IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

_________________________________________

)

R.B., A.C., J.R., and T.B., by and

)

through their next friend, on their own behalf and )

on behalf of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Dr. MARY LIVERS, in her official capacity as )

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of

)

Juvenile Justice; NAMON REID III, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City )

Center for Youth; DARON BROWN, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for )

Youth; and R.VICKIE SHOECRAFT, in her

)

official capacity Director of Swanson Center

)

for Youth

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________ )

COMPLAINTCLASS ACTION
2:12--CV--1502

COMPLAINT 1. This is a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate the Plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. I & XIV. The named Plaintiffs are children confined at Bridge City Center for Youth (BCCY), Jetson Center for Youth (JCY), Swanson Center for Youth (SCY) and youth in the Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) custody but housed at various contracted secure facilities around the state, who have been denied access to the courts. Rather than facilitate their access to courts, as the Constitution demands, the Defendants have instead created a series of obstacles designed to impede access. Under the Defendants’ obstructionist policies, or lack of policies, an incarcerated
1

child is not provided access to courts and counsel and suffer extreme constitutional violations and in many cases exposure to greater harm, with no recourse. Further, Defendants have failed to take any steps to assure access to courts and counsel for youth in OJJ custody that are housed at contract facilities. Plaintiffs are not provided adequate access to legal mail or provided with an adequate mechanism to contact counsel. On behalf of themselves and all other current and future residents of any OJJ secure facility or facility contracting with OJJ for secure confinement, the named Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to respect the class members’ constitutional rights to access the courts and counsel including creation and implementation of policies and procedures which help Plaintiffs attain access to meaningful, adequate and effective legal advocacy.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This action arises under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983. 3. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343(3), 2201 and 2202. 4. Because at least one Defendant resides in this district and many of the events or inaction giving rise to this cause occurred in this district, venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b).
THE PARTIES 5. Plaintiff R.B. is a 19-year-old boy who is committed to the jurisdiction of OJJ. R.B is currently housed at SCY. He sues on his own behalf. R.B. has experienced
2

persistent constitutional violations inside of multiple OJJ facilities. R.B. is not provided with meaningful access to courts and counsel after his rights are violated.
6. Plaintiff A.C. is a 16-year-old boy who is committed to the jurisdiction of OJJ. A.C. is currently housed at BCCY. He sues by and through his next friend, Kelly Craddock1. A.C. has experienced persistent constitutional violations inside of OJJ facilities. A.C. is not provided with meaningful access to courts and counsel after his rights are violated.
7. Plaintiff J.R. is a 17-year-old boy who is committed to the jurisdiction of the OJJ. J.R. is currently housed at BCCY. He sues by and through his next friend, Dolly Robicheaux2. J.R. has experienced persistent constitutional violations inside of OJJ facilities. J.R. is not provided with meaningful access to courts and counsel after his rights are violated.
8. Plaintiff T.B. is a 16-year-old girl who is committed to the jurisdiction of OJJ. T.B. is currently housed at an OJJ contracted facility. She sues by and through her next friend, Tracie Breaux3. T.B. has experienced persistent constitutional violations inside of OJJ contract facilities. T.B. is not provided with meaningful access to courts and counsel after her rights are violated.
9. Defendant Mary Livers is sued in her official capacity as the Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice. In that capacity, Defendant Livers is responsible for the management, oversight, control and policy-making at BCCY, JCY, and SCY, including the administration and day-to-day operations of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice. Additionally, Defendant Livers is responsible for contracting with
1 Please See Exhibit A, Declaration of Kelly Craddock. 2 Please See Exhibit B, Declaration of Dolly Robicheaux. 3 Please See Exhibit C, Declaration of Tracie Breaux.
3

facilities as an exercise of her statutory responsibility to provide placement for youth in OJJ legal custody.
10. Defendant Namon Reid III is sued in his official capacity as the Director of BCCY. In that capacity, Defendant Reid is responsible for the administration and dayto-day operations of BCCY.
11. Defendant Daron Brown is sued in his official capacity as the Director of JCY. In that capacity, Defendant Brown is responsible for the administration and day-today operations of Jetson Center for Youth.
12. Defendant R.Vickie Shoecraft is sued in her official capacity as Director of SCY. In that capacity, Defendant Shoecraft is responsible for the administration and day-to-day operations of SCY.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 13. Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action on their own behalf and on behalf of all children who are or who will in the future be incarcerated at a confinement facility under the care, custody, and control of the State of Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice. 14. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. More than 450 children are in OJJ secure custody. Children are committed to OJJ custody for varying amounts of time, and the population changes on a regular basis. The class also includes hundreds of future members whose names are not known. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 15. There are questions of law and fact common to all class members. The questions of law and fact common to all class members include but are not limited to the constitutionality of Defendants’ practice and policy of denying meaningful access to
4

courts and counsel. The common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
16. Because the policies and practices challenged in this Complaint apply with equal force to the named Plaintiffs and other members of the class, the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the class in general. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
17. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. They possess a strong personal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit, and are represented by experienced counsel with particular expertise with class action litigation in federal court. Counsel has the legal knowledge and the resources to fairly and adequately represent the interests of all class members in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4).
18. Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class in that Defendants’ policy and practice of interfering with Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to access the courts has affected all class members equally. Accordingly, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, and final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate to the class as a whole. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGFUL CONDUCT 19. The OJJ is responsible for the care and control of all Louisiana youth adjudicated delinquent and placed in their custody for the purposes of rehabilitation and treatment. These youth consist of boys and girls between 10-21 years of age. 20. BCCY, JCY, and SCY house boys exclusively but OJJ contracts with other facilities around the state to house female and other male youth.
5

21. Upon commitment to OJJ custody, Defendant has sole custody of Plaintiffs and is responsible for their care, treatment and placement. La. R.S. 15:901(D)(1).
22. BCCY, JCY, and SCY are under the supervision and control of OJJ and are responsible for execution of policies created by OJJ.
23. A high percentage of youth in the custody of Defendants suffer from severe mental illness and low level educational functioning and are in need of outside advocates to assure that their civil and educational rights are protected. National and Louisiana studies of juvenile justice involved youth demonstrate that these youth have complex behavioral needs. As many as 67% of incarcerated male juvenile offenders and 81% of the females have been found to have diagnosable mental illnesses in addition to their delinquency issues. Shufelt, J.S., and Cocozza, J.C. (2006), Youth with Mental Health Disorders in the Juvenile Justice System: Results from a Multi-state, Multi-system Prevalence Study.
24. On or around September 1, 2000, Defendant OJJ (formerly a subdivision of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections), entered into a consent agreement with private plaintiffs and the United States Department of Justice addressing OJJ’s constitutional violations including issues related to access to courts and counsel for youth housed in secure care.
25. Since that time, Defendants have neglected their responsibility as sole custodian of Plaintiffs, which is to provide them with meaningful access to courts and counsel.
6

26. Specifically, OJJ has made no effort to ensure that youth housed in OJJ contract facilities have access to courts and counsel. Plaintiffs are at the mercy of these contract facilities in order to receive access to family, courts and counsel. These youth have no access to counsel to address constitutional violations that occur inside these facilities.
27. Plaintiffs who receive adult charges while inside Defendants’ facilities have no access to counsel in order to protect their rights. Plaintiffs are transported from the juvenile facility to an adult jail and throughout this process they incriminate themselves without meaningful access to an attorney. Also, Plaintiffs are denied an opportunity to access counsel to confer about possible constitutional violations which occur as a result of the underlying facts related to the allegation of criminal misconduct.
28. Defendant OJJ contracts with numerous secure custody facilities all over the state of Louisiana and has failed to provide any mechanisms, policies, or procedures to assure Plaintiffs housed in these facilities have meaningful access to courts and counsel.
29. Plaintiffs are not provided with confidential communications with counsel and are routinely intimidated and discouraged from contacting counsel to address violence, abuse, and constitutional violations that occur inside the facilities.
30. Currently, Defendants are failing to provide Plaintiffs with their constitutionally required meaningful access to counsel and courts.
31. Defendants have failed to address an increase in violence inside their facilities. Because of increased violence, access to counsel is of increased importance for youth in Defendants’ custody.
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32. Defendants have blocked and stifled Plaintiffs’ access to meaningful counsel by intimidating Plaintiffs into not contacting counsel; refusing visits with counsel; canceling scheduled visits with counsel; refusing phone calls to attorneys after Plaintiffs have experienced crisis and trauma inside of Defendants’ facilities; failing to create effective ways for Plaintiffs to contact counsel; refusing to schedule visits with counsel in a manner timely enough to address the constitutional violations; failing to have any method to assure that Plaintiffs in contract facilities have access to court and counsel; and failing to operate a functioning administrative grievance procedure.
33. During the month of October 2011, Plaintiffs had no access to counsel because the phones used to contact attorneys and advocates at the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana (JJPL) were broken inside of BCCY. During this period, Plaintiffs were in various situations that put their constitutional rights in peril, including receiving adult charges for alleged criminal violations, violence victimization, and other constitutional concerns.
34. Staff at BCCY routinely inform Plaintiffs that “their attorney is too busy to talk with them,” which is baseless and meant to intimidate or discourage contact with Plaintiffs’ legal advocates.
35. Defendants routinely return legal mail with adequate postage that is properly addressed to Plaintiffs, thus disallowing access to legal advocacy.
36. Defendants routinely cancel scheduled attorney visits, limit access to clients in serious jeopardy of victimization or violence, and create administrative obstacles that severely delay visitation with Plaintiffs who are in urgent need of legal advocacy.
8

37. Youth housed in contract facilities have no access to counsel and are treated as pretrial detainees as opposed to youth who are judicially mandated to receive rehabilitative care. Defendants have not taken any steps to assure these youth have access to court and counsel even though youth in Defendant OJJ custody might be housed at a contract facility for months at a time.
38. Youth that receive adult charges while in the custody of OJJ inside of a juvenile secure care facility are not provided access to counsel at times when their rights are in extreme peril based on allegations of criminal law violations.
39. Plaintiffs housed at JCY were refused access to counsel during the months of November and January because scheduled visits were consistently canceled. Additionally, legal visits were requested and every date was allegedly inconvenient; therefore, Plaintiffs could not meet with attorneys or advocates for months.
40. Plaintiffs are intimidated by staff and feel unsafe to talk on the phone when they are allowed access to phones, thereby increasing the importance of legal visits with counsel and advocates.
41. On or around late April 2012, Defendant OJJ informed their probation staff not to speak with legal advocates and attorneys from the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana regarding Plaintiffs. Defendant OJJ’s actions further obstruct Plaintiffs’ ability to access the courts.
42. Currently, JJPL is the only entity providing access to legal counsel to youth in OJJ custody for civil matter and conditions of confinement grievances. However, JJPL’s access to these youth is made arbitrary and inadequate as a result of Defendant’s obstructionist practices.
9

43. Plaintiff J.R. experienced physical abuse at BCCY. He was in an altercation with a staff member and sustained multiple injuries, yet he was not treated for those injuries until he was arrested and transferred to Jefferson Parish Jail. J.R.’s family was not informed of his injuries or of his transfer. J.R. wished to contact legal counsel but was unable to do so because the phones were inaccessible. Additionally, Defendant told J.R. not to call The Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana [JJPL] to “rat on BCCY” and told him that he was the problem. When J.R. has been able to contact his attorney, he has had his confidential calls monitored by staff.
44. J.R. was alleged to have committed adult criminal violations while inside Defendant’s facility and did not have access to counsel when his constitutional rights were in jeopardy.
45. Plaintiff A.C. was placed on lockdown and was not given enough food; he had also been given rotten or undercooked food. A.C. was not permitted to attend school while on lockdown and could not contact counsel for recourse because the phones at BCCY were inaccessible during part of October, 2011. A.C. cannot speak freely when he speaks with legal advocates out of fear of retaliation from facility staff that listens to his calls.
46. Plaintiff R.B. was denied access to counsel while at JCY. R.B. was placed on suicide watch as a form of punishment. R.B. was denied an opportunity to communicate with counsel regarding these actions. R.B. was housed in an OJJ contract facility for more than a month while in OJJ custody. He desired to speak with an attorney during this time but there was no way for him to access an attorney. Additionally, R.B. was alleged to have committed adult criminal violations while inside the facility and did
10

not have access to counsel when he was transported to adult jail and his constitutional rights were in jeopardy.
47. Currently, T.B. is housed in an OJJ contract facility. Prior to her current placement, T.B. was housed at a Parish detention facility which contracts with OJJ to house youth. T.B. suffered consistent harassment while being housed in the Parish Detention Facility but had no access to legal counsel. OJJ has no policy in place to assure meaningful and adequate access to counsel but rather defers to the practices of the contract facilities.
48. Plaintiffs are intimidated by staff and Plaintiffs feel unsafe to talk on the phone when they are allowed access to phones, thereby increasing the importance of legal visits with counsel and advocates.
EXHAUSTION 49. Plaintiffs have exhausted all available administrative remedies. 50. Plaintiffs have continuously filed administrative grievances but Defendants have not responded to grievances or followed their procedures regarding the provision of a ruling and appeals of rulings.
CAUSES OF ACTION I.
51. By refusing to allow Plaintiffs meaningful access to counsel, Defendants are violating the Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to meaningful, effective, and adequate access to the courts. U.S. CONST. amend. I & XIV.
52. The violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights may be remedied pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
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II. 53. By refusing to allow Plaintiffs to meet with their counsel, Defendants are violating the Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 54. By failing to implement policies and procedures at all facilities that house youth in OJJ custody that will protect Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to meaningful, adequate, and effective counsel, Defendants’ violated Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. U.S. CONST. amend. I & XIV. 55. The violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights may be remedied pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court grant the following relief:
1. Certify a class consisting of all youth in Office of Juvenile Justice custody that are or will be held in OJJ secure custody inside Bridge City Center for Youth, Jetson Center for Youth, Swanson Center for Youth or any other secure custody facility in Louisiana.
2. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ current policy and practice, or lack thereof, with respect to attorney visitation, legal mail, and access to courts violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to adequate, meaningful, and effective access to the courts.
3. Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the Defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them to allow youth to meet with counsel of their choice by:
12

a. honoring written requests for legal visits, whether made by youth or by parents, without unnecessary delay;
b. assisting youth in making written requests for legal assistance; c. posting a notice in each housing unit at all facilities housing
youth in OJJ secure custody that informs youth of their right to speak with a lawyer to seek assistance; d. establishing policies and procedures for all Plaintiffs to ensure that these youth are provided with meaningful and effective access to court and counsel; e. refraining from harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise retaliating against children who ask to or do speak with lawyers; and f. protecting Plaintiffs from any harassment, intimidation, punishment, or other retaliation as a result of their participation in this lawsuit. 4. Enter a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to install and maintain in working condition telephones in every housing unit which houses youth in OJJ secure custody so that children can confidentially contact attorneys by phone. 5. Award Plaintiffs reasonable costs and attorney fees. 6. Grant Plaintiffs such other relief as the Court deems necessary and just.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John S. Williams JOHN S. WILLIAMS, Esq. (T.A.) Louisiana Bar No. 32240 Juvenile Justice Project of LA 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70113 williams@jswlawoffices.com (504) 486-0300
William E. Rittenberg, Esq. Rittenberg, Samuel & Phillips, LLC 715 Girod Street, Suite 100 New Orleans, Louisiana, 70130 Telephone: (504) 524-5555 Ext. 18 Fax: (504) 524-0912 rittenberg@rittenbergsamuel.com
Carol Kolinchak, Esq. Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 522-5437 x234 fax: (504) 522-5430 ckolinchak@jjpl.org
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 13th day of June 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of court by using the CM/ECF system. A copy of this document as well as
a notice of electronic filing has been personally served on all non-CM/ECF participant
Defendants:
Namon Reid 3225 River Road Bridge City, LA 70094
R. Vickie Shoecraft 4701 South Grand St., Monroe, LA 71202
14

Daron Brown 15200 Old Scenic Highway (at US Hwy 61), Baton Rouge, LA 70874 Dr. Mary Livers 7919 Independence Blvd. State Police Bldg., 1st Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70806
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams, Esq. (T.A.) Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Attorney for Plaintiffs Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300 Fax: (504) 754-7671
15

 
 Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4 Filed 06/14/12 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

)

R.B., A.C., J.R., and T.B., by and through

)

their next friend, on their own behalf and

)

on behalf of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Dr. MARY LIVERS, in her official capacity as )

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of

)

Juvenile Justice; NAMON REID III, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City )

Center for Youth; DARON BROWN, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for )

Youth; and R.VICKIE SHOECRAFT, in her

)

official capacity Director of Swanson Center

)

for Youth

)

)

Defendants.

