2:11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR Doc # 1 Filed 08/09/11 Pg 1 of 7 Pg ID 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a project of the Human Rights Defense Center,
Plaintiff,

v

Case No. 11-cv-13460

Hon.

LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,
Defendants. _________________________________
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DECLARATORY RELIEF, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff, by its attorneys, Thomas M. Loeb, Lance T. Weber and Brian J. Prain, complains against the above-named Defendants and in support states as follows:
Preliminary Statement

1. This is an action brought by plaintiff Prison Legal News, a project of the Human Rights Defense Center, for damages caused by Defendants’ censorship of its mail and restrictions on its access to prisoners at the Livingston County Jail.
2. Defendants have adopted and implemented written mail policies and practices that unconstitutionally restrict correspondence to prisoners via postcards only, and that prohibit delivery to prisoners of books, magazines and any other publications that have not been printed on postcards.

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3. Defendants’ policies and practices do not provide constitutionally adequate due process protections to senders of mail, such as notice of the government’s decision to censor mail and an opportunity to challenge the censorship.
4. Defendants have interfered with Plaintiff’s right of access to prisoners by refusing to allow counsel for Plaintiff to send legal mail to or otherwise communicate with prisoners in Defendants’ custody.
5. Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Association and its right to Due Process of Law have been violated by Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Defendants’ mail policy of postcards only violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Jurisdiction and Venue
6. This court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. 7. Venue is properly laid in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) as the
Defendants reside in and the claim arose in the Eastern District of Michigan.
Plaintiff and Defendants
8. That at all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff Prison Legal News (PLN) is a project of the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), a Washington non-profit corporation.
9. For the past 21 years, the core of plaintiff’s mission has been public education, advocacy and outreach in support of the ri ghts of prisoners and in furtherance of
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basic human rights. Plaintiff maintains a website, operates an email list, publishes and distributes books about the criminal ju stice system and legal issues affecting prisoners, and publishes and distributes a monthly journal of corrections news and analysis, Prison Legal News, to prisoners, lawyers, courts, libraries, and the public throughout the country. Prisoners, their family, friends and advocates are among the intended beneficiaries of PLN’s activities. 10. Defendant Livingston County is an organized municipal corporation existing under the laws of the State of Michigan. 11. Defendant Bob Bezotte is currently the Sheriff of Livingston County and is sued in his individual and official capacities. At all times relevant, he has acted under color of state law. 12. As Sheriff, he is responsible for the operations of the Livingston County Jail. Specifically, he is the policy maker for the Livingston County Jail with respect to its mail policy and its policy of refusing attorneys employed by Plaintiff to communicate with prisoners in Defendants’ custody.
Facts
13. PLN engages in core protected speech and expressive conduct on matters of public concern.
14. PLN publishes and distributes Prison Legal News, a monthly journal of corrections news and analysis about prisoner rights, court rulings, management of prison facilities and prison conditions. PLN publishes and distributes dozens
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of books about the criminal justice system and legal issues affecting prisoners
and pre-trial detainees.
15. PLN has over 7,000 subscribers throughout the United States and abroad,
including prisoners, pre-trial detainees, attorneys, journalists, public libraries,
judges, and other members of the public.
16. Defendants have written, instituted and implemented the following mail policy
at the Livingston County Jail:
MAIL - Inmates are permitted to write to any person outside of our Jail facility. Incoming Inmate correspondence must be addressed as follows:
Inmate Name, Resident Livingston County Jail 150 S. Highlander Way Howell, MI 48843
 Incoming mail must reflect sender’s name and address.  Correspondence from attorneys, as well as court and public officials may
be opened in the presence of an inmate.  Mail must be sent via US Postal Service.  Items NOT allowed: postage stamps, envelopes, blank stationary,
jewelry, food, books, magazines, sexually explicit pictures, cash, personal or company check.  All mail, except bona-fide legal mail, will be by standard post cards. This is both incoming and outgoing mail.  Incoming mail deemed inappropriate maybe placed in the inmate’s property locker.
17. Pursuant to this policy Defendants haveimproperly and illegally censored Plaintiff’s
publications, books, brochures and other correspondence sent to inmates at the
Livingston County Jail, including legal mail.
18. In January, April and June 2011PLN sent a sample copy ofPrison Legal News in a
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manila envelope via First Class mail, a new copy of the soft back book Protecting

Your Health & Safety via Media Mail, and three (3) single-page, double-sided

informational brochures in a standard #10 sized envelope via First Class Mail to

more than 50 individual prisoners at the Li vingston County Jail. All items were

addressed to specific, individual inmates and bore a return address of:

Prison PO

Legal News Box 2420 W. Brattleboro, VT 05303

19. Beginning in February 2011 and monthly thereafter, PLN has sent current issues of

Prison Legal News directly from its printer addressed individually to certain select

individual prisoners in Defendants’ custody.

20. Although this mail was been sent to certain inmates at the Livingston County Jail via

the U.S. Postal Service, no response was received from any prisoner.

21. All mail from PLN was censored by Defendants instead of being delivered to the

prisoner addressees.

22. In-house counsel for HRDC wrote letters on PLN’s behalf conspicuously marked

“Legal Mail” addressed to prisoners who werethe intended recipients of PLN’s mail

but no response was received from any prisoner. All legal mail sent from counsel on

PLN’s behalf was censored by Defendants.

23. Outside counsel for PLN attempted to communicate with certain prisoners in

Defendants’ custody by visiting them at the Jail during regular business hours and

Defendants refused to allow PLN’s counsel to speak with inmates in their custody.

24. Defendants provided PLN no not ice of their intent to censor PLN’s mail nor did

Defendants provide to PLN an opportunity to appeal their censorship decision. 5

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25. Defendants’ practice, policy or custom, asset forth more fully above with respect to its mail policies, was the moving force thatdeprived Plaintiff of its rights, privileges, or immunities secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §1983 including: a. Plaintiff’s right to freedom of the press, as protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; b. Plaintiff’s right to freedom of speech, as protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; c. Plaintiff’s right to freedom of asso ciation, as protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; d. Plaintiff’s right to be free of governmentcensorship, as protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; e. Plaintiff’s right to due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. THEREFORE, for all above reasons, plaintiff requests that this Court declare that
Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs violate the Constitution as set forth more fully throughout this Complaint; grant to plaintiff a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Defendants from continuing to violate the Constitution; award plaintiff compensatory damages in whatever amount the jury may determine; award plaintiff nominal damages in whatever amount the jury may determine; award plaintiff punitive damages against Defendant Bob Bezotte only, individually, in whatever amount the jury may determine; award costs and actual attorney fees pursuant to 42
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U.S.C. §1988; award plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and grant

such other relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.

PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL.

Dated: August 9, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

s/Thomas M. Loeb Attorney for Plaintiff 32000 Northwestern Hwy, Ste 170 Farmington Hills, MI 48334-1507 (248) 851-2020 tmloeb1@mich.com P25913

s/Lance Weber w/consent Co-counsel for Plaintiff Human Rights Defense Center PO Box 2420 W. Brattleboro, VT 05303 (802) 257-1342 lweber@humanrightsdefensecenter.org

s/Brian J. Prain w/consent Co-counsel for Plaintiff The Law Office of Brian J. Prain, PLLC 28475 Greenfield Rd Ste 121 Southfield, MI 48076 (248) 763-0641 brian@prainlaw.com P73944

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a Project of the Human Rights Defense Center,

Plaintiff,

v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Case No. 11-CV-13460 Honorable Denise Page Hood

Defendants.

/

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves a constitutional challenge to Defendants’ inmate incoming mail policy.

This matter is before the Court on Prison Legal News’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket

No. 25, filed January 12, 2012]. This m atter has been fully briefed and is now appropriate for

disposition. For the reasons stated below, Prison Legal News’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction

is DENIED.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that PLN does not have standing to assert its Fi rst and Fourteenth

Amendment claims because it cannot establish an injury-in-fact. Standing is a threshold issue that

must be determined before the Court may consider any substantive issues. Planned Parenthood

Assoc. v. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1394 (6th Cir. 1987). Article III standing requires that (1)

plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact, which is both concrete and particulari zed, and actual or

imminent;” (2) there is a causal connection betweenthe injury and complained of activity such that

it is fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and(3) it is likely, not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The party seeking to be heard in federal court must prove each element of standing with specificity. Coyne ex rel. Ohio v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999).
Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, PLN and inmates have a First Amendment interest in communicating with one another subject to regulatoi n that furthers legitimate penological interests. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1987). PLN alleges,as a publisher, that Defendants censored PLN’s attempted communications with the inmates in Livingston County Jail in violation of PLN’s freedom of expression and press and right to due proc ess. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 (1963). Defendants concede that they rejected PLN’s books, brochures, and postcards. These alleged harms are neither vague nor abstract. PLN has standing to assert its First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 212–13 (finding that “PLN suffered an injury—denial of the opportunity tocommunicate with certain inmates” was sufficient to support standing on its First Amendment claims).
Having found that PLN has standing, the Cour t will now consi der PLN’s request for injunctive relief. Whether a prelim inary injunction is appropriate is within the district court’s discretion. Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes, 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1996). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the relative positions ofthe parties pending a resolution on the merits. Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch , 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). A prelim inary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that the Court will not grant absent a cl ear showing by the movant that the case demands such relief. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't,305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002).
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The district court must consider four factors: (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction; (3) whether granting the preliminary injunction would cause substantial harmto others; and (4) whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public’s best interest. Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 573. The Court must make specific findings on each f actor unless f ewer factors would be dispositive. Performance Unlimited v. Qu estar Publishers, Inc. 52 F.3d 1373, 1381 (6th Cir. 1995). These factors are not prerequisites of relief, but must be balanced. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985). However, “because the questions of harm to the parties and the public interest generally cannot be addressed properly in the First Ame ndment context without first determining if there is a constitutional violation, the crucial inquiry often is” whe ther there is a constitutional violation. Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998).
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits The Court must engage in thetwo-step analysis applied inThornburgh to determine whether the challenged regulation is reasonably rela ted to a legitim ate penological interest. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2011); Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. The Court m ust first determine whether PLN has asserted a protected constitutional interest before analyzing whether Defendants’ regulation is related to a legitimate penological interest. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1048 (“we first determine whether any First Amendment interest is implicated” before “apply[ing] the four-factor Turner test”). The Court has already found that PLN’s claims rest on a constitutionally protected interest. The Court will proceed to the second step in the Turner analysis. The Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider when determ ining whether “a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91
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(1987). The Turner test requires that: 1. there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; 2. there must be alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; 3. we must consider the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation ofprison resources generally; and 4. there must not be alternatives available that fully accom modate the pr isoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 267 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91). Failure to satisfy the first factor is dispositive. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. The rem aining factors must be balanced together in order to evaluate the reasonableness of the challenged regulation. Jones, 569 F.3d at 267. The Court will reviewthe challenged regulation with deference to “the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of escurity, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408.
1. Rational Connection to Legitimate Penological Interest As to the f irst factor, the court m ust consider “whether the governmental objective underlying the regulations at issue is legitimate and neutral, and that the regulations are rationally related to that objective.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414. A regulati on will not be uphel d if “the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary and irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. Defendants contend in their response that the postcard-only policy posted on the website is
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not their only mail policy.1 The formal mail policy (“book policy) for delivery of books, magazines
and other materials is as follows:
Inmates will be allowed to receive newspapers, m agazines, and other types of publications, which are legally available tothe public as long as they are mailed directly from the publisher and approved by Inmate Services. a) All Cost of subscription is the inmate’s responsibility. b) Materials will be delivered to the inm ate as long as he/she is incarcerated.
c) Upon release, the inm ate is responsible for changing the addr ess . . . .
d) Exceptions: i) Specific information regarding weapons, explosives, incendiary devices, poisons or dangerous drugs. ii) Inflammatory writings advocating disorder, violence or insurrection against correctional personnel or facilities. iii) Pornographic materials. iv) Any instructional material in the martial arts. v) Any other material that pose a safety or security risk, or interferes with the orderly operation of the jail.
[Docket No. 32, Pg ID 1291]. Defendants argue taht its postcard-only and book policies are content
neutral and reasonably related to the penological interests of conserving jail resour ces and
maintaining security and safety for inmates and jail personnel. Defendants note that the tim e to
process mail decreased f rom eight hours to f our hours since the postcard-only policy was
implemented. According to Defendants, the decrease in tim e spent processing m ail reduces the
likelihood for errors in processing and, therefore,increases jail security. Personnel are now free to
engage in other security-related functions. Itgoes without question that ensuring that mail does not
contain contraband is a legitimate government interest. See Kalasho v. Kapture, 868 F. Supp. 882,
887 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (“Protecting prison security isa purpose central to all other correction goals.
1 The Court is curious as to why Defendants failed to provide this information in their Answer or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, but will nonetheless proceed in the absence of objection from PLN.
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As a consequence, the regulation’s goal is legitimate, as it relates to legitimate security concerns.”) (internal citations omitted).
The relevant question becomes whether Defendants’ postcard-only policy is neutral. It is important for the court to consider whether the challenged regulation operates in a neutral fashion, “without regard to the content of the expression.”Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Although the mail policy is facially neutral, Def endants’ inconsistent statem ents cut against a f inding of neutrality. Defendants assert that their postcard policy “applies equally toall correspondence except bona-fide legal mail.” [Docket No. 32, Pg ID 1127] (em phasis added). Defendants adm onish PLN for “fail[ing] to appreciate that a separate policy pertains to books, m agazines, and other reading materials.” [Docket No. 32, Pg ID 1123]. Ho wever, the postcard-only policy published on Defendants’ website does not identify an exception for “books , magazines, and other reading materials.” In fact, the affidavit of Lt. Tom Cremonte attached to Defendants’ Response further confirms that Livingston County Jail’s m ail policy “requir[es] all incoming and outgoi ng correspondence to be in the form of a standard 4” x 6” postcard” with the exception of bona-fide legal mail. [Docket No. 32, Pg ID 1299] (em phasis added). The use of the word “all” would necessarily imply that all mail (except bona-fide legal mail) must be on a 4” x 6” postcard.
Without deciding what policy is actually in e ffect at Livingston County Jail, there i s a question of fact as to De fendants application of its policies to PLN. Defendants provide no explanation as to why PLN’s books and other materials were rejected. PLN’s books were addressed to specific inmates, which is tantamount to a subscription, the cost of which was born by the inamte. Defendants do not argue or provide any evidence showing that each piece of m ail is checked to ensure that it follows a subscription or that inmates are required to follow a specific procedure in
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order to subscribe to a publication. Also absent form Defendants’ response is an explanation of why the postcards PLN subsequently m ailed that c onformed to Defendants’ posted policy wer e not delivered to inmates. Def endants assert that th eir policy is cont ent-neutral but appear to have applied their policy in such a way that is discriminatory towards PLN.
2. Alternative Means of Exercising the Right The second Turner factor requires the Court to consider alternative methods of expression left open for inm ates. “[C]ourts should be particularly conscious of the ‘m easure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829 (1974)). This factor is satisfied if the regulation allows the inmate to receive and read a broad range of publications. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. Defendants argue that there are several alternative means of expression open to PLN. Inmates may receive publications through subscription or PLN may donate its materials to the jail library. Inmates and those on the outside are afforded the protection of the Constitution subject to reasonable restrictions tailored to further a legitimate penological interest. Although the very nature of the inmate status requires less privacy, this does not necessarily dictate that inmates and those sending correspondence forfeit privacy as to the entire world. Those who send letters communicating personal information to an inmate expect that trained prison or jail staf will inspect the letter for contraband. See Docket No. 32, Pg ID 1288 (“Incoming mail shall be inspected for contraband and shall not be read unless there is a valid rea son to suspect a security violation.”). However, there is no expectation that personal information in the correspondence will be displayed for anyone that happens to be in reading distance of the postcard. Requiring inmates and those on
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the outside to fit everything into a postcard—broadcasting all infor mation contained on it to the world—robs the inm ates and non-inm ates of the m eaningful expression that the Constitution protects.
A jail by nature is to serve as a temporary housing facility, but some pretrial detainees may find themselves in Livingston County Jail for several months. The Court is mindful that the penal system is purposed for retribution and rehabilitation. The rehabilitation of inmates is as dependent on valuable contact with those on the outside asit is on the general penal experience on the inside. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974) (“the weight of professional opinion seems to be that inm ate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances r ather than retards the goal of rehabilitation”). Families are no longer able to send pictures of loved ones and clergy and other community leaders are foreclosed fromsending spiritual tracts and other correspondence. Although the Court cannot completely appreciate the day-to-day hardships of maintaining a safe and secure facility on dwindling resources, the protections ofthe Constitution should not submit to the need for efficiency.
Although Defendants’ postcard-only policy forecloses alternative means of expression for inmates, the relevant question is whether there ar e alternative means of expression left open for PLN. For the pur pose of this m otion, the Court regrettably m ust answer this question in the affirmative and PLN has not shown otherwise. Inmates at Livingston County Jail may subscribe to PLN’s publications. PLN may also donate its materials to the jail library, which would alleviate any concerns that PLN would not be able to informinmates of its existence. Inmates may then subscribe to receive PLN’s reading materials.
3. Impact of Accommodation on Others
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The Court will next consider “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Supreme Court has cautioned courts to give due consideration to the discretion of jail officials “[w]hen the accommodation of an asserted right willhave a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff.” Id. Defendants argue that requiring them to allow nonpostcard correspondence or accept unsolicited m ail would cause a “ripple effect” that would significantly expand the resources and time in processing inmate mail. As a result, jail personnel would be directed away from security maintenance.
The postcard-only policy has decreased the time spent on mail by half. An extra four hours of manpower to sort through m ail could c ause a ripple effect on a jail that already has lim ited resources. PLN argues that the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) allow inm ates to receive letter correspondence. However, PLN ha s provided no evidence that MDOC or BOP are facing the same budgetary and staffing concerns that Defendants indicates they have. Four extra hours of manpower to sort mail is not minimal. The Court cannot say with any conf idence that this extra tim e would not have a significan t effect on secur ity at Livingston County Jail.
4. Availability of Fully Accommodating Alternatives The final factor “is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable altern ative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91. If the “claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests,” the Court may consider this as evidence that the jail’s response was exaggerated.Id. at 91. PLN argues
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that the obvious alternative “is to inspect the contetns of the envelopes in the same way the mail was inspected prior to Defendants’ adoption of a ‘postcard only’ policy.” Again, Defendants note that staff at the jail was reduced and the postcard-onyl policy has cut mail processing by half. PLN fails to provide any evidence that going back to the old policy would be ade minimis cost to Defendants. This factor does not weigh in PLN’s favor.
The majority of the Turner factors weigh in favor of Defendants. At this stage, it does not appear likely that PLN would be successful on the merits.
B. Irreparable Injury PLN asserts that it s uffers irreparable injury because it is unable to communicate with inmates at Livingston County Jail or resolve thecensorship of its speech through a notice and appeal process. The Suprem e Court has stated that “[ t]he loss of First Am endment freedoms, for even minimal periods of tim e, unquestionably constitutes irreparable inj ury,” and “even m inimal infringement upon First Am endment values constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify injunctive relief.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). However,PLN has not shown that it is likely to be successful on the m erits and n ecessarily cannot show that it would be harm ed irreparably absent injunctive relief. See Connection Distrib. Co. v .Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]o the extent [plaintiff] can establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment claim, it also has established the possi bility of irreparable harm as a result of the deprivation of the claimed free speech rights.”). C. Harm to Others & Public Interest Although the Court sympathizes with the position of the inmates in the Livingston County Jail who are forced to maintain connections with those on the outside through a 4” x 6” postcard,
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the Court must, at this time, defer to jail officials in the absence of a showing that PLN will likely be successful on the merits. The issuance of injunctive relief could have a significant effect on the safety of both inmates and jail personnel alike. It is in the public interest to maintain jail stability and security. The Court should be slow to dismantle prison regulations absent a showing that it is absolutely necessary. These factors warrant against issuing injunctive relief. III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that PLN’s Motion for Prelim inary Injunction [Docket No. 25, filed January 12, 2012] is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Denise Page Hood Denise Page Hood United States District Judge Dated: March 29, 2013 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on March 29, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry Case Manager
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a Project of the Human Rights Defense Center,

Plaintiff,

v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERRIFF BOB BEZOTT, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Case No. 11-CV-13460 Honorable Denise Page Hood

Defendants.

/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves a constitutional challenge to Defendants’ mail policy as to prisoners.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. For

the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motionfor Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Prison Legal News (“PLN”) initiated this action on August 9, 2011. PLN alleges

that Livingston County and Livingston County Sheriff Bob Bezotte’s policy limiting inmate mail

to postcards violates the first am endment freedom of speech, press, and association, and the

fourteenth amendment right to due process.

PLN is a project of the Human Rights Defense Center in Washington, DC. PLN distributes

a monthly newsletter to inm ates, attorneys, courts, libraries, and the general public on prisoner

related news and legal issues. The Livingston County Jail enforces the following mail policy:
MAIL – Inmates are perm itted to write to any person outside of our Jail f acility. Incoming Inmate correspondence must be addressed as follows:
Inmate Name, Resident Livingston County Jail . . .
• Incoming mail must reflect sender’s name and address. • Correspondence from attorneys, as well as court and public officials may be
opened in the presence of an inmate. • Mail must be sent via US Posta Service. • Items NOT allowed: postage stamps, envelopes, blank stationary, jewelry,
food, books, magazines, sexually explicit pictures, cash, personal or company check. • All mail, except bona-fide legal mail, will be by standard post cards. This is both incoming and outgoing mail. • Incoming mail deemed inappropriate may be placed in the inmate’s property locker.
In January, April, and June 2011, PLN individually addressed and mailed a sample copy of
the Prison Legal News in a manila envelope via First Class Mail, a copy of a soft back book entitled
Protecting Your Health & Safety via Media Mail, and t hree (3) single-page, double-sided
informational brochures in a standard #10 sized envelope via First Class Mail to over 50 prisoners
in the Livingston County Jail. Ea ch item bore a return address to PLN’s PO Box in Verm ont. In
February 2011 and ea ch month thereafter, PLN sent a current issue of its publication to select
individually addressed inmates. No responses were received from the inmates nor did PLN receive
notice that the mail was not delivered. In September 2011, Defendants refused to deliver postcards
to specific inmates. PLN alleges tha t the inmates did not receive any correspondence from PLN
because Defendants censored it.
Human Rights and Defender Center attorneyssent correspondence on PLN’s behalf marked
as “Legal Mail” to select inmates. No responses were received. PLN outside counsel then attempted
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to visit select inmates during business hours at the Livingston County Jail and was refused visitation by jail personnel. III. ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allowsa party to move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. The manner of review under Rule 12(c) is the same as review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Jelovsek v. Bredesen, 545 F.3d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). Rule 12(c) requires the Court to “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept the well-pled factual allegatoins as true, and determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 337 (6th Cir. 2007). However, the oCurt will not accept as true the plaintiff’s legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id.
A. First Amendment Defendants argue that PLN does not have a first amendment right to distribute unsolicited sample copies of Prison Legal News to inmates. They contend that PLN, as a publisher, cannot access inmates when inmates, “through subscription, [have not] willingly [sought PLN’s] point of view . . . .” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1987). The Court, however, disagrees. It is well settled that an inmate does not lose his First Amendment right to receive mail by virtue of his incarceration. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408–10 (1974). The Suprem e Court has recognized that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution,’ nor do they bar free citizens from exercising their own constit utional rights by reaching out to those on the ‘inside.’” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 94–99 (1987)) (internal
3

citations omitted). R ather, “a prison inm ate ‘retains those [ constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitim ate penological objectives of the corrections system.’” Turner, 482 U.S. at 95 (quotingPell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
The Court must afford considerable deference to“the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate t he relations between prisoners and the outside world.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. A prison regulation will be upheld if i t is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. However, before the Court may engage in an analysis of whether the challenged regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the Court must first decide ifa protected interest is at stake.See Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In examining regulations that restrict communications with inmates, we first determine whether any First Amendment interest is implicated.”); Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408 (“there is no question that publishers who wish to com municate with those who, through subscription, willing seek their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners”).
Defendants assert that the Supreme Court inThornburgh recognized that inmates have a First Amendment right to receive m ail only when they have willingly sought the point of view of the publisher through a subscription. 490 U.S. at 408. The Court will not so significantly lim it Thornburgh as the Defendants urge. In Thornburgh, the Supreme Court recognized the interest of non-inmates and inmates in communicating with one another. Id. (noting that access to inmates is essential to lawyers, journalists, and loved ones). The Supreme Court noted that in the context of those categories of individuals who may seek access to inmates, “there is no question that publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their point of view
4

have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners.” Id. The Supreme Court did not, as the Defendants assert, limit First Amendment protection to those whose communications were a result of volition on the part of the inmate.
Rather, Thornburgh stands for the proposition that “prisoners and those ‘reaching out’ to them enjoy generally-existing constitutional rights unless those rights interf ere with the prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Livingston, 683 F.3d at 214; Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d a t 1049–51 (“A First Am endment interest in distributing and receiving information does not depend on a recipient’s priorrequest for that information.”). Communication between inmates and non-inmates is protected regardless of who initiates the communication. The regulation at issue goes f arther than simply limiting an inmate’s expression to m aterial that the inmate has voluntarily agreed to receive. Rather , Defendants’ regulation forecloses all forms of expression that do not fit within t he limited borders of a postcard. To conclude otherwise would prevent inmates from receiving invaluable correspondence from loved ones, attorneys, and clergy who may not first receive the inmate’s prior request.
Defendants note that this Court and the Sixth Circuit have upheld regulations banning bulk mail and free advertising.See Sheets v. Moore, 97 F.3d 164, 168–169 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding ban on free ads, fliers and bulk mail); Kalasho v. Kapturei, 868 F.Supp. 882, 886–88 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (finding policy requiring that subscriptions are se nt by first or second class m ail constitutional); Jones v. Campbell, 23 Fed. Appx. 458 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding regulation that required inmates to prepay for first or second class postage for materials normally sent bulk m ail constitutional); Thompson v. Campbell, No. 02-5588, 81 Fed. Appx. 563, 567–568 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2003) (unpublished) (upholding Tennessee ban on inm ate receipt of mail that advocates anarchy or
5

contains obscenity). However, the upholding of thoes regulations did not turn on whether the inmate had a First Amendment interest in receiving the information. The Sixth Circuit applied theTurner analysis and concluded that the challenged regulations were reasonably related to a legitim ate government interest. Defenda nts would have the Court com pletely silence PLN without first determining whether Defendants’ mail policy is reasonably related to a penological interest.
The Court must apply the four-factor standard provided inTurner when determining whether “a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights.” 482 U.S. at 89. First, the Court must determine whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate and neutral government interest. Id. The regulation must restrict the inmate’s expression without regard to the expression’s content. Id. at 90. Second, there must be alternative means of expression open to the inmate. Id. Third, the Court must consider the impact that the accommodation of the constitutional right will have on others in the prison. Id. Finally, the Court must consider the existence of obvious and easy alternatives as indicative of an exaggerated response by prison officials. Id. “This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id. at 90–91.
Defendants argument hinges completely on the hope that the Court will find that PLN has not demonstrated a constitutional injury. Defendants do not provide any argument on whether the challenged mail policy would meet the requirements of Turner. Even if Defendants were to offer some legitimate penological interest, the Court wouldnot be inclined to rely solely on the pleadings to make this determination. At this stage in litigation, PLN has provided sufficient allegations to demonstrate a First Amendment violation. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is
6

