Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 1 Filed 10/15/13 Page 1 of 12 Page ID#: 1

Lake James H. Perriguey, OSB No. 983213 lake@law-works.com LAW WORKS LLC 1906 SW Madison Street Portland, OR 97205-1718 Telephone: (503) 227-1928 Facsimile: (503) 334-2340
Lea Ann Easton, OSB No. 881413 leaston@dorsayindianlaw.com DORSAY & EASTON LLP 1 SW Columbia Street, Suite 440 Portland, OR 97204 Telephone: (503) 790-9060 Facsimile: (503) 790-9068
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION

DEANNA L. GEIGER and JANINE M. NELSON, ROBERT DUEHMIG and WILLIAM GRIESAR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon, ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon, JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,
Defendants.

Case No.: ______________
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE, OR OTHER RELIEF

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Plaintiffs Deanna Geiger and Janine Nelson, and Robert Duehmig and William Griesar complain of Defendants and allege:
INTRODUCTION 1. Oregon’s Constitution states: “It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.” Or. Const. Art. 15 § 5a. This provision discriminates against gay and lesbian Oregonians who were married legally in other jurisdictions. This provision also discriminates against gay and lesbian Oregonians who want to marry in Oregon. 2. Oregon statutory law includes the separate and unequal institution of same-sex domestic partnerships. This domestic partnership law extends to lesbian and gay couples only some of the legal benefits of marital status that Oregon extends to heterosexual citizens who marry one another. ORS 106.300 – 106.340. Oregon’s unequal treatment of gay and lesbian people denies them the fundamental liberties and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3. For these reasons, Plaintiffs ask this Court to permanently enjoin all enforcement of Or. Const. Art. 15 § 5a and all other Oregon statutes that exclude gay and lesbian people from equal access to civil marriage. 4. Plaintiffs are same sex couples who bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking 1) a declaration that Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to Page 2 - COMPLAINT

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the United States Constitution because it denies gay and lesbian people the equal opportunity to marry under state law and it denies equal state recognition of marriages between people of the same-sex, and 2) a permanent injunction preventing the Defendants from enforcing this provision of Oregon’s Constitution.
5. Plaintiffs also seek (1) a declaration that Oregon statutes, which refer to “husband and wife,” and by implication restrict marriage to only a man and a woman, are unconstitutional as applied to gay and lesbian couples under the Due Process Clause and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 2) a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from enforcing these statutes against Plaintiffs.
6. Plaintiffs seek equal access to marriage and the same legal recognition of their union that the State of Oregon extends to opposite-sex couples. Plaintiffs seek access all of the federal benefits and obligations that they are denied because Oregon Constitution Section 5 Article 15 prohibits marriage between same-sex couples.
7. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce their fundamental constitutional rights and liberties that the United States Constitution ensures for all people. Plaintiffs also seek recovery of their attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses for this action and for any other relief the Court may order. / / / / / /
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8. This case raises questions under the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C § 1983. This Court has jurisdiction over all claims for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
9. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants Rosenblum and Kitzhaber maintain official offices in Marion County, Oregon. Venue is also proper in this district because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred and are continuing to occur in this district.
THE PARTIES
10. Plaintiffs Deanna Geiger and Janine Nelson are women who have been in a committed relationship for 31 years. Plaintiffs are residents of Oregon and reside in Multnomah County, Oregon. Plaintiffs want to marry one another in Oregon.
11. Plaintiffs Robert Duehmig and William Griesar are men who were married in Canada in 2003. Plaintiffs are parents of two teenagers. Plaintiffs and their children are residents of Oregon and reside in Multnomah County, Oregon. Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar are citizens of Oregon and desire to have the State of Oregon officially treat them the same as heterosexual couples who are Oregon citizens married under the laws of other jurisdictions and officially sanction Plaintiffs’ marriage under Oregon law.
12. Defendant John Kitzhaber is the Governor of the State of Oregon. In his official capacity, the Governor is the chief executive officer of the State of Oregon. It is his responsibility to ensure that the State’s laws are enforced fairly, uniformly, and constitutionally.
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Defendant Kitzhaber is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
13. Defendant Ellen Rosenblum is the Attorney General of the State of Oregon. In her official capacity the Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the State of Oregon. It is her duty to ensure the State’s laws are enforced fairly, uniformly, and constitutionally. Defendant Rosenblum is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
14. Defendant Jennifer Woodward is the State Registrar of Oregon and is the manager of the Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority. It is her duty to record all marriages along with births and deaths in the vital statistic records for the State of Oregon. Defendant Woodward is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
15. Defendant Randy Waldruff is the County Assessor for Multnomah County. Randy Waldruff is responsible for maintaining vital records of marriages and issuing marriage licenses in Multnomah County, Oregon. Defendant Waldruff is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
16. Defendants, and those subject to their supervision, direction, and control, are responsible for the enforcement of Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and all Oregon marriage statutes. The relief requested in this action is sought against each Defendant, as well as against each Defendant’s officers, employees, and agents, and against all persons acting in cooperation with Defendant(s), under their supervision, at their direction, or under their control.
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FACTS
17. The Oregon Family Fairness Act created a separate and unequal institution of same-sex “domestic partnerships.” ORS 106.300 – 106.340. These laws provide to same-sex couples many, but not all, of the benefits and obligations of marriage.
18. Oregon’s legislative findings supporting the adoption of the Act at ORS 106.305 (4) acknowledge that “[t]his state has a strong interest in promoting stable and lasting families, including the families of same-sex couples and their children” and that “[a]ll Oregon families should be provided with the opportunity to obtain necessary legal protections and status and the ability to achieve their fullest potential.”
19. In addition to creating a separate and unequal legal framework, the Act’s provisions differ from the provisions in Oregon marriage statutes in the following ways:
a. To qualify for a domestic partnership, both individuals seeking to enter into a domestic partnership must be 18 years of age. ORS 106.325(5). Oregon’s marriage statutes, however, include a provision that 17-year-olds can marry with parental consent. ORS 106.010.
b. Marriage requires solemnization in front of two witnesses. ORS 106.010, 106.150. Domestic partnerships require no solemnization.
c. Applicants for a domestic partnership must consent to jurisdiction of the Oregon courts, requiring the parties to consider the possibility of a future dissolution of their partnership at its very inception. ORS 106.325(4). State law does not force opposite-sex couples to anticipate the possibility of divorce by consenting to Oregon court jurisdiction at the time they apply for a marriage license.
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d. ORS 106.041(4) provides that “[a] marriage license must contain the following statement: “Neither you nor your spouse is the property of the other. The laws of the State of Oregon affirm your right to enter into marriage and at the same time to live within the marriage free from violence and abuse.” There is no similar requirement for same-sex couples applying for recognition under the domestic partnership laws.

20.

Exclusion from marriage by Oregon law undermines the Plaintiffs’ abilities to

achieve their life goals and dreams, threatens their mutual economic stability, and denies them

equal dignity and status. Plaintiffs and their children are stigmatized and relegated to second-

class citizens.

21. Plaintiffs are identical to opposite-sex couples in all of the characteristics relevant to marriage. Same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as different-sex couples. Like different-sex couples, same-sex couples fall in love, build their lives together, plan their futures together, and hope to grow old together. Like different-sex couples, same-sex couples support one another emotionally and financially and take care of one another physically when faced with injury or illness. Same sex couples seek the same ability to raise and nurture children like different –sex couples. Plaintiffs seek equal access to marriage for the same emotional, romantic, and dignitary reasons and to provide the same legal shelter to their families, as different-sex spouses.

22. Oregon’s discriminatory marriage laws bar same-sex couples from equal access to many of the federal benefits, protections, and obligations accessible to heterosexual married couples under federal law.

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23. Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar are citizens of Oregon who were legally married in Vancouver, B.C., on December 29, 2003. Despite the fact that they are legally married, the Defendants refuse to recognize Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar as a legally married couple because they are both men. Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar want Defendants to accept their marriage license and desire to have the State of Oregon and Multnomah County officially treat them the same as heterosexual couples who are Oregon citizens married under the laws of other jurisdictions and officially sanction Plaintiffs’ marriage under Oregon law.
24. On September 23, 2013, Plaintiffs Geiger and Nelson applied for a marriage license in Multnomah County, Oregon. Plaintiffs were denied a marriage license by the Multnomah County Clerk because they are both women.
25. Plaintiffs and their extended families suffer significant emotional, physical, and economic harms, humiliation, and societal stigma caused by Oregon’s refusal to allow same sex couples equal access to marriage.
26. If Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a, and all Oregon statutes restricting marriage to heterosexual couples are not enjoined, Defendants will continue to enforce these unconstitutional laws against Plaintiffs, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The relief sought requires Defendants to recognize same-sex marriage as valid as a matter of federal law within the State of Oregon. The declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek requires Defendants to revise the official state forms for the application for license to marry, the certificate of registry of marriage including the license to marry, and the marriage certificate, and will require them to issue samesex couples a marriage license.
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF CLAIM ONE: DUE PROCESS 27. Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 30, supra, as if fully set forth herein. 28. Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a deprives Plaintiffs’ fundamental liberties that are protected by the Due Process Clause, both on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs. 29. Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a deprives Plaintiffs’ fundamental liberties by denying gay and lesbian individuals the right to choose who to marry and enter into officially sanctioned family relationships with their loved ones as opposite-sex individuals. Oregon stigmatizes gays, lesbians, their children and their families by denying them the same dignity, respect, and stature afforded officially recognized opposite-sex married couples by denying gay and lesbian couples equal access to marriage. 30. Insofar as they are enforcing the terms of Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and Oregon statutes that limit marriage to husband and wife, Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving and will continue to deprive Plaintiffs of numerous rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
CLAIM TWO: EQUAL PROTECTION 31. Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 30, supra, as if fully set forth herein.
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32. Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and all Oregon statutes referring to marriage and describing individuals in a marriage only as “husband” and “wife” violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, both on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs.
33. Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and all Oregon statutes referring to marriage and describing only “husband” and “wife” restrict civil marriage to individuals of the opposite sex. Plaintiffs are therefore unable to marry one another. Oregon law treats similarly situated people differently without legal justification by providing civil marriage to heterosexual couples but not to gay and lesbian couples.
34. Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and all state statutes to the extent they limit marriage to heterosexuals violate the Equal Protection Clause because they discriminate on the basis of sex. These legal provisions distinguish between couples consisting of a man and a woman and couples consisting of individuals of the same sex.
35. Insofar as they are enforcing the terms of Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and Oregon statutes that limit marriage to husband and wife, Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving and will continue to deprive Plaintiffs of numerous rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IRREPARABLE INJURY 36. Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 30, supra, as if fully set forth herein.
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37. Plaintiffs are now severely and irreparably injured by Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and by Oregon statutes that limit marriage to husband and wife. These state laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs’ injuries will be redressed only if this Court declares these laws unconstitutional and enjoins Defendants from enforcing them.
38. An actual and judicially cognizable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding whether Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and Oregon statutes that limit marriage to husband and wife violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants are currently enforcing these state laws to Plaintiffs’ detriment.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment as follows:
1. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court, pursuant to 28 USC § 2201, construe Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and Oregon statutes that limit marriage to husband and wife as unconstitutional and enter a declaratory judgment stating that laws that bar or in any way impede same-sex marriage violate Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
2. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement or application of Oregon Constitution Article 15 Section 5a and Oregon
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statutes that limit marriage to husband and wife or bar same-sex marriage in any manner;
3. Plaintiffs respectfully request that Defendants Woodward and Waldruff accept applicants for marriage licenses from same sex couples, grant marriage licenses to same sex couples and record same sex marriage licenses within the Vital Statistic records for the State of Oregon;
4. Plaintiffs respectfully request costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and all further relief to which they are entitled; and
5. Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 15th day of October 2013.

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By: s/ Lake James H. Perriguey Lake James H. Perriguey, OSB No. 983213
LAW WORKS LLC 1906 SW Madison Street Portland, OR 97205-1718 Telephone: (503) 227-1928 Facsimile: (503) 334-2340 lake@law-works.com
By: s/ Lea Ann Easton Lea Ann Easton, OSB No. 881413
DORSAY & EASTON LLP 1 SW Columbia Street, Suite 440 Portland, OR 97204 Telephone: (503) 790-9060 Facsimile: (503) 790-9068 leaston@dorsayindianlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

 
 Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 8 Filed 12/04/13 Page 1 of 15 Page ID#: 27

Lake James H. Perriguey, OSB No. 983213 lake@law-works.com LAW WORKS LLC 1906 SW Madison Street Portland, OR 97205-1718 Telephone: (503) 227-1928 Facsimile: (503) 334-2340
Lea Ann Easton, OSB No. 881413 leaston@dorsayindianlaw.com DORSAY & EASTON LLP 1 SW Columbia Street, Suite 440 Portland, OR 97204 Telephone: (503) 790-9060 Facsimile: (503) 790-9068
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION

DEANNA L. GEIGER and JANINE M. NELSON, ROBERT DUEHMIG and WILLIAM GRIESAR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon, ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon, JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,
Defendants.

Case No.: 6:13-cv-01834-MC
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE, OR OTHER RELIEF

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Plaintiffs Deanna Geiger and Janine Nelson, and Robert Duehmig and William Griesar complain of Defendants and allege:
INTRODUCTION
1. Oregon’s Constitution states: “It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.” Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a. This provision discriminates against gay and lesbian Oregonians who were married legally in other jurisdictions. This provision also discriminates against gay and lesbian Oregonians who want to marry in Oregon.
2. Oregon statutes, e.g. Oregon Revised Statutes§ 106.041 and §106.150 that refer to “husband” and “wife” have been interpreted to exclude same- sex couples from civil marriage in Oregon.
3. Oregon statutory law includes the separate and unequal institution of same-sex domestic partnerships. This domestic partnership law extends to lesbian and gay couples only some of the legal benefits of marital status that Oregon extends to heterosexual citizens who marry one another. ORS 106.300 – 106.340. Oregon’s unequal treatment of gay and lesbian people denies them the fundamental liberties and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
4. For these reasons, Plaintiffs ask this Court to permanently enjoin the application of Article 15 § 5a of the Oregon Constitution and the application and enforcement of Oregon statutes in a manner that excludes gay and lesbian people from equal access to civil marriage.
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5. Plaintiffs are same sex couples who bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaration that Article 15 § 5a of the Oregon Constitution is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it denies gay and lesbian people the equal opportunity to marry under state law and it denies equal state recognition of marriages between people of the same-sex, and a permanent injunction preventing the Defendants from enforcing this provision of Oregon’s Constitution.
6. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that Oregon statutes identified herein which refer to “husband and wife,” and by implication restrict marriage to only a man and a woman, are unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples under the Due Process Clause and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from enforcing these statutes that exclude Plaintiffs from equal access to marriage.
7. Plaintiffs seek equal access to marriage and the same legal recognition of their union that the State of Oregon extends to opposite-sex couples. Plaintiffs seek access all of the federal benefits and obligations that they are denied because of Article 15 § 5a of the Oregon Constitution.
8. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce their fundamental constitutional rights and liberties that the United States Constitution ensures for all people. Plaintiffs also seek recovery of their attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses for this action and for any other relief the Court may order. / / / / / /
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9. This case raises questions under the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C § 1983. This Court has jurisdiction over all claims for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
10. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants Rosenblum and Kitzhaber maintain official offices in Marion County, Oregon. Venue is also proper in this district because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred and are continuing to occur in this district.
THE PARTIES
11. Plaintiffs Deanna Geiger and Janine Nelson are women who have been in a committed relationship for 31 years. Plaintiffs are residents of Oregon and reside in Multnomah County, Oregon. Plaintiffs want to marry one another in Oregon.
12. Plaintiffs Robert Duehmig and William Griesar are men who were married in Canada in 2003. Plaintiffs are parents of two teenagers. Plaintiffs and their children are residents of Oregon and reside in Multnomah County, Oregon. Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar are citizens of Oregon and desire to have the State of Oregon officially treat them the same as heterosexual couples who are Oregon citizens married under the laws of other jurisdictions and officially sanction Plaintiffs’ marriage under Oregon law.
13. Defendant John Kitzhaber is the Governor of the State of Oregon. In his official capacity, the Governor is the chief executive officer of the State of Oregon. It is his responsibility to ensure that the State’s laws are enforced fairly, uniformly, and constitutionally.
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Defendant Kitzhaber is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
14. Defendant Ellen Rosenblum is the Attorney General of the State of Oregon. In her official capacity the Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the State of Oregon. It is her duty to ensure the State’s laws are enforced fairly, uniformly, and constitutionally. Defendant Rosenblum is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
15. Defendant Jennifer Woodward is the State Registrar of Oregon and is the manager of the Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority. It is her duty to record all marriages along with births and deaths in the vital statistic records for the State of Oregon. Defendant Woodward is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
16. Defendant Randy Waldruff is the County Assessor for Multnomah County. Randy Waldruff is responsible for maintaining vital records of marriages and issuing marriage licenses in Multnomah County, Oregon. Defendant Waldruff is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
17. Defendants, and those subject to their supervision, direction, and control, are responsible for the enforcement of Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a and Oregon laws. The relief requested in this action is sought against each Defendant, as well as against each Defendant’s officers, employees, and agents, and against all persons acting in cooperation with Defendant(s), under their supervision, at their direction, or under their control. / / / / / /
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FACTS
18. The Oregon Family Fairness Act created a separate and unequal institution of same-sex “domestic partnerships.” ORS 106.300 – 106.340. These laws provide to same-sex couples many, but not all, of the benefits and obligations of marriage.
19. Oregon’s legislative findings supporting the adoption of the Act at ORS 106.305 (4) acknowledge that “[t]his state has a strong interest in promoting stable and lasting families, including the families of same-sex couples and their children” and that “[a]ll Oregon families should be provided with the opportunity to obtain necessary legal protections and status and the ability to achieve their fullest potential.”
20. In addition to creating a separate and unequal legal framework, the Act’s provisions differ from the provisions in Oregon marriage statutes in the following ways:
a. To qualify for a domestic partnership, both individuals seeking to enter into a domestic partnership must be 18 years of age. ORS 106.325(5). Oregon’s marriage statutes, however, include a provision that 17-year-olds can marry with parental consent. ORS 106.010.
b. Marriage requires solemnization in front of two witnesses. ORS 106.010, 106.150. Domestic partnerships require no solemnization.
c. Applicants for a domestic partnership must consent to jurisdiction of the Oregon courts, requiring the parties to consider the possibility of a future dissolution of their partnership at its very inception. ORS 106.325(4). State law does not force opposite-sex couples to anticipate the possibility of divorce by consenting to Oregon court jurisdiction at the time they apply for a marriage license.
d. ORS 106.041(4) provides that “[a] marriage license must contain the following statement: “Neither you nor your spouse is the property of the other. The laws of the State of
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Oregon affirm your right to enter into marriage and at the same time to live within the marriage free from violence and abuse.” There is no similar requirement for same-sex couples applying for recognition under the domestic partnership laws.
21. Article 15 § 5a of Oregon’s Constitution defines marriage as between one man and one woman.
22. The following Oregon marital laws refer to “husband” and “wife”: ORS 106.020, Prohibited and void marriage; ORS 106. 041, Marriage License; application; record; ORS 106.150 Form of solemization; witnesses; solemnization before congregation; ORS 108.010, Removal of wife’s civil disabilities; wife’s civil rights same as husband’s; ORS 108.020, Nonliability for other spouse’s obligations; ORS 108.030, Liability of husband for civil injuries caused by wife; ORS 108.040, Liability of parents for expenses of family and education of children; ORS 108.045, Liability of stepparent for expenses of family and education of children; ORS 108.050, Nonliability of wife’s property for husbands obligations; ORS 108.060, Noninterest of one spouse in property of other; ORS 108.080, Civil remedies between spouses in respect of separate property; ORS 108.090, Conveyances, transfers and liens between spouses; creation and dissolution of estates by entireties; validation of prior dissolutions; ORS 108.100, Husband and wife as attorney in fact for each other; ORS 108.110, Petition for support of spouse and children; rules, ORS 108.510, Revocation of election to come under terms of Community Property law of 1943; ORS 108.530, Removal of community property status by agreement; and, ORS 108.550, Reliance on spouse’s right to deal with property in spouse’s name. The Oregon Evidence Code also uses the terms “husband” and “wife” : ORS 40.135, Rule 311, Presumptions; and ORS n 40.255, Rule 505, Husband and wife privilege. Defendants, relying upon the definition of marriage as between one man and one woman under
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Article 15 § 5a of Oregon Constitution, interpret the terms “husband” and “wife” in these state

laws to exclude same -sex couples from marriage and the privileges, benefits and obligations for

married persons created under these state laws.

23.

Exclusion from marriage by Oregon law undermines the Plaintiffs’ abilities to

achieve their life goals and dreams, threatens their mutual economic stability, and denies them

equal dignity and status. Plaintiffs and their children are stigmatized and relegated to second-

class citizens.

