Case: 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB As of: 02/13/2019 09:45 PM EST 1 of 6
CASREF,CLOSED
U.S. District Court Western District of Kentucky (Bowling Green) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11−cv−00189−JHM−HBB

Cole et al v. Warren County, Kentucky et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr Referred to: Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 12/12/2011 Date Terminated: 05/30/2012 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Stuart Cole individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Camille A. Bathurst Belzley Bathurst & Bentley P.O. Box 278 Prospect, KY 40059 502−292−2452 Email: camillebathurst@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary S. Logsdon Gary S. Logsdon & Associates, PSC P.O. Box 382 101 Main Cross Street Brownsville, KY 42210 270−597−2134 Fax: 270−597−2859 Email: gary@garylogsdonlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley Belzley Bathurst & Bentley P.O. Box 278 Prospect, KY 40059 502−292−2452 Email: gbelzley@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Loren Patterson individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Camille A. Bathurst (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary S. Logsdon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Warren County, Kentucky

represented by Stacey A. Blankenship Keuler Kelly Hutchins & Blankenship, LLP 100 S. Fourth Street, Suite 400 Paducah, KY 42001 270−448−8888 Fax: 270−448−0998 Email: sblankenship@kkhblaw.com

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LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas R. Moore Denton Law Firm 555 Jefferson Street, Suite 301 P.O. Box 969 Paducah, KY 42002−0969 270−443−8253 Fax: 270−442−6000 Email: kywd_ecf_deadletter@kywd.uscourts.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mike Buchanon individually

represented by Stacey A. Blankenship (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas R. Moore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jackie T. Strode individually

represented by Stacey A. Blankenship (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas R. Moore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jeff Robbins individually

represented by Stacey A. Blankenship (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas R. Moore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Pat Watt individually

represented by Stacey A. Blankenship (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas R. Moore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Misse Cooper−Edmonds individually

represented by Stacey A. Blankenship (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas R. Moore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Gayle Eston individually
Defendant South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.
Defendant Ellen Lee Bale individually
Defendant Tommy Ross individually

represented by Stacey A. Blankenship (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas R. Moore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Joel Lewis Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP − Louisville 101 S. Fifth Street, Suite 3500 Louisville, KY 40202 502−589−4200 Fax: 502−540−2171 Email: blewis@bgdlegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark S. Riddle Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP − Louisville 101 S. Fifth Street, Suite 3500 Louisville, KY 40202 502−587−3623 Fax: 502−540−2194 Email: mriddle@bgdlegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Joel Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark S. Riddle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Joel Lewis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark S. Riddle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/12/2011

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT filed by Stuart Cole and Loren Patterson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated against Warren County, Kentucky; Mike Buchanon; Jackie T. Strode; Jeff Robbins; Pat Watt; Misse Cooper−Edmonds; Gayle Eston; South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.; Ellen Lee Bale; and Tommy Ross. Filing fee $350, receipt number 0644−1339850. (Attachments: # 1 Cover Sheet, # 2 Tendered Summonses) (TJD) (Entered: 12/12/2011)

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12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/29/2011 01/20/2012
01/20/2012
01/23/2012 01/30/2012 02/20/2012 02/20/2012 03/05/2012

2 Case Assignment (Random Selection): Case Assigned to Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. (TJD) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
3 Summonses Issued as to Warren County, Kentucky; Mike Buchanon; Jackie T. Strode; Jeff Robbins; Pat Watt; Misse Cooper−Edmonds; Gayle Eston; South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.; Ellen Lee Bale; and Tommy Ross. Counsel for Plaintiff is responsible for printing and serving the attached issued summonses. (TJD) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
4 ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. (EBOC) on 12/12/2011; Referring Case to Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel pursuant to 28:636(b)(1)(A) for disposition of all non−dispositive motions. cc: Counsel, ERG, PH, KL (TJD) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
5 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Mike Buchanon, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Jeff Robbins, Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 12/29/2011)
6 MOTION to Dismiss SOUTH CENTRAL BANK OF BOWLING GREEN, INC., ELLEN BALE AND TOMMY ROSS by Defendants Ellen Lee Bale, Tommy Ross, South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc. Responses due by 2/13/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Ordinance Authorizing and Directing Prisoner Fee and Expense Reimbursement, # 3 Exhibit B − Warren Fiscal Court Minutes, # 4 Exhibit C − Warren County Jail − Inmate Rights & Rules and Services Offered to Inmates, # 5 Proposed Order) (Lewis, Benjamin) (Entered: 01/20/2012)
7 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendants Mike Buchanon, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Jeff Robbins, Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt Responses due by 2/13/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of County Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Exhibit A − Ordinance, # 3 Exhibit B − Inmate Rights & Rules, # 4 Exhibit C − Cole's Jail account, # 5 Exhibit D − Cole's account history, # 6 Exhibit E − Cole's booking sheets, # 7 Exhibit F − Cole's property receipt, # 8 Exhibit G − Inmate rights signed by Cole, # 9 Exhibit H − Patterson's booking sheet, # 10 Exhibit I − Patterson's account history, # 11 Exhibit J − bank notice, # 12 Exhibit K − Inmate rights signed by Patterson, # 13 Exhibit L − Patterson's property receipt, # 14 Proposed Order to Motion for Summary Judgment) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 01/20/2012)
8 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation for Extension of Time for Plaintiffs to Respond to Motions by Ellen Lee Bale, Mike Buchanon, Stuart Cole, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Loren Patterson, Jeff Robbins, Tommy Ross, South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc., Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 01/23/2012)
9 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 1/27/2012; By agreement of parties, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff shall have to and including 2/20/2012 to respond to Defendants' dispositive motion. cc:counsel (PHB) (Entered: 01/30/2012)
10 RESPONSE to Motion re 6 MOTION to Dismiss SOUTH CENTRAL BANK OF BOWLING GREEN, INC., ELLEN BALE AND TOMMY ROSS filed by Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson. Replies due by 3/8/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Original SB 332, # 2 Exhibit SB 332 legislative history, # 3 Exhibit Floor amendment 1, # 4 Exhibit Floor amendment 2, # 5 Exhibit Inmates' rights, # 6 Exhibit Fiscal Court ordinance, # 7 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 02/20/2012)
11 RESPONSE to Motion re 7 MOTION for Summary Judgment by County Defendants filed by Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson. Replies due by 3/8/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Original SB 332, # 2 Exhibit SB 332 legislative history, # 3 Exhibit Floor amendment 1, # 4 Exhibit Floor amendment 2, # 5 Exhibit Inmates' rights, # 6 Exhibit Fiscal Court ordinance, # 7 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) Modified attachment description on 2/21/2012 (CDF). (Entered: 02/20/2012)
12 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Motion to File Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment that Exceeds 15 Page Limitation by Defendants Mike Buchanon, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Jeff Robbins, Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt Responses due by 3/29/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Motion to File Reply that Exceeds 15 page limit, # 2 Reply