)

-------------------------------- )

CLASS ACTION 2:12-CV--1502

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Pursuant to Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs hereby move this Court to enter an immediate preliminary injunction to protect their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to adequate, meaningful and effective access to the courts and counsel. The named Plaintiffs seek preliminary relief on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated children. Without immediate intervention by this Court, Defendants will continue to deny the class members' constitutional rights by blocking their access to counsel, not providing any meaningful and effective way to attain counsel, intimidating and harassing children with valid claims, and retaliating against any child who complains about abuse or any other

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4 Filed 06/14/12 Page 2 of 4
unconstitutional condition of confinement. Attached to this motion is a memorandum of law and supporting evidence. I
For the reasons stated above and in Plaintiffs' memorandum, Plaintiffs respectfully ask that the Court enter a preliminary injunction requiring the Defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them to allow youth to meet with counsel of their choice by:
a. honoring written requests for legal visits, whether made by youth or by parents, without unnecessary delay;
b. assisting youth in making written requests for legal assistance; c. posting a notice in each housing unit at all facilities housing youth in
OJJ secure custody that informs youth of their right to speak with a lawyer to seek assistance; d. establishing policies and procedures for all Plaintiffs to ensure that they are provided with meaningful and effective access to court and counsel; e. refraining from harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise retaliating against children who ask to or do speak with lawyers; and f. protecting named Plaintiffs from any harassment, intimidation, punishment, or other retaliation as a result of their participation in this lawsuit.
I The exhibits submitted with this motion and memorandum in support are sufficient to carry Plaintiffs' burden under Rule 65. Nonetheless, if the Court believes an evidentiary hearing would be useful, Plaintiffs reserve the right to call the named representatives and other witnesses to testify in support of their motion. If a hearing is set, Plaintiffs would also request that their counsel be permitted to present oral argument.
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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4 Filed 06/14/12 Page 3 of 4
In light of the strength of their claims and "the strong public interest involved,"
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court waive the bond requirement set forth in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(c). Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th
Cir. 1995). Finally, Plaintiffs seek compensation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for reasonable attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of this motion. See Deerfield Med.
Center v. City ofDeerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 339 (5th Cir. 1981 ).
Respectfully Submitted,
Is/ John S. Williams
JohnS. Williams (T.A.) Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@j swlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300
William E. Rittenberg, Esq. Rittenberg, Samuel & Phillips, LLC 715 Girod Street, Suite 100 New Orleans, Louisiana, 70130 Telephone: (504) 524-5555 Ext. 18 Fax: (504) 524-0912 rittenberg@rittenbergsamuel.com
Carol Kolinchak, Esq. Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 522-5437 x234 fax: (504) 522-5430 ckolinchak@jjpl.org
3

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4 Filed 06/14/12 Page 4 of 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 14th day of June 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of court by using the CM/ECF system. A copy of this document as well as a notice of electronic filing has been personally served on all non-CM/ECF participant Defendants: Namon Reid 3225 River Road Bridge City, LA 70094 R. Vickie Shoecraft 4701 South Grand St. Monroe, LA 71202 Daron Brown 15200 Old Scenic Highway (at US Hwy 61), Baton Rouge, LA 70874 Mary Livers 7919 Independence Blvd. State Police Bldg., 1st Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70806
Is/ John S. Williams
John S. Williams, Esq. Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Attorney for Plaintiffs Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@j swlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300 Fax: (504) 754-7671
4

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-1 Filed 06/14/12 Page 1 of 18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

_________________________________________

)

R.B., A.C., J.R., and T.B., by and through

)

their next friend, on their own behalf and

)

on behalf of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Dr. MARY LIVERS, in her official capacity as )

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of

)

Juvenile Justice; NAMON REID III, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City )

Center for Youth; DARON BROWN, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for )

Youth; and R.VICKIE SHOECRAFT, in her

)

official capacity Director of Swanson Center

)

for Youth

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________ )

CLASS ACTION 2:12-CV–1502

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION

Under the Defendants’ unconstitutional policies, staff members and administration have

created an environment where youth are abused by staff and other youth and have no ability to

retain meaningful counsel or advocacy of their constitutional rights. The United States

Constitution and the Constitution of Louisiana impose affirmative obligations to ensure that

individuals in confinement have meaningful and effective access to courts. Because “[c]hildren,

by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves”, the State must

exercise special care to ensure that their rights are protected. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265

(1984). Defendants have not only failed to assist the class members in accessing the courts but

1

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-1 Filed 06/14/12 Page 2 of 18
have actively stood in their way by barring meaningful access to counsel, ignoring attorneyclient confidentiality, and intimidating class members into not filing administrative grievances or contacting attorneys when their rights have been violated. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek immediate injunctive relief to protect their rights to access the courts and counsel. They sue on their own behalf and on behalf of all current and future youth in Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) secure custody at Bridge City Center for Youth (BCCY), Jetson Center for Youth (JCY), Swanson Center for Youth (SCY), or any other parish or state facility that contracts with OJJ for the housing of youth adjudicated delinquent and in secure custody.
STATEMENT OF FACTS The Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer a denial of their right to counsel and their right of access to the courts. This denial of their constitutional rights poses a substantial threat of irreparable injury if it is not remedied. The Plaintiffs have experienced violations of their rights to adequate medical care, adequate food and education and have suffered physical and emotional abuse. Due to the denial of their right to counsel they have been unable to seek assistance in remedying these violations. Plaintiffs need to access courts and counsel, and subsequent denials and obstacles, have been actual and not speculative. i. Defendant Bridge City Center for Youth, Swanson Center for Youth and Bridge
City Center for Youth J.R. was experiencing physical abuse during October 2011 a t the hands of BCCY staff and needed access to legal counsel. During this time, J.R. had an altercation with a staff member and sustained multiple injuries, yet he was not given any medical attention and no r eport was filed regarding the injuries. In fact, J.R. received no medical treatment until he was transferred to Jefferson Parish Jail and booked with Battery on a Correctional Officer. J.R.’s family was never informed of his injuries or his subsequent arrest and transfer. BCCY did not investigate the
2

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-1 Filed 06/14/12 Page 3 of 18
incident for which J.R. was arrested; yet this was the second physical altercation between J.R. and this staff member. Throughout this time, the phones in the dormitories were inaccessible for about eight days. J.R. wished to contact the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana (JJPL) regarding the physical abuse he was experiencing, but he was unable to do so because the phones were not accessible. Furthermore, Defendant spoke to J.R. about calling JJPL and informed J.R. that he “is the problem” and he shouldn’t “rat on BCCY.” J.R. has also reported that staff at BCCY listen to the legal calls made on the pay phones and reports them to the director of the facility, thus violating attorney-client confidentiality.1
Similarly, A.C. at BCCY was denied access to counsel while enduring physical abuse from Juvenile Justice Specialists. A.C. was placed on a dministrative segregation and was not permitted to attend school during “lockdown.” He also reports that he was not given enough food and the food he was given was rotten or undercooked, making it unfit for consumption. A.C. reports that the bathrooms at BCCY are moldy and unsanitary and additionally, he is not given sufficient time to bathe properly. Yet, A.C. was unable to seek legal counsel or legal recourse for these circumstances because the phones at BCCY were not accessible for the first part of October 2011.2
In an article published on April 28, 2012 in The Times Picayune, the paper states, “Fights between youth were frequent last year in the state facilities, with data showing the problems are centered at BCCY. There were more than 550 "youth on youth" assaults or "youth on staff" assaults at BCCY in the first ten months of the year. The fights between youth accounted for 54 percent of such incidents statewide, though the center houses just one-third of the youngsters in secure care.” Laura Maggi, Bridge City Youth Center, Once a Model Correctional Facility, far
1 Please See Exhibit A, Affidavit of J.R. 2 Please See Exhibit B, Affidavit of A.C.
3

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-1 Filed 06/14/12 Page 4 of 18
from it now, The Times Picayune, April 28, 2012. Notwithstanding this level of violence, between July 2010 a nd July 2011, t here were only eleven Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) grievances filed according to BCCY. Public Records Request to Office of Juvenile Justice, October 2011.
Upon information and belief, The Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana (JJPL) is the only entity in the state that provides Plaintiffs with any access to legal counsel regarding various civil and juvenile delinquency legal matters. A large majority of Plaintiffs do not have access to the indigent defense counsel that they were appointed at their delinquency proceeding. Notwithstanding, JJPL attorneys and legal advocates have faced significant obstacles in attempting to provide legal advocacy or visit youth at BCCY, JCY, and SCY. Defendants have cancelled visits requested by Plaintiffs; rescheduled visits without informing counsel at JJPL therefore causing the youth to decline the visit after waiting for hours; failing to provide confidential communications; failing to provide access to legal mail in a timely manner; and many other acts that have made the access Plaintiffs have less than adequate and none effective. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs complications with accessing counsel at JJPL, Defendants have failed to take affirmative steps to assure adequate, effective, and meaningful access, as required by state and federal law.
Plaintiffs housed at SCY have suffered abuse while experiencing a systematic denial of access to counsel. When youths are placed on “ lockdown,” they are not permitted to use the phones and thus cannot report abuses. However, routinely the phones are inoperable and there is no a ccess to counsel. Plaintiffs suffer the lack of effective and meaningful access to legal mail because of the excessive delays. Defendant routinely informs JJPL that a youth is not housed at SCY creating further delays to Plaintiffs access because youth will in fact be housed
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at the facility. Defendant OJJ has moved the “Winter Unit” to SCY and this unit is used as a “lockdown” unit. While on “lockdown” Plaintiffs have no access to courts or counsel and are housed inside a cell for a majority of the day. SCY fails to take affirmative steps to assure that youth have access to courts and counsel and further when counsel is available they stifle communication by Plaintiffs, making their access less than meaningful, adequate or effective.
While at JCY, R.B. was continuously denied access to counsel. R.B. needed to contact counsel because he was placed on suicide watch as a form of punishment. R.B. was brutalized by staff while being housed at JCY but was denied access to contact an attorney to report the violence perpetrated against him. R .B. also needed to contact legal counsel because he was afraid of possible retaliation by staff upon reporting these violations.3 Many times when JJPL requests a visit with youth inside of JCY, Defendants ignore the request and do not respond, therefore stifling Plaintiffs access. Again, there are no ot her options for legal advocacy or consultation so the stifling of access to any source of legal assistance equates to an outright denial. ii. Office of Juvenile Justice
When a child is adjudicated delinquent and placed in OJJ custody, Defendant Livers has “sole custody of the child . . . [and] shall determine the child’s placement, care, and treatment, and the expenditures to be made therefor.” La. R.S. 15:901. OJJ is responsible for contracting with facilities around the state to house female youth and other male youth not housed at BCCY, SCY, or JCY. T he statutory and constitutional obligations owed to youth housed at OJJ contracted facilities is no less than that owed to youth housed in OJJ operated facilities. Defendant Livers must provide effective and meaningful access to counsel for all youth in the sole custody and control of OJJ regardless of where they are housed.
3 Please See Exhibit C, Affidavit of R.B.
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Plaintiff T.B. is housed at a facility that contracts with OJJ. T .B. is routinely treated poorly by staff. S he is routinely threatened by staff with the filing of additional criminal/delinquency charges. T.B. is afraid to ask to speak with an attorney because every other youth is denied when they ask. T.B. is afraid to even have a real conversation with her probation officer and close family members because any call she is allowed to make is conducted on speakerphone with a staff member in the room. T.B. indicated that she was happy to visit with someone regarding her rights and that she would not call for assistance, out of fear, but “please come back and help” her.4 Defendant Livers actions and lack of action has created an environment where youth housed in OJJ contracted facilities have no possibility to access the courts and counsel. I. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE
MERITS. To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, an applicant must establish the following:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest. Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 445 ( 5th Cir. 2009) (citing Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F .3d 396, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2006)). Where, as here, the Plaintiffs have carried their burden on all four requirements, a preliminary injunction is appropriate. To determine the likelihood of success on the merits, courts look to “standards provided by the substantive law.” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 596 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1990)). In the case at hand, standards can be found in
4 Please See Exhibit D, Affidavit of T.B.
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leading Supreme Court cases. The Court has repeatedly held that incarcerated individuals have the constitutionally protected right to access the courts. See generally Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)) (incarcerated persons have “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts”). That access must be meaningful. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. For access to be meaningful, adequate resources must be provided to prisoners. Id. at 356. Where, as here, adequate resources are not provided, prisoners’ constitutional rights are violated.
A. Incarcerated Persons Are Being Denied Their Constitutional Right to Access to the Courts.
“It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Patel v. Santana, 348 F . App’x. 974, 975 n.3 ( quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977)); accord Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350; see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 122 (2006) (6-3 decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution guarantees that prisoners, like all citizens, have a reasonably adequate opportunity to [access the courts] . . . because access to the courts is a fundamental right.”).
The right to access the courts arises from two constitutional provisions. The First Amendment establishes the right to petition the government to redress grievances. U.S. Const. amend. I. See also Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1986). Second, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause establishes the right to due process of law – which includes access to the courts. See Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying citizens access to the courts violates the “procedural norms embodied in the Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment.) See also Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 291 ( 7th Cir. 2004)
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(quoting Jackson, 789 F.2d at 308) (“[D]eprivation of the prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts [is] in violation of the First Amendment and substantive due process.”)
This right was originally recognized in the context of direct appeals and habeas petitions. However, the Supreme Court has “extended [the] universe of relevant claims . . . t o ‘civil rights actions’ – i.e., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 t o vindicate ‘basic constitutional rights.’” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)). This extension reflects the Court’s understanding that “civil rights actions are of fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme because they directly protect our most valued rights.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The case at hand deals with a basic constitutional right: the right to access the courts. This right is not limited to adults; it applies with equal force to children. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 ( 1967) (“[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone”); see also Frazier v. Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1297 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (same); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 n.8 ( 2000) (same); John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 233 ( 6th Cir. 1992) (holding that juveniles have the constitutional right to access courts). Thus it is clear that children have a constitutionally protected right to access courts.
i. Access to Courts Must Be Adequate, Effective and Meaningful. Access to the courts is “one of, perhaps the fundamental constitutional right.” Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973). Thus, to pass a constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court has held that the State must ensure that “access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.” Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 761 ( 5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822).
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In order to provide “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access, the Supreme Court has “consistently required States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners [have] meaningful access to the courts.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824 ( emphasis added). Thus, the State must do m ore than stand aside; it mu st provide the “tools” that incarcerated people need to “challenge the conditions of their confinement.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355; see also, e.g., Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828 ( holding that the State must provide incarcerated people with “adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law”); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U .S. 483, 488-90 (1969) (holding that prisons cannot prohibit consultations with “jailhouse lawyers” and “writ writers” in the absence of a “reasonable alternative to assist inmates.”). The State’s “affirmative obligation” does not take any particular form, but rather guarantees “the conferral of a capability – the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356.
B. Access to Counsel is the Only Means of Ensuring that Incarcerated Children Have Meaningful and Effective Access to the Courts.
Although the State may confer the “capability” to access the courts on adults in a variety of ways, thereby fulfilling its constitutional obligations, see id., “special concerns . . . are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 ( 1979) (“[A]lthough children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability . . . .”). The “touchstone” of the analysis in any access-to-courts claim is whether the proposed mechanism – here, access to counsel – is necessary to guarantee the plaintiff meaningful access to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, 825. This analysis requires a realistic assessment of the experience and intelligence of the
9