24. Plaintiffs are identical to opposite-sex couples in all of the characteristics relevant

to marriage. Same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as opposite-sex

couples. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples fall in love, build their lives together, plan

their futures together, and hope to grow old together. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex

couples support one another emotionally and financially and take care of one another physically

when faced with injury or illness. Same sex couples seek the same ability to raise and nurture

children like opposite –sex couples. Plaintiffs seek equal access to marriage for the same

emotional, romantic, and dignitary reasons and to provide the same legal shelter to their

families, as opposite-sex spouses.

25. Oregon’s discriminatory marriage laws bar same-sex couples from equal access to

many of the federal benefits, protections, and obligations accessible to heterosexual married

couples under federal law.

26. Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar are citizens of Oregon who were legally married

in Vancouver, B.C., on December 29, 2003. Despite the fact that they are legally married, the

Defendants refuse to recognize Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar as a legally married couple

because they are both men. Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar want Defendants to accept their

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marriage license and desire to have the State of Oregon and Multnomah County officially treat them the same as heterosexual couples who are Oregon citizens married under the laws of other jurisdictions and officially sanction Plaintiffs’ marriage under Oregon law.
27. On September 23, 2013, Plaintiffs Geiger and Nelson applied for a marriage license in Multnomah County, Oregon. Plaintiffs were denied a marriage license by the Multnomah County Clerk because they are both women.
28. Plaintiffs and their extended families suffer significant emotional, physical, and economic harms, humiliation, and societal stigma caused by Oregon’s refusal to allow same sex couples equal access to marriage.
29. If Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a is not declared unconstitutional, and if Oregon statutes restricting marriage to heterosexual couples are not enjoined from application in a manner that excludes plaintiffs from access to marriage solely because they are same-sex couples, Defendants will continue to enforce these unconstitutional laws against Plaintiffs, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The relief sought requires Defendants to recognize same-sex marriage as valid as a matter of federal law within the State of Oregon. The declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek requires Defendants to revise the official state forms for the application for license to marry, the certificate of registry of marriage including the license to marry, and the marriage certificate, require them to issue same-sex couples a marriage license, and extend to same sex couples the same privileges, benefits and obligations extended to “husband” and “wife” under state law. / / / / / /
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF CLAIM ONE: DUE PROCESS
30. Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 29, supra, as if fully set forth herein.
31. Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a deprives Plaintiffs’ fundamental liberties that are protected by the Due Process Clause, both on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs.
32. Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a deprives Plaintiffs’ fundamental liberties by denying gay and lesbian individuals the right to choose whom to marry. Oregon laws stigmatizes gays, lesbians, their children and their families by denying them the same dignity, respect, and stature afforded officially recognized opposite-sex married couples by denying gay and lesbian couples equal access to marriage.
33. Oregon Revised Statutes create a statutory presumption that marriage is permitted only to “husband” and “wife” and certain benefits, obligations and privileges afforded to “husband” and “wife” are created by the provisions of Oregon laws identified herein.
34. Insofar as Defendants are enforcing the of Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a to one man and one woman and applying and enforcing the Oregon statutes identified herein using the terms “ husband” and “wife” as limited to a man and a woman, Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving and will continue to deprive Plaintiffs of numerous rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
35. Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a and the state laws identified herein relying on the terms “husband” and “wife” to exclude marriage from same-sex couples or prevent recognition of marriages because they were entered by individuals of the same sex violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.
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Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 8 Filed 12/04/13 Page 11 of 15 Page ID#: 37
CLAIM TWO: EQUAL PROTECTION
36. Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 35 supra, as if fully set forth herein.
37. Plaintiffs state this cause of action against Defendants in their official capacities for purposes of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
38. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that no state shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. The conduct of Defendants and their agents in enforcing Oregon Constitution Article 15, § 5a, and the provisions of Oregon laws identified herein which reference “husband” and “wife” that exclude marriage for same-sex couples and restrict them solely to registered domestic partnership, violate Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection of the laws by discriminating impermissibly on the basis of sexual orientation.
39. Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a, and the provisions of Oregon laws identified herein which reference “husband” and “wife” that preclude marriage for same-sex couples or prevent recognition of marriages because they were entered by individuals of the same sex violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.
40. Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a and the Oregon statutes identified herein as referencing “husband” and “wife” that restrict civil marriage to individuals of the opposite sex treats similarly situated people differently without legal justification providing civil marriage to opposite- sex couples but not to same -sex couples.
41. Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a and all state statutes to the extent they limit marriage to heterosexuals violate the Equal Protection Clause because they discriminate on the
Page 11 - FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 8 Filed 12/04/13 Page 12 of 15 Page ID#: 38
basis of sex. These legal provisions distinguish between couples consisting of a man and a woman and couples consisting of individuals of the same sex.
42. Oregon stigmatizes gays, lesbians, their children and their families by denying them the same dignity, respect, and stature afforded officially recognized opposite-sex married couples by denying gay and lesbian couples equal access to marriage. Insofar as they are enforcing Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a and Oregon statutes herein which limit marriage to husband and wife, Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving and will continue to deprive Plaintiffs of numerous rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IRREPARABLE INJURY
43. Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 42, supra, as if fully set forth herein.
44. Plaintiffs are now severely and irreparably injured by Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a and by Oregon statutes that limit marriage to husband and wife. These state laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs’ injuries will be redressed only if this Court declares Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a unconstitutional and Oregon laws identified herein that would limit marriage to only opposite-sex couples unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs, and enjoins Defendants from enforcing them.
45. An actual and judicially cognizable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding whether Oregon Constitution Article 15 § 5a and Oregon statutes
Page 12 - FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 8 Filed 12/04/13 Page 13 of 15 Page ID#: 39
identified herein that limit marriage to husband and wife violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants are currently enforcing these state laws to Plaintiffs’ detriment.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request: 1. the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§2201 enter a declaratory judgment that Article 15
§ 5a of the Oregon Constitution violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and, declaring that it is unconstitutional for Defendants to refuse, based solely on the fact that Plaintiffs are same-sex couples, to recognize Plaintiffs’ out-of-state valid marriages as marriages in Oregon;
2. the Court issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants denying Plaintiffs and all other same-sex couples the right to marry in Oregon and enjoining Defendants from interpreting “husband” and “wife” to exclude same-sex couples from the privileges, benefits and obligations afforded opposite-sex married couples created under the state laws identified herein; and, enjoining Defendants from recognizing marriages validly entered into by Plaintiffs Duehmig and Griesar and other same-sex couples in another jurisdiction;
3. Plaintiffs respectfully request costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and all further relief to which they are entitled; and / / / / / /
Page 13 - FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 8 Filed 12/04/13 Page 14 of 15 Page ID#: 40
4. Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. DATED this 4th day of December 2013.
By: s/ Lake James H. Perriguey Lake James H. Perriguey, OSB No. 983213 LAW WORKS LLC 1906 SW Madison Street Portland, OR 97205-1718 Telephone: (503) 227-1928 Facsimile: (503) 334-2340 lake@law-works.com
By: s/ Lea Ann Easton Lea Ann Easton, OSB No. 881413 DORSAY & EASTON LLP 1 SW Columbia Street, Suite 440 Portland, OR 97204 Telephone: (503) 790-9060 Facsimile: (503) 790-9068 leaston@dorsayindianlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Page 14 - FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 8 Filed 12/04/13 Page 15 of 15 Page ID#: 41

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 4, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notice of such filings to all parties
registered in the CM/ECF system for this matter. I also certify that I e-mailed the foregoing to
the following parties:
Sheila Potter, Deputy Chief Counsel Oregon Department of Justice Sheila.potter@doj.state.or.us
Counsel for Defendants Rosenblum, Woodward, and Kitzhaber
Katharine von Ter Stegge Multnomah County Attorney’s Office katharine.von.terstegge@co.multnomah.or.us
Counsel for Defendant Waldruff

By: Lea 1 Portland, Phone: Fax:

DORSAY & EASTON, LLP
s/ Lea Ann Easton Ann Easton, OSB #881413
S.W. Columbia Street, Suite 440 OR 97258-2005
(503) 790-9060 (503) 790-9068 E-Mail: leaston@dorsayindianlaw.com

 
 Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 119 Filed 05/19/14 Page 1 of 4 Page ID#: 1400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

DEANNA L. GEIGER and JANINE M. NELSON; ROBERT DUEHMIG and WILLIAM GRIESER,

Case No. 6:13-cv-01834-MC (lead case)

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

V.

, JOHN KITZHA:BER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN _ROSENBLUM, in her official"capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, 'Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY . WALRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,

Defendants.

1-0RDER

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 119 Filed 05/19/14 Page 2 of 4 Page ID#: 1401

PAUL RUMMELL and BENJAMIN WEST; LISA CHICKADONZ and CHRISTINE TANNER; BASIC RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND,
Plaintiffs,
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY WALRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnornah County Assessor,
Defendants.

Case No. 6:13-cv-02256-MC (trailing case)

MCSHANE, Judge: The Court, having considered the Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment
(ECF Nos. 23 and 42), the Defendants' Responses (ECF Nos. 48 and 64), the oral arguments made by all parties on April23, 2014, and the briefs filed by amicus (ECF Nos. 66, 70, and 79), GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
The Court finds that there is no legitimate state interest that would justify the denial of the full and equal recognition, attendant rights, benefits, protections,_· privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and immunities of marriage to same-gender .. couples solely on the basis that those couples are of the same gender.
2-0RDER

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 119 Filed 05/19/14 Page 3 of 4 Page ID#: 1402
NOW, THEREFORE, The Court GRANTS the Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 23 and 42)
filed by the plaintiffs in each of the consolidated cases. The Court hereby DECLARES that Article 1S, section SA, of the Oregon
Constitution violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmer:t to the United States Constitution, and that as such it is void and unenforceable. Defendants and their officers, agents, and employees are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing Article 1S, section SA, of the Oregon Constitution.
The Court also DECLARES that ORS 106.010, ORS 106.041(1), and ORS 106.1S0(1) violate the Equal Protection Clause and are unenforceable to the extent that they would prohibit a person from marrying another person of the same gender, or would deny same-gender couples the right to marry with full and equal recognition, attendant rights, benefits, privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and immunities of marriage, where the couple would be otherwise qualified to marry under Oregon law. Defendants and their officers, agents, and employees are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing or applying those statutes-or any other state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance-as the basis to deny marriage to same~gender couples otherwise qualified to marry in Oregon, or to deny married same-gender couples any of
3 -ORDER

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 119 Filed 05/19/14 Page 4 of 4 Page ID#: 1403
the rights, benefits, privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and immunities that accompany marriage in Oregon.
The Court DECLARES that the Equal Protection Clause requires recognition of marriages of same-gender couples legally performed in other jurisdictions, where those marriages are in all other respects valid under Oregon law, and that no state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance can deny recognition of a same-gender couple's marriage validly performed in another jurisdiction. The Court PERMANENTLY ENJOINS Defendants and their officers, agents, and employees from denying that recognition.
This Order shall be effective immediately upon filing. IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ___·Laz___th day ofMay, 2014.
L--- l____.
Michael J. McShane United States District Judge
4-0RDER

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

DEANNA L. GEIGER and JANINE M. NELSON; ROBERT DUEHMIG and WILLIAM GRIESER,

Case No. 6:13-cv-01834-MC (lead case)

Plaintiffs,

OPINION

V.

JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor- of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM; in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, iJ1 her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY WALRUFF: in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,

Defendants.

1- OPINION

PAUL RUMMELL and BENJAMIN WEST; LISA CHICKADONZ and CI:-IRISTINE TANNER; BASIC RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND,
Plaintiffs,
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor Df Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY WALRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,
Defendants.

Case No. 6:13-cv-02256-MC (trailing case)

MCSHANE, Judge:
The plaintiffs include four Oregon couples seeking marriage in Multnomah County.
Although they meet the legal requirements of civil marriage in all other respects, their requests
for marriage licenses have been or would be denied because each couple is of the same gender. I
am asked to consider whether the state's constitutional and statutory provisions ("marriage
laws") that limit civil marriage to "one man and one woman" violate the United States
Constitution. 1 Because Or~gon' s marriage laws discriminate on the basis of sexua( orientation
1 In 1972, the Supreme Court found- a lack of "substantial federal question" in the appeal of two men seeking to marry one another after the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their equal protection and due process claims. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810; dismissing appeal from 191 N.W.2d 185 {1971). Considering 40 years of Supreme Court decisions, the Court's summary order in Baker yields no lasting precedential effect in 2014. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194-95 (D. Utah 2013) ("[D]octrinal developments in th~ Court's analysis of both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause as they apply to gay men and lesbians demonstrate that the Court's summary dismissal in Baker has little if any precedential effect today."); accord DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 WL 1100794, at *15 n.6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); Bishop v. United States ex ref. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 2013); De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-(A-00982-0LG, 2014 WL 715741, at *10 (W.O. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978, at *10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); but see
2 -OPINION

without a rational relationship to any legitimate government interest, the laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenfto the United States Constitution.
THE PARTIES All of the plaintiffs2 share in the characteristics that we would normally look_to when we describe the ideals of marriage and family. They present in the record as loving and committed couples who have established long~term relationships. Each has solemnized that relationship in the presence of their families and friends. One couple legally married in Canada, and others temporarily obtained marriage licenses in Multnomah County in 2004. Three of the four couples are parents, and are involved in their children's schools and activities. They support each other financially and emotionally and, by all accounts, their lives have become more meaningful in the single life that they share together. All of the plaintiffs have worked in Oregon to support each other and their children. They are a highly educated and productive group of individuals. Many of the plaintiffs work in the field of medicine and the health sciences. Mr. Griesar is a teacher. Mr. Rummell is a veteran of the United States Air Force. They pay taxes. They volunteer. They foster and adopt children who have been neglected and abused. They are a source of stability to their extended family, relatives, and friends. Despite the fact that these co,uples present so vividly the characteristics of a loving and supportive relationship, none of these ideals we attribute to marriage are spousal prerequisites under Oregon law. In fact, Oregon recognizes a marriage of love with the same equal eye that it recognizes a marriage of convenience. It affords the same set of rights and privileges to Tristan
Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (D. Nev. 2012) ("[T]he present challenge is in the main a gardenvariety equal protection challenge precluded by Baker."). 2 Plaintiff Basic Rights Education lund is a "civil rights organization dedicated to education about and advocacy for equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Oregonians[.]" Rummell Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., 5, ECF No. 33.
3 -OPINION

and Isolde that it affords to a Hollywood celebrity waking up in Las Vegas with a blurry memory and a ringed finger. It does not, however, afford these very same rights to gay and lesbian couples who wish to marry within the confines of our geographic borders.
The defendants include the State Registrar, the Governor, and the Attorney General of Oregon, as well as the Assessor for Multnomah County. The defendants concede that Oregon's marriage laws banning same-gender marriage are unconstitutional and legally indefensible, but state they are legally obligated to enforce the laws until this court declares the laws unconstitutional. 3 The case, in this respect, presents itself to this court as something akin to a friendly tennis match rather than a contested and robust proceeding between adversaries.
BACKGROUND I. Same-Gender Marriage in Oregon and Measure 36
Article I, § 20 of the Oregon Constitution prohibits granting privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens that are not equally available on the same terms to all citizens. In 1998, recognizing that same-gender couples were not permitted to marry, the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded Article I, § 20 of tl;le Oregon Constitution prohibited the state from denying insurance benefits to unmarried domestic partners ofhomosexual employees. Tanner v. Oregon Health Sci. Univ., 157 Or. App. 502, 525. The state responded by providing benefits to samegender couples who are able to demonstrate they share a committed relationship similar to a _marital relationship.
During this same period, challenges regarding the. rights available to same-gender couples begim to appear in the national spotlight. In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
3 The record must reflect that Multnomah County concluded 10 years ~go that denying marriage licenses to same-
gender couples violated the Oregon Constitution. Waldruff's Resp. Mot.Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 59. ("The County is proud to have stood firm on this core civil rights issue a decade ago when backing marriage rights for all was neither easy nor politically safe."). Still, due to the State's marriage laws, Multnomah County requires a court order to resume issuing marriage licenses to same-gender couples.
4-0PINION

concluded that Massachusetts's same-gender marriage ban violated their state constitution. Goodridge v. Dep 't ofPub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969. With that ruling, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-gender marriage.
On March 3, 2004, Multnomah County determined that its failure. to issue marriage licenses to same-gender couples violated Article I, § 20 of the Oregon Constitution. Li v..~tate, 338 Or. 376, 383-84 (2005). In the following weeks, approximately 3000 gay and lesbian couples received marriage licenses in Multnomah County.Jd. at 384. At the Governor's direction, the State Registrar refused to register the same-sex marriages and several same-gender couples brought a legal challenge to decide the inclusivity of Oregon's marriage laws. I d.
Before the Supreme Court of Oregon weighed in on the issue, Oregon voters provided their independent judgment on the question by approving a 2004 ballot initiative known as Measure 36. That measure amended the state constitution to define marriage as a union composed of"one man and one woman." Or. Const. art. 15, §SA. Measure 36 embedded constitutionally what the Oregon Supreme Court would later conclude the state's statutes had already required. Li, 338 Or. at 386 ("[A]lthough nothing ... expressly states that marriage is · limited to opposite-sex couples, the context ... leaves no doubt that, as a statutory matter, marriage in Oregon is so limited."). Nearly a year after Multnomah County began issuing marriage license~ to same-gender couples, those licenses were deemed invalid. ld. at 398.
In 2007, the Oregon State Legislature passed the Oregon Family Famess Act, allowing same-gender couples to register their domestic partnerships to receive certain state benefits. Oregon Family Fairness Act, 2007 Or. Laws, ch. 99, § 2 (codified at Or. Rev. Stat.§ 106.305). Domestic partnerships provided "more equal treatment of gays and lesbians and theirfamilies," § 106.305(6), by granting domestic partners similar rights and privileges to those enjoyed by
5 -OPINION

married spouses, § 106.305(5). The Legislature acknowledged, however, that domestic partnerships did not include the magnitude of rights inherent in the definition of marriage. § 106.305(7) (noting "that numerouS_,distinctions will exist between these two legally recognized relationships"). In the declarations submitted to this court, the plaintiffs maintain domestic partnerships have contributed greater confusion and expense to the lives of gay and lesbian couples and their families.
Last summer, the United States Supreme Court declared § 3 of the Defense Against Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96
(2013). As discussed below, DOMA defined marriage as a "union between one man and one
woman," 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), thereby prohibiting the federal government from extending marriage benefits to legally wed, same-gender spouses, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. The Court noted marriage regulations were traditionally a matter of state concern and that New York sought to protect same-gender couples by granting them the right to marry. DOMA violated due process ancl equal protection principles because it impermissibly sought to injure a class of persons New York specifically sought to protect. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. The Court concluded "[t]he Act's demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law." Id. at 2693-94.
Following the landmark decision in Windsor, Oregon concluded its own agenciesrpust recognize same-gender marriages lawfully entered into in other jurisdictions. State Defs.' Answer & Affirmative Defenses to Pls.' Am. Compl. Ex. A, ECF No. 58-1.4 The state also joined an amicuscuriae brief to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,_which has been asked to
. 4 The State's recognition of out-of-state same-gender marriages is limited to administrative agencies, and does not apply to the court system, local governments, or the private sector. Or. Admin. R. 105-010-0018 (2013).
6~ OPINION

invalidate a same-gender marriage ban in Nevada. Brief of Massachusetts, et al., as Amici Curiae in Supp. Mot. App. 2, Sevcik v. Sandoval (No. 12-17668). In lending its support, the state endorsed the contention that "same-sex couples form families, raise children,.and avail themselves of the benefits and abide by the obligations of marriage in the same manner as different-sex couples." Id. In so doing, the state effectively acknowledged that its legit~mate interest in sustaining both families and communities would be furthered if gay -and lesbian
couples were able to marry. Ii
II. The Harm Caused to Plaintiffs by the State's Marriage Laws The state's marriage laws impact the plaintiffs in a myriad of ways. The laws frustrate the
plaintiffs' freedom to structure a family life and plan for the future. Mr. Rummell did not receive a low-interest veteran loan to aid in purchasing a home because his income was not considered together with Mr. West's income. Ms. Geiger had to ask her employer to extend spousal relocation benefits to Ms. Nelson; a benefit that automatically vests with married couples. When Ms. Chickadonz gave birth to her and Ms. Tanner's children, they encumbered adoption expenses in order for Ms. Ta1mer to be the legal parent of her own children.
Domestic partnerships pledged to gay and lesbian couples rights and responsibilities approximating those afforded to married couples. Or. Rev. Stat.§§ 106.340(1)-(4). The plaintiffs submit that time has tarnished the promise of domestic partnerships. The plaintiffs explain that a general confusion persists regarding domestic partnerships. They encounter institutional obstacles when lawyers, courts, and health care and funerary service providers are unfamiliar with the rights that domestic partners are entitled to under the law. Domestic partners must draft advance medical directives to ensure they will be able to make important medical decisions on their partner's behalf should the necessity arise. See§ 127.635(2). Such rights and protections
7 -OPINION

pass automatically to married couples. § 127.635(2)(b). Likewise, domestic partners must draw up legal devices to imitate marriage's estate-planning benefits. See§§ 112.025, .035. Domestic partners are not guaranteed the same treatment at retirement as married couples. §§ 106.340(6)(8).
Oregon's marriage laws foreclose its same-gender couples (even those registered as domestic partners) from enjoying newly available federal recognition and benefits. They cannot· file joint federal income tax returns. Rev. Rul. 13-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 204. Instea?, unmarried gay and lesbian couples pay for costly measures that account for their mutual incomes, expenses, and assets. Decl. Clift 4, ECF No. 56. Oregon's marriage laws also foreclose the pathway to citizenship that a non-national can access by import of their marriage to a United States citizen. Employer-provided health insurance benefits covering unwed partners i~ federally taxable income. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 105(b), 106(b). Establishing joint ownership over an unwed couple's assets may trigger federal gift taxation. See Rev. Rul. 13-17 at 203; § 2503(b). Domestic partnership dissolution is taxable, unlike in marriage, see § 1041, as are the spousal-support payments arising from such dissolutions, see § 71. As compared to divorce, federally qualified retirement plans are indivisible among separating domestic partners. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-30, 2008-12 I.R.B. 638. Gay and lesbian couples waiting for the right to marry in Oregon risk a surviving partner being found ineligible for a deceased partner's Social Security benefits. See ·Soc. Sec. Admin., SSA Pub. No. 05-10084, Social Security: Survivors Benefits 5 (2013). Financial aid packages for the children of gay and lesbian families are calculated only on the basis of one parent's income. See § 1087nn(b).
Oregon's marriage laws weigh on the plaintiffs in ways less tangible, yet no less painful. The laws leave the plaintiffs and their families feeling degraded, humiliated, and stigmatized.
8 ~OPINION

