Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 35 PageID# 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

LINDA SARSOUR;

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RASHIDA TLAIB;

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ZAHRA BILLOO;

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NIHAD AWAD;

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COREY SAYLOR;

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DAWUD WALID;

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BASIM ELKARRA;

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HUSSAM AYLOUSH;

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HASSAN SHIBLY;

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ALIA SALEM;

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ADAM SOLTANI;

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IMRAN SIDDIQI;

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JULIA SHEARSON;

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NAMIRA ISLAM;

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KAREN DABDOUB;

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JOHN DOE NO. 1;

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JOHN DOE NO. 2;

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JOHN DOE NO. 3;

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JOHN DOE NO. 4;

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JOHN DOE NO. 5;

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JOHN DOE NO. 6;

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JOHN DOE NO. 7;

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JOHN DOE NO. 8;

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JOHN DOE NO. 9;

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JOHN DOE NO. 10;

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JANE DOE NO. 1; and,

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JANE DOE NO. 2;

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United )

States of America; in his official capacity

)

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JOHN F. KELLY, Secretary of the Department )

of Homeland Security; in his official capacity; )

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; and,

)

)

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 1:17-cv-00120 Hon.
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND

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COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, Council on American‐Islamic Relations (“CAIR”), The Law Office of Gadeir Abbas, and Akeel and Valentine, PLC, state as follows:
Introduction 1. The vulgar animosity that accounts for the existence of Executive Order entitled “Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals” (hereinafter the “Muslim Exclusion Order”), issued the same day of this action, is plain to see, and the absence of the words Islam or Muslim does nothing to obscure it. 2. In fact, the Executive Order has already gained national and international media attention and nationwide protests, and has been dubbed uniformly as the “Muslim Ban” because its apparent and true purpose and underlying motive—which is to ban Muslims from certain Muslim‐majority countries (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) (hereinafter the “Muslim majority countries”)—has been broadcast to the general public by the Trump Administration. 3. Less known is the second and equally central purpose of the Muslim Exclusion Order – to initiate the mass expulsion of immigrant and nonimmigrant Muslims lawfully residing in the United States by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) – based solely on their religious beliefs. 4. Many Muslims lawfully in the United States that are targeted by the Muslim Exclusion Order, including some of the John Doe and John Doe Plaintiffs, will be forced – as a
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result of the Muslim Exclusion Order – to return to their home countries, where they will likely face persecution, torture and even execution, simply because they are Muslim.
5. The malice that gave rise to the Muslim Exclusion Order first emerged on December 7, 2015, when President Trump issued a campaign promise to implement, if elected, “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”
6. The Muslim Exclusion Order is the fulfillment of President Trump’s longstanding promise and boasted intent to enact a federal policy that overtly discriminates against Muslims and officially broadcasts a message that the federal government disfavors the religion of Islam, preferring all other religions instead.
7. The Muslim Exclusion Order is both broader in some ways and narrower in others than the policy Defendant Trump proposed on December 7, 2015. The Muslim Exclusion Order is broader insofar as it denies immigration benefits to those who, like some of the immigrant and nonimmigrant Plaintiffs, followed the rules and entered and are now lawfully present in the United States.
8. The Muslim Exclusion Order is also narrower than originally proposed, because it applies only to a subset of Muslims rather than all Muslims. This, however, does not cure the policy of its constitutional infirmity. While the Muslim Exclusion Order does not apply to all Muslims, the policy only applies to Muslims.
9. The text of the Muslim Exclusion Order implements an impermissible religious gerrymander that divides foreign nationals, even those lawfully present inside the United States, into favored and disfavored groups based on their faith.
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10. Likewise, the Muslim Exclusion Order also divides green card holders, lawfully present inside the United States, into favored and disfavored groups based on their faith.
11. Because the history and text of the Muslim Exclusion Order reveal an illegal purpose and effect, Plaintiffs’ claims must be sustained.
Parties 12. Plaintiff Linda Sarsour is an American Muslim residing in Kings County, New York. Plaintiff Sarsour is a Palestinian activist and Executive Director of the Arab American Association of New York. In 2016, she served as spokesperson for Presidential Candidate Senator Bernie Sanders, and was one of three national co‐chairs for the 2017 Women’s March held the day after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States. Plaintiff Sarsour has appeared in “The Hijabi Monologues” and has her own show, The Linda Sarsour Show. 13. Plaintiff Rashida Tlaib is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Tlaib is a former Democratic member of the Michigan House of Representatives and an attorney at the Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice. Upon her swearing in on January 1, 2009, Plaintiff Tlaib became the first Muslim‐American woman to serve in the Michigan Legislature, and only the second Muslim woman in history to be elected to any state legislature in America. 14. Plaintiff Zahra Billoo is a Muslim American residing in Santa Clara County, California. Plaintiff Billoo is a civil rights attorney and the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, San Francisco Bay Area (CAIR‐SFBA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Billoo is frequently seen at mosques and universities facilitating
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trainings and workshops as a part of CAIR’s grassroots efforts to empower the American Muslim community and build bridges with allies on civil rights issues.
15. Plaintiff Nihad Awad is a Muslim American residing in Washington County, D.C. Plaintiff Awad is National Executive Director and co‐founder of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. As a national leader in the civil rights movement, Plaintiff Awad has led multiple campaigns to defend the rights of Muslims and to help Americans of other faiths better understand Islam. His work includes interfacing with the U.S. government, facilitating interfaith dialogue, speaking at conferences, conducting training and leadership seminars, and appearing in national and international media to discuss Islam and American Muslims. Plaintiff Awad has testified before both Houses of the U.S. Congress on matters involving Muslims in America. In 1997, he served on the White House Civil Rights Advisory Panel to the Commission on Safety and Security. In the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections, Plaintiff Awad was a key figure in creating the Muslim voting bloc. In 2006, he traveled to Iraq on a humanitarian mission to appeal for the release of American journalist Jill Carrol who was kidnapped and later released in Iraq. In September, 2011, Plaintiff Awad traveled to Iran as part of an interfaith delegation to meet with the President of Iran to appeal for the release of two American hikers held by Iran. In 2004, he was named one of National Journal’s more than 100 Most Influential People in the United States whose ideas will help shape the debate over public policy issues for the next decade. In 2009, he was named by a Georgetown University publication as one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the world. And in 2010, Arabian Business ranked him as 39th in the “Arabian Business Power 100” list, its annual listing of the most influential Arabs.
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16. Plaintiff Corey Saylor is a Muslim American residing in Fairfax County, Virginia. Plaintiff Saylor is Director of the Department to Monitor and Combat Islamophobia at the Council on American‐Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Saylor is an expert on political communications, legislative advocacy, media relations and anti‐ Islam prejudice in the United States. He is a regular voice on U.S. and international news outlets. Plaintiff Saylor has also run successful advocacy campaigns against corporate giants such as Burger King and Bell Helicopter‐Boeing when their actions or advertisements negatively impacted the American Muslim community.
17. Plaintiff Dawud Walid is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Walid is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Michigan (CAIR‐MI), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Walid has been interviewed and quoted in approximately 150 media outlets and has lectured at over 50 institutions of higher learning about Islam, interfaith dialogue and social justice. Plaintiff Walid served in the United States Navy under honorable conditions earning two United States Navy & Marine Corp Achievement medals while deployed abroad. He has also received awards of recognition from the city councils of Detroit and Hamtramck and from the Mayor of Lansing as well as a number of other religious and community organizations.
18. Plaintiff Basim Elkarra is a Muslim American residing in Sacramento County, California. Plaintiff Elkarra is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Sacramento Valley (CAIR‐SAC), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff
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Elkarra is a former board member of the Sacramento chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, and serves on the Executive Board of the California Democratic Party. He also serves on the City of Sacramento Community Police Commission. In 2011, the United States Embassy in London sent Plaintiff Elkarra to England to meet young British Muslims as part of a strategy to promote civic engagement.
19. Plaintiff Hussam Ayloush is a Muslim American residing in Riverside County, California. Plaintiff Ayloush is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Los Angeles (CAIR‐LA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist and community organizer. Ayloush is a fourth‐term elected Delegate to the California Democratic Party (CDP). He also serves on the board of the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC).
20. Plaintiff Hassan Shibly is a Muslim American residing in Hillsborough County, Florida. Plaintiff Shibly is the Chief Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Florida (CAIR‐FL), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Shibly met with President Barack Obama and several high‐ranking government officials regarding Islam and civil rights issues facing Muslims. He also often serves as a consultant on Islam for, among other private entities, law enforcement and other government agencies.
21. Plaintiff Alia Salem is a Muslim American residing in Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff Salem is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Dallas/Fort Worth (CAIR‐DFW), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist working for social
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justice, understanding and empowerment in her community. Plaintiff Salem’s work with CAIR‐DFW has been featured on local, national and international media outlets.
22. Plaintiff Adam Soltani is a Muslim American residing in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Plaintiff Soltani is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR‐OK), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Soltani currently serves as the chair of the Oklahoma Conference of Churches’ Religions United Committee and planning committee member for OKC’s Jewish‐Muslim Film Institute. He is also a former member of the Oklahoma Democratic Party Religious Education Committee, former board member of the Interfaith Alliance of Oklahoma, and a former member of Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City Executive Committee.
23. Plaintiff Imran Siddiqi is a Muslim American residing in Maricopa County, Arizona. Plaintiff Siddiqi is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR‐AZ), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization. Plaintiff Siddiqi is a writer and prominent civil rights activist. He has written extensively on the subject of Islamophobia, Middle East Affairs, and issues affecting American Muslims.
24. Plaintiff Julia Shearson is a Muslim American residing in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Plaintiff Shearson is the Executive Director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR‐OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. She has delivered hundreds of lectures and trainings on Islam and Muslims, civil and human rights, diversity, Islamophobia, and immigration justice. She was recently honored together with
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22 area women for her leadership, activism, and community service in an art exhibit entitled “Reflections: The Many Facets of Stephanie Tubbs Jones” installed at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in memory of the late Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones. Before joining CAIR‐ OH, Shearson served in the field of education for over 10 years, teaching at Ohio University, Jewish Vocational Services in Boston and at the Summer School and Division of Continuing Education at Harvard University.
25. Plaintiff Namira Islam is a Muslim American residing in Oakland County, Michigan. Plaintiff Islam is the Co‐Founder and Executive Director of the Muslim Anti‐ Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC), a faith‐based human rights education organization which focuses on racial justice. Plaintiff Islam has worked in the areas of prisoner rights, and on international law and war crimes at the United Nations in The Hague, Netherlands.
26. Plaintiff Karen Dabdoub is a Muslim American residing in Hamilton County, Ohio. Plaintiff Dabdoub is the Executive Director of the Cincinnati chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR‐OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Dabdoub has served the community since 2006 as a commissioner with the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission and was the president of CHRC from 2009 ‐ 2011. She is a founding member of Muslim Mothers Against Violence, a local group founded in 2005 by Muslim women to take a stand against violence, abroad and at home. She has been a member of the Martin Luther King Coalition of Cincinnati since 2006. She is a former member of the FBI Multi‐Cultural Advisory Council and the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights Community Advisory Committee. She was a member of Friends of Open House – Cincinnati Chapter, an international organization that worked to bring about peace and understanding
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between Palestinians and Israelis. Plaintiff Dabdoub appears in the documentary “A Visit to a Mosque in America,” an educational documentary, filmed locally, that has received national recognition and commendation.
27. Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in Oakland County, Michigan. He is the Imam, or religious Muslim leader, of a religious congregation. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and to his congregation despite his lawful permanent resident status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 is no longer able to travel outside the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 will be denied citizenship in the United States, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin.
28. Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 is a student and a Muslim of Somali national origin residing in the United States. He is an F‐1/Student visa holder. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and continuing his education despite his lawful student visa status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Somali national origin. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 is no longer able to travel outside the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 will not be allowed to pursue a path to citizenship in the United States, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Somali national origin.
29. Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 is a student and a Muslim of Yemeni national origin residing in Wayne County, Michigan. He is an F‐1/Student visa holder. In the event that
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Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and continuing his education despite his lawful student visa status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Yemeni national origin. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 is no longer able to travel outside the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 will not be allowed to pursue a path to citizenship in the United States, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Yemeni national origin.
30. Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 fled for fear of his life and safety from Syria. He will be eligible for lawful permanent residency in the United States, however will be prevented from obtaining lawful permanent residency based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to the United States despite his lawful status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 will no longer be eligible to renew his work authorization in the United States. In the event Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 is denied reentry in the United States were he to travel outside of the United States, he will be forced to return to Syria where he is likely to be tortured or even executed.
31. Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Sudanese national origin residing in Albany County, New York. He is eligible for and filed for citizenship in the United States. His application has been pending, however will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Sudanese national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 filed a marriage petition for
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his wife, which has already been pending for fourteen months. His wife has Sudanese citizenship through her parents although she has never lived in Sudan. Pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, his wife will be denied a visa to enter the United States to be reunited with her husband based solely on his and his wife’s religious status as Muslims and their Sudanese national origin. Moreover, in the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 is also no longer able to travel outside the United States to be reunited with his wife.
32. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 is a Muslim American residing in Albany County, New York. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 filed a marriage petition for his wife, who is currently pregnant with their baby. His application for her, however will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his wife’s religious status as a Muslim and her Sudanese national origin. Pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, John Doe No. 6 will be prevented from reunited with his wife and baby based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Sudanese national origin.
33. Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in Broward County, Florida. He will be eligible for citizenship in the United States, his application will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 is married to a United States Citizen. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and to his wife in the United States. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 is also no longer able to travel outside the United States to be reunited with his wife or his family.
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34. Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Sudanese national origin residing in Phillips County, Missouri. He will be eligible for citizenship in the United States, however his application will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Sudanese national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 filed a marriage petition for his wife, which has already been pending for nearly a year. Pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, his wife, a Sudanese national, will be denied a visa to enter the United States to be reunited with her husband based solely on his and his wife’s religious status as Muslims and their Sudanese national origin. Moreover, in the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 is also no longer able to travel outside the United States to be reunited with his wife.
35. Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in the United States. He will be eligible for citizenship in the United States, however his application will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 is one of few critical care physicians servicing an underserviced area in the United States. In the event he is prevented from returning to the United States, the area he serves will be lacking an essential physician to provide critical care to a substantial population in the United States.
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36. Plaintiff John Doe No. 10 is a Muslim American and a dual national, both a United States citizen and Syrian national. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 10 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States.
37. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 fled for fear of her life and safety from Syria. She is eligible for and filed for lawful permanent residency in the United States. Her application remains pending, however will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 exits the United States, she will be prevented from returning to the United States despite her lawful status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 will no longer be eligible to renew her work authorization in the United States also based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. In the event Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 is denied reentry in the United States were she to travel outside of the United States, she will be forced to return to Syria where she is likely to be tortured or even executed.
38. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 fled for fear of her life and safety from Syria. She will be eligible for lawful permanent residency in the United States, however will be prevented from obtaining lawful permanent residency based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 exits the United States, she will be prevented from returning to the United States despite her lawful status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on her religious
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status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 will no longer be eligible to renew her work authorization in the United States. In the event Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 is denied reentry in the United States were she to travel outside of the United States, she will be forced to return to Syria where she is likely to be tortured or even executed.
39. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the current President of the United States of America. Defendant Trump issued the Muslim Exclusion Order, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Trump is being sued in his official capacity, only.
40. Defendant John F. Kelly is the current Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Defendant Kelly is responsible for implementing the Muslim Exclusion Order, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Kelly is being sued in his official capacity, only.
41. Defendant U.S. Department of State is responsible for issuing visas and implementing the Muslim Exclusion Order. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of State position is currently vacant.
42. Defendant Director of National Intelligence is responsible for implementing the Muslim Exclusion Order. The Director of National Intelligence position is currently vacant. Defendant Director of National Intelligence is being sued in his official capacity, only.
Jurisdiction and Venue 43. Under U.S. Const. Art. III §2, this Court has jurisdiction because the rights sought to be protected herein are secured by the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 5 U.S.C. § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 706, the United States Constitution, and federal common law.
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44. This action seeks damages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) and 28 U.S.C. § 1357.
45. This action also seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 2201‐02, Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to the general, legal, and equitable powers of this Court.
46. A substantial part of the unlawful acts alleged herein were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
47. Venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as to the Defendants because Defendants are officers or employees of the United States sued in their official capacity and because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.
Factual Background President Trump’s Unconstitutional Executive Order Banning Muslims from Entering the United States and Initiating Mass Expulsion of Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Muslims Lawfully Residing Within the United States 48. The Muslim Exclusion Order is the as‐promised outcome of Defendant Trump’s hateful, year‐long campaign which was fueled, in significant part, by a desire to stigmatize Islam and Muslims. 49. Defendant Trump has often repeated his bigoted views on Islam and Muslims in a variety of contexts—in print, on television, and via official campaign statements. The Muslim Exclusion Order is the legal manifestation of those bigoted views. 50. Defendant Trump’s views on Islam are unequivocal. On or about March 10, 2016, in an interview aired on CNN, President Trump declared that he thinks “Islam hates us.”
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51. His statements regarding Islam and Muslims give rise to the inference that the Muslim Exclusion Order is motivated by a bare desire to inflict harm on this faith and those that belong to it.
52. In addition to President Trump’s statements regarding Islam and Muslims, the history of the Muslim Exclusion Order reveals its unlawful, discriminatory purpose. On December 7, 2015, while campaigning, President Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”
53. Defendant Trump’s rationale for this proposal included sweeping condemnations of Islam, the second largest religion in the world with over 1.6 billion people. His condemnation incorrectly surmised that Islam’s religious traditions, which he referred to as “Sharia”, “authoriz[e] such atrocities as murder against non‐believers who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.”
54. Subsequent to his nomination as the Republican candidate for the presidency, Defendant Trump began using facially neutral language to describe his anti‐Muslim policy. This neutral language suggested that a Trump administration would stop immigration “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism.”
55. On or about July 24, 2016, however, Defendant Trump disclosed that the neutral language was simply a veneer intended to subdue the public controversy generated by his discriminatory plan. To that end, in an interview on NBC, Defendant Trump stated the following: “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim…And I’m OK with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”
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56. In fact, On January 27, 2017, hours before signing the Muslim Ban, President Trump explained that his order was “going to help [persecuted Christians]”. His answer made clear that President Trump’s intention in crafting the Muslim Ban was to treat foreign nationals in the seven identified countries differently based on their faith.
57. On January 28, 2017, in an interview, Rudy Giuliani explained that after then‐ candidate Donald Trump announced his Muslim Ban—which explicitly prohibited Muslims from obtaining entry into the United States—Giuliani was asked to “show [Donald Trump] the right way to do [Muslim Ban] legally.” Giuliani then formed a commission to find a way to accomplish the Muslim Ban’s scope without mentioning Islam or Muslims.
58. Since the signing of the Muslim Exclusion Ban just two days ago, five district courts around the country issued stays.
59. On January 28, 2017, Judge Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a Temporary Restraining Order that forbade Defendants “from removing petitioners— lawful permanent residents at Dulles International Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of that Order, attached an exhibit.
60. On the same day, the United States District Court of the Western District of Washington granted an emergency stay of removal that prohibits Defendants “from removing John Doe I and Joe Doe II from the United States.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
61. Again on the same day, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted an emergency stay of removal, finding that the petitioners “have a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the removal of the petitioner and others
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similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
62. On January 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a Temporary Restraining Order against parts of the Muslim Ban, finding that the petitioners had established a “strong likelihood of success in establishing that the detention and/or removal of the petitioners and others similarly situated would violate their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
63. That same day, the United States District Court for the Central District of California prohibited the defendants “from barring Petitioner’s return to the United States” because he had “demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in establishing that removal violates the Establishment Clause” as well as other constitutional and statutory provisions. That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
64. While the Muslim Exclusion Order states that it suspends entry into the United States immigrants and nonimmigrants from the Muslim‐majority countries for 90 days, at the conclusion of the first 60 days, the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of State will submit a list of countries for a permanent ban on entry.
65. The language of the Muslim Exclusion Order corroborates President Trump’s admission that the facially neutral language is simply a pretext. The Order does not exclude persons based on where they are from but on what religion they belong to. Paragraph F suspends all grounds for persecution and allows only one: “religious‐based persecution.” However, religious‐based persecution can only be claimed by individuals who are not
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Muslim. Thus, the Muslim Exclusion Order constitutes a religious gerrymander—drawing distinctions that exclude the disfavored group—Muslims—while leaving others untouched.
66. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
COUNT I VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(Establishment Clause) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs) 67. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 68. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it (1) suspends entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibits Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Muslim‐ majority countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, (3) prohibits Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, (4) prohibits Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from same the Muslim‐majority countries from applying for any immigration benefit, including immigration benefits afforded under the INA and international human rights laws such as
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political asylum, (5) allows an exception only to non‐United States Citizens (“non‐USCs”) originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are not Muslim to claim religious persecution and gain entry into the United States, and (6) denying a religious persecution exception to non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are Muslim in order to gain entry into the United States, treats Islam on less than equal terms with other religious and non‐religious groups, thereby creating a denominational preference against Islam as a religion.
69. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by signing a Muslim Exclusion Order whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion.
70. President Trump’s Muslim Exclusion Order imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all of the Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been cast to the general public pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion singled out for disfavored treatment.
71. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
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72. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
73. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
COUNT II VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(Free Exercise) (On behalf of the John Doe and Jane Doe Plaintiffs) 74. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 75. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it prohibits the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, (1) who are lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and subsequently reentering the United States in order to return to their homes, (2) who are lawfully residing in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, and (3) who are either lawfully residing inside the United States or outside the United States from applying for immigration benefits afforded under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”)
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and international human rights laws such as political asylum, has deprived and continues to deprive them their right to free exercise of religion as secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, by discriminating against them based on their religious beliefs and by substantially burdening their right to freely exercise their religious faith.
76. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions directly infringe upon or substantially burden the First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the United States Constitution of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries by discriminating against them based on their religious beliefs and by substantially burdening their right to freely exercise their religious faith.
77. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, constitute a substantial burden on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, an adverse action against them motivated by their religious beliefs and practices, and an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment.
78. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries would deter an individual of ordinary firmness from openly exercising his/her right to practice his/her religion and may cause that individual to abandon his faith.
79. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist.
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80. Imposition of such a burden is not in furtherance of a compelling government interest nor is it the least restrictive means of furthering any governmental interest, compelling or otherwise.
81. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
82. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
83. The John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
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COUNT III VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702)
(Equal Protection) (On behalf of the John Doe and Jane Doe Plaintiffs) 84. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 85. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it prohibits the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, (1) who are residing lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and subsequently reentering the United States in order to return to their homes, (2) who are residing lawfully in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, and (3) who are either residing lawfully inside the United States or outside the United States from applying for immigration benefits afforded under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) and international human rights laws such as political asylum, without a constitutionally adequate legal mechanism, are discriminatory and constitute an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment. 86. By preventing the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, and/or applying for immigration benefits afforded to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) and international human rights law such as political asylum, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens.
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87. Moreover, non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are not Muslim, will be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order.
88. On the other hand, non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are Muslim will not be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order.
89. Defendants’ above‐described actions are motivated by the religious status of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and on the basis of their constitutionally‐protected free exercise of religion.
90. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States and to initiate the mass expulsion of non‐USC Muslims lawfully residing in the United States by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the INA based solely on their religious beliefs.
91. Defendants’ above‐described actions have a discriminatory effect upon and disparately impact the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, and not non‐USCs of other faiths originating from the same Muslim‐majority countries.
92. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist.
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93. Defendants’ above‐described actions do not serve a compelling state interest or a legitimate or public purpose, nor are they the least restrictive means or narrowly tailored to achieve any such interest.
94. Plaintiffs have suffered a concrete harm and psychological consequences as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
95. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
96. The John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
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COUNT IV UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702)
(On behalf of all Plaintiffs)
97. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 98. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it (1) suspends entry of non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibits non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, (3) prohibits non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, (4) prohibits non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from applying for any immigration benefit, including immigration benefits afforded under the INA and international human rights laws such as political asylum, (5) allows an exception only to non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are not Muslim to claim religious persecution and gain entry into the United States, and (6) denying a religious persecution exception to non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are Muslim in order to gain entry into the United States, treats Islam on less than equal terms with other religious and non‐religious groups, should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 99. Defendants’ actions as described above are arbitrary and capricious, shock the conscience, violate the decencies of civilized conduct, are so brutal and offensive that they do not comport with the traditional ideas of fair play and decency, lack even a rational
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relationship to any legitimate government interest, and have substantially burdened and unduly deprived Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their constitutionally protected rights, including their right to be free from discrimination on the basis of religion, the right to be free from condemnation by the government on the basis of their religion, the right to be free from being singled out by the government for disfavored treatment on the basis of their religion, liberty interests in engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, their international human rights, their right to free exercise of religion, their rights to freedom from false stigmatization and nonattainder, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
100. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, constitute a substantial burden on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, an adverse action against them motivated by their religious beliefs and practices, and an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
101. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries would deter an individual of ordinary firmness from openly exercising his/her right to practice his/her religion and may cause that individual to abandon his faith, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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102. By preventing the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, and/or applying for immigration benefits afforded under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) and international human rights laws such as political asylum, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
103. Moreover, non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are not Muslim, will be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
104. On the other hand, non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are Muslim, will not be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
105. Defendants’ above‐described conduct was prompted or substantially caused by Plaintiffs’ and such other similarly situated Muslims’ religious identity on the basis of their constitutionally‐protected free exercise of religion, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
106. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the
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Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by issuing a Muslim Exclusion Order whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
107. President Trump’s Muslim Exclusion Order imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all of the Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been broadcast to the general public pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion singled out for disfavored treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
108. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
109. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from these Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States and to initiate the mass expulsion of non‐USC Muslims lawfully residing in the United States by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the INA based solely on their religious beliefs, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
110. Imposition of such a burden is not in furtherance of a compelling government interest nor is it the least restrictive means of furthering any governmental interest, compelling or otherwise, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
111. Defendants’ above‐described actions have a discriminatory effect upon and have disparately impacted the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and similarly situated non‐USC
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Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, and not non‐USCs of other faiths, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
112. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
113. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
114. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests:
1. A speedy hearing of this action under Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
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3. An injunction that requires Defendants to remedy the constitutional violations
identified above, including prohibiting Defendants from engaging in the following:
(1) suspending entry of individuals with dual nationality, including American citizens, whose second nationality is from the Muslim‐majority countries, from entering the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order;
(2) suspending entry of non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐ majority countries from entering the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order;
(3) prohibiting non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order;
(4) prohibiting non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order;
(5) prohibiting non‐USCs originating from these Muslims countries from applying for any immigration benefit, including political asylum, under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”), pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order;
(6) allowing an exception only to non‐USCs who are not Muslim to claim religious persecution and gain entry into the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; and
(7) denying an exception to non‐USCs who are Muslim in order to gain entry into the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order;
4. A trial by jury;
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5. An award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of all litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and,
6. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. JURY DEMAND
NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby demand trial by jury of the above‐referenced causes of action.
Respectfully submitted, THE LAW OFFICE OF GADEIR ABBAS BY: /s/ Gadeir Abbas GADEIR I. ABBAS Attorney for Plaintiff 1155 F Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (720) 251‐0425 Fax: (720) 251‐0425 Email: gadeir.abbas@gmail.com Licensed in Virginia, not in D.C. Practice limited to federal matters COUNCIL ON AMERICAN‐ISLAMIC RELATIONS BY: /s/ Lena Masri LENA F. MASRI (P73461) Attorney for Plaintiff National Litigation Director 353 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 Phone: (202) 488‐8787
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Dated: January 30, 2017

AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLLC
BY: /s/ Shereef Akeel SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345) Attorney for Plaintiffs 888 W. Big Beaver Rd., Ste. 910 Troy, MI 48084 Phone: (248) 269‐9595 shereef@akeelvalentine.com

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 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 11 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 53 PageID# 187

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

LINDA SARSOUR;

)

RASHIDA TLAIB;

)

ZAHRA BILLOO;

)

NIHAD AWAD;

)

COREY SAYLOR;

)

DAWUD WALID;

)

BASIM ELKARRA;

)

HUSSAM AYLOUSH;

)

HASSAN SHIBLY;

)

ALIA SALEM;

)

ADAM SOLTANI;

)

IMRAN SIDDIQI;

)

JULIA SHEARSON;

)

NAMIRA ISLAM;

)

KAREN DABDOUB;

)

JIM SUES;

)

HANIF MOHEBI;

)

JAYLANI HUSSEIN;

)

JOHN ROBBINS;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 1;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 2;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 3;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 4;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 5;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 6;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 7;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 8;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 9;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 10;

)

JOHN DOE NO. 11;

)

JANE DOE NO. 1; and,

)

JANE DOE NO. 2;

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United )

States of America; in his official capacity

)

)

JOHN F. KELLY, Secretary of the Department )

of Homeland Security; in his official capacity; )

)

Case No. 17‐cv‐00120 Hon. Anthony J. Trenga
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; and,

)

)

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; )

)

Defendants.

)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________/

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through

their attorneys, Council on American‐Islamic Relations (“CAIR”), The Law Office of Gadeir

Abbas, and Akeel and Valentine, PLC, state as follows:

Introduction 1. The vulgar animosity that accounts for the existence of both Executive Order

13769 entitled “Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals”

(hereinafter the “First Muslim Ban”), issued on January 27, 2017, and Executive Order 13780

entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” issued

on March 6, 2017 (hereinafter “the Revised Order”) is plain to see, and the absence of the

words Islam or Muslim did nothing to obscure it.

2. In fact, the First Muslim Ban gained national and international media attention

and nationwide protests, and was dubbed uniformly as the “Muslim Ban” because its

apparent and true purpose and underlying motive—which was to ban Muslims from certain

Predominantly Muslim Countries (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen)

(hereinafter the “Predominantly Muslim Countries”)—has been broadcast to the general

public by the Trump Administration.

3. Less known was the second and equally central purpose of the First Muslim

Ban – to initiate the mass expulsion of immigrant and nonimmigrant Muslims lawfully

residing in the United States by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or
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receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) – based solely on their religious beliefs and national origin.
4. Many Muslims lawfully in the United States that were targeted by the First Muslim Ban, including some of the John Doe and John Doe Plaintiffs, would have been forced – as a result of the First Muslim Ban – to return to their home countries, where they would likely face persecution, torture and even execution, simply because they are Muslim.
5. The malice that gave rise to the First Muslim Ban first emerged on December 7, 2015, when Defendant Trump issued a campaign promise to implement, if elected, “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” That promise remains on his campaign website.1
6. Defendant Trump went on to explain that, “Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life. If I win the election for President, we are going to Make America Great Again.”
7. The First Muslim Ban was the fulfillment of Defendant Trump’s longstanding promise and boasted intent to enact a federal policy that overtly discriminates against
1 Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, December 7, 2015, available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press‐releases/donald‐j.‐trump‐statement‐on‐preventing‐muslim‐immigration
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Muslims and officially broadcasts a message that the federal government disfavors the religion of Islam, preferring all other religions instead.
8. The First Muslim Ban was both broader in some ways and narrower in others than the policy Defendant Trump proposed on December 7, 2015. The First Muslim Ban was broader insofar as it denied immigration benefits to those who, like some of the immigrant and nonimmigrant Plaintiffs, followed the rules and entered and are now lawfully present in the United States.
9. The First Muslim Ban was also narrower than originally proposed, because it applies only to a subset of Muslims rather than all Muslims. This, however, does not cure the policy of its constitutional infirmity. While the First Muslim Ban did not apply to all Muslims, the policy only applied to Muslims.
10. The text of the First Muslim Ban implemented an impermissible religious gerrymander that divided foreign nationals, even those lawfully present inside the United States, into favored and disfavored groups based on their faith.
11. Likewise, the First Muslim Ban also divided green card holders, lawfully present inside the United States, into favored and disfavored groups based on their faith.
12. As a result, the First Muslim Ban was a racially biased, religiously motivated and factually baseless impermissible executive overreach. Moreover, its motivation and application was irrational and unwarranted.
13. After the Ninth Circuit Court upheld a nationwide injunction against the First Muslim Ban, Defendants began to formulate a revised executive order.
14. On February 21, 2017, however, Presidential Senior Advisor Stephen Miller explained to Fox News that the revised order was “going to have the same basic policy
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outcome for the country,” confirming that the objective to ban as much Muslim immigration as the administration believes the judiciary will allow remained unchanged.2
15. On March 6, 2017, Defendant Trump issued Revised Order 13780, entitled “Executive Order Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States (hereinafter the “Revised Order”), that revokes the First Muslim Ban3 and creates a framework that although neutral on its face, maintains the same intent as the order It revised. Additionally, it’s system of case‐by‐case waivers allows the particular policy mechanisms in the First Muslim Ban to be implemented through the framework of the Revised Order.
16. Notably, the Revised Order spends a significant amount of space defending the First Muslim Ban, claiming that “Defendant Trump exercised [his] authority under Article II of the Constitution and under section 212(f) of the INA” by issuing it, and that it did not discriminate on the basis of religion:
Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any particular religion. While that order allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities ‐‐ whoever they are and wherever they reside – to avail themselves of the USRAP in light of their particular challenges and circumstances. Revised Order at Section 1(b)(iv).
2 Stephen Miller’s Fox News interview is coming back to haunt President Trump, The Washington Post, March 9, 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the‐fix/wp/2017/03/09/stephen‐millers‐fox‐news‐ interview‐is‐coming‐back‐to‐haunt‐president‐trump/?utm_term=.d96e059c6a60 3 See Revised Order at Section 13.
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17. In the end, the Revised Order maintains part of the immigration ban that the First Muslim Ban imposed: the part that prohibits nonimmigrant, nonresident Muslims from traveling to the United States.
18. The Revised Order also removes Iraq from the list of Predominantly Muslim Countries. Notably, a significant percentage of Iraqi refugees admitted to the United States are Christian.
19. Because the history and text of the First Muslim Ban reveal an illegal purpose and effect, because the effects of the Revised Order continue to impact foreign nationals whose visa applications were not approved pursuant to the First Muslim Ban, and because the illegal purpose and effect of the First Muslim Ban can still be accomplished through the Revised Order via the case‐by‐case discretionary and nonreviewable waivers, Plaintiffs’ claims must be sustained.
Parties 20. Plaintiff Linda Sarsour is an American Muslim residing in Kings County, New York. Plaintiff Sarsour is a Palestinian activist and Executive Director of the Arab American Association of New York. In 2016, she served as spokesperson for Presidential Candidate Senator Bernie Sanders, and was one of three national co‐chairs for the 2017 Women’s March held the day after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States. Plaintiff Sarsour has appeared in “The Hijabi Monologues” and has her own show, The Linda Sarsour Show. Plaintiff Sarsour has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of
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Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Sarsour has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
21. Plaintiff Rashida Tlaib is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Tlaib is a former Democratic member of the Michigan House of Representatives and an attorney at the Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice. Upon her swearing in on January 1, 2009, Plaintiff Tlaib became the first Muslim‐American woman to serve in the Michigan Legislature, and only the second Muslim woman in history to be elected to any state legislature in America. Plaintiff Tlaib suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐ adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Tlaib has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
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22. Plaintiff Zahra Billoo is a Muslim American residing in Santa Clara County, California. Plaintiff Billoo is a civil rights attorney and the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, San Francisco Bay Area (CAIR‐SFBA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Billoo is frequently seen at mosques and universities facilitating trainings and workshops as a part of CAIR’s grassroots efforts to empower the American Muslim community and build bridges with allies on civil rights issues. Plaintiff Billoo has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Billoo has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
23. Plaintiff Nihad Awad is a Muslim American residing in Washington County, D.C. Plaintiff Awad is National Executive Director and co‐founder of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. As a national leader in the civil rights movement, Plaintiff Awad has led multiple campaigns to defend the rights of Muslims and to help Americans of other faiths better understand Islam. His work includes interfacing
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with the U.S. government, facilitating interfaith dialogue, speaking at conferences, conducting training and leadership seminars, and appearing in national and international media to discuss Islam and American Muslims. Plaintiff Awad has testified before both Houses of the U.S. Congress on matters involving Muslims in America. In 1997, he served on the White House Civil Rights Advisory Panel to the Commission on Safety and Security. In the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections, Plaintiff Awad was a key figure in creating the Muslim voting bloc. In 2006, he traveled to Iraq on a humanitarian mission to appeal for the release of American journalist Jill Carrol who was kidnapped and later released in Iraq. In September, 2011, Plaintiff Awad traveled to Iran as part of an interfaith delegation to meet with the President of Iran to appeal for the release of two American hikers held by Iran. In 2004, he was named one of National Journal’s more than 100 Most Influential People in the United States whose ideas will help shape the debate over public policy issues for the next decade. In 2009, he was named by a Georgetown University publication as one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the world. And in 2010, Arabian Business ranked him as 39th in the “Arabian Business Power 100” list, its annual listing of the most influential Arabs. Plaintiff Awad has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Awad has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required
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to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
24. Plaintiff Corey Saylor is a Muslim American residing in Fairfax County, Virginia. Plaintiff Saylor is Director of the Department to Monitor and Combat Islamophobia at the Council on American‐Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Saylor is an expert on political communications, legislative advocacy, media relations and anti‐ Islam prejudice in the United States. He is a regular voice on U.S. and international news outlets. Plaintiff Saylor has also run successful advocacy campaigns against corporate giants such as Burger King and Bell Helicopter‐Boeing when their actions or advertisements negatively impacted the American Muslim community. Plaintiff Saylor has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Saylor has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
25. Plaintiff Dawud Walid is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Walid is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic
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Relations, Michigan (CAIR‐MI), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Walid has been interviewed and quoted in approximately 150 media outlets and has lectured at over 50 institutions of higher learning about Islam, interfaith dialogue and social justice. Plaintiff Walid served in the United States Navy under honorable conditions earning two United States Navy & Marine Corp Achievement medals while deployed abroad. He has also received awards of recognition from the city councils of Detroit and Hamtramck and from the Mayor of Lansing as well as a number of other religious and community organizations. Plaintiff Walid has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Walid has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
26. Plaintiff Basim Elkarra is a Muslim American residing in Sacramento County, California. Plaintiff Elkarra is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Sacramento Valley (CAIR‐SAC), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Elkarra is a former board member of the Sacramento chapter of the American Civil Liberties
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Union, and serves on the Executive Board of the California Democratic Party. He also serves on the City of Sacramento Community Police Commission. In 2011, the United States Embassy in London sent Plaintiff Elkarra to England to meet young British Muslims as part of a strategy to promote civic engagement. Plaintiff Elkarra has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐ adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Elkarra has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Moreover, Plaintiff Elkarra has in‐ laws in Syria that he is unable to bring to visit him in the United States pursuant to the Revised Order that he would otherwise seek to bring to visit him.
27. Plaintiff Hussam Ayloush is a Muslim American residing in Riverside County, California. Plaintiff Ayloush is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Los Angeles (CAIR‐LA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist and community organizer. Ayloush is a fourth‐term elected Delegate to the California Democratic Party (CDP). He also serves on the board of the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC). Plaintiff Ayloush has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete
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harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Ayloush has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Moreover, Plaintiff Ayloush has family in Syria that he is unable to bring to visit him in the United States pursuant to the Revised Order that he would otherwise seek to bring to visit him.
28. Plaintiff Hassan Shibly is a Muslim American residing in Hillsborough County, Florida. Plaintiff Shibly is the Chief Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Florida (CAIR‐FL), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Shibly met with President Barack Obama and several high‐ranking government officials regarding Islam and civil rights issues facing Muslims. He also often serves as a consultant on Islam for, among other private entities, law enforcement and other government agencies. Plaintiff Shibly has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based
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on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Shibly has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
29. Plaintiff Alia Salem is a Muslim American residing in Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff Salem is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Dallas/Fort Worth (CAIR‐DFW), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist working for social justice, understanding and empowerment in her community. Plaintiff Salem’s work with CAIR‐DFW has been featured on local, national and international media outlets. Plaintiff Salem has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Salem has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
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30. Plaintiff Adam Soltani is a Muslim American residing in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Plaintiff Soltani is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR‐OK), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Soltani currently serves as the chair of the Oklahoma Conference of Churches’ Religions United Committee and planning committee member for OKC’s Jewish‐Muslim Film Institute. He is also a former member of the Oklahoma Democratic Party Religious Education Committee, former board member of the Interfaith Alliance of Oklahoma, and a former member of Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City Executive Committee. Plaintiff Soltani has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Soltani has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Moreover, Plaintiff Soltani has family in Iran that he is unable to bring to visit him in the United States pursuant to the Revised Order that he would otherwise seek to bring to visit him.
31. Plaintiff Imran Siddiqi is a Muslim American residing in Maricopa County, Arizona. Plaintiff Siddiqi is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic
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Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR‐AZ), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization. Plaintiff Siddiqi is a writer and prominent civil rights activist. He has written extensively on the subject of Islamophobia, Middle East Affairs, and issues affecting American Muslims. Plaintiff Siddiqi has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Siddiqi has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
32. Plaintiff Julia Shearson is a Muslim American residing in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Plaintiff Shearson is the Executive Director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR‐OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. She has delivered hundreds of lectures and trainings on Islam and Muslims, civil and human rights, diversity, Islamophobia, and immigration justice. She was recently honored together with 22 area women for her leadership, activism, and community service in an art exhibit entitled “Reflections: The Many Facets of Stephanie Tubbs Jones” installed at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in memory of the late Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones. Before joining CAIR‐
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OH, Shearson served in the field of education for over 10 years, teaching at Ohio University, Jewish Vocational Services in Boston and at the Summer School and Division of Continuing Education at Harvard University. Plaintiff Shearson has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Shearson has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
33. Plaintiff Namira Islam is a Muslim American residing in Oakland County, Michigan. Plaintiff Islam is the Co‐Founder and Executive Director of the Muslim Anti‐ Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC), a faith‐based human rights education organization which focuses on racial justice. Plaintiff Islam has worked in the areas of prisoner rights, and on international law and war crimes at the United Nations in The Hague, Netherlands. Plaintiff Islam has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of
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all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Islam has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
34. Plaintiff Karen Dabdoub is a Muslim American residing in Hamilton County, Ohio. Plaintiff Dabdoub is the Executive Director of the Cincinnati chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR‐OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Dabdoub has served the community since 2006 as a commissioner with the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission and was the president of CHRC from 2009 ‐ 2011. She is a founding member of Muslim Mothers Against Violence, a local group founded in 2005 by Muslim women to take a stand against violence, abroad and at home. She has been a member of the Martin Luther King Coalition of Cincinnati since 2006. She is a former member of the FBI Multi‐Cultural Advisory Council and the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights Community Advisory Committee. She was a member of Friends of Open House – Cincinnati Chapter, an international organization that worked to bring about peace and understanding between Palestinians and Israelis. Plaintiff Dabdoub appears in the documentary “A Visit to a Mosque in America,” an educational documentary, filmed locally, that has received national recognition and commendation. Plaintiff Dabdoub has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of
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Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Dabdoub has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
35. Plaintiff Jim Sues is a Muslim American residing in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff Sues is the Executive Director of the New Jersey chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, New Jersey (CAIR‐NJ), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights and interfaith relations activist. Plaintiff Sues is also a Marketing Professional in the field of Telecommunications. Besides launching start‐ups and acting as a Telecommunications Consultant, he spent 20 years at IBM filling various Marketing roles such as Product Manager, Solutions Manager, and Strategy Team Lead. Plaintiff Sues is guest lecturer for Comparative Religion courses at Drew University and multiple community colleges. He also provides diversity training for corporations and local churches. Plaintiff Sues is a member of the south Orange – Maplewood Clergy Association and has served on the Board of Directors of various Muslim organizations including Majlis Ash‐Shoora of New Jersey and the NIA Masjid in Newark, NJ. Plaintiff Sues has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims,
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including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Sues has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
36. Plaintiff Hanif Mohebi is a Muslim American residing in San Diego County, California. Plaintiff Mohebi is the Executive Director of the San Diego chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, San Diego (CAIR‐SD), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. He has appeared in both local and national media outlets and has worked to bridge the gap between minorities and the American public. He has emerged as a guest speaker at high schools, universities, companies and community events on variety of topics ranging from Concepts of World Citizenship to The Cycle of Love, to History of Anti‐Civil Liberties Legislations. Plaintiff Mohebi has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Mohebi has had to change his
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conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
37. Plaintiff Jaylani Hussein is a Muslim American residing in Ramsey County, Minnesota. Plaintiff Hussein is the Executive Director of the San Diego chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Minnesota (CAIR‐MN), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Hussein worked as the Community Liaison Officer at Metro State University and as a Planner for the Minnesota Department of Agriculture. In 2013, he created Zeila Consultants to develop and offer cross‐cultural training workshops on East African cultures. He has presented on the Somali Culture to diverse public and private organizations across the US. He specializes in the areas of urban planning, community development, youth development (with over 8 years of experience in working in juvenile treatment centers for court adjudicated youth), legal and civil rights. Plaintiff Hussein has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Hussein has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and
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advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
38. Plaintiff John Robbins is a Muslim American residing in Middlesex County, Massachusetts. Plaintiff Robbins is the Executive Director of the Massachusetts chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Massachusetts (CAIR‐MA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Robbins is a dedicated and experienced community organizer, nonprofit leader, and public intellectual. He holds a Ph.D. in English, and completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Tufts University. A dedicated educator, he has taught algebra to high‐risk youth at a public high school in Maryland, English to refugee and orphan children in Turkey, and literature at Cornell and Tufts Universities. His writings have appeared in numerous outlets including Fortune, Time, Muslim Matters, the Hill, the Jewish Journal, the Boston Globe, and the Boston Herald, and he is a regular contributor at the Huffington Post. Dr. Robbins sits on the board of directors of Cooperative Metropolitan Ministries, the greater Boston area’s oldest interfaith social justice network. Plaintiff Robbins has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Robbins has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and
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advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. One of the Muslims that contacted Plaintiff Robbins for assistance is a student of Iranian national origin residing in Massachusetts. The student was issued a single‐entry visa and has valid F‐1 status expiring on the anticipated date of completion of his education. The student then traveled to Dubai in order to visit family, and applied to renew his visa just prior to the First Muslim Ban being issued. Upon information and belief, the student’s visa renewal application was not approved pursuant to the First Muslim Ban. As of this date, the student’s visa renewal application remains in administrative processing and has not yet been approved. The student contacted his university, and was told by the administration that he would need to complete a study abroad program offered at a university in New Zealand during this school semester in order to maintain his F‐1 status. The student will be subjected to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to renew his visa in order to continue his education, pursuant to Section 3(c)(i) of the Revised Order, based solely on his Iranian national origin. Upon information and belief, the student’s visa renewal application will be denied based on his religious status as a Muslim and his Iranian national origin, and as a result, he will be terminated from continuing his education at the university and lose his F‐1 status. Plaintiff Robbins intends to invite the student to speak to the local Massachusetts community about the effects of the Muslim Ban, however is unable bring him to the United States to speak due to the likelihood that the student will be unable to renew his student visa under the Revised Order based on his Muslim religious status and Iranian national origin.
39. Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in Oakland County, Michigan. He is the Imam, or religious Muslim
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leader, of a religious congregation. Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐ adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to defend his religion as a religion of peace.
40. Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 is a student and a Muslim of Somali national origin residing in the United States. He was issued a single‐entry visa and has valid F‐1 status expiring on the anticipated date of completion of his education. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 travels outside the country, he will be subjected to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to renew his student visa in order to continue his education, pursuant to Section 3(c)(i) of the Revised Order based solely on his Somali national origin. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff John Doe No. 2’s visa renewal application will be denied based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Somali national origin. This inability to travel imposes a particular hardship on Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 and other similarly situated student non‐USCs originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries because students frequently lose access to student housing during scheduled curriculum breaks, and if they are unable to travel home during those breaks, they risk forfeiting their F‐1 status and jeopardizing their education. Yet even if housing accommodations during
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breaks were provided, the Revised Order effectively deprives Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 from seeing his family for possibly the entire duration of his academic career. As a result, in the event Plaintiff John Doe No. 2's involvement in this lawsuit could reasonably be expected to negatively impact his immigration status either under existing immigration law, or under the vetting procedures contemplated by the Revised Order.
41. Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 is a student and a Muslim of Yemeni national origin residing in Wayne County, Michigan. He was issued a single‐entry visa and has valid F‐1 status expiring on the anticipated date of completion of his education. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe travels outside the country, he will be subjected to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to renew his student visa in order to continue his education, pursuant to Section 3(c)(i) of the Revised Order based solely on his Yemeni national origin. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff John Doe No. 3’s visa renewal application will be denied based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Somali national origin. This inability to travel imposes a particular hardship on Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 and other similarly situated student non‐USCs originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries because students frequently lose access to student housing during scheduled curriculum breaks, and if they are unable to travel home during those breaks, they risk forfeiting their F‐1 status and jeopardizing their education. Yet even if housing accommodations during breaks were provided, the Revised Order effectively deprives Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 from seeing his family for possibly the entire duration of his academic career. As a result, in the event Plaintiff John Doe No. 3's involvement in this lawsuit could reasonably be expected to negatively impact his immigration status either under existing immigration law, or under the vetting procedures contemplated by the Revised Order.
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42. Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐ adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored.
43. Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Sudanese national origin residing in Albany County, New York. Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 filed a marriage petition for his wife, which has already been pending for fourteen months. His wife has Sudanese citizenship through her parents although she has never lived in Sudan. Pursuant to the Revised Order, his wife will be subjected to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to obtain a visa to enter the United States to be reunited with her husband pursuant to Section 3(c)(iv) based solely on her Sudanese national origin. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff John Doe No. 5’s visa application for his wife will be denied based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Sudanese national origin. Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of
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all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to defend his religion as a religion of peace.
44. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 is a Muslim American of Sudanese national origin residing in Albany County, New York. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 filed a marriage petition for his wife, who is currently pregnant with their baby. His application for his wife, however will be subjected to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process, pursuant to Section 3(c)(iv) of the Revised Order, based solely on her Sudanese national origin. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff John Doe No. 6’s visa application for his wife will be denied based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Sudanese national origin. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6's involvement in this lawsuit could reasonably be expected to negatively impact his wife's immigration status either under existing immigration law, or under the vetting procedures contemplated by the Revised Order.
45. Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in Broward County, Florida. Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 has suffered and
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will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. Plaintiff John Doe No. 7's involvement in this lawsuit could reasonably be expected to negatively impact his immigration status either under existing immigration law, or under the vetting procedures contemplated by the Revised Order.
46. Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Sudanese national origin residing in Phillips County, Missouri. Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 filed a marriage petition for his wife, which was approved. She applied for a visa to enter the United States to reunite with her husband, however her visa application remains pending. Pursuant to the Revised Order, his wife, a Sudanese national, will be subjected to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to obtain the visa to enter the United States, pursuant to Section 3(c)(iv), based solely on her Sudanese national origin. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff John Doe No. 8’s visa application for his wife will be denied based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Sudanese national origin. Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based
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on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. Plaintiff John Doe No. 8's involvement in this lawsuit could reasonably be expected to negatively impact his or his wife's immigration status either under existing immigration law, or under the vetting procedures contemplated by the Revised Order.
47. Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in the United States. Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. Plaintiff John Doe No. 9's involvement in this lawsuit could reasonably be expected to negatively impact his immigration status either under existing immigration law, or under the vetting procedures contemplated by the Revised Order.
48. Plaintiff John Doe No. 10 is a Muslim American and a dual national, both a United States citizen and Syrian national residing in Suffolk County, Massachusetts. Plaintiff John Doe No. 10 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and
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condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored.
49. Plaintiff John Doe No. 11 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Iraqi national origin residing in the United States. Plaintiff John Doe No. 10 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored.
50. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 fled for fear of her life and safety from Syria, after being tortured by Syrian government forces. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political
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community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to defend her religion as a religion of peace. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1's involvement in this lawsuit could reasonably be expected to negatively impact her immigration status either under existing immigration law, or under the vetting procedures contemplated by the Revised Order.
51. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 fled for fear of her life and safety from Syria. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored.
52. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the current President of the United States of America. Defendant Trump issued the First Muslim Ban, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Trump is being sued in his official capacity, only.
53. Defendant John F. Kelly is the current Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Defendant Kelly is responsible for implementing the First Muslim Ban, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Kelly is being sued in his official capacity, only.
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54. Defendant James Comey is the current Director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Defendant Comey is responsible for implementing the First Muslim Ban, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Comey is being sued in his official capacity, only.
55. Defendant U.S. Department of State is responsible for issuing visas and implementing the First Muslim Ban. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of State position is currently vacant.
56. Defendant Director of National Intelligence is responsible for implementing the First Muslim Ban. The Director of National Intelligence position is currently vacant. Defendant Director of National Intelligence is being sued in his official capacity, only.
Jurisdiction and Venue 57. Under U.S. Const. Art. III §2, this Court has jurisdiction because the rights sought to be protected herein are secured by the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 5 U.S.C. § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 706, the United States Constitution, and federal common law. 58. This action also seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 2201‐02, Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to the general, legal, and equitable powers of this Court. 59. A substantial part of the unlawful acts alleged herein were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 60. Venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as to the Defendants because Defendants are officers or employees of the United States sued in their official capacity and
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because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.
Factual Background Defendant Trump’s Unconstitutional Executive Order
Banning Muslims from Entering the United States 61. The Revised Order is the as‐promised outcome of Defendant Trump’s hateful, year‐long campaign which was fueled, in significant part, by a desire to stigmatize Islam and Muslims. 62. Defendant Trump has often repeated his bigoted views on Islam and Muslims in a variety of contexts—in print, on television, and via official campaign statements. The First Muslim Ban is the legal manifestation of those bigoted views. 63. Defendant Trump’s views on Islam are unequivocal. On or about March 10, 2016, in an interview aired on CNN, Defendant Trump declared that he thinks “Islam hates us.” 64. His statements regarding Islam and Muslims give rise to the inference that the Revised Order is motivated by a bare desire to inflict harm on this faith and those that belong to it. 65. In addition to Defendant Trump’s statements regarding Islam and Muslims, the history of the Revised Order reveals its unlawful, discriminatory purpose. On December 7, 2015, while campaigning, Defendant Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”
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66. Defendant Trump’s rationale for this proposal included sweeping condemnations of Islam, the second largest religion in the world with over 1.6 billion people. His condemnation incorrectly surmised that Islam’s religious traditions, which he referred to as “Sharia”, “authoriz[e] such atrocities as murder against non‐believers who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.”
67. Subsequent to his nomination as the Republican candidate for the presidency, Defendant Trump began using facially neutral language to describe his anti‐Muslim policy. This neutral language suggested that a Trump administration would stop immigration “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism.”
68. On or about July 24, 2016, however, Defendant Trump conceded that the neutral language was simply a veneer intended to subdue the public controversy generated by his discriminatory plan. To that end, in an interview on NBC, Defendant Trump explained the following: “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim…And I’m OK with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”
69. In fact, on January 27, 2017, hours before signing the First Muslim Ban, Defendant Trump explained during an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network that his order was “going to help [persecuted Christians]” as opposed to Muslims. His answer made clear that Defendant Trump’s intention in crafting the Muslim Ban was to treat foreign nationals in the seven identified countries differently based on their faith.
70. The underlying unlawful discriminatory purpose of the First Muslim Ban is evidenced by the recent admissions by close associates of Defendant Trump, such as Rudolf Giuliani's recent admission that the President asked him to find legal ways to implement
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what he called “a Muslim Ban.” On January 28, 2017, during a Fox News interview, Giuliani, who is a close advisor to the Defendant Trump, boasted that after then‐candidate Donald Trump announced his Muslim Ban—which explicitly prohibited Muslims from obtaining entry into the United States—Giuliani was asked to “show [Donald Trump] the right way to do [the Muslim Ban] legally.” Giuliani then conceded that he formed a commission to find a way to accomplish the Muslim Ban’s scope without mentioning Islam or Muslims.
71. The language of the First Muslim Ban corroborates Defendant Trump’s admission that the facially neutral language is simply a pretext. That Order did not exclude persons based on where they are from but on what religion they belong to. Section 5 suspended all grounds for persecution and allowed only one: “religious‐based persecution.” However, religious‐based persecution could only be claimed by individuals who are not Muslim. Thus, the First Muslim Ban constituted a religious gerrymander—drawing distinctions that exclude the disfavored group—Muslims—while leaving others untouched.
72. Since the signing of the First Muslim Ban, several federal courts around the country issued stays.
73. On January 28, 2017, Judge Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a Temporary Restraining Order that forbade Defendants “from removing petitioners— lawful permanent residents at Dulles International Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of that Order. That Order is attached an exhibit.
74. On the same day, the United States District Court of the Western District of Washington granted an emergency stay of removal that prohibits Defendants “from removing John Doe I and Joe Doe II from the United States.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
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75. Again on the same day, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted an emergency stay of removal, finding that the petitioners “have a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the removal of the petitioner and others similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
76. On January 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a Temporary Restraining Order against parts of the First Muslim Ban, finding that the petitioners had established a “strong likelihood of success in establishing that the detention and/or removal of the petitioners and others similarly situated would violate their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
77. That same day, the United States District Court for the Central District of California prohibited the defendants “from barring Petitioner’s return to the United States” because he had “demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in establishing that removal violates the Establishment Clause” as well as other constitutional and statutory provisions. That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
78. On February 2, 2017, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Southern Division) issued an order temporarily enjoying the United States from applying Sections 3(c) and 3(e) of the First Muslim Ban. That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
79. On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court delivered a unanimous decision upholding a temporary restraining order issued by the United States District Court for the
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Western District of Washington enjoining and restraining Sections 3(c) and 5(a)‐(c) of the First Muslim Ban. That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
80. The unlawful effects and purpose of the First Muslim Ban persist through the issuance of the Revised Order, issued on March 6, 2017.
81. The Revised Order goes into effect on March 16, 2017. Revised Order at Section 14.
82. At the outset, all foreign nationals that had pending visa applications whose applications were not processed pursuant to the First Muslim Ban will continue to be denied entry because they are outside the United States and because they do not have a valid visa as of the effective date of the Revised Order, solely based on their religious status as Muslims and based on their national origin. Revised Order at Section 3(a).
83. The Revised Order creates a framework that although neutral on its face, allows case‐by‐case waivers such that the unlawful goals and intent of the First Muslim Ban could still be implemented on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis.
84. As such, pending visa applications whose applications were not processed pursuant to the First Muslim Ban and future visa applications filed by nationals originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries will be subjected to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process, based solely on their national origin.
85. As such, the Revised Order creates a framework that although neutral on its face, allows case‐by‐case waivers such that the unlawful goals and intent of the First Muslim Ban could still be implemented on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis.
86. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and spiritual and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim
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Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of (1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐ adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
COUNT I VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(Establishment Clause) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs) 87. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 88. The Revised Order creates a framework that although neutral on its face, maintains the intent of the First Muslim Ban and establishes a case‐by‐case waiver scheme that allows the unlawful goals and intent of the Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslim into the United States – to still be implemented in full. 89. Defendants’ unique application of the Revised Order to Muslims, insofar as it allows for the (1) suspension of entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibition of some Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants (those who have lawful status but who must obtain or renew their visas) originating from the Predominantly Muslim
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Countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, and the (3) disparate treatment of immigrants and nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries insofar as those persons would have to make a heightened showing and obtain a waiver to secure a visa to the United States.
90. Together, these consequences result in Muslims and Islam being treated on less than equal terms with other religious and non‐religious groups, thereby creating a denominational preference against Islam as a religion.
91. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by signing the Revised Order whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion.
92. Defendant Trump’s Revised Order imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been broad cast to the general public via the First Muslim Ban, and which the Revised Order continues to broadcast, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion and religious community singled out for disfavored treatment.
93. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of (1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false
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messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
94. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States based solely on their religious beliefs, to stigmatize Islam, and to broadcast an anti‐Islam message.
95. The Revised Order is not narrowly tailored to the interest the government asserts, insofar as it applies a blanket suspension to certain immigrants even when the Defendants possess no information to indicate any of the immigrants pose any threat to the United States.
96. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims irreparable harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
97. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
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COUNT II VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702)
(Equal Protection) (On behalf of the John Doe and Jane Doe Plaintiffs) 98. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 99. The Revised Order creates a framework that although neutral on its face, maintains the intent of the First Muslim Ban and establishes a case‐by‐case waiver scheme that allows the unlawful goals and intent of the Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslim into the United States – to still be implemented in full. 100. Defendants’ unique application of the Revised Order to Muslims, insofar as it allows for the (1) suspension of entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibition of some Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants (those who have lawful status but who must obtain or renew their visas) originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, and the (3) disparate treatment of immigrants and nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries insofar as those persons would have to make a heightened showing and obtain a waiver to secure a visa to the United States. 101. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
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Constitution by signing the Revised Order whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion.
102. By creating a framework that allows for the implementation of a Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslims into the United States – through a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens.
103. Moreover, by preventing the student John Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and lawfully residing in the United States who are pursuing their education, from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, in order to avoid risking forfeiting their F‐1 status and jeopardizing their education, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens.
104. Moreover, by subjecting Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to obtain a visa, including family‐based visas, solely based on their national origin, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens.
105. Defendants’ above‐described actions are motivated by the religious status of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and on the basis of their constitutionally‐ protected free exercise of religion.
106. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States based solely on their religious beliefs.
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107. Defendants’ above‐described actions have a discriminatory effect upon and disparately impact the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries, and not non‐USCs of other faiths originating from the same Predominantly Muslim Countries.
108. The Revised Order is not narrowly tailored to the interest the government asserts, insofar as it applies a blanket suspension to certain immigrants even when the Defendants possess no information to indicate any of the immigrants pose any threat to the United States.
109. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist.
110. Defendants’ above‐described actions do not serve a compelling state interest or a legitimate or public purpose, nor are they the least restrictive means or narrowly tailored to achieve any such interest.
111. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and spiritual and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of (1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐ adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C.
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2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
112. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
113. The John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
COUNT III UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702)
(On behalf of all Plaintiffs)
114. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 115. The actions of Defendants that are required or permitted by the Executive Order, as set forth above, were without observance of procedure required by law, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
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116. The Revised Order creates a framework that although neutral on its face, maintains the intent of the First Muslim Ban and establishes a case‐by‐case waiver scheme that allows the unlawful goals and intent of the Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslim into the United States – to still be implemented in full.
117. Defendants’ unique application of the Revised Order to Muslims, insofar as it allows for the (1) suspension of entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibition of some Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants (those who have lawful status but who must obtain or renew their visas) originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, and the (3) disparate treatment of immigrants and nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries insofar as those persons would have to make a heightened showing and obtain a waiver to secure a visa to the United States.
118. Defendants’ actions as described above are arbitrary and capricious, shock the conscience, violate the decencies of civilized conduct, are so brutal and offensive that they do not comport with the traditional ideas of fair play and decency, lack even a rational relationship to any legitimate government interest, and have substantially burdened and unduly deprived Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their constitutionally protected rights, including their right to be free from discrimination on the basis of religion, the right to be free from condemnation by the government on the basis of their religion, the right to be free from being singled out by the government for disfavored treatment on the basis of their religion, liberty interests in engaging in international travel and returning home in the
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United States, their international human rights, their rights to freedom of association, their rights to freedom from false stigmatization and nonattainder, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
119. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries, constitute an adverse action against them motivated by their religious beliefs and practices and an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
120. By creating a framework that allows for the implementation of a Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslims into the United States – through a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
121. By preventing the student John Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐ USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States without risking forfeiting their F‐1 status and jeopardizing their education, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
122. Moreover, by subjecting Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to obtain a visa, including family‐based visas, solely based on their national origin, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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123. Defendants’ above‐described conduct was prompted or substantially caused by Plaintiffs’ and such other similarly situated Muslims’ religious identity, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
124. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by issuing the Revised Order whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
125. Defendant Trump’s First Muslim Ban imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all of the Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been broadcast to the general public pursuant to the First Muslim Ban, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion singled out for disfavored treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
126. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
127. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from these Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States based solely on their religious beliefs, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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128. Imposition of such a burden is not in furtherance of a compelling government interest nor is it the least restrictive means of furthering any governmental interest, compelling or otherwise, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
129. Defendants’ above‐described actions have a discriminatory effect upon and disparately impact the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries, and not non‐USCs of other faiths, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
130. The actions of Defendants, as set forth above, are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; and without observance of procedure required by law, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(A)‐(D).
131. Defendants’ Revised Order violates 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which states that “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’…nationality.”
132. Defendants’ Revised Order violates Section 1182(a)(3)(B) of the INA which creates a statutory scheme that the Defendants must utilize to exclude persons from the United States based on terrorism‐related concerns. This Section directs the Executive Branch to deny visas to persons who have “engaged in a terrorist activity,” “incited terrorist activity,” who are a “representative…of a terrorist organization” or a “group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity, who are members “of a terrorist organization,” “endors[e] or espous[e] terrorist activity.” This complex statutory scheme indicates that Congress anticipated that the Executive Branch would make immigration decisions that have national
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security implications and that Congress had in mind exactly how it wanted the Executive Branch to exercise the authority delegated to it.
133. Defendants’ Revised Order violates Section 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(ii) of the INA, which only allows the Executive Branch to deny a visa to a person who “is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity” if there is at least “reasonable ground” for such a conclusion.
134. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and spiritual and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of (1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non‐ adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
135. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
136. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
COUNT V VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
(On behalf of all Plaintiffs)
137. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 138. Defendant Trump does not have the authority to give any person preference or priority or to discriminate in the issuance of an immigrant visa on the basis of a “person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence,” and therefore the First Muslim Ban is an unconstitutional overreach in violation of Section 202(a)(1) of the INA. 139. The Executive Order on its face mandates discrimination against those who apply for immigrant visas on the basis of their nationality, place of birth, and/or place of residence in violation of Section 1152(a)(1)(A). 140. Defendant Trump does not have the authority to suspend the entry of all foreign nationals from the six countries on the basis of terrorism‐related concern, because Congress has already created a statutory scheme for establishing an evidentiary threshold for making such determinations and otherwise directing the executive branch to exercise discretion in a particular manner in violation of Section 1182(a)(3)(B) of the INA. 141. The First Muslim Ban is a factually baseless, biased and bigoted effort to discriminate against a targeted group that even if one would to accept its purported basis, is not in any way related to the First Muslim Ban’s purported goals.
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142. Further, the First Muslim Ban is an irrational and arbitrary use of power, and as such is an unconstitutional executive overreach.
Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request:
1. A speedy hearing of this action under Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ Revised Order violates the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act, and is unlawful and invalid;
3. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ Revised Order is an unconstitutional overreach in violation of Section 202(a)(1) of the INA;
4. An injunction that requires Defendants to remedy the constitutional violations identified above, including prohibiting Defendants from engaging in the following: (1) implementing or enforcing any portion of the Revised Order; (2) requiring visa applications filed by foreign nationals originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries to be subjected to case‐by‐case waivers such that applicants are denied their visa applications on the basis of religion or national origin, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Revised Order; (3) prohibiting student visa holders originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from engaging in international travel and renewing their student visas to reenter the United States and continue their education, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Revised Order;
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(4) prohibiting foreign nationals originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Revised Order; and, (5) otherwise embedding policies and processes within the immigration and visa process that discriminate against or disfavor Islam or Muslims; 5. A trial by jury; 6. An award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of all litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and, 7. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby demand trial by jury of the above‐referenced causes of action.
Respectfully submitted, THE LAW OFFICE OF GADEIR ABBAS BY: /s/ Gadeir Abbas GADEIR I. ABBAS Attorney for Plaintiff 1155 F Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (720) 251‐0425 Fax: (720) 251‐0425 Email: gadeir.abbas@gmail.com
Licensed in Virginia, not in D.C. Practice limited to federal matters
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Dated: March 13, 2017

COUNCIL ON AMERICAN‐ISLAMIC RELATIONS
BY: /s/ Lena Masri LENA F. MASRI (P73461) Attorney for Plaintiff National Litigation Director 453 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 Phone: (202) 488‐8787
AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLLC
BY: /s/ Shereef Akeel SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345) Attorney for Plaintiffs 888 W. Big Beaver Rd., Ste. 910 Troy, MI 48084 Phone: (248) 269‐9595 shereef@akeelvalentine.com

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Executive Order- Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals
EXECUTIVE ORDER
PROTECTING THE NATION FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS BY FOREIGN NATIONALS
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) (INA), and section 301 oftitle 3, United States Code, and to protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Purpose. The visa-issuance process plays a crucial role in detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering the United States. Perhaps in no instance was that more apparent than with the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 200 1, when State Department policy prevented consular officers from properly scrutinizing the visa applications of several of the 19 foreign nationals who went on to murder nearly 3,000 Americans. And while the visa-issuance process was reviewed and amended after the September 11 attacks to better detect would-be terrorists from receiving visas, these measures did not stop attacks by foreign nationals who were 'admitted to the United States.
Hundreds of foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorismrelated crimes since September 11 , 2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States after claiming asylum; after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas; or through the U.S. refugee resettlement program. Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter our country. The United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism.
In order to protect Americans, we must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward our country and its founding principles. We cannot, and should not, admit into our country those who do not support the U.S. Constitution, or those who would place violent religious edicts over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry and hatred (including "honor" killings, other forms of violence against women, or the persecution of those who practice other religions) or those who would oppress members of one race, one gender, or sexual orientation.
Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to: (a) protect our citizens from foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and
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(b) prevent the admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit United States immigration laws for malevolent purposes.
Sec. 3. Suspension ofIssuance of Visas and Other Immigration Benefits to Nationals of Countries ofParticular Concern. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately conduct a review to determine the information needed from any country for adjudication of any visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) adequate to determine that the individual seeking the benefit is who the individual claims to be and is not a security or public-safety threat.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the review described in subsection (a), including the Secretary of Homeland Security's determination of the information needed for adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 30 days of the date of this order (excluding those foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, and C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy of the report to the Secretary of State and Director of National Intelligence.
(c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens to relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure.the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening of foreign nationals, and to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent the terrorist or criminal infiltration of foreign nationals, pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA I hereby find that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries designated pursuant to Division 0, Title II, Section 203 of the 2016 consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2029, P.L. 114-113), would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons for 30 days from the date of this order.
(d) Immediately upon receipt of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the information needed for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request all foreign governments that do not supply such information to start providing such information regarding their nationals within 60 days of notification.
(e) After the 60-day period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended fo r inclusion on a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of foreign nationals (excluding those foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, and C2 visas for travel to the United Nations) from countries that do not provide the information requested pursuant to subsection (d) of this order until compliance occurs.
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(t) At any point after submitting the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security may submit to the President the names of any additional countries recommended for similar treatment.
(g) Notwithstanding a suspension pursuant to subsection (c) of this section or pursuant to a Presidential proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may, on a case-by-case basis, and when in the national interest, issue visas or other immigration benefits to nationals of countries for which visas and benefits are otherwise blocked.
(h) The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall submit to the President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 30 days of the date ofthis order, a second report within 60 days of the date ofthis order, a third report within 90 days of the date of this order, and a fourth report within 120 days of the date of this order.
Sec. 4. Implementing Uniform Screening Standards for all Immigration Programs.(a) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation shall implement a program during the adjudication process for immigration benefits to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis, with the intent to cause harm, or who are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission . This program will include the development of uniform screening standards and procedures, such as in-person interviews; the creation of a database of identity documents proffered by applicants to ensure that duplicate documents are not used by multiple applicants; amended application forms that include questions aimed at identifying fraudulent answers and malicious intent; a mechanism to ensure that the applicant is who the applicant claims to be; a process to evaluate the applicant's likelihood of becoming a positive contributing member of society, and the applicant's ability to make contributions to the national interest; and, a mechanism to assess whether or not the applicant has the intent to commit criminal or terrorist acts after entering the United States.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in conj unction with the Secretary of State, Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the President an initial report on the progress ofthis directive within 60 days of the date of this order, a second report within 100 days of the date of this order, and a third report within 200 days of the date ofthis order.
Sec. 5. Realignment ofthe US. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 201 7. (a) The Secretary of State shall suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120 days. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall review the USRAP application and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures can be taken to ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional procedures. Refugee applicants who are already in the USRAP process may be admitted upon the initiation and completion of these revised procedures. Upon the date that is 120 days after this order, the Secretary of
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State shall resume USRAP admissions only for nationals of countries for whom the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality. Where necessary and appropriate, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall recommend legislation to the President to assist with such prioritization.
(c) The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, as appropriate, shall cease refugee processing of and the admittance of nationals of Syria as refugees until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes have been made to the USRAP to ensure its alignment with the national interest.
(d) Notwithstanding any previous Presidential determination regarding the number of refugee admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may only process and admit a total of 50,000 refugees during Fiscal Year 2017. During the 120-day suspension provided by section 5(a), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall initiate appropriate consultations in connection with this determination, including with respect to the allocation among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States.
(f) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis when in the national interest. Further, during the temporary suspension period described in subsection (a), the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may continue to process as refugees those refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality.
(g) The Secretary of State shall submit to the President an initial report on the progress of the directive in subsection (b) of this section regarding prioritization of claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution within 100 days of the date of this order and shall submit a second report within 200 days of the date of this order.
Sec. 6. Establishment ofSafe Zones to Protect Vulnerable Syrian Populations. Pursuant to the cessation of refugee processing for Syrian nationals, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, is directed within 90 days of the date of this order to produce a plan to provide safe areas in Syria and in the surrounding region in which Syrian nationals displaced from their homeland can await firm settlement, such as repatriation or potential third-country resettlement.
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Sec. 7. Rescission ofExercise ofAuthority Relating to the Terrorism Grounds of Inadmissibility. The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, consider rescinding the exercises of authority in section 212 of the INA relating to the terrorism grounds of inadmissibility, as well as any related implementing memoranda..
Sec. 8. Expedited Completion ofthe Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall expedite the completion and implementation of a biometric entry-exit tracking system for all travelers to the United States, as recommended by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President periodic reports on the progress of the directive contained in subsection (a) of this section. The initial report shall be submitted within 100 days of the date of this order, a second report shall be submitted within 200 days of the date of this order, and a third report shall be submitted within 365 days of the date ofthis order. Further, the Secretary shall submit a report every 180 days thereafter until the system is fully deployed and operational.
Sec. 9. Visa Interview Security. (a) The Secretary of State shall immediately suspend the Visa Interview Waiver Program and ensure compliance with section 222 of the INA, which requires that all individuals seeking a nonimmigrant visa, undergo an in-person interview, subject to specific statutory exceptions.
(b) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State shall immediately expand the Consular Fellows Program, including by substantially increasing the number of Fellows, lengthening or making permanent the period of service, and making language training at the Foreign Service Institute available to Fellows for assignment to posts outside of their area of core linguistic ability, to ensure that non-immigrant visa interview wait times are not unduly affected.
Sec. 10. Visa Validity Reciprocity. The Secretary of State shall review all nonimmigrant visa reciprocity agreements to ensure that they are, with respect to each visa classification, truly reciprocal insofar as practicable with respect to validity period and fees, as urged by sections 221 (c) and 281 of the INA, and other treatment. If a country does not treat U.S. nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas in a reciprocal manner, the Secretary of State shall adjust the visa validity period, fee schedule, or other treatment to match the treatment of U.S. nationals by the foreign country, to the extent practicable.
Sec. 11. Transparency and Data Collection. To be more transparent with the American people, and in order to more effectively implement policies and practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, consistent with applicable law, collect and make publicly available within 180 days, and every 180 days thereafter:
(a) information regarding the number of foreign-born individuals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related offenses; convicted of terrorism-related offenses; or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity,
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affiliation, or material support to a terrorism-related organization, or any other national security reasons; (b) information regarding the number offoreign-born individuals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and engaged in terrorismrelated acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States; and (c) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women or honor killings by foreign-born individuals in the United States. Sec. 12. General Provisions.(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate1s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 246
the WHITE HOUSE
Í

From the Press O៛ice
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Executive Orders Presidential Memoranda Proclamations Related OMB Material Legislation Nominations & Appointments Disclosures

The White House O៛ice of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release

March 06, 2017

Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - - - -

PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the­press­office/2017/03/06/executive­order­protecting­nation­foreign­terrorist­entry­united­states

1/22

3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate2s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 247 By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and to protect the Nation from terrorist activities by foreign nationals admitted to the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy and Purpose. (a) It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, including those committed by foreign nationals. The screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) play a crucial role in detecting foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism and in preventing those individuals from entering the United States. It is therefore the policy of the United States to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visaissuance process and the USRAP.

(b) On January 27, 2017, to implement this policy, I issued Executive Order 13769 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States).

(i) Among other actions, Executive Order 13769 suspended for 90 days the entry of certain aliens from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. These are countries that had already been identified as presenting heightened concerns about terrorism and travel to the United States. Specifically, the suspension applied to countries referred to in, or designated under, section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), in which Congress restricted use of the Visa Waiver Program for nationals of, and aliens recently present in, (A) Iraq or Syria, (B) any country designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of terrorism (currently Iran, Syria, and Sudan), and (C) any other country designated as a country of concern by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence. In 2016, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Libya, Somalia, and Yemen as additional countries of concern for travel purposes, based on consideration of three statutory factors related to terrorism and national security: "(I) whether the presence of an alien in the country or area increases the likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to the national security of the United States; (II) whether a foreign terrorist organization has a significant presence in the country or area; and (III) whether the country or area is a safe haven for terrorists." 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12)(D)(ii). Additionally, Members of Congress have expressed concerns about screening and vetting procedures following recent terrorist attacks in this country and in Europe.

(ii) In ordering the temporary suspension of entry described in subsection (b)(i) of this section, I exercised my authority under Article II of the Constitution and under section 212(f) of the INA, which provides in relevant part: "Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate3s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 248 be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate." 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). Under these authorities, I determined that, for a brief period of 90 days, while existing screening and vetting procedures were under review, the entry into the United States of certain aliens from the seven identified countries -- each a៛licted by terrorism in a manner that compromised the ability of the United States to rely on normal decision-making procedures about travel to the United States -- would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Nonetheless, I permitted the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to grant case-by-case waivers when they determined that it was in the national interest to do so.

(iii) Executive Order 13769 also suspended the USRAP for 120 days. Terrorist groups have sought to infiltrate several nations through refugee programs. Accordingly, I temporarily suspended the USRAP pending a review of our procedures for screening and vetting refugees. Nonetheless, I permitted the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly grant case-by-case waivers when they determined that it was in the national interest to do so.

(iv) Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any particular religion. While that order allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities -- whoever they are and wherever they reside -- to avail themselves of the USRAP in light of their particular challenges and circumstances.

(c) The implementation of Executive Order 13769 has been delayed by litigation. Most significantly, enforcement of critical provisions of that order has been temporarily halted by court orders that apply nationwide and extend even to foreign nationals with no prior or substantial connection to the United States. On February 9, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to stay or narrow one such order pending the outcome of further judicial proceedings, while noting that the "political branches are far better equipped to make appropriate distinctions" about who should be covered by a suspension of entry or of refugee admissions.

(d) Nationals from the countries previously identified under section 217(a)(12) of the INA warrant additional scrutiny in connection with our immigration policies because the conditions in these countries present heightened threats. Each of these countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate4s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 249 contains active conflict zones. Any of these circumstances diminishes the foreign government's willingness or ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States. Moreover, the significant presence in each of these countries of terrorist organizations, their members, and others exposed to those organizations increases the chance that conditions will be exploited to enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to travel to the United States. Finally, once foreign nationals from these countries are admitted to the United States, it is o韘en di៛icult to remove them, because many of these countries typically delay issuing, or refuse to issue, travel documents.

(e) The following are brief descriptions, taken in part from the Department of State's Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (June 2016), of some of the conditions in six of the previously designated countries that demonstrate why their nationals continue to present heightened risks to the security of the United States:

(i) Iran. Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984 and continues to support various terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, and terrorist groups in Iraq. Iran has also been linked to support for al-Qa'ida and has permitted al-Qa'ida to transport funds and fighters through Iran to Syria and South Asia. Iran does not cooperate with the United States in counterterrorism e៛orts.

(ii) Libya. Libya is an active combat zone, with hostilities between the internationally recognized government and its rivals. In many parts of the country, security and law enforcement functions are provided by armed militias rather than state institutions. Violent extremist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have exploited these conditions to expand their presence in the country. The Libyan government provides some cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism e៛orts, but it is unable to secure thousands of miles of its land and maritime borders, enabling the illicit flow of weapons, migrants, and foreign terrorist fighters. The United States Embassy in Libya suspended its operations in 2014.

(iii) Somalia. Portions of Somalia have been terrorist safe havens. Al-Shabaab, an alQa'ida-a៛iliated terrorist group, has operated in the country for years and continues to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries. Somalia has porous borders, and most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents. The Somali government cooperates with the United States in some counterterrorism operations but does not have the capacity to sustain military pressure on or to investigate suspected terrorists.

(iv) Sudan. Sudan has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1993 because of its support for international terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas. Historically, Sudan provided safe havens for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate5s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 250 groups to meet and train. Although Sudan's support to al-Qa'ida has ceased and it provides some cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism e៛orts, elements of core al-Qa'ida and ISIS-linked terrorist groups remain active in the country.

(v) Syria. Syria has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979. The Syrian government is engaged in an ongoing military conflict against ISIS and others for control of portions of the country. At the same time, Syria continues to support other terrorist groups. It has allowed or encouraged extremists to pass through its territory to enter Iraq. ISIS continues to attract foreign fighters to Syria and to use its base in Syria to plot or encourage attacks around the globe, including in the United States. The United States Embassy in Syria suspended its operations in 2012. Syria does not cooperate with the United States' counterterrorism e៛orts.

(vi) Yemen. Yemen is the site of an ongoing conflict between the incumbent government and the Houthi-led opposition. Both ISIS and a second group, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have exploited this conflict to expand their presence in Yemen and to carry out hundreds of attacks. Weapons and other materials smuggled across Yemen's porous borders are used to finance AQAP and other terrorist activities. In 2015, the United States Embassy in Yemen suspended its operations, and embassy sta៛ were relocated out of the country. Yemen has been supportive of, but has not been able to cooperate fully with, the United States in counterterrorism e៛orts.

(f) In light of the conditions in these six countries, until the assessment of current screening and vetting procedures required by section 2 of this order is completed, the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the national security of the United States is unacceptably high. Accordingly, while that assessment is ongoing, I am imposing a temporary pause on the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, subject to categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers, as described in section 3 of this order.

(g) Iraq presents a special case. Portions of Iraq remain active combat zones. Since 2014, ISIS has had dominant influence over significant territory in northern and central Iraq. Although that influence has been significantly reduced due to the e៛orts and sacrifices of the Iraqi government and armed forces, working along with a United States-led coalition, the ongoing conflict has impacted the Iraqi government's capacity to secure its borders and to identify fraudulent travel documents. Nevertheless, the close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected Iraqi government, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq's commitment to combat ISIS justify di៛erent treatment for Iraq. In particular, those Iraqi government forces that have fought to regain more than half of the territory previously dominated by ISIS have shown steadfast determination and earned enduring

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate6s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 251 respect as they battle an armed group that is the common enemy of Iraq and the United States. In addition, since Executive Order 13769 was issued, the Iraqi government has expressly undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing, and the return of Iraqi nationals subject to final orders of removal. Decisions about issuance of visas or granting admission to Iraqi nationals should be subjected to additional scrutiny to determine if applicants have connections with ISIS or other terrorist organizations, or otherwise pose a risk to either national security or public safety.
(h) Recent history shows that some of those who have entered the United States through our immigration system have proved to be threats to our national security. Since 2001, hundreds of persons born abroad have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the United States. They have included not just persons who came here legally on visas but also individuals who first entered the country as refugees. For example, in January 2013, two Iraqi nationals admitted to the United States as refugees in 2009 were sentenced to 40 years and to life in prison, respectively, for multiple terrorism-related o៛enses. And in October 2014, a native of Somalia who had been brought to the United States as a child refugee and later became a naturalized United States citizen was sentenced to 30 years in prison for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction as part of a plot to detonate a bomb at a crowded Christmas-tree-lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. The Attorney General has reported to me that more than 300 persons who entered the United States as refugees are currently the subjects of counterterrorism investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(i) Given the foregoing, the entry into the United States of foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism remains a matter of grave concern. In light of the Ninth Circuit's observation that the political branches are better suited to determine the appropriate scope of any suspensions than are the courts, and in order to avoid spending additional time pursuing litigation, I am revoking Executive Order 13769 and replacing it with this order, which expressly excludes from the suspensions categories of aliens that have prompted judicial concerns and which clarifies or refines the approach to certain other issues or categories of a៛ected aliens.
Sec. 2. Temporary Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern During Review Period. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall conduct a worldwide review to identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat. The Secretary of Homeland Security may conclude that certain information is needed from particular countries even if it is not needed from every country.

