UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I,

)

)

JANE DOE II,

)

)

JOHN DOE I, and

)

)

JOHN DOE II,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEREMIAH W. NIXON, in his official )

capacity as Attorney General for )

the State of Missouri,

)

)

MATT BLUNT, in his official capacity as )

Governor for the State of Missouri, )

)

THOMAS O’CONNOR, in his official )

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police )

Department,

)

)

STEVEN SCHICKER, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Ballwin, Missouri, Police

)

Department,

)

)

ROBERT P. McCULLOCH, in his official )

capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for )

St. Louis County, Missouri,

)

)

STEVEN CRUISE, in his official capacity )

as Chief of Police for the Bowling )

Green, Missouri, Police Department, )

)

MARK FISHER, in his official capacity as )

Prosecuting Attorney for Pike

)

County, Missouri,

)

No. 4:08-cv-1518
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTATORY RELIEF

)

CARL A. KINNISON, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police )

Department, and

)

)

HARRY MORLEY SWINGLE, in his )

official capacity as Prosecuting )

Attorney for Cape Girardeau County.)

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs are Missouri parents who are required to register as sex offenders based on convictions entered prior to June 30, 2008.
2. This lawsuit challenges a new Missouri statute, which became effective June 30, 2008, and requires Plaintiffs and others who are required to register as a sex offender to take the following actions, under threat of criminal charge, on October 31, 2008, and October 31 of every year: A. “Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;” B. “Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies;” C. “Post a sign at his or her residence stating, ‘No candy or treats at this residence’; and” D. “Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.” R.S.Mo. § 589.426.
3. As a result of the lack of clarity about what activities are prohibited by the statute, Plaintiffs reasonably fear that if R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is permitted to

2

be enforced they will be subjected to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement for actions or inactions that they did not reasonably know would violate the law. In particular, Plaintiffs do not understand how to conform to the statute’s criminal proscription on Halloween-related contact with children with respect to their own children and grandchildren. In addition, Plaintiffs submit that the challenged statute violates the rights guaranteed to them by the United State Constitution and the Missouri Constitution. 4. This action seeks entry of a declaratory judgment finding the R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is unconstitutional under the federal Constitution and the Missouri state constitution as well as preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1342, 1367, 2201
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 7. Divisional venue is proper in the Eastern Division pursuant to E.D.Mo.
L.R. 2.07(a)(1), (b)(2). PARTIES
8. Plaintiffs are convicted sex offenders, convicted in the State of Missouri prior to June 30, 2008, who reside in the State of Missouri.
3

9. Jane Doe I1 is a resident of the City of Maryland Heights in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about May 16, 2003, she was convicted in St. Louis County, Missouri, of two counts of second degree statutory sodomy. The offenses of which she was convicted occurred on or about May 1, 1999. She is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 589.400. She has significant contact with her grandchildren, who will be under the age of 18 on October 31, 2008, and for many years thereafter.
10. Jane Doe II is a resident of the City of Cape Girardeau in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. On or about December 7, 2001, she was convicted in St. Charles County, Missouri, of two counts each of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. The offenses of which she was convicted occurred on or about November 1, 1995. She is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 589.400. She has sole custody of her tenyear-old daughter.
11. John Doe I is a resident of the City of Ballwin in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about January 17, 2001, he was convicted in Cole County, Missouri, of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. The offenses of which he was convicted occurred on or about July 1, 1999. He lives with his step-children, who are under the age of 18.
12. John Doe II is resident of the City of Bowling Green in Pike County, Missouri. On or about June 28, 1995, he was convicted in Marion County, Missouri, of statutory rape. The offense of which he was convicted

1

Plaintiffs are filing a motion to proceed with use of pseudonyms

contemporaneously with their complaint.

4

occurred on or about February 5, 1995. He has sole custody of two children from a previous marriage, a step-child, and another child, all of with whom he resides and all of who are minors. 13. Defendant Jeremiah W. Nixon is the Attorney General of the State of Missouri and is sued solely in his official capacity. Nixon is the State’s chief law enforcement officer and is charged with instituting any proceedings necessary to enforce state statutes. R.S.Mo. § 27.060. The Attorney General is also authorized to aid prosecutors when so directed by the Governor and to sign indictments when directed by the court. R.S.Mo. § 27.030. His primary office is located in Cole County, Missouri. 14. Defendant Matt Blunt is the current Governor of the State of Missouri. The supreme executive power lies with the governor. Mo. Const. art. 4, § 1. He has the duty to “take care that laws are distributed and faithfully executed.” Mo. Const. art. 4, § 2. His primary office is located in Cole County, Missouri. 15. Defendant Thomas O’Connor is the Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights Police Department in Maryland Heights, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Maryland Heights and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Maryland Heights, where Jane Doe I resides. Maryland Heights is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. 16. Defendant Steven Schicker is the Chief of Police for the Ballwin Police Department in Ballwin, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official
5

capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Ballwin and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Ballwin, where John Doe I resides. Ballwin is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. 17. Defendant Carl A. Kinnison is the Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau Police Department in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for the City of Cape Girardeau and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within the City of Cape Girardeau, where Jane Doe II resides. Cape Girardeau is located in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. 18. Defendant Steven Cruise is the Chief of Police for the Bowling Green Police Department in Bowling Green, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Bowling Green and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Bowling Green, where John Doe II resides. Bowling Green is located in Pike County, Missouri. 19. Defendant Mark Fisher is the Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County. Fisher is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Pike County. His primary office is located in Pike County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 20. Defendant Robert P. McCulloch is the Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County. McCulloch is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within St.
6

Louis County. His primary office is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 21. Defendant Harry Morley Swingle is the Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County. Swingle is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Cape Girardeau County. His primary office is located in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 22. Defendants are named only for actions taken under color of state law.
STATUTE AT ISSUE 23. R.S.Mo. § 589.426, entitled “Registered sexual offender, Halloween-
related activities,” provides: 1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender
under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to: (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
7

2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
COUNT I Violation of Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment – Inadequate Notice
Jane Doe I v. Nixon, Blunt, O’Connor, McCulloch 24. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23
as if each were set forth here verbatim. 25. Plaintiffs and other persons of reasonable intelligence do not have an
understanding of several terms in the statutes, including what constitutes “avoid,” “Halloween-related contact” or “just cause,” within the context of the challenged statute. 26. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is so vague as to fail to provide fair notice or warning of what would constitute a violation. 27. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to define the criminal offense it creates with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. 28. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
8

COUNT II Violation of Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment – Inadequate Notice
Jane Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Kinnison, Swingle 29. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23
as if each were set forth here verbatim. 30. Plaintiffs and other persons of reasonable intelligence do not have an
understanding of several terms in the statutes, including what constitutes “avoid,” “Halloween-related contact” or “just cause,” within the context of the challenged statute. 31. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is so vague as to fail to provide fair notice or warning of what would constitute a violation. 32. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to define the criminal offense it creates with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. 33. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
COUNT III Violation of Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment – Inadequate Notice
John Doe I v. Nixon, Blunt, Schicker, McCulloch 34. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23
as if each were set forth here verbatim.
9

35. Plaintiffs and other persons of reasonable intelligence do not have an understanding of several terms in the statutes, including what constitutes “avoid,” “Halloween-related contact” or “just cause,” within the context of the challenged statute.
36. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is so vague as to fail to provide fair notice or warning of what would constitute a violation.
37. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to define the criminal offense it creates with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.
38. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. COUNT IV
Violation of Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment – Inadequate Notice John Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Cruise, Fisher
39. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
40. Plaintiffs and other persons of reasonable intelligence do not have an understanding of several terms in the statutes, including what constitutes “avoid,” “Halloween-related contact” or “just cause,” within the context of the challenged statute.
41. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is so vague as to fail to provide fair notice or warning of what would constitute a violation.
10

42. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to define the criminal offense it creates with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.
43. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. COUNT V
Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 Jane Doe I v. Nixon, Blunt, O’Connor, McCulloch
44. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
45. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes a punishment upon Plaintiff Jane Doe I for a crime that she committed before R.S.Mo. § 589.426’s enactment. COUNT VI
Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 Jane Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Kinnison, Swingle
46. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
47. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes a punishment upon Plaintiff Jane Doe II for a crime that she committed before R.S.Mo. § 589.426’s enactment. COUNT VII
Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 John Doe I v. Nixon, Blunt, Schicker, McCulloch
11

48. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
49. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes a punishment upon Plaintiff John Doe I for a crime that he committed before R.S.Mo. § 589.426’s enactment. COUNT VIII
Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 John Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Cruise, Fisher
50. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
51. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes a punishment upon Plaintiff John Doe II for a crime that he committed before R.S.Mo. § 589.426’s enactment. COUNT IX
Violation of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Family Jane Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Kinnison, Swingle
52. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
53. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 unreasonable interferes with Jane Doe II’s right to be involved with and direct the upbringing of her biological daughter. COUNT X
Violation of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Family John Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Cruise, Fisher
54. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
12

55. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 unreasonable interferes with John Doe II’s right to be involved with and direct the upbringing of his biological children. COUNT XI Violation of Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13 Jane Doe I v. Nixon, Blunt, O’Connor, McCulloch
56. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
57. Missouri’s Constitution provides, “that no ... law ... retrospective in its operation ... can be enacted.” Mo. Const. art I, § 13.
58. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes an affirmative obligations on Plaintiffs to each October 31 do the following (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
59. The obligations created by R.S.Mo. § 589.426 are new duties imposed as a result of Plaintiff Jane Doe I’s criminal conviction.
60. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 was enacted after Plaintiff Jane Doe I’s conviction. COUNT XII
Violation of Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13 Jane Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Kinnison, Swingle
13

61. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
62. Missouri’s Constitution provides, “that no ... law ... retrospective in its operation ... can be enacted.” Mo. Const. art I, § 13.
63. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes an affirmative obligations on Plaintiffs to each October 31 do the following (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
64. The obligations created by R.S.Mo. § 589.426 are new duties imposed as a result of Plaintiff Jane Doe II’s criminal conviction.
65. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 was enacted after Plaintiff Jane Doe II’s conviction.
COUNT XIII Violation of Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13 Jane Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Kinnison, Swingle 66. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim. 67. Missouri’s Constitution provides, “that no ... law ... retrospective in its operation ... can be enacted.” Mo. Const. art I, § 13.
14

68. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes an affirmative obligations on Plaintiffs to each October 31 do the following (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
69. The obligations created by R.S.Mo. § 589.426 are new duties imposed as a result of Plaintiff John Doe I’s criminal conviction.
70. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 was enacted after Plaintiff John Doe I’s conviction. COUNT XIII
Violation of Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13 Jane Doe II v. Nixon, Blunt, Kinnison, Swingle 71. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if each were set forth here verbatim. 72. Missouri’s Constitution provides, “that no ... law ... retrospective in its operation ... can be enacted.” Mo. Const. art I, § 13. 73. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes an affirmative obligations on Plaintiffs to each October 31 do the following (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his
15

residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m. 74. The obligations created by R.S.Mo. § 589.426 are new duties imposed as a result of Plaintiff John Doe II’s criminal conviction. 75. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 was enacted after Plaintiff John Doe II’s conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray this Court: A. Enter declaratory judgment that R.S.Mo. § 589.426 violates the Constitution of the United States, on its face, and the Missouri Constitution, as applied to Plaintiffs; B. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining enforcement R.S.Mo. § 589.426 against Plaintiffs; C. Award Plaintiffs costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; and D. Allow such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled.
16

Respectfully submitted, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF EASTERN MISSOURI /s/ Anthony E. Rothert ANTHONY E. ROTHERT, # 518779 American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, Missouri 63108 (314) 652-3114 FAX: (314) 652-3112 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
17

Jane Doe, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

,
plaintiff,

v.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al.

, defendant.

) ) ) ) Case No. ) ) )

ORIGINAL FILING FORM
THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED AND VERIFIED BY THE FILING PARTY WHEN INITIATING A NEW CASE.

THIS CAUSE, OR A SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT COMPLAINT, WAS

PREVIOUSLY FILED IN THIS COURT AS CASE NUMBER

AND ASSIGNED TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE

.

✔NEITHER THIS CAUSE, NOR A SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT COMPLAINT,
PREVIOUSLY HAS BEEN FILED IN THIS COURT, AND THEREFORE MAY BE OPENED AS AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING.

Theundersignedaffirmsthattheinformationprovidedaboveistrueandcorrect.

Date: 10-3-2008

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert Signature of FilingParty

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Matt Blunt

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Governor

ofState of Missouri

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Steven Cruise

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Chief of Police

ofCity of Bowling Green

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Mark Fisher

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Prosecuting Attorney ofPike County

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Carl A. Kinnison

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Chief of Police

ofCity of Cape Girardeau

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Robert P. McCulloch

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Prosecuting Attorney ofPike County

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Jeremiah W. Nixon

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Attorney General

ofState of Missouri

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Thomas O'Connor

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Chief of Police

ofCity of Maryland Heights

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Steven Schicker

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Chief of Police

ofCity of Ballwin

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Harry Morley Swingle

(Name ofdefendant)

(as Prosecuting Attorney ofCape Girardeau County

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofM issouriand hasbeen assigned docketnum ber

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Doe, et al., v. Nixon, et al.

Case Num ber:

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No.: 4:08-cv-1518

)

)

)

)

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Come now Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for reasons set forth in this Motion and the accompanying Suggestions in Support of this Motion for Preliminary Injunction, moves this Court for entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants and their agents from enforcing or threatening to enforce Mo.R.S. §589.426 on October 31, 2008. Entry preliminary injunction is appropriate in this case because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, there is a real threat of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs, no harm will be inflicted upon Defendants should preliminary injunction issue, and the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest. Bond should be waived or set at a nominal about since there will be no demonstrable harm to Defendants if their unconstitutional actions are enjoined. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request this Court: A. Grant preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants and their agents from
enforcing, attempting to enforce, or threatening to enforce Mo.R.S. §589.426 on October 31, 2008;

B. Waving bond or setting bond in a nominal amount; and
C. Allowing Plaintiffs such other and further relief as is just and proper under
the circumstances.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Anthony E. Rothert ANTHONY E. ROTHERT #518779 American Civil Liberties Union
of Eastern Missouri 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, Missouri 63108 (314) 652-3114 FAX: (314) 652-3112 e-mail: tony@aclu-em.org

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served upon each of the Defendants listed below at the address listed below by placing a copy of the foregoing in a properly addressed, postage pre-paid envelope and placing said envelope in the United States Mail on October 3, 2008:
Thomas O’Connor Maryland Heights Police Department 212 Millwell Drive Maryland Heights, MO 63043
Harry Morley Swingle Office of Prosecuting Attorney 100 Court Street Jackson, MO 63755
Steven Schicker Ballwin Police Department 300 Park Drive Ballwin, MO 63011
Jeremiah W. Nixon Missouri Attorney General's Office Supreme Court Building 207 W. High St. P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65102
Robert McCulloch Office of the Prosecuting Attorney 100 South Central Avenue - Second Floor Clayton, MO 63105
Carl A. Kinnison Cape Girardeau Police Department 40 South Sprigg Street Cape Girardeau, Missouri 63703
Mark Fisher Office of Prosecuting Attorney 115 West Main St. Bowling Green, MO 63334

Steven Cruise Bowling Green Police Department 15 W Church St Bowling Green, MO 63334
Matt Blunt Office of the Governor Room 216, State Capitol Building Jefferson City MO 65101

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

Case No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ)

)

JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court following a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of § 589.426, Mo.Rev.Stat. For the reasons stated on the record at the hearing, the Court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden to establish irreparable harm and a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their constitutional challenges to §§ 589.426.1 (1) and (2)1; they have

1Section 589.426 provides:
1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to: (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

further established that the balance of equities favors them to the extent “that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” Dataphase Sys. Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). However, the Court further finds that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing their entitlement to injunctive relief with respect to the enforcement of §§ 589.426.1 (3) and (4).
In their complaint, the plaintiffs claim that the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute fails to provide fair notice of the conduct it proscribes. If the plaintiffs succeed on the merits of the due process claim, the statute will be unenforceable not only as to the plaintiffs but as to all persons required to register as sexual offenders. The Court believes it is appropriate at the preliminary injunctive stage to focus on the actions of the defendants with respect to enforcement of the statute on October 31, 2008, as opposed to limiting the requested relief to the plaintiffs.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of § 589.426, Mo.Rev.Stat., on October 31, 2008, [Doc. #2] is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, their agents, and any persons acting in concert with them, are enjoined from enforcing the provisions of § 589.426.1 (1) and § 589.426.1 (2), Mo.Rev.Stat., on October 31, 2008.
-2-

CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated this 27th day of October, 2008.
- 3 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No.: 4:08-CV-1518 CEJ ) ) ) )

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Defendant Jeremiah W. Nixon, Attorney General of

Missouri, and Defendant Matt Blunt, Governor of Missouri, hereby respectfully appeal to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from the Order, dated October

27, 2008 [Doc. No. 59], granting, in part, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction

[Doc. No. 2].

Respectfully submitted,
JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON Attorney General

/s/ Christopher J. Quinn CHRISTOPHER J. QUINN # 63236 Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, Missouri 63188 (314)340-7861 Fax: (314)340-7029 Christopher.Quinn@ago.mo.gov
1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 27, 2008, the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court to be served by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system upon all parties.
/s/ Christopher J. Quinn Assistant Attorney General
2

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No.: 4:08-CV-1518 CEJ ) ) ) )

MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c), Defendants, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Attorney General

of Missouri, and Matt Blunt, Governor of Missouri, respectfully move this Court to stay

its order, dated October 27, 2008, granting, in part, plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

injunction [Doc. No. 59] pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit. In support of their motion, defendants incorporate by reference their

Memorandum in Support, filed contemporaneously herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON Attorney General

/s/ Christopher J. Quinn CHRISTOPHER J. QUINN # 63236 Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, Missouri 63188 (314)340-7861 Fax: (314)340-7029 Christopher.Quinn@ago.mo.gov
1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 28, 2008, the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court to be served by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system upon all parties.
/s/ Christopher J. Quinn Assistant Attorney General
2

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

Case No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ)

)

JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon and Matt Blunt for stay pending appeal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c).1 Specifically, defendants ask the Court to stay the preliminary injunction entered on October 27, 2008, enjoining enforcement of subsections (1) and (2) of § 589.426.1, Mo.Rev.Stat. The factors a court considers in determining whether to issue a stay pursuant to Rule 62(c) are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776-77 (1987). In evaluating the harm that will occur depending on whether or not a stay is granted, courts consider three factors: (1) the substantiality of the injury alleged; (2)

1Defendant Robert P. McCulloch joins the motion.

the likelihood of its occurrence; and (3) the adequacy of the proof provided. Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1991). The harm alleged must be both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical. Id.
Having reviewed the motions and memoranda of the parties, the Court concludes that defendants have not met their burden to establish the propriety of a stay pending their appeal of the order entered on October 27, 2008.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon and Matt Blunt to stay the order entered on October 27, 2008, [Doc. # 68] and the motion of defendant Robert P. McCulloch to stay [Doc. #64] are denied.
CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated this 30th day of October, 2008.
- 2 -

 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No: 08-3476 Jane Doe I, et al.,
Appellees v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al.,
Appellants
______________________________________________________________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis (4:08-cv-01518-CEJ)
______________________________________________________________________________ ORDER
The Appellants’ motion for stay has been considered by the Court and is hereby granted.
October 30, 2008
Order Entered at the Direction of the Court: Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. ____________________________________
/s/ Michael E. Gans

 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No: 08-3476 ___________________
Jane Doe, I; Jane Doe, II; John Doe, I; John Doe, II,
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Missouri; Matt Blunt, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Missouri,
Defendants - Appellants
Thomas O'Connor, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police Department; Steven Schicker, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Ballwin, Missouri, Police Department; Robert P. McCulloch, in his official capacity as Prosecuting
Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri; Steven Cruise, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Bowling Green, Missouri, Police Department; Mark Fisher, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County, Missouri; Carl A. Kinnison, in his official capacity as
Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police Department; Harry Morley Swingle, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County, Missouri,
Defendants ___________________
No: 08-3510 ___________________
Jane Doe, I; Jane Doe, II; John Doe, I; John Doe, II,
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Missouri; Matt Blunt, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Missouri; Thomas O'Connor, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police Department; Steven Schicker, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Ballwin, Missouri, Police
Department,
Defendants
Robert P. McCulloch, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri,

Defendant - Appellant Steven Cruise, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Bowling Green, Missouri, Police
Department; Mark Fisher, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County, Missouri; Carl A. Kinnison, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police Department; Harry Morley Swingle, in his official capacity as Prosecuting
Attorney for Cape Girardeau County, Missouri, Defendants
______________________________________________________________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis (4:08-cv-01518-CEJ) (4:08-cv-01518-CEJ)
______________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT Appellees have moved to dismiss these appeals, and appellants have filed responses stating they do not oppose dismissal. The motion to dismiss the cases is granted, and the appeals are hereby dismissed. The Court's mandate shall issue forthwith.
November 06, 2008
Order Entered Under Rule 27B(a): Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. ____________________________________
/s/ Michael E. Gans

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Case No.:4:08-cv-1518-CEJ ) ) ) ) )

ANSWER

In response to the allegations of plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, defendant O’Connor states:
1. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
2. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 3. Defendant O’Connor denies that the statute is unclear and further lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remainder of this allegation and therefore denies same. 4. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 5. Defendant O’Connor submits that this allegation consists of a legal conclusion about which defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information and therefore denies same. 6. Defendant O’Connor submits that this allegation consists of a legal conclusion about which defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information and therefore denies same. 7. Defendant O’Connor submits that this allegation consists of a legal conclusion about which defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information and therefore denies same.

8. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
9. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
10. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
11. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
12. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
13. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
14. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
15. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 16. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 17. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 18. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 19. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 20. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
2

21. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
22. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 23. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 24. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 25. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 26. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 27. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 28. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 29. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 30. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 31. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same. 32. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation.
3

COUNT I Violation of Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment –Inadequate Notice
33. Defendant O’Connor incorporates each of the answers contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth herein.
34. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation. 35. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation. 36. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation. 37. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation. 38. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation.
COUNT II Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 39. Defendant O’Connor incorporates each of the answers contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth herein. 40. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation.
COUNT III Violation of First Amendment – Interference with Family Association 41. Defendant O’Connor incorporates each of the answers contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth herein. 42. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation.
COUNT IV Violation of Fifth Amendment – Privilege against Self-Incrimination 43. Defendant O’Connor incorporates each of the answers contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth herein. 44. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation.
4

COUNT V Violation of Fourteenth Amendment – Right to Travel 45. Defendant O’Connor incorporates each of the answers contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth herein. 46. Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation.
COUNT VI Violation of Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13 47. Defendant O’Connor incorporates each of the answers contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth herein. 48. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 49. Defendant O’Connor admits the truth of this allegation. 49(i). Defendant O’Connor denies this allegation. 50. Defendant O’Connor lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore denies same.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Howard Paperner Howard Paperner - #49261 Attorney for Maryland Heights Police Department 9322 Manchester Road St. Louis, MO 63119 (314) 961-0097, Ext. 13 (314) 961-0667, Fax howardpaperner@sbcglobal.net
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was filed via the Court’s CM/ECF electronic system on this 7th day of November, 2008 to:
5

Mr. Anthony E. Rothert 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, MO 63108 tony@aclu-em.org ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
Mr. David C. Nelson Nelson and Nelson 420 N. High Street P.O. Box Y Belleville, IL 62222 dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
Mr. Robert E. Jones Mr. Adam R. Lorenz Jones & Haywood 7700 Bonhomme, Ste. 200 St. Louis, MO 63105 rejones@jhbkj.com alorenz@jhbkj.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTSCHICKER
Christopher J. Quinn Attorney General of Missouri P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 Christopher.Quinn@ago.mo.gov ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS NIXON AND BLUNT
Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel St. Louis County Counselor’s Office 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 lmerklinvonkaenel@stlouisco.com ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT McCULLOCH
Harry Morley Swingle Office of the Prosecuting Attorney 100 Court Street Jackson, MO 63755 hmswingle@capecounty.us
6

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SCHICKER The foregoing was served via U.S. postal service, postage prepaid, on this 7th day of November, 2008, to: Carl A. Kinnison Cape Girardeau Police Department 40 South Sprigg Street Cape Girardeau, MO 63703 Mark Fisher Office of the Prosecuting Attorney 115 West Main Street Bowling Green, MO 63334 Steven Cruise Bowling Green Police Department 15 W. Church Street Bowling Green, MO 63334
/s/ Howard Paperner Attorney for Maryland Heights Police Department
7

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Case No.:4:08-cv-1518-CEJ ) ) ) ) )

MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Defendant Thomas O’Connor moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and in support states:
1. Plaintiff filed this action on or about October 3, 2008, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the enforcement of Section 589.426 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. This Court entered its preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of a portion of the statute on October 27, 2008, and defendants Nixon and Blunt filed an immediate notice of appeal.
2. On October 28, 2008, defendants Nixon and Blunt filed a motion with the Eight Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals to stay this court’s preliminary injunction, and that motion was granted on October 30, 2008.
3. The celebration known as Halloween took place on October 31, 2008, and during that time the statute was in full force and effect due to the Eight Circuit’s stay order.
4. On November 2, 2008, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, but plaintiffs did not allege any facts establishing that any plaintiff, or any other person, was threatened with the enforcement of Section 589.426 R.S.Mo. In addition, in that the Halloween celebration will not take

place again until October 31, 2009, plaintiffs are not at risk of any immediate enforcement of the statute.
5. Upon information and belief, plaintiffs recently filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, seeking substantially the same, if not the exact, relief sought by plaintiffs in the first amended complaint filed in this court.
6. Because of (1) the absence of any great and immediate irreparable harm, (2) the significant lapse of time before any such risk may materialize, (3) the presence of an adequate remedy at law, and (4) plaintiffs’ litigation filed and pending in a Missouri state court concerning the interpretation of a Missouri statute, this court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
WHEREFORE, defendant Thomas O’Connor moves that the court abstain from exercising its jurisdiction and dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Howard Paperner Howard Paperner - #49261 Attorney for Maryland Heights Police Department 9322 Manchester Road St. Louis, MO 63119 (314) 961-0097, Ext. 13 (314) 961-0667, Fax howardpaperner@sbcglobal.net
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was filed via the Court’s CM/ECF electronic system on this 7th day of November, 2008 to:
2

Mr. Anthony E. Rothert 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, MO 63108 tony@aclu-em.org ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
Mr. David C. Nelson Nelson and Nelson 420 N. High Street P.O. Box Y Belleville, IL 62222 dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
Mr. Robert E. Jones Mr. Adam R. Lorenz Jones & Haywood 7700 Bonhomme, Ste. 200 St. Louis, MO 63105 rejones@jhbkj.com alorenz@jhbkj.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTSCHICKER
Christopher J. Quinn Attorney General of Missouri P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 Christopher.Quinn@ago.mo.gov ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS NIXON AND BLUNT
Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel St. Louis County Counselor’s Office 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 lmerklinvonkaenel@stlouisco.com ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT McCULLOCH
Harry Morley Swingle Office of the Prosecuting Attorney 100 Court Street Jackson, MO 63755 hmswingle@capecounty.us
3

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SCHICKER The foregoing was served via U.S. postal service, postage prepaid, on this 7th day of November, 2008, to: Carl A. Kinnison Cape Girardeau Police Department 40 South Sprigg Street Cape Girardeau, MO 63703 Mark Fisher Office of the Prosecuting Attorney 115 West Main Street Bowling Green, MO 63334 Steven Cruise Bowling Green Police Department 15 W. Church Street Bowling Green, MO 63334
/s/ Howard Paperner Attorney for Maryland Heights Police Department
4

 
 Multiple Documents
Part Description 1 15 pages 2 Waiver of Service Jim Wells 3 Waiver of Service John Connelly 4 Waiver of Service James Corwin 5 Waiver of Service John Jordan 6 Waiver of Service James Keathley 7 Waiver of Service Jerry Lee 8 Waiver of Service Paul Vescovo 9 Waiver of Service Daniel White
© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. For terms of service see bloomberglaw.com // PAGE 1 Document Link: http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ms/document/X1Q6L1ER66O2?documentName=82.xml

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 15 PageID #: 354

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I,

)

)

JANE DOE II,

)

)

JOHN DOE I,

)

)

JOHN DOE II,

)

)

JOHN DOE III, and

)

)

JOHN DOE IV,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEREMIAH W. NIXON, in his official )

capacity as Attorney General for )

the State of Missouri,

)

)

MATT BLUNT, in his official capacity as )

Governor for the State of Missouri, )

)

THOMAS O’CONNOR, in his official )

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police )

Department,

)

)

)

STEVEN SCHICKER, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Ballwin, Missouri, Police

)

Department,

)

)

ROBERT P. McCULLOCH, in his official )

capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for )

St. Louis County, Missouri,

)

No. 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ
PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTATORY RELIEF AND NOMINAL DAMAGES

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 15 PageID #: 355

STEVEN KRUSE, in his official capacity )

as Chief of Police for the Bowling )

Green, Missouri, Police Department,)

)

MARK FISHER, in his official capacity as )

Prosecuting Attorney for Pike

)

County, Missouri,

)

)

CARL A. KINNISON, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police )

Department,

)

)

H. MORLEY SWINGLE, in his

)

official capacity as Prosecuting )

Attorney for Cape Girardeau County,)

)

DANIEL L. WHITE, in his official

)

capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for )

Clay County, Missouri,

)

)

PAUL C. VESCOVO, III, in his official )

capacity as Sheriff of Clay County, )

Missouri,

)

)

JAMES CORWIN, in his official capacity )

as Chief of Police for the Kansas )

City, Missouri, Police Department, )

)

JOHN C. CONNELLY, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Manchester, Missouri Police

)

Department,

)

)

COLONEL JERRY LEE, in his official )

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

St. Louis County, Missouri Police )

Department,

)

)

JIM WELLS, in his official capacity as )

Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri, )

)

JOHN JORDON, in his official capacity )

as Sheriff of Cape Girardeau

)

County, Missouri, and

)

)

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 3 of 15 PageID #: 356

COLONEL JAMES F. KEATHLEY, in )

his official capacity Superintendent )

of the Missouri State Highway )

Patrol,

)

)

Defendants.

)

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs are Missouri parents who are required to register as sex offenders based on convictions entered prior to August 28, 2008.
2. This lawsuit challenges a new Missouri statute that became effective August 28, 2008, and requires Plaintiffs and others registered sexual offenders to take the following actions, under threat of criminal charge, on October 31 of every year: A. “Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;” B. “Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies;” C. “Post a sign at his or her residence stating, ‘No candy or treats at this residence’; and” D. “Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.” R.S.Mo. § 589.426.
3. As a result of the lack of clarity about what activities are prohibited by the statute, Plaintiffs reasonably fear that if R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is permitted to be enforced they will be subjected to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement for actions or inactions that they did not reasonably know would violate the law. In particular, Plaintiffs do not understand how to conform to the statute’s criminal proscription against Halloweenrelated contact with children who are their own children, their own grandchildren, or

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 4 of 15 PageID #: 357

who live with them. In addition, Plaintiffs submit that the challenged statute violates rights guaranteed to them by the United State Constitution and the Missouri Constitution. 4. This action seeks entry of a declaratory judgment finding that R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is unconstitutional under the federal Constitution and the Missouri state constitution as

well as preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the statute.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1342, 1367, 2201 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 7. Divisional venue is proper in the Eastern Division pursuant to E.D.Mo. L.R. 2.07(a)(1),

(b)(2).

PARTIES 8. Plaintiffs are Missouri residents who were convicted prior to August 28, 2008, of
offenses that require them to register as sexual offenders in the State of Missouri. 9. Jane Doe I1 is a resident of the City of Maryland Heights in St. Louis County, Missouri.

On or about May 16, 2003, she was convicted in St. Louis County, Missouri, of two

counts of second degree statutory sodomy. The offenses of which she was convicted

occurred on or about May 1, 1999. She is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 589.400. She has significant contact with her grandchildren, who are now and will be for years to come under the age of 18 (i.e., “children” within the meaning of the statute).

10. Jane Doe II is a resident of the City of Cape Girardeau in Cape Girardeau County,

1

Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, and John Doe II have previously filed a motion for

leave to proceed with the use of pseudonyms, which remains pending. (Doc. # 3). John Doe III and

John Doe IV anticipate filing a identical motion in the near future.

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 5 of 15 PageID #: 358
Missouri. On or about December 7, 2001, she was convicted in St. Charles County, Missouri, of two counts each of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. The offenses of which she was convicted occurred on or about November 1, 1995. She is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 589.400. She has sole custody of her ten-year-old daughter. 11. John Doe I is a resident of the City of Ballwin in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about January 17, 2001, he was convicted in Cole County, Missouri, of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. The offenses of which he was convicted occurred on or about July 1, 1999. He lives with his step-children, who are under the age of 18. 12. John Doe II is resident of the City of Bowling Green in Pike County, Missouri. On or about June 28, 1995, he was convicted in Marion County, Missouri, of statutory rape. The offense of which he was convicted occurred on or about February 5, 1995. He has sole custody of two children from a previous marriage, a step-child, and another child, with all of whom he resides and all of whom are minors. 13. John Doe III is a resident of the City of Kansas City in Clay County, Missouri. On or about November 13, 1997, he was convicted in Sedgwick County, Kansas, of indecent liberties with a minor. The offense of which he was convicted occurred on or about July 14, 1997. He lives with his daughter, who is a minor. 14. John Doe IV is a resident of the City of Manchester in St. Louis County Missouri. On or about January 27, 1999, he was convicted in the District of Columbia of a misdemeanor charge of sexual abuse. The offense of which he is convicted occurred on or about October 1, 1998. He has one minor child. 15. Defendant Jeremiah W. Nixon is the Attorney General of the State of Missouri and is sued solely in his official capacity. Nixon is the State’s chief law enforcement officer and is charged with instituting any proceedings necessary to enforce state statutes.

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 6 of 15 PageID #: 359
R.S.Mo. § 27.060. The Attorney General is also authorized to aid prosecutors when so directed by the Governor and to sign indictments when directed by the court. R.S.Mo. § 27.030. His primary office is located in Cole County, Missouri. 16. Defendant Matt Blunt is the current Governor of the State of Missouri. The supreme executive power lies with the governor. Mo. Const. art. 4, § 1. He has the duty to “take care that laws are distributed and faithfully executed.” Mo. Const. art. 4, § 2. His primary office is located in Cole County, Missouri. 17. Defendant Thomas O’Connor is the Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights Police Department in Maryland Heights, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Maryland Heights and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Maryland Heights, where Jane Doe I resides. Maryland Heights is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. 18. Defendant Steven Schicker is the Chief of Police for the Ballwin Police Department in Ballwin, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Ballwin and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Ballwin, where John Doe I resides. Ballwin is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. 19. Defendant Carl A. Kinnison is the Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau Police Department in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for the City of Cape Girardeau and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within the City of Cape Girardeau, where Jane Doe II resides. Cape Girardeau is located in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. 20. Defendant Steven Kruse is the Chief of Police for the Bowling Green Police Department in Bowling Green, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Bowling Green and will be responsible for enforcing

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 7 of 15 PageID #: 360
R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Bowling Green, where John Doe II resides. Bowling Green is located in Pike County, Missouri. 21. Defendant Mark Fisher is the Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County. Fisher is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Pike County. His primary office is located in Pike County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 22. Defendant Robert P. McCulloch is the Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County. McCulloch is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within St. Louis County. His primary office is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 23. Defendant H. Morley Swingle is the Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County. Swingle is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Cape Girardeau County. His primary office is located in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 24. Defendant Daniel L. White is the Prosecuting Attorney for Clay County. White is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Clay County. His primary office is located in Liberty, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. Defendant White sent a letter to Plaintiff John Doe III and all other persons required to register as sexual offenders in Clay County notifying them [THAT], “Violation of [R.S.Mo. § 589.426] is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in the county jail and/or a fine of up to $1,000.” Defendant White’s letter further advised, “Any and all violations of this law that occur in Clay County will be prosecuted.” 25. Defendant Paul C. Vescovo, III, is the Sheriff for Clay County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes,

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 8 of 15 PageID #: 361
including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Clay County, where John Doe III resides. Defendant Vescovo sent a letter to John Doe III and others required to register as sexual offenders in Clay County notifying them that, “During the course of Halloween night, my deputies and I will be patrolling and will check on each and every listed offender to ensure compliance with [R.S.Mo. § 589.426]. We’ll be checking on lighting, signage and whether the registered offender is inside his or her residence as mandated by the statute.” 26. Defendant Jim Wells is the Sheriff for Pike County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes, including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Pike County, where John Doe II resides. 27. Defendant John Jordan is the Sheriff for Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes, including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Cape Girardeau County, where Jane Doe II resides. 28. Defendant John C. Connolly is the Chief of Police for the Manchester Police Department in Manchester, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Manchester and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Manchester, where John Doe IV resides. Manchester is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. 29. Defendant Colonel Jerry Lee is the Chief of the St. Louis County Police Department. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes, including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within St. Louis County, where Jane Doe I, John Doe I, and John Doe IV reside. One of Defendant Lee’s detectives told the New York Times that—prior to entry of preliminary injunction—he had planned to knock on the doors of persons required to register as sexual offenders to ensure they were home. He further stated that after the preliminary injunction he planned to go to each house to

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 9 of 15 PageID #: 362
ensure that a sign was posted and exterior lights were off. It is unknown what he decided to do after the preliminary injunction was stayed by order of the Eighth Circuit. 30. Defendant James Corwin is the Chief of Police for the Kansas City Police Department in Kansas City, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for the City of Kansas City, Missouri, and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within St. Louis County, where John Doe III resides. 31. Defendant Colonel James F. Keathley is the Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol. He is sued solely in his official capacity. As superintendent of a statewide lawenforcement agency, he is responsible for the enforcement of R.S.Mo. § 589.426 against persons who come into contact with the Missouri Highway Patrol. Agents of Defendant Keathley made public statements that R.S.Mo. § 589.426 cannot be applied retrospectively to persons convicted before the statute’s enactment on August 28, 2008.
STATUTE AT ISSUE 32. R.S.Mo. § 589.426, entitled “Registered sexual offender, Halloween-related activities,”
provides: 1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections
589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to: (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 10 of 15 PageID #: 363
after 5 p.m. 2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
COUNT I Violation of Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment – Inadequate Notice 33. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each
were set forth here verbatim. 34. Plaintiffs and other persons of reasonable intelligence do not have an understanding of
several terms in the statutes, including what constitutes “avoid,” “Halloween-related contact,” and “just cause,” within the context of the challenged statute. 35. Defendants likewise have difficulty interpreting the meaning of the law. For instance Jane Doe II and other persons required to register as sexual offenders in Cape Girardeau County received a directive from the Cape Girardeau County Sheriff’s Office requiring them to sign and return a statement promising that they will comply with the Sheriff’s interpretation of R.S.Mo § 589.426. The statement that the Sheriff's office required Plaintiff to sign, reprinted verbatim below, reflected the Sheriff Department's particular interpretation of the statute. The statement reads: During the Halloween Season, I will make NO attempt to engage in any type of contact with children or go to any location, [sic] where children are known to frequent in order to celebrate any type of Halloween Festivities. I will remain inside my residence between 5 PM and 10:30 PM unless there is just cause to leave. I will post the sign; [sic] “NO CANDY OR TREATS AT THIS RESIDENCE” on my front door and will leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours. 36. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is so vague as to fail to provide fair notice or warning of activity that would violate the statute. 37. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to define the criminal offense it

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 11 of 15 PageID #: 364
creates with sufficient [CLARITY-PARTICULARITY/definiteness] that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. 38. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
COUNT II Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 39. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim. 40. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes a punishment upon Plaintiffs for crimes that were committed before R.S.Mo. § 589.426’s enactment.
COUNT III Violation of First Amendment – Interference with Family Association 41. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim. 42. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 unreasonable interferes with Plaintiffs’ right of family association with their children, step-children, and grandchildren.
COUNT IV Violation of Fifth Amendment – Privilege against Self-Incrimination 43. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim. 44. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 requires Plaintiffs affirmatively provide “just cause” for being absent from their homes from 5:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on October 31. This shifts the burden of providing a “just cause” reason for absence to the Plaintiffs, which requires them to speak in order to avoid arrest.

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 12 of 15 PageID #: 365
COUNT V Violation of Fourteenth Amendment – Right to Travel 45. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraph 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim. 46. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 requires Plaintiffs to remain in their homes from 5:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on October 31, which impedes their right to travel interstate and intrastate on that day each year, and affects the right to intrastate travel on that day and surrounding days each year.
COUNT VI Violation of Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13 47. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim. 48. Missouri’s Constitution provides, “that no ... law ... retrospective in its operation ... can be enacted.” Mo. Const. art I, § 13. 49. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes an affirmative obligations on Plaintiffs on each October 31 to do each of the following (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m. 49. The obligations created by R.S.Mo. § 589.426 are new duties imposed as a result of Plaintiffs’ criminal conviction. 50. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 was enacted after Plaintiffs’ convictions.

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 13 of 15 PageID #: 366
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray this Court:
A. Enter declaratory judgment that R.S.Mo. § 589.426 violates the Constitution of
the United States, on its face, and the Missouri Constitution, as applied to
Plaintiffs and others convicted prior to August 28, 2008, of offenses that give rise
to an obligation to register as a sexual offender;
B. Upon proper motion, certify appropriate Plaintiff and Defendant classes;
C. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining enforcement R.S.Mo. §
589.426;
D. Award Plaintiffs nominal damages for violation of the constitutional rights;
E. Award Plaintiffs costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1988; and
F. Allow such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Anthony E. Rothert ANTHONY E. ROTHERT #518779 American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, Missouri 63108 (314) 361-3635 FAX: (314) 361-3135 E-Mail: tony@aclu-em.org
David C. Nelson NELSON AND NELSON 420 N. High Street P.O. Box Y Belleville, IL 62222 618-277-4000 Fax: 618-277-1136 Email: dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 14 of 15 PageID #: 367
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served upon each of the Defendants listed below at the
address listed below by placing a copy of the foregoing in a properly addressed, postage pre-paid
envelope and placing said envelope in the United States Mail on November 3, 2008:
Mark Fisher Office of Prosecuting Attorney 115 West Main St. Bowling Green, MO 63334 Pro Se and Attorney for Defendant Fisher
and was delivered by operation of this Court’s ECF/CM system on November 2, 2008, to the following:
Robert E. Jones JONES AND HAYWOOD 7700 Bonhomme Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63105-1793 314-727-0777 Fax: 314-727-9071 Email: rejones@jhbkj.com Attorney for Defendant Schicker
Adam R. Lorenz JONES AND HAYWOOD 7700 Bonhomme Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63105-1793 314-727-0777 Fax: 314-727-9071 Email: alorenz@jhbkj.com Attorney for Defendant Schicker
Harry Morley Swingle Office of Prosecuting Attorney 100 Court Street Jackson, MO 63755 Pro Se and Attorney for Defendant Kinnison
Howard Paperner 9322 Manchester Road St. Louis, MO 63119 314-961-0097 Fax: 314-961-0667 Email: howardpaperner@sbcglobal.net Attorney for Defendant O’Connor

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 15 of 15 PageID #: 368
Christopher J. Quinn ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314-340-7861 Fax: 314-340-7029 Email: Christopher.Quinn@ago.mo.gov Attorney for Defendants Nixon and Blunt
Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel ST. LOUIS COUNTY COUNSELOR'S OFFICE 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 314-615-7042 Fax: 314-615-3732 Email: lmerklinvonkaenel@stlouisco.com Attorney for Defendant McCulloch
/s/ Anthony E. Rothert

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-2 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 369
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Jim Wells

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Sheriff

ofPike County, Missouri

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-2 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 370
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-3 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 371
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

John C. Connolly

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Chief

ofManchester, Missouri Police Department

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-3 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 372
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-4 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 373
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

James Corwin

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Chief

ofKansas City, Missouri Police Department

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-4 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 374
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-5 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 375
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

John Jordan

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Sheriff

ofCape Girardeu County, Missouri

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-5 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 376
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-6 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 377
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

COLONEL JAMES F. KEATHLEY

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Superintendent

ofMissouri Highway Patrol

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-6 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 378
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-7 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 379
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Colonel Jerry Lee

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Chief

ofSt. Louis County Police Department

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-7 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 380
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-8 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 381
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Paul C. Vescovo, III

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Sheriff

ofClay County, Missouri

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-8 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 382
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-9 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 383
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND
REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
* * Plaintiff to Complete Gray Area * *

TO:

Daniel L. White

(Nam e ofdefendant)

(as Prosecuting Attorney ofClay County, Missouri

)

(Title)

(Name ofbusiness)

Alawsuithasbeencommencedagainstyou(ortheentityonwhosebehalfyouareaddressed). Acopyofthecomplaintisattachedtothisnotice. Ithas been filed in the United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Eastern District

ofMissouriand hasbeen assigned docketnumber4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

.

Thisisnotaformalsummonsornotificationfrom thecourt,butrathermyrequestthatyousignandreturntheenclosedwaiverofserviceinordertosave thecostofservingyouwithajudicialsummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaint. ThecostofservicewillbeavoidedifIreceiveasignedcopy ofthewaiverwithin__30__daysafterthedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhichthisNoticeandRequestissent. Iencloseastampedandaddressed envelope (orothermeansofcost-free return) foryouruse. An extra copyofthe waiverisalso attached foryourrecords.

If you comply with this request and return the signed waiver to the undersigned, it will be filed with thecourtandnosummonswillbeservedonyou. Theactionwillthenproceedasifyouhadbeenservedonthe
datethewaiverisfiled,exceptyouwillnotbeobligatedtoanswerthecomplaintbefore60daysfrom thedatedesignatedbelowasthedateonwhich thisnotice issent(orbefore 90 daysfrom thatdate ifyouraddressisnotin anyjudicialdistrictofthe United States).
Ifyoudonotreturnthesignedwaiverwithinthetimeindicated, IwilltakeappropriatestepstoeffectformalserviceinamannerauthorizedbytheFederal RulesofCivilProcedureandwillthen, totheextentauthorizedbythoseRules, askthecourttorequireyou(orthepartyonwhosebehalfyouare addressed)topaythefullcostsofsuchservice. Inthatconnection,pleasereadthestatementconcerningthedutyofpartiestowaivetheserviceofthe summons, which issetforth on the footofthe waiverform.
Iaffirm thatthisrequestisbeing sentto you on behalfofthe plaintiff, this____ dayof________________, 20____.
Signature ofPlaintiff'sAttorneyor Unrepresented Plaintiff

DUTY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COSTS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule4oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurerequirescertainpartiestocooperateinsavingunnecessarycostsofserviceofthesummonsandcomplaint. A defendantlocatedintheUnitedStateswho, afterbeingnotified ofanactionandaskedbyaplaintifflocatedintheUnitedStatestowaiveserviceofsummons, failstodosowillberequiredtobearthecostofsuchserviceunlessgoodcausebeshownforitsfailuretosignandreturnthe waiver.
Itisnotgoodcauseforafailuretowaiveservicethatapartybelievesthatthecomplaintisunfounded, orthattheactionhasbeenbroughtinanunproperplaceorinacourtthatlacksjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof theactionoroveritspersonorproperty. A partywhowaivesserviceofthesummonsretainsalldefensesandobjections(exceptanyrelatingtothesummonsortotheserviceofsummons), andmaylaterobjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtortotheplacewheretheactionhasbeenbrought.
A defendantwhowaivesservicemustwithinthetimespecifiedonthewaiverform serveontheplaintiff'sattorney(orunrepresentedplaintiff) aresponsetothecomplaintandmustalsofileasignedcopyoftheresponsewith thecourt. Iftheanswerormotionisnotservedwithinthistime, adefaultjudgmentmaybetakenagainstthatdefendant. Bywaivingservice, adefendantisallowedmoretimetoanswer, thanifthesummonshadactuallyserved, whentherequestforwaiverofservicewasreceived.
-Page 1-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 77-9 Filed: 11/02/08 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 384
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

**PlaintiffTo Complete GrayArea **

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT(S)

To:

Anthony E. Rothert

(Name ofplaintiff'sattorneyorunrepresented plaintiff)

Iacknowledge receiptofyourrequestthatIwaive service ofa summonsin the action of: Case Caption: Jane Doe I, et al v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, et al

Case Number: 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ

intheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMissouri. Ihavealsoreceivedacopyofthecomplaintinthisaction,twocopiesofthis instrument, and a meansbywhich Ican return the signed waiverto you withoutcostto me.

IagreetosavethecostofserviceofasummonsandanadditionalcopyofthecomplaintinthislawsuitbynotrequiringthatI(ortheentityonwhose behalfIam acting) be served with judicialprocessin the mannerprovided byRule 4.

I(ortheentityonwhosebehalfIam acting)willretainalldefensesorobjectionstothelawsuitortothejurisdictionorvenueofthecourtexceptfor objectionsbased on a defectin the summonsorin the service ofthe summons.

