclu−sc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Zak Smith Bingham McCutchen 355 S Grand Ave, 44h Fl Los Angeles , CA 90071−3106 213−680−6400 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 2 of 8

V. Defendant Jeanne Woodford Director of the California Department of Corrections, in her official capacity
Defendant John Laudeman Warden of the Adelanto Community Correctional Facility, in his official capacity

represented by Barry G Thorpe CAAG − Office of Attorney General of California 300 S Spring St, Ste 1702 Los Angeles , CA 90013 213−897−9176 TERMINATED: 10/14/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Francis Bazan CAAG − Office of Attorney General of California 300 S Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles , CA 90013−1230 213−897−2181 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John E Rittmayer CAAG − Office of Attorney General of California 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles , CA 90013 213−897−7485 TERMINATED: 02/21/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barry G Thorpe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/14/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Francis Bazan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John E Rittmayer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/21/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/31/2004
03/31/2004
03/31/2004

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT against defendants John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford.(Filing fee $ 150.) , filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier.(rrey, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)

20 Day Summons Issued re Complaint − (Discovery) 1 as to John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford. (rrey, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)

2 CERTIFICATION as to Interested Parties filed by Plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (rrey, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)

Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 3 of 8

03/31/2004 03/31/2004 03/31/2004 04/02/2004 04/02/2004 04/02/2004 04/02/2004 04/02/2004 04/02/2004
04/05/2004 04/12/2004 04/12/2004 04/12/2004 04/12/2004 04/12/2004
04/14/2004

3 NOTICE TO PARTIES OF ADR PILOT PROGRAM filed.(rrey, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
FAX number for Attorney Nora C Cregan, Audrey May Huang, Stephen Zak Smith is 213−680−6499. (rrey, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
FAX number for Attorney Mark D Rosenbaum, Benjamin E Wizner is 213−250−3919. (rrey, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
4 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
5 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary Restraining Order 4 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
6 DECLARATION of Stephen Zak Smith in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary Restraining Order 4 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
7 DECLARATION of Chase Riveland in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary Restraining Order 4 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
8 DECLARATION of Billy Soza Warsoldier in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary Restraining Order 4 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
9 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. re 5 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 6 Declaration (Motion related), 7 Declaration (Motion related), 8 Declaration (Motion related), 4 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary Restraining Order, was served on 4/2/04. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
10 ORDER denying the temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew, 4 . (bp, ) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
11 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. Motion set for hearing on 5/3/2003 at 09:00 AM before Honorable Ronald S.W. Lew. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
12 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
13 DECLARATION of Chase Riveland in support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
14 DECLARATION of Billy Soza Warsoldier in support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
15 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaitiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. re 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 12 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 13 Declaration (Motion related), 14 Declaration (Motion related), was served on 4/12/04. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
16 PROOF OF SERVICE of summons and complaint Executed upon Jeanne Woodford, by substituted service upon Lee Ann

Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 4 of 8

04/20/2004 04/20/2004 04/21/2004 04/21/2004 04/22/2004 04/26/2004 04/26/2004 04/26/2004 04/26/2004 04/26/2004 04/28/2004 04/28/2004 05/03/2004 05/03/2004 05/11/2004 05/12/2004

Sauceda, Case Records Administrator on 4/1/2004, answer due 4/21/2004. (jag, ) (Entered: 04/22/2004)
17 ANSWER to Complaint − (Discovery) 1 filed by defendants' John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford.(bp, ) (Entered: 04/26/2004)
18 CERTIFICATION of Interested Parties filed by Defendants John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/26/2004)
19 OPPOSITION to MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by defendants' John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
20 DECLARATIONS of Sue Facciola and Suzanne Hubbard and exhibits in support of opposition to MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by defendants John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
21 EXPARTE APPLICATION for Extension of Time to File an opposition to plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction filed by defendants' John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
22 ORDER granting defendants' ex parte application for extension of time. The court will accept defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, filed on April 21, 2004 21 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew (bp, ) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
23 REPLY to opposition to MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
24 EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS to declarations of Sue Facciola and Susna L. Hubbard and to exhibits in support of defendants' oppositoin to MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
25 SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION of Billy Warsoldier in support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
26 DECLARATION of Stephen Zak Smith in support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
27 SIGNED SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION of Billy Soza Warsoldier in support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 11 filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
28 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Defendant Jeanne Woodford. correcting Response in Opposition to Motion 19 (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
29 MINUTES: The court DENIES plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Defense counsel is to submit an order for this court pursuant to local rule 52−4. Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. Court Reporter: Sharon Seffens. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
PLACED IN FILE − NOT USED re (Proposed) order granting motion for preliminary injunction submitted by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (shb, ) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
31 ORDER that plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew,(bp, ) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
30 MINUTES: NOTICE REGARDING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE; Matter is set for a Scheduling Conference on

Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 5 of 8

05/18/2004 05/19/2004
05/19/2004 05/20/2004 05/25/2004
05/26/2004
05/28/2004 05/28/2004 06/08/2004 06/08/2004

