Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 1 of 120

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAY1C E I V E D

JOSHUA DUNN; ALEX BALL; EDWARD BRAGGS; TEDRICK BROOKS; GARY LEE BROYLES; RICHARD BUS1NELLE; BOBBY COPELAND; HOWARD CARTER; CHANDLER CLEMENTS; ROBERT DILLARD; CHRISTOPHER GILBERT; DWIGHT HAGOOD; DALETRICK HARDY; SYLVESTER HARTLEY; CHRISTOPHER JACKSON; BRANDON JOHNSON; JOHN MANER; RICK MARTIN; WILLIE MCCLENDON; ROGER MCCOY; JERMAINE MITCHELL; KENNETH MONCRIEF; TOMMIE MOORE; MATTHEW MORK; ZERRICK NAYLOR; BRADLEY PEARSON; LEVITICUS PRUITT; TURNER ROGERS; JONATHAN SANFORD; TIMOTHY SEARS; BRIAN SELLERS; AUGUSTUS SMITH; RICHARD TERRELL; HUBERT. TOLLAR; DANIEL TOOLEY; JOSEPH TORRES; DONALD RAY TURNER; WILLIAM VILLAR; JAMIE WALLACE; ROBERT "MYNIASHA" WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; and ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM,

22, i.Uhi JUN I I A 10i
Eh:3i\ P. H\CETT. C1K
r 3T' hUDLEJA
Civil Action No :/MLL
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs,

V.
KIM THOMAS, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections; RUTH NAGLICH, in her official capacity as Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections; and ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

1

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 2 of 120
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. The prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the Plaintiff Class are incarcerated in Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") prisons. Plaintiffs bring this case to remedy (a) the defendants' failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to persons in the custody of the ADOC; (b) the defendants' failure to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care to persons in ADOC custody; (c) the defendants' failure to provide due process when medicating persons against their will; and (d) the defendants' failure to provide prisoners with disabilities with the accommodations and services to which they are entitled under the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief for the inhumane and discriminatory practices and conditions they face every day in ADOC custody. 2. The prisoner PLAINTIFFS and all those in ADOC custody are entirely dependent on DEFENDANTS KIM THOMAS, RUTH NAGLICH and ADOC (collectively, "DEFENDANTS") for medical and mental health care. Yet the system of care provided by DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH is grossly inadequate and subjects all prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm, including unnecessary pain, loss offunction, injury and death. 3. Because of the DEFENDANTS' deliberate indifference to the obvious medical needs Of the persons in their custody, plaintiffprisoners go for months or years without appropriate diagnoses of medical conditions. Numerous prisoners have died from a failure to treat medical conditions from canter to diabetes to hepatitis. Others have required emergency surgery or lost the use of legs, arms or eyes, after having been left to suffer with untreated symptoms for lengthy periods. Prisoners with mental illnesses or serious psychological problems are entirely denied mental health care or provided only with medication with little or no medication management, follow-up, or concern for Side effects, some of which are debilitating. Mental healthcare other
2

V I.-.,

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 3 of 120

than medications is nearly non-existent. Prisoners with a history of self-harm are provided with razor blades. After one prisoner who had repeatedly requested mental health care cut himself with one of the razors, a correctional officer said to him, "If you die, you die." DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH violate the prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishments in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
4. Prisoners who do not want to take psychiatric medications, often because they are experiencing serious side effects, are forced to take the medication without any regard for due process. If they refuse, they may be beaten, placed in segregation or both Even when there is a process to determine whether the prisoner is sufficiently ill and dangerous to warrant involuntary medication, the process falls far short of what due process requires. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH violate the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as it relates to mentally ill prisoners' right to bodily integrity.
5. Prisoners with physical or mental disabilities face discriminatory and dangerous circumstances throughout the ADOC system. They are housed in facilities that cannot accommodate them. They are often housed in prisons or housing units for prisoners with higher security classifications than their own for no reason other than their disabilities. They are not provided with necessary assistive services or devices, such as functioning wheelchairs or forms that they can read. They are punished for things they cannot do or do not know to do because of their disabilities.
6. The DEFENDANTS operate the most overcrowded prisons in the nation and spend the among the lowest amount on medical care per prisoner, of any state in the nation. They have long been aware of the unconstitutional and discriminatory practices of which the plaintiffs complain

3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 4 of 120
IM
7. PLAINTIFFS seek declaratory and injunctive relief to compel DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICFI, both sued in their official capacity, and ADOC to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care to all prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the class members they represent, to desist from medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will without due process, and to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
JURISDICTION 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. PLAINTIFFS seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 2201 and 2202,29 U.S.C. § 794a, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 12133.
VENUE 9. Venue is properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as several DEFENDANTS reside in the Middle District of Alabama and all DEFENDANTS reside in Alabama, many of the PLAINTIFFS reside in the Middle District of Alabama, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Alabama.
PARTIES 10. PLAINTIFF JOSHUA DUNN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is currently housed at St. Clair Correctional Facility ("St. Clair"). He has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, and be informed ADOC of this diagnosis at intake. PLAINTIFF DUNN suffered from acute mental health crises while in segregation, requested mental health care, and repeatedly engaged in self-harni, but received no mental health care and was not provided with timely emergency medical care. He suffers from headaches and has a

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 5 of 120
rM
cracked lens in his right eye. DEFENDANTS have refused to treat PLAINTIFF DUNN's right eye because his left eye is functional. DEFENDANTS have also failed to provide PLAINTIFF DUNN with appropriate medical care after he was stabbed multiple times by prisoners. PLAINTIFF DUNN is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF DUNN is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
11. PLAINTIFF ALEX BALL has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2005. He is currently housed at Staton Correctional Facility ("Staton"). PLAINTIFF BALL's right leg was amputated above the knee prior to coming into ADOC custody. He is forced ' to walk long distances and stand for long periods. He is not in an accessible dormitory. PLAINTIFF BALL has been diagnosed with high cholesterol but is not being treated for it. He is currently being denied access to work release because of his cholesterol level. PLAINTIFF BALL is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BALL is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
12. PLAINTIFF EDWARD BRAGGS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1967. He is currently housed at Hamilton Aged and Infirmed Center ("Hamilton A & I"), and has previously been housed at Bullock Correctional Facility ("Bullock"), Limestone Correctional Facility ("Limestone"), Easterling Correctional Facility ("Easterling") and Ventress Correctional Facility ("Ventress"). PLAINTIFF BR GGS is diabetic. In approximately 2004, PLAINTIFF BRAGGS's right leg was amputated at the knee due to lack of medical treatment

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 6 of 120
while in prison. He is currently experiencing the same symptoms in his left leg that led to the amputation Of his right leg and the cause of these Symptoms is not being treated. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS also has a grapefruit-sized hernia that is not being treated. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has been di4gnosed with anxiety and depression and receives very little mental health care for these conditions. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
13. PLAINTIFF TEDRICK BROOKS entered ADOC's custody in August 2011. He is currently housed at Bibb County Correctional Facility ("Bibb"). PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a very severe keloid condition that causes him significant pain and difficulty moving. His condition has gone mostly untreated while in ADOC custody. He has been forced to shave, although this makes his condition worse, and he has been punished for not shaving. PLAINTIFF BROOKS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BROOKS is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
14. PLAINTIFF GARY LEE BROYLES has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1989. He is currently housed at Elmore Correctional Facility ("Elmore"). He was previously housed at Draper Correctional Facility ("Draper"), Kilby Correctional Facility ("Kilby"), St. Clair, and Bullock PLAINTIFF BROYLES is hearing impaired, requiring hearing aids for both ears. He was provided with hearing aids for both ears in or around 1998, but one stopped working in or around 2011.. He has difficulty getting the battery replaced. PLAINTIFF
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 7 of 120
BROYLES is harassed and discriminated against on the basis of his hearing impairment. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BROYLES is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
15. PLAINTIFF RICHARD BUSINELLE has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2003. Since his initial stay at Kilby, he has been housed at Bullock. When he arrived at Bullock, he was housed in the mental health dormitory, until the Mental Health Unit was opened in 2006. He was moved to the , Mental Health Unit when it opened and has been their ever since. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He is given an injection of Prolixin every two weeks, takes Cogentin for the side effects, and meets with a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks. He receives no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has experienced severe weight-loss while in DEFENDANT ADOC's custody with no treatment or evaluation to determine the cause. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BUS INELLE is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
16. PLAINTIFF HOWARD CARTER has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1994. He is currently housed in segregation at St. Clair. He has previously been housed at Kilby, Holman Correctional Facility ("Holman"), Bullock, Staton and Donaldson Correctional Facility ("Donaldson"). PLAINTIFF CARTER is severely mentally ill and was subject to an involuntary medication order in 2011 and 2012. His medication was discontinued in 2013 and
VA

p

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 8 of 120

he was removed from the mental health caseload. PLAINTIFF CARTER has made several suicide attempts while in DEFENDANT ADOC's custody. PLAINTIFF CARTER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF CARTER is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
17. PLAINTIFF CHANDLER CLEMENTS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2003. He is currently housed in the Staton. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS has Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder (COPD) and, as a result, experiences extreme shortness of breath and low oxygen levels. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS was persuaded to sign a "Do Not Resuscitate" order ("DNR") to avoid being placed on life support in the prison infirmary. After he signed the DNR, he was denied breathing treatments and medications because of the DNR. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS is being denied adequate medical treatment.
18. PLAINTIFF BOBBY COPELAND has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2009. He is currently housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF COPELAND is legally blind and deaf. He suffers from congestive heart failure, high blood pressure, diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, asthma, high cholesterol, and kidney failure. PLAINTIFF COPELAND uses a wheelchair most of the time due to his various illnesses. PLAINTIFF COPELAND is routinely denied his medications and does not receive adequate care for his diabetes. Employees of DEFENDANT ADOC refuse to consistently monitor PLAINTIFF COPELAND's blood pressure. DEFENDANT ADOC has also failed to accommodate PLAINTIFF COPELAND's disabilities. PLAINTIFF COPE[.AND is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § .12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF COPELAND is being denied adequate
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 9 of 120
medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
19. PLAINTIFF ROBERT DILLARD has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2005. He is currently housed in the mental health dormitory in the Main Camp at Bullock. Following his initial intake at Kilby, he was housed first at the mental health dormitory, then in the Mental Health Unit from when it opened in 2006 until about January 2014, when he was moved back to the mental health dormitory. PLAINTIFF DILLARD was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at the age of eight. He takes Haldol, Risperdal, Cogentin and another medication that has a name and purpose he does not know. The extent of the counseling he receives is meeting With a mental health counselor one or two times a month for five to 10 minutes. He hears voices in his head. One of his front teeth is mottled dark brown and black and he has not been given dental care for the tooth. He likely has an undiagnosed learning or developmental disability and frequently does not understand documents he is given to read and sign. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF DILLARD is being denied adequate medical and mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
20. PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER GILBERT has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since in or about July 2012. He is housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF GILBERT has a damaged ankle that resulted in one leg being shorter than the other, and suffers from diabetes. DEFENDANT ADOC has provided PLAINTIFF GILBERT with insufficient accommodations for his disability that place him for greater risk of medical harm from his diabetes condition.
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 10 of 120
PLAINTIFF GILBERT is also required to stand for long periods of time despite his disability. PLAINTIFF GILBERT experiences sugar lows and highs due to improper treatment for his diabetes. PLAINTIFF GILBERT is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF GILBERT is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
21. PLAINTIFF DWIGHT HAGOOD entered the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC on a parole violation in 2011. He has been housed at Kilby since late 2012, when he was sent to Kilby from Bullock to await a transfer to Hamilton A & I. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has had diabetes since childhood and suffers from high blood pressure and numerous other medical conditions. He has had four strokes, the last of which occurred in or around November 2013, while in ADOC custody. As a result of one of these strokes, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is partially paralyzed on his left side and confined to a wheel chair. He has been denied access to accommodations for disability. He is also housed in a non-accessible dormitory with a high level of violence because of his disability. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
22. PLAINTIFF DALETRICK HARDY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2002. He is currently housed at St. Clair, and has previously been housed at Kilby, Draper, Bibb, Easterling, Fountain Correctional Facility ("Fountain"), Limestone, Bullock, and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF HARDY is severely mentally ill and has a long history of suicide attempts. He is not receiving any mental health treatment and has been in segregation at St. Clair
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 11 of 120
since May 2012. PLAINTIFF HARDY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HARDY is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
23. PLAINTIFF 5YLVESTER HARTLEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1981. He is currently ,housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has a long history of serious mental illness, but does not know his diagnosis. He is also on dialysis. He likely has an undiagnosed learning or developmental disability. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
24. PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER JACKSON has been in the custody Of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2006. He is currently housed in segregation at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF JACKSON was previously on the mental health caseload and was taking Haldol. He was not given any medications for side effects, and in or around April 2014 asked to be taken off Haldol because it made him shake. He has not received any mental health care since. He has been in segregation since 2007. He is transferred every few months between the segregation units at Holman, Donaldson and St. Clair. PLAINTIFF JACKSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF JACKSON is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 12 of 120 r.
25. PLAINTIFF BRANDON JOHNSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1996. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is currently housed in a Residential Treatment Unit at Donaldson. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON has a significant cognitive disability. He believes he was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury as a child, following a serious car accident. He is not receiving any medication or other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON also has serious cognitive disabilities stemming from a serious injury when he was a child. However, he is provided with no assistance in filling out medical forms or understanding rules or disciplinary matters. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
26. PLAINTIFF JOHN MANER entered ADOC custody in or around June 1998. He is currently housed in the Bibb. PLAINTIFF MANER suffers from a mobility impairment due to a gunshot wound, and ADOC has required him to choose between accessing programs and services and having necessary accommodations. He injured himself again in April 2014 after choosing to access programs and services. DEFENDANTS have declined to treat him. PLAINTIFF MANER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MANER is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
27. PLAINTIFF RICK MARTIN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1988. He is currently housed at St. Clair. He has previously been housed at Kilby and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has a long history of heart problems. He has had a stent in
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 13 of 120
his heart since 2010. In 2012, he had to get a new stent in his heart, and was not given necessary blood thinners afterward, resulting in his requiring emergency open-heart surgery because his un-thinned blood quickly clogged the stent. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has been denied adequate medical treatment.
28. PLAINTIFF WILLIE MCCLENDON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He is currently housed at Limestone and has been there since his initial brief intake period at Kilby. PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON developed an infection in his testicle which went untreated for several days, turned gangrenous, and resulted in his losing the testicle. PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON has been denied adequate medical care.
2. PLAINTIFF ROGER MCCOY entered ADOC custody in or around 1994. He is currently housed at the Bibb. He has previously been housed at Bullock and Limestone. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has an apparent mental health disorder for which he is treated with medications but little other treatment. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has been physically assaulted by correctional officers. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MCCOY is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
30. PLAINTIFF JERMAINE MITCHELL has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1999. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has also been housed at Bibb. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL uses a wheelchair and has limited use of his hands. He spent a year and a half housed in an infirmary because of his disabilities. Because he was housed in the infirmary, he was denied access to programs, benefits and services. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 14 of 120
has been informed that he might be able to walk again if he received physical therapy, but he is not being given physical therapy. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MITCHELL is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
31. PLAINTIFF KENNETH MONCRIEF has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010, following a parole violation. He is currently housed at Limestone and was previously housed in the Mental Health Unit at Bullock. He has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder. He was required to discontinue his psychiatric medicatiocis jn order to go on parole, because his parole placement was a facility does not accept residents who take psychiatric medications. Without mental health medication, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF has difficulty controlling his impulses and anger. He is not currently receiving any mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
32. PLAINTIFF TOMMIE MOORE has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF MOORE has glaucoma and is legally blind. He has not been treated for his glaucoma and has been denied the surgery he requires because DEFENANT ADOC refuses to pay for the procedure. PLAINTIFF MOORE resides in a dormitory with high incidences of violence solely because his disability only makes him eligible for a dormitory of that classification level. Correctional officers have harassed and threatened
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 15 of 120
PLAINTIFF MOORE due to his disability. PLAINTIFF MOORE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MOORE is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
33. PLAINTIFF MATTHEW MORK has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is currently housed at Holman. He has also been housed at Kilby, Limestone, and Ventress. PLAINTIFF MORK has hepatitis C and is not being treated for it because DEFENDANTS refuse to provide the medication PLAINTIFF MORK requires. PLAINTIFF MORK also suffered a serious injury to his arm due the actions of employees of DEFENDANT ADOC and received inadequate treatment for this injury. PLAINTIFF MORK is being denied adequate medical care.
34. PLAINTIFF ZERRICK NAYLOR has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2012. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has previously been housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR suffers from keratoconus and is legally blind. He sees only vague shadows. Due to his blindness, he was housed for more than two years in a housing unit that was unduly dangerous and restrictive. He has been and continues to be denied access to programs, benefits and services because of his blindness. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
35. PLAINTIFF BRADLEY PEARSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since August 2013. He is currently housed at Limestone and was previously housed at Kilby for about a month and then Decatur Work Release Center for 10 days. He was then excluded from
15

rM D

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 16 of 120

the Work Release Center because he is deaf. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF PEARSON is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;
36. PLAINTIFF LEVITICUS PRUITT has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2001. He is currently housed at Holman. He has previously been housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has a history of depression. Over the last six months, PLAINTIFF PRUITT has repeatedly been placed on Suicide watch and has requested mental health treatment, but has been denied any mental health care. He recently underwent an assault by other prisoners who threw burning items onto him while he was on suicide watch, but he was not taken to medical staff for more than a day after the assault, when he was taken to the hospital. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was also denied adequate medical treatment after he sustained an injury to his hand caused by correctional officers. He was also denied medical treatment for four hours after he engaged in selfharm with a razor blade in his segregation cell. PLAINTIFF PRUITT is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF PRUITT is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
37. PLAINTIFF TURNER ROGERS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since November 2012. He currently resides, at the Kilby. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has cataracts and a spot in the white of his eye that protrudes periodically, blocking his vision. Both conditions are not being treated. He has been prescribed eyeglasses, but these do not help his vision at all and give him headaches. PLAINTIFF ROGERS is being denied adequate medical care.

16

rA

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 17 of 120

38. PLAINTIFF JONATHAN SANFORD has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2002. Since his initial stay at Kilby, he has been housed at Bullock. When he arrived at Bullock, he was housed in the mental health dormitory, until the Mental Health, Unit was opened in 2006. He was moved to the Mental Health Unit when it opened and has been their ever Since. PLAINTIFF SANFORD has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PLAINTIFF SANFORD is given mental health medication, but receives little other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF SANFORD also suffers from a seizure disorder that is untreated and often unaccommodated. PLAINTIFF SANFORD is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF SANFORD is being denied adequate medical and mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1971
39. PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY SEARS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1996. He is currently housed at Ventress and was previously housed at Hamilton A & I, St. Clair and Limestone. PLAINTIFF SEARS has scoliosis and unexplained weight loss. Despite needing a shower with grab bars, PLAINTIFF SEARS was placed in a dormitory that was not accessible and was very far from the infirmary where he could shower. PLAINTIFF SEARS has been and continues to be forced to stand for long periods although his disability makes that painful and difficult for him. PLAINTIFF SEARS suffered extreme weight loss that went completely untreated for 10 months and is currently being inadequately treated. PLAINTIFF SEARS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 a442. 9 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF SEARS is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable

17

ns

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 18 of 120

accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
40. PLAINTIFF BRIAN SELLERS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2001. He is currently housed at St. Clair, but has also been housed at Donaldson, Holman, Ventress, Draper, Easterling and Kilby. He suffers from high blood pressure and heart disease, hepatitis C and has recently had surgery for kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS was taken off of his blood pressure medication, resulting in a heart attack. Also, DEFENDANTS delayed more than three years before approving a PLAINTIFFS SELLERS's surgery for kidney stones. Also, despite being prediabetic, and having recently passed out repeatedly, PLAINTIFF SELLERS is not receiving appropriate treatment. PLAINTIFF SELLERS is being denied adequate medical care.
41. PLAINTIFF AUGUSTUS SMITH has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He is housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF SMITH came into ADOC custody shortly after doctors gave him with a catheter and colostomy bag in anticipation of surgery that was to happen within three months. He has not had the surgery and continues to be required to use the catheter and colostomy bag. He suffers from frequent infections from the catheter. PLAINTIFF SMITH is being denied adequate medical care.
42. PLAINTIFF RICHARD TERRELL has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1992. He is currently housed at Bullock in the Mental Health Unit. He has previously been housed at Kilby, Easterling, and Holman. He has been in either the mental health dormitory at Bullock or the free-standing Mental Health Unit at Bullock since 1999. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. He has been given a shot of either Prolixin or Haldol every two weeks for the last 15
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 19 of 120
years. He does not know currently which he is receiving or if he receives the same one every time. He is also given Benadryl, but receives no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been assaulted and then denied medical attention. He has also been denied dental care and is likely to lose his two upper front teeth as a result. PLAINTIFF TERRELL likely has some form of learning disability or cognitive disability. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TERRELL is being denied adequate medical and mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
43. PLAINTIFF HUBERT TOLLAR has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1977. He is currently housed at St. Clair. In response to an outbreak of tuberculosis at St. Clair in January and February of 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was given a chest x-ray. There was a spot on his lung. He had a CT scan in or around late March 2014. On or about April 14, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was told that the CT scan showed that he had cancer and that he would be sent out for a biopsy the following day. As May 28, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had not been sent out for a biopsy of the cancerous spot on his lung. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR is being denied adequate medical care.
44. PLAINTIFF DANIEL TOOLEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2008. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has also been housed at Bullock, Kilby and Easterling. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is a prisoner with deafness. Due to his deafness, PLAINTIFF TOOLEY cannot communicate through spoken language and has some difficulty communicating by writing notes. For the past six years, DEFENDANT ADOC has never provided PLAINTIFF
19

0

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 20 of 120

TOOLEY a certified sign language interpreter. To communicate with PLAINTIFF TOOLEY, DEFENDANT ADOC staff relies on writing notes and another prisoner who knows limited sign language. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
45. PLAINTIFF JOSEPH TORRES is 20 years old. He entered ADOC's custody in February 2011 when he was 17 years old. PLAINTIFF TORRES was charged when he was 15 years old. He is currently housed at Bibb. He suffers from untreated cataracts and severe headaches. He has been informed that if he does not receive adequate treatment for his cataracts, he will go blind. PLAINTIFF TORRES is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TORRES is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
46. PLAINTIFF DONALD RAY TURNER has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2009. He is currently housed at Limestone, and has previously been housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF TURNER is deaf and is only semi-literate. He was excluded from work release because he is deaf and has high blood pressure. PLAINTIFF TURNER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TURNER is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
47. PLAINTIFF WILLIAM VILLAR has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2004. PLAINTIFF VILLAR is currently housed at Donaldson, and Was previously housed at
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 21 of 120
Holman. PLAINTIFF VILLAR suffered a stroke while incarcerated at Holman and has since been denied adequate medical care. The failure to treat him in the years since his stroke has resulted in the paralysis and other effects from the stroke becoming permanent. Further, DEFENDANTS have failed to take the steps necessary to enable him to have cataract surgery and necessary dental work. He has permanently lost the use of his left arm, hand and leg, and vision in his left eye, much of the control of his bowel and bladder, and two teeth. His vision in his right eye is severely impaired by untreated cataracts. PLAINTIFF VILLAR is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF VILLAR is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
48. PLAINTIFF JAMIE WALLACE has been in DEFENDANT ADOC's custody since 2010. Prior to his conviction, PLAINTIFF WALLACE was initially found not to be competent to stand trial and spent a year at Taylor Hardin, Secure Medical Facility. He is currently housed in Residential Treatment Unit at Donaldson and was previously housed in the Mental Health Unit at Bullock. PLAINTIFF WALLACE has numerous physical birth defects and has been diagnosed with ADHD, bi-polar disorder, paranoid schizophrenia and intermittent explosive disorder. He is receiving medication but no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF WALLACE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF WALLACE is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 22 of 120
49. PLAINTIFF ROBERT "MYNIASHA" WILLIAMS' has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since November 2012. She is housed at Fountain. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has ADHD, .a mood disorder, a history of being sexually abused, and a history of self-harm. While at Fountain, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS repeatedly cut herself with razor blades, and was not given adequate medical or mental health care. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 50. PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM (hereinafter
"ADAP") is designated as Alabama's authorized protection and advocacy agency under federal laws designed to protect individuals with disabilities. .ADAP has statutory authority to pursue legal and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of persons with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and other disabilities who are or will be receiving care and treatment In the State of Alabama. 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 794e; ADAP v. J.S. Tarwater, 97 F.3d 492 (11th Cir. 1996). ADAP is pursuing this action to protect and advocate for the rights and interests of prisoners in ADOC custody who are persons with mental illness and persons with mental or physical disabilities. ADAP has spent significant time and resources advocating on behalf of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC custody, monitoring and investigating the treatment and accornmo4ation of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC custody. The interests that ADAP seeks to vindicate by bringing this lawsuit are central to ADAP's purpose.
'PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is a transgendered individual who identifies as female. She was born with male anatomy and is classified as a male by DEFENDANT ADOC. In accordance with her preference, she is referred to herein by female pronouns.
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 23 of 120
51. DEFENDANT KIM THOMAS is the Commissioner of the ADOC, and he is sued herein in his official capacity. As the Commissioner of the Ai)OC, DEFENDANT THOMAS is responsible for heading the Alabama Department of Corrections, for the independent direction, supervision and control of the Alabama Department of Corrections, and for approving and issuing administrative regulations and changes. Ala. Code. 1975 § 14-1-1.3. (2010). He is responsible for providing constitutional conditions of confineWent in all facilities. At all times relevant hereto, he has acted under color of state law.
52. DEFENDANT RUTH NAGLICH is the Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the ADOC. DEFENDANT NAGLICH is sued in her official capacity. As Associate Commissioner, DEFENDANT NAGLICH is responsible for establishing, monitoring, and enforcing system-wide health care policies and practices. She is reSponsible for supervising the provision of adequate medical, mental health, and dental care for all prisoners within the custody of the department, including but not limited to those in Residential Treatment Units; Intensive Stabilization Units and segregation units. At all times relevant hereto, She has acted under color of state law.
53. DEFENDANT ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ("ADOC") is the administrative department of the state of Alabama respOnsible for administering and exercising the direct and effective control over penal and corrections institutions throughout the state of Alabama. Persons in the in-house custody of DEFENDANT ADOC are housed in 15 major correctional facilities and 13 work camps or work release centers. DEFENDANT ADOC is an instrumentality of the state of Alabama. DEFENDANT ADOC receives federal funding.
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 24 of 120
U
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 54. DEFENDANTS have long underfunded medical and mental health care. In 2011, DEFENDANT THOMAS recognized that Alabama pays less for health care than other prison systems. The failings in the health care system are well documented. For the years 2000 through 2011, Alabama prisons had among the highest mortality rates in the country, both generally and for illness-related deaths. 55. DEFENDANTS track all deaths in custody, all trips to the emergency room, and all hospital admissions. DEFENDANTS require their medical and mental health care providers to give them monthly reports on a wide variety of metrics. 56. During the process of soliciting bids for a comprehensive medical and mental health provider in the summer of 2012, DEFENDANT NAGLICH responded to numerous questions about the provision of care. She was asked whether persons "in need of mental health/psychiatric services currently residing at Bibb CF, Easterling, CF, Fountain CF, and Birmingham WR be relocated?" DEFENDANT NAGLICH responded that they would. They have not been. Easterling has 120 prisoners on psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication orders, and has no coverage by a psychiatrist or psychologist. Fountain has 64 people on psychiatric medications and no coverage by any psychiatrist or psychologist. Bibb, which has 133 people classified as MH-I, 29 people classified as MH-2, and one person on an involuntary medication order, has less than an quarter-time psychiatrist and no psychologist. 57. In 2009, DEFENDANT ADOC's Annual Report admitted that "Almost none of [ADOC' s] facilities meet the federal Americans With Disabilities Act requirements." 58. Starting in or around July 2012, PLAINTIFFS' counsel conducted site inspections of most major correctional facilities in ADOC. PLAINTIFFS' counsel provided feedback on many
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 25 of 120
of the obstacles in the facilities for persons with disabilities. DEFENDANTS have not, to PLAINTIFFS' counsel's knowledge, resolved any of the matters raised in that context.
59. Further, starting in the spring of 2014, PLAINTIFFS' counsel raised concerns about a number of individuals. In one instance, DEFENDANT ADOC partially accommodated an individual with a disability that PLAINTIFFS' counsel brought to its attention. In another case, the disabled individual was actually fiMher deprived of necessary accommodations. In most cases, there was no change whatsoever. Where PLAINTIFFS' counsel raised concerns about the lack of medical or mental health care, there was no response whatsoever.
60. Additionally, PLAINTIFFS' counsel sent DEFENDANT THOMAS a letter on April 9, 2014 detailing the failures of medical and mental health care and the violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. PLAINTIFFS' counsel invited DEFENDANT THOMAS to enter into discussion regarding how to resolve the issues. Despite the urgency of the issues raised, DEFENDANT THOMAS set up a meeting for a month and a half later on May 20, 2014. However, at that meeting, DEFENDANTS had no proposals or plans for resolving any of the issues raised. The only proposal from DEFENDANTS at the meeting was further meetings. PLAINTIFFS' counsel agreed, and DEFENDANTS were to schedule the meetings, but never did.
61. PLAINTIFFS' counsel also asked at the May 20, 2014 meeting that DEFENDANTS immediately address the issue of razor blades being freely available and entirely untracked in all facilities, including in Residential Treatment Units and for individuals who have recently attempted suicide with razor blades.
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 26 of 120
I. DEFENDANTS ARE DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT TO THE SERIOUS MEDICAL NEEDS OF PRISONERS IN THEIR CUSTODY.
62. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of failing to provide prisoners with adequate health care, and are deliberately indifferent to the fact that the systemic failure to do so results in significant injury and a substantial risk of serious harm.
61 From 2001 through 2011, ADOC's mortality rate was among the highest of any prison systems in the country.
64. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have contracted with Corizon, Inc. to provide medical care in the ADOC facilities since 2007.2 DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH initially contracted with Corizon to provide medical care from November 2007 through September 2010. The contract was extended until December 2012. Under the initial contract, despite having advance notice and time to prepare, Corizon failed every major performance audit conducted by ADOC.
65. In 2012, DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH released a request for proposal for a new health care contract. Applicants were scored on a 3,000-point scale on a number of different criteria. Out of a possible 3,000 points, contract price accounted for a possible 1,350 points in the assessment of the proposal, whereas "Qualifications/Experience/References Medical" counted for only 100 points.
66. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH renewed the ADOC contract with COrizon in 2012, even though Corizon (the company providing health care in Alabama prisons since 2007) failed every major audit and re-audit of its health case operations in Alabama prisons under its first contract with the state.
2 The initial contract was with Correctional Medical Services, Inc. ("CMS"). During the term of the initial contract, CMS merged with another correctional medical provider to form COrizon.
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 27 of 120
67. Moreover, despite the inadequacy of the care provided pursuant to the 2007 contract, DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH negotiated a new contract that would result in further reductions in the amount and quality of health care for prisoners in the custody of the ADOC. The per prisoner medical care spending was reduced through a contract amendment in 2009, and then reduced further under the new contract executed in 2012.
A. DEFENDANTS Routinely And Systematically Fail To Provide Adequate Numbers Of Health Care Professionals.
68. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not providing adequate medical staff to address the serious medical needs of prisoners in ADOC custody. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH put out a request for proposals for the medical care contract for the prisons that included a listing of minimum staffing requirements that set the level of staffing at each facility far below what is needed to provide adequate care. Further, the request for proposal was explicit in valuing cost containment far more than adequacy of care. The contract ultimately awarded reflected the importance of cost containment and provides inadequate staffing throughout the ADOC system.
69. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH recently negotiated a contract with Corizon, Inc. to provide medical services to prisoners in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC. Corizon contracted to provide 493 medical staff for the entire prison system, including just 19.6 medical doctors and 13 dentists. As reported by Corizon to DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH in its April 2014 report, there were 25,591 prisoners for whom Corizon was providing medical care pursuant to the contract. This means that, if all positions were filled, a doctor's average caseload in the ADOC is 1,395 people, and a dentist's is almost 2,000. The ratio of total medical staff (including administrative and records staff, nurses and doctors) to prisoners is 1:52.
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 28 of 120

However, all positions are not filled. In April 2014, Corizon had only 15.2 medical doctors and 12.4 dentists for the entire system, resulting in an average caseload for medical doctors of 1,684 patients and 2,064 patients On average for every dentist.
70. At Kilby, where the ADOC hospital is located, there are just one-and-a-half full-time doctors on staff to provide treatment to 2,151 prisoners.
71. The extraordinary understaffing for medical services leads to a host of predictable problems with the delivery of medical care, including delays, failures to diagnose and treat, failures to follow-up, errors, and decisions not to treat seriously ill prisoners.
B. DEFENDANTS Routinely Deny Medical Care To Prisoners With Serious Medical Conditions.
72. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of denying medical care to prisoners with serious medical conditions, or providing such prisoners with care that is so cursory or grossly incompetent that it amounts to a denial of care.
1. The denial of care has contributed to numerous prisoner deaths. 73. At Elmore, Javon Alexander had an adverse reaction to some substance on or about May 17, 2014. He was taken to the infirmary, where he writhed around, repeatedly falling off his bed. He was returned to his bed, but was not given any treatment. Two days later, he was finally taken to the hospital. He died thereafter. 74. In January 2014 at St. Clair, a prisoner was given a shot of something during dialysis that caused him to go into cardiac arrest. Although there was a crash cart in the dialysis unit, no one present at the prison knew how to use it. The prisoner died. 75. On February 6, 2012, at St Clair, a prisoner who had recently had surgery began bleeding from his rectum. He bled through three pairs of pants in a day. He asked for medical attention. He was given Only antacids. He died that night.

-

28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 29 of 120
76. In January 2011 at Limestone, a prisoner committed suicide using a state-issued razor blade. According to an ADOC Incident Report, he was found while he was still alive, when was asked why he had cut himself, he responded: "I'm not getting enough medical attention."
2. DEFENDANTS routinely deny care to plaintiffs and other prisoners, causing serious harm, pain and risk of harm to prisoners in ADOC custody.
77. In or around November 2012, four prisoners entered the dormitory where PLAINTIFF DUNN was housed. They beat PLAINTIFF DUNN and stabbed him several times with an icepick. They left, then came back about 30 minutes later and attacked him again. PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken to medical for a body chart the following day. He had been stabbed 15 times with the icepick. His wounds were not cleaned or treated. He was placed in segregation for three months. He received no further medical attention.
78. PLAINTIFF DUNN suffered a cracked lens in his right eye while he was in the county jail prior to coming into ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF DUNN has suffered from headaches two or three times a week since he cracked the lens in his eye. Particularly in the evenings, his head feels achy and tired all around his right eye, from the strain of trying to use it. Even though the cracked lens is causing PLAINTIFF DUNN pain, he has been told that he will receive no treatment for the cracked lens because his other eye is functional.
79. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has a history of heart problems. He had a heart attack in 1999, and had a stent placed in his heart in 2010. From the time he received the stent, he was on blood thinners. On or about February 18, 2012, PLAINTIFF MARTIN was at an outside hospital for a check-up on the stent. The doctor found a blockage and put in a new stent. PLAINTIFF MARTIN was returned to St. Clair the following day. He was returned to his dorm, rather than the infirmary. He was not given blood thinners, although the surgeon had prescribed them and he had long been on them. He was not seen by anyone from medical staff until on or about
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 30 of 120
February 23, 2012, at which point he asked why he was not on blood thinners The nurse said that she would check, but she did not get back to him. On or about February 26, 2012, PLAINTIFF MARTIN put in a sick call request, and he was placed on the list to be seen on February 29, 2012. Correctional officers brought him to the infirmary on or about February 28, 2012 because he had deteriorated so dramatically. However, nothing was done and he was returned to his dorm. The following day, he went back to the infirmary and was transferred to the hospital the same day for emergency open heart surgery because the stent was entirely blocked and blood was flowing around it.
80. PLAINTIFF SMITH came into ADOC custody eight years ago. He was set to have a surgery in summer 2007 to address an infection in his groin area. In anticipation of this surgery, doctors required PLAINTIFF SMITH to begin using a catheter and colostomy bag. He was to use the catheter and colostomy bag for three months. PLAINTIFF SMITH entered ADOC custody before he could have the surgery. He still has not had the needed surgery and still has the catheter and colostomy bag. He has frequent infections from the catheter, often requiring hospitalization. His urine is often a brownish color and, may have blood in it.
81. In February 2014, an infection from PLAINTIFF SMITH's catheter had gotten so bad that he had to be taken to Jackson Hospital for a series of visits. During these visits it was determined that PLAINTIFF SMITH's bladder was now incapable of holding the normal amount of fluid. Fluid leaks from PLAINTIFF SMITH's penis and pockets of pus repeatedly form around his groin area. PLAINTIFF SMITH endures pain so severe that he is often unable to sleep.
82. In or around March 2012, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON's scrotum swelled up dramatically. He put in a sick call slip. Two days later, a correctional officer was sent to see
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 31 of 120
him and, upon seeing the swelling, immediately brought PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON to the infirmary. However, this was a Saturday. No doctor was on duty, no doctor was called, and PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was not sent to the hospital. Instead, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was sent back to his dormitory with an icepack. The following Monday, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was Supposed to be seen by the doctor, but he was not put on the sick call list. Nonetheless, the correctional officers brought him to the infirmary, and he was then taken to the hospital. His testicle had become gangrenous and had to be amputated. He stayed approximately two weeks in the hospital. After his hospital stay, he was returned to the Limestone infirmary. However, he developed a Staph infection and had to be readmitted to the hospital.
83. From about 2002 through 2009, PLAINTIFF SELLERS was on medication for his blood pressure. The medication controlled his blood pressure. In 2009, while at Easterling, he was taken off his blood pressure medicine. No medical staff discussed his being taken off the medications with him; he went to pill call one day and was told he no longer had prescriptions for the blood pressure medications. After being taken off the medications, he felt the effects of his increasing blood pressure. Since he was taken off the medications, he has suffered from migraines and has frequently felt flushed. In November 2013, at the age of 40, PLAINTIFF SELLERS suffered a heart attack.
84. Since March 2014, PLAINTIFF SELLERS has had a recurring itchy rash that leaves scabs approximately one-fourth inch in diameter all over his body and face. In early May 2014, he had at least 15 such scabs on his face and neck. He put in several sick call slips, but did not received any treatment.
31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 32 of 120
85. PLAINTIFF MORK is currently housed in segregation. In mid-April 2014, PLAINTIFF MORK had put his right hand out through the slot in his cell door to get the attention of a correctional officer. The correctional officer grabbed his arm and yanked it upward, banging it on the top edge of the slot in the door, and then slammed the door against PLAINTIFF MORK's arm. PLAINTIFF MORK's arm swelled up from this, but he received no medical care. In late April 2014, the same thing happened again with his left arm. The bone in his forearm became misshapen from the incident. A nurse who passed by his cell during rounds said he should have an x-ray. When he asked to be taken to medical to document any injuries from the incident, no x-ray was taken, and none has been taken since. He does not know if the bone is broken.
86. In the fall of 2013, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD fell ill. He was having difficulty starting and stopping urinating and it burned when he urinated. He went to see medical, and provided a urine sample. The nurse looked at the sample and stated that it looked clear so nothing was wrong. No tests were done. For several days, he did not eat because he was too weak to get himself down the hall to the dining area. One day, he threw Up after eating some food another prisoner brought him. He submitted a sick call slip. He saw Dr. Sangeeta Doshi three days later. He told Dr. Doshi about the vomiting, the weakness and the difficulty urinating. Dr. Doshi did not examine him but told him that nothing was wrong with him and sent him back to his dorm. He continued throwing up that evening. That night PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had to be sent to the emergency room at Jackson Hospital. He was diagnosed with a kidney infection, and kept at the hospital for two days. He has had no follow-up care for the kidney infection since he returned to the prison. Since he came out of the hospital, he has been unable to stand. He told Dr. Doshi of this development, but was never examined to determine the cause of the additional weakness.
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 33 of 120
87. On one occasion in the last four years, PLAINTIFF TERRELL was hearing voices and he grew laud responding to them. A correctional officerbeat him, breaking his jaw and his rib, then put him into segregation. PLAINTIFF TERRELL was not given any medical attention at the time. Six months later, because he was in pain, he was seen in medical and given x-rays, at which point the broken bones were diagnosed.
88,. In spring 2014, PLAINTIFF TERRELL tried to change the channel of a television in the dormitory. A correctional officer told him not to, grabbed him and spit in his face. PLAINTIFF TERRELL tried to get away, and the officer called for back-up. The officers then beat PLAINTIFF TERRELL, at least one of them using a baton. He was taken to medical, where a wound on his head was taped up. He was then sent to segregation for about six weeks. While in segregation, his head wound was not treated and the dressing was not changed.
89. PLAINTIFF SANFORD suffers from a seizure disorder. He was taken off his seizure medication in or around 2010 because he had missed his morning doses on several occasions. Morning pill call happens at about 4:00 a.m. PLAINTIFF SANFORD, who takes medication to help him sleep at night, had overslept. PLAINTIFF SANFORD has had two seizures since he was taken off the seizure medication. The most recent one occurred in early May 2014. When he came to after the seizure, he had a large knot on his forehead. He had been given an icepack, but was never, as far as he knows, given any medical examination. A nurse stated that be was "faking" the seizure. Since his seizure, he has had at least one severe headache, although he does not ordinarily suffer from headaches.
90. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has a long history of self-harm with sharp objects. She is nonetheless provided with razors for shaving, and the razors are left with her in her cell. On or about March 2, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was housed in segregation at Fountain. She cut
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 34 of 120
herself with a razor. After PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS cut herself, she called out to a correctional officer who took her to the medical unit. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS's wound was dressed but not cleaned. Due to the failure to clean the wound, it became infected.
91. PLAINTIFF VILLAR suffered a stroke on December 6, 2010 while in his cell at Holman. Because he was unable to stand and reach the door of his cell, he was unable to obtain and submit a sick call slip for four days. During this period he communicated with the nurses who came by for pill call that he believed he had had a stroke and needed medical attention. They would not see him, however, without his submission of a sick call slip. He was ultimately diagnosed with having suffered from a stroke on December 31, 2010. His condition had significantly worsened in the interim. As a result of his stroke, PLAINTIFF VILLAR lost the use of his left arm and hand, lost the vision in his left eye, lost much of the strength in his left leg requiring him to use a cane to walk, and lost control of his bowels and bladder.
92. PLAINTIFF VILLAR is partially paralyzed from a stroke suffered while in ADOC custody. In late 2011, he was given just three physical therapy sessions. The physical therapist told him that he needed to see a neurologist. PLAINTIFF VILLAR has repeatedly asked to see a neurologist, but he has not been to see a neurologist.
93. PLAINTIFF VILLAR has cataracts in his left eye and his right eye is blurry on and off. In March 2013, PLAINTIFF VILLAR was sent to see an ophthalmologist at the UAB medical center. The ophthalmologist confirmed that he had cataracts in his left eye and needed surgery. A Corizon nurse told PLAINTIFF VILLAR that he would likely not get the surgery because he' had one functioning eye. PLAINTIFF VILLAR has not been provided with any treatment for the cataracts. PLAINTIFF VILLAR has serious dental problems. Many of his teeth are loose, and
The foregoing information is provided as background information only. Only the failure to provide PLAINTIFF VILLAR with adequate medical care after October 1, 2011 is the subject of this lawsuit.
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 35 of 120
J
two of his teeth fell out over the course of a couple weeks in the spring of 2014. He has been referred to an oral surgeon. The oral surgeon will not provide treatment for PLAINTIFF VILLAR's teeth until he is approved by a cardiologist DEFENDANTS will not send PLAINTIFF VILLAR to the cardiologist. As a result, he cannot have the necessary dental work done.
94. PLAINTIFF SEARS was diagnosed with Hodgkin disease in 1997 and was treated. However, like thaiy people who have had Hodgkin disease, PLAINTIFF SEARS experiences extreme weight loss. While at Hamilton A & I, he received a double tray of food, Ensure (a nutritional supplement) and vitamins to maintain his weight. When he left Hamilton A & I, the double meals, Ensure and vitamins were all discontinued. PLAINTIFF SEARS is six feet tall and, when he arrived at Ventress in May 2013, he weighed 192 pounds. By February 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS' weight had dropped 54 pounds to just 138 pounds. PLAINTIFF SEARS was then given an order for double portions, but is given only an extra piece of bread at meals. He continues to lose weight, though more slowly. As of the beginning of June 2014, he weighed 135 pounds. He is weak and exhausted. He is extremely gaunt and his head appears too large for his body. He has asked for Ensure and vitamins but been refused.
95. While PLAINTIFF SEARS was at Hamilton A & I, his health code was a 4. He was transferred to Ventress to participate in a substance abuse program. While at Ventress, his health has deteriorated significantly. In June 2014, despite his continuing weight gain, and just a month after being given a one-year "no prolonged standing" profile, without having seen a doctor, his health code was changed to a 1, indicating that he is "generally healthy" or "stable" in chronic care.
35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 36 of 120
96. In 2012, PLAINTIFF BUS1NELLE began rapidly losing weight. He dropped from 160 pounds to 125 pounds in about three months. He repeatedly asked to see a doctor, but was not permitted to.
97. In or around April 2014, PLAINTIFF MANER injured his left knee. He was getting down from his bed, which is an upper bunk that has no ladder. As he jumped down, he landed on his left leg. He felt a great deal of pain in his knee and he could move the knee back and forth, hearing a pop each time he moved it. PLAINTIFF MANER submitted a sick call request to have his knee examined. At the sick call, a nurse took is vital signs, gave him ibuprofen, and told him that he would need to see the facility doctor. PLAINTIFF MANER has not seen the doctor or had any x-rays. PLAINTIFF MANER is currently self-administering physical therapy to his left leg to build strength.
98. PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a severe keloid disorder, with large kelôids covering much Of his face, neck, chest, shoulders, back, and buttocks. They have spread dramatically in the time PLAINTIFF BROOKS has been in ADOC custody. They throb in cold temperatures, and throb and itch in hot temperatures. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF BROOKS passed out due to the pain from the keloids caused by the high temperatures in his dormitory. The temperature and pressure of the showers in his dormitory cause him a lot of pain. The many keloids on PLAINTIFF BROOKS's chest, waist, and back prevent from him from stretching. As a result, he often experiences pain in his chest and feels like his chest is caving inwards. PLAINTIFF BROOKS receives pain medication sometimes, but not consistently. Medical staff refuse to provide PLAINTIFF BROOKS with anything for the itching caused by the kelOids, and refused his request to bathe in the tub in the facility's infirmary to avoid the pain caused by water hitting the keloids in dormitory showers PLAINTIFF BROOKS is unable to wash between the keloids on
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 37 of 120

his back. As a result, he relies on prisoners who are willing to clean between the keloids on his

back with a cotton swab. When PLAINTIFF BROOKS is unable to clean between the keloids, an

odor develops that intensifies in warm temperatures.

99. PLAINTIFF BROOKS has requested surgery to remove the keloids approximately five

times between October 2011 and April 2011 His requests were denied. Medical staff informed

PLAINTIFF BROOKS in December 2013 that he has been approved for a surgery to remove the

keloids. He did not have the treatment. In or around March or April 2013, PLAINTIFF

BROOKS was finally sent to a dermatologist who informed him that the keloids had grown so

big that they could only be removed through radiation treatment. The dermatologist also

prescribed a medicinal soap, but medical staff failed to provide the soap to PLAINTIFF

BROOKS.

100.

In or around 2012, PLAINTIFF ROGERS was bitten three times by a spider. The

bites developed into large wounds. PLAINTIFF ROGERS went to the infirmary three or four

times to get treatment for the wounds. Medical staff told ROGERS that he was "nasty" and

needed a bath; they did not treat his wounds. Over the course of three weeks, the wounds grew

larger, and PLAINTIFF ROGERS became feverish and began vomiting. A correctional officer

took him to the infirmary to get him treated. He was given a cream, medicated soap and gauze to

protect the wound, and the wound eventually healed.

101.

PLAINTIFF BR GGS has a grapefruit-sized hernia. The prison doctor has told

PLAINTIFF BRAGGS that he will not recommend surgery because the hernia is not life

threatening.

102.

PLAINTIFF MITCHELL is in a wheelchair. He has been informed by a doctor at

the University of Alabama Birmingham that he might be able to walk again if he was provided

37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 38 of 120

with physical therapy, PLAINTIFF MITCHELL has made repeated request for physical therapy.

He has not had any physical therapy, and has been informed by Hamilton A & I staff that

prisoners are not given physical therapy

103.

PLAINTIFF BALL has high cholesterol. In or around May 2014, his health code

was raised to medical code 4, because of his cholesterol level. A health code of 4 is sufficiently

serious that it requires access to a health unit at all times and limits the programs in which a

prisoner can participate. PLAINTIFF BALL has never received medical treatment for high

cholesterol while in DEFENDANT ADOC's custody. Staff still has not placed PLAINTIFF

BALL on medication for cholesterol.

3. DEFENDANTS deny treatment for eye problems.

104.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not

treating cataracts and other eye problems.

105.

PLAINTIFF TORRES was diagnosed with cataracts in both eyes as a child. In or

around 2011 PLAINTIFF TORRES visited the Callahan Eye Clinic in Birmingham Alabama.

Doctors informed him that the vision in his left eye had substantially deteriorated. Doctors

advised PLAINTIFF TORRES that if he does not have surgery on his left eye, he will lose vision

in that eye. In or around 2011 and after his visit to the Callahan Clinic, PLAINTIFF TORRES

put in a sick call request to see the facility optometrist. The optometrist examined PLAINTIFF

TORRES by asking him to read a letter chart only. Afterwards, he informed PLAINTIFF ) TORRES that ADOC will not pay for his eye surgery and prescribed him a pair of glasses.

PLAINTIFF TORRES stopped using the eye glasses after a short time because they did not

improve his vision and gave him headaches. The glasses eventually broke and medical staff

refused to give him another pair because he discarded the frames.

38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 39 of 120

106.

Since 2011, PLAINTIFF TORRES has experienced increasingly severe

headaches that are so painful that they prevent him from sleeping. He experiences strain in his

tight eye due to the weakening of the left. As time passes, his vision worsens and he sees spots

and fog periodically.

107.

PLAINTIFF MOORE developed glaucoma in 2008. He was in the process of

arranging surgery for his glaucoma with the Franklin Clinic in Mobile when he was arrested.

After he was arrested, the eye doctor in the Mobile County Jail examined PLAINTIFF

MOORE's eyes and stated that he needed surgery for his glaucoma imi.ediately.. The eye doctor

said that he was writing this in PLAINTIFF MOORE's records that would go to ADOC. When

PLAINTIFF MOORE came into ADOC custody, he had an appointment with an eye doctor

every three months, later reduced to every six months. He spoke with the eye doctor three or

four times about getting surgery to treat his glaucoma. The eye doctor repeatedly told him tha

the state would not pay for glaucoma surgery because it did not have the money. His last

appointment with the eye doctor was in the summer of 2013. In or around February 2014,

PLAINTIFF MOORE spoke with the Director of the Pardons and Parole Board who also told

him there was inadequate money to pay for his surgery.

108.

PLAINTIFF ROGERS has not been able to see out of hi left eye since 2012. He

believes the problem is cataracts. Also, the white of his eye is swollen and droopy, blocking his

vision. He had cataract surgery on his tight eye about eight years ago, but his right eye now has

double vision. He has been given glasses, but they do not help with his eyesight at all. He has

received no other treatment for his eyesight.

109.

Larry Shepherd, then a prisoner in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC,

developed cataracts in both eyes in or around April 2011. He was unable to read any of the

39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 40 of 120

letters on the eye chart by June 2011. He was sent out to see an ophthalmologist in November

2011. The ophthalmologist prescribed that he have surgery on the cataracts in both eyes

"ASAP." As of November 2012, he had not had the surgery. He was released on medical

furlough at that time, and was able to have surgery on his right eye in February 2013.

4. DEFENDANTS do not treat hepatitis C

110.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not

treating hepatitis C. According to a report provided to DEFENDANTS THOMAS and

NAGLICH, in April 2014, 2,280 prisoners in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC had been

diagnosed with hepatitis C, but just seven of them were receiving treatment.

111.

The failure to treat prisoners for hepatitis C creates a significant risk of serious

harm. One prisoner at Holman recently died from complications from untreated hepatitis C.

Numerous individuals develop jaundice at Holman and do not receive treatment. A prisoner at

Ventress has untreated hepatitis C and is suffering from liver failure.

112.

PLAINTIFF MORK was diagnosed with hepatitis, C shortly before entering

ADOC custody. At that time, the doctors at the University of Alabama at Birmingham hospital

were about to start him on medications. In late 2011 or early 2012, while housed at Limestone,

the doctors told him that his hepatitis had progressed far enough that he should begin receiving

treatment. A doctor at Limestone told PLAINTIFF MORK that they did not treat everyone

because the medication was too expensive, but that he could submit a request. PLAINTIFF

MORK submitted the request, but never heard back. PLAINTIFF MORK was subsequently

transferred to Holman, where he has not received any treatment. To the best of his recollection,

he has not had his viral load checked for seven or eight months, and his blood is rarely checked.

40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 41 of 120

113.

PLAINTIFF SELLERS has hepatitis C. He is receiving no treatment for it. In

2011, he tested positive for tuberculosis (TB) exposure and was given Rifampin. PLAINTIFF

SELLERS developed jaundice and had to discontinue Rifampin. Since that time, the enzymes in

his blood have repeatedly tested high, indicating that his liver is not functioning appropriately.

114.

Michael Kennedy is a prisoner housed at Staton. He was born with hepatitis C.

After be came into ADOC custody in 2012, he was told that he is too sick to be treated for

hepatitis C. Although he is in a great deal of pain and was prescribed Phentyl, he receives

only Tylenol 3 for his pain. His liver is ordinarily drained every two months, at a hospital, with

the use of an ultrasound machine to determine where the draining catheter should be placed.

However, in February 2014, this procedure was done at Staton's infirmary, rather than an outside

medical facility. There was no ultrasound used. Instead, the doctor felt his abdomen and

guessed where to place the catheter. It was significantly more painful that when the procedure

was done in the hospital.

5. DEFENDANTS deny prisoners treatment for diabetes.

115.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not

providing adequate care for diabetes in a number of different ways.

116.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not

providing appropriate nutrition and medicine to control diabetes. For example, PLAINTIFF

GILBERT's diabetes has not been well-controlled since he has been in ADOC custody. Since he

has been at Kilby, his blood sugar level in the early mornings is typically around 300 or 400

milligrams per deciliter (mg/dL); the target level before eating is 70-130 rng/dL. At other points

in the day, he feels his blood sugar level dropping, and he gets shaky and breaks out into a sweat.

He has passed out from low blood sugar between 15 and 20 times in the two years he has been in

41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 42 of 120

ADOC custody. When he first came to Kilby, snacks were provided to diabetics to keep with

them so they could be eaten when needed. Now, diabetics are called to the cafeteria at some

point in the evening for Snacks. The snacks must be eaten at the time they are offered, rather than

when they are needed. Prior to coming to ADOC, he was on a long-acting, 24-hour insulin that

controlled his diabetes better. He has asked if he can be put back on the 24-hour insulin, but was

told by a doctor that he cannot because it is too expensive.

117.

At Kilby, several times each week, someone has a sufficiently serious diabetic

crisis that they must be carried to the infirmary.

118.

In approximately 2004, PLAINTIFF BRAGGS's right leg was amputated at the

knee due to lack of medical treatment while in prison. Prior to losing his leg, PLAINTIFF

BRAGGS, who has diabetes, complained of numbness and tingling in his foot to prison medical

staff for approximately three weeks. Prison medical staff told PLAINTIFF BRAGGS he had

athlete's foot. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is currently experiencing similar problems with his left

foot. Medical staff at Hamilton A & I have provided PLAINTIFF BRAGGS with a prescription

for the foot numbness, but have not addressed the reason his foot is numb and tingling.

PLAINTIFF BRAGGS does not know the name of the medicine he has been given for the

numbness. When be asked about possible side effects of this medication, a nurse said that

PLAINTIFF BRAGGS could "look up" the side effects of his medication. PLAINTIFF

BRAGGS is not aware of any way in which he could look up the side effects.

119.

PLAINTIFF BROYLES also has diabetes that is not well controlled. While he

was at Bullock, he collapsed four times from having low blood sugar. On one occasion, he was

in his bed, fell out, and hurt his head. His sugar blood sugar level was 40 mg/dL. He was

transferred to Elmore in January 2 014, and has also collapsed there from low blood sugar.

42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 43 of 120

120.

PLAINTIFF COPELAND has poorly controlled diabetes as well. His blood sugar

levels are generally between 150 and 350 mg/dL. On one occasion, when his blood sugar level

was toward the low end of the target range, 79 mg/dL, a nurse tried to give him insulin anyway.

This would have brought his blood sugar level down, likely to a dangerously low level.

121.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not

having diabetic prisoners' toenails clipped for them. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, who is diabetic

and paralyzed on One side of his body from a Stroke, asked to have his toenails clipped. Clipping

his own toenails is dangerous because he can easily give himself a small cut that, because he is

diabetic, creates a risk of infection and amputation. The nurses laughed and told him that they

were not in the prison to clip his toenails.

122.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of denying

diabetic prisoners appropriate foot care. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has not seen a podiatrist since he

came into ADOC custody, although he visited one regularly prior to his incarceration.

PLAINTIFF COPELAND's feet and legs are consistently swollen and painful, but he has not

seen a podiatrist.

123.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of denying

diabetic prisoners appropriate footwear. PLAINTIFF GILBERT was given an orthopedic shoe

that rubbed the skin off his toe because the shoe was too small. He asked for a new shoe, but

was denied. He had to cut away the top of the shoe. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD asked for diabetic

shoes and was told that because he is in a wheelchair, he does not need shoes.

124.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of denying

diabetic prisoners appropriate eye examinations and adequate treatment as needed.

43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 44 of 120

6. DEFENDANTS deny prisoners adequate dental treatment.

125.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of denying

prisoners adequate dental care.

126.

At some facilities, prisoners' teeth are rarely cleaned. Dentists do not generally

fill cavities. Once a prisoner's tooth becomes decayed, the only treatment available in most

facilities is to have the tooth pulled.. Once pulled, the teeth are not replaced unless the prisoner

has lost numerous teeth.

127.

PLAINTIFF DILLARI) has never had his teeth cleaned in the eight years he has

been at Bullock. PLAINTIFF DILLARD's left fr6nt tooth turned dark brown in early 2013. He

saw a dentist after the tooth turned brown, and the dentist said that he would see PLAINTIFF

DILLARD again about the tooth. He did not. After PLAINTIFF DILLARD moved to the

mental health dormitory in the main building at Bullock, he saw the dentist again. The dentist

said to "put him on the list." PLAINTIFF DILJ-ARD saw the dentist again around the end of

April 2014. The dentist did not work on the tooth at either of these appointments. The dentist

said that he would try to save the tooth, but has not yet done anything for the tooth.

128.

PLAINTIFF TERRELL's two upper front teeth are mottled dark brown and black,

particularly near the gum line. They are both loose. The last time he saw a dentist was, he

believes, about one and a half years ago. He recently asked to see the dentist and was told he is

"on the list" but that he could not see the dentist.

129.

PLAINTIFF BROYLES's dentures broke about three years ago. He has not been

provided with new dentures.

44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 45 of 120

C. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Delay Diagnosis And Treatment Of Serious Medical Needs.

130.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of delaying

diagnosis and treatment to prisoners with serious medical conditions, causing prisoners in

Alabama unnecessary pain, suffering, disabilities and sometimes death. The policy and practice

of delaying diagnosis and treatment creates a substantial risk of serious harm..

131.

Numerous prisoners have complained of symptoms for months without anyone

addressing their concerns, only to be diagnosed with advanced stage cancer that is terminal by

the time it is diagnosed. For example, Robert Jones, a prisoner who had been treated for prostate

cancer in 2006 started showing rapidly rising PSA levels in 2011. Rising PSA levels are an

indication of prostate cancer, requiring additional tests. He began vomiting, sometimes vomiting

blood, on a regular basis. However, he was not given necessary tests or diagnosed until a year

and a half later in February 2013. By that time, his prostate cancer had metastasized, spread to

his bones, and was terminal. He died in January 2014.

132.

PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had a chest x-ray in or around February 2014 because of a

TB outbreak at St. Clair. There was a spot on his lung. He had a CT scan in or around late

March 2014. On or about April 14, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was told that the CT scan

showed that he had cancer and that he would be Sent out for a biopsy the following day. As the

May 28, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had not been sent out for a biopsy of the cancerous spot on his

lung.

133.

In April 2014, a prisoner at St. Clair had an infection in his left foot that went

untreated for long enough that his foot became gangrenous and had to be amputated. Also in

April 2014, a prisoner at Bibb had an infection in his right foot that went untreated for long

enough that the front portion of his foot had to be amputated.

45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 46 of 120

134.

Starting in the summer of 2010, PLAINTIFF SELLERS began to experience pain

in his lower back and difficulty urinating, and occasionally saw blood in his tirine. He told

medical Staff, but was given only Ibuprofen for the back pain. His pain and urination difficulties

increased over the following three years. By July of 2013, be had blood in his urine every day,

and was in so much pain that he could not lay flat on his bed. Following a heart attack in

November 2013, he was transferred to Kilby. He had an MRJ, from which it was discovered that

he had kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS was placed on a medical hold, so that he could

have the kidney stones removed. He was prescribed Flomax to treat the kidney stones and Norco

for pain, and was scheduled for surge!. However, on December 31, 2013, he was transferred to

St. Clair. His medical records were not transferred to St. Clair. His diagnosis was not promptly

communicated to staff at St. Clair, he was not provided with his medications, and it was months

before his Surgery was scheduled. PLAINTIFF SELLERS finally had kidneys, urgery on March

7, 2014, more than three and a half years after he began having symptoms from the kidney

stones, and more three months after the kidney stones were ultimately diagnosed.

135.

The day of PLAINTIFF SELLERS' surgery for kidney Stones, he was returned to

his general population housing unit at St. Clair. Within two days he was feverish from infection.

He asked to be admitted to the infirmary at St. Clair. In the infirmary, he was left in a storage

closet overnight, then returned to his housing unit.

136.

PLAINTIFF PRUITT was splashed in the eyes with disinfectant when he was in

suicide watch in December 2013. He was taken to a hospital the following day. A doctor there

recommended that he see an eye specialist. He has not seen an eye specialist. His vision has

been cloudy since this incident.

46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 47 of 120

137.

On or about May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was housed in segregation and

the toilet in his cell became stopped up. On or about May 8, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUI'fl was attempting to summon assistance because of the stopped up toilet by sticking his right hand out

through the food slot in the door of his cell. A correctional officer pushed the door Of the slot up,

forcing his hand up and back. His hand swelled up immediately. He was then maced through

the slot in the door. There were no decontamination procedures taken. He was not taken to

shower, and his cell was not decontaminated. He only option for decontamination was to use his

hands, one of which was injured, to wash his face in the sink that is a single unit with the toilet

that had been stopped up for a week. He was given 20 days of restriction in segregation. He was

not taken to medical that day for his hand. He was taken the following day and given aspirin. It

was not until four days after the incident that his hand was x-rayed. He does not know the

results. As of June 16, his hand continues to cause him significant pain and he has difficulty

moving his thumb.

D. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Fail To Provide Adequate Emergency Care.

138.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have 'a policy and practice of failing

to respond adequately to medical emergencies. The poor response results in a substantial risk of

serious harm, as well as pain, loss of function, and even death.

139.

As discussed above, in January 2014, a prisoner who was injected with something

incorrectly during dialysis at St. Clair went into cardiac arrest. Although there was a . crash cart

in the dialysis unit, no one present knew how to use it. The prisoner died.

140.

PLAINTIFF DUNN cut himself with a razor blade on several occasions during a

nine-month period in segregation. On one occasion, on or about March 15, 2014 just before 6:00

p.m., he cut himself so deeply that he cut a tendon in his forearm. PLAINTIFF DUNN promptly

47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 48 of 120
told a sergeant that he had cut himself. The sergeant responded, "Why do you keep doing this on my shift? Why don't you just go ahead and kill yourself" Shortly after 6:00 p.m.., a nurse cane by, and PLAINTIFF DUNN showed the nurse his arm. The nurse said he would return when he had time, but did not come back. At approximately 9:00 p.m., PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken out of his cell and placed in a cell outside. He was beaten by two officers in the cell, then left there for another hour. At approximately 10:00 p.m., he was taken to the itifirmaiy. The nurse at the infirmary attempted to staunch the blood flow from PLAINTIFF DUNN's arm, but was unable to do so. At approximately 11:00 p.m., PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken to Brookwood Hospital, where several staples were put into his arm to hold the wound closed.
141. Years ago, PLAINTIFF SELLERS was diagnosed as pre-diabetic. He was on a wellness diet until 2012. PLAINTIFF SELLERS was moved into segregation at St. Clair on May 12, 2014. In segregation, the prisoners eat the dinner in the early afternoon, and then there is no food until breakfast in the early morning. Between May 12 and May 28, 2014, PLAINTIFF SELLERS passed out in segregation five times, each time in the evening. He does not have any way of knowing the amount of time he spends unconscious. When he comes to, he calls out for assistance, but no one comes. He asked nurses to be seen by medical several times when they came around for pill call. The nurses told him he needed a sick call slip, but when he asked them for a sick call slip, they stated they did not have one. When out of his cell for unrelated reasons, he has secured three sick call slips and submitted them. Each time he submits one, his blood pressure and temperature are checked, but there is no examination relating to his having passed out several times. On one occasion, he was in the infirmary and asked specifically to have his blood sugar level tested. The level was tested, but he has not been informed of the results.
48

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 49 of 120

E. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH Fail to Adequately Provide and Manage Medications and Medical Supplies and Devices.

142.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not

consistently providing and managing medications and other medical supplies. The medical staff

in Alabama prisons makes frequent medication errors or otherwise deprive prisoners of

prescribed medications.

143.

PLAINTIFF COPELAND takes medication for high blood pressure and diabetes.

Many months his medications run out before he is scheduled to see the doctor again. When this

happens he has to ask to be seen in sick call, first by a nurse, then by a doctor. The process can

take several days. The longest he has gone without his medications is about two weeks. When

he is not on his medications, he sweats, gets dizzy and Suffers from headaches. Several prisoners

describe medications running out before the end of the prescription.

144 PLAINTIFF ROGERS takes medication for diabetes. In March 2014, the

medication was abruptly discontinued Without any discussion with a doctor. PLAINTIFF

ROGERS went for approximately two months without his medication.

145.

PLAINTIFF HAGOOD also takes medication for diabetes. In or around May

2014, his diabetes medication was cut in half. His blood sugar levels immediately rose from

running at around 98 mgldL to close to or over 200 mgldL.

146.

PLAINTIFF BROOKS had a prescription for pain medication for his keloid

condition. He had had the prescription for approximately two years. In February 2014, the

prescription was discontinued. He had not had any discussion with the doctor about

discontinuing the medication. He only learned of the medication being discontinued when he

went to get it at pill call.

49

U

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 50 of 120

147.

Additionally, nearly all prisoners interviewed reported that they did not give

informed consent to medications. They were not informed of the purpose, risks, side effects and

benefits of the medications prescribed to them.

148.

On two occasions, PLAINTIFF DILLARD has been given the wrong medicine.

On one occasion, he was given the wrong medicine during evening pill call. He went back to his

bed and lay down. He got up about an hour later, and was unable to talk or Walk. Other

prisoners called for correctional officers, and he was escorted to the infirmary where he was

given a shot and then brought back to his dormitory and put to bed, where he slept off the

medication. On another occasion, PLAINTIFF DILLARD was given the wrong medication by

the nurse. He saw that he had the wrong medication and told the nurse. The nurse told him that

the doctor had changed his medication. He said that he would not take the medication because it

was not his. The nurse then gave him the medication he had previously been taking.

149.

PLAINTIFF DILLARD has also witnessed what he perceived as other prisoners

having bad reactions to medication on approximately six occasions. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has

witnessed numerous other prisoners look at their pills at the pill call window and tell the nurse

they have the wrong medications. On two occasions, PLAINTIFF DILLARD saw the

correctional officers walk up to the prisoners who stated that the medications were wrong, slap

them and tell them to take the medications.

150.

PLAINTIFF BROYLES has been given the wrong medication at pill call a few

times. He has refused to take medication that was not correct and been harassed by correctional

officers for doing so.

50

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 51 of 120

151.

PLAINTIFF VILLAR has asked for incontinence protection briefs because, due

to his stroke, he often soils his bed at night. Medical staff has refused to provide the necessary

briefs.

152.

Similarly, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has asked for incontinence protection briefs

because, due to his stroke, he cannot feel when he needs to urinate. Medical staff has refused to

provide the necessary briefs.

F. DEFENDANTS Have Inadequate Procedures For Preventing And Responding To Outbreaks Of Infectious Diseases In ADOC Prisons.

153.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have no effective system for

preventing or managing infectious diseases.

154.

In recent years, there have been numerous TB outbreaks in Alabama's prisons. In

or around January 2014, there was an outbreak of TB at St. Clair. Several men have been

diagnosed with active TB. Medical staff at St. Clair have determined that a man who was

diagnosed in February 2014 had likely been infectious for a year. One of the men diagnosed

with TB worked in the kitchen until the day he was diagnosed. Many prisoners at St. Clair did

not have aTB test done during their physicals in 2013.

155.

A correctional officer who was known by DEFENDANTS THOMAS and

NAGLICH to have active TB was allowed to continue working at Tutwiler Prison for Women

("Tutwiler") during September 2013. He was stationed in places in the facility where it was

deemed that he would have limited contact with prisoners and other employees and contractors

of ADOC, but he was allowed to continue working until he was physically unable to do so.

156.

At Donaldson in the summer of 2012, Dormitory K, which houses 130 men, was

under purportedly under quarantine for TB. The people in Dormitory K mixed freely with the

51

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 52 of 120

people in the adjacent dormitory and, to a lesser degree, with the prisoners housed in two more

dormitories of the same size.

157. There is an outbreak of scabies at Ventress that has been ongoing for three years

or more. Early on in the Ventress scabies outbreak, prisoners were instructed to place their

mattresses over a fence in the yard during the day to air them out:. When the prisoners collected

them at night, there was no way to ensure that each person got the same, mattress he had had

before. Such mixing of mattresses creates a high risk of infections spreading from one person to

another.

158.

There has also been an outbreak of scabies at St. Clair, Holman and Tutwiler in

recent months.

159.

Moreover, the conditions in the prisons make the spread of disease nearly

inevitable. The prisons are grossly overcrowded. Prisoners in every facility report the presence

of vermin, especially rats and. spiders. The vermin live in the housing units and in the kitchens.

In various prison units, birds enter and leave droppings.

160.

Additionally, the facilities have extensive plumbing problems. The showers,

toilets and sinks are inadequate to meet the needs to twice the number of people the facilities

were built to house. Few if any of the prisons have upgraded the plumbing systems sufficiently

to meet the demands of the prisons operating at twice the capacity.

161.

Sewage has overflowed into dormitories at Kilby and St. Clair. At Ventress,

prisoners have been required to carry raw sewage away from the facility to dump on the edges of

the facility grounds. At Hamilton A & I, there is a ditch of sewage near one edge of the

property. The administration of the facility had a footbridge built over the ditch.

52

a

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 53 of 120

G. DEFENDANTS Deny Care to Terminally Ill Prisoners, Issuing 'Do Not Resuscitate' or 'Allow Natural Death' Orders Against the Patient's Wishes.

162.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of allowing

doctors to discontinue care to terminally ill prisoners against their will. This is a policy and

practice that has continued over years and has been reported in DEFENDANTS' own

documents.

163.

One of the most basic health care decisions is when to discontinue treatment for a

terminally ill patient. This is a decision that resides with the patient. Numerous prisoners have

been given "Do Not Resuscitate" orders ("DNR") or "Allow Natural Death" orders ("AND")

Without their consent or even their knowledge.

164.

In some cases, the doctors have discussed this issue with prisoners, the prisoners

have affirmatively declined to be DNR or AND, but have been made DNR or AND regardless of

their refusal. In some cases, individuals have been persuaded to sign DNRs without knowing

what they were signing. The DNRs used by DEFENDANTS provide only that in the event of a

cardiac arrest, cardiopulmonary resuscitation not be initiated. Nonetheless, DEFENDANTS

THOMAS and NAGLICH rely on DNRs to deny medical care to prisoners.

165.

At Staton in May 2014, there were five individuals who Were on a list of persons

who had DNRs who did not mow that they were thought to have DNRs. One of these

individuals was PLAINTIFF COPELAND PLAINTIFF COPELAND is blind. No one spoke to

him about signing a DNR or ever told him that a document he was being asked to sign was a

DNR. Another prisoner who has been listed as having a DNR is Michael Kennedy. Kennedy

has end-stage liver failure from untreated hepatitis C. In early 2014, Kennedy learned from a

doctor at Staton that Dr. Bobby Crocker, the Corizon Regional Medical Director for the state,

had placed a DNR order in his file, although Kennedy had not agreed to it. Kennedy asked to

53

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 54 of 120

have it removed from his file. As of May 2014, Kennedy remained on the list of indivicu is who

are considered to have DNRs.

166.

At Staton, prisoner Roy Heath resides in the facility's infirmary due to his health.

He did not sign a DNR. In June 2014, he learned that he has a DNR in his medical file despite

not having signed one. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS has COPD. He experiences extreme shortness

of breath and low oxygen levels, and has periodic COPD crises that require him to be admitted to

the infirmary. Prior to late spring or early summer 2013, medical staff gave PLAINTIFF

CLEMENTS a shot of Sodium Metrizoate every six to eight hours whenever he had a COPD

crisis, along with a breathing treatment, oxygen, and several inhalers during an COPD crisis. In

or around late spring or early summer 2013, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS was admitted to the

infirmary due to an exacerbation of the COPD. Several days into his stay in the infirmary, Dr.

Crocker, asked to see PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS, requiring PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS to temporarily stop using oxygen to meet with Dr. Crocker. Dr. Crocker asked Clements if had

considered how he would feel to be on life support if he had a heart attack or was in a coma and

told Clements that if he signed a DNR., he could avoid that fate. Having difficulty breathing

because be was not using an oxygen mask and believing that the DNR only pertained to life-

saving measures in the event of a heart attack or coma, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS signed the

DNR.

167.

In or around August 2013, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS experienced another bout of

extreme breathing difficulty and again went into the infirmary. His oxygen level was 80. During

his 30 day stay in the infirmary, medical staff gave PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS only one shot of

Sodium Metrizoate. Despite PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS's condition, medical staff did not arrange

for his transport to a hospital.

54

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 55 of 120

168.

PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS returned to the infirmary again in or around February

2014 experiencing difficulty in breathing. His oxygen level was 92. As he lay in the infirmary,

PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS asked the nurse to provide him with some effective treatment. The

nurse responded that if he had not signed the DNR, medical staff could do something to help

him. It was at that point that he learned that medical staff was refraining from treating his chronic

condition due to the DNR. Although the DNR is rescindable merely by the prisoner stating that

he wants it rescinded, medical staff did not explain this to PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS. Because

he did not know that he could rescind the DNR, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS requested that

medical staff give him pain medication and put him in a closed room in the infirmary to die.

Facility physician Mendez ultimately gave Clements several shots of Sodium Mettioate and

antibiotics.

169.

At Kilby, prisoner Larry Shepherd signed a DNR in April 2012 without knowing

what he had Signed. Shepherd was blind from untreated cataracts and no one told him what the

document he was signing was. When he learned that he had signed a DNR, he asked to have it

rescinded. DEFENDANTS did not rescind it. To the contrary, DEFENDANTS relied on it in

their response to the lawsuit Shepherd had filed seeking to have cataract surgery.

170.

An Incident Report from Hamilton A & I reflects that on September 9, 2009, a

prisoner was found in crisis. Life saving measures were started, and the doctor was called. The

doctor told the staff that was present with the prisoner to "make him a DNR."

171.

Moreover, DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH cease to provide medical

treatment to people with DNRs. As discussed above, DEFENDANTS DEFENDANTS

THOMAS and NAGLICH denied prisoner Larry Shepherd cataract surgery based in part on the

existence of the DNR.

55

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 56 of 120

172.

At Kilby, prisoner Robert Jones was admitted to the infirmary from Jackson

Hospital in November 2013. He did not sign a DNR or a request for hospice care, but was

placed on hospice care.

H. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH Allow Correctional Officers To Interfere With Prisoners' Access To Medical Care.

173.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of allowing

correctional officers to deny or delay access to medical care. DEFENDANTS have not

adequately trained security and health care staff on how to handle health care emergencies, and

as a result of this failure to respond properly and timely to emergencies, prisoners suffer

avoidable harm and injuries, including unnecessary deaths. Correctional staff make the critical

initial decision about medical care is needed.

174.

In December 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was on suicide watch. At

approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 13, 2013, another prisoner threw burning fabric into

PLAINTIFF PRUITT's cell and the other suicide watch cell, burning PLAINTIFF PRUITT's

legs. Prisoners on the second floor of the unit where the suicide watch cells are located also

threw burning items into the cell. The correctional officers came and put out the fires, but failed

to do anything to stop this assault. The assault continued for approximately three hours. When

PLAINTIFF PRUITT asked to go to see the medical staff, the correctional officers refused,

dismissing his injuries as "minute" and "nothing." He was not taken to see medical staff until

the morning of December 14, 2013.

175.

Starting on December 14 or 15, 2013, prisoners started throwing disinfectant onto

PLAINTIFF PRUITT. Some of the disinfectant went into his eyes. Correctional officers did not

take him to get medical attention until the following day.

56

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 57 of 120
R

176.

On June 12, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was in segregation. He had been asking

for mental health care for months. He cut himself with a razor on both arms. When he informed

the corrections officer that he was bleeding, the officer ignored him and left him in the cell for

approximately four to five hours before taking him to the nurse.

177.

In March 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was in segregation at Fountain. She

had an infection from a wound that had not been properly treated by the medical staff. After she

had returned to the infirmary and gotten the infected wound properly cleaned and dressed,

medical staff told her she should return to the infirmary twice a day to have it re-dressed.

Correctional officers in the segregation unit did not permit her to return to the medical unit, and

the wound became infected-again.

178.

Corrections officers are often present before or during medical examinations.

They sometimes make comments during the examinations suggesting or stating that the prisoner

is lying to the medical professional. PLAINTIFFS ROGERS, BRAGGS and PRUITT have had

correctional officers interfere in their discussions with medical staff.

II. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE MENTAL HEALTH CARE TO PRISONERS.

179.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH fail to provide constitutionally

adequate mental health care in a number of ways. Their mental health care delivery system is

severely understaffed, and lacks adequate personnel with sufficient expertise to properly treat the

individuals within its care. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH fail to identify, treat and

medicate individuals with mental illness. Additionally, these systematic failures rise to the level

of causing significant injuries and the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Each of these

deficiencies, in isolation and in conjunction, result in a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

57

In

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 58 of 120

180.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH recognize that they must "[p]rovide

clinically effective mental health services." ALA. ADMIN. CODE. r. 600 (2005). DEFENDANTS

THOMAS and NAGLICH are aware that provision of mental health care includes providing

"various levels of care to include a full range of psychiatric and psychological treatments,

procedures, programs, institutional staffing and management." Id. r. 700 (2010). Pursuant to

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH's regulations, outpatient mental health. assistance,

counseling and programs must be offered to all ADOC prisoners. Id. r. 623 (2007).

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH are aware that they must "provide crisis intervention

for prisoners exhibiting signs of psychological distress" and that the crisis intervention requires

the involvement of a psychiatrist. Id r. 627 (2007). They are further aware that prisoners who

are receiving treatment for serious mental illness must be promptly evaluated when placed in

segregation. Id. r. 625 (2004).

181.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have long been aware that the staffing

of mental health professionals is inadequate. While DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH

have chosen to contract with an outside entity to provide these services, DEFENDANTS are

aware of the exact staffing at each facility and the extent of medical services provided. The

ADOC mental health provider regularly fails to adequately diagnose and treat the most seriously

mentally ill prisoners. Further, ADOC's policies at I even its most intensive mental health

treatment facility fail to protect those prisoners most in need of mental health treatment.

182.

ADOC routinely has failed to ensure adequate staffing, both as to gross numbers

of mental health professionals, and as to quality and experience, of key mental health

professionals.

58

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 59 of 120

183.

According to the April 2014 monthly Mental Health Report to DEFENDANTS, a

total of 24,951 individuals were housed in ADOC facilities, of whom 3,059 were receiving some

form of mental health treatment (having a classification of MH-1 or greater). A total of 2,209

prisoners were prescribed psychiatric medications. This population was distributed throughout

each of the facilities run by ADOC. At Tutwiler, nearly half the prisoners have a mental health

code of MH- 1 or greater.

184.

The mental health staffing at ADOC facilities is grossly inadequate. There are

just 6.2 psychiatrists for the entire prison system. This means that the psychiatrists have an

average caseload of 493 mentally ill patients.

185.

At many facilities, a psychiatrist position is not even staffed.

186.

As of April 2014, more than 16,000 prisoners were housed in facilities that have

no assigned psychiatrist. Considering only those individuals on the mental health caseload,

1,474 prisoners resided in a facility with no psychiatric staffing.

187.

As of April 2014, Easterling had 194 people on the mental health caseload. Of

the 194, 120 prisoners are on psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication

orders. Easterling had no psychiatrist.

188.

As of April 2014, Fountain had 106 people on the mental health caseload. Of the

106, 64 are on psychiatric medications. Fountain had no psychiatrist.

189.

As of April 2014, Holman had 115 people on the mental health caseload. Of

these, 75 were on psychiatric medications, including one person on an involuntary medication

order. Holman had no psychiatrist.

190.

As of April 2014, Limestone had 257 people on the mental health caseload. Of

these, 190 were on psychiatric medications. Limestone had no psychiatrist.

59

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 60 of 120

191.

As of April 2014, Montgomery Women's Facility had 88 people on the mental

health caseload. Of these, 60 were on psychiatric medications. Montgomery Women's Facility

had no psychiatrist

192.

As of April 2014, St. Clair had 98 people on the mental health caseload. Of these,

58 were on psychiatric medications, including six people on involuntary medication orders. St

Clair had no psychiatrist.

193.

As of April 2014, Staton had 303 people on the mental health caseload. There

were another 23 people not on the mental health caseload despite having DSM-IV Axis I

diagnoses. A total of 175 people Were On psychiatric medications, including three people on

involuntary medication orders. Staton had no regularly staffed psychiatrist.

194.

As of April 2014, Ventress had 200 people on the mental health caseload. Of

these, 139 were on psychiatric medications, including two people on involuntary medication

orders. Ventress had no psychiatrist.

195.

As of April 2014, there was Only one work release center that had any psychiatric

coverage at all. Altogether, the other work release centers housed 113 people on the mental

health caseload, of whom 75 were on psychiatric medications.

196.

At other facilities, the level of psychiatric staffing Was so low as to be clearly

insufficient. As of April 2014, Bibb had 161. people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 116

people were on psychiatric medications, including one person on an involuntary medication

order. Bibb had less than a quarter-time psychiatrist.

197.

As of April 2014, Hamilton A & I had 79 people on the mental health caseload, as

well as seven people not on the mental health caseload despite having DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses.

60

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 61 of 120

A total of 73 people were on psychiatric medications. Hamilton A & I had six hours per week of

psychiatrist coverage.

198.

The facilities that are designated to house the most seriously mentally ill prisoners

in ADOC custody also have very little psychiatric coverage.

199.

Bullock maintains a Residential Treatment Unit ("RTU"), a unit designated for

inpatient treatment of mentally ill prisoners. Bullock also maintains an Intensive Stabilization

Unit ("SU") for the most acutely mentally ill people in ADOC custody. As of April 2014, there

were 161 people housed in the RTU. Of these, 148 were prescribed psychiatric medications,

including 24 on involuntary medication orders. There were ii people housed in the SU. Of

these, eight were prescribed psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication

orders. There were an additional 284 people on the mental health caseload in the general

population, of whom 201 were prescribed psychiatric medications, including five on involuntary

medication orders. Bullock had one full-time and one half-time psychiatrist.

.200i

Donaldson maintains two RTUs. As of April 2014, Donaldson had 71 prisoners

housed in the RTIJs. In the RTIJs, 60 people were prescribed psychiatric medications, including

16 on involuntary medication orders. There were an additional 142 people on the mental health

caseload in the general population, of whom 73 were prescribed psychiatric medications,

including 3 on involuntary medication orders. Donaldson had a three-quarters time psychiatrist.

201.

Tutwiler also maintains an RTU and an SU. As of April 2014, Tutwiler housed

17 people in the RTIJ and one person in the SU. All were on psychiatric medications. Tutwiler

had an additional 425 people on the mental health caseload in general population, Of'these, 366

were on psychiatric medications. Tutwiler had two half-time psychiatrists.

61

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 62 of 120

202.

Many prisoners on psychiatric medications do not have periodic reviews by a

psychiatrist.

203.

Moreover, as of April 2014, there were only 5.55 psychologists for the entire

system. When fully staffed, DEFENDANT THOMAS and NAGLICH provide for a single

ADOC psychologist at Tutwiler, Kilby and Donaldson. These ADOC psychologists play a

mostly administrative role. The DEFENDANTS' contract with MHM provides for a part-time

psychologist at Donaldson, Bullock, Limestone and Holman and a full-time psychologist at

Tutwiler. The Tutwiler psychologist position was unfilled in April 2014. At all other facilities,

no psychologist is available.

204.

The only contact that a prisoner often has with any mental health professional is

when they are acutely mentally ill and exhibiting suicidal ideations or actions.

205.

When ADOC issued its request for proposals for a mental health services contract

in 2013, it identified the minimum staffing need from the provider to be 144.95 full-time

equivalent employees. Under the current contract, MHM Correctional Services ("MHM") is not

providing even this inadequate number of mental health staff. The staffing provided under the

new MHM contract is just 126.5 full-time equivalent employees.

206.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH require MHM to provide reports of

their staffing and provision of care every month. In the month of April 2014, these reports

showed that MHM had fewer than 120 full-time equivalent employees providing mental health

related services. Of 2,738 prisoners on the outpatient mental health caseload, just 258 were

scheduled to participate in any mental health group during the month.

62

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 63 of 120

A. DEFENDANTS Fail To Identify Mentally Ill Prisoners And Understate The Acuity Of Mental Illness Even In Those Identified.

207.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of under-

identifying mentally ill prisoners and understating the acuity of prisoners' mental illness. As a

result, mentally ill prisoners go untreated and severely mentally ill prisoners receive a far lower

level of treatment than they need.

208.

Just 12.3 percent of the ADOC population is identified as having a mental health

code of MH-1 or greater. This almost certainly indicates that Alabama is not identifying

prisoners with mental health disorders. In a 2006 study of prison and jail prisoners throughout

the country, the Department of Justice concluded that on average, about half of prisoners in state

correctional facilities meet the DSM-IV criteria for a mental illness.

209.

Further, many prisoners who are clearly suffering from a mental health disorder

or psychological distress go untreated. For example, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was been placed in

suicide watch three times from December 2013 through March 2014. On one occasion, he was

on suicide watch for approximately 10 days. He has previously been treated for depression. He

asked for mental health treatment several times since December 2013. PLAINTIFFS' counsel

informed DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH of PLAINTIFF PRUITT's urgent need for

mental health care on May, 16, 2014. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has not been given any treatment or /
placed on the mental health caseload.

210.

Similarly, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS engaged in self-harm repeatedly in March

2014. On one occasion, she continued to cut herself with a razor blade she found in the suicide

watch cell. After her third act of self-harm in a day, she was threatened with forcible medication.

Yet, two weeks later, she asked to be placed on the mental health caseload, and was refused.

63

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 64 of 120

211.

Another prisoner, PLAINTIFF DUNN repeatedly asked for mental health

treatment while he was in segregation. He cut himself with a razor on five occasions. Prior to

each incident, he asked to see mental health. He was never allowed to. The only time he saw

mental health was on the third day after each self-harm, a mental health professional would come

and ask him if he was ready to be released from suicide watch. He has never been placed on the

mental health caseload.

212.

Other prisoners are taken off the mental health caseload Without explanation.

PLAINTIFF CARTER has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, ADHD,

intermittent explosive disorder. He was prescribed antipsychotic medications for years. In

October 2013, all medications were discontinued and he believes he is no longer on the mental

health caseload.

213.

Similarly, PLAINTIFF HARDY, who has a history of serious mental illness since

childhood, was taken off the mental health caseload without explanation.

214.

PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, bi-

polar disorder, anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder. He was taken off all medications

and the mental health caseload. He was told that mental health staff believed he was "faking it."

215.

Further, DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH informed PLAINTIFFS'

counsel that they are aware of 30 prisoners who have diagnosed DSM-IV Axis I clinical disorders who are not on the mental health caseload. Of the 30, 23 are housed at the Elmore,

Staton and Draper, complex, facilities that do not have a psychologist or psychiatrist on staff.

216.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH also dramatically understate the level

of acuity, of those who are mentally ill. According to ADOC mental health codes, MH-1 and

MH-2 are used for prisoners with "mild impairment in mental functioning, such as depressed

64

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 65 of 120

mood or insomnia," MH-3 is for moderate impairments "such as difficulty in social situations

and/or poor behavior control," MH-4 is for severe impairments "such as suicidal ideation and/or

poor reality testing," MH-5 is used for severe impairments "such as delusions, hallucinations, or

inability to flitiction in most areas of daily living." MH-6, the code for the most acutely mentally

ill, is reserved for prisoners who have been committed to a mental hospital. As of April 2014,

just 242 prisoners in ADOC custody - less than 1 percent - were classified at greater than MH-2.

In contrast, the Department of Justice study cited above found that nationally some 43 percent of

state prisoners met the DSM-IV criteria for mania and 15 percent met the criteria for psychotic

disorders.

217.

Numerous prisoners who clearly meet the criteria for MH-3 or above are

classified as MH-1 or MH-2.

218.

PLAINTIFF MCCOY is acutely mentally ill and has poor reality testing. He is

housed at Bibb6 He is given psychiatric medications against his will. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is

classified as MH-1 or MH-2.

219.

PLAINTIFF DILLARD is classified as MH-1. He continues to have

hallucinations.

220.

Similarly, PLAINTIFF TERRELL is classified as MH-2. He is housed in the

Mental Health Unit at Bullock and has hallucinations.

221.

PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has been in and out of mental hospitals since he was a

child. He has difficulty carrying on a coherent conversation. He does not know what his

diagnosis is or what his mental health code is, but he is housed at St. Clair, where the highest

mental health code is MH-3.

65

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 66 of 120

222.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH's own documents reflect the

understatement of acuity of mental illness. According to an April 2014 report to

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH, only 230 people in ADOC custody were categorized

as MH-3, and just 12 people were classified at higher mental health codes. Yet 753 people were

receiving antipsychotic medications. Similarly, a March 2013 report to DEFENDANTS

THOMAS and NAGLICH from MHM showed that 242 people were categorized as MH-3 or

higher, but 853 people had psychotic disorders. Per the DEFENDANTS THOMAS and

NAGLICH's description of mental health classifications, persons with psychotic disorders would

appropriately be classified as MH-4 or MH-5.

B DEFENDANTS Deny Mentally Ill Prisoners Access To Necessary Psychotropic Medications And Medication Management.

223.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH are routinely and systematically

failing to prescribe, provide and manage necessary psychiatric medications.

224.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have designated a total of 3,059

prisoners as having a code of MH-1 or greater. Only 2,209, or 8.9 percent of the ADOC

population actually receive psychotropic medication. The average monthly expenditure for

psychiatric medications for prisoners in DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH's custody

decreased by 30 percent from March 2010 through February 2013, despite the relative stability in

prison population. As of April 2014, for those prisoners receiving psychiatric medication, an

average of just $1.33 per day is spent per patient for the totality of the psychiatric medication

prescribed.

225.

Further, as discussed above, DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH provide

no psychiatric coverage at all in the majority of facilities. In those facilities where they do, it is

minimal. Prisoners on mental health medications have very little interaction with the prescribing

66

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 67 of 120

professional. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is severely mentally ill and is on several

psychiatric medications, yet he is housed at a facility that has no coverage by a psychiatrist.

226.

PLAINTIFF SANFORD, who is housed in the Bullock RTU, is currently

prescribed Zoloft and Tegretol and continues to have auditory hallucinations that are not

controlled by the level of care, he is receiving. He sees a psychiatrist for about five minutes

about every two months.

227.

PLAINTIFF TERRELL, who is also housed in the Bullock RTU, is currently

taking either Prolixin or Haldol and continues to have visual and auditory hallucinations. He

sees a psychiatrist for about five minutes about one time per month.

228.

Many prisoners do not know the name of the medications they take and or their

potential side effects. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is given a shot every month, and

has a prescription for three other medications. He does not know the name of any of these

medications or the potential side effects.

229.

PLAINTIFF MCCOY receives a shot once a week by medical staff and

sometimes receives additional shots against his will throughout the week. He knows he has

taken Prolixin in the past, but does not know the name or purpose of the medication in the

weekly shots or the other shots he receives currently. He knows that they sometimes make him

nauseous and make his arm hurt, but otherwise does not know the potential side effects.

230.

PLAINTIFF TERRELL does not know what medication he is on. He thinks it is

either Prolixin or Haldol, PLAINTIFF TERRELL does not recall receiving individualized

information about the medications he is taking or giving informed consent. He took a class years

ago called "Know Your Medications" during which various psychiatric medications were

discussed. He understood very little of the class.

67'

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 68 of 120

231.

PLAINTIFF DIL LARD takes two antipsychotic medications (Haldol and

Risperdal), a medication for the side effects (Cogentin), and a medication that he does not know

the name of nor the reason be takes it. He had a "Know Your Medication" class in or around

2010, and another when he moved from the Mental Health Unit to the mental health dormitory in

or around January 2014. He does not recall receiving individualized information when being

prescribed his medications or giving informed consent.

232.

PLAINTIFF SANFORD has been on a variety of psychiatric medications during

the time he has been in ADOC custody. There have been times when he did not know what

medications he was on, let alone what they were for or what the side effects were.

233 ..

PLAINTIFF BRAGGS takes three medications for mental health and does not

know the names of the medications or their potential side effects.

234. Some prisoners take medications for years, and are then taken off the medications,

and often the mental health caseload, despite still needing treatment. These include prisoners

who continue to exhibit suicidal thoughts and actions. Despite continued self-injurious actions

these prisoners who have been improperly removed from the caseload and been denied needed

medication are not even returned to the caseload and their medications reinstated after numerous

suicide attempts. For example, PLAINTIFF CARTER was prescribed Prolixin and Haldol for

years. His mental illness is sufficiently severe that he has been placed at the residential Mental

Health Unit at Bullock and Kilby on more thati five occasions throughout the period of his

incarceration, and from 2011 until 2012 he had a forced medication order. In October 2013, all

medications were abruptly discontinued and he believes he is no longer on the mental health

caseload.

68

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 69 of 120

235.

PLAINTIFF HARDY has a history of serious mental illness since childhood and

has attempted suicide several times while in ADOC custody. He was previously prescribed

Weilbutrin, Trazadone and Prolixin. He was taken off his medications without explanation in

2012. He has made approximately six attempts on his own life since being taken off his

medications.

236.

PLAINTIFF JACKSON was taking Haldol, a first generation antipsychotic that is

well known for causing people to shake. To his knowledge, he was not given a medication for

the side effects, and the HaldOl made him shake. In early 2014, PLAINTIFF JACKSON asked

to be taken off the medication because of the side effects. He was offered neither the medication

for side effects, nor an antipsychotic medication that was less likely to cause him to shake. He

has been without psychiatric medications since. He tried to commit suicide by setting fire to his

cell in the fall of 2013.

237.

PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF, who has long been treated for depression, was taken

off Prozac and Trazadone. He has asked to have medications for his depression since, but has

been refused.

238.

PLAINTIFF WALLACE was taking several psychiatric medications, including

lithium. In 2012, the lithium was discontinued without explanation.

239.

Other prisoners simply do not receive medication for their mental health needs.

For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has trouble sleeping. In late May 2014, he believes he

went for at least eight days without sleeping. He receives no medication to help him sleep.

Also, as stated above, there are 30 people DEFENDANT ADOC has identified as not being on

the mental health caseload who have Axis I diagnoses.

69

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 70 of 120

240.

There is little regard for side effects of psychiatric medications. DEFENDANTS

THOMAS and NAGLICH are aware that one of the potentially life-threatening side effects of

many psychiatric medications is that they make patients more sensitive to heat and more

vulnerable to heat-related illnesses, such as heat stroke. Yet, prisoners on psychotropic

medications that increase heat sensitivity are exposed to levels of heat that pose potentially lethal

risks. Other than the RTUs and SUs, the ADOC facilities which routinely house prisoners taking

psychotropic medications are not air conditioned and the ambient air temperatures in the

facilities during the summer frequently exceed 85 degrees.

241.

PLAINTIFF DILLARD takes Haldol, Risperdol and Cogentin, all medications

that increase sensitivity to heat. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is in a mental health dormitory, but not

the RTU, at Bullock. There are many other people in the dormitory who are on psychiatric

medications, including Haldol, as well. There is no air conditioning in the dormitory in which

PLAINTIFF DILLARD is currently housed, and the dormitory becomes very hot. Average

daytime highs in the summer months in Union Springs, AL where Bullock is located, are in the

high 80s and low 90s.

242.

PLAINTIFF TERRELL is taking either Prolixin or Haldol, both of which increase

sensitivity to heat. Although he is in the RTU at Bullock, his dormitory currently does not have

air conditioning. PLAINTIFF TERRELL, who likely has an undiagnosed learning or

developmental disorder and has difficulty reading and understanding written material, was asked

to sign a paper promising to inform the correctional officers if he is getting too hot.

243.

Other side effects are also inadequately addressed. For example, PLAINTIFF

TERRELL's right hand and wrist shake. This is a recognized side effect of first-generation

antipsychotics, including Haldol and Prolixin. He told the doctor about the shaking, and the

70

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 71 of 120

doctor increased the Benadryl to three pills per night. This has not controlled the shaking but has

increased PLAINTIFF TERRELL's sleepiness. PLAINTIFF TERRELL sometimes sleeps for a

day and a half straight. Sleepiness is a side effect both of Haldol and Prolixin, and of Benadtyl.

244.

In or about 2005, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was diagnosed with depression. He was

prescribed Haldol, an antipsychotic used to treat schizophrenia and known to carry a risk of a

variety of side effects. He was given no medications to address the side effects and developed

what he describes as "lockjaw" after about a year. He then asked to be taken off HaldoL Muscle

movements in the jaw and muscular rigidity are known and serious side effects of Haldol. The

lockjaw lasted on and off for about a year after he stopped taking Haldol. He has not been

provided with any mental health care since requesting to be taken off Haldol due to the side

effects, although he continues to have suicidal ideations.

245.

Similarly, PLAINTIFF JACKSON was given no medications for the shakiness

caused by taking Haldol. When he complained of it, he was offered neither side effect

medication nor a different psychiatric medication that carries a lower risk of this particular side

effect.

C. DEFENDANTS Fail To Provide Mentally Ill Patients With Adequate Care.

246.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of

providing almost no mental health treatment other than medication to mentally ill prisoners.

247.

In April 2014, there were six individuals at St. Clair who have involuntary

medication orders. Individuals cannot be given involuntary medication orders unless they have a

serious mental illness and are dangerous to themselves or others. St. Clair has neither a

psychiatrist nor a psychologist, and there were no psychiatrist or psychologist contacts at St.

71

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 72 of 120

Clair during the entire month. The same is true for Ventress where there were two individuals

with involuntary medication orders.

248.

DEFENDANTS maintain a total of 375 beds in RTUs. According to an MHM

report provided to DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH, at the end of April 2014, there

were 249 individuals in the RTUs. Despite having 249 patients sufficiently ill to warrant

inpatient mental health care, there were just 160 individual contacts by psychiatrists with the

patients in the RTIJs over the course of the month, 29 individual contacts with a psychologist

and 96 contacts with a nurse practitioner. According to another MHM report provided to

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH, in March 2013, there was one individual in an RTIJ

at Limestone who was in the RTU for the entire month and he was classified as MH-3. MHM

reported that, over the course of the month, this individual met with a psychologist two times and

a nurse practitioner one time, and had no other mental health contacts.

249.

DEFENDANTS also maintain specialized units for the most acutely mentally ill

within its control at Bullock and Tutwiler, labeled as the "Intensive Stabilization Units" (SU)

with a total capacity of 38. The April 2014 report to DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH

indicates that as of the end of the month, there were 11 men in the SU at Bullock and one woman

in the Tutwiler SU. All were classified as MH-5, the highest level mental health designation that

does not require DEFENDANTs to move to a mental health facility. The woman in the SU at

Tutwiler was placed on "precautionary watch" in a safe cell for 15 days. The totality of her

contacts with mental health during the month of April was two contacts with the psychiatrist and

five with a mental health professional.

250.

The contacts with mental health staff are often perfunctory. For example, while

he was in the Bullock RTIJ, PLAINTIFF DILLARD had appointments with a counselor at

72

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 73 of 120

varying frequencies that lasted roughly 10 minutes. He estimates that he has met with his

Treatment Team approximately two times in the nine years he has been incarcerated. He is now

in the mental health dormitory at Bullock, where he sees a counselor one or two times a month

for five to 10 minutes. He continues to hear voices, and feels he would be helped if he had the

chance to talk through his problems more thoroughly. Other than the five to 10 minute

counseling sessions and medication, PLAINTIFF DILLARD receives no additional mental

health treatment or programming. The last time he had mental health programming other than

the "Know your Medication" class was in or around September 2013. To his knowledge there

are no mental health groups or programs for prisoners in the mental health dormitory at Bullock.

251.

PLAINTIFF TERRELL is housed in the Bullock RTU. This is the unit for the

most acutely mentally ill prisoners in ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been

diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. PLAINTIFF TERRELL

experiences auditory and visual hallucinations. He has great difficulty placing events in relation

to each other in time. He sleeps most of the time, sometimes for a day and a half at a time. In

addition to taking medication, he sees a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks and a

psychiatrist for about five minutes once a month. He receives no other mental health treatment. He has not been permitted to participate in any programming for several years.

252.

PLAINTIFF WALLACE is in the RTU at Donaldson. He spent approximately

nine months at the Bullock RTU. He has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bi-polar, ADHD,

and Intermittent Explosive Disorder. He has auditory hallucinations. He does not receive any

mental health treatment other than his medications.

253.

PLAINTIFF MCCOY appears to be acutely mentally ill. PLAINTIFF MCCOY

struggles to express coherent thoughts and communicate his needs. He suffers from delusions.

13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 74 of 120

He is medicated against his will. He does not know his diagnosis. His only counseling is with an

unlicensed mental health professional.

254.

PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE is housed in the Bullock RTU. PLAINTIFF

BUSINELLE has been housed there since it opened in 2006. Prior to 2006, he was housed in the

Mental Health Unit within the main building at Bullock PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has been

diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He is given an injection of Prolixin every two weeks

and takes Cogentin for the side effects. He meets with a counselor for about five minutes every

two weeks. He sees a psychiatrist approximately one time per month for about five minutes.

The meetings with the counselor and the psychiatrist amount to, in PLAINTIFF BUSrNELLE's

words, "hi and goodbye" and a question about how his medications are working. He receives no

other mental health treatment.

255.

Part of PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE's mental illness is that he gets angry and has

difficulty controlling his anger. When he feels this coming on, he puts in a request to see a

counselor. He routinely has to wait several days before seeing a counselor after putting in a request, on one occasion waiting 13 days. When he does see the counselor, all the counselor

does is refer him to the psychiatrist for a reassessment of his medications-. It then sometimes

takes weeks to see the psychiatrist. During the period of waiting, PLAINTIFF BUS INELLE has

to struggle to control the anger that a symptom of his mental illness and is highly dangerous in

the prison setting.

256.

PLAINTIFF SANFORD is housed in the Bullock RTU. At intake, PLAINTIFF

SANFORD informed ADOC that he has a history of suicide attempts and hospitalizations in

mental health facilities. PLAINTIFF SANFORD has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder,

schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. PLAINTIFF SANFORD has been On mental health

74

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 75 of 120

medications since he was about 16. He is currently prescribed Zoloft and Tegretol. PLAINTIFF

SANFORD hears voices and they are not controlled by the current level of care he is receiving.

He sees a psychiatrist for about five minutes every two months and a counselor for about five

minutes every three months. PLAINTIFF SANFORD is not permitted to participate in any

programming because he is considered an outpatient in the RTU.

257.

PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is housed at St. Clair. He was in and out of mental

hospitals in the years before he was incarcerated' at the age of 22. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY's

thoughts are disjointed and he has difficulty carrying on a coherent conversation., When

PLAINTIFF HARTLEY was housed at Holman from 2001 through 2003, he began to engage in

self-harm, cutting his forearms with razor blades. He has continued to cut himself since, the

most recent occurrence being in early 2014. St. Clair staff freely acknowledge that PLAINTIFF

HARTLEY is mentally ill. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is not receiving any mental health care of

which he is aware. From about 2002 to about 2004, PLAINTIFF HARTLEYparticipated in

mental health programming, but has received no counseling, classes or programs to help him

cope with his illness since that time. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY feels like he should be in a mental

hospital.

258.

PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and is

currently taking three psychiatric medications, the names of which he does not know. He sees a

mental health professional via a television screen once every two to three months for 15 to 20

minutes. He does not know if this person is a psychiatrist or not. He has no other contacts with

mental health staff.

259.

If prisoners are not on mental health medications, they often are entirely denied

access to mental health staff, even when going through a mental health crisis. PLAINTIFF

75

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 76 of 120

PRUITT has received no mental health treatment since he asked to be taken of Haldol in or

around 2006, after he developed a locked jaw. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was in segregation from

July 2013 through March 2014, and was later returned to segregation where he is now housed.

From December 2013 through June 2014, he went onto suicide watch four times. He repeatedly

requested referral to mental health, but has not been referred to mental health. On May 16, 2014,

PLAINTIFFS' counsel requested that PLAINTIFF PRUITT be seen by mental health.

PLAINTIFF PRUITT still had not been seen by any mental health staff.

260.

PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed into segregation in or around June 2013. In or

around August 2013, PLAINTIFF DUNN felt compelled to harm himself. While still resisting

this compulsion, he asked to see mental health staff, but was denied. He cut his forearm with a

razor that was provided to him for shaving. His only contact with mental health staff was when

someone came by his suicide watch cell on the third day after he cut himself to ask if he was

suicidal. He stated that he was not, and was returned segregation. This process was repeated

four more times during his nine-month stay in segregation, each time preceded by his request to

see mental health. He was never referred to mental health.

261.

Near the end of March 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS asked to see mental

health. She was told she had to ask Ms. Nichols, the ADOC psychological associate at Fountain.

She spoke with Ms. Nichols and asked to be placed on the mental health caseload and expressed

that she thought she needed psychiatric medication. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has in the past

been on the mental health caseload and been prescribed psychiatric medications, and she had

repeatedly cut herself earlier in the month and been threatened with forced medication. Ms.

Nichols told her that she did not need medication and did not need to be on the mental health

caseload.

76

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 77 of 120

262.

In or around 2010, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF had a mental health code of MH-3.

He was taking Prozac and Trazadone. He saw a psychiatrist occasionally, and he Saw a nurse

practitioner. After about a year, his mental health code was reduced to MH-1 and he was taken

off all medications. He is currently under no medication, He has asked for mental health

treatment, but been denied. Without his medication and treatment, he has difficulty controlling

his impulses and anger.

263.

PLAINTIFF HARDY has a lengthy history of mental health issues and

placements since he was a child. He suffers from auditory hallucinations that cause him to hurt

himself. The court that sentenced him acknowledged his history and ordered that he be provided

with mental health treatment while in ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF HARDY has been on the

mental health caseload much of the time he has been in ADOC custody. In 2004, his medication

was discontinued. He subsequently attempted suicide by cutting his wrist with a razor. He then

brought a razor with him into suicide watch, where he cut himself further. He was placed back

on the mental health caseload and was prescribed Wellbutrin, Trazadone and Prolix -in.. He was

again taken off the mental health caseload and his medication discontinued in 2009, and he again

attempted suicide using a razor blade, and again bringing the razor into suicide watch where he

continued to cut himself. He has received no mental health care since. He has attempted suicide

several times since being taken off his medications.

264.

PLAINTIFF JACKSON has received no mental health treatment since his

medications were discontinued in 2014.

265.

PLAINTIFF CARTER also has a long history of mental health problems and has

attempted suicide many times in DEFENDANTS's custody. He has received no mental health

care since October 2013.

77

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 78 of 120

266.

Mental health care provided on suicide watch is minimal. For example,

PLAINTIFF SANFORD has had multiple episodes of suicidal ideation since he has been at

Bullock. He last felt suicidal in or around October 2013. He informed the correctional officers

and was placed in a suicide watch cell. Correctional officers came by to check on him every

three hours. A doctor came around once a day for about five minutes and asked if he was alright,

but provided no counseling.

267.

On two occasions while in ADOC custody, PLAINTIFF SANFORD actually

attempted suicide. He was placed in suicide watch. The only mental health care he received was

a counselor who asked how he was doing from the cell front, spending about four or five minutes

talking with him every day or two, and a doctor who spoke with him for about 10 minutes once

or twice. Both times attempted suicide he was given a punishment with 45 days in segregation

and another 45 days without privileges, though he was ultimately not required to spend the time

in segregation.

268.

When PLAINTIFF PRUITT was assaulted by other prisoners with flaming cloth

in December 2013, he had been on suicide watch for over a week. He had received no mental

health counseling. Each day, a member of mental health staff would come to the front of the cell

and ask if he was still suicidal. They spent less than five minutes each day with the individuals

on suicide watch. On December 16, 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT told the mental health staff

person that he was no longer suicidal, not because of any improvement in his mental state,, but

because he wanted out of the cell where he had been assaulted.

269.

Each time PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed in suicide watch, he was seen by

mental health staff only on the third day, when they came to ask whether he was still suicidal.

78

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 79 of 120

D. DEFENDANTS Place The Mentally Ill In Segregation Without Regard For Their Mental Health.

270., DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of placing

mentally ill prisoners in segregation without regard for the harmful effects segregation has on the

mentally ill. DEFENDANTS are aware that this is a dangerous practice that can cause harm to

mentally ill prisoners. DEFENDANTS have a regulation requiring prompt evaluation and

ongoing monitoring of the mental health status of mentally ill prisoners who are placed in

segregation.

271.

At St. Clair, Holman and Tutwiler, there are no general mental health checks in

the segregation units.

272.

In May 2012, PLAINTIFF HARDY who has a long history of serious mental

illness, was taken off the mental health caseload and placed in segregation at St. Clair, where he

has remained since.

273.

PLAINTIFF JACKSON, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and has

auditory hallucinations, has been on the administrative transfer program between the segregation

units at St. Clair, Holman, and Donaldson for sevenyears.

274.

PLAINTIFF CARTER, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and several

other serious mental health disorders, has been in segregation continuously for last three years.

He has been in either an RTU or segregation most of the time he has been in ADOC custody.

275..

PLAINTIFF WALLACE has been in either a RTU or segregation since 2010.

276.

PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia,

1
depression and PTSD. He estimates that he has been placed in segregation four or five tithes.

Each time, he suffers exacerbated symptoms, including increased auditory and visual

hallucinations and increased nightmares.

75

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 80 of 120

277.

PLAINTIFF Sanford has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia,

depression and PTSD. He has been placed in segregation. While in segregation, he becomes

more depressed, has greater difficulty sleeping, has increased suicidal thoughts, and hears more

voices.

E. DEFENDANTS Fail To Adequately Protect Its Most Seriously Mentally Ill Who Exhibit Self-Injurious And Suicidal Actions.

278.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of not

protecting mentally ill prisoners from self-inflicted injuries or suicide.

279.

DEFENDANTS distribute razor blades throughout their facilities for prisoners to

shave. They are distributed in the RTUs, mental health dormitories, segregation units and other

housing units. The razors are not collected or accounted for in any way.

280.

On January 21, 2011, a prisoner at Limestone committed suicide using a state-

issued razor blade. The death and instrument used were both reported in an ADOC Incident

Report.

281.

Prisoners who have a recent history of using razors to injure themselves are still

provided with razors.

282.

PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has a long history of self-harm with sharp objects. She

is nonetheless provided with razors for shaving, and the razors are left with her in her cell. On or

about March 2, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was housed in segregation at Fountain. She cut

herself with a razor. After PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS cut herself, she called out to a correctional

officer, who took her to the medical unit. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS's wound was dressed but not

cleaned. She was placed in suicide watch until the following day. She was then asked by mental

health staff if she was suicidal. Upon her negative response, she was returned to her segregation

cell. The razor she had used to cut herself the previous day was still in her cell. She was not

80

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 81 of 120

provided with any mental health counseling either while in suicide watch or while in segregation

afterwards. She continued to be allowed to have razors in her cell.

283.

On or about March 10, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS again cut herself with a

razor blade in her cell, this time in front of a correctional officer. The correctional officer

walked to the front of the segregation unit, got a pair of handcuffs, walked back to PLAINTIFF

WILLIAMS's cell, and told her to place her hands through the slot in the cell door. She

complied, was handcuffed, and was taken to medical. Her new wound was cleaned, stitched up

and dressed, and she was placed in suicide watch. In the suicide watch cell, she found a razor

blade and again cut herself. She was taken to medical, the wound was cleaned and dressed and

she was again returned to the suicide watch cell. The razor blade had not been removed, and she

again cut herself, and was taken to medical. She told the correctional officers about the razor

blade, but they said they believed she was cutting herself on the sharp edges of the air vents in

the suicide watch cell. Because the sharp edges of the air vent in the suicide watch cell are rusty,

she was given a tetanus shot. She was told she would be forcibly medicated if she cut herself

again, She said she would not, and was returned to the suicide watch cell - the cell that the

correctional officers acknowledged knowing had a sharp, rusty air vent that could be used to cut

oneself. The following day, mental health staff asked if PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was still

suicidal, and upon her negative response, she was returned again to segregation.

284.

PLAINTIFF HARDY has attempted suicide numerous times, always using a

razor. On two occasions, at two different facilities, Fountain and Donaldson, PLAINTIFF

HARDY attempted suicide using a razor and then was able to bring his razor into the suicide

watch cell, where he again attempted to commit suicide. PLAINTIFF HARDY continues to be

81

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 82 of 120

provided with razors PLAINTIFF HARDY has no contact with mental health staff other than,

when he is in suicide watch and mental health personnel come by to ask if he is still suicidal.

285.

PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed in segregation at St. Clair in or around June 2013.

In August, he began to feel compelled to hann himself. He requested mental health care, but was

denied. Nonetheless, he was provided with a razor blade for shaving. He used the razor to cut

his forearm. PLAINTIFF DUNN was then taken to suicide watch. He was not seen by any

mental health professional for three days. On his third day in Suicide watch, a mental health

professional came to the suicide watch cell and asked if he was still suicidal. PLAINTIFF

DUNN stated that he was not and he was returned to segregation.. The razor blade he had used to

cut himself was still in his cell. There was no follow Up from any mental health'staff. There

were also no general rounds by mental health staff in the segregation unit. PLAINTIFF DUNN

remained in segregation until early April 2014. The same scenario of PLAINTIFF DUNN

asking for mental health care, being denied, cutting himself, going to suicide watch, receiving no

care on suicide watch other than a check on the third day as to whether he remained suicidal, and

then a return to the cell, where the razor remained, played out four more times during the months

he was in segregation. A lieutenant said to him after one act of self-harm, "you keep sitting there

cutting yourself. If you die, you die." On one occasion, his blood was still in his cell when he

returned from suicide watch.

286.

PLAINTIFF PRUITT engaged in self-harm on June 12, 2014. He had been in

suicide watch multiple times over the last six months, but had been provided with a razor. He

was in segregation and he cut both his wrists with the razor. He was eventually taken to medical

and then a suicide watch cell.

82

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 83 of 120

287.

At Holman, all inmates, including those in segregation or on suicide watch, are

given razors each time they shower. Corrections officers do not collect the razors after the

showers.

III. DEFENDANTS ROUTINELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY INVOLUNTARILY MEDICATE MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.

288.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy and practice of

medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will without providing due process to determine

whether the individuals can be forced to take medication.

289.

DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have a policy setting forth a

proceeding to determine whether a person can be medicated against his or her will. Prisoners

cannot be medicated against their will unless they are determined to be seriously mentally ill and

a danger to himself or herself or others. The widespread and pervasive practice is that many

prisoners in ADOC custody are denied due process in this deprivation of their right to bodily

integrity.

290.

Numerous mental health patients that DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH

have not identified as being seriously mentally ill are being medicated against their will. In April

2014, there were 23 prisoners on the outpatient mental health caseload with involuntary

medication orders. All but one of them were classified as MH-1 and MH-2, both defined as

having a "mild impairment in mental functioning, such as depressed mood or insomnia." One

person on the outpatient mental health caseload who may have an involuntary medication order

is classified as MH-3, which is defined as a moderate impairment, "such as difficulty in social

situations and/or poor behavior control."

83

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 84 of 120

291.

Further, numerous prisoners have been forcibly medicated under circumstances

that do not comport with the requirements of due process or the stated policy of DEFENDANTS

THOMAS and NAGLICH.

292.

PLAINTIFF HARTLEY occasionally refuses his medications. When he does, he

is placed in what he describes as a "padded cell" in the medical unit. Usually he spends three to

five days in the cell, though sometimes it is longer. The longest he has spent in the padded cell is seven months. When he is confined in the padded cell, mental health personnel come to check

on him two or three times a week for 15 to 30 minutes. PLAINTIFF HARTLEYmay have an

involuntary medication order, but is unaware of having gone through a process to determine

whether he can be medicated against his will.

293.

PLAINTIFF DILLARD has refused his medication. His medications make him

very. tired. Since he arrived at Bullock and was started on Haldol and then Prolixin, he has been

shaky. This is a known side effect of both medicines. In or around 2010, PLAINTIFF

DILLARD refused to take Prolixin because it was making him shaky. An officer slapped him

and wrestled him to the ground. The officers took him to the shift office and told him that they

were going to put him in segregation for refusing his medication. He was able to explain to them

that he needed to see the psychiatrist because he was suffering from side effects from the

medication. The officers agreed to tell the psychiatrist to see him and not to put him in

segregation if he took his medicine. PLAINTIFF DILLARD agreed, but it took 30 days for him

to be taken to see the psychiatrist.

294.

PLAINTIFF DILLARD has refused his medication on a number of occasions. On

at least one occasion he has been placed in segregation for refusing his medications. On all other

occasions, he has been told by correctional officers that he will be forcibly held down and given

84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 85 of 120

his medication. He has never had a hearing to determine whether he should be permitted to

refuse his medication.

295.

PLAINTIFF DILLARD has witnessed other prisoners refuse to tale their

medications. Sometimes they are forcibly held down and given their medication, sometimes the

threat of this is enough to cause them to accept the medication, and sometimes they are taken to

segregation until they start taking the medication.

296.

PLAINTIFF TERRELL has sometimes refused his medications. He has never, to

his knowledge, beengiven a hearing to determine whether he can be involuntarily medicated.

When he refuses the officers and nurses get angry with him. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF

TERRELL was written up because he refused his medication. He had his privileges revoked for

30 days. He often sees other prisoners taken to segregation for refusing their medications. He

sees one officer routinely threaten to beat people if they refuse their medications.

27. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has repeatedly refused to take his medications. When he

refuses, he is threatened with being placed in segregation. There have been many occasions

when he has been held down by correctional officers and given a shot. After the scheduled and

unscheduled shots, PLAINTIFF MCCOY suffers stomach aches, feels nauseous, and has pain in

his arm from the shot. To his knowledge, PLAINTIFF MCCOY has never had a hearing to determine whether he can be medicated against his will.

IV. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO REASONABLY ACCOMMODATE PRISONERS WITH DISABILITIES.

298. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities in

numerous ways, including, but not limited to, failing to remove architectural barriers, failing to

provide reasonable modifications in policies and procedures, failing to provide auxiliary aids and

services necessary for effective communication, improperly segregating prisoners with

85

0

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 86 of 120

disabilities, engaging in contractual arrangements that limit access to appropriate health care for

prisoners with disabilities. DEFENDANT ADOC receives federal funding.

A. ADOC Has Failed To Remove Architectural Barriers.

299.

DEFENDANT ADOC has not removed architectural barriers that can be done

with relative ease and at limited expense. Moreover, DEFENDANT ADOC does not operate

each service, program, or activity in a way that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in

its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by prisoners with disabilities. To the contrary

DEFENDANT ADOC consistently houses prisoners with mobility impairments in facilities that

are not accessible.

300.

With the exception of Hamilton A & I, every facility operated by ADOC contains

architectural barriers for prisoners with mobility impairments.

301.

Bathrooms throughout the ADOC system are not accessible. Toilets at some

facilities are on raised platforms. Some dormitories have only showers with controls at the very

top of the shower head. Many bathroom areas have a low wall to go into the shower area. Also,

access to the outside in many facilities involves going down stairs. While ADOC need not make

sure that all its facilities are accessible to persons with mobility impairments, it cannot house

those with mobility impairments in locations that are not accessible to them. Wardens indicated

during our inspections that individuals were not housed in dormitories that were not accessible.

However, these assertions were repeatedly belied by the presence of prisoners with disabilities in

such dormitories and confirmation that they did indeed live there.

302.

PLAINTIFF SEARS suffers from scoliosis. He uses a back brace and a cane.

Walking is difficult and painful for him, as is standing for long periods. PLAINTIFF SEARS

was housed in Hamilton A & I from April 2012 until January 2013. He was then moved to

86

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 87 of 120

Limestone, where he stayed until May 2013, and then Ventress. Initially, he was housed in

Dormitory C at Ventress. The dormitories in Ventress do not have grab bars in the showers, and

Dormitory C does not have a shower chair to accommodate people with disabilities.

PLAINTIFF SEARS fell in the shower a few weeks after his arrival, and injured his hip.

PLAINTIFF SEARS obtained a profile to shower in the infirmary, where there is a shower chair,

though no grab bars, in the shower. The infirmary is relatively close to Dormitory C. However,

in or about July 2013, PLAINTIFF SEARS was transferred to G Dorm, which is at the opposite

corner of the prison from the infirmary. He was generally not permitted to go to the infirmary to

shower until very late at night, often after midnight. Walking from G Dorm to the infirmary and

back was slow and painful, and, during the winter months, very cold.

303 1. PLAINTIFF SEARS grieved about being housed so far away from the shower he

could use. He was not provided any relief from the requirement that he trek all the way across

the facility in the middle of the night to shower until after PLAINTIFFS' counsel requested that

PLAINTIFF SEARS be more appropriately accommodated. He was then moved to Dormitory

A, which is close to the infirmary. However, Dormitory A is an honor dormitory in which

prisoners are not permitted to rest during the day, and, due to PLAINTIFF SEARS' physical

disabilities, he needs to be able to rest. He was then moved to Dormitory B, and then Dormitory

C. He still is housed in a unit that lacks the necessary accommodations for him.

304.

At Easterling, the shower in the infirmary has 3-4 inch wall over which a person

must step to enter the shower. Prisoners who use wheelchairs have been housed in the infirmary.

305. At Staton, prisoners with mobility impairments must make their way to the

infirmary in order to bathe using the "accessible" shower. The shower in the infirmary consists

of a small stainless steel cubicle with a plastic lawn chair in the middle and a hose that can be

87

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 88 of 120
used for bathing. To make matters worse, a prisoner must step up about eight inches to enter the shower. It is extremely difficult, if not physically impossible, for a prisoner who cannot walk and/or has limited mobility to enter and use this shower independently.
(Step into Staton infirmary shower) PLAINTIFF COPELAND housed in the infirmary because he is in a wheelchair. He is unable to access the infirmary shower without help from another prisoner. To get such assistance, be often must pay the other prisoner in food.
306. At Kilby, the ifirThary bathroom has a purportedly accessible toilet at the end of a narrow area with toilets on one side and urinals on the other. Prisoners in wheelchairs must navigate between the toilets and urinals to reach the accessible toilet, and there is inadequate space to do so. The shower has an unstable chair, and several prisoners have reported falling while trying to get in and out of the shower chair. The ramp to the yard is too steep, resulting in prisoners in wheelchairs being unable to control themselves going down and unable to mount the ramp to return to the infirmary from the yard. There are frequently prisoners who use wheelchairs who stay in the infirmary.
307. The Kilby infirmary also has several individual cells. The toilet and sink in the infirmary cells are a single unit with the sink directly above the toilet. The toilet and sink are also located in the corner of the cells. They are inaccessible to prisoners in wheelchairs.
88

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 89 of 120 I
DEFENDANT ADOC has housed prisoners who are in wheelchairs in the cells in the infirmary. Also at Kilby, wheelchair users who do not need to be in the infirmary are concentrated in Dormitory A. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was housed in Dormitory A from around late 2012 until May 2, 2014. There were, as of May 1, 2014, 10 wheelchair users in the dorm. There have been as many as 17 wheelchair users housed in Dormitory A at one time in the period PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has been housed there. There is just one purportedly accessible toilet in the dorm. Although the toilet has grab bars, it is not accessible because it is at the end of a narrow walkway with toilets on one side and sinks on the other, not leaving adequate room for maneuvering a wheelchair. Moreover, the purportedly accessible toilet was out of order for months at a time. The bunks in Dormitory A are so close together that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD cannot maneuver easily through the aisles between the bunks.
(Kilby Dormitory A bathroom, showing garbage can on top of accessible toilet)
308. PLAINTIFF BALL was on crutches from the time he entered ADOC custody until approximately April 2014. He is and has been housed in a dormitor' at Staton that does not
89

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 90 of 120
have an accessible shower. He must travel to the infirmary to shower in the purportedly accessible shower. The infirmary is approximately a quarter mile away from his dormitory. The infirmary shower is supposed to be accessible to persons with mobility impairments. However, there is a step up into the shower of approximately six inches.
309. At the Fountain chapel, the only bathroom for prisoners has a very narrow door that a person in a wheelchair would not be able to go through.
B. Adoc Has Not Made Reasonable Modifications In Policies And Procedures. 310. DEFENDANT ADOC has not made reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
1. ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities in the provision of medical care.
311. DEFENDANT ADOC has a policy that discriminates against prisoners with disabilities by requiring prisoners complete a written form to request medical care. Some prisoners with vision or intellectual disabilities cannot complete the necessary forms to receive medical care. There are no systems in place to enable prisoners who cannot read due to vision or intellectual disabilities to request medical care.
312. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR, MOORE and COPELAND cannot fill out sick call request forms without assistance from another prisoner or a correctional officer. There is no system in place for them to avoid having to share confidential medical information in this manner.
I!]