Iunderstandthatajudgmentmaybeenteredagainstme(orthepartyonwhosebehalfIam acting)ifananswerormotionunderRule12isnotserved

upon you within 60 daysafter

,

(Date W aiversent)

orwithin 90 daysafterdate if the requestwassentoutside the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACKNOW LEDGMENT OF W AIVER OF SERVICE

Date
as (OfficerorAgent)

Printnam e
Signature of (Corporation orAssociation)
Address
City, State, Zip Code
-Page 2-

Doe I et al v. Nixon et al, Docket No. 4:08-cv-01518 (E.D. Mo. Oct 03, 2008), Court Docket
General Information

Case Name Docket Number Court Nature of Suit Related Opinion(s)

Doe I et al v. Nixon et al 4:08-cv-01518 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri Constitutionality of State Statutes 2009 BL 77843 2009 BL 205446 2010 BL 168164 2010 BL 253867

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. For terms of service see bloomberglaw.com // PAGE 1 Document Link: http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ms/document/X1Q6L1ER66O2?documentName=82.xml

 
 Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 1 of 18 PageID #: 872

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I,

)

)

JANE DOE II,

)

)

JOHN DOE I,

)

)

JOHN DOE II,

)

)

JOHN DOE III, and

)

)

JOHN DOE IV,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEREMIAH W. NIXON, in his official )

capacity as Attorney General for )

the State of Missouri,

)

)

MATT BLUNT, in his official capacity as )

Governor for the State of Missouri, )

)

THOMAS O’CONNOR, in his official )

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police )

Department,

)

)

)

STEVEN SCHICKER, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Ballwin, Missouri, Police

)

Department,

)

)

ROBERT P. McCULLOCH, in his official )

capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for )

St. Louis County, Missouri,

)

No. 4:08-cv-1518 CEJ
PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTATORY RELIEF AND NOMINAL DAMAGES

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 2 of 18 PageID #: 873

STEVEN KRUSE, in his official capacity )

as Chief of Police for the Bowling )

Green, Missouri, Police Department, )

)

MARK FISHER, in his official capacity as )

Prosecuting Attorney for Pike

)

County, Missouri,

)

)

CARL A. KINNISON, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police )

Department,

)

)

H. MORLEY SWINGLE, in his

)

official capacity as Prosecuting )

Attorney for Cape Girardeau County,)

)

DANIEL L. WHITE, in his official

)

capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for )

Clay County, Missouri,

)

)

PAUL C. VESCOVO, III, in his official )

capacity as Sheriff of Clay County, )

Missouri,

)

)

JAMES CORWIN, in his official capacity )

as Chief of Police for the Kansas )

City, Missouri, Police Department, )

)

JOHN C. CONNELLY, in his official

)

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

Manchester, Missouri Police

)

Department,

)

)

COLONEL JERRY LEE, in his official )

capacity as Chief of Police for the )

St. Louis County, Missouri Police )

Department,

)

)

JIM WELLS, in his official capacity as )

Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri, )

)

JOHN JORDON, in his official capacity )

as Sheriff of Cape Girardeau

)

County, Missouri,

)

2

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 3 of 18 PageID #: 874

)

COLONEL JAMES F. KEATHLEY, in )

his official capacity Superintendent )

of the Missouri State Highway

)

Patrol,

)

)

Defendants.

)

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs are Missouri parents who are required to register as sex offenders based on convictions entered prior to August 28, 2008.
2. This lawsuit challenges a new Missouri statute, which became effective August 28, 2008, and requires Plaintiffs and others who are required to register as a sex offender to take the following actions, under threat of criminal charge, on October 31, 2008, and October 31 of every year: A. “Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;” B. “Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies;” C. “Post a sign at his or her residence stating, ‘No candy or treats at this residence’; and” D. “Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.” R.S.Mo. § 589.426.
3. As a result of the lack of clarity about what activities are prohibited by the statute, Plaintiffs reasonably fear that if R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is permitted to be enforced they will be subjected to arbitrary and discriminatory

3

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 4 of 18 PageID #: 875
enforcement for actions or inactions that they did not reasonably know would violate the law. In particular, Plaintiffs do not understand how to conform to the statute’s criminal proscription on Halloween-related contact with children with respect to their own children and grandchildren. In addition, Plaintiffs submit that the challenged statute violates the rights guaranteed to them by the United State Constitution and the Missouri Constitution. 4. This action seeks entry of a declaratory judgment finding the R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is unconstitutional under the federal Constitution and the Missouri state constitution as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the statute.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1342, 1367, 2201
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 7. Divisional venue is proper in the Eastern Division pursuant to E.D.Mo.
L.R. 2.07(a)(1), (b)(2). PARTIES
8. Plaintiffs are Missouri residents who were convicted prior to August 28, 2008, of offenses that require them to register as sexual offenders in the State of Missouri.
4

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 5 of 18 PageID #: 876

9. Jane Doe I1 is a resident of the City of Maryland Heights in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about May 16, 2003, she was convicted in St. Louis County, Missouri, of two counts of second degree statutory sodomy. The offenses of which she was convicted occurred on or about May 1, 1999. She is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 589.400. She has significant contact with her grandchildren, who will be under the age of 18 on October 31, 2008, and for many years thereafter.
10. Jane Doe II is a resident of the City of Cape Girardeau in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. On or about December 7, 2001, she was convicted in St. Charles County, Missouri, of two counts each of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. The offenses of which she was convicted occurred on or about November 1, 1995. She is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 589.400. She has sole custody of her tenyear-old daughter.
11. John Doe I is a resident of the City of Ballwin in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about January 17, 2001, he was convicted in Cole County, Missouri, of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. The offenses of which he was convicted occurred on or about July 1, 1999. He lives with his step-children, who are under the age of 18.
12. John Doe II is resident of the City of Bowling Green in Pike County, Missouri. On or about June 28, 1995, he was convicted in Marion County,

1

Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, and John Doe II have previously filed a

motion for leave to proceed with the use of pseudonyms, which remains pending. (Doc.

# 3). John Doe III and John Doe IV anticipate filing a identical motion in the near future.

5

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 6 of 18 PageID #: 877
Missouri, of statutory rape. The offense of which he was convicted occurred on or about February 5, 1995. He has sole custody of two children from a previous marriage, a step-child, and another child, all of with whom he resides and all of who are minors. 13. John Doe III is a resident of the City of Kansas City in Clay County, Missouri. On or about November 13, 1997, he was convicted in Sedgwick Couty, Kansas, of indecent liberties with a minor. The offense of which he was convicted occurred on or about July 14, 1997. He lives with his daughter, who is a minor. 14. John Doe IV is a resident of the City of Manchester in St. Louis County Missouri. On or about January 27, 1999, he was convicted in the District of Columbia, of a misdemeanor charge of sexual abuse. The offense of which he is convicted occurred on or about October 1, 1998. He has one minor child, with whom he plans to have contact on October 31, 2008. 15. Defendant Jeremiah W. Nixon is the Attorney General of the State of Missouri and is sued solely in his official capacity. Nixon is the State’s chief law enforcement officer and is charged with instituting any proceedings necessary to enforce state statutes. R.S.Mo. § 27.060. The Attorney General is also authorized to aid prosecutors when so directed by the Governor and to sign indictments when directed by the court. R.S.Mo. § 27.030. His primary office is located in Cole County, Missouri. 16. Defendant Matt Blunt is the current Governor of the State of Missouri. The supreme executive power lies with the governor. Mo. Const. art. 4, §
6

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 7 of 18 PageID #: 878
1. He has the duty to “take care that laws are distributed and faithfully executed.” Mo. Const. art. 4, § 2. His primary office is located in Cole County, Missouri. 17. Defendant Thomas O’Connor is the Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights Police Department in Maryland Heights, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Maryland Heights and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Maryland Heights, where Jane Doe I resides. Maryland Heights is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. 18. Defendant Steven Schicker is the Chief of Police for the Ballwin Police Department in Ballwin, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Ballwin and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Ballwin, where John Doe I resides. Ballwin is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. 19. Defendant Carl A. Kinnison is the Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau Police Department in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for the City of Cape Girardeau and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within the City of Cape Girardeau, where Jane Doe II resides. Cape Girardeau is located in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. 20. Defendant Steven Kruse is the Chief of Police for the Bowling Green Police Department in Bowling Green, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Bowling
7

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 8 of 18 PageID #: 879
Green and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Bowling Green, where John Doe II resides. Bowling Green is located in Pike County, Missouri. 21. Defendant Mark Fisher is the Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County. Fisher is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Pike County. His primary office is located in Pike County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 22. Defendant Robert P. McCulloch is the Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County. McCulloch is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within St. Louis County. His primary office is located in St. Louis County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 23. Defendant H. Morley Swingle is the Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County. Swingle is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Cape Girardeau County. His primary office is located in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. 24. Defendant Daniel L. White is the Prosecuting Attorney for Clay County. White is responsible for commencing and prosecuting all criminal actions, including violations of R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Clay County. His primary office is located in Liberty, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. Defendant White sent a letter to Plaintiff John Doe III
8

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 9 of 18 PageID #: 880
and all other persons required to register as sexual offenders in Clay County notifying them, “Violation of [R.S.Mo. § 589.426] is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in the county jail and/or a fine of up to $1,000.” Defendant White’s letter further advised, “Any and all violations of this law that occur in Clay County will be prosecuted.” 25. Defendant Paul C. Vescovo, III, is the Sheriff for Clay County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes, including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Clay County, where John Doe III resides. Defendant Vescovo sent a letter to John Doe III and others required to register as sexual offenders in Clay County notifying them that, “During the course of Halloween night, my deputies and I will be patrolling and will check on each and every listed offender to ensure compliance with [R.S.Mo. § 589.426]. We’ll be chaing on lighting, signage and whether the registered offender is inside his or her residence as mandated by the statute.” 26. Defendant Jim Wells is the Sheriff for Pike County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes, including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Pike County, where John Doe II resides. 27. Defendant John Jordan is the Sheriff for Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes, including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within Cape Girardeau County, where Jane Doe II resides.
9

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 10 of 18 PageID #: 881
28. Defendant John C. Connolly is the Chief of Police for the Manchester Police Department in Manchester, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for Manchester and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within Manchester, where John Doe IV resides. Manchester is located in St. Louis County, Missouri.
29. Defendant Colonel Jerry Lee is the Chief of the St. Louis County Police Depratment. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is responsible for enforcing Missouri criminal statutes, including R.S.Mo. § 589.426, within St. Louis County, where Jane Doe I, John Doe I, and John Doe IV reside. One of Defendant Lee’s detectives told the New York Times that—prior to entry of preliminary injunction—he had planned to knock of the doors of persons required to register as sexual offenders to ensure they were home. He further stated that after the preliminary injunction he planned to go to each house to ensure that a sign was posted and exterior lights were off. It is unknown what he decided to do after the preliminary injunction was stayed by order of the Eighth Circuit.
30. Defendant James Corwin is the Chief of Police for the Kansas City Police Department in Kansas City, Missouri. He is sued solely in his official capacity. He is the chief law enforcement officer for the City of Kansas City, Missouri, and will be responsible for enforcing R.S.Mo. § 589.426 within St. Louis County, where John Doe III resides.
10

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 11 of 18 PageID #: 882
31. Defendant Colonel James F. Keathley is the Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol. He is sued solely in his official capacity. As superintendent of a statewide law-enforcement agency, he is responsible for the enforcement of R.S.Mo. § 589.426 against persons who come into contact with the Missouri Highway Patrol. Agents of Defendant Keathley made public statements that R.S.Mo. § 589.426 cannot be applied retrospectively to persons convicted before the statute’s enactment on August 28, 2008. STATUTE AT ISSUE
32. R.S.Mo. § 589.426, entitled “Registered sexual offender, Halloweenrelated activities,” provides: 1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to: (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
11

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 12 of 18 PageID #: 883
2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
COUNT I Violation of Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment – Inadequate Notice
33. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
34. Plaintiffs and other persons of reasonable intelligence do not have an understanding of several terms in the statutes, including what constitutes “avoid,” “Halloween-related contact,” or “just cause,” within the context of the challenged statute.
35. Defendants likewise have difficulty interpreting the meaning of the law. For instance Jane Doe II and other persons required to register as sexual offenders in Cape Girardeau County received a directive from the Cape Girardeau County Sheriff’s Office purporting to require them to sign a statement that they will comply with the Sheriff’s interpretation of Mo.R.S. § 589.426. Under the Cape Girardeau Sheriff Department’s interpretation of the challenged statute’s language, it means: During the Halloween Season, I will make NO attempt to engage in any type of contact with children or go to any location, [sic] where children are known to frequent in order to celebrate any type of Halloween Festivities. I will remain inside my residence between 5 PM and 10:30 PM unless there is just cause to leave. I will post the sign; [sic] “NO CANDY OR TREATS AT THIS RESIDENCE” on
12

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 13 of 18 PageID #: 884
my front door and will leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours. 36. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 is so vague as to fail to provide fair notice or warning of what would constitute a violation. 37. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to define the criminal offense it creates with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. 38. In addition or in the alternative, R.S.Mo. § 589.426 fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
COUNT II Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 39. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32
as if each were set forth here verbatim. 40. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes a punishment upon Plaintiffs for crimes that
were committed before R.S.Mo. § 589.426’s enactment. COUNT III
Violation of First Amendment – Interference with Family Association 41. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32
as if each were set forth here verbatim. 42. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 unreasonable interferes with Plaintiffs’ right of family
association with their children, step-children, and grandchildren. COUNT IV
Violation of Fifth Amendment – Privilege against Self-Incrimination
13

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 14 of 18 PageID #: 885
43. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
44. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 requires Plaintiffs provide “just cause” for being absent from their homes from 5:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on October 31. This shifts the burden of providing a “just cause” reason for absence to the Plaintiffs, which requires them to speak against their own penal interests in order to avoid arrest. COUNT V Violation of Fourteenth Amendment – Right to Travel
45. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraph 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
46. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 requires Plaintiffs to remain in their homes from 5:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on October 31, which impedes their right to travel interstate and intrastate on that day each year, and affects the right to intrastate travel on that day and surrounding days each year. COUNT VI Violation of Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13
47. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-32 as if each were set forth here verbatim.
48. Missouri’s Constitution provides, “that no ... law ... retrospective in its operation ... can be enacted.” Mo. Const. art I, § 13.
49. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 imposes an affirmative obligations on Plaintiffs to each October 31 do each of the following (1) Avoid all Halloween-related
14

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 15 of 18 PageID #: 886
contact with children; (2) Remain inside her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to, employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m. 50. The obligations created by R.S.Mo. § 589.426 are new duties imposed as a result of Plaintiffs’ criminal conviction. 51. R.S.Mo. § 589.426 was enacted after Plaintiffs’ convictions. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray this Court: A. Enter declaratory judgment that R.S.Mo. § 589.426 violates the
Constitution of the United States, on its face, and the Missouri Constitution, as applied to Plaintiffs and others convicted prior to August 28, 2008, of offenses that give rise to an obligation to register as a sexual offender; B. Upon proper motion, certify appropriate Plaintiff and Defendant classes; C. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining enforcement R.S.Mo. § 589.426; D. Award Plaintiffs nominal damages against Defendants other than Nixon, Blunt, and Keathley for past violation of the constitutional rights;
15

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 16 of 18 PageID #: 887
E. Award Plaintiffs costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
F. Allow such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled. Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Anthony E. Rothert ANTHONY E. ROTHERT #518779 American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, Missouri 63108 (314) 361-3635 FAX: (314) 361-3135 E-Mail: tony@aclu-em.org
David C. Nelson NELSON AND NELSON 420 N. High Street P.O. Box Y Belleville, IL 62222 618-277-4000 Fax: 618-277-1136 Email: dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
16

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 17 of 18 PageID #: 888
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served upon each of the Defendants
listed below at the address listed below by placing a copy of the foregoing in a properly
addressed, postage pre-paid envelope and placing said envelope in the United States Mail
on December 8, 2008, to:
Mark Fisher Office of Prosecuting Attorney 115 West Main St. Bowling Green, MO 63334 Pro Se and Attorney for Defendant Kruse
Jim Wells Pike County Sheriff’s Department 1600 Business Hwy 54 W Bowling Green, Missouri 63334
and was delivered by operation of this Court’s ECF/CM system on December 8, 2008, to
the following:
Robert E. Jones JONES AND HAYWOOD 7700 Bonhomme Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63105-1793 314-727-0777 Fax: 314-727-9071 Email: rejones@jhbkj.com Attorney for Defendant Schicker
Adam R. Lorenz JONES AND HAYWOOD 7700 Bonhomme Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63105-1793 314-727-0777 Fax: 314-727-9071 Email: alorenz@jhbkj.com Attorney for Defendant Schicker
Harry Morley Swingle
17

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 154 Filed: 01/28/09 Page: 18 of 18 PageID #: 889
Office of Prosecuting Attorney 100 Court Street Jackson, MO 63755 Pro Se and Attorney for Defendants Kinnison and Jordan Howard Paperner 9322 Manchester Road St. Louis, MO 63119 314-961-0097 Fax: 314-961-0667 Email: howardpaperner@sbcglobal.net Attorney for Defendant O’Connor Christopher J. Quinn ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314-340-7861 Fax: 314-340-7029 Email: Christopher.Quinn@ago.mo.gov Attorney for Defendants Nixon and Blunt Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel ST. LOUIS COUNTY COUNSELOR'S OFFICE 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 314-615-7042 Fax: 314-615-3732 Email: lmerklinvonkaenel@stlouisco.com Attorney for Defendant McCulloch
/s/ Anthony E. Rothert
18

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for leave to proceed

in this action under pseudonyms. Defendants oppose the motion and the

issues are fully briefed.

Plaintiffs Jan Doe I, Jan Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II, John Doe III,

and John Doe IV are individuals required to register as sex offenders, pursuant

to MO.REV.STAT. § 589.400. Jane Doe I is a resident of the City of Maryland

Heights in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about May 16, 2003, she was

convicted in St. Louis County, Missouri, of two counts of second degree

statutory sodomy. Jane Doe I alleges that she has significant contact with her

grandchildren, who are under the age of eighteen. Jane Doe II is a resident

of the City of Cape Girardeau in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri. On or about

December 7, 2001, she was convicted in St. Charles County, Missouri, of two

counts of both statutory rape and statutory sodomy. Jane Doe II alleges that

she has sole custody of her ten-year old daughter. John Doe I is a resident of

the City of Ballwin in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about January 17,

2001, he was convicted in Cole County, Missouri, of statutory rape and

statutory sodomy. John Doe I alleges that he lives with his step-children, who are under the age of eighteen. John Doe II is a resident of the City of Bowling Green in Pike County, Missouri. On or about June 28, 1995, he was convicted in Marion County, Missouri, of statutory rape. John Doe II alleges that he lives with and has sole custody of his two children from a previous marriage, a stepchild, and another child, all of whom are minors. John Doe III is a resident of Kansas City in Clay County, Missouri. On or about November 13, 1997, he was convicted in Sedgwick County, Kansas, of indecent liberties with a minor. John Doe III lives with his daughter, who is a minor. John Doe IV is a resident of the City of Manchester in St. Louis County, Missouri. On or about January 27, 1999, he was convicted in the District of Columbia of a misdemeanor charge of sexual abuse. John Doe IV alleges that he has one minor child.
In their first amended complaint, plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that MO.REV.STAT. § 589.426, a criminal statute, violates the United States Constitution on its face and violates the Missouri Constitution as applied to plaintiffs. Additionally, plaintiffs ask that the Court enjoin the enforcement of the statute against plaintiffs. (Doc. #77).
Plaintiffs ask that the Court allow them to proceed in this action under the “Doe” pseudonyms. Plaintiffs state that use of pseudonyms is necessary to protect the privacy of their minor children. Plaintiffs argue that use of their real names “will ultimately require identification of their children.” Plaintiffs also contend that, by expressing their desire not to comply with the statute, they are admitting their intention to engage in illegal conduct. Moreover,
-2-

plaintiffs state that they may have violated the statute on October 31, 2008. Therefore, plaintiffs risk criminal prosecution if their real names are used.
Defendants do not dispute the fact that plaintiffs are challenging government activity. However, defendants argue that disclosure of plaintiffs’ real names will not reveal “information of the utmost intimacy.” Defendants contend that the fact that plaintiffs are sexual offenders “is already a matter of public record and readily discernible by anyone.” Defendants refer the Court to Missouri law, which mandates that:
Only the information listed in this subsection shall be provided to the public in the registered sexual offender search: (1) The name and any known aliases of the offender; (2) The date of birth and any known alias dates of birth of the
offender; (3) A physical description of the offender; (4) The residence, temporary, work, and school addresses of the
offender, including the street address, city, county, state, and zip code; (5) Any photographs of the offender; (6) A physical description of the offender’s vehicles, including the year, make, model, color, and license plate number; (7) The nature and dates of all offenses qualifying the offender
to register; (8) The date on which the offender was released from the
department of mental health, prison, or jail, or placed on parole, supervised release, or probation for the offenses qualifying the offender to register[.]
-3-

MO.REV.STAT. § 589.402.3. Missouri law also states that “[t]he registered
sexual offender search shall make it possible for any person using the Internet
to search for and find the information specified in subsection 3 . . . .”
MO.REV.STAT. § 589.402.2. Defendants maintain that “any interest [that]
plaintiffs may have in concealing their identities is outweighed by the strong
public interest in open courts.” Defendants contend that “plaintiffs have not
alleged that they engaged, on October 31 of any year, in any activity
prohibited by the Statute, [and] they cannot demonstrate any legitimate risk
of criminal prosecution ‘through the information contained in the pleading.’”
(citing MO.REV.STAT. § 589.426). Finally, defendants argue that they will suffer
prejudice if plaintiffs proceed under pseudonyms. Defendants note that, “[i]n
their Complaint and in various ‘declarations’ previously filed with [the] Court,
plaintiffs have asserted, inter alia, their standing as registered sex offenders
and their desire to engage in various activities with children” in violation of the
Statute. Therefore, defendants assert that they “should be entitled to examine
the veracity of plaintiffs’ allegations . . . .”
With respect to parties litigating actions under pseudonyms, the Court
has held that:
Pleadings are generally required to “include the names of all the parties.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). However, courts have recognized an exception to this rule where the “need for anonymity is sufficiently compelling.” Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F.Supp. 1249, 1256 (N.D. Iowa 1995). Although the Eighth Circuit has not articulated any specific standard for making this determination, other courts have identified several circumstances in which the exception may apply: (1) where the plaintiff is challenging government activity; (2) where the plaintiff is required to disclose
-4-

information of the utmost intimacy; and (3) where the plaintiff risks criminal prosecution through the information contained in the pleading. See Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992). The court must also consider the public’s interest in the openness of judicial proceedings. Id. Doe H.M. v. St. Louis County, et al., No. 4:07-CV-2116 (CEJ), 2008 WL 151629 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2008). Plaintiffs have not shown that use of their real names would reveal “information of the utmost intimacy.” As defendants note, MO.REV.STAT. § 589.402.3 not only requires disclosure of plaintiffs’ real names, but it also mandates the public disclosure of plaintiffs’ identity, residence, vehicle, and place of employment on the Internet. Therefore, compliance with the sexual offender registration law places the privacy of plaintiffs’ children or grandchildren in jeopardy. However, defendants concede that plaintiffs are challenging government activity. Moreover, if plaintiffs are required to litigate this action under their real names, they risk criminal prosecution. In fact, defendants argue that disclosure of plaintiffs’ real names is necessary so that defendants can investigate plaintiffs’ “desire to engage in various activities with children on October 31.” Therefore, there is a reasonable likelihood that defendants will criminally prosecute plaintiffs, under the statute, if plaintiffs’ real names are revealed. As such, the Court believes that plaintiffs have established that their interests in proceeding under pseudonyms outweigh the public interest in open proceedings. Accordingly,
-5-

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motions for leave to proceed under pseudonyms [Doc. ##3, 79] are granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendants Chris Koster, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Missouri, and Jeremiah Nixon, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri, for leave to file a response to plaintiffs’ motion for leave to proceed under pseudonyms [Doc. #93] is denied as moot.

Dated this 13th day of April, 2009.

____________________________ CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 6 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motions of defendants Robert P.

McCulloch and Colonel Jerry Lee for a more definite statement, pursuant to Rule

12(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiffs oppose the motions and the issues are fully briefed.

On October 3, 2008, plaintiffs Jan Doe I, Jan Doe II, John Doe I, and John

Doe II filed a motion for leave to proceed under pseudonyms. On October 21,

2008, McCulloch filed a motion for a more definite statement, requesting that the

Court “either require the Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement by

providing their full identities or to dismiss the case in its entirety.” (Doc. #41, at

4, ¶22) (emphasis added). On November 2, 2008, plaintiffs filed an amended

complaint to add John Doe III and John Doe IV as plaintiffs in this action. The next

day, plaintiffs John Doe II and John Doe IV filed a joint motion for leave to proceed

under pseudonyms. McCulloch and Lee then filed a joint motion for a more definite

statement, wherein they:

[I]ncorporate[d] and renew[ed] Defendant McCulloch’s Motion for [a] More Definite Statement and repl[ied] with respect to “Jan Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, and John Doe II” and reincorporate[d] the reasoning therein for . . . their . . . Motion for [a] More Definite Statement with respect to John Doe III and John Doe IV.

(Doc. #85, at 1-2). In a Memorandum and Order dated April 13, 2009, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motions for leave to proceed under pseudonyms. Therefore, defendants’ motions are moot.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Colonel Jerry Lee for a more definitive statement [Doc. ##41, 85] are denied as moot.

Dated this 21st day of July, 2009.

____________________________ CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 2 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:08-cv-1518 (CEJ)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for the Court to certify a

question of state law to the Missouri Supreme Court. Defendant Thomas O’Connor has

filed a response,1 and the issues are fully briefed.

I. Background

On October 3, 2008, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Mo.Rev.Stat. §

589.426 violates their constitutional rights under the United States and Missouri

Constitutions. Section 589.426 provides:

1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to:

(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;

(2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies;

(3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and

(4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.

1The other defendants in this action filed no response.

