14-1328-cv Briggs v. Bremby

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

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FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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August Term, 2014

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(Argued: March 3, 2015

Decided: July 6, 2015)

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Docket No. 14-1328-cv

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12 JAMES BRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS

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SIMILARLY SITUATED,

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Plaintiff-Appellee,

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– v. –

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19 RODERICK BREMBY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

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Defendant-Appellant.

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25 Before: CALABRESI, HALL, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

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Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of a class of food stamp applicants, arguing that the

28 Food Stamp Act requires the Connecticut Department of Social Services to provide food

29 stamp benefits to all eligible households within 30 or 7 days of application (depending on

30 the household’s level of economic need). The District Court granted Plaintiff classwide relief

31 through a preliminary injunction, and Defendant now appeals, arguing that there is no

32 private right of action to enforce the time limits of the Food Stamp Act under 42 U.S.C. §

33 1983. Defendant further argues that federal regulations permit the Connecticut Department

34 of Social Services to take more time to process food stamp applications, thereby excusing it

35 from the seeming requirements of the statute. We conclude that (1) food stamp applicants

36 can sue under § 1983 to enforce the statutory time limits for provision of food stamps, and

37 (2) federal regulations do not excuse Defendant from providing food stamps within the

38 statutory time limits. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

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MARC COHAN, National Center for Law and

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Economic Justice, New York, NY (Mary R. Mannix and

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Greg Bass, National Center for Economic Justice, and

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Giovanna Shay, Lucy Potter, and Cecil Thomas, Greater

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Hartford Legal Aid, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

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HUGH BARBER, Assistant Attorney General

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(Rosemary M. McGovern, Assistant Attorney General,

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on the brief), for George Jepsen, Attorney General of

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Connecticut, for Defendant-Appellant.

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9 CALABRESI, Circuit Judge:

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I. BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff James Briggs brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

12 Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services (“DSS”) to enforce the 13 Food Stamp Act’s time limits for awarding food stamp benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and 14 (9) provide that participating states shall give such benefits within 30 days of application to 15 eligible households, and within 7 days of application to especially needy households that 16 qualify for expedited benefits. Plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for the 17 District of Connecticut to enforce these time limits, and moved to certify a class of similarly 18 situated plaintiffs.

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The District Court (Bryant, J.) certified a class consisting of all past, current, and

20 future Connecticut food stamp applicants whose applications are not processed in a timely 21 manner. The District Court also found that there was credible evidence that “there is

22 ongoing, persistent systemic failure to comply with the strict unambiguous mandates 23 imposed by the [Food Stamp Act],” and entered a preliminary injunction requiring the DSS

24 to process food stamp applications within the statutory deadlines. Briggs v. Bremby, 2012 WL 25 6026167 at *18-19 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012). Defendant now appeals, arguing a) that the 26 Food Stamp Act does not give Plaintiff a right to the timely receipt of food stamps and, 27 therefore, that Plaintiff cannot seek to enforce these time limits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

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1 b) that, in any event, federal regulations excuse the DSS from abiding by the seeming 2 statutory deadlines for providing food stamp benefits.

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II. DISCUSSION

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Where allegations of error in a preliminary injunction involve questions of law, our

5 review is de novo. Am. Express Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Thorley, 147 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1998).

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A. Plaintiff can maintain a private lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the

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statutory time limits in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9)

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7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) states:

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The State plan of operation . . . . shall provide . . . . (3) that the State

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agency shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant

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household by way of verification of income . . . . household size (in any case

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such size is questionable), and such other eligibility factors as the Secretary

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determines to be necessary . . . . so as to complete certification of and provide

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an allotment retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household

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not later than thirty days following its filing of an application[.]

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7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9) states:

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The State plan of operation . . . . shall provide . . . . (9) that the State

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agency shall – (A) provide benefits no later than 7 days after the date of

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application to any household which-- (i) (I) has gross income that is less than

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$150 per month; or (II) is a destitute migrant or a seasonal farmworker

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household in accordance with the regulations governing such households in

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effect July 1, 1982; and (ii) has liquid resources that do not exceed $100[.]

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In Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), the Supreme Court established a three-

27 part test for determining whether a federal law creates a right that can presumptively be 28 enforced by private suit through § 1983: 1) “Congress must have intended that the provision

29 in question benefit the plaintiff,” 2) “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly 30 protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain

31 judicial competence,” and 3) “the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation

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1 on the States.” Id. at 340-41 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court has

2 further clarified that “it is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may

3 be enforced” under § 1983, and that nothing short of an “unambiguously conferred right”

4 will support a cause of action under § 1983. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283

5 (2002). If these requirements are met, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the

6 statutory right can be enforced through § 1983. Id. at 341.

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The two statutory time limits at issue in this case clearly meet the second and third

8 prongs of the Blessing test. They establish a right that is neither vague nor amorphous (both

9 provisions require the allotment of food stamps within a definite number of days), and they

10 impose binding obligations on the States (both provisions use the mandatory “shall”).

11 Whether Congress intended these provisions to benefit food stamp applicants, as the first

12 Blessing prong requires, justifies a bit more discussion.

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Plaintiff argues that the time limits were intended to benefit food stamp applicants by

14 ensuring the prompt provision of food stamps. Defendant contends instead that the time

15 limits were meant only to guide the States in how to marshal their resources when

16 administering food stamp programs. Three Supreme Court decisions inform our analysis of

17 whether these statutory provisions are sufficiently focused on benefitting the relevant

18 plaintiffs to be individually enforceable under § 1983.

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First, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418

20 (1987), the Court held that a rent ceiling provision of the Public Housing Act empowered

21 tenants to sue under § 1983 to collect for past overcharges. The relevant provision, 42

22 U.S.C. § 1437a, imposed the following rent ceiling requirement on local housing authorities:

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Dwelling units assisted under this chapter shall be rented only to families

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who are lower income families at the time of their initial occupancy of such

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units. Reviews of family income shall be made at least annually. A family

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shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter . . . the highest

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of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar:

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(1) 30 per centum of the family's monthly adjusted income;

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(2) 10 per centum of the family's monthly income; or

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(3) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public

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agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family's

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actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the

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family's housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated.

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11 Wright, 479 U.S. at 420 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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This rent ceiling provision was part of a detailed statutory scheme that established

13 requirements for state and local housing authorities. But despite the fact that the statute was

14 directed at government agencies, the Court in Wright held that the rent ceiling provision was

15 enacted to benefit tenants. See Wright at 430. In drawing this conclusion, the Court focused

16 on the fact that the provision was calibrated to the economic needs of individual families,

17 determining each family’s rent based on a percentage of their monthly income. According to

18 the Court, this constituted powerful evidence that the provision was intended to benefit the

19 families, and not merely to direct the allocation of government resources. See Id. at 430

20 (“The [rent ceiling provision] could not be clearer: . . . tenants could be charged as rent no

21 more and no less than 30 percent of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing

22 on the individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is undeniable.”).

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Subsequently, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), the Court

24 found a private right of action under § 1983 to enforce a reimbursement provision of the

25 Medicaid Act. Wilder involved a statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A), that

26 required state Medicaid plans to provide “reasonable and adequate” rates of reimbursement

27 for health care providers treating needy individuals. In relevant part, § 1396a(a)(13)(A)

28 stated the following:

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[A] State plan for medical assistance must – . . . . provide . . . for payment

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. . . of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services in an

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intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded provided under the plan

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through the use of rates (determined in accordance with methods and

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standards developed by the State . . .) which the State finds, and makes

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assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet

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the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated

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facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable

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State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards . . . .

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11 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502-03 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

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This provision was explicitly directed at government actors. It referred to

13 requirements of the “State plan” and the procedures and policies developed by the “State.”

14 Nonetheless, the Court found that its terms were individually enforceable through private

15 lawsuits brought by health care providers under § 1983. The Court did so in part because the

16 language indicated a clear intent to benefit these providers. Id. at 510 (“There can be little

17 doubt that health care providers are the intended beneficiaries of the [reimbursement

18 provision]. The provision establishes a system for reimbursement of providers and is

19 phrased in terms benefiting health care providers . . . .”). Wilder thus demonstrates that a

20 statute imposing a requirement on a “State plan” for administering a social welfare program

21 may nevertheless in appropriate circumstances give rise to a right enforceable under § 1983,

22 for instance if it includes a specific mandate intended to give rights to a particular group.

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Finally, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), the Court held that a

24 provision of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) could not be

25 individually enforced through § 1983. The relevant provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1),

26 stated:

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No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any

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educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting

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the release of education records (or personally identifiable information

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contained therein . . . ) of students without the written consent of their parents

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to any individual, agency, or organization.

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4 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Court distinguished this provision from those in Wright and Wilder, noting three

6 of its features. First, the statutory language at issue in Gonzaga is focused on the educational

7 agencies being regulated rather than on the interests of students or parents. That is to say,

8 the provision lacks “the sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the requisite

9 congressional intent to create new rights.” Id. at 287. Second, the provision regulates only

10 the general “policy or practice” of educational agencies and institutions regarding

11 disclosure, rather than focusing on specific instances of disclosure. Third, the provision

12 serves primarily to direct the distribution of federal resources. Id. at 287-91. Based on these

13 factors, the Court concluded that the provision was not intended to confer individual rights

14 upon students or parents, but was instead intended to impose a general rule for the use of

15 funds under FERPA. See also Loyal Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 445 F.3d 136,

16 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that the Gonzaga Court had used these three factors to distinguish

17 privately enforceable “rights” from vaguer “benefits” or “interests”).

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Wright and Wilder both strongly counsel in favor of finding the time limits of 7

19 U.S.C. §§ 2020(e)(3) and (9) privately enforceable under § 1983. Like the provisions in

20 Wright and Wilder, the Food Stamp Act’s time limits are drafted in a way that focuses on the

21 needs of the individual beneficiaries. They require that households’ eligibility be determined

22 “promptly,” and that allotments be provided retroactive to the period of application. They

23 are also calibrated to household income – eligible households are to be provided food stamp

24 benefits within 30 days, but especially needy ones are to receive such benefits within 7 days.

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1 And, while the Food Stamp Act’s time limits are written as requirements for a “State plan of

2 operation,” the Court in Wilder concluded that such a formulation can be fully consistent

3 with a legislative intent to confer enforceable rights upon the relevant plaintiffs. Wilder, 496

4 U.S. at 523. Indeed, it is commonplace that laws designed to protect individual rights are

5 formulated as restrictions on government action. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress

6 shall make no law . . .”).

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Nor does Gonzaga undercut the applicability of Wright and Wilder to the case before

8 us. None of the three factors that the Supreme Court used to distinguish the statute in

9 Gonzaga from those in Wright and Wilder apply to the provisions here. Unlike the funding

10 provision involved in Gonzaga, the Food Stamp Act’s time limits (1) contain language that is

11 focused on the interests of the applicant households and calibrated to their economic needs,

12 (2) create a specific requirement that must be followed for every food stamp applicant,

13 rather than a generalized “policy or practice,” and (3) do not merely direct the distribution

14 of funds. These factors establish that Congress has conferred individual rights upon food

15 stamp applicants in clear and unambiguous terms, and Gonzaga is thus distinguishable.

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The law of our circuit concerning the private enforceability of time limits in social

17 welfare statutes is, moreover, in full accord with our reading of these three Supreme Court

18 cases. See, e.g., Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 247, 254, 256-57 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding

19 that private plaintiffs can sue under § 1983 to enforce a Medicaid provision, 42 U.S.C. §

20 1396a(a)(3), which requires that a “State plan” must provide “an opportunity for a fair

21 hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under

22 the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness,” and concluding, also,

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1 that such plaintiffs can enforce a regulation providing that such a hearing will occur

2 “ordinarily within 90 days” of a hearing request).

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Accordingly, we find that 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9) satisfy the Blessing test, and

4 therefore create a rebuttable presumption that the time limits in those sections are privately

5 enforceable under § 1983. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341. This presumption can, however, be

6 overcome if Congress precluded recourse to § 1983 either “expressly,” or “impliedly, by

7 creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual

8 enforcement under § 1983.” Id.

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Briggs’s assertion that Congress intended to confer individual rights to timely

10 determination of food stamp eligibility is undermined, Defendant argues, by Congress’s

11 authorization of administrative enforcement of the Food Stamp Act’s time limits. In

12 particular, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to investigate State

13 noncompliance, withhold federal funds, and refer a noncompliant State to the Attorney

14 General to seek an injunction. Defendant asserts that Congress’s grant of those enforcement

15 powers to the Secretary demonstrates that Congress did not intend to permit parallel

16 enforcement by individuals in federal and state courts. Notably, the Supreme Court

17 concluded in Gonzaga that Congress did not mean to confer individual rights under FERPA,

18 in part because that statute created a comprehensive and centralized agency hearing

19 procedure to deal with individual complaints. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90. In stark

20 contrast with FERPA, however, the Food Stamp Act contains no similar agency

21 adjudication process or enforcement structure that could take the place of private lawsuits.

22 Rather, the statute before us is analogous to those in Wright and Wilder. The statutes in both

23 of those cases gave the appropriate federal agencies the power to exercise oversight and

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1 withhold funds, but that authority was held to be consistent with a private right to sue under

2 § 1983 because the statutes at issue did not construct frameworks for resolving individuals’

3 complaints. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 427-28; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521-23.

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We conclude that Congress did not impliedly preclude private enforcement of the

5 Food Stamp Act’s time limits by granting enforcement powers to the Secretary of

6 Agriculture.1 And we therefore hold that the time limits for allocating food stamps provided

7 in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9) are privately enforceable through lawsuits brought under §

8 1983.2

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B. Federal regulations do not excuse the DSS from processing food stamp

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applications within the statutory time limits

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Defendant argues that the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court

13 conflicts with a number of federal regulations. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(h) (establishing

14 procedures for situations where the State agency is at fault for not allocating food stamps

15 within 30 days of an application, and for situations where the applicant household is at fault

16 for not completing the eligibility determination process within 30 days); 7 C.F.R. §

17 273.2(i)(3)(iv) (providing that if the initial screening for “expedited” (7-day) food stamp

18 eligibility fails to identify that a household is eligible, then the State agency is only required

19 to process the application within 7 days of the date it discovers that the household is eligible

1 If more were needed, we note that this conclusion is amply supported by the legislative history of the Food Stamp Act. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-464, at 398 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 2327 (“The administrative remedies against the state contained in section 11(f) and elsewhere should not be construed as abrogating in any way private causes of action against states for failure to comply with Federal statutory or regulatory requirements.”). 2 This holding puts us in agreement with the Eleventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, which have both held that analogous statutory time limits in prior iterations of the Food Stamp Act were individually enforceable. See Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1987); Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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1 for expedited service). Defendant interprets these regulations as excusing the DSS from

2 having to follow the Food Stamp Act’s time limits.

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In support of its reading of these regulations, Defendant argues that 7 U.S.C. §

4 2020(e)(3) requires only that the DSS complete the certification of “eligible households”

5 within 30 days, and that “eligibility” need only be determined “promptly.” To make this

6 point, Defendant contrasts two statutory phrases. The first provides that “the State agency

7 shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant household.” The second

8 requires that the State agency must “complete certification of and provide an allotment

9 retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household not later than thirty days

10 following its filing of an application.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3). Defendant contends that while

11 the second phrase imposes a specific 30-day time limit as to eligible households, the DSS

12 need only “determine the eligibility” of non-eligible applicant households “promptly”

13 (rather than within any set time period).

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The obvious problem with this interpretation is that there would be no way for the

15 DSS to complete certification and provide an allotment of food stamps to all “eligible

16 households” within 30 days of the filing of an application, as 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) expressly

17 requires, if the DSS did not first determine – not only “promptly,” but well within 30 days –

18 which households are “eligible” and which are not. We therefore agree with the District

19 Court that both the eligibility determinations and the allotments must be made within 30

20 days. And, accordingly, there is no basis for Defendant’s interpretation of these regulations.

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The regulations simply provide additional procedures in case something goes wrong

22 and a statutory deadline is missed. Regulations which anticipate that a State agency will

23 sometimes fail to meet statutory deadlines, and which provide food stamp applicants with

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1 fallback procedures to deal with such situations, cannot be read to repeal those deadlines. 2 Such regulations supplement 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9); they do not override them. 3 Indeed, if the regulations did purport to repeal or limit the statutory time limits, they would 4 likely be ultra vires, for no agency regulation can overturn a clear statutory mandate.

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III. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS,

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PLAINTIFF,

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Individually and on behalf of all

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other persons similarly situated

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: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12cv324(VLB)

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v.

: MAY 13, 2013

:

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity :

as Commissioner of the State of

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Connecticut Department of Social Services, :

DEFENDANT.

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ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS The Plaintiff, James Briggs, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated brings this action against Roderick Bremby, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, for failing to provide timely benefits in violation of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, formerly known as the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §2020 (“FSA”). This Court certifies a class consisting of: “All persons in Connecticut who have applied, who are currently applying or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely processed for food stamps as required by 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. §273.2.”
Background

Plaintiffs are indigent individuals seeking benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) commonly known as food stamps from the Connecticut Department of Social Services (“DSS”). [Dkt. #1, Compl., ¶1].
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Plaintiffs allege that DSS has failed to ensure the processing of food stamp applications in a timely manner on a state wide basis. Id. at ¶2. Federal government provides complete funding to the states for all benefits under the Food Stamp Program and at least 50% of the states’ administrative costs involved in the operation of the program. Id. at ¶20. Each state must designate a single state agency responsible for administering the Food Stamp Program and complying with federal food stamp statutory and regulatory requirements. Id. at ¶21. DSS is the single state agency in Connecticut responsible for administering the Food Stamp Program. Id. at ¶22.
The FSA and implementing regulations of the Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture require DSS to process food stamp applications on a timely basis. DSS must provide food stamps to eligible applicants no later than 30 calendar days after date of application. Id. at ¶24 (citing 7 U.S.C. §2020(3)(3); 7 C.F.R. §§273.2(a), (g)(1)).
Expedited issuance of food stamps is available to households in immediate need: (1) those with very low gross income and liquid resources (less than $150 per month and no more than $100, respectively); (b) those with combined gross income and liquid resources that are less than the monthly household rent or mortgage, and utilities; and (c) those constituting destitute migrant or seasonal farmworker households. Id. at ¶25 (citing 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(9); 7 C.F.R. §273.2(a)(2), (i)(1)). Expedited food stamps must be provided to eligible households no later than the seventh calendar day following date of application. Id. at ¶26 (citing 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(9)(A); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (i)(3)(i)).
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DSS and FNS gave a joint presentation to the Connecticut General Assembly and DSS reported a six-month average of 16,041 food stamp applications per month. DSS has “described the agency’s food stamp ‘timeliness rate’ as follows: 2006 – 81.43%, 2007 – 82.99%, 2008 – 83.01%, 2009 – 79.11%, 2010 – 59.49%.” Id. at ¶29. DSS submitted a Food Stamp Corrective Action Plan to FNS in May 2008 stating that “CT has an unacceptable rate of timeliness in application processing.” Id. at ¶30.
The named Plaintiff, Mr. Briggs, applied for food stamps on January 20, 2012. Id. at ¶31. On February 19, 2012, Briggs received a request for verification from DSS dated February 9, 2012 asking for proof of citizenship which he faxed on February 10, 2012. Id. at ¶32. Mr. Briggs received a notice from DSS dated February 22, 2012 stating that his application was delayed since it still needed verification. Id. at ¶33. Mr. Briggs unsuccessfully tried to reach DSS at the telephone number listed on the written notice several times. Id.
The named Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class defined as follows: “All Connecticut residents who, since March 5, 2009 have applied, are applying, or will apply for food stamps from the Connecticut Department of Social Services.” Id. at ¶10.
Plaintiffs’ first claim is for violation of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and 7 C.F.R. §273.2(a)(2), (g)(1) for failing to provide food stamps benefits within 30 days of the date of application pursuant to Section 1983. Id. at ¶37.
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Plaintiffs’ second claim is for violation of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(9)(A) and 7 C.F.R. §273.2(a)(2), (i)(2), (i)(3)(i) for failing to provide food stamps benefits on an expedited basis within 7 days of the date of application pursuant to Section 1983. Id. at ¶39.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment declaring that the Defendant’s policies and practices violated the FSA and the implementing regulations of the FNS. Plaintiff also seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring Defendant to process all application for food stamps and issue benefits within the time frames mandated by the FSA and the implementing regulations promulgated by FNS. On December 4, 2012, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. [Dkt.# 58].
Legal Standard “The party seeking to certify a class bears the burden of demonstrating numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy” under Fed. R. Civ. P.23; see also Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.,191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999). A “district court may not grant class certification without making a determination that all of the Rule 23 requirements are met.” In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006). “To be certified as a class, the class must satisfy the four threshold requirements of 23(a): ‘the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (‘numerosity’);'there must be questions of law or fact common to the class (‘ commonality’); the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
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class (‘typicality’); and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (‘adequacy of the representation’).” Ellis v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 274 F.R.D. 53, 60 (D. Conn. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). Additionally, the class must satisfy one of the requirements of 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b). Here, the Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which provides that a class may be maintained if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
Analysis
Plaintiffs have sought certification of a class consisting of the following members: “All Connecticut residents who, since January 1, 2013, have applied for, are currently applying for, or will apply for food stamps and are eligible therefor.” [Dkt. #63]. Defendant argues that the proposed class fails to meet Rule 23(a)’s requirements for commonality and typicality. Defendant contends that the class definition should exclude the following groups (1) eligible applicants who do not experience delay in their eligibility determinations; (2) applicants who are not eligible for food stamp benefits; (3) eligible applicants for food stamp benefits who are not presently seeking benefits. [Dkt. #32, p.5]. Defendant contends that those applicants who experience no delay have not suffered any injury. Defendant further argues that the FSA mandates only apply to eligible applicants and that since the Plaintiffs only seek prospective relief the class should exclude those who applied in the past but are not currently seeking
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benefits. Id. Lastly, Defendant argues that the named Plaintiff, Mr. Briggs, is not an appropriate representative for those class members seeking and eligible for expedited food stamps because Mr. Briggs was not eligible for expedited food stamps and therefore did not suffer the same harm as those whose applications for expedited food stamps were not timely processed.
First, the Court finds that the class definition should not hinge on eligibility as Defendant contends because the statutory scheme requires that DSS determine an individual’s eligibility within 30 days and seven days respectively under 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and (9) regardless of whether that individual is eligible or not. As Plaintiffs argue, the clear language of the statute requires DSS to timely process applications regardless of whether DSS ultimately determines if a particular applicant is eligible or not for food stamps. Id. Moreover, it would be illogical to argue that DSS is only required to make timely eligibility determinations for those applicants who are eligible where DSS has no way of knowing prior to reviewing any application whether that applicant is eligible or not. DSS’s obligation under the FSA is to determine eligibility within the statutorily prescribed time frames not to presume eligibility for some group applicants. The Court therefore finds eligibility to be irrelevant with respect to class definition. The Court similarly finds it irrelevant to limit the class to exclude past applicants not presently seeking benefits. Past applicants whose applications were not timely processed have been aggrieved under the FSA and clearly have standing to seek prospective relief under Rule 23(b)(2) to enjoin the
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Defendant’s recurring practice of untimely processing of food stamp applications. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
However, the Court does agree that the class definition is overly broad as it includes applicants who experienced no delay in the processing of their food stamp applications and therefore did not suffer any harm. As these applicants would not have standing in their own right to bring an action for violation of the FSA, they are not appropriately included in the class. See In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 8362(LBS)(AJP), 2012 WL 1372145, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012) (noting that a class should not be certified where members lack standing to raise the asserted claims). Plaintiffs have agreed with the Court that these members should not be included as they suffered no harm. The Court therefore redefines the class to contain only those members who were or will be harmed by the untimely processing of their food stamp applications.
Lastly, the Court finds that Defendant’s objection that Mr. Briggs is not an adequate representative with respect to those applicants for expedited food stamps to be without merit. The Defendant contends that the harm suffered by those eligible for expedited food stamps differs because those applicants are entitled to a determination of eligibility within seven days of their initial application instead of thirty days. However, the Defendant’s objection is premised on a distinction without a meaningful difference as the harm, the untimely processing of food stamp applications, that the Defendant seeks to redress on behalf of the class is the same regardless of whether the applicant was eligible for expedited food stamps or not. It is immaterial for purposes of
7

class certification that the time frames for making the eligibility determination differ with respect to expedited food stamp applicants. Here, as will be discussed further below the fact that Mr. Briggs was not eligible for expedited food stamps does not destroy a finding of commonality, typicality or adequacy. In any event, this Court has granted the proposed Plaintiff Intervenor Paula Hollister’s motion to intervene as a plaintiff in this action and for appointment as a class representative. Ms. Hollister has alleged that she was entitled to and her application for expedited food stamps was not timely processed. Accordingly, the Defendant’s objections as to class certification with respect to expedited food stamps are now moot.
The Plaintiffs have met the commonality and typicality requirements because there are common questions of law and fact as to whether the Defendant is processing applications for food stamps in accord with applicable federal law and regulations. “Courts have found that ‘the test for commonality is not demanding’ and is met so long as there is at least one issue common to the class.” Raymond v. Rowland, 220 F.R.D. 173, 179 (D. Conn. 2004) (quoting Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A court may find a common issue of law even though there exists some factual variation among class members' specific grievances.” Dupler v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 249 F.R.D. 29, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the common issue of law is whether DSS is timely processing food stamp applications despite the fact that there is some factual
8

variation between class members’ specific grievances as to expedited or nonexpedited food stamp applications.
Likewise, there is typicality despite the distinction between expedited versus non-expedited food stamp applications. Typicality “is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same course of events and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability. [M]inor variations in the fact patterns underlying [the] individual claims” do not preclude a finding of typicality. By contrast, unique defenses that threaten to become the focus of the litigation may preclude such a finding.” Sykes v. Mel Harris and Assoc., LLC, 285 F.R.D. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the distinction between expedited or non-expedited food stamp applicants is simply a minor variation in the fact patterns underlying the individual claims that DSS failed to systemically process food stamp applications within the timeframes mandated by statute. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F.Supp.2d 352, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (certifying class consisting of “[a]ll New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance at a Job Center” and finding there was commonality and typicality because the “the myriad [of] constitutional, regulatory and statutory provisions invoked by the plaintiffs are properly understood as creating a single scheme for the delivery of ... welfare and as setting standards of conduct for those charged with providing such services— standards that the defendants are alleged to have violated in a manner common to the plaintiff class...”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
9

The Court further finds that Mr. Briggs will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). To determine adequacy, the Court must inquire as to whether “1) plaintiff's interests are antagonistic to the interest of other members of the class and 2) plaintiff's attorneys are qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation.” Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs’ counsel can adequately represent the class since counsel from both the Greater Hartford Legal Aid, Inc. and the National Center for Law and Economic Justice have extensive experience in both class action and individual affirmative litigation on behalf of impoverished individuals challenging state and governmental actions depriving them of benefits, including similar litigation regarding the FSA in other jurisdictions. [Dkt. #4, Pl. Mem., p. 12]. Further, there is no indication that Mr. Briggs’s interests are antagonistic to the interests of other members of the class. Even though Mr. Briggs was not eligible for expedited food stamps, that fact does not present a conflict of interest with respect to the class members who were eligible for the expedited entitlement. “[O]nly a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status.” Kuck v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (quoting 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1768, at 639 (1972)). Here Mr. Briggs and the class members, irrespective of entitlement to expedited food stamps, seek declaratory and injunctive relief to assure that the Defendant’s actions comply with their statutory rights for the timely processing of food stamp applications and therefore if Mr. Briggs prevails,
10

all class members will benefit. Further as noted above, these objections are now moot as the Court has permitted Ms. Hollister, whose application for expedited food stamps was not timely processed, to intervene as a Plaintiff in this action and appointed her as a class representative.
There further appears to be no dispute that the numerosity requirement has been met as the number of food stamp cases per month that have been pending for over 30 and 7 days ranges from approximately 800 to 2,000 and 400 to 1,600, respectively. Moreover, the class members are dispersed throughout the state, have limited resources, and lack legal sophistication. Lastly, the fluid composition of the class also indicates that joinder would be impracticable. See Reynolds, 118 F.Supp. 2d at 388 (finding that joinder was impracticable if not impossible due to the fluid nature of the class and the lack of financial resources and sophistication of class members) (collecting cases); [Dkt. #4, Pl. Mem., p. 7].
Lastly, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is “appropriate where the defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate.” Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)); Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (“Civil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples” of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions). Here, Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied as the class members seek to enjoin the defendant’s alleged continuing violation of their statutory right to timely processing of their food stamp applications. See Ligon v. City of New York, 288 F.R.D. 72, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“When a class seeks an indivisible
11

injunction benefitting all its members at once, there is no reason to undertake a case-specific inquiry into whether class issues predominate or whether class action is a superior method of adjudicating the dispute. Predominance and superiority are self-evident”). Courts have long recognized that in cases, like the present one, ““alleging systemic failure of governmental bodies to properly fulfill statutory requirements, have been held to be appropriate for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).’” Brooklyn Center for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 287 F.R.D. 240, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Raymond, 220 F.R.D. at 181). Accordingly, this Court finds that class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is warranted.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, class certification is appropriate as all of the prerequisites under Rule 23(a) have been satisfied and certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is warranted in view of the fact that the class seeks prospective injunctive relief designed to remedy the alleged systemic failure of DSS to timely process food stamp applications as mandated by statute. The Court therefore certify the following class: “All persons in Connecticut who have applied, who are currently applying, or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely processed for food stamps as required by 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. §273.2.”
12

IT IS SO ORDERED. ________/s/__ ________ Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: May 13, 2013
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 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS,
Plaintiff, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
v.
RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the State of Connecticut Department of Social Services,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. March 5, 2012 CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT I. The named plaintiff and all others similarly situated are indigent individuals who are seeking desperately needed benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), commonly known as food stamps, from the Connecticut Department of Social Services ("DSS" or "the Department"). The ongoing and persistent failure or refusal of the defendant DSS Commissioner to ensure the processing of food stamp applications in a timely manner, on a statewide basis, has resulted and continues to result in the ongoing denial of food stamp benefits to thousands of households critically in need of this assistance to help them feed their families. Without prompt access to food stamps as mandated by federal law, these individuals face hunger and serious health risks.