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03/06/2012 03/07/2012 03/08/2012 03/08/2012
03/19/2012 03/29/2012 04/04/2012 04/09/2012 04/15/2012 04/16/2012 04/19/2012 04/19/2012

to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, # 3 Exhibit A − Affidavit Tammy Davis, # 4 Exhibit B − Warren County Fiscal Court, # 5 Exhibit C − Affidavit Pat Watt, # 6 Exhibit D − Inmate Account Transactions, # 7 Exhibit E − Plaintiff's Court Net Criminal History) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
13 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation Allowing Until March 19, 2012 for SCB Defendants to File Reply by Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson, South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc., Ellen Lee Bale, and Tommy Ross. (Lewis, Benjamin) Modified to add filers on 3/7/2012 (CDF). (Entered: 03/06/2012)
14 AGREED ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 3/7/2012. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the SCB Defendants shall have to and including 3/19/2012 by which to file a Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss 6 . cc: Counsel (CDF) (Entered: 03/07/2012)
15 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO FILE REPLY THAT EXCEEDS THE 15−PAGE LIMIT granting 12 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 3/8/2012. cc: Counsel (CDF) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
16 REPLY to Response to Motion re 7 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Mike Buchanon, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Jeff Robbins, Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Affidavit of Tammy Davis, # 2 Exhibit B − Warren County Fiscal Court, # 3 Exhibit C − Affidavit of Pat Watt, # 4 Exhibit D − Inmate Account Transactions, # 5 Exhibit E − Plaintiff's Court Net Criminal History) (CDF) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
17 REPLY to Response to Motion re 6 MOTION to Dismiss SOUTH CENTRAL BANK OF BOWLING GREEN, INC., ELLEN BALE AND TOMMY ROSS filed by Ellen Lee Bale, Tommy Ross, South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.. (Riddle, Mark) Modified event text on 3/20/2012 (CDF). (Entered: 03/19/2012)
18 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply by Plaintiffs Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson Responses due by 4/22/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Surreply, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
19 RESPONSE to Motion re 18 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply filed by Mike Buchanon, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Jeff Robbins, Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt. Replies due by 4/21/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Response to Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
20 RESPONSE to Motion Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply and Proposed Order filed by South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.. Replies due by 4/26/2012. (Lewis, Benjamin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/10/2012: # 1 Proposed Order) (JBM). (Entered: 04/09/2012)
21 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Class Action Complaint by Plaintiffs Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson Responses due by 5/9/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Complaint, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 04/15/2012)
22 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response to Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson Responses due by 5/10/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed First Amended Class Action Complaint, # 2 Exhibit Jones case file, # 3 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Attachment 2 replaced on 5/31/2012) (CDF). (Entered: 04/16/2012)
23 MOTION to Strike and Substitute 22 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response to Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. Document or Part to be Stricken and/or Substituted: Exhibit 2by Plaintiffs Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson Responses due by 5/7/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Jones file, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
24 RESPONSE to Motion re 21 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Class Action Complaint Response and Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Mike Buchanon, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Jeff Robbins, Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt. Replies due by 5/6/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Deny Plaintiffs' 1st Amended Class) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/19/2012)

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04/19/2012
04/20/2012 04/20/2012 04/26/2012 05/10/2012 05/11/2012 05/30/2012
05/30/2012 05/30/2012 05/31/2012

25 RESPONSE to Motion re 7 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 22 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response to Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Supplement Response to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Mike Buchanon, Misse Cooper−Edmonds, Gayle Eston, Jeff Robbins, Jackie T. Strode, Warren County, Kentucky, Pat Watt. Replies due by 5/6/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Supplement Response, # 2 Proposed Order Grant Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement Response) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
26 REPLY to Response to Motion re 22 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response to Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment filed by Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
27 REPLY to Response to Motion re 21 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
28 RESPONSE to Motion re 21 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Ellen Lee Bale, Tommy Ross, South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.. Replies due by 5/13/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Motion for Leave to File An Amended Complaint) (Lewis, Benjamin) (Entered: 04/26/2012)
29 REPLY to Response to Motion re 21 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Bridge v. Ocwen Federal Bank, # 2 Exhibit Gamby v. Equifax Information Systems) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/10/2012)
Pursuant to GO 12−04, Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl added. Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel no longer assigned to case. (TJD) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
30 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 5/29/2012. For the reasons set forth, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that SCB Defendants' motion to dismiss (DN 6 ) and County Defendants' motion for summary judgment (DN 7 ) are GRANTED as to the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. The State law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file surreply (DN 18 ) is GRANTED and was taken into consideration in the Court's decision. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended class action complaint (DN 21 ) is DENIED. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file supplemental response to motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (DN 22 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. cc: Counsel (CDF) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
31 JUDGMENT by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of the Defendants consistent with the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order (DN 30 ) and the Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs' State law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. cc: Counsel (CDF) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
32 PLAINTIFFS' SURREPLY re 6 MOTION to Dismiss, and 7 MOTION for Summary Judgment, filed by Stuart Cole, Loren Patterson. (CDF) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
33 ORDER by Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl on 5/30/2012 granting 23 Motion to Strike and substitute. ORDERED that the original Exhibit 2 to Plaintiffs' motion for leave of Court to supplement response to Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment is hereby STRICKEN, and the document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' motion to strike shall be substituted in its place. cc: Counsel (CDF) (Entered: 05/31/2012)

 
 Case 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
[Filed Electronically]

STUART COLE and LOREN PATTERSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
PLAINTIFFS
v.
WARREN COUNTY, KENTUCKY Serve: Mike Buchanon County Judge-Executive 420 East 10th Ave., Suite 201 Bowling Green, KY 42101
MIKE BUCHANON, individually Serve: Mike Buchanon 420 East 10th Ave., Suite 201 Bowling Green, KY 42101
JACKIE T. STRODE, individually Serve: Jackie T. Strode Jailer Warren County Regional Jail 920 Kentucky Street Bowling Green, KY 42101
JEFF ROBBINS, individually Serve: Jeff Robbins Chief Deputy Warren County Regional Jail 920 Kentucky Street Bowling Green, KY 42101
PAT WATT, individually Serve: Pat Watt Chief Administrative Deputy Warren County Regional Jail 920 Kentucky Street

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1:11-CV-189-M

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) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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Bowling Green, KY 42101

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MISSE COOPER-EDMONDS, individually )

Serve: Misse Cooper-Edmonds

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Chief Deputy

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Warren County Regional Jail )

920 Kentucky Street

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Bowling Green, KY 42101

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GAYLE ESTON, individually

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Serve: Gayle Eston

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908 Captains Ct

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Bowling Green, KY 42103-9605 )

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SOUTH CENTRAL BANK OF

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BOWLING GREEN, INC.

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Serve: Ellen Lee Bale

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Chairwoman

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South Central Bank of

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Bowling Green, Inc.