2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. MO.REV.STAT. § 589.426. In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that § 589.426 violates (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute is vague and fails to provide adequate notice of the conduct that it proscribes; (2) the Ex Post Facto Clause in that it imposes punishment upon plaintiffs for crimes that they committed prior to the statute’s enactment in 2008; (3) the First Amendment in that the statute unreasonably interferes with plaintiffs’ right of family association with their children, step-children, and grandchildren; (4) the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination in that the statute requires plaintiffs to provide a “just cause” reason for failure to remain in their households; (5) the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute impedes their right to intrastate and interstate travel; and (6) the Missouri Constitution, Art. 1, § 13, in that the statute applies retrospectively. (Doc. #154). Plaintiffs now move for the Court to certify to the Missouri Supreme Court the question of “[w]hether . . . § 589.426 violates the Missouri Constitution by imposing affirmative obligations, punishment, or both upon persons required to register as sexual offenders as a result of convictions and offenses occurring prior to the statute’s date of enactment.” (Doc. #151, at 1). II. Discussion Certification “allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State’s highest court[.]” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (citation omitted). The certification process begins when the federal court sends “to the state high court a certificate that sets forth the questions of state law for which answers are sought.” Jonathan Remy Nash,
- 2 -

Examining the Power of the Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1693 (2003). The highest state court can either accept or reject the certified question. If the state court accepts the certified question, the federal court may render judgment in light of the state court’s answer. Id at 1674. Because it prevents federal courts from resolving state law questions, certification successfully “reduc[es] the delay, cut[s] the costs, and increase[s] the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.” Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 76.
According to plaintiffs, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 477.004 allows the Court to certify questions of state law to the Missouri Supreme Court. Section 477.004 provides:
The Missouri supreme court may answer questions of Missouri law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court or a United States Bankruptcy Court if there are involved in any proceeding before the certifying court questions of Missouri law which may be relevant to the cause then pending and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in this state. MO.REV.STAT. § 477.004.1. The Missouri Supreme Court in, Zeman v. V.F. Factory Outlet, Inc., held that, notwithstanding § 477.004, the Missouri Constitution does not grant it original jurisdiction to render opinions on certified questions from federal courts. See Zeman v. V.F. Factory Outlet, Inc., 911 F.2d 107, 109 (8th Cir. 1990). According to the Missouri Supreme Court, § 477.004 does not affect its inability to answer certified questions because the court’s jurisdiction is fixed by the Missouri Constitution and cannot be controlled, changed, or enlarged by a statute. Id. Plaintiffs argue that certification is appropriate because there is no indication that Zeman has or was intended to have any precedential effect. Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is unfounded. The Missouri Supreme Court did not limit its holding to the facts of Zeman. In Grantham v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159
- 3 -

(Mo. July 13, 1990), the Missouri Supreme Court similarly held that it had no general jurisdiction to answer certified questions from federal courts. As in Zeman, the court declared that the Missouri Constitution does not expressly, or by implication, permit the court to respond to certified questions. Id. The court did not suggest in either decision that its jurisdiction was limited to specific facts or circumstances. Rather, the court explicitly stated that it had no authority to respond to certified questions.
Plaintiffs also contend that the use of certification in Missouri’s sister states and by the United States Supreme Court will cause the Missouri Supreme Court to reach a different conclusion concerning the scope of its jurisdiction. Since 1990, most courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have either adopted or recognized the value of certification procedures. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 76. The use of certification in other states and by the United States Supreme Court does not alter the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision that it lacks jurisdiction to answer certified questions.
Finally, plaintiffs appear to argue that the Missouri Supreme Court has misinterpreted the state constitution. According to plaintiffs, the Missouri Supreme Court has the power to answer certified questions “because it accomplishes an objective naturally within the judicial orbit.” (Doc. #161, at 2). Plaintiffs also state that the Missouri General Assembly has the authority to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court. Plaintiffs suggest that the Missouri legislature is only prohibited from creating legislation that is obnoxious to other parts of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs contend that § 477.004 is not obnoxious to any other part of the Missouri Constitution and therefore action pursuant to the statute is lawful.
The Court cannot make a determination as to whether the Missouri Supreme Court misinterpreted the state constitution or conclude that the Missouri General Assembly has the authority to enlarge the Missouri Constitution. It is fundamental that
- 4 -

“state courts be free and unfettered” by the federal courts in interpreting their state constitutions. Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940). Federal courts do not have special competence in state law and have no authority to determine a state court’s jurisdiction under its own statutes. Therefore, federal courts must follow the highest state court’s construction and interpretation of a state statute. See Concordia Ins. Co. of Milwaukee v. Sch. Dist., 282 U.S. 545, 551 (1931). As such, the Court is bound by the Missouri Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Missouri Constitution.
Based on the foregoing, the Court will not certify to the Missouri Supreme Court the question of whether § 589.426 violates the Missouri Constitution. See Doe v. Neer, No. 4:07CV101RWS, 2009 WL 975154 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2009) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to certify a question of state law to the Missouri Supreme Court).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to certify a question of state law to the Missouri Supreme Court [Doc. #151] is denied.

Dated this 10th day of September, 2009.

____________________________ CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 5 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ) ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch

and Tim Fitch for the Court to abstain or stay further proceedings in this action.

Plaintiffs have responded and the issues are fully briefed.

I. Background

On June 30, 2008, the Missouri Legislature enacted MO.REV.STAT. § 589.426.

Section 589.426 provides:

1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to:

(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;

(2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies;

(3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and

(4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.

2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

The statute became effective on August 28, 2008.

On October 3, 2008, plaintiffs filed a thirteen-count complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that § 589.426 violates (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute is vague and fails to provide fair notice of the conduct that it proscribes; (2) the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution in that the statute imposes punishment for crimes committed prior to the statute’s enactment; and (3) Article 1, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution1 in that the statute applies retrospectively. On the same date, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of § 589.426.
On October 27, 2008, after a hearing, the Court entered an order enjoining the defendants from enforcing the provisions of § 589.426.1 (1) and § 589.426.1 (2), Mo.Rev.Stat., on October 31, 2008. The defendants filed a motion for a stay of the order, and the motion was granted without explanation by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 30, 2008.
On November 2, 2008, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adding John Doe III and John Doe IV as plaintiffs. In a judgment dated November 6, 2008, the Eighth Circuit granted defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss their appeal.
On January 28, 2009, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. Plaintiffs state that they are Missouri residents, who were convicted of crimes---prior to the effective date of § 589.426---for which they are required to register as sexual offenders.2 In the second amended
1Article 1, § 13 of the Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.” MO. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (emphasis added).
2On May 16, 2003, Jane Doe I was convicted in St. Louis County, Missouri, of second degree statutory sodomy. On December 7, 2001, Jane Doe II was convicted in St. Charles County, Missouri, of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. On January 17, 2001, John Doe I was convicted in Cole County, Missouri, of statutory rape and
-2-

complaint, plaintiffs allege that § 589.426 violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute is vague and fails to provide adequate
notice of the conduct that it proscribes (Count I); the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States Constitution in that it imposes punishment upon plaintiffs for crimes that
they committed prior to the statute’s enactment in 2008 (Count II); the First
Amendment in that the statute unreasonably interferes with plaintiffs’ right of family
association with their children, step-children, and grandchildren (Count III); the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination in that the statute requires plaintiffs
to provide a “just cause” reason for failure to remain in their households (Count IV);
the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute impedes their right to travel (Count V);
and the Missouri Constitution in that the statute applies retrospectively. (Doc. #154).
On November 26, 2008, the State of Missouri charged Charles A. Raynor with
violating § 589.426 in the Circuit Court of Audrain County, Missouri. See State of
Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor, No. 08U1-CR01062. In a Decision and Judgment dated
April 23, 2009, the circuit court held:
In our case, Mr. Raynor pled guilty to the offense requiring him to register as a sex offender on January 30, 1990. The Halloween-Related Restrictions for Sex Offenders statute, Section 589.426 RSMO was enacted in 2008. Clearly, this statute creates new obligations with respect to the Defendant’s past actions, including the display of a specific sign and the obligation to have all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m. each October 31st.
This Court sustains Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Information as it finds Section 589.426 RSMo [sic] violates article 1, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution.
statutory sodomy. On June 28, 1995, John Doe II was convicted in Marion County, Missouri, of statutory rape. On November 13, 1997, John Doe III was convicted in Sedgwick County, Missouri, of indecent liberties with a minor. On January 27, 1999, John Doe IV was convicted in the District of Columbia of a misdemeanor charge of sexual abuse. See (Doc. #154, at 5-6).
-3-

(Doc. #180-5). On May 20, 2009, the State of Missouri appealed the circuit court’s
ruling to the Missouri Supreme Court. See State of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor, No.
SC90164. The case is still pending.
II. Discussion
Defendants McCulloch and Fitch now move for the Court to abstain under R.R.
Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
“The Pullman abstention doctrine counsels restraint in the use of federal judicial
resources under certain circumstances.” Robinson v. City of Omaha, Neb., 866 F.2d
1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989). The Eighth Circuit holds that the Pullman abstention
doctrine “requires a federal court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction when the case
involves a potentially controlling issue of state law that is unclear, and the decision of
this issue by the state courts could avoid or materially alter the need for a decision on
federal constitutional grounds.” Id. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit states that:
Pullman abstention requires consideration of (1) the effect abstention would have on the rights to be protected by considering the nature of both the right and necessary remedy; (2) available state remedies; (3) whether the challenged state law is unclear; (4) whether the challenged state law is fairly susceptible to an interpretation that would avoid any federal constitutional question; and (5) whether abstention will avoid unnecessary federal interference in state operations.
Beavers v. Arkansas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 151 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1998).
The Eighth Circuit also wrote:
The paradigm case for abstention arises when the challenged state statute is susceptible of “a construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the [federal] constitutional question.” . . .
More fully, we have explained: “Where resolution of the federal constitutional question is dependent upon, or may be materially altered by the determination of an uncertain issue of state law, abstention may be proper in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional adjudication. . . .
-4-

The doctrine . . . contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain.” Beavers, 151 F.3d at 841 (citing Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965)). In light of the Beavers factors, the Court believes that Pullman abstention is appropriate. The parties agree that the provisions of § 589.426 (1) and § 589.426 (2), MO.REV.STAT., are unclear. Moreover, remedies are available in Missouri state courts. In fact, on October 31, 2008, one of the John Doe plaintiffs filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. See Doe v. State of Missouri, No. 08AC-CC00874. Before dismissing his petition, the plaintiff also filed an application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Id. Therefore, plaintiffs in this action may seek injunctive relief in the Missouri state courts, enjoining the enforcement of § 589.426 on October 31, 2009. Furthermore, if the Missouri Supreme Court finds, in State of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor, that § 589.426 does not apply retrospectively, the statute will not apply to plaintiffs. Thus, Counts II, III, IV, V, and VI of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint will be moot. Additionally, if the statute does not apply to them, plaintiffs will lack standing to pursue Count I because they will have no actual or imminent injury-in-fact. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (To establish standing, “[f]irst, the plaintiff must [show that he or she has] suffered an ‘injury in fact’-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent[.]’”) (citations omitted). Abstention will also avoid federal interference with the State of Missouri’s interpretation of its own laws.
Accordingly,
-5-

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Tim Fitch for the Court to abstain [Doc. #187] is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the proceedings in this action are stayed pending the resolution of state court proceedings in State of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor, No. SC90164.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions in this action are denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on plaintiffs’ second motion for preliminary injunction scheduled for Tuesday, October 6, 2009, at 9:30 a.m. is canceled.

Dated this 25th day of September, 2009.

____________________________ CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 6 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Memorandum and Order dated September 25, 2009, pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. #222). In that Memorandum and Order, the Court granted the motion to dismiss of defendants Robert McCulloch and Tim Fitch to abstain, and dismissed the remaining pending motions as moot, including plaintiffs’ motion, (Doc. #135), for reimbursement for the costs of service of summons served on Jim Wells. On November 3, 2008, plaintiffs sent a copy of the first amended complaint and a request for waiver of service via first-class mail to defendant Jim Wells, who was then the Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri. Wells failed to sign and return the waiver. On December 10, 2008, plaintiffs effectuated personal service on Wells. See (Doc. #130). After Stephen Wayne Korte became the Sheriff of Pike County, he was substituted for Wells in this action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) provides that a defendant “has a duty to avoid unnecessary expenses of serving the summons.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(1). Additionally, Rule 4(d) provides: The notice and request must:

(A) be in writing and be addressed:
(i) to the individual defendant; or
(ii) for a defendant t subject to service under Rule 4(h), to a officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process,
(B) name of the court where the complaint was filed;
(C) be accompanied by a copy of the complaint, two copies of a waiver form, and a prepaid means for returning the form;
(D) inform the defendant, using text prescribed in Form 5, of the consequences of waiving and not waiving service;
(E) state the date when the request is sent;
(F) give the defendant a reasonable time of at least 30 days after the request was sent . . . to return the waiver; and
(G) be sent by first-class mail or other reliable means.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(1). Additionally, Rule 4(d) explains that:
If a defendant located within the United States fails, without good cause to sign and return a waiver requested by a plaintiff located within the United States, the court must impose on the defendant:
(A) the expenses later incurred in making service; and
(B) the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, of any motion required to collect those service expenses.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2).
Here, the record indicates that Wells failed to return the waiver of service.
Plaintiffs have included an invoice, showing that they incurred an expense of $115.00
to obtain personal service upon Wells. (Doc. #136-1). Additionally, in a signed
declaration, plaintiffs’ counsel, Anthony E. Rothert, states that he spent 2.3 hours in
preparing the motion for reimbursement of costs. (Doc. #136-2). However, Mr.
Rothert only seeks reimbursement for one hour at his hourly rate of $175.00. The
-2-

Court finds the amount of time expended by counsel and the hourly rate to be reasonable. Because Wells failed to comply with plaintiffs’ request for waiver of service of summons, and because neither Wells nor Korte has shown good cause for the failure, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement of costs and an award of attorney’s fees in preparing the instant motion in the amount of $290.00.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration [Doc. #240] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Order entered on September 29, 2009 [Doc. #222], is vacated only to the extent that it denies the plaintiffs’ motion for costs. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for costs associated with service on Jim Wells [Doc. #135] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Steven Wayne Korte, as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri, is directed to pay plaintiffs $290.00 for the costs of service of summons and attorney’s fees.

Dated this 23rd day of July, 2010.

____________________________ CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 3 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motions to dismiss filed by six of the
defendants in this case, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint,
and plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
I. Background
On June 30, 2008, the Missouri Legislature enacted MO.REV.STAT. § 589.426,
which provides:
1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of
each year to:
(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;
(2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies;
(3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and
(4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
The statute became effective on August 28, 2008.

On October 3, 2008, plaintiffs filed a thirteen-count complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that § 589.426 violates (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute is vague and fails to provide fair notice of the conduct that it proscribes; (2) the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution in that the statute imposes punishment for crimes committed prior to the statute’s enactment; and (3) Article 1, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution1 in that the statute applies retrospectively. On that same date, plaintiffs file a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of § 589.426.
On October 27, 2008, after a hearing, the Court entered an order enjoining the defendants from enforcing the provisions of § 589.426.1(1) and § 589.426.1(2), MO.REV.STAT., on October 31, 2008. The defendants filed a motion for a stay of the order, and the motion was granted without explanation by the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals on October 30, 2008.
On November 2, 2008, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adding John Doe III and John Doe IV as plaintiffs. In a judgment dated November 6, 2008, the Eighth Circuit granted defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss their appeal.
On January 28, 2009, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. Plaintiffs state that they are Missouri residents, who were convicted of crimes—prior to the effective date of § 589.426—for which they are required to register as sexual offenders in the State of Missouri.2 In
1Article 1, § 13 of the Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.” MO. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (emphasis added).
2On May 16, 2003, Jane Doe I was convicted in St. Louis County, Missouri, of two counts of second degree statutory sodomy. On December 7, 2001, Jane Doe II was convicted in St. Charles County, Missouri, of two counts of (1) statutory rape and (2) statutory sodomy. On January 17, 2001, John Doe I was convicted in Cole County,
-2-

their second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that § 589.426 violates (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute is vague and fails to provide adequate notice of the conduct that it proscribes (Count I); (2) the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution in that it imposes punishment upon plaintiffs for crimes that they committed prior to the statute’s enactment in 2008 (Count II); (3) the First Amendment in that the statute unreasonably interferes with plaintiffs’ right of family association with their children, step-children, and grandchildren (Count III); (4) the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in that the statute requires plaintiffs to provide a “just cause” reason for failure to remain in their households (Count IV); (5) the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute impedes their right to travel (Count V); and (6) the Missouri Constitution in that the statute applies retrospectively.
Plaintiffs bring this action against defendants Robert P. McCulloch, in his official capacity as the Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri; Tim Fitch, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the St. Louis County, Missouri Police Department; Chris Koster, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Missouri; Jeremiah Nixon, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri; James Corwin, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department; and Ronald K. Replogle, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol.3 These defendants now seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ second
Missouri, of statutory rape and statutory sodomy. On June 28, 1995, John Doe II was convicted in Marion County, Missouri, of statutory rape. On November 13, 1997, John Doe III was convicted in Sedgwick County, Missouri, of indecent liberties with a minor. On January 27, 1999, John Doe IV was convicted in the District of Columbia of a misdemeanor charge of sexual abuse. See (Doc. #154, at 5-6).
3On January 28, 2009, the Court dismissed defendant Steven Schicker from this action. Defendants John C. Connelly, Steven Kruse, Mark Fisher, Carl A. Kinnison, H. Morley Swingle, Stephen Wayne Korte, John Jordan, Daniel L. White, and Paul C. Vescovo,
-3-

amended complaint with respect to them, and plaintiffs seek leave to file a third amended complaint. Plaintiffs have seek a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of § 589.426 on October 31, 2010.
II. Discussion A. Motions to Dismiss The moving defendants argue that, in light of the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff’s Department, 301 S.W.3d 56, Mo. 2010 (en banc), plaintiffs’ claims are now moot. “In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the parties must demonstrate an actual, ongoing case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.” Republican Party of Minn., Third Cong. Dist. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 789-90 (2004) (citation omitted). “Federal courts are not empowered to ‘give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Id. at 790 (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “A case becomes moot if it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the violation will recur or if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Id. (citation omitted). “The heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur lies with the party asserting mootness.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).
III. have filed answers to plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Defendant Tim Walsh has not filed an answer, nor has an attorney entered an appearance on his behalf.
-4-

The plaintiff in the F.R. case, Charles Raynor, challenged the constitutionality of the statute at issue in this case, MO.REV.STAT. § 589.426. Raynor, a sex offender whose conviction pre-dated the effective date of the statute, argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it operated retrospectively. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and held that § 589.426 was unconstitutional as it applied to Raynor because it violated the ex post facto clause of Article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution. F.R., 301 S.W.3d at 66.
The constitutionality of § 589.426 was addressed several months later by a federal district court in Doe v. Crane, No. 09-4220-CV-C-KNL, 2010 WL 2218624 (W.D. Mo. May 28, 2010). In that case, the plaintiff, a registered sex offender who was convicted prior to the enactment of the statute, argued that § 589.426 violated various provisions of the Constitution of the United States as well as the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id. at *1. Relying on the decision in F.R., the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were moot and that plaintiff lacked standing. Id. at *2.
The district court ruled that, even though “F.R. addressed an as-applied challenge, its language indicates that its holding extends to those whose prosecutions under R.S.Mo. § 589.426 would be based on convictions which occurred prior to August 28, 2008.” Id. at *3. Because the defendants admitted that the statute could not legally be applied to Doe and because there was “no indication that Doe has been threatened with prosecution or is otherwise under an imminent threat of prosecution,” Doe’s claims were moot. Id.
Here, as in Doe, the plaintiffs do not allege that they are being prosecuted or are under threat of being prosecuted under § 589.426. Indeed, in their memorandum in opposition to the motions to dismiss, plaintiffs state that there is merely a “shadow
-5-

of possible prosecution under R.S.Mo. § 589.426.” Additionally, the moving defendants acknowledge that the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition against laws that are retrospective in operation bars them from enforcing § 589.426 against the plaintiffs and other individuals convicted before the statute’s enactment. Thus, there is no reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be prosecuted under the statute. See Id. at *2 [citing Missouri Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 811 (8th Cir. 2007)]. The Court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims are now moot.
Plaintiffs contend that their requests for prospective relief, in the form of preliminary and permanent injunctions, defeat the moving defendants’ mootness arguments. A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that there is “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that [the] movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Dataphase Sys. Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc. 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). “The standard for issuing a preliminary or permanent injunction is essentially the same, excepting one key difference.” Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enters., Inc., 542 F.3d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 2008). “A permanent injunction requires the moving party to show actual success on the merits, rather than the fair chance of prevailing on the merits required for a standard preliminary injunction.” Id. (citation omitted).
As discussed above, plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that they will face prosecution under § 589.426. In light of the concessions made by the moving defendants, the plaintiffs’ fear of prosecution is speculative and hypothetical. Thus, plaintiffs cannot establish the likelihood of irreparable harm which is required for injunctive relief.
-6-

B. Nominal Damages Plaintiffs argue that, even if their claims for prospective relief are moot, they may still pursue their claim for nominal damages based on the moving defendants’ past constitutional violations. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (a § 1983 plaintiff can sustain an action for nominal damages for past constitutional violations). Even if a plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief becomes moot, the “opportunity to seek monetary damages for prior violations of his [or her] constitutional rights [remains].” Keup v. Hopkins, 596 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2010). See also Watts v. Brewer, 588 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that plaintiff’s release from prison had “mooted his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief but [had] not mooted his claim for monetary damages.”). The Court finds that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims, because they do not allege an actual or imminent injury-in-fact. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560,120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (1992) (To establish Article III standing, “[f]irst, the plaintiff must [show that he or she has] suffered an ‘injury in fact’-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent[.]’”) (citations omitted). There must also exist “a fairly traceable connection between plaintiff's injury and complained-of conduct of defendant.” Id. Here, the complaint contains allegations of public announcements made by certain defendants indicating their intention to enforce § 589.426. It is also alleged that two of the defendants sent letters to all registered sex offenders in Clay County, Missouri, including plaintiff John Doe III, notifying them of their obligation to comply with the statute and of the possibility of prosecution for non-compliance. The plaintiffs do not allege in the second amended complaint that they were, in fact, prosecuted or
-7-

specifically threatened with prosecution by any defendant in this case. The absence of such allegations make this case is distinguishable from the Keup and Watts cases.
Plaintiffs complied with the statute because it is penal in nature and they feared prosecution. The harm alleged by having to comply with a law later found unconstitutional, without any specific threat of enforcement by the defendants directed specifically at these plaintiffs, is not so “concrete or particularized” as to satisfy the standing requirements. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. The Court concludes that plaintiffs’ are not entitled to pursue their claims for nominal damages.
C. Non-moving Defendants Because “questions of mootness are matters of subject matter jurisdiction,” and a court must dismiss an action anytime it determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., this action must also be dismissed with respect to any non-moving defendants. Charleston Housing Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729, 739 (8th Cir.2005); See also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts sufficient to show that they have any grounds for relief against the non-moving defendants that are distinct from those addressed herein. They have had an opportunity to be fully heard on these issues, and consequently, the Court must dismiss all of its claims for relief as to the non-moving defendants as well. See Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P. D. Motion to Amend Complaint In their motion for leave, plaintiffs seek leave of Court to amend their complaint to add “additional facts related to the alleged violations of their constitutional rights on October 31, 2009.” (Doc. #238, at 2). “A district court should freely give leave to a party to amend its pleadings when justice so requires, Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(a); however, it may properly deny a party’s motion to amend its complaint when such amendment
-8-

would unduly prejudice the non-moving party or would be futile.” Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 2003)). “A court abuses its discretion when it denies a motion to amend a complaint unless there exists undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment.” Id. (citing Bell v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1998)). “When a court denies a motion to amend a complaint ‘on the ground of futility, it means that the court reached a legal conclusion that the amended complaint could not withstand’ a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12, Fed.R.Civ.P.” Bakhtiari v. Beyer, No. 4:06-CV-1489, 2008 WL 3200820, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 6, 2008) (citing In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2007)).
The Court finds that granting plaintiffs’ leave to file a third amended complaint would be futile. Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint contains no allegations showing that any of the defendants have threatened to enforce § 589.426 against any plaintiff in the wake of the decision in F.R. Because the plaintiffs’ claims in the second amended complaint are moot and the proposed amendment would be futile, the Court will deny plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Tim Fitch to dismiss the second amended complaint [Doc. #232] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendants Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, and Ronald K. Replogle to dismiss the second amended complaint [Doc. #236] is granted.
-9-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint [Doc. #238] is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ third motion for a preliminary injunction [Doc. #271] is denied as moot.

Dated this 27th day of October, 2010.

____________________________ CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 10 -

 
 Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 1 of 12 PageID #: 1709

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:08-CV-1518 (CEJ)

)

)

)

)

ORDER This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motions for attorneys’ fees and to amend the order requiring plaintiffs to bear the costs of this action. Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motions and the issues have been fully briefed. I. Background Plaintiffs filed this action on October 3, 2008 to enjoin defendants--municipal and state law enforcement officials--from enforcing Missouri’s newly enacted Halloween sex offender statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 589.426,1 which went into effect on August 28, 2008 (the “Halloween statute”). With their complaint, plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from enforcing the Halloween statute on October 31, 2008. On October 27, 2008, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion and

1 The statute provides: “Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to: (1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m . . . Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.”