Plaintiffs consider the time, energy, and sacrifice they devote to building a meaningful life with
their loved ones, but find their efforts less worthy in the eyes of the law. They face a tiered
'
system of recognition that grants greater legal status to married felons, deadbeat parents, and
mail-order brides. They see no rationale for such treatment, and are angered by what they
perceive as state-sanctioned discrimination against them. Accordingly, the plaintiffs request that
the state's laws withholding civil marriage from same-gender couples be found unconstitutional.
STANDARD OF REVIEW "The court shallgrant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
DISCUSSION I. A State's Right to Define Marriage within Constitutional Bounds
[M]arriage is often termed ... a civil contract ... [but] it is something more than a mere contract. ... It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888). 5 Society's significant interest in marriage is manifest by a state's "rightful a~d legitimate concern" for its citizens' marital statuses. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298,(1942); see also Li, 338 Or. at 391-92 (quoting Dakin v. Dakin, 197 Or. 69, 72 (1952) ("The marital relationship [is] 'one in which the sta!e is deeply
concerned and over which it exercises a jealous dominion."'). As the state eloquently notes:
It might be more helpful to think of marriage as just marriage- a relationship out of which spring duties to both spouse and society and from which are derived rights, [] such as the right to society and services and to conjugal love and affection- rights which generally prove to be either priceless or worthless, but which none the less the law sometimes attempts to evaluate in terms of money. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 317 (1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
9 -OPINION

Simply put, marriage matters. It matters not only for the individuals who decide to enter into the civil union, but also for the state. This is why the state lin..ks so many rights and protections to the decision to marry. Strong, stable marriages create unions in which children may be raised to become healthy and productive citizens, in which family members care for those who are sick or in need and would otherwise have to rely on government assistance, and through which community is built and strengthened. State Defs.' Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 64 . .A state's concern in regulating marriage includes the power to decide what marriage is
and who may enter into it. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691. This principal role reflects the state governments' longstanding monopoly over marital relations, an arrangement prevailing even at
the time of the Federal Constitution's adoption.ld.
The federal government defers to state marriage authority, accepting that marital policies
may vary from state to state. !d. Those variations reflect the dynamics of our federal system, ·which empowers citizens to "seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times," Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011), and to "form[] a consensus respecting the way [they] treat each other in their daily contact arid c;onstant interaction with each other," Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. Although states have wide latitude in regulating marriage, any such laws must
abide by the Constitution. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). The Constitution commands that no state may "deny to any person ... the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This pledge of equal protection ensures
"that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." FS. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 u_.s. 412,415 (1920). The clause presumes that one class of citizens will remain
entitled to the same benefits and burdens as the law affords to other classes. Yet, this
presumption is tempered by "the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one
· purpose or another," granting a degree of favor to some and disadvantage to others. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). The courts balance the constitutional principle with practical
lU- UPlNlUN

reality by tolerating laws that classify groups and individuals only if such laws are rationally

related to a legitimate state purpose. Id.

States can and do rationally regulate marriage. A state may, for example, permit eighteen

year olds to marry, but not twelve year olds. See Jonathan Todres, ~Maturity, 48 Hous. L. Rev.

1107, 1143 (2012). A state may not, however, prevent a "white" adult from marrying a "non-

white"adult, Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (overturning one such anti-miscegenation law in Virginia),

nor may it withhold marriage from either the destitute, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387-88

(1978) (overturning a Wisconsin law conditioning marriage on a non-custodial parent's ability to

satisfy existing child-support obligations), or the incarcerated, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96-

99 (1987) (overturning Missouri's requirement that inmates receive a warden's permission to

wed), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of2000, Pub.

L. No. 106-274, § 3, 114 Stat. 804. One lesson to borrow from these and sirp.ilar precedents is

that laws regulating marriage must advance legitimate state interests, and not a mere desire to

harm a particular class of its citizens.

II. The Windsor Decision and its Applicability to the Plaintiffs'.Claims

As noted, DOMA was a federal attempt to regulate marriage. That law defined

"marriage" and "spouse" to encompass opposite-gender couples only. See 1 U.S.C. § 7. The

definition's effect was to make legally married same-gender couples less equal than married

opposite-gender couples by depriving the former of numerous federal marital benefits. Windsor,

133 S. Ct. at 2694. That result frustrated New York's rightful decision to confer the dignity and

\

.

privilege of marriage upon gay and lesbian couples. Id. at 2695-96. In striking down the federal

definition, the Supreme Court explained that the law's "principal purpose and ... 1?-ecessary

11 -,-OPINION

effect" was "to demean" legally married gay and lesbian couples.Jd. at 2695. "[N]o legitimate

purpose" behind DOMA could overcome such injury. Jd. at 2696.

The case before me is not a reproduction of Windsor. There, the Supreme Court

invalidated a federal act that impinged New York's ability to afford gay and lesbian couples the

full entitlements of marriage. I d. at 2693 ("[DOMA] ... impose[s] a disadvantage, a separate
I
status ... upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned

aut~ority of the States."). Here, the plaintiffs challenge not federal but state law, one which

reserves civil marriage to the ·exclusive enjoyment of opposite-gender couples. This and similar ·

state marriage laws elsewhere are simply beyond the ambit of the Windsor ruling. See Bishop v.

United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d. 1252, 1278 (N.D. Okla. 2013) ("Windsor does not

answer whether a state may prohibit same-sex marriage in the. first instance.").

W. indsor

may

be

distinguished

from

the

present .

case

in

several

respects.

Yet,

recounting

.

such differences will not detract from the underlying principle shared in common by that case

and the one now before me. The principle is one inscribed in the Constitution, and it requires that

the state's marri~ge laws not "degrade or demean" the plaintiffs in violation of their rights to

equalprotection. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.

III. The State's Marriage Laws Viohite the Plaintiffs' Rights to Equal Protection

As discussed above, although states may regulate marriage, such laws must pass

constitutional muster. Plaintiffs argue the state's marriage laws violate their rights to equal

protection. When analyzing a law under the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth

Amendment, the court first determines the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.

Strict scrutiny, the most exacting level of scrutiny, is reserved for "suspect"

classifications such as race or national origin. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06

12- OPINION

· (2005). Because suspect classifications "raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose," courts must engage in a "searching judicial inquiry" to ferret out any illegitimate uses of such classifications. !d. Under this level of review, the government has the burden of demonstrating the clas.sifications are narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.Jd. at 505.
Other classifications, such as those based on gender or illegitimacy, are subject to heightened scrutiny. City ofCleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,473 U.S. 432,440-41 (1985). Under this level of review, the classification must be "substantially related to· a sufficiently important government in~erest." !d. at 441.
Most classifications are presumed to be valid and receive less-exacting judicial scrutiny, known as rational basis review.
Under rational basis review, the Equal Protection Claus is satisfied if: (1) there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, (2) the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and (3) the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. Bowers v. Whitman, 671 F.3d 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted). A. Discriminatory Classification. Plaintiffs argue the state's marriage laws discriminate based on gender, and therefore must receive heightened scrutiny. This argument reasons that because men may not marry other men, and women may not marry other women, the classification is necessarily one based on gender. Stated another way, if either person in a specific couple happened to be of the other gender, the couple could in facrmarry. Because the classification impacts each couple based
13- OPINION

solely on the gender of each person, plaintiffs argue the classification must be categorized as one based on gender. I disagree..
The state's marriage laws discriminate based on sexual orientation, not gender. In fact, the ban does not treat genders differently at all. Men and women are prohibited from doing the
exact same thing: marrying an individual of the same gender. T?e ban does not impact males and
females differently. Instead, the state's marriage laws classify same-gender couples differently than opposite-gender couples. While opposite-gender couples may marry a partner of their
'
choice, same-gender couples may not. Plaintiffs argue the Supreme Court has rejected government arguments based on "equal
application" oflaws that discriminate based on suspect classes. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8-9. The discriminatory laws in Loving, however, are not applicable to Oregon's marriage laws. First, the Court specifically noted the anti-miscegenation laws at issue there-because they involved racial classifications--could not survive an "equal application" explanation. !d. Second, the antimiscegenation laws there were "invidious racial discriminations," with proffered purposes of "preserv[ing] the racial integrity of its citizens" and preventing "the corruption ofbldod[.]" Id. at 7 (quoting Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E. 2d 749,756 (Va. 1955)).
There is no such invidious gender-based discrimination here. The state's marriage laws clearly were meant to, and indeed accomplished the goal of, preventing same-gender couples from marrying. The targeted group here is neither males nor females, but homosexual males and homosexual females. Therefore; I conclude the state's marriage laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, not gender. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (analyzing a similar Nevada law, the court concluded the law was not directed toward any one gender and did not affect one
14-0PINION

gender in a way demonstrating any gender-based aniinus, but was intended to prevent homosexuals from marrying).
B. Applicable Level of Scrutiny That the st~te's marriage laws discriminate based on sexual orientation does not answer
the question of what level of scrutiny applies._For the past quarter century, laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation received rational basis review in the Ninth Circuit. High Tech Gays v. Def Ind. us. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9fu Cir. 1990)' . In High Tech Gays, a class of plaintiffs challenged the Department of Defense's policy of"refusing to grant security clearances to known or suspected gay applicants" on equal protection grounds. Id. at 565. The _court had to determine whether homosexuals were a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class justifying the classifications to heightened review. The court inquired whether homosexuals:
1) Have suffered a history of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and 3) show that they are a minority or politically powerless, or alternatively show that the statutory classification at issue burdens a fundamental right. Id. at 573. The court concluded that although homosexuals suffered a history of discrimination, they did not meet the other criteria required of suspect classes. Therefore, classifications based on sexual orientation received rational basis review. Id. at 574. A Ninth Circuit panel recently considered whether High Tech Gays remains good law in light of Windsor. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471,480-84 (9th Cir. 2014). After noting that Windsor was silent as to the precise level of scrutiny applied to the s~xual orientation discrimination at issue there, the SmithKline court looked at what Windsor
a "actually did" in analyzing that equal protection claim. Id. at 480. After thorough and
persuasive analysis, the court concluded: In its words and its deed, Windsor established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation that is unquestionably higher than
15- OPINION

rational basis review. In other words, Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual orientation. ld. at 481. No mandate issued from SmithKline and, although neither party requested a rehearing en bane, at least one active judge of the Ninth Circuit made '\sua sponte call for a rehearing en baric. March 27, 2014 Order (No. 11-17357, ECF No. 88). "An appellate court's decision is not final until its mandate issues." Beardslee v. Brown, 393 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2004); accord United States v. Ruiz, 935 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotations omitted) ("[T]he legitimacy of an expectation of finality of an appellate order depends on the issuance or not of the mandate required to enforce the order."). Absent a mandate's issuance, the circuit "retains jurisdiction ofthe case and may modify or rescind its opinion." Ruiz, 935 F.2d at 1037; accord Carver v. Lehman, 558 F.3d 869, 878 (9th Cir. 2009). In· other words, the panel's decision in SmithKline is not yet a truly final and binding decision. The opinion may be modifl.ed, rescinded, or receive a majority vote for en bane review. I could independently conclude the Supreme Court did what SmithKline persuasively concluded it did. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (circuit panels and district courts may reject a prior panel's opinion when that opinion is "effectively overruled" by higher court).
·A
That is unnecessary here, as the state's marriage laws cannot withstand even the most relaxed level of scrutiny. C. Rational Basis Review
As described above, it is beyond question that Oregon's marriage laws place burdens upon same-gender couples that are not placed upon opposite-gender couples. This classification implicates the Equal Protection Clause. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizensthan for all others to
16- OPINION

seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equ<:~.l protection of the laws in the most literal sense."). The Equal Protection Clause does not allow classifications drawn solely for the purpose of disadvantaging a particular group intentionally singled out for unequal treatment. !d. For this reason, courts inquire whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.Jd. at 632-33. Courts presume the classification is valid, declaring it unconstitutional only when "the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). That a majority of Oregon voters enacted Measure 36 in order to constitutionally embed such classifications makes no difference to this analysis. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
As noted by the state, justifications offered in enacting Measure 36 are similar to those offered by other states in defending other bans on same-gender marriage. One such justification is protecting traditional definitions of marriage. Another is protecting children and encouraging stable families. As discussed below, only the latter justification is a legitim~te st~te interest. Especially when viewed in light of the state's other official policies, many of which are unique to Oregon, the state's ban on same-gender marriage is clearly unrelated to protecting children and ·encouraging stable families. The marriage laws place the plaintiffs and other gay and lesbian couples seeking to marry in Oregon at a disadvantage, andthe laws do so without any rationally related government purpose. i. Tradition
Marriage has traditionally been limited to opposite-gender couples. That the traditional definition of marriage excluded same-gender couples, however, does not end the inquiry. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993) ("Ancient lineage of a legal concept does not give it
17- OPINION

immunity from attack for lacking a rational basis."). If tradition alone was sufficient to withstand rational basis review, the right to equal protection would be quite hollow. "Tradition" would simply tum rational basis review into a rubber stamp condoning discrimination against longstanding, traditionally oppressed Il1inority classes everywhere. Limiting civil marriage to opposite-gender couples based only on a traditional definition of marriage is simply not a legitimate purpose. Golinski v. Off ofFers. JI;Jgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968,998 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ("[T]he argument that the definition of marriage should remain the same for the definition's sake is a circular argument, not a rational justification. Simply stating what has always been does not address the reasons for it. The mere fact that prior law, history, tradition, the dictionary and the Bible have defined a term does not give that definition a rational basis, it merely states what has been.").
Certain traditions may reflect personal religious and moral beliefs. Such beliefs likely informed the votes of many who favored Measure 36. However, as expressed merely a year
before Measure 36's passage, "[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be 'drawn for the purpose of.disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."' Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Coru;10r, J., concurringin the judgment) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633). That year, the Supreme Court concluded a Texas law criminalizing private, consensual, sexual acts between two.adults was unconstitutional. The Court explicitly adopted Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers -v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986); another case involving laws criminalizing homosexual conduct. Lawrence, 539 U.W. 577-78. Over a vigorous dissent from Justice Scalia, the Court adopted Justice Stevens' earlier conclusion that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
18'- OPINION

not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice[.]" Id. at 577. This remains
the law of the land, that mere moral disapproval of a particular group of citizens is not a
legitimate reason for intentionally withholding rights and benefits from that group.
To be clear, this case deals with civil marriage. The state recognizes that marriage is.a
civil contract. Or. Rev. Stat.§ 106.010. It is that right, to enter into a civil contract of marriage,
and the right to share in the benefits and obligations flowing from that civil contract, that are at
issue here. Judge John G. Heyburn II ofthe Western District ofKentucky, one of an ever-
increasing-and so far unanimous-number of state and federal judges to strike down similar
state bans following Windsor, put it very well:
Our religious and social traditions are vital to the fabric of society. Though each faith, minister, and individual can define marriage for themselves, at issue here are laws that act outside that protected sphere. Once the government defines marriage and attaches benefits to that definition, it must do so constitutionally. It cannot impose a traditional or faith-based limitation upon a public right without a sufficient justification for it. Assigning a religious or traditional rationale for a law, does not make it constitutional when that law discriminates against a class of people without other reasons.
The beauty of our Constitution is that it accommodates our individual faith's definition of marriage while preventing the government from unlawfully treating us differently. This is hardly surprising since it was written by people who came to America to find both freedom of religion and freedom from it.
Bourke v. Beshear, 3:13-750,2014 WL 556729, at *10 (Feb. 12, 2014).
Overturning the discriminatory marriage laws will not upset Oregonians' religious beliefs
and freedoms. 6 As tradition alone does not provide a legitimate state interest supporting
6 The New Mexico Supreme Court succinctly noted what religious impact allowing same-gender marriage would h'ave: "Our holding will not interfere with the religious freedom of religious organizations or clergy because (1) no religious organization will have to change its policies to accommodate same-gender couples, and (2) no religious clergy will be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs." Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 871 (2013); see also Kitchen, 961 F, Supp. 2d at 1214 ("[T]he court notes that its decision does not mandate any change for religious institutions, which may continue to express their own moral viewpoints and define their own traditions about marriage."):
19- OPINION '

classifications based on sexual orientation, I tum to other possible justifications for the state's marriage laws. ii. Protecting Children and Encouraging Stable Families
Supporters of Measure 36, and defenders of similar marriage laws throughout the
('
country, often tum to variations of the state's interest in protecting children and families in supporting such laws. These arguments range from state interests in encouraging responsible and "natural" procreation to arguments that-children fare better in opposite-gender families. Although protecting children and promoting stable families is certainly a legitimate governmental interest, the state's marriage laws do not advance this interest-they harm it.
Although the state has a legitimate interest in promoting stable families, its interest does not stop with families of opposite-gender couples. By enabling gay and lesbian couples to enter domestic partnerships, the state acknowledged the value and importance such families can provide. Specifically, the Oregon Legislature, in enacting the Oregon Family Fairness Act, found that "[t]his state has a strong interest in promoting stable and lasting families, including the families of same-sex couples and their children. All Oregon families should be provided with the opportunity to obtain necessary legal protections and status and the ability to achieve their fullest potential."§ 106.305(4). The legislature also found that "[m]any gay and lesbian Oregonians have formed lasting, committed, caring and faithful relationships with individuals of the same sex, despite long-standing social and economic discrimination. These couples live together, participate in their communities together and often raise children and care for family members together, just as do couples who are married under Oregon law." § 106.305(3). With this .finding, the legislature acknowledged that our communities depend on, and are strengthened by, strong, stable families of all types whether headed by gay, lesbian, or straight co1:1ples.
20-0PINION

Yet, because the state is unable to extend to opposite-gender relationships the full rights,

benefits, and responsibilities of marriage, it is forced to burden, demean, and harm gay and

lesbian couples and their families so long as its current marriage laws stand.·Although the state

created domestic partnerships to "ensure[e] more equal treatment of gays and lesbians and their

families," § 106.305(6), it also recognized domestic partnerships are not eq_ual to civil marriage,

§ 106.305(7). Recognizing domestic partnerships are not equal to marriage simply states the
'-
obvious. In Windsor, Justice Kennedy recently pointed out rather dramatically these inequalities.

Justice Kennedy recognized that prohibiting same-gender couples from joining in marriage

"humiliates" children being raised by same-gender couples and "makes it even more difficult for ·

the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with

. other families in their community and their daily lives." 133 S. Ct. at 2694. Creating second-tier

.

-

families does not advance the state's strong interest in promoting and protecting all families.

Nor does prohibiting same-gender marriage further Oregon's interest in protecting all

children. For example, the state's interest in protecting children concerns more than just those

children created in wedlock. § 109.060 (relationship between child and parents is the same

regardless of parents' marital status). The state has an interest in protecting all children,

including adopted children. § 109.050 (relationship of adoptive child and adoptive parents is the

same as would exist if the child had been the adoptive parents' biological child). And the state

does not treat "naturally and legitimately conceived" children any different than children

c;onceived in other ways. § 109.243 (rights between a child produced by artificial insemination

and a mother's husband are the same as those that exist in a naturally conceived birth). When the-

state seeks homes to provide security and support for vulnerable children, it does so without

asking if the adults in such households are married, same-gender partnered, or single. St. Defs.'