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate7s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 252 (b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the worldwide review described in subsection (a) of this section, including the Secretary of Homeland Security's determination of the information needed from each country for adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 20 days of the e៛ective date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy of the report to the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence.
(c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and in light of the national security concerns referenced in section 1 of this order, I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I therefore direct that the entry into the United States of nationals of those six countries be suspended for 90 days from the e៛ective date of this order, subject to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set forth in sections 3 and 12 of this order.
(d) Upon submission of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the information needed from each country for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request that all foreign governments that do not supply such information regarding their nationals begin providing it within 50 days of notification.
(e) A韘er the period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested until they do so or until the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the country has an adequate plan to do so, or has adequately shared information through other means. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security may also submit to the President the names of additional countries for which any of them recommends other lawful restrictions or limitations deemed necessary for the security or welfare of the United States.
(f) At any point a韘er the submission of the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, may submit to the President the names of any additional countries recommended for similar treatment, as well as the names of any countries that they

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate8s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 253 recommend should be removed from the scope of a proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section.

(g) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 60 days of the e៛ective date of this order, a second report within 90 days of the e៛ective date of this order, a third report within 120 days of the e៛ective date of this order, and a fourth report within 150 days of the e៛ective date of this order.

Sec. 3. Scope and Implementation of Suspension.

(a) Scope. Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any waiver under subsection (c) of this section, the suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this order shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:

(i) are outside the United States on the e៛ective date of this order;

(ii) did not have a valid visa at 5:00 p.m., eastern standard time on January 27, 2017; and

(iii) do not have a valid visa on the e៛ective date of this order.

(b) Exceptions. The suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this order shall not apply to:

(i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States;

(ii) any foreign national who is admitted to or paroled into the United States on or a韘er the e៛ective date of this order;

(iii) any foreign national who has a document other than a visa, valid on the e៛ective date of this order or issued on any date therea韘er, that permits him or her to travel to the United States and seek entry or admission, such as an advance parole document;

(iv) any dual national of a country designated under section 2 of this order when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by a non-designated country;

(v) any foreign national traveling on a diplomatic or diplomatic-type visa, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visa, C-2 visa for travel to the United Nations, or G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 visa; or

(vi) any foreign national who has been granted asylum; any refugee who has already been admitted to the United States; or any individual who has been granted withholding of removal, advance parole, or protection under the Convention Against Torture.

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0E0x1ec2ut0iv-eAOJrdTer-PIDrotDectingDTohecNuamtioneFnrotm1F1o-r2eign FTeirlreordist0E3ntr/y1I3nto/1T7he UPnitaedgSetate9s |owfh2ite2houPsea.ggoev ID# 254 (c) Waivers. Notwithstanding the suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this order, a consular o៛icer, or, as appropriate, the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or the Commissioner's delegee, may, in the consular o៛icer's or the CBP o៛icial's discretion, decide on a case-by-case basis to authorize the issuance of a visa to, or to permit the entry of, a foreign national for whom entry is otherwise suspended if the foreign national has demonstrated to the o៛icer's satisfaction that denying entry during the suspension period would cause undue hardship, and that his or her entry would not pose a threat to national security and would be in the national interest. Unless otherwise specified by the Secretary of Homeland Security, any waiver issued by a consular o៛icer as part of the visa issuance process will be e៛ective both for the issuance of a visa and any subsequent entry on that visa, but will leave all other requirements for admission or entry unchanged. Case-by-case waivers could be appropriate in circumstances such as the following:

(i) the foreign national has previously been admitted to the United States for a continuous period of work, study, or other long-term activity, is outside the United States on the e៛ective date of this order, seeks to reenter the United States to resume that activity, and the denial of reentry during the suspension period would impair that activity;

(ii) the foreign national has previously established significant contacts with the United States but is outside the United States on the e៛ective date of this order for work, study, or other lawful activity;

(iii) the foreign national seeks to enter the United States for significant business or professional obligations and the denial of entry during the suspension period would impair those obligations;

(iv) the foreign national seeks to enter the United States to visit or reside with a close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent) who is a United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or alien lawfully admitted on a valid nonimmigrant visa, and the denial of entry during the suspension period would cause undue hardship;

(v)the foreign national is an infant, a young child or adoptee, an individual needing urgent medical care, or someone whose entry is otherwise justified by the special circumstances of the case;

(vi) the foreign national has been employed by, or on behalf of, the United States Government (or is an eligible dependent of such an employee) and the employee can document that he or she has provided faithful and valuable service to the United States Government;

(vii) the foreign national is traveling for purposes related to an international organization designated under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA),

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-00Ex1e2cu0tiv-eAOJrTde-rIPDroDtectinDg TohceuNmatioennFtro1m1F-o2reignFTielrerodris0t E3n/tr1y3In/to1T7he UPniategd eSta1te0s | owhfit2eh2ouPsea.gogveID# 255 22 U.S.C. 288 et seq., traveling for purposes of conducting meetings or business with the United States Government, or traveling to conduct business on behalf of an international organization not designated under the IOIA;
(viii) the foreign national is a landed Canadian immigrant who applies for a visa at a location within Canada; or
(ix) the foreign national is traveling as a United States Government-sponsored exchange visitor.
Sec. 4. Additional Inquiries Related to Nationals of Iraq. An application by any Iraqi national for a visa, admission, or other immigration benefit should be subjected to thorough review, including, as appropriate, consultation with a designee of the Secretary of Defense and use of the additional information that has been obtained in the context of the close U.S.-Iraqi security partnership, since Executive Order 13769 was issued, concerning individuals suspected of ties to ISIS or other terrorist organizations and individuals coming from territories controlled or formerly controlled by ISIS. Such review shall include consideration of whether the applicant has connections with ISIS or other terrorist organizations or with territory that is or has been under the dominant influence of ISIS, as well as any other information bearing on whether the applicant may be a threat to commit acts of terrorism or otherwise threaten the national security or public safety of the United States.
Sec. 5. Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All Immigration Programs. (a) The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence shall implement a program, as part of the process for adjudications, to identify individuals who seek to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis, who support terrorism, violent extremism, acts of violence toward any group or class of people within the United States, or who present a risk of causing harm subsequent to their entry. This program shall include the development of a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures, such as in-person interviews; a database of identity documents pro៛ered by applicants to ensure that duplicate documents are not used by multiple applicants; amended application forms that include questions aimed at identifying fraudulent answers and malicious intent; a mechanism to ensure that applicants are who they claim to be; a mechanism to assess whether applicants may commit, aid, or support any kind of violent, criminal, or terrorist acts a韘er entering the United States; and any other appropriate means for ensuring the proper collection of all information necessary for a rigorous evaluation of all grounds of inadmissibility or grounds for the denial of other immigration benefits.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President an

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-00Ex1e2cu0tiv-eAOJrTde-rIPDroDtectinDg TohceuNmatioennFtro1m1F-o2reignFTielrerodris0t E3n/tr1y3In/to1T7he UPniategd eSta1te1s | owhfit2eh2ouPsea.gogveID# 256 initial report on the progress of the program described in subsection (a) of this section within 60 days of the e៛ective date of this order, a second report within 100 days of the e៛ective date of this order, and a third report within 200 days of the e៛ective date of this order.

Sec. 6. Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017. (a) The Secretary of State shall suspend travel of refugees into the United States under the USRAP, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall suspend decisions on applications for refugee status, for 120 days a韘er the e៛ective date of this order, subject to waivers pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall review the USRAP application and adjudication processes to determine what additional procedures should be used to ensure that individuals seeking admission as refugees do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional procedures. The suspension described in this subsection shall not apply to refugee applicants who, before the e៛ective date of this order, have been formally scheduled for transit by the Department of State. The Secretary of State shall resume travel of refugees into the United States under the USRAP 120 days a韘er the e៛ective date of this order, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall resume making decisions on applications for refugee status only for stateless persons and nationals of countries for which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that the additional procedures implemented pursuant to this subsection are adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, I hereby proclaim that the entry of more than 50,000 refugees in fiscal year 2017 would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and thus suspend any entries in excess of that number until such time as I determine that additional entries would be in the national interest.
(c) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as they determine that the entry of such individuals as refugees is in the national interest and does not pose a threat to the security or welfare of the United States, including in circumstances such as the following: the individual's entry would enable the United States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement or arrangement, or the denial of entry would cause undue hardship.
(d) It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent permitted by law and as practicable, State and local jurisdictions be granted a role in the process of determining the

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-00Ex1e2cu0tiv-eAOJrTde-rIPDroDtectinDg TohceuNmatioennFtro1m1F-o2reignFTielrerodris0t E3n/tr1y3In/to1T7he UPniategd eSta1te2s | owhfit2eh2ouPsea.gogveID# 257 placement or settlement in their jurisdictions of aliens eligible to be admitted to the United States as refugees. To that end, the Secretary of State shall examine existing law to determine the extent to which, consistent with applicable law, State and local jurisdictions may have greater involvement in the process of determining the placement or resettlement of refugees in their jurisdictions, and shall devise a proposal to lawfully promote such involvement.

Sec. 7. Rescission of Exercise of Authority Relating to the Terrorism Grounds of Inadmissibility. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, consider rescinding the exercises of authority permitted by section 212(d)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(B), relating to the terrorism grounds of inadmissibility, as well as any related implementing directives or guidance.

Sec. 8. Expedited Completion of the Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall expedite the completion and implementation of a biometric entry exit tracking system for in-scope travelers to the United States, as recommended by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President periodic reports on the progress of the directive set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The initial report shall be submitted within 100 days of the e៛ective date of this order, a second report shall be submitted within 200 days of the e៛ective date of this order, and a third report shall be submitted within 365 days of the e៛ective date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit further reports every 180 days therea韘er until the system is fully deployed and operational.

Sec. 9. Visa Interview Security. (a) The Secretary of State shall immediately suspend the Visa Interview Waiver Program and ensure compliance with section 222 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1202, which requires that all individuals seeking a nonimmigrant visa undergo an in-person interview, subject to specific statutory exceptions. This suspension shall not apply to any foreign national traveling on a diplomatic or diplomatic-type visa, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visa, C-2 visa for travel to the United Nations, or G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 visa; traveling for purposes related to an international organization designated under the IOIA; or traveling for purposes of conducting meetings or business with the United States Government.

(b) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State shall immediately expand the Consular Fellows Program, including by substantially increasing the number of Fellows, lengthening or making permanent the period of service, and making language training at the Foreign Service Institute available to Fellows for assignment to posts outside of their area of core linguistic ability, to ensure that nonimmigrant visa-interview wait times are not unduly a៛ected.

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-00Ex1e2cu0tiv-eAOJrTde-rIPDroDtectinDg TohceuNmatioennFtro1m1F-o2reignFTielrerodris0t E3n/tr1y3In/to1T7he UPniategd eSta1te3s | owhfit2eh2ouPsea.gogveID# 258 Sec. 10. Visa Validity Reciprocity. The Secretary of State shall review all nonimmigrant visa reciprocity agreements and arrangements to ensure that they are, with respect to each visa classification, truly reciprocal insofar as practicable with respect to validity period and fees, as required by sections 221(c) and 281 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1201(c) and 1351, and other treatment. If another country does not treat United States nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas in a truly reciprocal manner, the Secretary of State shall adjust the visa validity period, fee schedule, or other treatment to match the treatment of United States nationals by that foreign country, to the extent practicable.

Sec. 11. Transparency and Data Collection. (a) To be more transparent with the American people and to implement more e៛ectively policies and practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall, consistent with applicable law and national security, collect and make publicly available the following information:

(i) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related o៛enses while in the United States; convicted of terrorism-related o៛enses while in the United States; or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity, a៛iliation with or provision of material support to a terrorism-related organization, or any other national-securityrelated reasons;

(ii) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been radicalized a韘er entry into the United States and who have engaged in terrorism-related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States;

(iii) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called "honor killings," in the United States by foreign nationals; and

(iv) any other information relevant to public safety and security as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General, including information on the immigration status of foreign nationals charged with major o៛enses.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall release the initial report under subsection (a) of this section within 180 days of the e៛ective date of this order and shall include information for the period from September 11, 2001, until the date of the initial report. Subsequent reports shall be issued every 180 days therea韘er and reflect the period since the previous report.

Sec. 12. Enforcement. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and

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(b) In implementing this order, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including, as appropriate, those providing an opportunity for individuals to claim a fear of persecution or torture, such as the credible fear determination for aliens covered by section 235(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A).
(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the e៛ective date of this order shall be revoked pursuant to this order.
(d) Any individual whose visa was marked revoked or marked canceled as a result of Executive Order 13769 shall be entitled to a travel document confirming that the individual is permitted to travel to the United States and seek entry. Any prior cancellation or revocation of a visa that was solely pursuant to Executive Order 13769 shall not be the basis of inadmissibility for any future determination about entry or admissibility.
(e) This order shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum, to a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual to seek asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture, consistent with the laws of the United States.
Sec. 13. Revocation. Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017, is revoked as of the e៛ective date of this order.
Sec. 14. E៛ective Date. This order is e៛ective at 12:01 a.m., eastern daylight time on March 16, 2017.
Sec. 15. Severability. (a) If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be a៛ected thereby.
(b) If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch o៛icials shall implement those procedural requirements.
Sec. 16. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise a៛ect:

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3/7/2017 Case 1:17-cv-00Ex1e2cu0tiv-eAOJrTde-rIPDroDtectinDg TohceuNmatioennFtro1m1F-o2reignFTielrerodris0t E3n/tr1y3In/to1T7he UPniategd eSta1te5s | owhfit2eh2ouPsea.gogveID# 260 (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the O៛ice of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its o៛icers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 6, 2017.
¬ŧ­ 
HOME BRIEFING ROOM ISSUES THE ADMINISTRATION PARTICIPATE 1600 PENN
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17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 11-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 29 Page
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REX W. TILLERSON, Secretary of State; JOHN F. KELLY, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellants.

No. 17-35105 D.C. No.
2:17-cv-00141
ORDER

Motion for Stay of an Order of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2017
Filed February 9, 2017
Before: William C. Canby, Richard R. Clifton, and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges
Per Curiam Order

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STATE OF WASHINGTON V. TRUMP

COUNSEL
August E. Flentje (argued), Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General; Douglas N. Letter, Sharon Swingle, H. Thomas Byron, Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., and Catherine Dorsey, Attorneys, Appellate Staff; Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Noel J. Francisco, Acting Solicitor General; Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellants.
Noah G. Purcell (argued), Solicitor General; Marsha Chien and Patricio A. Marquez, Assistant Attorneys General; Colleen M. Melody, Civil Rights Unit Chief; Anne E. Egeler, Deputy Solicitor General; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General; Attorney General’s Office, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Washington.
Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General; Alan I. Gilbert, Solicitor General; Lori Swanson, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; for PlaintiffAppellee State of Minnesota.

ORDER
PER CURIAM:
At issue in this emergency proceeding is Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” which, among other changes to immigration policies and procedures, bans for 90 days the entry into the United States of individuals from seven countries. Two States challenged the Executive Order as unconstitutional and violative of federal law, and a federal district court preliminarily ruled in their favor and

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temporarily enjoined enforcement of the Executive Order. The Government now moves for an emergency stay of the district court’s temporary restraining order while its appeal of that order proceeds.
To rule on the Government’s motion, we must consider several factors, including whether the Government has shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, the degree of hardship caused by a stay or its denial, and the public interest in granting or denying a stay. We assess those factors in light of the limited evidence put forward by both parties at this very preliminary stage and are mindful that our analysis of the hardships and public interest in this case involves particularly sensitive and weighty concerns on both sides. Nevertheless, we hold that the Government has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal, nor has it shown that failure to enter a stay would cause irreparable injury, and we therefore deny its emergency motion for a stay.
Background
On January 27, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States” (the “Executive Order”). 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977. Citing the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and stating that “numerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorismrelated crimes” since then, the Executive Order declares that “the United States must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles.” Id. It asserts, “Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter the United States. The United

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States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism.” Id.
The Executive Order makes several changes to the policies and procedures by which non-citizens may enter the United States. Three are at issue here. First, section 3(c) of the Executive Order suspends for 90 days the entry of aliens from seven countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977-78 (citing the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 217(a)(12), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)). Second, section 5(a) of the Executive Order suspends for 120 days the United States Refugee Admissions Program. 82 Fed. Reg. 8,979. Upon resumption of the refugee program, section 5(b) of the Executive Order directs the Secretary of State to prioritize refugee claims based on religious persecution where a refugee’s religion is the minority religion in the country of his or her nationality. Id. Third, section 5(c) of the Executive Order suspends indefinitely the entry of all Syrian refugees. Id. Sections 3(g) and 5(e) of the Executive Order allow the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to make case-by-case exceptions to these provisions “when in the national interest.” 82 Fed. Reg. 8,978-80. Section 5(e) states that situations that would be in the national interest include “when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution.” 82 Fed. Reg. 8,979. The Executive Order requires the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence to evaluate the United States’ visa, admission, and refugee programs during the periods in which entry is suspended. 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977-80.
The impact of the Executive Order was immediate and widespread. It was reported that thousands of visas were

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immediately canceled, hundreds of travelers with such visas were prevented from boarding airplanes bound for the United States or denied entry on arrival, and some travelers were detained. Three days later, on January 30, 2017, the State of Washington filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging sections 3(c), 5(a)-(c), and 5(e) of the Executive Order, naming as defendants the President, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the United States (collectively, “the Government”). Washington alleged that the Executive Order unconstitutionally and illegally stranded its residents abroad, split their families, restricted their travel, and damaged the State’s economy and public universities in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, the INA, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Washington also alleged that the Executive Order was not truly meant to protect against terror attacks by foreign nationals but rather was intended to enact a “Muslim ban” as the President had stated during his presidential campaign that he would do.
Washington asked the district court to declare that the challenged sections of the Executive Order are illegal and unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement nationwide. On the same day, Washington filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to enjoin the enforcement of sections 3(c), 5(a)-(c), and 5(e) of the Executive Order. Two days later, Washington’s Complaint was amended to add the State of Minnesota as a plaintiff and to add a claim under the Tenth Amendment. Washington and Minnesota (collectively, “the States”) jointly filed an amended motion for a TRO. The Government opposed the

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motion the next day, and the district court held a hearing the day after that.
That evening, the court entered a written order granting the TRO. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). The district court preliminarily concluded that significant and ongoing harm was being inflicted on substantial numbers of people, to the detriment of the States, by means of an Executive Order that the States were likely to be able to prove was unlawful. Id. at *2. The district court enjoined and restrained the nationwide enforcement of sections 3(c) and 5(a)-(c) in their entirety. Id. It enjoined section 5(e) to the extent that section “purports to prioritize refugee claims of certain religious minorities,” and prohibited the government from “proceeding with any action that prioritizes the refugee claims of certain religious minorities.” The court also directed the parties to propose a briefing schedule for the States’ request for a preliminary injunction and denied the Government’s motion to stay the TRO pending an emergency appeal. Id. at *3.
The Government filed a notice of appeal the next day and sought an emergency stay in this court, including an immediate stay while its emergency stay motion was under consideration. We denied the request for an immediate stay and set deadlines for the filing of responsive and reply briefs on the emergency stay motion over the next two days.1 Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 469608 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017). The motion was submitted after oral argument was conducted by telephone.

1 We have also received many amicus curiae briefs in support of both the Government and the States.

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Appellate Jurisdiction
The States argue that we lack jurisdiction over the Government’s stay motion because the Government’s appeal is premature. A TRO is not ordinarily appealable. See Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002). We may nonetheless review an order styled as a TRO if it “possesses the qualities of a preliminary injunction.” Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Nat’l Union of Healthcare Workers, 598 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010). This rule has ordinarily required the would-be appellant to show that the TRO was strongly challenged in adversarial proceedings before the district court and that it has or will remain in force for longer than the fourteen-day period identified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). See, e.g., id.
We are satisfied that in the extraordinary circumstances of this case, the district court’s order possesses the qualities of an appealable preliminary injunction. The parties vigorously contested the legal basis for the TRO in written briefs and oral arguments before the district court. The district court’s order has no expiration date, and no hearing has been scheduled. Although the district court has recently scheduled briefing on the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction, it is apparent from the district court’s scheduling order that the TRO will remain in effect for longer than fourteen days. In light of the unusual circumstances of this case, in which the Government has argued that emergency relief is necessary to support its efforts to prevent terrorism, we believe that this period is long enough that the TRO

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should be considered to have the qualities of a reviewable preliminary injunction.2
Standing
The Government argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the States have no standing to sue. We have an independent obligation to ascertain our jurisdiction, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), and we consider the Government’s argument de novo, see, e.g., Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016). We conclude that the States have made a sufficient showing to support standing, at least at this preliminary stage of the proceedings.
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution allows federal courts to consider only “Cases” and “Controversies.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007). “Those two words confine ‘the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.’” Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). ”Standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement” and is therefore a prerequisite to our jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The “gist of the question of standing” is whether the plaintiff has a sufficiently “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” to ensure that the parties will be truly adverse and their legal

2 Our conclusion here does not preclude consideration of appellate jurisdiction at the merits stage of this appeal. See Nat’l Indus., Inc. v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 677 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1982).

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presentations sharpened. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
Because standing is “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case,” it “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. At this very preliminary stage of the litigation, the States may rely on the allegations in their Complaint and whatever other evidence they submitted in support of their TRO motion to meet their burden. See id. With these allegations and evidence, the States must make a “clear showing of each element of standing.” Townley v. Miller, 722 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013).3
The States argue that the Executive Order causes a concrete and particularized injury to their public universities, which the parties do not dispute are branches of the States under state law. See, e.g., Hontz v. State, 714 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Wash. 1986) (en banc); Univ. of Minn. v. Raygor, 620 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Minn. 2001).

3 Our decision in Townley concerned a motion for a preliminary injunction, but the legal standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Specifically, the States allege that the teaching and research missions of their universities are harmed by the Executive Order’s effect on their faculty and students who are nationals of the seven affected countries. These students and faculty cannot travel for research, academic collaboration, or for personal reasons, and their families abroad cannot visit. Some have been stranded outside the country, unable to return to the universities at all. The schools cannot consider attractive student candidates and cannot hire faculty from the seven affected countries, which they have done in the past.
According to declarations filed by the States, for example, two visiting scholars who had planned to spend time at Washington State University were not permitted to enter the United States; one was informed he would be unable to obtain a visa. Similarly, the University of Washington was in the process of sponsoring three prospective employees from countries covered by the Executive Order for visas; it had made plans for their arrival beginning in February 2017, but they have been unable to enter the United States. The University of Washington also sponsored two medicine and science interns who have been prevented by the Executive Order from coming to the University of Washington. The University of Washington has already incurred the costs of visa applications for those interns and will lose its investment if they are not admitted. Both schools have a mission of “global engagement” and rely on such visiting students, scholars, and faculty to advance their educational goals. Students and faculty at Minnesota’s public universities were similarly restricted from traveling for academic and personal reasons.
Under the “third party standing” doctrine, these injuries to the state universities give the States standing to assert the

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rights of the students, scholars, and faculty affected by the Executive Order. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 11416 (1976) (explaining that third-party standing is allowed when the third party’s interests are “inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue”; when the litigant is “fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right” as the third party; or when the third party is less able to assert her own rights). Vendors, for example, “have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976). Likewise, doctors have been permitted to assert the rights of their patients. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). And advocacy organizations such as the NAACP have been permitted to assert the constitutional rights of their members. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Most relevant for our purposes, schools have been permitted to assert the rights of their students. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 & n.13 (1976) (“It is clear that the schools have standing to assert these arguments [asserting free-association rights, privacy rights, and ‘a parent’s right to direct the education of his children’] on behalf of their patrons.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (allowing a school to assert the “right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training [and] the right of the child to influence the parents’ choice of a school”); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Pierce and rejecting the argument that the plaintiff school had no standing to assert claims of discrimination against its minority students); see also Ohio Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing similar authorities). As in those cases, the interests

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of the States’ universities here are aligned with their students. The students’ educational success is “inextricably bound up” in the universities’ capacity to teach them. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115. And the universities’ reputations depend on the success of their professors’ research. Thus, as the operators of state universities, the States may assert not only their own rights to the extent affected by the Executive Order but may also assert the rights of their students and faculty members.4
We therefore conclude that the States have alleged harms to their proprietary interests traceable to the Executive Order. The necessary connection can be drawn in at most two logical steps: (1) the Executive Order prevents nationals of seven countries from entering Washington and Minnesota; (2) as a result, some of these people will not enter state universities, some will not join those universities as faculty, some will be prevented from performing research, and some will not be permitted to return if they leave. And we have no difficulty concluding that the States’ injuries would be redressed if they could obtain the relief they ask for: a declaration that the Executive Order violates the Constitution and an injunction barring its enforcement. The Government does not argue otherwise.

4 The Government argues that the States may not bring Establishment Clause claims because they lack Establishment Clause rights. Even if we assume that States lack such rights, an issue we need not decide, that is irrelevant in this case because the States are asserting the rights of their students and professors. Male doctors do not have personal rights in abortion and yet any physician may assert those rights on behalf of his female patients. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 118.

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We therefore hold that the States have standing.5
Reviewability of the Executive Order
The Government contends that the district court lacked authority to enjoin enforcement of the Executive Order because the President has “unreviewable authority to suspend the admission of any class of aliens.” The Government does not merely argue that courts owe substantial deference to the immigration and national security policy determinations of the political branches—an uncontroversial principle that is well-grounded in our jurisprudence. See, e.g., Cardenas v. United States, 826 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that “the power to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control” (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977))); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010) (explaining that courts should defer to the political branches with respect to national security and foreign relations). Instead, the Government has taken the position that the President’s decisions about immigration policy, particularly when motivated by national security concerns, are unreviewable, even if those actions potentially contravene constitutional rights and protections. The Government indeed asserts that it violates separation of powers for the

5 The States have asserted other proprietary interests and also presented an alternative standing theory based on their ability to advance the interests of their citizens as parens patriae. Because we conclude that the States’ proprietary interests as operators of their public universities are sufficient to support standing, we need not reach those arguments.

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judiciary to entertain a constitutional challenge to executive actions such as this one.
There is no precedent to support this claimed unreviewability, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (rejecting the idea that, even by congressional statute, Congress and the Executive could eliminate federal court habeas jurisdiction over enemy combatants, because the “political branches” lack “the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will”). Within our system, it is the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a duty that will sometimes require the “[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)). We are called upon to perform that duty in this case.
Although our jurisprudence has long counseled deference to the political branches on matters of immigration and national security, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever held that courts lack the authority to review executive action in those arenas for compliance with the Constitution. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the political branches have unreviewable authority over immigration or are not subject to the Constitution when policymaking in that context. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (emphasizing that the power of the political branches over immigration “is subject to important constitutional limitations”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-41 (rejecting the argument that Congress has “unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens,” and affirming that courts can review “whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally

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permissible means of implementing that power”).6 Our court has likewise made clear that “[a]lthough alienage classifications are closely connected to matters of foreign policy and national security,” courts “can and do review foreign policy arguments that are offered to justify legislative or executive action when constitutional rights are at stake.” American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995).
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), does not compel a different conclusion. The Government cites Mandel for the proposition that “‘when the Executive exercises’ immigration authority ‘on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look behind the exercise of that discretion.’” The Government omits portions of the quoted language to imply that this standard governs judicial review of all executive exercises of immigration authority. In fact, the Mandel standard applies to lawsuits challenging an executive branch official’s decision to issue or deny an individual visa based on the

6 See also, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (reaffirming the broad power of Congress over immigration, but observing that “[i]n the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process”); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (reaffirming, in the context of adjudicating a constitutional challenge to an immigration policy, that “this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (“The powers to declare war, make treaties . . . and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”).

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application of a congressionally enumerated standard to the particular facts presented by that visa application. The present case, by contrast, is not about the application of a specifically enumerated congressional policy to the particular facts presented in an individual visa application. Rather, the States are challenging the President’s promulgation of sweeping immigration policy. Such exercises of policymaking authority at the highest levels of the political branches are plainly not subject to the Mandel standard; as cases like Zadvydas and Chadha make clear, courts can and do review constitutional challenges to the substance and implementation of immigration policy. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-41.
This is no less true when the challenged immigration action implicates national security concerns. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942) (stating that courts have a duty, “in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866) (“The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace . . . under all circumstances.”). We are mindful that deference to the political branches is particularly appropriate with respect to national security and foreign affairs, given the relative institutional capacity, informational access, and expertise of the courts. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 3334.
Nonetheless, “courts are not powerless to review the political branches’ actions” with respect to matters of national security. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 559 n.17 (9th Cir. 2005). To the contrary, while counseling deference to the national security determinations of the political branches, the Supreme Court has made clear that

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the Government’s “authority and expertise in [such] matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals,” even in times of war. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 34 (quoting id. at 61 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“‘[N]ational defense’ cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal. . . . It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“[S]imply because a statute deals with foreign relations [does not mean that] it can grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice.”).
Indeed, federal courts routinely review the constitutionality of—and even invalidate—actions taken by the executive to promote national security, and have done so even in times of conflict. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (striking down a federal statute purporting to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by non-citizens being held as “enemy combatants” after being captured in Afghanistan or elsewhere and accused of authorizing, planning, committing, or aiding the terrorist attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding unconstitutional a statute denying passports to American members of the Communist Party despite national security concerns); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding unconstitutional the detention of a law-abiding and loyal American of Japanese ancestry during World War II and affirming federal court jurisdiction over habeas petitions by such individuals). As a plurality of the Supreme Court cautioned in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), “Whatever power the United

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States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.” Id. at 536 (plurality opinion).
In short, although courts owe considerable deference to the President’s policy determinations with respect to immigration and national security, it is beyond question that the federal judiciary retains the authority to adjudicate constitutional challenges to executive action.
Legal Standard
The Government moves to stay the district court’s order pending this appeal. “A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). “It is instead ‘an exercise of judicial discretion,’ and ‘the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.’” Id. (quoting Virginian, 272 U.S. at 672-73) (alterations omitted). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 433-34.
Our decision is guided by four questions: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). “The first two factors . . . are the most critical,” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, and the last two steps are reached “[o]nce an applicant satisfies the first two

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factors,” id. at 435. We conclude that the Government has failed to clear each of the first two critical steps. We also conclude that the final two factors do not militate in favor of a stay. We emphasize, however, that our analysis is a preliminary one. We are tasked here with deciding only whether the Government has made a strong showing of its likely success in this appeal and whether the district court’s TRO should be stayed in light of the relative hardships and the public interest.
The Government has not shown that it is likely to succeed on appeal on its arguments about, at least, the States’ Due Process Clause claim, and we also note the serious nature of the allegations the States have raised with respect to their religious discrimination claims. We express no view as to any of the States’ other claims.
Likelihood of Success—Due Process
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the Government from depriving individuals of their “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Government may not deprive a person of one of these protected interests without providing “notice and an opportunity to respond,” or, in other words, the opportunity to present reasons not to proceed with the deprivation and have them considered. United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2014); accord Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry, 803 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015).
The Government has not shown that the Executive Order provides what due process requires, such as notice and a hearing prior to restricting an individual’s ability to travel. Indeed, the Government does not contend that the Executive

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Order provides for such process. Rather, in addition to the arguments addressed in other parts of this opinion, the Government argues that most or all of the individuals affected by the Executive Order have no rights under the Due Process Clause.
In the district court, the States argued that the Executive Order violates the procedural due process rights of various aliens in at least three independent ways. First, section 3(c) denies re-entry to certain lawful permanent residents and non-immigrant visaholders without constitutionally sufficient notice and an opportunity to respond. Second, section 3(c) prohibits certain lawful permanent residents and non-immigrant visaholders from exercising their separate and independent constitutionally protected liberty interests in travelling abroad and thereafter re-entering the United States. Third, section 5 contravenes the procedures provided by federal statute for refugees seeking asylum and related relief in the United States. The district court held generally in the TRO that the States were likely to prevail on the merits of their due process claims, without discussing or offering analysis as to any specific alleged violation.
At this stage of the proceedings, it is the Government’s burden to make “a strong showing that [it] is likely to” prevail against the States’ procedural due process claims. Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009)). We are not persuaded that the Government has carried its burden for a stay pending appeal.
The procedural protections provided by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are not limited to citizens. Rather, they “appl[y] to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,” regardless of “whether their

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presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). These rights also apply to certain aliens attempting to reenter the United States after travelling abroad. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33-34 (1982). The Government has provided no affirmative argument showing that the States’ procedural due process claims fail as to these categories of aliens. For example, the Government has failed to establish that lawful permanent residents have no due process rights when seeking to re-enter the United States. See id. (“[T]he returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude him.” (quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963))). Nor has the Government established that the Executive Order provides lawful permanent residents with constitutionally sufficient process to challenge their denial of re-entry. See id. at 35 (“[T]he courts must evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what procedures would satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the re-entry of a permanent resident alien.”).
The Government has argued that, even if lawful permanent residents have due process rights, the States’ challenge to section 3(c) based on its application to lawful permanent residents is moot because several days after the Executive Order was issued, White House counsel Donald F. McGahn II issued “[a]uthoritative [g]uidance” stating that sections 3(c) and 3(e) of the Executive Order do not apply to lawful permanent residents. At this point, however, we cannot rely upon the Government’s contention that the Executive Order no longer applies to lawful permanent residents. The Government has offered no authority establishing that the White House counsel is empowered to issue an amended order superseding the Executive Order

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signed by the President and now challenged by the States, and that proposition seems unlikely.
Nor has the Government established that the White House counsel’s interpretation of the Executive Order is binding on all executive branch officials responsible for enforcing the Executive Order. The White House counsel is not the President, and he is not known to be in the chain of command for any of the Executive Departments. Moreover, in light of the Government’s shifting interpretations of the Executive Order, we cannot say that the current interpretation by White House counsel, even if authoritative and binding, will persist past the immediate stage of these proceedings. On this record, therefore, we cannot conclude that the Government has shown that it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (emphasis added).
Even if the claims based on the due process rights of lawful permanent residents were no longer part of this case, the States would continue to have potential claims regarding possible due process rights of other persons who are in the United States, even if unlawfully, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 693; non-immigrant visaholders who have been in the United States but temporarily departed or wish to temporarily depart, see Landon, 459 U.S. 33-34; refugees, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note 8; and applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident or an institution that might have rights of its own to assert, see Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972). Accordingly, the Government has not demonstrated that the States lack viable claims based

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on the due process rights of persons who will suffer injuries to protected interests due to the Executive Order. Indeed, the existence of such persons is obvious.
The Government argues that, even if the States have shown that they will likely succeed on some of their procedural due process claims, the district court nevertheless erred by issuing an “overbroad” TRO. Specifically, the Government argues that the TRO is overbroad in two independent respects: (1) the TRO extends beyond lawful permanent residents, and covers aliens who cannot assert cognizable liberty interests in connection with travelling into and out of the United States, and (2) the TRO applies nationwide, and enjoins application of the Executive Order outside Washington and Minnesota. We decline to modify the scope of the TRO in either respect.
First, we decline to limit the scope of the TRO to lawful permanent residents and the additional category more recently suggested by the Government, in its reply memorandum, “previously admitted aliens who are temporarily abroad now or who wish to travel and return to the United States in the future.” That limitation on its face omits aliens who are in the United States unlawfully, and those individuals have due process rights as well. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. That would also omit claims by citizens who have an interest in specific non-citizens’ ability to travel to the United States. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (six Justices declining to adopt a rule that would categorically bar U.S. citizens from asserting cognizable liberty interests in the receipt of visas by alien spouses). There might be persons covered by the TRO who do not have viable due process claims, but the Government’s proposed revision leaves out at least some who do.

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Second, we decline to limit the geographic scope of the TRO. The Fifth Circuit has held that such a fragmented immigration policy would run afoul of the constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform immigration law and policy. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). At this stage of the litigation, we do not need to and do not reach such a legal conclusion for ourselves, but we cannot say that the Government has established that a contrary view is likely to prevail. Moreover, even if limiting the geographic scope of the injunction would be desirable, the Government has not proposed a workable alternative form of the TRO that accounts for the nation’s multiple ports of entry and interconnected transit system and that would protect the proprietary interests of the States at issue here while nevertheless applying only within the States’ borders.
More generally, even if the TRO might be overbroad in some respects, it is not our role to try, in effect, to rewrite the Executive Order. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995) (declining to rewrite a statute to eliminate constitutional defects); cf. Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 516 (1964) (invalidating a restriction on freedom of travel despite the existence of constitutional applications). The political branches are far better equipped to make appropriate distinctions. For now, it is enough for us to conclude that the Government has failed to establish that it will likely succeed on its due process argument in this appeal.
Likelihood of Success—Religious Discrimination
The First Amendment prohibits any “law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. A law that has a religious, not secular, purpose violates that clause,

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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), as does one that “officially prefer[s] [one religious denomination] over another,” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). The Supreme Court has explained that this is because endorsement of a religion “sends the ancillary message to . . . nonadherents ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). The Equal Protection Clause likewise prohibits the Government from impermissibly discriminating among persons based on religion. De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 50 (9th Cir. 1978).
The States argue that the Executive Order violates the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses because it was intended to disfavor Muslims. In support of this argument, the States have offered evidence of numerous statements by the President about his intent to implement a “Muslim ban” as well as evidence they claim suggests that the Executive Order was intended to be that ban, including sections 5(b) and 5(e) of the Order. It is well established that evidence of purpose beyond the face of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment and Equal Protection Clause claims. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. . . . Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”); Larson, 456 U.S. at 254-55 (holding that a facially neutral statute violated the Establishment Clause in light of legislative history demonstrating an intent to apply regulations only to minority religions); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-

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68 (1977) (explaining that circumstantial evidence of intent, including the historical background of the decision and statements by decisionmakers, may be considered in evaluating whether a governmental action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose).
The States’ claims raise serious allegations and present significant constitutional questions. In light of the sensitive interests involved, the pace of the current emergency proceedings, and our conclusion that the Government has not met its burden of showing likelihood of success on appeal on its arguments with respect to the due process claim, we reserve consideration of these claims until the merits of this appeal have been fully briefed.
The Balance of Hardships and the Public Interest
The Government has not shown that a stay is necessary to avoid irreparable injury. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Although we agree that “the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order,” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010), the Government has done little more than reiterate that fact. Despite the district court’s and our own repeated invitations to explain the urgent need for the Executive Order to be placed immediately into effect, the Government submitted no evidence to rebut the States’ argument that the district court’s order merely returned the nation temporarily to the position it has occupied for many previous years.
The Government has pointed to no evidence that any alien from any of the countries named in the Order has

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perpetrated a terrorist attack in the United States.7 Rather than present evidence to explain the need for the Executive Order, the Government has taken the position that we must not review its decision at all.8 We disagree, as explained above.
To the extent that the Government claims that it has suffered an institutional injury by erosion of the separation of powers, that injury is not “irreparable.” It may yet pursue and vindicate its interests in the full course of this litigation. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is the resolution of the case on the merits, not whether the injunction is stayed pending appeal, that will affect those principles.”).

7 Although the Government points to the fact that Congress and the Executive identified the seven countries named in the Executive Order as countries of concern in 2015 and 2016, the Government has not offered any evidence or even an explanation of how the national security concerns that justified those designations, which triggered visa requirements, can be extrapolated to justify an urgent need for the Executive Order to be immediately reinstated.
8 In addition, the Government asserts that, “[u]nlike the President, courts do not have access to classified information about the threat posed by terrorist organizations operating in particular nations, the efforts of those organizations to infiltrate the United States, or gaps in the vetting process.” But the Government may provide a court with classified information. Courts regularly receive classified information under seal and maintain its confidentiality. Regulations and rules have long been in place for that. 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(c) (describing Department of Justice procedures to protect classified materials in civil cases); 28 C.F.R. § 17.46(c) (“Members of Congress, Justices of the United States Supreme Court, and Judges of the United States Courts of Appeal and District Courts do not require a determination of their eligibility for access to classified information . . . .”); W.D. Wash. Civ. L.R. 5(g) (providing procedures governing filings under seal).

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By contrast, the States have offered ample evidence that if the Executive Order were reinstated even temporarily, it would substantially injure the States and multiple “other parties interested in the proceeding.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). When the Executive Order was in effect, the States contend that the travel prohibitions harmed the States’ university employees and students, separated families, and stranded the States’ residents abroad. These are substantial injuries and even irreparable harms. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976))).
The Government suggests that the Executive Order’s discretionary waiver provisions are a sufficient safety valve for those who would suffer unnecessarily, but it has offered no explanation for how these provisions would function in practice: how would the “national interest” be determined, who would make that determination, and when? Moreover, as we have explained above, the Government has not otherwise explained how the Executive Order could realistically be administered only in parts such that the injuries listed above would be avoided.
Finally, in evaluating the need for a stay, we must consider the public interest generally. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Aspects of the public interest favor both sides, as evidenced by the massive attention this case has garnered at even the most preliminary stages. On the one hand, the public has a powerful interest in national security and in the ability of an elected president to enact policies. And on the other, the public also has an interest in free flow of travel, in avoiding separation of families, and in freedom from

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discrimination. We need not characterize the public interest more definitely than this; when considered alongside the hardships discussed above, these competing public interests do not justify a stay.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the emergency motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED.

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 11-4 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 3 PageID# 297

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------- X
HAMEED KHALID DARWEESH and HAIDER SAMEER ABDULKHALEQ ALSHA WI, 011 beltalf oftltemselves and otlters similarly situated,
Petitioners,
- against -

DECISION AND ORDER 17 Civ. 480 (AMD)

DONALD TRUMP, President oft/1e United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ("OHS"); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ("CBP"); JOHN KELLY, Secretary of DHS; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN,Acting Commissioner ofCBP; JAMES T. MADDEN, New York Field Director, CBP,,

Respondents. ---------------------------------------------------------------X ANN DONNELLY, District Judge.
On January 28, 2017, the petitioners filed an Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.
IT APPEARING to the Court from the Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal, the other submissions, the arguments of counsel, and the hearing held on the 28th of January, 201 7,
1. The petitioners have a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the removal of the petitioner and others similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution;

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 11-4 Filed 03/13/17 Page 2 of 3 PageID# 298
2. There is imminent danger that, absent the stay of removal, there will be substantial and irreparable injury to refugees, visa-holders, and other individuals from nations subject to the January 27, 2017 Executive Order;
3. The issuance of the stay of removal will not injure the other parties interested in the proceeding;
4. It is appropriate and just that, pending completion of a hearing before the Court on the merits of the Petition, that the Respondents be enjoined and restrained from the commission of further acts and misconduct in violation of the Constitution as described in the Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal. WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondents, their officers,
agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all members and persons acting in concert or participation with them, from the date of this Order, are
ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from, in any manner or by any means, removing individuals with refugee applications approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen legally authorized to enter the United States.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to assure compliance with the Court's order, the Court directs service of this Order upon the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of New York, and further directs the United States Marshals Service to take those actions deemed necessary to enforce the provisions and prohibitions set forth in this Order.

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SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York January 28, 2017

M. Donnelly nited States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

Tareq Aqel Mohammed Aziz and
Ammar Aqel Mohammed Aziz, by their next friend,
Aqel Muhammad Aziz, and
John Does 1-60,
Petitioners,

Case No. 1:17-cv-116 Date: January 28, 2017

v.

DONALD TRUMP, President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (“DHS”); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (“CBP”); JOHN KELLY, Secretary of DHS; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting Commissioner of CBP; and WAYNE BIONDI, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Port Director of the Area Port of Washington Dulles,

Respondents.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the Court orders that: a) respondents shall permit lawyers access to all legal permanent residents being detained at Dulles International Airport; b) respondents are forbidden from removing petitioners—lawful permanent residents at Dulles International Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of this Order.

Dates: January 28, 2017 1

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1 Matt Adams Glenda Aldana Madrid
2 NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT
3 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98104
4 (206) 957-8611

5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

7

AT SEATTLE

8 _______________________________________

9 John DOE 1, John DOE 2

)

10

)

Petitioners,

)

11

v.

)

12

) Case No.: C17-126

Donald TRUMP; President of the United States )

13 of America; John F. Kelly, Secretary of the

) Agency No. A

14 Department of Homeland Security;

)

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ) ORDER GRANTING EMERGENCY

15 KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting

) MOTION FOR STAY OF REMOVAL

16 Commissioner of Customs and Border

)

17 18

Protection; CUSTOMS AND BORDER

)

PROTECTION; and the UNITED STATES OF

) )

AMERICA,

)

19

)

Respondents.

)

20

)

21

)

) 22

23
ORDER- 1 -
24 P e t i t i o n f o r W r i t o f H a b e a s C o r p u s
25

Northwest Immigrant Rights Project 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98104 Tel: 206 957-8611

26

27

28

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1

2

THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO THE COURT UPON PETITIONERS’

3 EMERGENCY ORDER FOR STAY OF REMOVAL, AND THE COURT HAVING
4 CONSIDERED THE EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 5
DOCKET NO. 1, AND THE MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY, DOCKET NO. 2, 6 7 HEREBY GRANTS THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

8 1. THE COURTS GRANTS A STAY OF REMOVAL.
9

10

2. DEFENDANTS ARE ENJOINED FROM REMOVING JOHN DOE I AND

11 JOHN DOE II FROM THE UNITED STATES PENDING FURTHER ORDER
12

13

OF THE COURT.

14

3. The Court SETS a hearing for 10:00 a.m. on Friday, February 3, 2017, to

15

determine whether to lift the stay.

16

DATED this 28th day of January, 2017.

17

18 19

A

20

Thomas S. Zilly

21

United States District Judge

22

23
ORDER- 2 -
24 P e t i t i o n f o r W r i t o f H a b e a s C o r p u s
25

Northwest Immigrant Rights Project 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98104 Tel: 206 957-8611

26

27

28

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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 Ali Khoshbakhti Vayeghan,

12

Petitioner,

13

v.

14 Kelly, et al.,

15

Respondents.

16

) )

Case No. CV 17-0702

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

17

18

19

On January 28, 2017, Petitioner Vayeghan filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

20 Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, an Order to Show Cause re

21 Preliminary Injunction, and an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order

22 (“TRO”) staying his removal from the United States, and ordering his release from the

23 custody of the Department of Homeland Security. [Doc. ##1, 2.] Before the Court could

24 rule on the TRO, he was placed on a flight to Dubai to be removed to Iran. On January

25 29, 2017, he filed an Amended Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order 26 (“Amended TRO”), which is currently before the Court. [Doc. # 4.] 27

28

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1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of TROs and preliminary

2 injunctions, and courts apply the same standard to both. See Credit Bureau Connection,

3 Inc. v. Pardini, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 2737128, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2010)

4 (citing Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless & Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1199 v.

5 Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006)). The purpose of such injunctive relief is

6 to preserve the rights and relative positions of the parties, i.e., the status quo, until a final
7 judgment issues. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th 8 Cir. 2010) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 9 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981)). 10

11

Having reviewed and considered Petitioner’s written submissions, the Court finds

12 that:

13

1. Petitioner has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in establishing that

14

15

removal violates the Establishment Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act,

16

and his rights to Equal Protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

17

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152(a)(1)(A) (“[N]o person shall receive any preference or

18

priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of

19

the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”); Johnson

20

v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506–508 (2005); Board of Educ. Of Kiryas Joel Vill.

21

Sch. Dist. V. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696, 702–703 (1994); Vill. of Arlington

22

Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1977).

23

24 2. There is a strong likelihood that Petitioner is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

25

absence of interim injunctive relief.

26

27

28

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1 3. The balance of equities weighs sharply in favor of Petitioner and granting interim

2

injunctive relief.

3

4 4. The Court must consider the public interest in upholding constitutional rights.

5

Preminger v. Pincipi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). Given the constitutional

6

rights at issue in this case, interim injunctive relief is in the public interest.

7

8

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

9

10

1. Respondents are enjoined and restrained from barring Petitioner’s return to the

11

United States.

12

13

2. Respondents shall transport Petitioner back to the United States and admit him

14

15

under the terms of his previously approved visa.

16

17

3. Respondents shall communicate the terms of this Court’s order immediately to

18

officers in Dubai, and to authorities in the airport in Dubai holding Petitioner on

19

Respondents’ orders.

20 21 4. Respondents shall file their opposition to Petitioners’ Ex Parte Application by

22

February 3, 2017. Petitioner shall file her reply by February 7, 2017.

23

24 5. Respondents shall appear before the assigned judge on February 10, 2017 at 9:30

25

a.m. to show cause why the preliminary injunctive relief sought in the Ex Parte

26

27

28

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1 6. Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re

2

Preliminary Injunction should not be granted.

3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

6

7 DATED: January 29, 2017 8 9

DOLLY M. GEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10

11

12

13

14

15

16 DATED: January 29, 2017 17
18

DOLLY M. GEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

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 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 40 PageID# 368

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.;

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. 17-cv-00120

)

Hon. Anthony J. Trenga

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United )

EXPEDITED HEARING

States of America; in his official capacity, et al.; )

REQUESTED

)

Defendants.

)

_____________________________________________________________________________/

PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

NOW COME Plaintiffs Hussam Ayloush, Basim Elkarra, Adam Soltani and John Doe Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, Council on American-Islamic Relations (“CAIR”), The Law Office of Gadeir Abbas, and Akeel and Valentine, PLC, and hereby move this Court for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, in the form requested in the Amended Complaint, in order to prevent irreparable injury to Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and interests. In support of their Emergency Motion, Plaintiffs rely on the pleadings, motions, and attached Brief in Support filed concurrently with the Court.
Plaintiffs’ counsel have conferred with counsel for Defendants, and they stated that they do not concur with the relief sought.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons discussed in the accompanying Brief, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Honorable Court GRANT their Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, and grant costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief it deems just and equitable.

i

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13 Filed 03/13/17 Page 2 of 40 PageID# 369

Dated: March 13, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
THE LAW OFFICE OF GADEIR ABBAS
BY: /s/ Gadeir Abbas GADEIR I. ABBAS Attorney for Plaintiff 1155 F Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (720) 251-0425 Fax: (720) 251-0425 Email: gadeir.abbas@gmail.com
Licensed in Virginia, not in D.C. Practice limited to federal matters
COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS
BY: /s/ Lena Masri LENA F. MASRI (P73461) Attorney for Plaintiff National Litigation Director 453 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 Phone: (202) 488-8787
AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLLC
BY: /s/ Shereef Akeel SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345) Attorney for Plaintiffs 888 W. Big Beaver Rd., Ste. 910 Troy, MI 48084 Phone: (248) 269-9595 shereef@akeelvalentine.com

ii

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.;

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. 17-cv-00120

)

Hon. Anthony J. Trenga

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United )

States of America; in his official capacity, et al.; )

)

Defendants.

)

_____________________________________________________________________________/

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

iii

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Table of Contents Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4 Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ 6 Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1 Factual Background ........................................................................................................................ 2
A. The Revised Muslim Ban ................................................................................................. 2 B. The Plaintiffs Bringing This Emergency Motion............................................................. 6
a. Plaintiffs Hussam Ayloush, Basim Elkarra and Adam Soltani ........................................ 6 b. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 – a United States Citizen .......................................................... 6 c. John Doe Nos. 5, 7 and 8 – Legal Permanent Residents.................................................. 7 d. John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 – F1 Students .............................................................................. 7 Procedural History .......................................................................................................................... 8 Standard of Review......................................................................................................................... 8 Argument ........................................................................................................................................ 9 A. Plaintiffs are likely to suffer an irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted........ 9 B. Conversely, there is no likelihood of harm to the Defendants if injunctive relief is granted. Accordingly, the balance of hardships tips in favor of these Plaintiffs..................................... 10 C. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.................................................................. 12 a. Because each Plaintiff is tangibly impacted by the Revised Muslim Ban, each Plaintiff has standing to bring all claims. ............................................................................................ 12
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b. Because the purpose of the Revised Muslim Ban is invidious and the effect is disparate, the Defendants have violated the Establishment Clause. ...................................................... 16 c. The Revised Muslim Ban is discriminatory and targets Muslims for distinctive treatment in violation of the Jane and John Does’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause. .............. 22 d. Defendant Trump does not have the authority to give any person preference or priority or to discriminate on the basis of a person’s nationality, the Revised Muslim Ban is an unconstitutional overreach in violation of Sec. 202(a)(1) of the Immigration Nationality Act.
26 D. An injunction and declaratory relief is in the public interest. ........................................ 30 E. These Plaintiffs have suffered a legal wrong as direct result of the Revised Muslim Ban, and accordingly have standing to request that the Revised Muslim Ban be set aside as unlawful.
31 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 31 Certificate of Service .................................................................................................................... 33
v

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Cases

Table of Authorities

Abourezk v. Reagan, 251 U.S. App. D.C. 355, 785 F.2d 1043 (1986) ......................................... 28 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) ....................................................................................... 16 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ........................................................................................... 14 Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).................................................................... 13, 14 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) ............................................................................. 17 Cooper v. U.S. Postal Service, 577 F.3d 479 (2d Cir.2009) ......................................................... 13 Deerfield Medical Ctr. v. City of Deerfield, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................... 9 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ............................................................... 17, 18, 20, 22 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ............................................................................................ 13 Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petroleva Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1985)
..................................................................................................................................................... 9 G. G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016)................................................... 9 Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) .............................................................................. 22, 23 Immigration Nationality Act of 1965, Section 1182(a)(3) ............................................... 28, 29, 30 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)............................................................................................ 30 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)................................... 14 Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) ................................................... 31 McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) ....... 13, 16 Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 180 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1950)........................... 8 Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) .......................................................................... 16 Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2012)................................... 12

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Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) ........................................................................................................................................ 13
Planned Parenthood Of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) ..................................... 14 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)..................................................................................... 21, 22 Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997) ............................................................... 13 Tiffany v. Forbes Custom Boats, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6268 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1992) .. 9, 12 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) .................................................................................... 13 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)................................................................................... 16, 18 Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)...................................................................................... 23, 24 Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1980)........................................................................... 8 Statutes
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) .............................................................................................................. 27 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)......................................................................................................................... 27 Immigration Nationality Act of 1965, Section 1182(a)(1)(A)...................................................... 27 Code of Federal Regulations
46 Fed. Reg. 48107 (1981) ........................................................................................................... 27 6 Fed. Reg. 44751 ......................................................................................................................... 28 64 Fed. Reg. 55809 (1999) ........................................................................................................... 27 67 Fed. Reg. 69974 (2003) ........................................................................................................... 27 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 (2004) ............................................................................................................. 27 74 Fed. Reg. 4093 ......................................................................................................................... 28 76 Fed. Reg. 49277 ....................................................................................................................... 28
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Introduction This case is not about the security of our country. It does not seek to prevent the Trump Administration from investigating or arresting individuals suspected of or who are actually engaged in criminal activity. The plaintiffs do not seek to pare back the Trump Administration’s responsibility to apply the standard Congress created to determine when to deny visas to foreign nationals who the federal government has “reasonable ground” to believe that they are engaged or likely to engage in terrorist activity. That is not the core of this action. No—this case is about the treatment of Muslims and Islam in American. It is about whether the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause will serve Muslims in much the same way those provisions have served other unpopular minorities in the past. And what makes this case difficult is also what makes it, ultimately so easy: the Trump Administration’s shameless and brazen conduct. These immigration restrictions began as a campaign promise to ban all Muslim immigration, evolved into a ban on only Muslim immigrants from seven countries, and ended up as a ban on all immigration from six countries that cumulatively contain more than 160 million Muslims—97 percent of the population of these countries. So, whatever characteristics can be attributed to President Trump’s Revised Muslim Ban, subtlety is just not one of them. Whether this Court measures the Revised Muslim ban against the Constitution or the Immigration and Naturalization Act, its unlawfulness is clear. Though the Constitution forbids the federal government from enacting policies animated by a desire to harm and stigmatize Muslims, the history and context of the Revised Muslim Ban reveal its invidious purpose. In defense of his desire to impose these immigration restrictions, Defendant Trump has variously claimed that “Islam hates us” and that “there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.” His advisors have even claimed that Islam itself is not a religion and
1

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13 Filed 03/13/17 Page 9 of 40 PageID# 376
that the United States could even become an Islamic government. And in language that leaves no
room for interpretation, Congress explicitly prohibited the kind of discrimination the defendants
are trying to embed into the immigration system.
The Revised Muslim Ban is just as transparently invidious, illegal, and unconstitutional as
the last one. So, it is up to this Court to demonstrate that the Constitution has the wherewithal to
withstand the clever repackaging of unlawful government conduct reflected in this latest executive
action.
Factual Background A. The Revised Muslim Ban On December 7, 2015, Defendant Trump made an unprecedented campaign promise that,
if fulfilled, would overtly discriminate against an entire religious group and officially broadcast a
message of disfavor against one religion. That campaign promise remains on Defendant Trump’s
campaign website (Ex. A):
DONALD J. TRUMP STATEMENT ON PREVENTING MUSLIM IMMIGRATION
(New York, NY) December 7th, 2015, -- Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on. According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population. Most recently, a poll from the Center for Security Policy released data showing "25% of those polled agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified as a part of the global jihad" and 51% of those polled, "agreed that Muslims in America should have the choice of being governed according to Shariah." Shariah authorizes such atrocities as murder against nonbelievers who won't convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.
Mr. Trump stated, "Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason
2

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13 Filed 03/13/17 Page 10 of 40 PageID# 377
or respect for human life. If I win the election for President, we are going to Make America Great Again." - Donald J. Trump The proposal was justified by a poll conducted by a firm previously run by Defendant Trump’s advisor, Ms. Kellyanne Conway. (Ex. Z). In fact, true to his campaign promise, as soon as Defendant Trump took office, on January 27, 2017, he issued Executive Order 13769, entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (the “First Muslim Ban”). The following day, his close advisor, Mr. Rudolf Giuliani boasted during a Fox News Interview in response to the question “does the ban have anything to do with religion” that, “I’m gonna tell you the whole history of it. When [Defendant Trump] first announced it, he said Muslim Ban. He called me up, he said put a commission together, show me the right way to do it legally. I put a commission together… and what we did was, we focused on, instead of religion, danger…. And that is what the ban is based on.”1 (Ex. B). In essence, Mr. Giuliani conceded that the commission was formed to find a way to accomplish the goals of the Muslim Ban, without mentioning Islam or Muslims. It is no surprise then, that just hours before issuing the Order, Defendant Trump explained that the purpose of the Order was to give priority to Christians over Muslims to enter the country.2 (Ex. C). The reality is, however, that the First Muslim Ban was much broader in some ways than the Muslim ban proposed during Defendant Trump’s presidential campaign. Rather, the First Muslim Ban would serve to expel Muslims from the United States in that it not only instituted a ban on entry into the United States of all individuals that originate from seven predominantly Muslim countries. It also prevented reentry and suspended all immigration benefits to foreign

1 Trump asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani says – and ordered a commission to do it ‘legally,’ The Washington

Post, January 29, 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-

for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/?utm_term=.c95693070fb2

2 Trump Favors Christian Refugees, Asked Advisors for Muslim Ban, January 30, 2017, transcript of interview

available

at:

https://www.democracynow.org/2017/1/30/headlines/trump_favors_christian_refugees_asks_advisers_for_muslim_

ban

3

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nationals from the seven countries lawfully residing in the United States, forcing them to fall out of status. (Ex. AA). At the same time, it provided a way into the country for non-Muslims via the “religious-based persecution” exception, which can only be claimed by individuals who are not Muslim. (Ex. V, First Muslim Ban, Sec. 5(b)). Put simply, the First Muslim Ban constituted a religious gerrymander—drawing distinctions that exclude the disfavored group—Muslims—while leaving others untouched.
The First Muslim Ban instituted a ban on entry into the United States by any citizen from seven predominantly Muslim countries, including Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (the "Banned Countries"). While the Order specified that the ban will be in place for only 90 days, the clear implications of the Order indicated an indefinite ban. The Order itself overtly implied that individuals currently residing the in the U.S. having come here from one of the Banned Countries may very well be a terrorist or have hostility towards the U.S. The Order warned that despite increased scrutiny following the attacks on September 11, 2001, “numerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes,” including those who entered the U.S. through the visa and refugee programs. (Ex. V, Sec. 1). The stated “purpose” of the Order was to "prevent foreign-born individuals" who may be involved in “terrorism-related crimes” from entering the U.S. through “visitor, student, or employments visas, or who enter[] through the United States refugee resettlement program.” Id. The First Muslim Ban further intended to “ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes towards it” or who “would place violent ideologies over American law" or who would engage in “honor killings” or “other forms of violence against women.” Id. The implication was clear: terrorists are already here and they came from the Banned Countries, of whom 97% are Muslim. Finally, the Order contemplated further action be taken against all immigrants who are residing in the U.S. legally.
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In other words, immigrants currently residing in the U.S. would be subject to a future application process that will subjectively evaluate their “goodness” before deciding whether to revoke their lawful status.
Recognizing the unlawfulness of the First Muslim Ban, the Ninth Circuit Court upheld a nationwide injunction. In response, the Defendants immediately began to formulate a revised executive order. On February 21, 2017, prior to Defendant Trump signing the Revised Muslim Ban, Presidential Senior Advisor Stephen Miller explained that the revised order was “going to have the same basic policy outcome for the country,” confirming that the objective to ban as much Muslim immigration as the administration believes the judiciary will allow remained unchanged.3 (Ex. D).
A few days later, on March 6, 2017, Defendant Trump signed Executive Order 13780, entitled “Executive Order Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States (hereinafter the “Revised Muslim Ban”), that revoked the First Muslim Ban (Ex. W, Sec. 13) and creates a framework that although neutral on its face, carries through the same invidious intent insofar it essentially seeks to preserve a portion of the First Muslim Ban. The Revised Muslim Ban also establishes a case-by-case waiver scheme that the Trump administration can utilize to implement all of the religion-conscious, anti-Muslim preferences envisioned by the First Muslim ban. (Ex. W, Revised Muslim Ban, Sec. 3(a)).
Notably, the Revised Muslim Ban spends a significant amount of space defending the First Muslim Ban, claiming that “Defendant Trump exercised [his] authority under Article II of the
3 Stephen Miller’s Fox News interview is coming back to haunt President Trump, The Washington Post, March 9, 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/03/09/stephen-millers-fox-newsinterview-is-coming-back-to-haunt-president-trump/?utm_term=.d96e059c6a60
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Constitution and under section 212(f) of the INA” by issuing it, and that it did not discriminate on the basis of religion:
Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any particular religion. While that order allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities -- whoever they are and wherever they reside – to avail themselves of the USRAP in light of their particular challenges and circumstances. (Ex. W, Sec. 1(b)(iv)). In the end, the Revised Muslim Ban maintains part of the immigration ban that the First Muslim Ban imposed: the part that prohibits nonimmigrant, nonresident Muslims from traveling to the United States.
B. The Plaintiffs Bringing This Emergency Motion a. Plaintiffs Hussam Ayloush, Basim Elkarra and Adam Soltani
Plaintiffs Hussam Ayloush, Basim Elkarra and Adam Soltani are American Muslims that are no longer able to bring their family members from Syria and Iran to visit them in the United States as a direct result of the Revised Muslim Ban as they otherwise would. They are prominent civil rights and grassroots activists that have had to change their conduct adversely in that they have been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted or stigmatized by the First Muslim Ban, push back against the anti-Muslim sentiment fomented and legitimized by Defendants, and defend their religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
b. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 – a United States Citizen John Doe No. 6 is a Muslim and citizen of the United States. He recently filed for a marriage petition for his wife, who is currently pregnant with their child. His wife is a Sudanese Muslim residing outside the United States. His application for his wife, however will be subjected
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to a more onerous application process that will require her to make heightened showings to obtain a waiver from the Revised Muslim Ban, pursuant to Sec. 3(c)(iv) of the Revised Muslim Ban, based solely on her Sudanese national origin.
c. John Doe Nos. 5, 7 and 8 – Legal Permanent Residents John Doe No. 7 is a Syrian Muslim who is a legal permanent resident residing in the United States. John Doe Nos. 5 and 8 are both Sudanese Muslims who have also been granted a legal permanent resident status and lawfully residing in the United States. John Doe Nos. 5 and 7 each filed marriage petitions for their wives, which remain pending as of this date. Under the terms of the Revised Muslim Ban, once their marriage petitions are approved and their wives apply for a visa to enter the United States, their wives’ visa applications will be subject to a more onerous application process that will require her to make heightened showings to obtain a waiver from the Revised Muslim Ban. John Doe No. 8 filed a marriage petition for his wife, which was approved. She applied for a visa to enter the United States to reunite with her husband; however, her visa application remains pending. Under the terms of the Revised Muslim Ban, his wife’s visa application will also be subject to a more onerous application process that will require her to make heightened showings to obtain a waiver from the Revised Muslim Ban.
d. John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 – F1 Students Plaintiff John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 are Muslim students of Somali and Yemeni national origin respectively, that are residing in the United States. Each were issued single-entry visas and have F-1 status expiring on the anticipated date of completion of their education. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 travel outside the country—travel that both intend to undertake—they will be subjected to a a more onerous application process that will require them to make heightened showings to obtain a waiver from the Revised Muslim Ban.
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As a result, Plaintiff John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 are forced to avoid traveling in order to avoid risking forfeiting their F-1 status and jeopardizing their education. This inability to travel imposes a particular hardship because students frequently lose access to student housing during scheduled curriculum breaks, and if they are unable to travel home during those breaks, they risk re-entry and thereby their education. Yet even if housing accommodations during breaks were provided, the Revised Muslim Ban effectively deprives John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 from seeing their families, and they will be forced to miss out on holidays, weddings and funerals, for possibly the entire duration of their academic career.
Procedural History Executive Order 13769 entitled “Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals,” was issued by Defendants on January 27, 2017 (the “First Muslim Ban”). Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, three days later, on January 30, 2017. [Dkt. 1]. After the Ninth Circuit Court upheld a nationwide injunction of Executive Order 13769, Defendants issued Executive Order 13780 entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” (the “Revised Muslim Ban”) on March 6, 2017. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief on March 10, 2017. [Dkt. 11]. Defendants were properly served with a copy of the summons and complaint. The proofs of service, which have been mailed for filing with the Court. (Ex. X).
Standard of Review “The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully investigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity.” Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980); Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 180 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1950). To obtain relief prior to the end of a case, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are (1) “likely to succeed on the merits,” (2)
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“likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) that the “balance of hardships tips in [their] favor, and (4) that “the requested injunction is in the public interest.” G. G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd, 822 F.3d 709, 724 (4th Cir. 2016). Because the purpose of a preliminary injunction standard is to “preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits,” the rules of evidence do not apply. Id. at 725. While “admissible evidence may be more persuasive than inadmissible evidence,” a court may consider both. Id. Indeed, in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, “district courts may look to, and indeed in appropriate circumstances rely on, hearsay or other inadmissible evidence.” Id. at 726.
Argument A. Plaintiffs are likely to suffer an irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted. If the Court does not enjoin the Revised Muslim Ban, each of the Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm, including violations of their First Amendment rights under the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. For this reason alone, the Revised Muslim Ban imposes an irreparable injury on the Plaintiffs bringing this Motion. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the deprivation of First Amendment rights “unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). “[A]n 'injury or claim is “irreparable” if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.’” Tiffany v. Forbes Custom Boats, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6268 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1992) (quoting Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petroleva Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Deerfield Medical Ctr. v. City of Deerfield, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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B. Conversely, there is no likelihood of harm to the Defendants if injunctive relief is granted. Accordingly, the balance of hardships tips in favor of these Plaintiffs.
Defendants cannot show a likelihood of harm if this Court was to grant the injunctive relief Plaintiffs are seeking. Accordingly, the balance of hardships clearly tips in favor of these Plaintiffs.
Defendant Trump called for his “Muslim Ban” in the immediate aftermath of the San Bernardino shooting. That shooting was perpetrated by an American-born citizen and a lawful permanent resident born in Pakistan. His proposed Muslim ban, however, would not have affected the ability of the American born, citizen shooter to attack. And certainly, neither this executive order nor the prior, now-enjoined one, would affect immigration from Pakistan. Thus, the proposed Muslim ban was aimed more at capturing and benefiting from the anti-Muslim sentiment that was sweeping the country than at addressing some security gap.
Indeed, the justification of this ban on Muslim immigration was not simply a manner of migration flows. The Muslim ban, instead, was conceived by then-Candidate Trump as a broadside against Islam itself. The announcement of the Muslim ban explained that “25% of those polled [600 Muslims living in the United States] agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified as a part of the global jihad” and that “51%... agreed that Muslims in American should have the choice of being governed according to Shariah.” (Ex. A). Thencandidate Trump’s announcement even dipped his toe into theology, opining that “Shariah authorizes such atrocities as murder against non-believers who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women. Id.
In the immediate aftermath of the Orlando Shooting, during which Omar Mateen shot and killed 49 people, Defendant Trump doubled down on his proposed Muslim ban explaining that “they’re pouring in and we don’t know what we’re doing.” (Ex. E). He presented his Muslim ban
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as a response to the Orlando Shooting even though the attacker was born in New York. Thencandidate Trump reasoned that “the only reason the killer was in America in the first place was because we allowed his family to come here” from Afghanistan. Id. Indeed, he explained that “the Boston bombers came here through political asylum,” one of whom was born in the former Soviet Union while the other was born in Kyrgyzstan, and one of the San Bernardino shooters “was the child of immigrants from Pakistan.” In all cases, he saw his Muslim ban as preventing Muslims from settling inside the United States where they may have kids who, decades later, will be more likely to commit acts of terrorism.
This disconnect became even more pronounced when Defendant Trump issued both Orders. Their scope did not include Afghanistan—from which the Orlando Shooter’s parents immigrated. They did not include Pakistan, Russia, or Kyrgyzstan—from which one of the San Bernardino shooters and both Boston Bombers immigrated. Nor did they include any of the countries from which a terrorist killer immigrated.
The preamble to the Revised Muslim Ban emphasizes that the visa process “plays a crucial role in detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering” the country. (Ex. V, Sec. 1). It highlights the fact that the 9/11 hijackers, who were “19 foreign nationals” from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates, were given visas, and that “[n]umerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes since September 11, 2001.” Id. But among those who have perpetrated deadly acts of terrorism inside the United States, none were from any of the seven countries affected. (Ex. F). In fact, between Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and Libya—there have only been 17 actual terrorists who have immigrated from those countries to the United States and “committed or were convicted of attempting to commit a terrorist attack on U.S. soil from 1975 through 2015.” (Ex.
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G). If Defendant Trump intended to prevent foreign nationals from committing acts of terrorism inside the United States, one would expect that countries from which the greatest number of terrorists have emerged to be included in the ban—countries like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the latter being the country of origin for more foreign national terrorists than the seven countries combined. Id. Instead, the Orders include Libya and Syria, from which exactly zero killers have immigrated, as well as Somalia and Yemen, which have together produced just one.
In short, the disconnect between the events that Defendant Trump relied upon to justify his propose Muslim ban and the language of the Orders – including the Revised Muslim Ban – he issued reveal that the intent was invidious and not grounded in a purpose to address security. Thus, the likelihood of harm clearly tips in favor of Plaintiffs, and issuance of injunctive relief is warranted.
C. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits. A showing of likelihood of success on the merits is required “only if there is no imbalance of hardship in favor of the plaintiff.” Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d at 808. Only in the event where a plaintiff is unable to show that the hardship balance tips in his favor, will they be required to show a clear and convincing likelihood of success on the merits. Tiffany v. Forbes Custom Boats, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6268 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1992).
a. Because each Plaintiff is tangibly impacted by the Revised Muslim Ban, each Plaintiff has standing to bring all claims.
First Amendment standing is unique. The courts are willing to recognize intangible harms due to the spiritual nature of the claims. In the Fourth Circuit, for example,, “plaintiffs have been found to possess standing when they are ‘spiritual[ly] affront[ed]’ as a result of ‘direct’ and ‘unwelcome’ contact with [alleged religious symbolism] within their community.” Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 605 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Suhre v. Haywood
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Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086–87 (4th Cir. 1997)). “Feelings of marginalization and exclusion are cognizable forms of injury, particularly in the Establishment Clause context, because one of the core objectives of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the State from sending a message to non-adherents of a particular religion ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’” Moss, 683 F.3d at 607 (quoting McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (emphasis added). In the context of alleged Establishment Clause violations, “[t]he injury often occurs when a plaintiff comes into contact with, or is exposed to, a government-promoted expression of religion.” See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (plurality op.) (plaintiff challenging a display of the Ten Commandments outside the Texas State Capitol), or in public schools, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423, 82 S. Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) (plaintiff challenging a state program of daily classroom prayer). The injury in an “expression” case is simply exposure to a state-sponsored religious message. Cooper v. U.S. Postal Service, 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir.2009).
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has established similar principles in Equal Protection Clause cases.The injury requirement can be satisfied “‘[w]hen the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, .... [t]he “injury in fact” ... is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier[.]’” Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 372 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)). Just like in Establishment Clause cases, “stigmatic injury stemming from discriminatory treatment is sufficient to satisfy standing’s injury requirement if the plaintiff identifies ‘some concrete interest with respect to which [he or she] [is] personally subject to discriminatory treatment’ and ‘[t]hat interest independently satisf[ies] the causation requirement of standing doctrine.’” Bostic, 760
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F.3d at 372 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 n. 22 (1984) abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)).
As the Hassan court noted: “Unequal treatment is ‘a type of personal injury [that] ha[s] long [been] recognized as judicially cognizable’ . . . and virtually every circuit court has reaffirmed—as has the Supreme Court—that a ‘discriminatory classification is itself a penalty’… and thus qualifies as an actual injury for standing purposes, where a citizen's right to equal treatment is at stake.” Id. at 289–90 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Feb. 2, 2016) (citations omitted). See also Planned Parenthood Of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 790 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Discriminatory treatment is a harm that is sufficiently particular to qualify as an actual injury for standing purposes.”). The Revised Muslim Ban creates” a barrier that makes it more difficult” for John Doe Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 from reuniting with their foreign national spouses “than it is for members of another group will impose a John Doe Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8’s efforts to be reunited with their foreign national spouses. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 372 (4th Cir. 2014). Each has filed for immigration benefits for their wives, and their wives’ visas will be subjected to a separate and unequal waiver process that is heightened, entirely discretionary and unreviewable, pursuant to Sec. 3(c)(iv) of the Revised Muslim Ban. Once the Revised Muslim Ban goes into effect on March 16, 2017, these Plaintiffs’ lives will be impacted by this distinct process that segregates and disadvantages their spouses as compared to other citizens and legal permanent residents with spouses that are not nationals of the Banned Countries affected by the Revised Muslim Ban. The Revised Muslim Ban will also prevent John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 from engaging in international travel without forfeiting their F-1 status and jeopardizing their education, a distinct harm that has not been imposed on other foreign nationals not from the countries affected by the Revised Muslim Ban. As a result, they will be forced to miss holidays, weddings and funerals,
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among other things, in their countries of origin. While they have lawful status to reside and study in the United States, each were issued single-entry visas and thus, are required to apply for new visas in the event that they travel abroad. They will be subjected to a heightened, entirely discretionary and unreviewable process in order to renew their student visas, pursuant to Sec. 3(c)(i) of the Revised Muslim Ban. This inability to travel imposes a particular hardship on them and other similarly situated foreign national students originating from the Banned Countries, because students frequently lose access to student housing during scheduled curriculum breaks, and if they are unable to travel home during those breaks, they risk forfeiting re-entry and thereby their education. Yet even if housing accommodations during breaks were provided, the Revised Muslim Ban effectively deprives John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 from seeing their families for possibly the entire duration of their academic career.
Plaintiffs Ayloush, Elkarra and Soltani, all American Muslims, are prominent civil rights activists who have had to spend a significant amount of their time after the First Muslim Ban was issued assisting and advocating on behalf of Muslims targeted by that order and pushing back against the anti-Muslim sentiment that Defendants have fomented and legitimized through their actions. Moreover, they are no longer able to bring their family members from Syria and Iran to visit them in the United States as a direct result of the Revised Muslim Ban. The plaintiffs want to facilitate relationships between their children and their foreign national relatives, and the Revised Muslim Ban would subject their family to a segregated, more onerous visa process that diminishes the prospects of their children knowing their foreign national relatives.
Each of the Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete and irreparable harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor
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and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including themselves, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. These Plaintiffs have been personally confronted with a government-sponsored religious expression that directly touches their religious sensibilities. It is precisely Plaintiffs’ interaction with and exposure to Defendants’ conduct that gives rise to their injury.
b. Because the purpose of the Revised Muslim Ban is invidious and the effect is disparate, the Defendants have violated the Establishment Clause.
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Laws intended to advance or inhibit religion, or having either effect, violate the Establishment Clause. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997).
In the Fourth Circuit, the Lemon Test controls the outcome of Establishment Clause claim. Here, the most relevant prong for this Honorable Court to consider is the purpose prong, which “contemplates an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the government.” Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003). Evidence of this subjective intent can come in many forms, but the process for assessing such evidence requires the Court to adopt the perspective of an “objective observer who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation” of government action. McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). This legislative history includes statements made by the “prime sponsor” of government action. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 42-43, 5557 (1985). In addition to the text, legislative history, and the statements of government officials,
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both the “historical context of the statute” and “the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage” are relevant to the Court’s intent inquiry. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587, 59495 (1987). Beyond all of this, even the effects of government action can be evidence of purpose insofar as conduct that “disproportionately burden[s] a particular class of religious observers,” may serve as “evidence of an impermissible legislative motive.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
Here, the evidence of Defendants’ intent is overwhelming. To begin with, Defendant Trump alongside his advisors and appointees have repeatedly articulated their bigoted views on Islam and Muslims. At various times during the presidential campaign, Defendant Trump stated that he believes “there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.” (Ex. A). “I think Islam hates us,” was Defendant Trump’s response to a question regarding his anti-Muslim campaign promises.4 (Ex. H). Defendant Trump has likewise explained that in his view, “there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.” Id.
Defendant Trump’s bigoted, anti-Muslim views are shared by his closest advisors. During his presidential campaign, Defendant Trump’s former national security advisor, Lt. General Michael Flynn, stated his belief that the “[f]ear of Muslims is rational.” (Ex. I). Mr. Flynn has attributed the problem of Muslims committing acts of terrorism to Islam itself, referring to Islam as a “cancer.” He has even described Islam, not as a religion, but as a political ideology: “Islam is a political ideology. It definitely hides behind being a religion.” (Ex. J). A member of the national security advisory staff, Sebastian Gorka, when asked if Islam was religion, demurred and declined “to get into theological debates.” (Ex. K). Presidential Chief Political Strategist Steven
4 Donald Trump: ‘I think Islam hates us,’ CNN Politics, March 10, 2016, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/
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Bannon has said that “Islam is not a religion of peace.” (Ex. L). Mr. Bannon has said that he believes that an Islamic Republic can arise in the United States and that this process “starts slowly with the loss of the will to win.” (Ex. M). He is also reported to have said that “the West is at war with Islam” and that Muslim communities in Europe are “eroding traditional Christian values.” (Ex. N). Presidential Senior Advisor Stephen Miller, promoted something called “Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week as a college student—which, for him, was not many years ago. (Ex. O). As this Court determines Defendants’ intent, these statements—made by the “prime sponsors” of the Revised Muslim Ban—must be taken into account. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 42-43, 55-57 (1985).
Beyond the general views of Defendant Trump and his advisors, the Revised Muslim Ban’s evolution, from the announcement of a Muslim ban during the campaign to the issuance of the First Muslim Ban, comprise “the specific sequence of events leading” to the challenged conduct. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587, 594-95 (1987). Here, there is no question; the Revised Muslim Ban is but the latest iteration of the vulgar and explicit ban on Muslim immigration thencandidate Trump made a pillar of his campaign. On December 7, 2015, while running for president, Defendant Trump “call[ed] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” (Ex. A). In elaborating on how this proposal would work, then-candidate Trump explained that customs agents would ask travelers, “are you Muslim” and travelers who answered yes would not be allowed to enter. (Ex. P).
Speaking in the aftermath of the Orlando shooting, perpetrated by a citizen born in New York, Defendant Trump blamed Muslim immigration, claiming that “100,000 immigrants from the Middle East and many more from Muslim countries outside the Middle East” comprise a potential “better, more horrible version than the legendary Trojan Horse ever was.” (Ex. E).
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Defendant Trump also said “the Muslims have to help us figure out, there’s tremendous hatred there.”5 (Ex. Q). In sum, Defendant Trump generally utilized his policy proposal to prohibit Muslim immigration to denigrate Islam and to cast doubt on the loyalty of Muslims.
After the primaries, then-candidate Trump began using facially neutral language to describe his Muslim ban. However, in a presidential debate, he explained that nothing had actually changed: “The Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into a extreme vetting from certain areas of the world.” (Ex. R). His spokesperson also confirmed that the facially neutral rhetoric was not a change in policy: “No…he has not back pedaled on his Muslim ban.” (Ex. Q).
Hours before signing the First Muslim Ban, Defendant Trump explained that the Order was “going to help [persecuted Christians]” and that his intention in crafting the Order was to treat foreign nationals in the Banned Countries differently based on their faith. The text of the Order did just that. Sec. 5(b) directed DHS to prioritize “refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” (Ex. V, Sec. 5(b)).
The First Muslim Ban also included veiled references to Islam that were consistent with Defendant Trump and his advisors’ views on Islam and the proposed Muslim Ban. On the one hand, the Muslim Ban announcement claimed that Shari’ah—which Muslims consider to be the cumulative traditions of their faith—authorizes “murder against non-believers who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.” (Ex. A). On the other, the First Muslim Ban captured this bigoted thought in a subtler way, declaring that our country should not admit persons “who would place violent ideologies over American Law.” (Ex. V, Sec. 1).
5 Compilation of video footage available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hF2NpPIq5hQ
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Thus, the First Muslim Ban, which applied to seven predominantly Muslim countries and created exceptions and preferences for persons from those countries who are not Muslim, entered our world as a campaign promise fulfilled. And while the First Muslim Ban did not ban all Muslim immigration to the United States, Rudy Giuliani—who consulted with Trump on the strategy of the text of the executive—explained that this was a tactical decision in accordance with a request by Defendant Trump “to show him the right way to do [the Muslim ban] legally.”6 (Ex. B).
After the Ninth Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction against the First Muslim Ban, Defendants began to formulate the Revised Muslim Ban. On February 21, 2017, Presidential Senior Advisor Stephen Miller explained to Fox News that the revised order was “going to have the same basic policy outcome for the country”7 “with mostly minor technical differences,” (Ex. Y) confirming that the objective to ban as much Muslim immigration as the administration believes the judiciary will allow remained unchanged. (Ex. D). Although the Revised Muslim Ban revokes the First Muslim Ban (Ex. W, Sec. 3), it creates a visa scheme, that although neutral on its face, allows case-by-case waivers such that the unlawful goals and explicitly anti-Muslim religious preferences of the First Muslim Ban could still be implemented fully, and on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis. At each stage of the Revised Muslim Ban’s evolution, its invidious intent carries through. Because of “the specific sequence of events leading” to the Revised Muslim Ban, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Establishment Clause claim. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587, 594-95 (1987).
6 Trump asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani says – and ordered a commission to do it ‘legally,’ The Washington Post, January 29, 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-askedfor-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/?utm_term=.c95693070fb2 7 Stephen Miller’s Fox News interview is coming back to haunt President Trump, The Washington Post, March 9, 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/03/09/stephen-millers-fox-newsinterview-is-coming-back-to-haunt-president-trump/?utm_term=.d96e059c6a60
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While the Revised Muslim Ban includes brand new post-facto rationalizations for its ban that are facially neutral, the purpose prong of the Lemon test mandates that “the secular purpose…be genuine, not a sham.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). Here, as in Mcreary, “openly available data support[s] a commonsense conclusion that a religious objective” is the true aim of this Order. Additionally, this Court cannot “ignore perfectly probative evidence,” including the explicit push for a Muslim ban, the various bigoted views of Islam held and expounded upon at length by Defendant Trump’s advisors, and the First Muslim Ban’s religious gerrymandering that made clear its aim was to apply to Muslims alone. Id. “Reasonable observers have reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid an observer to turn a blind eye to the context in which the policy arose.” Id.
Indeed, the declared purpose of the Revised Muslim Ban is not the end of this Court’s inquiry. In Stone, for example, the Supreme Court found an Establishment Clause violation, even though the state of Kentucky explicitly declared a “secular legislative purpose.” Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980). Simply put, “an "avowed" secular purpose is not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
The government will argue that, in promulgating a rule regarding the entry of persons into the United States, Defendant Trump with the purpose of protecting national security. But even if the President has wide authorities to alter immigration rules and regulate entry into the United States, there is no exception to the Establishment Clause that would obviate the need for this Court to determine whether, in exercising his authority, the President did so with an impermissible intent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been clear that the Establishment Clause prohibits actions—that in other contexts may be lawful—which are motivated by an intent to favor or disfavor a religion.
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In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court struck down a law that mandated the teaching of creation science alongside evolution. In striking the law down, though, the Court noted that it did not mean to suggest that government “could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught,” suggesting that there could be a permissible context for requiring the teaching of creation science in schools. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987). As the Supreme Court noted, “teaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction.” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 578, 594. Similarly, in Stone v. Graham, the United States Supreme Court struck down a law requiring public classrooms to post a copy of the Ten Commandments. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39 (1980).
Even if this Court believes that Defendant Trump generally has the authority to bar classes of immigrants from entering the United States, he cannot do what would otherwise be lawful if the objective is to disfavor a religion and its adherents. The history of Revised Muslim Ban makes clear that this attempt to ban some Muslim immigration is aimed at disfavoring Islam and Muslims.
c. The Revised Muslim Ban is discriminatory and targets Muslims for distinctive treatment in violation of the Jane and John Does’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
To prove an equal protection clause violation, a plaintiff must show that “invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). “[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984).
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This Court must review many sources of evidence to determine whether the challenged government action contains impermissible intent. First, the Court should assess whether “the law bears more heavily on one [protected class] than another,” which—though not dispositive—is “not irrelevant.” Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Indeed, disparate impact provides “an important starting point” for this intent inquiry. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 252, 266. Second, the Court should review the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,” which will “shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purposes.” Id. at 267. Third, the Court must determine whether, in making the decision and establishing the decision’s parameters, the government made “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence” and whether “factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.” Id. at 267.
To begin with, there is no doubt that the Revised Muslim Ban “bears more heavily” on Muslims than any other group. Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). According to the CIA’s Factbook, which records the percentage of Muslim populations, the countries affected are not simply Muslim majority. Rather, Muslims comprise more than 95% of the population of five of the six countries: Libya is 96.6 percent Muslim, Iran is 99.4 percent Muslim, Yemen is 99.1 percent Muslim, and Syria is 87 percent Muslim. The United Nations reports that Sudan is more than 97 percent Muslim (Ex. S) and that Somalia is 99 percent Muslim. (Ex. T at 22). In sum, there are approximately 166 million people in these six countries, all of whom will be affected by the Revised Muslim Ban, and 97 percent of whom are Muslim.
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Washington v. Davis, it is “not infrequently true that discriminatory impact… may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality.” Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 229, 242. This is just such a case: 97 percent of
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the people affected by the Revised Muslim Ban are Muslim, and this “seriously disproportionate exclusion” of Muslim foreign nationals from the United States provides unequivocal evidence of the Defendants’ discriminatory intent. Id.
Second, the “specific sequence of events” that culminated in the issuance of the Revised Muslim Ban reveals that Defendants’ intent was invidious. Plaintiffs have laid out above how this Order can be traced back to then-candidate Trump’s proposal for a “total and complete ban on Muslim immigration.” That “sequence of events” provides an additional indication that the Trump administration’s intent was unlawful.
Finally, the Revised Muslim Ban was issued in a manner that both “departed from the normal procedural sequence” and ignored “factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker.” Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 267. To begin with, it is abnormal for a single policy—in this case, a set of immigration restrictions and directives—to abandon its original justification and adopt an entirely new one on multiple occasions. Defendant Trump introduced this Order as a “total and complete ban on Muslim immigration” in response to a terrorist attack perpetrated by a US citizen and a lawful permanent resident from Pakistan. He justified this policy on the basis that “there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.” (Ex. A). But when Defendant Trump signed the First Muslim Ban, he limited his order to seven countries with a combined population of approximately 160 million Muslims— approximately 10 percent of the entire global Muslim population. And instead of justifying this policy by referencing the “great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population,” Defendant Trump adopted a different rationale: “[d]eteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter the United States.” (Ex. V, Sec. 1). Additionally, the First Muslim
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Ban included a new justification: that the United States “cannot, and should not, admit…those who would place violent ideologies over American law, who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred, or those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation”—which, together, comprise a set of false, anti-Muslim smears that have been propogated at various times by Defendant Trump and his closest advisors.
The Revised Muslim Ban altogether abandons those smears and replaces the categorical suspension of visa issuance to seven groups of foreign nationals with an exception laden scheme that does not comport with the problem it claims to address. Defendant Trump again shifted his justification for the suspension of immigration from six countries on the basis that “the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts…is unacceptably high.” (Ex. W, Sec. 1(f)). At the same time, the Order permits “lawful permanent residents,” foreign nationals “admitted to or paroled into the United States” and valid visa-holders to enter the United States. The Order also creates a waiver process which, though it subjects foreign nationals from these six countries to a disparate standard, replicates the case-bycase determinations that the Order claims creates an “unacceptably high” risk of admitting dangerous people. In short, the Revised Muslim Ban now claims that the government is unable to determine who can safely be admitted into the United States to justify a categorical suspension of immigration and then demands that the government determine who can be safely admitted into the United States. The shifts in justification and abnormal policy evolution—abandoning some rationales, adopting entirely new ones, and then fashioning a policy that replicates the problem it claims to address—can be explained only by an invidious purpose.
The Revised Muslim Ban also ignores “factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker” which, in this case, include the assessment of DHS’s Intelligence and Analysis
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unit. In a leaked document that contains language that the Revised Muslim Ban draws from, DHS concludes—in the title of the document itself—that “[c]itizenship [is] likely an unreliable indicator of terrorist threat to the United States. (Ex. U). The report goes on to state that “relatively few citizens of the seven countries impacted by E.O. 13769, compared to neighboring countries, maintain access to the United States” and are “rarely implicated in U.S.-[b]ased terrorism.” Id. Notably, the report also concedes that since the start of the ongoing conflict in Syria in March, 2011, not a single Syrian national committed an act of terrorism in the United States or was even charged with a terrorism-related offense. Id. The report includes the bubble-bursting conclusion that terrorist groups “in Iran, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan remain regionally focused” and that of the 82 “foreign-born individuals” who “died in pursuit of or were convicted of any terrorismrelated federal offense inspired by a foreign terrorist organization” the top seven countries of origin were: “Pakistan (5), Somalia (3), and Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan (2),” all but one not affected by the Revised Muslim Ban.” Id. While the Revised Muslim Ban borrows language from this report regarding the country conditions of the six affected nations, it ignores the reports’ conclusion. Simply put, in issuing this Order, Defendants set aside what is typically critical—DHS intelligence and analysis. This is yet another basis upon which the Court can make a finding of invidious intent.
d. Defendant Trump does not have the authority to give any person preference or priority or to discriminate on the basis of a person’s nationality, the Revised Muslim Ban is an unconstitutional overreach in violation of Sec. 202(a)(1) of the Immigration Nationality Act.
The Revised Muslim Ban violates the Immigration Nationality Act (“INA”) for two reasons. First, it discriminates on the basis of nationality, conduct Congress has expressly forbidden. And second, the Order creates a new terrorism-related inadmissibility scheme which, in many ways, is precisely opposite of the scheme Congress has created and honed over decades.
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To begin with, Congress long ago forbade the Executive Branch from embedding discrimination into the country’s immigration system. In a statutory section titled “Nondiscrimination,” Congress made its wishes known: “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’…nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). This provision became law in 1965 and no law since has modified its terms.
The Defendants will argue that INA Sec. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), a law passed more than a decade before the non-discrimination directive—empowers the president to issue the Revised Muslim Ban. INA Sec. 1182(f) states that “[w]henever the president finds that entry of any aliens or any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” the President may “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens.” Id. Besides predating INA Sec. 1182(a)(1)(A)’s nondiscrimination directive, no president has ever utilized this section in the manner done here.
In 1981, President Reagan issued Proclamation 4865 which suspended “entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas.” 46 Fed. Reg. 48107 (1981). In 1999, President Clinton published a memorandum based on INA Sec. 1182(f) that delegated to the Attorney General the authority to screen “undocumented persons she has reason to believe is seeking to enter the United States and who is encountered in a vessel interdicted on the high seas.” 64 Fed. Reg. 55809 (1999). President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13276 relied on Sec. 1182(f) to delegate responsibilities “for responding to migration of undocumented aliens in the Caribbean region. 67 Fed. Reg. 69974 (2003). He also relied on INA Sec. 1182(f) to “suspend the entry into the United States…of certain persons who have committed, participated in, or are beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions.” 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 (2004). He also used INA Sec. 1182(f)
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to suspend entry to the United States “of certain senior government officials...who have impeded their government’s antitrafficking efforts” or otherwise not adhered to antitrafficking measures and standards. 74 Fed. Reg. 4093. President Obama used INA Sec. 1182(f) to suspend the entry of aliens “who are subject to United Nationals Security Council travel bans” (76 Fed. Reg. 44751) and well as those who are “serious violators of human rights and humanitarian law” (76 Fed. Reg. 49277). This pattern of practice is consistent with the DC Circuit’s observation that INA Sec. 1182(f) provides “sweeping proclamation power…against the danger posed by any particular case or class of cases that is not covered by one of the categories in Sec. 1182(a).” Abourezk v. Reagan, 251 U.S. App. D.C. 355 n.2, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 (1986) (emphasis added).
Not only has Congress prohibited nationality-based discrimination, it has also directed the Executive Branch to apply a specific set of criteria to determine whether an immigrant applicant should be denied entry on the basis of terrorism-related concerns. In a statutory section titled “Classes of Aliens Ineligible for Visas or Admission,” Congress again limited the executive branch’s discretion by creating a scheme for determining inadmissibility. INA Sec. 1182(a)(3)(B) directs the Executive Branch to deny visas to persons who have “engaged in a terrorist activity,” “incited terrorist activity,” who are a “representative…of a terrorist organization” or a “group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity, who are members “of a terrorist organization,” “endors[e] or espous[e] terrorist activity.” This complex statutory scheme indicates that Congress anticipated that the Executive Branch would make immigration decisions that have national security implications, and that Congress had in mind exactly how it wanted the Executive Branch to exercise the authority delegated to it.
Tellingly, this statutory scheme establishes an evidentiary threshold that the Executive Branch must meet if it denies visas to persons on terrorism-related grounds. The law only allows
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the Executive Branch to deny a visa to a person who “is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity” if there is at least “reasonable ground” for such a conclusion. INA, Sec. 1182(a)(3))(B)(i)(ii). Congress could have established a different threshold or delegated the creation of a standard of determining the threat posed by prospective immigrants. But Congress was specific; only when there is “reasonable ground to believe” that an immigrant is “likely to engage” in terrorist activity can the Executive Branch deny a visa. Id.
Displacing this statutory scheme and running roughshod over Congress’s half-century nondiscrimination directive, the Executive Order applies to more than 160 million people and excludes them from our immigration system. Even though Congress created a mechanism for denying visas on the basis of concerns of terrorism and charged the Executive Branch with administering its scheme, the Order pushes that to the side with respect to Syria, Iran, Somalia, Libya and Yemen. Defendant Trump instead concludes that “their nationals continue to present heightened risks to the security of the United States. (Ex. W, Sec. 1(e)). On the basis of this conclusion, Defendant Trump ignores Congress and simply suspends immigration from these six countries.
Moreover, in a transparent attempt to complicate Plaintiffs’ standing, the Executive Order creates a separate scheme of exemptions and heightened standards that have nothing to do with what Congress has required. Whereas Congress established a “reasonable ground[s]” threshold to exclude prospective immigrants on the basis of terrorism threats, the Order requires foreign nationals to demonstrate that a visa denial “would cause undue hardship” and that entry “would be in the national interest.” (Ex. W, Sec. 3(c)). Remarkably, the Order reverses the burden of proof that Congress established by requiring foreign nationals to demonstrate that their entry “would not pose a threat to national security” to the “satisfaction” of the consular official. Id. This scheme runs afoul of the standard Congress established that requires the Executive Branch to uncover
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“reasonable ground[s]” for believing that a foreign national poses a threat of terrorism. INA, Sec. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(ii).
The Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance of this statutory scheme in issuing visa denials. In Kerry v. Din, a consular official denied a foreign national a visa on the basis of INA Sec. 1182(a)(3)(B)’s terrorism bar. But visa denials are not a discretionary determination. Rather, “the consular officer’s determination that [the foreign national] was ineligible for a visa was controlled by specific statutory factors.” Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015). The Supreme Court emphasized that the consular officer must “show that the denial rested on a determination that [the foreign national] did not satisfy the statute’s requirements.” Id. The subtext is that, had the consular official based the visa denial on factors not identified by Congress, it would not have been “facially legitimate and bona fide” and thus open to a challenge. Id.
D. An injunction and declaratory relief is in the public interest. The final factor the Court consider is whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction. G. G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd, 822 F.3d 709 at 724. Because the history and text of the First Muslim Ban reveal an illegal purpose and effect, because the effects of the Revised Muslim Ban continue to impact foreign nationals whose visa applications were not approved pursuant to the First Muslim Ban, and because the illegal purpose and effect of the First Muslim Ban can still be accomplished through the Revised Muslim Ban via the case-by-case discretionary and nonreviewable waivers, there is no doubt that it is in the public’s best interests to enjoin the Revised Muslim Ban and to declare it unconstitutional to afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy it brings.
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E. These Plaintiffs have suffered a legal wrong as direct result of the Revised Muslim Ban, and accordingly have standing to request that the Revised Muslim Ban be set aside as unlawful.
In order to obtain judicial review under the general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the person claiming the right to sue must identify some agency action that affects him in specified fashion and must show that he has suffered legal wrong because of the challenged agency action or is adversely affected or aggrieved by that action within the meaning of a relevant statute. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). “Agency Action” is defined under 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”
Plaintiffs have each alleged that they have and will suffer legal wrongs and that they have and will be adversely affected as a direct result of the Revised Muslim Ban. Accordingly, they have standing to challenge the Revised Muslim Ban and to request that it be aside as unlawful.
Conclusion WHEREFORE, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Honorable Court GRANT their Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, and grant costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief it deems just and equitable.
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Dated: March 13, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
THE LAW OFFICE OF GADEIR ABBAS
BY: /s/ Gadeir Abbas GADEIR I. ABBAS Attorney for Plaintiff 1155 F Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (720) 251-0425 Fax: (720) 251-0425 Email: gadeir.abbas@gmail.com
Licensed in Virginia, not in D.C. Practice limited to federal matters
COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS
BY: /s/ Lena Masri LENA F. MASRI (P73461) Attorney for Plaintiff National Litigation Director 453 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 Phone: (202) 488-8787
AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLLC
BY: /s/ Shereef Akeel SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345) Attorney for Plaintiffs 888 W. Big Beaver Rd., Ste. 910 Troy, MI 48084 Phone: (248) 269-9595 shereef@akeelvalentine.com