denied as to this point. B. Fourteenth Amendment PLN claims that “Defendants provided PLN no notice of their intent to censor PLN’s mail
nor did Defendants provide to PLN an opportunity toappeal their censorship decision.” [Docket No. 1, Pg ID 5]. Defendants argue that there is no due process violation because PLN does not have a constitutionally protected interest in distributing unsolicited sam ple publications. The Court recognizes that a claimant cannot assert a due process violation in the absence of a constitutionally recognized liberty or property interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Given the Court’s analysis above, Defendants’ challenge to PLN’s due process claim fails for the same reason. PLN has sufficiently stated a claim for a due process violation.
C. Right to Litigate Defendants argue that PLN has no right to accses inmates or send legal mail to inmates when it does not represent any of the inmate recipients. PLN contends that its right to access derives from its right to litigate and not from its status as a member of the press. PLN cites a Supreme Court case and a case fromthe Eleventh Circuit to supportits proposition that PLN has a First Amendment right to access inmates in order to assert its rightto litigate PLN’s constitutional grievances. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983). However, these cases do not support PLN’s conclusion. In NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court held that a Virginia law which prohibited NAACP attorneys and supporters from encouraging members of the public to join litigation to desegregate schools was an unconstitutional infringem ent on the NAACP’s First Am endment freedoms of expression and association. 371 U.S. 415, 429, 434 (1963). Upon invitation, NAACP attorneys
7

would hold a me eting with parents and students to explain the necessary steps to desegregate schools. Id. at 421. There, potential litigants could express their interest in representation. Id. at 422. The NAACP attorneys would also distributepetitions and identify potential litigants amongst petitioners. Id. The Supreme Court found that the NAACP’s solicitation of prospective litigants was a form of political expression and association and Virginia could not ban its efforts to encourage others to litigate. Id. at 429. It did not recognzie a right to litigate, but explained that “the activities of the NAACP . . . are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit . . . as improper solicitation of legal business.” Id.
The present case is distinguishable fr om Button in several im portant ways. First, the potential litigants in Button were members of the public that were not subject to governm ent detention. The standard to access an inmate is much higher than to access members of the general public. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. Second, NAACP, unlike PLN, was inforimng individuals of their legal rights so those individuals could determine whether they wanted to pursue litigation. The NAACP attorneys sought to represent the individula. Here, PLN is a publication and not a legal aid organization. Although the distrbi ution of its publication will ultimately inform inmates of their legal rights, PLN is sendingits attorneys to talk to inmates in order to vindicatePLN’s rights. PLN is not attempting to provide legal representation to the inmates. The purpose of the conversation is not to inform the inmate of an alleged legal wrong, but to gather more information on the alleged wrong committed against PLN. Finally, the NAAC P did not im pose an affirmative duty on t he government. Its efforts to encourage individualsto pursue litigation were initiated and sustained by members of the NAACP.
PLN’s reliance on Jean v. Nelson is also m isplaced. In Jean, the governm ent placed
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significant restrictions on attorney access to Haitian detainees; attorneys sought access to t he detainees in order to inform them of their legal rights. The Eleventh Circuit noted “that regulation of aliens in detention is analogous to regulation in the prison context . . . [and] a determination of proper access regulations requires balancing the gover nment’s interest in detention and security against the plaintiffs’ first amendment rights.” 711 F.2d 1455, 1508 (11th Cir.1983). It went on to recognize plaintiffs’ “purely legal claim of a right to solicit clients in detention. Although this solicitation may not permit individual face-to-face encounter, if Button and Primus mean anything they permit legal counsel to inform individuals of their legal rights when counsel does so a s an exercise of political speech unaccom panied by expectation of r emuneration.” Id. at 1508–09. Again, PLN is a publication and not an or ganization seeking to offer legal services to inm ates. Informing inmates of their legal rights is ancillary. The primary objective in talking to inmates is to allow PLN to better assert its own legal interests so that PL N will be able to distribute its publications. Here, PLN is not attempting to talk with inmates as an act of expression. Rather, PLN is talking to inmates is part of discovery.
PLN argues that it has a right to access inmates in order to vindicate its own constitutional grievances. PLN seems to be asking the Court to impose on the government an affirmative duty to assist PLN in the exercise of PLN’s constitutional right to associate. No such affirmative duty on the government exists. See Deshaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (“the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the governm ent itself may not deprive t he individual.”). Such a require ment would im pose a trem endous burden on prisons. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker , 953 F.2d 1498, 1513–14 (11th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that “[ t]he
9

Constitution . . . does not require the Government to assist the holder of a constitutional right in the exercise of that right” and case law does not suppotr“the conclusion that the Government infringes associational freedom when it denies access to those whom it lawful ly detains”); UkrainianAmerican Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(reasoning that “[t]o admit everyone who would like to advise the [detainee,]each in accordance withhis own view of the good life, and to com municate their offers of assistance would impose a substantial burden upon the Government.”) PLN by its own a dmission seeks to “vindicate its own legal rights . . . and seek judicial relief for constitutional wrongs.” [Docke t No. 20, Pg ID 313]. It cannot expe ct the government to give it unrestricted access to inmates to assert its own rights, especially when PLN contact is unsolicited.
The Court recognizes that PLN has a right to associate and express itself as an organization through litigation. The Court will not extend this righto a right to litigate and access those who are lawfully in government custody. PLN appears to be seeking discovery in order to build its case against Defendants. Again, PLN is a publication. It is not seeking access to inm ates in order to further its representation ofinmates’ constitutional grievances but to vindicate PLN’sown rights as a publication. PLN is not inform ing the inmates of their legal rights but is e ssentially soliciting discovery. The Court finds no right that “guara ntees [PLN] governmental assistance in pursuing [PLN’s] political objective.” Ukrainian-American Bar, 893 F.2d at 1380. This is a discovery issue and PLN has failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation as to Defendants failure to allow visitation of inmates or delivery of “legal mail” not personal to an individual detained inmate. IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, PLN’s First Amendment claims survive except to the extent that the Court finds that
10

PLN has failed to state a constitutional claim for failure to allow visitation of inmates or delivery of “legal m ail” that is not personally m arked to an individual inm ate. Furtherm ore, PLN’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim also remains.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 11, filed October 7, 2011] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Denise Page Hood Denise Page Hood United States District Judge Dated: March 29, 2013 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on March 29, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry Case Manager
11

 
 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR Doc # 122 Filed 01/10/14 Pg 1 of 5 Pg ID 2686

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a Project of the Human Rights Defense Center,

Plaintiff,

-V-
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Case No. 11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR Hon. Denise Page Hood

Defendants. /
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), Prison Legal News (PLN) respectfully
requests leave to file a supplemental complaint, and states the following in support:

1. Pursuant to local court rules, concurrence was sought; however, Defendant has neither concurred nor denied.
2. The standard for granting leave to file a supplemental complaint under Rule 15(d) is the same as the standard for granting leave to file an amended complaint under Rule 15(a). See Glatt v. Chicago Park District, 87 F.3d 190, 194 (7th Cir.1996).

	  

1	  

2:11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR Doc # 122 Filed 01/10/14 Pg 2 of 5 Pg ID 2687
3. Fed.R.Civ.P.15(a) mandates that leave to amend “be freely given when justice so requires.”
4. In Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the Supreme Court offered several factors for district courts to consider in deciding whether to grant a motion to amend under Rule 15(a). The leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given in absence of any of the following factors: a) undue delay b) bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant c) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed d) undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment e) futility of amendment
5. The court has “broad discretion” in ruling on a request to supplement the complaint. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9t' Cir.1988).
6. Rule 15(d) permits the filing of a supplemental complaint when there is a cause of action that arises after the original complaint was filed. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir.1998) (internal quotations omitted).

	  

2	  

2:11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR Doc # 122 Filed 01/10/14 Pg 3 of 5 Pg ID 2688
7. “The purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after the initial pleadings are filed.” William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir.1982).
8. Plaintiff asks the Court to grant this motion, and states the following reasons in support: a) Granting Plaintiff leave to file this supplemental complaint will require a modification of the scheduling order to extend discovery for 30 days only to complete deposition and an entry on land, but it will not delay trial or trial related matter. Extended discovery would be limited to the claim in the supplemental complaint. b) There is no bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of Plaintiff because the facts supporting this supplement occurred in December of 2013. c) Plaintiff has not repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies with other amendments d) Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced by the filing of this supplemental complaint.

	  

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2:11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR Doc # 122 Filed 01/10/14 Pg 4 of 5 Pg ID 2689
e) Plaintiff’s supplement is not futile. Plaintiff seeks to file a supplemental complaint because events have occurred (See attached supplemental complaint) since plaintiff filed its original complaint. Such events are directly related to the violations alleged in the complaint filed on August 9, 2011.
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) provides in pertinent part, “[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
10. The interests of justice will be served by this Court hearing all of the allegations contained in the complaint and supplemental complaint at one trial.
11. In the case at bar, there exists no good reason to deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Supplemental Complaint. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant his motion for
leave to file a first supplemental complaint complaint.

	  

4	  

2:11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR Doc # 122 Filed 01/10/14 Pg 5 of 5 Pg ID 2690
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Daniel E. Manville Daniel E. Manville (P39731) Director, Civil Rights Clinic
Sharron Seaton Clinician Law Student
Counsel for Plaintiff Michigan State University College of Law 610 Abbot Road East Lansing, MI. 48823 517-336-8088, x1137 (office) 517-336-8089 (fax) daniel.manville@law.msu.edu
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Daniel E. Manville certify, under penalty of perjury, that on 1/10/2014, I caused a copy of the above document to be served by the ECF system on Defendant CMS’s Attorney.
/s/ Daniel E. Manville Daniel E. Manville

	  

5	  

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a Project of the Human Rights Defense Center,

Plaintiff,

v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERRIFF BOB BEZOTT, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Case No. 11-CV-13460 Honorable Denise Page Hood

Defendants. /

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT’S MARCH 29, 2013, ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [#68], DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY [#182], AND NOTING AMENDED ORDER

This matter involves a constitutional challenge to Defendants’ mail policy as

to prisoners. Now before the Cour

t is Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for

Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion

for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. [Docket No. 68,filed April 15, 2013] For the

reasons stated below, Plaintiff’sMotion for Reconsideration isDENIED. Plaintiff’s

Motion to File Supplem ental Authorities in Support of its Am ended Motion for

1

Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 182, filed April 2, 2014] is also DENIED. I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Prison Legal News, initiate d this action on August 9, 2011. PLN alleges that Livingston County and Livingston County Sheriff Bob Bezotte’s policy limiting inmate mail to postcards violates the First Amendment freedom of speech, press, and association, and the Fourt eenth Am endment right to due process. Defendants contend, among other things, that jail’s policies and procedures regarding inmate mail are legitimate and neutral. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h) allows a party to file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days after entry of judgment or order. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(1). No response or oral argument is allowed unless the Court orders otherwise. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7(h)(2). Pursuant to Rule 7.1(h)(3), “the court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsidera tion that m erely present the sam e issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly orby reasonable implication.” The standard of review to be employed by the Court when examining a motion for reconsideration is the “palpable defect” standard. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). A “palpable defect” is
2

a “defect which is obvious, clear, unm istakable, manifest, or plain.” Olson v. The

Home Depot, 321 F. Supp. 2d 872, 874 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The movant must show

that (1) the court and the parties have b een misled by a “palpable defect,” and (2)

correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case. E.D. Mich. L.R.

7.1(h)(3).

Further, “a motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle for raising

new facts or arguments.” United States v. A.F.F., 144 F. Supp. 2d 809, 811 (citing

Salopek v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 99–9012, 2000 WL 350263, at *2 (10th

Cir. Apr. 5, 2000)). “Like motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,

motions under Local Rule 7.1(h) ‘are

aimed at reconsideration, not initial

consideration.’” Collins v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co,. 834 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (E.D. Mich.

2011) (quoting Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367,

374 (6th Cir. 1998)). “Abse nt a legitimate excuse, an argument raised for the first

time in a motion for reconsideration at the district court generally will be forfeited.”

In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 728 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United

States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 331-32 (6th Cir. 2009)).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff makes various arguments for reconsideration. The Court has reviewed

each argumen t an d has determin ed that Plaintiff either seeks to have the Court

3

reevaluate issues that it has already decdied upon without a shownig of palpable defect or defect that would “result in a different disposition of the case” or raises entirely new issues that it has not yet presented to the Court. For example, Plaintiff argues that the Court “found PLN failed to state a claim for non-delivery of legal mail ‘that is not personally marked to an individualinmate’” and that this finding was “contrary to factual findings m ade by this Court.” The Court notes that if m ail is alread y addressed to individual inmates as Plaintiff claims and as this Court has noted,see Pl. Compl. at Pg ID 5 (“All items were addressed to specific individual inmates . . . .”), any claim that Plaintiff has made as to mail “not personally marked to an individual inmate” is m oot. The Court did not m ake a conclusion, as Plai ntiff contends, that “PLN did not address its publicationsand legal mail to specific inmates.” [Docket No. 68, Pg ID 2016] Instead, the Court held that Plai ntiff failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation based on mail that was “not personal to an individual inmate” because Plaintiff contends that all of its mail is personally addressed.
Additionally, Plaintiff makes numerous new claims for relief. For exam ple, Plaintiff’s reliance on the “overbreadth doctirne” as it is not mentioned in its response to Defendants’ m otion and one that the Court will not consider in a m otion for reconsideration. Plaintiff also makes new arg uments that it would have referred prisoners to the ACLU, compares itself to a paralegal, and now argues that its right
4

to meet with the prisoners stems from “a constitutional right for attorneys to meet with witnesses to interview them to find support for the allegations of a party wanting to bring a lawsuit.” [Id. at Pg ID 2018] The Court notes that in Plaintiff’s previous filings, Plaintiff argued based on violationsof its right to access witnesses for its own constitutional violations and not those attributable to a prisoner. This is also a new argument and not one that the Court will addrses in this order. Lastly, Plaintiff makes arguments regarding the right of the prisoners to hire and consult with an attorney, arguments that it had not presented before the Court. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion and determ ined that Plaintiff has not pointed to any palpable defect in the Court’s order that would lead to a diffe rent outcom e and, having found that the remaining claims are n ew cl aims that the court will not address in a m otion for reconsideration, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. The Court will, however, for clarity purposes reissue the order amending the “It is Ordered” section only.
The Court also notes that on April 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion to File Supplemental Au thorities in Support of its Am ended Motion for Reconsideration [Docket No. 182] . The Court has reviewed this supplem ental m aterial and that motion is DENIED for the same reasons it has denied the instant motion. IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
5

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Am ended Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying in PartDefendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 68, filed April 15, 2013] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to File Supplem ental Authorities in Support of its Amended Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying in PartDefendants’ Motion for Patrial Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 182, filed April 2, 2014] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will enter an am ended Order Granting in Part and Denyingin Part Defendants’ Motionfor Partial Judgment on the Pleadings consistent with what has been noted above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Denise Page Hood Denise Page Hood United States District Judge Dated: April 11, 2014 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on April 11, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. S/Julie Owens for LaShawn R. Saulsberry Case Manager
6

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a Project of the Human Rights Defense Center,

Plaintiff,

v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERRIFF BOB BEZOTT, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Case No. 11-CV-13460 Honorable Denise Page Hood

Defendants. /

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves a constitutional challenge to Defendants’ mail policy as

to prisoners. This m atter is before th e Court on Defendants’ Motion for Partial

Judgment on the Pleadings. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion for

Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART1.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Prison Legal News (“PLN”) initiated this action on August 9, 2011.

1
The Court notes that this Order remains the same as this Court’s March 29, 2013, Order, except for the “It is Ordered” portion, which had been amended.

PLN alleges that Livingston County a nd Livingston County Sheriff Bob Bezotte’s
policy limiting inmate mail to postcards vio lates th e first am endment freedom of
speech, press, and association, and the fourteenth amendment right to due process.
PLN is a project of the Human Rights Defense Center in Washington, DC. PLN
distributes a monthly newsletter to inmates, attorneys, courts, libraries, and the general
public on prisoner related newsand legal issues. The Livingston County Jail enforces
the following mail policy:
MAIL – Inmates are permitted to write to any person outside of our Jail facility. Incoming Inmate correspondence must be addressed as follows:
Inmate Name, Resident Livingston County Jail . . .
• Incoming mail must reflect sender’s name and address. • Correspondence from attorneys, as well as court and public
officials may be opened in the presence of an inmate. • Mail must be sent via US Postal Service. • Items NOT allowed: postage stamps, envelopes, blank stationary,
jewelry, food, books, magazines, sexually explicit pictures, cash, personal or company check. • All mail, except bona-fi de legal m ail, will be by standard post cards. This is both incoming and outgoing mail. • Incoming mail deemed inappropr iate may be placed in the inmate’s property locker.
In January, April, and June 2011, PL N individually addressed and m ailed a
sample copy of the Prison Legal News in a manila envelope via First Class Mail, a
2

copy of a soft back book entitled Protecting Your Health & Safety via Media Mail, and three (3) single-page, double-sided info rmational brochures in a standard #10 sized envelope via First Class Mail to ovre50 prisoners in the Livingston County Jail. Each item bore a return address to PLN’sPO Box in Vermont. In February 2011 and each month thereafter, PLN sent a currentsisue of its publication to select individually addressed inmates. No responses were received from the inmates nor did PLN receive notice that the m ail was not delivered. In September 2011, De fendants refused to deliver postcards to specific inmates. PLN laleges that the inmates did not receive any correspondence from PLN because Defendants censored it.
Human Rights and Defender Center attorneys sent correspondence on PLN’s behalf marked as “Legal Mail” to select inmates. No responses were received. PLN outside counsel then attem pted to visit select inmates during business hours at the Livingston County Jail and was refused visitation by jail personnel. III. ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. The manner of review under Rule 12(c) is the same as review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Jelovsek v. Bredesen, 545 F.3d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). Rule 12(c) requires the Court to “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept the
3

well-pled factual allegations as true, and determ ine whethe r the m oving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois

Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 337 (6th Cir. 2007). Hwo ever, the Court will not accept

as true the plaintiff’s legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id.

A. First Amendment

Defendants argue that PLN does not have a first amendment right to distribute

unsolicited sample copies of Prison Legal News to inmates. They contend that PLN,

as a publisher, cannot access inmates when inmates, “through subscription, [have not]

willingly [sought PLN’s] point of view . . . .” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,

408 (1987). The Court, however, disagrees.

It is well settled that an inm ate does not lose his First Am endment right to

receive mail by virtue of his incarceration. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408; Procunier

v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408–10 (1974). The Supreme Court has recognized that

“[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections

of the Constitution,’ nor do they bar free citizens from

exercising their o wn

constitutional rights by reaching out to those on the ‘inside.’”Thornburgh, 490 U.S.

at 407 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 94–99 (1987)) (internal citations

omitted). Rather, “a prison inmate ‘retains those [constitutional] rights that are not

inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives

4

of the corrections system.’” Turner, 482 U.S. at 95 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
The Court must afford considerable deference to “the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest ofescurity, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. A prison regulation will be upheld if it is reasonably related toa legitimate penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. However, before the Court m ay engage in an analysis of whether the challenged regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the Court must first decide if a protected interest is at stake. See Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th C ir. 2011) (“In e xamining re gulations tha t re strict communications with inm ates, we first determine whether any First Am endment interest is im plicated.”); Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408 (“there is no question that publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, willing seek their point of view have a legitim ate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners”).
Defendants assert that the Suprem e Court in Thornburgh recognized that inmates have a First Amendment right to receive mail only when they have willingly sought the point of view of the publisher through a subscription. 490 U.S. at 408. The Court will not so significan tly lim it Thornburgh as the Defendants urge. In
5

Thornburgh, the Supreme Court recognized the interest of non-inmates and inmates in communicating with one another. Id. (noting that access to inmates is essential to lawyers, journalists, and loved ones). TheSupreme Court noted that in the context of those categories of individuals who may seekaccess to inmates, “there is no question that publishers who wish to com municate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their point of view have laegitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners.” Id. The Supreme Court did not, as the Defendants assert, limit First Amendment protection to those whose communications were a result of volition on the part of the inmate.
Rather, Thornburgh stands for the proposition that “prisoners and those ‘reaching out’ to them en joy g enerally-existing constitutional rights unless those rights interfere with the prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Livingston, 683 F.3d at 214; Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049–51 (“A First Amendment interest in distributing and receiving information does not depend on a recipient’s prior request for that information.”). Communication between inmates and non-inmates is protected regardless of who initiates the com munication. The regulation at issue goes farther than simply limiting an inmate’s expression to material that the inmate has voluntarily agreed to receive. Rather, Def endants’ regulation forecloses all form s of expression that do not fit within the lim ited borders of a
6

postcard. To co nclude otherwise would prevent inmates from receiving invaluable correspondence from loved ones, attorneys, and clergy who may not first receive the inmate’s prior request.
Defendants note that this Court and the Sixth Circuit have upheld regulations banning bulk mail and free advertising. See Sheets v. Moore, 97 F.3d 164, 168–169 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding ban on free ads, fliers and bulk amil); Kalasho v. Kapturei, 868 F. Supp. 882, 886–88 (E.D. Mich. 1994) ( finding policy requiring that subscriptions are sent by first orsecond class mail constitutional); Jones v. Campbell, 23 Fed. Appx. 458 (6th Cir.2001) (finding regulation that required inmates to prepay for first or second class postage for materials normally sent bulk mail constitutional); Thompson v. Campbell,No. 02-5588, 81 Fed. Appx. 563,567–568 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2003) (unpublished) (upholding Tennessee ban on inm ate receipt of m ail that advocates anarchy or contains obscenity). However, the upholding of those regulations did not turn on whether the in mate had a First Am endment interest in receiving the inform ation. The Sixth Circuit applied the Turner analysi s an d concluded that the challenge d regulations were reasonabl y related to a legitim ate government i nterest. D efendants w ould ha ve t he C ourt c ompletely si lence PL N without first determining whether Defendants’ mail policy is reasonably related to a penological interest.
7

The Court m ust apply the four-factor standard provided in Turner when determining whether “a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights.” 482 U.S. at 89. First, the Court must determine whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate andneutral government interest.Id. The regulation must restrict the inmate’s expression without regard to the expression’s content.Id. at 90. Second, there must be alternative means ofexpression open to the inmate. Id. Third, the Court must consider the impactthat the accommodation of the constitutional right will have on others in the prison. Id. Finally, the Court must consider the existence of obvious and easy alternatives as indicative of anexaggerated response by prison officials. Id. “This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative m ethod of accom modating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id. at 90–91.
Defendants argument hinges completely on the hope that the Court will find that PLN has not demonstrated a constitutional injury. Defendants do not provide any argument on whether the challenged m ail policy would m eet the requirem ents of Turner. Even if Defendants were to offer some legitimate penological interest, the Court would not be inclined to rely solelyon the pleadings to make this determination. At this stage in litigation, PLN has provide d sufficient allegations to demonstrate a First Amendment violation. Defendants’ m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings is
8

denied as to this point. B. Fourteenth Amendment PLN claims that “Defendants provided PLN no notice of their intent to censor
PLN’s m ail nor did Defendants provide to PLN an opportunity to appeal their censorship decision.” [Docket No. 1, Pg ID 5]. Defendants argue that there is no due process violation because PLN does not have a constitutionally protected interest in distributing unsolicited sam ple publications. The Court recognizes that a claim ant cannot assert a due process violation in the absence of a constitutionally recognized liberty or property interest. Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Given the Court’s analysisabove, Defendants’ challengeto PLN’s due process claim fails for the sam e reason. PLN has suffi ciently stated a claim for a due process violation.
C. Right to Litigate Defendants argue that PLN has no rightto access inmates or send legal mail to inmates when it does not represent any of the inmate recipients. PLN contends that its right to access derives from its right tolitigate and not from itsstatus as a member of the press. PLN cites aSupreme Court case and a casefrom the Eleventh Circuit to support its proposition that PLN has a First Amen dment right to access inm ates in order to assert its right to litigat e PLN’s constitutional grievances. See NAACP v.
9

Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Jean v. Nel son, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983). However, these cases do not support PLN’s conclusion.
In NAACP v. Button , the Supreme Co urt held that a Virginia law which prohibited NAACP attorneys and supporters fromencouraging members of the public to join litigation to desegregate schools was an unconstitutional infringement on the NAACP’s First Amendment freedoms of expression and association. 371 U.S. 415, 429, 434 (1963). Upon invitation, NAACP a ttorneys would hold a m eeting with parents and students to explain the necessary steps to desegregate schools. Id. at 421. There, potential litigants could expresstheir interest in representation.Id. at 422. The NAACP attorneys would also distribute petitions and identify potential litigants amongst petitioners. Id. The Supreme Court found that the NAACP’s solicitation of prospective litigants was a form of political expression and association and Virginia could not ban its efforts to encourage others to litigate. Id. at 429. It did not recognize a right to litigate, but explained that “the activities of the NAACP . . . are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit . . . as im proper solicitation of legal business.” Id.
The present case is distinguishable from Button in several im portant ways. First, the potential litigants inButton were members of the public that were not subject
10

to government detention. Th e standard to access an inm ate is much higher than to access members of the general public. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. Second, NAACP, unlike PLN, was informing i ndividuals of their legal rights so those individuals could determine whether they wanted to pursue litigation. The NAACP attorneys sought to represent the individua l. Here, PLN is a publication and not a legal aid organization. Although the dist ribution of its publication will ultim ately inform inmates of their legal rights, PLN is sendingits attorneys to talk to inmates in order to vindicatePLN’s rights. PLN is not attempting to provide legal representation to the inm ates. The purpose of the conversation is not to inform the inm ate of an alleged legal wrong, but togather more information on the alleged wrong committed against PLN. Finally, the NAACP did not impose an affirm ative duty o n t he government. Its efforts to encourage indivdiuals to pursue litigation were initiated and sustained by members of the NAACP.
PLN’s reliance on Jean v. Nelson is also misplaced. In Jean, the government placed significant restrictions on attorneyaccess to Haitian detainees; attorneys sought access to the detainees in o rder to inform them of their legal rights. The Eleventh Circuit noted “that regulation of aliens in detention is analogous to regulation in the prison context . . . [and] a d etermination of proper access regulations requires balancing the government’s interest in detention and security against the plaintiffs’
11

first amendment rights.” 711 F.2d 1455, 1508 (11th Cir. 1983). It went on to recognize plaintiffs’ “purely legal claim of a right to solicit clients in detention. Although this solicitation may not permit individual face-to-face encounter, ifButton and Primus mean anything they permit legal counsel to inform individuals of their legal rights when counsel does so as an exercise of political speech unaccompanied by expectation of remuneration.” Id. at 1508–09. Again, PLN is a publication and not an organization seeking to offer legal services to inmates. Informing inmates of their legal rights is ancillary. The primary objective in talking to inmates is to allow PLN to b etter assert its own le gal interests so that PLN will be able to distribute its publications. Here, PLN is not attempting to talk with inmates as an act of expression. Rather, PLN is talking to inmates is part of discovery.
PLN argues that it has a right to access inmates in order to vindicate its own constitutional grievances. PLN seem s to be asking the Court to im pose on the government an affirmative duty to assist PLN in the exercise of PLN’s constitutional right to associate. No such affirmative duty on the government exists. See Deshaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (“the Due Proce ss Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, evenwhere such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). Such a requirement would impose a tremendous burden on prisons.See
12

Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513–14 (11th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that “[t]he Constitution . . . does not require the Government to assist the holder of a constitutional right in the exercise of that right” and case law does not support “the conclusion that the Government infringes sasociational freedom when it denies access to those whomit lawfully detains”);Ukrainian-American Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Bake,r893 F.2d 1374, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reasoning tha“t[t]o admit everyone who would like to advise the [detainee], each in accordance with his own view of the good life, and to communicate their offers of assistance would impose a substantial burden upon the Government.”) PLN by its own admission seeks to “vindicate its own legal rights . . . and seek judicial relief for constitutional wrongs.” [Docket No. 20, Pg ID 313]. It cannot expect the government to give it unrestricted access to inmates to assert its own rights, especially when PLN contact is unsolicited.
The Court recognizes that PLN has a rightto associate and express itself as an organization through litigation. The Court will not extend this right to a right to litigate and access those who are lawfully ingovernment custody. PLN appears to be seeking discovery in order to build its cas e against Defendants. Again, PLN is a publication. It is not seeking access to inmates in order to further its representation of inm ates’ constitutional grievances but to vindicate PLN’s own rights as a publication. PLN is not informing the inmates of their legal rights but is essentially
13

soliciting discovery. The Court finds no right that “guarantees [PLN] governmental

assistance in pursuing [PLN’s] political objective.” Ukrainian-American Bar, 893

F.2d at 1380. This is a discovery issue and PLN has failed to state a claim for a

constitutional violatio n as to Defendants failure to allo w visitation of inm ates or

delivery of “legal mail” not personal to an individual detained inmate.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the

Pleadings [Docket No. 11, filed October 7, 2011] is DENIED IN PART and

GRANTED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDthat Plaintiff’s FirstAmendment claims survive

judgment on the pleadings.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for

a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff has failed, on these facts, to state

a claim for a constitutional violation fo r fa ilure to allow visitation of inm ates or

delivery of “legal mail” not personal to an individual inmate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2014

S/Denise Page Hood Denise Page Hood United States District Judge

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on April 11, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Julie Owens for LaShawn R. Saulsberry Case Manager
15

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, d/b/a Prison Legal News,

Plaintiff,

v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Case No. 11-CV-13460 Honorable Denise Page Hood

Defendants. /

ORDER REGARDING VARIOUS MOTIONS

I. Background

The Plaintiff, Prison Legal News, and Defendants, Livingston County and Bob

Bezotte, have filed various motions that remain outstanding. All of those outstanding

motions, except for Docket No. 127, are addressed herein. A short summary of the

claims of Plaintiff can be found in other court Orders, specifically the Court’s Orders

dated March 29, 2013 [Docket Nos. 63, 64]. The Court notes that it has conducted

three hearings regarding a number of the motions discussed in this Order–on April 23,

2014, May 9, 2014, and March 9, 2016. With respect to each motion discussed, the

Court will specifically identify any hearing at which the motion was discussed. In

addition, at the March 9, 2016, hearing, the parties agreed to withdraw their respective

motions for summary judgment [Docket Nos. 155, 156/157], with the understanding that they would be able to re-file them in the future, after the outstanding discovery matters are resolved and discovery is completed.1
II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 66]
A. Motion for Reconsideration Plaintiff timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s March 29, 2013 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In order to obtain reconsideration of a particular matter, the party bringing the motion for reconsideration must: (1) demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have been misled; and (2) demonstrate that “correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h). See also Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir. 2004); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 44 F.Supp.2d 865, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Kirkpatrick v. General Electric, 969 F.Supp. 457, 459 (E.D. Mich. 1997). “[T]he court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same
1In light of the withdrawal of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion to File Supplemental Authority [Docket No. 211] and Plaintiff’s Notice of (Motion to File) Supplemental Authority [Docket No. 223]. In light of the withdrawal of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Motion to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 165].
2

issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication.” E.D. MICH. LR 7.1(h)(3); Mailberger v. City of Livonia, 747 F.Supp.2d 759 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
Plaintiff first asserts that the Court misapplied the law and facts in determining that a preliminary injunction was not warranted. Plaintiff claims that the Court erred in not issuing a preliminary injunction regarding Defendants’ practices that prohibit delivery to inmates of books, magazines, and any other publications that are not printed on postcards. This argument, however, merely restates arguments previously made and ruled upon by this Court, and Plaintiff has demonstrated no palpable defect by which the Court and the parties have been misled. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied with respect to the rulings the Court made in the March 29, 2013 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Plaintiff also accurately asserts that the Court failed to address Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment due process claim when ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff claims the Court’s failure to address the due process claim is, in itself, sufficient grounds for granting reconsideration. The Court agrees – but only to the extent that granting the Motion for Reconsideration means that the Court needs to address Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment due process claim in the context of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. The Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for
3

Reconsideration insofar as Plaintiff requests that the Court address and decide whether
Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction with respect to its 14th Amendment due
process claim. The Court notes that the parties briefed this issue when filing their briefs addressing Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.2 The Court concludes
that additional briefing is not necessary, and the Court will decide the issue on the
briefs the parties filed regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
[Docket Nos. 25, 32, 34]
For the reasons stated in this Section II.A., the Court grants in part and denies
in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
B. 14th Amendment Due Process Claim
The Court utilizes the same standard for injunctive relief set forth in its March
29, 2013 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction; specifically
that:
The district court must consider four factors: (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction; (3) whether granting the preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public’s best interest. Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 573. The Court must make specific findings on each factor unless fewer factors would be dispositive. Performance Unlimited v. Questar Publishers, Inc. 52 F.3d 1373, 1381 (6th Cir.
2The American Civil Liberties Union Fund (“ACLU”) filed an amicus curiae brief with respect to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, but the ACLU did not brief this issue.
4

1995).... [Docket No. 63, PgID 1975]
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits The Court must engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether the challenged regulation/policy is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408-09 (1989); Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court must first determine whether Plaintiff has asserted a protected constitutional interest before analyzing whether Defendants’ regulation is related to a legitimate penological interest. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1048 (“we first determine whether any First Amendment interest is implicated” before “apply[ing] the four-factor Turner test”). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment due process claims regarding Defendants’ notice of rejected mail/opportunity to appeal such reject policy implicate a constitutionally protected interest. The Supreme Court has held that due process requires a governmental entity’s “decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter . . . be accompanied by minimal procedural safeguards” to be constitutional. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417 (1974) (emphasis added). The Martinez court concluded that such “minimal procedural safeguards” include: (1) notice must be given to the inmate to whom the rejected letter
5

was addressed; (2) the author of the letter must be given a reasonable opportunity to
object to (i.e., heard with respect to) the decision to reject the letter; and (3)
complaints concerning the rejection must be reviewed by someone other than the
individual who originally rejected the letter. Id. at 418-19. The Sixth Circuit has since
elaborated on the Martinez court’s conclusion, stating that:
As an initial matter, we note that the “minimum procedural safeguards” referred to in Martinez are not mandated solely because of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but are primarily required because of the First Amendment free speech rights that are being protected. It is because of the concerns over protecting the freedom of speech and preventing the chilling of speech that procedural safeguards must be in place before letters are withheld or censored. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406 n. 10, 418-19, 94 S.Ct. at 1808 n. 10, 1814[;] Campbell v. Sumner, 587 F.Supp. 376, 378 (D.Nev.1984). Therefore, we must determine which procedures are required under the Due Process Clause to adequately protect the important First Amendment interests at stake.[3]
We first hold that an incoming mail censorship regulation must provide that notice of rejection be given to the inmate-recipient. The need for such a requirement is evident: without notice of rejection, censorship of protected speech can escape detection by inmates and therefore go unchallenged. Although prison officials may have occasionally, or even consistently, given notice to inmates, the regulation does not require that notice be given.
Second, we hold that the mail censorship regulation is insufficient because it fails to require that notice and an opportunity to protest the decision be given to the author of the rejected letter. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, the decision in Martinez, as previously
3The Court notes that in Martin, as in this case, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a likelihood of success with respect to its First Amendment claims (in fact, the Martin court actually ruled that the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was not viable).
6

discussed, was premised on the fact that the First Amendment rights of free citizens were implicated by the censorship of prisoners' mail. Without notifying the free citizen of the impending rejection, he would not be able to challenge the decision which may infringe his right to free speech. Cf. Trudeau v. Wyrick, 713 F.2d 1360, 1366 (8th Cir.1983) (author of letter brought a First Amendment challenge);[] Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1027-28 (2d Cir.1985) (the author would have standing to challenge interference with prisoners' mail). Second, since the inmate-recipient would not have seen the contents of the withheld letter, he may require the aid of the author to meaningfully challenge the rejection decision. See Cofone v. Manson, 409 F.Supp. 1033, 1042 (D.Conn.1976) (holding that a publisher must receive notice when a prison official decides to withhold a particular publication since a prisoner “cannot be expected to marshal arguments in favor of its admission without the assistance of someone familiar with the material”).
We conclude, finally, that a mail censorship regulation must provide for an appeal of the rejection decision to an impartial third party prior to the letter being returned. This is necessary to ensure that future rejection decisions are fair, and based on appropriate factors.
Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1986).
Based on Martinez and Martin, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a
constitutionally protected interests in: (a) receiving notification from Defendants when
Defendants reject (i.e., do not deliver) mail Plaintiff sends to designated inmates at the
Livingston County Jail, and (b) being able to appeal any such rejection to an impartial
third party (at least with respect to the initial copies of any publication).4 In this case,
4See, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 223(5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original) (after a review committee’s denial of a publication, “subsequent denials of identical publications amount to routine enforcement of a
7

it is undisputed that the Livingston County Jail policy does not require that a sender or the designated inmate recipient be notified that mail has been rejected, nor does it provide that such sender or inmate have a right to appeal/be heard with respect to the rejection of the mail. [See, e.g., Docket No. 155-7, PgID 3625] Likewise, it is undisputed that Defendants did not notify Plaintiff or any designated inmate recipients at the Livingston County Jail when Defendants rejected (did not deliver) publications sent by Plaintiff to such inmates. [Docket No. 25-2, PgID 529, ¶ 11; Docket No. 25-6, PgID 556, ¶ 6; Docket No. 155-7, PgID 3617, 3625]
Defendants argument regarding Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights focused on the issue of standing (which Plaintiff has for 14th Amendment purposes, as the Court held in its March 29, 2013 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction). Defendants only peripherally addressed the issue of their failure to notify Plaintiff or inmates that Defendants rejected Plaintiff’s publications sent to designated inmates. To the extent Defendants did discuss the issue of procedural due process, their argument was limited to citing a district court case from Utah regarding “promotional sample packets,” a case which is neither persuasive nor binding on this Court. See Prison Legal News v. Cheshire, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48099, at *25-26 (D. Utah June 30, 2006).
rule with general applicability”).
8

The Court now must engage in the second step of the analysis applied in
Thornburgh, i.e., determining whether the challenged regulation is reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1048; Thornburgh, 490
U.S. at 408-09. As the Court stated in its March 29, 2013 Order denying Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction:
The Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider when determining whether “a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987). The Turner test requires that:
1. there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;
2. there must be alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates;
3. we must consider the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and
4. there must not be alternatives available that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 267 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91). Failure to satisfy the first factor is dispositive. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. The remaining factors must be balanced together in order to evaluate the reasonableness of the challenged regulation. Jones, 569 F.3d at 267. The Court will review the challenged regulation with deference to “the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the
9

outside world.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. [Docket No. 63, PgID 1975-76]
The Court finds that Defendant has failed to satisfy the first Turner factor. Defendants have not even provided a legitimate penological interest why Defendants do not notify the sender or the designated inmate recipient that the sender’s mail to such intended inmate recipient was rejected (which necessarily precludes the ability to appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party). For that reason, the Court cannot find that there is any rational connection to a legitimate penological interest for failing to notify the sender or designated inmate recipient of the rejection (or not affording them the right to appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party). Defendant’s failure to satisfy the first Turner factor is dispositive. The Court concludes that the challenged regulation (not providing notice to Plaintiff or the designated inmate recipient that Defendants rejected mail sent by Plaintiff to the designated inmates and not affording either of them the opportunity to appeal such rejection to an impartial third party) is not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.
With respect to Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment procedural due process claim, the Court holds that it appears likely that Plaintiff will be successful on the merits.
2. The Remaining Factors
10

The Court also finds that, because Plaintiff’s constitutional rights likely are being violated, the remaining three injunctive relief factors (irreparable harm, harm to others, public interest) weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction requiring notice to Plaintiff and the designated inmate of rejected mail from Plaintiff to such inmate (and affording Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient the right to appeal such rejection to an impartial third party) is not granted. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir. 1987) (“there is potential irreparable injury in the form of a violation of constitutional rights”); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996) (there is a “presumption of irreparable injury that flows from violation of constitutional rights”). Further, as the Court has concluded that “there is a likelihood that the [Defendant’s policy] will be found unconstitutional [vis a vis the absence of notice to the sender of the mail or the designated inmate recipient and the right to appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party]; it is therefore questionable whether [Livingston County] has any ‘valid’ interest in enforcing the [policy]. Consequently, [the Court] find[s] no substantial harm in preventing Defendants from enforcing it” insofar as Defendants fail to provide such notice. Planned Parenthood, 822 F.2d at 1400. “Finally, the last factor–whether the public interest is served by the injunction–is also met, since the public is certainly interested
11

in the prevention of enforcement of [a policy] which may be unconstitutional.” Id. The Court finds that all four factors weigh in favor of Plaintiff with respect to
its request for a preliminary injunction with respect to its 14th Amendment due process claim. Specifically, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction as to Defendants’ failure to provide notice to, and an opportunity to appeal by, Plaintiff and designated inmate recipients when Defendants reject publications sent by Plaintiff to such designated inmates at Livingston County Jail.
The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction with respect to its 14th Amendment procedural due process claim. In addition, the Court orders that, effective immediately, Defendants must, in every instance that Defendants reject (i.e., do not deliver) mail sent by Plaintiff to a designated inmate at the Livingston County Jail (at least with respect to the initial copy of any publication): (a) notify Plaintiff of such rejection; (b) notify the designated inmate recipient of such rejection; and (c) notify Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient of the right to–and afford Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient the opportunity to–appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party. III. Plaintiff’s Motion for an Injunction to Allow Access to Detainees-
Witnesses [Docket No. 124] On January 13, 2014, Plaintiff moved the Court to order Defendants to allow
12

Plaintiff’s attorneys and experts access to possible inmate witnesses located at the
Livingston County Jail. This motion was fully briefed, and its subject matter was
argued at a hearing on April 23, 2014.
Plaintiff stated at the April 23, 2014 hearing that the matters at issue in this
motion for an injunction to allow access to detainees-witness and the matters at issue
in Plaintiff’s motion to compel entry on land [Docket No. 123] were basically the
same. The Court agrees with Plaintiff and, for the same reasons the motion to compel
entry on land was denied, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for an injunction to
allow access to detainees-witness. As the Court stated in addressing the motion to
compel entry on land in its April 14, 2015 Order:
Here, Plaintiff requests that the Court allow it to visit the Livingston County Jail to review the mailroom, the cell areas, and the law library of the Livingston County Jail, requests permission to review the processing of the mail at the jail, and also permission to interview “detainees confined at the jail” to discuss “issues pertaining to this litigation.” Plaintiff has failed to cite to any cases in which a Court has allowed attorneys who are not seeking to give detainees legal advice or represent them in some way have access to detainees while incarcerated to further their own litigious goals. As stated in this Court’s March 29, 2013, Order, PLN does not have a right to access inmates in order to vindicate its own constitutional grievances. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that “[t]he Constitution . . . does not require the Government to assist the holder of a constitutional right in the exercise of that right” and case law does not support “the conclusion that the Government infringes associational freedom when it denies access to those whom it lawfully detains”); Ukrainian-American Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reasoning that “[t]o admit everyone who would like to
13

advise the [detainee], each in accordance with his own view of the good life, and to communicate their offers of assistance would impose a substantial burden upon the Government.”).
Plaintiff again seems to seek to inspect the mailroom and storage facilities, review the mail procedures, review the jail cells, and speak with inmates to assert its own rights and build its own case. Plaintiff is a publication and is not in the business of informing inmates of their legal rights [or] providing legal representation such that i[t] should have the same level of access to inmates as attorneys and legal aid organizations. The Court finds no right that “guarantees [Plaintiff] governmental assistance in pursuing [its] political objective.” UkrainianAmerican Bar, 893 F.2d at 1380. This Court is satisfied that, as Plaintiff noted, this is indeed a discovery issue but “rule 34 [does not] permit[] blanket discovery upon [a] bare skeletal request when confronted with an objection.” Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 588 F.2d 904, 908 (4th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has failed to show how the information it seeks by entering the jail is relevant to its constitutional claims at this time or that access to information cannot be obtained by other means.
[Docket No. 221, PgID 6206-08 (emphasis added)]
As the foregoing language reveals, the Court implicitly denied Plaintiff’s
motion for an injunction to allow access to detainees-witnesses in its April 14, 2015
Order. [Docket No. 221] In reviewing Plaintiff’s brief in support of its motion for an
injunction to allow access to detainees-witnesses, the Court finds no argument or law
to persuade the Court that it should not apply the reasoning set forth above in deciding
Plaintiff’s motion for an injunction to allow access to detainees-witnesses. Most
significantly, the present action is not an action brought on behalf of inmates of
Livingston County Jail, and Plaintiff “does not have a right to access inmates in order
14

to vindicate its own constitutional grievances.” Haitian Refugee Center, 953 F.2d at 1513-14.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for an injunction to allow access to detainees-witnesses. IV. Defendants’ Motion for Leave of Court to Take Depositions [Docket No.
139] On January 30, 2014, Defendants moved the Court for leave to depose four former inmates at the Livingston County Jail to whom Plaintiff attempted to mail its publications. Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ motion for four reasons: (1) the knowledge by Defendants of the elements of Plaintiff’s claims; (2) the misbehavior of Defendants’ counsel; (3) lack of merit; and (4) untimeliness. The parties argued this motion at the May 9, 2014 hearing. Defendants contend that they received Declarations from the four individuals (Michael Stoll, Michael Rickman, Brian Rheingans, and Andrew Tweedy) in December 2013. In each declaration, the former Livingston County Jail inmate declared that he had not received any materials from Plaintiff or been notified that Plaintiff had tried to send materials to him while at the Livingston County Jail. At the time Defendants filed their motion, three of the inmates were incarcerated at prisons throughout Michigan, including at least one in the Upper Peninsula near the Michigan/Wisconsin border. The fourth individual had been released from prison,
15

though Defendant had not yet located him. The Court is not persuaded that Defendants were entitled to the relief they
sought in 2014, nor that such relief is necessary or appropriate at this time. First, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ contention that they only became aware of the need to depose these four individuals in December 2013/January 2014. Defendants were or reasonably should have been on notice since the outset of the litigation that Plaintiff had a claim based on Defendants’ failure to deliver mail to designated inmates at the Livingston County Jail. In April 2013, in Plaintiff’s responses to Defendants’ first set of discovery requests, Plaintiff identified two of the four individuals. Further, Plaintiff’s specifically identified these four individuals on a witness list filed August 23, 2013, over five months before Defendants’ motion was filed.
Second, Defendants claim to need to talk to these four individuals because each of them allegedly: (1) was sent materials by Plaintiff (though none of those four individuals has personal knowledge that such materials were sent to them); (2) can testify that he did not receive any materials from Plaintiff while incarcerated at Livingston County Jail; and (3) was not notified by Defendants (or anyone associated with Livingston County Jail) that Defendants had rejected (not delivered) mail sent by Plaintiff that was specifically addressed to him. Since the motion was filed,
16

however, Livingston County Jail Administrator, Lieutenant Tom Cremonte (“Cremonte”) has testified that Defendants did not deliver materials mailed by Plaintiff to inmates at the Livingston County Jail (even if addressed to a designated inmate), nor did Defendants notify Plaintiff or any inmates to whom Plaintiff’s materials were sent that Defendants had received–but did not deliver–such materials. [Docket No. 155-7, PgID 3625] As Cremonte has admitted to the very conduct to which these four individuals will testify, it is unclear that their testimony is still necessary.
In addition, it is not clear to the Court where the four individuals are located at this time. In light of Cremonte’s admissions, the value of and need for these four witnesses is debatable, at best. If they are still in the Michigan prison system and/or located throughout Michigan (as they were when Defendants filed their motion), the Court is not persuaded that devoting judicial resources or the parties’ resources on this issue furthers the interests of justice at this time. In the event that this matter ultimately proceeds to trial and these four witnesses will be called to testify, the Court will consider a renewed motion by Defendants to take the depositions of these four individuals, if Defendants still desire to depose them.
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Leave of Court to Take Depositions, without prejudice.
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V. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Docket No. 159] In its March 10, 2014 Motion for Sanctions, Defendants ask the Court to
sanction: (a) Plaintiff, for filing a Motion to File Supplemental Complaint with allegations Plaintiff knew or should have known were frivolous and lacked merit, and (b) “plaintiff” ACLU, for acting in bad faith when it conducted discovery “far beyond any scope as an amicus curiae and . . . further outside of the scheduling order.” The parties have fully briefed the Motion for Sanctions, and this Court heard arguments on the motion at the May 9, 2014 hearing.
A. Sanctions Warranted Against Plaintiff Defendants contend that Plaintiff should be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for filing a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint (“Proposed Supplemental Complaint”) on January 10, 2014 [Docket No. 122]. Section 1927 provides that “any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” The instant motion for sanctions constitutes the second time that Defendants have requested that Plaintiff be sanctioned for filing the Proposed Supplemental Complaint. The first time Defendants sought sanctions against Plaintiff for filing the Proposed Supplemental Complaint was in their response to the Proposed
18

Supplemental Complaint, filed on January 27, 2014 [Docket No. 133]. When Plaintiff withdrew the Proposed Supplemental Complaint on February 5, 2014 [Docket No. 147], however, Defendants’ initial request for sanctions was obviated. Defendants argue that sanctions should be imposed against Plaintiff because it “knowingly and frivolously pursued a meritless claim in its Proposed Supplemental Complaint.” Specifically, Defendant states that Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion includes claims that Plaintiff had First Amendment rights ‘to communicate with those confined to determine whether they have information pertaining to legal matters that said detainee could be a witness for’ and to have correspondence delivered from an ‘attorney of record.’” [Docket No. 159, PgID 4572 (quoting Docket No. 122-1, PgID 2693, ¶¶ 7-8)] Defendant argues that Plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that filing such a claim was frivolous and vexatious because the Court had rejected those claims in an Order Regarding Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, issued on March 29, 2013 [Docket No. 64]. In that Order, the Court stated that Plaintiff does not have “a right to litigate and access those who are lawfully in government custody” and that Plaintiff “failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation as to Defendants’ failure to allow visitation of inmates or delivery of ‘legal mail.’” Id. at PgID 1993. Defendants contend that Plaintiff should be sanctioned because an “attempt to raise a claim that ha[s] already been rejected is sanctionable
19

under section 1927.” [Docket No. 159, PgID 4572 (citing Fharmacy Records v. Simmons, 2006 WL 156669, at *3 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 20, 2006) (Roberts, J.) (sanctioning plaintiffs’ attorney under section 1927 for pursuing meritless claims based on an argument that was similar to an argument previously rejected by the Court))].
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions is meritless legally and factually. Plaintiff contends that its initial Complaint alleged that Plaintiff’s in-house counsel sought to contact detainees before the lawsuit was filed (Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23), a right the Court concluded Plaintiff did not have. [Docket No. 64, PgID 1992]. Plaintiff states that, in the Proposed Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that it sent letters to detainees at the Livingston County Jail as part of discovery and those letters were not delivered to the detainees. Plaintiff then expounds on the need for parties to be able to present evidence through witnesses and to meet with them in order to prepare for trial. [Docket No. 166, PgID 4660-64] Plaintiff contends that Defendants are interfering with the discovery process as to Plaintiff’s counsel having access to potential witnesses (Livingston County Jail detainees).
With respect to its decision to withdraw the Proposed Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiff states that:
After further discussion with counsel for [Plaintiff], it was decided the motion to file a supplemental complaint, even if granted, could not allow
20

[Plaintiff] to have access to the requested witnesses until after trial was completed. It was determined to withdraw the motion because [Plaintiff] had pending a motion for an order to obtain access to these detainees through the discovery process (D/E 124) and a grant of that motion would get immediate access to the potential witnesses. [Docket No. 166, PgID 4658] As Defendants’ argue in their reply, Plaintiff does not explain how the allegations in the Proposed Supplemental Complaint were substantively different than the allegations that the Court rejected in its March 29, 2013 Order Regarding Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In both instances, Plaintiff challenged Defendants’ denial of access by Plaintiff to detainees of the Livingston County Jail, something the Court had clearly ruled upon in its March 29, 2013 Order. The Court also is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s contention that it decided to withdraw the Proposed Supplemental Complaint because it had filed a discovery motion for an order to access the detainees. The Proposed Supplemental Complaint was filed on January 10, 2014, and the motion for an order to access the detainees was filed on January 13, 2014, only three days later–and 14 days before Defendants filed their response to the Proposed Supplemental Complaint. In other words, Plaintiff had two weeks before Defendants’ response within which it could have withdrawn the proposed Supplemental Motion that sought relief that the Court previously had ruled Plaintiff had no right to. Because Plaintiff elected to file the Proposed Supplemental
21