7/26/2004 09:00 AM. Parties are reminded of their obligations to disclosure information and confer on a discovery plan not later than 21 days prior to the scheduling conference and report to the Court not than 14 days after they confer; Failure to comply may lead to the imposition of sanctions. Plaintiff counsel is directed to give notice of the Scheduling Conference to all parties that have appeared in this action, and is directed to give notice of the Scheduling conference immediately to each party that makes an initial appearance in this action after this date (See document for further details) by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. Court Reporter: Not Present. (ir, ) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
33 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Defendants John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford re 19 . (jp, ) (Entered: 05/26/2004)
32 NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION APPEAL/REPRESENTATION STATEMENT to 9th CCA filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. Appeal of Order 31 Filed On: 05/11/04; Entered On: 05/05/12/04; Filing fee $255., Paid, receipt number 65938. cc: Audrey M. Huang, Bingham McCutchen LLP; Ben Wizner, ACLU Foundation of Southern California; John Laudeman; Barry Thorpe, Office of the Attorney General (wdc, ) (Entered: 05/19/2004)
Civil Appeals Docketing Statement received from plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier forwarded to 9th CCA. RE: Appeal to Circuit Court, 32 . (wdc, ) (Entered: 05/19/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: Appeal to Circuit Court, 32 . (cbr, ) (Entered: 05/20/2004)
36 CERTIFIED ORDER from 9th CCA filed as to Appeal to Circuit Court, 32 filed by Billy Soza Warsoldier, CCA # 04−55879. Order received in this district on 06/01/04. Appeal filed 05/19/04 is a preliminary injunction appeal. Appellant's emergency motion for preliminary injunction pending appeal is granted. Pending further order of the court, appellees are enjoined from enforcing that hair length regulation at issue in this appeal against appellant. Brief schedule set. (cbr, ) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
37 ORDER from 9th CCA filed as to Appeal to Circuit Court, 32 filed by Billy Soza Warsoldier, CCA # 04−55879. Order received in this district on 6/1/04. Appellant's motion for clarification of the court's May 25, 2004 order is granted. Appellant shall be released from custody pending disposition of this appeal. The previously established briefing schedule remains in effect. (weap, ) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
34 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 04−55879, 9th CCA regarding Appeal to Circuit Court, 32 filed by Billy Soza Warsoldier. (wdc, ) (Entered: 05/28/2004)
35 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDERING FORM For Dates: 5/3/04; Court Reporter: Sharon Seffens; Court of Appeals Case Number: 04−55879; Re: Appeal to Circuit Court, 32 . (ghap, ) (Entered: 05/28/2004)
38 RECEIPT OF REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 05/03/04 Court Reporter: Sharon Seffens. (cbr, ) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings held on 05/03/04. Court Reporter: Sharon Seffens. (cbr, ) Modified on 6/9/2004 (cbr, ). (Entered: 06/09/2004)

Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 6 of 8

06/14/2004 06/30/2004 07/01/2004
10/14/2004
08/22/2005 09/08/2005
10/11/2005 10/17/2005 10/17/2005 10/27/2005 02/13/2006

39 CERTIFICATE OF RECORD Transmitted to USCA re Appeal to Circuit Court, 32 filed by Billy Soza Warsoldier; Court of Appeals Case Number: 04−55879. (ghap, ) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
41 STIPULATION to Continue of scheduling conference filed by plaintiff an defendants John Laudeman, Billy Soza Warsoldier, Jeanne Woodford. Lodged proposed order. (pj, ) (Entered: 07/07/2004)
40 ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE OF SCHEDULING CONFERENCE by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew: The Scheduling Conference originally scheduled to be held on July 26, 2004, is rescheduled and will instead occur on the day that is 28 days after the date of the Ninth Circuits determination on appeal or a subsequent date as ordered by this Court.(ca, ) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
42 NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT of Counsel for defendants within Office of the Attorney General: That this case is now being handled by Deputy Attorney General John E. Rittmayer, instead of Deputy Attorney General Barry G. Thorp, in the office of Attorney General. The mailing address remains the same filed by defendants John Laudeman, Jeanne Woodford. (jp, ) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
43 MANDATE of 9th CCA filed as to Appeal to Circuit Court 32 , CCA # 04−55879. The judgment of District Court in this cause be, and hereby is reversed and remanded. Costs taxed of $424.. Mandate received in this district on 08/26/05. (cbr, ) (Entered: 09/02/2005)
44 MINUTES: IN CHAMBERS; Counsel notified. Court ORDERS that the mandate of the Ninth Circuit Cour to Appeals: REVERSED AND REMANDED. COSTS TAXED IN THE AMOUNT OF $424.00 is hereby filed and spread upon the minutes of this District Court. This case is set for status conference on 10/17/05 at 9:00. Counsel are to file a joint status report as to this case no later than 10/11/05. Courts address is 312 North Spring Street, 5th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90012 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew Court Reporter: Not present. (ir, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)
45 JOINT STATUS REPORT of Counsel filed by Plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. (ir, ) (Entered: 10/13/2005)
46 MINUTES: SCHEDULING CONFERENCE; Court and counsel confer. Scheduling Conference is held. Court sets the following dates: Discovery cut−off 3/10/06. Motion filing cut−off 3/20/06. Pretrial Conference 5/1/06 at 11:00. Court Trial 5/30/06 at 9:00. Court signs the ADR 12 Order by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew Court Reporter: Sheri Kleeger. (ir, ) (Entered: 10/19/2005)
47 ORDER by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew, case ordered to Attorney Settlement Officer Panel for a Local Rule 16−14 settlement conference. Within 10 days, plaintiff shall notify the ADR Program Coordinator of name of Attorney Settlement Officer who will conduct the settlement conference.(ir, ) (Entered: 10/19/2005)
48 STIPULATION REGARDING SELECTION of Attorney Settlement Officer Filed; Parties stipulate that Jeff S Westerman may serve as Attorney Settlement Officer for a Local Rule 16−14 Settlement Conference.(ir, ) (Entered: 10/28/2005)
49 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew: Trial and accompanying dates are modified as follows, which is a shift of approximately 3 months: Discovery cut−off 6/12/06;

Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 7 of 8

02/21/2006 07/06/2006 09/01/2006 02/08/2007
02/08/2007
02/20/2007 02/20/2007 05/25/2007

Motion filing cut−off 6/28/06; Pretrial Conference 8/14/06 at 11:00; Court Trial 8/29/06 at 9:00. In addition or in the alternative disclosures pursuant to the FRCP 26(a)(2) must be made within 21 days of the Discovery cut−off date.(ir, ) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
50 NOTICE of Reassignment of Counsel, new counsel is John F Bazan filed by Defendants Jeanne Woodford, John Laudeman. (ir, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
51 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew: Factual discovery cut−off rescheduled from 6/12/06 to 8/28/06; Expert Witness ID and Reports rescheduled from 7/3/06 to 9/11/06; Expert Witness Deposition cut−off scheduled for 10/2/06; Motion filing cut−off rescheduled from 6/28/06 to 10/23/06; Final Pretrial conference rescheduled from 8/14/06 to 11/6/06 at 11:00; Court trial rescheduled from 8/29/06 to 11/21/06 at 9:00.(ir, ) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
52 JOINT STIPULATION AND ORDER: Discovery cut−off 10/9/2006; Expert disclosures date is 10/23/06; Expert deposition cut off date is 11/13/06; Motions due by 11/27/2006; Final Pretrial Conference set for 2/12/2007 at 11:00 AM; Bench Trial set for 3/6/2007 at 09:00 AM. IT IS SO ORDERED by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. (klg, ) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
53 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND STIPULATED REQUEST TO VACATE SCHEDULING ORDER, CONTINUE PRE−TRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL; AND ORDER by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew: The parties STIPULATE and respectfully request that the court VACATE the 9/1/06 JOINT STIPULATION 52 . The parties further STIPULATE and respectfully request that the Court CONTINUE the Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/4/2007 at 09:00 AM and the Court Trial until 6/26/2007 at 09:00 AM to allow the parties to execute one of the terms of the settlement agreemenet and file a stipulation of dismissal. (klg, ) (Entered: 02/09/2007)
54 DUPLICATE DOCUMENT OF 53 − NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND STIPULATED REQUEST TO VACATE SCHEDULING ORDER, CONTINUE PRE−TRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL; AND ORDER: The parties further STIPULATE and respectfully request that the Court CONTINUE the Final Pre−Trial conference until 6/4/07 at 9:00 am and the Court Trial until 6/26/07 at 9:00 am to allow the parties to execute one of the terms of the settlement agreement and file a stipulation of dismissal. IT IS SO ORDERED. (klg, ) Modified on 3/22/2007 (klg, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 3/22/2007 (shb, ). (Entered: 02/13/2007)
55 NOTICE of Association of Counsel associating attorney Peter J Eliasberg on behalf of Plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier. Filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier (bb, ) (Entered: 02/22/2007)
56 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information: Attorney Ben Wizner will no longer receive service of documents from the Clerks Office for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice.Ben Wizner is no longer attorney of record in this case for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice. Filed by plaintiff Billy Soza Warsoldier (bb, ) (Entered: 02/22/2007)
57 STIPULATION AND ORDER approved by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew: Upon request and stipulation of the parties, the Final Pretrial Conference is continued to 7/30/2007 at 9:00 AM. The Court Trial is continued to 8/21/2007 at 9:00 AM to allow the parties to finalize all terms of the executed settlement agreement and file a stipulation of dismissal. (kd) (Entered: 05/29/2007)

Case: 2:04-cv-2233 As of: 10/06/2008 04:45 PM PDT 8 of 8

07/05/2007

58 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew : re Complaint − (Discovery) 1 . ORDER DISMISSING ACTION with prejudice by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the sole purpose of enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement. (Made JS−6. Case Terminated.)(ca) (Entered: 07/05/2007)