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incarcerated persons. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 ( 2004) (stating that the inmate’s “education or sophistication” should be taken into account). Here, the incarcerated persons are children, some as young as ten years old. Many are dealing with illiteracy and mental or emotional disabilities.
“Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.” Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 (1984), supra. Accordingly, many approaches that work for adults are not adequate for children. The Supreme Court has recognized that children are particularly helpless in legal matters:
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy . . . . H e cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. . . . [ A child] needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, crush him. Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U .S. 596, 599 -600 (1948); see also Fare, 442 U .S. at 725, supra (“[S]pecial concerns . . . are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved.”); Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that even the most sophisticated child needs adult guidance in legal matters). In this case, while a prison law library may provide adults meaningful access to the courts, see Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826, this approach is not workable for children. See John. L, 969 F.2d 228, 234 (“merely providing [children] with access to a law library. . . would fail to assure meaningful access.”). See also Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F . Supp 1130, 115 8 (S.D. Miss., 1977) (“[W]ithout assistance [fifteen to twenty-year-old youth] could not make effective use of legal materials.”).
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For the same reasons, children’s constitutional rights to access the courts cannot be entrusted to other youth, “no matter how sophisticated.” Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (noting that even the most sophisticated child needs adult guidance in legal matters). In contrast to the “old hands” who served as “writ writers” in Johnson, the Supreme Court has held that:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, . . . is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights . . . . He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses . . . . Without some adult protection . . . , a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54. Given the relative immaturity of children, the only means of ensuring “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access to the courts is to permit them to consult with an attorney. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822; see also John. L., 969 F.2d at 230. In order to insure that incarcerated children have adequate, effective, and meaningful access to courts, “the State must provide the juveniles with access to an attorney.” John L., 969 F.2d at 230. In the words of the Supreme Court, a “juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law [and] to make skilled inquiry into the facts . . . . The child requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.” Gault, 387 U .S. at 36 (internal quotations, citations, and footnotes omitted). Defendants have actively impeded access to counsel. As noted above, A.C. and J.R. were denied telephone access to contact representation for two weeks in October 2011. T he Defendants have also denied legal visitation access to the children on m ultiple occasions. Furthermore, legal mail is not delivered to the incarcerated children in a t imely matter. This denial of legal visit requests by Defendants Brown and OJJ amounts to a consistent denial of access to legal counsel.
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Based on the foregoing case law, it is clear that where, as here, incarcerated children are denied access to their attorneys, they are denied their constitutional right to “effective and meaningful” access to the courts.
C. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights to Access the Courts Include the Right to be Free From Harassment and Other Retaliation.
Meaningful access to the courts is not possible for prisoners who fear retaliation. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly held that “prison officials may not retaliate against or harass an inmate because of the inmate’s exercise of his right of access to the courts,” nor may officials harass or “retaliat[e] against inmates who complain of prison conditions or official misconduct.” Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Threats are sufficient on their own to interfere with the children’s “fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
Plaintiffs in this case have been threatened. As a result, they live in a culture that promotes silence over action. For instance, as noted above, J.R. has had his calls to counsel monitored by facility staff persons. Based on such monitoring, Defendant went so far as to blame J.R. for his denial of access to a phone. Defendant told J.R. that he “shouldn’t continue to rat on BCCY.” Furthermore, staff persons stand inches from the door during attorney visitations, which not only violates attorney/client confidentiality, but also creates an atmosphere of fear during meetings with counsel. Also, Defendants’ staff stands next to Plaintiffs or place calls on speaker phone when Plaintiffs make phone calls, therefore destroying any expectation of confidentiality. This atmosphere, in turn, creates a chilling effect on speech whereby Plaintiffs are intimidated from seeking redress.
Because of the foregoing reasons- lack of access to counsel, denial of legal mail, failure of Defendants to meaningful and effective system to access the courts, and the atmosphere of
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harassment and retaliation created by Defendants’ staff- a substantial likelihood of success on the merits has been established.
II. PRELIMINARY RELIEF IS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE HARM. This Court must act immediately to stop the ongoing, irreparable harm to Plaintiffs that is
caused by denying them access to counsel. Any delay in access to counsel, and thus courts, causes per se irreparable harm in three ways: (1) the delay of justice itself; (2) the destruction of evidence; and (3) the creation of a chilling effect, which prevents future reports of misconduct.
First, the Plaintiff’s claims in this case provide a classic illustration of the oft-quoted maxim “[j]ustice delayed is justice denied.” Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F .2d 806, 815 ( 5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Stelly v. C.I.R., 761 F .2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985)); accord Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union v. Cont’l Sprinkler Co., 967 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1992) (“denying justice by delay”). The right to access the courts, “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” is grounded in the First Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I. Even a temporary deprivation of one’s fundamental constitutional rights is per se irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held “the loss of First Amendment freedoms of even minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a preliminary injunction.” Palmer ex. Rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Deerfield Med. Ctr. V. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that violation of constitutional rights alone constitutes irreparable harm)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, for these children, each additional day during which access to counsel is denied is another day of enduring abuse.
Second, preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm of a more tangible nature: the destruction of evidence. When a child is abused in state custody, anything
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short of immediate access to counsel undermines the child’s ability “to petition the Government for redress” of his injuries: bruises fade, as do the memories of potential witnesses; conditions of confinement claims become moot upon r elease; and deadlines pass unmet. For example, A.C., R.B., and J.R., all suffered verbal and physical abuse and were denied access to counsel in a timely manner. As time passes, not only does physical evidence of abuse fade, the clarity of memories diminishes as well. Considering the vulnerability of youth, a meaningful opportunity to access the courts, absent of retaliation and intimidation, is impossible.
Third, the constant threat of retaliation at Defendants’ facilitites has a chilling effect on the willingness of children to report abuse. The latitude afforded prison officials in the control and discipline of inmates “does not encompass conduct that infringes on an inmate’s substantive constitutional rights,” Woods v. Smith, 60 F .3d 1161, 1166 ( 5th Cir. 1995) (citing Franco v. Kelly, 854 F .2d at 590 ( 2d Cir. 1988). Monitoring attorney phone calls and visitations, in addition to explicit discouragement of attorney access by authoritative figures, create a culture of fear and silence, infringing on constitutional rights. “The law of this [5th] [C]ircuit is clearly established . . . t hat a prison official may not . . . ha rass an inmate for exercising the right of access to the courts, or for complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s misconduct.” Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164.
When a child thinks he will not gain prompt access to counsel, he is less likely to reveal poor conditions or details of abuse. Thus, the preliminary injunction would ease the substantial threats of per se irreparable harm outlined above.
III. THE THREATENED INJURY TO PLAINTIFFS OUTWEIGHS ANY HARM THAT THE INJUNCTION MIGHT CAUSE DEFENDANTS.
The third element that must be established in order to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction is that the threatened injury to the plaintiffs must outweigh any damage
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that the injunction might cause the defendants. There is no question that this burden is met in this case. The relief requested by the Plaintiffs- access to attorneys- would impose little or no burden on the Defendants. While prison officials in the control and discipline of inmates do ha ve a strong interest in maintaining safety and order, this interest “does not encompass conduct that infringes on a n inmate’s substantive constitutional rights”. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166; see also State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 757 (La. 1992) (“Subject to the legitimate requirements of prison and security, prison inmates retain their fundamental constitutional rights and protections.”). In contrast, the relief would be an enormously important first step in remedying grave constitutional and physical harm inflicted upon i ncarcerated children. See Jackson, 789 F.2d at 310 ( stating that the right to “access to the courts is protected by the First Amendment…That right has also been found in the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of procedural and substantive due process”). Thus, the threatened injury to the plaintiffs indeed outweighs any possible harm to the Defendants if the preliminary injunction is granted.
IV. PRELIMINARY RELIEF WOULD NOT DISSERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST Mandating access to counsel does not disserve the public interest. See generally Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1997) (access to courts serves constitutional interests). In fact, humane treatment of prisoners serves the public interest.
[The] public interest survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabilitation. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U .S. 1, 37 ( 1978). Prisoners are especially vulnerable to maltreatment, and thus the public has an increased interest in ensuring their protection. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, ( 1976) (“[I]t is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself”) (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490 (1926)). This is even
15

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more essential when dealing with incarcerated children who are more vulnerable and less able to care for themselves. See Bellotti, 443 U .S. at 635 ( noting the vulnerability of children). Thus, not only does the requested preliminary relief not disserve the public interest, it in fact, serves it. Based on t he well documented culture of violence inside these facilities the public interest is served by restoring constitutional safeguards for all youth in Defendants’ custody.
a. The Requirement That a Bond Be Posted Should Be Waived The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court exercise its discretion to waive the bond requirement customarily associated with the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Several courts have declined to require plaintiffs to post bond in connection with temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. See Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (approving waiver of bond given strength of case and “the strong public interest involved”); Bookfriends, Inc. v. Talt, 223 F. Supp. 2d 932, 953 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (declining to require bond based on f inding that defendants would suffer no m onetary damage in the event they were wrongfully enjoined); Sluiter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 979 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Due to the strong likelihood of Plaintiffs’ success on the merits and their demonstrated financial inability, the Court finds it would be improper to require any security in this matter.”). In this case, several factors counsel in favor of waiver, including the strength of the claims, the Plaintiffs’ indigency, the strong public interest involved, and the fact that a preliminary injunction would not require the defendants to incur any financial burdens.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants must be ordered to create policies and observe the
constitutional rights of Plaintiffs rather than impede Plaintiffs’ access to counsel. See Bounds,
430 U.S. at 824 (requiring “States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners
meaningful access to the courts”). Plaintiffs are not only entitled to meet with the attorney of
their choice, they are also entitled to be advised of their right to access the courts, to have
confidential conversations with their attorney or their representative, and be heard on matters
relating to their disposition of delinquency and the conditions of their confinement. See Id.
Finally, Plaintiffs are entitled to an order protecting them from harassment, intimidation, and
other retaliation by Defendants and their officials, agents, and employees.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that their motion for an immediate preliminary injunction
be granted and that the bond requirement be waived.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John S. Williams JOHN S. WILLIAMS (T.A.) Louisiana Bar No. 32240 Juvenile Justice Project of LA 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com (504) 486-0300
William E. Rittenberg, Esq. Rittenberg, Samuel & Phillips, LLC 715 Girod Street, Suite 100 New Orleans, Louisiana, 70130 Telephone: (504) 524-5555 Ext. 18 Fax: (504) 524-0912 rittenberg@rittenbergsamuel.com
Carol Kolinchak, Esq. Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard
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New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 522-5437 x234 fax: (504) 522-5430 ckolinchak@jjpl.org
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on 14th day of July 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of court by using the CM/ECF system. A copy of this document as well as a notice of
electronic filing has been personally served on all non-CM/ECF participant Defendants:
Namon Reid 3225 River Road Bridge City, LA 70094
R. Vickie Shoecraft 4701 South Grand St., Monroe, LA 71202
Daron Brown 15200 Old Scenic Highway (at US Hwy 61), Baton Rouge, LA 70874
Mary Livers 7919 Independence Blvd. State Police Bldg., 1st Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70806
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams, Esq. Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Attorney for Plaintiffs Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300 Fax: (504) 754-7671
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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-2 Filed 06/14/12 Page 1 of 3
EXHIBIT A

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-2 Filed 06/14/12 Page 2 of 3
Affidavit of J.R., A Minor
State of Louisiana Parish of Jefferson
In the State of Louisiana, Parish of Jefferson, I, J.R., being duly sworn, depose that I am a youth housed at Bridge City Center for Youth, and that I have had difficulty accessing legal mail from the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana (JJPL). I further depose that the lack of timely access to legal mail keeps me from being able to access the attorneys at JJPL or any other attorneys. In add ition, I further depose the following statements of conditions at Bridge City Center for Youth:
I contacted the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana to complain about not receiving any mail, not having any clothes, and being isolated all day. In school I do work that is on an elementary school level that does not challenge me but rather keeps me occupied. On Wednesday, August 31, 2011, I asked a Bridge City staff person to take me out of the dorm I was in because I felt that a fight would happen between me and another youth. The staff member laughed at me and did not transfer me to another dorm. Later on that day, I was in my dormitory, and the youth that I told the staff member about, punched me in the head, exposing cartilage in my ear. I went to the infirmary, and was sent back to my dorm, with exposed cartilage, getting no medical treatment. I did not get any medical attention until Thursday, September 1, 20 11 at 10:00 AM. The doctor came to the facility and saw me, giving me 3 stitches in my ear. I never went to the hospital for treatment. I am afraid to stay at Bridge City because of all the violence.
I have been told repeatedly not to contact the attorneys at JJPL by Bridge City staff and to stop being a "rat." When I am able to make calls to attorneys, my calls are not confidential and are listened to by Bridge City staff. I know that I have the right to feel safe in the facility, and that my rights are being violated. My access to an attorney to discuss the issue~ inside of Bridge City is limited.
I swear (or affirm) that the information I have provided is true and complete.

I, John S. Williams, a Notary Public of the State aforesaid, hereby certify that J.:R. personally known to me to be the affiant in the foregoing affidavit, personally appeared before me this day and having been by me duly sworn deposes and says that the facts set forth in the above affidavit are true and correct.
Witness my hand and official seal this the d 1+\.- day of ("(\q(c h

Notary Public

John S. Williams
Notary Public Bar No. 32270, 10 No. 92049
State of Louisiana My commission is for life

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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-2 Filed 06/14/12 Page 3 of 3
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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-3 Filed 06/14/12 Page 1 of 3
EXHIBIT B

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-3 Filed 06/14/12 Page 2 of 3

Affidavit of R.B., A Minor

State of Louisiana Parish of Ouachita

In the State of Louisiana, Parish of Ouachita, I, R.B., being dul y sworn, depose that I am a youth housed at Jetson Center for Youth, and that I have had difficulty accessing legal mail from the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana (JJPL) or any other attorneys. I further depose that the lack of timely access to legal mail keeps me from being able to access the attorneys at JJPL or any other attorneys. In addition, I further depose the fo llowing statements of conditions at Bridge City Center for Youth:

I am currently housed in Swanson Center for Youth but I was formerly housed at Jetson Center for Youth. While in Jetson, I was routinely denied legal visits from attorneys and advocates at JJPL. I have been denied access to counseli ng services and place on suicide watch as a fo rm of punishment. I have been retaliated against by facil ity staff for requesting a legal visit. During my time on lockdown I had no access to phones and I was not able to contact anyone, including legal advocates. There have been many occasions that I needed to speak with an attorney or legal advocate but I have not been able to access attorneys at JJPL or any other attorneys.

I swear (or affirm) that the information I have provided is true and complete.
.Ul

I, John Williams, a Notary Public of the State aforesaid, hereby certify that R.B. personally known to me to be the affiant in the foregoing affidavit, personally appeared before me this day and having been by me duly sworn deposes and says that the facts set forth in the above affidavit are true and correct.

Blb \ Witness my hand and official seal this the \

day of A~(\

John s.Williams
Notary Public
Bar No. 32270, 10 No. 92049
State of Louisiana .
My commission is for life

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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-3 Filed 06/14/12 Page 3 of 3

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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-4 Filed 06/14/12 Page 1 of 3
EXHIBIT C

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-4 Filed 06/14/12 Page 2 of 3

Affidavit of A.C., A Minor
State of Louisiana Parish of J efferson
In the State of Louisiana, Parish of Jefferson, I, A. C., being duly sworn, depose that I am a youth housed at Bridge City Center for Youth, and that I have had difficulty accessing legal mail from the Juvenile Justice Proj ect of Louisiana (JJPL) or any other attorneys. I further depose that the lack of timely access to legal mail keeps me fro m being able to access the attorneys at JJPL or any other attorneys. In addition, I further depose the fo llowing statements of conditions at Bridge City Center for Youth :
I have been mistreated by staff and I do not get to see the doctor when I have serious medical concerns. I was diagnosed with asthma before going to Bridge City and never got my medication. The Bridge C ity staff says that I complain too much, and that is why I do not get to see the doctor when I ask. I have been placed on lockdown and not provided edible food, allowed to go to school or allowed to contact legal advocates at JJPL.
A Bridge City staff person routinely threatens me by saying that I was going to be kicked out of Bridge City and sent to a facility more than 150 miles away from my fam ily. The staff person also threatened that she would push my release date back because I talked to the attorneys at JJPL. I fil ed an administrative grievance because I was not being treated right, but my grievance was not acted on.
On September 13,20 11 at about 7:45 a.m., I was attacked by another youth. I was punched in the nose, and had bruises on my nose and under my left eye. I went to the infirmary for my injuries, but the nurse only took pictures for a report. The nurse never treated my injuries. Bridge City staff did nothing about this fight even though it was in clear view of a camera. Since the fi ght, I have problems breathing through my nose. I am depressed at Bridge C ity because of the youth on yo uth and staff on youth abuse that I have to go through everyday inside Bridge City Center for Youth. I have been in need of legal advocacy but I have not been able to access attorneys at JJPL or any other attorneys.
I swear (or affirm) that the info rmation I have provided is true and complete.

I, John Williams, a Notary Public of the State aforesaid, hereby certify that A.C. personally known to me to be the affiant in the foregoing affidavit, personally appeared before me this day and having been by me duly sworn deposes and says that the facts set forth in the above affidavit are true and correct.

tb Witness my hand and official seal this the Ql

day of m arGb __, Ol Dl~..

John S. Williams Notary Public
Bar No. 32270, ID No. 92049 State of Louisiana
My commission is for life

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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-4 Filed 06/14/12 Page 3 of 3

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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-5 Filed 06/14/12 Page 1 of 3
EXHIBIT D

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-5 Filed 06/14/12 Page 2 of 3

Affidavit of T.B., A Minor

State of Louisiana Parish of Red River Parish

In the State of Louisiana, Parish of Red River, I, T.B. , being duly sworn, depose that I am a youth housed at Ware Youth Center, and that I have had difficulty accessing legal advocacy from the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana (JJPL) or any other attorneys. I further depose that I am fearful of talking to attorneys because of the lack of confidentiality and the possibility of retaliation. In addition, I further depose the following statements regarding the lack of meaningful and effective access to legal counsel and legal advocacy:

I have no way to contact legal advocacy at Ware unless I am contacted by legal advocates and .__..attorneys at the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana. Additionally, after I was determined to be I · ~ a delinquent youth and placed in Office of Juven ile Justice custody I was housed in "St:-J~ L'\~~ Parish Detention Center. During this time, I was sexually harassed by guards and forced to sleep in undergarments and tank tops. During this time, I had no way to contact an attorney or legal advocate from anywhere. All my calls at Ware youth Center are made on speakerphone with a Ware Youth Facility Staff member present. I have routinely wanted to speak with a lawyer regarding the lack of confidentiality and my treatment at St. James Parish Detention Center but due to the lack of confidentiality and access to legal counsel m y ability to receive legal assistance
is limited.

I swear (o~ffirm) that the information I have provided is true and complete .
d/3

I, John Williams, a Notary Public of the State aforesaid, hereby certify that T.B. personally known to me to be the affiant in the foregoing affidavit, personally appeared before me this day and having been by me duly sworn deposes and says that the facts set forth in the above affidavit

are true and correct.