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1757 Campbell Lane

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Bowling Green, KY 42104

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ELLEN LEE BALE, individually

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Serve: Ellen Lee Bale

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P.O. Box 667

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208 South Broadway

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Glasgow, KY 42141

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TOMMY ROSS, individually

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Serve: Tommy Ross

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President

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South Central Bank of

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Bowling Green, Inc.

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1757 Campbell Lane

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Bowling Green, KY 42104

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DEFENDANTS.

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I. Introduction

1. Plaintiffs Stuart Cole and Loren Patterson file this action in their individual capacity

and on behalf of all persons who, while incarcerated or detained at the Warren County Regional Jail

(“the Jail”), have been wrongfully deprived of their property without due process of law by:

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a. The policy, custom and/or practice at the Jail of endorsing, cashing and retaining all proceeds from checks in the possession of persons admitted to the Jail other than sentenced prisoners without the payees’ knowledge, approval, endorsement or consent, in violation of Kentucky law, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution;
b. The policy, custom and/or practice of accepting and honoring such checks by South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc. (the “Bank”), in violation of Kentucky law, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution; and
c. The policy, custom and/or practice at the Jail of retaining cash and proceeds from checks of persons admitted to the Jail other than sentenced prisoners without their consent, and/or in violation of and/or in excess of sums permitted under KRS § 441.265, and/or without providing an accounting of same, in violation of Kentucky law, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution.
2. On information and belief, numerous persons admitted to the Jail who are not
sentenced prisoners have been subject to the wrongful taking of their property by such policies,
customs and/or practices and the wrongful conduct described below. On information and belief,
such policies, customs and/or practices have caused consequential and special damages to some or
all such persons in addition to the actual damages represented by the funds retained.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
3. Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, seek recovery of actual and punitive
damages from Defendants under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, for gross and
unconscionable violations of the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, this Court has
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1343. Plaintiffs, and all
others similarly situated, also seek declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages from
Defendants under state and common law and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution pursuant to
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the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court. As Warren County, Kentucky is the location of all acts pertinent to Plaintiffs’ claims, venue is proper in this Court.
III. Parties 4. Plaintiffs were incarcerated following their arrest, but bonded out and were not sentenced prisoners, at the Warren County Regional Jail (the “Jail”) in Warren County, Kentucky. 5. Defendants Warren County, Kentucky (the “County”), and County Judge-Executive Mike Buchanon, at all times mentioned herein, employed, were responsible for the establishment of policies either formally or by custom for, and were responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, the officers and employees of the Jail. 6. Defendant Strode, at all times mentioned herein, was the Warren County Jailer, and Defendants Robbins, Watts, Cooper-Edmonds and Eston (who retired on July 31, 2011) were for all or part of all times mentioned herein, Chief Deputies of the Jail (collectively, the “Individual County Defendants”). As such, the Individual County Defendants were responsible for the establishment of policies, customs and practices governing the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, officers and employees staffing the Jail, and the establishment of policies, customs and practices governing conduct and practices of the Jail’s officers and employees regarding, inter alia, property of arrestees and pre-trial detainees like Plaintiffs, and, on information and belief, individually participated in the wrongful conduct made the basis of this complaint. 7. Upon information and belief, South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc. (the “Bank”) at all times mentioned herein maintained one or more depository accounts for the Jail. 8. Upon information and belief, Defendants Bale and Ross (the “Individual Bank Defendants”), at all times mentioned herein, were Chairwoman and President, respectively, of the Bank, and as such were, together with the Bank, responsible for the establishment of policies,
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customs and practices governing the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, officers and employees of the Bank, and the establishment of policies, customs and practices governing conduct and practices of the Bank’s officers and employees regarding, inter alia, ensuring proper endorsement of, and acceptance for deposit into the accounts of the Bank’s account holders, checks presented to the Bank by its customers, and, on information and belief, individually participated in the wrongful conduct made the basis of this complaint.
IV. Nature of Defendants’ Conduct 9. The County and the Individual County Defendants (collectively, “the County Defendants”) engaged in the conduct described below under color of state law, and in accordance with the policies, customs and practice of the County and the Jail. The offenses described below resulted from the failure of the County Defendants to employ qualified persons for positions of authority, and/or to properly or conscientiously train and supervise the conduct of such persons after their employment, and/or to promulgate appropriate operating policies and procedures either formally or by custom and practice to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of inmates in the Jail’s care and custody. The County Defendants created, approved or knowingly acquiesced in a policy, custom and/or practice under which unconstitutional practices and practices which violate statutory and common law occurred, and/or promulgated operating policies and procedures either formally or by custom and practice which violate the constitutional, statutory and common law rights of inmates in the Jail’s care and custody. The County Defendants’ conduct was intentional or grossly negligent, was conducted in bad faith, and was indicative not only of deliberate indifference to, but active malice and a total and reckless disregard for the constitutional, statutory and common law rights of Plaintiffs and the classes, justifying an award of punitive damages in addition to the actual damages which Plaintiffs and the classes are entitled to recover.
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10. The Bank and the Individual Bank Defendants (collectively, the “Bank Defendants”), engaged in the conduct described below as state actors and in accordance with the policies, customs and practices of the Bank. The offenses described below resulted from the failure of the Bank Defendants to employ qualified persons for positions of authority, and/or to properly or conscientiously train and supervise the conduct of such persons after their employment, and/or to promulgate appropriate operating policies and procedures either formally or by custom and practice to protect the constitutional, statutory and common law rights of inmates in the Jail’s care and custody. The Bank Defendants created, approved or knowingly acquiesced in a policy, custom and/or practice under which unconstitutional practices and practices which violate statutory and common law occurred, and/or promulgated operating policies and procedures either formally or by custom and practice which violate the constitutional, statutory and common law rights of inmates in the Jail’s care and custody. The Bank Defendants’ conduct was intentional or grossly negligent, was conducted in bad faith, and was indicative not only of deliberate indifference to, but active malice and a total and reckless disregard for the constitutional, statutory and common law rights of Plaintiffs and the classes, justifying an award of punitive damages in addition to the actual damages which Plaintiffs and the classes are entitled to recover.
IV. Class Action 11. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1), (2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The classes consists of (a) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail taken, endorsed and deposited by the County Defendants in the Jail’s account or accounts with the Bank or other financial institutions; (b) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had the cash and checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail retained by
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the County Defendants without their written consent, and/or in violation of and/or in excess of sums permitted under KRS § 441.265; and (c) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had the cash and checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail retained by the County Defendants without giving an accounting to such persons upon release from the Jail.
12. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all class members. They are members of the classes and their claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiffs will aggressively pursue the interests of the entirety of the classes. Plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining injunctive relief and actual, special, consequential and punitive damages for the violations of their statutory and constitutional rights and privileges are consistent with and not antagonistic of those of any other person within their classes.
13. Given the events which transpired upon their admission to the Jail and following their release from the Jail, Plaintiffs allege that the County Defendants have a policy, custom and/or practice of: (a) seizing checks in the possession of all persons admitted to the Jail, endorsing such checks without such persons’ consent or legal authorization, depositing such checks in its account or accounts with the Bank or other financial institutions, and retaining the proceeds; (b) retaining cash and checks in the possession of all persons admitted to the Jail without their consent, and/or in violation of and/or in excess of sums permitted under KRS § 441.265; and (c) retaining the cash and checks in the possession of all persons admitted to the Jail without giving an accounting to such persons upon release their from the Jail. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the Bank Defendants have a policy, custom and/or practice of accepting checks made payable to persons detained or incarcerated in the Jail, and depositing such checks in the Jail’s account or accounts with the Bank without the payee’s endorsement, consent or legal authorization.
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Case 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 8
14. Such conduct violates the rights of persons who are not sentenced prisoners under,
among other things, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
42 U.S.C. §1983, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky common law. The
only question that remains to be resolved is whether Plaintiffs and the members of the classes are
entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, and to an award of compensatory and punitive damages
and, if so, the extent of such an award.
15. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of this controversy because:
a. A multiplicity of suits with consequent burden on the Court and Defendants should be avoided;