 
 418 F.3d 989 (2005)
Billy Soza WARSOLDIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Jeanne WOODFORD, Director of the California Department of Corrections, in her official capacity; John Laudeman, Warden of the Adelanto Community Correctional Facility, in his
official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 04-55879.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2004. Submission vacated December 6, 2004.
Resubmitted June 24, 2005. Filed July 29, 2005.
9901 *990 *991 Audrey Huang (Argued and Briefed), Bingham, McCutchen, Los Angeles, CA; Ben Wizner (Briefed), ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant.
John E. Rittmayer (Argued) and Barry G. Thorpe (Briefed), Deputy Attorney General, State of California, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellees.
Before: PREGERSON, TASHIMA, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
California prisoner Billy Soza Warsoldier appeals from the district court's denial of his request for a preliminary injunction in his suit challenging a California Department of Corrections ("CDC") hair grooming policy, which requires that all male inmates maintain their hair no longer than three inches. Warsoldier refuses to adhere to the grooming policy because of his sincere religious belief that he may cut his hair only upon the death of a loved one. He argues that the policy, and CDC's refusal to permit a religious exception, violates his right to religious freedom. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and for the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district court's denial of Warsoldier's request for a preliminary injunction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts here are undisputed by the parties. Billy Soza Warsoldier is a Cahuilla Native American. He has participated in his tribe's cultural, social, and religious affairs throughout his life. One tenet of Warsoldier's 992 religious faith teaches that hair symbolizes and embodies the knowledge *992 a person acquires during a lifetime and that hair may be cut only upon the death of a close relative. In keeping with his religion, Warsoldier maintains his hair long because he believes that cutting his hair would cost him his wisdom and strength. He further believes that if he were to cut his hair, he would be unable to join his ancestors in the afterlife and that instead, the deceased members of his tribe will subject him to taunting and ridicule. Except upon his father's death in 1980, Warsoldier has not cut his hair since 1971.
From April 2, 2003 to May 27, 2004, Warsoldier was an inmate at California's Adelanto Community Correctional Facility ("ACCF"), a minimum security prison located in Adelanto, California.[1] CDC's grooming policy prohibits male inmates from maintaining their hair longer than three inches. 15 Cal.Code Reg. § 3062(e). On April 24, 2003, Warsoldier was given a copy of a Rules Violation Report, which alleged that he was not in compliance with CDC's grooming policy. He received similar notices of violation on June 3 and June 16, 2003. The prison held hearings on each of the violations, during which Warsoldier pleaded not guilty and asserted that his "religious beliefs and cultural background" prevented him from complying with the grooming policy. Nevertheless, after

each hearing, Warsoldier was found guilty of violating the grooming policy. For his violations of the policy, Warsoldier was punished by confinement to his cell and the imposition of additional duty hours.
On July 20, 2003, the prison's Unit Classification Committee ("UCC") designated Warsoldier a "program failure" pursuant to section 3062(m) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations for his refusal to cut his hair.[2] As punishment, Warsoldier (1) lost his assignment to particular duties; (2) lost his phone call rights; (3) was expelled from print shop and landscaping classes; (4) was removed from his position as a member of the Executive Body for the Inmate Advisory Council; (5) was prohibited from going to the main yard for recreation; (6) had his monthly draw at the prison store reduced from $180 to $45; and (7) was prohibited from making special purchases at the prison store.
After Warsoldier pursued CDC's appeal process and exhausted all of the available administrative remedies, he filed suit in United States District Court. Warsoldier's suit challenges CDC's hair grooming regulation as violating his right to religious freedom under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). Warsoldier's complaint seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting CDC from punishing him for exercising his religious beliefs and compelling CDC to lift all disciplinary sanctions that have been imposed upon him as a consequence of his refusal to adhere to the grooming policy. He also seeks a declaration that applying the policy to him violates his rights under RLUIPA.
993 *993 The district court denied Warsoldier's request for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that because CDC had not forcibly cut Warsoldier's hair and had no intention of doing so before his release, it was questionable whether Warsoldier had suffered a constitutional injury. Because Warsoldier was scheduled to be released in eighteen days, the court concluded that the balance of hardships did not weigh in Warsoldier's favor and there was no need to grant a preliminary injunction.
Warsoldier appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A district court's decision regarding preliminary injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Pharm. Research v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 660, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003). We must reverse the district court if it abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact.[3]Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir.2003). Where, as here, the district court's ruling rests solely on conclusions of law and the facts are either established or undisputed, de novo review is appropriate. See Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir.2002).
II. Preliminary Injunctive Relief[4]
"To obtain a preliminary injunction, [Warsoldier] must show either (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the 994 *994 possibility of irreparable injury or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance
of hardships tipping in [Warsoldier's] favor." See Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576, 580 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir.1991)) (internal quotations omitted). "These two alternatives represent extremes of a single continuum, rather than two separate tests. Thus, the greater the relative hardship to [Warsoldier], the less probability of success must be shown." See Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted).
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Section 3 of RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability," unless the government establishes that the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest," and does so by "the least restrictive means."[5] 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000cc-5(7)(A). "A person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government." § 2000cc-2(a).
The Supreme Court recently upheld RLUIPA against a challenge under the Establishment Clause. Cutter v. Wilkinson, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). In Cutter, the Court found that RLUIPA's institutionalized-persons provision was compatible with the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA "alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise." Id. at 2121. In upholding the act, the Court recognized RLUIPA "[a]s the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens," id. at 2117, and that Congress sought to provide inmates a mechanism to seek redress against the "`frivolous or arbitrary' barriers [that] impeded institutionalized persons' religious exercise," id. at 2119; see also id. at 2115 (noting that RLUIPA's purpose is to "protect[ ] institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government's permission and accommodation of their religion"). Congress did this by replacing the "legitimate penological interest" standard articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), with the "compelling governmental interest" and "least restrictive means" tests codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See also Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2119.
Under RLUIPA, Warsoldier bears the initial burden of going forward with evidence to demonstrate a prima facie claim that CDC's grooming policy and its punitive sanctions designed to coerce him to comply with that policy 995 constitute a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).[6]*995 If Warsoldier establishes the prima facie existence of such a substantial burden, on which he bears the burden of persuasion, the CDC shall bear the burden of persuasion to prove that any substantial burden on Warsoldier's exercise of his religious beliefs is both "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and the "least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc-2(b). By its terms, RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate's right to exercise his religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) ("This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.").
1. Substantial Burden
CDC regulations provide that
A male inmate's hair shall not be longer than three inches and shall not extend over the eyebrows or below the top of the shirt collar while standing upright. Hair shall be cut around the ears, and sideburns shall be neatly trimmed, and shall not extend below the mid-point of the ear.
15 Cal.Code Reg. § 3062(e). In contrast,
A female inmate's hair may be any length but shall not extend over the eyebrows or below the bottom of the shirt collar while standing upright. If hair is long, it shall be worn up in a neat, plain style, which does not draw undue attention to the inmate.
15 Cal.Code Reg. § 3062(f). Section 3062(e) makes no exception for religious adherents whose faith prohibits them from cutting their hair. Warsoldier argues that CDC's grooming policy 0907 in particular its failure to provide for a religious exception 0907 imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion, which prohibits him from cutting his hair.
Although RLUIPA does not define what constitutes a "substantial burden" on religious exercise, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5, in the context of a land use suit brought under RLUIPA, we have explained that "for a land use regulation to impose a `substantial burden,' it must be `oppressive' to a `significantly great' extent. That is, a `substantial burden' on `religious exercise' must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise," San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.2004). In addition, the