IJ. \ pr~ fHh Witness my hand and official seal this the j

day of

John S. Williams Notary Public
Bar No. 32270, ID No. 92049 State of Louisiana
My commission is for life

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Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 4-5 Filed 06/14/12 Page 3 of 3

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 Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19 Filed 07/19/12 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

_________________________________________

)

R.B., A.C., J.R., and T.B., by and through

)

their next friend, on their own behalf and

)

on behalf of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Dr. MARY LIVERS, in her official capacity as )

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of

)

Juvenile Justice; NAMON REID III, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City )

Center for Youth; DARON BROWN, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for )

Youth; and R.VICKIE SHOECRAFT, in her

)

official capacity Director of Swanson Center

)

for Youth

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________ )

CLASS ACTION
2:12-CV--1502 Section J Division 2 Judge Carl J. Barbier Magistrate Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION Plaintiffs hereby move this court for certification of the class proposed herein pursuant to Feral Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and Local Civil Rule 23.1. For the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification, this action satisfies the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a). In addition, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are satisfied because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19 Filed 07/19/12 Page 2 of 3
For the reasons set forth herein and in the accompanying Memorandum in Support of the
Motion for Class certification, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter an Order providing that this
action shall be maintained as a class action.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams (T.A.) Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300
Carol Kolinchak, Esq. Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 522-5437 x234 fax: (504) 522-5430 ckolinchak@jjpl.org
Michael H. Grey, Jr. Louisiana Bar No. 33868 Families and Friend of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Children 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70112 mgrey@fflic.org (504) 522-5437 x248

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19 Filed 07/19/12 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 19th day of July 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of court by using the CM/ECF system. A copy of this document as well as a notice of
electronic filing has been personally served on all non-CM/ECF participant Defendants:
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams, Esq. Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Attorney for Plaintiffs Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300 Fax: (504) 754-7671

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

_________________________________________

)

R.B., A.C., J.R., and T.B., by and through

)

their next friend, on their own behalf and

)

on behalf of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Dr. MARY LIVERS, in her official capacity as )

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of

)

Juvenile Justice; NAMON REID III, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City )

Center for Youth; DARON BROWN, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for )

Youth; and R.VICKIE SHOECRAFT, in her

)

official capacity Director of Swanson Center

)

for Youth

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________ )

CLASS ACTION
2:12-CV--1502 Section J Division 2 Judge Carl J. Barbier Magistrate Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

TABLE OF AUTHORITY

Cases

Page(s)

Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)…………………...4,11

Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (834 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1987)…………………………4 French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985)…………………….4

Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuona, 713 F.2d 984 (3rd Cir. 1983)…………………………………………4 Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980)……………………..4

1

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 2 of 15
Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (U.S. App. D.C. 1978)………4 Finney v. Arkansas Bd. Of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974)………………………………………….4 Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)………………………………..4 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)………………………………...4 Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2001)………….4 Gates v. Cook, 234 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2000)………………………...4 Logory v. County of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135 (M.D. Pa 2011)……………………………………...4 M.D. ex rel. Stuckenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012)….…4,7,8,9 McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F. 3d 545 (5th Cir. 2003)…5 Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000)….…5 Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999)….…..5,10 Jack v. American Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974)…..5 Andre H. v. Amback, 104 F.R.D. 606 (S.D.N.Y.1985)………….…...6 Skinner v. Uphoff, 209 F.R.D. 484 (D. Wyo. 2002)………………….6 Holland v. Steele, 92 F.R.D. 58 (N.D. Ga 1981)……………………..6 Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011)……………….7,8,12 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) ………………..9 Shaw v. Toshiba America Information Systems, 91 F.Supp. 2d 942 (E.D. Tex. 2000)………………………………….9 Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)…………….10 Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982)………………………10 United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980)…….10
2

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 3 of 15
Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1980)………………………….10 Rodriquez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2008)………………….11 Rules 42 USC 1983…………………………………………………………..3 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23………………………………...…3-14 Local Rule 23.1………………………………………………………...3
I. INTRODUCTION This is a civil action brought under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the violation of civil and constitutional rights of children, who are now or in the future will be in Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice secure custody. The children confined at Bridge City Center for Youth (BCCY), Jetson Center for Youth (JCY), Swanson Center for Youth (SCY), and youth in Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) custody but housed at various contract secure facilities around the state are being denied meaningful access to counsel and the courts. This action addresses violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Louisiana Children’s Code, and other applicable federal and state laws. Plaintiffs request that the Court certify this proceeding as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the purposes of declaratory and injunctive relief as to all the claims made in this action, Plaintiffs request certification of a class of all children who are now, or in the future will be subject to Office of Juvenile Justice custody and secure confinement. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to grant class certification as the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and Local Rule 23.1 have been satisfied.
3

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 4 of 15
II. Proposed Class Definition The proposed class consists of all children who are currently, or in the future will be incarcerated at a state run or contract confinement facility under the statutory care, custody, and control of the State of Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice pursuant the Louisiana Children’s Code. Class action suits have been a traditional vehicle for challenging system-wide violations in prisons, jails, and detention facilities. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975). Federal courts in this and other judicial circuits have routinely authorized such cases to proceed as class actions on behalf of all prisoners confined in the challenged institutions. See Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1987); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1251 (7th Cir. 1985); Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984 (3rd Cir. 1983); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir 1980); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (U.S. App. D.C. 1978); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2001); Gates v. Cook, 234 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2000); Logory v. County of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135 (M.D. Pa. 2011). III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED BECAUSE THE
REQUIREMENTS OF FED. R. CIV. P.23 ARE SATISFIED A class should be certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) when the class is (1) so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions, of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs seeking class certification must satisfy Rule 23(a)’s four threshold requirements, as well as the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 837 (5th Cir. March 23, 2012). When conducting the analysis of the Rule
4

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 5 of 15
23 requirements, before certifying a class, courts must “look beyond the pleadings to understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.” Id 675 at 838 citing McManus v Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2003).
A. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 23(a) 1. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) allows a class action to be maintained if the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The size of the proposed class and the inclusion of future members are factors that make joinder impracticable. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). The 5th Circuit has held that a “sufficiently large number of potential claimants alone may indicate that the numerosity requirement is met.” Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999). Courts in the 5th Circuit have not required evidence of exact class size or identity of class members to satisfy the numerosity requirement, and there is no set number above or below which a class is considered to have or have not satisfied the numerosity requirement. Id.
In addition to considering the number of people in a proposed class, courts also look at the impracticability of joining all the plaintiffs. Impracticability of joinder is correlated to the number of class members in that the larger the number of potential claimants, the greater the impracticability of joinder. In Jack v. American Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1974), where the proposed class included “unnamed, unknown future” members, the Court noted that “joinder of unknown individuals is certainly impracticable” and weighs in favor of certification. See also Pederson, 213 F.3d at 869 (inclusion of future class members is relevant to whether joinder is impracticable). Courts have often found that, regardless of the current size of
5

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 6 of 15
the class, in cases involving prisons and jails, the numerosity requirement is satisfied because joining future members is impracticable. Andre H. v. Amback, 104 F.R.D. 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Skinner v. Uphoff, 209 F.R.D. 484,488 (D. Wyo. 2002); Holland v. Steele, 92 F.R.D. 58, 63 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
The proposed class consists of children between the ages of 10-21 who are now, or in the future will be statutorily placed in the care, custody, and control of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice and placed inside of a Louisiana operated secure care facility or a secure care facility contracting with the Office of Juvenile Justice. This population of youth is a transient group because youth are frequently being admitted and/or released into these facilities based on the judgment of various judges around the state with juvenile jurisdiction. On any given day, the Office of Juvenile Justice houses between 400-500 youth in secure custody, housed at various secure facilities around the state including Bridge City Center for Youth, Jetson Center for Youth, and Swanson Center for Youth. Approximately 800-1200 youth are admitted and/or released from OJJ secure custody in any calendar year.
In the current case, the class as defined would include present and future children placed in Office of Juvenile Justice secure custody. As stated, this population is transient and is constantly revolving based on youth satisfying their delinquency disposition or other youth being adjudicated delinquent and place in secure custody. The nature of this population makes joinder impractical. Individual litigation would impose a substantial burden on Plaintiffs, Defendants, and the courts.
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) allows a class action to be maintained if there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). In order to meet this requirement under Rule
6

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 7 of 15
23(a)(2), the proposed class must prove that the claims of every class member “depend upon a common contention that is capable of class wide resolution,” which means that the contention is “of such a nature… that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). “What matters to class certification…is not the raising of common ‘questions’…but rather the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers.” Id. Even a single common question is sufficient for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2). Id. at 2556.
The Plaintiffs in this case allege that Defendants’ practice and policy of denying meaningful access to courts and counsel causes all class members irreparable harm as a result of the violation of their 1st and 14th amendment rights but also puts them at risk of further losing their liberties within the facilities without the ability to protect their rights. Defendants have neglected their responsibility, as outlined in the Louisiana Children’s Code, as sole custodian of Plaintiffs, which is to provide them with meaningful access to courts and counsel. Each member of the Plaintiff class is effectively barred from access to counsel and the courts. A class-wide proceeding would generate a common answer to Plaintiffs’ allegations, as the Wal-Mart court requires.
Most recently, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a case and interpreted the requirements of the Wal-Mart opinion. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832 (5th Circuit 2012). The 5th Circuit found that “members of a proposed class do not establish that their claims can productively be litigated at once, merely by alleging a violation of the same legal provision by the same defendant.” Id. at 840. In M.D., The court found that each class member’s claims required individualized determinations of various issues of law and fact. Id. The 5th Circuit criticized the district court because it did not “indicate how the resolution of the
7

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 8 of 15
alleged common question of fact would decide an issue that is central to the substantive due process claims… of every class member at the same time.” Id. at 841. (Plaintiffs alleged various allegations of systemic deficiencies in the State’s administration of Texas’ long-term foster care system).
In the present case, the inquiry does not require individual determinations. Each member of the proposed Plaintiff class is exposed to the centralized administrative policies or lack thereof, of OJJ while detained in OJJ operated secure care facilities and contracted facilities throughout the state. The proposed Plaintiff class does not claim that “general systemic deficiencies result in widespread violations of their statutory and constitutional rights”, a contention that the 5th Circuit found too general. See Id. at 842. Rather, the proposed Plaintiff class alleges that Defendants engage in practices that actively and daily impede their access to counsel. This violation applies to each named and putative plaintiff equally. Additionally, Defendants lack any resemblance of a policy or procedure to provide adequate, meaningful, and effective access to courts and counsel. Each manifestation of this policy, or absence of a policy, is not unique to one facility, but Plaintiffs experience legal violations as a result of these practices in each OJJ operated facility and contract facility. Resolution of Plaintiffs contentions regarding Defendants’ behavior would decide an issue central to the claims of every class member at the same time, namely that Plaintiffs are denied meaningful access to counsel.
One solution provides a class-wide answer. The relief sought here, declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, would compel Defendants to actively provide, not blatantly bar, Plaintiffs’ meaningful access to counsel. Resolving these specific allegations would “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of the individuals’ claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 U.S. at 2551. The common contentions listed above are more than sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).
8

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 9 of 15
3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) allows a class action to be maintained if the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Because the policies and practices challenged apply with equal force to the named Plaintiffs and other members of the class, the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the class in general. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The test for typicality is not that the claims of the named individuals be identical to the claims of the other class members, but that the class representatives must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as other class members. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982). Claims of both named and unnamed class members must arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct and are based on the same legal theory, despite factual distinctions between claims of the named plaintiffs and other class members. Shaw v. Toshiba America Information Systems, 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 955 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Here, the legal theories advanced and relief sought by the named Plaintiffs and putative class members are the same. Constitutional violations stem from Plaintiffs’ lack of meaningful access to counsel while housed in OJJ operated or contracted facilities. Further, there are no fundamental factual differences between the circumstances of the named plaintiffs and other putative class members. The proposed class in the instant case may be distinguished from the putative class in M.D. where the court found that Rule 23(a)’s typicality requirement was not satisfied because the alleged harms suffered by the Named Plaintiffs were not experienced by a majority of the purported class. M.D., 675 F3d at 838. Here, all youth detained in OJJ operated or contracted facilities are subject to the same policies and structural barriers to accessing counsel and the
9

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 10 of 15
courts. If class certification is denied, every individual youth in current or future OJJ custody would be forced to vindicate his or her rights in an individual lawsuit addressing the same violations challenged in this lawsuit.
4. Adequacy of Representation The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). For the adequacy requirement to be met, there must be no significant conflict of interests between the named plaintiffs and the absent class members. Mullen, 186 F.3d at 625-36. In Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Supreme Court articulated that the adequacy-of-representation requirement “tends to merge” with Rule 23(a)’s commonality and typicality criteria, which work in conjunction to ensure that maintenance of a class action is economical and “whether the named plaintiffs’ claims and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Amchem 521 U.S. at 625. Additionally, the future release from OJJ custody does not make any of the named plaintiffs inadequate class representatives. Prospective future release does not constitute grounds for denying class certification; the prospect of release actually supports class certification. Stewart v. Winter, 669 F. 2d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 1982). Specifically for prison litigation, class certification ensures the presence of a continuing class of plaintiffs with a live dispute against prison authorities. Id. citing United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980); See also Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 716-717 (5th Cir. 1980)(it was an error to deny certification on grounds that plaintiffs were no longer incarcerated in jail). Here, the Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. They have the same claims and seek the same remedies as the class as a whole. Each named
10

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 11 of 15
Plaintiff has suffered the same or similar harm as the members of the class, and each named Plaintiff has the same interest in vindication of his or her rights as members of the class. Additionally, there exists no conflict of interest between the named Plaintiffs and the other class members because they all advance the same legal theories and they all pursue the same legal relief. The named Plaintiffs possess a strong personal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit, and are represented by experienced counsel with particular expertise with class action litigation in federal court. Counsel has the legal knowledge and the resources to fairly and adequately represent the interests of all the class members in this action.
B. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) Along with meeting all of the requirements of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must meet one of the
three requirements of Rule 23(b). Here, Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Defendants’ actions have been taken “on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Courts have recognized that class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are particularly important in civil rights cases where injunctive relief is sought, as in the present case. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975). Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are particularly common and appropriate in prison and jail lawsuits where the issues involved are applicable in the same manner to each member of the class. Specifically, whether a class may be certified under 23(b)(2) depends on whether class members seek uniform relief from a practice applicable to all of them. Rodriquez v. Hayes, 591 F3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2008).
Here, Defendants’ refusal or failure to act equally affects rights common to all of the class members, both the named Plaintiffs and the unnamed class members. Defendants are acting or refusing to act in a manner that is generally applicable to the entire class of Plaintiffs. Final
11

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 12 of 15
injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate because it will resolve the challenge to Defendants’ action and inactions for the class as a whole. The policies and practices at issue are not the result of actions, policies, or practices aimed solely at the named Plaintiffs or other specific detained children. These policies and practices, or lack thereof, have general application to the class of children as a whole.
The proposed class is distinguished from the class in Wal-Mart, where the Court concluded that Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. Walmart, 131 U.S. at 2557. (The Court did not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant. “The key to the 23(b)(2) class is the individual nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs do not seek different injunction or declaratory judgments against Defendants. Plaintiffs request a single declaratory judgment that Defendants’ current policy with respect to attorney visitation, legal mail, and access to courts violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to adequate, meaningful, and effective access to the courts. Plaintiffs request a single permanent injunction requiring the Defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them to allow youth to meet with counsel of their choice.
Plaintiffs’ request for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is necessary to ensure that any mandatory relief will extend not merely to one named individual, but the entire class of children who are currently or will in the future be detained by OJJ. Therefore, injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole is appropriate.
12

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 13 of 15
C. The Proposed Class Counsel Satisfy the Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) so the Court should designate Plaintiff’s Counsel as class counsel.
Federal Rule 23(g) requires that the district court appoint class counsel for any class that is certified. Fed. R. Civ. P 23(g)(1). The appointed class counsel must be listed in the Court’s class certification order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). The Rule identifies four factors that the Court must consider in appointing class counsel: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;” (2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law;” and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The Law Offices of John S. Williams, LLC, The Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana (JJPL), and Families and Friends of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Children (FFLIC) have agreed to act jointly as co-counsel, if the court so designates them.
Proposed class counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, fully satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(g). Proposed class counsel have worked for many months in identifying and investigating the claims in this action, through numerous interviews with named Plaintiffs, scores of other putative class members and with other potential fact witnesses, extensive factual and legal research, and review of named and putative plaintiffs’ court records. Proposed Plaintiffs’ counsel have significant experience in handling class actions and other complex litigation, including the very matters asserted in this case, namely, civil rights actions on behalf of institutionalized persons; and proposed class counsel are knowledgeable in the applicable law. Lastly, all three of the organizations have committed major staffing and material resources to the representation of the putative class. In sum, Plaintiffs’ counsel fully satisfy the
13

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 14 of 15
criteria for class counsel set forth in Rule 23(g) and Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court
appoint them as such in its class certification order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Local Rule
23.1, Plaintiffs’ request the Court should certify the class defined as all children who are
currently or who will in the future be held in secure confinement under the legal and physical
custody of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams (T.A.) Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300
Carol Kolinchak, Esq. Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 522-5437 x234 fax: (504) 522-5430 ckolinchak@jjpl.org
Michael H. Grey, Jr. Louisiana Bar No. 33868 Families and Friend of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Children 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70112 mgrey@fflic.org (504) 522-5437 x248
14

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 15 of 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 19th day of July 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of court by using the CM/ECF system. A copy of this document as well as a notice of electronic filing has been personally served on all non-CM/ECF participant Defendants:
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams, Esq. Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Attorney for Plaintiffs Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300 Fax: (504) 754-7671
15

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-2 Filed 07/19/12 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

_________________________________________

)

R.B., A.C., J.R., and T.B., by and through

)

their next friend, on their own behalf and

)

on behalf of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Dr. MARY LIVERS, in her official capacity as )

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of

)

Juvenile Justice; NAMON REID III, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City )

Center for Youth; DARON BROWN, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for )

Youth; and R.VICKIE SHOECRAFT, in her

)

official capacity Director of Swanson Center

)

for Youth

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________ )

CLASS ACTION
2:12-CV--1502 Section J Division 2 Judge Carl J. Barbier Magistrate Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr.