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 2 of 12 PageID #: 1710
entered an order enjoining defendants from enforcing Sections 589.426 (1) and (2). Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal and emergency motion to stay the Court’s preliminary injunction. On October 30, 2008, the Eighth Circuit issued an order summarily granting defendants’ motion and staying the preliminary injunction. On November 6, 2008, the Eighth Circuit dismissed defendants’ interlocutory appeal at plaintiffs’ request.
On June 29, 2009, plaintiffs filed their second motion for a preliminary injunction. On August 14, 2009, plaintiffs and defendants Daniel White and Robert Boydston filed a joint stipulation stating that they consent to the entry of a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the Halloween Statute during the pendency of plaintiffs’ action. The stipulation also contained an agreement that the parties to stipulation would bear their own “costs and expenses herein incurred or expended in the prosecution and/or defense of this matter.” (Doc. #209). On September 25, 2009, the Court issued an order granting the motion of defendants Robert McCulloch and Tim Fitch to abstain under R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) and staying all proceedings in this matter pending the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff’s Department, 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).
The F.R. decision was issued on January 12, 2010 and held that the Halloween statute violated the Missouri Constitution as applied retrospectively to sex offenders convicted prior to the enactment of the Halloween statute. Id. Defendants represented that they would not seek to enforce the Halloween statute against plaintiffs following F.R. and requested that plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed. On October 27, 2010, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint as moot, finding that the
-2-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 3 of 12 PageID #: 1711
Halloween Statute had been held unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs by the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in F.R. Doe v. Nixon, NO. 4:08-CV-1518 CEJ, 2010 WL 4363413 *2 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (Doc. #222). The Court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for nominal damages because they had not alleged that any defendant actually enforced the Halloween statute against plaintiffs and their theory of harm as to how the Halloween statute affected them on the two days it was could have been enforced was too speculative. Id. at *4.
On October 27, 2010, the Court dismissed the action as to all defendants and ordered plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs now seek to alter or amend the October 27, 2010 judgment arguing that it was a manifest error of law to treat defendants as the prevailing parties. Plaintiffs also seek attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on this same argument.
II. Discussion Plaintiffs’ motions raise the difficult question of who should bear the cost of preventing the enforcement of a criminal statute that all parties now agree is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs. “Parties to a lawsuit generally must bear their own costs . . .” Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Hopkins, Minn., 511 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 2008). Section 1988, however, is an exception to this general rule and states, in relevant part: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 . . ., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Similarly, Rule 54(d)(1) states “[u]less a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs---other than attorneys’ fees---should be allowed to the
-3-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 4 of 12 PageID #: 1712
prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
A. Prevailing Party Analysis
As recently explained by the Eighth Circuit,
The test for prevailing party explained by Supreme Court is that “a plaintiff ‘prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); see Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) (“The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.”). The Supreme Court refined this standard in [Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)] when it rejected the “catalyst” theory, which had been endorsed by all but one of the circuit courts and which permitted a plaintiff to recover fees if its lawsuit achieved the desired result through a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. 532 U.S. at 602, 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court held instead that a party must obtain a judicially sanctioned material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties to the lawsuit to achieve prevailing party status. Id. at 604-05. Surveying its past cases the Court determined that enforceable judgments on the merits and consent decrees create the requisite material alteration in the parties' legal relationship to achieve prevailing party status. See id. at 603-04, 121 S.Ct. 1835.
Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Hopkins, Minn., 511 F.3d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir.
2008). “[A] preliminary injunction can in some instances carry the judicial imprimatur
required by Buckhannon to convey prevailing party status.” Id. at 837 (referring to
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 and citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d
1083, 1086 (8th Cir.2006)). However, a plaintiff that obtains “a preliminary injunction
that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same
case,” is not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74,
83 (2007).
Plaintiffs contend that they, not defendants, should be considered the prevailing
-4-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 5 of 12 PageID #: 1713
parties in this action. In support, they point to the preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the Halloween statute on October 31, 2008. They also argue that the Court’s October 27, 2010 dismissal order constituted a “judicially sanctioned admission” by defendants that the Halloween Statute could not be constitutionally applied to plaintiffs. (Doc. #287). Defendants, on the other hand, point out that the preliminary injunction ordered by the Court on October 27, 2008 was stayed by the Eighth Circuit’s October 30, 2008 order and, thus, never materially altered the parties’ relationship. They also claim that the October 27, 2010 order dismissing this action at defendants’ request did not create any judicially enforceable rights and cannot serve as a basis for an award of attorneys’ fees.
The Court finds that plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in this case. The preliminary injunction they obtained on October 27, 2008 was a judicially sanctioned alteration of the parties’ rights. Unlike the injunction in Sole, it was never “reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case.” Sole, 551 U.S. at 83. Nor does the fact that the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss this case as moot undermine plaintiffs’ status. While a dismissal on the merits may convey prevailing party status on a defendant, cf. E.E.O.C. v. Ceridian Corp., Slip Copy, 2009 WL 1458278 (D. Minn. 2009) (voluntary dismissal with prejudice is decision on the merits; it materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by precluding plaintiff’s claims arising out of the same underlying operative set of facts), a dismissal based upon mootness is a finding that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and does not preclude plaintiff from asserting the same claims in future litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not operate as an adjudication on the merits). As such, the plaintiffs won the only “battle” that was
-5-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 6 of 12 PageID #: 1714
determined on the merits and would have won the war but for the doctrines of avoidance and abstention in combination with defendants’ wise retreat. See Sole, 551 U.S. at 86 (“A plaintiff who “secur[es] a preliminary injunction, then loses on the merits as the case plays out and judgment is entered against [her],” has “[won] a battle but los[t] the war.” (quoting Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002).
Defendants argue that this case is distinguishable from a closely related decision from the Western District of Missouri, Doe v. Crane, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3927822 (W.D. Mo. 2010). The Court disagrees and finds the analysis in Crane persuasive. The Crane plaintiff, raising the same issues and represented by the same counsel as plaintiffs here, was considered the prevailing party after challenging the Halloween statute as unconstitutional. Id. Many of the defendants here were also named as defendants in Crane. Id. Like plaintiffs here, the Crane plaintiff was granted a temporary order enjoining enforcement of the Halloween statute before the Court stayed proceedings based upon Pullman abstention. Following the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in F.R., the Crane Court also granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on mootness grounds where all defendants represented that they would no longer seek to enforce the Halloween statute against plaintiff. Based on these indistinguishable facts, the Crane Court determined that the plaintiff was the prevailing party and ordered defendants to pay the costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Id.
Defendants’ rely heavily upon the fact the preliminary injunction obtained by plaintiffs on October 27, 2008 was stayed by the Eighth Circuit on October 30, 2008. This reliance is misplaced. The Eighth Circuit’s stay was not a reversal on the merits and defendants’ appeal of the October 27, 2008 preliminary injunction was dismissed
-6-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 7 of 12 PageID #: 1715
by the Eighth Circuit on November 6, 2008 upon plaintiffs’ motion and defendants’ consent. Defendants’ argument that the October 27, 2008 preliminary injunction had no actual effect is refuted by the parties’ subsequent behavior. Defendants never prosecuted any plaintiff for violating the Halloween statute despite continuing to threaten that they would enforce the statute and despite evidence that at least one plaintiff could have been charged with a violation.2 Also, following the 2008 injunction, two defendants stipulated to the entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining them from enforcing the Halloween statute in 2009 in exchange for plaintiffs not seeking attorneys’ fees and costs from those defendants. The Court need not delve into whether defendants’ subsequent behavior was a result of the preliminary injunction or voluntary behavior; the fact that these changes followed a preliminary injunction entered in this case distinguishes it from the “catalyst” theory rejected in Buckhannon. 532 U.S. 598 (rejecting the theory that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party” if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct without a judicially sanctioned determination of the merits).
This Court’s decision in Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C. v. Missouri Dept. of Revenue, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 151369 (E.D. Mo. 2008) is also indistinguishable and supports the Court’s decision. Similar to here, the Missouri Supreme Court invalidated the statute challenged in Greenpoint while the related federal case was still pending. As such, the underlying dispute in Greenpoint was rendered moot and the parties reached a settlement except as to the issue of attorneys’ fees. Regardless, the
2Plaintiff John Doe IV submitted an affidavit stating that he was not at his residence on October 31, 2008 as required by statute because he was attending his son’s Bar Mitzvah in another state. (Doc. #180).
-7-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 8 of 12 PageID #: 1716
Greenpoint plaintiffs were awarded fees as the prevailing parties even though the “only
relief . . . that [had] not been reversed is [the] agreed preliminary injunction.” Id. at
*8. The district court found that the agreed preliminary injunction was enough to
distinguish Greenpoint from the catalyst theory rejected in Buckhannon because
defendants’ voluntary change of position not solely based upon the success of the state
court plaintiff. Id. at *9 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 and summarizing cases
from other circuits that have reached this same result). Likewise, defendants’
voluntary retreat here was not solely based upon another plaintiff’s success and
plaintiffs are the prevailing parties for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
C. Reasonableness of Fees Amount
As explained in Greenpoint,
[T]he starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The party seeking fees must submit evidence to support the hours worked and the rate claimed. The district court is required to exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not “reasonably expended,” i.e., that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary. Id. at 434.
The Court is obligated to provide a “concise but clear explanation” of its reasons for a fee award. McCurry v. Tesch, 824 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir.1987). In determining the amount of fees, the Court is to consider twelve factors:
(1) [T]he time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
-8-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 9 of 12 PageID #: 1717
Greenpoint, 2008 WL 151369 at *10 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 3; Winter v. Cerro Gordo County Conservation Bd., 925 F.2d 1069, 1074 n. 8 (8th Cir.1991)).
Plaintiffs request that the Court award them attorneys’ fees of $60,127.50 and $490.00 in costs. According to the affidavits of plaintiffs’ counsel, attorney David Nelson expended 58 hours on this matter at a rate $300.00 per hour and attorney Anthony Rothert expended 189.9 hours at a rate of $225.00 per hour. (Doc. #287-2 and 287-3). The affidavits include itemized time entries that detail the work performed by both attorneys between September 24, 2008 and October 28, 2010.
Defendants object to the reasonableness of the fees requested by plaintiffs. Specifically, they claim that the hourly rates of the attorneys are too high and that the time expended after the September 25, 2009 order staying proceedings is unjustified. Alternatively, defendants argue that the time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel after the F.R. decision was issued is unreasonable because any dispute after that point was merely about attorneys’ fees and nominal damages. Finally, defendants make various arguments as to why an award of fees to plaintiffs would be unjust, claiming that they were merely attempting to enforce a newly enacted statute or even likening their situation to a catch-22.3
Addressing this last argument first, the Court finds defendants’ general grievances based upon fairness unpersuasive. Similar concerns have been considered and dismissed by the Eighth Circuit:
Presumably it will always be true that state officials enforcing a law or otherwise defending state action will believe, or at least hope, that the
3More precisely, defendants McCulloch and Fitch state: “Plaintiffs’ position bars defendants from ever doing the right thing . . . Defendants are ‘damned if they do anything and damned if they don’t.’” (Doc. #302 at 12).
-9-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 10 of 12 PageID #: 1718
law or action in question will be upheld against a federal constitutional attack. The point of § 1988 is that such officials proceed at their peril. If in fact they are wrong, and the law they are enforcing turns out to be invalid, § 1988 puts the financial burden on the state officials. The judgment of Congress is that the burden rests more properly on them than on the party who has been wronged by the application of an invalid law.
Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1152 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Further, the comparative role each defendant played in this action also bears little
significance in apportioning fees. As further noted by the court in Carhart ,
[D]efendant’s] argument that he did not actively participate in the lawsuit and that he should not, therefore, be responsible for the attorney's fees, is equally without merit. His role in the proceedings may have been minor, but this does not excuse him from having to share in the actual costs. He relied on his co-defendants to present their defense of the constitutionality of LB 23, a statute he has indicated he would enforce, and he cannot now avoid helping to pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees.
Id. The State enacted and defendants threatened to enforce a statute that, on its face,
raised constitutional concerns. Defendants must now bear the cost of that decision.
As to the rates charged by attorneys Nelson and Rothert, the Court finds their
respective hourly rates to be reasonable in light of their considerable experience, the
complexity of this case, the prevailing rates for attorneys of comparable experience in
the St. Louis market and the rates other courts have deemed reasonable in similar
instances. Cf. Doe v. Crane, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3927822 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (awarding
$2,512.50 in fees for 10 hours of legal service performed by the same attorneys).
As to the timing of the legal work performed by plaintiffs’ counsel, the Court
finds that the work performed after October 31, 2008 is not recoverable by plaintiffs.
The preliminary injunction entered in favor of plaintiffs was only effective on October
31, 2008 even if it had not been stayed. After this point, plaintiffs’ counsels’ efforts
-10-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 11 of 12 PageID #: 1719
did not lead to any additional material benefit to their clients. See Greenpoint, 2008 WL 151369 at *12. The affidavits submitted by attorneys Nelson and Rothert establish that they expended 86.2 and 28.2 hours in this matter, respectively, prior to October 31, 2008.
Even after limiting plaintiffs to recovering fees incurred before October 31, 2008, the amount claimed by plaintiffs remains excessive. Cf. Crane, 2010 WL 3927822 (awarding only $2,512.50 in fees for essentially the same relief as plaintiffs obtained here). Specifically, some of the hours claimed by attorney Rothert are not justified by the accompanying description of the work performed. For instance, Rothert states that he spent 10.3 hours on state court proceedings and traveling to and from Jefferson City, Missouri on October 30, 2008. (Doc. #287-3). He attributes another 6.5 hour entry on October 29, 2008 to work related to a “motion for state court relief.” Id. Plaintiffs cannot recover for time expended in a related-but-separate case. See Greenpoint, 2008 WL 151369 at *12. In another entry, Rothert claims 7.8 hours on October 31, 2008 for “prospective clients; work on amended complaint.” (Doc. #2873). It is unclear if this entry is related to this case or a different proceeding and, regardless, it is too vague to justify 7.8 hours of billable time. Because the Court finds these specific entries unreasonable, plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation for them. Thus, a reduction of 24.6 hours will be applied.
Finally, defendants Daniel White and Robert Boydston argue that they should not be liable for any of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees based upon the stipulation for the entry of an agreed preliminary injunction they filed on August 14, 2009. The agreed upon preliminary injunction was never entered and the fees awarded by the Court were all incurred before October 31, 2008. As such, the Court does not believe this stipulation
-11-

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 311 Filed: 08/25/11 Page: 12 of 12 PageID #: 1720

shields defendants White and Boydston from joint and several liability for the fees

awarded herein. Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1152 (defendants are jointly and severally liable

for attorneys’ fees’ awarded to a prevailing plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).

*****

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the plaintiffs are the prevailing

parties and are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for time expended prior to October

31, 2008 at the hourly rate charged by attorneys Rothert and Nelson as follows:

Anthony Rothert 61.6 hours @ $225/hour = $13,860.00

David Nelson

28.2 hours @ $300/hour = $8,460.00

The total amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded is $22,320.00. In addition, plaintiffs

are entitled to recover costs in the amount of $490.00.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees’ [Doc.

#285] is granted in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to amend [Doc. #288] is

granted. The Order of Dismissal entered on October 27, 2010, is amended as follows:

“Defendants shall bear the costs.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs are awarded attorneys’ fees in the

amount of $22,320.00 and costs in the amount of $490.00.

Dated this 25th day of August, 2011.

____________________________ CAROL E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 12 -

 
 Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 1 of 17 PageID #: 1896
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________
No. 11-3112 ___________________________
Jane Doe, I; Jane Doe, II; John Doe, I; John Doe, II; John Doe, III; John Doe, IV
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Missouri; Chris Koster, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Missouri
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants
Thomas O’Connor, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police Department; Robert P. McCulloch, in his official
capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri; Steven Kruse, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Bowling Green, Missouri, Police
Department; Mark Fisher, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County, Missouri; Carl A. Kinnison, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for
the Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police Department; H. Morley Swingle, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County, Missouri
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants
James Corwin, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
Tim Fitch, in his official capacity as Chief of the St. Louis County, Missouri, Police Department; Robert Boydston, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Clay County, Missouri; Stephen Wayne Korte, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pike
County, Missouri; John Jordan, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri; Tim Walsh, in his official capacity as Chief of Police
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 2 of 17 PageID #: 1897
for the Manchester, Missouri, Police Department
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants
Ronald K. Replogle, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant ___________________________
No. 11-3114 ___________________________
Jane Doe, I; Jane Doe, II; John Doe, I; John Doe, II; John Doe, III; John Doe, IV
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Missouri; Chris Koster, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Missouri;
Thomas O’Connor, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police Department
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants
Robert P. McCulloch, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
Steven Kruse, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Bowling Green, Missouri, Police Department; Mark Fisher, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County, Missouri; Carl A. Kinnison, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police Department; H. Morley
Swingle, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County, Missouri; James Corwin, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the
-2-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 3 of 17 PageID #: 1898
Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants
Tim Fitch, in his official capacity as Chief of the St. Louis County, Missouri, Police Department
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
Robert Boydston, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Clay County, Missouri; Stephen Wayne Korte, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri;
John Jordan, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri; Tim Walsh, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Manchester,
Missouri, Police Department; Ronald K. Replogle, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants ___________________________
No. 11-3213 ___________________________
Jane Doe, I; Jane Doe, II; John Doe, I; John Doe, II; John Doe, III; John Doe, IV
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Missouri; Chris Koster, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Missouri;
Thomas O’Connor, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police Department; Robert P. McCulloch, in his official
capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri; Steven Kruse, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Bowling Green, Missouri, Police
Department; Mark Fisher, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County, Missouri; Carl A. Kinnison, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for
the Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police Department; H. Morley Swingle, in his
-3-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 4 of 17 PageID #: 1899
official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County, Missouri; James Corwin, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Kansas City,
Missouri, Police Department; Tim Fitch, in his official capacity as Chief of the St. Louis County, Missouri, Police Department; Robert Boydston, in his official
capacity as Sheriff of Clay County, Missouri; John Jordan, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri; Stephen Wayne Korte, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri; Tim Walsh, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Manchester, Missouri, Police Department; Ronald K. Replogle, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees ____________
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
____________
Submitted: November 16, 2012 Filed: May 10, 2013 ____________
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges. ____________
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, Chris Koster, James Corwin, and Colonel Ronald Replogle (the State Officials), and Colonel Tim Fitch and Robert P. McCulloch (the St. Louis County Officials) appeal the district court’s August 25, 2011, order granting in part the plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and granting the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment to reflect the grant of attorneys’ fees and costs. Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II, John Doe III,and John Doe IV (the Does) appeal the
-4-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 5 of 17 PageID #: 1900
district court’s October 27, 2010, order dismissing the Does’ claims as moot1 and the district court’s August 25, 2011, order to the extent it reduced the requested award of attorneys’ fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Each of the Does was convicted of an offense for which he or she is required to register as a sex offender in Missouri.Each of the Does’ convictions occurred prior to June 30, 2008, when the Missouri Legislature enacted Missouri Revised Statute § 589.426 (the Halloween statute). The Halloween statute provides:
1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall berequired on October thirty-first of each year to:
(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; (2) Remain inside his or her resdi ence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m . unless required to be elsewhere for jus t cau se, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies; (3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence”; and (4) Leave all outside residentia l lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m. 2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections 589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426.
1The Does do not appeal the district courts’order to the extent it dismissed their claims against the State Officials.
-5-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 6 of 17 PageID #: 1901
On October 3, 2008, the Does2 filed an initial complaint against the Governor and Attorney General of Missouri, as wellas several county prosecutors and chiefs of police, in their official capacities, allegingthat the Halloween statute violated various provisions of the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitutio3n.The Does sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The Does filed a m otion for prelimin ary injunction with their com plaint, requesting that the Officials be prohibite d from enforcing the Halloween statute on October 31, 2008. The motion was fully briefed, and a hearing was held on October 27, 2008. That same day, the district court issued an order granting the Does’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Citing the four factors outlined in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc. , 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981), the district court concluded that the Does had carried their burden on all four factors and specifically indicated that the Does demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their federal due process claim. See D. Ct. Order of Oct. 27, 2008, 1-2.
Several of the Officials ap pealed the district court’s grant of the prelim inary injunction and moved to have the order stayed pending the appeal. On October 30, 2008, this court granted the Officials’ m otion to stay the prelim inary injunction without discussion, thus enabling the Offi cials to enforce the Halloween statute if necessary. Three days later,the Does moved to dismiss the Officials’ appeal as moot,
2John Doe III and John Doe IV were not plaintiffs in the initial complaint, but were added as plaintiffs in the Does’ first amended complaint filed on November 2, 2008.
3The Does added an additional prosecutni g attorney, law enforcement officers, and the Superintendent of the Missouri Stat e Highway Patrol as defendants in their first and second amended complaints. In addition, the Doessubstituted several of the initial defendants in favor of individuals who have assumed their elected office. For simplicity, we refer to the defendants collectively as “the Officials.”
-6-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 7 of 17 PageID #: 1902
noting that the preliminary injunction waseffective on October31, 2008, only and had since expired of its own te rms. We granted the Does’ m otion and dism issed the appeal.
The Does subsequently filed their first and second amended complaints, which also sought nominal damages, as well as a second motion for preliminary injunction. At the time the Does filed their second motion for preliminary injunction, there was litigation pending in th e Misso uri courts regarding an individual nam ed Charles Raynor, who was charged with violating the Halloween statute on October 31, 2008. Raynor was a registered sex offender, w hose conviction was en tered prior to the Halloween statute’s enactment. A Missouri circuit court dismissed the charge against Raynor, concluding that it violated th e Missouri Constitution’s prohibition on retrospective laws. Thereafter, the State of Missouri apepaled the order dismissing the charges against Raynor to the Missouri S upreme Court, where it was consolidated with another case. SeeF.R. v. St. Charles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept,. 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. 2010).
Several of the Officials moved the district court to stay the Does’ action under the Pullman doctrine4 until the Missouri Supreme Court rendered its decision in F.R. The district court granted the m otion to stay on Septem ber 25, 2009, and denied without prejudice the Does’ motion for a second preliminary injunction. On January 12, 2010, the Missouri Suprem e Court affirm ed the circuit court’s dism issal of Raynor’s charge in F.R., concluding that the Halloweenstatute violated the Missouri Constitution as applied to Raynor. See F.R. 301 S.W.3d at 66. The court held that because Raynor’s conviction predated the Halloween statute’s enactment, the statute violated the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition o n retrospective laws by im posing additional duties and obligations on Raynor that did not exist at the tim e of his conviction. See id. at 63-66.
4Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). -7-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 8 of 17 PageID #: 1903
Following the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in F.R., the State Officials and St. Louis County Officials moved the district court to dismiss the Does’ action as moot. The m oving Officials acknowledged that enforcing the Halloween statute against the Does, whose convictions, like Raynor’s, predated the Halloween statute’s enactment, would be unconstitutional. In uspport of this motion, the moving Officials admitted that they could not and would notenforce the Halloween statute against the Does. State Officials Koster, Nixon, Corwi,nand Replogle, filed a declaration stating that
in accordance with the holding of theSupreme Court of Missouri in F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff’s Dept., 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. Banc 2010), [they], t heir officers, agents, serv ants, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting on their behalf cannotand will not enforce Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426 against plaintiffs based on convictions occurring prior to its effective date.
See Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ App. 8-9. Based inpart upon this acknowledgment, the district court concluded that the Does ’ claims were moot because there was no reasonable expectation that they would beprosecuted under the Halloween statute and that consequently the Does no longer had standing to proceed. S ee D. Ct. Order of Oct. 27, 2010, at 5-6. Moreover, becau se mootness and standing are questions of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court concluded that the dismissal of the Does’ action was necessary as to the non-moving Officials as well. Seeid. at 8. In an order of dismissal issued with its opinion, the district court ordered that the Does bear the costs of the action.
Thereafter, the Does moved for attorneys’ fees and costs as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and to alter or amend the October 27, 2010, order to reflect the grant of attorneys’ fees and costs to theDoes. The district court granted in part the Does’ motion for attorneys’ fees, concludingthat they were prevailing parties because they had received a preliminary injunction, and granted the motion to alter or amend
-8-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 9 of 17 PageID #: 1904
the judgment. See D. Ct. Order of Aug. 25, 2011, 4-8.The district court held that the Does were entitled only to those attorneys’ fees incurred through the date of the preliminary injunction. It therefore reduced the award of attorneys’ fees and costs from the $60,967.50 requested by the Does to $22,810.00. See id. at 10-12.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Under § 1988
The State Officials and St. Louis County Officials argue that the district court erred in awarding the Does attorneys’ f ees and costs as prevailing parties under § 1988. “We review de novo both the dete rmination of whether a litigant is a prevailing party[] and the legal issues rela ted to the awar d o f at torney fees[.]” Advantage Media, L.L.C., v. City of Hopkins, Minn. , 511 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“In the United States, parties are ordinailry required to bear their own attorney’s fees—the prevailing party is not entitled tocollect from the loser.” Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). An exception to this general rulaepplies when Congresshas provided explicit statutory authority for awarding fees to a prevailing party. See id. Such a grant of authority is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides that “[i] n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . [§]1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs[.]”
“The test for prevailing party [as] explained by [the] Supreme Court is that ‘a plaintiff “prevails” when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between theparties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the pl aintiff.’” Advantage Media , 511 F.3d at 836 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992)). “The Suprem e Court refined this
-9-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 10 of 17 PageID #: 1905
standard in Buckhannon when it rejected the ‘catalyst’ theory, . . . which permitted a plaintiff to recover fees if its lawsuit achieved the desired result through a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 836-37. “Instead, the Court held that, to be a prevailing party entitled to a statutory attorneys’ fee award, a party must obtain a judicially sanctioned material alteration of the legalrelationship of the parties to the lawsuit.” N. Cheyenne Trib e v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006); see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (“A defendant’s voulntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”).
We recently analyzed the “prevailing party” determination in the context of a preliminary injunction in Rogers Group, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, 683 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2012). In Rogers Group , we acknowledged that “a preliminary injunction can in som e instances carry the judicial im primatur required by Buckhannon to convey prevailing party status.” Id. at 909-10 (internal quotation marks om itted). To determ ine whether the prelim inary injunction had created prevailing party status, we applied three core principles derived from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Buckhannon , and identified in Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 947 (D.C. Cri. 2005). Rogers Group, 683 F.3d at 910. Those three principles are:
First, in order to be a prevailing party, a claimant must show that there has been a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. (Citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S. Ct. 1835.)
Second, a prevailing party is a pa rty in whose favor a judgm ent is rendered, regardless of the am ount of dam ages awarded. (Citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S. Ct. 1835.)
-10-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 10 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 11 of 17 PageID #: 1906
Third, a claim ant is not a prevailing party m erely by virtue of having acquired a judicial pronouncem ent unaccom panied by judicial relief. (Citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606, 121 S. Ct. 1835.)
Rogers Group, 683 F.3d at 910 (quoting Select Milk, 400 F.3d at 947).
The Does contend that they should be ocnsidered prevailing parties on the basis of the district court’s October 27, 2008, order granting the Does’ request for a preliminary injunction and the district court’s October 27, 2010,order dismissing the Does’ claims as moot.
1. Preliminary Injunction
The district court concluded that the Does were prevailing parties because they “won the only ‘battle’ that was determined on the merits and would have won the war but for the doctrines of avoidance and ab stention in com bination with defendants’ wise retreat.” D. Ct. Order of Aug. 25, 2011a, t 5-6. The Supreme Court has held that “[a] plaintiff who achieves a transient victory at the threshold of an action can gain no award under that fee-shifting provision if, at the end of the litigation, her initial success is undone and she leaves the courthouse emptyhanded.” Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 78 (2007).
In Sole , the plaintiff sought to enjoin st ate park officials from enforcing an anti-nudity rule in effectfor state parks. Id.at 78-79. The plaintiff wished to organize an antiwar artwork consisting of nude individuals assembled into a peace sign on a beach in the park. Id.at 78. The plaintiff was granted the preliminary injunction and she assem bled her artwork in the park as planned. Id. at 79-80. Thereafter, t he plaintiff sought a permanent injunction, but the district court granted the state park officials’ motion for summary judgment on the merits. Id. at 80. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the plain tiff was a prevaili ng party because she had
-11-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 12 of 17 PageID #: 1907
obtained a preliminary injunction that actually prohibited the police from interfering with the nude artwork. Id. at 81. Th e S upreme C ourt disagreed, holding that “[p]revailing party status . .. does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherw ise undone by the final decision in the sam e case.” Id. at 83.
The Does achieved an even less signifi cant victory with their prelim inary injunction than did the plaintiff in Sole . Although when granted the prelim inary injunction prohibited the enforcement of the Halloween statute on October 31, 2008, it was stayed before it had any effect. In effect t hen, t he s tay of the preliminary injunction, which expired ofits own terms on November 1, 2008, resulted in the Does leaving the courthouse emptyhanded, their initial success having been undone without a change in the parties’ legal relationship.
We conclude that this is the type of atrnsient victory that the Supreme Court has indicated is not entitled to an awadr under a fee-shifting provision. SeeSole, 551 U.S. at 78. As we have noted, “a claim ant is not a prevailing party m erely by virtue of having acquired a judicial pronouncement unaccompanied by judicial relief.” Rogers Group, 683 F.3d at 910 (internal quotation m arks omitted). Although the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction may have served as a court-ordered change in the parties’ legalrelationship, this change wasnever realized because of our stay of that order. Thus, the districtocurt’s October 27, 2008, order effectively served as a judicial pronouncement without judicialrelief and did not confer prevailing party status upon the Does.
2. Dismissal on Mootness Grounds
The Does argue next t hat the district court’s order dism issing their case on mootness grounds confers prevailing party status upon them. The Does contend that
-12-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 13 of 17 PageID #: 1908
the Officials’ “admissions forced a j udicial order recognizing § 589.426 cannot be applied to Plaintiffs and, only after the amdission was judicially sanctioned, Palintiffs’ claims are, arguably, moot.” Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ Principal and Resp. Br. 1920. Moreover, “[n]ow that Defendants have achieved dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case as moot based on their admissions, Defendants are bound by those admissions.” Id. at 20.
The Does, however, miss the point that underscores the Officials’ admission; it was a voluntary action taken by the Offici als’ in the Does’ lawsuit. Th e Do es implicitly acknowledge this fact later, by arguing that the decision in F.R. “certainly provided writing on the wall, . . . [but it]did not prevent Defendants fromfighting on in the district court or from attempting to enforce § 589.426 against Plaintiffs.” Id. at 21. What ultimately halted the Officials was not a judicially sanctioned order, or a victory of any type by the Does; rather, it was the decision in F.Ra.nd the Officials’ voluntary cessation of the threat of prosecution that brought about mootness.
As noted above, the Suprem e Court ha s rejected the catalyst theory in determinations of prevailing party status, and has m ade clear that “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accom plishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. In Northern Cheyenne Trib,ewe recognized that
Congress intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the m erits of at least som e of his claim s. For only in that event has there been a dtermination of the ‘substantial rights of the parties,’ which Congress determined was a necessary foundation for departing from the usual rule in this country that each party is to bear the expense of his own attorney.
-13-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 13 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 14 of 17 PageID #: 1909
N. Cheyenne Tribe, 433 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980)).
We find the Does’ attempt to create the necessary judicial imprimatur after the Officials’ voluntary change unpersuasive. We pointed out in Rogers Groupthat this is the type of situation that does not confer prevailing party status:
If the [City] had acted to m oot this case through voluntary cessation before there was a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties, [Rogers Group] w ould not have been [a] “prevailing part[y].”
Rogers Group , 683 F.3d at 911 (quoting Select Milk , 400 F.3d at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The dismissal on mootness grounds in the instant case was not the result of the Does prevailing on the merits of any of their claims. Instead, it was the product of a voluntary change adopted by the Officials’ in t he face of the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in F.R. Under these circumstances, the Does are not entitled to prevailing party status simply because the voluntary change in conduct is recognized in an order of dism issal. See Singer Mgm t. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2011) (enbanc) (rejecting argument that the defendant’s voluntary concession which m ooted plaintiffs’ claim s, resulting in dismissal, conferred prevailing party statu)s; Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that order of dismissal could not confer prevailing party status because “[a]s a matter of law and logic, the district court cannot have awar ded Klamath any relief if it dism issed the case because it could not g rant relief. A nd that is exactly what a dismissal on mootness or ripeness grounds means”).
Because neither basis identified by the Does confers prevailing party status upon them, we reverse the district court’s gr ant of attorneys’ fees and costs to the Does under § 1988, as well as the district court’s amendment of the judgment under Rule 59 to reflect the award of attorneys’fees and costs. Becausethey are not entitled
-14-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 14 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 15 of 17 PageID #: 1910
to attorneys’ fees, their appeal of the district court’s reduction of fees is accordingly dismissed as moot.
B. District Court’s Mootness Determination
The Does contend that the district court erred in determining that their claims had been mooted and, therefore, that the Does lacked standing. Thus, they argue that the district court should not have dismissed their second amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction.5 We review de novo a district coutr’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Flores v. United States, 689 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Charleston Hous . Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. , 419 F.3d 729, 739 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Questions of m ootness are m atters of subject m atter jurisdiction that we review de novo.”).
“[A] federal court has no authority to give opinions upon m oot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A case becomes moot if it can be said with assurance that there isno reasonable expectation that the violation will recur or if interimrelief or events havecompletely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 745 (8th Cir. 2004). “The heavy burde n of persua[ding] the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to startup again lies with the party asserting mootness.” Friends of the Earth,Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5The only portion of the district court’s dismissal order with which the Does take issue is the determination of mootness. Accordingly, we limit our discussion of the district court’s order to the appropriateness of that determination.
-15-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 15 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 16 of 17 PageID #: 1911
The Does contend that the district court erred in concluding that the Officials had carried their burden of dem onstrating that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur. Th e Does contend that the Missouri Suprem e Court’s decision in F.R.was an as-applied challenge that is binding only as to Raynor. The Does contend that the Halloween statute is thus still on the books and that even after the decision in F.R., it still applies to them on its face. They argue further that the Officials’ admission that the Halloween statute is not enforceable following F.R. is insufficient to bring a halt to their challenge to the Halloween statute because they still “reasonably fear arrest and prosecution under § 589.426 if they do not alter their behavior to conformto its dictates.”Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ Principal and Resp. Br. 29.
The district court did not err in conculding that there was no longer a reasonable expectation that enforcement of the Hallow een statute as to the Does would occur. Although F.R. was an as-applied challenge, the Doespoint to no fact or circumstance that distinguishes them from Raynor such that F.R. would be inapplicable to them . Considering the Missouri Supreme Court’s analysis and decision, as well as the fact that each of the Does’ obligation to regi ster as a sex of fender i s derived from a conviction that predated theHalloween statute’s enactment, we fail to see how any of the Officials could enforce the Halloween statute against the Does. This conclusion is bolstered by the lack of evidence that the Does are actually under a threat of arrest or prosecution after F.R. See Republican Party of Minn., Third Cong. Dist. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding the plaintiff’s claims were moot when the ch arges against its memb er were dism issed and “there [was] no evidence that the Party, or even one of its members, [was] under imminent threat of prosecution”).
Given these circumstances, we agree with the district court that the Does’ fear of arrest and prosecution under the Halloween statute is speculative and hypothetical and that there is no reas onable expectation that a prosecution based upon such an
-16-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 16 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