Supreme Court has found a substantial burden as "where the state ... denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (ruling in First Amendment context). Although such "compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial." Id. at 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425.
As a consequence of his refusal to cut his hair in violation of his religious beliefs, Warsoldier has been subjected 996 to a series of punishments designed by CDC to *996 coerce him into compliance. He has (1) been confined to his
cell; (2) had additional duty hours imposed on him; (3) been reclassified into a workgroup where inmates do not receive time credits or as many privileges as others working in a higher work group; (4) lost his phone call privileges; (5) been expelled from print shop and landscaping classes; (6) been removed from his position as a member of the Executive Body for the Inmate Advisory Council; (7) been prohibited from going to the main yard for recreation; (8) had his monthly draw at the prison store reduced from $180 to $45; and (9) been prohibited from making special purchases at the prison store. According to CDC's statement of reasons supporting its grooming policy, such punishments are "necessary to make complying with the grooming standards more of an appealing choice to the inmate."
Notwithstanding these assorted punishments, CDC advances the argument, accepted by the district court, that because Warsoldier has not been physically forced to cut his hair, his religious practice has not been restricted. According to CDC, even though he has been subjected to a variety of punishments for refusing to yield on his religious beliefs, Warsoldier is still "free to exercise his religion in all respects." In other words, the grooming policy is not a substantial burden because Warsoldier may practice his religion 0907 he will just be punished for doing so in an effort to compel him to acquiesce with the grooming policy in contravention of his religious beliefs. Such an argument flies in the face of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent that clearly hold that punishments to coerce a religious adherent to forgo her or his religious beliefs is an infringement on religious exercise. See e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (reasoning that forcing someone "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand .... puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship"); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 563 (9th Cir.1997) (noting "that `putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs' infringes on the free exercise of religion") (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425).
Because the grooming policy intentionally puts significant pressure on inmates such as Warsoldier to abandon their religious beliefs by cutting their hair, CDC's grooming policy imposes a substantial burden on Warsoldier's religious practice. See May, 109 F.3d at 563 (finding substantial burden where prison officials conditioned receipt of benefits upon conduct 0907 undoing of inmate's dreadlocks 0907 that was proscribed by Rastafarian inmate's religious faith); see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18, 101 S.Ct. 1425; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 n. 5, 83 S.Ct. 1790 ("Under some circumstances, indirect `discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes."); Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938, 942 (9th Cir.1983) ("The Supreme Court has clearly articulated that government may not restrict exercise of constitutionally protected rights, even when that restriction takes the form of withholding a benefit, rather than applying a penalty, for that exercise.").
2. Compelling State Interest
Because we find that CDC's grooming policy imposes a substantial burden on Warsoldier's religious exercise, 997 CDC must establish that the policy serves a compelling *997 governmental interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1
(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
According to CDC, three compelling interests are served by its hair grooming policy. First, the hair length standards facilitate the security of prison inmates and staff by allowing the quick and accurate identification of inmates. In addition, inmates may hide contraband or weapons in their hair or on their bodies. Absent the grooming standards, prison guards would be forced to make physical contact with an inmate to check for