NOTICE OF SUBMISSION 1. Plaintiff’s re-files their Motion for Class certification and supporting Memorandum of Law on July 19, 2012 dating back to the original filing which took place on July 13, 2012. 2. Please take Notice that the undersigned counsel will bring the attached Motion and Memorandum in Support for Class Certification for hearing before the Honorable U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier on Wednesday, December 19, 2012 at 9:30 am at the U.S. Federal Court building located at 500 Poydras Avenue, New Orleans LA.

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-2 Filed 07/19/12 Page 2 of 2
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams (T.A.) Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300
Carol Kolinchak, Esq. Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 522-5437 x234 fax: (504) 522-5430 ckolinchak@jjpl.org
Michael H. Grey, Jr. Louisiana Bar No. 33868 Families and Friend of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Children 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70112 mgrey@fflic.org (504) 522-5437 x248
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of July 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of court by using the CM/ECF system. A copy of this document as well as a notice of
electronic filing has been personally served on all non-CM/ECF participant Defendants:
/s/ John S. Williams John S. Williams, Esq. Louisiana Bar No. 32270 Attorney for Plaintiffs Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com Telephone: 504-486-0300 Fax: (504) 754-7671

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 19-3 Filed 07/19/12 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

_________________________________________

)

R.B., A.C., J.R., and T.B., by and through

)

their next friend, on their own behalf and

)

on behalf of those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Dr. MARY LIVERS, in her official capacity as )

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of

)

Juvenile Justice; NAMON REID III, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City )

Center for Youth; DARON BROWN, in his

)

Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for )

Youth; and R.VICKIE SHOECRAFT, in her

)

official capacity Director of Swanson Center

)

for Youth

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________ )

CLASS ACTION
2:12-CV--1502 Section J Division 2 Judge Carl J. Barbier Magistrate Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr.

PROPOSED ORDER BEFORE THIS COURT is Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Class Certification H aving considered the pleadings, memorandum of law, and supporting evidence, this Court finds that the motion is well taken and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Plaintiffs’ Class Certification is GRANTED. This action shall be maintained as a class action. SO ORDERED, this the ____ day of ____________, 2012.

______________________________________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

R.B., ET AL. VERSUS MARY LIVERS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 12-00679-BAJ-SCR

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and Reconsider Ruling Dismiss ing Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 55), filed by Plaintiffs R.B., Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, and Dolly Robicheaux (collectively "Plaintiffs"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 59(e), seeking an order from this Court reversing its previous ruling dismissing Plaintiffs' claims, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants Mary Livers, Namon Reid, Daron Brown, and R. Vickie Shoecraft (collectively "Defendants") oppose the motion. (Doc. 57.) Oral argument is not necessary. Jurisdiction is proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. I. Background
On March 25, 2013, this Court issued a ruling granting Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. (Doc. 53.) In granting t he motion, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege facts demonstrating their ability to pursue non-frivolous legal claims once the conditions a llegedly denying t hem access to the courts were removed. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Ex parte Young

exception did not apply, and thus, Plaintiffs claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
In support of the instant motion, Plaintiffs contend that the Court made a manifest error oflaw when it concluded that the Exparte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. Ex parte Young, 209 U .S . 123 (1908). Plaintiffs also argue that the Court improperly evaluated the sufficiency of their underlying conditions of confinement claims, using a heightened pleading standard. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request the Court reconsider and reverse its previous ruling.
In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to identify a manifest error oflaw. Defendants contend that the Court properly evaluated the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, Defendants request the Court deny Plaintiffs' motion. II. Standard of Review
"A Rule 59(e) motion 'calls into question the correctness ofa judgment."' Templet v. HydroChem Inc. , 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Transtexas Gas Corp. , 303 F .3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002)). "A Rule 59(e) motion must clearly establish either a manifest error oflaw or fact or must present newly discovered evidence" and cannot be used to "raise arguments that could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued." Advocare Int'l LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc. , 524 F.3d 679, 691 (5th Cir. 2008). "Relief under Rule 59(e) is also appropriate when there has been an intervening change in the controlling law." Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc. , 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiffs failed to point to any newly discovered evidence
2

or an intervening change in the controlling law. Thus, t he only issue is whether the Court made a manifest error of law.
"A 'manifest error' is not demonstrated by t he disappointment of the losing party. It is the 'wholesale dis regard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent."' S haw v. Broadcast.com, Inc., No. 98-cv-2017-P, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34553, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2005) (quoting Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F. 3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000); cf Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp. , 394 F .3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (defining "manifest error" in appellate review context as "one that is plain and indisuputable, a nd that amounts to a complete disregard of t he controlling law.").
Courts have significant discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e). Templet, 367 F.3d at 479. Nevertheless, granting a mot ion for reconsideration is "an extraordinary remedy th at should be used sparingly." Id. Thus, in determining whether to grant a motion to reconsider, courts must balance the following judicial imperatives: (I) "the need to bring litiga tion to an end" and (2) "the need to render just decisions on the basis of all t he facts." Id. III. Analysis
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction In its ruling granting Defendants' motion to dismiss, th e Court concluded that th e Ex parte Young excep tion to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims because Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate their ability to pursue non-frivolous legal claims once the conditions allegedly denying t hem access to the courts were removed. (Doc. 53, p. 22.)
3

In s upport of their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and during the hearing on the matter, Defendants argued that the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity did not apply because "Plaintiffs' claims are, on the face of their complaint, legally frivolous." (Doc. 37-1, p. 8.) However, as discussed below, whether a claim is frivolous is not the relevant inquiry under Ex parte Young.
1. The Ex parte Young Doctrine and Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims Against Defendants
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. In that ruling, the Court permitted suits against state officials in their official capacity in order to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157). This exception applies when the state official: (1) has some connection with the enforcement of the statute; or (2) is specifically charged with the duty to enforce the statute and is threatening to exercise that duty. ld. at 414-15 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157) ("[i]n making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional .. . such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a representative of t he State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party.")).
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that enforcement of an unconstitutional law is not an official act because a state cannot confer authority on its officers to violate the Constitution or federal law. Aguilar v. Tex. Dep't of Crim.
4

Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing American Bank & Trust Co. of
Opelousas v. Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1993)). The Exparte Young exception
"has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights
and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States."'
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105. Under this exception an individual official may be liable
only for implementing a policy that is "itself [] a repudiation of constitutional rights"
and "the moving force of the constitutional violation." Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736,
742 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169-70 (5th Cir.
1985)).
For Ex parte Young to apply, the "suit must be brought against individual
persons in their official capacities as agents of the state and the relief sought must be
declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect." Aguilar, 160 F.3d at
1054 (quoting Saltz v. Tennessee Dep't of Employment Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir.
1992)). In Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986), the Supreme Court opined:
[Ex parteYoung] has been focused on cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated at one time or over a period of time in the past, as well as on cases in which the relief against the state official directly ends the violation of federal law as opposed to cases in which t h at relief is intended indirectly to encourage compliance with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet third-party interests s uch as compensation. As we have noted: Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.
Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an action of a s t ate official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the state official is the named defendant.
5

This is true if the relief is expressly denominated as damages. It is also true if the relief is tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation of federal law, even though styled as something else. On the other hand, relief that serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.
Id. at 277-78 (quotations and citations omitted).
The Supreme Court recently explained more succinctly that in determining
whether the doctrine ofExparte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, "a
court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges
an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective." Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011)
(quoting Verizon Md. I nc. v. Pub. Svc. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Here, Plaintiffs identify Defendant Mary Livers ("Livers") as the Deputy Secretary of th e Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice (the "OJJ"). (Doc. 1, ~ 9.)
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Livers is "responsible for th e management, oversight,
control and policy-making at [the Bridge City Center for Youth], [the Jetson Center for
Youth], and [the Swanson Center for Youth], including the administration and day-to-
day operations of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice." (Doc. 1, ~ 9.) Plaintiffs further allege th at Livers "is responsible for contracting with facilities as an exercise
of her statutory responsibility to provide placement for youth in OJJ legal custody." (Doc. 1, ,, 9.)
Plaintiffs' identify Defendant Namon Reid III ("Reid") as the Director of the
Bridge City Center for Youth ("BCCY"). (Doc. 1, ,I 10.) Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges
6

Reid "is responsible for the administration and day-to-day operations ofBCCY." (Doc.
1, , , 10.)
Plaintiffs identify Defendant Daron Brown ("Brown") as the Director of the J etson Center for Youth ("JCY''). (Doc. 1, ~ 11.) Plaintiffs' Complaint allege Brown "is responsible for the administration and day-to-day operations of Jetson Center for Youth." (Doc. 1, ~ 11.)
Plaintiffs identify Defendant R. Vickie Shoecraft ("Shoecraft") as the Director of the Swanson Center for Youth ("SCY''). (Doc. 1, ,, 12.) Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges Shoecraft "is responsible for the administration and day-to-day operations of SCY." (Doc. 1, ,, 12.)
Plaintiffs' Complaint further alleges that "upon committment to OJJ custody, Defendant has sole custody ofPlaintiffs and is responsible for their care, treatment and placement." (Doc. 1, ,, 21.) Plaintiffs allege that Defenda nts have "neglected their responsibility as sole custodian[s] of Plaintiffs, which is to provide them with meaningful access to courts and counsel." (Doc. 1, ,, 25.) According to Plaintiffs, "by refusing to allow Plaintiffs meaningful access to counsel," "refusing to allow Plaintiffs to meet with their counsel" and "failing to implement policies and procedures at all facilities that house youth in OJJ custody," Defendants h ave violated Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights ..." (Doc. 1, ,,,, 51-54.)
Plaintiffs's Complaint alleges that Defendants have "created a series ofobstacles designed to impede access." (Doc. 1, ~ 1.) According to Plaintiffs, "[u[nder [ ] Defendants obstructionist policies, or lack of policies, an incarcerated child is not
7

provided access to courts and counsel ..." (Doc. 1, ~ 1.) Plaintiffs also allege that "Defendants have failed to take any steps to assure access to courts and counsel for youth in OJJ custody that are housed at contract facilities." (Doc. 1, ~ 1.)
According to Plaintiffs, Defenda nts have "int imidat[ed] Plaintiffs into n ot contacting counsel; refus[ed] visits with counsel; cancel[ed] scheduled visits wit h counsel; refus [ed] phone calls to attorneys after Plaintiffs have experienced crisis and trauma inside ofDefendants' facilities; fail[ed] to create effective ways for Plaintiffs to con tact counsel; refus[ed] to schedule visits with counsel in a ma nner timely enough to address the constitutional violations; fail[ed] to have any method to assure that Plaintiffs in contract facilities have access to court and counsel; and fail[ed] to operate
a functioning administrative grievance procedure." (Doc. 1, ,I 32.) Plaintiffs also allege
Defendants "routinely return legal mail with adequate postage t hat is properly addressed to Plaintiffs, thus [,] disallowing access to legal advocacy." (Doc. 1, ~ 35.) According to Plaintiffs, "Defendants routinely cancel scheduled attorney visits, limit access to clients in serious jeopardy of victimization or viole nce, and create administrative obstacles that severely delay visitation with Plaintiffs who are in
,I urgent need oflegal advocacy." (Doc. 1, 36.)
Plaintiffs allege t hat, as a result ofDefendants' failure "to provide Plaintiffs with their constitutionally required meaningful access to counsel a nd courts," "Plaintiffs who receive adult charges while inside [OJJ] facilities have no access to counsel to protect their rights," "Plaintiffs are denied a n opportunity to access coun sel to confer about possible constitutional violations," and that "Plaintiffs are not provided with
8

confiden tial communications with counsel." (Doc. 1, ~~ 27-28, 30.) Plaintiffs also allege that they "are routinely intimidated and discouraged from contacting counsel to address violence, abuse, and constitutional violations that occur inside the facilities." (Doc. 1, ~ 29.)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek "declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to ... creat[e] and implement[] ... policies and procedures which help Plaintiffs attain access to meaningful, adequate and effective legal advocacy." (Doc. 1, ~ 1; Prayer for Relief.)
Having accepting all well pled facts as true, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' Complaint, on its face , sufficiently alleges that Defendants Livers, Reid, Brown, and Shoecraft have a duty to provide Plaintiffs' "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. The Court also concludes that Plaintiffs' Complaint, on its face , sufficiently alleges that Livers, Reid, Brown, and Shoecraft are currently depriving and/or threatening to deprive Plaint iffs' of "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. The Court further concludes that Plaintiffs' Complaint, on its face , sufficiently alleges an ongoing violation of federal law, and seeks relief that is properly characterized as prospective. Further , it is undisputed that Plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought against Defendants Livers, Reid, Brown, and Shoecraft in their official capacities as agents of the State of Louisiana. (Doc. 1, ~~I 9-12.)
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have met the Ex parte Young exception. Thus, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against Defendants are not proscribed
9

by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
it was manifest error to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims on this basis.
B. Standing
In further s uppor t of their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Defendants
argued that Plaintiffs' Complaint "ultimately fails to plead facts sufficient to establish
standing and to support their jurisdictional allegations." (Doc. 37-1, p. 3.) According
to Defendants, Plaintiffs' failed to show an actual injury, and thus, lacked standing to
pursue their claims . (Doc. 37-1, p. 9.) In support oftheir argument, Defendants relied
on Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). However, Defendants misunderstand the
Supreme Court's standard, as discussed in Lewis.
As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for t he Fifth Circuit:
L ewis involved an inmate's claim that he was denied his constit utional right of access to t he courts by the poor quality of his prison's legal libra ry. In t hat context, the Supreme Court said that a deficient law library, though it might be an "injury in fact," was not a "relevant injury in fact" because there is not, and the plaintiff did not even argue for, a free-standing right to access a legal library. The right to access legal materials derives from the right to access the courts, so a "relevant" injury in Lewis had to be one that was at least allegedly caused by being denied access to the courts, i.e., lost or impeded legal claims. Consequently, the plaintiff in Lewis lacked st a nding because he did not even allege a n injury that resulted from t he alleged legal violation.
Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir. Tex. 2012) (citations
omitted). Indeed, for purposes of standing, t he "injury in fact" test requires both "an
inj ury to a cognizable interest" and that "the party seeking revi ew be himself among
the injured." L ujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992). If the plaintiff
was the "object" of the challenged action, then "there is ordinarily little question that
10

the action or inaction has caused him injury." Id. at 561-62; see also United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 534, 538, n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) ("[W]hether [a plaintiff] has standing to make the argument is distinct from whether the argument has merit.").
Here, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that they are t he "object" of Defendants' actions, or inaction, which interfered with Plaintiffs' constitutional right to access the courts. See, e.g. , Doc. 1, ~ 32. Plaintiffs also sufficiently allege "personal injury" fairly traceable to Defendants' alleged unlawful conduct. See, e.g. , Doc. 1, ~~ 44, 45, 46; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-63; Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (noting that standing requires a "plaintiff [to] allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's a llegedly unlawful conduct"). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims for denial of access to the courts. Thus, Defendants' request that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' claims on this basis must be denied.
C. Whether Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Pled Claims Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
In support of their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Defendants also argued that "Plaintiffs' claims are legally frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted ..." (Doc. 37, p. 1.) However, Defendants' motion sought a dismissal "for lack of jurisdiction," pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). (Doc. 37- 1, p. 1.)
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) provide distinct grounds for dismissal of a claim for r elief. Rule 12(b)(6) applies when a plaintiff"fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) applies to claims over which a
11

federal district court "lack[s] ... subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Here, Defendants sought dismissal ofPlaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
only. Accordingly, it was manifest error for the Court to evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs' access to the courts claims. Furt her, contrary to Defendants' assertions, the Plaintiffs' access to the courts claims are not so attenuated, clearly immaterial, or wholly uns ubstantial as to warrant a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Hagan u. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and Reconsider Ruling Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 55) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court's Ruling (Doc. 53) and Order of Dismissal (Doc. 54) are hereby VACATED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' are granted LEAVE TO AMEND their Complaint no later than April 28, 2014. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' are granted LEAVE TO REFILE their motion for preliminary injunction, if necessary, no later than May 12, 2014. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED t hat Plaintiffs' are granted LEAVE TO REFILE their motion for class certification, if necessary, no later than May 26, 2014. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is REFERRED to the United States Magistrate Judge to immediately set a Scheduling Conference, trial date,
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pretrial conference date, and pretrial deadlines. Baton Rou ge, Louisia na, this 3 1st day of March 2014. BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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 Case 3:12-cv-00679-BAJ-SCR Document 53 03/25/13 Page 1 of 23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

R.B., ET AL. VERSUS MARY LIVERS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 12-00679-BAJ-SCR

RULING
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 37), filed by Defendants, seeking an order from this Court dismissing Plaintiffs claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(1 ). Plaintiffs oppose the motion. (Doc. 45.) Defendants filed a reply memorandum. (Doc. 52.) The motion was heard with oral argument on December 20, 2012. (Doc. 48.) I. Background
Plaintiffs R.B., Tracie Breaux ("Breaux"), Kelly Craddock ("Craddock"), and Dolly Robicheaux ("Robicheaux")1 (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed this lawsuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of youth who are or will be placed in a Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice (the "OJJ") facility.