Case: 4:08-cv-01518-CEJ Doc. #: 333 Filed: 05/10/13 Page: 17 of 17 PageID #: 1912
arrest will occur. See D. Ct. Order of Oct. 27, 2010, at 5-6. The district court thus did not err in determining that the Does lacked standing and in dismissing the Does’ second amended complaint for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction. SeeKlobuchar, 381 F.3d at 789-90; see alsoYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42(1971) (“A federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution in a state court is aserious matter. And persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or specu lative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in such cases.”).
We turn finally to the Does’ argument that if the Officials’ “admission that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426 cannot be enforced against Plaintiff s does not place a judicial imprimatur on those adm issions, then the district court’s dism issal of the second amended complaint should be reversed.” The Does contend that this is an either/or decision, which requires that either the dismissal confer prevailing party status because it carries judicial imprimatur, or that there can be no mootness co nclusion because the Officials are not bound by thei r promise not to enforce the Halloween statute against the Does. We do not agr ee. The order recognizes the Officials’ declaration acknowledging that they are barred from enforcing the Halloween statute against the Does. No further dem onstration of m ootness was required. The order does not grant the type of relief on the m erits that the Suprem e Court has found is necessary to confer prevailing party statusunder § 1988, and the Does’ citation to the recent Supreme Court opi nion Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013), although confirming the determination of mootness, does not alter this conclusion.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order dismissing the Does’ claims as moot. We reverse the district court’s order granti ng the Does attorneys’ fees and costs as prevailing parties under § 1988 and the corresponding amendment to the judgment.
______________________________
-17-
Appellate Case: 11-3112 Page: 17 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Entry ID: 4034452

 
 Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 1 of 34
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:08−cv−01518−CEJ

Doe I et al v. Nixon et al Assigned to: Honorable Carol E. Jackson Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Jane Doe I
Plaintiff Jane Doe II
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 10/03/2008 Date Terminated: 10/27/2010 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Anthony E. Rothert AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, MO 63108 314−669−3420 Fax: 314−652−3112 Email: trothert@aclu−mo.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David C. Nelson NELSON AND NELSON 420 N. High Street P.O. Box Y Belleville, IL 62222 618−277−4000 Fax: 618−277−1136 Email: dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, MO 63108 314−669−3422 Fax: 314−652−3112 Email: gdoty@aclu−mo.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grant R. Doty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 2 of 34

John Doe I

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe II

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe III

represented by John Doe III PRO SE

Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/11/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David C. Nelson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/11/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/11/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Doe IV

represented by Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 3 of 34

Grant R. Doty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Chris Koster in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Missouri
Defendant Jeremiah W. Nixon in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri
Defendant Thomas O'Connor in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Maryland Heights, Missouri, Police Department

represented by Mary Delworth Morris ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Old Post Office Building P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314−340−7875 Fax: 314−340−7029 Email: mary.morris@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher J. Quinn DRISCOLL FIRM, P.C. 211 N. Broadway Suite 2440 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−932−3232 Fax: 314−932−3233 Email: Chris@thedriscollfirm.com TERMINATED: 06/18/2012
Maureen C. Beekley ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314−340−6816 Fax: 314−340−7957 Email: maureen.beekley@ago.mo.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher J. Quinn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2012
Maureen C. Beekley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Paperner 9322 Manchester Road St. Louis, MO 63119 314−961−0097 Fax: 314−961−0667 Email: howardpaperner@sbcglobal.net LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 4 of 34

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Steven Schicker in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Ballwin, Missouri, Police Department TERMINATED: 01/28/2009

represented by Robert E. Jones CURTIS AND HEINZ, P.C. 130 S. Bemiston Avenue Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63105−1951 314−725−8788 Fax: 314−725−9789 Email: rejones@lawfirmemail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam R. Lorenz CURTIS AND HEINZ, P.C. 130 S. Bemiston Avenue Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63105−1951 314−725−8788 Fax: 314−725−8789 Email: alorenz@lawfirmemail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert P. McCulloch in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri

represented by Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel ST. LOUIS COUNTY COUNSELOR'S OFFICE 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 314−615−7042 Fax: 314−615−3732 Email: lmerklinvonkaenel@stlouisco.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl W. Becker ST. LOUIS COUNTY COUNSELOR'S OFFICE 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 314−615−7029 Fax: 314−615−3732 Email: carl_becker@stlouisco.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Steven Kruse in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Bowling Green, Missouri, Police Department

represented by Mark S. Fisher Pike County, MO 115 West Main Street Bowling Green, MO 63334 573−324−2201 Fax: 573−324−9893 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael G. Berry BERRY WILSON, LLC 200 East High Street Suite 300 Jefferson City, MO 65101 573−638−7272 Fax: 573−638−2693

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 5 of 34

Email: michaelberry@berrywilsonlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mark Fisher in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County, Missouri

represented by Mark S. Fisher (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael G. Berry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Carl A. Kinnison in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police Department

represented by H. Morley Swingle CAPE GIRARDEAU COUNTY COUTHOUSE 100 Court Street Jackson, MO 63755 573−243−2430 Fax: 573−204−2318 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael G. Berry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
H. Morley Swingle in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County

represented by H. Morley Swingle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael G. Berry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Daniel L White in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney of Clay County, Missouri

represented by Peter T. Maharry APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICE 700 SW Jackson Suite 300 Topeka, KS 66603 785−296−5484 Fax: 785−296−2869 Email: pmaharry@sbids.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Paul C Vescovo, III in his official capacity as Sheriff of Clay County, Missouri TERMINATED: 08/12/2009

represented by Peter T. Maharry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 6 of 34

James Corwin in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department

represented by Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher J. Quinn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2012

Maureen C. Beekley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John C Connelly in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Manchester, Missouri, Police Department TERMINATED: 09/16/2009

represented by Patrick R. Gunn GUNN AND GUNN 11901 Olive Boulevard Suite 312, P.O. Box 419002 St. Louis, MO 63141−6736 314−432−4550 Fax: 314−432−4489 Email: prg@gunn−gunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Colonel Jerry Lee in his official capacity as Chief of the St. Louis County, Missouri, Police Department TERMINATED: 07/06/2009

represented by Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Stephen Wayne Korte in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri

represented by Michael G. Berry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Jordan in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri

represented by H. Morley Swingle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael G. Berry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James F. Keathley in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol TERMINATED: 07/15/2010

represented by Christopher J. Quinn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2012

Defendant
Tim Fitch in his official capacity as Chief of the St. Louis County, Missouri, Police Department

represented by Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 7 of 34

Carl W. Becker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert Boydston

represented by Peter T. Maharry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tim Walsh in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Manchester, Missouri, Police Department

Defendant
Ronald K. Repolgle in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol

represented by Mary Delworth Morris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher J. Quinn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2012

Maureen C. Beekley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/03/2008
10/03/2008 10/03/2008 10/03/2008 10/03/2008

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Matt Blunt, Steven Cruise, Mark Fisher, Carl A. Kinnison, Harry Morley Swingle, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Matt Blunt, Thomas O'Connor, Steven Schicker, Robert P. McCulloch with receipt number 08650000000001605683, in the amount of $350 Non−Jury Demand,, filed by Matt Blunt, Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Original Filing Form, # 3 Waiver of Service Blunt, # 4 Waiver of Service Cruise, # 5 Waiver of Service Fisher, # 6 Waiver of Service Kinnison, # 7 Waiver of Service McCulloch, # 8 Waiver of Service Nixon, # 9 Waiver of Service O'Connor, # 10 Waiver of Service Schicker, # 11 Waiver of Service Swingle)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
3 MOTION for Leave to TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYMS by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
4 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 3 MOTION for Leave to TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYMS filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
5 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Jane Doe I, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of Jane Doe II, # 3 Exhibit C − Declaration of John Doe I, # 4 Exhibit D − Declaration of John Doe II)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/03/2008)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 8 of 34

10/03/2008 10/08/2008 10/08/2008
10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/09/2008
10/09/2008
10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/10/2008
10/10/2008 10/15/2008 10/15/2008

Case Opening Notification Waivers issued 9, Judge Assigned: Charles A. Shaw. (SAJ) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
6 MOTION to Expedite briefing and consideration of Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
7 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 6 MOTION to Expedite briefing and consideration of Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
8 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Steven Schicker Steven Schicker waiver signed on 10/3/2008, answer due 12/2/2008. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
9 ENTRY of Appearance by Robert E. Jones for Defendant Steven Schicker. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
10 ENTRY of Appearance by Adam R. Lorenz for Defendant Steven Schicker. (Lorenz, Adam) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
11 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for expedited briefing, hearing, and oral argument on their motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED without prejudice as premature denying 6 Motion to Expedite Signed by Honorable Charles A. Shaw on 10/9/08. (JWJ) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
12 MEMORANDUM requesting issuance of summons by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Blunt, # 2 Summons Cruise, # 3 Summons Fisher, # 4 Summons Kinnison, # 5 Summons McCollouch, # 6 Summons Nixon, # 7 Summons O'Connor, # 8 Summons Swingle)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
13 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Process Server: Mark Rauss/Master File (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
14 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiff Jane Doe II Process Server: John M. Mackey (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
15 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Process Server: David M. Roberts/DMR Investigations, LLC (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
16 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Process Server: Kellerman Investigations (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
17 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Process Server: Stephen R. Waters/Waterland Litigation Services, LLC (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
Summons Reissued as to defendantSteven Cruise, Mark Fisher, Carl A. Kinnison, Harry Morley Swingle, Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Thomas O'Connor, Robert P. McCulloch.10/10/2008 summons issued. Summons emailed to Plaintiffs at tony@aclu−em.org. (NCL) (Entered: 10/10/2008)
18 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Steven Schicker (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/10/2008)
19 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Steven Cruise waiver signed on 10/3/2008, answer due 12/2/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/15/2008)
20 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Matt Blunt served on 10/14/2008, answer due 11/3/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/15/2008)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 9 of 34

10/15/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/17/2008
10/17/2008 10/20/2008

21 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Jeremiah W. Nixon served on 10/14/2008, answer due 11/3/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/15/2008)
22 ENTRY of Appearance by Howard Paperner for Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
23 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Mark Fisher served on 10/14/2008, answer due 11/3/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
24 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Steven Cruise served on 10/14/2008, answer due 12/2/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
25 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Carl A. Kinnison served on 10/15/2008, answer due 11/4/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
26 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Harry Morley Swingle served on 10/15/2008, answer due 11/4/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
27 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Robert P. McCulloch served on 10/14/2008, answer due 11/3/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) Modified on 10/21/2008; INCORRECT SUMMONS ATTACHED; RE−FILED AS DOCUMENT 35 ; (DJO). (Entered: 10/16/2008)
28 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Thomas O'Connor served on 10/11/2008, answer due 10/31/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
29 Second MOTION to Expedite briefing, hearing and oral argument by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
30 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 29 Second MOTION to Expedite briefing, hearing and oral argument filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
31 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs second motion for expedited briefing, hearing, and oral argument on their motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED. [Doc. 29] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the standard briefing schedule established by the local rules will be modified as follows: (1) defendants opposition to plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction shall be filed no later than Tuesday, October 21, 2008; (2) plaintiffs reply brief in support of their motion for preliminary injunction shall be filed no later than Thursday, October 23, 2008; (3) the Court will hold a hearing on plaintiffsmotion for preliminary injunction on Tuesday, October 28,2008 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12−N. At the hearing, the parties shall be prepared to submit proposed orders to the Court for its consideration.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs shall serve written notice of its second motion for expedited briefing, hearing, and oral argument on their motion for preliminary injunction along with a copy of this order via electronic mail, facsimile, or hand−delivery on all defendants who have not entered their appearance. Plaintiffs shall file a certification with the Court by Monday, October 20, 2008 that this has been done.Granting 29 Motion to Expedite Signed by Honorable Charles A. Shaw on 10/17/08. (JWJ) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
32 ENTRY of Appearance by Christopher J. Quinn for Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
33 ORDER − Upon review of the Court file, the undersigned concludes there are circumstances present in this case which might give rise to the need for recusal pursuant to 28 USC 455. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is transmitted to the Clerk of the Court for random reassignment to another district judge.. Signed by Honorable Charles A. Shaw on 10/20/2008. (MRC) (Entered: 10/20/2008)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 10 of 34

10/20/2008 10/20/2008 10/20/2008 10/20/2008 10/20/2008
10/20/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/22/2008 10/22/2008 10/22/2008 10/23/2008 10/23/2008

34 REPORT TO COURT ORDER re 33 Order, Certification of Complaince with Court Order by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice with attachments)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
35 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Rober McCulloch served on 10/14/2008; (Rothert, Anthony) Modified on 10/21/2008 (DJO). (Entered: 10/20/2008)
36 MEMORANDUM re 27 Summons Returned Executed, 35 Summons Returned Executed by Plaintiff Jane Doe I. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
37 ENTRY of Appearance by David C. Nelson for Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Nelson, David) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
38 REASSIGNMENT ORDER (James G. Woodward, Clerk of Court) − On October 20, 2008 United States District Judge Charles A. Shaw entered an order of recusal that directs the Clerk of Court to assign the above styled cause to another district Judge of this Court. Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the above styled cause is randomly reassigned to the Honorable Judge Carol E. Jackson for all further proceedings. Case reassigned to Judge Honorable Carol E. Jackson for all further proceedings (MRC) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
39 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is rescheduled for Monday, October 27, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 14 North; Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/20/2008;(DJO) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
40 ENTRY of Appearance by Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel for Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
41 MOTION for More Definite Statement by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
42 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
43 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Defendant Steven Schicker. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
44 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
45 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 41 MOTION for More Definite Statement filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
46 MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time and Memorandum in Support by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
47 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
48 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Defendants Carl A. Kinnison, Harry Morley Swingle. (Attachments: # 1 Senate Bill 714, # 2 Fax Cover Sheet/Cover Letter)(DJO) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
49 MOTION for Leave to File Objection Out of Time by Defendants Steven Cruise, Mark Fisher; (Attachments: # 1 Opposition of Defendants Fisher and Kruse (Cruise) to Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Senate Bill 714, # 3 Fax Cover Sheet/Cover Letter)(DJO) (Entered: 10/23/2008)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 11 of 34

10/23/2008 10/23/2008 10/23/2008 10/23/2008
10/23/2008
10/24/2008 10/24/2008 10/24/2008 10/24/2008 10/27/2008
10/27/2008 10/27/2008 10/27/2008 10/27/2008 10/28/2008

50 RESPONSE to Motion re 49 MOTION for Leave to, 46 MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time and Memorandum in Support (no objection) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
51 ORDER granting 46 Motion for Leave to ; granting 49 Motion for Leave to Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/23/2008. (CEJ) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
52 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
53 REPLY to Response to Motion re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit E − Second Declaration of Jane Doe II, # 2 Exhibit E−1 Exhibit to Second Declaration of Jane Doe II)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
54 Opposition of defendants Fisher and Kruse to Preliminary Injunction (Originally filed as attachments to 49 ) re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, filed by Defendants Steven Cruise, Mark Fisher. (Attachments: # 1 Senate Bill, # 2 Fax Cover Sheet)(KKS) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
55 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiff Jane Doe I re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, Supplemental Declaration in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
56 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiff John Doe II re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, Supplemental Declaration in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
57 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiff John Doe I re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008, Supplemental Declaration in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
58 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiff Jane Doe II re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin enforcement of R.S.Mo. Sect. 589.426 on October 31, 2008,. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
59 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of § 589.426, Mo.Rev.Stat., on October 31, 2008, 2 is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, their agents, and any persons acting in concert with them, are enjoined from enforcing the provisions of § 589.426.1 (1) and § 589.426.1 (2), Mo.Rev.Stat., on October 31, 2008; Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/27/2008;(DJO) (Entered: 10/27/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Oct 27 15:00:32 CDT 2008 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 10/27/2008)
60 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 59 Memorandum &Order,, by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 08650000000001631919. (Entered: 10/27/2008)
65 Initial Notification and or Briefing Schedule from USCA for 60 Notice of Appeal filed by Jeremiah W. Nixon, Matt Blunt USCA Appeal Number: 08−3476;(DJO) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
67 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Carol E. Jackson: Parties present for Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on 10/27/2008; Arguments heard; Preliminary Injunction Granted in part and Denied in Part; (Court Reporter: Gary Bond.) (DJO) (DJO). (Entered: 10/29/2008)
***REMARK, Notice of appeal electronically retrieved by the USCA on 10/27/2008. (DLT) (Entered: 10/28/2008)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 12 of 34