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 91 of 120
2. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities by failing to issue or honor profiles exempting prisoners from certain requirements of prison life.
313. DEFENDANT ADOC requires prisoners who need to be exempted from specific tasks or conditions to obtain a "profile." For example, profiles can exempt prisoners from prolonged standing or walking, from shaving, or from doing certain types of work. They can also entitle the prisoner to certain benefits, such as diabetic meals or a lower bunk.
314. However, many prisoners with disabilities are not given profiles for accommodations that they need and that are reasonable. Further, even when prisoners have profiles, the profiles are not consistently followed by prison staff. PLAINTIFF SEARS has severe scoliosis. Prolonged standing and walking causes him pain. From his arrival at Ventress on May 9, 2013 until May 5, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS did not have a profile that exempted him from prolonged standing. PLAINTIFF SEARS routinely had to wait in line at pill call, sometimes for as long as three hours. On May 5, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was given a "no prolonged standing" profile. This has reduced the amount he is required to stand. However, there are several officers who have informed PLAINTIFF SEARS that they will not honor his profile and make him stand, for long periods.
315. As discussed above, in June 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was informed that his health code had been changed from 4 to 1. Because he was a 1, he was told he would be required to Work. PLAINTIFF SEARS asked if there were jobs he would be able to do sitting down, as he has a "no prolonged standing" profile. He was told there were not, and that if he did not begin to work, he would be subject to disciplinary action.
316. Due to the difference in the length of PLAINTIFF GILBERT's legs, standing for lengthy periods of time is painful. He has a profile from the doctor stating that he should not be
91

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 92 of 120
required to stand for long periods. He is nonetheless often required to stand for pill call and in line for food Shortly after coming into ADOC custody, he was provided with a single crutch. This gave some relief, but still left him in significant pain. PLAINTIFF GILBERT did not receive a wheelchair for eight months after he arrived at the prison.
317. PLAINTIFF BALL was on crutches most of the time he has been inADOC custody. PLAINTIFF BALL has a "no standing" profile. However, PLAINTIFF BALL is still required to stand for long periods of time. PLAINTIFF BALL must attend yard call between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m., where he frequently has to stand due to the lack of seating. During these times, PLAINTIFF BALL must kick his remaining foot against the wall to prevent ensuing numbness.
318. PLAINTIFF BALL must also walk to the infirmary to shower in the accessible bathroom. He estimates the walk to be about a quarter of a mile. After he gets to the infirmary, he must stand in line for the shower for 10 to 15 minutes. When PLAINTIFF SANFORD was on the seizure medication, he had a profile ordering that he be in a bottom bunk. However, the profile expired and could not be renewed 'because he had been taken off the medication. PLAINTIFF SANFORD was then assigned a top bunk. He repeatedly asked for the reasonable accommodation for his seizure disorder of being assigned to a lower bunk because he is afraid that he will have a seizure in bed, and fall off and injure himself. He was told be could not switch to a lower bunk, because he was not on seizure medication. A week or so before his most recent seizure, a nurse looked in his file, noted that he has a seizure disorder, and had his bed switched.
319. PLAINTIFF BROOKS develops keloids at the site of broken skin. Therefore, PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a profile that allows him to abstain from shaving for extended
92

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 93 of 120
periods of time. Despite this profile, ADOC correctional officers often refuse to allow PLAINTIFF BROOKS to eat at meal times because he has not shaved. On at least six or seven occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS to shave before he could eat despite his shaving profile. On all six or seven occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS has shaved and cut himself, causing another keloid to develop. On three of these occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS was not allowed to eat even after he shaved.
3. DEFENDANT ADOC has numerous housing policies that discriminate against prisoners with disabilities.
320. DEFENDANT ADOC has housing policies and procedures that violate the rights of prisoners with disabilities. Prisoners with disabilities are housed in restrictive and unduly dangerous housing units because of their disabilities.
321. For example, at Kilby, prisoners who are blind and prisoners who are in wheelchairs are housed in Dormitory A, regardless of the security classification that their conviction and criminal history would qualify them for. DEFENDANT ADOC describes this dormitory as "a dorm in the main hail near the infirmary where others who have disabilities or medical needs, yet are not in need of infirmary care, are placed." This is a dormitory that also houses violent offenders with high security classifications. There is a great deal of violence that the blind and wheelchair-bound prisoners are subjected to solely because of their disabilities. Further, due to the level of violence in the dormitory generally, the dormitory is often on lockdown. The prisoners with disabilities are therefore deprived of recreation time and other privileges because of their disabilities. Also, other than for the prisoners with disabilities, the dormitory is a "transit" dorm, for prisoners coming into ADOC custody and waiting for their assignment to another facility. As a result, programming is not available for prisoners in
93

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 94 of 120
Dormitory A. Prisoners who are assigned to Dormitory A because of their disabilities are therefore excluded fromprograning because of their disabilities.
322. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR and MOORE are both blind and spent many months in Dormitory A because of their disability. Similarly, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, who is confined to a wheelchair, was assigned to Dormitory A because of his disability. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR, MOORE and HAGOOD would all be classified at a security classification of 1 or 2, but for their disability. Dormitory A is a dormitory that houses prisoners with a security classification of 4.
323. Also, male prisoners whose kidney function is so impaired they must have dialysis are housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is a dialysis patient. This appears to be the reason he is at St. Clair, the primary facility for providing dialysis. However, St. Clair is not equipped to treat individuals with mental illness as acute as PLAINTIFF HARTLEY's There is neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist on staff at St. Clair. Because PLAINTIFF HARTLEY needs dialysis, he is being denied adequate mental health care
324. PLAINTIFFS TURNER and PEARSON are both deaf. They are both housed at Limestone. They have both been determined to have security classifications of 2. Ordinarily, Limestone is for prisoners with higher security classifications than 2.
325. Some facilities, including at least Státon and Bibb, house persons with disabilities in infirmaries, regardless of whether they have medical needs requiring placement in the infirmary. Being confined to the infirmary deprivesprisoners of benefits, programs and services. For example, at Staton, one of the prisons where mobility-impaired prisoners are housed in the infirmary; the yard for the infirmary is extremely small and lacks the recreation equipment found in the ordinary yard.. Prisoners housed in infirmaries also have no access to programming. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL was housed in the infirmary at Bibb for 18 months. Correctional staff
94

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 95 of 120
told him he was housed there because he has limited use of his hands. While in the Bibb infirmary, he was able to leave the infirmary only to go to visitation.
C. ADOC Does Not Provide Necessary Assistive Devices And Services. 326. PLAINTIFF GILBERT's legs are two different lengths. In April 2013, he requested an orthopedic shoe. He had used such shoes before coming to the prison and they significantly increased his futictionality , and reduced his pain. He received the shoes after a fourmonth delay. However, the shoe that was ordered was too small and rubbed the skin off his foot, a particularly dangerous problem for PLAINTIFF GILBERT, as be is diabetic and small wounds on a foot can easily become infected and lead to amputations. He has repeatedly requested an orthopedic shoe that fits properly, but has been denied. He has had to cut out the top of the toe of the shoe to avoid getting sores on his foot. 327. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is confined to a wheelchair. He is also partially paralyzed on the left side. He has difficulty getting around in the prison, does not have an assistant to help him, and prisoners are not permitted to assist him. Due to his medical conditions, he has prescriptions for about 15 per day. He does not receive his pills consistently because, without assistance, he is sometimes unable to get to the pill call window. When he makes the difficult journey to the pill call window, nurses make fun of him for having missed pill call previously. He frequently misses meals because, without assistance, it is difficult for him to get to the dining area. 328. The bunks in his dormjtoy are so close together that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD cannot maneuver easily through the aisles between the bunks, and has to ask other prisoners to move out of the way. The other prisoners resent this and make fun of PLAINTIFF HAGOOD and threaten him. When PLAINTIFF HA000D complains to correctional officers of the
95

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 96 of 120
harassment, they laugh at him. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has written two requests to the warden asking for an assistant. but no assistant was provided. On May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFFS' counsel requested that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD be provided with an assistant or transferred to a housing unit where help would be available. The following day, PLAINT IF F HAGOOD was transferred to Dormitory B, a dormitory that had no accessible toilet, no accessible shower, no ramp to the outside yard. He was not assigned a helper. In the new dorm, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was unable to bathe, get himself to pill call, or go outside. After PLAINTIFFS' counsel again requested that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD be provided with an assistant or transferred to a housing unit where help would be available, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was told he would be transferred back to Dormitory A and was assigned an assistant in Dormitory A. However, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was not transferred back to Dormitory A, nor was he assigned an assistant in Dormitory B.
329. Because he was in an inaccessible dormitory and did not have an assistant, from May 2, 201.4 through May 23, 2014, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had no yard time, because he cannot go outside from Dormitory B. He had four or five showers during this period, because he has to go to Dormitory A to shower and has no assistance to get there.
330. On or about May 17, 2014, there was a fire in the kitchen at Kilby. The prison was evacuated. PLAINTIFF HA000D could not evacuate directly from Dormitory B. He was required to push himself in his wheelchair farther into the prison, against the flow of evacuating prisoners, to get to Dormitory A, and then out through Dormitory A, because only Dormitory A has a ramp. On or about May 19, 2014, Kilby was again evacuated, this time due to a gas leak in another dorm. Again, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had to go farther into the prison, against traffic, to get to Dormitory A to evacuate.
96

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 97 of 120
331. PLAINTIFF BROYLES requires a hearing aid for both ears. In or around 1998, medical staff at St. Clair provided BROYLES with two hearing aids for his left and right ears. In or around January 2011, the hearing aid for the left ear ceased working. A Corizon physician told PLAINTIFF BROYLES that ADOC will not replace the left hearing aid because BROYLES only needs to bear from one hear. PLAINTIFF BROYLES often falls when walking because he is off balance due to the difference in hearing between his two ears.
332. PLAINTIFF BROYLES' right hearing aid began to malfunction in early 2014, creating audible feedback. As a result of the malfunction in the right hearing aid and the loss of the left hearing aid, BROYLES can hear only certain pitches and sounds and only if they are loud, clear, and in complete quiet. Medical staff often delay in replacing the battery in the right hearing aid, sometimes for as long as three days. The facility administration requires that he submit a Sick call request for new batteries and pay the corresponding fee, and he often must make several such requests to get replacement batteries.
333. ADOC officials have promised PLAINTIFF BROYLES that he will receive new hearing aids, but he has yet to receive one.
334. PLAINTIFF BALL used crutches from 2005, when he came into ADOC custody, until April 2014. He was not provided with any assistance in the cafeteria to bring his food tray to his table to eat.. He was required to seek assistance from other prisoners.
335. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is deaf. He has signed up for GED classes. However, there is no One to provide sign language for him in the class. He stayed with the class for two months, but ultimately dropped it because, without the reasonable accommodation Of a sign language interpreter, he could not understand the material. PLAINTIFF PEARSON has requested to go to trade school, but has been denied because he does not have a GED. There is
97

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 98 of 120
no sign language interpreter at Limestone. The facility uses another prisoner to provide sign language interpretation, but he is not qualified and his signs are incomprehensible to PLAINTIFF PEARSON.
336. PLAINTIFF TURNER is also deal. He has tried to go to GED classes and to church, but there are no staff members at Limestone who can communicate with him using sign language. He was unable to follow the GED classes or the church services without a sign language interpreter.
D. DEFENDANT ADOC Excludes Prisoners With Disabilities From Programs, Benefits And Services.
337. DEFENDANT ADOC has numerous policies that discriminate against prisoners with disabilities by excluding them from important programs, benefits and services.
338. Prisoners with disabilities are excluded from work release programs due solely to their disabilities. PLAINTIFF PEARSON was excluded from the Decatur Work Release Center and sent to Limestone because he is deaf.
339. PLAINTIFF TURNER has high blood pressure, for which he takes medication. The medication controls his blood pressure well. He requested to go to work release, but was denied, being told: "you are deaf and you have high blood pressure."
340. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is housed in a dormitory in the main facility at Bullock that houses prisoners with less acute mental illness than those in Mental Health Unit. He currently has the mental health code MR . 1, the lowest level of mental health code a prisoner can have and still be on the mental health caseload. About a year ago, PLAINTIFF DILLARD had a mental health code of MH-3 or MH-4. He asked to become an outpatient, which he understands to require being an MU- 1, because he will be up for parole in 2015 and cannot be paroled if he is
98

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 99 of 120
still considered an inpatient. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is foregoing mental health treatment because otherwise he will be excluded from the possibility of parole.
341. PLAINTIFF MANER has a disabled leg as a result of a gunshot wound prior to coming into prison. Prior to 2010, PLAINTIFF MANER had several profiles (accommodations from facility administration in consideration of his disability) that permitted him to: (1) wear shower shoes to prevent falls in the shower, (2) use a cane to assist in walking, (3) abstain from prolonged standing, and (4) sleep on a bottom bunk, PLAINTIFF MANER received these profiles in 1998 when he entered ADOC's custody..
342. In 2010, PLAINTIFF MANER learned that the various profiles created to accommodate his disability render him ineligible to participate in work release programs or to transfer to facilities designated for prisoners who have made substantial rehabilitative progression, known as honor camps, because the profiles raise his health code level. Participation in work release programs and residence in honor camps results in several benefits to prisoners and serves as evidence of rehabilitation helpful to gain parole. Because he could not access these benefits if his disability was accommodated through the use of the profiles, PLAINTIFF MANER asked medical staff at his residence facility in 2010, Hamilton Aged and thfirmed, to remove the profiles.
343. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is currently housed at Hamilton A & I. There are no programs at Hamilton A & I for prisoners who are blind. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR requested to participate in the G.E.D. program and was told that the staff would have to "check into it." He has not received a response.
344. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR has a security classification of 2. Prisoners without disabilities who have a security classification of 2 are eligible for work release.
99

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 100 of 120
345. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is not eligible for work release because he is blind. 346. Prior to March 2014, PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was housed at Kilby in Dormitory A because he is blind. PLAINTIFF MOORE is currently housed in Dormitory A because he is blind. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was housed in Dormitory A until May 2014 because he is in a wheelchair. For prisoners who are not disabled, Dormitory A is a transit dormitory to which prisoners are sent for a short period of time before being sent to a more permanent placement. However, PLAINTIFF NAYLOR spent over two years in Dormitory A, PLAINTIFF MOORE has spent approximately four years in Dormitory A, and PLAINTIFF HAGOOD spent approximately 16 months in Dormitory A. Because the dormitory has a high level of violence, as is often the case with higher security dormitories, it is often on lockdown, resulting in disabled plaintiffs being denied access to outside recreation. Also, because Dormitory A is a transit dorm, programming is generally not available to persons housed there. 347. Mentally ill prisoners housed in the RTU at Bullock are not provided with regular recreation. They go outside one or two times per week. The recreation yards for prisoners in the RTU are caged areas roughly 15 feet by 10 feet and no recreational equipment. When prisoners are allowed out, there are often eight to 15 individuals in these small areas.
E. ADOC Fails To Provide Auxiliary Aids And Services Necessary For Effective Communication.
348. ADOC does not provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to achieve effective communication with prisoners with disabilities. Examples of such measures may include large print materials for prisoners with low vision or a sign language interpreter for prisoners with deafness.
349. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is deaf. He has never been offered a sign language interpreter, even though he requested one on numerous occasions. He does not understand
100

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 101 of 120
certain ADOC policies as they relate to prisoners and cannot participate in any programs offered by the prison due to his lack of ability to communicate. DEFENDANT ADOC often relies on other prisoners with limited sign language ability to "communicate" with PLAINTIFF TOOLEY. In or around January 2014, PLAINTIFF TOOLEY was denied a sign language interpreter for a disciplinary hearing. He did not understand the proceedings. He was sentenced to a 30-day segregation term.
350. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is mostly deaf in both ears. For a time, he had two hearing aids, but eventually, personnel of both ADOC and Corizon informed him he would only be provided with one hearing aid. As a result of having only one functioning hearing aid, he loses his balance frequently. He often has to wait a long time for a replacement battery for the single hearing aid. On one occasion, he was assaulted by a CERT team member for failing to obey an order that he could not hear.
3.51. In or around April 2013, Bullock staff disciplined PLAINTIFF BROYLES twice for missing pill call and not taking his medication for diabetes; He had missed pill call because he could not hear correctional officers order prisoners to line up for pill call due to his malfunctioning hearing aids. The Corizon physician at Bullock refused to allow PLAINTIFF BROYLES to stay on his medication unless PLAINTIFF BROYLES successfully attended two pill calls. PLAINTIFF BROYLES had trouble accomplishing this task because of the malfunctioning hearing aids and the inconsistent times for pill call. At Draper, PLAINTIFF BROYLES received approximately five disciplinary infractions over a year period for failing to obey orders that he could not hear. The warden at Draper ultimately rescinded each of these infractions.
101

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 102 of 120
352. DEFENDANT ADOC has refused to provide PLAINTIFF BROYLES with instructional materials to learn sign language.
353. Several blind prisoners have reported that they are routinely asked to sign documents that they cannot read. PLAINTIFF COPELAND signed a Do Not Resuscitate order without knowing what it was. Another prisoner, Larry Shepherd, now deceased, had his band was placed on the spot where he needed to sign, and believed that he was signing a property sheet relating to his transfer; he later discovered the form was a Do Not Resuscitate order.
354. In 2013, PLAINTIFF TURNER was accused by another prisoner of using an unauthorized credit card to make telephone calls. A disciplinary hearing was held without a sign language interpreter. PLAINTIFF TURNER was not able to understand much of the proceeding, and was unable to present his side of the story. He received 15 days in segregation as a result.
355. PLAINTIFF MOORE has asked for books on tape approximately 10 times, but has never been provided any.
356. PLAINTIFF MOORE cannot go to sick call without filling out a sick call request form. If PLAINTIFF MOORE needs to go to medical, he must ask another prisoner to write down his medical complaint on a sick call request form. When PLAINTIFF MOORE goes to sick call or to visit the eye doctor, the doctors and nurses write down notes from the visit but do not explain his diagnosis or treatment.
357. PLAINTIFF MOORE, who is blind, was written up for the incident described above where he did not stand up promptly because he did not know that the correctional officer telling people to stand for count was speaking to him and the standard practice in the dormitory was that the prisoners who are blind did not stand for count. He was not brought to his disciplinary hearing and did not admit to any misconduct or sign the disciplinary report, but the
102

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 103 of 120
documentation from the disciplinary hearing states that he plead guilty. He was given a 10-day segregation term.
358. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is currently housed at Hamilton A & I. Hamilton A & I does not have written materials in altemativeformats such as books on tape.
359. PLAINTIFF TERRELL was in Special Education classes starting at the beginning of school. He completed ninth grade, but does not know his reading level.. Sometimes documents are read to him, sometimes they are not. Sometimes he understands documents, whether he reads them or they are read to him, sometimes he does not. PLAINTIFF T1kRELL is not being adequately accommodated for his apparent learning or cognitive disability.
360. PLAINTIFF DILLARD believes he reads at about a sixth grade level. He attended school up until seventh grade. He was in Special Education classes for all of his classes throughout his schooling. He sometimes signs documents without understanding them. When he is in medical, some of the nurses tell him what is in the documents, others do not. Some nurses simply say, "how are your medications?" then tell him to sign a paper.
F. Prisoners With Disabilities Are Verbally Harassed, Physically Assaulted, And Punished For Their Disabilities.
361. Several prisoners have reported incidents where they were verbally or physically mistreated due to their disabilities. In Dormitory A at Kilby, where prisoners who are blind or in wheelchairs have been concentrated, prisoners report correctional officers taunting . prisoners about their disabilities. A blind prisoner reported that correctional officers waive their hands right in front of his face, refer to him as "blind man", and make jokes about the blind train When the blind prisoners line up to lead each other to go to the dining room or pill call. A prisoner also reports that the correctional officers say to people in wheelchairs who complain about something, "What are you going to do about it? You can't get up."
103

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 104 of 120
362. A blind prisoner reports that on one occasion during count he sat up on his bed, which is what he usually does during count. A correctional officer yelled to stand up, but did not identify the person at whom he was yelling by name, Alabama Institutional Serial number or bed number. The correctional officer kept yelling, identifying the person Only as "you." The prisoner did not know that he was the person being told to stand up. The correctional officer assaulted the blind prisoner for disobeying, and then wrote him up. The prisoner was given a disciplinary report that indicated he had pled guilty to the infraction at the discipline hearing. He had not pled guilty and no one had told him that the written record of the hearing indicated that he had pled guilty.
363. A prisoner who is nearly entirely deaf was in his dormitory when a CERT team came in and ordered everyone to stand. The deaf prisoner was turned away at the time, aüd did not know of the order. A member of the CERT team hit him on the back of the head for not standing up when Ordered to do so.
364. PLAINTIFF MOORE is provided with no assistance getting around the dormitory or the prison. PLAINTIFF MOORE and other blind prisoners in Dorm itory A assist each other, but are often mocked by the correctional officers and other prisoners. The correctional officers call the prisoners who are blind names, such as "blind motherfucker." When he tries to move around the housing unit, prisoners routinely stand in his way.
365. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF MOORE was sitting on his bunk. Correctional officers came in and called out "count time." Ordinarily, at count, PLAINTIFF MOORE and other blind prisoners remain seated on their bunks, and PLAINTIFF MOORE did so on this occasion as well. A correctional officer yelled to stand up. PLAINTIFF MOORE did not know the correctional officer was yelling at him, until the correctional officer yelled "That goes for you
104

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 105 of 120
too, blind motherfucker!" PLAINTIFF MOORE asked the correctional officer not to speak to him that way. The correctional officer grabbed PLAINTIFF MOORE and slammed hiffi to the ground, then whispered to PLAINTIFF MOORE that he should have killed him.
366. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is harassed, threatened, and subjected to physical violence by correctional officers and prisoners due to his disability. Correctional officers Often yell at PLAINTIFF BROYLES because he does not hear their orders and threaten to physically assault him. Correctional officers also often accuse PLAINTIFF BROYLES of pretending to have hearing limitations. PLAINTIFF BROYLES has had these experiences at Draper, Elmore, Kilby, St. Clair, and Bullock Correctional facilities. A correctional officer at Bullock threw a baton at PLAINTIFF BROYLES when PLAINTIFF BROYLES did not respond to the officer, because he did not hear him.
367. Mentally ill prisoners in the RTU at Bullock are subjected to a great deal of physical violence. PLAINTIFF MCCOY was brutally beaten by correctional officers while he was housed at the Bullock RTU. PLAINTIFF BUS1NELLE has four teeth knocked out by correctional officers in 2009. Correctional officers broke PLAINTIFF TERRELL's jaw and rib in one incident when PLAINTIFF TERRELL was in the midst of a psychotic episode, and beat his head with a baton on another occasion. PLAINTIFF DILLARD was slammed to the ground by correctional officers when he refused his medications because he was having difficulty with the side effects. Correctional officers knock over bunks in the mornings in the Bullock RTU if they think the prisoners are not getting up quickly enough in the morning, although many of the prisoners in the RTU take medications that cause them to sleep.
105

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 106 of 120
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS PLAINTIFF Class
368. All prisoner PLAINTIFFS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of class of all prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH and ADOC (the "PLAINTIFF Class").
Numerosity: Fed. K Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 369. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). As of March 31, 2014, there were approximately 25,055 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC, all of whom are dependent entirely on DEFENDANTS for the provision of health care. Due to DEFENDANTS' policies and practices, all in-house ADOC prisoners, numbering tens of thousands annually, receive or are at risk of receiving inadequate health care while in ADOC prisons. 370. The PLAINTIFF Class members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the Ai)OC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 371. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether DEFENDANTS' failure to operate a health care system providing minimally adequate health care violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, (b) whether DEFENDANTS have been deliberately indifferent to the serious health care needs of class members.
106

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 107 of 120
372. DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 373. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the PLAINTIFF Class. The named PLAINTIFFS' claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct as those of the PLAINTIFF Class. The named PLAINTIFFS' claims are based on the same theory of law as the class's claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 374. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately ' protecting the interests of the PLAINTIFF class. The named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the class. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the PLAINTIFF class members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners' rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 375. This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because the number of current class members is approximately 25,055, and the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
107

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 108 of 120
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 376. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS' policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. All state-wide health care policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of ADOC by DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLIcH. Medical care is provided pursuant to a single contract with a single medical provider with policies and practices that are centrally promulgated, disseminated, overseen and enforced by the medical provider's Medical Statewide Management team and by DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the PLAINTIFF class.
Mental Health Subclass 377. PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLIARD, HARDY, HARTLEY, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MCCOY, MONCRIEF, PRUITT, SANFORD, ThRRELL, WALLACE, and WILLIAMS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a subclass of all prisoners (hereinafter "Mental Health Subclass") who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the mental health care policies and practices of DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH and ADOC.
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 378. The Mental Health Subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of March 31, 2014, there were approximately 25,055 prisoners in in-house
108

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 109 of 120
custody of the ADOC, all of whom are dependent entirely on DEFENDANTS for the provision of mental health care. As of April 30, 2014, there were 3,059 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC who are on the mental health caseload, as well as 30 prisoners who have been diagnosed with DSM-IV Axis I disorders who are not on the mental health caseload. Due to DEFENDANTS' policies and practices, all ADOC prisoners, numbering tens of thousands annually, receive or are at risk of receiving inadequate mental health care while in ADOC prisons. The Mental Health Subclass members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 379. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Mental Health Subclass. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether DEFENDANTS' failure to operate a mental health care system providing minimally adequate mental health care violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, (b) whether DEFENDANTS have been deliberately indifferent to the resulting harm and risk of harm to Mental Health Subclass members who are deprived of minimally adequate mental health care; (c) whether DEFENDANTS' policies, practices and courses of conduct in medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 380. DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
109

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 110 of 120
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 381. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the Mental Health Subclass, because their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct. The named PLAINTIFFS' claims are based on the same theory of law as the subclass's claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 382. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the Mental Health Subclass because the named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the subclass. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the Mental Health Subclass members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners' rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23b)(1)(A) and (B) 383. Because the number of Mental Health Subclass members is so large, the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turti would establish incompatible standards of conduct for DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 384. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS' policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class.
110

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 111 of 120
All state-wide health care policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of ADOC by DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH. Mental health care is provided pursuant to a single contract with a single medical provider with policies and practices that are centrally promulgated, disseminated, overseen and enforced by the mental health care providers' statewide Management team and by DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Mental Health Subclass.
ADA Subclass 385. PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BALL, BRAGGS, BROOKS, BROYLES, BUSINELLE, CARTER COPELAND, DILLARD, GILBERT, HAGOOD, HARDY, HARTLEY, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MANER, MCCOY, MITCHELL, MONCRIEF, MOORE, NAYLOR, PEARSON, PRUITT, SANFORD, SEARS, TERRELL, TOOLEY, TORRES, TURNER, VILLAR, WALLACE, and WILLIAMS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a subclass of all prisoners (hereinafter "ADA Subclass") who are now, or will in the future be, persons with disabilities as that term is used in the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and are in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC.
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 386. The ADA Subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of March 31, 2014, there were approximately 25,055 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC. As of April 30, 2014, there were at least:
1. 42 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC whose kidney function is sufficiently impaired to require dialysis;
111

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 112 of 120
2. 1,329 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC who are enrolled in the diabetes chronic care clinic; and
3. 3,029 prisoners on the mental health caseload. There were also numerous prisoners with mobility, vision, hearing and developmental disabilities.
387. Due to DEFENDANTS' policies and practices, all ADOC prisoners with disabilities risk being discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities in accessing facilities, programs, benefits and services while in ADOC prisons. The ADA Subclass members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 388. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the ADA Subclass. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether DEFENDANTS have failed to make appropriate accommodations in the physical structure and infrastructure of the ADOC facilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (b) whether DEFENDANTS have failed to make appropriate accommodations in the policies and procedures in ADOC facilities as they apply to persons with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (c) whether DEFENDANTS have discriminated against the members of the ADA Subclass in the provision of and access to programs, benefits, and services. 389. DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
112

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 113 of 120
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 390. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the ADA Subclass, because their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct,. The named PLAINTIFFS' claims are based on the same theory of law as the subclass's claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 391. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the ADA Subclass because the named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the subclass. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the ADA Subclass members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners' rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 392. Because the number of ADA Subclass members is so large, the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for DEFENDANT ADOC. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ.. P. 23(b)(2) 393. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS' policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class.
113

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 114 of 120
All state-wide policies regarding the treatment and accommodation are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of DEFENDANT ADOC. The budget and planning for modifications to the physical structure of the ADOC facilities are established at the central headquarters by DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Mental Health Subclass.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF First Cause Of Action: Inadequate Medical Care All Prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF CLASS v.
DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Cruel and Unusual Punishment)
394. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-393 above.
395. By their policies and practices described herein, DEFENDANTS KIM THOMAS and RUTH NAGLICH subject PLAINTIFFS and the Plaintiff Class to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury from inadequate medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These policies and practices have been and continue to be implemented by DEFENDANTS and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, in their official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS' ongoing deprivation of rights secured by the United States constitution under the Eighth Amendment.
396. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
114

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 115 of 120
Second Cause Of Action: Inadequate Mental Health Treatment PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BUS1NELLE, CARTER, DILLIARD, HARDY, HARTLEY,
JACKSON, JOHNSON, MCCOY, MONCRIEF, PRUITT, SANFORD, TERRELL, WALLACE, WILLIAMS; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; the Mental Health Subclass v. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Cruel and Unusual Punishment) 397. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-396 above. 398. By their policies and practices described herein, DEFENDANTS KIM THOMAS and RUTH NAGLICH subject PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the Mental Health Subclass to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury from inadequate mental health treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These policies and practices have been and continue to be implemented by DEFENDANTS and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of State law, in their Official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS' ongoing deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution under the Eighth Amendment. 399. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Third Cause Of Action: Deprivation Of Due Process Prior To Involuntarily Medicating Prisoners
PLAINTIFFS DILLARD, HARTLEY, SANFORD, TERRELL, MCCOY; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; the Mental Health Subclass v.
DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process) 400. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-399 above.
115

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 116 of 120
401. Bytheir policies and practices described herein, DEFENDANTS KIM THOMAS and RUTH NAGLICH subject PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the Mental Health Subclass of their due process rights by involuntarily medicating prisoners in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
402. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Fourth Cause Of Action: Violation Of The Rights Of Prisoners With Disabilities PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BALL, BRAGGS, BROOKS, BROYLES, BUSINELLE, CARTER,
COPELAND, DILLARD, GILBERT, HAGOOD, HARDY, HARTLEY, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MANER, MCCOY, MITCHELL, MONCRIEF, MOORE, NAYLOR, PEARSON,
PRUITT, SANFORD, SEARS, TERRELL, TOOLEY, TORRES, TURNER, VILLAR, WALLACE, WILLIAMS; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; and the ADA Subclass v. DEFENDANTS THOMAS and NAGLICH (Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) 403. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 1-402 above. 404. By, their policies and practices described herein, DEFENDANT ADOC subjects
PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the ADA Subclass to regular and systemic discrimination based on their disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12131-12134, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. These policies and practices continue to be implemented by DEFENDANT and its agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with ADOC under color of state law, in their official
116

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 117 of 120
capacities, and are the proximate cause Of the PLAINTIFFS' ongoing deprivation of rights secured by federal law.
405. DEFENDANT ADOC has been and is aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and has condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 406. PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent have no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs suffered as set forth in this complaint. PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury as a result of the unlawful acts, omissions, policies, and practices of DEFENDANTS THOMAS, NAGLICH and ADOC, as alleged herein, unless PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent are granted the relief they request. The need for relief is critical because the rights at issue are paramount under the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States. 407. WHEREFORE, the named PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent request that this Court grant them the following relief: A. Declare that the suit is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and (2); B. Adjudge and declare that the acts, omissions, policies, and practices of DEFENDANTS, and their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law or otherwise, described herein are in violation of the rights of prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, which grants constitutional protection to the PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent;
117

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 118 of 120
C. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin DEFENDANTS, their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, from subjecting prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF Classes to the illegal and unonstitutionai conditions, acts, omissions, policies, and practices set forth above.
D. Order DEFENDANTS and their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, to develop and implement, as soon as practical, a plan to eliminate the substantial risk of serious harm that prisoner PLAINTIFFS and members of the PLAINTIFF Classes suffer due to DEFENDANTS' inadequate medical and mental health care, and due to DEFENDANTS' policies and practices with regard to persons with disabilities. DEFENDANTS' plan shall include at a minimum the following:
1. Staffing: Staffing shall be sufficient to provide prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF Class with timely access to qualified and competent clinicians who can provide routine, urgent, emergent, and specialty health care;
2. Access: Policies and practices that provide timely access to health care; 3. Screening: Policies and practices that reliably screen for medical, dental, and
mental health conditions that need treatment; 4. Emergency Response: Timely and competent responses to health care
emergencies; S. Medication and Supplies: Timely prescription and distribution of medications and
supplies necessary for medically adequate care; 6. Chronic Care: Timely access to competent care for chronic diseases; 7. Environmental Conditions: Basic sanitary conditions that do not promote the
spread or exacerbation of diseases or infections, including but not limited to a smoke-flee environment; 8. Mental Health Treatment: Timely access to necessary treatment for serious mental illness, including medication, therapy, inpatient treatment, suicide prevention, and suicide watch;
118

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 119 of 120
9. Quality Assurance: A regular assessment of health care staff, services, procedures, and activities designed to improve outcomes, and to identify and correct errors or systemic deficiencies;
10. Accommodations: Appropriate accommodations for individuals with disabilities, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
E. Award PLAINTIFFS the costs of this suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees and
litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law;
F. Retain jurisdiction of this case until DEFENDANTS have fully complied with the
orders of this Court, and there is a reasonable assurance that DEFENDANTS will continue to
cor ply in the future absent continuing jurisdiction; and
G. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June, 2014.
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
By: Maria V. Moths
Maria V. Morris (Alabama Bar NO. ASB-2 1 98-R64M) Ebony Howard (Alabama Bar No. ASB-7247-0761-1) SOUTHERN P0 VERY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue . Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: (334) 956-8200 Facsimile: (334) 956-8481 rnriamorrissplcenter.org ebony.howard@splcentet.org
Miriam Haskell* (Florida Bar No. 069033) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER P.O. Box 370037 Miami, FL 33137 Telephone: (786) 347-2056 Facsimile: (786) 237-2949 miriam.haskellsplcenter.org
119

Case 2:14-cv-00601-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 06/17/14 Page 120 of 120
*Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming William Van Der Pol (ASB-21 12-1 14F) J. Patrick Hackney (ASB-697 1 -H5 1 J) ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM (ADAP) University of Alabama 500 Martha Parham West Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0395 Telephone: (205) 348-6894 Facsimile:, (205) 348-3909 wvanderpoljradap.ua.edu jphackney@adap.ua.edu Attorneys for Plaintffs
6
120

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 133 Filed 04/08/15 Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al., Plaintiffs
v. RUTH NAGLICH, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) CIV. ACT. NO. 1:14cv601-MHT-TFM ) ) ) )

ORDER

On March 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents

Relating to Non-Plaintiffs. Doc. 109. The court held oral argument on the Motion on

March 31, 2015. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert the defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners in their custody by

“routinely and systemically fail[ing] to provide adequate numbers of health care

professionals,” by “routinely deny[ing] medical care to prisoners with serious medical

conditions,” by “routinely and systemically delay[ing] diagnosis and treatment of serious

medical needs,” by “routinely and systemically fail[ing] to provide adequate emergency

care, ” by “fail[ing] to adequately provide and manage medications and medical supplies

and devices,” by “having inadequate procedures for preventing and responding to

outbreaks of infectious diseases in ADOC prisons,” by “deny[ing] care to terminally ill

prisoners, issuing ‘do not resuscitate’ or ‘allow natural death’ orders against the patient’s

wishes,” and by “allow[ing] correctional officers to interfere with prisoners’ access to

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 133 Filed 04/08/15 Page 2 of 6
medical care” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., pp. 26-57, 109. Plaintiffs also contend that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to their health by failing to provide adequate mental health care to prisoners by “fail[ing] to identify mentally ill prisoners and understat[ing] the acuity of mental illness even in those identified,” by “deny[ing] mentally ill prisoners access to necessary psychotropic medications and medication management,” by “fail[ing] to provide mentally ill patients with adequate care,” by “plac[ing] the mentally ill in segregation without regard for their mental health,” and “fail[ing] to adequately protect its most seriously mentally ill who exhibit self-injurious and suicidal actions” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., pp. 57-82, 115. In addition, Plaintiffs assert that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by “routinely and systematically involuntarily medicat[ing] mentally ill prisoners without due process.” Id., pp. 3, 83-85, 115. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by subjecting them to regular and systemic discrimination based on their disabilities. Id., pp. 85-105, 116.
In their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs request the court to compel a series of discovery requests. See Doc. 109, List of Disputed Requests, pp. 7-8. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek documents indicating a systemic failure of ADOC officials to provide adequate healthcare and reasonable accommodations to prisoners. Defendants, however, argue that the documents requested are either irrelevant, burdensome, and/or invade the privacy interests of non-plaintiffs.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 133 Filed 04/08/15 Page 3 of 6
Discovery is not limited to that information which is admissible in court, but rather discoverable information is “relevant information” which “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(1). The court recognizes its duty to balance production of “relevant information” which is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” with concerns that the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
It is important to note that the case is currently in the class certification stage with four separate proposed classes. The defendants argue that they have produced all documents relevant to class certification and that the plaintiffs are merely requesting the information in order to discover names of potential members to add to the class. The plaintiffs, however, maintain that the names of the individuals are unnecessary and that the purpose of each request is relevant to the merits of their claims. The defendants contend that discovery related to the merits of the case is not appropriate at this pre-certification stage of the proceedings.
For Plaintiffs to certify a class in a class action lawsuit, they must prove that as a class representative, they are “part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011)(citations omitted). Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure provides four requirements that Plaintiffs must meet to ensure that they “are appropriate

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 133 Filed 04/08/15 Page 4 of 6
representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra. Pursuant to Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must effectively “limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims” by proving “numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.” Id. (citations omitted).
Defendants argue that courts routinely limit pre-certification discovery to issues related to whether the class should be certified. They contend that the documents relating solely to individuals who are not named as plaintiffs “are only potentially relevant to the merits of the class action if the class is certified.” Doc. 126, p. 11. This court recognizes that parties routinely bifurcate discovery in class-action lawsuits. During oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel represented that the parties met and determined that both discovery concerning class certification and the merits of their claims would begin during the pre-certification stage of the case. The Defense protests that the parties did not agree to begin discovery in this manner. In their Rule 26(f) Report of Planning Meeting, however, the parties agreed to “conduct discovery on the following subjects: All claims and allegations contained in the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and matters incidental thereto; All defenses, responses, and averments contained in the Answers of the State and matters incidental thereto.” Doc. 60, pp. 3-4. On September 16, 2014, the Court adopted and incorporated the terms of the discovery plan in its entirety. Doc. 61. This court therefore finds that, based on the specific terms of the Planning Report and the Order, Plaintiffs may proceed with discovery on the merits at this stage of the proceedings.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 133 Filed 04/08/15 Page 5 of 6
Nonetheless, the defendants’ argument that production of certain requested documents relating to non-plaintiffs is unduly burdensome is persuasive. The plaintiffs request a random sampling of 20 medical records of prisoners with HIV, diabetes, epilepsy or seizure disorders, asthma, hypertension, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, cancer, and any condition treated with anticoagulation therapy.1 There is no dispute that the individual medical records of prisoners are not computerized. The defendants argue that the only way to obtain the medical information requested by the plaintiffs is to review each medical file by hand. The plaintiffs, however, argue that the information is relevant to their claims against the defendants because repeated examples of delayed or denied medical care may indicate a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference to the health of prisoners by prison authorities.
Upon considering the arguments of the parties, the court concludes that a less burdensome form of discovery should be imposed at this pre-certification stage of the proceedings. The defendants shall obtain from Corizon the computerized pharmaceutical records of every twentieth prisoner incarcerated in an ADOC facility between July 8, 2012 and July 8, 2014. At this time, the names of the individuals may be redacted. The defendants shall provide these pharmaceutical records to the plaintiffs. From these pharmaceutical records, the plaintiffs should be able to determine whether a person is provided medicine which is routinely prescribed for the treatment of a particular
1 The plaintiffs also request the records of pregnant prisoners. None of the plaintiffs, however, is pregnant or of child-bearing age. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to discover the records of pregnant prisoners, the Motion to Compel is due to be DENIED.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 133 Filed 04/08/15 Page 6 of 6
condition. After the plaintiffs determine whether a particular individual was prescribed medication which is routinely prescribed for the treatment of any of the aforementioned conditions, they may request the name of that individual. At that time, Corizon and/or the ADOC shall provide the names of these individuals to plaintiffs. Upon receiving the names, it is the responsibility of the plaintiffs to obtain HIPAA releases from each individual in order to review his or her medical records.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Both pre-class certification discovery and discovery on the merits of the claims shall proceed as previously scheduled. (2) To the extent the plaintiffs seek records relating to pregnancy, the Motion to Compel is DENIED. (3) To the extent the parties seek to discover medical and mental health records of non-plaintiffs, the Motion to Compel is GRANTED with the aforementioned limitations. The defendants and/or entity in possession of the pharmaceutical records shall produce such information to the plaintiffs on or before June 9, 2015. Done this 8th day of April, 2015.
/s/Terry F. Moorer TERRY F. MOORER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 1 of 140

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN; SHEILA ALLEN; EDWARD BRAGGS; TEDRICK BROOKS; GARY LEE BROYLES; QUANG BUI; RICHARD BUSINELLE;; HOWARD CARTER; CHANDLER CLEMENTS; ROBERT DILLARD; PAUL FOLSOM; CHRISTOPHER GILBERT; DWIGHT HAGOOD; DALETRICK HARDY; SYLVESTER HARTLEY; CHARLIE HENDERSON; CHRISTOPHER JACKSON; BRANDON JOHNSON; JOHN MANER; RICK MARTIN; WILLIE MCCLENDON; ROGER MCCOY; JERMAINE MITCHELL; KENNETH MONCRIEF; TOMMIE MOORE; MATTHEW MORK; ROGER MOSELEY; ZERRICK NAYLOR; BRADLEY PEARSON; LEVITICUS PRUITT; TURNER ROGERS;; TIMOTHY SEARS; BRIAN SELLERS; AUGUSTUS SMITH; WILLIAM SULLIVAN; RICHARD TERRELL; HUBERT TOLLAR; DANIEL TOOLEY; JOSEPH TORRES; DONALD RAY TURNER; JAMIE WALLACE; ROBERT “MYNIASHA” WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; and ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM,

Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHTTFM
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs,

v.

JEFFERSON DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections; RUTH NAGLICH, in her official capacity as Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections; and ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 2 of 140
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. The prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the Plaintiff Class are incarcerated in Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) prisons. Plaintiffs bring this case to remedy (a) the defendants’ failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to persons in the custody of the ADOC; (b) the defendants’ failure to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care to persons in ADOC custody; (c) the defendants’ failure to provide due process when medicating persons against their will; and (d) the defendants’ failure to provide prisoners with disabilities with the accommodations and services to which they are entitled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504”). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief for the inhumane and discriminatory practices and conditions they face every day in ADOC custody. 2. The prisoner PLAINTIFFS and all those in ADOC custody are entirely dependent on DEFENDANTS JEFFERSON DUNNDUNN, RUTH NAGLICH and ADOC (collectively, “DEFENDANTS”) for medical and mental health care. Yet the system of care provided by DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH is grossly inadequate and subjects all prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm, including unnecessary pain, loss of function, injury and death. 3. Because of the DEFENDANTS’ deliberate indifference to the obvious medical needs of the persons in their custody, plaintiff prisoners go for months or years without appropriate diagnoses of medical conditions. Numerous prisoners have died from a failure to treat medical conditions from cancer to diabetes to hepatitis. Others have required emergency surgery or lost the use of legs, arms or eyes, after having been left to suffer with untreated symptoms for lengthy periods. Prisoners with mental illnesses or serious psychological problems are entirely denied mental health care or provided only with medication with little or no medication management, follow-up, or concern for side effects, some of which are debilitating.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 3 of 140
Mental health care other than medications is nearly non-existent. Prisoners with a history of selfharm are provided with razor blades.1 After one prisoner who had repeatedly requested mental health care cut himself with one of the razors, a correctional officer said to him, “If you die, you die.” DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH violate the prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishments in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
4. Prisoners, who do not want to take psychiatric medications, often because they are experiencing serious side effects, are forced to take the medication without any regard for due process. If they refuse, they may be beaten, placed in segregation or both. Even when there is a process to determine whether the prisoner is sufficiently ill and dangerous to warrant involuntary medication, the process falls far short of what due process requires. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH violate the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as it relates to mentally ill prisoners’ right to bodily integrity.
5. Prisoners with physical or mental disabilities face discriminatory and dangerous circumstances throughout the ADOC system. They are housed in facilities that cannot accommodate them. They are often housed in prisons or housing units for prisoners with higher security classifications than their own for no reason other than their disabilities. They are not provided with necessary assistive services or devices, such as functioning wheelchairs or forms that they can read. They are punished for things they cannot do or do not know how to do because of their disabilities.
6. The DEFENDANTS DUNN, NAGLICH, and ADOC operate the most overcrowded prisons in the nation and spend among the lowest amount on medical care per
1 The failure to protect the mentally ill from self-harm with razor blades was the subject of a Preliminary Injunction Motion. The issue has been preliminarily settled, but is in a monitoring phase to determine whether the issue has actually been resolved.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 4 of 140
prisoner of any state in the nation. They have long been aware of the unconstitutional and discriminatory practices of which the plaintiffs complain.
7. PLAINTIFFS seek declaratory and injunctive relief to compel DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH, both sued in their official capacity (sometimes collectively the “OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS”), and DEFENDANT ADOC to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care to all prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the class members they represent, to desist from medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will without due process, and to comply with the ADA and § 504.
JURISDICTION 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. PLAINTIFFS seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201 and 2202, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 12133.
VENUE 9. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as several DEFENDANTS reside in the Middle District of Alabama and all DEFENDANTS reside in Alabama, many of the PLAINTIFFS reside in the Middle District of Alabama, and a substantial number of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Alabama.
PARTIES 10. PLAINTIFF JOSHUA DUNN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is currently housed at St. Clair Correctional Facility (“St. Clair”). 2 He has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, and he informed ADOC of this diagnosis at intake.
2 ADOC frequently moves prisoners, including named plaintiffs, among its facilities. Allegations regarding the ADOC facility currently housing each named plaintiff are based on a February 19, 2015 search using the “Search for Inmates” page on ADOC’s website (http://www.doc.state.al.us/inmatesearch.aspx).
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 5 of 140
PLAINTIFF DUNN suffered from acute mental health crises while in segregation, requested mental health care, and repeatedly engaged in self-harm, but received no mental health care and was not provided with timely emergency medical care. He suffers from headaches and has a cataract due to a previously cracked lens in his right eye. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have refused to treat PLAINTIFF DUNN’s right eye because his left eye is functional. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have also failed to provide PLAINTIFF DUNN with appropriate medical care after he was stabbed multiple times by prisoners. PLAINTIFF DUNN is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF DUNN is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
11. PLAINTIFF SHEILA ALLEN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2006. She is currently housed at Tutwiler Correctional Facility. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has had hypertension and headaches since shortly after she entered ADOC custody. She has been given a variety of blood pressure medications, but continues to have high blood pressure and headaches. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has tested positive for blood and protein in her urine, but has received no follow up. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has severe rectal bleeding that has not been addressed by medical staff. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has been denied adequate medical treatment.
12. PLAINTIFF EDWARD BRAGGS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1967. He is currently housed at Hamilton Aged and Infirmed Center (“Hamilton A & I”), and has previously been housed at Bullock Correctional Facility (“Bullock”), Limestone Correctional Facility (“Limestone”), Easterling Correctional Facility (“Easterling”) and Ventress Correctional Facility (“Ventress”). PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is diabetic. In approximately 2004,
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 6 of 140
PLAINTIFF BRAGGS’s right leg was amputated at the knee due to lack of medical treatment while in prison. He is currently experiencing the same symptoms in his left leg that led to the amputation of his right leg and the cause of these symptoms is not being treated. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS also has a grapefruit-sized hernia that is not being treated. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and receives very little mental health care for these conditions. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
13. PLAINTIFF TEDRICK BROOKS entered DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody in August 2011. He is currently housed at Bibb County Correctional Facility (“Bibb”). PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a very severe keloid condition that causes him significant pain and difficulty moving. His condition has gone mostly untreated while in ADOC custody. He has been forced to shave, although this makes his condition worse, and he has been punished for not shaving. PLAINTIFF BROOKS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BROOKS is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
14. PLAINTIFF GARY LEE BROYLES has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1989. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I. He was previously housed at Elmore Correctional Facility (“Elmore”), Draper Correctional Facility (“Draper”), Kilby Correctional Facility (“Kilby”), St. Clair, and Bullock. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is hearing impaired, requiring hearing aids for both ears. He was provided with hearing aids for both ears in or around 1998, but one stopped working in or around 2011. He has difficulty getting the
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 7 of 140
battery replaced. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is harassed and discriminated against on the basis of his hearing impairment. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BROYLES is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
15. PLAINTIFF QUANG BUI has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1986. He has been housed at St. Clair since 2005. He has previously been housed at Holman Correctional Facility (“Holman”), Donaldson Correctional Facility (“Donaldson”) and Kilby. PLAINTIFF BUI’s English is very limited. His first language is Vietnamese. Since he has entered the custody of ADOC, his has lost much of his ability to speak Vietnamese. PLAINTIFF BUI has been told by DEFENDANT ADOC that he is mentally ill. He does not know his diagnosis, but has received shots of Haldol for approximately five years. He does not want to take the medication but has not been permitted to stop. He has not been fairly afforded a hearing to determine whether he must be involuntarily medicated. PLAINTIFF BUI is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BUI is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504, and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
16. PLAINTIFF RICHARD BUSINELLE has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2003. Since his initial stay at Kilby, he has been housed at Bullock and most recently at Bibb. When he arrived at Bullock, he was housed in the mental health dormitory, until the Mental Health Unit was opened in 2006. He was moved to the Mental Health Unit when it opened and has been their ever since. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He is given an injection of Prolixin every two weeks, takes
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 8 of 140
Cogentin for the side effects, and meets with a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks. He receives no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has experienced severe weight-loss while in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody with no treatment or evaluation to determine the cause. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE suffered for two and a half years with two teeth that needed to be pulled. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
17. PLAINTIFF HOWARD CARTER has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1994. He is currently housed in segregation at St. Clair. He has previously been housed at Kilby, Holman, Bullock, Staton and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF CARTER is severely mentally ill and was subject to an involuntary medication order in 2011 and 2012. After being prescribed antipsychotic medications for years, his medication was discontinued in 2013 and he was not receiving any medication at the time this lawsuit commenced. PLAINTIFF CARTER has made several suicide attempts while in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody. PLAINTIFF CARTER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF CARTER is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
18. PLAINTIFF CHANDLER CLEMENTS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2003. He is currently housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS has Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder (COPD) and, as a result, experiences extreme shortness of breath and low oxygen levels. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS was persuaded to sign a “Do Not Resuscitate” order (“DNR”) to avoid being placed on life support in the prison
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 9 of 140

infirmary. After he signed the DNR, he was denied breathing treatments and medications

because of the DNR. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS is being denied adequate medical treatment.

19. PRISONER

BOBBY

COPELANDPRISONER

BOBBY

COPELANDPRISONER BOBBY COPELANDPRISONER BOBBY COPELANDPRISONER

BOBBY COPELANDPRISONER BOBBY COPELANDPRISONER BOBBY

COPELANDPLAINTIFF ROBERT DILLARD has been in the custody of DEFENDANT

ADOC since 2005. He is currently housed in the mental health dormitory in the Main Camp at

Bullock. Following his initial intake at Kilby, he was housed first at the mental health

dormitory, then in the Mental Health Unit from when it opened in 2006 until about January 2014,

when he was moved back to the mental health dormitory. PLAINTIFF DILLARD was

diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at the age of eight. He takes Haldol, Risperdal, Cogentin

and another medication that has a name and purpose he does not know. The extent of the

counseling he receives is meeting with a mental health counselor one or two times a month for

five to ten minutes. He hears voices in his head. One of his front teeth is mottled dark brown

and black and he has not been given dental care for the tooth. He likely has an undiagnosed

learning or developmental disability and frequently does not understand documents he is given to

read and sign. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. §

12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF DILLARD is being denied adequate

medical and mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the

ADA and § 504 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.

20. PLAINTIFF PAUL FOLSOM has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC

since in or about 1992. He is housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM suffers from severe

headaches. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM also has a lump in his left breast that has not been examined

9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 10 of 140
in over three years. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM has been told that he has cysts, one in each of his kidneys. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM is being denied adequate medical treatment.
21. PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER GILBERT has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since in or about July 2012. He is housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF GILBERT has a damaged ankle that resulted in one leg being shorter than the other, and suffers from diabetes. DEFENDANT ADOC has provided PLAINTIFF GILBERT with insufficient accommodations for his disability that place him for greater risk of medical harm from his diabetes condition. PLAINTIFF GILBERT is also required to stand for long periods of time despite his disability. PLAINTIFF GILBERT experiences sugar lows and highs due to improper treatment for his diabetes. PLAINTIFF GILBERT is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF GILBERT is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
22. PLAINTIFF DWIGHT HAGOOD entered the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC because of a parole violation in 2011. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is currently housed at Easterling. Prior to being transferred to Easterling, he was housed at Kilby and Bullock. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has had diabetes since childhood and suffers from high blood pressure and numerous other medical conditions. He has had at least one stroke and other serious medical issues while in ADOC custody. As a result of one of these issues, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is partially paralyzed on his left side and confined to a wheelchair. He has been denied access to accommodations for disability. He is also housed in a non-accessible dormitory with a high level of violence. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 11 of 140
and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
23. PLAINTIFF DALETRICK HARDY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2002. He is currently housed at Donaldson, and has previously been housed at St. Clair, Kilby, Draper, Bibb, Easterling, Fountain Correctional Facility (“Fountain”), Limestone, Bullock, and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF HARDY is severely mentally ill and has a long history of suicide attempts. He has received constitutionally inadequate mental health treatment and had been in segregation at St. Clair since May 2012 before being recently transferred to Donaldson. PLAINTIFF HARDY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HARDY is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
24. PLAINTIFF SYLVESTER HARTLEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1981. He is currently housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has a long history of serious mental illness, but does not know his diagnosis. He is also on dialysis. He likely has an undiagnosed learning or developmental disability. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
25. PLAINTIFF CHARLIE HENDERSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since October 2013. He was previously in ADOC custody from 2005 to 2010. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON was diagnosed with hepatitis C in 1993, prior to entering ADOC custody. His current diagnosis is hepatitis C, stage 3.
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 12 of 140
PLAINTIFF HENDERSON was also diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver in 2007 while in ADOC custody. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not provided PLAINTIFF HENDERSON with any hepatitis C treatment during either of the times he has been in its custody. After PLAINTIFF HENDERSON received his cirrhosis diagnosis, ADOC medical personnel continued to refuse to provide PLAINTIFF HENDERSON with any treatment for hepatitis C claiming that all treatment will negatively impact his liver. ADOC medical personnel persisted in this reasoning despite the availability of hepatitis C treatment that does not have adverse effects on the liver. The lack of treatment for hepatitis C has caused a rise in the ammonia levels in PLAINTIFF HENDERSON’s brain. As a result, he suffers from memory loss and general confusion. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON also has a mass on his colon previously identified as cancerous or a symptom of Crohn’s disease for which the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS refuse to provide treatment. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is also hearingimpaired and, as a result, often misses meal time, medical appointments, and pill call due to his inability to hear ADOC personnel call for him. DEFENDANT ADOC has not provided PLAINTIFF HENDERSON with a meaningful accommodation in light of his disability. As a result, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON often misses pill call and medical appointments, sometimes resulting verbal reprimands. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
26. PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER JACKSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2006. He is currently housed in segregation at Donaldson. PLAINTIFF JACKSON was previously on the mental health caseload and was taking Haldol.
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 13 of 140
He was not given any medications for side effects, and in or around April 2014 asked to be taken off Haldol because it made him shake. He was not offered and informed about any other mental health medication which would be appropriate for his treatment which had a lesser likelihood of side effects. He has been in segregation since 2007. He is transferred every few months between the segregation units at Holman, Donaldson and St. Clair. PLAINTIFF JACKSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF JACKSON is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
27. PLAINTIFF BRANDON JOHNSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1996. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is currently housed in a Residential Treatment Unit at Donaldson. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON has a significant cognitive disability. He believes he was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury as a child, following a serious car accident. He is not receiving any medication or other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON also has serious cognitive disabilities stemming from a serious injury when he was a child. However, he is provided with no assistance in filling out medical forms or understanding rules or disciplinary matters. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
28. PLAINTIFF JOHN MANER entered DEFENDANT ADOC custody in or around June 1998. He is currently housed in the Bibb. PLAINTIFF MANER suffers from a mobility impairment due to a gunshot wound, and ADOC has required him to choose between accessing programs and services and having necessary accommodations. He injured himself again in April 2014 after choosing to access programs and services. DEFENDANT ADOC has declined to
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 14 of 140
treat him. PLAINTIFF MANER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MANER is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
29. PLAINTIFF RICK MARTIN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1988. He is currently housed at St. Clair. He has previously been housed at Kilby and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has a long history of heart problems. He has had a stent in his heart since 2009. In 2012, he had to get a new stent in his heart, and was not given necessary blood thinners afterward, resulting in his requiring emergency open-heart surgery because his un-thinned blood quickly clogged the stent. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has been denied adequate medical treatment.
30. PLAINTIFF WILLIE MCCLENDON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He is currently housed at Limestone and has been there since his initial brief intake period at Kilby. PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON developed an infection in his testicle which went untreated for several days, turned gangrenous, and resulted in his losing the testicle. PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON has been denied adequate medical care.
31. PLAINTIFF ROGER MCCOY entered DEFENDANT ADOC custody in or around 1994. He is currently housed at the Bibb. He has previously been housed at Bullock and Limestone. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has an apparent mental health disorder for which he is treated with medications but little other treatment. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has been physically assaulted by correctional officers. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MCCOY is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 15 of 140
under the ADA and § 504, and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
32. PLAINTIFF JERMAINE MITCHELL has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1999. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has also been housed at Bibb. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL uses a wheelchair and has limited use of his hands. He spent a year and a half housed in an infirmary because of his disabilities. Because he was housed in the infirmary, he was denied access to programs, benefits and services. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL has been informed that he might be able to walk again if he received physical therapy, but he is not being given physical therapy. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MITCHELL is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
33. PLAINTIFF KENNETH MONCRIEF has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010, following a parole violation. He is currently housed at Easterling and was previously housed at Limestone and in the Mental Health Unit at Bullock. He has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder. He was required to discontinue his psychiatric medications in order to go on parole, because his parole placement was a facility does not accept residents who take psychiatric medications. Without mental health medication, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF has difficulty controlling his impulses and anger. He was not receiving any mental health medications at the time of the filing of the lawsuit. PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 16 of 140
34. PLAINTIFF TOMMIE MOORE has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is housed at the Mobile Work Release Center. He was previously housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF MOORE has glaucoma and is legally blind. He has not been treated for his glaucoma and has been denied the surgery he requires because DEFENDANT ADOC refuses to pay for the procedure. PLAINTIFF MOORE resided in a dormitory with high incidences of violence solely because his disability only made him eligible for a dormitory of that classification level. Correctional officers have harassed and threatened PLAINTIFF MOORE due to his disability. PLAINTIFF MOORE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MOORE is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
35. PLAINTIFF MATTHEW MORK has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is currently housed at Holman. He has also been housed at Kilby, Limestone, and Ventress. PLAINTIFF MORK has hepatitis C and is not being treated for it because the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS refuse to provide the medication PLAINTIFF MORK requires. PLAINTIFF MORK also suffered a serious injury to his arm due the actions of employees of DEFENDANT ADOC and received inadequate treatment for this injury. PLAINTIFF MORK is being denied adequate medical care.
36. PLAINTIFF ROGER MOSELEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He currently resides at Easterling. In 2006, PLAINTIFF MOSELEY suffered two broken legs in a car accident. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY had four surgeries on each of his knees shortly after the accident, before entering ADOC custody. He was confined to a wheelchair and had begun physical therapy in order to walk again. DEFENDANT ADOC has refused to provide PLAINTIFF MOSELEY with physical therapy or other appropriate treatment,
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 17 of 140
delaying his recovery and forcing him to unnecessarily remain in a wheelchair while he selfadministered physical therapy to re-learn how to walk. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MOSELEY is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
37. PLAINTIFF ZERRICK NAYLOR was incarcerated by DEFENDANT ADOC from 2012 until 2015. He was most recently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has previously been housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR suffers from keratoconus and is legally blind. He sees only vague shadows. Due to his blindness, he was housed for more than two years in a housing unit that was unduly dangerous and restrictive. While in ADOC custody, he was denied access to programs, benefits and services because of his blindness. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is no longer in the physical custody of ADOC. However, he was released at the end of the prison-portion of a split sentence. He is on probation and has a high risk of being readmitted to ADOC custody and facing the same discriminatory practices he faced prior to his release.
38. PLAINTIFF BRADLEY PEARSON was incarcerated by DEFENDANT ADOC from August 2013 through February 1, 2015. He was most recently housed at Limestone and was previously housed at Kilby for about a month and then Decatur Work Release Center for 10 days. He was then excluded from the Work Release Center because he is deaf. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF PEARSON was being denied reasonable accommodations for
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 18 of 140
his disabilities under the ADA and § 504. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is no longer in the physical custody of DEFENDANT ADOC. However, he was released at the end of the prison-portion of a split sentence. He is on probation and has a high risk of being readmitted to ADOC custody and facing the same discriminatory practices he faced prior to his release.
39. PLAINTIFF LEVITICUS PRUITT has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2001. He is currently housed at Holman. He has previously been housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has a history of depression. Over the last six months, PLAINTIFF PRUITT has repeatedly been placed on suicide watch and has requested mental health treatment, but has been denied any mental health care. He recently underwent an assault by other prisoners who threw burning items onto him while he was on suicide watch, but he was not taken to medical staff for more than a day after the assault, when he was taken to the hospital. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was also denied adequate medical treatment after he sustained an injury to his hand caused by correctional officers. He was also denied medical treatment for four hours after he engaged in self-harm with a razor blade in his segregation cell. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was denied adequate medical treatment after injuring his back lifting weights. He is now required to wear a permanent back brace due to limitations caused by the constant pain experienced in his lower back. PLAINTIFF PRUITT is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF PRUITT is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
40. PLAINTIFF TURNER ROGERS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since November 2012. He currently resides at the Kilby. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has cataracts and a spot in the white of his eye that protrudes periodically, blocking his vision. Both
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 19 of 140
conditions are not being treated. He has been prescribed eyeglasses, but these do not help his vision at all and give him headaches. PLAINTIFF ROGERS is being denied adequate medical care.
41. PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY SEARS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1996. He is currently housed at Ventress and was previously housed at Hamilton A & I, St. Clair and Limestone. PLAINTIFF SEARS has scoliosis and unexplained weight loss. Despite needing a shower with grab bars, PLAINTIFF SEARS was placed in a dormitory that was not accessible and was very far from the infirmary where he could shower. PLAINTIFF SEARS has been and continues to be forced to stand for long periods although his disability makes that painful and difficult for him. PLAINTIFF SEARS suffered extreme weight loss that went completely untreated for 10 months and is currently being inadequately treated. PLAINTIFF SEARS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF SEARS is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
42. PLAINTIFF BRIAN SELLERS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2001. He is currently housed at St. Clair, but has also been housed at Donaldson, Holman, Ventress, Draper, Easterling and Kilby. He suffers from high blood pressure and heart disease, hepatitis C and has recently had surgery for kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS was taken off of his blood pressure medication, resulting in a heart attack. Also, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH delayed more than three years before approving a PLAINTIFFS SELLERS’s surgery for kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS is being denied adequate medical care.
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 20 of 140
43. PLAINTIFF AUGUSTUS SMITH has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He is housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF SMITH came into ADOC custody shortly after doctors gave him a catheter in anticipation of surgery that was to happen within three months. As of the commencement of this lawsuit, he had not had the surgery and continued required use of the catheter. He suffered from frequent infections from the catheter. After an approximately seven-year delay, PLAINTIFF SMITH finally had surgery in 2014, after this lawsuit was commenced. PLAINTIFF SMITH is being denied adequate medical care.
44. PLAINTIFF WILLIAM SULLIVAN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1990. He is currently housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN suffers from congestive heart failure and high blood pressure. He needs medications to manage these conditions. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’S prescribed medications are regularly late and sometimes discontinued altogether. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN also experiences pain and discomfort resulting from what he describes as a “bottom” hernia on his left side. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has no bottom teeth—the last two having been pulled after multiple un-answered sick calls. He has no bottom dentures and his top dentures do not fit, resulting in pain and difficulty eating. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has been denied adequate medical treatment.
45. PLAINTIFF RICHARD TERRELL has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1992. He is currently housed at Bullock in the Mental Health Unit. He has previously been housed at Kilby, Easterling, and Holman. He has been in either the mental health dormitory at Bullock or the free-standing Mental Health Unit at Bullock since 1999. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. He has been given a shot of either Prolixin or Haldol every two weeks for the last 15 years. He does not know currently which he is receiving or if he receives the same one every
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 21 of 140
time. He is also given Benadryl, but receives no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been assaulted and then denied medical attention. He has also been denied dental care and is likely to lose his two upper front teeth as a result. PLAINTIFF TERRELL likely has some form of learning disability or cognitive disability. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TERRELL is being denied adequate medical and mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
46. PLAINTIFF HUBERT TOLLAR has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1977. He is currently housed at St. Clair. In response to an outbreak of tuberculosis at St. Clair in January and February of 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was given a chest x-ray. There was a spot on his lung. He had a CT scan in or around late March 2014. On or about April 14, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was told that the CT scan showed that he had cancer and that he would be sent out for a biopsy the following day. As of May 28, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had not been sent out for a biopsy of the cancerous spot on his lung. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR did not begin chemotherapy until late September 2014. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR is being denied adequate medical care.
47. PLAINTIFF DANIEL TOOLEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2008. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has also been housed at Bullock, Kilby and Easterling. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is a prisoner with deafness. Due to his deafness, PLAINTIFF TOOLEY cannot communicate through spoken language and has some difficulty communicating by writing notes. For the past six years, DEFENDANT ADOC has never provided PLAINTIFF TOOLEY a certified sign language interpreter. To communicate
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 22 of 140
with PLAINTIFF TOOLEY, DEFENDANT ADOC staff relies on writing notes and another prisoner who knows limited sign language. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
48. PLAINTIFF JOSEPH TORRES is 20 years old. He entered DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody in February 2011 at age 17. PLAINTIFF TORRES was charged when he was 15 years old. He is currently housed at Bibb. He suffers from untreated cataracts and severe headaches. He has been informed that if he does not receive adequate treatment for his cataracts, he will go blind. PLAINTIFF TORRES hurt his knee while playing basketball at Bibb. He was not provided with care, and his knee remained swollen for approximately two years. PLAINTIFF TORRES was given crutches but was not moved to a lower bunk for two weeks. PLAINTIFF TORRES is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TORRES is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
49. PLAINTIFF DONALD RAY TURNER has been in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody since 2009. He is currently housed at Limestone, and was previously housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF TURNER is deaf and is only semi-literate. He was excluded from work release because he is deaf and has high blood pressure. PLAINTIFF TURNER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TURNER is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
50. PLAINTIFF JAMIE WALLACE has been in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody since 2010. Prior to his conviction, PLAINTIFF WALLACE was initially found incompetent to
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 23 of 140
stand trial and spent a year at Taylor Hardin, Secure Medical Facility. He is currently housed in Residential Treatment Unit at Donaldson and was previously housed in the Mental Health Unit at Bullock. PLAINTIFF WALLACE has numerous physical birth defects and has been diagnosed with ADHD, bi-polar disorder, paranoid schizophrenia and intermittent explosive disorder. He is receiving medication but no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF WALLACE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF WALLACE is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
51. PLAINTIFF ROBERT “MYNIASHA” WILLIAMS3 has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since November 2012. She is housed at Fountain. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has ADHD, a mood disorder, a history of being sexually abused, and a history of self-harm. While at Fountain, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS repeatedly cut herself with razor blades, and was not given adequate medical or mental health care. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for her disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
52. PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM (hereinafter “ADAP”) is designated as Alabama’s authorized protection and advocacy agency under federal laws designed to protect individuals with disabilities. ADAP has statutory authority to pursue legal and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of persons with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and other disabilities who are or will be receiving care and treatment in the State of Alabama. 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 794e;
3 PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is a transgendered individual who identifies as female. She was born with male anatomy and is classified as a male by DEFENDANT ADOC. In accordance with her preference, she is referred to herein by female pronouns.
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 24 of 140
ADAP v. J.S. Tarwater, 97 F.3d 492 (11th Cir. 1996). ADAP is pursuing this action to protect and advocate for the rights and interests of prisoners in ADOC custody who are persons with mental illness and persons with mental or physical disabilities. Prior to commencement of this lawsuit, ADAP spent significant time and resources advocating on behalf of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC custody, monitoring and investigating the treatment and accommodation of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC custody. ADAP’s prelitigation efforts and expenditures of resources were necessitated by the ADOC policies and practices challenged, which policies and practices serve to frustrate and perceptibly impair ADAP’s advocacy efforts and its ability to accomplish the statutory purposes for which it was created. In bringing this suit, ADAP seeks to vindicate interests central to its purpose. ADAP thus has organizational standing under Article III based on a “concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] activities – with the consequent drain on [its] resources.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
53. DEFENDANT JEFFERSON DUNN has served as the Commissioner of the ADOC since April 1, 2015, when his predecessor, previously named DEFENDANT BILLY SHARP, resigned his position as ADOC Commissioner.4 DEFENDANT DUNN is sued herein in his official capacity. The Commissioner of the ADOC is responsible for heading the Alabama Department of Corrections, for the independent direction, supervision and control of the Alabama Department of Corrections, and for approving and issuing administrative regulations and changes. Ala. Code. 1975 § 14-1-1.3. (2010). The Commissioner is responsible for providing constitutional conditions of confinement in all facilities. At all times relevant hereto, DEFENDANT DUNN and his predecessor have acted under color of state law.
4 By operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), DEFENDANT DUNN was “automatically substituted” in place of DEFENDANT BILLY SHARP, who Plaintiffs sued in his official capacity, upon SHARP’s resignation.
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 25 of 140
54. DEFENDANT RUTH NAGLICH is the Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the ADOC. DEFENDANT NAGLICH is sued in her official capacity. As Associate Commissioner, DEFENDANT NAGLICH is responsible for establishing, monitoring, and enforcing system-wide health care policies and practices. She is responsible for supervising the provision of adequate medical, mental health, and dental care for all prisoners within ADOC custody, including but not limited to those in Residential Treatment Units, Intensive Stabilization Units and segregation units. At all times relevant hereto, she has acted under color of state law.
55. DEFENDANT ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (“ADOC”) is the administrative department of the state of Alabama responsible for administering and exercising the direct and effective control over penal and corrections institutions throughout the state of Alabama. Persons in the in-house custody of DEFENDANT ADOC are housed in 15 major correctional facilities and 13 work camps or work release centers. DEFENDANT ADOC is an instrumentality of the state of Alabama. DEFENDANT ADOC receives federal funding.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 56. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have long underfunded medical and mental health care as well as compliance with the ADA. Since at least the 1990s, have outsourced the medical and mental health care provided through managed care agreements with private companies that purportedly specialize in correctional care.
DEFENDANTS Systematically Underfunded Medical Care 57. Alabama’s focus on reducing the cost of caring for the people in its prisons has sacrificed constitutionally adequate care. By 2003, the ADOC Commissioner acknowledged that Alabama’s “underfunded, understaffed, and overcrowded” prison system had, at that time, “the lowest inmate cost per day in the Country.”
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 26 of 140
58. In 2006, then-Commissioner of ADOC Richard Allen admitted that one of the major problems facing ADOC was “[s]oaring healthcare costs for inmates.” He explained “[t]he cost of inmate health care has spiraled in recent years,” with costs nearly doubling over the threeyear period ending in Fiscal Year 2006.” Then-Commissioner Allen identified four factors leading costs: “(1) the increased number of inmates incarcerated, (2) an increase in the severity of illness and degenerative diseases of inmates received into the systems as a result of a lack of free world health care coverage, (3) improvement in healthcare services as a result of new medical technology including advanced drug treatments, and mandated access to higher levels of care by litigation in federal courts, and (4) physical plant limitations of the institutional health care units do not allow for onsite longterm or advance care services, resulting in a dependency on costly free world community providers.” These factors remain today.
59. Focusing on cost control rather than the constitutionality of its care, ADOC, under the direction of DEFENDANT NAGLICH, would ultimately pursue a new managed healthcare contract premised on a risk model in which ADOC paid a lower contract price in return for the private contractor bearing virtually all of the risk associated with increased healthcare costs, including the costs of offsite care.
60. By placing the financial responsibility for each instance in which medical or mental health care is provided on the private providers, DEFENDANTS created a financial incentive for the provider to not provide care. The incentive grew stronger over the years as DEFENDANTS continually sought to reduce the price paid to the providers for prisoner medical and mental health care.
61. ADOC’s cost-cutting efforts proved highly successful from a dollars-and-cents standpoint, with DEFENDANT ADOC’s 2010 Annual Report stating that while “medical and
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 27 of 140
mental health services [costs] increased 295% from the years 2000 to 2005, . . . [s]ince 2006, the cost increases have averaged only 6% per year.” Indeed, in 2011, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor recognized that Alabama pays less for health care than other prison systems.
62. Unsurprisingly, DEFENDANTS’ continual effort to cut costs has ensured that the healthcare provided to class members is grossly inadequate. The failings in the health care system are well documented and known to the DEFENDANTS. For the years 2000 through 2011, Alabama prisons had among the highest mortality rates in the country, both generally and for illness-related deaths.
63. DEFENDANTS track medical care costs, including among other things, all deaths in custody, all trips to the emergency room, and all hospital admissions. DEFENDANTS require their medical provider to give them monthly reports on a wide variety of metrics. They audit the performance of the medical provider using numerous tools to spot-check the performance of the medical provider. Since 2007, DEFENDANTS have contracted with Corizon, Inc. k/n/a Corizon, LLC (“Corizon”) to provide medical care in the ADOC facilities.5 Corizon failed every single major performance audit conducted by DEFENDANTS under the initial contract with ADOC. Despite this abysmal performance, DEFENDANTS extended the contract from 2010 to 2012. Corizon continued to fail every major performance audit, but was awarded a new three year contract in 2012.
DEFENDANTS Systematically Underfunded Mental Health Care 64. In 2007 and 2008, then-ADOC Commissioner Allen acknowledged that Alabama was “more or less [] criminalizing mental illness,” with more than 5,000 of the approximately
5 At the time of the initial contract, Corizon was known as Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (“CMS”). The corporate name change from CMS to Corizon occurred during the initial contract term in conjunction with a 2011 merger or acquisition involving CMS’s corporate parent (Valitás Health Services, Inc.) and the corporate parent of another correctional medical provider.
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 28 of 140
25,000 in-custody ADOC inmates in need of mental health treatment. Allen also admitted that 36% of incarcerated women and 20% of incarcerated men were in need of mental health care. This data, according to former Commissioner Allen, served as “a strong indication that in Alabama the prison system has become a default mental health treatment facility,” with the mentally ill “coming to prison instead of going to some sort of treatment center.”
65. At roughly the same time, Allen’s Deputy Commissioner Vernon Barnett admitted that only about 2,500 inmates – half of the number of persons former Commissioner Allen identified as needing mental health treatment – were actually receiving mental health care.
66. ADOC’s longstanding Mental Health Director Dr. Ronald Cavanaugh, who served under DEFENDANT NAGLICH until early 2014, acknowledged in 2010 that in recent decades, “Alabama prisons have become a surrogate mental health system” and “ADOC has become the State’s principal agent for providing substance abuse treatment.
67. The in-house custody population has remained fairly steady since 2007. The mental health caseload is currently about 3,100. By then-Commissioner Allen’s estimates, this likely means that 40% of the in-custody population in need of mental health treatment is not receiving any treatment at all.
68. Moreover, the evidence is clear that many are not. During the process of soliciting bids for a comprehensive medical and mental health provider in the summer of 2012, DEFENDANT NAGLICH responded to numerous questions about the provision of care. She was asked whether persons “in need of mental health/psychiatric services currently residing at Bibb CF, Easterling, CF, Fountain CF, and Birmingham WR be relocated?” DEFENDANT NAGLICH responded that they would. They have not been. Easterling has 120 prisoners on psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication orders, and has no coverage by
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 29 of 140
a psychiatrist or psychologist. Fountain has 64 people on psychiatric medications and no
coverage by any psychiatrist or psychologist. Bibb, which has 133 people classified as MH-1, 29
people classified as MH-2, and one person on an involuntary medication order, has less than a
quarter-time psychiatrist and no psychologist.6
DEFENDANTS Systematically Underfund Compliance with the ADA and § 504
69. DEFENDANT ADOC has been aware since at least May 2006 that “Almost none
of [its] facilities meet the federal Americans with Disabilities Act requirements.” At that time,
DEFENDANT ADOC was uncertain as to “the cost of bringing all facilities up to currently
accepted codes, including the provisions of the [ADA],” but committed to engaging “an
engineering/architectural firm that specializes in correctional facilities to inspect thoroughly our
existing physical plant and determine cost effective repairs and renovations that can be
6 DEFENDANTS’ actions also violate international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is binding on the U.S. S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. In April 2014, the Human Rights Committee, the body that reviews states’ compliance with the covenant, expressed concern over conditions for people in U.S. prisons, particularly those with serious mental illnesses and those held in solitary confinement. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, 23 April 2014, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, available at: http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/iccpr_concluding_obs_2014.pdf [accessed 2 July 2014].
The United States has ratified the Convention Against Torture, with the reservation that the Convention’s prohibitions against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment be understood as defined and prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). Thus, the United States recognizes the Convention as binding authority on these matters, in addition to the Constitution. Also, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which is binding on the U.S. and applicable in this case because of the racial disparity demonstrated by high rates of incarceration of people of color, prohibits discrimination in the provision of healthcare. CERD, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966), entered into force 4 Jan. 1969. Additionally, the United Nations, of which the United States is a member, has established minimum rules for the treatment of incarcerated people. While not binding, they provide a guideline for the United States. These rules require a psychiatrist at every institution, and call for dental care and medical care that “should be organized in close relationship to the general health administration of the community or nation.” United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 2 July 2014].
Finally, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, signed by the United States, provides for the right to health and medical care. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 11, O.A.S. Official Rec., OEA/Ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L.V/II.82, doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992).
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 30 of 140
accomplished,” with the expectation “that some older facilities may not be economically repairable, and will be considered for closing when other bed space is available.” Following receipt of the survey results, DEFENDANT ADOC intended to make repairs and renovations over a seven-to-eight year period with work “prioritized based on the most urgent needs of the department.”
70. As set forth in its 2007 Annual Report, DEFENDANT ADOC’s contracted specialty engineering/architectural determined through a facility survey that “it would cost approximately $94 million to bring all facilities up to currently accepted codes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act.” In the years since DEFENDANT ADOC received this survey report, virtually nothing has been done to pursue ADA compliance.
The Lack of Care and Accommodation Resulting from the Underfunding Continue Unabated, Despite DEFENDANTS’ Knowledge of the Problems
71. Admissions by ADOC officials confirm budgetary constraints are a continual factor in ADOC’s pervasive health, dental, mental health care deficiencies and longstanding ADA non-compliance. Former Deputy Commissioner Vernon Barnett reported in 2008 that, facing budget cuts, ADOC was “in a crisis as how to exactly stay on course and take care of the inmates,” with “inmate health care, mental health care, food, utilities and expenses and personnel costs” identified as “[t]he only places that the Department can cut.” In 2009, Barnett admitted that ADOC was forced to make “Medical Reductions,” in response to additional budget cuts, including eliminating nursing staff at work release facilities, and amending its contract to further reduce its payments to Corizon.
72. Moreover, despite the inadequacy of the care provided pursuant to the 2007 contract as demonstrated by the high mortality rate and consistently failed audits, DEFENDANTS NAGLICH negotiated a new contract that would result in further reductions in
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 31 of 140
the amount and quality of health care for prisoners in the custody of the ADOC. The agreed medical care spending for an optional 4th year of the contract was reduced by approximately $2 million through a contract amendment in or around 2009 and a separate price reduction was agreed with regard to the optional 5th year of the contract. The actual annual contract price was then greatly reduced further under the new Corizon contract executed in 2012, with ADOC saving $12 million dollars in the first year over the 2012 contract price, and nearly $24 million total during the three-year contract period.
73. Starting in or around July 2012, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel conducted site inspections of most major correctional facilities in ADOC. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel provided feedback on many of the obstacles in the facilities for persons with disabilities. DEFENDANT ADOC has not, to PLAINTIFFS’ counsel’s knowledge, resolved any of the matters raised in that context.
74. Further, starting in the spring of 2014, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel raised concerns about a number of individuals. In one instance, DEFENDANT ADOC partially accommodated an individual with a disability that PLAINTIFFS’ counsel brought to its attention. In another case, the disabled individual was actually further deprived of necessary accommodations. In most cases, there was no change whatsoever. Where PLAINTIFFS’ counsel raised concerns about the lack of medical or mental health care, there was no response whatsoever.
75. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel sent DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor a letter on April 9, 2014 detailing the failures of medical and mental health care and the violations of the ADA and § 504. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel invited DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor to enter into discussion regarding how to resolve the issues. Despite the urgency of the issues raised, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor set up a meeting for a month and a half later on May 20, 2014. However, at that meeting, DEFENDANTS had no proposals or plans for resolving any of
31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 32 of 140
the issues raised, only a proposal for further meetings. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel agreed, and DEFENDANTS were to schedule these further meetings, but never did.7
76. Fully aware of the serious nature of the federal constitutional deprivations and statutory violations to which PLAINTIFFS are subjected, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor Kim Thomas was reported in the news media to have given Corizon a “vote of confidence” as part of an August 20, 2014 presentation at Alabama Association of County Commissions’ annual meeting. With DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor having unexpectedly resigned on or about January 27, 2015, DEFENDANTS announced in early February 2015 that Corizon’s contract would be renewed for two additional years. I. DEFENDANTS ARE DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT TO THE SERIOUS
MEDICAL NEEDS OF PRISONERS IN THEIR CUSTODY. 77. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of failing
to provide prisoners with adequate health care, and are deliberately indifferent to the fact that the systemic failure to do so results in significant injury and a substantial risk of serious harm.
78. From 2001 through 2011, ADOC’s mortality rate was among the highest of any prison systems in the country.
79. In 2012, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH released a request for proposal for a new health care contract. Applicants were scored on a 3,000-point scale on a number of different criteria. Out of a possible 3,000 points, contract price accounted for a possible 1,350 points in the assessment of the proposal, whereas “Qualifications/Experience/References Medical” counted for only 100 points.
7 PLAINTIFFS’ counsel also asked at the May 20, 2014 meeting that DEFENDANTS immediately address the issue of razor blades being freely available and entirely untracked in all facilities, including in Residential Treatment Units and for individuals who have recently attempted suicide with razor blades.
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 33 of 140
80. DEFENDANTS renewed the ADOC contract with Corizon in 2012, even though Corizon had failed every major audit and re-audit of its health care operations in Alabama prisons under its first contract with the state.
A. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Fail to Provide Adequate Numbers of Health Care Professionals. 81. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not
providing adequate medical staff to address the serious medical needs of prisoners in ADOC custody. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH put out a request for proposals for the medical care contract for the prisons that included a listing of minimum staffing requirements that set the level of staffing at each facility far below what is needed to provide adequate care. Further, the request for proposal was explicit in valuing cost containment far more than adequacy of care. The contract ultimately awarded reflected the importance of cost containment and provides inadequate staffing throughout the ADOC system.
82. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH recently negotiated a contract with Corizon to provide medical services to prisoners in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC. Corizon contracted to provide 493 medical staff for the entire prison system, including just 19.6 medical doctors and 13 dentists. As reported by Corizon to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and NAGLICH in its April 2014 report, there were 25,591 prisoners for whom Corizon was providing medical care pursuant to the contract. This means that, if all positions were filled, a doctor’s average caseload in the ADOC is 1,395 people, and a dentist’s is almost 2,000. The ratio of total medical staff (including administrative and records staff, nurses and doctors) to prisoners is 1:52. However, all positions are not filled. In April 2014, Corizon had only 15.2 medical doctors and 12.4 dentists for the entire system, resulting in
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 34 of 140
an average caseload for medical doctors of 1,684 patients and 2,064 patients on average for every dentist.
83. At Kilby, where the ADOC hospital is located, there are just one-and-a-half fulltime doctors on staff to provide treatment to 2,151 prisoners.
84. The extraordinary understaffing for medical services leads to a host of predictable problems with the delivery of medical care, including delays, failures to diagnose and treat, failures to follow-up, errors, and decisions not to treat seriously ill prisoners.
B. DEFENDANTS Routinely Deny Medical Care to Prisoners with Serious Medical Conditions. 85. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
denying medical care to prisoners with serious medical conditions, or providing such prisoners with care that is so cursory or grossly incompetent that it amounts to a denial of care.
1. The denial of care has contributed to numerous prisoner deaths. 86. At Elmore, Javon Alexander had an adverse reaction to some substance on or about May 17, 2014. He was taken to the infirmary, where he writhed around, repeatedly falling off his bed. He was returned to his bed, but was not given any treatment. Two days later, he was finally taken to the hospital. He died thereafter. 87. In January 2014 at St. Clair, a prisoner was given a shot of something during dialysis that caused him to go into cardiac arrest. Although there was a crash cart in the dialysis unit, no one present at the prison knew how to use it. The prisoner died. 88. On February 6, 2012, at St. Clair, a prisoner who had recently had surgery began bleeding from his rectum. He bled through three pairs of pants in a day. He asked for medical attention. He was given only antacids. He died that night.
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 35 of 140
89. In January 2011 at Limestone, a prisoner committed suicide using a state-issued razor blade. According to an ADOC Incident Report, he was found while he was still alive, when was asked why he had cut himself, he responded: “I’m not getting enough medical attention.”
2. DEFENDANTS routinely deny care to plaintiffs and other prisoners, causing serious harm, pain and risk of harm to prisoners in ADOC custody.
90. In or around November 2012, four prisoners entered the dormitory where PLAINTIFF DUNN was housed. They beat PLAINTIFF DUNN and stabbed him several times with an icepick. They left, then came back about 30 minutes later and attacked him again. PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken to medical for a body chart the following day. He had been stabbed 15 times with the icepick. His wounds were not cleaned or treated. He was placed in segregation for three months. He received no further medical attention.
91. PLAINTIFF DUNN suffered a cracked lens in his right eye while he was in the county jail prior to coming into ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF DUNN developed a cataract as a result of the cracked lens, and has suffered from headaches two or three times a week since he cracked the lens in his eye. Particularly in the evenings, his head feels achy and tired all around his right eye, from the strain of trying to use it. Even though the cataract is causing PLAINTIFF DUNN pain, he has been told that he will receive no treatment for the cataract because his other eye is functional.
92. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has a history of heart problems. He had a heart attack in 1999, and had a stent placed in his heart in 2009. From the time he received the stent, he was on blood thinners. On or about February 18, 2012, PLAINTIFF MARTIN was at an outside hospital for a check-up on the stent. The doctor found a blockage and put in a new stent. PLAINTIFF MARTIN was returned to St. Clair the following day. He was returned to his dorm,
35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 36 of 140
rather than the infirmary. He was not given blood thinners, although the surgeon had prescribed them and he had long been on them. He was not seen by anyone from medical staff until on or about February 23, 2012, at which point he asked why he was not on blood thinners. The nurse said that she would check, but she did not get back to him. On or about February 26, 2012, PLAINTIFF MARTIN put in a sick call request, and he was placed on the list to be seen on February 29, 2012. Correctional officers brought him to the infirmary on or about February 28, 2012 because he had deteriorated so dramatically. However, nothing was done and he was returned to his dorm. The following day, he went back to the infirmary and was transferred to the hospital the same day for emergency open heart surgery because the stent was entirely blocked and blood was flowing around it.
93. In or around March 2012, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON’s scrotum swelled up dramatically. He put in a sick call slip. Two days later, a correctional officer was sent to see him and, upon seeing the swelling, immediately brought PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON to the infirmary. However, this was a Saturday. No doctor was on duty, no doctor was called, and PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was not sent to the hospital. Instead, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was sent back to his dormitory with an icepack. The following Monday, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was supposed to be seen by the doctor, but he was not put on the sick call list. Nonetheless, the correctional officers brought him to the infirmary, and he was then taken to the hospital. His testicle had become gangrenous and had to be amputated. He stayed approximately two weeks in the hospital. After his hospital stay, he was returned to the Limestone infirmary. However, he developed a staph infection and had to be readmitted to the hospital.
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 37 of 140
94. From about 2002 through 2009, PLAINTIFF SELLERS was on medication for his blood pressure. The medication controlled his blood pressure. In 2009, while at Easterling, he was taken off his blood pressure medicine. No medical staff discussed his being taken off the medications with him; he went to pill call one day and was told he no longer had prescriptions for the blood pressure medications. After being taken off the medications, he felt the effects of his increasing blood pressure. Since he was taken off the medications, he has suffered from migraines and has frequently felt flushed. In November 2013, at the age of 40, PLAINTIFF SELLERS suffered a heart attack.
95. PLAINTIFF MORK is currently housed in segregation. In mid-April 2014, PLAINTIFF MORK had put his right hand out through the slot in his cell door to get the attention of a correctional officer. The correctional officer grabbed his arm and yanked it upward, banging it on the top edge of the slot in the door, and then slammed the door against PLAINTIFF MORK’s arm. PLAINTIFF MORK’s arm swelled up from this, but he received no medical care. In late April 2014, the same thing happened again with his left arm. The bone in his forearm became misshapen from the incident. A nurse who passed by his cell during rounds said he should have an x-ray. When he asked to be taken to medical to document any injuries from the incident, no x-ray was taken, and none has been taken since. He does not know if the bone is broken.
96. In the fall of 2013, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD fell ill. He was having difficulty starting and stopping urinating and it burned when he urinated. He went to see medical, and provided a urine sample. The nurse looked at the sample and stated that it looked clear so nothing was wrong. No tests were done. For several days, he did not eat because he was too weak to get himself down the hall to the dining area. One day, he threw up after eating some
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 38 of 140
food another prisoner brought him. He submitted a sick call slip. He saw Dr. Sangeeta Doshi three days later. He told Dr. Doshi about the vomiting, the weakness and the difficulty urinating. Dr. Doshi did not examine him but told him that nothing was wrong with him and sent him back to his dorm. He continued throwing up that evening. That night PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had to be sent to the emergency room at Jackson Hospital. He was diagnosed with a kidney infection, and kept at the hospital for two days. He has had no follow-up care for the kidney infection since he returned to the prison. Since he came out of the hospital, he has been unable to stand. He told Dr. Doshi of this development, but was never examined to determine the cause of the additional weakness.
97. On one occasion in the last four years, PLAINTIFF TERRELL was hearing voices and he grew loud responding to them. A correctional officer beat PLAINTIFF TERRELL, breaking his jaw and his rib, then put him into segregation. PLAINTIFF TERRELL was not given any medical attention at the time. Six months later, because he was in pain, he was seen in medical and given x-rays, at which point the broken bones were diagnosed.
98. In spring 2014, PLAINTIFF TERRELL tried to change the channel of a television in the dormitory. A correctional officer told him not to, grabbed him and spit in his face. PLAINTIFF TERRELL tried to get away, and the officer called for back-up. The officers then beat PLAINTIFF TERRELL, at least one of them using a baton. He was taken to medical, where a wound on his head was taped up. He was then sent to segregation for about six weeks. While in segregation, his head wound was not treated and the dressing was not changed.
99. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has a long history of self-harm with DUNN objects. She is nonetheless provided with razors for shaving, and the razors are left with her in her cell. On or about March 2, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was housed in segregation at Fountain.
38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 39 of 140
She cut herself with a razor. After PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS cut herself, she called out to a correctional officer who took her to the medical unit. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS’s wound was dressed but not cleaned. Due to the failure to adequately clean the wound, it became infected.
100. PLAINTIFF SEARS was diagnosed with Hodgkin disease in 1997 and was treated. However, like many people who have had Hodgkin disease, PLAINTIFF SEARS experiences extreme weight loss. While at Hamilton A & I, he received a double tray of food, Ensure (a nutritional supplement) and vitamins to maintain his weight. When he left Hamilton A & I, the double meals, Ensure and vitamins were all discontinued. PLAINTIFF SEARS is six feet tall and, when he arrived at Ventress in May 2013, he weighed 192 pounds. By February 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS’ weight had dropped 54 pounds to just 138 pounds. PLAINTIFF SEARS was then given an order for double portions, but is given only an extra piece of bread at meals. He continues to lose weight, though more slowly. As of the beginning of June 2014, he weighed 135 pounds. He is weak and exhausted. He is extremely gaunt and his head appears too large for his body. He has asked for Ensure and vitamins but been refused.
101. While PLAINTIFF SEARS was at Hamilton A & I, his health code was a 4. He was transferred to Ventress to participate in a substance abuse program. While at Ventress, his health has deteriorated significantly. In June 2014, despite his continuing weight loss, and just a month after being given a one-year “no prolonged standing” profile, without having seen a doctor, his health code was changed to a 1, indicating that he is “generally healthy” or “stable” in chronic care.
102. In 2012, PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE began rapidly losing weight. He dropped from 160 pounds to 125 pounds in about three months. He repeatedly asked to see a doctor, but was not permitted to.
39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 40 of 140
103. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY entered the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC confined to a wheelchair, as the result of a car accident in 2007. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY requested physical therapy but was informed by medical staff at Easterling that ADOC does not provide physical therapy to prisoners. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY began to self-administer physical therapy to teach himself how to walk again using weights, another prisoner’s cane, and the advice of fellow prisoners while at Easterling. By April 2013, PLAINTIFF MOSELEY had taught himself how to walk, though with a limp. He still has muscle spasms in his legs four to five times a week and is in constant pain. DEFENDANT ADOC has only provided PLAINTIFF MOSELEY with a knee brace.
104. In or around April 2014, PLAINTIFF MANER injured his left knee. He was getting down from his bed, which is an upper bunk that has no ladder. As he jumped down, he landed on his left leg. He felt a great deal of pain in his knee and he could move the knee back and forth, hearing a pop each time he moved it. PLAINTIFF MANER submitted a sick call request to have his knee examined. At the sick call, a nurse took is vital signs, gave him ibuprofen, and told him that he would need to see the facility doctor. PLAINTIFF MANER has not seen the doctor or had any x-rays. PLAINTIFF MANER is currently self-administering physical therapy to his left leg to build strength.
105. In July 2012, PLAINTIFF TORRES injured his knee. He went to medical, and was given an ace bandage and crutches, but the knee, which had swollen significantly by the time he was taken to medical, was not examined. He was not given an x-ray for about two weeks, and despite ongoing swelling for the next two years, he was not provided with any additional diagnostic testing or physical therapy.
40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 41 of 140
106. PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a severe keloid disorder, with large keloids covering much of his face, neck, chest, shoulders, back, and buttocks. They have spread dramatically in the time PLAINTIFF BROOKS has been in ADOC custody. They throb in cold temperatures, and throb and itch in hot temperatures. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF BROOKS passed out due to the pain from the keloids caused by the high temperatures in his dormitory. The temperature and pressure of the showers in his dormitory cause him a lot of pain. The many keloids on PLAINTIFF BROOKS’s chest, waist, and back prevent from him from stretching. As a result, he often experiences pain in his chest and feels like his chest is caving inwards. PLAINTIFF BROOKS receives pain medication sometimes, but not consistently. Medical staff refuse to provide PLAINTIFF BROOKS with anything for the itching caused by the keloids, and refused his request to bathe in the tub in the facility’s infirmary to avoid the pain caused by water hitting the keloids in dormitory showers. PLAINTIFF BROOKS is unable to wash between the keloids on his back. As a result, he relies on prisoners who are willing to clean between the keloids on his back with a cotton swab. When PLAINTIFF BROOKS is unable to clean between the keloids, an odor develops that intensifies in warm temperatures.
107. PLAINTIFF BROOKS has requested surgery to remove the keloids approximately five times between October 2011 and April 2013. His requests were denied. Medical staff informed PLAINTIFF BROOKS in December 2013 that he has been approved for a surgery to remove the keloids. He did not have the treatment. In or around March or April 2014, PLAINTIFF BROOKS was finally sent to a dermatologist who informed him that the keloids had grown so big that they could only be removed through radiation treatment. The dermatologist also prescribed a medicinal soap, but medical staff failed to provide the soap to PLAINTIFF BROOKS.
41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 42 of 140
108. In or around 2012, PLAINTIFF ROGERS was bitten three times by a spider. The bites developed into large wounds. PLAINTIFF ROGERS went to the infirmary three or four times to get treatment for the wounds. Medical staff told ROGERS that he was “nasty” and needed a bath; they did not treat his wounds. Over the course of three weeks, the wounds grew larger, and PLAINTIFF ROGERS became feverish and began vomiting. A correctional officer took him to the infirmary to get him treated. He was given a cream, medicated soap and gauze to protect the wound, and the wound eventually healed.
109. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has a grapefruit-sized hernia. The prison doctor has told PLAINTIFF BRAGGS that he will not recommend surgery because the hernia is not life threatening.
110. In July 2013, and prior to his placement in ADOC custody for the second time, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON learned that he has a mass on his colon that is either cancerous or a symptom of Crohn’s disease. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON entered the custody of ADOC before he could receive medical treatment for the mass. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON informed medical personnel of the mass during his intake examination at Kilby. The personnel told him that the mass is only polyps and that he should not worry about it. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON later showed medical personnel at Ventress his medical records indicating that the polyps are either cancerous or a symptom of Crohn’s disease. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON has seen blood in his stool since July 2013 and tested positive for blood in his stool several times in 2014, but has not received any treatment.
111. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM suffers from severe headaches, which have persisted for approximately five years. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM’s headaches have gone unexamined and
42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 43 of 140
untreated for more than four years, despite PLAINTIFF FOLSOM’s requests for medical evaluation.
112. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM also has a lump in his left breast, which has not been treated or removed. Medical staff discovered the lump four years ago. The lump in PLAINTIFF FOLSOM’s left breast causes PLAINTIFF FOLSOM a great deal of pain.
113. In or about 2011, PLAINTIFF FOLSOM learned he had a cyst in his liver. About a year later, PLAINTIFF FOLSOM was told the cyst was not in his liver, but in his kidney. In or about 2014, PLAINTIFF FOLSOM learned he had two cysts, one in each of his kidneys. He has been told neither the cysts nor kidneys need to be removed.
114. PLAINTIFF ALLEN is 34. She was diagnosed with high blood pressure in approximately 2006. Since about the same time, she has suffered from headaches about every other day. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has been given a variety of blood pressure medicines over the years, but they have not controlled her blood pressure. In 2012 or 2013, PLAINTIFF ALLEN was sent out to a cardiologist who put her on a medication that brought down her blood pressure. The medication was discontinued after several months, and her blood pressure has not been as well controlled since. In early 2015, PLAINTIFF ALLEN was taken off her blood pressure medications, other than water pills. She experienced headaches, nausea, dizziness, and could hear her pulse when she laid down. After complaining, she was placed back on blood pressure medications several days later. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has also been placed on imitrex for her headaches. Imitrex is a migraine medicine that is contraindicated for persons with uncontrolled high blood pressure. Her blood pressure currently runs at around 160-175 over 90-120. The doctor at Tutwiler has told her that this is her “normal.”
43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 44 of 140
115. In early 2015, PLAINTIFF ALLEN tested positive on two separate occasions for blood and protein in her urine. There has been no follow up to determine the cause of the blood and protein in PLAINTIFF ALLEN’s urine.
116. In 2011, PLAINTIFF ALLEN had rectal bleeding. She had a colonoscopy and was diagnosed with internal and external hemorrhoids. The doctor who performed the colonoscopy stated that she should a follow-up examination within one or two years. She has not had a follow-up examination. Since approximately 2013, the bleeding from her rectum has increased dramatically. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has complained to medical staff about it, but has not been examined or treated, other than being given hemorrhoid medication.
117. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN suffers from a hernia. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN describes the hernia as a “bottom” hernia, on his left side. He has been given a truss so that the hernia will not move or enlarge. Despite the truss, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’s hernia drops approximately 1.5 inches, and hangs between his legs, where it causes constant pain from chafing. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has requested treatment for the hernia since he was first incarcerated in 1990. In 2013, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN was told he would not receive surgery for the hernia.
3. DEFENDANTS deny treatment for eye problems. 118. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not treating cataracts and other eye problems. 119. PLAINTIFF TORRES was diagnosed with cataracts in both eyes as a child. In or around 2011, PLAINTIFF TORRES visited the Callahan Eye Clinic in Birmingham, Alabama. Doctors informed him that the vision in his left eye had substantially deteriorated. Doctors advised PLAINTIFF TORRES that if he does not have surgery on his left eye, he will lose vision
44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 45 of 140
in that eye. In or around 2011 and after his visit to the Callahan Clinic, PLAINTIFF TORRES put in a sick call request to see the facility optometrist. The optometrist examined PLAINTIFF TORRES by asking him to read a letter chart only. Afterwards, he informed PLAINTIFF TORRES that ADOC will not pay for his eye surgery and prescribed him a pair of glasses. PLAINTIFF TORRES stopped using the eye glasses after a short time because they did not improve his vision and gave him headaches. The glasses eventually broke and medical staff refused to give him another pair because he discarded the frames.
120. Since 2011, PLAINTIFF TORRES has experienced increasingly severe headaches that are so painful that they prevent him from sleeping. He experiences strain in his right eye due to the weakening of the left. As time passes, his vision worsens and he sees spots and fog periodically.
121. PLAINTIFF MOORE developed glaucoma in 2008. He was in the process of arranging surgery for his glaucoma with the Franklin Clinic in Mobile when he was arrested. After he was arrested, the eye doctor in the Mobile County Jail examined PLAINTIFF MOORE’s eyes and stated that he needed surgery for his glaucoma immediately. The eye doctor said that he was writing this in PLAINTIFF MOORE’s records that would go to ADOC. When PLAINTIFF MOORE came into ADOC custody, he had an appointment with an eye doctor every three months, later reduced to every six months. He spoke with the eye doctor three or four times about getting surgery to treat his glaucoma. The eye doctor repeatedly told him that the state would not pay for glaucoma surgery because it did not have the money. His last appointment with the eye doctor was in the summer of 2013. In or around February 2014, PLAINTIFF MOORE spoke with the Director of the Pardons and Parole Board who also told him there was inadequate money to pay for his surgery.
45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 46 of 140
122. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has not been able to see out of his left eye since 2012. He believes the problem is cataracts. Also, the white of his eye is swollen and droopy, blocking his vision. He had cataract surgery on his right eye about eight years ago, but his right eye now has double vision. He has been given glasses, but they do not help with his eyesight at all. He has received no other treatment for his eyesight.
123. Larry Shepherd, then a prisoner in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC, developed cataracts in both eyes in or around April 2011. He was unable to read any of the letters on the eye chart by June 2011. He was sent out to see an ophthalmologist in November 2011. The ophthalmologist prescribed that he undergo surgery on the cataracts in both eyes “ASAP.” As of November 2012, he had not had the surgery. He was released on medical furlough at that time, and was able to have surgery on his right eye in February 2013.
4. DEFENDANTS do not treat hepatitis C. 124. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not treating hepatitis C. According to a report provided to DEFENDANTS DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH, in April 2014, 2,280 prisoners in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC had been diagnosed with hepatitis C, but just seven of them were receiving treatment. 125. The failure to treat prisoners for hepatitis C creates a significant risk of serious harm. One prisoner at Holman recently died from complications from untreated hepatitis C. Numerous individuals develop jaundice at Holman and do not receive treatment. A prisoner at Ventress has untreated hepatitis C and is suffering from liver failure. 126. PLAINTIFF MORK was diagnosed with hepatitis C shortly before entering ADOC custody. At that time, the doctors at the University of Alabama at Birmingham hospital were about to start him on medications. In late 2011 or early 2012, while housed at Limestone,
46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 47 of 140
the doctors told him that his hepatitis had progressed far enough that he should begin receiving treatment. A doctor at Limestone told PLAINTIFF MORK that they did not treat everyone because the medication was too expensive, but that he could submit a request. PLAINTIFF MORK submitted the request, but never heard back. PLAINTIFF MORK was subsequently transferred to Holman, where he has not received any treatment. To the best of his recollection, he has not had his viral load checked for seven or eight months, and his blood is rarely checked.
127. PLAINTIFF SELLERS has hepatitis C. He is receiving no treatment for it. In 2011, he tested positive for tuberculosis (TB) exposure and was given Rifampin. PLAINTIFF SELLERS developed jaundice and had to discontinue Rifampin. Since that time, the enzymes in his blood have repeatedly tested high, indicating that his liver is not functioning appropriately.
128. Michael Kennedy is a prisoner housed at Staton. He was born with hepatitis C. After he came into ADOC custody in 2012, he was told that he is too sick to be treated for hepatitis C. Although he is in a great deal of pain and was prescribed Phentanyl, he receives only Tylenol 3 for his pain. His liver is ordinarily drained every two months, at a hospital, with the use of an ultrasound machine to determine where the draining catheter should be placed. However, in February 2014, this procedure was done at Staton’s infirmary, rather than an outside medical facility. There was no ultrasound used. Instead, the doctor felt his abdomen and guessed where to place the catheter. It was significantly more painful than when the procedure was done in the hospital.
129. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON has made several requests for hepatitis C treatment, including on June 29 and July 9, 2014, but has been denied. In 2007, facility medical staff at Bullock told PLAINTIFF HENDERSON that he did not qualify for the hepatitis C treatment because he had a short time left on his sentence. In 2013, medical personnel at Kilby erroneously
47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 48 of 140
told PLAINTIFF HENDERSON that all of the possible treatments for the hepatitis C would harm his liver. In 2014, medical personnel refused to provide PLAINTIFF HENDERSON treatment for hepatitis C due to his liver condition.
130. While residing at Limestone in 2008, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON learned that the lack of treatment for hepatitis C has led to high levels of ammonia in his brain, causing him to experience confusion, memory loss, and cognitive difficulty. The medication that DEFENDANT DUNN’s and DEFENDANT NAGLICH offered PLAINTIFF HENDERSON to treat the high ammonia levels causes severe diarrhea. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not offered PLAINTIFF HENDERSON treatment to offset the effects of the diarrhea nor an alternate medication that does not have this side effect.
5. DEFENDANTS deny prisoners treatment for diabetes. 131. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not providing adequate care for diabetes in a number of different ways. 132. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not providing appropriate nutrition and medicine to control diabetes. For example, PLAINTIFF GILBERT’s diabetes has not been well-controlled since he has been in ADOC custody. Since he has been at Kilby, his blood sugar level in the early mornings is typically around 300 or 400 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dL); the target level before eating is 70-130 mg/dL. At other points in the day, he feels his blood sugar level dropping, and he gets shaky and breaks out into a sweat. He has passed out from low blood sugar between 15 and 20 times in the two years he has been in ADOC custody. When he first came to Kilby, snacks were provided to diabetics to keep with them so they could be eaten when needed. Now, diabetics are called to the cafeteria at some point in the evening for snacks. The snacks must be eaten at the time they are offered, rather than
48

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 49 of 140
when they are needed. Prior to coming to ADOC, he was on a long-acting, 24-hour insulin that controlled his diabetes better. He has asked if he can be put back on the 24-hour insulin, but was told by a doctor that he cannot because it is too expensive.
133. At Kilby, several times each week, someone has a sufficiently serious diabetic crisis that they must be carried to the infirmary.
134. In approximately 2004, PLAINTIFF BRAGGS’s right leg was amputated at the knee due to lack of medical treatment while in prison. Prior to losing his leg, PLAINTIFF BRAGGS, who has diabetes, complained of numbness and tingling in his foot to prison medical staff for approximately three weeks. Prison medical staff told PLAINTIFF BRAGGS he had athlete’s foot. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is currently experiencing similar problems with his left foot. Medical staff at Hamilton A & I have provided PLAINTIFF BRAGGS with a prescription for the foot numbness, but have not addressed the reason his foot is numb and tingling. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS does not know the name of the medicine he has been given for the numbness. When he asked about possible side effects of this medication, a nurse said that PLAINTIFF BRAGGS could “look up” the side effects of his medication. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is not aware of any way in which he could look up the side effects.
135. PLAINTIFF BROYLES also has diabetes that is not well controlled. While he was at Bullock, he collapsed four times from having low blood sugar. On one occasion, he was in his bed, fell out, and hurt his head. His sugar blood sugar level was 40 mg/dL. He was transferred to Elmore in January 2014, and has also collapsed there from low blood sugar.
136. Prisoner Bobby Copeland, a prisoner who died in March 2015, had poorly controlled diabetes as well. His blood sugar levels were generally between 150 and 350 mg/dL. On one occasion, when his blood sugar level was toward the low end of the target range, 79
49

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 50 of 140
mg/dL, a nurse tried to give him insulin anyway. This would have brought his blood sugar level down, likely to a dangerously low level.
137. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not having diabetic prisoners’ toenails clipped for them. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, who is diabetic and paralyzed on one side of his body from a stroke, asked to have his toenails clipped. Clipping his own toenails is dangerous because he can easily give himself a small cut that, because he is diabetic, creates a risk of infection and amputation. The nurses laughed and told him that they were not in the prison to clip his toenails.
138. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying diabetic prisoners appropriate foot care. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has not seen a podiatrist since he came into ADOC custody, although he visited one regularly prior to his incarceration. Prisoner Copeland’s feet and legs were consistently swollen and painful, but he did not see a podiatrist.
139. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying diabetic prisoners appropriate footwear. PLAINTIFF GILBERT was given an orthopedic shoe that rubbed the skin off his toe because the shoe was too small. He asked for a new shoe, but was denied. He had to cut away the top of the shoe. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD asked for diabetic shoes and was told that because he is in a wheelchair, he does not need shoes.
140. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying diabetic prisoners appropriate eye examinations and adequate treatment as needed.
6. DEFENDANTS deny prisoners adequate dental treatment. 141. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying prisoners adequate dental care.
50

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 51 of 140
142. At some facilities, prisoners’ teeth are rarely cleaned. Dentists do not generally fill cavities. Once a prisoner’s tooth becomes decayed, the only treatment available in most facilities is to have the tooth pulled. Once pulled, the teeth are not replaced unless the prisoner has lost numerous teeth.
143. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN came into ADOC custody in 1990 with an upper denture. It has not been replaced and no longer fits. He has been complaining for years that his upper dentures do not fit.
144. Over the years, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has lost his bottom teeth. In March 2015, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN only had two remaining bottom teeth. Both teeth were abscessed and caused PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN serious pain. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN submitted multiple sick calls regarding his painful abscessed teeth, but received no reply from medical staff. Finally, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN reached out to a custody officer about the abscessed teeth. Ultimately, dental staff examined PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN but did not give him pain medication for his abscessed teeth. The teeth were pulled two days later.
145. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN now has no bottom teeth. He does not have bottom dentures and they are not, to his knowledge, in process. He has difficulty chewing. Although PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN cuts his food up into very small pieces, he chokes multiple times a week on food that gets stuck in the back of his throat. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN also cuts his lower gums when he eats.
146. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has never had his teeth cleaned in the eight years he has been at Bullock. PLAINTIFF DILLARD’s left front tooth turned dark brown in early 2013. He saw a dentist after the tooth turned brown, and the dentist said that he would see PLAINTIFF DILLARD again about the tooth. He did not. After PLAINTIFF DILLARD moved to the
51

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 52 of 140
mental health dormitory in the main building at Bullock, he saw the dentist again. The dentist said to “put him on the list.” PLAINTIFF DILLARD saw the dentist again around the end of April 2014. The dentist did not work on the tooth at either of these appointments. The dentist said that he would try to save the tooth, but has not yet done anything for the tooth.
147. PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s two upper front teeth are mottled dark brown and black, particularly near the gum line. They are both loose. The last time he saw a dentist was, he believes, about one and a half years ago. He recently asked to see the dentist and was told he is “on the list” but that he could not see the dentist.
148. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE’s dentures broke about three years ago. He has not been provided with new dentures.
C. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Delay Diagnosis and Treatment of Serious Medical Needs. 149. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
delaying diagnosis and treatment to prisoners with serious medical conditions, causing prisoners in Alabama unnecessary pain, suffering, disabilities and sometimes death. The policy and practice of delaying diagnosis and treatment creates a substantial risk of serious harm.
150. Numerous prisoners have complained of symptoms for months without anyone addressing their concerns, only to be diagnosed with advanced stage cancer that is terminal by the time it is diagnosed. For example, Robert Jones, a prisoner who had been treated for prostate cancer in 2006 started showing rapidly rising PSA levels in 2011. Rising PSA levels are an indication of prostate cancer, requiring additional tests. He began vomiting, sometimes vomiting blood, on a regular basis. However, he was not given necessary tests or diagnosed until a year and a half later in February 2013. By that time, his prostate cancer had metastasized, spread to his bones, and was terminal. He died in January 2014.
52

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 53 of 140
151. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had a chest x-ray in or around February 2014 because of a TB outbreak at St. Clair. There was a spot on his lung. He had a CT scan in or around late March 2014. On or about April 14, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was told that the CT scan showed that he had cancer and that he would be sent out for a biopsy the following day. As of May 28, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had not been sent out for a biopsy of the cancerous spot on his lung. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR did not start chemotherapy until late September 2014.
152. Prisoner Baker was diagnosed with a lump in her breast in January 2012, while in ADOC custody. A biopsy in August 2012 indicated that the lump was not malignant, but outside medical staff instructed her to have annual check-ups to monitor the lump. Despite informing facility medical staff that she needed an annual mammogram,, she did not receive any follow-up care necessary to confirm that the lump had not grown or become malignant, prior to being added as a named plaintiff in this lawsuit. She received a mammogram in approximately September 2014, more than two years after her biopsy and approximately two months after being added to this lawsuit.
153. In April 2014, a prisoner at St. Clair had an infection in his left foot that went untreated for long enough that his foot became gangrenous and had to be amputated. Also in April 2014, a prisoner at Bibb had an infection in his right foot that went untreated for long enough that the front portion of his foot had to be amputated.
154. PLAINTIFF SMITH came into ADOC custody eight years ago. He was set to have a surgery in summer 2007 to address an infection in his groin area. In anticipation of this surgery, doctors required PLAINTIFF SMITH to begin using a catheter. He was to use the catheter for three months. PLAINTIFF SMITH entered ADOC custody before he could have the surgery. As of the time of filing this lawsuit, he had not had the surgery. He had frequent
53

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 54 of 140
infections from the catheter, often requiring hospitalization. His urine is often a brownish color and may have blood in it.
155. In February 2014, an infection from PLAINTIFF SMITH’s catheter had gotten so bad that he had to be taken to Jackson Hospital for a series of visits. During these visits it was determined that PLAINTIFF SMITH’s bladder was now incapable of holding the normal amount of fluid. Fluid leaks from PLAINTIFF SMITH’s penis and pockets of pus repeatedly form around his groin area. PLAINTIFF SMITH endures pain so severe that he is often unable to sleep.
156. In late 2014, after a seven-year delay and only a few months after the filing of this lawsuit, PLAINTIFF SMITH was finally given the surgery he needed.
157. Starting in the summer of 2010, PLAINTIFF SELLERS began to experience pain in his lower back and difficulty urinating, and occasionally saw blood in his urine. He told medical staff, but was given only Ibuprofen for the back pain. His pain and urination difficulties increased over the following three years. By July of 2013, he had blood in his urine every day, and was in so much pain that he could not lay flat on his bed. Following a heart attack in November 2013, he was transferred to Kilby. He had an MRI, from which it was discovered that he had kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS was placed on a medical hold, so that he could have the kidney stones removed. He was prescribed Flomax to treat the kidney stones and Norco for pain, and was scheduled for surgery. However, on December 31, 2013, he was transferred to St. Clair. His medical records were not transferred to St. Clair. His diagnosis was not promptly communicated to staff at St. Clair, he was not provided with his medications, and it was months before his surgery was scheduled. PLAINTIFF SELLERS finally had kidney surgery on March
54

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 55 of 140
7, 2014, more than three and a half years after he began having symptoms from the kidney stones, and more three months after the kidney stones were ultimately diagnosed.
158. The day of PLAINTIFF SELLERS’s surgery for kidney stones, he was returned to his general population housing unit at St. Clair. Within two days he was feverish from infection. He asked to be admitted to the infirmary at St. Clair. In the infirmary, he was left in a storage closet overnight, then returned to his housing unit.
159. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was splashed in the eyes with disinfectant when he was in suicide watch in December 2013. He was taken to a hospital the following day. A doctor there recommended that he see an eye specialist. He has not seen an eye specialist. His vision has been cloudy since this incident.
160. In 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT injured his back while lifting weights. He received a pain medication after the injury but continues to experience pain in his lower back. At times the pain is so severe that he is unable to get out of bed. He currently receives ibuprofen and wears a back brace but receives no other treatment for the constant pain. He has not been evaluated by a back specialist. When he asked to see a doctor in the free world, he was told by medical staff that there was no need to see anyone about his back.
161. On or about May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was housed in segregation and the toilet in his cell became stopped up. On or about May 8, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was attempting to summon assistance because of the stopped up toilet by sticking his right hand out through the food slot in the door of his cell. A correctional officer pushed the door of the slot up, forcing his hand up and back. His hand swelled up immediately. He was then maced through the slot in the door. There were no decontamination procedures taken. He was not taken to shower, and his cell was not decontaminated. He only option for decontamination was to use his
55

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 56 of 140
hands, one of which was injured, to wash his face in the sink that is a single unit with the toilet that had been stopped up for a week. He was given 20 days of restriction in segregation. He was not taken to medical that day for his hand. He was taken the following day and given aspirin. It was not until four days after the incident that his hand was x-rayed. He does not know the results. As of June 16, his hand continues to cause him significant pain and he has difficulty moving his thumb.
162. In or around June 2012, PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE began complaining of serious tooth pain in two teeth, and asking for the two teeth to be removed. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE put in repeated sick call requests relating to the pain from these two teeth for two and a half years, before they were finally extracted in late 2014.
D. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Fail to Provide Adequate Emergency Care. 163. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of failing
to respond adequately to medical emergencies. The poor response results in a substantial risk of serious harm, as well as pain, loss of function, and even death.
164. As discussed above, in January 2014, a prisoner who was injected with something incorrectly during dialysis at St. Clair went into cardiac arrest. Although there was a crash cart in the dialysis unit, no one present knew how to use it. The prisoner died.
165. PLAINTIFF DUNN cut himself with a razor blade on several occasions during a nine-month period in segregation. On one occasion, on or about March 15, 2014 just before 6:00 p.m., he cut himself so deeply that he cut a tendon in his forearm. PLAINTIFF DUNN promptly told a sergeant that he had cut himself. The sergeant responded, “Why do you keep doing this on my shift? Why don’t you just go ahead and kill yourself.” Shortly after 6:00 p.m., a nurse came by, and PLAINTIFF DUNN showed the nurse his arm. The nurse said he would return when he
56

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 57 of 140
had time, but did not come back. At approximately 9:00 p.m., PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken out of his cell and placed in a cell outside. He was beaten by two officers in the cell, then left there for another hour. At approximately 10:00 p.m., he was taken to the infirmary. The nurse at the infirmary attempted to staunch the blood flow from PLAINTIFF DUNN’s arm, but was unable to do so. At approximately 11:00 p.m., PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken to Brookwood Medical Center (“Brookwood”), where several staples were put into his arm to hold the wound closed. The doctor at Brookwood instructed that PLAINTIFF DUNN should be returned to the hospital for follow-up care if he experienced weakness as a result of the cut in the tendon. Although PLAINTIFF DUNN did experience weakness in his arm, he received no care for the weakness.
E. DEFENDANTS Fail to Adequately Provide and Manage Medications, Medical Supplies, and Medical Devices. 166. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not
consistently providing and managing medications and other medical supplies. The medical staff in Alabama prisons makes frequent medication errors or otherwise deprive prisoners of prescribed medications.
167. Prisoner Bobby Copeland took medication for high blood pressure and diabetes. Many months his medications ran out before he wa scheduled to see the doctor again. When this happened he had to ask to be seen in sick call, first by a nurse, then by a doctor. The process could take several days. The longest he went without his medications was about two weeks. When he was not on his medications, he sweated, got dizzy and suffered from headaches. Several prisoners describe medications running out before the end of the prescription.
57

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 58 of 140
168. PLAINTIFF ROGERS takes medication for diabetes. In March 2014, the medication was abruptly discontinued without any discussion with a doctor. PLAINTIFF ROGERS went for approximately two months without his medication.
169. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD also takes medication for diabetes. In or around May 2014, his diabetes medication was cut in half. His blood sugar levels immediately rose from running at around 98 mg/dL to close to or over 200 mg/dL.
170. PLAINTIFF BROOKS had a prescription for pain medication for his keloid condition. He had had the prescription for approximately two years. In February 2014, the prescription was discontinued. He had not had any discussion with the doctor about discontinuing the medication. He only learned of the medication being discontinued when he went to get it at pill call.
171. Additionally, nearly all prisoners interviewed reported that they did not give informed consent to medications. They were not informed of the purpose, risks, side effects and benefits of the medications prescribed to them.
172. On two occasions, PLAINTIFF DILLARD has been given the wrong medicine. On one occasion, he was given the wrong medicine during evening pill call. He went back to his bed and lay down. He got up about an hour later, and was unable to talk or walk. Other prisoners called for correctional officers, and he was escorted to the infirmary where he was given a shot and then brought back to his dormitory and put to bed, where he slept off the medication. On another occasion, PLAINTIFF DILLARD was given the wrong medication by the nurse. He saw that he had the wrong medication and told the nurse. The nurse told him that the doctor had changed his medication. He said that he would not take the medication because it was not his. The nurse then gave him the medication he had previously been taking.
58

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 59 of 140
173. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has also witnessed what he perceived as other prisoners having bad reactions to medication on approximately six occasions. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has witnessed numerous other prisoners look at their pills at the pill call window and tell the nurse they have the wrong medications. On two occasions, PLAINTIFF DILLARD saw the correctional officers walk up to the prisoners who stated that the medications were wrong, slap them and tell them to take the medications.
174. Prisoner Baker took several medications for heart disease, arthritis, and several mental health conditions. Prisoner Baker routinely went without her medications. Starting in the fall of 2013, she went about eight months without her heart medication, which she is supposed to receive once a month. Prisoner Baker also received improper dosages of folic acid and methotrexate from the pharmacist.
175. Medical staff gave Prisoner Baker the wrong medication many times. On one occasion, she suffered a severe reaction to an incorrect medicine that was given to her. She had no recollection of what happened, but was told by other prisoners that she was completely out of control for several hours.
176. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has a serious heart condition and high blood pressure. He has suffered from two heart attacks since entering ADOC custody, and had emergency surgery to put several stents into his arteries following the second heart attack. Following the second heart attack and surgery, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN was underwent a radium test that he understand revealed a serious blockage of his arteries. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN takes a number of medications for his heart condition, as well as for acid reflux and other medical issues. He receives all his medications KOP (“Keep on person”). PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’s medications are often late. When it is time for them to be renewed, medical staff at pill call tell him that they
59

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 60 of 140
do not have the medications in stock and that PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN will have to wait until the medications are restocked. Currently, he is permitted to check to see if the medications have come in only one time per week.
177. As of June 15, 2015, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN had gone almost a week without any of his medications.
178. In early 2015, two of PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’s medications for his heart condition, niacin and aspirin, were discontinued. The aspirin was re-started in the late spring, but PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN continues to go without niacin.
179. PLAINTIFF BROYLES has been given the wrong medication at pill call a few times. He has refused to take medication that was not correct and been harassed by correctional officers for doing so.
180. Similarly, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has asked for incontinence protection briefs because, due to his stroke, he cannot feel when he needs to urinate. Medical staff has refused to provide the necessary briefs.
F. DEFENDANTS Have Inadequate Procedures for Preventing and Responding to Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases in ADOC Prisons. 181. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have no effective system for
preventing or managing infectious diseases. 182. In recent years, there have been numerous TB outbreaks in Alabama’s prisons. In
or around January 2014, there was an outbreak of TB at St. Clair. Several men have been diagnosed with active TB. Medical staff at St. Clair have determined that a man who was diagnosed in February 2014 had likely been infectious for a year. One of the men diagnosed with TB worked in the kitchen until the day he was diagnosed. Many prisoners at St. Clair did not have a TB test done during their physicals in 2013.
60

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 61 of 140
183. A correctional officer who was known by DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH to have active TB was allowed to continue working at Tutwiler during September 2013. He was stationed in places in the facility where it was deemed that he would have limited contact with prisoners and other employees and contractors of ADOC, but he was allowed to continue working until he was physically unable to do so.
184. At Donaldson in the summer of 2012, Dormitory K, which houses 130 men, was under purportedly under quarantine for TB. The people in Dormitory K mixed freely with the people in the adjacent dormitory and, to a lesser degree, with the prisoners housed in two more dormitories of the same size.
185. There is an outbreak of scabies at Ventress that has been ongoing for three years or more. Early on in the Ventress scabies outbreak, prisoners were instructed to place their mattresses over a fence in the yard during the day to air them out. When the prisoners collected them at night, there was no way to ensure that each person got the same mattress he had had before. Such mixing of mattresses creates a high risk of infections spreading from one person to another.
186. There has also been an outbreak of scabies at St. Clair, Holman and Tutwiler in recent months.
187. Moreover, the conditions in the prisons make the spread of disease nearly inevitable. The prisons are grossly overcrowded. Prisoners in every facility report the presence of vermin, especially rats and spiders. The vermin live in the housing units and in the kitchens. In various prison units, birds enter and leave droppings.
188. Additionally, the facilities have extensive plumbing problems. The showers, toilets and sinks are inadequate to meet the needs to twice the number of people the facilities
61

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 62 of 140
were built to house. Few if any of the prisons have upgraded the plumbing systems sufficiently to meet the demands of the prisons operating at twice the capacity.
189. Sewage has overflowed into dormitories at Kilby and St. Clair. At Ventress, prisoners have been required to carry raw sewage away from the facility to dump on the edges of the facility grounds. At Hamilton A & I, there is a ditch of sewage near one edge of the property. The administration of the facility had a footbridge built over the ditch.
G. DEFENDANTS Deny Care to Terminally Ill Prisoners, Issuing ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ or ‘Allow Natural Death’ Orders Against the Patient’s Wishes. 190. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
allowing doctors to discontinue care to terminally ill prisoners against their will. This is a policy and practice that has continued over years and has been reported in these DEFENDANTS’ own documents.
191. One of the most basic health care decisions is when to discontinue treatment for a terminally ill patient. This is a decision that resides with the patient. Numerous prisoners have been given “Do Not Resuscitate” orders (“DNR”) or “Allow Natural Death” orders (“AND”) without their consent or even their knowledge.
192. In some cases, the doctors have discussed this issue with prisoners, the prisoners have affirmatively declined to be DNR or AND, but have been made DNR or AND regardless of their refusal. In some cases, individuals have been persuaded to sign DNRs without knowing what they were signing. The DNRs used by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS provide only that in the event of a cardiac arrest, cardiopulmonary resuscitation not be initiated. Nonetheless, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS rely on DNRs to deny medical care to prisoners.
62

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 63 of 140
193. At Staton in May 2014, there were five individuals who were on a list of persons who had DNRs who did not know that they were thought to have DNRs. One of these individuals was Michael Kennedy. Kennedy had end-stage liver failure from untreated hepatitis C. In early 2014, Kennedy learned from a doctor at Staton that Dr. Bobby Crocker, the Corizon Regional Medical Director for the state, had placed a DNR order in his file, although Kennedy had not agreed to it. Kennedy asked to have it removed from his file. As of May 2014, Kennedy remained on the list of individuals who are considered to have DNRs. Kennedy has since died.
194. At Staton, prisoner Roy Heath resides in the facility’s infirmary due to his health. He did not sign a DNR. In June 2014, he learned that he has a DNR in his medical file despite not having signed one.
195. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS has COPD. He experiences extreme shortness of breath and low o xygen levels, and has periodic COPD crises that require him to be admitted to the infirmary. Prior to late spring or early summer 2013, medical staff gave PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS a shot of Sodium Metrizoate every six to eight hours whenever he had a COPD crisis, along with a breathing treatment, oxygen, and several inhalers during an COPD crisis. In or around late spring or early summer 2013, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS was admitted to the infirmary due to an exacerbation of the COPD. Several days into his stay in the infirmary, Dr. Crocker asked to see PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS, requiring PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS to temporarily stop using oxygen to meet with Dr. Crocker. Dr. Crocker asked Clements if had considered how he would feel to be on life support if he had a heart attack or was in a coma and told Clements that if he signed a DNR, he could avoid that fate. Having difficulty breathing because he was not using an oxygen mask and believing that the DNR only pertained to life-
63

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 64 of 140
saving measures in the event of a heart attack or coma, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS signed the DNR.
196. In or around August 2013, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS experienced another bout of extreme breathing difficulty and again went into the infirmary. His oxygen level was 80. During his 30 day stay in the infirmary, medical staff gave PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS only one shot of Sodium Metrizoate. Despite PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS’s condition, medical staff did not arrange for his transport to a hospital.
197. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS returned to the infirmary again in or around February 2014 experiencing difficulty in breathing. His oxygen level was 92. As he lay in the infirmary, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS asked the nurse to provide him with some effective treatment. The nurse responded that if he had not signed the DNR, medical staff could do something to help him. It was at that point that he learned that medical staff was refraining from treating his chronic condition due to the DNR. Although the DNR is rescindable merely by the prisoner stating that he wants it rescinded, medical staff did not explain this to PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS. Because he did not know that he could rescind the DNR, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS requested that medical staff give him pain medication and put him in a closed room in the infirmary to die. Facility physician Mendez ultimately gave Clements several shots of Sodium Metrizoate and antibiotics.
198. At Kilby, prisoner Larry Shepherd signed a DNR in April 2012 without knowing what he had signed. Shepherd was blind from untreated cataracts and no one told him about the document he was signing. When he learned that he had signed a DNR, he asked to have it rescinded. DEFENDANTS did not rescind it. To the contrary, DEFENDANTS relied on it in their response to the lawsuit Shepherd had filed seeking to have cataract surgery.
64

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 65 of 140
199. An Incident Report from Hamilton A & I reflects that on September 9, 2009, a prisoner was found in crisis. Life saving measures were started, and the doctor was called. The doctor told the staff that was present with the prisoner to “make him a DNR.”
200. Moreover, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS cease to provide medical treatment to people with DNRs. As discussed above, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH denied prisoner Larry Shepherd cataract surgery based in part on the existence of the DNR.
201. At Kilby, prisoner Robert Jones was admitted to the infirmary from Jackson Hospital in November 2013. He did not sign a DNR or a request for hospice care, but was placed on hospice care.
H. DEFENDANTS Allow Correctional Officers to Interfere With Prisoners’ Access to Medical Care. 202. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
allowing correctional officers to deny or delay access to medical care. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not adequately trained security and health care staff on how to handle health care emergencies, and as a result of this failure to respond properly and timely to emergencies, prisoners suffer avoidable harm and injuries, including unnecessary deaths. Correctional staff make critical initial decisions about the medical care needed.
203. In December 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was on suicide watch. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 13, 2013, another prisoner threw burning fabric into PLAINTIFF PRUITT’s cell and the other suicide watch cell, burning PLAINTIFF PRUITT’s legs. Prisoners on the second floor of the unit where the suicide watch cells are located also threw burning items into the cell. The correctional officers came and put out the fires, but failed to do anything to stop this assault. The assault continued for approximately three hours. When
65

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 66 of 140
PLAINTIFF PRUITT asked to go to see the medical staff, the correctional officers refused, dismissing his injuries as “minute” and “nothing.” He was not taken to see medical staff until the morning of December 14, 2013.
204. Starting on December 14 or 15, 2013, prisoners started throwing disinfectant onto PLAINTIFF PRUITT. Some of the disinfectant went into his eyes. Correctional officers did not take him to get medical attention until the following day.
205. On June 12, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was in segregation. He had been asking for mental health care for months. He cut himself with a razor on both arms. When he informed the corrections officer that he was bleeding, the officer ignored him and left him in the cell for approximately four to five hours before taking him to the nurse.
206. In March 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was in segregation at Fountain. She had an infection from a wound that had not been properly treated by the medical staff. After she had returned to the infirmary and gotten the infected wound properly cleaned and dressed, medical staff told her she should return to the infirmary twice a day to have it re-dressed. Correctional officers in the segregation unit did not permit her to return to the medical unit, and the wound became infected again.
207. Corrections officers are often present before or during medical examinations. They sometimes make comments during the examinations suggesting or stating that the prisoner is lying to the medical professional. PLAINTIFFS ROGERS, BRAGGS and PRUITT have experienced correctional officers interfering in their discussions with medical staff. II. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE MENTAL HEALTH CARE TO
PRISONERS. 208. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS fail to provide constitutionally
adequate mental health care in a number of ways. Their mental health care delivery system is
66

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 67 of 140
severely understaffed, and lacks adequate personnel with sufficient expertise to properly treat the individuals within its care. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS fail to identify, treat and medicate individuals with mental illness. Additionally, these systematic failures rise to the level of causing significant injuries and the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Each of these deficiencies, in isolation and in conjunction, result in a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
209. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS recognize that they must “[p]rovide clinically effective mental health services.” ALA. ADMIN. CODE. r. 600 (2005). The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that provision of mental health care includes providing “various levels of care to include a full range of psychiatric and psychological treatments, procedures, programs, institutional staffing and management.” Id. r. 700 (2010). Pursuant to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ regulations, outpatient mental health assistance, counseling and programs must be offered to all ADOC prisoners. Id. r. 623 (2007). The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that they must “provide crisis intervention for prisoners exhibiting signs of psychological distress” and that the crisis intervention requires the involvement of a psychiatrist. Id. r. 627 (2007). They are further aware that prisoners who are receiving treatment for serious mental illness must be promptly evaluated when placed in segregation. Id. r. 625 (2004).
210. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have long been aware that the staffing of mental health professionals is inadequate. While the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have chosen to contract with an outside entity to provide these services, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware of the exact staffing at each facility and the extent of medical services provided. The ADOC mental health provider regularly fails to adequately diagnose and treat the most seriously mentally ill prisoners. Further, ADOC’s
67

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 68 of 140
policies at even its most intensive mental health treatment facility fail to protect those prisoners most in need of mental health treatment.
211. ADOC routinely has failed to ensure adequate staffing, both as to gross numbers of mental health professionals, and as to quality and experience, of key mental health professionals.
212. According to the April 2014 monthly Mental Health Report to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH, a total of 24,951 individuals were housed in ADOC facilities, of whom 3,059 were receiving some form of mental health treatment (having a classification of MH-1 or greater). A total of 2,209 prisoners were prescribed psychiatric medications. This population was distributed throughout each of the facilities run by ADOC. At Tutwiler, nearly half the prisoners have a mental health code of MH-1 or greater.
213. The mental health staffing at ADOC facilities is grossly inadequate. There are just 6.2 psychiatrists for the entire prison system. This means that the psychiatrists have an average caseload of 493 mentally ill patients.
214. At many facilities, a psychiatrist position is not even staffed. 215. As of April 2014, more than 16,000 prisoners were housed in facilities that have no assigned psychiatrist. Considering only those individuals on the mental health caseload, 1,474 prisoners resided in a facility with no psychiatric staffing. 216. As of April 2014, Easterling had 194 people on the mental health caseload. Of the 194, 120 prisoners are on psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication orders. Easterling had no psychiatrist. 217. As of April 2014, Fountain had 106 people on the mental health caseload. Of the 106, 64 are on psychiatric medications. Fountain had no psychiatrist.
68

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 69 of 140
218. As of April 2014, Holman had 115 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 75 were on psychiatric medications, including one person on an involuntary medication order. Holman had no psychiatrist.
219. As of April 2014, Limestone had 257 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 190 were on psychiatric medications. Limestone had no psychiatrist.
220. As of April 2014, Montgomery Women’s Facility had 88 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 60 were on psychiatric medications. Montgomery Women’s Facility had no psychiatrist.
221. As of April 2014, St. Clair had 98 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 58 were on psychiatric medications, including six people on involuntary medication orders. St. Clair had no psychiatrist.
222. As of April 2014, Staton had 303 people on the mental health caseload. There were another 23 people not on the mental health caseload despite having DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses. A total of 175 people were on psychiatric medications, including three people on involuntary medication orders. Staton had no regularly staffed psychiatrist.
223. As of April 2014, Ventress had 200 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 139 were on psychiatric medications, including two people on involuntary medication orders. Ventress had no psychiatrist.
224. As of April 2014, there was only one work release center that had any psychiatric coverage at all. Altogether, the other work release centers housed 113 people on the mental health caseload, of whom 75 were on psychiatric medications.
225. At other facilities, the level of psychiatric staffing was so low as to be clearly insufficient. As of April 2014, Bibb had 161 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 116
69

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 70 of 140
people were on psychiatric medications, including one person on an involuntary medication order. Bibb had less than a quarter-time psychiatrist.
226. As of April 2014, Hamilton A & I had 79 people on the mental health caseload, as well as seven people not on the mental health caseload despite having DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses. A total of 73 people were on psychiatric medications. Hamilton A & I had six hours per week of psychiatrist coverage.
227. The facilities that are designated to house the most seriously mentally ill prisoners in ADOC custody also have very little psychiatric coverage.
228. Bullock maintains a Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”), a unit designated for inpatient treatment of mentally ill prisoners. Bullock also maintains an Intensive Stabilization Unit (“SU”) for the most acutely mentally ill people in ADOC custody. As of April 2014, there were 161 people housed in the RTU. Of these, 148 were prescribed psychiatric medications, including 24 on involuntary medication orders. There were 11 people housed in the SU. Of these, eight were prescribed psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication orders. There were an additional 284 people on the mental health caseload in the general population, of whom 201 were prescribed psychiatric medications, including five on involuntary medication orders. Bullock had one full-time and one half-time psychiatrist.
229. Donaldson maintains two RTUs. As of April 2014, Donaldson had 71 prisoners housed in the RTUs. In the RTUs, 60 people were prescribed psychiatric medications, including 16 on involuntary medication orders. There were an additional 142 people on the mental health caseload in the general population, of whom 73 were prescribed psychiatric medications, including 3 on involuntary medication orders. Donaldson had a three-quarters time psychiatrist.
70