Complaint after Defendants denied concurrence in it and because Plaintiff did not withdraw the meritless Proposed Supplemental Complaint when it filed its motion for an order to access detainees-witnesses (the reason Plaintiff now asserts for withdrawing the Proposed Supplemental Complaint), Defendants needlessly incurred the expense of responding to the Proposed Supplemental Complaint.
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to sanctions against Plaintiff with respect to: (a) the reasonable fees and costs Defendants incurred in responding to Plaintiff’s Proposed Supplemental Complaint, (b) the reasonable fees and costs of Defendants associated with preparing their Motion for Sanctions and corresponding reply brief, and (c) one-half (.5) hour of Mr. Seward’s time for arguing the Motion for Sanctions at the May 9, 2014 hearing (collectively, “Defendants’ Fees and Costs”). The Court orders Defendants to provide the Court, within 30 days of the date of this Order, a detailed invoice that sets forth the basis for Defendants’ Fees and Costs.
B. Sanctions Not Warranted Against ACLU Defendants recognize that the Court granted ACLU amicus curiae status in this lawsuit, and the ACLU had filed briefs in this matter on certain motions prior to Defendants filing the Motion for Sanctions on January 10, 2014. [Docket Nos. 28, 37, 56] Defendants contend that the ACLU also has acted as a litigating amicus curiae
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“by participating in discovery in this lawsuit when” the ACLU:
1. Made a FOIA request from the Livingston County Sheriff’s Department requesting a list of all Livingston County Jail inmates on January 27, 2014;
2. Mailed 25 letters to inmates at the Livingston County Jail on February 19, 2014 (the “ACLU Letters”); and
3. Informed the inmates that the ACLU was investigating the Livingston County Jail’s mailing policy and inquired whether any inmate(s) was interested in meeting with an ACLU attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal representation or advice regarding the Livingston County Jail mailing policy.
Defendants argue that because the ACLU acted in bad faith in conducting the above
described discovery and otherwise acting as a “litigating amicus curiae,” the Court
should sanction the ACLU by dismissing them as amicus curiae and disallowing any
information received as a result of this “investigation” conducted outside the scope of
the scheduling order.
The Court is not persuaded that Defendants’ motion has any merit with respect
to the ACLU. First, other than Defendants’ speculation, there is no evidence that the
ACLU conducted discovery in this case. Second, although ACLU’s counsel may have
conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel, the Court is not aware of any authority (and
Defendants have cited none) that prohibits counsel for a party to litigation from
consulting with other attorneys.
Third, the ACLU is pursuing an entirely separate legal issue and cause of action
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than Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s lawsuit, as this Court has expressed, is about Plaintiff’s rights, primarily centered on its First Amendment rights as a publisher. Plaintiff’s lawsuit is not about the rights of inmates at the Livingston County Jail. See, e.g., Section III, above; Docket No. 221, PgID 6206-08. The ACLU’s efforts, including its FOIA request to obtain the names of the inmates on January 27, 2014 and mailing the ACLU Letters on February 19, 2014, are focused on the rights of inmates vis a vis the Livingston County Jail mailing policy. The rights of Plaintiff and the rights of inmates of the Livingston County Jail may be related, but they are not the same. Fourth, the very conduct of the ACLU about which Defendants complain in their Motion for Sanctions has become the subject of a lawsuit filed by the ACLU against Defendants – one in which this Court and the Sixth Circuit have found that Defendants unconstitutionally processed (or, more accurately, failed to process) the ACLU Letters.
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions should be denied to the extent they seek sanctions against the ACLU.
C. Conclusion Based on the analysis and conclusions set forth in Sections V.A. and B., the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions. VI. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [Docket No. 181]
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Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add Lieutenant Tom Cremonte as a Defendant, and it has alleged sufficient facts to support First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against him. Plaintiff also seeks to add factual allegations related to mail that was sent by Plaintiff to certain prisoners incarcerated at the Livingston County Jail after the date of the original complaint because Defendants have continued to censor Plaintiff’s mail pursuant to Defendants’ customs, practices and policies. Plaintiff contends that, if this Court grants the filing of this amended complaint, neither Plaintiff nor Defendants will need additional discovery as to the claims against Cremonte or as to the inclusion of specific details regarding mail sent to the Livingston County Jail after the commencement of this action. Plaintiff further contends that the filing of the Second Amended Complaint will not unduly prejudice Defendants because the additional mail specified in the Second Amended Complaint was delivered directly to the Livingston County Jail, which Defendants control.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint should be denied because: (1) it is untimely, as it was filed after the close of discovery and the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment; (2) Plaintiff has failed to establish good cause for modification of the scheduling order; (3) Plaintiff knew of the factual basis for its request to add Cremonte and the new claims for
25

common law conversion and unconstitutional takings at least 12 (and maybe as many as 26) months before filing the Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint; and (4) the amendments would be futile as to the claims against Cremonte, the new common law conversion claim, and the unconstitutional takings claims.
Plaintiff asserts that the new claims set forth in the Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint stem from information learned at the deposition of Cremonte, which did not occur until January 31, 2014 (two months before Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint was filed). Plaintiff also contends that any delay in seeking to add Cremonte and the new claims is primarily due to Defendants failure to provide responses to discovery requests.
Rule 15 permits a party to amend its complaint once as a matter of course within (i) twenty-one days after service of the complaint; or (ii) within twenty-one days after service of an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss, whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Thereafter, a party may only amend its complaint with the adverse parties’ written consent or leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).5
5When a party seeks to add factual allegations concerning events that occurred after the date on which it filed the original complaint, a motion to supplement the complaint under Rule 15(d) – rather than a motion to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) – is the mechanism by which to obtain such relief. The standard for granting leave to file a supplemental complaint under Rule 15(d) is the same as the standard for granting leave to file an amended complaint under Rule 15(a). See Glatt v. Chicago Park District, 87 F.3d 190, 194 (7th Cir.1996).
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Rule 15 espouses a liberal standard to the extent that it authorizes district courts to grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “a party must act with due diligence if it intends to take advantage of the Rule’s liberality.” United States v. Midwest Suspension & Brake, 49 F.3d 1197, 1202 (6th Cir. 1995). District courts “should deny leave to amend” in circumstances involving: (1) undue delay in seeking leave to amend; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies through previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to adverse parties; and (5) futility of the proposed amendment. Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 306 F. App’x. 943, 949 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has good cause for seeking to further amend its Complaint to add claims against Cremonte, as well as the conversion and takings claims. Cremonte’s deposition did not occur until shortly before Plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. As such, Plaintiff likely could not have known most of the information that Cremonte would provide, including: (a) the alleged extent of his involvement in processing the mail at Livingston County Jail; (b) what Cremonte (himself) did with mail sent by Plaintiff to the Livingston County Jail; and (c) what ultimately happened to the mail sent by Plaintiff to inmates at the
27

Livingston County Jail. The lack of cooperation by Defendants vis a vis discovery requests from Plaintiff also contributed to the inability of Plaintiff to fully recognize the claims Plaintiff now seeks to add to its cause of action. Based on the active motion practice of Plaintiff and the timing of the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not exercised undue delay, acted with a dilatory motive, or failed to cure deficiencies through previous amendments.
The Court also finds that Defendant will not suffer undue prejudice by having to defend the new allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. First, the new allegations and claims stem from information Plaintiff obtained during its deposition of Cremonte, an employee of Defendants. The allegations arise out of the discovery that has occurred in this case, and Plaintiff has represented that it will not need any additional discovery to pursue the new claims. The Court intends to hold Plaintiff to that representation, and Plaintiff will not be able to conduct new discovery insofar as such discovery would turn on the new allegations or claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint.6
Second, the parties have withdrawn their summary judgment motions.
6Defendant, however, can move the Court if it believes it needs additional discovery with respect to the new claims set forth in the Second Amended Complaint.
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Defendants will have the opportunity to re-file their summary judgment motion and argue the reasons Plaintiff’s claims against Cremonte and the new claims should be dismissed as a matter of law. Most, if not all, of Defendants’ arguments have been formulated and, seemingly, incorporated into their previous summary judgment motion and/or their response to the Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. In addition, although the Court will consider any arguments regarding the viability of Plaintiff’s claims in any dispositive motion(s) filed in the future, the Court is not persuaded at this time that the proposed amendments are futile.
Finally, the Court finds that permitting Plaintiff’s proposed amendments promotes the interests of justice. This case has been ongoing for several years, for a variety of reasons. The Court concludes that addressing the matters set forth in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in the present litigation will best conserve the time and expense of the parties and the Court.
The Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and orders Plaintiff to file with the Court, within seven days of the date of this Order, a copy of the Amended Complaint attached to its Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint – with the title edited to read: “Second Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief and Jury Demand.”
VII. Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not
29

be Held in Contempt [Docket No. 227] On November 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion asking the Court to hold Defendants in contempt. Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to comply with the Court’s September 30, 2015 Order requiring Defendants to, on or before October 30, 2015: (a) produce certain discovery to Plaintiff; or (b) provide the Court with an affidavit stating why Defendants “cannot produce the requested information.” The motion was fully briefed by the parties, and on March 9, 2016, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion. It is undisputed that Defendant did not, on or before October 30, 2015, produce any discovery documents identified in the September 30, 2015 Order, nor did Defendants provide the Court with an affidavit that specified why Defendants could not produce the requested information to Plaintiff. It is further undisputed that, on October 30, 2015, Defendants sent Plaintiff an affidavit from Cremonte that purported to explain why Defendants could not produce the requested information. In its Motion, Plaintiff asks that the Court to: (1) grant Plaintiff’s motion for contempt; (2) order Defendants to appear to show cause why an order of civil contempt should not be entered against them; (3) order Defendants to produce the requested documents or strike/exclude Defendants from relying on their “alleged” security incidents caused by mail; (4) require Defendants to file sworn affidavit(s)
30

showing compliance with the Court’s orders; and (5) award costs and attorney fees associated with this motion to Plaintiff.
Prior to the March 9, 2016 hearing, Defendants notified Plaintiff that it was updating its software and, as a result, beginning in December 2015, Defendants were able to begin searching jail records back to 2009. At the hearing, the parties argued and discussed what information was now available to certain persons at the Livingston County Sheriff’s Department, as well as the need for additional information from persons generally referenced but not identified in Cremonte’s October 30, 2015 affidavit. As a result of the March 9, 2016 hearing, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order granting Plaintiff limited discovery. [See Docket No. 237]
The Court finds that such stipulated order addresses and resolves the relief Plaintiff requested with respect to parts (2)-(4) above. As to part (1), the Court concludes that Defendants should not be held in contempt because they did cause Cremonte to timely file an affidavit that addressed, albeit generally and inadequately (as discussed below), the information identified in the Court’s September 30, 2015 Order. In addition, because Plaintiff received the affidavit within the time parameters set by the Court, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not prejudiced by Defendants’ failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file the affidavit with the Court.
In determining whether costs and fees should be assessed against Defendant
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(part (5)), the Court finds that Defendants efforts to comply with and satisfy the directives of the Court in the September 30, 2015 Order were underwhelming and inadequate–and warrant the imposition of an award of costs and fees against Defendants. First, as Defendants admit, the affidavit of Cremonte was not filed with the Court – as the Court expressly required in the September 30, 2015 Order, when it stated: “If Defendants determine that they are unable to give an answer to a specific RFP, Defendants must provide the Court with signed affidavits stating why they cannot produce the requested information.” [Docket No. 226, PgID 6254 (emphasis added)].
Second, as is evident by even a cursory review of Cremonte’s October, 30, 2015 affidavit, very few of his statements were based on his personal knowledge of what information was available. Instead, Cremonte averred what he allegedly had been told by various other Livingston County employees, none of whom are identified his affidavit. Likewise, the affidavit provides little detail about why Defendants could not produce the requested information (in fact, Cremonte does not really even state that Defendants cannot produce it); rather, Cremonte repeatedly suggests that Defendants did not have the resources (the personnel) to produce the requested information.
Third, the Court notes that the September 30, 2015 Order stemmed from a motion to compel filed by Plaintiff due to Defendants’ ongoing failure to comply with
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certain discovery requests of Plaintiff. In the September 30, 2015 Order, the Court analyzed but ultimately denied Plaintiff’s request that the Court sanction Defendants for their failure to produce the requested and required information. When doing so, however, the Court stated, “the Court does not determine that sanctions are warranted at this time. Defendant believed that it was in compliance with the Court’s Order. The Court is not satisfied that Defendants intentionally defied its Order or purposefully attempted to evade compliance.” [Docket No. 226, PgID 6255]
With respect to the September 30, 2015 Order, the Court again finds that Defendants did not intentionally defy the Court’s Order or purposefully evade compliance. Notwithstanding the absence of any intentional defiance or purposeful evasion of compliance, however, the Court concludes that the interests of justice, including to compensate Plaintiff for having to file a motion that it should never have had to file and to encourage and ensure Defendants’ full compliance with future orders of the Court, demand the imposition of costs against Defendant in connection with this matter at this time. Defendants’ actions (or inactions) have required Plaintiff to repeatedly file motions to obtain discovery to which the Court has determined Plaintiff is entitled. More significantly, as it relates to the instant motion, Defendants failed to take action to comply with the directives of the Court for a period of several weeks after Plaintiff notified Defendants that they failed to comply with the Court’s
33

September 30, 2015 Order, leading Plaintiff to file (appropriately) the instant motion. The Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause to the extent that
Plaintiff asked the Court to award costs and attorney fees associated with this Motion for Order to Show Cause to Plaintiff. The Court orders that Defendants shall pay Plaintiff the costs and fees Plaintiff reasonably incurred in preparing and filing the Motion for Order to Show Cause (and accompanying brief), preparing and filing its reply brief with respect to the same, and appearing at the March 9, 2016 hearing (collectively, “Plaintiff’s Fees and Costs”). The Court orders Plaintiff to provide the Court, within 30 days of the date of this Order, a detailed invoice that sets forth the basis for Plaintiff’s Fees and Costs.
Based on the analysis and conclusions set forth in this Section VII, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in Contempt. IX. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, A. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order
Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 66] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. B. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for an Injunction to Allow Access to Detainees-Witnesses [Docket No. 124] is DENIED. C. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Leave of
34

Court to Take Depositions [Docket No. 139] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
D. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Docket No. 159] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
E. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [Docket No. 181] is GRANTED.
F. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in Contempt [Docket No. 227] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
G. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, effective immediately, Defendants shall, in every instance that Defendants reject (i.e., do not deliver) mail sent by Plaintiff to a designated inmate at the Livingston County Jail (at least with respect to the initial copy of any publication): (a) notify Plaintiff of such rejection; (b) notify the designated inmate recipient of such rejection; and (c) notify Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient of the right to–and afford Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient the opportunity to–appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party.
H. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall provide the Court, within 30 days of the date of this Order, a detailed invoice that sets forth the basis for Defendants’ Fees and Costs.
I. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file with the Court, within five days of the date of this Order, a copy of the Amended Complaint attached to its Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint – with the title edited to read: “Second Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief and Jury Demand.”
J. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide the Court, within 30 days of the date of this Order, a detailed invoice that sets forth the basis for Plaintiff’s Fees and Costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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S/Denise Page Hood Denise Page Hood Chief Judge, United States District Court Dated: March 31, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on March 31, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry Case Manager
36

 
 Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6368 Page 1 of 13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, a project of the Human Rights Defense Center,
Plaintiff,

v

Case No. 2:11-CV-13460-DPH-MAR

Hon. Denise Page Hood

LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF

BOB BEZOTTE, individually and

officially, LIEUTENANT THOMAS

CREMONTE, individually and officially, and

LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Defendants.

_________________________________

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DECLARATORY RELIEF, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff, by its attorneys, Daniel E. Manville, Thomas M. Loeb, Lance T.

Weber and Brian J. Prain, complains against the above-named Defendants and in

support states as follows:

Preliminary Statement

1. This is an action brought by plaintiff Prison Legal News, a project of the

Human Rights Defense Center, for damages caused by Defendants’ censorship

of its mail and restrictions on its access to prisoners at the Livingston County

Jail.

2. Defendants have adopted and implemented written and unwritten mail policies

and practices that unconstitutionally restrict correspondence to prisoners via

Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6369 Page 2 of 13
postcards only, that prohibit delivery to prisoners of books, magazines and any other publications that have not been printed on postcards, and fail to provide notice to PLN when its items were rejected. 3. Defendants’ written and unwritten policies and practices do not provide constitutionally adequate due process protections to senders of mail, such as notice of the government’s decision to censor mail and an opportunity to challenge the censorship. 4. Defendants have interfered with Plaintiff’s right of access to prisoners by refusing to allow counsel for Plaintiff to send legal mail to or otherwise communicate with prisoners in Defendants’ custody.1 5. Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Association and its right to Due Process of Law have been violated by Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Defendants’ mail policy of postcards only violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated the Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment and improperly exercised control over and converted for their own use, property that was entrusted to Defendants for delivery to specific prisoners.
1 This Court issued an order finding that Plaintiff PLN does not have a constitutional right to send legal mail to detainees (D/E 64). PLN filed a motion for rehearing (D/E 68) and it is still pending. Plaintiff is filing a motion to file supplemental authorities

Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6370 Page 3 of 13
Jurisdiction and Venue 6. This court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. 7. Venue is properly laid in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) as the
Defendants reside in and the claim arose in the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff and Defendants
8. That at all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff Prison Legal News (PLN) is a project of the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), a Washington nonprofit corporation.
9. For the past 21 years, the core of plaintiff’s mission has been public education, advocacy and outreach in support of the rights of prisoners and in furtherance of basic human rights. Plaintiff maintains a website, operates an email list, publishes and distributes books about the criminal justice system and legal issues affecting prisoners, and publishes and distributes a monthly journal of corrections news and analysis, Prison Legal News, to prisoners, lawyers, courts, libraries, and the public throughout the country. Prisoners, their family, friends and advocates are among the intended beneficiaries of PLN’s activities.
10. Defendant Livingston County is an organized municipal corporation existing under the laws of the State of Michigan.
in support of D/E 68.
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6371 Page 4 of 13
11. Defendant Bob Bezotte is currently the Sheriff of Livingston County and is sued in his individual and official capacities. At all times relevant, he has acted under color of state law.
12. As Sheriff, he is responsible for the operations of the Livingston County Jail. Specifically, he is the policy maker for the Livingston County Jail with respect to its mail policy and its policy of refusing attorneys employed by Plaintiff to communicate with prisoners in Defendants’ custody.
13. Defendant Thomas Cremonte was at all time relevant a Lieutenant with the office of the Sheriff of Livingston County and is sued in his individual and official capacities. At all times relevant hereto, he acted under color of state law. He is responsible for the overall operations of the Livingston County jail, management and supervision of the staff, and the implementation and oversight of its written and unwritten jail policy governing mail for prisoners. Facts
14. PLN engages in core protected speech and expressive conduct on matters of public concern.
15. PLN publishes and distributes Prison Legal News, a monthly journal of corrections news and analysis about prisoner rights, court rulings, management of prison facilities and prison conditions. PLN publishes and distributes dozens
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6372 Page 5 of 13
of books about the criminal justice system and legal issues affecting prisoners
and pre-trial detainees.
16. PLN has over 7,000 subscribers throughout the United States and abroad,
including prisoners, pre-trial detainees, attorneys, journalists, public libraries,
judges, and other members of the public.
17. Defendants have written, instituted and implemented the following mail policy
at the Livingston County Jail:
MAIL - Inmates are permitted to write to any person outside of our Jail facility. Incoming Inmate correspondence must be addressed as follows:
Inmate Name, Resident Livingston County Jail 150 S. Highlander Way Howell, MI 48843
• Incoming mail must reflect sender’s name and address. • Correspondence from attorneys, as well as court and public officials may
be opened in the presence of an inmate. • Mail must be sent via US Postal Service. • Items NOT allowed: postage stamps, envelopes, blank stationary,
jewelry, food, books, magazines, sexually explicit pictures, cash, personal or company check. • All mail, except bona-fide legal mail, will be by standard post cards. This is both incoming and outgoing mail. • Incoming mail deemed inappropriate may be placed in the inmate’s property locker.
18. Pursuant to this policy Defendants have improperly and illegally censored
Plaintiff’s publications, books, brochures and other correspondence sent to
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6373 Page 6 of 13
inmates at the Livingston County Jail, including legal mail. 19. In January, April and June 2011, in March and July 2012, and in February and
October 2013 PLN sent a sample copy of Prison Legal News in a manila envelope via First Class mail, a new copy of the soft back book Protecting Your Health and Safety via Media Mail, and three (3) single-page, double-sided informational brochures in a standard #10 sized envelope via First Class Mail to individual prisoners at the Livingston County Jail. Over the course of those three years, PLN sent the aforementioned items to a total of approximately eighty-eight (88) prisoners incarcerated at the jail. All items were addressed to specific, individual inmates and bore a return address of:
Prison Legal News PO Box 2420 W. Brattleboro, VT 05303 20. Beginning in February 2011 and monthly thereafter, continuing to the present PLN has sent current issues of Prison Legal News directly from its printer addressed individually to certain select individual prisoners in Defendants’ custody. 21. In September 2011, PLN’s editor Paul Wright sent individually addressed postcards to 37 prisoners at the jail who were intended recipients of mail previously sent to them at the jail.
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6374 Page 7 of 13
22. In October 2011, October 2012 and September 2013 PLN sent its annual fundraiser letter to subscribers incarcerated at the jail. Over the course of those three years, PLN sent a total of 57 fundraising letters to incarcerated subscribers at the jail.
23. Additionally, PLN sent approximately 67 subscription renewal letters specifically addressed to individual prisoners incarcerated at the jail over the course of time from July 2011 to the present.
24. Although this mail was being sent to certain inmates at the Livingston County Jail via the U.S. Postal Service, no response was received from any prisoner.
25. PLN continues, and will continue in the future, to mail its monthly magazine, Prison Legal News, its books, its informational brochures, its fundraising letters, sample copies of its monthly magazine, its subscription renewal letters, postcards and other mail to prisoners at the Livingston County jail.
26. All mail from PLN was censored by Defendants instead of being delivered to the prisoner addressees.
27. In-house counsel for HRDC wrote letters on PLN’s behalf conspicuously marked “Legal Mail” addressed to prisoners who were the intended recipients of PLN’s mail but no response was received from any prisoner. All legal mail sent from counsel on PLN’s behalf was censored by Defendants.
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6375 Page 8 of 13
28. Outside counsel for PLN attempted to communicate with certain prisoners in Defendants’ custody by visiting them at the Jail during regular business hours and Defendants refused to allow PLN’s counsel to speak with inmates in their custody.
29. Defendants provided PLN no notice of their intent to censor PLN’s mail nor did Defendants provide to PLN an opportunity to appeal their censorship decisions.
30. Defendants took custody of certain copies of Prison Legal News and Protecting Your Health and Safety which had been mailed by Plaintiff to certain specific prisoners at the Livingston County Jail - and without notice, permission, or consent of Plaintiff, Defendants placed copies of these items in the jail’s library. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for the use and benefit of its property. Cremonte Depo, Pg. 38, ¶3-20; Pg. 40, ¶3-16.
31. Defendants further confiscated all other PLN Mail and kept it within the administrative office at Livingston County Jail, or turned it over to its legal counsel. Again, this action was taken without notice, permission or consent of Plaintiff. Cremonte Depo, Pg. 48, ¶¶1-5, 16-23. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments Under Color of State Law – Section 1983
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6376 Page 9 of 13
32. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 33. Defendants’ written and unwritten practice, policy or custom, as set forth more
fully above with respect to its mail policies, was the moving force that deprived Plaintiff of its rights, privileges, or immunities secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §1983 including: a. Plaintiff’s right to freedom of the press, as protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution; b. Plaintiff’s right to freedom of speech, as protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution; c. Plaintiff’s right to freedom of association, as protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution; d. Plaintiff’s right to be free of government censorship, as protected by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution; e. Plaintiff’s right to due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Conversion)
34. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs.
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6377 Page 10 of 13
35. Defendants, without right or permission from Plaintiff improperly exercised dominion or control over and converted for their own use the personalty (i.e., PLN magazine and other publications) of the Plaintiff.
36. Plaintiff entrusted to Defendants said personalty for a specific purpose – delivery to prisoners at the Livingston County Jail.
37. The manner in which Defendants exercised such dominion or control was both inconsistent with, and seriously interfered with, Plaintiff’s rights as a property owner to enjoy and/or control its personalty.
38. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of Defendants’ acts of conversion and the injuries resulting from those acts, Plaintiff lost the intrinsic value of their property and suffered economic and non-economic damages.
39. The Plaintiffs are further entitled to the immediate return of the personalty at issue. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Takings Clause of 5th Amendment)
40. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the preceding paragraphs. 41. Defendants violated the 5th Amendment Due Process requirements and prohibition
on takings without just compensation.
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6378 Page 11 of 13
42. Plaintiff creates, publishes, and distributes Prison Legal News, Protecting Your Health and Safety and other publications (“PLN Publications” herein) that are distributed to Defendants for delivery to prisoners in their custody through U.S. Mail.
43. PLN Publications constitute the private and personal property of the Plaintiff and as such are afforded full property rights.
44. Plaintiff intended these PLN Publications to be received by prisoners housed within the Livingston County jail and not taken, maintained or otherwise withheld by Defendants.
45. Defendants without knowledge or consent of the Plaintiff and without notice to Plaintiff, took PLN Publications and converted them into the property of the Defendants.
46. Defendants maintained dominion and control over Plaintiff’s property without knowledge of, consent of, or notice to the Plaintiff.
47. Defendants have used and continue to use the property for their own benefit without consent and/or just compensation to the Plaintiff.
48. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to just compensation for the Defendants unlawful taking of Plaintiff’s property. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6379 Page 12 of 13
THEREFORE, for all above reasons, Plaintiff requests that this Court declare that Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs violate the Constitution as set forth more fully throughout this Complaint, and that it improperly exercised dominion or control over and converted for their own use Plaintiff’s property; grant to plaintiff a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Defendants from continuing to violate the Constitution; award plaintiff compensatory damages in whatever amount the jury may determine; award plaintiff nominal damages in whatever amount the jury may determine; award plaintiff punitive damages against Defendant Bob Bezotte and Thomas Cremonte, individually, in whatever amount the jury may determine; award costs and actual attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; award plaintiff prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL. Respectfully submitted, s/ Daniel E. Manville (P39731) Co-counsel for Plaintiff Director, Civil Rights Clinic Michigan State University College of Law 610 Abbot Road East Lansing, MI 48823 (517) 336-8088 daniel.manville@law.msu.edu s/ Thomas M. Loeb (P25913)
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Case 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS ECF No. 241 filed 04/04/16 PageID.6380 Page 13 of 13
Co-counsel for Plaintiff 32000 Northwestern Hwy, Ste 170 Farmington Hills, MI 48334-1507 (248) 851-2020 tmloeb1@mich.com s/ Lance Weber Co-counsel for Plaintiff Human Rights Defense Center PO Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460 (561) 360-2523 lweber@humanrightsdefensecenter.org s/ Brian J. Prain (P73944) Co-counsel for Plaintiff The Law Office of Brian J. Prain, PLLC 28475 Greenfield Rd Ste 121 Southfield, MI 48076 (248) 763-0641 brian@prainlaw.com The second amended complaint is being served on Defendants’ counsel by ECF on April 4, 2016. s/ Daniel E. Manville
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, d/b/a Prison Legal News,

Plaintiff,

v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, individually and officially, LIEUTENANT THOMAS CREMONTE, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Case No. 11-CV-13460 Honorable Denise Page Hood

Defendants. /

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FILED AS DOCKET NUMBERS 258, 261, and 274

On July 29, 2016, the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [Dkt.