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2. Accordingly, plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, to challenge the defendant's policies and practices of failing or refusing to process food stamp applications and provide food stamps on a timely basis to eligible applicants, in violation of Congressionally enacted food stamp statutes and federal regulations promulgated pursuant to those statutes by the federal Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
3. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant, in his official capacity as DSS Commissioner, from failing or refusing to process applications for food stamps and to provide these benefits on a timely basis.
II. JURISDICTION
4. The Court's subject matter jurisdiction over this action is conferred by 28 U.S. C. § 1331.
5. Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201(a) and 2202, and by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Injunctive relief is authorized by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress deprivations of the plaintiffs' federal statutory and regulatory rights.
III. PARTIES 7. Plaintiff JAMES BRIGGS resides in Connecticut. 8. Defendant RODERICK BREMBY is Commissioner of the Department of Social Services (DSS) of the State of Connecticut. In his official capacity as DSS Commissioner, Defendant Bremby is responsible for, inter alia, the statewide operation and administration of the Connecticut Food Stamp Program, in compliance with the federal Food Stamp Program. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-2(9).
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 3 of 15
IV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 9. Plaintiff is an impoverished person seeking food stamps who sues on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I 0. The plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of a class defined as follows: All Connecticut residents who, since March 5, 2009 have applied, are applying, or will apply for food stamps from the Connecticut Department of Social Services. II. The plaintiff class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Precise numbers regarding those adversely affected by the defendant's failure or refusal to comply with federal law by processing food stamp applications and providing food stamp benefits on a timely basis are in the possession and control of DSS, which also has possession and control of records for plaintiffs and all those similarly situated. Available data regarding numerosity of the class demonstrates the following: a. In a February 22, 2011 joint presentation by DSS and FNS to the Connecticut General Assembly, DSS reported a six-month average of 16,041 food stamp applications per month. b. As more fully referenced in Paragraph 28 of this Complaint, DSS has failed or refused to timely process the food stamp applications of thousands of individuals, resulting in class members suffering delays in the receipt of their benefits. 12. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class, including whether defendant continues to fail or refuse to process plaintiffs' food stamp applications and provide food stamps to them on a timely basis, in violation of federal Food Stamp Act statutes and implementing regulations promulgated by FNS.
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 4 of 15
13. The named plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the plaintiff class. The named plaintiff and members of the class have applied for food stamps and have experienced unlawful delays by the defendant in the processing of those benefits.
14. The named plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed plaintiff class. In supporting his individual claims, the named plaintiff will simultaneously advance the claims of absent class members.
15. Plaintiffs' counsel are experienced in complex class litigation involving public benefit programs and civil rights laws. Counsel have the resources, expertise and experience to prosecute this action on behalf of the plaintiff class.
16. Plaintiffs' claims satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the proposed class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief with respect to the proposed class as a whole.
V. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEME A. Food Stamp Program Purpose and Administration 17. Congress established the federally funded, state-administered Food Stamp Program in 1964, to "safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households." Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 2, 78 Stat. 703 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011). In order to "alleviate ... hunger and malnutrition," Congress enacted the Food Stamp Program to "permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for participation." !d.; 7 C.P.R.§ 271.1. 18. Effective October I, 2008, the federal Food Stamp Program was renamed the
4

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 5 of 15
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the federal Food Stamp Act was renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of2008. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 4001 and 4002, 122 Stat. 1651, 1853-1860.
19. In Connecticut, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits are commonly known as food stamps.
20. The federal government provides complete funding to the states for all benefits under the Food Stamp Program, and at least 50% of the states' administrative costs involved in their operation of the program. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2019, 2025(a); 7 C.F.R. §§ 277.1(b), 277.4.
21. Each state must designate a single state agency responsible for administering the Food Stamp Program and complying with federal food stamp statutory and regulatory requirements. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (d), and (e); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(a), 277.4. The state agency's responsibilities include the certification of eligible applicant households and the issuance of food stamp benefits to those households. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(1), (e).
22. Connecticut participates in the Food Stamp Program. The Department of Social Services is the single state agency responsible for administering the Food Stamp Program in Connecticut, in compliance with federal statutes and implementing FNS regulations. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-2(9).
B. Food Stamp Program Requirements Regarding Application Processing Timeliness 23. To be eligible for food stamps, households' net income, after specified allowable exclusions and deductions, must be below the federal poverty line. In the case of certain households that do not include an elderly or disabled member, the net income, after specified allowable exclusions but before specified allowable deductions, must not exceed the poverty line by more than 30 percent. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c). Under Connecticut's categorical eligibility
5

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 6 of 15
program there is no asset limit for SNAP participants. See 7 C.P.R. 273.8(e)(l7). 24. The Food Stamp Act and implementing FNS regulations require DSS, as
administered by the defendant, to process food stamp applications on a timely basis. DSS must provide food stamps to eligible applicants no later than 30 calendar days after date of application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(a), (g)(!).
25. Expedited issuance of food stamps is available to the following households in immediate need: (a) those with very low gross income and liquid resources (less than $150 per month and no more than $100, respectively); (b) those with combined gross income and liquid resources that are less than the monthly household rent or mortgage, and utilities; and (c) those constituting destitute migrant or seasonal farmworker households. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9); 7 C.P.R.§ 273.2(a)(2), (i)(l).
26. Expedited food stamps must be provided to eligible households no later than the seventh calendar day following date of application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9)(A); 7 C.P.R. § 273 .2(i)(3)(i).
27. DSS must directly facilitate the food stamp application process through a variety of statutory and regulatory mandates, including the following:
a. DSS must allow households to file an application for benefits on the same day that they first contact the local social services office in person, during office hours. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(iii); 7 C.P.R.§ 273.2(c)(1);
b. DSS is required to "encourage" households to file food stamp applications the same day they or their representatives contact the office in person or by telephone, and express "interest in obtaining food stamp assistance or express[] concerns which indicate food insecurity." 7 C.P.R. § 273.2(c)(2)(i);
6

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 7 of 15
c. The applications filed on the first day of contact by households seeking to apply for food stamps need only include the applicant name, address, and signature. Households need not be interviewed prior to filing their applications. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c)(l);
d. DSS must document the dates that applications are filed, by recording the dates of receipt at the local social services offices. The length of time the agency has to deliver food stamp benefits is calculated from the dates the applications are filed in the local social services offices designated to accept the household applications (except for certain individuals being released from public institutions). 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c)(l);
e. DSS must give applicants, at the time of application, a "clear written statement" about necessary verification cooperation to complete the application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3);
f. If households seek to apply jointly for cash assistance and food stamps, any delays by DSS in processing applications for cash assistance may not result in any delays in the processing of food stamp applications. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2020(e)(3), (i)(2); 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(g)(l), (j)(l )(iii). If cash applications are denied or withdrawn, applicant households cannot be required to submit new applications for food stamps. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2020(e)(3), (i)(2); 7 C.F.R. § 273 .2(j)(l )(v);
g. DSS, as administered by the defendant, must affirmatively identify households eligible for expedited service at the time the households request assistance. For example, a receptionist, volunteer, or other employee of DSS must be responsible for screening applications as they are filed or as individuals come in to apply. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i)(2);
h. Required verification of eligibility is minimal for expedited processing cases. The applicant's identity must be verified, but the issuance of food stamps within the required seven days cannot be delayed solely due to lack of verification of other eligibility factors, e.g.,
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 8 of 15

household residency, income, or liquid resources. 7 C.P.R. § 273.2(i)(4)(i).

VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Facts Common to the Class

28. The defendant has engaged in a continuing and persistent pattern of severe

noncompliance with federal law requiring the processing of food stamp applications on a timely

basis. The defendant's own data reporting demonstrates this, as follows:

a. Food Stamp Applications Pending Over 30 Days (data from DSS "Application Length Pending Report," DMF 8030A-DMF 80271, p. 239)

Month
January, 20 I 0 February, 2010 March, 2010 April, 2010 May, 2010 June, 2010 July, 2010 August, 2010 September, 2010 October, 20 I0 November, 2010 December, 20 I 0 January, 2011 February, 2011 March, 2011 April, 2011 May, 2011 June, 2011 July, 2011 August, 2011 September, 2011
October, 2011
November, 2011
December, 2011

Number of food stamp cases pending at the end of the month 6216 6155 6121 5557 5012 4876 4854 5273 5609 5694 5360 5405 5000 5218 4942 4590 4408 4428 4440 5026 5120
6142
5814
5396

Number of pending cases that have been pending for over 30 days 1846 2100 1953 1576 1063 924 905 963 1087 1154 1758 1802 1675 1437 1028 931 812 889 825 1308 1488
1562
2340
1967

% of total pending cases that have been pending for over 30 days 30% 34% 32% 28% 21% 19% 19% 18% 19% 20% 33% 33% 34% 28% 21% 20% 18% 20% 19% 26% 29%
25%
40%
36%

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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 9 of 15

January, 2012

5564

1996

36%

February, 2012

4988

1784

36%

b. Food Stamp Application Dispositions Taking More Than 30 Days (data from "Application Length Pending Report", DMF 8030A-DMF 80271, p. 251)

Month
January, 2010 February, 2010 March, 2010 April, 2010 May, 2010 June,2010 July, 2010 August, 20 I 0 September, 20 I 0 October, 2010 November, 2010 December, 2010 January, 2011 February, 2011 March, 2011 April, 2011 May, 2011 June, 2011 July, 2011 August, 20 II September, 20 II October, 2011 November, 2011 December, 2011 January, 2012 February, 2012

Total food stamp case dispositions (grant, deny, withdraw, cancel) 15,993 14,463 17,712 15,639 14,671 14,679 14,479 16,171 16,072 16,475 14,889 15,655 16,250 16,949 19,428 16,491 17,532 16,254 16,692 16,541 14,804 15,720 14,605 15,461 15,203 16,430

Number of dispositions that took more than 30 days
4141 4470 5232 4580 3768 3885 3412 3729 4162 4085 4095 4007 4956 4456 4257 3853 3773 3740 3432 3564 4226 4464 4933 5009 47300 4422

% of dispositions that took more than 30 days
26% 31% 29.5% 29% 26% 26% 23.5% 23% 26% 25% 27.5% 25.5% 30% 26% 22% 23% 21.5% 23% 20.5% 21.5% 28.5% 28% 34% 32% 31% 27%

c. Expedited Food Stamp Applications pending more than seven days (data from DSS "Food Stamp Expedited Service Report," DMF 8068B-DMF80681, page 5)

I Month

I Expedited

I Number of pending I Percentage of total

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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 10 of 15

August, 20 I 0 September, 2010 October, 2010 November, 2010 December, 2010 January, 2011 February, 2011 March, 2011 April, 2011 May, 2011 June, 2011 July, 2011 August, 20 II September, 20 II October, 2011 November, 2011 December, 2011 January, 2012 February, 2012

applications pending at the end of the month
593 535 561 455 473 513 511 526 579 557 531 568 893 1034 1190 1154 1294 1668 1684

expedited applications that have been pending for over 7 days 433 408 423 398 413 426 420 393 458 443 382 429 757 947 973 1053 1224 1457 1578

pending expedited applications that have been pending for over 7 days 73% 76% 75% 87% 87% 83% 82% 75% 79% 80% 72% 76% 85% 91.5% 82% 91% 95% 87% 94%

d. Expedited Food Stamp Applications-Dispositions taking more than 7 days (data from DSS "Food Stamp Expedited Service Report," DMF8068B-DMF80681, page 5)

Month
August, 20 I 0 September, 2010 October, 20 I0 November, 2010 December, 2010 January, 2011 February, 2011 March, 2011 April, 2011 May, 2011 June, 2011 July, 2011 August, 2011 September, 20 II

Total Expedited application dispositions (grant, deny) 5000 4895 4835 4308 4641 4864 5286 6109 5275 5803 5490 5778 6186 8327

Number of expedited application dispositions that took more than 7 days 1918 1914 1829 1565 1797 1908 2103 2234 1917 2117 1969 2011 2318 4290

Percentage of expedited application dispositions that took over 7 days 38% 39% 39% 36% 39% 39% 40% 37% 36% 36% 36% 35% 37% 51.5%

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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 11 of 15

October, 2011

8965

4668

52%

November, 2011

7982

4282

54%

December, 2011

8609

4659

54%

January, 2012

9004

4741

53%

February, 2012

9731

5086

52%

29. The Department admitted its deficient performance in timely processing of food stamp applications at a February 22, 2011 presentation to the Connecticut General Assembly, where it described the agency's food stamp "timeliness rate" as follows: 2006- 81.43%; 200782.99%; 2008-83.01 %; 2009-79.11 %; 2010-59.49%.
30. The Department has repeatedly admitted to FNS its deficiencies in timely processing of food stamp applications. For example, a DSS "Food Stamp Program Corrective Action Plan" submitted to FNS in May 2008 stated that "CT has an unacceptable rate of timeliness in application processing." Plans submitted by DSS in November 2009 and May 2010 also identified application processing timeliness as a "problem area." In February 5, 20 l 0 correspondence to Yvette S. Jackson, Acting Regional Administrator, USDA/FNS, Northeast Region, former DSS Commissioner Michael Starkowski stated: "We understand that there is room for improvement in our timeliness ... rates." In December 2, 2010 correspondence to James Arena-DeRosa, USDA/FNS Regional Administrator, Northeast Region, Commissioner Starkowski stated that "[w]e recognize the need to improve our performance" regarding the food stamp application timeliness rate, among other measures. He further stated: "We acknowledge that these rates are unacceptable and improving them is a top agency priority."
B. Facts oflndividual Named Plaintiffs 31. Plaintiff James Briggs applied for food stamps from DSS on January 20, 2012. Mr. Briggs had to leave his job of many years on November II, 2011 when his car broke down and he could not afford to repair or replace it. He had to drive 26 miles to work and could no longer
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 12 of 15
get there. He has colon cancer and by the time he applied for food stamps, medical expenses had consumed all of his savings. His sole source of income was $75 per week from the Soldiers Sailors and Marines' Fund.
32. Following submission of his application, Mr. Briggs got a request for verification from DSS dated February 9, 2012. It asked for proof of citizenship/identity and a letter from Soldiers and Sailors who were providing him $75 per week. The information was due back by February 19, 2012. He faxed a copy of his birth certificate and driver's license through Bristol Community Organization on February 10,2012. Bristol Veteran's Affairs Office faxed a letter, regarding the four Soldiers and Sailors payments he had received from them in January and February, to DSS on February 9, 2012. He is still awaiting a decision from DSS.
33. Mr. Briggs received a notice from DSS dated February 22, 2012 stating that his application was delayed because "We still need more verification. You should keep trying to get the verification we need." He has not been told of any outstanding verification other than the documentation he supplied on February 91h and 1Oth. He tried to reach DSS at the telephone number listed on the written notice to find out what, if any, additional information was needed, but he could not get through on the phone, despite several tries, and his messages were not returned.
34. Mr. Briggs has been using the money from the Sailor's Soldier's and Marines fund, sparingly, to eat. He has only received five payments of $75 each. He has not been able to pay for the room he is staying in, and has been asked to leave by the end of March. Given his health condition, the lack of food stan1ps has made it all the more ditlicult for him to meet his nutritional needs.
35. Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have no adequate remedy at law and are
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 13 of 15
being irreparably injured by the defendant's actions of failing or refusing, in violation of federal law, to timely process their applications for food stamps and issue food stamps to them, despite their being eligible for these benefits.
VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM: Food Stamp Application Delays 36. Paragraphs !through 35 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated herein. 37. Defendant's ongoing and persistent policies and practices of failing or refusing to timely process food stamp applications and provide food stamp benefits to eligible households within 30 days of the date of application violate the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3), and implementing regulations of the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(2), (g)(l). This violation of federal law is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. SECOND CLAIM: Expedited Food Stamp Application Delays 38 Paragraphs I through 35 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated herein. 39. Defendant's ongoing and persistent policies and practices of failing or refusing to timely process food stamp applications on an expedited basis and to provide expedited food stamp benefits to eligible households within seven days of the date of application violate the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9)(A), and implementing regulations of the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(2), (i)(2), (i)(3)(i). This violation of federal law is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
REQUESTS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: A. Assume jurisdiction of this matter;
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B. Certify this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2) with respect to the proposed class identified herein;
C. Enter a declaratory judgment, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, declaring that the defendant's policies and practices of failing or refusing to:
i) timely process food stamp applications and provide food stamp benefits to eligible households within 30 days of the date of application violate the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3), and implementing regulations of the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(2), (g)(l), as cited in the First Claim for Relief herein; and ii) timely process food stamp applications on an expedited basis and to provide expedited food stamp benefits to eligible households within seven days of the date of application violate the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9)(A), and implementing regulations of the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(2), (i)(2), (i)(3)(i), as cited in the Second claim for Relief herein; D. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, requiring defendant to: i) process all applications for food stamps and issue benefits to all eligible applicants statewide within the time frames mandated by the Federal Food Stamp Act and implementing regulations promulgated by the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; and ii) provide food stamps on an expedited basis to all eligible applicants statewide within the time frames mandated by the Federal Food Stamp Act and
14

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 1 Filed 03/05/12 Page 15 of 15

implementing regulations promulgated by the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; E. Award plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;and F. Order such other, further, or different relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATE: --~·-?~/_s~:._/,_;2-__._______

Respectfully submitted,
,.
I
Lucy Potter ct2 449), lpotter@ghla.org Greg Bass (ct 18114), gbass@ghla.org Cecil Thomas (ct27264), cthomas@ghla.org Greater Hartford Legal Aid 999 Asylum Ave., 3'd Floor Hartford, CT 06105-2465 860.541.5000 (tel.) 860.541.5050 (fax)
Mary R. Mannix, mannix(ii?ndej.org Marc Cohan, cohan@ndej.org National Center for Law and
Economic Justice 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506 New York, NY 10001 212.633.6967 (tel.) 212.633.6371 (fax)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

15

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS,

:

Plaintiff,

:

Individually and on behalf of all

:

other persons similarly situated,

:

:

v.

:

:

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity :

as Commissioner of the State of

:

Connecticut Department of Social Services, :

Defendant.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-00324 (VLB)
March 24, 2014

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO ALTER AND AMEND AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. 84]
I. Introduction The Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated against the Defendant, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, for failing to provide timely benefits in violation of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, formerly known as the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (“FSA”).1 The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, thereby enjoining the Defendant from failing or refusing to process timely all applications for food stamps and to provide food stamps on a timely basis to all eligible households and individuals. [Dkt. 83]. After issuing the injunction, the Defendant
1 The Court notes that this statute was amended by the Agriculture Act of 2014, PL 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (Feb. 7, 2014). However, for purposes of this decision, references to the prior statute will be used as they correspond to the Preliminary Injunction Order at issue here and the relevant statutory provisions were not amended by the Agriculture Act of 2014 in any pertinent manner.
1

filed this motion to alter and amend that order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or to reconsider the order pursuant to Local Rule 7(c). For the following reasons, the Defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
II. Legal Standard
“A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59 is decided under the same standard as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59.” Country Club Assocs. v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 243, 245 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Conn., Inc. v. Thorne, 68 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1995)). The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “A motion for reconsideration is justified only where the defendant identifies an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Ayazi v. United Fed’n of Teachers Local 2, 487 F. App'x 680, 681 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Ensign Yachts, Inc. v. Arrigoni, No. 3:09cv209(VLB), 2010 WL 2976927, at *1 (D. Conn. July 23, 2010) (same). A “motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257. Similarly, a “motion for reconsideration may not be used to plug gaps in an original argument or to argue in the alternative once a decision is made.” Lopez v. Smiley, 375 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21-22 (D. Conn.
2

2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c) requires parties seeking reconsideration to “set[ ] forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court overlooked in the initial decision or order.” D. Conn. Loc. Civ. R. 7(c).
III. Discussion
The Defendant argues that the Preliminary Injunction Order (the “Order”) must be amended to correct a clear error and prevent manifest injustice as the Order, it alleges, is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the violation at issue, and it contradicts other statutory obligations. [Dkt. 84, Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter and Amend and Local Rule 7(c) Motion for Reconsideration].
1. Narrowly Tailored
First, the Defendant argues that the preliminary injunction is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the violation and imposes undue burdens on legal or discretionary activity. [Dkt. 84-1, Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter and Amend and Local Rule 7(c) Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3-6]. The Plaintiff argues that the Order is tied closely to the violation that is occurring. [Dkt. 88, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Alter and Amend and Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10-15].
“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Forschner Grp., Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124
3

F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A district court has a wide range of discretion in framing an injunction in terms it deems reasonable to prevent wrongful conduct.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Even so, “[i]njunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit specific legal violations . . . [and] should not impose unnecessary burdens on lawful activity.” Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the “scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
The Defendant argues that the injunction ordered in this case is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the violation found because it infringes on the state government’s discretionary authority and, as will be discussed in the next section, creates rights for individuals not protected by the statute. [Dkt. 84-1, p. 3-6]. However, where systemic violations in complying with federal benefit statutes are found, courts have consistently ordered injunctions requiring complete compliance with the deadlines imposed by the statute and requiring the state to develop measures that would adequately track and report its compliance. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 271-90 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming a preliminary injunction that required the defendant to comply with legallymandated time frames for the delivery of benefits and services and to develop procedural reforms designed to provide clear recordkeeping when evidence of systemic failures to comply with federal law for timely processing and providing benefits to people with HIV or AIDS was found).
4

For example, in Hess v. Hughes, the district court found that Maryland’s Department of Human Resources, the agency in charge of executing the federal food stamp program in effect at the time, was failing to determine eligibility to participate in the program and providing benefits to eligible households within the statutorily prescribed time frames. Hess v. Hughes, 500 F. Supp. 1054, 105861 (D. Md. 1980). In granting the injunction, the court noted that the “obvious deleterious effect to the plaintiffs—the lack of food,” substantially outweighs any administrative hardship created by the order. Id. at 1059. Recognizing that compliance with the statute was mandatory, the defendants were
enjoined from failing to comply with the requirements of the federal Food Stamp regulations (1) as to the screening of Food Stamp applicants to identify those eligible for expedited service, (2) as to the provision of Food Stamps within three working days to those applicants determined eligible for expedited service, and (3) as to the provision of Food Stamps within 30 days to those applicants eligible for ordinary participation in the Food Stamp program. Id. at 1063. In short, this injunction required the defendants to do what they are statutorily obligated to do. The Order issued by this Court has the same effect on the Defendant here.
More recently, in Reynolds v. Giuliani, the court granted the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction requiring the defendants to “process all applications for food stamps, Medicaid, and cash assistance including applications for expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigation grants, within the time-frames required by law” and enjoining the defendants “from converting any additional income support centers into job centers until the City makes a host of
5

institutional reforms concerning how the City implements these programs.” Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court found that the evidence presented was indicative of systemic violations of failure to process timely applicants whose urgent needs were being overlooked. Id. at 347. The injunction, therefore, created several obligations, including that the “City defendants are directed to process all applications for expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigation grants at Job Centers within the time frames required by law;” the “City defendants are directed to make eligibility determinations regarding food stamps and Medicaid applications at Job Centers separate from the eligibility determinations regarding cash assistance applications;” the “City defendants are directed to send plaintiffs and all persons applying for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance, including expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigation grants at Job Centers, timely and adequate written notice of determinations of their eligibility for all benefits which they seek;” and the “City defendants are preliminarily enjoined from converting any Income Support Centers to Job Centers or opening any new Job Centers pending a hearing and determination on the adequacy of a corrective plan of training and procedures” for all centers. Id. at 347-48. It further required the development of a corrective plan to address the systemic failures and dictated the elements to be addressed in that plan. Id. at 348.
The injunction issued in those cases provides for the same type of relief issued by this Court in the Order. Both of the injunctions discussed required the defendants to comply with the deadlines established by federal law and required
6

the implementation of specific monitoring controls and corrective plans. These injunctions were ordered after a finding of systemic violations in which the plaintiffs’ needs for essential benefits were being delayed because of state administrative incompetency, in clear violation of the implementing federal law. Here, the Order states that the Court found, and the Defendant admitted, that there are “systemic deficiencies in the manner in which it processes food stamps, including without limitation routine loss of applications, loss of verification documentation, and the failure to timely schedule interviews as required by the” FSA. [Dkt. 83, Preliminary Injunction Order, p. 1-2]. Therefore, the Court mandated that the Defendant comply with the deadlines imposed by the statute with respect to determining eligibility and providing benefits and required the implementation of monitoring controls and an informal review process. When compared to the terms of other injunctions, the imposition is no greater than those ordered by other courts in similar situations.
The Defendant relies on Rizzo v. Goode as support for its position. There, the Supreme Court held that the district court improperly “injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of the state agency” in ordering the municipal police department to “draft, for the court’s approval, ‘a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints’, to be formulated along . . . ‘guidelines’ suggested by the court.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 369, 380 (1976). At issue in that case was the Philadelphia Police Department’s procedures for “handling citizen complaints alleging police misconduct.” Id. at 366. The injunction “significantly revis[ed] the internal
7

procedures of the Philadelphia police department, [and] was indisputably a sharp limitation on the department’s ‘latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs.’’” Id. at 379. Unlike in this case, however, the Supreme Court expressed serious doubt as to whether there was a right that was being violated, the extent of the violation, and whether the plaintiffs even had standing to assert such a claim. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that “there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or degree from that which exists elsewhere,” and the district court even emphasized that “respondents had no constitutional right to improved police procedures for handling civilian complaints. But given that violations of constitutional rights of citizens occur in ‘unacceptably’ high numbers, and are likely to continue to occur, the court-mandated revision was a ‘necessary first step’ in attempting to prevent future abuses.” Id. at 370, 375. Rizzo is inapposite and Defendant’s reliance on it in this matter is misplaced.
Unlike in Rizzo, in this case the Plaintiffs do have a clearly established right to sustenance, which the Order directs the State to respect and honor. The regulations at issue, “which provide a deadline that specifically includes grants and denials of benefits, define the federal right that is at issue here: the right to a timely decision, regardless of eligibility” on an application for food stamps. Robidoux v. Kitchel, 876 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Vt. 1995) (emphasis in the original). The state is “free not to participate in the ‘scheme of cooperative federalism’ established under the Food Stamp . . . Act[], but if it decides to join, ‘it must comply with federal requirements’” in the act to continue receiving federal funds.
8

Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1972)). This is not a case like Rizzo, where the court was imposing upon the State agency its idea of how best to manage itself; it is the Court telling the Defendant that its systemic failures in complying with a benefits statute enacted by Congress are unacceptable. In this circumstance, courts have routinely created identical obligations imposed by this Court’s Order and enjoined the acting agencies from violating federal law. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Order is sufficiently and narrowly tied to the systemic violations of timely processing applications as required by the FSA. The Motion to Reconsider and/or to Amend and Alter the Order on this ground is DENIED.
2. Contradiction of Statutory Obligations The Defendant argues that the Order must be altered because it conflicts
with the current obligations created by the statute. Specifically, the Defendant argues that (1) it should only be required to provide benefits retroactively if the household is determined to be eligible to receive benefits; (2) eligibility must be a factor in the Order requiring prompt application processing; and (3) prompt processing of applications must only occur if the application process is timely completed. [Dkt. 89, Defendant’s Reply Memorandum In Support of Defendant’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter and Amend and Local Rule 7(c) Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2-9].
9

a. Retroactive Payment of Benefits
The Defendant argues that benefits must be restored retroactively to the month of application only if the household is determined to be eligible for assistance, and the fault for the delay is attributable to the State agency. [Id. at 9]. The Defendant takes issue with the following language in the Order: “7. Defendant shall process all applications for food stamps and provide food stamp benefits retroactive to the month of application to those households that have completed the application process and been determined eligible as required by 7 U.S.C. §§2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. §273.2,” and “10. In each case in which Defendant is at fault for failing to make a timely eligibility determination, Defendant shall restore the household benefits retroactive as prescribed by 7 C.F.R. § 273.17.” The Court agrees with the Defendant that the regulations only require a payment of retroactive benefits to eligible households when it is found that the State agency was at fault for the delay. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(h). Nothing in the Order is meant to require nor does it require the State to do otherwise. The uncontested issue here is that the state has long been derelict in its duty to make eligibility determinations timely and to maintain adequate records of applicant submissions made to establish eligibility.
Since the Defendant has raised concerns about possible misinterpretations of the Order, the Court GRANTS the motion to amend on this issue. Paragraph 10 of the Order is amended to state: “In each case in which Defendant is at fault for failing to make a timely eligibility determination, Defendant shall restore the household benefits retroactive as prescribed by 7 C.F.R. § 273.17(d)(ii) and
10

273.2(h).” The reference to § 273.17 in Paragraph 6 is also amended to “§ 273.17(d)(ii).” Since Paragraph 7 currently references the same regulation section, it remains unaltered. The Court also adds the following: “15. This order is not intended to and shall not be construed to require the state to pay benefits to applicants it demonstrates to be ineligible, including by virtue of an untimely application.”
b. Eligibility and Timeliness in Application Processing
The Defendant’s second and third points it wishes to amend address the same concern: the duty to process applications for ineligible applicants or those that are not timely completed. The Defendant argues that the Order improperly provides relief for households whose individual rights were not violated because they either are not eligible for assistance or because they did not fulfill their obligation to timely complete the application process. [Dkt. 89, p. 2-3]. The Defendant argues that the following paragraphs in the Order should be amended: “11. Defendant shall provide eligible households that complete the initial application process (including combined applications for food stamps, cash assistance, or other federal benefits) an opportunity to participate in the food stamp program as soon as possible, but no later than thirty calendar days following the date the application was filed . . . ,” and “14. Within twelve (12) months of this Order, Defendant shall be in full compliance with all federal requirements to promptly determine the eligibility for food stamps of each applicant household so as to complete certification and provide assistance to all eligible households.” The Defendant argues that the word “timely” should be
11

added to both of these provisions to ensure that it must only process
applications that are timely submitted. It also argues that the remainder of
paragraph 14 should be amended to ensure that entitlement to prompt application
processing is limited “only to eligible households;” accordingly, the paragraphs
related to overall compliance must make an exception for households that fail “to
comply with their responsibilities to timely complete the application process.”
[Dkt.84-1, p. 15-16]. The Defendant’s reading of the Order and its obligations
under the statute and regulations are incorrect.
Chapter 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) provides that
the State agency shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant household by way of verification of income other than that determined to be excluded . . . so as to complete certification of and provide an allotment retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household not later than thirty days following its filing of an application, and that the State agency shall provide each applicant household, at the time of application, a clear written statement explaining what acts the household must perform to cooperate in obtaining verification and otherwise completing the application process.
From the language of the statute, it is clear that the State agency has obligations
and responsibilities that commence the moment the application is filed. The
regulations clarify that the
State agency shall provide eligible households that complete the initial application process an opportunity to participate . . . as soon as possible, but no later than 30 calendar days following the date the application was filed . . . . An application is filed the day the appropriate food stamp office receives an application containing the applicant’s name and address, which is signed by either
12

a responsible member of the household or the household’s authorized representative. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g)(1). To file an application, therefore, it is not required that the interview be completed or that the entire application process be finished; instead, the application is filed when the State agency receives the signed application containing the name and address of the applicant. It is from this date that the state has 30 days to provide eligible households that complete the application process benefits.
Even though the Defendant admits it has a duty to eligible households, it also has obligations and responsibilities to those households that are ineligible or fail to timely complete the application process.
Households that are found to be ineligible shall be sent a notice of denial as soon as possible but not later than 30 days following the date the application was filed. If the household has failed to appear for a scheduled interview and has made no subsequent contact with the State agency to express interest in pursuing the application, the State agency shall send the household a notice of denial on the 30th day following the date of application. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g)(2). While the Defendant is correct that certain regulations require the Defendant to keep an application longer than 30 days, it is clear that the State agency has responsibilities and obligations to assist the applicant in completing the process. This assistance requires the state’s prompt action to process and review the application and determine what other steps or other evidence are needed for the application process to be completed.
13

The Defendant argues that Paragraphs 11 and 14 of the Preliminary Injunction Order currently require it to perform certain actions that are not required by the statute and regulations. First, it argues that the word timely must be added to Paragraph 11, so that the paragraph will read: “Defendant shall provide eligible households that timely complete the initial application process . . . an opportunity to participate in the food stamp program as soon as possible, but no later than thirty calendar days following the date the application was filed by 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R. §273.2(g).” [Dkt. 84-1, p. 14]. The Defendant argues that this modification is necessary to “clarify that the defendant’s administrative obligation to timely process does not extend to situations where the household delays in completing the application process.” [Id.]. Inexplicably, the Defendant makes this argument even though the language in the Order is a direct quote from the regulations. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g)(1). Therefore, adding the word “timely” will ultimately change what the regulations actually require, instead of correcting what the Defendant claims is an added obligation. As the Defendant correctly points out, this Court does not have the ability to change the obligations that are statutorily imposed; it only has the ability to ensure that the Defendant complies with the statutory requirements. Therefore, adding the word “timely” is inappropriate in light of the regulations.
Pursuant to the regulations and, therefore, the Order, the State is only required to provide to eligible households that complete the initial application process an opportunity to participate in the program. By definition the applicant is required to complete the application process to receive the benefits. The Court
14

is unsure as to what the Defendant hopes to achieve by adding the word “timely” as it seems to be encompassed already by the language in the Order.
Moreover, the regulations require the state to issue a Notice of Denial to ineligible applicants and to those who fail to appear at their scheduled interview or show no further interest in the application process. After recipient of the applications and the supporting documentation required to apply for food stamps, the state has both the obligation and the ability to determine who is and who is not eligible. The Order imposes no obligations on the state to which it is not already subject.
The Defendant also requests adding the words “eligible” and “timely” in Paragraph 14 of the Order to ensure that it only needs to process applications for those households that are both eligible for assistance and timely complete the application process. [Dkt. 84-1, p. 15-16]. The Defendant argues that this is appropriate because the statute only requires that it process applications timely and provide benefits to eligible households, not ineligible ones. The Defendant appears to be confused of the definition of “processing applications” because it interprets that term as used in the Order to require the ultimate determination of eligibility. However, the regulations provide that
[t]he application process includes filing and completing an application form, being interviewed, and having certain information verified. The State agency must act promptly on all applications and provide food stamp benefits retroactive to the month of application to those households that have completed the application process and have been determined eligible. The State
15

agency must make expedited service available to households in immediate need. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(2). Clearly, the State agency has an obligation to “act promptly” in processing all applications, even for households who ultimately are determined to be ineligible. Process, therefore, does not mean determining eligibility, rather it requires the state to review the application and take additional steps as specified in the regulations. This reading of the regulations is confirmed by the statutory language which states that the “State agency shall provide each applicant household, at the time of application, a clear written statement explaining what acts the household must perform to cooperate in obtaining verification and otherwise completing the application process.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3). The notice that is provided “shall also inform the household of the State agency’s responsibility to assist the household in obtaining required verification provided the household is cooperating with the State agency . . . .” 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c)(5). Therefore, the terms of the Order are consistent with the understanding that the State agency is required to act promptly on all applications by processing them in the sense that the State agency reviews the information submitted and assists the applicant in timely completing the process. This is all the Order requires.
In addition to the fact that the terms of the Order mirror the obligations created by the statute and the regulations, it is worth noting that another court in this Circuit has also held that the regulations, “which provide a deadline that specifically includes grants and denials of benefits, define the federal right that is at issue here: the right to a timely decision, regardless of eligibility.” Robidoux,
16

876 F. Supp. at 579 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g)) (emphasis in the original). The court held that this must be the case because “[i]n establishing a processing deadline for all applications, the federal government recognized the interest of all applicants in a timely decision. Individuals deemed eligible for benefits need assistance quickly. Those who are found to be ineligible need to seek alternative resources, and potentially pursue an appeal, as soon as possible.” Id. at 580. This analysis is persuasive and confirms this Court’s understanding that the statute and the regulations require the state agency to act the moment an application is filed. The state has the responsibility to assist the applicant in timely completing the process and to determine quickly the applicant’s eligibility. Given this, the Order is not overly broad and does not require the Defendant to perform any functions not otherwise prescribed in the statute. Furthermore, the Order is not intended to and shall not be read to require the Defendant to perform any functions not found in the statute or the regulations. Since the Defendant has failed to show that the Court has erred in issuing the Order as related to its processing obligations or created a manifest injustice, the motion is DENIED on these bases.
IV. Conclusion
The Defendant’s motion to amend and alter or motion to reconsider is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Order is amended as explained in Section III(2)(a), and the Defendant’s motion is denied in all other respects.
17

IT IS SO ORDERED. ________/s/______________ Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: March 24, 2014
18

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS,

:

:

PLAINTIFF,

:

Individually and on behalf of all

:

other persons similarly situated

:

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12cv324(VLB)

:

v.

: DECEMBER 4, 2012

:

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity :

as Commissioner of the State of

:

Connecticut Department of Social Services, :

DEFENDANT.

:

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING DEFENDANT’S [DKT. #19] MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION [Dkt. #2] FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION The Plaintiff, James Briggs, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated brings this action against Roderick Bremby, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, for failing to provide timely benefits in violation of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, formerly known as the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §2020 (“FSA”). Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 seeking to enjoin the Defendant from failing or refusing to timely process all applications for food stamps and to provide foods stamps on a timely basis to all eligible households and individuals. Also before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6). Defendant argues that the complaint must be dismissed and the motion for preliminary injunction denied because individuals have no right to enforce the FSA. For the foregoing

1

reasons, the Court finds that the FSA creates a private right of action enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court therefore denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss and grants Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
Background
i. Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs are indigent individuals seeking benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) commonly known as food stamps from the Connecticut Department of Social Services (“DSS”). [Dkt. #1, Compl., ¶1].
Plaintiffs allege that DSS has failed to ensure the processing of food stamp applications in a timely manner on a state wide basis. Id. at ¶2. Federal government provides complete funding to the states for all benefits under the Food Stamp Program and at least 50% of the states’ administrative costs involved in the operation of the program. Id. at ¶20. Each state must designate a single state agency responsible for administering the Food Stamp Program and complying with federal food stamp statutory and regulatory requirements. Id. at ¶21. DSS is the single state agency in Connecticut responsible for administering the Food Stamp Program. Id. at ¶22.
The FSA and implementing regulations of the Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture require DSS to process food stamp applications on a timely basis. DSS must provide food stamps to eligible applicants no later than 30 calendar days after date of application. Id. at ¶24 (citing 7 U.S.C. §2020(3)(3); 7 C.F.R. §§273.2(a), (g)(1)).
2

Expedited issuance of food stamps is available to households in immediate need: (1) those with very low gross income and liquid resources (less than $150 per month and no more than $100, respectively); (b) those with combined gross income and liquid resources that are less than the monthly household rent or mortgage, and utilities; and (c) those constituting destitute migrant or seasonal farmworker households. Id. at ¶25 (citing 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(9); 7 C.F.R. §273.2(a)(2), (i)(1)). Expedited food stamps must be provided to eligible households no later than the seventh calendar day following date of application. Id. at ¶26 (citing 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(9)(A); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (i)(3)(i)).
DSS and FNS gave a joint presentation to the Connecticut General Assembly and DSS reported a six-month average of 16,041 food stamp applications per month. DSS has “described the agency’s food stamp ‘timeliness rate’ as follows: 2006 – 81.43%, 2007 – 82.99%, 2008 – 83.01%, 2009 – 79.11%, 2010 – 59.49%.” Id. at ¶29. DSS submitted a Food Stamp Corrective Action Plan to FNS in May 2008 stating that “CT has an unacceptable rate of timeliness in application processing.” Id. at ¶30.
The named Plaintiff, Mr. Briggs, applied for food stamps on January 20, 2012. Id. at ¶31. On February 19, 2012, Briggs received a request for verification from DSS dated February 9, 2012 asking for proof of citizenship which he faxed on February 10, 2012. Id. at ¶32. Mr. Briggs received a notice from DSS dated February 22, 2012 stating that his application was delayed since it still needed verification. Id. at ¶33. Mr. Briggs unsuccessfully tried to reach DSS at the telephone number listed on the written notice several times. Id.
3

The named Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class defined as follows: “All Connecticut residents who, since March 5, 2009 have applied, are applying, or will apply for food stamps from the Connecticut Department of Social Services.” Id. at ¶10.
Plaintiffs’ first claim is for violation of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and 7 C.F.R. §273.2(a)(2), (g)(1) for failing to provide food stamps benefits within 30 days of the date of application pursuant to Section 1983. Id. at ¶37.
Plaintiffs’ second claim is for violation of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(9)(A) and 7 C.F.R. §273.2(a)(2), (i)(2), (i)(3)(i) for failing to provide food stamps benefits on an expedited basis within 7 days of the date of application pursuant to Section 1983. Id. at ¶39.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment declaring that the Defendant’s policies and practices violated the FSA and the implementing regulations of the FNS. Plaintiff also seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring Defendant to process all application for food stamps and issue benefits within the time frames mandated by the FSA and the implementing regulations promulgated by FNS.
ii. Statutory Scheme
The FSA, originally enacted August 31, 1964, “is a complex federal funding statute that grants monies to the states for the operation of food stamp programs.” Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F.Supp.2d 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing
4

Public Law 88–525; 78 STAT. 703). The FSA authorized the establishment of a supplemental nutrition assistance program to alleviate “hunger and malnutrition” and designed to “permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for participation.” 7 U.S.C. §2011.
The Act mandates that the Secretary of Agriculture “shall issue such regulations consistent with this chapter as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate for the effective and efficient administration of the supplemental nutrition assistance program.” 7 U.S.C. 2013(c). The Act further provides that “[a]ssistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation.” 7 U.S.C. §2014(a).
Section 2020 governs the administration of the food stamp program and provides that the “State agency of each participating State shall have responsibility for certifying applicant households and issuing EBT cards.” 7 U.S.C. §2020(a). Each State agency “shall submit for approval a plan of operation specifying the manner in which such program will be conducted within the State in every political subdivision.” 7 U.S.C. §2020 (d). Section 2020(e) is titled the “[r]equisites of State plan of operation” and enumerates various requirements that each “State plan of operation … shall provide.” Under Section 2020(e)(3), one requisite of the State plan of operation is that the “State agency shall … promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant household by way of verification of income … so as to complete certification of and provide an allotment retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household not
5

later than thirty days following its filing of an application, and that the State
agency shall provide each applicant household, at the time of application, a clear
written statement explaining what acts the household must perform to cooperate
in obtaining verification and otherwise completing the application process.” 7
U.S.C. §2020 (e)(3).
Another requisite of the State plan of operation is that the “State agency
shall ... provide benefits no later than 7 days after the date of application to any
household which … has gross income that is less than $150 per month; or … is a
destitute migrant or a seasonal farmworker household in accordance with the
regulations governing such households in effect July 1, 1982; and … has liquid
resources that do not exceed $100…[and] provide benefits no later than 7 days
after the date of application to any household that has a combined gross income
and liquid resources that is less than the monthly rent, or mortgage, and utilities
of the household.” 7 U.S.C. §2020 (e)(9).
Under the subsection entitled “State noncompliance; correction of
failures,” the Act provides that
If the Secretary determines, upon information received by the Secretary, investigation initiated by the Secretary, or investigation that the Secretary shall initiate upon receiving sufficient information evidencing a pattern of lack of compliance by a State agency of a type specified in this subsection, that in the administration of the supplemental nutrition assistance program there is a failure by a State agency without good cause to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter, the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter, the State plan of operation submitted pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the State plan for automated data processing submitted pursuant to subsection (o)(2) of this section, or the requirements established pursuant to section 2032 of this title the Secretary shall immediately inform such State agency of such failure and shall allow the
6

State agency a specified period of time for the correction of such failure. If the State agency does not correct such failure within that specified period, the Secretary may refer the matter to the Attorney General with a request that injunctive relief be sought to require compliance forthwith by the State agency and, upon suit by the Attorney General in an appropriate district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the geographic area in which the State agency is located and a showing that noncompliance has occurred, appropriate injunctive relief shall issue, and, whether or not the Secretary refers such matter to the Attorney General, the Secretary shall proceed to withhold from the State such funds authorized under sections 2025(a), 2025(c), and 2025(g) of this title as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, subject to administrative and judicial review under section 2023 of this title.” 7 U.S.C. §2020 (g).
Under the Act’s “Violations and Enforcement” section, it also provides that
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Secretary may provide
for the issuance or presentment for redemption of benefits to such person or
persons, and at such times and in such manner, as the Secretary deems
necessary or appropriate to protect the interests of the United States or to ensure
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant
to this chapter” and that the “[b]enefits issued pursuant to this chapter shall be
deemed to be obligations of the United States within the meaning of section 8 of
Title 18.” 7. U.S.C. §2024(a) and (d).
A. Motion to Dismiss
Legal Standard
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Sarmiento v. U.S., 678 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2012)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations,
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“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court should follow a “two-pronged approach” to evaluate the sufficiency of the complaint. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). “A court ‘can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50). “At the second step, a court should determine whether the ‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ assumed to be true, ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted).
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Analysis
The Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to relief under Sections 2020(e) (3) and (9) of the FSA in connection with the untimely processing of their food stamp applications. The Defendant seeks to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the FSA does not provide for a private right of action and therefore argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
42 U.S.C. §1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color of law, “subject, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law.” Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutes as well as the Constitution, but plaintiffs must establish the violation of a federal right, not just the violation of federal law.” M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)).
“It has been long recognized that the pertinent question in determining whether a statute provides a basis for a § 1983 suit is whether Congress intended to create individual rights binding on States-as opposed to mere ‘precatory terms’ that do not ‘unambiguously’ create state obligations, or ‘generalized,’ ‘systemwide ‘ duties on States.” Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 300-01 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 18 (1981) and Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997)) (emphasis in the original).
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The Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe clarified the standard articulated in Blessing v. Freestone for determining whether a statute gives rise to an individual right enforceable under Section 1983. In Blessing, the Supreme Court explained that “[f]irst, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41.
In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court made clear that it is insufficient for the plaintiff to fall “within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. The Supreme Court explained that only “rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests” may be enforced under §1983. Id. at 275 (emphasis in the original). Such rights must be “unambiguously conferred” as reflected in the text and structure of the statute by “rights-creating language” and have an individual rather than aggregate focus. Id. at 273-75, 283, 286-89. A provision has an aggregate focus where it is not concerned with “whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied” but is instead concerned with the aggregate services, policies or practices of the chartered agency. Id. at 274-275.
“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” Id. at 284. However, the “Sate may
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rebut this presumption by showing that Congress ‘specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.’” Id. at 285 n.4 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004-1005, n. 9 (1984)). “The State's burden is to demonstrate that Congress shut the door to private enforcement either expressly, through specific evidence from the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A number of district courts in the Second Circuit pre and post Gonzaga have concluded that there is a private right of action under the FSA. See, e.g., M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F.Supp.2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F.Supp.2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Reynolds v. Giuliani, No.98Civ.877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. Fen. 14, 2005), Walker v. Eggleston, No.04Civ.0369 (WHP), 2005 WL 639584 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F.Supp.2d 352, 382-84 (2000). In addition, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits applying a preGonzaga analysis have likewise concluded that the FSA creates enforceable rights within the meaning of Section 1983. See Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987); Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th Cir.1987). Although the Second Circuit has not addressed the particular question at issue, it has addressed a similar question presented under the Medicaid Act concluding there was a private right of action under that provision. See Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004).
Defendant argues that the district courts in the Second Circuit which have found a private right of action and the Second Circuit’s decision in Rabin
11

misapply the standard articulated in Gonzaga. Defendant contends that the rationale applied by the Supreme Court in Gonzaga and to a lesser extent Blessing compels the conclusion that Section 2020(e)(3) and (9)’s 30 day and 7 day respective application processing requirements are broader or vaguer benefits as opposed to enforceable rights because the FSA has an aggregate not individual focus and lacks any rights-creating language. Defendant relies primarily on an opinion from a non-binding Western District of Texas case which he argues correctly applied Gonzaga. See Howard v. Hawkins, No.A-09-CA-577SS (W.D. Tex. 2009) [the decision is attached in slip-opinion form to Defendant’s motion. Citations herein are to the slip-opinion].
In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court concluded that a provision of the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) did not confer an enforceable right. At issue was the following section of FERPA which provided that “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein ...) of students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization.” Id. at 279 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)). The Supreme Court explained that the provision lacked the “sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the requisite congressional intent to create new rights” as the provisions “speak only to the Secretary of Education, directing that ‘[n]o funds shall be made available’ to any ‘educational agency or institution’ which has a prohibited ‘policy or practice.’” Id. at 287 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court
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memorably concluded this provision’s focus was “two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents and clearly does not confer the sort of ‘individual entitlement’ that is enforceable under § 1983.” Id. (emphasis in the original). The Supreme Court emphasized that there can be no enforceable rights where the statute focuses on the regulated agency rather than the individuals protected. Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001)). The FERPA provision at issue had an aggregate focus because it spoke “only in terms of institutional policy and practice, not individual instances of disclosure” and was not concerned with “whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied.” Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the provision was not phrased in the terms of the person benefited but instead a as a funding prohibition, it did not create a private a right of action.
In coming to its conclusion, the Supreme Court contrasted the provision in FERPA with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 whose statutes the Supreme Court pointed out were phased with “an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.” Id. at 284 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Title VI provides: ‘No person in the United States shall ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance’ on the basis of race, color, or national origin.” Id. at 284n.4 (quoting 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994 ed.)) (emphasis in the original). “Title IX provides: ‘No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, ... be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.’” Id. at 284n.4 (quoting 86 Stat. 373, 20
13

U.S.C. § 1681(a)) (emphasis in the original). The Supreme Court explained that Title VI and Title IX did contain explicit right-or duty-creating language as opposed to FERPA. Id. In the instant case, Defendant makes this same comparison to support his argument that the FSA provisions at issue do not focus on the benefited class but rather on the state agency.
Lastly, the Supreme Court reasoned that its conclusion that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions fail to confer enforceable rights were “buttressed by the mechanism that Congress chose to provide for enforcing these provisions.” Id. at 289. The Supreme Court pointed out that Congress expressly authorized the Secretary to deal with violations of the Act and that the Act required the Secretary to establish a review board. Id. FERPA provides in relevant part that a board shall be established “for the purpose of investigating, processing, reviewing, and adjudicating violations of this section and complaints which may be filed concerning alleged violations of this section.” The Supreme Court concluded that these “administrative procedures squarely distinguish this case from Wright and Wilder, where an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review mechanism … and further counsel against our finding a congressional intent to create individually enforceable rights.” 536 U.S. at 289-90 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987) and Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)). The Supreme Court noted that it need not determine whether FERPA’s procedures were sufficiently comprehensive to offer an independent basis for precluding enforcement due to its finding that FERPA creates no private right to enforce. Id. at 290 n.8.
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In Blessing, the Supreme Court held that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act which required States receiving welfare funds to “substantially comply” with the requirements designed to ensure timely payment of child support did not create an enforceable right. To qualify for federal funds under Title IV-D, the “State must certify that it will operate a child support enforcement program that conforms with the numerous requirements set forth in Title IV–D of the Social Security Act” and “will do so pursuant to a detailed plan that has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 333. In addition, the “structure of each State's Title IV–D agency, like the services it provides, must conform to federal guidelines” including creating separate units to administer the program, disbursing collected funds, providing staffing at certain levels, and implementing a computer data system that meet numerous federal specifications. Id. at 334. “To oversee this complex federal-state enterprise, Congress created the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This agency is charged with auditing the States' compliance with their federally approved plans. Audits must occur at least once every three years, or more often if a State's performance falls below certain standards. If a State does not ‘substantially comply’ with the requirements of Title IV–D, the Secretary is authorized to penalize the State by reducing its Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) grant by up to five percent.” Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court explained that the lower court’s holding “paint[ed] with too broad a brush” and that it “was incumbent upon respondents to identify with particularity the rights
15

they claimed, since it was impossible to determine whether Title IV-D, as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined ‘rights.’” Id. at 342.
The Blessing court explained that the requirement that a State agency operate its program in substantial compliance with Title IV-D “was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents… Far from creating an individual entitlement to services, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a State's Title IV–D program. Thus, the Secretary must look to the aggregate services provided by the State, not to whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied.” Id. at 343. Consequently, the court of appeals erred “in taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV–D creates rights. It is readily apparent that many other provisions of that multifaceted statutory scheme do not fit our traditional three criteria for identifying statutory rights. To begin with, many provisions, like the ‘substantial compliance’ standard, are designed only to guide the State in structuring its systemwide efforts at enforcing support obligations. These provisions may ultimately benefit individuals who are eligible for Title IV–D services, but only indirectly.” Id. at 344. The Supreme Court explained that the numerous requirements for the States’ data processing system are “complex standards” which do not give rise to individualized rights to computer services. They are simply intended to improve the overall efficiency of the States’ child support enforcement scheme.” Id. In addition, the regulations regarding sufficient staffing do not give rise to federal rights because “the link between increased staffing and the services provided to any particular individual is far too
16

tenuous to support the notion that Congress meant to give each and every Arizonan who is eligible for Title IV–D the right to have the State Department of Economic Security staffed at a ‘sufficient’ level.” Id. at 345.
Notably the Supreme Court did not foreclose the possibility that Title-IV D gives rise to some individually enforceable rights. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that 42 U.S.C. §657 may give individuals a federal right. Under Section 657, recipients must assign their child support rights to the State and fully cooperate with the State's efforts to establish paternity and obtain support payments. “Although the State may keep most of the support payments that it collects on behalf of AFDC families in order to offset the costs of providing welfare benefits, until recently it only had to distribute the first $50 of each payment to the family.” Id. at 334 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1)). “The amended version of Title IV–D replaces this $50 pass-through with more generous distributions to families once they leave welfare.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. II)). “Non–AFDC recipients who request the State's aid are entitled to have all collected funds passed through. § 657(a)(3). In all cases, the State must distribute the family's share of collected support payments within two business days after receipt.” Id. (citing § 654b(c)(1)). The Supreme Court suggested that the requirement that the State agency pass through the first $50 of each payment collected could give rise to a “federal right to receive a specified portion of the money collected” on an individual’s behalf. Id. at 345-46.
In the instant case, Defendant argues that the FSA provisions at issue are comparable to FERPA and Title IV-D’s provisions because the FSA provisions
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contain no rights-creating language and have an aggregate focus on policies and practices of the state agency as opposed to the needs of the individual. [Dkt. #19, Def. Motion to Dismiss, p. 18-22]. Defendant hinges his argument on the fact that Section 2020(e)(3) and (9) require that the State agency process food stamp applications within 30 and 7 days are phrased as required content of the State plan of operations. Under Section 2020(d), the State agency must submit for approval a plan of operation for the food stamp program. Section 2020(e) details specific requirements for the State plan of operation, including Section 2020(e)(3)’s requirement that the state plan shall provide that the State agency shall promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant by way of verification of income “so as to complete the certification of and provide an allotment retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household not later than thirty days following its filing of an application” and Section 2020(e)(9)’s requirement that the State plan of operation shall provide that the State agency “shall provide benefits no later than 7 days after the date of application to any household” which meet specified criteria. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9).
Defendant contends that because Section 2020(e) provides the requirements for a State plan the statute has an aggregate focus on the regulated entity as opposed to the individual in line with the Western District of Texas’s decision. In that decision, the district court concluded that the statute is not directed towards individuals because 2020(e)(3) and (9) are set out in a “framework for a state plan with requirements focused on the agency regulated.” Howard, Civ. 1:09-cv-00577-SS, p. 7. This reasoning is unpersuasive as it is
18