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Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13 Filed 03/13/17 Page 40 of 40 PageID# 407 Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on March 13, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the Eastern District of Virginia using the ECF System, which will send notification to the registered participants of the ECF System as listed on the Court’s Notice of Electronic Filing.
/s/ Gadeir Abbas
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­ DECEMBER 07, 2015 ­
DONALD J. TRUMP STATEMENT ON PREVENTING MUSLIM IMMIGRATION
(New York, NY) December 7th, 2015, -- Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can ‫ﳼ‬gure out what is going on. According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population. Most recently, a poll from the Center for Security Policy released data showing "25% of those polled agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justi‫ﳼ‬ed as a part of the global jihad" and 51% of those polled, "agreed that Muslims in America should have the choice of being governed according to Shariah." Shariah authorizes such atrocities as murder against non-believers who won't convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.
Mr. Trump stated, "Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life. If I win the election for President, we are going to Make America Great Again." - Donald J. Trump

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DONALD TRUMP
Read Donald Trump's Speech on
the Orlando Shooting
Ryan Teague Beckwith Updated: Jun 13, 2016 4:36 PM Eastern
Donald Trump addressed the shooting at a gay club in Orlando in a prepared speech Monday, calling for suspending immigration from countries with a history of terrorism.
Here is a full transcript of his remarks, as given.
TRUMP: (OFF-MIKE) This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and all of the bad things and we all know what's going on, and especially how poor she'd do as president in these very, very troubled times of radical Islamic terrorism. TRUMP: Even her former Secret Service agent, who's seen her under pressure and in times of stress, has stated that she lacks the temperament and integrity to be our president. There will be plenty of opportunity to discuss these important issues at a later time, and I will deliver that speech very, very soon. But today, there's only one thing to discuss, the growing threat of terrorism inside of our borders. The attack on the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, was the worst terror strike on our soil since September 11th, and the worst mass shooting in our country's history. So many people -- it's just hard to believe, but just so many people dead, so many people gravely injured, so much carnage, such a disgrace. The horror is beyond description. The families of these wonderful people are totally devastated, and they will be forever. Likewise, our whole nation and indeed the whole world is devastated. We express our deepest sympathies to the victims, the wounded, and their families. We mourn as one people for our nation's loss, and pledge our support to any and all who need it. I would like to ask now that we all observe a moment of silence for the victims of this attack. Thank you. Our nation stands together in solidarity with the members of Orlando's LGBT community. They have been through something that nobody could ever experience. This is a very dark moment in America's history. A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub, not only because he wanted to kill Americans, but in order to execute gay and lesbian citizens, because of their sexual orientation. It's a strike at the heart and soul of who we are as a nation. It's an assault on the ability of free people to live their lives, love who they want, and express their

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identity. It's an attack on the right of every single American to live in peace and safety in their own country. We need to respond to this attack on America as one united people, with force, purpose, and determination. But the current politically correct response cripples our ability to talk and to think and act clearly. We're not acting clearly, we're not talking clearly, we've got problems. If we don't get tough, and if we don't get smart, and fast, we're not going to have our country anymore. There will be nothing, absolutely nothing, left. The killer, whose name I will not use, or ever say, was born in Afghan, of Afghan parents, who immigrated to the United States. His father published support for the Afghan Taliban, a regime which murders those who don't share its radical views, and they murdered plenty. The father even said he was running for president of Afghanistan. The bottom line is that the only reason the killer was in America in the rst place, was because we allowed his family to come here. That is a fact, and it's a fact we need to talk about. We have a dysfunctional immigration system, which does not permit us to know who we let into our country, and it does not permit us to protect our citizens properly. We have an incompetent administration. And if I'm elected president, that will not change, I will tell you, that will not change over the next four years. We have an administration that will not change. But if I get in there, it's going to change, and it's going to change quickly. We're going from totally incompetent to just the opposite, believe me. (APPLAUSE) TRUMP: Thank you. With 50 people dead and perhaps more ultimately and dozens more wounded, we cannot afford to talk around issues anymore. We have to address these issues headon. I called for a ban after San Bernardino and was met with great scorn and anger but now many years and I have to say many years but many are saying that I was right to do so. And although the pause is temporary we must nd out what is going on. We have to do it. It will be lifted -- this ban -- when and as a nation we're in a position to properly and perfectly screen these people coming into our country. They're pouring in and we don't know what we're doing. The immigration laws of the United States give the president powers to suspend entry into the country of any class of persons. Now, any class -- it really is determined and to be determined by the president for the interests of the United States. And it's as he or she deems appropriate. Hopefully it's he in this case. (APPLAUSE) Thank you. I will use this power to protect the American people. When I'm elected I will suspend immigration from areas of the world where there's a proven history of terrorism against the United States, Europe or our allies until we fully understand how to end these threats. After a full ... (APPLAUSE)

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Thank you. And by the way we have no choice. After a full and partial and long -- really long overdue security assessment we will develop a responsible immigration policy that serves the interests and values of America. (APPLAUSE) We cannot continue to allow thousands upon thousands of people to pour into our country many of whom have the same thought process as this savage killer. Many of the principles of radical Islam are incompatible with Western values and institutions. (APPLAUSE) Remember this, radical Islam is anti-woman, anti-gay and antiAmerican. (APPLAUSE) I refuse to allow America to become a place where gay people, Christian people, Jewish people are targets of persecution and intimation by radical Islamic preachers of hate and violence. (APPLAUSE) This is not just a national security issue. It's a quality of life issue. If we want to protect the quality of life for all Americans -- women and children, gay and straight, Jews and Christians and all people then we need to tell the truth about radical Islam and we need to do it now. (APPLAUSE) We need to tell the truth also about how radical Islam is coming to our shores. And it's coming ... (APPLAUSE) With these people, folks, it's coming. We're importing radical Islamic terrorism into the West through a failed immigration system and through an intelligence community held back by our president. Even our own FBI director has admitted that we cannot effectively check the backgrounds of people we're letting into America. All of the September 11th hijackists were issued visas. Large numbers of Somali refugees in Minnesota have tried to join ISIS. The Boston bombers came here through political asylum. The male shooter in San Bernardino again whose name I will not mention was the child of immigrants from Pakistan and he brought his wife, the other terrorist from Saudi Arabia through another one of our easily exploited visa programs. (APPLAUSE) TRUMP: Immigration from Afghanistan into the United States has increased nearly
ve fold -- ve fold in just one year. According to Pew Research, 99 percent of the people in Afghanistan support oppressive sharia law. We admit many more, and that's just the way it is. We admit many more from other countries in the region. And I'll tell you what: They share these oppressive views and values. We want to remain a free and open society. Then, and if we do, then we have to control our borders. We have to control, and we have to control them now, not later. Right now. (APPLAUSE) Thank you.

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Yet Hillary Clinton, for months, and despite so many attacks, repeatedly refused to even say the words radical Islam until I challenged her yesterday. And, guess what, she will probably say them. She sort of has said them, but let's see what happens. She really has no choice, but she doesn't want to. However, she's really been forced, and she has been forced to say these words. She supports, and the reason is, she supports so much of what is wrong, and what is wrong with this country, and what's going wrong with our country and our borders. She has no clue, in my opinion, what radical Islam is and she won't speak honestly about it if she does, in fact, know. She's in total denial, and her continuing reluctance to ever name the enemy broadcasts weakness across the entire world -- true weakness. I don't know if you know this, but just a few weeks before San Bernardino, the slaughter, that's all it was was a slaughter, Hillary Clinton explained her refusal to say the words "radical Islam." Here is what she said, exact quote, "Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people, and have nothing whatsoever to do with terrorism." That is Hillary Clinton. So, she says the solution is to ban guns. They tried that in France which has among the toughest gun laws anywhere in the world, and 130 people were brutally murdered by Islamic terrorists in cold blood. Her plan is to disarm law abiding Americans, abolishing the Second Amendment, and leaving only the bad guys and terrorists with guns. No good. Not going to happen, folks. Not going to happen. Not going to happen. (APPLAUSE) Thank you. She wants to take away American's guns and then admit the very people who want to slaughter us. Let them come into the country, we don't have guns. Let them come in, let them have all the fun they want. I will be meeting with the NRA, which has given me their earliest endorsement in a presidential race, to discuss how to ensure Americans have the means to protect themselves in this age of terror. I will be always defending the Second Amendment. (APPLAUSE) Thank you. Thank you. The bottom line is that Hillary supports policies that bring the threat of radical Islam into American and allow it to grow oversees, and it is growing. In fact, Hillary Clinton's catastrophic immigration plan will bring vastly more radical Islamic immigration into this country, threatening not only our society but our entire way of life. When it comes to radical Islamic terrorism, ignorance is not bliss. It's deadly -totally deadly. The Obama administration, with the support of Hillary Clinton and others, has also damaged our security by restraining our intelligence gathering and we have, just, no intelligence gathering information. We need this information so badly, and he stopped it. We don't have the support. We don't have the support of the law enforcement system because Obama is not letting them do their job. They are not being allowed to do their job. And, they can do it well -- better than anybody. We need a new leader. We need a new leader fast.

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(APPLAUSE) TRUMP: Thank you. They have put political correctness above common sense, above your safety, and above all else. I refuse to be politically correct. (APPLAUSE) I want to do the right thing. I want to straighten things out and I want to make America great again. (APPLAUSE) The days of deadly ignorance will end, and they will end soon if I'm elected. As president I will give our intelligence community, law enforcement and military the tools they need to prevent terrorist attacks. They don't have those tools now. (APPLAUSE) We need an intelligence gathering system second to none. Second to none. That includes better cooperation between state, local and federal of cials, and with our allies, very importantly. I will have an Attorney General, a Director of National Intelligence and a Secretary of Defense who'll know how to ght a war on radical Islamic terrorism. (APPLAUSE) And they will have the support that they need to get the job done right, not like it is right now. It's not right. (APPLAUSE) We also must ensure the American people are provided the information they need to understand the threat. The Senate subcommittee on Immigration has already identi ed hundreds of immigrants charged with terrorist activities inside the United States since September 11th. Nearly a year ago, the Senate Subcommittee asked President Obama's Department of Justice, State and Homeland Security to provide the immigration history of all terrorists inside the United States. These Departments refused to comply. Nobody even knows why. They refused to comply. President Obama must release the full and complete immigration histories of all individuals implicated in terrorist activities of any kind since September 11th. So important. The public has a right to know how these people got here, how they came on to this great land, why are they here? (APPLAUSE) We have to screen applicants to know whether they are af liated with or supporting radical groups and beliefs, very simple. We have to control the amount of future immigration into this country and we have to prevent large pockets of radicalization from forming inside America. Not complicated. (APPLAUSE) Every - and just think of this. Take a look. Every single event, even a single individual can be devastating, and all you have to do is take a look at what happened in Orlando and what happened in other cases. Just a single event. And just one person. Can you imagine what they'll do in large groups, which we're allowing now to come here.

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Truly our President doesn't know what he's doing. He's failed us and he's failed us badly. Under his leadership this situation will not get any better, it will only get worse. And I've been saying that for a long time. Each year the United States permanently admits 100,000 immigrants from the Middle East and many more from Muslim countries outside of the Middle East. Our government has been admitting ever- growing numbers, year after year, without any effective plan for our own security. In fact, Clinton's State Department was in charge of admissions and the admissions process for people applying to enter from overseas. Having learned nothing from these attacks, she now plans to massively increase admissions without a screening plan including a 500 percent increase in Syrian refugees coming into our country. Tell me, tell me - how stupid is that? This could be a better, bigger, more horrible version than the legendary Trojan Horse ever was. Altogether, under the Clinton plan, you'd be admitting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East with no system to vet them, or to prevent the radicalization of the children and their children. Not only their children, by the way, they're trying to take over our children and convince them how wonderful ISIS is and how wonderful Islam is and we don't know what's happening. TRUMP: The burden is on Hillary Clinton to tell us why she believes immigration from these dangerous countries should be increased without any effective system to really to screen. We're not screening people. So why don't we have an effective screening system? We don't. We're being laughed at all over the world. The burden is on Hillary Clinton to tell us why we should admit anyone into our country who supports violence of any kind against gay and lesbian Americans. The burden is on Hillary Clinton to tell us how she will pay for it, her plan will cost hundreds of billions of dollars long term. Wouldn't this be money better spent rebuilding America for our current population including the many poor people already living here. We have cities, we have inner cities... (APPLAUSE) We have poverty all over and this is how we're spending billions of dollars. We have to stop the tremendous ow of Syrian refugees into the United States. We don't know who they are, they have no documentation and we don't know what they're planning and we won't unless we have proper supervisor and proper leadership in which case they're out of here. What I want... (APPLAUSE) What I want is common sense. I want a mainstream immigration policy that promotes American values. That's a choice I put before the American people. A mainstream immigration policy designed to bene t America or Hillary Clinton's radical immigration policy designed to bene t politically correct special interests. That's all it is. We've got to get smart and tough and vigilant and we've got to do it now because later is too late -- going to be too late for our country. The media talks about home grown terrorism but Islamic radicalism and that's a very, very important term -- a term that the president refuses to use and the

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networks that nurture it are imports from overseas whether you like it or whether you don't like it. Yes, there are many radicalized people already inside our country as a result of poor policies of the past. But the whole point is that we will be much, much and it will be easier to deal with our current problem if we don't keep on bringing people who add to the problem. And that's what they're doing. We're letting all of these people -- hundreds of thousands of people come in and all they're doing is adding to this incredible problem we have. For instance, the controversial mosque attended by the Boston bombers had at its founder and as its founder an immigrant from overseas charged in an assassination plot. This shooter and amazingly in Orlando was the child of an immigrant father who supported one of the most repressive regimes on earth. Why would we admit people who support violent hatred? Hillary Clinton can never claim to be a friend of the gay community as long as she continues to support immigration policies that bring Islamic extremists to our country and who suppress women, gays and anyone who doesn't share their views or values. (APPLAUSE) She can't have it both ways. She can't claim to be supportive of these communities while trying to increase the number of people coming in who want to oppress these same communities. How does this kind of immigration make our lives better? How does this kind of immigration make our country better? Why does Hillary Clinton want to bring people in in vast numbers who reject our values? Why? Explain. Ask yourself who is really the friend of women and the LGBT community, Donald Trump with actions or Hillary Clinton with her words? TRUMP: I will tell you who the better friend is and some day I believe that will be proven out bigly (ph). (APPLAUSE) And by the way the LGBT community is just -- what's happened to them is just so sad and to be thinking about where their policies are currently with this administration is a disgrace to that community, I will tell you right now. Clinton wants to allow radical Islamic terrorists to pour into our country. They enslave women, and they murder gays. I don't want them in our country. (APPLAUSE) Immigration is a privilege, and we should not let anyone into this country who doesn't support our communities. All of our communities, every single one of them. Americans already admitted four times more immigrants than any country on Earth, anybody in the world. Four times more. At least, because we don't even know who's coming in. And we continue to admit millions more with no real checks or scrutiny. Not surprisingly, wages for our workers haven't budged. In almost 20 years. You wonder why we get the crowds, you wonder why we get this tremendous support, you wonder why I've gotten more votes than any Republican in any primary in the history of the Republican Party? Take a look at that. Take a look at your security, take a look at the wages. For 18 years they've been stagnant, they've even gone down.

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So whether it's a matter of national security, or nancial security, we can't afford to keep on going like this. Cannot afford it. We owe $19 trillion in debt. And no longer have any options. Our communities from all backgrounds are ready for some relief. This is not an act of offense against anyone. It's really an act of defense. I want us all, all of us, to work together. We have to form a partnership, with our Muslim communities. We have Muslim communities in this country that are great, and we have to form that partnership. Now, the Muslim community, so important. They have to work with us. They have to cooperate with law enforcement and turn in the people who they know are bad. They know it. And they have to do it, and they have to do it forthwith. I want to x our schools. I want to x our bridges. And our jobs market, we're going to have it rocket again, we're going to make great trade deals. But I want every American to succeed including Muslims. But the Muslims have to work with us. They have to work with us. They know what's going on. They know that he was bad. They knew the people in San Bernardino were bad. But you know what? They didn't turn them in. And you know what? We had death, and destruction. Hillary Clinton wants to empty out the Treasury to bring people into the country that include individuals who preach hate against our citizens. I want to protect our citizens, all of our citizens. The terrorist attack on Pulse nightclub demands a full and complete investigation into every single aspect of the assault. In San Bernardino, as an example, people who knew what was going on, they knew exactly, but they used the excuse of racial pro ling for not reporting it. They said oh, "We thought so but we didn't want to use racial pro ling." Which was probably an excuse given to them by their lawyer, so they don't get in trouble. We need to know what the killer discussed with his relatives, parents, friends and associates. We need to know if he was af liated with any radical mosques or radical activists and what, if any, is their immigration status. We have to know, and we have to know fast. We need to know if he traveled anywhere and who he traveled with. We need to know, and we need to make sure, every single last person involved in this plan, including anyone who knew something but didn't tell us, is brought to justice, so when people know what's going on and they don't tell us, and we have an attack, and people die, these people have to have consequences. Big consequences. (APPLAUSE) America must do more -- much more -- to protect its citizens, especially people who are potential victims of crimes based on their backgrounds or sexual orientation, as you just saw in Orlando. TRUMP: It also means we must change our foreign policy. The decision to overthrow the regime in Libya, then pushing for the overthrow of the regime in Syria, among other things, without plans for the day after, have created space for ISIS to expand and grow like nobody has ever seen before. These actions, along with our disastrous Iran deal, have also reduced our ability to work in partnership with our Muslim allies in the region. That is why our new goal

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must be to defeat Islamic terrorism not nation building. No more nation building. It's never going to work. And by the way we've spent almost $5 trillion over the years on trying to nation build in the Middle East and it has been complete and total disaster. We're further away now than we were 15 years ago. For instance, the last major NATO mission was Hillary Clinton's war in Libya. That mission helped to unleash ISIS on a new continent. I've said NATO need to change its focus and stop terrorism. We have to focus on terrorism and we have to stop terrorism. Since I've raised that criticism and it's OK. I've gotten no credit for it but these are minor details -- NATO has since announced a new initiative -- front page of the Wall Street Journal four days ago focused on just that. America must unite the whole civilized world in the ght against Islamic terrorism. (APPLAUSE) Pretty much like we did with communism during the Cold War. We tried it President Obama's way, doesn't work. He gave the world his apology tour. We got ISIS and many other problems in return. That's what we got. Remember the famous apology tour. We're sorry for everything. I'd like to conclude my remarks today by again expressing our solitarily with the people of Orlando who have come under this horri c attack. When I'm president I pledge to protect and defend all Americans who live inside our borders. Wherever they come from, wherever they were born, I don't care. All Americans living here and following our laws not other laws will be protected. (APPLAUSE) Thank you. Thank you. We're going to be tough and we're going to be smart and we're going to do it right. America will be a tolerant and open society. America will also be a safe society. We will protect our borders at home. We will defeat ISIS overseas. We have no choice. We will ensure every parent can raise their children in peace and safety. We will make America rich again. We will make America safe again. We will make America great again. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. (APPLAUSE) Thank you. Thank you very much, everybody. Appreciate it. Thank you.

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Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 40 PageID# 419
By Alex Nowrasteh September 13, 2016
errorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of actions to contain it outweigh the costs. Foreign­born terrorists who entered the country, either as immigrants or tourists, were responsible for 88 percent (or 3,024) of the 3,432 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end of 2015. This paper presents the first terrorism risk analysis of the visa categories those foreign­born terrorists used to enter the United States. Including those murdered in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the chance of an American perishing in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil that was committed by a foreigner over the 41­year period studied here is 1 in 3.6 million per year. The hazard posed by foreigners who entered on different visa categories varies considerably. For instance, the chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack caused by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year while the chance of being murdered in an attack committed by an illegal immigrant is an astronomical 1 in 10.9 billion per year. By contrast, the chance of being murdered by a tourist on a B visa, the most common tourist visa, is 1 in 3.9 million per year. Any government response to terrorism must take account of the wide range of hazards posed by foreign­born terrorists who entered under various visa categories. The federal government has an important role to play in screening foreigners who enter the United States, and to exclude those who pose a threat to the national security, safety, or health of Americans. This terrorism risk analysis of individual visa categories can aid in the efficient allocation of scarce government security resources to

Catsheo1se:1c7a-tcevg-o0r0ie1s20th-AatJaTr-eIDmDostDeoxcpulmoietanbt l1e3b-y3 teFrriloerdis0ts3./1T3h/e17hazPaardgsep2oosef d40byPfaogreeIiDgn#­420 born terrorists are not large enough to warrant extreme actions like a moratorium on all immigration or tourism. Continue to full version Ţ
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The December 2, 2015, terrorist attack that left 14 people dead in San Bernardino, California, was committed by American­born Syed Rizwan Farook and his foreign­ born wife, Tashfeen Malik, who entered the United States two years earlier on a K­1 fiancé(e) visa.1 Their attack was dramatic and brutal, and it prompted calls for

Cahseeig1h:1te7n-cevd-0im01m2i0g-rAaJtiTo-nIDrDestrDicotciounms,eandt d1i3t-io3naFl isleedcu0r3it/y13ch/1e7cksPfaogreK3­1oifm4m0 iPgaragnetIsD, # 421 and even a complete moratorium on all immigration.2 Substantial administrative hurdles and barriers are in place to block foreign­born terrorist infiltration from abroad.3 Any change in immigration policy for terrorism prevention should be subject to a cost­benefit calculation. A sensible terrorism screening policy must do more good than harm to justify its existence. That means the cost of the damage the policy prevents should at least equal the cost it imposes.
Government security resources should be allocated to the most efficient means of reducing the costs of terrorism. The Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) seeks to evaluate the risk of threats and hazards, like terrorism, to help the government more effectively allocate security resources to the “threats that pose the greatest risk.”4 However, the SNRA did not include a thorough terrorism risk analysis of different visa categories.
This policy analysis identifies 154 foreign­born terrorists in the United States who killed 3,024 people in attacks from 1975 through the end of 2015. Ten of them were illegal immigrants, 54 were lawful permanent residents (LPR), 19 were students, 1 entered on a K­1 fiancé(e) visa, 20 were refugees, 4 were asylum seekers, 34 were tourists on various visas, and 3 were from Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries. The visas for 9 terrorists could not be determined. During that period, the chance of an American being murdered by a foreign­born terrorist was 1 in 3,609,709 a year. The chance of an American being killed in a terrorist attack committed by a refugee was 1 in 3.64 billion a year. The annual chance of being murdered by somebody other than a foreign­born terrorist was 252.9 times greater than the chance of dying in a terrorist attack committed by a foreign­born terrorist.
The first part of this policy analysis provides a quantification of the risks of foreign­ born terrorists entering the United States in each U.S. visa category. It does so by identifying known foreign­born terrorists, counting how many people they murdered in terrorist attacks, and estimating the costs of those attacks. The second part of this policy analysis compares the costs of terrorism with the costs of proposed policy solutions such as an immigration moratorium.

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 4 of 40 PageID# 422 Few researchers have tried to identify the specific visas used by terrorists, and none have used that information to produce a risk assessment for each U.S. visa category. John Mueller and Mark Stewart have produced superb terrorism risk analyses, but they did not focus specifically on the terrorism risk from visa categories.5 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke wrote the most complete survey of visas used by foreign­ born terrorists.6 However, their published work does not allow separating threats by country, their analysis ended in 2006, their data set is no longer available, and they did not produce a risk analysis.7 Broader links between immigration and terrorism are the subject of additional strands of research. Immigrants are overrepresented among those convicted of terrorist­ related offenses post­9/11.8 In the developing world, heavy refugee flows are correlated with increased terrorism.9
This analysis focuses on the 41­year period from January 1, 1975, to December 31, 2015, because it includes large waves of Cuban and Vietnamese refugees that posed a terrorism risk at the beginning of the time period and bookends with the San Bernardino terrorist attack. It identifies foreign­born terrorists who were convicted of planning or committing a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and links them with the specific visa they were first issued as well as the number of people they individually murdered, if any, in their attacks.10 This report counts terrorists who were discovered trying to enter the United States on a forged passport or visa as illegal immigrants. Asylum seekers usually arrive with a different visa with the intent of applying for asylum once they arrive, so they are counted under the asylum category. For instance, the Tsarnaev brothers, who carried out the Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013, traveled here with a tourist visa but their family immediately applied for asylum, so they are included in that category. Next, information on the individual terrorists, their visa types, and number of victims is compared with the estimated costs per victim and the total number of visas issued in each category. Where conflicting numerical estimates exist, the highest plausible figures are used with the intent to maximize the risks and costs of terrorism in terms of human life. The appendix lists all of the terrorists identified.

CaFsien1al:l1y7,-octvh-e0r0c1o2s0t-sAoJfTt-eIrDrDorisDmo,csuumchenats1p3r-o3perFtiyledda0m3a/1g3e,/1lo7ssePsatgoeb5usoifn4e0ssPesa,gaenIDd # 423 reduced economic growth, are considered. Only three terrorist attacks committed by foreigners on U.S. soil have created significant property, business, and wider economic damage: the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 9/11 attacks, and the Boston Marathon bombing. The costs of the government’s responses to terrorism are excluded. his analysis is concerned primarily with the cost of human lives taken in terrorist attacks.
Counting Foreign‐Born Terrorists and Their Victims
This policy analysis examines foreign­born and immigrant terrorists and so excludes American­born terrorists except for purposes of comparison. For attacks planned or carried out by native­born Americans in concert with foreigners, the Americans are excluded and the immigrants are credited entirely for the terrorist plots and murders. That choice increases the estimates of the harm caused by foreign­born terrorists. For plots that included many foreign­born terrorists and victims, each terrorist is credited with an equal number of victims. For instance, the 1993 World Trade Center attack was committed by six foreign­born terrorists; six people were murdered, so each terrorist is responsible for one murder. Airplane hijackings that started in the United States and ended in different countries — such as the September 10, 1976, hijacking of TWA Flight 355 by Croatian nationalists that eventually terminated in Paris, France — are also included. However, this analysis excludes terrorist attacks in which the identities of the perpetrators were unknown, as well as attacks that occurred or were intended to occur (but were not successfully carried out) abroad.
Sources
The identities of the terrorists come from nine main data sets and documents. The first is Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases, edited by John Mueller.11 This voluminous work contains biographical and other information related to attacks and cases since September 11, 2001. Mueller’s work is indispensable because he focuses on actual terrorism cases rather than questionable instances of people who were investigated for terrorism but then cleared of terrorism, convicted under other statutes, and ultimately counted as “terrorism­related” convictions. For instance, the widely cited March 2010 Department of Justice (DOJ) report, National Security

CaDseiv1is:1io7n-cSvt-a0t0is1t2ic0s-AoJnTU-InDsDealeDdoIcnutmerennat t1io3n-3al TFeilrerdor0i3s/m13a/1n7d TPerargoeri6smof­4R0elPataegdeID# 424 Convictions,12 included only 107 convictions based on actual terrorism statutes out of 399 “terrorism­related” convictions.13 Many of those terrorism­related convictions were for citizenship fraud, passport fraud, or false statements to an immigration officer by immigrants who never posed an actual terrorism threat to the homeland.14 The convictions of Nasser Abuali, Hussein Abuali, and Rabi Ahmed provide context for the government’s use of the term “terrorism­related.” An informant told the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that the trio tried to purchase a rocket­propelled grenade launcher, but the FBI found no evidence supporting the accusation. The three individuals were instead charged with receiving two truckloads of stolen cereal and convicted.15 The government classified their convictions as “terrorism­related” despite the lack of an actual terrorist connection, terror threat, planned attack, conspiracy, or any actual tentative steps taken toward carrying out a terror attack. That case is an especially absurd one to count as terrorism, but it is not too different from many of the other 289 convictions in the DOJ report. The second source is the Fordham University Center on National Security’s compilation of all of the trials for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) members in the United States.16 Third is the 2013 Congressional Research Service report American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.17 The fourth source of terrorist identities is the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), which covers the years 1968­2009.18 Fifth is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, College Park.19 The RDWTI and GTD overlap considerably. Sources six through nine are the New America Foundation,20Mother Jones,21 the Investigative Project on Terrorism,22 and the research of University of North Carolina professor Charles Kurzman.23
Individual immigration information for the terrorists comes from the sources mentioned above, news stories, court documents, government reports, and publicly accessible databases. Many of the terrorists analyzed here entered the United States on one visa but committed their terrorist attack after they switched to another visa or were naturalized. This report classifies those individuals under the first visa they had when they entered. The only exception to that rule is for those seeking asylum in the United States — they are counted under the asylum visa. That exception is important because those individuals usually make their claim at the U.S. border or after they

Cahsaev1e:1en7t-ecrve-0d0o1n20an-AoJthTe-IrDvDisa,Dooftceunmweintth1t3h-e3intFeinletdio0n3o/1f3a/p1p7lyiPnaggfoer7aosyf l4u0mP. aFgoerID# 425 instance, Faisal Shahzad entered initially on a student visa and then obtained an H­1B visa before he unsuccessfully attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in 2010. He is counted as having entered on a student visa.
These data sets identify 154 foreign­born terrorists in the United States from 1975 to the end of 2015. Ten of the subjects were illegal immigrants, 54 were lawful permanent residents (LPR), 19 were students, 1 entered on a K­1 fiancé(e) visa, 20 were refugees, 4 were asylum seekers, 34 were tourists on various visas, and 3 were from Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries. The visas for 9 terrorists could not be determined. The number of murder victims per terrorist attack comes from government reports, the RDWTI, the GTD, and John Mueller’s research. From 1975 through 2015, those 154 foreign­born terrorists murdered 3,024 people, 98.6 percent of whom were killed on September 11, 2001. The other 1.4 percent of murder victims were dispersed over the 41­ year period, with two spikes in 1993 and 2015. The spikes were produced by the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that killed 6 people and the combination of two 2015 incidents — the Chattanooga shooting on July 16, 2015, that killed 5 people and the San Bernardino attack on December 2, 2015, that killed 14 people. (The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing killed 3 people.)
From 1975 through 2015, the annual chance that an American would be murdered in a terrorist attack carried out by a foreign­born terrorist was 1 in 3,609,709. Foreigners on the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) killed zero Americans in terrorist attacks, whereas those on other tourist visas killed 1 in 3.9 million a year. The chance that an American would be killed in a terrorist attack committed by a refugee was 1 in 3.64 billion a year. Of the roughly 768,000 total murders committed in the United States from 1975 to the end of 2015, 3,024 (or 0.39 percent) were committed by foreign­born terrorists in an attack.24 Those risk statistics are summarized in Table 1. The annual chance of being murdered was 252.9 times as great as dying in an attack committed by a foreign­born terrorist on U.S. soil.

CaTshee1U:1.7S-.cmv-u0r0d1e2r0r-aAtJeTd-eIDclDinedDofrcoummaenhtig1h3-o3f 10F.il1e7dp0e3r/11030/1,0700Piang1e9880ofto40a PloawgeoIfD# 426 4.45 per 100,000 in 2015 (see Figure 1). The 1975­2015 rate of murder committed by foreign­born terrorists was 0.026 per 100,000 per year, spiking to 1.047 in 2001. Zero Americans were killed in a domestic attack committed by foreign­born terrorists in 30 of the 41 examined years. In the 14 years after 9/11, only 3 years were marred by successful foreign­born terrorist attacks. Figure 1 shows a single perceptible blip for terrorism on the 9/11 attacks and a flat line otherwise. Table 1. Chance of Dying in an Attack by a Foreign­Born Terrorist, 1975­ 2015
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; U.S. Census Bureau, “American Community Survey”; Disaster Center, “United States Crime Rates 1960­2014”; and author’s calculations. Note: Nonwhole numbers for deaths result from dividing the number of victims among multiple terrorist perpetrators.

CaFseig1u:r1e7-1c.vU-0.0S1.2M0-uArJdT-eIrDDRatDeosc,uEmxecnlut d13in-3g FFoilreedi0g3n/­1B3o/1r7n TPeargreo9riosfm40 PageID# 427
Source: Disaster Center, “United States Crime Rates 1960­2014”; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; and author’s calculations.
Uniqueness of 9/11
The foreign­born terrorist murder rate by itself has a single spike in 2001 and is virtually a flat line for every other year (see Figure 1). The foreign­born terrorist murder rate of 1.047 per 100,000 in 2001 is 176.3 times as great as the next highest annual rate of 0.0059 in 2015. The statistical mode (meaning the most common number) of the annual murder rate by foreign­born terrorists is zero. The 9/11 attacks killed 2,983 people (not counting the 19 hijackers). The attacks were a horrendous crime, but they were also a dramatic outlier. The year 2015 was the deadliest year excluding 9/11, with 19 Americans killed by foreign­born terrorists. Fourteen of those victims were killed in the San Bernardino attack — the second deadliest ever committed by a foreign­born terrorist on U.S. soil. The attacks on 9/11 killed about 213 times as many people as were killed in San Bernardino.

CasTeo1p:u1t7-tchve-d00ea1t2h0s-AbyJTfo-IrDeiDgn­Dboocrnumteernrot r1i3st-s3inFtoilepder0s3p/e1c3t/i1v7e, aPtaogtael 1o0f 3o,f44302 PageID# 428 Americans were murdered in terrorist attacks during the 41­year time period. Of those, 408 were killed by native­born Americans or unknown terrorists, and 3,024 were killed by foreigners.25
Government officials frequently remind the public that we live in a post­9/11 world where the risk of terrorism is so extraordinarily high that it justifies enormous security expenditures.26 The period from 1975 to 2001 had only 17 murders committed by 16 foreign­born terrorists of a total of 64 who either tried or were successful in their attacks. During the same time period, 305 people were killed in terrorist attacks committed by native­born Americans and those with unknown nationalities. The majority of those victims (168) were killed in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that was committed by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, who were both U.S. natives.
From September 12, 2001, until December 31, 2015, 24 people were murdered on U.S. soil by a total of 5 foreign­born terrorists, while 65 other foreign­born terrorists attempted or committed attacks that did not result in fatalities. During the same period, 80 people were murdered in terrorist attacks committed by native­born Americans and those with unknown nationalities.
The number of murders committed by terrorists who are native­born or have unknown nationalities is higher than the number committed by foreigners in pre­ and post­9/11 United States. The horrendous death toll from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 dominates deaths from other attacks.
Estimating the Cost per Terrorist Victim
When regulators propose a new rule or regulation to enhance safety, they are routinely required to estimate how much it will cost to save a single life under their proposal.27 Human life is very valuable but not infinitely so. Americans are willing to take risks that increase their chance of violent death or murder, such as enlisting in the military, living in cities that have more crime than rural areas, or driving at high speeds, actions that would be unthinkable if individuals placed infinite value on their own lives. It then stands to reason that there is a value between zero and infinity that people place on their lives. In public policy, a review of 132 federal regulatory decisions concerning public exposure to carcinogens found that regulatory action never occurs if the

Casined1i:v1id7u-cavl-f0a0ta1l2it0y-AriJsTk-iIsDlDoweDrotchuamne1nitn1730-03,0F0i0le,din0d3i/c1a3ti/n17g thPaatgreisk1s1aorfe4d0eePmageedID# 429 acceptable if the annual fatality risk is lower than that figure.28 A similar type of analysis for foreign­born terrorism will help guarantee that scarce resources are devoted to maximizing the number of lives saved relative to the costs incurred. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produced an initial estimate that valued each life saved from an act of terrorism at $6.5 million, then doubled that value (for unclear reasons) to $13 million per life saved.29 Hahn, Lutter, and Viscusi use data from everyday risk­reduction choices made by the American public to estimate that the value of a statistical life is $15 million.30 This policy analysis uses Hahn, Lutter, and Viscusi’s $15 million estimate to remove any suspicion of undervaluation.
There are other costs of terrorism, such as property damage, medical care for the wounded, and disruptions of economic activity.31 However, those costs are highly variable and confined to three major terrorist attacks caused by foreigners. They are the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 9/11 attacks, and the Boston Marathon bombing. The highest plausible cost estimates for those events are $1 billion,32 $170 billion,33 and $25 million,34 respectively. The combined amount of just over $171 billion excludes the costs of the government’s response to terrorism but captures virtually the entirety of the property and other economic damage. The cost of lives lost was greater than the value of property and other economic damages in every terrorist attack examined here except for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 9/11 attacks.
The DHS annual Yearbook of Immigration Statistics35 provided the statistics for the numbers of lawful permanent residents, student visas, K­1 fiancé(e) visas, asylum seekers, B­tourist visas, and entrants through the VWP. The numbers of student visas, K­1 fiancé(e) visas, and B­tourist visas issued are available from 1981 onward, and the VWP numbers are available only beginning in 1986, when the program was created. The particulars of the various visa programs will be described in their individual sections.

CasTeh1e:R17ef-ucvg-e0e0P1r2o0c-eAsJsTin-gIDCDentDerochuams reencto1r3d-e3d thFeilendu0m3b/1e3r /o1f7refPuaggeees1g2oionfg4b0aPckagtoeID# 430 1975. The annual gross inflow of illegal immigrants is estimated on the basis of data from DHS, Pew Research Center, the Pew Hispanic Center, and other sources.36 For the purposes of this report, only the illegal immigrants who actually entered the country illegally are included in that category.37 Immigrants who entered on legal visas and became illegal by overstaying are counted under the legal visa category on which they entered. There are other vastly greater estimates of the number of illegal immigrants who entered the United States from 1975 to 2015; this analysis assumes the smaller estimated number of illegal entries to maximize the danger posed by that class of immigrants.38 This estimation methodology could exaggerate the number of terrorists who entered the United States with an LPR status, thus diminishing the relative danger of other categories. At the time of writing, data were unavailable for 2014 or 2015, so for those years this paper uses an estimate of the previous two years of available visa numbers.
The terrorist risk for each visa category can be understood in different ways. The following sections will present the number of foreign­born terrorists in each visa category, the number of murders carried out by terrorists in each visa category, the chance of a terrorist getting a visa, and how many deaths can be expected by each foreign­born terrorist on a particular visa. Multiplying the number of murders in each visa category by the $15 million cost per victim yields the estimate of the costs of terrorism.
Each subsection that follows presents two estimates: one includes all victims from all foreign­born terrorist attacks from 1975 to the end of 2015 and the other excludes 9/11 because it is such an extreme outlier. The number of victims from the 9/11 attacks is more than two orders of magnitude greater than the next deadliest foreign­born terror attack on U.S. soil.39 That scale of attack is unlikely to be repeated, whereas other attacks on a smaller and less deadly scale will certainly occur in the future. Presenting the terrorism hazard data in two formats, one including 9/11 and the other excluding it, enables the reader to focus on understanding the risks from the more common smaller­scale attacks that terrorists commit on U.S. soil.
Terrorism Risk for All Visa Categories
The U.S. government issued 1.14 billion visas under the categories exploited by 154

Casfoer1e:i1gn7-­cbvo-r0n0t1e2r0ro-AriJsTts-IwDhDo eDnotecruemdefrnotm131-9375Ftioletdhe03e/n1d3/o1f720P15a.g4e0 1O3f tohfo4s0e,PoanglyeID# 431 0.0000136 percent were actually granted to terrorists. In other words, one foreign­ born terrorist entered the United States for every 7.38 million nonterrorist foreigners who did so in those visa categories. Table 2 and Figure 2 display these numbers, broken out in subcategories. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were the deadliest in world history. Table 3 gives the same statistics as Table 2, except that it excludes the 9/11 attacks. Excluding the 9/11 terrorists and Zacarias Moussaoui, who intended to participate but could not because he was in jail at the time, 134 foreign­born terrorists entered the United States of a total of 1.14 billion visas issued in these categories from 1975 through 2015. That means that only 0.00001 percent of all foreigners who entered on these visas were terrorists. For each terrorist, excluding the 9/11 attackers, 8.48 million visas were granted to nonterrorist foreigners. Of the 19 9/11 hijackers, 18 were on tourist visas. The 19th hijacker was Hani Hanjour who entered the United States on a student visa. Zacarias Moussaoui was not a hijacker on 9/11, but he was involved in the plot. His French citizenship allowed him to enter the United States on the VWP. Omitting the 9/11 terrorist attackers would make the student and the tourist visa categories look substantially safer and slightly improve the safety of the VWP. Table 2. All Terrorists, by Visa Category, 1975­2015
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on

CasNea1ti:o1n7a-cl vS-e0c0u1r2it0y-;ACJhTa-rIDleDs KuDrozcmuamne,n“tS1p3re-3adsFhieleedt o0f3M/1u3s/1li7m­PAamgeeri1c4anofT4er0roPraigsmeID# 432 Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina­Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic­terrorism/; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates. Note: LPR = lawful permanent resident; VWP = Visa Waiver Program; K­1 = fiancé(e) visa; NA = Not available. *1981 onward. ^1986 onward. Figure 2. All Terrorists, by Visa Category
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; and Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim­American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina­ Chapel Hill, http://kurman.unc.edu/islamic‐terrorism/ . Note: LPR = lawful permanent resident; VWP = Visa Waiver Program; K­1 = fiancé(e) visa.
Number and Cost of Terrorism Victims for All Visa Categories

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 15 of 40 PageID# 433 As previously noted, 3,024 people were murdered by foreign­born terrorists in attacks in the United States from 1975 to the end of 2015. Those terrorist attacks cost $45.36 billion in human life or $1.11 billion per year on average as displayed in Table 4.41 The terrorism cost equals $39.93 per visa issued over that time. Excluding the 9/11 terrorist attacks lowers the human cost of terrorism to $615 million during the period or $15 million per year as displayed in Table 5. The murder­cost of terrorism committed by the foreign­born inside the United States, excluding 9/11, is $0.54 per visa issued.
Of the 154 terrorists, 114 did not murder anyone in a terrorist attack. Many of them were arrested before they were able to execute their attacks or their attacks failed to take any lives. Including all terrorists and the 9/11 hijackers, even the ones who did not kill anybody, each terrorist killed about 20 people on average for a total human cost of $294.6 million. Excluding 9/11, each terrorist killed an average of 0.31 people, for a total human cost of $4.6 million per terrorist analyzed here.
Only 40 of the 154 foreign­born terrorists actually killed anyone. Of those terrorists, each one killed an average of 75.6 people and took $1.13 billion worth of human life. Excluding 9/11, each successful terrorist killed an average of just under two people for a human cost of $29.29 million inflicted by each successful terrorist.
Excluding the 9/11 attackers, 21 foreign­born terrorists succeeded in murdering 41 people from 1975 through 2015. Sixteen of those terrorists committed their attacks prior to 9/11 and killed a total of 17 people — an average of 1.06 murders per terrorist. Only two terrorists during this time period killed more than one person each: Mir Aimal Kasi shot and killed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett as they were waiting in traffic outside of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, on January 25, 1998; and El Sayyid Nosair assassinated Meir Kahane on November 5, 1990, and then participated in the first World Trade Center attack on February 26, 1993, which killed six people. Over time the number of terrorists has shrunk but their deadliness has increased.

CasTea1b:l1e73-c.vT-0e0r1r2o0r-iAsJtsT,-IbDyDViDsaocCuamteengto1r3y-,3ExFcilleudd0in3/g139//1171 APtatagcek1s6, o19f 4705­P2a0g1e5ID# 434
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim­American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina­Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamicterrorism/; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates. Note: LPR = lawful permanent resident; VWP = Visa Waiver Program; K­1 = fiancé(e) visa; NA = Not available. *1981 onward. ^1986 onward.

CasTea1b:l1e74-c.vD-0e0a1d2l0i-nAeJsTs-IoDfDAlDl Toceurmroernits1ts3,-3byFViliesda0C3a/1t3e/g1o7ryP, a1g9e751­72o0f1450 PageID# 435
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates. Note: Nonwhole numbers for deaths result from dividing the number of victims among multiple terrorist perpetrators; NA = Not available. Table 5. Deadliness of All Terrorists, by Visa Category, Excluding 9/11, 1975­2015
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of

CasTeer1r:o1r7i-scmv-a0n0d12R0e-sApJoTn-sIDesDto DToercruomriesmnt 1G3lo-3balFTileerdro0r3is/1m3/D17atabPaasgee; C1e8notfer40onPageID# 436 National Security; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates. Note: Nonwhole numbers for deaths result from dividing the number of victims among multiple terrorist perpetrators; NA = Not available. There were five successful attacks after 9/11 that killed 24 people, with each terrorist responsible for an average of 4.8 murders. Egyptian­born Hesham Mohamed Hedayet killed two people on July 4, 2002, at Los Angeles International Airport; the Tsarnaev brothers killed three people in the Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013; Mohammad Abdulazeez murdered five people on July 16, 2015; and Tashfeen Malik, along with her U.S.­born husband, killed 14 on December 2, 2015, in San Bernardino, California. The pre­9/11, 9/11, and post­9/11 numbers are summarized in Table 6. Table 6. Foreign­Born Terrorists and Murders in Pre­ and Post­9/11 United States
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Department of Homeland Security; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates. Foreign­born terrorists on tourist visas have killed more Americans in attacks than those on any other type of visa, followed distantly by those who entered on student visas. The 2,983 deaths on 9/11 account for all but 41 of those deaths. Excluding the 9/11 attacks, the K­1 fiancé(e) visa appears to be the deadliest (due entirely to the San Bernardino attack) followed by LPRs and tourists.

CasTeh1e:f1o7ll-ocwv-i0n0g1s2u0b-sAeJcTti-oIDnsDdisDcoucsusmtheentte1r3ro-3rismFilreidsk0s3a/n13d/1co7stsPfaogreea1c9hosfp4e0ciPficagveisIaD# 437 category. Summary data for the categories are provided in Table 7. Table 7. Summary of Terrorism Incidents and Costs, by Visa Category
Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim­American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina­Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic‐terrorism/; Department of Homeland Security;Pew Hispanic Research Center; Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System; and author’s estimates.
Illegal Immigrants
Only 10 illegal immigrants became terrorists, a minuscule 0.000038 percent of the 26.5 million who entered from 1975 through 2015 as summarized in Table 7. In other words, 2.65 million illegal immigrants entered the United States for each one who ended up being a terrorist. Only one of those illegal immigrants, Ahmed Ajaj, actually succeeded in killing an American as he was one of the 1993 World Trade Center conspirators. The human cost of terrorism caused by illegal immigrants was thus $15,000,000 or equal to $0.57 cents per illegal immigrant. As a reminder, none of the 9/11 hijackers entered the United States illegally.
Lawful Permanent Residents

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 20 of 40 PageID# 438 An LPR is also commonly known as a green card holder. An LPR can reside and work permanently in the United States until such time as he naturalizes or commits a serious enough crime to lose his green card and be deported.42 More terrorists have taken advantage of the LPR category than any of the other visa categories. From 1975 through 2015, 54 foreign­born terrorists were LPRs — an average of 1.32 terrorists per year. Over the 41­year period, more than 35 million LPRs were allowed in, meaning that just 0.00016 percent of LPRs were actual terrorists. In other words, one terrorist entered for every 644,990 nonterrorist legal permanent residents.
Those 54 LPR terrorists killed only eight people in terrorist attacks. The human cost of LPR terrorism was thus $120 million, equal to $3.45 per green card issued. None of the 9/11 hijackers had green cards.
Student Visas
Student visas allow foreigners to enter the United States temporarily to attend an educational institution such as a college, university, seminary, private elementary school, or vocational training program.43 A total of 19 students — 0.00008 percent of the 24,176,617 student visas issued from 1981 to 2015 — were terrorists.44 In other words, one terrorist was issued a student visa for every 1,272,454 students who were not terrorists.
Terrorists on student visas appear especially deadly because one of them was a 9/11 hijacker. Altogether, students caused 158.5 fatalities, or one for every 152,534 students admitted.45 The human cost of terrorism caused by foreigners on student visas was thus $2.38 billion, equal to 5.23 percent of all the terrorism costs to human life. The average terrorism cost per student visa issued is $98.34.
Excluding 9/11, 18 terrorists entered the United States as students, or one entry for every 1.34 million student visas issued. Those 18 committed a total of 1.5 murders that cost $22.5 million or $0.93 per student visa issued.
K‐1 Fiancé(e) Visas
The K­1 visa permits a foreign­citizen fiancé or fiancée to travel to the United States to

Casmea1r:r1y7h-cisv-o0r0h1e2r0U-A.SJ.T­c-IiDtiDzenDspoocnumsoernwt i1th3i-n3 90Fidleadys03o/f1a3r/r1i7val.POangcee2m1 aorfr4ie0dP, tahgeeID# 439 foreign­citizen can then apply to adjust his or her immigration status to that of LPR.46 Tashfeen Malik entered the United States on a K­1 visa sponsored by her U.S.­born husband, Syed Rizwan Farook. Together they murdered 14 people during the San Bernardino terrorist attack of December 2, 2015. Because it is unknown which attacker specifically killed which victims, this report attributes all 14 murders to Malik.
The San Bernardino attack is the only one to involve this visa. However, because of the relatively small number — 604,132 — of these visas issued over the 41­year time frame examined, this lone attack makes the K­1 look like a very dangerous visa, with a single murder for every 43,152 K­1 visas issued. The single terrorist on the K­1 visa has imposed $210 million in costs or an average of $347.61 for every K­1 visa issued — by far the highest cost per visa issued. So while it is the second deadliest visa, there is no trend of K­1 visa holders committing attacks.47
Refugees
A refugee is a person who is located outside of the United States and is of special humanitarian concern; demonstrates that he or she was persecuted or fears persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group; is not firmly settled in another country; and does not violate other immigration bars on admission such as posing a national security or public health risk.48 Refugees apply from a third country and then enter the United States after they have been granted their visa. Refugees must apply for a green card after one year of residing in the United States. Of the 3,252,493 refugees admitted from 1975 to the end of 2015, 20 were terrorists, which amounted to 0.00062 percent of the total. In other words, one terrorist entered as a refugee for every 162,625 refugees who were not terrorists. Refugees were not very successful at killing Americans in terrorist attacks. Of the 20, only three were successful in their attacks, killing a total of three people and imposing a total human cost of $45 million, or $13.84 per refugee visa issued. The three refugee terrorists were Cubans who committed their attacks in the 1970s and were admitted before the Refugee Act of 1980 created the modern rigorous refugee­screening procedures currently in place. Prior to that act, a hodgepodge of poorly managed post­World War II refugee and displaced persons statutes, presidential grants of parole, and ad hoc

Casceon1g:1re7s-scivo-n0a0l1l2e0g-isAlJaTti-oInDDalloDwoecduHmuenngt a1r3ia-3n, CFuilebdan0,3V/1ie3t/n1a7mePsaeg, aen2d2ootfh4er0rPeafuggeeIeD# 440 groups to settle in America.49 All of the murders committed by foreign­born refugees in terrorist attacks were committed by those admitted prior to the 1980 act.
Two of the Cuban terrorists assassinated a Chilean dissident and his American aide. The third Cuban terrorist assassinated a Cuban exile leader who supported a closer United States relationship with Fidel Castro. The GTD and RDWTI showed many more terrorist attacks and assassinations in the 1970s and 1980s that were likely perpetrated by Cuban or Vietnamese refugees, but no one was ever arrested for the crimes so they could not be included here.
Many of the refugees arrested after 9/11 were admitted as children, and in some cases there is doubt over whether their attacks even qualify as terrorism.50 Other refugees have been arrested for terrorism or the vague “terrorism­related charges,” but they were planning terrorist attacks overseas or providing material support for foreign groups operating overseas.51 No refugees were involved in the 9/11 attacks.
Asylum Seekers
Asylum seekers are those who ask U.S. border officials for protection because they have suffered persecution or fear that they will suffer persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinions.52 Unlike refugees, asylum seekers must apply in person at the border and are often detained before being granted asylum. Four asylum seekers, or 0.0006 percent of the 700,522 admitted from 1975 through 2015, later turned out to be terrorists. For every terrorist who was granted asylum, 175,131 nonterrorist asylum seekers were admitted. Terrorists who were asylum seekers killed four people in terrorist attacks, three of them in the Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013, carried out by the Tsarnaev brothers. The brothers entered the United States as young children and later became terrorists. Ramzi Yousef, who helped plan the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that killed six people, was the other asylum seeker. Because Yousef planned and carried out those attacks as a member of a six­person team, this report considers him to be responsible for one of the six murders.

CasAelt1o:g1e7t-hcevr-,0a0s1y2lu0m-AJseTe-kIDerDs caDuosceudmfoeunrt 1fa3t-a3litiFesil,eodr0o3n/1e3fo/1r7evePrayg1e752,313o1f a4d0mPiattgeedI.D# 441 The total human cost of terrorism by asylum seekers was $60 million, equal to an average of $85.65 per asylum seeker admission. No asylum seekers were involved with 9/11.
Tourist Visas
Tourists on the B visa are allowed to tour the United States for business or pleasure as well as enroll in short recreational courses of study.53 These are the tourist visas available to most residents of the world. The tourist visa categories were the second most abused by terrorists. A total of 34 terrorists entered the United States on tourist visas over the 35­year period (1981­ 2015) for which data are available. That is an average of 0.97 terrorists who entered on a tourist visa annually. Almost 658 million tourists entered the United States on tourist visas, so a single terrorist was issued a visa in this category for every 19.35 million issued.
The 34 terrorists on tourist visas killed 2,834 people in attacks or one victim for every 232,157 visas issued. The total terrorism cost in terms of human life by terrorists on tourist visas was $42.51 billion, or $64.61 per visa.
Eighteen of the terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks held tourist visas, so this visa category is responsible for 93.7 percent of all deaths caused by terrorists. Excluding 9/11 lowers the number of fatalities to eight and the total death­related costs to $120 million or $0.18 per tourist visa issued. Excluding the 9/11 hijackers, one terrorist entered on a tourist visa for every 41.12 million nonterrorist tourists. There was one murder victim for every 82.24 million nonterrorist tourists who entered.
Visa Waiver Program
The VWP enables most citizens of the participating countries to travel to the United States for business or tourism for up to 90 days without first obtaining a visa.54 The participating countries are developed nations in Europe, East Asia, and South America that have established security procedures to exclude terrorists and share traveler information with the U.S. government, and whose citizens rarely overstay illegally in the United States.55

CasTeh1er:1e7w-cevre-0t0h1r2ee0-tAerJrTo-rIDisDts oDnothcuemVeWnPt 1o3u-t3ofFailteodta0l3o/f1338/187miPllaiogne e2n4troife4s0duPrainggeItDh#e 442 life of the program (since 1986), or a single terrorist for every 129 million entries. That makes the VWP the safest visa category. The three VWP terrorists killed zero people. One was French national Zacarias Moussaoui, who was originally part of the 9/11 conspiracy but was in jail on unrelated charges during the attacks. The second was the British shoe bomber Richard Reid, who attempted to ignite his shoe on a transatlantic flight en route to the United States. The last was Qaisar Shaffi, who cased New York buildings for a future attack that was broken up by British intelligence. Besides those three, Ahmed Ajaj and Ahmed Ressam were apprehended at John F. Kennedy International Airport while attempting to enter the country illegally using forged passports from nations that were part of the VWP. Because they were captured at the border and their documents were forgeries, they are classified as illegal immigrants.56
In addition, a few international terrorist suspects have been apprehended while trying to enter through the VWP. These include a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, a French­Bolivian dual­national who was implicated in a 1990 bombing of U.S. Marines in La Paz, and a British mercenary who tried to buy a fighter jet for the infamous Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar.57
According to the historical data, the VWP was the least likely category to be used by terrorists.
Unknown
The visa statuses of nine terrorists are unknown. Those individuals committed their attacks or were arrested between 1975 and 1990. Only two of the nine actually succeeded, and they are responsible for 1.5 murders with a total human cost of $22.5 million.58
Immigration screening for counter­terrorism purposes is important, but it will never be perfect.59 As Steven Camarota at the Center for Immigration Studies wrote, “To be sure, in a nation as large as the United States, it is impossible to prevent terrorists from entering the country 100 percent of the time.”60 Even though terrorists rarely

Casaech1i:e1v7e-cthv-e0ir0u12lt0im-AaJtTe-pIDolDicyDgooaclusm, tehnetU1n3-it3edFSitleadte0s3w/1il3l /a1l7wayPsabgeev2u5lnoefr4a0blPe atogeID# 443 terrorist attacks in the sense that the possibility of harm will be greater than zero.61 Confronted with the threat of Islamic terrorism, well­known conservatives like Larry Kudlow, David Bossie, and Ann Coulter have called for a complete moratorium on immigration.62 They presumably want to restrict only LPRs, student visas, fiancé(e) visas, illegal immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, but they may also want to prevent the entry of tourists. The following sections will separate tourists from immigrants and migrants to estimate how many Americans must die from terrorism to justify a moratorium on foreigners entering the United States. Finding the break­even point at which the benefits of reduced terrorism justify the cost incurred by stopping all legal immigration and tourism helps form the outer­most boundaries of a sensible policy.63 If the benefits of the different policies proposed below outweigh the costs, then the measure is cost­effective. If, however, the costs of the policies proposed below are greater than the benefits, then they are not cost­effective.
This cost­benefit analysis considers the cost of human deaths, property damage, injuries, and economic disruption caused by terrorism. In virtually all cases of terrorism, with the notable exception of the 9/11 attacks, property damage is minuscule while the cost of injuries is minor compared with the cost of the deaths. Government reactions to terrorism, such as the virtual shutdown of Boston in the wake of the Marathon bombing and the grounding of all air travel after 9/11, are not considered.64
Broad Immigration Moratorium
The economic cost of a moratorium on all future immigration is tremendous. Professor Benjamin Powell of Texas Tech University estimated the economic costs of a total immigration moratorium at $229 billion annually.65 This section includes two cost projections. The first conservatively estimates the economic costs of a moratorium to be only $35 billion annually, which is the number used by Harvard economist George Borjas.66 That $35 billion counts only the immigration surplus, which is the increase in American wages caused by immigration. The figure ignores other enormous economic benefits, including the economic gains to the immigrants themselves. The second cost projection assumes the $229 billion annual price tag of a moratorium calculated by Benjamin Powell.

CasTeh1e:g1r7e-actve-s0t0p1o2s0s-iAblJeTb-IeDnDefitDoof caunmimenmt i1g3r-a3tioFnilmedor0a3to/1r3iu/1m7 wPoualgdeb2e6thoef 4e0limPiangaetIiDon# 444 of all terrorism by immigrants. Including the devastation caused by the 9/11 attacks, 190 people were murdered on U.S. soil in terrorist attacks committed by 117 illegal immigrants, LPRs, students, fiancé(e)s, refugees, asylum seekers, and those with unknown visa statuses since 1975 — accounting for 6.3 percent of all fatalities caused by foreign­born terrorists on American soil. The other 2,834 murders, or 93.7 percent, were committed by 34 tourists who would have been unaffected by an immigration moratorium. Those 34 tourists account for 22.1 percent of all foreign­born terrorists but 93.7 percent of murders caused by foreign­born terrorist attacks. Some 99.7 percent of the murders committed by terrorists on tourist visas occurred on 9/11. A ban on immigration will barely diminish the costs of terrorism.
The costs of an immigration moratorium vastly exceed the benefits, even with very generous assumptions buttressing the pro­moratorium position. According to a break­ even analysis, which seeks to find when the cost of an immigration restriction would equal the benefit of reduced terrorism, an immigration moratorium would have to prevent 2,333 deaths annually at an estimated $15 million per death. In reality, an average of 4.6 murders were committed per year by immigrant (non­tourist) terrorists during the 41­year period. An immigration moratorium would have to prevent 504 times as many such murders in any given year as actually occurred annually from 1975 through 2015 for the costs of a moratorium to equal the benefits.
Benjamin Powell’s more realistic $229 billion annual estimate of the economic costs of an immigration moratorium means the ban would have to prevent 15,267 murders by terrorists each year at a cost savings of $15 million per murder for the benefits of the ban to equal the costs. That number is about 3,294 times as great as the average annual number of terrorist deaths caused by immigrants (excluding tourists) and more than five times as great as all of the murders committed by all foreign­born terrorists (including tourists) from 1975 through 2015.
In short, an immigration moratorium produces huge economic costs for minuscule benefits.
Tourism Moratorium
Given the role that tourism played in the 9/11 attacks, it is tempting to think that

Casliem1i:t1in7g-cavn-0i0m1m20ig-AraJtTio-InDbDanDtooctouumreisnmt 1m3i-g3htFbieleadp0r3e/f1e3r/a1b7le pPoalgicey.2Y7eotfth4e0 ePcaogneoImD#ic445 costs of a tourism moratorium are even larger. The World Travel and Tourism Council estimated that international tourists added $194.1 billion directly and indirectly to the U.S. economy in 2014.67 A moratorium on tourism would deny the U.S. economy an amount of economic activity equal to just over 1 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. The majority of all murders committed by foreign­born terrorists, 93.7 percent, were committed by 34 different terrorists on tourist visas. A total of 99.7 percent of all terrorist murders committed by those on tourist visas were committed by 18 such men on 9/11. Over the entire 41­year period of this study, an average of 69.1 Americans were murdered each year in terrorist attacks committed by those on tourist visas, producing an average annual cost of $1.037 billion — which is what would be saved if there was a moratorium.
But the costs of a tourist moratorium vastly exceed the benefits. Such a moratorium would have to deter at least 12,940 murders by terrorists per year to justify the loss in economic activity. The annual number of murders committed by tourists in terrorist attacks would have to be 187.2 times as great as they currently are to justify a moratorium. To put in perspective the 12,940 murders that would have to be prevented each year, that is about 4.3 times as great as all the deaths caused by all foreign­born terrorists over the entire 41­year period studied here. Counterterrorism cannot justify a tourist moratorium.
Including Nonhuman Costs
The destruction of private property, businesses, and economic activity caused by foreign­born terrorism during the 1975­2015 time period is estimated to have cost $171 billion. The combined human, property, business, and economic costs of terrorism from 1975 through 2015 are thus estimated at $216.39 billion. Spread over 41 years, the average annual cost of terrorism is $5.28 billion, which is still far less than the minimum estimated yearly benefit of $229.1 billion from immigration and tourism ($35 billion + $194.1 billion). The average yearly costs of terrorism, including the loss of human life, injuries, property destruction, and economic disruptions, would have to be 43.4 times as great as they have been to justify a moratorium on all foreigners entering the United States. A moratorium on foreigners entering the United States is

Casmeo1r:e1c7o-csvtl-y00th1a2n0-tAheJTb-eIDneDfitsDeovceunmwehnetn13in-3cludFiinlegdt0h3e/p1r3o/1p7ertyP,abguesi2n8esosf,4a0ndPagrgeeaIDte#r 446 economic costs caused by foreign­born terrorism.
Foreign­born terrorism on U.S. soil is a low­probability event that imposes high costs on its victims despite relatively small risks and low costs on Americans as a whole.68 From 1975 through 2015, the average chance of dying in an attack by a foreign­born terrorist on U.S. soil was 1 in 3,609,709 a year. For 30 of those 41 years, no Americans were killed on U.S. soil in terrorist attacks caused by foreigners or immigrants. Foreign­born terrorism is a hazard to American life, liberty, and private property, but it is manageable given the huge economic benefits of immigration and the small costs of terrorism. The United States government should continue to devote resources to screening immigrants and foreigners for terrorism or other threats, but large policy changes like an immigration or tourist moratorium would impose far greater costs than benefits.
All identified foreign persons who attempted terrorism in the United States over the time period 1975­2015 are listed in Table A1.

CasTea1b:l1e7A-c.v1-.0I0d1e2n0-tAifJiTe-dIDFDoreDiogcnumPeernsto1n3-s3WFhiloedA0tt3e/1m3p/1t7edPoargCeo2m9 omf i4t0tePdageID# 447 Terrorism on U.S. Soil, 1975­2015

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 30 of 40 PageID# 448

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 31 of 40 PageID# 449

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 32 of 40 PageID# 450

CasNeo1te:1: 7A-=cva-s0y0le1e2,0F-=AsJtTu-dIDenDt oDn oFcourmMenvti1sa3,-3I=ilFleilgeadl,0K3=/1K3­/11 7fianPcaég(ee)3, L3=olfa4w0fuPlageID# 451 permanent resident, R=refugee, T=tourist on B­visa,
U=unknown, V=visa waiver program.
*If multiple attackers, all casualties spread evenly across all attackers.
1. Matt Pearce, “A Look at the K­1 Visa That Gave San Bernardino Shooter Entry into U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, December 8, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la‐fg‐k1‐visas‐20151208‐ story.html.
2. Alicia A. Caldwell, “U.S. Reviewing Fiancé Visa Program after San Bernardino Shooting,” Associated Press, December 8, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/u‐s‐reviewing‐fiance‐visa‐ program‐after‐san‐bernardino‐shooting/; Larry Kudlow, “I’ve Changed. This Is War. Seal the Borders. Stop the Visas,” National Review, December 11, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428411/larry‐kudlow‐seal‐ borders‐stop‐visas; David Bossie, “Conservatives Should Think Bigger on Immigration Ban,” Breitbart, December 11, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/big‐ government/2015/12/11/conservatives‐should‐think‐bigger‐on‐ immigration‐ban/; Ann Coulter, interview by Breitbart News Saturday, December 12, 2015, https://soundcloud.com/breitbart/breitbart‐news‐saturday‐ann‐ coulter‐december‐12‐2015.
3. See Jared Hatch, “Requiring a Nexus to National Security: Immigration, ‘Terrorist Activities,’ and Statutory Reform,” BYU Law Review 3 (2014): 697­732.
4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], “The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk­Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation” (Washington: DHS, December 8, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma‐strategic‐national‐risk‐ assessment‐ppd8.pdf.

Cas5e. J1o:1h7n-cMvu-0e0ll1e2r,0e-Ad.J,TT-eIDrrDoriDsmocSuimnceen9t /1131-:3ThFeilAedm0e3ri/c1a3n/1C7asPesag(Ceo3lu4mofb4u0s:POahgieoID# 452 State University, March 2016), http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html.
6. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006): 503­21.
7. Emails with Robert Leiken on March 14, 2016, and Steven Brooke on March 17, 2016, confirmed that the data set their paper was based on does not exist anymore. Emails are available upon request.
8. U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], “Criminal Alien Statistics: Information on Incarcerations, Arrests, and Costs,” GAO­11­187 (Washington: GAO, March 2011), p. 25.
9. Daniel Milton, Megan Spencer, and Michael Findley, “Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee Flows and Transnational Problems,” International Interactions (August 2013): 3.
10. Illegal immigrants are included in a visa category called “illegal” to improve readability.
11. Mueller, Terrorism and Political Violence.
12. U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and Terrorism­Related Convictions 9/11/01­ 3/18/10 (Washington: DOJ), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/doj032610‐ stats.pdf.
13. GAO, “Criminal Alien Statistics,” pp. 25­26.
14. DOJ, National Security Division Statistics.
15. “Profiles in Terror: Nasser Abuali,” Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/fbi‐terrorist/nasser‐abuali‐stolen‐cereal.
16. “By the Numbers: ISIS Cases in the United States, March 1, 2014­January 25, 2016,” New York, Center on National Security at Fordham Law, January 25, 2016, http://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/56a7

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 35 of 40 PageID# 453 a90a2399a387c5bc9eeb/1453828362342/ISIS+Cases‐ +Statistical+Overview+01‐25‐16.pdf.
17. Jerome P. Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat,” CRS Report for Congress no. R41416 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf.
18. RAND National Security Division, “RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents,” http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism‐incidents.html.
19. “Global Terrorism Database” (College Park: University of Maryland), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
20. “Homegrown Extremism 2011­2015” (Washington: New America Foundation), http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/analysis.html.
21. “Profiles in Terror,” Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/fbi‐ terrorist.
22. The Investigative Project on Terrorism, “International Terrorism and Terrorism­ Related Convictions 9/11/01­3/18/10,” http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/627.pdf.
23. Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim­American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina­Chapel Hill, http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic‐terrorism/.
24. United States Crime Rates 1960­2014, Disaster Center website, http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm.
25. I used the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland to estimate the total number of terrorist deaths in the United States during this time period except for 1993 because the data are missing for that year. I used data from the RAND Database to fill in the missing 1993 GTD data.
26. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 13­21.
27. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Responsible Counterterrorism Policy,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 755, September 10, 2014, p. 4.

Cas2e8.1M:17u-ecllve-r00an12d0S-tAeJwTa-rIDt,DChaDsoincgumGehnotst1s3, -p3. 13F7il.ed 03/13/17 Page 36 of 40 PageID# 454
29. Lisa A. Robinson, James K. Hammitt, Joseph E. Aldy, Alan Krupnick, and Jennifer Baxter, “Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 7, no. 1 (2010): article 14.
30. Robert W. Hahn, Randall W. Lutter, and W. Kip Viscusi, “Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality?” Washington, AEI­Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000, https://law.vanderbilt.edu/files/archive/011_Do‐Federal‐ Regulations‐Reduce‐Mortality.pdf. See also Benjamin H. Friedman, “Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 1 (2011): 85, footnote 31.
31. See Karen C. Tumlin, “Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy,” California Law Review 92, no. 4 (July 2004): 1173­239; and John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 237­48.
32. Phil Hirschkorn, “New York Remembers 1993 WTC Victims,” CNN New York Bureau, February 26, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/02/26/wtc.bombing/.
33. Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, pp. 144, 279.
34. “Insurers Have Paid $1.2M for Boston Bombing P/C Claims So Far; Health Claims to Top $22M,” Insurance Journal, August 30, 2013, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2013/08/30/303392.htm.
35. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics” (Washington: DHS, multiple years), https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook‐ immigration‐statistics.
36. Thomas J. Espenshade, “Unauthorized Immigration to the United States,” Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995): 195­216; Doug S. Massey and Audrey Singer, “New Estimates of Undocumented Mexican Migration and the Probability of Apprehension,” Demography 32, no. 2 (May 1995): 203­13; and “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000” (Washington:

CasOeff1ic:1e7o-fcvP-o0l0ic1y2a0n-AdJPTl-aInDnDingD, oUc.Su.mIemnmt 1ig3r-a3tioFnilaendd0N3/a1t3u/r1a7lizaPtaiogne S3e7rvoifc4e)0, PageID# 455 https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_Repor t_1211.pdf.
37. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered Defense,” GAO­04­82 (Washington: GAO, May 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0482.pdf.
38. Combining three sources for three time periods yields an astonishing 50,052,500 illegal entries: (1) the estimated gross illegal entries from Massey and Singer, “New Estimates,” for the years 1975 to 1989; (2) Robert Warren and Donald Kerwin, “Beyond DAPA and DACA: Revisiting Legislative Reform in Light of Long­Term Trends in Unauthorized Immigration to the United States,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 3, no. 1 (2015), for the years 1990 to 2009; and (3) estimating from Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Trends in Unauthorized Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow” (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2008), for the years 2009 to 2015.
39. “San Bernardino Shooting,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/specials/san‐ bernardino‐shooting.
40. Illegal immigrants are not really a visa category, but they are listed as such for simplicity’s sake.
41. No discount rate adjustment.
42. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR)” (Washington: DHS), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/lawful‐ permanent‐resident‐lpr.
43. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Student Visa” (Washington: U.S. Department of State), https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/study‐ exchange/student.html.
44. F and M visas are for students.
45. Wadih el­Hage was on a student visa when he and Glen Cusford Francis likely assassinated Dr. Rashad Khalifa on January 31, 1990, in Tucson, Arizona.