b. It may be virtually impossible for all class members to intervene as partiesplaintiff in this action; and
c. Upon adjudication of Defendants’ liability, claims of the class members can be determined by this Court.
VI. Facts
16. KRS 441.265 provides in relevant part that:
a. A prisoner in a county jail shall be required by the sentencing court to reimburse the county for expenses incurred by reason of the prisoner's confinement as set out in this section, except for good cause shown.
b. The jailer may adopt, with the approval of the county's governing body, a prisoner fee and expense reimbursement policy, which may include, but not be limited to, the following:
i. An administrative processing or booking fee; ii. A per diem for room and board of not more than fifty dollars ($50) per day or the actual per diem cost, whichever is less, for the entire period of time the prisoner is confined to the jail; iii. Actual charges for medical and dental treatment; and iv. Reimbursement for county property damaged or any injury caused by the prisoner while confined to the jail.
c. Rates charged may be adjusted in accordance with the fee and expense reimbursement policy based upon the ability of the prisoner confined to the
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Case 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 9
jail to pay, giving consideration to any legal obligation of the prisoner to support a spouse, minor children, or other dependents. The prisoner's interest in any jointly owned property and the income, assets, earnings, or other property owned by the prisoner's spouse or family shall not be used to determine a prisoner's ability to pay.
d. Payment of any required fees may be automatically deducted from the prisoner's property or canteen account. Nothing in KRS 441.265 suggests that it applies to anything other than a sentenced prisoner (as opposed to an arrestee or pretrial detainee who retains a presumption of innocence), or permits a jail to deposit checks and retain cash in the possession of any person absent a court order, or without such person’s consent, or without consideration of such person’s support obligations or need for such funds to pay for more pressing obligations (such as rent, electricity, water, medicine, etc.), or without regard to such person’s guilt of the offense for which they were arrested or are detained pending trial, or beyond the actual or reasonable cost incurred as a consequence of such person’s incarceration, or without an accounting of funds collected, retained and returned, or without regard to the consequences of such action. 17. Plaintiffs were arrested, admitted to the Jail, and then released after posting bond. When Plaintiffs were admitted to the Jail, they both had in their possession certain checks made payable to such Plaintiff and sums of cash. The checks and cash were taken from them by the County Defendants in accordance with the County Defendants’ policy, custom and/or practice. The County Defendants wrongfully, knowingly and intentionally, and without Plaintiffs’ knowledge, approval, endorsement or consent, stamped the checks “For Deposit Only, Warren County Jail, Inmate Account,” in accordance with Jail practice, custom and/or policy. The County Defendants then presented the checks to the Bank Defendants, which wrongfully accepted them for deposit into one or more accounts of the Jail at the Bank. The County Defendants retained proceeds of such checks in addition to the cash taken from Plaintiffs without Plaintiffs’ consent, and/or in violation of
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Case 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 10
and/or in excess of the amounts authorized by KRS § 441.265. Plaintiffs received no accounting for the cash and checks taken and retained by the County Defendants.
18. Because of the County Defendants’ wrongful retention of cash and checks in Plaintiffs’ possession in violation of and/or in excess of the amounts authorized by KRS § 441.265 and their failure to account for same, the County Defendants’ cashing of the checks in Plaintiffs’ possession, and the wrongful acceptance and deposit of the checks by the Bank Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered injury including, without limitation, the deprivation of their property without due process of law.
VII. Causes of Action A. Count I
19. Paragraphs 1-18 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 19.
20. Plaintiffs’ and the classes’ treatment by the County Defendants is the result of a continuing pattern of misconduct and is the result of policies, procedures, customs and practices of the County Defendants, either written or unwritten, that are systematically applied to all persons admitted to the Jail, pursuant to which persons like Plaintiffs are deprived of their property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and are subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, all in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983. Such practices constitute an arbitrary use of government power, and evince a total, intentional and unreasonable disregard for and deliberate indifference to the constitutional, state and common law rights of persons in the Jail’s care and custody, including Plaintiffs and the members of the classes, and the wholesale violations of those rights likely to result from the systematic pursuit of such policies, customs and practices.
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21. Plaintiffs’ and the classes’ treatment by the Bank Defendants is the result of a continuing pattern of misconduct and is the result of policies, procedures, customs and practices of the Bank, either written or unwritten, that are systematically applied to all persons admitted to the Jail, pursuant to which the persons like Plaintiffs are deprived of their property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and are subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, all in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983. By engaging in such practices, the Bank Defendants serve as a state actor. Such practices constitute an arbitrary use of government power, and evince a total, intentional and unreasonable disregard for and deliberate indifference to the constitutional, state and common law rights of persons in the Jail’s care and custody, including Plaintiffs and the members of the classes, and the wholesale violations of those rights likely to result from the systematic pursuit of such policies, customs and practices.
22. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the classes, through Defendants’ intentional or grossly negligent conduct, bad faith and deliberate indifference to their rights, were deprived of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and were subjected to an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, all in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983.
B. Count II 23. Paragraphs 1-22 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 23. 24. By virtue of the foregoing, the County Defendants and Bank Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent, all to the damage of the Plaintiffs and the classes.
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C. Count III 25. Paragraphs 1-24 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 25. 26. By virtue of the foregoing, the County Defendants and Bank Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Plaintiffs and the classes of their property, all to the damage of Plaintiffs and the classes.
C. Count IV 27. Paragraphs 1-26 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 27. 28. By virtue of the foregoing, the County Defendants and Bank Defendants violated the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including, without limitation, Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, Articles 355.3 and 355.4 of the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code, and sections 506.040 et seq., 514.030, 514.070, 522.020 and 522.030 of the Kentucky Penal Code. In addition, the County Defendants violated the Administrative Regulations of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including, without limitation, § 501 KAR 3:120.
D. Count V 29. Paragraphs 1-28 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 29. 30. By virtue of the foregoing, the County Defendants and Bank Defendants acted in bad faith.
E. Count VI 31. Paragraphs 1-30 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 31.
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Case 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 13
32. By virtue of the foregoing, the County Defendants and Bank Defendants converted the property of the Plaintiffs and the classes.
E. Count VI 33. Paragraphs 1-32 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 33. 34. By virtue of the foregoing, the County Defendants and Bank Defendants fraudulently deprived the Plaintiffs and the classes of their property.
VIII. Damages 35. Paragraphs 1-34 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 35. 36. As a consequence of the County Defendants and Bank Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs and the members of the classes have been wrongfully deprived of their property, in violation of the Plaintiffs’ and the classes’ constitutional, statutory and common law rights. 37. As a result, Plaintiffs and the members of the classes are entitled to recover all actual, consequential and special damages arising from the conduct of the County Defendants and Bank Defendants. Furthermore, the County Defendants and Bank Defendants’ violations of the constitutional, statutory and common law rights of the Plaintiffs and the classes were knowing, intentional, malicious and evinced a total and reckless disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and the classes, entitling them to recover punitive damages from such Defendants in order to deter such conduct in the future. 38. The Bank Defendants acted in bad faith and failed to exercise ordinary care, and as a result Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes are entitled to recover from the Bank Defendants actual damages and special and consequential damages they suffered as a proximate consequence of
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Case 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 14
the Bank Defendants’ actions pursuant to KRS § 355.4-103. In addition, Plaintiffs and the classes, pursuant to KRS § 286.3-800, are entitled to recover from the Bank the sums represented by all checks wrongfully accepted by the Bank and deposited to the account of the Jail.
IX. Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction 39. Paragraphs 1-38 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 39. 40. In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the classes request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment against the County Defendants and Bank Defendants deeming unconstitutional any and all policies, procedures, customs or practices which resulted in the Jail’s retention of cash and checks of persons who are not sentenced prisoners in violation of and/or in excess of sums authorized by KRS § 441.265, the Jail’s failure to account to Plaintiffs and the classes for their property, and the Jail’s endorsement of and cashing of Plaintiffs’ and the classes’ checks, and the Bank’s depositing of such checks in the Jail’s accounts, without the payees’ knowledge, approval, endorsement or consent, and further request that this Court permanently order the County Defendants and Bank Defendants to refrain from following or enforcing such policies, procedures, customs or usages that contributed to the damages sustained by Plaintiffs and the classes. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the classes they represent request (a) that this action proceed as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and (b) a trial by jury, and further request that they and all members of the classes (c) be awarded actual, consequential, special and punitive damages, (d) be granted the declaratory and injunctive relief requested herein, and (e) be awarded all costs, attorney fees, pre- and post-judgment interest and all other relief to which they are entitled.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Gregory A. Belzley Gregory A. Belzley
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Case 1:11-cv-00189-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 15 BelzleyBathurst Attorneys P.O. Box 278 Prospect, KY 40059 Gary S. Logsdon P.O. Box 382 101 Main Cross Street Brownsville, KY 42210 Counsel for Plaintiffs
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-00189-JHM