entirely premised on the title of the statutory provisions at issue while ignoring the clear substance and content of these provisions. Here, Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) do not speak in terms of institutional policy and practice as was the case in both Gonzaga and Blessing despite the title of these provisions as “Requisites of State plan of operation.” The content and substance of these provisions are unquestionably focused on whether the needs of a particular person has been satisfied.
Moreover, the Second Circuit has refuted this logic in Rabin holding that there was an enforceable right in connection with a provision of the Medicaid Act requiring that each State must provide each family receiving aid pursuant to a plan of the State approved under the AFDC requirements “in at least 3 of the 6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid … shall ... remain eligible for assistance under the plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period....” Rabin, 362 F.3d at 194 (citing Section 1396r-6(b)). Although the Medicaid provision at issue required that the State plan “provide that eligible applicants receive aid rather than directly requiring that all eligible persons receive the assistance,” the Second Circuit concluded that the language of the provision “focuses much more directly than does the FERPA provision on the individual’s entitlement” and did not contain any “qualifying language akin to FERPA’s ‘policy and practice.’”1 Id. at 201-02.
1 Although 42 U.S.C. §1320a-2 provides that “in an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter [which includes the Medicaid statutes], such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan,” the Second Circuit’s analysis in Rabin did not entirely rely on this provision in coming to its conclusion that Section 1396r-6 could support a Section 1983
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The Second Circuit held that “[b]ecause all of the language of Section 1396r-6
except the “plan requirements” language, reflects Congress's intention to confer
a right to TMA upon persons who meet the various eligibility requirements, we
find that Section 1396r-6 can support a Section 1983 claim. Id. at 202.2
As was the case in Rabin, Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) focus directly on the
individual entitlement and contain no qualifying language akin to FERPA’s policy
and practice. Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9)’s requirements that the State process
food stamp applications and provide benefits to eligible households within 30
days and 7 days for households eligible for expedited food stamps
unambiguously provide a precise benefit to identifiable individuals unlike
FERPA’s provision directing that funds not be made available to an agency which
has a prohibited policy or practice. The provision in FERPA is readily
distinguishable from the FSA provisions at issue. FEPRA merely provided an
incentive for an education agency or institution to adopt a particular policy or
practice as opposed to a mandate that the education agency or institution be
claim. The Second Circuit pointedly distinguished Section 1396r-6 from the FERPA provision at issue in Gonzaga to conclude that the Congress conferred an enforceable right. 2 Defendant contends that the Second Circuit’s approach to Gonzaga has been inconsistent as illustrated by the contrary outcomes reached in Rabin and Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Ed., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir.2002) and suggests the Court apply Taylor’s approach. In Taylor, the Second Circuit considered a records-access provision of FERPA and noted that the statute “combines elements of both the funding-prohibition language that the Gonzaga Court held does not confer an individual right and the individually focused language that evidences an intent to create an enforceable right.” 313 F.3d at 785. However, the Second Circuit concluded that the structure of the statute, in which the first sentence focuses on the Secretary of Education’s obligations, evinces an intent that the second sentence is merely “a limitation on which records schools should make available,” and not a right enforceable under § 1983. Id. However this Court agrees with the Williston court that “when comparing the outcomes of Rabin and Taylor, the Circuit did not reach different outcomes when applying the Gonzaga test to like statutes. Rather, the Circuit arrived at different outcomes because the statutes at issue were different.” Willison v. Eggleston, 410 F.Supp.2d 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Because the FSA does not contain similar funding prohibition language, the Second Circuit’s decision in Taylor is not as persuasive or guiding in the instant case.
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required to do so. Under the FSA, the State has no choice or discretion in its plan of operation but is required to process and provide specific benefits to eligible individuals within specified time-frames under its plan. The mere fact that these mandates are embedded within the requirements for a State plan do not make these provisions one of institutional policy or practice particularly, whereas here, the language of the provisions are written in highly specific terms focused on the needs of the individuals protected.3 Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) are clearly phrased in the terms of the person benefited and not in terms of aggregate policy and practice of the State agency. Unlike Gonzaga, these provisions are not two steps removed from the interests of eligible individuals.
Defendant also argues in line with the Western District of Texas decision that there is no rights creating-language because Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9)’s requirements are phrased as the State agency shall provide the benefit within the specified time-frames rather than directly requiring that all eligible individuals shall be provided the benefit within the specified time-frames. Defendant attempts to buttress this argument by referring to Title VI and Title IX which are phrased as no person shall be subjected to discrimination. However this is a distinction without a meaningful difference. This line of reasoning implies that the statute would be focused on the benefitted class if the phrases constituting the sentence were simply reversed to specify that eligible individuals shall be
3 The conclusion that it is immaterial that Section 2020(e)(3) and (9)’s directives are embedded within the requirements for a State plan is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Blessing that Title IV-D may give rise to enforceable rights despite that the fact that Title IV-D’s requirements are likewise embedded within the requirements for a State plan. The Supreme Court strongly suggested that 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) could give rise to an enforceable right despite the fact that the provision was embedded within the framework of a State plan.
21

provided with the benefit within the specified time-frames by the State agency under the plan of operation. However the actual meaning of these provisions do not change regardless if the provisions were phrased as the “State agency shall provide the benefit” versus “eligible individuals shall be provided the benefit by the State agency.” Either way these provisions are phrased in rights-creating language with an unmistakable focus on the benefitted class much like Title VI and Title IX.4 See Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Viewing Titles VI and IX, we find it difficult, if not impossible, as a linguistic matter, to distinguish the import of the relevant Title XIX language-“A State plan must provide”-from the “No person shall” language of Titles VI and IX” as both employ terms that are mandatory rather than precatory and individually focused.”).
In addition, Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) of the FSA are also distinguishable from the provisions of Title IV-D which the Supreme Court concluded did not confer enforceable rights. In Blessing, the respondents argued that the enforcement provision of Title IV-D which included the “substantial compliance” standard was the source of their enforceable rights. The Supreme Court soundly rejected this argument noting it was incumbent on respondents to identify with particularity the rights they claimed as opposed to claiming undefined rights to Title IV-D as an undifferentiated whole. 520 U.S. at 342. The Supreme Court therefore held that the enforcement standard itself could not provide a basis for a private right of action to enforce each and every Title IV-D specification. In the
4 This conclusion is also bolstered by the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Blessing that Title IV-D and in particular 42 U.S.C. § 657 may give rise to enforceable rights despite the fact that § 657 is phrased as “State shall pay” the individual as opposed to the individual shall be paid by the State.
22

instant case, the Plaintiffs do not argue that the enforcement mechanism in Section 2020(g) of the FSA is the source of their enforceable rights. The Plaintiffs clearly heeded the Supreme Court’s advice in Blessing and specified particular rights based on specific provisions of the FSA. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have identified explicit directives under the FSA to the State agency to provide food stamps within specific time-frames reflective of individual entitlements to services unrelated to any performance standards. As the Plaintiffs point out, nowhere in the language of Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) is there a standard directed to a yardstick for measuring system-wide performance. The Supreme Court also explained in Blessing that many of Title IV-D specifications did not give rise to federal rights because the link between those specifications and the services provided to the individual was far too tenuous. Id. at 345. In contrast, the link between Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9)’s directive to provide food stamps within specific time-frames and the services provided to the individuals under the FSA is far from tenuous. Indeed, the link could not be any more direct.
Defendant argues that the enforcement mechanism under Section 2020(g) of the FSA is further evidence that Congress did not intend to confer enforceable rights. First, Defendant appears to suggest that the enforcement mechanism under Section 2020(g) of the FSA which triggers administrative action where there is a “pattern of lack of compliance” is somehow akin to the “substantial compliance” standard in Blessing and inconsistent with the existence of individual rights. Defendant contends that Section 2020(g) of the FSA “clearly
23

contemplated isolated instances of noncompliance. The provisions at issue are clearly analogous with the statutory provisions at issue in Blessing; just as Blessing understood a ‘substantial compliance’ standard as effectively focusing on aggregate, not individual rights…” [Dkt. #19, p. 26]. However Defendant misunderstands the Supreme Court’s holding in Blessing which considered whether the enforcement provision itself could be the source of undefined enforceable rights. This Court agrees that Section 2020(g) is focused on the aggregate practices of the State agency and not directly on the needs of any particular individual. However, Plaintiffs do not base their claim on Section 2020(g) and instead identify other provisions which as discussed above are undeniably focused on the needs of identified individuals and not on the aggregate practices of the State agency. The fact that Section 2020(g) is aggregate focused does not change the fact that Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) are focused on the individual. This conclusion is once again bolstered by the fact that the Blessing court did not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D may give rise to enforceable individual rights despite the existence of the substantial compliance provision.
Second, Defendant argues more generally that the overall structure of the FSA which provides for enforcement by the Secretary under 2020(g) is further evidence that Congress did not intend to create enforceable rights as was the case in Gonzaga. The Gonzaga court noted that its conclusion was buttressed by the fact that the Secretary of Education was expressly authorized to deal with violations of the act and required to establish a board to investigate and
24

adjudicate complaints which may be filed concerning alleged violations of FERPA. 536 U.S. at 289-90. The Supreme Court concluded that these “administrative procedures squarely distinguish this case from Wright and Wilder, where an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review mechanism … and further counsel against our finding a congressional intent to create individually enforceable rights.” 536 U.S. at 289-90 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. 418 and Wilder, 496 U.S. 498). However, Section 2020(g)’s administrative procedures are readily distinguishable from FERPA’s because an aggrieved individual lacks any federal review mechanism under the FSA.
As the Plaintiffs point out under Section 2020(g) “no federal entity or systematic process is established to address individual complaints to the Secretary…[t]he Statue merely provides contingent federal compliance attempts directed to the state.” [Dkt. #25, Pl. Mem., p. 34]. Section 2020(g) authorizes the Secretary “upon receiving information evidencing a pattern of lack of compliance by a State agency” to allow the State to attempt to correct such failure. If the State fails to correct the failure, the FSA requires the Secretary to withhold funds. The FSA also allows the Secretary in his or his discretion to refer the matter to the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief. 7 U.S.C. §2020(g). The authority to withhold funds enables the Secretary to shift the monetary burden of systemic dilatory processing of food stamp applications to the state, fostering compliance and assuring that needy families are not deprived of sustenance.
Section 2020(g) stands in sharp contrast to FERPA’s Section 1232g(g) which mandates that the Secretary establish a review board to investigate,
25

process, review, and adjudicate violations of FERPA and “complaints which may
be filed concerning alleged violations of this section.” 20 U.S.C. 1232g(g). Not
only does Section 2020(g) not afford a remedy to an aggrieved individual, it
appears to only afford prospective relief in the event that there is a great number
of eligible individuals who did not receive foods stamps in accordance with
2020(e)(3) and (9)’s clear directives over a long period of time. Because an
aggrieved individual lacks any federal review mechanism under the FSA and
because the FSA’s enforcement mechanism is focused on reducing future
violations on a systematic level and not addressing any aggrieved individual’s
injury, the structure of the FSA under Section 2020(g) does not indicate that
Congress intended to foreclose a Section 1983 remedy which is essential to assuring the health and welfare of indigent families.5
Although Defendant substantially relies on Section 2020(g)’s enforcement
mechanism as evidence that Congress did not confer an enforceable right,
Defendant appears to stop just short of arguing that Section 2020(g) is
sufficiently comprehensive to offer an independent basis for precluding private
5 Defendant also relies on Almendares v. Palmer, No.300-cv-7524, 2002 WL 31730963 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002) in support of his argument that the FSA does not create a private right of action. Almendares involved a claim that defendants violated the FSA by failing to ensure the adequate provision of bilingual program informational materials and notices and bilingual staff or interpreters under the food stamp program. The Almendares court appropriately found that the provision of the FSA at issue was aggregate focused because the state plan was to provide for “appropriate bilingual personnel and printed material… [of the state] in such a substantial number of members of low-income households speak a language other than English.” 2002 WL 31730963, at *5 (citing 7 U.S.C. §2020(E)(1)(B)). Because the Almendares court did not interpret Section 2020(e)(3) or (9), its reasoning on an entirely different provision is irrelevant to this Court’s analysis. In addition although Alemendares “acknowledged that [t]he administrative scheme is only evidence of Congress intent not to create an individually enforceable private right. The administrative scheme in the Food Stamp Act is not the type of remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant a 1983 claim.” Williston, 379 F.Supp.2d at 577.
26

enforcement. Even if Defendant had not stopped short, it is clear that Section 2020(g) does not create a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under Section 1983. As discussed above, Section 2020(g)’s enforcement mechanism is only triggered if there are systematic, widespread and prolonged violations of the FSA. In addition, there is no guarantee that the Secretary will actually seek injunctive relief which would only have the effect of preventing future violations and not provide intended beneficiaries of the program essential nutrition. It is inconceivable how individual enforcement would be incompatible and inconsistent with the FSA where Section 2020(g) contains no mechanism for an aggrieved individual to obtain federal review and redress for their injury. As Plaintiffs emphasize there is no evidence or other indication that a private right of action will lead to “interference” with any administrative efforts by the Secretary to effect compliance under Section 2020(g). [Dkt. #25, p. 36-37]. The administrative enforcement mechanism provided in Section 2020(g) clearly complements not displaces individual private enforcement.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has “stressed that a plaintiff’s ability to invoke § 1983 cannot be defeated simply by the availability of administrative mechanisms to protect the plaintiff’s interests.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Blessing, the Supreme Court explained that generalized administrative powers including the ability to audit and cut off federal funding was not sufficient to demonstrate congressional intent to foreclose a Section 1983 remedy. Id. (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 428 and Wilder,
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496 U.S. at 521). Even where “oversight powers were accompanied by limited state grievance procedures for individuals, [the Supreme Court] has found that §1983 was still available.” Id. Lastly, the Supreme Court in Blessing remarked that “even assuming the Secretary’s authority to sue for specific performance, Title IV-D’s administrative enforcement arsenal” would still not be sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent to withdraw a Section 1983 remedy. Id. Here, the Secretary’s administrative arsenal under Section 2020(g) is no greater than the arsenal the Supreme Court examined in Blessing. Under the FSA, the Secretary only has the power to cut off funding and in its discretion may seek injunctive relief which is analogous to a suit for specific performance. This is clearly not enough under Supreme Court precedent to “close the door on §1983 liability.” Id.
Although the Court need not consider the legislative history of the FSA in coming to its conclusion that Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) create enforceable rights because the text of these provisions and the structure of the statute unambiguously create binding and mandatory obligations on the State, the legislative history only confirms this conclusion. Both the House and Senate Committees unequivocally stated that the administrative remedies under the FSA do not abrogate any private cause of action. See H.R. Rep. No.95-464, at 398 (1977) (“The administrative remedies against the state contained in section 11(f) [now Section 2020(g)] and elsewhere should not be construed as abrogating in any way private causes of action against states for failure to comply with Federal statutory or regulatory requirements.”); S. Rep. No.95-180, at 152 (“This provision
28

does not abrogate private causes of action against States for failure to comply with Federal statutory or regulatory requirements.”). In addition, Senator McGovern stated that “[w]hile we expect that power to seek injunctive relief will enable the Secretary to bring about State compliance more quickly than in the past, it would be naïve to overlook the old adage about the wheels of bureaucracy turning slowly. Thus, … this section is not to be interpreted as interfering in any way with the right of individual recipients or groups of recipients, in class actions or otherwise to take their case to court.” 123 Cong. Rec. 16,349 (1977). The Court’s conclusion which is based on the text and structure of Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) is further underscored by examination of the legislative history.
Lastly, Defendant argues that FSA regulations “demonstrate that the State agency’s eligibility determination is a funding obligation of the secretary.” [Dkt. #19, p.35]. Defendant contends that FSA “regulations demonstrate that the food stamp agency is not even subject to a ‘duty,’ enforceable by the Secretary, to have an eligibility determination made within 30 days …because the regulations themselves in many instances prohibit the food stamp agency from making an eligibility determination within 30 days.” Id. at 36. Defendant points to detailed regulations concerning the responsibilities of applicants and argues that delay can result due to the applicant’s fault. Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. §273.2). Defendant essentially argues there can be no private right of action where these FSA regulations effectively “do not require DSS to process Food Stamp applications within 30 days.” Id. Defendant makes several other similar arguments regarding FSA regulations which he curiously contends are entitled to Chevron deference.
29

Id. at 45. Defendant argues that FSA regulations contradict the existence of any enforceable right. [Dkt. #33, p. 3]. The Plaintiffs argue the exact opposite concluding that a “comprehensive review of the [FSA] regulations reveal the Secretary’s mandate that the states process applications within the respective time periods.” [Dkt. #25, p.41-43]. However, as Defendant acknowledges, “it is improper to look to any implementing federal regulations on the threshold issue of whether Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to created individual rights.” Id. at 36. Therefore both Defendant and Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding FSA regulations do not disturb this Court’s conclusion that Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) create enforceable private rights.
In sum an analysis of the factors articulated in Blessing and clarified in Gonzaga confirms that Sections 2020 (e)(3) and (9) of the FSA confer private rights of action as these provisions are intended to benefit the particular individuals who, like the Plaintiffs, have filed applications establishing their eligibility for food stamps and who do not receive food stamps within the time mandated by the FSA. Accordingly, Sections 2020 (e)(3) and (9) imposes on States a binding obligation to provide food stamps within the specified time frames to eligible applicants, rather than merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct and are not so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. As discussed above, the right of eligible individuals to have food stamps provided within the specified time-frames was unambiguously conferred in the text and structure of the statute. These provisions of the FSA are clearly not concerned with aggregate services, policies
30

and practices of the regulated agency but instead concerned with whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied. Accord Willingston, 379 F.Supp. 2d at 575 (“The provisions of the FSA here appear to relate to the individual household that applies for benefits … with respect to a specific relief to a specific class of beneficiaries and time frames within which eligible households must receive the benefits provided. Rather than having an ‘aggregate focus,’ the FSA does establish specific rights for individual households applying for food stamps and for eligible households to receive food stamps in a timely manner”); M.K.B., 445 F.Supp.2d at 428 (concluding that both 2020(e)(3) and (9) are plainly intended to benefit the plaintiffs and the obligations imposed are neither vague nor amorphous; and speak in mandatory terms); Reynolds, 2005 WL 342106, at *15-16 (“Congress intended those provisions to benefit eligible applicants such as plaintiffs, the provisions are unambiguous and they impose unequivocal obligations on the states”). The Court therefore finds that Sections 2020 (e)(3) and (9) confer federal rights enforceable under Section 1983 and denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Legal Standard
“Generally, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued, and, in addition, ‘either (1) that it is likely to succeed on the merits of the action, or (2) that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
31

litigation, provided that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party.’” Mitchell V. City of New Haven, 854 F.Supp.2d 238, 244 (D. Conn. 2012) (quoting Mullins v. City of N.Y., 626 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.2010)). “Moreover, when, as here, the injunction sought is mandatory, rather than prohibitory, such that it will alter, rather than preserve, the status quo, the party seeking the injunction must make a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ showing of a likelihood of success.” M.K.B., 445 F.Supp. 2d at 426 (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir.1996)).
Analysis
Defendant primarily argues that the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because there is no private right of action available to enforce Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9). For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Sections 2020 (e)(3) and (9) confer federal rights enforceable under Section 1983 and therefore Defendant’s principal argument against granting a preliminary injunction is not persuasive.
The Court notes that the parties have raised several other arguments and lines of reasoning in their motion papers which are not entirely relevant to the question of whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate in the first instance and go more to question of what type of injunctive relief should be entered. In addition, Defendant presents many of these arguments in support of his contention that the FSA does not confer a private right of action. Distilling those arguments from that framework, one of Defendant’s main concerns is that
32

the proposed class is too broad as it includes applicants who suffered a delay due to their own fault. The parties devote a significant portion of their motion papers describing a myriad of FSA regulations governing the allocation of responsibility for delay and applicant responsibilities more generally.
The process to obtain food stamps appears to begin with the submission of an initial application. After the initial application is submitted, DSS requires an applicant to produce “common sense verification” and schedules an interview prior to making its eligibility determination. [Dkt. #38, p. 11]. Implicit within Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) mandates that food stamps be provided within 30 and 7 days is the condition precedent that the applicant has submitted all of the required information/ documentation and been provided with a timely interview. The Court agrees with Defendant that it would inappropriate to find DSS in violation of Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) where the delay was truly caused by the applicant. However there is no question that where the applicant fulfilled his or her obligations and DSS failed to schedule a timely interview, regularly loses applicant paperwork as was the case for the named Plaintiff and which the Defendant concedes is a systemic problem which it has been working to resolve for several years, or simply failed to make a timely determination, DSS would be in clear violation of Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9).
To the extent that Defendant’s arguments regarding delay and allocation of fault can be construed as an argument that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success, Defendant fails to provide any persuasive evidence that applicant fault is the primary reason for the delay. Defendant points to data that
33

was collected and produced pursuant to a stipulated judgment that was entered by another court in the District of Connecticut in the 1990s involving the processing of food stamps. See Alvarez v. Commissioner, Department of Income Maintenance, No.B-90-190(WWE) [Dkt. #33, Att. 1]. He argues that the Alvarez data indicates that the delay is caused by applicants. However, Plaintiffs argue that the Alvarez data is flawed because it is inconsistent with FSA regulations governing the allocation of responsibility and therefore unreliable. Defendant fails to provide any evidence indicating what percentage of the delay is attributable to applicants under the rubric of FSA regulations. Without such information, the Court is disinclined to credit the Alvarez data at this juncture in the litigation to determine that there is not a substantial likelihood of success particularly where Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the delay is primarily caused by DSS.
First, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the named Plaintiff, Mr. Briggs, was eligible to receive food stamps, submitted all the required documentation which was misplaced by DSS. The Plaintiffs have therefore demonstrated the Mr. Briggs through no fault of his own was not provided with food stamps within the required time-frames in violation of Sections 2020()(3) and (9). [Dkt. #2, Att. 2, Briggs Decl.]. Second, Plaintiffs also provide evidence that DSS has conceded in its Corrective Action Plan submitted to FNS that the root cause of the delays is the absence of automated business processes. [Dkt. #33, Roberts Aff., Ex. F at 2]. In a May 2, 2012 letter to FNS, DSS indicates that “errors occur most often at recertification and are most frequently a result of not acting
34

on information or not having documentation or records available at the time of the review. In addition to reinforcing program rules, the Department needs to address the administrative issue of record control.” Id. Third, Plaintiffs have indicated that DSS has reduced staffing by 19% between 2002 and 2009 and by another 8% in September and October 2011 despite increasing caseloads. [Dkt. #33, Ferron-Poole Aff., ¶¶11-12]. Lastly, Plaintiffs point out that DSS’s Corrective Action Plans to FNS have never asserted that the delay was attributable to applicant fault. [Dkt. #38, Potter Aff., ¶¶4-5, Atts. 3-4].
Further, Plaintiffs have presented DSS data demonstrating ongoing and systemic delays. Between January 2010 and February 2012, the percent of applications pending over 30 days has ranged from 18% in August 2011 and May 2011 to 40% in November 2011. In addition the percent of all decision made in a month late ranged from 20.5% in July 2011 to as many as 32% in December 2011. [Dkt. #38, p. 14]. Between August 2010 and February 2012, the percentages of expedited applications pending at the end of the month that were overdue ranged from 95% for December 2011 to 72% in June 2011. Id. Expedited determinations taking more than 7 days have ranged from 35% in July 2011 to 54% in December 2011. Id. In addition, at a February 22, 2011 presentation to the Connecticut General Assembly, DSS described its food stamp “timeliness rate” as follows: 2006 -81.43%, 2007 – 82.99%, 2008-83.01%, 2009-79.11%, 2010 – 59.49%. [Dkt. #2, p. 6]. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that there are significant delays in the processing of food stamps beyond the statutory mandates resulting from the fault of DSS. The low levels of timeliness rates are persuasive evidence that the
35

State has failed to timely provide food stamps in compliance with the unambiguous mandates of Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9).
Lastly, Defendant suggests that even if there is an enforceable right, the Plaintiffs are only entitled to enforce that DSS substantially comply with the FSA because Section 2020(g) authorizes administrative enforcement upon evidence of a pattern of lack of compliance. Plaintiffs argue that Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) and implementing regulations mandate full compliance not substantial compliance. The Court agrees that it would illogical to read Section 2020(g)’s “pattern of lack of compliance” trigger for administrative enforcement as imputing a substantial compliance standard into Sections 2020(e)(3) and (9) unambiguous mandate that food stamps be provided within the specified time frames. The Southern District of New York also rejected this same argument in Reynolds. The Reynold’s court persuasively explained that this argument was “unavailing because it is the text of the Food Stamp Act … at which this Court must look in determining the level of compliance required.” 2005 WL 342106, at *17. The Reynold’s court reasoned that the enforcement provision under Section 2020(g) was not intended to measure what the FSA requires but only intended to measure how great a failure to meet those requirements should cause funds to be cut off. Id. (citing Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1991)). This Court agrees that the “language of these provisions is unambiguous and requires that the state agencies ‘shall’ or ‘must’ provide the specified benefits to eligible individuals. The plain language thus requires that state agencies comply strictly with their obligations to provide food stamps … to eligible applicants.”
36

Id.; accord, Withdrow, 942 F2d. 1387-88 (holding that strict not substantial compliance is required under FSA); Haskins v. Stanton, 794 F.2d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
Further as the Reynold’s court cogently explained this “interpretation does not encroach on a municipal government’s conduct of its internal affairs because the Act itself imposes the burden … Nor does this holding disturb the principle that district courts have discretion when deciding whether injunctive relief is warranted. An injunction is not required whenever an agency that is otherwise in full compliance fails in one or a very few sporadic instances. There is however, doubtless a point at which any failure of total compliance is truly de minimus, where the state has come to comply ‘as strictly as is humanly possible,’ and it is within the discretion of the district court to deny injunctive relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
At the preliminary injunction stage, the Plaintiffs have presented credible evidence that the state is not failing in one or a very few sporadic instances but instead that there is ongoing, persistent systemic failure to comply with the strict unambiguous mandates imposed by the FSA which warrant injunctive relief. The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiffs have established a clear or substantial showing of a likelihood of success on their claims.
Having established a clear or substantial likelihood of success, the Plaintiffs are only entitled to injunctive relief where they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued. Irreparable harm is “‘the single most
37

important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.’ ” Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2948 at 431 (1st ed.1973)).
The denial of essential public benefits like food stamps which help provide for basic nutrition and sustenance undeniably constitutes irreparable harm. See, e.g., M.K.B., 445 F.Supp.2d, at 437-38 (“Given the often perilous economic circumstances of the plaintiffs in this case, and those similarly situated, the denial of public benefits to such individuals unquestionably constitutes irreparable harm.”); Mass. Ass'n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749, 753 (1st Cir.1983); Martin v. Weiner, No. 06-cv-00943(SC), 2006 WL 435477, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006); Reynolds, 35 F.Supp.2d at 339 (“To indigent persons, the loss of even a portion of subsistence benefits constitutes irreparable injury.”); Cincotta v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin., No. 00 Civ. 9064(JSR), 2001 WL 897176, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. August 9, 2001) (“The loss or potential loss of welfare benefits, including food stamp benefits, can constitute irreparable injury warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (finding that denial of welfare benefits deprive individuals “of the very means by which to live.”); Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F.Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“To indigent persons, the loss of even a portion of subsistence benefits constitutes irreparable injury.”). Further, the Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the deprivation of timely food stamps has caused
38

imminent harm that cannot be remedied through post-hoc monetary compensation. See [Dkt. #2, Att. 2, Briggs Decl.].
Considering the Plaintiffs’ vital and essential interest in the timely receipt of food stamps and the resultant harm suffered through the loss of timely benefits, the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the Plaintiffs and outweighs any injury caused by requiring the Defendant to do what was already required under the Act. The Court agrees with the Seventh Circuit that “[b]ecause the defendants are required to comply with the Food Stamp Act under the terms of the Act, we do not see how enforcing compliance imposes any burden on them. The Act itself imposes the burden, this injunction merely seeks to prevent the defendants from shirking their responsibilities under it. We also fail to see how enforcing a statute designed to promote the public welfare disserves the public.” Haskins, 794 F.2d at 1277.
The Defendant has informed the Court that DSS has undertaken various ameliorative measures to improve its timeliness rates. However, such action while commendable does not render injunctive relief moot, nor does it deprive the Court of its authority to grant injunctive relief “or determine the question before it.” M.K.B., 445 F.Supp.2d, at 438; see also Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (“a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice… If it did, courts would be compelled to leave the defendant free to return to its old ways.”); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (claims not rendered moot because defendant would be “free
39

to return to his old ways. This, together with a public interest in having the practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion.”). As the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, a clear or substantial showing of likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, and that the balance of hardships decidedly tips in their favor, this Court finds preliminary injunctive relief to be appropriate. The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
The Court notes that the parties dispute the definition of the proposed class and have made various arguments regarding the apportionment of fault and the relevancy of the stipulated judgment in Alvarez to any injunctive relief. In light of these disputes, the Court will reserve judgment on the exact nature of the injunction that will issue. The Court will shortly schedule a hearing to discuss the proposed class and the nature of injunctive relief that will issue.
The Court also grants Plaintiffs’ motion to waive the posting of a bond required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Court finds it appropriate to waive Rule 65(c)’s bond requirement in view of the facts that Plaintiffs are indigent and have brought an action that promotes the public’s interest. See California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1319, 1325–26, as modified by 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir.1985) (finding district court properly exercised discretion to allow plaintiffs to proceed without posting a bond because district court had “discretion to dispense with the security requirement, or to request mere nominal security, where requiring security would effectively deny access to judicial review”); Miller v. Carlson, 768 F.Supp. 1331, 1340–41 (N.D.Cal.1991)
40

(bond waived as plaintiffs are “indigent persons” and the preliminary injunction “is consistent with public policy”); Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 220 (3d Cir.1991) (upholding waiver of the bond requirement where suit was brought to enforce compliance with the Medicaid Act).
Conclusion Based upon the above reasoning, Defendant’s [Dkt. #19] motion to dismiss is DENIED and Plaintiff’s motion [Dkt. #2] for preliminary injunction is GRANTED. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs’ [Dkt. #3] motion for release of bond obligation.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ________/s/__ ________ Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: December 4, 2012
41

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS,

:

:

PLAINTIFF,

:

Individually and on behalf of all

:

other persons similarly situated

:

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12cv324(VLB)

:

v.