Cas4e6.1B:1u7r-ecavu-0o0f1C2o0n-AsuJlTa-rIDADffairDso, c“Numoneinmt m13i-g3ranFtilVeidsa03fo/1r3a/1F7ianPcéa(gee) (3K8­o1)f”40 PageID# 456 (Washington: U.S. Department of State), https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/family/fiance‐k‐ 1.html.
47. Alex Nowrasteh, “Secret Policy to Ignore Social Media? Not So Fast,” Cato at Liberty, December 15, 2015, http://www.cato.org/blog/secret‐policy‐ignore‐ social‐media‐not‐so‐fast.
48. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugees” (Washington: DHS), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees‐asylum/refugees.
49. Charlotte J. Moore, “Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies,” Congressional Research Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, March 1, 1981), pp. 3­16.
50. Matthew Hendley, “Paul Gosar Thinks Abdullatif Aldosary, Alleged Bomber, Is a ‘Known Terrorist’; He Is Not,” Phoenix New Times, December 7, 2012, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/paul‐gosar‐thinks‐abdullatif‐ aldosary‐alleged‐bomber‐is‐a‐known‐terrorist‐he‐is‐not‐6647318.
51. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Combating Terrorism: Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation Process and U.S. Agency Enforcement Actions,” GAO­15­ 629 (Washington: GAO, June 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671028.pdf.
52. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation & Worldwide Processing Priorities” (Washington: DHS), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees‐ asylum/refugees/united‐states‐refugee‐admissions‐program‐usrap‐ consultation‐worldwide‐processing‐priorities.
53. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Visitor Visa” (Washington: U.S. Department of State), https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visitor.html.
54. . Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Visa Waiver Program” (Washington: U.S. Department of State), https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visa‐waiver‐

Caspero1g:1r7a-mc.vh-0t0m1l2#0r-eAfJeTr-eIDncDe. Document 13-3 Filed 03/13/17 Page 39 of 40 PageID# 457
55. Ibid.
56. Steven A. Camarota, “The Open Door: How Military Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993­2001,” Center for Immigration Studies, Center Paper no. 21, May 2002, http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2002/theopendoor.pdf.
57. Office of Inspector General, “An Evaluation of the Security Implications of the Visa Waiver Program,” OIG­04­26 (Washington: DHS, April 2004), pp. 11­12, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_SecurityImpVisaWaiverProgEval _Apr04.pdf.
58. Two terrorists killed one person in an attack, so they each got credit for one­half of the murder.
59. DHS, “The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8.”
60. Camarota, “The Open Door: How Military Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993­2001.”
61. Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 42­78.
62. Kudlow, “I’ve Changed”; Bossie, “Conservatives Should Think Bigger”; and Ann Coulter, interview by Breitbart News Saturday.
63. See Mueller and Stewart, “Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending.”
64. Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, p. 188.
65. Benjamin Powell, “Coyote Ugly: The Deadweight Cost of Rent Seeking for Immigration Policy,” Public Choice 150 (2012): 195­208.
66. George Borjas, “Immigration and the American Worker: A Review of the Academic Literature” (Washington: Center for Immigration Studies, April 2013), p. 2, http://cis.org/immigration‐and‐the‐american‐worker‐review‐academic‐ literature.

Cas6e7.1W:1o7r-cldv-T0r0a1v2e0l -aAnJdTT-IoDuDrismDoCcouumnecnilt, 1“T3r-3aveFl i&ledTo0u3r/i1s3m/1:7EcoPnaogme i4c0Imofp4a0ctP2a0g1e5I,D# 458 United States of America,” London, World Travel and Tourism Council, p. 5, http://www.wttc.org/‐/media/files/reports/economic%20impact%20researc h/countries%202015/unitedstatesofamerica2015.pdf. 68. Mueller and Stewart, “Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending,” pp. 239­40.
Alex Nowrasteh is the immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity.

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 13-4 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 8 PageID# 459
JA NUA RY 26, 2017 12:03PM
By
President Trump is expected to sign an executive order shortly to temporarily ban all visas for people from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia among other actions. An advanced copy of this order was available earlier this week. The first sentence of his order states that it is to “protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States.” However, the countries that Trump chose to temporarily ban are not serious terrorism risks. I compiled a list of foreign­born people who committed or were convicted of attempting to commit a terrorist attack on U.S. soil from 1975 through 2015. Below is a table with the distribution of their countries of origin (Figure 1). The first seven countries are those to be initially and, hopefully, temporarily denied visas. During the time period analyzed here, 17 foreign­born folks from those nations were convicted of carrying out or attempting to carry out a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and they killed zero people. Zero Libyans or Syrians intended to carry out an attack on U.S. soil during this time. Figure 1

CaFsoere1i:g1n7­-Bcovr-0n0T1e2r0r-oAriJsTt-CIDoDuntDryoocfuOmreignitn1,31-9475­F2il0e1d503/13/17 Page 2 of 8 PageID# 460

Country Iran Iraq Libya Somalia Sudan Syria Yemen Afghanistan Algeria Armenia Australia Bangladesh Bosnia Croatia Cuba Dominican Republic Egypt Ethiopia France Ghana Guyana Haiti India Japan Jordan Kazakhstan

Terrorists Murders Terrorists (percent) Murders (percent)

6

0

3.9%

0.0%

2

0

1.3%

0.0%

0

0

0.0%

0.0%

2

0

1.3%

0.0%

6

0

3.9%

0.0%

0

0

0.0%

0.0%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

3

0

1.9%

0.0%

4

0

2.6%

0.0%

6

1

3.9%

0.0%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

2

0

1.3%

0.0%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

9

1

5.8%

0.0%

11

3

7.1%

0.1%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

11

162

7.1%

5.4%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

2

0

1.3%

0.0%

3

0

1.9%

0.0%

2

0

1.3%

0.0%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

4

0

2.6%

0.0%

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

CaKsoeso1v:o17-cv-00120-AJT-ID2D Docu0ment 13-4 1F.3il%ed 03/13/17 P0a.g0e% 3 of 8 PageID# 461

Kuwait

2

6

1.3%

0.2%

Kyrgyzstan

2

3

1.3%

0.1%

Lebanon

4

158.5

2.6%

5.2%

Macedonia

3

0

1.9%

0.0%

Mexico

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

Morocco

3

0

1.9%

0.0%

Nigeria

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

Pakistan*

14

3

9.1%

0.1%

Palestine

5

2

3.2%

0.1%

Saudi Arabia*

19

2,369

12.3%

78.3%

Serbia

2

0

1.3%

0.0%

South Korea

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

Taiwan

1

1

0.6%

0.0%

Trinidad and Tobago

2

0.5

1.3%

0.0%

Turkey

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

United Arab Emirates

2

314

1.3%

10.4%

United Kingdom

3

0

1.9%

0.0%

Uzbekistan

3

0

1.9%

0.0%

Vietnam

1

0

0.6%

0.0%

Total

154

3,024

100.0%

100.0%

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim­American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill; Department of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; New America Foundation; Mother Jones; Senator Jeff Sessions; Various news sources; Court documents.

Ca*sSean1:B1e7r-cnva-r0d0i1n2o0s-hAoJoTt-eIrDTDashDfoeceunmMeanltik13w-4as bFoilrend i0n3P/1a3k/i1s7tanPbaugtem4oosftl8y PreasgideeIDd#in462 Saudi Arabia from the time she was an infant. She physically met her U.S. born husband in Saudi Arabia. I counted her as Saudi but one could reasonably count her as Pakistani because she was born in Pakistan and she held a Pakistani passport. Doing so would transfer 14 terrorist murders from the Saudi Arabia’s row to Pakistan’s row.
Attempting or committing a terrorist attack on U.S. soil is not the only terrorist offense. Materially supporting foreign terrorist organizations, seeking to join a foreign terrorist group overseas, plotting or carrying out terrorist attacks in other countries, and others are also terrorism offenses. I excluded foreign­born people convicted of those offenses because Trump is concerned with “making America safe again,” not with making other countries safe or with a global war on terrorism. A terrorist attack in another country doesn’t kill Americans inside of the United States and these threats are not what concern American voters nearly as much as terrorism on U.S. soil. You can call this an America First weighting of terrorism offenses.
Trump’s executive order cites the “[h]undreds of foreign­born individuals [who] have been convicted or implicated in terrorism­related crimes” as another reason for a visa ban for these countries. He likely got the “hundreds of foreign­born individuals” from a news release and list put out by Senator Jeff Sessions (R­AL) that purportedly shows all 580 “terrorism­related” convictions since 9/11 with at least 380 of them as immigrants.
It is disturbing that Sessions’ flawed list of terrorism convictions is the basis for much of this executive order. There are at least two major problems with the list. First, you might get the impression that all of those convictions were for terrorist attacks planned on U.S.­soil but only 40, or 6.8 percent, were. Second, 241 of the 580 convictions, or 42 percent, were not even for terrorism offenses. Many of the investigations started based on a terrorism tip like, for instance, the suspect wanting to buy a rocket­propelled grenade launcher. However, the tip turned out to be groundless and the legal saga ended with only a mundane conviction of receiving stolen cereal. According to Sessions’ list, that cereal thief is a terrorist.

CaInseth1e:1l7it-tclev-o0v0e1r2103-AyeJaTr-sIDcDoverDeodciunmthenetS1e3s-s4ionFs’illeidst,0t3h/1er3e/1w7erePaabgoeu5t tohfr8eePageID# 463 convictions per year for planning or committing an attack on U.S. soil. For every one of them, there were six non­terrorism convictions counted as terrorism and 4.5 convictions for supporting, joining, or planning a terrorist attack overseas. In short, the list provided by Senator Jeff Sessions does not show a daunting terrorist threat to American lives in the homeland.
Trump’s executive order goes on to argue that “[d]eteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter our country.” Presumably, the goal is to reduce American deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil so the deadliness of terrorist attacks matters more than the number of terrorists. For instance, 114 of the 154 foreign­born terrorists from 1975 to the end of 2015 didn’t kill anybody. The three countries where the deadliest terrorists came to the United States from were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. Together they all accounted for 94.1 percent of all American deaths in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil committed by the foreign­born. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not beset by any of the supposedly­terrorism increasing problems that are described in this order. Egyptians account for 5.4 percent of all terrorist victims but their attacks occurred between 1993 and 2002 when Egypt was a more stable country than it is today. The only exception to this might be Lebanon which accounts for 5.2 percent of all terrorist victims but nearly all of those were committed by Ziad Jarrah on 9/11 – a single data point. Meanwhile, foreign­born people from Syria, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Iran, and Yemen have not successfully killed anybody in a U.S. terrorist attack.
Trump’s executive order then continues to say that the United States “cannot, and should not, admit into our country those who do not support the U.S. Constitution.” Virtually nobody in the world, including most Americans, supports the U.S. Constitution and it seems peculiar to block tourists who want to visit Disneyland from entering because they “do not support the U.S. Constitution.” My guesses are that whoever wrote this executive order is either confused about the difference between immigrants and non­immigrants, it is just sloppily drafted, or this is an earlier draft. Temporary visitors should not have to swear allegiance or express support for the Constitution any more than an American should have to swear allegiance to or express

Camsye s1u:1p7p-ocrvt-f0o0r1m20o-nAaJrTch-IyDwDheDnovciusimtienngtt1h3e-U4 niFteildedK0in3g/1d3o/m17. InPategrem6s ooff 8suPpapgoertIDfo#r464 the Constitution, all that matters is that immigrants who naturalize take an oath to do so – as they are currently required to under U.S. law.
The order also directs the government to find a way to identify immigrants “with the intent to cause harm, or who are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission.” Blocking immigrants who intend to commit crimes or terrorist attacks is a wonderful idea – so wonderful that the government already does it. However, the line that seeks to identify those who “are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission” is hopelessly vague. There is a risk greater than zero that virtually anybody is a risk subsequent to their admission so this type of broad, ill­defined dictate could theoretically screen out everybody. More likely, it will just be used to capriciously target individuals for political or personal reasons.
A later line in the executive order provides some context for the “risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission” line. It orders DHS to regularly publish “information regarding the number of foreign­born individuals in the Untied States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and engaged in terrorism­related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism­related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States.” Presumably, DHS will use that information to build a detailed risk profile of immigrants to exclude those who could become radicalized. One worrying term is “terrorism­related organizations.” I couldn’t find any mentions or definition of a “terrorism­related organization” in U.S. law. There are no mentions of “terrorism­related convictions” either. If “terrorism­related organizations” is defined as broadly as “terrorism­related convictions” has been in Jeff Sessions’ terrorist list then many non­terrorist organizations will be included for flimsy reasons. This is like the no­fly list but with far graver consequences.
The order also says there should be a “process to evaluate the applicant’s likelihood of becoming a positive contributing member of society, and the applicant’s ability to make contributions to the national interest.” The immigration law already does the former by excluding criminals, national security threats, and numerous other categories of excludable people while the broad immigrant and non­immigrant work visas supposedly identify which foreigners are most valuable. At best this line in the

Caesxeec1u:t1i7ve-covr-d0e0r12is0r-eAdJuTn-IdDaDnt aDnodcautmweonrts1t 3it-4signFaillesdth0e3/g1o3v/e1r7nmPeangte’s 7inotef n8tPtoagbeeIDev#en465 more involved in planning the labor market by selecting winners and losers through the immigration system.

The seven countries temporarily banned under this executive order represent a small percent of all green cards and entries into the United States (the latter estimated by I­ 94s per country). In 2015, the government issued 52,365 green cards to immigrants born in those seven countries which amount to just 4.98 percent of all green cards issued that year and 29.4 percent of all green cards issued to nationals from Muslim countries (Table 2). In the same year, there were 86,236 non­immigrant entries from those countries which accounted for 0.11 percent of all entries although they comprised 4.5 percent of all entries for Islamic countries (Table 2).

The economic cost of a temporary ban, or even a permanent one, is small because so few green cards and nonimmigrant visas are issued to folks from those seven countries. However, the danger of terrorism on U.S. soil committed by citizens of those countries has also been very low historically with only 17 convictions from 1975 through 2015 and zero Americans killed in domestic attacks. Future terrorists could come from different countries than terrorists did in the past but, based on current evidence, this ban is still a net loss because it will likely stop few terrorists, prevent zero deaths, and slightly reduce immigration and tourism. All minor economic pain, no gain.

Table 2

Number of Green Cards and Entries per Country, 2015

Iran Iraq Libya Somalia Sudan Syria Yemen

Green Cards 13,114 21,107 734 6,796 3,580 3,840 3,194

Entries (I­94)
35,266 21,381 2,879
359 4,792 16,010 5,549

CaAslel C1o:u1n7tr-icesv-00120-AJT1,-0ID51D,031Docum76e,n63t81,323-64 Filed 03/13/17 Page 8 of 8 PageID# 466

Islamic Countries (OIC) 178,015

1,896,383

Source: Department of Homeland Security
If President Trump was committed to banning immigrants from certain countries in order to reduce the already small risk of terrorism on U.S. soil committed by the foreign­born then he would not just ban nationals from these seven countries. For this reason, I expect his administration to expand the list of countries banned in the near future. Section 3, subsections c, d, e, and f clarify that the president can extend these bans to other countries or make them permanent. This is a warning about additional bans on migrants and immigrants to come as well as the process by which those bans will be enacted.
Topics: International Economics, Development & Immigration Tags: terrorism, Trump, Executive Action, migration, bans, Muslim country

This work by Cato Institute is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐ ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

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https://nyti.ms/2eM6sek
POLITICS
Michael Flynn, Anti­Islamist Ex­ General, Offered Security Post, Trump Aide Says
By MATTHEW ROSENBERG and MAGGIE HABERMAN NOV. 17, 2016 WASHINGTON — President­elect Donald J. Trump has offered the post of national security adviser to Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, potentially putting a retired intelligence officer who believes Islamist militancy poses an existential threat in one of the most powerful roles in shaping military and foreign policy, according to a top official on Mr. Trump’s transition team.
General Flynn, 57, a registered Democrat, was Mr. Trump’s main national security adviser during his campaign. If he accepts Mr. Trump’s offer, as expected, he will be a critical gatekeeper for a president with little experience in military or foreign policy issues.
Mr. Trump and General Flynn both see themselves as brash outsiders who hustled their way to the big time. They both post on Twitter often about their own successes, and they have both at times crossed the line into outright Islamophobia.
They also both exhibit a loose relationship with facts: General Flynn, for instance, has said that Shariah, or Islamic law, is spreading in the United States (it is not). His dubious assertions are so common that when he ran the Defense Intelligence Agency, subordinates came up with a name for the phenomenon: They called them “Flynn facts.”

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As an adviser, General Flynn has already proved to be a powerful influence on Mr. Trump, convincing the president­elect that the United States is in a “world war” with Islamist militants and must work with any willing allies in the fight, including President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.
Fear of Muslims is RATIONAL: please forward this to others: the truth fears no questions... https://t.co/NLIfKFD9lU
During the transition, General Flynn has been present when Mr. Trump has received his daily intelligence briefing. As national security adviser, he would have the last word on how the president should respond to crises such as a showdown with China over the South China Sea or an international health crisis like the Ebola epidemic.
But, like Mr. Trump, he would enter the White House with significant baggage. The Flynn Intel Group, a consulting firm he founded after he was fired by President Obama as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has hazy business ties to Middle Eastern countries and has appeared to lobby for the Turkish government. General Flynn also took a paid speaking engagement last year with Russia Today, a television network funded by the Kremlin, and attended the network’s lavish anniversary party in Moscow, where he sat at Mr. Putin’s elbow.
Those potential conflicts of interest had led Mr. Trump’s transition team to worry that General Flynn might have difficulty winning confirmation for any post that, unlike the national security adviser role, requires congressional approval, such as director of the C.I.A. But for Mr. Trump, he has one overriding virtue: He was an early and ardent supporter in a campaign during which most of the Washington national security establishment openly called Mr. Trump unfit to lead.
General Flynn did not respond to repeated interview requests. Yet in numerous speeches and interviews before the election, and in a book published in August, he laid out a view of the world that sees the United States as facing a singular,

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overarching threat that can be described in only one way: “radical Islamic terrorism.”
@FieldofFight ­­ Obama and Hillary's Refusal to Name Radical Islamic Terrorism: Aiming to 'Dumb Us Down' ­ Breitbart https://t.co/ZitXKKoaRt

All else is secondary for General Flynn, and any other description of the threat is “the worst kind of political correctness,” he said in an interview three weeks before the election.
Islamist militancy poses an existential threat on a global scale, and the Muslim faith itself is the source of the problem, he said, describing it as a political ideology, not a religion. He has even at times gone so far as to call it a political ideology that has “metastasized” into a “malignant cancer.”
For General Flynn, the election of Mr. Trump represents an astounding career turnaround. Once counted among the most respected military officers of his generation, General Flynn was fired after serving only two years as chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He then re­emerged as a vociferous critic of a Washington elite that he contended could not even properly identify the real enemy — radical Islam, that is — never mind figure out how to defeat it.
In Mr. Trump, General Flynn found someone who was more than willing to listen. He readily signed on to the campaign, and quickly emerged as the angry voice of the national security establishment, leading chants of “lock her up” against Hillary Clinton at rallies and the Republican convention. And now, after months of the two men talking to each other, it can be hard to tell where Mr. Trump’s views end and General Flynn’s begin.
They both believe that the United States needs to start working with Mr. Putin to defeat Islamist militants and stop worrying about his suppression of critics at home, his attempt to dismember Ukraine or the Russian military’s indiscriminate

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bombing of Syrian cities. The same goes for President Abdel Fattah el­Sisi of Egypt, who took power in a coup and who was the first world leader to speak with Mr. Trump after the election.
Mr. Trump “looks at people and leaders of countries and says: ‘Can I work with this guy? Do we have a common threat that we can focus on?’” Mr. Flynn said in the interview before the election. “He knows that when it comes to Russia or any other country, the common enemy that we all have is radical Islam.”
General Flynn and Mr. Trump also agree that the United States needs to sharply curtail immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, and possibly even force American Muslims to register with the government.
We are facing violent, but very serious and cunning radical Islamists. We can be war weary when we win. If we lose, we have nothing.
The similarities run beyond political views. Like the boy from Queens who made it in Manhattan, General Flynn came into the military without a West Point pedigree — he graduated from the Army’s Reserve Officer Training Program at the University of Rhode Island — and earned a reputation as outspoken and unconventional as he climbed the ranks to the top of military intelligence.
Yet General Flynn still nurses the grudge of an outsider, believing he never quite got the respect he deserves. For example, he has attributed his dismissal from the Defense Intelligence Agency to a pair of consummate insiders: James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, and Michael Vickers, the undersecretary of defense intelligence.
His response, like that of his new boss, has been to buck the establishment. In his view, both the Republican and the Democratic luminaries who have shaped American defense and foreign policy through two presidencies have “gotten us into mess after mess for the wrong reasons.”

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“I would argue with that crowd all day long,” he said before the election.
Among the hard­line Republicans who now dominate the party, General Flynn has become something of a cult figure for what they see as his brave stand against the Obama administration’s perfidy. General Flynn insists that he was fired from the intelligence agency because he refused to toe the administration’s line that Islamist militants were in retreat. (He was right, in all fairness.)
“He’s an analyst who can get deep into the weeds on the issues and a lot of this stuff and then is very good at playing three­dimensional chess,” said Representative Devin Nunes, the California Republican who is chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and a close confidant to Mr. Flynn. “He was the one who called out the administration for being wrong on Al Qaeda.”
But many of those who worked with General Flynn attribute his firing to management problems, saying his attempts to overhaul the sprawling agency had left it a chaotic, backbiting mess. They also question whether his tactical acumen — he was especially good at unraveling militant networks in Afghanistan and Iraq — can translate into the kind of strategic thinking needed at the White House.
“He is a very talented information gatherer,” said Sarah Chayes of the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, who worked with General Flynn when he ran military intelligence in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011.
“But his thinking process is not sufficiently analytical to test some streams against others and make sense of it, or draw consistent conclusions,” she said. “If you listen to him, in 10 minutes you’ll hear him contradict himself two or three times.”
Take his views on Islam. In the interview before the election, he characterized Islam as intolerant.
Then he said that he had many Muslim friends, and that the United States needed to do a better job of understanding Islamic culture and fostering its tolerant side.

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Matthew Rosenberg reported from Washington, and Maggie Haberman from New York. Michael S. Schmidt and Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Washington. Get politics and Washington news updates via Facebook, Twitter and in the Morning Briefing newsletter.
A version of this article appears in print on November 18, 2016, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Trump Is Said to Pick General as Security Aide.
© 2017 The New York Times Company

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Michael Flynn & Islam: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know

Published 11:59 am EST, November 18, 2016 Updated 1:13 pm EST, November 22, 2016

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Michael Flynn at Trump Tower on November 17. (Getty)
Retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn has officially been named Donald Trump‘s National Security Adviser. The choice will not go over well with some who have accused Flynn of being Islamophobic, making comments about how the U.S. is at war with Islam.
Flynn played a key role during the presidential campaign, serving as Trump’s national security adviser and even considered a potential running mate. Before his time on the campaign trail though, he was Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a position President Barack Obama appointed him to. Flynn resigned from that job and retired in April 2014, a year before his term was over.
He also served in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as director of intelligence for the Joint Special Operations Command from 2004 to 2007 and also held the same role for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010.
Here is a look at Flynn’s comments on Islam.
1. Flynn Is a Board Member of ACT For America, Which the Southern Poverty Law Center Considers the Largest Anti-Muslim Group in America
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(Getty)
Flynn is a member of ACT For America and on the board of advisers. The Southern Poverty Law Center considers the group the “largest grassroots anti-Muslim group in America” with 280,000 members across the country. In a June 2016 post for ACT For America’s website, Flynn wrote that “Radical Islam has declared war on America.” He criticized the Obama Administration for not using the term “radical Islam,” which Trump did repeatedly on the campaign trail. “We don’t need him to preach to us, we needed him to lift us out of the shock that America was feeling after yet another horrific attack perpetrated by a Muslim man who has been radicalized in the faith of Islam,” Flynn wrote after the Orlando Pulse nightclub shooting. “Instead, the President demonstrated zero leadership tonight, lacked inspiration and you could tell all he wanted to do was make the statement and get out of the press room…a sad day for America indeed.” ACT For America was founded by author Brigitte Gabriel, who is described as “one of the leading national security experts in the world -providing information and analysis on the rise of Islamic terrorism” on the group’s site. Her books include Because They Hate and They Must Be Stopped.
WATCH: Michael Flynn Calls Islam a ‘Vicious Cancer’
Michael Flynn, Donald Trump's choice for National Security Adviser, once called Islam a "vicious cancer" that has to be "excised" and warned of shariah law being imposed in the U.S. Click here to read more
2. Flynn Said in August That Islam is a ‘Political Ideology’ Hiding Behind a Religion & a ‘Vicious Cancer’
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ACT! for America San Antonio - Lt. Gen. (Ret) Michael Flynn
In August 2016, Flynn gave a speech at an ACT For America Dallas event. In his speech, he covered topics from his book, The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies. He told the audience that he doesn’t see Islam as a religion and even called it a “cancer.” “Islam is a political ideology. It definitely hides behind being a religion,” Flynn said, reports the Dallas Morning News. He also praised Irving, Texas Mayor Beth Van Duyne, who gained national attention last year for her comments on Muslims by suggesting that a secret Shariah law court was being set up at an Irving mosque. “Beth is incredibly brave. Vote for her for anything,” Flynn said. He also said that he’s studied the ways the Founding Fathers were influenced by religion when they set up the American government. “This Islamic ideology was something they wanted nothing to do with,” he said.
"Field of Fight" with Ret. Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn
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In the above speech to the Ahavath Torah Congregation in Stoughton, Massachusetts, Flynn tells the audience that Islam is a “vicious caner inside the body of 1.7 billion people” that needs to be “excised.” The video was found by CNN and has been readily available on YouTube since August 26. Flynn delivered the speech on August 23.
Donald Trump Cabinet: Who Will Be Secretary of State?
Donald Trump has several candidates for the Secretary of State job, with Rudy Giuliani and Nikki Haley in the mix. Here's who he could pick. Click here to read more
3. Flyyn Wrote in His Book That Islamist Militants Will ‘Drink the Blood of Their Dying Enemies’
(Getty)
In July 2016, the Intercept conduced an interview with Flynn, which included a quote from his book, in which he warned of the consequences of Islamic militants winning the war against radical Islam. Flynn writes:
There is no escape from this war. Do you want to be ruled by men who eagerly drink the blood of their dying enemies? Such questions are almost never asked. Yet if you read the publicly available ISIS documents on their intentions, there’s no doubt that they are dead set on taking us over and drinking our blood.
“We’re in a world war against a messianic mass movement of evil people, most of them inspired by a totalitarian ideology: Radical Islam,” Flynn also wrote in the book. “But we are not permitted to speak or write those two words, which is potentially fatal to our culture.” “I watched our own government lie to us about a number of things,” Flynn told The Intercept. “I just see us going in the wrong direction, and that’s really why I sort of jumped into the middle of
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the fray.” In his book, Flynn also described Islam as a “political ideology” instead of a religion. He also often refers to the U.S.’ enemy simply as “Islam” in general, even though he does try to include a distinction between radical Islam and Muslims who aren’t extremists.
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4. Flynn Said He’s Been at ‘War With Islam’ for the Past Decade
Who is Michael Flynn?
In the past, Flynn has said that he’s been “at war with Islam, or a, or a component of Islam, for the last decade.” When Flynn was on Al-Jazeera in January 2016, Flynn was asked if he thought that kind of rhetoric only served to inflame ISIS’ fight against the west. In his response, Flynn said that there is an element inside the religion that will change it, “one way or the other, in my believe, change it for the bad.” Flynn said:
Let’s not kid ourselves about what it is that we are facing and we are facing and the Islamic world is facing an element within the religion of Islam that is going to change it one way or the other, in my belief, change it for the bad, for the negative, if something is not done. But they have grabbed hold of this religion and they are using it in a very, very dangerous way and if the, if the religious component, the somewhat pro-moderate component of Islam actually stands up to it, I believe that it can be defeated.
When asked if he was really saying that he was at war with an entire religion of over 1 billion people, Flynn tried to clarify. “Not with – not with a billion plus. Not with a billion plus,” he said.
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“We are at war with a radical component of Islam and the way I believe it is that Islam is a, is a political ideology based on a religion,” he added.
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New York Rep. Chris Collins is on Donald Trump's transition committee, acting as the liaison between the team and Congress. Here's a look at his career. Click here to read more
5. Flynn Wrote That the Muslim World is an ‘Epic Failure’ Compared the Western World

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Fear of Muslims is RATIONAL: please forward this to others: the truth fears no questions... youtu.be/tJnW8HRHLLw
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In July 2016, Flynn wrote an op-ed for the New York Post, in which he said he was fired by the military because of “the stand I took on radical Islamism and the expansion of al Qaeda and its associated movements.”
Flynn also wrote that “everybody,” including “most living Muslims,” know that the “Islamic world is an epic failure.” He wrote:

We have failed to challenge their jihadist doctrines, even though their true believers only number a small fraction of the Muslim world, and even though everybody, above all most living Muslims, knows that the Islamic world is an epic failure, desperately needing economic, cultural and educational reform of the sort that has led to the superiority of the West.
Flynn later added:

Just as the Muslim world has failed, so the secular tyrants have wrecked their own countries. They hate us in part because they know their own peoples would prefer to live as we do. They hope to destroy us before they have to face the consequences of their many failures.
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When it comes to Trump’s proposed Muslim ban, Flynn supports vetting immigrants from war zones. He told Al-Jazeera in May that he supports “vetting of individuals and the proper screening of individuals who are coming from certain parts of the world like Syria.”
In a Politico interview in October, he said he agreed with stopping immigration from some war zones, adding, “And while Islam writ large may not be the problem, the Obama administration refuses to state that this extremist ideology is even a problem. It’s a cancer within Islam.”
Michael Flynn & Russia: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know
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Read more about Donald Trump and Melania in Spanish at AhoraMismo.com:
Melania Trump: Las Fotos Más Sexys y Escandalosas de la Esposa de Donald Trump
Melania Trump, la esposa de Donald Trump, tiene una historia muy única cuando se trata de mujeres casadas con candidatos… Click here to read more
Daniel S. Levine is entertainment and news contributor to Heavy, and former editor at TheCelebrityCafe.com. Graduate of Hofstra University, plus classic movie and Star Wars geek. Follow him on Twitter at @dsl89 and contact him at daniel.levine@heavy.com. November 22, 2016 1:13 pm

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39 comments

Arthur says:

November 18, 2016 at 12:

About time we got people into power that know islam is the sickness of this earth and needs to be vaporized from history of mankind. No way to rid the world o this sick ideology other than through the removal of all those that adhere to this ideology. It’s not a religion at all. It is a sick form of control over weak sand turd minded people stuck in the middle ages. Get rid of it and over night you will see a global change that all can enjoy!

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Hypocrite says:

November 18, 2016 at 2:

Sure. Since Islam is responsible for burning children and women alive in their hundreds of thousands, just like in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Vietnam.

Reply

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Anonymous says:

November 19, 2016 at 1:

Wow, is that your best rebuttal? Comparing an incident over 50 years ago, during wartime with the constant attacks by Islamic militants on helpless, innocen bystanders. The blood of Leftist propaganda is really getting their moneys worth out of you. Simpleton.

Reply

Anonymous says: Read the Book entitled Killing the Rising Sun! Reply

November 19, 2016 at 11:

Lee johnson says: UMM. I believe they started it. More that hundreds of thousands would have be lost if we finished it the conventional way. Reply

November 20, 2016 at 8:

Hilma Svea says:

November 21, 2016 at 6:

Arthur, were you born this stupid or did you acquire it in life? This type of anger can only come from a person whose wife has left him for another man, prob a Muslim man.

Reply

Christinah Curtis says: I HAVE PRAYED TOWARD THIS END…..CHRISTIAH CURTIS ON FACEBOOK! JEREMIAH 33:3 Reply

November 24, 2016 at 10:

Anonymous says:

November 27, 2016 at 11:

Arthur I see your just as big a bigot as mr Flynn. You definitely sound like you were brought up on hating everyone different from yourself !!!

Reply

E Deploribus Unum™ (@IJihadEnough) says:

November 18, 2016 at 1:

Flynn sounds like not only an excellent choice but the best choice. When Trump said “We’re Gonna Knock the Hell Outta ISIS” he meant it. There’s a new sheriff i town and if you don’t like it, tough. Maybe next time y’all will vote. Personally, I’ve Jihad It with Radical and Moderate Islam. It is a violent, repulsive religion that teaches intolerance and hate towards anyone who doesn’t subscribe to crazy ideas in the Koran. If we lived in Iran, Iraq or Syria you would give us no religious freedom, in fact, we might be killed after being tortured. This is the new America…Muslims are welcome as long as they respect the American Flag, it’s people a their beliefs. It’s not about you here. It’s about U.S. If you don’t like it, you a free to return to your homeland. It’s really that simple.

Reply

Hypocrite says: You sound like an expert in Islam. Funny how they have nuclear bombs and they never used them against children. Reply

November 18, 2016 at 2:

Bill Seaman says: oohhh an A-bomb debate ! Come at me Bro Reply

November 19, 2016 at 2:

Stu says: They can’t…The little kiddies are much to useful as “human shields”… Reply

November 19, 2016 at 2:

Robert Cash says:

November 19, 2016 at 3:

Pure moral equivalencey hogwash. After the way Japan treated American Soldiers so inhumanely, after the atrocities they visited on anyone who opposed th after multiple continuous appeals for them to stop doing that, we put an end to them. As the only country on this planet who has ever used nuclear weapon combat, you should keep that in mind the next time you want to defend the 7th century savagery Islam perpetrates on not only their enemies (which is basic anyone who isn’t them), but multitudes of civilians. In this context, with all the chances on earth every country has given Islam to stop maiming and killing

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everything in sight, to stop treating HALF of their own population as cattle, can we not conclude that someone is keeping count on how many chances they h left before things get really harsh? It takes a significant set of circumstances to bring into play the structural change the US Government just saw happen recently. The US has had just about enough of this BS. Islam understands one thing in conflict, utter and merciless battlefield domination, they want it that w and modern sensibilities be damned. War is hell youngster, civilians are going to die, better theirs than ours.
Reply

bouizemovic says:

November 19, 2016 at 8:

the muslims are fed up of the continuous crime commited by your soldiers in Irak, in Lybia and now in Syria.

If you dont want blow back dont interfere with the muslim nations and stop giving your tax money to Israel.

Believe me you can t defeat the muslims, even if you dropped bombs in muslim country, you still have muslim people in european countries.

Will you drop bomb to european country, may be you should drop bomb in china and in russia because they have a big minority of muslim too.

My point is that you are a fool and an ignorant, thinking of because of your bombs you can destroy all the muslims, if you manage to destroy all the muslims you will get killed too.

Reply

Alan Lancaster says: We can and will defeat islam-sharia. Reply

November 24, 2016 at 8:

Mr Apolo the great says: Remove sharia law trust in Jesus christ he is the way n the truth…….president trump of usa is coming to correct the world… amen. Reply

November 22, 2016 at 7:

Hilma Svea says:

November 21, 2016 at 6:

American Muslims do respect the american flag. There are over 10,000 of them serving in the armed forces. They are born here and this is their homeland.

Reply

Hypocrite says: Let’s hope Iran gets the nukes soon. After all, they are Putin’s best friends Reply

November 18, 2016 at 2:

Handsome Jack says:

November 18, 2016 at 11:

And that means he actually knows what it is and isn’t a sucker for the taqqiya being spread now to gullible american youths. Islam is an anglerfish, using religion it’s glowing lure. Nazism had its own Aryanism/Islamism Ubermensch religion, yet noone says ‘Naziphobia’. Islam is creeping into the West under the guise of ‘____ Socialism’

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Kate says:

November 19, 2016 at 1:

“They hope to destroy us before they have to face the consequences of their many failures.” That sounds like the definition of the West, drill baby drill!

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Patrick says: Absolutely a Good Choice! Honest view of reality! Reply

November 19, 2016 at 1:

jb80538 says:

November 19, 2016 at 3:

He’s spot on with what islam really is! They are using our constitution against us to practice their sick “religion! islam has been at war with the rest of the world s that pedophile came up with it!

Reply

Anonymous says:

November 24, 2016 at 6:

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I just wonder how many people do you personally know that are Muslim??? That makes you an expert on the religion??? You sound like a very ignorant perso who has never interacted with anyone but his kind of people. Last I checked this country is based on all different kinds of immigrints Don’t just go by what some man is saying and accept it , everyone one of us is born with a brain I wish we just used it a little !
Reply

Anonymous says: So what? Reply

November 19, 2016 at 3:

Pauline W Smith says:

November 19, 2016 at 5:

He is certainly correct in his assessment. We have to understand that the radicals don’t like us and want to kill us and take over the country.

Reply

KitSlater says:

November 19, 2016 at 10:

For a public figure Flynn has an impressive and fearless grasp of the threat that Islam poses. I would offer two caveats, however. Firstly he should ease up on th ‘drinking our blood’ issue – a bit close to ‘blood libel’. ‘Spilling our blood’ will sound much better, even if the former is a quotation. Secondly, he should realise th all Muslims will, ipso facto, favour Islamic hegemony in the West. ‘Radical Islam’ just wants to do it quicker. Islam itself will so severely compromise the West tha will inevitably lead to major internal conflicts. Just like it has everywhere else on Earth.

Reply

Anonymous says: I agree with everything he says. A great choice. Reply

November 20, 2016 at 12:

H. Johnson says: The right man for the job. Reply

November 20, 2016 at 11:

Paul says:

November 20, 2016 at 11:

Just because you stupid leftist/progressives think there is nothing wrong with Islam does NOT mean the rest of America is that stupid! You idiots were so blinded your own biases you couldn’t even get the election right and now we’re supposed to care about your what you think? Go F yourself…..

Reply

Hi My Name Is: (@Gregory__Adams) says: Extreme? Reality based and educated. Reply

November 20, 2016 at 5:

Anonymous says: Sounds totally squared away to me. Reply

November 21, 2016 at 12:

Hilma Svea says: what kind of people are you so full of poisonous hatred? Is this what Christianity teaches you? It seems like you are just hateful people. Reply

November 21, 2016 at 6:

Kevin Allison says:

November 22, 2016 at 4:

Hilma. Wanting to stop IsIs is hateful? Not wanting Sharia law is hateful ? Not wanting Terrorism is hateful? Have you seen European No Go Zones where people Great Brittan can not even go to a neighbourhood that has been taken over by Muslims? Thats called self preservation and respect for our way of life. Which by way was hammered out Originally by Christians and maintained by Immigrants who fled here from every part of the globe. They assimulated. The USA began as greatest nation to ever exist in the history of the world. Lets keep it that way. Name any non western country that multitudes of people risk thier lives to enter. Answer… None.. Name the opportunities that exist in ANY country other than the USA where people to have a chance to grow and thrive like they enjoy under o Constitution. Which by the way is based on Judeo/Christian values. Values of the Jewish and Christian belief system. Which many in Islam happen to consider Infidels and worthy of torture, slavery and death.

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Anonymous says: What do you expect from a bunch of rednecks !!!!!! Reply

November 24, 2016 at 6:

Anonymous says:

November 24, 2016 at 6:

It’s amazing that such a educated man that’s been working for the government for so long can have these racist undertones and ideas about a religion that he r has no clue about .he s just spewing hate in a very different form and catering to the bright minded audience in front of him!he talks about the Ottoman Empire they were the only empire that allowed people to practice their own beliefs all u have to do is look it up. Instead of believing ,this garbage out of this mans mou Any fool can spew lies but it’s a bigger fool to believe it without doing your own research ! Wake up

Reply

Anonymous says:

November 24, 2016 at 6:

I’m a Muslim man living in the northeast ,and I voted for trump because I feel their needs to be a change in Washington only because he isn’t a politician ,hes a business man with that being said our fellow country men in the south or middle of the country need to realize that NOT all Muslims are terrorists ! It’s only a handful of people that have been brain washed and use the religion as excuse for their actions.we live in a great country and hopefully trump will make it greate just wish people would use some common sense instead of just believing everything that they hear or see on tv That our religion does not promote hate in any form what so ever .you can’t judge a billon people’s faith just based on the actions of a few animals in the WORLD

Reply

Anonymous says:

November 24, 2016 at 7:

It’s amazing that a person might be elected to run a department in our country with so much hate against a certain group I just wonder if he made those same comments about about any other group of people how fast he would be shunned or be apologizing for his comments ?? Just makes you wonder why things are this way

Reply

Khalid Lateef says:

February 14, 2017 at 12:

There was a time when the Christians of Europe believed the Jews were the greatest threat to their children’s future.

The Jews were taunted for not assimilating and adopting Christian culture.

The Jews were accused of preferring their Torah laws above all others and creating a “state within a state”.

The Jews were accused of “wanting to take over the world”, blood sacrifice of little children and other absurdities which would send Crusading mobs to hunt the down and hang them from trees.

England banned all Jews for 300 years, France banned all Jews for 100 years, Spain banned all the Jews and Russia banned all Jews from entering for 150 years.

Then Hitler skyrocketed to power in Germany with a promise to make Germany Great Again and he promised to protect Christian civilization by implementing a final solution to the Jewish problem.

Can’t the Christians go for even 100 years without repeating it all over again ?

People remember the terror acts committed by Muslims (totalling 4,000 people) but never acknowledge the fact that 500,000 Muslims in Iraq died due to the American invasion.

..

Reply

Khalid Lateef says:

February 14, 2017 at 12:

The beauty of ISLAM is that it is the Abrahamic Covenant and those who target the children of Abraham shall be targeted by the Lord of Abraham. If you look at Islamic history you will notice that when people left the Muslims alone Islam was dormant but when the Muslims were targeted and they were ma to suffer then Islam spread faster than anybody could imagine. God has promised that when his enemies target his people then he will make his covenant sprea faster and farther which will confuse those who hate the truth.

Reply

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Steve Bannon in 2010: 'Islam is not a religion of peace. Islam is a religion of submission'
By Andrew Kaczynski, CNN @ Updated 8:51 PM ET, Tue January 31, 2017


Source: CNN

0:04 / 2:54

Bannon seen as most inﬂuential Trump adviser 02:54

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Story highlights
"Islam is not a religion of peace. Islam is a religion of submission. Islam means submission," Bannon said.

(CNN) — President Trump's chief strategist, former Breitbart executive Steve Bannon, once dismissed the notion that Islam is a religion of peace, describing it in a 2010 radio interview as "a religion of submission."
Bannon made the comments on "Western Word Radio with Avi Davis," an online right-wing radio station.

Bannon mocked George W. Bush for proclaiming "Islam is a religion of peace."

In the segment, Bannon, who at the time served on the board of Breitbart, criticized former President George W. Bush for what he and fellow guest conservative columnist Diana West described as injecting political correctness into the federal government.

Bannon mocked Bush for proclaiming "Islam is a religion of peace."

 "thIselawmhioslenBothyt ianugrseiinlsiggjuiostnht,oihsfespiiesteatc,heey.oeIusplaiatmogmriseee,ahrteeo'lsigthaioeRnePoprfuisvbualbiccmaynisPsvieoorlnsi.cioIysnl-aa-mnnodmt aTeeacnromsnssseurbovmaftiisvsei-o-nh,e"'sBaanRneopnusbaliicda. n"I mean,
Service.

httpe://swtwawb.lcisnnh.cmome/n20t1, 7c/0o1u/3n1/tproyliticclsu/kbfilev­ebarnsnioonn­oon­fistlhame/Clintons. That's all they are. It's the baby boomer, narcissistic, he wants 1/3

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establishment, country club version of the Clintons. That's all they are. It's the baby boomer, narcissistic, he wants to feel loved."

KevinFileman
December 2010

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The word Islam means submission, and a Muslim is one who submits to God. The Arabic root of the word Islam means "to be safe" and is connected to the word "peace."

A spokesperson for the Trump administration did not respond to a request for a comment before publication.

Bannon's comments shed light on his views on Islam, just as his role in the White House comes under intense scrutiny.

Bannon played a key role in designing and implementing Trump's executive order banning citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States, suspending the US refugee admissions program for four months, and indeﬁnitely banning Syrian refugees from being relocated to the US.

Over the weekend, Trump signed another executive order elevating Bannon, a political strategist, to a principal position on the National Security Council, in a break from prior administration's practice.

Editor's note: This article has been updated to clarify the deﬁnition of Islam.

I Press helps Spicer adjust ﬂag pin
Trump's plan for Medicaid could hurt the opioid abusers he promised to help

Nancy Pelosi says she would have retired if Hillary Clinton won

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SerSvcichei絝.: I haven't seen any evidence Obama admin wiretapped Trump

http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/31/politics/kfile­bannon­on­islam/

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Service.

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Steve Bannon's Islamophobic ﬁlm script just one example of anti-Muslim views
The man who once imagined a ‘global war’ between ‘the Judeo-Christian west’ and ‘jihadist Islamic fascism’ is now Trump’s top adviser. Here’s a selection of anti-Muslim remarks he has made in the past

Steve Bannon’s script for Destroying the Great Satan was never produced. Photograph: Pool/Reuters
Tom McCarthy
Friday 3 February 2017 14.47 EST
T he emergence this week of a script for an Islamophobic ﬁlm written a decade ago by Steve Bannon, Donald Trump’s chief strategist, has drawn new attention to Bannon’s past statements about Islam, and to his view that “the Judeo-Christian west” is engaged in a “global war” against “jihadist Islamic fascism”.

The script for the ﬁlm, Destroying the Great Satan, which was never produced, opens with a fantasy scene of the US Capitol adorned with a star-and-crescent ﬂag and broadcasting the Muslim call to prayer, according to a script obtained by the Washington Post. The ﬁlm imagines a “fundamental clash of civilizations” between the west and “supremacist” Islam, the Post reported.

https://www.theguardian.com/us­news/2017/feb/03/steve­bannon­islamophobia­film­script­muslims­islam

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3/11/2017 Case 1:17-cv-0S0t1ev2e0Ba-nAnoJnT's-IsIDlamDophoDbicofcilmumscreipnt jtus1t o3n-e8examFpilleeodf a0nti3­M/1us3li/m1v7iewsP| aUSgenew2s o| Tfhe3GPuaardgiaenID# 489 Here is a selection from the script published by the Post, and previous statements Bannon has made about Islam.
‘Loss of the will to win’
The road to the establishment of an Islamic Republic in the United States starts slowly and subtly with the loss of the will to win. The road to this unique hell on earth is paved with the best intentions from our major institutions. This political/accommodation/appeasement approach is not simply a function of any one individual’s actions but lies at the heart of our most important cultural and political institutions.
– from Destroying the Great Satan, a 2007 ﬁlm script by Stephen Bannon.
‘Very brutal and bloody conflict’
We’re at the very beginning stages of a very brutal and bloody conﬂict, of which if the people in this room, and people in the church, do not bind together and really form what I feel is an aspect of the church militant, to really be able to not just stand with our beliefs against but to ﬁght for our beliefs this this new barbarity that’s starting, uh that we will literally eradicate everything we’ve been bequeathed over the last 2,000 and 2,500 years.
– from a summer 2014 talk via Skype to a Vatican meeting of the conservative Catholic group Institute for Human Dignity.
‘Something that we’re going to have to face’
It’s a very unpleasant topic. But we are in an outright war against jihadist Islamic fascism. And this war is, is, I think metastasizing, almost far quicker than governments can handle it … We have Boko Haram and other groups that will eventually partner with Isis in this global war. And it is unfortunately something that we’re going to have to face, and we’re going to have to face very quickly.
– from a summer 2014 talk via Skype to a Vatican meeting of the conservative Catholic group Institute for Human Dignity.
‘The very beginning stages of a global conflict’
I think the discussion of, you know, can we put a cap on wealth creation and distribution – it’s something that should be at the heart of every Christian that is a capitalist. Is, what is the purpose I’m doing with this wealth. What is the purpose I’m doing with the ability that god has given us and that divine providence has given us to actually be a creator of jobs and a creator of wealth. I think it behooves all us to really take a hard look and make sure that we are reinvesting that back into positive things, but also to make sure that we understand that we’re at the very beginning stages of a global conﬂict, and that if we do not bind together with other countries that this conﬂict is only going to metastasize.
They have a Twitter account today, Isis does, about turning the United States into a river of blood if it comes in and tries to defend the city of Baghdad. And trust me, that is going to come to Europe. That is going to come to central Europe, it is going to come to western Europe, and it’s going to come to the United Kingdom. And so, I think that we are in a crisis, like I said a crisis of capitalism, really the underpinnings of capitalism. And on top of that we’re now, I believe, at the beginning stages of a global war against Islamic fascism.

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‘The Judeo-Christian west is in crisis’
I believe the world, and particularly the Judeo-Christian west, is in a crisis, and it’s really the organizing principle of how we built Breitbart News to really be a platform to bring news and information to people throughout the world, principally in the west but we’re expanding internationally, to let people understand the depths of this crisis. And it is a crisis both of capitalism but really of the underpinnings of the Judeo-Christian west and our beliefs.
It’s ironic I think that we’re talking today, at exactly, uh, tomorrow, 100 years ago, at the exact moment we’re talking, uh, the assassination took place in Sarajevo, um, of uh Archduke Franz, uh, Ferdinand, um, that uh led to really the end of the Victorian era and the beginning of the bloodiest century in mankind’s history.
– from a summer 2014 talk via Skype to a Vatican meeting of the conservative Catholic group Institute for Human Dignity.
‘Islam is not a religion of peace’
In a 2010 interview, Bannon spoke of former president George W Bush and his statement after the 9/11 attacks that “Islam is a religion of peace”:
Islam is not a religion of peace. Islam is a religion of submission. Islam means submit. I mean, the whole thing, it’s just categorically, he’s – Avi, he is the epitome, he’s the Republican version – not a conservative – he’s a Republican establishment, country club version of the Clintons. That’s all they are. It’s a it’s it’s a it’s a – it’s the baby boomer, narcissistic, he wants to feel loved.
– A 2010 interview with “Western Word Radio with Avi Davis”, ﬂagged by CNN.
‘There’s clearly a fifth column ... that has to be dealt with?’
Bannon asking a radio guest a question:
You believe that not only we’re at war, but we have to prosecute this as a war, and we have to take care of this ﬁfth column – there’s clearly a ﬁfth column here in the United States – that needs to be dealt with immediately?
– 2016 Breitbart interview, ﬂagged by USA Today.
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Steve Bannon allegedly said he 'believes the West is at war with Islam'
'Bannon is of the belief that, if Europe is to be saved, there is no way to avoid armed conﬂict. The power of Islam cannot be stopped by peaceful means'
Clark Mindock New York | Tuesday 14 February 2017 17:32 GMT
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   Bannon waits for the start of Trump's meeNteinwgswithVobiucesisnessSpleoardtsers iCnuRltouoresevelt Room at the White House
Nicholas Kamm/Getty
A Danish journalist claims President Donald Trump's top adviser said that he believes Western civilisation is at war with the Islamic faith.
Steve Bannon, the chief White House strategist who pushed the administration to implement a travel ban on seven predominantly-Muslim countries soon after Trump took oﬃce last month, is said to have made the remarks in May during a conversation at a private event with Flemming Rose, who had come to discuss the rising inﬂuence of Islam in Europe.
“Bannon is of the belief that, if Europe is to be saved, there is no way to avoid armed conﬂict. The power of Islam cannot be stopped by peaceful means. In short, Bannon told me in no uncertain terms that the West is at war with Islam,” Mr Rose, who was at the centre of controversy for his part in publishing cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed in 2005, wrote in the Huﬃngton Post.
 The controversial orders Donald Trump has already issued



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During the exchange, Mr Rose said that Mr Bannon expressed the belief that a violent war could have a cleansing eﬀect and may be necessary to overcome the conﬂict between Western nations and terrorist organisations – like Isis and its supporters.
Islamic communities – whether violent or not – in Europe were eroding traditional Christian values, he said.
In the ﬁrst few weeks of the Trump administration, Mr Bannon successfully pushed Trump to sign a series of executive orders that were later called a "Muslim ban" by critics.
READ MORE
The legal setback of Trump's ‘Muslim ban’ is a defeat for Steve Bannon Steve Bannon ‘connects network of white nationalists’ Trump 'didn't realise' he was promoting Bannon to NSC
That executive order, which restricted refugees from travelling to the US – and even targeted green card holders who were on trips overseas – has since been blocked in federal court.
Mr Bannon is the former chairman of Breitbart News, a conservative alternative news website that has given voice to the alt-right movement. The alt-right is deﬁned by the Southern Poverty Law Centre as "a set of far-right ideologies, groups, and individuals whose core belief is that 'white identity' is under attack by multicultural forces using 'political correctness' and 'social justice' to undermine white people and 'their' civilisation."

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His association with that movement has proven to be
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The Dark History of the White House Aides Who Crafted Trump's "Muslim Ban"

JOSH HARKINSON JAN. 30, 2017 5䰫20 PM
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As a member of the Duke Conservative Union, Miller worked closely with Richard Spencer, a Ph.D. student who would later coin the
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term "alt­right" and become a leading white nationalist.

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TRUMP WANTS U.S. BORDER AGENTS TO ASK 'ARE YOU MUSLIM?'

BY POLLY MOSENDZ ON 12/8/15 AT 9:28 AM

Republican U.S. presidential candidate businessman Donald Trump suggested custom agents ask those entering the country if they are Muslim on December 8.
RICK WILKING/REUTERS

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Republican presidential frontrunner Donald Trump suggested border agents should ask those entering the United States if they are Muslim in order to determine if they will be allowed into the country, while speaking on MSNBC Tuesday morning.
This comes after Trump announced a proposal on Monday to ban Muslims from entering the United States. The idea of such a ban, which would be unconstitutional, was widely condemned by both fellow Republicans and Democrats.
Asked by the MSNBC host how his proposal would work in practice and whether border agents would have to ask people their religion, Trump said, "They would say 'Are you Muslim?'"
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Trump's proposal would also prevent Muslim Americans from traveling back into the United States, despite their citizenship status. On Tuesday, Trump clarified there would be exceptions to his ban: athletes, world leaders, and members of the military. He said he hopes the ban "wouldn't last very long."
“By doing this, what we really need help from are the Muslims who do know whats going on, the neighbors of people looking to do harm, they have to call the police," Trump said.
Trump added that while he “loves” and “wants to work with” Muslims, his message to Muslim Americans was that they must “turn in bad ones.”
When asked how his proposed ban would be executed, Trump offered a vague answer: “It could happen at the site [of origin,] it could happen here, it could happen in many different forms. That would have to be worked out. And I don’t think it would be for an extended period of time. We have to get our hands around this situation.”
Related Stories
Republicans Condemn Donald Trump's Proposal to Ban Muslims From Entering U.S.
Donald Trump Calls for 'Total and Complete Shutdown' of Muslims Entering U.S.

As for his critics, Trump said fellow Republicans had condemned his other ideas, such as a

border wall with Mexico, and eventually came to approve his decisions. “The ones that aren’t to

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On Good Morning America, Trump was asked if being compared to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler bothered him. “No, what I’m doing is no different from FDR,” he replied.
During President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s time in office, the United States created internment camps for Japanese Americans following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the anniversary of which was on Monday. Trump said that he does not support such internment.
When asked if he regrets making the proposal, Trump said “thousands” are supporting him.
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Presidential Debate at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri October 9, 2016

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PARTICIPANTS: Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (D) and Businessman Donald Trump (R)

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RADDATZ: Ladies and gentlemen the Republican nominee for president, Donald J. Trump, and the Democratic nominee for president, Hillary Clinton. [applause]

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COOPER: Thank you very much for being here. We're going to begin with a question from one of the members in our town hall. Each of you will have two minutes to respond to this question. Secretary Clinton, you won the coin toss, so you'll go first. Our first question comes from Patrice Brock. Patrice?
QUESTION: Thank you, and good evening. The last debate could have been rated as MA, mature audiences, per TV parental guidelines. Knowing that educators assign viewing the presidential debates as students' homework, do you feel you're modeling appropriate and positive behavior for today's youth?

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CLINTON: Well, thank you. Are you a teacher? Yes, I think that that's a very good question, because I've heard from lots of teachers and parents about some of their concerns about some of the things that are being said and done in this campaign.

And I think it is very important for us to make clear to our children that our country really is great because we're good. And we are going to respect one another, lift each other up. We are going to be looking for ways to celebrate our diversity, and we are going to try to reach out to every boy and girl, as well as every adult, to bring them in to working on behalf of our country.

I have a very positive and optimistic view about what we can do together. That's why the slogan of

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my campaign is "Stronger Together," because I think if we work together, if we overcome the

divisiveness that sometimes sets Americans against one another, and instead we make some big goals—and I've set forth

some big goals, getting the economy to work for everyone, not just those at the top, making sure that we have the best

education system from preschool through college and making it affordable, and so much else.

If we set those goals and we go together to try to achieve them, there's nothing in my opinion that America can't do. So that's why I hope that we will come together in this campaign. Obviously, I'm hoping to earn your vote, I'm hoping to be elected in November, and I can promise you, I will work with every American.

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I want to be the president for all Americans, regardless of your political beliefs, where you come from, what you look like, your religion. I want us to heal our country and bring it together because that's, I think, the best way for us to get the future that our children and our grandchildren deserve.
COOPER: Secretary Clinton, thank you. Mr. Trump, you have two minutes.
TRUMP: Well, I actually agree with that. I agree with everything she said. I began this campaign because I was so tired of seeing such foolish things happen to our country. This is a great country. This is a great land. I've gotten to know the people of the country over the last year­and­a­half that I've been doing this as a politician. I cannot believe I'm saying that about myself, but I guess I have been a politician.

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And my whole concept was to make America great again. When I watch the deals being made, when I watch what's happening with some horrible things like Obamacare, where your health insurance and health care is going up by numbers that are astronomical, 68 percent, 59 percent, 71 percent, when I look at the Iran deal and how bad a deal it is for us, it's a one­sided transaction where we're giving back $150 billion to a terrorist state, really, the number one terror state, we've made them a strong country from really a very weak country just three years ago.
When I look at all of the things that I see and all of the potential that our country has, we have such tremendous potential, whether it's in business and trade, where we're doing so badly. Last year, we had almost $800 billion trade deficit. In other words, trading with other countries. We had an $800 billion deficit. It's hard to believe. Inconceivable.
You say who's making these deals? We're going the make great deals. We're going to have a strong border. We're going to bring back law and order. Just today, policemen was shot, two killed. And this is happening on a weekly basis. We have to bring back respect to law enforcement. At the same time, we have to take care of people on all sides. We need justice.

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COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump. The question from Patrice was about are you both modeling positive and appropriate behavior for today's youth? We received a lot of questions online, Mr. Trump, about the tape that was released on Friday, as you can imagine. You called what you said locker room banter. You described kissing women without consent, grabbing their genitals. That is sexual assault. You bragged that you have sexually assaulted women. Do you understand that?
TRUMP: No, I didn't say that at all. I don't think you understood what was—this was locker room talk. I'm not proud of it. I apologize to my family. I apologize to the American people. Certainly I'm not proud of it. But this is locker room talk.
You know, when we have a world where you have ISIS chopping off heads, where you have—and, frankly, drowning people in steel cages, where you have wars and horrible, horrible sights all over, where you have so many bad things happening, this is like medieval times. We haven't seen anything like this, the carnage all over the world.
And they look and they see. Can you imagine the people that are, frankly, doing so well against us with ISIS? And they look at our country and they see what's going on.
Yes, I'm very embarrassed by it. I hate it. But it's locker room talk, and it's one of those things. I will knock the hell out of ISIS. We're going to defeat ISIS. ISIS happened a number of years ago in a vacuum that was left because of bad judgment. And I will tell you, I will take care of ISIS.
COOPER: So, Mr. Trump...

TRUMP: And we should get on to much more important things and much bigger things.

COOPER: Just for the record, though, are you saying that what you said on that bus 11 years ago that you did not actually kiss women without consent or grope women without consent?

TRUMP: I have great respect for women. Nobody has more respect for women than I do.

COOPER: So, for the record, you're saying you never did that?

TRUMP: I've said things that, frankly, you hear these things I said. And I was embarrassed by it. But I have tremendous respect for women.

COOPER: Have you ever done those things?

TRUMP: And women have respect for me. And I will tell you: No, I have not. And I will tell you that I'm going to make our country safe. We're going to have borders in our country, which we don't have now. People are pouring into our country, and they're coming in from the Middle East and other places.

We're going to make America safe again. We're going to make America great again, but we're going to make America safe again. And we're going to make America wealthy again, because if you don't do that, it just—it sounds harsh to say, but we have to build up the wealth of our nation.

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.

TRUMP: Right now, other nations are taking our jobs and they're taking our wealth.

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.

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TRUMP: And that's what I want to talk about.
COOPER: Secretary Clinton, do you want to respond?
CLINTON: Well, like everyone else, I've spent a lot of time thinking over the last 48 hours about what we heard and saw. You know, with prior Republican nominees for president, I disagreed with them on politics, policies, principles, but I never questioned their fitness to serve.
Donald Trump is different. I said starting back in June that he was not fit to be president and commander­in­chief. And many Republicans and independents have said the same thing. What we all saw and heard on Friday was Donald talking about women, what he thinks about women, what he does to women. And he has said that the video doesn't represent who he is.
But I think it's clear to anyone who heard it that it represents exactly who he is. Because we've seen this throughout the campaign. We have seen him insult women. We've seen him rate women on their appearance, ranking them from one to ten. We've seen him embarrass women on TV and on Twitter. We saw him after the first debate spend nearly a week denigrating a former Miss Universe in the harshest, most personal terms.
So, yes, this is who Donald Trump is. But it's not only women, and it's not only this video that raises questions about his fitness to be our president, because he has also targeted immigrants, African­ Americans, Latinos, people with disabilities, POWs, Muslims, and so many others.
So this is who Donald Trump is. And the question for us, the question our country must answer is that this is not who we are. That's why—to go back to your question—I want to send a message—we all should—to every boy and girl and, indeed, to the entire world that America already is great, but we are great because we are good, and we will respect one another, and we will work with one another, and we will celebrate our diversity.
These are very important values to me, because this is the America that I know and love. And I can pledge to you tonight that this is the America that I will serve if I'm so fortunate enough to become your president.
RADDATZ: And we want to get to some questions from online...
TRUMP: Am I allowed to respond to that? I assume I am.
RADDATZ: Yes, you can respond to that.
TRUMP: It's just words, folks. It's just words. Those words, I've been hearing them for many years. I heard them when they were running for the Senate in New York, where Hillary was going to bring back jobs to upstate New York and she failed.
I've heard them where Hillary is constantly talking about the inner cities of our country, which are a disaster education­ wise, jobwise, safety­wise, in every way possible. I'm going to help the African­Americans. I'm going to help the Latinos, Hispanics. I am going to help the inner cities.
She's done a terrible job for the African­Americans. She wants their vote, and she does nothing, and then she comes back four years later. We saw that firsthand when she was United States senator. She campaigned where the primary part of her campaign...
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, Mr. Trump—I want to get to audience questions and online questions.
TRUMP: So, she's allowed to do that, but I'm not allowed to respond?
RADDATZ: You're going to have—you're going to get to respond right now.
TRUMP: Sounds fair.
RADDATZ: This tape is generating intense interest. In just 48 hours, it's become the single most talked about story of the entire 2016 election on Facebook, with millions and millions of people discussing it on the social network. As we said a moment ago, we do want to bring in questions from voters around country via social media, and our first stays on this topic. Jeff from Ohio asks on Facebook, "Trump says the campaign has changed him. When did that happen?" So, Mr. Trump, let me add to that. When you walked off that bus at age 59, were you a different man or did that behavior continue until just recently? And you have two minutes for this.
TRUMP: It was locker room talk, as I told you. That was locker room talk. I'm not proud of it. I am a person who has great respect for people, for my family, for the people of this country. And certainly, I'm not proud of it. But that was something that happened.

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If you look at Bill Clinton, far worse. Mine are words, and his was action. His was what he's done to women. There's never been anybody in the history politics in this nation that's been so abusive to women. So you can say any way you want to say it, but Bill Clinton was abusive to women.

Hillary Clinton attacked those same women and attacked them viciously. Four of them here tonight. One of the women, who is a wonderful woman, at 12 years old, was raped at 12. Her client she represented got him off, and she's seen laughing on two separate occasions, laughing at the girl who was raped. Kathy Shelton, that young woman is here with us tonight.

So don't tell me about words. I am absolutely—I apologize for those words. But it is things that people say. But what President Clinton did, he was impeached, he lost his license to practice law. He had to pay an $850,000 fine to one of the women. Paula Jones, who's also here tonight.

And I will tell you that when Hillary brings up a point like that and she talks about words that I said 11 years ago, I think it's disgraceful, and I think she should be ashamed of herself, if you want to know the truth. [applause]

RADDATZ: Can we please hold the applause? Secretary Clinton, you have two minutes.

CLINTON: Well, first, let me start by saying that so much of what he's just said is not right, but he gets to run his campaign any way he chooses. He gets to decide what he wants to talk about. Instead of answering people's questions, talking about our agenda, laying out the plans that we have that we think can make a better life and a better country, that's his choice.

When I hear something like that, I am reminded of what my friend, Michelle Obama, advised us all: When they go low, you go high. [applause]

And, look, if this were just about one video, maybe what he's saying tonight would be understandable, but everyone can draw their own conclusions at this point about whether or not the man in the video or the man on the stage respects women. But he never apologizes for anything to anyone.

He never apologized to Mr. and Mrs. Khan, the Gold Star family whose son, Captain Khan, died in the line of duty in Iraq. And Donald insulted and attacked them for weeks over their religion.

He never apologized to the distinguished federal judge who was born in Indiana, but Donald said he couldn't be trusted to be a judge because his parents were, quote, "Mexican."

He never apologized to the reporter that he mimicked and mocked on national television and our children were watching. And he never apologized for the racist lie that President Obama was not born in the United States of America. He owes the president an apology, he owes our country an apology, and he needs to take responsibility for his actions and his words.

TRUMP: Well, you owe the president an apology, because as you know very well, your campaign, Sidney Blumenthal— he's another real winner that you have—and he's the one that got this started, along with your campaign manager, and they were on television just two weeks ago, she was, saying exactly that. So you really owe him an apology. You're the one that sent the pictures around your campaign, sent the pictures around with President Obama in a certain garb. That was long before I was ever involved, so you actually owe an apology.

Number two, Michelle Obama. I've gotten to see the commercials that they did on you. And I've gotten to see some of the most vicious commercials I've ever seen of Michelle Obama talking about you, Hillary.

So, you talk about friend? Go back and take a look at those commercials, a race where you lost fair and square, unlike the Bernie Sanders race, where you won, but not fair and square, in my opinion. And all you have to do is take a look at WikiLeaks and just see what they say about Bernie Sanders and see what Deborah Wasserman Schultz had in mind, because Bernie Sanders, between super­delegates and Deborah Wasserman Schultz, he never had a chance. And I was so surprised to see him sign on with the devil.

But when you talk about apology, I think the one that you should really be apologizing for and the thing that you should be apologizing for are the 33,000 e­mails that you deleted, and that you acid washed, and then the two boxes of e­mails and other things last week that were taken from an office and are now missing.

And I'll tell you what. I didn't think I'd say this, but I'm going to say it, and I hate to say it. But if I win, I am going to instruct my attorney general to get a special prosecutor to look into your situation, because there has never been so many lies, so much deception. There has never been anything like it, and we're going to have a special prosecutor.

When I speak, I go out and speak, the people of this country are furious. In my opinion, the people that have been long­ term workers at the FBI are furious. There has never been anything like this, where e­mails—and you get a subpoena, you get a subpoena, and after getting the subpoena, you delete 33,000 e­mails, and then you acid wash them or bleach them, as you would say, very expensive process.

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So we're going to get a special prosecutor, and we're going to look into it, because you know what? People have been—their lives have been destroyed for doing one­fifth of what you've done. And it's a disgrace. And honestly, you ought to be ashamed of yourself.

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, I want to follow up on that. [crosstalk]

RADDATZ: I'm going to let you talk about e­mails.

CLINTON: ... because everything he just said is absolutely false, but I'm not surprised.

TRUMP: Oh, really? CLINTON: In the first debate...[laughter]

RADDATZ: And really, the audience needs to calm down here.

CLINTON: ... I told people that it would be impossible to be fact­checking Donald all the time. I'd never get to talk about anything I want to do and how we're going to really make lives better for people.

So, once again, go to HillaryClinton.com. We have literally Trump—you can fact check him in real time. Last time at the first debate, we had millions of people fact checking, so I expect we'll have millions more fact checking, because, you know, it is—it's just awfully good that someone with the temperament of Donald Trump is not in charge of the law in our country.

TRUMP: Because you'd be in jail. [applause]

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton...

COOPER: We want to remind the audience to please not talk out loud. Please do not applaud. You're just wasting time.

RADDATZ: And, Secretary Clinton, I do want to follow up on e­ mails. You've said your handing of your e­mails was a mistake. You disagreed with FBI Director James Comey, calling your handling of classified information, quote, "extremely careless." The FBI said that there were 110 classified e­mails that were exchanged, eight of which were top secret, and that it was possible hostile actors did gain access to those e­mails. You don't call that extremely careless?

CLINTON: Well, Martha, first, let me say—and I've said before, but I'll repeat it, because I want everyone to hear it—that was a mistake, and I take responsibility for using a personal e­mail account. Obviously, if I were to do it over again, I would not. I'm not making any excuses. It was a mistake. And I am very sorry about that.

But I think it's also important to point out where there are some misleading accusations from critics and others. After a year­long investigation, there is no evidence that anyone hacked the server I was using and there is no evidence that anyone can point to at all—anyone who says otherwise has no basis—that any classified material ended up in the wrong hands.

I take classified materials very seriously and always have. When I was on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I was privy to a lot of classified material. Obviously, as secretary of state, I had some of the most important secrets that we possess, such as going after bin Laden. So I am very committed to taking classified information seriously. And as I said, there is no evidence that any classified information ended up in the wrong hands.

RADDATZ: OK, we're going to move on.

TRUMP: And yet she didn't know the word—the letter C on a document. Right? She didn't even know what that word— what that letter meant.

You know, it's amazing. I'm watching Hillary go over facts. And she's going after fact after fact, and she's lying again, because she said she—you know, what she did with the e­mail was fine. You think it was fine to delete 33,000 e­mails? I don't think so.

She said the 33,000 e­mails had to do with her daughter's wedding, number one, and a yoga class. Well, maybe we'll give three or three or four or five or something. 33,000 e­mails deleted, and now she's saying there wasn't anything wrong.

And more importantly, that was after getting a subpoena. That wasn't before. That was after. She got it from the United States Congress. And I'll be honest, I am so disappointed in congressmen, including Republicans, for allowing this to happen.

Our Justice Department, where our husband goes on to the back of a airplane for 39 minutes, talks to the attorney general days before a ruling is going to be made on her case. But for you to say that there was nothing wrong with you deleting

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39,000 e­mails, again, you should be ashamed of yourself. What you did—and this is after getting a subpoena from the United States Congress. COOPER: We have to move on. TRUMP: You did that. Wait a minute. One second. COOPER: Secretary Clinton, you can respond, and then we got to move on. RADDATZ: We want to give the audience a chance. TRUMP: If you did that in the private sector, you'd be put in jail, let alone after getting a subpoena from the United States Congress. COOPER: Secretary Clinton, you can respond. Then we have to move on to an audience question. CLINTON: Look, it's just not true. And so please, go to... TRUMP: Oh, you didn't delete them? COOPER: Allow her to respond, please. CLINTON: It was personal e­mails, not official. TRUMP: Oh, 33,000? Yeah. CLINTON: Not—well, we turned over 35,000, so... TRUMP: Oh, yeah. What about the other 15,000? COOPER: Please allow her to respond. She didn't talk while you talked. CLINTON: Yes, that's true, I didn't. TRUMP: Because you have nothing to say. CLINTON: I didn't in the first debate, and I'm going to try not to in this debate, because I'd like to get to the questions that the people have brought here tonight to talk to us about. TRUMP: Get off this question. CLINTON: OK, Donald. I know you're into big diversion tonight, anything to avoid talking about your campaign and the way it's exploding and the way Republicans are leaving you. But let's at least focus... TRUMP: Let's see what happens...[crosstalk] COOPER: Allow her to respond. CLINTON: ... on some of the issues that people care about tonight. Let's get to their questions. COOPER: We have a question here from Ken Karpowicz. He has a question about health care. Ken? TRUMP: I'd like to know, Anderson, why aren't you bringing up the e­mails? I'd like to know. Why aren't you bringing... COOPER: We brought up the e­mails. TRUMP: No, it hasn't. It hasn't. And it hasn't been finished at all. COOPER: Ken Karpowicz has a question. TRUMP: It's nice to—one on three. QUESTION: Thank you. Affordable Care Act, known as Obamacare, it is not affordable. Premiums have gone up. Deductibles have gone up. Copays have gone up. Prescriptions have gone up. And the coverage has gone down. What will you do to bring the cost down and make coverage better? COOPER: That first one goes to Secretary Clinton, because you started out the last one to the audience. CLINTON: If he wants to start, he can start. No, go ahead, Donald. TRUMP: No, I'm a gentlemen, Hillary. Go ahead. [laughter]

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COOPER: Secretary Clinton?

CLINTON: Well, I think Donald was about to say he's going to solve it by repealing it and getting rid of the Affordable Care Act. And I'm going to fix it, because I agree with you. Premiums have gotten too high. Copays, deductibles, prescription drug costs, and I've laid out a series of actions that we can take to try to get those costs down.

But here's what I don't want people to forget when we're talking about reining in the costs, which has to be the highest priority of the next president, when the Affordable Care Act passed, it wasn't just that 20 million got insurance who didn't have it before. But that in and of itself was a good thing. I meet these people all the time, and they tell me what a difference having that insurance meant to them and their families.

But everybody else, the 170 million of us who get health insurance through our employees got big benefits. Number one, insurance companies can't deny you coverage because of a pre­existing condition. Number two, no lifetime limits, which is a big deal if you have serious health problems.

Number three, women can't be charged more than men for our health insurance, which is the way it used to be before the Affordable Care Act. Number four, if you're under 26, and your parents have a policy, you can be on that policy until the age of 26, something that didn't happen before.

So I want very much to save what works and is good about the Affordable Care Act. But we've got to get costs down. We've got to provide additional help to small businesses so that they can afford to provide health insurance. But if we repeal it, as Donald has proposed, and start over again, all of those benefits I just mentioned are lost to everybody, not just people who get their health insurance on the exchange. And then we would have to start all over again.

Right now, we are at 90 percent health insurance coverage. That's the highest we've ever been in our country.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, your time is up.

CLINTON: So I want us to get to 100 percent, but get costs down and keep quality up.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, you have two minutes.

TRUMP: It is such a great question and it's maybe the question I get almost more than anything else, outside of defense. Obamacare is a disaster. You know it. We all know it. It's going up at numbers that nobody's ever seen worldwide. Nobody's ever seen numbers like this for health care.

It's only getting worse. In '17, it implodes by itself. Their method of fixing it is to go back and ask Congress for more money, more and more money. We have right now almost $20 trillion in debt.

Obamacare will never work. It's very bad, very bad health insurance. Far too expensive. And not only expensive for the person that has it, unbelievably expensive for our country. It's going to be one of the biggest line items very shortly.

We have to repeal it and replace it with something absolutely much less expensive and something that works, where your plan can actually be tailored. We have to get rid of the lines around the state, artificial lines, where we stop insurance companies from coming in and competing, because they want—and President Obama and whoever was working on it—they want to leave those lines, because that gives the insurance companies essentially monopolies. We want competition.

You will have the finest health care plan there is. She wants to go to a single­payer plan, which would be a disaster, somewhat similar to Canada. And if you haven't noticed the Canadians, when they need a big operation, when something happens, they come into the United States in many cases because their system is so slow. It's catastrophic in certain ways.

But she wants to go to single payer, which means the government basically rules everything. Hillary Clinton has been after this for years. Obamacare was the first step. Obamacare is a total disaster. And not only are your rates going up by numbers that nobody's ever believed, but your deductibles are going up, so that unless you get hit by a truck, you're never going to be able to use it.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, your time...

TRUMP: It is a disastrous plan, and it has to be repealed and replaced.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, let me follow up with you. Your husband called Obamacare, quote, "the craziest thing in the world," saying that small­business owners are getting killed as premiums double, coverage is cut in half. Was he mistaken or was the mistake simply telling the truth?

CLINTON: No, I mean, he clarified what he meant. And it's very clear. Look, we are in a situation in our country where if we were to start all over again, we might come up with a different system. But we have an employer­based system. That's where the vast majority of people get their health care.

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And the Affordable Care Act was meant to try to fill the gap between people who were too poor and couldn't put together any resources to afford health care, namely people on Medicaid. Obviously, Medicare, which is a single­payer system, which takes care of our elderly and does a great job doing it, by the way, and then all of the people who were employed, but people who were working but didn't have the money to afford insurance and didn't have anybody, an employer or anybody else, to help them.
That was the slot that the Obamacare approach was to take. And like I say, 20 million people now have health insurance. So if we just rip it up and throw it away, what Donald's not telling you is we just turn it back to the insurance companies the way it used to be, and that means the insurance companies...
COOPER: Secretary Clinton...
CLINTON: ... get to do pretty much whatever they want, including saying, look, I'm sorry, you've got diabetes, you had cancer, your child has asthma...
COOPER: Your time is up.
CLINTON: ... you may not be able to have insurance because you can't afford it. So let's fix what's broken about it, but let's not throw it away and give it all back to the insurance companies and the drug companies. That's not going to work.
COOPER: Mr. Trump, let me follow up on this.
TRUMP: Well, I just want—just one thing. First of all, Hillary, everything's broken about it. Everything. Number two, Bernie Sanders said that Hillary Clinton has very bad judgment. This is a perfect example of it, trying to save Obamacare, which is a disaster.
COOPER: You've said you want to end Obamacare...
TRUMP: By the way...
COOPER: You've said you want to end Obamacare. You've also said you want to make coverage accessible for people with pre­existing conditions. How do you force insurance companies to do that if you're no longer mandating that every American get insurance?
TRUMP: We're going to be able to. You're going to have plans...
COOPER: What does that mean?
TRUMP: Well, I'll tell you what it means. You're going to have plans that are so good, because we're going to have so much competition in the insurance industry. Once we break out—once we break out the lines and allow the competition to come...
COOPER: Are you going—are you going to have a mandate that Americans have to have health insurance?
TRUMP: President Obama—Anderson, excuse me. President Obama, by keeping those lines, the boundary lines around each state, it was almost gone until just very toward the end of the passage of Obamacare, which, by the way, was a fraud. You know that, because Jonathan Gruber, the architect of Obamacare, was said—he said it was a great lie, it was a big lie. President Obama said you keep your doctor, you keep your plan. The whole thing was a fraud, and it doesn't work.
But when we get rid of those lines, you will have competition, and we will be able to keep pre­existing, we'll also be able to help people that can't get—don't have money because we are going to have people protected.
And Republicans feel this way, believe it or not, and strongly this way. We're going to block grant into the states. We're going to block grant into Medicaid into the states...
COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.
TRUMP: ... so that we will be able to take care of people without the necessary funds to take care of themselves.
COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.
RADDATZ: We now go to Gorbah Hamed with a question for both candidates.
QUESTION: Hi. There are 3.3 million Muslims in the United States, and I'm one of them. You've mentioned working with Muslim nations, but with Islamophobia on the rise, how will you help people like me deal with the consequences of being labeled as a threat to the country after the election is over?
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, you're first.

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TRUMP: Well, you're right about Islamophobia, and that's a shame. But one thing we have to do is we have to make sure that—because there is a problem. I mean, whether we like it or not, and we could be very politically correct, but whether we like it or not, there is a problem. And we have to be sure that Muslims come in and report when they see something going on. When they see hatred going on, they have to report it.

As an example, in San Bernardino, many people saw the bombs all over the apartment of the two people that killed 14 and wounded many, many people. Horribly wounded. They'll never be the same. Muslims have to report the problems when they see them.

And, you know, there's always a reason for everything. If they don't do that, it's a very difficult situation for our country, because you look at Orlando and you look at San Bernardino and you look at the World Trade Center. Go outside. Look at Paris. Look at that horrible—these are radical Islamic terrorists.

And she won't even mention the word and nor will President Obama. He won't use the term "radical Islamic terrorism." Now, to solve a problem, you have to be able to state what the problem is or at least say the name. She won't say the name and President Obama won't say the name. But the name is there. It's radical Islamic terror. And before you solve it, you have to say the name.

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton?

CLINTON: Well, thank you for asking your question. And I've heard this question from a lot of Muslim­Americans across our country, because, unfortunately, there's been a lot of very divisive, dark things said about Muslims. And even someone like Captain Khan, the young man who sacrificed himself defending our country in the United States Army, has been subject to attack by Donald.

I want to say just a couple of things. First, we've had Muslims in America since George Washington. And we've had many successful Muslims. We just lost a particular well­known one with Muhammad Ali.

My vision of America is an America where everyone has a place, if you're willing to work hard, you do your part, you contribute to the community. That's what America is. That's what we want America to be for our children and our grandchildren.

It's also very short­sighted and even dangerous to be engaging in the kind of demagogic rhetoric that Donald has about Muslims. We need American Muslims to be part of our eyes and ears on our front lines. I've worked with a lot of different Muslim groups around America. I've met with a lot of them, and I've heard how important it is for them to feel that they are wanted and included and part of our country, part of our homeland security, and that's what I want to see.

It's also important I intend to defeat ISIS, to do so in a coalition with majority Muslim nations. Right now, a lot of those nations are hearing what Donald says and wondering, why should we cooperate with the Americans? And this is a gift to ISIS and the terrorists, violent jihadist terrorists.

We are not at war with Islam. And it is a mistake and it plays into the hands of the terrorists to act as though we are. So I want a country where citizens like you and your family are just as welcome as anyone else.

RADDATZ: Thank you, Secretary Clinton.

Mr. Trump, in December, you said this. "Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what the hell is going on. We have no choice. We have no choice." Your running mate said this week that the Muslim ban is no longer your position. Is that correct? And if it is, was it a mistake to have a religious test?

TRUMP: First of all, Captain Khan is an American hero, and if I were president at that time, he would be alive today, because unlike her, who voted for the war without knowing what she was doing, I would not have had our people in Iraq. Iraq was disaster. So he would have been alive today.

The Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into a extreme vetting from certain areas of the world. Hillary Clinton wants to allow hundreds of thousands—excuse me. Excuse me..

RADDATZ: And why did it morph into that? No, did you—no, answer the question. Do you still believe...

TRUMP: Why don't you interrupt her? You interrupt me all the time.

RADDATZ: I do.

TRUMP: Why don't you interrupt her?

RADDATZ: Would you please explain whether or not the Muslim ban still stands?

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TRUMP: It's called extreme vetting. We are going to areas like Syria where they're coming in by the tens of thousands because of Barack Obama. And Hillary Clinton wants to allow a 550 percent increase over Obama. People are coming into our country like we have no idea who they are, where they are from, what their feelings about our country is, and she wants 550 percent more. This is going to be the great Trojan horse of all time.
We have enough problems in this country. I believe in building safe zones. I believe in having other people pay for them, as an example, the Gulf states, who are not carrying their weight, but they have nothing but money, and take care of people. But I don't want to have, with all the problems this country has and all of the problems that you see going on, hundreds of thousands of people coming in from Syria when we know nothing about them. We know nothing about their values and we know nothing about their love for our country.
RADDATZ: And, Secretary Clinton, let me ask you about that, because you have asked for an increase from 10,000 to 65,000 Syrian refugees. We know you want tougher vetting. That's not a perfect system. So why take the risk of having those refugees come into the country?
CLINTON: Well, first of all, I will not let anyone into our country that I think poses a risk to us. But there are a lot of refugees, women and children—think of that picture we all saw of that 4­year­old boy with the blood on his forehead because he'd been bombed by the Russian and Syrian air forces.
There are children suffering in this catastrophic war, largely, I believe, because of Russian aggression. And we need to do our part. We by no means are carrying anywhere near the load that Europe and others are. But we will have vetting that is as tough as it needs to be from our professionals, our intelligence experts and others.
But it is important for us as a policy, you know, not to say, as Donald has said, we're going to ban people based on a religion. How do you do that? We are a country founded on religious freedom and liberty. How do we do what he has advocated without causing great distress within our own county? Are we going to have religious tests when people fly into our country? And how do we expect to be able to implement those?
So I thought that what he said was extremely unwise and even dangerous. And indeed, you can look at the propaganda on a lot of the terrorists sites, and what Donald Trump says about Muslims is used to recruit fighters, because they want to create a war between us.
And the final thing I would say, this is the 10th or 12th time that he's denied being for the war in Iraq. We have it on tape. The entire press corps has looked at it. It's been debunked, but it never stops him from saying whatever he wants to say.
TRUMP: That's not been debunked.
CLINTON: So, please...
TRUMP: That has not been debunked.
CLINTON: ... go to HillaryClinton.com and you can see it.
TRUMP: I was against—I was against the war in Iraq. Has not been debunked. And you voted for it. And you shouldn't have. Well, I just want to say...
RADDATZ: There's been lots of fact­checking on that. I'd like to move on to an online question...
TRUMP: Excuse me. She just went about 25 seconds over her time.
RADDATZ: She did not.
TRUMP: Could I just respond to this, please?
RADDATZ: Very quickly, please.
TRUMP: Hillary Clinton, in terms of having people come into our country, we have many criminal illegal aliens. When we want to send them back to their country, their country says we don't want them. In some cases, they're murderers, drug lords, drug problems. And they don't want them.
And Hillary Clinton, when she was secretary of state, said that's OK, we can't force it into their country. Let me tell you, I'm going to force them right back into their country. They're murderers and some very bad people.
And I will tell you very strongly, when Bernie Sanders said she had bad judgment, she has really bad judgment, because we are letting people into this country that are going to cause problems and crime like you've never seen. We're also letting drugs pour through our southern border at a record clip. At a record clip. And it shouldn't be allowed to happen.