Nos. 258, 261] On August 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Exhibits to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 274]. All of the motions are

fully briefed. The Court held a hearing on the motions on October 6, 2016.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s brings, in essence, four claims in three Counts: (1) Count I - a

Section 1983 action alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (2)

Count II - a state law claim for conversion; and (3) Count III - a takings claim

pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. A short summary of the claims of Plaintiff can be found in other court Orders, specifically the Court’s two Orders dated March 29, 2013. [Dkt. Nos. 63, 64] Most significantly, the Livingston County Jail (“Jail”) has had the following policies regarding inmate mail:
A. Postcard Only Policy. Beginning in October 2010, the Jail implemented
a postcard only policy which required all non-publications mail to be sent on postcards. I have been unable to find a copy of this “policy” in the record, though the essence of it is set forth in the current publications policy (set forth below).
B. The Old Publications Policy. The mail policy for delivery of books,
magazines and other materials, effective as of December 5, 2006 and in effect at the time this case was filed was:
Inmates will be allowed to receive newspapers, magazines, and other types of publications, which are legally available to the public as long as they are mailed directly from the publisher and approved by Inmate Services.
a) All Cost of subscription is the inmate’s responsibility. b) Materials will be delivered to the inmate as long as he/she
is incarcerated. c) Upon release, the inmate is responsible for changing the
address . . . . d) Exceptions:
i) Specific information regarding weapons, explosives,
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incendiary devices, poisons or dangerous drugs. ii) Inflammatory writings advocating disorder, violence
or insurrection against correctional personnel or facilities. iii) Pornographic materials. iv) Any instructional material in the martial arts. v) Any other material that pose a safety or security risk, or interferes with the orderly operation of the jail.
[Dkt. No. 32, Pg ID 1291]
C. Current Publications Policy. The mail policy for delivery of books,
magazines and other materials changed in 2012 to provide as follows:
MAIL – Inmates are permitted to write to any person outside of our Jail facility. Incoming Inmate correspondence must be addressed as follows:
Inmate Name, Resident Livingston County Jail . . .
• Incoming mail must reflect sender’s name and address. • Correspondence from attorneys, as well as court and public
officials may be opened in the presence of an inmate. • Mail must be sent via US Postal Service. • Items NOT allowed: postage stamps, envelopes, blank stationary,
jewelry, food, books, magazines, sexually explicit pictures, cash, personal or company check. • All mail, except bona-fide legal mail, will be by standard post cards. This is both incoming and outgoing mail. • Incoming mail deemed inappropriate may be placed in the inmate’s property locker.
[Dkt. No. 25, PgID 533]
On March 31, 2016, the Court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a
3

preliminary injunction regarding the mail policies at the Jail, insofar as the policies
infringed on Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment due process claim. The Court ordered that:
[E]ffective immediately, Defendants must, in every instance that Defendants reject (i.e., do not deliver) mail sent by Plaintiff to a designated inmate at the Livingston County Jail (at least with respect to the initial copy of any publication): (a) notify Plaintiff of such rejection; (b) notify the designated inmate recipient of such rejection; and (c) notify Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient of the right to—and afford Plaintiff and the designated inmate the opportunity to—appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party.
Dkt. No. 239, PgID 6328. Defendants assert that they revisited their mail policies
immediately after receiving the Court’s March 31, 2016 Order, and they implemented
changes to comply with that Order. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for contempt
and to enforce the preliminary injunction, arguing that Defendants’ new procedures
did not comport with the Court’s Order. Plaintiff’s motion for contempt has been
argued and remains pending.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s cause
of action. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment seeks an order from the Court
that:
1. Declares: (a) Defendants’ postcard-only, no magazines, no books and no due process notice or opportunity to appeal policies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (b) Defendants’ enforcement of those policies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and (c) Defendants’ censored PLN’s mail in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for which Defendants must pay nominal, compensatory and punitive damages to Plaintiff;
4

2. Enjoins Defendants from: (1) permanently rejecting or otherwise censoring mail on the ground that (a) it is not in the form of a postcard or (b) it is a magazine or book; and (2) denying due process to prisoners and their correspondents when censoring mail;
3. Declares that: (a) Defendants unlawfully converted Plaintiff’s property (i.e. its books and monthly journal) without compensation to Plaintiff, and without right or permission; (b) the conversion of Plaintiff’s property was unlawful, for which Defendants must pay damages to Plaintiff;
4. Declares that: (a) Defendants unlawfully took Plaintiff’s property (i.e. its books and monthly journal); (b) maintained control and dominion over the property without Plaintiff’s consent; and (c) used the property for its own benefit without just compensation to Plaintiff; and
5. Permanently enjoins Defendants from: (a) taking, converting or otherwise exercising dominion and control over Plaintiff’s property (i.e. its books and monthly journal); (b) without receiving Plaintiff’s consent or permission; (c) for their own benefit or use; and (d) without just compensation or payment to Plaintiff.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedures provides that the court “shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). The presence of factual disputes will preclude granting of summary
judgment only if the disputes are genuine and concern material facts. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is
5

“genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Although the Court must view the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, where “the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. A court must look to the substantive law to identify which facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. B. Analysis
As Plaintiffs’ argue and Defendants acknowledge, the Court has rejected Defendants’ arguments regarding protection for unsolicited literature (in the March 29, 2013 Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings [Dkt. No. 64, PgID 1986-90]) and due process (in the
6

Court’s March 31, 2016 Order Regarding Various Motions [Dkt. No. 239, PgID 632028]). Defendants assert that “any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . does not end the action as to any of the claims . . . and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Patton v. U.P.S., 872 F.2d 1027 (1989). Defendants ask that the Court reconsider these issues. The Court will not reconsider those issues, as Defendants have not raised any new arguments.
1. Count I (First Amendment Claim) The Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider when determining whether “a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91(1987).The Turner test requires that: 1. there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; 2. there must be alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; 3. we must consider the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and 4. there must not be alternatives available that fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 267 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91).
7

Failure to satisfy the first factor is dispositive. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. The
remaining factors must be balanced together in order to evaluate the reasonableness
of the challenged regulation. Jones, 569 F.3d at 267. The Court will review the
challenged regulation with deference to “the determinations of prison administrators
who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the
outside world.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. See also Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963
F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 1992).
As the Court held, Plaintiff has a constitutional right to send unsolicited mail
to prisoners at the Jail, Dkt. No. 64, PgID 1986-90, and there is no need to revisit that
issue here. Plaintiff challenges the postcard only policy and both of the publications
policies.
a. Valid Rational Connection to Legitimate Penological Interests
Defendants assert that there are two legitimate penological interests behind their postcard only and publications policies:1 (1) safety and security; and (2) the efficient
1Defendants suggest that Plaintiff’s arguments regarding PYHS and informational brochures are misplaced because PYHS was not published by Plaintiff and the informational brochures are not publications. These arguments lack merit. First, there is no requirement that a “publication” has to be published by the party sending it to the inmate. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979) (the “prohibition against receipt of hardback books unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores does not violate the First Amendment rights of . . . inmates”); Ward, 881 F.2d at 326 (“Defendants . . . permitted inmates to receive newspapers, magazines, and books from publishers or book clubs only”).
8

use of resources. As noted by the Sixth Circuit, the right to receive mail from an outside source “is subject to restriction in the interests of prison security, but such restriction must further legitimate penological objectives, in a manner no more restrictive than necessary.” Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1985). And, although the Turner standard affords deference to correction officials, Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408, Turner’s “reasonableness standard is not toothless,” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 535 (2006) (citing Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414), and does not grant a “blank check to prison officials.” Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 547 (2005).
The Court finds that both of the penological interests asserted by Defendant are legitimate. See, e.g., Jones v. Campbell, 23 F. App’x 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (reducing burden on staff who processes the mail is a legitimate government interest); Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 431 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Collins, 683 F.3d 697, 704 (6th Cir. 2012); Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415 (maintaining institutional security and order is a legitimate penological interest); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (same); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (same). Plaintiff does not seem to dispute that the interests asserted by
Second, if an informational brochure is not be a publication, it would fall within the category of enveloped mail. Either way, the informational brochures are barred by the Jail’s mail policies.
9

Defendant are legitimate penological interests. Plaintiff instead argues that there is an absence of a valid, rational connection between the regulations and the legitimate governmental interests asserted by Defendants.2
Defendants argue, and evidence supports their position, that deputies (and not simply clerical staff) had to assist in processing mail, which took the deputies from their “primary duties of ensuring a safe and secure Jail.” According to Sgt. Terrance Edward Davis, deputies processed the mail on the night shift for at least a year, Dkt. No. 258, PgID 6951, and had to perform the mail screening while continuing to perform their other duties. Id. at 6963-64. Defendant Cremonte previously filed an affidavit averring that the time for Jail staff to process mail went from an 8-hour day, with assistance from deputies, to a 4-hour day after implementation of the postcard only policy. Dkt. No. 32, PgID 1300, ¶¶ 10-11, Dkt. No. 258, Ex. 1 at 173-74. There is also evidence that before the postcard only policy, one of the 7 full-time civilians (at least at times) processed the mail for 8 hours, but after the postcard only policy was implemented, one of the 3 full-time civilians and 4 part-time civilians processed the
2The postcard only policy was adopted in October 2010, before Plaintiff began sending its materials to inmates at the Jail, such that the policy was the result of the heavy volume of mail received even before Plaintiff began sending mail to Jail inmates. Prior to enacting the postcard only policy, Jail employees searched for other postcard only policies, Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 34 at 65; Ex. 38 at 42-43, and contacted staff persons at another jail that has a postcard only policy. Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 38 at 58.
10

mail in 4 hours. Dkt. No. 258, Ex. 1 at 173-74. Plaintiff argues that the postcard only policy was irrational, as jails across the
country permit enveloped mail, just as the Jail did so prior to implementation of the postcard only policy. Plaintiff cites a plethora of Ninth Circuit cases to support its position, as well as a Seventh Circuit case and 10th Circuit case. Plaintiff also relies on a similar case involving the Macomb County Jail. Prison Legal News v. Macomb Cnty., Mich., No. 15-12350, Dkt. No. 49, June 17, 2016 (Stipulated Injunction). In that case, Plaintiff recently obtained much of the relief it seeks here (namely, the elimination of a postcard only policy), but that resolution was the result of a stipulated settlement, not a determination by the court and the case remains open.
The rationale adopted by Federal courts in striking down postcard-only policies is clear – letters facilitate the exchange of views on: (a) poor jail conditions and how to alleviate them, (b) legal rights, and (c) how to address private medical, psychological and educational needs, among other things. The Urban Institute’s Justice Policy Center noted the link between public safety and reading:
Research demonstrates that education can change thinking, encourage pro-social behavior, increase employment, and reduce recidivism. Education’s power to transform lives in both tangible and intangible ways makes it one of the most valuable and effective tools we may have for helping people rebuild their lives after incarceration, as well as for combating crime and reducing criminal justice costs. Dkt. No. 261, PgID 7482 (citing From the Classroom to the Community: Exploring
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the Role of Education During Incarceration and Reentry (2009)). The American Bar Association has underscored the importance of mail to prisoners noting that “[m]ail is a crucial method by which prisoners maintain and build familial and community ties.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Third Edition, “Treatment of Prisoners” Standard 23-8.6 at 265.3 The national detention standards for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement facilities state that “[f]acilities shall not limit detainees to postcards and shall allow envelope mailings.” ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards 2011.4 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412–13 (1974).
As to safety and security, Defendants contend that the postcard only policy is necessary and reasonably related to ensuring safety and security. Defendants rely on a district court case from Florida, where the court stated:
Sealed envelopes provide a greater opportunity for the introduction of drugs and weapons into jail facilities than postcards because envelopes can contain multiple pages of paper with folds and creases that lend themselves to smuggling contraband. Postcards have no folds or creases.
3http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/ crimjust_standards_treatmentprisoners.html.
4https://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2011
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Even if a jail staffer has to remove the stamp from a postcard to make sure no contraband lies beneath, that effort pales in comparison to the effort necessary to inspect a sealed letter or a pop-up greeting card thoroughly.
* * * * *
Plaintiff argues that the . . . policy cannot rationally be connected to reducing the introduction of contraband for security purposes if the policy does not completely eliminate the problem. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument because it is rational for the Sheriff’s Office to . . . implement policies and procedures which reduce the amount of contraband entering its facilities, even if the policies and procedures will not eliminate the problem completely.
Althouse v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 12-80135, 2013 WL 536072, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2013).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ rationale for the postcard only ban rationale
is “purely imagined.” Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to show there is any
actual danger to support their assertion that the postcard only policy is necessary and
reasonable. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have “no credible evidence that the Jail
experienced any threat to penological interests as a consequence of allowing prisoners
to have books, letters or magazines.” Dkt. No. 261, PgID 7483. As Plaintiff asserts,
records from the Jail from 2009 to January 2016, as well as the 1 year and 10 month
period prior to the postcard only policy and the three years prior to the blanket
publication ban, show little, if any, actual or contraband or threat. Plaintiff suggests
that “Turner requires more than just a belief in some speculative threat at some future
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date,” Dkt. No. 286, PgID 8459, but it does not cite specifically to any authority that
requires a showing of “actual danger.”
Plaintiff cites a district court case from California that compared a postcard only
policy with the prior policy of subjecting incoming mail to a routine,
industry-standard inspection. See Prison Legal News v. County of Ventura, 2014 WL
2736103 (C.D. Cal. 2014). The Ventura court found the “rational relationship
between the postcard-only policy and enhancing security dissolves,” stating that:
Given that contraband can be interdicted by inspecting all incoming mail, the connection between the postcard-only policy and the County’s goal of reducing contraband is tenuous at best. While the postcard-only policy may theoretically reduce the risk of contraband entering the jail—simply because envelopes offer more creases and folds for smuggling, and no inspection system is foolproof—this mere theoretical possibility is insufficient to rebut [the plaintiff’s] evidence that letter mail does not pose a legitimate security threat. Absent any evidence that affirmatively shows that the postcard-only policy enhances jail security, we conclude the postcard-only policy smacks of arbitrariness and irrationality.
Id. at **4-5.
Defendant counters that they need not show actual danger to support the
reasonableness of the challenged regulation, as a showing that a potential danger
exists is sufficient. Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408, 413 (6th Cir. 1984). See also
Thompson v. Campbell, 81 F. App’x 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Thornburgh, 490
U.S. at 417) (the issue is “not whether the prohibited materials have in fact caused
problems or even ‘likely’ to cause problems, but whether a reasonable official might
14

think that the policy advances those interests”). See also Prison Legal News v. Chesire, No. 04-173, 2006 WL 1868307, at **5-8 (D. Utah June 30, 2006).
With respect to the old publications policy, Defendants argue that distributing unsolicited publications required that Jail staff sort and process a burdensome influx of incoming mail. Relying on Kaufman v. Karlen, No. 06-205, 2007 WL 1821098, *15 (W.D. Wis. June 21, 2008), aff’d, 270 Fed. Appx. 442 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that a policy prohibiting free publications in order to reduce mail volume was rationally related to governmental interest). Defendants suggest that influx of incoming unsolicited mail created opportunities to smuggle contraband into the Jail and that inmates would accumulate excessive amounts of property in their cells, increasing opportunities to conceal smuggled contraband. Relying on Ligons, 2009 WL 4796150, at *3 (finding that a subscription-only policy designed to promote security and lessen the administrative burden furthered a legitimate governmental interest).
Defendants’ argument is undermined by the Jail policy of allowing inmates to subscribe to an unspecified number of daily local newspapers, Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 39 at 37-38, which allows an accumulation of paper in cells much greater than a weekly or monthly magazine. Plaintiff also has presented evidence that Defendants did not enforce their publication policy that limited prisoners to two books.
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As to the current publications policy that completely bans publications, Defendants cite several recent cases where the court has upheld a ban on the receipt of publications by inmates. Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir. 1993); Prison Legal News v. Chesire, No. 04-173, 2006 WL 1868307, at **5-8 (D. Utah June 30, 2006); Black v. Camon, No. 06-75, 2010 WL 890159, at **2-4 (M.D. Ga. March 9, 2010). Defendants assert that the policies should be upheld because they are content-neutral—the restrictions were made and are enforced “without regard to the content of the expression,” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415, and were adopted to combat the aforementioned safety and security concerns, as well as Jail personnel overwhelmed by the volume of incoming publications.
Defendants argue that their policies are neutral because they limit the method of communication without limiting the substance or suppressing expression because they apply to all non-“legal mail” correspondence. Citing Covell, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1153. The Court agrees that the policies are neutral, as they apply to all persons. As the Court previously noted, there is evidence that the postcard only policy may not have been content-neutral as it relates to Plaintiff (when Defendant Cremonte failed to deliver a number of postcards sent by Plaintiff that were addressed to individuals).
Defendants argue that they have presented evidence that the publications posed serious security threats, as publications can be used to smuggle contraband into the
16

Jail and conceal contraband inside the Jail. Defendants again argue that actual documented problems are not necessary, as potential danger is sufficient to support the reasonableness of a policy. Citing Chesire, 2006 WL 1868307, at **5-6.
As to actual threats or contraband, the evidence seems to show the following. Defendants have produced no evidence of drugs being smuggled through the mail prior to 2009 and only two situations involving drugs since then, though there is no indication those two situations involved use of the mail. Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 29 (Incident Report Nos. 13-0218, 15-0984). Three incidents involving weapons and a book, magazine or an envelope have been reported since 2013, after the implementation of the publication ban and postcard only policy. Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 29 (Incident Report Nos. 13-0266, 13-0848, and 14-0237); Ex. 39 at 32. No incident reports were produced identifying threats, inappropriate advertisements, or solicitations through letters, books, or magazines have been made, but there were some documents produced indicating letters, books, or magazines were used for escape plans. Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 29 (Incident Report No. 10-02942); Ex. 26; and Ex. 30. There is no evidence that letters, books, or magazines were used to cover cell doors or windows, nor that they were used to start fires or jam locks. Defendant Cremonte testified that there were at least two murder for hire plots identified in the mail and one threat to kill a detective. Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 34 at 145-46.
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Defendants identify several ways in which the mail policies would improve jail security, including: (a) reducing mail processing time, which allows deputies to be engaged in normal duties related to securing the Jail; (b) reducing incidents where inmates flush materials down the toilet; and (c) reducing or making less likely that contraband or dangerous materials/plans will enter the Jail through the mails. Defendants concede that contraband has been received in the Jail, even after the mail policies were implemented, but contend those breaches do not undermine the rational connection of the postcard policy to its legitimate penological goals. Covell v. Arpaio, 662 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1153 (D. Ariz. 2009)(instances of contraband entering the jail after implementation of the policy were “not sufficient to show that the policy lacks a rational connection to a legitimate penological goal”).
The Court finds that there are genuine disputes of material facts regarding whether the legitimate penological interests asserted by Defendants are rationally connected to the Defendants’ policies. The parties present conflicting evidence and interpretations of the number of prisoners at the Jail during the relevant periods, as well as the average length of incarceration. The issue is complicated due to expansion of the Jail during the relevant periods. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the burden on Jail personnel to process mail with respect to volume of mail coming in (as all incoming mail, not simply Plaintiff’s, is subject to Defendants’ mail policies)
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and how long processing such mail takes under the policies—and how long it would take without the policies.
As noted above, there also is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the number of contraband and security threat incidents that have occurred at the Jail. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ basis for the postcard only policy was that, according to Defendant Cremonte, there were “a couple dozen incidents of contraband entering the facility over an 11 year period.” Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 34 at 158-59. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s reading of Defendant Cremonte’s deposition was erroneous, as what Defendant Cremonte actually was responding to was the period between January 2010 and when the postcard only policy was implemented in October, 2010. Dkt. No. 285, PgID 8364-65. The parties’ argument centers on the following deposition testimony of Defendant Cremonte:
Q. As to [the number of incidents in which mail contained contraband] that violate[s] state law . . . you can’t really give me a figure for 2010 up through the postcard policy . . . ?
A. No. Q. You can’t give me a figure whether it is 10, whether it’s 100,
whether it’s 200? A. Two dozen times or so. Dkt. No. 258, PgID 6797. The Court finds that neither party has demonstrated the absence of a genuine
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dispute of material fact regarding whether the penological interests asserted by
Defendants are rationally related to the postcard only and publication policies.
b. Reasonable Alternative Means of Communication
The parties have submitted conflicting evidence regarding whether there are any
reasonable alternative means by which outside parties (such as Plaintiff) can
communicate with prisoners at the Jail. Defendants argue that Plaintiff can
communicate with inmates through postcards, telephone calls, in person visits, and by donating publications to the Jail library.5 Defendants recognize that such alternatives
may not be ideal, but states that the alternatives “need not be ideal; . . . they need only
be available.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 135. At least several courts have agreed with Defendants’ arguments. See, e.g., Covell, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1154.6
Defendants argue that the old publications policy allowed inmates to receive
5Based on the briefs, it is unclear whether there is one Jail library or if there is a “law library” where only online resources are available (Plaintiff argues the “law library” consists of this) plus a library with hard copies of items (Defendants seem to suggest such a library exists).
6See also Prison Legal News v. Chapman, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1300 (M.D. Ga. 2014); Perkins v. Demeyo, No. 12-01242, 2014 WL 5782769, at *6 (D. Nev. Nov. 6, 2014); Althouse, 2013 WL 536072, at *5; Daniels v. Harris, No. 11-45, 2012 WL 3901646, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2012), report and recommendation adopted in Daniels v. Harris, No. 11-45, 2012 WL 3901644 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2012); Gamble v. Arpaio, No. 12-0790, 2013 WL 5890730, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2013).
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publications to which they subscribed and to have access to publications, including Plaintiff’s, in the Jail library, where Plaintiff can donate its publications. Citing Ligons, 2009 WL 4796150, at *4; Kalasho, 868 F.Supp. at 887; Kaufman, 2007 WL 1821098, at *16 (because “free material may be donated to the prison library where it will be shelved,” prisoners had “alternate means of . . . acquiring information that might otherwise be denied under the policy banning free material”). Defendants argue that “worn” materials include the same information and that Plaintiff could send postcards alerting prisoners to find those materials in the Jail library.
Defendants suggest that the Jail library, which contains many publications (including Plaintiffs) provides a sufficient alternative for inmates. Defendants argue that, if Plaintiff wants to communicate directly with inmates to be sure they know Plaintiff’s materials are available, Plaintiff could send postcards to inmates, which would make the inmates aware of the publications in the Jail library.
Plaintiff counters that there are no reasonable alternative means at the Jail for it to communicate with prisoners at the Jail. First, Plaintiff asserts that the Jail’s “law library” does not have any hard copy publications from Plaintiff, only terminals for prisoners to do legal research (which does not include Plaintiff’s publications). Second, Plaintiff contends that the library cart that goes around to prisoners once a week (on Sunday) is not a reasonable alternative because the books on the cart “are
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very worn” and are not always returned. Third, Plaintiff states that while one of its books may have been on the library cart, the monthly journal (Prison Legal News) and some of its other books are not, so Plaintiff’s information is not available to prisoners at the Jail. Plaintiff notes that another district court has concluded that, based on access restrictions for inmates, “the library is not a sufficient alternative means to exercise the inmate’s right to receive information.” Prison Legal News v. Werholtz, No. 01-4054, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73629, at *7 (D. Kan. 2007). F o u r t h , Plaintiff states that only video visitation is allowed at the jail, not contact visitation. Fifth, Plaintiff argues that the cost of phone calls from the Jail is expensive and prohibitive. Sixth, Plaintiff asserts that it cannot communicate by postcards because the content of its materials (presently communicated in brochures, letters, and publications) will not fit on a postcard.
Plaintiff relies on a Ninth Circuit case for the proposition that “[c]ourts have rejected mail policies requiring speech to be communicated in a particular medium.” Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff states that, while the Sixth Circuit has upheld policies limiting periodicals only to those sent by publishers, it has not banned any particular medium, as Defendants’ policies do. Ward v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 881 F.2d 325, 330 (6th Cir. 1989); Brooks, 779 F.2d at 1180-81 (prison officials cannot withhold personal subscription publications, noting that “[l]ike
22

personal correspondence, a subscription represents the exercise of volition by both sender and recipient.”). Notably, there are no subscriptions at issue in this case - only unsolicited items sent by Plaintiff to prisoners at the Jail, though the Court has ruled that unsolicited communications are protected the same as subscriptions. Defendants respond that “[i]t appears . . . that a simple postcard could be used across the country to alert inmates to Plaintiff’s existence and available materials.” This argument is undermined by Defendants’ refusal (at least in September 2011) to deliver 30 postcards because Defendant Cremonte considered it a “mass mailing.” Dkt. No. 258, PgID 6592.
The Court finds that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding alternative means of communication.
c. Effect of Accommodation Plaintiff argues that the third Turner factor favors Plaintiff. The Supreme Court has stated that “the policies followed at other well-run institutions [are] relevant to a determination of the need for a particular type of restriction.” Procunier, 416 U.S. at 414 n.14. Plaintiff argues that there are over 2,600 penal institutions, including death row and maximum security prisons, that permit the distribution and delivery of mail from Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that the Jail should be capable of, and should have to allow, the same, without the restrictive mail policies Defendants seek to continue.
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Defendants counter that, prior to the implementation of the postcard only policy, staff at the Jail expended significantly more resources processing mail to inmates and that deputies were part of the staff who had to help process mail, which diverted their attention from “important duties and assignments within the Jail.” Defendants argue that contraband was a serious problem and presented a significant risk. A return to allowing publications and enveloped mail, Defendants argue, would require a “significant reallocation of the Jail’s limited financial resources, impair the ability of deputies to ensure a safe and secure Jail, and reopen opportunities for inmates and outsiders to smuggle contraband into the Jail.” Citing Overton, 539 U.S. at 135; Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418; Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Defendants assert that this “ripple effect” is “sufficient to tip the third factor” in Defendants’ favor. Covell, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1154. Defendants argue that the fact that other facilities are able to distribute materials is both: (a) irrelevant to the circumstances that exist at the Jail; and (b) offset by the fact that numerous courts have upheld a postcard only policy.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff views the issue of sending publications too narrowly. Defendants contend that Plaintiff considers only the materials it sends and ignores the fact that other publishers, bookstores, etc. are sending publications, which results in a voluminous influx of mail that imposes an undue burden on Jail staff.
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Defendants contend that, because the average length of incarceration (16-17 days) is not long enough for a subscription to begin, the Jail policy was rational, as accommodating non-subscriptions “would be an inefficient and inappropriate allocation of Jail resources.” Relying on Ligons, 2009 WL 4796150, at *5; Kaufman, 2007 WL 1821098, at *16. Plaintiff counters that “[a]t least 41% of the prisoners incarcerated at the Jail [from January 2011 to September 2011] were there for more than 60 days and would be able to receive ongoing subscriptions.” Dkt. No. 262, Ex. 25. Defendants contend that the effect of allowing publications into the Jail places a significant strain on the Jail’s resources and personnel, as all publishers, not just Plaintiff, would have to be accommodated because the policies are content-neutral and apply to all persons, not simply Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that, to the extent Defendants claim that the policies were to cut costs, the savings attributable to implementation of the policies is “too modest.” Plaintiff contends that Defendants are not even able to identify the costs saved due to the policies, especially as the evidence shows that Defendants’ claim that the prisoner population is at the Jail on average of 16-17 days.
There appears to be a genuine dispute of material fact on this issue, one that will require the factfinder to evaluate the facts and how they impact Plaintiff, inmates, and the Jail and its operations.
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d. Ready Alternatives/Exaggerated Response The Court must consider the existence of obvious and easy alternatives as indicative of an exaggerated response by prison officials. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91. “This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id. Plaintiff argues that the postcard only policy is an “exaggerated response” to concerns at the Jail, and that a return to inspecting mail in envelopes would be reasonable, as evidenced by the more than 2,600 correctional facilities nationwide, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, that allow enveloped mail, books, and magazines and accept Plaintiff’s materials. Citing Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d at 1075; Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that widespread distribution of publisher’s materials suggests that mail bans may be an exaggerated response). Plaintiff contends that this alternative “fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests,” which the “court may consider . . . as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. Plaintiff contends that Jail staff can, together with random searches of cells, inmates, and accumulated paper, detect and intercept contraband in the following ways: visual and physical inspection, the use of
26