contraband. During such contact, prison guards risk suffering a puncture wound from sharp implements possibly concealed in the inmate's long hair. Further, such policies reduce animosity and tension by removing a method by which inmates may signal a gang affiliation. Second, because short hair is easier to keep clean, requiring that male inmates maintain short hair reduces the spread of head-borne parasites such as lice within the prison. Health and safety are also further facilitated by short hair, because it reduces the risk of injury during the inmate's use of heavy machinery. Finally, CDC argues that requiring male inmates to cut their hair ensures public safety because it "enhance[s] identification of inmates who are attempting to escape or who have escaped." In addition, requiring short hair prevents prisoners from easily disguising their identity by cutting their hair upon their escape.
In support of its argument, CDC cites three out-of-circuit cases upholding prison grooming policies as serving a compelling interest under the strict-scrutiny standard of RLUIPA's predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA").[7] These cases are not dispositive, however. In two of the cases the regulations were upheld against challenges brought by inmates of maximum security facilities. See Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 503-04 (11th Cir.1996) (finding state's "compelling interest in security and order within their prisons" especially applies "in `close custody' facilities like MCI which contain extremely violent offenders"); Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1555 (8th Cir.1996) ("It is more than merely `eminently reasonable' for a maximum security prison to prohibit inmates from having long hair in which they could conceal contraband and weapons. It is compelling."). In contrast here, Warsoldier was incarcerated in ACCF, a minimum security facility. In the third case, Diaz v. Collins, the Fifth Circuit upheld a prison grooming policy requiring that male inmates maintain short hair without discussing whether any other less restrictive means that could accomplish the same compelling interest were offered by the inmate or rejected by the prison. 114 F.3d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir.1997). But, under RLUIPA, CDC is required to demonstrate not only that its policy serves a compelling interest, but also that it has employed the least restrictive means to achieve that compelling interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
CDC also cites Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 331-32 (9th Cir.1990), in support of its argument that its stated interests are legitimate. CDC's reliance on Friedman is misplaced because that case was decided under the preRLUIPA standard articulated in Turner, which upheld a prison regulation impinging on inmates' constitutional 998 rights where the regulation "is reasonably related to legitimate *998 penological interests."[8]482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. RLUIPA replaced Turner's "legitimate penological interest" test with a "compelling government interest" test. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Similarly, in arguing that it has met its evidentiary burden, CDC cites cases that all predate passage of RLUIPA and involve claims subjected to the lower standard of a "legitimate penological interest" versus RLUIPA's "compelling government interest" standard. Compare Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 731 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, and noting that "[p]rison regulations that infringe on an inmate's practice of his religion are valid if they are `reasonably related to legitimate penological interests'"), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (government must establish that burden is "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest").
Nevertheless, the question here is not whether prison security is a compelling governmental interest. It clearly is. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); see also May, 109 F.3d at 563 (noting that security during transfer of inmates is compelling interest). Rather, the question is whether CDC's grooming policy is the least restrictive alternative available to CDC to reach its compelling interest.
3. Least Restrictive Alternative
Assuming that CDC has met its evidentiary burden, and that it has established that the grooming policy serves a compelling governmental interest, CDC must still establish that the grooming policy is the least restrictive alternative to achieve that interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). This it has failed to do.
In attempting to meet its burden, CDC presents only conclusory statements that the hair grooming policy is the least restrictive means to ensuring prison security. First, CDC states that "[a]ll other modes of regulation would either overly burden the inmate or the penal institution, or conversely fail to meet the compelling penological interests achieved by the grooming standards." CDC does not elaborate why this is the case or what other

modes of regulation it considered and rejected. Instead, CDC relies on four out-of-circuit cases where courts upheld grooming policies as the least restrictive means. As noted above, these cases dealt with grooming standards in maximum security prisons.
In contrast here, Warsoldier was placed in a minimum security prison. Inmates at facilities such as ACCF have a greater degree of freedom than inmates at higher security facilities precisely because they pose fewer security 999 risks. ACCF inmates *999 have less serious criminal histories, are serving minimal sentences, and are less likely to attempt to escape. Additionally, inmates in low-level security facilities may be permitted to leave the premises to work and may sleep in unlocked dorm rooms rather than locked prison cells. Given the reduced security pressures at such minimum security facilities, the least restrictive means in a maximum security prison may not be identical to what is required for a minimum security facility. CDC does not address this difference.
Moreover, even outside the context of a minimum security facility, CDC cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) (finding, in context of First Amendment challenge to speech restrictions, that "[a] court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective"); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (holding that city's minority set-aside program was not narrowly tailored in part because city had not considered whether raceneutral measures would have achieved government's interest); Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1078 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that government "neglected to undertake any consideration 0907 let alone serious, good faith consideration" of race-neutral alternatives (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). For instance, one alternative to CDC's rigid policy would be the creation of a religious exemption to the grooming policy. Rather, CDC simply states that "[t]o meet the penological interests furthered by the grooming standard, the prison must enforce the grooming policies upon all inmates regardless of their religious convictions." It does nothing to explain why this is so or to discuss whether it has ever considered a less restrictive approach.
Equally problematic for CDC is that other prison systems, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, do not have such hair length policies or, if they do, provide religious exemptions. Prisons run by the federal government, Oregon, Colorado, and Nevada all meet the same penological goals without such a policy. Nevada permits inmates "freedom in personal grooming." Nev. Dep't of Corrections Admin. Reg. 705.01(1.1).[9] Similarly, Colorado's Department of Corrections has no hair length requirement and expressly provides for a religious exemption to its grooming regulations. Colo. Admin. Reg. 850-11(I); (IV)(A)(1)(d).[10] Oregon merely requires that an inmate's "[h]ead and facial hair ... be maintained in a clean and neat manner." Or. Admin. R. § 291-123-0015(2)(a).[11] Nor does the federal Bureau of Prisons impose any mandatory restrictions on its inmates' hair length, regardless of the prison's security level. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5230.05 § 551.4.[12] Indeed, "[f]or more than a decade, the federal Bureau of Prisons has managed the largest correctional system in the Nation under the same heightened scrutiny standard as RLUIPA 1000 without compromising *1000 prison security, public safety, or the constitutional rights of other prisoners." Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124 (quoting Brief for United States at 24).
Surely these other state and federal prison systems have the same compelling interest in maintaining prison security, ensuring public safety, and protecting inmate health as CDC. Nevertheless, CDC offers no explanation why these prison systems are able to meet their indistinguishable interests without infringing on their inmates' right to freely exercise their religious beliefs. Instead, CDC argues that its prisons should not be hindered in addressing its compelling interests just because other jurisdictions have adopted policies that do not substantially burden inmates' religious practices.
Contrary to CDC's argument, we have found comparisons between institutions analytically useful when considering whether the government is employing the least restrictive means. Indeed, the failure of a defendant to explain why another institution with the same compelling interests was able to accommodate the same religious practices may constitute a failure to establish that the defendant was using the least restrictive means. See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885 n. 3 (9th Cir.1995) (finding fault with defendant's failure to explain fact that another school district had managed to accommodate Sikh students' religious practices without