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ICE just endorsed me. They've never endorsed a presidential candidate. The Border Patrol agents, 16,500, just recently endorsed me, and they endorsed me because I understand the border. She doesn't. She wants amnesty for everybody. Come right in. Come right over. It's a horrible thing she's doing. She's got bad judgment, and honestly, so bad that she should never be president of the United States. That I can tell you.
RADDATZ: Thank you, Mr. Trump. I want to move on. This next question from the public through the Bipartisan Open Debate Coalition's online forum, where Americans submitted questions that generated millions of votes. This question involves WikiLeaks release of purported excerpts of Secretary Clinton's paid speeches, which she has refused to release, and one line in particular, in which you, Secretary Clinton, purportedly say you need both a public and private position on certain issues. So, Tu, from Virginia asks, is it OK for politicians to be two­faced? Is it acceptable for a politician to have a private stance on issues? Secretary Clinton, your two minutes.
CLINTON: Well, right. As I recall, that was something I said about Abraham Lincoln after having seen the wonderful Steven Spielberg movie called "Lincoln." It was a master class watching President Lincoln get the Congress to approve the 13th Amendment. It was principled, and it was strategic.
And I was making the point that it is hard sometimes to get the Congress to do what you want to do and you have to keep working at it. And, yes, President Lincoln was trying to convince some people, he used some arguments, convincing other people, he used other arguments. That was a great—I thought a great display of presidential leadership.
But, you know, let's talk about what's really going on here, Martha, because our intelligence community just came out and said in the last few days that the Kremlin, meaning Putin and the Russian government, are directing the attacks, the hacking on American accounts to influence our election. And WikiLeaks is part of that, as are other sites where the Russians hack information, we don't even know if it's accurate information, and then they put it out.
We have never in the history of our country been in a situation where an adversary, a foreign power, is working so hard to influence the outcome of the election. And believe me, they're not doing it to get me elected. They're doing it to try to influence the election for Donald Trump.
Now, maybe because he has praised Putin, maybe because he says he agrees with a lot of what Putin wants to do, maybe because he wants to do business in Moscow, I don't know the reasons. But we deserve answers. And we should demand that Donald release all of his tax returns so that people can see what are the entanglements and the financial relationships that he has...
RADDATZ: We're going to get to that later. Secretary Clinton, you're out of time.
CLINTON: ... with the Russians and other foreign powers.
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump?
TRUMP: Well, I think I should respond, because—so ridiculous. Look, now she's blaming—she got caught in a total lie. Her papers went out to all her friends at the banks, Goldman Sachs and everybody else, and she said things—WikiLeaks that just came out. And she lied. Now she's blaming the lie on the late, great Abraham Lincoln. That's one that I haven't... [laughter]
OK, Honest Abe, Honest Abe never lied. That's the good thing. That's the big difference between Abraham Lincoln and you. That's a big, big difference. We're talking about some difference.
But as far as other elements of what she was saying, I don't know Putin. I think it would be great if we got along with Russia because we could fight ISIS together, as an example. But I don't know Putin.
But I notice, anytime anything wrong happens, they like to say the Russians are—she doesn't know if it's the Russians doing the hacking. Maybe there is no hacking. But they always blame Russia. And the reason they blame Russia because they think they're trying to tarnish me with Russia. I know nothing about Russia. I know—I know about Russia, but I know nothing about the inner workings of Russia. I don't deal there. I have no businesses there. I have no loans from Russia.
I have a very, very great balance sheet, so great that when I did the Old Post Office on Pennsylvania Avenue, the United States government, because of my balance sheet, which they actually know very well, chose me to do the Old Post Office, between the White House and Congress, chose me to do the Old Post Office. One of the primary area things, in fact, perhaps the primary thing was balance sheet. But I have no loans with Russia. You could go to the United States government, and they would probably tell you that, because they know my sheet very well in order to get that development I had to have.
Now, the taxes are a very simple thing. As soon as I have—first of all, I pay hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes. Many of her friends took bigger deductions. Warren Buffett took a massive deduction. Soros, who's a friend of hers, took a massive

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deduction. Many of the people that are giving her all this money that she can do many more commercials than me gave her —took massive deductions.
I pay hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes. But—but as soon as my routine audit is finished, I'll release my returns. I'll be very proud to. They're actually quite great.
RADDATZ: Thank you, Mr. Trump.
COOPER: We want to turn, actually, to the topic of taxes. We have a question from Spencer Maass. Spencer?
QUESTION: Good evening. My question is, what specific tax provisions will you change to ensure the wealthiest Americans pay their fair share in taxes?
COOPER: Mr. Trump, you have two minutes.
TRUMP: Well, one thing I'd do is get rid of carried interest. One of the greatest provisions for people like me, to be honest with you, I give up a lot when I run, because I knock out the tax code. And she could have done this years ago, by the way. She's a United States—she was a United States senator.
She complains that Donald Trump took advantage of the tax code. Well, why didn't she change it? Why didn't you change it when you were a senator? The reason you didn't is that all your friends take the same advantage that I do. And I do. You have provisions in the tax code that, frankly, we could change. But you wouldn't change it, because all of these people gave you the money so you can take negative ads on Donald Trump.
But—and I say that about a lot of things. You know, I've heard Hillary complaining about so many different things over the years. "I wish you would have done this." But she's been there for 30 years she's been doing this stuff. She never changed. And she never will change. She never will change.
We're getting rid of carried interest provisions. I'm lowering taxes actually, because I think it's so important for corporations, because we have corporations leaving—massive corporations and little ones, little ones can't form. We're getting rid of regulations which goes hand in hand with the lowering of the taxes.
But we're bringing the tax rate down from 35 percent to 15 percent. We're cutting taxes for the middle class. And I will tell you, we are cutting them big league for the middle class.
And I will tell you, Hillary Clinton is raising your taxes, folks. You can look at me. She's raising your taxes really high. And what that's going to do is a disaster for the country. But she is raising your taxes and I'm lowering your taxes. That in itself is a big difference. We are going to be thriving again. We have no growth in this country. There's no growth. If China has a GDP of 7 percent, it's like a national catastrophe. We're down at 1 percent. And that's, like, no growth. And we're going lower, in my opinion. And a lot of it has to do with the fact that our taxes are so high, just about the highest in the world. And I'm bringing them down to one of the lower in the world. And I think it's so important—one of the most important things we can do. But she is raising everybody's taxes massively.
COOPER: Secretary Clinton, you have two minutes. The question was, what specific tax provisions will you change to ensure the wealthiest Americans pay their fair share of taxes?
CLINTON: Well, everything you've heard just now from Donald is not true. I'm sorry I have to keep saying this, but he lives in an alternative reality. And it is sort of amusing to hear somebody who hasn't paid federal income taxes in maybe 20 years talking about what he's going to do.
But I'll tell you what he's going to do. His plan will give the wealthy and corporations the biggest tax cuts they've ever had, more than the Bush tax cuts by at least a factor of two. Donald always takes care of Donald and people like Donald, and this would be a massive gift. And, indeed, the way that he talks about his tax cuts would end up raising taxes on middle­class families, millions of middle­class families.
Now, here's what I want to do. I have said nobody who makes less than $250,000 a year—and that's the vast majority of Americans as you know—will have their taxes raised, because I think we've got to go where the money is. And the money is with people who have taken advantage of every single break in the tax code.
And, yes, when I was a senator, I did vote to close corporate loopholes. I voted to close, I think, one of the loopholes he took advantage of when he claimed a billion­dollar loss that enabled him to avoid paying taxes.
I want to have a tax on people who are making a million dollars. It's called the Buffett rule. Yes, Warren Buffett is the one who's gone out and said somebody like him should not be paying a lower tax rate than his secretary. I want to have a surcharge on incomes above $5 million.

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We have to make up for lost times, because I want to invest in you. I want to invest in hard­working families. And I think it's been unfortunate, but it's happened, that since the Great Recession, the gains have all gone to the top. And we need to reverse that.
People like Donald, who paid zero in taxes, zero for our vets, zero for our military, zero for health and education, that is wrong.
COOPER: Thank you, Secretary.
CLINTON: And we're going to make sure that nobody, no corporation, and no individual can get away without paying his fair share to support our country.
COOPER: Thank you. I want to give you—Mr. Trump, I want to give you the chance to respond. I just wanted to tell our viewers what she's referring to. In the last month, taxes were the number­one issue on Facebook for the first time in the campaign. The New York Times published three pages of your 1995 tax returns. They show you claimed a $916 million loss, which means you could have avoided paying personal federal income taxes for years. You've said you pay state taxes, employee taxes, real estate taxes, property taxes. You have not answered, though, a simple question. Did you use that $916 million loss to avoid paying personal federal income taxes for years?
TRUMP: Of course I do. Of course I do. And so do all of her donors, or most of her donors. I know many of her donors. Her donors took massive tax write­offs.
COOPER: So have you paid personal federal income tax?
TRUMP: A lot of my—excuse me, Anderson—a lot of my write­ off was depreciation and other things that Hillary as a senator allowed. And she'll always allow it, because the people that give her all this money, they want it. That's why.
See, I understand the tax code better than anybody that's ever run for president. Hillary Clinton—and it's extremely complex—Hillary Clinton has friends that want all of these provisions, including they want the carried interest provision, which is very important to Wall Street people. But they really want the carried interest provision, which I believe Hillary's leaving. Very interesting why she's leaving carried interest.
But I will tell you that, number one, I pay tremendous numbers of taxes. I absolutely used it. And so did Warren Buffett and so did George Soros and so did many of the other people that Hillary is getting money from. Now, I won't mention their names, because they're rich, but they're not famous. So we won't make them famous.
COOPER: So can you—can you say how many years you have avoided paying personal federal income taxes?
TRUMP: No, but I pay tax, and I pay federal tax, too. But I have a write­off, a lot of it's depreciation, which is a wonderful charge. I love depreciation. You know, she's given it to us.
Hey, if she had a problem—for 30 years she's been doing this, Anderson. I say it all the time. She talks about health care. Why didn't she do something about it? She talks about taxes. Why didn't she do something about it? She doesn't do anything about anything other than talk. With her, it's all talk and no action.
COOPER: In the past...
TRUMP: And, again, Bernie Sanders, it's really bad judgment. She has made bad judgment not only on taxes. She's made bad judgments on Libya, on Syria, on Iraq. I mean, her and Obama, whether you like it or not, the way they got out of Iraq, the vacuum they've left, that's why ISIS formed in the first place. They started from that little area, and now they're in 32 different nations, Hillary. Congratulations. Great job.
COOPER: Secretary—I want you to be able to respond, Secretary Clinton.
CLINTON: Well, here we go again. I've been in favor of getting rid of carried interest for years, starting when I was a senator from New York. But that's not the point here.
TRUMP: Why didn't you do it? Why didn't you do it?
COOPER: Allow her to respond.
CLINTON: Because I was a senator with a Republican president.
TRUMP: Oh, really?
CLINTON: I will be the president and we will get it done. That's exactly right.

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TRUMP: You could have done it, if you were an effective—if you were an effective senator, you could have done it. If you were an effective senator, you could have done it. But you were not an effective senator.
COOPER: Please allow her to respond. She didn't interrupt you.
CLINTON: You know, under our Constitution, presidents have something called veto power. Look, he has now said repeatedly, "30 years this and 30 years that." So let me talk about my 30 years in public service. I'm very glad to do so.
Eight million kids every year have health insurance, because when I was first lady I worked with Democrats and Republicans to create the Children's Health Insurance Program. Hundreds of thousands of kids now have a chance to be adopted because I worked to change our adoption and foster care system. After 9/11, I went to work with Republican mayor, governor and president to rebuild New York and to get health care for our first responders who were suffering because they had run toward danger and gotten sickened by it. Hundreds of thousands of National Guard and Reserve members have health care because of work that I did, and children have safer medicines because I was able to pass a law that required the dosing to be more carefully done.
When I was secretary of state, I went around the world advocating for our country, but also advocating for women's rights, to make sure that women had a decent chance to have a better life and negotiated a treaty with Russia to lower nuclear weapons. Four hundred pieces of legislation have my name on it as a sponsor or cosponsor when I was a senator for eight years.
I worked very hard and was very proud to be re­elected in New York by an even bigger margin than I had been elected the first time. And as president, I will take that work, that bipartisan work, that finding common ground, because you have to be able to get along with people to get things done in Washington.
COOPER: Thank you, secretary.
CLINTON: I've proven that I can, and for 30 years, I've produced results for people.
COOPER: Thank you, secretary.
RADDATZ: We're going to move on to Syria. Both of you have mentioned that.
TRUMP: She said a lot of things that were false. I mean, I think we should be allowed to maybe...
RADDATZ: No, we can—no, Mr. Trump, we're going to go on. This is about the audience.
TRUMP: Excuse me. Because she has been a disaster as a senator. A disaster.
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, we're going to move on. The heart­breaking video of a 5­year­old Syrian boy named Omran sitting in an ambulance after being pulled from the rubble after an air strike in Aleppo focused the world's attention on the horrors of the war in Syria, with 136 million views on Facebook alone.
But there are much worse images coming out of Aleppo every day now, where in the past few weeks alone, 400 people have been killed, at least 100 of them children. Just days ago, the State Department called for a war crimes investigation of the Syrian regime of Bashar al­Assad and its ally, Russia, for their bombardment of Aleppo.
So this next question comes through social media through Facebook. Diane from Pennsylvania asks, if you were president, what would you do about Syria and the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo? Isn't it a lot like the Holocaust when the U.S. waited too long before we helped? Secretary Clinton, we will begin with your two minutes.
CLINTON: Well, the situation in Syria is catastrophic. And every day that goes by, we see the results of the regime by Assad in partnership with the Iranians on the ground, the Russians in the air, bombarding places, in particular Aleppo, where there are hundreds of thousands of people, probably about 250,000 still left. And there is a determined effort by the Russian air force to destroy Aleppo in order to eliminate the last of the Syrian rebels who are really holding out against the Assad regime.
Russia hasn't paid any attention to ISIS. They're interested in keeping Assad in power. So I, when I was secretary of state, advocated and I advocate today a no­fly zone and safe zones. We need some leverage with the Russians, because they are not going to come to the negotiating table for a diplomatic resolution, unless there is some leverage over them. And we have to work more closely with our partners and allies on the ground.
But I want to emphasize that what is at stake here is the ambitions and the aggressiveness of Russia. Russia has decided that it's all in, in Syria. And they've also decided who they want to see become president of the United States, too, and it's not me. I've stood up to Russia. I've taken on Putin and others, and I would do that as president.

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I think wherever we can cooperate with Russia, that's fine. And I did as secretary of state. That's how we got a treaty reducing nuclear weapons. It's how we got the sanctions on Iran that put a lid on the Iranian nuclear program without firing a single shot. So I would go to the negotiating table with more leverage than we have now. But I do support the effort to investigate for crimes, war crimes committed by the Syrians and the Russians and try to hold them accountable.
RADDATZ: Thank you, Secretary Clinton. Mr. Trump?
TRUMP: First of all, she was there as secretary of state with the so­called line in the sand, which...
CLINTON: No, I wasn't. I was gone. I hate to interrupt you, but at some point...
TRUMP: OK. But you were in contact—excuse me. You were...
CLINTON: At some point, we need to do some fact­checking here.
TRUMP: You were in total contact with the White House, and perhaps, sadly, Obama probably still listened to you. I don't think he would be listening to you very much anymore.
Obama draws the line in the sand. It was laughed at all over the world what happened.
Now, with that being said, she talks tough against Russia. But our nuclear program has fallen way behind, and they've gone wild with their nuclear program. Not good. Our government shouldn't have allowed that to happen. Russia is new in terms of nuclear. We are old. We're tired. We're exhausted in terms of nuclear. A very bad thing.
Now, she talks tough, she talks really tough against Putin and against Assad. She talks in favor of the rebels. She doesn't even know who the rebels are. You know, every time we take rebels, whether it's in Iraq or anywhere else, we're arming people. And you know what happens? They end up being worse than the people.
Look at what she did in Libya with Gadhafi. Gadhafi's out. It's a mess. And, by the way, ISIS has a good chunk of their oil. I'm sure you probably have heard that. It was a disaster. Because the fact is, almost everything she's done in foreign policy has been a mistake and it's been a disaster.
But if you look at Russia, just take a look at Russia, and look at what they did this week, where I agree, she wasn't there, but possibly she's consulted. We sign a peace treaty. Everyone's all excited. Well, what Russia did with Assad and, by the way, with Iran, who you made very powerful with the dumbest deal perhaps I've ever seen in the history of deal­making, the Iran deal, with the $150 billion, with the $1.7 billion in cash, which is enough to fill up this room.
But look at that deal. Iran now and Russia are now against us. So she wants to fight. She wants to fight for rebels. There's only one problem. You don't even know who the rebels are. So what's the purpose?
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, Mr. Trump, your two minutes is up.
TRUMP: And one thing I have to say.
RADDATZ: Your two minutes is up.
TRUMP: I don't like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS. Russia is killing ISIS. And Iran is killing ISIS. And those three have now lined up because of our weak foreign policy.
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, let me repeat the question. If you were president...[laughter]...what would you do about Syria and the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo? And I want to remind you what your running mate said. He said provocations by Russia need to be met with American strength and that if Russia continues to be involved in air strikes along with the Syrian government forces of Assad, the United States of America should be prepared to use military force to strike the military targets of the Assad regime.
TRUMP: OK. He and I haven't spoken, and I disagree. I disagree.
RADDATZ: You disagree with your running mate?
TRUMP: I think you have to knock out ISIS. Right now, Syria is fighting ISIS. We have people that want to fight both at the same time. But Syria is no longer Syria. Syria is Russia and it's Iran, who she made strong and Kerry and Obama made into a very powerful nation and a very rich nation, very, very quickly, very, very quickly.
I believe we have to get ISIS. We have to worry about ISIS before we can get too much more involved. She had a chance to do something with Syria. They had a chance. And that was the line. And she didn't.
RADDATZ: What do you think will happen if Aleppo falls?

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TRUMP: I think Aleppo is a disaster, humanitarian­wise.
RADDATZ: What do you think will happen if it falls?
TRUMP: I think that it basically has fallen. OK? It basically has fallen. Let me tell you something. You take a look at Mosul. The biggest problem I have with the stupidity of our foreign policy, we have Mosul. They think a lot of the ISIS leaders are in Mosul. So we have announcements coming out of Washington and coming out of Iraq, we will be attacking Mosul in three weeks or four weeks.
Well, all of these bad leaders from ISIS are leaving Mosul. Why can't they do it quietly? Why can't they do the attack, make it a sneak attack, and after the attack is made, inform the American public that we've knocked out the leaders, we've had a tremendous success? People leave. Why do they have to say we're going to be attacking Mosul within the next four to six weeks, which is what they're saying? How stupid is our country?
RADDATZ: There are sometimes reasons the military does that. Psychological warfare.
TRUMP: I can't think of any. I can't think of any. And I'm pretty good at it.
RADDATZ: It might be to help get civilians out.
TRUMP: And we have General Flynn. And we have—look, I have 200 generals and admirals who endorsed me. I have 21 Congressional Medal of Honor recipients who endorsed me. We talk about it all the time. They understand, why can't they do something secretively, where they go in and they knock out the leadership? How—why would these people stay there? I've been reading now...
RADDATZ: Tell me what your strategy is.
TRUMP: ... for weeks—I've been reading now for weeks about Mosul, that it's the harbor of where—you know, between Raqqa and Mosul, this is where they think the ISIS leaders are. Why would they be saying—they're not staying there anymore. They're gone. Because everybody's talking about how Iraq, which is us with our leadership, goes in to fight Mosul.
Now, with these 200 admirals and generals, they can't believe it. All I say is this. General George Patton, General Douglas MacArthur are spinning in their grave at the stupidity of what we're doing in the Middle East.
RADDATZ: I'm going to go to Secretary Clinton. Secretary Clinton, you want Assad to go. You advocated arming rebels, but it looks like that may be too late for Aleppo. You talk about diplomatic efforts. Those have failed. Cease­fires have failed. Would you introduce the threat of U.S. military force beyond a no­fly zone against the Assad regime to back up diplomacy?
CLINTON: I would not use American ground forces in Syria. I think that would be a very serious mistake. I don't think American troops should be holding territory, which is what they would have to do as an occupying force. I don't think that is a smart strategy.
I do think the use of special forces, which we're using, the use of enablers and trainers in Iraq, which has had some positive effects, are very much in our interests, and so I do support what is happening, but let me just...
RADDATZ: But what would you do differently than President Obama is doing?
CLINTON: Well, Martha, I hope that by the time I—if I'm fortunate...
TRUMP: Everything.
CLINTON: I hope by the time I am president that we will have pushed ISIS out of Iraq. I do think that there is a good chance that we can take Mosul. And, you know, Donald says he knows more about ISIS than the generals. No, he doesn't.
There are a lot of very important planning going on, and some of it is to signal to the Sunnis in the area, as well as Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, that we all need to be in this. And that takes a lot of planning and preparation.
I would go after Baghdadi. I would specifically target Baghdadi, because I think our targeting of Al Qaida leaders—and I was involved in a lot of those operations, highly classified ones—made a difference. So I think that could help.
I would also consider arming the Kurds. The Kurds have been our best partners in Syria, as well as Iraq. And I know there's a lot of concern about that in some circles, but I think they should have the equipment they need so that Kurdish and Arab fighters on the ground are the principal way that we take Raqqa after pushing ISIS out of Iraq.
RADDATZ: Thank you very much. We're going to move on...

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TRUMP: You know what's funny? She went over a minute over, and you don't stop her. When I go one second over, it's like a big deal.
RADDATZ: You had many answers.
TRUMP: It's really—it's really very interesting.
COOPER: We've got a question over here from James Carter. Mr. Carter?
QUESTION: My question is, do you believe you can be a devoted president to all the people in the United States?
COOPER: That question begins for Mr. Trump.
TRUMP: Absolutely. I mean, she calls our people deplorable, a large group, and irredeemable. I will be a president for all of our people. And I'll be a president that will turn our inner cities around and will give strength to people and will give economics to people and will bring jobs back.
Because NAFTA, signed by her husband, is perhaps the greatest disaster trade deal in the history of the world. Not in this country. It stripped us of manufacturing jobs. We lost our jobs. We lost our money. We lost our plants. It is a disaster. And now she wants to sign TPP, even though she says now she's for it. She called it the gold standard. And by the way, at the last debate, she lied, because it turned out that she did say the gold standard and she said she didn't say it. They actually said that she lied. OK? And she lied. But she's lied about a lot of things.
I would be a president for all of the people, African­Americans, the inner cities. Devastating what's happening to our inner cities. She's been talking about it for years. As usual, she talks about it, nothing happens. She doesn't get it done.
Same with the Latino Americans, the Hispanic Americans. The same exact thing. They talk, they don't get it done. You go into the inner cities and—you see it's 45 percent poverty. African­ Americans now 45 percent poverty in the inner cities. The education is a disaster. Jobs are essentially nonexistent.
I mean, it's—you know, and I've been saying at big speeches where I have 20,000 and 30,000 people, what do you have to lose? It can't get any worse. And she's been talking about the inner cities for 25 years. Nothing's going to ever happen.
Let me tell you, if she's president of the United States, nothing's going to happen. It's just going to be talk. And all of her friends, the taxes we were talking about, and I would just get it by osmosis. She's not doing any me favors. But by doing all the others' favors, she's doing me favors.
COOPER: Mr. Trump, thank you.
TRUMP: But I will tell you, she's all talk. It doesn't get done. All you have to do is take a look at her Senate run. Take a look at upstate New York.
COOPER: Your two minutes is up. Secretary Clinton, two minutes?
TRUMP: It turned out to be a disaster.
COOPER: You have two minutes, Secretary Clinton.
CLINTON: Well, 67 percent of the people voted to re­elect me when I ran for my second term, and I was very proud and very humbled by that.
Mr. Carter, I have tried my entire life to do what I can to support children and families. You know, right out of law school, I went to work for the Children's Defense Fund. And Donald talks a lot about, you know, the 30 years I've been in public service. I'm proud of that. You know, I started off as a young lawyer working against discrimination against African­ American children in schools and in the criminal justice system. I worked to make sure that kids with disabilities could get a public education, something that I care very much about. I have worked with Latinos—one of my first jobs in politics was down in south Texas registering Latino citizens to be able to vote. So I have a deep devotion, to use your absolutely correct word, to making sure that an every American feels like he or she has a place in our country.
And I think when you look at the letters that I get, a lot of people are worried that maybe they wouldn't have a place in Donald Trump's America. They write me, and one woman wrote me about her son, Felix. She adopted him from Ethiopia when he was a toddler. He's 10 years old now. This is the only one country he's ever known. And he listens to Donald on TV and he said to his mother one day, will he send me back to Ethiopia if he gets elected?
You know, children listen to what is being said. To go back to the very, very first question. And there's a lot of fear—in fact, teachers and parents are calling it the Trump effect. Bullying is up. A lot of people are feeling, you know, uneasy. A lot of kids are expressing their concerns.

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So, first and foremost, I will do everything I can to reach out to everybody.

COOPER: Your time, Secretary Clinton.

CLINTON: Democrats, Republicans, independents, people across our country. If you don't vote for me, I still want to be your president.

COOPER: Your two minutes is up.

CLINTON: I want to be the best president I can be for every American.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, your two minutes is up. I want to follow up on something that Donald Trump actually said to you, a comment you made last month. You said that half of Donald Trump's supporters are, quote, "deplorables, racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic." You later said you regretted saying half. You didn't express regret for using the term "deplorables." To Mr. Carter's question, how can you unite a country if you've written off tens of millions of Americans?

CLINTON: Well, within hours I said that I was sorry about the way I talked about that, because my argument is not with his supporters. It's with him and with the hateful and divisive campaign that he has run, and the inciting of violence at his rallies, and the very brutal kinds of comments about not just women, but all Americans, all kinds of Americans.

And what he has said about African­Americans and Latinos, about Muslims, about POWs, about immigrants, about people with disabilities, he's never apologized for. And so I do think that a lot of the tone and tenor that he has said—I'm proud of the campaign that Bernie Sanders and I ran. We ran a campaign based on issues, not insults. And he is supporting me 100 percent.

COOPER: Thank you.

CLINTON: Because we talked about what we wanted to do. We might have had some differences, and we had a lot of debates...

COOPER: Thank you, Secretary.

TRUMP: ... but we believed that we could make the country better. And I was proud of that.

COOPER: I want to give you a minute to respond.

TRUMP: We have a divided nation. We have a very divided nation. You look at Charlotte. You look at Baltimore. You look at the violence that's taking place in the inner cities, Chicago, you take a look at Washington, D.C.

We have an increase in murder within our cities, the biggest in 45 years. We have a divided nation, because people like her —and believe me, she has tremendous hate in her heart. And when she said deplorables, she meant it. And when she said irredeemable, they're irredeemable, you didn't mention that, but when she said they're irredeemable, to me that might have been even worse.

COOPER: She said some of them are irredeemable.

TRUMP: She's got tremendous—she's got tremendous hatred. And this country cannot take another four years of Barack Obama, and that's what you're getting with her.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, let me follow up with you. In 2008, you wrote in one of your books that the most important characteristic of a good leader is discipline. You said, if a leader doesn't have it, quote, "he or she won't be one for very long." In the days after the first debate, you sent out a series of tweets from 3 a.m. to 5 a.m., including one that told people to check out a sex tape. Is that the discipline of a good leader?

TRUMP: No, there wasn't check out a sex tape. It was just take a look at the person that she built up to be this wonderful Girl Scout who was no Girl Scout.

COOPER: You mentioned sex tape.

TRUMP: By the way, just so you understand, when she said 3 o'clock in the morning, take a look at Benghazi. She said who is going to answer the call at 3 o'clock in the morning? Guess what? She didn't answer it, because when Ambassador Stevens...

COOPER: The question is, is that the discipline of a good leader?

TRUMP: ... 600—wait a minute, Anderson, 600 times. Well, she said she was awake at 3 o'clock in the morning, and she also sent a tweet out at 3 o'clock in the morning, but I won't even mention that. But she said she'll be awake. Who's going—

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the famous thing, we're going to answer our call at 3 o'clock in the morning. Guess what happened? Ambassador Stevens— Ambassador Stevens sent 600 requests for help. And the only one she talked to was Sidney Blumenthal, who's her friend and not a good guy, by the way. So, you know, she shouldn't be talking about that.
Now, tweeting happens to be a modern day form of communication. I mean, you can like it or not like it. I have, between Facebook and Twitter, I have almost 25 million people. It's a very effective way of communication. So you can put it down, but it is a very effective form of communication. I'm not un­proud of it, to be honest with you.
COOPER: Secretary Clinton, does Mr. Trump have the discipline to be a good leader?
CLINTON: No.
TRUMP: I'm shocked to hear that. [laughter]
CLINTON: Well, it's not only my opinion. It's the opinion of many others, national security experts, Republicans, former Republican members of Congress. But it's in part because those of us who have had the great privilege of seeing this job up close and know how difficult it is, and it's not just because I watched my husband take a $300 billion deficit and turn it into a $200 billion surplus, and 23 million new jobs were created, and incomes went up for everybody. Everybody. African­ American incomes went up 33 percent.
And it's not just because I worked with George W. Bush after 9/11, and I was very proud that when I told him what the city needed, what we needed to recover, he said you've got it, and he never wavered. He stuck with me.
And I have worked and I admire President Obama. He inherited the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. That was a terrible time for our country.
COOPER: We have to move along.
CLINTON: Nine million people lost their jobs.
RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, we have to...
CLINTON: Five million homes were lost.
RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, we're moving.
CLINTON: And $13 trillion in family wealth was wiped out. We are back on the right track. He would send us back into recession with his tax plans that benefit the wealthiest of Americans.
RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, we are moving to an audience question. We're almost out of time. We have another...
TRUMP: We have the slowest growth since 1929.
RADDATZ: We're moving to an audience question.
TRUMP: It is—our country has the slowest growth and jobs are a disaster.
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, Secretary Clinton, we want to get to the audience. Thank you very much both of you. [laughter]
We have another audience question. Beth Miller has a question for both candidates.
QUESTION: Good evening. Perhaps the most important aspect of this election is the Supreme Court justice. What would you prioritize as the most important aspect of selecting a Supreme Court justice?
RADDATZ: We begin with your two minutes, Secretary Clinton.
CLINTON: Thank you. Well, you're right. This is one of the most important issues in this election. I want to appoint Supreme Court justices who understand the way the world really works, who have real­life experience, who have not just been in a big law firm and maybe clerked for a judge and then gotten on the bench, but, you know, maybe they tried some more cases, they actually understand what people are up against.
Because I think the current court has gone in the wrong direction. And so I would want to see the Supreme Court reverse Citizens United and get dark, unaccountable money out of our politics. Donald doesn't agree with that.
I would like the Supreme Court to understand that voting rights are still a big problem in many parts of our country, that we don't always do everything we can to make it possible for people of color and older people and young people to be able to exercise their franchise. I want a Supreme Court that will stick with Roe v. Wade and a woman's right to choose, and I want a Supreme Court that will stick with marriage equality.

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Now, Donald has put forth the names of some people that he would consider. And among the ones that he has suggested are people who would reverse Roe v. Wade and reverse marriage equality. I think that would be a terrible mistake and would take us backwards.
I want a Supreme Court that doesn't always side with corporate interests. I want a Supreme Court that understands because you're wealthy and you can give more money to something doesn't mean you have any more rights or should have any more rights than anybody else.
So I have very clear views about what I want to see to kind of change the balance on the Supreme Court. And I regret deeply that the Senate has not done its job and they have not permitted a vote on the person that President Obama, a highly qualified person, they've not given him a vote to be able to be have the full complement of nine Supreme Court justices. I think that was a dereliction of duty.
I hope that they will see their way to doing it, but if I am so fortunate enough as to be president, I will immediately move to make sure that we fill that, we have nine justices that get to work on behalf of our people.
RADDATZ: Thank you, Secretary Clinton. Thank you. You're out of time. Mr. Trump?
TRUMP: Justice Scalia, great judge, died recently. And we have a vacancy. I am looking to appoint judges very much in the mold of Justice Scalia. I'm looking for judges—and I've actually picked 20 of them so that people would see, highly respected, highly thought of, and actually very beautifully reviewed by just about everybody.
But people that will respect the Constitution of the United States. And I think that this is so important. Also, the Second Amendment, which is totally under siege by people like Hillary Clinton. They'll respect the Second Amendment and what it stands for, what it represents. So important to me.
Now, Hillary mentioned something about contributions just so you understand. So I will have in my race more than $100 million put in—of my money, meaning I'm not taking all of this big money from all of these different corporations like she's doing. What I ask is this.
So I'm putting in more than—by the time it's finished, I'll have more than $100 million invested. Pretty much self­funding money. We're raising money for the Republican Party, and we're doing tremendously on the small donations, $61 average or so.
I ask Hillary, why doesn't—she made $250 million by being in office. She used the power of her office to make a lot of money. Why isn't she funding, not for $100 million, but why don't you put $10 million or $20 million or $25 million or $30 million into your own campaign?
It's $30 million less for special interests that will tell you exactly what to do and it would really, I think, be a nice sign to the American public. Why aren't you putting some money in? You have a lot of it. You've made a lot of it because of the fact that you've been in office. Made a lot of it while you were secretary of state, actually. So why aren't you putting money into your own campaign? I'm just curious.
CLINTON: Well...[crosstalk]
RADDATZ: Thank you very much. We're going to get on to one more question.
CLINTON: The question was about the Supreme Court. And I just want to quickly say, I respect the Second Amendment. But I believe there should be comprehensive background checks, and we should close the gun show loophole, and close the online loophole.
COOPER: Thank you.
RADDATZ: We have—we have one more question, Mrs. Clinton.
CLINTON: We have to save as many lives as we possibly can.
COOPER: We have one more question from Ken Bone about energy policy. Ken?
QUESTION: What steps will your energy policy take to meet our energy needs, while at the same time remaining environmentally friendly and minimizing job loss for fossil power plant workers?
COOPER: Mr. Trump, two minutes?
TRUMP: Absolutely. I think it's such a great question, because energy is under siege by the Obama administration. Under absolutely siege. The EPA, Environmental Protection Agency, is killing these energy companies. And foreign companies

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are now coming in buying our—buying so many of our different plants and then re­jiggering the plant so that they can take care of their oil.
We are killing—absolutely killing our energy business in this country. Now, I'm all for alternative forms of energy, including wind, including solar, et cetera. But we need much more than wind and solar.
And you look at our miners. Hillary Clinton wants to put all the miners out of business. There is a thing called clean coal. Coal will last for 1,000 years in this country. Now we have natural gas and so many other things because of technology. We have unbelievable—we have found over the last seven years, we have found tremendous wealth right under our feet. So good. Especially when you have $20 trillion in debt.
I will bring our energy companies back. They'll be able to compete. They'll make money. They'll pay off our national debt. They'll pay off our tremendous budget deficits, which are tremendous. But we are putting our energy companies out of business. We have to bring back our workers.
You take a look at what's happening to steel and the cost of steel and China dumping vast amounts of steel all over the United States, which essentially is killing our steelworkers and our steel companies. We have to guard our energy companies. We have to make it possible.
The EPA is so restrictive that they are putting our energy companies out of business. And all you have to do is go to a great place like West Virginia or places like Ohio, which is phenomenal, or places like Pennsylvania and you see what they're doing to the people, miners and others in the energy business. It's a disgrace.
COOPER: Your time is up. Thank you.
TRUMP: It's an absolute disgrace.
COOPER: Secretary Clinton, two minutes.
CLINTON: And actually—well, that was very interesting. First of all, China is illegally dumping steel in the United States and Donald Trump is buying it to build his buildings, putting steelworkers and American steel plants out of business. That's something that I fought against as a senator and that I would have a trade prosecutor to make sure that we don't get taken advantage of by China on steel or anything else.
You know, because it sounds like you're in the business or you're aware of people in the business—you know that we are now for the first time ever energy­independent. We are not dependent upon the Middle East. But the Middle East still controls a lot of the prices. So the price of oil has been way down. And that has had a damaging effect on a lot of the oil companies, right? We are, however, producing a lot of natural gas, which serves as a bridge to more renewable fuels. And I think that's an important transition.
We've got to remain energy­independent. It gives us much more power and freedom than to be worried about what goes on in the Middle East. We have enough worries over there without having to worry about that.
So I have a comprehensive energy policy, but it really does include fighting climate change, because I think that is a serious problem. And I support moving toward more clean, renewable energy as quickly as we can, because I think we can be the 21st century clean energy superpower and create millions of new jobs and businesses.
But I also want to be sure that we don't leave people behind. That's why I'm the only candidate from the very beginning of this campaign who had a plan to help us revitalize coal country, because those coal miners and their fathers and their grandfathers, they dug that coal out. A lot of them lost their lives. They were injured, but they turned the lights on and they powered their factories. I don't want to walk away from them. So we've got to do something for them.
COOPER: Secretary Clinton...
CLINTON: But the price of coal is down worldwide. So we have to look at this comprehensively.
COOPER: Your time is up.
CLINTON: And that's exactly what I have proposed. I hope you will go to HillaryClinton.com and look at my entire policy.
COOPER: Time is up. We have time for one more...
RADDATZ: We have...
COOPER: One more audience question.
RADDATZ: We've sneaked in one more question, and it comes from Karl Becker.

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QUESTION: Good evening. My question to both of you is, regardless of the current rhetoric, would either of you name one positive thing that you respect in one another? [applause]
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, would you like to go first?
CLINTON: Well, I certainly will, because I think that's a very fair and important question. Look, I respect his children. His children are incredibly able and devoted, and I think that says a lot about Donald. I don't agree with nearly anything else he says or does, but I do respect that. And I think that is something that as a mother and a grandmother is very important to me.
So I believe that this election has become in part so—so conflict­oriented, so intense because there's a lot at stake. This is not an ordinary time, and this is not an ordinary election. We are going to be choosing a president who will set policy for not just four or eight years, but because of some of the important decisions we have to make here at home and around the world, from the Supreme Court to energy and so much else, and so there is a lot at stake. It's one of the most consequential elections that we've had.
And that's why I've tried to put forth specific policies and plans, trying to get it off of the personal and put it on to what it is I want to do as president. And that's why I hope people will check on that for themselves so that they can see that, yes, I've spent 30 years, actually maybe a little more, working to help kids and families. And I want to take all that experience to the White House and do that every single day.
RADDATZ: Mr. Trump?
TRUMP: Well, I consider her statement about my children to be a very nice compliment. I don't know if it was meant to be a compliment, but it is a great—I'm very proud of my children. And they've done a wonderful job, and they've been wonderful, wonderful kids. So I consider that a compliment.
I will say this about Hillary. She doesn't quit. She doesn't give up. I respect that. I tell it like it is. She's a fighter. I disagree with much of what she's fighting for. I do disagree with her judgment in many cases. But she does fight hard, and she doesn't quit, and she doesn't give up. And I consider that to be a very good trait.
RADDATZ: Thanks to both of you.
COOPER: We want to thank both the candidates. We want to thank the university here. This concludes the town hall meeting. Our thanks to the candidates, the commission, Washington University, and to everybody who watched.
RADDATZ: Please tune in on October 19th for the final presidential debate that will take place at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Good night, everyone.

Citation: Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri," October 9, 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119038.

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About Sudan

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Sudan: The Land and the People

(/content/dam/sudan/img/fisherman.jpg)As part of its income generating projects, UNDP has purchased small boats to fishermen in Port Sudan (Photo: UNDP Sudan)
Sudan, situated in Northeast Africa is a country of immense diversity that fascinates and intrigues most of its visitors from anthropologists and archeologists to historians and average travelers. It is a country that is unique and complex in its climate, politics, environment, languages, cultures, religion and ethnicities.
Sudan is the third largest country on the African continent with a total area of 1,882,000 sq km. The country has international borders with 7 states : Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad and Libya. The River Nile traverses the country from South to North while the Red Sea washes about 550 miles of eastern coast making Sudan a bridge between Africa and the Middle East.
The country faces a number of environmental challenges related to climate change including soil erosion, desertification and recurrent droughts. Agricultural expansion both public and private has proceeded without conservation measures. The consequences have manifested themselves in the form of deforestation, soil desiccation and the lowering of soil fertility and water tables in various parts of the country.
While the population of Sudan predominately descends from both indigenous African groups and Arabs, today most tribes in the country speak Arabic and the Arab culture predominates. Over 97% of the population of Sudan is Sunni Muslims with a small Christian minority.
History and Government

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Sudan gained independence on 1st January 1956, since then the country has experienced alternating forms of democratic and authoritarian government. Sudan’s period of conflict (1955­ 1972 and 1983­2005) stands as one of the longest in Africa’s post­independence history.
Continued conflict between the Khartoum­based Government and opposition forces in Sudan’s regions have oftentimes reuslted in grave socio­political divides across the country, exacerbated by struggle over natural resources.
In 2005, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ending the the war between the North and the South. In line, with the stipulations of the CPA, a referendum took place in Southern Sudan on January 9­15, 2011, on whether the region should remain as part of Sudan or become independent. The vast majority of southerners voted for independence. Hence, South Sudan declared officially its independence on January 9th 2011, becoming the world’s 193rd state.
Following the secession of South Sudan, a second republic was declared a promising a new government and constitution (replacing the interim constitution that was in place under the CPA). However, Sudan’s susceptibility to internal armed conflict continued, and the country still hosts two peacekeeping missions [United Nations­African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)]. The peace process in Sudan gained new momentum in 2011 with the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) and the subsequent establishment of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) in 2012.
Sudan’s Economy: Opportunities and Challenges

In 2010, Sudan was considered as the 17th –fastest –growing economy in the world given the rapid development of the country ­largely from oil profits, despite international sanctions. However, the secession of the South in 2011, had gravely affected the economy as more than 80% of Sudan’s oil fields existed in the southern part of the country. This decline in oil revenues caused a major adjustment to the Sudan’s fiscal situation and prompting financial austerity measures. The situation was further exacerbated by the continuing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan and their inability to reach an agreement over transit fees for oil from South Sudan. Both parties have still not reached an agreement on this issue.

Sudan however is endowed with rich natural resources, including natural gas, gold, silver, chromite, asbestos, manganese, gypsum, mica, zinc, iron, lead, uranium, copper, kaolin, cobalt, granite, nickel, tin and aluminum.

Historically, agriculture remained as the main source of income and employment in Sudan, hiring over 80% of Sudanese and making up a third of the economic sector. Despite this strong agricultural orientation, oil production drove most of Sudan’s post­2000 growth. Real GDP growth is estimated at 2.8 % in 2011 compared to 11.5 %. As a result of the oil loss, the growth of both industrial and service sectors fell in to the negative 2012 while only agriculture sector witnessed positive growth in both years.

In the agricultural sector, the government has tried to diversify its cash crops; however cotton and gum Arabic remain its major agricultural exports. Livestock production also has vast potential, and many animals, particularly camels and sheep, are exported to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. Problems of irrigation and transportation remain the greatest constraints to a more dynamic agricultural economy.

Sudan continues to strengthen links with key emerging country partners, especially China, Malaysia and India following the attraction of substantial “resource seeking” FDI from these countries since the late 1990s. The Government continues to engage in strategic partnerships with local and foreign private investors in order to increase agricultural exports and absorp the shock of losing oil revenues.

Human Development Context
The overall economic growth in Sudan has not been translated into equivalent human development improvements and poverty reduction realities.
Significant disparities between urban and rural areas are apparent, contributing to an increasingly urban informal sector which accounts for more than 60% of Sudan’s GDP. In fact investments and services are concentrated in and around Khartoum state. This has encouraged a rural­urban migration that weakens the agricultural productivity and deepen poverty in both urban and rural areas.

According to Sudan House Hold Survey 2010, over 60% of the households in Sudan have access to improved drinking water sources (66.6% in urban and 57.7% in rural areas) and 27.1% of the households in Sudan have access to improved sanitation (46.9% in urban and 17.9% in rural areas).

Prevalence of child malnutrition is high, at 31.8% in 2010 with a 2015 target of 15 percent and the proportion of population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption of 28 percent in 2010 with a target of 14 percent in 2015. The under­five mortality rate per 1000 live births declined from 130 in 1990 to 78 per 1000 in 2010, maternal mortality rate was estimated at 216 per 100.000 live births in 2010. According to the 2010 MDGs Report, delivery by trained personnel increased from 57% of deliveries in 2006 to 72% of deliveries in 2010 with a target of 90 percent by 2015.

The net primary school enrollment rate has reached 67% (male 69% vs female 64%) in 2009, however with succinct regional disparities ranging from the highest 85%(male 87% vs female 83%) in Khartoum to the rate(ages 15 years and above) was estimated at 62% (male 73% versus female 52%) in 2009.

Gender equality is one of the priority issues for development in Sudan. Women are given a quota of at least 25 percent representation in national or state parliaments in the 2008 Electoral Law, which is also reflected in the real political representation of women in the National Assembly. According to the 2010 MDGs Report, women occupy 28% of the seats in the newly elected parliament in 2010.

Statistics

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Per capita income Human Dev. Index
$1270 0.414

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MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION
A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population October 2009

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About the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

This report was produced by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life. The Pew Forum delivers timely, impartial information on issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs. The Pew Forum is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy organization and does not take positions on policy debates. Based in Washington, D.C., the Pew Forum is a project of the Pew Research Center, which is funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts.
This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals:

Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Luis Lugo, Director
Research Alan Cooperman, Associate Director, Research Brian J. Grim, Senior Researcher Mehtab S. Karim, Visiting Senior Research Fellow Sahar Chaudhry, Research Analyst Becky Hsu, Project Consultant Jacqueline E. Wenger, Research Associate Kimberly McKnight, Megan Pavlischek and Hilary Ramp, Research Interns
Editorial Sandra Stencel, Associate Director, Editorial Andrea Useem, Contributing Editor Tracy Miller, Editor Sara Tisdale, Assistant Editor

Communications and Web Publishing Erin O’Connell, Associate Director, Communications Oliver Read, Web Manager Loralei Coyle, Communications Manager Robert Mills, Communications Associate Liga Plaveniece, Program Coordinator
Pew Research Center Andrew Kohut, President Paul Taylor, Executive Vice President Scott Keeter, Director of Survey Research Michael Piccorossi, Director of Operations Michael Keegan, Graphics Director Alicia Parlapiano, Infographics Designer Russell Heimlich, Web Developer

Visit http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=450 for the interactive, online presentation of Mapping the Global Muslim Population.

Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 1615 L St., NW, Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036-5610 Phone (202) 419-4550 Fax (202) 419-4559 www.pewforum.org
© 2009 Pew Research Center

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Mapping the Global Muslim Population
A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population
Table of Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................................................... 1 Asia Predominates.................................................................................................. 5 Living as Majorities and Minorities....................................................................... 7 Sunni and Shia Populations .................................................................................. 8
Regional Distribution of Muslims ............................................................................ 12 Asia-Paciﬁc ............................................................................................................ 12 Middle East-North Africa ..................................................................................... 16 Sub-Saharan Africa............................................................................................... 19 Europe.................................................................................................................... 21 Americas................................................................................................................ 24
World Muslim Population by Region and Country ................................................ 27
Appendix A: Methodology for Muslim Population Estimates ............................. 35 Appendix B: Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates ........................................... 38 Appendix C: Data Sources by Country ................................................................... 42 Appendix D: Advisers and Consultants.................................................................. 56

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Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life / Mapping the Global Muslim Population

Executive Summary

A comprehensive demographic study of more than 200 countries finds that there are 1.57 billion Muslims of all ages living in the world today, representing 23% of an estimated 2009 world population of 6.8 billion.
While Muslims are found on all five inhabited continents, more than 60% of the global Muslim population is in Asia and about 20% is in the Middle East and North Africa. However, the Middle East-North Africa region has the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries. Indeed, more than half of the 20 countries and territories1 in that region have populations that are approximately 95% Muslim or greater.
More than 300 million Muslims, or one-fifth of the world’s Muslim population, live in countries where Islam is not the majority religion. These minority Muslim populations are often quite large. India, for example, has the third-largest population of Muslims worldwide. China has more Muslims than Syria, while Russia is home to more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined.
Of the total Muslim population, 10-13% are Shia Muslims and 87-90% are Sunni Muslims. Most Shias (between 68% and 80%) live in just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.
These are some of the key findings of Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population, a new study by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life. The report offers the most up-to-date and fully sourced estimates of the size and distribution of the worldwide Muslim population, including sectarian identity.
Previously published estimates of the size of the global Muslim population have ranged widely, from 1 billion to 1.8 billion.2 But these commonly quoted estimates often have appeared without citations to specific sources or explanations of how the figures were generated.
The Pew Forum report is based on the best available data for 232 countries and territories. Pew Forum researchers, in consultation with nearly 50 demographers and social scientists at universities and research centers around the world, acquired and analyzed about 1,500 sources, including census reports, demographic studies and general population surveys, to arrive at these figures – the largest project of its kind to date. (See Methodology for more detail.)

1 For a definition of “territories,” see the methodology in Appendix A.
2 See, for example, CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html); Foreign Policy magazine, May 2007 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3835); Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think, 2008 (http://www.gallup.com/press/104206/WHO-SPEAKS-ISLAM.aspx); Adherents.com (http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html); and IslamicPopulation.com (http://www. islamicpopulation.com/world_general.html).

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Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life / Mapping the Global Muslim Population
The Pew Forum’s estimate of the Shia population (10-13%) is in keeping with previous estimates, which generally have been in the range of 10-15%. Some previous estimates, however, have placed the number of Shias at nearly 20% of the world’s Muslim population.3 Readers should bear in mind that the figures given in this report for the Sunni and Shia populations are less precise than the figures for the overall Muslim population. Data on sectarian affiliation have been infrequently collected or, in many countries, not collected at all. Therefore, the Sunni and Shia numbers reported here are expressed as broad ranges and should be treated as approximate.
These findings on the world Muslim population lay the foundation for a forthcoming study by the Pew Forum, scheduled to be released in 2010, that will estimate growth rates among Muslim populations worldwide and project Muslim populations into the future. The Pew Forum plans to launch a similar study of global Christianity in 2010 as well. The Pew Forum also plans to conduct in-depth public opinion surveys on the intersection of religion and public life around the world, starting with a 19-country survey of sub-Saharan Africa scheduled to be released later this year. These forthcoming studies are part of a larger effort - the Global Religious Futures Project, jointly funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation - that aims to increase people’s understanding of religion around the world.

3 See, for example, IslamicWeb.com (http://www.islamicweb.com/beliefs/cults/shia_population.htm); “Shia Muslims in the Middle East,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 2006 (http://www.cfr.org/publication/10903/); and “The Revival of Shia Islam,” Vali Nasr speaking at a Pew Forum event, July 2006 (http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=120).

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Distribution of Muslim Population by Country and Territory
Only countries with more than 1 million Muslims are shown

United States

United Kingdom
Germany

Russia

France

Kazakhstan

Bosnia-Herz. Kosovo

Azerbaijan Uzbekistan

Albania

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan

Morocco Mauritania

Tunisia

Lebanon Syria

Palestinian terr.

Iraq

Iran Afghanistan

Algeria

Libya

Israel Jordan
Egypt

Kuwait Qatar

Pakistan

Saudi

United Arab

Arabia

Emirates

Oman

Senegal Gambia
Guinea Sierra Leone

Mali

Niger

Burkina
Faso Nigeria

Chad

Eritrea Yemen
Sudan
Ethiopia

Nepal

China

Bangladesh

India

Burma (Myanmar)

Thailand

Ivory Coast

Ghana

Cameroon

Uganda

Somalia

Sri Lanka

Malaysia

Benin

Kenya

Tanzania

Malawi

Mozambique

150 million Muslims
75

10

Philippines Indonesia

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orld Distribution of Muslim Population
his wei hte ma o the worl shows each country s relati e si e ase on its Muslim o ulation i ures are roun e to the nearest million

World Population
6.8 billion

Muslim Population
1.57 billion

Netherlands 1

United Kingdom 2

Germany 4 Bosnia-Herzegovina 2

Kosovo 2

Canada 1

France 4 Spain 1

Bulgaria 1

United States 2 Argentina 1

Albania 3
Rep. of Macedonia 1

Turkey 74

Russia 16 Kazakhstan 9

Turkmenistan 5 Tajikistan 6

Azerbaijan 9 Uzbekistan 26

Kyrgyzstan 5

Afghanistan 28

Tunisia 10 Mauritania 3

Libya 6 Chad 6

Lebanon 3 Israel 1
Palestinian terr. 4

Algeria 34

Egypt 79

Syria 20 Jordan 6

Iraq 30

Iran 74

Saudi Arabia
25

Kuwait 3 Bahrain 1 Qatar 1 United Arab

Emirates 4

Yemen 23

Oman 2

Pakistan 174

Western Sahara 1

Morocco

32

Mali 12

Niger 15

Burkina Faso 9

Senegal

12

Sudan 30

Eritrea 2 Ethiopia 28 Djibouti 1

Nigeria 78

Somalia 9 Uganda 4

Gambia 2

Ivory Coast
8 Sierra Leone 4

Benin 2 Cameroon

Tanzania 13 Congo 1
Mozambique 5

Kenya 3

Guinea 9

Togo 1

3

Comoros 1

Guinea Bissau

Ghana 4

1

South Africa 1 Malawi 2

Muslims elsewhere around the world 8

India 161

China 22 Nepal 1

Bangladesh 145

Sri Lanka 2

Burma (Myanmar) 2
Thailand 4 Malaysia 17
Singapore 1

Indonesia 203

Philippines 5

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Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life / Mapping the Global Muslim Population

Asia Predominates
Two-thirds of all Muslims worldwide live in the 10 countries shown below. Of the 10 countries, six are in Asia (Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey), three are in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria and Morocco) and one is in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria).

Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims

Indonesia Pakistan India Bangladesh Egypt Nigeria Iran Turkey* Algeria Morocco*

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
202,867,000 174,082,000 160,945,000 145,312,000
78,513,000 78,056,000 73,777,000 73,619,000 34,199,000 31,993,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 88.2% 96.3 13.4 89.6 94.6 50.4 99.4 ~98 98.0 ~99

Percentage of World Muslim Population
12.9% 11.1 10.3
9.3 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.7 2.2 ~2

*Data for Turkey and Morocco come primarily from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in these two countries is rounded to the nearest integer.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

The bulk of the world’s Muslim population – more than six-in-ten (62%) – is located in Asia, a region that, for the purposes of this report, includes not only East Asian countries such as China but also countries as far west as Turkey. (For a complete breakdown of countries by region, see “World Muslim Population by Region and Country” on page 27.)

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Muslim Population by Region

Asia-Paciﬁc Middle East-North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Europe Americas World Total

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
972,537,000 315,322,000 240,632,000
38,112,000 4,596,000
1,571,198,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 24.1% 91.2 30.1 5.2 0.5 22.9

Percentage of World Muslim Population
61.9% 20.1 15.3
2.4 0.3 100.0

Europe
38.1m
2.4%
Sub-Saharan Africa
240.6m
15.3%

Americas
4.6 million
0.3%

Middle East-North Africa
315.3m
20.1%

Asia-Paciﬁc
972.5m
61.9%

Note: The list of countries that make up each region can be found in the section titled “World Muslim Population by Region and Country.”
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Living as Majorities and Minorities
While 80% of the world’s Muslims live in countries where Muslims are in the majority, significant numbers – about one-fifth of the world’s Muslim population – live as religious minorities in their home countries. Of the roughly 317 million Muslims living as minorities, about 240 million – about three-quarters – live in five countries: India (161 million), Ethiopia (28 million), China (22 million), Russia (16 million) and Tanzania (13 million). Two of the 10 countries with the largest number of Muslims living as minorities are in Europe: Russia (16 million) and Germany (4 million).
These minority populations are often quite large. For example, India, a Hindu-majority country, has the third-largest population of Muslims worldwide. The Muslim population of Ethiopia is about as large as that of Afghanistan. China has more Muslims than Syria; Russia is home to more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined; and Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon.

Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims Living as Minorities

India Ethiopia China Russia Tanzania Ivory Coast Mozambique Philippines Germany* Uganda

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
160,945,000 28,063,000 21,667,000 16,482,000 13,218,000 7,745,000 5,224,000 4,654,000 4,026,000 3,958,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 13.4% 33.9 1.6 11.7 30.2 36.7 22.8 5.1 ~5 12.1

Percentage of World Muslim Population
10.3% 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 <1 0.3

* Data for Germany come in part from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in Germany is rounded to the nearest integer.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life / Mapping the Global Muslim Population
Of the 232 countries and territories included in this study, 50 are Muslim-majority. Out of these, however, more than six-in-ten (62%) have a smaller Muslim population than do Russia and China individually.
The Middle East-North Africa region contains the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries compared with other regions. Of the 20 countries and territories in the region, 17 have a population that is more than 75% Muslim, with Israel, Lebanon and Sudan being the only exceptions. In comparison, only 12 of 61 countries in Asia, 10 of 50 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and two of 50 countries in Europe (Kosovo and Albania) are 75% or more Muslim.
Sunni and Shia Populations
An overwhelming majority of Muslims are Sunnis, while an estimated 10-13% are Shias. This report estimates that there are between 154 million and 200 million Shia Muslims in the world today.
Between 116 million and 147 million Shias live in Asia, representing about three-quarters of the world’s Shia population (note that Iran is included in the Asia-Pacific region). Meanwhile, nearly a quarter of the world’s Shias (36 million to 44 million) live in the Middle East-North Africa.4
Looked at in a different way, 12-15% of the Muslim population in the Asia-Pacific region is Shia, as is 11-14% of the Muslim population in the Middle East-North Africa region. The figures for Shias are generally given as a range because of the limitations in the secondary-source data (see Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates on page 38).
Most Shias (between 68% and 80%) live in four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq. Iran has 66 million to 70 million Shias, or 37-40% of the world’s total Shia population. Iraq, India and Pakistan each are home to at least 16 million Shias.

4 The three-quarters figure for Asia was calculated by comparing the middle of the range of the estimates for Asia’s Shia population (about 132 million) with the middle of the range of the estimates for the world’s Shia population (about 177 million). The figure for the Middle East-North Africa was calculated by comparing the middle of the range of the estimates for the Middle East-North Africa’s Shia population (about 40 million) with the middle of the range of the estimates for the world’s Shia population (about 177 million).

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Quick Definition: Sunnis and Shias
Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims (also known as Shiites) comprise the two main sects within Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first formed around a dispute over leadership succession soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Over time, however, the political divide between the two groups broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices as well.
While the two sects are similar in many ways, they differ over conceptions of religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants, for example.
For readers seeking more detail on the categories used in this report, Sunnis include followers of the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the Wahhabi or Salafi movement. Shias include Ithna Asharis (Twelvers), Ismailis, Zaydis, Alevis and Alawites.
There also are a few Muslim groups that are difficult to classify as either Sunni or Shia. These include Kharijites in Oman and the Nation of Islam movement in the United States, as well as the Druze, who are located primarily in and around Lebanon. Given the relatively small numbers of people associated with such groups, this report does not provide separate figures for them, but they are included in the overall Muslim population statistics.
Readers should also note that there is no separate estimate for Sufis, whose spiritual and mystical practices have a following among both Sunnis and Shias. There are no reliable
Sizeable numbers of Shias (1 million or more) are found in Turkey, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Nigeria and Tanzania. Shias constitute a relatively small percentage of the Muslim population elsewhere in the world. About 300,000 Shias are estimated to be living in North America, including both the U.S. and Canada, constituting about 10% of North America’s Muslim population.
In four countries – Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Iraq – Shia Muslims make up a majority of the total population.

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Countries with More Than 100,000 Shia Muslims

Estimated 2009 Shia Population

Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia

Iran

66 - 70 million

90 - 95%

Pakistan

17 - 26 million

10 - 15

India

16 - 24 million

10 - 15

Iraq

19 -22 million

65 - 70

Turkey

7 - 11 million

10 - 15

Yemen

8 - 10 million

35 - 40

Azerbaijan

5 - 7 million

65 - 75

Afghanistan

3 - 4 million

10 - 15

Syria

3 - 4 million

15 - 20

Saudi Arabia

2 - 4 million

10 - 15

Nigeria

<4 million

<5

Lebanon

1 - 2 million

45 - 55

Tanzania

<2 million

<10

Kuwait

500,000 - 700,000

20 - 25

Germany

400,000 - 600,000

10 - 15

Bahrain

400,000 - 500,000

65 - 75

Tajikistan

~400,000

~7

United Arab Emirates

300,000 - 400,000

~10

United States

200,000 - 400,000

10 - 15

Oman

100,000 - 300,000

5 - 10

United Kingdom

100,000 - 300,000

10 - 15

Bulgaria

~100,000

10 - 15

Qatar

~100,000

~10

Approximate Percentage of World
Shia Population
37 - 40% 10 - 15
9 - 14 11 - 12
4 - 6 ~5
3 - 4 ~2 ~2
1 - 2 <2 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1

World Total

154 - 200 million

10 - 13

100

Note: Countries with an estimated Shia population of less than 1% of the country’s Muslim population are not listed. The ﬁgures for Shias are generally given in a range because of the limitations of the secondary-source data (see Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates). Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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More T an a T ird of t e orld s ia Muslims i e in ran

0 Miles

2000

Turkey

Azerbaijan

Tajikistan

Me iterranean Syria

ea Lebanon

Iraq

Afghanistan Iran

Kuwait Bahrain
Saudi Arabia Qatar

Pakistan

United Arab Emirates

Oman

n ian Ocean

Yemen

India

75 million Shia Muslims
25
5

Based on the midpoints of estimated ranges

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Regional Distribution of Muslims
This report divides the world into five regions to take a closer look at the geographic distribution of Muslims. (For a list of the countries in each region, see “World Muslim Population by Region and Country” on page 27.) The five regions are presented in descending order of Muslim population, with the region with the highest number of Muslims (Asia-Pacific) appearing first and the region with the lowest number of Muslims (Americas) appearing last.
Asia-Pacific (61 countries and territories)
Muslims living in the Asia-Pacific region constitute 62% of all Muslims worldwide. The six Asian countries with the largest Muslim populations are: Indonesia (203 million), Pakistan (174 million), India (161 million), Bangladesh (145 million), Iran (74 million) and Turkey (74 million). Together these six countries are home to about 85% of Asia’s Muslim population and more than half (53%) of the global Muslim population. About half of the Muslim population within Asia lives in South Asia (50%) and the remainder are somewhat equally divided between Southeast-East Asia (26%) and Central-Western Asia (24%). Very few Muslims, however, live in the Pacific (<1%).5

5 In this report, South Asia includes seven countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Southeast-East Asia includes 19 countries: Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Macau, Malaysia, Mongolia, North Korea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam. Central-Western Asia includes 11 countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Pacific includes 24 countries: American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna.

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Muslims in Asia-Pacific by Subregion
Paciﬁc
0.5 million
<1%
Central-Western Asia
235m
24%

Southeast-East Asia
253m
26%

South Asia
484m
50%

Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Indonesia is the country with the world’s largest Muslim population (203 million); about 13% of all Muslims in the world live in Indonesia. Indonesia’s Muslim population accounts for about 80% of all Muslims living in Southeast-East Asia.
In South Asia, three of the seven countries – Pakistan, India and Bangladesh – together are home to nearly a third (31%) of the world’s Muslim population and 99% of South Asia’s Muslim population.
Other Asian countries with more than 20 million Muslims include Afghanistan (28 million), Uzbekistan (26 million) and China (22 million). There are Muslims in every province of China, but the highest concentrations are in the west, primarily in Xinjiang, Ningxia and Gansu, with other significant populations in Henan, Qinghai, Yunnan, Hebei and Shandong. Xinjiang is the only Muslim-majority province of China, with Muslims accounting for approximately 53% of the total population.

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Countries in Asia-Pacific with the Largest Number of Muslims

Indonesia Pakistan India Bangladesh Iran Turkey* Afghanistan Uzbekistan China Malaysia Rest of region Regional Total

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
202,867,000 174,082,000 160,945,000 145,312,000
73,777,000 73,619,000 28,072,000 26,469,000 21,667,000 16,581,000 49,148,000 972,537,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 88.2% 96.3 13.4 89.6 99.4 ~98 99.7 96.3 1.6 60.4 7.1 24.1

Percentage of World Muslim Population
12.9% 11.1 10.3
9.3 4.7 4.7 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.1 3.1 61.9

World Total

1,571,198,000

22.9

100.0

* Data for Turkey come primarily from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in Turkey is rounded to the nearest integer.
Note: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Distribution of Muslim Population in sia Pa ifi

Kazakhstan

Mongolia

Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan

North Korea

Turkey Armenia Iran
Cyprus

Afghanistan

Bhutan China Nepal

South Korea Japan

Pakistan

Hong

India

Bangladesh Burma Kong

(Myanmar) Laos

Taiwan

Thailand

Northern

Vietnam

Cambodia

Philippines

Mariana Islands

Sri Lanka

Malaysia Brunei

Maldives

Singapore

aci ic Ocean

150 million Muslims 50 10
Black circles denote <100,000 Muslims
Countries where the number of Muslims is too small to be reliably estimated not shown.

n ian Ocean
0 Miles

2000

Indonesia Timor-Leste

Papua New Guinea

Australia

Fiji
New Caledonia

New Zealand

);Ď)7)%6',Ď)28)6T7Ď3691Ď32Ď)0-+-32Ď?Ď9&0-'Ď-*)ĎeĎMapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Middle East-North Africa (20 countries and territories)
The Middle East-North Africa region is home to an estimated 315 million Muslims, or about 20% of the world’s Muslim population. Of these, approximately 79 million live in Egypt, meaning that about one-in-four (25%) Muslims in the region live in Egypt.
More than half the countries in the Middle East-North Africa region have populations that are approximately 95% Muslim or greater. These include Algeria, Egypt, Iraq,6 Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen. Other countries in the region also have populations with a high percentage of Muslims, including Syria (92%), Oman (88%), Bahrain (81%), Qatar (78%), United Arab Emirates (76%) and Sudan (71%). Although most of the citizens of the Persian Gulf countries of Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates are Muslim, these countries have a substantial number of non-Muslim workers who are not citizens; this brings down the total percentage of their populations that is Muslim.
North Africa is home to the three largest Muslim populations in the Middle East-North Africa region: Egypt (79 million), Algeria (34 million) and Morocco (32 million). Other countries in the region with large Muslim populations include: Iraq (30 million), Sudan (30 million), Saudi Arabia (25 million), Yemen (23 million), Syria (20 million) and Tunisia (10 million). The population of the remaining 11 countries and territories in the region – Libya, Jordan, Palestinian territories, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Israel, Qatar, Bahrain and Western Sahara – totals about 31 million.
The Palestinian territories are home to about 4 million Muslims. In addition, Israel is home to roughly 1 million Muslims, slightly more than Qatar. Although Israel has a Muslim population similar in size to those of some western European countries, Muslims constitute a much larger portion (about 17%) of its population. By comparison, the United Kingdom is home to between 1 million and 2 million Muslims, about 3% of its total population.

6 In Iraq and Afghanistan (Asia-Pacific), foreign military personnel or others associated with ongoing military and humanitarian operations are not included in the population estimates.

Regional Distribution of Muslims

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Countries in the Middle East-North Africa with the Largest Number of Muslims

Egypt Algeria Morocco* Iraq* Sudan Saudi Arabia* Yemen Syria Tunisia Libya Jordan Rest of region Regional Total

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
78,513,000 34,199,000 31,993,000 30,428,000 30,121,000 24,949,000 23,363,000 20,196,000 10,216,000
6,203,000 6,202,000 18,937,000 315,322,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 94.6% 98.0 ~99 ~99 71.3 ~97 99.1 92.2 99.5 96.6 98.2 65.7 91.2

Percentage of World Muslim Population
5.0% 2.2 ~2 ~2 1.9 ~2 1.5 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.2 20.1

World Total

1,571,198,000

22.9

100.0

* Data for Morocco, Iraq and Saudi Arabia come primarily from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in these three countries is rounded to the nearest integer.
Note: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Regional Distribution of Muslims

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Distribution of Muslim Population in Middle ast ort fri a

Morocco
Western Sahara

Algeria

Tunisia

Me iterranean

Lebanon

ea

Palestinian terr.

Syria Jordan

0 Miles
Iraq

1000

Libya

Israel Egypt

Kuwait Bahrain

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

United

Arab Emirates

ea e

Sudan

Yemen

Oman

50 million Muslims 25
5

tlantic Ocean

n ian Ocean

);Ď)7)%6',Ď)28)6T7Ď3691Ď32Ď)0-+-32Ď?Ď9&0-'Ď-*)ĎeĎMapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Sub-Saharan Africa (50 countries and territories)
Sub-Saharan Africa has about 241 million Muslims, which is about 15% of the world Muslim population. Nigeria has the largest Muslim population in Sub-Saharan Africa, with about 78 million Muslims (about 50% of Nigeria’s total population). Almost one-in-three Muslims (about 32%) in Sub-Saharan Africa live in Nigeria. Western Africa is the only area in Sub-Saharan Africa with a Muslim majority. In contrast, the southern part of Africa has the smallest Muslim population.

Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with the Largest Number of Muslims

Nigeria Ethiopia Niger Tanzania Mali Senegal Burkina Faso Somalia Guinea Ivory Coast Rest of region Regional Total

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
78,056,000 28,063,000 15,075,000 13,218,000 12,040,000 12,028,000
9,292,000 8,995,000 8,502,000 7,745,000 47,618,000 240,632,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 50.4% 33.9 98.6 30.2 92.5 96.0 59.0 98.5 84.4 36.7 11.3 30.1

Percentage of World Muslim Population
5.0% 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 3.0 15.3

World Total

1,571,198,000

22.9

100.0

Note: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Regional Distribution of Muslims

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Sub-Saharan Africa is also home to a number of countries that have very large Muslim majorities. Countries with the highest percentages of Muslim populations are: Mauritania (99%), Niger (99%), Somalia (99%), Mayotte (98%), Comoros (98%), Djibouti (97%), Senegal (96%), Gambia (95%), Mali (93%), Guinea (84%) and Sierra Leone (71%). The combined Muslim population of all these countries is about 67 million, or about 4% of the global Muslim population.

Distribution of Muslim Population in ub a aran fri a

AFRICA

Cape

Mauritania Mali

Verde Senegal

Niger

Chad

Gambia Guinea Bissau
Sierra Leone

Guinea Liberia

Burkina Faso Benin Ghana
Togo

Nigeria Cent.
African Rep. Cameroon

Ivory Coast Equatorial

Guinea

Rep. of

Gabon Congo

Congo

Eritrea Ethiopia Uganda Kenya Rwanda

tlantic Ocean

Burundi Tanzania

Djibouti Somalia
n ian Seychelles Ocean

50 million Muslims

Angola

Zambia Malawi

Comoros Mayotte

25

Namibia

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

Madagascar

Reunion

5

Botswana

Mauritius

Black circles denote <60,000 Muslims
Countries where the number of Muslims is too small to be reliably estimated not shown.

South Africa

Swaziland Lesotho
0 Miles

1000

);Ď)7)%6',Ď)28)6T7Ď3691Ď32Ď)0-+-32Ď?Ď9&0-'Ď-*)ĎeĎMapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Europe (50 countries and territories)
Europe has about 38 million Muslims, constituting about 5% of its population. European Muslims make up slightly more than 2% of the world’s Muslim population.
Readers should bear in mind that estimates of the numbers of Muslims in Europe vary widely because of the difficulty of counting new immigrants. Nevertheless, it is clear that most European Muslims live in eastern and central Europe. The country with the largest Muslim population in Europe is Russia, with more than 16 million Muslims, meaning that more than four-in-ten European Muslims live in Russia. While most Muslims in western Europe are relatively recent immigrants (or children of immigrants) from Turkey, North Africa or South Asia, most of those in Russia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria belong to populations that are centuries old, meaning that more than six-in-ten European Muslims are indigenous.
Despite the limitations of the underlying data for Europe, it appears that Germany is home to more than 4 million Muslims – almost as many as North and South America combined. This means that Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon (between 2 million and 3 million) and more than any other country in western Europe. This also puts Germany among the top-10 countries with the largest number of Muslims living as a minority population. While France has a slightly higher percentage of Muslims than Germany, this study finds that it has slightly fewer Muslims overall.7 The United Kingdom is home to fewer than 2 million Muslims, about 3% of its total population.
The European countries with the highest concentration of Muslims are located in eastern and central Europe: Kosovo (90%), Albania (80%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (40%) and Republic of Macedonia (33%). Greece is about 3% Muslim, while Spain is about 1% Muslim. Italy has one of the smallest populations of Muslims in Europe, with less than 1% of its population being Muslim.8

7 This report estimates that France’s Muslim population is between 3 million and 4 million based on recent immigrant data and a 2005 Generations and Gender Survey projected forward to 2009. Other sources, including the U.S. State Department, CIA World Factbook, World Religion Database and general population surveys, have variously estimated the Muslim population of France at between 2.5 million and 6 million.
8 Figures for Italy come from the 2004 European Social Survey. Similar estimates were found in other general population surveys, including the 2002 and 2007 Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Projects surveys. However, other sources have variously estimated Italy’s Muslim population at between 30,000 and 1.5 million.

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Countries in Europe with the Largest Number of Muslims

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population

Russia

16,482,000

Germany*

4,026,000

France*

3,554,000

Albania

2,522,000

Kosovo

1,999,000

United Kingdom

1,647,000

Bosnia-Herzegovina*

1,522,000

Netherlands

946,000

Bulgaria

920,000

Republic of Macedonia

680,000

Rest of region

3,814,000

Regional Total

38,112,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 11.7% ~5 ~6 79.9 89.6 2.7 ~40 5.7 12.2 33.3 1.1 5.2

Percentage of World Muslim Population
1.0% <1 <1 0.2 0.1 0.1 <1 0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.2 2.4

World Total

1,571,198,000

22.9

100.0

* Data for Germany, France and Bosnia-Herzegovina come primarily from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in these three countries is rounded to the nearest integer.
Note: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Regional Distribution of Muslims

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Distribution of Muslim Population in urope

0 Miles

1000

Sweden

Finland

Norway

Estonia

tlantic Ocean Portugal

Ireland Spain

orth ea
Denmark
United Kingdom
Netherlands

Latvia Lithuania
Belarus
Poland

Belgium Luxembourg

Germany

Czech Rep.

Ukraine Moldova

France

Liechtenstein Austria Hungary Romania

Slovenia Croatia

Switzerland

Serbia

Italy

Bosnia-Herz.

Andorra

Montenegro Kosovo Bulgaria

Albania

Rep. of Macedonia

Gibraltar

Me iterranean ea

Malta

Greece

Russia

lac ea

Georgia

10 million Muslims
5

0.5
Black circles denote <3,000 Muslims

);Ď)7)%6',Ď)28)6T7Ď3691Ď32Ď)0-+-32Ď?Ď9&0-'Ď-*)ĎeĎMapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life / Mapping the Global Muslim Population
The Americas (51 countries and territories)
Of the approximately 4.6 million Muslims in the Americas, more than half, or about 2.5 million, live in the United States.9 But Canada has more than double the percentage of Muslims in the United States. Two percent of Canadians, about 700,000 people, are Muslim; in contrast, 0.8% of the U.S. population is Muslim. Suriname is the country in the region with the largest Muslim population percentage, at about 16%. Guyana is next, at about 7% Muslim, and Trinidad and Tobago is about 6% Muslim. Argentina, with about 800,000 Muslims, is home to the largest number of Muslims in South America. Less than 1% of Mexico’s population is Muslim.

9 There has been considerable debate over the exact number of Muslims in the United States. The 2.5 million figure is a projection for 2009 based on the Pew Research Center’s 2007 survey “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream” (http://pewforum.org/surveys/muslim-american/) and available Census Bureau data (http://factfinder. census.gov/), adjusted for U.S. population growth. For a discussion of the larger debate, see http://pewresearch.org/ pubs/532/questions-muslim-survey.

Regional Distribution of Muslims

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Countries in the Americas with the Largest Number of Muslims

United States Argentina Canada Brazil Mexico* Venezuela Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Guyana Panama Rest of region Regional Total

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
2,454,000 784,000 657,000 191,000 110,000 94,000 83,000 78,000 55,000 24,000 67,000
4,596,000

Percentage of Population that is Muslim 0.8% 1.9 2.0 0.1 <1 0.3 15.9 5.8 7.2 0.7 <0.1 0.5

Percentage of World Muslim Population
0.2% 0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.3

World Total

1,571,198,000

22.9

100.0

* Data for Mexico come primarily from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in Mexico is rounded to the nearest integer.
Note: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Regional Distribution of Muslims

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Distribution of Muslim Population in t e meri as

Canada

aci ic Ocean
2 million Muslims 1 0.1 Black circles denote <10,000 Muslims Countries where the number of Muslims is too small to be reliably estimated not shown.

United States

Bermuda

Mexico
Guatemala El Salvador

Dominican Republic

tlantic Ocean

Cuba

Puerto

Haiti Rico

Jamaica

Guadeloupe

Honduras Martinique

St. Vincent and the Grenadines Barbados

Nicaragua

Panama

Trinidad and Tobago VenezuelaSuriname

Colombia Ecuador

Guyana French Guiana

Peru

Brazil Bolivia
Paraguay

Chile

Uruguay

Argentina

0 Miles

2000

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World Muslim Population by Region and Country
For information about how data for each country or territory were collected and analyzed, see Appendix C. Sources include national censuses, demographic and health surveys, and other general population surveys and studies. Population figures for previous years have been projected forward to 2009 based on the assumption that the Muslim population of the country is growing at the same rate as the general population. (See Methodology in Appendix A.) Data for countries marked with an asterisk (*) are drawn primarily from general population surveys, which have smaller sample sizes than demographic surveys and are not designed to measure the size of small minority populations. This may lead to undercounts of Muslims in countries where they represent a small minority of the population and overcounts where they represent the vast majority of the population. Those numbers, therefore, should be considered more approximate.

World Muslim Population by Region and Country www.pewforum.org

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World Muslim Population by Region and Country

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population

Percentage of Population that
is Muslim

Percentage of World Muslim
Population

Source and Year

Asia-Paciﬁc
Afghanistan American Samoa Armenia Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bhutan Brunei Burma (Myanmar) Cambodia China Cook Islands Cyprus Federated States of Micronesia Fiji French Polynesia Guam Hong Kong* India Indonesia Iran Japan Kazakhstan Kiribati Kyrgyzstan Laos Macau Malaysia Maldives Marshall Islands Mongolia Nauru Nepal New Caledonia New Zealand Niue North Korea Northern Mariana Islands Pakistan Palau

972,537,000
28,072,000 --
1,000 365,000 8,765,000 145,312,000
7,000 269,000 1,889,000 236,000 21,667,000
-198,000
-53,000
--7,000 160,945,000 202,867,000 73,777,000 183,000 8,822,000 -4,734,000 2,000 -16,581,000 304,000 -133,000 -1,231,000 7,000 37,000 -2,000 1,000 174,082,000 --

24.1%
99.7 <0.1 <0.1
1.7 99.2 89.6
1.0 67.2
3.8 1.6 1.6 <0.1 22.7 <0.1 6.3 <0.1 <0.1 <1 13.4 88.2 99.4 0.1 56.4 <0.1 86.3 <0.1 <0.1 60.4 98.4 <0.1 5.0 <0.1 4.2 2.8 0.9 <0.1 <0.1 0.7 96.3 <0.1

61.9%
1.8 --
<0.1 <0.1
0.6 9.3 <0.1 <0.1 0.1 <0.1 1.4
-<0.1
-<0.1
--<1 10.3 12.9 4.7 <0.1 0.6 -0.3 <0.1 -1.1 <0.1 -<0.1 -0.1 <0.1 <0.1 -<0.1 <0.1 11.1 --

WRD 2005 WRD 2005 DHS 2000 Census 2006 DHS 2006 Census 2001 WRD 2005 Census 1991 WRD 2005 DHS 2005 Census 2000 (ethnicity data) Census 2001 Census 2001 and WRD 2005 Census 2000 Census 2007 Census 1971 WRD 2005 WVS 2005 Census 2001 Census 2000 Census 2006 WRD 2005 DHS 1999 Census 2005 DHS 1997 Census 1995 Census 1991 Census 2000 WRD 2005 Census 1999 WRD 2005 Census 2002 Census 2001 WRD 2005 Census 2006 Census 2001 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 1998 Census 2000

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World Muslim Population (cont.)

Papua New Guinea Philippines Pitcairn Islands Samoa Singapore Solomon Islands South Korea Sri Lanka Taiwan* Tajikistan Thailand Timor-Leste Tokelau Tonga Turkey* Turkmenistan Tuvalu Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam Wallis and Futuna

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
2,000 4,654,000
--706,000 -71,000 1,711,000 23,000 5,848,000 3,930,000 43,000 --73,619,000 4,757,000 -26,469,000 -157,000 --

Middle East-North Africa
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq* Israel Jordan Kuwait* Lebanon Libya Morocco* Oman Palestinian territories* Qatar Saudi Arabia* Sudan Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Western Sahara Yemen

315,322,000
34,199,000 642,000
78,513,000 30,428,000
1,194,000 6,202,000 2,824,000 2,504,000 6,203,000 31,993,000 2,494,000 4,173,000 1,092,000 24,949,000 30,121,000 20,196,000 10,216,000 3,504,000
510,000 23,363,000

Percentage of Population that
is Muslim
<0.1 5.1
<0.1 <0.1 14.9 <0.1
0.1 8.5 <1 84.1 5.8 3.8 <0.1 <0.1 ~98 93.1 0.1 96.3 <0.1 0.2 <0.1
91.2%
98.0 81.2 94.6 ~99 16.7 98.2 ~95 59.3 96.6 ~99 87.7 ~98 77.5 ~97 71.3 92.2 99.5 76.2 99.4 99.1

World Muslim Population by Region and Country www.pewforum.org

Percentage of World Muslim
Population
<0.1 0.3 ---
<0.1 --
<0.1 0.1 <1 0.4 0.3
<0.1 ---
4.7 0.3 <0.1 1.7
-<0.1
--

Source and Year
Census 2000 Census 2000
WRD 2005 Census 2001 Census 2000 Census 1999
WRD 2005 Census 2001
WVS 2006 WRD 2005 Consultant 2009 WRD 2005 Census 2006 Census 2001 TESEV 2006 DHS 2000 WRD 2005 DHS 2002 Census 1999 WRD 2005 WRD 2005

20.1%
2.2 <0.1
5.0 ~2 0.1 0.4 <1 0.2 0.4 ~2 0.2 <1 0.1 ~2 1.9 1.3 0.7 0.2 <0.1 1.5

WRD 2005 Census 2001
DHS 2005 WVS 2006 Statistical Abstract 2008 DHS 2002 Pew Global 2007 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Pew Global 2007 Census 1993 Pew Global 2009 Census 2004 WVS 2003 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005

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World Muslim Population (cont.)

Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola* Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi* Cameroon Cape Verde* Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia* Ghana Guinea Guinea Bissau Ivory Coast Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Republic of Congo Reunion Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Seychelles

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
240,632,000
190,000 2,182,000
8,000 9,292,000
180,000 3,498,000
1,000 395,000 6,257,000 664,000 943,000 838,000
27,000 1,854,000 28,063,000
140,000 1,625,000 3,787,000 8,502,000
680,000 7,745,000 2,793,000
1,000 483,000 215,000 1,955,000 12,040,000 3,261,000 214,000 191,000 5,224,000
8,000 15,075,000 78,056,000
59,000 34,000 182,000
-12,028,000
1,000

Percentage of Population that
is Muslim
30.1%
~1 24.4
0.4 59.0
~2 17.9
<1 8.9 55.8 98.3 1.4 96.9 4.0 36.5 33.9 9.5 ~95 15.9 84.4 42.2 36.7 7.0 <0.1 12.2 1.1 12.8 92.5 99.1 16.6 98.4 22.8 0.4 98.6 50.4 1.6 4.2 1.8 <0.1 96.0 1.1

Percentage of World Muslim
Population
15.3%
<1 0.1 <0.1 0.6 <1 0.2 <1 <0.1 0.4 <0.1 0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.1 1.8 0.1 <1 0.2 0.5 <0.1 0.5 0.2 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 <0.1 <0.1 0.3 <0.1 1.0 5.0 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
-0.8 <0.1

Source and Year
Pew Global 2002 Census 2002 Census 2001 DHS 2003
InterMedia 2007 DHS 2004
AfroB 2005 DHS 1995 DHS 2004 WRD 2005 DHS 2007 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 DHS 2002
Census 2007 DHS 2000
InterMedia 2004 Census 2000 DHS 2005 WRD 2005 DHS 2005 DHS 2003 WRD 2005 Census 2008 DHS 2004 Census 1998 DHS 2006 WRD 2005 Census 2000 WRD 2005 DHS 2003 WRD 2005 DHS 2006 DHS 2003 DHS 2005 WRD 2005 Census 2002 WRD 2005 DHS 2006 Census 2002

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World Muslim Population (cont.)

Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa St. Helena Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
4,059,000 8,995,000
731,000 --
2,000 13,218,000
809,000 3,958,000
58,000 109,000

Europe
Albania Andorra* Austria Belarus* Belgium* Bosnia-Herzegovina* Bulgaria Channel Islands Croatia* Czech Republic Denmark* Estonia Faeroe Islands Finland France* Georgia Germany* Gibraltar Greece* Hungary Iceland Ireland Isle of Man Italy* Kosovo Latvia* Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg*

38,112,000
2,522,000 1,000
353,000 19,000
281,000 1,522,000
920,000 --
18,000 1,000
88,000 2,000 --
24,000 3,554,000
423,000 4,026,000
1,000 310,000
24,000 --
22,000 --
36,000 1,999,000
2,000 2,000 3,000 13,000

Percentage of Population that
is Muslim
71.3 98.5
1.5 <0.1
0.2 30.2 12.2 12.1
0.4 0.9
5.2%
79.9 ~1 4.2 <1 ~3
~40 12.2
0.1 <1 <0.1 ~2 0.1 <0.1 0.5 ~6 9.9 ~5 4.0 ~3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 <1 89.6 <1 4.8 0.1 ~3

Percentage of World Muslim
Population
0.3 0.6 <0.1
-<0.1
0.8 0.1 0.3 <0.1 <0.1

Source and Year
Census 2004 WRD 2005
Census 2001 Census 1987
DHS 2006 DHS 2004 DHS 1998 Census 2002 Census 2000 DHS 2006

2.4%
0.2 <1 <0.1 <1 <1 <1 0.1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1
-<0.1
<1 <0.1
<1 <0.1
<1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
<1 0.1 <1 <0.1 <0.1 <1

MICS 2005 WVS 2005 Census 2001 WVS 2000 ESS 2006 WVS 2001 Census 2001 WRD 2005 InterMedia 2004 WRD 2005 ESS 2006 Census 2000 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 ERFI 2005 Census 2002 Ministry of the Interior 2009 Census 2001 ESS 2004 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 2002 WRD 2005 ESS 2004 WRD 2005 WVS 1999 Census 2000 Census 2001 ESS 2004

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World Muslim Population (cont.)

Malta Moldova Monaco Montenegro Netherlands Norway* Poland* Portugal Republic of Macedonia Romania Russia San Marino Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain* Sweden* Switzerland Ukraine United Kingdom Vatican City

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population
1,000 17,000
-111,000 946,000
65,000 48,000 15,000 680,000 66,000 16,482,000
-244,000
-49,000 650,000 149,000 323,000 456,000 1,647,000
--

Americas
Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Aruba Bahamas Barbados Belize Bermuda Bolivia Brazil British Virgin Islands Canada Cayman Islands Chile Colombia* Costa Rica* Cuba Dominica

4,596,000
--784,000 --2,000 -1,000 2,000 191,000 -657,000 -4,000 14,000 -9,000 --

Percentage of Population that
is Muslim
0.2 0.5 0.4 17.7 5.7 ~1 <1 0.1 33.3 0.3 11.7 <0.1 3.2 <0.1 2.4 ~1 ~2 4.3 1.0 2.7 <0.1
0.5%
0.3 0.6 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.8 <0.1 0.1 1.2 2.0 0.2 <0.1 <1 <1 0.1 0.1

Percentage of World Muslim
Population

Source and Year

<0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
0.1 <1 <1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 1.0
-<0.1 <0.1 <0.1
<1 <1 <0.1 <0.1 0.1
--

WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 2003 Census 2003 ESS 2006 ESS 2006 Census 2001 Census 2002 Census 2002 Census 2002 (ethnicity data) WRD 2005 Census 2002 Census 2001 Census 2002 ESS 2006 ESS 2006 Census 2000 DHS 2007 Census 2001 WRD 2005

0.3%
<0.1 <0.1
0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
<1 <1 <0.1 <0.1

Census 2001 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005
Census 2000 WRD 2005
Census 2000 Census 2001
WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 2001 WRD 2005 Census 2002 WVS 2005 LatinoB 2007 WRD 2005 WRD 2005

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World Muslim Population (cont.)

Estimated 2009 Muslim Population

Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Falkland Islands (Malvinas) French Guiana Greenland Grenada Guadeloupe Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Martinique Mexico* Montserrat Netherlands Antilles Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Puerto Rico St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Pierre and Miquelon St. Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Turks and Caicos Islands U.S. Virgin Islands United States Uruguay Venezuela

2,000 2,000 2,000
-2,000
--2,000 1,000 55,000 2,000 11,000 1,000 1,000 110,000 --1,000 24,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 ---2,000 83,000 78,000 --2,454,000 1,000 94,000

Percentage of Population that
is Muslim
<0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
0.9 <0.1
0.3 0.4 <0.1 7.2 <0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.2 <1 0.1 0.2 <0.1 0.7 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.5 15.9 5.8 <0.1 0.1 0.8 <0.1 0.3

Percentage of World Muslim
Population
<0.1 <0.1 <0.1
-<0.1
-<0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
<1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
-<0.1
0.2 <0.1 <0.1

Source and Year
WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 1972 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 2002 Census 2003 WRD 2005 Census 2001 WRD 2005 WVS 1996 Census 1980 Census 1992 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 2002 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 1991 Census 2001 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 WRD 2005 Census 2000 Census 1990 WRD 2005 Pew Research Center 2007 WRD 2005 WRD 2005

World Total

1,571,198,000

22.9%

100.0%

* Indicates the use of a source with a small enough sample size to make these estimates somewhat less reliable. Due to this greater margin of error, percentages are rounded to the nearest integer rather than to the ﬁrst decimal place and are therefore more approximate (~). The only exception to this rule is the display of Turkey’s percentage of world population as 4.7% rather than ~ 5%.
“--” indicates that the number of Muslims is too small to be reliably estimated.
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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World Muslim Population (cont.)
Source Abbreviations

AfroB Census (ethnicity data) Consultant DHS ERFI ESS InterMedia LatinoB MICS Ministry of the Interior Pew Global Statistical Abstract TESEV WRD WVS

Afrobarometer Based on ethnicity data from census Consultant to the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Demographic and Health Survey Etude de Relations Familiales et Intergénérationnelles European Social Survey InterMedia Survey Latinobarometro Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project Survey Statistical Abstract of Israel Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation Publications World Religion Database World Values Survey

For more information, see List of Sources.

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Appendix A: Methodology for Muslim Population Estimates
The Pew Forum’s Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population seeks to provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive demographic estimate of the number of Muslims in the 231 countries and territories for which the United Nations Population Division provides general population estimates.10 In order to have statistics that are comparable across countries, wherever possible this study counts all groups and individuals who self-identify as Muslim. (The method for identifying Sunnis and Shias is different; see Appendix B for a complete explanation.)
The number of Muslims in each of the countries and territories is calculated by multiplying the United Nations’ 2009 total population estimate for each country and territory by the single most recent and reliable demographic or social-scientific estimate of the percentage of Muslims in each country’s population, based on the conservative assumption that Muslim populations are growing at the same rate as each country’s general population. (A 2010 Pew Forum report will provide estimates of the differential growth rates of Muslim populations.)
Sources include national censuses, demographic and health surveys, and general population surveys and studies. The specific source used for each country is indicated in Appendix C. Readers should note, however, that general population surveys generally have smaller sample sizes than demographic surveys and are not designed to measure the size of small minority populations. This may lead to undercounts of Muslims in countries where they represent a small minority of the population and overcounts where they represent the vast majority of the population. See below for more detail.
With all sources, results may have been affected by methodological decisions with respect to how the data were collected and managed. Social, cultural or political factors could also have affected how answers to census and survey questions are provided and recorded.

10 Population estimates for 2009 for Taiwan and Kosovo are from the Population Reference Bureau. Taiwan’s population is deducted from the U.N.’s China estimate and Kosovo’s from the U.N.’s Serbia estimate.

Methodology for Muslim Population Estimates

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Discussion of Sources
Censuses
For this study, Pew Forum researchers acquired and analyzed religious affiliation data from 81 censuses that were conducted since 1999, comparing more current sources of data with older census data on religious affiliation for an additional 103 countries as a cross check. Religious affiliation questions from national censuses are the best source for estimating the number of Muslims because they generally cover the entire population and are conducted on a fairly regular basis. The chief limitation in using census data is that fewer than half of recent country censuses included a religious affiliation question. In addition, these surveys are conducted only once every 10 years.
Demographic Surveys
Where recent census data on religion are not available, religious affiliation questions from largescale demographic surveys, such as Macro International’s MEASURE Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) (http://www.measuredhs.com/), are the second-best source because of their large sample sizes, sampling frame and representative results at the province level. Though less comprehensive than census data, demographic surveys complete sufficiently high numbers of household interviews to produce a generally accurate demographic profile of the country. For this report, DHS data were acquired and analyzed for more than 60 countries, or nearly two-thirds of the countries where census data are lacking or are older than 1999. For most of the DHS surveys, both women and men are interviewed and Macro International provides the data in separate male-female datasets. Pew Forum staff pooled the female and male datasets in consultation with sampling experts at Macro International so that the combined dataset retains nationally representative results. In countries where only females are interviewed, Pew Forum staff used those data to make the overall Muslim population estimate for the country.
General Population Surveys
Pew Forum researchers acquired and analyzed religious affiliation data from general population surveys for some 100 countries. In more than 20 of those countries, these surveys provide religious affiliation data where a recent census or demographic survey is lacking. Since general population surveys typically involve only 1,000 to 2,000 respondents, however, they provide less accurate numbers. This is especially true where the size of the Muslim population is quite small or Muslims live in concentrated locations that are not oversampled. As a result, data drawn primarily from these sources is marked with an asterisk in the tables throughout this report.

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World Religion Database
Pew Forum researchers also used estimates from the World Religion Database (www. WorldReligionDatabase.org), primarily for countries where census and survey estimates were out-of-date, unavailable or lacked sufficient coverage. Besides census and survey reports, WRD estimates also take into account other sources of information on religious affiliation, including anthropological and ethnographic studies as well as reputable statistical reports from religious groups themselves. The WRD is an outgrowth of the international religious demography project at Boston University’s Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs.
A Note on Country and Territory Designation
The word “country” in this report refers to all countries recognized as such by the United Nations. The word “territory” in this report does not have a technical definition, but rather is a general term for distinct geographical entities not recognized as countries by the United Nations but that have separate population estimates reported by the United Nations. Territories in this report include such entities as Hong Kong and Macau (special administrative regions of China), Greenland (an autonomous constituent country within the Kingdom of Denmark) and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (an unincorporated territory of the United States).

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Appendix B: Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates

For the purposes of this report, sectarian differences among Muslims were simplified into two categories: Sunni and Shia. It should be noted, however, that both these groups contain selfidentified Muslim communities that may be considered heterodox or nonmainstream by other Muslims.
Unlike estimates for Muslim populations overall, almost no censuses and relatively few surveys ask Muslims about their Sunni or Shia affiliation. Accordingly, Pew Forum researchers have relied on three primary sources to generate Sunni-Shia estimates:
• Analyses by more than 20 demographers and social scientists at universities and research centers around the world who are acting as consultants on this project;
• Ethnographic analyses published in the World Religion Database (WRD); and
• A review of other published or frequently used estimates.
For most countries with sizeable Muslim populations, one or more experts provided the Pew Forum with their best estimate of the Sunni-Shia breakdown based on their own review of the published sources and other expert analyses available to them.
Additionally, for all countries and territories in the study, Pew Forum researchers consulted the WRD estimates of the proportion of Muslims who are Sunni and Shia in each country. The WRD estimates are based in turn on the WRD’s ethnicity database of more than 4,300 ethnolinguistic groups. Readers should note, however, that these estimates are limited both by the initial assumptions made about the Sunni-Shia composition of each ethnicity and by the variability of ethnicity information available in each country.
As a result, the Sunni-Shia estimates presented in this report are based primarily on data gathered via ethnographic and anthropological studies, necessitated by the fact that many Muslims either cannot or will not identify themselves as Sunni or Shia. Therefore, Pew Forum staff are not able to estimate the possible margin of error associated with any one particular estimate. Taking into account the three different sources, this study provides a likely range of the proportion of Muslims worldwide that are Shia based on an analysis of each country. Some ranges are broader than others because the sources consulted provided different estimates or because the sources suggest a wider range due to the lack of more precise information for a particular country.
Finally, for nearly 200 countries, Pew Forum researchers also consulted estimates contained in the religious demography section of the annual International Religious Freedom reports published by the U.S. State Department as well as estimates published in the CIA World Factbook.

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Estimated Percentage Range of Shia by Country

Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia

Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population

World Total

10-13%

100%

Afghanistan Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia-Herzegovina Botswana Brazil British Virgin Islands Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burma (Myanmar) Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Cayman Islands Central African Republic

10 - 15 <5 <1 -<1 -<1 <1
<10 <1 <1
<10 <1
65-75 --
65-75 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 -<1 <1 <1 <1
<10 <1 <1
10 - 15 <1 <1 <5 <1 <1
~10 <1 <1 <1

~2 <1 <1
-<1
-<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 3 - 4
-<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
-<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1

Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia

Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population

Chad

<1

<1

Channel Islands

<1

<1

Chile

<1

<1

China

<1

<1

Colombia

<1

<1

Comoros

<1

<1

Congo

<1

<1

Cook Islands

--

--

Costa Rica

--

--

Croatia

<1

<1

Cuba

<1

<1

Cyprus

<1

<1

Czech Republic

<1

<1

Denmark

<5

<1

Djibouti

<1

<1

Dominica

<1

<1

Dominican Republic

<1

<1

Ecuador

<1

<1

Egypt

<1

<1

El Salvador

<1

<1

Equatorial Guinea

<1

<1

Eritrea

<1

<1

Estonia

<1

<1

Ethiopia

<1

<1

Faeroe Islands

--

--

Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

--

--

Federated States of Micronesia

--

--

Fiji

<1

<1

Finland

<1

<1

France

2-3

<1

French Guiana

<1

<1

French Polynesia

--

--

Gabon

<1

<1

Gambia

<1

<1

Georgia

15 - 25

<1

Germany

10 - 15

<1

Ghana

<1

<1

Gibraltar

<1

<1

Greece

10 - 15

<1

Greenland

<1

<1

Grenada

<1

<1

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Shia by Country (cont.)

Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia

Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population

Guadeloupe Guam Guatemala Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Isle of Man Israel Italy Ivory Coast Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Kosovo Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macau Madagascar Malawi

<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
-<1 <1 10 - 15 <1 90 - 95 65 - 70 <1
-<1 <5 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <5
--20 - 25 <1 <1 25 - 35 45 - 55 <1 <1 <1 <1 10 - 20 <1 -<1 <1

<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
-<1 <1 9 - 14 <1 37 - 40 11 - 12 <1
-<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
--<1 <1 <1 <1 ~1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 -<1 <1

Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia

Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population

Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Martinique Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mexico Moldova Monaco Mongolia Montenegro Montserrat Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands Netherlands Antilles New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue North Korea Northern Mariana Islands Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Palestinian territories Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Pitcairn Islands

< 2 <1 <1 <1
-<1 <1 <10 <1 <1 <1 <1 <5
--<1 <1 <1 -<1 <5 70 - 75 <1 <1 <1 <1 <5 -<1 -<1 5 - 10 10 - 15 -<1 <1 <1 -<1 <1 --

<1 <1 <1 <1
-<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
--<1 <1 <1 -<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <2 -<1 -<1 <1 10 - 15 -<1 <1 <1 -<1 <1 --

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Shia by Country (cont.)

Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia

Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population

Poland

<1

Portugal

<1

Puerto Rico

<1

Qatar

~10

Republic of Congo

<1

Republic of Macedonia

<1

Reunion

<1

Romania

<1

Russia

<1

Rwanda

<1

Samoa

--

San Marino

<1

Sao Tome and Principe

<1

Saudi Arabia

10 - 15

Senegal

<1

Serbia

<15

Seychelles

<1

Sierra Leone

<1

Singapore

<1

Slovakia

<1

Slovenia

<1

Solomon Islands

<1

Somalia

<1

South Africa

<10

South Korea

<1

Spain

<1

Sri Lanka

<1

St. Helena

--

St. Kitts and Nevis

<1

St. Lucia

<1

St. Pierre and Miquelon

<1

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

<1

Sudan

<1

Suriname

<1

Swaziland

<1

<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
-<1 <1 1 - 2 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
-<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1

Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia

Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population

Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor-Leste Togo Tokelau Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Islands Tuvalu U.S. Virgin Islands Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vatican City Venezuela Vietnam Wallis and Futuna Western Sahara Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

20 - 40 <1
15 - 20 <1 ~7
<10 <1 <1 <1 --<1 <1
10 - 15 ~1 --<1 <5 <1
~10 10 - 15 10 - 15
<1 ~1
--<1 <1 -<1 35 - 40 <1 <1

<1 <1 ~2 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
--<1 <1 4 - 6 <1 --<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 --<1 <1 -<1 ~ 5 <1 <1

Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

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Appendix C: Data Sources by Country
The below list of general sources provides bibliographic information for sources that were used to provide estimates for the Muslim populations of multiple countries. The subsequent list of sources by country provides abbreviated bibliographic information identifying which general sources were used to provide estimates for countries, as well as fuller bibliographic information for sources that were used for one country only.
General Sources
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). MEASURE DHS. Calverton, Maryland: Administered by Macro International, 1995-2007. <http://www.measuredhs.com/> European Social Survey (ESS). London: Led by Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, 2004, 2006. <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/> Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2009 Survey <http://pewglobal.org/datasets/> Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2007 Survey <http://pewglobal.org/datasets/> Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2002 Survey <http://pewglobal.org/datasets/> United Nations Demographic Yearbook. “Special Census Topics Volume 2 - Social characteristics, ‘Table 6: Population by religion, sex, urban/rural residence and percentage: each census, 19852004.’ ” New York: United Nations Statistics Division, 2006. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ demographic/sconcerns/popchar/popchar2.htm> World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition. David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, eds. United States: Oxford University Press, 2001. World Religion Database: International Religious Demographic Statistics and Sources (WRD). Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds. Leiden, Netherlands and Boston, Mass.: Brill, 2008. (Muslim population estimates from 2005.) <http://www.worldreligiondatabase.org> World Values Survey (WVS). “Values Survey Database.” World Values Survey Association, 19992006. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

Data Sources by Country

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Sources by Country
Afghanistan: 2005 World Religion Database
Albania: 2005 Albania Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). Obtained from “Table HH.3: Household Composition: Percent distribution of households by selected characteristics.” Albania Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2005, Final Report. Tirana, Albania: Albanian National Institute of Statistics, 2009. <http://www.childinfo.org/mics3_surveys.html>
Algeria: 2005 World Religion Database
American Samoa: 2005 World Religion Database
Andorra: 2005 World Values Survey
Angola: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2002 Survey
Anguilla: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Antigua and Barbuda: 2005 World Religion Database
Argentina: 2005 World Religion Database
Armenia: 2000 Demographic and Health Survey
Aruba: 2000 Census. Obtained from “Table P-A.5: Population by religion, age, and sex.” Fourth Population and Housing Census: Aruba October 14, 2000. Aruba Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001. <http://www.cbs.aw/cbs/readBlob.do?id=467> (PDF)
Australia: 2006 Census. Obtained from “Category No. 2068.0 – 2006 Census Tables: Religious Affiliation(a) (Full Classification List) by Sex.” 2006 Census of Population and Housing. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007. <http://www.abs.gov.au/>
Austria: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Azerbaijan: 2006 Demographic and Health Survey. (Survey excluded the Kalbajar-Lachin region and four out of the seven districts of the Yukhari Garabakh region.)
Bahamas: 2000 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.
Bahrain: 2001 Census. Obtained from “Part 2, ‘Table - 0603.0: POPULATION BY RELIGION, AGE GROUPS, NATIONALITY AND SEX – 2001.’ ” Bahrain Census 2001. Bahrain: Directorate of Statistics in Central Informatics Organization, 2001. <http://www.cio.gov.bh/CIO_ENG/sitemap.aspx>

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Bangladesh: 2001 Census. Obtained from Population Statistics: Census at a Glance. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2007. <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/dataindex/census/bang_atg.pdf> (PDF) and <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/>
Barbados: 2005 World Religion Database
Belarus: 2000 World Values Survey
Belgium: 2006 European Social Survey
Belize: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Benin: 2002 Census. Obtained from “ ‘Table: Ethnie et Religion,’ Principaux Indicateurs SocioDemographiques,” Troisieme Recensement General de la Population et de l’Habitation, Febrier 2002. Institut National de la Statistique et de L’Analyse Economique, 2003. <http://www.insaebj.org/IMG/pdf/principaux_indicateur_rgph3.pdf> (PDF) and <http://www.insae-bj.org/?Religion>
Bermuda: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Bhutan: 2005 World Religion Database
Bolivia: 2005 World Religion Database
Bosnia-Herzegovina: 2001 World Values Survey
Botswana: 2001 Census. Obtained from Ntloedibe-Kuswani, G.S. “AFRICAN RELIGIONS AND 2001 POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS IN BOTSWANA.” Centre for Continuing Education, University of Botswana, 2003. <http://www.cso.gov.bw/images/stories/Census/paper24.pdf> (PDF)
Brazil: 2005 World Religion Database
British Virgin Islands: 2005 World Religion Database
Brunei: 1991 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Bulgaria: 2001Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Burkina Faso: 2003 Demographic and Health Survey
Burma (Myanmar): 2005 World Religion Database
Burundi: 2007 InterMedia Survey. Washington, D.C.: InterMedia. Prepared for Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life in 2009. <http://www.intermedia.org/>
Cambodia: 2005 Demographic and Health Survey

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Cameroon: 2004 Demographic and Health Survey
Canada: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Cape Verde: 2005 Afrobarometer Survey. Michigan State University, 2006. <http://www. afrobarometer.org/>
Cayman Islands: 2005 World Religion Database
Central African Republic: 1995 Demographic and Health Survey
Chad: 2004 Demographic and Health Survey
Channel Islands: 2005 World Religion Database
Chile: 2002 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.
China: Based on ethnicity data in 2000 Census. Census data obtained from The Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. China: Nationalities Publishing House, 2003.
Colombia: 2005 World Values Survey
Comoros: 2005 World Religion Database
Congo: 2007 Demographic and Health Survey
Cook Islands: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Costa Rica: 2007 Latinobarometro. Chile: Latinobarometro Corporation. Obtained by Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life in 2009. <http://www.latinobarometro.org/>
Croatia: 2004 InterMedia Survey. Washington, D.C.: InterMedia. Prepared for Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life in 2009. <http://www.intermedia.org/>
Cuba: 2005 World Religion Database
Cyprus: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Cyprus: 2005 World Religion Database (Two sources were used for the Cyprus estimate.)
Czech Republic: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Denmark: 2006 European Social Survey
Djibouti: 2005 World Religion Database
Dominica: 2005 World Religion Database

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Dominican Republic: 2005 World Religion Database
Ecuador: 2005 World Religion Database
Egypt: 2005 Demographic and Health Survey
El Salvador: 2005 World Religion Database
Equatorial Guinea: 2005 World Religion Database
Eritrea: 2002 Demographic and Health Survey
Estonia: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Ethiopia: 2007 Census. Obtained from “Table 6: Population Size of Regions by Religion and Place of Residence: 2007.” Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Population Census Commission, 2008.
Faeroe Islands: 2005 World Religion Database
Falkland Islands (Malvinas): 1972 Census. Obtained from World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition.
Federated States of Micronesia: 2000 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.
Fiji: 2007 Census. Obtained from “‘Table 2.10 Population by Religion and Province of Enumeration, Fiji: 2007 Census,’ Key Statistics: March 2009.” Fiji 2007 Census. Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, 2009.
Finland: 2005 World Religion Database
France: 2005 Etude des Relations Familiales et intergénérationnelles (ERFI; French version of the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS)). Paris: Institut national d’études démographiques, 2005. 2009 adjustment for population under 18 and estimates of recent immigrants by Anne Goujon, a consultant to the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, Vienna Institute of Demography, Austria. <http://www.ined.fr/en/resources_documentation/publications/pop_soc/ bdd/publication/1366/>
French Guiana: 2005 World Religion Database
French Polynesia: 1971 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Gabon: 2000 Demographic and Health Survey

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Gambia: 2004 InterMedia Survey. Washington, D.C.: InterMedia. Prepared for Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life in 2009. <http://www.intermedia.org/>
Georgia: 2002 Census. Obtained from “Table: Population by Religious Beliefs (By Major Administrative -Territorial Units).” 2002 First General National Census in Georgia. State Department for Statistics of Georgia, 2003. <http://www.statistics.ge/_files/english/census/2002/ Religious%20beliefs.pdf> (PDF)
Germany: 2009 Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland Survey. Deutsche Islam Konferenz. Germany: Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2009. <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de>
Ghana: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Gibraltar: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Greece: 2004 European Social Survey
Greenland: 2005 World Religion Database
Grenada: 2005 World Religion Database
Guadeloupe: 2005 World Religion Database
Guam: 2005 World Religion Database
Guatemala: 2005 World Religion Database
Guinea: 2005 Demographic and Health Survey
Guinea Bissau: 2005 World Religion Database
Guyana: 2002 Census. Obtained from “ ‘Religious Composition,’ Chapter II Population Composition,” Census 2002 National Census Report. Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007. <http:// www.statisticsguyana.gov.gy/pubs/Chapter2_Population_Composition.pdf> (PDF)
Haiti: 2003 Census. Obtained from “Le Quatrième Recensement General de la Population et de l’Habitat.” Haiti 2003 Census. Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique, 2003; as well as from “Haiti,” 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom. United States: U.S. State Department, 2008. <http://www.ihsi.ht/rgph_resultat_ensemble_population.htm#>
Honduras: 2005 World Religion Database
Hong Kong: 2005 World Values Survey
Hungary: 2005 World Religion Database

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Iceland: 2005 World Religion Database
India: 2001 Census. Obtained from “Table: India at a Glance – Religious Composition.” India 2001 Census. Government of India: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 2001. <http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/religion.aspx> and <http:// www.censusindia.net/>
Indonesia: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Iran: 2006 Census. Census data obtained in 2009 from Farzaneh Roudi, a consultant to the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.
Iraq: 2006 World Values Survey
Ireland: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Isle of Man: 2005 World Religion Database
Israel: “Table 2.2: Population, By Religion.” Statistical Abstract of Israel 2008 No. 59. Israel: The Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008. <www.cbs.gov.il>
Italy: 2004 European Social Survey
Ivory Coast: 2005 Demographic and Health Survey
Jamaica: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Japan: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2002 Survey
Jordan: 2002 Demographic and Health Survey
Kazakhstan: 1999 Demographic and Health Survey
Kenya: 2003 Demographic and Health Survey
Kiribati: 2005 Census. Obtained from “Section 4.2, ‘Religion.’ ” Kiribati 2005 Census, Volume 2: Analytical Report. Kiribati National Statistics Office, 2007. <http://www.spc.int/prism/Country/KI/ Stats/CensusSurveys/censurveys-index.htm>
Kosovo: 2005 World Religion Database
Kuwait: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2007 Survey
Kyrgyzstan: 1997 Demographic and Health Survey
Laos: 1995 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.

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Latvia: 1999 World Values Survey Lebanon: 2005 World Religion Database Lesotho: 2005 World Religion Database Liberia: 2008 Census. Obtained from “Table 4.3: Distribution of Population by Religious Affiliation, Age and Sex, Liberia 2008.” 2008 Population and Housing Census: Final Results. Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, 2009. Libya: 2005 World Religion Database Liechtenstein: 2000 Census. Obtained from “Religion und Hauptsprachen - Band 2.” Liechtenstein 2000 Census. Lichtenstein Statistics Department, 2000. <http://www.llv.li/pdf-llv-avw-statistikreligion_und_hauptsprache_teil1-analyse> (PDF) Lithuania: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Luxembourg: 2004 European Social Survey Macau: 1991 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Madagascar: 2004 Demographic and Health Survey Malawi: 1998 Census. Obtained from World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition. Malaysia: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Maldives: 2005 World Religion Database Mali: 2006 Demographic and Health Survey Malta: 2005 World Religion Database Marshall Islands: 1999 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Martinique: 2005 World Religion Database Mauritania: 2005 World Religion Database Mauritius: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Mayotte: 2005 World Religion Database Mexico: 1996 World Values Survey Moldova: 2005 World Religion Database

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Monaco: 2005 World Religion Database
Mongolia: 2005 World Religion Database
Montenegro: 2003 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.
Montserrat: 1980 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Morocco: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2007 Survey
Mozambique: 2003 Demographic and Health Survey
Namibia: 2005 World Religion Database
Nauru: 2002 Census. Obtained from “Chapter 2 ‘Population Characteristics-Religion.’” 2002 Nauru Census Main Report and Demographic Profile of the Republic of Nauru 1992-2002. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2006. <http://www.spc.int/prism/country/nr/stats/ Publication/Census/NR_02_Census_Rept_FINAL.pdf> (PDF)
Nepal: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Netherlands: 2003 Census. Obtained from “Tabel Religie; naar regio; 2000/2002 of 2003.” StatLine Databank. Netherlands: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2004. <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/ publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70794ned&D1=a&D2=0,53-55&D3=0&HD=0909241634&HDR=T,G2&STB=G1>
Netherlands Antilles: 1992 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
New Caledonia: 2005 World Religion Database
New Zealand: 2006 Census. Obtained from “Religious Affiliation Section.” Quick Stats about Culture and Identity. Statistics New Zealand, 2006. <http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/ 2006CensusHomePage/quickstats-about-a-subject/culture-and-identity/religious-affiliation.aspx>
Nicaragua: 2005 Census. Obtained from “Capitulo 1 ‘Censo de Poblacion.’ ” VIII Censo de Poblacion y IV de Vivienda 2005 INEC. Instituto Nacional de Informacion de Desarrollo, 2005. <http://www.inec.gob.ni/censos2005/ResumenCensal/Resumen2.pdf> (PDF)
Niger: 2006 Demographic and Health Survey
Nigeria: 2003 Demographic and Health Survey
Niue: 2001 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.

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North Korea: 2005 World Religion Database
Northern Mariana Islands: 2005 World Religion Database
Norway: 2006 European Social Survey
Oman: 1993 Census. Obtained from “ ‘Table No.1: Total Population by Region: Omani & NonOmani’; ‘Table 3.1.8: Non-Omani Population by Region, Religion, and Sex’; ‘Section 2-5: Religion,’ Housing and Establishments.” General Census of Population. Sultanate of Oman: Ministry of Development, 1993.
Pakistan: 1998 Census. Obtained from “Table: Population by Religion.” 1998 Population Census. Government of Pakistan: Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, 1998. <http://www. statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/other_tables/pop_by_religion.pdf> (PDF)
Palau: 2000 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.
Palestinian territories: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2009 Survey
Panama: 2005 World Religion Database
Papua New Guinea: 2000 Census. Obtained from “Papua New Guinea.” 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom. Unites States: U.S. State Department, 2008.
Paraguay: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Peru: 2005 World Religion Database
Philippines: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Pitcairn Islands: 2005 World Religion Database
Poland: 2006 European Social Survey
Portugal: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Puerto Rico: 2005 World Religion Database
Qatar: 2004 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Republic of Congo: 2005 Demographic and Health Survey
Republic of Macedonia: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Reunion: 2005 World Religion Database

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Romania: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Russia: Based on ethnicity data in 2002 Census. Obtained from Heleniak, Timothy. “ ‘Table 4: Russia’s Ethnic Muslim Population by Region, 1989 and 2002,’ Regional Distribution of the Muslim Population of Russia.” Eurasian Geography and Economics. Volume 47, No. 4. 2006.
Rwanda: 2002 Census. Obtained from “Table TA06E. Distribution of the Resident Population in Ordinary Households by Religious affiliation, Urban/Rural Residence and by Sex.” The Rwanda 2002 Census of Population and Housing. Rwanda: National Census Service, 2004. <http://www. statisticsrwanda.gov.rw/TablesEnglish/TA06E.htm>
St. Helena: 1987 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
St. Kitts and Nevis: 1991 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
St. Lucia: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
St. Pierre and Miquelon: 2005 World Religion Database
St. Vincent and the Grenadines: 2005 World Religion Database
Samoa: 2001 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.
San Marino: 2005 World Religion Database
Sao Tome and Principe: 2005 World Religion Database
Saudi Arabia: 2003 World Values Survey
Senegal: 2006 Demographic and Health Survey
Serbia: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Seychelles: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Sierra Leone: 2004 Census. Obtained from “Table 1.9: Percentage distribution of Heads by Religion by Region and Residence.” Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey (SLIHS) 2003/04. Government of Sierra Leone, 2007. <http://www.statistics.sl/SLIHS_REPORT.pdf> (PDF)
Singapore: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Slovakia: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Slovenia: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.

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Solomon Islands: 1999 Census. Obtained from “Table P01-3: Relationship, Ethnicity, and Religion by Province of Enumeration, Solomon Islands: 1999.” Solomon Islands 1999 Census. PacificWeb. org. <http://www.pacificweb.org/DOCS/Other%20P.I/SolomonIs/Si1999/PROVINCE.doc> (PDF)
Somalia: 2005 World Religion Database
South Africa: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
South Korea: 2005 Census. Obtained from personal email correspondence with United Nations Statistics Division.
Spain: 2006 European Social Survey
Sri Lanka: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Sudan: 2005 World Religion Database
Suriname: 2005 World Religion Database
Swaziland: 2006 Demographic and Health Survey
Sweden: 2006 European Social Survey
Switzerland: 2000 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Syria: 2005 World Religion Database
Taiwan: 2006 World Values Survey
Tajikistan: 2005 World Religion Database
Tanzania: 2004 Demographic and Health Survey
Thailand: 2009 estimate by Aree Jampaklay, a consultant to the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, Thailand. Estimate adjusts for a probable census undercount of Muslims in southern Thailand.
Timor-Leste: 2005 World Religion Database
Togo: 1998 Demographic and Health Survey
Tokelau: 2006 Census. Obtained from “‘Table 2.5: Lotu i te Fenua e Mahani Nofo ai (Religion by Atoll of Usual Residence),’ Tabular Report, Section 2, Social Profile.” Tokelau 2006 Census of Population and Dwellings. Statistics New Zealand and the Office of the Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau, 2006. <http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tk/stats/Reports/2006censusrpts/2006%20 Census%20Tabular%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf> (PDF)

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Tonga: 2001 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Trinidad and Tobago: 2000 Census. Obtained from “Non-Institutional Population: Religion.” Trinidad and Tobago 2000 Census: 2007 Pocket Digest. Central Statistical Office, 2007. <http:// cso.gov.tt/files/cms/Pocket%20Digest%202007.pdf> (PDF)
Tunisia: 2005 World Religion Database
Turkey: Carkoglu, Ali and Binnaz, Toprak. Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey. Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation Publications, 2006.
Turkmenistan: 2000 Demographic and Health Survey. Obtained from “Table 3.2: Residence, ethnicity, and religion by region.” Turkmenistan Demographic and Health Survey 2000. Calverton, Maryland: Gurbansoltan Eje Clinical Research Center for Maternal and Child Health (GECRCMCH) and ORC Macro; Turkmenistan: Ministry of Health and Medical Industry. Calverton, Maryland: GECRCMCH and ORC Macro, 2001. NOTE: The DHS dataset for Turkmenistan has never been released, but data on religious affiliation was included in the text of the DHS report cited here.
Turks and Caicos Islands: 1990 Census. Obtained from World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition.
Tuvalu: 2005 World Religion Database
Uganda: 2002 Census. Obtained from United Nations Demographic Yearbook.
Ukraine: 2007 Demographic and Health Survey
United Arab Emirates: 2005 World Religion Database
United Kingdom: England and Wales: 2001 Census. Obtained from “Table KS07: Religion.” United Kingdom 2001 Census: England and Wales. London: Office for National Statistics, 2001. <http://www.ons.gov. uk/census/index.html> Scotland: 2001 Census. Obtained from “Table T25: Theme Table on Current Religion, Scotland.” United Kingdom 2001 Census: Scotland. General Register Office for Scotland, 2002. <http:// www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/files/theme24-55.xls#T25!a1> (Excel file) and <http://www.groscotland.gov.uk/census/censushm/scotcen2/index-of-census-results.html> Northern Ireland: 2001 Census. Obtained from “Table T30: Theme Table on Religion.” United Kingdom 2001 Census: Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2004. <http://www.nisranew.nisra.gov.uk/census/pdf/theme_tables.pdf> (PDF) and <http://www. nisranew.nisra.gov.uk/census/start.html> (Several sources were used for the United Kingdom estimate.)
Uruguay: 2005 World Religion Database

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United States: Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream. Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center, 2007. <http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf> (PDF) Uzbekistan: 2002 Demographic and Health Survey Vanuatu: 1999 Census. Obtained from “Table D: The three most common religious groups by province”; “Table 2.10: Population by religion and island of residence.” 1999 Population and Housing Census. Vanuatu National Statistics Office, 2001. Vatican City: 2005 World Religion Database Venezuela: 2005 World Religion Database Vietnam: 2005 World Religion Database U.S. Virgin Islands: 2005 World Religion Database Wallis and Futuna: 2005 World Religion Database Western Sahara: 2005 World Religion Database Yemen: 2005 World Religion Database Zambia: 2000 Census. Obtained from “CSO, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, ‘Table 8: Population percentage distribution of religion by sex.’ ” International Human Rights Instruments: Core Document Forming part of the Reports of State Parties Zambia, Zambia 2000 Census. United Nations, 2004. <http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:Hyqbhl5z-4cJ:www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ doc.nsf/0/acd8c3e025cdebb7c1257054002dcfa5/%24FILE/G0540810.DOC+Burundi+1990+ce nsus+and+religion&cd=23&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> Zimbabwe: 2006 Demographic and Health Survey

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Appendix D: Advisers and Consultants

Project Advisers
Mohamed Ayad, Macro International, Demographic & Health Surveys John Casterline, Ohio State University Carl Haub, Population Reference Bureau Amaney Jamal, Princeton University Charles Westoff, Princeton University Peter Xenos, University of Hawaii at Manoa Tukufu Zuberi, University of Pennsylvania
Consultants
Below is the list of demographers and social scientists with whom the Pew Forum consulted to arrive at the estimates included in this report as well as the growth rate and future population size estimates that will appear in a forthcoming report. Most were working in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of their institution or organization.
All Muslim population estimates were arrived at using multiple sources and may not be identical to the estimates used or suggested by a particular country expert.
Niveen ME Abu-Rmeileh, Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University, West Bank, Palestinian territories (Country Focus: Palestinian territories)
Victor Agadjanian, Arizona State University, Tempe, Ariz. (Country Focus: Kazakhstan)
Tauseef Ahmed, Freelance Consultant in Population and Reproductive Health, Pakistan (Country Focus: Pakistan)
Ahmed Mohamed Al-Haddad, Population Studies and Training Center, Sana’a University, Yemen (Country Focus: Yemen)
Yousef Hayder Nimer Al-Madi, Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Syria (Country Focus: Syria and Palestinians living in Syria and Lebanon)
Evi Nurvidya Arifin, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (Country Focus: Indonesia)

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M’hamed Ayed, Tunisia (Country Focus: Tunisia)
Jennifer B. Barrett, Department of Sociology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Country Focus: Uzbekistan)
Cem Behar, Bogaziçi University, Turkey (Country Focus: Turkey) ˘
Ali Çarkoglu, Sabancı University, Turkey (Country Focus: Turkey) ˘
Rufat Efendiyev, Institute of Economy, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan (Country Focus: Azerbaijan)
Karl Feld, Zarlasht Mirbacha, David Peng and John Willingham, D3 Systems, Inc., Vienna, Va. (Country Focus: Afghanistan)
Robert W. Hefner, Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs, Boston University, Boston, Mass. (Country Focus: Indonesia)
Timothy Heleniak, Department of Geography, University of Maryland, College Park, Md. (Country Focus: Russia)
Mohammad Irfan, International Institute of Islamic Economics, International Islamic University, Pakistan (Country Focus: Pakistan)
Aree Jampaklay and Sureeporn Punpuing, The Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidal University, Thailand (Country Focus: Thailand)
M.A. Muqtedar Khan, University of Delaware, Newark, Del. (Regional Focus: Middle East and South Asia)
Khalid Khawaja, Arab Institute for Training and Research in Statistics, Jordan (Country Focus: Jordan)
Rshood M. Khraif, King Saud University, Saudi Arabia (Country Focus: Saudi Arabia)
Barkat-e-Khuda, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, with Nurul Alam, International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (Country Focus: Bangladesh)
Ali Kouaouci, University of Batna, Algeria, and University of Montreal, Canada (Country Focus: Algeria)
Idrissa Alichina Kourgueni, Centre International D’Etudes et De Recherches Sur Les Populations Africaines, Niger (Country Focus: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger)
Jianxin Li, Department of Sociology, Peking University, China (Country Focus: China)

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Aslam Mahmood, Centre for the Study of Regional Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India (Country Focus: India)
Gisele Maynard-Tucker, Center for the Study of Women, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif. (Country Focus: Guinea)
Khaleel Mohammed, San Diego State University, San Diego, Calif. (Country Focus: Argentina, Brazil and Guyana)
Khan Mohammad Mohsin, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh (Country Focus: Bangladesh)
Abdul Ghaffar Mughal, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif., and South and East European University, Republic of Macedonia (Country Focus: Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan)
Mohamed Nimer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C. (Country Focus: United States)
Martha Brill Olcott, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. (Country Focus: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
Zahia Ouadah-Bedidi, Institut National d’Études Démographiques, France (Country Focus: Libya and Morocco)
Kolawole Azeez Oyediran, John Snow Incorporated, Nigeria; with Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman, Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and Sama’ila Madaki Yusuf, USAID/ACCESS-JHPIEGO, Nigeria (Country Focus: Nigeria)
Farzaneh Roudi, Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C. (Country Focus: Iran)
Abdul Majid Salleh, Independent Consultant, Malaysia, with Wan Hashim Wan Jaffar, Independent Consultant, Malaysia (Country Focus: Malaysia)
Hussein Abdel-Aziz Sayed, Cairo University, Egypt (Country Focus: Egypt)
Vegard Skirbekk, Marcin Stonawski and Samir KC, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria; Bilal Barakat and Anne Goujon, Vienna Institute of Demography, Austria; Eric Kaufmann, Birkbeck College, University of London, United Kingdom; and Erling Lundevaller, Umeå University, Sweden (Country Focus: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden)
Eldaw Abdalla Suliman, Dubai Health Authority, United Arab Emirates (Country Focus: Sudan)
Charles H. Teller, Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C., and Institute for Population Studies, Ethiopia (Country Focus: Ethiopia)

Advisers and Consultants

www.pewforum.org

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Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life / Mapping the Global Muslim Population
Peter Xenos, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii (Country Focus: Philippines) Guiping Yang, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, United Kingdom, and Department of Philosophy and Religious Study, Central University of Nationalities in China, China; with Yinan Chen, Lixin Zhang, Siying Zhang, Qiang Zhen and Meng Zhu, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, China (Country Focus: China) Farhat Yusuf, Department of Business, Macquarie University, Australia (Country Focus: Australia, Canada and New Zealand)

Advisers and Consultants

www.pewforum.org

59

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Executive Order- Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals
EXECUTIVE ORDER
PROTECTING THE NATION FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS BY FOREIGN NATIONALS
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) (INA), and section 301 oftitle 3, United States Code, and to protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Purpose. The visa-issuance process plays a crucial role in detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering the United States. Perhaps in no instance was that more apparent than with the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 200 1, when State Department policy prevented consular officers from properly scrutinizing the visa applications of several of the 19 foreign nationals who went on to murder nearly 3,000 Americans. And while the visa-issuance process was reviewed and amended after the September 11 attacks to better detect would-be terrorists from receiving visas, these measures did not stop attacks by foreign nationals who were 'admitted to the United States.
Hundreds of foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorismrelated crimes since September 11 , 2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States after claiming asylum; after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas; or through the U.S. refugee resettlement program. Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter our country. The United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism.
In order to protect Americans, we must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward our country and its founding principles. We cannot, and should not, admit into our country those who do not support the U.S. Constitution, or those who would place violent religious edicts over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry and hatred (including "honor" killings, other forms of violence against women, or the persecution of those who practice other religions) or those who would oppress members of one race, one gender, or sexual orientation.
Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to: (a) protect our citizens from foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and
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(b) prevent the admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit United States immigration laws for malevolent purposes.
Sec. 3. Suspension ofIssuance of Visas and Other Immigration Benefits to Nationals of Countries ofParticular Concern. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately conduct a review to determine the information needed from any country for adjudication of any visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) adequate to determine that the individual seeking the benefit is who the individual claims to be and is not a security or public-safety threat.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the review described in subsection (a), including the Secretary of Homeland Security's determination of the information needed for adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 30 days of the date of this order (excluding those foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, and C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy of the report to the Secretary of State and Director of National Intelligence.
(c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens to relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure.the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening of foreign nationals, and to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent the terrorist or criminal infiltration of foreign nationals, pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA I hereby find that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries designated pursuant to Division 0, Title II, Section 203 of the 2016 consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2029, P.L. 114-113), would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons for 30 days from the date of this order.
(d) Immediately upon receipt of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the information needed for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request all foreign governments that do not supply such information to start providing such information regarding their nationals within 60 days of notification.
(e) After the 60-day period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended fo r inclusion on a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of foreign nationals (excluding those foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, and C2 visas for travel to the United Nations) from countries that do not provide the information requested pursuant to subsection (d) of this order until compliance occurs.
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(t) At any point after submitting the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security may submit to the President the names of any additional countries recommended for similar treatment.
(g) Notwithstanding a suspension pursuant to subsection (c) of this section or pursuant to a Presidential proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may, on a case-by-case basis, and when in the national interest, issue visas or other immigration benefits to nationals of countries for which visas and benefits are otherwise blocked.
(h) The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall submit to the President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 30 days of the date ofthis order, a second report within 60 days of the date ofthis order, a third report within 90 days of the date of this order, and a fourth report within 120 days of the date of this order.
Sec. 4. Implementing Uniform Screening Standards for all Immigration Programs.(a) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation shall implement a program during the adjudication process for immigration benefits to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis, with the intent to cause harm, or who are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission . This program will include the development of uniform screening standards and procedures, such as in-person interviews; the creation of a database of identity documents proffered by applicants to ensure that duplicate documents are not used by multiple applicants; amended application forms that include questions aimed at identifying fraudulent answers and malicious intent; a mechanism to ensure that the applicant is who the applicant claims to be; a process to evaluate the applicant's likelihood of becoming a positive contributing member of society, and the applicant's ability to make contributions to the national interest; and, a mechanism to assess whether or not the applicant has the intent to commit criminal or terrorist acts after entering the United States.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in conj unction with the Secretary of State, Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the President an initial report on the progress ofthis directive within 60 days of the date of this order, a second report within 100 days of the date of this order, and a third report within 200 days of the date ofthis order.
Sec. 5. Realignment ofthe US. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 201 7. (a) The Secretary of State shall suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120 days. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall review the USRAP application and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures can be taken to ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional procedures. Refugee applicants who are already in the USRAP process may be admitted upon the initiation and completion of these revised procedures. Upon the date that is 120 days after this order, the Secretary of
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State shall resume USRAP admissions only for nationals of countries for whom the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality. Where necessary and appropriate, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall recommend legislation to the President to assist with such prioritization.
(c) The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, as appropriate, shall cease refugee processing of and the admittance of nationals of Syria as refugees until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes have been made to the USRAP to ensure its alignment with the national interest.
(d) Notwithstanding any previous Presidential determination regarding the number of refugee admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may only process and admit a total of 50,000 refugees during Fiscal Year 2017. During the 120-day suspension provided by section 5(a), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall initiate appropriate consultations in connection with this determination, including with respect to the allocation among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States.
(f) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis when in the national interest. Further, during the temporary suspension period described in subsection (a), the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may continue to process as refugees those refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality.
(g) The Secretary of State shall submit to the President an initial report on the progress of the directive in subsection (b) of this section regarding prioritization of claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution within 100 days of the date of this order and shall submit a second report within 200 days of the date of this order.
Sec. 6. Establishment ofSafe Zones to Protect Vulnerable Syrian Populations. Pursuant to the cessation of refugee processing for Syrian nationals, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, is directed within 90 days of the date of this order to produce a plan to provide safe areas in Syria and in the surrounding region in which Syrian nationals displaced from their homeland can await firm settlement, such as repatriation or potential third-country resettlement.
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Sec. 7. Rescission ofExercise ofAuthority Relating to the Terrorism Grounds of Inadmissibility. The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, consider rescinding the exercises of authority in section 212 of the INA relating to the terrorism grounds of inadmissibility, as well as any related implementing memoranda..
Sec. 8. Expedited Completion ofthe Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall expedite the completion and implementation of a biometric entry-exit tracking system for all travelers to the United States, as recommended by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President periodic reports on the progress of the directive contained in subsection (a) of this section. The initial report shall be submitted within 100 days of the date of this order, a second report shall be submitted within 200 days of the date of this order, and a third report shall be submitted within 365 days of the date ofthis order. Further, the Secretary shall submit a report every 180 days thereafter until the system is fully deployed and operational.
Sec. 9. Visa Interview Security. (a) The Secretary of State shall immediately suspend the Visa Interview Waiver Program and ensure compliance with section 222 of the INA, which requires that all individuals seeking a nonimmigrant visa, undergo an in-person interview, subject to specific statutory exceptions.
(b) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State shall immediately expand the Consular Fellows Program, including by substantially increasing the number of Fellows, lengthening or making permanent the period of service, and making language training at the Foreign Service Institute available to Fellows for assignment to posts outside of their area of core linguistic ability, to ensure that non-immigrant visa interview wait times are not unduly affected.
Sec. 10. Visa Validity Reciprocity. The Secretary of State shall review all nonimmigrant visa reciprocity agreements to ensure that they are, with respect to each visa classification, truly reciprocal insofar as practicable with respect to validity period and fees, as urged by sections 221 (c) and 281 of the INA, and other treatment. If a country does not treat U.S. nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas in a reciprocal manner, the Secretary of State shall adjust the visa validity period, fee schedule, or other treatment to match the treatment of U.S. nationals by the foreign country, to the extent practicable.
Sec. 11. Transparency and Data Collection. To be more transparent with the American people, and in order to more effectively implement policies and practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, consistent with applicable law, collect and make publicly available within 180 days, and every 180 days thereafter:
(a) information regarding the number of foreign-born individuals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related offenses; convicted of terrorism-related offenses; or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity,
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affiliation, or material support to a terrorism-related organization, or any other national security reasons; (b) information regarding the number offoreign-born individuals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and engaged in terrorismrelated acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States; and (c) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women or honor killings by foreign-born individuals in the United States. Sec. 12. General Provisions.(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.; Plaintiffs,
v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.;
Defendants.

No. 1:17-cv-00120(AJT/IDD)

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................................. 2
I. The Immigration and Nationality Act...............................................................................................2 II. The Revoked Order ............................................................................................................................. 4 III. Litigation Challenging the Revoked Order.......................................................................................4 IV. The Order..............................................................................................................................................5
A. The Order’s Temporary Entry Suspension..............................................................................6 B. The Order’s Waiver Provision...................................................................................................7 V. Litigation Concerning the Order ....................................................................................................... 8 STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................................................................................................8 ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................................9 I. Plaintiffs Do Not Allege Any Harm That Requires Emergency Relief ....................................... 9 A. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Irreparable Harm Related To Visas
or Entries ....................................................................................................................................10 B. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Any Other Form of Irreparable
Harm. ........................................................................................................................................... 12 II. Plaintiff’s Do Not Clearly Demonstrate They Are Likely to Succeed
on the Merits.......................................................................................................................................14 A. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Order Are Not Justiciable .......................................................14 B. The Order is a Valid Exercise of the President’s Authority................................................16
1. The Order falls squarely within the President’s broad authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)..................................................................................16
2. Section 1152 does not prevent the President from suspending the entry of nationals from the designated foreign countries ......................................17
3. Section 1182(a) does not prevent the President from suspending the entry of nationals from the designated countries ....................................................20
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Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 22 Filed 03/17/17 Page 3 of 35 PageID# 680 4. The Order Does Not Discriminate on the Basis of Religion.......................................21 a. The Order Draws Distinctions on the Basis of Risk, not Religion.........................22 b. The Order Cannot be Restrained on the Basis of Campaign Statements..............24
III. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weigh Strongly Against Injunctive Relief. ...................................................................................................................................................28
IV. The Facial Sweeping Relief Sought is Unwarranted. ....................................................................30 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 30
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INTRODUCTION Consistent with the Executive’s broad constitutional authority over foreign affairs and national security, Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) of Title 8 expressly authorize the President to restrict or suspend entry of any class of aliens when in the national interest. Exercising that authority, the President issued Executive Order (“E.O.”) No. 13,780 (“Order”), which temporarily suspends (i) entry of certain foreign nationals from six countries that Congress and the previous Administration determined pose a heightened terrorism risk and (ii) processing of refugee applications. 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Those suspensions apply only for a short period, to enable the new Administration to review screening and vetting procedures to ensure that they adequately detect terrorists. For the past 30 years, every President has invoked his power to protect the interests of the United States by suspending the entry of categories of aliens. As a legal matter, the Order is no different. The Order replaces former Executive Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017) (“Revoked Order”).1 After the Ninth Circuit declined to stay a nationwide injunction against the Revoked Order, the President decided to develop a new Order that was more narrowly tailored to meet the articulable national security risks and that also addressed judicial concerns, rather than engaging in protracted litigation. Unlike the Revoked Order, the Order applies only to aliens outside the United States who lack a visa—individuals who “ha[ve] no constitutional rights regarding” their admission. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Even as to them, the Order includes a comprehensive waiver process to mitigate undue hardships. It also eliminates any priority in refugee admissions based on religious minority persecution. On its face and in practice, the Order is only about protecting those in the United States from risks posed by some foreign nationals. These changes are fatal to plaintiffs’ claims. First, plaintiffs have not alleged any irreparable harm that would be suffered during the period of a TRO; and indeed, their allegations of harm are so scant that plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable.
1 The Order’s terms revoked E.O. 13,769 at 12:01 AM on March 16, 2017. See Order § 13. 1

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Plaintiffs allege that the Order imposes a stigmatic injury as “a state-sponsored religious message.” Pls. TRO Mot., ECF No. 13 (“Mot.”), at 13. But even assuming this were true, controlling precedent is clear that an abstract, stigmatic injury alone is insufficient to confer Article III standing. Nor have plaintiffs described any injury that is concrete, certain, and impending from application of the Order’s visa provisions: by its terms, the Order does not apply to any of the plaintiffs themselves. And their claimed injuries regarding the travel of family members rely on layers of speculation about future events, including both the denial of the waivers provided for in the Order and those persons’ ability to obtain a visa (which is a privilege, not a right) in the absence of the Order.
Second, the changes to the Order foreclose plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. Two separate provisions of the immigration laws grant the President broad authority plainly encompassing the Order’s entry suspensions. As a constitutional matter, the Order does not cover any aliens with dueprocess rights with respect to entry, and the Order accords ample process through a waiver system. Nor does it discriminate on the basis of religion. Its text and purpose are explicitly religion-neutral.
Third, the changes to the Order eliminate any occasion to consider emergency relief. No immediate upheaval would occur as a result of the new Order taking effect. No visa will be revoked. No lawful permanent resident traveling abroad will be barred from returning. Nobody lawfully in the United States loses any prior ability to leave the country to travel and later return. And plaintiffs have identified no harm that will befall them at any time absent an injunction, which is not surprising, since plaintiffs raised many of the same allegations in their original complaint six weeks ago and have not diligently sought to proceed with this lawsuit in the interim. There is no basis to restrain the Order temporarily, and certainly no basis to restrain it in its entirety. Plaintiffs’ motion should thus be denied.
BACKGROUND I. The Immigration and Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq., governs admission of aliens into
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the United States. Admission, aside from lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”), generally requires a valid immigrant or nonimmigrant visa (or another entry document, such as a refugee travel document). Id. §§1181, 1182(a)(7)(A)(i), (B)(i)(II), 1203. The process of obtaining a visa typically includes an inperson interview and results in a decision by a State Department consular officer. Id. §§1201(a)(1), 1202, 1204. Eligibility for a visa depends on many factors, including nationality. See, e.g., id. §§1184(e), 1735. While a visa allows an alien to seek admission, it does not guarantee admission if the alien, upon arriving, is found “inadmissible.” Id. §§1201(h), 1225(a).
Congress has created a Visa Waiver Program that enables nationals of participating countries to seek temporary admission for tourism or certain business purposes without a visa. 8 U.S.C. §§1182(a)(7)(B)(iv), 1187. In 2015, however, Congress excluded from the Program individuals with connections to specific countries. Id. §1187(a)(12). Congress itself specifically excluded nationals of countries participating in the Program who are dual nationals of or had recently visited Iraq or Syria, where “[t]he Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) … maintain[s] a formidable force,” and nationals of and recent visitors to countries designated by the Secretary of State as state sponsors of terrorism (currently Iran, Sudan, and Syria).2 8 U.S.C. §1187(a)(12)(A)(i)-(ii); Congress also authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to designate additional countries of concern, considering whether a country is a “safe haven for terrorists,” “whether a foreign terrorist organization has a significant presence” in the country, and “whether the presence of an alien in the country … increases the likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to” U.S. national security, id. §1187(a)(12)(D)(i)-(ii). And in February 2016 DHS excluded recent visitors to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, noting that the designation was “indicative of the Department’s continued focus on the threat of foreign fighters.”3 In short, Congress and the prior Administration determined that the conditions
2 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 6 (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/258249.pdf. 3 https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/18/dhs-announces-further-travel-restrictions-visa-waiver-program.
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in these seven countries warranted individualized review in admitting aliens into our Nation’s borders. Critically, Congress also has accorded the Executive broad discretion to suspend entry of
aliens. First, Section 1182(f) provides: Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.
Second, Section 1185(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an alien to enter or attempt to enter the country “except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” See also E.O. 13323 (delegating authority to DHS). II. The Revoked Order
On January 27, 2017, the President issued the Revoked Order. It directed the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State to assess current screening procedures to determine whether they were sufficient to detect individuals who were seeking to enter this country to do it harm. Revoked Order §3(a)-(b). While that review was ongoing, the Revoked Order suspended for 90 days entry of foreign nationals of the seven countries already identified as posing heightened terrorism-related concerns in the context of the Visa Waiver Program. Id. §3(c). It authorized the Secretaries, however, to make case-by-case exceptions to the suspension. Id. §3(g).
The Revoked Order similarly directed a review of the Refugee Program, and, pending that review, suspended admission under the Program for 120 days, subject to case-by-case waivers. Revoked Order §5(a). In addition, it sought to assist victims of religious persecution by directing agencies to prioritize refugee claims premised on religious-based persecution, provided the religion at issue was “a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” Id. §5(b). III. Litigation Challenging the Revoked Order
The Revoked Order was challenged in multiple courts. In this Court, certain aliens denied
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entry to the United States at Dulles Airport initiated litigation, in which the Commonwealth of Virginia subsequently intervened. See generally Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-116 (LMB/TCB), --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 580855, (Feb. 13, 2017). Alleging that the Revoked Order violated the Establishment Clause, Virginia then sought to enjoin the Revoked Order, identifying 350 students attending state universities and faculty members for whom the Revoked Order “affects international travel,” and an estimated “$20.8 million in lost tuition and fees” to the institutions . Id. at *2-*3. A judge of this Court then found that Virginia had standing, had satisfied the four-part test for a preliminary injunction set forth in Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008), and enjoined the 90-day suspension of entry as to any “person who has a Virginia residence or is employed by or attends an educational institution administered by [] Virginia” and is an LPR or valid visa holder. Id. at *11. A district court in the Ninth Circuit, meanwhile, enjoined the same provision nationwide, along with the refugee provisions of § 5 of the Revoked Order, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit declined to stay the injunction pending appeal. See Wash. v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Wash. v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). After issuance of the Order, the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc to consider vacatur; a published dissent joined by 5 judges, however, observed that the panel’s holding “is simply irreconcilable” with Supreme Court precedent and therefore would have stayed the district court’s TRO and subsequently vacated the panel opinion. Wash. v. Trump, ---F.3d---, 2017 WL 992527 at *6, *7, *9 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2017) (Bybee, J.). (“9th Cir. Mar. 15 Dissent”).
IV. The Order. In Washington, the Ninth Circuit invited the “political branches” to act, “as far better equipped” than courts to revise the Revoked Order. 847 F.3d 1167. Responding to this judicial invitation, on March 6, 2017—at the joint urging of the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security4— the President issued the Order, which revoked the Revoked Order, and replaced it with substantially
4 Joint Ltr. to President (Mar. 6, 2017),https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 17_0306_S1_DHS-DOJ-POTUS-letter_0.pdf
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revised provisions that address the concerns raised by judges of this and other courts. In addition, the President narrowed the scope of the temporary suspension on travel to six countries, excluding Iraq.
A. The Order’s Temporary Entry Suspension The Order’s central, explicit purpose is to enable the President and his Administration to assess whether current screening and vetting procedures are sufficient to detect terrorists seeking to enter the Nation. Order §1(f). To facilitate that important review, the President ordered a temporary, 90-day pause on entry of certain foreign nationals from six nations previously “identified as presenting heightened concerns about terrorism and travel to the United States” by Congress or the prior Administration: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Id. §1(a), (d)-(f). The Order excludes Iraq from the temporary suspension on travel, noting that “the Iraqi government has expressly undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing, and the return of Iraqi nationals subject to final orders of removal” since the Executive issued the Revoked Order. Id. § 1(g). In response to the judicial rulings, moreover, the Order provides that the suspension applies only to aliens who: (1) are outside the United States on the Order’s effective date, (2) do not have a valid visa on that date, and (3) did not have a valid visa on the effective date of the Revoked Order. Order §3(a). It expressly excludes other categories of aliens that concerned courts, including any LPR, any foreign national admitted to or paroled into the United States, and any foreign national granted asylum, any refugee already admitted to the United States, or any person granted certain protections from removal. See id. §3(b). Consequently, an alien who is in the U.S. on the Order’s effective date (for example, on a single-entry visa, Mot. at 15) and leaves will not be subject to the Order’s temporary suspension in seeking a new visa or upon return; instead, he will be subject to pre-existing rules governing admission. The Order also explains that each of the six countries “is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones,” which is why Congress and DHS previously designated them “countries of concern.” Id. §1(b)(1); (d). The
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Order details the circumstances of each country that give rise to “heightened risk[s]” that terrorists from those countries would attempt to enter the United States and that those countries’ governments may lack the “willingness or ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States” to screen them properly. Order §1(d)-(e).
B. The Order’s Waiver Provision The order permits consular officers to grant case-by-case waivers to § 3 where denying entry “would cause undue hardship” and “entry would not pose a threat to national security and would be in the national interest.” Order § 3(c). Moreover, it lists circumstances where waivers could be considered, including for (among others): • foreign nationals previously “admitted to the United States for a continuous period of work, study, or other long-term activity,” but who are currently outside the U.S. and seeking to reenter; • individuals who seek entry for “significant business or professional obligations and the denial of entry would impair those obligations”; and • individuals who seek entry “to visit or reside with a close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent) who is a [U.S.] citizen, [LPR], or alien lawfully admitted on a valid nonimmigrant visa.” Id. These provisions expand significantly on the Revoked Order’s waiver provisions. The Order also specifies that requests for waivers will be processed “as part of the visa issuance process.” Order §3(c); see also DHS, Q&A: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry … (Mar. 6, 2017));5 U.S. Dep’t of State, Executive Order on Visas (Mar. 6, 2017).6 Consular officers reviewing visa applications from otherwise-eligible applicants will carefully review each request under these criteria and may consider other appropriate circumstances that are not enumerated in the Order.7
5 https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/03/06/qa-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entryunited-states 6 See https:/travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/news/important-announcement.html (as revised). 7 The Order contains a number of other provisions, which plaintiffs do not discuss in their TRO motion, even though a moving party must “demonstrate[], with respect to each claim, that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.” N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008). Significantly, the Order directs an immediate review of the
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V. Litigation Concerning the Order. In the District of Hawaii, the State of Hawaii and an American citizen challenged the Order and the Court entered a nationwide TRO as to sections 2 and 6 of the Order. That court found that the citizen, Dr. Elshikh, had standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim based on “official condemnation” of his religious views, the “deeply sadden[ing]” effect on him, and his statement that he “will not be able to associate as freely with those of other faiths.” Haw. v. Trump, 2017 WL 1011673, at *9-*10 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017). The Court then concluded that, under Ninth Circuit case law, it would credit campaign-related statements made by the President and his advisers as relevant “historical background” for the Order, and found a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at *13-*16. In the District of Maryland, six individuals and three refugee organizations challenged the Order and the Court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction as to section 2(c) of the Order. Int’l Refugee Assist. Proj. (“IRAP”) v. Trump, 2017 WL 1018235 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017). That Court held that several individual plaintiffs had standing to bring claims, and that those plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Establishment Clause claims, and also held that Section 1182(f) permitted the President to bar entry, but not immigrant visa issuance, based on nationality.
STANDARD OF REVIEW “The standard for granting either a TRO or a preliminary injunction is the same.” Moore v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va. 2006). Both “are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). The movant “must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
Refugee Program’s processes to determine “what additional procedures should be used to ensure that individuals seeking admission as refugees do not pose a threat” to the country. Order §6(a). To facilitate that review, the Order suspends Refugee Program travel for 120 days, noting that “[t]errorist groups have sought to infiltrate severeal nations through refugee programs.” Id. §1(b)(iii). Unlike the Revoked Order, the Order does not prioritize refugee claims based on persecution against religious minorities. Compare Revoked Order at § 5(b).
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relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that [a TRO] is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The movant bears the burden as to all “four requirements, each of which must be satisfied.” Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 345-47 (4th Cir. 2009) (reinstated in relevant part after vacatur, 607 F.3d 355). Injunctive relief that “deeply intrudes into the core concerns of the executive branch”—including foreign affairs and national security—may be awarded only upon “an extraordinarily strong showing” on each element. Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954- (D.C. Cir. 1978).
“Facial challenges are disfavored” compared to as-applied challenges. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Repub. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51 (2008). They are thus “the most difficult challenge[s] to mount successfully.” U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Plaintiffs bear a “heavy burden” to show “that no set of circumstances exists under which the [Order] would be valid.” Id.; U.S. v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2010) (facial challenge must fail “if a statute has a plainly legitimate sweep”).

ARGUMENT Plaintiffs do not come close to meeting their extraordinary burden. At the outset, they present no imminent, irreparable harm that requires emergency relief; and indeed, no concrete, nonspeculative injury that would satisfy Article III’s justiciability requirements at all. Moreover, plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits. The Order falls well within the President’s statutory authority, applies only to individuals outside the country who do not have a valid visa, includes no religious preference, and includes the national security rationales identified by this Court in Aziz as lacking in the Revoked Order. Plaintiffs are therefore not entitled to the sweeping relief they seek.

I.

Plaintiffs Do Not Allege Any Harm That Requires Emergency Relief.

To secure a TRO or preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show “irreparable harm” absent

such relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Such harm must be “neither remote nor speculative, but actual and

imminent.” Direx Israel v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991). The irreparable

harm standard “erects a very high bar for a movant,” Henke v. Dep’t of Interior, 842 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59