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 71 of 140
230. Tutwiler also maintains an RTU and an SU. As of April 2014, Tutwiler housed 17 people in the RTU and one person in the SU. All were on psychiatric medications. Tutwiler had an additional 425 people on the mental health caseload in general population. Of these, 366 were on psychiatric medications. Tutwiler had two half-time psychiatrists.
231. Many prisoners on psychiatric medications do not have periodic reviews by a psychiatrist.
232. Moreover, as of April 2014, there were only 5.55 psychologists for the entire system. When fully staffed, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS provide for a single ADOC psychologist at Tutwiler, Kilby and Donaldson. These ADOC psychologists play a mostly administrative role. The contract between ADOC and MHM provides for a part-time psychologist at Donaldson, Bullock, Limestone and Holman and a full-time psychologist at Tutwiler. The Tutwiler psychologist position was unfilled in April 2014. At all other facilities, no psychologist is available.
233. The only contact that a prisoner often has with any mental health professional is when they are acutely mentally ill and exhibiting suicidal ideations or actions.
234. When ADOC issued its request for proposals for a mental health services contract in 2013, it identified the minimum staffing need from the provider to be 144.95 full-time equivalent employees. Under the current contract, MHM Correctional Services (“MHM”) is not providing even this inadequate number of mental health staff. The staffing provided under the new MHM contract is just 126.5 full-time equivalent employees.
235. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS require MHM to provide reports of their staffing and provision of care every month. In the month of April 2014, these reports showed that MHM had fewer than 120 full-time equivalent employees providing mental health
71

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 72 of 140
related services. Of 2,738 prisoners on the outpatient mental health caseload, just 258 were scheduled to participate in any mental health group during the month.
A. DEFENDANTS Fail to Identify Mentally Ill Prisoners and Understate the Acuity of Mental Illness Even in Those Identified. 236. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of under-
identifying mentally ill prisoners and understating the acuity of prisoners’ mental illness. As a result, mentally ill prisoners go untreated and severely mentally ill prisoners receive a far lower level of treatment than they need.
237. Just 12.3 percent of the ADOC population is identified as having a mental health code of MH-1 or greater. This almost certainly indicates that Alabama is not identifying prisoners with mental health disorders. In a 2006 study of prison and jail prisoners throughout the country, the Department of Justice concluded that on average, about half of prisoners in state correctional facilities meet the DSM-IV criteria for a mental illness.
238. Further, many prisoners who are clearly suffering from a mental health disorder or psychological distress go untreated. For example, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was been placed in suicide watch three times from December 2013 through March 2014. On one occasion, he was on suicide watch for approximately 10 days. He has previously been treated for depression. He asked for mental health treatment several times since December 2013. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel informed DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH of PLAINTIFF PRUITT’s urgent need for mental health care on May 16, 2014. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has not been given any treatment or placed on the mental health caseload.
239. Similarly, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS engaged in self-harm repeatedly in March 2014. On one occasion, she continued to cut herself with a razor blade she found in the suicide
72

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 73 of 140
watch cell. After her third act of self-harm in a day, she was threatened with forcible medication. Yet, two weeks later, she asked to be placed on the mental health caseload, and was refused.
240. Another prisoner, PLAINTIFF DUNN repeatedly asked for mental health treatment while he was in segregation. He cut himself with a razor on five occasions. Prior to each incident, he requested mental health treatment. His requests were denied. PLAINTIFF DUNN had very limited contacts while he was on suicide watch. He has never been placed on the mental health caseload and received no follow-up care after being released from suicide watch.
241. Other prisoners are taken off the mental health caseload without explanation. PLAINTIFF HARDY, who has a history of serious mental illness since childhood, was taken off the mental health caseload without explanation.
242. Similarly, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder. He was taken off all medications. He was told that mental health staff believed he was “faking it.”
243. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is obviously severely mentally ill, but not being treated by mental health staff. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON has also not been sent to a neuropsychologist to determine what, if any, treatment is appropriate to address his possible brain injury.
244. Further, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH informed PLAINTIFFS’ counsel that they are aware of 30 prisoners who have diagnosed DSMIV Axis I clinical disorders who are not on the mental health caseload. Of the 30, 23 are housed at the Elmore, Staton and Draper, complex, facilities that do not have a psychologist or psychiatrist on staff.
73

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 74 of 140
245. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS also dramatically understate the level of acuity of those who are mentally ill. According to ADOC mental health codes, MH-1 and MH-2 are used for prisoners with “mild impairment in mental functioning, such as depressed mood or insomnia,” MH-3 is for moderate impairments “such as difficulty in social situations and/or poor behavior control,” MH-4 is for severe impairments “such as suicidal ideation and/or poor reality testing,” MH-5 is used for severe impairments “such as delusions, hallucinations, or inability to function in most areas of daily living.” MH-6, the code for the most acutely mentally ill, is reserved for prisoners who have been committed to a mental hospital. As of April 2014, just 242 prisoners in ADOC custody – less than 1 percent – were classified at greater than MH-2. In contrast, the Department of Justice study cited above found that nationally some 43 percent of state prisoners met the DSM-IV criteria for mania and 15 percent met the criteria for psychotic disorders.
246. Numerous prisoners who clearly meet the criteria for MH-3 or above are classified as MH-1 or MH-2.
247. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is acutely mentally ill and has poor reality testing. He is housed at Bibb. He is given psychiatric medications against his will. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is classified as MH-1 or MH-2.
248. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is classified as MH-1. He continues to have hallucinations.
249. Similarly, PLAINTIFF TERRELL is classified as MH-2. He is housed in the Mental Health Unit at Bullock and has hallucinations.
250. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has been in and out of mental hospitals since he was a child. He has difficulty carrying on a coherent conversation. He does not know what his
74

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 75 of 140
diagnosis is or what his mental health code is, but he is housed at St. Clair, where the highest mental health code is MH-3.
251. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ own documents reflect the understatement of acuity of mental illness. According to an April 2014 report to DEFENDANTS DUNN’s predecessor and NAGLICH, only 230 people in ADOC custody were categorized as MH-3, and just 12 people were classified at higher mental health codes. Yet 753 people were receiving antipsychotic medications. Similarly, a March 2013 report to DEFENDANTS DUNN’s predecessor and NAGLICH from MHM showed that 242 people were categorized as MH-3 or higher, but 853 people had psychotic disorders. Per the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ description of mental health classifications, persons with psychotic disorders would appropriately be classified as MH-4 or MH-5.
B. DEFENDANTS Deny Mentally Ill Prisoners Access to Necessary Psychotropic Medications and Medication Management. 252. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are routinely and systematically
failing to prescribe, provide and manage necessary psychiatric medications. 253. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have designated a total of 3,059
prisoners as having a code of MH-1 or greater. Only 2,209, or 8.9 percent of the ADOC population actually receive psychotropic medication. The average monthly expenditure for psychiatric medications for prisoners in the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ custody decreased by 30 percent from March 2010 through February 2013, despite the relative stability in prison population. As of April 2014, for those prisoners receiving psychiatric medication, an average of just $1.33 per day is spent per patient for the totality of the psychiatric medication prescribed.
75

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 76 of 140
254. Further, as discussed above, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS provide no psychiatric coverage at all in the majority of facilities. In those facilities where they do, said coverage is minimal. Prisoners on mental health medications have very little interaction with the prescribing professional. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is severely mentally ill and is on several psychiatric medications, yet he is housed at a facility that has no coverage by a psychiatrist.
255. PLAINTIFF TERRELL, who is also housed in the Bullock RTU, is currently taking either Prolixin or Haldol and continues to have visual and auditory hallucinations. He sees a psychiatrist for about five minutes about one time per month.
256. Many prisoners do not know the name of the medications they take and or their potential side effects. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is given a shot every month, and has a prescription for three other medications. He knows the name of some but not all of these medications and does not know their potential side effects.
257. PLAINTIFF MCCOY receives a shot once a week by medical staff and sometimes receives additional shots against his will throughout the week. He knows he has taken Prolixin in the past, but does not know the name or purpose of the medication in the weekly shots or the other shots he receives currently. He knows that they sometimes make him nauseous and make his arm hurt, but otherwise does not know the potential side effects.
258. PLAINTIFF TERRELL does not know what medication he is taking. He thinks it is either Prolixin or Haldol. PLAINTIFF TERRELL does not recall receiving individualized information about the medications he is taking or giving informed consent. He took a class years ago called “Know Your Medications” during which various psychiatric medications were discussed. He understood very little of the class.
76

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 77 of 140
259. PLAINTIFF DILLARD takes two antipsychotic medications (Haldol and Risperdal), a medication for the side effects (Cogentin), and a medication that he does not know the name of nor the reason he takes it. He had a “Know Your Medication” class in or around 2010, and another when he moved from the Mental Health Unit to the mental health dormitory in or around January 2014. He does not recall receiving individualized information when being prescribed his medications or giving informed consent.
260. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS takes three medications for mental health and does not know the names of the medications or their potential side effects.
261. Some prisoners take medications for years, and are then taken off the medications, and often the mental health caseload, despite still needing treatment. These include prisoners who continue to exhibit suicidal thoughts and actions. Despite continued self-injurious actions these prisoners who have been improperly removed from the caseload and been denied needed medication are not even returned to the caseload and their medications reinstated after numerous suicide attempts. For example, PLAINTIFF CARTER, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, ADHD, and intermittent explosive disorder, was prescribed Prolixin and Haldol for years. His mental illness is sufficiently severe that he has been placed at the residential Mental Health Unit at Bullock and Kilby on more than five occasions throughout the period of his incarceration, and from 2011 until 2012 he had a forced medication order. In October 2013, all medications were abruptly discontinued.
262. PLAINTIFF HARDY has a history of serious mental illness since childhood and has attempted suicide several times while in ADOC custody. He was previously prescribed Wellbutrin, Trazadone and Prolixin. He was taken off his medications without explanation in
77

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 78 of 140
2012. He has made approximately six attempts on his own life since being taken off his medications.
263. PLAINTIFF JACKSON was taking Haldol, a first generation antipsychotic that is well known for causing people to shake. To his knowledge, he was not given a medication for the side effects, and the Haldol made him shake. In early 2014, PLAINTIFF JACKSON asked to be taken off the medication because of the side effects. He was offered neither the medication for side effects, nor an antipsychotic medication that was less likely to cause him to shake. He has been without psychiatric medications since. He tried to commit suicide by setting fire to his cell in the fall of 2013.
264. PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF, who has long been treated for depression, was taken off Prozac and Trazadone. He has asked to have medications for his depression since, but has been refused.
265. PLAINTIFF WALLACE was taking several psychiatric medications, including lithium. In 2012, the lithium was discontinued without explanation.
266. Other prisoners simply do not receive medication for their mental health needs. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has trouble sleeping. He sleeps between four and five hours a night. Also, as stated above, there are 30 people DEFENDANT ADOC has identified as not being on the mental health caseload who have Axis I diagnoses.
267. There is little regard for side effects of psychiatric medications. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that one of the potentially life-threatening side effects of many psychiatric medications is that they make patients more sensitive to heat and more vulnerable to heat-related illnesses, such as heat stroke. Yet, prisoners on psychotropic medications that increase heat sensitivity are exposed to levels of heat that pose potentially lethal
78

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 79 of 140
risks. Other than the RTUs and SUs, the ADOC facilities which routinely house prisoners taking psychotropic medications are not air conditioned and the ambient air temperatures in the facilities during the summer frequently exceed 85 degrees.
268. PLAINTIFF DILLARD takes Haldol, Risperdol and Cogentin, all medications that increase sensitivity to heat. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is in a mental health dormitory, but not the RTU, at Bullock. There are many other people in the dormitory who are on psychiatric medications, including Haldol, as well. There is no air conditioning in the dormitory in which PLAINTIFF DILLARD is currently housed, and the dormitory becomes very hot. Average daytime highs in the summer months in Union Springs, AL where Bullock is located, are in the high 80s and low 90s.
269. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is taking either Prolixin or Haldol, both of which increase sensitivity to heat. Although he is in the RTU at Bullock, his dormitory currently does not have air conditioning. PLAINTIFF TERRELL, who likely has an undiagnosed learning or developmental disorder and has difficulty reading and understanding written material, was asked to sign a paper promising to inform the correctional officers if he is getting too hot.
270. Other side effects are also inadequately addressed. For example, PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s right hand and wrist shake. This is a recognized side effect of first-generation antipsychotics, including Haldol and Prolixin. He told the doctor about the shaking, and the doctor increased the Benadryl to three pills per night. This has not controlled the shaking but has increased PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s sleepiness. PLAINTIFF TERRELL sometimes sleeps for a day and a half straight. Sleepiness is a side effect both of Haldol and Prolixin, and of Benadryl.
271. In or about 2005, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was diagnosed with depression. He was prescribed Haldol, an antipsychotic used to treat schizophrenia and known to carry a risk of a
79

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 80 of 140
variety of side effects. He was given no medications to address the side effects and developed what he describes as “lockjaw” after about a year. He then asked to be taken off Haldol. Muscle movements in the jaw and muscular rigidity are known and serious side effects of Haldol. The lockjaw lasted on and off for about a year after he stopped taking Haldol. He has not been provided with any mental health care since requesting to be taken off Haldol due to the side effects, although he continues to have suicidal ideations.
272. Similarly, PLAINTIFF JACKSON was given no medications for the shakiness caused by taking Haldol. When he complained of it, he was offered neither side effect medication nor a different psychiatric medication that carries a lower risk of this particular side effect.
273. PLAINTIFF BUI takes Haldol. It causes him to shake. He does not, to his knowledge, receive any medications to combat this well-known side effect of Haldol and has not been offered an alternative medication to Haldol that would not cause him to shake.
C. DEFENDANTS Fail to Provide Mentally Ill Patients with Adequate Care. 274. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
providing almost no mental health treatment other than medication to mentally ill prisoners. 275. In April 2014, there were six individuals at St. Clair who have involuntary
medication orders. Individuals cannot be given involuntary medication orders unless they have a serious mental illness and are dangerous to themselves or others. St. Clair has neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist, and there were no psychiatrist or psychologist contacts at St. Clair during the entire month. The same is true for Ventress where there were two individuals with involuntary medication orders.
80

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 81 of 140
276. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS maintain a total of 375 beds in RTUs. According to an April 2014 MHM report provided to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, there were 249 individuals in the RTUs. Despite having 249 patients sufficiently ill to warrant inpatient mental health care, there were just 160 individual contacts by psychiatrists with the patients in the RTUs over the course of the month, 29 individual contacts with a psychologist and 96 contacts with a nurse practitioner. According to another MHM report provided to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, in March 2013, there was one individual in an RTU at Limestone who was in the RTU for the entire month and he was classified as MH-3. MHM reported that, over the course of the month, this individual met with a psychologist two times and a nurse practitioner one time, and had no other mental health contacts.
277. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS also maintain specialized units for the most acutely mentally ill within its control at Bullock and Tutwiler, labeled as the “Intensive Stabilization Units” (SU) with a total capacity of 38. The April 2014 report to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS indicates that as of the end of the month, there were 11 men in the SU at Bullock and one woman in the Tutwiler SU. All were classified as MH-5, the highest level mental health designation before DEFENDANTS are required to transfer individuals to a mental health facility. The woman in the SU at Tutwiler was placed on “precautionary watch” in a safe cell for 15 days. The totality of her contacts with mental health during the month of April was two contacts with the psychiatrist and five with a mental health professional.
278. The contacts with mental health staff are often perfunctory. For example, while he was in the Bullock RTU, PLAINTIFF DILLARD had appointments with a counselor at varying frequencies that lasted roughly 10 minutes. He estimates that he has met with his
81

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 82 of 140
Treatment Team approximately two times in the nine years he has been incarcerated. He is now in the mental health dormitory at Bullock, where he sees a counselor one or two times a month for five to 10 minutes. He continues to hear voices, and feels he would be helped if he had the chance to talk through his problems more thoroughly. Other than the five to 10 minute counseling sessions and medication, PLAINTIFF DILLARD receives no additional mental health treatment or programming. The last time he had mental health programming other than the “Know your Medication” class was in or around September 2013. To his knowledge there are no mental health groups or programs for prisoners in the mental health dormitory at Bullock.
279. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is housed in the Bullock RTU. This is the unit for the most acutely mentally ill prisoners in ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. PLAINTIFF TERRELL experiences auditory and visual hallucinations. He has great difficulty placing events in relation to each other in time. He sleeps most of the time, sometimes for a day and a half at a time. In addition to taking medication, he sees a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks and a psychiatrist for about five minutes once a month. He receives no other mental health treatment. He has not been permitted to participate in any programming for several years.
280. PLAINTIFF WALLACE is in the RTU at Donaldson. He spent approximately nine months at the Bullock RTU. He has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bi-polar, ADHD, and Intermittent Explosive Disorder. He has auditory hallucinations. He does not receive any mental health treatment other than his medications.
281. PLAINTIFF MCCOY appears to be acutely mentally ill. PLAINTIFF MCCOY struggles to express coherent thoughts and communicate his needs. He suffers from delusions.
82

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 83 of 140
He is medicated against his will. He does not know his diagnosis. His only counseling is with an unlicensed mental health professional.
282. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE was housed in the Bullock RTU from the time the facility opened until an unknown point in time after this lawsuit was commenced, at which point PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE was moved to Bibb. Prior to 2006, he was housed in the Mental Health Unit within the main building at Bullock. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He is given an injection of Prolixin every two weeks and takes Cogentin for the side effects. He meets with a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks. He sees a psychiatrist approximately one time per month for about five minutes. The meetings with the counselor and the psychiatrist amount to, in PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE’s words, “hi and goodbye” and a question about how his medications are working. He receives no other mental health treatment.
283. Part of PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE’s mental illness is that he gets angry and has difficulty controlling his anger. When he feels this coming on, he puts in a request to see a counselor. He routinely has to wait several days before seeing a counselor after putting in a request, on one occasion waiting 13 days. When he does see the counselor, the counselor just refers him to the psychiatrist for a reassessment of his medications. It then sometimes takes weeks to see the psychiatrist. During the period of waiting, PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has to struggle to control the anger that a symptom of his mental illness and is highly dangerous in the prison setting.
284. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is housed at St. Clair. He was in and out of mental hospitals in the years before he was incarcerated at the age of 22. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY’s thoughts are disjointed and he has difficulty carrying on a coherent conversation. When
83

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 84 of 140
PLAINTIFF HARTLEY was housed at Holman from 2001 through 2003, he began to engage in self-harm, cutting his forearms with razor blades. He has continued to cut himself since, sometimes cutting himself on the leg. The most recent occurrences began in early 2014. St. Clair staff acknowledge that PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is mentally ill. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is not receiving any mental health care of which he is aware. From about 2002 to about 2004, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY participated in mental health programming, but has received no counseling, classes or programs to help him cope with his illness since that time. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY feels like he should be in a mental hospital.
285. PLAINTIFF BUI has been medicated against his will for years with regular shots of Haldol. He does not know what his diagnosis is and does not know why he is on the mental health caseload. He speaks little English. He does not want to be on medication, and he is not permitted to cease taking medication in order to determine whether he needs to be medicated. He has never had counseling or treatment with anyone who speaks Vietnamese or with the assistance of a translator.
286. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and is currently taking three psychiatric medications, the names of which he does not know. He sees a mental health professional via a television screen once every two to three months for 15 to 20 minutes. He does not know whether the person he sees is a psychiatrist. He has no other contacts with mental health staff.
287. If prisoners are not prescribed mental health medications, they are often denied access to mental health staff, even when going through a mental health crisis. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has received no mental health treatment since he asked to be taken off Haldol in or around 2006, after he developed a locked jaw. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was in segregation from
84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 85 of 140
July 2013 through March 2014, and was later returned to segregation where he is now housed. From December 2013 through June 2014, he went onto suicide watch four times. He repeatedly requested referral to mental health, but has not been referred to mental health. On May 16, 2014, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel requested that PLAINTIFF PRUITT be seen by mental health. PLAINTIFF PRUITT still had not been seen by any mental health staff.
288. PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed into segregation in or around June 2013. In or around September 2013, PLAINTIFF DUNN felt compelled to harm himself. While still resisting this compulsion, he asked to see mental health staff, but was denied. He cut his forearm with a razor that was provided to him for shaving. He had very limited contacts with mental health staff while on suicide watch. He was returned to segregation after three days, and then received no follow-up. This process was repeated four more times during his nine-month stay in segregation, each time preceded by his request to see mental health. He was never referred to mental health for follow-up care.
289. Near the end of March 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS asked to see mental health. She was told that she had to ask Ms. Nichols, the ADOC psychological associate at Fountain. She spoke with Ms. Nichols and asked to be placed on the mental health caseload and expressed that she thought she needed psychiatric medication. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has in the past been on the mental health caseload and has been prescribed psychiatric medications. She repeatedly cut herself earlier in the month and had been threatened with forced medication. Ms. Nichols told her that she did not need medication and did not need to be on the mental health caseload.
290. In or around 2010, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF had a mental health code of MH-3. He was taking Prozac and Trazadone. He saw a psychiatrist occasionally, and he saw a nurse
85

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 86 of 140
practitioner. After about a year, his mental health code was reduced to MH-1 and he was taken off all medications. He currently takes no medication. He has asked for mental health treatment, but been denied. Without his medication and treatment, he has difficulty controlling his impulses and anger.
291. PLAINTIFF HARDY has a lengthy history of mental health issues and placements since he was a child. He suffers from auditory hallucinations that cause him to hurt himself. The court that sentenced him acknowledged his history and ordered that he be provided with mental health treatment while in ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF HARDY has been on the mental health caseload much of the time he has been in ADOC custody. In 2004, his medication was discontinued. He subsequently attempted suicide by cutting his wrist with a razor. He then brought a razor with him into suicide watch, where he cut himself further. He was placed back on the mental health caseload and was prescribed Wellbutrin, Trazadone and Prolixin. He was again taken off the mental health caseload and his medication discontinued in 2009, and he again attempted suicide using a razor blade, and again bringing the razor into suicide watch where he continued to cut himself. He has received no mental health care since. He has attempted suicide several times since being taken off his medications.
292. PLAINTIFF JACKSON has received no mental health medications since his medications were discontinued in 2014.
293. PLAINTIFF CARTER also has a long history of mental health problems and has attempted suicide many times in DEFENDANTS’s custody. He was not receiving any form of mental health medication as the time of the filing of the suit.
294. Mental health care provided on suicide watch is minimal. When PLAINTIFF PRUITT was assaulted by other prisoners with flaming cloth in December 2013, he had been on
86

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 87 of 140
suicide watch for over a week. He had received no mental health counseling. Each day, a member of mental health staff would come to the front of the cell and ask if he was still suicidal. They spent less than five minutes each day with the individuals on suicide watch. On December 16, 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT told the mental health staff person that he was no longer suicidal, not because of any improvement in his mental state, but because he wanted out of the cell where he had been assaulted.
295. Each time PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed in suicide watch, he was seen by mental health staff only to determine whether he was still suicidal.
D. DEFENDANTS Place the Mentally Ill in Segregation Without Regard for Their Mental Health. 296. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
placing mentally ill prisoners in segregation without regard for the harmful effects segregation has on the mentally ill. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that this is a dangerous practice that can cause harm to mentally ill prisoners. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a regulation requiring prompt evaluation and ongoing monitoring of the mental health status of mentally ill prisoners who are placed in segregation.
297. At St. Clair, Holman and Tutwiler, there are no general mental health checks in the segregation units.
298. In May 2012, PLAINTIFF HARDY who has a long history of serious mental illness, was taken off the mental health caseload and placed in segregation at St. Clair, where he has remained since.
299. PLAINTIFF JACKSON, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and has auditory hallucinations, has been on the administrative transfer program between the segregation units at St. Clair, Holman, and Donaldson for seven years.
87

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 88 of 140
300. PLAINTIFF CARTER, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and several other serious mental health disorders, has been in segregation continuously for last three years. He has been in either an RTU or segregation most of the time he has been in ADOC custody.
301. PLAINTIFF WALLACE has been in either a RTU or segregation since 2010. 302. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. He estimates that he has been placed in segregation four or five times. Each time, he suffers exacerbated symptoms, including increased auditory and visual hallucinations and increased nightmares. E. DEFENDANTS Fail to Adequately Protect Its Most Seriously Mentally Ill Who Exhibit Self-Injurious and Suicidal Actions.8 303. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not protecting mentally ill prisoners from self-inflicted injuries or suicide. 304. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS distribute razor blades throughout their facilities for prisoners to shave. They are distributed in the RTUs, mental health dormitories, segregation units and other housing units. The razors are not collected or accounted for in any way. 305. On January 21, 2011, a prisoner at Limestone committed suicide using a stateissued razor blade. The death and instrument used were both reported in an ADOC Incident Report. 306. Prisoners who have a recent history of using razors to injure themselves are still provided with razors. 307. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has a long history of self-harm with DUNN objects. She is nonetheless provided with razors for shaving, and the razors are left with her in her cell.
8 As noted in a previous footnote, the parties have preliminarily settled Defendants’ alleged failure to protect the mentally ill from self-harm with razor blades, subject to a monitoring phase to ensure the issue’s actual resolution.
88

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 89 of 140
On or about March 2, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was housed in segregation at Fountain. She cut herself with a razor. After PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS cut herself, she called out to a correctional officer, who took her to the medical unit. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS’s wound was dressed but not cleaned. She was placed in suicide watch until the following day. She was then asked by mental health staff if she was suicidal. Upon her negative response, she was returned to her segregation cell. The razor she had used to cut herself the previous day was still in her cell. She was not provided with any mental health counseling either while in suicide watch or while in segregation afterwards. She continued to be allowed to have razors in her cell.
308. On or about March 10, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS again cut herself with a razor blade in her cell, this time in front of a correctional officer. The correctional officer walked to the front of the segregation unit, got a pair of handcuffs, walked back to PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS’s cell, and told her to place her hands through the slot in the cell door. She complied, was handcuffed, and was taken to medical. Her new wound was cleaned, stitched up and dressed, and she was placed in suicide watch. In the suicide watch cell, she found a razor blade and again cut herself. She was taken to medical, the wound was cleaned and dressed and she was again returned to the suicide watch cell. The razor blade had not been removed, and she again cut herself, and was taken to medical. She told the correctional officers about the razor blade, but they said they believed she was cutting herself on the DUNN edges of the air vents in the suicide watch cell. Because the DUNN edges of the air vent in the suicide watch cell are rusty, she was given a tetanus shot. She was told she would be forcibly medicated if she cut herself again. She said she would not, and was returned to the suicide watch cell – the cell that the correctional officers acknowledged knowing had a DUNN, rusty air vent that could be used
89

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 90 of 140
to cut oneself. The following day, mental health staff asked if PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was still suicidal, and upon her negative response, she was returned again to segregation.
309. PLAINTIFF HARDY has attempted suicide numerous times, always using a razor. On two occasions, at two different facilities, Fountain and Donaldson, PLAINTIFF HARDY attempted suicide using a razor and then was able to bring his razor into the suicide watch cell, where he again attempted to commit suicide. PLAINTIFF HARDY continues to be provided with razors. PLAINTIFF HARDY has no contact with mental health staff other than, when he is in suicide watch and mental health personnel come by to ask if he is still suicidal.
310. PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed in segregation at St. Clair in or around June 2013. In September, he began to feel compelled to harm himself. He requested mental health care, but was denied. Nonetheless, he was provided with a razor blade for shaving. He used the razor to cut his forearm. PLAINTIFF DUNN was then taken to suicide watch. He had limited contacts with mental health staff, primarily asking if he was still suicidal. On the third day, PLAINTIFF DUNN stated that he was not and he was returned to segregation. The razor blade he had used to cut himself was still in his cell. There was no follow up from any mental health staff. There were also no general rounds by mental health staff in the segregation unit. PLAINTIFF DUNN remained in segregation until early April 2014. The same scenario of PLAINTIFF DUNN asking for mental health care, being denied, cutting himself, going to suicide watch, receiving no care on suicide watch other than a check as to whether he remained suicidal, and then a return to the cell, where the razor remained, played out four more times during the months he was in segregation. A lieutenant said to him after one act of self-harm, “you keep sitting there cutting yourself. If you die, you die.” On one occasion, his blood was still in his cell when he returned from suicide watch.
90

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 91 of 140
311. PLAINTIFF PRUITT engaged in self-harm on June 12, 2014. He had been in suicide watch multiple times over the last six months, but had been provided with a razor. He was in segregation and he cut both his wrists with the razor. He was eventually taken to medical and then a suicide watch cell.
312. At Holman, all inmates, including those in segregation or on suicide watch, are given razors each time they shower. Corrections officers do not collect the razors after the showers. III. DEFENDANTS ROUTINELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY INVOLUNTARILY
MEDICATE MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. 313. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will without providing due process to determine whether the individuals can be forced to take medication.
314. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy setting forth a proceeding to determine whether a person can be medicated against his or her will. Prisoners cannot be medicated against their will unless they are determined to be seriously mentally ill and a danger to himself or herself or others. The widespread and pervasive practice is that many prisoners in ADOC custody are denied due process in this deprivation of their right to bodily integrity.
315. Numerous mental health patients that the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not identified as being seriously mentally ill are being medicated against their will. In April 2014, there were 23 prisoners on the outpatient mental health caseload with involuntary medication orders. All but one of them were classified as MH-1 and MH-2, both defined as having a “mild impairment in mental functioning, such as depressed mood or insomnia.” One person on the outpatient mental health caseload who may have an involuntary
91

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 92 of 140
medication order is classified as MH-3, which is defined as a moderate impairment, “such as difficulty in social situations and/or poor behavior control.”
316. Further, numerous prisoners have been forcibly medicated under circumstances that do not comport with the requirements of due process or the stated policy of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS.
317. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY occasionally refuses his medications. When he does, he is placed in what he describes as a “padded cell” in the medical unit. Usually he spends three to five days in the cell, though sometimes it is longer. The longest he has spent in the padded cell is seven months. When he is confined in the padded cell, mental health personnel come to check on him two or three times a week for 15 to 30 minutes. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is unaware of having gone through a process to determine whether he can be medicated against his will.
318. In or around 2009, PLAINTIFF BUI was asked, as he understood it, to volunteer to take a medication. This medication was Haldol. At that time, PLAINTIFF BUI agreed to take the medication. In or around the fall of 2012, PLAINTIFF BUI informed mental health staff that he no longer wanted to take the medication. He requested to be taken off the medication because it made him shake and he did not want to be medicated. He was told that he would be placed in segregation if he refused to take the medication. PLAINTIFF BUI has asked several times to be taken off Haldol and has been refused, often with the threat of segregation. PLAINTIFF BUI’s English is limited and he has little understanding of the hearings in which staff approve involuntary medication orders. Contrary to ADOC regulations, PLAINTIFF BUI is not permitted to discontinue taking medication for the determination of whether he needs to be involuntarily medicated. The evidence presented at his hearings regarding his need for medication is that, medicated, he is doing well, and prior to being medicated he was not. Based
92

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 93 of 140
on this reasoning, as long as PLAINTIFF BUI does well, he will not be allowed to cease taking involuntary medication.
319. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has refused his medication. His medications make him very tired. Since he arrived at Bullock and was started on Haldol and then Prolixin, he has been shaky. This is a known side effect of both medicines. In or around 2010, PLAINTIFF DILLARD refused to take Prolixin because it was making him shaky. An officer slapped him and wrestled him to the ground. The officers took him to the shift office and told him that they were going to put him in segregation for refusing his medication. He was able to explain to them that he needed to see the psychiatrist because he was suffering from side effects from the medication. The officers agreed to tell the psychiatrist to see him and not to put him in segregation if he took his medicine. PLAINTIFF DILLARD agreed, but it took 30 days for him to be taken to see the psychiatrist.
320. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has refused his medication on a number of occasions. On at least one occasion he has been placed in segregation for refusing his medications. On all other occasions, he has been told by correctional officers that he will be forcibly held down and given his medication. He has never had a hearing to determine whether he should be permitted to refuse his medication.
321. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has witnessed other prisoners refuse to take their medications. Sometimes they are forcibly held down and given their medication, sometimes the threat of this is enough to cause them to accept the medication, and sometimes they are taken to segregation until they start taking the medication.
322. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has sometimes refused his medications. He has never, to his knowledge, been given a hearing to determine whether he can be involuntarily medicated.
93

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 94 of 140
When he refuses the officers and nurses get angry with him. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF TERRELL was written up because he refused his medication. He had his privileges revoked for 30 days. He often sees other prisoners taken to segregation for refusing their medications. He sees one officer routinely threaten to beat people if they refuse their medications.
323. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has repeatedly refused to take his medications. When he refuses, he is threatened with being placed in segregation. There have been many occasions when he has been held down by correctional officers and given a shot. After the scheduled and unscheduled shots, PLAINTIFF MCCOY suffers stomach aches, feels nauseous, and has pain in his arm from the shot. To his knowledge, PLAINTIFF MCCOY has never had a hearing to determine whether he can be medicated against his will. IV. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO REASONABLY ACCOMMODATE PRISONERS WITH
DISABILITIES. 324. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities in
numerous ways, including, but not limited to, failing to remove architectural barriers, failing to provide reasonable modifications in policies and procedures, failing to provide auxiliary aids and services necessary for effective communication, improperly segregating prisoners with disabilities, engaging in contractual arrangements that limit access to appropriate health care for prisoners with disabilities. Further, the constitutional violations alleged with regard to the provision of mental health care, including both the denial of care and involuntary medication without due process, also violate the ADA. DEFENDANT ADOC receives federal funding.
A. DEFENDANT ADOC Has Failed to Remove Architectural Barriers. 325. DEFENDANT ADOC has not removed architectural barriers that can be done
with relative ease and at limited expense. Moreover, DEFENDANT ADOC does not operate each service, program, or activity in a way that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in
94

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 95 of 140
its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by prisoners with disabilities. To the contrary, DEFENDANT ADOC consistently houses prisoners with mobility impairments in facilities that are not accessible.
326. With the exception of Hamilton A & I, every facility operated by ADOC contains architectural barriers for prisoners with mobility impairments.
327. Bathrooms throughout the ADOC system are not accessible. Toilets at some facilities are on raised platforms. Some dormitories have only showers with controls at the very top of the shower head. Many bathroom areas have a low wall to go into the shower area. Also, access to the outside in many facilities involves going down stairs. While ADOC need not make sure that all its facilities are accessible to persons with mobility impairments, it cannot house those with mobility impairments in locations that are not accessible to them. Wardens indicated, during monitoring visits conducted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, that individuals were not housed in dormitories that were not accessible. However, these assertions were repeatedly belied by the presence of prisoners with disabilities in such dormitories and confirmation that they did indeed live there.
328. PLAINTIFF SEARS suffers from scoliosis. He uses a back brace and a cane. Walking is difficult and painful for him, as is standing for long periods. PLAINTIFF SEARS was housed in Hamilton A & I from April 2012 until January 2013. He was then moved to Limestone, where he stayed until May 2013, and then Ventress. Initially, he was housed in Dormitory C at Ventress. The dormitories in Ventress do not have grab bars in the showers, and Dormitory C does not have a shower chair to accommodate people with disabilities. PLAINTIFF SEARS fell in the shower a few weeks after his arrival, and injured his hip. PLAINTIFF SEARS obtained a profile to shower in the infirmary, where there is a shower chair,
95

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 96 of 140
though no grab bars, in the shower. The infirmary is relatively close to Dormitory C. However, in or about July 2013, PLAINTIFF SEARS was transferred to G Dorm, which is at the opposite corner of the prison from the infirmary. He was generally not permitted to go to the infirmary to shower until very late at night, often after midnight. Walking from G Dorm to the infirmary and back was slow and painful, and, during the winter months, very cold.
329. PLAINTIFF SEARS grieved about being housed so far away from the shower he could use. He was not provided any relief from the requirement that he trek all the way across the facility in the middle of the night to shower until after PLAINTIFFS’ counsel requested that PLAINTIFF SEARS be more appropriately accommodated. He was then moved to Dormitory A, which is close to the infirmary. However, Dormitory A is an honor dormitory in which prisoners are not permitted to rest during the day, and, due to PLAINTIFF SEARS’ physical disabilities, he needs to be able to rest. He was then moved to Dormitory B, and then Dormitory C. He still is housed in a unit that lacks the necessary accommodations for him.
330. At Easterling, the shower in the infirmary has 3-4 inch wall over which a person must step to enter the shower. Prisoners who use wheelchairs have been housed in the infirmary.
331. At Staton, prisoners with mobility impairments must make their way to the infirmary in order to bathe using the “accessible” shower. The shower in the infirmary consists of a small stainless steel cubicle with a plastic lawn chair in the middle and a hose that can be used for bathing. To make matters worse, a prisoner must step up about eight inches to enter the shower. It is extremely difficult, if not physically impossible, for a prisoner who cannot walk
96

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 97 of 140
and/or has limited mobility to enter and use this shower independently.
(Step into Staton infirmary shower) Prisoner Bobby Copeland was housed in the infirmary because he was in a wheelchair. He was unable to safely access the infirmary shower without help from another prisoner. He fell numerous times when getting into the shower.
332. At Kilby, the infirmary bathroom has a purportedly accessible toilet at the end of a narrow area with toilets on one side and urinals on the other. Prisoners in wheelchairs must navigate between the toilets and urinals to reach the accessible toilet, and there is inadequate space to do so. The shower has an unstable chair, and several prisoners have reported falling while trying to get in and out of the shower chair. The ramp to the yard is too steep, resulting in prisoners in wheelchairs being unable to control themselves going down and unable to mount the ramp to return to the infirmary from the yard. There are frequently prisoners who use wheelchairs who stay in the infirmary.
333. The Kilby infirmary also has several individual cells. The toilet and sink in the infirmary cells are a single unit with the sink directly above the toilet. The toilet and sink are also located in the corner of the cells. They are inaccessible to prisoners in wheelchairs. DEFENDANT ADOC has housed prisoners who are in wheelchairs in the cells in the infirmary. Also at Kilby, wheelchair users who do not need to be in the infirmary are concentrated in Dormitory A. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was housed in Dormitory A from around late 2012 until
97

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 98 of 140 May 2, 2014. There were, as of May 1, 2014, 10 wheelchair users in the dorm. There have been as many as 17 wheelchair users housed in Dormitory A at one time in the period PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has been housed there. There is just one purportedly accessible toilet in the dorm. Although the toilet has grab bars, it is not accessible because it is at the end of a narrow walkway with toilets on one side and sinks on the other, not leaving adequate room for maneuvering a wheelchair. Moreover, the purportedly accessible toilet was out of order for months at a time. The bunks in Dormitory A are so close together that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD cannot maneuver easily through the aisles between the bunks.
(Kilby Dormitory A bathroom, showing garbage can on top of accessible toilet) 334. At the Fountain chapel, the only bathroom for prisoners has a very narrow door that a person in a wheelchair would not be able to go through.
98

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 99 of 140
B. DEFENDANT ADOC Has Not Made Reasonable Modifications in Policies and Procedures. 335. DEFENDANT ADOC has not made reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
1. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities in the provision of medical care.
336. DEFENDANT ADOC has a policy that discriminates against prisoners with disabilities by requiring prisoners complete a written form to request medical care. Some prisoners with vision or intellectual disabilities cannot complete the necessary forms to receive medical care. There are no systems in place to enable prisoners who cannot read due to vision or intellectual disabilities to request medical care.
337. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR and MOORE cannot fill out sick call request forms without assistance from another prisoner or a correctional officer. This was also true for prisoner Bobby Copeland. There is no system in place for them to avoid having to share confidential medical information in this manner.
338. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is hearing impaired, but ADOC has not provided him with a hearing aid or any other meaningful accommodation. As a result, he often misses medical and dentist appointments because he cannot hear his name being called and no one informs him that his name has been called. While on medication for tuberculosis at Ventress, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON missed pill call so often that medical staff required him to remain on the medication for an extra month. When he missed appointments, the nurses at Ventress told him that it is his responsibility to be on time for appointments. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON also missed meal times because he cannot hear the signal to wake up on time. He has been verbally
99

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 100 of 140
reprimanded for continuing to walk around the facility during lock-down because he couldn’t hear correctional officers’ orders.
2. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities by failing to issue or honor profiles exempting prisoners from certain requirements of prison life.
339. DEFENDANT ADOC requires prisoners who need to be exempted from specific tasks or conditions to obtain a “profile.” For example, profiles can exempt prisoners from prolonged standing or walking, from shaving, or from doing certain types of work. They can also entitle the prisoner to certain benefits, such as diabetic meals or a lower bunk.
340. However, many prisoners with disabilities are not given profiles for accommodations that they need and that are reasonable. Further, even when prisoners have profiles, the profiles are not consistently followed by prison staff. PLAINTIFF SEARS has severe scoliosis. Prolonged standing and walking causes him pain. From his arrival at Ventress on May 9, 2013 until May 5, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS did not have a profile that exempted him from prolonged standing. PLAINTIFF SEARS routinely had to wait in line at pill call, sometimes for as long as three hours. On May 5, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was given a “no prolonged standing” profile. This has reduced the amount he is required to stand. However, there are several officers who have informed PLAINTIFF SEARS that they will not honor his profile and make him stand for long periods.
341. As discussed above, in June 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was informed that his health code had been changed from 4 to 1. Because he was a 1, he was told he would be required to work. PLAINTIFF SEARS asked if there were jobs he would be able to do sitting down, as he has a “no prolonged standing” profile. He was told there were not, and that if he did not begin to work, he would be subject to disciplinary action.
100

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 101 of 140
342. Due to the difference in the length of PLAINTIFF GILBERT’s legs, standing for lengthy periods of time is painful. He has a profile from the doctor stating that he should not be required to stand for long periods. He is nonetheless often required to stand for pill call and in line for food. Shortly after coming into ADOC custody, he was provided with a single crutch. This gave some relief, but still left him in significant pain. PLAINTIFF GILBERT did not receive a wheelchair for eight months after he arrived at the prison.
343. PLAINTIFF BROOKS develops keloids at the site of broken skin. Therefore, PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a profile that allows him to abstain from shaving for extended periods of time. Despite this profile, ADOC correctional officers often refuse to allow PLAINTIFF BROOKS to eat at meal times because he has not shaved. On at least six or seven occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS was ordered to shave before he could eat despite his shaving profile. On all six or seven occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS has shaved and cut himself, causing another keloid to develop. On three of these occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS was not allowed to eat even after he shaved.
344. Prisoner Baker had a profile for use of a wedge to accommodate her acid reflux. For a period of time, she was not allowed to use a wedge, even though she had had a wedge profile for several years. Prisoner Baker began to use extra blankets to substitute for the wedge but the blankets were taken away. ADOC subsequently refused to give out extra blankets or replace the wedge. Without the wedge, Prisoner Baker’s acid reflux became so bad that she developed ulcers in her esophagus and experienced irritation in her voice box. Sometime after suffering these problems, Prisoner Baker was re-issued a wedge.
101

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 102 of 140
345. PLAINTIFF TORRES fell and injured his knee, requiring him to use crutches for approximately six months. During the first two weeks, DEFENDANT ADOC would not change his bed assignment, even though he was assigned to an upper bunk.
3. DEFENDANT ADOC has numerous housing policies that discriminate against prisoners with disabilities.
346. DEFENDANT ADOC has housing policies and procedures that violate the rights of prisoners with disabilities. Prisoners with disabilities are housed in restrictive and unduly dangerous housing units because of their disabilities.
347. For example, at Kilby, prisoners who are blind and prisoners who are in wheelchairs are housed in Dormitory A, regardless of the security classification. DEFENDANT ADOC describes this dormitory as “a dorm in the main hall near the infirmary where others who have disabilities or medical needs, yet are not in need of infirmary care, are placed.” This is a dormitory that also houses violent offenders with high security classifications. There is a great deal of violence that the blind and wheelchair-bound prisoners are subjected to solely because of their disabilities. Further, due to the level of violence in the dormitory generally, the dormitory is often on lockdown. The prisoners with disabilities are therefore deprived of recreation time and other privileges because of their disabilities. Also, other than for the prisoners with disabilities, the dormitory is a “transit” dorm, for prisoners coming into ADOC custody and waiting for their assignment to another facility. As a result, programming is not available for prisoners in Dormitory A. Prisoners who are assigned to Dormitory A because of their disabilities are therefore excluded from programming because of their disabilities.
348. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR and MOORE are both blind and spent many months in Dormitory A because of their disability. Similarly, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, who is confined to a wheelchair, was assigned to Dormitory A because of his disability. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR,
102

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 103 of 140
MOORE and HAGOOD would all be classified at a security classification of 1 or 2, but for their disability. Dormitory A is a dormitory that houses prisoners with a security classification of 4.
349. Also, male prisoners whose kidney function is so impaired they must have dialysis are housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is a dialysis patient. This appears to be the reason he is at St. Clair, the primary facility for providing dialysis. However, St. Clair is not equipped to treat individuals with mental illness as acute as PLAINTIFF HARTLEY’s. There is neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist on staff at St. Clair. Because PLAINTIFF HARTLEY needs dialysis, he is being denied adequate mental health care.
350. PLAINTIFFS TURNER and PEARSON are both deaf. They are both housed at Limestone. They have both been determined to have security classifications of 2. Ordinarily, Limestone is for prisoners with higher security classifications than 2.
351. Some facilities, including at least Staton and Bibb, house persons with disabilities in infirmaries, regardless of whether they have medical needs requiring placement in the infirmary. Being confined to the infirmary deprives prisoners of benefits, programs and services. For example, at Staton, one of the prisons where mobility-impaired prisoners are housed in the infirmary, the yard for the infirmary is extremely small and lacks the recreation equipment found in the ordinary yard. Prisoners housed in infirmaries also have no access to programming. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL was housed in the infirmary at Bibb for 18 months. Correctional staff told him he was housed there because he has limited use of his hands. While in the Bibb infirmary, he was able to leave the infirmary only to go to visitation.
C. DEFENDANT ADOC Does Not Provide Necessary Assistive Devices and Services. 352. PLAINTIFF GILBERT’s legs are two different lengths. He informed a nurse that
he required an orthopedic shoe during the intake process and several times thereafter during the
103

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 104 of 140
fall of 2012. In and after March 2013, he submitted written requests for an orthopedic shoe. He had used such shoes before coming to the prison and they significantly increased his functionality and reduced his pain. He received the shoes after a four-month delay. However, the shoe that was ordered was too small and rubbed the skin off his foot, a particularly dangerous problem for PLAINTIFF GILBERT, as he is diabetic and small wounds on a foot can easily become infected and lead to amputations. He has repeatedly requested an orthopedic shoe that fits properly, but has been denied. He has had to cut out the top of the toe of the shoe to avoid getting sores on his foot.
353. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is confined to a wheelchair. He is also partially paralyzed on the left side. He has difficulty getting around the prison, does not have an assistant to help him, and is not permitted to obtain assistance from other prisoners. Due to his medical conditions, he has prescriptions for about 15 pills per day. He does not receive his pills consistently because, without assistance, he is sometimes unable to get to the pill call window. When he makes the difficult journey to the pill call window, nurses make fun of him for having missed pill call previously. He frequently misses meals because, without assistance, it is difficult for him to get to the dining area.
354. The bunks in his dormitory at Kilby were so close together that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD could not maneuver easily through the aisles between the bunks, and had to ask other prisoners to move out of the way. The other prisoners resented this and made fun of PLAINTIFF HAGOOD and threatened him. When PLAINTIFF HAGOOD complained to correctional officers of the harassment, the officers laughed at him. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD wrote two requests to the warden asking for an assistant, but no assistant was provided. On May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel requested that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD be provided with an assistant or
104

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 105 of 140
transferred to a housing unit where help would be available. The following day, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was transferred to Dormitory B, a dormitory that had no accessible toilet, no accessible shower, no ramp to the outside yard. He was not assigned a helper. In the new dorm, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was unable to bathe, get himself to pill call, or go outside. After PLAINTIFFS’ counsel again requested that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD be provided with an assistant or transferred to a housing unit where help would be available, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was told he would be transferred back to Dormitory A and was assigned an assistant in Dormitory A. However, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was not transferred back to Dormitory A, nor was he assigned an assistant in Dormitory B.
355. Because he was in an inaccessible dormitory and did not have an assistant, from May 2, 2014 through May 23, 2014, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had no yard time, because he cannot go outside from Dormitory B. He had four or five showers during this period, because he has to go to Dormitory A to shower and has no assistance to get there.
356. On or about May 17, 2014, there was a fire in the kitchen at Kilby. The prison was evacuated. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD could not evacuate directly from Dormitory B. He was required to push himself in his wheelchair farther into the prison, against the flow of evacuating prisoners, to get to Dormitory A, and then out through Dormitory A, because only Dormitory A has a ramp. On or about May 19, 2014, Kilby was again evacuated, this time due to a gas leak in another dorm. Again, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had to go farther into the prison, against traffic, to get to Dormitory A to evacuate.
357. PLAINTIFF BROYLES requires a hearing aid for both ears. In or around 1998, medical staff at St. Clair provided BROYLES with two hearing aids for his left and right ears. In or around January 2011, the hearing aid for the left ear ceased working. A Corizon physician
105

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 106 of 140
told PLAINTIFF BROYLES that ADOC will not replace the left hearing aid because BROYLES only needs to hear from one hear. PLAINTIFF BROYLES often falls when walking because he is off balance due to the difference in hearing between his two ears.
358. PLAINTIFF BROYLES’ right hearing aid began to malfunction in early 2014, creating audible feedback. As a result of the malfunction in the right hearing aid and the loss of the left hearing aid, BROYLES can hear only certain pitches and sounds and only if they are loud, clear, and in complete quiet. Medical staff often delay in replacing the battery in the right hearing aid, sometimes for as long as three days. The facility administration requires that he submit a sick call request for new batteries and pay the corresponding fee, and he often must make several such requests to get replacement batteries.
359. ADOC officials have promised PLAINTIFF BROYLES that he will receive new hearing aids, but he has yet to receive one.
360. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is deaf. He has signed up for GED classes. However, there is no one to provide sign language for him in the class. He stayed with the class for two months, but ultimately dropped it because, without the reasonable accommodation of a sign language interpreter, he could not understand the material. PLAINTIFF PEARSON has requested to go to trade school, but has been denied because he does not have a GED. There is no sign language interpreter at Limestone. PEARSON was also required to attend classes which all individuals are required to attend shortly before their release to prepare them for a successful transition to life outside the ADOC. He was unable to understand the information contained in the mandatory training because no sign language interpreter was present. The facility uses another prisoner to provide sign language interpretation, but he is not qualified and his signs are incomprehensible to PLAINTIFF PEARSON.
106

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 107 of 140
361. PLAINTIFF TURNER is also deaf. He has tried to go to GED classes and to church, but there are no staff members at Limestone who can communicate with him using sign language. He was unable to follow the GED classes or the church services without a sign language interpreter.
362. Prisoner Baker had rheumatoid arthritis. Her arthritis frequently caused pain and swelling in her hands. At times she was unable to perform physical tasks which required use of her hands. In February 2012, Prisoner Baker was ordered to fold sheets, blankets, and a pillow case on her bed. Prisoner Baker’s hands were visibly swollen and she informed two correctional officers that she was in severe pain and incapable of using her hands to perform the task. The officers continued to order her to perform the task and failed to offer any assistance or accommodation. After being threatened with segregation, Prisoner Baker attempted to untie her sheets but was in such pain that she could not follow the order. As a result, she received a disciplinary, resulting in loss of privileges and 30 days in segregation.
363. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY suffered two broken legs in a 2006 car accident, which led to four surgeries on each of his knees and caused him to be confined to a wheelchair. Prior to ADOC custody in 2007, PLAINTIFF MOSELEY had begun physical therapy in order to walk again, but following his incarceration, DEFENDANT ADOC refused to provide PLAINTIFF MOSELEY with physical therapy or other appropriate treatment, delaying his recovery and forcing him to unnecessarily remain in a wheelchair while he self-administered physical therapy to re-learn how to walk.
D. DEFENDANT ADOC Excludes Prisoners with Disabilities from Programs, Benefits and Services. 364. DEFENDANT ADOC has numerous policies that discriminate against prisoners
with disabilities by excluding them from important programs, benefits and services.
107

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 108 of 140
365. Prisoners with disabilities are excluded from work release programs due solely to their disabilities. PLAINTIFF PEARSON was excluded from the Decatur Work Release Center and sent to Limestone because he is deaf.
366. PLAINTIFF TURNER has high blood pressure, for which he takes medication. The medication controls his blood pressure well. He requested to go to work release, but was denied, being told: “you are deaf and you have high blood pressure.”
367. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is housed in a dormitory in the main facility at Bullock that houses prisoners with less acute mental illness than those in Mental Health Unit. He currently has the mental health code MH-1, the lowest level of mental health code a prisoner can have and still be on the mental health caseload. About a year ago, PLAINTIFF DILLARD had a mental health code of MH-3 or MH-4. He asked to become an outpatient, which he understands to require being an MH-1, because he will be up for parole in 2015 and cannot be paroled if he is still considered an inpatient. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is foregoing mental health treatment because otherwise he will be excluded from the possibility of parole.
368. PLAINTIFF MANER has a disabled leg as a result of a gunshot wound prior to coming into prison. Prior to 2010, PLAINTIFF MANER had several profiles (accommodations from facility administration in consideration of his disability) that permitted him to: (1) wear shower shoes to prevent falls in the shower, (2) use a cane to assist in walking, (3) abstain from prolonged standing, and (4) sleep on a bottom bunk. PLAINTIFF MANER received these profiles in 1998 when he entered ADOC’s custody.
369. In 2010, PLAINTIFF MANER learned that the various profiles created to accommodate his disability render him ineligible to participate in work release programs or to transfer to facilities designated for prisoners who have made substantial rehabilitative
108

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 109 of 140
progression, known as honor camps, because the profiles raise his health code level. Participation in work release programs and residence in honor camps results in several benefits to prisoners and serves as evidence of rehabilitation helpful to gain parole. Because he could not access these benefits if his disability was accommodated through the use of the profiles, PLAINTIFF MANER asked medical staff at his residence facility in 2010, Hamilton A & I, to remove the profiles.
370. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was most recently housed at Hamilton A & I. There are no programs at Hamilton A & I for prisoners who are blind. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR requested to participate in the G.E.D. program and was told that the staff would have to “check into it.” He did not receive a response.
371. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR had a security classification of 2. Prisoners without disabilities who have a security classification of 2 are eligible for work release.
372. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was not eligible for work release because he is blind. 373. Prior to March 2014, PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was housed at Kilby in Dormitory A because he is blind. PLAINTIFF MOORE is currently housed in Dormitory A because he is blind. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was housed in Dormitory A until May 2014 because he is in a wheelchair. For prisoners who are not disabled, Dormitory A is a transit dormitory to which prisoners are sent for a short period of time before being sent to a more permanent placement. However, PLAINTIFF NAYLOR spent over two years in Dormitory A, PLAINTIFF MOORE has spent approximately four years in Dormitory A, and PLAINTIFF HAGOOD spent approximately 16 months in Dormitory A. Because the dormitory has a high level of violence, as is often the case with higher security dormitories, it is often on lockdown, resulting in disabled
109

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 110 of 140
plaintiffs being denied access to outside recreation. Also, because Dormitory A is a transit dorm, programming is generally not available to persons housed there.
374. Mentally ill prisoners housed in the RTU at Bullock are not provided with regular recreation. They go outside one or two times per week. The recreation yards for prisoners in the RTU are caged areas roughly 15 feet by 10 feet and no recreational equipment. When prisoners are allowed out, there are often eight to 15 individuals in these small areas.
E. DEFENDANT ADOC Fails to Provide Auxiliary Aids and Services Necessary for Effective Communication. 375. ADOC does not provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to achieve effective
communication with prisoners with disabilities. Examples of such measures may include large print materials for prisoners with low vision or a sign language interpreter for prisoners with deafness.
376. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is deaf. He has never been offered a sign language interpreter, even though he requested one on numerous occasions. He does not understand certain ADOC policies as they relate to prisoners and cannot participate in any programs offered by the prison due to his lack of ability to communicate. DEFENDANT ADOC often relies on other prisoners with limited sign language ability to “communicate” with PLAINTIFF TOOLEY. In or around January 2014, PLAINTIFF TOOLEY was denied a sign language interpreter for a disciplinary hearing. He did not understand the proceedings. He was sentenced to a 30-day segregation term.
377. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is mostly deaf in both ears. For a time, he had two hearing aids, but eventually, personnel of both ADOC and Corizon informed him he would only be provided with one hearing aid. As a result of having only one functioning hearing aid, he loses his balance frequently. He often has to wait a long time for a replacement battery for the
110

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 111 of 140
single hearing aid. On one occasion, he was assaulted by a CERT team member for failing to obey an order that he could not hear.
378. In or around April 2013, Bullock staff disciplined PLAINTIFF BROYLES twice for missing pill call and not taking his medication for diabetes. He had missed pill call because he could not hear correctional officers order prisoners to line up for pill call due to his malfunctioning hearing aids. The Corizon physician at Bullock refused to allow PLAINTIFF BROYLES to stay on his medication unless PLAINTIFF BROYLES successfully attended two pill calls. PLAINTIFF BROYLES had trouble accomplishing this task because of the malfunctioning hearing aids and the inconsistent times for pill call. At Draper, PLAINTIFF BROYLES received approximately five disciplinary infractions over a year period for failing to obey orders that he could not hear. The warden at Draper ultimately rescinded each of these infractions.
379. DEFENDANT ADOC has refused to provide PLAINTIFF BROYLES with instructional materials to learn sign language.
380. Several blind prisoners have reported that they are routinely asked to sign documents that they cannot read. Another prisoner, Larry Shepherd, now deceased, had his hand was placed on the spot where he needed to sign, and believed that he was signing a property sheet relating to his transfer; he later discovered the form was a Do Not Resuscitate order.
381. In 2013, PLAINTIFF TURNER was accused by another prisoner of using an unauthorized credit card to make telephone calls. A disciplinary hearing was held without a sign language interpreter. PLAINTIFF TURNER was not able to understand much of the proceeding, and was unable to present his side of the story. He received 15 days in segregation as a result.
111

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 112 of 140
382. PLAINTIFF MOORE has asked for books on tape approximately 10 times, but has never been provided any.
383. PLAINTIFF MOORE cannot go to sick call without filling out a sick call request form. If PLAINTIFF MOORE needs to go to medical, he must ask another prisoner to write down his medical complaint on a sick call request form. When PLAINTIFF MOORE goes to sick call or to visit the eye doctor, the doctors and nurses write down notes from the visit but do not explain his diagnosis or treatment.
384. PLAINTIFF MOORE, who is blind, was written up for the incident described above where he did not stand up promptly because he did not know that the correctional officer telling people to stand for count was speaking to him and the standard practice in the dormitory was that the prisoners who are blind did not stand for count. He was not brought to his disciplinary hearing and did not admit to any misconduct or sign the disciplinary report, but the documentation from the disciplinary hearing states that he pled guilty. He was given a 10-day segregation term.
385. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was previously housed at Hamilton A & I. Hamilton A & I does not have written materials in alternative formats such as books on tape.
386. PLAINTIFF TERRELL was in Special Education classes starting at the beginning of school. He completed ninth grade, but does not know his reading level. Sometimes documents are read to him, sometimes they are not. Sometimes he understands documents, whether he reads them or they are read to him, sometimes he does not. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is not being adequately accommodated for his apparent learning or cognitive disability.
387. PLAINTIFF DILLARD believes he reads at about a sixth grade level. He attended school up until seventh grade. He was in Special Education classes for all of his classes
112

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 113 of 140
throughout his schooling. He sometimes signs documents without understanding them. When he is in medical, some of the nurses tell him what is in the documents, others do not. Some nurses simply say, “how are your medications?” then tell him to sign a paper.
F. Prisoners with Disabilities Are Verbally Harassed, Physically Assaulted, and Punished for Their Disabilities.
388. Several prisoners have reported incidents where they were verbally or physically mistreated due to their disabilities. In Dormitory A at Kilby, where prisoners who are blind or in wheelchairs have been concentrated, prisoners report correctional officers taunting prisoners about their disabilities. A blind prisoner reported that correctional officers waive their hands right in front of his face, refer to him as “blind man”, and make jokes about the blind train when the blind prisoners line up to lead each other to go to the dining room or pill call. A prisoner also reports that the correctional officers say to people in wheelchairs who complain about something, “What are you going to do about it? You can’t get up.”
389. A blind prisoner reports that on one occasion during count he sat up on his bed, which is what he usually does during count. A correctional officer yelled to stand up, but did not identify the person at whom he was yelling by name, Alabama Institutional Serial number or bed number. The correctional officer kept yelling, identifying the person only as “you.” The prisoner did not know that he was the person being told to stand up. The correctional officer assaulted the blind prisoner for disobeying, and then wrote him up. The prisoner was given a disciplinary report that indicated he had pled guilty to the infraction at the discipline hearing. He had not pled guilty and no one had told him that the written record of the hearing indicated that he had pled guilty.
390. A prisoner who is nearly entirely deaf was in his dormitory when a CERT team came in and ordered everyone to stand. The deaf prisoner was turned away at the time and did
113

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 114 of 140
not know of the order. A member of the CERT team hit him on the back of the head for not standing up when ordered to do so.
391. PLAINTIFF MOORE was housed in Dormitory A at Kilby for many months. He was provided with no assistance getting around the dormitory or the prison. PLAINTIFF MOORE and other blind prisoners in Dormitory A assisted each other, but were often mocked by the correctional officers and other prisoners. The correctional officers call the prisoners who are blind names, such as “blind motherfucker.” When he tried to move around the housing unit, prisoners routinely stood in his way.
392. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF MOORE was sitting on his bunk. Correctional officers came in and called out “count time.” Ordinarily, at count, PLAINTIFF MOORE and other blind prisoners remain seated on their bunks, and PLAINTIFF MOORE did so on this occasion as well. A correctional officer yelled to stand up. PLAINTIFF MOORE did not know the correctional officer was yelling at him, until the correctional officer yelled “That goes for you too, blind motherfucker!” PLAINTIFF MOORE asked the correctional officer not to speak to him that way. The correctional officer grabbed PLAINTIFF MOORE and slammed him to the ground, then whispered to PLAINTIFF MOORE that he should have killed him.
393. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is harassed, threatened, and subjected to physical violence by correctional officers and prisoners due to his disability. Correctional officers often yell at PLAINTIFF BROYLES because he does not hear their orders and threaten to physically assault him. Correctional officers also often accuse PLAINTIFF BROYLES of pretending to have hearing limitations. PLAINTIFF BROYLES has had these experiences at Draper, Elmore, Kilby, St. Clair, and Bullock. A correctional officer at Bullock threw a baton at PLAINTIFF
114

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 115 of 140
BROYLES when PLAINTIFF BROYLES did not respond to the officer, because he did not hear him.
394. Mentally ill prisoners in the RTU at Bullock are subjected to a great deal of physical violence. PLAINTIFF MCCOY was brutally beaten by correctional officers while he was housed at the Bullock RTU. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE had four teeth knocked out by correctional officers in 2009. Correctional officers broke PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s jaw and rib in one incident when PLAINTIFF TERRELL was in the midst of a psychotic episode, and beat his head with a baton on another occasion. PLAINTIFF DILLARD was slammed to the ground by correctional officers when he refused his medications because he was having difficulty with the side effects. Correctional officers knock over bunks in the mornings in the Bullock RTU if they think the prisoners are not getting up quickly enough in the morning, although many of the prisoners in the RTU take medications that cause them to sleep. V. DEFENDANTS RETALIATE AGAINST PRISONERS FOR EXERCISING THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 395. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have established a policy or custom
that permits ADOC employees and contractors to engage in retaliatory action against prisoners who exercise their first amendment rights to communicate with counsel and file complaints regarding conditions of confinement. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS act recklessly and with deliberate indifference with regard to permitting ADOC employees and contractors to engage in retaliatory action against these prisoners. Moreover, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS knew, or should have known, that ADOC employees would act unlawfully by subjecting these prisoners to retaliatory treatment and failed to stop them.
115

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 116 of 140
396. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS retaliate against prisoners who exercise their rights to meet confidentially with counsel and to file complaints regarding the conditions of their confinement.
397. PLAINTIFF DUNN has repeatedly requested mental health treatment and has engaged in acts of self-harm on five occasions while in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC. As the first-named plaintiff in this lawsuit, PLAINTIFF DUNN’s claims have been the focus of a prominent media campaign. In particular, PLAINTIFF DUNN’s claims were featured in local and national press.
398. On June 28, 2014, a prisoner initiated a fight with PLAINTIFF DUNN. Approximately three days later, PLAINTIFF DUNN, who was confused about why the fight happened, asked Officer Mitchell Sanders to permit him to speak with mental health staff. Officer Sanders responded, “I read about the lawsuit in the newspaper. You’re always trying to manipulate the system. You’re not going to see anybody.” Officer Sanders’s denial of PLAINTIFF DUNN’s request runs contrary to ADOC’s Administrative Regulation 609, which provides for self-referrals to mental health to be given to the medical unit and then passed along to a psychologist.
399. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were notified on June 5, 2014 that PLAINTIFF SEARS’ “no prolonged standing” medical profile was not being honored consistently. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were informed by counsel of the failure to accommodate PLAINTIFF SEARS’ disabilities on June 16, 2014. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were informed in this communication that the actions taken against PLAINTIFF SEARS “appear to be retaliatory.”
116

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 117 of 140
400. PLAINTIFF SEARS is housed at Ventress. Plaintiffs’ counsel and legal staff has met with PLAINTIFF SEARS several times since February 11, 2014. Officer Gwendolyn Pullom facilitates attorney visits at Ventress and is aware of each of PLAINTIFF SEARS’ visits with Plaintiffs’ counsel. As required throughout ADOC facilities, Plaintiffs’ counsel identified themselves to facility staff prior to each meeting with PLAINTIFF SEARS. Officer Gwendolyn Pullom is married to Officer David Pullom.
401. On June 20, 2014, three days after the filing of this lawsuit, PLAINTIFF SEARS was showering in the handicapped accessible shower in the infirmary of Ventress, as permitted by his medical profile. PLAINTIFF SEARS suffers from severe scoliosis and is frail from untreated extreme weight loss. When PLAINTIFF SEARS finishes his shower, he must ring a bell to receive assistance to return to his dormitory. PLAINTIFF SEARS rang the bell and called out for assistance for approximately 20 minutes after he finished his shower. Officer David Pullom came into the infirmary and began yelling at PLAINTIFF SEARS, saying, “You think you’re a smart ass. You think you run something. You don’t run shit here. You’re causing all this trouble around here. Well, you don’t scare me. You’re a fuck boy. Get on the fucking ground now.” Officer Pullom then forced PLAINTIFF SEARS to the ground, handcuffed him behind his back forcefully, and pushed his face into the floor. Officer Pullom then pushed his knee into PLAINTIFF SEARS’ back and ground PLAINTIFF SEARS’ face into the floor with his hand, while continuing to yell obscenities at him. Officer Pullom continued to assault PLAINTIFF SEARS until two prisoners arrived and yelled for him to stop. Officer Pullom then said, “You think you’re a big shot around here, well, you ain’t shit to me. You ain’t nothing to me and I’m going to show you. Give me your fucking I.D. card. I’m going to write your stupid ass up.” Officer Pullom then left the area. At that point PLAINTIFF SEARS realized that a correctional
117

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 118 of 140
officer and two Corizon nurses witnessed the assault. PLAINTIFF SEARS asked the nurses to evaluate him for injuries, but they refused. PLAINTIFF SEARS also requested that the correctional officer initiate an investigation pursuant to ADOC policy. The correctional officer left the area without responding. Unable to get up because of his physical condition and the handcuffs, PLAINTIFF SEARS remained on the bathroom floor for approximately two hours until a correctional officer returned to escort him back to his dormitory. PLAINTIFF SEARS informed an ADOC lieutenant about the incident and requested that he make a formal report. After receiving PLAINTIFF SEARS’s complaint concerning the incident, Ventress’s warden found that no excessive forced had been used, but agreed to turn the matter over to I & I. PLAINTIFF SEARS nevertheless received a disciplinary report regarding the incident on or about June 30, 2014 and has received no further information about any I & I investigation or findings.
402. On or about September 1, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was at the pill call window at 2:00 a.m. Another prisoner came up to the window, reached around PLAINTIFF SEARS and asked for his medication. After giving the other prisoner his medication, the nurse yelled at PLAINTIFF SEARS for cutting the line. PLAINTIFF SEARS said that he did not cut the line, but the nurse continued to yell at him. A correctional officer started to yell at PLAINTIFF SEARS. Three officers pulled PLAINTIFF SEARS across the yard, leaving PLAINTIFF SEARS’ cane behind. Eventually PLAINTIFF SEARS fell to the ground. When he was on the ground, he could not get up without his cane. The officers ordered PLAINTIFF SEARS to get up. He explained that he could not. A lieutenant came over and ordered that PLAINTIFF SEARS be handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The lieutenant then ordered PLAINTIFF SEARS to get up and go to F-Dorm, a disciplinary dorm. PLAINTIFF SEARS explained that he
118

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 119 of 140
could not and showed the lieutenant that he had a no standing, no walking profile. The lieutenant tore the profile in half. PLAINTIFF SEARS was then picked up, taken to F-Dorm and reassigned to F-Dorm. PLAINTIFF SEARS was given three disciplinaries for not getting up off the ground when he could not do so, due to his disabilities, as well as two other disciplinaries from this incident. The disciplinaries were delivered to PLAINTIFF SEARS by leaving them on his bed while he was in the bathroom area, and stated that he had refused to sign, although he had not been given the opportunity to sign.
403. When PLAINTIFF SEARS came up for parole late in 2014, he was denied and set off for three years. He believes that the disciplinaries he has received since the filing of the initial complaint in this matter are the reason he was denied parole. He further believes that the disciplinaries were given to him in retaliation for his participation in this lawsuit.
404. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD met with Plaintiffs’ Counsel at Kilby on February 25, 2014 and May 7, 2014. As required, Plaintiff’s Counsel identified themselves to facility staff prior to each meeting with PLAINTIFF HAGOOD. On May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was identified in a letter from counsel to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH as needing reasonable accommodations for his disabilities.
405. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has received insulin injections for diabetes since 1969 and he felt his diabetes was well controlled. In late May, 2014, facility medical personnel changed PLAINTIFF HAGOOD’S prescription for diabetes from insulin injections to oral medication, requiring him to take six or seven pills a day. This change in prescription was conducted without notice, explanation, or a meeting with medical personnel. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD’S new medication makes him nauseous and gives him headaches. His blood sugar levels are much higher with the new medication. In June 2014 PLAINTIFF HAGOOD
119

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 120 of 140
requested that Dr. Karen Stone, the Corizon Regional Director, reinstate his insulin prescription. Dr. Stone refused this request and taunted PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, saying, “now go back there and tell your lawyer.” PLAINTIFF HAGOOD did not report any problems with his insulin medication prior to the change.
406. Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT ADOC on December 21, 2012, informing them that a number of prisoners had complained of retaliation after legal visits. Plaintiffs’ counsel requested that correctional facility staff be reminded of the rules against retaliation and that signs be posted in prominent places in each facility explaining that prisoners should not be retaliated against for speaking with legal counsel. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor acknowledged receipt of the letter, but did not indicate whether or how the matter would be addressed.
407. Employees of DEFENDANT DUNN who are the subject of investigations into the violations of prisoners’ rights are frequently not disciplined and may even be promoted. For example, following a finding by the United States Department of Justice of numerous constitutional violations, wardens at Tutwiler were transferred to other prisons, where they continued to work, and one warden was even promoted.
408. ADOC employees and medical staff often threaten retaliation/use the threat of retaliation to control/manipulate. On or around June 4, 2014, Plaintiffs’ Counsel met with PLAINTIFFS BUSINELLE and TERRELL at Bullock. While Plaintiffs’ Counsel met with another prisoner, PLAINTIFFS TERRELL and BUSINELLE sat outside the room in which the meeting was taking place, waiting their turns. As they waited, an officer walked past them and said to them, “You were waiting to go home, but now you’re going to go to jail.” PLAINTIFFS
120

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 121 of 140
TERRELL and BUSINELLE both understood this as a threat that they would be placed in segregation.
409. On July 3, 2014, approximately two weeks after this lawsuit was filed, PLAINTIFF MORK was told by a correctional officer that his life and the lives of other plaintiffs were in danger. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were informed by Counsel of this communication on the same day. As of July 9, 2014, no one had come to speak with PLAINTIFF MORK to investigate this serious matter.
410. On March 17, 2014, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor of PLAINTIFF SELLERS’s need for medical attention. Shortly thereafter, he was moved from his dormitory to another dormitory in which he had enemies. He informed ADOC correctional officers of the problem and refused to go. The officers physically assaulted him and then moved him anyway. He asked to speak with personnel from the Investigations & Intelligence Division (I & I) but was not allowed to do so. After Plaintiffs’ Counsel contacted DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor to request that PLAINTIFF SELLERS speak with personnel from I & I, he was permitted to do so. The I & I officer asked PLAINTIFF SELLERS the subject of his conversations with Plaintiffs’ Counsel.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS PLAINTIFF Class
411. All prisoner PLAINTIFFS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a class of all prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and ADOC (the “PLAINTIFF Class”).
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)
121

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 122 of 140
412. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). At the time this lawsuit was commenced and at all times since, there have been in excess of 24,000prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC, all of whom are dependent entirely on the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS for the provision of health care. Due to policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, all in-house ADOC prisoners, numbering tens of thousands annually, receive or are at risk of receiving inadequate health care while in ADOC prisons.
413. The PLAINTIFF Class members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 414. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of systematically failing to operate a health care system providing minimally adequate health care that violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, (b) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of deliberate indifference to the serious health care needs of class members. (c) whether ADOC’s policies, procedures, and practices reflect deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of class members such that ADOC has violated their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.
122

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 123 of 140
(d) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ capitated contract system permits improper cost considerations to interfere with treatment of serious medical conditions. (e) whether the systemic and pervasive deficiencies in care at ADOC facilities have placed class members at unreasonable risk of suffering new or worsening physical injury, illness, mental anguish, emotional distress, and the prospect of premature death. 415. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 416. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the PLAINTIFF Class. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct as those of the PLAINTIFF Class. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims are based on the same theory of law as the class’s claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 417. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the PLAINTIFF class. The named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the class. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the PLAINTIFF class members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B)
123

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 124 of 140
418. This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because the number of current class members is approximately 25,055, and the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 419. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS’ policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. All state-wide health care policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of ADOC by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Medical care is provided pursuant to a single contract with a single medical provider with policies and practices that are centrally promulgated, disseminated, overseen and enforced by the medical provider’s Medical Statewide Management team and by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the PLAINTIFF class.
Mental Health Subclass 420. PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, HARDY, HARTLEY, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MCCOY, MONCRIEF, PRUITT, TERRELL, WALLACE, and WILLIAMS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a),
124

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 125 of 140
23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a subclass of all prisoners (hereinafter “Mental Health Subclass”) who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the mental health care policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC.
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 421. The Mental Health Subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. At the time this lawsuit was commenced and at all times since, there have been in excess of 24,000prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC, all of whom are dependent entirely on the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS for the provision of mental health care. As of April 30, 2014, there were 3,059 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC who are on the mental health caseload, as well as 30 prisoners who have been diagnosed with DSM-IV Axis I disorders who are not on the mental health caseload. Due to the policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS all ADOC prisoners, numbering tens of thousands annually, receive or are at risk of receiving inadequate mental health care while in ADOC prisons. The Mental Health Subclass members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 422. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Mental Health Subclass. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of systematically failing to operate a mental health care system providing minimally adequate mental health care that violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
125

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 126 of 140
(b) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of deliberate indifference to the resulting harm and risk of harm to Mental Health Subclass members who are deprived of minimally adequate mental health care; (c) whether ADOC’s policies, procedures, and practices reflect deliberate indifference to the serious mental health needs of class members such that ADOC has violated their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment; (d) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ capitated contract system permits improper cost considerations to interfere with treatment of serious mental health conditions; (e) whether the systemic and pervasive deficiencies in mental health care at ADOC facilities have placed class members at unreasonable risk of suffering new or worsening mental illness, physical injury, illness, mental anguish, emotional distress, and the prospect of premature death; (f) whether the policies, practices and courses of conduct in medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 423. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)
126

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 127 of 140
424. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the Mental Health Subclass, because their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims are based on the same theory of law as the subclass’s claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 425. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the Mental Health Subclass because the named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the subclass. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the Mental Health Subclass members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 426. Because the number of Mental Health Subclass members is so large, the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 427. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS’ policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class.
127

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 128 of 140
All state-wide health care policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of ADOC by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Mental health care is provided pursuant to a single contract with a single medical provider with policies and practices that are centrally promulgated, disseminated, overseen and enforced by the mental health care providers’ statewide Management team and by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Mental Health Subclass.
ADA Subclass 428. PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BROOKS, BROYLES, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, GILBERT, HAGOOD, HARDY, HARTLEY, HENDERSON, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MANER, MCCOY, MITCHELL, MONCRIEF, MOORE, MOSELEY, NAYLOR, PEARSON, PRUITT, SEARS, TERRELL, TOOLEY, TORRES, TURNER, WALLACE, and WILLIAMS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a subclass of all prisoners (hereinafter “ADA Subclass”) who are now, or will in the future be, persons with disabilities as that term is used in the ADA and § 504 and are in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC.
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 429. The ADA Subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of March 31, 2014, there were approximately 25,055 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC. As of April 30, 2014, there were at least:
1. 42 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC whose kidney function is sufficiently impaired to require dialysis;
128

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 129 of 140
2. 1,329 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC who are enrolled in the diabetes chronic care clinic; and
3. 3,029 prisoners on the mental health caseload. There were also numerous prisoners with mobility, vision, hearing and developmental disabilities.
434. Due to the policies and practices of DEFENDANT ADOC, all ADOC prisoners with disabilities risk being discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities in accessing facilities, programs, benefits and services while in ADOC prisons. The ADA Subclass members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 435. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the ADA Subclass. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether DEFENDANT ADOC has failed to make appropriate accommodations in the physical structure and infrastructure of the ADOC facilities in violation of the ADA and § 504; (b) whether DEFENDANT ADOC has failed to make appropriate accommodations in the policies and procedures in ADOC facilities as they apply to persons with disabilities in violation of the ADA and § 504; (c) whether DEFENDANT ADOC has discriminated against the members of the ADA Subclass in the provision of and access to programs, benefits, and services. 436. DEFENDANT ADOC is expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)
129

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 130 of 140
437. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the ADA Subclass, because their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims are based on the same theory of law as the subclass’s claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 438. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the ADA Subclass because the named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the subclass. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the ADA Subclass members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 439. Because the number of ADA Subclass members is so large, the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for DEFENDANT ADOC. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 440. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the policies, practices, actions, and omissions of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought
130

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 131 of 140
is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. All state-wide policies regarding the treatment and accommodation are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of DEFENDANT ADOC. The budget and planning for modifications to the physical structure of the ADOC facilities are established at the central headquarters by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Mental Health Subclass.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF First Cause of Action: Inadequate Medical Care All Prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF CLASS v.
DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Cruel and Unusual Punishment)
441. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-440 above.
442. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS subject PLAINTIFFS and the Plaintiff Class to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury from inadequate medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These policies and practices have been and continue to be implemented by DEFENDANTS and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, in their official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS’ ongoing deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution under the Eighth Amendment.
443. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Second Cause of Action: Inadequate Mental Health Treatment
131

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 132 of 140
PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, HARDY, HARTLEY, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MCCOY, MONCRIEF, PRUITT, TERRELL, WALLACE, WILLIAMS; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; the Mental Health Subclass v. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH
(42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Cruel and Unusual Punishment) 444. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 1-440 above. 445. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY
DEFENDANTS subject PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the Mental Health Subclass to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury from inadequate mental health treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These policies and practices have been and continue to be implemented by DEFENDANTS and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, in their official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS’ ongoing deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution under the Eighth Amendment.
446. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Third Cause of Action: Deprivation of Due Process Prior to Involuntarily Medicating Prisoners
PLAINTIFFS BUI, DILLARD, HARTLEY, MCCOY, TERRELL; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; the Mental Health Subclass v. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process)
447. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-440 above.
132

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 133 of 140
448. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS subject PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the Mental Health Subclass of their due process rights by involuntarily medicating prisoners in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
449. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of the Rights of Prisoners with Disabilities PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BROOKS, BROYLES, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, GILBERT, HAGOOD, HARDY, HARTLEY, HENDERSON, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MANER, MCCOY, MITCHELL, MONCRIEF, MOORE, MOSELEY, NAYLOR, PEARSON, PRUITT, SEARS, TERRELL, TOOLEY, TORRES, TURNER, WALLACE, WILLIAMS; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; and the
ADA Subclass v. DEFENDANT ADOC (Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) 450. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-440 above. 451. By their policies and practices described herein, DEFENDANT ADOC subjects PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the ADA Subclass to regular and systemic discrimination based on their disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12131-12134, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. These policies and practices continue to be implemented by DEFENDANT ADOC and its agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with ADOC under color of state law, in their official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS’ ongoing deprivation of rights secured by federal law.
133

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 134 of 140
452. DEFENDANT ADOC has been and is aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and has condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Fifth Cause of Action: Retaliation in Violation of Prisoners’ First Amendment Rights to Communicate with Counsel and to File Lawsuits Regarding Conditions of Confinement PLAINTIFFS DUNN, HAGOOD, SEARS v. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH in their
official capacity (42 U.S.C. § 1983; First and Fourteenth Amendment) 453. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-440 above. 454. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS subjected PLAINTIFFS SEARS, DUNN and HAGOOD to retaliation for communicating with attorneys and filing a lawsuit regarding conditions of confinement, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 455. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of the retaliatory actions complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 456. PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent have no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs suffered as set forth in this complaint. PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury as a result of the unlawful acts, omissions, policies, and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC, as alleged herein, unless PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent are granted the relief they request. The need for relief is critical because the rights at issue are paramount under the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States.
134

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 135 of 140
457. WHEREFORE, the named PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent request that this Court grant them the following relief:
A. Declare that the suit is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and (2);
B. Adjudge and declare that the acts, omissions, policies, and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, and their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law or otherwise, described herein are in violation of the rights of prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, which grants constitutional protection to the PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent;
C. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin all DEFENDANTS, their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, from subjecting prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF Classes to the illegal and unconstitutional conditions, acts, omissions, policies, and practices set forth above.
D. Order the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC, their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, to develop and implement, as soon as practical, a plan to eliminate the substantial risk of serious harm that prisoner PLAINTIFFS and members of the PLAINTIFF Classes suffer due to inadequate medical and mental health care of DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH, and due to the policies and practices with regard to persons with disabilities of DEFENDANT ADOC. The plan shall include at a minimum the following:
1. Staffing: Staffing shall be sufficient to provide prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF Class with timely access to qualified and competent clinicians who can provide routine, urgent, emergent, and specialty health care;
135

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 136 of 140
2. Access: Policies and practices that provide timely access to health care; 3. Screening: Policies and practices that reliably screen for medical, dental, and
mental health conditions that need treatment; 4. Emergency Response: Timely and competent responses to health care
emergencies; 5. Medication and Supplies: Timely prescription and distribution of medications and
supplies necessary for medically adequate care; 6. Chronic Care: Timely access to competent care for chronic diseases; 7. Environmental Conditions: Basic sanitary conditions that do not promote the
spread or exacerbation of diseases or infections, including but not limited to a smoke-free environment; 8. Mental Health Treatment: Timely access to necessary treatment for serious mental illness, including medication, therapy, inpatient treatment, suicide prevention, 9. Quality Assurance: A regular assessment of health care staff, services, procedures, and activities designed to improve outcomes, and to identify and correct errors or systemic deficiencies; 10. Accommodations: Appropriate accommodations for individuals with disabilities, as required by the ADA and § 504. E. Award PLAINTIFFS the costs of this suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law; F. Retain jurisdiction of this case until all DEFENDANTS have fully complied with the orders of this Court, and there is a reasonable assurance that DEFENDANTS will continue to comply in the future absent continuing jurisdiction; and G. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2015.
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER By: /s/ Maria V. Morris
Maria V. Morris
136

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 137 of 140
Rhonda Brownstein (ASB-3193-O64-R) Maria V. Morris (ASB-2198-R64M) Latasha L. McCrary (ASB-1935-L75M) Valentina Restrepo (ASB-7422-I67Z) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: (334) 956-8200 Facsimile: (334) 956-8481 rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org maria.morris@splcenter.org latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org valentina.restrepo@splcenter.org
Miriam Haskell* (FL. Bar No. 069033) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER P.O. Box 370037 Miami, FL 33137 Telephone: (786) 347-2056 Facsimile: (786) 237-2949 miriam.haskell@splcenter.org *admitted pro hac vice William Van Der Pol, Jr. (ASB-2112-114F) J. Patrick Hackney (ASB-6971-H51J) Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 Phone: (205) 348-4928 Fax: (205) 348-3909
Brent L. Rosen Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC 614 S. Hull Street Montgomery, AL 36104 Telephone: 334-223-3014 Facsimile: 334-263-0960 brosen@bakerdonelson.com
William Glassell Somerville, III Andrew Philip Walsh
137

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 138 of 140
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz 420 20th Street North; Suite 1400 Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: 205-250-8375 Facsimile: 205-488-3775 wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com awalsh@bakerdonelson.com Gregory M. Zarzaur Anil A. Mujumdar Diandra S. Debrosse Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: 205-983-7985 Facsimile: 888-505-0523 gregory@zarzaur.com anil@zarzaur.com diandra@zarzaur.com ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
138

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 139 of 140
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have on this 24th day of June, 2015, served a copy of the foregoing to all counsel of record, including the following opposing counsel and the mediator, by e-filing with the Court:
David Randall Boyd, Esq. John Garland Smith, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101
Michael Leon Edwards, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201
Susan Nettles Han, Esq. Balch & Bingham, LLP 1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 1500 Birmingham, AL 35203
William Richard Lunsford, Esq. Melissa Marler, Es q. Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 655 Gallatin Street Huntsville, AL 35801
Anne Hill, Esq. Elizabeth Anne Sees, Esq. Joseph Gordon Steward, Jr. Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, AL 36130
Mitesh Shah, Esq. Mitchell David Greggs. Esq. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC
139

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 210 Filed 06/25/15 Page 140 of 140

1901 6th Avenue North, Suite 2400 Birmingham, AL 35203
Gordon Douglas Jones Jones & Hawley, P.C. 2001 Park Place; Suite 830 Birmingham, AL 35203

/s/ Maria V. Morris Counsel for the Plaintiffs

140

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of the

)

Alabama Department of

)

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiffs in this class-action lawsuit are

more than 40 state prisoners and the Alabama

Disabilities Advocacy Program.

They assert the

following claims: inadequate medical and mental-health

treatment in Alabama prison facilities; denial of due

process for involuntary medical treatment; failure to

accommodate prisoners with disabilities properly; and

denial of prisoners’ rights to communicate with counsel

and challenge the conditions of their confinement.

They rely on the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments (as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983); the

Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C.

§§ 12131-12134); and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794). The defendants are the Alabama

Department of Corrections, its Commissioner, and its

Associate

Commissioner

of

Health

Services.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).

This cause is before the court on the question

whether the protocol for resolving discovery matters in

this case needs to be restructured. For the reasons

explained below, the answer is “Yes,” and this opinion

explains why and how.

To date, discovery has proceeded in this case with

a magistrate judge at the helm, but with objections to

the magistrate judge’s discovery orders then reviewed

by the court. This means that, between the magistrate

judge and the court, there have been two

decision-makers for the numerous discovery disputes

that already have arisen. This duplication of efforts

2

has been inefficient; has caused delays; and has expended unnecessarily the resources of both the parties and the court.
The first discovery dispute in this case arose over four months ago. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents (doc. no. 109). Since that motion was filed, the magistrate judge has issued three orders on discovery, see Orders dated April 8, 2015, May 12, 2015, & June 10, 2015 (doc. nos. 133, 163, & 199); the plaintiffs have filed objections to each, see Plaintiffs’ Objection to Order on Motion to Compel Production of Documents, Plaintiffs’ Renewed Objection to Order on Motion to Compel Production of Documents, & Plaintiffs’ Objection to Order on Motion to Compel Adequate Site Inspections (doc. nos. 146, 173, & 202); and both parties have filed numerous briefs and engaged in long hearings before the magistrate judge. These appeals now await resolution before this court. Moreover, it is clear from the parties’ responses to
3

the court’s recent show-cause order1 that continued
jurisdiction over discovery by the magistrate judge in
this case will result in further appeals. See Order
(doc. no. 213); Defendants’ Response (doc. no. 214);
Plaintiffs’ Response (doc. no. 216). Meanwhile, the
1. The court’s show-cause order was as follows:
“Chief Judge W. Keith Watkins entered the following order in Hope for Families & Community Service, Inc., et al. v. Warren, et al., civil action no. 3:06cv1113-WKW:
‘Upon review of the plaintiffs’ appeal of the discovery order of the Magistrate Judge ... and the filings related to the deferred portions of the plaintiffs’ motions to compel ..., it is obvious to the undersigned that discovery and other pretrial rulings by the Magistrate Judge will very likely result in further appeals, delay, and undue expenditure of resources of the parties and of the court. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that reference of discovery motions to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn until further order of the court.’
...
It is ORDERED that the parties in this case show cause, if any there be, in writing by July 1, 2015, as to why a similar order is not warranted in this case.” Order (doc. no. 213).
4

briefing schedule for class certification--and this court’s determination on the matter--has been delayed until these disputes are resolved, which could delay the trial of the case.
The court recognizes that, due to the scale of this case, discovery is both voluminous and complex. The court also recognizes that the parties’ difficulty resolving disagreements regarding the scope of discovery and the plaintiffs’ access to information within the defendants’ control makes sense: The nature of this case means that the strength of the parties’ arguments very well may turn on evidence that the plaintiffs obtain through the discovery process. Because the discovery disputes here could be as consequential to the outcome of the case as later determinations on the dispositive questions, they have been litigated with the same zeal, and this has resulted in numerous requests for review by the district court of “non-dispositive” matters.
5

Nevertheless, many of the discovery disputes boil down

to logistical, practical issues.

Further, the court is impressed that, when

discovery issues are resolved in this case, they tend

to be resolved most expeditiously, and more likely to

the greatest satisfaction of all, when the parties

simply sit down at a table, either figuratively or

literally, and informally attempt to resolve these

issues between themselves.

And these informal

resolutions occur sometimes at the urging of the

magistrate judge or the court.

Based on these concerns and observations, the court

is convinced that the case would proceed more smoothly,

and more swiftly, if the court’s resources were used in

a different way and thus that it is the best interest

of all to restructure the procedures for resolving discovery disputes in this case.2

2. Also, the court cannot overlook that, while researching the issue at hand, it became apparent that there is no standing order or local rule in this district referring discovery matters to its magistrate
6

The referral of matters to magistrate judges is
meant to “increas[e] the overall efficiency of the
Federal judiciary.” Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,
268 (1976) (citing S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 11 (1967)). Here, on the one hand, instead of
increasing efficiency, the referral of discovery to the
magistrate judge for formal resolution has resulted in
and likely will continue to result in significant
delays and inefficiency. On the other hand, there are
likely some--if not many--discovery issues (many of
which, as said, are logistical) that could benefit from
an informal first pass by a mediator familiar with the
case, who can assist the parties in coming to a quick
resolution on certain disputes and reduce the parties’
need to resort to the formal, adversarial process on so
judges. Nor is there any formal order of referral in this case. It appears that referral of such matters has been done by custom only. However, because “custom” does not establish the legality of a procedure, there is the concern that the referral of this matter to the magistrate judge, without a local rule, a standing order, or a formal order in the instant case, was not proper in the first place.
7

many discovery-related questions. A mediator also can make logistical recommendations to the court as necessary, and, at the very least, can winnow down the number of issues that must be presented to this court. In short, the court believes that a mediation process would best serve all in getting done what needs to be done. While the court’s show-cause order, see supra note 1, suggested withdrawing discovery from the reach of the magistrate judge altogether, the court believes that it still needs the help of the magistrate judge and therefore will adopt the magistrate judge as a mediator.
The court has already discussed this new process with the magistrate judge, who is well-trained in mediation, and he concurs that the process will likely result in a more expeditious resolution of discovery disputes.
* * * Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the discovery process in this case is restructured as follows:
8

(1) First, any party seeking resolution of a discovery dispute must file a request for mediation with the magistrate judge.
(2) Mediation will take place with the magistrate judge as mediator.
(3) Because the resolution of discovery disputes has been so contentious in this case, any and all discovery disputes resolved by mediation must be reduced to writing. The court will not recognize any oral agreements.
(4) The parties may file an appropriate objection or motion for resolution of those discovery disputes not resolved in mediation before the magistrate judge.
DONE, this the 27th day of July, 2015. ___/s/ Myron H. Thompson____ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 1 of 10

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT

NEW SCHEDULING ORDER

Please read this order carefully. These deadlines and responsibilities may not be changed without leave of court. All parties are expected to comply with each and every provision of this order in a timely manner, and extensions will be granted only in extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances. The parties are also expected to comply with the Middle District's Local Rules and the Middle District's Guidelines to Civil Discovery Practice, both of which can be found at http://www.almd.uscourts.gov/.

Under Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court is required to set a schedule for discovery and the filing of motions. Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 2 of 10
SECTION 1. This case will be tried in two phases: first, in Phase 1, the court will consider certification of the putative non-mental-health ADA subclass(es) and hear the non-mental-health ADA claims; second, in Phase 2, the court will consider certification of the other putative classes and hear all other claims.
In Phase 1, a pretrial conference is scheduled for May 16, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Montgomery, Alabama. Phase 1 is set for non-jury trial on June 20, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. The court anticipates that this trial will last four weeks.
In Phase 2, a pretrial conference is scheduled for September 12, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Montgomery, Alabama. Phase 2 is set for non-jury trial on October 17, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. The court anticipates that this trial will last eight weeks.
The pretrial conferences will be on the record and held in Chambers 200FMJ, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U. S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama.
At the pretrial conference for each phase, the court will consider the matters addressed by Rule 16. All parties will be expected to have complied fully with this new scheduling order.
ALL LEAD ATTORNEYS must appear at the time above designated and be fully prepared to state the facts of the relevant phase of the case in the most minute
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 3 of 10

detail, and be authorized to admit all facts that are true. All motions which have not been otherwise submitted or ruled on will be heard at the above stated time. Counsel should be prepared to argue them. Appropriate penalties will be imposed for failure to comply with these requirements.

The parties are DIRECTED to prepare JOINTLY a

proposed pretrial order in accordance with the attached

outline. The plaintiffs shall ensure that the proposed

pretrial order is received by the court NOT LATER THAN

THREE BUSINESS days prior to the pretrial conference by

either (1) delivery of the order (both hard copy and on

electronic media) to chambers or (2) by transmitting an

electronic copy of the proposed pretrial order to the

court as an attachment to an email message sent to

<propord_thompson@almd.uscourts.gov>.

For these

purposes, the electronic copy should be in Word format

and not in WordPerfect or Adobe Acrobat PDF format.

SECTION 2. Dispositive motions (i.e., motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment) and Daubert motions shall be filed no later than 35 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase. A brief and all supporting evidence shall be filed with any such motion. In all briefs filed by any party relating to the motion, the discussion of the evidence in the brief must be accompanied by a specific reference, by page and line, to where the evidence can be found in a supporting deposition or document. Failure to make such specific reference will result in the evidence not being considered by the court.

The opposing parties will be permitted to file responses within 21 days after such motions are due, and the moving parties will be permitted to file replies within 7 days after the responses are due.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 4 of 10
Daubert motions and issues will be heard at trial unless the court determines otherwise.
SECTION 3. Motions to amend the pleadings or to add parties shall be filed no later than 35 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase.
SECTION 4. Motions for class certification shall be filed no later than 35 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase. A brief addressing the factors enumerated in Rule 23(a), (b) and (g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be filed with any such motion. Opposition briefs shall be filed within 21 days after the motions for class certification are due, and the moving parties will be permitted to file replies within 7 days after the responses are due.
SECTION 5. The failure to file a response to any motion -- either dispositive or non-dispositive -within the time allowed by the Court shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion.
SECTION 6. All fact discovery shall be completed for both phases no later than 70 days prior to the pretrial conference for Phase 1.
All expert discovery shall be completed no later than 42 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase, except that, as to any witnesses whose names are not revealed until the last day allowed under SECTION 9 or whose names are not revealed with sufficient time for the other parties to take a deposition prior to the pretrial conference, the opposing party shall have the deadline in this paragraph extended to allow for deposing such witnesses. The failure to complete
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 5 of 10
discovery shall not be sufficient grounds to extend the dispositive and Daubert motion deadline.
SECTION 7. The parties shall disclose to each other the identity of ANY person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 701, 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and provide the reports of retained experts or witnesses whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involved giving expert testimony, required by Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no later than 56 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase.
The parties shall comply fully with all requirements of Rule 26(a)(2) in regard to disclosure of expert testimony. Unless an objection is filed within 14 days after disclosure of any expert witness, the disclosure shall be deemed to be in full compliance with the Rule.
SECTION 8. FORTY-TWO (42) DAYS BEFORE EACH PHASE OF TRIAL, each party shall, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, file a list of all its witnesses, and shall provide to all other parties, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3), the addresses and telephone numbers of all witnesses, except witnesses to be used solely for impeachment purposes, separately identifying those whom the party expects to present and those whom the party may call if the need arises. The witness list should include the names of any witnesses required to be disclosed under Section 8. Unless specifically agreed between the parties or allowed by the court for good cause shown, the parties shall be precluded from calling any witness not so identified. Objections to any witness identified must be filed no later than 21 days before the trial date and shall set out the
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 6 of 10

grounds and legal authority. The offering party shall file a written response to any objections no later than 14 days before the trial date.

SECTION 9. FORTY-TWO (42) DAYS BEFORE EACH PHASE

OF TRIAL, the parties shall, pursuant to the provisions

of Rule 26(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, file deposition designations that the

parties expect to use at trial. Designations must be

by page and line numbers, based on counsel’s good faith

opinion that they are relevant and admissible.

Designation of entire depositions is not allowed.

Adverse parties shall within one week thereafter file

deposition designations expected to be used in

response, and a party shall within three days of the

designation of such responsive parts file the

designation of any part that is desired as a rebuttal

thereto.

Unless specifically agreed between the

parties or allowed by the court for good cause shown,

the parties shall be precluded from using any part of a

deposition or other document not so listed, with the

exception of parts of depositions or documents to be

used solely for the purpose of impeachment. Except to

the extent written objections are filed 21 days prior

to the trial date, each party shall be deemed to have

agreed that one of the conditions for admissibility

under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

is satisfied with respect to any such deposition and

that there is no objection to the testimony so

designated. Objections shall state with particularity

the portions objected to, and the objecting party shall

attach a copy of the portions to which the objections

apply.

SECTION 10. FORTY-TWO (42) DAYS BEFORE EACH PHASE OF TRIAL, the parties shall, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 7 of 10
Procedure, file exhibit lists and furnish opposing counsel for copying and inspection all exhibits and tangible evidence to be used at the trial. The list shall identify specifically and separately by exhibit number each document to be offered, and general or bulk designations are not allowed. Proffering counsel shall have such evidence marked for identification prior to trial. Unless specifically agreed between the parties or allowed by the court for good cause shown, the parties shall be precluded from offering such evidence not so furnished and identified, with the exception of evidence to be used solely for the purpose of impeachment. Except to the extent written objections are filed, the evidence shall be deemed genuine and admissible in evidence. Objections shall be filed 21 days prior to the trial date, and shall set forth the grounds and legal authorities. The offering party shall file a written response to the objections no later than 14 days prior to trial and shall include a premarked copy of the evidence at issue.
SECTION 11. GENERAL PROVISIONS:
(A) All briefs on any matter before the court must be formal in format and filed with the Court. The Court does not accept "letter briefs" or "letter reports."
(B) A request or motion for extension of a deadline in any court order (i) must be in writing; (ii) must indicate that movant has, in a timely manner, previously contacted counsel for all other parties; and (iii), based on that contact, must state whether counsel for all other parties agree to or oppose the extension request or motion. A request or motion that fails to meet this requirement will be denied outright,
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 8 of 10

unless the movant offers a credible explanation in the

request or motion why this requirement has not been

met.

Absent stated unforeseen and unavoidable

circumstances beyond the control of the movant, oral

extension requests and motions are not allowed, and

"eleventh hour" extension requests and motions will be

denied outright.

(C) Any proposed order that a party desires the

court to enter should be submitted to the court in both

(i) an Adobe Acrobat PDF format attachment to the

motion and (ii) by transmitting an electronic copy of

the proposed order to the court as an attachment to an

email

message

sent

to

<propord_thompson@almd.uscourts.gov>.

For these

purposes, the electronic copy should be in Word format

and not in WordPerfect or Adobe Acrobat PDF format. If

the proposed order relates to discovery matters, e.g.,

a HIPAA order or protective order, an electronic copy

of the proposed order should be sent to the e-mail

address of the assigned Magistrate Judge whose address

may

be

found

at

<http://www.almd.uscourts.gov/judges/propord.htm>.

DONE, this the 8th day of September, 2015.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson____ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 9 of 10

NOTICE TO ATTORNEYS
The proposed pretrial order must be joint, and not piecemeal, and it should be reviewed and approved by all parties BEFORE the pretrial hearing.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, ________ERN DIVISION

Plaintiff, v.
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER ON PRETRIAL HEARING A pretrial hearing was held in this case on ______, wherein the following proceedings were held and actions taken: 1. PARTIES AND TRIAL COUNSEL:

COUNSEL APPEARING AT PRETRIAL HEARING: (same

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 239 Filed 09/08/15 Page 10 of 10
as trial counsel) or (indicate if different)
2. JURISDICTION AND VENUE:
3. PLEADINGS: The following pleadings and amendments were allowed:
4. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES: (a) The plaintiff(s)
(b) The defendant(s) PLEASE LEAVE ORDER UNFINISHED AT THIS POINT FOR COMPLETION BY THE COURT.

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of the

)

Alabama Department of

)

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiffs in this class-action lawsuit are

more than 40 state prisoners and the Alabama

Disabilities Advocacy Program. The prisoners intend to

represent a putative class of all prisoners in the

state system. If a class is certified, the litigation

could affect over 25,000 prisoners in approximately 29

facilities. The defendants are the Alabama Department

of Corrections (ADOC), its Commissioner, and its

Associate Commissioner of Health Services.

The plaintiffs assert the following claims: inadequate medical and mental-health treatment in Alabama prison facilities; denial of due process for involuntary mental-health treatment; failure to accommodate prisoners with disabilities; and retaliation against the plaintiffs for communicating with counsel in order to challenge these conditions of their confinement. They rely on the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983); the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.); and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794). They seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).
This litigation is before the court on the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. The defendants seek the dismissal of the claims of two named plaintiffs, Zerrick Naylor and Bradley Pearson, who have been released from prison since the case was
2

filed. The defendants argue that these two plaintiffs lack standing and, alternatively, that their claims are moot. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion will be denied with respect to standing. With respect to mootness, the motion will be reserved, and a hearing will be set to take additional evidence and hear further argument.
I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Naylor and Pearson are both disabled: Naylor is blind, and Pearson is hearing-impaired and communicates by sign language. They claim that they have been denied reasonable accommodations for their disabilities. Both also claim that, because of their disabilities, they have been denied access to certain programs, benefits, and services available to other prisoners. Other blind and deaf prisoners are also plaintiffs in this suit, but, Naylor and Pearson contend, no other plaintiffs were denied reasonable
3

accommodations or programming in the same ways as they were.
This lawsuit was filed in June 2014. At that time, Naylor and Pearson were both in prison based on ‘split’ sentences. Under Alabama law, with certain crimes excepted, a court may ‘split’ a sentence of 20 years or less by requiring the defendant to serve a period of time in prison, suspending the remainder of the sentence, and requiring the defendant to serve a term of probation. See 1975 Ala. Code § 15-18-8(a)(1). Upon finding a violation of probation, the court may revoke the probation and require the defendant to serve the remainder of his original sentence in prison, less any time already served, or, depending upon the circumstances, impose a lesser prison sentence, modify the conditions of probation, or continue the defendant on probation. See generally 1975 Ala. Code § 15-18-8; Dixon v. Alabama, 912 So. 2d 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
4

In February 2015, more than seven months after this

lawsuit was filed, Naylor and Pearson were released

from ADOC custody and began to serve probation on split

sentences. Naylor had served three years in prison,

and Pearson, two years.

Naylor will remain on

probation and subject to conditions of release for

three years; Pearson will remain on supervised probation for, at least, five years.1 If they do not

meet their conditions of probation, they could face a

return to prison.

Since filing the original complaint, the plaintiffs

have amended their pleadings several times. Naylor and

Pearson were released from prison after the first

amended complaint was filed; the second amended

1. Although Naylor and Pearson submitted a court order from Naylor’s case purporting to place him on unsupervised probation for the remainder of his 15-year sentence, Alabama law provides that the maximum period of probation is five years. See 1975 Ala. Code § 15-22-54(a) (“[I]n no case ... shall the maximum probation period of a defendant guilty of a felony exceed five years.”). Accordingly, it is unclear whether he will actually remain on probation for more than five years.
5

complaint, which added a new named plaintiff and some more-detailed factual allegations,2 reflected these changes in their status.
II. DISCUSSION After the second amended complaint was filed, the defendants moved to have Naylor and Pearson dismissed. The defendants argue that, because these two plaintiffs had been released from custody, their claims are now moot and based on the second amended complaint, they no longer have standing to proceed. Standing and mootness are related but separate issues. “[T]he emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
2. The factual allegations regarding Naylor’s treatment remained identical; the factual allegations regarding Pearson’s treatment remained identical except for a new allegation that he suffered the discrimination he had experienced in other arenas of prison life in a class he was required to attend shortly before his release.
6

and whether the dispute touches upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Once a party has established standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, the claim he asserts must remain “live” throughout the pendency of the lawsuit--that is, it cannot become moot. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).
Although the Supreme Court famously described mootness as “standing set in a time frame,” it has emphasized that “there are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). Therefore, the fact that a plaintiff would not now have standing to initiate a challenge to a given practice
7

does not necessarily mean that a previously filed challenge has become moot.
Here, there is no dispute that Naylor and Pearson both had standing to bring suit when they filed their original complaint in June 2014.; that, since then, they have both been released; and that, when the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, they updated it to reflect that change. Whether Naylor and Pearson retain their personal stake in the lawsuit thus comes down to two questions: Did amending their complaint to reflect their release defeat their standing? And did their release moot their claims? Because standing is typically a preliminary determination, the court will begin with it.
A. Standing As explained above, Naylor’s and Pearson’s claims concern the alleged denial of reasonable accommodations for their disabilities while in prison and the alleged denial of access to certain programs, benefits, and
8

services on account of their disabilities. There is no dispute that they had standing when the first complaint was filed. Instead, the defendants argue that, because they had been released by the time the first amended complaint was filed, they no longer have standing. The court disagrees.
The standing inquiry asks whether such a dispute exists at the beginning of the litigation, as compared to the mootness inquiry, which asks whether such a dispute remains throughout the litigation. See Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (standing is assessed "at the outset of the litigation" (citation omitted)); see also Cleveland Branch, NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[S]tanding does not have to be maintained .... Instead, it is to be determined as of the time the complaint is filed."); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1991) ("As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is
9

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and subsequent events do not deprive the court of jurisdiction.").
Normally, a case begins, for standing purposes, when the initial complaint is filed. However, in a case which the defendants rely on, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized an exception to this rule of thumb, apparently in order to prevent litigants from trying to shoehorn standing for expired claims by amending them onto unrelated complaints. In Focus, 344 F.3d at 1275, it concluded that, when an amended complaint raises new allegations which do not relate back to a transaction or occurrence identified in the original complaint, standing (at least with respect to claims based on these new allegations) must be assessed as of the date of the amendment. In that case, the plaintiff initially alleged that it would suffer First Amendment injury because it was not permitted to advertise for a conference to be held on a certain future date; an amended complaint making the same
10

allegation was not filed until after the date of the

conference had past. Id. Because the allegations were

“identical” and thus "plainly relate[d] back" under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), the court held that the

plaintiff needed to show standing only as of the date

its original complaint was filed. Id.

Neither Focus nor any other precedent holds that

standing is to be reassessed every time an amended

complaint is filed.

Litigants routinely amend

complaints for a wide variety of reasons, many of them

not particularly substantive. Absent an amendment

which effectively begins the case anew by adding in

unrelated allegations (or new plaintiffs), standing once established need not be reconsidered.3 This does

3. The court also notes that, with respect to Naylor and Pearson, the second amended complaint functioned as a ‘supplemental’ rather than an ‘amended’ pleading. Formal styling aside, the portion of the filing relevant to them did not add “facts or legal claims in existence at the time the original pleading was filed,” as appropriate in an amendment, Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 n.8 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)); rather, it “set
(footnote continued) 11

not, of course, leave defendants without recourse when
a dispute evaporates after a case against them has
begun; they can argue, just as defendants do here, that
the plaintiffs' claims have become moot.
Here, Naylor and Pearson's allegations regarding
the conditions of confinement in the defendants' prison
facilities have likewise remained essentially the same;
they certainly concern the same “conduct, transaction,
or occurrence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Just as
forth new facts in order to update the earlier pleading,” as appropriate in a supplement, id. at 1359-60 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), other citations omitted); see also C. Wright & A. Miller, 3 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1504 (“[Amended pleadings] relate to matters that occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading and entirely replace the earlier pleading; [supplemental pleadings] deal with events subsequent to the pleading to be altered and represent additions to or continuations of the earlier pleadings.”).
In substance, Naylor and Pearson’s filing was an update as to the newly arisen fact of their release. Presumably, this supplement was folded for convenience into an amended pleading that had to be filed in order to add a new named plaintiff. Standing requirements imposed on amended complaints are inapposite where, as here, it would have been appropriate for the plaintiffs at issue--Naylor and Pearson--to instead file a supplemental pleading.
12

in Focus, the fact that their amended complaint reveals that they were subjected to these conditions in the past is irrelevant to the standing analysis. Because their allegations plainly relate back to their original complaint, they need show standing only as of the date it was filed. This they have done. The defendants' contention that Naylor and Pearson no longer present a justiciable case or controversy is properly considered not as a question of standing, but rather as one of mootness.
B. Mootness Having established that Naylor and Pearson had standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction in the first place and that they maintain that standing now, the court turns to a distinct, and more fact-intensive question: Are their claims now moot? In other words, do Naylor and Pearson maintain a personal, legally cognizable interest in the litigation, or must these plaintiffs and their claims be dismissed from the case?
13

Because more evidence is required for the court to resolve this issue, it is reserved pending an evidentiary hearing; nevertheless, this opinion will set out analytical guideposts.
“Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)[, such as in motions to dismiss on mootness grounds,] come in two forms. Facial attacks on the complaint require the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion. Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion is brought, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence
14

of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Id.
Although the defendants’ motion to dismiss was based in significant part on an undisputed fact that appeared on the face of the amended complaint--that is, that Naylor and Pearson had been released from prison--it also took issue with the plaintiffs’ allegation regarding another critical fact, on which mootness might turn: whether Naylor and Pearson in fact “have a high risk of being readmitted to ADOC custody and facing the same discriminatory practices [they] faced prior to [their] release.” See Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class Action Complaint (doc. no. 127) at 8. The motion argued that the plaintiffs had offered “no specific support ... [for this] pessimistic assertion[,]” and “ignore[d] the practical reality that the practices they complain of will not evade review.” Id. Naylor and Pearson responded, attempting to answer with some
15

additional evidence, including statistics about the overall reincarceration rates of Alabama probationers on split sentences and Pearson’s criminal record. Therefore, this court will treat the motion to dismiss as a factual attack.
“Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction--its very power to hear the case--there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-13 (5th Cir. May 20, 1981).4 In considering such a factual attack, it is within “[t]he unique power of district courts to make factual findings which are decisive of jurisdiction ....” Id. at 413. The court will hold a hearing to inform its exercise of that power.
4. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
16

Somewhat different mootness analyses apply to individual claims and to claims brought on behalf of a putative class; hence, this discussion will proceed to consider both in turn, though the individual and class claims are substantively the same.
1. Plaintiffs’ Contentions In opposing the motion to dismiss, Naylor and Pearson suggest that, because there is a significant chance that they will be reincarcerated (more on this below), none of their claims has been mooted by their release and they remain free to proceed just as if they were still in prison. But this broad assertion is without support in relevant case law. They rely on an out-of-circuit case, Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), that does not go so far as they suggest, and a district court decision, Hernandez v. Monterey, 70 F. Supp. 3d 963 (N.D. Cal.
17

2014) (Grewal, J.), that is inconsistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent.
In Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 860-61, 865-67, the Ninth Circuit held that disabled parolees had standing to challenge on behalf of a class discrimination during parole-revocation hearings. As a preliminary matter, this is a standing case, not a mootness case. In any event, the appeals court based its conclusion regarding standing on extensive factual findings made by the district court regarding the likelihood that the plaintiffs would be placed into parole-revocation proceedings (though not, it appears, regarding the likelihood that their parole would in fact be revoked). The court allowed the already paroled plaintiffs to pursue claims regarding those hearings; however, it nowhere suggested that they would have standing to challenge any form of discrimination they might suffer
18

in prison if their parole were actually revoked.5
Compare McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1217-18
(10th Cir. 1999) (“[O]ther than (arguably) the Seventh
Circuit, our research indicates that every circuit to
consider the issue has decided that release to parole
moots a claim regarding prison conditions and
regulations, as opposed to parole procedures or
conditions and regulations that affect parole.” (citing
opinions of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and D.C. Circuits)).
Naylor and Pearson also cite Hernandez, 70 F. Supp.
3d at 969-72, 974-76, a jail-conditions suit seeking
prospective relief. There, the court held that several
inmate plaintiffs who were not in incarcerated in the
5. Notably, the Armstrong plaintiffs’ claims regarding parole-revocation hearings (as distinct from claims regarding conditions of confinement more generally) likely would have qualified for a mootness exception--either the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception for individual claims, or the ‘inherently transitory’ exception for class claims--due to the district court’s findings regarding the likelihood of recurrence and the brevity of such hearings.
19

jail when the complaint was filed had standing to seek

prospective relief. Id. at 976. The court based its

holding on Armstrong v. Davis, reading the case to hold

that, because these plaintiffs were under supervision

and therefore “still subject to the disputed conditions

of the jail,” they had standing. However, as discussed

above, Armstrong actually did not go so far as the

Hernandez court said.

Further, this holding of

Hernandez conflicts with binding Eleventh Circuit

precedent, which will be discussed below. Accordingly,

this court cannot rely on it.

2. Individual Claims “The general rule is that a prisoner’s transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief” regarding conditions of confinement. McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984). This is because “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a pending case or controversy regarding injunctive relief
20

if unaccompanied by any continuing, present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). See also McAlpine, 187 F.3d at 1215 (“[W]hen an inmate’s claim for prospective relief regarding conditions of confinement becomes moot due to the inmate-plaintiff’s release from confinement, the inmate’s parole or supervised release status does not, absent some exceptional showing, bring that claim under the narrow ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception to the mootness doctrine.”).
However, when a prisoner brings a claim that is ‘capable of repetition, but evading review,’ that claim is not moot even when the injury has, for now, ended, such as due to his or her release from custody. For individual claims, “the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ doctrine [is] limited to the situation where two elements combine[]: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there
21

[is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining

party would be subjected to the same action again.”

Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (citations

omitted). To meet this second threshold, a plaintiff

must allege more than a “mere physical or theoretical

possibility” of recurrence; rather there must be a

“reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability

that the same controversy will recur involving the same

complaining party.”

Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Honig v. Doe, 484

U.S. 305, 318 n.6 (1988) (explaining that the

likelihood of recurrence need not be “established with

mathematical precision” as long as the expectation of

recurrence is reasonable, and that the question is

“whether the controversy was capable of repetition and

not ... whether the claimant had demonstrated that a

recurrence of the dispute was more probable than not).

The court will require additional briefing and

evidence as to both prongs of the test. Naylor and

Pearson should identify any specific claims that they

22

believe will evade review because they challenge conditions to which a prisoner is subjected for a brief period of time. They should submit evidence as to the durations of these conditions. They should also submit individualized evidence substantiating their assertions that, due to the conditions of their release, their disabilities, or any other reasons, they are especially likely to have their probation revoked and be reincarcerated. See, e.g., id. at 320 (“[T]he record is replete with evidence that Smith is unable to govern his aggressive, impulsive behavior. ... In the absence of any suggestion that respondent has overcome his earlier difficulties, it is certainly reasonable to expect, based on his prior history of behavioral problems, that he will again engage in classroom misconduct.”); Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 867 (basing the conclusion that “a person with disabilities is more likely to be suspected of conduct that results in the revocation of parole than other parolees” on specific factual findings of the district court). To the extent
23

they allege that the very discrimination they have experienced has increased their likelihood of reincarceration, Naylor and Pearson should explain how it has done so. Finally, they should explain to the court why their reincarceration would necessarily result in the reimposition of the conditions they have identified as ‘evading review.’ The defendants should submit any evidence to the contrary.
3. Class Claims Of course, Naylor and Pearson do not distinguish in their substantive allegations between ‘individual’ and ‘class’ claims--they make the same allegations on behalf of themselves as they do on behalf of unnamed putative class members who are similarly disabled and are alleged to suffer similar discrimination. However, the mootness analysis differs depending on whether the court is considering the claims as brought on behalf of individual plaintiffs or on behalf of a class. Because these claims have been litigated as class claims from
24

the outset of the case, but no class has yet been

certified, the court must consider them under both

frameworks.

When a named plaintiff’s claim becomes moot after

certification of the class, the claim remains

justiciable for Article III purposes. Geraghty, 445

U.S. at 403-04; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.

747, 753-54 (1976).

By contrast, when a named

plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot prior to the

certification of a class, the class claim is normally

mooted. Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th

Cir. 1987) (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 & n.11).

However, a well-recognized exception exists: “where a

named plaintiff’s claim is ‘inherently transitory,’ and

becomes moot prior to certification, a motion for

certification may ‘relate back’ to the filing of the

complaint.” Genesis Healthcare Corp., v. Symczyk, 133

S. Ct. 1523, 1528 n.2 (2013) (citation omitted). See

also Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 131 (1977)

(explaining that the Court had “adjudicated the merits

25

of [] class claims notwithstanding the mootness of the claims of the named parties” when “mootness was due to the inexorable passage of time”); Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 651 F.2d 1030, 1045 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that while “a suit brought as a class action must as a general rule be dismissed for mootness when the personal claims of the named plaintiffs are satisfied and no class has properly been certified,” “this general rule must yield when the district court is unable reasonably to rule on a motion for class certification before the individual claims of the named plaintiffs become moot”).
The Supreme Court established this exception to mootness for ‘inherently transitory’ pre-certification class claims in a line of cases beginning with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 395-403 (1975). Sosna itself concerns post-certification mootness. Sosna, an Iowa resident who wanted a divorce but had resided in the state for less than a year, brought a class action challenging an Iowa durational-residency requirement
26

that limited state-court divorce jurisdiction to persons who had resided in the State for at least one year. The district court certified the class, but by the time her case was on appeal at the Supreme Court, Sosna had both resided in Iowa for more than a year and had already procured the divorce elsewhere. Although the Court noticed that Sosna’s individual claim was moot, it did not dismiss her action and ruled on the merits of the class claims.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning rested in part, and as relevant here, on the transitory nature of Sosna’s claim. When “the issue sought to be litigated escapes full appellate review at the behest of any single challenger,” the Court explained, the case “does not inexorably become moot by the intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs.” Id. at 401. Rather, while the Court took care to “in no way detract[] from the firmly established requirement that the judicial power of Art. III courts extends only to ‘cases and controversies,’” id. at 402, it set out a
27

flexible, case-specific approach to assessing mootness. “In cases in which the alleged harm would not dissipate during the normal time required for resolution of the controversy, the general principles of Art. III jurisdiction require that the plaintiff’s personal stake in the litigation continue throughout the entirety of the litigation.” Id. On the other hand, in cases such as the one brought by Sosna (where, due to the transitory nature of the claim, no particular “spokesman ... could retain a personal adversary position throughout the course of the litigation”), the Court shifted its focus to the ongoing controversy still “very much alive for the class of persons she has been certified to represent.” Id. at 401 & n.9.
In keeping with this practical approach, the Court also issued a further instruction. While Sosna’s holding relied firmly on “the fact that a putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is certified under Rule 23,” Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1530, the Court noted that, “There may be cases in which the
28

controversy involving the named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion.” Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402 n.11 (emphasis added). “In such instances, whether the certification can be said to ‘relate back’ to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review.” Id.
Since then, the Court has affirmed and developed this pre-certification analysis. In particular, the Court expressly held in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin that the ‘relation-back’ doctrine applied even though “the class was not certified until after the named plaintiffs’ claims had become moot” because the claims raised were inherently transitory.6 500 U.S.
6. Indeed, this is true even before a formal motion for certification has been made. As the Eleventh Circuit recently explained, “There is nothing in the [relevant caselaw] that suggests the relation-back doctrine turns on whether the named plaintiffs’
(footnote continued) 29

44, 52 (1991) (citations omitted). As the Court has more recently explained, the “‘inherently transitory’ rationale was developed to address circumstances in which the challenged conduct was effectively unreviewable, because no plaintiff possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for litigation to run its course.” Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1531.
A claim is inherently transitory not only if there exists no plaintiff who could both establish standing at the outset of litigation and retain an active stake by the time class certification is decided, but also if

individual claims become moot before or after the

plaintiffs move to certify a class.

Quite the

contrary. ... [A] motion to certify, without more, does

nothing that is significant on this issue. The motion

indicates that the named plaintiff intends to represent

a class if allowed to do so, but the complaint itself

announces that same intent; the motion is not needed

for that purpose. ... The assertion that a motion

fundamentally changes the legal landscape--indeed, that

it impacts the constitutional prerequisites to

jurisdiction under Article III--makes no sense. What

matters is that the named plaintiff acts diligently to

pursue the class claims.” Stein, 772 F.3d at 707.

This case has been litigated by both parties and

treated by the court as a putative class action from

the outset.

30

it would be difficult to identify which prospective plaintiff that would be at the time of filing. As the Court explained in Gerstein v. Pugh, a claim should be considered inherently transitory when “[i]t is by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, would be in ... custody long enough for a district judge to certify the class.” 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (emphasis added). Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have held that, although “the ultimate length of confinement does affect the applicability of the ‘inherently transitory’ exception, the essence of the exception is uncertainty about whether a claim will remain alive for any given plaintiff long enough for a district court to certify the class.” Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); accord Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 90-92 (2d Cir. 1977); Thorpe v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (Huvelle, J.).
Claims that derive from potentially imminent release from custody are “a classic example of a
31

transitory claim.” Wade v. Kirkland, 118 F.3d 667, 670
(9th Cir. 1997). However, it is not clear whether
Naylor and Pearson are raising such claims. See id.
(reversing and remanding for the district court to take
evidence on the average length of detention in a county
jail in order to determine whether the claims brought
on behalf of a class of inmates were “in fact
‘inherently transitory’”).
Again, the court requires additional briefing and
evidence.7 Should they seek to argue that their claims
are inherently transitory, Naylor and Pearson should
identify any specific claims that they believe are
inherently transitory as defined in the case law
7. Although Sosna and its progeny have recognized the existence of the ‘inherently transitory’ exception to class claims, its application in this circuit has at times been confusing. In particular, in Tucker, 819 F.2d at 1035, the Eleventh Circuit considered putative class claims brought by a named plaintiff who had aged out of the class he was attempting to represent (juveniles confined in the county jail), but discussed the applicability of the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception, not the ‘inherently transitory’ exception. The parties may wish to address the relevance of Tucker’s analysis to this case.
32

discussed here. They should submit evidence as to the average durations of these conditions, and any uncertainty regarding those durations. They should also submit evidence demonstrating that it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be subjected to these conditions. The defendants should submit argument and evidence to the contrary.
* * * For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The defendants’ partial motion to dismiss (doc. no. 127) is denied as to standing. (2) As to mootness, the motion is reserved and set for a hearing at 10:00 a.m. on December 16, 2015, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (3) The plaintiffs are to submit a pre-hearing brief outlining the evidence they intend to present and explaining why that evidence supports their positions
33

on mootness no later than 21 days before the hearing; the defendants are to respond no later than 14 days before the hearing; and the plaintiffs may reply no later than seven days before the hearing.
DONE, this the 6th day of October, 2015. ___/s/ Myron H. Thompson____ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
34

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 1 of 50

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER I. Introduction The issue currently before the court in this prison-conditions case is whether the plaintiffs are entitled, under either Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (specifically as interpreted in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1998)) or the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10807, to the production of quality-assurance

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 2 of 50
documents by non-party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (MHM).
One of the plaintiffs in this case is the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), which is the State’s designated protection and advocacy system (P&A); the function of a P&A is to “protect and advocate the rights of individuals with mental illness [] and investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness....” 42 U.S.C.A. § 10803. The other plaintiffs are a group of Alabama prisoners, who seek to represent putative classes of other prisoners.
The defendants are the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC), ADOC Commissioner Jefferson S. Dunn, and ADOC Associate Commissioner for Health Services Ruth Naglich. MHM, which is not a party to this case, contracts with ADOC to provide mental-health care to prisoners in ADOC’s custody.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 3 of 50
As relevant here, the plaintiffs allege: that the defendants’ mental-health-care system, as administered by MHM, is constitutionally inadequate and violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; that the defendants, through MHM, involuntarily medicate mentally ill prisoners without providing the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment; and that the defendants discriminate against mentally ill prisoners in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134.
In the course of the discovery process, MHM has refused to produce a number of documents (a few hundred pages worth), with respect to which it has asserted an Alabama state-law ‘quality assurance’ (alternately referred to as ‘peer review’) privilege, as codified at 1975 Ala. Code § 22-21-8.1 MHM has also--in the
1. Section 22-21-8(b) of the 1975 Alabama Code states in relevant part: “All accreditation, quality assurance credentialing and similar materials shall be (continued...)
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 4 of 50
alternative--urged the court to recognize a similar
federal common-law privilege.
The documents at issue, which the court has
reviewed in camera, are grouped into three distinct
categories by MHM but can all be characterized as
audits. As described by MHM itself, in its briefing to
this court and its proposal for its ADOC contract,
these audits include “random samplings of clinician[s’]
credentialing files, patient charts and meeting minutes
as well as comparisons of contractually obligated
service elements to actual services performed at the
facilit[ies],” MHM Brief in Opposition (doc. no. 294)
held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action against a health care professional or institution arising out of matters which are the subject of evaluation and review for accreditation, quality assurance and similar functions, purposes, or activities.” See also 1975 Ala. Code § 22-21-8(a) (“Accreditation, quality assurance and similar materials as used in this section shall include written reports, records, correspondence, and materials concerning the accreditation or quality assurance or similar function or any hospital, clinic, or medical staff.”).
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 5 of 50
at 2 n.1, and also draw on “meetings with [ADOC], mental health, medical and security leadership; meetings with mental health line staff and correctional officers; ... and observation of actual clinical interventions,” MHM Proposal (doc. no. 301-1) at 10.
After attempting to mediate, see Order, Dunn v. Dunn, 2015 WL 4661318 (M.D. Ala. July 27, 2015) (Thompson, J.), the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the production of these documents, arguing that state-law privileges do not apply in federal-question cases, that no federal common-law quality-assurance privilege exists in cases raising civil-rights claims, and that federal statutory law actually mandates the disclosure of the documents at issue to ADAP upon its request.
For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the asserted privileges are inapplicable in this
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 6 of 50
litigation, and will therefore order MHM to produce the documents at issue.2
II. State Statutory Law All of the claims in this case were brought pursuant to federal, rather than state, law. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 therefore makes clear that federal common law (or a federal statute, if applicable)--not state law--“governs [this] claim of privilege.” 1975 Alabama Code § 22-21-8 has no direct bearing here. Cf. Marshall v. Planz, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1273 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (Thompson, J.) (recognizing that “Rule 501 no longer prevent[ed] the application of the state-law peer review privilege now that [all federal] claims
2. Because the court rejects MHM’s assertion of privilege on the ground that neither the state-law privilege nor an equivalent federal common-law privilege applies here, the court assumes without deciding that the documents at issue would fall within the scope of the state-law privilege being asserted and need not decide whether MHM has, as the plaintiffs contend, waived any quality-assurance privilege by failing to assert it in a timely manner.
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 7 of 50
ha[d] been dismissed on summary judgment”). Hence, the state-law privilege MHM claims is--as MHM essentially conceded during a telephonic hearing on this motion--not directly applicable.
II. Federal Common Law MHM urges the court, however, to recognize an equivalent privilege under the federal common law.
A. Adkins In Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1326-30 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit applied the test articulated in Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8, 10-15, in order to determine “whether to recognize the [‘medical peer review’] privilege in federal civil rights cases.” Although it noted that such a privilege has been implemented in every State,3 the court expressly
3. See Jenkins v. DeKalb Cnty., 242 F.R.D. 652, 661 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (Thrash, J.) (“[W]hile the policies of the 50 states bear[] on the wisdom of a particular (continued...)
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 8 of 50
declined to recognize a federal common-law peer-review privilege in civil-rights cases. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330. Indeed, “[i]t appears that every United States Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue of whether there is a federal medical peer review privilege has rejected the claim.” Jenkins v. DeKalb Cnty., 242 F.R.D. 652, 659 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (Thrash, J.). Although MHM attempts to distinguish Adkins, on the ground that it involved a claim of employment discrimination to which the peer-review evidence at issue was essential, this court disagrees; the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is squarely applicable to this case.
As Adkins explained, the relevant factors under Jaffee are: “1) the needs of the public good; 2) whether the privilege is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust; 3) the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege; and 4) consensus among the privilege, an inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is not a privilege popularity contest.”).
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 9 of 50
states.” 488 F.3d at 1328. Because the distinctions MHM attempts to draw relate only to the third and, to a lesser extent, the first factors, the court relies on the discussion of the second and fourth factors in Adkins without rehashing that analysis.
1. Evidentiary Value MHM’s first and most strident argument in support of its assertion of privilege is that the documents at issue here are of less evidentiary value than were the documents involved in Adkins, which were “critical” to proving that discrimination had occurred. 488 F.3d at 1329. But Adkins and Jaffee nowhere suggest that evidence over which a purported privilege is asserted must be essential to the claims of the party moving to compel production in order for a court to decline to recognize the privilege (indeed, it is impossible for a court to determine with certainty that any given piece of evidence is the linchpin of a case before hearing
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 10 of 50
the rest of the evidence); rather, the relative value of the evidence is one factor to be considered. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12 (observing, in recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege, that “the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of the privilege is modest”).
Although the documents MHM seeks to withhold might not be essential to the plaintiffs’ case, their evidentiary value is likely quite significant. These documents draw on source material otherwise unavailable to the plaintiffs, and will likely prove extremely important as they attempt to demonstrate that the defendants’ policies and practices towards mentally ill prisoners evince deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights. Moreover, this evidence might well be valuable in determining whether to certify a class or classes and, if liability is proven, how to craft an effective remedy.
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 11 of 50
Contrary to MHM’s assertion, the plaintiffs do not otherwise have access to some of the source materials on which the quality-assurance assessments in these documents were based; in particular, they draw on extensive conversations with medical, mental-health, and security staff that plaintiffs’ counsel and their experts have not been permitted to conduct and observations of clinical interactions that they have not been allowed to make. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support (doc. no. 301) at 4; see also Mediation Agreement Pertaining to Discovery (doc. no. 250-1) at 22 (“ADOC will provide an employee of ADOC or its contractors to answer questions any Plaintiffs’ expert may have regarding the location or use of any item or portion of any ADOC facility that may be visited. ... However, nothing in this paragraph will required ADOC to respond to questions concerning its programs or the efficacy of the same.); id. at 26 (“Except as set forth above, and as necessary for the purpose of escorting
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 12 of 50
the experts to the requested areas of the facilities and identifying records to be reviewed or inmates to be met with, counsel for the Plaintiffs and any expert witness retained by them agree to have no contact with any employee or contractor of ADOC during any visit allowed by this agreement.”).
Even if the plaintiffs did have all of the source materials on which MHM drew in assessing the care it was providing to prisoners in ADOC custody, MHM’s own analysis of that information would have distinct and significant evidentiary value, above and beyond the value of such information in a run-of-the-mill malpractice case. In a medical-malpractice case, peer-review materials are relevant only because they provide an assessment of the quality of care provided to an individual patient; while a provider’s acknowledgement of errors may be particularly damning, the plaintiffs’ experts’ assessment of the care provided goes to the same issue: whether the care was
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 13 of 50
substandard. Here, by contrast, MHM’s own assessment
of the care it has been providing is likely to be
central to--indeed, perhaps necessary for--the court’s
determination of a number of other issues.
As a preliminary note, although MHM contends that
its client, ADOC, does not have access to its
peer-review documents, there appears, on the current
record, to be no basis for this contention.4 MHM’s
contract with ADOC states that “MHM shall make
available to the ADOC, at the ADOC’s request, all
records, documents, and other papers relating to the
4. The court takes pains to acknowledge that it reaches this conclusion--as it must--based on the limited record before it. Specifically, although the defendants were invited to file a brief in response to the motion to compel, they declined to file anything. The defendants are nonetheless free to argue, when this case is tried on the merits, that they were not able to access (or believed they were not able to access) MHM’s quality quality-assurance documents; if presented with additional evidence on this point, the court will reconsider its conclusion. However, the plaintiffs would in any event need to be able to review the contents of the documents in order to be able meaningfully to contest such a contention by the defendants that the documents fall outside the scope of the contractual provision discussed below.
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 14 of 50
direct delivery of mental health care services to inmates hereunder.” MHM Contract (doc. no. 301-2) at 4. The court has reviewed the documents at issue, and they appear to fall within the plain language of this contractual provision: they “relat[e] to the direct delivery of mental health care,” in that they discuss numerous individual cases as well as practices employed by practitioners in administering treatment to patients. More generally, they concern the quality of MHM’s direct delivery of services, and are designed to improve it. Furthermore, were there any ambiguity as to the meaning of this provision, evidence extrinsic to the contract appears strongly to suggest that both parties intended the provision to cover quality-assurance documents. MHM stated plainly and repeatedly in its proposal in response to ADOC’s request for proposals that it would share its quality-assurance reports with ADOC; indeed, MHM’s concerted efforts to share the information gleaned from
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 15 of 50
its quality-assurance activities appears to have been a selling point. See MHM Proposal (doc. no. 301-1) at 4-6 (stating that “MHM understands and agrees to the requirements" of the portion of the request for proposals that required that a "report of the findings [of the vendor’s Comprehensive Quality Improvement (CQI) program] will be presented at the monthly administrative meeting between Vendor and ADOC Director of Treatment"; that MHM will “provide[]” ADOC with "[r]eports from routine monitoring and special studies ... regularly during monthly administrative meetings and quarterly CQI meetings" and “submit[]” "semi-annual and annual reports to the ADOC”; that "[g]uided by the ADOC, the MHM CQI program will continue to collaborate with the Department and the medical contractor, share information and data, as well as actively coordinate and participate in CQI activities”; and that MHM “will ensure that utilization and outcome data as well as the
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 16 of 50
results of CQI studies and corrective action plans are reported to the ADOC at least quarterly”).5
The court is faced with a systemic challenge to the quality of mental-health care--specifically, an allegation that the quality is so poor as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment--and a claim that ADOC discriminates against mentally ill prisoners. Both the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and ADA claims therefore place at issue not merely ADOC’s treatment of individual prisoners but also, much more importantly, its policies and practices with respect to all mentally
5. As a side note, the fact that MHM’s quality-assurance program is contractually mandated, and the fact that its purported quality is apparently a major selling point, suggest that the second Jaffee factor--“whether the privilege is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust”--weighs more strongly in favor of rejecting the privilege in this case than in Adkins. Although it is conceivable that the risk of self-critical disclosure might lead a private hospital to consider cutting back on its quality-assurance programs, it appears that if MHM decided to do so, it would find itself out of business.
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 17 of 50
ill prisoners.6 As other courts have recognized,
“evidence of unconstitutional policies and customs may
not exist outside of the confines of [such reports],”
because “unofficial, defacto practices and customs
within the jail are ... difficult to expose[,]” Estate
of Belbachir v. Cnty. of McHenry, 2007 WL 2128341, at
*6–*7 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2007) (Mahoney, M.J.); see
also Johnson v. Cook Cty., 2015 WL 5144365, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 31, 2015) (Gilbert, M.J.) (distinguishing
medical-malpractice cases, where the policy that
6. Somewhat bizarrely, MHM argues that the audits “do not address any issues related to the [ADA] as that is not a function of the audits.” MHM Brief in Opposition (doc. no. 294) at 4. Given that ADOC is required to comply with that law, and that MHM stated in its proposal to ADOC that its quality-assurance program was designed to “ensure[] compliance with ADOC expectations as well as [National Commission on Correctional Health Care] and [American Correctional Association] standards,” this assertion is, in itself, noteworthy. MHM Proposal (doc. no. 301-1) at 4; see also MHM Contract (doc. no. 301-2) at 1 (noting, in a prefatory clause, that “ADOC desires to provide mental health care to inmates in accordance with applicable law”). That aside, an assessment that is not designed to determine compliance with a law or standard may nonetheless be highly relevant to that issue.
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 18 of 50
motivates medical peer-review privilege is “at its strongest” and the impact of the privilege on the plaintiff’s ability to prove his case is at is weakest, from cases alleging “systemic failures” and “widespread practice[s] of deliberate indifference,” which are “often harder for a plaintiff to prove”; and distinguishing performance evaluations of individual practitioners from reports which “focus[] primarily on systems and processes” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jenkins, 242 F.R.D. at 660 (recognizing that peer-review reports may contain “nonmedical” information regarding how prison staff identified and responded to problems, which may “at least raise an inference of jail customs or policies”).
Indeed, part of the plaintiffs’ contention is that “MHM’s monitoring of [] care was either inadequate or that the problems found were grossly understated.” Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support (doc. no. 301) at 6. As they point out--and as any judge who has heard a
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 19 of 50
prison-conditions case well knows--“monitoring of the system of care is an essential part of the system of care. ... The audits are themselves part of the system of care, and thus relevant to show another aspect of the inadequacy of care.” Id. at 6-7. The court need not take the plaintiffs’ word for it; MHM’s own proposal says, “It is only through monitoring, tracking, trending, and analysis that problem-prone processes can be corrected to produce the most efficient and effective outcomes for inmate mental health.” MHM Proposal (doc. no. 301-1) at 4. In a one-off medical-malpractice case, the quality of the quality-assurance process is often irrelevant, but in a challenge to a massive system’s provision of care for thousands of incarcerated patients (and especially given that it is a closed system), the efficacy of the system’s feedback loop and its capacity for self-correction are critical to this court’s assessment of whether they are functioning above the
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 20 of 50
constitutional baseline. See id. at 140 (“A major focus of our [quality-assurance] Program is to implement corrective actions developed as the result of [quality-assurance] reviews and to monitor the effectiveness of the corrective actions in producing the intended improvements. If these goals are not achieved, [quality-assurance] activities become only a ‘paper’ process.”).
Furthermore, with respect to their Eighth Amendment claims, the plaintiffs must show not only that they have been denied adequate mental-health care, but that the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to that violation of their rights, meaning that they “kn[e]w[] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Although they have not seen the documents at issue here, the plaintiffs identify a number of ways in which they expect to rely on them in attempting to prove deliberate indifference.
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 21 of 50
First, to the extent that the documents were reviewed by ADOC officials (the record is unresolved as to whether and to what extent they were), the contents could be used to show that prison officials were aware of any problems the documents identify. Second, to the extent that there were--as the plaintiffs allege--significant disparities between ADOC’s own audit of MHM care at a particular facility (which revealed serious concerns) and MHM’s positive report to the defendants based on its audit of the facility, this evidence could support the assertion that ADOC officials were deliberately indifferent in continuing to rely on the reports provided by MHM, instead of conducting further audits themselves. Third, if ADOC officials renewed MHM’s contract in 2013 (shortly after the documents at issue were produced)7 without reviewing
7. MHM also argues that these documents are not relevant because they are outdated; they were created between 2010 and 2012. However, they are, in the court’s view, recent enough to be probative of the present state of mental-health care being provided to (continued...)
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 22 of 50
those documents, this failure could help to show disregard of the risk that plaintiffs allege MHM posed to prisoners.8
This evidence may also play an important role at two other junctures in the litigation, one before a merits adjudication and one after. First, these peer-review documents might well be highly relevant to the court’s determination as to whether to certify a class or classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which requires (as a prerequisite under Rule 23(a)) a finding that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class[,]” as well as a finding that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so prisoners in Alabama, especially in light of the apparent infrequency of similar assessments. To be sure, however, the defendants are free to offer evidence to show that things have changed.
8. To be clear, the court has not made findings of fact or conclusions of law on any of these points. Rather, it concludes only that this is potentially vital evidence on which the plaintiffs are entitled to rely in attempting to make their case.
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 23 of 50
that final injunctive relief ... is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” When determining whether to certify a class, the court will need to decide whether there is evidence that the problems the named plaintiffs allege to have occurred have common causes and common solutions--i.e., whether the causes of those problems could feasibly be remedied en masse. MHM’s quality-assurance records may be valuable evidence on this question, because their very purpose is to identify, from the view of providers, any systemic problems and solutions. Second, if the court finds liability, these records may prove essential to the crafting of an effective remedy; although the court could potentially appoint a monitor to oversee the implementation of new policies or practices and report the results for the court’s consideration, MHM’s documents would represent the only available evidence of which remedial measures have already been tried, which have worked, and which have not.
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 24 of 50
2. Public Good MHM also argues that the Adkins court’s decision turned on its view that lawsuits challenging employment discrimination (which the court repeatedly generalizes to “federal civil rights cases”) serve important public interests. 488 F.3d at 1329. But so too do lawsuits challenging allegedly unconstitutional mental-health care in prison and the alleged discrimination against, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations for, mentally ill prisoners. “[N]early every United States district court that has addressed the issue in the context of section 1983 litigation brought on behalf of jail or prison inmates has rejected the assertion of privilege.” Jenkins, 242 F.R.D. at 659 (citing cases)9;
9. The Jenkins court identified one case involving at Eighth Amendment prisoner civil rights claim in which the court found the existence of a medical peer-review privilege--Hadix v. Caruso, 2006 WL 2925270, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 6, 2006) (Enslen, J.)--but did not follow it. Jenkins, 242 F.R.D. at 660-61 (noting “the extreme difficulty prison inmates (continued...)
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 25 of 50
see also Francis v. United States, 2011 WL 2224509, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2011) (Fox, M.J.) (“[T]here
appears to be consensus among lower courts and in other
circuits that no federal privilege protects medical
peer review materials in civil rights [actions].”).
The importance of public scrutiny of medical and
mental-health care is greater in the prison and jail
contexts than in an ordinary medical-malpractice case,
to which MHM unconvincingly analogizes this case. See
Agster v. Maricopa Cnty., 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.
2005) (“Whereas in the ordinary hospital it may be that
often face in obtaining evidence of jail customs or policies,” and in that light rejecting Hadix’s contention that “an evaluation of the prisoner’s medical records was enough to satisfy the prisoner’s discovery requests”; and concluding that “[t]o the extent that Hadix has any persuasive value, it disappears in the context of a section 1983 claim involving more than mere malpractice”). Another court has rejected Hadix as well. See Lowe v. Vadlamudi, 2012 WL 3887177, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2012) (Lawson, J.) (distinguishing and rejecting the conclusion in Hadix on the ground that, in Hadix, “the court found that disclosure of such records was not necessary in part because an independent medical monitor had been appointed in that case”).
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 26 of 50

the first object of all involved in patient care is the

welfare of the patient, in the prison context the

safety and efficiency of the prison may operate as

goals affecting the care offered.