10/28/2008 10/28/2008 10/28/2008 10/28/2008 10/28/2008
10/29/2008 10/30/2008
10/30/2008 10/30/2008 10/30/2008
10/30/2008
10/30/2008
10/31/2008
10/31/2008 10/31/2008 11/02/2008

61 MOTION to Stay re 59 Memorandum &Order,, by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
62 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 61 MOTION to Stay re 59 Memorandum &Order,, filed by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
63 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 59 Memorandum &Order,, by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. (Entered: 10/28/2008)
64 MOTION to Stay re 59 Memorandum &Order,, by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
66 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 64 MOTION to Stay re 59 Memorandum &Order,,, 61 MOTION to Stay re 59 Memorandum &Order,, filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
68 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint,,, by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 10/29/2008)
69 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon and Matt Blunt to stay the order entered on October 27, 2008, 61 and the motion of defendant Robert P. McCulloch to stay 64 are denied; Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/30/2008;(DJO) Modified on 10/30/2008 (DJO). (Entered: 10/30/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Thu Oct 30 08:31:38 CDT 2008 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
70 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 59 Memorandum &Order,, motion to modify by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
71 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 70 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 59 Memorandum &Order,, motion to modify filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
72 ORDER of USCA as to 63 Notice of Appeal filed by Robert P. McCulloch, 60 Notice of Appeal filed by Jeremiah W. Nixon, Matt Blunt USCA Appeal #: 08−3476; The Appellants' motion for stay has been considered by the Court and is hereby granted.(DJO) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
73 Initial Notification and or Briefing Schedule from USCA for 63 Notice of Appeal filed by Robert P. McCulloch, 60 Notice of Appeal filed by Jeremiah W. Nixon, Matt Blunt USCA Appeal Number: 08−3510 (Attachments: # 1 Briefing Schedule)(DJO) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
74 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 59 Memorandum &Order,, by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 08650000000001637159. Appeal Record due by 12/9/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Appellant's Form A, # 2 Statement of Issues on Appeal) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
75 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 70 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 59 Memorandum &Order,, motion to modify filed by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
76 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 70 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 59 Memorandum &Order,, motion to modify filed by Defendant Steven Schicker. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
77 AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendant all defendants Amendment to 1 Complaint,,, non−jury demand, , filed by John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Related document: 1 Complaint,,, filed by John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, Jane Doe I, Matt Blunt. (Attachments: # 1 Waiver of Service Jim Wells, # 2 Waiver of Service John Connelly, # 3 Waiver of Service James Corwin, # 4 Waiver of Service John Jordan, # 5 Waiver of Service James Keathley, # 6 Waiver of Service Jerry Lee, # 7 Waiver of Service Paul

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 13 of 34

11/03/2008 11/03/2008 11/03/2008 11/03/2008 11/03/2008 11/04/2008 11/04/2008 11/04/2008 11/04/2008 11/05/2008 11/06/2008
11/06/2008
11/06/2008
11/06/2008 11/07/2008 11/07/2008

Vescovo, # 8 Waiver of Service Daniel White)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/02/2008)
78 ORDER of USCA : Motion for stay filed by appellant, Robert McCulloch, has been considered by the court and is hereby granted. 63 60 74 USCA Appeal #: 08−3510 (KKS) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
79 MOTION for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms (John Doe III and John Doe IV) by Plaintiffs John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
80 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 79 MOTION for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms (John Doe III and John Doe IV) filed by Plaintiffs John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
81 RESPONSE to Motion re 70 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 59 Memorandum &Order,, motion to modify filed by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
86 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 59 Memorandum &Order,, by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. Filing fee $ 455.(KMS) (Entered: 11/05/2008)
82 ENTRY of Appearance by Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel for Defendant Lee Jerry. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
83 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Out of Time by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
84 REPLY to Response to Motion re 41 MOTION for More Definite Statement filed by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
85 Second MOTION for More Definite Statement by Defendants Jerry Lee, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
Receipt 4644003631 in the amount of $455.00 for NOTICE OF APPEAL/DOCKET FEE on behalf of ST. LOUIS COUNTY TREASURER (CCAM) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
87 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 86 Notice of Appeal. Notice of Appeal filed on 11/03/2008 by Defendant Robert P. McCulloch. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE. SUBMIT FORM A &B TO EIGHTH CIRCUIT CLERKS OFFICE(DLT) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
88 JUDGMENT of USCA: USCA Appeal #: No: 08−3476; No: 08−3510 ; Appellees have moved to dismiss these appeals, and appellants have filed responses stating they do not oppose dismissal. The motion to dismiss the cases is granted, and the appeals are hereby dismissed. The Court's mandate shall issue forthwith. (KKS) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
89 MANDATE of USCA In accordance with the judgment of 11/06/2008, and pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a), the formal mandate is hereby issued in the above−styled matters. 63 Notice of Appeal filed by Robert P. McCulloch, 86 Notice of Appeal filed by Robert P. McCulloch, 60 Notice of Appeal filed by Jeremiah W. Nixon, Matt Blunt USCA #:No: 08−3476; No: 08−3510(KKS) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Thu Nov 6 15:00:30 CST 2008 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
***REMARK,Document 86 notice of appeal was previously filed 63 . So this document will be considered null and void, along with 87 (DLT). (Entered: 11/07/2008)
90 ANSWER to 77 Amended Complaint,, by Thomas O'Connor.(Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 11/07/2008)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 14 of 34

11/07/2008 11/07/2008 11/10/2008 11/10/2008 11/10/2008 11/12/2008 11/12/2008
11/12/2008 11/12/2008 11/12/2008 11/12/2008 11/14/2008 11/14/2008 11/17/2008
11/19/2008 11/19/2008

91 MOTION to Dismiss Case and Memorandum in Support by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
92 MOTION to Withdraw 74 Notice of Appeal, by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
93 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Motion for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonym Out of Time by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
94 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 93 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Motion for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonym Out of Time filed by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
95 RESPONSE to Motion re 3 MOTION for Leave to TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYMS, 79 MOTION for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms (John Doe III and John Doe IV) filed by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
96 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 91 MOTION to Dismiss Case and Memorandum in Support by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
97 TRANSCRIPT proceedings of Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on October 27, 2008 before Judge Carol E. Jackson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Gary Bond, Telephone number 314−244−7980. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/3/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/15/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/10/2009. (KKS) (Main Document 97 replaced on 1/6/2012) (KKS). (Entered: 11/12/2008)
98 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
99 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 98 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
100 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 85 Second MOTION for More Definite Statement filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
101 ANSWER to Complaint by John C Connelly.(Gunn, Patrick) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
102 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Thomas O'Connor's motion for leave to withdraw his notice of appeal 92 is granted. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 11/14/08. (KKS) (Entered: 11/14/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Fri Nov 14 14:09:46 CST 2008 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 11/14/2008)
103 REPLY to Response to Motion re 3 MOTION for Leave to TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYMS, 79 MOTION for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms (John Doe III and John Doe IV) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/17/2008)
104 ENTRY of Appearance by Peter T. Maharry for Defendants Daniel L White, Paul C Vescovo, III. (Maharry, Peter) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
105 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 98 MOTION to Dismiss Case through Dec. 8, 2008, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/19/2008)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 15 of 34

11/20/2008 11/21/2008
11/21/2008 11/24/2008 11/24/2008
11/25/2008 11/25/2008 11/26/2008 11/26/2008
12/01/2008 12/01/2008 12/01/2008
12/01/2008
12/01/2008 12/01/2008 12/01/2008 12/01/2008

106 ANSWER to 77 Amended Complaint,, by Carl A. Kinnison, H. Morley Swingle, John Jordan.(Swingle, H.) (Entered: 11/20/2008)
107 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by James Corwin, James F Keathley James Corwin waiver signed on 11/3/2008, answer due 1/2/2009; James F Keathley waiver signed on 11/3/2008, answer due 1/2/2009. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/21/2008)
108 ENTRY of Appearance by Christopher J. Quinn for Defendants James Corwin, James F Keathley. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/21/2008)
109 MEMORANDUM request issuance of summons for Defendant Wells by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Summons)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/24/2008)
110 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 91 MOTION to Dismiss Case and Memorandum in Support through November 26, 2008, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/24/2008)
111 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Process Server: Kellerman Investigations (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
Summons Issued as to defendant Jim Wells; 1 @ 20 sent via email (KMS) Modified on 11/26/2008 to edit text (DJO). (Entered: 11/25/2008)
112 MOTION for Entry of Clerk's Default against Defendant Mark Fisher by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
113 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Memoradum in Opposition to Defendant Thomas O'Connor's Motion to Dismiss Outside of Time by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' response in opposition to Defendant O'Connor's motion to dismiss)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
114 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II John Jordan waiver signed on 11/3/2008, answer due 1/2/2009. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
115 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, John Doe III, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Daniel L White waiver signed on 11/3/2008, answer due 1/2/2009. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
116 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II Paul C Vescovo, III waiver signed on 11/3/2008, answer due 1/2/2009. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
117 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time until December 8, 2008, to file their response to the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Thomas O'Connor, Jeremiah W. Nixon and Matt Blunt [Doc. #96, 105] is granted. 96 105 Responses due by 12/8/2008. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 12/1/08. (KXS) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Dec 1 16:21:35 CST 2008 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
118 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for the Court to modify its order granting a preliminary injunction [Doc. #70] is denied. 70 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 12/1/08. (KXS) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Dec 1 16:24:38 CST 2008 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
119 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Thomas O'Conner's motion for an extension of time until November 25, 2008, to file an answer to plaintiffs' amended complaint [Doc. #68] is granted. 68 Signed by Honorable Carol E.

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 16 of 34

12/01/2008 12/01/2008 12/01/2008 12/01/2008 12/02/2008 12/02/2008 12/03/2008 12/03/2008 12/08/2008 12/08/2008 12/08/2008 12/08/2008 12/10/2008 12/10/2008 12/10/2008 12/12/2008 12/17/2008 12/31/2008 01/02/2009 01/02/2009

Jackson on 12/1/08. (KXS) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Dec 1 16:26:57 CST 2008 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
120 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Robert P. McCulloch to file a reply out of time [Doc. #83] is granted. 83 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 12/1/08. (KXS) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Dec 1 16:28:36 CST 2008 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
***REMARK − motion for clerk's entry of default #112 forwarded to Jim Woodward, Clerk of Court (KXS) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
121 ANSWER to 77 Amended Complaint,, by Steven Schicker.(Lorenz, Adam) (Entered: 12/02/2008)
122 RESPONSE in Opposition re 91 MOTION to Dismiss Case and Memorandum in Support filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/02/2008)
123 Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Defendant Mark Fisher (KXS) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Dec 3 09:14:49 CST 2008 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
124 RESPONSE in Opposition re 98 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
125 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Second Amended Complaint)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
126 MOTION for Entry of Clerk's Default against Defedant Kruse by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
127 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 125 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
128 Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Defendant Steven Kruse (KXS) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Dec 10 17:00:23 CST 2008 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
***REMARK − copy of clerk's entry of default mailed to Stephen Kruse, City of Bowling Green, 16 N. Church Street, Bowling Green, MO (KXS) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
129 REPLY to Response to Motion re 98 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants Matt Blunt, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 12/12/2008)
130 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Jane Doe I, John Doe III, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. Jim Wells served on 12/10/2008, answer due 12/30/2008. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/17/2008)
131 ANSWER to 77 Amended Complaint,, by Daniel L White, Paul C Vescovo, III.(Maharry, Peter) (Entered: 12/31/2008)
132 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants James Corwin, James F Keathley. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 01/02/2009)
133 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 132 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants James Corwin, James F Keathley. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered:

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 17 of 34

01/05/2009 01/05/2009
01/05/2009
01/06/2009 01/06/2009
01/06/2009 01/07/2009 01/08/2009 01/12/2009 01/12/2009 01/12/2009 01/12/2009 01/14/2009 01/15/2009 01/20/2009 01/20/2009 01/20/2009

01/02/2009)
134 MOTION for Entry of Clerk's Default against Defendant Jim Wells by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/05/2009)
135 MOTION for Costs associated with service against Defendant Jim Wells in his official capacity as sheriff of Pike county by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/05/2009)
136 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 135 MOTION for Costs associated with service against Defendant Jim Wells in his official capacity as sheriff of Pike county filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Invoice for Service, # 2 Exhibit Declaration in Support of Motion)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/05/2009)
***REMARK − motion for clerk's entry of default forwarded to clerk of court (KXS) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
137 Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Defendant Jim Wells IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Clerk's Default against Defendant Jim Wells [Doc. # 134 ] is GRANTED, and the default of this defendant is hereby entered. (KXS) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Tue Jan 6 16:44:18 CST 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
***REMARK − copy of clerk's order of default mailed to Jim Wells (KXS) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
138 ANSWER to Complaint Second Amended Complaint by John C Connelly.(Gunn, Patrick) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
139 MOTION to Dismiss Case or in the Alternative to Stay Case by Defendant Steven Schicker. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
140 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 139 MOTION to Dismiss Case or in the Alternative to Stay Case filed by Defendant Steven Schicker. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
141 MOTION to Dismiss Party Steven Schicker by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
142 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 132 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
143 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Jerry Lee, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 01/14/2009)
144 REPLY to Response to Motion re 132 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants James Corwin, James F Keathley. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 01/15/2009)
145 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 139 MOTION to Dismiss Case or in the Alternative to Stay Case filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/20/2009)
146 RESPONSE in Opposition re 143 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/20/2009)
147 MOTION to Substitute Party Nixon for Blunt as Governor of the State of Missouri by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/20/2009)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 18 of 34

01/20/2009 01/20/2009 01/20/2009 01/26/2009 01/26/2009 01/28/2009 01/28/2009 01/28/2009
01/28/2009
01/28/2009 02/02/2009 02/05/2009 02/10/2009

148 MOTION to Substitute Party Koster for Nixon as Attorney General of the State of Missouri by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/20/2009)
149 MOTION to Substitute Party Korte for Wells as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/20/2009)
150 NOTICE Amended Certificate of Service: by Plaintiff Jane Doe I re 146 Response in Opposition to Motion (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/20/2009)
151 MOTION for Relief Certify Question to Supreme Court of Missouri by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/26/2009)
152 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 151 MOTION for Relief Certify Question to Supreme Court of Missouri filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit MO Supreme Court order in Zeman v VF Factory Outlet)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/26/2009)
153 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint [Doc. # 125 ] is granted. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 01/28/2009. (DJO) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
154 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTATORY RELIEF AND NOMINAL DAMAGES against all defendants Amendment to 77 Amended Complaint filed by Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II; (DJO) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
155 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall make an entry in the docket record reflecting the dismissal without prejudice of the claims against defendant Steven Schicker, in accordance with the plaintiffs' memorandum for dismissal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). Each party shall bear its own costs. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendant Steven Schicker to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint or in the alternative to stay the action [Doc. # 139 ] is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 01/28/2009. (DJO) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
156 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to substitute Jeremiah W. Nixon for defendant Matt Blunt in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri [Doc. # 147 ] is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to substitute Chris Koster for defendant Jeremiah W. Nixon in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Missouri [Doc. # 148 ] is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to substitute Stephen Wayne Korte for defendant Jim Wells in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri [Doc. # 149 ] is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d); Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 01/28/2009;(DJO) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Jan 28 16:56:05 CST 2009 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
157 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 151 MOTION for Relief Certify Question to Supreme Court of Missouri filed by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 02/02/2009)
158 MOTION for Leave to Incorporate by Reference Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F Keathley, Chris Koster. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 02/05/2009)
159 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Chris Koster, Attorney General of Missouri, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Governor of Missouri, James Corwin, Chief of Police for Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, and Colonel James F. Keathley, Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, for leave to incorporate by reference their previously−filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs' and

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 19 of 34

02/10/2009 02/11/2009 02/11/2009 02/12/2009
02/18/2009 03/06/2009
03/06/2009 03/06/2009
03/06/2009 03/09/2009 03/09/2009 03/09/2009 03/09/2009

supporting memoranda as their motions to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint [Doc. # 158 ] is granted. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 02/10/2009. (DJO) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Tue Feb 10 16:12:48 CST 2009 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
160 MOTION for Leave to Incorporate by Reference Their Motions to Dismiss and Motions for More Definite Statement by Defendants Jerry Lee, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 02/11/2009)
161 REPLY to Response to Motion re 151 MOTION for Relief Certify Question to Supreme Court of Missouri filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 02/11/2009)
162 MOTION for Leave to incorporate by reference their memoranda in opposition to Defendants Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, and Colonel James F. Keathley's motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint as Plainitffs' opposition to the same Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 02/12/2009)
163 ANSWER to 154 Amended Complaint by Daniel L White, Paul C Vescovo, III.(Maharry, Peter) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
164 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to incorporate by reference their previously−filed memoranda in opposition to defendants Chris Koster, Attorney General of Missouri, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Governor of Missouri, James Corwin, Chief of Police for Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, and Colonel James F. Keathley's motions to dismiss plaintiffs' first amended complaint as plaintiffs' opposition to the same defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint [Doc. #162] is granted. 162 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 3/6/09. (KXS) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Fri Mar 6 11:37:22 CST 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
165 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch, Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri, and Colonel Jerry Lee, Chief of St. Louis County, Missouri, Police Department, for leave to incorporate by reference their previouslyfiled (1) motions to dismiss plaintiffs' first amended complaint and memoranda as their motions to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint and (2) motions for more definite statement with respect to plaintiffs' first amended complaint as their motions for more definite statement with respect to plaintiffs' second amended complaint [Doc. #160] is granted. 160 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 3/6/09. (KXS) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Fri Mar 6 11:39:26 CST 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
166 MOTION for Discovery in advance of the the time specified by Rule 26(d) by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
167 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 143 MOTION to Dismiss Case as incorporated by reference to stand as motion to dismiss second amended complaint (Doc. # 160, 165) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
168 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 166 MOTION for Discovery in advance of the the time specified by Rule 26(d) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
169 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 85 Second MOTION for More Definite Statement, 41 MOTION for More Definite Statement as incorporated by reference to stand as motion for more definite statement with respect to Plaintiffs' second

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 20 of 34

03/16/2009 03/17/2009 03/17/2009 03/20/2009 03/20/2009 03/23/2009 04/13/2009
04/13/2009 04/13/2009 04/13/2009
04/13/2009 06/29/2009

amended complaint (Doc. # 160, 165) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
170 RESPONSE to Motion re 166 MOTION for Discovery in advance of the the time specified by Rule 26(d) filed by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F Keathley, Chris Koster. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 03/16/2009)
171 RESPONSE to Motion re 166 MOTION for Discovery in advance of the the time specified by Rule 26(d) filed by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
172 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 166 MOTION for Discovery in advance of the the time specified by Rule 26(d) filed by Defendants Jerry Lee, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
173 ENTRY of Appearance by Michael G. Berry for Defendants Steven Kruse, Mark Fisher, Carl A. Kinnison, H. Morley Swingle, Stephen Wayne Korte, John Jordan. (Berry, Michael) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
174 MOTION for Leave to Answer Out of Time, and to set Aside Clerk's Default Judgments by Defendants Steven Kruse, Mark Fisher, Carl A. Kinnison, H. Morley Swingle, Stephen Wayne Korte, John Jordan. (Attachments: # 1 proposed answer)(Berry, Michael) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
175 REPLY to Response to Motion re 166 MOTION for Discovery in advance of the the time specified by Rule 26(d) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
176 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the unopposed motion of (1) defendants Mark Fisher, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Pike County, Missouri, Steven Kruse, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Bowling Green, Missouri, Police Department, Stephen Wayne Korte, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri, Carl A. Kinninson, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Police Department, H. Morley Swingle, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Cape Girardeau County, and John Jordan, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri, for leave to file answers out of time; and (2) defendants Fisher, Kruse, and Korte to set aside the default judgements entered against defendants Fisher, Kruse, and Korte's predecessor in office, Jim Wells, [Doc. #174] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk's entries of default [Doc. ##123, 128, 137] as to defendants Mark Fisher, Steven Kruse, and Stephen Wayne Korte's predecessor in office, Jim Wells, are vacated. 174 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 4/13/09. (KXS) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Apr 13 14:03:53 CDT 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
177 ANSWER to 154 Second Amended Complaint by Steven Kruse, Mark Fisher, Carl A. Kinnison, H. Morley Swingle, Stephen Wayne Korte, John Jordan.(KXS) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
178 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motions for leave to proceed under pseudonyms [Doc. ##3, 79] are granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendants Chris Koster, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Missouri, and Jeremiah Nixon, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri, for leave to file a response to plaintiffs' motion for leave to proceed under pseudonyms [Doc. #93] is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 4/13/09. (KXS) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Apr 13 14:12:07 CDT 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/29/2009)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 21 of 34

06/29/2009
07/02/2009 07/06/2009
07/06/2009 07/07/2009 07/08/2009 07/08/2009 07/08/2009
07/08/2009 07/09/2009 07/14/2009 07/15/2009 07/15/2009 07/16/2009

180 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A Declaration of Jane Doe I, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B Declaration of Jane Doe II, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C Declaration of John Doe IV, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D Missouri state court decision in State v Raynor)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
181 MOTION to Substitute Party Tim Fitch for Col. Jerry Lee in his official capacity as Police Chief of the St. Louis County Police Department by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
182 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to substitute Tim Fitch for defendant Colonel Jerry Lee in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the St. Louis County, Missouri, Police Department [Doc. # 181 ] is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). granting 181 Motion to Substitute Party. Tim Fitch rep by Lorena V. Merklin von Kaenel added. Col. Jerry Lee terminated Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/6/09. (KKS) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Jul 6 12:06:56 CDT 2009 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
183 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F Keathley, Chris Koster. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
184 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
185 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
186 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the unopposed motion of defendants Chris Koster, Attorney General of Missouri, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Governor of Missouri, James Corwin, Chief of Police for the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, and Colonel James F. Keathley, Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, for an extension of time until July 24, 2009, to file their response to respond to plaintiffs' second motion for preliminary injunction, and for an extension of time until August 7, 2009, for plaintiffs to file their reply memorandum in support of their second motion for a preliminary injunction [Doc. #183] is granted. 183 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/8/09. (KXS) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Jul 8 15:12:11 CDT 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
187 MOTION to Stay or for Abstention by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
188 ORDER granting 184 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply ; granting 185 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 07/14/2009. (CEJ) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
189 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 187 MOTION to Stay or for Abstention by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
190 ENTRY of Appearance by Carl W. Becker for Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Becker, Carl) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
191 ORDER granting 189 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 187 MOTION to Stay or for Abstention Responses due by 8/4/2009 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 07/16/2008. (CEJ) (Entered: 07/16/2009)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 22 of 34

07/16/2009 07/17/2009 07/20/2009 07/21/2009 07/21/2009 07/21/2009
07/21/2009 07/24/2009 07/29/2009 07/30/2009
07/30/2009 07/31/2009 07/31/2009 08/04/2009 08/04/2009 08/04/2009

192 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance related to Defendants' Motion for Abstention or Stay by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
193 ORDER granting 192 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 07/17/2009. (CEJ) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: copy of #193 docket text order mailed to Mark S. Fisher, Prosecuting Attorney, Pike County, MO; 115 West Main Street, Bowling Green, MO 63334; (see receipt) Mon Jul 20 12:14:29 CDT 2009 (O'Leary, Deborah) Modified on 7/20/2009 (DJO). (Entered: 07/20/2009)
194 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Colonel Jerry Lee for a more definitive statement [Doc. ## 41 , 85 ]are denied as moot.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/21/09. (KKS) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Tue Jul 21 16:34:06 CDT 2009 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
195 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' second motion for an extension of time to file a response to defendant Thomas O'Connor's motion to dismiss [Doc. # 110 ] is denied as moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an opposition to defendant Thomas OConnors motion to dismiss out of time [Doc. # 113 ] is denied as moot.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/21/09. (KKS) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Tue Jul 21 16:36:50 CDT 2009 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
196 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F Keathley, Chris Koster. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
197 MOTION for Leave to Incorporate by Reference As Their Response To Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/29/2009)
198 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Colonel Tim Fitch to incorporate by reference [Doc. # 197 ] is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a party's adoption or incorporation by reference of a pleading or other document filed by another party will not be permitted.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/30/09. (KKS) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Thu Jul 30 14:21:15 CDT 2009 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
199 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction Out of Time by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
200 RESPONSE in Opposition re 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
201 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Colonel Tim Fitch for leave to file their response to plaintiffs' second motion for preliminary injunction out of time [Doc. #199] is granted. 199 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 8/4/09. (KXS) (Entered: 08/04/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Tue Aug 4 10:29:36 CDT 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 08/04/2009)
202 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 187 MOTION to Stay or for Abstention filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/04/2009)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 23 of 34