x-ray machines, and drug or metal detectors. Defendants contend that the postcard only policy is not an exaggerated response
to their concerns, based on both cost and security factors that existed prior to—and were the reasons for—the adoption of the postcard only policy. Chapman, 44 F.Supp.3d at 1301 (jail staff “would still have to open, inspect, and monitor sealed envelopes with multi-page letters—the same concerns the postcard-only policy was meant to address”); Althouse, 2013 WL 536072, at *6. Defendant suggests that utilizing the alternative proposed by Plaintiff would result in “the same problems the postcard only policy was designed to eliminate,” so it is “not an obvious and feasible alternative to [Defendants’] postcard only policy.” Althouse, 2013 WL 536072, at *6. Defendants argue that Plaintiff, who has the burden to do so, has not demonstrated that its proposed “alternative would accommodate the right at a de minimis cost to the [J]ail.” Covell, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1155; Althouse, 2013 WL 536072, at *5 (the effort necessary to screen a postcard “pales in comparison to the effort necessary to inspect a sealed letter”).
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s alternative of allowing its unsolicited literature is unworkable because Defendants cannot make an exception just for Plaintiff and allowing everyone to do so would have more than a de minimis cost on the Jail. Citing Kalasho, 868 F.Supp. at 888 n.1. Defendants contend that, because Plaintiff
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does not “suggest a simple and effective means of addressing the concerns” regarding the volume of mail, the fourth Turner factor weighs in favor of upholding the policy. Kaufman, 2007 WL 1821098, at *16.
Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not met its burden of identifying an alternative that is not burdensome to Defendants. Relying on Overton, 539 U.S. at 132; Shaw, 532 U.S. at 232. Defendants contend that the fact that “2,600 correctional facilities nationwide” can process publications is irrelevant to demonstrate that Defendants’ publication policy is an “exaggerated response.” Chesire, 2006 WL 1868307, at *8 (each jail’s unique population and administrative constraints have to be considered). “The Constitution does not mandate a lowest common denominator security standard, whereby a practice permitted at one penal institution must be permitted at all institutions.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 93 (citing Campbell, 441 U.S. at 554) (internal citations omitted).
Defendant concludes, and the Court finds, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact precluding the Court from “mak[ing] a definitive ruling on the existence of ‘ready alternatives’” at this stage of the proceedings. Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 1999).
e. Conclusion The Court finds that a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s First
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Amendment claim as it relates to the postcard only policy and both of the publications policies.
f. Qualified Immunity Defendants assert that Defendant Bezotte and Defendant Cremonte are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendant Bezotte and Defendant Cremonte in their individual capacities on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that Defendant Bezotte and Defendant Cremonte are not entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Livermore v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff must show that Defendant Bezotte and Defendant Cremonte knowingly violated the Constitution or displayed plain incompetence. Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013). Generally, only case law from the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court can clearly establish the existence of constitutional rights. Hocker v. Pikeville City Police Dep’t, 738 F.3d 150, 153-54 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ arguments regarding qualified immunity. First, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is, and the Court finds that there is not, any clearly established law regarding postcard policies. Neither the Sixth
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Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court have ruled on the issue, and as Defendants state, several courts have upheld postcard policies after conducting analysis under Turner. See, e.g., Covell v. Arpaio, 662 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1153-55 (D. Ariz. 2009).7 Likewise, courts have routinely granted qualified immunity because the constitutionality of a postcard only policy remains unsettled. See, e.g., Daniels, 2012 WL 3901646, at *4; Salam v. Delaney, No. 12-01040, 2014 WL 4961185, at *11 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 30, 2014); Rucker v. Gilmore, No. 13-03028, 2015 WL 506210, at **5-6 (D. Kan. Feb. 6, 2015); Brown v. Hickman, No. 12-03150, 2015 WL 1097392, at *9 (W.D. Ark. March 11, 2015); Pergande v. Trumbo, No. 10-6314, 2013 WL 4083337, at **1-2 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2013).
Second, there is no clear precedent from the Sixth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court with respect to either of the Jail’s publication policies. Decisions in which other courts evaluated similar publication policies do not “point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of,” nor are they “so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be
7See also Barnes v. Wilson, 110 F. Supp. 3d 624, 632-33 (D. Md. 2015); Chapman, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1299-1301; Perkins, 2014 WL 5782769 at **5-7; Althouse 2013 WL 536072 at **4-6; Daniels, 2012 WL 3901646 at **5-6; Gamble, 2013 WL 5890730 at **4-5; Gieck, 2008 WL 2604919 at **4-7; Gambuzza v. Parmenter, No. 09-1891, 2010 WL 2179029, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 28, 2010) (citing Covell and three other cases in which courts upheld the postcard only policy under Turner’s “reasonableness” test).
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found wanting.” Virgili v. Gilbert, 272 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 2001). In fact, some courts have upheld similar publication policies. Even in Chapman, where the court found that a publication ban violated the First Amendment, the court granted qualified immunity. Chapman, 44 F.Supp.3d at 1306-07.
Third, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant Bezotte was personally involved in the censorship of Plaintiff’s postcards in order to establish liability against him. Heyerman v. Calhoun Cnty., 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012); Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991). Based on uncontroverted evidence, Defendant Bezotte did not know that Jail staff censored Plaintiff’s postcards. (Dkt. No. 258, Ex. 2 at 47-48). Plaintiff has not established personal involvement by Defendant Bezotte, and the Court finds that he is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the postcards.
As to Defendant Cremonte, Defendants argue that no precedent from the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court clearly establishes that non-delivery of mass mailings is unconstitutional, and courts in the Sixth Circuit have upheld policies or practices that prohibit receipt of bulk mail. Sheets, 97 F.3d at 168-69; Kalasho, 868 F. Supp. at 887-88; Jones, 23 F. App’x. at 461-64; Thompson, 81 F. App’x. at 569-70. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged a distinction between personal correspondence, which “represents the exercise of volition by both sender and recipient,” and mass
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mailings. Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1985). Based on the aforementioned decisions, an official in Defendant Cremonte’s position could have reasonably concluded that non-delivery of mass mailings was constitutional. See Sheets, 97 F.3d at 166-68. The Court finds that Defendant Cremonte is entitled to qualified immunity regarding the postcards because there appears to be a genuine dispute of material fact whether the postcards delivered to the Jail in September 2011 (and perhaps on other occasions) constituted a “mass mailing.”
2. Count I (Fourteenth Amendment Claim) The Court has ruled in Plaintiff’s favor on this issue on its motion for preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on its claim that Defendants denied Plaintiff due process when censoring mail sent by Plaintiff to inmates. For that reason, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and required Defendant to provide to Plaintiff and the designated recipient inmate: (a) notice of any rejection of mail (at least with the first copy of any publication), and (b) the right to appeal that rejection, and (c) the right to have the appeal decided by “an impartial third party.” Plaintiff argues that the Court should: (1) declare that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights with respect to all books, magazines, and enveloped mail sent to the Jail, and (2) convert the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction.
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Defendants argue that they should not have to provide notice and the right to appeal for each piece of mail, as different considerations exist when there are mass mailings. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 408 n.11, 417 (the decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards,” but “different considerations may come into play in the case of mass mailings”); Perry v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2011) (“mass mailings require a lower standard for due process guidelines). As set forth in Perry, a court must consider three factors when evaluating a due process claim:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Perry, 664 F.3d at 1368 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have a compelling private interest in ensuring that its unsolicited publications reach inmates when compared to Defendants’ important interest in maintaining institutional security and order. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff had notice of why its books and magazines would not be delivered to inmates—because the policies are on the website and Plaintiff filed suit based on the policies. Defendants also note that Plaintiff never contacted the Jail to protest the policy or rejection of Plaintiff’s literature. Defendants state that, since the Court
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issued the preliminary injunction, they have implemented new procedures, complied with the Court’s directives, and no due process violations have occurred. The Court previously denied a motion for contempt and sanctions filed by Plaintiff regarding Defendants’ compliance with the Court’s preliminary injunction order.
The Court concludes that, notwithstanding the issuance of the preliminary injunction, there remains a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s Fourteen Amendment due process claim. The Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to: (1) declare that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights with respect to all books, magazines, and enveloped mail sent to the Jail, and (2) convert the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction
3. Count II - Conversion Claim Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took custody of certain copies of Plaintiff’s publications (specfically, Prison Legal News and Protecting Your Health & Safety) and, for “their own use,” placed the publications in the Jail library, without either: (a) giving notice to, or obtaining consent from, Plaintiff; or (b) ordering any of the books or a monthly subscription for Prison Legal News. Because Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for use of its publications at the Jail, Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to judgment on its conversion claim. Plaintiff does not specify whether it is pleading a statutory or common law conversion claim. M.C.L. 600.2919a(1)(a) provides:
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(1) A person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees: (a) Another person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s use. Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for statutory conversion because Plaintiff has not shown that any of the magazines or books were converted to Defendants’ use. Defendants contend that the magazines and books were placed in the Jail library for the use and benefit of inmates. Citing Aroma Wines & Equip., Inc. v. Columbian Distrib. Servs., Inc., 497 Mich. 337, 340, 358-59, 361 (2015). Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. Defendants’ argument is persuasive. The Jail was not obligated to have any of the publications in any of its libraries, so by “taking” those publications and putting them in the Jail library, Defendants were not saving money. There is no evidence that the Jail or any of the Defendants derive any benefit from the content of the publications or having the publications at the Jail; rather, having the publications in the library was solely for the benefit of the very inmates Plaintiff was trying to reach (and, arguably, for the benefit of Plaintiff). As there is no evidence that the Jail or any of the Defendants converted the property to their own use, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on Count II. Defendants contend that Plaintiff also does not have a viable common law conversion claim because the publications sent by Plaintiff were gifts to the inmates,
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such that Plaintiff lacks an interest in the publications. Defendants’ argument is misplaced, as the “gifts” were never accepted by the inmates—because the inmates were not aware of, and could not have accepted, them. See Davidson v. Bubbee, 227 Mich.App. 264, 268 (1997) (citing Molenda v. Simonson, 307 Mich. 139, 141-42 (1943)) (“In order for a gift to be valid, three elements must be satisfied: [including that] . . . (3) the donee must accept the gift.”).
Defendants assert that a claim for conversion cannot survive absent a reasonable attempt to recover the property. Gum v. Fitzgerald, 80 Mich.App. 234, 239 (1977) (“Plaintiffs are required to show that a reasonable attempt has been made to recover their property in order to establish that their right to possession has been refused”). It is undisputed that there is no allegation or evidence that Plaintiff made any attempt to recover the property, and summary judgment on Count II also is appropriate for this reason. See Frank Turner Ministries, Inc. v. Bank of America, No. 298967, 2011 WL 5008615, at *2 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 20, 2011) (holding that because “plaintiffs presented no evidence to indicate that they demanded return of the property,” the circuit court “properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendants, terminated the preliminary injunction regarding the property, and dismissed the complaint”).
4. Count III - 5th Amendment Takings Claim In its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s entire argument consists of
36

directing the Court to its (one paragraph) argument regarding conversion. As individuals, Defendant Bezotte and Defendant Cremonte are not governmental entities who could exercise the power of eminent domain/taking. Vicory v. Walton, 730 F.2d 466, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1984). Count III is dismissed against them in their individual capacities as a matter of law.
Procedurally, a takings claim requires that: (1) the state provide an adequate procedure for redressing a taking; (2) the plaintiff has availed itself of the procedure in state court; and (3) the plaintiff has been denied just compensation. Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 519 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2008). Defendants argue Plaintiff’s takings claim is not ripe for review because Plaintiff does not allege or offer evidence that: (a) Plaintiff’s publications were appropriated for public use (Defendants argue they were placed in a Jail library, in the Jail’s administrative offices, or turned over to legal counsel); (b) the property was taken by express or implicit authority (Defendants argue the taking was allegedly the result of an ultra vires act by Defendant Cremonte, which is not imputed to Defendant Livingston County); and (c) state remedies are unavailable (Defendants argue that this is especially true as a conversion action is an adequate remedy). See, e.g., Lytle v. Potter, 480 F.Supp.2d 986, 990 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Perry v. Se. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., 154 F. App’x 467, 475 (6th Cir. 2005).
37

Plaintiff counters that Braun is inapplicable in this case, as Defendants did not make any remedies available to Plaintiff or even tell Plaintiff of the takings, but Plaintiff does not cite any authority to support this argument. Plaintiff argues that Defendants do not explain how the publications taken and made available to the Jail inmates “could be anything other than a public use of materials.” The property at issue is being made available only to a very select segment of the population, not clearly the public at large. For that reason, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Count III.
III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBITS In its Motion to Strike Exhibits to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff seeks to have the Court strike: (a) five exhibits, each of which is an entire deposition transcript; and (b) three reports that relate to staffing or budget matters at the Jail. The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike.
A. Deposition Transcripts Eastern District of Michigan, Local Rule 26.2 provides, in part: (a) A party or other person may not file discovery material specified in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1) and certificates of service for such discovery material except: (1) when it provides factual support for a Motion, response or reply.
The party or other person relying on the material must file only the germane portion of it as an exhibit or attachment to the Motion, response, or reply.
38

(emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that, because Defendants attached entire deposition transcripts as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 10, and 19 to their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant violated Local Rule 26.2 and the Court should strike all five exhibits.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument for several reasons: (1) Plaintiff made, and the Court declined to adopt, the same arguments regarding entire deposition transcripts included as exhibits to prior filings by Defendants in this case, see Dkt. No. 218 (“the attachment of the entire transcript of these depositions might aid the Court in its decision and, in its discretion, allows these exhibits”); (2) Plaintiff attached the entire deposition transcript of Defendant Bezotte in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, even though Plaintiff only cited to four pages of that transcript, see Dkt. No. 262, PgID 7557, 7575, Dkt. No. 262-33, PgID 7883-7905; and (3) Plaintiff has not shown–and there is no reason for the Court to find–that Plaintiff is in any way prejudiced by the filing of entire transcripts as exhibits in this case. The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike as it relates to Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 10, and 19 to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
B. Staffing and Budgetary Reports Plaintiff seeks to strike Exhibit 5, a 2002 County Jail Services Unit (“CJSU”) report because Plaintiff claims it is too old to be relevant. Plaintiff seeks to strike Exhibit 8, a 2010 CJSU Inspection Report because it is a draft (not a final) report,
39

contains hearsay, and is untrustworthy. Plaintiff seeks to strike Exhibit 9, a 2012 CJSU Inspection Report because it contains hearsay and is untrustworthy.
Defendants assert that the 2002 report provides a complete picture of the County’s increasing budget constraints that led to the policy changes. Defendants state that the 2010 report demonstrates the staffing inadequacies the Jail faced. Defendants assert that the draft version of the 2010 report is the proper document to demonstrate the staffing inadequacies because it reflects the CJSU’s raw findings, without input and influence of the County. Defendants rely on the 2012 report to demonstrate the staffing inadequacies it faced.
A district court has discretion whether to strike exhibits. See, e.g., Seay v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 480 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s request to strike the three reports is unwarranted. First, there is no need for the Court to rely on Exhibit 5, 8, or 9 in deciding Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. As the Court does not rely on the documents in deciding the dispositive motion, there is no need to strike the documents. See, e.g., Fox v. Michigan State Police Dep’t, 173 F. App’x 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2006). Second, Plaintiff cites no Sixth Circuit authority (only district court cases) for the proposition that a district court has the authority to strike inadmissible exhibits to dispositive motions. As the Fox court noted, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the district court to remove
40

documents other than the pleadings from the record in a case.” Id. Third, “it is well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the
trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment,” Smoot v. United Transp. Union, 246 F.3d 633, 649 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), and evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. But, just because evidence is not admissible does not dictate that the district court strike the evidence; it just means that the district court must not consider it.
Fourth, there are no specific references to the CJSU reports in the discussion and analysis sections of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. All references to Exhibits 5, 8, and 9 were on pages 5-6 of Defendants’ brief (the Statement of Facts section), Dkt. No. 258, PgID 6583-84, and “CJSU,” “2002,” “2010,” and “2012” are not used after pages 5-6 of Defendants’ brief (other than in case citations). As Defendants’ arguments in favor of summary judgment are not, and the Court’s decision need not be, based on any of those three reports, the Court will not strike Exhibits 5, 8, and 9 from the record.
Fifth, even if the Court were to rely on any of the CJSU reports, there appears to be admissible and relevant evidence in each of the reports. The 2002 report may bear on Defendants’ arguments regarding staffing issues in light of budgetary restraints, at least relative to why certain staffing and budgetary decisions allegedly
41

involved in this lawsuit were made. Both the 2010 and 2012 reports are public records and, even if some of the evidence in those reports constitutes inadmissible hearsay, there is still admissible evidence in both reports. Plaintiff’s complaints about those reports appear to be more about reliability than admissibility, which is an issue for cross-examination. Finally, Defendants’s arguments in their brief, regarding staffing and budgetary issues, do not identify or specify Exhibits 5, 8, and 9; the discussions are about staffing and budgetary issues generally. For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike as it relates to Exhibits 5, 8, and 9. IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 258] is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 261] is DENIED; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Exhibits to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 274] is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Denise Page Hood Denise Page Hood Chief Judge, United States District Court
42

Dated: March 31, 2017 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on March 31, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry Case Manager
43

 
 2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS Doc # 306 Filed 06/30/17 Pg 1 of 5 Pg ID 8652

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, d/b/a Prison Legal News,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 11-cv-13460-DPH-MAR

-v-

Honorable Denise Page Hood

LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, individually and officially, LIEUTENANT THOMAS CREMONTE, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON COUNTY,

Defendants.

STIPULATED ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL The parties stipulate and agree that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) and Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994), this case shall be dismissed with prejudice, with such stipulation and agreement contingent upon this Court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the terms of this dismissal are just and proper, and it is accordingly ORDERED as follows:

2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS Doc # 306 Filed 06/30/17 Pg 2 of 5 Pg ID 8653

1. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the attached

settlement agreement.

2. In all other respects, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice and

without costs.

IT IS ORDERED. Dated: June 30, 2017

s/Denise Page Hood DENISE PAGE HOOD Chief Judge, U. S. District Court

Signed and agreed to for the HRDC by:

Signed and agreed to for the Defendants by:

/s/ Daniel E. Manville, Esq.
Daniel E. Manville (P39731) Director, Civil Rights Clinic Michigan State University, College of Law 610 Abbot Road East Lansing, Michigan 48823 (517) 913-9690 daniel.manville@law.msu.edu
/s/ Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq. Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq.
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER
P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, Florida 33460 561-360-2523
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Dated: June 20, 2017

/s/ T. Joseph Seward, Esq.
T. Joseph Seward (P35095) Lindsey A. Peck (P74579)
SEWARD PECK & HENDERSON PLLC
210 East Third Street, Suite 212 Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 733-3580 jseward@sph-pllc.com lpeck@sph-pllc.com
Counsel for Defendants
Dated: June 20, 2017

2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS Doc # 306 Filed 06/30/17 Pg 3 of 5 Pg ID 8654

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

1.

This is an agreement by and between the HUMAN RIGHTS

DEFENSE CENTER, d/b/a Prison Legal News ("HRDC") and LIVINGSTON

COUNTY SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, individually and officially, LIEUTENANT

THOMAS CREMONTE, individually and officially, and LIVINGSTON

COUNTY (collectively, “Livingston County”).

2. The purpose of this agreement is to settle all claims, attorneys’ fees and costs in the case of Human Rights Defense Center, d/b/a Prison Legal News v. Livingston County Sheriff Bob Bezotte, et al., Case No. 11-cv-13460-DPH filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

3. In making this agreement Livingston County denies any wrongdoing or admission of liability and HRDC understands and agrees this Settlement Agreement is not an admission of liability. Instead Livingston County is entering into this Settlement Agreement to avoid incurring additional costs and fees in defending this matter and to resolve the uncertainty of litigation. This agreement shall apply to Livingston County, its employees, agents, or any successors responsible for the implementation of the terms of this Settlement Agreement.

4. In exchange for and consideration of the payments, acts, and promises set forth below, the HRDC shall cause to be filed the foregoing stipulated order of voluntary dismissal, the form of which has been agreed to by the parties.

5. In the event the Court does not sign the stipulated order as proposed and in the form agreed to by the parties, this agreement shall be null and void.

6. Livingston County shall accept up to 30 subscriptions per month of the Prison Legal News addressed to specific inmates regardless of whether the subscriptions are paid or are gifts, and shall deliver the Prison Legal News to inmates provided, of course, that the inmates are still housed at the Livingston County Jail. Likewise the Livingston County Jail shall deliver up to 30 books per month addressed to specific inmates, again provided that the inmate is still housed at the Jail.

7. In the event that HRDC sends more than 30 issue of Prison Legal News and/or books per month, the HRDC shall contact the Jail administrator. The Jail shall not unreasonably withhold the delivery of these additional materials. The HRDC expects that the additional materials may number up to two (2) or three (3) per month.

2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS Doc # 306 Filed 06/30/17 Pg 4 of 5 Pg ID 8655

8. In the event the Jail censors the materials either by non-delivery of the item or by redacting portions of the item, the Jail shall give notice of the censorship in writing to the inmate to whom the material was addressed as well as to the HRDC within seven (7) calendar days. Said notice to HRDC shall be sent to the following address: Prison Legal News, P.O. Box 1151, Lake Worth, FL 33460. HRDC shall have up to ten (10) calendar days after receipt of the notice to file any appeal. The Jail shall keep possession of the item subject to censorship through the conclusion of the Jail's appellate process or 30 days, whichever is shorter.

9. The HRDC agrees to dismiss with prejudice count I of the operative complaint contesting the constitutionality of the Jail's colloquially referred to postcard only policy.
10. Within 30 days of the date the Court signs and enters the stipulated order of voluntary dismissal, Livingston County shall cause to be paid to the HRDC a sum in the amount of $295,000.00.
11. The HRDC agrees that by entering into this Settlement Agreement the HRDC does release Livingston County and its employees, agents, elected and appointed officials from any claim or demand for damages or other relief which is or could have been sought in this action through the date of this Settlement Agreement. Nothing in this paragraph precludes either party from enforcing the other terms of this agreement.

12. The parties agree that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this agreement.
13. The parties recognize that paragraphs 7 and 8 of this agreement operate as a form of prospective equitable relief. Should there come a time when a party believes that it is no longer equitable that all or part this agreement should have prospective application (for example, due to a significant change in the law), and the parties cannot come to an agreement privately on a modification being sought, the party seeking relief may move for such from the Court. The decision on such a motion shall be governed by the legal standard and case law established for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
14. This agreement is effective upon being executed by all parties through counsel whose signatures appear below.

Signed and agreed to

Signed and agreed to

2:11-cv-13460-DPH-EAS Doc # 306 Filed 06/30/17 Pg 5 of 5 Pg ID 8656

for the HRDC by:

for the Defendants by:

/s/ Daniel E. Manville, Esq. Daniel E. Manville (P39731) Director, Civil Rights Clinic Michigan State University, College of Law 610 Abbot Road East Lansing, Michigan 48823 (517) 913-9690 daniel.manville@law.msu.edu

/s/ T. Joseph Seward, Esq. T. Joseph Seward (P35095) Lindsey A. Peck (P74579)
SEWARD PECK & HENDERSON PLLC
210 East Third Street, Suite 212 Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 (248) 733-3580 jseward@sph-pllc.com lpeck@sph-pllc.com

/s/ Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq. Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, Florida 33460 561-360-2523

Counsel for Defendants Dated: June 20, 2017

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Dated: June 20, 2017

 
 Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 1 of 24
CLOSED,reassigned
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:11−cv−13460−DPH−EAS

Human Rights Defense Center v. Bezotte et al Assigned to: District Judge Denise Page Hood Referred to: Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 08/09/2011 Date Terminated: 06/30/2017 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Prison Legal News TERMINATED: 04/16/2015

represented by Brian J. Prain Law Office of Brian J. Prain, PLLC 37211 Goddard Road Romulus, MI 48174 248−763−0641 Fax: 248−286−6167 Email: brian@prainlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville Civil Rights Clinic 610 Abbot East Lansing, MI 48823 51−336−8088, x1137 Fax: 517−336−0646 Email: daniel.manville@law.msu.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance T. Weber Dan Newlin & Partners 7335 W. Sand Lake Road Suite 300 Orlando, FL 32819 407−250−6513 Email: lance.weber@newlinlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sabarish Neelakanta Human Rights Defense Center P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460 561−360−2523 Fax: 866−735−7136 Email: sneelakanta@humanrightsdefensecenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Loeb 32000 Northwestern Highway Suite 170 Farmington Hills, MI 48334−1507 248−851−2020 Fax: 258−851−2525 Email: lawyerloeb@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Human Rights Defense Center Doing business as Prison Legal News

represented by Brian J. Prain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 2 of 24

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lance T. Weber (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/29/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sabarish Neelakanta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas M. Loeb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Sheriff Bob Bezotte Livingston County Sheriff
Defendant Livingston, County of

represented by Lindsey A. Peck Collins Einhorn Farrell PC 4000 Town Center 9th Floor Southfield, MI 48075 248−355−4141 Fax: 248−663−7711 Email: Lindsey.peck@ceflawyers.com TERMINATED: 03/21/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara E. Lowry Seward Peck & Henderson PLLC 210 East 3rd Street Suite 212 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248−733−3599 Fax: 248−733−3633 Email: slowry@sph−pllc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward Seward Peck & Henderson PLLC 210 East 3rd Street Suite 212 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248−733−3580 Fax: 248−733−3633 Email: jseward@sewardhenderson.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lindsey A. Peck (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/21/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara E. Lowry

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 3 of 24

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Thomas Cremonte

represented by T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan

represented by Daniel S. Korobkin American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578−6824 Fax: (313) 578−6811 Email: dkorobkin@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/09/2011
08/09/2011 08/09/2011 08/11/2011 08/15/2011 08/29/2011 09/02/2011 09/02/2011 09/07/2011 09/13/2011
10/07/2011
10/07/2011

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Prison Legal News against All Defendants with Jury Demand. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 0645−3109066 − Fee: $ 350. County of 1st Plaintiff: Out of State − County Where Action Arose: Livingston − County of 1st Defendant: Livingston. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Loeb, Thomas) [ADDRESS FOR CO−COUNSEL BRIAN J. PRAIN IS INCORRECT] Modified on 8/10/2011 (LHac). (Entered: 08/09/2011)
2 SUMMONS Issued for *Bob Bezotte* (TMcg) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
3 SUMMONS Issued for *Livingston, County of* (TMcg) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
4 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Brian J. Prain appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Prain, Brian) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
5 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Livingston, County of served on 8/12/2011, answer due 9/2/2011. (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Lance T. Weber − NOT SWORN on behalf of Prison Legal News. (Weber − NOT SWORN, Lance) (Entered: 08/29/2011)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by T. Joseph Seward on behalf of All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
8 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
9 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 10/17/2011 02:45 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
10 STATEMENT of DISCLOSURE of CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS and FINANCIAL INTEREST by Prison Legal News identifying Corporate Parent Human Rights Defense Center, Corporate Parent Human Rights Defense Center for Prison Legal News. (Weber − NOT SWORN, Lance) (Entered: 09/13/2011)
11 MOTION for Judgment on Pleadings by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 6) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 10/07/2011)
12 MOTION for Sanctions by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 5

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 4 of 24

10/13/2011 10/13/2011 10/17/2011 10/27/2011 10/31/2011 10/31/2011
11/02/2011 11/11/2011
11/14/2011
11/18/2011 11/21/2011 12/07/2011
12/20/2011
12/21/2011
01/12/2012

Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 9) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 10/07/2011)
13 NOTICE of hearing on 11 MOTION for Judgment on Pleadings, 12 MOTION for Sanctions. Motion Hearing set for 12/7/2011 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 10/13/2011)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Scheduling Conference set for 12/7/2011 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 10/13/2011)
14 STIPULATION by Prison Legal News (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
15 ORDER granting enlargement of time for plaintiff to answer defendant' motion for sanctions 12 :( Responses due by 10/31/2011) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 10/27/2011)
16 STIPULATION by Prison Legal News (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 10/31/2011)
17 RESPONSE to 12 MOTION for Sanctions filed by Prison Legal News. (Loeb, Thomas) Modified on 11/1/2011 (DTyl) [ANSWER OPPOSING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS] (Entered: 10/31/2011)
18 ORDER Granting 16 Stipulation for Enlargement of Time for Plaintiff to Answer, 11 Defendants' MOTION for Judgment on Pleadings :( Responses due by 11/14/2011) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 11/02/2011)
19 REPLY to Response re 12 MOTION for Sanctions filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exh 1−Statement of Robert J. McRoberts, # 3 Exhibit Exh 2− PLN's Postcard, # 4 Exhibit Exh 3− PLN's September 2011 Newsletter, # 5 Exhibit Exh 4− Marr v Jones, # 6 Exhibit Exh 5− Burns v Unum Group) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 11/11/2011)
20 RESPONSE to 11 MOTION for Judgment on Pleadings filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Protecting Your Health & Safety, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Prison Legal News Vol. 22, # 4 Exhibit 3 − PLN's Informational Brochures, # 5 Exhibit 4 − PLN v Werholtz, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Leachman v Thomas) (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 11/14/2011)
21 STIPULATION AND ORDER Granting Extension of Time to File Reply to Response to Motion for Sanctions Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (SJa) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
22 REPLY to Response re 11 MOTION for Judgment on Pleadings filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
Minute Entry − Motion Hearing held on 12/7/2011 re 11 MOTION for Judgment on Pleadings, 12 MOTION for Sanctions before District Judge Denise Page Hood. Disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT(Court Reporter Cheryl Warren Daniel) (LSau) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
23 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 12 MOTION for Sanctions filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exh 1− Vaughn Court Records, # 3 Exhibit Exh 2− Correspondence, dated December 7, 2011, # 4 Exhibit Exh 3−Tweedy Court Records) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/20/2011)
24 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 23 Supplemental Brief, filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex 1 − Declaration of Brian J. Prain, # 3 Exhibit Ex 2 − Order of Appointment of Mr. Prain and Notice of Hearing) (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 12/21/2011)
25 MOTION Enter Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Paul Wright, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Livingston County Michigan Sheriff's Dept. Inmate Rules, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Roose−Church, Lisa − Journal Suing Sheriff Over Mail, # 5 Exhibit 4 −Declaration of Brian Prain, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Declaration of Paul Shaposka, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Declaration of Christopher Atkins, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Declaration of Lance Weber, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Postcard from PLN to 1 of 37 Detainees at the Jail, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Quick Facts about the Bureau of Prisons, # 11 Exhibit 10 − MDOC 2010 Statistical Report, # 12 Exhibit