In these

circumstances, it is peculiarly important that the

public have access to the assessment by peers of the

care provided.

Given the demands for public

accountability, which seem likely to guarantee that

such reviews take place whether they are privileged or

not, we are not convinced by the County's argument that

such reviews will cease unless kept confidential by a

federal peer review privilege.”); see also Williams v.

City of Phila., 2014 WL 5697204, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov.

4, 2014) (Surrick, J.) (agreeing, and distinguishing a

prison civil-rights case from a “medical-malpractice

action in which the plaintiff seeks monetary damages

for the inadequate care of a prison doctor”).

The court’s conclusion in Adkins rests in no small

part on the general “presumption against privileges

26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 27 of 50
which may only be overcome when it would achieve a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth[,]” “a high standard, [such that] only the most compelling candidates will overcome the law’s weighty dependence on the availability of relevant evidence.” 488 F.3d at 1328 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption is at its strongest in civil-rights cases. See Estate of Belbachir, 2007 WL 2128341, at *6 (“The interest in protecting the civil rights of individuals has led the courts to take caution before recognizing privileges in federal civil rights actions, where any assertion of privilege must overcome the fundamental importance of a law meant to protect citizens from unconstitutional state action.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
3. Protective Orders
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 28 of 50
One other element of the analysis in Adkins further supports its application to this case. The Adkins court explained that the “concerns advanced by the defendants”--that is, that performance evaluations would be less candid and that patient confidentiality might be compromised--“may capably be served in the absence of a medical peer review privilege[,]” because “district courts are well-equipped with a variety of mechanisms to ensure that peer review materials, once furnished through discovery, are not compromised by wayward hands....” 488 F.3d at 1329-30. One of the mechanisms Adkins suggests is the protective order. This court has already entered one such order on MHM’s motion, which addresses the concern about patient confidentiality. See Order (doc. no. 279). Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below, this court will enter an additional protective order conditionally deeming the documents at issue confidential, in order to ensure that they are not disclosed to anyone not
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 29 of 50
involved in, or used for any purposes other than, this
litigation.
B. Non-Party Status
One final point bears mention: MHM has vehemently
insisted that its status as a non-party should alter
the privilege analysis in its favor. The court rejects
this argument for several reasons. First, despite
having more than one opportunity to brief the issue,
MHM has failed to provide any relevant citation for
this proposition; the court has been unable to find any support for it in the case law.10
10. The only appellate reference this court has been able to find even mildly supportive of this position is an old case out of the Ninth Circuit, Dart Indus. Co., Inc. v. Westwood Chem. Co., Inc., 649 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1980). Two judges on the panel suggested that the “‘necessary’ restriction on discovery may be broader when a non-party is the target of discovery.” Id. at 649 (emphasis added). In so doing, they cited a district court decision, Collins & Aikman Corp. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 219, 221 (D.S.C. 1971) (Hemphill, J.), for the proposition that non-party discovery should be more limited in part to protect third parties from “disclosure of confidential (continued...)
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 30 of 50
Second, the defendants appear to have the right to
obtain the documents, and the plaintiffs could
therefore have requested that the defendants produce
them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1) (stating that
subpoenas may properly request documents “in the
responding party’s possession, custody, or control”).
The defendants might well have agreed to produce them
without asserting any privilege; they were invited to
file a brief opposing the motion to compel but did not
do so. In any event, the ordinary, broad relevance
documents.” However, Collins & Aikman Corp. was decided one year after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first amended to allow discovery from non-parties, and its discussion on this point was prefaced by an acknowledgement that “it is not at this point clear whether the same broad test for relevance of documents will be utilized with respect to third parties.” Id. It does not appear that this view has gained a foothold since. See also Wright & Miller, 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2459 (3d ed.) (concluding that although a few courts have “suggest[ed] that a different test of relevancy might apply when the subpoena is directed to a person who is not a party in the action, ... there is no basis for this distinction in the rule’s language”).
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 31 of 50
standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) would indisputably apply to such a request.11
Finally, there is a more fundamental problem with MHM’s argument concerning its non-party status. MHM is not formally a party to this suit, but it is hardly a peripheral player whose records are incidentally relevant to the case; rather, it is a major provider of correctional mental-health services, and its contract with ADOC explicitly anticipates its involvement in litigation. See MHM Contract (doc. no. 301-2) at 5. In fact, while MHM is not a governmental entity, it is
11. If production were burdensome, MHM would, perhaps, have a colorable argument that the defendants should bear that burden. But this dispute involves only a few hundred pages of already compiled documents, which MHM volunteered to submit to the court for in camera review. It would presumably be no less burdensome for MHM to send them to the defendants for production to the plaintiffs than for MHM to simply produce them.
31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 32 of 50

serving

a

quintessentially--constitutionally

mandated--state function.12

For these reasons, no higher standard of relevance

applies to requests for production by MHM. Further,

even if a higher standard did apply, the court has

concluded, based upon an in camera review of the

documents, that these documents are highly relevant.

C. Federal Privilege Statutes
Although MHM nowhere claims that the documents at
issue fall within any federal statutory privilege, a
brief discussion of the two federal statutes related to
medical peer review helps to illustrate why recognizing
12. In the Eleventh Circuit, private prison contractors are not subject to liability under Title II of the ADA, see Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010), so some of the claims to which these documents are relevant could not lie against MHM. It would be profoundly unjust, however, if a state department of corrections could insulate itself from liability by ensuring that documentation of the medical or mental-health care provided prisoners was created by private corporations which were both not subject to suit and then, by dint of that non-party status, protected from discovery.
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 33 of 50
a federal common-law peer-review privilege beyond the narrow bounds of the limited privilege already codified would be inappropriate.
The Supreme Court has made clear that courts should be particularly reluctant to recognize federal common-law privileges in cases where Congress has considered enacting such a privilege and declined to do so. See Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (rejecting the University’s assertion of a federal common-law peer-review privilege, and cautioning courts to be “especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself”).
Congress has passed two major pieces of legislation related to medical peer review: the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. § 11101-11152, and the Patient Safety and Quality
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 34 of 50
Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA), 42 U.S.C. 299b-21-299b-26.
As for the HCQIA, courts have concluded with significant consistency that “[f]ar from creating a broad privilege, Congress, in enacting the HCQIA, carefully crafted a very specific privilege, applicable to peer review material submitted to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] pursuant to the dictates of the mandatory reporting provisions of that statute. That is as far as Congress went, and that is as far as this Court should apply the privilege contained therein.” Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597, 602 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (Rice, J.); see also In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386, 290-91 (D. Mass. 2005) (Saris, J.); Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Kaplan, J.); Teasdale v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 692 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (Conti, J.).
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 35 of 50

Two decades later, in the PSQIA, Congress again

created a “unique and narrow” peer-review privilege for

“work product prepared by a patient safety organization

or prepared for, and reported to, a patient safety

organization.” Schlegel v. Kaiser Family Found. Health

Plan, 2008 WL 4570619, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008)

(Mueller, M.J.). Although the scope of this privilege

appears broad at first blush, it is in fact seriously

circumscribed by the definition of “patient safety

organization”: an organization certified by the

Secretary of the Department of Health and Human

Services the “mission and primary activity of [which]

are to conduct activities that are to improve patient

safety and the quality of health care delivery” and

which “has bona fide contracts ... with more than 1

provider for the purpose of receiving and reviewing

patient safety work product.”

42 U.S.C.

§ 299b-24(b)(1). There are currently 81 certified

patient safety organizations; MHM, however, is not one

35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 36 of 50

of them, and there is no indication that MHM reports to

a certified patient safety organization.

See

“Federally-Listed PSOs,” Agency for Healthcare Research

and Quality, https://pso.ahrq.gov/listed.

MHM’s

quality-assurance mechanisms are, as it has repeatedly

noted, purely internal; the privilege created by the

PSQIA covers a particular form of (certified) external

review.

As another court has recently recognized, the

PSQIA’s “drafters made clear that the statute was not

intended to provide a blanket protection for all

information and communications generated for quality

control purposes.” Johnson, 2015 WL 5144365, at *6

(citation omitted) (noting that the statute itself

“stress[es]” that information that is not developed for

the purpose of reporting to a patient safety

organization does not become privileged merely because

it is in fact reported to one, and citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 299-b21(7)(B) to that effect). The PSQIA is designed

36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 37 of 50

to incentivize a particular form of external

quality-assurance review that Congress deems optimal.

It sets up a certification scheme to recognize

organizations that provide that sort of review and

provides a strong incentive for providers to employ one

of them--namely, the privilege.

Extending the

privilege to other quality-assurance documents not

submitted to a certified organization would destroy

this incentive and seriously undermine the purpose of

Congress’s certification scheme.

Given the Supreme Court’s warning that courts must

be hesitant to create federal common-law privileges

outside the bounds of a carefully delineated

Congressional pronouncement, and in light of Congress’s

enactment of the HCQIA and PSQIA, MHM’s assertion of a

broad federal common-law quality-assurance privilege must be rejected.13

13. It is true that, “since Congress enacted the PSQIA, [a few] federal [district] courts have recognized some form of a medical peer review privilege (continued...)
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 38 of 50
under federal common law.” Tep v. Southcoast Hosps. Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 6873137, at *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2014) (Sorokin, J.). These cases, however, differ in significant respects from the case before the court. Nearly all of them involve medical malpractice claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)--quintessentially private damages actions in which no public or federal interest is implicated, quite unlike Eighth Amendment and ADA claims--and in some instances involve external review processes by organizations akin to patient safety organizations but not so certified, quite unlike the purely internal review process employed by MHM. See Tep, 2014 WL 6873137, at *3-*5 (recognizing a medical peer-review privilege in a case alleging violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) and state malpractice claims); Sevilla v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1058-69 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Cole, J.) (recognizing the privilege in an FTCA medical malpractice case); Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *4-*6 (recognizing the privilege in an FTCA dental malpractice case in light of the fact that the documents at issue were provided to an external entity, the New York State Department of Health, “which, although not listed as a [patient safety organization], meets many of the same qualifying criteria for [patient safety organizations] and performs similar functions, which Congress clearly intended to encourage”); KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590-98 (D. Del. 2010) (Thynge, M.J.) (recognizing the privilege in an FTCA medical malpractice case in light of the fact that the documents at issue were provided to external entities, review bodies within the National Institutes of Health, which, “[w]hether or not [they] meet the technical requirements for listing as [patient safety organizations,] clearly perform the same functions Congress intended the PSQIA to encourage”). (continued...)
38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 39 of 50
D. PAIMI
Because the evidence withheld by MHM is not
protected by either a state or federal
quality-assurance privilege, it is subject to
disclosure. Therefore, the court need not reach the
merits of the parties’ arguments as to whether the
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental
Illness Act (PAIMI) provides an independent basis for
compelling disclosure of the evidence at issue.14
This court joins others in concluding that although the PSQIA somewhat expanded the federal statutory peer-review privilege, it does not undermine the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that no federal common-law peer-review privilege applies in civil-rights cases. See, e.g., Awwad v. Largo Med. Ctr., Inc., 2012 WL 1231982, at *1 & n.2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2012) (McCoun, M.J.) (rejecting the defendant’s suggestion that Adkins “should be revisited” in light of the PSQIA and concluding that Adkins remained binding).
14. Hence, the court need not address MHM’s procedural quibbles--namely, that the plaintiffs’ subpoena did not constitute an appropriate request for records pursuant to PAIMI because the subpoena did not cite that statute and because counsel employed by the (continued...)
39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 40 of 50
However, as PAIMI provides additional support for the court’s conclusion, a brief discussion of its relevance is warranted.
As the plaintiffs point out, Congress has not only declined to privilege, but affirmatively mandated the disclosure of, at least some of the records that MHM has withheld. PAIMI explains that P&As such as ADAP are designed to “protect and advocate the rights of such individuals through activities to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and Federal and State statutes; and investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), rather than ADAP itself, signed the subpoena. In any event, these arguments are dubious; although it is a non-party, MHM has participated in this litigation enough to be well apprised of the fact that Alabama’s P&A, ADAP, is both a party to this litigation and co-counsel with SPLC. Surely MHM, a leading corporate provider of correctional mental-health services, is also well aware that PAIMI authorizes P&As to access mental-health records in the course of their work.
40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 41 of 50
probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 10801(b)(2).
Congress apparently considered access to records to be essential to these advocacy and investigatory roles, because it specifically provided P&As “access to all records of” a variety of categories of individuals with mental illness. 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4). As all of the courts of appeals to address the issue have concluded, “all records” of an individual means what it says; PAIMI authorizes access even to quality-assurance records otherwise protected by state-law privileges. See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 383 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Prot. & Advocacy for Person with Disabilities v. Mental Health & Addiction & Advocacy Servs., 448 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2006) (opinion of Sotomayor, J.); Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Mo. Dep’t of Mental Health, 447 F.3d 1021, 1023 (8th Cir. 2006); Ctr. for Legal Advocacy v. Hammons, 323 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2003);
41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 42 of 50
Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun, 228 F.3d 423, 428 (3d Cir. 2000) (opinion of Alito, J.).
Moreover, PAIMI expressly preempts state privilege law. See 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(2)(C) (“If the laws of a State prohibit an eligible system from obtaining access to the records of individuals with mental illness in accordance with [the provision in PAIMI authorizing such access, that records-access provision] shall not apply to such system before [a grace period of up to two years].”); Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc., 228 F.3d at 428 (“PA[I]MI would preempt a Pennsylvania law that prohibited the disclosure of the peer review reports to [the P&A].”). Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 501--which instructs courts that “[t]he common law ... governs a claim of privilege unless [‘a federal statute’] provides otherwise”--would not permit this court to recognize the applicability of a federal common-law peer-review privilege to documents which a federal statute says must be disclosed.
42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 43 of 50
The court need not and will not dive into the weeds
in order to determine whether all of the hundreds of
pages of quality-assurance documents at issue could be
obtained by ADAP under PAIMI.15 For present purposes,
15. MHM also argues that PAIMI does not cover the records at issue here because a subsection of the statute defines the term “records,” and the documents at issue do not fall within that definition. But the documents at issue do appear to fall within its bounds and, furthermore, the provision that MHM cites is a non-exhaustive list.
The section of the statute at issue is devoted to the confidentiality of mental-health records obtained by P&As; the relevant subsection says that, “As used in this section, the term ‘records’ includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment or reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring as such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records.” 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(3)(A).
However, the requested documents do relate to alleged neglect (and potentially abuse), which are defined extremely broadly in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 10802(5) (“The term ‘neglect’ means a negligent act or omission by any individual responsible for providing services in a facility rendering care or treatment which caused or may have cause injury or death to a[n] individual with mental illness or which (continued...)
43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 44 of 50
the statute is more generally instructive: Congress, by
authorizing unfettered access to “all records,”
including otherwise protected peer-review documents,
manifested its view that access to such records is
critical to the efficacy of efforts to protect and
placed a[n] individual with mental illness at risk of injury or death, and includes an act or omission such as the failure to establish or carry out an appropriate individual program plan or treatment plan for a[n] individual with mental illness, the failure to provide adequate nutrition, clothing, or health care to a[n] individual with mental illness, or the failure to provide a safe environment for a[n] individual with mental illness, including the failure to maintain adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff.”); § 10802(1) (“The term ‘abuse’ means any act or failure to act by an employee of a facility rendering care or treatment which was performed, or which was failed to be performed, knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally, and which cause, or may have caused, injury or death to a[n] individual with mental illness[.]”).
Moreover, the use of the word “includes” in the provision MHM cites indicates that what follows is not an exclusive list of what constitutes “records.” See United States v. Whiting, 165 F.3d 631, 633 (8th Cir. 1999) (“When a statute uses the word ‘includes’ rather than ‘means’ in defining a term, it does not imply that items not listed fall outside the definition.”); United States v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 614 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]ncludes’ is not a finite word of limitation; its use destroys the basis for implying the negative.”).
44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 45 of 50
advocate for the mentally ill. Moreover, the statute as a whole reflects Congress’s view that such efforts promote important federal interests. PAIMI serves as further support for the court’s decision not to recognize a federal common-law quality-assurance or peer-review privilege that would undermine the ability of Alabama’s P&A to determine whether mentally ill state prisoners are being mistreated and, if so, to seek remediation.
III. Confidentiality After Production Finally, MHM argues that, even if the court compels disclosure of the records in question, it should issue a protective order deeming them confidential and limiting access to the records to ADAP, due to its status as a P&A. The court declines to enter the sweeping order MHM requests, but will enter a more limited protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).
45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 46 of 50

MHM’s contention that any disclosure of its

peer-review records should be limited to ADAP was based

on its belief that only a P&A (and not its co-counsel)

would be entitled to view records obtained pursuant to

PAIMI. Whether or not that understanding is correct,

the court’s decision here relies on the lack of a

privilege--and not on the disclosure mandate in

PAIMI--so an order that would grant exclusive access to

ADAP, and seriously curtail the plaintiffs’ ability to

use this evidence, is not appropriate.

However, a more limited protective order will not

significantly

hinder

the

plaintiffs

while

simultaneously recognizing the “important interests”

served by preventing public disclosure of peer-review

documents. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1328 (describing a

medical provider’s interests in a peer-review

privilege, including interests in encouraging candor in

the peer-review process, maintaining patient

confidentiality, and avoiding malpractice litigation).

46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 47 of 50
While countervailing considerations outweigh MHM’s interests in keeping the documents out of this litigation entirely, there is at this time no apparent need for them to be more widely released. At least for the time being, the plaintiffs’ ability to use this evidence in developing and presenting their case will not be prejudiced by the entry of a protective order conditionally deeming the documents at issue confidential. The court will revisit this protective order if circumstances arise, in the course of trying or deciding this case, that justify the public disclosure of some or all of the documents at issue.
The question, then, is to whom exactly these documents should be disclosed. As ordered below, MHM and the parties are to draft and submit to the court a proposed protective order, taking into account the following issues:
First, plaintiffs’ counsel (including ADAP, which is representing itself as a party) are entitled to
47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 48 of 50
access these documents. Second, and for obvious reasons, the named prisoner plaintiffs should not have access to these documents, absent some overriding need not now apparent. Third, the defendants should receive any of the documents they do not already have. Fourth, as for defense counsel: MHM has expressed concern that if counsel for ADOC obtains the documents, they could be shared with Corizon Correctional Healthcare, a competitor of MHM’s which is represented (including as a non-party in the discovery portion of this litigation) by one of the same firms employed by ADOC. The court is confident that the protective order can be crafted in such a way as to mitigate this concern. Fifth, the parties and MHM should identify which of the parties’ experts should have access to the documents for purposes of rendering their opinions; they should likewise identify which deponents employed by ADOC and MHM should be allowed to view (and be questioned about the contents of) the documents. With respect to this
48

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 49 of 50
final point, the protective order should permit any expert or deponent to whose opinion or testimony the documents are reasonably relevant to view them, and prohibit disclosure otherwise.
* * *
Because the court concludes, based on its in camera review of the documents that MHM has withheld, that the documents are protected neither by the state-law privilege MHM invoked nor by any other federal common-law or statutory quality-assurance or peer-review privilege, it is ORDERED as follows:
(1) The plaintiffs’ motion to compel (doc. no. 290) is granted.
(2) MHM Correctional Services, Inc., is promptly to produce, in accordance with the protective order soon to be entered, the documents identified in its privilege log dated December 23, 2015 (doc. no. 290-3), by the following reference numbers and (inclusive)
49

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318 Filed 01/27/16 Page 50 of 50
ranges: 14, 16, 45-68, 71-82, 96-112, 127-138, and 150-162.
(3) Within seven days of the date of today’s order, the parties and MHM are to confer and submit a joint proposed protective order as outlined in the above opinion. If, after making good-faith efforts, the parties and MHM cannot reach an agreement as to the precise terms of that order, they may submit separate proposals.
DONE, this the 27th day of January, 2016. /s/ Myron H. Thompson____
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318-1 Filed 01/27/16 Page 1 of 2
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on December 1, 2013, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $455.00 to $505.00.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365, 1 368 ( 11th Ci r. 1 983). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885- 86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys’ fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L .Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . .” and from “[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court’s denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964). Rev.: 4/04

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 318-1 Filed 01/27/16 Page 2 of 2
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD – no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

On January 27, 2016, following the parties’

mediation before the magistrate judge, the court held a

hearing on the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to compel

compliance with the discovery schedule (doc. no. 317).

With reluctance, the court approved a limited extension

to the fact discovery deadline of March 7, 2016, see

New Scheduling Order (doc. no. 239), in order to permit

certain experts for the plaintiffs to conduct site

inspections in mid-March 2016. The plaintiffs have

represented that these experts’ evidence will relate

only to the second phase of trial in this case. Moreover, the parties have represented that they will not request the extension of any other deadline on the basis of this delay. The court’s approval was contingent on this representation; any extension request made on the basis of the delay in inspections will be denied.
As the court explained at that hearing, any further request for an extension of any sort will be looked upon with extreme disfavor. To the extent that discovery disputes remain, the parties--who are represented by a veritable phalanx of capable lawyers on both sides--must resolve them in a way that does not delay the progress of litigation in this case. As the court also emphasized, it has devoted and will continue to devote considerable time, resources, and personnel to this case. Three full months out of the coming year have been set aside for trial. Changes to the schedule currently in place, which was initially set with the
2

agreement of the parties, will not be made absent the most compelling of reasons. See Chrysler Int'l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Given the caseload of most district courts and the fact that cases can sometimes stretch out over years, district courts must have discretion and authority to ensure that their cases move to a reasonably timely and orderly conclusion.”).
To be crystal clear: Any motion to continue any deadline in this case which could reasonably have been avoided by the good faith efforts and diligence of the parties, and which therefore evinces disregard for the court and reflects dilatory conduct not commensurate with the gravity with which the court views this case, will be denied. The parties have represented that they do not now anticipate making further motions for extensions, and the court takes this representation very seriously. Any request for an extension made on a
3

basis reasonably foreseeable as of this date will be denied.
* * * It is therefore ORDERED as follows: (1) The deadline for fact discovery of March 7, 2016, as set out in the court’s new scheduling order (doc. no. 239), is extended only to the extent articulated on the record on January 27, 2016; specifically, plaintiffs’ experts may conduct the site inspections enumerated on the dates indicated by plaintiffs’ counsel and agreed to by defense counsel. This order shall not be construed to grant any extension other than those explicitly articulated on the record on January 27, 2016. (2) The plaintiffs’ emergency motion to compel compliance with the discovery schedule (doc. no. 317) is denied as moot. DONE, this the 28th day of January, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson____ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376 Filed 03/15/16 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JOSHUA DUNN, ET AL.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

Civil Action Number:

v.

)

)

2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM

JEFFERSON DUNN, ET AL.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT CONCERNING CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
AND §504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973

The Parties to this action jointly move this Honorable Court for approval of the

settlement and resolution of all claims and issues set for the Phase I trial of this case which is

scheduled to begin trial on June 20, 2016. As grounds in support thereof, the Parties show the

following:

1. In March 2016, the Parties reached an agreement to certify a settlement class and

settle the claims raised and issues set to be addressed in the Phase I trial of the instant action.

2. Through this Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement

(“Joint Motion”) the Parties request: (a) certification of the settlement class; (b) preliminary

approval of the settlement agreement; (c) approval of notice to the class; and (d) scheduling of a

final fairness hearing.

3. The Parties jointly request that the Court certify the settlement class under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a

disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), excluding those inmates

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376 Filed 03/15/16 Page 2 of 7
whose disabilities relate solely to or arise from mental disease, illness, or defect.” See Ex. 1 (fully executed Settlement Agreement) at 2.1
4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) permits a case to be maintained as a class action if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 5. The settlement class here meets the requirements under Rule 23(a) of numerosity, commonality, and typicality to justify certification, as well as the requirement that there is adequate and fair representation by counsel. Here, the proposed settlement class, as defined herein at ¶3 supra, may number in the thousands of inmates, and joinder is therefore impractical. The commonality and typicality requirements are met here because the class shares common questions of law or fact, as the Phase I claims challenge the policies and practices affecting ADOC inmates with disabilities as described in the Settlement Agreement, and the named class representatives have claims typical of the class, as they are or have been ADOC inmates who are subject or have been subject to the challenged policies and practices. 6. The requirement of adequate representation will be met here because class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, as they have done throughout this matter. 7. The Court should preliminarily approve the Settlement Agreement reached in this case, attached hereto as Ex. 1, as it is the product of arm’s-length, serious, informed and non-

1 Due to typographical and printing errors, the pagination of the signature pages are misnumbered. Counsel realized this error shortly before the filing of this document. Despite these pagination errors, the Settlement Agreement is fully executed.

243856.4

2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376 Filed 03/15/16 Page 3 of 7

collusive negotiations between experienced and knowledgeable counsel who have actively prosecuted and defended this litigation.
8. The Parties further request that the Court approve the Notice to the Class, attached hereto as Ex. 2, as it meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) and 23(e)(1), that “the court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” The Notice will be posted in English and Spanish in prominent locations accessible to all prisoners in all ADOC facilities covered by the Settlement Agreement. It will also be made available in alternative formats. Additionally, full copies of the Settlement Agreement will be made available to inmates in all ADOC prison libraries.
9. Lastly, the Parties request that the Court enter the Proposed Order of preliminary approval of the class settlement, attached hereto as Ex. 3. The Proposed Order provides that members of the settlement class will have ___2 days to communicate any comments to the Court. The Proposed Order further provides that the Court will then conduct a final fairness hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement of the Phase I claims and issues on the terms and conditions provided for in the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be finally approved by the Court.
10. ADAP is a Plaintiff in this case and has asserted claims in Phase I via its associational standing. ADAP’s Phase I claims, as defined by the Settlement Agreement, see Ex. 1, are settled and resolved by the execution of the Settlement Agreement.
11. The Parties recognize that a motion for class certification is customarily supported by briefing on class certification. Because the Parties have agreed to class certification as a result of a non-collusive, arm’s-length negotiation and in an effort to preserve the Court’s
2 This space was left intentionally blank as the Court will set the time period for receiving comments from class members via entry of an Order of Preliminary Approval.

243856.4

3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376 Filed 03/15/16 Page 4 of 7

valuable time and resources, the Parties have not submitted such briefing with the instant motion.
Should this Honorable Court require briefing on class certification, the Parties respectfully
request that the Court enter a scheduling order setting forth a briefing schedule on the issue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Parties jointly move this Honorable Court: (1)
to certify the settlement class; (2) grant preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement; (3) to
approve the notice to the class; and (4) to enter an order scheduling a final fairness hearing.
Dated: March 15, 2016
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Maria V. Morris Maria V. Morris Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 (334) 956-8200 maria.morris@splcenter.org One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs
/s/ Anil A. Mujumdar Anil A. Mujumdar Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse – Trial Lawyers 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35203 (205) 983-7985 anil@zarzaur.com One of the Attorneys for Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program
/s/ John G. Smith John G. Smith Balch & Bingham LLP P.O. Box 78 Montgomery, Alabama 36101 (334) 834-6500 jgsmith@balch.com One of the Attorneys for Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections

243856.4

4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376 Filed 03/15/16 Page 5 of 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 15, 2016, a copy of the above and foregoing was filed with the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama using the CM/ECF system which sent notification to all counsel of record.
Ebony Glenn Howard Latasha McCrary Valentina Restrepo Rhonda C. Brownstein J. Richard Cohen SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 ebony.howard@splcenter.org Latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org Valentina.restrepo@splcenter.org Rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org Richard.cohen@splcenter.org
Miriam Haskell SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER P.O. Box 370037 Miami, Florida 33137 miriam.haskell@splcenter.org
William Van Der Pol J. Patrick Hackney Glenn N. Baxter ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM University of Alabama 500 Martha Parham West, Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0395 wvanderpoljr@adap.ua.edu jphackney@adap.ua.edu gnbaxter@bama.ua.edu
Andrew Philip Walsh William Glassell Somerville III Patricia Clotfelter BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ PC 420 20th Street North, Suite 1400 Birmingham, Alabama 35203 awalsh@bakerdonelson.com wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com

243856.4

5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376 Filed 03/15/16 Page 6 of 7
Brent L. Rosen BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ PC 614 S. Hull Street Montgomery, Alabama 36104 brosen@bakerdonelson.com
Gregory M. Zarzuar Diandra S. Debrosse ZARZAUR MUJUMDAR & DEBROSSE 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Gregory@zarzaur.com fuli@zarzaur.com
Deana Johnson Counsel for MHM Services, Inc. 1447 Peachtree Street NE Suite 500 Atlanta, GA 30309 djohnson@mhm-services.com
Anne Adams Hill Elizabeth Anne Sees Alabama Department of Corrections 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, AL 36104 Anne.Hill@doc.alabama.gov Elizabeth.sees@doc.alabama.gov
Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr. Alabama Department of Corrections P.O. Box 301501 Montgomery, AL 36130 joseph.stewart@doc.alabama.gov
David R. Boyd BALCH & BINGHAM LLP Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101-0078 dboyd@balch.com

243856.4

6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376 Filed 03/15/16 Page 7 of 7

Michael L. Edwards J. Eric Getty Susan Nettles Han Steven C Corhern BALCH & BINGHAM LLP Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201-0306 medwards@balch.com egetty@balch.com shan@balch.com scorhern@balch.com
William R. Lunsford Matthew B. Reeves Melissa K. Marler Stephen C. Rogers MAYNARD COOPER & GALE PC 655 Gallatin Street Huntsville, AL 35801 blunsford@maynardcooper.com mreeves@maynardcooper.com mmarler@maynardcooper.com srogers@maynardcooper.com
Mitesh B. Shah Mitchell D. Gregg Bryan A. Coleman Evan P. Moltz MAYNARD COOPER & GALE PC 1901 Sixth Avenue North 2400 Regions Harbert Plaza Birmingham, AL 35203 mshah@maynardcooper.com mgreggs@maynardcooper.com bcoleman@maynardcooper.com emoltz@maynardcooper.com

/s/ John G. Smith Of Counsel

243856.4

7

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 1 of 34
EXHIBIT 1

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 2 of 34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JOSHUA DUNN, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFERSON DUNN, ET AL., Defendants.

)

)

)

)

Civil Action Number:

)

)

2: 14-cv-0060 1-MHT-TFM

)

)

)

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONCERNING CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND §504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, AND RESOLVING THE
PHASE I TRIAL OF THESE PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION 1. On June 17, 2014, the individually named plaintiffs and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program ("ADAP") filed the instant lawsuit (the "lawsuit") challenging, among other things, the compliance of the Alabama Depatiment of Corrections ("ADOC") with the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (referenced collectively herein as "ADA"). 2. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama has bifurcated the issues raised in the lawsuit into two trial Phases: Phase I, which includes the trial of claims and issues brought under the ADA, other than claims relating to mental health status; and Phase II, which includes all other claims in the litigation. 3. The Patiies to this Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") believe that, in order to avoid additional protracted, costly and uncertain litigation, it is in their respective best interests to resolve the issues to be tried in Phase I of this litigation.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 3 of 34

4. Accordingly, the Patties to this Agreement, by and through their respective counsel, jointly stipulate and agree to the following provisions to resolve Phase I of the litigation.
II. STATEMENT OF PARTIES, PURPOSE, AND INTENT 1. Defendant ADOC is the agency of the State of Alabama in charge of the stateowned and operated prisons in Alabama that currently or may in the future have physical custody of the individually named plaintiffs. 2. The individually named plaintiffs in this lawsuit are currently, or may in the future be, in the physical custody of ADOC.
3. Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program ("ADAP") is the duly authorized protection and advocacy agency in the State of Alabama.
4. The individually named plaintiffs and ADAP seek class certification of their claims asserted in this lawsuit under the ADA. As part of this agreed resolution of the claims to be tried in Phase I of this litigation, ADOC consents to the certification, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, of a class whose members (the "Class") are defined as "any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness, or defect."
5. The individually named plaintiffs, the Class, and ADAP are collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiffs."
6. The Plaintiffs and ADOC are collectively referred to as the "Parties." 7. The Parties stipulate that there are no individual or class claims, including putative class claims, under the ADA asserted against Defendant Jefferson Dunn, named in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections and Defendant

243732.5

Page 2 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 4 of 34

Ruth Naglich, named in her official capacity as Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections.
8. The purpose of this Agreement is to settle and resolve all issues which were to be presented in the trial of Phase I of this matter. The Parties agree and stipulate that by this Agreement they hereby resolve all pending claims in this action for alleged violations of the ADA, except for claims under the ADA that relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness or defect. Claims brought by Plaintiffs under the ADA that relate solely to or arise solely fi·om mental disease, illness or defect are not waived and are reserved for resolution during the Phase II trial. 1
9. Except for ADOC's consent to class certification as described in paragraph 4 of this section, the Parties agree that ADOC has not consented to class certification of claims that arise under the ADA and that relate solely to or arise solely fi·om mental health disabilities, or claims that arise under the Eighth Amendment. Class certification and the merits of such claims will be resolved in Phase II of this litigation.
10. The Parties may not use this Agreement for any purpose in Phase II of the litigation except as evidence of what has or has not been resolved by this Agreement.
11. Nothing in this Agreement will be construed as an admission by ADOC of any violation of law. To the contrary, ADOC denies every material allegation of the Complaint, as amended, in this case and denies any liability to the Plaintiffs. This Agreement does not

1 The Parties agree that the question of whether ADOC should be required to add the following categories of inmates to the mental health caseload is expressly reserved for resolution during Phase II of this litigation: (i) inmates placed in suicide watch or safe cells; (ii) any inmate who has been placed in segregation more than two times in a 365-day period (except that placement into segregation for protective custody or similar reasons); and (iii) any inmate who spends more than 50% of his or her time housed in segregation.

243732.5

Page 3 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 5 of 34

constitute, and will not be construed as, an admission of or evidence of any act of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of any Inmate, or of any violation of the ADA.
12. The Parties stipulate that nothing in this Agreement will be used for any purpose outside of the above-captioned matter or against any named Defendant in any other litigation that has been or may be filed against any named Defendant. Nothing in this Agreement will be construed to require ADOC to do more than what is required by the ADA, court decisions applying or interpreting the ADA, or Rules and Regulations interpreting the ADA.
13. The Parties believe that this Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to protect the interests of all Parties concerning the issues contained herein. The Parties will jointly file this Agreement with the Court and ask that the Court issue an order directing notice to the Class, setting an objection period, and setting a fairness hearing for preliminary approval, and that the Court then approve the Class and the settlement as final after the Parties have reached an agreement on specific remedial actions to be taken by ADOC to implement the provisions of this Agreement.
III. PRELIMINARY AND FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
1. Preliminary Approval - No later than seven (7) days after all necessary signatories have executed this Agreement, the Patties will jointly submit this Agreement to the Court for preliminary approval, along with a proposed order for preliminary approval, a schedule for notice, proposed notices of preliminary approval, a schedule for an objection period, and a request for a fairness hearing under Rule 23 (e) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Final Approval - Within twenty (20) days of the Parties reaching agreement, the Patiies will file with the Court any additional agreement or agreements, which will include

243732.5

Page 4 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 6 of 34

notice provisions, a proposed Final Approval Order, and comply with all provisions of Rule 23(e) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IV. DEFINITIONS 1. "Substantial Compliance" will mean adherence in all material respects to the terms of this Agreement and to any plan or plans implemented by ADOC so as to comply with the terms of this Agreement, recognizing that one hundred percent (100%) compliance is not required. Isolated, acute, non-substantive or immaterial deviations from the terms of this Agreement or from any plan implemented by ADOC so as to comply with the terms of this Agreement will not prevent a finding of Substantial Compliance, provided that ADOC can demonstrate that it has: (a) implemented a system or systems (i) for assuring compliance, and (ii) for taking corrective measures in response to instances of non-compliance; and (b) instituted policies, practices, and resources that are capable of durable and sustained compliance. 2. "Disability" and "Disabilities" will have the same meaning they have under the ADA and its implementing regulations. 3. "Inmate" will be defined as any individual detained by, housed in, held at, or otherwise in the custody of ADOC. This term does not include any individual who has been released on parole and/or probation and who is not physically housed in an ADOC facility. ADOC's facilities include ADOC major institutions, ADOC community work centers and ADOC work release centers. The facilities covered in this Agreement are:
Bibb Correctional Facility Bullock Correctional Facility

243732.5

Page 5 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 7 of 34

Donaldson Correctional Facility Draper Correctional Facility Easterling Correctional Facility Elmore Correctional Facility Fountain Correctional Facility Hamilton Aged and Infirmed Holman Correctional Facility Kilby Correctional Facility Limestone Correctional Facility St. Clair Correctional Facility Staton Correctional Facility Tutwiler Prison for Women Ventress Correctional Facility Alex City Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Atmore Community Work Center Birmingham Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Camden Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Childersburg Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Decatur Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Elba Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Frank Lee Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Hamilton Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Loxley Community Based Facility/Community Work Center

243732.5

Page 6 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 8 of 34

Mobile Community Based Facility/Community Work Center Montgomery Women's Facility Red Eagle Community Work Center
V. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 1. Plan - The Parties will develop a plan in the general subject areas listed in Section V of this Agreement to provide for care, services, accommodations, programs, and activities for Inmates consistent with the terms of this Agreement and the provisions of the ADA. The Plan is intended to ensure that Inmates are not exposed to substantial harm and that Inmates are not subject to discrimination on the basis of disability. 2. Housing - ADOC will house every Inmate with a disability in a housing unit that is fully accessible under and compliant with the ADA according to the Inmate's particular disability or disabilities. ADOC will provide an adequate number of facilities that are ADA accessible to allow housing of Inmates with disabilities. Housing areas designated to hold Inmates with disabilities will factor in the higher anticipated concentration of Inmates with disabilities such that any Inmates so housed will have the same access to the facilities, housing areas and programs as Inmates who are not disabled. 3. Clustering- ADOC will be permitted to cluster Inmates with disabilities to allow better access to treatment, education, vocational training, and accessible facilities. "Clustering" is defined as placing a concentration of Inmates with disabilities in a specific ADOC facility or within a specific ADOC facility. Any clustering of Inmates will be permissible only to the extent that there are specific educational, treatment, training, or specialized housing reasons for such clustering. However, clustering cannot result in Inmates with disabilities being more geographically isolated from family and community than other Inmates unless there are specific

243732.5

Page 7 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 9 of 34

educational, treatment, training, or specialized housing reasons for such clustering. This provision will not be construed to allow ADOC to systematically segregate Inmates with disabilities absent specific educational, treatment, training, or specialized housing reasons for such clustering.
4. Security Level - All Inmates with disabilities will be housed in a location consistent with their security level. Security levels will be determined without regard to disability, except to the extent that a disability provides the justification for lowering an Inmate's security level.
5. Emergencies - ADOC agrees to implement an emergency-preparedness plan to accommodate all Inmates with disabilities in all facilities in which such Inmates are housed or receive any programs, benefits, or services. ADOC agrees to make appropriate modifications to ensure prompt warning and egress for Inmates with disabilities. The modifications may include but are not limited to flashing lights and audible sirens in housing and common areas, administrative and architectural modifications as necessary, a specific point of rescue in such locations, and assigning and training a correctional officer in each relevant area with the specific responsibility to ensure that any disabled Inmate is properly assisted in the event of an emergency. ADOC agrees to inform Inmates with disabilities of the ADA emergencypreparedness modifications.
6. Identification and Screening for Disabilities - ADOC will screen Inmates for disabilities at the time of intake. ADOC may recognize an Inmate's disability either as the result of appropriate screening or self-identification.
(a) Screening: ADOC will conduct an appropriate screening at intake so as to identify Inmates with disabilities and to determine what disabilities Inmates may have. The

243732.5

Page 8 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 10 of 34
screening will include written and oral questioning of an Inmate concerning disabilities, medical treatment or conditions, and mental health treatment or conditions. As part of this Agreement, ADAP will provide a list of questions to assist in this screening. ADOC will document the results of this screening. ADOC will identify Inmates with intellectual disabilities through the use of appropriate tests. If there is a group-administered test that will appropriately measure intellectual disabilities, then the Parties will give preference to that test. The percentage of Inmates identified as having intellectual disabilities should be generally consistent with the percentage of the general population with intellectual disabilities as defined by the DSM V or its most recent update. The identification of Inmates with mental illness will be made by a psychiatrist or psychologist, although mental health professionals and psychological associates may participate in the process
(b) Self-Identification: In the event an Inmate self-identifies as a person with a disability: (i) ADOC can accept the Inmate's claim of disability; or (ii) if ADOC does not accept the Inmate's claim of disability, it will obtain medical records concerning the Inmate's prior medical or mental health treatment or will conduct sufficient and appropriate additional medical or mental health screening to determine whether the Inmate has a disability as defined by the ADA.
7. Tracking - ADOC will implement a system to track Inmates with disabilities to ensure that such Inmates will receive proper accommodations and appropriate treatment for their disabilities. ADOC's tracking will include the following: (i) the name and AIS# of the Inmate; (ii) the nature of the Inmate's disability or disabilities; (iii) all accommodations for an Inmate's disability or disabilities, including (but not limited to) restrictions on housing or bed placement;

243732.5

Page 9 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 11 of 34

and (iv) any security restrictions that are the result of the disability. ADOC will periodically review the Inmate tracking system and update it as appropriate.
8. Change in Status - As part of, or in addition to, tracking Inmates with disabilities as discussed in paragraph 7 of this section, "Tracking," ADOC will implement a system to identify chronic and acute changes in disability status. The system will include medical and mental health examinations as part of the yearly physical exams each Inmate receives to determine whether any Inmate has developed a disability while in ADOC custody.
9. Transfer - ADOC will implement a working procedure to move Inmates with newly emergent or newly identified disabilities into an appropriate housing placement. If ADOC learns of the need for an ADA accommodation which would be better provided at another facility, or a different housing location within the same facility, ADOC will promptly take appropriate steps to transfer the Inmate to the other facility or housing location. If the Inmate is to be transferred, ADOC will move the Inmate as soon as reasonably practicable, considering appropriate security issues.
10. ADA Coordinators- ADOC will designate an ADA Coordinator at every facility and will designate a statewide ADA Coordinator.
(a) ADOC will designate an ADA Coordinator at each facility. All facility ADA Coordinators will hold equivalent rank and will be trained and assigned responsibility to ensure the facility complies with the ADA. The facility ADA Coordinator may have duties in addition to those as an ADA Coordinator. At each institutional/staff meeting, the topic of ADA compliance at the particular facility will be discussed by and with the facility ADA Coordinator. This person will be familiar with the provisions of the ADA and will be knowledgeable concerning ADOC's ADA Grievance Procedures.

243732.5

Page 10 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 12 of 34
(b) ADOC will designate one or more persons who will be assigned responsibility to ensure that ADOC complies with the provisions of the ADA with respect to Inmates as a fulltime statewide ADOC ADA Coordinator. This person will be properly trained and familiar with the provisions of the ADA and will be knowledgeable concerning ADOC's ADA Grievance Procedures.
11. ADA Grievance Procedures - ADOC will create working ADA accommodation, grievance, and appeal procedures. These procedures will be freestanding and distinct from the medical/mental health request or grievance procedures. The new ADA-specific procedures will include the following:
(a) The ADA grievance will be addressed in writing to the Inmate by the ADA Coordinator at each facility. There will be a specific timeframe in which to respond.
(b) An Inmate may appeal a facility ADA Coordinator's decision to the statewide ADA Coordinator. Any response to an appeal will be provided in writing to the Inmate. There will be a specific timeframe within which to respond to appeals.
(c) ADOC may use one form for the request for accommodation, grievance, and appeal procedures, provided that such form will clearly indicate to Inmates the different uses of the form. Such form or forms will be made readily available at all ADOC facilities. ADA grievances written on other documents that are clearly identifiable as ADA grievances will be addressed in the same manner as ADA grievances written on the ADA grievance form and will not be found to be deficient because they are written on a different document.
(d) In the event a grievance on the new ADA form is related to the provision of medical or mental health care or concerns medical or mental health treatment decisions, the

243732.5

Page 11 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 13 of 34

Inmate will be informed that the grievance should be directed to ADOC's contracted medical or mental health care provider.
12. Training- ADOC will provide both initial and periodic training on the provisions and requirements of the ADA to all its personnel who are required to attend the Correctional Officer Training Academy as a condition of their employment with ADOC. The initial training may be part of the new officer's training program, and will include not less than four (4) hours of ADA training. The four (4) hours do not have to be consecutive and may be included in other blocks of training. Periodic training concerning the provisions of the ADA at least two (2) hours in duration will be provided to such officers at least annually.
13. Program Access - ADOC will implement a system by which Inmates with disabilities are provided access to programs offered by ADOC consistent with the Inmate's security classification and status. ADOC may not discriminate in the provision of such programs against an Inmate with a disability based upon the existence of the disability. Accordingly, all types of programs appropriate for an Inmate's given security level will be made available and accessible to that Inmate irrespective of disability provided that reasonable accommodations for that disability may be made. Likewise, ADOC will not deny an Inmate's access to programs based on a mental health or security code if that code is based solely upon disability. However, ADOC will not be required to provide access to programs to an Inmate with a disability when: (1) such programs are not available to Inmates at the facility where the Inmate with the disability is assigned; and (2) when there are security or disciplinary reasons unrelated to the Inmate's disability that prevent the Inmate from accessing the programs. ADOC is obligated to provide only reasonable accommodations to programs for Inmates with disabilities and is not required to take extraordinary steps to provide an Inmate access to a program. "Programs" are defined as

243732.5

Page 12 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 14 of 34
educational, vocational, rehabilitative, work release, treatment, and religious training or instruction. The Patiies acknowledge that there are currently discussions concerning the construction of four (4) new ADOC-operated prison facilities. If ADOC does not build four (4) new prisons, all educational, rehabilitative, and vocational programs offered by ADOC will be made available to eligible Inmates regardless of disability, subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions ofthe ADA. If ADOC does build four (4) new prisons, then, during the building period, ADOC will provide educational and rehabilitative programs to eligible Inmates, regardless of disability. Any programs at the new facilities, whether educational, vocational, or rehabilitative, will be fully ADA accessible. During the building process, ADOC will not be required to architecturally modify vocational programs currently in existence, nor is it required to add vocational programs presently unavailable at particular facilities. During the building process, if an otherwise eligible Inmate with a disability can access a program with a reasonable accommodation that does not require architectural modifications, then the program will be made available to that Inmate to the same extent it is available to other Inmates. Inmates may grieve any decision regarding admission or denial of admission into programs under the ADA Grievance process.
14. Facility Access- Subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA, Inmates with disabilities will be able to access all areas within a facility that they are authorized to access to the same extent Inmates without disabilities can access those areas. These areas include but are not limited to: housing units, recreational areas, libraries, canteen, cafeteria, visitation, chapel, hobby craft, and areas for medical and mental health treatment.

243732.5

Page 13 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 15 of 34
15. RTUs/SUs - ADOC will provide access to all programs other than vocational programs to Inmates in the Tutwiler, Bullock, and/or Donaldson RTU/SU, unless, after an individualized assessment, such access is counter-indicated. Denial of access will require an individualized reason why such programs are counter-indicated, and the Inmate will be notified of the reasoning in writing within three (3) business days. A denial is subject to the ADA grievance procedure. ADOC will not be required to provide access to vocational programs at the Tutwiler, Bullock and/or Donaldson RTU/SU.
16. Materials - ADOC will provide the Inmate Handbook in alternative formats to include Braille, large print and audio. In the event an Inmate with a disability needs to access other written types of materials in an alternative format, ADOC will provide reasonable accommodations for such access consistent with the provisions of the ADA.
17. Auxiliary Services/Aids- ADOC will provide access to specialized services, such as sign language interpretation, in all situations in which such services are mandated, as well as any other similar circumstances. ADOC's current Administrative Regulation 705, if implemented in practice, is sufficient. Interpreters need not be American Sign Language ("ASL") certified, provided that they have sufficient skill to ensure effective communication. In instances that do not implicate privacy or security, it may be appropriate for other Inmates to serve as interpreters, provided that the Inmate providing the service and the Inmate receiving the service are agreeable to such an arrangement. Any Inmate who serves as an interpreter will be required to sign a document that indicates the Inmate's agreement to abide by all privacy laws, to include HIPAA. TTY telephone access will be on the same scheduled availability as "regular" phone access available to Inmates in a particular housing area.

243732.5

Page 14 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 16 of 34

18. Health Codes - The existence of a disability cannot result in an increase in the health code of an Inmate beyond that minimally necessary to ensure appropriate medical care. Any such increases cannot form the basis for a denial of access to a program if the Inmate is otherwise eligible for the program.
19. Notice- ADOC will post the provisions ofthis agreement in the law library, or if there Is no law library, the area where other inmate information is made available of each institution and will amend the Inmate handbook to include the provisions of this agreement. The substance of what will be posted in the libraries and in the Inmate handbooks will be drafted by ADOC and Plaintiffs jointly. All such documents will be available in alternative formats to include large print and braille.
20. Infirmaries and Specialized Cells - All infirmaries will be fully ADA accessible. An appropriate number of each of the following special purpose cells: safe cells; segregation cells; and death row cells, and accompanying showers, will be modified to make them fully ADA accessible. At least one (1) fully ADA accessible safe cell will be provided at each facility. The accessible specialized cells will be spread throughout ADOC's facilities in such a manner that they are available, regardless of sex, to Inmates at appropriate security levels.
21. Transition Plan - ADOC will create a §504 transition plan. 22. Unresolved Claims - As indicated in Section II above, Plaintiffs bring claims in this lawsuit that are not resolved by this Agreement and that are subject to be tried in Phase II of this litigation. ADOC will not contend in the Phase II Trial that Plaintiffs were required to resolve these claims in this Agreement. Plaintiffs are not waiving and reserve the right to pursue additional architectural changes that are not ADA-based for medical or mental health purposes. Nothing in this paragraph will be construed as an admission on the pmi of the

243732.5

Page 15 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 17 of 34
Defendants that there are architectural changes needed, necessary, or required or that, to the extent such architectural changes are needed, necessary, or required, a cause of action exists to mandate that such changes be made.
23. Quality Assurance- ADOC will create a Quality Assurance Program ("QAP") to assess compliance with the terms of this Agreement and any procedures utilized by ADOC to ensure that the terms of this Agreement are met. The QAP will include access to necessary information at the facility and state level; regular review and analysis of disability-based accommodation requests and ADA grievances and appeals; and additional training recommendations for ADOC staff, if needed. ADOC will continue such QAP beyond the termination of this Court's jurisdiction in a format reasonably formulated to ensure that ADOC is meeting its requirements under the ADA.
24. Meet and Confer- No later than April 15, 2016, the Parties will have completed meeting and conferring concerning plans to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. At that time, if there are any issues concerning this Agreement that the Parties have been unable to resolve, the Parties agree to submit the unresolved issues to an agreed upon mediator, or in the event the Parties cannot agree to a mediator, one designated by the U.S. District Judge assigned to this case. The Parties will meet and confer with the mediator to attempt to resolve any outstanding issues. If the Parties are unable to agree, any aggrieved Party may seek redress with the Court.
VI. MONITORING 1. The Pmiies agree that monitoring of this Agreement is necessary and that ADAP will serve as the monitor. ADOC will allow ADAP reasonable access to facilities, documents, staff, procedures, logs, records, Inmates, and other similar informational sources. ADAP will be

243732.5

Page 16 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 18 of 34

entitled to conduct interviews with Inmates and staff to assess compliance with the terms of this Agreement and any plan to effectuate its terms.
2. ADAP agrees to be bound by any Protective or Court Orders entered in this case to protect the confidentiality of Inmate records and sensitive security information.
3. ADAP will prepare a written report on ADOC's efforts to meet the requirements of this Agreement and any plan to effectuate the terms ofthis Agreement at least quarterly. Each repott will indicate all areas in which the ADOC is, or is not, in Substantial Compliance. Such report will be provided to ADOC and all counsel of record. If ADAP believes that ADOC is not in Substantial Compliance with the terms and provisions of this Agreement and any plan to effectuate its terms, ADAP will provide written recommendations of actions that it believes necessary to achieve Substantial Compliance with the terms of the provision or provisions. ADOC will then have twenty (20) days to provide written comments, objections, or remedial action plans in response. The Parties will meet and confer to attempt to address deficiencies identified by ADAP.
4. Monitoring will continue for a period not exceeding six (6) years from the execution of this Agreement, regardless of whether ADOC does or does not build new prisons. In the event that ADOC has undettaken to build new prisons, but they have not been completed as of January I, 2020, monitoring will continue until two (2) years after the completion of the prisons.
5. If ADAP finds evidence of any violation of law which does not involve the subject matter of this Agreement, then ADAP will inform ADOC of the evidence supporting such a belief in writing. This information may include the name(s) of Inmates who have allegedly suffered such harm, provided that such Inmates consent to ADAP identifying them by

243732.5

Page 17 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 19 of 34

name. ADOC will review and investigate such claims and provide a report of such an investigation. If ADAP remains convinced that a violation of law existed, despite any report from ADOC to the contrary, the Parties will meet and confer about any appropriate resolution, to include meeting with a court appointed mediator before taking any legal action or filing any administrative complaints.
VII. RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT 1. The Parties consent to the reservation and exercise of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court (the "Court") for the Middle District of Alabama over all disputes between the Patties and among the Parties arising out of this Agreement and the implementation. 2. For purposes of jurisdiction and enforcement of this Agreement only, the Parties jointly request the Court to find that this Agreement satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1 )(A) in that it is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the federal rights ofthe Plaintiffs. 3. The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Agreement, once approved, and any plan necessary to effectuate its terms for the duration of the monitoring period expressed in Section VI, paragraph 4, above. 4. The Court will be the sole forum for enforcement of this Agreement. Any order to achieve Substantial Compliance with the provisions of this Agreement will be subject to the provisions ofthe Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626. 5. If Plaintiffs' counsel believe that the ADOC is not complying with this Agreement or any plan to effectuate its terms, they will notify ADOC, in writing, of facts supporting their belief. ADOC will investigate the allegations and respond in writing through its

243732.5

Page 18 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 20 of 34

counsel within thirty (30) days. If Plaintiffs' counsel is not satisfied with ADOC's response, the Parties will conduct negotiations to resolve the issue(s). If the Parties are unable to resolve the issue(s) timely and satisfactorily, the Parties agree to present the issue(s) to an agreed upon mediator. If the Parties cannot agree upon the selection of a mediator, the Parties will jointly request that the Court appoint a mediator. If the Parties remain unable to resolve the issue(s) following direct discussions or mediation, either patiy may move the Court for any relief allowed by law or equity. Nothing herein will prevent any Party, in matters of patiicularly urgency over issues that are central to the purposes of this Agreement, from bypassing the mediator and seeking relief from the Court. Provided, however, that in such an event the moving party will have first brought the matter to the opposing party's attention and provided the opposing party a reasonable oppmiunity to investigate and, if necessary, address the matter. In the event that the Court finds that ADOC has failed to comply with this Agreement, it will require ADOC to submit a plan for approval by the Court to remedy the deficiencies identified by the Court. In the event that such a plan does not remedy the deficiencies, the Court retains power to enforce this Agreement through all remedies provided by law.
6. This Agreement may be enforced only by the Parties hereto. Nothing contained in this Agreement is intended, or will be construed, to evidence an intention to confer any right or remedy upon any person other than the Parties hereto.
VIII. TERMINATION 1. ADOC may request a finding that it is in Substantial Compliance with this Agreement, and has maintained Substantial Compliance for at least twelve (12) consecutive months. However, ADOC may not seek an early termination ofjurisdiction until the latter ofthe following dates: Two (2) years after completion of new prison facility construction totaling

243732.5

Page 19 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 21 of 34
approximately 12,000 bed design capacity for males and 1,200 bed design capacity for females, or, if no new prisons are built, forty-two (42) months after the Court has approved this Agreement. If new prisons are built, and if no additional prisons are under construction or in design, then ADOC may not seek early termination of Court jurisdiction until at least 1 year after the last such prison becomes fully operational.
2. If upon request for termination, the Court concludes that the ADOC is in Substantial Compliance with all terms and conditions of this Agreement, then the Court may terminate jurisdiction of the portion or portions of this case subject to this Agreement.
3. The Parties will work in good faith to achieve Substantial Compliance with all terms and conditions of this Agreement within the time parameters of this Agreement. If Plaintiffs believe that ADOC is not in or progressing toward Substantial Compliance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Plaintiffs may move for an order extending jurisdiction over this matter beyond maximum time period contemplated herein. To extend jurisdiction, Plaintiffs will establish by substantial evidence and the Court will so find that ADOC is not in Substantial Compliance with this Agreement or any subsequent Order entered by the Court.
IX. AMENDMENTS 1. By mutual agreement, the Pmiies may change terms of this Agreement (except for the six-year termination provision of XI.4.(a) below), including but not limited to the timetables for taking specific actions, provided that such modifications are memorialized in writing, signed by the Parties or through their counsel, and approved by the Court. 2. ADOC may not make any substantial changes to any policy, procedure, regulation, or rule that conflicts with the terms of this Agreement. ADOC will supply or make

243732.5

Page 20 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 22 of 34

available to Plaintiffs' counsel any policies, procedures, regulations, or rules implementing the provisions ofthis Agreement for their review and comment.
3. ADOC may not approve any changes in policy, procedure, regulation, or rule by its Medical and/or Mental Health provider that conflicts with the terms of this Agreement.
X. FUNDING 1. The Parties acknowledge that implementation ofthe terms of this Agreement and any plan necessary to effectuate its terms are subject to the availability and receipt of appropriated funds. 2. The Parties further acknowledge that the lack of funding does not preclude the Court from entering an Order to achieve compliance with this Agreement that comports with the applicable provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, and with other applicable law, provided that ADOC reserves the right to assert that the lack of funding should be taken into account in any remedial order. 3. ADOC agrees to make all possible good faith efforts to seek all necessary funding to implement the terms of this Agreement. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree as to whether there is sufficient funding to implement this Agreement, the Parties will meet and confer, and if necessary, consult with the Court. In the event that the Parties remain unable to agree, either party may seek assistance of the Comt. XI. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES 1. ADOC agrees to pay attorneys' fees and associated costs to counsel for the Plaintiffs in the total amount of$1,030,000.00. Plaintiffs agree that ADOC may pay this sum in installments as follows: $500,000 within thirty (30) days ofthe Court's preliminary approval of this Agreement; $200,000 on or before October 1, 2016; and the balance on or before March 1,

243732.5

Page 21 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 23 of 34

2017. Interest on such sums is waived. ADOC acknowledges that counsel for Plaintiffs have been involved in the prosecution of other claims in this case beyond those resolved by this Agreement. ADOC acknowledges that payment of the above sum is for work and associated costs on the claims resolved herein and that Plaintiffs' counsel reserve the right to seek additional attorneys' fees and costs for claims not addressed by this Agreement.
2. The Parties further agree that the award of attorneys' fees and costs cover all fees and expenses accrued on the claims addressed herein through the date of the execution of this Agreement, and do not cover additional attorneys' fees and expenses incurred either during the negotiation and execution of the any additional plans necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement or monitoring.
3. Plaintiffs agree that they will not seek nor petition the Court for a fee award of greater than $35,000.00 for time and expenses incurred concerning any plan necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. 2 Plaintiffs' counsel will be entitled for reasonable attorneys' fees for such services. Plaintiffs' counsel will provide itemized hours expended negotiating and executing such plan or plans. ADOC agrees to pay an hourly rate of$195.00 for services described in this paragraph. The Parties will meet and confer and attempt to agree upon payment of fees relating to drafting and finalizing plans to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree upon the reasonable number of hours expended, either party may seek assistance of the Court appointed mediator, or the Court if the Parties remain unable to agree.
4. Plaintiffs' counsel agrees that they will not seek nor petition the Court for an award of fees and expenses for monitoring services greater than the following amounts. For

2 The $195 .00/hr rate identified herein is not to be construed as in any way applicable or preclusive to hourly rates set forth by Plaintiffs' counsel in any future fee application in this case.

243732.5

Page 22 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 24 of 34

purposes of describing the periods hereinafter, the time commences upon execution and final approval of this settlement by the Court. ADOC has indicated that if a decision is made to build new prison facilities, that it will take until approximately 2020 for the new prisons to become operational. The amounts listed hereafter are based upon an estimation that all new ADOC prisons will become operational at the beginning of year five (5). If such prisons become operational either before December 31, 2019 or after January 1, 2021, the Parties agree to negotiate in good faith an appropriate modification of the periods and fee caps described herein.
(a) If ADOC builds one or more new prisons, then the fee amounts for monitoring services will be capped at, and not exceed, the following amounts:
Year One: $70,000.00 Year Two: $60,000.00 Year Three: $50,000.00 Year Four: $40,000.00 Year Five: $60,000.00 Year Six: $50,000.00 (b) If ADOC chooses not to build any new prisons, monitoring costs wi11 be capped at, and not exceed, the following amounts: Year One: $70,000.00 Year Two: $60,000.00 Year Three: $50,000.00 5. Plaintiffs' counsel will provide itemized hours expended on a quarterly basis. ADOC agrees to pay an hourly rate of $195.00 for services rendered in the monitoring process. The Parties wi11 meet and confer and attempt to agree upon payment for monitoring

243732.5

Page 23 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 25 of 34
services rendered. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree upon the reasonable number of hours expended, either party may seek assistance of the Court appointed mediator, or the Court if the Parties remain unable to agree.
6. The annual caps and hourly rates described herein do not apply to: (a) Plaintiffs' motions to enforce the terms of this Agreement; and (b) Plaintiffs' opposition to any motions filed by ADOC arising out of this Agreement. No fees and expenses will be awarded to Plaintiffs' counsel for such motions or oppositions unless the Court finds: (a) that the motion or opposition was necessary to enforce substantial rights under the ADA; and (b) that Plaintiffs attempted to resolve the matter and or narrow the issues as much as possible by meeting and conferring with ADOC, taking full opportunity of recourse to the mediation process before presenting the issues to the Court. Plaintiffs' counsel agree that they may not seek attorneys' fees and costs of more than $200,000 per year on motions to enforce the terms of this Agreement.
XII. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS 1. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement among the Parties as to all claims contained herein. This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements, whether written, oral, or implied. Each party represents that it has full legal authority to enter into and execute this Agreement. 2. This Agreement may not be altered or amended, except in writing signed by all Parties or their representatives. 3. This Agreement will be binding on all successors, assigns, employees, agents, and all other working on behalf of Plaintiffs and ADOC.

243732.5

Page 24 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 26 of 34
4. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts and such counterparts will be provided to all Parties immediately upon execution.

243732.5

Page 25 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 27 of 34

Rhonda Brownstein Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue . Montgomery, Alabama 36104 (334) 956.8200 rhonda. hn)wn~in @splcentcr.or,g One ofthe Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Maria . Morris Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 (334) 956-8200 maria. morris@ splcenter.org One ofthe Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Date: uh~fo

Page 25 of32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 28 of 34

James A. 'IJ(tcker. Executi Director Alabama fisnbilities /\(!t{t{)cacy Program Box 870~)5 Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487

Date:

/~:::/=;:~/ .1//'r) .it~) //
//Al'/l/P'aaIbt.armi~akIrD•Hzl~tii..rsc/'a)·k;b<'ni.le.•ityt:iXe:.s.-A</"d':'v-' /·o"·c' .ac/:y'1P;·.;tru_ot;~ Yg-~- t1/·

Box 870395

Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487

(205) 348-4928

jphackney(~aci@Jla.edu

_

One ofthe AttorneysforPlaintiff.~

William vlnuer Pol, Jr.
Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487 (205) 348-4928 wvandeq;oljr(Q{adap. pa.edu One ofthe Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Date: ~3=---'l'-----'=~----

243732 4

Page 26 of32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 29 of 34

>~ ~ .--:l-'1( b
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Zarzaur rv ~jumdat· & Debrosse -Trial Lawyers

2332 2nl Avenue North

Birmingham, Alabama 35203

(205) 983-7985 ..

anil@zarzaur.com

.

One.ofthe Attor.n-eys for. PlaintiffAlabama Di.-sabilitie. s Ad.vocacy Pr.-o-gr.am

2437324

Page 27 of32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 30 of 34

~~0-- ~;c:;k:::_~v
William G. Somerville Baker Donelson Beannan Caldwel1 & Berkowitz 420 20th Street North Suite 1400 Birmingham, Alabama 35203
(205) 250-8375
One ofthe Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

Date: A/t<A-<~k 'f) __.J~

Page 28 of32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 31 of 34

David R. Boyd

Date: _ _0_3+7/_t..:::....?,t,?-/.-'-IL-k_ _

Balch & Bingham LLP

P.O. Box 78

Montgomery, Alabama 36101

(334) 834-6500

.Q.Qgyd(iiJbalch:com One ofthe Attorneys for Defendant Alabama Department ofCorrections

// f;;'~f/~{~~;~;;;;~t:;f/"
r;;7f~ ;-/;::.::f~;:~d"~~/>/
;~ / ,/~"----,~···"··--:#..:::__ _ _ _ __
JohwC';. S!Ifith B!fl'Ch & Bingham LLP P.O. Box 78 Montgomery, Alabama 36101
(334) 834-6500
.i&'iDlillJ.(il\bill.£lJ·CQ!ll One (~(the Attorneys for Defendant Alabama Department ofCorrections

243732.5

Page 30 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 32 of 34
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ William R. Lunsford Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 655 Gallatin Street Huntsville, Alabama 35801 (256) 551-0171 blunsford@maynarclcooper.com One ofthe Attorneys for Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich

243732,5

Page 31 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 33 of 34
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Mitesh B. Shah Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 1901 6th Avenue North Suite 2400 Birmingham, Alabama 35203 (205) 254-1178 mshah@!maynardcooper.com One ofthe Attorneys for Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich

243732.5

Page 32 of33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 376-1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 34 of 34

Al>anbrarem'aR\'Ill~, ~GJe'naerrat'm!e~~t.,9PCdo-r-r·ectioQns '

Date: 3 / I C> I I 0

301 South Ri]5Tey·stfeet

Montgomery, Alabama 36130

(334) 353-3885

anne. hi 110)doc.alabnma.gov

One ofthe Attorneys for Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections

Jef~ Injfts fficial Capacity as Commissioner
of the Alabama Department of Corrections 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, Alabama 36130

243732.5

Page 33 of33

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JOSHUA DUNN, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. JEFFERSON DUNN, ET AL.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Civil Action Number: ) ) 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM ) ) )

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR PHASE 1

COME NOW the Plaintiffs, pursuant to this Court’s Order for supplemental

briefing as it relates to class certification for Phase 1 (Doc. 499), and submit the

following information related to the questions raised in the Order to support

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification:

1.a. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(B)(3) Is Privately Enforceable Through the ADA and § 504
Plaintiffs allege and will prove that Defendants have violated, and continue

to violate, the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

(collectively, “the ADA”). Plaintiffs will prove the violations of the ADA in part

by proving that the ADOC fails to take actions set forth in the regulations and that

these actions, if taken, would prevent many of the individual instances of

exclusions and discrimination currently occurring.

1

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 2 of 21
Plaintiffs will prove that Defendants have violated the “methods of administration” provision of the ADA, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3), by failing to establish a method to identify and track prisoners with disabilities. This inability to identify and track prisoners with disabilities causes “the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability.” Quite simply, if the ADOC does not know who has a disability, or does not share this information internally as inmates move from facility to facility, the ADOC will not know to accommodate those individuals.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3) is privately enforceable because the regulation “does not create any rights that do not exist under the ADA.” Brantley v. MaxwellJolly, 656 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal 2009). The regulation simply prohibits a public entity from employing a method of administration that has the effect of subjecting individuals with disabilities to discrimination. Because the regulation falls within the scope if the ADA’s prohibition against disability-based discrimination, the regulation is enforceable through the private right of action contained in the statute. See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 567 (6th Cir. 2005) [“if the regulation simply effectuates the express mandates of the controlling statute, then the regulation may be enforced via the private cause of action available under that statute”]. Many, if not most, courts addressing claims brought under 28 C.F.R.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 3 of 21
§ 35.130(b)(3) have found that a plaintiff may properly state a claim under the regulation. Brantley, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 1176, citing Frederick L. v. Department of Public Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 538-39 (E.D.Pa.2001) (“The ADA regulations at issue here are merely rules for the implementation of the statutory directives; they do not prohibit otherwise permissible conduct”); Crabtree v. Goetz, 2008 WL 5330506 at *24 (M.D.Tenn. Dec. 19, 2008) (ruling that plaintiffs had standing to enforce 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)); Pennsylvania Prot. and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dept., 402 F.3d 374, 385 (3rd Cir. 2005) (remanding action for consideration of plaintiffs’ discriminatory administration claim under 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)).
1.b. The ADA Violations that Arise Due to the ADOC Methods of Administration Can Be Resolved in One Stroke Plaintiffs’ claims relating to ADOC’s methods of administration of the ADA
are of a common nature and have a classwide resolution – they can indeed be resolved in one stroke.
At the end of the day, Plaintiffs seek accommodations for their disabilities. Defendant can create a system to provide these accommodations. The Court can order it to do so. The mechanisms set out in the ADA implementing regulations provide guidance on how to do this: ADOC should have an ADA accommodation request process and grievance procedure, properly trained ADA coordinators, and
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 4 of 21
a method for identifying prisoners with disabilities in order to begin the discussion of potential accommodations.
What Plaintiffs seek is not novel. In Henderson, this Court certified a class of HIV+ prisoners of ADOC. Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506 (M.D. Ala. 2012). There, the court found that “the named plaintiffs’ legal claim—that the defendants are engaged in disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act—is identical to the class’s claim.” Id. at 511 (citing PradoSteiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that “a strong similarity of legal theories will satisfy the typicality requirement despite substantial factual differences”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This court found that the discriminatory policies of the ADOC against prisoners with HIV could be addressed in a state-wide class action. Henderson, 289 F.R.D. at 511. Each plaintiff and class member was experiencing the discrimination of the policy, despite the varied ways the policy impacted the individual named plaintiffs. Id. at 510-11.
Although Plaintiffs here have different disabilities, ADOC policies, specifically the lack of an adequate means to request and oversee accommodations by prisoners with disabilities, affects the Named Plaintiffs similarly. Here, like in Henderson, the Plaintiffs are all impacted by the same systemic issue, despite the varied ways each of them is denied accommodation.
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 5 of 21
1.c. The Methods of Administration Elements Are Elements of Class Certification, Not Distinct Elements of an ADA Claim Since the previous questions have been answered in the affirmative, the
Court requests that Plaintiffs detail “the elements that plaintiffs must prove in order to prevail on a so-called methods-of-administration ADA claim.” Doc. 499 at 2.
The ADA regulations prohibit public entities from using methods of administration “[t]hat have the effect of . . . discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) (“methods of administration regulation”). As described above, violations of the regulations are privately enforceable as support for Plaintiffs’ allegations that ADOC violates the ADA. The methods of administration regulation specifically is “merely [a] rule[] for the implementation of the statutory directives [of the ADA].” Frederick L., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 538. The regulation itself “does not create rights that do not exist under the ADA”; instead, it “merely prohibits public entities from employing methods of administration which have the effect of discriminating against qualified disabled individuals on the basis of their disabilities.” Schwarz v. The Vill. Charter School, Inc., No. 5:12cv-177-Oc-34PL, 2016 WL 787934, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 29, 2016) (quoting Brantley, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2009)); see also Frederick, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (explaining that a failure to comply with the regulatory terms is evidence of a violation of the ADA itself).
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 6 of 21
Because a violation of the methods of administration regulation itself is not a separate violation, the elements that the plaintiffs need to prove mirror those for any other ADA violation. The elements are: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1953, 141 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1998).
Plaintiffs will show that the ADOC’s methods of administration result in the exclusion of the putative ADA subclass members from receiving the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of the ADOC. The methods of administration are not themselves an element of the violation of the ADA. Rather, they provide a common cause of the exclusions from the benefits, and fixing them will provide a common remedy to the ongoing, systemic violations of the ADA.
2. Plaintiffs Properly Request that the Court Order ADOC to Develop and Implement a Plan that Will Remedy the ADA Violations Plaintiffs Will Prove Plaintiffs in this case seek class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to order ADOC to develop and implement a plan to eliminate the substantial risk of harm that Plaintiffs and members of the putative
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 7 of 21
class suffer due to ADOC’s unlawful policies and practices with regard to persons with disabilities. Doc. 210 at 135. More specifically, Plaintiffs identify five remedies that this Court could order on behalf of the putative class as a whole. Doc. 493 at 14. First, the Court can order ADOC to develop an ADA transition plan. Second, the Court can order ADOC to develop and implement a system by which prisoners with disabilities may request accommodations as well as a system whereby prisoners can properly grieve ADA-related complaints. Third, the Court can order ADOC to develop and implement a system in which it can identify and track persons with disabilities throughout their incarceration. Fourth, the Court can order ADOC to train its employees and agents on the requirements of the ADA. And, finally, the Court can order ADOC to employ someone—an ADA coordinator—to ensure that ADOC is complying with the ADA. Id. In short, the Court can order Defendant to craft a plan to remedy the systemic ADA violations Plaintiffs will prove. See Henderson, 913 F.Supp.2d at 1317.
Although Plaintiffs’ five remedies are consistent with the implementation provisions of the ADA, they are not merely exhortations to obey the law. They are narrowly tailored remedies for addressing the specific harms Plaintiffs will prove. Such relief is appropriate in a case of this nature. See id. Indeed, this court made a similar order in Henderson. There, plaintiffs challenged a policy of segregating HIV+ prisoners. Id. Implementing regulations of the ADA require “the most
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 8 of 21
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). The court found that ADOC’s segregation policy violated the ADA, and gave ADOC the opportunity to craft a remedy to ensure that the treatment of plaintiffs “must depend upon an individual-byindividual assessment of these prisoners that honors each prisoner’s rights under the ADA.” Id. at 1318. The remedy required ADOC to satisfy the requirements of the regulation for which plaintiffs had proven a violation.
Here, the Court is presented with a prisons conditions case. Such a case is subject to the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Under the PLRA, relief must be “narrowly drawn” and “extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(1)(A); see also Henderson, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. The relief ordered must be “the least intrusive means necessary.” Id. Courts have found that the “least intrusive” provision of the PLRA is satisfied where prison officials are ordered to “draft and promulgate a plan” which leaves prison officials the discretion to determine the details of how to deliver the relief ordered. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 363 (1996) (finding that the district court erred by not issuing an order which gave prison officials “the responsibility for devising a remedial plan.”); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832-33 (1977) (finding that the district court “scrupulously respected the
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 9 of 21
limits on their role” by ordering prisoner officials to “devise a remedy for the violation.”); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 883 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “[a]llowing defendants to develop policies and procedures to meet the ADA’s requirements is precisely the type of process that the Supreme Court has indicated is appropriate for devising a suitable remedial plan in a prison litigation case.”); Pierce v. County of Orange, 761 F.Supp.2d 915, 954 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that “the least intrusive means to compel the County to remedy the physical barriers and disparate provision of programs, services, and activities to disabled detainees [in the county jail] is to allow the County [jail officials] to draft a proposed plan that will address and correct each and every physical barrier identified… and that will ensure that disabled detainees are provided with equal access to programs, services, and activities”).
In this case, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court for relief that is consistent with the requirements of the PLRA. Rather than asking the Court to “thrust itself into prison administration,” Plaintiffs are asking that the Court order Defendant ADOC to develop and implement a plan that will remedy its violations under the ADA. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832. Such a request is “narrowly drawn” and “extend[s] no further than necessary” to correct ADOC’s violations of the ADA. See 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(1)(A). The request allows ADOC, rather than Plaintiffs or this Court, to determine in the first instance the details of how it will comply with
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 10 of 21
the law. Once ADOC devises such a plan, Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to object and the Court will resolve any disputes. See Pierce, 761 F.Supp.2d at 954. Once the disputes are resolved and the plan is final, “the Court will approve the plan and that will become the [final] injunctive relief ordered.” Id.
For the reasons set forth above, it is within the Court’s authority and appropriate, under the PLRA, to issue an order requiring ADOC to develop a plan to remedy its violations. 3.a. ADAP Has Associational Standing to Represent the Members of the
Putative Class The Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (“ADAP”) filed this suit against the ADOC for rights violations under the ADA suffered by inmates with disabilities, who are ADAP’s constituents. ADAP is Alabama’s designated Protection and Advocacy (“P&A”) agency charged with protecting the legal rights of persons with disabilities in this State. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 15001(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 794e(a)(1); see also Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. SafetyNet Youthcare, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1314 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (“ADAP is Alabama’s designated, federally funded program authorized by Congress to protect and advocate for the civil rights of persons with disabilities in Alabama.”). ADAP has associational standing to represent the members of the Phase I putative class, because the putative class members are ADAP’s constituents.
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 11 of 21
Standing doctrine addresses “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when three things occur: (1) its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor relief requested require the participation of individual members. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). In Doe v. Stincer, the Eleventh Circuit stated: “It is enough for the representative entity to allege that one of its members or constituents has suffered an injury that would allow it to bring suit in its own right.” 175 F. 3d 879, 884-85 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that, if a constituent had standing, the P&A would have associational standing for claims under the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act) (internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit looks for a close nexus between the organization and its members on one side and the alleged injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct on the other. Stincer, 175 F. 3d at 884-85.
The nexus here is between ADAP, which represents individuals with disabilities, and harms to individuals with disabilities in ADOC prisons caused by ADOC’s violations of the ADA, through its failure to remove architectural barriers in its facilities, denial of access to its programs and services, and refusal to provide
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 12 of 21
auxiliary aids and services. Because ADAP has constituents who have suffered violations under the ADA and have standing to sue, a nexus exists. See Stincer, 175 F.3d at 885-86.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the ability of P&As to pursue litigation to vindicate the rights of those it protects. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011) (Virginia P&A filed suit against Virginia’s department of mental health pursuant to the DD Act). The Court held: “in addition to pressing its own rights, a P&A system may ‘pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on behalf of’ those it protects.” Stewart, 563 U.S. at 251 (internal citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 15044(b). As Alabama’s P&A, ADAP specifically alleged its claims according to its authority on behalf of itself and on behalf of the individuals it is charged with protecting. See Doc. 210 at ¶52.
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that P&As have associational standing in Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Developmental Ctr., 97 F.3d 492, 497 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Stincer, 175 F.3d at 886 (finding that a P&A organization “may sue on behalf of its constituents like a more traditional association may sue on behalf of its members”). In Tarwater, ADAP filed suit against the Alabama Department of Mental Health pursuant to its authority under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act to obtain records of two (2) former institutionalized persons. Like the plaintiff in Hunt, ADAP is an
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 13 of 21
organization designated by the government to protect a specific, vulnerable segment of society. See generally Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1108-13 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the Hunt factors to determine that the Oregon P&A had associational standing under PAIMI to pursue claims against Oregon’s Department of Human Services); and Mississippi Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Cotten, 929 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The state cannot satisfy the requirements of [the Act] by establishing a protection and advocacy system which has this authority in theory, but then taking action which prevents the system from exercising that authority.”).
Historically, litigation has been recognized as a crucial tool for P&As to protect against and remedy violations on behalf of those P&As are charged with protecting. See, e.g., Hawaii Disability Rights Ctr. v. Cheung, 513 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1194 (D. Haw. 2007) (“To ensure such protection, the P&A System is given the express authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to guarantee protection of, and advocacy for, the rights of the developmentally disabled individuals within the State.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 616 (D.R.I. 1978), aff’d, 605 F. 2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979) (“[T]he advocacy agency and a private right of action are crucial to protect the rights secured by the Act.”). 3.b. ADAP’s Claims, and the Relief It Seeks, Are Coextensive with Those of
the Putative Subclass
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 14 of 21
For the reasons stated above, ADAP’s claims and the relief it seeks are essentially coextensive with that of the putative class. Regardless of the Court’s determination of class certification, ADAP independently has associational standing as Alabama’s P&A to pursue its claims for the same systemic violations and relief sought by the putative class.
A difference between the claims for which ADAP is seeking relief and the claims of the class would arise only if the Court were to certify a class smaller than the proposed subclass. As discussed below, the Court could certify sub-classes of the putative ADA sub-class in a variety of ways. If the Court were to do so, there might be constituents of ADAP whose particular issues did not fall squarely within the sub-classes. In that event, ADAP would still have standing to pursue such claims, although the sub-classes would not. 4. The Court Should Not Create Subclasses
Establishing subclasses for Phase 1 is neither necessary nor efficient. The ADA violations asserted by Plaintiffs have a common cause that ties them together and means they can be addressed with “one stroke.” The ADA violations all come back to the ADOC’s failure to have a system to accommodate prisoners with disabilities. Because ADOC does not know who in its custody has a disability, does not have a process for prisoners to request an accommodation, and does not have designated personnel trained to evaluate and respond to requests for
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 15 of 21
accommodations, the putative class members are denied accommodations. Although the accommodations that they are denied vary from person to person and facility to facility, the common thread amongst them all is failure to create a system to provide accommodations. For any set of subclasses, the Court would be presented with the same evidence regarding the lack of system for accommodation for each subclass, resulting in a repetitious presentation of evidence.
If the Court believes sub-classes are appropriate, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to consider certifying the following subclasses:
1. Prisoners who have one or more disabilities and are now, or in the future will be, in the custody of ADOC who have been denied access to services or programs solely due to their disability.
2. Prisoners who have one or more disabilities and are now, or in the future will be, in the custody of ADOC who have been denied reasonable modifications to accommodate their disabilities.
3. Prisoners who have one or more disabilities and are now, or in the future will be, in the custody of ADOC who have been denied auxiliary aids and services to accommodate their disabilities.
4. Prisoners who have one or more disabilities and are now, or in the future will be, in the custody of ADOC who need removal of architectural barriers to accommodate their disabilities.
These subclasses track the recognized types of ADA violations. Together they should cover all persons with disabilities. While there would be evidence of each of the subclasses attempting to receive accommodations in the absence of a process, they type of the accommodations requested would be more similar
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 16 of 21
between ADA subclasses created in this manner than if there one single ADA subclass.
Certifying subclasses by disability or ADOC facility could be potentially problematic. Although named Plaintiffs have experienced common instances of disability discrimination, such as lack of an adequate accommodation request process, named Plaintiffs have a variety of disabilities and certifying subclasses based upon disability would likely prove to be unwieldy. Also, many persons with disabilities have multiple disabilities and would fall into multiple subclasses. Their evidence would be redundant, but would have to be presented for each subclass of which they were a member. Moreover, as discussed above, there would likely be persons with disabilities who fell outside the subclasses whose claims could nonetheless be brought by ADAP.
Nor would it be helpful to certify subclasses by ADOC facility. ADOC moves prisoners between facilities for a wide range of reasons. Many of the proposed class representatives have spent time at multiple facilities. They have encountered the same difficulties in obtaining accommodations at multiple facilities. Such subclasses would result in plaintiffs and class members providing evidence regarding the claims of multiple subclasses.1
1 One possible variation on subclasses by facility would be to have a subclass of persons at Hamilton and Tutwiler, and another for persons at all other facilities. Hamilton and Tutwiler both have an ADA request and grievance
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 17 of 21
5. Dismissal of Named Plaintiffs Will Not Alter the Presentation of Claims and Evidence at Trial
The Court asked Plaintiffs to brief how the potential dismissal of Named Plaintiffs who have been released from physical custody of ADOC will affect the claims or evidence presented in this case. Doc. 499 at 4-5. The short answer is that it will not.
ADOC unlawfully discriminates against the Plaintiffs and putative subclass members by failing to accommodate prisoners with disabilities, thereby excluding them from programs and services. Doc. 492 at 1-2. Every Plaintiff and every putative subclass member suffer the same violation of the ADA: the failure of the ADOC to create a mechanism to obtain an accommodation results in the denial of accommodations. Given the systemic nature of the claims presented, the dismissal of Named Plaintiffs Pearson, Hagood, and Moore will not alter the class claims or the evidence presented, so long as the Court certifies the class as requested. The same is true via ADAP’s associational standing to pursue its claims. See supra, Question 3.
Named Plaintiffs Pearson, Hagood, and Moore have claims that are relevant to one or more systemic violations that Plaintiffs seek to prove. Their dismissal would not preclude admission of any evidence relating to their claims, including
process, unlike all other facilities. They have both been architecturally remediated for ADA compliance more substantially than the other facilities. However, subclasses created along these lines would still have the problem of persons being transferred among facilities and thus the need for the same witness to present evidence on both subclasses.
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 18 of 21
their individual testimony, as that evidence remains relevant to the systemic claims regardless of whether they are Named Plaintiffs or simply witnesses testifying about ADOC practices regarding its failures to make ADA accommodations.
For example, Plaintiffs will present evidence that ADOC fails to make its facilities architecturally accessible to prisoners with disabilities. Doc. 492 at 8-9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs will present evidence that Mr. Hagood, who uses wheelchair, was housed in dormitories that were not wheelchair accessible. This evidence will be relevant to the claims of the class or ADAP, regardless of whether Mr. Hagood remains a plaintiff. Similarly, Plaintiffs claim that ADOC fails to ensure effective communication for prisoners with disabilities. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs will present evidence that Mr. Pearson, who is deaf, was not provided with a sign language interpreter, regardless of whether Mr. Pearson remains a plaintiff.
If the Court does not certify the class as proposed or otherwise limits ADAP’s presentation of its claims, and instead certifies various subclasses, the dismissal of some of these Named Plaintiffs might affect the claims and evidence presented. Specifically, if the Court were to certify subclasses defined by a specific disability, dismissing Named Plaintiff Moore would leave a subclass of prisoners with visual impairments without a class representative because Plaintiff Moore is the only remaining Named Plaintiff who is blind. However, if the Court
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 19 of 21

were to certify subclasses by type of ADA violation to which the subclass

members were subjected, Plaintiff Moore, as a person who is blind who

experienced the architectural barriers, would be able to testify about ADOC’s

failures to accommodate him.

Dated: May 25, 2016

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Maria V. Morris Maria V. Morris One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104
Rhonda Brownstein (ASB-3193-O64R) Maria V. Morris (ASB-2198-R64M)
Ebony G. Howard (ASB-7247-O76H) Latasha L. McCrary (ASB-1935-L75M) Brooke Menschel (ASB-7675-Z61K) Valentina Restrepo (ASB-7422-I67Z) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 Telephone: (334) 956-8200 Facsimile: (334) 956-8481 rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org maria.morris@splcenter.org ebony.howard@splcenter.org latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org brooke.menschel@splcenter.org valentina.restrepo@splcenter.org
Miriam Haskell* (FL. Bar No. 069033) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER P.O. Box 370037 Miami, FL 33137 Telephone: (786) 347-2056 Facsimile: (786) 237-2949 miriam.haskell@splcenter.org *admitted pro hac vice
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 20 of 21
Eunice Cho* (GA. Bar No. 632669) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 1989 College Avenue NE Atlanta, GA 30317 Telephone: (404) 221-5842 Facsimile: (404) 221-5857 eunice.cho@splcenter.org *admitted pro hac vice
William Van Der Pol, Jr. (ASB-2112-114F) J. Patrick Hackney (ASB-6971-H51J) Glenn N. Baxter (ASB-3825-A41G) Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 Telephone: (205) 348-4928 Facsimile: (205) 348-3909 wvanderpoljr@adap.ua.edu jphackney@adap.ua.edu gnbaxter@adap.ua.edu
William Glassell Somerville, III (ASB-6185-E63W) Andrew Philip Walsh (ASB-3755-W77W) Dennis Nabors Patricia Clotfelter (ASB-0841-F43P) Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC 420 20th Street North, Suite 1400 Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 250-8375 Facsimile: (205) 488-3775 wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com awalsh@bakerdonelson.com dnabors@bakerdonelson.com pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com
Gregory M. Zarzaur (ASB-0759-E45Z) Anil A. Mujumdar (ASB-2004-L65M) Diandra S. Debrosse (ASB-2956-N76D) Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 983-7985 Facsimile: (888) 505-0523 gregory@zarzaur.com anil@zarzaur.com diandra@zarzaur.com ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 508 Filed 05/25/16 Page 21 of 21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have on this 25th day of May, 2016, electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

David R. Boyd, Esq. John G. Smith, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101
William Richard Lunsford, Esq. Melissa K. Marler, Esq. Stephen Rogers, Esq. Matthew B. Reeves, Esq. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C. 655 Gallatin Street Huntsville, AL 35801
Anne Hill, Esq. Elizabeth Anne Sees, Esq. Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Esq. Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, AL 36130

Michael Leon Edwards, Esq. Susan Nettles Han, Esq. John Eric Getty, Esq. Steven C. Corhern, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201
Mitesh Shah, Esq. Mitchell David Greggs, Esq. Bryan A. Coleman, Esq. Evan P. Moltz, Esq. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC 1901 6th Avenue North, Suite 2400 Birmingham, AL 35203
Deana Johnson, Esq. Brett T. Lane, Esq. MHM Services, Inc. 1447 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 500 Atlanta, GA 30309

/s/ Maria V. Morris One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs

21

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 1 of 84

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JOSHUA DUNN, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. JEFFERSON DUNN, ET AL.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

Civil Action Number:

)

)

2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM

)

)

)

AMENDED AND RESTATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONCERNING CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND §504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, AND RESOLVING THE PHASE 1 TRIAL OF THESE PROCEEDINGS

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 2 of 84
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 3 II. STATEMENT OF PARTIES, PURPOSE, AND INTENT................................................ 4 III. PRELIMINARY AND FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT ...... 8 IV. DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................................... 8 V. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS....................................................................................... 11
1. Introduction................................................................................................................... 11 2. Provisions Regarding Assessment, Self Evaluation and Transition Plan, and Corrective
Actions. ................................................................................................................. 12 3. Provisions Regarding Program Access and Reasonable Accommodation. .................. 24 4. Provisions Regarding RTUs and SUs. .......................................................................... 25 5. Provisions Regarding Identifying, Documenting and Tracking Inmates with
Disabilities. ........................................................................................................... 27 6. Provisions Regarding Security Levels. ......................................................................... 36 7. Provisions Regarding Auxiliary Aids. .......................................................................... 38 8. Provisions Regarding Emergencies. ............................................................................. 44 9. Provisions Regarding Accommodations and Appeals. ................................................. 46 10. Provisions Regarding ADA Coordinators. ................................................................. 48 11. Provisions Regarding Training of ADOC Staff.......................................................... 55 12. Provisions Regarding a Quality Assurance Plan (including Quality Assurance Tools.)
............................................................................................................................... 58 13. Unresolved Claims...................................................................................................... 69 VI. MONITORING................................................................................................................. 69 VII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS.............................................................................. 70 VIII. RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT .................................... 73 IX. TERMINATION............................................................................................................... 73 X. AMENDMENTS .............................................................................................................. 74 XI. FUNDING......................................................................................................................... 75 XII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES......................................................................... 75 XIII. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS ......................................................................................... 77

244554.6

Page 2 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 3 of 84

I.

INTRODUCTION

1. On June 17, 2014, the individually named Plaintiffs and the Alabama Disabilities

Advocacy Program (“ADAP”) filed the instant lawsuit (the “Lawsuit”) challenging, among other

things, the compliance of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) with the provisions

of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12111, et seq., including the ADA

Amendment Acts of 2008, 42 USC 12001 et seq., ( collectively, the “ADA”) and §504 the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC § 701, et seq. (“Rehabilitation Act”) (the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act are jointly referred to herein as the “Acts.”)

2. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama (the “Court”) has

bifurcated the issues raised in the Lawsuit into two trial Phases: Phase 1, which includes the trial

of claims and issues brought under the Acts, other than claims relating to mental health status;

and Phase 2, which includes all other claims in the Lawsuit.

3. On March 15, 2016, the parties submitted their “Joint Motion for Preliminary

Approval of a Class Action Settlement of Concerning Claims Arising Under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Doc. 376) (“Joint Motion”).

Attached to the Joint Motion was the parties’ “Settlement Agreement Concerning Claims Arising

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and

Resolving the Phase I Trial of These Proceedings” (Doc. 376-1) (“ Agreement”).

4. The Court conducted a hearing on the Joint Motion on March 17, 2016.

5. Following that hearing, and by Order of March 18, 2016, the Court directed that

the “Plan” referenced in the Agreement be submitted to the Court. (Doc. 394 at ¶ (2)) (“Order”).

6. Since the entry of the Order, the parties have continued to work, both

independently and through extensive mediation, to further refine and define the terms and

provisions of an agreement that will settle the issues to be tried in Phase 1. The Parties believe

244554.6

Page 3 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 4 of 84
that they have reached such a resolution and that, in order to avoid additional protracted, costly and uncertain litigation, it is in their respective best interests to resolve the issues to be tried in Phase 1 of this litigation.
7. Accordingly, the Parties, by and through their respective counsel, jointly stipulate and agree to the following provisions to resolve Phase 1 of the litigation. II. STATEMENT OF PARTIES, PURPOSE, AND INTENT
1. Named Defendant ADOC is the agency of the State of Alabama in charge of the state-owned and operated prisons and work release facilities in Alabama that currently or may in the future have physical custody of the individually named plaintiffs.
2. The individually named plaintiffs in this lawsuit are currently, or may in the future be, in the physical custody of ADOC.
3. Plaintiff ADAP is the duly authorized protection and advocacy agency in the State of Alabama.
4. The individually named plaintiffs and ADAP seek class certification of their claims asserted in this lawsuit under the Acts. As part of this agreed resolution of the claims to be tried in Phase 1 of this litigation, ADOC consents to the certification, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, of a class whose members (the “Class”) are defined as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness, or defect.”
5. The individually named plaintiffs, the Class, and ADAP are collectively referred to herein as “Plaintiffs.”
6. The Plaintiffs and ADOC are collectively referred to as the “Parties.”

244554.6

Page 4 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 5 of 84

7. The Parties stipulate that there are no individual or class claims, including putative class claims, under the Acts asserted against Named Defendant Jefferson Dunn, named in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, or Named Defendant Ruth Naglich, named in her official capacity as Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections.
8. The purpose of this “Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement Concerning Claims Arising Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Resolving the Phase 1 Trial of these Proceedings” (“Amended Agreement”) is to: (1) amend, supplement and supersede the Agreement; (2) provide the “plan” requested in the Order; and (3) settle and resolve all issues which were to be presented in the trial of Phase 1 of this matter. The Parties agree and stipulate that by this Amended Agreement they hereby resolve all pending claims in this action for alleged violations of the Acts, except for claims under the Acts that relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness or defect. Claims brought by Plaintiffs under the Acts that relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness or defect are not waived and are reserved for resolution during the Phase 2 trial.1
9. Except for ADOC’s consent to class certification as described in Section II, paragraph 4 above, the Parties agree that ADOC has not consented to class certification of claims that arise under the Acts and that relate solely to or arise solely from mental health disabilities, or claims that arise under the Eighth Amendment. Class certification and the merits of such claims will be resolved in Phase 2 of this litigation.
1 The Parties agree that the question of whether ADOC should be required to add the following categories of Inmates to the mental health caseload is expressly reserved for resolution during Phase 2 of this litigation: (i) Inmates placed in suicide watch or safe cells; (ii) any Inmate who has been placed in segregation more than two times in a 365-day period (except that placement into segregation for protective custody or similar reasons); and (iii) any Inmate who spends more than 50% of his or her time housed in segregation.

244554.6

Page 5 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 6 of 84
10. The Parties may not use this Amended Agreement or Agreement for any purpose in Phase 2 of the litigation except as evidence of what has or has not been resolved by this Amended Agreement.
11. Nothing in this Amended Agreement or Agreement will be construed as an admission by ADOC of any violation of law. To the contrary, ADOC denies every material allegation of the Complaint, as amended, in this case and denies any liability to the Plaintiffs. This Amended Agreement and Agreement do not constitute, and will not be construed as, an admission or evidence of any act of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of any Inmate, or of any violation of the Acts.
12. The Parties stipulate that nothing in this Amended Agreement or in the Agreement will be used for any purpose outside of the above-captioned matter or against any named Defendant in any other litigation that has been or may be filed against any named Defendant. Nothing in this Amended Agreement or in the Agreement will be construed to require ADOC to do more than what is required by the Acts, court decisions applying or interpreting the Acts, or Rules and Regulations interpreting the Acts.
13. The Parties believe that this Amended Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to protect the interests of all Parties concerning the issues contained herein. The Parties jointly file this Amended Agreement with the Court and ask that the Court issue an order directing notice to the Class, setting an objection period, and setting a fairness hearing for preliminary approval, and that the Court then approve the Class and the settlement as final.
14. However, and in the event that this Amended Agreement is not approved by the Court such that it settles and resolves, on a class basis, all issues to be tried in Phase 1, the Parties retain all of their pre-Settlement litigation rights and defenses, including ADOC’s right to

244554.6

Page 6 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 7 of 84
petition for interlocutory review of any order granting class certification. Additionally, the Parties shall return to the status quo ante in the Lawsuit as if the Parties had not entered into this Amended Agreement. Any discussions, offers, or negotiations associated with this Amended Agreement or Agreement will not be discoverable or offered into evidence or used in the Lawsuit or any other action or proceeding for any purpose, without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ right to seek class certification, and ADOC’s right to oppose class certification. In such event, all Parties will stand in the same position as if the Amended Agreement or Agreement had not been negotiated, made or filed with the Court.

244554.6

Page 7 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 8 of 84

III. PRELIMINARY AND FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 1. Preliminary Approval – No later than seven (7) days after all necessary
signatories have executed this Amended Agreement, the Parties will jointly submit this Amended Agreement to the Court for preliminary approval, along with a proposed order for preliminary approval, a schedule for notice, proposed notices of preliminary approval, a schedule for an objection period, and a request for a fairness hearing under Rule 23 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Final Approval – Within twenty (20) days of the Parties reaching agreement, the Parties will file with the Court any additional agreement or agreements, which will include notice provisions, a proposed Final Approval Order, and comply with all provisions of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IV. DEFINITIONS 1. “Substantial Compliance” means adherence in all material respects to the terms of
this Amended Agreement and to any plans or methods implemented by ADOC so as to comply with the terms of this Amended Agreement, recognizing that one hundred percent (100%) compliance is not required. Isolated, acute, non-substantive or immaterial deviations from the terms of this Amended Agreement or from any plans or methods implemented by ADOC so as to comply with the terms of this Amended Agreement will not prevent a finding of Substantial Compliance, provided that ADOC can demonstrate that it has:
a. implemented a system or systems (i) for assuring compliance, and (ii) for taking corrective measures in response to instances of non-compliance; and
b. instituted policies, practices, and resources that are capable of durable and sustained compliance.

244554.6

Page 8 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 9 of 84
2. “Disability” and “Disabilities” have the same meaning they have under the Acts and applicable implementing regulations.
3. “Inmate” is defined as any individual detained by or in the custody of ADOC, including any individual housed in or held at any facility operated or controlled by ADOC. This term does not include any individual who has been released on parole and/or probation or who is not physically housed in an ADOC facility.
4. Inmate with a Disability. An Inmate who is a qualified individual with a disability who:
a. Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;
b. Has a record or history of such impairment; or c. Is perceived or regarded as having such impairment. 5. “Programs” are defined as educational, vocational, rehabilitative, work release, treatment, and religious training or instruction and include all educational, rehabilitative, substance abuse treatment, vocational, work release, religious, disciplinary, classification, medical or mental health treatment or similar programs, procedures, or processes provided to Inmates in ADOC custody regardless of whether such programs are administered by ADOC, or by a contractor of ADOC. 6. An “Otherwise Qualified Inmate:” An Inmate who is able to meet all of a Program’s requirements in spite of his or her impairment. 7. Auxiliary Aids and Services: Refers to qualified interpreters, note takers, transcription services, written materials, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive listening systems, telephones compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, captioning

244554.6

Page 9 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 10 of 84
telecommunications devices for deaf persons (“TDD” or “TTY”), videotext displays or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments; qualified readers, taped texts, documents in Braille or large print, or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual impairments; acquisition or modification of devices; or other similar services and actions. This term also includes the provision of tutors and aides where appropriate.
8. Statewide ADA Coordinator. An ADOC employee charged with the duty of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Acts throughout ADOC’s facilities, among other duties as detailed elsewhere in this Amended Agreement.
9. Facility ADA Coordinator. An ADOC employee charged with the duty of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Acts at the ADOC facility for which he or she is designated as Facility ADA Coordinator, among other duties as detailed elsewhere in this Amended Agreement.
10. Facility. All correctional facilities, including work release centers, operated by ADOC whether at the time of this Agreement or in the future.
11. Major Life Activities. These include, but are not limited to: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.
12. Major Bodily Functions. These include but are not limited to functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.

244554.6

Page 10 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 11 of 84
13. Undue Hardships. An accommodation that is excessively costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of ADOC or any of its Facilities.
14. Request for an Accommodation. A request to a Facility ADA Coordinator by an Inmate for use of an assistive device or service, change in housing placement, modification of architectural or program access, or other modification of policy or procedure to ensure than an Inmate with a Disability may, with a reasonable accommodation, access all programs and program areas and Facility areas (to include housing), in a manner consistent with that of an Inmate without a disability who is otherwise similarly situated.
15. Appeal. The process that permits an Inmate to seek review by the Statewide ADA Coordinator of a decision by a Facility ADA Coordinator.
16. ADA Request Form. The form, an exemplar of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A,” through which an Inmate may Request an Accommodation or pursue an Appeal.
V. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 1. Introduction. The Parties have jointly developed and agreed upon the below-
described substantive provisions that are designed to provide for care, services, accommodations, programs, and activities for Inmates consistent with the terms of this Amended Agreement and the Acts. These provisions are intended to ensure that Inmates are not, on the basis of disability, exposed to substantial harm and that Inmates are not, on the basis of disability, subject to discrimination.

244554.6

Page 11 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 12 of 84
2. Provisions Regarding Assessment, Self-Evaluation and Transition Plan, and Corrective Actions.
I. The following summary describes the activities and time frames in which these activities will be completed (discussed in more detail in later provisions).All time frames are based on the date of the Court’s Final Approval of this Amended Agreement (“Final Approval”).
A. Within four (4) months of Final Approval, ADOC will have completed a list of all educational and rehabilitative programs, and all vocational programs, sorted by institution, for all ADOC facilities. See Section V.2.IV.
B. Within six (6) months of Final Approval, ADOC will designate facilities which it certifies will not be used to house Inmates with mobility or vision impairments. See Section V.2.III.
C. Within twelve (12) months of Final Approval, ADOC will complete a Self-evaluation to include:
1. An architectural survey of its major prison and work release facilities. See Section V.2.IV.
2. A systematic review of ADOC Policies and Procedures, and facility specific Policies and Procedures, specific to inmates for any facility where ADOC intends to house inmates with disabilities. See SectionV.2.IV.
3. All annual (or semi-annual) Inmate medical evaluations to ensure that all disability-related handicaps and accommodations are entered into the Health Services Module, as provided in Section V.5.I. below, except for those evaluations discussed in Section V.5.I.C.2.ii. below, will have been completed.

244554.6

Page 12 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 13 of 84
D. Within fifteen (15) months of Final Approval, ADOC will complete a Transition Plan describing how ADOC intends to effectuate compliance with the Acts concerning housing assignments and program access. This will designate whether architectural barriers are to be removed, or remediated, or new facilities built, or if policy changes will be implemented to overcome any architectural barrier in each instance for each Facility. See Section V.2.V.
E. Within eighteen (18) months of Final Approval, ADOC will: 1. Modify all procedures and policies necessary to overcome
architectural barriers without remediation or removal. See Section V.2.V.B. 2. For all instances in which architectural removal or
remediation is selected, or new Facilities built, ADOC will provide the Monitor all existing materials outlining the removal or remediation or building processes, including any bid specifications, requests for proposals, contracts (if the same exist as of that time) and similar records. See Section V.2.V.
F. Within twenty-four (24) months after Final Approval, and again at thirty (30) months after Final Approval, ADOC will supplement and update the status of any architectural removal or remediation programs or building processes. See Section V.2.V.
G. Within thirty-two (32) months after Final Approval, ADOC will have completed all architectural barrier removal or remediation or constructed sufficient new facilities to accommodate Inmates with Disabilities. See Section V.2.V.
II. Identification and Listing of Programs. Within four (4) months of Final Approval, ADOC will provide the designated Architectural Expert and Plaintiffs’ counsel a complete list of all educational, vocational, and rehabilitative programs and services, identified

244554.6

Page 13 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 14 of 84
by name and at the Facility or Facilities where offered. This list will include programs and services at Facilities that are not intended to be architecturally surveyed.
III. Designation of Facilities That Will Not House Inmates with Disabilities. ADOC may designate certain of its Facilities that will not be architecturally surveyed, subject to the limitations set forth in Section V.2.IV.D.3. below. ADOC will certify, in writing, its facilities that will not contain Inmates with vision or mobility disabilities and this certification will be provided to the designated Architectural Expert and Plaintiffs’ counsel within six (6) months after the date of Final Approval.
IV. Self-Evaluation. ADOC will conduct a self-evaluation of its Facilities consistent with the provisions of 28 C.F.R. 105-35.117 and 35.150 (c) and (d).
A. On or before twelve (12) months following Final Approval, ADOC will complete a written Self-evaluation identifying and listing, by Facility, the following: all programs, activities, and services ADOC provides or makes available to Inmates at each facility, including facilities that will not be architecturally surveyed; Inmates’ access to and within each of ADOC’s Facilities where ADOC intends to assign Inmates with vision or mobility impairments; and all of ADOC’s policies and practices regarding Inmates at each facility where ADOC intends to assign Inmates with Disabilities, including policies and practices that govern the administration of ADOC's Programs, activities, and services at that Facility as the same relate to Inmates. These policies and practices are typically reflected in ADOC’s administrative regulations, standard operating procedures, policy directives, and memoranda.
B. ADOC’s review of its policies will ensure the following: 1. That ADOC is able to communicate with Inmates with
Disabilities in a manner that is as effective as its communications with other Inmates. If ADOC

244554.6

Page 14 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 15 of 84
communicates with Inmates by telephone, it should ensure that TDDs or equally effective telecommunication systems are used to communicate with individuals with impaired hearing or speech. If ADOC provides telephone emergency services, it should review its policies to ensure direct access to individuals who use TDD’s and computer modems.
2. That ADOC accommodates Inmates with vision and hearing impairments. This may include, but is not limited to, readers for individuals with vision impairments; interpreters or other alternative communication measures, as appropriate, for individuals with hearing impairments; and note-takers for individuals with manual impairments. A method for securing these services should be developed, including guidance on when and where these services will be provided. ADOC may permit properly trained and willing Inmates to serve in these capacities. Where equipment is used as part of ADOC's program, activity, or service, an assessment should be made to ensure that the equipment is usable by Inmates with Disabilities, particularly Inmates with hearing, visual, and manual impairments. In addition, ADOC should have policies that ensure that the equipment is maintained in operable working order.
3. That Inmates with Disabilities are accounted for and evacuated to a place of safety during an emergency. This may require the installation of visual and audible warning signals and special procedures for assisting individuals with disabilities from a facility during an emergency.
4. That Inmates with Disabilities are not portrayed in an offensive or demeaning manner.
5. That ADOC’s decisions concerning a fundamental alteration in the nature of a Program, activity, or service, or a decision that an undue financial or

244554.6

Page 15 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 16 of 84
administrative burden will be imposed by Title II of the ADA, are made properly and expeditiously.
6. That the construction of any new Facility or part of a facility, or the alteration of existing Facilities after January 26, 1992, conforms to the standards designated under the regulations enforcing Title II of the ADA.
7. That measures have been taken to ensure that employees of ADOC are familiar with the policies and practices for the full participation of Inmates with Disabilities. Appropriate training should be provided to employees.
8. That, if ADOC limits or denies an Inmate’s participation in its Programs, activities, or services based upon that Inmate’s drug usage, it ensures that such policies do not discriminate against former drug users, as opposed to individuals who are currently engaged in illegal drug use. Nothing herein will be construed to permit ADOC to limit the provision of medical or mental health care to Inmates based upon the illegal use of drugs unless the same is determined by ADOC’s medical or mental health care provider(s) to be contraindicated.
C. Once ADOC has identified its policies and practices, it will review and analyze whether these policies and practices permit, or adversely affect, the full participation of Inmates with Disabilities in its Programs, activities, and services. In performing this review and analysis, ADOC will be mindful that although its policies and practices may appear harmless, those policies may in application result in denying Inmates with disabilities the full participation of its Programs, activities, or services. These policies or practices will be modified to ensure that Inmates may, with reasonable accommodation, access Programs. ADOC does not have to alter or change policies necessary for the operation or provision of the program, service,

244554.6

Page 16 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 17 of 84
or activity. The self-evaluation should identify policy modifications to be implemented and include complete justifications for not modifying any exclusionary or limiting policies or practices.
D. ADOC will survey its Facilities,to identify any physical barriers to Inmate access at the Facility (the “Survey”). The Survey will be in writing (supplemented where appropriate by photographs and/or diagrams) and will identify all architectural barriers for housing and Program access, as defined by the Acts, for any areas in which Inmates in such Facility are allowed access. The Survey will determine whether Inmates with vision or mobility impairments are provided access to all areas within the facility in which the given Inmate may access, given appropriate security concerns. The survey will identify steps that should be taken to make Programs, when viewed in their entirety, accessible to Inmates with Disabilities. If structural changes or modifications to facilities are necessary, those changes or modifications should be described in the Transition Plan. The Survey will include a systematic review of each Facility in which ADOC may choose to house inmates with disabilities defined by the Acts.
1. As part of the Survey, ADOC will assess at least the following areas of its existing Prison and Work Release Facilities to, among other things, determine the existence of architectural barriers which functionally inhibit Inmates with physical disabilities from accessing those parts of the Prisons or Work Release Facilities that Inmates are permitted to access: (a) Housing; (b) Recreational Areas; (c) Vocational Programs; (d) Educational Programs; (e) Chapel; (f) Libraries; (g) Canteen; (h) Cafeteria; (i) Visitation; (j) Hobby Craft; (k) Medical care treatment areas; and (l) Mental health care treatment areas.
2. The Survey will be conducted jointly by ADOC, an agreedupon Architectural Expert (the “Architectural Expert”) and a representative designated by

244554.6

Page 17 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 18 of 84

Plaintiffs’ counsel. ADOC will compensate the expert at a rate agreed to with the expert, and will compensate the person designated by Plaintiffs’ counsel at a rate of $1,500.00 for each day, or part of a day, of the survey, and at a rate of $150.00 for any hours spent in preparing and/or reviewing the Survey.2 The parties will jointly schedule surveys of the selected facilities. If the parties are unable to agree whether a specific condition constitutes or creates a violation of the Acts, such condition will be identified but listed as questioned. More than one facility may be surveyed on any particular day provided that sufficient time is allocated to each facility, and such surveys may not exceed nine hours on each day. One knowledgeable counsel for Plaintiffs may serve as Plaintiffs’ designee. Any item identified as questioned will be resolved through the Dispute Resolution Process described in Section VII., below.
3. ADOC need not include as part of the Survey facilities ADOC certifies will not house Inmates with vision or mobility Disabilities. To exclude a facility from the Survey, ADOC will designate in writing a list of any such facilities not later than six (6) months after the date of Final Approval. However, ADOC will survey enough facilities to ensure sufficient available bed space to house Inmates with Disabilities in a manner consistent with their individual needs, but also considering the requirement that integrated housing be provided when appropriate. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). ADOC must survey at least fifty percent (50%) of its facilities existing and in use as of Final Approval of in each of the following categories: Major Facility-Close Custody, Major Facility-Medium Custody, and Work Release/Community Based Facility. The minimum number of facilities required shall be calculated separately for men’s and women’s facilities. J.O. Davis Correctional Facility must be included in the Survey.
2 The compensation of Plaintiffs’ counsel for involvement with this process is considered as part of the monitoring costs as set out in Section VI. of this Amended Agreement.

244554.6

Page 18 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 19 of 84
E. ADOC will maintain a copy of its self-evaluation for a period of three (3) years. A copy of this self-evaluation will be made available to the general public, and a copy of the same will be maintained at the law library of all ADOC facilities. ADOC is permitted to redact from any copy of the self-evaluation made available to the public or to Inmates any portion of the self-evaluation that could adversely impact safety or security concerns at ADOC facilities. However, unreacted copies of the self-evaluation will be provided, under seal, to the Court, the arbitrator, the monitor, and Plaintiffs’ counsel.
V. Transition Plan. ADOC will create an ADA Transition Plan consistent with the provisions of 28 C.F.R. 105-35.117 and 35.150 (c) and (d). The Transition Plan will list any improvements and changes necessary in the Programs, activities, and services ADOC provides or makes available to Inmates; all of ADOC’s policies and practices regarding Inmates; and Inmates’ access to and within ADOC’s facilities necessary to ensure that ADOC complies with the provisions of the Acts and this Amended Agreement.
A. ADOC will use the results of the Survey, the analysis of the necessary remediation, and the information gleaned during the implementation of any existing or new procedures concerning the identification of Inmates with Disabilities in order to assign Inmates with Disabilities to Facilities that are appropriate for their individualized needs, based on disability, security level, and classification. ADOC will not be required to utilize facilities that are identified as part of the Survey as having significant architectural barriers making remediation or reasonable accommodation impracticable or that would impose Undue Hardship on ADOC. However, ADOC will ensure that there are a sufficient number of beds of appropriate security classification and specialized purpose to ensure that all Inmates with Disabilities are appropriately housed based upon their individual disability status, and that such

244554.6

Page 19 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 20 of 84
Inmates are provided equal access to programs as similarly situated inmates without disabilities in the same facility. All Programs available anywhere within the ADOC system for similarly situated Inmates without disabilities will be made available to such Inmates with Disabilities. However, this does not mean an Inmate with a disability may obtain a transfer to a different facility that offers the same Programs offered at his current facility. Whether an area is deemed accessible for an Inmate with a Disability in an existing facility shall be governed by the 1991 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, and the applicable standards found at 28 C.F.R § 36, unless substantial architectural modifications are, or were, made to the existing facility after January 26, 1992. If substantial modifications are, or were made to the existing facility after January 26, 1992, and for any new prisons built by ADOC, accessibility will be governed by the 2010 ADA Standards of Accessible Design found at 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 regarding new construction and alterations, and the 2004 ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) found at 36 C.F.R. § 1191.
B. ADOC will take appropriate remedial action to eliminate impediments to full and equivalent participation. Any corrections necessary will be completed under the following schedule:
1. Architectural: a. Any necessary architectural changes to any ADOC
Facility in which Inmates with vision or mobility impairments are assigned will be completed within twenty (20) months of completion of the survey.
b. Within three (3) months of the completion of the survey, ADOC will identify in writing how it intends to effectuate compliance with the ADA concerning housing assignments and programmatic access affected by architectural and other

244554.6

Page 20 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 21 of 84
barriers. Any changes in procedure required to overcome architectural barriers will be in writing, specifically outlining the exact methodology by which ADOC intends to overcome each barrier identified during the Survey for any facility in which ADOC intends to house inmates with disabilities, without barrier removal or remediation. Any questioned areas, if not removed or remediated, shall be identified in writing with an explanation as to why ADOC does not believe that a modification is necessary.
c. Nothing in this Agreement will be construed as requiring removal or remediation of architectural barriers identified in the Survey if ADOC is able to create a policy or procedure change which has the net effect of nullifying the problem associated with the barrier, and that such non-physical removal or remediation does not place anything more than nominal additional burdens on Inmates with Disabilities securing access to programming. If removal or remediation is to occur, ADOC will provide all associated documentary materials to Plaintiffs’ counsel, including contracts, to ensure that all appropriate remediation occurs within the prescribed period.
d. Following the expiration of the one (1) year period during which ADOC will assess its facilities, no later than every sixth (6th) month thereafter, ADOC will provide the monitor with a status report to include a timeline, spreadsheet or similar document or record reflecting work that is contemplated, work that has begun, work that is ongoing and work that has been completed. This document will contain expected dates of completion of ongoing work or work that has not yet commenced. The monitor will be provided access to any contract, change order or similar document or record necessary to ensure the appropriate work has been provided for, what work will be done and the anticipated time period necessary to complete the work.

244554.6

Page 21 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 22 of 84
2. Procedural: Within six (6) months after completion of the Survey, ADOC will have implemented all policies, procedures, and/or Standard Operating Procedures to remove barriers identified in the Survey for all instances in which physical remediation is not contemplated.
C. Nothing herein prevents ADOC from making modifications or improvements to its existing prison or work release facilities in order to bring such facilities or any parts of such facilities into compliance with the architectural requirements of the ADA. Likewise, nothing herein prevents ADOC from constructing entirely new prison or work release facilities so long as those facilities are complaint with the provisions of the Acts.
D. The Transition Plan will include the name of the official responsible for the plan's implementation.
E. ADOC will maintain a copy of the Transition Plan. Additionally, a copy of the Transition Plan same will be maintained at the law library of all ADOC facilities that maintain an inmate law library. ADOC is permitted to redact from any copy of the selfevaluation made available to the public or to Inmates any portion of the self-evaluation that could adversely impact safety or security concerns at ADOC facilities. However, unreacted copies of the Transition Plan will be provided, under seal, to the Court, the arbitrator, the monitor and Plaintiffs’ counsel.
VI. Prison Facilities. Notwithstanding any provision of this Amended Agreement to the contrary, the parties acknowledge that the structures at issue are prisons or work release facilities that, due to their very nature, have barriers to prevent inmates from escaping custody. Barriers such as locks and locked entryways, bars, fences and similar devices

244554.6

Page 22 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 23 of 84
and structures necessary to incarcerate Inmates or, due to custodial reasons, restrict Inmate movement, need not be removed or remedied.

244554.6

Page 23 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 24 of 84
3. Provisions regarding Program Access and Reasonable Accommodation. ADOC will provide reasonable accommodations to Inmates with Disabilities so that those Inmates may access and participate in Programs offered by ADOC. Reasonable accommodations can include, but are not limited to, architectural modifications to a facility or part of a facility, supplying materials in alternate formats, providing augmentative communication devices, providing aides, and extending time needed to complete a Program. To the extent allowed by the provisions of the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 USC § 15601, et seq. (“PREA”), ADOC may use aides, including other Inmates, to facilitate access to ADOC Programs for Inmates with disabilities.

244554.6

Page 24 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 25 of 84
4. Provisions Regarding RTUs and SUs. Residential Treatment Units (“RTUs”) and Stabilization Units (“SUs”) are specialized confinements within a prison where Inmates generally receive access to many services within the confines of the units themselves. Inmates are provided access to educational and rehabilitative Programs in the units themselves, rather than in the regular classroom setting that Inmates in general population may utilize.
I. For ADOC to restrict access to programming for Inmates in these units, ADOC must conduct an individualized assessment as to why such programming would pose a risk to the Inmate or others, or why the Inmate’s current mental health status precludes being able to meaningfully participate in the Program. Each Inmate must be assessed individually for each Program. The assessment may be made only by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner (“CRNP”) who has actively treated the Inmate. The assessment must be in writing and must identify the specific reason(s) why access to a given Program is restricted. Within three (3) days, not including weekends or holidays, of an Inmate in an RTU or SU being denied access to a Program, the written explanation of the clinician explaining why access is restricted must be provided to the affected Inmate. The Inmate may then take advantage of the provisions of the ADA Accommodation and Appeal Procedure that is established as part of this Amended Agreement.
II. ADOC will reassess Program access for any Inmates housed in an RTU or SU who have been denied access to Programs after requesting such access each time new programming is made available or new enrollment into existing programming becomes available.

244554.6

Page 25 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 26 of 84
III. While educational and rehabilitative programming is readily transferable to the RTU and SU housing units, vocational programming is not.3 To the extent vocational programming is available only in separate buildings from any housing units at ADOC facilities, it would be impractical to attempt to bring these programs into RTU/SU housing units given the nature of those units. Access to the necessary tools to participate in such programming may pose a heightened security risk in housing units generally. Because both the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the reasonable accommodations provisions of the Acts place limitations upon unfettered access to programming in certain circumstance, ADOC will not be required to provide access to vocational programming for inmates in RTUs and SUs. However, once an inmate is stabilized in an RTU or SU and then reassigned to general population housing, the Inmate may not be discriminated against in enrolling in vocational Programs based upon his or her prior admission to a residential mental health unit.

3 ADOC currently provides vocational programming and training in a variety of fields. They include building trades, electrical, body shop and auto mechanics, welding, and beautician.

244554.6

Page 26 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 27 of 84
5. Provisions Regarding Identifying, Documenting and Tracking Inmates with Disabilities. ADOC will identify Inmates with disabilities at initial intake and while in custody.
I. Evaluation. ADOC will continue to screen, evaluate and test Inmates for physical, mental or intellectual disabilities at the time of initial intake, consistent with ADOC Office of Health Services (“OHS”) Policy. ADOC may recognize an Inmate’s disability either as the result of appropriate evaluation, testing, or self-identification.
A. Screening. Upon being taken into ADOC’s custody, Inmates will continue to be screened for disabilities at the time of the initial health assessment. This screening will be accomplished within five (5) days, not including weekends and holidays, of an Inmate entering ADOC’s custody.
1. Within twelve (12) hours of an Inmate arriving at an ADOC intake facility, the Inmate will be questioned orally consistent with ADOC’s “New Arrival Intake Screening – Form 2” and ADOC’s “Reception Mental Health Screening Evaluation – Intake Form 1” concerning:
a. perceived or recognized disabilities; b. prior physical, intellectual or mental health treatment and diagnoses; and c. previously identified disabilities. 2. The screening will be consistent with OHS Policy and National Commission on Correctional Health Care (“NCCHC”) Standards. The screening will be performed by medical and mental health providers employed or contracted by ADOC. 3. ADOC will reasonably accommodate inmates with vision, hearing or mobility disabilities during Intake.