: MAY 13, 2013

:

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity :

as Commissioner of the State of

:

Connecticut Department of Social Services, :

DEFENDANT.

:

Preliminary Injunction Order

WHEREAS, this action was commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce rights conferred by the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (the “Food Stamp Act” or “FSA”) and regulations promulgated thereunder on behalf of persons alleging that Defendant fails to process applications and provide food stamps1 in a timely manner in violation of the FSA;

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant to process applications for, and provide, food stamps in a timely manner, as required by the FSA;

WHEREAS, the Defendant admits that there are systemic deficiencies in the manner in which it processes food stamps, including without limitation routine

1 Effective October 1, 2009, the federal Food Stamp Program was renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the federal Food Stamp Act was renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§4001, 4002.
1

loss of applications, loss of verification documentation, and the failure to timely schedule interviews as required by the FSA;
WHEREAS, on December 4, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in this action;
WHEREAS, the Court has broad discretion in fashioning equitable relief;
NOW, GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:
I. DEFINITIONS 1. “Applicant” means any person or household that applies, by any approved means, on a State-prescribed form, for food stamps. 2. “Expedited” service of a food stamp application” refers to the processing of a food stamp application on an expedited basis for households that meet the criteria for expedited processing set forth in 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(9), 7 C.F.R. §273.2(i). 3. “Food stamps” means assistance provided pursuant to the Food and Nutrition Act of 1977, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §2011 et seq., and any and all successor programs, including but not limited to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§4001, 4002. 4. “Order” means this order prescribing the Preliminary Injunction. 5. “Term” means the date this Order was entered until the date of final adjudication of the matter.
2

II. CLASS CERTIFICATION 6. The Plaintiff class shall consist of: All persons in Connecticut who have applied, who are currently applying, or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely processed for food stamps as required by 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. §273.2 and 273.17.
III. DEFENDANT’S OBLIGATIONS 7. Defendant shall process all applications for food stamps and provide food stamp benefits retroactive to the month of application to those households that have completed the application process and been determined eligible as required by 7 U.S.C. §§2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R §273.2. 8. Defendant shall determine whether the state or the household is at fault and the reason for any failure to make a timely eligibility determination as prescribed by 7 C.F.R §273.2(h). 9. On the last day of each month beginning August 31, 2013, Defendant shall report to the Plaintiff the reason for the failure to timely determine eligibility of each applicant as prescribed by 7 C.F.R §273.2(h) specifying whether the applicant or the Defendant was at fault. 10. In each case in which Defendant is at fault for failing to make a timely eligibility determination, Defendant shall restore the household benefits retroactive as prescribed by 7 C.F.R §273.17.
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11. Defendant shall provide eligible households that complete the initial application process (including combined applications for food stamps, cash assistance, or other federal benefits) an opportunity to participate in the food stamp program as soon as possible, but no later than thirty calendar days following the date the application was filed as required by 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R. §273.2 (g).
12. Defendant shall provide expedited service of food stamp application(s) (including combined applications for food stamps, cash assistance, or other federal benefits) to households eligible for such expedited service no later than the seventh (7th) calendar day following the date the application is filed as set forth in 7 U.S.C. §2020 (e)(9) and 7 C.F.R. §273.2(i).
13. Defendant shall promptly enact any changes to policy statements, procedures, manuals, and internal directives necessary to ensure that his staff, employees, consultants, contractors, agents and assigns comply with the terms and conditions of this Order. Defendant will provide copies of any such changes to Plaintiffs’ counsel for comment before publication and afford Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity for timely comment. In addition, Defendant shall conduct such training as is necessary to ensure that his staff, employees, consultants, contractors, agents, and assigns comply with the terms and conditions of this Order.
4

14. Within twelve (12) months of this Order, Defendant shall be in full compliance with all federal requirements to promptly determine the eligibility for food stamps of each applicant household so as to complete certification and provide assistance to all eligible households. For purposes of this Order, full compliance shall mean compliance in all cases except those individual and isolated instances of delay that occur inevitably in an agency such as Defendant’s. To account for these instances of individual and isolated error, Defendant shall be considered in full compliance with the terms of sub-paragraphs 14(d) and 14(h) of this Order if his agency’s timely processing of food stamp applications meets the requirements of those paragraphs within a 3 percent margin of error – i.e. Defendant achieves 97% compliance. a. 70 percent of all food stamps applicant households subject to 30-day processing by August 31, 2013; b. 80 percent of all food stamps applicant households subject to 30-day processing by October 31, 2013; c. 90 percent of all food stamps applicant households subject to 30-day processing by December 31, 2013; d. Full compliance for all food stamps applicant households subject to 30-day processing by the last day of the 12th month following the date of this Order and shall be sustained for six consecutive months;
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e. 70 percent of all expedited food stamps applicant households by August 31, 2013;
f. 80 percent of all expedited food stamps applicant households by October 31, 2013;
g. 90 percent of all expedited food stamps applicant households by December 31, 2013;
h. Full compliance or all expedited food stamps applicant households by the last day of the 12th month following the date of this Order and shall be sustained for six consecutive months.
i. By July 31, 2014, the percentage of applications pending more than 30 days shall not exceed 10% of all applications and shall be sustained for six consecutive months.
j. By September 30, 2014, the percentage of applications pending more than 30 days shall not exceed 5% of all applications and shall be sustained for six consecutive months.
IV. MONITORING
Each month during the Term, Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs’ counsel or their designated representatives, with the following reports:
15. Within fifteen (15) days of the end of the preceding month:
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k. A report noting the number of initial applications filed in the month, sorted by local office and aggregate statewide;
l. A report noting the number of application determinations made in the month, statewide and subdivided by office where filed and the statewide aggregate.
m. A report as described in Section III Paragraph 9 of this Order.
16. Plaintiffs shall be entitled to a single statistically significant, randomly selected, sample of applications processed to determination in a month to be determined by Plaintiffs’ counsel. The parties shall meet to determine the sampling protocol and methodology. The sample drawn shall be large enough to provide a 3% confidence interval at the 95% confidence level. Within 90 days of the end of the month sampled, Defendant shall submit a report to Plaintiffs’ counsel that indicates the following: a. for those applications determined eligible for expedited Food Stamp application processing, whether or not Food Stamp benefits were issued within 7 days following the date the application was filed; and b. for those applications not determined eligible for expedited processing, whether the applications were processed and benefits issued to those found eligible within 30 days following the filing of the application.
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17. With regard to cases in the sample specified in Paragraph 16 that have been reported as not being timely processed, Defendant will conduct a review of those applications and provide corrective action on those applications remaining. Defendant will provide a report of its findings and corrective action taken on these cases to Plaintiffs’ counsel within 90 days from the end of the sampling period. Defendant shall also consolidate and propose to Plaintiffs’ counsel changes in policies, procedures and protocols to avoid such delays.
18. In the event that Plaintiffs reasonably believe, based on the results of the sample described in Paragraph 16 above, that the monitoring reports identified in paragraph 15 above are not reliable with regard to the timely processing of Food Stamp applications subject to 30-day processing and/or the timely expedited processing of applications for Food Stamp benefits, they will give notice to Defendant and counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant will meet and confer regarding the results of the sample. If the Defendant agrees with the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs and Defendant will attempt to arrive at a resolution, which may include, inter alia, if necessary, the conducting of an additional sample. In the event the Plaintiffs and Defendant are unable to agree that a resolution is necessary and/or to the scope of a
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resolution, the disputed issues will be referred to the Court for resolution. IV. INFORMAL REVIEW PROCESS 19. Defendant shall provide a mechanism by which Plaintiffs’ counsel may bring to the attention of Defendant no more than ten instances in a month in which an application which its investigation reveals may not have been processed in accordance with the FSA. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall inform Defendant of the specific processing deficiency alleged. Defendant agrees to investigate each specific alleged processing deficiency and to advise Plaintiffs’ counsel of the result of said investigation within five (5) business days. Defendant shall designate and provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with the identity of the contact information for the person(s) responsible for resolving requests for assistance referred under this paragraph and any successors to the person(s) responsible for resolving the issues.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: May 13, 2013

________/s/__ ________ Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge

9

 
 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162 Filed 01/05/17 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS,

:

Individually and on behalf of all

CIVIL ACTION NO.

other persons similarly situated,

:

3:12-cv-00324-VLB

Plaintiffs,

:

:

CLASS ACTION

v.

:

RODERICK BREMBY, in his

:

Official capacity as Commissioner

of the Connecticut Department of :

Social Services,

:

Defendant.

_________________________________:

JANUARY 5, 2017

JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CLASS NOTICE, TO SET A DATE FOR FAIRNESS HEARING
AND FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e), the parties submit this joint Motion to the

Court respectfully requesting that this Court:

a) Issue an Order preliminarily approving the attached proposed

Stipulation and Order of Settlement;

b) Approve the class settlement notice and distribution plan;

c) Establish a date for the fairness hearing 60 days from the preliminary

approval of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement; and

d) Following the fairness hearing, enter the proposed Stipulation and

Order of Settlement.

In support of this Motion, the parties state as follows:

1. Following arm’s length negotiations, the parties have agreed to a 1

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162 Filed 01/05/17 Page 2 of 5
resolution of all claims in this action pleaded against the Defendant, Roderick Bremby (“Defendant”), in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services (“DSS”), as set forth in the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement, attached as Exhibit A. 2. The parties believe that resolution of this matter through negotiation, rather than through further lengthy and expensive adversarial litigation, is in the best interests of both the Defendant and the Plaintiff class. 3. The parties believe the proposed settlement of this action includes terms and conditions that are fair, reasonable, and adequate. 4. The proposed form of notice to class members regarding the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement, attached as Exhibit B (hereinafter “Class Notice”), conforms to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e). It includes a summary description and a more detailed description of the terms and provisions of the Order, indicates the time and place of the fairness hearing, and advises class members how to appear and object to the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement. The Defendant will arrange for translation of the Class Notice into Spanish. 5. The parties propose distribution of the Class Notice as follows: a) Copies of the Class Notice, in English and Spanish, as well as a copy
of the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement, will be posted prominently on the DSS web site and the web site of Greater Hartford Legal Aid (GHLA), local counsel for the Plaintiffs, at least 45 days
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162 Filed 01/05/17 Page 3 of 5
prior to the date of the fairness hearing, and will remain on such web sites until the date of the final fairness hearing set by this Court. b) The Defendant will arrange for the Class Notice to be printed as a poster, in English and Spanish. For a period of no less than 45 days and until the date of the fairness hearing set by this Court, this bilingual poster, of at least 11” x 17” in size, will be prominently displayed in the waiting rooms of all DSS offices. c) Physical copies of the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement will be available at Greater Hartford Legal Aid. Plaintiffs’ counsel will also seek to have third parties, including legal services programs, providing social services to low income Connecticut residents post a link to the Class Notice and proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement on their websites. 6. The parties respectfully request that the Court set a date for a fairness hearing for a time convenient for the Court, 60 days from preliminary approval of the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement, to allow sufficient time after publication of the Class Notice to permit objections to the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement, if any, to be filed with the Court. WHEREFORE, the parties request entry of an order preliminarily approving the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement, utilizing the draft Order attached hereto as Exhibit C, or in such other form as the Court deems appropriate.
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162 Filed 01/05/17 Page 4 of 5
Respectfully submitted,
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
GREATER HARTFORD LEGAL AID /s/Giovanna Shay ct26702 gshay@ghla.org Lucy Potter ct23449 lpotter@ghla.org Cecil Thomas ct27264 cthomas@ghla.org 999 Asylum Ave., 3rd Floor Hartford, CT 06105-2465 (860) 541-5000 Fax (860) 541-5050
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMIC JUSTICE Marc Cohan phv 05465 cohan@nclej.org Mary R. Mannix phv05465 Mannix@nclej.org Greg Bass ct18114 bass@nclej.org 275 Seventh Ave., Ste. 1506 New York, NY 10001-6708 (212) 633-6967 Fax (212) 633-6371
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Hugh Barber ct05731 Hugh.Barber@ct.gov Emily Melendez ct21411 Emily.Melendez@ct.gov Jennifer Callahan ct29033 Jennifer.Callahan@ct.gov Office of the Attorney General 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06106 (860) 808-5210 Fax (860) 808-5385
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162 Filed 01/05/17 Page 5 of 5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 5, 2017, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by email to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicted on the notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s CM/ECF System.
/s/Giovanna Shay
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONN ECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS, individually and on behalf )

of all others similarly situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity )

as Commissioner of the State of

)

Connecticut Department of Social

)

Services,

)

Defendant.

)

CASE NO. 3:12-CV-324 (VLB) (CLASS ACTION)

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT

Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant

Roderick Bremby, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the State of

Connecticut Department of Social Services, failed to provide Supplemental

Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits within the time frames mandated

by federal law to eligible households who apply for benefits.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant on

behalf of themselves and members of a certified class to require Defendant to determine such households' eligibility within the mandated time frames and

provide SNAP within the mandated time frames to those eligible. The Court entered an order certifying the class on May 13, 2013.

This Court also entered a Preliminary Injunction Order in this matter on May

13, 2013, which was affirmed by the Second Circuit on July 6, 2015. The Plaintiffs

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filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Defendant opposed, and which remains pending before this Court.
Nevertheless, in the interest of avoiding the costs, burdens, and uncertainty of potential litigation, the parties have agreed to resolve all issues presented in this litigation without further proceedings and without Defendant admitting any fault or liability. Whereas the parties desire to settle this action, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: I. DEFINITIONS For purposes of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement (hereinafter "Order"), the following definitions apply: 1. "Timely Denial" means, as to initial applications for SNAP benefits, an action taken by the case worker or the data system to deny the initial application and to cause a notice to be generated on or before the 30th day after the application was submitted to the agency, unless the 30th day falls on a weekend or holiday. If the 30th day falls on a weekend or holiday, the denial of SNAP benefits shall be timely if the SNAP application is denied on the next business day after the weekend or holiday. 2. "Timely Application Approval" means a) as to applications eligible for expedited processing, that SNAP benefits are issued and available to the household no later than the 7th day following the date on which the household submitted the application; and b) as to applications subject to 30 day processing,
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that SNAP benefits are issued and available to the household no later than the 30th day following the date on which the household submitted the application.
3. "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)" refers to the program established by 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. and in this Order "SNAP" and "food stamps" are used interchangeably.
II. CLASS CERTIFICATION 4. Pursuant to the Court's May 13, 2013 order certifying a class, the class is defined as: "All persons in Connecticut who have applied, are currently applying, or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely processed for food stamps as required by 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2." Ill. DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS 5. Set forth in sub-paragraphs 5(a)- (c) are Defendant's obligations under federal statutes and regulations as to initial regular and expedited SNAP applicants, with which Defendant shall comply: a. Defendant shall screen applicant households to determine if the
household is eligible for expedited service of their SNAP application at the time the household applies for benefits in accordance with 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i)(2). b. Defendant shall provide expedited service of a SNAP application to households eligible for such expedited service no later than the seventh calendar day following the date the application is filed as set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i)(3).
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c. Defendant shall provide eligible households that complete the initial application process an opportunity to participate in the SNAP program as soon as possible, but no later than thirty calendar days following the date the application was filed as required by 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g).
6. Defendant shall fully comply with the timely processing requirements of the applicable SNAP statute and regulations. For purposes of this Order, Defendant shall be deemed to be fully complying with the timely processing requirements of the SNAP statute and regulations so long as Defendant meets a 96% timely processing standard with respect to 30 day regular SNAP applications and also meets a 96% timely processing standard with respect to 7 day expedited SNAP applications, starting no later than the month following the date that this Order is so ordered and that Order is entered on the docket sheet of the United States District Court.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 6 of this Order, from the month following the date that this Order is so Ordered and the Order entered on the District Court's docket sheet through the month of June 2017, Defendant shall be deemed to be in full compliance with the timely processing requirements of the SNAP statute and regulations for expedited 7-day applications so long as Defendant meets a timely processing standard as to applications filed in the months in this period, following adjustment of the monthly data as described in paragraph 10 and 11, and 14, defined as the actual number of timely processed
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Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 5 of 21
applications increased by two (2%) percent. Thus, for example, a reported timeliness percentage of 94.2 % would be adjusted upwards by 2% to 96.2%.
8. Beginning with applications filed in the month of July 2017, Defendant shall be deemed to fully comply with the timely processing requirements of the SNAP statute and regulations for expedited applications so long as Defendant meets a 96% timely processing standard with respect to 7 day expedited SNAP applications.
9. For purposes of this Order, the data on Defendant's SNAP Application Timeliness Report, or any subsequent report to which the parties agree and the Court so orders, is the measure of timely performance as to any month. Specifically, as reflected in the SNAP Application Timeliness Report, the percent timely as to 30-day regular applications is the percent reported in the column titled "Combined Adjusted SNAP Regular" and the percent timely as to 7-day expedited applications is the percent reported in the column titled "Combined Adjusted SNAP Expedited."
10. The SNAP Application Timeliness Report as of the date that this Order is entered onto the Docket of this Court is based on data from the Eligibility Management System (EMS), the Defendant's legacy computer system. This data is adjusted to more accurately reflect the timeliness of SNAP application processing. Attached to this agreement are two stipulations agreed to by the parties the July 18, 2013 Stipulation, DKT # 94 attached hereto as Exhibit A and the March 31, 2014 Stipulation, DKT # 104 attached hereto as Exhibit B, detailing adjustments to
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capture a number of cases misidentified due to EMS limitations. In addition, the baseline data in the SNAP Application Timeliness Report reflects: a) expedited eligibility identification for reporting purposes based upon initial screening of the application for assistance and b) the exclusion of cases that were incorrectly identified as applications by EMS but were actually cases reinstated following completion of periodic review forms. See Exhibits A thru D attached hereto.
11. Beginning with the report for applications filed in the month following the month this order is so ordered and entered on the docket sheet, the timely performance rate derived by the adjustments set forth in paragraph 10 may, at Defendant's discretion, be further adjusted as a result of individual reviews of "untimely expedited" cases for: a) late recertifications that were correctly treated as new applications but were incorrectly identified as eligible for expedited processing due to worker error; and b) timely recertifications that should not have been treated as new applications but that were entered in the system as expedited applications because that was the only option available in EMS.
12. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, no further adjustments to the SNAP Application Timeliness Report to correct inaccuracies in the EMS system will be made during the term of this Order, other than those listed in paragraphs 7, 10and11 of this Order.
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13. Cases coded as untimely due to client delay as specified herein in paragraph 13 shall be considered timely for purposes of Paragraph 111(6) of this Order. Delay in such cases will be coded as follows:
a. Extension Granted (EX). A case in which delay in processing results from an applicant missing his or her initial interview and asking to schedule an interview after the 30th day of the processing period.
b. More Verification (MV). A case in which delay results from a request for verification that the Department did not reasonably need to request during the initial review of the application, and the due date for supplying the verification falls after the close of the thirty day period because of the need to allow the applicant 10 days to respond to the request. This code shall not be used if the required verification should reasonably have been requested during the Department's initial review of the application.
c. Insufficient Time (IT). This delay results when there is insufficient time for the worker to process the application and provide benefits by the 30th day because: 1) the applicant provides verification after the date due but before the 30th day and the worker approves on the 30111 day or the first business day after a weekend or holiday if the 30111 day fell on a weekend or holiday; or the applicant missed the initial interview, the Department sent the applicant a Notice of Missed Interview (NOMI) and the interview is completed on the 3ot11 day or the first business day after a weekend or holiday if the 30th day fell on a weekend or holiday. 7

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 8 of 21
14. Emergency Event (EE). This delay code is used where delay is attributable to an emergency event beyond the control of the Defendant, such as natural disasters, severe weather conditions, or power outages. lmpaCT implementation-related delays do not constitute an emergency event justifying use of the EE code. This delay excuses Defendant's performance for the particular applications affected if: 1) one or more offices were closed or unable to enter data into an eligibility system for a full day; 2) Defendant was unable to process the particular applications affected as a result; 3) the particular applications needed to be processed on the day that the emergency event occurred; and 4) the particular applications affected were subsequently processed within three business days of the conclusion of the emergency event. This code is used only upon instruction from Defendant's Central Office. The EE code can be used for both expedited and regular applications. The use of this code is subject to sample review by Defendant and/or audit by Plaintiffs in accordance with paragraph 18.
15. Cased coded EX, MV, IT and EE will each appear in a separate column in the SNAP Application Timeliness Report and will be counted as timely processed cases.
16. Defendant agrees that he shall enact any changes to policy to ensure that DSS staff, employees, agents, and assigns comply with the terms and conditions of this Order and will submit them to Plaintiffs' counsel for review and comment prior to enactment. In addition, Defendant shall conduct such training as is necessary to ensure that DSS staff, employees, agents, and assigns comply with
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the terms and conditions of this Order. Moreover, Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel with copies of any changed policy memos, procedures manuals, training materials, and internal directives upon issuance. In addition, Defendant will add language to the SNAP application that informs the applicant that a worker will call the applicant by phone or that the applicant may call the Department for a SNAP interview at any time after the applicant has submitted the application.
IV. REPORTS A. Timeliness of SNAP Applications 17. During the term of this Order, Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel with the following reports, by the first business day on or after the fifteenth of each month, except for those months the Defendant exercises its discretion under paragraph 11 of this Order to review case files in which case the Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel with the reports by the first business day on or after the twenty-second of each month: a. The monthly SNAP Application Timeliness Report that has been designed
pursuant to this Court's Preliminary Injunction Order; the parties' July 18, 2013 Stipulation, DKT # 94 attached here as Exhibit A; the March 31, 2014 Stipulation, DKT # 104 attached here as Exhibit B; and Exhibit D attached hereto, further modified to include a column indicating how many cases were excluded based on client fault pursuant to paragraphs 13-15. A copy of the March 2016 Report is attached as Exhibit C. Additional columns will be added to the report in the month following the month this
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order is entered, to reflect cases coded IT and EE. Any adjustments made pursuant to paragraph 11 shall also be reflected on the report. b. The monthly Application Length Pending Report so long as it is generated by the Eligibility Management System ("EMS"); c . The monthly Expedited Service Report for so long as it is generated by EMS . B. Sampling 18. Sampling will occur under two circumstances, neither of which is mutually exclusive: a. At Plaintiffs' option, one statistically significant random or systematic sample shall be drawn by Defendant from a month to be designated by the Plaintiffs to determine the accuracy and reliability of the reporting set forth in Section IV(A) of this Order. The sample size shall be a number that is necessary to provide no greater than a 5% confidence interval (margin of error) at the 95% confidence level for that sampling frame . The parties shall meet and confer before the sample is drawn to discuss the sampling methodology; the sample size; the data recording instrument to be used for recording the information drawn from the sample; and the data sources for both the monthly reports and the sample. Defendant shall review the sample pursuant to the agreed-upon terms and shall report results of the review to Plaintiffs' counsel. In the event the parties
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are unable to reach an agreement, the disputed issues will be referred to the Court for resolution. b. At Plaintiffs' option, one statistically significant random or systematic sample shall be drawn by Defendant from a three month period to be designated by the Plaintiffs to determine the accuracy and reliability of delay codes (EX, IT, MV, or EE) used to excuse a delay in processing an application. The sample size shall be a number that is necessary to provide no greater than a 5% confidence interval (margin of error) at the 95% confidence level for that sampling frame. The parties shall meet and confer before the sample is drawn to discuss the sampling methodology; the sample size; the data recording instrument to be used for recording the information drawn from the sample; and the data sources for both the monthly reports and the sample. Defendant shall review the sample pursuant to the agreed-upon terms and shall report results of the review to Plaintiffs' counsel. In the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the disputed issues will be referred to the Court for resolution. c. Plaintiffs reserve the right to audit the sample reviewed by the Defendant as set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) above. If Plaintiffs elect to audit the sample reviews conducted by the Defendant, the parties will meet and confer in an attempt to reach an agreement on an appropriate audit sample size and on an appropriate audit methodology that minimizes
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administrative burden and disruption to the Defendant while providing sufficiently reliable audit res ults as to the accuracy of the Defendant's sample review determinations. If the parties cannot agree on an audit sample size and/or methodology, the issue will be presented to the Court for its resolution, either by Court-monitored discussions conducted by a Magistrate Judge or by a judicial adjudication, as determined by the U.S. District Judge. d. The parties acknowledge that any audit conducted by Plaintiffs pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) above will necessarily involve disclosure of client identifiers and other confidential information that are contained in the electronic individual application files maintained by the Defendant, including confidential medical information protected by HIPAA (protected confidential medical information is frequently contained in Food Stamp application files, especially when households apply for both Food Stamps and Medicaid at the same time utilizing the same application form), by the Food Stamp Act, and by state law. The parties acknowledge that Plaintiffs' counsel represents the certified class and that they would be requesting information on their clients related to their prosecution of this action when the confidential personal information is disclosed pursuant to plaintiffs' conduct of audits. Accordingly, the parties stipulate that the Defendant may release protected confidential information on class members to plaintiffs' counsel consistently with the requirements of
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HIPAA, 42 C.F.R. § 164.512, the Food Stamp Act, 7 C.F.R. § 272.1(c)(3), and state law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-90, related to Plaintiffs' conduct of audits pursuant to 18(c) when the release of such information is "so ordered" by the Court by its approval of this Settlement Agreement and Plaintiffs elect to conduct such audits. Plaintiffs' counsel shall strictly limit its use of confidential personal information obtained from such audits to purposes directly related to this lawsuit, and, if any judicial enforcement proceedings results as a result of any audit conducted pursuant to sub-paragraph 18(c), any necessary confidential personal information shall then either be filed under seal with the approval of the Court or all personal identifiers shall be redacted and the individuals identified by initials or some other agreed acronyms known only to the parties and to the Court. C. Meet and Confer regarding Reports 19. Notwithstanding Paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Order, which limit adjustment of the SNAP Application Timeliness Report to correct inaccuracies identified by Defendant in the reporting of expedited applications in the legacy EMS system, if, during the term of the Court's jurisdiction, Defendant develops new reports which he believes may provide Plaintiffs and the Court with the information required by Section IV(A) of this Order in a manner that is equally reliable and no less convenient, Defendant shall give notice to Plaintiffs' counsel regarding any
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such reports and meet and confer with Plaintiffs' counsel regarding whether Section IV of this Order should be modified to address the new reports.
20. Prior to making any substantive modification to the reports identified herein, Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel with any template or other information to explain the proposed modifications and provide Plaintiffs' counsel with the opportunity to evaluate whether the proposed modified report would continue to provide the information they believe is necessary for monitoring compliance with this Order. Plaintiffs' counsel shall not unreasonably oppose any such modification.
21. To the extent that any subsequent SNAP Application Timeliness Report is derived from data reported in other reports generated by the lmpaCT system or otherwise, Defendants will make such other reports available to Plaintiffs' counsel at the same interval that the SNAP Application Timeliness Report is provided, as set forth in Section IV.
22. If the parties cannot agree on whether any new report or any modified report can be used for the purposes of monitoring Defendant's compliance with the terms of this Order, the disputed issues will be referred to the Court for resolution.
V. INFORMAL REVIEW PROCESS 23. Defendant agrees to provide a mechanism by which Plaintiffs' counsel may bring to the attention of the Defendant those instances in which an initial application may not have been processed in accordance with applicable federal
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statutes and regulations cited herein and Defendant will promptly address these situations within no more than five (5) business days.
VI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND RIGHT TO CURE 24. Plaintiffs may, upon motion to this Court, allege a claim of noncompliance with the terms of this Order. Prior to bringing any such motion, Plaintiffs will be required to serve written notice on defendant detailing any claim of non-compliance. Within the thirty (30) business days thereafter, or at such time as is mutually agreed upon, the parties shall confer by telephone or in-person in a good faith effort to resolve the dispute. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, Plaintiffs may file a motion with this Court alleging a claim of noncompliance and shall specify the relief sought. Any motion shall detail any and all such efforts to resolve the dispute prior to seeking Court intervention. Defendant is preparing to implement its new statewide eligibility management system ("lmpaCT"), currently scheduled for a staged release between October 2016 and May 2017, during which time the Defendant is likely to experience unforeseeable, operational challenges as a result of the scope and complexity of the project. Defendant will notify counsel for the Plaintiffs within three business days of an lmpaCT implementation-related disruption that could affect the timely processing of SNAP applications, even if such an event occurs between SNAP Application Timeliness Reports and set forth all efforts and plans to cure. Plaintiffs shall not unreasonably deny Defendant an opportunity to cure any identified issue that could result in a violation of the Order.
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VII. JURISDICTION 25. Unless otherwise extended by the Court, the Court's jurisdiction herein shall terminate upon Motion by the Defendant when the Defendant has achieved full compliance as defined in paragraph (6, 7 and 8) of this Order for 26 months of any 30 month period, or for 22 consecutive months whichever comes first. The first month that may be counted toward the compliance shall be the month following the date that this Order is so ordered and that Order is entered on the docket sheet of the United States District Court. 26. Upon the Defendant's achievement of full compliance over a time period described in this Section (VII) and termination of this Court's jurisdiction, this action shall be dismissed with prejudice. VIII. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 27. Within forty-five ("45") days of entry of this Order, as an order of the Court, Plaintiffs shall file a bill of costs and motion for attorney's fees and costs with the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In response, Defendant shall not challenge Plaintiffs' entitlement to fees and costs as of the date of this agreement, but may only challenge the amount of the request. IX. GENERAL PROVISIONS 28. Within 30 days of execution of this Order by the parties, the parties shall file this Order with the District Court and request that the Court enter an order:
16