21- OPINION

Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 22, ECF No. 64. The state's policies clearly demonstrate its interest in supporting all children, including children raised by same-gender couples.
The above policies make perfect sense. Oregon's policies accept that children fare the same whether raised by opposite-gender or same-gender couples. See DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 1210285,2014 WL 1100794, at *12 (E.D. Mich. March 21, 2014) (noting approximately 150 sociological and psychological studies confirm "there is simply no scientific basis to conclude that children raised in same-sex households fare worse than those raised in heterosexual households."); De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-0LG, 2014 WL 715741, aJ *15 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) ("[S]ame-sex couples can be just as responsible for a child's welfare as the countless heterosexual couples across the nation."); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 479 (E.D. Va. 2014) ("Same-sex couples can be just as responsible for a child's existence as the countless couples across the nation who choose, or are compelled to rely upon, enhanced or alternative reproduction methods for procreation."); P~rry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,980 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding "[t]he gender of a child's parent is not a factor in a child's adjustment. The sexual orientation of an individual does not determine whether that individual can be a good parent. Children raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted. The research supporting this conclusion is accepted beyond serious debate in the field of developmental psychology."). The. realization that same-gender couples make just as good parents as opposite-gender couples is supported by more than just common sense; it is also supported by "the vast majority of scientific studies" examining the issue. See Brief of the Am. Psychol. Ass'n, et al. as Amici Curia, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,2695-96 (2013) (12-307), 2013 WL 871958, at *19 (listing studies).
22-0PINION

Some argue the state's int~rest in responsible procreation supports same-gender marriage bans. Procreation, however, is not vital to the state's interest in marriage. Procreative potential is not a marriage prerequisite.§ 106.010 (marriage is a civil contract between males and females at least 17 years of age). There is no prohibition to marriage as to sterile or infertile persons, or upon couples who have no desire to have children. The only prohibited marriages, other than those between same-gender couples, are those involving first cousins or those in which either . party is already married. § 106.020.
Additionally, any governmental interest in responsible procreation is not advanced by denying marriage to gay a lesbian couples. There is no logical nexus between the interest and the exclusion. See Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d. at 1291 ("[T]here is no rational link between excluding same-sex couples fr;m marriage and the goals of encouraging 'responsible procreation' ...."). Opposite-gender couples will continue to choose to have children responsibly or not, and those considerations are not impacted in any way by whether sam~­ gender couples are allowed to marry. Nothing in this court's opinion today will effect the miracle of birth, accidental or otherwise. A couple who has had an unplanned child has, by definition, given little thought to the outcome of their actions. The fact that their lesbian neighbors got married in the month prior to conception seems of little import to the stork thai is flying their way.
The logical nexus between the state's interest in "natural" procreation and denying marriage to same-gender couples is as unpersuasive as the argument in favor of responsible procreation. Oregon law plays no favorites between "naturally and legitimately conceived" ·children and those conceived via artificial insemination.§ 109.243 (so long as the husband consented to the artificial insemination, the child will have the same rights and relationship as
23 -OPINION

between naturally conceived children). The state's interest is in a child's well-being regardless of the ndeans of conception. There is simply no rational argument connecting this interest to the prohibition of same-gender marriage.
Although protecting children and promoting stable families is a legitimate governmental purpose, prohibiting same-gender couples from marrying is not rationally related to that interest. To justify classifications singling out a particular class of persons, the law must, at a minimum, contain some "factual context" tying the classification to the purpose sought to be achieved. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33. There is no such factual context here. In,fact, the relationship between prohibiting same-gender couples from marrying and protecting children and promoting stable families is utterly arbitrary and completely irrational. The state's marriage laws fly in the face of the state's "strong interest in promoting stable and lasting families, including the families of same-sex couples and their children." § 106.305(4).
Expanding the embrace of civil marriage to gay and lesbian couples will not burden any legitimate state interest. The attractiveness of marriage to opposite-gender couples is not derived from its inaccessibility to same-gender couples. 0ee Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 972 ("Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of oppositesex marriages."). The well-being of Oregon's children is not enhanced by destabilizing and limiting the rights and resources available to gay and lesbian families. See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 994~95 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ("The only effect the bans have on children's well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married.").
24-0PINION

The state's marriage laws unjustifiably treat same-gender couples differently than opposite-gender couples. The laws assess a couple's fitness for civil marriage based on their sexual orientation: opposite-gender couples pass; same-gender couples do not. No legitimate state purpose justifies the preclusion of gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage.
CONCLUSION I am aware that a large number of Oregonians, perhaps even a majority, have religious or moral objections to expanding the definition of civil marriage (and thereby expanding the benefits and rights that accompany marriage) to gay and lesbian families. It was' these same objections that led to the passage of Measure 36 in 2004. Generations of Americans, my own included, were raised in a world in which homosexuality was believed to be a moral perversion, a mental disorder, or a mortal sin. I remember that one of the more popular playground games of my childhood was called "smear the queer" 7 and it was played with great zeal and without a moment's thought to today' s political correctness. On a darker level, that same worldview led to an environment of cruelty, violence, and self-loathing. It was but 1~86 when the United States
Supreme Court justified, on the basis of a"millennia of moral teaching," the imprisonment of
gay men and lesbian women who engaged in consensual sexual acts. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Even today I am reminded of the legacy that we have bequeathed today' s generation when my son looks dismissively at the sweater I bought him for Christmas and, with a roll of his eyes, says "dad ... that is so gay."
It is not surprising then that many of us raised with such a world view would wish to protect our beliefs and our families by turning to the ballot box to enshrine in law those traditions
J The game entailed boys tackling one another "until one survivor remained standing." Frazier v. Norton, 334 N.W.2d 865, 866 (S.D. 1983). Children today continue to play the ga,me, now known as "kill the carrif2r."
25 -OPINION

. we have come to value. But just as the Constitution protects the expression of these moral viewpoints, it equally protects the minority from being diminished by them.
It is at times difficult to see past the shrillness of the debate. Accusations of religious bigotry and banners reading "God Hates Fags" make for a messy democracy and, at times, test the First Amendmentresolve.ofboth sides. At the core of the Equal Protection Clause, however, there exists a foundational belief that certain rights should be shielded from the barking crowds; that certain rights are subject to ownership by all and not the stake hold of popular trend or shifting majorities.
My decision will not be the final word on this subject, but on this issue of marriage I am struck more by our similarities than our differences. I believe that if we can look for a moment past gender and sexuality, we can see in these plaintiffs nothing more or less than our own families. Families who we would expect our Constitution to protect, if not exalt, in equal measure. With discernment we see not shadows lurking in closets or the stereotypes of what was once believed; rather, we see families committed to the common purpose of love, devotion, and service to the greater community.
Whe~e will this all lead? I know that many suggest we are going down a slippery slope that will have no moral boundaries. To those who truly harbor such fears, I can only say this: Let us look less to the sky to see what might fall; rather, let us look to each other ... and rise. ORDER TO FOLLOW.

DATED this j_J_th day of May, 2014. 26-0PINION

"-----~
Michael J. McShane
United States District Judge

 
 Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 12 Filed 12/20/13 Page 1 of 5 Page ID#: 60

Thomas R. Johnson, OSB No. 010645 TRJohnson@perkinscoie.com Kristina J. Holm, OSB No. 112607 KJHolm@perkinscoie.com Misha Isaak, OSB No. 086430 MIsaak@perkinscoie.com PERKINS COIE LLP 1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor Portland, OR 97209-4128 Telephone: 503.727.2000 Facsimile: 503.727.2222
Jennifer Middleton, OSB No. 071510 JMiddleton@jjlslaw.com JOHNSON JOHNSON & SCHALLER PC 975 Oak Street, Suite 1050 Eugene, OR 97401 Telephone: 541.683.2506 Facsimile: 541.484.0882
Cooperating attorneys on behalf of the ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.

Kevin Díaz, OSB No. 970480 KDiaz@aclu-or.org ACLU FOUNDATION OF OREGON, INC. P.O. Box 40585 Portland, OR 97240 Telephone: 503.227.6928 Facsimile: 503.227.6948
Rose Saxe * RSaxe@aclu.org Amanda Goad * AGoad@aclu.org AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Telephone: 212.549.2627 Facsimile: 212.549.2650
* Pro hac vice applications pending

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Rummell, West, Chickadonz, Tanner, and Basic Rights Education Fund

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION

PAUL RUMMELL and BENJAMIN WEST; LISA CHICKADONZ and CHRISTINE TANNER; BASIC RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND,

No. 6:13-cv-02256-TC

Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42
By Plaintiffs Paul Rummell, Benjamin West, Lisa Chickadonz, Christine Tanner, and Basic Rights Education Fund

Defendants.

1- MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
LEGAL28777991.2

Perkins Coie LLP 1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor
Portland, OR 97209-4128 Phone: 503.727.2000 Fax: 503.727.2222

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 12 Filed 12/20/13 Page 2 of 5 Page ID#: 61

DEANNA L. GEIGER and JANINE M. NELSON; ROBERT DUEHMIG and WILLIAM GRIESAR,,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority, and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,
Defendants.

No. 6:13-cv-01834-MC

Plaintiffs Paul Rummell, Benjamin West, Lisa Chickadonz, Christine Tanner, and Basic Rights Education Fund respectfully request that the Court consolidate the action captioned Rummel et al. v. Kitzhaber et al., No. 6:13-cv-02256-TC, with the previously-filed action captioned Geiger et al. v. Kitzhaber et al., No. 6:13-cv-01834-MC.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Deanna L. Geiger, Janine M. Nelson, Robert Duehmig, and William Griesar initiated an action on October 15, 2013, against defendants John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, and Randy Wuldruff, all named in their official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the state of Oregon’s exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage violates their rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. These plaintiffs are represented by attorneys Lake Perriguey and Lea Ann Easton. On December 4, 2013, they filed an amended complaint. Defendants Kitzhaber, Rosenblum, and Woodward, all state officials represented by the Oregon

2- MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
LEGAL28777991.2

Perkins Coie LLP 1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor
Portland, OR 97209-4128 Phone: 503.727.2000 Fax: 503.727.2222

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 12 Filed 12/20/13 Page 3 of 5 Page ID#: 62

Department of Justice, filed their answer on December 13, 2013. Defendant Randy Wuldruff has not yet appeared or answered.
Yesterday, on December 19, 2013, plaintiffs Paul Rummell, Benjamin West, Lisa Chickadonz, Christine Tanner, and Basic Rights Education Fund initiated a separate action raising substantially similar claims against the same defendants. They are represented by attorneys from Perkins Coie LLP in Portland, Johnson Johnson & Schaller PC in Eugene, the ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., and the national American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. With this motion, plaintiffs Rummell, West, Chickadonz, Tanner, and Basic Rights Education Fund seek consolidation of the two actions.
DISCUSSION I. Consolidation is Warranted For Actions Before the Same Court Involving Common
Questions of Law and Fact Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides: “If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may … consolidate the actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2). “The purpose of consolidation is to streamline and economize pretrial proceedings so as to avoid duplication of effort, and to prevent conflicting outcomes in cases involving similar legal and factual issues.” In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 724 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). “[C]onsolidation of separate actions presenting a common issue of law or fact is permitted under Federal Rule 42 as a matter of convenience and economy in judicial administration.” 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2383 (3d ed. 2013). “The district court is given broad discretion to decide whether consolidation under Rule 42(a) would be desirable ….” Id. Further, “[t]he consent of the parties is not required by the rule to accomplish the consolidation. Rather, it is for the district court to weigh the saving of time and effort that consolidation under Rule 42(a) would produce against any inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would cause for the litigants and the trial judge.” Id.

3- MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
LEGAL28777991.2

Perkins Coie LLP 1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor
Portland, OR 97209-4128 Phone: 503.727.2000 Fax: 503.727.2222

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 12 Filed 12/20/13 Page 4 of 5 Page ID#: 63
Civil rights cases brought by separate plaintiffs alleging the same or similar constitutional violations against common defendants are often appropriate for consolidation. For instance, in Midwest Community Council, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 98 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the district court sua sponte consolidated two actions both charging racial discrimination in allocation of public park resources, despite that one of the actions also asserted a claim for employment discrimination in the park district and one of the parties opposed consolidation. Id. at 499-500. Courts have also consolidated civil rights actions brought by separate prisoners alleging similar violations arising from improper prison conditions. E.g., Anderson v. Spizziota, No. 11-5663, 2012 WL 1268346, *1-3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2012); Lynch v. DeMarco, No. 112602, 2012 WL 1429211, *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012).
Here, consolidation is appropriate because the cases involve common issues of law and fact. The plaintiffs in the Geiger and Rummel actions have sued the same defendants for the same legal claims arising from substantially similar facts. In both cases, two same-sex couples seek the same relief: the freedom to marry in Oregon. It would certainly “streamline and economize pretrial proceedings,” “avoid duplication of effort,” and “prevent conflicting outcomes,” TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d at 724, if these actions are consolidated. Further, consolidation will not prejudice any party. In the Geiger action, the plaintiffs filed their complaint just two months ago, amended their complaint just 16 days ago, the state-official defendants filed their answer just last week, and defendant Wuldruff has not yet filed an answer. To date, no issues in that action have been litigated or adjudicated. Thus, the two actions can easily proceed on the same schedule in one consolidated proceeding. //

4- MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
LEGAL28777991.2

Perkins Coie LLP 1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor
Portland, OR 97209-4128 Phone: 503.727.2000 Fax: 503.727.2222

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 12 Filed 12/20/13 Page 5 of 5 Page ID#: 64

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, plaintiffs Paul Rummell, Benjamin West, Lisa Chickadonz, Christine

Tanner, and Basic Rights Education Fund respectfully request that the Court consolidate the

Geiger and Rummel actions.

DATED: December 20, 2013

s/ Thomas R. Johnson
Thomas R. Johnson, OSB No. 010645 TRJohnson@perkinscoie.com Kristina J. Holm, OSB No. 112607 KJHolm@perkinscoie.com Misha Isaak, OSB No. 086430 MIsaak@perkinscoie.com Perkins Coie LLP Telephone: 503.727.2000

Jennifer Middleton, OSB No. 071510 JMiddleton@jjlslaw.com Johnson Johnson & Schaller PC Telephone: 541.683.2506

Cooperating attorneys on behalf of the ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.

Kevin Díaz, OSB No. 970480 ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. KDiaz@aclu-or.org Telephone: 503.227.6928
Rose Saxe* RSaxe@aclu.org Telephone: 212.549.2627 Amanda Goad* AGoad@aclu.org Telephone: 213.977.5244 American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Rummell, West, Chickadonz, Tanner, and Basic Rights Education Fund
* Pro hac vice applications pending

5- MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
LEGAL28777991.2

Perkins Coie LLP 1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor
Portland, OR 97209-4128 Phone: 503.727.2000 Fax: 503.727.2222

 
 Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 87 Filed 04/21/14 Page 1 of 27 Page ID#: 789
Roger K. Harris (OSB No. 78046) HARRIS BERNE CHRISTENSEN LLP 5000 SW Meadows Road, Suite 400 Lake Oswego, OR 97035 (503) 596-2928; (503) 968-2003 Fax roger@hbclawyers.com
John C. Eastman (Cal. Bar No. 193726)* CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE c/o Chapman University Fowler School of Law One University Dr. Orange, CA 92866 (877) 855-3330; (714) 844-4817 Fax jeastman@chapman.edu
* Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice pending
Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION

DEANNA L. GEIGER, JANINE M. NELSON, ROBERT DUEHMIG and WILLIAM GRIESAR,
Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority; and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,
Defendants,

Case No.: 6:13-cv-01834-MC (Lead Case) and
Case No.: 6:13-cv-02256-MC (Trailing Case)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - i

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 87 Filed 04/21/14 Page 2 of 27 Page ID#: 790
and NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, INC., on behalf of their Oregon members,
Proposed Intervenor.
PAUL RUMMELL and BENJAMIN WEST; LISA CHICKADONZ and CHRISTINE TANNER; BASIC RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND,
Plaintiffs, v. JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority; and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,
Defendants, and NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, INC., on behalf of their Oregon members,
Proposed Intervenor.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - ii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................................................iv INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................................................1 ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................................................3
I. Proposed Intervenor Has Third-Party Standing To Assert Protectable Interests of Its Members....................3 II. Proposed Intervenor Is Entitled to Intervene as of Right Under Rule 24(a)....................................................5
A. Proposed Intervenor Has Timely Filed This Motion................................................................................5 B. Proposed Intervenor’s Members Have Significantly Protectable Interests in the Subject of this Action.8 C. The Court’s Ruling Might Impair Proposed Intervenor’s Significantly Protectable Interests. ..............12 D. The Existing Parties Have Already Demonstrated That They Are Not Adequately Representing the
Interests of Proposed Intervenor’s Members..........................................................................................16 III. Alternatively, Proposed Intervenor Should Be Granted Permissive Intervention. ........................................17 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................................18
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - iii

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland,
95 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1996) ....................................................................................................... 6 American Association of People with Disabilities v. Herrera,
257 F.R.D. 236 (D.N.M. 2008) ................................................................................................. 13 American Brake Shoe & Foundly Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.,
3 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ..................................................................................................... 6 Arakaki v. Cayetano,
324 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................................................................................... 5 Associated Builders and Contractors, Saginaw Valley Area Chapter v. Perry,
115 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................................... 7 Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) .................................................................................................................. 17 Bank of Marin v. England ,
352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965) ..................................................................................................... 15 Bogaert v. Land,
2008 WL 2952006 (W.D. Mich. July 29, 2009) ....................................................................... 13 Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) .................................................................................................................... 12 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) .................................................................................................................... 4
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Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 87 Filed 04/21/14 Page 5 of 27 Page ID#: 793
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) .......................................................................................................... 10
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) .................................................................................................................... 4
Employee Staffing Services, Inc. v. Aubry, 20 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 1994) ..................................................................................................... 17
Financial Guar. Ins. Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 943 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1991) ..................................................................................................... 17
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) .................................................................................................................. 15
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980) .................................................................................................................. 16
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) .................................................................................................................. 12
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 14
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) ......................................................................................................... 10
Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1972)..................................................................................................... 6
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................... 18
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - v

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Legal Aid Soc’y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979) ..................................................................................................... 6
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Ore. 2005) ........................................................................................................ 9, 14
Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004)............................................................................................................. 10
Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) .................................................................................................................... 4
Norwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) ......................................................................................................... 5
Park & Tilford v. Schults, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947) ........................................................................................................ 6
Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953) ....................................................................................................... 6
Portland Audobon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989) ..................................................................................................... 13
ProtectMarriage.com - Yes on 8, et al v. Debra Bowen, et al., No. 11-17884 (9th Cir., pending) ................................................................................................ 4
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) .................................................................................................................. 12
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) .............................................................................................................. 15, 16
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - vi

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 87 Filed 04/21/14 Page 7 of 27 Page ID#: 795
Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir.1998) ........................................................................................................ 8
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983) ..................................................................................................... 16
Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................................... 10
Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................. passim
Starbuck v. City and County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1977) ..................................................................................................... 15
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228 (Ore. 2000) ............................................................................................................ 14
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) .................................................................................................................. 16
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) .................................................................................................................... 6
United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1933) ......................................................................................................... 6
United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................. 5, 17
United States v. Covington Technologies Co., 967 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992) ..................................................................................................... 5
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - vii

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 87 Filed 04/21/14 Page 8 of 27 Page ID#: 796 United States v. Windsor,
133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).................................................................................................................. 2 Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton,
255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 8 Utah Assoc. of Counties v. Clinton,
255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................. 13 Yniguez v. Arizona,
939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991) ....................................................................................................... 6
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - viii

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 87 Filed 04/21/14 Page 9 of 27 Page ID#: 797
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 18 U.S.C. § 401............................................................................................................................. 13 Or. Const. Art. 4, § 1.................................................................................................................... 13 Or. Const., Art. 15, § 5a ...................................................................................................... 9, 11, 13 Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.010.................................................................................................................. 9 Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.041(1) ......................................................................................................... 8, 9 Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.077.............................................................................................................. 8, 9 Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.110.................................................................................................................. 9 Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.120.................................................................................................................. 8 Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.150.................................................................................................................. 9 Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.400............................................................................................................. 10 Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403............................................................................................................. 10 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) ............................................................................................................. 4, 9, 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) ..................................................................................................................... 17
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - ix