1Piaintiff R.B., who is incarcerated at the Swanson Center for Youth, sues on his own behalf. (Doc. 1, 1f5.) T.B., who is incarcerated at an Office of Juvenile Justice contract facility,
sues through her mother, Plaintiff Tracie Breaux. (Doc. 1, 1f8; Doc. 1-8.) A. C., who is incarcerated
at the Bridge City Center for Youth, sues through his mother, Plaintiff Kelly Craddock. (Doc. 1, 1l
6; Doc. 1-6.) J.R., who is incarcerated at the Bridge City Center for Youth, sues through his
mother, Plaintiff Dolly Robicheaux. (Doc. 1, 1f7; Doc. 1-7.)

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Plaintiffs named as Defendants Mary Livers ("Livers"), in her official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the OJJ, Namon Reid Ill ("Reid"), in his official capacity as Director of the Bridge City Center for Youth ("BCCY"), Daron Brown ("Brown"), in his official capacity as Director of the Jetson Center for Youth ("JCY"), and R. Vickie Shoecraft ("Shoecraft"), in her official capacity as Director of the Swanson Center for Youth ("SCY") (collectively "Defendants"). (Doc. 1, 11119-12.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have, and continue to, violate their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, by denying them meaningful access to the courts. 2
According to the complaint, OJJ is responsible for the care and control of all Louisiana youth adjudicated delinquent and placed in OJJ's custody for the purpose of rehabilitation and treatment. (Doc. 1, 1119.) These youth consist of boys and girls between 10 and 21 years of age. (Doc. 1, 1119.) BCCY, JCY, and SCY house male youth exclusively, but OJJ contracts with other facilities around the State of Louisiana to house female youth and other male youth. (Doc. 1, 1120.) Plaintiffs allege a high percentage of the youth housed in BCCY, JCY, SCY, and OJJ contract facilities suffer from mental illness and low level educational functionality, and are in need of "outside advocates" to protect their civil and educational rights. (Doc. 1, 1123.)
On or about September 1, 2000, OJJ entered into a consent agreement with private plaintiffs and the United States Department of Justice in order to address OJJ's
2Piaintiffs' lawsuit was transferred to this Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on October 31, 2012. (Doc. 35.)
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constitutional violations, including denying youth access to the courts. 3 (Doc. 1, ,-r 24.)
Plaintiffs allege, however, that since that time, Defendants have continued to violate
their constitutional rights by denying them meaningful access to the courts. (Doc. 1, ,-r,-r
25, 31-32, 35.) Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, class
certification, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. (Doc. 1.)
As to the instant motion, Defendants seek an order from this Court dismissing
Plaintiffs claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1). Defendants argue that they are entitled to
sovereign immunity, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants further assert that the Ex Parte Young4
exception to sovereign immunity does not apply. Defendants also contend that
Plaintiffs do not have standing because their right of access to the courts claims are
frivolous. In the alternative, Defendants argue that only Livers should remain a
Defendant, as the other named Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion and argue that the Ex Parte Young exception applies to each Defendant. 5 Plaintiffs also contend that they do, in fact, have standing, and that
3See Williams v. McKeithen, 121 F.Supp. 2d 943, 944-45 (M.D. La. 2000). 4209 U.S. 123 (1908). 5lnitially, Plaintiffs did not file a memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 37) or in the Alternative Provide Enlarged Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion. (Doc. 39.) During the hearing on the matter, the undersigned heard and considered counsel for Plaintiffs' arguments in support of the Motion to Strike, as well as counsel for Defendants' arguments in opposition. Subsequently, the Court and the parties agreed that the Court must consider Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, that Plaintiffs would be permitted additional time to file a memorandum in opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, and that Defendants would be permitted to reply to Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition. (Doc. 48.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 37) or in the Alternative Provide Enlarged Time to Respond to Defendants'
3

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their right of access to the courts allegations are legally sufficient. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged specific claims against each of the Defendants. Thus, Defendants Reid, Brown, and Shoecraft should not be dismissed. II. Standard of Review
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286-287 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)); Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998)). Under Rule 12(b)(1 ), a claim is "properly dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate" the claim. /d. (quoting Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). The court should consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. /d. (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001 ), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2001 )). Considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss first "prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice." /d. (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 ).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Benton v. U.S., No. 91-1547, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38464, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 1992). A complaint is subject to dismissal under 12(b)(6) if it fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In reviewing
Motion (Doc. 39) was denied in part, and granted in part. 4

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a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Be// At!. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, however, "the court is permitted to look at evidence in the record beyond simply those facts alleged in the complaint and its proper attachments." Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B. V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1111 (2009); Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (stating that a court ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion may evaluate "(1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts"). 6 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should only be granted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims entitling him to relief. Wagstaffv. United States Dep't of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 2007).
6Here, neither party has submitted affidavits, testimony, nor other evidentiary materials. Thus, the Court's review is limited to whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[l]f the defense merely files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed to be true. If those jurisdictional allegations are sufficient the complaint stands.").
5

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However, "[t]he burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Celestine v. Trans Wood, Inc., 467 Fed. Appx. 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 ). "Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." /d. (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 ). A pleading stating a claim for relief must contain "a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]" /d. (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(1 )). In federal question cases, the party must demonstrate a non-frivolous claim based on federal law. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939).
When a district court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its determination is not on the merits of the case, and does not bar the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in a proper jurisdiction. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Ill. Analysis
A. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity from Suit in Federal Court
The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. CON ST. amend. XI. This language expressly encompasses not only suits brought against a state by citizens of another state, but suits against a state by citizens of that same state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
6

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98, (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). "A state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity extends to any state agency or entity deemed an alter ego or arm
of the state." Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Service Center, 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir.
2002). In general, therefore, a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. Lewis v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. 7 /d.
The Eleventh Amendment also bars a suit against a state official when "the state is a real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101-02 (citations
omitted). Thus, the general rule is that relief sought against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter. And, as when the State
itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against
a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101-02 (citations omitted); see also Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d
7The Court notes that a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court is not absolute. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 662 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2011 ). A state's immunity may be abrogated by Congress as a means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. (citing Co//. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)). A state may also waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily invoking federal court jurisdiction, or by making a "clear declaration" that it intends to submit itself to federal court jurisdiction. /d. However, here, Section 1983 does not abrogate the State of Louisiana's Eleventh Amendment immunity, nor has the State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); La. R.S. § 13:5106). Further, Plaintiffs do not contend that Congress abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or that the State has waived such.
7

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405, 412 (5th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff cannot evade Eleventh Amendment immunity by naming an individual state officer as a defendant in lieu of the state itself).
B. Ex Parte Young Doctrine In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court held that enforcement of an unconstitutional law is not an official act because a state cannot confer authority on its officers to violate the Constitution or federal law. Aguilar v. Tex. Oep't of Grim. Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing American Bank & Trust Co. of Opelousas v. Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1993)). The Ex Parte Young exception "has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States."' Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105. Under this exception an individual official may be liable only for implementing a policy that is "itself []a repudiation of constitutional rights" and "the moving force of the constitutional violation." 0/iverv. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Grandstaffv. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1985)). In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe ofIdaho, 521 U.S. 261,296 (1997). To meet the Ex Parte Young exception, a plaintiff's suit alleging a violation of federal law must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and
8

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prospective in effect. Aguilar, 160 F.3d at 1054 (citing Saltz v. Tennessee Dep't of Employment Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992)).
C. The Ex Parte Young Doctrine and Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims
"Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person 'of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' [T]his provision safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated federal law by depriving Plaintiffs their First and Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts.
A substantive right of access to the courts has long been recognized. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) ("It is now established beyond a doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts."). Access to the courts is protected by the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) ("[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances."); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979). This right has also been found in the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of procedural and substantive due process. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-75 (5th Cir. 1983).
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1. Plaintiffs' Right of Access to the Courts Claims Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments8
In support of their motion, Defendants argue that the Ex Parle Young doctrine does not apply to Plaintiffs' right of access to the courts claims because Plaintiffs' claims are frivolous. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims lack a factual basis, and that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that prejudice or actual injury resulted from Defendants' alleged actions. Thus, the Ex Parle Young doctrine does not apply, Defendants are entitled to the protections of the Eleventh Amendment, and Plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their allegations, accepted as true, give rise to actionable claims. According to Plaintiffs, in order to insure that youth who are placed in OJJ facilities have "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts, the State must permit them to consult with an attorney. Plaintiffs further contend that they have sufficiently alleged that Defendants have, and continue to, deny youth placed in OJJ facilities access to counsel. They also argue that they have sufficiently alleged that Defendants' actions frustrated their ability to file suits that are now untimely, and that Defendants' actions continue to frustrate their ability to file suits. Thus, the Ex Parle Young doctrine applies, and Plaintiffs' claims should not be dismissed.
"Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts that is 'adequate, effective, and meaningful."' Terryv. Huberl, 609 F.3d 757,761 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
8Piaintiffs' complaint fails to allege specific facts related to their Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts claims. Thus, Plaintiffs's claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendment will be analyzed together.
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Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822). However, this right "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability - the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354; see also Wiig v. Ulrich, No. 12-40339, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25544, at *1-2 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 2012) ("The right of prisoners to meaningful court access 'encompasses only a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement."') (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999)).
An inmate who brings a Section 1983 claim based on his right of access to the courts must be able to show that he incurred an actual injury in order to prevail. Turner v. Epps, 460 Fed. Appx. 322, 327-328 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825. The right of access does not create "an abstract, freestanding right," but exists to vindicate other rights. /d. (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 ). Thus, to have standing to sue, Plaintiffs must allege that he was prejudiced by the purported violation by showing that his ability to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim was hindered by the defendant's actions. Wiig, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25544, at* 2 ("To establish a valid claim for denial of access to the courts, an inmate must show that he suffered an actual injury as a result of the alleged denial.") (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-354).
Plaintiffs' complaint makes a number of allegations regarding the injuries allegedly suffered by the proposed class. However, as stated by the Supreme Court
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in Lewis, named plaintiffs must show that they personally have been injured: That a suit may be a class action ... adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)). See also Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 305 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[A]s a general rule class injuries attributed to members of a class but not sustained by a named class representative cannot be remedied in the class action lawsuit."); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'/ Bank of Dallas, 723 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984). For this reason, the Court will limit its analysis to each named Plaintiffs' allegations.
a. Plaintiff R.B.'s Allegations R. B. alleges that he was placed in lockdown as a form of punishment. (Doc. 1, ,-r 46.) During such time, he was denied access to counsel. /d. It is not clear from the complaint in which facility R.B. alleges he was placed in lockdown. However, the complaint alleges he was housed in an OJJ contract facility for over a month, during which time he was denied access to counsel. /d. According to R.B., despite being charged with committing an adult criminal violation and subsequently transported to an adult jail, he was denied access to counsel. /d. The Court first notes that a conditions of confinement claim must satisfy tests for both objective and subject components. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). For the objective component, "extreme deprivations are required to make out a
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conditions of confinement claim." !d. at 9. A change in custodial status does not constitute an "extreme deprivation" because prison officials have broad discretion in classifying prisoners in terms of their custodial status. McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th Cir. 1990); Wilkerson v. Stadler, 329 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2003). Further, only those conditions which impose "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" will implicate the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Even accepting R.B.'s allegations as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to him, it cannot be said that he has plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that his placement in lockdown imposed an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Accordingly, R. B. has failed to show his ability to pursue a non-frivolous conditions of confinement claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, the complaint fails to state what adult criminal violation R.B. was charged with, whether he was convicted of such charges, or how he was prejudiced or injured by his inability to access counsel. As indicated above, a civil rights plaintiff must support his claims with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, a district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff 'might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A.
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(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994), cerl. denied, 513 U.S. 883 (1994 ).
For these reasons, the Court finds that R. B. has failed to sufficiently allege facts that demonstrate his ability to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. Accordingly, the Ex Parle Young doctrine does not apply to his right to access the courts claims.
b. Plaintiff Tracie Breaux's Allegations (on Behalf of T.B.)
Breaux alleges that T.B. is currently in an OJJ contract facility. (Doc. 1, ,-r 47.) Before being placed in the OJJ contract facility, T.B. was placed in a Parish detention facility, which also contracts with OJJ. /d. Breaux alleges that T.B. was subjected to "consistent harassment" while housed in the Parish detention facility, and was denied access to counsel. /d. Breaux further contends the OJJ has failed to develop a policy that ensures youth placed in OJJ contract facilities are provided with meaningful and adequate access to counsel. /d. Instead, it relies on the practices of the respective contract facility. /d.
Breaux failed to provide the Court with any facts regarding the "consistent harassment" T.B. allegedly endured. 9 As a result, the Court is left to speculate. To the extent Breaux alleges T.B. was subjected to verbal harassment, the Fifth Circuit has held that "[m]ere allegations of verbal abuse do not present actionable claims under§ 1983." Bender v. Bruney, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 998 (1983) ("As a rule,
9The complaint fails to sufficiently describe the type of harassment, the duration of the harassment, when the harassment occurred, where the harassment occurred, or who was involved.
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'mere threatening language and gestures of a custodial officer do not, even if true, amount to a constitutional violation."')).
Breaux has failed to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation. For this reason, the Court finds that she has failed to demonstrate T. B.'s ability to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. Accordingly, the Ex Parte Young doctrine does not apply to Breaux's right to access the courts claims.
c. Plaintiff Kelly Craddock's Allegations (on Behalf of A.C.)
Craddock alleges that while A.C. was placed in lockdown, he was given undercooked, rotten, or inadequate food. (Doc. 1, ~ 45.) Craddock also alleges A. C. was not permitted to attend school while on lockdown. /d. She further alleges that A. C. was prevented from contacting legal counsel because the phones used to contact counsel were broken. /d. Craddock also alleges that, on those occasions when A. C. is permitted to contact counsel, his calls are monitored by BCCY staff. /d.
As indicated above, a change in custodial status does not amount to the type of "extreme deprivation" required to make out a conditions of confinement claim. Further, to implicate the Due Process Clause, Plaintiffs must show "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
Here, Craddock failed to plead any facts whatsoever demonstrating that A. C.'s placement in lockdown imposed an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." To the extent Craddock alleges Defendants prevented A. C. from attending school while he was in lockdown, she has
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not alleged that school attendance is a cognizable right that would permit the Court to exercise jurisdiction. In summary, Craddock has failed to show A C.'s ability to pursue a non-frivolous conditions of confinement claim.
To the extent Craddock alleges that A. C. was deprived of food 10, this allegation implicates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must establish both a subjective and objective component. The objective requirement necessitates that the inmate allege a sufficiently serious deprivation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991 ). "Only those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave' to constitute cruel and unusual punishment." /d. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981 )). Whether the deprivation of food falls below this threshold depends on the amount and duration of the deprivation. Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, Craddock failed to allege a sufficiently serious deprivation. Indeed, Craddock's allegations fail to include any facts related to the amount or duration of the alleged food deprivation.
Further, in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Craddock must establish that BCCY staff members acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind measured by deliberate indifference, which is defined as knowing and disregarding an excessive risk of harm to A. C.'s health or safety. Farmerv. Brennen, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Here, Craddock failed to describe what, if any, injuries A. C. suffered as result
10lt is not clear from the complaint whether Craddock intended to allege that A.C. was deprived of food, or that the quality of the food he received was inadequate, or both.
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of the "undercooked, rotten, or inadequate food", nor did she allege that BBCY staff members knew and disregarded an excessive risk of harm to A. C.'s health or safety. Accordingly, Craddock has failed to show A C.'s ability to pursue a non-frivolous Eight Amendment claim.
Craddock's allegations that A C.'s telephone calls with counsel were monitored by BCCY staff may implicate the First and Sixth Amendment. See, e.g. Moore v. Janing, 427 F.Supp. 567, 576 (D. Ne. 1976). However, in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a party must demonstrate a non-frivolous claim based on federal law.
Here, Craddock failed to allege that the telephone monitoring impeded A.C.'s ability to access counsel, or pursue a legally nonfrivolous claim. Thus, Craddock's unsubstantiated allegation that A C.'s telephone calls with counsel were monitored is insufficient. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Walker v. south Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990) ("a complaint, which contains a 'bare bones' allegation that a wrong occurred and which does not plead any of the facts giving rise to the injury, does not provide adequate notice.").
In summary, the Court finds that Craddock has failed to sufficiently allege facts that demonstrate A C.'s ability to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. Accordingly, the Ex Parte Young doctrine does not apply to Craddock's right to access the courts claims.
17