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 5 of 24

01/25/2012 01/27/2012 02/09/2012 02/09/2012 02/09/2012 02/09/2012
02/09/2012
02/10/2012 02/10/2012

11 − Federal Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5265.14, # 13 Exhibit 12 − MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.118, # 14 Exhibit 13 − Unpublished Decisions) (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 01/12/2012)
26 NOTICE of hearing on 25 MOTION Enter Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing set for 2/24/2012 02:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
27 STIPULATED ORDER granting extension of time to file response to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 25 :( Responses due by 2/9/2012) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 01/27/2012)
28 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amicus Brief, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 1, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 2, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 3, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 4, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 5, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 6, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 7, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 8, # 10 Exhibit Ex. 9) (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 28 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
30 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Brief in Opposition to Prison Legal News' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
31 RESPONSE to 25 MOTION Enter Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exh 1− Complaint, # 3 Exhibit Exh 2− Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 4 Exhibit Exh 3− Prison Legal News v Livingston, # 5 Exhibit Exh 4− Thompson v Campbell, # 6 Exhibit Exh 5− Prison Legal News v Cheshire, # 7 Exhibit Exh 6− Declaration of Lance Weber, # 8 Exhibit Exh 7− Marr v Jones, # 9 Exhibit Exh 8− New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v Comm'r, # 10 Exhibit Exh 9− Statement of Robert J. McRoberts, # 11 Exhibit Exh 10− Declaration of Brain Prain, # 12 Exhibit Exh 11− Mitchell v Mich. Dep't of Corr., # 13 Exhibit Exh 12− Anderson v Prisoner Health Servs, # 14 Exhibit Exh 13− Declaration of Paul Shaposka, Jr., # 15 Exhibit Exh 14− Declaration of Paul Wright, # 16 Exhibit Exh 15− Policy 5(d)1, # 17 Exhibit Exh 16− Policy 5(e)1, # 18 Exhibit Exh 17− Gambuzza v Parmenter, # 19 Exhibit Exh 18− Affidavit of Lieutenant Cremonte, # 20 Exhibit Exh 19− Brown v Gerth, # 21 Exhibit Exh 20− Ligons v Perez, # 22 Exhibit Exh 21− Kaufman v Karlen, # 23 Exhibit Exh 22− Fisher v Caruso) (Seward, T.)[FILING ERRROR: INCORRECT BRIEF ATTACHED; REFILED AS DOCUMENT 32 ] Modified on 2/10/2012 (DPer). (Entered: 02/09/2012)
32 RESPONSE to 25 MOTION Enter Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exh 1− Complaint, # 3 Exhibit Exh 2−Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 4 Exhibit Exh 3− Prison Legal News v Livingston, # 5 Exhibit Exh 4− Thompson v Campbell, # 6 Exhibit Exh 5− Prison Legal News v Cheshire, # 7 Exhibit Exh 6− Declaration of Lance Weber, # 8 Exhibit Exh 7− Marr v Jones, # 9 Exhibit Exh 8− New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v Comm'r, # 10 Exhibit Exh 9− Statement Robert J. McRoberts, # 11 Exhibit Exh 10− Declaration of Brain Prain, # 12 Exhibit Exh 11− Mitchell v Mich. Dep't of Corr., # 13 Exhibit Exh 12− Anderson v Prisoner Health Servs, # 14 Exhibit Exh 13− Declaration of Paul Shaposka, Jr., # 15 Exhibit Exh 14− Declaration of Paul Wright, # 16 Exhibit Exh 15− Policy 5(d)1, # 17 Exhibit Exh 16− Policy 5(e)1, # 18 Exhibit Exh 17− Gambuzza v Parmenter, # 19 Exhibit Exh 18− Affidavit of Lieutenant Cremonte, # 20 Exhibit Exh 19− Brown v Gerth, # 21 Exhibit Exh 20− Ligons v Perez, # 22 Exhibit Exh 21− Kaufman v Karlen, # 23 Exhibit Exh 22− Fisher v Caruso) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
33 NOTICE of hearing on 28 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief. Motion Hearing set for 2/24/2012 02:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER granting 30 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Brief in Opposition to Prison Legal News' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Livingston, County of, Bob Bezotte. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood.

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 6 of 24

02/20/2012 02/22/2012
02/23/2012 02/24/2012
02/29/2012 04/06/2012 04/10/2012 04/23/2012 05/01/2012 05/16/2012 06/09/2012
07/02/2012 07/05/2012 07/16/2012 07/30/2012 07/30/2012 07/31/2012

(LSau) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
34 REPLY to Response re 25 MOTION Enter Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction filed by Prison Legal News. (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 02/20/2012)
35 RESPONSE to 28 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exh 1− Dow Chem. Co. v United States, # 3 Exhibit Exh 2− Commodities Export v City of Detroit, # 4 Exhibit Exh 3− Canada v Ray, # 5 Exhibit Exh 4− PACER List of PLN Cases, # 6 Exhibit Exh 5− BancInsure, Inc v U.K. Bancorporation, # 7 Exhibit Exh 6− United States v Mich. Dep't of Cmty Health, # 8 Exhibit Exh 7− Williams v City of Lansing, # 9 Exhibit Exh 8− Georgacarakos v Wiley, # 10 Exhibit Exh 9− PLN v Cheshire) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/22/2012)
36 NOTICE by Prison Legal News of Supplemental Authority in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Loeb, Thomas) (Entered: 02/23/2012)
Minute Entry − Motion Hearing held on 2/24/2012 re 25 MOTION Enter Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction filed by Prison Legal News, 28 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief filed by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan before District Judge Denise Page Hood. Disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT(Court Reporter Cheryl Warren Daniel) (LSau) (Entered: 02/24/2012)
37 REPLY to Response re 28 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief filed by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2) (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 02/29/2012)
38 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel E. Manville on behalf of Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/06/2012)
39 MOTION Rule 16 Status Conference by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
40 RESPONSE to 39 MOTION Rule 16 Status Conference filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
41 REPLY to Response re 39 MOTION Rule 16 Status Conference filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit Listing, # 2 Exhibit 1, Rothstein v. Steinberg, unpublished) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
42 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 7/30/2012 02:15 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 05/16/2012)
43 NOTICE by Prison Legal News re 11 MOTION for Judgment on Pleadings, 25 MOTION Enter Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, PLN v Livingston, 5th CIrcuit, # 2 Exhibit 2, McGlone v. Bell, 6th Circuit, # 3 Exhibit 3, PLN v. Columbia County, Order) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 06/09/2012)
44 MOTION to Adjourn Scheduling Conference by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
45 RESPONSE to 44 MOTION to Adjourn Scheduling Conference filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
46 REPLY to Response re 44 MOTION to Adjourn Scheduling Conference filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Scheduling Conference RESET for 8/6/2012 03:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
47 ORDER granting in part 44 Defendants' Motion to Adjourn Scheduling Conference and Notice of Hearing. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
48 Notice of E−mail Delivery Failure as to attorney Daniel E. Manville. Bounced NEF for 47 Order on Motion to Adjourn, Set Deadlines/Hearings. (KCla) (Entered: 07/31/2012)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 7 of 24

08/06/2012 08/06/2012
09/12/2012 09/12/2012 09/19/2012 09/26/2012 09/30/2012 10/10/2012
10/10/2012
10/15/2012 10/22/2012 10/25/2012 11/06/2012 12/03/2012 12/05/2012 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 04/05/2013

Minute Entry − Scheduling Conference held on 8/6/2012 before District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 08/07/2012)
49 SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 1/31/2013 Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 2/15/2013 Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/22/2013 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Jury Trial set for 5/21/2013 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Refer to image for additional dates) (LSau) (Entered: 08/07/2012)
50 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Lindsey A. Kaczmarek appearing on behalf of Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
51 MOTION for Protective Order by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exh 1− PLN's Discovery Requests, # 3 Exhibit Exh 2− Williams v Scottrade, Inc) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
52 RESPONSE to 51 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 1, Discovery Responses) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
53 REPLY to Response re 51 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
54 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND GRANTING THE ACLUS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF.Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/30/2012)
55 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, Interrogatory Requests, # 3 Exhibit 2, Document Requests, # 4 Exhibit 3, Proof of Service of Discovery, # 5 Exhibit 4, Objections to Interrogatories, # 6 Exhibit 5, Objections to Document Requests, # 7 Exhibit 6, Letter to Defendants' Counsel) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 10/10/2012)
56 Amicus Curiae BRIEF by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit Certificate of Service) (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 10/10/2012)
57 NOTICE of hearing on 51 MOTION for Protective Order , 55 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses. Motion Hearing set for 11/7/2012 04:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
58 RESPONSE to 55 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
59 REPLY to Response re 55 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 10/25/2012)
60 ORDER granting 51 Motion for Protective Order and denying 55 Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 11/06/2012)
61 WITNESS LIST by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/03/2012)
62 ORDER SUSPENDING 49 Scheduling Order,. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (MWil) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
63 ORDER denying Plaintiff's 25 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
64 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
65 SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 5/31/2013 Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 6/21/2013 Final Pretrial Conference set for 9/23/2013 02:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Jury Trial set for 10/15/2013 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Refer to image for additional dates) (LSau) (Entered: 04/05/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 8 of 24

04/12/2013 04/12/2013 04/15/2013 04/24/2013 04/24/2013 04/26/2013 04/26/2013 05/01/2013 05/13/2013 06/04/2013
06/04/2013
07/24/2013 07/30/2013 07/30/2013 08/06/2013
08/07/2013 08/13/2013

66 MOTION for Reconsideration re 63 Order on Motion − Free by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
67 MOTION for Reconsideration re 64 Order on Motion for Judgment by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
68 Amended MOTION for Reconsideration re 64 Order on Motion for Judgment by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
69 MOTION for Order Extending Discovery Deadlines and Trial Date by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
70 Amended MOTION for Order Extending Discovery Deadlines and Trial Date by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
71 Defendants' WITNESS LIST by All Defendants (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 04/26/2013)
72 Plaintiff's WITNESS LIST by Prison Legal News (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/26/2013)
73 NOTICE TO APPEAR : Status Conference Re: [Docket #69] & [Docket #70] set for 5/13/2013 04:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 05/01/2013)
Minute Entry − Status Conference held on 5/13/2013 before District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
74 ORDER Deeming Moot Plaintiffs 67 Motion for Reconsideration, Deeming 69 Moot Plaintiffs Motion for Order Extending Discovery Deadlines, Granting Plaintiffs Amended 70 Motion for Order Extending Discovery Deadlines, and Amended Scheduling Order. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Loury, R) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
Set/Reset Scheduling Order Deadlines: Discovery due by 9/30/2013 Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 10/30/2013 Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/21/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Jury Trial set for 2/18/2014 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (Loury, R) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
75 MOTION for Protective Order as to 2d Discovery Requests by Defendants by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, discovery Requests & Responses, # 2 Exhibit 2, Hours of Counsel for Sanctions) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
76 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: 75 MOTION for Protective Order as to 2d Discovery Requests by Defendants filed by Prison Legal News. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 07/30/2013)
77 NOTICE OF HEARING on 75 MOTION for Protective Order as to 2d Discovery Requests by Defendants. Motion Hearing set for 9/10/2013 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon (EBut) (Entered: 07/30/2013)
78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits 1, Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 2, Responses to Request to Admit, # 3 Exhibit 2, Responses Requests for Documents, # 4 Exhibit 3, Responses to Interrogatories, # 5 Exhibit 4, Letter to Seward, # 6 Exhibit 5, Affidavit of Cermonte, # 7 Exhibit 6, Hoxier v. Livingston County, unpublished, # 8 Exhibit 7, Van Leuen v. American, unbublished, # 9 Exhibit 8, Declaration of Manville, # 10 Exhibit 9, Declaration Weber, # 11 Exhibit 9−1, CV of Weber, # 12 Exhibit 9−2, CV of Hull, # 13 Exhibit 9−3, CV of Thornton, # 14 Exhibit 9−4, Time Sheet of Weber, # 15 Exhibit 9−5, Time Sheet of Hull, # 16 Exhibit 9−6, Time Sheet of Thornton) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
79 RESPONSE to 75 MOTION for Protective Order as to 2d Discovery Requests by Defendants filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit) (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
80 REPLY to Response re 75 MOTION for Protective Order as to 2d Discovery Requests by Defendants filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 08/13/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 9 of 24

08/15/2013 08/16/2013 08/20/2013 08/21/2013
08/23/2013 08/23/2013 08/23/2013
08/23/2013 08/23/2013 08/27/2013 08/29/2013 09/03/2013 09/04/2013 09/04/2013 09/04/2013 09/04/2013 09/10/2013
09/10/2013 09/11/2013

81 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: 78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery filed by Prison Legal News. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Ciesla, C) (Entered: 08/15/2013)
82 NOTICE OF HEARING on 78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery. Motion Hearing set for 9/10/2013 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon (EBut) (Entered: 08/16/2013)
83 MOTION TO EXTEND re 74 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Order on Motion for Order,,,, Set/Reset Scheduling Order Deadlines, by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
84 STIPULATION AND ORDER ENLARGING THE TIME FOR DEFENDANTS TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S 78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery :( Responses due by 8/30/2013) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Ciesla, C) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
85 Plaintiff's Exhibit and WITNESS LIST by Prison Legal News (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
86 Exhibit List by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
87 ReNOTICE OF HEARING on 78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery, 75 MOTION for Protective Order as to 2d Discovery Requests by Defendants. Motion Hearing set for 9/10/2013 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon (EBut) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
88 WITNESS LIST by All Defendants (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
89 Exhibit List by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
90 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Status Conference set for 9/10/2013 04:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (Ciesla, C) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
91 RESPONSE to 78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
92 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Document Requests by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/03/2013)
93 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages to file reply brief by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 09/04/2013)
94 REPLY to Response re 78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, PLN v. Columbia County) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 09/04/2013)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER granting 93 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages to file reply brief filed by Prison Legal News. Entered by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. (EBut) (Entered: 09/04/2013)
95 RESPONSE to 93 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages to file reply brief filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, PLN v. Columbia County) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 09/04/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: Motion Hearing held on 9/10/2013 re 78 Second MOTION to Compel discovery filed by Prison Legal News, 75 MOTION for Protective Order as to 2d Discovery Requests by Defendants filed by Prison Legal News Disposition: #75 granted in part, #78 granted (Tape #MAR 9/11/13) (EBut) Modified on 9/11/2013 (EBut). (Entered: 09/11/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Status Conference held on 9/10/2013. (LSau) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
96 ORDER granting in part 75 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. (EBut) (Entered: 09/11/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 10 of 24

09/11/2013 09/12/2013
09/17/2013
09/18/2013
09/25/2013 10/03/2013 10/09/2013 10/16/2013 10/23/2013 10/25/2013 10/30/2013 11/12/2013 11/21/2013
11/21/2013 12/03/2013 12/04/2013 12/05/2013 12/11/2013

97 ORDER granting 78 Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. (EBut) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
98 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER:( Discovery due by 1/31/2014, Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 2/28/2014, Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/3/2014 02:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood, Jury Trial set for 7/8/2014 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood). Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Refer to image for additional dates) (JOwe) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
99 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: 92 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Document Requests filed by Livingston, County of, Bob Bezotte. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/17/2013)
100 ORDER granting 92 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 92 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Document Requests Responses due by 10/4/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. (EBut) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
101 OBJECTION to Order Granting in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/25/2013)
102 NOTICE of Change of Address/Contact Information by Lance T. Weber on behalf of Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
103 RESPONSE to 101 Objection to Order Granting in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 10/09/2013)
104 MOTION for Protective Order by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
105 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: 104 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Prison Legal News. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 10/23/2013)
106 NOTICE OF HEARING on 104 MOTION for Protective Order . Motion Hearing set for 11/21/2013 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon (EBut) (Entered: 10/25/2013)
107 RESPONSE to 104 MOTION for Protective Order filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
108 REPLY to Response re 104 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: Motion Hearing held on 11/21/2013 re 104 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Prison Legal News. Disposition: granted (Tape #MAR 11/21/13) (EBut) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
109 ORDER granting 104 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. (EBut) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
110 Plaintiff's WITNESS LIST by Prison Legal News (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
111 NOTICE by Prison Legal News re 109 Order on Motion for Protective Order (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 12/04/2013)
112 MOTION for Summary Judgment by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
113 NOTICE OF HEARING on 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment . Motion Hearing set for 3/5/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 12/11/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 11 of 24

12/11/2013
12/13/2013 12/26/2013 12/26/2013 12/26/2013 12/27/2013 01/08/2014 01/09/2014 01/10/2014
01/10/2014
01/13/2014
01/15/2014 01/16/2014 01/16/2014

114 MOTION for Order to Enforce Order Compelling Discovery Responses by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 1, Order to Compel Answers, # 3 Exhibit 2, Defendants' Responses to Document Requests, # 4 Exhibit 3, Supplemental Response Based on Order to Compel, # 5 Exhibit 4, Affidavit of Defendant) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
115 RESPONSE to 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 12/13/2013)
116 RESPONSE to 114 MOTION for Order to Enforce Order Compelling Discovery Responses filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/26/2013)
117 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by All Defendants of proposed Order to Extend Time for Defendants to File Reply Brief re: Motion for Summary Judgment (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/26/2013)
118 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 116 Response to Motion by All Defendants (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/26/2013)
119 STIPULATION AND ORDER Extending the Time for Defendants to File a Reply Brief in Support of Their 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment :( Reply due by 1/10/2014) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 12/27/2013)
120 REPLY to Response re 114 MOTION for Order to Enforce Order Compelling Discovery Responses filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
121 REPLY to Response re 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
122 AMENDED COMPLAINT to file Supplmental Complaint filed by Prison Legal News against All Defendants. NO NEW PARTIES ADDED. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Supplemental Complaint) (Manville, Daniel)[DOCKET ERROR−DOCUMENT IS TITLED MOTION] Modified on 1/13/2014 (TMcg). (Entered: 01/10/2014)
123 MOTION to Compel ENTRY ON LAND by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit Listing, # 2 Exhibit 1. Emails, # 3 Exhibit 2. letter from Seward, # 4 Exhibit Letter to Seward, # 5 Exhibit Letter from Seward, # 6 Exhibit 5 Entry on Land, Amended, # 7 Exhibit 6. 2d Amended Entry on Land, # 8 Exhibit 7. 7.Access 4 All, Inc. v. W & D Davis Inv. Co., Ltd., CIV.A. 2:06−CV−504, 2007 WL 614091 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 21, 2007), # 9 Exhibit 8.Burley v. Gagacki, 10−CV−10555, 2010 WL 4867411 *2 (E.D.Mich. Nov. 23, 2010)) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 01/10/2014)
124 MOTION for Order To Allow PLN's Counsel to Interview Detainees by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit Listing, # 2 Exhibit 1, Ltr from Seward, # 3 Exhibit 2, Ltr to Seward, # 4 Exhibit Ltr from Seward, # 5 Exhibit 4, Access 4 (unpublished), # 6 Exhibit 5, Gornick (unpublished), # 7 Exhibit 6, PD 05.03.140, # 8 Exhibit 7, PD 05.03.116, # 9 Exhibit 8, PD 05.03.118) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
125 NOTICE OF HEARING on 114 MOTION for Order to Enforce Order Compelling Discovery Responses. Motion Hearing set for 3/5/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
126 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 01/16/2014)
127 Third MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Brief in Support by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, # 3 Exhibit Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Fourth Set of Requests for Production of Documents, # 4 Exhibit Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Fifth Set of Requests for Production of Documents, # 5 Exhibit Defendants' Supplemental Answers to Plaintiff's First, Fourth and Fifth Sets of Discovery Requests, # 6 Exhibit Defendants' Answers and Objections to Plaintiff's Seventh Set of Requests for Production of Documents, # 7

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 12 of 24

01/24/2014 01/24/2014 01/26/2014
01/26/2014 01/27/2014 01/27/2014 01/27/2014 01/27/2014 01/28/2014 01/29/2014
01/29/2014 01/29/2014

Exhibit Letter to Defendants counsel dated December 19, 2013, # 8 Exhibit Letter to Defendants' counsel dated December 20, 2013, # 9 Exhibit Letter from Defendants counsel dated January 2, 2014, # 10 Exhibit Letter to Defendants' counsel dated January 10, 2014, # 11 Exhibit Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admissions, # 12 Exhibit Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 01/16/2014)
128 NOTICE OF HEARING on 127 Third MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Brief in Support, 123 MOTION to Compel ENTRY ON LAND, 124 MOTION for Order To Allow PLN's Counsel to Interview Detainees, 122 MOTION to Amend/Correct. Motion Hearing set for 3/19/2014 03:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 114 MOTION for Order to Enforce Order Compelling Discovery Responses. Motion Hearing set for 3/19/2014 03:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
129 MOTION for Sanctions for failure to Appear fro Depositions by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 1, Email to Atty. Seward as to 30(b)(6) deposition, # 3 Exhibit 2, Deposition Notice for 1.20.14, # 4 Exhibit 3, Email to Atty Seward Deposition Notice of 1.21.14, # 5 Exhibit 4, Email to Seward Deposition Notice1.27.14, # 6 Exhibit 5, Amaned dep. for 1.20.14., # 7 Exhibit Email 1.20.14 from Seward, # 8 Exhibit 7, Email 1.20.14 from Seward, # 9 Exhibit 8, Transcript of Failure to Appear, # 10 Exhibit 9, Sharp v. Mazzola, unpublished) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 01/26/2014)
130 MOTION for Protective Order as to Scheduled Deposition by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Email from Seward to Manville) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 01/26/2014)
131 RESPONSE to 123 MOTION to Compel ENTRY ON LAND filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1−Second Amended Notice, # 3 Exhibit 2−Dawson case, # 4 Exhibit 3− Access 4 All case, # 5 Exhibit 4−Order, # 6 Exhibit Cremonte Affidavit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
132 RESPONSE to 124 MOTION for Order To Allow PLN's Counsel to Interview Detainees filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1− Order R#64, # 3 Exhibit 2−McRoberts Statement, # 4 Exhibit 3− Cremonte Affidavit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
133 RESPONSE to 122 MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
134 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: 130 MOTION for Protective Order as to Scheduled Deposition filed by Prison Legal News. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
135 REPLY to Response re 124 MOTION for Order To Allow PLN's Counsel to Interview Detainees filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 1, Inmate Rules, Mail, # 3 Exhibit 2, Jail Rules, Mail, # 4 Exhibit 3, Policy Number 5(d)1, # 5 Exhibit 4, Policy Number 5(e)1, # 6 Exhibit 5, Policy Number 3(g)1) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 01/28/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 127 Third MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Brief in Support, 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 123 MOTION to Compel ENTRY ON LAND, 124 MOTION for Order To Allow PLN's Counsel to Interview Detainees, 114 MOTION for Order to Enforce Order Compelling Discovery Responses, 122 MOTION to Amend/Correct. Motion Hearing RESET for 4/23/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
136 MOTION for Order to file Oversized Reply Brief by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
137 RESPONSE to 127 Third MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Brief in Support filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 5

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 13 of 24

01/30/2014 01/30/2014
02/04/2014 02/04/2014 02/04/2014
02/04/2014 02/04/2014 02/04/2014 02/04/2014 02/05/2014 02/05/2014
02/05/2014 02/07/2014 02/07/2014 02/10/2014

Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 6) (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
138 MOTION for Protective Order by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
139 MOTION Leave of Court to Depose Michael Stoll, Michael Rickman & Brian Rheingans & Extend Discovery to Allow for Said Depositions Along with Deposition of Andrew Tweedy by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 5) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
140 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: 138 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Livingston, County of, Bob Bezotte. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
141 ORDER Granting Motion to File Oversized Reply 136 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
142 NOTICE OF HEARING on 139 MOTION Leave of Court to Depose Michael Stoll, Michael Rickman & Brian Rheingans & Extend Discovery to Allow for Said Depositions Along with Deposition of Andrew Tweedy , 129 MOTION for Sanctions for failure to Appear fro Depositions. Motion Hearing set for 4/23/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
143 NOTICE OF HEARING on 138 MOTION for Protective Order . Motion Hearing set for 3/3/2014 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon (EBut) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
Motions terminated: 130 MOTION for Protective Order as to Scheduled Deposition filed by Prison Legal News. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. (EBut) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
144 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages of reply by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
145 REPLY to Response re 123 MOTION to Compel ENTRY ON LAND filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
RESET Deadlines as to 138 MOTION for Protective Order . Motion Hearing RESET for 3/11/2014 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. THIS IS A FIRM DATE. (FMos) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
146 RESPONSE to 139 MOTION Leave of Court to Depose Michael Stoll, Michael Rickman & Brian Rheingans & Extend Discovery to Allow for Said Depositions Along with Deposition of Andrew Tweedy filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit Listing, # 2 Exhibit 1, Declarations of PLN's Counsel, # 3 Exhibit 2, 1.10.14 Notices of Deps, # 4 Exhibit 3, Re−Notice of Deps for 1.30 & 1.31.14, # 5 Exhibit 4, Proposed Stip Order Ojibway, # 6 Exhibit 5, Proposed Step Order not listing a prisoner, # 7 Exhibit 7, Rule 30(b)(6) Notice 1.29.14, # 8 Exhibit 8, Notice of Dep Wright, # 9 Exhibit 9, Notice of Dep of inmate Tweedy, # 10 Exhibit 10, MDOC's web page) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
147 NOTICE by Prison Legal News of withdrawal of 122 MOTION to Amend/Correct SUPPLMENTAL COMPLAINT. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
148 ORDER granting 144 Motion to File Oversized Reply. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
149 RESPONSE to 129 MOTION for Sanctions for failure to Appear fro Depositions filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
150 RESPONSE to 138 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Thomas v. Baca, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99261 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2006), # 3 Exhibit 2 − Greco v. Livingston County, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11906 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2014), # 4 Exhibit 3 − Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Second Set of Discovery, with Plaintiffs Discovery Exhibit 1, #