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INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs filed this suit on October 15, 2013, challenging the constitutionality of Oregon’s long-standing and recently reaffirmed definition of marriage. Dkt.#1. After they filed a First Amendment Complaint on December 4, 2013, Dkt.#8, the named defendants—the Governor, Attorney General, and State Registrar of Health Statistics (collectively, the “State Defendants”), and the Multnomah County Assessor—all filed answers to the complaint, declining to admit and thereby contesting Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges. Dkt.#9 (Dec. 13, 2013); Dkt.#13 (Dec. 23, 2013). Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on January 14, 2014, and the case was consolidated on January 22, 2014 with a parallel case, Rummell v. Kitzhaber, No. 6:13-cv-02256-MC, pressing nearly identical constitutional challenges. Only in their answer to the Rummell complaint, filed on February 24, 2014— eleven days after the close of discovery in this case, see Dkt.#2 (setting discovery completion date as February 13, 2014)—did the State Defendants announce that they “will not defend the Oregon ban on same-sex marriage in this litigation” and that, “[r]ather, they will take the position in their summary judgment briefing that the ban cannot withstand a federal constitutional challenge under any standard of review.” Dkt.#58, ¶ 28. Then, in their “oppositions” to Plaintiffs’ respective summary judgment motions, Defendants affirmatively joined Plaintiffs’ attacks on the constitutionality of the Oregon marriage laws. State Defendants’ Response to Mot. for Summary Judgment (Dkt.#64); Defendant Randy Waldruff’s Response to Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt.#59). The State Defendants argued that heightened scrutiny should apply, even while acknowledging that Ninth Circuit precedent had long applied mere rational basis review and that a very recent decision of the Ninth Circuit applying heightened scrutiny was not yet final and based (quite
PROPOSED INTERVENOR’S MOTION TO INTERVENE - 1

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erroneously, in our view) on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), which admittedly did not specify a level of review. Dkt.#64 at 13-14. They argued that strict scrutiny should also be applied because the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that marriage is a fundamental right, disparaging the perfectly legitimate arguments that have been made to distinguish prior Supreme Court cases—all based on man-woman marriage—from this distinctly different circumstance. Id. at 25-30. They conceded issues of bad motive on the part of Oregon citizens when adopting the constitutional amendment that are not supported by the record. Id. at 14 (“it is apparent that the reason for the ban was to enshrine in the state constitution a belief that same-sex couples are disfavored”). They argued that Oregon’s law fails even rational basis review. Id. at 15. They advanced and then rejected as “inadequate” the straw-man argument that the voters sought to protect traditional marriage “simply for the sake of holding onto tradition.” Id. at 17-18. They rejected the State’s legitimate interest in family stability for procreative unions on the ground that the state’s marriage laws do not bar opposite-sex couples who are incapable of procreation from marrying—an unnecessary concession under rational basis review, which does not require perfection in the fit between means and ends. Id. at 18-20. They ignored the overwhelming body of precedent that, under rational basis review, it is perfectly acceptable for a government program to reach groups that further the government’s purpose and not extend the program to groups that do not (even if extending the program would not undermine the original purpose). Id. at 23-24. And they accepted unquestioningly the unsubstantiated claim asserted in Windsor that children being raised by same-sex couples are “humiliated” by the State’s decision not to redefine marriage to encompass same-sex relationships. Id. at 24-25.
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Despite the State Defendants’ assertion that they have considered all these justifications and contemplated whether there might be others to defend the rationality of Oregon’s marriage law “and have found nothing to present to this Court,” there are perfectly plausible, indeed persuasive, counterarguments on every single point addressed by the State Defendants. But this Court will never be presented with those arguments absent intervention by someone willing to make them.
The Attorney General’s decision not only to refuse to defend the long-standing and recently reaffirmed marriage laws of the State of Oregon, but also to join Plaintiffs’ challenges to their constitutionality, has therefore left this case in the posture of a collusive suit. Proposed Intervenor seeks to intervene in order to remedy that problem, providing the legal defense that the Attorney General and the other named defendants refuse to provide, protecting the protectable interests of its own members, providing this court with advocacy in opposition to the legal claims asserted that is critical to our adversarial system, and ensuring jurisdiction for any appeal that might become necessary.
ARGUMENT I. Proposed Intervenor Has Third-Party Standing To Assert Protectable Interests of
Its Members. Proposed Intervenor, National Organization for Marriage, Inc., is a non-profit organization devoted to protecting the institution of marriage and the faith communities that sustain it. Decl. of Brian S. Brown, ¶ 2. Founded in 2007, it serves as a national resource for marriage-related initiatives at the state and local level. Id. It currently has more than eleven thousand members nationwide, including more than one hundred members in Oregon. Id. ¶ 3. Among its Oregon members are a county clerk, a wedding services provider, and an Oregon voter who cast a vote in the November 2004 election in support of Measure 36 (the 2004 ballot
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initiative that amended Oregon’s Constitution to define marriage as between one man and one woman). Id. ¶ 4. Each of these members of NOM has a particularized interest in the outcome of this litigation. See Section II.B, infra.
Moreover, there is documented evidence, already acknowledged by the Supreme Court, of retaliation, economic reprisal, and other harms that have befallen others who are similarly situated. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 480-82 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the “intimidation tactics” that were deployed against supporters of California’s Proposition 8, which added a one-man/one-woman definition of marriage to California’s Constitution); id. at 370 (majority opinion) (describing those “recent events in which donors to certain causes were blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation” as a “cause for concern” that would render donor disclosure requirements “unconstitutional as applied to an organization if there were a reasonable probability that the group's members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed”); ProtectMarriage.com - Yes on 8, et al v. Debra Bowen, et al., No. 11-17884 (9th Cir., pending) (complaint outlining numerous examples of voter and donor intimidation that occurred after donor’s names were publicly disclosed). As a result, Proposed Intervenor’s members have legitimate and well-founded fears that intervening on their own behalf to defend their particularized interests directly would subject them to similar forms of reprisal. They are therefore hindered in defending those interests on their own behalf and, under governing Supreme Court precedent, Proposed Intervenor has standing to assert their particularized interests on their behalf. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991); Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
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II. Proposed Intervenor Is Entitled to Intervene as of Right Under Rule 24(a). Four requirements must be satisfied to intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2): (1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a “significantly protectable” interest relating to the subject of the action; (3) the disposition of the action might, as a practical matter, impair the applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest might be inadequately represented by the existing parties. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2001); Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003). Each of these requirements must be evaluated liberally in favor of intervention:
A liberal policy in favor of intervention serves both efficient resolution of issues and broadened access to the courts. By allowing parties with a practical interest in the outcome of a particular case to intervene, [the court] often prevent[s] or simplifies] future litigation involving related interests; at the same time, [the court] allow[s] an additional interested party to express its views ... . United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002). In reviewing these factors, “a district court is required to accept as true the nonconclusory allegations made in support of an intervention motion.” Southwest Ctr., 268 F .3d at 819. Proposed Intervenor, on behalf of its members, satisfies all four requirements. A. Proposed Intervenor Has Timely Filed This Motion. Three criteria determine the timeliness of a motion to intervene: (1) the stage of the proceedings; (2) the reason for delay, if any, in moving to intervene; and (3) prejudice to the parties. Norwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1996). The court may permit intervention at any stage in the proceeding, including post-judgment. See, e.g, United States v. Covington Technologies Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992). This motion is timely notwithstanding the currently scheduled April 23, 2014 hearing on Plaintiffs’ respective motions for summary judgment. Although discovery closed in the
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lead case on February 13 and closed in the consolidated case on April 18, no trial date has been set and no judgment has been entered. The immediate purpose of this intervention is to ensure that Oregon’s marriage laws are adequately defended from the perspective of a local governmental official responsible for enforcing them and others who have protectable interests in them, and to ensure that there is a party willing and able to appeal any ruling against those laws, an interest that can easily be accommodated at this stage of the litigation.
Indeed, courts frequently permit intervention even after trial for the purpose of appealing an adverse ruling. See, e.g, United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991); Legal Aid Soc’y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1328 (9th Cir. 1979); Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953); Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1933); and American Brake Shoe & Foundly Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[i]ntervention should be allowed even after a final judgment where it is necessary to preserve some right which cannot otherwise be protected [such as] the right to appeal from the judgments entered on the merits by the District Court.” Pellegrino, 203 F.2d at 465-66 (citations omitted); see also Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d 1406, 1412 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the Guild’s right to intervene [post-judgment] for the purpose of appealing is well established”); Park & Tilford v. Schults, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947) (postjudgment motion to intervene was timely where purpose was to appeal adverse ruling). Allowing intervention to facilitate appellate review is especially appropriate where a substantial question, such as the constitutionality of a provision of the Oregon Constitution, might otherwise be left unsettled by an appellate court. See Associated Builders and
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Contractors, Saginaw Valley Area Chapter v. Perry, 115 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The existence of a substantial unsettled question of law is a proper circumstance for allowing intervention and appeal. [citation omitted]. Where such uncertainty exists, one whose interests have been adversely affected by a district court’s decision should be entitled to receive the protection of appellate review.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
(2) There is thus good cause for the delay, especially in this extraordinary situation. The Attorney General only announced on February 24, 2014, in its answer in the consolidated Rummell case, that she would not be defending Oregon’s marriage laws, and only demonstrated that she was actually joining in Plaintiffs’ attack on the law’s constitutionality when she filed her “opposition” to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion on March 18, 2014, just a month ago, leaving Oregon’s marriage laws entirely undefended in this litigation. Proposed Intervenor began the process of identifying potential parties to intervene shortly thereafter, only to discover that individuals with protectable interests that may be effected by this litigation had genuine concerns about reprisal that hindered their ability to intervene. Brown Decl. ¶ 4. Proposed Intervenor then determined only days ago that it had among its membership ranks individuals with protectable interests such that it could, pursuant to the jurisdictional rules on third-party standing, intervene on their behalf. Id. ¶ 5. Proposed Intervenor has thus moved expeditiously to submit this motion. Further, while this case has moved quickly toward a hearing on a dispositive motion in accordance with the expedited schedule adopted by this Court, it is still only six months since the action was filed. No trial has been held, and it appears that the parties did not even engage in discovery, see Dkt.#7 (agreement waiving Rule 26 discovery disclosures).
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(3) Allowing intervention will not cause undue delay or unfairly prejudice the parties. Although Proposed Intervenor will be requesting that the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motions be continued until the end of May in order to allow for adequate time to prepare an opposition brief and to allow for any reply briefs that Plaintiffs and/or the nominal defendants think warranted, Proposed Intervenor is prepared to submit a preliminary brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment by close of business on April 22, 2014, if necessary, in order that it can be considered by this Court at the scheduled April 23, 2014 hearing. Proposed Intervenor’s counsel is also prepared to participate in the currently scheduled oral argument if the Court denies Proposed Intervenor’s request for a continuance.1
B. Proposed Intervenor’s Members Have Significantly Protectable Interests in the Subject of this Action. Whether a proposed intervenor has a significantly protectable interest is a “practical,
threshold inquiry,” and “[n]o specific legal or equitable interest need be established.” Southwest Ctr., 268 F .3d at 818 (quotations omitted). “It is generally enough that the interest asserted is protectable under some law, and that there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted).
Proposed Intervenor, on behalf of its members, has such interests.
1 Should the Court determine that Summary Judgment is not warranted once it has before it an actual opposition to Plaintiffs’ respective Motions for Summary Judgment, further proceedings, including the re-opening of discovery, may well be warranted. But that is a function of the fact that this case has heretofore proceeded in a collusive manner, albeit outside of public view until the Attorney General announced her true intention after the close of discovery in the principal case. For the reasons set out in Sections II.C-D below, the ability to avoid the consequences of a collusive suit weighs heavily in favor of intervention, even if that extends the timetable for final resolution of the case. Plaintiffs would undoubtedly prefer to wage their litigation battle against defendants who are fully in agreement with their positions, but it is not unfair prejudice to require that they actually seek to vindicate their claims against a true adversary. See, e.g., Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The prejudice prong of the timeliness inquiry ‘measures prejudice caused by the intervenors’ delay—not by the intervention itself’”) (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 828 (5th Cir.1998)).
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Protectable Interest of County Clerks. Proposed Intervenor’s members include an Oregon County Clerk. Brown Decl. ¶ 6. Under Oregon law, county clerks are responsible for issuing marriage licenses “directed to any person or religious organization or congregation authorized by Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.120 to solemnize marriages, and authorizing the person, organization, or congregation to join together as husband and wife the persons named in the license.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.041(1). The clerk must issue a marriage license if, but only if, “all other legal requirements for issuance of the marriage license have been met.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.077. “County clerks . . . cannot issue marriage licenses contrary to the statutes set out in ORS chapter 106 that circumscribe their functions.” Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 95 n.5 (Ore. 2005). That includes Section 106.010, which provides that “Marriage is a civil contract entered into in person by males at least 17 years of age and females at least 17 years of age, who are otherwise capable, and solemnized in accordance with ORS 106.150.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.010. It also has included, since its adoption by the voters in 2004, Article 15, Section 5a of the Oregon Constitution, which provides: “It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.” Or. Const. Art. 15, § 5a.
As the Oregon Supreme Court noted in Li v. State, “[t]he ministerial aspects of issuing marriage licenses in Oregon have, by statute, long been a county function.” Li v. State, 110 P.3d at 95 n.5. County clerks are “charged with the responsibility of physically issuing the licenses.” Id. (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.041). “The county clerk is also the entity that must receive a couple’s written application and verify that the legal requirements for issuing a marriage license have been met.” Id. (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.077). Most significantly, the Court held that “County clerks . . . cannot issue marriage licenses contrary to the statutes set
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out in ORS chapter 106 that circumscribe their functions.” Id. (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.110).
Given these official duties and obligations, a county clerk clearly has a protectable interest authorizing her intervention as of right under Rule 24(a). Indeed, county clerks have frequently been named as defendants in litigation by same-sex couples challenging their State’s marriage laws. See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (lawsuit against Orange County, California clerk for injunction and declaratory relief that California law prohibiting same-sex marriage was unconstitutional); Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004) (county clerks sued for issuing same-sex marriage licenses); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (same-sex couples sue county clerks for refusing to issue marriage licenses); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (same). Plaintiffs themselves recognized the official interest of county clerks by naming as a defendant the Multnomah County Assessor who, performing the duties with respect to the issuance of marriage licenses that are performed by county clerks elsewhere in the State, “is responsible for maintaining vital records of marriages and issuing marriage licenses in Multnomah County, Oregon.” First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 16.
Proposed Intervenor’s members who are County Clerks who issue marriage licenses and perform marriages will thus be directly affected in the performance of their duties if Oregon’s marriage laws are ruled unconstitutional and, as has happened elsewhere, the state officials bound by that ruling seek to compel statewide compliance with it (as they have already announced they would do).
Protectable Interests of Wedding Services Providers. Proposed Intervenor’s members include providers of wedding services who have sincerely-held religious objections to
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facilitating marriage ceremonies between people of the same sex. Brown Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7. Oregon’s public accommodation statute defines a “place of public accommodation” as including “any place or service offering to the public . . . facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods [or services . . . .” Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.400. The law then prohibits a “place of public accommodation” from selectively providing its services on the basis of, inter alia, “sexual orientation.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403. Currently, wedding service providers in Oregon are not required to facilitate marriage ceremonies between people of the same sex because Oregon law does not define such relationships as “marriages.” Should Oregon’s marriage law be overturned by judicial decision without possibility of crafting the kind of conscience exemptions that can often be obtained through the legislative process, Proposed Intervenor’s members who provide wedding services and who have sincerely-held religious beliefs that prevent them from facilitating marriage ceremonies between people of the same sex would find themselves in the untenable position of having to choose between: 1) adhering to their religious beliefs and either violating Oregon’s public accommodation law or ceasing to engage in the wedding services business; or 2) complying with Oregon’s public accommodation law in violation of their sincerely-held religious beliefs. That is a particularized injury giving them standing to participate in this litigation.
Protectable Interests of Measure 36 Supporters. Proposed Intervenor’s members include citizens of Oregon who voted in support of Measure 36, the 2004 ballot initiative that added Article 15, Section 5a to the Oregon Constitution, which provides “that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.” Or. Const. Art. 15, § 5a; Brown Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8. The judicial relief sought by Plaintiffs in these cases would negate the votes of those individuals (and the votes of the 1,028,546 Oregonians who
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voted to approve Measure 36). The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the right to vote is a constitutionally-protected fundamental right that cannot be denied directly but also cannot be destroyed or diluted indirectly. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). “Having once granted the right to vote,” as Oregon has done here with its constitutional initiative process, “the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)). Yet that is precisely what the Oregon Attorney General has done here. By refusing to provide any defense to the Oregon marriage law, adopted by the voters of Oregon in 2004, when a perfectly plausible defense can be made, the Oregon Attorney General has entirely and arbitrarily negated the votes of the more than one million Oregon voters who successfully supported Measure 36, in favor of the less than eight hundred thousand Oregon voters who unsuccessfully opposed it. Those voters who supported Measure 36, some of whom are members of Proposed Intervenor, therefore have a particularized interest in seeing that their votes are not negated by the actions of the Attorney General.
C. The Court’s Ruling Might Impair Proposed Intervenor’s Significantly Protectable Interests. The Ninth Circuit “follow[s] the guidance of Rule 24 advisory committee notes that
state that ‘[i]f an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene.” Southwest Ctr., 268 F.3d at 822 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee’s notes). As explained above, the outcome of this action will, as a practical matter, affect the ability of Proposed Intervenor’s members’ ability to comply with Oregon’s marriage laws and/or subject them to conflicting duties. This requirement is thus plainly met.
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For example, any injunctive relief granted by this Court would directly affect the performance of County Clerk’s legal duties. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin all relevant state officials from enforcing Oregon’s marriage laws and, ultimately, to require them to issue such orders as may be necessary to ensure that all county clerks across Oregon issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. FAC ¶ 17 (“The relief requested in this action is sought against each Defendant . . . and against all persons acting . . . under their supervision, at their direction, or under their control”) (emphasis added).
A Clerk’s interest in the effective performance of her duties and the threat of an injunction impacting those duties from a federal District Court seeking to enforce an order from the Attorney General or other state officials justify intervention. See, e.g., American Association of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 257 F.R.D. 236 (D.N.M. 2008). Herrera involved a challenge to a New Mexico state voter-registration law. The District Court for the District of New Mexico permitted a county clerk to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), holding:
If the injunction was issued, Coakley [the county clerk] would be prohibited from performing certain electoral duties that New Mexico law requires. This direct effect on what Coakley can and cannot do as a county clerk is the direct and substantial effect that is recognized as a legally protectable interest under rule 24(a). Id. at 256 (citing Utah Assoc. of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Bogaert v. Land, 2008 WL 2952006 (W.D. Mich. July 29, 2009) (county clerks permitted to intervene where plaintiffs sought injunction that would change clerks’ obligations in administering a recall election). The threat of injunction alone gives Proposed Intervenor’s County Clerk members a direct interest in this litigation sufficient to warrant intervention. See Portland Audobon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989) (where plaintiff sought injunction, “the
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governmental bodies charged with compliance can be the only defendants”). Violation of such an order could lead to civil or even criminal liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (authorizing criminal contempt for violation of a court order).
More broadly, county clerks have a sworn duty to uphold and defend the Oregon Constitution, which includes both Article 15 § 5a and the “unfettered” right of the people to the initiative process by which it was enacted. Or. Const. Art. 4, § 1; Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228, 331 Or. 38 (Ore. 2000). To be sure, the duties of county clerks with respect to marriage are largely ministerial, and county clerks are not independent judges of the constitutionality of state law, but Article 15 § 5A has been upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court as a valid constitutional amendment, Li v. State, 110 P.3d at 95, and yet is undefended by state officials.
The other categories of members whom Proposed Intervenor seeks to represent in this litigation would also find their protectable interests impaired absent intervention. Proposed Intervenor’s members who voted for Ballot Measure 36 in 2004 will have those votes entirely negated if this Court accepts the collusive arguments by Plaintiffs and existing Defendants, without possibility of defending before this court or on appeal the initiative for which they voted. Proposed Intervenor’s members who provide wedding services in accord with their sincerely-held religious beliefs will find those beliefs in conflict with Oregon law should this Court grant Plaintiffs’ respective motions for summary judgment.
Finally, the weighty constitutional questions presented by this case plainly warrant definitive resolution by the Ninth Circuit and perhaps even the Supreme Court. The judgments of federal district courts have no precedential effect except on the parties. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal trial court decisions are not binding
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precedent). Every federal district court judge “sits alone and renders decisions not binding on the others,” even within the same district. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 n.10 (1996). “The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the decision of another.” Starbuck v. City and County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 457 (9th Cir. 1977). The opportunity for appellate review is critical. “In the judicial scheme of things, a district court decision which has not withstood the acid test of appellate review cannot be regarded as authoritative ....” Bank of Marin v. England , 352 F.2d 186, 189 n.l (9th Cir. 1965).
Given that the Attorney General has already announced that she would not appeal a judgment by this Court holding Oregon’s marriage laws unconstitutional, there will likely be no one to bring the significant issues presented by this case before an appellate court, absent the intervention requested here. The result would be legal uncertainty and confusion.
The holding in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), supports intervention under these circumstances. There, ex-felons sued three county election officials, challenging California’s constitutional provision prohibiting ex-felons from voting. When all three officials indicated that they would allow the ex-felons to register and vote, essentially mooting the dispute, and after it appeared that the Secretary of State would not be contesting the claims, the County Clerk of Mendocino County filed a complaint in intervention, alleging that the suit was collusive. The California Supreme Court ordered that the clerk be added as a party defendant. She then became the defendant that appealed the action to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the law. Rejecting Article III concerns, the Supreme Court opined that, without the opportunity to appeal, the intervening clerk and all other county clerks
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in the state would have been “permanently bound” by a decision of the California Supreme Court on a matter of federal constitutional law. Id. at 35. Similar reasoning applies here.
Proposed Intervenor, on behalf of its members, thus has significantly protectable interests in this action.
D. The Existing Parties Have Already Demonstrated That They Are Not Adequately Representing the Interests of Proposed Intervenor’s Members. The burden of showing inadequacy of representation by existing parties is “minimal”;
“the applicant need only show that the representation of its interests by existing parties ‘may be’ inadequate.” Southwest Ctr., 268 F.3d at 823 (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)). Courts consider the following three factors:
(1) Whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the would-be intervenor would offer any necessary element to the proceedings that other patties would neglect. Id. at 822. The Ninth Circuit has found that intervention is warranted where the facts indicate that the defendant government official desires the same legal outcome sought by the plaintiff. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, as described more fully in the introduction, supra at 5-7, the Attorney General and the other named defendants have affirmatively joined Plaintiffs’ constitutional attack on Oregon’s marriage laws, Dkt.#59; Dkt.#64, taking positions on the constitutionality of those laws that render them inadequate to represent the interests of Proposed Intervenor’s members in defending the laws. Quite simply, a party with a direct stake in the enforcement and administration of Oregon’s marriage laws that is willing to defend those laws should be represented in this action. “The clash of adverse parties” is an element of federal jurisdiction, GTE Sylvania, Inc.
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v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382 (1980), because it “sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). “The adversity requirement insures that a court is presented with opposing parties that are fairly motivated to diligently and effectively present the merits of all sides of the issues presented, thereby facilitating the court’s efforts to reach the correct results.” Financial Guar. Ins. Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 943 F.2d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, since the Attorney General has already announced that she would not appeal an ruling by this Court holding that Oregon’s marriage laws are unconstitutional, it is abundantly clear that the existing parties will not adequately represent the Proposed Intervenor’s interest in appellate review of any such decision.
In short, given that Proposed Intervenor’s presence will be critical to ensure the possibility of appellate review of this Court’s decision and to avoid the potential for confusion and conflicting duties discussed above, there is plainly “sufficient doubt about the adequacy of representation to warrant intervention.” Southwest Ctr., 268 F.3d at 824 (quotation omitted).
III. Alternatively, Proposed Intervenor Should Be Granted Permissive Intervention. Courts have broad discretion to grant permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b). Unlike intervention as of right, a significantly protectable interest is not required. See Employee Staffing Services, Inc. v. Aubry, 20 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 1994). “[A] court may grant permissive intervention where the applicant shows (1) independent grounds for jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s claim or defense, and the main action, have a question of law or question of fact in common.” United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 403. Proposed Intervenor meets each of these requirements.
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First, as noted out the outset, Proposed Intervenor has third-party standing to intervene