08/07/2009 08/07/2009 08/07/2009 08/10/2009 08/12/2009
08/12/2009 08/12/2009
08/12/2009 08/14/2009 08/27/2009 08/27/2009 08/27/2009 09/01/2009 09/10/2009
09/10/2009 09/11/2009 09/14/2009

203 REPLY to Response to Motion re 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
204 MOTION for Leave to File Out of Time Defendant O'Connor's Memorandum in Opposition by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
205 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 179 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
206 MOTION to Substitute Party by Defendant Paul C Vescovo, III. (Maharry, Peter) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
207 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Thomas O'Connor for leave to file his response to plaintiffs' second motion for preliminary injunction out of time that "merely adopts the memorandum in opposition filed by defendants Koster, Nixon, Corwin, and Keathley" [Doc. #204] is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a party's adoption or incorporation by reference of a pleading or other document filed by another party will not be permitted. 204 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 8/12/09. (KXS) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Aug 12 16:17:12 CDT 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
208 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to substitute Robert Boydston for defendant Paul Vescovo in this action [Doc. #206] is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25 (d). 206 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 8/12/09. (KXS) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Aug 12 16:19:29 CDT 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
209 STIPULATION (Joint Stipulation of Plaintiffs and Defendants White and Boydston for Entry of Preliminary Injunction) by Defendants Daniel L White, Robert Boydston. (Maharry, Peter) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
210 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Memorandum in Support)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
211 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
212 STATEMENT of Material Facts re 211 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
213 REPLY to Response to Motion re 187 MOTION to Stay or for Abstention filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
214 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to certify a question of state law to the Missouri Supreme Court [Doc. #151] is denied. (see attached order). Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 9/10/09. (KMS) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Thu Sep 10 15:30:15 CDT 2009 (Scheele, Kara) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
215 MOTION to Substitute Party by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
216 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on plaintiffs second motion for a preliminary injunction is scheduled for Tuesday, October 6, 2009, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 14 North. Motion Hearing set for 10/6/2009 09:30 AM in Courtroom 14N before Honorable Carol E. Jackson.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 24 of 34

09/14/2009 09/16/2009 09/16/2009 09/16/2009 09/21/2009 09/21/2009 09/24/2009
09/25/2009
09/25/2009 10/07/2009 10/08/2009 10/13/2009 10/15/2009 10/19/2009

9/14/09. (KMS) (Entered: 09/14/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Sep 14 14:38:44 CDT 2009 (Scheele, Kara) (Entered: 09/14/2009)
217 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F. Keathley, Chris Koster. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
218 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to substitute Tim Walsh for defendant John C. Connolly in this action [Doc. #215] is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 9/16/09. (KXS) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Wed Sep 16 16:02:16 CDT 2009 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
219 MOTION to Continue the Time for Defendants' to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 09/21/2009)
220 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F. Keathley, Chris Koster, Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/21/2009)
221 MOTION for Protective Order with respect to St. Louis County plaintiffs and defendants by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II, Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Protective Order)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/24/2009)
222 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (See Doc 267 −VACATED only to the extent that it denies the plaintiffs' motion for costs.) : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Tim Fitch for the Court to abstain [Doc. # 187 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the proceedings in this action are stayed pending the resolution of state court proceedings in State of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor, No. SC90164. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions in this action are denied without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on plaintiffs' second motion for preliminary injunction scheduled for Tuesday, October 6, 2009, at 9:30 a.m. is canceled.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 9/25/09. (KKS) Modified on 7/23/2010 (KKS). (Entered: 09/25/2009)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Fri Sep 25 14:34:53 CDT 2009 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
223 MOTION for Reconsideration re 222 Memorandum &Order,, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/07/2009)
224 RESPONSE in Opposition re 223 MOTION for Reconsideration re 222 Memorandum &Order,, filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 10/08/2009)
225 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 223 MOTION for Reconsideration re 222 Memorandum &Order,, filed by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F. Keathley, Chris Koster. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
226 REPLY to Response to Motion re 223 MOTION for Reconsideration re 222 Memorandum &Order,, filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/15/2009)
227 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration [Doc. # 223 ] is denied. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/19/2009. (DJO) (Entered: 10/19/2009)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 25 of 34

10/19/2009 01/14/2010 02/03/2010 02/11/2010 02/22/2010 02/22/2010 05/17/2010 05/17/2010 05/26/2010
05/27/2010
05/27/2010 06/01/2010 06/01/2010
06/04/2010 06/04/2010 06/04/2010
06/04/2010

ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Mon Oct 19 12:30:34 CDT 2009 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
228 MEMORANDUM by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe III, John Doe IV, Jane Doe II, John Doe I, John Doe II. (Attachments: # 1 Missouri Supreme Court Opinion)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/14/2010)
229 MOTION to Lift Stay by Plaintiff Jane Doe I. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 02/03/2010)
230 RESPONSE to Motion re 229 MOTION to Lift Stay filed by Defendants Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, James F. Keathley, Chris Koster. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
231 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' unopposed motion to lift the stay entered on September 25, 2009 [Doc. # 229 ] is granted; Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 02/22/2010; (DJO) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 231. to non−registered party Mon Feb 22 15:01:25 CST 2010 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
232 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
233 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 232 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
234 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 232 MOTION to Dismiss Case of Defendants Robert McCulloch and Chief Tim Fitch by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Nelson, David) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
235 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time until June 4, 2010, to file their response to defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Tim Fitch's motion to dismiss [Doc. # 234 ] is granted. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 05/27/2010. (DJO) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 235. to non−registered attorney Thu May 27 16:08:11 CDT 2010 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
236 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot by Defendants James Corwin, James F. Keathley, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
237 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 236 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot filed by Defendants James Corwin, James F. Keathley, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Order in Doe v. Crane, Case No. 09−4220−CV−C−NKL)(Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 06/01/2010)
238 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Third Amended Complaint)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
239 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 238 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
240 MOTION for Reconsideration re 222 Memorandum &Order,, insofar as it denied motion (Doc. # 135), MOTION to Vacate 222 Memorandum &Order,, insofar as it denied motion (Doc. # 135) by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
241 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 240 MOTION for Reconsideration re 222 Memorandum &Order,, insofar as it denied motion (Doc. # 135) MOTION to Vacate 222 Memorandum &Order,, insofar as it denied motion (Doc. # 135) MOTION for Reconsideration re 222 Memorandum &Order,, insofar as it denied motion (Doc. # 135) MOTION to Vacate 222 Memorandum &Order,, insofar as it denied motion (Doc. # 135) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II,

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 26 of 34

06/04/2010 06/09/2010 06/10/2010 06/14/2010
06/14/2010 06/14/2010 06/15/2010 06/18/2010 06/18/2010 06/21/2010
06/21/2010 06/23/2010 06/23/2010 06/29/2010 06/30/2010

John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
242 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 232 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
243 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 236 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot, 237 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/09/2010)
244 MOTION to Continue Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 06/10/2010)
245 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the unopposed motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Tim Fitch for an extension of time until June 23, 2010, to file a reply in support of their motion to dismiss and a response to plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a third amended complaint [Doc. # 244 ] is granted. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 06/14/2010. (DJO) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 245. to non−registered attorney Mon Jun 14 12:46:42 CDT 2010 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
246 ORDER granting 243 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 06/14/2010. (CEJ) (Entered: 06/14/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 246. Mailed to party not electronically notified. Tue Jun 15 10:54:36 CDT 2010 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 06/15/2010)
247 MOTION to Substitute Party Ronald K. Replogle for Defendant James Keathley in his official capacity as superintedent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/18/2010)
248 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 236 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot through July 2, 2010 by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/18/2010)
249 ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' unopposed motion for an extension of time until July 2, 2010, to file their response to the motion to dismiss of defendants Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, and James Keathley [Doc. # 236 ] is granted. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 06/21/2010; (DJO) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 249. Mon Jun 21 13:51:34 CDT 2010 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
250 REPLY to Response to Motion re 232 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
251 RESPONSE in Opposition re 238 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
252 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 236 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot, 237 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 06/29/2010)
253 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs unopposed motion for an extension of time until July 9, 2010, to file a response to the motion to dismiss of defendants Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, and James Keathley [Doc. #252] is granted. ORDER granting 252 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Responses due by 7/9/2010 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 27 of 34

06/30/2010 06/30/2010 07/09/2010 07/15/2010 07/15/2010 07/15/2010 07/15/2010 07/15/2010 07/15/2010 07/15/2010
07/16/2010 07/19/2010 07/19/2010 07/19/2010

on 6/30/2010. (KMS) (Entered: 06/30/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 253. sent to parties not set up for electronic notification Wed Jun 30 10:45:10 CDT 2010 (Scheele, Kara) (Entered: 06/30/2010)
254 REPLY to Response to Motion re 238 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Main Document 254 replaced on 7/19/2010) (KKS). (Entered: 06/30/2010)
255 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 236 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
256 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to substitute Ronald K. Repolgle for defendant James E. Keathley in this action [Doc. #247] is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). James F. Keathley terminated Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/15/10. (KKS) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 256. mailed to party not electronically notified Thu Jul 15 12:31:20 CDT 2010 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
257 MOTION for Leave to To File Surreply Pursuant to Local Rule 7−4.01 by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
258 SURREPLY to Motion re 257 MOTION for Leave to To File Surreply Pursuant to Local Rule 7−4.01, 238 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
259 ENTRY of Appearance by Maureen C. Beekley for Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Beekley, Maureen) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
260 MOTION for Extension of: Time to File Reply by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Beekley, Maureen) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
261 MOTION for Leave to file substitute (corrected) reply memorandum in response to the opposition of Fitch &McCulloch to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File 3d Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Corrected/Substitute Reply Memorandum to Fitch and McColloch opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file amended complaint)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
262 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 257 MOTION for Leave to To File Surreply Pursuant to Local Rule 7−4.01 filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 07/16/2010)
263 ORDER ( Response to Court due by 7/26/2010.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' unopposed motion for an extension of time until July 26, 2010, to file their reply in support of their motion to dismiss [Doc. # 260 ] is granted.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/19/10. (KKS) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 263. mailed to party not electronically notified Mon Jul 19 11:17:59 CDT 2010 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
264 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Thomas O'Connor for leave to file a sur−reply in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint [Doc. # 257 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for leave to substitute their reply memorandum in support of their motion for leave to file an amended complaint [Doc. # 261 ] is granted.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 28 of 34

07/19/2010 07/21/2010 07/23/2010 07/23/2010
07/23/2010 07/26/2010 08/09/2010 08/09/2010 08/10/2010 09/15/2010 09/15/2010 09/15/2010 09/16/2010 09/17/2010 09/22/2010 09/23/2010

7/19/10. (KKS) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 264. mailed to party not electronically notified Mon Jul 19 14:41:46 CDT 2010 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
265 REPLY in Support of Motion re 238 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Substitute Memorandum Filed with Leave of Court) filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) Modified on 7/22/2010 (KMS). (Entered: 07/21/2010)
266 MOTION for Leave to File Surresponse in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Surresponse)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 07/23/2010)
267 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration [Doc. # 240 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Order entered on September 29, 2009 [Doc. # 222 ], is vacated only to the extent that it denies the plaintiffs' motion for costs. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for costs associated with service on Jim Wells [Doc. # 135 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Steven Wayne Korte, as Sheriff of Pike County, Missouri, is directed to pay plaintiffs $290.00 for the costs of service of summons and attorney's fees.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 7/23/10. (KKS) (Entered: 07/23/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 267. mailed to party not electronically notified Fri Jul 23 15:01:59 CDT 2010 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 07/23/2010)
268 REPLY to Response to Motion re 236 MOTION to Dismiss Case as Moot filed by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Beekley, Maureen) (Entered: 07/26/2010)
269 ORDER granting 266 Motion for Leave to Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 8/9/2010. (CEJ) (Entered: 08/09/2010)
270 SURRESPONSE to Motion re 238 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/09/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 269. Tue Aug 10 09:13:13 CDT 2010 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 08/10/2010)
271 Third MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
272 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
273 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 271 Third MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
274 ORDER granting 272 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 9/16/2010. (CEJ) (Entered: 09/16/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 274. Mailed to party not electronically notified. Fri Sep 17 09:39:18 CDT 2010 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
275 RESPONSE in Opposition re 271 Third MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Beekley, Maureen) (Entered: 09/22/2010)
276 MOTION for Leave to File Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Third Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 29 of 34

09/23/2010 09/27/2010 09/28/2010 09/29/2010 10/01/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/04/2010 10/27/2010
10/27/2010 10/27/2010
10/27/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/17/2010

von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 09/23/2010)
277 RESPONSE in Opposition re 271 Third MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 09/23/2010)
278 ORDER granting 276 Motion for Leave to Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 9/27/2010. (CEJ) (Entered: 09/27/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 276. Mailed to party not notified electronically Tue Sep 28 07:49:22 CDT 2010 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 09/28/2010)
279 REPLY to Response to Motion re 271 Third MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
280 MOTION for Leave to file sur−reply by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit State defendants' sur−reply, # 2 Exhibit A)(Beekley, Maureen) (Entered: 10/01/2010)
281 ORDER granting 280 Motion for Leave to Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/4/2010. (CEJ) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 281. copy mailed to counsel not electronically notified Mon Oct 4 11:33:20 CDT 2010 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
282 SURREPLY to 271 Third MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(KXS) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 282. copy mailed to counsel not electronically notified Mon Oct 4 11:36:26 CDT 2010 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
283 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Robert P. McCulloch and Tim Fitch to dismiss the second amended complaint [Doc. # 232 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendants Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, James Corwin, and Ronald K. Replogle to dismiss the second amended complaint [Doc. # 236 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a third amended complaint [Doc. # 238 ] is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' third motion for a preliminary injunction [Doc. # 271 ] is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/27/2010; (DJO) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 283. to non−registered attorney Wed Oct 27 17:11:13 CDT 2010 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
284 ORDER OF DISMISSAL; In accordance with the Memorandum and Order entered this same date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that this action is dismissed as to all defendants. Plaintiffs shall bear the costs; Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/27/2010; (DJO) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 284. to non−registered attorney Wed Oct 27 17:16:59 CDT 2010 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
285 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
286 MOTION for Bill of Costs by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
287 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A − Order in Doe v. Crane, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B − Nelson Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit Ex. C − Rothert Affidavit, # 4 Exhibit Ex. D − Order in Day v. RWCID, # 5 Exhibit Ex. E − Order in Phelps−Roper v. City of Manchester, Missouri)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/17/2010)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 30 of 34

11/17/2010 11/17/2010 11/23/2010 11/24/2010
11/24/2010 11/24/2010
11/24/2010 11/29/2010 11/30/2010 11/30/2010 11/30/2010 12/02/2010
12/02/2010 12/02/2010

288 MOTION to Alter Judgment by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
289 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
290 MOTION to Continue Time To Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Motion to Amend by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
291 MOTION for Relief Order the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees Have the Same Effect Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a Timely Motion Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, Ex Parte MOTION for Extension (in the alternate) of: Time in Which to File a Notice of Appeal by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
292 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Defendants Robert Boydston, Daniel L White. (Baker, David) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
293 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 291 MOTION for Relief Order the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees Have the Same Effect Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a Timely Motion Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 MOTION for Relief Order the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees Have the Same Effect Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a Timely Motion Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59Ex Parte MOTION for Extension (in the alternate) of: Time in Which to File a Notice of AppealEx Parte MOTION for Extension (in the alternate) of: Time in Which to File a Notice of Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
294 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
295 ORDER granting 290 Motion to Continue ; granting 294 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply ( Responses due by 12/15/2010) Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 11/29/2010. (CEJ) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
296 RESPONSE in Opposition re 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 286 MOTION for Bill of Costs, 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Defendant Thomas O'Connor. (Paperner, Howard) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 295. copy mailed to counsel not electronically notified Tue Nov 30 14:18:21 CST 2010 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
297 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment through and including December 22, 2010, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
298 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 297 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment through and including December 22, 2010, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 12/2/10. (KXS) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 298. copy mailed to counsel not electronically notified Thu Dec 2 11:28:14 CST 2010 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
299 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e) [Doc. #291] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' pending motion for attorneys' fees is construed as a timely motion under Rule 59 for

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 31 of 34

12/02/2010 12/03/2010 12/09/2010 12/15/2010
12/15/2010 12/16/2010 12/16/2010 12/17/2010
12/17/2010 01/07/2011 01/07/2011 01/10/2011 01/10/2011 01/10/2011

purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4). 291 291 Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 12/2/10. (KXS) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 299. copy mailed to counsel not electronically notified Thu Dec 2 16:56:56 CST 2010 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
300 ENTRY of Appearance by Grant R. Doty for Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Doty, Grant) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
301 SATISFACTION OF COSTS re 267 Memorandum &Order,, Regarding Defendant Steven Wayne Korte by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Doty, Grant) (Entered: 12/09/2010)
302 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 286 MOTION for Bill of Costs, 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Opinion in John Doe HM v. City of Creve Coeur, et al., 4:07−cv−00946 ERW)(Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
303 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 286 MOTION for Bill of Costs, 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Quinn, Christopher) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
304 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 286 MOTION for Bill of Costs, 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment by Plaintiff Jane Doe I. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 12/16/2010)
305 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 12/16/2010)
306 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 304 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 286 MOTION for Bill of Costs, 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment by Plaintiff Jane Doe I. (Rothert, Anthony) ; 305 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 12/17/10. (KXS) (Entered: 12/17/2010)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 306. copy mailed to counsel not electronically notified Fri Dec 17 15:14:05 CST 2010 (Spurgeon, Katherine) (Entered: 12/17/2010)
307 REPLY to Response to Motion re 288 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
308 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
309 Docket Text ORDER: Granting 308 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. ;. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 1/10/11. (KKS) (Entered: 01/10/2011)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 309. mailed to party not notified electronically Mon Jan 10 13:07:50 CST 2011 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 01/10/2011)
310 REPLY to Response to Motion re 285 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 286 MOTION for Bill of Costs filed by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. (KKS) (Entered: 01/10/2011)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 32 of 34

08/25/2011
08/25/2011 09/07/2011 09/07/2011 09/07/2011 09/07/2011 09/22/2011
09/23/2011
09/26/2011 09/27/2011 09/27/2011
09/28/2011

311 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees [Doc. #285] is granted in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to amend [Doc. #288] is granted. The Order of Dismissal entered on October 27, 2010, is amended as follows: Defendants shall bear the costs. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs are awarded attorneys fees in the amount of $22,320.00 and costs in the amount of $490.00. ORDER granting in part 285 Motion for Attorney Fees ; granting 288 Motion to Alter Judgment Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 8/25/2011. (KMS) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 311. sent to parties not set up for electronic notification Thu Aug 25 12:03:39 CDT 2011 (Scheele, Kara) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
312 Docket Text ORDER Re: 286 MOTION for Bill of Costs by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV ; ORDERED Denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 9/7/2011. (KMS) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 312. sent to parties not set up for electronic notification Wed Sep 7 07:55:46 CDT 2011 (Scheele, Kara) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
313 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiff John Doe III only ;attorney/firm Anthony E. Rothert, David C. Nelson, and Grant R. Doty by Plaintiff John Doe III. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
314 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 313 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiff John Doe III only ;attorney/firm Anthony E. Rothert, David C. Nelson, and Grant R. Doty filed by Plaintiff John Doe III. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
315 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 311 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, Order on Motion to Alter Judgment,,,, by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Attachments: # 1 Appellant's Form A, # 2 Attachment to Appellant's Form A, # 3 Appellee's Form B) Modified on 10/3/2011 to remove receipt information for filing fees, as transaction not complete. (Entered: 09/22/2011)
316 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 315 Notice of Appeal. Notice of Appeal filed on 09/22/2011 by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, and Ronald K. Repolgle. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE. SUBMIT FORM A &B TO EIGHTH CIRCUIT CLERKS OFFICE.(JMW) (Entered: 09/23/2011)
317 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 311 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, Order on Motion to Alter Judgment,,,, by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch. (Attachments: # 1 Original Filing Form Form A, # 2 Original Filing Form Form B) Modified on 9/29/2011 to remove receipt information for filing fees, as transaction not complete. (KCM). (Entered: 09/26/2011)
318 DECLARATION filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch re 317 Notice of Appeal, Certificate That No Transcript Will Be Ordered. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 09/27/2011)
319 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 311 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, Order on Motion to Alter Judgment,,,,. Notice of Appeal filed on 9/26/11. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE. SUBMIT FORM A &B TO EIGHTH CIRCUIT CLERKS OFFICE(BAK) (Entered: 09/27/2011)
320 Initial Notification and or Briefing Schedule from USCA for 317 Notice of Appeal, filed by Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch, 315 Notice of Appeal, filed by Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle, James Corwin USCA Appeal Number: 11−3112/11−3114 Method of Appendix due: 11/17/11 Transcript due: 11/7/11 Briefs due: 11/17/11 (Attachments: # 1 Briefing Schedule)(BAK)

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 33 of 34

09/29/2011 09/29/2011 10/04/2011 10/06/2011
10/07/2011
10/11/2011
10/11/2011 10/11/2011 10/12/2011 10/12/2011 10/12/2011
01/10/2012 01/27/2012 06/15/2012

(Entered: 09/29/2011)
321 Appeal Transmittal USCA Appeal #: 11−3112/11−3114 The following has been forwarded to USCA: 97 Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript(BAK) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
Receipt 4644024037 in the amount of $455.00 for NOTICE OF APPEAL/DOCKET FEE on behalf of TREASURER OF MISSOURI (CCAM) (Entered: 09/30/2011)
322 Appeal Transmittal Acknowledgment USCA Appeal #: 11−3112/11−3114 The following has been acknowledged as received by USCA: 97 Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript(KMS) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
323 NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL as to 284 Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), 311 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, Order on Motion to Alter Judgment,,,, 283 Memorandum &Order,, by Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 0865−2961749. (Attachments: # 1 Form A, # 2 Form A − Attachment, # 3 Form B) (Entered: 10/06/2011)
324 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 284 Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), 311 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, Order on Motion to Alter Judgment, 283 Memorandum &Order,,. Notice of Appeal filed on 10/6/11. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE. SUBMIT FORM A &B TO EIGHTH CIRCUIT CLERKS OFFICE(BAK) (Entered: 10/07/2011)
325 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the joint motion of plaintiffs' attorneys to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff John Doe III and for leave to file John Doe III's name, last−known address, and telephone phone number under seal [Doc. # 313 ] is granted. Attorney Anthony E. Rothert; Grant R. Doty and David C. Nelson terminated.. Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 10/11/11. (KKS) (Entered: 10/11/2011)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 325. mailed to party not notified electronically Tue Oct 11 12:44:26 CDT 2011 (Stamm, Katie) (Entered: 10/11/2011)
Receipt 4644024254 in the amount of $455.00 for NOTICE OF APPEAL/DOCKET FEE on behalf of St. Louis County Missouri (CCAM) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
326 SEALED DOCUMENT re 325 Order, Add and Terminate Attorneys,, (notification of John Doe III's name, last−known address, and last−known telephone number) by Plaintiff John Doe III. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
327 DECLARATION filed by Defendants Tim Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch re 317 Notice of Appeal, Certificate Regarding Appendix. (Merklin von Kaenel, Lorena) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
328 Initial Notification and or Briefing Schedule from USCA for 323 Notice of Cross Appeal, filed by John Doe I, Jane Doe II, John Doe II, John Doe IV, John Doe III, Jane Doe I USCA Appeal Number: 11−3112 Method of Appendix due: 12/1/11 Transcript due: 11/21/11 Briefs due: 12/1/11 (Attachments: # 1 Briefing Schedule)(BAK) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
329 Appeal Transmittal USCA Appeal #: 11−3112 The following has been forwarded to USCA: 97 Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript(BAK) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
330 Appeal Remark USCA Appeal #: 11−3112 preliminary injunction hearing transcript forwared to USCA(KXS) (Entered: 01/27/2012)
331 MOTION to Substitute Attorney/Law Firm ;attorney or firm Mary D. Delworth ;substituted for:Christopher J. Quinn by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster,

Case: 4:08-cv-1518 As of: 11/11/2014 03:44 PM CST 34 of 34

06/18/2012
06/18/2012 05/10/2013 05/31/2013 05/31/2013

Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle. (Delworth, Mary) (Entered: 06/15/2012)
332 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 331 MOTION to Substitute Attorney/Law Firm; attorney or firm Mary D. Delworth; substituted for: Christopher J. Quinn by Defendants James Corwin, Chris Koster, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Ronald K. Repolgle; ORDERED GRANTED; Signed by Honorable Carol E. Jackson on 06/18/2012; (DJO) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: . 332 non−electronic party Mon Jun 18 12:17:25 CDT 2012 (O'Leary, Deborah) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
333 OPINION from USCA: USCA Appeal #: 11−3112, 11−3114, 11−3213 We affirm in part and reverse in part. (Attachments: # 1 letter, # 2 letter)(KMS) (Entered: 05/10/2013)
334 MANDATE of USCA; In accordance with the opinion and judgment of 05/10/2013, and pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a), the formal mandate is hereby issued in the above−styled matter. USCA #:11−3112, 11−3114, 11−3213(KMS) (Entered: 05/31/2013)
ORDER RECEIPT: (see receipt) Docket No: 334. sent to parties not set up for electronic notification Fri May 31 10:13:17 CDT 2013 (Scheele, Kara) (Entered: 05/31/2013)