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 17 of 21
a. preliminarily approving the proposed settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate;
b. scheduling a final hearing to determine the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement and whether the Court should approve the Order; and c. approving a class action notice containing a summary of the settlement terms, the date of the final hearing, and information regarding the right to comment or object, which notice shall be posted, in English and Spanish, on the websites for the Department of Social Services and Greater Hartford Legal Aid, and in DSS' Regional offices, and such other places as agreed by the parties and approved by the Court, or as ordered by the Court in the absence of agreement between the parties. d. Between the signing of this Order and the fairness hearing, DSS shall direct all inquiries regarding the Order from class members to Plaintiffs' counsel. 29. The terms and conditions of this Order shall become effective upon so-ordering by the Court. 30. This Order is final and binding upon the parties, their successors and assigns. The parties recognize and acknowledge that the only consideration for signing this Order are the terms stated herein and no other promise, agreement, or
17

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 18 of 21
representation of any kind has been made to any party by any person or entity whatsoever to cause any party to sign this Order.
31. This Order constitutes a compromise settlement of disputed and contested matters between the parties. It shall not be construed as an admission of any sort by any of the parties, nor shall it be used as evidence in a proceeding of any kind, except as necessary to administer and/or enforce the terms of this Order.
32. This Order constitutes an integrated stipulation, containing the entire understanding of the parties with respect to the matters addressed herein and, except as set forth in this Order, no representations, warranties or promises, oral or written, have been made or relied on by the parties. This Order shall prevail over any prior communications between the parties or their representatives relative to matters addressed herein. This Order may not be changed unless the change is in writing and signed by the parties and the Court or the Court on its own.
33. The parties warrant and represent that they have read and understand the foregoing provisions of this Order and that they and their respective signatories are fully authorized and competent to approve and consent to this Order on their behalf.
34. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Order, Defendant reserves the right to seek to implement, change, or otherwise alter or amend the procedures and requirements of this Order if required by intervening changes in federal statute or regulation Inconsistent with this Order. Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel written notification, by certified mail or by hand delivery with written
18

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 19 of 21

acknowledgment of receipt, of a purported required change at least thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of implementation, unless Defendant is required to implement such a purported required change in less than thirty (30) days. If Defendant determines he is required to implement a purported required change in less than thirty (30) days, Defendant shall provide notice to the Plaintiffs' counsel no later than seven (7) working days after learning of a purported required change. Plaintiffs may move the Court to challenge whether the change is required by federal statute or regulations. Any such change shall be implemented as narrowly as possible to preserve as much of this Order as possible.
/11 U/11, AGREED TO ON

.f I .
l1/(
GREATER HARTFORD LEGAL AID Lucy Potter ct23449 lpotter@ghla.org Giovanna Shay ct26702 gshay@ghla.org Cecil J. Thomas ct27264 cthomas@ghla.org 999 Asylum Ave., 3rd Floor Hartford, CT 06105-2465 (860) 541-5000 Fax (860) 541-5050.

'-._,

n/t1/IJ,

NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMIC JUSTICE Marc Cohan phv05466 cohan@nclej.org Mary R. Mannix phv 05465 mannix@nclej.org Greg Bass ct18114 bass@nclej.org 275 Seventh Ave., Ste. 1506 New York, NY 10001 -6708 (212) 633-6967 FAX (212) 633-6371

19

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 20 of 21
AGREED TO ON
7. FOR THE DEFENDANT:
'ssloner, Department of Social Services
F THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Hugh Barber ct# 05731 Office of the Attorney General 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06106 Tel: (860) 808-5210 Fax: (060)808-5385 Ell)atl: u h.Barber
/
v.· / Emily Melendez Assistant Attorney general f ederal Bar No. ct21411 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141-0120 Tel: (860) 808-5210 Fax: (860) 808-5385 .E mily.Melendez@ct.gov
20

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 162-1 Filed 01/05/17 Page 21 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS, individually and on behalf )

of all others similarly situated,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity )

as Commissioner of the State of

)

Connecticut Department of Social

)

Services,

)

Defendant.

)

CASE NO. 3:12-CV-324 (VLB) (CLASS ACTION)

[PROPOSED] ORDER
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e), following notice to the class and a hearing, this Court finds that the foregoing settlement in the above-captioned matter is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and it is:

SO ORDERED: United States District Court Judge

DATED:

21

 
 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 163 Filed 01/06/17 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ZOllJAN-b P l1=2b

JAMES BRIGGS, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

C3·.IV1I2L-cAvC-0T0I O3 ·2N4 ~N·VJO!_. B! OC R_1'DCOCTURT

v.
RODERICK BREMBY, in his Official capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services, Defendant.

CLASS ACTION January 6, 2017

ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING STIPLUATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT AND ORDER OF NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF CLASS
WHEREAS, this action was brought as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23;
WHEREAS, on May 13, 2013, this Court certified the Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2) as "All persons in Connecticut who have applied, who are currently applying, or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely processed for food stamps as required by 7 U.S.C. §2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2." Order Certifying Class, May 13, 2013 (DKT. # 82);
WHEREAS, counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendant Roderick

1

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 163 Filed 01/06/17 Page 2 of 4
Bremby ("Defendant"), in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Social Services(" DSS") have entered into a proposed Stipulation and Order of
Settlement which, if approved by the Court, would dispose of the claims made in this action by the Plaintiffs; and
WHEREAS, counsel for the parties have jointly moved the Court, pursuant to Rule 23 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for preliminary approval of the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement, for a hearing thereon, and for authorization of notice of the hearing to be provided to members of the plaintiff class;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement is preliminarily approved. 2. A hearing pursuant to Rule 23 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be held before this Court on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 at 1:30PM for purposes of determining whether the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be approved by this Court. The hearing shall take place before the Honorable Vanessa L. Bryant, U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, in Courtroom 3 at the Abraham Ribicoff Federal Building, 450 Main
2

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 163 Filed 01/06/17 Page 3 of 4
Street, Hartford, CT 06103. 3. Attached as Exhibit A is the parties' proposed Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action Concerning the Timely Processing of Food Stamp Applications. The Class Notice is hereby approved. 4. At least forty-five (45) days prior to the hearing, the Defendant shall post the Class Notice, in English and Spanish, in the public client waiting areas at the DSS offices in locations that class members are reasonably likely to see. The Class Notice shall be of at least 11" x 17" in size. The Defendant shall post the Class Notice, in English and Spanish, and the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement on its web site at http://ct.gov/dss. The Defendant shall also provide Plaintiffs' counsel with electronic copies of the Class Notice in Spanish, sent by email, which Plaintiffs' counsel shall post, together with the English version, in the waiting room of Greater Hartford Legal Aid. 5. Additionally, at least forty-five (45) days prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel shall post the Class Notice in English and Spanish, and the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement on the web sites of Greater Hartford Legal Aid (www.ghla.org and www.ctlawhelp.org). 6. Any member of the Plaintiff class may appear at the aforesaid hearing, in person or by counsel, and object to the proposed Stipulation and
3

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 163 Filed 01/06/17 Page 4 of 4 Order of Settlement or give reasons why the proposed settlement should not be approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate. 7. Any member of the plaintiff class may also object to or comment on the proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement by submitting objections to the Court in writing. Objections or comments must be post-marked by February 20, 2017 and sent to the Court at the address listed above. It is so ordered Dated: January 6, 2017 At Hartford, Connecticut
The Honorable Judge Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge
4

 
 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 1 of 21

JAMES BRIGGS, Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Z o. 3 p q .'\ q: ll .. ' u i) -

i I i •• I I

'

I -\

l

~

v.

Civil No. 3:12-CV-0324 (VLB)

RODERICK BREMBY, in his Official capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services,
Defendant.

CLASS ACTION MARCH 7, 2017

ORDER OF FINAL APPROVAL OF STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT The parties' proposed Stipulation and Order of Settlement having been
preliminarily approved by this Court on January 6, 2017; adequate notice having been made to the class members; and the parties having appeared at a fairness hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e) on March 7, 2017, this Court hereby finds that the settlement in the above-captioned matter is fair, reasonable and adequate. Accordingly, the Stipulation and Order of Settlement annexed to this Order, incorporating Exhibits A through D referenced in Paragraph 10 of the Stipulation and appended to the Stipulation is SO ORDERED.

Vanessa Lynne Bryant

Digitally signed by Vanessa Lynne Bryant
ON: o=Admlnlstrative Office of the US Courts, emall=vanessa_bryant@ctd.uscourts gov, cn=Vanessa Lynne Bryant Date: 2017.03.08 18:19:22 -05'00'

The Honorable Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Court Judge

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 2 of 21
Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-!Ii Filed OJ/06/17 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECtiCUT

JAMES BRIGGS; lndivldually and on behalf )

of all others similarly situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

}

v.

}

)
RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity J

as Commissioner of the Stale of

}

Connecticut Department of Social

l

Services,

)

Defendant.

)

CASE NO• .3:12;.CV-324 (VLB) (CLASS ACTION)

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SEITLEMENT
Plaintlns brought this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 all&ging that Defendant
Roderick Bremby, in his offici.al capacity as Commissioner of the State of Connecticut Department of Social Services, failed to provide Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits wfthin the fime frame.s man.dated by federaf raw to eligible househotds who apply for benefits.
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant on behalf of themselves and members of a certified class to requlre Defendant to determine such households' eHgibllity within the mandated tim.e frames and provide SNAP within the mandated time frames to those eligible~ The Court entered
an order certifying the class on May 13;. 2013.
This Court also entered a Preliminary lnjuriction Order in this matter on May 131 2013, which was affirmed by the Second Circuit on July 6, 2015. The Plafrltlffs

1

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 3 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-!Ii Filed Ol/06/17 Page 2 of 21
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Defendant opposed, and which remains pending before this Court.
Nevertheless, in the. interest of avoiding the costs, burdens, and uncertainty
of p·otentlallltlgation, the parties h·ave agreed to resolve alllssues presented in this
Htlgatlon without further proceedings and without Defendant admitting any fault or liability. Whereas the parties desire to settle this action, and good causa appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: I. O.EFINlTIONS
F.or purposes of this Stipulation and Order of :Settlement (hereinafter
"Order"), the following definitions apply:
1. "Timely Denlal" means, as to initial appllcatlo.ns for SNAP benefits, an
action taken by the case worker or the dat:a system to deny the initial application and to cause a nofl.ce to be generated on or before the 30th day after the applfcation was submitted to the agency, unless the 30th day falls on a weekend or holiday. If the 30th day falls on a weekend or holiday, the; denlal of SNAP benefits
;shaJI be timely i'f the SNAP application i.s denied on the next business day after the
weekend or holiday.
2. '1Timely Applicat-Ion Appr.oval" means a) as to applications eligible ·fo.r
expedited processing, that SNAP benefits are issued and available to the household no later tha.n the 7th day following the date on which the household submitted the application; and b) as to applications subject to 30 day processingt
2

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 4 of 21
Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 169-$ Filed O:B/06/17 Page 3 of 21
that SNAP benefits are issued and available to the household no later than the 30th day following the date on which the hoUsehold submitted the application.
3. nsupplemental Nutr1tton Assistance Program (SNAPt refers to the program established by 7 U.S.C. § 2011 elseq. and in this Order "SNAP" ami 11food
stamps11 are used interchangeably. II, CLASS CERTIFICATION
4. Pursuant to the C.ourt's May 13, 20'13 order certifying a class, the class is
defined as: HAlf persons fn Connecticut who have applied, are currently applying, or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely proces,seQ for food stamps as required by 7 U;S.c. § 2020(e}(3) and (e')(9}; 7 C.F.R. § 2.73.2.n
Ill. DEFENOANT~S OBLIGATIONS
5. Set forth in sub-paragraphs 5(a)-(c) are Defendant's obligations under federal statutes and re.gutations as to initial regular and expedited SNAP applicants, with Which Defendant shall comply:
a. Defendant shall screen applicant hqusehol<;ts to determine If the
household is eJigible for expedited service of their SNAP application at
the time the household applies for benefits in accordance with 7 U.S.C.
§ 2020(e)(9) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(1)(2).
b. De·fendant shall provide expedited service of a SNAP application to
households eligible for such expedited service no later than the
seventh calendar day following the date the application is fHed as set
forth in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(1)(3}. 3

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 5 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-$ Filed O:B/06/17 Page 4 of 21
c. O.efendant shaH provide .altglble households that complete the initial application process an ol)portunlty to participate in tha SNAP program as soon as possible, but no later than thirty calendar days following
the date the applicatton was filed as required by 1 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3}; 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g}. 6. Defendant shan fully comply with the UmeW processing requirements
of the applicable SNAP· statute and raguta.tions. For purpos·es of this Order, Defendant shall be deemed to be fully ctnnptying with the timely processing
requtreme.nts of the SNAP statute and regulations so tort~ as Defendant meets a
96% timely proc·essing standard with respect to 30 day regular SNAP applications
and also n'Hi!ets a 96% timely processing standard with respect to 7 day expedited SNAP applications, starting no later than the month following the date that this Order is so ordered and that Order is entered on the docket sheet of the United States District Court.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 6 of this Order1 from the
month following the date that this Order is so Ordered and the Order entered on the District Court's dpoket -sheet through the month of June 2017, Oefe:ndant s'hall be deemed to be. ln full compliance with the, timely processing requirements of the SNAP statute and regulations for expedited 7-day applications so long as Defendant meets a timely processing standard as to applications filed in the months In this period, following adjustment of the monthly data as described in paragraph 10 and 11, and 14, defined as the actual number of timely processed
4

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 6 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-$ Filed O:B/06/17 Page 5 of 21
applications Increased by two {2%) :perc,ent. Thus, for example, a rep<>rted
timeliness p.ercec~1tage of .94.2 °/c would be adjusted upwards by 2% to 96.2%.
a. Begrnnlng with appllcatrotts filed in the month of July 2017, Defendant
~hall be deemed to fully comply With the timely proces·s:iJ:lg requirements of the SNAP statute and regulations for expedited appUcations so long as Defendant meets a 96% tfme.ly processing standard with respect to 7 day expedited SNAP applications.
9, For purposes of this Order, the dat-a on Defendant's SNAP Application Timeliness Report, or any subsequent report to which the parties 11gree and the
Court so orders, Is the measure of timely performance as to any month.
Specifically, as reflect~d in the SNAP AppHca.tlon Timeliness Re.port, the. pe.rcent timely as to 30-day regular applications- is the percent reported in the column titled 41Combined Adjusted SNAP Regular" and the percent timel.y as to 7~day expedited applications is the percent reported in th~ column taled i'Comblned Adjusted SNAP Expedited."
10. The SNAP Appllcatio:n Timeliness Rep.ort as ofthe date that this Order
Is entered onto the Docket of this C-ourt ls based on data from the EllglhHity Management System (EMS), the Defendant's legacy computer system, This data is adjusted to more accurately refJe:ct the timeliness of SNAP application pro.cesslng.
Attached to this agreement are two sUpulations agreed to by the parUes the July 18, 2013 Stipulation, DK.T # 94 attached hereto as Exhibit A arid the March 31, 2014
Stipulation, DKT # 104 attached hereto as Exhibit B, detailing adjustments to
.5

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 7 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-!Ii Filed O:B/06/17 Page 6 of 21
capture a number of cases misidentified due to EMS limitations. In addition, the
baseline data In the SNAP Application Timeliness Report reflects: a) expedited
eligibility identification for reporting purp~ses based upon ini'tial scr~ning of the application for assistance and !)} the e:xotusion of cases that were Incorrectly identified as appUcations by EMS but were actually cases reinstated following completion of periodl:c review forms. See Exhibits A thru D attached hereto.
'11. Beghming with the report for applications filed in the month following the month this order is so ordered and entered on the docket sheet, the timely performance rate d~rived by the adjustments set forth in paragraph 10 may, at Defendant's discretion, be f1.,uther adjusted as a result of Individual reviews of
"untimely expedited.. cases for: a} late recertifications that were correctly treated
as new applications but were incorrectly identified as eligible. for expedited processing due to worker error; and b) timely recertifications that should not have been treated as new applications but that were entered In the system as expedited applications becaus-e that was the only option available in EMS.
12. Notwithstanding any other provis'i'on of this Orde:r; no further
adjustments to the SNAP Application Timeliness Report to correct inaccuracies In
the EMS system will be made during the-term of this Order, other than those listed
In paragraphs 7, 10 and 11 ofthls Order.
6

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 8 of 21 Case 3: 12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-ffi Filed O:B/06/17 Page 7 of 21
13. Cases coded as untime-ly due to client delay as specifled here1n In
paragraph 13 shaH be considered timely fa•· purposes of Pa:ragraph 1Jl(6) af this Order. Delay in such cases will be coded as follows:
a. Extension Granted (EX). A case. in which detay In proc.ess:ing results from an applicant missing his or her initial interview and asking to schedule an Interview after the 30th day of the processing period.
b. More Verification (MV). A case in which defay results from a request for verlffeation that the Department did not reasonably need to request during the fnltlat review of the application, and the due date for supplying the verifi.cation falls after the close of the thirty day period because of the need to allow the applicant 10 days to respond to the request. Thfs code
shaH not ba used if the requ1red verification should reasonably have been requested during the Department's Initial review of the appltc:ation. c. Insufficient Time (IT}. This delay results when there Is lnsuffJ~,:ient time for the worker to process the application and prov:lde benefits by the 301h
day because: 1) the appHcant provides verification after the date due but before the 30th day and the worker approves on the 30th day or the first
buslnes·s day after a wee.kend or holiday if the 30th day fell on a weekend
or holiday; or the applicant missed the inftial Interview, the Department
sent the a.ppl.lcant a Noti:ce of IVIisse.d Interview (NOMI) and the interview
Is completed on the 30th day or the first business day after a weekend or
holiday If the 30th day fell on a weekend or holiday. 7

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 9 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 169-!li Filed O:B/06/17 Page 8 of 21
14. Emergency Event (:EE). Thl$ delay code is used where delay is attl'ibutable to an emetgeney event beyon'd the control of the. D&fendant, suc.h as natural disasters., severe weather condlllons, or power outages. ImpaCT implementation-related delays do not constitute an emergency event justifying use of the EE code. This de.lay excuses Defendant1s performance fo·r the particular
applications affected if~ 1) one or more off.tces were closed or unable to enter data Into an eligibility system for a full day; 2) Defendant was unable to process the
particular applications affected as a result; 3) the particular applications needed to
be processed on the day that the emergeMcy even:t occurred; and 4) the particular
applications affected were subs.equently processed within three business days of the conclusion of the emergency event. This code Is used onfy upon instr~mtion from Defendant's Central Office. The EE code can be Wied for both expedited and regular appllcat1ons. The use of this code is subject to sample review by Defendant and/or audit by PlahiUffs in accordance with paragraph 18.
15. Cased cod.ed EX, MV, IT and EE will each appear in a separate column 'in the SNAP Applfcation Time.llness Report and will be counted as timely processed cases.
tG. Defendant agrees that he shall enact any changes to policy to e·nsure
that DSS staff, employees, agents, and assigns comply with the terms and
conditions of this Order and will submit them to PlalntfffS' counsel for review and comment prior to enactment. In addition, Defendant shall conduct such training as
is neces.sary to ensure that DSS staff, employees, agents, and assigns comply wfth
a

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 10 of 21
Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16!3-!li Filed O:B/06/17 Page 9 of 21
the terms and conditlc:>ns of thl$ 01·der. Moreover~ Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel with copies of any c'har1ged policy memos, procedures manuals, train.ing materials, and internal directiVes l~Pon lss:uance. In addition. Defendant will add language to the SNAP application that informs the appltcant that a worker
wliJ call the applicant by phone or that the: appUcant rnay call the Department for a
SNAP interview at .any time after the applicant has submitted the application. IV. REPORTS A. Tlmelines.s of SNAP Applications 17. During the term of this Order, Oe.fendant shaH provide Plaintiffs'
counsel with the forlowing reports,. by the firsl business day on or after the fifteenth
o·f each month, except for those months the Defendant exercises Its discretion
under paragraph 11 of this Order to review case files in which case the Oe.fendant
shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel with the reports by the f1t'$t business day on or after the twenty-second of each month:
a. The monthly SNAP Application Timeliness Report that has been designed pursuant to this Courl!s Preliminary Injunction Order; the parties' July 18,
2013 StlpuJation, DKT # 94 att~ched here as Exhibit A; the March 31, 2014 Stipulation, OKT # 104 aflaohed here as Exhibit B; and Exhibit D attached
hereto, further modlfied to include a column Indicating how many cases
were excluded based on C.lietlt fault pursuant to paragraphs 13-15. A
copy of the March 2016 Report Is attached as Exhibit c. AddltionaJ columns will be added to the report in the month following the month this
9

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 11 of 21
Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-$ Filed O:B/06/17 Page 10 of 21
order is entere.d, to reflect c~ses coded IT and EE, Any adjustments made
pursuant to paragraph 11 shall also be refte,cted on the report. b. The monthly Appllc,aflon Length Pending Report so long as it Is
generated by the Eltgibility-Management System ("eMS'');
c, The monthly Expedited Servlce Report fo.r so long as it ls generated by EMS.
B. Sampling
18. Sampling will occ.ur under two circumstances, neither of which is mutually exclusive:
a. At Plaintiffs' option, one sta'tlsttcaiJy slgnlflcaiit random or systematic
sample shall be drawn by Defendant from a month to be designated by the Plaintiffs to determine the accuracy and reHability of the reporting set forth in Section IV(A) of this Order. The sample sl:z:e shall be a number
that Is necessarY tQ pr<>vlde no greater than a 5% confidence interval (margin of error) at ttw 95% confidence' level for that sampUn.g frame. T}JQ· parties shall meet and confer before the sample Is drawn to dlsc.uss the
sampling methodology; the sample sl~e:; the data recor.ding Instrument to be U$ed for recording the inform~tton drawn from th'e sample.; and the
data sources for both the monthly reports and the sample. Defendant
shall review the, sample pursuant to the agreed-upon terms and shall
report results of the rev.lew to Plaintiffs' counseL rn the event the parties
10

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 12 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-$ Filed O:B/06/17 Page 11 of 21
are unable to reach an agreement, the di$puted issues wUI be referred to
the Court for resolution.
b. At PlalnUffs' option, one statistically stgniffcant random ot· systematic sample shafl be drawn by Defendant from a three month period to be designated by the Plaintiffs to determine the accuracy and reliability of
delay codes (EX, IT, MV, or EE) used to excuse a delay in processing an applicaUon. The sample size shall be ~ number that is necessary to provide no greater than a 5% confidence interval (margin of error) at the 95% confidence level for that sampling frame. The parties shall meet and confer before the sample is drawn to discuss the sampling methodologyj
the sample sb~e; the data recording instrument to be used for recordln.g
the information drawn from tbe sample; and the d'ata s:ourc.es for both the monthly reports and the sample. Defendant shall review the samplo pursuant to the agreed-upon terms .and shall report results ot·the review to Plaintiffs' counsel. In the eve.nt the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the disputed issues will be referred to the Court for res:olution. c. Plaintiffs reserve the right to audit the sample revlewed by the Defendant as &at forth in paragraphs (a) ·and (b) above. If Plaintiffs elect to audit the sample reviews cot1ducted by the Defendant, the parties will meet and confer in an attempt to reach an agreement on an appropriate audl.t sample s·ize and on a.n appropriate audit methodology that minlrrtlzes
11

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 13 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-!n Filed Ol/06/17 Page 12 of 21
administrative burden and disruption to the Defendant whUe providing sufftcfently reliable audlt results as to the accuracy of the Defendant's sample revi'ew determinations. If the parties cannot agree on an audit sample· size and/or methodology, the iss,ue will be presented to the Court for its resolution, either by Court..monltored discusslons condu,cted by a Ma_glstrate Judge or by a judicl:al adjudlcation1 as determined by the U.S. District Judge.
d. The parties acknowledge tha.t any aud.it conducted by Plaintiffs pursuant to sub~paragraph (c) above will necessarily involve disclosure of client
identifiers and other confldentlal infot'mation that are contained In, the electronic individual application fHes maintained by the Defendant, Including confidential medical information protected by HIPAA (protected confidential medical information is frequently contained in Food Stamp appUcation fll.es, especially when households appJy for both Food Stamps and Med·lcald at the same time utfflzlng the saiTle applieation form)~ by the
Food Stamp Act, and by state law. The parties acknowledge that Plalntlffsr counsel repre&ents the certified class and that they would be
reques·ting Information on their clients related to their prosecution of thfs action when the confidential p.ersortal Information is, disclosed pursuant
to plaintiffs' conduct of audits. Accordingly, the parties s.tiputate that the Defendant may release ptotected confidential information on class member.s to plaintiffs' cot,msel consistently with the requirements of
12

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 14 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-9i Filed O:B/06/17 Page 13 of 21
HIPAA, 42 C,F.R. § 164.512,. the Food. Stamp Act, 7 C.F.R. § 272.1 (c)(3),
and state law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-90} related to Plaintiffs' conduct of audits pursuant to 1>8{c) when the release of such informatlon is "so ordet·ed" by the court by its approval of this Settfement Agreeme.nt and Plaintiffs elect to conduct such audits. Plaintiffs' counsel shall strrctly Hrnlt It$ use of confidential personal information obtained from such audits to purposes directly related to this lawsuit, and) if any judicial enforcem.ent proceedings results as a result of any audit conducted pursuant to sub-paragraph t8(cll any necessary confidential personal information shall then either be filed under seal with the approva' of the Court or all personal Identifiers shall be redacted and the indiViduals
identified by initials or some other agreed acronyms known only to the
parties and to the Court. C. Meet and Confer regarding Reports 19. Notwithstanding Paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Order, which limit adjustment of the SNAP Application Timeliness Report to correct lnaccqracies identified by Defendant In the reporting of expedited appHcations In the legacy EMS system, if, during the term of the Court's jurisdiction, Defendant develops new
reports whlch he believes may provide Plaintiffs and the Court with the. information required by Section IV(A) of this Order in a manner that Is equally reliable and no,
less convenient, Defendant shall give notice to Plaintiffs' counsel regarding any
13