STUART COLE and LOREN PATTERSON

PLAINTIFF

V.

WARREN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et. al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.,

Ellen Bale, and Tommy Ross’ motion to dismiss [DN 6], Defendants Warren County, Kentucky,

Mike Buchanon, Jackie T. Strode, Jeff Robbins, Pat Watt, Misse Cooper-Edmonds, and Gayle

Eston’s motion for summary judgment [DN 7], and Plaintiffs Stuart Cole and Loren Patterson’s

motion for leave to file an amended class action complaint [DN 21]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe

for decision. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and

motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs, Stuart Cole and Loren Patterson, bring this class action complaint on behalf

of persons lodged in the Warren County Regional Jail (“Jail”), challenging various policies

concerning the seizure of property upon admission into the jail and the assessment of various fees

of incarceration. Plaintiff Cole was arrested for the first time on October 25, 2003 and booked into

the Jail. At the time of his arrest, Cole had a check made payable to him in the amount of $33.00.

The check was taken by the Jail and stamped “For Deposit Only, Warren County Jail, Inmate

Account” and deposited into the South Central Bank Inmate Account and $33.00 was credited to

Cole’s Inmate Canteen Account. Cole was assessed a $20 processing fee and a $20 daily housing

fee. These fees were deducted from Cole’s inmate account. After Cole posted bond and was released, a $5 bond fee was also charged to his inmate account. At the time of his release, Cole owed a balance of $12 to the Jail which remained unpaid.
On March 12, 2009, Cole was again arrested and booked into the Jail. This time, Cole had two checks written to him, one in the amount of $200 and the other in the amount of $59.55. He also had $4 in cash on him. The checks were taken by the Jail and stamped with “For Deposit Only, Warren County Jail, Inmate Account.” The cash was also deposited. Cole’s account was charged with the negative $12 balance from his arrest in 2003, as well as a $75 fee, which Defendants state is a $50 processing fee and a $25 daily housing fee. When Cole was released on Bond he signed a Prisoner Property Receipt that stated:
I hereby certify that I have received all items listed on this receipt as well as information regarding the funds within my inmate account and the appropriate procedures for recouping the same. (Warren County Regional Jail, Prisoner Property Receipt [DN 7-7].) Cole also signed a Rights Form when he was admitted to the Jail which advised him: If due a refund and you fail to come by the jail, or fail to return the bottom of the letter given to you at the time of your release, to the jail within ninety (90) days, you will have forfeited your refund and it will become the property of the jail. (Warren County Jail Inmate Rights & Rules and Services Offered to Inmates [DN 7-8].) At the time of his release, Cole was due a refund of $172.70. Cole did not claim his refund within the time period and the Jail has retained the funds. Plaintiff Loren Patterson was arrested on September 5, 2011, and booked into the Jail possessing a check for $150 that was made payable to Patterson. Consistent with policy, his check was taken from him and stamped “For Deposit Only, Warren County Jail, Inmate Account” and
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deposited in the South Central Inmate Account. The Jail deducted $100 as a booking fee, which the County Defendants claim is a $70 administrative processing fee and a $30 daily housing fee. Patterson was released on bond and charged a $5 bond fee. Patterson’s check was returned to the Jail due to a “Stop Payment” order and a $5 handling fee was charged to his inmate account, leaving a negative balance of $110.
The Plaintiffs bring a § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments, as well as various state law claims. Plaintiffs chiefly complain that their checks were deposited in the South Central Bank Inmate Account without their knowledge, consent or endorsement and thus, they were deprived of their property without due process of law. Plaintiffs argue that the charges were made and their property taken before they had an opportunity to a hearing before a sentencing court. Plaintiffs maintain that according to KRS 441.265(1), only a sentencing court may require a prisoner to reimburse the county for costs associated with confinement.
South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc., Ellen Bale, and Tommy Ross (collectively “SCB Defendants”) have moved the court to dismiss the action against them. Warren County, Mike Buchanon, Jackie T. Strode, Jeff Robbins, Pat Watt, Misse Cooper-Edmonds, and Gayle Eston (collectively “County Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment. All Defendants argue that the county governing body was authorized by KRS 441.045 to implement rules for operating the jail and KRS 441.265 authorizes the jailer to impose prisoner fees which “may be automatically deducted from the prisoner’s property or canteen account.” KRS § 441.265(1);(6).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The SCB Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss stating that all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail
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as a matter of law. While they have not specifically referenced Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this Court will analyze the motion under that standard. In addition, the SCB Defendants and the County Defendants have adopted each other’s applicable arguments under their motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. As the Court has relied on purely legal arguments, it will analyze both the County Defendants and SCB Defendants’ arguments under a motion to dismiss standard.
Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff,” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), “accept all well-pled factual allegations as true[,]” id., and determine whether the “complaint states a plausible claim for relief[,]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Under this standard, the plaintiff must provide the grounds for its entitlement to relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff satisfies this standard only when it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint falls short if it pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant's liability” or if the alleged facts do not “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678, 679. Instead, the allegations must “‘show[ ] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
If “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court” when ruling upon a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Federal Rules require that “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). This Rule does not require the Court to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment every time the Court
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reviews documents that are not attached to the complaint. Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999). “[W]hen a document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff’s claim . . . [,] the defendant may submit an authentic copy [of the document] to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss, and the court’s consideration of the document does not require conversion of the motion to one for summary judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Courts may also consider public records, matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and letter decisions of governmental agencies.” Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
III. DISCUSSION A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere." Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two allegations are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). First, "a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States," West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), and second, he "must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Id. "Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie." Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged that (1) “[t]he policy, custom and/or practice at the Jail of endorsing, cashing and retaining all proceeds from checks in the possession of persons admitted to the Jail other than sentenced prisoners without the payees’ knowledge, approval, endorsement or consent;” (2) “[t]he policy custom and/or practice of accepting and honoring such
5