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 14 of 24

02/10/2014 02/11/2014 02/14/2014 02/28/2014 02/28/2014
02/28/2014 03/03/2014
03/06/2014
03/10/2014 03/10/2014 03/11/2014
03/11/2014 03/12/2014 03/12/2014 03/17/2014 03/17/2014

5 Exhibit 4 − Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., 326 Fed. Appx. 900 (6th Cir. Mich. 2009).) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
151 REPLY to Response re 127 Third MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Brief in Support filed by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
152 NOTICE by Prison Legal News re 127 Third MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Brief in Support and Withdrawal of Certain Issues Therefrom (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
153 REPLY to Response re 129 MOTION for Sanctions for failure to Appear fro Depositions filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
154 MOTION for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief in Excess of Page Limit by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
155 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support, # 2 Index of Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit 1 − Policy 5(e)1, # 4 Exhibit 2 − Inmate Rules and Regulations, # 5 Exhibit 3 − Jail Policy from Sheriff's Website, # 6 Exhibit 4 − Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories (Excerpt), # 7 Exhibit 5 − Depo of Cremonte, # 8 Exhibit 6 − Depo of Payne, # 9 7 − Depo of Gostomski, # 10 8 − Wall v. Wade) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
156 MOTION for Summary Judgment by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
158 NOTICE OF HEARING on 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 154 MOTION for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief in Excess of Page Limit, 156 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment. Motion Hearing set for 4/23/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
159 MOTION for Sanctions by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) Modified on 4/15/2014 (KKra). [EXHIBIT 2 STRICKEN PER COURT ORDER 4/14/14] (Entered: 03/10/2014)
160 RESPONSE to 154 MOTION for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief in Excess of Page Limit filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon: Motion Hearing held on 3/11/2014 re 138 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Livingston, County of, Bob Bezotte Disposition: granted in part (Tape #MAR 3/11/14) (EBut) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
161 ORDER granting in part 138 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon. (EBut) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
162 MOTION to Expedite Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
163 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lance Weber) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
164 REPLY to Response re 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
165 MOTION to Strike 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/17/2014)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 15 of 24

03/17/2014 03/18/2014 03/18/2014 03/19/2014
03/20/2014 03/21/2014 03/21/2014 03/21/2014 03/21/2014
03/24/2014 03/24/2014 03/24/2014 03/28/2014 03/28/2014 03/31/2014

166 RESPONSE to 159 MOTION for Sanctions filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Gornick v. Calif. Dep't of Corr.) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
167 MOTION for Leave to File sur−reply by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
168 SUR−REPLY re 154 MOTION for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief in Excess of Page Limit filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Unpublished) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
169 NOTICE OF HEARING on 163 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment , 159 MOTION for Sanctions , 162 MOTION to Expedite Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Motion Hearing set for 4/23/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
170 NOTICE by Prison Legal News of withdrawal of 163 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment . (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
171 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Sanctions by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
172 REPLY to Response re 159 MOTION for Sanctions filed by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
173 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
174 RESPONSE to 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Budget Summary and Status Reports, # 3 Exhibit 2002 Staffing Report, # 4 Exhibit Personnel Summary, # 5 Exhibit Lay−Off Letters, # 6 Exhibit 2010 Inspection Report, # 7 Exhibit 2012 Inspection Report, # 8 Exhibit Memo to File, # 9 Exhibit Inmate Rights & Privileges, # 10 Exhibit Response to RFA 96 (7th Set), # 11 Exhibit Sales Receipts, # 12 Exhibit Response to RFA 1 (3rd Set), # 13 Exhibit Response to RFA 3 (3rd Set), # 14 Exhibit Response to RFPOD 6 (3rd Set), # 15 Exhibit Response to ROGG 5c (1st Set), # 16 Exhibit Response to Court Order, # 17 Exhibit Response to ROGG 8 (1st Set), # 18 Exhibit Excerpts of Paul Wright's Deposition Transcript, # 19 Exhibit Response to RFA 5 (3rd Set), # 20 Exhibit Response to RFA 6 (3rd Set), # 21 Exhibit Althouse v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, # 22 Exhibit Daniels v. Harris, # 23 Exhibit Gamble v. Arpaio, # 24 Exhibit Ligons v. Perez, # 25 Exhibit Kaufman v. Karlen, # 26 Exhibit Prison Legal News v. Cheshire, # 27 Exhibit Black v. Camon) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
175 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (Unopposed) by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan. (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
176 RESPONSE to 159 MOTION for Sanctions filed by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan. (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
177 RESPONSE to 165 MOTION to Strike 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment and to Strike Defendants' Exhibits filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
178 NOTICE OF HEARING on 165 MOTION to Strike 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment . Motion Hearing set for 4/23/2014 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
179 ORDER Granting Motion to File Sur−Reply 167 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
180 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by All Defendants of Proposed Orders re: DKT #171 & #173 (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/31/2014)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 16 of 24

04/02/2014 04/02/2014 04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/04/2014 04/07/2014
04/07/2014 04/08/2014 04/08/2014 04/09/2014 04/09/2014 04/10/2014 04/11/2014
04/11/2014 04/11/2014

181 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint,, by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amended Complaint) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
182 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authorities as to D/E 68 by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
183 REPLY to Response re 159 MOTION for Sanctions filed by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
184 ORDER Granting Defendant's 171 Motion for Leave to File An Oversized Brief in Support of Their Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Sanctions. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Loury, R) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
185 ORDER Granting Defendant's 173 Motion for Leave to File An Oversized Brief in Support of Their Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Loury, R) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
186 REPLY to Response re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Paul Wright, # 2 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 1 of 10, # 3 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 2 of 10, # 4 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 3 of 10, # 5 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 4 of 10, # 6 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 5 of 10, # 7 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 6 of 10, # 8 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 7 of 10, # 9 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 8 of 10, # 10 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 9 of 10, # 11 Exhibit A to Paul Wright Dec. Part 10 of 10, # 12 Exhibit B to Paul Wright Dec., Protecting Your Health and Safety, # 13 Exhibit C to Paul Wright Dec., Postcard from Paul Wright to Keith Canfield, # 14 Exhibit D to Paul Wright Dec., Postcard from Keith Canfield to Paul Wright, # 15 Exhibit E to Paul Wright Dec., Postcard from Paul Wright to Keith Canfield, # 16 Exhibit 2 − Declaration of Brett Brown, # 17 Exhibit 3 − Declaration of Paul Shaposka, # 18 Exhibit 4 − Declaration of Brian Church, # 19 Exhibit 5 − Prison Legal News v. Werholtz, # 20 Exhibit 6 − Declaration of Mark Henson) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
187 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
188 NOTICE OF HEARING on 181 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint,, . Motion Hearing set for 5/14/2014 02:15 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (JOwe) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
189 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 182 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authorities as to D/E 68 (JOwe) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER granting 187 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by Prison Legal News. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
190 ORDER granting ACLU's Unopposed 175 Motion for Leave to File Response to Defendants' 175 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
191 RESPONSE to 181 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint,, filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
192 ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Amended 68 Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's March 29, 2013 Order, 64 Order Regarding Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings, Denying Plaintiff's 182 Motion to FileSupplemental Authority, and Noting Amended Order. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
193 AMENDED 64 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's 11 Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
194 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by All Defendants of Proposed Order to Strike Attachment 3 of Ex.2 re: DKT #159 (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/11/2014)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 17 of 24

04/11/2014 04/14/2014 04/16/2014
04/17/2014 04/22/2014 04/23/2014
04/23/2014
04/23/2014
04/28/2014 04/28/2014 04/30/2014 05/02/2014 05/09/2014
05/15/2014

195 MOTION to Strike Attachment 3 of Ex. 2 of DKT No 159 by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
196 ORDER granting 195 Motion to Strike. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (KKra) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
197 MOTION for Reconsideration re 196 Order on Motion to Strike, 195 MOTION to Strike Attachment 3 of Ex. 2 of DKT No 159 , MOTION for Leave to File Response in Opposition to 195 Motion to Strike by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − ACLU's Proposed Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike) (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
198 REPLY to Response re 181 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint,, filed by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
199 MOTION for Reconsideration re 196 Order on Motion to Strike by Prison Legal News. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Motion Hearing held on 4/23/2014 re 127 Third MOTION to Compel, 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 124 MOTION for Order, 123 MOTION to Compel, 114 MOTION for Order Disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT(Court Reporter Rene Twedt) (LSau) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
200 NOTICE OF HEARING on 127 Third MOTION to Compel, 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 139 MOTION Leave of Court to Depose Michael Stoll, Michael Rickman & Brian Rheingans & Extend Discovery to Allow for Said Depositions Along with Deposition of Andrew Tweedy , 159 MOTION for Sanctions , 156 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 181 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint,, . Motion Hearing set for 5/9/2014 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
201 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 162 MOTION to Expedite Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 154 MOTION for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief in Excess of Page Limit, 126 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages , 157 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Summary Judgment, 129 MOTION for Sanctions for failure to Appear fro Depositions (LSau) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
202 NOTICE of Appearance by Sara E. Lowry on behalf of All Defendants. (Lowry, Sara) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
203 RESPONSE to 197 MOTION for Reconsideration re 196 Order on Motion to Strike, 195 MOTION to Strike Attachment 3 of Ex. 2 of DKT No 159 MOTION for Leave to File Response in Opposition to 195 Motion to Strike filed by All Defendants. (Lowry, Sara) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
204 NOTICE of Appearance by Sabarish Neelakanta on behalf of Prison Legal News. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
205 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 199 MOTION for Reconsideration re 196 Order on Motion to Strike (LSau) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Motion Hearing held on 5/9/2014 re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Prison Legal News, 127 Third MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Brief in Support filed by Prison Legal News, 139 MOTION Leave of Court to Depose Michael Stoll, Michael Rickman & Brian Rheingans & Extend Discovery to Allow for Said Depositions Along with Deposition of Andrew Tweedy filed by Livingston, County of, Bob Bezotte, 159 MOTION for Sanctions filed by Livingston, County of, Bob Bezotte Disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT(Court Reporter Jodie Matthews) (LSau) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
206 EXHIBIT , Supplemental Filing re 129 MOTION for Sanctions for failure to Appear fro Depositions by Prison Legal News (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Email, # 2 Exhibit 2, Stipulation, # 3 Exhibit 3, Stipulation, # 4 Exhibit 4, Letter to Seward, # 5 Exhibit 5, Subpoena) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 05/15/2014)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 18 of 24

05/16/2014 05/16/2014 05/16/2014 05/21/2014 05/23/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014 06/11/2014 06/16/2014 06/17/2014 09/30/2014 10/17/2014 10/21/2014 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 04/14/2015 04/14/2015 04/16/2015 05/19/2015

207 [STRICKEN] NOTICE by Prison Legal News re: Deposition of Sgt. Terrance Davis (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition Transcript) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) Modified on 5/16/2014 (KKra). (Entered: 05/16/2014)
NOTICE of Error directed to: Sabarish Neelakanta re 207 Notice (Other). Document is prohibited discovery, disclosure or a certificate of service thereof. Document was stricken. [No Image Associated with this docket entry] (KKra) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
208 EXHIBIT Supplemental Filing re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Prison Legal News (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
209 RESPONSE to 206 Exhibit, Plaintiff's Supplemental Exhibits Filing by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 05/21/2014)
210 EXHIBIT Reply to Response to Filing of Supplemental Exhibits re 206 Exhibit, by Prison Legal News (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
211 MOTION re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment to File Supplemental Authority by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit PLN v. County of Ventura) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
TEXT−ONLY NOTICE: Final Pretrial Conference Hearing on June 3, 2014 and Jury Trial are Cancelled re 98 Scheduling Order. (LSau) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
212 MOTION for Order to File Hightlighted Deposition of Bezotte by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Highlighted Deposition of Bezotte) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
213 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 211 MOTION re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment to File Supplemental Authority (LSau) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
214 ORDER granting 212 PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ORDER TO FILE HIGHLIGHTED DEPOSITION OF BEZOTTE. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
215 ORDER Granting 126 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; Denying 129 Motion for Sanctions and Granting 154 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
216 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Lance Weber) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
217 ORDER Granting 216 Plaintiff's Motion for an Enlargement of Time in Which to Respond to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
218 ORDER Regarding Various Motions. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
219 ORDER Regarding Motions for Reconsideration of Order Striking Attachment 3 I.E. Exhibit 2 of Docket 159. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
220 MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 112 and Allowing Plaintiff to File an Amended Complaint. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
221 ORDER Denying 123 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Rule 34 Entry on Land for Expert and Counsel. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
222 AMENDED COMPLAINT with Jury Demand filed by Prison Legal News against All Defendants. NO NEW PARTIES ADDED. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
223 NOTICE by Prison Legal News re 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Order in Prison Legal News v.

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 19 of 24

06/17/2015
07/24/2015 09/30/2015 11/22/2015 12/02/2015 12/02/2015 12/07/2015 12/14/2015 01/19/2016
02/08/2016 02/10/2016 02/10/2016 02/10/2016 02/10/2016 03/09/2016
03/09/2016 03/10/2016 03/14/2016 03/23/2016

County of San Diego, et al.,) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
224 NOTICE of Appearance by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek on behalf of Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of., NOTICE of Change of Address/Contact Information by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek on behalf of Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 06/17/2015)
225 STIPULATION AND ORDER for substitution of attorneys. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (DPer) (Entered: 07/24/2015)
226 ORDER Granting 114 Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce the Court's Order of September 11, 2013. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
227 MOTION for Order to Show Cause by Prison Legal News. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Cremonte, # 2 Exhibit 2, 2d Affidavit of Cremate, # 3 Exhibit 3, Letter to Defendants' Counsel) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 11/22/2015)
228 NOTICE OF HEARING on 227 MOTION for Order to Show Cause . Motion Hearing set for 1/20/2016 03:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
229 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Status Conference set for 1/20/2016 03:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
230 RESPONSE to 227 MOTION for Order to Show Cause filed by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
231 REPLY to Response re 227 MOTION for Order to Show Cause filed by Prison Legal News. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 12/14/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 227 MOTION for Order to Show Cause .( Motion Hearing set for 2/10/2016 03:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood), Set Deadlines/Hearings:( Status Conference set for 2/10/2016 03:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood) (LSau) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
232 Status REPORT by Prison Legal News (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Chart of Pending Motions) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
233 AFFIDAVIT of Sergeant Kimble Carter by All Defendants (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
234 AMENDED 233 Affidavit by All Defendants Affidavit of Sergeant Kimble Carter (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 227 MOTION for Order to Show Cause . Motion Hearing RESET for 3/9/2016 04:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference RESET for 3/9/2016 04:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Motion Hearing held on 3/9/2016 re 227 MOTION for Order to Show Cause filed by Prison Legal News Disposition: Motion taken under advisement (Court Reporter: Cheryl Daniel) (LSau) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Status Conference held on 3/9/2016 (LSau) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
235 NOTICE by Prison Legal News of withdrawal of 155 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
236 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 5/23/2016 03:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 03/14/2016)
237 ORDER Granting Limited Discovery Pursuant to the Court's March 9, 2016 Directives at the Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/23/2016)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 20 of 24

03/23/2016 03/23/2016 03/24/2016 03/24/2016 03/31/2016 04/04/2016
04/04/2016 04/04/2016 04/05/2016 04/07/2016 04/15/2016
04/20/2016 04/22/2016
04/24/2016
04/25/2016 04/29/2016 05/06/2016 05/16/2016

Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference set for 5/23/2016 03:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
TEXT−ONLY NOTICE: Scheduling Conference Hearing on May 23, 2016 is Cancelled re 236 Notice to Appear (LSau) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Telephonic Status Conference held on 3/24/2016 (LSau) (Entered: 03/24/2016)
238 NOTICE by All Defendants of withdrawal of 156 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/24/2016)
239 ORDER Regarding Various Motions. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
240 MOTION re 239 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Order on Motion for Order, Order on Motion − Free, Order on Motion for Sanctions, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, Order on Motion for Order to Show Cause, 192 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Order on Motion for Leave to File,, Rule 60(b)(5) motion by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Sucui v. Washington) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
241 AMENDED COMPLAINT with Jury Demand filed by All Plaintiffs against Thomas Cremonte. NEW PARTIES ADDED. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
REQUEST for SUMMONS for Thomas Cremonte. (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
242 SUMMONS Issued for *Thomas Cremonte* (DAll) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference RESET for 5/31/2016 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
243 RESPONSE to 240 MOTION re 239 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Order on Motion for Order, Order on Motion − Free, Order on Motion for Sanctions, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, Order on Motion for Order to Show Cause, 192 Order on Motion for Reconsider filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Peck, Lindsey) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
244 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 241 Amended Complaint by All Plaintiffs served on Defendant Cremate (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
245 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of withdrawal of 240 MOTION re 239 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Order on Motion for Order, Order on Motion − Free, Order on Motion for Sanctions, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, Order on Motion for Order to Show Cause, 192 Order on Motion for Reconsider . (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
246 MOTION for Reconsideration re 64 Order on Motion for Judgment Rule 54(b) Motion by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit Listing, # 2 Exhibit 1, Kniffen v. Macomb Co., # 3 Exhibit 2, McNulty v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., # 4 Exhibit 3, Kniffen v. Macomb County, # 5 Exhibit 4, Suciu v. Washington, # 6 Exhibit 5, Affidavit of Counsel Manville, # 7 Exhibit 6, Affidavit of Counsel Weber) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 04/24/2016)
247 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
248 STIPULATION AND ORDER as to Sanctions. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference set for 5/31/2016 11:00 AM (TIME CHANGE ONLY) before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 05/06/2016)
249 RESPONSE to 246 MOTION for Reconsideration re 64 Order on Motion for Judgment Rule 54(b) Motion filed by Bob Bezotte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 05/16/2016)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 21 of 24

05/23/2016 05/31/2016 06/10/2016
06/17/2016 07/06/2016 07/12/2016 07/14/2016 07/18/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016
07/29/2016
07/29/2016 07/29/2016 07/29/2016 07/29/2016
08/01/2016 08/03/2016

250 REPLY to Response re 246 MOTION for Reconsideration re 64 Order on Motion for Judgment Rule 54(b) Motion filed by Human Rights Defense Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Deposition of Cremate, portion) (Manville, Daniel) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Status Conference held on 5/31/2016 (LSau) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
251 ORDER SETTING DATES, ( Discovery due by 7/15/2016, Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 7/29/2016, Jury Trial set for 10/4/2016 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood.) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (KWin) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
252 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Injunction) (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
253 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Telephonic Status Conference set for 7/12/2016 11:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Telephonic Status Conference held on 7/12/2016 (LSau) (Entered: 07/13/2016)
254 ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (DPar) (Entered: 07/14/2016)
255 NOTICE by Human Rights Defense Center of Service of Expert Report of John L. Clark Pursuant to 26(a) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 07/18/2016)
256 MOTION for Contempt and to Enforce Preliminary Injunction by Human Rights Defense Center. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
257 DECLARATION by Paul Wright re 256 MOTION for Contempt and to Enforce Preliminary Injunction filed by Human Rights Defense Center (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
258 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Bob Bezotte, Thomas Cremonte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit 14, # 16 Exhibit 15, # 17 Exhibit 16, # 18 Exhibit 17, # 19 Exhibit 18, # 20 Exhibit 19, # 21 Exhibit 20, # 22 Exhibit 21) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
259 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Bob Bezotte, Thomas Cremonte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
260 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by All Plaintiffs. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
261 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Human Rights Defense Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Unreported Cases) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
262 Plaintiff's STATEMENT of Statement of Undisputed Facts by Human Rights Defense Center (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit, # 26 Exhibit, # 27 Exhibit, # 28 Exhibit, # 29 Exhibit, # 30 Exhibit, # 31 Exhibit, # 32 Exhibit, # 33 Exhibit, # 34 Exhibit, # 35 Exhibit, # 36 Exhibit, # 37 Exhibit, # 38 Exhibit, # 39 Exhibit, # 40 Exhibit, # 41 Exhibit, # 42 Exhibit, # 43 Exhibit, # 44 Exhibit, # 45 Exhibit) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
263 EXHIBIT 20 re 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Bob Bezotte, Thomas Cremonte, Livingston, County of (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
264 NOTICE OF HEARING on 256 MOTION for Contempt and to Enforce Preliminary Injunction. Motion Hearing set for 9/14/2016 03:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 08/03/2016)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 22 of 24

08/04/2016 08/05/2016
08/05/2016 08/05/2016 08/09/2016 08/10/2016 08/16/2016 08/19/2016 08/19/2016 08/19/2016 08/19/2016 08/19/2016 08/19/2016
08/22/2016 08/25/2016 08/25/2016 08/25/2016
08/30/2016 09/02/2016

265 ORDER Granting 260 Motion for Leave to File Oversized Brief. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (DPar) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
266 RESPONSE to 256 MOTION for Contempt and to Enforce Preliminary Injunction filed by Bob Bezotte, Thomas Cremonte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
267 NOTICE OF HEARING on 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 261 MOTION for Summary Judgment . Motion Hearing set for 10/6/2016 02:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
TEXT−ONLY NOTICE: Jury Trial Hearing on October 4, 2016 is Cancelled. (LSau) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
268 ORDER Granting Defendants' 259 Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (SBur) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
269 REPLY to Response re 256 MOTION for Contempt and to Enforce Preliminary Injunction filed by Human Rights Defense Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit July 19, 2016 Emails) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/10/2016)
270 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness John L. Clark by Bob Bezotte, Thomas Cremonte, Livingston, County of. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
271 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Their Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
272 RESPONSE to 261 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Bob Bezotte, Thomas Cremonte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
273 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Human Rights Defense Center. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
274 MOTION to Strike 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 19 by Human Rights Defense Center. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
275 RESPONSE to 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Human Rights Defense Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Unreported cases) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
276 STATEMENT of Disputed Facts by Human Rights Defense Center (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Decl. of Paul Wright, # 2 Exhibit Decl. of Sabarish Neelakanta, # 3 Exhibit 2016 Annual Budget) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) Modified on 8/22/2016 (Ahmed, N). (Entered: 08/19/2016)
277 EXHIBIT 1 − Decl of Paul Wright (Corrected) re 276 Statement, by Human Rights Defense Center (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
278 ORDER Granting 273 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (DPar) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
279 ORDER Granting 271 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (DPar) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
280 NOTICE OF HEARING on 274 MOTION to Strike 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 19, 270 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness John L. Clark. Motion Hearing set for 10/6/2016 02:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
281 RESPONSE to 270 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness John L. Clark filed by Human Rights Defense Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
282 RESPONSE to 274 MOTION to Strike 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 19 filed by Bob Bezotte, Thomas Cremonte, Livingston, County of. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/02/2016)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 23 of 24

09/02/2016 09/02/2016 09/02/2016
09/02/2016 09/08/2016 09/09/2016 09/14/2016 09/16/2016 09/21/2016 09/21/2016
09/30/2016 10/06/2016
12/28/2016

283 MOTION Defendants' Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment re 275 Response to Motion by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/02/2016)
284 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Supoprt of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment by Human Rights Defense Center. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 09/02/2016)
285 REPLY to Response re 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 283 MOTION Defendants' Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment re 275 Response to Motion filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1 − Deposition Transcript of Lieutenant Jeff LeVeque, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2 − Deposition Transcript of Sergeant Kimble Carter, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3 − Deposition Transcript of Lieutenant Thomas Cremonte, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4 − Deposition Transcript of Sergeant Kevin Mack, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 5 − Deposition Transcript of Kathy Gostomski, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 6 − Deposition Transcript of Shelly Payne, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 7 − Affidavit of Lieutenant Jeffrey A. LeVeque) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/02/2016)
286 REPLY to Response re 261 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Human Rights Defense Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Unreported Cases) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 09/02/2016)
287 REPLY to Response re 274 MOTION to Strike 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 19 filed by Human Rights Defense Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Unreported Cases) (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
288 ORDER Granting 284 Motion for Leave to File Oversized Brief. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Motion Hearing held on 9/14/2016 re 256 MOTION for Contempt and to Enforce Preliminary Injunction filed by Human Rights Defense Center Disposition: Motion taken under advisement (Court Reporter: Cheryl Daniel) (LSau) (Entered: 09/15/2016)
289 ORDER Granting Defendants' Ex Parte 283 Motion For Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (KWin) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
290 REPLY to Response re 270 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness John L. Clark filed by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
291 REPLY to Response re 270 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness John L. Clark Addendum to Motion to Strike Expert Witness REPLY filed by All Defendants. (Seward, T.)[DOCKET ERROR − WRONG EVENT USED − DOCUMENT IS AN ADDENDEUM TO DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS EXPERT WITNESS JOHN L. CLARK] Modified on 9/21/2016 (LGra). (Entered: 09/21/2016)
292 ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part 127 Plaintiff's Third Motion to Compel Production of Documents. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Motion Hearing held on 10/6/2016 re 270 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness John L. Clark filed by Livingston, County of, Thomas Cremonte, Bob Bezotte, 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Livingston, County of, Thomas Cremonte, Bob Bezotte, 274 MOTION to Strike 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 19 filed by Human Rights Defense Center, 261 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Human Rights Defense Center Disposition: Motion taken under advisement (Court Reporter: Marie Metcalf) (LSau) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
293 MOTION for Withdrawal of Attorney Lance Weber by Human Rights Defense Center. (Weber, Lance) (Entered: 12/28/2016)

Case: 2:11-cv-13460 As of: 05/06/2019 05:06 PM EDT 24 of 24

12/29/2016 03/09/2017
03/31/2017 03/31/2017 03/31/2017 04/03/2017 04/04/2017 05/03/2017 05/05/2017 05/05/2017 05/05/2017 05/08/2017 05/10/2017 05/11/2017 05/17/2017 06/30/2017 03/21/2018 05/15/2018 08/13/2018

294 ORDER Granting re 293 MOTION for Withdrawal of Attorney Lance Weber filed by Human Rights Defense Center., Attorney Lance T. Weber terminated. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (TMcg) (Entered: 12/29/2016)
295 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 258 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 261 MOTION for Summary Judgment Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 258 and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 261 filed by All Defendants. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 03/09/2017)
296 ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Rule 54(b) Motion 246 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
297 ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Civil Contempt and to Enforce Preliminary Injunction 256 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
298 ORDER Regarding Motions Filed As Docket Numbers 258 , 261 , and 274 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
299 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/12/2017 02:30 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Jury Trial set for 7/18/2017 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
300 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Status Conference set for 5/5/2017 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 04/04/2017)
301 Supplemental WITNESS LIST by Human Rights Defense Center (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 05/03/2017)
Text−Only Order of reassignment from Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford pursuant to Administrative Order 14−009. (SSch) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Status Conference held on 5/5/2017 (LSau) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
302 ORDER REFERRING OTHER MATTERS to Magistrate Judge Stafford : Settlement Conference to be conducted May 2017 − June 2017. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
303 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Settlement Conference set for 5/17/2017 10:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation) (MarW) (Entered: 05/08/2017)
304 ORDER REGARDING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford. (MarW) (Entered: 05/10/2017)
305 Second Supplemental WITNESS LIST by Human Rights Defense Center (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 05/11/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford: Settlement Conference held on 5/17/2017. Disposition: Settlement reached (Court Reporter: Digitally Recorded) (MarW) (Entered: 05/17/2017)
306 STIPULATED ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 06/30/2017)
Attorney Lindsey A. Peck is discontinued from receiving Notices of Electronic Filing. Reason: no longer representing Def's County of Livingston and Bezotte, Bob. (Peck, Lindsey) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
307 DOCUMENT received from George Wyatt, Jr. (DPer) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
308 DOCUMENT received from George Wyatt, Jr. (titled as an amended complaint) (DPer) (Entered: 08/14/2018)