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 15 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-!Ii Filed O:B/06/17 Page 14 of 21
such reports and meet and confer with Plaintiffs' counsel regarding Whether Section IV of this Order should be modified to address the n.ew reports.
20. Prior to makfng any substantive mo~dification to the reports Identified herein, Deferidants shaU provide Plaintiffs• couns.e~ with any template or other information to explatn the proposed modifications and provide Plah1tlffs' counse.l with the opportunity to evaluate whether the proposed modified report would continue to provide the information they believe is necessary for monitoring compliance with this Order. Plaintiffs' counsel shalf not unreasonably oppose any such modification.
21. To the extent that any subsequent SNAP Applicatton TitneUness
Report is derived from data reported in other reports gen:era:ted by the ImpaCT
system or otherwise. Defendants will make such other reports available to
Plaintiffs' counsel at the same Interval that the SNAP Application Timeliness Rep()rt is provided, as S'et forth In Section IV.
22. If the parties cannot agree on whether any new ·report or any modified report can be used for the purposes of monitoring Defendant's compliance with the
wm terms of this Order, the disputed Issues be referred to the Court for resolution.
V. INFORMAL REVIEW PROCESS
23. Defendant agrees to provide a mechanism by which Plaintiffs' counsel
may bring to the attention of the Defenda.nt those instances in which an initial application may not have been proc~ssed 111 accordance with ap.pficable federal.
14

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 16 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-9i Filed OJI/06/17 Page 15 of 21
statutes and regulations cited herein and Defendant will promptly address these situations within no more than five (5.) business d'ays.
VI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND RIGHT TO CURE
24. Plaintiffs may, upon motion to- this Court; allege a claim of
noncompliance w1th the terms of thts Or.der. Prior to brlnglng any such motion, Plaintiffs will be re.quired to serve written notice on defendant detaiiJng any claim of
non"complfance. Within the thirty (30) business days thereafter, or at such time as
is mutually agreed upon, the parties shall confer by telephone or in-person In a good faith effort to 1·esolve the dispute. If the parties are unable to res.olve the dispute, Plaintiffs may file a motion with this Court alleging a claim of noncompliance and shaH specify the relief sought Any motiOn shall detail any and all such efforts to resolve the dispute prior to seeking Court Intervention. Defendant is preparing to implement its new statewide eligibility management system
("ImpaCT"), currently scheduled for a staged release between October 2016 and
May 201:7; during which time the Defendant is flkely to experience unforeseeable, operatiot1al challenges as a result of the scope and complexity of the project Defendant will notlfy counsel for the Plaintiffs within three business days of an ImpaCT lrnplementatlonwrelated disruption that could affect the timely processing of SNAP applications, even if such an event occurs between SNAP AppUcatl.on Timeliness Reports and set forth all effot·ts and plans to cure. Plaintiffs shall not unreasonably deny Defendant an opportunity to cure any identified issue that could result in a violation of the Order.
15

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 17 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-!Ii Filed O:B/06/17 Page 16 of 21
VII. .J:URISDICTIQN 25. Unless otherwise extended by the Court, the Court's jurisdiction herein shall terminate upon Monon by the Defendant when the Defendant has achieved full compliance as defined in paragraph (&, 7 and Q) of this Order for 26 montl)s of any 30 month period, or for 22 consecutlve months whichever 'Comes first. The· first month that may be counted toward the compliance shall be the month following the date that this Order Is so ordered and that Order is entered on the dock(Jt sheet of the United States CHs.trict Court. 26. Upon the Defendant"s ach1evement of full compllanc:e over a time period described in this Section (VII) and termination of this Court's jurtsdictlon, this action shall be dismissed with prejudice. VIII. ATTORNEY'S FEE!S AND COSTS 27. Within fo.rty-five e'45") days of entry of this Order, as an ord.er of the Court, Plaintiffs shall file a bitl of costs and motion for attorney's fees and costs
with thfl Court pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1988. In response, Defendant shall not
challenge Plaintiffs' entitlement to fees and costs as of the date of this agreement, but may only challenge the,amount ofthe request.
IX. GENERAL PROVISIONS 28. Within 30 days of exe:eution of this Order by the parties, tfl~ parties shall file this Order with the o·istrlct Court and request that the Court enter an order:
16

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 18 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-9i Filed O:B/06/17 Page 17 of 21
a. pn:diminarlly approving the proposed settlement as fair, reaso11able, and adequate;
b. scheduling a final hearing to determine the fairness, r~asonablenass, and adequacy of the propm~ed settlement and whether the Court should approve the Order; and c. approving a class action notice contaihlng a summary of the
settlement terms, the date of the final hearing, and information regat'ding the right to comment or object, which notice shall be
posted; in English and Spanish, on ,fhe websites for the Department of Social Services and Greater Hartford Legal Aid, and in DSS' Regional offices, and such other places as agreed by the parties and approved
by the Court1 or as ordered ~Y the Court in the absence of agreement between the parties.
d. Between the si,gning of this Orcter and the fairness hearlng1 DSS shall di'rect all inquiries regarding the Order from class members to Plallitiffs' counsel. .29. The terms and conditions of this Order shaH become e.ffective upon so-ordering bY the Court. 30. This Order is final and binding upon the parties, their succe.ssors and assigns. The parties recognize and acknowledge that the. only consideration for signing this Order are th~ terms stated herain and no other promise1 agreement> or
17

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 19 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16B-ffi Filed O:B/06/17 Page 18 of 21
representation of any kind has been made to any party by any person or entity
whatsoever to cause any party to sign this Order.
31. This Order constitutes a compromise settlement of disputed and
contested matters between the p·artles. It shall not be construed as an admission of
any sort by any of the parties, nor shall Jt be used as evidence In a proceeding of
any kind, except as necessary to administer and/or enforce the terms of thfs Order.
32. This Order com~titutes an Integrated s-tipulation, containing the entire understanding of the parfles with respect to the matters addressed herein and,
e:xcept as set forth in this Order) no representatlons1 wanantie.s or promises, oral or written, have ba.an made or re.lied on by the parties. This Order shall prevail over any prior communications between the parties or theJr representatives relative to matters addr-essed herein. This Ordet' may not be changed unless the change Is In writing and signed by the parties and the Court or the Court on its own.
33. The parties warrant and represent that they have read and understand
the foregoing provis1ons of this Order and that they and their respective signatories are fully authorized and competent to approve and cons,ent to this Order on their behalf.
34. Notwithstanding the provisions of thi.s Order, Defendant reserves the. right to seek to implement, change, or otherwise alter or amend the procedures and
requirements of this Order if required by Intervening changes In federal statute or
regulation Inconsistent With this Order. Defendant shall provide Pla.intiffs' counsel written notifJcation, by certified mall or by hand delivery with written
18

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 20 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16lHii Filed OJI/06/17 Page 19 of 21
~cknowledgment of reuelpt, of a purported requlr·ect change at le~st thirty (30) days
prior to the commencement of implementation, unless .Defendant is required to
implement such a purported required change in less than thirty (30) days. If
Defendant determines he is required to implement a purported required chang& In
less than thirty {30). days, Defendant shall provide notice to the Plaintiffs' counsel
no later than seven (7) working days aft-er learning of a purported reqUII'ed change.
Plaintiffs rnay move the Court to challenge Whether the change is required by
federal ·statute or regulations. Any such change shall be implemented as narrowly
as possible to preserve as much of this Order as possible.
/1 AGREED TO ON IJ...~; (, t
FO~ TH~ ,~~ AI NTIFFS:
£,11 ; }&('I GREAfER HARTFORD LEGAL AID
Lucy Potter ct23449 lpotter@ghla.org Giovanrta Shay ct26702 gshay@ghla.arg
Cecil J. ThomaE; c.tZ7264 cthomas@ghla.org 999 Asylum Ave., 3rd Floor Hartford, CT 061 05-24&5 {86'0) 541·5000 Fax (860) 541-5050.
Nuf ~....~WAf 11Jif/J;,
NATlONAL CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMIC JUSTICE Marq Coh~n phv05466 cohan@ncleJ.org Mary R. Mannix phv 05465 mannlx@nclej.org Greg Bass ct18114 bass@nclej.org 275 Seventh Ave., Ste. 1506
New York, NY 10001-6708 (212) 633-6967 FAX (212) 633~6371
19

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 170 Filed 03/09/17 Page 21 of 21 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 16S-!Ii Filed O:B/06/17 Page 20 of 21

1"1 AGREED TO ON

z:1l?>

7- FOR THE DEFENDANT:

I I

(

l?mlly '1. rY1ele~ld_ez Assl~tant Attern~y genEJraf

I

f.ad·sral Bat· No, ct2'14'11

55 Etm Stt·e.et

P.o. Bo>< 1.20

Hartford, <;T 06141-01'20-

Tel~ (:86.0) 808+5'210

Fax: (860) 008--!i'385

,Emlly.MelettcJ&z@ct.nov

20

 
 Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 182 Filed 09/11/17 Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS, individually and on behalf )

of all others similarly situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity )

as Commissioner of the State of

)

Connecticut Department of Social

)

Services,

)

Defendant.

)

CASE NO. 3:12-CV-324 (VLB) (CLASS ACTION)

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEE ANO COSTS

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that Defendant Roderick Bremby, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the

State of Connecticut Department of Social Services, failed to provide Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits within the time frames mandated by federal law to eligible households who apply for benefits.

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against

Defendant on behalf of themselves and members of a certified class to require

Defendant to determine such households' eligibility within the mandated time

frames and provide SNAP within the mandated time frames to those eligible.

WHEREAS, the Court entered an order certifying the class on May 13, 2013.

This Court also entered a Preliminary Injunction Order in this matter on May 13,

2013, which was affirmed by the Second Circuit on July 6, 2015.

1

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 182 Filed 09/11/17 Page 2 of 6
WHEREAS, In the interest of avoiding the costs, burdens, and uncertainty of potential litigation, the parties agreed to resolve the issues presented In this litigation without further proceedings and without Defendant admitting any fault or liability.
WHEREAS, on March 9, 2017, the Court "so ordered" the Stipulation and Order of Settlement ("Settlement"), which approved the Settlement entered Into by the parties; and
WHEREAS, the Settlement provides that "within forty.five ("45") days of entry of this Order, as an order of the Court, Plaintiffs shall file a bill of costs and motion for attorney's fees and costs with the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In response, Defendant shall not challenge Plaintiffs' entitlement to fees and costs as of the date of this agreement, but may only challenge the amount of the request"; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class and defendant, In his offlclal capacity, now seek by this Stipulation and Order of Settlement Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Stipulation") to resolve the issue of attorney's fees, costs, litigation expenses, and disbursements for the period through April 17, 2017, without further proceedings and on terms and conditions just and fair to the parties;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between Plaintiff Class and Defendant, as represented below, as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
2

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 182 Filed 09/11/17 Page 3 of 6
I. Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of nine hundred and twenty-two thousand dollars and no cents ($922,000.00) to the below designated plaintiffs' counsel in full and complete satisfaction of any and all claims for attorney's fees, costs, litigation expenses, and disbursements sought by, or incurred on behalf of, the Plaintiff Class as against Defendant in connection with the acts, transactions, occurrences or omissions alleged in this action for the period through April 17, 2017 as well as any fees, costs or expenses incurred in negotiating the fee award through and including the date that this Stipulation is signed by the parties counsel.
2. Upon receipt of any forms and/or documents required by the State of Connecticut Office of the Comptroller, the State of Connecticut shall, within thirty (30) days thereof, make payment by delivering a check or wire transfer payable in the amounts of $391,698.02 to Greater Hartford Legal Aid, 999 Asylum Ave., 3rd Floor, Hartford, CT 06105-2465 and $530,301.98 to the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506, New York, NY 10001.
3. In consideration for the paymentdescribed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Stipulation, the Plaintiff Class and Plaintiffs' counsel herewith releases and forever discharges the State of Connecticut, the Connecticut Department of Social Services, Roderick Bremby and all other present or former officers, agents and employees of the State of Connecticut, from all actions, causes of action, suits, claims, controversies, damages and demands of every nature and name, in law and in equity, including attorneys' fees and costs, litigation expenses and
3

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 182 Filed 09/11/17 Page 4 of 6
disbursements, which the Plaintiff Class and Plaintiffs' counsel, his successors and assigns or legal counsel ever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world which are stated in or arise out of the factual incidents as set forth In the Complaint in the above-referenced case, and any claim for fees, costs and expenses that were Incurred up to and including through Aprll 17, 2017 as well as any fees, costs or expenses incurred In seeking and negotiating the fee award through and Including the date that this Stipulation Is signed by Plaintiffs' counsel.
4. This Stipulation embodies the entire agreement of the parties in this matter and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Stipulation regarding the subject matter of the Instant proceedings, other than the Settlement, shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the parties hereto, or to vary the terms and conditions contained herein.
5. This Stipulation Is final and binding upon the parties, their successors and assigns.
6. This Stipulation may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and which, taken together, shall constitute one and the same Instrument.
4

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 182 Filed 09/11/17 Page 5 of 6
AGREED TO AND SUE!MITTED ON SEPTEME!ER 7, 2017
GRE TER HA FORD LE ALAID Giovanna Shay ct267ll2 ay@ghla.org Lucy Potter et23449 lpotter@ghla.org Cecil J, Thomas ct27264 cthomas@ghla.org 999 Asylum Ave., 3rd Floor Hartford, CT 06105-2465 (860) 541-5000 Fax (860) 541-5050
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMIC JUSTICE Marc Cohan phv05466 cohan@nclej.org Mary R. Mannix phv 05465 mannilc@nclej.org Greg Bass ct18114 bass@nclej.org 275 Seventh Ave., Ste. 1506 New York, NY 10001·6708 (212) 633-6967 FAX (212) 633-6371
CE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL • mily Melendez Jennifer Callahan 55 Elm Street P.O. aox 120 Hartford, CT 06106
5

Case 3:12-cv-00324-VLB Document 182 Filed 09/11/17 Page 6 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES BRIGGS, individually and on behalf )

of all others similarly situated,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

RODERICK BREMBY, in his official capacity )

as Commissioner of the State of

)

Connecticut Department of Social

)

Services,

)

Defendant.

)

CASE NO. 3:12-CV-324 (VLB) (CLASS ACTION)

[PROPOSED] ORDER
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, this Court finds that the foregoing settlement in the above-captioned matter is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and it is:

SO ORDERED: United States District Court Judge

DATED:

6

 
 CLOSED,EFILE,RAR,REFCNF
U.S. District Court District of Connecticut (New Haven) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:12−cv−00324−VLB

Briggs v. Bremby Assigned to: Judge Vanessa L. Bryant Referred to: Judge Robert A. Richardson (Settlement) Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/05/2012 Date Terminated: 12/19/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

James Briggs Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

represented by Cecil Joseph Thomas Greater Hartford Legal Aid 999 Asylum Avenue Hartford, CT 06105−2465 860−541−5017 Fax: 860−541−5050 Email: cthomas@ghla.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory Lee Bass National Center for Law and Economic Justice 275 Seventh Ave., Suite 1506 New York, NY 10001−6708 (212) 633−6967 Fax: (212) 633−6371 Email: bass@nclej.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lucy Potter Greater Hartford Legal Aid 999 Asylum Avenue Hartford, CT 06105−2465 860−541−5000 Email: lpotter@ghla.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marc Cohan National Center for Law and Economic Justice 275 Seventh Ave., Suite 1506 New York, NY 10001−6708 212−633−6967 Fax: 212−633−6371 Email: cohan@nclej.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary R. Mannix National Center for Law and Economic Justice 275 Seventh Ave., Suite 1506 New York, NY 10001−6708 212−633−6967 Fax: 212−633−6371 Email: mannix@nclej.org LEAD ATTORNEY

V.
Defendant
Roderick Bremby in his official capacity as Commissioner of the State of Connecticut Department of Social Services

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Petra T. Tasheff National Center for Law and Economic Justice 275 Seventh Ave., Suite 1506 New York, NY 10001−6708 212−633−6967 Fax: 212−633−6371 Email: tasheff@nclej.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Giovanna E. Shay Greater Hartford Legal Aid 999 Asylum Avenue Hartford, CT 06105−2465 860−541−5061 Fax: 860−541−5050 Email: gshay@ghla.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Hugh Barber Attorney General's Office Health & Human Services 55 Elm St., Po Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141−0120 860−808−5210 Fax: 860−808−5385 Email: hugh.barber@ct.gov TERMINATED: 04/27/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer L Callahan Attorney General's Office − Elm St (Htfd) 55 Elm St. Environmental Dept. 2nd Floor Hartford, CT 06106 860−808−5210 Fax: 860−808−5385 Email: jennifer.callahan@ct.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rosemary Miller McGovern Attorney General's Office −Elm Htfd 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141 860−808−5210 Email: rosemary.mcgovern@ct.gov TERMINATED: 04/07/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily V. Melendez Attorney General's Office Health and Education

55 Elm St. Hartford, CT 06106 860−808−5210 Fax: 860−808−5385 Email: emily.melendez@ct.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/05/2012 03/05/2012 03/05/2012
03/05/2012 03/05/2012 03/05/2012 03/05/2012 03/05/2012 03/05/2012 03/06/2012
03/06/2012 03/06/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Roderick Bremby ( Filing fee $350 receipt number 0205−2423723.), filed by James Allen Briggs.(Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
Request for Clerk to issue summons as to Roderick Bremby. (Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by James Allen Briggs.Responses due by 3/26/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Plaintiff James Briggs, # 3 Exhibit to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction Table 1, # 4 Exhibit to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction Table 2, # 5 Exhibit to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction Table 3, # 6 Exhibit to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction Table 4, # 7 Affidavit Attorney's Declaration in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 8 Exhibit to Attorney's Declaration Attachment 1, # 9 Exhibit to Attorney's Declaration Attachment 2, # 10 Exhibit to Attorney's Declaration Attachment 3)(Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
3 First MOTION for Release of Bond Obligation by James Allen Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Waive Bond for Preliminary Injunction)(Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
4 First MOTION to Certify Class by James Allen Briggs.Responses due by 3/26/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plainitff's Motion for Class Certification)(Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
Judge Vanessa L. Bryant added. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
5 Order on Pretrial Deadlines: Motions to Dismiss due on 06/05/2012. Amended Pleadings due by 5/4/2012; Discovery due by 9/4/2012; Dispositive Motions due by 10/4/2012. Signed by Clerk on 03/05/2012. (Grady, B.) Modified on 3/6/2012 to correct signature (Grady, B.). (Entered: 03/06/2012)
6 ELECTRONIC FILING ORDER − PLEASE ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH COURTESY COPY REQUIREMENTS IN THIS ORDER: Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 03/05/2012. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
7 ORDER RE: Judge's Chambers Practices. Counsel are directed to read and comply with the Chambers Practices and Standing Orders prior to filing any document. So ordered. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 03/05/2012. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
8 NOTICE TO COUNSEL: Counsel initiating or removing this action is responsible for serving all parties with attached documents and copies of 6 Electronic Filing Order, 5 Order on Pretrial Deadlines, 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 4 First MOTION to Certify Class, 7 Order Re: Chambers Practices, 3 First MOTION for Release of Bond Obligation, 1 Complaint. Signed by Clerk on 03/06/2012. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
9 ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and LR 4 as to *Roderick Bremby* with answer to complaint due within *21* days. Attorney *Lucy Potter* *Greater Hartford Legal Aid* *999 Asylum Avenue* *Hartford, CT 06105−2465*. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
10 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. The Court schedules a Pretrial Conference set for 3/20/2012 01:00 PM in Courtroom Two, 450 Main St.,

03/08/2012
03/08/2012 03/08/2012 03/08/2012 03/12/2012 03/15/2012 03/20/2012
03/20/2012 03/26/2012
04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/09/2012 04/09/2012

Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant for planning purposes. The Parties should be prepared to discuss a briefing schedule for the preliminary injunction hearing / trial, the allegations in the complaint, class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and Mandamus.The Court orders the Plaintiff to serve the Defendant by 3/13/2012 as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1) the Court "may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party." (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
11 ORDER. All parties are asked to read and comply with the Court's Chambers Practices, including the filing and discovery dispute resolution requirements. Failure to comply may result in the summary denial of relief sought in a non−compliant pleading, re: 7 Order Re: Chambers Practices. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/08/2012. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Cecil Joseph Thomas on behalf of James Briggs (Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Gregory Lee Bass on behalf of James Briggs (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
14 NOTICE by James Briggs Plaintiff's Disclosure of Related Case (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
15 SUMMONS Returned Executed by James Briggs. Roderick Bremby served on 3/8/2012, answer due 3/29/2012. (Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Hugh Barber on behalf of Roderick Bremby (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 03/15/2012)
17 First MOTION for Extension of Time until April 13, 2012 File Opposition 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 4 First MOTION to Certify Class by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) Modified on 3/26/2012 to change event (Grady, B.). (Entered: 03/20/2012)
18 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant: Conference held on 3/20/2012. Total Time: 1 hour and 26 minutes(Court Reporter D.SMITH(ECRO).) (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) by Roderick Bremby.Responses due by 4/16/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Attachment 1, # 4 Attachment 2, # 5 Attachment 3, # 6 Attachment 4, # 7 Memorandum in Support)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 03/26/2012)
20 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Response as to 19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) until April 16, 2012 by James Briggs. (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
21 First REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
22 ORDER granting 20 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to MOTION to Dismiss until April 16, 2012. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/9/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 04/09/2012)
23 SCHEDULING ORDER: The Court adopts the Partie' Rule 26(f) report and sets the following case management deadlines: Discovery shall be completed by 10/2/2012; Dispositive Motions are due by 11/1/2012; if no Dispositive Motions are filed, the Joint Trial Memorandum is due by 12/3/2012 and trial to the Court will commence during January 2013 in Courtroom Two, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant; if Dispositive Motions are filed the Joint Trial Memorandum is due by 9/1/2013 and trial to the Court will commenced during October 2013 in Courtroom Two, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant. Dates for the presentation of evidence will be designated following the submission of the Joint Trial Memorandum. All Proposed Voir Dire questions, Proposed Jury Charge Instructions, and Motions in Limine must be filed along with the Joint Trial Memorandum. All evidentiary objections raised in the Joint Trial Memorandum must be the subject of a Motion in Limine supported by applicable Second Circuit precedent. In addition, Defendant's response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is due on May 4, 2012 and Plaintiff's reply will be due May 18, 2012. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/9/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 04/09/2012)

04/09/2012
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24 ORDER granting 17 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendant's response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is due on May 4, 2012 and Plaintiff's reply is due May 18, 2012. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/9/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 04/09/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) Responses due by 4/16/2012 (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Responses due by 5/4/2012 (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
25 Memorandum in Opposition re 19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) filed by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Carr v. Wilson−Coker Slip Opinion)(Thomas, Cecil) (Entered: 04/16/2012)
26 NOTICE of Appearance by Rosemary Miller McGovern on behalf of Roderick Bremby (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 04/26/2012)
27 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 4 First MOTION to Certify Class until May 14, 2012 by Roderick Bremby. (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 04/26/2012)
28 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Reply Brief by Roderick Bremby. (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
29 ORDER granting 27 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, First MOTION to Certify Class until May 14, 2012. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/30/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
30 ORDER granting 28 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/30/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
31 REPLY to Response to 19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) filed by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 4 First MOTION to Certify Class, 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Responses due by 5/14/2012 (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
32 Memorandum in Opposition re 4 First MOTION to Certify Class filed by Roderick Bremby. (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 05/14/2012)
33 Memorandum in Opposition re 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Ronald Roberts, # 2 Affidavit Silvana Flattery, # 3 Affidavit Louis Polzella, # 4 Affidavit Astread Ferron−Poole, # 5 Affidavit Darleen Klase, # 6 Exhibit Case Attachments)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 05/14/2012)
34 Plaintiffs' First Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit for Preliminary Injunction Reply Brief by James Briggs. (Bass, Gregory) Modified on 5/23/2012 to remove text (Grady, B.). (Entered: 05/22/2012)
35 ORDER granting 34 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages for Preliminary Injunction Reply Brief. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/22/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 05/22/2012)
36 MOTION for Extension of Time until June 26, 2012 respond to Plaintiffs First Request For Production by Roderick Bremby. (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
37 OBJECTION Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's 36 Motion for Enlargement of Time filed by James Briggs. (Bass, Gregory) Modified on 5/29/2012 to link to motion (Grady, B.). Modified on 5/29/2012 to creat association (Grady, B.). (Entered: 05/24/2012)
38 REPLY to Response to 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Attorney Lucy Potter in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction)(Bass,

05/29/2012 05/31/2012
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Gregory) (Entered: 05/29/2012)
39 REPLY to Response to 4 First MOTION to Certify Class Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Class Certification filed by James Briggs. (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 05/29/2012)
40 ORDER granting 36 Motion for Extension of Time until June 26, 2012 respond to Plaintiffs First Request For Production absent objection pursuant to Local Rule 7(b). Pursuant to Local Rule 7(b), opposing counsel may move within 7 days of this Order to have the Court set aside the order for good cause. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/31/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 05/31/2012)
41 MOTION for Attorney(s) Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, Petra T. Tasheff to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0205−2524847) by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Affidavit)(Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
42 ORDER granting 41 MOTION for Attorney(s) Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, Petra T. Tasheff to be admitted pro hac vice. Certificate of Good Standing due by 8/12/2012. Signed by Clerk on 06/13/2012. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
43 NOTICE of Appearance by Petra T. Tasheff on behalf of James Briggs (Tasheff, Petra) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
44 NOTICE of Appearance by Mary R. Mannix on behalf of James Briggs (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
45 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until July 26, 2012 respond to plaintiff's first rfp by Roderick Bremby. (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
46 ORDER granting 45 Motion for Extension of Time until July 26, 2012 respond to plaintiff's first rfp. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 6/26/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
47 CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING re 41 MOTION for Attorney(s) Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, Petra T. Tasheff to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0205−2524847) by James Briggs. (Tasheff, Petra) (Entered: 06/28/2012)
48 CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING re 41 MOTION for Attorney(s) Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, Petra T. Tasheff to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0205−2524847) by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
49 CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING re 41 MOTION for Attorney(s) Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, Petra T. Tasheff to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0205−2524847) by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
50 First MOTION for Extension of Time until 120 days after Court's ruling on motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Uncontested Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Completion of discovery by James Briggs. (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 08/16/2012)
51 ORDER granting 50 Motion for Extension of Time. The Court will set an amended scheduling order following its ruling on the motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 8/22/12. (Fernandez, Melissa) Modified on 8/23/2012 to correct signed date (LaLone, L.). (Entered: 08/22/2012)
52 ENTERED IN ERROR . . . Supplemental RESPONSE re 25 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion advising Court of recent 2nd Cir decision filed by James Briggs. (Tasheff, Petra) Modified on 8/28/2012 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 08/24/2012)
53 Supplemental RESPONSE to 54 Supplemental RESPONSE By Plaintiffs' re Additional Authority, to 19 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) Modified on 8/29/2012 to link to motion (Grady, B.). (Entered: 08/27/2012)
Docket Entry Correction: Document 52 Response − Entered in Error − docket entries must be in pleading format. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 08/28/2012)

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54 Supplemental RESPONSE to 25 Memorandum in Opposition to 19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) filed by James Briggs. (Tasheff, Petra) Modified on 8/29/2012 to fix text (Grady, B.). (Entered: 08/29/2012)
55 First MOTION for Leave to File Permission to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Affidavit Attorney's Declaration in Support of Supplemental Memorandum for Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit B)(Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
56 Supplemental MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Permission to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction by James Briggs.Responses due by 12/21/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1 Bremby Statement to Governor)(Bass, Gregory). Added MOTION for permission to file supplemental memorandum in support of preliminary injunction on 12/12/2012 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 11/30/2012)
57 NOTICE of Appearance by Jennifer L Callahan on behalf of Roderick Bremby (Callahan, Jennifer) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
Set deadlines as to 56 MOTION for permission to file supplemental memorandum in support of preliminary injunction. Responses due by 12/21/2012 (Grady, B.) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
58 ORDER granting 3 Motion for Release of Bond Obligation; denying 19 Motion to Dismiss; granting 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See attached memorandum of decision. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/4/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
59 ORDER denying 55 Motion for Leave to File as moot; denying 56 Motion for Preliminary Injunction as moot. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/4/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
60 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. The Court schedules a status conference / hearing for 12/21/2012 at 10:00 AM in Chambers, Suite 320, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant to discuss class certification and injunctive relief. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
61 ORDER denying 56 Motion for Leave to File as moot. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/17/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
62 NOTICE by Roderick Bremby Defendant's Memorandum with Respect to Proposed Class Certification and 2 First MOTION Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit "A")(Barber, Hugh) Modified on 12/21/2012 to link to motion (Grady, B.). (Entered: 12/20/2012)
63 PROPOSED ORDER re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
64 RESPONSE re 63 Proposed Order, 62 Notice, re: 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) Modified on 1/3/2013 to link to motion (Grady, B.). (Entered: 12/20/2012)
65 ORDER rescheduling status conference / hearing for 1/23/2013 in Courtroom 2, 450 Main Street, Hartford, Ct to discuss the nature of injunctive relief and the proposed class. This Court held that the FSA created private enforceable rights in its decision denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. Although the Court concurrently ruled on the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction when it denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court's decision on the motion for preliminary injunction was predicated on the prior ruling on the motion to dismiss. As Defendant's motion to dismiss sounds in standing or alternatively lack of jurisdiction, the Second Circuit has appellate jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on the Court's December 4, 2012 ruling on the motion to dismiss in which it held that Sections 2020 (e)(3) and (9) confer federal