on behalf its members, several categories of which have, for the reasons set out in Section I.B,

protectable interests at issue in this litigation. Proposed Intervenor therefore has standing to

defend Oregon’s marriage laws on their behalf, providing the necessary “independent grounds

for jurisdiction” required for permissive intervention.

Second, as discussed in Section I.A above, this motion is timely. See League of United

Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997) (court considers same three

timeliness factors for permissive intervention as it does for mandatory intervention).

Third, Proposed Intervenor’s defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims present questions of law and

fact in common with all the defendants, even though the Proposed Intervenor will actually

provide the defense that the nominal defendants have refused to provide.

Proposed Intervenor thus meets the requirements for permissive intervention.

CONCLUSION

The motion to intervene should be granted.

Dated this 21st of April, 2014.

/s/ Roger K. Harris Roger K. Harris (OSB No. 78046) HARRIS BERNE CHRISTENSEN LLP

John C. Eastman* CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor National Organization for Marriage, on behalf of its Oregon members

* Pro Hac Vice Application pending

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 (ORDER LIST: 572 U.S.)

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2014

13A1173

ORDER IN PENDING CASE NAT’L ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE V. GEIGER, DEANNA L., ET AL.
The application for stay presented to Justice Kennedy and by him referred to the Court is denied.

 
 Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 58 Filed 02/24/14 Page 1 of 7 Page ID#: 502

ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM Attorney General SHEILA H. POTTER #993485 Deputy Chief Trial Counsel ANNA M. JOYCE #013112 Solicitor General Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410 Portland, OR 97201 Telephone: (971) 673-1880 Fax: (971) 673-5000 Email: Sheila.Potter@doj.state.or.us
Anna.Joyce@doj.state.or.us
Attorneys for State Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

DEANNA L. GEIGER and JANINE M. NELSON; ROBERT DUEHMIG and WILLIAM GRIESAR,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 6:13-cv-01834-MC (Lead Case)
STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT

JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority; and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,

Defendants.

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STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT
SP3/cjw/4958717-v1
Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410
Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 58 Filed 02/24/14 Page 2 of 7 Page ID#: 503

PAUL RUMMELL and BENJAMIN WEST; LISA CHICKADONZ and CHRISTINE TANNER; BASIC RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND,
Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon; JENNIFER WOODWARD, in her official capacity as State Registrar, Center for Health Statistics, Oregon Health Authority; and RANDY WALDRUFF, in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor,
Defendants.

Case No. 6:13-cv-02256-TC

Defendants John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, and Jennifer Woodward (collectively “State Defendants” or “the State”) respond to the Rummell plaintiffs’ allegations stated in their Amended Complaint as set forth below. References to paragraphs in this Answer are references to the numbered paragraphs in the Amended Complaint.
1. State Defendants lack the knowledge sufficient to admit or deny the allegations specific to the named individual plaintiffs in paragraphs 1 – 3. To the extent a response is required, State Defendants deny, solely on the basis of their absence of knowledge necessary to admit, and not for the purpose of specifically disputing the individual plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their commitment, their relationships, or their families.
2. On information and belief, State Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 24 relating to the identity and mission of plaintiff BREF.
3. Statements of the relief sought by plaintiffs (¶¶ 1, 7) require no response, and none is made.

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STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT
SP3/cjw/4958717-v1
Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410
Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000

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4. State Defendants admit that the Oregon legislature created a legal domestic partnership status, which is different from and is not legally identical to marriage; and they admit that the Oregon constitution and statutes define marriage in a way that prevents same-sex couples from marrying. The remainder of paragraph 2 consists of a mixture of allegations of facts that the State Defendants lack knowledge sufficient to admit or deny (e.g., individual plaintiffs’ partnerships, public perception of marriage) and legal conclusions, which require no response. To the extent that it contains allegations of fact requiring a response, the State Defendants deny on the basis of an absence of knowledge.
5. With respect to paragraph 3, State Defendants admit that the Deputy Attorney General for Oregon issued a legal opinion on October 16, 2013, and that on the basis of that opinion, Oregon’s Chief Operating Officer issued direction to Oregon state agencies to begin recognizing same-sex marriages validly and legally performed in other states. The direction and the legal opinion are attached to this Answer as Exhibit A, and are thereby incorporated into this Answer; they speak for themselves. State Defendants admit that Oregon law prevents same-sex couples from marrying in Oregon, and that Mr. Jordan’s direction does not bind local governments or the courts.
6. Allegations of injury or harm resulting from state law in paragraph 4 are legal conclusions, to which no response is required and none is made.
7. On information and belief, State Defendants admit paragraph 5. 8. Paragraph 6 is a mixture of legal conclusions, which require no response, and factual allegations that the State Defendants lack knowledge sufficient to admit or deny as fact. 9. State Defendants lack the knowledge sufficient to admit or deny the allegations specific to the named individual plaintiffs in paragraphs 8 – 23. To the extent a response is required, State Defendants deny, solely on the basis of their absence of knowledge necessary to

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STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT
SP3/cjw/4958717-v1
Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410
Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 58 Filed 02/24/14 Page 4 of 7 Page ID#: 505

admit, and not for the purpose of specifically disputing the individual plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their commitment, their relationships, or their families.
10. In response to paragraph 25, State Defendants admit that Multnomah County began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 2004, and that a declaratory judgment action was filed in response. State Defendants lack knowledge sufficient to admit or deny activities of BREF alleged in paragraph 25.
11. The allegations in paragraphs 26 – 31 are legal conclusions to which no response is required and none is made.
12. Allegations regarding jurisdiction and venue (¶¶ 32 – 36) are legal conclusions to which no response is required and none is made. State Defendants do not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction.
13. Paragraphs 37 – 38 consist of a mixture of legal conclusions, to which no response is required and none is made, and factual allegations that the State Defendants lack knowledge sufficient to admit or deny.
14. State Defendants admit paragraph 39. 15. With respect to paragraphs 40 – 41, State Defendants admit that Measure 36 passed, but lack knowledge sufficient to admit or deny the thoughts, feelings, or motivations of the individual voters. The statements submitted in support of, and opposition to, Measure 36 are a matter of record and speak for themselves. 16. Paragraphs 42-46 consist of legal conclusions, to which no response is required and none is made. The opinion memorandum referenced in paragraphs 45 – 46 is incorporated as Exhibit A to this Answer. 17. Allegations of injury or harm resulting from state law (¶¶ 47 – 53) are a mixture of broad factual assertions that the State does not have sufficient knowledge to categorically admit or deny (e.g., whether domestic partners’ relationships may be treated with respect in other

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STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT
SP3/cjw/4958717-v1
Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410
Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 58 Filed 02/24/14 Page 5 of 7 Page ID#: 506

states) and legal conclusions (e.g., that the same-sex marriage ban is the legal cause of unspecified persons viewing same-sex relationships as less consequential), to which no response is required and none is made.
18. In response to paragraph 54, State Defendants individually and collectively deny that they, or any one of them, encourage disrespect of, or for, same-sex couples or the children of same-sex parents. The remaining statements in paragraph 54 are, again, a mixture of legal conclusions, to which no response is required and none is made, and broad factual assertions as to multiple unspecified individuals and private entities, which the State cannot categorically admit or deny due to an absence of specific factual knowledge.
19. State Defendants admit that performing same-sex marriages in Oregon would have no adverse effect on existing marriages, and that sexual orientation does not determine an individual’s capacity to establish a loving and enduring relationship. State Defendants likewise admit that domestic partnership registration confers many legal protections but not all of the rights, obligations, and privileges associated with marriage. The remainder of paragraphs 55-57 consist of legal conclusions to which no response is required and none is made.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 20. State Defendants incorporate and reallege their responses above, in reply to paragraphs 58, 70, and 98. 21. Paragraphs 59 – 69, 71 – 77, 83 – 86, 88, 90 – 97, and 99 – 101 consist of legal conclusions to which no response is required and none is made. 22. In response to paragraph 78, State Defendants individually and collectively deny that their actions have denied same-sex couples dignity or respect, or that the enforcement of state law amounts to or reflects moral disapproval or antipathy toward any person or group of people. The remainder of paragraph 78 consists of legal conclusions to which no response is required and none is made.

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STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT
SP3/cjw/4958717-v1
Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410
Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000

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23. State Defendants lack the knowledge sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of fact made as to all same-sex couples everywhere in paragraphs 79 – 80.
24. Statements of the relief sought by plaintiffs in paragraph 81 require no response, and none is made.
25. State Defendants admit paragraphs 82 and 87. 26. In response to paragraph 89, State Defendants lack knowledge sufficient to admit or deny the specific allegations but admit that sexual orientation is a fixed characteristic for purposes of the legal analysis in this case.
GENERAL RESPONSES 27. Any factual allegations requiring a response, and not specifically admitted, are denied. 28. State Defendants will not defend the Oregon ban on same-sex marriage in this litigation. Rather, they will take the position in their summary judgment briefing that the ban cannot withstand a federal constitutional challenge under any standard of review. In the meantime, as the State Defendants are legally obligated to enforce the Oregon Constitution’s ban on same-sex marriage, they will continue to do so unless and until this Court grants the relief sought by the plaintiffs.

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STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT
SP3/cjw/4958717-v1
Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410
Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000

Case 6:13-cv-01834-MC Document 58 Filed 02/24/14 Page 7 of 7 Page ID#: 508
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Eleventh-Amendment Immunity Against Money Damages) 29. To the extent plaintiffs seek money damages against the State, any such claims fail, as State Defendants are immune from claims for damages under the doctrine of EleventhAmendment Immunity. DATED February 20 , 2014.
Respectfully submitted, ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM Attorney General
s/ Sheila H. Potter SHEILA H. POTTER #993485 Deputy Chief Trial Counsel ANNA M. JOYCE #013112 Solicitor General Trial Attorneys sheila.potter@doj.state.or.us anna.joyce@doj.state.or.us Of Attorneys for State Defendants

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STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THE RUMMELL AMENDED COMPLAINT
SP3/cjw/4958717-v1
Department of Justice 1515 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 410
Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000

 
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FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AUG 27 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

DEANNA L. GEIGER; et al., Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees, v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, INC., Proposed Intervenor,
Movant - Appellant.

No. 14-35427
D.C. Nos. 6:13-cv-01834-MC 6: 13-cv-02256-MC
District of Oregon, Eugene
ORDER

Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. This appeal arises from the district court's denial of the National
Organization for Marriage, Inc.'s ("NOM") motion to intervene in a consolidated action challenging the validity of Oregon's state constitutional and statutory provisions limiting civil marriage to one man and one woman, and the district court's subsequent order granting summary judgment. The district court's summary judgment order enjoined the enforcement of Article 15, § 5A, of the
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Constitution of Oregon; O.R.S. 106.010; O.R.S. 106.041(1); O.R.S. 106.150(1); and any other state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance as the basis to deny marriage or the rights accompanying marriage to same-gender couples otherwise qualified to marry under Oregon law, or to deny recognition of a same-gender couple's marriage leally performed in other jurisdictions and in all other respects valid under Oregon law.
Before the court are two motions to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees (collectively "Oregon State Defendants"). On May 14, 2014, the district court denied NOM's motion to intervene in the consolidated district court action. On May 16,2014, NOM filed a notice of appeal from that denial. On May 19,2014, the district court issued an opinion and an order granting summary judgment for plaintiffs-appellees (collectively "Geiger"), and entered final judgment in favor of Geiger. On May 22, 2014, NOM filed an amended notice of appeal in the district court, amending the appeal to include a protective notice of appeal of the district court's May 19, 2014 order and judgment. On the same date, NOM also filed in the district court a separate protective notice of appeal of the May 19, 2014 order and judgment.
On May 20, 2014, the Oregon State Defendants filed in this court a motion to dismiss as moot the appeal of the district court's May 14, 2014 denial ofNOM's

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motion to intervene. Geiger filed a joinder in the Oregon State Defendants' May 20, 2014 motion. On June 13, 2014, the Oregon State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the protective notice of appeal for lack of standing.
Neither Geiger nor the Oregon State Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the district court's May 19,2014 final judgment. Therefore, even ifNOM were to prevail in its appeal of the district court's denial of its motion to intervene, NOM must also demonstrate that it has Article III standing to challenge the final judgment. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (intervenor's right to continue a suit on appeal "in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Article III").
NOM asserts that it has Article III standing to appeal the district court's judgment as a third party on behalf of several of its members, identified as Oregon members who provide wedding services, Oregon members who voted for Measure 36, and at least one member who is an elected Oregon county clerk. We find that NOM's Oregon wedding service provider members' objection to facilitating samegender marriage ceremonies is not sufficient to establish Article III standing. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)) (Article III standing "requires the litigant to

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prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision[]"). Likewise, the interest of NOM's Oregon voter members in reversing the district court judgment in order to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable Oregon law is insufficient to establish Article III standing. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (holding proponents of ballot proposition had "no 'personal stake' in defending its enforcement that is distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of California[]"). Finally, as the district court determined, we also find that NOM's member who is an elected Oregon county clerk is not appearing in an official capacity and that the clerk's personal objections are not sufficient to establish Article III standing. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664-65, 2668 (citing Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987)) (holding the private party petitioners who held no office lacked Article III standing, and declining to uphold ''the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to[]").
We therefore hold that NOM lacks Article III standing to appeal the district court's May 19,2014 final judgment. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663-64 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). We grant the Oregon State Defendants' June 13,2014 motion to dismiss NOM's appeal from the final judgment for lack of

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standing. See id. We also grant the Oregon State Defendants' May 20, 2014 motion to dismiss as moot NOM's appeal of the denial of its motion to intervene. 1 See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68.
DISMISSED.

1The district court denied intervention as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) on the grounds that appellant's members lacked a significant protectable interest, and in its discretion denied permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). The district court also denied the motion to intervene on the grounds that appellant's motion was untimely.

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 Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 1 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>
CONSOLIDATED,TERMINATED
U.S. District Court District of Oregon (Eugene (6)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 6:13−cv−01834−MC

Geiger et al v. Kitzhaber et al Assigned to: Judge Michael J. McShane Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Deanna L. Geiger
Plaintiff Janine M. Nelson
Plaintiff Robert Duehmig
Plaintiff William Griesar

Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Date Terminated: 05/19/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Lake James H. Perriguey Law Works, LLC 1906 SW Madison Street Portland, OR 97205−1718 503−227−1928 Fax: 503−334−2340 Email: lake@law−works.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lea Ann Easton Dorsay & Easton LLP 1 SW Columbia Street Suite 440 Portland, OR 97258 503−790−9060 Fax: 503−790−9068 Email: leaston@dorsayindianlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lake James H. Perriguey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lea Ann Easton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lake James H. Perriguey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lea Ann Easton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lake James H. Perriguey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 2 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

Lea Ann Easton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Consol Plaintiff Basic Rights Education Fund

represented by Jennifer J. Middleton Johnson, Johnson, Lucas & Middleton 975 Oak Street Suite 1050 Eugene, OR 97401 541−683−2506 Fax: 541−484−0882 Email: jmiddleton@justicelawyers.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Diaz Compassion & Choices 4224 NE Halsey St Ste 335 Portland, OR 97231 503.943.6532 Email: kdiaz@compassionandchoices.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristina J. Holm Perkins Coie, LLP 1120 NW Couch Street 10th Floor Portland, OR 97209−4128 503−727−2000 Fax: 503−346−2157 Email: KJHolm@perkinscoie.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Misha A.D. Isaak Perkins Coie, LLP 1120 NW Couch Street 10th Floor Portland, OR 97209−4128 503−727−2086 Fax: 503−346−2086 Email: MIsaak@perkinscoie.com (Inactive) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C. Goad American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 1313 West 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−977−9500 Fax: 213−977−5273 Email: agoad@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 3 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

Thomas R. Johnson Perkins Coie, LLP 1120 NW Couch Street 10th Floor Portland, OR 97209−4128 503−727−2176 Fax: 503−727−2222 Email: TRJohnson@perkinscoie.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Consol Plaintiff Paul Rummell

represented by Jennifer J. Middleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Diaz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristina J. Holm (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Misha A.D. Isaak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amanda C. Goad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas R. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Consol Plaintiff Benjamin West

represented by Jennifer J. Middleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Diaz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristina J. Holm (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Misha A.D. Isaak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amanda C. Goad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 4 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas R. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Consol Plaintiff Lisa Chickadonz

represented by Jennifer J. Middleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Diaz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristina J. Holm (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Misha A.D. Isaak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amanda C. Goad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas R. Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Consol Plaintiff Christine Tanner

represented by Jennifer J. Middleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Diaz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristina J. Holm (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Misha A.D. Isaak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amanda C. Goad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas R. Johnson (See above for address)

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 5 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID> ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant John Kitzhaber in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon
Defendant Oregon Atty General Ellen Rosenblum in her official capacity as Attorney General of Oregon
Defendant Jennifer Woodward in her official capacity State Registrar, Center for Health Stastics, Oregon Health Authority

represented by Anna M. Joyce Oregon Department of Justice 1162 Court Street NE Salem, OR 97301 503−378−4402 Email: anna.joyce@doj.state.or.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Williams Oregon Department of Justice 5625 SW California St Portland, OR 97219 503−407−9048 Email: mary_h_williams@msn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheila H. Potter Oregon Department of Justice Trial Division 100 SW Market Street Portland, OR 97201 971−673−1880 Fax: 971−673−5000 Email: sheila.potter@doj.state.or.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anna M. Joyce (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheila H. Potter (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anna M. Joyce (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Williams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheila H. Potter (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 6 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

Defendant
Randy Waldruff in his official capacity as Multnomah County Assessor

represented by Katharine Von Ter Stegge Office of the Multnomah County Attorney 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500 Portland, OR 97214 503−988−3138 Fax: 503−988−3377 Email: katevts@multco.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jenny M. Madkour Office of the Multnomah County Attorney 501 SE Hawthorne Boulevard Suite 500 Portland, OR 97214 (503) 988−3138 Fax: (503) 988−3377 Email: jenny.m.madkour@multco.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Defendant National Organization for Marriage, Inc. TERMINATED: 05/14/2014
Amicus Oregon United for Marriage

represented by John C. Eastman Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence c/o Chapman University Fowler School of Law One University Drive Orange, CA 90807 (877) 855−3330 Fax: (714) 844−4817 Email: jeastman@chapman.edu LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roger K. Harris Harris Berne Christensen LLP 15350 SW Sequoia Parkway Suite 250 Portland, OR 97224 503−968−1475 Fax: 503−968−2003 Email: roger@hbclawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Will Eidson Stoel Rives, LLP (Seattle) 600 University Street Suite 3600 Seattle, WA 98101 206−624−0900 Fax: 206−386−7500 Email: jweidson@stoel.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman Stoel Rives, LLP (Seattle)

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 7 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

600 University Street Suite 3600 Seattle, WA 98101 206−624−0900 Fax: 206−386−7500 Email: ljfeldman@stoel.com TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven C. Berman Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Schlachter 209 S.W. Oak Street 5th Floor Portland, OR 97204 503−227−1600 Fax: 503−227−6840 Email: sberman@stollberne.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine A. Gartner Stoll Berne 209 SW Oak St. Suite 500 Portland, OR 97204 503−227−1600 Fax: 503−227−6840 Email: ngartner@stollberne.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Oregon Says I Do

represented by James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven C. Berman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nadine A. Gartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Nike, Inc.