checks by South Central Bank of Bowling Green, Inc.;” and (3) “[t]he policy, custom and/or practice at the Jail of retaining cash and proceeds from checks of persons admitted to the Jail other than sentenced prisoners without their consent, and/or in violation of and/or in excess of sums permitted under KRS § 441.265, and/or without providing an accounting of same” are in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
1. Fourth Amendment Both the SCB Defendants and the County Defendants argue that there were no violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. The SCB Defendants argue that an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures includes searches incident to custodial arrests and searches when booked at a jail. The County Defendants state that the Jail is required by 501 KAR § 3:120(3)(1)-(3) “to conduct a search of each prisoner and his possession to search for contraband in such a manner which jail personnel reasonably determines is necessary to protect the safety of fellow prisoners, jail personnel, and institutional security.” (County Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., 9 [DN 7].) Additionally, the County Defendants state that the Jail had a “legitimate interest in searching for and seizing money which inmates may carry inside the jail, in order to maintain a safe and orderly facility.” (Id.) Plaintiffs acknowledge the exception and state that they do not complain of being searched at booking or at having property removed from their possession and held until their release. Nor do they challenge the constitutionality of the Jail’s reimbursement for statutorily-authorized fees in the manner proscribed by KRS § 441.265. Instead, Plaintiff complains that the “[s]eizure of these monies offends the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the extent such seizure violates the provisions of KRS § 441.265 - the statute’s prescription for satisfying procedural due
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process, and its limitation, effected through the Fiscal Court ordinance, of how much can be seized, and for what.” (Pls.’ Memo in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, 13 [DN 10].) Stated another way, the seizure of the monies is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment provided the provisions of KRS § 441.265 are followed. Thus, this issue is dependent upon the analysis below.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no State will deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The guarantee of procedural due process “assures the deprivation of life, liberty, or property will not be effectuated without ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Barachkov v. 41B Dist. Court, 311 F.App’x 863, 871 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). A procedural due process claim raises two questions: (1) “whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State” and (2) “whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dept. Of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
Both the County Defendants and the SCB Defendants agree that the Plaintiffs had a property interest in their money, answering the first question affirmatively. As to the second question, the Plaintiffs insist they are not arguing they are entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before the Jail seizes cash and checks in their possession to reimburse costs authorized pursuant to KRS § 441.265. Instead, Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to a hearing in front of the sentencing court before the Jail can collect any funds for reimbursement of prisoner confinement expenses. The statute states:
[A] prisoner in a county jail shall be required by the sentencing court to reimburse the county for expenses incurred by reason of the prisoner’s confinement as set out in this section, except for good cause shown.
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KRS § 441.265(1) (emphasis added) The same argument was made to Judge Bertelsman in Sickles v. Campbell Co., Ky., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Kentucky, July 13, 2006) and it was rejected. Judge Bertelsman’s decision was upheld by the Sixth Circuit in Sickles v. Campbell Co., Ky., 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs argue that Judge Bertelsman interpreted the statute incorrectly and that the Sixth Circuit’s holding is limited.
Plaintiffs fault Judge Bertelsman for not looking to the legislative history after finding that the statute was ambiguous. Although the word “ambiguous” was used in Judge Bertelsman’s opinion, it is clear that he did not find the statute ambiguous after it was considered as a whole. Therefore, it would have been improper for him to have referred to the legislative history. The Court agrees with Judge Bertelsman and finds no ambiguity in the statute.
Judge Bertelsman cited the automatic deduction provisions of KRS § 411.265(6), and the definition of “prisoner” found in KRS § 441.005(3)(c), to conclude that the correct reading of the statute is that fees may be imposed and periodically collected as soon as the prisoner is booked into the jail. The reference to the “sentencing court” in subparagraph (1) was found by Judge Bertelsman to allow the court to impose a judgment for any deficiency at sentencing which was not defrayed by the automatic deduction.1
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that a jail may withhold a portion of an inmate’s account in order to cover costs without providing the inmate with a hearing before it withholds the money.
1Additionally, the provisions of subparagraph (1) would seem to provide a prisoner a mechanism to ask the sentencing court to excuse the payment of expenses for good cause, particularly if the charges are acquitted or dismissed.
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The Sixth Circuit determined that there was a property interest at stake, and then addressed what process is due by balancing “[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; . . . [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation[;] . . . [3] the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and . . . [4] the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 730 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). After analyzing the four factors, the Sixth Circuit held that “[i]n view of the modest private interests at stake, the small risk of error, the limited benefits of additional safeguards and the unchallenged government interests in the policy,” there was no need for a pre-deprivation hearing before Campbell County and Kenton County withheld funds from inmates’ accounts. Id. at 730-31.
The Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish their argument here from that which the Sixth Circuit has already rejected in Sickles. However, the Court sees no difference. Here, the Plaintiffs claim that KRS § 411.265(1) requires that any withholding be delayed until after the sentencing court conducts a hearing. That precise claim was made, acknowledged, discussed, and rejected by the Sixth Circuit when it quoted the language of KRS § 411.265(1) and stated that “to say that a sentencing court must do one thing (requiring reimbursement even after the inmate’s release) is not to say that another government entity (the county jail) may not do another (collecting room-andboard fees from inmates while they remain in jail).” Id. at 732. Therefore, the Court concludes that Sickles is controlling on the issue of whether KRS § 411.265(1) requires withholdings to be delayed until after a hearing before the sentencing court.
However, there are claims made in this case which are different from those made in Sickles. Plaintiffs challenge the practice of seizing personal checks made payable to a prisoner, depositing
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them into the Jail account without the prisoner’s endorsement, knowledge or consent; not providing the prisoner with a billing statement upon release as required by KRS § 411.265(7); and the charging of fees not authorized by KRS § 411.265(2)(a). The Court will address each of these in turn.