Case 3:12-cv-00679-BAJ-SCR Document 53 03/25/13 Page 18 of 23
d. Plaintiff Dolly Robicheaux's Allegations (on Behalf of J.R.)
According to Robicheaux, J.R. has been subjected to physical abuse at BCCY.
(Doc. 1, 1f 43.) Robicheaux further alleges that J.R. was involved in a physical
altercation with a BCCY staff member, that resulted in multiple injuries. /d. Robicheaux alleges, however, that he was not treated for those injuries. /d. She also alleges that J.R. was prevented from contacting legal counsel because the phones used to contact
counsel were broken. (Doc. 1, 1f1f 33, 43.) According to Robicheaux, BCCY staff discouraged J.R. from calling counsel and "rat[ting] out BCCY." (Doc. 1, 1f 43.)
Following the physical altercation, J.R. was arrested and transferred to a Jefferson Parish jail, where he finally received medical treatment. /d. Robicheaux alleges that, despite being subsequently arrested for committing an adult criminal violation, J.R. was denied access to counsel while in BCCY. /d. She further alleges that on those occasions when J.R. was permitted to contact counsel, his calls were monitored by BCCY staff. /d.
Here, Robicheaux does not allege an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Instead, the complaint merely alleges that J.R. has been subjected to physical abuse at BCCY. However, as discussed above, such a bare bones allegation is insufficient to establish an injury which may be redressed by this Court.
Although the Eighth Amendment "does not by its precise words, mandate a certain level of medical care for prisoners[,]" Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999), the Supreme Court has interpreted it as imposing a duty on prison officials
18

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to "ensure that inmates receive adequate ... medical care." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when his conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs, constituting an 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain."' Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S.
at 297). "A prison inmate can demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation by showing that a prison official refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." /d. at 464 (quotation omitted).
As discussed above, there is both an objective and subjective standard for Eighth Amendment claims. "A prison official acts with deliberate indifference 'only if [(A)] he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and [(B)] he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."' Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). "Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner's disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances." /d. Further, "delay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate indifference that results in substantial harm." Easter, 467 F.3d at 464 (quotation omitted). In summary, "[d]eliberate indifference 'is an extremely high standard to meet."' Domino v. Texas Dep't of Grim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001 ).
19

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Here, Robicheaux alleges that J.R. was involved in a physical altercation with a BCCY staff member, that resulted in multiple injuries, and that he was not treated for those injuries until he was arrested and transferred to a Jefferson Parish jail. (Doc. 1,
1J 43.) Robicheaux's allegations, however, are insufficient to support an Eighth
Amendment claim. Robicheaux failed to allege facts that demonstrate BCCY staff showed deliberate
indifference to J.R.'s serious medical needs by intentionally denying or delaying his access to medical care. Walker v. Butler, 967 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1992). Nor does Robicheaux allege facts that demonstrate BCCY staff refused to treat J.R., ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for his serious medical needs. Easter, 467 F.3d at 464. Indeed, the complaint merely alleges J.R. was not treated for his injuries until he was arrested and transferred to a Jefferson Parish jail. Such bare bones allegations are insufficient to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment claim. Further, Robicheaux failed to state what adult criminal violation J.R. was charged with, whether he was convicted of such charges, or how he was prejudiced or injured by his inability to access counsel. 11
Like Craddock, Robicheaux failed to allege that the telephone monitoring impeded J.R.'s ability to access counsel, or pursue a legally nonfrivolous claim. Thus,
11According to Defendants, J.R.'s right of access to the courts claim is legally frivolous because he pled guilty to the charge of battery on a corrections office employee, and was represented by counsel during all stages of the criminal proceeding. Defendants, however, failed to provide the Court with evidence to support this assertion. Further, Plaintiffs' complaint includes no such factual allegations.
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Robicheaux's bare bones, unsubstantiated allegation that J.R.'s telephone calls with counsel were monitored is insufficient.
As indicated above, a civil rights plaintiff must support her claims with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Schultea, 47 F.3d at1433. Based on the allegations in the complaint, it cannot be said that Robicheaux has plead sufficient facts to demonstrate J.R.'s ability to pursue a non-frivolous claim. Accordingly, the Ex Parte Young doctrine does not apply to Robicheaux's right to access the courts claims. IV. Conclusion
Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution. Turne v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Further, the Court recognizes the importance of access to counsel for youth placed in OJJ facilities so that they may receive "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. However, as stated by the Supreme Court in Lewis, only after an "inmate shows that an actionable claim [challenging his sentence or conditions of confinement] which he desired to bring has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not been provided," can the Court conclude that he has "demonstrate[d) that the State has failed to furnish 'adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.'" Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added) (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828).
As stated by Plaintiffs in their memorandum in opposition, when asserting a right of access to the courts claim, "the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must
21

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be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant." (Doc. 45, p. 12) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002)). Despite this acknowledgment, Plaintiffs have simply failed to do so.
Even accepting Plaintiffs' allegations as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to them, it cannot be said that the named Plaintiffs have plead sufficient facts to demonstrate their ability to pursue non-frivolous legal claims once the conditions allegedly denying them access to counsel are removed. Further, to the extent Plaintiffs' allegations prove to be true, it does necessarily follow that this Court is the proper forum for Plaintiffs to pursue their claims.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Ex Patte Young doctrine does not apply to Plaintiffs' right to access the courts claims. Thus, Defendants are entitled to the protections of the Eleventh Amendment, and Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 37) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4) is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 19) is DENIED AS MOOT.
22

Case 3:12-cv-00679-BAJ-SCR Document 53 03/25/13 Page 23 of 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Stay Plaintiffs' Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification (Doc. 38) is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 37) or in the Alternative Provide Enlarged Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion (Doc. 39) is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 25th day of March 2013.
BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
23

 
 U.S. District Court Middle District of Louisiana (Baton Rouge) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:12−cv−00679−BAJ−SCR

CLOSED

R.B. et al v. Livers et al Assigned to: Judge Brian A. Jackson Referred to: Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger Case in other court: Louisiana Eastern, 2:12−cv−01502 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 10/31/2012 Date Terminated: 05/01/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Tracie Breaux as next friend of T.B., a minor

represented by John Shamaa Williams The Law Offices of John S. Williams 4164 Canal Street New Orleans, LA 70119 United Sta (504) 486−0300 Fax: 504 754−7671 Email: jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Anne Kolinchak 2563 Bayou Road 2nd Floor New Orleans, LA 70119 (504) 259−8395 Email: cakolinchak@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William E. Rittenberg Rittenberg & Samuel, LLC 715 Girod Street New Orleans, LA 70130−3505 504−524−5555 Fax: 524−0912 Email: rittenberg@rittenbergsamuel.com TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
R.B. on behalf of himself and those similarly situated

represented by John Shamaa Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Anne Kolinchak (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William E. Rittenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kelly Craddock as next friend of A.C., a minor

represented by John Shamaa Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dolly Robicheaux as next friend of J.R., a minor
V. Defendant Mary Livers Dr., in her official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice
Defendant Namon Reid, III in his Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City Center for Youth
Defendant Director Daron Brown in his Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for Youth

Carol Anne Kolinchak (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William E. Rittenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Shamaa Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Anne Kolinchak (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William E. Rittenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Courtney Keller Louisiana Department of Justice − N.O. Litigation Division 1450 Poydras Street Suite 900 New Orleans, LA 70112 504−599−1200 Fax: 504−599−1212 Email: kellerm@ag.louisiana.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phyllis Esther Glazer Meeks & Associates, LLC 3501 W. Esplanade Ave. Suite 3 Metairie, LA 70002 (504) 355−0020 Email: pglazer@meekslawllc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Courtney Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phyllis Esther Glazer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Courtney Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant
R. Vickie Shoecraft in her official capacity Director of Swanson Center for Youth

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phyllis Esther Glazer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Courtney Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phyllis Esther Glazer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/13/2012
06/13/2012 06/13/2012 06/14/2012
06/27/2012 06/27/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, Daron Brown, R. Vickie Shoecraft . (Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 053L−3552147) filed by R.B., Kelly Craddock, Dolly Robicheaux, Tracie Breaux. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit)(Williams, John) Modified on 6/13/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 06/13/2012)
2 Initial Case Assignment to Judge Carl Barbier and Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. (mmf, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 06/13/2012)
3 Summons Issued as to Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons)(gec, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 06/13/2012)
4 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Motion set for 8/8/2012 11:00 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Affidavit, # 4 Affidavit, # 5 Affidavit)(Williams, John) Modified text on 6/15/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] Modified on 11/2/2012 to reinstate motion to pending status (JDL). (Entered: 06/14/2012)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Mary Livers served on 6/15/2012, answer due 7/6/2012. (Williams, John) Modified on 6/27/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 06/27/2012)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Daron Brown served on 6/18/2012, answer due 7/9/2012. (Williams, John) Modified on 6/27/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 06/27/2012)
7 **ERROR: WRONG EVENT SELECTED** AFFIDAVIT of Service by Henry McCoy of Summons served on Namon Reid III on 6/19/12. (Williams, John) Modified on 7/2/2012 (caa, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/01/2012)
8 **ERROR: WRONG EVENT SELECTED** AFFIDAVIT of Service by Marshall Moon of Summons served on R. Vickie Shoecraft on 6/20/12. (Williams, John) Modified on 7/2/2012 (caa, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/01/2012)
10 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Namon Reid, III served on 6/19/2012, answer due 7/10/2012. (caa, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/02/2012)
11 SUMMONS Returned Executed; R. Vickie Shoecraft served on 6/20/2012, answer due 7/11/2012. (caa, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/02/2012)

07/02/2012 07/09/2012 07/09/2012 07/09/2012 07/10/2012 07/10/2012 07/11/2012 07/12/2012 07/19/2012 08/03/2012
08/07/2012 08/08/2012 08/31/2012

9 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 7 Affidavit of Service & 8 Affidavit of Service. Filing attorney selected incorrect event. Correct event is Summons Returned Executed. Clerk took corrective action by re−docketing the event. No further action necessary at this time.(caa, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/02/2012)
12 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw WIlliam E. Rittenberg as Attorney of Record by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 7/10/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/09/2012)
13 Waiver by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft of Right to Reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997e(g) (Glazer, Phyllis) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/09/2012)
14 ORDER granting 12 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney William E. Rittenberg terminated. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/9/12. (sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/09/2012)
15 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 12 MOTION to Withdraw WIlliam E. Rittenberg as Attorney of Record. Document does not contain Section and Magistrate Judge. All future pleadings must reflect Section "J" and Magistrate Judge (2). (gec, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/10/2012)
16 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record Micheal Grey by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 7/11/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/10/2012)
17 ORDER granting 16 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Michael Henry Grey, Jr for Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/11/12. (sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/11/2012)
18 **DEFICIENT** MOTION to Certify Class by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Motion set for 12/19/2012 09:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 7/13/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 07/12/2012)
19 MOTION to Certify Class by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Motion set for 12/19/2012 09:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] Modified on 11/2/2012 to reinstate motion to pending status (JDL). (Entered: 07/19/2012)
20 ORDERED that Defendants shall file an appropriate responsive pleading to Plaintiffs' Complaint 1 on or before September 3, 2012. FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 4 ) is hereby CONTINUED WITHOUT DATE pending Defendants' response to the allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 8/2/12.(sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 08/03/2012)
21 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Sara V. Pic by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 8/8/2012 (gec, ). [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 08/07/2012)
22 ORDER granting 21 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Sara Virginia Pic for Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., for Dolly Robicheaux. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 8/8/12. (sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 08/08/2012)
23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively, MOTION to Dismiss Case by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. Motion set for 9/26/2012 09:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Glazer, Phyllis) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 08/31/2012)

09/12/2012
09/14/2012 09/17/2012 09/18/2012
09/19/2012 09/20/2012 10/09/2012 10/12/2012 10/15/2012

24 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Carl Barbier: Status Conference held on 9/12/2012. The Court will address Defendants' pending Motion for Change of Venue, or Alternatively to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 23 ) prior to any other pending motions. The Court ORDERED that any opposition is due on or before Friday, September 14, 2012. Defendants' reply due not later than Friday, September 21, 2012. The Court will advise counsel whether oral argument is necessary. The Court will ask Magistrate Judge Wilkinson to follow up with the parties to attempt an early mediation of the Plaintiffs' complaints re ongoing constitutional violations at various LA Office of Juvenile Justice & contract facilities. The Plaintiffs are to bring specific complaints & specific requests for relief to the mediation before Magistrate Judge Wilkinson. (NEF: Judge Wilkinson, T. Lee) (sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 09/13/2012)
25 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux re 23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively MOTION to Dismiss Case . (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit)(Williams, John) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 09/14/2012)
26 ORDER: ORDERED that a telephone conference is hereby set in this matter before the undersigned on September 18, 2012 at 10:30 a.m. The purpose of the conference is to discuss Judge Barbier's order issued in this matter on September 12, 2012 and to schedule any in−person settlement conference(s) that might be appropriate. Record Doc. No. 24. Counsel must participate in the conference by contacting my office at 504−589−7630 at the designated time. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr on 9/14/12. [NEF: Hon. Carl J. Barbier](tbl) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 09/17/2012)
27 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr: A telephone conference was conducted before the undersigned on 9/18/2012. IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 24, 2012, plaintiffs' counsel must submit to defense counsel a written settlement proposal, with a copy to the undersigned, setting forth the relief plaintiffs seek in any potential settlement agreement, supported by a listing of any specific complaints or immediate concerns of plaintiffs that have not previously been described in plaintiffs' affidavits or other filings. FURTHER ORDERED that defense counsel must transmit the settlement proposal to their principals for review and consideration. Plaintiffs' counsel having advised today that there is no objection, the undersigned will then conduct a separate telephone conference concerning settlement prospects with defense counsel and their designated principal(s) on October 9, 2012 at 10:30 a.m. to assess the interest of defendants in making their own settlement proposal and whether and how further settlement proceedings might be conducted. (tbl) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 09/19/2012)
28 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Continue Defendants' Motion (Rec. Doc. 23) by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Glazer, Phyllis) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 09/19/2012)
29 ORDER granting 28 MOTION to Continue Defendants' Motion (Rec. Doc. 23); ORDERED that the hearing on 23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively MOTION to Dismiss Case is continued to 10/24/2012. Defendant's shall file their reply memo on or before 10/12/2012. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 9/20/2012.(gbw, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 09/20/2012)
30 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr: Telephone Conference held on 10/9/2012. (NEF: Sect J) (caa, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 10/09/2012)
31 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Glazer, Phyllis) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 10/12/2012)
32 ORDER granting 31 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/15/12. (sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.]

10/15/2012 10/31/2012 10/31/2012 10/31/2012 11/02/2012
11/02/2012 11/07/2012 11/09/2012 11/14/2012 11/15/2012 11/15/2012 11/19/2012
12/10/2012 12/10/2012

(Entered: 10/15/2012)
33 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft re 23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively MOTION to Dismiss Case . (sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 10/15/2012)
34 ORDER granting 23 MOTION to Change Venue; FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for theMiddle District of Louisiana. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/30/12.(sek, ) [Transferred from Louisiana Eastern on 10/31/2012.] (Entered: 10/31/2012)
35 Case transferred in from the Louisiana Eastern; Case Number 2:12−cv−01502. Original file certified copy of transfer order and docket sheet received. (Entered: 10/31/2012)
Case assigned to Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson and Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (NLT) (Entered: 10/31/2012)
36 ORDER: The defts file responsive pleadings by 11/16/2012. FURTHER ORDERED that the defts shall have until 11/23/2012 to file their response to the pltfs 4 Motion for Immediate Preliminary Injunction. FURTHER ORDERED that the defts shall have until 11/30/2012 to file their response to pltfs 19 Motion for Class Certification. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 11/2/2012. (JDL) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 19 First MOTION to Certify Class. (JDL) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
38 MOTION to Stay Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 4) and Motion for Class Certification (Rec. Doc. 18) by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 11/09/2012)
39 First MOTION to Strike 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Order)(Williams, John) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
40 First MOTION for Expedited Hearing on 25 Response in Opposition to Motion, by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Order)(Williams, John) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
41 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 39 First MOTION to Strike 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
42 RESPONSE in Opposition to 38 MOTION to Stay Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 4) and Motion for Class Certification (Rec. Doc. 18) MOTION to Stay Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 4) and Motion for Class Certification (Rec. Doc. 18) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 order)(Williams, John) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
43 Notice to Counsel: (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)Oral argument on all pending motions is scheduled for 12/20/2012 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 2 before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson. (PJH) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, 40 First MOTION for Expedited Hearing on 25 Response in Opposition to Motion,, 4 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 39 First MOTION to Strike 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, 38 MOTION to Stay Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 4) and Motion for Class Certification (Rec. Doc. 18) MOTION to Stay Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 4) and Motion for Class Certification (Rec. Doc. 18), 19 First MOTION to Certify Class .