244554.6

Page 27 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 28 of 84
B. Self-Identification. Inmates may self-identify as having a disability.
1. ADOC may accept the Inmate’s claim of disability. 2. ADOC is not required to accept an Inmate’s claim of disability. If ADOC does not accept that claim, it will take appropriate steps to obtain medical records concerning the Inmate’s self-identified medical or mental health condition and any treatment for such condition in order to confirm or rebut the disability the Inmate claims. Alternatively, ADOC will conduct sufficient and appropriate medical or mental health screening as discussed in the “Examination and Testing” section - Section C immediately below - to determine whether the Inmate has a disability as defined by the ADA. C. Examination and Testing. Regardless of whether an Inmate selfidentifies as having a disability, ADOC will continue to evaluate Inmates for disabilities through examination and testing. 1. ADOC will identify Inmates with physical disabilities in accordance with OHS Policy. A physical exam of each Inmate will be conducted by a medical provider employed or contracted by ADOC and appropriately licensed by the State of Alabama. This exam will occur within seven (7) days of intake, not including weekends and holidays. Inmates in ADOC’s custody at the time of the Court’s final approval of this Amended Agreement will continue to be screened, evaluated and tested for disabilities to ensure that physical disability status is identified, treated and accommodated. Within six (6) months of the Court’s final approval of this Agreement, each Inmate with a health care code of 4 or above will be screened, tested and evaluated for physical disabilities. Each Inmate with a health care code

244554.6

Page 28 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 29 of 84
of 3 or less will be evaluated within twelve (12) months of the Court’s final approval of this Agreement at the time of their annual physical.
2. ADOC will identify Inmates with intellectual disabilities through the use of appropriately administered tests under the following regimen.
i. Beginning eight (8) months after the Court’s final approval of this Amended Agreement, Inmates coming into or returning to ADOC’s custody (“New Inmates”) will be screened for intellectual disabilities initially using the Beta III test. This testing will be performed in a group setting. A New Inmate who scores 80 or lower on the Beta III test will then be individually screened for intellectual disabilities using the most current version of the Weschler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). If the Inmate scores 75 or below on the WASI, no further IQ testing is necessary and the Inmate will be deemed to have an IQ equal to the Inmate’s WASI score. If the Inmate’s score on the Beta III is 80 or less, but the Inmate’s WASI score is greater than 75 but less than 79, then the Inmate will be given the most current version of the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, (WAIS), currently the WAIS IV. An Inmate who scores 79 or higher on the WASI, or 76 or higher on the WAIS, is deemed to have an IQ too high for further consideration of an intellectual disability. If an Inmate’s score on either the WASI or the WAIS is 75 or less, then additional testing to determine whether the Inmate has an intellectual or developmental disability will be performed using the most current version of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, other similarly appropriate protocols, or appropriate clinical assessment.
ii. All Inmates who are admitted to ADOC’s custody during the eight months following the Court’s final approval of this Amended Agreement who score 75 or less on a Beta III test administered by or at the request of ADOC will be determined to have an

244554.6

Page 29 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 30 of 84
intellectual disability and no further testing will be required. Inmates in the custody of the ADOC at the time the Court gives final approval to this Amended Agreement who have a record of a score from a Beta III previously administered by or at the request of ADOC will have those scores entered into the OHS Module at the time of their next annual or semi-annual classification review, whichever is earlier, and will be determined to have an intellectual ability and require no further testing. Current Inmates who have no record of a test score from a Beta III test administered by or at the request of ADOC will be tested using the Beta III within three (3) months following the Inmate’s next annual or semi-annual classification review, whichever is earlier. The results of that testing will be placed in the OHS module after receipt of those results and those who score 75 or less will be determined to have an intellectual disability and no further testing will be required. All three categories of inmates in this sub-section will be referred to as “Current Inmates.”
iii. ADOC reserves the right, but is not required, to administer the WAIS to any Inmate, regardless of the Inmate’s Beta III or WASI score, to confirm an IQ score.
iv. The Parties reserve the right to re-examine the initial threshold cutoff on the Beta III test when the Beta IV test is introduced and enters use by ADOC and decide if the cutoff score utilized to trigger the administration of further IQ testing will remain at 80. The parties will evaluate the data showing the distribution of individuals who were utilized to normalize the score, as well as peer reviewed documentation and articles showing that the Beta IV test performs at least as well as the WASI, compared to the WAIS.
v. Appropriately licensed mental health professionals employed by or contracted by ADOC will utilize the guidelines outlined in the most current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders, as published by the American Psychiatric

244554.6

Page 30 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 31 of 84
Association (“APA”), to determine the criteria in identifying individuals with intellectual disabilities. The percentage of Inmates identified as having an intellectual disability should be reflective of findings of peer reviewed articles which estimate that approximately 4-10% of inmates in State Prisons meet the clinical definition of Intellectual Disability. Further, the percentage of Inmates identified through intellectual testing as falling below the IQ threshold of the testing protocol incorporated herein, but who are found not to have an Intellectual Disability because either, i.) they did not have significant deficits in adaptive behaviors as identified in the DSM-V, or ii.) because onset of the inmate's intellectual functioning as defined by the results of IQ testing did not occur during the inmate's developmental period, will be reflective of the findings of peer reviewed articles which found that approximately 80% of inmates who had an IQ below the threshold were ultimately found to meet the definition of having an Intellectual Disability.
3. For the purpose of determining developmental disabilities, and in addition to the processes for determining intellectual disabilities for New Inmates and Current Inmates described in provision 5.I.C.2. immediately above, ADOC may administer the most current version of the Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT), currently the WRAT IV, to New Inmates. If an Inmate scores at less than the 7th grade level on the WRAT, appropriate clinical assessments will be performed to determine developmental disability status.
4. The identification of Inmates with intellectual or developmental disabilities will be made by a psychiatrist or psychologist, although mental health professionals and psychological associates may participate in the process.

244554.6

Page 31 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 32 of 84
5. ADOC will continue to periodically screen, evaluate and test Inmates for disabilities while Inmates are in ADOC’s custody to ensure that any change in an Inmate’s disability status is identified, treated and accommodated.
I. Documentation. ADOC will document the results of self-identification or examination of Inmates for physical, intellectual or mental disabilities performed at any time, including at intake and while in custody.
A. ADOC will transition to documenting the-above described information into the OHS Computer Module at the time the Computer Module becomes operative. Prior to the implementation of the Module, the Office of Health Services will provide training to each category of staff who may access the module concerning information related to an Inmate’s disabilities that may be entered into the Module.
B. The Module will electronically capture and store the information collected by the appropriate screening party at each step of intake. Only appropriate parties and providers will have access to change and store information on the dashboard and access to the dashboard will be limited by ADOC security and classification personnel so as not to disclose personal health information, as that term is defined by HIPAA. The Module will, however, allow access to general information necessary to properly classify, house, and reasonably accommodate Inmates with physical or mental disabilities, such as medical codes, mental health codes, physical limitations, and special needs communications.
C. Inmate information maintained on the Module will be updated as additional evaluation, screening, testing and examinations upon Inmates are performed. The Module will be update with this information no later than three (3) days, not including weekends and holidays, following the completion of the evaluation, screening, testing or examination.

244554.6

Page 32 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 33 of 84
D. Any health services contractor retained by ADOC will be contractually obligated to maintain the Module and update information contained therein related to Inmate disabilities or accommodation.
E. The information obtained will be provided to ADOC personnel and contractors of ADOC consistent with the provisions of HIPAA.
II. Tracking. ADOC will track Inmates who have been identified as having a disability and any accommodations for such disability to ensure that Inmates receive appropriate care and accommodations for disabilities.
A. ADOC will utilize the Module to track the care and any accommodations for Inmates with disabilities that are directed or ordered by ADOC’s medical or mental health providers.
B. The Module will display to appropriate users, consistent with the provisions of HIPAA, the (1) nature of an Inmate’s disability or disabilities; (2) accommodations ordered by ADOC’s medical or mental health provider-contractors for an Inmate’s disability or disabilities, including, but not limited to, medical appliances and restrictions on housing or bed placement; and (3) any security restrictions that are the result of the disability.
C. ADOC will periodically review the OHS Module and update it as appropriate.
D. The information tracked on the Module and by the Facility ADA Coordinators will be made available to ADOC employees and contractors, consistent with the provisions of HIPAA, to ensure that reasonable accommodations are made and will be made for Inmates in need of an accommodation.

244554.6

Page 33 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 34 of 84
III. Placement and change in status. In the event an Inmate, during the course of incarceration by ADOC, is identified by appropriate screening, evaluation or testing as having (A) a previously undiagnosed or unrecognized disability or (B) an existing disability has materially changed, ADOC will take all necessary steps to determine whether, and to what extent, that disability may be reasonably accommodated.
A. Appropriate medical or mental health staff and ADOC personnel, including the ADA coordinator at the facility where the Inmate is (or is to be) housed will, within five (5) days, not including weekends and holidays, of the disability identification or change, review the information contained on the Module and the information maintained by the Facility ADA Coordinator on the OHS Module to determine the necessity of accommodation of the newly identified disability or changed disability. Appropriate reasonable accommodations, including but not limited to housing assignments- given security codes, health codes and mental health codes- for such newly identified or changed disability, will be provided within five (5) days, not including weekends and holidays, of the review of the information by the abovedescribed personnel.
B. ADOC agrees to transfer Inmates with emergent or acute mobility or vision impairments from any non-ADA compliant infirmary or Facility under a schedule that, for security reasons, will be submitted to the court under seal.
IV. Transfer screening. Inmates transferred from one ADOC facility to another will undergo a Transfer Screening at the receiving facility.
A. If, as a result of the Transfer Screening, it appears that an Inmate with a Disability’s health code should be raised, within 14 days, not including weekends and holidays, the provider at the receiving facility will communicate with the provider at the sending

244554.6

Page 34 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 35 of 84
facility to discuss the Inmate’s prior health code and the reasons for increasing the Inmate’s health code.
B. If, as a result of that communication, it is determined that the Inmate with a Disability’s health code should not be raised, then ADOC is not obligated to update the Module to reflect that discussion.
C. If, as a result of that communication, it is determined that the Inmate with a Disability’s health code should still be raised, a comment box within the Module will be opened and updated to reflect that the communication occurred and the reasons for the Inmate with a Disability’s increased health code.
D. The provisions of this section do not apply when an Inmate with a Disability is transferred from one facility to another due to the Inmate with a disability being admitted to the Infirmary at the receiving facility.
V. Use of Information. Information developed and collected during the Identification, Documentation and Tracking processes outlined above will be used to provide Inmates with identified or recognized disabilities reasonable accommodations consistent with the provisions of the Acts as the same are applied to correctional facilities. The information will be further used as part of the Quality Assurance provisions of this Agreement.

244554.6

Page 35 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 36 of 84
6. Provisions Regarding Security Levels. At initial classification, reclassification or additional classification reviews, ADOC will assign Inmates security levels without regard for disabilities. ADOC will not increase a security level or custody level for an Inmate based solely upon an Inmate’s disability.4 ADOC may lower a security level for an Inmate with a disability under two general circumstances.
I. ADOC may, within ADOC’s discretion, lower an Inmate’s security level to allow an Inmate with a disability to access a program or facility (or portion of a facility) to which the Inmate would not otherwise be entitled to access due to that Inmate’s security level. For an Inmate to be considered for a reduction under such a circumstance, all of the following must apply:
A. The given program or facility is considered important to the rehabilitation, education, or treatment of the given Inmate based upon that Inmate’s disability. To be considered “important”, the program or facility (or portion of a facility) must be focused on substantially benefiting an Inmate’s health, condition, or life skills in a manner different from, and in addition to, that for an Inmate without a disability.5

4 A “custody level” is “a level of supervision required for an Inmate at the institution, within the ADOC, where the Inmate is confined. An Inmate can be assigned a custody level of maximum, close, medium, minimum-in, minimum-out, or community.” ADOC Admin. Reg. 400. A “security level” is “the rating assigned to various institutions and placement options within the ADOC and to Inmates through classification procedures for the purposes of placement within the ADOC”. Id. An Inmate’s security level is utilized, among other purposes, to determine which prisons, and portions of prisons, an Inmate may be housed.
5 For instance, if ADOC has a program teaching life skills, it is likely that many, if not all, Inmates may benefit from such a program. However, for Inmates with intellectual disabilities, one of the primary methods of integrating such an individual into a more normalized existence is extensive training on life skills to augment deficiencies attendant to their disability. In such a circumstance, life skill training is particularly targeted and beneficial to such an Inmate in a manner far greater than the benefit to an Inmate without an intellectual disability.

244554.6

Page 36 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 37 of 84
B. The Inmate must have had no major disciplinary findings for at least one (1) year prior to the date the reduction has been requested. If a weapon was involved in a prior disciplinary event, then the Inmate must be free of such a disciplinary finding for at least two (2) years before the date of the request.
C. The program or facility must be available to a similarly situated Inmate without a disability.
II. ADOC may also reduce the security level of an Inmate based upon a disability where the disability itself makes the Inmate less of a security risk.6
III. The reduction in security level may be permanent (subject to re-evaluation for disciplinary reasons) or temporary.

6 For instance, Inmates with significant medical issues, mobility issues, and vision issues may inherently pose a less significant security risk than a similarly situated Inmate without a disability.

244554.6

Page 37 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 38 of 84
7. Provisions Regarding Auxiliary Aids. I. ADOC will provide specific and appropriate auxiliary aids and services
necessary for Inmates with disabilities to access all Programs and services provided to Inmates in the custody of ADOC. Auxiliary aids and services include, but are not limited to, the following:
A. Sign language interpreters; B. Note takers or transcription services; C. Written materials in alternate format such as Braille large print; D. Telephone handset amplifiers; E. Assistive listening devices; F. Telephone system compatible with hearing aids; G. Hearing aids; H. Captioning telecommunication devices for deaf Inmates (TDD or TTY); I. Video text displays; J. Other appropriate methods to aurally deliver materials to Inmates with hearing impairments; K. Readers or tutors; L. Taped texts; and M. Other appropriate methods to make visually delivered materials available to Inmates with vision impairments. II. One or more TTY phones will be available at any facility at which any Inmate with a hearing impairment who needs such a device in order to effectively participate in a telephone conversation is housed. If ADOC chooses to aggregate Inmates with hearing

244554.6

Page 38 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 39 of 84
impairments in a single, or small number, of facilities then ADOC will ensure that there are a sufficient number of TTY phones available at that facility so that Inmates with hearing impairments may make use of the TTY phone consistent with access to phones for a non-hearing impaired Inmates. TTY phones must be made available during the same periods, and under the same circumstances, that similarly situated Inmates are allowed access to telephones. However, and in the event ADOC or a facility places a time or length limit on any telephone call, an Inmate with a hearing impairment utilizing a TTY phone must be entitled to use of the TTY phone for a period of four (4) times the period that a similarly situated Inmate without a hearing impairment is permitted to use the telephone for any one telephone call. ADOC will ensure that all such TTY phones are kept in good repair and operational.
III. ADOC or its medical services provider will: A. Conduct a minimum of one routine assessment every three (3)
months (or sooner by Inmate request) of each deaf or hard of hearing Inmate regarding the provision of appropriate auxiliary aids and services;
B. Keep appropriate medical records regarding auxiliary aids and services;
C. Purchase and keep appropriate types of hearing aid batteries in stock;
D. Provide replacement hearing aids batteries to Inmates requesting them no later than 24 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) after such request, if readily available within the local community. Should a hearing aid require a specific or specialized battery type not available on the local level, ADOC or its medical vendor will have 72 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) to secure such specialty battery;

244554.6

Page 39 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 40 of 84
E. Send hearing aids to a repair vendor no later than 48 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) following a validated request by an Inmate for repair of his or her hearing aid; and
F. Inform the Inmate when the hearing aid was sent for repair and the anticipated return date.
IV. ADOC or its medical services provider will maintain an annual, perpetual log of all existing hearing aid repairs, to include:
A. Date the device was received for repair at the facility; B. Name of outside vendor performing the repair; C. Date the device was shipped or taken to the vendor conducting the repair; and D. Date the device was received back at the facility. V. ADOC will provide sign language interpreters to Inmates with hearing impairments whose primary means of communication is American Sign Language (“ASL.”) Individuals employed or contracted by ADOC for this purpose will be qualified and able to effectively communicate in ASL. These individuals will agree to abide with the Code of Ethics for certified ASL interpreters circumstances where interpreters may be required in the following listed situations. This list is neither exhaustive nor mandatory, and does not imply that there are no other situations when it may be necessary or appropriate to provide interpreters to Inmates: A. Initial Intake. B. Classification processing. C. Regularly scheduled health care appointments and programs. D. Substance Abuse treatment and other formal programming.

244554.6

Page 40 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 41 of 84
E. Educational classes and activities. F. Disciplinary board hearings. G. Criminal Investigations. H. Classification review interviews. I. Formal investigations conducted by ADOC staff. VI. In instances which do not implicate privacy or security concerns, other Inmates with the requisite skills may be utilized as sign language interpreters, provided that both the Inmate with a hearing impairment and the skilled non-disabled Inmate agree to such an arrangement. The Inmate with a hearing impairment and the skilled non-disabled Inmate must be able to effectively communicate with each other and the skilled non-disabled Inmate must be able to effectively and accurately relay the information being provided by the Inmate with a hearing impairment. The Inmate with a hearing impairment must be informed that he may decline to allow an Inmate to serve as an interpreter. He must also be informed that should he decline another Inmate as an interpreter, he will be provided a non-Inmate interpreter at no cost, and that no adverse action will be taken against him. Any Inmate who serves as an interpreter under such circumstances will be required to sign a document indicating that Inmate’s agreement to abide by all privacy laws, to include HIPAA. VII. ADOC may not utilize an Inmate to serve as a sign language interpreter in any circumstance involving medical or mental health treatment, examinations, or consultations, or the initiation or investigation of an incident under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), except in the very limited circumstance where an extended delay in obtaining an effective interpreter could compromise the safety of the Inmate with deafness, the performance of first

244554.6

Page 41 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 42 of 84

responder duties under Section 115.64 of PREA, or the investigation of an incident covered by PREA.
VIII. ADOC may not employ an Inmate to serve as a sign language interpreter in any circumstance involving due process7 or the investigation or initiation of any incident relating to assaults, violence, or other potentially criminal activities within the facilities.
IX. ADOC will provide the Inmate Handbooks, text books and materials, Orders or Notices from Courts which are required to be posted, or other similar written materials in alternate formats such as Braille and large print. ADOC need not have on-site all text books and materials necessary at all times, but must have available, all such materials such as they are available to sight impaired Inmates as needed. ADOC will have available a sufficient number of such materials in alternate format such that all Inmates who need access to them may do so simultaneously.
X. For written materials that are unique to an Inmate such as medical and mental health information, disciplinary information, classification information, or other documents directed to only such Inmate, ADOC will either provide the same in alternate format, or will create a procedure under which such Inmates may have access to the information consistent with how an Inmate without a sight impairment would access such materials. Providing such materials aurally either by taped recording, or providing access to a person who would read the materials to the Inmate is acceptable. There cannot be limits on the number of times the Inmate can access the information, but ADOC can create reasonable limitations on where and when the information can be accessed. If ADOC intends to make such materials

7 “Due Process” events would include, but would not be limited to, disciplinary proceedings, investigations of potential or alleged criminal activities by the Inmate, and involuntary administration of medication.

244554.6

Page 42 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 43 of 84
available by reading the materials to the Inmate, ADOC will note in the Inmate’s file who, what, and when such materials are made available.

244554.6

Page 43 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 44 of 84
8. Provisions Regarding Emergencies. I. ADOC will revise the current Administrative Regulation to include
provisions to ensure that Inmates with Disabilities are evacuated to safe locations in times of emergencies. For each Facility that contains Inmates with vision, hearing or mobility impairments, the Shift Commander for each shift will designate in writing more than one Correctional Officers who are assigned the duty of ensuring that all such Inmates are evacuated to a safe location in times of emergencies. A log will reflect the assigned Correctional Officers for each shift. The Shift Commander will notify the assigned officers who will acknowledge this assignment in writing. Each facility may implement a Standard Operating Procedure specific to that facility to ensure compliance based upon the unique features of that facility.
II. In each Facility, ADOC will designate one or more areas of Rescue Assistance (as defined under Section 3.5 of the 1991 ADA Standards for Accessible Design), by November 1, 2016. On or before that date, the facilities will post a written memorandum outlining the area(s) of Rescue Assistance, and the area(s) must be shown on a map. Both the written memorandum and map will be posted in the location in which Inmate information is normally posted. The written memorandum will also be provided in alternate format upon request. The determination of the number and location of such areas must take into account the size of the facility, the compactness of the facility, and the number of Inmates with Disabilities likely to be present in the facility.
III. For each shift in each facility, the Shift Commander will assign responsibility to ensure that Inmates found at the area of Rescue Assistance are adequately protected and evacuated before such personnel may vacate the facility. This assignment will be done in writing, and the Officer so assigned will acknowledge this assignment in writing. In

244554.6

Page 44 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 45 of 84
other areas of the facility, ADOC will implement a system under which its personnel ensure that all Inmates under the control of correctional officers in a particular location are evacuated to a safe location based upon the nature of the emergency.
IV. ADOC will implement a system of periodic emergency drills whereby facilities, on at least a quarterly basis, as part of that drill will to ensure that the officers assigned the above-described duties fully execute these responsibilities. For the initial two such sessions in each facility, ADOC will provide a sign language interpreter to explain the process to Inmates who use sign language as their primary means of communication. All Inmates who have a sight, hearing, or mobility impairment will be provided a written explanation of the procedure. This explanation will be provided in an alternative format when appropriate. Thereafter, Inmates who are transferred into a facility, or who have a newly emergent condition of a sight, hearing, or mobility impairment, will be provided a copy of the emergency evacuation plan, either written or, where appropriate, in alternate formats within three (3) business days of: (1) arriving at the receiving facility or (2) a medical diagnosis of a sight, hearing or mobility impairment. ADOC will provide access to a sign language interpreter to any hearing impaired Inmate who uses sign language as his or her primary means of communication in order to answer and explain the procedure.
V. The required policy modifications discussed in this Provision are intended to supplement any existing policies and Standard Operating Procedures currently in place at each facility, and not to supersede them.

244554.6

Page 45 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 46 of 84
9. Provisions Regarding Accommodations and Appeals. I. Effective February 1, 2017, any Inmate who has, or believes he or she has,
a disability as defined by the Acts may make Requests for Accommodations and pursue Appeals of decisions concerning Requests for Accommodations.
II. An Inmate’s Request for Accommodation or Appeal will be in writing and contain information about the alleged discrimination, Request for Accommodation, or reason for the Appeal. It will be set out on the ADA Request Form (Exhibit A) or any later form generated by ADOC for the same purpose. ADA Request Forms will be made available to Inmates with Disabilities through the Shift Commander’s office or centralized security cubicle, the Facility ADA Coordinator’s office, and the Law Library, provided the Facility maintains a Law Library. ADA Request Forms will be provided to Inmates through either written or oral request.
III. The Request for Accommodation or Appeal should be submitted by the Inmate as soon as possible. Appeals to the Statewide ADA Coordinator must be made within thirty (30) calendar days after a denial of a Request for Accommodation. The Request for Accommodation or Appeal must also generally specify the type of accommodation or service the Inmate seeks. The ADA Request Form must be dated and signed by the Inmate. Boxes or similar repositories will be placed in the Facility for depositing such forms or the forms may be given by the Inmate (including, but not limited to, Inmates whose movement is restricted due to their custody level and are unable to deposit the form on their own) to any ADOC officer or employee for deposit in such boxes. The box, or repository to deposit the ADA Request Form, will be located in places in which all Inmates whose custody permits them movement in a Facility may have access. In the event that an Inmate is unable to complete the form for any reason, ADOC personnel will assist the Inmate in completing the form. Upon receipt of such a form, the Facility

244554.6

Page 46 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 47 of 84
ADA Coordinator will review, document, respond, and retain a copy of the form and response consistent with the duties and time parameters specified in the part of this Agreement concerning the duties of ADA Coordinators. If the Facility ADA Coordinator is unsure what is being requested in the Form, the Facility ADA Coordinator will personally interview the Inmate and make appropriate inquiries to inform the Facility ADA Coordinator and Statewide ADA Coordinator about the nature of the Request for Accommodation and any appropriate accommodation, or Appeal.
IV. The safety, security, and health of the Inmate making a Request for Accommodation or Appeal, and that of other Inmates, and the security of the Facility will always be an overriding concern in making reasonable accommodations for Inmates with disabilities.
V. In the event that the Facility determines that it cannot reasonably accommodate a n Inmate with a Disability, consideration may be given to Facilities and programming available at various other Facilities of an appropriate security level to accommodate an Inmate’s particular disability, to include transfers.

244554.6

Page 47 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 48 of 84
10. Provisions Regarding ADA Coordinators. ADOC will employ Facility ADA Coordinators and a Statewide ADA Coordinator within the time frames established for ADOC’s Self-evaluation and Transition Plan.
I. Facility ADA Coordinators. A. ADOC will designate a responsible employee (“Facility ADA
Coordinator”) at each ADOC facility to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under the Acts with respect to any current or future Inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability. The staff at each ADOC facility will receive notice of the designated Facility ADA Coordinator for the facility.
B. The Facility ADA Coordinators will be direct reports to the warden of their assigned facility concerning their duties as a Facility ADA Coordinator and may have duties in addition to those as ADA Coordinator.
C. In each ADOC facility, the name, office address, and telephone number for that facility’s Facility ADA Coordinator will be posted in each dormitory, chow hall, visitation area, library, medical care treatment areas, mental health care treatment areas, chapel, canteen, and educational areas. Each Facility ADA Coordinator’s office will be in a location readily available to Inmates in general population. This posting will also contain the name, office address, and telephone number of the Statewide ADA Coordinator, described herein, as well as the locations of ADA Request Forms and drop boxes for ADA Request Forms within each facility.
D. Each Facility ADA Coordinator will receive and respond to all ADA Request Forms for that facility or transmit ADA appeals to the Statewide ADA Coordinator. The Facility ADA Coordinator will keep a file containing all ADA Request Forms

244554.6

Page 48 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 49 of 84
received and all responses given to requests for accommodations and appeals. Should an Inmate require or request assistance completing an ADA Request Form, the Facility ADA Coordinator will assist the Inmate with completing the form. Each Facility ADA Coordinator will prepare a monthly report regarding the requests for accommodations received and the accommodations granted. The monthly report will be submitted to the Statewide ADA Coordinator by the seventh (7th) day of the following month. The monthly report will, at a minimum, include the following information:
1. Number of ADA requests 2. Number of granted ADA requests 3. Number of denied ADA requests 4. Number of ADA requests denied because the requests involved a medical or mental health issue. 5. Number of partially denied ADA requests 6. Number of ADA requests partially denied because the requests involved a medical or mental health issue. 7. Narrative about the status of any ADA violations discovered by the Facility ADA Coordinator. E. Each Facility ADA Coordinator will review existing ADOC administrative regulations, existing facility standard operating procedures, and administrative directives to assess compliance with the facility’s obligations under the ADA and will provide any resultant recommendations regarding compliance to both the Statewide ADA Coordinator and the facility’s warden.

244554.6

Page 49 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 50 of 84
F. Each Facility ADA Coordinator will attend regularly occurring facility staff meetings to discuss the facility’s ADA compliance and to respond to any staff questions regarding ADA compliance.
G. All Facility ADA Coordinators will attend an annual in-person meeting with the Statewide ADA Coordinator, and will attend quarterly telephonic meetings with the Statewide ADA Coordinator.
H. The Facility ADA Coordinators will ensure that copies of ADA Request Forms, or the information contained therein, are maintained in the Inmate’s file.
I. The Facility ADA Coordinators will ensure on a monthly basis that all assistive devices assigned to the facility are available and in working order. The Facility ADA Coordinators will also ensure on a monthly basis that all alternative format forms are available. The Facility ADA Coordinators will confirm the availability of assistive devices and alternative format forms in the monthly report described above.
J. At least monthly, each Facility ADA Coordinator will tour the facility, to include any area an Inmate is permitted to access, to determine if any Inmates are housed in an inappropriate location, any ADA compliant fixtures are in disrepair or nonoperational, any part of the physical structure is in need of repair which would affect ADA compliance, or if any policy, procedure, or operation in not being conducted in a manner necessary to ensure compliance with ADOC’s ongoing responsibility under the ADA. If any deficiencies are noted, the Facility ADA Coordinator will, within 24 hours, notify in writing the appropriate personnel charged with remedying the non-compliant program or structure, the Warden, and the Statewide ADA Coordinator of the nature of the problem. The Facility ADA

244554.6

Page 50 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 51 of 84
Coordinator will periodically review whether the problem identified has been rectified until such time as it is remedied.
K. Facility ADA Coordinators will, upon receipt, immediately review all ADA requests to determine whether a request concerns an urgent situation. In the event of an urgent situation, the Facility ADA Coordinator will respond to the request in writing and provide, if required, the requested accommodation within three (3) days of receipt of the request, not including weekends and holidays. In all other situations, the Facility ADA Coordinator will respond to the request in writing within ten (10) days of receipt of the request, not including weekends and holidays.
II. Statewide ADA Coordinator. A. ADOC will employ a responsible employee (“Statewide ADA
Coordinator”) to coordinate its efforts statewide to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under the Acts with respect to any current or future Inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability. The staff at all ADOC facilities will receive notice of the designated Statewide ADA Coordinator.
B. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will be a full-time position. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will answer directly to Inspector General of the ADOC.
C. In each ADOC facility, the name, office address, and telephone number for the Statewide ADA Coordinator will be posted in each dormitory, chow hall, visitation area, library, medical care treatment areas, mental health care treatment areas, chapel, canteen, and educational areas.
D. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will receive, review, and maintain monthly reports from the Facility ADA Coordinators at each facility. The Statewide

244554.6

Page 51 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 52 of 84
ADA Coordinator will prepare quarterly reports summarizing the data received from Facility ADA Coordinators via their respective monthly reports and submit the quarterly reports by the fifteenth (15th) day in the months of April, July, October, and January, to the ADOC Inspector General and the Associate Commissioner for the Office of Health Services.
E. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will review existing ADOC administrative regulations, facility standard operating procedures provided by Facility ADA Coordinators, and administrative directives to assess compliance with the ADOC’s obligations under the ADA and to provide any resultant recommendations regarding compliance to the Commissioner, the facility wardens, and the Facility ADA Coordinators.
F. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will inspect every ADOC major and work release facility, to include tours of the physical plant, interviews with staff and interviews with Inmates with disabilities, for compliance with the Acts as follows:
1. Each Facility will be inspected on an annual basis. 2. Facilities where Inmates with vision or mobility impairments are housed will be inspected by the Statewide ADA Coordinator for compliance with the Acts on a bi-annual basis. At least one (1) of these inspections will be unannounced. G. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will conduct the Quality Assurance Program audits as described in the Quality Assurance part of this Agreement. H. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will be audited at least annually by the ADA Committee described in the Quality Assurance Part of this Agreement. I. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will review and provide input regarding any proposed ADA training offered by the ADOC to its administrative staff, facility staff, or the staff of any third-party providers.

244554.6

Page 52 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 53 of 84
J. All appeals of ADA requests will be reviewed by the Statewide ADA Coordinator. Such appeals will be received by the Statewide ADA Coordinator directly or forwarded to the Statewide ADA Coordinator from the Facility ADA Coordinator or the warden where the aggrieved Inmate is housed. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will respond in writing to any ADA appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appeal, not including weekends and holidays. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will maintain a file of all ADA appeals and responses. The file will contain all of the following for each appeal to the extent such documents were generated: the original ADA request, the denial of the original request, the Inmate’s appeal of the denied request, and the written response to the Inmate’s appeal.
K. For the first twelve (12) months following Final Approval of the Amended Agreement, the Statewide ADA Coordinator will:
1. Conduct annual in-person meetings for all Facility ADA Coordinators;
2. In addition to the above, Conduct a second in-person meeting with the Facility ADA Coordinators for facilities where Inmates with vision or mobility impairments are housed; and
3. Host monthly telephonic meetings with all facility ADA Coordinators.
L. For the two (2) years following twelve (12) months after Final Approval, the Statewide ADA Coordinator will:
1. Conduct annual in-person meetings with all Facility ADA Coordinators;

244554.6

Page 53 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 54 of 84
2. In addition to the above, conduct a second in-person meeting with Facility ADA Coordinators for facilities where inmates with vision or mobility impairments are housed; and
3. Host quarterly telephonic meetings with all Facility ADA Coordinators.
M. After three (3) years following Final Approval, the meetings described in paragraphs K and L immediately above may be reduced to an annual in-person meeting for all Facility ADA Coordinators and quarterly telephonic meetings with all Facility ADA Coordinators.
N. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will respond to any questions from Facility ADA Coordinators regarding Inmate requests for accommodations or ADA accessibility issues affecting specific facilities.

244554.6

Page 54 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 55 of 84
11. Provisions Regarding Training of ADOC Staff. ADOC will provide initial and periodic training concerning the provisions and requirements of the ADA to both security staff (i.e., those who are required to attend the Correctional Officer Training Academy) and ADA Coordinators.
I. Initial Training. A. Security Staff. The Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program
(“ADAP”) will, in conjunction with ADOC, provide training concerning the provisions and requirements of the ADA to the first class of students entering the Correctional Officer Training Academy following January 1, 2017. This training will consist of no less than four (4) hours of classroom instruction. Thereafter, ADOC will provide the four (4) hours of training to each class entering the Correctional Officer Training Academy. ADAP will allow ADOC to utilize all curricula, materials and the like generated by ADAP for this instruction. This further includes, without limitation, video recordings of the instruction provided by ADAP. ADOC will not disseminate these materials outside of ADOC absent a subpoena or request for production. ADOC agrees to compensate ADAP for its services in providing this training. ADOC and ADAP will enter into a memorandum of understanding that further described the parties’ obligations and commitments concerning this training.
B. ADA Coordinators. ADAP will, in conjunction with ADOC, provide training concerning the provisions and requirements of the ADA to all Facility ADA Coordinators and the Statewide ADA Coordinator beginning on or before January 31, 2017.This training will consist of no less than six (6) hours of classroom instruction. ADAP will provide four (4) hours of instruction to the Coordinators concerning the provisions and requirements of the ADA and their responsibilities as ADA Coordinators. ADOC will provide two (2) additional

244554.6

Page 55 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 56 of 84
hours of instruction concerning ADOC’s internal policies and procedures as the same relate to the duties of an ADA Coordinator. Thereafter, ADOC will provide the six (6) hours of training to any ADA Coordinators it designates. ADAP will allow ADOC to utilize all curricula, materials and the like generated by ADAP for this instruction. This further includes, without limitation, video recordings of the instruction provided by ADAP. ADOC will not disseminate these materials outside of ADOC absent a subpoena or request for production. ADOC agrees to compensate ADAP for its services in providing this training.
II. Annual Training. A. Security Staff. ADOC will require all members of its Security
staff to participate in two (2) hours of annual training concerning the ADA. ADAP will provide this training during ADOC’s first training session in a selected ADOC region in each of the calendar years of 2018, 2019 and 2020. Thereafter, ADOC will provide this training. ADAP will allow ADOC to utilize all curricula, materials and the like generated by ADAP for this instruction. This further includes, without limitation, video recordings of the instruction provided by ADAP. ADOC will not disseminate these materials outside of ADOC absent a subpoena or request for production. ADOC agrees to compensate ADAP for its services in providing this training.
B. ADA Coordinators. ADOC will require all Facility ADA Coordinators and the Statewide ADA Coordinator to participate in two (2) hours of annual training concerning the ADA. ADAP will provide this training during the calendar years of 2018, 2019 and 2020. Thereafter, ADOC will provide this training. ADAP will allow ADOC to utilize all curricula, materials and the like generated by ADAP for this instruction. This further includes, without limitation, video recordings of the instruction provided by ADAP. ADOC will not

244554.6

Page 56 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 57 of 84
disseminate these materials outside of ADOC absent a subpoena or request for production. ADOC agrees to compensate ADAP for its services in providing this training.

244554.6

Page 57 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 58 of 84

12. Provisions regarding a Quality Assurance Plan (including Quality Assurance Tools)
I. ADOC will implement a Quality Assurance Program (“QAP”) to assess its compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, as well as its ongoing legal obligations under the ADA. The QAP will be administered by ADOC’s Statewide ADA Coordinator. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will conduct all QAP audits described herein except the QAP audit of the Statewide ADA Coordinator. The QAP audit of the Statewide ADA coordinator will be conducted by the ADA Committee described herein. The Quality Assurance Program will include major audits, periodic corrective audits, and minor audits.8
A. At least annually, the Statewide ADA Coordinator will conduct a major audit of each facility’s Facility ADA Coordinator to ensure compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement and its ongoing legal obligations under the ADA.
1. An audit tool including the following areas of inquiry will be utilized in this process:
a. All ADA accommodations as well as grievance and appeals processes;
b. ADA training for ADOC staff regarding Inmates with disabilities;
c. Access to programming for Inmates with disabilities;
8 Major audits are defined as utilizing all sections of the auditing tool. Periodic corrective audits are defined as audits triggered by deficiencies found in either a major audit or a minor audit of some subset of the sections of the auditing tool to determine if the resulting corrective action plan has been implemented and is effective in correcting deficiencies found. Minor audits are defined as regularly scheduled audits utilizing a rotating set of less than all the sections of the auditing tool.

244554.6

Page 58 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 59 of 84
d. Assignments of health codes by ADOC’s healthcare provider and security levels for Inmates with disabilities;
e. Identification, tracking, and transfer of Inmates with disabilities; and
f. Provision of accessible housing and facilities and maintenance of the same.
2. The audit tool to measure compliance with the ADA will be annually reviewed following the first year it is put into use and modified as necessary or appropriate to ensure compliance. The initial data to be evaluated is appended hereto under the title “Quality Assurance Audit Tools.” Any facility audited pursuant to the Quality Assurance Program will maintain at least 85% compliance with each subject area. A failure on any or all subject areas will subject the facility to a corrective audit, no later than six (6) months after completion of the annual audit, covering at least those areas in which the facility failed to meet 85% compliance.
3. At the conclusion of each QAP audit (whether major, corrective, or minor) a written report of the audit, showing the percentages of compliance in each subject area will be provided to the facility Warden, ADOC’s Office of Health Services (“OHS”), the Statewide ADA Coordinator, the Facility ADA Coordinator at the audited facility. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will maintain a complete record of all audits performed (whether major, corrective, or minor) along with all corresponding corrective action plans.
4. If any deficiencies are identified, within fifteen (15) days (excluding weekends and holidays) after the written report is submitted, the facility Warden, a representative from OHS, the Statewide ADA Coordinator, and the Facility ADA Coordinator

244554.6

Page 59 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 60 of 84
will meet and confer telephonically or in person to develop a corrective action plan to remedy any deficiencies found. All corrective action plans will be in writing. After a corrective action plan has been adopted and implemented, a corrective audit will follow. During the corrective audit, the auditor will review whether the facility has implemented the terms of the corrective action plan and whether the underlying compliance deficiencies have been resolved. The results of the corrective audit will be in writing, and if continuing deficiencies are noted, additional corrective actions will be developed and additional corrective audits will be conducted to achieve compliance.
B. In addition to the annual major audit, each facility will be subject to periodic minor audits which are audits of some portions of the full audit. The subject areas of the minor audits will be rotated annually to ensure that each subject area is reviewed at each facility through the minor audit process at least every three (3) years. The facilities will not be given notice of the timing or subject of minor audits. The corrective audit and corrective action plan processes described herein also apply to deficiencies found via the periodic minor audit process.
II. An ADA Committee will be appointed by the ADOC Commissioner to include a minimum of five (5) persons, at least forty percent (40%) of whom are from outside the ADOC. The outside representatives will include one representative from the Governor’s Office on Disability and one representative from the Alabama Department of Mental Health. If no representative from the Governor’s Office on Disability or the Alabama Department of Mental Health is willing or available to serve on the Committee, the ADOC Commissioner will recruit an appropriate number of representatives from similarly situated agencies or interest groups

244554.6

Page 60 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 61 of 84
outside of ADOC. The ADA Committee will meet as needed, but at least once annually, to audit the Statewide ADA Coordinator.
A. The audit of the Statewide ADA Coordinator will include the following areas of inquiry:
1. Maintaining compliance with the ADOC’s policies and procedures relating to Inmates with disabilities;
2. A review of the Statewide ADA Coordinator’s quarterly reports;
3. A review the Facility ADA Coordinators’ monthly reports; and
4. A review of the files of Inmate ADA grievance appeals maintained by the Statewide ADA Coordinator.
B. The audit tool to measure the Statewide ADA Coordinator’s compliance with these subject areas will be periodically reviewed and modified to ensure compliance. The initial data to be evaluated is appended hereto. Pursuant to the Quality Assurance Program, the Statewide ADA Coordinator will maintain at least 85% compliance with each subject area. A failure on any or all subject areas will subject the Statewide ADA Coordinator to a corrective audit, no later than six (6) months after completion of the annual audit, covering at least those areas in which the Statewide ADA Coordinator failed to meet 85% compliance.
C. At the conclusion of each QAP audit of the Statewide ADA Coordinator, a written report of the audit, showing the percentages of compliance in each subject area, will be provided to the Commissioner, ADOC’s Office of Health Services (“OHS”), and

244554.6

Page 61 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 62 of 84

the Statewide ADA Coordinator. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will maintain a complete record of all audits performed along with all corresponding corrective action plans.
D. If any deficiencies are identified, within fifteen (15) days (excluding weekends and holidays) after the written report is submitted, the ADOC Inspector General, a representative of OHS, a representative of the ADA Committee,9 and the Statewide ADA Coordinator will meet and confer telephonically or in person to develop a corrective action plan to remedy any deficiencies found. All corrective action plans will be in writing. After a corrective plan has been adopted and implemented, a corrective audit will follow. During the corrective audit, the ADA Committee will review whether the Statewide ADA Coordinator has implemented the terms of the corrective action plan and whether the underlying compliance deficiencies have been resolved. The results of the corrective audit will be in writing, and if continuing deficiencies are noted, additional corrective actions will be developed and additional corrective audits will be conducted to achieve compliance.
III. QA Audit Tools. A. Intake Facilities. The audit of medical records at intake will
consist of a review of one hundred (100) randomly selected medical records of Inmates at intake. The review will include a review of records from a least six (6) separate months and will include a review of medical records of Inmates who may no longer be housed in the intake facility. All Inmates who were screened during the previous period10 will be entered into a database under which a computer or other similar method of random selection is utilized to ensure against
9 The ADA Committee cannot name as its representative the OHS staff member who serves on the Committee. It is permissible for OHS to name as its representative the member of its staff who serves on the ADA Committee. 10 “Previous period” is defined as the period since the most recent audit of the same kind as being currently undertaken.

244554.6

Page 62 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 63 of 84
selection bias. This selection process will occur ten (10) days before the scheduled audit, and ADOC will ensure that, if the original file is not otherwise accessible, a duplicate copy of the portions of the sections of the medical record necessary for the audit for an Inmate not currently housed at the intake facility is transported to the intake facility for audit purposes. The following areas will be assessed:
1. Was the Inmate questioned, within twelve (12) hours of arrival at ADOC’s intake facility concerning: perceived or recognized disabilities; prior physical, intellectual, or mental health treatment and diagnoses; and previously identified disabilities?
2. Did the Inmate receive a screening for physical and mental health disabilities within seven (7) days, not including weekends and holidays, of arrival at ADOC’s intake facility by a properly qualified medical and mental health provider?11
3. Within seven (7) days, not including weekend and holidays, of the Inmate’s physical and mental health screening by a qualified medical and mental health provider were all approved profiles, medical and mental health codes, accommodations, and disabilities entered into the Health Services Module computer system?
4. Within three (3) days, not including weekends and holidays, of a medical or mental health provider entering a profile, recommending an accommodation for disabilities, finding an ADA qualified medical or mental health condition, or creating a mental health code of two (2) or greater, was the Facility ADA Coordinator notified in writing of each such an event?

11 A “properly qualified” provider is defined as the medical and/or mental health provider authorized to conduct the initial screening for Inmates upon arrival at an ADOC facility.

244554.6

Page 63 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 64 of 84
5. Within seven (7) days, not including weekends and holidays, of arrival of an Inmate at ADOC’s Intake Facility, did the Inmate receive a Beta and a WRAT?
6. Within three (3) days, not including weekends and holidays, of an Inmate scoring eighty (80) or below on the Beta or a scoring seven (7) or below on the WRAT, was the Inmate scheduled for further testing and review by a psychologist for the possible existence of an intellectual disability or a learning disability?
7. For all Inmates scoring eighty (80) or below on the Beta and/or scoring seven (7) or below on the WRAT, were all testing, interviews, and examinations conducted by a psychologist completed within thirty three (33) days from the date of notification of the Beta or WRAT score?
8. For any Inmate scoring 75 or below on the Beta at the time of arrival in ADOC’s custody, was ADOC’s director of classification and chief psychologist notified within three (3) days, not including weekends and holidays?
9. For any Inmate who arrived with a prescription for a physical or mental health medication, was the Inmate examined by a properly qualified medical/mental health provider before the medication which the Inmate entered ADOC’s intake facility ran out?
10. For any Inmate who arrived with a prescription for a physical or mental health medication, was that prescription validated and, once validated, did the Inmate receive that medication(s) until he/she was seen by a medical/mental health provider?
11. Did Inmates arriving at ADOC’s intake facility receive information on their rights under the ADA, and the appropriate accommodation, grievance, and

244554.6

Page 64 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 65 of 84

appeal procedures, within three (3) days of arrival, not including weekends and holidays, and acknowledge receipt of such information in writing?
12. An ADOC intake facility also will be subject to, and assessed under the “Non-Intake Facilities” audit with respect to Inmates who have been continuously housed in such a facility for the previous six (6) months.
B. Non-Intake Facilities. The audit of a non-intake facility will consist of a review of the medical and mental health records of fifty (50) Inmates selected at random.12 The following areas will be assessed:
1. Did each Inmate receive a timely reassessment of their medical and mental health condition as required by ADOC policies?
2. If any Inmate has received an ADA accommodation which is not contained on the Health Services Module, does the ADA Coordinator have a log of all such accommodations?
3. The audit will also consist of a review of forty (40) granted, denied, or partially granted requests for ADA accommodation/appeals.
4. Were all granted accommodations/appeals entered into the health services module computer system within three (3) days, not including weekends and holidays, of the requests being granted?
C. Facility ADA Coordinators. The audit of a facility ADA Coordinator will consist of a review of twenty (20) requests for accommodations, twenty (20) transfers of an Inmate with an ADA accommodation to another facility, ten (10) requests for accommodation, and five (5) appeals, and will also include an in-person interview with ten (10)
12 The random selection process described in “Intake Facility” section herein or a similar procedure is acceptable.

244554.6

Page 65 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 66 of 84

Inmates who have filed requests for ADA accommodations, from the previous period.13 The following areas will be assessed during the audit.
1. Were all accommodations, requests and appeals answered/forwarded, within the applicable time parameters?
2. Does the response adequately identify the reason for any denial or partial denial of a request for an ADA accommodation?
3. For each request for an accommodation that is denied or denied in part, is there written confirmation that the Facility ADA Coordinator met with the Inmate in person within the applicable time parameters?
4. Is there a monthly report containing all the elements of the “Facility ADA Coordinator’s Monthly Report”?
5. Is there a monthly written report indicating that the Facility ADA Coordinator conducted a walkthrough of all areas of the facility where Inmates are allowed access, along with a written record of any deficiencies found?
6. Did the Facility ADA Coordinator attend all mandatory annual training required of Facility ADA Coordinators?
7. Did the Facility ADA Coordinator attend all required periodic meetings of ADOC ADA staff?
8. Did the Facility ADA Coordinator transmit all information not contained on the health services computer module regarding an Inmate’s accommodation and/or profile to the receiving facility within three (3) days, not including weekends and holidays, of the Inmate’s transfer?

13 If fewer than the allotted number exist, then all of a particular category will be reviewed.

244554.6

Page 66 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 67 of 84
D. Statewide ADA Coordinator. 1. A review of the Statewide ADA Coordinator will consist of
a review of materials in his/her possession. It will include: a. Does the Statewide ADA Coordinator have a
complete file containing all facility audits and results? b. Does the Statewide ADA Coordinator have a
complete file of all corrective action plans for all facilities? c. Does the Statewide ADA Coordinator have a
complete file of all monthly facility reports? d. Does the Statewide ADA Coordinator have written
proof of the mandatory facility walk-throughs? e. Did the Statewide ADA Coordinator attend all
mandatory annual training? f. Did the Statewide ADA Coordinator attend all
periodic meetings of ADOC ADA staff? g. Does the Statewide ADA Coordinator have an
annual report showing any modification of facilities, policies, procedures, or regulations which must be implemented to ensure continued compliance with the ADA?
2. The Statewide ADA Coordinator will also be assessed by reviewing the appeals process. To effectuate this, twenty (20) appeals from the previous period will be reviewed. It will include:
a. Did the Statewide ADA Coordinator review and respond within the time parameters contemplated herein?

244554.6

Page 67 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 68 of 84
b. For each request for an accommodation or grievance that is denied or denied in part, is there written confirmation that the Facility ADA Coordinator met with the Inmate in person within the applicable time parameters?
E. Evaluation of Results. For purposes of determining the requirement for a “corrective audit” as contemplated herein, the 85% threshold will apply to each subsection for each applicable person/facility.14
F. Notice. ADOC will post the provisions of this agreement in the law library, or if there is no law library, the area where other inmate information is made available of each of its prison and work release facilities. It will amend the Inmate handbooks to include the provisions of this agreement. The substance of what will be posted in the libraries and in the Inmate handbooks will be drafted by ADOC and Plaintiffs jointly. All such documents will be available in alternative formats to include large print and braille.

14 For instance, if a review of medical records is contemplated only those instances in which data showing a failure to perform, or acceptable performance will be used. If 50 records are used, but for a particular issue less than 50 individuals would have been subject to such a process, then such non-applicable instances will be ignored.

244554.6

Page 68 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 69 of 84

13. Unresolved Claims. Plaintiffs bring claims in this lawsuit that are not resolved by this Amended Agreement and that are subject to be tried in Phase 2 of this litigation. ADOC will not contend in the Phase 2 Trial that Plaintiffs were required to resolve these claims in this Amended Agreement. Plaintiffs are not waiving and reserve the right to pursue additional architectural changes that are not ADA-based for medical or mental health purposes as part of Phase 2 of this lawsuit. Nothing in this paragraph will be construed as an admission on the part of the Defendants that there are architectural changes needed, necessary, or required or that, to the extent such architectural changes are needed, necessary, or required, a cause of action exists to mandate that such changes be made. VI. MONITORING
1. The Parties agree that monitoring of ADOC’s compliance with the terms of this Amended Agreement is necessary and that ADAP will serve as the monitor. ADOC will allow ADAP reasonable access to facilities, documents, staff, procedures, logs, records, Inmates, and other similar informational sources in order to ensure that compliance. ADAP will be entitled to conduct interviews with Inmates and staff to assess compliance with the terms of this Amended Agreement.
2. ADAP agrees to be bound by any Protective or Court Orders entered in this case to protect the confidentiality of Inmate records and sensitive security information.
3. ADAP will prepare a written report on ADOC’s efforts to meet the requirements of this Agreement and any plan to effectuate the terms of this Amended Agreement at least quarterly. Each report will indicate all areas in which the ADOC is, or is not, in Substantial Compliance. Such report will be provided to ADOC and all counsel of record. If ADAP believes that ADOC is not in Substantial Compliance with the terms and provisions of this Amended Agreement and any plan to effectuate its terms, ADAP will provide written

244554.6

Page 69 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 70 of 84
recommendations of actions that it believes necessary to achieve Substantial Compliance with the terms of the provision or provisions. ADOC will then have twenty (20) days to provide written comments, objections, or remedial action plans in response. The Parties will meet and confer to attempt to address deficiencies identified by ADAP.
4. Monitoring will continue for a period not exceeding six (6) years from the execution of this Amended Agreement, regardless of whether ADOC does or does not build new prisons. In the event that ADOC has undertaken to build new prisons, but they have not been completed as of January 1, 2020, monitoring will continue until two (2) years after the completion of the prisons.
5. If ADAP finds evidence of any violation of law which does not involve the subject matter of this Amended Agreement, it is obligated to report that to the ADOC General Counsel, or her designee. VII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
1. During the assessment, implementation, or monitoring periods of this Amended Agreement (see Sections V-VI, above), if Plaintiffs’ counsel or the monitor believe that ADOC is not complying with some aspect of the Amended Agreement, they will notify counsel for the ADOC, in writing, of such a belief identifying any facts supporting the belief. ADOC will investigate the allegations and respond in writing through its counsel within thirty (30) days after receipt of the notification. If Plaintiffs’ counsel or the monitor is not satisfied with ADOC’s response, the Parties will negotiate in good faith to resolve the issue(s). If the Parties are unable to resolve the issue(s) timely and satisfactorily, the Parties agree to present the issue(s) for binding arbitration before Hon. John E. Ott, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of

244554.6

Page 70 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 71 of 84

Alabama.15 This provision regarding binding arbitration applies regardless of whether the issue affects twelve (12) or more inmates, as discussed below.
2. If the issue is one that impacts fewer than twelve (12) inmates, resolution through the arbitration process shall be the final resolution under this Amended Agreement. Nothing in this Amended Agreement establishes a compulsory administrative prerequisite with which an Inmate must comply prior to the initiation of a lawsuit alleging violations of the Acts suffered during the Inmate's term of incarceration. Nothing in this agreement shall prevent an Inmate from exercising his/her rights under ADOC’s ADA Grievance Process.
3. If the issue is one that impacts twelve (12) or more Inmates and the Parties are unable to resolve the issue(s) timely and satisfactorily through negotiation or the arbitration process, either party may bring the issue before the Court for resolution. Any issue brought before The Court will be decided on an abuse of discretion standard.
4. Issues relating to ADOC system-wide or facility specific policies, or physical barriers within a specific facility, shall be presumed to impact twelve (12) or more inmates. The Arbitrator shall have the authority to decide whether an issue impacts twelve (12) or more inmates.
5. In the event that the arbitrator or Court, acting as final decision-maker, finds that ADOC has failed to comply with this Amended Agreement, ADOC will submit a plan to remedy the deficiencies identified within thirty (30) days of the decision. In the event that such a plan does not timely remedy the deficiencies, the Court retains the authority to enforce this Amended
15 If, at any time during the term this Amended Agreement is in effect, Judge Ott or any successor arbitrator becomes unavailable to arbitrate disputes, the Parties will agree upon a replacement arbitrator. If the Parties are unable to agree upon a replacement arbitrator, they will petition the Court to appoint a replacement arbitrator who will be a current or former U.S. Magistrate Judge from one of the U.S. District Courts sitting in Northern, Middle or Southern Districts of Alabama.

244554.6

Page 71 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 72 of 84
Agreement through all remedies provided by law. Any attorneys’ fees awarded are subject to the provisions of Section XII of this Amended Agreement.
6. The Court will be the sole forum for enforcement of this Amended Agreement. Any order to achieve Substantial Compliance with the provisions of this Amended Agreement will be subject to the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626.

244554.6

Page 72 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 73 of 84

VIII. RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT 1. The Parties consent to the reservation and exercise of jurisdiction by the Court
over disputes between the Parties and among the Parties arising out of this Amended Agreement.
2. For purposes of jurisdiction and enforcement of this Amended Agreement only, the Parties jointly request the Court to find that this Amended Agreement satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) in that it is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the federal rights of the Plaintiffs.
3. The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Amended Agreement, once approved, until the Agreement is terminated.
4. This Amended Agreement may be enforced only by the Parties hereto. Nothing contained in this Amended Agreement is intended, or will be construed, to evidence an intention to confer any right or remedy upon any person other than the Parties hereto. IX. TERMINATION
1. ADOC may seek a termination of its obligations under this Amended Agreement upon a finding that it is in Substantial Compliance with this Amended Agreement and has maintained Substantial Compliance for at least twelve (12) consecutive months. ADOC may not obtain a termination of its obligations under this Amended Agreement until five (5) years following the Final Approval of this Amended Agreement.
2. If, upon request for termination, the Court concludes that the ADOC is in Substantial Compliance with all terms and conditions of this Amended Agreement, then the Court may terminate jurisdiction of the portion or portions of this case subject to this Amended Agreement.

244554.6

Page 73 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 74 of 84

3. The Parties will work in good faith to achieve Substantial Compliance with all terms and conditions of this Amended Agreement within the time parameters of this Amended Agreement. If Plaintiffs believe that ADOC is not in or progressing toward Substantial Compliance with the terms and conditions of this Amended Agreement, Plaintiffs may move for an order extending jurisdiction over this matter beyond maximum time period contemplated herein. To extend jurisdiction, Plaintiffs will be required to establish by substantial evidence and the Court will so find that ADOC is not in Substantial Compliance with this Amended Agreement or any subsequent Order entered by the Court. X. AMENDMENTS
1. By mutual agreement, the Parties may change terms of this Amended Agreement (except for the six-year monitoring provision of Section XII.2. below), including but not limited to the timetables for taking specific actions, provided that such modifications are memorialized in writing, signed by the Parties or through their counsel, and approved by the Court.
2. ADOC may not make any substantial changes to any policy, procedure, regulation, or rule that conflicts with the terms of this Amended Agreement. ADOC will supply or make available to Plaintiffs’ counsel any policies, procedures, regulations, or rules implementing the provisions of this Agreement for their review and comment.
3. The Alabama Prison Transformation Initiative (“APTI”) is expected to be considered during or before the 2017 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature. In the event the Alabama Legislature passes the APTI on or before the conclusion of the 2017 Regular Session of Alabama Legislature such that it has authorized bonding authority for the construction of new prison facilities, the parties agree to meet and re-evaluate the deadlines discussed in Section V.2. “Provisions Regarding Assessment, Self-evaluation and Transition Plan, and Corrective Actions” and elsewhere in this Amended Agreement. If the Parties cannot agree upon

244554.6

Page 74 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 75 of 84

amended or supplemental deadlines for these provisions, based on the construction of new Facilities authorized by the APTI, the Parties will submit those issues to the “Dispute Resolution Process” discussed in Section VII of this Amended Agreement.
4. ADOC may not approve any changes in policy, procedure, regulation, or rule by its Medical and/or Mental Health provider that conflicts with the terms of this Amended Agreement.

XI. FUNDING 1. The Parties acknowledge that implementation of the terms of this Amended
Agreement and any plan necessary to effectuate its terms are subject to the availability and receipt of appropriated funds.
2. The Parties further acknowledge that the lack of funding does not preclude the Court from entering an Order to achieve compliance with this Amended Agreement that comports with the applicable provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, and with other applicable law, provided that ADOC reserves the right to assert that the lack of funding should be taken into account in any remedial order.
3. ADOC agrees to make all possible good faith efforts to seek all necessary funding to implement the terms of this Amended Agreement. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree as to whether there is sufficient funding to implement this Amended Agreement, the Parties will meet and confer, and if necessary, consult with the Court. In the event that the Parties remain unable to agree, either party may seek assistance of the Court. XII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES
1. ADOC agrees to pay attorneys’ fees and associated costs to counsel for the Plaintiffs in the total amount of $1,250,000.00. Plaintiffs agree that ADOC may pay this sum in

244554.6

Page 75 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 76 of 84
installments as follows: a first installment payment of $500,000.00 on or before thirty (30) days following Final Approval; a second installment payment of $375,000.00 within six (6) months thereafter; a final installment payment of $375,000.00 within six (6) months following the second installment payment. Such payments will be remitted to the Southern Poverty Law Center. Interest on such sums is waived. ADOC acknowledges that counsel for Plaintiffs have been involved in the prosecution of other claims in this case beyond those resolved by this Agreement. ADOC acknowledges that payment of the above sum is for work and associated costs on the claims resolved herein and that Plaintiffs’ counsel reserve the right to seek additional attorneys’ fees and costs for claims not addressed by this Agreement.
2. Plaintiffs’ counsel agrees that they will not seek nor petition the Court for an award of fees and expenses for monitoring services greater than the following amounts. For purposes of describing the periods hereinafter, the time commences upon execution and final approval of this settlement by the Court. The fees amounts for monitoring services will be capped at, and not exceed, a total of the following amounts:
a. Year One: $70,000.00 b. Year Two: $60,000.00 c. Year Three: $50,000.00 d. Year Four: $40,000.00 e. Year Five: $60,000.00 f. Year Six: $50,000.00 The cost associated with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s participating in the facility survey described in Section V.2. of this Amended Agreement applies toward the total cost of monitoring but will not

244554.6

Page 76 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 77 of 84
be deducted in whole from year one and can be spread over other year’s assessments if necessary.
3. Plaintiffs’ counsel will provide itemized hours expended on a quarterly basis. ADOC agrees to pay an hourly rate of $195.00 for services rendered in the monitoring process. The Parties will meet and confer and attempt to agree upon payment for monitoring services rendered. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree upon the reasonable number of hours expended, either party may seek assistance of the arbitrator or the Court if the Parties remain unable to agree.
4. The annual caps and hourly rates described herein do not apply to: (a) Plaintiffs’ motions to enforce the terms of this Amended Agreement; and (b) Plaintiffs’ opposition to any motions filed by ADOC arising out of this Amended Agreement. No fees and expenses will be awarded to Plaintiffs’ counsel for such motions or oppositions unless the Court finds: (a) that the motion or opposition was necessary to enforce substantial rights under the Acts; and (b) that Plaintiffs attempted to resolve the matter and or narrow the issues as much as possible by meeting and conferring with ADOC, taking full opportunity of recourse to the mediation process before presenting the issues to the Court. Plaintiffs’ counsel agree that they may not seek attorneys’ fees and costs of more than $200,000 per year on motions to enforce the terms of this Agreement. XIII. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
1. This Amended Agreement constitutes the entire agreement among the Parties as to all claims contained herein. This Amended Agreement supersedes all prior agreements, whether written, oral, or implied. Each party represents that it has full legal authority to enter into and execute this Agreement.

244554.6

Page 77 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 78 of 84
2. This Amended Agreement may not be altered or amended, except in writing signed by all Parties or their representatives.
3. This Amended Agreement will be binding on all successors, assigns, employees, agents, and all other working on behalf of Plaintiffs and ADOC.
4. This Amended Agreement may be executed in counterparts and such counterparts will be provided to all Parties immediately upon execution.

244554.6

Page 78 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 79 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 80 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 81 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 82 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 83 of 84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 518 Filed 05/26/16 Page 84 of 84

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 1 of 19

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 1 PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT APPROVAL ORDER Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the parties jointly move the court to grant preliminary approval to their proposed settlement agreement of Phase 1 of this litigation (doc. no. 518); to approve the form of notice to class members of the proposed settlement agreement (attached as Exhibit A); to approve the form for objecting to or commenting on the proposed settlement agreement (attached as Exhibit B); and to approve the process for distributing these

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 2 of 19

documents and collecting comments, as further set out

below. Based on the entire record before the court,

the court finds as follows:

First, the court finds that the proposed settlement

agreement should be and is preliminarily approved, that

notice should be provided to interested parties, and

that a fairness hearing should be conducted.

The court further finds it appropriate to

provisionally certify a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive-relief

settlement class composed of “any current or future

inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama

Department of Corrections who has a disability as

defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B),

excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate

solely to or arise from mental disease, illness, or

defect.” For reasons to be articulated in a final

decision regarding whether to approve the settlement,

the court preliminarily finds that the settlement class

meets the requirements of Rule 23(a)--numerosity,

commonality,

typicality,

and

adequacy

of

2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 3 of 19
representation--as well as the requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) that the issues involved “apply generally to the class,” such that “relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” The court preliminarily finds that plaintiffs’ counsel in this case can capably serve as and should be appointed class counsel, based on the factors outlined in Rule 23(g).
Finally, the court finds that the notice and comment forms attached as exhibits to this order, and the process for distributing and collecting these outlined below, constitute sufficient notice of, and--together with the fairness hearing(s) described below--opportunity to be heard on, the proposed settlement agreement, as is required by due process and Rule 23(e).
It is therefore ORDERED that the joint motion for preliminary approval (doc. no. 520) is granted as follows:
1. The proposed settlement agreement (doc. no. 518) is preliminarily approved, with final
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 4 of 19
approval subject to a hearing and to review by the court of any objections to or comments about its terms submitted by class members, and to the court’s resolution of certain outstanding issues identified in open court at a hearing held on June 3, 2016, and set for briefing below. 2. An injunctive-relief settlement class, defined as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise from mental disease, illness, or defect,” is provisionally certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). 3. The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g).
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 5 of 19
4. The Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) is to provide notice of the proposed settlement agreement as further outlined below by June 24, 2016, and to collect comments from class members as further outlined below by the submission deadline of July 25, 2016. a. As a preliminary matter, the proposed settlement agreement (doc. no. 518) and notice and comment forms (Exhibits A and B) are to be translated into Spanish, and printed in both Braille and large print, and these alternative format documents are to be distributed to each ADOC facility prior to June 24, 2016. Although posted documents need not be provided in any alternative format, any individual inmate known to or believed by correctional officers to read only Spanish or to be vision-impaired must be provided individual copies of both the notice and comment forms in an appropriate
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 6 of 19
alternative format, and must be provided the agreement itself in an appropriate alternative format upon request. If an inmate who had difficulty reading any of the alternative format documents or who has difficulty writing requests that the forms or the agreement itself be read to him or requests assistance in completing a comment form, this request must be promptly accommodated by ADOC. b. Copies of the proposed settlement agreement are to be made available for inmates to review in the law library of each ADOC prison or work-release facility or, for facilities that have no law library, in the area where information for inmates is made available. At least one copy is to be made available per 100 inmates housed in any particular facility.
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 7 of 19
c. A copy of the proposed settlement agreement is to be provided promptly upon request to any inmate who is not authorized or able to access the law library or other area where copies of the agreement are being made available.
d. For inmates housed in dorms at ADOC’s prison or work-release facilities, the notice form is to be posted in each of the libraries and dorms of these facilities, wherever information for inmates is ordinarily posted. Sufficient copies of the comment form are to be made available to inmates housed in dorms in their facilities’ libraries and in their shift commanders’ offices.
e. Any inmate whose housing assignment is other than a dorm is to be provided, by hand delivery: (1) a copy of the notice form, (2) a copy of the comment form, and (3) a
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 8 of 19

letter-sized envelope.

A correctional

officer employed by ADOC is to distribute

these papers. ADOC is to maintain a roster

that indicates, by name and AIS number, the

inmates to whom these forms have been

individually distributed. Inmates are to

sign this roster upon receipt of the forms;

in the event that an inmate refuses to sign

or rejects the forms, the distributing

officer is to note this on the roster.

f. ADOC is to inform all inmates of the

notice and opportunity to object or comment

by means of a weekly oral announcement, to

be made during morning count each Monday of

the comment period, as follows: “Attention.

There is a proposed settlement of the Dunn

v. Dunn Americans with Disabilities Act

lawsuit that affects all inmates. You have

until July 25, 2016, to provide written

comments about that settlement. You can

8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 9 of 19
review the proposed settlement agreement in the law library [for facilities that have no law library, specify alternate location]. If you are not able to access the law library [for facilities that have no law library, specify alternate location], a copy of the agreement will be provided to you if you request one from a correctional officer. By July 25, 2016, you should place all written comments in the ADA Settlement Comment Box, located next to the inmate request slip box. If you need a copy of the comment form, you can get one from the correctional officer supervising your living area or from the law library. If you cannot access the ADA Settlement Comment Box, you should ask a correctional officer to have your comment form collected and placed in the comment box.”
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 10 of 19
g. At each ADOC prison or work-release facility, a secured box clearly labeled “ADA Settlement Comment Box” is to be placed adjacent to the box where inmate request slips are collected. This box may be a securely taped cardboard box, and must be of sufficient size to accommodate all comment forms that are submitted. This box is to be used exclusively for the collection of comment forms.
h. Inmates who are allowed freedom of movement within a facility are to be allowed to place their comment forms in the designated comment box. Comment forms are to be collected from those inmates who do not have freedom of movement within a facility as follows, with records of the inmates from whom forms have been collected to be maintained on rosters by those responsible for the collection:
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 11 of 19

i. In segregation units, the forms are to

be collected by members of the

Institutional Segregation Review Board

during normal rounds and deposited in

the comment box.

ii. In

mental-health

units

and

stabilization units and on death row,

the forms are to be collected by the

Captains who are responsible for those

units and deposited in the comment box.

iii. In segregation units or holding units

at work-release facilities, the forms

are to be collected by the Wardens of

those facilities and deposited in the

comment box.

i. The Warden of each ADOC facility is to

certify in writing that the facility has

complied with the above requirements

regarding the provision of notice and the

collection of forms, and that all comment

11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 12 of 19
boxes have been transmitted to ADOC’s general counsel as required below. j. On the 20th day of the comment period, the Warden at each facility is to transmit to the office of ADOC’s general counsel the comment box(es) at the facility, and immediately replace the comment box(es) with a box or boxes of the same design and labeling as the box replaced. At the end of the final day of the comment period, the Warden at each facility is to transmit the replacement comment box(es) to the office of ADOC’s general counsel. k. After each set of comment boxes is received by ADOC’s general counsel, counsel for ADOC will promptly arrange with class counsel and a representative of the clerk of court for the Middle District of Alabama a time for the parties to meet at the United States Courthouse in Montgomery in order to
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 13 of 19
confirm that comment boxes from all ADOC facilities have been received and to open those boxes. l. Each of these two sets of comments is to be scanned by the clerk of court and docketed as a single filing. At the same time as these comments are docketed, comments received by the clerk of court by mail by that date are also to be compiled and docketed. Finally, on August 12, any additional comments received by the clerk of court by mail are to be compiled and docketed. The clerk of court is to retain the original copies of all comments, whether submitted to comment boxes or by mail.
i. To be clear, five compilations of comments are to be docketed and marked as follows: 1. First round of comments submitted to comment boxes.
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 14 of 19
2. First round of comments submitted by mail.
3. Second round of comments submitted to comment boxes.
4. Second round of comments submitted by mail.
5. Third round of comments submitted by mail.
5. By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are to file a joint supplemental brief addressing comprehensively and in detail the following questions raised previously by the court at a hearing held in open court on June 3, 2016: a. Do the official-capacity defendants consent to the amendment of the complaint and proposed settlement agreement to include them as defendants, to ensure that in a potential future enforcement action, Eleventh Amendment immunity would not bar plaintiffs from raising claims under the
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 15 of 19
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regarding conduct by prison administrators which does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment? See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). If they do not, what are the implications for any future action to enforce the proposed settlement agreement, and would it be fair to grant approval in light of these implications? b. Under relevant binding and persuasive precedent, are there claims arising under the ADA which an individual prisoner would not be precluded from bringing by the substantive terms of the proposed settlement agreement--that is, absent the provision creating a mechanism for dispute resolution? Assuming that there are, can the court lawfully enter an order containing a provision requiring unnamed class members to arbitrate these claims and barring them from
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 16 of 19
federal court; would this order be enforceable? Assuming that the court has the authority to do so, would it be fair to enter such an order? 6. By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are to confirm in written filings with the court the following agreements, stipulated to during a hearing held in open court on June 3, 2016: a. The parties agree that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1), which authorizes defendants in prison litigation to seek termination of prospective relief after two years, can be and has been waived by defendants with respect to their proposed settlement agreement, and that defendants, having taken this position, will be estopped from arguing to the contrary in any future litigation related to enforcement of the proposed settlement agreement.
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 17 of 19
b. The parties agree that the maximum term contemplated by the proposed settlement agreement, beyond which plaintiffs will be required to seek an extension in order for the court to retain jurisdiction, is a period of 72 months to begin upon the court’s final approval of the settlement.
c. The parties agree that the word “binding,” should be omitted from Subsection 1 of Section VII of the proposed settlement agreement, and that the decision of the arbitrator is binding (that is, not subject to appeal) only if the issue being arbitrated affects fewer than 12 inmates. The parties further agree that the arbitrator’s decision as to whether a particular issue affects more than 12 inmates will be subject to review by the district court for abuse of discretion.
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 18 of 19
7. By no later than August 17, 2016, the parties are to file pre-hearing briefs, both summarizing by topic and responding to the objections to and comments on the proposed settlement agreement that have been submitted by class members. These briefs must include citations to the page numbers on which any referenced objections or comments appear in the docketed compilations of responses.
8. A fairness hearing is set for 10:00 a.m. on August 31, 2016, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. At this hearing, counsel for both parties must be prepared to respond to the objections raised and comments made by class members, as well as to the court’s concerns as outlined above.
9. The court will determine, after receiving objections and comments from class members, from which of them it intends to hear oral testimony.
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 532 Filed 06/13/16 Page 19 of 19
This testimony will be heard by videoconference from various ADOC facilities.
a. By no later than August 17, 2016, the parties are to consult with the clerk of court and file under seal a joint proposal as to arrangements for videoconferencing.
b. By no later than August 22, 2016, the court will inform the parties which class members will testify, and which dates during the week of August 29, 2016, the court will hear testimony.
c. By no later than August 26, 2016, the parties are to file a list of which class members will testify from which facilities.
DONE, this the 13th day of June, 2016. /s/ Myron H. Thompson____
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 534 Filed 06/14/16 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT

PHASE 1 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ORDER Upon further consideration of the parties’ proposed Phase 1 settlement agreement (doc. no. 518), and in addition to the briefing ordered in this court’s Phase 1 preliminary settlement approval order (doc. no. 532), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) By no later than June 20, 2016, plaintiffs are
to file a brief addressing whether the court should appoint a guardian ad litem to represent at the fairness hearing the interests of class

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 534 Filed 06/14/16 Page 2 of 2
members who are incompetent or otherwise unable to understand or comment on the terms of the settlement agreement. This brief is to respond to the position taken by defendants on this question in their notice of response (doc. no. 531). (2) By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are to address in detail in a joint filing the bases on which they propose that the court grant final certification of the proposed class. This brief is specifically to address each of the applicable requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. DONE, this the 14th day of June, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson____ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 539 Filed 06/20/16 Page 1 of 4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT

SECOND PHASE 1 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ORDER Upon further consideration of the parties’ proposed Phase 1 settlement agreement (doc. no. 518), and in addition to the briefing ordered in this court’s Phase 1 preliminary settlement approval order (doc. no. 532) and Phase 1 supplemental briefing order (doc. no. 534), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are
to confirm in a written filing with the court their agreement, stipulated to during a

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 539 Filed 06/20/16 Page 2 of 4

telephone conference held on the record on June

17, 2016, that under the terms of their

proposed settlement agreement and applicable

law, only this court, and not the arbitrator,

would have the authority to hear or rule on a

motion to extend or terminate the consent

decree in this case.

(2) By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are

to file a joint supplemental brief addressing

comprehensively and in detail the following

questions raised previously by the court during

a telephone conference held on the record on

June 17, 2016, and explaining why their answers

to these questions are (i) in compliance with

all relevant law and (ii) not unfair to the

members of the settlement class:

a. Would the arbitrator have the power to

enforce his decisions?

Would he have

contempt power, and if not, with what other

enforcement authority would he be vested?

2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 539 Filed 06/20/16 Page 3 of 4
If the arbitrator does have some enforcement authority, are his enforcement decisions reviewable by the court, and if so, under what standard? Must an issue be raised before the arbitrator bsefore it can be presented to the court as the basis for a contempt motion? b. If the court hears a motion to terminate or extend the consent decree or a portion of the consent decree, would the arbitrator’s decisions regarding issues pertinent to the motion to terminate or extend be binding on the court? In particular, are decisions of the arbitrator which were not appealed or were not subject to appeal binding on the court in assessing substantial compliance? To the extent that some or all decisions of the arbitrator are not binding upon the court in deciding a motion to terminate or extend the consent decree, under what
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 539 Filed 06/20/16 Page 4 of 4
standard of review would the court revisit his decisions? DONE, this the 20th day of June, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson____ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 544 Filed 06/24/16 Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON DUNN, in his official )

capacity as Commissioner

)

of the Alabama Department of

)

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-00601-MHT-TFM

JOINT STATUS REPORT REGARDING STATUS CONFERENCE The Parties, by and through undersigned counsel and pursuant to this

Court’s Order (Doc. 527), respectfully submit this status report regarding matters

they seek to discuss during the June 29, 2016 status conference.

I. Mediation of the case

The parties are actively working with Judge Ott to mediate the remaining

claims in this matter. Through mediation, the parties are initially focused on

addressing the claims related to the provision of mental health care.

II. Structure of the case

Plaintiffs are prepared to address the Court’s inquiry at the June 9, 2016

status conference regarding the structure of the presentation of evidence at trial.

1

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 544 Filed 06/24/16 Page 2 of 6
III. Outstanding discovery issues set for mediation Plaintiffs have identified and continue to identify perceived gaps in the
production of discovery by Defendants. Plaintiffs seek supplementation of discovery production, and the Parties have conferred on multiple occasions about the outstanding issues concerning credentialing documents, mortality reviews, and medical charts. The Parties are currently set for mediation of these discovery issues on June 29, 2016 at 10:30 a.m.

Dated: June 24, 2016

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Maria V. Morris Maria V. Morris Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

Rhonda Brownstein (ASB-3193-O64R) Maria V. Morris (ASB-2198-R64M) Ebony G. Howard (ASB-7247-O76H) Latasha L. McCrary (ASB-1935-L75M) Brooke Menschel (ASB-7675-Z61K) Jaqueline Aranda Osorno (ASB-3296-A17H) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 Telephone: (334) 956-8200 Facsimile: (334) 956-8481 rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org maria.morris@splcenter.org ebony.howard@splcenter.org
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 544 Filed 06/24/16 Page 3 of 6
latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org brooke.menschel@splcenter.org jaqueline.aranda@splcenter.org
Miriam Haskell* (FL. Bar No. 069033) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER P.O. Box 370037 Miami, FL 33137 Telephone: (786) 347-2056 Facsimile: (786) 237-2949 miriam.haskell@splcenter.org *admitted pro hac vice
Eunice Cho* (GA. Bar No. 632669) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 1989 College Avenue NE Atlanta, GA 30317 Telephone: (404) 221-5842 Facsimile: (404) 221-5857 eunice.cho@splcenter.org *admitted pro hac vice
William Van Der Pol, Jr. (ASB-2112-114F) J. Patrick Hackney (ASB-6971-H51J) Glenn N. Baxter (ASB-3825-A41G) Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 Telephone: (205) 348-4928 Facsimile: (205) 348-3909 wvanderpoljr@adap.ua.edu jphackney@adap.ua.edu gnbaxter@adap.ua.edu
Lisa Borden William Glassell Somerville, III (ASB-6185-E63W) Andrew Philip Walsh (ASB-3755-W77W) Patricia Clotfelter (ASB-0841-F43P) Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC 420 20th Street North, Suite 1400
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 544 Filed 06/24/16 Page 4 of 6
Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 250-8375 Facsimile: (205) 488-3775 wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com awalsh@bakerdonelson.com dnabors@bakerdonelson.com pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com
Gregory M. Zarzaur Anil A. Mujumdar (ASB-2004-L65M) Diandra S. Debrosse Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 983-7985 Facsimile: (888) 505-0523 gregory@zarzaur.com anil@zarzaur.com diandra@zarzaur.com
ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
/s/ William R. Lunsford William R. Lunsford One of the Attorneys for Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich
William R. Lunsford Matthew B. Reeves Melissa K. Marler Stephen C. Rogers MAYNARD COOPER & GALE PC 655 Gallatin Street Huntsville, AL 35801 Telephone: (256) 512-5710 Facsimile: (256) 512-0119 E-mail: blunsford@maynardcooper.com mreeves@maynardcooper.com mmarler@maynardcooper.com srogers@maynardcooper.com
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 544 Filed 06/24/16 Page 5 of 6
Mitesh B. Shah Mitchell D. Greggs Bryan A. Coleman Evan P. Moltz MAYNARD COOPER & GALE PC 1901 Sixth Avenue North 2400 Regions Harbert Plaza Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 254-1178 Facsimile: (205) 714-6438 E-mail: mshah@maynardcooper.com mgreggs@maynardcooper.com bcoleman@maynardcooper.com emoltz@maynardcooper.com
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 544 Filed 06/24/16 Page 6 of 6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have on this 24th day of June, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following.

David R. Boyd, Esq. John G. Smith, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101
Anne Hill, Esq. Elizabeth Anne Sees, Esq. Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Esq. Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, AL 36130

Michael Leon Edwards, Esq. Susan Nettles Han, Esq. John Eric Getty, Esq. Steven C. Corhern, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201
Deana Johnson, Esq. Brett T. Lane, Esq. MHM Services, Inc. 1447 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 500 Atlanta, GA 30309

/s/ Maria V. Morris One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

6

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ADAP SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION The plaintiffs in this putative class-action lawsuit are dozens of state prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP). The defendants are officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC): the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner of Health Services.1 They are sued in their official capacities only.

1. ADOC itself is also a party, but with respect to only claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and (continued...)

In Phase 2A of this case, with which this opinion
is concerned, ADAP and a subset of individual
plaintiffs assert the following mental-health claims:
constitutionally inadequate mental-health treatment in
Alabama prison facilities and involuntary medication
without due process. They rely on the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive
relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights).2
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, which are nearly settled and therefore not discussed in this opinion. See Joint Status Report (doc. no. 968) at 968 (“Plaintiffs and Defendants ADOC have agreed in substance to a settlement that resolves the Phase 2A ADA issues. These parties continue to work to resolve the Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys and monitoring fees for these issues.”). To the extent that the parties are not successful in reaching a final resolution of these claims, they have reserved them for later adjudication. See Phase 2 Order on Remaining ADA Claims (doc. no. 981).
2. This case has twice been bifurcated for the administrative convenience of the court and the parties. The claims in Phase 1, which the parties settled with a consent decree approved by the court, involved ADA claims alleging discrimination on the (continued...)
2

The issue before the court is whether ADAP has
associational standing to bring the mental-health care
claims at issue in Phase 2A of this case.3 The court
concludes that it does.
basis of and non-accommodation of physical disabilities. See Dunn v. Dunn, -- F.R.D. --, 2016 WL 4718216 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2016) (Thompson, J.). The claims in Phase 2B, which are set to go to trial after the Phase 2A claims (should they survive summary judgment), involve Eighth Amendment claims related to medical and dental care.
3. ADAP itself has been a plaintiff in this case since its outset. During the course of litigation of Phase 1 (concerning discrimination against and failure to accommodate prisoners with physical disabilities), the court sought clarification as to the precise basis for ADAP’s standing--that is, whether it was claiming organizational standing, associational standing, or both. In response, ADAP represented that it was asserting both. It was unnecessary to resolve whether ADAP had adequately pled associational standing at the time, because the parties settled Phase 1. In order to ensure that the basis of ADAP’s asserted standing was squarely presented, for purposes of defendants’ response and for adjudication, the court instructed ADAP to seek leave to amend the complaint to clarify the bases for its standing (in advance both of the deadline for amendments and the Phase 2 briefing), and leave was granted. Dunn v. Dunn, 2016 WL 4169157 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 2016) (Thompson, J.). Although defendants were offered the opportunity to conduct additional discovery regarding standing, id. at *3, they declined to do so.
3

I. Background ADAP’s claims are systemic and prospective in nature: It contends not that any particular prisoner’s rights were violated in the past, but instead that defendants’ policies and practices violate and will continue to violate the constitutional rights of prisoners who have serious mental illness, both by creating a substantial risk of serious harm to them and by denying them due process. While defendants have sought summary judgment, their summary-judgment motion does not mention ADAP, but focuses exclusively on ADAP’s co-plaintiffs, individual prisoners.4 The court issued an order informing the parties that it would, sua sponte, “raise for disposition on summary judgment the issue of
4. In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, they specify that they are requesting “judgment as a matter of law as to the claims of Named Plaintiffs.” Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 768) at 2. In a footnote, defendants expressly define the phrase “Named (continued...)
4

whether plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program ... has associational standing with respect to any, some, or all of the claims to be litigated during Phase 2 of this case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (recognizing that district courts have the authority to raise issues for disposition on summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the parties are on notice that they must come forward with any and all pertinent evidence).” Phase 2 Briefing Order on Associational Standing (doc. no. 724) at 1-2.
The court further ordered ADAP to “file a brief affirmatively setting forth the basis for its asserted associational standing and explaining the scope of this standing”; the brief was “to discuss any relevant case law and any evidence [ADAP] believes is pertinent to its assertion of standing,” and required defendants, “[i]f [they] wish to contest” ADAP’s associational standing, to “do so in the context of their summary
Plaintiffs” by listing every individual prisoner plaintiff, but not ADAP. Id. at 2 n.2.
5

judgment motion.” Id. at 2. See Wright & Miller, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2720.1 (4th ed.) (“[I]f the court determines to enter summary judgment on a ground not presented or argued by the parties, the failure to give the losing party an opportunity to defend against that ground provides a ground for reversal. Conversely, as now expressly recognized by Rule 56(f), if the parties are provided with an opportunity to address the court's alternative ground, then summary judgment may properly be entered.”).
Having been placed on notice that the court would consider resolving the issue of associational standing on summary judgment, the parties filed briefs as directed, and the court has considered the arguments and evidence put forward. For the reasons explained below, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), the court will grant summary judgment to ADAP on the issue of associational standing, and, as ADAP requested, “uphold its associational standing to bring
6

its claims” in Phase 2A of this case. Pl. ADAP’s Br. on Associational Standing (doc. no. 754) at 25.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment, which can be granted not only as

to a claim or defense but also as to any “part” of a

claim or defense, is appropriate under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(a) if “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact” and one party “is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.”

Only record

evidence--not assertions in pleadings--can create a

dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

The evidence is to be viewed in the light most

favorable to the party against which summary judgment

is being sought or considered. Coleman v. Smith, 828

F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. Associational Standing ADAP, the State’s protection and advocacy organization (P&A), contends that it has associational
7

standing to litigate claims that are, in essence, identical to those the individual plaintiffs endeavor to bring on behalf of the plaintiff classes.5 The court agrees for the following reasons.

5. ADAP is not only representing itself as an

association but also serving as counsel to the

individual named plaintiffs who represent the putative

plaintiff class or classes.

Notably, “class

certification under Rule 23 and associational standing

are evaluated on two different rubrics,” and an

organization may well have associational standing even

if the requirements of Rule 23 could not be met. See

Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div. of Int'l Bhd. of

Teamsters v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 20 F. Supp. 3d

686, 691 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (Simon, J.). Defendants also

argue, relying on Access 4 All, Inc. v. Trump Int’l

Hotel & Tower Condo., 458 F. Supp. 2d 160, 172-73

(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Karas, J.), that, even if ADAP does

have standing to bring claims that are coextensive with

those brought by the putative plaintiff class or

classes, it should be denied prudential standing

because its claims would be duplicative. This argument

holds no water. Since ADAP’s claims mirror those of

the class or classes, and ADAP also represents the

individual named plaintiffs, defendants will hardly be

put to any extra trouble defending against both. If

defendants did not contest that the individual named

plaintiffs can proceed on their claims (both

individually and as a class or classes), ADAP would

presumably feel no need to continue to assert its own

standing, essentially in the alternative.

ADAP also asserts organizational standing pursuant to Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), (continued...)
8

The Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with
Mental Illness Act (PAIMI) authorizes P&As to bring
litigation to address systemic problems in the
treatment of people with mental illness.6 Specifically,
42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes P&As to “pursue
administrative, legal, or other appropriate remedies to
ensure the protection of the rights of individuals with
mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in
the State”; meanwhile, § 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes P&As
to “pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on
and Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012). See Fifth Am. Compl. (doc. no. 805) at 24 (“Prior to commencement of this lawsuit, ADAP spent significant time and resources advocating on behalf of prisoners with disabilities [including mental illness] in ADOC custody, monitoring and investigating the treatment and accommodation of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC custody. ADAP’s prelitigation efforts and expenditures of recourse were necessitated by the ADOC policies and practices challenged, which policies and practices serve to frustrate and perceptibly impair ADAP’s advocacy efforts and its ability to accomplish the statutory purposes for which it was created.”). The court need not address this alternative basis for standing at this time.
9

behalf of an individual ... with mental illness” under certain circumstances. As many courts have explained, and as many others have recognized in the course of finding that P&As have standing to bring claims on behalf of identifiable groups of similarly situated constituents, “PAIMI authorizes [P&As] to pursue claims for system-wide change” under subsection (a)(1)(B), in addition to claims on behalf of individuals pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(C). Univ. Legal Servs., Inc. v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 2005 WL 3275915, at *5 (D.D.C. July 22, 2005) (Hogan, J.); see also Brown v. Stone, 66 F. Supp. 2d 412, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Block, J.) (“Essentially, subdivision B is apparently designed to address systemic issues affecting the rights of multiple individuals. ... By contrast, subdivision C addresses the rights of particular individuals, and is significantly more restrictive....” (citations omitted)). As the court explained in Brown, “if
6. Oddly, the case law sometimes refers to this statute with the acronym PAMII.
10

Congress merely intended for state [P&A] systems to act as advocates on behalf of [specific] mentally [ill] individuals, it would not have included (a)(1)(B) in the statute in addition to (a)(1)(C).” Id. at 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Block, J.) (citation omitted). “Given ‘the broad remedial purposes of the Act,’” the court in Brown concluded, the plaintiff P&A had standing to bring claims on behalf of “a particular group of individuals” it had “identified,” not by name but by what amounted to a description of a class: “all those” indigent patients in state psychiatric hospitals being assessed full charges for their care based on the defendants’ policy of charging for care any patients who sued for injuries arising out of their psychiatric treatment. Id. (quoting Rubenstein v. Benedictine Hosp., 790 F. Supp. 396, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Cholakis, J.)).
Of course, in addition to this statutory authorization to bring actions on behalf of mentally ill individuals, ADAP must also have standing to sue
11

under Article III. The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test for determining whether an organization has associational standing to sue on behalf of its members: “an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Although the first two prongs of the Hunt test are constitutional requirements, the third is merely prudential and may be eliminated by Congress. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58 (1996).
The Eleventh Circuit has squarely held that P&As may sue on behalf of the constituents they serve just “like a more traditional association may sue on behalf of its members.” Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 885-86
12

(11th Cir. 1999). In so doing, it explained that a P&A that meets PAIMI’s requirements, despite not having members in a formal sense, functions as a membership organization, and can have associational standing to represent its constituents.
P&As are required under PAIMI to have a governing board and advisory council that include specified percentages of individuals or family members of individuals who receive or have received mental-health care; to provide the public with an opportunity to comment on its activities and priorities; and to have a grievance system for clients and potential clients. See id. at 886. ADAP has shown, and defendants have not disputed, that ADAP meets these requirements of PAIMI and functions as a membership organization for purposes of asserting associational standing on behalf of its constituents, Alabamians with mental illness.
13

Defendants do claim,7 however, that ADAP has not
demonstrated that it was appropriately designated as
the P&A that the “State shall have in effect,” per 42
U.S.C. § 15043(a).8 This is a remarkable argument, in
7. Notably, defendants, in their brief, do not go so far as to say that ADAP is not the State’s P&A; they merely challenge the adequacy of the evidence it has put forward to demonstrate that it was designated as such. Accordingly, defendants do not suggest that any other organization is instead the P&A, or, for that matter, that Alabama does not have a P&A. They also do not dispute that ADAP has proven that it receives, through the State, the federal funds that the State is authorized to collect only if it has a P&A. In fact, defendants have not presented any evidence creating a factual dispute regarding ADAP’s P&A status; instead, they assert that a P&A must be created by a state executive or legislative action.
8. P&As have obtained their statutory mandates through a series of statutes expanding their purview to cover additional forms of disabilities. Therefore, considerable cross-referencing is required. 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes “a system established in a State under section 10803 of this title” to litigate on behalf of individuals with mental illness; § 10803 explains that an “eligible system[]” that receives a federal allotment is to “establish and administer [a] system ... to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with mental illness”; § 10802(2) defines the term “eligible system” to mean “the system established in a State to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities under subtitle C of the Developmental Disabilities Assistance (continued...)
14

light of the fact that both this court and the Eleventh Circuit have expressly recognized ADAP as Alabama’s P&A for over two decades. Indeed, in Stincer itself, 175 F.3d at 883, the court of appeals cited its affirmation of this court’s decision in Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Developmental Center, 97 F.3d 492, 495 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The Advocacy Program is the federally mandated and funded P&A system Alabama has established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(1).”), aff’g 894 F. Supp. 424, 426-27 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (Thompson, J.). See also Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. SafetyNet Youthcare, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1321-22 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (Granade, J.), on reconsideration in other part, 2015 WL 566946 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2015); Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Wood, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2008)
and Bill of Rights Act of 2000”; § 15043, in turn, says that in order to receive a federal allotment, a “State shall have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities.”
15

(Thompson, J.). These repeated judicial findings alone probably suffice to make this argument a nonstarter.
In addition, defendants’ argument is based on a faulty premise. They contend that Governor George Wallace’s 1976 designation of the University of Alabama’s Legal Aid Clinic as the organization to implement a P&A was inadequate, because his communication was not labeled as an executive order and, in any event, he was not empowered to create a state agency by executive order. The rub is this: There is no need for a P&A to be a state agency or indeed a creation of the State. A State need only “have in effect” a P&A, not create one. Moreover, defendants have pointed to no state law requiring any particular executive or legislative action in order to designate a preexisting organization as the one authorized to serve functions outlined and receive monies appropriated by Congress. Although some P&As in other States were created by statute or executive
16

order, the manner of designation employed in Alabama was also entirely permissible.
Finally, at multiple prior points in the course of this very case, defendants have recognized ADAP as the State’s P&A. In advance of filing this litigation, ADAP investigated the treatment of prisoners with disabilities and mental illness in ADOC prisons across the State; during and in order to facilitate this investigation, ADAP, along with plaintiffs’ counsel, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), entered into a “Memorandum of Understanding” with ADOC. This document clearly reflects the State’s understanding that ADAP is the State’s P&A. It states that ADOC “recognizes and appreciates the mission of the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program and its desire to assist and advocate for individuals in institutions who are identified as mentally ill and/or developmentally disabled.” Memo. of Understanding (doc. no. 754-10) at 2. Furthermore, the memorandum recognizes that SPLC--which was assisting ADAP in carrying out its functions--“may
17

request copies of inmate records,” and that “[t]hese will be supplied in accordance with the applicable authorization required by or granted under 42 U.S.C. § 10805 or 42 U.S.C. § 15043.” Id. These statutory provisions authorize P&As--and only them--to access the records of their constituents. By entering into this agreement, ADOC necessarily recognized that ADAP was the State’s P&A.
Additionally, when the court asked defendants for their position as to whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent the interests of a subset of the Phase 1 settlement class at the fairness hearing, the State expressed in writing its belief that this was unnecessary, explaining as follows: “[O]ne of the Phase 1 Plaintiffs is [ADAP]. As stated in the complaint, the Amended Agreement and elsewhere in the record, ADAP is the duly authorized protection and advocacy agency in the state of Alabama for disabled persons. Given its unique position in this regard, ADOC believes that ADAP will adequately represent and protect the
18

interests of all putative class members....” Notice of Resp. (doc. no. 531) at 1-2. In light of the foregoing, defendants’ argument that ADAP is not the State’s P&A is meritless.
That sideshow behind it, the court turns to application of the first prong of Hunt--whether the association’s members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. In Stincer, the Eleventh Circuit explained that all a representative entity must do under Hunt’s first prong is to show “that one of its members or constituents has suffered an injury that would allow it to bring suit in its own right”; one constituent is enough, and he or she (and any additional constituents) need not be named. 175 F.3d at 884-85; see also id. at 882 (explaining that this is a requirement that the member or constituent have “standing”). Hence, ADAP has plainly satisfied the first Hunt prong with respect to the Eighth Amendment and due-process claims the individual named plaintiffs have standing--as recognized in the court’s separate
19

summary-judgment opinion--to bring, because the
individual named plaintiffs are constituents of ADAP on
whose behalf it has brought precisely the same claims
they have brought on their own behalves.9
Furthermore, even were there no individual named
plaintiffs in the case (either as class representatives
or as individual plaintiffs), ADAP would have standing
to bring these claims. Stincer requires only that a
P&A show that it has one constituent with standing to
9. Defendants argue that ADAP has not satisfied Hunt’s first prong because the named plaintiffs have not exhausted available administrative remedies. A failure to exhaust does not impact standing because standing is jurisdictional, while the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit have explained, is not. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101 (2006) (“[It is] clear that the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional.”); Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) (same). Thus, even if defendants were correct (as discussed in the separate opinion on summary judgment with respect to the individual named plaintiffs, they are not) that the individual named plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, and were therefore barred from bringing their claims by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), this failure to exhaust would have no effect on these plaintiffs’ standing, and would therefore be irrelevant (continued...)
20

bring the claim--not that an individual named plaintiff in the case has standing to bring the claim. (Indeed, there need not be any plaintiff other than the P&A; this is the very crux of associational standing.) Although not required to do so, plaintiffs have in fact identified, through their experts’ reports, a significant number of particular prisoners other than the individual named plaintiffs who are mentally ill--and are therefore constituents of ADAP and who together have been subjected to each of the policies and practices being challenged here. Because this expert evidence demonstrates that at least one mentally ill prisoner has been directly exposed to and affected by each of these policies and practices, it further undergirds the court’s conclusion that ADAP has constituents with standing to bring its claims, and thus that ADAP has satisfied the first prong of Hunt.
to their ability to support ADAP’s associational standing.
21

Further, plaintiffs’ experts’ systemic evidence of

the risk of harm to mentally ill prisoners would alone,

even absent their identification of individual

prisoners, be sufficient to meet Hunt’s first prong;

the Eleventh Circuit has explained that, at least when

seeking relief from a prospective harm, associations

need only show the high likelihood of the existence of

a member who will be harmed by the challenged policy or

practice, but need not identify any particular member

with such standing. See Stincer, 175 F.3d at 884

(“[U]nder Article III’s established doctrines of

representational standing, we have never held that a

party suing as a representative must specifically name

the individual on whose behalf the suit is brought and

we decline to create such a requirement in PAMII.”).

Thus, for example, in Fla. State Conference of

N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1160 (11th Cir.

2008), the court held that two organizations had

associational

standing

to

challenge

a

voter-registration law because, although they could not

22

identify a specific member who would be injured, it was highly likely that one of their members would be. See also id. at 1160 (“When the alleged harm is prospective, we have not required that the organizational plaintiffs name names because every member faces a probability of harm in the near and definite future.”); id. at 1163 (“[P]robabilistic harm is enough injury in fact to confer ... standing in the undemanding Article III sense. ... To satisfy the requirements of associational standing, all that plaintiffs need to establish is that at least one member faces a realistic danger [of being harmed by the challenged policy].” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing Browning as recognizing that associations with a large number of constituents can show associational standing based on the high probability that at least one of them will suffer an injury).
23

Defendants do not dispute that ADAP satisfies the

second Hunt prong--that the interests ADAP seeks to

protect in the lawsuit are germane to its purpose--with

good reason. ADAP has been entrusted by Congress with

the protection of and advocacy for the interests at

issue in this litigation. See Stincer, 175 F.3d at 884

(“The very purpose of [the enabling statutes) was to

confer standing on protection and advocacy systems ...

as representative bodies charged with the authority to

protect and litigate the rights of individuals with

[disabilities].”).

One of ADAP’s priorities is

protecting people with mental illness housed in

institutional settings (including prisons) from abuse

and neglect. In serving this advocacy function, ADAP

can bring claims not only pursuant to its enabling

statutes, but also pursuant to other statutes and

constitutional provisions. See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy

Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.

Supp. 2d 872, 874 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (Hamilton, J.)

(Eighth Amendment, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims);

24

Stincer, 175 F.3d at 880 (ADA); N.J. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Davy, 2005 WL 2416962, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2005) (Chesler, J.) (due process); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003) (due process); Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220-21 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (McAvoy, J.) (Fourth Amendment, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act); Unzueta v. Schalansky, 2002 WL 1334854, at *3 (D. Kan. May 23, 2002) (Rogers, J.) (due process); Risinger v. Concannon, 117 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D. Me. 2000) (Carter, J.) (unspecified civil rights claims brought pursuant to § 1983); Brown, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (First Amendment and equal protection); Rubenstein, 790 F. Supp. at 398 (due process and equal protection); Goldstein v. Coughlin, 83 F.R.D. 613, 614 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (Curtin, J.) (Rehabilitation Act and unspecified constitutional claims).
As for Hunt’s prudential third prong--that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit--the Eleventh Circuit appears to have
25

recognized in Stincer, and other courts have since squarely held, that Congress, by granting P&As the authority to pursue legal remedies to ensure the protection of those with disabilities, abrogated this requirement.10 In Oregon Advocacy Center, 322 F.3d at 1110-12, the court discussed at some length, and endorsed, the reasoning of Stincer. Then, it concluded that Congress had, by passing statutes that “explicitly authorize[] [P&As] to bring suit on behalf of their constituents,” abrogated Hunt’s third, prudential prong. Id. at 1113 (reasoning based on United Food, 517 U.S. at 548-49, in which the Supreme Court held that Congress, “by specifically authorizing the union to sue for its members’ damages,” had “without doubt” abrogated the third prong of Hunt). Numerous other
10. In Stincer, the court explained that the third prong could be abrogated by Congress, and, in not addressing it further, suggested that the plaintiff P&A would not need to meet it. 175 F.3d at 882-83. However, because the court remanded the case after finding that the record did not yet establish that the P&A had met Hunt’s first prong, Stincer did not (continued...)
26

district courts have reached the same conclusion. See

Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n, 642 F. Supp. 2d at

878; Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 307

(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Cogan, J.); N.J. Prot. & Advocacy,

Inc., 2005 WL 2416962, at *2; Univ. Legal Servs., Inc.,

2005 WL 3275915, at *4; Unzueta, 2002 WL 1334854, at

*3; Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houston, 136 F. Supp.

2d 353, 364-65 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (Antwerpen, J.);

Risinger, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 68-70.

This is not to say that the claims ADAP has brought

could not satisfy Hunt’s third prong--that they do not

required the participation of individual constituents

in the litigation.

Indeed, ADAP’s claims would

generally pass that test, for much the same reason that

they present common questions suitable for class-wide

resolution. Because ADAP seeks uniform injunctive

relief throughout the prison system rather than

individualized relief, and because its most critical

explicitly and conclusively hold that the third prong does not apply to P&As.
27

evidence consists of expert testimony, deposition

testimony of mental-health providers and ADOC

employees, and documentary evidence such as medical

records and audits, the participation of any particular

prisoner in the litigation is unnecessary. See Univ.

Legal Servs., 2005 WL 3275915, at *5 (“[R]ather than

seeking individualized relief, ULS seeks injunctive

remedies that would bring institution-wide relief for

its constituents. ULS could meet its burden by

presenting evidence of its claims of institutional

neglect and other problems through the use of medical

records, audits, depositions of Defendants, expert and

fact witness testimony, and other relevant documents

and written discovery.

The mere need to show

individualized harm to the patients is not enough to

offend Hunt’s third prong without a clear need for

their direct participation in the litigation itself.”).

The fact that the assessments and treatments ADAP

contends will be improved by the systemic reforms they

seek will necessarily be individualized does not mean

28

that the participation of individual constituents would be required. In Joseph S., a case litigated in the Eastern District of New York, an advocacy organization and two individual named plaintiffs brought ADA claims on behalf of mentally ill persons in highly restrictive nursing homes. “Although the injunctive relief that plaintiffs [sought] would, if granted, require individualized evaluations of whether persons with mental illness could appropriately receive care and treatment in a setting more integrated than a nursing home,” the court found that Hunt’s third requirement would be met because “these individualized assessments would be completed by defendants, not the court,” such that the participation of individual members in the litigation would not be required. 561 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09 (relying on Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986)); see also id. at 308 (explaining that “the fact that participation by some individuals may be required--for example, to demonstrate the general
29

manner in which defendants fail to ensure that individuals discharged from psychiatric wards or hospitals are properly screened before they are placed in nursing homes--is not fatal to associational standing”).
IV. Exhaustion Defendants raised for the first time at oral argument the contention that ADAP itself failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. Because exhaustion does not go to standing, the court will not resolve this issue on summary judgment. Instead, the court will briefly explain why the current record strongly suggests that ADAP has adequately exhausted.11
11. Defendants’ argument that ADAP would lack associational standing if the individual named plaintiffs had failed to exhaust has been dispatched with above. See supra n.9.
30

PAIMI explicitly addresses the issue of exhaustion
by P&As prior to the initiation of legal action in 42
U.S.C. § 10807, which provides:
“(a) Prior to instituting any legal action in a Federal or State court on behalf of an individual with mental illness, an eligible system ... shall exhaust in a timely manner all administrative remedies where appropriate. If, in pursuing administrative remedies, the system ... determines that any matter with respect to such individual will not be resolved within a reasonable time, the system ... may pursue alternative remedies, including the initiation of a legal action.
“(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to any legal action instituted to prevent or eliminate imminent serious harm to an individual with mental illness.”
There is very little case law interpreting this
provision, but what does exist makes clear that
§ 10807’s requirement is not a strict one. In Gonzalez
v. Martinez, 756 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(Nesbitt, J.), a court in this circuit discussed at
some length the meaning of the phrase “where
appropriate.” Recognizing that the plain language was
not illuminating, the court turned to the legislative
history of the provision:
31

“It is the belief of the Committee that

conciliation, negotiation, mediation and other

administrative procedures can work effectively

in providing protection and advocacy of the

mentally ill, especially because litigation in

most instances is costly and time consuming.

The Committee recognizes the experience of the

[P&A] System in implementing such negotiation

and mediation on behalf of persons with

disabilities, as well as the system’s use of

other administrative remedies in lieu of

litigation. The Committee further notes that

only 5 percent of [P&A] cases in 1984 have

resulted in court action.

The Committee

intends that the [P&A] System in its new role

as the eligible protection and advocacy system

for mentally ill persons under this Act should

continue the non-litigative approach to

advocacy and dispute resolution and urges the

continued use of administrative and alternative

remedies prior to the initiation of a legal

action.

“It is not the intention of the Committee that the administrative remedies must be pursued for an unreasonable duration, but rather that whenever possible there should be timely and reasonable attempts made to mediate and negotiate appropriate administrative remedies. If the pursuit of administrative remedies has not solved any matter within a reasonable time, the eligible system may pursue alternative remedies, including the initiation of a legal action.”

Id. at 1537-38 (quoting S. Rep. No. 109, 99th Cong., 2d

Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1361, 1371); see

also id. at 1538 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 99th

32

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1377, 1382-83 (“The conferees recognize ... that exhaustion of administrative remedies may delay action on behalf of mentally ill individuals and have authorized the system to proceed with legal action when unreasonable delays exist. If legal action is initiated, courts retain their prerogative to determine that the issues are not ripe and to remand the matter for further administrative consideration.”)).
The Gonzalez court then went on to reject the argument by defendants that § 10807 requires exhaustion of all administrative remedies, not only those that would “prove adequate under the traditional judicially-created exhaustion doctrine,” and the court noted that the discussion of the court’s “prerogative” in the House Report supports the conclusion that courts retain “substantial discretion” in determining whether a P&A has adequately exhausted. Id. at 1539; see also Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 2010 WL 3906259, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2010) (Hood, J.)
33

(agreeing). The court concluded, moreover, that the state statutory remedies defendants argued the P&A should have exhausted--such as filing individual grievances--were not “adequate to provide relief for the type of egregious, systemic abuse that [the P&A] alleges.” Gonzalez, 756 F. Supp. at 1538 (applying the exhaustion doctrine set out in Patsy v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Another court has characterized § 10807 as “impos[ing] a limited obligation on a [P&A] to make some efforts to pursue administrative remedies before filing suit.” Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Flint Cmty. Sch., 146 F. Supp. 3d 897, 905 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (Lawson, J.); see also id. at 906 (“The defendants were unable or unwilling, on repeated occasions, to complete any satisfactory response to the plaintiff’s ... requests in a timely manner, and they therefore forfeited any right they had to handle the resulting ... disputes with the plaintiff exclusively through administrative channels.”); Prot. & Advocacy
34

for Persons with Disabilities v. Armstrong, 266 F. Supp. 2d 303, 313 (D. Conn. 2003) (Squatrito, J.) (concluding that the P&A had satisfied the exhaustion requirement by “attempt[ing] to request” the relief sought in the litigation, which the defendant “declined to provide”); Advocacy Ctr. v. Stalder, 128 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365 (M.D. La. 1999) (Parker, J.) (same).
Therefore, it appears that the pretrial efforts of ADAP to bring its claims to the attention of defendants and seek to resolve them without litigation were sufficient to satisfy § 10807.
On April 9, 2014, a couple of months before this lawsuit was filed, ADAP and the SPLC sent the ADOC Commissioner a letter reporting the results of a lengthy investigation they had conducted.12 As noted in the letter, this investigation included interviews with dozens of prisoners, facility inspections throughout

12. The Commissioner at the time was Kim Thomas,

not Jefferson Dunn.

Because this is an

official-capacity suit, they are treated as one and the

same.

35

ADOC’s major institutions, and reviews of thousands of pages of medical records, policies, contracts, reports, and other documents. The authors of the letter asserted that Alabama’s prisoners were not being provided constitutionally adequate mental-health care because of a shortage of mental-health professionals and a regular failure to adequately diagnose and treat mentally ill prisoners.
The letter pointed to evidence regarding understaffing, including the following: There were just 6.2 psychiatrists for the entire prison system, which left 11,000 prisoners--including 1,166 on the mental-health caseload--in a facility with no psychiatric staffing at all. It also noted that only 3.5 psychologists were employed in the prison system--roughly half the ratio that existed in the 1970s, when the level of mental-health staffing was found to be unconstitutionally inadequate. The letter also cited to the fact that the overall level of mental-health staffing present in ADOC facilities was
36

significantly lower than the minimum level set by ADOC in its request for proposals.
The letter also asserted that ADOC was under-identifying prisoners with mental illness, especially those with severe mental illnesses. This conclusion, the letter made clear, was based on a comparison of ADOC statistics to those found in a 2006 Department of Justice study; ADAP and SPLC also identified 853 prisoners who, in light of ADOC’s own documentation of their mental illness, should have been classified as in need of more intensive mental-health treatment. They further reported their findings that only 9 % of prisoners received psychotropic medication, that many of those prisoners had almost no interaction with the prescribing professionals, that prisoners were taken off their medications and the mental-health caseload despite still needing treatment and despite continued self-injury and suicide attempts, that prisoners entering custody faced long delays in receiving medication, that less effective medications
37

were prescribed to save money, and that a shortage of custodial staff caused medication delivery to be delayed, skipped, and performed incorrectly.
The letter also explained that, according to an ADOC report, more than 30 prisoners whom mental-health staff had diagnosed as having a serious mental illness were housed in the general population in facilities with few mental-health staff (including 7 in a facility with no psychiatric staffing at all); that 270 prisoners, who were housed in residential treatment units due to their serious mental illnesses, received only cursory psychotherapy; and that prisoners who were acutely psychotic and a danger to themselves received little treatment besides being placed in a suicide cell where, once a day, a mental-health provider would stop by for less than five minutes. The letter also addressed ADOC’s practice of providing razor blades to suicidal prisoners, including those housed in the residential treatment units and those with a documented history of suicide attempts.
38

Finally, the letter described ADOC’s failure to provide due process when involuntarily medicating prisoners with mental illness. The authors discussed 30 prisoners suffering from mild impairment in mental functioning who they contended were unjustifiably subject to involuntary-medication orders.
As James Tucker, ADAP’s Executive Director, testified, “The demand letter conveyed an identification of the issues that needed to be remedied.” Tucker Depo. (doc. no. 754-1) at 175. The letter explained that while its authors were “ready to fully litigate this matter in federal court,” they “believe[d] that it would in the best interests of all parties at this time to resolve these violations through a stipulated injunction,” and requested that defendant “let [them] know whether [they were] willing to enter into discussion regarding how to resolve the issues presented below.” Letter (doc. no. 754-11) at 2. Because, as Tucker put it, there was not “a meeting of the minds about how both sides might work together
39

to achieve a resolution,” plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. Tucker Depo. (doc. no. 754-1) at 175.13

The current record reflects that ADAP attempted to

resolve the issues identified in the letter informally, but that it “determine[d]”14 that they would “not be

resolved within a reasonable time.”

42 U.S.C.

§ 10807(a).

Moreover, in light of the fact that this lawsuit

was initiated to challenge a system of inadequate

mental-health care that plaintiffs contend, and have

13. Although ADAP and plaintiffs’ counsel did have a meeting with the Commissioner in late May 2014, before the suit was filed, and defendants assert in their answer that plaintiffs’ counsel did not “express[] any concerns over the ‘urgency’ of the issues discussed, and, in fact, refused to provide any meaningful information in order to address concerns raised because of their commitment to instituting this action,” there is no evidence in the current record in support of this contention. Defs’ Answer (doc. no. 834) at 34-35. Indeed, their position appears to be belied by the detailed nature of the 26-page letter, which concludes by expressing the view that “the concerns in this letter are serious issues and should be resolved in the most expeditious and effective way.” Letter (doc. no. 754-11) at 27.
40

offered evidence to show, causes serious harm to mentally ill prisoners on a daily basis--as one example, they challenge inadequacies in crisis care including access by suicidal prisoners to razor blades--the court further note that the record strongly suggests that ADAP was exempt from the exhaustion requirement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10807(b), which allows the immediate filing, without any attempt at exhaustion, of “any legal action instituted to prevent or eliminate imminent serious harm to a mentally ill individual.”
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, on the other hand, does not apply to P&As. As the Eleventh Circuit as explained, the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e reveals the scope of its applicability: it requires exhaustion by “a prisoner.” “Prisoner” is defined in 42 U.S.C. 1997e(h) to mean “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted
14. The plain text of the provision merely requires that the P&A make such a “determin[ation],” not that it (continued...)
41

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.” Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 795 (11th Cir. 2003). As this court has previously explained in another case brought by ADAP, “[t]he provisions respecting prisoner suits ... do not apply because ADAP is clearly not a ‘prisoner’ under the statute. ... ADAP is not a ‘person’ and has neither been incarcerated nor detained.” Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
This accords with the sensible conclusions reached by a number of other courts that the estates and guardians of prisoners are not “prisoners” and are therefore not subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Tretter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F. App’x 155, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2014) (administrator of prisoner’s estate); Anderson v. Cty. of Salem, 2010 WL 3081070, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2010) (Bumb, J.) (administrator of prisoner’s estate); Torres-Rios v.
be an objectively reasonable one.
42

Pereira-Castillo, 545 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206 (D.P.R.
2007) (Besosa, J.) (administrator of prisoner’s
estate); Netters v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 2005 WL
2113587, at *3 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2005) (Mays,
J.) (guardians of prisoner’s minor next-of-kin);
Rivera-Rodriguez v. Pereira-Castillo, 2005 WL 290160,
at *6 (D.P.R. Jan. 31, 2005) (Delgado-Colon, M.J.)
(guardians of minor prisoner).15
A couple of additional points bear mention. First,
as a practical matter, there is no evidence in the
current record to suggest that ADAP would be able to
submit a grievance to MHM on behalf of a prisoner; in
15. The Supreme Court held in Jones v. Bock that the PLRA’s requirement of exhaustion does not create a total exhaustion rule, wherein the failure of a prisoner to exhaust one claim would bar him from bringing other, exhausted claims. 549 U.S. 199, 220-21 (2007). Courts have concluded, by analogy to Jones, that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not applicable to the claims of non-prisoners brought alongside those of prisoners. See Apanovich v. Taft, 2006 WL 2077040, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006) (King, M.J.); Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the failure of prisoner plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies did (continued...)
43

that very concrete sense, it is not “available” to ADAP. Second, it would conflict with ADAP’s statutory purpose and the associational standing doctrine just discussed to allow ADAP to bring claims only on behalf of prisoners who had themselves exhausted an administrative grievance process (assuming one were available to exhaust). This is because P&As have an essential role in advocating on behalf of prisoners with disabilities, whether mental or physical, that render it difficult or impossible for them to advocate for themselves. Although the court has not found and need not find that the individual named plaintiffs in this case would necessarily be incapable of filing grievances, common sense dictates that some severely mentally ill prisoners will be unable to do so. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s associational standing case law recognizes that an association seeking prospective injunctive relief need not necessarily
not “dispose of” the claims of the non-prisoner plaintiffs).
44

identify any particular constituent to show that one has standing. If the P&A need not identify any particular prisoner by name, it certainly cannot be expected to exhaust a particular prisoner’s administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
V. Conclusion Finally, the court pauses to note that litigation of the claims in this case by ADAP is not merely an alternative, but in significant ways preferable, to litigation solely by the individual named plaintiffs. Review of the individual named plaintiffs’ depositions and other record evidence reveals that, although many of them are quite lucid, some clearly experience difficulties with communication, whether due to intellectual disabilities, symptoms of mental illness, or a combination. In passing PAIMI, and in authorizing P&As to engage in legal advocacy on behalf of mentally ill constituents, Congress recognized that these constituents’ impairments will often make it difficult
45

for them to recognize, understand, articulate, and

advocate for their own rights. See Stincer, 175 F.3d

at 884 (“The very purpose of PAMII was to confer

standing on protection and advocacy systems ... as

representative bodies charged with the authority to

protect and litigate the rights of individuals with

mental illness.”); see also S. Rep. No. 100-454, 100th

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3217,

3227 (discussing the PAIMI Amendments Act of 1988)

(“Informing a mentally ill individual of his or her

rights is a critical function of a protection and

advocacy system.

It is also the Committee’s

expectation that the system will communicate this

information to and respond to questions by mentally ill

individuals in an appropriate, meaningful, and

effective manner, taking into consideration the nature

and severity of the particular individual’s

disability.”).

46

*** An appropriate summary judgment in favor of ADAP with respect to its associational standing to bring the Phase 2A claims in this case will be entered, and ADAP’s Phase 2A claims will proceed to trial DONE, this the 25th day of November, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION

The plaintiffs in this putative class-action

lawsuit are dozens of state prisoners and the Alabama

Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP). The defendants

are officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections

(ADOC): the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner

of Health Services.1 They are sued in their official
capacities only.
In Phase 2A of this case, with which this opinion
is concerned, ADAP and a subset of individual
plaintiffs assert the following mental-health claims:
constitutionally inadequate mental-health treatment in
Alabama prison facilities and involuntary medication
without due process. They rely on the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive
relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
1. ADOC itself is also a party, but with respect to only claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, which are nearly settled and therefore not discussed in this opinion. See Joint Status Report (doc. no. 968) at 968 (“Plaintiffs and Defendants ADOC have agreed in substance to a settlement that resolves the Phase 2A ADA issues. These parties continue to work to resolve the Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys and monitoring fees for these issues.”). To the extent that the parties are not successful in reaching a final resolution of these claims, they have reserved them for later adjudication. See Phase 2 Order on Remaining ADA Claims (doc. no. 981).
2

(federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights).2 The case
is proceeding on two parallel tracks consisting of
ADAP’s claims and the individual plaintiffs’ claims.
In September 2016, more than two years after this
case was filed and after extensive discovery,
defendants moved for summary judgment on the individual
plaintiffs’ Phase 2 claims.3 This motion is now before
2. This case has twice been bifurcated for the administrative convenience of the court and the parties. The claims in Phase 1, which the parties settled with a consent decree approved by the court, involved ADA claims alleging discrimination on the basis of and non-accommodation of physical disabilities. See Dunn v. Dunn, -- F.R.D. --, 2016 WL 4718216 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2016) (Thompson, J.). The claims in Phase 2B, which are set to go to trial after the Phase 2A claims (should they survive summary judgment), involve Eighth Amendment claims related to medical and dental care.
3. In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, they specify that they are requesting “judgment as a matter of law as to the claims of Named Plaintiffs.” Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 768) at 2. In a footnote, defendants expressly define the phrase “Named Plaintiffs” by listing every individual prisoner plaintiff, but not ADAP. Id. at 2 n.2.
3

the court. The court will, at this time, decide the motion only as to the Phase 2A claims.4
As defendants requested summary judgment with regard to only individual plaintiffs, this opinion addresses only the claims by those individual prisoners, and hereinafter ‘plaintiffs’ refers to only individual plaintiffs, excluding ADAP. The defendants' summary-judgment motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

4. Both parties consented to the schedule of

motions deadlines in this case, and to the simultaneous

disposition of the motions for summary judgment and

class certification.

In light of the need for

extensive evidentiary development prior to considering

class certification, this approach was both appropriate

and necessary. See Rubenstein, Newberg on Class

Actions § 7:10 (5th ed.) (explaining that “Wal-Mart

[Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011),]

authorized courts to look at the merits of a case in

deciding the certification motion; that look at the

merits may be aided by discovery, hence forestalling

the certification decision to a point not dissimilar

from the summary judgment point of a lawsuit”; and that

“the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules, in 2003,

changed the language of the timing rule [for decisions

on class certification] from “as soon as practicable”

to “at an early practicable time”; and that the

(continued...)

4

I. Background ADOC confines about 23,500 prisoners in 28 prison facilities, including 15 major facilities, which are close custody or medium custody, and 13 work release centers, which are minimum custody. Of the major correctional facilities, Tutwiler is the only one that houses female prisoners. At three of the major correctional facilities--Bullock, Donaldson, and Tutwiler--there are Residential Treatment Units (“RTUs”), which house mentally ill prisoners who need more direct monitoring and intensive treatment than is available in general population. Bullock and Tutwiler also have Intensive Stabilization Units (“SUs”), which house mentally ill prisoners in need of direct monitoring and stabilization after crises. Based on an intake screening, which takes place at Kilby for men and Tutwiler for women, prisoners receive
“Committee supported this change, in part, on the need (continued...)
5

a mental-health code ranging from MH-0, which indicates that a prisoner does not need any mental-health care, to MH-6, which indicates that a prisoner cannot be treated in ADOC custody and requires referral for inpatient treatment in a state hospital. Codes of MH-1 to MH-2 are for prisoners who ADOC believes can be housed in general population, while the higher codes (MH-3 to MH-5) indicate that a prisoner should be housed in an RTU or SU. Prisoners can also be added to the mental-health caseload during a post-intake classification review, based on a referral by staff, or by self-referral. At different points in early 2016, the mental-health caseload included between 2,700 and 3,400 prisoners.
ADOC has contracted with MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (MHM) to provide mental-health services--including medication, individual counseling, and group therapy-to mentally ill prisoners. MHM’s current contract with
for discovery prior to certification”). 6

ADOC went into effect on October 1, 2013. MHM’s

program in Alabama is led by Dr. Robert Hunter, who has

been the Medical Director and Chief Psychiatrist since

2003, and Teresa Houser, who is the Program Manager (an

administrative position) and has been working for MHM

since 2008. MHM employs a range of mental-health

providers,

including

psychiatrists,

certified

registered nurse practitioners (CRNPs), psychologists,

‘mental health professionals’ (MHPs), registered nurses

(RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), activity technicians (ATs), and clerical support staff.5

Although MHM provides virtually all of the

mental-health treatment for prisoners, ADOC also

employs two psychologists who assist with the intake

process, ‘psychological associates’ who do some

screening and may provide some therapeutic care to

5. The numbers and qualifications of, and the relationships among, these various categories of practitioners will be discussed at some length later in this opinion.
7

prisoners with very low-level mental illness,6 and a

chief psychologist who is responsible for oversight of

mental-health staff.

Commissioner Jefferson Dunn, who took office in

April 2015, leads the ADOC. Associate Commissioner for

Health Services Ruth Naglich, who has served in this

role since 2004, has a nursing license and 20 years of

experience in correctional medicine.

She is

responsible for managing and overseeing ADOC’s medical

and mental-health services, including those services

delivered by MHM.

II. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

6. These psychological associates are not psychiatrists or psychologists. There is conflicting record evidence regarding the role that they play-specifically, as to whether they provide treatment to (continued...)
8

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” With respect to issues where “the non-moving party bears the burden of proof ... at trial [such as, here, the merits of plaintiffs’ claims], the moving party, in order to prevail, must do one of two things: show that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support its case, or present affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.” Hammer v. Slater, 20 F. 3d 1137, 1141 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
On issues as to which the movant has the burden of proof at trial (such as, here, exhaustion of administrative remedies), the movant “must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
any prisoners who are actually on the mental-health (continued...)
9

of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 530 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Once the party seeking summary judgment has met its

initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party to demonstrate why summary judgment would be

inappropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 331 (1986).

The nonmoving party must

affirmatively set forth specific facts showing a

genuine issue for trial, and may not rest upon mere

allegations or denials in pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1).

The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is

not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of

the matter, but rather to determine only whether a

genuine issue exists for trial. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In

making this determination, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

caseload, or only to prisoners who are not. 10

party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Commc’ns Corp., 590 F.2d 100, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1979) (“If a frog be found in the party punch bowl, the presence of a mischievous guest but not the occurrence of spontaneous generation may reasonably be inferred.”). The court is not to weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations at summary judgment. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996).
III. Procedural Arguments A. Mootness
Defendants contend that the mental-health care claims of six of the named plaintiffs--Businelle, Carter, Dillard, Dunn, Moncrief, and Terrell--are due to be dismissed as moot, based on “‘[t]he general rule ... that a prisoner’s transfer or release from a jail moots his individual [and pre-certification class]
11

claim for declaratory and injunctive relief’” regarding conditions of confinement.7 Dunn v. Dunn, 148 F. Supp.
3d 1329, 1337 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (Thompson, J.) (quoting
McKinnon v. Talladega Cty., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th
Cir. 1984)). Plaintiffs argue that none of these
plaintiffs’ pre-certification class claims are moot
because: (1) all of them but Terrell have been
conditionally released and are subject to the terms of
probation or parole, (2) Dunn has been arrested and
charged with another crime, making it likely that he
will be incarcerated again either if he is convicted of
that crime or if his parole is revoked, (3) Businelle
is subject to the “picking-off” exception to mootness
for pre-certification class claims; and (4) Dillard's,
Moncrief's, and Terrell’s claims fall within the
7. Although defendants also contend that some of the named plaintiffs’ claims regarding medical care have been mooted by the provision--subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit--of care they requested, defendants have not raised such an argument with respect to any mental-health claims. As a result, the court need not address this contention here. (continued...)
12

“inherently transitory” exception to mootness for pre-certification class claims. All of these arguments fail; therefore, the court will dismiss these named plaintiffs.8
The court easily rejects the first of these arguments. Plaintiffs cite no case law for the proposition that a prisoner released on probation or parole remains, as they contend, in the custody of the Department of Corrections; he certainly does not remain in its custody for purposes relevant here, since he is free to receive free-world mental-health care and cannot receive mental-health care provided by the Department. Although plaintiffs note generally that there are high rates of recidivism among state prisoners and that three individuals have previously been re-incarcerated, they have not attempted to
8. Plaintiffs remain free, of course, to call these individuals as witnesses and to offer evidence about their care in proving their case at trial. They will not, however, remain parties to the case.
13

explain the relevance of this information to any exception to mootness, instead suggesting that they remain free to proceed on claims to the same extent as if they were still imprisoned.
Plaintiffs also contend that Dunn’s claims are not moot because they fall within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness for individual claims. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). Based on Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317-23 (1988), they argue that there is a “reasonable expectation” that Dunn will again be subject to the challenged conduct. He has been arrested and charged with a felony, and they contend that he is likely either to be convicted of this offense or to have his parole revoked. In either event, plaintiffs argue, he will be returned to the custody of defendants and again subject to their mental-health care system. Plaintiffs have not submitted any record evidence to support these claims. But even if they had submitted evidence to this effect, plaintiffs’ reliance on the “reasonable
14

expectation” standard elaborated upon in Honig would be

misplaced. A party seeking to employ the exception for

claims that are “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” must show “two elements combined: (1) the

challenged action was, in its duration, too short to be

fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,

and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party would be subject to the same

action again.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482

(1982) (emphasis added).

Honig addresses, and

plaintiffs have addressed, only the latter of these two

elements; Dunn has not shown that the duration of a

future term in prison would be “so short as to evade

review.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998).

Plaintiffs next argue that Businelle’s claims are

subject to the “picking-off” exception because he was

denied parole in May but granted it in September, just

as class-certification briefing was in progress. See

Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1050

(5th Cir. 1981) (finding that the relation-back

15

doctrine applies to defeat mootness with respect to
class claims “when the defendants have the ability by
tender to each named plaintiff effectively to prevent
any plaintiff in the class from procuring a decision on
class certification”); see also Stein v. Buccaneers
Ltd. P’ship, 772 F.3d 698, 706-07 (11th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing this as the law of the Eleventh Circuit).
Although this quick reconsideration is perhaps somewhat
suspicious, plaintiffs have not offered any evidence to
show that defendants or their employees were in any way
responsible for or involved in the decision by the
independent parole board to grant him release. Without
any such evidence, the court cannot conclude that the exception applies.9
9. Although there is some support in the case law for application of this exception even when there is no evidence that the defendant actually did act with the intent of picking-off the plaintiffs at issue, see White v. Matthews, 559 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1977), when the defendant could easily have acted in this fashion to prevent certification, plaintiffs have cited no case law suggesting either that the exception applies to acts other than those “specific[ally] ... (continued...)
16

Finally, plaintiffs’ fourth argument--that the claims of Dillard, Moncrief, and Terrell fall within the exception to mootness for inherently transitory class claims--fares no better. As the court explained in detail in a prior opinion: “A claim is inherently transitory not only if there exists no plaintiff who could both establish standing at the outset of litigation and retain an active stake by the time class certification is decided, but also if it would be difficult to identify which prospective plaintiff that would be at the time of filing. As the Supreme Court explained in Gerstein v. Pugh, a claim should be considered inherently transitory when ‘[i]t is by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, would be in ... custody long enough for a

demanded in the lawsuit.” Zeidman, 651 F.3d at

1050-51.

In other words, while the picking-off

exception would squarely apply to decisions by

defendants to provide health care the named plaintiffs

alleged they had long been denied, it is not clear that

it applies to parole decisions not challenged in the

lawsuit.

17

district judge to certify the class.’ 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (emphasis added). Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have held that, although ‘the ultimate length of confinement does affect the applicability of the ‘inherently transitory’ exception, the essence of the exception is uncertainty about whether a claim will remain alive for any given plaintiff long enough for a district court to certify the class.’” Dunn, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 1340 (quoting Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added), and citing Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 90-92 (2d Cir. 1977); and Thorpe v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (Huvelle, J.)).
Although claims that “derive from potentially imminent release from custody are ‘a classic example of a transitory claim,’” id. (quoting Wade v. Kirkland, 118 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1997)), plaintiffs have endeavored to identify another category of issues that they contend are inherently transitory: those related to the mental-health care provided in ADOC’s RTUs.
18

They note that there were only about 200 male prisoners housed in the RTUs at the time the complaint was filed, and have suggested that the prisoners frequently move into and out of the RTUs.
But the question here is not whether incarcerated plaintiffs who are not currently housed in the RTUs but have been in the past and may be again in the future can challenge the level of treatment provided in those units. Instead, the question is whether plaintiffs who have been released from custody altogether can challenge certain conditions they experience in prison. Defendants point out that there are a number of easily identifiable prisoners who are virtually certain to remain in custody for years (because they are serving extremely long sentences, including in some instances life without the possibility of parole) and who have experienced or are likely to experience, and can therefore properly challenge, the conditions in the RTUs going forward. Indeed, some of these prisoners remain as named plaintiffs in this case.
19

Plaintiffs also contend that Dillard and Terrell

also represent a small number of prisoners who are both

mentally ill and intellectually disabled.

But

plaintiffs fail to explain why the claims of such

prisoners are inherently transitory; the fact that

there are relatively few of them (how many, plaintiffs

do not say) is not enough. Although the court can

imagine ways in which the provision of mental-health

care to prisoners with intellectual disabilities is

shaped by those disabilities, it is not aware that

plaintiffs have made any allegations in their complaint of systemic problems specific to this circumstance.10

Dillard's, Moncrief's, and Terrell’s claims are

therefore not inherently transitory.

10. The due-process claims raised by Dillard and Terrell do appear potentially to relate to their intellectual disabilities, to the extent that these disabilities may impact their ability to give informed consent to medication. Because the court will not be certifying this portion of plaintiffs’ due-process claim for class-wide adjudication, it does not matter whether or not the due-process class claims these two named plaintiffs brought are moot.
20

B. Exhaustion Defendants contend that many of the named plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and that their claims are therefore barred. They rely for evidence on the admissions of seven named plaintiffs (Businelle, Carter, Jackson, McCoy, Moncrief, Wallace, and Williams) in their depositions that they did not file a mental-health grievance within the last five years; the declaration of an MHM employee
that a review of MHM files revealed another five named plaintiffs (Bui, Dillard, Hardy, Johnson, and Pruitt) who did not file a mental-health grievance between January 1, 2012, and July 1, 2014; and plaintiffs’ admission that another (Hartley) never filed a grievance with respect to his claims in this case.11
11. These plaintiffs did not concede that there was a grievance process available to them with respect to these claims. Moreover, “[w]hether an administrative remedy was available to a prisoner in a particular prison or prison system, and whether such remedy was applicable to the grievance underlying the prisoner’s (continued...)
21

Defendants do not contend that one of the remaining Phase 2A plaintiffs (Braggs) failed to exhaust.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) imposes the following exhaustion requirement: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has squarely held that exhaustion is an affirmative defense, on which defendants bear the burden of proof. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216-17 (2007). And, as the Supreme Court recently reiterated, proper exhaustion is a mandatory predicate to suit, with one exception: administrative remedies must be “available,” meaning that “an inmate
suit, are not questions of fact. They either are, or inevitably contain, questions of law ... [which] [t]he court cannot properly determine ... on the basis of a party’s concession....” Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1999).
22

is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858-59 (2016) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).
Defendants have not borne their burden of proof with respect to any of the named plaintiffs at issue in Phase 2A for a number of reasons. As a preliminary matter, it is critical to note that ADOC is a highly unusual state prison system, in that it does not operate its own general grievance process for prisoners; therefore, the question is whether a grievance process operated entirely by MHM, which is not a general grievance process and functions without any involvement by correctional officials, was available for exhaustion of the specific claims in this case, which are brought only against correctional officials. See Henderson v. Thomas, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (Thompson, J.) (“[W]ith no generalized grievance system, ADOC inmates have lost ‘a way of attempting to
23

improve prison conditions without having to file a lawsuit.’ In turn, corrections officials ‘lose the substantial benefits that administrative remedies were intended to provide them.’” (quoting Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 2008))).
Of course, the court recognizes that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, unlike the pre-PLRA requirement, does not require that administrative remedies be “effective,” and contains no futility exception. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998). Again, Alabama is an outlier; it is one of the few “state penal institutions [that do] not have an administrative remedy program to address prison conditions, and thus there are no ‘available’ administrative remedies to exhaust” with respect to many conditions-related claims. Id. at 1327. Instead, ADOC’s contractors have provided (or not, in light of the discussion below) grievance processes for discrete issues. Obviously, the provision of a grievance procedure with respect to one issue does not result in
24

a requirement that prisoners exhaust it as to all issues; the court is forced to determine which issues are covered and which are not.12
With respect to plaintiffs’ claims that defendants’ policies of custodial understaffing, and placement of prisoners in prolonged segregation without regard to their mental illness, create a substantial risk of serious harm by impeding access to, and increasing demand for, mental-health care, the grievance process was obviously not available; MHM has nothing to do with custodial staffing and the placement of prisoner in segregation. As this court explained in Henderson, in

12. Defendants cite to this court’s decision in

Edwards v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1242,

1256-57 (M.D. Ala. 2000), for the proposition that

“[r]egardless of their chances of success using the

defendants’ grievance procedures, the PLRA requires the

plaintiffs to exhaust them.”