First, as to the practice of seizing personal checks made payable to a prisoner and depositing them into the Jail account without the prisoner’s endorsement, knowledge, or consent, the Court does not find a Due Process violation. While it has already been noted that the Plaintiffs have a property interest in the checks, this property interest is no different from the interest they have in the cash that is in their possession upon arrest. The funds (made up of both cash and checks) are deposited into the inmates’ account for safe keeping, which, under Sickles is not a due process violation. SCB converts the checks to cash in the inmates’ account. However, with the exception of the Jail withdrawing fees that it is constitutionally allowed to withdraw, Plaintiffs have access to these funds while in jail and once they are released from Jail. Plaintiffs were not deprived of their funds. See Sickles, 501 F.3d 726; Browder v. Ankrom, 2005 WL 1026045 (W.D.Ky. April 25, 2005) (holding that inmates are not deprived of their property because the money is deducted in exchange for services rendered or goods provided.). See also Lawson v. Clarke, 2007 WL 2778259 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 21, 2007) (“While plaintiff alleges that his private funds have been ‘converted,’ he offers no evidence that he was ever denied access to the funds on deposit in his personal account, or that any such funds were ever withheld from him, except to the extent that funds received for deposit in plaintiff’s personal account were subject to mandatory deductions under” state law.) While the Plaintiffs claim the Jail’s endorsement and SCB’s acceptance of the checks violates Kentucky state law, it does not violate their Due Process since Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property. The Fourteenth Amendment “is not violated every time a county violates a state law.”
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Sickles, 501 F.3d at 731. Second, the Plaintiffs claim they were not provided with a billing statement upon release as
required by KRS § 441.265(7) and, therefore, their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process was violated. By statute, upon release “the prisoner shall be presented with a billing statement produced by the jailer or designee.” KRS § 441.265(7). The Plaintiffs claim they never received this statement, although the record reflects that both Plaintiffs signed Prisoner Property Receipts which state that:
I hereby certify that I have received all items listed on this receipt as well as information regarding the funds within my inmate account, and the appropriate procedures for recouping the same.
(Warren Count Regional Jail Prisoner Property Receipt [DN 7-7, 7-13]). The third claim is similar to the second in that it alleges the violation of a state statute.
Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have violated the Fourteenth Amendment by deducting fees from the Plaintiffs’ inmate account not authorized by KRS 441.265, including the collection of a bond fee; the initial charge of a combined processing and per diem fee; and the deduction of an amount that is labeled “Posted to Fines/Cost/Med”.
Despite the fact that the County Defendant’s response seems to address all of Plaintiff’s claims of unauthorized fee assessments, the Court will assume for purposes of this motion that some fees collected were unauthorized and that the Plaintiffs never actually received a copy of their billing statement. Thus, the allegations support a claim that the jail violated the state statute that provides the process for assessing prisoner fees. The question presented here is whether such allegations support a section 1983 constitutional claim.
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“Although the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to provide a fundamentally fair process ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187,14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965), it is not violated every time a county violates a state lawparticularly a state law that does not purport to define a property interest or a pertinent liberty interest, see, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (Section 1983 ‘does not provide a remedy for abuses [of state power] that do not violate federal law.’).” Sickles, 501 F.3d at 732. The billing statement requirement is part of Kentucky’s procedure for releasing prisoners, it is not constitutionally required. And even if the Jail assessed unauthorized fees, and arguably violated Plaintiff’s Due Process, the Plaintiffs should have taken advantage of their post-deprivation remedies provided by the Jail. “[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)); See also Bailey v. Carter, 15 Fed. Appx. 245, 251 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Even if the copayment charge does deprive the inmates of property within the meaning of the Due Process Claim, the inmates failed to allege that the post-deprivation procedure is inadequate.”); McMillan v. Fielding, 136 Fed. Appx. 818 (6th Cir. 2005) (The Sixth Circuit affirmed a decision dismissing a prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allegations for failure to state a claim. The prisoner alleged that an officer took a check from the prisoner’s legal mail and put it into the prisoner’s trust fund account against his wishes. The district court held “that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a remedy for addressing the taking of property if a post-deprivation remedy is available.”)
In Sickles, the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had adequate post-deprivation remedies
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because the inmates were informed about the county removing money from their canteen account and the inmates were provided notice regarding the jail’s internal grievance procedures. 501 F.3d at 731. In the present case, upon admittance to the jail, Plaintiffs signed an Inmate Rights & Rules and Services Offered to Inmates form stating that they understood the rules and regulations of the jail and received their own copy of the rules and regulations. [DN 7-8, 7-12.] In those rules and regulations there are sections regarding the amount of fees assessed a prisoner and the proper procedure to file grievances. Under 501 K.A.R. 3:120, the Jail must return property that was not legally confiscated and the prisoners are required to sign a receipt for their property at the time of release. If a prisoner has a complaint, he or she must “submit [it] in writing with specific details within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of release.” 501 K.A.R. 3:120(5)(8). It is Warren County’s policy that the Jail provides information regarding the funds in their inmate account and allows a 90-day window to collect any excess funds. Plaintiffs were provided adequate postdeprivation and thus, a section 1983 claim is not the proper remedy.
While Plaintiffs argue that their failure to avail themselves of any post deprivation remedy does not bar this action, the law in the Sixth Circuit states that “in § 1983 damage suits claiming the deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Filipelli v. Hopkins County Jail, 2011 WL 5555682, *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2011) (quoting Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983)). The Plaintiffs have not pursued any post-deprivation remedies and, therefore, can not allege that their post-deprivation remedies were inadequate to remedy the deprivation. In addition, Plaintiffs have alleged several state law tort claims which have been found to be adequate postdeprivation remedies. See Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 191 (6th Cir. 1985) (the Sixth Circuit
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affirmed a holding that there was no section 1983 claim as “a common law action for conversion was available . . . in the state courts of Kentucky”); Vicor, 721 F.2d at 1065 (“Policy considerations do not require a federal hearing in procedural due process cases that can be corrected in state court.”) Therefore, this Court holds that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is not the appropriate remedy for Plaintiffs and their allegations concerning their Fourteenth Amendment rights must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
3. SCB as State Actors As mentioned, to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), and second, he “must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Id. The SCB Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim must also fail because SCB Defendants did not act under the color of state law. The Supreme Court has stated that “acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Id. at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). As a bank, SCB accepts checks and cash, crediting that money to customers’ bank accounts on a daily basis, in its ordinary course of business. SCB Defendants reason that performing these routine acts for a county jail does not clothe them with the authority of state law. In response, Plaintiffs state the Supreme Court has “consistently held that a private party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982). Plaintiffs state that the case at present is unique because it involves
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a seizure of disputed property, conversion to state ownership, and the SCB Defendants’ “willful participation in an illegal process by which checks written to Plaintiffs were permitted by the SCB Defendants to be deposited in an account for the Jail without Plaintiffs’ knowledge, endorsement or consent.” (Pls’ Response to SCB Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., 2 [DN 10].)