12/12/2012 12/20/2012
01/07/2013 01/10/2013 01/10/2013 01/24/2013
02/27/2013 03/12/2013 03/12/2013 03/25/2013
04/08/2013 04/24/2013 04/24/2013

Motion Hearing set for 12/20/2012 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 2 before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson. (PJH) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
44 90−DAY CONFERENCE ORDER: Scheduling Conference set for 1/24/2013 at 1:00 PM in chambers before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. Status Report due by 1/10/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 12/12/12. (BNW) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
48 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson: Motion Hearing held on 12/20/2012 re 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Namon Reid, III, Mary Livers, R. Vickie Shoecraft, Daron Brown. Counsel present oral argument to the Court. Matter taken under submission. Plaintiffs shall file their memorandum in opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction no later than January 7, 2013. Defendants reply to Plaintiffs Opposition shall be filed by January 10, 2013. If the Court denies Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and finds that this Court has jurisdiction, an order setting further deadlines, including deadline by which Defendants must file an answer to the complaint, will issue. (Court Reporter C. Smith−Neely.) (PJH) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
45 First RESPONSE in Opposition to 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by All Plaintiffs. (Williams, John) (Entered: 01/07/2013)
46 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Motion for Leave to File, # 2 Proposed Pleading;)(Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
47 STATUS REPORT by All Parties. (Williams, John) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
49 MINUTE ENTRY/ORDER SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE: Scheduling Conference held on 1/24/2013 before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. Cnsl agreed that entry of a scheduling order is premature until the district judge rules on dft's pending Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Entry of a scheduling order is deferred...Telephone Scheduling Conference set for 2/27/2013 at 1:00 PM. This conf will be canceled if the district judge has not ruled on the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and it may be rescheduled...(BNW) (Entered: 01/28/2013)
50 ORDER Canceling Status Conference Set for February 27, 2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 2/27/2013. (LLH) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
51 ORDER granting 46 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by Namon Reid, III, Mary Livers, R. Vickie Shoecraft, Daron Brown. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 03/12/2013. (SMG) (Entered: 03/12/2013)
52 REPLY MEMORANDUM in Support of 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (SMG) (Entered: 03/12/2013)
53 RULING granting 37 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 38 Motion to Stay; granting in part and denying in part 39 Motion to Strike ; denying as moot 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying as moot 19 Motion to Certify Class. The Plaintiff's claim are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 03/25/2013. (SMG) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
54 ORDER OF DISMISSAL: The Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 4/8/2013. (LLH) (Entered: 04/08/2013)
55 MOTION to Vacate and Reconsider Ruling by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Williams, John) Modified on 4/24/2013 (LLH). (Entered: 04/24/2013)
56 NOTICE of Timing of Filing by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux re 55 First MOTION for Reconsideration (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment)(Williams, John) (Entered: 04/24/2013)

04/25/2013 03/06/2014 03/31/2014
03/31/2014 04/02/2014 04/03/2014
04/10/2014 04/30/2014 05/01/2014 05/07/2014

57 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 55 MOTION to Vacate and Reconsideration filed by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Glazer, Phyllis) Modified on 4/25/2013 (LLH). (Entered: 04/25/2013)
58 Letter dated 3/6/2014 to Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson from John S. Williams regarding Request for Ruling on Motion to Vacate and Reconsider by All Plaintiffs. (Williams, John) Modified to edit text on 3/6/2014 (SMG). (Entered: 03/06/2014)
59 RULING AND ORDER granting 55 Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and Reconsider Ruling Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court's Ruling 53 and Order of Dismissal 54 are hereby VACATED. Plaintiffs' shall AMEND their Complaint no later than 04/28/2014, are granted LEAVE TO RE−FILE their motion for preliminary injunction, if necessary, no later than 05/12/2014 and LEAVE TO RE−FILE their motion for class certification, if necessary, no later than 05/26/2014. This matter is REFERRED to the United States Magistrate Judge to immediately set a Scheduling Conference, trial date, pretrial conference date, and pretrial deadlines. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 03/31/2014. (CGP) Modified on 3/31/2014 to edit text (CGP). (Entered: 03/31/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry) Amended Pleadings due by 4/28/2014. Motions shall be filed by 5/12/2014. (CGP) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
60 ORDER: Pursuant to the 59 Ruling and Order issued 3/31/2014, a Telephone Conference is set for 4/3/2014 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. The court will call counsel at the office number on the docket sheet unless a different number is provided. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 4/2/2014. (JDL) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
61 MINUTE ENTRY/SCHEDULING ORDER and ORDER SETTING TIME TO FILE ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT: Telephone Scheduling Conference held on 4/3/2014 before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger. IT IS ORDERED that dfts shall file their answer by 4/14/2014. As to any amended complaint, IT IS ORDERED that dfts shall file their answer within 14 days after the amended complaint is served. All class certification fact discovery due by 7/7/2014... All other fact discovery shall be completed by 10/15/2014... Dispositive Motions and Daubert Motions relevant to all other issues shall be filed by 11/22/2014. Final Pretrial Order due by 3/12/2015. Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/2/2015 at 1:30 PM in chambers before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson. TRIAL set for 5/11/2015−5/14/2015 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 2 before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson. [NOTE: Whether this will be a JURY TRIAL or a BENCH TRIAL will be determined after the dfts file their answer to the Complaint. The trial date is currently a SECOND SETTING for May 14, 2015 only.] (BNW) Modified on 4/4/2014 (BNW). (Entered: 04/04/2014)
62 NOTICE OF COLLATERAL APPEAL to the USCA for the 5th Circuit of 59 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,, by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 053N−1065826. (Glazer, Phyllis) Modified on 4/10/2014 to edit text (JDL). (Entered: 04/10/2014)
63 Joint MOTION to Dismiss by All Parties. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kolinchak, Carol) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
64 ORDER OF DISMISSAL granting 63 Joint Motion to Dismiss. The above captioned matter is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 05/01/2014. (CGP) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
65 MANDATE of USCA as to 62 Notice of Appeal to the USCA for the 5th Circuit, filed by Namon Reid, III, Mary Livers, R. Vickie Shoecraft, Daron Brown. The appeal is dismissed as of 05/02/2014 pursuant to appellants' motion (CGP) (Entered: 05/07/2014)

 
 Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 34 Filed 10/31/12 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

R.B., ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-1502

MARY LIVERS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DEUPTY SECRETARY OF THE LOUISIANA OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ET AL.

SECTION: “J”(2)

ORDER Before the Court are the Defendants’ Motion for Change of Venue or, Alternatively, for Dismissal of the Case (Rec. Doc. 23), the Plaintiffs’ Opposition (Rec. Doc. 25), and the Defendants’ Reply (Rec. Doc. 31). After considering the motion, the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for reasons discussed more fully below, that Defendants’ Motion for Change of Venue is GRANTED. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the Court to transfer a civil action to any other district where it might have been brought in the interests of justice and for the convenience of

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 34 Filed 10/31/12 Page 2 of 3
parties and witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The venue rules provide that a civil action may be brought in, inter alia, “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred [...]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs in the instant case are primarily challenging the policies of the Office of Juvenile Justice (“OJJ”), a sub-office of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, which is located in Baton Rouge, and the policy decisions of the Department Directors, who reside in Baton Rouge. Thus, most of the events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims occurred within the Middle District in Baton Rouge. Because the Plaintiffs are challenging department-wide policies, most of the records that they request during discovery, as well as all of the witnesses involved in the department-wide policy-making, will be located in Baton Rouge where the OJJ is located. In addition, as the putative class members are spread across the state of Louisiana, there is no overriding connection to this district. Consequently, the Court finds that a transfer to the Middle District of Louisiana would be in the interests of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.
Moreover, the subject matter of the instant action comprises a material part of the subject matter of Williams v. McKeithen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 943 (M.D. La. 2000), a case that was previously adjudicated in the United States District Court for the Middle

Case 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW Document 34 Filed 10/31/12 Page 3 of 3
District of Louisiana. Both actions involve allegations that Defendants systematically deprived juveniles in state custody of access to the courts and counsel in violation of their constitutional rights. The Court finds that transferring the instant action to the Middle District of Louisiana will promote judicial economy, conserve judicial resources, and obviate any potential for conflicting rulings.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Change of Venue (Rec. Doc. 23) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned matter is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30th day of October, 2012.
___________________________ CARL J. BARBIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case: 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW As of: 05/10/2013 10:28 AM CDT 1 of 6
CLASS_REQUESTED,CLOSED,TRANSFER
U. S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:12−cv−01502−CJB−JCW

R.B. et al v. Livers et al Assigned to: Judge Carl Barbier Referred to: Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/13/2012 Date Terminated: 10/31/2012 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Tracie Breaux as next friend of T.B., a minor

represented by John S. Williams The Law Offices of John S. Williams, LLC 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70113 504−486−0300 Email: jwilliams@jswlawoffices.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Anne Kolinchak Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70113 504−522−5437 Ex. 234 Fax: 504−522−5430 Email: ckolinchak@jjpl.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Henry Grey , Jr. Families and Friends of Louisiana Incarcerated Children 1600 Oretha Castle Haley New Orleans, LA 70113 504−522−5437 Email: mgrey@fflic.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Virginia Pic Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana 1600 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70113 504−522−5437 Email: svpic@jjpl.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William E. Rittenberg Rittenberg &Samuel, LLC 715 Girod St. New Orleans, LA 70130−3505 504−524−5555 Email: rittenberg@rittenbergsamuel.com TERMINATED: 07/09/2012

Plaintiff
R.B. on behalf of himself and those similarly situated

represented by John S. Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Anne Kolinchak (See above for address)

Case: 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW As of: 05/10/2013 10:28 AM CDT 2 of 6

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Henry Grey , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Virginia Pic (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William E. Rittenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012

Plaintiff
Kelly Craddock as next friend of A.C., a minor

represented by John S. Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Anne Kolinchak (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Henry Grey , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Virginia Pic (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William E. Rittenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012

Plaintiff
Dolly Robicheaux as next friend of J.R., a minor

represented by John S. Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Anne Kolinchak (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Henry Grey , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Virginia Pic (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William E. Rittenberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012

V. Defendant

represented by

Case: 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW As of: 05/10/2013 10:28 AM CDT 3 of 6

Mary Livers Dr., in her official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice

Michael Courtney Keller Louisiana Department of Justice (New Orleans) 400 Poydras St. Suite 1600 New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 599−1200 Email: kellerm@ag.state.la.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phyllis Esther Glazer Louisiana Department of Justice (New Orleans) Office of the Attorney General − Litigation Division 400 Poydras St. Suite 1600 New Orleans, LA 70130 504−599−1200 Fax: 504−599−1212 Email: glazerp@ag.state.la.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Namon Reid, III in his Official capacity as Director of the Bridge City Center for Youth

represented by Michael Courtney Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phyllis Esther Glazer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Daron Brown in his Official capacity as Director of Jetson Center for Youth

represented by Michael Courtney Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phyllis Esther Glazer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
R. Vickie Shoecraft in her official capacity Director of Swanson Center for Youth

represented by Michael Courtney Keller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phyllis Esther Glazer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/13/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, Daron Brown, R. Vickie Shoecraft . (Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 053L−3552147) filed by R.B., Kelly Craddock, Dolly Robicheaux, Tracie Breaux. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit)(Williams, John) Modified on 6/13/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 06/13/2012)

Case: 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW As of: 05/10/2013 10:28 AM CDT 4 of 6

06/13/2012 06/13/2012 06/14/2012
06/27/2012 06/27/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012 07/02/2012
07/09/2012
07/09/2012 07/09/2012 07/10/2012
07/10/2012
07/11/2012 07/12/2012

2 Initial Case Assignment to Judge Carl Barbier and Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. (mmf, ) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
3 Summons Issued as to Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons)(gec, ) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
4 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Motion set for 8/8/2012 11:00 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Affidavit, # 4 Affidavit, # 5 Affidavit)(Williams, John) Modified text on 6/15/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 06/14/2012)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Mary Livers served on 6/15/2012, answer due 7/6/2012. (Williams, John) Modified on 6/27/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 06/27/2012)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Daron Brown served on 6/18/2012, answer due 7/9/2012. (Williams, John) Modified on 6/27/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 06/27/2012)
7 **ERROR: WRONG EVENT SELECTED** AFFIDAVIT of Service by Henry McCoy of Summons served on Namon Reid III on 6/19/12. (Williams, John) Modified on 7/2/2012 (caa, ). (Entered: 07/01/2012)
8 **ERROR: WRONG EVENT SELECTED** AFFIDAVIT of Service by Marshall Moon of Summons served on R. Vickie Shoecraft on 6/20/12. (Williams, John) Modified on 7/2/2012 (caa, ). (Entered: 07/01/2012)
10 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Namon Reid, III served on 6/19/2012, answer due 7/10/2012. (caa, ) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
11 SUMMONS Returned Executed; R. Vickie Shoecraft served on 6/20/2012, answer due 7/11/2012. (caa, ) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
9 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 7 Affidavit of Service &8 Affidavit of Service. Filing attorney selected incorrect event. Correct event is Summons Returned Executed. Clerk took corrective action by re−docketing the event. No further action necessary at this time.(caa, ) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
12 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw WIlliam E. Rittenberg as Attorney of Record by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 7/10/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 07/09/2012)
13 Waiver by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft of Right to Reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997e(g) (Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
14 ORDER granting 12 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney William E. Rittenberg terminated. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/9/12. (sek, ) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
15 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 12 MOTION to Withdraw WIlliam E. Rittenberg as Attorney of Record. Document does not contain Section and Magistrate Judge. All future pleadings must reflect Section "J" and Magistrate Judge (2). (gec, ) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
16 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record Micheal Grey by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 7/11/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 07/10/2012)
17 ORDER granting 16 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Michael Henry Grey, Jr for Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/11/12. (sek, ) (Entered: 07/11/2012)
18 **DEFICIENT** MOTION to Certify Class by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Motion set for 12/19/2012 09:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 7/13/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 07/12/2012)

Case: 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW As of: 05/10/2013 10:28 AM CDT 5 of 6

07/19/2012 08/03/2012 08/07/2012 08/08/2012 08/31/2012 09/12/2012
09/14/2012 09/17/2012
09/18/2012

19 MOTION to Certify Class by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. Motion set for 12/19/2012 09:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) (Entered: 07/19/2012)
20 ORDERED that Defendants shall file an appropriate responsive pleading to Plaintiffs' Complaint 1 on or before September 3, 2012. FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 4 ) is hereby CONTINUED WITHOUT DATE pending Defendants' response to the allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 8/2/12.(sek, ) (Entered: 08/03/2012)
21 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Sara V. Pic by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Williams, John) Modified on 8/8/2012 (gec, ). (Entered: 08/07/2012)
22 ORDER granting 21 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Sara Virginia Pic for Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., for Dolly Robicheaux. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 8/8/12. (sek, ) (Entered: 08/08/2012)
23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively, MOTION to Dismiss Case by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. Motion set for 9/26/2012 09:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
24 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Carl Barbier: Status Conference held on 9/12/2012. The Court will address Defendants' pending Motion for Change of Venue, or Alternatively to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 23 ) prior to any other pending motions. The Court ORDERED that any opposition is due on or before Friday, September 14, 2012. Defendants' reply due not later than Friday, September 21, 2012. The Court will advise counsel whether oral argument is necessary. The Court will ask Magistrate Judge Wilkinson to follow up with the parties to attempt an early mediation of the Plaintiffs' complaints re ongoing constitutional violations at various LA Office of Juvenile Justice &contract facilities. The Plaintiffs are to bring specific complaints &specific requests for relief to the mediation before Magistrate Judge Wilkinson. (NEF: Judge Wilkinson, T. Lee) (sek, ) (Entered: 09/13/2012)
25 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Tracie Breaux, Kelly Craddock, R.B., Dolly Robicheaux re 23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively MOTION to Dismiss Case . (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit)(Williams, John) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
26 ORDER: ORDERED that a telephone conference is hereby set in this matter before the undersigned on September 18, 2012 at 10:30 a.m. The purpose of the conference is to discuss Judge Barbier's order issued in this matter on September 12, 2012 and to schedule any in−person settlement conference(s) that might be appropriate. Record Doc. No. 24. Counsel must participate in the conference by contacting my office at 504−589−7630 at the designated time. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr on 9/14/12. [NEF: Hon. Carl J. Barbier](tbl) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
27 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr: A telephone conference was conducted before the undersigned on 9/18/2012. IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 24, 2012, plaintiffs' counsel must submit to defense counsel a written settlement proposal, with a copy to the undersigned, setting forth the relief plaintiffs seek in any potential settlement agreement, supported by a listing of any specific complaints or immediate concerns of plaintiffs that have not previously been described in plaintiffs' affidavits or other filings. FURTHER ORDERED that defense counsel must transmit the settlement proposal to their principals for review and consideration. Plaintiffs' counsel having advised today that there is no objection, the undersigned will then conduct a separate telephone conference concerning settlement prospects with defense counsel and their designated principal(s) on October 9, 2012 at 10:30 a.m. to assess the interest of defendants in making their own settlement proposal and whether and how further settlement proceedings might be conducted. (tbl) (Entered:

Case: 2:12-cv-01502-CJB-JCW As of: 05/10/2013 10:28 AM CDT 6 of 6

09/19/2012 09/20/2012
10/09/2012 10/12/2012 10/15/2012 10/15/2012 10/31/2012 10/31/2012

09/19/2012)
28 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Continue Defendants' Motion (Rec. Doc. 23) by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
29 ORDER granting 28 MOTION to Continue Defendants' Motion (Rec. Doc. 23); ORDERED that the hearing on 23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively MOTION to Dismiss Case is continued to 10/24/2012. Defendant's shall file their reply memo on or before 10/12/2012. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 9/20/2012.(gbw, ) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
30 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr: Telephone Conference held on 10/9/2012. (NEF: Sect J) (caa, ) (Entered: 10/09/2012)
31 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Glazer, Phyllis) (Entered: 10/12/2012)
32 ORDER granting 31 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/15/12. (sek, ) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
33 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by Daron Brown, Mary Livers, Namon Reid, III, R. Vickie Shoecraft re 23 MOTION to Change Venue or alternatively MOTION to Dismiss Case . (sek, ) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
34 ORDER granting 23 MOTION to Change Venue; FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for theMiddle District of Louisiana. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/30/12.(sek, ) (Entered: 10/31/2012)
35 Receipt of transfer of case to Middle District of Louisiana as case 3:12−cv−00679. (gec, ) (Entered: 10/31/2012)