This statement is

accurate, with one caveat: prisoners need not exhaust

when the chance of success is zero, because the

grievance process at issue does not encompass the

subject of the prisoner’s complaint. (At the time

Edwards was decided, ADOC did offer its own,

all-encompassing grievance process. This no longer

exists.)

25

concluding that the medical-grievance process operated by ADOC’s medical care contractor was not available with respect to “broader disputes about ADOC housing and transfer policy” and could not “be used to complain to prison officials--as opposed to the Correctional Medical Services personnel--about accommodations policy,” “defendants have submitted no evidence that the medical professionals reviewing the medical grievance forms had any authority over nonmedical issues or ADOC policy more generally. Allowing ADOC to characterize the medical grievance process as a generalized system would bait-and-switch the plaintiffs.” 891 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11 (citation omitted).
The same argument can fairly be made with respect to plaintiffs’ contentions that defendants are prospectively violating the Eighth Amendment by providing in their contract with MHM for too little funding and too few qualified practitioners. Even were it true (this issue is taken up later) that MHM made
26

available a grievance process for plaintiffs to challenge discrete instances of inadequate care at the hands of practitioners employed by MHM, there is no evidence to suggest that MHM administrators had any authority unilaterally to increase their own contractual funding or staffing levels (indeed, it is plain that they did not). Booth explains that although the precise form of relief requested by a prisoner need not be available in order for him to be required to exhaust a grievance procedure (for example, when a prisoner demands monetary compensation but this form of redress cannot be provided), a grievance process is not available when “the relevant administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever in response to a complaint.” 532 U.S. at 736. Booth goes on to elaborate that the administrative officers hearing the grievance must have some “authority to act on the subject of the complaint,” and take some responsive action “with respect to the type of allegations ... raise[d].” Id.
27

at 736 n.4 (emphasis added). The officers’ ability to do something is not enough; they must have the ability to do something responsive. Here, MHM plainly has no authority to give any relief at all with respect to the funding and staffing levels set by defendants; if a grievance were filed requesting such action, MHM would surely “disclaim[] the capacity to consider those petitions.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859.13

13. Compare, for example, the process defendants

have put forward to the process at issue in Lopes v.

Beland, 2014 WL 1289455 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2014)

(Casper, J.). In that case, the plaintiff was granted

a single-cell restriction based on a medical condition

that rendered it unsafe for him to be housed with a

cellmate, but then filed suit against both correctional

and medical contractor defendants, contending that this

restriction was sometimes violated.

The state

Department of Corrections maintained a general

grievance process, but carved out claims regarding

“medical ... decisions,” and required grievances

regarding such issues to be filed with the medical

contractor, which maintained its own grievance process.

Id. at *2 (citation and quotation mark omitted). The

court suggested that the failure to exhaust this

process might not have barred suit (even against the

medical contractor itself) if the contractor’s

grievance process had not allowed prisoners a final

appeal to correctional officials, because then the

“prison grievance tribunal would [not] have had any

(continued...)

28

This is vividly illustrated by the fact that,
although MHM initially submitted a proposal in 2013 for
staffing of 144.95 full-time equivalent positions,
based on its own assessment of the level needed to
provided appropriate care to prisoners across the
system, it eventually had to reduce that figure
substantially, to 126.5, because MHM was informed by
defendants that “the department ... wouldn’t be able to
fund that many employees.”14 Houser Depo., P Ex. 14
authority to take some responsive action to [the inmate’s] complaints.” Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
14. The court raised for consideration by the parties the question whether a grievance process is available with respect to claims against correctional defendants when it is operated entirely by a contractor. See Lopes, 2014 WL 1289455, at *6 (denying summary judgment to correctional defendants based on a finding that they had failed to meet their burden to show that the plaintiff had not exhausted correctional administrative remedies, while granting summary judgment to medical-contractor defendants based on a finding that they had met their burden to show that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the contractor’s grievance process). However, the court need not reach this issue, because it finds that defendants have not satisfied their burden to show the existence of an available grievance process.
29

(doc. no. 675-14) at 298.15 Houser, MHM’s Program Manager, testified that she has repeatedly requested additional funding for staffing, but that her requests have been denied due to budgetary constraints.
With regard to both the policies and practices discussed above and the policies and practices over which MHM does have control, the court further concludes that even the grievance process that MHM purports to operate is not available for purposes of the PLRA because it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,” because, although “some mechanism exists to provide relief,” it is “so confusing” that “no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the “procedures need not,” however, “be sufficiently
15. ‘P Ex.’ hereinafter refers to exhibits attached to plaintiffs’ opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment or plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. ‘D Ex.’ refers to exhibits attached to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
30

‘plain’ as to preclude any reasonable mistake or debate with respect to their meaning”).
As an initial matter, plaintiffs point out that the only evidence defendants offered as to the existence of a grievance process for mental health-related claims at the relevant juncture (when the case was filed in 2014) was the declaration of MHM’s Program Manager, Teresa Houser, attaching and referencing a grievance policy approved in July 2016. This policy said nothing about what grievance process did or did not exist two years earlier. See Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“The only facts pertinent to determining whether a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed his original complaint.”). In reply, defendants have submitted a similar document they say--notably, without offering a supplemental declaration from Houser--was in effect since 2009.
Even if this policy were in effect, defendants have still failed to meet their burden to show that an
31

ordinary prisoner could figure out how to use it. As a

preliminary matter, Houser testified that prisoners are

informed of the mental-health grievance process when

they receive “a form entitled Orientation to Mental

Health Services,” which, she says, “describ[es] the

grievance processes and procedures.” Houser Decl., D

Ex. 143 (doc. no. 782-37) at 3. This statement

contorts the meaning of the word ‘describe’ well past

its breaking point. All the form tells prisoners is

this: “If you believe the mental health services

provided to you are inadequate, you may file an inmate

grievance.”

Inmate Orientation to Mental Health

Services, P Ex. 170 (doc. no. 850-70) at 2. It does

not tell prisoners anything about how to file such a

grievance (or how to distinguish it from any other form

of inmate grievance): this ‘description’ does not

reveal what form the grievance should be composed on,

to whom it should be given and by what means, what

information should be included, who will review it and

32

how quickly, and whether there is any process of appeal.
There is no evidence to suggest that MHM’s written grievance policy was made available to prisoners; even if it was, the policy is not substantially more informative. It states that a prisoner “may file a formal grievance by completing the relevant form.”16 MHM Grievance Mechanisms for Health Complaints, D Ex. 182 (doc. no. 877-3), at 2, Dunn(MHM) 00071. Aside from the fact that this opaque boilerplate does not reveal which form is the “relevant” one, there is a further problem in practice: Houser stated in her deposition that the form prisoners are to use is actually the medical grievance form provided by Corizon, which is actually a grievance form produced by (and displaying the name of) Corizon’s predecessor,
16. The court notes that this was changed, in the 2016 policy, to refer instead--but not much more informatively--to “the client-authorized form.” 2016 Grievance Mechanism for Health Complaints, D Ex. 143 (doc. no. 782-37) at 9.
33

Correctional Medical Services. If the requirement that

a prisoner submit a form issued by one contractor, and

used to file grievances with another, to yet a third

contractor, not named on the form, were not enough to

confound even the most intelligent and diligent of

prisoners, there is still more. The form Houser says

should be used includes checkboxes to identify “the

type of grievance you are filing,” but the only two

options are “Medical Grievance” and “Medical Grievance

Appeal.” Grievances of William Sullivan, P Ex. 165

(doc. no. 683-5) at 1, PLF002101.

Apparently,

defendants believe that prisoners should have surmised

that they needed to cross out “Medical” and write

“Mental Health,” or that they should simply have

created a new, third checkbox to indicate the topic of

their grievances.

Moreover, MHM’s current policy states that

“[f]ormal grievances related to mental health services

may not be received directly by mental health staff but

may be sent to the designated institutional

34

department.”

MHM Grievance Mechanism for Health

Complaints, D. Ex 182 (doc. no. 877-3) at 2, Dunn(MHM)

00071. Unfortunately, the policy does not reveal what

the designated institutional department is, or how a

prisoner should “send” his grievance to it. Houser

stated in her deposition--directly contrary to the

written policy she cited--that a prisoner who has

completed a grievance form should “either put it in the

in-house mail or hand it to us when they see us.”

Houser Depo. (doc. no. 996-17) at 22. Defendants have

not offered evidence to show that either of these

avenues for submission is disclosed to prisoners in any

way; indeed, one is forbidden by the very policy

defendants say reveals how the process works. While

the PLRA might not require a grievance process that is

completely clear and easy to follow, it does not

countenance one that is so full of blind alleys and

35

dead ends that even those who run it cannot manage to
accurately and consistently describe how it works.17
If a prisoner were able to determine how to file a
grievance properly, it would be by sheer lucky
guesswork. The fact that the court remains uncertain
as to how a prisoner attempting to file a mental-health
grievance should indicate as much on the form and how
he should submit the form makes clear that this process
17. The court notes that there are even more ways in which MHM’s policy and the statements of Houser leave this court (and certainly an ordinary inmate) largely in the dark as to how its grievance process operates once a grievance is filed. For example, although the policy states that “[u]pon receipt of a grievance related to mental health services, staff forward it to the Program [Manager] or designee,” it is logged, and the Program [Manager] or designee responds in writing, MHM Grievance Mechanism for Health Complaints, D. Ex 182 (doc. no. 877-3) at 2, Dunn(MHM) 00071, Houser--who is the Program Manager--testified that all grievances are actually taken initially to the site administrator, who “determine[s] what--what needs to happen next,” and “make[s] a decision on how to go about handling it at that point.” Houser Depo. P Ex. 181 (doc. no. 850-81) at 45-46. This statement strongly suggests that the procedures outlined in the policy are not consistently followed.
36

is not “available.”18 Indeed, it appears that prisoners
do not understand that a mental-health grievance
process exists; two named plaintiffs, Businelle and
Jackson, testified to this effect.19 Although Houser
contends that the process must be understood because
“inmates ... submit grievances on a regular basis,”
18. Plaintiffs also argue that the court should consider the fact that the prisoners at issue have serious mental illnesses in determining whether the grievance process was so confusing as to be unavailable to them. However, even setting aside the potentially impaired cognitive abilities of the prisoners at issue, the court concludes on the current record that this grievance process is so poorly, confusingly, and inconsistently described that it is not available to any prisoner. Hence, the court need not address this argument at this time.
19. Defendants are correct that a prisoner’s mere assertion that he was unaware of the existence of a grievance procedure does not support a finding of unavailability in the face of system-wide evidence of its availability. Edwards, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. Here, the statements to this effect by two named plaintiffs are powerfully corroborated, rather than rebutted, by system-wide evidence of un-availability. The court also notes the striking disparity between the testimony of the numerous named plaintiffs regarding their awareness of a medical grievance process, and the testimony that they were not aware of a mental-health grievance process.
37

Houser Decl., D Ex. 143 (doc. no. 782-37) at 3, plaintiffs have presented considerable evidence to the contrary. Although MHM’s current policy states that MHM’s quality improvement program reviews grievances, plaintiffs note that not a single filed grievance was referenced in the minutes of MHM’s quality improvement meetings until October 2014 (after this case was filed). More damning still, MHM’s own annual audit in 2014 documented that three major facilities had logged no grievances at all that year, and that “MHM Site Administrators indicated that they rarely receive grievances.”20 MHM 2014 Audit, P Ex. 177 (doc. no. 850-77) at 10, ADOC0140892-9. In 2013, the audit

20. One of these facilities, Bullock, houses many

of the most severely mentally ill prisoners in the

system. As the court is well aware from its own pro se

docket, prisoners are not reluctant to complain about

the care they are receiving.

Whether or not

constitutionally adequate mental-health care is being

provided at Bullock, it frankly beggars belief to

imagine that mentally ill prisoners housed there were

aware of a grievance process but not a single one opted

to use it over the course of the year in which this

case was filed.

38

revealed that “[g]rievance logs were found at most
facilities, many of which included no grievances.” MHM
2013 Audit, P Ex. 178 (doc. no. 850-78) at 14,
ADOC0141610-13. Apart from raising concern as to why
grievance logs were not found at all facilities, these
audit findings further corroborate plaintiffs’
contention that it is the very rare prisoner who is
aware that he is permitted to file a grievance with MHM and can manage to figure out how to do so.21
Three additional points warrant mentioning with
respect to exhaustion of plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment
claims. First, the court notes that even if MHM’s
grievance process were available with respect to some
21. Defendants do cite to an unreported pro se case in which a magistrate judge of this court recommended dismissal of a mental-health claim as unexhausted on the basis of MHM’s grievance process. See Hayes v. Giles, 2010 WL 4975619, at *7-8 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2010) (Capel, M.J.), as adopted, 2011 WL 22634 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2011) (Fuller, J.). But the pro se plaintiff in this case did not dispute the availability of a grievance process or his failure to exhaust it. As explained above, defendants bear an affirmative burden to show availability, and they have not met it.
39

or all of the claims at issue (again, it is not), defendants evidence would be inadequate to establish that plaintiffs have not exhausted it. This is because their evidence shows only that they did not file grievances regarding their mental-health care over spans of a few years. As discussed below, with respect to the statute of limitations arguments raised by defendants, plaintiffs claim continuing violations arising from policies or practices they say (and have offered evidence to show) have existed for some years. “In order to exhaust their remedies, prisoners need not file multiple, successive grievances raising the same issue (such as prison conditions or policies) if the objectionable condition is continuing.” Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing, among other cases, Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs. Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 2010) (a prisoner is “not required to initiate another round of the administrative grievance process on the exact same issue each time” a deprivation occurs), and Johnson v.
40

Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 521 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[P]risoners need not continue to file grievances about the same issue.”)). In order to bear their burden to show that plaintiffs had not exhausted, they would need to show that they had never filed grievances about the issues in this lawsuit. This they have not done.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “a class of prisoner-plaintiffs certified under Rule 23(b)(2) satisfies the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement through ‘vicarious exhaustion,’ i.e., when one or more class members ha[s] exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to each claim raised by the class.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, because the court has, in conjunction with its denial of summary judgment, certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class, and because defendants do not raise the affirmative defense of exhaustion with respect to the mental-health
41

claims brought one of the remaining named plaintiffs (Braggs), vicarious exhaustion might well apply to some or all of plaintiffs’ claims.
Third and finally, the court notes that, while ADOC has no general grievance process, there does exist a formal process for appealing an involuntary-medication order. Defendants did not argue in their motion for summary judgment that the plaintiffs who raise due-process claims regarding involuntary medication have failed to exhaust this process. In any event, the one plaintiff who is actually subject to an involuntary-medication order, Bui, has filed an appeal of this order, so he appears to have exhausted this administrative remedy, assuming it is available. This appeals process is plainly not applicable to the remaining plaintiffs bringing due-process claims, who contend that the consent they gave was not voluntary, because they have not been afforded hearings or received orders and therefore have nothing to appeal.
42

C. Statute of Limitations

Defendants contend that summary judgment is due to

be granted with respect to plaintiffs Hardy and McCoy,

because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations.22 The statute of limitations for a § 1983

claim is determined by reference to state law; the

court looks to the limitations period for personal

injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 5498 U.S. 384, 387

(2007). In Alabama, it is two years. However, it is

federal law that determines when the cause of action

accrues--that is, when the clock begins to run. Id. at

388.

“Generally, accrual occurs when the prisoner knows

or should know that he has suffered the injury that

forms the basis of his complaint and can identify the

person who inflicted the injury. Chappell v. Rich, 340

F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003).

However, an

22. Defendants also raise this argument with respect to Dillard. Because his claims are moot, the court need not address him further here.
43

‘allegation of a failure to provide needed and requested medical attention constitutes a continuing tort, which does not accrue until the date medical attention is provided.’ Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1980). The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis is whether the prisoner complains ‘of the present consequence of a one[-]time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation into the present, which does.’ Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).” Baker v. Sanford, 484 F. App'x 291, 293 (11th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs have alleged just such a continuing violation; they seek prospective injunctive relief to remedy a substantial risk of serious harm that they contend has existed for some time and continues to exist. Given that the risk itself is the injury plaintiffs allege, the two challenged by defendants on this point need not actually demonstrate that this risk
44

has resulted in harm to them within the past two years. See Robinson v. United States, 327 F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that “continuing to expose [the plaintiff] to the source of his [infection] ... was a continuing violation,” presumably because it created a risk of reinfection). A prisoner can bring a claim that correctional administrators have acted in a way that creates a substantial risk of future harm even though that harm has never yet occurred; it would be nonsensical, then, to conclude that once some harm has occurred, a prisoner must bring a claim within a certain period of time, even though the conduct of the defendants that is creating the risk continues unabated. Plaintiffs in this case must, of course, show more than that the conduct of defendants creating the risk of harm occurred at the time of filing or at some point within the two years before the case was filed; they must, because they seek prospective relief against official-capacity defendants, show that this conduct is still ongoing.
45

As another court recently put it, “[d]efendants’ statute of limitations argument wholly ignores the fundamental nature and substance of the Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim. ... Plaintiffs brought suit to terminate an ongoing systemic pattern and practice of failure to provide constitutionally adequate [mental-health] care on the part of [the Department of Corrections] and its contractual providers. Plaintiffs allege that the unlawful conduct was continuing as of the date the lawsuit was filed, and that it continues as of today. The particular episodes of deficient [mental-health] care alleged in the complaint are not invoked as separate claims for relief, seeking recovery on the basis of separate instances of compensable harm. On the contrary, the examples of alleged sub-standard care set forth in Plaintiffs’ pleadings--which are now supported by sworn declarations, deposition testimony, and other competent record evidence--are offered as corroboration for Plaintiffs’ assertion that [ADOC] has engaged in an ongoing pattern and practice of wrongful,
46

unconstitutional acts and omissions reflecting deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the prisoners residing [in their facilities].” Scott v. Clarke, 64 F. Supp. 3d 813, 826 (W.D. Va. 2014) (Moon, J.).
The court need not address Hardy, as it finds that he has not demonstrated the existence of a current, serious mental-health care need. (This issue is discussed below.) However, the court concludes that the statute of limitations does not bar McCoy’s claims.
Defendants misperceive (or ignore) much of the substance of the claims brought by McCoy. They address only his involuntary-medication claim, and assert that he is disputing the procedures used to issue an involuntary-medication order in 2005. However, McCoy’s claim actually revolves around his contention that he did not give voluntary and informed consent to medication injected into him in 2013 and 2014, well within the statute of limitations period. Moreover, with respect to McCoy’s Eighth Amendment claim, he has
47

clearly alleged, and offered evidence to show, an ongoing denial of adequate treatment; Dr. Burns specifically cited him as someone whose acute and disabling mental illness was not, at the time of her inspection, receiving an appropriate level of treatment.23

D. Preclusion

The one named plaintiff involved in Phase 2A of

this case with respect to whom defendants raise a

preclusion argument is Pruitt.

However, his

mental-health claims are not barred by this prior

litigation. Indeed, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is ambiguous as to whether they even contend

that Pruitt’s mental-health claims, as opposed to his

23. Additionally, McCoy is free to offer evidence regarding events that occurred more than two years before this case was filed, as “[s]tatutes of limitations do not operate as an evidentiary bar controlling the evidence admissible at the trial of a timely-filed cause of action.” Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 346 (4th Cir. 1994).
48

medical care claims, are precluded. Assuming, out of an abundance of caution, that defendants do make such an argument, the court explains below why it fails.
As defendants correctly explain, res judicata (claim preclusion) prohibits “successive litigation of the very same claim,” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001), and applies “not only to the precise legal theory presented in the prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative fact.’” NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F. 2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990).24 Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars relitigation of an issue when the same issue was raised and actually litigated in a prior suit, and the court’s decision as to that issue was necessary to the final resolution of the suit. See
24. Res judicata also requires an identity of parties; defendants argue that this requirement is satisfied because some the defendants in the suit previously filed by Pruitt were employees of, and therefore in privity with, the defendants in this case. The court need not reach this issue.
49

Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedez Benz of N. Am., Inc., 32 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 1994).
Here, Pruitt’s prior suit was, quite obviously, totally unrelated to his claims in the present case. In 2009, he filed a pro se complaint against the warden of the facility where he was housed and a number of correctional officers. This complaint makes no mention of mental-health care; instead, he complains about a particular, discrete incident, during which correctional officers allegedly kicked him out of a medical ward while he was in pain and awaiting testing for kidney stones, physically assaulted him, and then denied him access to care for his resulting injuries. The issues raised in that suit--whether the alleged actions occurred and whether they constituted violations of his constitutional rights--are entirely irrelevant to Pruitt’s claim that he is currently being subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm due to the deliberate indifference of the Commissioner and Associate Commissioner to the serious mental-health
50

needs of prisoners in their custody. The only thing connecting these two cases is that they have something to do with Pruitt’s health during his incarceration. His current claims are not precluded.

IV. Substantive Arguments

A. Eighth Amendment

1. Standard

Defendants adamantly insist that plaintiffs have

not pursued a proper theory of Eighth Amendment

liability because they seek to prove that defendants,

by providing a deficient system of mental-health care,

have created a substantial risk of serious future harm

to mentally ill prisoners in their custody. In light

of their erroneous belief that such a showing would not

support liability, defendants have proceeded in their

summary judgment briefing as if plaintiffs have brought

a case focused on obtaining specific treatment for

their individual mental-health problems.

Before

addressing defendants’ arguments regarding the

51

sufficiency of plaintiffs’ evidence, the court will detour to explain why plaintiffs’ actual theory of the case is well-supported by the case law. The court will discuss this precedent at some length because a clear understanding of its framework will facilitate the orderly and efficient presentation of the parties’ evidence at trial.
One of the well-recognized ways that prison officials can violate the Eighth Amendment is by failing to provide prisoners with minimally adequate health care. This is because prisoners “must rely on prison authorities to treat [their] medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “Federal and state governments therefore have a constitutional obligation to provide minimally adequate medical care to those whom they are punishing by incarceration.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991). However, “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to
52

constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. ...

Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional

violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In

order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must

allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs. It is only such indifference that can offend

evolving standards of decency in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.”

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, it is clear that “[f]ailure to provide

basic psychiatric and mental health care states a claim

of deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs

of prisoners.” Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).25 “The case law establishes that

25. Eleventh Circuit case law makes clear that the “basic” mental-health care to which prisoners are entitled includes not only pharmacological but also psychotherapeutic treatment. See Greason, 891 F.2d at 834 (“Even if this case involved failure to provide (continued...)
53

‘mental health needs are no less serious than physical needs’ for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2004)). This is because the denial of adequate mental-health care can be just as painful as the denial of adequate physical health care. See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 2012 WL 6738517, at *21 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (Pratt, J.) (“Psychological pain exists. It is real and it results from many of the symptoms which are associated with the mentally ill.”).
Deliberate indifference claims have both an objective and a subjective component. There are multiple modes of demonstrating the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation. Although a prisoner may seek an injunction requiring prison officials to
psychotherapy or psychological counselling alone, the court would still conclude that the psychiatric care (continued...)
54

remedy a condition which is already inflicting harm on
him at the time he files his complaint (for example, a
prisoner is not receiving any insulin, which is
necessary to treat his diabetes, and seeks an order
requiring prison officials to provide it to him), he
may also seek an injunction to prevent serious harm
which is substantially likely to occur in the future--
in the phrasing of Farmer v. Brennan, “a substantial
risk of serious harm.” 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).26
was sufficiently similar to medical treatment to bring it within the embrace of Estelle.”).
26. It is clear that prisoners can make out Eighth Amendment violations based on the totality of multiple conditions of confinement, rather than needing to demonstrate that each individually is unconstitutional. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575–76 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1982). Such claims are cognizable so long as the multiple conditions combine to deprive the prisoner of a specific human need, such as health care. See Gates, 376 F.3d at 333 (“Conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise--for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with (continued...)
55

As the Supreme Court explained in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), a case in which a prisoner challenged his prolonged exposure to second-hand smoke, “a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event,” because “the Eighth Amendment protects against future harms to inmates,” even when the harm “might not affect all of those exposed” to the risk and even when the harm would not manifest itself immediately. Id. at 33-34. As the court explained, prisoners complaining of unclean drinking water need not “wait[] for an attack of dysentery” before filing suit. Id. at 33. The Court made clear that, although “scientific” or other expert evidence is relevant is assessing the gravity of the risk--that is, “the seriousness of the potential harm
a failure to issue blankets.” (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). By the same token, when multiple policies or practices combine to create a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners’ mental health, they violate the Constitution.
56

and the likelihood that such injury to health will
actually be caused by exposure to” the risk at issue--
the inquiry does not end there. Id. at 36. “It also
requires a court to assess whether society considers
the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to
expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other
words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he
complains is not one that today’s society chooses to
tolerate.” Id.27
27. Defendants repeatedly quote language from Helling describing the sort of risk that is actionable as one that is “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,” and that gives rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers.” 509 U.S. at 33-34. But Helling itself makes clear that it must be “sure or very likely” that some--not necessarily all--of the prisoners exposed will suffer harm, and that the dangers--like those of second-hand smoke--need not manifest themselves immediately. The Eleventh Circuit has read Helling to require a plaintiff to show an “unreasonable” risk of serious harm, drawing on the language in Helling’s holding. Kelley v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 35).
(continued...) 57

It is true that the Supreme Court once suggested, in dicta in a case about access to law libraries, that “a healthy inmate who ha[s] suffered no deprivation of needed medical treatment [lacks standing to] claim violation of his constitutional right to medical care ... simply on the ground that the prison medical facilities were inadequate.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). But this pronouncement has no bearing

Furthermore, Helling requires that the risk

involved must be “so grave that it violates

contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone

unwillingly to such a risk.” 509 U.S. at 36. While

the first couple of words --“so grave”--might appear at

first glance to set a very high bar, there are

important modifiers in that sentence: “contemporary”

and “unwillingly.” Helling was decided in 1993;

contemporary standards of decency had clearly evolved

rapidly since 1964, when the Surgeon General of the

United States issued the first federal report linking

smoking to ill health.

Moreover, the modifier

“unwillingly” reflects once again the Court’s

recognition that prisoners “must rely on prison

authorities to treat [their] medical needs,” Estelle,

429 U.S. at 103; the question is not whether society

believes a particular level of health care is one

everyone must receive by right (indeed, at present,

society does not require the provision of anything but

emergency care), but rather whether society believes it

(continued...)

58

on this case. The plaintiffs here are prisoners with serious mental illnesses, not healthy prisoners; while a healthy prisoner might not be able to show a sufficiently specific and substantial risk of serious harm in alleging that he might become sick in some way at some time and need some form of medical care that might then not be adequately provided, plaintiffs in this case need mental-health care and argue that the severe inadequacies of the care being provided are subjecting them to a high likelihood of fairly imminent harm. Indeed, they have offered evidence to show that the risk has already been manifested in deficient care they and others have received. For prisoners who are not healthy, it is clear that they “need not wait until [they] suffer[] an actual injury because the constitutional injury is the exposure to the risk of harm.” Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513, 521 (D. Ariz.
unacceptable to force someone to receive that level of health care.
59

2013) (Wake, J.) (citing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 506 n.3 (2011)), aff’d, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014).28
In the end, whether plaintiffs have already been
harmed by the practices they challenge is, although
relevant, not dispositive of their claims. This is
because, as in Parsons, evidence related to the named
plaintiffs was “not submitted to support individual
Eighth Amendment claims; rather, the plaintiffs
submitted [it] as evidence of the defendants’ unlawful
policies and practices, and as examples of the serious
harm to which all inmates in [defendants’] custody are
allegedly exposed.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 672
(9th Cir. 2014). What these plaintiffs must show is
28. In similar fashion, this case is distinguishable from another one on which defendants rely in their brief, Bumpus v. Watts, 448 F. App'x 3 (11th Cir. 2011). In that case, the court held that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] only asserted that routine dental care would prevent future dental problems, he has failed to show an objectively serious medical need.” Id. at 5. Whether or not the denial of preventative care is actionable under the Eighth Amendment is irrelevant, because plaintiffs are not healthy prisoners seeking preventative care.
60

that they have been subjected to the harmful policies
and practices at issue, not (necessarily) that they
have already been harmed by these policies and
practices. Admittedly, to the extent that they allege
a condition has existed for a length of time, they
generally must show that some prisoners--themselves or
others--have been harmed, in order to demonstrate an
objectively substantial risk of serious harm.29
29. Of course, expert testimony is also relevant to making this showing, especially because the uncertain course of mental illness, affected as it is by a number of factors, may make it difficult to show conclusively that the pain caused by, or the worsening of, any particular prisoner’s illness is due to a particular denial of or delay in treatment; instead, it may be necessary for an expert to rely in significant part on her expertise in treating patients and experience observing outcomes to demonstrate how substantial the risks and how serious the harms are.
As an aside, the court notes that, in theory, a mechanism of injury could be such that, although no one in a prison system had yet been harmed, it was likely that many would be in the future. For example, consider the introduction of a toxic substance, the symptoms of exposure to which only manifest after a period of time; plaintiffs would not need to wait until someone got sick to bring a claim. In this case, however, there is no reason to believe that if the (continued...)
61

Although the Eighth Amendment’s objective requirement of showing serious harm is not met by a showing of mere discomfort, see Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1295, “unnecessary pain or suffering” is serious harm. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993). The serious-harm requirement “is concerned with both the ‘severity’ and the ‘duration’ of the prisoner's exposure” to the harm, such that an exposure to harm “which might not ordinarily violate the Eighth Amendment may nonetheless do so if it persists over an extended period of time.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1295 (citation omitted); see also id. (“Severity and duration do not necessarily form a perfect sliding scale, but our analysis should be informed by a consideration of both factors.”). As a result, a persistent and ongoing harm may be actionable even when
policies and practices of which plaintiffs complain indeed create a substantial risk of serious harm, that harm would not yet have occurred to at least some mentally ill prisoners.
62

that same harm, occurring in a discrete past instance, might not be.
One additional point bears mention. Defendants’ repeatedly insist that what plaintiffs are presenting to the court in this case is a mere disagreement with their health care providers about the care appropriate in their cases. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Th[e] evidence shows that [the plaintiffs] received significant medical care while at the jail. Although [he] may have desired different modes of treatment, the care the jail provided did not amount to deliberate indifference.”). Defendants are quite right that a prisoner’s mere preference for a different treatment over the one that was provided is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.30 But the Eleventh Circuit has
30. Many of the cases defendants cite for this proposition involve pro se prisoners who raise unsubstantiated disagreements with the care their providers have deemed appropriate. This case is different both because the disagreements are (continued...)
63

made clear that the mere fact that a health care provider provided some treatment is not sufficient to establish that it was constitutionally adequate treatment. Even in Eighth Amendment cases, “the quality of a doctor’s treatment is evaluated according to professional standards.” Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th Cir. 1989). In Waldrop, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that there existed a dispute of material fact as to whether a psychiatrist’s treatment of the plaintiff’s serious psychiatric needs was constitutionally adequate despite the fact that “all actions taken by [the treating psychiatrist] are undisputed,” because the plaintiff’s “treatment must be evaluated according to professional standards.” Id. The circuit has clearly held that “conflicting expert opinion concerning the extent to
substantiated by expert evidence and because they do not reflect one-off treatment decisions, but rather policies or practices that repeatedly affect the care provided to mentally ill prisoners.
64

which [psychiatric care] may have departed from

professional standards” can warrant denial of summary

judgment on an Eighth Amendment claim. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835 (11th Cir. 1990).31

Greason v.

The court now turns its attention to the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference standard.32 In

order to prove that a condition of confinement violates

31. Although it is unclear whether in Greason and Waldrop, which were decided before Farmer, the court appropriately evaluated evidence regarding subjective deliberate indifference, see Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1365 n.9 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1999), it is clear that, as relevant here, these cases properly endorsed the relevance of expert testimony applying professional standard to the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim, see, e.g., Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1369 (“[I]n Greason this Court relied on expert testimony only in addressing the objective prong of deliberate indifference.”).
32. This prong actually contains both a subjective knowledge element and an objective response element-that is, a prison official who is subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm is liable if he “disregards the risk by failing to take [objectively] reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Here, although defendants argue that they did not know of and did not create the risk of harm plaintiffs challenge, they have not argued that they have taken objectively reasonable (indeed, any) measures to address it.
65

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by creating an objectively “substantial risk of serious harm,” a prisoner must show subjective “deliberate indifference” on the part of the defendant: that is, “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312; see also Kelley, 400 F.3d at 1284 (explaining the distinction between the objective and subjective prongs).
In general, “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk ... was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and
66

the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Subjective deliberate indifference by prison officials to prisoners’ medical and mental health can be manifested--and proven--in different ways. As explained in Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999), courts have found deliberate indifference when a prison official “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason;33 or (3) prevents a
33. “An inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 (continued...)
67

prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical

treatment.”

Courts have also found deliberate

indifference when a prison official “persists in a

particular course of treatment in the face of resultant

pain and risk of permanent injury.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the Eighth Amendment is not violated

merely because a prisoner receives less than ideal

health care, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly

recognized that even when some care is provided,

F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n.9 (2002). Notably, however, the detrimental effect need not be anything other than the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” even for a period of a few hours. Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.3d 1533, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); see also Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Hill’s statement that a delay in treatment is actionable only when it “involve[s] life-threatening conditions or situations where it is apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the medical problem,” or “the delay results in an inmate’s suffering a life-long handicap or permanent loss,” applies only to cases in which plaintiffs assert that their medical needs “required immediate or emergency attention”).
68

“deliberate indifference may be established by a showing of grossly inadequate care as well as by a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of treatment.” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 1996), and Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1035); see also Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citing Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974), and Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970)).
What ties these forms of deliberate indifference together is, of course, deliberateness. On the one hand, the deprivation of care that in retrospect was necessary to avert harm--either pain, the worsening of a condition, or death--is not actionable merely because the defendant was negligent (even seriously so) in failing to recognize its necessity. (This is because we cannot infer knowledge on the part of the defendant when the care is merely subpar but not “grossly inadequate,” not because any care better than the
69

grossly inadequate always passes constitutional
muster.) On the other hand, the Eighth Amendment does
forbid the very same denial of or delay of care once
the defendant--a physician, officer, or official--
becomes aware that that care should be provided.
Delaying or denying provision of health care that a
defendant knows to be necessary for a “non-medical
reason,” or rendering health care that is less
effective because it is “easier,” is unconstitutional
because it reflects not a medical mistake but an intentional deprivation.34
This discussion reveals a critical point,
overlooked by defendants in their protestations that
plaintiffs cannot show Eighth Amendment violations
34. The specific reason for denying necessary care is not particularly important, as long as it does not reflect an exercise of medical judgment. “[T]he policy of deferring to the judgment of prison officials in matters of prison discipline and security does not usually apply in the context of medical care to the same degree as in other contexts.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505 n.19 (quoting Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983).
70

because they all received some mental-health care: Although health care that is just slightly better than “grossly inadequate” does not violate the Constitution when the defendant does not realize it is so subpar, substantially smaller shortcomings in health care are actionably unlawful when the decision-maker understands that a particular standard of care will cause serious harm to prisoners but decides to go ahead with it nonetheless, because it is easier or cheaper. See Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703-04 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff’s “allegation that the defendants failed to provide even that level of diagnostic care that they themselves believed necessary” clearly stated a claim for deliberate indifference, without making a finding that the denial of this level of care would, in and of itself, reflect deliberate indifference, and stating that “[i]ntentional failure to provide service
71

acknowledged to be necessary is the deliberate indifference proscribed by the Constitution”).35
What is striking in this case is the extent to
which the mental-health practitioners involved appear
to recognize what plaintiffs’ experts have opined: the
care being provided mentally ill prisoners in Alabama
is lacking in certain ways. Defendants argue at some
length that plaintiffs’ experts have not convincingly
demonstrated that this care is so grossly inadequate
that its sheer inadequacy demonstrates deliberate
indifference, but this is beside the point. When
prison mental-health administrators know and
communicate that they need more staff to provide
35. As a purely hypothetical illustrative example: a court might find that a doctor’s wholesale failure to diagnose a rare, fatal disease--resulting in death--did not reflect deliberate indifference, but in another case, that once the doctor had diagnosed the disease, the decision to prescribe one medication which she knew would treat the disease but cause the prisoner to become deaf, rather than another more expensive medication that she knew did not have that serious side effect, did evince deliberate indifference.
72

appropriate care for prisoners, and the Commissioner
refuses to provide funding for this staff, not in any
exercise of medical judgment but because he does not
have the money, this suffices to establish deliberate
indifference and--in conjunction with a showing that
this creates a substantial risk of serious harm--to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
Defendants have honed in on, and cited numerous
times in their briefs, the line in Waldrop, repeated in
other cases, that “when a prison inmate has received
medical care, courts hesitate to find an Eighth Amendment violation.” 871 F.2d at 1035.36 First of
36. Defendants cite a number of cases reciting different versions of this point. See Bauer v. Kramer, 424 F. App’x 917, 919 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A doctor’s decision about the type of medicine that should be prescribed is generally ‘a medical judgment’ that is ‘an inappropriate basis for imposing liability under section 1983.’ Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995).”); Freeman v. Lebedovych, 186 F. App’x 943, 944 (11th Cir. 2006) (“When a mentally ill prisoner receives medical treatment that is arguably aimed at stabilizing his condition, we will generally refuse to engage in subsequent review of medical decisions.”).
73

all, some of the policies and practices challenged here were not decided upon by medical staff (as defendants remind the court, the Commissioner and Associate Commissioner are not doctors), and do not concern treatment decisions; these include staffing decisions, and policies regarding placement in segregation. In addition, even with respect to the policies and practices that do concern mental-health treatment, defendants have ignored the admonition that immediately follows in Waldrop: “Hesitation does not mean, however, that the course of a physician’s treatment of a prison inmate’s medical or psychiatric problems can never manifest the physician’s deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs.” Id. As the court explained in “reaffirm[ing]” its previous case law, deliberateness can either be inferred, from the fact that the medical care rendered is “grossly incompetent,” or else demonstrated in the form of a “choice” to provide care known to be less effective-and therefore to subject the prisoner to a substantial
74

risk of serious harm--because it is easier or cheaper.

Id.; see also Freeman v. Lebedovych, 186 F. App’x 943,

944 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Inadequate psychiatric care

constitutes deliberate indifference if the quality of

psychiatric care received is a substantial deviation

from accepted professional standards.”).

Another point warrants some focused attention.

Defendants have made a great fuss over plaintiffs’

assertions that they are bringing a “systemic,” rather

than individual, Eighth Amendment challenge, as if this

form of claim was not well-established in the

jurisprudence

of

this

circuit--indeed,

so

well-established that it is generally denoted with the term defendants so scorn.37

37. This ground is so well-trod that a number of district courts have set out a six-part framework for assessing the baseline constitutional adequacy of a prison mental-health care system. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (Karlton, J.) (“[T]he courts have focused on the presence or absence of six basic, essentially common sense, components of a minimally adequate prison mental health care delivery system.”). This framework, first (continued...)
75

formulated by Judge Justice, requires that (1) “there

must be a systematic program from screening and

evaluating inmates in order to identify those who

require mental health treatment”; (2) “treatment must

entail more than segregation and close supervision of

the inmate patients”; (3) “treatment requires the

participation of trained mental health professionals,

who must be employed in sufficient numbers to identify

and treat in an individualized manner those treatable

inmates suffering from serious mental disorders”; (4)

“accurate, complete, and confidential records of the

mental health treatment process must be maintained”;

(5)

“prescription

and

administration

of

behavior-altering medications in dangerous amounts, by

dangerous methods, or without appropriate supervision

and periodic evaluation, is an unacceptable method of

treatment”; and (6) “a basic program for the

identification, treatment and supervision of inmates

with suicidal tendencies is a necessary component of

any mental health treatment program.” Balla v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1577 (D. Idaho

1984) (Ryan, J.) (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp.

1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Justice, J.); other

citations omitted). Because this framework was first

articulated over 35 years ago, and because

mental-health care has evolved dramatically since that

time, the court considers it to be instructive but not

determinative as to the floor below which mental-health

care would be grossly inadequate and therefore

unconstitutional. See Plata, 563 U.S. at 506 n.3

(discussing plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief based on

the showing that “the delivery of care in the prisons

[had] fall[en] below the evolving standards of decency

that mark the progress of a maturing society” (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)). The proposition that the

constitutional minimum with respect to health care has

increased over time should be an entirely

(continued...)

76

“In institutional level challenges to prison health
care such as this one, systemic deficiencies can
provide the basis for a finding of deliberate
indifference. Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058. Deliberate
indifference to inmates’ health needs may be shown, for
example, by proving that there are ‘such systemic and
gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment,
or procedures that the inmate population is effectively
denied access to adequate medical care.’ Ramos v.
Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980). ...
[A]lthough incidents of malpractice standing alone will
not support a claim of eighth amendment violation, ‘[a]
series of incidents closely related in time may
uncontroversial one; courts find Eighth Amendment violations based on the denial of sorts of care that did not exist decades earlier. See, e.g., Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (reversing a grant of summary judgment on and remanding for trial an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, based in part on the court’s finding that harm to the plaintiff, who had torn a tendon, would have been avoided by “sending [him] to the emergency room so he could get an MRI,” a diagnostic procedure that did not (continued...)
77

disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference.’ Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058-59 (citing Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir.1974)). ‘Repeated examples of delayed or denied medical care may indicate a deliberate indifference by prison authorities to the suffering that results.’ Id. at 1059 (citing Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (‘In class actions challenging the entire system of health care, deliberate indifference to inmates’ health needs may be shown by proving repeated examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff.’).” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505; see also Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 867 (D.D.C. 1989) (Green, J.) (“The evidence points to systemic failure throughout the entire medical services
exist until the late 1970s and did not come into regular use until much more recently).
78

that show deliberate indifference to the medical needs of the inmates of Occoquan.”).38
Notably, this means that, although one-off
negligent treatment is not actionable, its repetition
can render it so; put differently, care that causes
serious harm but is not grossly inadequate can be
challenged when it recurs, because frequent negligence,
just like a single instance of truly egregious
recklessness, may allow the court to infer subjective
deliberate indifference.
Moreover, deliberate indifference can, of course,
be demonstrated straightforwardly, through direct
evidence that an administrator was aware of serious
38. In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-302 (1991), the Supreme Court considered and rejected the petitioner’s argument that the requirement of subjective deliberate indifference should not apply to systemic, as opposed to one-time, conditions. In so doing, it explained that “[t]he long duration of a cruel prison condition may make it easier to establish knowledge and hence some form of intent, cf. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, n.10 (1989); but there is no logical reason why it should cause the requirement of intent to evaporate.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300-01.
79

systemic deficiencies and failed to correct them. In Greason, 891 F.2d at 839-40, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a denial of a motion for summary judgment filed by the Georgia Department of Corrections’ director of mental-health, because he was “aware of many conditions at the GDCC that could lead to grossly inadequate mental health care,” such as that prisoners did not receive enough recreation time, that mental-health treatment plans were not employed, that there were no policies or procedures to enable officers to prevent suicides, and that there was a “severe lack of staff members and [a] need for a mental health care unit.” “In light of all the major problems ... of which [the director] was aware but which he apparently did not attempt to remedy,” the court had “no difficulty” in holding that a reasonable factfinder could find that he acted with deliberate indifference.39 Id. at 839.
39. Unlike in the present case, the court in (continued...)
80

This is an official-capacity suit--“only another

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent” or against the “official’s

office.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1542 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the

question

is

not

whether

the

particular

official-capacity defendants are “dedicated public

servant[s] who [are] trying very hard to make [the

prisons they run] efficient and effective correctional

institution[s]”--often, administrators do struggle

valiantly to reform the prisons they run--but rather

“the institution’s historical indifference.” LaMarca,

995 F.2d at 1542 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(explaining that substitution of a newly appointed

superintendent as the official named in the suit had no

Greason was considering the director’s deliberate indifference in the context of supervisory liability, as opposed to the underlying constitutional violation. See 891 F.2d at 836-37, 839 (finding a disputed issue as to whether the director, “in failing adequately to train and supervise subordinates ... was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s mental health care needs”).
81

effect on the deliberate indifference analysis); see also Laube v. Haley, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Thompson, J.) (explaining that “the real parties in interest are the responsible entities: the Department of Corrections and, ultimately, the State of Alabama. Hence, the court’s analysis of deliberate indifference is properly focused on the reasonableness of the State of Alabama’s responses as limited by the State’s powers”).
One final point, which often arises in systemic cases and is squarely presented here, bears mention. It is clear that at least in official-capacity suits like this one, lack of funds is not a justification for substandard treatment. See Laube, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1248 (“When prison officials are sued solely in their official capacities, the lack of funds available to them is not an adequate defense to a finding of a constitutional violation on their part.”); see also Harris, 941 F.2d at 1509 (“[W]e are troubled by and reject any suggestion ... that a state’s comparative
82

wealth might affect a[] ... prisoner’s right to constitutionally adequate medical care. We do not agree that financial considerations must be considered in determining the reasonableness of inmates’ medical care.... We are aware that systemic deficiencies in medical care may be related to a lack of funds allocated to prisons by the state legislature. Such a lack, however, will not excuse the failure of correctional systems to maintain a certain minimum level of medical service necessary to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, inadequate funding can be a basis for a finding of deliberate indifference, to the extent that it is the non-medical reason for a correctional administrator’s interference with the care medical providers have deemed necessary. As the Seventh Circuit put it in reversing a finding that no Eighth Amendment violation had occurred when “a psychiatric position was authorized for the prison and prison
83

officials had been trying for two years to fill it[,] ... this circumstance may weigh more heavily against the state than for it, since the position has remained vacant for two years and the authorized salary is, in the district court’s words, ‘woefully inadequate.’” Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1983). The Eleventh Circuit likewise endorsed this point when it quoted with approval a line from a complaint alleging that “limited funds ... may have contributed to deliberate indifference shown for the serious medical needs” of the plaintiff. Ancata, 769 F.2d at 705.
Having addressed defendants’ arguments regarding the relevant case law, the court will now turn to assessing whether plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact as to the multiple necessary elements of their claims.
84

2. Serious Need As a predicate to raising an Eighth Amendment mental-health claim, a plaintiff must have a serious mental-health care need. A serious need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Jacoby v. Baldwin Cty., 596 F. App’x 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Defendants contend that three of the Phase 2A plaintiffs, Hardy, Johnson, and Pruitt, have no current serious mental-health care need, as required to state an Eighth Amendment mental-health claim.40

40. In defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

they contended that “[t]hree (3) of the Named

Plaintiffs suffer from no ‘serious mental health

need.’” Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. (doc. no. 769) at 74.

They then went on to make other arguments about “[t]he

remaining Named Plaintiffs.”

Plaintiffs then

proceeded, most reasonably, to discuss in their

opposition brief the evidence in the record that they

contend demonstrates that these three particular

plaintiffs have serious mental-health needs, while also

reasserting their (unchallenged) position that the

(continued...)

85

As to Hardy, the court agrees with defendants.
Although defendants’ expert, Dr. Patterson, recognized
that Hardy has dysthymic disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and antisocial and borderline
personality disorders, he also concluded that these
conditions “do not appear to affect him in such manner
that he requires mental health care currently.”
Patterson Report (doc. no. 679-9) at 33. Hardy was
removed from the mental-health caseload in 2010,
remainder of the Phase 2A named plaintiffs also have such needs.
Inexplicably, defendants, in their reply, pretend as if they disputed whether plaintiffs other than these three have serious mental-health needs, stating as follows: “With the exception of three (3) individuals, Named Plaintiffs do not attempt to prove they suffered from the serious mental health need required to state an Eighth Amendment claim. They merely allege in conclusory fashion that they do indeed have a serious mental health need.” Defs.’ Summ. J. Reply (doc. no. 876) at 96. This misrepresentation is troubling. In any event, the court concludes, based on its review of the record, that plaintiffs have offered more than sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the remaining plaintiffs have serious mental-health needs.
86

apparently reflecting the conclusion of mental-health

staff that he did not need treatment. record evidence to the contrary.41

There is no

As for Johnson: although defendants contend that he

has never been diagnosed with a serious mental illness,

there is no dispute that he suffered a traumatic brain

injury as a child, that he was identified by staff at

ADOC’s mental hospital (prior to his conviction) as

suffering from depression with possible psychosis and

potentially incompetent to stand trial, and that in

2015, MHM’s Medical Director and Chief Psychiatrist,

Dr. Hunter, diagnosed him with adjustment disorder with

anxiety and possible psychosis, after recognizing that

he had “been in crisis for over a week” and had

“paranoia and possible delusions.” Johnson Medical

Records, P Ex. 62 (doc. no. 844-12) at 15, MR047700.

He also testified in his deposition and has told other

41. Although plaintiffs point out that Hardy has in the past engaged in or threatened self-harm, there is (continued...)
87

prisoners that he suffers from auditory hallucinations.

Defendants contend that Johnson’s ability to express

his need for care orally and in writing demonstrates

that he is not seriously cognitively impaired. Whether

or not their evidence shows this (plaintiffs point to

evidence that Johnson relies on his uncle or other

prisoners to fill out forms), his ability to articulate

his requests would not demonstrate that he was not

mentally ill.

This evidence is, at a minimum,

sufficient to create a dispute of material fact both as

to whether Johnson has been diagnosed (by Dr. Hunter)

as in need of mental-health treatment, and as to

whether it is obvious that he has a current, serious

mental-health need.

Pruitt was previously diagnosed with schizophrenia,

depression, and antisocial personality disorder.

However, mental-health staff have concluded that these

conditions are in remission since 2010, and removed him

no evidence that he has done so at any time in the past (continued...)
88

from the mental-health caseload. Defendants offer evidence to show that he has been evaluated numerous times since then--based on his repeated requests for treatment--and that mental-health staff have consistently concluded that he does not require treatment. However, there is evidence in the record sufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to whether it would be obvious to a lay person that Pruitt does require treatment, given his recent and serious attempts to harm himself: he was admitted to a crisis or suicide cell five times in the first half of 2014. In one case, he was readmitted within a few days after cutting himself again; in another case, it took over a week to stabilize him.
3. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm Because defendants have taken the tack of responding to plaintiffs’ claims as if they were about past violations, their response to the evidence that
four years. 89

plaintiffs have presented of a risk of harm has been conclusory (and largely constituted an attack on the methodology employed, rather than the findings offered, by plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Burns). However, the court will discuss plaintiffs’ evidence here in order to explain why it does create a dispute of material fact as to whether the policies and practices at issue create an actionable risk of harm.42 Because only

42. Almost all of the policies and practices at

issue in this case directly impact the provision of

mental-health care. One does not, however: Although

the court certainly appreciates plaintiffs’ contention

that an inadequate quality assurance system has

contributed to the inadequate care they describe, the

court is concerned that this issue might be too

attenuated to constitute, in itself, an Eighth

Amendment violation.

While adequate funding and

staffing are categorically necessary to provide

adequate health care, the court would like to hear

further argument (and evidence from experts in the

field) as to whether an adequate quality assurance

program falls into the same category. Because evidence

regarding MHM and ADOC’s quality assurance programs

will clearly be relevant to establishing deliberate

indifference with respect to other portions of

plaintiffs’ claim--plaintiffs offer this evidence to

show both awareness of and disregard for deficiencies--

the court will hear it and resolve at or after trial

whether an inadequate quality assurance program can

(continued...)

90

defendants have moved for summary judgment, the court will focus its attention on plaintiffs’ evidence. However, the court has carefully considered defendants’ expert evidence as well; as noted below, defendants’ primary mental-health expert, Dr. Patterson, agrees in many important respects with plaintiffs’ experts.
Dr. Kathryn Burns, a licensed medical doctor with a certification in general psychiatry, has for several years served as the Chief Psychiatrist for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. She is also a Distinguished Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, and has conducted assessments of the mental-health care provided by prison systems in six different States. Dr. Burns’s expert report offers her opinions as to the adequacy of mental-health and custodial staffing, assessment and classification of mental illness, mental-health treatment, and oversight of mental-health care.
itself be an actionable violation of the Eighth (continued...)
91

Dr. Craig Haney, who has a Ph. D. in psychology, is

the Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the

University of California, Santa Cruz, and has published

scholarly articles and presented lectures on the

psychological effects of incarceration.

He has

inspected and testified about numerous state prisons

and similar institutions. Dr. Haney’s expert report

addresses the effects of overcrowding and understaffing

on prisoners with mental-health needs, the effects of

segregation on mentally ill prisoners, and the adequacy

of mental-health treatment.

Eldon Vail has worked in prisons for nearly 35

years; he has served as warden of three different

prisons, the Deputy Secretary of the Washington State

Department of Corrections for seven years; and its

Secretary for four years. Vail has been an expert

witness and consultant in numerous cases involving

correctional facilities. Vail’s expert report covers

Amendment. 92

the impact of overcrowding and custodial understaffing on prisoners’ need for health care and on defendants’ ability to provide it, as well as the impact of segregation on prisoners’ mental health.
Because these reports are lengthy and because defendants do not seriously engage with the substance of them in their motion for summary judgment, the court will not discuss comprehensively all of the deficiencies they identify; instead, it will simply offer an illustrative summary. Because Dr. Burns is plaintiffs’ primary mental-health expert, the court will focus more significantly on her opinions, although, as discussed below, many of them were corroborated by Dr. Haney’s independent assessment.
a. Inadequate Staff Dr. Burns explains in her report that ADOC entered into a settlement agreement in Bradley v. Harrelson, in 2001, in which it agreed to provide certain specified levels of mental-health staff for the male prisoner
93

population. See Order Approving Settlement Agreement,
Bradley v. Harrelson, No. 2:92-cv-70 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2001) (Albritton, J.), ECF No. 412.43 She further
explains that despite a significant increase in the
prisoner population, it has subsequently entered into
contracts to provide significantly fewer highly
qualified staff (psychiatrists and psychologists), and
more practitioners with lower levels of qualification
(clinical registered nurse practitioners (CRNPs),
licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and “mental health
professionals,” such as social workers with master’s
degrees and counselors, some of whom are unlicensed and
uncertified (MHPs)). This trend has continued over
time: in 2000, there were eight psychiatrists for about
43. The provision of mental-health care to Alabama’s prisoners has been litigated at least twice before. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (Johnson, J.), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part, and remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (Albritton, J.) (certifying a class).
94

20,600 prisoners (men only), but by earlier this year, there were about five full-time equivalents; over the same period, the number of MHPs increased by about 50%, and the number of CRNPs more than doubled, from three to just over seven full-time equivalents. MHM’s Program Manager, Houser, agreed in her deposition that, even were all vacancies filled, many of defendants’ facilities would not have “enough” mental-health staff.
Dr. Burns relies on MHM’s internal documents to demonstrate that, although Alabama law requires clinical registered nurse practitioners to be supervised by psychiatrists, they are practicing partially or in many cases entirely without supervision at many facilities. Dr. Burns draws on her experience supervising CRNPs in her own practice and her experience evaluating prison mental-health care around the country to explain that allowing CRNPs to practice without supervision increases the likelihood that prisoners will be misdiagnosed and receive inappropriate pharmaceutical and therapeutic treatment.
95

She offers examples she recognized during her inspections of CRNPs’ failure to diagnose or treat mental illness in prisoners, including instances of them dismissing serious symptoms (including auditory hallucinations and self-harm) and requests for treatment. Dr. Burns reaches similar conclusions regarding the reliance on unlicensed MHPs.

b. Inadequate Assessment

Dr. Burns explains that prisoners can access

mental-health care in one of three ways--identification

at reception, self-referral, and staff referral--and

opines that each of these mechanisms is deficient in

ways that subject prisoners to harm.

Reception

screening is conducted by licensed practical nurses,

who take histories and determine whom to refer to

psychiatrists for comprehensive evaluations. But Dr.

Burns explains that LPNs are not qualified to make this

preliminary assessment, and that reliance on these

practitioners--who are unsupervised by registered

96

nurses (again, contrary to Alabama law)--to conduct reception screening results in the failure to recognize and diagnose mental illness. She opines (and it seems fairly self-evident) that this failure to diagnose in turn results in denial of treatment to prisoners who then go on to suffer, including through self-harm. Dr. Burns cites examples of prisoners whose mental illness was not recognized at reception, leading to denial of treatment except for placement in a crisis cell after cutting or attempting to hang themselves.
Dr. Burns also opines that under-identification is reflected in the fact that “MHM consistently reports lower prevalence rates of mental illness in ADOC prisons than prevalence rates reported in other prisoners and prison systems throughout the United States.”44 Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 24-26. Dr.
44. She also opines that another problem contributes to this low figure: MHM’s active efforts, documented in institutional and state-wide meeting notes, to remove prisoners from the caseload, to ensure that it remains at a “working number.” Burns Report (continued...)
97

Haney relies on different but similar comparator statistics in his report to conclude that ADOC’s identification of prisoners who belong on the mentalhealth caseload “almost certainly” represents a “gross underestimate” of the number of mentally ill prisoners in their custody. Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 161. Dr. Burns identifies prisoners who had not been placed on the mental-health caseload, initially or at all, despite their histories of mental-health problems, and received mental-health care only when in crisis. Dr. Burns also reviewed the mental-health classification system, and finds that it actually categorizes prisoners by their housing needs, rather than based on whether or not they suffer from serious mental illness, and she identified prisoners who had
(doc. no. 868-2) at 31 (citation omitted). She again points to a prisoner who typified this problem, who, “despite being on a heavy load of psychotropic medication and being transferred to the highest level of mental health care offered in ADOC on two separate occasions, ... was removed from the mental health caseload at one point.” Id.
98

been denied of more intensive treatment despite

suffering from symptoms that would necessitate such

treatment, because they had received the lowest level

of mental-health classification (MH-1).

As for self-referrals, Dr. Burns reports finding

many instances in which MHM was unresponsive to written

requests for care, and documented a number of instances

in which prisoners engaged in self-harm and destructive

behavior in order to get attention from mental-health

providers.

(She notes that “[i]ronically, these

behaviors often result in disciplinary action and

placement in segregation where mental health treatment

is even more difficult to access.” Burns Report (doc.

no. 868-2) at 29.) She also notes that MHM audits of

responses to self-referrals reveal that they are often

untimely (or the timeliness of responses is not

documented).

99

c. Inadequate Treatment Dr. Burns explains that prisoners with serious mental illness require a continuum of services from outpatient treatment to residential treatment to inpatient treatment, and a range of forms of treatment, including medication management and individual and group therapy. She notes that inpatient care is provided by transferring a prisoner to a state psychiatric hospital, but notes that MHM’s Medical Director and Chief Psychiatrist, Dr. Hunter, testified in his deposition that inpatient care is rarely sought except as a prisoner approaches release. Dr. Burns opines that she “found many inmates on [her] tours that clearly required a higher level of care than could be provided in ADOC facilities.” Id. at 32. She points to specific examples of prisoners who required inpatient treatment, including at least one prisoner who MHM providers recognized to require it.
100

As for intermediate, residential care for men,45 Dr. Burns notes that prisoners who are not mentally ill are placed in residential treatment beds rather than in segregation,46 and that the danger these prisoners pose, in conjunction with inadequate custodial staffing on these units (as reflected both in MHM documents and the reports of prisoners), results in the mentally ill prisoners on these units receiving little time out of their cells, missing appointments or having group sessions cancelled, and prisoners, including those being watched for self-harm, being inadequately monitored. Dr. Burns also observes, based on MHM reports, that residential treatment beds are consistently underutilized, and she points to a number of prisoners who have been classified as outpatients but require residential treatment. Dr. Haney also
45. r. Burns found residential care at the women’s facility to be substantially better.
46. MHM documents also reflect providers’ concern about this issue.
101

discusses this problem at some length in his report, opining that insufficient treatment space for critically mentally ill prisoners delays access to necessary care. He further notes that Dr. Hunter, MHM’s Medical Director and Chief Psychiatrist, acknowledged that even having additional mental-health personnel would not necessarily “translate into less crises, less crisis placement as long as the system continues to lack appropriate spaces” to place critically ill patients. Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 171-72 (quoting Hunter Depo. (doc. no. 675-16) at 162).
Furthermore, Dr. Burns opines that many seriously mentally ill prisoners are receiving primarily psychopharmacological treatment, and either no or minimal psychotherapy. See Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 35-36 (“It is well established both inside and outside of prison, that mental health treatment is more than psychotropic medication. Some mental health conditions do not require treatment with medication at
102

all; other conditions require medication but improve to
a greater extent when treatment with medication is
combined with other treatment modalities including
group and individual psychotherapy.”). During her
inspections, she “interviewed and reviewed the charts
of dozens of prisoners who were offered no treatment
other than psychotropic medication.” Id. at 36 n.45.
Her conclusions on this point are based not only on
chart reviews and interviews with prisoners, but also
on depositions of MHM staff, who acknowledged the
infrequency and brief duration of psychotherapeutic contacts with prisoners.47
47. With respect to the treatment provided to the named plaintiffs, defendants repeatedly assert that their allegations regarding infrequent or nonexistent psychotherapy or counseling are false, based on medical records showing repeated “contacts” with mental-health staff. The court has reviewed many of the records at issue and concludes that there is a genuine dispute as to whether these notations represent psychotherapy or brief check-in encounters, which Dr. Burns agrees occur but deems entirely distinct from “actual treatment.” Id. at 38-39.
(continued...) 103

Dr. Burns also opines that group treatment is
seriously lacking, both for prisoners in residential
placements and, to a greater degree, for outpatients,
noting that MHM’s most recent contract compliance
review revealed that a number of facilities with
hundreds of prisoners each on their mental health
caseloads offered few or no groups. She explains that
group treatment interventions should be offered for
prisoners with depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder, anxiety, and schizophrenia, “based upon their
individualized assessment of mental health needs.”
Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 39.
Dr. Burns and Dr. Haney also opine that to the extent that counseling does occur, it is compromised by the fact that it generally occurs in non-confidential settings. Defendants’ response to this contention (when raised by the named plaintiffs) appears to be that ADOC policy requires the presence of custody staff for security purposes. But this does not address whether the policy creates a substantial risk of serious harm. The court recognizes that bona fide security needs might justify such a requirement, at least in some instances; whether or not it is justified here will be assessed at trial.
104

Dr. Burns opines that prisoners who are prescribed

psychotropic medication are also harmed by inadequate

medication management practices. As a general matter,

she concludes based on chart reviews and audit findings

that follow-up appointments to assess the impact of

medication are infrequent and brief.

More

specifically, she opines that prescribers rely too

heavily on long-acting Haldol and Prolixin injections.

Dr. Burns explains that these and similar medications

"impact normal movement and can cause severe

restlessness (akathisia) and painful muscle spasms

(acute dystonic reaction) and also lead to permanent,

irreversible movement disorders that include tremor,

involuntary movements of the tongue and mouth (tardive

dyskinesia) and Parkinsonism." Id. at 42. She reports

that "[m]any of the inmates interviewed displayed these

types of movement disorders, but their prescriptions

were continued rather than changed to medications less

likely to cause these problems," and identifies a

number of prisoners who continue to be prescribed this

105

type of medication, and one who was previously took an alternative medication that worked well for her, was switched to these medications, suffered from serious side effects, was taken off it, and now receives no medication despite suffering from ongoing auditory hallucinations. Id. Dr. Burns also explains that this sort of injectable medication is so long-acting that it is impossible to adjust the dosage quickly (either upwards, to treat worsening symptoms, or downwards, to address side effects), and that other mental-health care systems therefore generally use oral medications to make dose adjustments.
Although Dr. Burns touches on the issue, Dr. Haney devotes much of his expert report to the harmful effects of ADOC’s policy of housing prisoners with serious mental illness in segregation. Dr. Burns explains, based on her own observations during tours and MHM reports she reviewed, that prisoners with mental illness are overrepresented in segregation, and that prisoners in segregation “receive medications and
106

brief cell front contacts by MHPs and LPNs,” but little

or “no mental health therapy or group treatment.” Id.

at 39. In conjunction with the fact that residential

beds are underused, this leads Dr. Burns to conclude

that “inmates with mental illness are being diverted to

segregation for behaviors related to untreated or

undertreated mental illness rather than being placed or

maintained in more intensive mental health treatment

settings.” Id. at 40.

Dr. Haney describes his tours of segregation units

at length.

In one facility, he describes the

segregation units as “difficult to describe and unlike

any I have ever seen in decades of doing this work”;

they “typically remain dark,” and the floors outside

were “filthy” and appeared to be “charr[ed].” Haney

Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 50. In another facility, he

describes the segregation unit as filled with the smell

of something burning and the sound of prisoners banging

on their cell doors and screaming “help me”; some

cell-door windows were covered, others were shattered,

107

a number of doors were blackened from fires, and there

was urine puddled on the floor outside several cells.

Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 34. At a third

facility, in addition to conditions similar to the

above, Dr. Haney describes hearing from multiple

prisoners in segregation that they had been kept

outside, in exercise pens, for multiple days on end.

He described this finding as “bizarre and alarming.”

Id. at 67.

In each of these facilities, he observed and spoke

with prisoners in segregation whose mental health he

believes has seriously deteriorated as a result of

their confinement in these conditions.

He also

discusses at some length a bevy of scientific research

he and others have conducted regarding the harmful

psychological effects of segregation, particularly on prisoners who are mentally ill.48 This literature, he

48. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Morgan, offers some contrary evidence from a study he conducted. However, even Dr. Hunter, MHM’s Medical Director and Chief (continued...)
108

says, finds with remarkable consistency that prolonged isolation of the sort he observed in defendants’ facilities results in some prisoners experiencing profound emotional disturbances and serious psychological injuries, including increased “anxiety, withdrawal, hypersensitivity, ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control, irritability, aggression, rage, paranoia, hopelessness, a sense of impending emotional breakdown, self-mutilation, and suicidal ideation and behavior.” Id. at 113. He cites additional studies for the proposition that placement in segregation dramatically increases the risk of self-harm. He also describes a growing “scientific, professional, human rights--and, in fact, correctional--consensus” that the use of
Psychiatrist, testifies in his deposition that “segregation is potentially detrimental to one’s health and well-being.” Hunter Depo., P Ex. 56 (doc. no. 844-6) at 180. He observes that lengthy terms in segregation can “lead to a lot of helplessness, hopelessness, and despair.” Id. at 182. There is certainly a genuine dispute as to this point.
109

segregation is harmful and should be minimized, and that the segregation of mentally ill prisoners should be prohibited outright or very strictly limited. Id. at 103, 153-54.
Dr. Haney also opines that inadequate monitoring and treatment practices further exacerbate the harms caused by placement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation. For one thing, he agrees with and expands upon the statement by Dr. Hunter, MHM’s Medical Director and Chief Psychiatrist, that “[t]here’s a need for closer monitoring or at least a mental health intervention once an inmate is notified officially of a classification change, especially if he’s already in segregation.” Id. at 184 (quoting Hunter Depo. (doc. no. 996-2) at 221). Dr. Haney also emphasizes the need for monitoring of prisoners in segregation, noting that Houser admitted in her deposition that “she does not know how long mental health staff spend in the Segregation Units, [and] does not know if they have set schedules for going into the units.” Id. at 186
110

(citing Houser Depo. (doc. no. 996-17) at 177-78). Dr.

Haney notes that Dr. Hunter admits--in words remarkably

similar to those plaintiffs’ experts used to describe

other interactions with mental-health staff--that

segregation rounds are “somewhat of a drive-by type of

process. It’s usually done at cell side: How are you

doing, how are you getting along; look around inmate’s

cell, seeing what kind of condition he’s in, look at

the inmate, see what kind of condition he’s in, how

he’s looking, how he’s [] acting, how he’s responding

to you.

And, again, it’s pretty cursory, just

cell-side visit.” Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 187

(quoting Hunter Depo. (doc. no. 996-2) at 192).

Additionally, Dr. Burns opines that treatment for

prisoners on suicide or crisis watch is inadequate.

Among other problems, Dr. Burns observes that treatment

of prisoners on watch “is generally limited to brief

cell front contacts by MHP staff asking the prisoner

whether or not he remains suicidal,” and that one

prisoner was not seen by mental-health staff for an

111

entire weekend. Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 46. She also notes that prisoners released from suicide or crisis watch are not routinely placed on the mentalhealth caseload, and cites examples of prisoners who were thereby denied adequate follow-up treatment. As for monitoring, Dr. Burns “found no evidence that ADOC or MHM has a process to ensure constant watch when a prisoner is actively suicidal.” Id. at 47. She notes that the observation forms feature pre-printed 15-minute intervals, and that making observations at “predictable and regular intervals increase[s] the risk that the prisoner on watch has adequate time and opportunity to attempt and complete suicide in between observations.” Id. She also notes that MHM officials acknowledged in depositions that prisoners in crisis are “sometimes placed in inappropriate locations such as offices or libraries rather than in safe cells which increases the risk of self-harm and suicide.” Id. Dr. Haney observed as much during some of this tours, see Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 62 (discussing a
112

prisoner who he found lying on the floor of an unlit

office), and he notes that some of the suicide watch

cells he saw “did not appear suicide proof”--in one,

“there was a rusted metal bed on the floor and

protrusions in the cell that could be used to fasten a

sheet or other ligature.” 868-4) at 40-41.49

Haney Report (doc. no.

Dr. Haney adds his concern regarding statements

made by Dr. Hunter, MHM’s Medical Director and Chief

Psychiatrist, that reflected his and others’ disregard

of prisoners’ threats of self-harm: Dr. Hunter

acknowledged hearing reports that custodial staff made

jokes to prisoners about suicide, and that he knew of

between five and ten instances in the preceding year in

which, in the words of Dr. Haney quoting Dr. Hunter,

“custody staff have challenged prisoners to make good

49. He also reports that at one facility, the body of a prisoner who had committed suicide just a few days before his tour had not been discovered until the day after his death, because staff had not conducted security checks that night.
113

on their threats of self-harm--either ‘called their bluffs’ or explicitly ignored their stated intentions to engage in self-harm and sent them back to their housing unit--and the prisoners in fact engaged in self-harm including instances where the prisoner ‘was sent back to their housing unit only for them to perhaps act out in a more severe manner, such as cut deeper.’” Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 164 (quoting Hunter Depo. (doc. no. 996-2) at 165). (Dr. Haney also notes that Houser testified to her awareness of custodial staff failing to inform mental-health staff of prisoners engaging in self-harm, and of one instance in which this may have contributed to a prisoner’s death.)
Dr. Burns, Dr. Haney, and Eldon Vail, plaintiffs’ correctional expert, further opine regarding the effects of inadequate custodial staff on various
114

aspects of the mental-health care provided to prisoners
in defendants’ custody.50
50. Dr. Haney reports on a number of effects of custodial understaffing, some of which relate directly to the provision of mental-health care at issue in this case and some of which do not. To the extent that Dr. Haney’s report discusses other ramifications of the “out-of-control” nature of defendants’ facilities, the court has considered them, for purposes of this case, only as further confirmation of the extent of the staffing deficit, and not as potential sources of liability. That said, the court would be remiss if it did not state on the record that Dr. Haney’s descriptions of the overall level of violence in certain facilities he visited are extraordinarily troubling. During a single day at Bibb, for example, Dr. Haney personally “witnessed evidence of an uprising by prisoners, an attempted escape, a suicide attempt, evidence of recent fires in the Segregation Units, presumably started by prisoners, and the representation by the Warden that one half of the prison was so unsafe that [Dr. Haney] could not enter it.” Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 51. (The prisoner attempting to commit suicide, by pulling a ligature around his neck, had partially covered the window to his watch cell; a lawyer participating in the tour was the one to notice and summon correctional officers. Id. at 49-50.)) Dr. Haney opined that “[a]ny of these incidents would be noteworthy and indicative of a lack of institutional control,” and that “[t]ogether they reflect the kind of chaos and disorder that appears to pervade the ADOC.” Id. at 51. He observed that over 40 years of studying prisons, he has never “been denied entry to a prison or been unable to complete an inspection because the prison could not ensure [his] safety”; during his (continued...)
115

Dr. Burns concludes, in part based on MHM

employees’ recognition of and complaints about the

problem, that a shortage of correctional officers

undermines prisoners’ access to mental-health care,

because the officers are needed to escort prisoners to,

and supervise them at, individual and group

appointments and activities.

She points, in

particular, to evidence that prisoners who are housed

in a number of segregation and residential treatment

units are not adequately monitored or treated because

inadequate custodial staffing makes it difficult for

mental-health staff to have out-of-cell contact with

them. Vail agrees; in his report, he discusses records

demonstrating that “staffing shortages are creating an

impediment for regular access by mental health staff to

inmates in segregation” at five major facilities. See

Vail Report (doc. no. 868-6) at 67-70. He describes

inspections of facilities in Alabama, this occurred at three out of the six facilities he was scheduled to visit over the course of a week. Id. at 18.
116

notes from a multidisciplinary team meeting at one facility which indicate that a mental health provider “must conduct groups with only a ‘walkie-talkie,’ as there is no officer available to provide security during the group.” Id. at 68.
Dr. Haney, too, gives a number of examples, all of which draw on admissions by staff employed by MHM. For example, he notes that Houser admitted that groups were “frequently” cancelled at six of ADOC’s major facilities, that these shortages also affect “activity tech groups, individual counseling, seeing the providers, psychiatrist or nurse practitioner,” and result in segregation rounds being “often delayed.” Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 176-77 (quoting Houser Depo. (doc. no. 996-32) at 190, 192-93); see also Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 175-76 (quoting Fields Depo. (doc. no. 996-83) at 127-28 (stating that “a lot of the groups and programming were cancelled” due to custodial understaffing at four major facilities). He further notes that Houser stated that the inadequate levels of
117

(and training of) custodial staff at Donaldson--one of ADOC’s facilities designated to provide residential treatment--result in it being a “difficult facility to provide mental health services in at this time,” and create “just a lack of a therapeutic milieu, and that, in and of itself, will cause problems.” Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 177 (quoting Houser Depo (doc. no. 996-32) 206-07). He opines, based on his observations and interviews, that another MHM employee’s description of these problems as “compromise[s]” was “far too generous a euphemism.” Id. at 175.
d. Conclusion This evidence is plainly sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the policies and practices plaintiffs challenge create a substantial risk of serious harm to ADOC prisoners who have serious mental illnesses. To conclude, it is worth noting that even defendants’ own mental-health expert, Dr. Patterson,
118

agreed with many of the findings by Drs. Burns and Haney, including: that “staffing of the facilities is insufficient and a significant number of the mental health staff are unlicensed practitioners,” and that there was “not documented supervision of the unlicensed practitioners, all of whom were providing direct services, and some [of whom] were also supervisors,” Patterson Report (doc. no. 679-9) at 46; that the “physical structures are outdated with regard to the provision of mental health services in that many do not have adequate space for the provision of group and individual counseling and treatment, nor are there adequate beds for the provision of residential treatment (RTU) and stabilization (SU) services,” which “inherently limit[s] the number and capabilities of the mental health staff,” id. at 46-47; that there are “delays in the provision of assessment and treatment services including the provision of medications for inmates, again largely related to the insufficient staffing and inadequate identification of inmates in
119

need of services,” id. at 47; that there are “deficiencies including delays in responses to sick calls, referrals, and scheduled appointments” that “contribute to a failure to provide necessary mental health services” and cause “potential harm,” including “continued pain and suffering of mental health symptoms including suicide and disciplinary actions due to inadequate treatment,” id.; and that there are “deficiencies in adequately identifying inmates during the reception and intake process that are in need of mental health services,” resulting in an “underestimate[]” of “the numbers of inmates in need of mental health services,” id. Dr. Patterson recognized “the need for increased numbers and properly trained and credentialed mental health staff” and supervision by registered nurses of those conducting intake assessments. Id.
He also found that the treatment plans he reviewed “are not appropriate for individual patients,” as they are “neither individualized nor multidisciplinary,” and
120

“were signed on different dates by different people, which indicates that they are not being reviewed by a treatment team simultaneously and with the inclusion of the inmate. This is a deficiency that must be corrected and quite simply is not appropriate.” Id. at 50. He observed “treatment plans that are ‘cookie cutter’ and have the same problems listed over and over again as well as the same interventions and same objectives despite whatever improvements or lack thereof the individual inmate has experienced,” and even found that treatment plans for prisoners in crisis cells failed to “reflect decompensation or deterioration in the inmate’s functioning.” Id. at 50-51.
Based on an audit he conducted, Dr. Patterson concluded that there were three areas of “substantial concern”: “Suicide Risk Evaluation and Management,” “Mental Health Treatment Planning,” and referrals. He identified the first two as “seriously deficient.” Id. at 52.
121

As Dr. Haney put it in his rebuttal report, defendants’ own expert’s “criticisms map almost perfectly onto, and significantly reinforce,” those of plaintiffs’ experts. Haney Rebuttal Report (doc. no. 840-15) at 18.
4. Individual Harm As plaintiffs point out, evidence that the named plaintiffs have suffered harm is relevant to substantiate the assertion that defendants’ policies place them and other at a substantial risk of serious harm. (By this token, corroborating evidence related to the care of named plaintiffs whose claims are not justiciable is just as relevant as that of the named plaintiffs whose claims are justiciable.) However, they need not, as a technical matter, show that harm has already occurred to them in order successfully to demonstrate the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm. What they certainly need not show, despite defendants’ vociferous insistence to the
122

contrary, is that they have each been harmed in ways that, on their own, would suffice to prove a claim for deliberate indifference with respect to the past provision of mental-health care. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 677 (“Because plaintiffs do not base their case on deficiencies in care provided on any one occasion, this Court has no occasion to consider whether these instances of delay--or any other particular deficiency in medical care complained of by the plaintiffs--would violate the Constitution ... if considered in isolation.” (quoting Brown, 563 U.S. at 506 n.3)).
Nevertheless, all of the named plaintiffs have created a material dispute as to whether they have suffered serious harm; indeed, in a few cases defendants’ own expert agrees that the care they have received was inadequate in ways that the court finds clearly amount to serious harm.51 As a preface, the
51. Plaintiffs, and Drs. Burns and Haney in their rebuttal reports, raise significant concerns regarding Dr. Patterson’s assessment of the appropriateness of (continued...)
123

the named plaintiffs’ treatment when he admittedly never spoke with any of them, and relied heavily on records they contend (and, in fact, he agreed) are poorly kept. In noting his agreement that the care of these named plaintiffs’ care is inadequate, the court is not passing on the admissibility or reliability of his evidence. Because plaintiffs have not moved for summary judgment, those are questions for trial.
The court notes that one of the named plaintiffs whose care Dr. Patterson found to be deficient, Carter, has been released. Although his claims are therefore moot, the court will briefly discuss the evidence regarding his mental-health care, because it goes to the substantial risk of serious harm faced by the named plaintiffs who remain incarcerated.
Carter has been diagnosed with psychosis, schizoaffective disorder, adjustment disorder with mood and conduct disturbance, major depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, and impulse control disorder.
Defendants contended in their motion for summary judgment that Carter merely “desire[d] a different type of mental-health treatment, despite his total lack of any qualification to direct his own treatment.” Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (doc. no. 769) at 100. This was a remarkable position, in light of the fact that someone who does have such qualifications--defendants’ own expert, Dr. Patterson--agreed with Carter that he “ha[d] not received adequate mental health care while incarcerated in the Alabama Department of Corrections.” Patterson Report (doc. no. 679-9) at 22. Specifically, Dr. Patterson opined that Carter’s care had been inadequate because his psychotropic medications were discontinued in 2014--despite the fact that, as Dr. (continued...)
124

court notes that there are many other disputes of fact
which are, for purposes of concision, not discussed
Patterson recognized, Carter continued to suffer symptoms that including hearing voices that tell him to cut himself. Id.
In addition to this denial of medication, plaintiffs also noted that Carter was on “seg rotation” (being rotated amongst segregation units at different facilities). His medical records reflected statements to mental-health staff, in line with the evidence offered by Dr. Haney, that “he believe[d] he ha[d] some paranoia because of being in segregation.” Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 102-03; Carter Medical Records, P Ex. 73 (doc. no. 844-23) at 23, MR029623.
Plaintiffs also offered evidence that Carter was denied adequate care when he expressed his intent to harm himself, including testimony indicating that the last time prior to his deposition on which he cut himself with a razor blade, he had written to the mental-health staff, explaining that he “was having suicidal though[s],” but did not “get nothing in respond back.” Carter Depo., P Ex. 30 (doc. no. 840-30) at 340. They also pointed to medical records in which mental-health staff documented that Carter reported hearing voices telling him to kill himself and injure others, and that he was assessed to have a “potential for injury,” but described the plan for his treatment, in its entirety, as “Release to DOC.” Carter Medical Records, P Ex. 73 (doc. no. 844-23) at 14-15, MR003288-89.
125

below; exclusion of a fact from this discussion is not
an indication that it is not in dispute.52
52. Three preliminary unrelated notes bear mentioning:
First, the court notes that its review of the evidence in the voluminous record (filling over 25 boxes) in this case was thorough, despite it being hampered by the need for painstaking deciphering of many of the photocopied, handwritten mental-health records defendants produced to plaintiffs, some of which were barely legible.
Second, the court notes that a number of the named plaintiffs have presented evidence to show that they cut themselves repeatedly with razor blades they were given by custodial staff (and which custodial staff failed to remove from their persons and safe cells). Frequently, these prisoners eventually swallowed the razor blades. The status of this issue is somewhat unclear. Initially, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on this issue; then, the parties reached an agreement sufficient for plaintiffs to withdraw their motion. However, plaintiffs have represented to the court that razor blades are still available to prisoners in crisis, and their expert evidence is sufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to this point; the court will hear more at trial.
Third, the court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs’ complaint does, in a small number of places, use overly broad language to characterize the allegations of the named plaintiffs. At points, plaintiffs’ complaint could be read to allege an outright denial of treatment, when in fact they present (continued...)
126

a. Braggs Braggs has been diagnosed with anxiety, major depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder.53 He takes psychotropic medications for these conditions. Braggs testified in his deposition that he has repeatedly contacted mental-health staff to complain of unpleasant side effects of these

evidence to show, and now contend in their briefing,

that a given plaintiff suffered only from extremely

inadequate treatment.

To a significant degree,

however, this disparity appears to arise as a result of

a genuine dispute as to what constitutes ‘treatment’:

defendants’ briefing considers every contact between a

prisoner and mental-health staff to be treatment,

whereas plaintiffs and their experts have a

substantially narrower conception that excludes what

they describe as cursory contacts.

53. Defendants do not address evidence of individual harm with respect to the mental-health care received by Braggs, Hartley, Jackson, Johnson, and McCoy in their motion for summary judgment, although they do discuss these plaintiffs’ treatment in their statement of undisputed facts. Merely mentioning facts in the statement of facts is not sufficient to meet defendants’ summary-judgment burden on this issue; the court addresses the issue to provide the parties guidance.

127

medications--that they make him feel sick--but has been told that his only other option was to discontinue the medication he had been prescribed. Defendants do not appear to have offered evidence to rebut this point.
Defendants’ expert, Dr. Patterson, notes that Braggs’ treatment plans contemplate regular therapy, but plaintiffs note that no such meetings are documented in his records (including during periods Braggs spent in segregation); instead, the only mental-health contacts documented in his records involve discussions about medication compliance. Defendants respond that plaintiffs admitted that Braggs had received both individual and group counseling while incarcerated. Pls.’ Resp. to State’s Reqs. for Admis. (doc. no. 382-1) at 77. What they actually admitted was that, subject to an objection that the request for admission was “ambiguous as to the time frame or frequency being referenced ... [and] vague as to the meaning of ‘mental health treatment’ and ‘counseling,’”
128

Braggs did receive some mental-health treatment other

than medication at some point.

Plaintiffs also point out that Braggs’ treatment

plans were signed by unsupervised LPNs and by ADOC’s

unlicensed site administrator, and that Braggs has been

classified as MH-1 (“stabilized with mild impairment in

mental functioning”), despite having multiple diagnoses

and being prescribed multiple psychotropic medications.

Dr. Burns found that allowing unsupervised LPNs to make

treatment

decisions

resulted

in

such

misclassification.54

54. Defendants’ contention that Braggs received adequate mental-health treatment is based in part on a letter he sent in 2014 to the former ADOC Commissioner, Kim Thomas--who he believed to be the director of mental health at Hamilton A&I--in which he described mental-health staff as committed and qualified. Braggs Depo., D Ex. 7 (doc. no. 771-19) at 116-18. Braggs also agreed at his deposition that he did not believe that he should be “receiving any different mental health treatment at this time.” Id. at 140.
However, in that same deposition, Braggs testified that he had repeatedly informed the mental-health staff that he was suffering side effects, but was informed that the only options were to endure these effects or (continued...)
129

Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact

as to whether Braggs has been harmed by policies and

practices

regarding

medication

management,

psychotherapeutic

care,

and

assessment

and

classification.

b. Hartley

Hartley has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder.55

Defendants’ expert, Dr. Patterson, reviewed

Hartley’s deposition testimony and his medical records,

and agrees with plaintiffs that he “is not receiving

adequate mental health care.

Interventions to

adequately address his chronic marijuana abuse and the

the symptoms that would return if he stopped taking the medication. Given that context, neither Braggs’s failure to articulate a specific alternative treatment at his deposition nor his letter to the Commissioner demonstrates that he has not suffered harm.
55. In addition to Hartley’s Eighth Amendment claim, he also brings a due-process claim. Evidence as to this latter claim is not addressed here. (continued...)
130

resultant mental dysfunction including his aggression and agitation, and self-injurious behaviors have not been included in his treatment, and he continues to abuse marijuana infrequently. To properly remedy these deficiencies, the treatment team needs to develop an individualized, comprehensive treatment plan and interventions to address his comorbid marijuana use and impact on his mental health functioning.” Patterson Report (doc. no. 679-9) at 41. Dr. Patterson relatedly notes in his report that Hartley’s treatment plans are “not individualized and are repetitive with the same problem statement, interventions and goals repeated treatment plan after treatment plan without reflection of changes in Hartley’s mental status and behaviors.” Id.56
56. Defendants assert that the treatment Hartley was provided with respect to his use of marijuana was adequate, based on records reflecting that mentalhealth staff encouraged him to maintain sobriety after placing him on suicide watch in 2014, when he was experiencing hallucinations caused by use of marijuana. (continued...)
131

Dr. Burns likewise recognized Hartley’s care as seriously deficient. She identified Hartley in her report as a prisoner who “require[es] an RTU level of care but [has been] improperly classified as [an] outpatient[],” and described him as a “seriously mentally ill inmate with side effects from medication and still experiencing symptoms that negatively impact [his] functioning leading to placement on watch in [the] infirmary but not considered for transfer to [a] higher level of care.” Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 37-38.
Plaintiffs have also presented evidence to demonstrate that, although Hartley does have frequent contacts with mental-health staff, they largely involve little or no counseling--which, according to Dr. Patterson, he requires. As one example, they point to his records from the first four months of 2016, noting
Given that defendants’ expert disagrees that this treatment was adequate, there is at least a genuine dispute as to this issue.
132

that he was seen by mental-health staff ten times, but that six of them involved solely medication administration, one was a medication check, and one was a check-in while he was in a crisis cell; only two were counselling sessions, but they were supposed to occur monthly--that is to say, twice as often. As a more recent example, Dr. Burns notes in her report that “[w]hen he was placed in suicide watch at St. Clair shortly before our interview, his only contact with mental health staff was through the door.” Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 46.
In addition, Hartley has offered evidence to show inadequate medication management: his medical records show that he has complained of shaking caused by the Prolixin shots he receives, that he could not be prescribed a sufficiently high dose of a medication to treat these side effects because it adversely affected his kidneys, and that he has requested--but not been prescribed--alternative antipsychotic medication (from a class of medications that, according to MHM records,
133

providers were discouraged from prescribing due to cost).
Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact as to whether Hartley has been harmed by policies and practices regarding assessment and classification, psychotherapeutic care, and medication management.57
c. Jackson Jackson has been diagnosed with a mood disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and depression. Plaintiffs have presented evidence to show that his extended, continuous placement in segregation, from 2007 to 2014, has resulted in psychological harm. Dr. Haney identified Jackson as an example of a prisoner who has suffered from placement in segregation, noting that Jackson stated that segregation “breaks you down mentally, you have anxiety and all this stuff but you
57. Hartley’s medical records also indicate that at least one mental-health appointment of his has been cancelled due to inadequate custodial staffing.
134

don’t realize it’s happening to you.” Haney Report Appendix (doc. no. 868-4) at 39-40.
Moreover, plaintiffs have offered evidence sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether he received adequate mental-health treatment while in segregation. Dr. Haney cited Jackson as an example of the cursory nature of mental-health contacts in segregation, noting that he stated that the counselor “comes around to your cell, runs by, ‘you want to talk to mental health?’ but half the time you don’t even see them, they rush through,” and tell the prisoners that the “only thing we want to know is, are you suicidal?” Id. Jackson also reported that when he was taken out of his cell for a counseling appointment once a month, it would last only “10-15 minutes, at most,” and that the counselors “change so often, you don’t see the same person twice, so you don’t form any real connection to them.” Id.
Plaintiffs also offer evidence to show that Jackson’s mental-health classification failed to
135

account for the severity of his symptoms; he was, until
recently, classified at the lowest level, MH-1, despite
his diagnoses--which providers have recognized are
accompanied by “severe behavioral disturbances”--his
receipt of multiple psychotropic medications including
an antipsychotic, and his multiple recent placements on
suicide watch.
Finally, Dr. Patterson noted his concern about
lapses in medication administration for Jackson, and
Jackson’s medical records indicate that a number of his
mental-health appointments were canceled due to
security issues arising from insufficient number of
custodial officers.58
58. Defendants contend that Jackson has received adequate mental-health treatment because he agreed during his deposition that he does not “have any concerns” about the mental-health treatment decisions his providers have made. Although he testified that he wants “better” treatment, he was unable at his deposition to identify any specific inadequacies in his care. Jackson Depo., D Ex. 45-1 (doc. no. 777-1) at 149-50. As was the case with Braggs, Jackson’s failure to articulate a specific, alternative course of treatment at his deposition does not necessarily mean (continued...)
136

Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact as to whether Jackson has been harmed by policies and practices regarding segregation, psychotherapeutic care, assessment and classification, medication management, and custodial staffing.
d. Johnson Johnson has a significant intellectual disability, as reflected in his difficulty answering straightforward questions at his deposition. Prior to his conviction, he was evaluated at the state mental hospital and diagnosed as depressed and possibly psychotic; the evaluators believed that he might be incompetent to stand trial. After his admission to prison, he had no contact with mental-health staff for about 20 years, until he
that he has not suffered harm from inadequate treatment, especially given the testimony by Jackson and expert opinion regarding his continuous stay in segregation and consequent deterioration.
137

was placed on suicide watch in late 2015. At that time, his psychiatrist observed that he was experiencing “paranoia [and] possible delusions,” and noted that despite his assessment at the state mental hospital, he was not on the mental-health caseload. Johnson Medical Records, P Ex. 62 (doc. no. 844-12) at 15, MR047700. Remarkably, in the section of the chart for symptoms, Dr. Hunter noted as follows: “He is now involved with SPLC to perhaps go to court given the beforementioned.” Id.
Plaintiffs have also offered evidence to show that when Johnson was released from suicide watch, he was placed in segregation, and, though referred for mentalhealth treatment, did not receive it. See Haney Report Appendix (doc. no. 868-4) at 37. Although he has some contact with mental-health staff every week or two, these interactions are very brief.
Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact as to whether Johnson has been harmed by policies and
138

practices regarding assessment and classification, crisis case, and psychotherapeutic care.
e. McCoy McCoy has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and is delusional.59 Plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to whether McCoy has received an appropriate level of care. Over 20 years in prison, he has spent only two years receiving residential, as opposed to outpatient, care. Dr. Burns concluded that he required an RTU level of care and had been improperly classified. Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 37-38. McCoy testified, and Dr. Burns recognized, that he is seen infrequently and inconsistently by mental-health staff, sometimes going months at a time without seeing a psychiatrist or nurse

59. In addition to his McCoy also claims that he (continued...)
139

Eighth Amendment claim, has been involuntarily

practitioner. His medical records and his testimony reflect that his treatment plans are frequently altered outside of his presence; he does not believe that he has ever attended a meeting of his treatment team. McCoy’s medical records reflect that he suffers from side effects from his psychotropic medication, including pain at the injection site, stiffness, and nausea, and he testifies that he has been refused treatment for these side effects.
Additionally, McCoy has been repeatedly placed in prolonged segregation, despite statements by his mental-health care providers that “[p]rolonged isolation will adversely affect [his] mental stability,” and that “prolonged placement in segregation may cause [him] to decompensate or deteriorate psychologically,” and that his “mental health has deteriorated since he was put in segregation.” McCoy Institutional File, P Ex. 101
medicated. The evidence in support of the latter claim (continued...)
140

(doc. no. 850-1) at 15, ADOC021879; 3, ADOC021336; 8, ADOC021491.
Dr. Burns explains in her rebuttal report that when she interviewed McCoy, “he was psychotic with poorly organized thought processes and nearly incomprehensible speech.” Burns Rebuttal Report (doc. no. 840-14) at 1. In her review of McCoy’s records, she “found that the medical record did not accurately portray or document his condition.” Id. She added that “there is evidence in the record that in spite of his psychotic state, he has been housed in segregation, seen infrequently and [] not received adequate medication management.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact as to whether McCoy has been harmed by policies and practices regarding assessment and classification, psychotherapeutic care, medication management, and segregation.
is not addressed here. 141

f. Pruitt Pruitt has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. He has repeatedly attempted to harm himself, and offered evidence sufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to the adequacy of the care he received during and after these crises. His medical records reflect that during a six-month period beginning at the end of 2013, he was admitted to a crisis cell at least five times (including, in one instance, for as long as eleven days); as defendants’ expert, Dr. Patterson, recognizes in his report with respect to two of the admissions, there is no indication that he was seen by a psychiatrist or nurse practitioner (or, in most cases, a psychologist) during any of these stints. Patterson Report (doc. no. 679-9) at 42-43. His medical records reflect the effects of inadequate monitoring. During one admission to a suicide cell, another prisoner threw disinfectant in Pruitt’s face. During another, he was housed in a
142

suicide cell located on death row (a practice Dr. Haney roundly condemns), and other prisoners threw burning fabric onto him, burning his leg; he was not removed from his cell until about 45 minutes had elapsed.
Plaintiffs have also presented evidence to show that the follow-up care Pruitt has received after leaving the suicide and crisis cells has been inadequate. Dr. Burns cites him as an example of her general conclusion that prisoners released from crisis cells are “not routinely placed on the mental health caseload” and are thus denied “adequate follow-up.” Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 46-47 & n.58. He stated in his deposition that he had requested mental-health treatment on a number of occasions, but was told that he would be seen by mental-health staff when they had time, and then not seen. Pruitt testified that the mental-health counselor had refused to see him the week preceding his deposition. He explained that the only contact with mental-health staff he had during the two years preceding his
143

deposition had occurred during segregation rounds; unlike some other prisoners, he was never taken out of his cell for counseling. Dr. Burns corroborates this statement, noting that his charts reflect that he has been offered “no treatment other than psychotropic medications,” and that he has “repeatedly asked to see a mental health counselor, including submitting a request slip, but no one has spoken with him individually.” Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 36 n.45. Dr. Burns also cites him as an example of inadequate treatment leading to repeated self-harm. Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 18-19 & n.18.
Dr. Burns also recognizes in her report that Pruitt has repeatedly received disciplinary sanctions for symptoms of his mental illness--he has been cited for creating a “security, safety or health hazard” when he has injured himself. Burns Report (doc. no. 568-2) at 29.
Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact as to whether Pruitt has been harmed by policies and
144

practices regarding crisis care, assessment and

classification,

psychotherapeutic

care,

and

disciplinary sanctions.

g. Wallace

Wallace has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder,

paranoid schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder. He also

has an intellectual disability. He has very recently

engaged in self-harm, attempting to commit suicide by

biting himself.

Defendants’ expert, Dr. Patterson, agrees with

plaintiffs that “[h]is mental health treatment has been

inadequate in the ADOC.” Patterson Report (doc. no.

679-9) at 28.

In particular, he explains that

Wallace’s “treatment plans are inadequate and do not

effectively address the symptoms of his Bipolar

Disorder,” and “his intellectual disability also

contributes to his variable participation in treatment

and is not adequately addressed in the treatment plans.

145

The medical records do not indicate he has been

consistently offered group therapies to address his

intellectual deficits and [] the focus of the plans

appears to be on his hygiene and participation, but the

interventions do not realistically provide for services

to address his dual diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder and

Intellectual Disability.”

Id.

This alone is

sufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to

whether Wallace has been harmed defendants’ provision

of inadequate mental-health care.

The record also contains evidence from Wallace’s

deposition and his institutional file showing that he

has received numerous sanctions due to symptoms of his

mental illness, including nine disciplinary citations

for cutting his wrists.

Plaintiffs have also offered evidence to show that

Wallace has received inadequate psychotherapeutic

treatment. Although defendants respond that he had 550

interactions with mental-health staff between January

2012 and the end of September 2015, plaintiffs respond

146

that many of these interactions were cursory, citing examples of extremely brief interactions. Moreover, Dr. Haney cited Wallace as an example of a prisoner receiving who had primarily brief, cell-front interactions with mental-health staff; Dr. Haney’s report also noted that Wallace explained that, although he is removed from his cell for a counseling session once every other month, “officers hurry [the counselor] up if she spends too long with inmates.” Haney Report Appendix (doc. no. 868-4) at 40.
Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact as to whether Wallace has been harmed by policies and practices regarding crisis care, disciplinary sanctions, and psychotherapeutic care.
h. Williams Williams has been diagnosed with a mood disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; she has previously been prescribed antipsychotic medication and
147

received inpatient psychiatric treatment.60 She has a
history of sexual abuse.
Plaintiffs have offered evidence sufficient to
create a dispute of material fact as to whether she has
been denied adequate mental-health treatment as a
result of the decision not to place her on the
mental-health caseload for several years after her
admission. Despite being referred for an evaluation,
Williams was not placed on the mental-health caseload
upon reentering custody in late 2012. In March 2014,
she cut herself a number of times after a traumatic
incident,61 but was released from the safe cell without
60. Williams is a transgender woman. Defendants have housed her in male facilities.
61. The record reflects that Williams told mentalhealth providers that she was cutting herself because she wanted to speak with her attorney or her husband about this incident, but that she was not in fact suicidal. In addition, she refused to speak with mental-health staff on certain occasions. Although it is a somewhat close call, the court concludes that the evidence about these repeated instances of self-harm, combined with the opinion of plaintiffs’ experts that the monitoring of and care provided to prisoners who (continued...)
148

any plan for follow-up treatment, and, despite her requests, without being put on the mental-health caseload. Williams’s experience dovetails with Dr. Burns’s opinion that prisoners released from crisis cells are not being provided adequate follow-up treatment.
Moreover, plaintiffs have offered evidence to show that the care Williams received immediately surrounding the cutting incidents was deficient, including medical records showing that the providers who monitored her while she was in the crisis cell were not mental-health staff, and her deposition testimony that when she did speak with a mental-health provider, the interactions were brief--about five minutes. On one instance, her medical records reflect that she was twice returned to segregation--over the course of less than an hour and a half--after cutting herself and indicating her intent
are harming themselves is inadequate, suffices to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Williams has been harmed.
149

to continue doing so. Each time, she followed through,

and was brought back to the medical unit. Again, this

evidence appears to illustrate Dr. Burns’s findings

regarding the inadequacy of monitoring of prisoners

engaging in self-harm.

Finally, plaintiffs note that Williams’s self-harm

began within a few days after her placement in

segregation. In her declaration, Williams echoed what

Dr. Haney explained in his report: “Being in

segregation messes with my mental capacity.

It

triggers me to harm myself.” Williams Decl., P Ex. 83

(doc. no. 679-3) at 2. Plaintiffs have therefore

created a dispute of material fact as to whether

Williams’s placement in segregation subjected her to

psychological (as well as physical) harm.

Plaintiffs have created a dispute of material fact

as to whether Williams has been harmed by policies and

practices regarding assessment and classification,

crisis care, and segregation.

150

5. Deliberate Indifference Plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to establish subjective deliberate indifference in multiple different ways. First, plaintiffs apprised defendants--in writing, prior to commencing litigation--that the policies and practices at issue in this case created a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners with serious mental illness. Second, MHM officials recognized the necessity of reforms (and the ways that prisoners were being harmed), and related these concerns to defendants, who failed to take responsive action, whether because they lacked sufficient funds or for some other reason. Third, plaintiffs offer evidence regarding defendants’ decision to renew MHM’s contract despite serious, recognized problems, and failure to monitor the care being provided by MHM, and argue compellingly that this
151

evidence, too, could support a finding of subjective deliberate indifference.62
As discussed at length in the opinion as to ADAP,
ADAP and plaintiffs’ counsel from the Southern Poverty
Law Center discussed in detail the allegations in this
case in a letter they sent to defendants prior to
beginning this litigation. Courts have repeatedly
found subjective deliberate indifference in systemic
cases based on the defendants’ receipt of
communications and reports setting forth the ways in
which the medical or mental-health care provided in
their prisoners was inadequate and failure to respond.
In Scott v. Clarke, 64 F. Supp. 3d 813, 835-37
(W.D. Va. 2014) (Moon, J.), the court found that
62. Finally, plaintiffs have offered evidence of egregious and widespread shortcomings which appear to be manifested in such obvious ways that the court could infer subjective deliberate indifference based on their mere existence. The court has discussed this evidence at some length and will not tarry further, except to conclude that these facts, if proven at trial, could well support an inferential finding of subjective deliberate indifference.
152

plaintiffs had demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to the defendants’ subjective deliberate indifference to constitutionally inadequate medical care based in significant part on plaintiffs’ counsel’s pre-litigation letter to the defendants. This letter “notif[ied] [them] that Plaintiffs and other women residing at FCCW ‘have suffered and continue to suffer the adverse physical and mental effects of FCCW’s failure to provide care or provision of deficient care in deliberate indifference to their serious medical conditions’”; explained that despite delegating the provision of health care to a contractor, defendants retained “an affirmative duty” to ensure that the contractor was not subjecting prisoners to harm or a risk thereof by providing inadequate care; noted that defendants had been unresponsive to grievances regarding deficient care; “provided its recipients with an itemized listing of specific areas of concern in regard to the quality of medical care provided at FCCW”; “advised the addressees
153

of the potential legal implications of the sub-standard care described under the Eighth Amendment”; and “invited [them] to commence negotiations.” Id. at 836-37. The defendants failed to take action in response to the letter from plaintiffs’ counsel; plaintiffs then filed suit. The court found that this and other evidence of defendants’ “failure to require or undertake corrective action and [their] ‘hands-off’ attitude towards [their] medical care contractors ... constitute[d] ample grounds for a finding of deliberate indifference.” Id. at 839. The initiation of this litigation occurred in very similar fashion.
Other courts have similarly found subjective awareness based on external reports. See LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1536-37 (subjective awareness shown based in part on “an external management review of [the prison] conducted from August 26 to 29, 1980,” which “concluded that ‘[t]he assault trend, both inmate on inmate and inmate on staff, from July 1979, through June 1980, has increased’”); Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
154

1261 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Thompson, J.) (subjective awareness shown based in part on “correspondence between the DOC and the Department of Justice” that “demonstrates that the DOC had knowledge of the allegations of serious harm being inflicted by prison officers upon inmates by means of the hitching post”); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1300, 1317 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (Karlton, J.) (subjective awareness shown based in part on “the Stirling Report produced pursuant to a legislative mandate and the CDC commissioned Scarlett Carp Report,” “regarding the prevalence of, and the provision of mental health care services to, inmates who suffer from [serious mental] disorders”); Harris v. Angelina Cty., Tex., 31 F.3d 331, 335–36 (5th Cir. 1994) (subjective awareness shown based in part on “Reports from the Texas Commission on Jail Standards to the County”).
Moreover, plaintiffs have presented a wealth of direct evidence demonstrating that defendants were apprised of at least some of the serious inadequacies
155

in mental-health care now challenged even before

counsel brought them to their attention.

The

depositions of MHM administrators are replete with

acknowledgements of their awareness of--and

communication with defendants and their staff

about--the problems documented by plaintiffs’ experts.

For example, with respect to the staff’s ability to

handle the mental-health caseload: MHM Medical Director

and Chief Psychiatrist Dr. Hunter admits that the

combination of the increased size and severity of the

mental-health caseload with the staffing decision by

ADOC discussed above have “start[ed] to tax our ability

to adequately do what we do.” Hunter Depo., P Ex. 16

(doc. no. 675-16) at 44. A recent audit by MHM of

Donaldson, one of ADOC’s treatment-oriented facilities,

recognizes “a shortage of mental health staff” and

attendant problems, including that “admission nursing

assessments to the RTU were not being completed” and

“treatment plans were not being completed, not

individualized.” Fields Depo. (doc. no. 996-83) at

156

127.

Houser testified that MHM had repeatedly

requested that ADOC provide funds to hire additional

mental-health staff, “in order for us to be able to

provide services in a more timely way,” and because the

“number of crises that go on on a daily basis ... takes

away from doing the daily therapeutic things for the

people on the caseload.” Houser Depo., P Ex. 15 (doc.

no. 675-15) at 22. The funds MHM requested were not

provided, due to “state budget issues.” Id. at 79-82.

As another example, Dr. Hunter also agrees with

plaintiffs’ experts concern about the use of

residential treatment units to house prisoners in

segregation without mental illnesses. Houser, too,

acknowledges that residential treatment units have been

used as “overflow seg,” that this results in problems

with “security” and “programming” in the units, and

that it causes delays in mentally ill prisoners

receiving treatment. Houser Depo. (doc. no. 996-17) at

191-92; Houser Depo. (doc. no. 996-32) at 59-60. Dr.

Hunter was blunter: “We’ve always had a problem with

157

our treatment units, our stabilization units, doubling as a segregation unit. And we’ve been clear and vocal that that’s not the best use of our crisis space, and it does compromise treatment.” Hunter Depo. (doc. no. 996-2) at 159. A correctional administrator’s failure to respond when mental-health providers in his facilities are “clear and vocal” that their ability to provide care is being undermined reflects deliberate indifference.
As for the placement of prisoners with mental illness in segregation, Dr. Hunter explains that he met with correctional administrators in early 2015 to share concerns about “the deleterious effects of long-term seg placement” and “what other systems are doing in that regard to address their problem”; he reports that the Commissioner’s chief of staff was present at the meeting and stated that the Commissioner “very much would like some reform on how seg is handled here in Alabama.” Hunter Depo. (doc. no. 996-2) at 184-86. Houser describes MHM’s effort to communicate at this
158

meeting “how when inmates are detained in a single cell for long periods of time, it will cause--often cause further decompensation in their mental health.” Houser Depo. (doc. no. 996-32) at 66.63 In particular, this meeting with ADOC administrators about the use of segregation was apparently prompted by an increasing rate of suicide over the past few years. Dr. Hunter explained at the meeting that in “looking at the suicides on record for that period of time, again a common denominator in most of them was segregation placement or the prospect of segregation placement,” but testified that no follow-up steps had been taken by defendants “to address mental health implications of segregation,” and that no follow-up meeting had occurred, despite an agreement to have one. Hunter Depo., P Ex. 16 (doc. no. 675-16) at 191, 200-01. At
63. This concern was put in stronger terms still in the minutes of a meeting of MHM administrators in July of 2013: “DOC is over using segregation on MH inmates. They want to punish them.” CQI Meeting Minutes, P Ex. 182 (doc. no. 850-82) at 61.
159

the risk of stating the obvious, a correctional administrator’s failure to take any corrective (or even responsive) action when the chief physician responsible for providing mental-health care to prisoners in his custody tells him that his practice of placing mentally ill prisoners in segregation is resulting in their deaths is a textbook case of deliberate indifference, and truly shocks the conscience.
Plaintiffs also point to defendants’ failure to conduct more than minimal auditing of the mental-health care being provided, and their failure to respond to serious concerns raised by the auditing that was actually done, as further evidence of deliberate indifference. Although the Associate Commissioner and the Office of Health Services (OHS) she runs are responsible, under the contract, from monitoring the performance of MHM in delivering mental-health care, the evidence suggests that they have abdicated this obligation to engage in “continuous quality improvement.” Mental Health Services Contract, P Ex.
160

153 (doc. no. 682-13) at 9, ADOC00330. In 2013 and 2014, OHS conducted only two formal audits, both of the same residential treatment unit at one facility, Donaldson, in April and May 2013. This audit revealed problems in a variety of areas including, among others, access to mental-health care, treatment planning, medication administration, and the placement of prisoners who did not require residential care in treatment beds. Depositions revealed that OHS did not work with MHM to develop a plan to address these problems, re-audit the unit, or meet more than once do discuss the results; no one from MHM or the facility was present at the only meeting. An MHM employee testified at her deposition that many of the problems identified in that audit remained three years later. Although MHM does conduct more extensive quality improvement activities (and setting aside the inadequacies in this oversight as described by plaintiffs’ experts), which document problems at different facilities with, among other things,
161

delinquent appointments, outdated treatment plans, and medication errors, OHS does not request or receive copies of the corrective action plans MHM creates in response to its audit findings, and the Associate Commissioner does not request or receive MHM’s annual contract compliance report.64 She does not request or receive reports from the member of her staff who attends MHM’s quality improvement meetings, or review minutes of those meetings. The OHS audits that were conducted provide further support for the conclusion that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioner were aware of serious problems in the delivery of mental-health care to prisoners; their failure to conduct further audits or review the audits that are
64. In fact, the Associate Commissioner testified that she “can’t say for certain” whether the contract compliance report is even being produced, as required, on a yearly basis. She explained that “[a] lot of that was handled directly with Dr. Cavanaugh,” an individual who she then acknowledged has “been dead maybe a year and a half.” Naglich Depo., P Ex. 22 (doc. no. 676-2) at 182.
162

conducted by MHM is further evidence of their failure
to take reasonable responsive action. Together, they
are yet another basis on which the court could conclude
that defendants have been deliberately indifferent.65
B. Due Process
Defendants move for summary judgment with respect
to involuntary-medication claims of Bui, Hartley, and
McCoy, on the grounds that Bui has received adequate
due process and that the other two prisoners have
65. Plaintiffs also suggest that defendants’ decision to enter, in 2013, into a “capitated” contract that provides a certain, fixed amount of funding per prisoner reflects deliberate indifference because it creates a profit incentive for MHM to spend as little as possible in providing mental-health care. As another court has recently recognized, entering into such a contract can reflect a privileging of cost considerations over medical needs that constitutes deliberate indifference. See Scott, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 839-41; see also Manis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 302, 305 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (Higgins, J.) (“Especially when a private corporation is hired to operate a prison, there is an obvious temptation to skimp on civil rights whenever it would help to maximize shareholders’ profits.”). The court will consider evidence going to this issue at trial.
163

consented to receiving the medication (such that it was not involuntary at all).66 The court finds that summary

judgment is due to be denied in part and granted in

part with respect to these claims.

In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court

recognized that a prisoner possesses “a significant

liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted

administration of anti-psychotic drugs under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 494 U.S.

210, 221–22 (1990).

Given that the purpose of

psychotropics is “to alter the will and the mind of the

subject,” forced medication “constitutes a deprivation

of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.”

Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). Nonetheless, the right to refuse

treatment of psychotropic drugs is not absolute.

Although a prisoner’s constitutional right to be free

66. Dillard and Terrell also brought due-process claims falling within this category. These claims are moot.
164

from unwanted medication is evaluated in light of the fact that he is incarcerated, id. at 222, involuntary-medication orders must meet minimum standards of substantive and procedural due process, id. at 220.
In Harper, the Supreme Court concluded that “given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the state to treat a prisoner who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will,” if (1) “the inmate is dangerous to himself or others” and (2) “the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Id. at 227. Because Washington’s policy met these substantive guarantees and provided adequate administrative procedures--including notice, a right to be present at an adversary hearing, and to present and cross examine witnesses--prior to a determination that prisoners would be medicated over his objections, the court found Washington’s policy to comport with due process. Id. at 235.
165

Moreover, since Harper, courts have recognized that the viability of involuntary-medication claims do not depend upon the means used to compel the administration of unwanted medication: violence, the threat of violence, or the threat of other “adverse consequences.” United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1054 n.10 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Roland v. McMonagle, 2015 WL 5918179, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015) (Oetken, J.) (“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits prison officers from using the threat of violence to compel an inmate to ingest a drug, particularly where no medical professional has authorized forced medication.”); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (“Since Chambers v. State of Florida, this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical.... A number of cases have demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, that the efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be matched ... by more sophisticated modes of ‘persuasion.’”). However, mere encouragement to take a prescribed medication does not
166

give rise to a constitutional claim. See Abbott v. Soong, 2016 WL 1170944, at *3 (M.D. La. Mar. 2, 2016) (Wilder-Doomes, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1215369 (M.D. La. Mar. 23, 2016) (Dick, J.).
1. Substantive Due Process Bui, the one plaintiff who is currently subject to an involuntary-medication order, has created disputes of material fact with respect to whether the initial order and its repeated renewals violated his substantive and procedural due-process rights. Bui has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, depressed type. Since 2007, he has been subject to a continuously renewed order for involuntary antipsychotic medication, which he receives by monthly injection. It is clear that Bui does not take his medication voluntarily: his medical record reflects repeated verbal requests to staff to terminate the involuntary-medication order, and indicates that on at
167

least one occasion he agreed to the injection only when

“confronted with possible interventions (DOC

assistance).” Bui Medical Records, P Ex. 68 (doc. no.

844-18) at 11, MR002531. It also indicates that he

formally appealed the order in 2009, but that the

committee concluded that his denial of any mental

illness was evidence that the order should be

continued. Id. at 40, MR002726.

Notes

from

the

review

of

this

involuntary-medication order include suggestions in

February 2008 and January 2010 that, as put in the

latter instance, he would be a “good candidate for

discontinuing the involuntary medication order at next

review.” Id. at 47, MR002833; 32, MR002674. However,

in July 2010, the order was renewed based on his “lack

of insight regarding his mental illness,” the

likelihood that he would stop taking his medication if

it was not involuntarily administered, and his recent

gains from treatment. Id. at 30-31, MR002660-61. The

168

order has subsequently been renewed, about every six months.
Plaintiffs have offered evidence to show that the decision to continue involuntary medication has not been based on current symptoms demonstrating a grave disability or danger to himself or others, but rather on the fact that he denies the existence of his mental illness. Plaintiffs note that the fact that Bui receives a long-acting injection on a monthly basis means that he has never been able to appear (and be observed) un-medicated at any of his hearings, as he is entitled by ADOC regulations to do. The evidence in the record shows that prior to the initiation of his involuntary medication, Bui’s symptoms involved inappropriate behavior such as touching of female staff and proselytizing--but no “outward aggression or violence either to himself or others,” Hunter Depo. (doc. no. 996-2) at 256-59--and that his symptoms have improved over time, allowing him to move into general population. But defendants have not shown the absence
169

of a dispute of material fact as to whether his current
symptoms warrant ongoing involuntary medication.67
Summary judgment will therefore be denied as to whether
Bui’s involuntary medication violates his substantive
due-process rights.
67. Defendants contend that there is no dispute as to whether it “[w]ould ... be appropriate to continue [a prisoner; specifically, Bui] on involuntary medications solely because he’s doing well,” noting that their expert, Dr. Patterson, stated in his deposition that this would “absolutely” be appropriate, and contending that this evidence is unrebutted. Patterson Depo., P Ex. 12 (doc. no. 840-12) at 240. Even if this is so, this testimony goes only whether continuation would be in the patient’s medical interest, not to whether it would be necessary because he is a danger to himself or others. (To the extent that Dr. Patterson opined that a patient “doing well” is a sufficient basis, on its own, to continue involuntary medication indefinitely, his opinion is contrary to Supreme Court law. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. Plaintiffs point to the deposition testimony of Dr. Charles Woodley that a determination as to a patient’s dangerousness should be based on observations within the past year. Woodley Depo., P Ex. 58 (doc. no. 844-8) at 110-11. In light of the undisputed evidence that Bui is not currently a danger, and the evidence in the record suggesting that involuntary medication may no longer be in his medical interest, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether continuation of his involuntary-medication order violates his substantive due-process rights.
170

2. Procedural Due Process Plaintiffs also contend that defendants have violated Bui’s right to procedural due process. They identify evidence of a number of inadequacies in the hearing process that has been afforded Bui: most of the hearing notices Bui received did not indicate the recommended medication and/or the reasons for the hearing, and some of the hearing notices include dates that appear to have been changed or were dated for the same day as the hearing or, in one case, the day after the hearing. Plaintiffs also presented some records that do not indicate--as they should--that Bui was provided with a staff advisor. Defendants first contend that Bui’s procedural due-process claim fails as a matter of law because ADOC’s regulation setting forth procedures for involuntary medication is modeled after the Washington regulation that was upheld by the Supreme Court in Harper. However, simply showing that the regulation
171

itself is constitutional is not sufficient to defeat

plaintiffs’ claim that the procedure actually afforded

to Bui--which they say fails to comply with that

regulation--is unconstitutional.

As the court

understands it, plaintiffs’ claim is not that Harper

establishes the constitutional procedural floor, or

that a prisoner has a constitutional due-process right

to the procedures outlined in state regulations, but

rather that the procedures in fact being provided do

not suffice; deviations from the regulations approved

in Harper and from state regulations are certainly

pertinent to this inquiry, though not dispositive. His

claim is therefore a potentially viable one.

Defendants also note that Bui answered in the

affirmative during his deposition when asked

(generally, rather than with respect to any one of his

numerous hearings) whether he had received notice of

and an opportunity to attend his involuntary-medication

hearings, that he had refused to attend some hearings,

and that he had received the various procedural

172

protections to which he was entitled at each one, such as the presence of a staff advisor, a right to appeal, and the ability to be unmedicated. However, Bui is not a native or fluent speaker of English, and he appears to have misunderstood the one question in this series to which he gave more than a monosyllabic response. Bui Depo., D Ex. 14-1 (doc. no. 772-2) at 72-73 (“Q: You had the ability to be unmedicated on that day, correct? A: Yeah. I told him [the doctor] I was-every time I see him, I told him I don’t want to get a shot no more.”). Moreover, this admission appears clearly to be untrue; as plaintiffs point out, Bui is required to receive a monthly injection of a long-lasting medication that makes his appearance at a hearing in an unmedicated state impossible. In light of this, and the apparent deficiencies revealed by his records, the court concludes that Bui’s affirmative answers are insufficient to support summary judgment, and that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to his procedural due-process claim.
173

3. Voluntary and Knowing Consent As for Hartley and McCoy, plaintiffs agree that they have signed forms consenting to administration of psychiatric medication,68 but offer evidence to create a dispute of material fact as to whether there is a practice of coercing prisoners to take psychotropic medication and failing to inform them adequately about their medication, and as to whether this practice has resulted in the consent ostensibly given by Hartley and McCoy not being knowing or voluntary. See Hightower ex rel. Dahler v. Olmstead, 959 F. Supp. 1549, 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (citing Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 398 (11th Cir. 1988)) (“In order to consent, Plaintiffs
68. With respect to McCoy, plaintiffs agree only that his signed name appears on the forms; McCoy testified that the signatures were not his own. Although the court might ordinarily hesitate to credit testimony to this effect and place a heavy burden on an individual claiming a signature to be inauthentic to demonstrate as much, the evidence corroborating his other allegations cautions in favor of hearing him out.
174

must waive their liberty interest in refusing

antipsychotic medication.

Any waiver of a

constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary.”).

Other than during a one-month period in 2005, McCoy

has not been under an involuntary-medication order.

However, he testified at his deposition that he

verbally refused to take his shot on multiple occasions

(constituting a withdrawal of prior consent), and that

he has at times been subjected to force at the hands of

correctional officers, threatened with placement in

segregation, and actually placed in an isolation cell

as a result of his refusal. (Defendants suggest that

his testimony relates only to an incident in 2009. But

he testified in his deposition that he continued to

refuse medication and that officers threaten to “lock

him up” if he doesn’t accept the shot he receives

“right now.” McCoy Depo., D Ex. 61-1 (doc. no. 778-17)

at 34. Another plaintiff corroborated portions of this

175

account in his deposition.69 Moreover, plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Burns, observed during her interviews with prisoners that they “consistently reported being subjected to being threatened with forcible medication injections if they refused either oral medications or a scheduled injection; and some said they had actually been subjected to the use of force to be given an injection of a refused medication.” Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 43.
Defendants do not substantively dispute this account of coercion, merely responding that McCoy signed a number of consent forms, that his medical records at points document McCoy’s statements agreeing to be medicated, and that his assertion of a forged signature and his testimony describing coercion do not
69. The court recognizes that certain evidentiary objections have been raised regarding this testimony; these will be resolved at trial, as a genuine dispute of material fact exists even without it.
176

suffice to create a genuine dispute of fact.70 But whether or not he signed the forms, he has offered evidence sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether his consent on many past occasions has been voluntary, and as to whether defendants’ have an

70. Defendants rely on Whitehead v. Burnside, 403

F. App’x 401, 403-04 (11th Cir. 2010), for the

proposition that McCoy’s own “[s]elf-serving

statements” alleging coercion “[can]not create a

question of fact in the face of contradictory,

contemporaneously created medical records.”

This

argument fails because McCoy offers not only his own

statement but also the report of Dr. Burns that other

prisoners described similar treatment (as well as the

testimony of another prisoner who observed one of the

incidents). Were this evidence inadequate to proceed

to trial on a claim like McCoy’s, medical providers who

failed to document their own malfeasance would be

entirely protected from liability. Illegal behavior

like threatening a patient in order to coerce him to

consent to medication is obviously not the sort of

thing likely to be documented, even when it does occur.

(Whitehead, by contrast, tried to create a dispute

about something very likely to be documented if it had

occurred: a recommendation that a fractured kneecap

required immediate surgery. Not only did his medical

records not reflect that recommendation, prison records

revealed that the administrator who Whitehead claimed

had overruled the physician’s recommendation was not

present at the prison at the time.)

177

unconstitutional practice of allowing staff to coerce

prisoners into taking psychotropic medication.

The due-process claim brought by Hartley, however,

does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact.

Hartley is developmentally disabled and reads at a

third-grade level, and testified that he sometimes

requires assistance in reading and understanding

documents he signs. He also testified that he does not

know what psychotropic medications he takes or what

they are for.

However, Hartley agreed that

mental-health staff would answer his questions and

explain the documents he was asked to sign.

Furthermore, plaintiffs do not present evidence of a

policy or practice of mental-health staff failing to

educate prisoners about their medications. While Dr.

Burns spoke to some prisoners who do not know what

medications they are taking, this alone--absent some

evidence that this information was not discussed by

providers, or that these prisoners were not competent

to consent--would not be sufficient evidence from which

178

to conclude that providers consistently fail to get informed consent from prisoners.71 Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted with respect to Hartley’s due-process claim.
C. Liability Defendants contend that plaintiffs have not offered evidence to demonstrate that any policies and procedures of the Commissioner and Associate Commissioner are causally related to any constitutional violations; in other words, they contend that they are simply not responsible. They note the unremarkable and undisputed facts that neither of these officials is actually involved in the direct provision of care to prisoners, and also that ADOC contracts with a
71. Even those who are not mentally ill or cognitively impaired do not necessarily remember the medications they are taking and cannot necessarily explain their effects.
179

corporation, MHM, to provide mental-health care.72 They
also cite the principle that “supervisory officials are
not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts
of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability,” Cottone v. Jenne, 326
F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), but rather only for a “custom
or policy,” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1331
(11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), which “must be the
moving force of the constitutional violation,” not
merely “tangentially related to a constitutional
violation,” Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 285
F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).73
72. Actually, the record reflects that there are some low-level employees of ADOC--called psychological associates--who are involved to some extent in the direct provision of mental-health care to those with low-level problems, and that a couple of psychologists employed by ADOC play a role in the intake process.
73. In fact, it does not appear that this causation case law even applies to official-capacity, (continued...)
180

But this standard applies in cases where the inferior, not the superior, is the one who has been deliberately indifferent. Here, plaintiffs are not seeking to hold defendants responsible for the deliberately indifferent acts or omissions of their underlings; they are seeking to hold defendants responsible for their own deliberately indifferent acts

injunctive-relief claims brought under Ex parte Young.

The cases defendants cite all involve retrospective

claims

for

money

damages

against

either

personal-capacity defendants or municipal defendants.

(Defendants do cite one case, Miller v. King, 384 F.3d

1248 (11th Cir. 2004), which applied this standard to

an official-capacity, injunctive-relief claim without

discussion. This decision was vacated, however, and is

therefore no longer binding precedent. See Miller v.

King, 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006).).

A number of other courts have held that official-capacity, injunctive-relief claims can proceed despite an absence of any retrospective causal connection to the defendants. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2016); Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2014); Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011); Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Brnovich, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1084 (D. Ariz. 2016) (continued...)
181

and omissions, and those of the contractor to which they have delegated authority over a non-delegable constitutional obligation. The acts and omissions plaintiffs have challenged are specific policies and practices of defendants. They have offered evidence to show that these policies and practices have caused constitutional injury by creating a substantial risk of serious harm. Again, these policies and practices are not being identified to show defendants’ liability for the deliberate indifference of officers or providers acting pursuant to them; they are being identified to show defendants’ own deliberate indifference. They fall into two general categories: policies and practices with respect to which defendants actually exercised final decision-making authority, and those which can be ascribed to defendants because they delegated final decision-making authority with respect
(Logan, J.); Malik v. Tanner, 697 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Kram, J.).
182

to the non-delegable duty to provide adequate mental-
health care to prisoners in their custody.74
74. Although plaintiffs have offered substantial evidence of policies and practices, the court notes that even acts or omissions that do not constitute a policy or practice would be sufficient to establish liability for a violation. (Of course, plaintiffs have endeavored to show the existence of policies and practices because they must do so for purposes of commonality in class certification.) See Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1383 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that in a case seeking prospective injunctive relief from an Eighth Amendment violation, the question is “whether the combined acts or omissions of all state officials with some responsibility for operation of the Alabama penal system created living conditions in the prisons which violated the eighth amendment”); LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1538-42 (remanding a personal-capacity damages claim against a former prison warden in light of the plaintiffs’ failure to show a causal connection to the former warden, but upholding a grant of injunctive relief against his successor based on a finding that the successor had not “taken sufficient steps to ensure that [the] past wrongs would not be repeated”); cf. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Personal action by defendants individually is not a necessary condition of injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity. ... All that is required is that the official be responsible for the challenged action. As the Young court held, it is sufficient that the state officer sued must, ‘by virtue of his office, ha[ve] some connection’ with the unconstitutional act or conduct complained of.”).
183

In the first category fall policies and practices expressly set forth by defendants in the contract between ADOC and MHM: underfunding and understaffing, both in terms of the total number of mental-health staff and the number of staff with different qualifications. As has been discussed elsewhere, plaintiffs have presented evidence that the decisions of ADOC to provide less money and fewer and less qualified staff than their request for bids initially called for, and than MHM administrators requested, have resulted in a range of serious problems in the delivery of mental-health care across the system. Moreover, there is evidence in the record (in addition to the letter plaintiffs’ counsel sent to defendants in advance of filing this case) that defendants were aware that the contractor they had selected was struggling to provide what it considered to be adequate care with the resources allotted, but failed to provide more resources.
184

Also in this first category are the policies or practices of operating prisons which are severely understaffed by correctional officers and overcrowded with prisoners.75 Obviously, the Commissioner, not MHM, is responsible for providing adequate custodial staff and space in the facilities he runs. Moreover, there is evidence that he and the Associate Commissioner are aware of the gravity of the harms that can result from understaffing, including to the health and safety of prisoners. This category also includes correctional policies and practices like the placement of mentally
75. This category also includes policies and practices which are clearly determined by defendants and also appear to stem from custodial understaffing and overcrowding, such as the practice of housing segregation prisoners in residential treatment beds, and the practice of housing prisoners with serious mental illness in segregation cells. The record makes clear that housing assignments are not within the control of MHM.
185

ill prisoners in segregation, and coercion of prisoners to take psychotropic medications.76
The second category of policies and practices are those that defendants have not themselves enacted, but which are attributable to them because they have fully delegated decision-making authority to MHM with respect to their constitutional obligation to provide mentalhealth care to prisoners. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985), in rejecting an argument very similar to defendants’ contention that the health care claims being brought against them based liability only on respondeat superior: “The federal courts have consistently ruled that governments, state and local,
76. It is clear that correctional administrators can be liable for deficient health care based on their adoption of custodial policies and practices that hinder prisoners’ access to care. See H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1087 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding liability when the defendant authorized lengthy isolation of a prisoner and thereby “placed medical attention beyond [his] reach”).
186

have an obligation to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals. This duty is not absolved by contracting with an entity [to provide these services.] Although [a contractor] has contracted to perform an obligation owed by the [State], the [State] itself remains liable for any constitutional deprivations caused by the policies or customs of the [contractor]. In that sense, the [government’s] duty is non-delegable.”77 Id. at 705; see also id. at 706 n.11 (explaining that “if, either expressly or by default, [a government entity] permit[s] others to decide or determine policy, it is liable for their actions if these policies prove unconstitutional”). The court went on to elaborate that “where a governmental entity delegates the final authority to make decisions then
77. This proposition is well enshrined in Supreme Court precedent. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (“Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State’s prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights.”).
187

those decisions necessarily represent official policy,”
and concluded that when a defendant has a
constitutional obligation to provide health care but
gives a contractor the “responsibility to make final
decisions regarding a [policy or practice as to when or
what care is provided], then their acts, policies and
customs become official policy.”78 Id. at 705 n.9
(citing Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688 F.2d 1328,
1334 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also King v. Kramer, 680
F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a county
could not “shield itself from § 1983 liability by
78. Defendants’ response to plaintiffs’ reliance on Ancata is puzzling; they argue that it is distinguishable because Ancata was decided at the motion to dismiss stage, whereas this case is at the summary judgment stage, and, they contend, plaintiffs have not offered evidence to show that defendants had “actual knowledge of a constitutional violation” by the mental-health providers. Defs.’ Reply Br. (doc. no. 876) at 120. But this goes to whether or not plaintiffs can establish subjective deliberate indifference, not to whether defendants can be held liable for a policy or practice of MHM. And, as discussed previously, plaintiffs have indeed offered evidence sufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to subject deliberate indifference.
188

contracting out its duty to provide medical services

... [because] the private company’s policy becomes that

of the County if the County decision-making authority to it”).79

delegates

final

Therefore, to the extent that defendants ceded to

MHM administrators decision-making authority over

various policies or practices regarding treatment--for

example, regarding aspects of medication management--

79. Although Ancata itself involved a county jail, rather than a state prison, its plain language makes clear that it is applicable to the latter as well. See Reaves v. Dep’t of Corr., -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2016 WL 4124301, at *17 (D. Mass. July 15, 2016) (Hillman, J.) (applying Ancata’s reasoning regarding delegation of policymaking authority to find that official-capacity defendants, including the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, could be held liable for the policies or practices of a correctional health contractor); Scott, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 819-21 (applying Ancata to conclude that “where a State effectively cedes final decision-making authority with respect to the provision of or failure to provide medical care to a third-party contractor, the contractor’s policies and decisions effectively become and constitute the policies and decisions of the State”).
189

MHM’s policies or practices are attributable to them.80
Defendants have not offered evidence that they retain
80. As reviewed and discussed by the parties’ experts, ADOC does have a number of written policies governing some aspects of the provision of mentalhealth care. To the extent that these policies result in inadequate care, defendants are clearly, directly liable. To the extent that a certain aspect of mentalhealth care is not governed by a departmental policy, such that MHM sets the policy--or, to the extent that MHM has a practice of failing to comply with the ADOC policy (that is to say, MHM has final decision-making authority “by default,” Ancata, 769 F.2d at 706 n.11, because its decisions are not actually subject to oversight)--defendants are also liable. See Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 793-94 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that, after consideration of the “relevant operational practices,” a physician’s assistant was the final policymaker with respect to medical affairs at a prison facility, because, “[a]lthough it was initially contemplated that the physician’s assistant would be supervised by a medical doctor, the evidence revealed that a custom and practice developed so that the policy was that [the physician’s assistant] was authorized to function without any supervision or review at all”).
Additionally, the court notes that, although MHM appears to have decision-making authority with respect to the types of medications prescribed, there is evidence that these decisions are also causally connected to defendants’ denial of adequate funding. Plaintiffs note that MHM’s meeting notes reveal that Dr. Hunter, its Medical Director and Chief Psychiatrist, has repeatedly expressed concern about the cost of certain classes of antipsychotics, and (continued...)
190

as a formal matter or actually exercise as a practical
matter decision-making authority with respect to these
policies or practices. Moreover, plaintiffs have
offered considerable evidence to show that the audits
ADOC’s Office of Health Services conducts of
mental-health care or of MHM’s compliance with its
contractual obligations are either extremely sparse or
non-existent; it appears that only two audits of any
mental-health unit or program have been conducted in
the past few years, and it appears that correctional
encouraged providers to “soften the impact” of these medications’ increasing cost by “transitioning inmates off these medications.” CQI Meeting Minutes, P Ex. 238 (doc. no. 686-18) at 3, MHM031155. Plaintiffs also point to the deposition testimony of named plaintiffs who were told by providers that they were being taken off medication that effectively treated their conditions (hallucinations and bipolar disorder) because ADOC “couldn’t afford it.” Wallace Depo., P Ex. 32 (doc. no. 840-32) at 29, 95; see also Businelle Depo., P Ex. 40 (doc. no. 840-40) at 83-84. As discussed above, although a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to a treatment of choice, it is clearly established that the knowing decision to provide less effective treatment in order to save money violates the Eighth Amendment.
191

officials do not request, receive, or review copies of MHM’s internal quality assurance reports. In light of this absence of oversight, the court has no difficulty in concluding that plaintiffs have at least created a dispute of material fact as to whether defendants can be held liable for the various policies and practices at issue in this case implemented by MHM.81
D. Ex Parte Young Defendants also argue that the relief sought by plaintiffs in this case is not available under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). To articulate the law correctly: Ex parte Young allows plaintiffs to sue officials of a State in their official capacities only to obtain prospective relief, and only to remedy a “continuing violation of federal law.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
81. Bui’s substantive and procedural due-process claims fall within this category; although there is an (continued...)
192

Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Ex parte Young does not permit a plaintiff ‘to adjudicate the legality of past conduct.’” Poindexter v. Dep’t of Human Res., 946 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (Watkins, J.) (quoting Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999)). Defendants also point to language in Ex parte Young itself indicating that the exception cannot be employed to require an official to perform a task he has the discretion not to perform. 209 U.S. at 158.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs cannot obtain a declaration that past acts or omissions of defendants violated the Constitution, that plaintiffs have not presented evidence of an ongoing violation, and that plaintiffs improperly seek an order requiring defendants to perform discretionary tasks, which would
ADOC regulation governing the involuntary-medication process, it is implemented by MHM, per its contract.
193

constitute improper judicial interference with the

management of state prisons.