sacrificing school safety). Furthermore, "[w]here a prisoner challenges the[ prison's] justifications, prison officials must set forth detailed evidence, tailored to the situation before the court, that identifies the failings in the alternatives advanced by the prisoner." May, 109 F.3d at 564-65 (emphasis added).
CDC also fails to explain why its women's prisons do not adhere to an equally strict grooming policy even in maximum security facilities. In contrast to the men's grooming policy at issue here, CDC regulations provide that
A female inmate's hair may be any length but shall not extend over the eyebrows or below the bottom of the shirt collar while standing upright. If hair is long, it shall be worn up in a neat, plain style, which does not draw undue attention to the inmate.
15 Cal.Code Reg. § 3062(f). As Warsoldier points out, the government's interest in inmate health and security is no less compelling when the inmate is female rather than male. Concerns about inmate identification, lice infestation, and the ease with which an escaped inmate may alter her or his appearance are the same regardless of the sex of the offender. That CDC's compelling interests apply equally to male and female inmates suggests that there is no particular health or security concern justifying the policy, and, more importantly, that the hair length restriction is not the least restrictive means to achieve the same compelling interests.
Challenging this comparison, CDC argues that the difference in treatment between male and female inmates is justified because women inmates are "much less likely" to commit violent crimes than male inmates and, hence, that women inmates pose a lesser security concern. However, the evidence cited by CDC does not clearly bear this out. According to CDC's data, female inmates commit assaults and/or batteries at a rate of 3.2 per 100 inmates. In comparison, male inmates commit 4.7 assaults and/or batteries per 100 inmates. A difference of 1.5 percent hardly suggests that female inmates are "much less likely" to commit assaults than male inmates. Furthermore, the data cited by CDC does not indicate whether it is based on California's entire prison population, 1001 which would include maximum security facilities, or is *1001 limited to minimum security facilities like ACCF. Warsoldier was incarcerated at a minimum security facility, which is likely to have significantly different security needs than a maximum security facility.[13]
CDC makes no attempt to explain why prisons in other jurisdictions and its own women's prisons are able to meet the same compelling interests of prison safety and security without requiring short hair or permitting a religious exemption. Instead, CDC insists that this court must completely defer to CDC's judgment. CDC's insistence, however, is insufficient to meet its burden of proof under § 2000cc-2(b). See May, 109 F.3d at 564-65 ("Our holding should not suggest that prison officials can satisfy the demands of RFRA with mere assertions of unfulfilled security objectives.").
4. Conclusion
Based on the above, we find that Warsoldier has demonstrated a likelihood that he will prevail on the merits. While we recognize that CDC's interest in maintaining prison security is compelling, CDC's conclusory statements are insufficient to meet its burden that it has adopted the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. At a minimum, there exists serious questions going to the merits of Warsoldier's claim.
B. Possibility of Irreparable Injury
For the same reasons the grooming policy constitutes a substantial burden on Warsoldier's religious practice, we conclude that Warsoldier faces the possibility of irreparable injury absent an injunction barring enforcement of the grooming policy. Because his religion forbids him from cutting his hair, CDC's grooming policy and its continual punishment of Warsoldier's noncompliance with that policy forces Warsoldier to choose between following his religious beliefs and suffering continual punishment, and abandoning his religious beliefs to avoid such punishment. We have previously held that "`putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs' infringes on the free exercise of religion." May, 109 F.3d at 563 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (noting that forcing someone "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning

one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand .... puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship").
Finally, "[u]nder the law of this circuit, a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief in a First Amendment context can establish irreparable injury sufficient to merit the grant of relief by demonstrating the existence of a colorable First Amendment claim." See Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 973-74 (internal citations omitted); see also 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004) ("When 1002 an alleged deprivation of *1002 a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary."). Because Warsoldier has, at a minimum, raised a colorable claim that the exercise of his religious beliefs has been infringed, he has sufficiently established that he will suffer an irreparable injury absent an injunction barring enforcement of the grooming policy against him.
C. Balance of Hardships
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the fact that Warsoldier was due to be released in eighteen days does not mean that the balance of hardships weigh against him: "[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury" for purposes of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Rather, this case raises serious First Amendment questions and compels a finding that the potential for irreparable injury exists, or at the very least, that "the balance of hardships tips sharply in [Warsoldier's] favor." See Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 973 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Balanced against the irreparable injury faced by Warsoldier is CDC's compelling interest in maintaining prison security, health, and hygiene. In considering which way the balance tilts, it is important to note that, unlike the cases cited by CDC, which involved maximum security prisons, ACCF is a minimum security prison. Based on these facts, we find that the balance of hardships here tilt in Warsoldier's favor, and thus, that the district court erred in denying him preliminary injunctive relief. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (holding that when the loss of First Amendment freedoms "[i]s both threatened and occurring at the time of [plaintiff's] motion and [if] [plaintiff] sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, the Court of Appeals might properly have held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief").
CONCLUSION
RLUIPA requires that CDC use the least restrictive means necessary to achieve its compelling interest in prison safety and security. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); see Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2119. The policy at issue here is sweeping: it applies to all male inmates, but to no female inmates regardless of a female inmate's security threat; it does nothing to distinguish between inmates housed at maximum security facilities and those low level offenders in minimum security institutions; and it provides absolutely no accommodation for religious belief. Yet, CDC has utterly failed to demonstrate that the disputed grooming policy is the least restrictive means necessary to ensure prison safety and security. Because Warsoldier has established a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility that the grooming policy will cause him to suffer an irreparable injury, the district court's denial of his request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting CDC from enforcing its hair grooming policy is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Our previous injunction enjoining CDC from enforcing the grooming regulation against Warsoldier and releasing Warsoldier from custody pending this appeal shall remain in place pending entry of a final judgment in the district court.
[1] This court previously granted Warsoldier's emergency request for a preliminary injunction enjoining CDC from enforcing the grooming regulation against Warsoldier pending this appeal. We also ordered that Warsoldier be released from custody pending this appeal.
[2] Section 3062(m) defines a "program failure" as "[a]n inmate who fails to comply with these grooming standards." 15 Cal.Code Reg. § 3062(m). Such an inmate may be "subject to progressive discipline and

classification committee review for appropriate housing and program placement. Physical force shall not be used to enforce compliance with these regulations, except as permitted by existing law or with a court order." Id.
[3] Warsoldier argues that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in denying him injunctive relief. Before denying the injunction, the district court remarked that
[t]he Court has given this request for preliminary injunction great consideration and has considered all aspects of the case, and after having reviewed the papers and entertaining the oral argument, the Court makes the following ruling....
According to CDC, although the district court did not explicitly state what standard it applied, it must have relied on the right legal standard because the court stated it had read Warsoldier's brief, which included the correct legal standard. We reject the suggestion that because Warsoldier included the correct standard in his brief, that the district court necessarily applied that standard in reaching its conclusion.
[4] CDC argues for the first time on appeal that the Supreme Court's decisions in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), foreclose Warsoldier's claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. In Heck, the Court held that a prisoner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to recover damages based on an invalid conviction or sentence may only be brought after "the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Balisok took this reasoning one step further and applied Heck to a prisoner's § 1983 claim for damages and declaratory relief based on the allegedly invalid procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits. 520 U.S. at 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584.
Our decision, however, does not rely on CDC's denial of Warsoldier's good-time credits; Heck and Balisok therefore have no application here. Warsoldier was first notified of his extended parole date on May 11, 2004 0907 after the district court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction. Because the factual basis for CDC's Heck argument is undeveloped, the district court has not had the opportunity to consider the question in the first instance, and the extension of Warsoldier's incarceration is not a basis for our holding here, we decline to address CDC's argument that Warsoldier's RLUIPA claim must be brought in a habeas proceeding. CDC may raise this issue on remand to the district court should Warsoldier challenge his loss of good-time credits. We express no opinion on the merits of CDC's argument that Heck and Balisok should be extended to apply to RLUIPA claims in general or to the specific facts of this case.
[5] Section 3 applies when "the substantial burden [on religious exercise] is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance," such as the federal funds California accepts for the operation of its prisons. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). The parties do not dispute that RLUIPA applies to California prisons.
[6] Section 2000cc-2 provides that,
If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
[7] There exists little Ninth Circuit authority construing RLUIPA. Thus, the parties rely in part on cases construing its predecessor, RFRA, which the Supreme Court struck down as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997).
[8] In Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (9th Cir.2004), we considered a similar challenge to CDC's hair length regulation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that case, we applied Turner and concluded that the regulation served a legitimate penological interest and did not infringe upon the exercise of Native American religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 712-15. The panel noted, however, that

We express no opinion about whether the CDC's hair length regulation violates the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), which provides that the government may not impose a substantial burden on an inmate's exercise of religion unless the regulation in question furthers a compelling state interest in the least restrictive manner. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding RLUIPA's constitutionality). Henderson brought his claim under the First Amendment, not the RLUIPA, so here we apply only Turner's "reasonable relation" standard.
Id. at 715 n. 1.
[9] Available at http://www.doc.nv.gov.
[10] Available at http://www.doc.state.co. us/admin_reg/PDFs/0850_11.pdf.
[11] Available at http://arcweb.sos.state.or. us/rules/OARS_200/OAR_291/291_123.html.
[12] Available at http://bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsPolicyLoc.
[13] Equally misplaced is CDC's reliance on out-of-circuit equal protection cases approving differential treatment between male and female prisoners vis-a-vis grooming standards. The cases cited all involve equal protection claims by male prisoners that were subject to rational basis analysis or intermediate scrutiny analysis. See Dreibelbis v. Marks, 742 F.2d 792, 795-96 (3d Cir.1984); DeBlasio v. Johnson, 128 F.Supp.2d 315, 328 (E.D.Va.2000); and Davie v. Wingard, 958 F.Supp. 1244, 1252-53 (S.D.Ohio 1997). In contrast, under RLUIPA, CDC's regulations must survive strict scrutiny analysis. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
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