“The Sixth Circuit applies three tests for determining whether private action is fairly attributable to the state: the nexus test, the public function test, and the state compulsion test.” Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003)). First, the nexus test “requires that a sufficiently close relationship exist between the state and the private actor (through regulation or by contract) so that private action may be attributable to the state.” Id. Plaintiffs can not establish that SCB was a state actor under the nexus test. There were no contracts involved, and “[m]erely because a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into state action.” Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992). The Jail was just another customer to SCB. SCB was not working under the Jail’s direction, only holding checks and cash in an account for the Jail.
Next, Plaintiffs can not establish that SCB Defendants were state actors through the public function test which “requires that the private actor exercise powers that are traditionally reserved to the state.” Wittstock, 330 F.3d at 902. These powers include holding elections and eminent domain. See Wolotsky, 960 F.2d 1335. Providing banking services is not a power that has been traditionally reserved to the state.
Lastly, the Plaintiffs can not establish that SCB Defendants were state actors through the state compulsion test. “The state compulsion test requires that a state exercise such coercive power or provide such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that in law the choice of the
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private actor is deemed to be that of the state.” Id. The choice of the SCB Defendants to accept cash and checks from the Jail was the SCB Defendant’s choice. No allegation has been made that Warren County exercised power over the bank in order to force them to hold prisoner funds in an account, the Jail was simply a customer of the bank. Therefore, the Court holds that SCB Defendants were not acting under the color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 claim.
B. Amended Complaint The Plaintiffs have filed a motion for leave to file an Amended Class Action Complaint in order to (1) add a plaintiff and class representative; (2) specify that SCB acted under color of state law; and (3) add a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. [DN 21]. This motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) which states that, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” A district court should freely grant a plaintiff leave to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, a district court may deny a motion to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The County Defendants object to the Amended Complaint on grounds that Plaintiffs had the opportunity to add any new plaintiffs and assert all claims and allegations in their original Complaint and failed to do so. SCB Defendants also object to the Amended Complaint stating that the original Complaint already alleged that SCB Defendants were state actors and the parties have already briefed the topic, making it an unnecessary amendment to the original Complaint. As to the Fair
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Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim, the SCB Defendants argue that this claim is futile because the statutes apply only to “debt collectors” which are defined as:
Any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another...
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). In addition, the SCB Defendants contend that the cash and checks that were confiscated from the prisoners are considered contraband inside the Jail and the bank was safeguarding the monies, which the Jail collected incarceration-related fees from. These fees, the SCB Defendants argue, do not fit the FDCPA definition of “debt” which is
Any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). SCB Defendants reason that the incarceration-related fees are not the subject of transactions that are “primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” Id.
While the Sixth Circuit has stated that “the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is an extraordinarily broad statute,” it is inapplicable to the case at present. Bridge v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 2012 WL 1470146, at *4 (6th Cir. April 30, 2012) (citation omitted). SCB was not acting as a debt collector for the Jail. Monies and checks were deposited into the canteen account for safekeeping and Jail had access to those funds to collect fees. Regardless of whether or not the checks were properly or improperly endorsed, SCB was not acting as a third party debt collector for Jail and it can not be said that the SCB Defendants’ principal purpose is collecting debts. Banks have been found to be debt collectors, but these cases involve debts that the banks purchased from
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credit card companies or mortgages that were assigned to a third-party bank. See Bridge, 2012 WL 1470146; Gamby v. Equifax Information Services LLC, 2012 WL 447491 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2012). The Court agrees with the SCB Defendants’ argument that allowing the Amended Complaint would be futile. As stated above, the Court determined that there was no deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and SCB Defendants did not act under color of state law. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is inapplicable to this situation and, as a matter of law, the amendment is futile. Lastly, the facts regarding the additional plaintiff do not alter the Court’s finding as to the deprivation of constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an Amended Class Action Complaint.
C. State Law Claims In their Complaint, Plaintiffs have also alleged in Count II that the County and SCB Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent; in Count III, that the County and SCB Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Plaintiffs of their property; in County IV, a violation of Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, Articles 355.3 and 355.4 of the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code, sections 506.040 et seq., 514.030, 514.070, 522.020 and 522.030 of the Kentucky Penal Code, as well as section 501 KAR § 3:120 of the Administrative Regulations of the Commonwealth of Kentucky; in Count V, the County and SCB Defendants acted in bad faith; in Count VI, the County and SCB Defendants converted the property of the Plaintiffs; and in Count VI, the County and SCB Defendants fraudulently deprived the Plaintiffs of their property. SCB Defendants contend that because the sole federal claim under Section 1983 fails as a matter of law, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Section 1367(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 USC § 1367(c)(3).
In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), the Supreme Court discussed the
propriety of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims following its
decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
The Gibbs Court recognized that a federal court’s determination of state-law claims could conflict with the principle of comity to the States and with the promotion of justice between the litigating parties. For this reason, Gibbs emphasized that “pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.” Ibid. Under Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice. Id., at 726-27.
Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 349-50.
Given that the remaining claims are state-law claims, and that this case is in its infancy, the
Court finds that the balance of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity all point toward
declining supplemental jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ pendent state-law claims are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that SCB Defendants’ motion
to dismiss [DN 6] and County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [DN 7] are GRANTED
as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The State law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
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Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file surreply [DN 18] is GRANTED and was taken into consideration in the Court’s decision. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended class action complaint [DN 21] is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file supplemental response to motions to dismiss and for summary judgment [DN 22] is DENIED AS MOOT.

cc: counsel of record

May 29, 2012

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