This case, and the relief plaintiffs have

requested, falls squarely within the Ex parte Young

exception.

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that

defendants are committing an ongoing violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.82 And they seek a

prospective injunction prohibiting them from subjecting

prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm and

requiring them to implement a plan to change the

policies and practices plaintiffs contend have created

this risk.

82. This is clearly the primary thrust of the declaratory relief plaintiffs request. The court recognizes, however, that plaintiffs’ complaint could reasonably be read to also request a declaration that past discrete acts of defendants and various other officials and correctional and mental-health staff--as distinct from the past pendency of the current policies and practices of defendants--violated the Constitution. The court sees no conceivable need to consider whether it is empowered to enter such a declaration.
194

As discussed above, plaintiffs have indeed
presented enough evidence to create a dispute of
material fact as to whether such a continuing violation
exists. To the extent that defendants object to
plaintiffs’ reliance on evidence about past events to
demonstrate this risk, they confuse an evidentiary
approach to proving claims and the claims themselves.
Plaintiffs in official-capacity cases regularly rely on
evidence of a pattern of past violations in order
demonstrate that a policy or practice that caused those
violations is presently and continues to be
unconstitutional.83
83. Consider a hypothetical claim that double-celling in a particular unit creates a substantial risk that prisoners housed on that unit will be sexually assaulted. One way to prove a current risk of harm is to offer expert evidence that the current practice of double-celling the prisoners on this unit makes it likely that sexual assault will occur. Another way (instead or in conjunction with the first) to prove plaintiffs’ case is to show that double-celling has in past resulted in frequent assaults in this unit, thereby supporting the inference that double-celling will continue to have this effect in the future.
195

Finally, defendants also make an argument regarding

the appropriate deference to be shown correctional

administrators. This point really has little to do

with Ex parte Young. Although defendants argue that

this exception precludes the court from ordering

official-capacity defendants to perform discretionary

functions, they miss the mark entirely: While

correctional administrators do have discretion with

respect to how they provide constitutionally adequate

mental-health care, Supreme Court case law makes clear

and defendants surely agree that they very much lack

discretion as to whether they provide it.

See

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974)

(“[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any

failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional

claims whether arising in a federal or state

institution. When a prison regulation or practice

offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal

courts will discharge their duty to protect

constitutional rights.”). It is well-established that

196

courts do not violate the Eleventh Amendment when they

order official-capacity defendants to redress

unconstitutional conditions. To the extent that the

mental-health care being provided does not violate the

Eighth Amendment, and to the extent that defendants’

medication of prisoners without their consent does not

violate due process, no injunction will be forthcoming.

The court notes that the relief plaintiffs have

requested is precisely that contemplated by the

requirement that courts afford “States the first

opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal

administration of their prisons.”

Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973). Plaintiffs do not

seek--and this court will certainly not agree--to

“dictat[e] in excruciatingly minute detail” the way

that mental-health care should be provided to

prisoners, or engage in a “wholesale takeover[] of

state correctional facilities.” Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 364 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Plaintiffs ask only that the court identify any

197

policies and practices of defendants that violate the Constitution, and then order them to formulate a plan to address those policies and practices so that they no longer deprive prisoners of constitutionally adequate mental-health care. Considerable deference to prison administrators’ decisions regarding the management of their facilities is appropriate. But abdication of the court’s role as warden of the Constitution is not.
* * * In conclusion, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the individual plaintiffs’ claims will be granted in part and denied in part. Businelle, Carter, Dillard, Dunn, Moncrief, and Terrell, along with their claims, will be dismissed without prejudice; and summary judgment will be entered on the merits against Hardy. The mental-health Eighth Amendment claims of Hartley, Braggs, Jackson, Johnson, McCoy, Pruitt, Wallace, and Williams will go to trial. The
198

involuntary-medication due-process claims of Bui and McCoy will also proceed to trial.
An appropriate judgment will be entered. DONE, this the 25th day of November, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
199

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 1 of 144

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN; SHEILA ALLEN; EDWARD BRAGGS; TEDRICK BROOKS; GARY LEE BROYLES; QUANG BUI; RICHARD BUSINELLE; HOWARD CARTER; CHANDLER CLEMENTS; ROBERT DILLARD; PAUL FOLSOM; CHRISTOPHER GILBERT; DWIGHT HAGOOD; DALETRICK HARDY; SYLVESTER HARTLEY; CHARLIE HENDERSON; CHRISTOPHER JACKSON; BRANDON JOHNSON; JOHN MANER; RICK MARTIN; WILLIE MCCLENDON; ROGER MCCOY; JERMAINE MITCHELL; KENNETH MONCRIEF; TOMMIE MOORE; MATTHEW MORK; ROGER MOSELEY; ZERRICK NAYLOR; BRADLEY PEARSON; LEVITICUS PRUITT; TURNER ROGERS; TIMOTHY SEARS; BRIAN SELLERS; AUGUSTUS SMITH; WILLIAM SULLIVAN; RICHARD TERRELL; HUBERT TOLLAR; DANIEL TOOLEY; JOSEPH TORRES; DONALD RAY TURNER; JAMIE WALLACE; ROBERT “MYNIASHA” WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; and ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM,

Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHTTFM
FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs,

v.

JEFFERSON DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections; RUTH NAGLICH, in her official capacity as Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections; and ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 2 of 144
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. The prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the Plaintiff Class are incarcerated in Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) prisons. Plaintiffs bring this case to remedy (a) the defendants’ failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to persons in the custody of the ADOC; (b) the defendants’ failure to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care to persons in ADOC custody; (c) the defendants’ failure to provide due process when medicating persons against their will; and (d) the defendants’ failure to provide prisoners with disabilities with the accommodations and services to which they are entitled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504”). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief for the inhumane and discriminatory practices and conditions they face every day in ADOC custody. 2. The prisoner PLAINTIFFS and all those in ADOC custody are entirely dependent on DEFENDANTS JEFFERSON DUNNDUNN, RUTH NAGLICH and ADOC (collectively, “DEFENDANTS”) for medical and mental health care. Yet the system of care provided by DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH is grossly inadequate and subjects all prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm, including unnecessary pain, loss of function, injury and death. 3. Because of the DEFENDANTS’ deliberate indifference to the obvious medical needs of the persons in their custody, plaintiff prisoners go for months or years without appropriate diagnoses of medical conditions. Numerous prisoners have died from a failure to treat medical conditions from cancer to diabetes to hepatitis. Others have required emergency surgery or lost the use of legs, arms or eyes, after having been left to suffer with untreated symptoms for lengthy periods. Prisoners with mental illnesses or serious psychological problems are entirely denied mental health care or provided only with medication with little or no medication management, follow-up, or concern for side effects, some of which are debilitating.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 3 of 144
Mental health care other than medications is nearly non-existent. Prisoners with a history of selfharm are provided with razor blades.1 After one prisoner who had repeatedly requested mental health care cut himself with one of the razors, a correctional officer said to him, “If you die, you die.” DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH violate the prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishments in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
4. Prisoners, who do not want to take psychiatric medications, often because they are experiencing serious side effects, are forced to take the medication without any regard for due process. If they refuse, they may be beaten, placed in segregation or both. Even when there is a process to determine whether the prisoner is sufficiently ill and dangerous to warrant involuntary medication, the process falls far short of what due process requires. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH violate the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as it relates to mentally ill prisoners’ right to bodily integrity.
5. Prisoners with physical or mental disabilities face discriminatory and dangerous circumstances throughout the ADOC system. They are housed in facilities that cannot accommodate them. They are often housed in prisons or housing units for prisoners with higher security classifications than their own for no reason other than their disabilities. They are not provided with necessary assistive services or devices, such as functioning wheelchairs or forms that they can read. They are punished for things they cannot do or do not know how to do because of their disabilities.
6. The DEFENDANTS DUNN, NAGLICH, and ADOC operate the most overcrowded prisons in the nation and spend among the lowest amount on medical care per
1 The failure to protect the mentally ill from self-harm with razor blades was the subject of a Preliminary Injunction Motion. The issue has been preliminarily settled, but is in a monitoring phase to determine whether the issue has actually been resolved.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 4 of 144
prisoner of any state in the nation. They have long been aware of the unconstitutional and discriminatory practices of which the plaintiffs complain.
7. PLAINTIFFS seek declaratory and injunctive relief to compel DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH, both sued in their official capacity (sometimes collectively the “OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS”), and DEFENDANT ADOC to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care to all prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the class members they represent, to desist from medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will without due process, and to comply with the ADA and § 504.
JURISDICTION 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. PLAINTIFFS seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201 and 2202, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 12133.
VENUE 9. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as several DEFENDANTS reside in the Middle District of Alabama and all DEFENDANTS reside in Alabama, many of the PLAINTIFFS reside in the Middle District of Alabama, and a substantial number of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Alabama.
PARTIES 10. PLAINTIFF JOSHUA DUNN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is currently housed at St. Clair Correctional Facility (“St. Clair”). 2 He has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, and he informed ADOC of this diagnosis at intake.
2 ADOC frequently moves prisoners, including named plaintiffs, among its facilities. Allegations regarding the ADOC facility currently housing each named plaintiff are based on a February 19, 2015 search using the “Search for Inmates” page on ADOC’s website (http://www.doc.state.al.us/inmatesearch.aspx).
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 5 of 144
PLAINTIFF DUNN suffered from acute mental health crises while in segregation, requested mental health care, and repeatedly engaged in self-harm, but received no mental health care and was not provided with timely emergency medical care. He suffers from headaches and has a cataract due to a previously cracked lens in his right eye. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have refused to treat PLAINTIFF DUNN’s right eye because his left eye is functional. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have also failed to provide PLAINTIFF DUNN with appropriate medical care after he was stabbed multiple times by prisoners. PLAINTIFF DUNN is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF DUNN is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
11. PLAINTIFF SHEILA ALLEN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2006. She is currently housed at Tutwiler Correctional Facility. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has had hypertension and headaches since shortly after she entered ADOC custody. She has been given a variety of blood pressure medications, but continues to have high blood pressure and headaches. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has tested positive for blood and protein in her urine, but has received no follow up. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has severe rectal bleeding that has not been addressed by medical staff. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has been denied adequate medical treatment.
12. PLAINTIFF EDWARD BRAGGS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1967. He is currently housed at Hamilton Aged and Infirmed Center (“Hamilton A & I”), and has previously been housed at Bullock Correctional Facility (“Bullock”), Limestone Correctional Facility (“Limestone”), Easterling Correctional Facility (“Easterling”) and Ventress Correctional Facility (“Ventress”). PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is diabetic. In approximately 2004,
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 6 of 144
PLAINTIFF BRAGGS’s right leg was amputated at the knee due to lack of medical treatment while in prison. He is currently experiencing the same symptoms in his left leg that led to the amputation of his right leg and the cause of these symptoms is not being treated. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS also has a grapefruit-sized hernia that is not being treated. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and receives very little mental health care for these conditions. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
13. PLAINTIFF TEDRICK BROOKS entered DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody in August 2011. He is currently housed at Bibb County Correctional Facility (“Bibb”). PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a very severe keloid condition that causes him significant pain and difficulty moving. His condition has gone mostly untreated while in ADOC custody. He has been forced to shave, although this makes his condition worse, and he has been punished for not shaving. PLAINTIFF BROOKS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BROOKS is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
14. PLAINTIFF GARY LEE BROYLES has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1989. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I. He was previously housed at Elmore Correctional Facility (“Elmore”), Draper Correctional Facility (“Draper”), Kilby Correctional Facility (“Kilby”), St. Clair, and Bullock. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is hearing impaired, requiring hearing aids for both ears. He was provided with hearing aids for both ears in or around 1998, but one stopped working in or around 2011. He has difficulty getting the
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 7 of 144
battery replaced. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is harassed and discriminated against on the basis of his hearing impairment. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BROYLES is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
15. PLAINTIFF QUANG BUI has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1986. He has been housed at St. Clair since 2005. He has previously been housed at Holman Correctional Facility (“Holman”), Donaldson Correctional Facility (“Donaldson”) and Kilby. PLAINTIFF BUI’s English is very limited. His first language is Vietnamese. Since he has entered the custody of ADOC, his has lost much of his ability to speak Vietnamese. PLAINTIFF BUI has been told by DEFENDANT ADOC that he is mentally ill. He does not know his diagnosis, but has received shots of Haldol for approximately five years. He does not want to take the medication but has not been permitted to stop. He has not been fairly afforded a hearing to determine whether he must be involuntarily medicated. PLAINTIFF BUI is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BUI is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504, and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
16. PLAINTIFF RICHARD BUSINELLE has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2003. Since his initial stay at Kilby, he has been housed at Bullock and most recently at Bibb. When he arrived at Bullock, he was housed in the mental health dormitory, until the Mental Health Unit was opened in 2006. He was moved to the Mental Health Unit when it opened and has been their ever since. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He is given an injection of Prolixin every two weeks, takes
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 8 of 144
Cogentin for the side effects, and meets with a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks. He receives no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has experienced severe weight-loss while in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody with no treatment or evaluation to determine the cause. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE suffered for two and a half years with two teeth that needed to be pulled. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
17. PLAINTIFF HOWARD CARTER has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1994. He is currently housed in segregation at St. Clair. He has previously been housed at Kilby, Holman, Bullock, Staton and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF CARTER is severely mentally ill and was subject to an involuntary medication order in 2011 and 2012. After being prescribed antipsychotic medications for years, his medication was discontinued in 2013 and he was not receiving any medication at the time this lawsuit commenced. PLAINTIFF CARTER has made several suicide attempts while in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody. PLAINTIFF CARTER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF CARTER is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
18. PLAINTIFF CHANDLER CLEMENTS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2003. He is currently housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS has Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder (COPD) and, as a result, experiences extreme shortness of breath and low oxygen levels. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS was persuaded to sign a “Do Not Resuscitate” order (“DNR”) to avoid being placed on life support in the prison
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 9 of 144
infirmary. After he signed the DNR, he was denied breathing treatments and medications because of the DNR. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS is being denied adequate medical treatment.
19. PLAINTIFF ROBERT DILLARD has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2005. He is currently housed in the mental health dormitory in the Main Camp at Bullock. Following his initial intake at Kilby, he was housed first at the mental health dormitory, then in the Mental Health Unit from when it opened in 2006 until about January 2014, when he was moved back to the mental health dormitory. PLAINTIFF DILLARD was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at the age of eight. He takes Haldol, Risperdal, Cogentin and another medication that has a name and purpose he does not know. The extent of the counseling he receives is meeting with a mental health counselor one or two times a month for five to ten minutes. He hears voices in his head. One of his front teeth is mottled dark brown and black and he has not been given dental care for the tooth. He likely has an undiagnosed learning or developmental disability and frequently does not understand documents he is given to read and sign. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF DILLARD is being denied adequate medical and mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
20. PLAINTIFF PAUL FOLSOM has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since in or about 1992. He is housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM suffers from severe headaches. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM also has a lump in his left breast that has not been examined in over three years. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM has been told that he has cysts, one in each of his kidneys. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM is being denied adequate medical treatment.
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 10 of 144
21. PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER GILBERT has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since in or about July 2012. He is housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF GILBERT has a damaged ankle that resulted in one leg being shorter than the other, and suffers from diabetes. DEFENDANT ADOC has provided PLAINTIFF GILBERT with insufficient accommodations for his disability that place him for greater risk of medical harm from his diabetes condition. PLAINTIFF GILBERT is also required to stand for long periods of time despite his disability. PLAINTIFF GILBERT experiences sugar lows and highs due to improper treatment for his diabetes. PLAINTIFF GILBERT is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF GILBERT is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
22. PLAINTIFF DWIGHT HAGOOD entered the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC because of a parole violation in 2011. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is currently housed at Easterling. Prior to being transferred to Easterling, he was housed at Kilby and Bullock. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has had diabetes since childhood and suffers from high blood pressure and numerous other medical conditions. He has had at least one stroke and other serious medical issues while in ADOC custody. As a result of one of these issues, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is partially paralyzed on his left side and confined to a wheelchair. He has been denied access to accommodations for disability. He is also housed in a non-accessible dormitory with a high level of violence. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 11 of 144
23. PLAINTIFF DALETRICK HARDY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2002. He is currently housed at Donaldson, and has previously been housed at St. Clair, Kilby, Draper, Bibb, Easterling, Fountain Correctional Facility (“Fountain”), Limestone, Bullock, and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF HARDY is severely mentally ill and has a long history of suicide attempts. He has received constitutionally inadequate mental health treatment and had been in segregation at St. Clair since May 2012 before being recently transferred to Donaldson. PLAINTIFF HARDY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HARDY is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
24. PLAINTIFF SYLVESTER HARTLEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1981. He is currently housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has a long history of serious mental illness, but does not know his diagnosis. He is also on dialysis. He likely has an undiagnosed learning or developmental disability. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
25. PLAINTIFF CHARLIE HENDERSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since October 2013. He was previously in ADOC custody from 2005 to 2010. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON was diagnosed with hepatitis C in 1993, prior to entering ADOC custody. His current diagnosis is hepatitis C, stage 3. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON was also diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver in 2007 while in ADOC custody. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not provided PLAINTIFF
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 12 of 144
HENDERSON with any hepatitis C treatment during either of the times he has been in its custody. After PLAINTIFF HENDERSON received his cirrhosis diagnosis, ADOC medical personnel continued to refuse to provide PLAINTIFF HENDERSON with any treatment for hepatitis C claiming that all treatment will negatively impact his liver. ADOC medical personnel persisted in this reasoning despite the availability of hepatitis C treatment that does not have adverse effects on the liver. The lack of treatment for hepatitis C has caused a rise in the ammonia levels in PLAINTIFF HENDERSON’s brain. As a result, he suffers from memory loss and general confusion. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON also has a mass on his colon previously identified as cancerous or a symptom of Crohn’s disease for which the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS refuse to provide treatment. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is also hearingimpaired and, as a result, often misses meal time, medical appointments, and pill call due to his inability to hear ADOC personnel call for him. DEFENDANT ADOC has not provided PLAINTIFF HENDERSON with a meaningful accommodation in light of his disability. As a result, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON often misses pill call and medical appointments, sometimes resulting verbal reprimands. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
26. PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER JACKSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2006. He is currently housed in segregation at Donaldson. PLAINTIFF JACKSON was previously on the mental health caseload and was taking Haldol. He was not given any medications for side effects, and in or around April 2014 asked to be taken off Haldol because it made him shake. He was not offered and informed about any other mental
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 13 of 144
health medication which would be appropriate for his treatment which had a lesser likelihood of side effects. He has been in segregation since 2007. He is transferred every few months between the segregation units at Holman, Donaldson and St. Clair. PLAINTIFF JACKSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF JACKSON is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
27. PLAINTIFF BRANDON JOHNSON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1996. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is currently housed in a Residential Treatment Unit at Donaldson. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON has a significant cognitive disability. He believes he was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury as a child, following a serious car accident. He is not receiving any medication or other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON also has serious cognitive disabilities stemming from a serious injury when he was a child. However, he is provided with no assistance in filling out medical forms or understanding rules or disciplinary matters. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
28. PLAINTIFF JOHN MANER entered DEFENDANT ADOC custody in or around June 1998. He is currently housed in the Bibb. PLAINTIFF MANER suffers from a mobility impairment due to a gunshot wound, and ADOC has required him to choose between accessing programs and services and having necessary accommodations. He injured himself again in April 2014 after choosing to access programs and services. DEFENDANT ADOC has declined to treat him. PLAINTIFF MANER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 14 of 144
and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MANER is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
29. PLAINTIFF RICK MARTIN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1988. He is currently housed at St. Clair. He has previously been housed at Kilby and Donaldson. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has a long history of heart problems. He has had a stent in his heart since 2009. In 2012, he had to get a new stent in his heart, and was not given necessary blood thinners afterward, resulting in his requiring emergency open-heart surgery because his un-thinned blood quickly clogged the stent. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has been denied adequate medical treatment.
30. PLAINTIFF WILLIE MCCLENDON has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He is currently housed at Limestone and has been there since his initial brief intake period at Kilby. PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON developed an infection in his testicle which went untreated for several days, turned gangrenous, and resulted in his losing the testicle. PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON has been denied adequate medical care.
31. PLAINTIFF ROGER MCCOY entered DEFENDANT ADOC custody in or around 1994. He is currently housed at the Bibb. He has previously been housed at Bullock and Limestone. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has an apparent mental health disorder for which he is treated with medications but little other treatment. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has been physically assaulted by correctional officers. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MCCOY is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504, and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 15 of 144
32. PLAINTIFF JERMAINE MITCHELL has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1999. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has also been housed at Bibb. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL uses a wheelchair and has limited use of his hands. He spent a year and a half housed in an infirmary because of his disabilities. Because he was housed in the infirmary, he was denied access to programs, benefits and services. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL has been informed that he might be able to walk again if he received physical therapy, but he is not being given physical therapy. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MITCHELL is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
33. PLAINTIFF KENNETH MONCRIEF has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010, following a parole violation. He is currently housed at Easterling and was previously housed at Limestone and in the Mental Health Unit at Bullock. He has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder. He was required to discontinue his psychiatric medications in order to go on parole, because his parole placement was a facility does not accept residents who take psychiatric medications. Without mental health medication, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF has difficulty controlling his impulses and anger. He was not receiving any mental health medications at the time of the filing of the lawsuit. PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF is being denied adequate mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
34. PLAINTIFF TOMMIE MOORE has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is housed at the Mobile Work Release Center. He was previously housed
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 16 of 144
at Kilby. PLAINTIFF MOORE has glaucoma and is legally blind. He has not been treated for his glaucoma and has been denied the surgery he requires because DEFENDANT ADOC refuses to pay for the procedure. PLAINTIFF MOORE resided in a dormitory with high incidences of violence solely because his disability only made him eligible for a dormitory of that classification level. Correctional officers have harassed and threatened PLAINTIFF MOORE due to his disability. PLAINTIFF MOORE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MOORE is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
35. PLAINTIFF MATTHEW MORK has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2010. He is currently housed at Holman. He has also been housed at Kilby, Limestone, and Ventress. PLAINTIFF MORK has hepatitis C and is not being treated for it because the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS refuse to provide the medication PLAINTIFF MORK requires. PLAINTIFF MORK also suffered a serious injury to his arm due the actions of employees of DEFENDANT ADOC and received inadequate treatment for this injury. PLAINTIFF MORK is being denied adequate medical care.
36. PLAINTIFF ROGER MOSELEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He currently resides at Easterling. In 2006, PLAINTIFF MOSELEY suffered two broken legs in a car accident. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY had four surgeries on each of his knees shortly after the accident, before entering ADOC custody. He was confined to a wheelchair and had begun physical therapy in order to walk again. DEFENDANT ADOC has refused to provide PLAINTIFF MOSELEY with physical therapy or other appropriate treatment, delaying his recovery and forcing him to unnecessarily remain in a wheelchair while he selfadministered physical therapy to re-learn how to walk. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY is a person with
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 17 of 144
a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF MOSELEY is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
37. PLAINTIFF ZERRICK NAYLOR was incarcerated by DEFENDANT ADOC from 2012 until 2015. He was most recently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has previously been housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR suffers from keratoconus and is legally blind. He sees only vague shadows. Due to his blindness, he was housed for more than two years in a housing unit that was unduly dangerous and restrictive. While in ADOC custody, he was denied access to programs, benefits and services because of his blindness. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR is no longer in the physical custody of ADOC. However, he was released at the end of the prison-portion of a split sentence. He is on probation and has a high risk of being readmitted to ADOC custody and facing the same discriminatory practices he faced prior to his release.
38. PLAINTIFF BRADLEY PEARSON was incarcerated by DEFENDANT ADOC from August 2013 through February 1, 2015. He was most recently housed at Limestone and was previously housed at Kilby for about a month and then Decatur Work Release Center for 10 days. He was then excluded from the Work Release Center because he is deaf. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF PEARSON was being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is no longer in the physical custody of DEFENDANT ADOC. However, he was released at the end of the prison-portion of
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 18 of 144
a split sentence. He is on probation and has a high risk of being readmitted to ADOC custody and facing the same discriminatory practices he faced prior to his release.
39. PLAINTIFF LEVITICUS PRUITT has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2001. He is currently housed at Holman. He has previously been housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has a history of depression. Over the last six months, PLAINTIFF PRUITT has repeatedly been placed on suicide watch and has requested mental health treatment, but has been denied any mental health care. He recently underwent an assault by other prisoners who threw burning items onto him while he was on suicide watch, but he was not taken to medical staff for more than a day after the assault, when he was taken to the hospital. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was also denied adequate medical treatment after he sustained an injury to his hand caused by correctional officers. He was also denied medical treatment for four hours after he engaged in self-harm with a razor blade in his segregation cell. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was denied adequate medical treatment after injuring his back lifting weights. He is now required to wear a permanent back brace due to limitations caused by the constant pain experienced in his lower back. PLAINTIFF PRUITT is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF PRUITT is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
40. PLAINTIFF TURNER ROGERS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since November 2012. He currently resides at the Kilby. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has cataracts and a spot in the white of his eye that protrudes periodically, blocking his vision. Both conditions are not being treated. He has been prescribed eyeglasses, but these do not help his
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 19 of 144
vision at all and give him headaches. PLAINTIFF ROGERS is being denied adequate medical care.
41. PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY SEARS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1996. He is currently housed at Ventress and was previously housed at Hamilton A & I, St. Clair and Limestone. PLAINTIFF SEARS has scoliosis and unexplained weight loss. Despite needing a shower with grab bars, PLAINTIFF SEARS was placed in a dormitory that was not accessible and was very far from the infirmary where he could shower. PLAINTIFF SEARS has been and continues to be forced to stand for long periods although his disability makes that painful and difficult for him. PLAINTIFF SEARS suffered extreme weight loss that went completely untreated for 10 months and is currently being inadequately treated. PLAINTIFF SEARS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF SEARS is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
42. PLAINTIFF BRIAN SELLERS has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2001. He is currently housed at St. Clair, but has also been housed at Donaldson, Holman, Ventress, Draper, Easterling and Kilby. He suffers from high blood pressure and heart disease, hepatitis C and has recently had surgery for kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS was taken off of his blood pressure medication, resulting in a heart attack. Also, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH delayed more than three years before approving a PLAINTIFFS SELLERS’s surgery for kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS is being denied adequate medical care.
43. PLAINTIFF AUGUSTUS SMITH has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2007. He is housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF SMITH came into ADOC custody
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 20 of 144
shortly after doctors gave him a catheter in anticipation of surgery that was to happen within three months. As of the commencement of this lawsuit, he had not had the surgery and continued required use of the catheter. He suffered from frequent infections from the catheter. After an approximately seven-year delay, PLAINTIFF SMITH finally had surgery in 2014, after this lawsuit was commenced. PLAINTIFF SMITH is being denied adequate medical care.
44. PLAINTIFF WILLIAM SULLIVAN has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1990. He is currently housed at Staton. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN suffers from congestive heart failure and high blood pressure. He needs medications to manage these conditions. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’S prescribed medications are regularly late and sometimes discontinued altogether. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN also experiences pain and discomfort resulting from what he describes as a “bottom” hernia on his left side. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has no bottom teeth—the last two having been pulled after multiple un-answered sick calls. He has no bottom dentures and his top dentures do not fit, resulting in pain and difficulty eating. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has been denied adequate medical treatment.
45. PLAINTIFF RICHARD TERRELL has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1992. He is currently housed at Bullock in the Mental Health Unit. He has previously been housed at Kilby, Easterling, and Holman. He has been in either the mental health dormitory at Bullock or the free-standing Mental Health Unit at Bullock since 1999. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. He has been given a shot of either Prolixin or Haldol every two weeks for the last 15 years. He does not know currently which he is receiving or if he receives the same one every time. He is also given Benadryl, but receives no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been assaulted and then denied medical attention. He has also been denied dental
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 21 of 144
care and is likely to lose his two upper front teeth as a result. PLAINTIFF TERRELL likely has some form of learning disability or cognitive disability. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TERRELL is being denied adequate medical and mental health care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504 and has had his right to refuse medication violated without due process.
46. PLAINTIFF HUBERT TOLLAR has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 1977. He is currently housed at St. Clair. In response to an outbreak of tuberculosis at St. Clair in January and February of 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was given a chest x-ray. There was a spot on his lung. He had a CT scan in or around late March 2014. On or about April 14, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was told that the CT scan showed that he had cancer and that he would be sent out for a biopsy the following day. As of May 28, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had not been sent out for a biopsy of the cancerous spot on his lung. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR did not begin chemotherapy until late September 2014. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR is being denied adequate medical care.
47. PLAINTIFF DANIEL TOOLEY has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since 2008. He is currently housed at Hamilton A & I, and has also been housed at Bullock, Kilby and Easterling. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is a prisoner with deafness. Due to his deafness, PLAINTIFF TOOLEY cannot communicate through spoken language and has some difficulty communicating by writing notes. For the past six years, DEFENDANT ADOC has never provided PLAINTIFF TOOLEY a certified sign language interpreter. To communicate with PLAINTIFF TOOLEY, DEFENDANT ADOC staff relies on writing notes and another prisoner who knows limited sign language. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is a person with a disability
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 22 of 144
as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
48. PLAINTIFF JOSEPH TORRES is 20 years old. He entered DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody in February 2011 at age 17. PLAINTIFF TORRES was charged when he was 15 years old. He is currently housed at Bibb. He suffers from untreated cataracts and severe headaches. He has been informed that if he does not receive adequate treatment for his cataracts, he will go blind. PLAINTIFF TORRES hurt his knee while playing basketball at Bibb. He was not provided with care, and his knee remained swollen for approximately two years. PLAINTIFF TORRES was given crutches but was not moved to a lower bunk for two weeks. PLAINTIFF TORRES is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TORRES is being denied adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
49. PLAINTIFF DONALD RAY TURNER has been in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody since 2009. He is currently housed at Limestone, and was previously housed at Kilby. PLAINTIFF TURNER is deaf and is only semi-literate. He was excluded from work release because he is deaf and has high blood pressure. PLAINTIFF TURNER is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF TURNER is being denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
50. PLAINTIFF JAMIE WALLACE has been in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody since 2010. Prior to his conviction, PLAINTIFF WALLACE was initially found incompetent to stand trial and spent a year at Taylor Hardin, Secure Medical Facility. He is currently housed in Residential Treatment Unit at Donaldson and was previously housed in the Mental Health Unit at
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 23 of 144
Bullock. PLAINTIFF WALLACE has numerous physical birth defects and has been diagnosed with ADHD, bi-polar disorder, paranoid schizophrenia and intermittent explosive disorder. He is receiving medication but no other mental health treatment. PLAINTIFF WALLACE is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF WALLACE is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
51. PLAINTIFF ROBERT “MYNIASHA” WILLIAMS3 has been in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC since November 2012. She is housed at Fountain. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has ADHD, a mood disorder, a history of being sexually abused, and a history of self-harm. While at Fountain, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS repeatedly cut herself with razor blades, and was not given adequate medical or mental health care. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is a person with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) and (B). PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is being denied adequate medical and mental health care, and reasonable accommodations for her disabilities under the ADA and § 504.
52. PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM (hereinafter “ADAP”) is designated as Alabama’s authorized protection and advocacy agency under federal laws designed to protect individuals with disabilities. ADAP has statutory authority to pursue legal and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of persons with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and other disabilities who are or will be receiving care and treatment in the State of Alabama. 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 794e; ADAP v. J.S. Tarwater, 97 F.3d 492 (11th Cir. 1996). ADAP is pursuing this action to protect and advocate for the rights and interests of prisoners in ADOC custody who are persons with
3 PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS is a transgendered individual who identifies as female. She was born with male anatomy and is classified as a male by DEFENDANT ADOC. In accordance with her preference, she is referred to herein by female pronouns.
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 24 of 144
mental illness and persons with mental or physical disabilities. Prior to commencement of this lawsuit, ADAP spent significant time and resources advocating on behalf of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC custody, monitoring and investigating the treatment and accommodation of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC custody. ADAP’s prelitigation efforts and expenditures of resources were necessitated by the ADOC policies and practices challenged, which policies and practices serve to frustrate and perceptibly impair ADAP’s advocacy efforts and its ability to accomplish the statutory purposes for which it was created. In bringing this suit, ADAP seeks to vindicate interests central to its purpose. ADAP thus has organizational standing under Article III based on a “concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] activities – with the consequent drain on [its] resources.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). ADAP furthermore asserts its associational standing, as Alabama’s authorized protection and advocacy agency, on behalf of its constituents who include any current or future prisoner in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as that term is used in the ADA and § 504. Doe v. Stincer 175 F. 3d 879, 886 (11th Cir. 1999).
53. DEFENDANT JEFFERSON DUNN has served as the Commissioner of the ADOC since April 1, 2015, when his predecessor, previously named DEFENDANT BILLY SHARP, resigned his position as ADOC Commissioner.4 DEFENDANT DUNN is sued herein in his official capacity. The Commissioner of the ADOC is responsible for heading the Alabama Department of Corrections, for the independent direction, supervision and control of the Alabama Department of Corrections, and for approving and issuing administrative regulations and changes. Ala. Code. 1975 § 14-1-1.3. (2010). The Commissioner is responsible for providing
4 By operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), DEFENDANT DUNN was “automatically substituted” in place of DEFENDANT BILLY SHARP, who Plaintiffs sued in his official capacity, upon SHARP’s resignation.
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 25 of 144
constitutional conditions of confinement in all facilities. At all times relevant hereto, DEFENDANT DUNN and his predecessor have acted under color of state law.
54. DEFENDANT RUTH NAGLICH is the Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the ADOC. DEFENDANT NAGLICH is sued in her official capacity. As Associate Commissioner, DEFENDANT NAGLICH is responsible for establishing, monitoring, and enforcing system-wide health care policies and practices. She is responsible for supervising the provision of adequate medical, mental health, and dental care for all prisoners within ADOC custody, including but not limited to those in Residential Treatment Units, Intensive Stabilization Units and segregation units. At all times relevant hereto, she has acted under color of state law.
55. DEFENDANT ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (“ADOC”) is the administrative department of the state of Alabama responsible for administering and exercising the direct and effective control over penal and corrections institutions throughout the state of Alabama. Persons in the in-house custody of DEFENDANT ADOC are housed in 15 major correctional facilities and 13 work camps or work release centers. DEFENDANT ADOC is an instrumentality of the state of Alabama. DEFENDANT ADOC receives federal funding.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 56. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have long underfunded medical and mental health care as well as compliance with the ADA. Since at least the 1990s, have outsourced the medical and mental health care provided through managed care agreements with private companies that purportedly specialize in correctional care.
DEFENDANTS Systematically Underfunded Medical Care 57. Alabama’s focus on reducing the cost of caring for the people in its prisons has sacrificed constitutionally adequate care. By 2003, the ADOC Commissioner acknowledged that
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 26 of 144
Alabama’s “underfunded, understaffed, and overcrowded” prison system had, at that time, “the lowest inmate cost per day in the Country.”
58. In 2006, then-Commissioner of ADOC Richard Allen admitted that one of the major problems facing ADOC was “[s]oaring healthcare costs for inmates.” He explained “[t]he cost of inmate health care has spiraled in recent years,” with costs nearly doubling over the threeyear period ending in Fiscal Year 2006.” Then-Commissioner Allen identified four factors leading costs: “(1) the increased number of inmates incarcerated, (2) an increase in the severity of illness and degenerative diseases of inmates received into the systems as a result of a lack of free world health care coverage, (3) improvement in healthcare services as a result of new medical technology including advanced drug treatments, and mandated access to higher levels of care by litigation in federal courts, and (4) physical plant limitations of the institutional health care units do not allow for onsite longterm or advance care services, resulting in a dependency on costly free world community providers.” These factors remain today.
59. Focusing on cost control rather than the constitutionality of its care, ADOC, under the direction of DEFENDANT NAGLICH, would ultimately pursue a new managed healthcare contract premised on a risk model in which ADOC paid a lower contract price in return for the private contractor bearing virtually all of the risk associated with increased healthcare costs, including the costs of offsite care.
60. By placing the financial responsibility for each instance in which medical or mental health care is provided on the private providers, DEFENDANTS created a financial incentive for the provider to not provide care. The incentive grew stronger over the years as DEFENDANTS continually sought to reduce the price paid to the providers for prisoner medical and mental health care.
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 27 of 144
61. ADOC’s cost-cutting efforts proved highly successful from a dollars-and-cents standpoint, with DEFENDANT ADOC’s 2010 Annual Report stating that while “medical and mental health services [costs] increased 295% from the years 2000 to 2005, . . . [s]ince 2006, the cost increases have averaged only 6% per year.” Indeed, in 2011, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor recognized that Alabama pays less for health care than other prison systems.
62. Unsurprisingly, DEFENDANTS’ continual effort to cut costs has ensured that the healthcare provided to class members is grossly inadequate. The failings in the health care system are well documented and known to the DEFENDANTS. For the years 2000 through 2011, Alabama prisons had among the highest mortality rates in the country, both generally and for illness-related deaths.
63. DEFENDANTS track medical care costs, including among other things, all deaths in custody, all trips to the emergency room, and all hospital admissions. DEFENDANTS require their medical provider to give them monthly reports on a wide variety of metrics. They audit the performance of the medical provider using numerous tools to spot-check the performance of the medical provider. Since 2007, DEFENDANTS have contracted with Corizon, Inc. k/n/a Corizon, LLC (“Corizon”) to provide medical care in the ADOC facilities.5 Corizon failed every single major performance audit conducted by DEFENDANTS under the initial contract with ADOC. Despite this abysmal performance, DEFENDANTS extended the contract from 2010 to 2012. Corizon continued to fail every major performance audit, but was awarded a new three year contract in 2012.
DEFENDANTS Systematically Underfunded Mental Health Care
5 At the time of the initial contract, Corizon was known as Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (“CMS”). The corporate name change from CMS to Corizon occurred during the initial contract term in conjunction with a 2011 merger or acquisition involving CMS’s corporate parent (Valitás Health Services, Inc.) and the corporate parent of another correctional medical provider.
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 28 of 144
64. In 2007 and 2008, then-ADOC Commissioner Allen acknowledged that Alabama was “more or less [] criminalizing mental illness,” with more than 5,000 of the approximately 25,000 in-custody ADOC inmates in need of mental health treatment. Allen also admitted that 36% of incarcerated women and 20% of incarcerated men were in need of mental health care. This data, according to former Commissioner Allen, served as “a strong indication that in Alabama the prison system has become a default mental health treatment facility,” with the mentally ill “coming to prison instead of going to some sort of treatment center.”
65. At roughly the same time, Allen’s Deputy Commissioner Vernon Barnett admitted that only about 2,500 inmates – half of the number of persons former Commissioner Allen identified as needing mental health treatment – were actually receiving mental health care.
66. ADOC’s longstanding Mental Health Director Dr. Ronald Cavanaugh, who served under DEFENDANT NAGLICH until early 2014, acknowledged in 2010 that in recent decades, “Alabama prisons have become a surrogate mental health system” and “ADOC has become the State’s principal agent for providing substance abuse treatment.
67. The in-house custody population has remained fairly steady since 2007. The mental health caseload is currently about 3,100. By then-Commissioner Allen’s estimates, this likely means that 40% of the in-custody population in need of mental health treatment is not receiving any treatment at all.
68. Moreover, the evidence is clear that many are not. During the process of soliciting bids for a comprehensive medical and mental health provider in the summer of 2012, DEFENDANT NAGLICH responded to numerous questions about the provision of care. She was asked whether persons “in need of mental health/psychiatric services currently residing at Bibb CF, Easterling, CF, Fountain CF, and Birmingham WR be relocated?” DEFENDANT
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 29 of 144
NAGLICH responded that they would. They have not been. Easterling has 120 prisoners on
psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication orders, and has no coverage by
a psychiatrist or psychologist. Fountain has 64 people on psychiatric medications and no
coverage by any psychiatrist or psychologist. Bibb, which has 133 people classified as MH-1, 29
people classified as MH-2, and one person on an involuntary medication order, has less than a
quarter-time psychiatrist and no psychologist.6
DEFENDANTS Systematically Underfund Compliance with the ADA and § 504
69. DEFENDANT ADOC has been aware since at least May 2006 that “Almost none
of [its] facilities meet the federal Americans with Disabilities Act requirements.” At that time,
DEFENDANT ADOC was uncertain as to “the cost of bringing all facilities up to currently
accepted codes, including the provisions of the [ADA],” but committed to engaging “an
6 DEFENDANTS’ actions also violate international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is binding on the U.S. S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. In April 2014, the Human Rights Committee, the body that reviews states’ compliance with the covenant, expressed concern over conditions for people in U.S. prisons, particularly those with serious mental illnesses and those held in solitary confinement. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, 23 April 2014, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, available at: http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/iccpr_concluding_obs_2014.pdf [accessed 2 July 2014].
The United States has ratified the Convention Against Torture, with the reservation that the Convention’s prohibitions against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment be understood as defined and prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). Thus, the United States recognizes the Convention as binding authority on these matters, in addition to the Constitution. Also, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which is binding on the U.S. and applicable in this case because of the racial disparity demonstrated by high rates of incarceration of people of color, prohibits discrimination in the provision of healthcare. CERD, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966), entered into force 4 Jan. 1969. Additionally, the United Nations, of which the United States is a member, has established minimum rules for the treatment of incarcerated people. While not binding, they provide a guideline for the United States. These rules require a psychiatrist at every institution, and call for dental care and medical care that “should be organized in close relationship to the general health administration of the community or nation.” United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 2 July 2014].
Finally, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, signed by the United States, provides for the right to health and medical care. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 11, O.A.S. Official Rec., OEA/Ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L.V/II.82, doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992).
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 30 of 144
engineering/architectural firm that specializes in correctional facilities to inspect thoroughly our existing physical plant and determine cost effective repairs and renovations that can be accomplished,” with the expectation “that some older facilities may not be economically repairable, and will be considered for closing when other bed space is available.” Following receipt of the survey results, DEFENDANT ADOC intended to make repairs and renovations over a seven-to-eight year period with work “prioritized based on the most urgent needs of the department.”
70. As set forth in its 2007 Annual Report, DEFENDANT ADOC’s contracted specialty engineering/architectural determined through a facility survey that “it would cost approximately $94 million to bring all facilities up to currently accepted codes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act.” In the years since DEFENDANT ADOC received this survey report, virtually nothing has been done to pursue ADA compliance.
The Lack of Care and Accommodation Resulting from the Underfunding Continue Unabated, Despite DEFENDANTS’ Knowledge of the Problems
71. Admissions by ADOC officials confirm budgetary constraints are a continual factor in ADOC’s pervasive health, dental, mental health care deficiencies and longstanding ADA non-compliance. Former Deputy Commissioner Vernon Barnett reported in 2008 that, facing budget cuts, ADOC was “in a crisis as how to exactly stay on course and take care of the inmates,” with “inmate health care, mental health care, food, utilities and expenses and personnel costs” identified as “[t]he only places that the Department can cut.” In 2009, Barnett admitted that ADOC was forced to make “Medical Reductions,” in response to additional budget cuts, including eliminating nursing staff at work release facilities, and amending its contract to further reduce its payments to Corizon.
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 31 of 144
72. Moreover, despite the inadequacy of the care provided pursuant to the 2007 contract as demonstrated by the high mortality rate and consistently failed audits, DEFENDANTS NAGLICH negotiated a new contract that would result in further reductions in the amount and quality of health care for prisoners in the custody of the ADOC. The agreed medical care spending for an optional 4th year of the contract was reduced by approximately $2 million through a contract amendment in or around 2009 and a separate price reduction was agreed with regard to the optional 5th year of the contract. The actual annual contract price was then greatly reduced further under the new Corizon contract executed in 2012, with ADOC saving $12 million dollars in the first year over the 2012 contract price, and nearly $24 million total during the three-year contract period.
73. Starting in or around July 2012, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel conducted site inspections of most major correctional facilities in ADOC. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel provided feedback on many of the obstacles in the facilities for persons with disabilities. DEFENDANT ADOC has not, to PLAINTIFFS’ counsel’s knowledge, resolved any of the matters raised in that context.
74. Further, starting in the spring of 2014, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel raised concerns about a number of individuals. In one instance, DEFENDANT ADOC partially accommodated an individual with a disability that PLAINTIFFS’ counsel brought to its attention. In another case, the disabled individual was actually further deprived of necessary accommodations. In most cases, there was no change whatsoever. Where PLAINTIFFS’ counsel raised concerns about the lack of medical or mental health care, there was no response whatsoever.
75. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel sent DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor a letter on April 9, 2014 detailing the failures of medical and mental health care and the violations of the ADA and § 504. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel invited DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor to enter into
31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 32 of 144
discussion regarding how to resolve the issues. Despite the urgency of the issues raised, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor set up a meeting for a month and a half later on May 20, 2014. However, at that meeting, DEFENDANTS had no proposals or plans for resolving any of the issues raised, only a proposal for further meetings. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel agreed, and DEFENDANTS were to schedule these further meetings, but never did.7
76. Fully aware of the serious nature of the federal constitutional deprivations and statutory violations to which PLAINTIFFS are subjected, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor Kim Thomas was reported in the news media to have given Corizon a “vote of confidence” as part of an August 20, 2014 presentation at Alabama Association of County Commissions’ annual meeting. With DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor having unexpectedly resigned on or about January 27, 2015, DEFENDANTS announced in early February 2015 that Corizon’s contract would be renewed for two additional years. I. DEFENDANTS ARE DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT TO THE SERIOUS
MEDICAL NEEDS OF PRISONERS IN THEIR CUSTODY. 77. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of failing
to provide prisoners with adequate health care, and are deliberately indifferent to the fact that the systemic failure to do so results in significant injury and a substantial risk of serious harm.
78. From 2001 through 2011, ADOC’s mortality rate was among the highest of any prison systems in the country.
79. In 2012, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH released a request for proposal for a new health care contract. Applicants were scored on a 3,000-point scale on a number of different criteria. Out of a possible 3,000 points, contract price
7 PLAINTIFFS’ counsel also asked at the May 20, 2014 meeting that DEFENDANTS immediately address the issue of razor blades being freely available and entirely untracked in all facilities, including in Residential Treatment Units and for individuals who have recently attempted suicide with razor blades.
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 33 of 144
accounted for a possible 1,350 points in the assessment of the proposal, whereas “Qualifications/Experience/References Medical” counted for only 100 points.
80. DEFENDANTS renewed the ADOC contract with Corizon in 2012, even though Corizon had failed every major audit and re-audit of its health care operations in Alabama prisons under its first contract with the state.
A. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Fail to Provide Adequate Numbers of Health Care Professionals. 81. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not
providing adequate medical staff to address the serious medical needs of prisoners in ADOC custody. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH put out a request for proposals for the medical care contract for the prisons that included a listing of minimum staffing requirements that set the level of staffing at each facility far below what is needed to provide adequate care. Further, the request for proposal was explicit in valuing cost containment far more than adequacy of care. The contract ultimately awarded reflected the importance of cost containment and provides inadequate staffing throughout the ADOC system.
82. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH recently negotiated a contract with Corizon to provide medical services to prisoners in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC. Corizon contracted to provide 493 medical staff for the entire prison system, including just 19.6 medical doctors and 13 dentists. As reported by Corizon to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and NAGLICH in its April 2014 report, there were 25,591 prisoners for whom Corizon was providing medical care pursuant to the contract. This means that, if all positions were filled, a doctor’s average caseload in the ADOC is 1,395 people, and a dentist’s is almost 2,000. The ratio of total medical staff (including administrative and records staff, nurses and doctors) to prisoners is 1:52. However, all positions are not filled. In April
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 34 of 144
2014, Corizon had only 15.2 medical doctors and 12.4 dentists for the entire system, resulting in an average caseload for medical doctors of 1,684 patients and 2,064 patients on average for every dentist.
83. At Kilby, where the ADOC hospital is located, there are just one-and-a-half fulltime doctors on staff to provide treatment to 2,151 prisoners.
84. The extraordinary understaffing for medical services leads to a host of predictable problems with the delivery of medical care, including delays, failures to diagnose and treat, failures to follow-up, errors, and decisions not to treat seriously ill prisoners.
B. DEFENDANTS Routinely Deny Medical Care to Prisoners with Serious Medical Conditions. 85. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
denying medical care to prisoners with serious medical conditions, or providing such prisoners with care that is so cursory or grossly incompetent that it amounts to a denial of care.
1. The denial of care has contributed to numerous prisoner deaths. 86. At Elmore, Javon Alexander had an adverse reaction to some substance on or about May 17, 2014. He was taken to the infirmary, where he writhed around, repeatedly falling off his bed. He was returned to his bed, but was not given any treatment. Two days later, he was finally taken to the hospital. He died thereafter. 87. In January 2014 at St. Clair, a prisoner was given a shot of something during dialysis that caused him to go into cardiac arrest. Although there was a crash cart in the dialysis unit, no one present at the prison knew how to use it. The prisoner died. 88. On February 6, 2012, at St. Clair, a prisoner who had recently had surgery began bleeding from his rectum. He bled through three pairs of pants in a day. He asked for medical attention. He was given only antacids. He died that night.
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 35 of 144
89. In January 2011 at Limestone, a prisoner committed suicide using a state-issued razor blade. According to an ADOC Incident Report, he was found while he was still alive, when was asked why he had cut himself, he responded: “I’m not getting enough medical attention.”
2. DEFENDANTS routinely deny care to plaintiffs and other prisoners, causing serious harm, pain and risk of harm to prisoners in ADOC custody.
90. In or around November 2012, four prisoners entered the dormitory where PLAINTIFF DUNN was housed. They beat PLAINTIFF DUNN and stabbed him several times with an icepick. They left, then came back about 30 minutes later and attacked him again. PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken to medical for a body chart the following day. He had been stabbed 15 times with the icepick. His wounds were not cleaned or treated. He was placed in segregation for three months. He received no further medical attention.
91. PLAINTIFF DUNN suffered a cracked lens in his right eye while he was in the county jail prior to coming into ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF DUNN developed a cataract as a result of the cracked lens, and has suffered from headaches two or three times a week since he cracked the lens in his eye. Particularly in the evenings, his head feels achy and tired all around his right eye, from the strain of trying to use it. Even though the cataract is causing PLAINTIFF DUNN pain, he has been told that he will receive no treatment for the cataract because his other eye is functional.
92. PLAINTIFF MARTIN has a history of heart problems. He had a heart attack in 1999, and had a stent placed in his heart in 2009. From the time he received the stent, he was on blood thinners. On or about February 18, 2012, PLAINTIFF MARTIN was at an outside hospital for a check-up on the stent. The doctor found a blockage and put in a new stent. PLAINTIFF MARTIN was returned to St. Clair the following day. He was returned to his dorm,
35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 36 of 144
rather than the infirmary. He was not given blood thinners, although the surgeon had prescribed them and he had long been on them. He was not seen by anyone from medical staff until on or about February 23, 2012, at which point he asked why he was not on blood thinners. The nurse said that she would check, but she did not get back to him. On or about February 26, 2012, PLAINTIFF MARTIN put in a sick call request, and he was placed on the list to be seen on February 29, 2012. Correctional officers brought him to the infirmary on or about February 28, 2012 because he had deteriorated so dramatically. However, nothing was done and he was returned to his dorm. The following day, he went back to the infirmary and was transferred to the hospital the same day for emergency open heart surgery because the stent was entirely blocked and blood was flowing around it.
93. In or around March 2012, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON’s scrotum swelled up dramatically. He put in a sick call slip. Two days later, a correctional officer was sent to see him and, upon seeing the swelling, immediately brought PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON to the infirmary. However, this was a Saturday. No doctor was on duty, no doctor was called, and PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was not sent to the hospital. Instead, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was sent back to his dormitory with an icepack. The following Monday, PLAINTIFF MCCLENDON was supposed to be seen by the doctor, but he was not put on the sick call list. Nonetheless, the correctional officers brought him to the infirmary, and he was then taken to the hospital. His testicle had become gangrenous and had to be amputated. He stayed approximately two weeks in the hospital. After his hospital stay, he was returned to the Limestone infirmary. However, he developed a staph infection and had to be readmitted to the hospital.
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 37 of 144
94. From about 2002 through 2009, PLAINTIFF SELLERS was on medication for his blood pressure. The medication controlled his blood pressure. In 2009, while at Easterling, he was taken off his blood pressure medicine. No medical staff discussed his being taken off the medications with him; he went to pill call one day and was told he no longer had prescriptions for the blood pressure medications. After being taken off the medications, he felt the effects of his increasing blood pressure. Since he was taken off the medications, he has suffered from migraines and has frequently felt flushed. In November 2013, at the age of 40, PLAINTIFF SELLERS suffered a heart attack.
95. PLAINTIFF MORK is currently housed in segregation. In mid-April 2014, PLAINTIFF MORK had put his right hand out through the slot in his cell door to get the attention of a correctional officer. The correctional officer grabbed his arm and yanked it upward, banging it on the top edge of the slot in the door, and then slammed the door against PLAINTIFF MORK’s arm. PLAINTIFF MORK’s arm swelled up from this, but he received no medical care. In late April 2014, the same thing happened again with his left arm. The bone in his forearm became misshapen from the incident. A nurse who passed by his cell during rounds said he should have an x-ray. When he asked to be taken to medical to document any injuries from the incident, no x-ray was taken, and none has been taken since. He does not know if the bone is broken.
96. In the fall of 2013, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD fell ill. He was having difficulty starting and stopping urinating and it burned when he urinated. He went to see medical, and provided a urine sample. The nurse looked at the sample and stated that it looked clear so nothing was wrong. No tests were done. For several days, he did not eat because he was too weak to get himself down the hall to the dining area. One day, he threw up after eating some
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 38 of 144
food another prisoner brought him. He submitted a sick call slip. He saw Dr. Sangeeta Doshi three days later. He told Dr. Doshi about the vomiting, the weakness and the difficulty urinating. Dr. Doshi did not examine him but told him that nothing was wrong with him and sent him back to his dorm. He continued throwing up that evening. That night PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had to be sent to the emergency room at Jackson Hospital. He was diagnosed with a kidney infection, and kept at the hospital for two days. He has had no follow-up care for the kidney infection since he returned to the prison. Since he came out of the hospital, he has been unable to stand. He told Dr. Doshi of this development, but was never examined to determine the cause of the additional weakness.
97. On one occasion in the last four years, PLAINTIFF TERRELL was hearing voices and he grew loud responding to them. A correctional officer beat PLAINTIFF TERRELL, breaking his jaw and his rib, then put him into segregation. PLAINTIFF TERRELL was not given any medical attention at the time. Six months later, because he was in pain, he was seen in medical and given x-rays, at which point the broken bones were diagnosed.
98. In spring 2014, PLAINTIFF TERRELL tried to change the channel of a television in the dormitory. A correctional officer told him not to, grabbed him and spit in his face. PLAINTIFF TERRELL tried to get away, and the officer called for back-up. The officers then beat PLAINTIFF TERRELL, at least one of them using a baton. He was taken to medical, where a wound on his head was taped up. He was then sent to segregation for about six weeks. While in segregation, his head wound was not treated and the dressing was not changed.
99. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has a long history of self-harm with DUNN objects. She is nonetheless provided with razors for shaving, and the razors are left with her in her cell. On or about March 2, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was housed in segregation at Fountain.
38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 39 of 144
She cut herself with a razor. After PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS cut herself, she called out to a correctional officer who took her to the medical unit. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS’s wound was dressed but not cleaned. Due to the failure to adequately clean the wound, it became infected.
100. PLAINTIFF SEARS was diagnosed with Hodgkin disease in 1997 and was treated. However, like many people who have had Hodgkin disease, PLAINTIFF SEARS experiences extreme weight loss. While at Hamilton A & I, he received a double tray of food, Ensure (a nutritional supplement) and vitamins to maintain his weight. When he left Hamilton A & I, the double meals, Ensure and vitamins were all discontinued. PLAINTIFF SEARS is six feet tall and, when he arrived at Ventress in May 2013, he weighed 192 pounds. By February 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS’ weight had dropped 54 pounds to just 138 pounds. PLAINTIFF SEARS was then given an order for double portions, but is given only an extra piece of bread at meals. He continues to lose weight, though more slowly. As of the beginning of June 2014, he weighed 135 pounds. He is weak and exhausted. He is extremely gaunt and his head appears too large for his body. He has asked for Ensure and vitamins but been refused.
101. While PLAINTIFF SEARS was at Hamilton A & I, his health code was a 4. He was transferred to Ventress to participate in a substance abuse program. While at Ventress, his health has deteriorated significantly. In June 2014, despite his continuing weight loss, and just a month after being given a one-year “no prolonged standing” profile, without having seen a doctor, his health code was changed to a 1, indicating that he is “generally healthy” or “stable” in chronic care.
102. In 2012, PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE began rapidly losing weight. He dropped from 160 pounds to 125 pounds in about three months. He repeatedly asked to see a doctor, but was not permitted to.
39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 40 of 144
103. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY entered the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC confined to a wheelchair, as the result of a car accident in 2007. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY requested physical therapy but was informed by medical staff at Easterling that ADOC does not provide physical therapy to prisoners. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY began to self-administer physical therapy to teach himself how to walk again using weights, another prisoner’s cane, and the advice of fellow prisoners while at Easterling. By April 2013, PLAINTIFF MOSELEY had taught himself how to walk, though with a limp. He still has muscle spasms in his legs four to five times a week and is in constant pain. DEFENDANT ADOC has only provided PLAINTIFF MOSELEY with a knee brace.
104. In or around April 2014, PLAINTIFF MANER injured his left knee. He was getting down from his bed, which is an upper bunk that has no ladder. As he jumped down, he landed on his left leg. He felt a great deal of pain in his knee and he could move the knee back and forth, hearing a pop each time he moved it. PLAINTIFF MANER submitted a sick call request to have his knee examined. At the sick call, a nurse took is vital signs, gave him ibuprofen, and told him that he would need to see the facility doctor. PLAINTIFF MANER has not seen the doctor or had any x-rays. PLAINTIFF MANER is currently self-administering physical therapy to his left leg to build strength.
105. In July 2012, PLAINTIFF TORRES injured his knee. He went to medical, and was given an ace bandage and crutches, but the knee, which had swollen significantly by the time he was taken to medical, was not examined. He was not given an x-ray for about two weeks, and despite ongoing swelling for the next two years, he was not provided with any additional diagnostic testing or physical therapy.
40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 41 of 144
106. PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a severe keloid disorder, with large keloids covering much of his face, neck, chest, shoulders, back, and buttocks. They have spread dramatically in the time PLAINTIFF BROOKS has been in ADOC custody. They throb in cold temperatures, and throb and itch in hot temperatures. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF BROOKS passed out due to the pain from the keloids caused by the high temperatures in his dormitory. The temperature and pressure of the showers in his dormitory cause him a lot of pain. The many keloids on PLAINTIFF BROOKS’s chest, waist, and back prevent from him from stretching. As a result, he often experiences pain in his chest and feels like his chest is caving inwards. PLAINTIFF BROOKS receives pain medication sometimes, but not consistently. Medical staff refuse to provide PLAINTIFF BROOKS with anything for the itching caused by the keloids, and refused his request to bathe in the tub in the facility’s infirmary to avoid the pain caused by water hitting the keloids in dormitory showers. PLAINTIFF BROOKS is unable to wash between the keloids on his back. As a result, he relies on prisoners who are willing to clean between the keloids on his back with a cotton swab. When PLAINTIFF BROOKS is unable to clean between the keloids, an odor develops that intensifies in warm temperatures.
107. PLAINTIFF BROOKS has requested surgery to remove the keloids approximately five times between October 2011 and April 2013. His requests were denied. Medical staff informed PLAINTIFF BROOKS in December 2013 that he has been approved for a surgery to remove the keloids. He did not have the treatment. In or around March or April 2014, PLAINTIFF BROOKS was finally sent to a dermatologist who informed him that the keloids had grown so big that they could only be removed through radiation treatment. The dermatologist also prescribed a medicinal soap, but medical staff failed to provide the soap to PLAINTIFF BROOKS.
41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 42 of 144
108. In or around 2012, PLAINTIFF ROGERS was bitten three times by a spider. The bites developed into large wounds. PLAINTIFF ROGERS went to the infirmary three or four times to get treatment for the wounds. Medical staff told ROGERS that he was “nasty” and needed a bath; they did not treat his wounds. Over the course of three weeks, the wounds grew larger, and PLAINTIFF ROGERS became feverish and began vomiting. A correctional officer took him to the infirmary to get him treated. He was given a cream, medicated soap and gauze to protect the wound, and the wound eventually healed.
109. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has a grapefruit-sized hernia. The prison doctor has told PLAINTIFF BRAGGS that he will not recommend surgery because the hernia is not life threatening.
110. In July 2013, and prior to his placement in ADOC custody for the second time, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON learned that he has a mass on his colon that is either cancerous or a symptom of Crohn’s disease. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON entered the custody of ADOC before he could receive medical treatment for the mass. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON informed medical personnel of the mass during his intake examination at Kilby. The personnel told him that the mass is only polyps and that he should not worry about it. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON later showed medical personnel at Ventress his medical records indicating that the polyps are either cancerous or a symptom of Crohn’s disease. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON has seen blood in his stool since July 2013 and tested positive for blood in his stool several times in 2014, but has not received any treatment.
111. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM suffers from severe headaches, which have persisted for approximately five years. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM’s headaches have gone unexamined and
42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 43 of 144
untreated for more than four years, despite PLAINTIFF FOLSOM’s requests for medical evaluation.
112. PLAINTIFF FOLSOM also has a lump in his left breast, which has not been treated or removed. Medical staff discovered the lump four years ago. The lump in PLAINTIFF FOLSOM’s left breast causes PLAINTIFF FOLSOM a great deal of pain.
113. In or about 2011, PLAINTIFF FOLSOM learned he had a cyst in his liver. About a year later, PLAINTIFF FOLSOM was told the cyst was not in his liver, but in his kidney. In or about 2014, PLAINTIFF FOLSOM learned he had two cysts, one in each of his kidneys. He has been told neither the cysts nor kidneys need to be removed.
114. PLAINTIFF ALLEN is 34. She was diagnosed with high blood pressure in approximately 2006. Since about the same time, she has suffered from headaches about every other day. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has been given a variety of blood pressure medicines over the years, but they have not controlled her blood pressure. In 2012 or 2013, PLAINTIFF ALLEN was sent out to a cardiologist who put her on a medication that brought down her blood pressure. The medication was discontinued after several months, and her blood pressure has not been as well controlled since. In early 2015, PLAINTIFF ALLEN was taken off her blood pressure medications, other than water pills. She experienced headaches, nausea, dizziness, and could hear her pulse when she laid down. After complaining, she was placed back on blood pressure medications several days later. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has also been placed on imitrex for her headaches. Imitrex is a migraine medicine that is contraindicated for persons with uncontrolled high blood pressure. Her blood pressure currently runs at around 160-175 over 90-120. The doctor at Tutwiler has told her that this is her “normal.”
43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 44 of 144
115. In early 2015, PLAINTIFF ALLEN tested positive on two separate occasions for blood and protein in her urine. There has been no follow up to determine the cause of the blood and protein in PLAINTIFF ALLEN’s urine.
116. In 2011, PLAINTIFF ALLEN had rectal bleeding. She had a colonoscopy and was diagnosed with internal and external hemorrhoids. The doctor who performed the colonoscopy stated that she should a follow-up examination within one or two years. She has not had a follow-up examination. Since approximately 2013, the bleeding from her rectum has increased dramatically. PLAINTIFF ALLEN has complained to medical staff about it, but has not been examined or treated, other than being given hemorrhoid medication.
117. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN suffers from a hernia. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN describes the hernia as a “bottom” hernia, on his left side. He has been given a truss so that the hernia will not move or enlarge. Despite the truss, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’s hernia drops approximately 1.5 inches, and hangs between his legs, where it causes constant pain from chafing. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has requested treatment for the hernia since he was first incarcerated in 1990. In 2013, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN was told he would not receive surgery for the hernia.
3. DEFENDANTS deny treatment for eye problems. 118. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not treating cataracts and other eye problems. 119. PLAINTIFF TORRES was diagnosed with cataracts in both eyes as a child. In or around 2011, PLAINTIFF TORRES visited the Callahan Eye Clinic in Birmingham, Alabama. Doctors informed him that the vision in his left eye had substantially deteriorated. Doctors advised PLAINTIFF TORRES that if he does not have surgery on his left eye, he will lose vision
44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 45 of 144
in that eye. In or around 2011 and after his visit to the Callahan Clinic, PLAINTIFF TORRES put in a sick call request to see the facility optometrist. The optometrist examined PLAINTIFF TORRES by asking him to read a letter chart only. Afterwards, he informed PLAINTIFF TORRES that ADOC will not pay for his eye surgery and prescribed him a pair of glasses. PLAINTIFF TORRES stopped using the eye glasses after a short time because they did not improve his vision and gave him headaches. The glasses eventually broke and medical staff refused to give him another pair because he discarded the frames.
120. Since 2011, PLAINTIFF TORRES has experienced increasingly severe headaches that are so painful that they prevent him from sleeping. He experiences strain in his right eye due to the weakening of the left. As time passes, his vision worsens and he sees spots and fog periodically.
121. PLAINTIFF MOORE developed glaucoma in 2008. He was in the process of arranging surgery for his glaucoma with the Franklin Clinic in Mobile when he was arrested. After he was arrested, the eye doctor in the Mobile County Jail examined PLAINTIFF MOORE’s eyes and stated that he needed surgery for his glaucoma immediately. The eye doctor said that he was writing this in PLAINTIFF MOORE’s records that would go to ADOC. When PLAINTIFF MOORE came into ADOC custody, he had an appointment with an eye doctor every three months, later reduced to every six months. He spoke with the eye doctor three or four times about getting surgery to treat his glaucoma. The eye doctor repeatedly told him that the state would not pay for glaucoma surgery because it did not have the money. His last appointment with the eye doctor was in the summer of 2013. In or around February 2014, PLAINTIFF MOORE spoke with the Director of the Pardons and Parole Board who also told him there was inadequate money to pay for his surgery.
45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 46 of 144
122. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has not been able to see out of his left eye since 2012. He believes the problem is cataracts. Also, the white of his eye is swollen and droopy, blocking his vision. He had cataract surgery on his right eye about eight years ago, but his right eye now has double vision. He has been given glasses, but they do not help with his eyesight at all. He has received no other treatment for his eyesight.
123. Larry Shepherd, then a prisoner in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC, developed cataracts in both eyes in or around April 2011. He was unable to read any of the letters on the eye chart by June 2011. He was sent out to see an ophthalmologist in November 2011. The ophthalmologist prescribed that he undergo surgery on the cataracts in both eyes “ASAP.” As of November 2012, he had not had the surgery. He was released on medical furlough at that time, and was able to have surgery on his right eye in February 2013.
4. DEFENDANTS do not treat hepatitis C. 124. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not treating hepatitis C. According to a report provided to DEFENDANTS DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH, in April 2014, 2,280 prisoners in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC had been diagnosed with hepatitis C, but just seven of them were receiving treatment. 125. The failure to treat prisoners for hepatitis C creates a significant risk of serious harm. One prisoner at Holman recently died from complications from untreated hepatitis C. Numerous individuals develop jaundice at Holman and do not receive treatment. A prisoner at Ventress has untreated hepatitis C and is suffering from liver failure. 126. PLAINTIFF MORK was diagnosed with hepatitis C shortly before entering ADOC custody. At that time, the doctors at the University of Alabama at Birmingham hospital were about to start him on medications. In late 2011 or early 2012, while housed at Limestone,
46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 47 of 144
the doctors told him that his hepatitis had progressed far enough that he should begin receiving treatment. A doctor at Limestone told PLAINTIFF MORK that they did not treat everyone because the medication was too expensive, but that he could submit a request. PLAINTIFF MORK submitted the request, but never heard back. PLAINTIFF MORK was subsequently transferred to Holman, where he has not received any treatment. To the best of his recollection, he has not had his viral load checked for seven or eight months, and his blood is rarely checked.
127. PLAINTIFF SELLERS has hepatitis C. He is receiving no treatment for it. In 2011, he tested positive for tuberculosis (TB) exposure and was given Rifampin. PLAINTIFF SELLERS developed jaundice and had to discontinue Rifampin. Since that time, the enzymes in his blood have repeatedly tested high, indicating that his liver is not functioning appropriately.
128. Michael Kennedy is a prisoner housed at Staton. He was born with hepatitis C. After he came into ADOC custody in 2012, he was told that he is too sick to be treated for hepatitis C. Although he is in a great deal of pain and was prescribed Phentanyl, he receives only Tylenol 3 for his pain. His liver is ordinarily drained every two months, at a hospital, with the use of an ultrasound machine to determine where the draining catheter should be placed. However, in February 2014, this procedure was done at Staton’s infirmary, rather than an outside medical facility. There was no ultrasound used. Instead, the doctor felt his abdomen and guessed where to place the catheter. It was significantly more painful than when the procedure was done in the hospital.
129. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON has made several requests for hepatitis C treatment, including on June 29 and July 9, 2014, but has been denied. In 2007, facility medical staff at Bullock told PLAINTIFF HENDERSON that he did not qualify for the hepatitis C treatment because he had a short time left on his sentence. In 2013, medical personnel at Kilby erroneously
47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 48 of 144
told PLAINTIFF HENDERSON that all of the possible treatments for the hepatitis C would harm his liver. In 2014, medical personnel refused to provide PLAINTIFF HENDERSON treatment for hepatitis C due to his liver condition.
130. While residing at Limestone in 2008, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON learned that the lack of treatment for hepatitis C has led to high levels of ammonia in his brain, causing him to experience confusion, memory loss, and cognitive difficulty. The medication that DEFENDANT DUNN’s and DEFENDANT NAGLICH offered PLAINTIFF HENDERSON to treat the high ammonia levels causes severe diarrhea. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not offered PLAINTIFF HENDERSON treatment to offset the effects of the diarrhea nor an alternate medication that does not have this side effect.
5. DEFENDANTS deny prisoners treatment for diabetes. 131. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not providing adequate care for diabetes in a number of different ways. 132. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not providing appropriate nutrition and medicine to control diabetes. For example, PLAINTIFF GILBERT’s diabetes has not been well-controlled since he has been in ADOC custody. Since he has been at Kilby, his blood sugar level in the early mornings is typically around 300 or 400 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dL); the target level before eating is 70-130 mg/dL. At other points in the day, he feels his blood sugar level dropping, and he gets shaky and breaks out into a sweat. He has passed out from low blood sugar between 15 and 20 times in the two years he has been in ADOC custody. When he first came to Kilby, snacks were provided to diabetics to keep with them so they could be eaten when needed. Now, diabetics are called to the cafeteria at some point in the evening for snacks. The snacks must be eaten at the time they are offered, rather than
48

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 49 of 144
when they are needed. Prior to coming to ADOC, he was on a long-acting, 24-hour insulin that controlled his diabetes better. He has asked if he can be put back on the 24-hour insulin, but was told by a doctor that he cannot because it is too expensive.
133. At Kilby, several times each week, someone has a sufficiently serious diabetic crisis that they must be carried to the infirmary.
134. In approximately 2004, PLAINTIFF BRAGGS’s right leg was amputated at the knee due to lack of medical treatment while in prison. Prior to losing his leg, PLAINTIFF BRAGGS, who has diabetes, complained of numbness and tingling in his foot to prison medical staff for approximately three weeks. Prison medical staff told PLAINTIFF BRAGGS he had athlete’s foot. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is currently experiencing similar problems with his left foot. Medical staff at Hamilton A & I have provided PLAINTIFF BRAGGS with a prescription for the foot numbness, but have not addressed the reason his foot is numb and tingling. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS does not know the name of the medicine he has been given for the numbness. When he asked about possible side effects of this medication, a nurse said that PLAINTIFF BRAGGS could “look up” the side effects of his medication. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS is not aware of any way in which he could look up the side effects.
135. PLAINTIFF BROYLES also has diabetes that is not well controlled. While he was at Bullock, he collapsed four times from having low blood sugar. On one occasion, he was in his bed, fell out, and hurt his head. His sugar blood sugar level was 40 mg/dL. He was transferred to Elmore in January 2014, and has also collapsed there from low blood sugar.
136. Prisoner Bobby Copeland, a prisoner who died in March 2015, had poorly controlled diabetes as well. His blood sugar levels were generally between 150 and 350 mg/dL. On one occasion, when his blood sugar level was toward the low end of the target range, 79
49

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 50 of 144
mg/dL, a nurse tried to give him insulin anyway. This would have brought his blood sugar level down, likely to a dangerously low level.
137. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not having diabetic prisoners’ toenails clipped for them. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, who is diabetic and paralyzed on one side of his body from a stroke, asked to have his toenails clipped. Clipping his own toenails is dangerous because he can easily give himself a small cut that, because he is diabetic, creates a risk of infection and amputation. The nurses laughed and told him that they were not in the prison to clip his toenails.
138. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying diabetic prisoners appropriate foot care. PLAINTIFF ROGERS has not seen a podiatrist since he came into ADOC custody, although he visited one regularly prior to his incarceration. Prisoner Copeland’s feet and legs were consistently swollen and painful, but he did not see a podiatrist.
139. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying diabetic prisoners appropriate footwear. PLAINTIFF GILBERT was given an orthopedic shoe that rubbed the skin off his toe because the shoe was too small. He asked for a new shoe, but was denied. He had to cut away the top of the shoe. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD asked for diabetic shoes and was told that because he is in a wheelchair, he does not need shoes.
140. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying diabetic prisoners appropriate eye examinations and adequate treatment as needed.
6. DEFENDANTS deny prisoners adequate dental treatment. 141. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of denying prisoners adequate dental care.
50

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 51 of 144
142. At some facilities, prisoners’ teeth are rarely cleaned. Dentists do not generally fill cavities. Once a prisoner’s tooth becomes decayed, the only treatment available in most facilities is to have the tooth pulled. Once pulled, the teeth are not replaced unless the prisoner has lost numerous teeth.
143. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN came into ADOC custody in 1990 with an upper denture. It has not been replaced and no longer fits. He has been complaining for years that his upper dentures do not fit.
144. Over the years, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has lost his bottom teeth. In March 2015, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN only had two remaining bottom teeth. Both teeth were abscessed and caused PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN serious pain. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN submitted multiple sick calls regarding his painful abscessed teeth, but received no reply from medical staff. Finally, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN reached out to a custody officer about the abscessed teeth. Ultimately, dental staff examined PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN but did not give him pain medication for his abscessed teeth. The teeth were pulled two days later.
145. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN now has no bottom teeth. He does not have bottom dentures and they are not, to his knowledge, in process. He has difficulty chewing. Although PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN cuts his food up into very small pieces, he chokes multiple times a week on food that gets stuck in the back of his throat. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN also cuts his lower gums when he eats.
146. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has never had his teeth cleaned in the eight years he has been at Bullock. PLAINTIFF DILLARD’s left front tooth turned dark brown in early 2013. He saw a dentist after the tooth turned brown, and the dentist said that he would see PLAINTIFF DILLARD again about the tooth. He did not. After PLAINTIFF DILLARD moved to the
51

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 52 of 144
mental health dormitory in the main building at Bullock, he saw the dentist again. The dentist said to “put him on the list.” PLAINTIFF DILLARD saw the dentist again around the end of April 2014. The dentist did not work on the tooth at either of these appointments. The dentist said that he would try to save the tooth, but has not yet done anything for the tooth.
147. PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s two upper front teeth are mottled dark brown and black, particularly near the gum line. They are both loose. The last time he saw a dentist was, he believes, about one and a half years ago. He recently asked to see the dentist and was told he is “on the list” but that he could not see the dentist.
148. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE’s dentures broke about three years ago. He has not been provided with new dentures.
C. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Delay Diagnosis and Treatment of Serious Medical Needs. 149. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
delaying diagnosis and treatment to prisoners with serious medical conditions, causing prisoners in Alabama unnecessary pain, suffering, disabilities and sometimes death. The policy and practice of delaying diagnosis and treatment creates a substantial risk of serious harm.
150. Numerous prisoners have complained of symptoms for months without anyone addressing their concerns, only to be diagnosed with advanced stage cancer that is terminal by the time it is diagnosed. For example, Robert Jones, a prisoner who had been treated for prostate cancer in 2006 started showing rapidly rising PSA levels in 2011. Rising PSA levels are an indication of prostate cancer, requiring additional tests. He began vomiting, sometimes vomiting blood, on a regular basis. However, he was not given necessary tests or diagnosed until a year and a half later in February 2013. By that time, his prostate cancer had metastasized, spread to his bones, and was terminal. He died in January 2014.
52

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 53 of 144
151. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had a chest x-ray in or around February 2014 because of a TB outbreak at St. Clair. There was a spot on his lung. He had a CT scan in or around late March 2014. On or about April 14, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR was told that the CT scan showed that he had cancer and that he would be sent out for a biopsy the following day. As of May 28, 2014, PLAINTIFF TOLLAR had not been sent out for a biopsy of the cancerous spot on his lung. PLAINTIFF TOLLAR did not start chemotherapy until late September 2014.
152. Prisoner Baker was diagnosed with a lump in her breast in January 2012, while in ADOC custody. A biopsy in August 2012 indicated that the lump was not malignant, but outside medical staff instructed her to have annual check-ups to monitor the lump. Despite informing facility medical staff that she needed an annual mammogram,, she did not receive any follow-up care necessary to confirm that the lump had not grown or become malignant, prior to being added as a named plaintiff in this lawsuit. She received a mammogram in approximately September 2014, more than two years after her biopsy and approximately two months after being added to this lawsuit.
153. In April 2014, a prisoner at St. Clair had an infection in his left foot that went untreated for long enough that his foot became gangrenous and had to be amputated. Also in April 2014, a prisoner at Bibb had an infection in his right foot that went untreated for long enough that the front portion of his foot had to be amputated.
154. PLAINTIFF SMITH came into ADOC custody eight years ago. He was set to have a surgery in summer 2007 to address an infection in his groin area. In anticipation of this surgery, doctors required PLAINTIFF SMITH to begin using a catheter. He was to use the catheter for three months. PLAINTIFF SMITH entered ADOC custody before he could have the surgery. As of the time of filing this lawsuit, he had not had the surgery. He had frequent
53

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 54 of 144
infections from the catheter, often requiring hospitalization. His urine is often a brownish color and may have blood in it.
155. In February 2014, an infection from PLAINTIFF SMITH’s catheter had gotten so bad that he had to be taken to Jackson Hospital for a series of visits. During these visits it was determined that PLAINTIFF SMITH’s bladder was now incapable of holding the normal amount of fluid. Fluid leaks from PLAINTIFF SMITH’s penis and pockets of pus repeatedly form around his groin area. PLAINTIFF SMITH endures pain so severe that he is often unable to sleep.
156. In late 2014, after a seven-year delay and only a few months after the filing of this lawsuit, PLAINTIFF SMITH was finally given the surgery he needed.
157. Starting in the summer of 2010, PLAINTIFF SELLERS began to experience pain in his lower back and difficulty urinating, and occasionally saw blood in his urine. He told medical staff, but was given only Ibuprofen for the back pain. His pain and urination difficulties increased over the following three years. By July of 2013, he had blood in his urine every day, and was in so much pain that he could not lay flat on his bed. Following a heart attack in November 2013, he was transferred to Kilby. He had an MRI, from which it was discovered that he had kidney stones. PLAINTIFF SELLERS was placed on a medical hold, so that he could have the kidney stones removed. He was prescribed Flomax to treat the kidney stones and Norco for pain, and was scheduled for surgery. However, on December 31, 2013, he was transferred to St. Clair. His medical records were not transferred to St. Clair. His diagnosis was not promptly communicated to staff at St. Clair, he was not provided with his medications, and it was months before his surgery was scheduled. PLAINTIFF SELLERS finally had kidney surgery on March
54

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 55 of 144
7, 2014, more than three and a half years after he began having symptoms from the kidney stones, and more three months after the kidney stones were ultimately diagnosed.
158. The day of PLAINTIFF SELLERS’s surgery for kidney stones, he was returned to his general population housing unit at St. Clair. Within two days he was feverish from infection. He asked to be admitted to the infirmary at St. Clair. In the infirmary, he was left in a storage closet overnight, then returned to his housing unit.
159. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was splashed in the eyes with disinfectant when he was in suicide watch in December 2013. He was taken to a hospital the following day. A doctor there recommended that he see an eye specialist. He has not seen an eye specialist. His vision has been cloudy since this incident.
160. In 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT injured his back while lifting weights. He received a pain medication after the injury but continues to experience pain in his lower back. At times the pain is so severe that he is unable to get out of bed. He currently receives ibuprofen and wears a back brace but receives no other treatment for the constant pain. He has not been evaluated by a back specialist. When he asked to see a doctor in the free world, he was told by medical staff that there was no need to see anyone about his back.
161. On or about May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was housed in segregation and the toilet in his cell became stopped up. On or about May 8, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was attempting to summon assistance because of the stopped up toilet by sticking his right hand out through the food slot in the door of his cell. A correctional officer pushed the door of the slot up, forcing his hand up and back. His hand swelled up immediately. He was then maced through the slot in the door. There were no decontamination procedures taken. He was not taken to shower, and his cell was not decontaminated. He only option for decontamination was to use his
55

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 56 of 144
hands, one of which was injured, to wash his face in the sink that is a single unit with the toilet that had been stopped up for a week. He was given 20 days of restriction in segregation. He was not taken to medical that day for his hand. He was taken the following day and given aspirin. It was not until four days after the incident that his hand was x-rayed. He does not know the results. As of June 16, his hand continues to cause him significant pain and he has difficulty moving his thumb.
162. In or around June 2012, PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE began complaining of serious tooth pain in two teeth, and asking for the two teeth to be removed. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE put in repeated sick call requests relating to the pain from these two teeth for two and a half years, before they were finally extracted in late 2014.
D. DEFENDANTS Routinely and Systematically Fail to Provide Adequate Emergency Care. 163. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of failing
to respond adequately to medical emergencies. The poor response results in a substantial risk of serious harm, as well as pain, loss of function, and even death.
164. As discussed above, in January 2014, a prisoner who was injected with something incorrectly during dialysis at St. Clair went into cardiac arrest. Although there was a crash cart in the dialysis unit, no one present knew how to use it. The prisoner died.
165. PLAINTIFF DUNN cut himself with a razor blade on several occasions during a nine-month period in segregation. On one occasion, on or about March 15, 2014 just before 6:00 p.m., he cut himself so deeply that he cut a tendon in his forearm. PLAINTIFF DUNN promptly told a sergeant that he had cut himself. The sergeant responded, “Why do you keep doing this on my shift? Why don’t you just go ahead and kill yourself.” Shortly after 6:00 p.m., a nurse came by, and PLAINTIFF DUNN showed the nurse his arm. The nurse said he would return when he
56

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 57 of 144
had time, but did not come back. At approximately 9:00 p.m., PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken out of his cell and placed in a cell outside. He was beaten by two officers in the cell, then left there for another hour. At approximately 10:00 p.m., he was taken to the infirmary. The nurse at the infirmary attempted to staunch the blood flow from PLAINTIFF DUNN’s arm, but was unable to do so. At approximately 11:00 p.m., PLAINTIFF DUNN was taken to Brookwood Medical Center (“Brookwood”), where several staples were put into his arm to hold the wound closed. The doctor at Brookwood instructed that PLAINTIFF DUNN should be returned to the hospital for follow-up care if he experienced weakness as a result of the cut in the tendon. Although PLAINTIFF DUNN did experience weakness in his arm, he received no care for the weakness.
E. DEFENDANTS Fail to Adequately Provide and Manage Medications, Medical Supplies, and Medical Devices. 166. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not
consistently providing and managing medications and other medical supplies. The medical staff in Alabama prisons makes frequent medication errors or otherwise deprive prisoners of prescribed medications.
167. Prisoner Bobby Copeland took medication for high blood pressure and diabetes. Many months his medications ran out before he wa scheduled to see the doctor again. When this happened he had to ask to be seen in sick call, first by a nurse, then by a doctor. The process could take several days. The longest he went without his medications was about two weeks. When he was not on his medications, he sweated, got dizzy and suffered from headaches. Several prisoners describe medications running out before the end of the prescription.
57

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 58 of 144
168. PLAINTIFF ROGERS takes medication for diabetes. In March 2014, the medication was abruptly discontinued without any discussion with a doctor. PLAINTIFF ROGERS went for approximately two months without his medication.
169. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD also takes medication for diabetes. In or around May 2014, his diabetes medication was cut in half. His blood sugar levels immediately rose from running at around 98 mg/dL to close to or over 200 mg/dL.
170. PLAINTIFF BROOKS had a prescription for pain medication for his keloid condition. He had had the prescription for approximately two years. In February 2014, the prescription was discontinued. He had not had any discussion with the doctor about discontinuing the medication. He only learned of the medication being discontinued when he went to get it at pill call.
171. Additionally, nearly all prisoners interviewed reported that they did not give informed consent to medications. They were not informed of the purpose, risks, side effects and benefits of the medications prescribed to them.
172. On two occasions, PLAINTIFF DILLARD has been given the wrong medicine. On one occasion, he was given the wrong medicine during evening pill call. He went back to his bed and lay down. He got up about an hour later, and was unable to talk or walk. Other prisoners called for correctional officers, and he was escorted to the infirmary where he was given a shot and then brought back to his dormitory and put to bed, where he slept off the medication. On another occasion, PLAINTIFF DILLARD was given the wrong medication by the nurse. He saw that he had the wrong medication and told the nurse. The nurse told him that the doctor had changed his medication. He said that he would not take the medication because it was not his. The nurse then gave him the medication he had previously been taking.
58

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 59 of 144
173. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has also witnessed what he perceived as other prisoners having bad reactions to medication on approximately six occasions. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has witnessed numerous other prisoners look at their pills at the pill call window and tell the nurse they have the wrong medications. On two occasions, PLAINTIFF DILLARD saw the correctional officers walk up to the prisoners who stated that the medications were wrong, slap them and tell them to take the medications.
174. Prisoner Baker took several medications for heart disease, arthritis, and several mental health conditions. Prisoner Baker routinely went without her medications. Starting in the fall of 2013, she went about eight months without her heart medication, which she is supposed to receive once a month. Prisoner Baker also received improper dosages of folic acid and methotrexate from the pharmacist.
175. Medical staff gave Prisoner Baker the wrong medication many times. On one occasion, she suffered a severe reaction to an incorrect medicine that was given to her. She had no recollection of what happened, but was told by other prisoners that she was completely out of control for several hours.
176. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN has a serious heart condition and high blood pressure. He has suffered from two heart attacks since entering ADOC custody, and had emergency surgery to put several stents into his arteries following the second heart attack. Following the second heart attack and surgery, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN was underwent a radium test that he understand revealed a serious blockage of his arteries. PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN takes a number of medications for his heart condition, as well as for acid reflux and other medical issues. He receives all his medications KOP (“Keep on person”). PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’s medications are often late. When it is time for them to be renewed, medical staff at pill call tell him that they
59

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 60 of 144
do not have the medications in stock and that PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN will have to wait until the medications are restocked. Currently, he is permitted to check to see if the medications have come in only one time per week.
177. As of June 15, 2015, PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN had gone almost a week without any of his medications.
178. In early 2015, two of PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN’s medications for his heart condition, niacin and aspirin, were discontinued. The aspirin was re-started in the late spring, but PLAINTIFF SULLIVAN continues to go without niacin.
179. PLAINTIFF BROYLES has been given the wrong medication at pill call a few times. He has refused to take medication that was not correct and been harassed by correctional officers for doing so.
180. Similarly, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has asked for incontinence protection briefs because, due to his stroke, he cannot feel when he needs to urinate. Medical staff has refused to provide the necessary briefs.
F. DEFENDANTS Have Inadequate Procedures for Preventing and Responding to Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases in ADOC Prisons. 181. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have no effective system for
preventing or managing infectious diseases, and the overcrowding of ADOC facilities creates opportunities for rapid contagion.
182. In recent years, there have been numerous TB outbreaks in Alabama’s prisons. In or around January 2014, there was an outbreak of TB at St. Clair. Several men have been diagnosed with active TB. Medical staff at St. Clair have determined that a man who was diagnosed in February 2014 had likely been infectious for a year. One of the men diagnosed
60

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 61 of 144
with TB worked in the kitchen until the day he was diagnosed. Many prisoners at St. Clair did not have a TB test done during their physicals in 2013.
183. A correctional officer who was known by DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH to have active TB was allowed to continue working at Tutwiler during September 2013. He was stationed in places in the facility where it was deemed that he would have limited contact with prisoners and other employees and contractors of ADOC, but he was allowed to continue working until he was physically unable to do so.
184. At Donaldson in the summer of 2012, Dormitory K, which houses 130 men, was under purportedly under quarantine for TB. The people in Dormitory K mixed freely with the people in the adjacent dormitory and, to a lesser degree, with the prisoners housed in two more dormitories of the same size.
185. There is an outbreak of scabies at Ventress that has been ongoing for three years or more. Early on in the Ventress scabies outbreak, prisoners were instructed to place their mattresses over a fence in the yard during the day to air them out. When the prisoners collected them at night, there was no way to ensure that each person got the same mattress he had had before. Such mixing of mattresses creates a high risk of infections spreading from one person to another.
186. There has also been an outbreak of scabies at St. Clair, Holman and Tutwiler in recent months.
187. Moreover, the conditions in the prisons make the spread of disease nearly inevitable. The prisons are grossly overcrowded. Prisoners in every facility report the presence of vermin, especially rats and spiders. The vermin live in the housing units and in the kitchens. In various prison units, birds enter and leave droppings.
61

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 62 of 144
188. Additionally, the facilities have extensive plumbing problems. The showers, toilets and sinks are inadequate to meet the needs to twice the number of people the facilities were built to house. Few if any of the prisons have upgraded the plumbing systems sufficiently to meet the demands of the prisons operating at twice the capacity.
189. Sewage has overflowed into dormitories at Kilby and St. Clair. At Ventress, prisoners have been required to carry raw sewage away from the facility to dump on the edges of the facility grounds. At Hamilton A & I, there is a ditch of sewage near one edge of the property. The administration of the facility had a footbridge built over the ditch.
G. DEFENDANTS Deny Care to Terminally Ill Prisoners, Issuing ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ or ‘Allow Natural Death’ Orders Against the Patient’s Wishes. 190. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
allowing doctors to discontinue care to terminally ill prisoners against their will. This is a policy and practice that has continued over years and has been reported in these DEFENDANTS’ own documents.
191. One of the most basic health care decisions is when to discontinue treatment for a terminally ill patient. This is a decision that resides with the patient. Numerous prisoners have been given “Do Not Resuscitate” orders (“DNR”) or “Allow Natural Death” orders (“AND”) without their consent or even their knowledge.
192. In some cases, the doctors have discussed this issue with prisoners, the prisoners have affirmatively declined to be DNR or AND, but have been made DNR or AND regardless of their refusal. In some cases, individuals have been persuaded to sign DNRs without knowing what they were signing. The DNRs used by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS provide only that in the event of a cardiac arrest, cardiopulmonary resuscitation not be initiated.
62

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 63 of 144
Nonetheless, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS rely on DNRs to deny medical care to prisoners.
193. At Staton in May 2014, there were five individuals who were on a list of persons who had DNRs who did not know that they were thought to have DNRs. One of these individuals was Michael Kennedy. Kennedy had end-stage liver failure from untreated hepatitis C. In early 2014, Kennedy learned from a doctor at Staton that Dr. Bobby Crocker, the Corizon Regional Medical Director for the state, had placed a DNR order in his file, although Kennedy had not agreed to it. Kennedy asked to have it removed from his file. As of May 2014, Kennedy remained on the list of individuals who are considered to have DNRs. Kennedy has since died.
194. At Staton, prisoner Roy Heath resides in the facility’s infirmary due to his health. He did not sign a DNR. In June 2014, he learned that he has a DNR in his medical file despite not having signed one.
195. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS has COPD. He experiences extreme shortness of breath and low o xygen levels, and has periodic COPD crises that require him to be admitted to the infirmary. Prior to late spring or early summer 2013, medical staff gave PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS a shot of Sodium Metrizoate every six to eight hours whenever he had a COPD crisis, along with a breathing treatment, oxygen, and several inhalers during an COPD crisis. In or around late spring or early summer 2013, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS was admitted to the infirmary due to an exacerbation of the COPD. Several days into his stay in the infirmary, Dr. Crocker asked to see PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS, requiring PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS to temporarily stop using oxygen to meet with Dr. Crocker. Dr. Crocker asked Clements if had considered how he would feel to be on life support if he had a heart attack or was in a coma and told Clements that if he signed a DNR, he could avoid that fate. Having difficulty breathing
63

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 64 of 144
because he was not using an oxygen mask and believing that the DNR only pertained to lifesaving measures in the event of a heart attack or coma, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS signed the DNR.
196. In or around August 2013, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS experienced another bout of extreme breathing difficulty and again went into the infirmary. His oxygen level was 80. During his 30 day stay in the infirmary, medical staff gave PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS only one shot of Sodium Metrizoate. Despite PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS’s condition, medical staff did not arrange for his transport to a hospital.
197. PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS returned to the infirmary again in or around February 2014 experiencing difficulty in breathing. His oxygen level was 92. As he lay in the infirmary, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS asked the nurse to provide him with some effective treatment. The nurse responded that if he had not signed the DNR, medical staff could do something to help him. It was at that point that he learned that medical staff was refraining from treating his chronic condition due to the DNR. Although the DNR is rescindable merely by the prisoner stating that he wants it rescinded, medical staff did not explain this to PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS. Because he did not know that he could rescind the DNR, PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS requested that medical staff give him pain medication and put him in a closed room in the infirmary to die. Facility physician Mendez ultimately gave Clements several shots of Sodium Metrizoate and antibiotics.
198. At Kilby, prisoner Larry Shepherd signed a DNR in April 2012 without knowing what he had signed. Shepherd was blind from untreated cataracts and no one told him about the document he was signing. When he learned that he had signed a DNR, he asked to have it
64

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 65 of 144
rescinded. DEFENDANTS did not rescind it. To the contrary, DEFENDANTS relied on it in their response to the lawsuit Shepherd had filed seeking to have cataract surgery.
199. An Incident Report from Hamilton A & I reflects that on September 9, 2009, a prisoner was found in crisis. Life saving measures were started, and the doctor was called. The doctor told the staff that was present with the prisoner to “make him a DNR.”
200. Moreover, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS cease to provide medical treatment to people with DNRs. As discussed above, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH denied prisoner Larry Shepherd cataract surgery based in part on the existence of the DNR.
201. At Kilby, prisoner Robert Jones was admitted to the infirmary from Jackson Hospital in November 2013. He did not sign a DNR or a request for hospice care, but was placed on hospice care.
H. DEFENDANTS Allow Correctional Officers to Interfere With Prisoners’ Access to Medical Care. 202. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
allowing correctional officers to deny or delay access to medical care, whether by individual officer’s affirmative actions or the systemic understaffing of custodial staff who are necessary to prisoners’ access to treatment. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not adequately trained security and health care staff on how to handle health care emergencies, and as a result of this failure to respond properly and timely to emergencies, prisoners suffer avoidable harm and injuries, including unnecessary deaths. Correctional staff make critical initial decisions about the medical care needed. Understaffing of correctional staff by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS leads to prisoners missing off-site medical appointments and prisoners in segregation not receiving medical treatment.
65

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 66 of 144
203. In December 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was on suicide watch. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 13, 2013, another prisoner threw burning fabric into PLAINTIFF PRUITT’s cell and the other suicide watch cell, burning PLAINTIFF PRUITT’s legs. Prisoners on the second floor of the unit where the suicide watch cells are located also threw burning items into the cell. The correctional officers came and put out the fires, but failed to do anything to stop this assault. The assault continued for approximately three hours. When PLAINTIFF PRUITT asked to go to see the medical staff, the correctional officers refused, dismissing his injuries as “minute” and “nothing.” He was not taken to see medical staff until the morning of December 14, 2013.
204. Starting on December 14 or 15, 2013, prisoners started throwing disinfectant onto PLAINTIFF PRUITT. Some of the disinfectant went into his eyes. Correctional officers did not take him to get medical attention until the following day.
205. On June 12, 2014, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was in segregation. He had been asking for mental health care for months. He cut himself with a razor on both arms. When he informed the corrections officer that he was bleeding, the officer ignored him and left him in the cell for approximately four to five hours before taking him to the nurse.
206. In March 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was in segregation at Fountain. She had an infection from a wound that had not been properly treated by the medical staff. After she had returned to the infirmary and gotten the infected wound properly cleaned and dressed, medical staff told her she should return to the infirmary twice a day to have it re-dressed. Correctional officers in the segregation unit did not permit her to return to the medical unit, and the wound became infected again.
66

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 67 of 144
207. Corrections officers are often present before or during medical examinations. They sometimes make comments during the examinations suggesting or stating that the prisoner is lying to the medical professional. PLAINTIFFS ROGERS, BRAGGS and PRUITT have experienced correctional officers interfering in their discussions with medical staff. II. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE MENTAL HEALTH CARE TO
PRISONERS. 208. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS fail to provide constitutionally
adequate mental health care in a number of ways. Their mental health care delivery system is severely understaffed, and lacks adequate personnel with sufficient expertise to properly treat the individuals within its care. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS fail to identify, treat and medicate individuals with mental illness. Additionally, these systematic failures rise to the level of causing significant injuries and the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Each of these deficiencies, in isolation and in conjunction, result in a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
209. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS recognize that they must “[p]rovide clinically effective mental health services.” ALA. ADMIN. CODE. r. 600 (2005). The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that provision of mental health care includes providing “various levels of care to include a full range of psychiatric and psychological treatments, procedures, programs, institutional staffing and management.” Id. r. 700 (2010). Pursuant to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ regulations, outpatient mental health assistance, counseling and programs must be offered to all ADOC prisoners. Id. r. 623 (2007). The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that they must “provide crisis intervention for prisoners exhibiting signs of psychological distress” and that the crisis intervention requires the involvement of a psychiatrist. Id. r. 627 (2007). They are further aware that prisoners who
67

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 68 of 144
are receiving treatment for serious mental illness must be promptly evaluated when placed in segregation. Id. r. 625 (2004).
210. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have long been aware that the staffing of mental health professionals is inadequate. While the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have chosen to contract with an outside entity to provide these services, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware of the exact staffing at each facility and the extent of medical services provided. The ADOC mental health provider regularly fails to adequately diagnose and treat the most seriously mentally ill prisoners. Further, ADOC’s policies at even its most intensive mental health treatment facility fail to protect those prisoners most in need of mental health treatment.
211. ADOC routinely has failed to ensure adequate staffing, both as to gross numbers of mental health professionals, and as to quality and experience, of key mental health professionals.
212. According to the April 2014 monthly Mental Health Report to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH, a total of 24,951 individuals were housed in ADOC facilities, of whom 3,059 were receiving some form of mental health treatment (having a classification of MH-1 or greater). A total of 2,209 prisoners were prescribed psychiatric medications. This population was distributed throughout each of the facilities run by ADOC. At Tutwiler, nearly half the prisoners have a mental health code of MH-1 or greater.
213. The mental health staffing at ADOC facilities is grossly inadequate. There are just 6.2 psychiatrists for the entire prison system. This means that the psychiatrists have an average caseload of 493 mentally ill patients.
214. At many facilities, a psychiatrist position is not even staffed.
68

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 69 of 144
215. As of April 2014, more than 16,000 prisoners were housed in facilities that have no assigned psychiatrist. Considering only those individuals on the mental health caseload, 1,474 prisoners resided in a facility with no psychiatric staffing.
216. As of April 2014, Easterling had 194 people on the mental health caseload. Of the 194, 120 prisoners are on psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication orders. Easterling had no psychiatrist.
217. As of April 2014, Fountain had 106 people on the mental health caseload. Of the 106, 64 are on psychiatric medications. Fountain had no psychiatrist.
218. As of April 2014, Holman had 115 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 75 were on psychiatric medications, including one person on an involuntary medication order. Holman had no psychiatrist.
219. As of April 2014, Limestone had 257 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 190 were on psychiatric medications. Limestone had no psychiatrist.
220. As of April 2014, Montgomery Women’s Facility had 88 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 60 were on psychiatric medications. Montgomery Women’s Facility had no psychiatrist.
221. As of April 2014, St. Clair had 98 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 58 were on psychiatric medications, including six people on involuntary medication orders. St. Clair had no psychiatrist.
222. As of April 2014, Staton had 303 people on the mental health caseload. There were another 23 people not on the mental health caseload despite having DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses. A total of 175 people were on psychiatric medications, including three people on involuntary medication orders. Staton had no regularly staffed psychiatrist.
69

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 70 of 144
223. As of April 2014, Ventress had 200 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 139 were on psychiatric medications, including two people on involuntary medication orders. Ventress had no psychiatrist.
224. As of April 2014, there was only one work release center that had any psychiatric coverage at all. Altogether, the other work release centers housed 113 people on the mental health caseload, of whom 75 were on psychiatric medications.
225. At other facilities, the level of psychiatric staffing was so low as to be clearly insufficient. As of April 2014, Bibb had 161 people on the mental health caseload. Of these, 116 people were on psychiatric medications, including one person on an involuntary medication order. Bibb had less than a quarter-time psychiatrist.
226. As of April 2014, Hamilton A & I had 79 people on the mental health caseload, as well as seven people not on the mental health caseload despite having DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses. A total of 73 people were on psychiatric medications. Hamilton A & I had six hours per week of psychiatrist coverage.
227. The facilities that are designated to house the most seriously mentally ill prisoners in ADOC custody also have very little psychiatric coverage.
228. Bullock maintains a Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”), a unit designated for inpatient treatment of mentally ill prisoners. Bullock also maintains an Intensive Stabilization Unit (“SU”) for the most acutely mentally ill people in ADOC custody. As of April 2014, there were 161 people housed in the RTU. Of these, 148 were prescribed psychiatric medications, including 24 on involuntary medication orders. There were 11 people housed in the SU. Of these, eight were prescribed psychiatric medications, including two on involuntary medication orders. There were an additional 284 people on the mental health caseload in the general
70

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 71 of 144
population, of whom 201 were prescribed psychiatric medications, including five on involuntary medication orders. Bullock had one full-time and one half-time psychiatrist.
229. Donaldson maintains two RTUs. As of April 2014, Donaldson had 71 prisoners housed in the RTUs. In the RTUs, 60 people were prescribed psychiatric medications, including 16 on involuntary medication orders. There were an additional 142 people on the mental health caseload in the general population, of whom 73 were prescribed psychiatric medications, including 3 on involuntary medication orders. Donaldson had a three-quarters time psychiatrist.
230. Tutwiler also maintains an RTU and an SU. As of April 2014, Tutwiler housed 17 people in the RTU and one person in the SU. All were on psychiatric medications. Tutwiler had an additional 425 people on the mental health caseload in general population. Of these, 366 were on psychiatric medications. Tutwiler had two half-time psychiatrists.
231. Many prisoners on psychiatric medications do not have periodic reviews by a psychiatrist.
232. Moreover, as of April 2014, there were only 5.55 psychologists for the entire system. When fully staffed, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS provide for a single ADOC psychologist at Tutwiler, Kilby and Donaldson. These ADOC psychologists play a mostly administrative role. The contract between ADOC and MHM provides for a part-time psychologist at Donaldson, Bullock, Limestone and Holman and a full-time psychologist at Tutwiler. The Tutwiler psychologist position was unfilled in April 2014. At all other facilities, no psychologist is available.
233. The only contact that a prisoner often has with any mental health professional is when they are acutely mentally ill and exhibiting suicidal ideations or actions.
71

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 72 of 144
234. When ADOC issued its request for proposals for a mental health services contract in 2013, it identified the minimum staffing need from the provider to be 144.95 full-time equivalent employees. Under the current contract, MHM Correctional Services (“MHM”) is not providing even this inadequate number of mental health staff. The staffing provided under the new MHM contract is just 126.5 full-time equivalent employees.
235. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS require MHM to provide reports of their staffing and provision of care every month. In the month of April 2014, these reports showed that MHM had fewer than 120 full-time equivalent employees providing mental health related services. Of 2,738 prisoners on the outpatient mental health caseload, just 258 were scheduled to participate in any mental health group during the month.
A. DEFENDANTS Fail to Identify Mentally Ill Prisoners and Understate the Acuity of Mental Illness Even in Those Identified. 236. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of under-
identifying mentally ill prisoners and understating the acuity of prisoners’ mental illness. As a result, mentally ill prisoners go untreated and severely mentally ill prisoners receive a far lower level of treatment than they need.
237. Just 12.3 percent of the ADOC population is identified as having a mental health code of MH-1 or greater. This almost certainly indicates that Alabama is not identifying prisoners with mental health disorders. In a 2006 study of prison and jail prisoners throughout the country, the Department of Justice concluded that on average, about half of prisoners in state correctional facilities meet the DSM-IV criteria for a mental illness.
238. Further, many prisoners who are clearly suffering from a mental health disorder or psychological distress go untreated. For example, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was been placed in suicide watch three times from December 2013 through March 2014. On one occasion, he was
72

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 73 of 144
on suicide watch for approximately 10 days. He has previously been treated for depression. He asked for mental health treatment several times since December 2013. PLAINTIFFS’ counsel informed DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH of PLAINTIFF PRUITT’s urgent need for mental health care on May 16, 2014. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has not been given any treatment or placed on the mental health caseload.
239. Similarly, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS engaged in self-harm repeatedly in March 2014. On one occasion, she continued to cut herself with a razor blade she found in the suicide watch cell. After her third act of self-harm in a day, she was threatened with forcible medication. Yet, two weeks later, she asked to be placed on the mental health caseload, and was refused.
240. Another prisoner, PLAINTIFF DUNN repeatedly asked for mental health treatment while he was in segregation. He cut himself with a razor on five occasions. Prior to each incident, he requested mental health treatment. His requests were denied. PLAINTIFF DUNN had very limited contacts while he was on suicide watch. He has never been placed on the mental health caseload and received no follow-up care after being released from suicide watch.
241. Other prisoners are taken off the mental health caseload without explanation. PLAINTIFF HARDY, who has a history of serious mental illness since childhood, was taken off the mental health caseload without explanation.
242. Similarly, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder. He was taken off all medications. He was told that mental health staff believed he was “faking it.”
73

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 74 of 144
243. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON is obviously severely mentally ill, but not being treated by mental health staff. PLAINTIFF JOHNSON has also not been sent to a neuropsychologist to determine what, if any, treatment is appropriate to address his possible brain injury.
244. Further, DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH informed PLAINTIFFS’ counsel that they are aware of 30 prisoners who have diagnosed DSMIV Axis I clinical disorders who are not on the mental health caseload. Of the 30, 23 are housed at the Elmore, Staton and Draper, complex, facilities that do not have a psychologist or psychiatrist on staff.
245. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS also dramatically understate the level of acuity of those who are mentally ill. According to ADOC mental health codes, MH-1 and MH-2 are used for prisoners with “mild impairment in mental functioning, such as depressed mood or insomnia,” MH-3 is for moderate impairments “such as difficulty in social situations and/or poor behavior control,” MH-4 is for severe impairments “such as suicidal ideation and/or poor reality testing,” MH-5 is used for severe impairments “such as delusions, hallucinations, or inability to function in most areas of daily living.” MH-6, the code for the most acutely mentally ill, is reserved for prisoners who have been committed to a mental hospital. As of April 2014, just 242 prisoners in ADOC custody – less than 1 percent – were classified at greater than MH-2. In contrast, the Department of Justice study cited above found that nationally some 43 percent of state prisoners met the DSM-IV criteria for mania and 15 percent met the criteria for psychotic disorders.
246. Numerous prisoners who clearly meet the criteria for MH-3 or above are classified as MH-1 or MH-2.
74

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 75 of 144
247. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is acutely mentally ill and has poor reality testing. He is housed at Bibb. He is given psychiatric medications against his will. PLAINTIFF MCCOY is classified as MH-1 or MH-2.
248. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is classified as MH-1. He continues to have hallucinations.
249. Similarly, PLAINTIFF TERRELL is classified as MH-2. He is housed in the Mental Health Unit at Bullock and has hallucinations.
250. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has been in and out of mental hospitals since he was a child. He has difficulty carrying on a coherent conversation. He does not know what his diagnosis is or what his mental health code is, but he is housed at St. Clair, where the highest mental health code is MH-3.
251. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ own documents reflect the understatement of acuity of mental illness. According to an April 2014 report to DEFENDANTS DUNN’s predecessor and NAGLICH, only 230 people in ADOC custody were categorized as MH-3, and just 12 people were classified at higher mental health codes. Yet 753 people were receiving antipsychotic medications. Similarly, a March 2013 report to DEFENDANTS DUNN’s predecessor and NAGLICH from MHM showed that 242 people were categorized as MH-3 or higher, but 853 people had psychotic disorders. Per the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ description of mental health classifications, persons with psychotic disorders would appropriately be classified as MH-4 or MH-5.
B. DEFENDANTS Deny Mentally Ill Prisoners Access to Necessary Psychotropic Medications and Medication Management. 252. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are routinely and systematically
failing to prescribe, provide and manage necessary psychiatric medications.
75

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 76 of 144
253. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have designated a total of 3,059 prisoners as having a code of MH-1 or greater. Only 2,209, or 8.9 percent of the ADOC population actually receive psychotropic medication. The average monthly expenditure for psychiatric medications for prisoners in the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ custody decreased by 30 percent from March 2010 through February 2013, despite the relative stability in prison population. As of April 2014, for those prisoners receiving psychiatric medication, an average of just $1.33 per day is spent per patient for the totality of the psychiatric medication prescribed.
254. Further, as discussed above, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS provide no psychiatric coverage at all in the majority of facilities. In those facilities where they do, said coverage is minimal. Prisoners on mental health medications have very little interaction with the prescribing professional. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is severely mentally ill and is on several psychiatric medications, yet he is housed at a facility that has no coverage by a psychiatrist.
255. PLAINTIFF TERRELL, who is also housed in the Bullock RTU, is currently taking either Prolixin or Haldol and continues to have visual and auditory hallucinations. He sees a psychiatrist for about five minutes about one time per month.
256. Many prisoners do not know the name of the medications they take and or their potential side effects. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is given a shot every month, and has a prescription for three other medications. He knows the name of some but not all of these medications and does not know their potential side effects.
257. PLAINTIFF MCCOY receives a shot once a week by medical staff and sometimes receives additional shots against his will throughout the week. He knows he has
76

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 77 of 144
taken Prolixin in the past, but does not know the name or purpose of the medication in the weekly shots or the other shots he receives currently. He knows that they sometimes make him nauseous and make his arm hurt, but otherwise does not know the potential side effects.
258. PLAINTIFF TERRELL does not know what medication he is taking. He thinks it is either Prolixin or Haldol. PLAINTIFF TERRELL does not recall receiving individualized information about the medications he is taking or giving informed consent. He took a class years ago called “Know Your Medications” during which various psychiatric medications were discussed. He understood very little of the class.
259. PLAINTIFF DILLARD takes two antipsychotic medications (Haldol and Risperdal), a medication for the side effects (Cogentin), and a medication that he does not know the name of nor the reason he takes it. He had a “Know Your Medication” class in or around 2010, and another when he moved from the Mental Health Unit to the mental health dormitory in or around January 2014. He does not recall receiving individualized information when being prescribed his medications or giving informed consent.
260. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS takes three medications for mental health and does not know the names of the medications or their potential side effects.
261. Some prisoners take medications for years, and are then taken off the medications, and often the mental health caseload, despite still needing treatment. These include prisoners who continue to exhibit suicidal thoughts and actions. Despite continued self-injurious actions these prisoners who have been improperly removed from the caseload and been denied needed medication are not even returned to the caseload and their medications reinstated after numerous suicide attempts. For example, PLAINTIFF CARTER, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, ADHD, and intermittent explosive disorder, was prescribed
77

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 78 of 144
Prolixin and Haldol for years. His mental illness is sufficiently severe that he has been placed at the residential Mental Health Unit at Bullock and Kilby on more than five occasions throughout the period of his incarceration, and from 2011 until 2012 he had a forced medication order. In October 2013, all medications were abruptly discontinued.
262. PLAINTIFF HARDY has a history of serious mental illness since childhood and has attempted suicide several times while in ADOC custody. He was previously prescribed Wellbutrin, Trazadone and Prolixin. He was taken off his medications without explanation in 2012. He has made approximately six attempts on his own life since being taken off his medications.
263. PLAINTIFF JACKSON was taking Haldol, a first generation antipsychotic that is well known for causing people to shake. To his knowledge, he was not given a medication for the side effects, and the Haldol made him shake. In early 2014, PLAINTIFF JACKSON asked to be taken off the medication because of the side effects. He was offered neither the medication for side effects, nor an antipsychotic medication that was less likely to cause him to shake. He has been without psychiatric medications since. He tried to commit suicide by setting fire to his cell in the fall of 2013.
264. PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF, who has long been treated for depression, was taken off Prozac and Trazadone. He has asked to have medications for his depression since, but has been refused.
265. PLAINTIFF WALLACE was taking several psychiatric medications, including lithium. In 2012, the lithium was discontinued without explanation.
266. Other prisoners simply do not receive medication for their mental health needs. For example, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY has trouble sleeping. He sleeps between four and five
78

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 79 of 144
hours a night. Also, as stated above, there are 30 people DEFENDANT ADOC has identified as not being on the mental health caseload who have Axis I diagnoses.
267. There is little regard for side effects of psychiatric medications. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that one of the potentially life-threatening side effects of many psychiatric medications is that they make patients more sensitive to heat and more vulnerable to heat-related illnesses, such as heat stroke. Yet, prisoners on psychotropic medications that increase heat sensitivity are exposed to levels of heat that pose potentially lethal risks. Other than the RTUs and SUs, the ADOC facilities which routinely house prisoners taking psychotropic medications are not air conditioned and the ambient air temperatures in the facilities during the summer frequently exceed 85 degrees.
268. PLAINTIFF DILLARD takes Haldol, Risperdol and Cogentin, all medications that increase sensitivity to heat. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is in a mental health dormitory, but not the RTU, at Bullock. There are many other people in the dormitory who are on psychiatric medications, including Haldol, as well. There is no air conditioning in the dormitory in which PLAINTIFF DILLARD is currently housed, and the dormitory becomes very hot. Average daytime highs in the summer months in Union Springs, AL where Bullock is located, are in the high 80s and low 90s.
269. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is taking either Prolixin or Haldol, both of which increase sensitivity to heat. Although he is in the RTU at Bullock, his dormitory currently does not have air conditioning. PLAINTIFF TERRELL, who likely has an undiagnosed learning or developmental disorder and has difficulty reading and understanding written material, was asked to sign a paper promising to inform the correctional officers if he is getting too hot.
79

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 80 of 144
270. Other side effects are also inadequately addressed. For example, PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s right hand and wrist shake. This is a recognized side effect of first-generation antipsychotics, including Haldol and Prolixin. He told the doctor about the shaking, and the doctor increased the Benadryl to three pills per night. This has not controlled the shaking but has increased PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s sleepiness. PLAINTIFF TERRELL sometimes sleeps for a day and a half straight. Sleepiness is a side effect both of Haldol and Prolixin, and of Benadryl.
271. In or about 2005, PLAINTIFF PRUITT was diagnosed with depression. He was prescribed Haldol, an antipsychotic used to treat schizophrenia and known to carry a risk of a variety of side effects. He was given no medications to address the side effects and developed what he describes as “lockjaw” after about a year. He then asked to be taken off Haldol. Muscle movements in the jaw and muscular rigidity are known and serious side effects of Haldol. The lockjaw lasted on and off for about a year after he stopped taking Haldol. He has not been provided with any mental health care since requesting to be taken off Haldol due to the side effects, although he continues to have suicidal ideations.
272. Similarly, PLAINTIFF JACKSON was given no medications for the shakiness caused by taking Haldol. When he complained of it, he was offered neither side effect medication nor a different psychiatric medication that carries a lower risk of this particular side effect.
273. PLAINTIFF BUI takes Haldol. It causes him to shake. He does not, to his knowledge, receive any medications to combat this well-known side effect of Haldol and has not been offered an alternative medication to Haldol that would not cause him to shake.
C. DEFENDANTS Fail to Provide Mentally Ill Patients with Adequate Care.
80

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 81 of 144
274. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of providing almost no mental health treatment other than medication to mentally ill prisoners.
275. In April 2014, there were six individuals at St. Clair who have involuntary medication orders. Individuals cannot be given involuntary medication orders unless they have a serious mental illness and are dangerous to themselves or others. St. Clair has neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist, and there were no psychiatrist or psychologist contacts at St. Clair during the entire month. The same is true for Ventress where there were two individuals with involuntary medication orders.
276. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS maintain a total of 375 beds in RTUs. According to an April 2014 MHM report provided to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, there were 249 individuals in the RTUs. Despite having 249 patients sufficiently ill to warrant inpatient mental health care, there were just 160 individual contacts by psychiatrists with the patients in the RTUs over the course of the month, 29 individual contacts with a psychologist and 96 contacts with a nurse practitioner. According to another MHM report provided to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, in March 2013, there was one individual in an RTU at Limestone who was in the RTU for the entire month and he was classified as MH-3. MHM reported that, over the course of the month, this individual met with a psychologist two times and a nurse practitioner one time, and had no other mental health contacts.
277. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS also maintain specialized units for the most acutely mentally ill within its control at Bullock and Tutwiler, labeled as the “Intensive Stabilization Units” (SU) with a total capacity of 38. The April 2014 report to the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS indicates that as of the end of the month, there were 11 men in the
81

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 82 of 144
SU at Bullock and one woman in the Tutwiler SU. All were classified as MH-5, the highest level mental health designation before DEFENDANTS are required to transfer individuals to a mental health facility. The woman in the SU at Tutwiler was placed on “precautionary watch” in a safe cell for 15 days. The totality of her contacts with mental health during the month of April was two contacts with the psychiatrist and five with a mental health professional.
278. The contacts with mental health staff are often perfunctory. For example, while he was in the Bullock RTU, PLAINTIFF DILLARD had appointments with a counselor at varying frequencies that lasted roughly 10 minutes. He estimates that he has met with his Treatment Team approximately two times in the nine years he has been incarcerated. He is now in the mental health dormitory at Bullock, where he sees a counselor one or two times a month for five to 10 minutes. He continues to hear voices, and feels he would be helped if he had the chance to talk through his problems more thoroughly. Other than the five to 10 minute counseling sessions and medication, PLAINTIFF DILLARD receives no additional mental health treatment or programming. The last time he had mental health programming other than the “Know your Medication” class was in or around September 2013. To his knowledge there are no mental health groups or programs for prisoners in the mental health dormitory at Bullock.
279. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is housed in the Bullock RTU. This is the unit for the most acutely mentally ill prisoners in ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. PLAINTIFF TERRELL experiences auditory and visual hallucinations. He has great difficulty placing events in relation to each other in time. He sleeps most of the time, sometimes for a day and a half at a time. In addition to taking medication, he sees a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks and a
82

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 83 of 144
psychiatrist for about five minutes once a month. He receives no other mental health treatment. He has not been permitted to participate in any programming for several years.
280. PLAINTIFF WALLACE is in the RTU at Donaldson. He spent approximately nine months at the Bullock RTU. He has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bi-polar, ADHD, and Intermittent Explosive Disorder. He has auditory hallucinations. He does not receive any mental health treatment other than his medications.
281. PLAINTIFF MCCOY appears to be acutely mentally ill. PLAINTIFF MCCOY struggles to express coherent thoughts and communicate his needs. He suffers from delusions. He is medicated against his will. He does not know his diagnosis. His only counseling is with an unlicensed mental health professional.
282. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE was housed in the Bullock RTU from the time the facility opened until an unknown point in time after this lawsuit was commenced, at which point PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE was moved to Bibb. Prior to 2006, he was housed in the Mental Health Unit within the main building at Bullock. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He is given an injection of Prolixin every two weeks and takes Cogentin for the side effects. He meets with a counselor for about five minutes every two weeks. He sees a psychiatrist approximately one time per month for about five minutes. The meetings with the counselor and the psychiatrist amount to, in PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE’s words, “hi and goodbye” and a question about how his medications are working. He receives no other mental health treatment.
283. Part of PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE’s mental illness is that he gets angry and has difficulty controlling his anger. When he feels this coming on, he puts in a request to see a counselor. He routinely has to wait several days before seeing a counselor after putting in a
83

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 84 of 144
request, on one occasion waiting 13 days. When he does see the counselor, the counselor just refers him to the psychiatrist for a reassessment of his medications. It then sometimes takes weeks to see the psychiatrist. During the period of waiting, PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE has to struggle to control the anger that a symptom of his mental illness and is highly dangerous in the prison setting.
284. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is housed at St. Clair. He was in and out of mental hospitals in the years before he was incarcerated at the age of 22. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY’s thoughts are disjointed and he has difficulty carrying on a coherent conversation. When PLAINTIFF HARTLEY was housed at Holman from 2001 through 2003, he began to engage in self-harm, cutting his forearms with razor blades. He has continued to cut himself since, sometimes cutting himself on the leg. The most recent occurrences began in early 2014. St. Clair staff acknowledge that PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is mentally ill. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is not receiving any mental health care of which he is aware. From about 2002 to about 2004, PLAINTIFF HARTLEY participated in mental health programming, but has received no counseling, classes or programs to help him cope with his illness since that time. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY feels like he should be in a mental hospital.
285. PLAINTIFF BUI has been medicated against his will for years with regular shots of Haldol. He does not know what his diagnosis is and does not know why he is on the mental health caseload. He speaks little English. He does not want to be on medication, and he is not permitted to cease taking medication in order to determine whether he needs to be medicated. He has never had counseling or treatment with anyone who speaks Vietnamese or with the assistance of a translator.
84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 85 of 144
286. PLAINTIFF BRAGGS has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and is currently taking three psychiatric medications, the names of which he does not know. He sees a mental health professional via a television screen once every two to three months for 15 to 20 minutes. He does not know whether the person he sees is a psychiatrist. He has no other contacts with mental health staff.
287. If prisoners are not prescribed mental health medications, they are often denied access to mental health staff, even when going through a mental health crisis. PLAINTIFF PRUITT has received no mental health treatment since he asked to be taken off Haldol in or around 2006, after he developed a locked jaw. PLAINTIFF PRUITT was in segregation from July 2013 through March 2014, and was later returned to segregation where he is now housed. From December 2013 through June 2014, he went onto suicide watch four times. He repeatedly requested referral to mental health, but has not been referred to mental health. On May 16, 2014, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel requested that PLAINTIFF PRUITT be seen by mental health. PLAINTIFF PRUITT still had not been seen by any mental health staff.
288. PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed into segregation in or around June 2013. In or around September 2013, PLAINTIFF DUNN felt compelled to harm himself. While still resisting this compulsion, he asked to see mental health staff, but was denied. He cut his forearm with a razor that was provided to him for shaving. He had very limited contacts with mental health staff while on suicide watch. He was returned to segregation after three days, and then received no follow-up. This process was repeated four more times during his nine-month stay in segregation, each time preceded by his request to see mental health. He was never referred to mental health for follow-up care.
85

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 86 of 144
289. Near the end of March 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS asked to see mental health. She was told that she had to ask Ms. Nichols, the ADOC psychological associate at Fountain. She spoke with Ms. Nichols and asked to be placed on the mental health caseload and expressed that she thought she needed psychiatric medication. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has in the past been on the mental health caseload and has been prescribed psychiatric medications. She repeatedly cut herself earlier in the month and had been threatened with forced medication. Ms. Nichols told her that she did not need medication and did not need to be on the mental health caseload.
290. In or around 2010, PLAINTIFF MONCRIEF had a mental health code of MH-3. He was taking Prozac and Trazadone. He saw a psychiatrist occasionally, and he saw a nurse practitioner. After about a year, his mental health code was reduced to MH-1 and he was taken off all medications. He currently takes no medication. He has asked for mental health treatment, but been denied. Without his medication and treatment, he has difficulty controlling his impulses and anger.
291. PLAINTIFF HARDY has a lengthy history of mental health issues and placements since he was a child. He suffers from auditory hallucinations that cause him to hurt himself. The court that sentenced him acknowledged his history and ordered that he be provided with mental health treatment while in ADOC custody. PLAINTIFF HARDY has been on the mental health caseload much of the time he has been in ADOC custody. In 2004, his medication was discontinued. He subsequently attempted suicide by cutting his wrist with a razor. He then brought a razor with him into suicide watch, where he cut himself further. He was placed back on the mental health caseload and was prescribed Wellbutrin, Trazadone and Prolixin. He was again taken off the mental health caseload and his medication discontinued in 2009, and he again
86

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 87 of 144
attempted suicide using a razor blade, and again bringing the razor into suicide watch where he continued to cut himself. He has received no mental health care since. He has attempted suicide several times since being taken off his medications.
292. PLAINTIFF JACKSON has received no mental health medications since his medications were discontinued in 2014.
293. PLAINTIFF CARTER also has a long history of mental health problems and has attempted suicide many times in DEFENDANTS’s custody. He was not receiving any form of mental health medication as the time of the filing of the suit.
294. Prisoners on the mental health caseload are often denied access to mental health services because of DEFENDANTS’ failure to adequately provide correctional staff. Understaffing of custody officers results in the cancellation of mental health programming, denial of access to mental health counseling, and inadequate mental health monitoring of individuals housed in segregation.
295. Mental health care provided on suicide watch is minimal. When PLAINTIFF PRUITT was assaulted by other prisoners with flaming cloth in December 2013, he had been on suicide watch for over a week. He had received no mental health counseling. Each day, a member of mental health staff would come to the front of the cell and ask if he was still suicidal. They spent less than five minutes each day with the individuals on suicide watch. On December 16, 2013, PLAINTIFF PRUITT told the mental health staff person that he was no longer suicidal, not because of any improvement in his mental state, but because he wanted out of the cell where he had been assaulted.
296. Each time PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed in suicide watch, he was seen by mental health staff only to determine whether he was still suicidal.
87

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 88 of 144
D. DEFENDANTS Place the Mentally Ill in Segregation Without Regard for Their Mental Health. 297. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of
placing mentally ill prisoners in segregation without regard for the harmful effects segregation has on the mentally ill. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are aware that this is a dangerous practice that can cause harm to mentally ill prisoners. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a regulation requiring prompt evaluation and ongoing monitoring of the mental health status of mentally ill prisoners who are placed in segregation.
298. At St. Clair, Holman and Tutwiler, there are no general mental health checks in the segregation units.
299. In May 2012, PLAINTIFF HARDY who has a long history of serious mental illness, was taken off the mental health caseload and placed in segregation at St. Clair, where he has remained since.
300. PLAINTIFF JACKSON, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and has auditory hallucinations, has been on the administrative transfer program between the segregation units at St. Clair, Holman, and Donaldson for seven years.
301. PLAINTIFF CARTER, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and several other serious mental health disorders, has been in segregation continuously for last three years. He has been in either an RTU or segregation most of the time he has been in ADOC custody.
302. PLAINTIFF WALLACE has been in either a RTU or segregation since 2010. 303. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and PTSD. He estimates that he has been placed in segregation four or five times. Each time, he suffers exacerbated symptoms, including increased auditory and visual hallucinations and increased nightmares.
88

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 89 of 144
E. DEFENDANTS Fail to Adequately Protect Its Most Seriously Mentally Ill Who Exhibit Self-Injurious and Suicidal Actions.8 304. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of not
protecting mentally ill prisoners from self-inflicted injuries or suicide. 305. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS distribute razor blades throughout
their facilities for prisoners to shave. They are distributed in the RTUs, mental health dormitories, segregation units and other housing units. The razors are not collected or accounted for in any way.
306. On January 21, 2011, a prisoner at Limestone committed suicide using a stateissued razor blade. The death and instrument used were both reported in an ADOC Incident Report.
307. Prisoners who have a recent history of using razors to injure themselves are still provided with razors.
308. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS has a long history of self-harm with DUNN objects. She is nonetheless provided with razors for shaving, and the razors are left with her in her cell. On or about March 2, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was housed in segregation at Fountain. She cut herself with a razor. After PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS cut herself, she called out to a correctional officer, who took her to the medical unit. PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS’s wound was dressed but not cleaned. She was placed in suicide watch until the following day. She was then asked by mental health staff if she was suicidal. Upon her negative response, she was returned to her segregation cell. The razor she had used to cut herself the previous day was still in her cell. She was not provided with any mental health counseling either while in suicide watch or while in segregation afterwards. She continued to be allowed to have razors in her cell.
8 As noted in a previous footnote, the parties have preliminarily settled Defendants’ alleged failure to protect the mentally ill from self-harm with razor blades, subject to a monitoring phase to ensure the issue’s actual resolution.
89

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 90 of 144
309. On or about March 10, 2014, PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS again cut herself with a razor blade in her cell, this time in front of a correctional officer. The correctional officer walked to the front of the segregation unit, got a pair of handcuffs, walked back to PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS’s cell, and told her to place her hands through the slot in the cell door. She complied, was handcuffed, and was taken to medical. Her new wound was cleaned, stitched up and dressed, and she was placed in suicide watch. In the suicide watch cell, she found a razor blade and again cut herself. She was taken to medical, the wound was cleaned and dressed and she was again returned to the suicide watch cell. The razor blade had not been removed, and she again cut herself, and was taken to medical. She told the correctional officers about the razor blade, but they said they believed she was cutting herself on the edges of the air vents in the suicide watch cell. Because the edges of the air vent in the suicide watch cell are rusty, she was given a tetanus shot. She was told she would be forcibly medicated if she cut herself again. She said she would not, and was returned to the suicide watch cell – the cell that the correctional officers acknowledged knowing had a rusty air vent that could be used to cut oneself. The following day, mental health staff asked if PLAINTIFF WILLIAMS was still suicidal, and upon her negative response, she was returned again to segregation.
310. PLAINTIFF HARDY has attempted suicide numerous times, always using a razor. On two occasions, at two different facilities, Fountain and Donaldson, PLAINTIFF HARDY attempted suicide using a razor and then was able to bring his razor into the suicide watch cell, where he again attempted to commit suicide. PLAINTIFF HARDY continues to be provided with razors. PLAINTIFF HARDY has no contact with mental health staff other than, when he is in suicide watch and mental health personnel come by to ask if he is still suicidal.
90