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen Stoel Rives LLP 760 S.W. Ninth Ave. Suite 3000 Portland, OR 97205 503−294−9408 Fax: 503−220−2480 Email: ajpedersen@stoel.com

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 8 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus NW Natural

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Portland General Electric Company

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Neil Kelly Company

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 9 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Weinstein PR

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Morel Ink

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Gerding Edlen

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 10 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Oregon Business Association

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus HM3 Energy, Inc.

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Intel Corporation

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Oregon State University

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address)

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 11 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Portland Timbers

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Tonkon Torp

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Portland State University

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address)

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 12 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus NW Evaluation Association

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Christopher David Experience Design

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Autodesk, Inc.

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 13 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

Standard Insurance Company

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Oregon Health & Science University

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Columbia Sportswear Company

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Powell's Books

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 14 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Medford Fabrication

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Russell Development Company

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Torpet LLC

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 15 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Portland Business Alliance

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Portland Public Schools

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 16 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

Amicus salesforce.com, Inc.
Amicus Gard Communications
Amicus Celilo Group Media, Inc.
Amicus Starbucks Coffee Company

represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 17 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

Amicus Moda Health Plan Inc.
Amicus EDJE Consulting
Amicus University of Oregon

James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 6:13-cv-1834 As of 01/09/2019 09:25 AM PST Page 18 of 33 Page ID#: <pageID>

Amicus Jubitz Family Foundation
Amicus Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation of Greater Portland
Amicus Oregon Area Jewish Committee Amicus Oregon Board of Rabbis

Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Joseph Pedersen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Will Eidson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonard J. Feldman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Heather K. Cavanaugh Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP 111 SW Fifth Avenue Suite 3400 Portland, OR 97204 503−205−2417 Fax: 503−224−0155 Email: heather.cavanaugh@millernash.com TERMINATED: 04/09/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Heather K. Cavanaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Heather K. Cavanaugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/15/2013
10/16/2013

# Docket Text
1 Complaint. Filing fee in the amount of $400 collected. Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3454587 Jury Trial Requested: No. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, Janine M. Nelson, William Griesar against John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Randy Waldruff, Jennifer Woodward (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet). (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
2 Notice of Case Assignment to Judge Michael J. McShane and Discovery and Pretrial Scheduling Order. NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve the summonses and all documents issued by the Clerk at the time of filing upon all named parties in accordance with Local Rule 3−5. Discovery is to be completed by 2/13/2014. Joint Alternate Dispute Resolution Report is due by 3/17/2014. Pretrial Order is due by

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10/30/2013 10/30/2013 11/04/2013 11/04/2013 11/25/2013 12/04/2013 12/13/2013 12/13/2013 12/20/2013 12/20/2013 12/23/2013 12/31/2013 01/02/2014
01/03/2014 01/03/2014 01/03/2014
01/03/2014 01/03/2014

3/17/2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. (ljb) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
3 Waiver of Service of Summons Returned Executed by Jennifer Woodward waiver sent on 10/22/2013. Executed by Sheila Potter, Oregon Dept of Justice Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Easton, Lea) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
4 Waiver of Service of Summons Returned Executed by Randy Waldruff waiver sent on 10/24/2013. Executed by Katharine vonTer Stegge, Multnomah County Attorney's Office Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Easton, Lea) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
5 Waiver of Service of Summons Returned Executed by John Kitzhaber waiver sent on 10/31/2013. Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Easton, Lea) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
6 Waiver of Service of Summons Returned Executed by Ellen Rosenblum waiver sent on 10/22/2013. Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Easton, Lea) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Agreement . Filed by Deanna L. Geiger. (Easton, Lea) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
8 First Amended Complaint . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, Janine M. Nelson, William Griesar against All Defendants. (Easton, Lea) (Entered: 12/04/2013)
9 Answer to 8 Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defense. Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 12/13/2013)
10 Exhibits A re Answer to Amended Complaint 9 . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 12/13/2013)
11 Motion to Consolidate . Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Paul Rummell, Benjamin West, Lisa Chickadonz, Christine Tanner. (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
12 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Consolidate. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion to Consolidate 11 .) (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
13 Answer to 8 Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses. Filed by Randy Waldruff. (Von Ter Stegge, Katharine) (Entered: 12/23/2013)
14 Scheduling Order by Judge Michael J. McShane. Rule 16 Conference is set for 1/8/2014 at 02:00PM by Telephone before Judge Michael J. McShane. The Court will initiate the call. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. (cp) (Entered: 12/31/2013)
15 Scheduling Order by Judge Michael J. McShane. Based upon the schedule of the Court, the Rule 16 Conference set for 1/8/2014 is reset for 1/22/2014 at 02:30PM in Eugene Courtroom 2 before Judge Michael J. McShane. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. (cp) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
16 Response in Opposition to Motion to Consolidate 11 . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/03/2014)
17 Declaration in Opposition to Motion to Consolidate 11 . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Perriguey, Lake James) Modified for clarity of the record on 1/9/2014 (ljb). (Entered: 01/03/2014)
18 Scheduling Order by Judge Michael J. McShane: Oral Argument regarding Motion to Consolidate 11 is set for 1/22/2014 at 02:30PM in Eugene Courtroom 2 before Judge Michael J. McShane. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. (cp) (Entered: 01/03/2014)
19 Motion to Set Deadline for Their Response to Rummell Plaintiffs' Motion for Consolidation. Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 01/03/2014)
20 Declaration of Sheila H. Potter in Support of Motion to Set Deadline for State's Response. Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Motion − Miscellaneous 19 .) (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 01/03/2014)

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01/08/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/20/2014 01/22/2014 01/22/2014
02/05/2014

21 Response to Motion to Consolidate 11 . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
22 Response to Motion to Consolidate 11 . Filed by Randy Waldruff. (Von Ter Stegge, Katharine) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
23 Motion for Summary Judgment . Oral Argument requested. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
24 Memorandum in Support . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 23 .) (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
25 Declaration of Deanna L. Geiger . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 23 .) (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
26 Declaration of Janine M. Nelson . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 23 .) (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
27 Declaration of Robert Duehmig . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 23 .) (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
28 Declaration of William Griesar . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 23 .) (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
29 Declaration of Lea Ann Easton . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 23 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
30 Declaration of Priscilla Yamin . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 23 .) (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
31 Reply to Motion to Consolidate 11 . Filed by Paul Rummell. (Isaak, Misha) (Entered: 01/20/2014)
32 Notice of Association of Attorney Sheila H. Potter,Anna M. Joyce for Jennifer Woodward,Anna M. Joyce for Ellen Rosenblum,Anna M. Joyce for John Kitzhaber. Filed by Jennifer Woodward, Ellen Rosenblum, John Kitzhaber (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
33 MINUTES of Proceedings: Motion Hearing Held regarding Motion to Consolidate 11 and Rule 16 Conference. Motion to Consolidate 11 is granted. Rummell Plaintiffs Dispositive Motions are due by 2/10/2014. Supplemental Briefing to Motion for Summary Judgment 23 is due by 2/10/2014. Responses to Dispositive Motions are due by 3/10/2014. Replies to Dispositive Motions are due by 3/24/2014. Oral Argument is set for 4/23/2014 at 01:30PM in Eugene Courtroom 2 before Judge Michael J. McShane. Lake Perriguey and Lea Ann Easton present as counsel for plaintiffs. Sheila H. Potter and Anna Joyce present as counsel for John Kitzhaber, Oregon Atty General Ellen Rosenblum and Jennifer Woodward. Katharine Von Ter Stegge present as counsel for Defendant Randy Waldruff. Jennifer Middleton, Kevin Diaz, Misha Isaak and Thomas R. Johnson present as counsel for Basic Rights Education Fund, Paul Rummell, Benjamin West, Lisa Chickadonz and Christine Tanner, Movants. Court Reporter: Kristi Anderson. Judge Michael J. McShane presiding. (Related document(s): Motion to Consolidate 11 .) (cp) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
34 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Answer Amended Complaint(17 in 6:13−cv−02256−TC). Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−TC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 02/05/2014)

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02/05/2014 02/10/2014 02/11/2014
02/12/2014 02/12/2014 02/13/2014 02/13/2014
02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014

35 Declaration of Sheila H. Potter . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Time to Answer a Complaint/Petition, (19 in 6:13−cv−02256−TC, 34 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−TC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
36 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time and to Amend Memorandum. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−TC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
37 ORDER: Granting Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Answer (34) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC ((19) and (22)in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Granting Joint Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (36) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC ( 21 in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Answer is due by 2/12/2014. Dispositive Motions from Rummell plaintiffs' are due by 2/18/2014 and amended memorandums from Geiger plaintiffs' are due 2/18/2014. Responses to Dispositive Motions are due by 3/18/2014. Replies to Dispositive Motions are due by 4/1/2014. Oral Argument remains set for 1:30PM on 4/23/2014 in Eugene Courtroom 2 before Judge Michael J. McShane. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
38 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Answer Amended Complaint(17 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
39 Declaration of Sheila H. Potter . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Time to Answer a Complaint/Petition, (26 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
40 ORDER: Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Answer (38) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Answer (26) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Answer is due by 2/20/2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 02/13/2014)
41 Amended Order: Granting Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Answer (34) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC ((19) and (22)in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Granting Joint Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (36) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC ( 21 in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Answer is due by 2/12/2014. Dispositive Motions from Rummell plaintiffs' are due by 2/18/2014 and amended memorandums from Geiger plaintiffs' are due 2/18/2014. Responses to Dispositive Motions are due by 3/18/2014. Replies to Dispositive Motions are due by 4/1/2014. Amicus Briefs are due 4/1/2014. Oral Argument remains set for 1:30PM on 4/23/2014 in Eugene Courtroom 2 before Judge Michael J. McShane. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 02/13/2014)
42 Motion for Summary Judgment . Oral Argument requested. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
43 Plaintiffs' First Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(23 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/26/2014: # 1 Memo with Active Hyperlinks) (cp). Modified on 2/26/2014 to attach Memo with active hyperlinks.(cp). (Entered: 02/18/2014)
44 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.

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02/18/2014 02/18/2014
02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014

(Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
45 Second Declaration of Lea Ann Easton in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(23 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
46 Declaration of Misha Isaak in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
47 Declaration of Paul Rummell in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
48 Declaration of Benjamin West in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
49 Declaration of Lisa Chickadonz in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
50 Declaration of Christine Tanner in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
51 Declaration of Jeana Frazzini in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
52 Declaration of Eric Marcoux in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
53 Declaration of Nicola Cowie in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
54 Declaration of Maura C. Roche in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)

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02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/18/2014 02/24/2014 03/04/2014 03/04/2014 03/04/2014 03/05/2014
03/17/2014 03/18/2014 03/18/2014

55 Declaration of Mark Johnson Roberts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
56 Declaration of Mark Clift . Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
57 Declaration of Gregory A. Chaimov . Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
58 Answer to Complaint and Affirmative Defenses to the Rummell Amended Complaint. Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 02/24/2014)
59 Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC), Motion for Summary Judgment (23 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC). Filed by Randy Waldruff.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Von Ter Stegge, Katharine) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
60 Declaration of Marissa Madrigal in Support of Defendant Walruff's Response to Motions for Summary Judgment Filed in The Geiger and Rummell Cases. Filed by Randy Waldruff. (Related document(s): Response to Motion, (59 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 48 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Von Ter Stegge, Katharine) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
61 Declaration of Katharine von Ter Stegge in Support of Defendant Walruff's Response to Motions for Summary Judgment Filed in The Geiger and Rummell Cases. Filed by Randy Waldruff. (Related document(s): Response to Motion, (59 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 48 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Von Ter Stegge, Katharine) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
62 OFFICIAL COURT TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS FILED Hearing held on 1/22/2014 before Judge Michael J. McShane, Court Reporter Kristi Anderson, telephone number (541)431−4112. Transcript may be viewed at Court's public terminal or purchased from the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. Afterwards it may be obtained through PACER−See Policy at ord.uscourts.gov. Notice of Intent to Redact Transcript is due by 3/17/2014. Redaction Request due 3/31/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/10/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/6/2014. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Anderson, Kristi) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
63 Notice of Association of Attorney Sheila H. Potter. Mary Williams. Filed by Jennifer Woodward, Ellen Rosenblum, John Kitzhaber, Jennifer Woodward, Ellen Rosenblum, John KitzhaberAssociated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
64 Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC), Motion for Summary Judgment (23 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC). Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
65 Declaration of Sheila H. Potter . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Response to Motion, (64 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 53 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 03/18/2014)

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66 Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment and Amici Curiae Memorandum. Filed by Oregon United for Marriage, Oregon Says I Do.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Berman, Steven) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
67 Declaration of Mike Marshall in Support of Oregon Says I Do and Oregon United for Marriage's Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment and Amici Curiae Memorandum. Filed by Oregon Says I Do, Oregon United for Marriage. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave, (56 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 66 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Berman, Steven) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
68 Declaration of Steven C. Berman in Support of Oregon Says I Do and Oregon United for Marriage's Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment and Amici Curiae Memorandum. Filed by Oregon Says I Do, Oregon United for Marriage. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave, (56 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 66 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Berman, Steven) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
69 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Brief of Oregon Employers as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs. Filed by Amici, Nike, Inc., NW Natural, Portland General Electric Company, Neil Kelly Company, Weinstein PR, Weinstein PR, Morel Ink, Gerding Edlen, Oregon Business Association, HM3 Energy, Inc., Intel Corporation, Oregon State University, Portland Timbers, Tonkon Torp, Portland State University, NW Evaluation Association, Christopher David Experience Design, Autodesk, Inc., Standard Insurance Company, Oregon Health & Science University, Columbia Sportswear Company, Powell's Books, Medford Fabrication, Russell Development Company, Torpet LLC, Portland Business Alliance, Portland Public Schools, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., salesforce.com, Inc., Gard Communications, Celilo Group Media, Inc., Starbucks Coffee Company, Moda Health, EDJE Consulting, University of Oregon, and Jubitz Family Foundation.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Pedersen, Amy) Modified on 4/4/2014 to correct party filer(cp). (Entered: 04/02/2014)
70 Brief of Oregon Employers as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs. Filed by Amici, Nike, Inc., NW Natural, Portland General Electric Company, Neil Kelly Company, Weinstein PR, Weinstein PR, Morel Ink, Gerding Edlen, Oregon Business Association, HM3 Energy, Inc., Intel Corporation, Oregon State University, Portland Timbers, Tonkon Torp, Portland State University, NW Evaluation Association, Christopher David Experience Design, Autodesk, Inc., Standard Insurance Company, Oregon Health & Science University, Columbia Sportswear Company, Powell's Books, Medford Fabrication, Russell Development Company, Torpet LLC, Portland Business Alliance, Portland Public Schools, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., salesforce.com, Inc., Gard Communications, Celilo Group Media, Inc., Starbucks Coffee Company, Moda Health, EDJE Consulting, University of Oregon, and Jubitz Family Foundation. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave(64 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Pedersen, Amy) Modified on 4/4/2014 to correct filer(cp). (Entered: 04/02/2014)
71 Amended Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Leonard J. Feldman . Filing fee in the amount of $100 collected; Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3631582. Filed by All Plaintiffs.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Pedersen, Amy) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
72 Amended Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney James Will Eidson . Filing fee in the amount of $100 collected; Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3631584. Filed by All Plaintiffs.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Pedersen, Amy) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
73 Order for Administrative Correction of the Record pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) regarding Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Brief of Oregon Employers as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs(64 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 69 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC). A Clerical error has been discovered in the case record. The Clerk is directed to make the following administrative corrections to the record: The filing indicates it was filed by all plaintiffs, when in fact it was filed by Amici, Nike, Inc., NW Natural, Portland General Electric Company, Neil Kelly Company,

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Weinstein PR, Weinstein PR, Morel Ink, Gerding Edlen, Oregon Business Association, HM3 Energy, Inc., Intel Corporation, Oregon State University, Portland Timbers, Tonkon Torp, Portland State University, NW Evaluation Association, Christopher David Experience Design, Autodesk, Inc., Standard Insurance Company, Oregon Health & Science University, Columbia Sportswear Company, Powell's Books, Medford Fabrication, Russell Development Company, Torpet LLC, Portland Business Alliance, Portland Public Schools, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., salesforce.com, Inc., Gard Communications, Celilo Group Media, Inc., Starbucks Coffee Company, Moda Health, EDJE Consulting, University of Oregon, and Jubitz Family Foundation. The Clerk is directed to correct the docket text accordingly. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
74 Order for Administrative Correction of the Record pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) regarding Brief(70 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 65 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). A Clerical error has been discovered in the case record. The Clerk is directed to make the following administrative corrections to the record: The filing indicates it was filed by all plaintiffs, when in fact it was filed by Amici, Nike, Inc., NW Natural, Portland General Electric Company, Neil Kelly Company, Weinstein PR, Weinstein PR, Morel Ink, Gerding Edlen, Oregon Business Association, HM3 Energy, Inc., Intel Corporation, Oregon State University, Portland Timbers, Tonkon Torp, Portland State University, NW Evaluation Association, Christopher David Experience Design, Autodesk, Inc., Standard Insurance Company, Oregon Health & Science University, Columbia Sportswear Company, Powell's Books, Medford Fabrication, Russell Development Company, Torpet LLC, Portland Business Alliance, Portland Public Schools, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., salesforce.com, Inc., Gard Communications, Celilo Group Media, Inc., Starbucks Coffee Company, Moda Health, EDJE Consulting, University of Oregon, and Jubitz Family Foundation. The Clerk is directed to correct the docket text accordingly. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
75 ORDER: Granting Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Brief of Oregon Employers as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs (69) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Leave (64) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
76 ORDER: Granting Oregon United for Marriage and Oregon Says I Do's Motion for Leave (66) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC (Granting Motion for Leave (56) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
95 ORDER: Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Leonard J. Feldman for Autodesk, Inc.,Celilo Group Media, Inc., Columbia Sportswear Company, EDJE Consulting, Gard Communications, Gerding Edlen, HM3 Energy, Inc., Intel Corporation, Jubitz Family Foundation, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Medford Fabrication, Moda Health, Morel Ink, NW Evaluation Association, NW Natural, Neil Kelly Company, Nike, Inc., Oregon Business Association, Oregon Health & Science University, Oregon State University, Portland Business Alliance, Portland General Electric Company, Portland Public Schools, Portland State University, Portland Timbers, Powell's Books, Russell Development Company, Standard Insurance Company, Starbucks Coffee Company, Tonkon Torp, Torpet LLC, University of Oregon, Weinstein PR, salesforce.com, Inc., PECI. Application Fee in amount of $100 collected. Receipt No. 0979−3631582 issued in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Signed on 4/4/14 by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (ljb) Modified on 4/24/2014 to clean up docket text and to remove parties not represented by this attorney(cp). (Entered: 04/23/2014)
96 ORDER: Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of James W. Eidson for Autodesk, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Basic Rights Education Fund,James W. Eidson for Celilo Group Media, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Christopher David Experience Design,James W. Eidson for Columbia Sportswear Company,James W. Eidson for EDJE Consulting,James W. Eidson for Gard Communications,James W. Eidson for Gerding Edlen,James W. Eidson for HM3 Energy, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Intel Corporation,James W. Eidson for Jubitz Family Foundation,James W. Eidson for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Medford Fabrication,James