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(D.D.C. 2012), with a threshold well above the injury required for Article III standing. See, e.g., Taylor v. Res. Tr. Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1508, amended, 66 F.3d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal. For Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991).
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Irreparable Harm Related To Visas or Entries. Three of the plaintiffs who allege harm stemming from the visa process do so in an apparent misunderstanding of the Order. John Does #2 and #3 both allege that they are students present in the United States on a valid visa, and then allege harms related to a future entry to the United States or future visa renewal. But the Order is explicit: the temporary suspension of entry “shall apply only to [those] who [] are outside the United States” or “do not have a valid visa.” Order § 3(a) (emphasis added). Individuals who are not subject to the temporary suspension of entry would continue not be subject to it even after they depart the U.S. or their visa expires. John Doe #5, meanwhile, rests his allegations on a pending marriage petition for his wife, who “has Sudanese citizenship through her parents although she has never lived in Sudan.” FAC ¶ 43, ECF No. 11. From this allegation, it appears John Doe #5’s wife is also outside the scope of the Order’s suspension of entry, which exempts “dual national[s]” traveling on a non-designated country’s passport, see Order § 3(b)(iv), such as a person whose only link to one of the six countries is inherited citizenship.8 Plaintiffs, John Does #2, #3, and #5 have therefore failed to identify any visas even covered by the Order. Three other plaintiffs who alleged visa or entry-related harms all fail to allege that such harms are actual, imminent, and would be expected to occur within the period of temporary, emergency relief. Plaintiff Elkarra vaguely alleges that his “Syrian in-laws” will be unable to visit him in the United States, but there is no suggestion that they have plans to travel within the pendency of the Order’s
8 Even if John Doe #5’s wife presents a passport of one of the six countries, action on her petition is not imminent. Based on the Apr. 2017 Visa Bulletin (the document produced by the Dept. of State to indicate visa availability), visa numbers in the second preference family category (applicable to LPRs) are available to those with priority dates before June 8, 2015, so even if her petition was approved today, there is a likely wait of several months before she could even apply for an immigrant visa.
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temporary, 90-day suspension period. Plaintiffs Ayloush and Soltani likewise make vague allegations
about unspecified “family in Iran” and Syria who are unable to visit. Such allegations are insufficient
because “[s]uch ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or … any
specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’
injury” required for standing, let alone the higher standard for irreparable harm. Friends for Ferrell Pkwy.
v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992)).
Nor can the remaining three plaintiffs who assert claims based on marriage petitions for their
spouses, establish they are likely to suffer imminent, irreparable harm. John Does #6 and #7 allege
that that they have filed marriage petitions for their wives and that those are pending, but they
acknowledge that the Order will not apply to their wives until some indefinite date in the future, if
“their marriage petitions are approved.” 9 Mot. at 7. Of course, their marriage petitions may not, and
may never be, approved, based on pre-Order standards that remain unchanged. Any injury is therefore
neither actual nor imminent, and does not meet the requirements for irreparable harm. Moreover,
courts have concluded that there is no standing based on the purported injury of a delay in visa
decision-making. See, e.g., Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, 622 F. Supp. 2d 865, 878-80 (N.D. Cal.
2008), aff’d 368 F. Appx. 750 (holding no standing and that claims were unripe); Kodra v. Sec’y, 903 F.
Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (no standing to challenge delay of visa determination).
John Doe #8 asserts that his marriage petition for his wife has been approved, and he claims
that her visa application will be “subject to a more onerous application process.” Mot. at 7. But that
9 USCIS processing times for I-130 petitions vary by the service center to which it is assigned, with a current average wait time of 5-7 months before processing. See https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/ processTimesDisplayInit.do. Thus, John Does #6 and 7 can reasonably face a wait of several more months before their wives could even apply for immigrant visas, the preprocessing and processing of which will take additional months. John Doe #7’s allegations in the Motion also contradict those in the Complaint in which he alleged that he “is married to a United States Citizen” (the First Amended Complaint makes no allegation of a pending petition). See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 33; compare Johnston v. Crawford, 2005 WL 6119881, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2005) (“Even by the lenient standards of federal notice pleading [before Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)], this claim is not pled in the complaint and is not properly asserted for the first time in the motion for a TRO.”)
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claim of harm ignores the waiver process. The Order specifically identifies circumstances like these as an example of where a waiver may be appropriate: a person who “seeks to enter the United States to . . . reside with . . . a spouse.” Order § 3(c)(iv). Contrary to his claims that seeking a waiver will be “onerous,” the Order integrates the grant of a waiver into the pre-existing consular visa interview process, as recently explained in further detail by the State Department:
We do not plan to cancel any previously scheduled visa appointments. After the new Executive Order goes into effect, any individual who believes he or she is eligible for a waiver or exemption should apply for a visa and disclose during the visa interview any information that might qualify the individual for a waiver/exemption. State Dep’t Alert (Mar. 6, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/news/importantannouncement.html. This integrated waiver process thus imposes no “delay” on John Doe #8’s family “reunification”, contrary to the finding of the IRAP court. 2017 WL 1018235 at *7. In sum, none of the plaintiffs can identify an actual or imminent harm that will occur through the visa or entry process. B. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Any Other Form of Irreparable Harm. Aside from the facially-inadequate harms to visas and admissions described above, plaintiffs’ remaining allegation of irreparable harm is that they will suffer a “stigmatic injury,” Mot. at 12-13, and that such injury is “unquestionably” irreparable. Mot. at 9 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). But plaintiffs’ perfunctory reliance on case law finding Establishment Clause injuries to be irreparable is of no avail here, because Plaintiffs have failed to describe an Establishment Clause harm sufficient for Article III standing, let alone an irreparable harm that would require emergency relief. Courts have been clear that these types of “allegations of stigmatic injury will not suffice to link a plaintiff personally to the conduct he challenges unless . . . the plaintiff personally has been denied a benefit,” Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and such allegations, thus, cannot form the basis for standing or irreparable harm. Rather, a government action that is alleged to confer “outsider status” must also directly impose “personal . . . claimed injuries [] traceable to the Defendants.” Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 2010) (“an ‘abstract stigmatic injury’
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resulting from such outsider status is insufficient to confer standing” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 755–56 (1984)).10 This principle, that standing requires stigmatic injury plus something more is
reflected in Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Dist. 7, the Fourth Circuit opinion on which plaintiffs rely. See 683
F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012). There, the Court of Appeals identified standing for a plaintiff family
who alleged “outsider” status and that they had personally received a letter from their school district
promoting a “course of religious education [with] Christian content,” and “prayers and other Christian
references [at] school events,” and that this forced them to change their conduct to avoid encounters
with their school.11 Id. The allegations beyond “stigmatic injury” that plaintiffs describe do not meet
these standards: a plaintiff’s own choice to, e.g., appear “on national media outlets,” to describe their
faith, Mot. at 6, is not equivalent to official action “den[ying] a benefit,” Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1141, or
“forc[ing] him repeatedly to encounter a religious belief he finds offensive.” Newdow, 598 F.3d at 642.12
Nor can plaintiffs demonstrate irreparable harm by asserting that they have engaged in
“assist[ance] and advoc[acy] on behalf of” individuals affected by the Revoked Order or by describing
“their religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets.” Mot. at 6. Plaintiffs’ own decisions
about how to spend their time in assistance, religious advocacy, and media appearances are their “own
10 Although the Government believes the determination that Dr. Elshikh in Hawaii v. Trump has standing is in error, it is also distinguishable from plaintiffs’ claims here. The Court in Hawaii applied Ninth Circuit precedent holding that “outsider status” plus a “chill[ing]” of “participation in the political community” satisfied Article III. See Hawaii at *10 (quoting Catholic League v. S.F., 624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010)). The Government likewise disagrees with the finding of standing for an Establishment Clause claim in the IRAP case, but even those plaintiffs pleaded personalized allegations of harm in excess of the plaintiffs here. See IRAP at 16-17 (relying on, e.g., IRAP plaintiffs’ “worries [about] safe[ty] in this country”).
11 In Cooper v. USPS, 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir. 2009), plaintiff likewise received a direct religious message as the government directly provided him a service. And in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the plaintiffs’ children were directly subject to in-class, state-sponsored prayers. 12 Here, too, plaintiffs’ allegation that this harm was “ongoing,” notwithstanding the nationwide injunction entered regarding the Revoked Order, is an indicator that plaintiffs’ allegations of “psychological and spiritual” injury are in fact those caused by “passionate disagreement premised on Establishment Clause principles” rather than “‘direct’ and ‘unwelcome’ contact with an alleged religious establishment within their community.” Moss, 683 F.3d at 605. Such abstract disagreement with policies does not satisfy the high bar for irreparable harm.
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decisions . . . and, therefore, [] indirect, self-inflicted, and not irreparable harm.” Safari Club Int’l v. Jewell, 47 F. Supp. 3d 29, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Penn. v. N.J., 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976)). In short, none of plaintiffs’ claims meet the extraordinary threshold required for emergency relief. II. Plaintiffs Do Not Clearly Demonstrate They Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits.
“[A] party seeking a preliminary injunction . . . must clearly show that it is likely to succeed on the merits.” Dewhurst v. Century Alum. Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011). This “requirement that the plaintiff clearly demonstrate that it will likely succeed on the merits is far stricter than” a “requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate only a grave or serious question for litigation.” Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347. Here, plaintiffs fail in multiple respects to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success.
A. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Order Are Not Justiciable. All of plaintiffs’ claims fail because they lack Article III standing or because their claims are not yet ripe. To have the standing required to satisfy Article III’s “case” or “controversy” requirement, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a “legally and judicially cognizable” injury. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997). At a minimum, this consists of a “concrete and particularized” injury caused by the Order that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. For the same reasons explained above, they have not shown injury-in-fact here. See supra Part I. Article III is not satisfied by an “abstract, stigmatic injury” without accompanying personal injuries directly traceable to the Defendants. See Kurtz, 829 F.2d 1141; Newdow 598 F.3d 643. The “some day” allegations of plaintiffs that they wish to have family visit from abroad, the speculation about future processing of visa applications (a stage in the admissions process only one plaintiff’s spouse has even reached), and plaintiffs’ own choices to engage in religious advocacy and outreach do not satisfy this standard. Nor can plaintiffs rely by analogy on equal protection cases, as they seek to do, see Mot. at 13-14 because the Fourth Circuit has established that “constraints of rationality imposed by the constitutional requirement of substantive due process and of nondiscrimination exacted by the equal protection
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component of the due process clause do not limit the federal government's power to regulate either immigration or naturalization.” Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 710 (4th Cir. 2000).
In addition, plaintiffs’ visa and admission related claims are not yet ripe. “The doctrine[] of... ripeness . . . originate[s] in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no less than standing does.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). Ripeness ensures that courts “avoid[] … premature adjudication,” particularly where future decisions or factual evolution may obviate the need for judicial relief or alter the character of the controversy. Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003). To avoid dismissal for lack of ripeness, plaintiff must show that “postponing review [] impose[s] a hardship . . . that is immediate, direct, and significant.” W.V. Highlands Conserv. v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 797, 801 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, for the reasons discussed above—plaintiffs’ marriage petitions have not yet been approved; plaintiffs’ family members have not yet applied for visas; visa interviews have not yet been scheduled; plaintiffs’ family members may be eligible for waivers—there is no hardship that is yet “immediate” or “direct,” nor is it likely there will be one within the 90-day suspension period in the Order.
Plaintiffs’ claims are also barred by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, under which the denial of a visa to an alien abroad is not subject to judicial review. See Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 184 n.3, 185 n.6 (1956); Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As another judge of this court has explained, “courts have consistently held that a consular officer’s decision to grant or deny a visa is not subject to judicial or administrative review [and] [i]mportantly, the doctrine of nonreviewability of consular officers’ visa determinations is essentially without exception.” Romero v. Consulate, 860 F. Supp. 319, 322 (E.D. Va. 1994). Some courts of appeals have recognized a “limited exception to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability where a U.S. citizen asserts a violation of a constitutional right.” Adeyemo v. Kerry, 2013 WL 498169, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2013), aff’d 546 F. App’x. 187 (4th Cir. 2013). But “[t]he Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue,”
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id., and adopting this exception for nationality-based classifications would be particularly inappropriate because “classifications on the basis of nationality are frequently unavoidable in immigration matters.” Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 435 (2d Cir. 2008).
B. The Order is a Valid Exercise of the President’s Authority. In any event, plaintiffs’ challenges to the Order are not likely to succeed on the merits. The Order’s temporary suspension of entry of certain classes of aliens during a review of the Nation’s screening and vetting procedures is a valid exercise of the President’s broad statutory authority to “suspend the entry of all aliens or of any class of aliens” (Sec. 1182(f)) and to prescribe the terms on which aliens may enter (Sec. 1185(a)(1)). And it is completely neutral with respect to religion.
1. The Order falls squarely within the President’s broad authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a).
“‘[T]he power to exclude aliens is inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches.’” Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). “Distinctions on the basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by the Congress or the Executive.” Narenji v. Civilette, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“So long as such distinctions are not wholly irrational they must be sustained”); cf. Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981) (“When the federal government classifies aliens on the basis of nationality, the classification must be sustained if it has a rational basis…. The United States is not bound to treat the nationals of unfriendly powers [] the same [as] friendly powers”). Here, Congress has conferred expansive authority on the President, including in two statutory provisions that the Order expressly invokes. Order §2(c).
First, Section 1182(f) provides that “[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or of any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants,” or “impose on the entry of aliens
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any restrictions he deems to be appropriate.” “The President’s sweeping proclamation power [under Section 1182(f)] provides a safeguard against the danger posed by any particular case or class of cases that is not covered by one of the [inadmissibility] categories in section 1182(a).” Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). Every President over the last thirty years has invoked that authority to suspend or restrict entry of certain classes of aliens.13
Second, Section 1185(a) broadly authorizes the “President” to “prescribe” reasonable “rules, regulations, and orders,” and “limitations and exceptions” regarding entry of aliens. That provision is the latest in a line of statutory grants of authority tracing back nearly a century. See Pub. L. No. 65154, §1(a), 40 Stat. 559 (1918). Originally limited to times of war or declared national emergency, Congress removed that limitation in 1978, when it enacted Section 1185(a) in its current form. Pub. L. 95-426, §707(a), 92 Stat. 963, 992-93 (1978).
Both of those provisions comfortably encompass the Order’s temporary suspension of entry of aliens from six countries that the President—in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security—concluded required special precautions while the review of existing screening and vetting protocols is completed. That temporary measure is a paradigmatic exercise of the President’s authority to “suspend the entry” of “any class of aliens” he finds may be “detrimental to the interests of the United States,” 8 U.S.C. §1182(f), and to prescribe reasonable “limitations” on entry, id. §1185(a)(1).
2. Section 1152 does not prevent the President from suspending the entry of nationals from the designated foreign countries.
Plaintiffs first contend that Section 1152(a)(1)(A), which prohibits discrimination on the basis
13 See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation (“Procl.”) 5517 (1986) (Reagan; Cuban nationals); E.O. 12,807 (1992) (George H.W. Bush; government officials who impeded anti-human-trafficking efforts); Procl. 8342 (2009) (George W. Bush; same); Procl. 6958 (1996) (Clinton; Sudanese government officials and armed forces); Procl. 8693 (2011) (Obama; aliens subject to U.N. Security Council travel bans). Plaintiffs contend that these actions did not “utilize[] this section in the manner done here,” Mot. at 27, but provide no further analysis. In fact, these examples are closely akin to the Order, relying on section 1182(f) to prevent entry of aliens partly or entirely based on nationality.
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of nationality in the allocation of immigrant visas, bars the President from drawing nationality-based distinctions under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a). Plaintiffs are wrong, and even if they were correct, it would not justify the broad relief plaintiffs seek because 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to aliens seeking “immigrant” visas. Id.; see IRAP at 20-24 (“the statutory language makes clear” that 1152(a) is so limited).14 Most of the aliens plaintiffs claim will be affected by the Order—students, employees, tourists, and family visiting relatives, like the family members of plaintiffs Ayloush and Elkarra— would seek to enter on nonimmigrant visas, and thus are not covered by Section 1152(a)(1)(A). Nor does the section apply to those entering under the Refugee Program, who do not receive visas.15 See 8 U.S.C. §1181(c). Plaintiffs thus cannot meet the “heavy burden” of the “no set of circumstances” or “plainly legitimate sweep” tests required by a facial challenge. Comstock, 627 F.3d 518. Rather, even if their reading of 1152(a)(1)(A) were correct, the Order would still be valid in most applications.
In any event, plaintiffs’ statutory argument is wrong. Section 1152(a)(1)(A)—enacted in 1965 to abolish the prior system of nationality-based quotas—governs only “the issuance of an immigrant visa” in the ordinary process of visas and admissions. It does not purport to, and has never been interpreted to restrict, the President’s longstanding authority to suspend entry of “any class of aliens” or to prescribe reasonable “rules, regulations, and orders” regarding entry. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1). For example, President Reagan invoked Section 1182(f) to “suspend entry into the United States as immigrants by all Cuban nationals,” subject to exceptions. Proclam. No. 5517 (1986).16 And
14 The vast majority—more than 70%—of visas issued in the last two fiscal years to nationals of the six countries at issue were nonimmigrant visas. See https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en /lawand-policy/statistics/annual-reports/ report-of-the-visa-office-2016.html; https://travel.state. gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2015.html. 15 Even where Section 1152(a)(1)(A) applies, Congress made clear that it does not “limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for [] processing [] immigrant visa applications,” id. §1152(a)(1)(B), which at most is all the Order’s temporary pause does. 16 See also Procl. 6958 (1996) (members of Sudanese government and military); Procl. 5829 (1988) (certain Panamanian persons); Procl. 5887 (1988) (Nicaragua government officials and employees).
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the Supreme Court deemed it “perfectly clear that [Section 1182(f)] grants the President ample power to use a naval blockade [to] simply deny … Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.” Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 187 (1993).
Section 1185(a), too, has long been understood to authorize nationality-based distinctions. In 1979, the Office of Legal Counsel construed it as authorizing the President to “declare that the admission of Iranians or certain classes of Iranians would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” Immigration Laws and Iranian Students, 4A Op. O.L.C. 133, 140 (Nov. 11, 1979), and President Carter invoked that section two weeks later. E.O. 12,172 (1979). Plaintiffs are thus simply wrong to assert that past Presidents have not drawn nationality-based distinctions in administering the immigration laws. Compare Mot. at 27, with Narenji, 617 F.2d at 746-48 (upholding requirement that nonimmigrant-alien students who were Iranian nationals to inform INS about residence and status).
These examples illustrate that limiting the entry of nationals of particular countries can be critical to the President’s ability to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs and protect its security, yet plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation would upset the long-settled understanding of presidential authority that “distinctions on the basis of nationality may be drawn in [] immigration,” Narenji, 617 F.2d at 747, thereby disabling the President from restricting entry of immigrants from any country—even one with which the nation was on the verge of war. As the Second Circuit held in Rajah, “given the importance to immigration law of, inter alia, national citizenship, passports, treaties, and relations between nations, the use of such classifications is commonplace and almost inevitable.” 544 F.3d at 435.
Plaintiffs also contend that Section 1152(a)(1)(A) overrides the President’s Section 1182(f) authority because it “became law in 1965,” after 1182(f). Mot. at 27. But plaintiffs have it backwards: to read Section 1152(a)(1)(A) as narrowing Section 1182(f) would be to treat it as a partial “‘repeal[] by implication,’” which courts will not do unless Congress’s “‘intention’” is “‘clear and manifest.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife (NAHB), 551 U.S. 644, 662, 664 n.8 (2007). Sections
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1152(a)(1)(A) and 1182(f) can best be reconciled by sensibly reading Section 1152(a)(1)(A)’s general, default provisions as not affecting the President’s authority under Section 1182(f) to suspend entry based on a specific finding of national interest. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070-71 (2012) (“‘[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general.’”).17
3. Section 1182(a) does not prevent the President from suspending the entry of nationals from the designated countries
Plaintiffs also contend that the Order’s suspension of entry exceeds the President’s Section 1182(f) authority because the suspension is based on terrorism concerns, and Congress has already set forth criteria for denying admission on terrorism-related grounds in Section 1182(a)(3)(B). See Mot. at 28. Plaintiffs’ argument unpersuasively assumes that the President may not exercise his Section 1182(f) authority based on any general concern that also overlaps with one of Section 1182(a)’s many specific grounds for inadmissibility. That cramped understanding of Section 1182(f) contravenes the text and structure of the statute as well as decades of practice. Section 1182(a) sets forth numerous specific grounds of inadmissibility, including grounds relating to “[h]ealth[],” “[c]riminal” history, “[s]ecurity,” and “[f]oreign policy.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1), (2), (3), (3)(C). Recognizing that specific statutory criteria cannot anticipate every threat to national interests, Section 1182(f) supplements those criteria by granting the President broad authority to “suspend the entry” of additional aliens or classes of aliens, and nothing in Section 1182(f)’s text suggests the President cannot exercise that authority in response to concerns that overlap with one of Section 1182(a)’s inadmissibility grounds.
Experience confirms that Section 1182(f) is not confined to topics on which Section 1182(a) is silent. For example, Congress identified certain crimes that render aliens inadmissible, 8 U.S.C. §
17 Furthermore, even if Section 1152(a)(1)(A) could be construed to narrow Section 1182(f), it cannot be read to narrow Section 1185(a)—which was amended and expanded in 1978, after Section 1152(a)(1)(A)’s enactment. Nothing in Section 1185(a)’s current text or post-1978 history limits the President’s authority to restrict entry by nationals of particular countries.
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1182(a)(2), yet Presidents have invoked Section 1182(f) to suspend the entry of aliens who committed criminal offenses.18 Similarly, Section 1182(a) renders inadmissible aliens who have participated in certain human-rights violations, including “genocide,” “torture,” and “extrajudicial killing,” 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii), yet presidents have invoked Section 1182(f) to suspend entry of aliens linked to other human-rights abuses.19 More broadly, Section 1182(a)(3)(C) deems an alien inadmissible to prevent “potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences.” Yet numerous invocations of Section 1182(f) have addressed foreign policy and reflected the President’s determination that “it is in the foreign policy interests of the United States to suspend [] entry” of the affected aliens. See, e.g., Procl. 7062 (Jan. 14, 1998).20 So, too, Section 1182(a)(3)(B)’s exclusion of certain aliens on terrorismrelated grounds does not impliedly bar the President from temporarily suspending certain entries to assess whether existing procedures are adequate to detect potential terrorists.
4. The Order Does Not Discriminate on the Basis of Religion. The Order does not discriminate on the basis of religion.21 It applies to six countries that Congress and the prior Administration determined posed special risks of terrorism. It applies to certain nationals of those countries, regardless of religion. And it excludes numerous individuals who fall outside the scope of the Order based on its religiously-neutral exclusions or are entitled to a waiver, again based on neutral criteria. Plaintiffs nevertheless try to impugn the Order using campaign statements. As the Supreme Court has made clear, official action must be adjudged by its “‘text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute or comparable official act[ion],’” not through “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844,
18 E.g., E.O. 13,694 (2015); Procl. No. 7750 (2004). 19 E.g., E.O. 13,692 (2015); E.O. 13,606 (2012); Procl. No. 8697 (2011); Procl. No. 8015 (2006). 20 See also, e.g., Procl. No. 7060 (1997); E.O. 13,726, (2017); E.O. 13,712 (2015); E.O. 13,687 (2015). 21 As noted, unlike the Revoked Order, the Order contains no prioritization in refugee admissions of refugee claims based on religious-minority persecution.
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862 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). Measured against these standards, the Order falls well within the President’s lawful authority.
a. The Order Draws Distinctions on the Basis of Risk, not Religion. The Order’s temporary suspensions are expressly premised on the President’s finding that a temporary pause in entry was necessary to “prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists” while the review of screening and vetting procedures is ongoing. Order §2(c). As the Order explains, the six countries covered were previously designated by Congress and the Executive Branch as presenting particular risks, and the risk of continued entry from those countries during the review was, in the President’s view, unacceptably high. The lengthy reasoning provided in Section 1 of the Order goes beyond the constitutional requirement set by Mandel of a “facially legitimate” reason, 408 U.S. at 770; as the Supreme Court has explained: “[t]he Executive should not have to disclose its ‘real’ reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat—or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country’s nationals.” Reno, 525 U.S. at 491. The Order is also religion-neutral on its face. It draws no “explicit and deliberate distinctions” based on religion, Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982), and indeed, does not mention religion at all. For this reason, even if the Order was not in the immigration context, plaintiffs would need very strong evidence of purpose to overcome the stated secular purpose. Id. And in the immigration context, courts may not “look behind the exercise of [Executive] discretion” taken “on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770; accord Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 795 (confirming that a broad “policy choice” is to be reviewed under the same “standard … applied in [] Mandel”); accord Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We are unable to distinguish Mandel on the grounds that . . . the reasoning or outcome would vary according to which executive officer is exercising the Congressionally-delegated power to exclude”). The Fourth Circuit has affirmed this principle, explaining that “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review of political
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questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.” Appiah, 202 F.3d at 710; see Rajah, 544 F.3d 438 (“[t]he most exacting level of scrutiny that we will impose on immigration legislation is rational basis review”).
Plaintiffs rely on cases far removed from the immigration context, such as “disparate impact” cases applying equal protection principles. But it is an “unreasoned assumption that courts should simply plop Establishment Clause cases from the domestic context over to the foreign affairs context; [that] ignores the realities of our world.” 9th Cir. Mar. 15 Dissent at n.6. And in any event, even outside the immigration context, the Order’s stated purpose would be entitled to “deference” so long as it is “genuine,” i.e., “not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864. Courts judge the genuineness of the government’s true “object” by considering the “operation” of its action, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993). Here, the effect of the law is, consistent with its stated purpose and the evidence about the activities of terrorist organizations and the risks posed by nationals of the particular countries in § 1 (along with refugee admissions in general), to temporarily suspend admissions from nationals of six countries (along with refugees worldwide) irrespective of any covered alien’s religion (including millions of non-Muslim individuals).
Plaintiffs repeatedly note that the six countries covered by the entry suspension are “predominantly Muslim,” and assert that this creates an allegedly-improper “disparate impact.” Mot. 3, 4, 20, 22-23. But Iraq is also a predominantly Muslim country covered by the Revoked Order, and it has been excluded from the temporary suspensions on travel in this Order because “since [E.O.] 13769 was issued, the Iraqi government has expressly undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing, and the return of Iraq nationals subject to final orders of removal.” Order § 1(g). The treatment of Iraq highlights that the Order is tailored not to religion, but to national security risk and other countries’ cooperation efforts.
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The six remaining countries covered were previously selected by Congress and the Executive through a process that Plaintiffs do not contend was religiously motivated. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not dispute the presence of al-Qaida and Islamic State and their affiliates in all six countries; the designation of Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism; and the “significant compromise[] by terrorist organizations” or “active conflict zones” associated with each country. Order §§ 1(d), (e). The IRAP court recognized these national security interests, and declined to “second-guess the conclusion that” the Order advances these interests. See IRAP at 35. And significantly, the court in Aziz did not have the opportunity to consider the country-specific material set forth in Section 1 of the Order because no such information was presented in the Revoked Order. See Aziz, 2017 WL 580855 at *9 (relying on the “dearth of evidence” regarding national security in the record).22 This evidence is sufficient: in the immigration context, the only “question is whether the [law] is supported by a rational basis.” Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 127 (4th Cir 2011).
b. The Order cannot be restrained on the basis of campaign statements. Plaintiffs argue that the Order targets Islam not because of what it says or does, but because statements made “at various times during the presidential campaign” that plaintiffs claim reflect “the general views of Defendant Trump,” and inferences they claim can be drawn from broad political statements made by various advisors, constitute an allegedly unlawful “sequence of events” leading to the Order. Mot. at 16-18 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987)). But even if the Court could properly look behind the Order’s “facially legitimate and bona fide” national security purpose (and it cannot, Mandel, 408 U.S. at 77), informal statements by the President or his surrogates
22 Without explanation, the Hawaii court ignored §1 of the Order except to quote from, without relying on, plaintiffs’ allegations that portions of § 1 improperly relate to terrorism convictions of Iraqi nationals who are no longer covered by the Order. But the Order itself explains why Iraq, one of the seven countries covered by the Revoked Order, is no longer covered: in the interim, “the Iraqi government has expressly undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing, and the return of Iraqi nationals subject to final orders of removal.” Order § 1(g). Given the desire by plaintiffs here for “justification” of the adoption of the new Order, the inclusion of this information cannot reasonably support a finding of pretext.
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that do not directly concern the Order are irrelevant. “Establishment Clause analysis does not look to the veiled psyche of government officers,” but rather to “the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862-63. Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, Edwards focused on what was “clear from the legislative history,” not analysis of the legislators’ psyche or statements in their pre-official capacity. 482 U.S. 590-93. Statements by private persons cannot reveal the government’s purpose or “object.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859-60; see Glassman v. Arlington Cty, 628 F.3d 140, 147(4th Cir. 2010). Indeed, the Supreme Court has declined to rely even on press statements and other informal communications by incumbent government officials, recognizing that they may not accurately reflect the government’s position. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624 n.52 (2006); Professionals & Patients… v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1995).
Using comments by political candidates to question the stated purpose of later action is particularly problematic. Candidates are not government actors, and statements of what they might attempt to achieve if elected, which are often simplified and imprecise, are not “official act[s].” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862. They generally are made without the benefit of advice from an as-yetunformed Administration, and cannot bind elected officials who later conclude that a different course is warranted. See Repub. Pty. of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002). Permitting campaign statements to contradict official pronouncements of the government’s objectives would inevitably “chill political debate during campaigns.”23 Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1995) (declining to rely on campaign statements). It also would be unworkable, requiring the “judicial psychoanalysis” that
23 The interpretation by the Court in IRAP that Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) authorizes reliance on campaign statements overreads the discussion in Glassroth: although describing the campaign history and the district court’s reliance on it, the 11th Circuit declined to rest its “de novo” review of the district court on those statements, instead citing the judge’s trial testimony explicitly acknowledging a religious purpose. Id. at 1297 (relying on “his testimony when he said that the monument ‘reflects the sovereignty of GOD over the affairs of men’”). In addition, in contrast to the private-citizen status of the presidential candidate at the time of statements here, the judge in Glassroth was already a lower court judge at the time of the campaign. Id. at 1284-85.
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McCreary repudiated. 545 U.S. at 862. And contrary to the opinion in Aziz, there is ample precedent
supporting the fact that the oath to the Constitution taken by the President and other public officers
at entry into the office does meaningfully alter those officials’ relationships to the Constitution.24 Cf.
Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015).
Even considering plaintiffs’ proffered extrinsic evidence, none of it demonstrates that this
Order—adopted after the President took office, to address the Ninth Circuit’s concerns—was driven
by religious animus.25 The Order is not a “complete shutdown” on Muslims entering the country,
Mot. 2, or even from the six countries named, nor is it limited to Muslim-majority countries given that
it temporarily suspends the Refugee Program globally. There is a complete disconnect between
plaintiffs’ imputed purpose and the Order’s actual effect.26
Plaintiffs cite McCreary to argue for looking behind the Order’s text and legal effects to
speculate at its aims. In fact, McCreary says the opposite. McCreary makes clear that what matters is not
a government official’s subjective motive, but only the “official objective” drawn from “readily
discoverable fact.” 545 U.S. at 862. As McCreary explained, the Supreme Court’s previous cases had
24 Significantly the only post-inauguration statement by the President on which the Court relied in Aziz related to the religious refugee provision not in the Order. See Aziz at *4-*5, *8; supra n.6.
25 Plaintiffs suggest the Order should be analyzed no differently than the Revoked Order because it “maintains . . . the part that prohibits nonimmigrant, nonresident” persons from the six countries, Mot. at 6—which ignores the waiver provisions and other modifications—is flawed. It is not “an attempt to ‘evade’ the injunction” when the Government changes “a policy . . . in order to resolve a specific controversy,” even if that new policy maintains aspects of the old. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 717 (2010). As another judge of this Court noted in Aziz, the President’s campaign statements do not “render every policy that the president makes related to Muslim majority countries open to challenge,” Aziz, 2017 WL 580855 at *9, including the Order, directed as it is only at persons abroad who have not been determined admissible to the United States. Here, the Order explains both its purpose of suspending entry during the period of a review of admissions procedures and that its provisions respond to concerns raised by courts, there is thus no basis to suggest that an “abnormal policy evolution” has occurred that cannot be explained. Mot. at 25.
26 Plaintiffs make much of the fact that this Order is under-inclusive because it does not apply to foreign countries from which they allege other Muslim terrorists or their families originated. Mot. at 10-12. But the fact that the Order applies to countries identified by the previous Administration and Congress is hardly evidence of animus.
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rested on analysis of objective facts directly related to the law at issue. See id. at 862-63 (“In each case, the government’s action was held unconstitutional only because openly available data,” related to “official act[s]”—“supported a commonsense conclusion that a religious objective permeated the government’s action”); see Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-35 (gleaning purpose from ordinances’ “text” and “operation”). McCreary’s analysis of the counties’ purpose therefore centered on the text of the resolutions that serially authorized Ten Commandments displays and the displays themselves, and the Court emphatically rejected suggestions that it “look to the veiled psyche of government officers.” 545 U.S. at 863. Importantly, the counties’ final display still showed a “sectarian spirit,” since it “quoted more of the purely religious language [of the Commandments]… than the first two displays had done,” and, significantly, was created “without a new resolution or repeal of the old one.” Id. at 870, 872.
This case contrasts starkly with McCreary, but even applying McCreary, the Tenth Circuit has described a standard for “curative actions” where a court is concerned that a prior official action had an improper purpose, and that standard is met here. See Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848, 863 (10th Cir. 2016). Curative actions should be “(1) purposeful, (2) public, and (3) at least as persuasive as the initial endorsement of religion.” Id. Here, the Order explicitly states that it is not issued for religious purposes, and instead describes its national security purposes. Compare id. at 864 with Order §§ 1(b)-(i). The Order is highly public; its evidence of secular purpose is stated in its text and not “difficult-to-access.” Felix, 841 F.3d 863. The Order removed the only explicitly religious element in the Revoked Order, supra n.6. And given the particular deference to Executive determinations in the national security context, see, e.g., Holder v. Humanit. Law Project (HLP), 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010), the Order’s description of the national security concerns animating its purpose should be treated as persuasive by the Court.27 In short, the President’s efforts to accommodate courts’ concerns while also fulfilling his
27 Relevantly, the Order also reflects the considered views of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, who announced the Order. Contrary to the view of the IRAP court, see IRAP, 2017 WL 1018235 at *15, the fact that the formal document stating these views issued “the same day” as the Order does not render those views suspect.
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constitutional duty to protect the Nation is permissible evidence of intent is not to discriminate along religious lines. See Children’s Health… v. Min de Parle, 212 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding facially neutral, post-invalidation, reenactment). III. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weigh Strongly Against Injunctive Relief.
The balance of the equities and the public’s interest—which merge here, see Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)—counsel strongly in favor of leaving the Order in effect. The President, in consultation with members of his Cabinet, determined that, during the review of screening and vetting procedures, the “risk of erroneously permitting entry” of an individual who intends to commit terrorist acts “is unacceptably high.” Order §1(f). That risk assessment provides more than sufficient basis to leave the Order’s temporary, precautionary safeguards in place.
“Courts have accorded great weight to considerations of national security when balancing the interests and equities of the parties.” Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Pena, 972 F. Supp. 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 24; Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (because of “assertions of potential harm to national security and foreign policy— assertions which [the court] obviously can not appraise—…we are constrained to refuse an injunction” on a limited record). “[T]he Supreme Court has long acknowledged that ‘no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.’” U.S. v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). “The continuing threat of international terrorism highlights [that] the ‘government has no more profound responsibility than the protection of Americans … against additional unprovoked attack.’” Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 240.
Notably, the Order describes data showing that some 300 persons who entered as refugees are currently under investigation, and hundreds of foreign-born persons have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes. Order §1(h). Given that reality, the Executive’s obligation and the Order’s aim and scope is based on the Executive’s “[p]redictive judgment” where the greatest risk exists going
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forward, an assessment which is entitled to the greatest possible degree of judicial deference. Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527-29 (1988). Such judgments “have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry,” as they “are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy . . . for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.” Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). “[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked, and respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.” HLP, 561 U.S. at 34.
The “evaluation of the facts by the Executive” to support predictive judgments is especially “entitled to deference” when “litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interest of national security and foreign affairs.” HLP, 561 U.S. at 33-35 (emphasis added). When the Executive adopts “a preventive measure … to prevent imminent harms in the context of international affairs and national security,” the government “is not required to conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we grant weight to its empirical conclusions.” Id. at 35. Thus, where “[t]he Executive … deem[s] nationals of a particular country a special threat,” “a court would be ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of that determination. Reno, 525 U.S. at 491. Here, the Order’s objective is to prevent future terrorist attacks before they occur, and the Order properly focuses on six countries that the President, and the Congress, and the prior Administration determined pose the greatest risk of terrorist entry in the future. See also Rajah, 544 F.3d 433, 439 & n.3 (upholding against “improper [religious] animus” challenge program that first applied to five of the same six countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria). IV. The Facial Sweeping Relief Sought is Unwarranted.
“An injunction ‘should be tailored to restrain no more than what is reasonably required to accomplish its ends.’” Hayes v. N. State Law Enf’t.. Officers Ass’n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir. 1993).
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“Particularly is this so when preliminary relief, on something less than a full record and full resolution of the facts, is granted.” Consol. Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of S. W. Va., 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1971). The emergency relief requested—enjoining the Order in its entirety—is plainly overbroad.
First, Plaintiffs can only plausibly attempt to show harms stemming from the Order’s provisions suspending entry of certain foreign nationals from the six countries. To the extent any of those claimed harms are cognizable and irreparable, harms rooted in those particular provisions do not support enjoining the Order in its entirety. Second, Plaintiffs cannot carry the required burden for a facial challenge of “establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exist under which the [Order] would be valid,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. Accordingly, even if the Court were to grant any emergency relief, it should be strictly limited to only what is necessary to prevent irreparable injuries to Plaintiffs themselves, because “equity requires that injunctions be carefully tailored.” Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prod. LP v. von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710, 715 (4th Cir. 2015). Applying that principle, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly vacated injunctions that reach beyond the minimum scope necessary to redress the plaintiff’s specific harm pending further proceedings. See, e.g., Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 436 (4th Cir. 2003); Ga.-Pac., 781 F.3d at 716-17. For the claims related to others’ visa applications, an injunction could address, at most, those applicants’ visa applications.28
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny plaintiffs’ motion.
28 Plaintiffs also do not demonstrate the need for a nationwide injunction. While “[n]ationwide injunctions may issue if necessary to afford relief to the prevailing party,” relief must be no broader than necessary to avoid limiting “the ability of other circuits to consider the questions.” Aziz, 2017 WL 580855 at *10.
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Dated: March 17, 2017 By:

Respectfully submitted,

DANA J. BOENTE United States Attorney

CHAD READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil Division

JENNIFER D. RICKETTS Director, Federal Programs Branch

JOHN R. TYLER Assistant Director, Federal Programs Branch

____/s/________________

DENNIS C. BARGHAAN, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

2100 Jamieson Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: (703) 299-3891

Fax:

(703) 299-3983

Email: dennis.barghaan@usdoj.gov

ERIC J. SOSKIN BRAD P. ROSENBERG ARJUN GARG MICHELLE R. BENNETT DANIEL SCHWEI

Trial Attorneys United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

31

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 22 Filed 03/17/17 Page 35 of 35 PageID# 712

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will transmit a true and correct copy of the same to the following:
Gadeir Ibrahim Abbas The Law Office of Gadeir Abbas 1155 F Street, N.W., Suite 1050
Washington, D.C. 20004 Email: Gadeir@abbaslawfirm.com

Dated: March 17, 2017

/s/________________

DENNIS C. BARGHAAN, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

2100 Jamieson Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: (703) 299-3891

Fax:

(703) 299-3983

Email: dennis.barghaan@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

32

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 30 Filed 03/20/17 Page 1 of 4 PageID# 824

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.; Plaintiffs,
v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.;
Defendants.

No. 1:17-cv-00120(AJT/IDD)

NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
On March 20, 2017, plaintiffs submitted a notice of additional authority in this matter. See ECF No. 28. To keep the Court fully apprised of relevant authorities, Defendants hereby note an additional opinion: Order Denying Washington’s Emergency Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction, Wash. v. Trump, Case No. C17-0141JLR, Dkt. No. 163 (Mar. 16, 2017). This Order is a further proceeding in Wash. v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (cited in Defendants’ Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for TRO, ECF No. 22, at 5). In it, the Court declined to extend an injunction entered against now-revoked Executive Order No. 13,769 to Executive Order 13,780, the Order now at issue in this litigation.

March 20, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
DANA J. BOENTE United States Attorney
CHAD READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil Division

1

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 30 Filed 03/20/17 Page 2 of 4 PageID# 825

JENNIFER D. RICKETTS Director, Federal Programs Branch

JOHN R. TYLER Assistant Director, Federal Programs Branch

By:

/s/________________

DENNIS C. BARGHAAN, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

2100 Jamieson Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: (703) 299-3891

Fax:

(703) 299-3983

Email: dennis.barghaan@usdoj.gov

ERIC J. SOSKIN BRAD P. ROSENBERG ARJUN GARG MICHELLE R. BENNETT DANIEL SCHWEI

Trial Attorneys United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

2

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 30 Filed 03/20/17 Page 3 of 4 PageID# 826

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will transmit a true and correct copy of the same to the following:
Gadeir Ibrahim Abbas The Law Office of Gadeir Abbas 1155 F Street, N.W., Suite 1050
Washington, D.C. 20004 Email: Gadeir@abbaslawfirm.com

Date: March 20, 2017

/s/________________

DENNIS C. BARGHAAN, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

2100 Jamieson Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: (703) 299-3891

Fax:

(703) 299-3983

Email: dennis.barghaan@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

3

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 30 Filed 03/20/17 Page 4 of 4 PageID# 827 4

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 1 of 45 PageID# 774
UNITED STATES DISRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINA

LINDA SARSOUR, et al

)

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

DONALDJ. TRUMP, etal

)

)

Defendants

)

No. 17-cv-0120(AJT)

RAISING POLITICAL QUESTION NONJUSTICIABILITY, AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FROM PROFESSOR VICTOR WILLIAMS,
OF THE AMERICA FIRST LAWYERS ASSOCATION, IN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP
Victor Williams, Appearing Pro Se
America First Lawyers Association www.americafirstlawyers.com 5209 Baltimore Ave, Bethesda, MD 20816 (301) 951-9045 americafirstlawyers@gmail.com

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 2 of 45 PageID# 775
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES & RELATED CASES A. Parties and Amici. All parties, interveners, and amici appearing in this Court are listed in party briefing except that this brief is filed on behalf of Professor Victor Williams in support ofDefendants. B. Related Cases. Other related cases of which Amicus is aware are referenced in the briefing offered by parties.
America First Lawyers Association www.americafirstlawyers.com 5209 Baltimore Ave, Bethesda, MD 20816 (301) 951-9045 americafirstlawyers@gmail.com
ii

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 3 of 45 PageID# 776

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Certificate as to Parties, Rulings and Related Cases .....................................ii Table of Contents............................................................................iii Table of Authorities......................................................................iv,v,vi Statement of Authorship and Financial Contribution.......................................vii Statement of Identity, Interest and Authority ofAmicus................................ 1-4 Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-35 Certificate of Service...........................·.............................................36

iii

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 4 of 45 PageID# 777
·'

Cases:

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Alaska v. Kerry, 912 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Alaska 20 13)..................................23

Aktepe v. United States: 705 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997)................................ 19 Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1990)................................28

Baker v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186 (1962)................................................24,25,27

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723 (2008)................................................29

Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman 333 U.S. 103 (1948)...................... 8 Ctr.for Biological Diversity v. Hagel, 80 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .........23

DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2nd Cir. 1973).......................................9

El-Shifa v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) ........... l3,14,33

Goldwater v. Carter, 44 U.S. 996 (1979) ............................................29,30

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) ...................................... 16 Jaber v. United States, 2016 WL 706183 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2016)................. 13,14 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) ............................................ 7

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 32 (1982).................................................7.

LegalAssistancefor Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep 't ofState, Bureau ofConsular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ....................... 27,28

Lowry v. Regan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987)......................................27

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ..................................................20,24,34
Mobarez v. Kerry, Civil Action No. 2015-0516 (D.D.C. 2016) ..............................................................................7,8,11, 23

iv

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 5 of 45 PageID# 778

Cases:

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) .............................................. 19, 29

Miami Nation ofIndians v. Interior, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001)...............19,20

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)........................................27,28

Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991 )..............................31 ,32

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)....................................24

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004)........................................................28

Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1988)........................................9,27

Snider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005).................................25

United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,269 (1990).......................19,28

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)...........................................29

Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012) ............................. 12,13,21,22,23

Constitutions/Statutes/Executive Orders

Page(s):

U.S. Const.

art. II, § 1 ..........................................................................................23

art. II, § 2 .............................................................................................................7,23

amend. XII, § 1 ............................................................................34

Exec. Order No. 13780 (March 6, 2017) (titled: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States) ............................. .11,16,17,18

v

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 6 of 45 PageID# 779

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Other

Page(s):

Alexander Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale 1986) ..................................................31 ,32

Mathew Boyle, Senate-Committee: 580 Terror Convictions Since 2001, BREITBARTNEWS, June 22, 2016http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/20 16/06/22/senate-com.mittee-580-terror-convictions-in-u-s-since911-380-terrorists-are-foreign-born/. ................................................... 16,17

Stephen Dinan, Trump Says Extreme Vetting Pause Is Same as Obama 's 2011 Iraq Policy, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29,2017, http://www. washingtontimes.com/news/20 17/j an/29/trump-says-extreme-vettingpause-same-obamas-20 11-/....................................................................................... 6

Stephen Dinan, Somali/and Pleads To Be Removedfrom Trump's Extreme Vetting List, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/20 17/mar/9/somalia-pleads-be-removedextreme-vetting-list/ ........................................................................ 11

Alexander Hamilton, No. 23: The Necessity ofa Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation ofthe Union, in Clinton Rossiter, ed., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (New York: Mentor, 1999).........................................24

Inside the Beltway: 'Lawyers for Trump' Founded" WASH. TIMES, July 4, 2016....3

Nan Levinson, WAR IS NOT AGAME: THE NEW ANTIWAR SOLDIERS AND THE MOVEMENT THEY CREATED (Rutgers 2014)...............................................5

Speech of the Honorable John Marshall (Mar. 7, 1800)(cited by The Political Question Doctrine and the Supreme Court ofthe United States (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah and Bruce E. Cain, eds.)(2007)..............................20

Joseph R. Nye, Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power 88 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 160 (2009), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631 ................................................ ! 0

vi

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 7 of 45 PageID# 780

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Other

Page(s):

Debra Weiss, Law Profa Write-In GOP Candidate to Challenge Ted Cruz Eligibility, ABA JOURNAL, April11, 2016, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/law prof enters gop presidential race t o challenge ted cruzs eligibility/ .......................................................2

Pete Williams, Law Professor Challenges Cruz on Citizenship, Candidacy, NBC NEWS, April11, 2016. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/law-professorcandidate-challenges-cruz-citizenship-n554046.........................................3

Victor Williams, Travel Ban Challenges Present a Non-Reviewable Political Question, JURIST- FORUM, Feb.15, 2017, http://jurist.org/forum/20 17/02Nictor-Williams-travel-ban.php .......................... 15

Victor .Williams, D. C. Law Professor Makes Case for Sessions' Senate Confirmation, STREET INSIDER, Jan. 9, 2017, bttp://markets.financialcontent.com/streetinsider/news/read/33555004 ..................3

Victor Williams, Trump Will Bring Return to Rule ofLaw and Economic Growth, THE HILL, Nov. 6, 2016. http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidentialcampaign/304291-trump-will-bring-return-to-rule-of-law-and-economic ...............3

Victor Williams, Law Professor Now Proudly in Basket ofDeplorables, THE HILL, Sept. 20, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidentialcampaign/296783-law-prof-once-an-obama-supporter-now-in-basket-of ...............3

vii

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 8 of 45 PageID# 781
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP, LENGTH, AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION
This brief is offered by Amicus as an individual. Institutional affiliation is
offered only for informational purposes. It is presented in 14 point, New Times Roman font with Argument section totaling 7182 words. No party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party, nor other person, contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission ofthis brief.
viii

-
Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 9 of 45 PageID# 782

·.·

;r

BLANK

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 10 of 45 PageID# 783
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY OF AMICUS
Appealing to the Court's broad discretion to allow an amicus filing, Amicus
avers his significant interest in this case and suggests that the proffered brief will be of unique assistance to the Court. Defendants do not oppose, and Plaintiffs have not responded to query about, the attached Motion respectfully seeking leave
of the Court to file this amicus curiae brief. Professor Victor Williams is a
Washington, D.C. attorney and law professor with over twenty years' experience-formerly affiliated as fulltime faculty with both the Catholic University of America's Columbus School ofLaw and the City University ofNew York's John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Professor Williams has particular knowledge and expertise regarding the text, history, and interpretation of Article II and Article III of the U.S. Constitution with many scholarly and popular publications. He earned his J.D. from the University of California-Hastings College of the Law. After completing an extemship with both Ninth Circuit Judge Joseph Sneed and Eleventh Circuit Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat and a two-year clerkship with Judge Brevard Hand of the Southern District ofAlabama, Williams did advanced training in federal jurisdiction and international law (LL.M.) from Columbia University's School of Law and in economic analysis of the law (LL.M.) from George Mason University's Scalia School of Law.

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 11 of 45 PageID# 784
In past, Professor Victor Williams has been granted leave to file amicus briefs in other lower courts as well as by the U.S. Supreme Court. Professor Williams has published scholarship and commentary that offered strong support for the constitutional discretion and prerogatives of the past four presidents (without regard to their party affiliation). Professor Williams zealously advocated for timely Senate confirmation of the judicial and executive nominees of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Although these past presidents often pursued policy ends at odds with Professor Williams' personal policy preferences, he continued to defend their constitutional authority.
But now, Professor Williams' acknowledges that his ultimate policy pr~ference to always "put America first" is clearly.reflected in President Trump's agenda and early actions. Williams was an early primary supporter of candidate Donald Trump. In spring 2016, Williams launched a widely-reported legal action, after obtaining "competitor candidate standing" as a write-in candidate in several late primary states, to challenge the ballot eligibility of (naturally-born Canadian) Ted Cruz. (www.victorwilliamsforpresident.com). See e.g., Debra Weiss, Law Profa Write-In GOP Candidate to Challenge Ted Cruz Eligibility, ABA JOURNAL, Aprilll, 2016, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/law prof enters gop presidential race t o challenge ted cruzs eligibility/ and Pete Williams, Law Professor Challenges
2

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 12 of 45 PageID# 785
Cruz on Citizenship, Candidacy, NBC NEWS, April 11, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/law-professor-candidate-challenges-cruzcitizenship-n554046.
After Senator Cruz withdrew from the GOP primary, Professor Williams also withdrew from the primary race, formerly endorsed Donald Trump, and founded Super PAC (GOP Lawyers) rallying Lawyers and Law Professors (www.goplawyers.com) to support Donald Trump in the general election. See Victor Williams, Trump Will Bring Return to Rule ofLaw and Economic Growth,
THE HILL, Nov. 6, 2016. http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-
campaign/304291-trump-will-bring-retum-to-rule-of-law-and-economic , Victor
Williams, Law Professor Now Proudly in .Basket ofDeplorables, THE HILL, Sept.
20, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/296783-lawprof-once-an-obama-supporter-now-in-basket-of, and Inside the Beltway: 'Lawyers for Trump' Founded" WASH. TIMES, July 4, 2016.
The campaign group has now transformed into the "America First Lawyers Association" (www.americafirstlawyers.com) which Professor Williams chairs, to advance the Trump administration's "America first" nominations, policies, and programs. See e.g. Victor Williams, D. C. Law Professor Makes Case for Sessions' Senate Confirmation, STREET INSIDER, Jan. 9, 2017, http:l/markets.financialcontent.com/streetinsider/news/read/33555004
3

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 13 of 45 PageID# 786
Amicus submits that the proffered brief will make a valuable contribution to
the existing briefmg in this case as it presents an alternatively focused theory asserting that the claims against the president's travel freeze raise a nonjusticiable political question- thus this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Submitted on March~' 2017
America First Lawyers Association www.americafirstlawyers.com 5209 Baltimore Ave, Bethesda, MD 20816 (301) 951-9045 americafirstlawyers@gmail.com
4

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 14 of 45 PageID# 787
ARGUMENT
Supporting Defendants' arguments, Amicus submits an alternative theory:
This action is due for immediate dismissal as it presents a nonjusticiable political
question. Amicus first acknowledges, however, the emotionally-compelling
narratives regarding the aliens at issue in the instant action and in related cases filed throughout the nation. The aliens seeking entry onto American soil come from nations beset with evil oppression, state-sponsored terrorism, violent domestic disorder, and religious civil wars. Adequate reasons are presented to explain the aliens' desired entry; often involving being reunited with loved ones. Y~t, these aliens seek entry into America as our nation continues to be in a prolonged war with radical terrorists, many of whom have come from those very same nations. Since September 11, 2001, over 40 terrorists from the six listed nations, are among 380 foreign-born terrorists, who have been charged, tried, and convicted of terrorist acts in the United States. Our new president instituted the travel freeze both to better prosecute this war on terror and to fundamentally shift American foreign policy related to the war. Although no salve for those who suffer, William Tecumseh Sherman's missive applies: "I am sick and tired of war. Its glory is all moonshine....War is hell." Nan Levinson, WAR IS NoT AGAME: THE NEW ANTIWAR SOLDIERS AND THE MOVEMENT THEY CREATED 13 {Rutgers 2014).
5

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 15 of 45 PageID# 788
Just as did Barack Obama for eight years, our new president is engaging in a delicate national security and foreign policy calculus as he begins to prosecute the unprecedented, prolonged war with terrorists from these six nations and other nations of the region. Stephen Dinan, Trump Says Extreme Vetting Pause Is Same as Obama's 2011 Iraq Policy, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29,2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/29/trump-says-extreme-vettingpause-same-obamas-20 11-/.
As a matter of first-order determination, this Court is barred from making an inquiry into the Executive Branch's war-prosecution calculus. Assertion that such an inquiry is necessary for the Court to conduct a second-order analysis of immigration statutes, Administrative Procedure Act (APA} immigration processes, or specious constitutional claims does not make that inquiry or the controversy justiciable. Assertion of specious claims from American citizens, businesses, or sovereign States, that they suffer tangent harm from the implementation of the travel freeze, or equally specious claims of broad due process, equal protection, and religious discrimination violations arising from the travel freeze, do not make this controversy justiciable. This Court must immediately dismiss the instant action (and all related pending and subsequent actions) raising such claims.
6

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 16 of 45 PageID# 789
In various factual contexts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled: "[A]n alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative." Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). In implementing the travel freeze, President Trump acts within his inherent and exclusive Article II,§ 2 authorities as Commander-in-Chief during a time of war.
The president acts with an authority that the Supreme Court recognizes as "inherent in [the nation's] sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country against foregin encroachments and dangers - a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government." Kleindienstv. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (quotation marks omitted); accord Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
In its 2016 Mobarez v. Kerry ruling, the District Court for the District of Columbia explained that it could not review just such a decision by Barack Obama which the president made in a diplomatic, foreign policy, and military context. When deciding to shutter the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, President Obama refused to facilitate the exit and safe travels of American citizens from the horrific conditions in Yemen back to American soil. The court refused to reach the plaintiffs' requested statutory interpretation and APA process analysis that supported their
7

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 17 of 45 PageID# 790
right to such travel assistance because such interpretation, inquiry, and analysis would have required the court to answer a political question:
But the question that Plaintiffs' APA claim poses is not just what these provisions mean; it is also whether, if they mean what Plaintiffs say they mean, the Executive has violated the mandate that these provisions establish, and it is that aspect ofthe court's inquiry that would necessarily require the court to answer a non-justiciable political question.... Mobarez v. Kerry, Civil Action No. 2015-0516 (D.D.C. 2016). The court would not second guess the president's admittedly-strange decision not to help America's own citizen travel back to America.
Associate Justice Robert Jackson in Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman long ago recognized that foreign policy decisions "are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil." 333 U.S. 103 111 (1948). Justice Jackson further emphasized that such "decisions are of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry." /d.
Amicus respectfully asserts that in the instant action the Court will find no judicially manageable standards by which it can endeavor to assess our newlyelected president's interpretation of classified and military intelligence and his
8

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 18 of 45 PageID# 791
resulting decision -- based on that intelligence -- to freeze entry of aliens from listed nations. See DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2nd Cir. 1973).
The Fourth Circuit has specifically warned about just such information-rich national security and foreign policy litigation where a judge is:
asked to make determinations of fact in an area where the judiciary lacks power to obtain information, and in which it has neither expertise to evaluate the information brought before it nor standards to guide its review....These difficulties lead us to conclude that this suit presents a nonjusticiable political question." Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1988).
Ifthe freeze is not implemented, this Court is not competent to assess the nature and fiscal costs of alternative national security measures that may be required to try to keep track of aliens allowed to enter from the listed nations. This Court is not competent to foresee the unintended national security and foreign policy consequences of such judicial interference in the war on terror.
The travel freeze is implemented as a matter of the president's war-strategy, national-security, and foreign-policy calculus- and not as a matter of ordinary immigration procedure or immigration law enforcement. The president's calculus that led to the immediate travel freeze also includes longer-term policy objectives. The travel freeze has varied objectives - lawyered - with only some patent.
9

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 19 of 45 PageID# 792
But obviously, the new president sends a strong war-related policy signal to all nations-- "friends and foe alike"-- regarding his "America first" foreign
policy shift first formally announced in his Inaugural Address. The travel freeze
cues our NATO allies to reconsider their own porous national borders. The European nations' irresponsible failure to maintain their own sovereign borders has led to deadly terrorist acts and generally violent public spaces. Alien terrorists and would-be terrorist thugs who have been welcomed into Europe by its naive leaders
now stand in European airports only a seven-hour direct flight away from the
United States.
The freeze also directly confronts and disrupts expectations of wealthy monarchs and potentates 9fthe Middle East. Those oil-rich kingdoms have long expected America to "pay any price, bear any burden" to deal with their own region's hellish disorder.1
1 One might hope that the travel freeze is the beginning of a disruptive application of an "America first" version of"smart power" theories; a disruptive move appropriate to this unusual, prolonged war. (For a traditional articulation of smart power theory, see Joseph R. Nye: Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power 88 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 160 (2009)). Amicus certainly hopes that the travel freeze is the beginning of a correction in the government's over-reliance on a tired "carrot and stick" foreign-policy. As a part of a broader "America first" construct, perhaps the new policy will reject the wasteful acts of recent presidents who have spent endless American-tax-dollar "carrots" in foreign aid to ungrateful regimes. The same presidents have made even more shameful payments of brave military personnel used up like just so many "sticks" thrown into the Middle Eastern desert.
10

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 20 of 45 PageID# 793
All nations of the world -- including our allies in Europe and our "frenemies" in the Middle East -- have been given explicit notice that at any point in future the travel freeze list may expand to include "the names of any additional countries recommended for similar treatment, as well as [to contract to remove] the names of any countries that .. . should be removed from the scope of a proclamation." Exec. Order No. 13780 (March 6, 2017). Indeed, Iraq was able to reform its vetting cooperation so as not to be included in the March 6, 20 17 list. See Stephen Dinan, Somali/and Pleads To Be Removedfrom Trump's Extreme Vetting List, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2017, http://www. washingtontimes.com/news/20 17/mar/9/somalia-pleads-be-removedextreme-vetting-list/.
Again, in its 2016 Mobarez v. Kerry ruling, the District Court for the District of Columbia recognized that it did not have jurisdiction to review President Obama's inherent and exclusive authority in matters of war strategy, national security, and foreign policy. Finding political question nonjusticiability, the court refused to examine statutory and APA based challenges to the Executive's decision to close the U.S. Embassy in Yemen without providing an exit strategy and travel arrangement for American citizens living in Yemen to safely return to American soil. Notwithstanding the compelling claims of American citizens (many who were Muslim in faith practice) that a federal statute
11

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and APA processes required that the president ensure their travel security, the Court refused to review the case. The ruling acknowledged that the court did not have the institutional competence or critical information required to judge the dangerous conditions in Yemen - and thus it refused to second guess the president's refusal to provide evacuation processes when closing the embassy. Mobarez v. Kerry, Civil Action No. 2015-0516 (D.D.C. 2016).
Similarly, in the instant case, the president has determined that the dangerous, violent, and absurdly chaotic conditions exist in Yemen and other listed nations are such that the Executive Branch must freeze travel by aliens from those nations. Amicus respectfully asserts that just as the judiciary may not second guess the president's refusal to provide for embassy evacuations of American citizens out of Yemen, neither should it second guess the new president's refusal to allow embassy/consular processing of visa applications for aliens in Yemen and other of the listed nations. In accessing that perpetually violent region ofthe world, this C.ourt does not have better institutional competence, or better military strategy, or better classified information than does the Executive Branch.
In Mobarez, the court used Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012), to explain why political-question abstention, notwithstanding the American-citizen plaintiffs' reliance on a federal statute, executive order, and memorandum of understanding, was required:
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When deciding the claim merely requires the court to engage in garden-variety statutory analysis and constitutional reasoning, [the court] has authority to do so (i.e., the claim is justiciable), but a claim that goes beyond those classically judicial functions to request that a court override discretionary foreign-policy decisions that the political branches . have made-however framed-falls within the heartland of the political-question doctrine....
In the fmal analysis, then, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims would necessarily require the Court to "supplant a foreign policy decision ofthe political branches with [this Court's] own unmoored determination" of whether the situation calls for evacuation in a manner that renders Plaintiffs' claims nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine....
[T]the 'strategic choices directing the nation's foreign affairs are constitutionally committed to the political branches[,]'and once it becomes clear that a plaintiff wishes the courts to 'reconsider the wisdom of discretionary foreign policy decisions[,]' the judicial inquiry must end.
ld. (quoting Zivotoftky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) and (quoting El-
Shifa v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en bane)). [Additional
discussion of Zivotofsky v. Clinton's support for a nonjusticiability determination
in the instant case presented below at page 19.]
And consider also the District Court for the District of Columbia's political
question determination, made earlier in 2016, in the context of Yemen nationals
who asserted a directly-relevant federal tort claim statute to seek relief from
injuries that resulted from American national security actions in the Yemen:
"If plaintiffs' claims, 'regardless of how they are styled, call into question the
prudence of the political branches in matters of foreign policy or national security,'
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then they must be dismissed." Jaber v. United States, No. 15-0840, 2016 WL 706183, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2016) (quoting El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 841). It was in respect for the separation of powers that the court refused to second guess President Obama's decision to launch drone strikes which killed and wounded Yemen nationals. The court was not competent to analyze the military and classified information needed to review the tort-claims statutory claims. Id. Similarly, President Trump's calculus in judging the hellish conditions presently existing in Yemen, and other listed nations, and his decision temporarily freeze Yemen nationals, and those from the other listed nations from obtaining a visa and/or gaining actual entry onto American soil is nonjusticiable.
The en bane D.C. Circuit has offered fulsome explanation as to why the federal judiciary should not review such matters: "The political question doctrine bars our review of claims that, regardless of how they are styled, call into question the prudence ofthe political branches in matters of foreign policy or national security constitutionally committed to their discretion." El-Shifa, 607 F.3d 836, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en bane). The en bane D.C. Circuit was resolute: "Courts are not a forum for reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security." /d. at 840.
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To understand this litigation, reference must be made to the passionately negative reaction of establishment and institutional elites to the candidacy of Donald John Trump. A significant percentage of the established intellectual leaders and Beltway hierarchy of both the Democratic and Republican parties, declared themselves early to be - #NeverTrump. Now a broader group of elites in our political, media and legal establishments seek to undermine President Trump's nascent administration - particularly in relation to his war-policies and aliens. As example, in a shocking act of insubordination, President Trump's Acting Attorney General Sally Yates publically announced she was ordering her federal prosecutors across the nation to not enforce the president's orders. Yates had accepted the offer to serve as President Trump's Acting Attorney General while being well aware ofthe president's positions on military strategy and alien entry. Tellingly, Yates did not resign in respectful disagreement with the travel freeze, but rather chose public insubordination. Senate Judiciary Chairman Charles Grassley was among many to describe General Yates' action as nothing less than "sabotage." Only history will tell if and when those establishment and Beltway elites, some perhaps tormented from what has been termed Trump derangement syndrome, come to eventually accept Donald Trump's election. See Victor Williams, Travel Ban Challenges Present a Non-Reviewable Political Question, JURIST - FORUM, Feb.15, 2017, http://jurist.org/forum/2017/02Nictor-Williams-travel-ban.php.
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Following Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, however, this Court must honor the choice ofthe electors and in "maintenance of a republican form of government" acknowledge that it is the elected-president, not the unelected judiciary, that has responsibilities to calculate war strategy and formulate war-related foreign policy. In Harisiades, the Supreme Court clearly stated "any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government." 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
Amicus respectfully argues that it is not possible for the judiciary to competently review the wisdom of the Executive Branch's calculus -- of war strategy, national security, and foreign policy- made in implementing the travel freeze. Conditions are such in these listed nations that there must be a fulsome assessment ofthe prior administration's vetting procedures by the new president: "[T]he risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one ofthese countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the national security ofthe United States is unacceptably high." Exec. Order No. 13780 (March 6, 2016).
As referenced above, over 40 foreign-born aliens from the six listed nations have been charged, tried and convicted of terrorist related acts in the United States since September 2001, revealed by Sen. Jeff Sessions' Senate Judiciary Committee
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Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 26 of 45 PageID# 799
Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest. Mathew Boyle, Senate-
Committee: 580 Terror Convictions Since 2001, BREITBARTNEWS, June 22,2016,
http://www.breitbart.com/big-govemment/2016/06/22/senate-committee-580-
terror-convictions-in-u-s-since-911-380-terrorists-are-foreign-born/.
Although the Executive Branch should not have had to do so to avoid judicial
interference in its war-strategy calculus, the president's Executive Order
nevertheless references some of the hellish conditions existing in those listed
nations - conditions which require the travel freeze. Amicus respectfully asserts
that after the Court seriously considers these conditions, there should be no doubt
regarding its obligation to immediately dismiss the instant action:
i) Iran. Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984 and continues to support various terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, and terrorist groups in Iraq. Iran has also been linked to support for al-Qa'ida and has permitted al-Qa'ida to transport funds and fighters through Iran to
\
Syria and South Asia. Iran does not cooperate with the United States in counterterrorism efforts.
(ii) Libya. Libya is an active combat zone, with hostilities between the internationally recognized government and its rivals. In many parts of the country, security and law enforcement functions are provided by armed militias rather than state institutions. Violent extremist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have exploited these conditions to expand their presence in the country. The Libyan government provides some cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism efforts, but it is unable to secure thousands of miles of its land and maritime borders, enabling the illicit flow of weapons, migrants, and foreign terrorist fighters. The United States Embassy in Libya suspended its operations in 2014.
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(iii) Somalia. Portions of Somalia have been terrorist safe havens. AlShabaab, an al-Qa'ida-affiliated terrorist group, has operated in the country for years and continues to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries. Somalia has porous borders, and most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents. The Somali government cooperates with the United States in some counterterrorism operations but does not have the capacity to sustain military pressure on or to investigate suspected terrorists.
(iv) Sudan. Sudan has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1993 because of its support for international terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas. Historically, Sudan provided safe havens for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups to meet and train. Although Sudan's support to alQa'ida has ceased and it provides some cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism efforts, elements of core al-Qa'ida and ISIS-linked terrorist groups remain active in the country.
(v) Syria. Syria has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979. The Syrian government is engaged in an ongoing military conflict against ISIS and others for control of portions of the country. At the same time, Syria continues to support other terrorist groups. It has allowed or encouraged extremists to pass through its territory to enter Iraq. ISIS continues to attract foreign fighters to Syria and to use its base in Syria to plot or encourage attacks around the globe, including in the United States. The United States Embassy in Syria suspended its operations in 20 12. Syria does not cooperate with the United States' counterterrorism efforts.
(vi) Yemen. Yemen is the site of an ongoing conflict between the incumbent government and the Houthi-led opposition. Both ISIS and a second group, alQa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have exploited this conflict to expand their presence in Yemen and to carry out hundreds of attacks. Weapons and other materials smuggled across Yemen's porous borders are used to finance AQAP and other terrorist activities. In 2015, the United States Embassy in Yemen suspended its operations, and embassy staff were relocated out ofthe country. Yemen has been supportive of, but has not been able to cooperate fully with, the United States in counterterrorism efforts.
Exec. Order No. 13780 (March 6, 2017). There is no competent way for the
Court to reach the "unmanageable" analysis of statutes or rules involving alien visa
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issuance or revocation or any other such ordinary immigration processes. Orderly judicial abstention is critically important during this time of prolonged war, during which recent presidents have struggled with implementing complicated foreign policy and national security formulas related to the most unusual and difficult conflict with radical terrorists.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs may not clear the political question bar simply by recasting the president's calculus involved with a foreign policy and national security determination in terms of an ordinary matter of immigration law and/or APA immigration procedure. See Aktepe v. United States: 705 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997). Neither can Plaintiffs jump the abstention barrier by specious assertions of due process and equal protection violations, United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259,269 (1990) (citingJohnsonv. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,770 (1950), nor
by assertions of religious discrimination by slanderously questioning the motives of the president for implementing the freeze. There are "legitimate reasons" for the
president's action and this Court can "not infer a discriminatory purpose." McCleskey v. Kemp,481 U.S.279,298-99(1987).
Nor can the equally specious assertions by American citizens and permanent residents who claim a legal interest in foreign-soil aliens' entry onto American soil during the time of war justify this Court's interference with the Commander-in-
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Chief decision. The president is simply placing a pause on the entry of foreign-soil aliens from the very region of the world that is spawning our terrorist enemies.
Throughout our Republic's history, the Supreme Court has recognized that some issues are committed by the Constitution's text to the exclusive discretion of the elected political branches. When these political questions manifest, the judiciary lacks jurisdiction to act in its prescribed and limited role as a court. Congressman John Marshall, in 1800, warned his U.S. House colleagues that the political branches would be "swallowed-up by the judiciary" without such judicial self-restraint. Speech of the Honorable John Marshall (Mar. 7, 1800), 18 U.S. app. note I, at 16-17 (1820) (cited by The Political Question Doctrine and the Supreme Court ofthe United States (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah and Bruce E. Cain, eds.) 25 n. 10) 2007).
Three years later, U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall provided early guidance as to the "rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction." Marshall offered this political question description: "By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience." Marbury v. Madison,
5 u.s. 137, 165 (1803).
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More recently, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner artfully explained that the doctrine acknowledges the Constitution's "assignment of exclusive decision making responsibility to the nonjudicial branches ofthe federal government." Miami Nation ofIndians v. Department ofInterior, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001). Consider Judge Posner's abstention description:
The doctrine identifies a class of questions that either are not amenable to judicial resolution because the relevant considerations are beyond the courts' capacity to gather and weigh, or have been committed by the Constitution to the exclusive, unreviewable discretion ofthe executive and/or legislative the so-called 'political' - branches ofthe federal government. Id at 346. (citations and references omitted). Even more instructive is Richard Posner's strong statement regarding the "nature ofthe questions that the court would have to answer - which asks whether the answers would be ones a federal court could give without ceasing to be a court." Id at 347.
In the context of the national litigation challenging the travel freeze, it is fair to consider that a court's zealous actions to force an answer to the patent political question matches Posner's description of a court "ceasing" to be a court.
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court was discretely tasked with determining a federal statute's constitutionality and the resulting ruling provides helpful contrast as to the contours ofthe abstention requirement. 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). Unlike the instant case, the high court did not need to determine whether
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there were judicially determinable and manageable standards for an interpretation, analysis, and application of the relevant statute. Its determination was discrete as to the statute's constitutionality. Indeed to make it clear that Zivotofsky was decided in a narrow context, Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in concurrence, reiterated the importance ofpolitical-question abstention to the separation of powers. Id at 1431-6 (2012). And Associate Justice Steve Breyer wrote to warn how allowing judicial review in a broader foreign policy context can pose a "serious risk" of "embarrassment, show lack of respect for the other branches, and potentially disrupt sound foreign policy decision making." Id at 1437. Justice Breyer urged careful consideration of the abstention option in foreign policy matters involving the Middle East where ordinary administrative matters can have far reaching implications:
Political reactions in that region can prove uncertain. And in that context it may well tum out that resolution ofthe constitutional argument will require a court to decide how far the statute, in practice, reaches beyond the purely administrative, determining not only whether but also the extent to which enforcement will interfere with the president's ability to make significant recognition-related foreign policy decisions. /d. at 1429-30. The instant case requires far more than a straightforward determination of a statute's constitutionality, as was the case in Zivotofsky. Rather, the Plaintiffs' claims require this Court to review and second guess the Executive Branch's
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complicated foreign policy and national security calculus in prosecuting the war on terror. As discussed above, in Mobarez, the District of Columbia District of Columbia acknowledged Zivotofsky 's assistance to cases such as the instant one. Mobarez v. Kerry Civil Action No. 2015-0516 (D.D.C. 2016). Other courts have recently made similar nonjusticiability determinations by contrasting the narrow context of the Zivotosky ruling. See Ctr.for Biological Diversity v. Hagel, 80 F. Supp. 991, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2016) and Alaska v. Kerry, 972 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Alaska 2013).
Judicial oversight ofthe newly-elected president's travel freeze violates fundamental constitutional understandings regarding the separation ofpowers and consent of the governed. The newly-elected president is vested with all executive power by Article II, § 1, and is made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and state militias by Article II, § 2. The president has a most solemn duty to protect the Republic's citizens from potential harm. Vigilance against alien enemies who threaten to alight our shores, during a time of war, is the highest mandate of the president. But, as argued above, the travel freeze has obvious "smart power" foreign policy objectives that are also critical to the president's prosecution ofthe war.
Providing such Executive energy for national security was a fundamental reason for the 1787 Convention that led to replacement of the Articles of
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Confederation. Consider Alexander Hamilton's argument for ratification of our
second Constitution in FEDERALIST 23:
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety ofnational exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety ofthe means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction ofthe same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense. Alexander Hamilton, "No. 23: The Necessity ofa Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation ofthe Union," in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 148-153 (New York: Mentor, 1999). From Marbury forward, the political question doctrine has developed to preclude judicial consideration in a variety of issues with foreign relations prominent. See e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918).
In the modem case ofBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court identified six independent characteristics "[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question." The first two are often given the most weight. The six include:
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[1] a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [2] or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; [4] or the impossibility of a court's undertaking of independent resolution without expressing lack ofthe respect due to coordinate branches of government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to the political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
See Bak~r, 369 U.S. at 217. As the D.C. Circuit has written, only one Baker criteria need manifest for an
abstention determination. See Snider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Not one, not two, but all six Baker characteristics are patent for this Court's consideration of the Plaintiffs' claims. If the Court goes beyond the textuallycommitted authority of the president, it risks becoming lost in the densest of a modem political thicket. The Court will find no manageable standards to competently decide the claims and will be forced to make policy determinations -without the skills or classified information needed for such determinations.
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Again, there are no judicially manageable standards by which the Court can endeavor to assess the President's interpretation of classified and military intelligence and his resulting decision - based on that intelligence - whether to restrict entry of foreign-soil aliens from the listed nations. And, the Court has no ability to judge the layered foreign-policy objectives for the president's explicit messaging to other nations ofthe cooperation expected in the war on terror ifthey want to avoid being placed on the list - in future. As a matter of a required firstorder determination, the Court's inquiry into such Executive Branch business is barred. Assertion that such an inquiry is necessary to an unmanageable, secondorder analysis of statutory assertions, APA process, or specious constitutional claims does not make the inquiry or the controversy justiciable.
It will be with little or no "respect" shown to coordinate political branches if the Court seriously considers Plaintiffs' specious assertion that the president's motivation for the freeze stems from religious bigotry. And review of this matter is opposite to an "adherence" to the president's political decision already made. The Court's engagement in such judicial interference also threatens political and practical chaos. And by reviewing the instant matter, this Court will only add to the "multifarious pronouncements" of courts across the nation regarding the travel freeze. Although both the president and the judiciary will suffer "embarrassment" from such judicial intervention, it is the American people who will suffer a greater
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danger ofterrorist harm. And the American people's long asserted claims of self-governance are cast into doubt if their newly-elected president is not given room to do exactly what he promised to during 2016 election - better protect citizens during this time of war.
Judicial declarations interfering with President Trump's decision on the travel freeze will certainly create doubts among the international community as to the resolve of the United States to adhere to this position. And the judicial interference undercuts the freeze's message to other nations regarding the new administration's broader and significant shift to an "America first" war strategy and foreign policy. See Lowry v. Regan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987). See also, Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 1988).
Subsequent to Baker, the Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) applied these Baker factors by instructing that the political question analysis begins by "determin[ing] whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed." 506 U.S. at 228. The Supreme Court rejected, as nonjusticiable, a debenched federal judge's challenge to the Senate's exercise of its Article I, § 3, Clause 6 "sole" duty to "try" all impeachments. The Court refused to review a procedurally problematic Senate impeachment trial process in which an "evidence committee" of only 12 senators heard testimony while 88 senators avoided jury duty. All 100 Senators were ultimately allowed to vote -- thumbs up
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or down -- rendering the final removal verdict. The Court determined that it did not have authority to review the shortcut Senate trial process used to strip U.S. District Judge Walter Nixon of his tenured office and salary. The Court explicitly ruled "the word 'try' in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate" Id. at 239. Neither should this Court review the president's exercise of his exclusive textual authority to implement war strategy and security-related foreign policy.
Just as the Supreme Court did in the Nixon, this Court should readily determine that "there is no separate provision of the Constitution" 506 U.S. at 237, that could be rationally argued to conflict with the President's textual authority to utilize his war powers to implement the travel freeze. Foreign-soil aliens do have Fifth Amendment rights (and they cannot bootstrap such rights from their alleged contacts with American citizens and resident aliens). As Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote: "Indeed, we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,269 (1990) (citingJohnsonv. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950). See also, Lega/Assistancefor Vietnamese Asy/umSeekersv.Dep'tofState, Bureau ofConsular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Neither do foreign-soil aliens have First Amendment rights to assert religious discrimination claims. Protests that Donald Trump had bad motives in his decision to institute the travel freeze - particularly those that allege a religious bias against Muslims by including references to statements he made in the 2016 presidential election- are both specious and slanderous. Again, there are "legitimate reasons" for the president's action and this Court can "not infer a discriminatory purpose." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99(1987).
It bears reemphasis that the travel freeze does not apply to aliens presently
residing in America, unlike the alien residents at issue in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356,369 (1886). And the instant action does not involve aliens having been involuntarily taken to, and/or subject to prolonged detention on, American soil or on foreign soil over which America has "plenary or exclusive jurisdiction." Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004). Quite the opposite in factual context, the complaints stem from foreign-soil aliens not being immediately allowed entry onto America's soil. The Guantanamo Bay cases are not supportive of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. See Boumediene v. Bush, 53 US 723 (2008).
Goldwater v. Carter is the best example of the Supreme Court's most efficient political question determination. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Goldwater involved a group of senators, led by Barry Goldwater, who sued President Jimmy Carter to challenge his abrogation of a United States treaty with Taiwan. The
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Supreme Court rejected the senators' attempt to interfere with an exclusive Executive authority to conduct foreign policy. Without oral argument, the high court announced: "The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint." !d. In a concurring statement, Associate Justice William Rehnquist explained: "[T]he basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is 'political' and therefore nonjusticiable." !d. at 1002. After neither oral argument or a review the merits regarding the senators' challenge to the president's foreign policy decision, Rehnquist stated:
An Art. III court's resolution of a question that is 'political' in character can
create far more disruption among the three coequal branches ofGovernment than.the resolution of a question presented in a moot.controversy. Since the political nature ofthe questions presented should have precluded the lower courts from considering or deciding the merits ofthe controversy, the prior proceedings in the federal courts must be vacated, and the complaint dismissed. !d. at 1005-06. Just a year before the American people were to replace a weakened Executive with a new president who promised a different foreign policy (an election that was held while Iran's religious tyrants held Americans hostage in the U.S. Embassy), Justice Rehnquist upheld the authority of the president and the legitimacy ofthe judiciary by articulating the requirement for judicial abstention. Justice Rehnquist's 1979 words provide the clearest argument for this Court's 2017 immediate dismissal.
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But perhaps less "domesticated" abstention advocacy is needed to counsel this Court's self-restraint in this important and highly public matter; "something greatly more flexible, something ofprudence, not construction and not principle." The purest prudential strain of nonjusticiability still incubates in Alexander Bickel's THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS. Professor Bickel described political questions as those issues which ask the courts to evaluate policy and choose between outcomes - functions which the
judiciary as an institution is functionally incompetent to carry out.
In unmatched written aesthetic, Alexander Bickel offered a foundation
instead ofBaker-like criteria:
In a mature democracy, choices such as this must be made by the executive...Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, ofthe political-question doctrine: the Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness ofthe issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be; (d) fmally ("in a mature democracy"), the inner vulnerability, the selfdoubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
Alexander Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 184 (Yale 1986).
When considering the danger that could result from judicial interference in the president's foreign policy and war strategy, it is disturbingly prescient that
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Professor Bickel addressed "the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored but that it should but will not be." And certainly today, our unelected judiciary, which has "no earth to draw strength from," would be wise to stay out ofthe worsening and ugly mud-fight being waged by ideological elites against Donald Trump.
Admittedly, the late Yale University Law professor's prudential poetry unnerves the judge-centric consciousness so predominant at bar and in the legal academy. All the more reason for this Court's deep consideration of its fundamental truths.
There is a related -- but separate -consideration for this Court: The ~ation's extreme need for finality in this matter. This need for finality weighs very heavily in favor of a political question determination. As Judge Steven Williams reasoned in 1991, when Nixon v. United States was before the D.C. Circuit: "Although the primary reason for invoking the political question doctrine in our case is the textual commitment...the need for finality also demands it." Nixon v. United States, 93 8 F.2d 239, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(citations omitted).
The cost of the judiciary answering political questions is often chaos: "If claims such as Nixon's were justiciable, procedural appeals from every impeachment trial would become routine...the intrusion ofthe courts would
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expose the political life ofthe country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos." Id at 246. Challenges to the president's travel freeze are now becoming "routine," with adjudications challenging the travel restriction ongoing in several sister courts. It must be clearly seen that "the intrusion ofthe courts would expose the political life [and national security] of the country to months, or perhaps years, of [dangerous] chaos." /d.
As what is termed Trump derangement syndrome appears virulently contagious among lawyers (who need only the federal court filing fee to manifest the disorder), fmality in this area is needed to help retard future frivolous litigation against Donald Trump's future war prosecution and related foreign policy efforts.
Attempts by the judiciary to interfere with President Trump's exercise ofhis inherent and exclusive authorities threaten a serious breach of the separation of powers. The judiciary does not have the institutional competence or information to make decisions about what actions are required in order for the new president to fulfill his responsibilities to prosecute this unusual, ongoing war.
Just as the D.C. Circuit explained, cases involving national security and foreign relations "raise issues that 'frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application' or 'involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the
33

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 27 Filed 03/17/17 Page 43 of 45 PageID# 816
executive or legislature."' El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 841 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 221).
Article II grants the president war powers and security-related foreign relations authorities "the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience." Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137, 165 (1803). In our 227 years of self-government practice under our second constitution, only 45 persons have known the unique obligation. It is a burden that requires the president to make difficult calculations often based often on classified information. President Barack Obama has now been relieved of that heavy burden, and a majority of"Electors [have inet and voted] in their respective states" to place the burden on the shoulders (and on the heart) of another. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XII,§ 1.
This Court should not interrupt the new president's prosecution ofthe war that he inherited from past administrations - from past presidents holding onto tired and failed foreign policies. Amicus respectfully argues that the Plaintiffs' claims should be immediately dismissed with a determination of nonjusticiability.
Just as this argument began, it should fmish by again acknowledging that one can hardly bear to read many of the tragic narratives of aliens' hurt, fear, and family separation as relayed in the travel freeze litigation across America. Sadly,
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General Shennan remains right - "war is hell." During this time as our new president re-orients prosecution of America's prolonged war with terrorism, while the hellish states of civil war, violent disorder, and evil oppression only worsen in the listed nations, our federal judiciary has its own high duty to perform -abstention.
Iiams, pro se irst Lawyers Association www.americafirstlawyers.com 5209 Baltimore Ave Bethesda, :MD 20816 (301) 951-9045 americafirstlawyers@gmail.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March lll, 2017, the foregoing brief with relevant motion was filed with the Clerk of this Court using the Federal Express courier (as prose
prospective Amicus is not a registered ECF user) and served on parties using
electronic transmittal via their email addresses registered to their ECF accounts.
ertca First Lawyers Association www.americafirstlawvers.com 5209 Baltimore Ave, Bethesda, MD 20816 (301) 951-9045 americafirstlawyers@gmail.com
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 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 36 Filed 03/24/17 Page 1 of 32 PageID# 841

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________________)

Civil Action No. 1:17cv00120 (AJT/IDD)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ “Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction” [Doc. No. 13] (the “Motion”). The Court held

a hearing on the Motion on March 21, 2017, following which it took the Motion under

advisement. Upon consideration of the Motion, the memoranda in support thereof and in

opposition thereto, the arguments of counsel at the hearing held on March 21, 2017, and for the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.1

I. BACKGROUND The Plaintiffs seek an emergency order enjoining the enforcement of Executive Order 13,780 (“EO-2” or the “Order”), issued by President Donald J. Trump (“President Trump” or the “President”) on March 6, 2017 and scheduled to go into effect on March 16, 2017. Subject to a number of enumerated limitations, exemptions, and waivers, the Order suspends entry into the United States by nationals of six countries for 90 days and by all refugees for 120 days. EO-2

1 Both parties have urged the Court to decide the Motion on the merits. In particular, the Plaintiffs claim that given the nature of their Establishment Clause injuries, the harm inflicted by EO-2 is not confined to any particular provision and persists so long as any of its provisions continue to operate. Given the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, the temporary and limited nature of the injunctions already issued, and the facts that appear to be particular to these Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that there remains a justiciable controversy ripe for adjudication and will therefore decide the Motion on its merits.

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explicitly rescinds Executive Order 13,769 (“EO-1”), which similarly temporarily barred nationals from certain countries from obtaining visas or entering the United States but did not contain the exemptions and waivers now in EO-2 and also included certain religious preferences no longer in EO-2.
The ultimate issue in this action is whether the President exceeded his authority, either as delegated to him by Congress or as provided by the Constitution. But because Plaintiffs seek at the beginning of this case the relief they would ultimately obtain at the end of the case should they prove successful, Plaintiffs must show not only that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that EO-2 exceeded the President’s authority, but also that (2) without immediate injunctive relief, Plaintiffs face imminent irreparable harm; (3) the balance of equities, including the balance of hardships, weigh in their favor; and (4) issuance of the requested injunction on an emergency basis is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
A. Factual History 1. Executive Order No. 1
On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). EO-1 immediately suspended immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States for 90 days to aliens from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. EO-1 also suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) for 120 days, id. § 5(a), and suspended the entry of all refugees from Syria indefinitely, id. § 5(c). Furthermore, in screening refugees, government bodies were directed “to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority
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religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” Id. § 5(b). The order provided for “case-bycase” exceptions to the 120-day refugee suspension. Id. § 5(f).
A group of plaintiffs including the State of Washington and the State of Minnesota challenged EO-1 on both constitutional and statutory grounds in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). On February 3, 2017, the district court issued a nationwide injunction halting enforcement of the operative portions of that order, although it did not provide a specific basis for finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. Id. On February 9, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants’ emergency appeal to stay the district court’s order, which it construed as a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit found that the defendants had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim, but it reserved judgment on the plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause claims, noting that they “raise[d] serious allegations and present[ed] significant constitutional questions.” Id. at 1168.
Separately, on February 13, 2017, this Court enjoined the enforcement of section 3(c) only as to Virginia residents and students enrolled in state educational institutions located in the State of Virginia. Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-116, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 580855 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017) (Brinkema, J.). This Court ruled that the plaintiffs had clearly demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, but it did not address their other claims. That injunction has not been appealed.
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2. Executive Order No. 2 Responding to the successful legal challenges to EO-1, on March 6, 2017, President Trump issued EO-2. EO-2 explicitly rescinds EO-1 and was scheduled to go into effect on March 16, 2017 at 12:01 a.m. EDT. EO-2 has the same title as EO-1 and has many of the same stated policies and purposes. It also has substantial differences, as discussed in detail below. Briefly summarized, EO-2 removes Iraq from the list of designated countries whose nationals are covered by the Order, eliminates the indefinite suspension of all refugees from Syria, exempts otherwise covered persons who are located in the United States or who had appropriate travel documents as of the date on which EO-1 was issued, provides a list of categories where otherwise covered persons qualify for consideration of a waiver, and removes any religiousbased preferences for waivers. The Order also contains substantially more justification for its national security concerns and the need for the Order, including why each particular designated country poses specific dangers. Before the Order’s effective date, the State of Hawaii and a United States citizen challenged the Order in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. On March 15, 2017, the Hawaii court issued a nationwide temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining the enforcement of sections 2 and 6 of EO-2. Hawai‘i v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050, 2017 WL 1011673 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017). At the hearing in this action before this Court on March 21, 2017, Defendants represented that they expected the District of Hawaii court to extend the TRO, with their consent, until that court decides the pending motion for a preliminary injunction, a hearing on which has been scheduled for March 29, 2017.2 The TRO has not been appealed.
2 The TRO did not have an expiration date, but it will expire on March 29, 2017, unless extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) (“The order expires at the time after entry—not to exceed 14 days—that the court sets . . . .”). Where the court has not set a specific time of expiration, the order simply expires fourteen days after entry.
4

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A separate group of six individuals and three organizations challenged EO-2 in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that it inflicted stigmatizing injuries as well as various other more particularized forms of harm. In an order signed on March 15, 2017 but entered on March 16, 2017, the Maryland court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of section 2(c) of EO-2. Int’l Refugee Assist. Proj. v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 1018235 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017).
Litigation in the Western District of Washington also continues. In that case, Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to enforce the court’s February 3, 2017 preliminary injunction of EO1. The district court rejected that motion, finding that EO-2 did not violate the court’s prior preliminary injunction because EO-2 is substantively different from EO-1. Order Denying Washington’s Emergency Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction, Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2017), ECF No. 163.
By way of summary, at this point, the District of Hawaii court’s TRO remains in effect as to sections 2 and 6 of the Order until March 29, 2017, and the District of Maryland court’s preliminary injunction remains in effect as to section 2(c) of the Order. All other sections of EO2 are in force at this time. Plaintiffs in this litigation ask this Court to enjoin the enforcement of EO-2 in its entirety.
B. Plaintiffs Who Move for Emergency Relief All Plaintiffs are Muslims who are presently residing in various locations across the country and claim that they have been harmed by the issuance of EO-2 in a variety of ways. Among the injuries they allege is the harm created by a stigma against Muslims living in the United States. Specifically, they claim that as a result of Defendants’ conduct, beginning with the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban,” Defendants have promoted views that (1)
5

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disfavor and condemn their religion of Islam; (2) marginalize and exclude Muslims, including themselves, based on the claim that Muslims are disposed to commit acts of terrorism; (3) endorse other religions and nonreligion over Islam; (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community; and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 11] (“AC”) ¶¶ 20-38. In addition, Plaintiffs allege a range of other injuries based on each’s particular status in the United States and each’s relationships with persons outside of the United States. The following eight Plaintiffs have joined in the Motion.3
Plaintiffs Basim Elkarra, Hussam Ayloush, and Adam Soltani are United States citizens who allegedly “are no longer able to bring their family members from Syria and Iran to visit them in the United States as a direct result of the Revised Muslim Ban [EO-2] as they otherwise would.” Plaintiffs’ Motion (“Pls.’ Mot.”) 6. They further allege that, as “prominent civil rights and grassroots activists,” they “have had to change their conduct adversely in that they have been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted or stigmatized by the First Muslim Ban [EO-1], push back against the anti-Muslim sentiment fomented and legitimized by Defendants, and defend their religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.” Id.
Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 is also a United States citizen. He recently filed a marriage petition for his Sudanese wife currently residing outside of the United States, which he claimed would be “subjected to a more onerous application process that will require her to make heightened showings to obtain a waiver from the Revised Muslim Ban [EO-2], pursuant to Sec. 3(c)(iv) of the Revised Muslim ban, based solely on her Sudanese national origin.” Id. 6-7. That
3 Plaintiffs John Doe No. 5 is a Sudanese national and lawful permanent resident of the United States who initially joined in the presently pending Motion; however, on March 21, 2017, he withdrew his Motion. [Doc. No. 31.]
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petition was approved while this Motion was pending, however, [see Doc. No. 31], and her visa application is now pending.
Plaintiffs John Doe Nos. 7 and 8 are lawful permanent residents of the United States. John Doe No. 7 is a Syrian national, and John Doe No. 8 is a Sudanese national. John Doe No. 7 filed a marriage petition for his wife, which is currently pending. John Doe No. 8 also filed a marriage petition for his wife, which was approved, but her visa application remains pending. These three Plaintiffs allege that under EO-2, “their wives’ visa applications will be subject to a more onerous application process that will require [them] to make heightened showings to obtain a waiver from the Revised Muslim Ban.” Id. 7.
Plaintiffs John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 are students of Somali and Yemeni national origin who were issued single-entry F-1 student visas which expire upon completion of their studies. They allege that they intended to travel outside of the United States but that, if they do so now, they “will be subjected to a more onerous application process that will require them to make heightened showings to obtain a waiver.” Id. They claim that this inability to travel imposes a hardship because they are additionally deprived of the opportunity to see their families, and they may not be able to stay in student housing during school breaks. Id. 7-8.
C. Procedural History President Trump issued EO-1 on January 27, 2017. Three days later, on January 30, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief [Doc. No.1] against President Trump, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security John F. Kelly, the U.S. Department of State, and the Director of National Intelligence.4 Then, on March 13, 2017,5 after
4 On February 3, 2017 and February 27, 2017, three separate motions to intervene were filed by pro se movants Janice Wolk Grenadier [Doc. No. 2], Raquel Okyay [Doc. No. 4], and Vincent A. Molino [Doc. No. 8]. The Court denied each of these motions. [Doc. Nos. 5, 10.]
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President Trump’s March 6, 2017 issuance of EO-2, which explicitly rescinded EO-1, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief [Doc. No. 11] as well as their presently pending “Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction” [Doc. No. 13].
II. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes federal courts to issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. “The standard for granting either a TRO or a preliminary injunction is the same.” Moore v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Both are “extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). The movants bear the burden to establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 263 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2013).
III. ANALYSIS A. Standing In order to obtain the requested injunction, Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that they have standing to challenge EO-2. Defendants dispute that any of the Plaintiffs have standing. “Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the
5 In their Motion, Plaintiffs incorrectly claim that they filed their Amended Complaint on March 10, 2017. See Def.’s Mot. 8. The Amended Complaint is dated “March 13, 2017,” see AC 53, and the Court’s CM/ECF electronic case filing system also indicates that the document was electronically filed on March 13, 2017.
8

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federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191. To establish standing, a plaintiff must set forth specific facts to demonstrate that (1) he has “suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) there exists “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for every claim, but a claim is justiciable if even only one Plaintiff has standing to raise it. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370-71 (4th Cir. 2014).
Because of the nature of Plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims, their showing of standing may be based on subjective, non-economic, or intangible injuries. Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[R]ules of standing recognize that noneconomic or intangible injury may suffice to make an Establishment Clause claim justiciable.”); Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 605 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[P]laintiffs have been found to possess standing when they are ‘spiritual[ly] affront[ed]’ as a result of ‘direct’ and ‘unwelcome’ contact with an alleged religious establishment within their community.” (quoting Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086-87)); Bostic, 760 F.3d at 372 (Equal Protection Clause challenges, like Establishment Clause challenges, can be premised on “stigmatic injury stemming from discriminatory treatment.”). However, the allegation of injury in the form of a stigma alone is insufficient to support standing; there must also be a “cognizable injury caused by personal contact [with the offensive conduct].” Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1090; see also Moss, 683 F.3d at 607 (finding standing where plaintiffs alleged “outsider” status after having received a letter from
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their school district promoting a “course of religious education [with] Christian content” and “prayers and other Christian references [at] school events”).
In this case, all Plaintiffs claim that in addition to the stigma that the Order has imposed on them as Muslims, they have suffered “cognizable injury caused by personal contact” because EO-2 prevents or impermissibly burdens their ability to (1) reunite with their foreign national spouses or other relatives; (2) travel internationally without fear of forfeiting their own visas; (3) renew their visas without being subjected to a heightened standard of review; and (4) attend other life activities without the need to combat the pernicious effects of EO-2 through religious advocacy and outreach. Based on these alleged injuries and the facts that have been presented, the Court finds for the purposes of the Motion that Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that they have standing to challenge EO-2.
B. Plaintiffs’ Likelihood of Success on the Merits Section 2(c) of EO-2 suspends the entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 days, subject to the limitations, exemptions, and waivers in sections 3 and 12. Section 6 of EO-2 suspends decisions on applications for refugee status worldwide for 120 days, subject to waivers issued under section 6(c). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin EO-2 in its entirety on the grounds that all or parts of the Order exceed the President’s statutory or constitutional authority and that, in any event, the Order, as a whole, has the unconstitutional effect of imposing upon them a stigma based on their status as Muslims. “[A] party seeking a preliminary injunction . . . must clearly show that it is likely to succeed on the merits.”6 Dewhurst v. Century Alum. Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011).
6 Plaintiffs claim that “a showing of likelihood of success on the merits is required ‘only if there is no imbalance of hardships in favor of the plaintiff.’” Pls.’ Mot. 12 (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 808 (4th Cir. 1991)). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter in 2008, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “[o]ur . . . standard in several respects [as stated in Direx Israel, Ltd.] now stands in fatal tension with the Supreme
10