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rights enforceable under Section 1983. See W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing district court ruling denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing); J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Central Schools, 386 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming district court ruling denying motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). In addition, the Second Circuit would also have appellate jurisdiction over both the rulings on the motion to dismiss and the motion for preliminary injunction despite the fact that the Court has yet to determine the exact parameters of injunctive relief under the collateral order doctrine much like questions of qualified immunity. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the final judgment rule, which has come to be known as the "collateral order doctrine." Id. at 54547, 69 S.Ct. 1221. "To qualify for the exception, an order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." U.S. v. Yousef, 475 F. App'x 809, 809 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the Court's rulings on both the motions to dismiss and preliminary injunction satisfy these criteria. Further the rationale supporting appellate jurisdiction over questions of immunity applies with equal force to the present situation. Much like an officer shielded by qualified immunity, the State should not be required to bear the burden of litigation where such a threshold issue is in contention. As Defendant's pleadings appear to suggest that he will likely seek to appeal the Court's decision, the Court reschedules the conference for 1/23/2013 after the appeals period has lapsed. Should the Defendant choose not to appeal, the parties should be prepared to attend the scheduled conference. If the Defendant chooses to appeal the decision, the Court will reschedule the conference after the resolution of such appeal. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/21/2012. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
70 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant: Status Conference held on 12/21/2012. 8 minutes(Court Reporter D.Smith(ECRO).) (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
66 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 65 Order,,,,,,,,,,,, by Roderick Bremby. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 0205−2731778. (Attachments: # 1 Judge's Ruling/Order)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 01/02/2013)
67 ORDER denying 4 Motion to Certify Class without prejudice to renewing after resolution of the pending interlocutory appeal. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 1/4/2013. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
68 First MOTION for Reconsideration re 65 Order,,,,,,,,,,,, 67 Order on Motion to Certify Class by James Briggs.Responses due by 1/25/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Plaintiffs Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration)(Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
69 ORDER denying 68 Motion for Reconsideration on order denying motion for class certification without prejudice to renewing pending resolution of interlocutory appeal. As the Court previously expressed in its prior 65 order, the question of injunctive relief is premature at this juncture in which the Defendant has appealed the Court's determination that the FSA confers enforceable rights under Section 1983. As this Court explained, the Court does not believe that the State should be required to bear the burden of litigation including a preliminary injunction where a threshold issue is in dispute. Moreover, the Plaintiffs' arguments as to whether the interlocutory appeal is premature are properly before the Second Circuit as this Court has no authority to dismiss the notice of appeal. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 1/7/2013. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 01/07/2013)
71 Index to Record on Appeal by Roderick Bremby re 66 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, 26 Notice of Appearance, 38 Reply to Response to Motion, 64 Response, 69 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,, 42 Order on Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice, 55 First MOTION for Leave to File Permission to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, 63 Proposed Order, 4 First MOTION to Certify Class, 68 First MOTION for Reconsideration re 65 Order,,,,,,,,,,,, 67 Order on Motion to Certify ClassFirst MOTION for Reconsideration re 65 Order,,,,,,,,,,,, 67 Order on

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Motion to Certify Class, 39 Reply to Response to Motion, 53 Response, 33 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 43 Notice of Appearance, 14 Notice (Other), 25 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 57 Notice of Appearance, 67 Order on Motion to Certify Class, 1 Complaint, 54 Response, 12 Notice of Appearance, 16 Notice of Appearance, 32 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 59 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 56 Supplemental MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Permission to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Leave to File, 65 Order,,,,,,,,,,,, 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 15 Summons Returned Executed, 13 Notice of Appearance, 19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6) MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6), 60 Calendar Entry, 31 Reply to Response to Motion, 44 Notice of Appearance, 62 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 41 MOTION for Attorney(s) Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, Petra T. Tasheff to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0205−2524847). For docket entries without a hyperlink, contact the court to arrange for the document(s) to be made available to you. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
72 MOTION for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292b) and MOTION to Stay by Roderick Bremby. Responses due by 3/27/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 2d Circuit Ruling, # 3 Exhibit Case Attachments)(McGovern, Rosemary). Added MOTION for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal on 3/7/2013 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 03/06/2013)
Set deadline as to 72 MOTION for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). Responses due by 3/27/2013 (Grady, B.) (Entered: 03/07/2013)
73 Memorandum in Opposition re 72 MOTION to Stay and Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal filed by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 03/26/2013)
74 MANDATE of USCA dated 04/04/2013 dismissing 66 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal(Grady, B.) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
75 REPLY to Response to 72 MOTION to Stay and Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal filed by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Case Attachments)(McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 04/09/2013)
76 RESPONSE re 72 MOTION to Stay and Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal filed by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
77 ORDER denying 72 Motion to Stay; denying 72 Motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal. In the interests of judicial efficiency, the Court will proceed to make determinations on the form of injunctive relief and class certification. The Court schedules a hearing for April 29, 2013 in Courtroom 2, 450 Main Street, Hartford Ct to discuss the form of injunctive relief that will be entered and class certification. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/19/2013. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
78 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Hearing set for 4/29/2013 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom Two, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant. See order dkt# 77 . (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
80 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant: Hearing held on 4/29/2013. Total Time: 1 hours and 56 minutes(Court Reporter D.Smith(ECRO).) (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 05/09/2013)
79 MOTION to Intervene by James Briggs.Responses due by 5/29/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Intervention Memorandum, # 2 Affidavit Hollister Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit Amended Intervenor Complaint)(Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 05/08/2013)
81 ORDER granting 79 Motion to Intervene and appointing Paula Hollister as a class representative. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/13/2013. (Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 05/13/2013)

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82 ORDER certifying class. See attached Order. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/13/2013.(Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
83 Preliminary Injunction Order. See attached Order Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/13/2013.(Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e), MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 83 Order Local Rule 7(c) by Roderick Bremby.Responses due by 6/18/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Attachment 1 May 13, 2013 Order, # 3 Attachment 2 Dec 4 2012 Decision)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order by James Briggs.Responses due by 6/18/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Affidavit, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit A to Mannix Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit B to Mannix Declaration)(Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
86 ORDER: The parties are directed to file responses to the 84 motion to alter judgment and the 85 motion to amend/correct order by 6/12/2013. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/31/2013.(Fernandez, Melissa) (Entered: 05/31/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 83 Order Local Rule 7(c), 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order. Responses due by 6/12/2013. See order dkt# 86 . (LaLone, L.) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
87 Memorandum in Opposition re 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order filed by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit "A" (Roberts Affidavit))(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
88 Memorandum in Opposition re 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 83 Order Local Rule 7(c) filed by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
89 REPLY to Response to 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 83 Order Local Rule 7(c) filed by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 06/26/2013)
90 REPLY to Response to 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order filed by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit)(Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 06/26/2013)
91 MOTION Defer Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Preliminary Injunction Order re 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order by James Briggs.Responses due by 7/18/2013 (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 06/27/2013)
92 RESPONSE re 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 83 Order Local Rule 7(c) Sur−Reply filed by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
93 Joint NOTICE by Roderick Bremby, James Briggs re 91 MOTION Defer Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Preliminary Injunction Order re 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 07/11/2013)
94 Joint STIPULATION re 91 MOTION Defer Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Preliminary Injunction Order re 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order , 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order by Roderick Bremby, James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 07/18/2013)

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95 ORDER: The Court hereby vacates the Scheduling Order, docket no. 23 . Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 8/9/13.(Rock, K.) (Entered: 08/09/2013)
96 MOTION that the court rule on pending motion re 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 83 Order Local Rule 7(c) by Roderick Bremby.Responses due by 11/11/2013 (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
97 MOTION for Greg Bass to Withdraw as Attorney by James Briggs. (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 12/24/2013)
98 ORDER granting 97 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Gregory Lee Bass terminated. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/27/13. (Ives, D) (Entered: 12/27/2013)
99 Second MOTION Final decision on Defendant's Rule 59(e) 84 Motion to Alter and Amend and Local Rule 7(c) Motion for Reconsideration by Roderick Bremby. Responses due by 2/7/2014 (McGovern, Rosemary) Modified on 1/21/2014 to remove text. (Grady, B.). (Entered: 01/17/2014)
100 RESPONSE re 99 Second MOTION Final decision on Defendant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter and Amend and Local Rule 7(c) Motion for Reconsideration (#84) re 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motio filed by James Briggs. (Mannix, Mary) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
101 ORDER granting in part and denying in part the Defendant's 84 Motion to Alter Judgment and/or Motion for Reconsideration. See the attached memorandum of decision. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/24/2014. (Burkart, B.) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
102 ORDER denying as moot the Defendant's 96 and 99 Motions for a Ruling on the Defendant's 84 Motion in light of the Court's 101 Order. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/24/2014. (Burkart, B.) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
103 ORDER denying as moot the Plaintiff's 85 Motion to Amend/Correct and the Plaintiff's 91 Motion to Defer Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Preliminary Injunction Order in light of the Parties' 94 Stipulation. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/24/2014. (Burkart, B.) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
104 Second STIPULATION re 83 Order and Order Re Defendant's Reporting to Plaintiffs' Counsel Pursuant to May 13, 2013 Preliminary Injunction Order by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit I)(McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
105 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 83 Order, 101 Order on Motion to Alter Judgment, Order on Motion for Reconsideration by Roderick Bremby. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0205−3220529. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Judge's May 13, 2013 Order, # 2 Exhibit Judge's March 24, 2014 Order)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
106 ENTERED IN ERROR . . . Index to Record on Appeal by Roderick Bremby re 105 Notice of Appeal,. For docket entries without a hyperlink, contact the court to arrange for the document(s) to be made available to you. (Barber, Hugh) Modified on 5/8/2014 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 05/08/2014)
107 Index to Record on Appeal by Roderick Bremby re 105 Notice of Appeal, 26 Notice of Appearance, 38 Reply to Response to Motion, 74 USCA Mandate, 91 MOTION Defer Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Preliminary Injunction Order re 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order , 81 Order on Motion to Intervene, 87 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 85 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order , 73 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 92 Response, 64 Response, 23 Scheduling Order,,,,, 69 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,, 42 Order on Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice, 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 83 Order Local Rule 7(c), 82 Order, 86 Order, 102 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, 90 Reply to

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Response to Motion, 55 First MOTION for Leave to File Permission to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, 103 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,, 63 Proposed Order, 4 First MOTION to Certify Class, 83 Order, 68 First MOTION for Reconsideration re 65 Order,,,,,,,,,,,, 67 Order on Motion to Certify Class, 39 Reply to Response to Motion, 53 Response, 33 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 100 Response, 43 Notice of Appearance, 14 Notice (Other), 25 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 72 MOTION to Stay and Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal, 96 MOTION that the court rule on pending motion re 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Inju, 57 Notice of Appearance, 66 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, 67 Order on Motion to Certify Class, 1 Complaint, 79 MOTION to Intervene , 54 Response, 12 Notice of Appearance, 75 Reply to Response to Motion, 16 Notice of Appearance, 32 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 99 Second MOTION Final decision on Defendant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter and Amend and Local Rule 7(c) Motion for Reconsideration (#84) re 84 MOTION to Alter Judgment FRCP 59(e) MOTION for Reconsideration re 58 Order on Motio, 58 Order on Motion for Release of Bond Obligation, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 80 Status Conference, 59 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 56 Supplemental MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Permission to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Leave to File, 70 Status Conference, 76 Response, 65 Order,,,,,,,,,,,, 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 77 Order on Motion to Stay, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,,, 15 Summons Returned Executed, 13 Notice of Appearance, 89 Reply to Response to Motion, 19 MOTION to Dismiss FRCP 12(b)(6), 101 Order on Motion to Alter Judgment, Order on Motion for Reconsideration, 60 Calendar Entry, 31 Reply to Response to Motion, 44 Notice of Appearance, 62 Notice (Other), 88 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 41 MOTION for Attorney(s) Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, Petra T. Tasheff to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0205−2524847). For docket entries without a hyperlink, contact the court to arrange for the document(s) to be made available to you. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
108 ENTERED IN ERROR . . . Index to Record on Appeal by James Briggs re 107 Index to Record on Appeal 105 Notice of Appeal,. For docket entries without a hyperlink, contact the court to arrange for the document(s) to be made available to you. (Potter, Lucy) Modified on 5/23/2014 (Grady, B.). (Entered: 05/22/2014)
109 Supplemental Index transmitted to US Court of Appeals consisting of documents 93, 94, and 104, re: 105 Notice of Appeal, 93 Notice regarding plaintiffs' motion to defer, 94 Stipulation, and 104 Stipulation. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
110 NOTICE of Appearance by Giovanna E. Shay on behalf of James Briggs as additional counsel (Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
111 MOTION for Rosemary M. McGovern to Withdraw as Attorney by Roderick Bremby. (McGovern, Rosemary) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
112 ORDER granting Attorney Rosemary Miller McGovern's 111 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendant. Attorney McGovern is terminated from this case. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/7/15. (De Palma, C) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
113 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. The Court schedules a Telephonic Status Conference for 4/28/2015 at 4:30 PM before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant, for the purpose of obtaining a report from the parties on the current status of the case. The parties are ordered to call Chambers at 860−240−3123 with all parties on the line. In the alternative, the parties may set up a dial−in number and provide Chambers with a participant passcode. (De Palma, C) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
114 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant: Telephonic Status Conference held on 4/28/2015. 11 minutes(Court Reporter M. Enderlin (ECRO).) (MacGillivary, S) (Entered: 04/30/2015)

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115 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by Roderick Bremby.(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
120 MANDATE of USCA dated 08/31/2015 affirming the judgment of the district court, re: 105 Notice of Appeal. (Grady, B.) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment by James Briggs.Responses due by 9/29/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Material Facts Under Local Rule 56(a)1, # 2 Affidavit by Attorney Lucy Potter, # 3 Exhibit A to Potter Declaration, # 4 Exhibit B to Potter Declaration, # 5 Exhibit C to Potter Declaration, # 6 Exhibit D to Potter Declaration, # 7 Exhibit E to Potter Declaration, # 8 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment)(Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
117 MOTION for Extension of Time until October 20, 2015 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 09/18/2015)
118 MOTION for Extension of Time until November 3, 2015 to respond to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
119 ORDER granting 117 Motion for Extension of Time; granting 118 Motion for Extension of Time. No further motions for extensions of time will be granted. The parties were previously instructed to confer and file a Rule 16 Report setting forth a reasonable trial schedule in this matter. This case cannot proceed without a scheduling Order. The parties are ordered to immediately confer and file a Rule 16 Report. Given that dispositive motions were filed in September, the parties should articulate any reason why trial should not be set for the first Tuesday in July, 2016, with a Joint Trial Memorandum due 6/1/16. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 10/20/15. (Shechter, N.) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
121 Memorandum in Opposition re 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Material Facts, # 2 Exhibit 1 Table of Contents of Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit 14, # 16 Exhibit 15, # 17 Exhibit 16, # 18 Exhibit 17)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
122 AFFIDAVIT re 121 Memorandum in Opposition to 116 Motion for Summary Judgment. Declaration of Hugh Barber Signed By Hugh Barber filed by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) Modified on to link to motion 11/4/2015 (Grady, B.). Modified on 11/4/2015 ro create association (Grady, B.). (Entered: 11/03/2015)
123 PROPOSED ORDER Joint Report for Rule 16 Scheduling by James Briggs. (Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
124 NOTICE of Appearance by Gregory Lee Bass on behalf of James Briggs (Bass, Gregory) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
125 VACATED SCHEDULING ORDER: The parties' Rule 16 Report is approved, as modified. Fact discovery is to be completed by 3/1/2016; expert discovery is to be completed by 5/16/2016, and the parties should agree on reasonable deadlines for the completion of all expert depositions and reports by that date. The Joint Trial Memorandum is due by 6/1/2016. All Proposed Voir Dire questions, Proposed Jury Charge Instructions, and Motions in Limine must be filed along with the Joint Trial Memorandum. All evidentiary objections raised in the Joint Trial Memorandum must be the subject of a Motion in Limine supported by applicable Second Circuit precedent. Jury Selection set for 6/30/2016 09:30 AM in Courtroom Three, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant. Dates for the presentation of evidence will be designated following the submission of the Joint Trial Memorandum. Counsel shall be prepared to present evidence on any day in July of 2016. If the parties believe that a pre−trial settlement conference would useful once the Court has ruled on the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and discovery has completed, the parties should submit a Motion for Referral no later than 5/16/16. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 11/18/15. (Shechter, N.) Modified on 5/27/16 to vacate per order 146 . (Fernandez, C.). (Entered: 11/18/2015)

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126 MOTION for Leave to File Oversized Reply Brief by James Briggs. (Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
127 REPLY to Response to 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
128 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Bench Trial in this matter will take place during the month of July, 2016, and counsel shall be prepared to present evidence on any day in July of 2016. Dates for the presentation of evidence will be designated following the submission of the Joint Trial Memorandum, due on 6/1/16. Discovery deadlines remain unchanged from the Court's prior Scheduling Order at Docket No. 125. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/7/15. (Shechter, N.) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
129 MOTION for Extension of Time until March 18, 2016 for the defendant to produce requested documents 23 Scheduling Order,,,,, by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
130 ORDER granting 126 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3−2−16. (Bryant, Vanessa) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
131 ORDER granting 129 Motion for Extension of Time. Any future motion which does not comply with Local Rule 7 will be denied.Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3−2−16. (Bryant, Vanessa) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
132 NOTICE of Appearance by Emily V. Melendez on behalf of Roderick Bremby (Melendez, Emily) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
133 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephonic Status Conference set for 5/10/16 at 10:00 AM before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant. The parties are ordered to call Chambers at 860−240−3123 with all parties on the line. In the alternative, the parties may call Chambers to distribute a dial−in number to the Court. (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
134 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. RESET FROM 05/10/2016. Telephonic Status Conference set for 5/6/2016 03:00 PM before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant. The parties are ordered to call Chambers at 860−240−3123 with all parties on the line. In the alternative, the parties may call Chambers to distribute a dial−in number to the Court. (Lewis, L.) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
135 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion re: 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment . ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION.

04/28/2016
05/02/2016 05/05/2016

Motion Hearing set for 5/19/16 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom Three, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 04/27/16.(Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
136 ORDER: The Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services is Ordered to appear at the hearing on the 116 Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled for May 19, 2016. This hearing will be held in lieu of the telephonic status conferences scheduled at docket numbers 133 and 134, which will no longer be held. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/28/16. (Shechter, N.) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
137 REPLY to Response to 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment Motion for Permission to File Surreply filed by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Surreply, # 2 Exhibit One, # 3 Exhibit Two)(Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
138 RESPONSE re 137 Reply to Response to Motion filed by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' Surreply, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Melendez, Emily) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

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139 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Robert A. Richardson for settlement conference. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 05/19/16.(Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
140 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant: Evidentiary Hearing held on 5/19/16, Motion Hearing held on 5/19/16 re 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by James Briggs. Total Time: 2 hours and 10 minutes.(Court Reporter F. Velez.) (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
141 PDF with attached Audio File. Court Date & Time [ 5/19/2016 9:51:59 AM ]. File Size [ 31308 KB ]. Run Time [ 02:10:27 ]. (admin). (Entered: 05/19/2016)
142 Marked Witness List by Roderick Bremby. (Fernandez, C.) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/19/2016: # 1 REPLACEMENT PDF) (Fernandez, C.). (Entered: 05/19/2016)
143 Docket Entry Correction − WITNESS LIST. (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
144 ORDER: A settlement conference is scheduled for 6/28/16 at 1:00 PM with Judge Richardson. Please see attached order for important instructions. Signed by Judge Robert A. Richardson on 5/20/2016. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Settlement Conference is set for 6/28/2016 at 1:00 PM in Chambers Room 258, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Robert A. Richardson. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
145 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Settlement Conference set for 6/28/2016 at 1:00 PM in Chambers Room 258, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Robert A. Richardson. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
146 ORDER: In light of the parties' upcoming settlement conference, the Scheduling Order in this case is vacated. The parties are to advise the Court as to the status of this case after the conference has concluded and the Court will determine the outcome and remedies addressed in Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/26/16.(Shechter, N.) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
147 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert A. Richardson: Settlement Conference held on 6/28/2016. Case not settled. The parties will arrange another time to meet with Judge Richardson to continue settlement discussions. Total Time: 4 hours and 30 minutes. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
148 ORDER: A continuation of the previous settlement conference is scheduled for 7/25/16 at 1:00 PM with Judge Richardson. The parties will also take part in a conference call on 7/11/16 at 2:55 PM with Judge Richardson. Signed by Judge Robert A. Richardson on 6/30/2016. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: A telephonic conference call is set for 7/11/2016 at 2:55 PM before Judge Robert A. Richardson. A settlement conference is set for 7/25/2016 at 1:00 PM in Chambers Room 258, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Robert A. Richardson. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
149 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Telephonic conference call set for 7/11/2016 at 2:55 PM before Judge Robert A. Richardson. A settlement conference is set for 7/25/2016 at 1:00 PM in Chambers Room 258, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Robert A. Richardson. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
150 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert A. Richardson: Telephonic Conference held on 7/11/2016. Total time: 20 minutes. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
151 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert A. Richardson: Settlement Conference held on 7/25/2016. Case not settled. The parties are continuing settlement discussions and will report back to the Court by 8/1/2016. Total Time: 4 hours and 40

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minutes. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
152 ORDER: A telephonic conference is scheduled for 9/12/2016 at 10:30 AM with Judge Richardson to discuss the parties progress toward settlement. Conference call instructions will be emailed to the parties. Signed by Judge Robert A. Richardson on 9/6/2016. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 09/06/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: A telephonic conference is set for 9/12/2016 at 10:30 AM before Judge Robert A. Richardson. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 09/06/2016)
153 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert A. Richardson: Telephonic Conference held on 9/12/2016. Total Time: 15 minutes. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
154 ORDER: A settlement conference is scheduled for 9/28/2016 at 10:30 AM with Judge Richardson. Signed by Judge Robert A. Richardson on 9/23/2016. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Settlement Conference is set for 9/28/2016 at 10:30 AM in Chambers Room 258, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Robert A. Richardson. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
155 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Settlement Conference is set for 9/28/2016 at 10:30 AM in Chambers Room 258, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Robert A. Richardson. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
156 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert A. Richardson: Settlement Conference held on 9/28/2016. Settlement negotiations ongoing. Total Time: 4 hours. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
157 Consent MOTION to Withdraw 116 First MOTION for Summary Judgment Without Prejudice, Subject to Restoration by James Briggs. (Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
158 ORDER withdrawing 116 Motion for Summary Judgment; and granting 157 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 9/30/2016. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
159 ORDER: Within 14 days, the parties are ordered to confer and file a joint status report detailing the current state of this case, and proposing a new pretrial and trial schedule. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/2/2016. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
Set Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 12/16/2016 (LaMura, K.) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
160 Joint STATUS REPORT Regarding Settlement by James Briggs. (Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
161 ORDER DISMISSING CASE as settled. The parties have reported that this case has settled. Rather than continue to keep the case open on the docket, the Clerk is directed to terminate this file without prejudice to reopening on or before 2/20/2017. If the parties wish to file a stipulation of dismissal (for approval by the Court or simply for inclusion in the Court's file), they may do so on or before 2/20/2017. The date set forth in this order may be extended for good cause in accordance with Local Rule 7(b). Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/19/2017. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS SURVEY: The following link to the confidential survey requires you to log into CM/ECF for SECURITY purposes. Once in CM/ECF you will be prompted for the case number. Although you are receiving this survey through CM/ECF, it is hosted on an independent website called SurveyMonkey. Once in SurveyMonkey, the survey is located in a secure account. The survey is not docketed and it is not sent directly to the judge. To ensure anonymity, completed surveys are held up to 90 days before they are sent to the judge for review. We hope you will take this opportunity to participate, please click on this link:

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https://ecf.ctd.uscourts.gov/cgi−bin/Dispatch.pl?survey (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
162 Joint MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment for Preliminary Approval. of Settlement Agreement and Class Notice, to Set a Date for Fairness Hearing by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Stipulation and Order of Settlement, # 2 Exhibit B − Proposed Class Notice, # 3 Exhibit C − Proposed Order Preliminarily Approving Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Order of Notice to Plaintiff Class, # 4 Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion)(Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
163 ORDER granting 162 Motion to Approve Consent Judgment. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 01/06/17. (Attachments: # (A) Exhibit Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action) (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
164 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Settlement Fairness Hearing set for 03/08/17 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom Three, 450 Main St., Hartford, CT before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant. (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
165 Joint MOTION for Joint Telephone Status Conference by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
166 ORDER denying 165 Motion for Conference. Members of the class will have the opportunity to raise objections at tomorrow's fairness hearing relating to the parties' failure to post all exhibits referenced in the Stipulation and Order of Settlement on their websites. A telephone conference is therefore unnecessary. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/7/2017. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 03/07/2017)
167 Joint MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment at Fairness Hearing by James Briggs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Peter Hadler, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Lucy Potter)(Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 03/07/2017)
168 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Vanessa L. Bryant: Motion Hearing held on 03/08/17 re 167 Joint MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment at Fairness Hearing filed by James Briggs, 44 minutes.(Court Reporter F. Velez, ECRO) (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 03/08/2017)
169 PDF with attached Audio File. Court Date & Time [ 3/8/2017 1:24:34 AM ]. File Size [ 10516 KB ]. Run Time [ 00:43:49 ]. (admin). (Entered: 03/08/2017)
170 ORDER granting 167 Motion to Approve Consent Judgment. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 03/08/17. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Fernandez, C.) (Entered: 03/09/2017)
171 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs by James Briggs.Responses due by 5/11/2017 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Marc Cohan of NCLEJ with Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Giovanna Shay of GHLA with Exhibits)(Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 04/20/2017)
172 MOTION for Hugh Barber to Withdraw as Attorney by Roderick Bremby. (Barber, Hugh) (Entered: 04/26/2017)
173 ORDER granting 172 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Hugh Barber terminated. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/27/2017. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 04/27/2017)
174 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 171 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs until July 10, 2017 by Roderick Bremby. (Melendez, Emily) (Entered: 05/09/2017)
175 Joint MOTION Referral to Magistrate Judge re 171 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs by Roderick Bremby.Responses due by 5/30/2017 (Melendez, Emily) (Entered: 05/09/2017)
176 ORDER granting 174 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/10/2017. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 05/10/2017)

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177 ORDER granting 175 Motion for Referral to Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/10/2017. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 05/10/2017)
178 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Robert A. Richardson for a settlement conference relating to the award of attorney's fees. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/10/2017. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 05/10/2017)
179 ORDER: A settlement conference relating to the award of attorney's fees is scheduled for 7/13/17 at 1:00 PM with Judge Richardson. Signed by Judge Robert A. Richardson on 5/16/2017. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 05/16/2017)
180 OBJECTION re 171 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by Roderick Bremby. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Melendez, Emily) (Entered: 07/10/2017)
181 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert A. Richardson: Settlement Conference held on 7/13/2017. The parties have made significant progress towards settlement and will continue settlement discussions. If the parties are unable to reach a final settlement regarding the dispute over attorneys' fees, the parties should notify the Court immediately. In such an event, Plaintiff shall have 14 days from said notification to file a response to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Total Time: 3 hours and 30 minutes. (Fries, J.) (Entered: 07/13/2017)
182 Joint STIPULATION and Order of Settlement Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs by James Briggs. (Shay, Giovanna) (Entered: 09/11/2017)
183 ORDER denying as moot 171 Motion for Attorney Fees in light of the parties' 182 Stipulation and Order of Settlement Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court finds that the 182 Stipulation and Order of Settlement Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and the parties are therefore ORDERED to comply with its terms. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 9/12/2017. (Hoffman, S) (Entered: 09/12/2017)