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W. Eidson for Moda Health,James W. Eidson for Morel Ink,James W. Eidson for NW Evaluation Association,James W. Eidson for NW Natural,James W. Eidson for Neil Kelly Company,James W. Eidson for Nike, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Oregon Business Association,James W. Eidson for Oregon Health & Science University,James W. Eidson for Oregon State University,James W. Eidson for Portland Business Alliance,James W. Eidson for Portland General Electric Company,James W. Eidson for Portland Public Schools,James W. Eidson for Portland State University,James W. Eidson for Portland Timbers,James W. Eidson for Powell's Books,James W. Eidson for Russell Development Company,James W. Eidson for Standard Insurance Company,James W. Eidson for Starbucks Coffee Company,James W. Eidson for Tonkon Torp,James W. Eidson for Torpet LLC,James W. Eidson for University of Oregon,James W. Eidson for Weinstein PR,James W. Eidson for salesforce.com, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Autodesk, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Celilo Group Media, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Christopher David Experience Design,James W. Eidson for Columbia Sportswear Company,James W. Eidson for EDJE Consulting,James W. Eidson for Gard Communications,James W. Eidson for Gerding Edlen,James W. Eidson for HM3 Energy, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Intel Corporation,James W. Eidson for Jubitz Family Foundation,James W. Eidson for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Medford Fabrication,James W. Eidson for Moda Health,James W. Eidson for Morel Ink,James W. Eidson for NW Evaluation Association,James W. Eidson for NW Natural,James W. Eidson for Neil Kelly Company,James W. Eidson for Nike, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Oregon Business Association,James W. Eidson for Oregon Health & Science University,James W. Eidson for Oregon Says I Do,James W. Eidson for Oregon State University,James W. Eidson for Oregon United for Marriage,James W. Eidson for Portland Business Alliance,James W. Eidson for Portland General Electric Company,James W. Eidson for Portland Public Schools,James W. Eidson for Portland State University,James W. Eidson for Portland Timbers,James W. Eidson for Powell's Books,James W. Eidson for Ellen Rosenblum,James W. Eidson for Russell Development Company,James W. Eidson for Standard Insurance Company,James W. Eidson for Starbucks Coffee Company,James W. Eidson for Tonkon Torp,James W. Eidson for Torpet LLC,James W. Eidson for University of Oregon,James W. Eidson for Weinstein PR,James W. Eidson for salesforce.com, Inc.. Application Fee in amount of $100 collected. Receipt No. 0979−3631584 issued in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of James W. Eidson for Autodesk, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Basic Rights Education Fund,James W. Eidson for Celilo Group Media, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Christopher David Experience Design,James W. Eidson for Columbia Sportswear Company,James W. Eidson for EDJE Consulting,James W. Eidson for Gard Communications,James W. Eidson for Gerding Edlen,James W. Eidson for HM3 Energy, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Intel Corporation,James W. Eidson for Jubitz Family Foundation,James W. Eidson for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Medford Fabrication,James W. Eidson for Moda Health,James W. Eidson for Morel Ink,James W. Eidson for NW Evaluation Association,James W. Eidson for NW Natural,James W. Eidson for Neil Kelly Company,James W. Eidson for Nike, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Oregon Business Association,James W. Eidson for Oregon Health & Science University,James W. Eidson for Oregon State University,James W. Eidson for Portland Business Alliance,James W. Eidson for Portland General Electric Company,James W. Eidson for Portland Public Schools,James W. Eidson for Portland State University,James W. Eidson for Portland Timbers,James W. Eidson for Powell's Books,James W. Eidson for Russell Development Company,James W. Eidson for Standard Insurance Company,James W. Eidson for Starbucks Coffee Company,James W. Eidson for Tonkon Torp,James W. Eidson for Torpet LLC,James W. Eidson for University of Oregon,James W. Eidson for Weinstein PR,James W. Eidson for salesforce.com, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Autodesk, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Celilo Group Media, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Christopher David Experience Design,James W. Eidson for Columbia Sportswear Company,James W. Eidson for EDJE Consulting,James W. Eidson for Gard Communications,James W. Eidson for Gerding Edlen,James W. Eidson for HM3 Energy, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Intel Corporation,James W. Eidson for Jubitz Family Foundation,James W. Eidson for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Medford Fabrication,James W. Eidson for Moda Health,James W. Eidson for Morel Ink,James W. Eidson for NW Evaluation Association,James W. Eidson for NW Natural,James W. Eidson for Neil Kelly Company,James W. Eidson for Nike, Inc.,James W. Eidson for Oregon Business Association,James W. Eidson for

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Oregon Health & Science University,James W. Eidson for Oregon Says I Do,James W. Eidson for Oregon State University,James W. Eidson for Oregon United for Marriage,James W. Eidson for Portland Business Alliance,James W. Eidson for Portland General Electric Company,James W. Eidson for Portland Public Schools,James W. Eidson for Portland State University,James W. Eidson for Portland Timbers,James W. Eidson for Powell's Books,James W. Eidson for Ellen Rosenblum,James W. Eidson for Russell Development Company,James W. Eidson for Standard Insurance Company,James W. Eidson for Starbucks Coffee Company,James W. Eidson for Tonkon Torp,James W. Eidson for Torpet LLC,James W. Eidson for University of Oregon,James W. Eidson for Weinstein PR,James W. Eidson for salesforce.com, Inc.. Application Fee in amount of $100 collected. Receipt No. 0979−3631584 issued in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Signed on 4/4/14 by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (ljb) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
77 Request for Refund of Fees Paid Electronically regarding Amended Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney James Will Eidson . Filing fee in the amount of $100 collected; Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3631584(67 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 72 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC), Amended Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Leonard J. Feldman . Filing fee in the amount of $100 collected; Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3631582(66 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 71 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC) . Filed by Autodesk, Inc., Celilo Group Media, Inc., Christopher David Experience Design, Columbia Sportswear Company, EDJE Consulting, Gard Communications, Gerding Edlen, HM3 Energy, Inc., Intel Corporation, Jubitz Family Foundation, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Medford Fabrication, Moda Health, Morel Ink, NW Evaluation Association, NW Natural, Neil Kelly Company, Nike, Inc., Oregon Business Association, Oregon Health & Science University, Oregon State University, Portland Business Alliance, Portland General Electric Company, Portland Public Schools, Portland State University, Portland Timbers, Powell's Books, Russell Development Company, Standard Insurance Company, Starbucks Coffee Company, Tonkon Torp, Torpet LLC, University of Oregon, Weinstein PR, salesforce.com, Inc.. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Pedersen, Amy) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
78 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Brief of Oregon Religious Organizations as Amici Curaie in Support of Plaintiffs. Filed by Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation of Greater Portland, Oregon Area Jewish Committee, Oregon Board of Rabbis.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Cavanaugh, Heather) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
79 Brief of Oregon Religious Organizations as Amici Curaie in Support of Plaintiffs. Filed by Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation of Greater Portland, Oregon Area Jewish Committee, Oregon Board of Rabbis. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave, (74 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Cavanaugh, Heather) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
80 ORDER: Granting Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation of Greater Portland, Oregon Area Jewish Committee, Oregon Board of Rabbis' Motion for Leave (78) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Leave (74) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
81 Clerk's Notice of Pay.gov Refund regarding Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3628993. The request has been granted and the amount of $100.00 will be refunded to Stoel Rives LLP Related Doc (77 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 73 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC) Request for Refund of Fees Paid Electronically. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (ljp) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
82 Clerk's Notice of Pay.gov Refund regarding Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3629020. The request has been granted and the amount of $100.00 will be refunded to Stoel Rives LLP Related Doc (77 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 73 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC) Request for Refund of Fees Paid Electronically. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC(ljp) (Entered: 04/11/2014)

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83 Order: Judge McShane requests that the parties confer prior to the hearing to discuss the order in which the parties will proceed and to designate which attorneys will be making the oral arguments. Charlene Pew, my courtroom deputy, will escort the attorneys to chambers 15 minutes prior to the hearing for an in chambers discussion. The court would also like to know what parties or party representatives will be present for the arguments. The parties should be prepared to discuss their position regarding a stay of any court order pending further clarification by the Ninth Circuit or further action by Oregon voters. (Related Docs. Motion for Summary Judgment (23 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC), Scheduling Order (30 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 41 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC), Motion for Summary Judgment (42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
84 Notice re Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC) of Supplemental Authorities Filed by All Plaintiffs (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Middleton, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
85 Order: Oral Argument regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment is currently set for 1:30 P.M. on 4/23/2014 in Eugene Courtroom 2 before Judge Michael J. McShane. The proceeding will be broadcast for overflow purposes to Courtroom 3 in Eugene and to Courtroom 12A in Portland. No electronic devices of any kind will be allowed in Courtroom 2 or the overflow courtrooms for this proceeding. Counsel for a named party unable to attend the hearing in person is directed to contact Charlene Pew, Courtroom Deputy to Judge McShane by 5:00 P.M. on 4/22/2014 to arrange for attendance via telephone conference. Counsel for the parties can arrange for overnight delivery of a transcript of the proceedings by contacting Court Reporter, Kristi Anderson at (541) 431−4112 prior to the hearing. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
86 Motion to Intervene . Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc..Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
87 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene. Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.. (Related document(s): Motion to intervene(84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
88 Declaration of Brian S. Brown in Support of Motion to Intervene. Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.. (Related document(s): Motion to intervene(84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
89 Proposed Answer to (8 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC) Amended Complaint . Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc..Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
90 Corporate Disclosure Statement . Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
91 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Attorney John C. Eastman . Filing fee in the amount of $100 collected; Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3651249. Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc..Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
92 Motion to Postpone Summary Judgment Hearing and Extend Time for Submitting Rule 56 Memoranda. Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc..Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
93 ORDER: Oral argument on plaintiff's motion for summary judgement was scheduled on January 22, 2014, for tomorrow afternoon. Today, a proposed intervenor represented by California counsel, moves this court to postpone argument while the court considers their motion to intervene filed at 11:00 P.M. last night. The Motion to Postpone 92 is DENIED as untimely. In order to brief and participate in any motion for summary judgement, the proposed intervenor must first demonstrate it has standing

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to intervene. The court will not issue a decision on summary judgement pending resolution of the motion to intervene. If intervention is allowed, the court will schedule a second briefing schedule on summary judgement or the court will set the matter for trial. All responses to the Motion to Intervene 86 are due May 2, 2014. Proposed intervenor is to reply by May 9, 2014. Oral argument on the motion to intervene 86 is set for 9:00 A.M. on 5/14/2014 in Courtroom 2 of the Eugene Courthouse before Judge Michael J. McShane. The attorneys are to appear in person. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
97 ORDER: Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of John C. Eastman for National Organization for Marriage, Inc.,John C. Eastman for National Organization for Marriage, Inc. Application Fee in amount of $100 collected. Receipt No. 0979−3651249 issued in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of John C. Eastman for National Organization for Marriage, Inc.,John C. Eastman for National Organization for Marriage, Inc. Application Fee in amount of $100 collected. Receipt No. 0979−3651249 issued in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Signed on 4/22/14 by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (ljb) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
94 Supplemental Declaration of Paul Rummell . Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Isaak, Misha) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
98 MINUTES of Proceedings: Motion Hearing Held regarding Motion for Summary Judgment(42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC) and Motion for Summary Judgment(23 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC). Lake Perriguey and Lea Ann Easton present as counsel for Geiger plaintiffs; Jennifer Middleton, Tom Johnson, Misha Isaak, Amanda Goad and Kevin Diaz present as counsel for Rummell plaintiffs. Sheila Potter, Mary Williams and Anna Joyce present as counsel for State of Oregon defendants; Kate von Ter Stegge present as counsel for Multnomah County defendant. Court Reporter: Kristi Anderson. Judge Michael J. McShane presiding. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
99 Order: The Oral Argument hearing currently scheduled to be heard on 5/14/2014 will be broadcast for overflow purposes to Courtroom 3 in Eugene and to Courtroom 12A in Portland. No electronic devices of any kind will be allowed in Courtroom 2 or the overflow courtrooms for this proceeding. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
100 Notice REQUEST REGARDING RECUSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 455 Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
101 OFFICIAL COURT TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS FILED Oral Argument held on 4/23/2014 before Judge Michael J. McShane, Court Reporter Kristi Anderson, telephone number (541)431−4112, e−mail Kristi_Anderson@ord.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at Court's public terminal or purchased from the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. Afterwards it may be obtained through PACER−See Policy at ord.uscourts.gov. Notice of Intent to Redact Transcript is due by 5/12/2014. Redaction Request due 5/27/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/5/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/1/2014. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Anderson, Kristi) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
102 Joint Response of State and County Defendants to Motion to Intervene (84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Joyce, Anna) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
103 Declaration of Jenny M. Madkour . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Response to Motion(100 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Joyce, Anna) (Entered: 05/02/2014)

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104 Declaration of Sheila H. Potter . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Response to Motion(100 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Joyce, Anna) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
105 Joint Response in Opposition to Motion to Intervene (86 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
106 Declaration of Jennifer Middleton in Opposition to Motion to Intervene. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Response in Opposition to Motion, (103 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
107 Response in Opposition to Proposed Intervenor's Notification and Request Regarding Recusal. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West. (Related document(s): Notice(98 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
108 Notice of Supplemental Authority with Exhibits Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer WoodwardAssociated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
109 Reply in Support of to Motion to Intervene (86 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc..Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 05/09/2014)
110 Declaration of John C. Eastman in Support of Motion to Intervene. Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.. (Related document(s): Motion to intervene(86 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 05/09/2014)
111 Notice of Association of Attorney Jenny M. Madkour,Jenny M. Madkour for Randy Waldruff,Jenny M. Madkour for Randy Waldruff. Filed by Randy WaldruffAssociated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Madkour, Jenny) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
112 Supplemental Declaration of John C. Eastman in Support of Motion to Intervene. Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.. (Related document(s): Motion to intervene(84 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
113 Joint Motion to Strike Declaration of John C. Eastman In Support of Motion to Intervene Declaration, (108 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 110 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC). Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Johnson, Thomas) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
114 MINUTES of Proceedings: Motion Hearing Held in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC and 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Denying Motion to Intervene (86) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC and Motion to Intervene (84) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC; Denying Motion to Strike (113) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC and Motion to Strike (111) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Denying proposed intervenors oral motion to stay. Lake Perriguey and Lea Ann Easton; Jennifer Middleton, Tom Johnson, Misha Isaak, and Kevin Diaz present as counsel for plaintiffs. Ellen Rosenblum, Sheila Potter, Mary Williams and Anna Joyce; Jenny Madkour present as counsel for defendants. John C. Eastman and Roger K. Harris present as counsel for Proposed Intervenor Defendant. (Court Reporter Kristi Anderson.) Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC,

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6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
115 OFFICIAL COURT TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS FILED Hearing held on 5/14/2014 before Judge Michael J. McShane, Court Reporter Kristi Anderson, telephone number (541)431−4112. Transcript may be viewed at Court's public terminal or purchased from the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. Afterwards it may be obtained through PACER−See Policy at ord.uscourts.gov. Notice of Intent to Redact Transcript is due by 5/27/2014. Redaction Request due 6/9/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/19/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/18/2014. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Anderson, Kristi) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
116 Order: The Court intends on issuing an opinion on the pending motions for summary judgment at noon on Monday, May 19, 2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
117 Notice of Appeal to the 9th Circuit Filing fee $505 collected; Agency Tracking ID 0979−3683584: . Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
118 Opinion regarding Motion for Summary Judgment (23 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC), Motion for Summary Judgment (42 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 31 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).Signed on 5/19/2014 by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
119 ORDER: Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (23) and Motion for Summary Judgment (42) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (31) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Signed on 5/19/2014 by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
120 Judgment. Based upon the record, judgment for plaintiffs. Signed on May 19, 2014 by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
121 Amended Notice of Appeal Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
122 Notice of Appeal Filed by National Organization for Marriage, Inc.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Harris, Roger) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
123 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorney Fees. Filed by All Plaintiffs.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
124 Declaration of Lake James H. Perriguey in Support of Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for Attorney Fees. Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Time(121 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
125 ORDER: Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorney Fees (123) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorney Fees (121) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Petition for Attorney Fees due 6/17/2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
126 Order from USCA by the US Supreme Court re Notice of Appeal 117 . Received Supreme Court order dated 06/04/2014: The application for stay presented to Justice Kennedy and by him referred to the Court is denied. (ljb) . (Additional attachment added on 6/6/2014. # 1 Order in Pending Case) (ljb). (Entered: 06/04/2014)
127 Motion for Attorney Fees . Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 06/17/2014)

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128 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Isaak, Misha) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
129 Memorandum in Support of Geiger Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees(125 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 127 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
130 Declaration of Lake James H. Perriguey in Support of Geiger Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees(125 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
131 Amended Declaration of Lake James H. Perriguey in Support of Geiger Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees(125 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit OSB Fee Economic Survey, # 2 Morones Survey, # 3 Attorney Time Reports)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
132 Declaration of Lea Ann Easton in Support of Geiger Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees(125 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
133 Declaration of Sage J. Teton in Support of Geiger Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees(125 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
134 Declaration of Charles F. Hinkle in Support of Geiger Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees. Filed by Robert Duehmig, Deanna L. Geiger, William Griesar, Janine M. Nelson. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees(125 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Perriguey, Lake James) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
135 ORDER: Granting Consolidated Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (128) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (126) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Motion for Attorney fees is due 7/1/2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
136 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Isaak, Misha) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
137 ORDER: Granting Motion for Extension of Time (136) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Extension of Time (134) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC.Fee Petition is due 7/15/2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
138 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Attorney Fee Petition. Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
139 Declaration of Sheila H. Potter . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Time, (136 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC, 138 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 07/03/2014)

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140 ORDER: Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Attorney Fee Petition (138)in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Attorney Fee Petition (136) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Response is due by 7/15/2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
141 Unopposed Motion to Suspend Deadline to File Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Filed by Basic Rights Education Fund, Lisa Chickadonz, Paul Rummell, Christine Tanner, Benjamin West.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Isaak, Misha) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
142 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Attorney Fee Petition. Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
143 ORDER: Granting Unopposed Motion to Suspend Deadline to File Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs(141) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Attorney Fee Petition(142) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Unopposed Motion to Suspend Deadline to File Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs(139) in case 6:13−cv−01834−MC; Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Attorney Fee Petition (140) in case 6:13−cv−02256−MC. Response is due by 7/18/2014. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (cp) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
144 Response (titled State and County Defendants' Response to Petition for Attorney Fees and Notice of Proposed Agreement on Fees) to Motion for Attorney Fees (127 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 125 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
145 Declaration of Sheila H. Potter . Filed by John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward, John Kitzhaber, Ellen Rosenblum, Jennifer Woodward. (Related document(s): Response to Motion, (144 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 142 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC).)Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Potter, Sheila) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
146 ORDER: Granting Stipulated Motion for Attorney Fees 127 . Signed on 8/19/2014 by Judge Michael J. McShane. (cp) (Entered: 08/19/2014)
147 Order of USCA for the 9th Circuit, USCA # 14−35427, re Notice of Appeal(117 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 115 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). The appeal is dismissed. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (ljb) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
148 Order from USCA for the 9th Circuit, re Notice of Appeal(117 in 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 115 in 6:13−cv−02256−MC). Appellant the National Organization for Marriage's petition for rehearing en banc is denied. Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (ljb) (Entered: 11/26/2014)
149 Notice of Attorney Withdrawal: Leonard J. Feldman Filed by Autodesk, Inc., Celilo Group Media, Inc., Christopher David Experience Design, Columbia Sportswear Company, EDJE Consulting, Gard Communications, Gerding Edlen, Jubitz Family Foundation, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Medford Fabrication, Moda Health Plan Inc., Morel Ink, NW Evaluation Association, NW Natural, Neil Kelly Company, Nike, Inc., Oregon Health & Science University, Portland Business Alliance, Portland General Electric Company, Portland Public Schools, Portland State University, Portland Timbers, Powell's Books, Russell Development Company, Standard Insurance Company, Starbucks Coffee Company, Tonkon Torp, Torpet LLC, University of Oregon, Weinstein PR, salesforce.com, Inc.Associated Cases: 6:13−cv−01834−MC, 6:13−cv−02256−MC (Feldman, Leonard) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
150 The petition for writ of certiorari was denied on 4/20/15. Supreme Court number 14−1048 and Court of Appeals No. 14−35427. (ljb) (Entered: 04/27/2015)

 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED
MAY 19 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

DEANNA L. GEIGER; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
JOHN KITZHABER, in his official capacity as Governor of Oregon; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
v.
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, INC., Proposed Intervenor; on behalf of their Oregon Members,
Movant - Appellant.

No. 14-35427
D.C. Nos. 6:13-cv-01834-MC 6:13-cv-02256-MC
District of Oregon, Eugene
ORDER

Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Appellant’s emergency motion to stay district court proceedings pending
appeal is denied. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
The briefing schedule established previously remains in effect.

AS/MOATT