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The “requirement . . . is far stricter than . . . [a] requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate only a
grave or serious question for litigation.” Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. F.E.C., 575 F.3d 342,
346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), judgment vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), and adhered to in relevant part, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).7 In determining whether the Plaintiffs have
made the required showing, the issue is not whether EO-2 is wise, necessary, under- or over-
inclusive, or even fair. It is not whether EO-2 could have been more usefully directed to
populations living in particular geographical areas presenting even greater threats to national
security or even whether it is politically motivated. Rather, the core substantive issue of law, as
to which Plaintiffs must establish a clear likelihood of success, is whether EO-2 falls within the
bounds of the President’s statutory authority or whether the President has exercised that authority
in violation of constitutional restraints.
1. Plaintiffs’ Claim that EO-2 Violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (Count IV8)
Plaintiffs claim that section 2(c) of EO-2 bars entry into the United States based on
nationality and therefore violates the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), Pub. L.
No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012). Plaintiffs argue that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1152(a)(1)(A) (“Section 1152”) bars EO-2. Defendants claim that the President’s broad
Court’s 2008 decision in Winter. . . . [T]he . . . balance-of-hardship test may no longer be applied in granting or denying preliminary injunctions in the Fourth Circuit.” Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. F.E.C., 575 F.3d 342, 34647 (4th Cir. 2009), judgment vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010). 7 The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Real Truth About Obama, Inc. following its opinion in Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and remanded to the Fourth Circuit “for ‘further consideration in light of Citizens United and the Solicitor General’s suggestion of mootness.’” Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. F.E.C., 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. F.E.C., 559 U.S. 1089 (2010)). In a published order issued per curiam, the Fourth Circuit reissued Parts I and II of its earlier opinion, “stating the facts and articulating the standard for the issuance of preliminary injunctions,” and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directive. 8 Plaintiffs’ labelling of this claim as “Count V” in their Amended Complaint appears to be a typo, as there is no Count IV. See AC 50.
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authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (“Section 1182(f)”) to bar entry of “any aliens or class of aliens” is not restricted by Section 1152.9
Congress has the exclusive constitutional authority to create immigration policies. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).10 In exercising that authority, Congress has enacted (and repealed) a wide variety of immigration statutes over the years, with a wide variety of restrictions and authorizations. As a result, the current version of the INA, a comprehensive statute governing immigration and the treatment of aliens originally passed in 1952, is a legislative rabbit warren that is not easily navigated.
Section 1182(a)(3)(B) identifies those aliens seeking to enter the United States who are “inadmissible” because of certain identified activities related to terrorism. These aliens include, with certain exceptions, aliens who have engaged in “terrorist activities,” are reasonably believed to be engaged or “likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activities,” are representatives of a terrorist organization, endorse or espouses terrorist activities or persuade others to do so, have received military-type training from a terrorist organization, or are the spouses or children of an alien who is inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i). “Terrorist activity” is defined broadly. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
In addition to the specific criteria for inadmissibility set forth in Section 1182(a)(3)(B), Section 1182(f), which was also passed in 1952, delegates broad authority to the President to bar entry into the United States of “any aliens or class of aliens.” More specifically, Section 1182(f) provides that:
9 The Court will first assess Plaintiffs’ statutory claims pursuant to its obligation to avoid constitutional rulings whenever possible. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”). 10 Defendants contend that the President has Article II authority, as well as statutory authority, to issue EO-2. Given the Court’s ruling, there is no need to consider the merits of Defendants’ Article II contentions.
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Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. Id. § 1182(f). 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (“Section 1185(a)”), passed in 1978, further delegates authority to the President: Unless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful for an alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe. Id. § 1185(a)(1). President Trump relies explicitly on his authority under Section 1182(f) and Section 1185(a) to suspend the entry of all nationals from the six designated countries for 90 days as well as to suspend the entry of all refugees under the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days. EO-2 §§ 2(c), 6. In 1965, Congress amended the INA to prohibit certain types of discrimination in connection with the issuance of immigrant visas. Section 1152 provides: No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Plaintiffs rely centrally on this provision to argue that the President’s exercise of his authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) is limited and restricted by the nondiscrimination provision in Section 1152. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (“Section 1201(h)”) is also relevant. In pertinent part, it provides: Nothing in [the INA] shall be construed to entitle any alien, to whom a visa or other documentation has been issued, to be admitted the United States, if, upon arrival at a port of entry in the United States, he is found to be inadmissible under this chapter, or any other provision of law.
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Id. § 1201(h). So as to leave no doubt as to the scope of entitlement granted by the issuance of an immigrant visa, Congress mandated that the text of this provision “appear upon every visa application.” Id.
Plaintiffs urge this Court to conclude that section 2(c) of EO-2 discriminates on the basis of nationality and is therefore prohibited by Section 1152. Plaintiffs argue in this regard that because this non-discrimination section was added after Section 1182(f), Congress intended that it supersede Section 1182(f) to the extent the two sections conflict. Plaintiffs argue in support of this position that, historically, presidents have used Section 1182(f) only to prohibit the issuance of visas to classes of applicants that are not subject to Section 1152. See Pls.’ Mot. 27-28. Plaintiffs also contend that because, when applicable, Section 1152(a) applies to any assessment of the terrorism related grounds for inadmissibility under Section 1182(a)(3)(B), Section 1152(a)’s non-discrimination restrictions must also be read to apply to the President’s exercise of authority under Section 1182(f) and 1185(a), at least in so far as that authority is exercised to bar entry based on terrorism concerns. For all these reasons, Plaintiffs claim that Congress foreclosed the President’s ability to make national security determinations on the basis of criteria prohibited under Section 1152.
In response to Plaintiffs’ position, Defendants see presidential authority and authorizations in Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) unaffected by Section 1152 and contend that the President’s authority under those sections “comfortably encompass the Order’s temporary suspension of entry of aliens from six countries.” Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion [Doc. No. 22] (“Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n”) 17. They contend, in this regard, that Section 1185(a) was enacted after Section 1152 and that, in any event, Section 1152 prohibits discrimination only in the issuance of an immigration – not a non-immigration – visa “in the
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ordinary process of visas and admissions.” Id. 18. Section 1152 “does not purport to, and has never been interpreted to restrict, the President’s longstanding authority [under Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a)].” Id. Defendants further contend that since most of the aliens that Plaintiffs claim will be affected by EO-2 – students, employees, tourists, refugees, and family – would seek to obtain non-immigrant visas, any limitations imposed by Section 1152 would not extend to the President’s authority to bar entry of that class of aliens seeking non-immigration visas.
In construing the proper scope of the President’s statutory authority, the Court has reviewed the text and structure of the INA as a whole and, specifically, the practical, operational relationship each of the above referenced provisions has with the others. Based on that analysis, the Court concludes, at a minimum, that Section 1152’s non-discrimination restrictions, which apply in connection with the issuance of immigrant visas, do not apply to the issuance or denial of non-immigrant visas or entry under Section 1182(f).12
The Court also has substantial doubts that Section 1152 can be reasonably read to impose any restrictions on the President’s exercise of his authority under Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a). Under those sections, the President has unqualified authority to bar physical entry to the United States at the border. Sections 1182(f) and 1152(a) deal with different aspects of the immigration process, and Section 1201(h) makes clear that while clearly related, the process of issuing a visa, and the rules and regulations related thereto, involves an aspect of the immigration process that is separate and distinct from the process of actually permitting entry into the country. There is nothing in the legislative scheme to suggest that Congress intended Section 1152 to restrict the exercise of the President’s unqualified authority under Section 1182(f) with respect to a
12 The District of Maryland court attempted to reconcile these seemingly contradictory provisions of the INA in International Refugee Assistance Project. There, the court concluded that Section 1152 bars the President from discriminating on the basis of nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas only. Int’l Refugee Assist. Proj., 2017 WL 1018235, at *10.
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completely distinct aspect of the immigration process. To do so would appear to make Section 1201(h) all but meaningless. Likewise, the Court sees little merit to Plaintiffs’ argument that because there are specific grounds for inadmissibility in Section 1182(a)(3)(B) based on terrorist activities, the President is foreclosed from barring entry of “aliens or classes of aliens” under Section 1182(f) based on national security concerns related to terrorism. Nothing in the text of Section 1182(a)(3)(B) or any other provision of the INA suggests that an alien may be barred from entering the United States on terrorism grounds only through the regular visa application process. This provision simply provides grounds that establish per se ineligibility to receive a visa or to be admitted into the country. It also shows that Congress knows how to make a provision applicable to both the visa decision and the entry decision when it so intends and that the two aspects of immigration are distinct. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States . . . .”).
For the above reasons, the Court cannot say at this point in the litigation that Plaintiffs have clearly shown that the President’s authority under Section 1182(f) and 1185(a) is limited by Section 1152 with respect to either immigrant or non-immigrant visas. Plaintiffs have therefore not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their INA statutory claim even if EO-2 discriminates on the basis of nationality (Count IV).
2. Plaintiffs’ Claim that EO-2 Constitutes Unlawful Agency Action Under the Administrative Procedures Act (Count III)
Plaintiffs claim that the issuance of EO-2 violates the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5. U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2012). Although the APA defines an “agency” broadly to include “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 701, this definition is not broad enough to
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include the Office of the President. The Supreme Court has explicitly found that “the President’s
actions [a]re not reviewable under the APA, because the President is not an ‘agency’ within the
meaning of the APA.” Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469 (1994); see also Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (“Out of respect for the separation of powers and
the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to
subject the President to the provisions of the APA.”). Accordingly, because President Trump’s
issuance of EO-2 is not reviewable under the APA, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are
likely to succeed on the merits as to their unlawful agency action claim (Count III).
3. Plaintiffs’ Claim that EO-2 Violates the Establishment Clause (Count I)
Plaintiffs also allege that EO-2 violates the Establishment Clause because it disfavors the religion of Islam.13 The First Amendment prohibits any “law respecting an establishment of
religion,” U.S. Const. amend. I, and “mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
If an act is discriminatory on its face, than it will be subject to strict scrutiny. Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 246, 255 (1982). If it is not discriminatory on its face, then courts typically apply
a three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) to determine whether the act violates the Establishment Clause.14
13 As a threshold matter, there remain open issues concerning to what extent recognized Establishment Clause principles and prohibitions developed over time with respect to domestic government conduct transfer seamlessly in application to restrict government conduct touching upon national security matters, including immigration and the treatment of aliens with no claim to citizenship or other immigration benefits. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this Motion, and because the Plaintiffs invoke the Establishment Clause based on their personal status as U.S. citizens or as lawful residents of the United States, the Court assumes, without deciding, that the President’s exercise of his authority to issue EO-2 is circumscribed by settled Establishment Clause principles. 14 There is one additional test to find a violation of the Establishment Clause, which has only once been invoked and is not relevant to this litigation. Regardless of whether a government action is facially neutral, that action will be found constitutional where there is “unambiguous and unbroken history” that unequivocally demonstrates the Framers’ intent that the Establishment Clause not prohibit the government action. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (finding the opening of congressional session with a prayer constitutional).
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The text of EO-2, unlike that of EO-1, makes no mention of religion as a criterion for benefits or burdens. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs maintained at the hearing that EO-2, section 1(f), which articulates President Trump’s rationale behind the Order, is nevertheless discriminatory on its face because the national security risk referenced to justify EO-2 in that section is demonstrably false and EO-2’s plain language therefore betrays the Order’s discriminatory intent.
As an initial matter, and as Plaintiffs concede in their brief, the language of EO-2 is facially neutral. See Pls’ Mot. 5 (“[EO-2] creates a framework that although neutral on its face, carries through the same invidious intent insofar it essentially seeks to preserve a portion of the First Muslim Ban [EO-1].”). To be facially neutral simply means that there is no discrimination in “that which is shown by the mere language employed, without any explanation, modification, or addition from extrinsic facts or evidence.” Face, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Discrimination based on religion cannot be inferred from the language EO-2 employs. EO-2 draws no “explicit and deliberate distinctions” based on religion. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 262 (1982). Moreover, the Court sees no basis for the claim that EO-2’s stated and referenced justifications are “demonstrably false,” and no inference of religious discrimination can be reasonably inferred from those justifications. EO-2 is therefore “facially neutral,” and the Court applies the Lemon test to assess its constitutional validity under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Under the Lemon test, to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge, the government action (1) “must have a secular legislative purpose,” (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) “the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax
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Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiffs do not contend that EO-2 fails to satisfy the second or third prongs of the Lemon test, and the Court only needs to consider whether EO-2 has a secular purpose.
EO-2 clearly has a stated secular purpose: the “protect[ion of United States] citizens from terrorist attacks, including those committed by foreign nationals.” EO-2 § 1(a). It also details the overall policy and purpose for the Order. See id. (“The screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) play a crucial role in detecting foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism and in preventing those individuals from entering the United States. It is therefore the policy of the United States to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated the visa-issuance process and the USRAP.”); id. § 2(c) (explaining that the suspensions are needed “[t]o temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and in light of the national security concerns referenced in section 1 of this order”). The Court must therefore first determine to what extent and on what basis it will look behind the Order’s stated secular purpose and justification to determine whether EO-2 constitutes a subterfuge or pretext for a true purpose of religious discrimination. The Plaintiffs contend in that regard that the Court must consider what they claim is a long and unbroken stream of antiMuslim statements made by both candidate Trump and President Trump, as well as his close advisors, which, taken together, makes clear that EO-1 and EO-2 are nothing more than subterfuges for religious discrimination against Muslims. Defendants contend that given the
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clearly articulated secular purpose and national security related justifications in EO-2, the Court should not consider any such statements and end its inquiry at the text of EO-2.
In determining how to proceed, the Court is cast upon cross jurisprudential currents. On the one hand, this prong of the Lemon analysis “contemplates an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the government.” Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that in the immigration context, a court should not “look behind the exercise of [Executive Branch] discretion” when exercised “on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). In Mandel, the Supreme Court recognized that First Amendment rights were implicated in the government’s denial of a visa to an invited foreign lecturer. Nevertheless, and even though the government did not attempt to justify that denial on national security grounds, the Supreme Court concluded that where the government has provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, “the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who [claim they are injured by the visa denial].” Id.; see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 (1977) (confirming that a broad “policy choice” is to be reviewed under the same “standard . . . applied in[]Mandel”). As reflected in these rulings, a court must extend substantial deference to the government’s facially legitimate and non-discriminatory stated purposes. See, e.g., Appiah v. U.S. I.N.S., 202 F.3d 704, 710 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the president in the area of immigration and naturalization.” (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976)).
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Since Mandel and Fiallo, the Supreme Court has counseled that the focus of a district court’s inquiry should be on whether the stated purpose “was an apparent sham, or the secular purpose secondary.” McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 865 (2005) (While courts “often . . . accept governmental statements of purpose, in keeping with the respect owed in the first instance to such official claims, . . . in those unusual cases where the claim was an apparent sham, or the secular purpose secondary, the unsurprising results have been findings of no adequate secular object.”). It also directs that a court must develop an “an understanding of official objective . . . from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” Id. at 862. Based on these principles, the Court rejects the Defendants’ position that since President Trump has offered a legitimate, rational, and non-discriminatory purpose stated in EO-2, this Court must confine its analysis of the constitutional validity of EO-2 to the four corners of the Order. The Court has therefore carefully assessed President Trump’s facially legitimate national security basis for EO-2 against the backdrop of all of the statements the President and his closest advisors have made.15
When this Court reviewed and enjoined EO-1, “the question [wa]s whether the [order] was animated by national security concerns at all.” Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *10 (Brinkema, J.). President Trump and his advisors made statements that allowed the inference that the President’s purpose in exercising his authority under Section 1182(f) to issue EO-1 was to impose burdens wholesale on people who subscribe to the Islamic faith, viz., a “Muslim Ban.” That possible purpose was also reflected in the text and structure of EO-1, which contained language that, when considered in connection with public statements, suggested that Christians
15 These statements are recounted in detail in Plaintiffs’ briefs and the opinions of those courts that have enjoined the enforcement of EO-1 and EO-2. See Hawai‘i v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050, 2017 WL 1011673, at *13-15 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017); Int’l Refugee Assist. Proj. v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 1018235, at *3-4 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017); Aziz v. Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:17-cv-116, 2017 WL 580855, at *3-5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017).
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would be given a benefit not available to Muslims. EO-2 is materially different in structure, text,
and effect from EO-1 and has addressed the concerns raised not only by this Court but also by
other courts that reviewed and enjoined EO-1. EO-2 was not rushed into immediate effect but,
rather, was issued ten days before its effective date, permitting government bodies to better
prepare for its effective implementation. It does not indefinitely suspend the entry of refugees
from Syria, and it applies to all refugees, no matter where they are located. It does not direct that
preference be given to any particular religion or group of religion over any other.
EO-2 also effectively excludes large categories of otherwise covered nationals from the
relatively short suspension of any right to enter the United States. For example, section 3(a)
limits the scope of section 2(c) to aliens who were not in the United States on the Order’s effective date and who did not have a valid visa on that date or on the effective date of EO-1.16
Under section 3(b), all of the Plaintiffs involved in this litigation are exempted from the reach of
the Order. Similarly, under section 12(c) and (d), all immigrant and non-immigrant visas issued
before the issuance of EO-2, including those marked revoked or cancelled pursuant to EO-1, are
valid and reinstated. EO-2 also contains multiple circumstances and categories under which
consular officials are permitted to grant case-specific waivers to coverage under section 2(c) or section 6(a).17 EO-2 §§ 3(c), 6(c). Iraq is eliminated from the list of suspended countries
because “the Iraqi government has expressly undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation,
information sharing, and the return of Iraqi nationals subject to finals orders of removal” since
16 Other groups of aliens whose inclusion in the scope of EO-1 concerned the Ninth Circuit are similarly excluded from the scope of EO-2, including legal permanent residence, foreign nationals admitted to or paroled into the United States, foreign nationals granted asylum, refugees already admitted to the United States, and people granted particular forms of protection from removal. EO-2 § 3(b). 17 This list includes, inter alia, foreign nationals previously “admitted to the United States for a continuous period of work, study, or other long-term activity” but who currently reside outside of the United States and seek to re-enter; those who seek entry for “significant business or professional obligations and the denial of entry would impair those obligations”; and those who seek entry “to visit or reside with a close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent) who is a [U.S.] citizen, legal permanent resident, or alien lawfully admitted on a valid nonimmigrant visa.” EO-2 § 3(c).
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President Trump issued EO-1. Id. § 4. Finally, a “Policy and Purpose” section has been added
which provides an extensive justification for the Order on the basis of national security, including information specific to each of the six countries referenced in EO-2.18 Id. § 1. And as
stated above, EO-2 was also explicitly revised in response to judicial decisions that identified problematic aspects of EO-1 and invited revisions.19
Given the revisions in EO-2, the question is now whether the President’s past statements
continue to fatally infect what is facially a lawful exercise of presidential authority. In that
regard, the Supreme Court has held that “past actions [do not] forever taint any effort on [the
government’s] part to deal with the subject matter. . . . District courts are fully capable of
adjusting preliminary relief to take account of genuine changes in constitutionally significant
conditions.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 848. This Court is no longer faced with a facially
discriminatory order coupled with contemporaneous statements suggesting discriminatory intent.
And while the President and his advisors have continued to make statements following the issuance of EO-1 that have characterized or anticipated the nature of EO-2,20 the Court cannot
conclude for the purposes of the Motion that these statements, together with the President’s past
statements, have effectively disqualified him from exercising his lawful presidential authority
18 When it issued its stay of the district court’s TRO of EO-1, the Ninth Circuit indicated it had invited President Trump to make the sorts of changes that he has now made in his reissuance of the Order. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Despite the district court’s and our own repeated invitations to explain the urgent need for the Executive Order to be placed immediately into effect, the Government submitted no evidence . . . .”). 19 As President Trump states in the Order, “I am revoking Executive Order 13769 and replacing it with this order, which expressly excludes from the suspensions categories of aliens that have prompted judicial concerns and which
clarifies or refines the approach to certain other issues or categories of affected aliens.” EO-2 § 1(i); cf. Order
Denying Washington’s Emergency Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction, Washington v. Trump, No. C170141JLR, at 5-6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2017), ECF No. 163. (noting significant differences between EO-1 and EO-2 in denying the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to enforce the court’s preliminary injunction of EO-1 against EO-2 on the grounds that EO-2 constituted the same conduct previously enjoined). 20 Among these are the President’s reference to EO-2 as a “watered-down version” of EO-1, [see Doc. No. 28]; and Presidential Advisor Stephen Miller’s statement that a revised executive order was “going to have the same basic policy outcome for the country” and that it would be issued “with mostly minor technical differences.” Pls’ Mot., Ex. Y.
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under Section 1182(f). In other words, the substantive revisions reflected in EO-2 have reduced the probative value of the President’s statements to the point that it is no longer likely that Plaintiffs can succeed on their claim that the predominate purpose of EO-2 is to discriminate against Muslims based on their religion and that EO-2 is a pretext or a sham for that purpose. To proceed otherwise would thrust this Court into the realm of “‘look[ing] behind’ the president’s national security judgments . . . result[ing] in a trial de novo of the president’s national security determinations,” Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *8, and would require “a psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts,” all within the context of extending Establishment Clause jurisprudence to national security judgments in an unprecedented way.
For the above reasons, Plaintiffs have not made a clear showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits as to their Establishment Clause claim (Count I).
4. Plaintiffs’ Claim that EO-2 Violates the Equal Protection Clause (Count II)
Plaintiffs also contend that EO-2 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the First Amendment by targeting Muslims for distinctive treatment. The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.21 It is undisputed that EO-2 has a differential impact on Muslims. According to Plaintiffs, “there are approximately 166 million people in these six countries, all of whom will be affected by the [Order], and 97 percent of whom are Muslim.” Pls.’ Mot. 23. Defendants do not dispute that the countries affected are overwhelmingly Muslim.
“[A] law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is not invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater
21 Although the Clause only applies to state and local governments according to its text, the Supreme Court has held that it also applies to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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proportion of one race than of another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). This precept is particularly applicable in the area of immigration measures related to national security concerns. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized that where a particular immigration measure is facially neutral and has a rational national security basis that is “facially legitimate and bona fide,” such a measure will survive an Equal Protection Clause challenge. Rajah v. Mukasy, 544 F.3d 427, 438 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Romero v. INS, 399 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2005)). “Distinctions on the basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by Congress or the Executive . . . [and must be upheld] [s]o long as [they] are not wholly irrational . . . .” Id. (quoting Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
In Rajah, the Fourth Circuit rejected an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a program that required all non-permanent resident males over the age of sixteen from a group of countries that were, except for North Korea, predominantly Muslim to appear personally at government facilities for registration and fingerprinting and to present immigration related documents (“the Program”). Individuals who did not appear risked potential arrest. Id. at 433. The Fourth Circuit concluded that there was a rational national security basis for the special registration requirements because (1) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 “were facilitated by the lax enforcement of immigration laws”; (2) “[t]he Program was designed to monitor more closely aliens from certain countries selected on the basis of national security criteria”; and (3) the “Program was a plainly rational attempt to enhance national security.” Id. at 438-39. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause challenge, the Fourth Circuit observed:
To be sure, the Program did select countries that were, with the exception of North Korea, predominantly Muslim. Petitioners argue, without evidence other than that fact, that the Program was motivated by an improper animus toward Muslims. However, one major threat of terrorist attacks comes from radical Islamic groups. The Program was clearly tailored to those facts. It excluded males under 16 and females on the grounds that military age men are a greater
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security risk. Muslims from non-specified countries were not subject to registration. Aliens from the designated countries who were qualified to be permanent residents in the United States were exempted whether or not they were Muslims. The Program did not target only Muslims: non-Muslims from the designated countries were subject to registration. There is therefore no basis for petitioner’s claim.
Id. at 439. Plaintiffs argue that EO-2 is suspect because it does not extend to other countries that
pose greater terrorist threats, considering that there is no evidence that individuals who
committed acts of terrorism in the United States have actually come from the designated
countries. But the Fourth Circuit dispatched those sorts of arguments as well:
Petitioners also challenge the Program based on their perception of its effectiveness and wisdom. They argue, among other things, that it has not succeeded in catching a terrorist. However, we have no way of knowing whether the Program’s enhanced monitoring of aliens has disrupted or deterred attacks. In any event, such a consideration is irrelevant because an ex ante rather than an ex post assessment of the Program is required under the rational basis test. Id. at 439.
EO-2 identified a broad range of conditions, circumstances, and conditions that raise
“facially legitimate and bona fide” national security bases for the Order, including that each of
the designated countries (1) has conditions that present “heightened risks”; (2) is a state sponsor
of terrorism; (3) has been actively compromised by terrorist organizations; or (4) contains active
combat zones. EO-2 § 2(d). The President sees in these circumstances conditions that
“diminish[] the foreign government’s willingness or ability to share or validate important
information about individuals seeking travel to the United States,” and “the significant presence
in each of these countries of terrorist organizations, members, and others exposed to these
organizations increases the chance that conditions will be exploited to enable terrorist operatives
or sympathizers to travel to the United States.” Id. § 1(d). Moreover, “once foreign nationals
from these countries are admitted to the United States, it is often difficult to remove them,
because many of these countries typically delayed issuing, or refuse to issue, travel documents.” 26

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Id. EO-2 also identifies specific conditions in each designated country “that demonstrate why their nationals continue to present heightened risks to the security of the United States.” Id. § 1(e). The President has concluded that “[i]n light of the conditions in these six countries, until the assessment of current screening and vetting procedures required by section 2 of this order is completed, the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harming national security of the United States is unacceptably high.” Id. § 1(f). These are judgments committed to the political branches – not to the courts.
Moreover, as with the Program at issue in Rajah, EO-2 is similarly tailored to limit the scope of the temporary suspension. EO-2 contains limitations, exemptions, and waivers that undercut any inference that the purpose of the Order was to discriminate against Muslims because of their religion or nationality rather than national security concerns. Also as in Rajah, while the Order pertains to predominantly Muslin countries, it applies to any particular person equally, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Overall, EO-2 identifies a rational security basis for its issuance at least as strong and explicit as that found sufficient in Rajah. Plaintiffs again argue that the stated justifications and revisions reflected in EO-2 cannot overcome the President’s statements, including that EO-2 is a “watered-down” version of EO-1. But those statements do not eliminate the real substantive differences between the two orders, and for the reasons previously discussed within the context of Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause challenge, those statements are insufficient for the Court to conclude that the Plaintiffs have clearly shown that they will likely succeed on their Equal Protection Clause challenge in Count III.
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C. Irreparable Harm in the Absence of Preliminary Relief The Fourth Circuit has held that, as a matter of law, “loss of First Amendment rights, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 520-21 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); see also Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-116 (LMB/TCB), 2017 WL 580855, at *10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017). These Plaintiffs allege violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution in Count I, see AC ¶¶ 87-97, as well as various other forms of irreparable harm including (1) inability to arrange visits from foreign relatives, (2) more stringent review of spousal marriage petitions, and (3) more stringent review of a visa application. Without ruling specifically on these claims of irreparable harm, the Court finds it sufficient that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights are implicated in EO-2; and Plaintiffs should therefore not be denied injunctive relief based on the lack of irreparable harm. D. Balance of Equities In order to obtain the requested injunction, plaintiffs must establish, separately from any showing of irreparable harm, that the “balance of equities” weighs in their favor. In determining whether plaintiffs have made that showing, “[i]n each case, courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.’” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)). Plaintiffs argue that EO-2 has inflicted five different categories of harm on them: it (1) may prevent them from reuniting with their foreign national spouses due to EO-2’s heightened standard of review of marriage applications and visas; (2) may prevent them from renewing their own visas because those visas will be subject to a heightened standard of review; (3) may
28

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prevent them from traveling internationally out of their fear that they may somehow forfeit their own visas by doing so; (4) has imposed a stigma on the American Muslim community of which they are a part; and (5) has required them to devote their time and attention to publicly advocating on behalf of the American Muslim community.
All of these alleged harms are either speculative or were already experienced before or independently of EO-1 or EO-2. For example, with respect to the harms alleged in category 1, Plaintiffs claim that their marriage petitions filed on behalf of their spouses or their relatives’ visas will either be delayed in processing or subject to new, never before imposed, heightened standards of scrutiny. In support of that claim, they point to section 3(c) of EO-2, which provides consular officials with the discretion to issue individual waivers “if the foreign national has demonstrated to the officer’s satisfaction that denying entry during the suspension period would cause undue hardship, and that his or her entry would not pose a threat to national security and would be in the national interest,” as well as section 4, which subjects nationals of Iraq to “thorough review,” and section 5, which directs various agencies within the executive branch to implement a uniform screening and vetting procedure for screening all individuals who seek to enter the United States. Yet, as reflected in a State Department Alert issued on March 6, 2017, visa application appointments continue to be held. See Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n 12. Defendants have further represented that currently, while the enforcement of EO-2 has been enjoined by other Courts, applications are being reviewed in substantially the same way as before the issuance of either EO-1 or EO-2. In fact, on March 21, 2017, Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 “advise[d] the Court that his marriage petition that he filed for his wife was approved, and her visa application is currently pending.” [Doc. No. 31.] In short, there is no evidence that relevant visa applications
29

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have been processed, delayed, or denied in any meaningfully different way than before the issuance of EO-1 and EO-2.
Similarly speculative are the harms claimed in categories 2 and 3, based on certain of the Plaintiffs’ currently held visas and their immigration status. For example, Plaintiffs John Doe Nos. 2 and 3, who have valid F-1 student visas, allege that EO-2’s interferes with their ability to travel. But these Plaintiffs are in a category expressly exempted from the temporary ban of the Order. In that regard, section 3(a) provides that “the suspension of entry . . . shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who: (i) are outside the United States on the effective date of this order; (ii) did not have a valid visa at 5:00 p.m., eastern standard time on January 27, 2017; and (iii) do not have a valid visa on the effective date of this order.” EO-2 § 3(a). Plaintiffs John Doe Nos. 2 and 3 were inside the United States on the effective date of the Order and had valid F-1 visas both as of January 27, 2017 and as of March 16, 2017, the effective date of the Order. They are therefore exempt from EO-2’s temporary suspension of entry, and it is completely speculative whether these Plaintiffs would experience any harm as a result of EO-2 were they to travel within the United States or internationally.
Finally, with respect to the harms included in categories 4 and 5, certain Plaintiffs claim that they are being harmed by EO-2 because they are “prominent civil rights activists . . . [who have been forced] to spend a significant amount of their time . . . assisting and advocating on behalf of Muslims targeted by th[e] order and pushing back against the anti-Muslim sentiment that Defendants have fomented and legitimized through their actions.”22 These individuals have engaged in these activities in connection with their chosen calling and careers and were engaged in similar civil rights activities before and independently of the issuance of EO-2. Likewise, the stigma Plaintiffs have felt, judging by their description, emanated before either executive order
22 Def.’s Mot. 15.
30

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issued; and while those feelings of stigma are undoubtedly legally cognizable injuries and may have been deepened with the issuance of the executive orders, they were primarily experienced separate and apart from the issuance of the orders and will not be cured if the Court were to grant the Motion. Therefore, any stigma that was in fact caused by the orders cannot be materially undone or redressed at this point beyond what has already been effected through the injunctions already issued by other district courts.
In contrast to the speculative and abstract hardships that Plaintiffs may experience in the absence of immediate relief, “the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). In EO-1, the President did “little more than reiterate that fact” and “submitted no evidence” to demonstrate the need for immediate action. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2017). However, in EO-2, the President has provided a detailed justification for the Order based on national security needs, and enjoining the operation of EO-2 would interfere with the President’s unique constitutional responsibilities to conduct international relations, provide for the national defense, and secure the nation. On balance, Plaintiffs have not established that the equities tip in their favor.
E. Public Interest Plaintiffs must also establish that the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest. “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the record now before the Court, the parties’ respective interests described above, the subject matter of EO-2, and the protections to the public that EO-2 is intended to
31

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 36 Filed 03/24/17 Page 32 of 32 PageID# 872 provide, Plaintiffs have not established that the public interest favors issuance of immediate relief in this action.
V. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, Plaintiffs have not established that (I) they are likely to succeed on the merits oftheir case, (2) the balance of hardships tips in their favor, or (3) immediate relief would be in the public interest. Accordingly, they have not established that they are entitled to obtain the extraordinary remedy of an injunction enjoining the enforcement of E0-2. Plaintiffs' Motion is therefore denied. The Court will issue an appropriate order.
Alexandria, Virginia Marcl1 24, 2017
32

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 41 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 5 PageID# 985

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP,

)

President of the United States,

)

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00120 (AJT/IDD)

CONSENT MOTION TO STAY THE PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to this Court’s inherent authority, Defendants, through undersigned counsel,

hereby respectfully submit this consent motion to stay the proceedings in the above-captioned

action.1 The grounds for this motion are as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint challenges Executive Order 13780 (“Executive

Order”), “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” issued on

March 6, 2017.

2. On March 13, 2017, Plaintiffs moved for a Temporary Restraining Order

(“TRO”) and/or a Preliminary Injunction in this matter. ECF No. 13. Defendants opposed, ECF

No. 22, and after hearing argument on May 21, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion on

March 24, 2017. ECF No. 36.

3. In other litigation challenging the Executive Order, nationwide injunctions have

issued barring the enforcement of several sections of the Executive Order. In Int’l Refugee

1 Plaintiffs consent to stay proceedings on the basis that Plaintiffs will be filing a motion to intervene on behalf of John Doe No. 8 in Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir.), on the APA and INA claims at issue in that appeal.

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 41 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 5 PageID# 986
Assistance Project v. Trump, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland enjoined Section 2(c) of the Executive Order. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 WL 1018235 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir. Mar. 17, 2017). An appeal in that action is presently pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where briefing will be complete by April 21, 2017, and oral argument before the en banc court is set for May 8, 2017. See Order, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2017), Dkt. No. 25.2
4. Further proceedings in this Court are likely to be shaped by the Fourth Circuit’s consideration of the legal issues presented in IRAP. Defendants therefore respectfully request that the Court stay further proceedings pending the outcome of that appeal.
5. “A district court has the ‘inherent power’ to stay a pending action to ensure both the ‘efficient management of [its] docket[],’ as well as ‘economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” Hawley v. Johnson & Johnson, 2011 WL 7946243, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2011) (quoting Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983); Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). When considering a motion to stay, a court should consider three factors: “(1) the interests of judicial economy; (2) hardship and equity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; [and] (3) potential prejudice to the non-moving party.” Sehler v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, 2013 WL 5184216, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2013)
2 A separate nationwide preliminary injunction of Sections 2 and 6 of the Executive Order has been entered by the United States Court for the District of Hawaii. See Haw. v. Trump ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2017 WL 1011673 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017) (granting Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)); Haw. v. Trump., 2017 WL 1167383 (Mar. 29, 2017) (converting TRO to preliminary injunction). The government has appealed the injunction to the Ninth Circuit, which in turn adopted an expedited briefing schedule and will hear oral argument on May 15, 2017. See Case No. 17-15589 (9th Cir.), Dkt. Nos. 14, 18. In the meantime, the District of Hawaii adopted the Hawaii parties’ joint motion to stay further district court proceedings in that case pending resolution of the appeal. See No. 17-cv-50 (D. Haw. Apr. 3, 2017), Dkt. No. 279.
- 2 -

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 41 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 5 PageID# 987
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hawley, 2011 WL 7946243, at *1 (“When determining whether a stay is appropriate, a district court must ‘weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.’” (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255)). In general, the decision of whether to stay a case “lies within the sound discretion” of the court. See Fisher v. United States, 2013 WL 6074076, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2013).
6. Here, all of the factors articulated in Sehler weigh in favor of a stay. Because this motion is submitted by consent, there is no potential prejudice to either party if the stay is granted. In the interests of judicial economy, a stay would avoid the unnecessary and burdensome expenditure of the parties’ and this Court’s resources that would be required to adjudicate both the jurisdictional and merits issues presented in this action. Moreover, no hearings have been scheduled in this action, and there are no pending deadlines (other than defendants’ initial response to the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 12(a)); therefore, a stay would not affect any current proceedings in this Court.
7. This consent motion is being filed in lieu of a motion to dismiss (or a responsive pleading), which presently is due – pursuant to this Court’s order, ECF No. 39 – on April 24, 2017. Should this Court deny the motion, defendants respectfully request that they be permitted to file its initial response to the complaint within ten (10) days of this Court entering such a denial. /// ///
- 3 -

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 41 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 5 PageID# 988

8. A proposed Order is provided for the convenience of the Court.

April 21, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

DANA J. BOENTE United States Attorney

CHAD READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil Division

JENNIFER D. RICKETTS Director, Federal Programs Branch

JOHN R. TYLER Assistant Director, Federal Programs Branch

By:

/s/________________

DENNIS C. BARGHAAN, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

2100 Jamieson Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: (703) 299-3891

Fax:

(703) 299-3983

Email: dennis.barghaan@usdoj.gov

ERIC J. SOSKIN BRAD P. ROSENBERG ARJUN GARG MICHELLE R. BENNETT DANIEL SCHWEI

Trial Attorneys United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

- 4 -

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 41 Filed 04/21/17 Page 5 of 5 PageID# 989

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will transmit a true and correct copy of the same to the following:

Gadeir Ibrahim Abbas The Law Office of Gadeir Abbas 1155 F Street, N.W., Suite 1050
Washington, D.C. 20004 Email: Gadeir@abbaslawfirm.com

Date: April 21, 2017

/s/________________

DENNIS C. BARGHAAN, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

2100 Jamieson Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: (703) 299-3891

Fax:

(703) 299-3983

Email: dennis.barghaan@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

- 5 -

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 41-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID# 990

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP,

)

President of the United States, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-120 (AJT/IDD)

[Proposed] ORDER

Upon consideration of defendants’ consent motion for a stay of proceedings, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendants’ consent motion is GRANTED; it is further

ORDERED that all proceedings in this matter are hereby stayed until further order of the

Court.

Date: __________

____________________________________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 1 of 40 PageID# 1006

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

LINDA SARSOUR;

)

RASHIDA TLAIB;

)

ZAHRA BILLOO;

)

NIHAD AWAD;

)

COREY SAYLOR;

)

DAWUD WALID;

)

BASIM ELKARRA;

)

HUSSAM AYLOUSH;

)

JOHN ROBBINS

)

ALIA SALEM;

)

ADAM SOLTANI;

)

IMRAAN SIDDIQI;

)

JULIA SHEARSON;

)

NAMIRA ISLAM;

)

KAREN DABDOUB;

)

JIM SUES;

)

HANIF MOHEBI;

)

JAYLANI HUSSEIN;

)

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United )

States of America; in his official capacity

)

)

Case No. 1-cv-00120 Hon. Anthony J. Trenga
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND

1

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 2 of 40 PageID# 1007

Elaine Duke, Secretary of the Department

)

of Homeland Security; in his official capacity; )

)

Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State of the

)

Department of State, in his official capacity;

)

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________/

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through

their attorneys, Council on American-Islamic Relations (“CAIR”) and Akeel and Valentine,

PLC, state as follows:

Introduction

1. During his presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump promised to

ban all Muslim immigration to the Untied States. Since moving to the White House, President

Donald Trump has tried via three separate executive actions to ban more than 100 million

Muslims from entering the United States.

2. As the Trump Administration’s regular and vulgar attacks against Islam and

Muslims make clear, the attempt to ban Muslim immigration is but one part of a

multipronged attempt to demonize Islam and marginalize Muslims in the United States.

3. This case is a challenge to the defendants’ latest attempt to fulfill this bigoted

attack against Islam. On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued a proclamation titled

“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United

States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.” Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed Reg. 45,161

2

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 3 of 40 PageID# 1008
(Sept. 24, 2017) (“Proclamation”). The Proclamation indefinitely bans virtually all travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries.
4. The challenge is brought by Muslim citizens, many with relatives from the banned countries subject to the executive action, who are stigmatized by the message the Proclamation broadcasts: that Islam is dangerous and Muslims must be treated differently.
5. These Muslim plaintiffs are leaders in their communities and their activism against anti-Muslim bigotry and in defense of their communities has put them in the position of confronting the stigma the Proclamation imposes on Islam. Indeed, the plaintiffs have seen firsthand how the public understands the Proclamation to be a multi-thousand word monument to the anti-Muslim bigotry that helped sweep Donald Trump into the presidency.
Parties 6. Plaintiff Linda Sarsour is an American Muslim residing in Kings County, New York. Plaintiff Sarsour is a Palestinian activist and Executive Director of the Arab American Association of New York. In 2016, she served as spokesperson for Presidential Candidate Senator Bernie Sanders, and was one of three national co-chairs for the 2017 Women’s March held the day after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States. Plaintiff Sarsour has appeared in “The Hijabi Monologues” and has her own show, The Linda Sarsour Show. Plaintiff Sarsour has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders,
3

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 4 of 40 PageID# 1009
dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Sarsour has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Proclamation and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Through her activism, Sarsour has come into direct contact with the Proclamation’s stigmatizing message.
7. Plaintiff Rashida Tlaib is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Tlaib is a former Democratic member of the Michigan House of Representatives and an attorney at the Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice. Upon her swearing in on January 1, 2009, Plaintiff Tlaib became the first Muslim-American woman to serve in the Michigan Legislature, and only the second Muslim woman in history to be elected to any state legislature in America. Plaintiff Tlaib suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all nonadherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Tlaib has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
4

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 5 of 40 PageID# 1010
8. Plaintiff Zahra Billoo is a Muslim American residing in Santa Clara County, California. Plaintiff Billoo is a civil rights attorney and the Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, San Francisco Bay Area (CAIR-SFBA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Billoo is frequently seen at mosques and universities facilitating trainings and workshops as a part of CAIR’s grassroots efforts to empower the American Muslim community and build bridges with allies on civil rights issues. Plaintiff Billoo has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Billoo has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
9. Plaintiff Nihad Awad is a Muslim American residing in Washington County, D.C. Plaintiff Awad is National Executive Director and co-founder of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. As a national leader in the civil rights movement, Plaintiff Awad has led multiple campaigns to defend the rights of Muslims and to help Americans of other faiths better understand Islam. His work includes interfacing
5

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 6 of 40 PageID# 1011
with the U.S. government, facilitating interfaith dialogue, speaking at conferences, conducting training and leadership seminars, and appearing in national and international media to discuss Islam and American Muslims. Plaintiff Awad has testified before both Houses of the U.S. Congress on matters involving Muslims in America. In 1997, he served on the White House Civil Rights Advisory Panel to the Commission on Safety and Security. In the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections, Plaintiff Awad was a key figure in creating the Muslim voting bloc. In 2006, he traveled to Iraq on a humanitarian mission to appeal for the release of American journalist Jill Carrol who was kidnapped and later released in Iraq. In September, 2011, Plaintiff Awad traveled to Iran as part of an interfaith delegation to meet with the President of Iran to appeal for the release of two American hikers held by Iran. In 2004, he was named one of National Journal’s more than 100 Most Influential People in the United States whose ideas will help shape the debate over public policy issues for the next decade. In 2009, he was named by a Georgetown University publication as one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the world. And in 2010, Arabian Business ranked him as 39th in the “Arabian Business Power 100” list, its annual listing of the most influential Arabs. Plaintiff Awad has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Awad has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required
6

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 7 of 40 PageID# 1012
to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
10. Plaintiff Corey Saylor is a Muslim American residing in Fairfax County, Virginia. Plaintiff Saylor is the former Director of the Department to Monitor and Combat Islamophobia at the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Saylor is an expert on political communications, legislative advocacy, media relations and anti-Islam prejudice in the United States. He is a regular voice on U.S. and international news outlets. Plaintiff Saylor has also run successful advocacy campaigns against corporate giants such as Burger King and Bell Helicopter-Boeing when their actions or advertisements negatively impacted the American Muslim community. Plaintiff Saylor has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Saylor has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. His research as a CAIR director has led him to conclude that the Trump Administration’s travel
7

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 8 of 40 PageID# 1013
and visa restrictions continue to fuel anti-Muslim sentiment and hate crimes to an extent never seen before.
11. Plaintiff Dawud Walid is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Walid is the Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Michigan (CAIR-MI), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Walid has been interviewed and quoted in approximately 150 media outlets and has lectured at over 50 institutions of higher learning about Islam, interfaith dialogue and social justice. Plaintiff Walid served in the United States Navy under honorable conditions earning two United States Navy & Marine Corp Achievement medals while deployed abroad. He has also received awards of recognition from the city councils of Detroit and Hamtramck and from the Mayor of Lansing as well as a number of other religious and community organizations. Plaintiff Walid has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Walid has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
8

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12. Plaintiff Basim Elkarra is a Muslim American residing in Sacramento County, California. Plaintiff Elkarra is the Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Sacramento Valley (CAIR-SAC), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Elkarra is a former board member of the Sacramento chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, and serves on the Executive Board of the California Democratic Party. He also serves on the City of Sacramento Community Police Commission. In 2011, the United States Embassy in London sent Plaintiff Elkarra to England to meet young British Muslims as part of a strategy to promote civic engagement. Plaintiff Elkarra has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all nonadherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Elkarra has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Moreover, Plaintiff Elkarra has inlaws in Syria that he is unable to bring to visit him in the United States pursuant to the Proclamation.
13. Plaintiff Hussam Ayloush is a Muslim American residing in Riverside County, California. Plaintiff Ayloush is the Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic
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Relations, Los Angeles (CAIR-LA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist and community organizer. Ayloush is a fourth-term elected Delegate to the California Democratic Party (CDP). He also serves on the board of the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC). Plaintiff Ayloush has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Ayloush has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Ayloush also has Syrian relatives who, because of the Proclamation, cannot now come to visit him and his family in the United States.
14. Plaintiff Alia Salem is a Muslim American residing in Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff Salem is the former Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Dallas/Fort Worth (CAIR-DFW), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist working for social justice, understanding and empowerment in her community. Plaintiff Salem’s work with CAIR-DFW has been featured on local, national and international media outlets. Plaintiff Salem has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to
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psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Salem has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
15. Plaintiff Adam Soltani is a Muslim American residing in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Plaintiff Soltani is the Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR-OK), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Soltani currently serves as the chair of the Oklahoma Conference of Churches’ Religions United Committee and planning committee member for OKC’s Jewish-Muslim Film Institute. He is also a former member of the Oklahoma Democratic Party Religious Education Committee, former board member of the Interfaith Alliance of Oklahoma, and a former member of Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City Executive Committee. Plaintiff Soltani has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his
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own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Soltani has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Moreover, Plaintiff Soltani has family in Iran that he is unable to bring to visit him in the United States pursuant to the Proclamation.
16. Plaintiff Imran Siddiqi is a Muslim American residing in Maricopa County, Arizona. Plaintiff Siddiqi is the Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR-AZ), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization. Plaintiff Siddiqi is a writer and prominent civil rights activist. He has written extensively on the subject of Islamophobia, Middle East Affairs, and issues affecting American Muslims. Plaintiff Siddiqi has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Siddiqi has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Plaintiff Siddiqi’s online activism has brought him
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into direct contact with evidence that the public understands the defendants’ repeated attempts to establish visa restrictions on several countries to be an attempt to stigmatize Islam and disfavor Muslims.
17. Plaintiff Julia Shearson is a Muslim American residing in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Plaintiff Shearson is the Executive Director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR-OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. She has delivered hundreds of lectures and trainings on Islam and Muslims, civil and human rights, diversity, Islamophobia, and immigration justice. She was recently honored together with 22 area women for her leadership, activism, and community service in an art exhibit entitled “Reflections: The Many Facets of Stephanie Tubbs Jones” installed at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in memory of the late Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones. Before joining CAIROH, Shearson served in the field of education for over 10 years, teaching at Ohio University, Jewish Vocational Services in Boston and at the Summer School and Division of Continuing Education at Harvard University. Plaintiff Shearson has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Shearson has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims
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targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Shearson has seen directly how, in her own community, the defendants’ attempts to impose visa and travel restrictions have catalyzed and legitimized anti-Muslim activism.
18. Plaintiff Namira Islam is a Muslim American residing in Oakland County, Michigan. Plaintiff Islam is the Co-Founder and Executive Director of the Muslim AntiRacism Collaborative (MuslimARC), a faith-based human rights education organization which focuses on racial justice. Plaintiff Islam has worked in the areas of prisoner rights, and on international law and war crimes at the United Nations in The Hague, Netherlands. Plaintiff Islam has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Islam has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
19. Plaintiff Karen Dabdoub is a Muslim American residing in Hamilton County, Ohio. Plaintiff Dabdoub is the Executive Director of the Cincinnati chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR-OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff
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Dabdoub has served the community since 2006 as a commissioner with the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission and was the president of CHRC from 2009 - 2011. She is a founding member of Muslim Mothers Against Violence, a local group founded in 2005 by Muslim women to take a stand against violence, abroad and at home. She has been a member of the Martin Luther King Coalition of Cincinnati since 2006. She is a former member of the FBI Multi-Cultural Advisory Council and the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights Community Advisory Committee. She was a member of Friends of Open House – Cincinnati Chapter, an international organization that worked to bring about peace and understanding between Palestinians and Israelis. Plaintiff Dabdoub appears in the documentary “A Visit to a Mosque in America,” an educational documentary, filmed locally, that has received national recognition and commendation. Plaintiff Dabdoub has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of her religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including herself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over her own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Dabdoub has had to change her conduct adversely in that she has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend her religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
20. Plaintiff Jim Sues is a Muslim American residing in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff Sues is the Executive Director of the New Jersey chapter of the Council
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on American-Islamic Relations, New Jersey (CAIR-NJ), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights and interfaith relations activist. Plaintiff Sues is also a Marketing Professional in the field of Telecommunications. Besides launching start-ups and acting as a Telecommunications Consultant, he spent 20 years at IBM filling various Marketing roles such as Product Manager, Solutions Manager, and Strategy Team Lead. Plaintiff Sues is guest lecturer for Comparative Religion courses at Drew University and multiple community colleges. He also provides diversity training for corporations and local churches. Plaintiff Sues is a member of the south Orange – Maplewood Clergy Association and has served on the Board of Directors of various Muslim organizations including Majlis Ash-Shoora of New Jersey and the NIA Masjid in Newark, NJ. Plaintiff Sues has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Sues has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
21. Plaintiff Hanif Mohebi is a Muslim American residing in San Diego County, California. Plaintiff Mohebi is the Executive Director of the San Diego chapter of the Council
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on American-Islamic Relations, San Diego (CAIR-SD), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. He has appeared in both local and national media outlets and has worked to bridge the gap between minorities and the American public. He has emerged as a guest speaker at high schools, universities, companies and community events on variety of topics ranging from Concepts of World Citizenship to The Cycle of Love, to History of Anti-Civil Liberties Legislations. Plaintiff Mohebi has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Mohebi has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
22. Plaintiff Jaylani Hussein is a Muslim American residing in Ramsey County, Minnesota. Plaintiff Hussein is the Executive Director of the San Diego chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Minnesota (CAIR-MN), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Hussein worked as the Community Liaison Officer at Metro State University and as a Planner for the Minnesota Department of Agriculture. In 2013, he created Zeila
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Consultants to develop and offer cross-cultural training workshops on East African cultures. He has presented on the Somali Culture to diverse public and private organizations across the US. He specializes in the areas of urban planning, community development, youth development (with over 8 years of experience in working in juvenile treatment centers for court adjudicated youth), legal and civil rights. Plaintiff Hussein has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Hussein has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts.
23. Plaintiff John Robbins is a Muslim American residing in Middlesex County, Massachusetts. Plaintiff Robbins is the Executive Director of the Massachusetts chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Massachusetts (CAIR-MA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Robbins is a dedicated and experienced community organizer, nonprofit leader, and public intellectual. He holds a Ph.D. in English, and completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Tufts University. A dedicated educator, he has taught algebra to high-risk youth at a public high school in Maryland, English to refugee and orphan children
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in Turkey, and literature at Cornell and Tufts Universities. His writings have appeared in numerous outlets including Fortune, Time, Muslim Matters, the Hill, the Jewish Journal, the Boston Globe, and the Boston Herald, and he is a regular contributor at the Huffington Post. Dr. Robbins sits on the board of directors of Cooperative Metropolitan Ministries, the greater Boston area’s oldest interfaith social justice network. Plaintiff Robbins has suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm, in addition to psychological and spiritual consequences, since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants sending a message of (1) disfavor and condemnation of his religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including himself, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over his own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all non-adherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. In fact, Plaintiff Robbins has had to change his conduct adversely in that he has been required to assist and advocate on behalf of Muslims targeted by the Muslim Ban and defend his religion as a religion of peace on national media outlets and through grassroots efforts. Plaintiff Robbins intends to invite Plaintiff John Doe No. 12 to speak to the local Massachusetts community about the effects of the Muslim Ban, however is unable bring him to the United States to speak due to the likelihood that Plaintiff John Doe No. 12 will be unable to renew his student visa under the EO-2 based on his Muslim religious status and Iranian national origin.
24. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the current President of the United States of America. Defendant Trump issued the Proclamation, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Trump is being sued in his official capacity, only.
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25. Defendant Elaine Duke is the current Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Defendant Kelly is responsible for implementing the Proclamation, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Kelly is being sued in his official capacity, only.
26. Defendant Rex Tillerson is the Secretary of State. The U.S. Department of State is responsible for issuing visas and implementing the Muslim Proclamation The Secretary of the U.S. Department of State position is currently vacant.
Jurisdiction and Venue 27. Under U.S. Const. Art. III §2, this Court has jurisdiction because the rights sought to be protected herein are secured by the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 5 U.S.C. § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 706, the United States Constitution, and federal common law. 28. This action also seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 2201-02, Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to the general, legal, and equitable powers of this Court. 29. A substantial part of the unlawful acts alleged herein were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 30. Venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as to the Defendants because Defendants are officers or employees of the United States sued in their official capacity and because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.
Factual Background Defendant Trump’s Unconstitutional Executive Order
Banning Muslims from Entering the United States
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31. The Proclamation is the as-promised outcome of Defendant Trump’s hateful, year-long campaign which was fueled, in significant part, by a desire to stigmatize Islam and Muslims.
32. Defendant Trump has often repeated his bigoted views on Islam and Muslims in a variety of contexts—in print, on television, and via official campaign statements. The Proclamation is the legal manifestation of those bigoted views.
33. Defendant Trump’s views on Islam are unequivocal. On or about March 10, 2016, in an interview aired on CNN, Defendant Trump declared that he thinks “Islam hates us.”
34. His statements regarding Islam and Muslims give rise to the inference that the EO-2 is motivated by a bare desire to inflict harm on this faith and those that belong to it.
35. In addition to Defendant Trump’s statements regarding Islam and Muslims, the history of the EO-2 reveals its unlawful, discriminatory purpose. On December 7, 2015, while campaigning, Defendant Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”
36. Defendant Trump’s rationale for this proposal included sweeping condemnations of Islam, the second largest religion in the world with over 1.6 billion people. His condemnation incorrectly surmised that Islam’s religious traditions, which he referred to as “Sharia”, “authoriz[e] such atrocities as murder against non-believers who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.”
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37. Subsequent to his nomination as the Republican candidate for the presidency, Defendant Trump began using facially neutral language to describe his anti-Muslim policy. This neutral language suggested that a Trump administration would stop immigration “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism.”
38. On or about July 24, 2016, however, Defendant Trump conceded that the neutral language was simply a veneer intended to subdue the public controversy generated by his discriminatory plan. To that end, in an interview on NBC, Defendant Trump explained the following: “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim…And I’m OK with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”
39. In fact, on January 27, 2017, hours before signing EO-1, Defendant Trump explained during an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network that his order was “going to help [persecuted Christians]” as opposed to Muslims. His answer made clear that Defendant Trump’s intention in crafting the Muslim Ban was to treat foreign nationals in the seven identified countries differently based on their faith.
40. The underlying unlawful discriminatory purpose of EO-1 is evidenced by the recent admissions by close associates of Defendant Trump, such as Rudolf Giuliani's recent admission that the President asked him to find legal ways to implement what he called “a Muslim Ban.” On January 28, 2017, during a Fox News interview, Giuliani, who is a close advisor to the Defendant Trump, boasted that after then-candidate Donald Trump announced his Muslim Ban—which explicitly prohibited Muslims from obtaining entry into the United States—Giuliani was asked to “show [Donald Trump] the right way to do [the Muslim Ban] legally.” Giuliani then conceded that he formed a commission to find a way to accomplish the EO-1’s scope without mentioning Islam or Muslims.
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41. The language of EO-1 corroborates Defendant Trump’s admission that the facially neutral language is simply a pretext. That Order did not exclude persons based on where they are from but on what religion they belong to. Section 5 suspended all grounds for persecution and allows only one: “religious-based persecution.” However, religiousbased persecution could only be claimed by individuals who are not Muslim. Thus, EO-1 constituted a religious gerrymander—drawing distinctions that exclude the disfavored group—Muslims—while leaving others untouched.
42. Since the signing of the EO-1, several federal courts around the country issued stays.
43. On January 28, 2017, Judge Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a Temporary Restraining Order that forbade Defendants “from removing petitioners— lawful permanent residents at Dulles International Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of that Order. That Order is attached an exhibit.
44. On the same day, the United States District Court of the Western District of Washington granted an emergency stay of removal that prohibits Defendants “from removing John Doe I and Joe Doe II from the United States.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
45. Again on the same day, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted an emergency stay of removal, finding that the petitioners “have a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the removal of the petitioner and others similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
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46. On January 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a Temporary Restraining Order against parts of the Original Proclamation, finding that the petitioners had established a “strong likelihood of success in establishing that the detention and/or removal of the petitioners and others similarly situated would violate their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
47. That same day, the United States District Court for the Central District of California prohibited the defendants “from barring Petitioner’s return to the United States” because he had “demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in establishing that removal violates the Establishment Clause” as well as other constitutional and statutory provisions. That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
48. On February 2, 2017, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Southern Division) issued an order temporarily enjoying the United States from applying Sections 3(c) and 3(e) of the Original Proclamation. That Order is also attached as an exhibit.
49. On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court delivered a unanimous decision upholding a temporary restraining order issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington enjoining and restraining Sections 3(c) and 5(a)-(c) of the EO-1.
50. The unlawful effects and purpose of EO-1 persisted through the issuance of EO-2, issued on March 6, 2017.
51. EO-2 was supposed to go into effect on March 16, 2017.
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52. EO-2 created a framework that although neutral on its face, allows case-bycase waivers such that the unlawful goals and intent of the Original Proclamation could still be implemented on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis.
53. As such, the EO-2 created a framework that although mostly 1neutral on its face, allows case-by-case waivers such that the unlawful goals and intent of the Original Proclamation could still be implemented on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis.
54. The Proclamation, issued on September 24, 2017, is the latest iteration of the defendants attempt to stigmatize Islam and marginalize Muslims. This executive action purports to be the product of a “worldwide review” of visa procedures in order to determine which countries’ nationals should be restricted in their ability to get US visas.
55. This process did not actually apply its own stated criterion. Countries with adequate processes were still banned and countries with inadequate processes were left unaffected. Five of the six countries affected by EO-2 were still affected by the Proclamation.
56. The addition of North Korea and Venezuala is insulting window dressing to the religious animus that still underlies this executive action.
57. Overall, the Proclamation bars approximately 138 million Muslim nationals from six Muslim-majority nations, which is more than 85% of the people affected by the Proclamation.
58. The Proclamation also treats immigrant and nonimmigrant visas differently in a manner that does not correspond to the rationale of the executive action itself and can only be explained by animosity to Muslims moving to the United States permanently—a rationale that the defendants would later confirm in their opposition to so-called chain migration.
1 EO-2 is not neutral on its face. Its reference to “honor killings” is a phrase anti-Muslim groups and media outlets use to describe instances of Muslims committing domestic violence, and its embrace and rationalization of EO-1 incorporate the religious gerrymander of EO-1.
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59. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and spiritual and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of (1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all nonadherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
COUNT I VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(Establishment Clause) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs) 60. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 61. The EO-2 creates a framework that although neutral on its face, allows caseby-case waivers such that the unlawful goals and intent of the Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslim into the United States – could still be implemented on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis. 62. Defendants’ unique application of the Proclamation to Muslims, insofar as it allows for the (1) suspension of entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States, (2)
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prohibition of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, and the (3) prohibition of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who are lawfully pursuing the education in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, treats Islam on less than equal terms with other religious and non-religious groups, thereby creating a denominational preference against Islam as a religion.
63. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by signing the EO-2 whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion.
64. Defendant Trump’s EO-2 imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all of the Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been cast to the general public via the Proclamation, which the Proclamation implement via a nonreviewable and discretionary framework, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion singled out for disfavored treatment.
65. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and spiritual and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of (1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion
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of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all nonadherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
66. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims irreparable harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
67. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
COUNT II VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702)
(Equal Protection) (On behalf of the John Doe and Jane Doe Plaintiffs) 68. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein.
28

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 29 of 40 PageID# 1034
69. The EO-2 creates a framework that although neutral on its face, allows caseby-case waivers such that the unlawful goals and intent of the Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslim into the United States – could still be implemented on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis.
70. Defendants’ unique application of the EO-2 to Muslims, insofar as it allows for the (1) suspension of entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibition of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, and the (3) prohibition of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who are lawfully pursuing the education in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, treats Islam on less than equal terms with other religious and non-religious groups, thereby creating a denominational preference against Islam as a religion.
71. By creating a framework that allows for the implementation of a Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslim into the United States – through a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process, Defendants have treated them like second-class citizens.
72. Moreover, by preventing the student John Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and lawfully residing in the United States who are pursuing their education, from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, in order to avoid risking forfeiting their F-1 status, Defendants have treated them like second-class citizens.
29

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 30 of 40 PageID# 1035
73. Moreover, by subjecting Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to obtain a visa, including family-based visas, solely based on their national origin, Defendants have treated them like second-class citizens.
74. Defendants’ above-described actions are motivated by the religious status of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non-USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and on the basis of their constitutionallyprotected free exercise of religion.
75. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States based solely on their religious beliefs.
76. Defendants’ above-described actions will have a discriminatory effect upon and disparately impact the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non-USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries, and not non-USCs of other faiths originating from the same Predominantly Muslim Countries.
77. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist.
78. Defendants’ above-described actions do not serve a compelling state interest or a legitimate or public purpose, nor are they the least restrictive means or narrowly tailored to achieve any such interest.
79. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and spiritual and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of
30

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 31 of 40 PageID# 1036
(1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all nonadherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
80. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non-USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
81. The John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
COUNT III UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702)
31

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 32 of 40 PageID# 1037
(On behalf of all Plaintiffs)
82. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 83. The EO-2 creates a framework that although neutral on its face, allows caseby-case waivers such that the unlawful goals and intent of the Original Proclamation could still be implemented on a discretionary and nonreviewable basis. 84. Defendants’ unique application of the EO-2 to Muslims, insofar as it allows for the (1) suspension of entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibition of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, and the (3) prohibition of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who are lawfully pursuing the education in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, treats Islam on less than equal terms with other religious and non-religious groups, thereby creating a denominational preference against Islam as a religion, should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 85. Defendants’ actions as described above are arbitrary and capricious, shock the conscience, violate the decencies of civilized conduct, are so brutal and offensive that they do not comport with the traditional ideas of fair play and decency, lack even a rational relationship to any legitimate government interest, and have substantially burdened and unduly deprived Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their constitutionally protected rights, including their right to be free from discrimination on the basis of religion, the right to be free from condemnation by the government on the basis of their religion, the right to
32

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 33 of 40 PageID# 1038
be free from being singled out by the government for disfavored treatment on the basis of their religion, liberty interests in engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, their international human rights, their rights to freedom of association, their rights to freedom from false stigmatization and nonattainder, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
86. Defendants’ above-described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above-described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non-USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries, constitute an adverse action against them motivated by their religious beliefs and practices and an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
87. By creating a framework that allows for the implementation of a Muslim Ban – the denial of entry of Muslim into the United States – through a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process, Defendants have treated them like second-class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
88. By preventing the student John Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated nonUSC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States without risking forfeiting their F-1 status, Defendants have treated them like second-class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
89. Moreover, by subjecting Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries to a discretionary and nonreviewable waiver process to obtain a visa, including
33

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 34 of 40 PageID# 1039
family-based visas, solely based on their national origin, Defendants have treated them like second-class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
90. Defendants’ above-described conduct was prompted or substantially caused by Plaintiffs’ and such other similarly situated Muslims’ religious identity, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
91. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by issuing the EO-2 whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
92. Defendant Trump’s Proclamation imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all of the Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been broadcast to the general public pursuant to the Proclamation, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion singled out for disfavored treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
93. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
94. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from these Predominantly Muslim Countries from entering the United States based solely on their religious beliefs, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
34

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 35 of 40 PageID# 1040
95. Imposition of such a burden is not in furtherance of a compelling government interest nor is it the least restrictive means of furthering any governmental interest, compelling or otherwise, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
96. Defendants’ above-described actions will have a discriminatory effect upon and disparately impact the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and similarly situated non-USC Muslims originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries, and not non-USCs of other faiths, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.
97. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and spiritual and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants having sent a message to the broader American public of (1) disfavor and condemnation of their religion of Islam, (2) marginalization and exclusion of Muslims, including Plaintiffs, based on the false messaging that Muslims are prone to commit terrorism, (3) the endorsement of all religions over their own, (4) Muslims are outsiders, dangerous, and not full members of the political community, and (5) all nonadherents of Islam are insiders and therefore favored. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Moss v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. S.C. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
98. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action.
35

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99. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
COUNT V VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act)
(On behalf of all Plaintiffs)
1. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 2. Defendant Trump does not have the authority to give any person preference or priority or to discriminate in the issuance of an immigrant visa on the basis of a “person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence,” and therefore the Proclamation is an unconstitutional overreach in violation of Section 202(a)(1) of the INA. 3. Defendant Trump does not have the authority to suspend the entry of “all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions” on the basis of religion, and therefore the Proclamation is an unconstitutional overreach that is inconsistent with the First Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. 4. The Proclamation is a factually baseless, biased and bigoted effort to discriminate against a targeted group that even if one would to accept its purported basis, is not in any way related to the Proclamation’s purported goals.
36

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 37 of 40 PageID# 1042 5. Further, the Proclamation is an irrational and arbitrary use of power, and as
such is an unconstitutional executive overreach.
37

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Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request:
1. A speedy hearing of this action under Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;
2. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ EO-2 violates the First and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure
Act;
3. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ EO-2 is an unconstitutional overreach in
violation of Section 202(a)(1) of the INA and the First Amendment right to equal
protection;
4. An injunction that requires Defendants to remedy the constitutional violations
identified above, including prohibiting Defendants from engaging in the following:
(1) requiring visa applications filed by non-USCs originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries to be subjected to case-by-case waivers such that applicants are denied their visa applications on the basis of religion or national origin, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the EO-2; (3) prohibiting student visa holders originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from engaging in international travel and renewing their student visas to reenter the United States and continue their education, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the EO-2; and, (4) prohibiting non-USCs originating from the Predominantly Muslim Countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the EO-2; 5. A trial by jury;
38

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 39 of 40 PageID# 1044
6. An award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of all litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and,
7. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. JURY DEMAND
NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby demand trial by jury of the above-referenced causes of action.
Respectfully submitted, ______/s/___________________________
_ Gadeir Abbas* Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Ph: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lfmasri@cair.com Licensed in VA; not in DC Practice limited to federal matters
/s/ Lena Masri LENA F. MASRI (P73461) Attorney for Plaintiff National Litigation Director 453 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 Phone: (202) 488-8787
39

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 48 Filed 12/26/17 Page 40 of 40 PageID# 1045

Dated: March 10, 2017

AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLLC
BY: /s/ Shereef Akeel SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345) Attorney for Plaintiffs 888 W. Big Beaver Rd., Ste. 910 Troy, MI 48084 Phone: (248) 269-9595 shereef@akeelvalentine.com

40

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 49 Filed 01/05/18 Page 1 of 4 PageID# 1046

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

LINDA SARSOUR, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP,

)

President of the United States,

)

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00120(AJT/IDD)

JOINT MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to this Court’s inherent authority, the parties, through the undersigned counsel,

hereby respectfully submit this joint motion to stay the proceedings in the above-captioned

action. The grounds for this motion are as follows:

1. After this Court concluded that their Amended Complaint was moot, see ECF No. 47, plaintiffs filed a (Second) Amended Complaint on December 26, 2017, that challenges

Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting

Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (“Proclamation”), see ECF No. 48.
2. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3), defendants’ response to the

Second Amended Complaint is currently due on January 9, 2018.

3. In other litigation challenging the Proclamation, two district courts entered

nationwide preliminary injunctions barring the enforcement of some of the Proclamation’s entry

restrictions. In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland enjoined implementation of Section 2 of the Proclamation,

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 49 Filed 01/05/18 Page 2 of 4 PageID# 1047
except as to nationals of Venezuela or North Korea or persons without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017), appeal docketed, Nos. 172231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 2017). An appeal in that action is presently pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where the en banc court heard argument on December 8, 2017. In Hawaii v. Trump, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii enjoined implementation of Section 2 of the Proclamation, except as to nationals of Venezuela or North Korea. See Preliminary Injunction, Hawaii v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC, ECF No. 390 (D. Haw. Oct. 20, 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2017 WL 6554184 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017); see also Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 WL 4639560 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017). The government also appealed in that case and, on December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, except as to foreign nationals without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. See Hawaii, 2017 WL 6554184. The Supreme Court has stayed the preliminary injunctions entered in both cases pending disposition of the government’s appeals in the courts of appeals and any subsequent proceedings in the Supreme Court. See Trump v. IRAP, No. 17A560, 2017 WL 5987435 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2017); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17A550, 2017 WL 5987406 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2017).
4. The parties agree that further proceedings in this Court are likely to be shaped by resolution of the appeals in IRAP and Hawaii. They therefore respectfully request that the Court stay further proceedings in this case pending final disposition of all appellate proceedings in IRAP and Hawaii.
- 2 -

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 49 Filed 01/05/18 Page 3 of 4 PageID# 1048
5. “A district court has the ‘inherent power’ to stay a pending action to ensure both the ‘efficient management of [its] docket[],’ as well as ‘economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” Hawley v. Johnson & Johnson, 2011 WL 7946243, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2011) (quoting Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983); Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). When considering a motion to stay, a court should consider three factors: “(1) the interests of judicial economy; (2) hardship and equity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; [and] (3) potential prejudice to the non-moving party.” Sehler v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, 2013 WL 5184216, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hawley, 2011 WL 7946243, at *1 (“When determining whether a stay is appropriate, a district court must ‘weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.’” (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255)). In general, the decision of whether to stay a case “lies within the sound discretion” of the court. See Fisher v. United States, 2013 WL 6074076, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2013).
6. Here, all of the factors articulated in Sehler weigh in favor of a stay. Because this motion is submitted jointly by the parties, there is no potential prejudice to either party if the stay is granted. In the interests of judicial economy, a stay would avoid the unnecessary and burdensome expenditure of the parties’ and this Court’s resources that would be required to adjudicate both the jurisdictional and merits issues presented in this action. Moreover, no hearings have been scheduled in this action, and there are no pending deadlines (other than defendants’ response to the Second Amended Complaint); therefore, a stay would not affect any current proceedings in this Court.
7. This joint motion is being filed in lieu of a motion to dismiss (or a responsive pleading), which presently is due on January 9, 2018. Should this Court deny the motion,
- 3 -

Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 49 Filed 01/05/18 Page 4 of 4 PageID# 1049

defendants respectfully request that they be permitted to file their response to the Second Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of this Court entering such a denial.
8. A proposed Order is provided for the convenience of the Court. Respectfully submitted,

___________/s/___________ ______ Gadeir Abbas 453 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 Tel: 720.251.0425 Fax: 202.488.0833 Email: gabbas@cair.com licensed in VA; not in DC practice limited to federal matters
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
Date: January 5, 2018

_________/s/_________________ Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr. Assistant U.S. Attorney 2100 Jamieson Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Tel: (703) 299-3891 Fax: (703) 299-3983 Email: dennis.barghaan@usdoj.gov
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS
Date: January 5, 2018

- 4 -

 
 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 50 Filed 01/09/18 Page 1 of 1 PageID# 1051

IN THE UNI TED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

LINDA SARSOUR, et ai. Plaintiffs,
V.
DONALD J. TRUMP, el ai.
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-120 (A.IT/IDD)

ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Parties' Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings. [Doc. No. 49]. in which they ask the Court to stay this action inlight of other litigation challenging Presidential
Proclamation No. 9645. See Iniernaiionul Refugee Assislancc Project v. Trump, 2017 WL 4674314(D. Md. Oct. 17,2017);/-/rmw/v. Trump,'Ho. l:17-cv-0050 (D. Haw. Oct. 20,2017),
ajfdinparl. vacated in part, 2017 WL 6554184 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017). Upon consideration of
the Motion and the incorporated memorandum in support thereof, it is hereby ORDERED that the Parties' Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings, [Doc. No. 49], be, and the
same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that all proceedings in this action be, and the same hereby are, STAYED
until further order of the Court. The Clerk is directed to place this matter on the inactive docket. The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this Order to all counsel of record.

Alexandria, Virginia January 9, 2018

Anthony J.
United Stat

istricl Judge

 
 CLOSED,JURY,STAYED
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Virginia - (Alexandria) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD

Sarsour et al v. Trump et al Assigned to: District Judge Anthony J Trenga Referred to: Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis Cause: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Date Terminated: 06/25/2021 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Date Filed 01/30/2017
02/03/2017 02/03/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State (Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0422-5353656), filed by Alia Salem, John Doe No. 5, Dawud Walid, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 6, Linda Sarsour, John Doe No. 2, Imran Siddiqi, John Doe No. 7, Karen Dabdoub, Corey Saylor, John Doe No. 9, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Rashida Tlaib, Hussam Ayloush, Adam Soltani, Julia Shearson, Namira Islam, John Doe No. 4, Basim Elkarra, Zahra Billoo, John Doe No. 8, Hassan Shibly, John Doe No. 3, Nihad
Awad. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit Executive Order, # 2
Exhibit Exhibit EDVA TRO, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit EDNY
TRO, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit WDWA TRO, # 5 Exhibit
Exhibit EDCA TRO, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit EDMA TRO, # 7
Civil Cover Sheet)(jlan) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
2 MOTION to Intervene in Support of President Donald J. Trump et al. by Janice Wolk Grenadier. (klau, ) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
3 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 2 MOTION to Intervene : Motion Hearing set for 2/24/2017 at 10:00 AM in Alexandria Courtroom 701

02/03/2017 02/06/2017 02/07/2017
02/08/2017 02/08/2017 02/27/2017 02/28/2017

before District Judge Anthony J Trenga. (klau, ) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
4 MOTION to Intervene in Support of President Donald J. Trump et al. by Raquel Okyay. (Told to Notice) (klau, ) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
5 ORDER that the motions to Intervene 2 4 be, and the same hereby are, DENIED. ORDERED that the hearing on Grenadier's motion, currently scheduled for February 24, 2017 be, and the same hereby is, CANCELED (see order for details). Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 2/6/17. Copy mailed to pro se movants. (klau, ) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
6 Proposed Summons by Nihad Awad, Hussam Ayloush, Zahra Billoo, Karen Dabdoub, Basim Elkarra, Janice Wolk Grenadier, Namira Islam, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9, Raquel Okyay, Alia Salem, Linda Sarsour, Corey Saylor, Julia Shearson, Hassan Shibly, Imran Siddiqi, Adam Soltani, Rashida Tlaib. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Cover Letter)(Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
7 Summons Issued for service by Certified Mail as to Donald J. Trump, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General NOTICE TO ATTORNEY: Print out one electronically issued summons and one copy of the attachments for each defendant to be served with the complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Notice to Attorney)(klau, ) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
Notice of Correction re 6 Proposed Summons, An incomplete summons for defendant John F. Kelly was filed. The filing user has been notified to refile the document. (klau, ) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
8 MOTION to Intervene Pursuant to F.R.C.P.24 by Vincent A. Molino. (Told to Notice) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(klau, ) Modified text on 2/28/2017 (klau, ). (Entered: 02/28/2017)
9 Summons Issued for service by Certified Mail as to John F. Kelly, NOTICE TO ATTORNEY: Print out ONE electronically issued summons and one copy of the attachments for each defendant to be served with the complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Notice to Attorney)(klau, ) (Entered: 02/28/2017)

03/03/2017 03/13/2017
03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017

10 ORDER denying 8 Motion to Intervene (see order for details). Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 3/3/17. Copy mailed to Mr. Molino. (klau, ) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
11 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND against Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State, filed by Alia Salem, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 6, Linda Sarsour, Imran Siddiqi, John Doe No. 7, Karen Dabdoub, Corey Saylor, Jane Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 9, Jane Doe No. 2, Rashida Tlaib, Hussam Ayloush, Adam Soltani, Julia Shearson, Namira Islam, John Doe No. 4, Basim Elkarra, Zahra Billoo, John Doe No. 8, Hassan Shibly, John Doe No. 3, Nihad Awad. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit First Muslim Ban, # 2 Exhibit Revised Muslim Ban, # 3 Exhibit 9th Circuit Decision Upholding Nationwide Injunction, # 4 Exhibit EDNY Injunction, # 5 Exhibit EDVA Injunction, # 6 Exhibit WDWA Injunction, # 7 Exhibit EDCA Injunction, # 8 Exhibit EDMA Injunction)(Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
12 MOTION for Protective Order and to Keep the Names of the John and Jane Doe Doe Plaintiffs Under Seal by Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, # 2 Exhibit V - First Muslim Ban, # 3 Exhibit W - Revised Muslim Ban, # 4 Exhibit Z -)(Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction by Hussam Ayloush, Basim Elkarra, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, Adam Soltani. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit E, # 3 Exhibit F, # 4 Exhibit G, # 5 Exhibit I, # 6 Exhibit J, # 7 Exhibit L, # 8 Exhibit M, # 9 Exhibit N, # 10 Exhibit O, # 11 Exhibit P, # 12 Exhibit R, # 13 Exhibit S, # 14 Exhibit T, # 15 Exhibit U, # 16 Exhibit V, # 17 Exhibit W, # 18 Exhibit X, # 19 Exhibit Y, # 20 Exhibit Z, # 21 Exhibit AA)(Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
14 Notice of Hearing Date re 13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/13/2017)

03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017
03/13/2017 03/13/2017

15 NOTICE of Appearance by Dennis Carl Barghaan, Jr on behalf of Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State (Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
16 MOTION to Continue Hearing Until Friday, March 17, 2017 by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State. (Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
Notice of Correction re 12 MOTION for Protective Order and to Keep the Names of the John and Jane Doe Doe Plaintiffs Under Seal. The filing user has been notified to file a Notice of Hearing Date or a Notice of Waiver of Oral Argument.(gwalk, ) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
Set Deadlines as to 13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing set for 3/15/2017 at 10:00 AM in Alexandria Courtroom 701 before District Judge Anthony J Trenga. (clar, ) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
Reset Deadlines as to 13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing set for 3/17/2017 at 10:00 AM in Alexandria Courtroom 701 before District Judge Anthony J Trenga. (clar, ) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
17 ORDER granting 16 Motion to Continue. The hearing on Defendants' Motion currently scheduled for March 13, 2017 be, and the same hereby is, CONTINUED to Tuesday, March 21, 2017 at 10 a.m.; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants file their opposition brief no later than Friday, March 17, 2017 at 12 p.m. noon. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 03/13/2017. (dvanm, ) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
Reset Deadlines as to 13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing set for 3/21/2017 at 10:00 AM in Alexandria Courtroom 701 before District Judge Anthony J Trenga. (dvanm, ) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
18 Certificate of Service Returned Executed by Certified mail as to U.S. Attorney, Attorney General and Donald Trump (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Letter)(klau, ) (Entered: 03/15/2017)

03/13/2017 03/16/2017
03/16/2017
03/17/2017 03/17/2017 03/17/2017 03/20/2017

19 Certificate of Service Returned Executed by Certified Mail as to John Kelly. (copy) (klau, ) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
20 Motion to appear Pro Hac Vice by Shereef Akeel and Certification of Local Counsel Gadeir Abbas Filing fee $ 75, receipt number 04225427784. by Nihad Awad, Hussam Ayloush, Zahra Billoo, Karen Dabdoub, Basim Elkarra, Janice Wolk Grenadier, Namira Islam, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9, Vincent A. Molino, Raquel Okyay, Alia Salem, Linda Sarsour, Corey Saylor, Julia Shearson, Hassan Shibly, Imran Siddiqi, Adam Soltani, Rashida Tlaib, Dawud Walid. (Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
21 Motion to appear Pro Hac Vice by Lena Masri and Certification of Local Counsel Gadeir Abbas Filing fee $ 75, receipt number 04225428101. by Nihad Awad, Hussam Ayloush, Zahra Billoo, Karen Dabdoub, Basim Elkarra, Janice Wolk Grenadier, Namira Islam, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9, Vincent A. Molino, Raquel Okyay, Alia Salem, Linda Sarsour, Corey Saylor, Julia Shearson, Hassan Shibly, Imran Siddiqi, Adam Soltani, Rashida Tlaib, Dawud Walid. (Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
22 Memorandum in Opposition re 13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction filed by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State. (Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
23 MOTION for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae, Raising Political Question Nonjusticiability, from Professor Victor Williams of the America First Lawyers Association, in Support of President Donald J. Trump by Victor Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Amicus Curiae Brief, # 2 Letter)(klau, ) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
27 Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of President Donald Trump filed by Victor Williams. (klau, ) Modified on 3/20/2017 to correct filed date (klau, ). (Entered: 03/20/2017)
24 ORDER granting 21 Motion for Pro hac vice. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 3/20/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 03/20/2017)

03/20/2017 03/20/2017 03/20/2017
03/20/2017
03/20/2017 03/21/2017

25 ORDER granting 20 Motion for Pro hac vice. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 3/20/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
26 ORDER that 23 Motion for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED and Professor Williams' amicus brief is DEEMED filed as of March 17, 2017. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 3/20/17. Copy mailed: yes (klau, ) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
28 NOTICE by Nihad Awad, Hussam Ayloush, Zahra Billoo, Karen Dabdoub, Basim Elkarra, Janice Wolk Grenadier, Namira Islam, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9, Vincent A. Molino, Raquel Okyay, Alia Salem, Linda Sarsour, Corey Saylor, Julia Shearson, Hassan Shibly, Imran Siddiqi, Adam
Soltani, Rashida Tlaib, Dawud Walid re 13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction [new evidence] (Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
29 Waiver of Oral Argument by Nihad Awad, Hussam Ayloush, Zahra Billoo, Karen Dabdoub, Basim Elkarra, Janice Wolk Grenadier, Namira Islam, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9, Vincent A. Molino, Raquel Okyay, Alia Salem, Linda Sarsour, Corey Saylor, Julia Shearson, Hassan Shibly, Imran Siddiqi, Adam Soltani, Rashida Tlaib, Dawud Walid (Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
30 NOTICE by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State of Additional Authority (Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
31 NOTICE by Nihad Awad, Hussam Ayloush, Zahra Billoo, Karen Dabdoub, Basim Elkarra, Namira Islam, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9, Alia Salem, Linda Sarsour, Corey Saylor, Julia Shearson, Hassan Shibly, Imran Siddiqi, Adam Soltani, Rashida Tlaib, Dawud Walid (Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 03/21/2017)

03/21/2017
03/23/2017 03/24/2017 03/24/2017 03/24/2017 03/24/2017 04/07/2017 04/10/2017

32 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Anthony J Trenga:Motion Hearing held on 3/21/2017. Appearances of counsel.
Pltfs' 13 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction is argued in open court and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. (Court Reporter R. Wilson.)(yguy) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
33 ORDER granting 12 Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order and to Keep the Names of the John and Jane Doe Doe Plaintiffs Under Seal. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis on 3/23/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
34 NOTICE by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State of Fourth Circuit Briefing Schedule (Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
35 NOTICE by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State of Fourth Circuit Briefing Schedule (amended to include attachment) (Attachments: # 1 Fourth Circuit Briefing Order)(Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
36 MEMORANDUM OPINION re Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 3/24/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
37 ORDER that Plaintiffs' 13 Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 3/24/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
38 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Other Initial Response by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 04/07/2017)
39 ORDER: Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer [Doc. No. 38] (the "Motion"). Upon consideration of the Motion and the memorandum in support thereof, it is herebyORDERED that the Motion [Doc. No. 38] be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED andthat Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint no later than April 24, 2017. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 4/10/17. (yguy) (Entered: 04/10/2017)

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04/21/2017 04/24/2017 08/18/2017 10/25/2017 11/03/2017 11/06/2017

40 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on March 21, 2017, before Judge Anthony J. Trenga, Court Reporter/Transcriber Renecia Wilson, Telephone number,703-501-1580. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS:The parties have thirty(30) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.vaed.uscourts.gov Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the court reporter/transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER Redaction Request due 5/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/12/2017.(wilson, renecia) (Entered: 04/13/2017)

41 Consent MOTION to Stay the Proceedings by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of

State. (Attachments: # 1 (Entered: 04/21/2017)

Proposed Order)(Barghaan, Dennis)

42 ORDER granting 41 Consent Motion to Stay. ORDERED that all proceedings in this matter are hereby stayed until further order of the Court. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 4/24/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
43 ORDER that the previously imposed stay in this matter [Doc. No. 42] be, and the same hereby is, CONTINUED pending the outcome of the appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court, styled Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 8/18/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
44 ORDER that within 10 days of this Order, the parties file written submissions to show cause, if any there be, why this case should not be dismissed as moot. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 10/25/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 10/25/2017)

45 Response to 44 Order filed by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State. (Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
46 Response to Show Cause Order filed by Nihad Awad, Hussam Ayloush, Zahra Billoo, Karen Dabdoub, Basim Elkarra, Janice Wolk Grenadier, Namira Islam, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, John Doe

11/09/2017
12/26/2017
01/05/2018 01/09/2018 06/25/2021

No. 1, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 2, John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, John Doe No. 8, John Doe No. 9, Vincent A. Molino, Raquel Okyay, Alia Salem, Linda Sarsour, Corey Saylor, Julia Shearson, Hassan Shibly, Imran Siddiqi, Adam Soltani, Rashida Tlaib, Dawud Walid. (Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
47 ORDER that the stay previously imposed be, and the same hereby is, LIFTED for the limited purpose of allowing Plaintiffs leave to file an amended or supplemental complaint within forty-five days of the date of this Order. ORDERED that in the event that Plaintiffs timely file an amended or supplemental complaint, the stay is lifted in its entirely and the case shall proceed in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures. ORDERED that if Plaintiffs do not timely file an amended or supplemental complaint, the action shall be dismissed as moot. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 11/9/17. (klau, ) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
48 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by John Doe No. 5, Raquel Okyay, Dawud Walid, John Doe No. 10, John Doe No. 1, Linda Sarsour, John Doe No. 2, Karen Dabdoub, John Doe No. 9, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Vincent A. Molino, Julia Shearson, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 8, Hassan Shibly, Alia Salem, John Doe No. 6, John Doe No. 7, Imran Siddiqi, Corey Saylor, Janice Wolk Grenadier, Rashida Tlaib, Hussam Ayloush, Adam Soltani, Namira Islam, Basim Elkarra, Zahra Billoo, John Doe No. 3, Nihad Awad.(Abbas, Gadeir) (Entered: 12/26/2017)
49 Joint MOTION to Stay by Director of National Intelligence, John F. Kelly, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
50 ORDER granting 49 Motion to Stay. ORDERED that all proceedings in this action be, and the same hereby are, STAYED until further order of the Court. The Clerk is directed to place this matter on the inactive docket. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 1/9/18. (klau, ) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
51 STIPULATION of Dismissal (Joint) by Director of National Intelligence, Donald J. Trump, U.S. Department of State. (Barghaan, Dennis) (Entered: 06/25/2021)

06/25/2021

52 So Ordered re 51 Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with all parties to bear their own costs, including any possible attorneys' fees or other expenses of this litigation filed by U.S. Department of State, Director of National Intelligence, Donald J. Trump. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 6/25/21. (klau, ) Modified on 6/25/2021 (c/m on 6/25/21) (klau, ). (Entered: 06/25/2021)

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