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 91 of 144
311. PLAINTIFF DUNN was placed in segregation at St. Clair in or around June 2013. In September, he began to feel compelled to harm himself. He requested mental health care, but was denied. Nonetheless, he was provided with a razor blade for shaving. He used the razor to cut his forearm. PLAINTIFF DUNN was then taken to suicide watch. He had limited contacts with mental health staff, primarily asking if he was still suicidal. On the third day, PLAINTIFF DUNN stated that he was not and he was returned to segregation. The razor blade he had used to cut himself was still in his cell. There was no follow up from any mental health staff. There were also no general rounds by mental health staff in the segregation unit. PLAINTIFF DUNN remained in segregation until early April 2014. The same scenario of PLAINTIFF DUNN asking for mental health care, being denied, cutting himself, going to suicide watch, receiving no care on suicide watch other than a check as to whether he remained suicidal, and then a return to the cell, where the razor remained, played out four more times during the months he was in segregation. A lieutenant said to him after one act of self-harm, “you keep sitting there cutting yourself. If you die, you die.” On one occasion, his blood was still in his cell when he returned from suicide watch.
312. PLAINTIFF PRUITT engaged in self-harm on June 12, 2014. He had been in suicide watch multiple times over the last six months, but had been provided with a razor. He was in segregation and he cut both his wrists with the razor. He was eventually taken to medical and then a suicide watch cell.
313. At Holman, all inmates, including those in segregation or on suicide watch, are given razors each time they shower. Corrections officers do not collect the razors after the showers. III. DEFENDANTS ROUTINELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY INVOLUNTARILY
MEDICATE MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.
91

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 92 of 144
314. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy and practice of medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will without providing due process to determine whether the individuals can be forced to take medication.
315. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a policy setting forth a proceeding to determine whether a person can be medicated against his or her will. Prisoners cannot be medicated against their will unless they are determined to be seriously mentally ill and a danger to himself or herself or others. The widespread and pervasive practice is that many prisoners in ADOC custody are denied due process in this deprivation of their right to bodily integrity.
316. Numerous mental health patients that the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have not identified as being seriously mentally ill are being medicated against their will. In April 2014, there were 23 prisoners on the outpatient mental health caseload with involuntary medication orders. All but one of them were classified as MH-1 and MH-2, both defined as having a “mild impairment in mental functioning, such as depressed mood or insomnia.” One person on the outpatient mental health caseload who may have an involuntary medication order is classified as MH-3, which is defined as a moderate impairment, “such as difficulty in social situations and/or poor behavior control.”
317. Further, numerous prisoners have been forcibly medicated under circumstances that do not comport with the requirements of due process or the stated policy of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS.
318. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY occasionally refuses his medications. When he does, he is placed in what he describes as a “padded cell” in the medical unit. Usually he spends three to five days in the cell, though sometimes it is longer. The longest he has spent in the padded cell is
92

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 93 of 144
seven months. When he is confined in the padded cell, mental health personnel come to check on him two or three times a week for 15 to 30 minutes. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is unaware of having gone through a process to determine whether he can be medicated against his will.
319. In or around 2009, PLAINTIFF BUI was asked, as he understood it, to volunteer to take a medication. This medication was Haldol. At that time, PLAINTIFF BUI agreed to take the medication. In or around the fall of 2012, PLAINTIFF BUI informed mental health staff that he no longer wanted to take the medication. He requested to be taken off the medication because it made him shake and he did not want to be medicated. He was told that he would be placed in segregation if he refused to take the medication. PLAINTIFF BUI has asked several times to be taken off Haldol and has been refused, often with the threat of segregation. PLAINTIFF BUI’s English is limited and he has little understanding of the hearings in which staff approve involuntary medication orders. Contrary to ADOC regulations, PLAINTIFF BUI is not permitted to discontinue taking medication for the determination of whether he needs to be involuntarily medicated. The evidence presented at his hearings regarding his need for medication is that, medicated, he is doing well, and prior to being medicated he was not. Based on this reasoning, as long as PLAINTIFF BUI does well, he will not be allowed to cease taking involuntary medication.
320. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has refused his medication. His medications make him very tired. Since he arrived at Bullock and was started on Haldol and then Prolixin, he has been shaky. This is a known side effect of both medicines. In or around 2010, PLAINTIFF DILLARD refused to take Prolixin because it was making him shaky. An officer slapped him and wrestled him to the ground. The officers took him to the shift office and told him that they were going to put him in segregation for refusing his medication. He was able to explain to them
93

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 94 of 144
that he needed to see the psychiatrist because he was suffering from side effects from the medication. The officers agreed to tell the psychiatrist to see him and not to put him in segregation if he took his medicine. PLAINTIFF DILLARD agreed, but it took 30 days for him to be taken to see the psychiatrist.
321. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has refused his medication on a number of occasions. On at least one occasion he has been placed in segregation for refusing his medications. On all other occasions, he has been told by correctional officers that he will be forcibly held down and given his medication. He has never had a hearing to determine whether he should be permitted to refuse his medication.
322. PLAINTIFF DILLARD has witnessed other prisoners refuse to take their medications. Sometimes they are forcibly held down and given their medication, sometimes the threat of this is enough to cause them to accept the medication, and sometimes they are taken to segregation until they start taking the medication.
323. PLAINTIFF TERRELL has sometimes refused his medications. He has never, to his knowledge, been given a hearing to determine whether he can be involuntarily medicated. When he refuses the officers and nurses get angry with him. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF TERRELL was written up because he refused his medication. He had his privileges revoked for 30 days. He often sees other prisoners taken to segregation for refusing their medications. He sees one officer routinely threaten to beat people if they refuse their medications.
324. PLAINTIFF MCCOY has repeatedly refused to take his medications. When he refuses, he is threatened with being placed in segregation. There have been many occasions when he has been held down by correctional officers and given a shot. After the scheduled and unscheduled shots, PLAINTIFF MCCOY suffers stomach aches, feels nauseous, and has pain in
94

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 95 of 144
his arm from the shot. To his knowledge, PLAINTIFF MCCOY has never had a hearing to determine whether he can be medicated against his will. IV. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO REASONABLY ACCOMMODATE PRISONERS WITH
DISABILITIES. 325. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities in
numerous ways, including, but not limited to, failing to remove architectural barriers, failing to provide reasonable modifications in policies and procedures, failing to provide auxiliary aids and services necessary for effective communication, improperly segregating prisoners with disabilities, engaging in contractual arrangements that limit access to appropriate health care for prisoners with disabilities. Further, the constitutional violations alleged with regard to the provision of mental health care, including both the denial of care and involuntary medication without due process, also violate the ADA. DEFENDANT ADOC receives federal funding.
A. DEFENDANT ADOC Has Failed to Remove Architectural Barriers. 326. DEFENDANT ADOC has not removed architectural barriers that can be done
with relative ease and at limited expense. Moreover, DEFENDANT ADOC does not operate each service, program, or activity in a way that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by prisoners with disabilities. To the contrary, DEFENDANT ADOC consistently houses prisoners with mobility impairments in facilities that are not accessible.
327. With the exception of Hamilton A & I, every facility operated by ADOC contains architectural barriers for prisoners with mobility impairments.
328. Bathrooms throughout the ADOC system are not accessible. Toilets at some facilities are on raised platforms. Some dormitories have only showers with controls at the very top of the shower head. Many bathroom areas have a low wall to go into the shower area. Also,
95

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 96 of 144
access to the outside in many facilities involves going down stairs. While ADOC need not make sure that all its facilities are accessible to persons with mobility impairments, it cannot house those with mobility impairments in locations that are not accessible to them. Wardens indicated, during monitoring visits conducted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, that individuals were not housed in dormitories that were not accessible. However, these assertions were repeatedly belied by the presence of prisoners with disabilities in such dormitories and confirmation that they did indeed live there.
329. PLAINTIFF SEARS suffers from scoliosis. He uses a back brace and a cane. Walking is difficult and painful for him, as is standing for long periods. PLAINTIFF SEARS was housed in Hamilton A & I from April 2012 until January 2013. He was then moved to Limestone, where he stayed until May 2013, and then Ventress. Initially, he was housed in Dormitory C at Ventress. The dormitories in Ventress do not have grab bars in the showers, and Dormitory C does not have a shower chair to accommodate people with disabilities. PLAINTIFF SEARS fell in the shower a few weeks after his arrival, and injured his hip. PLAINTIFF SEARS obtained a profile to shower in the infirmary, where there is a shower chair, though no grab bars, in the shower. The infirmary is relatively close to Dormitory C. However, in or about July 2013, PLAINTIFF SEARS was transferred to G Dorm, which is at the opposite corner of the prison from the infirmary. He was generally not permitted to go to the infirmary to shower until very late at night, often after midnight. Walking from G Dorm to the infirmary and back was slow and painful, and, during the winter months, very cold.
330. PLAINTIFF SEARS grieved about being housed so far away from the shower he could use. He was not provided any relief from the requirement that he trek all the way across the facility in the middle of the night to shower until after PLAINTIFFS’ counsel requested that
96

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 97 of 144
PLAINTIFF SEARS be more appropriately accommodated. He was then moved to Dormitory A, which is close to the infirmary. However, Dormitory A is an honor dormitory in which prisoners are not permitted to rest during the day, and, due to PLAINTIFF SEARS’ physical disabilities, he needs to be able to rest. He was then moved to Dormitory B, and then Dormitory C. He still is housed in a unit that lacks the necessary accommodations for him.
331. At Easterling, the shower in the infirmary has 3-4 inch wall over which a person must step to enter the shower. Prisoners who use wheelchairs have been housed in the infirmary.
332. At Staton, prisoners with mobility impairments must make their way to the infirmary in order to bathe using the “accessible” shower. The shower in the infirmary consists of a small stainless steel cubicle with a plastic lawn chair in the middle and a hose that can be used for bathing. To make matters worse, a prisoner must step up about eight inches to enter the shower. It is extremely difficult, if not physically impossible, for a prisoner who cannot walk and/or has limited mobility to enter and use this shower independently.
(Step into Staton infirmary shower) Prisoner Bobby Copeland was housed in the infirmary because he was in a wheelchair. He was unable to safely access the infirmary shower without help from another prisoner. He fell numerous times when getting into the shower.
333. At Kilby, the infirmary bathroom has a purportedly accessible toilet at the end of a narrow area with toilets on one side and urinals on the other. Prisoners in wheelchairs must
97

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 98 of 144
navigate between the toilets and urinals to reach the accessible toilet, and there is inadequate space to do so. The shower has an unstable chair, and several prisoners have reported falling while trying to get in and out of the shower chair. The ramp to the yard is too steep, resulting in prisoners in wheelchairs being unable to control themselves going down and unable to mount the ramp to return to the infirmary from the yard. There are frequently prisoners who use wheelchairs who stay in the infirmary.
334. The Kilby infirmary also has several individual cells. The toilet and sink in the infirmary cells are a single unit with the sink directly above the toilet. The toilet and sink are also located in the corner of the cells. They are inaccessible to prisoners in wheelchairs. DEFENDANT ADOC has housed prisoners who are in wheelchairs in the cells in the infirmary. Also at Kilby, wheelchair users who do not need to be in the infirmary are concentrated in Dormitory A. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was housed in Dormitory A from around late 2012 until May 2, 2014. There were, as of May 1, 2014, 10 wheelchair users in the dorm. There have been as many as 17 wheelchair users housed in Dormitory A at one time in the period PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has been housed there. There is just one purportedly accessible toilet in the dorm. Although the toilet has grab bars, it is not accessible because it is at the end of a narrow walkway with toilets on one side and sinks on the other, not leaving adequate room for maneuvering a wheelchair. Moreover, the purportedly accessible toilet was out of order for months at a time. The bunks in Dormitory A are so close together that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD cannot maneuver easily through the aisles between the bunks.
98

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 99 of 144
(Kilby Dormitory A bathroom, showing garbage can on top of accessible toilet) 335. At the Fountain chapel, the only bathroom for prisoners has a very narrow door that a person in a wheelchair would not be able to go through.
B. DEFENDANT ADOC Has Not Made Reasonable Modifications in Policies and Procedures. 336. DEFENDANT ADOC has not made reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
1. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities in the provision of medical care.
337. DEFENDANT ADOC has a policy that discriminates against prisoners with disabilities by requiring prisoners complete a written form to request medical care. Some prisoners with vision or intellectual disabilities cannot complete the necessary forms to receive
99

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 100 of 144
medical care. There are no systems in place to enable prisoners who cannot read due to vision or intellectual disabilities to request medical care.
338. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR and MOORE cannot fill out sick call request forms without assistance from another prisoner or a correctional officer. This was also true for prisoner Bobby Copeland. There is no system in place for them to avoid having to share confidential medical information in this manner.
339. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON is hearing impaired, but ADOC has not provided him with a hearing aid or any other meaningful accommodation. As a result, he often misses medical and dentist appointments because he cannot hear his name being called and no one informs him that his name has been called. While on medication for tuberculosis at Ventress, PLAINTIFF HENDERSON missed pill call so often that medical staff required him to remain on the medication for an extra month. When he missed appointments, the nurses at Ventress told him that it is his responsibility to be on time for appointments. PLAINTIFF HENDERSON also missed meal times because he cannot hear the signal to wake up on time. He has been verbally reprimanded for continuing to walk around the facility during lock-down because he couldn’t hear correctional officers’ orders.
2. DEFENDANT ADOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities by failing to issue or honor profiles exempting prisoners from certain requirements of prison life.
340. DEFENDANT ADOC requires prisoners who need to be exempted from specific tasks or conditions to obtain a “profile.” For example, profiles can exempt prisoners from prolonged standing or walking, from shaving, or from doing certain types of work. They can also entitle the prisoner to certain benefits, such as diabetic meals or a lower bunk.
100

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 101 of 144
341. However, many prisoners with disabilities are not given profiles for accommodations that they need and that are reasonable. Further, even when prisoners have profiles, the profiles are not consistently followed by prison staff. PLAINTIFF SEARS has severe scoliosis. Prolonged standing and walking causes him pain. From his arrival at Ventress on May 9, 2013 until May 5, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS did not have a profile that exempted him from prolonged standing. PLAINTIFF SEARS routinely had to wait in line at pill call, sometimes for as long as three hours. On May 5, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was given a “no prolonged standing” profile. This has reduced the amount he is required to stand. However, there are several officers who have informed PLAINTIFF SEARS that they will not honor his profile and make him stand for long periods.
342. As discussed above, in June 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was informed that his health code had been changed from 4 to 1. Because he was a 1, he was told he would be required to work. PLAINTIFF SEARS asked if there were jobs he would be able to do sitting down, as he has a “no prolonged standing” profile. He was told there were not, and that if he did not begin to work, he would be subject to disciplinary action.
343. Due to the difference in the length of PLAINTIFF GILBERT’s legs, standing for lengthy periods of time is painful. He has a profile from the doctor stating that he should not be required to stand for long periods. He is nonetheless often required to stand for pill call and in line for food. Shortly after coming into ADOC custody, he was provided with a single crutch. This gave some relief, but still left him in significant pain. PLAINTIFF GILBERT did not receive a wheelchair for eight months after he arrived at the prison.
344. PLAINTIFF BROOKS develops keloids at the site of broken skin. Therefore, PLAINTIFF BROOKS has a profile that allows him to abstain from shaving for extended
101

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 102 of 144
periods of time. Despite this profile, ADOC correctional officers often refuse to allow PLAINTIFF BROOKS to eat at meal times because he has not shaved. On at least six or seven occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS was ordered to shave before he could eat despite his shaving profile. On all six or seven occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS has shaved and cut himself, causing another keloid to develop. On three of these occasions, PLAINTIFF BROOKS was not allowed to eat even after he shaved.
345. Prisoner Baker had a profile for use of a wedge to accommodate her acid reflux. For a period of time, she was not allowed to use a wedge, even though she had had a wedge profile for several years. Prisoner Baker began to use extra blankets to substitute for the wedge but the blankets were taken away. ADOC subsequently refused to give out extra blankets or replace the wedge. Without the wedge, Prisoner Baker’s acid reflux became so bad that she developed ulcers in her esophagus and experienced irritation in her voice box. Sometime after suffering these problems, Prisoner Baker was re-issued a wedge.
346. PLAINTIFF TORRES fell and injured his knee, requiring him to use crutches for approximately six months. During the first two weeks, DEFENDANT ADOC would not change his bed assignment, even though he was assigned to an upper bunk.
3. DEFENDANT ADOC has numerous housing policies that discriminate against prisoners with disabilities.
347. DEFENDANT ADOC has housing policies and procedures that violate the rights of prisoners with disabilities. Prisoners with disabilities are housed in restrictive and unduly dangerous housing units because of their disabilities.
348. For example, at Kilby, prisoners who are blind and prisoners who are in wheelchairs are housed in Dormitory A, regardless of the security classification. DEFENDANT ADOC describes this dormitory as “a dorm in the main hall near the infirmary where others who
102

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 103 of 144
have disabilities or medical needs, yet are not in need of infirmary care, are placed.” This is a dormitory that also houses violent offenders with high security classifications. There is a great deal of violence that the blind and wheelchair-bound prisoners are subjected to solely because of their disabilities. Further, due to the level of violence in the dormitory generally, the dormitory is often on lockdown. The prisoners with disabilities are therefore deprived of recreation time and other privileges because of their disabilities. Also, other than for the prisoners with disabilities, the dormitory is a “transit” dorm, for prisoners coming into ADOC custody and waiting for their assignment to another facility. As a result, programming is not available for prisoners in Dormitory A. Prisoners who are assigned to Dormitory A because of their disabilities are therefore excluded from programming because of their disabilities.
349. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR and MOORE are both blind and spent many months in Dormitory A because of their disability. Similarly, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, who is confined to a wheelchair, was assigned to Dormitory A because of his disability. PLAINTIFFS NAYLOR, MOORE and HAGOOD would all be classified at a security classification of 1 or 2, but for their disability. Dormitory A is a dormitory that houses prisoners with a security classification of 4.
350. Also, male prisoners whose kidney function is so impaired they must have dialysis are housed at St. Clair. PLAINTIFF HARTLEY is a dialysis patient. This appears to be the reason he is at St. Clair, the primary facility for providing dialysis. However, St. Clair is not equipped to treat individuals with mental illness as acute as PLAINTIFF HARTLEY’s. There is neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist on staff at St. Clair. Because PLAINTIFF HARTLEY needs dialysis, he is being denied adequate mental health care.
103

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 104 of 144
351. PLAINTIFFS TURNER and PEARSON are both deaf. They are both housed at Limestone. They have both been determined to have security classifications of 2. Ordinarily, Limestone is for prisoners with higher security classifications than 2.
352. Some facilities, including at least Staton and Bibb, house persons with disabilities in infirmaries, regardless of whether they have medical needs requiring placement in the infirmary. Being confined to the infirmary deprives prisoners of benefits, programs and services. For example, at Staton, one of the prisons where mobility-impaired prisoners are housed in the infirmary, the yard for the infirmary is extremely small and lacks the recreation equipment found in the ordinary yard. Prisoners housed in infirmaries also have no access to programming. PLAINTIFF MITCHELL was housed in the infirmary at Bibb for 18 months. Correctional staff told him he was housed there because he has limited use of his hands. While in the Bibb infirmary, he was able to leave the infirmary only to go to visitation.
C. DEFENDANT ADOC Does Not Provide Necessary Assistive Devices and Services. 353. PLAINTIFF GILBERT’s legs are two different lengths. He informed a nurse that
he required an orthopedic shoe during the intake process and several times thereafter during the fall of 2012. In and after March 2013, he submitted written requests for an orthopedic shoe. He had used such shoes before coming to the prison and they significantly increased his functionality and reduced his pain. He received the shoes after a four-month delay. However, the shoe that was ordered was too small and rubbed the skin off his foot, a particularly dangerous problem for PLAINTIFF GILBERT, as he is diabetic and small wounds on a foot can easily become infected and lead to amputations. He has repeatedly requested an orthopedic shoe that fits properly, but has been denied. He has had to cut out the top of the toe of the shoe to avoid getting sores on his foot.
104

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 105 of 144
354. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD is confined to a wheelchair. He is also partially paralyzed on the left side. He has difficulty getting around the prison, does not have an assistant to help him, and is not permitted to obtain assistance from other prisoners. Due to his medical conditions, he has prescriptions for about 15 pills per day. He does not receive his pills consistently because, without assistance, he is sometimes unable to get to the pill call window. When he makes the difficult journey to the pill call window, nurses make fun of him for having missed pill call previously. He frequently misses meals because, without assistance, it is difficult for him to get to the dining area.
355. The bunks in his dormitory at Kilby were so close together that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD could not maneuver easily through the aisles between the bunks, and had to ask other prisoners to move out of the way. The other prisoners resented this and made fun of PLAINTIFF HAGOOD and threatened him. When PLAINTIFF HAGOOD complained to correctional officers of the harassment, the officers laughed at him. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD wrote two requests to the warden asking for an assistant, but no assistant was provided. On May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFFS’ counsel requested that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD be provided with an assistant or transferred to a housing unit where help would be available. The following day, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was transferred to Dormitory B, a dormitory that had no accessible toilet, no accessible shower, no ramp to the outside yard. He was not assigned a helper. In the new dorm, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was unable to bathe, get himself to pill call, or go outside. After PLAINTIFFS’ counsel again requested that PLAINTIFF HAGOOD be provided with an assistant or transferred to a housing unit where help would be available, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was told he would be transferred back to Dormitory A and was assigned an assistant in
105

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 106 of 144
Dormitory A. However, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was not transferred back to Dormitory A, nor was he assigned an assistant in Dormitory B.
356. Because he was in an inaccessible dormitory and did not have an assistant, from May 2, 2014 through May 23, 2014, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had no yard time, because he cannot go outside from Dormitory B. He had four or five showers during this period, because he has to go to Dormitory A to shower and has no assistance to get there.
357. On or about May 17, 2014, there was a fire in the kitchen at Kilby. The prison was evacuated. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD could not evacuate directly from Dormitory B. He was required to push himself in his wheelchair farther into the prison, against the flow of evacuating prisoners, to get to Dormitory A, and then out through Dormitory A, because only Dormitory A has a ramp. On or about May 19, 2014, Kilby was again evacuated, this time due to a gas leak in another dorm. Again, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD had to go farther into the prison, against traffic, to get to Dormitory A to evacuate.
358. PLAINTIFF BROYLES requires a hearing aid for both ears. In or around 1998, medical staff at St. Clair provided BROYLES with two hearing aids for his left and right ears. In or around January 2011, the hearing aid for the left ear ceased working. A Corizon physician told PLAINTIFF BROYLES that ADOC will not replace the left hearing aid because BROYLES only needs to hear from one hear. PLAINTIFF BROYLES often falls when walking because he is off balance due to the difference in hearing between his two ears.
359. PLAINTIFF BROYLES’ right hearing aid began to malfunction in early 2014, creating audible feedback. As a result of the malfunction in the right hearing aid and the loss of the left hearing aid, BROYLES can hear only certain pitches and sounds and only if they are loud, clear, and in complete quiet. Medical staff often delay in replacing the battery in the right
106

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 107 of 144
hearing aid, sometimes for as long as three days. The facility administration requires that he submit a sick call request for new batteries and pay the corresponding fee, and he often must make several such requests to get replacement batteries.
360. ADOC officials have promised PLAINTIFF BROYLES that he will receive new hearing aids, but he has yet to receive one.
361. PLAINTIFF PEARSON is deaf. He has signed up for GED classes. However, there is no one to provide sign language for him in the class. He stayed with the class for two months, but ultimately dropped it because, without the reasonable accommodation of a sign language interpreter, he could not understand the material. PLAINTIFF PEARSON has requested to go to trade school, but has been denied because he does not have a GED. There is no sign language interpreter at Limestone. PEARSON was also required to attend classes which all individuals are required to attend shortly before their release to prepare them for a successful transition to life outside the ADOC. He was unable to understand the information contained in the mandatory training because no sign language interpreter was present. The facility uses another prisoner to provide sign language interpretation, but he is not qualified and his signs are incomprehensible to PLAINTIFF PEARSON.
362. PLAINTIFF TURNER is also deaf. He has tried to go to GED classes and to church, but there are no staff members at Limestone who can communicate with him using sign language. He was unable to follow the GED classes or the church services without a sign language interpreter.
363. Prisoner Baker had rheumatoid arthritis. Her arthritis frequently caused pain and swelling in her hands. At times she was unable to perform physical tasks which required use of her hands. In February 2012, Prisoner Baker was ordered to fold sheets, blankets, and a pillow
107

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 108 of 144
case on her bed. Prisoner Baker’s hands were visibly swollen and she informed two correctional officers that she was in severe pain and incapable of using her hands to perform the task. The officers continued to order her to perform the task and failed to offer any assistance or accommodation. After being threatened with segregation, Prisoner Baker attempted to untie her sheets but was in such pain that she could not follow the order. As a result, she received a disciplinary, resulting in loss of privileges and 30 days in segregation.
364. PLAINTIFF MOSELEY suffered two broken legs in a 2006 car accident, which led to four surgeries on each of his knees and caused him to be confined to a wheelchair. Prior to ADOC custody in 2007, PLAINTIFF MOSELEY had begun physical therapy in order to walk again, but following his incarceration, DEFENDANT ADOC refused to provide PLAINTIFF MOSELEY with physical therapy or other appropriate treatment, delaying his recovery and forcing him to unnecessarily remain in a wheelchair while he self-administered physical therapy to re-learn how to walk.
D. DEFENDANT ADOC Excludes Prisoners with Disabilities from Programs, Benefits and Services. 365. DEFENDANT ADOC has numerous policies that discriminate against prisoners
with disabilities by excluding them from important programs, benefits and services. 366. Prisoners with disabilities are excluded from work release programs due solely to
their disabilities. PLAINTIFF PEARSON was excluded from the Decatur Work Release Center and sent to Limestone because he is deaf.
367. PLAINTIFF TURNER has high blood pressure, for which he takes medication. The medication controls his blood pressure well. He requested to go to work release, but was denied, being told: “you are deaf and you have high blood pressure.”
108

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 109 of 144
368. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is housed in a dormitory in the main facility at Bullock that houses prisoners with less acute mental illness than those in Mental Health Unit. He currently has the mental health code MH-1, the lowest level of mental health code a prisoner can have and still be on the mental health caseload. About a year ago, PLAINTIFF DILLARD had a mental health code of MH-3 or MH-4. He asked to become an outpatient, which he understands to require being an MH-1, because he will be up for parole in 2015 and cannot be paroled if he is still considered an inpatient. PLAINTIFF DILLARD is foregoing mental health treatment because otherwise he will be excluded from the possibility of parole.
369. PLAINTIFF MANER has a disabled leg as a result of a gunshot wound prior to coming into prison. Prior to 2010, PLAINTIFF MANER had several profiles (accommodations from facility administration in consideration of his disability) that permitted him to: (1) wear shower shoes to prevent falls in the shower, (2) use a cane to assist in walking, (3) abstain from prolonged standing, and (4) sleep on a bottom bunk. PLAINTIFF MANER received these profiles in 1998 when he entered ADOC’s custody.
370. In 2010, PLAINTIFF MANER learned that the various profiles created to accommodate his disability render him ineligible to participate in work release programs or to transfer to facilities designated for prisoners who have made substantial rehabilitative progression, known as honor camps, because the profiles raise his health code level. Participation in work release programs and residence in honor camps results in several benefits to prisoners and serves as evidence of rehabilitation helpful to gain parole. Because he could not access these benefits if his disability was accommodated through the use of the profiles, PLAINTIFF MANER asked medical staff at his residence facility in 2010, Hamilton A & I, to remove the profiles.
109

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 110 of 144
371. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was most recently housed at Hamilton A & I. There are no programs at Hamilton A & I for prisoners who are blind. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR requested to participate in the G.E.D. program and was told that the staff would have to “check into it.” He did not receive a response.
372. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR had a security classification of 2. Prisoners without disabilities who have a security classification of 2 are eligible for work release.
373. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was not eligible for work release because he is blind. 374. Prior to March 2014, PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was housed at Kilby in Dormitory A because he is blind. PLAINTIFF MOORE is currently housed in Dormitory A because he is blind. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was housed in Dormitory A until May 2014 because he is in a wheelchair. For prisoners who are not disabled, Dormitory A is a transit dormitory to which prisoners are sent for a short period of time before being sent to a more permanent placement. However, PLAINTIFF NAYLOR spent over two years in Dormitory A, PLAINTIFF MOORE has spent approximately four years in Dormitory A, and PLAINTIFF HAGOOD spent approximately 16 months in Dormitory A. Because the dormitory has a high level of violence, as is often the case with higher security dormitories, it is often on lockdown, resulting in disabled plaintiffs being denied access to outside recreation. Also, because Dormitory A is a transit dorm, programming is generally not available to persons housed there. 375. Mentally ill prisoners housed in the RTU at Bullock are not provided with regular recreation. They go outside one or two times per week. The recreation yards for prisoners in the RTU are caged areas roughly 15 feet by 10 feet and no recreational equipment. When prisoners are allowed out, there are often eight to 15 individuals in these small areas. E. DEFENDANT ADOC Fails to Provide Auxiliary Aids and Services Necessary for Effective Communication.
110

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 111 of 144
376. ADOC does not provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to achieve effective communication with prisoners with disabilities. Examples of such measures may include large print materials for prisoners with low vision or a sign language interpreter for prisoners with deafness.
377. PLAINTIFF TOOLEY is deaf. He has never been offered a sign language interpreter, even though he requested one on numerous occasions. He does not understand certain ADOC policies as they relate to prisoners and cannot participate in any programs offered by the prison due to his lack of ability to communicate. DEFENDANT ADOC often relies on other prisoners with limited sign language ability to “communicate” with PLAINTIFF TOOLEY. In or around January 2014, PLAINTIFF TOOLEY was denied a sign language interpreter for a disciplinary hearing. He did not understand the proceedings. He was sentenced to a 30-day segregation term.
378. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is mostly deaf in both ears. For a time, he had two hearing aids, but eventually, personnel of both ADOC and Corizon informed him he would only be provided with one hearing aid. As a result of having only one functioning hearing aid, he loses his balance frequently. He often has to wait a long time for a replacement battery for the single hearing aid. On one occasion, he was assaulted by a CERT team member for failing to obey an order that he could not hear.
379. In or around April 2013, Bullock staff disciplined PLAINTIFF BROYLES twice for missing pill call and not taking his medication for diabetes. He had missed pill call because he could not hear correctional officers order prisoners to line up for pill call due to his malfunctioning hearing aids. The Corizon physician at Bullock refused to allow PLAINTIFF BROYLES to stay on his medication unless PLAINTIFF BROYLES successfully attended two
111

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 112 of 144
pill calls. PLAINTIFF BROYLES had trouble accomplishing this task because of the malfunctioning hearing aids and the inconsistent times for pill call. At Draper, PLAINTIFF BROYLES received approximately five disciplinary infractions over a year period for failing to obey orders that he could not hear. The warden at Draper ultimately rescinded each of these infractions.
380. DEFENDANT ADOC has refused to provide PLAINTIFF BROYLES with instructional materials to learn sign language.
381. Several blind prisoners have reported that they are routinely asked to sign documents that they cannot read. Another prisoner, Larry Shepherd, now deceased, had his hand was placed on the spot where he needed to sign, and believed that he was signing a property sheet relating to his transfer; he later discovered the form was a Do Not Resuscitate order.
382. In 2013, PLAINTIFF TURNER was accused by another prisoner of using an unauthorized credit card to make telephone calls. A disciplinary hearing was held without a sign language interpreter. PLAINTIFF TURNER was not able to understand much of the proceeding, and was unable to present his side of the story. He received 15 days in segregation as a result.
383. PLAINTIFF MOORE has asked for books on tape approximately 10 times, but has never been provided any.
384. PLAINTIFF MOORE cannot go to sick call without filling out a sick call request form. If PLAINTIFF MOORE needs to go to medical, he must ask another prisoner to write down his medical complaint on a sick call request form. When PLAINTIFF MOORE goes to sick call or to visit the eye doctor, the doctors and nurses write down notes from the visit but do not explain his diagnosis or treatment.
112

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 113 of 144
385. PLAINTIFF MOORE, who is blind, was written up for the incident described above where he did not stand up promptly because he did not know that the correctional officer telling people to stand for count was speaking to him and the standard practice in the dormitory was that the prisoners who are blind did not stand for count. He was not brought to his disciplinary hearing and did not admit to any misconduct or sign the disciplinary report, but the documentation from the disciplinary hearing states that he pled guilty. He was given a 10-day segregation term.
386. PLAINTIFF NAYLOR was previously housed at Hamilton A & I. Hamilton A & I does not have written materials in alternative formats such as books on tape.
387. PLAINTIFF TERRELL was in Special Education classes starting at the beginning of school. He completed ninth grade, but does not know his reading level. Sometimes documents are read to him, sometimes they are not. Sometimes he understands documents, whether he reads them or they are read to him, sometimes he does not. PLAINTIFF TERRELL is not being adequately accommodated for his apparent learning or cognitive disability.
388. PLAINTIFF DILLARD believes he reads at about a sixth grade level. He attended school up until seventh grade. He was in Special Education classes for all of his classes throughout his schooling. He sometimes signs documents without understanding them. When he is in medical, some of the nurses tell him what is in the documents, others do not. Some nurses simply say, “how are your medications?” then tell him to sign a paper.
F. Prisoners with Disabilities Are Verbally Harassed, Physically Assaulted, and Punished for Their Disabilities.
389. Several prisoners have reported incidents where they were verbally or physically mistreated due to their disabilities. In Dormitory A at Kilby, where prisoners who are blind or in wheelchairs have been concentrated, prisoners report correctional officers taunting prisoners
113

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 114 of 144
about their disabilities. A blind prisoner reported that correctional officers waive their hands right in front of his face, refer to him as “blind man”, and make jokes about the blind train when the blind prisoners line up to lead each other to go to the dining room or pill call. A prisoner also reports that the correctional officers say to people in wheelchairs who complain about something, “What are you going to do about it? You can’t get up.”
390. A blind prisoner reports that on one occasion during count he sat up on his bed, which is what he usually does during count. A correctional officer yelled to stand up, but did not identify the person at whom he was yelling by name, Alabama Institutional Serial number or bed number. The correctional officer kept yelling, identifying the person only as “you.” The prisoner did not know that he was the person being told to stand up. The correctional officer assaulted the blind prisoner for disobeying, and then wrote him up. The prisoner was given a disciplinary report that indicated he had pled guilty to the infraction at the discipline hearing. He had not pled guilty and no one had told him that the written record of the hearing indicated that he had pled guilty.
391. A prisoner who is nearly entirely deaf was in his dormitory when a CERT team came in and ordered everyone to stand. The deaf prisoner was turned away at the time and did not know of the order. A member of the CERT team hit him on the back of the head for not standing up when ordered to do so.
392. PLAINTIFF MOORE was housed in Dormitory A at Kilby for many months. He was provided with no assistance getting around the dormitory or the prison. PLAINTIFF MOORE and other blind prisoners in Dormitory A assisted each other, but were often mocked by the correctional officers and other prisoners. The correctional officers call the prisoners who are
114

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 115 of 144
blind names, such as “blind motherfucker.” When he tried to move around the housing unit, prisoners routinely stood in his way.
393. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF MOORE was sitting on his bunk. Correctional officers came in and called out “count time.” Ordinarily, at count, PLAINTIFF MOORE and other blind prisoners remain seated on their bunks, and PLAINTIFF MOORE did so on this occasion as well. A correctional officer yelled to stand up. PLAINTIFF MOORE did not know the correctional officer was yelling at him, until the correctional officer yelled “That goes for you too, blind motherfucker!” PLAINTIFF MOORE asked the correctional officer not to speak to him that way. The correctional officer grabbed PLAINTIFF MOORE and slammed him to the ground, then whispered to PLAINTIFF MOORE that he should have killed him.
394. PLAINTIFF BROYLES is harassed, threatened, and subjected to physical violence by correctional officers and prisoners due to his disability. Correctional officers often yell at PLAINTIFF BROYLES because he does not hear their orders and threaten to physically assault him. Correctional officers also often accuse PLAINTIFF BROYLES of pretending to have hearing limitations. PLAINTIFF BROYLES has had these experiences at Draper, Elmore, Kilby, St. Clair, and Bullock. A correctional officer at Bullock threw a baton at PLAINTIFF BROYLES when PLAINTIFF BROYLES did not respond to the officer, because he did not hear him.
395. Mentally ill prisoners in the RTU at Bullock are subjected to a great deal of physical violence. PLAINTIFF MCCOY was brutally beaten by correctional officers while he was housed at the Bullock RTU. PLAINTIFF BUSINELLE had four teeth knocked out by correctional officers in 2009. Correctional officers broke PLAINTIFF TERRELL’s jaw and rib in one incident when PLAINTIFF TERRELL was in the midst of a psychotic episode, and beat
115

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 116 of 144
his head with a baton on another occasion. PLAINTIFF DILLARD was slammed to the ground by correctional officers when he refused his medications because he was having difficulty with the side effects. Correctional officers knock over bunks in the mornings in the Bullock RTU if they think the prisoners are not getting up quickly enough in the morning, although many of the prisoners in the RTU take medications that cause them to sleep. V. DEFENDANTS RETALIATE AGAINST PRISONERS FOR EXERCISING THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 396. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have established a policy or custom
that permits ADOC employees and contractors to engage in retaliatory action against prisoners who exercise their first amendment rights to communicate with counsel and file complaints regarding conditions of confinement. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS act recklessly and with deliberate indifference with regard to permitting ADOC employees and contractors to engage in retaliatory action against these prisoners. Moreover, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS knew, or should have known, that ADOC employees would act unlawfully by subjecting these prisoners to retaliatory treatment and failed to stop them.
397. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS retaliate against prisoners who exercise their rights to meet confidentially with counsel and to file complaints regarding the conditions of their confinement.
398. PLAINTIFF DUNN has repeatedly requested mental health treatment and has engaged in acts of self-harm on five occasions while in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC. As the first-named plaintiff in this lawsuit, PLAINTIFF DUNN’s claims have been the focus of a prominent media campaign. In particular, PLAINTIFF DUNN’s claims were featured in local and national press.
116

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 117 of 144
399. On June 28, 2014, a prisoner initiated a fight with PLAINTIFF DUNN. Approximately three days later, PLAINTIFF DUNN, who was confused about why the fight happened, asked Officer Mitchell Sanders to permit him to speak with mental health staff. Officer Sanders responded, “I read about the lawsuit in the newspaper. You’re always trying to manipulate the system. You’re not going to see anybody.” Officer Sanders’s denial of PLAINTIFF DUNN’s request runs contrary to ADOC’s Administrative Regulation 609, which provides for self-referrals to mental health to be given to the medical unit and then passed along to a psychologist.
400. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were notified on June 5, 2014 that PLAINTIFF SEARS’ “no prolonged standing” medical profile was not being honored consistently. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were informed by counsel of the failure to accommodate PLAINTIFF SEARS’ disabilities on June 16, 2014. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were informed in this communication that the actions taken against PLAINTIFF SEARS “appear to be retaliatory.”
401. PLAINTIFF SEARS is housed at Ventress. Plaintiffs’ counsel and legal staff has met with PLAINTIFF SEARS several times since February 11, 2014. Officer Gwendolyn Pullom facilitates attorney visits at Ventress and is aware of each of PLAINTIFF SEARS’ visits with Plaintiffs’ counsel. As required throughout ADOC facilities, Plaintiffs’ counsel identified themselves to facility staff prior to each meeting with PLAINTIFF SEARS. Officer Gwendolyn Pullom is married to Officer David Pullom.
402. On June 20, 2014, three days after the filing of this lawsuit, PLAINTIFF SEARS was showering in the handicapped accessible shower in the infirmary of Ventress, as permitted
117

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 118 of 144
by his medical profile. PLAINTIFF SEARS suffers from severe scoliosis and is frail from untreated extreme weight loss. When PLAINTIFF SEARS finishes his shower, he must ring a bell to receive assistance to return to his dormitory. PLAINTIFF SEARS rang the bell and called out for assistance for approximately 20 minutes after he finished his shower. Officer David Pullom came into the infirmary and began yelling at PLAINTIFF SEARS, saying, “You think you’re a smart ass. You think you run something. You don’t run shit here. You’re causing all this trouble around here. Well, you don’t scare me. You’re a fuck boy. Get on the fucking ground now.” Officer Pullom then forced PLAINTIFF SEARS to the ground, handcuffed him behind his back forcefully, and pushed his face into the floor. Officer Pullom then pushed his knee into PLAINTIFF SEARS’ back and ground PLAINTIFF SEARS’ face into the floor with his hand, while continuing to yell obscenities at him. Officer Pullom continued to assault PLAINTIFF SEARS until two prisoners arrived and yelled for him to stop. Officer Pullom then said, “You think you’re a big shot around here, well, you ain’t shit to me. You ain’t nothing to me and I’m going to show you. Give me your fucking I.D. card. I’m going to write your stupid ass up.” Officer Pullom then left the area. At that point PLAINTIFF SEARS realized that a correctional officer and two Corizon nurses witnessed the assault. PLAINTIFF SEARS asked the nurses to evaluate him for injuries, but they refused. PLAINTIFF SEARS also requested that the correctional officer initiate an investigation pursuant to ADOC policy. The correctional officer left the area without responding. Unable to get up because of his physical condition and the handcuffs, PLAINTIFF SEARS remained on the bathroom floor for approximately two hours until a correctional officer returned to escort him back to his dormitory. PLAINTIFF SEARS informed an ADOC lieutenant about the incident and requested that he make a formal report. After receiving PLAINTIFF SEARS’s complaint concerning the incident, Ventress’s warden
118

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 119 of 144
found that no excessive forced had been used, but agreed to turn the matter over to I & I. PLAINTIFF SEARS nevertheless received a disciplinary report regarding the incident on or about June 30, 2014 and has received no further information about any I & I investigation or findings.
403. On or about September 1, 2014, PLAINTIFF SEARS was at the pill call window at 2:00 a.m. Another prisoner came up to the window, reached around PLAINTIFF SEARS and asked for his medication. After giving the other prisoner his medication, the nurse yelled at PLAINTIFF SEARS for cutting the line. PLAINTIFF SEARS said that he did not cut the line, but the nurse continued to yell at him. A correctional officer started to yell at PLAINTIFF SEARS. Three officers pulled PLAINTIFF SEARS across the yard, leaving PLAINTIFF SEARS’ cane behind. Eventually PLAINTIFF SEARS fell to the ground. When he was on the ground, he could not get up without his cane. The officers ordered PLAINTIFF SEARS to get up. He explained that he could not. A lieutenant came over and ordered that PLAINTIFF SEARS be handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The lieutenant then ordered PLAINTIFF SEARS to get up and go to F-Dorm, a disciplinary dorm. PLAINTIFF SEARS explained that he could not and showed the lieutenant that he had a no standing, no walking profile. The lieutenant tore the profile in half. PLAINTIFF SEARS was then picked up, taken to F-Dorm and reassigned to F-Dorm. PLAINTIFF SEARS was given three disciplinaries for not getting up off the ground when he could not do so, due to his disabilities, as well as two other disciplinaries from this incident. The disciplinaries were delivered to PLAINTIFF SEARS by leaving them on his bed while he was in the bathroom area, and stated that he had refused to sign, although he had not been given the opportunity to sign.
119

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 120 of 144
404. When PLAINTIFF SEARS came up for parole late in 2014, he was denied and set off for three years. He believes that the disciplinaries he has received since the filing of the initial complaint in this matter are the reason he was denied parole. He further believes that the disciplinaries were given to him in retaliation for his participation in this lawsuit.
405. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD met with Plaintiffs’ Counsel at Kilby on February 25, 2014 and May 7, 2014. As required, Plaintiff’s Counsel identified themselves to facility staff prior to each meeting with PLAINTIFF HAGOOD. On May 1, 2014, PLAINTIFF HAGOOD was identified in a letter from counsel to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH as needing reasonable accommodations for his disabilities.
406. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD has received insulin injections for diabetes since 1969 and he felt his diabetes was well controlled. In late May, 2014, facility medical personnel changed PLAINTIFF HAGOOD’S prescription for diabetes from insulin injections to oral medication, requiring him to take six or seven pills a day. This change in prescription was conducted without notice, explanation, or a meeting with medical personnel. PLAINTIFF HAGOOD’S new medication makes him nauseous and gives him headaches. His blood sugar levels are much higher with the new medication. In June 2014 PLAINTIFF HAGOOD requested that Dr. Karen Stone, the Corizon Regional Director, reinstate his insulin prescription. Dr. Stone refused this request and taunted PLAINTIFF HAGOOD, saying, “now go back there and tell your lawyer.” PLAINTIFF HAGOOD did not report any problems with his insulin medication prior to the change.
407. Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT ADOC on December 21, 2012, informing them that a number of prisoners had complained of retaliation after legal visits. Plaintiffs’ counsel requested that correctional facility
120

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 121 of 144
staff be reminded of the rules against retaliation and that signs be posted in prominent places in each facility explaining that prisoners should not be retaliated against for speaking with legal counsel. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor acknowledged receipt of the letter, but did not indicate whether or how the matter would be addressed.
408. Employees of DEFENDANT DUNN who are the subject of investigations into the violations of prisoners’ rights are frequently not disciplined and may even be promoted. For example, following a finding by the United States Department of Justice of numerous constitutional violations, wardens at Tutwiler were transferred to other prisons, where they continued to work, and one warden was even promoted.
409. ADOC employees and medical staff often threaten retaliation/use the threat of retaliation to control/manipulate. On or around June 4, 2014, Plaintiffs’ Counsel met with PLAINTIFFS BUSINELLE and TERRELL at Bullock. While Plaintiffs’ Counsel met with another prisoner, PLAINTIFFS TERRELL and BUSINELLE sat outside the room in which the meeting was taking place, waiting their turns. As they waited, an officer walked past them and said to them, “You were waiting to go home, but now you’re going to go to jail.” PLAINTIFFS TERRELL and BUSINELLE both understood this as a threat that they would be placed in segregation.
410. On July 3, 2014, approximately two weeks after this lawsuit was filed, PLAINTIFF MORK was told by a correctional officer that his life and the lives of other plaintiffs were in danger. DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor and DEFENDANT NAGLICH were informed by Counsel of this communication on the same day. As of July 9, 2014, no one had come to speak with PLAINTIFF MORK to investigate this serious matter.
121

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 122 of 144
411. On March 17, 2014, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor of PLAINTIFF SELLERS’s need for medical attention. Shortly thereafter, he was moved from his dormitory to another dormitory in which he had enemies. He informed ADOC correctional officers of the problem and refused to go. The officers physically assaulted him and then moved him anyway. He asked to speak with personnel from the Investigations & Intelligence Division (I & I) but was not allowed to do so. After Plaintiffs’ Counsel contacted DEFENDANT DUNN’s predecessor to request that PLAINTIFF SELLERS speak with personnel from I & I, he was permitted to do so. The I & I officer asked PLAINTIFF SELLERS the subject of his conversations with Plaintiffs’ Counsel.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS PLAINTIFF Class
412. All prisoner PLAINTIFFS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a class of all prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and ADOC (the “PLAINTIFF Class”).
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 413. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). At the time this lawsuit was commenced and at all times since, there have been in excess of 24,000prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC, all of whom are dependent entirely on the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS for the provision of health care. Due to policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, all in-house ADOC prisoners, numbering tens of thousands annually, receive or are at risk of receiving inadequate health care while in ADOC prisons.
122

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 123 of 144
414. The PLAINTIFF Class members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 415. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of systematically failing to operate a health care system providing minimally adequate health care that violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, (b) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of deliberate indifference to the serious health care needs of class members. (c) whether ADOC’s policies, procedures, and practices reflect deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of class members such that ADOC has violated their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. (d) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ capitated contract system permits improper cost considerations to interfere with treatment of serious medical conditions. (e) whether the systemic and pervasive deficiencies in care at ADOC facilities have placed class members at unreasonable risk of suffering new or worsening physical injury, illness, mental anguish, emotional distress, and the prospect of premature death.
123

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 124 of 144
416. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 417. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the PLAINTIFF Class. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct as those of the PLAINTIFF Class. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims are based on the same theory of law as the class’s claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 418. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the PLAINTIFF class. The named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the class. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the PLAINTIFF class members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 419. This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because the number of current class members is approximately 25,055, and the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)
124

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 125 of 144
420. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS’ policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. All state-wide health care policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of ADOC by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Medical care is provided pursuant to a single contract with a single medical provider with policies and practices that are centrally promulgated, disseminated, overseen and enforced by the medical provider’s Medical Statewide Management team and by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the PLAINTIFF class.
Dental Subclass 421. PLAINTIFFS DILLARD, TERRELL, SULLIVAN, and BUSINELLE bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all prisoners (hereinafter “Dental Subclass”) who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the dental care policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC.
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 422. The Dental Subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. At the time this lawsuit was commenced and at all times since, there have been in excess of 24,000 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC, all of whom are dependent entirely on the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS for the provision of dental care. ADOC does not consistently maintain data on the number of inmates receiving dental care, but in 2013-2014,
125

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 126 of 144
Corizon reported 39,494 total dental care “encounters”9 at ADOC facilities. Due to the policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS all ADOC prisoners, numbering tens of thousands annually, receive or are at risk of receiving dental care while in ADOC prisons. The Dental Subclass members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 423. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Dental Subclass. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of systematically failing to operate a dental care system providing minimally adequate dental care that violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment; (b) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of deliberate indifference to the resulting harm and risk of harm to Dental Subclass members who are deprived of minimally adequate dental care; (c) whether ADOC’s policies, procedures, and practices reflect deliberate indifference to the serious dental needs of class members such that ADOC has violated their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment; (d) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ capitated contract system permits improper cost considerations to interfere with treatment of serious dental conditions; and
9 “Encounters” include intake dental screens, 30-day intake dental exams, dentist encounters and dental hygienist encounters. Corizon Monthly Client Report, September 2014 at ADOC043336.
126

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 127 of 144
(e) whether the systemic and pervasive deficiencies in dental care at ADOC facilities have placed class members at unreasonable risk of suffering new or worsening dental problems, premature tooth extraction, and the prospect of premature death. 424. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 425. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the Dental Subclass, because their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims are based on the same theory of law as the subclass’s claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 426. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the Dental Subclass because the named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the subclass. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the Dental Subclass members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 427. Because the number of Dental Subclass members is so large, the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could
127

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 128 of 144
result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 428. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS’ policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. All state-wide health care policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of ADOC by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Dental care is provided pursuant to a single contract with a single medical provider with policies and practices that are centrally promulgated, disseminated, overseen and enforced by the dental care providers’ statewide Management team and by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Dental Subclass.
Mental Health Subclass 430. PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, HARDY, HARTLEY, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MCCOY, MONCRIEF, PRUITT, TERRELL, WALLACE, and WILLIAMS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a subclass of all prisoners (hereinafter “Mental Health Subclass”) who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the mental health care policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC.
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)
128

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 129 of 144
431. The Mental Health Subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. At the time this lawsuit was commenced and at all times since, there have been in excess of 24,000 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC, all of whom are dependent entirely on the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS for the provision of mental health care. As of April 30, 2014, there were 3,059 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC who are on the mental health caseload, as well as 30 prisoners who have been diagnosed with DSM-IV Axis I disorders who are not on the mental health caseload. Due to the policies and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS all ADOC prisoners, numbering tens of thousands annually, receive or are at risk of receiving inadequate mental health care while in ADOC prisons. The Mental Health Subclass members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 432. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Mental Health Subclass. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of systematically failing to operate a mental health care system providing minimally adequate mental health care that violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, (b) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have a custom, policy, or practice of deliberate indifference to the resulting harm and risk of harm to Mental Health Subclass members who are deprived of minimally adequate mental health care;
129

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 130 of 144
(c) whether ADOC’s policies, procedures, and practices reflect deliberate indifference to the serious mental health needs of class members such that ADOC has violated their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment; (d) whether the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS’ capitated contract system permits improper cost considerations to interfere with treatment of serious mental health conditions; (e) whether the systemic and pervasive deficiencies in mental health care at ADOC facilities have placed class members at unreasonable risk of suffering new or worsening mental illness, physical injury, illness, mental anguish, emotional distress, and the prospect of premature death; (f) whether the policies, practices and courses of conduct in medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 433. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 434. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the Mental Health Subclass, because their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims are based on the same theory of law as the subclass’s claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 435. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the Mental Health Subclass because the named PLAINTIFFS do not have any
130

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 131 of 144
interests antagonistic to the subclass. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the Mental Health Subclass members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 436. Because the number of Mental Health Subclass members is so large, the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 437. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DEFENDANTS’ policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. All state-wide health care policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of ADOC by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. Mental health care is provided pursuant to a single contract with a single medical provider with policies and practices that are centrally promulgated, disseminated, overseen and enforced by the mental health care providers’ statewide Management team and by the OFFICIAL CAPACITY
131

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 132 of 144
DEFENDANTS. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Mental Health Subclass.
ADA Subclass 438. PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BROOKS, BROYLES, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, GILBERT, HAGOOD, HARDY, HARTLEY, HENDERSON, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MANER, MCCOY, MITCHELL, MONCRIEF, MOORE, MOSELEY, NAYLOR, PEARSON, PRUITT, SEARS, TERRELL, TOOLEY, TORRES, TURNER, WALLACE, and WILLIAMS bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a subclass of all prisoners (hereinafter “ADA Subclass”) who are now, or will in the future be, persons with disabilities as that term is used in the ADA and § 504 and are in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC.
Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 439. The ADA Subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of March 31, 2014, there were approximately 25,055 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC. As of April 30, 2014, there were at least:
1. 42 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC whose kidney function is sufficiently impaired to require dialysis;
2. 1,329 prisoners in in-house custody of the ADOC who are enrolled in the diabetes chronic care clinic; and
3. 3,029 prisoners on the mental health caseload. There were also numerous prisoners with mobility, vision, hearing and developmental disabilities.
132

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 133 of 144
434. Due to the policies and practices of DEFENDANT ADOC, all ADOC prisoners with disabilities risk being discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities in accessing facilities, programs, benefits and services while in ADOC prisons. The ADA Subclass members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the ADOC.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 435. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the ADA Subclass. Such questions include, but are not limited to:
(a) whether DEFENDANT ADOC has failed to make appropriate accommodations in the physical structure and infrastructure of the ADOC facilities in violation of the ADA and § 504; (b) whether DEFENDANT ADOC has failed to make appropriate accommodations in the policies and procedures in ADOC facilities as they apply to persons with disabilities in violation of the ADA and § 504; (c) whether DEFENDANT ADOC has discriminated against the members of the ADA Subclass in the provision of and access to programs, benefits, and services. 436. DEFENDANT ADOC is expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 437. The claims of the named PLAINTIFFS are typical of those of the ADA Subclass, because their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct. The named PLAINTIFFS’ claims are based on the same theory of law as the subclass’s claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)
133

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 134 of 144
438. The named PLAINTIFFS are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the ADA Subclass because the named PLAINTIFFS do not have any interests antagonistic to the subclass. The named PLAINTIFFS, as well as the ADA Subclass members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC. Finally, the named PLAINTIFFS are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 439. Because the number of ADA Subclass members is so large, the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for DEFENDANT ADOC. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 440. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the policies, practices, actions, and omissions of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC that form the basis of this complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. All state-wide policies regarding the treatment and accommodation are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of DEFENDANT ADOC. The budget and planning for modifications to the physical structure of the ADOC facilities are established at the central headquarters by the
134

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 135 of 144
OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Mental Health Subclass.
ADAP’s Associational Standing 441. ADAP is the duly authorized protection and advocacy agency for the state of Alabama. ADAP asserts its associational standing to bring its claims on behalf of its constituents who include any current or future prisoner in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as that term is used in the ADA and § 504. 442. In support of its claims, ADAP adopts by reference paragraphs 1 – 56, 64 – 76, and 208 – 394 as if fully set forth herein. 443. The prisoner PLAINTIFFS who make up the putative Mental Health Subclass and the putative ADA Subclass are constituents of ADAP and their factual allegations adopted herein confer upon ADAP associational standing to pursue its claims coextensively with those of the putative Mental Health and ADA Subclasses. ADAP has associational standing to pursue its claims, in part, because ADAP’s constituents otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. 444. ADAP serves its constituents by prosecuting its claims herein pursuant to the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et seq., the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001, et seq. (“DD Act”), and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794e, et seq. (“PAIR”). As Alabama’s protection and advocacy agency, ADAP receives funding via PAIMI, the DD Act, and PAIR to pursue legal, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with disabilities who are receiving care or treatment in Alabama. Accordingly, ADAP has associational standing to pursue its
135

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 136 of 144
claims, in part, because the interests ADAP seeks to protect through its claims in this case, i.e., the rights prisoners with disabilities in the custody of DEFENDANT ADOC, are germane to ADAP’s central purpose.
445. ADAP maintains advisory councils, has conducted an administrative investigation into DEFENDANT ADOC’s practices with respect to ADAP’s constituents, and has received communications from its constituents incarcerated in DEFENDANT ADOC’s facilities regarding DEFENDANT ADOC’s practices. ADAP further asserts its associational standing to bring its claims to express these collective views and protect the collective interests of its constituents who are now incarcerated or will in the future be incarcerated in DEFENDANT ADOC’s custody.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF First Cause of Action: Inadequate Medical Care All Prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF CLASS v.
DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Cruel and Unusual Punishment)
446. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-440 above.
447. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS subject PLAINTIFFS and the Plaintiff Class to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury from inadequate medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These policies and practices have been and continue to be implemented by DEFENDANTS and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, in their official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS’ ongoing deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution under the Eighth Amendment.
136

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 137 of 144
448. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Second Cause of Action: Inadequate Mental Health Treatment PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, HARDY,
HARTLEY, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MCCOY, MONCRIEF, PRUITT, TERRELL, WALLACE, WILLIAMS; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; the Mental Health Subclass v. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Cruel and Unusual Punishment) 449. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-445 above. 450. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS subject PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the Mental Health Subclass to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury from inadequate mental health treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These policies and practices have been and continue to be implemented by DEFENDANTS and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, in their official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS’ ongoing deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution under the Eighth Amendment. 451. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Third Cause of Action: Deprivation of Due Process Prior to Involuntarily Medicating Prisoners
PLAINTIFFS BUI, DILLARD, HARTLEY, MCCOY, TERRELL; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; the Mental Health Subclass v. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH
137

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 138 of 144
(42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process) 452. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-445 above. 453. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS subject PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the Mental Health Subclass of their due process rights by involuntarily medicating prisoners in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 454. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct. Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of the Rights of Prisoners with Disabilities PLAINTIFFS DUNN, BRAGGS, BROOKS, BROYLES, BUI, BUSINELLE, CARTER, DILLARD, GILBERT, HAGOOD, HARDY, HARTLEY, HENDERSON, JACKSON, JOHNSON, MANER, MCCOY, MITCHELL, MONCRIEF, MOORE, MOSELEY, NAYLOR, PEARSON, PRUITT, SEARS, TERRELL, TOOLEY, TORRES, TURNER, WALLACE, WILLIAMS; PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM; and the
ADA Subclass v. DEFENDANT ADOC (Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) 455. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-445 above. 456. By their policies and practices described herein, DEFENDANT ADOC subjects PLAINTIFFS, the client and constituents of PLAINTIFF ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGAM, and the ADA Subclass to regular and systemic discrimination based on their disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12131-12134, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. These policies and practices continue to be implemented by DEFENDANT ADOC and its agents,
138

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 139 of 144
officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with ADOC under color of state law, in their official capacities, and are the proximate cause of the PLAINTIFFS’ ongoing deprivation of rights secured by federal law.
457. DEFENDANT ADOC has been and is aware of all the deprivations complained of herein, and has condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
Fifth Cause of Action: Retaliation in Violation of Prisoners’ First Amendment Rights to Communicate with Counsel and to File Lawsuits Regarding Conditions of Confinement PLAINTIFFS DUNN, HAGOOD, SEARS v. DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH in their
official capacity (42 U.S.C. § 1983; First and Fourteenth Amendment) 458. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-440 above. 459. By their policies and practices described herein, the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS subjected PLAINTIFFS SEARS, DUNN and HAGOOD to retaliation for communicating with attorneys and filing a lawsuit regarding conditions of confinement, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 460. The OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS have been and are aware of the retaliatory actions complained of herein, and have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 461. PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent have no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs suffered as set forth in this complaint. PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury as a result of the unlawful acts, omissions, policies, and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC, as alleged herein, unless PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent are granted the relief they request. The
139

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 140 of 144
need for relief is critical because the rights at issue are paramount under the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States.
462. WHEREFORE, the named PLAINTIFFS and the class they represent request that this Court grant them the following relief:
A. Declare that the suit is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and (2);
B. Adjudge and declare that the acts, omissions, policies, and practices of the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS, and their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law or otherwise, described herein are in violation of the rights of prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, which grants constitutional protection to the PLAINTIFFS and the classes they represent;
C. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin all DEFENDANTS, their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, from subjecting prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF Classes to the illegal and unconstitutional conditions, acts, omissions, policies, and practices set forth above.
D. Order the OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS and DEFENDANT ADOC, their agents, employees, officials, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law, to develop and implement, as soon as practical, a plan to eliminate the substantial risk of serious harm that prisoner PLAINTIFFS and members of the PLAINTIFF Classes suffer due to inadequate medical and mental health care of DEFENDANTS DUNN and NAGLICH, and due to the policies and practices with regard to persons with disabilities of DEFENDANT ADOC. The plan shall include at a minimum the following:
140

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 141 of 144
1. Staffing: Medical, Mental Health, Dental and Correctional staffing shall be sufficient to provide prisoner PLAINTIFFS and the PLAINTIFF Class with timely access to qualified and competent clinicians who can provide routine, urgent, emergent, and specialty health care;
2. Access: Policies and practices that provide timely access to health care;
3. Screening: Policies and practices that reliably screen for medical, dental, and mental health conditions that need treatment;
4. Emergency Response: Timely and competent responses to health care emergencies;
5. Medication and Supplies: Timely prescription and distribution of medications and supplies necessary for medically adequate care;
6. Chronic Care: Timely access to competent care for chronic diseases;
7. Environmental Conditions: Basic sanitary conditions that do not promote the spread or exacerbation of diseases or infections, including but not limited to a smoke-free environment;
8. Mental Health Treatment: Timely access to necessary treatment for serious mental illness, including medication, therapy, inpatient treatment, suicide prevention,
9. Quality Assurance: A regular assessment of health care staff, services, procedures, and activities designed to improve outcomes, and to identify and correct errors or systemic deficiencies;
10. Accommodations: Appropriate accommodations for individuals with disabilities, as required by the ADA and § 504.
E. Award PLAINTIFFS the costs of this suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and
litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable law;
F. Retain jurisdiction of this case until all DEFENDANTS have fully complied with
the orders of this Court, and there is a reasonable assurance that DEFENDANTS will continue to
comply in the future absent continuing jurisdiction; and
//
//
141

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 142 of 144
G. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of September, 2016.
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
By: /s/ Maria V. Morris Maria V. Morris
Rhonda Brownstein (ASB-3193-O64R) Maria V. Morris (ASB-2198-R64M) Ebony G. Howard (ASB-7247-O76H) Latasha L. McCrary (ASB-1935-L75M) Brooke Menschel (ASB-7675-Z61K) Jaqueline Aranda Osorno (ASB-3296-A17H) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 Telephone: (334) 956-8200 Facsimile: (334) 956-8481 rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org maria.morris@splcenter.org ebony.howard@splcenter.org latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org brooke.menschel@splcenter.org jaqueline.aranda@splcenter.org
Miriam Haskell* (FL. Bar No. 069033) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER P.O. Box 370037 Miami, FL 33137 Telephone: (786) 347-2056 Facsimile: (786) 237-2949 miriam.haskell@splcenter.org *admitted pro hac vice
Eunice Cho* (GA. Bar No. 632669) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 1989 College Avenue NE Atlanta, GA 30317 Telephone: (404) 221-5842 Facsimile: (404) 221-5857 eunice.cho@splcenter.org *admitted pro hac vice
142

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 143 of 144
William Van Der Pol, Jr. (ASB-2112-114F) J. Patrick Hackney (ASB-6971-H51J) Glenn N. Baxter (ASB-3825-A41G) Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 Telephone: (205) 348-4928 Facsimile: (205) 348-3909 wvanderpoljr@adap.ua.edu jphackney@adap.ua.edu gnbaxter@adap.ua.edu
William G. Somerville, III (ASB-6185-E63W) Andrew P. Walsh (ASB-3755-W77W) Dennis Nabors Patricia Clotfelter (ASB-0841-F43P) Lisa W. Borden (ASB-5673-D57L) Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC 420 20th Street North, Suite 1400 Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 328-0480 Facsimile: (205) 322-8007 wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com awalsh@bakerdonelson.com dnabors@bakerdonelson.com pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com lborden@bakerdonelson.com
Gregory M. Zarzaur (ASB-0759-E45Z) Anil A. Mujumdar (ASB-2004-L65M) Diandra S. Debrosse (ASB-2956-N76D) Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 983-7985 Facsimile: (888) 505-0523 gregory@zarzaur.com anil@zarzaur.com fuli@zarzaur.com
ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
143

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 805 Filed 09/28/16 Page 144 of 144

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have filed the foregoing electronically on this 28th day of September, 2016, with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

David R. Boyd, Esq. John G. Smith, Esq. John W. Naramore, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101-0078 dboyd@balch.com jgsmith@balch.com jnaramore@balch.com

Michael L. Edwards, Esq. Steven C. Corhern, Esq. Christopher F. Heinss, Esq. Jenelle R. Evans, Esq. Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201-0306 medwards@balch.com scorhern@balch.com cheinss@balch.com jevans@balch.com

William R. Lunsford, Esq. Melissa K. Marler, Esq. Stephen C. Rogers, Esq. Matthew B. Reeves, Esq. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C. 655 Gallatin Street, SW Huntsville, AL 35801 blunsford@maynardcooper.com mmarler@maynardcooper.com srogers@maynardcooper.com mreeves@maynardcooper.com

Mitesh Shah, Esq. Mitchell D. Greggs, Esq. Bryan A. Coleman, Esq. Evan P. Moltz, Esq. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C. 1901 6th Avenue North, Suite 2400 Birmingham, AL 35203 mshah@maynardcooper.com mgreggs@maynardcooper.com bcoleman@maynardcooper.com emoltz@maynardcooper.com

Anne Hill, Esq. Elizabeth A. Sees, Esq. Joseph G. Stewart, Jr., Esq. Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, AL 36104 anne.hill@doc.alabama.gov elizabeth.sees@doc.alabama.gov joseph.stewart@doc.alabama.gov

Deana Johnson, Esq. Brett T. Lane, Esq. MHM Services, Inc. 1447 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 500 Atlanta, GA 30309 djohnson@mhm-services.com btlane@mhm-services.com
/s/ Maria V. Morris One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs
144

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 1 FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL OPINION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION
The individual plaintiffs in Phase 1 of this lawsuit are 17 prisoners with disabilities in the custody of the defendants, the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC or the Department) and Commissioner Jefferson Dunn. The Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Alabama’s protection and advocacy organization for people with disabilities, is also a plaintiff.

Plaintiffs alleged that the Department has violated

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),

codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C.

§ 794.1

Briefly, plaintiffs contended that the

Department lacks adequate systems for implementing its

obligations under the ADA, and that this results in

discrimination against and failure to accommodate

prisoners with disabilities.2 Specifically, plaintiffs

1. This case has been bifurcated for the administrative convenience of the court and parties. Phase 1, at issue in this opinion, involves ADA claims alleging discrimination on the basis of and non-accommodation of physical disabilities. Phase 2, to be tried later, involves Eighth Amendment claims alleging inadequate medical and mental healthcare. Phase 2 also involves ADA claims alleging discrimination on the basis of and non-accommodation of mental disabilities. Although class certification will be considered separately for the two phases, there is significant overlap between the putative class representatives and members.
2. “State prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity,’” and Title II therefore “unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage.” Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998). Moreover, the ADA applies to all of the “many recreational ‘activities,’ (continued...)
2

alleged that the Department failed to (1) implement a

system for identifying prisoners with disabilities;

(2) institute a system for receiving accommodation

requests and a grievance procedure for challenging

denied accommodations; (3) appoint ADA coordinators;

(4) adequately train personnel regarding the

requirements of the ADA; (5) develop an ADA transition

plan and corresponding policies and procedures;

(6) remove architectural barriers affecting prisoners

with

disabilities;

(7) provide

reasonable

accommodations, such as auxiliary and visual aids and

services, to those with disabilities; and (8) enable

those with disabilities to access various types of

programming and services.

Plaintiffs sought

declaratory and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction is

medical ‘services,’ and educational and vocation ‘programs’” offered by prisons, id. at 210; see also Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11th Cir. 2007), and to such basic necessities of life as use of toilets, showers, and sinks, see Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1032-33 (D. Kan. 1999) (Brown, J.).
3

proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).
In March 2016, almost two years after this case was filed and after extensive discovery, the parties submitted to the court a joint motion for preliminary approval of a settlement of the Phase 1 claims in this case. Their agreement lacked specificity; akin to an outline, it contained placeholders in the form of references to a “plan” that the parties intended to develop later. Concerned that it could not approve a settlement without scrutinizing its details--the “beef,” as the court bluntly put it--the court ordered the parties to submit this plan.
Initially, it appeared that it would be impossible for the parties to reach agreement as to specifics; both they and the court prepared to go to trial. Meanwhile, they continued to negotiate, and wisely requested the assistance of United States Magistrate Judge John Ott, who generously volunteered--despite being from another district--to devote a tremendous
4

amount of time to the task. After numerous lengthy

mediation sessions, they reached a much more detailed

settlement agreement.

The parties submitted this agreement to the court

and, after a hearing, it entered an order granting

preliminary approval and requiring the parties to

provide notice to class members.

See Phase 1

Preliminary Settlement Approval Order (doc. no. 532).

The preliminary approval order provisionally

certified the putative Phase 1 class and established a

procedure for providing notice of the proposed

settlement agreement--and a reasonable opportunity to

object or comment--to putative class members. Both the

court’s certification analysis and the notice procedure

are discussed in greater detail below.

In addition to receiving written comments on the

settlement from putative class members, the court held

three fairness hearings. In the first two, it heard

from a representative group of putative class members

who had submitted comments on or objections to the

5

settlement agreement and who were selected by the court, with the input of the parties. Following these hearings, the court held a third fairness hearing at which counsel for the parties responded to the various comments and objections raised by these witnesses and other questions raised by the court.
For the reasons that follow, the court will grant final approval of the settlement and the parties’ request to enter a consent decree.
II. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT The settlement agreement runs some 78 pages. As a preliminary matter, it is predicated on--and defendants consent to--the certification of a settlement class defined as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. §705(9)(B), excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness,
6

or defect.” Am. and Restated Settl. Agmt. (doc. no.

518) at 4.

The settlement agreement addresses the following

measures that the Alabama Department of Corrections

will be required to take in order to ensure that it is

in compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act:

Self-Assessment and Transition Plan:

The

Department will evaluate all facilities that house

disabled prisoners, and identify necessary changes to

facilities and policies concerning disabled prisoners’

ability to communicate and access programs. The

Department will create a transition plan, listing

changes to be made and deadlines for those changes.

Programs: The Department will provide reasonable

accommodations for disabled prisoners to access the

programs offered by the Department.

Special Housing Units: The Department will make

individualized assessments of disabled prisoners housed

in residential treatment and stabilization units to

7

ensure that they have reasonable access to the Department’s programs.
Identification and Tracking: An initial screening for disabilities will be performed within 12 hours of a prisoner’s entering the Department’s custody, and a physical examination will be administered within seven days of entry. The Department will test new prisoners for intellectual and developmental disabilities using certain tests and guidelines. Within about one year, all prisoners will receive testing for intellectual disabilities and physical examinations. The Department will track prisoners with disabilities through a new system-wide computer database. The Department will periodically re-evaluate prisoners for changes in disability status, and will do so anytime a prisoner is transferred among facilities.
Security Levels: In assigning security levels, the Department will not increase a prisoner’s security level solely based upon a disability, but the
8

Department will have discretion to lower a prisoner’s security level based upon a disability.
Auxiliary Aids and Services: For prisoners with hearing and vision impairments, the Department will provide auxiliary aids and services including readers, materials in Braille, and teletype phones. Hearing-impaired prisoners will be assessed at least every three months to ensure their hearing aids are properly functioning, and any needed repairs or replacement batteries will be provided according to set deadlines. Sign-language interpreters will be provided for certain specified proceedings, such as intake interviews, health-care appointments, and disciplinary hearings, and other prisoners may serve as interpreters only with a hearing-impaired prisoner’s consent and only on occasions not involving either medical care or a criminal investigation, or otherwise implicating a due-process right.
9

Emergencies: To evacuate disabled prisoners in the

event of an emergency, the Department will designate

responsible employees, create plans, and run drills.

Requests, Grievances, and Coordinators:

The

Department will implement a procedure for receiving and

processing prisoners’ requests for accommodations and

appeals of denials, including specified forms,

repositories to submit forms, and assistance for

prisoners in completing and submitting forms. The

Department will appoint an ADA coordinator for each of

its facilities, as well as a state-wide coordinator, to

handle ADA requests, process appeals, produce monthly

reports, and assess compliance.

Training: The Department will provide initial and

annual ADA training to correctional officers and

enhanced training to ADA coordinators.

Quality Assurance: The Department will create a

quality-assurance program that includes audits of the

identification of disabled prisoners and of

accommodation requests and appeals.

10

The agreement also contains the following

provisions related to implementation:

Monitoring: ADAP will monitor the Department’s

compliance with the consent decree, and will be

entitled to access relevant documents and to conduct

interviews with prisoners and staff. ADAP will prepare

quarterly reports on the Department’s compliance

containing written recommendations for any necessary

changes, and the parties will meet and confer to

address any reported deficiencies.

Dispute Resolution Process:

Both the named

plaintiffs and unnamed class members (either with or

without representation by class counsel) must arbitrate

claims that the Department is not in compliance with

the consent decree. If the Department’s alleged

non-compliance impacts fewer than 12 prisoners, the

arbitrator’s decision will be final. If 12 or more

prisoners are affected, the arbitrator’s decision may

be appealed to the court for review under an

abuse-of-discretion standard.

11

Termination: After five years the Department may request termination of the consent decree, which will terminate after six years unless plaintiffs request and the court grants an extension.
Amendment: The parties may mutually amend the agreement. The parties agree to re-evaluate deadlines in the transition plan if Alabama passes legislation to construct new prison facilities.
Funding: The Department will make good-faith efforts to obtain necessary funding to comply with the agreement.
Attorneys’ Fees: Finally, the agreement contains an agreement that the Department will pay plaintiffs’ attorneys $ 1.25 million in fees and costs, as well as additional fees on an hourly basis (subject to caps) during the monitoring process, and fees for any litigation necessary to enforce the consent decree.
12

III. DISCUSSION Judicial policy favors the settlement of class-action cases. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). This is particularly true “in an area [such as this] where voluntary compliance by the parties over an extended period will contribute significantly toward ultimate achievement of statutory goals,” Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, 466 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (Gold, J.) (quoting Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union, 514 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975)), and “in class actions with their notable uncertainty, difficulties of proof, and length,” Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 538 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (King, J.) (citations omitted), aff’d, 899 F.2d 21 (11th Cir. 1990). However, the court retains an important role in evaluating and approving such settlements, pursuant to multiple provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18
13

U.S.C. § 3626.

First, because the settlement

contemplates the certification of a class, the court

must determine whether the requirements of Rule 23(a)

and (b) are met. Second, Rule 23(e) imposes both

procedural and substantive requirements that must be

satisfied before the court may approve a settlement

that binds absent class members. Third, because the

settlement includes an agreed-upon award of attorneys’

fees and costs to plaintiffs’ counsel, the court must

determine their suitability for appointment as class

counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) and the reasonableness

of the fee award reasonable pursuant to Rule 23(h).

Fourth and finally, the court must confirm that the

prospective relief to be afforded through entrance of a

consent decree complies with various provisions of the

PLRA.

A. Class Certification: Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) The court previously granted provisional certification of a settlement class defined to include
14

“any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise from mental disease, illness, or defect.” Phase 1 Preliminary Settlement Approval Order (doc. no. 532) at 2.3
Having considered the parties’ post-settlement brief on this topic, the court now concludes that final certification of this settlement class is appropriate for the reasons that follow.
In order for any certification motion to succeed, the putative class representatives must show that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
3. The court and the parties intended the word ‘solely’ to modify both ‘relate to’ and ‘arise from,” as reflected in the settlement agreement itself. However, the court preliminarily certified the class based on the language included in the parties’ motion for preliminary approval, which omitted the second ‘solely.’ The class certified here is worded according to the language in the settlement agreement.
15

law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition, a class must clear one of three additional hurdles; because the named plaintiffs in this case seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, they must also show that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). These requirements apply with “equal force” to uncontested certification of a class for purposes only of settlement. Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Thompson, J.) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620-22 (1997)).
16

The court notes that, in conducting this analysis,

it has had the benefit of briefing on a contested

motion for class certification filed prior to

settlement of Phase 1 of this case.

Although

defendants no longer contest certification for purposes

and in light of the settlement, the court has assured

itself that, for the reasons discussed below, none of

the arguments defendants previously offered warrants

denial of certification.

i. Standing “[A]ny analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing”; only once the court finds that the named plaintiffs have standing may it consider whether they have “representative capacity, as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the rights of others.” Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987). To show Article III standing, the named plaintiffs must show that they have been injured, that their injuries are fairly traceable to the defendants’
17

conduct, and that a judgment in their favor would
likely redress their injuries. See Mulhall v. UNITE
HERE Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2010).
The individual named plaintiffs clearly have
standing to assert the claims brought in Phase 1 and
now resolved in the settlement agreement.4 Each is a
prisoner in the custody of defendants, (allegedly) has
4. Not all of the plaintiffs named in the complaint prior to bifurcation raised Phase 1 claims. The following named plaintiffs did so, and are therefore named class representatives: Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Roger Moseley, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, and Donald Ray Turner.
Note that the court has excluded from this list four named plaintiffs who were released from custody prior to the filing of plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, and whose ability to serve as class representative defendants then challenged. (These four individuals are: Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Tommie Moore, and Bradley Pearson.) Because the parties’ have reached a settlement, it is irrelevant whether these named plaintiffs’ class claims are moot. See Dunn v. Dunn, 148 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (Thompson, J.) (discussing the legal framework for assessing the mootness of putative class claims brought by prisoners who have been released from custody). For the purposes of this opinion alone, the court has assumed without deciding that they are.
18

a disability that qualifies for the protection of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and (allegedly) has been denied reasonable accommodations as a result of the policies and procedures of defendants. A judgment in plaintiffs’ favor would have remedied these alleged violations, just as will this consent decree.
ii. Rule 23(a) 1. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1)’s requirement of numerosity is satisfied if joinder--the usual method of combining similar claims--would be impracticable. Although there is no strict threshold, classes containing more than 40 members are generally large enough to warrant certification. See, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3.12 (5th ed.). “[P]laintiff[s] need not show the precise number of members in the class,” given that the numerosity requirement is “less significant” where
19

“class wide discrimination has been alleged.” Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983).
In moving to certify a class prior to settlement, plaintiffs acknowledged that, due to the Department’s “fail[ure] to adequately identify, track and accommodate people in its custody with disabilities, ADOC’s data significantly underestimate[] and under-identif[y] the number of people with disabilities in its custody,” and thus that they--and the court--could not be sure with great specificity how many current prisoners are members of the class. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Class Cert. (doc. no. 433-2) at 30. However, they submitted evidence, in the form of records obtained from the Department’s medical contractor, indicating that, as of March 2015 (the date of the most recent records available to plaintiffs), at least 100 prisoners used wheelchairs, 20 had hearing impairments, a dozen were blind, and a dozen used prostheses. All of these disabilities plainly fall
20

within the definition of disability in the ADA.5 This
evidence alone is sufficient to support a finding of
numerosity.6
5. In relevant part, that definition states that “the term ‘disability’ means ... a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual,” and “major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communications, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) and (2)(A).
6. Plaintiffs also suggested in their motion and the parties now suggest in their post-settlement brief that the court consider statewide data regarding the rate of disability among the adult population in Alabama (apparently, it leads the nation at slightly less than a third). Because the court need not calculate exactly how many current prisoners are members of the class in order to certify it, the court need not determine whether a reliable inference can be drawn on the basis of these data. However, the court notes that a recent study by the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics found that approximately a third of state and federal prisoners reported at least one disability, and that almost a quarter of these prisoners reported a serious vision, hearing, or ambulatory impairment, rates more than twice that of the general population. See Jennifer Bronson, et al., Disabilities Among Prison and Jail Inmates, 2011-12 (Dec. 2015) (reporting findings based on a national survey of almost 40,000 prisoners housed in over 200 state and federal prisons, including at least one (continued...)
21

“Moreover, the fluid nature of a plaintiff class--as in the prison-litigation context--counsels in favor of certification of all present and future members.” Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 510 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (Thompson, J.) (citing Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 878 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming a certified class of 31 present members as well as future members who could not be identified); Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965, 975 (D. Mass. 1981) (Freedman, J.) (finding numerosity after considering “the fact that the inmate population at these facilities is constantly revolving”)); see also Reid v. Donelan, 297 F.R.D. 185, 189 (D. Mass. 2014) (Ponsor, J.) (explaining, in finding numerosity and certifying a class of detained plaintiffs, that “when a party seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief, ... the
facility located in each state), available online at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dpji1112.pdf. (This online document has been filed on the docket.) Given that defendants incarcerate approximately 25,000 prisoners, the size of the class is almost certainly in the thousands.
22

inclusion of future members increases the

impracticability of joinder” (citing McCuin v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 167 (1st Cir.

1987)); Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3.15

(5th ed.) (explaining that the inclusion of future

class members “may make class certification more, not

less, likely”; citing two decisions certifying classes

of prisoners, Hill v. Butterworth, 170 F.R.D. 509, 514

(N.D. Fla. 1997) (Paul, J.) (“[T]he presence of an

unknown number of future class members here actually

bolsters a finding of the requisite numerosity. ...

This Circuit has held [that when] the alleged class

includes

future

[members],

necessarily

unidentifiable[,] ... the requirement of Rule 23(a)(1)

is clearly met, for joinder of unknown individuals is

clearly impracticable.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 145

F.R.D. 339, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Sweet, J.) (“The class

action device is particularly well-suited in actions

brought by prisoners due to the fluid composition of

23

the prison population. Prisoners frequently come and go from institutions for a variety of reasons. Veteran prisoners are released or transferred, while new prisoners arrive every day. Class actions therefore generally tend to be the norm in actions such as this.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted))).7
In light of plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing that there are at least--and probably quite substantially more than--150 prisoners with disabilities (as defined in the ADA) in the custody of the Department, and in light of precedent making clear that it is appropriate in prison-conditions litigation to consider future and as-yet-unidentifiable class members in determining whether joinder is impracticable or indeed impossible, the court finds that the class meets the numerosity
7. Recognition of prisoners’ relatively limited “access to the legal system ... has [also] led courts to certify classes in cases ... which involve issues of common concern to inmates even when the potential class size is small and somewhat undefined.” Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422, 426 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (Albritton, J., adopting recommendation of Carroll, M.J.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
24

requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires named plaintiffs seeking class certification to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), the Supreme Court explained that “this does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law. ... [Rather,] [t]heir claims must depend upon a common contention ... [which] must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution--which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. What matters to class certification ... is not the raising of common ‘questions’--even in droves--but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. at 350 (citation and internal quotation marks
25

omitted). In short, commonality requires a showing that there is “some glue” holding the claims together. Id. at 352.
However, plaintiffs seeking to demonstrate commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) need not show that common questions “predominate” over individual questions as required under Rule 23(b)(3); indeed, “even a single common question will do.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359 (citations and alterations omitted).
a. Analysis In their pre-settlement opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, defendants focused primarily (almost exclusively) on contesting commonality. Although they no longer raise these points of law, the court must give a reasoned response to their arguments in order to explain adequately why certification of a settlement class is warranted. Defendants contended that commonality was lacking because the putative class was “expansive,”
26

encompassing prisoners with a wide range of disabilities, and sought to “challenge the entire panoply of possible ADA violations.” Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Class Cert. (doc. no. 476)) at 18. They argued that plaintiffs’ claims were “not a single, homogenous claim,” except at “the highest level of abstraction,” but rather “many different ADA claims touching on many different ADA requirements that Plaintiffs[] ha[d] lumped together for purposes of this lawsuit.” Id. at 18-19.
Defendants were quite correct that the individual named plaintiffs’ disabilities, and the accommodations they alleged they had been denied, are rather different. But defendants misapprehended the basis of liability plaintiffs asserted: not the denial of the accommodations themselves, but the denial of a system that would have the effect of ensuring that they and their fellow prisoners were appropriately accommodated. (Or, to phrase it differently, they argue that defendants have failed to remedy an inadequate system
27

that has the effect of discriminating against them by failing to accommodate their disabilities.)
If indeed plaintiffs were an assorted group of prisoners alleging merely that defendants had failed to provide them particular accommodations (and seeking simply orders requiring that they be provided those same accommodations), class certification would not be appropriate. But plaintiffs were endeavoring to prove not merely, or even primarily, that their individual rights to particular accommodations under the ADA have been violated. They planned to present evidence to this effect to demonstrate that defendants’ failure to implement certain policies and procedures has the effect of consistently violating their rights under the ADA, and that they--and the class members they represent--were therefore entitled to an order requiring defendants to implement those policies and procedures.8
8. Of course, it may well be true that some class members have not actually been denied a reasonable (continued...)
28

Plaintiffs directed the court to a number of alleged systemic failures. They highlighted three in particular (which also constitute violations of Department of Justice regulations promulgated pursuant to Title II of the ADA, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.107(a), 35.107(b), 35.150(d)): the failure to (1) appoint and train ADA coordinators, (2) adopt ADA grievance procedures, and (3) develop an ADA transition plan. Defendants conceded for the sake of argument that whether they had failed to do these things could be common questions with common answers, but argued that these questions could not satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) because the regulations at issue are not privately enforceable, and the common answers were therefore not “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S.
accommodation. But the inclusion of some class members who have not been injured does not defeat certification. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 1003, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015); Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 564 (3d Cir. 2015); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 824 (7th Cir. 2012); Holmes v. Godinez, 311 F.R.D. 177, 216 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (Aspen, J.).
29

at 350.
The court will assume, also for the sake of
argument, that defendants were correct that these
regulations do not create a private right of action.
This would not, however, have made them irrelevant.
They are binding regulations promulgated by the
Department of Justice (which would be empowered to
bring an enforcement action).9 When courts have found
them not to be privately enforceable, as in Ability
Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d
901, 913-14 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)), they have reasoned that
the regulations are designed to facilitate, but do more
9. See A.R. ex rel. Root v. Dudek, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1363, 1368-70 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (Rosenbaum, J.) (explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Title II’s enforcement provision, incorporates by reference the enforcement provision of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, which authorizes the Department of Justice to bring enforcement litigation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (granting agencies enforcement authority to “effect[]” “[c]ompliance with ... requirement[s] adopted pursuant to this section,” such as “regulations ... which shall be consistent with achievement of the objections of the statute”).
30

than merely describe, compliance with the ADA, such that “it is conceivable that a public entity could fully satisfy its obligations to accommodate the disabled while at the same time fail to put forth a suitable transition plan.”
All this means is that the Department’s failure to implement a transition plan would not have constituted a per se violation; plaintiffs could not have shown liability merely by proving that the Department had no transition plan, without showing that the Department had, as a result, failed to accommodate prisoners with disabilities. That said, plaintiffs could have argued, and proven at trial, that the Department’s failure to do the things required by these regulations had the effect of discriminating.

b. Methods-of-Administration Regulation

Indeed,

there

is

another--privately

enforceable--ADA regulation which makes clear that

policies and practices (or their absence) which result

31

in discrimination against people with disabilities are actionable under the ADA, even if the policies and practices (such as the three regulations discussed above) are not themselves required by the statue. Under this regulation, plaintiffs in an ADA case can challenge a policy or practice--whether it is one described in another regulation or simply one articulated by the plaintiffs themselves--if it causes the public entity to discriminate against them, including by failing to accommodate them.
The so-called methods-of-administration regulation recognizes that the ADA forbids a public entity’s utilization, “directly or through contractual or other arrangements, [of] criteria or methods of administration: (i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability; [or] (ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect
32

to individuals with disabilities.”

28 C.F.R.

§ 35.130(b)(3).10

This regulation “applies to written policies as

well as actual practices, and is intended to prohibit

both blatantly exclusionary policies or practices as

well as policies and practices that are neutral on

their face, but deny individuals with disabilities an

effective opportunity to participate.”

Cota v.

Maxwell-Jolly, 688 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (N.D. Cal.

2010) (Armstrong, J.) (citation and internal quotation

10. Courts have consistently held that the methods-of-administration regulation is privately enforceable under Alexander, because it “does not create rights that do not exist under the ADA.” Brantley v. Maxwell-Jolly, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Armstrong, J.); see also Day v. D.C., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22-23 (D.D.C. 2012) (Huvelle, J.); Conn. Off. of Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Connecticut, 706 F. Supp. 2d 266, 277-78 (D. Conn. 2010) (Thompson, J.); Crabtree v. Goetz, 2008 WL 5330506, at *24 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2008) (Haynes, J.); Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (Schiller, J.); Judice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978, 982 (E.D. La. 1996) (Feldman, J.) (“28 C.F.R. § 35.130 ... do[es] not seem broader than the statute.”).
33

marks omitted). And there is nothing in the regulation

or the case law interpreting it to suggest that the

discriminatory effects of a particular method of

administration must be uniform in order for the method

to be properly subject to challenge.11

Moreover, an omission as well as a commission can

be an actionable method of administration.12

In

11. Consider, for example, the hypothetical prison administrator who decides whether to accept any particular accommodation request by flipping a coin. This method of administration will have widely varied effects, and will just as plainly be actionably unlawful. Less farcically, consider the administrator who denies any accommodation that would cost more than $ 20. This method of administration may result in the denial of hearing aids, sign-language interpreters, and shower grab-bars, in lots of different facilities to lots of different prisoners with lots of different disabilities. Clearly, though, they could properly raise one common joint methods-of-administration claim and offer evidence of all these denials as proof of discriminatory effects.
12. The methods-of-administration regulation makes clear that a know-nothing, do-nothing policy of non-administration is a privately actionable violation of the ADA, at least when plaintiffs can show that it has the effect of discriminating. As Justice Marshall explained in Alexander v. Choate, Congress designed the Rehabilitation Act, the predecessor statute to the ADA, to address not only “invidious animus,” but also, more (continued...)
34

Connecticut Office of Protection & Advocacy for Persons
with Disabilities v. Connecticut, 706 F. Supp. 2d 266
(D. Conn. 2010) (Thompson, J.), the court held that the
plaintiffs had adequately alleged a claim under the
regulation by contending that the defendants had, among
other things, “failed to adequately assess and identify
the long-term care needs of Plaintiffs and the Class
they represent and to determine whether those needs
could be appropriately met in integrated,
community-based settings.” Id. at 277-78. The court
went on to find that the plaintiffs had identified
commonly, “thoughtlessness and indifference--[] benign neglect.” 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). Courts have consistently explained that “Title II [of the ADA] imposes affirmative obligations on public entities and does not merely require them to refrain from intentionally discriminating against the disabled.” Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Disabled in Action v. Bd. of Elections in City of N.Y., 752 F.3d 189, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2014); Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2006); Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454-55 (5th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 488 (4th Cir. 2005). Under the ADA, a public entity must be “proactive.” Clemons v. (continued...)
35

multiple common issues suitable for class certification “with respect to the alleged failure of the methods of administration used by the defendants,” including their “failure to evaluate the proposed class for readiness for community placement.” Id. at 287; see also id. at 289 (explaining that the “gravamen” of the plaintiffs’ claims was not a demand to be placed in community-based alternatives but rather a demand that the defendants “cease using methods of administration that subject individuals with disabilities to discrimination”). See also Kathleen S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 10 F. Supp. 2d 460, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Broderick, J.) (finding that the defendant had “utilized methods of administration at Haverford State Hospital which have resulted in discrimination against class members .... through its failure to initiate plans sufficiently in advance to ensure the necessary placements in the community within a reasonable time after it was
Dart, 2016 WL 890697, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2016) (Tharp, J.).
36

determined that a member of [the class] had become appropriate for community placement”).

c. Common Questions

The methods-of-administration regulation neatly

encapsulates the common questions plaintiffs presented,

which were whether the Department has employed methods

of administration that have the effect of

discriminating

against

prisoners

with

disabilities--namely, (1) employing no system or an

inadequate system for identifying and tracking

prisoners with disabilities, (2) employing no system or

an inadequate system for prisoners to request

accommodations and submit grievances regarding

non-accommodation, (3) failing to appoint or train ADA

coordinators or other administrators responsible for

oversight of compliance with the ADA, (4) failing to

train staff regarding the requirements of the ADA,

(5) failing to promulgate policies and procedures

regarding the treatment of prisoners with disabilities,

37

and (6) failing to draft a plan for identifying and addressing areas of non-compliance with the requirements of the ADA. These are questions common to the class, susceptible of common answers apt to drive the resolution of the case.
Plaintiffs not only alleged in their complaint that the lack of these policies and practices resulted in discrimination; they presented expert evidence to show as much in support of their motion for class certification. While the court would of course have had to weigh this evidence against any contrary evidence presented by defendants had Phase 1 of this case proceeded to a merits adjudication, plaintiffs “affirmatively demonstrate[d] [their] compliance with [] Rule” 23(a)(2). Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
The commonality requirement is satisfied.
3. Typicality Although the commonality and typicality inquiries “tend to merge,” the typicality requirement--which is
38

“somewhat of a low hurdle”--focuses the court’s

attention on “whether a sufficient nexus exists between

the claims of the named representatives and those of

the class at large.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon,

457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982); Taylor v. Flagstar Bank,

FSB, 181 F.R.D. 509, 517 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Albritton,

J.); Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1322

(11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

A class

representative’s claims are typical if they “arise from

the same event or pattern or practice and are based on

the same legal theory” as the class claims; they need

not be identical. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568

F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted);

see In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D.

260, 275 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (Bowdre, J.).

This court has previously found the typicality

requirement satisfied in another case brought by

disabled prisoners, given that “the named plaintiffs’

legal claim--that the defendants are engaged in

disability discretion in violation of the ADA and

39

Rehabilitation Act--is identical to the class’s claim.” Henderson, 289 F.R.D. at 511. Here, too, the named plaintiffs brought the same claims as the class: that the Department employed methods of administration which resulted in rampant discrimination against prisoners with disabilities.
It is true that the named plaintiffs (and the class members more generally) have diverse disabilities and require various different accommodations for those disabilities. Their claims were not disability or accommodation-specific, though; they challenged systemic practices with which they all interact and from which they all allegedly suffer. Moreover, to the extent that the named plaintiffs have sought and obtained relief that pertains specifically to prisoners with certain categories of disabilities, such as those related to communication, mobility, or cognition, the court is satisfied that the named plaintiffs, as a group, adequately cover the spectrum of disabilities,
40

such that the particular interests of all class members are represented.
4. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires the court to find that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This analysis “encompasses two separate inquiries: (1) whether any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives and the class;13 and (2) whether the representatives will adequately prosecute the action.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Adequate representation is usually presumed in the absence of contrary evidence,” and generally exists for injunctive-relief classes, because there is no monetary
13. For a conflict to defeat class certification, it must be “fundamental,” such that “some party members claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that benefitted other members of the class.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003).
41

pie to be sliced up. Access Now, Inc. v. Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. Grp., Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 522, 528 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (Seitz, J.). No member of the class will be harmed when another prisoner’s disability is accommodated pursuant to the relief they have all sought and together obtained. To the contrary: many of the reforms the consent decree requires facially benefit all disabled prisoners equally; for example, establishing an ADA request and grievance process will allow all class members, regardless of their individual circumstances, to seek out and obtain accommodations. See Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc., 211 F.R.D. at 464 (certifying a settlement class of persons with diverse disabilities and finding that the consent decree to be issued would “provide substantially equal benefits and relief to all members of the class through increased accessibility and the coordinated removal of physical and communication barriers”).
Moreover, many of the particular accommodations to be provided to individual class members will in fact
42

have significant benefits for other prisoners. Once an inmate handbook is translated into Braille for one prisoner’s use, for example, another blind prisoner who enters the system will more readily be provided with the same accommodation. Once a grab bar is installed in a shower in a particular dormitory to accommodate a prisoner who has difficulty standing, another prisoner with a similar disability can use it.
Turning now to the second aspect of Rule 23(a)(4): “The vigor with which [] named representative[s] and [their] counsel will pursue the class claims is assessed by considering the competency of counsel and the rationale for not pursuing further litigation.” Id. (citing Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1533 (11th Cir. 1985)). The competency of counsel for plaintiffs in this case is reflected plainly in their extensive involvement in a large number of successful class actions vindicating the constitutional or federal statutory rights of classes of prisoners and individuals with disabilities in Alabama, throughout
43

the South, and across the country. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Class Cert. (doc. no. 433-2) at 46-48 (listing cases).
Their rationale for not pursuing further litigation is equally plain--after extensive negotiation and while actively preparing to try Phase 1 of this case, they reached a settlement highly favorable to all members of the class. “[C]ontinued litigation would only serve to delay class relief ....” Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc., 211 F.R.D. at 464.
Admittedly, the court is troubled by plaintiffs’ counsel’s earlier acquiescence to an initial settlement agreement that included a seriously inadequate level of specificity. On balance, however, the court is impressed that once set to the task of negotiating a detailed ‘plan,’ they proceeded to engage in weeks of involved mediation, in which they apparently fought hard and obtained very good results for their clients. The fact that these efforts at first fell through, and only resulted in a settlement shortly before trial, is
44

one indication of the steadfastness of plaintiffs’ counsel. Additionally, the bifurcation of this case into phases places the court at a uniquely privileged vantage point in assessing whether plaintiffs’ counsel are overeager to settle. The parties have attempted to negotiate a settlement to Phase 2 of this case--concerning medical, dental, and mental healthcare--in numerous mediation sessions with the same magistrate judge who helped them to resolve Phase 1. Despite seeking a three-week extension of pretrial deadlines in the hope that they would be able to reach agreement, they have informed the court that Phase 2 will go to trial. Although the court cannot know the reasons for this decision, it certainly suggests that plaintiffs’ counsel are not pushovers.
Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.
iii. Rule 23(b)(2) A class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2) in cases in which “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
45

act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule 23(b)(2) has been liberally applied in the area of civil rights, including suits challenging conditions and practices at various detention facilities, as well as claims for violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.” Bumgarner v. NCDOC, 276 F.R.D. 452, 457-58 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (Boyle, J.); see also Wright & Miller, 7AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1776 (3d ed.) (discussing the range of civil-rights actions certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), and explaining that “the class suit is a uniquely appropriate procedure in civil-rights cases, which generally involve an allegation of discrimination against a group as well as the violation of rights of particular individuals”). Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to say that the rule’s requirements are “almost automatically satisfied in actions primarily
46

seeking injunctive relief.” Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter
v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994).
As plaintiffs have repeatedly explained (and indeed
offered some evidence to demonstrate) throughout the
litigation of this case, the problems of which they
complain and the remedies they seek are systemic. The
existence or lack of a general, state-wide Department
policy or procedure regarding the identification,
tracking, or accommodation of disabilities necessarily
affects all disabled prisoners.14
14. As discussed above in the commonality context, the fact that some class members may already have received reasonable accommodations and therefore might not have been injured by the challenged policies and procedures does not defeat certification. See Anderson v. Garner, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (Murphy, J.) (“‘[A]ll the class members need not be aggrieved by or desire to challenge the defendant’s conduct in order for one or more of them to seek relief under Rule 23(b)(2).’ Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Georgia, 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State, 99 F.R.D. 16, 35 (S.D. Ga. 1983). ‘What is necessary is that the challenged conduct or lack of conduct be premised on a ground that is applicable to the entire class.’ Georgia NAACP, 99 F.R.D. at 35-36.”).
47

Class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.
B. Settlement Approval: Rule 23(e) When parties to a non-class action--who have participated actively in litigating and then in resolving their case--reach a private settlement, the court need not and does not enquire into the appropriateness of it terms. Before approving a settlement agreement in a class action, though, “a court has a heavy, independent duty to ensure that the settlement is ‘fair, adequate, and reasonable.’” Laube v. Campbell, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), additional citation omitted). This careful inspection is “essential to ensure adequate representation of class members who have not participated in shaping the settlement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee note. In the course of this review, the court must determine whether notice to the class was adequate, and
48

must consider the comments made and objections raised by class members, as well as the opinions of class counsel. Laube, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
i. Notice to Class Members “The court must ensure that all class members are informed of the agreement[] and have the opportunity to voice their objections.” Laube, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). The court’s order preliminarily approving the settlement agreement contained specific procedures for the Department of Corrections to give notice of the settlement to the members of the provisionally certified class, as well as approved notice and comment forms. Substantively, the three-page notice form included a description of the case, a definition of the class, a list of the provisions of the settlement agreement, an indication of its preclusive effects, and notice of the agreement concerning attorney’s fees. Additionally, the notice included directions for
49

obtaining a copy of the settlement agreement, contact information for class counsel along with an invitation for prisoners to inquire about the settlement, an announcement of the fairness hearing, and instructions for prisoners to exercise their right to comment about or object to the settlement. The comment form allowed a respondent to select the general topic(s) at issue from a list, and to indicate whether the commenter wished to testify at a fairness hearing.
The notice form was posted in each dormitory and library within the prison system, and copies of the comment form were made available in the libraries and shift commanders’ offices. Copies of the settlement agreement were made available for viewing in the law library or another location within each facility and were provided upon request to any prisoners lacking access to that location. Prisoners who were not housed in dormitories were hand-delivered a copy of the notice and comment forms and an envelope. Weekly oral
50

announcements also notified all prisoners of the settlement and the opportunity to comment or object.
The notice and comment forms and copies of the settlement agreement were also made available in Spanish, Braille, and large print. Upon request, prisoners were to receive assistance in reading the documents and in writing comments.
Secured and clearly labeled comment boxes were placed in each facility for prisoners to submit forms, and defendants’ staff were designated to collect comment forms from prisoners lacking the freedom to move about their facilities. The comment boxes and forms were transmitted to the Department’s general counsel, and a representative of the clerk of court met with the parties to open the comment boxes. Prisoners were also given the option to submit comments by mail directly to the clerk of court.
Notice of the settlement agreement was posted by June 24, 2016, and prisoners were given until July 25, 2016, to submit comments. (Comments received by mail
51

after this date were also docketed.) More than 550 prisoners submitted comments.
One matter concerning the submission of comments warrants additional discussion. The court received correspondence from two prisoners housed at Holman Correctional Facility, which it construed both as objections to the settlement agreement and as motions for extensions of the time for submission of comments.
Both submissions, which were phrased similarly to each other, stated that prisoners at Holman had been unable to review the settlement agreement at all because the facility--including the law library where the settlement documents were to be made available--had been in lockdown throughout the duration of the comment period. These prisoners further stated that no comment box had been placed at Holman.15
15. Notably, these submissions were postmarked well after the comment period had closed; at that time, there should no longer have been a comment box in the facility.
52

The court promptly brought these submissions to the attention of the parties, explaining that it took the allegations very seriously. Because the putative class members in this case are incarcerated, and their freedom of movement is limited not only by their custodians but also in many cases by their disabilities, the court is acutely sensitive to ensuring that they received adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Hence, the court instructed the parties to investigate these allegations and report back.
Having now looked into the matter, the parties contend that prisoners at Holman were in fact given adequate notice of the settlement agreement and opportunity to respond to it. First, the parties point to the fact that nine prisoners at Holman did timely submit comments, three by direct mail to the court and six by way of a comment box placed at Holman, consistent with the established notice procedure. Second, the parties present evidence in the form of a
53

sworn affidavit by the Warden of Holman, which indicates that he followed the notice procedures, that Holman was on lockdown on June 27-28, July 1-5, July 11-12, and July 16-17, but not otherwise on lockdown during the comment period, and that during these lockdown periods notice and comment forms were nonetheless available to prisoners throughout the facility.
Although it is unfortunate that prisoners at Holman were unable to review the settlement agreement in the law library for some portions of the comment period, the evidence submitted by the parties suggests--and the comments the court received from prisoners at Holman corroborates--that prisoners housed there were able to do so for more than half of the one-month period allotted. Therefore, the court finds that putative class members at Holman were afforded an adequate opportunity to review and respond to the settlement agreement, and that they need not be afforded additional time to do so.
54

ii. Objections and Comments Based on the suggestions of counsel and the court’s own review of the comments submitted, 45 prisoners and two individuals who had been released from the Department’s custody during the pendency of this lawsuit were selected to testify during fairness hearings conducted over the course of two days--partially in person at the federal courthouse, and partially by videoconference (due to the impracticality of visiting a large number of prisons). Of those selected, 37 elected to testify. Prisoners were selected based on various considerations, including the substance of their comments; those who submitted comments not germane to the case or the settlement were excluded from consideration. Efforts were made to ensure a fairly representative sample in terms of the range of disabilities class members have and the facilities in which they are housed. Both the parties and the court have reviewed the written
55

comments of those who were not selected to testify, as well as those who declined to do so.
Those prisoners who testified at the fairness hearings and those who submitted comments raised a range of issues, many of which were relevant but some of which were not. For example, some prisoners wrote about other legal claims they wished to bring or on prison conditions unrelated to discrimination against prisoners with disabilities.
Other comments were relevant to this litigation, but were more squarely related to claims at issue in Phase 2, rather than Phase 1. For example, several prisoners commented that their requests for medically necessary treatment, including mental-health treatment, had been denied by the Department.
Of the directly pertinent comments, the vast majority expressed discontentment with existing conditions or procedures, rather than any objection to the adequacy or fairness of the agreement or to any specific provision of it. Indeed, many expressed
56

support for the agreement. Generally, the comments

submitted fell into five loosely defined categories:

identification,

accommodations,

architecture,

grievances, and money damages and attorney fees.

Identification: Thirty-one prisoners flagged their

comments as related to disability-identification

procedures. Some commented that they had not been

formally identified as disabled despite the fact that

their medical records indicated they were. Some

suggested allowing disabled prisoners to self-identify.

Others commented that identification of their

disabilities did not follow them during transfers

between facilities. Further, some alleged that the

Department’s failure to identify their disabilities had

resulted in them being required to hold jobs they were

not capable of performing. Finally, some prisoners

suggested that those with disabilities be housed

separately from others, in part due to security-related

concerns.

57

The settlement agreement allows, but does not require, the Department to accept an individual prisoner’s self-report of a disability. Assuming the Department does not accept such self-reports, the agreement requires it to conduct screening procedures within specified time periods, using specified tests, and requires it to review disability determinations periodically. As to tracking, the agreement mandates a new Department-wide computer system. It also requires the Department’s personnel at receiving facilities to review a prisoner’s disability status and corresponding health codes in the event of a transfer. Furthermore, the agreement’s identification provisions are designed to address the concerns of those prisoners required to do work they are not able to perform; once identified, a disabled prisoner would be given a work assignment (if any) consistent with the prisoner’s limitations. Finally, as to requests that disabled prisoners be housed separately from other prisoners, the court agrees with the parties that imposing such a
58

requirement would be inconsistent with the ADA’s integration mandate. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Accommodations: One hundred and four prisoners indicated that their comments pertained to disability accommodations. Some prisoners with vision impairments stated that materials provided to them, such as official notices or books, should be made available in alternate formats such as large print or audio. At the fairness hearing, for example, one woman with a vision impairment testified that her requests for books on tape had been denied repeatedly. The settlement agreement addresses these concerns. It provides that educational materials, notices, court orders, and other generally available documents must be provided in alternate formats; it also provides for taped texts.
Several prisoners with hearing impairments commented that they had been denied access to functional hearing aids; for example, prisoners commented that they had been provided with one hearing
59

aid instead of two, or that their hearing aid

batteries, or hearing aids themselves, were not

repaired or replaced in a timely manner. The court

heard from multiple prisoners that they were unable to

use their hearing aids because they were broken and had

not been repaired for extended periods of time. Others

commented that they had not been provided with sign

language interpreters.

The settlement agreement

addresses these concerns by mandating that the

Department assess each hearing-impaired prisoners with

respect to auxiliary aids and services every three

months, timely replacement or repair of damaged hearing

aids, and timely replacement of hearing aid batteries.

Other prisoners commented that, due to their

disabilities, they are denied access to certain

facilities and programming. For example, at the

fairness hearing, one witness stated that he had been

denied access to trade school and the honors program

due to his disability. To address these sorts of

issues, the settlement agreement provides that any

60

individual who, independent of disability status,

qualifies for a certain program, must be provided

access to that program on a non-discriminatory basis,

and requires the Department to undertake a transition

planning process to determine (among other things) how

to afford prisoners access to programs which are

currently inaccessible.

Facilities: Forty-six prisoners indicated that

their comments pertained to architectural barriers.

The court received such comments pertaining to numerous

(indeed, nearly all) Department facilities. Prisoners

commented, for example, that the facilities where they

were housed lacked accessible bathrooms with shower

chairs and hand rails, that hallways and dorms lacked

rails, and that--due to overcrowding--prisoners with

devices such as canes and wheelchairs were unable to

move around safely.

At the fairness hearings,

prisoners testified, for example, that they were unable

to attend chapel and certain programs due to those

programs being held in locations that are not

61

accessible to individuals with mobility impairments. Others noted that facilities lacked climate controls, making them extremely hot in the summer and extremely cold in the winter.
The settlement agreement addresses these concerns by requiring the Department to develop and implement a transition plan for identifying and addressing architectural barriers. The Department may address these issues either through architectural changes or potentially through the relocation of programs. The comments concerning climate control were mostly unrelated to any prisoner’s disability and, therefore, unrelated to the claims brought and now settled in this case. To the extent that a prisoner’s disability does require access to facilities of a certain temperature-for example, one prisoner testified at the fairness hearing that, due to her burn injury, she cannot have prolonged heat exposure--those concerns should be addressed by way of the new accommodation request and
62

grievance procedure provided for in the settlement agreement.
Grievances: Fifteen prisoners noted that their comments pertained to the Department’s grievance procedure. Most of these comments criticized the Department’s existing (general) grievance procedure rather than the procedure outlined in the agreement. Prisoners complained, for example, that no grievance procedure currently exists, or that the existing grievance procedure is inadequate. Others expressed concern about the ADA grievance procedure outlined in the settlement agreement. One commenter suggested that the Department’s personnel be required to sign a document indicating receipt of an individual grievance. Another prisoner who testified at the fairness hearing suggested that a third party, outside of the Department’s system, be involved in the grievance process. Relatedly, a few prisoners objected to the Department’s employees serving as ADA coordinators.
63

Because the settlement agreement does establish a clear and well-elaborated procedure for receiving and adjudicating requests for accommodations and appeals from the denial of such requests, it adequately addresses the objections to the lack of an adequate process. The agreement does not require staff to issue signed receipts, but it does require that ADA Coordinators document all grievances, which will help to ensure accountability. If an individual prisoner within the settlement class is unable to secure a requested accommodation, that individual can seek assistance from plaintiffs’ counsel, and may pursue arbitration, even without plaintiffs’ counsel’s consent. The settlement agreement thus adequately addresses this concern. Finally, ADA regulations require that the coordinators be the Department’s employees. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.107(a) (“A public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under this
64

part, including any investigation of any complaint communicated to it alleging its noncompliance with this part or alleging any actions that would be prohibited by this part.”)
Attorney Fees and Money Damages: Some prisoners objected to the attorneys’ fee provision of the settlement agreement, while others objected to the fact that the agreement only provided for injunctive relief rather than money damages. The court will address the appropriateness of the attorneys’ fees in a subsequent section of this opinion.
As to money damages, the court understands that commenters alleging past harms may feel that they are entitled to damages. But in determining whether the settlement in this case is a fair and reasonable one, the court must look to whether the settlement agreement is an adequate resolution of the claims presented in this lawsuit. Since its inception, the plaintiffs in this case have only alleged claims for injunctive relief; no money damages were ever at issue. Moreover,
65

Eleventh Circuit case law makes clear that an unnamed class member cannot be precluded from bringing a claim for damages stemming from the same conditions challenged in the class action, if the class representatives sought only injunctive or declaratory relief. See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1031 (11th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases). This additional remedial avenue has therefore not been foreclosed.
Conclusion: The court has carefully considered the comments and objections filed by class members, which highlight the importance of the reforms to be effected pursuant to the consent decree. However, none calls into serious question the fairness or adequacy of the settlement agreement.
iii. Objections by Federal Public Defender and Equal Justice Initiative
Four death-sentenced prisoners, represented by the Federal Public Defender, filed an objection to the section of the settlement agreement, V.5.I.C.2, that requires defendants to test prisoners for intellectual
66

disabilities and that reserves for defendants the right to administer additional tests. Their objection is that there is a risk that this testing, especially if repeated, could artificially inflate a prisoner’s results, which could in turn adversely impact a potential intellectual-disability defense to a death sentence under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
The objectors requested that the reservation of defendants’ right to administer additional testing be struck from the settlement, that death-sentenced prisoners (and their lawyers) be given an opportunity to opt out of testing, and that such prisoners be allowed to provide defendants with alternate documentation to demonstrate their intellectual disabilities.
The court ordered the parties to solicit and present to the court the view of the Equal Justice Initiative, which represents many of the prisoners on Alabama’s death row. The Equal Justice Initiative agrees with the objection and believes that the only
67

way to protect the rights of the roughly 200 death-sentenced prisoners in defendants’ custody is to exempt them from all testing “until and unless [their] lawyer[s] request[]” it. Letter from Bryan Stevenson (doc. no. 652-1) at 1. The Federal Defender has since expressed its agreement with the Equal Justice Initiative that death-sentenced prisoners should not be required to opt out of testing. Both the Federal Defender and the Equal Justice Initiative take the position that the proposed exemption does not violate the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
In response to the objections of the Federal Defender and Equal Justice Initiative, the parties submitted a joint proposal that the relevant section be ‘carved out’ with respect to the few hundred prisoners on death row. Under this approach, the Department will not be required to change its current practices regarding the testing of death-row prisoners for intellectual disabilities, and the question whether these practices are adequate with respect to those
68

prisoners will be reserved for adjudication or settlement during Phase 2 of this litigation.
The parties agree that this resolution is in the best interest of all class members, including the death-row prisoners affected by it. The court finds that the objections of the Federal Defender and Equal Justice Initiative present a serious question worthy of further consideration and, because the parties’ proposed solution would allow more time to resolve this narrow issue without delaying the entry of the consent decree, it agrees that such a carve-out is appropriate.
Unlike most of the other stipulations the parties have filed, which offer clarifying interpretations of provisions of the settlement agreement, the parties’ proposal with respect to this issue amounts to a modification of the settlement agreement. However, after careful consideration, the court finds that additional notice of this modification need not be given, for three reasons.
69

First, the parties propose a modification only to a small subsection of the settlement agreement. Second, the number of prisoners affected by the change will be very small--less than one percent of the current population. Third, and most important, carving out the provision will not constitute a final resolution of the issue. Instead, the matter will simply be reserved for future resolution. For these reasons, notice is not required. See Harris v. Graddick, 615 F. Supp. 239, 244 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (Thompson, J.) (holding, with respect to an amendment to a settlement of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, that “where the amendment is narrow and it is clearly apparent that the interests of the classes are not substantially impaired, the court is of the opinion that the notice already given is adequate and that additional notice is not required pursuant to Rule 23(e)”); see also Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 102 F. Supp. 3d 306, 313-14 (D.D.C. 2015) (Sullivan, J.) (citing cases).
70

iv. Views of Class Counsel Class counsel contend that the settlement agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of plaintiffs’ Phase 1 claims. They argue that, if the agreement is approved, the Department will be required to address discrimination against disabled prisoners on several fronts, including by creating a transition plan and the oversight mechanisms described above, by instituting corrective actions to bring facilities into compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and by continually reassessing its policies and procedures to ensure that prisoners are not discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities. They also contend that changes to existing policies and procedures will allow for improved identification and tracking of disabilities and ensure that prisoners with disabilities will be afforded, and continue to receive, appropriate accommodations throughout their incarceration. These policy and procedural changes will allow disabled prisoners increased access to
71

rehabilitative programming available within the Department system; those prisoners in residential treatment and stabilization units will likewise benefit from individualized assessments as to the appropriateness of restricting their access to such programming.
Further, class counsel argue that, although the settlement agreement will not provide (and plaintiffs never sought) direction as to the particular accommodations to be provided to individual prisoners, the changes to the Department’s existing grievance processes will create a meaningful avenue for prisoners to assert their rights to such accommodations. Finally, they argue that the Department’s creation of a new quality assurance program, the monitoring process, and the continued jurisdiction of the court for a period of at least five years will help to ensure that the agreement is implemented appropriately.
The court considered appointing a guardian ad litem to advocate for the interests of the unnamed class
72

members who, due to cognitive and communication-related disabilities, are incapable of understanding the terms of the settlement agreement or submitting intelligible comments on them. The court heard the views of the parties as to this proposal. Instead of appointing a guardian ad litem, it found that ADAP, which has a federal mandate to advocate for and ensure the protection of disabled Alabamians, was best situated to voice the concerns of these class members.
The court explained that, although “this court did not appoint a [guardian ad litem] to represent incompetent class members in a previous class action challenge regarding the State's mental health and mental retardation system[,] [it] then explained ... that ‘a court should be even more circumspect about accepting a settlement where ... members of the plaintiff class are not themselves capable of assessing the settlement and voicing their views on whether it is fair, reasonable and adequate, and the court must therefore rely on comments from such secondary sources
73

as public interest groups and organizations.’” See Dunn v. Dunn, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2016 WL 3869905, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 7, 2016) (Thompson, J.) (quoting Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Wallis, 1986 WL 69194, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 1986) (Thompson, J.), and citing William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435, 1450-52 (2006) (discussing the related roles that public interest groups and court-appointed guardians can play in monitoring the fairness of class settlements)). ADAP is the primary public interest organization devoted to disability rights issues in Alabama.
The court also declined to appoint a guardian ad litem because, practically speaking, such an individual would be hard-pressed to even identify class members with cognitive and communication-related disabilities, given that the lack of a system to identify such prisoners is one of the problems to be remedied under the settlement. By contrast, ADAP is familiar with the needs of these class members in light of its statutory
74

role as their advocate and its involvement in this litigation. The court therefore instructed ADAP to file a brief discussing whether the settlement agreement was a fair resolution of the claims of class members with severe cognitive and communication-related disabilities.
In its brief, ADAP explains that the settlement agreement is a fair resolution of these claims because it provides benefits to all disabled prisoners as well as particular benefits to the subset with cognitive and communication-related disabilities. The settlement agreement’s provisions relating to identification and tracking of disabled prisoners, access to programs and services, and the ADA request and grievance process, inure to the benefit of all disabled prisoners.
Additionally, the settlement agreement includes detailed specifications for testing to assess prisoners for cognitive disabilities; these evaluations will allow defendants to provide accommodations to those prisoners who require them. Prisoners with severe
75

communication-related disabilities have much to gain from the provisions regarding auxiliary aids and program access, which require defendants to supply note-takers, readers, and tutors, other aides, and communication devices.
v. Court’s Assessment The court must also assess for itself, based on the evidence and argument presented by the parties and by class members who submitted comments and objections, whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. “Relevant factors include the stage in the proceedings; the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success at trial; the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the lawsuit; and the range of possible recovery.” Laube, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1246. As to the substantive provisions of the agreement, the court finds that they represent a highly favorable result for the plaintiff class. The plaintiffs in this case challenged the Department’s treatment of disabled
76

prisoners at a systemic level. They argued that the Department’s policies and procedures were grossly inadequate to ensure compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and that because of these inadequate policies and procedures, disability discrimination was prevalent.
The settlement agreement essentially gives the class all of the remedies plaintiffs sought at the outset of this litigation. Notably, even if plaintiffs had proceeded to and prevailed at trial on their Phase 1 claims, the parties would have still been confronted with the task of fashioning a remedial plan. Any such plan would likely have closely resembled that contained in the settlement agreement currently before the court. Notably, because there are a variety of ways in which the Department may accommodate certain disabilities (for example, either by moving a prisoner or by renovating the facility where he is housed), the court would as an initial matter have permitted defendants to select the manner in which they would come into
77

compliance with federal law. Moreover, because such systemic changes are involved (for example, the creation and implementation of a new computer system, and assessment and training of tens of thousands of people), it would not have been feasible to order significantly more rapid compliance than is contemplated in the settlement agreement. If anything, settlement means that change will come more quickly.
During and shortly following the preliminary approval hearing, the court did express significant concerns regarding two particular provisions of the settlement agreement: a provision stating that the claims being settled had been raised only against the Department, and not against the official-capacity defendants, and a provision outlining a mechanism for arbitration of disputes arising during the implementation period. However, after considerable discussion, the parties have resolved these issues to the satisfaction of the court by entering into binding stipulations regarding these provisions.
78

1. Official-Capacity Defendants The settlement agreement states that the plaintiffs brought no ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims against the two official-capacity defendants (who are defendants to plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims in Phase 2 of this litigation), and that the Department is therefore the only defendant involved in the settlement of Phase 1. The court expressed concern that the exclusion of the official-capacity defendants from the Phase 1 settlement could potentially create a problem were plaintiffs later to return to court in an effort to enforce the terms of or extend the consent decree. Alabama’s Eleventh Amendment immunity has been abrogated by the express terms of the Rehabilitation Act. See Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1290-93 (11th Cir. 2003). The ADA, by contrast, abrogated sovereign immunity only to the extent that the claims brought under it allege actions that constitute violations of the Fourteenth
79

Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
Absent the inclusion of an official-capacity defendant subject to suit under Ex parte Young, plaintiffs would be unable to challenge any ongoing violations of the ADA (but not the Rehabilitation Act) that did not constitute violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although these are often described as largely overlapping statutes, see Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000), there are some disability-rights claims that can be brought only or are easier to bring under the ADA, because the ADA’s causation requirement is more relaxed--that is, “because of,” rather than “solely by reasons of.” See Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 504-05 (5th Cir. 2002).
The State was unable simply to waive its immunity for purposes of this suit, because a provision of the Alabama Constitution has been interpreted to bar waiver “by the Legislature or any other State authority.”
80

Stroud v. McIntosh, 722 F.3d 1294, 1299 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (same). Therefore, the parties have stipulated that “without the necessity of a separate amendment to the Complaint, Commissioner Dunn, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, be added (a) as a defendant to the claims addressed in the proposed Phase 1 settlement agreement and (b) as a named party to that agreement.” Joint Br. Addressing Ct.’s Question Re. Addition of Official-Capacity Defs. to Phase 1 Claims and Settl. (doc. no. 576) at 1. This stipulation resolves the court’s concern; both the Alabama Department of Corrections and Commission Jefferson Dunn are defendants to the Phase 1 claims.
2. Arbitration The settlement agreement provides for the arbitration of disputes arising during the pendency of the consent decree. Because the court requested and
81

the parties provided a number of clarifications
regarding the scope and effect of this provision, it is
reproduced here in full for ease of discussion:
“VII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
1. During the assessment, implementation, or monitoring periods of this Amended Agreement (see Sections V-VI, above), if Plaintiffs’ counsel or the monitor believe that ADOC is not complying with some aspect of the Amended Agreement, they will notify counsel for the ADOC, in writing, of such a belief identifying any facts supporting the belief. ADOC will investigate the allegations and respond in writing through its counsel within thirty (30) days after receipt of the notification. If Plaintiffs’ counsel or the monitor is not satisfied with ADOC’s response, the Parties will negotiate in good faith to resolve the issue(s). If the Parties are unable to resolve the issue(s) timely and satisfactorily, the Parties agree to present the issue(s) for binding arbitration before Hon. John E. Ott, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Alabama.15 This provision regarding binding arbitration applies regardless of whether the issue affects twelve (12) or more inmates, as discussed below.
15. If, at any time during the term this Amended Agreement is in effect, Judge Ott or any successor arbitrator becomes unavailable to arbitrate disputes, the Parties will agree upon a replacement arbitrator. If the Parties are unable to agree upon a replacement arbitrator, they
82

will petition the Court to appoint a replacement arbitrator who will be a current or former U.S. Magistrate Judge from one of the U.S. District Courts sitting in Northern, Middle or Southern Districts of Alabama.
2. If the issue is one that impacts fewer than twelve (12) inmates, resolution through the arbitration process shall be the final resolution under this Amended Agreement. Nothing in this Amended Agreement establishes a compulsory administrative prerequisite with which an Inmate must comply prior to the initiation of a lawsuit alleging violations of the Acts suffered during the Inmate's term of incarceration. Nothing in this agreement shall prevent an Inmate from exercising his/her rights under ADOC’s ADA Grievance Process.
3. If the issue is one that impacts twelve (12) or more Inmates and the Parties are unable to resolve the issue(s) timely and satisfactorily through negotiation or the arbitration process, either party may bring the issue before the Court for resolution. Any issue brought before [t]he Court will be decided on an abuse of discretion standard.
4. Issues relating to ADOC system-wide or facility specific policies, or physical barriers within a specific facility, shall be presumed to impact twelve (12) or more inmates. The Arbitrator shall have the authority to decide whether an issue impacts twelve (12) or more inmates.
5. In the event that the arbitrator or Court, acting as final decision-maker, finds that ADOC has failed to comply with this
83

Amended Agreement, ADOC will submit a plan to remedy the deficiencies identified within thirty (30) days of the decision. In the event that such a plan does not timely remedy the deficiencies, the Court retains the authority to enforce this Amended Agreement through all remedies provided by law. Any attorneys’ fees awarded are subject to the provisions of Section XII of this Amended Agreement.
6. The Court will be the sole forum for enforcement of this Amended Agreement. Any order to achieve Substantial Compliance with the provisions of this Amended Agreement will be subject to the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626.”
Am. and Restated Settl. Agmt. (doc. no. 518) at 70-72.
In its order preliminarily approving the settlement
and in subsequent briefing orders, the court expressed
concerns and sought clarification regarding the extent
to which arbitration would be binding (or, put
differently, not subject to judicial review), mandatory
(or, put differently, the exclusive avenue for relief),
and enforceable.
In a number of subsequent stipulations, the parties
have addressed the court’s questions and significantly
assuaged its concerns.
84

a. When Is Arbitration Binding? As a preliminary matter, the parties have addressed the court’s concern that the language in this provision is somewhat inconsistent, in describing the arbitration in subsection 1 as “binding” but then explaining that the arbitrator’s decisions will be appealable if the issues decided affect 12 or more prisoners. The parties have entered a binding stipulation confirming that the word “binding” should be omitted from this subsection and that “the decision of the arbitrator is binding (that is, not subject to appeal) only if the issue affects fewer than twelve (12) inmates.” Parties’ Joint Stip. (doc. no. 638) at 1. Additionally, the court anticipated the possibility that a dispute could arise over whether the arbitrator had correctly decided that an issue affected fewer than 12 prisoners. The court therefore sought clarification as to whether the parties intended their agreement--in stating that the arbitrator “shall have the authority
85

to decide whether an issue impacts twelve (12) or more inmates”--to vest him with the exclusive (unreviewable) authority to decide this issue. In response to this concern, the parties have entered a binding stipulation in which they “agree that the arbitrator’s decision as to whether a particular issue affects more than 1216 inmates will be subject to review by the District Court for abuse of discretion.” Id.
Lastly, the court sought clarification regarding the relationship between the arbitration process and motions the parties might file to terminate or extend the consent decree. The parties confirmed in a binding stipulation that such motions may be heard and decided only by the court. Phase 1 Parties’ Joint Stip. Concern. Provs. of PLRA as Relates to Phase 1 Settl. (doc. no. 560) at 3.
16. The court understands the parties to mean “12 or more,” rather than “more than 12.” According to the arbitration provision, decisions affecting exactly 12 prisoners are appealable.
86

The parties further explained that although many of

the arbitrator’s factual findings would be binding on

this court in considering such a motion, some factual

findings, and the arbitrator’s conclusions of law,

would not be.17 Specifically, they stated that the

arbitrator’s decisions would be binding on a motion to

terminate or extend only if defendants successfully

asserted the affirmative defense of collateral

estoppel. See Joint Resp. to Ct.’s Second Suppl. Br.

Order (doc. no. 563) at 7 & n.5.

They

explained--correctly--that to the extent an issue

raised in a motion to terminate or extend was identical

to one actually litigated (with a full and fair

opportunity to do so) in front of, and necessarily

decided by, the arbitrator, his decision would preclude

17. This discussion pertains only to factual findings made by the arbitrator which relate to fewer than 12 prisoners. Because the arbitration provision sets no deadline by which decisions affecting 12 or more prisoners must be appealed, any factual findings pertaining to 12 or more prisoners could simply be appealed in conjunction with a motion to terminate or extend.
87

relitigation of that issue on a motion to terminate or extend. See Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000) (setting forth requirements for collateral estoppel); Freecharm Ltd. v. Atlas Wealth Holdings Corp., 499 F. App’x 941, 943-45 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of an issue decided in arbitration).
Moreover, the parties agreed that the arbitrator’s conclusions of law would not be binding under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, because the legal question whether defendants had violated the consent decree with respect to any individual unnamed class member would not have been litigated by the named plaintiffs and, perhaps more important, would be very much distinct from the legal issues before the court on a motion to terminate or extend: whether defendants were in substantial compliance with the decree and
88

whether they were committing ongoing violations of the
ADA.18
Helpfully, the parties offer an illustrative
example of an unnamed class member, Mr. Jones, who
asserts in an arbitration that he submitted an
accommodation request for a cane but received no
response, in violation of the consent decree. Suppose,
they say, that the arbitrator decides that defendants
have not violated the decree because Mr. Jones did not
in fact submit the accommodation request. Suppose as
well that plaintiffs later seek to avoid termination of
the decree based (in part or in whole) on a showing
18. In the fifth year, the question (per the terms of the settlement agreement) would be whether defendants had been in substantial compliance with the terms of the decree for at least one year.
Were plaintiffs to seek to extend jurisdiction into a sixth year and beyond, the court would need to determine--pursuant to the PLRA--whether “prospective relief remain[ed] necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of [a] Federal right, extend[ed] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [was] narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 36526(b)(3).
89

that defendants are repeatedly failing to respond to accommodations requests.
In such a circumstance, the parties agree that the arbitrator’s factual finding that Mr. Jones did not submit an accommodation request would be binding on the court. However, plaintiffs would not be estopped from arguing that other class members had submitted requests but received no responses, or indeed that Mr. Jones had suffered some other violation of the consent decree or the ADA (including that the failure to provide him with a cane was, per se, a violation of either the decree or the statute). Moreover, as discussed, the specific legal issue decided by the arbitrator--that defendants had not violated the decree by failing to respond to Mr. Jones’s accommodation request--would not again be at issue on a motion to extend or terminate, so his determination would therefore not bind the court.
90

b. When Is Arbitration Mandatory?
The court’s most significant concern about the
arbitration provision, based on representations made by
defense counsel during the preliminary approval
hearing, was that it could prevent class members from
raising in federal court (this one or another one)
claims that had not been raised or settled in this
case.19 Had it swept so broadly, the court might well
have been unwilling to approve it.
However, the parties have agreed to construe the
arbitration provision to require an unnamed class
member to submit to arbitration only if seeking to
19. See Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1134-37 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a consent decree governing the provision of medical care to prisoners across the state did not preclude an individual prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims regarding specific medical treatment allegedly denied to him, because the consent decree governed “a broad category of conduct” and the “specific issues raised [by the plaintiff] ha[d] not already been addressed conclusively by the decree[],” and that “individual claims for injunctive relief related to medical treatment are discrete from the claims for systemic reform addressed in [the consent decree]” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
91

enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. See Joint Br. Re. Scope of Arbitration (doc. no. 575). A prisoner who seeks to assert a new and independent claim alleging a violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act is free to file such a lawsuit in federal court. Of course, defendants would be at liberty to argue that the claims in that complaint were precluded by the settlement in this case, but they would have to do so based on the substantive provisions of the consent decree and not on the arbitration provision itself.
Based on this stipulation, and in light of circuit case law regarding enforcement of consent decrees by unnamed class members, the court concludes that on balance, the arbitration provision expands, rather than limits, the remedies available to an unnamed class member who contends that the consent decree has been violated to that individual’s detriment. In the Eleventh Circuit, consent decrees are enforceable only through contempt proceedings, see Reynolds v. McInnes,
92

338 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2003), and “unnamed,

non-intervening members of a class ... do not have

standing to enforce [a] consent decree.” Reynolds v.

Butts, 312 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002). But see

Clarkson v. Coughlin, 2006 WL 587345 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,

2006) (Sweet, J.) (discussing the adjudication of

contempt motions brought by unnamed class members to

enforce a consent decree). Absent the arbitration

provision, an unnamed class member unrepresented by

class counsel could not obtain relief for a violation

of the consent decree. The arbitration provision gives

such a prisoner an avenue by which to appeal the denial

of accommodation to an adjudicator unaffiliated with

the Department.

Additionally, the court expressed the concern that

the remainder of the consent decree not be undermined

were a court later to invalidate the arbitration

provision, for whatever reason.

During an

on-the-record conference call to address this issue,

the parties stipulated that the arbitration provision

93

is to be “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and case law interpreting it,” and, pursuant to that case law, “is severable from the remainder of the settlement agreement, such that were a court to invalidate the arbitration provision at some point during the pendency of the consent decree, the remainder of the consent decree would remain in full force.” Arbitration Severability Stip. (doc. no. 719) at 4. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (“[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.” (interpreting § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16)).
c. How Is Arbitration Enforceable? The court sought confirmation that the arbitrator’s decisions would meaningfully be enforceable. The parties confirmed their agreement that although the arbitrator will not himself exercise enforcement power, the consent decree requires compliance with decisions
94

of the arbitrator, such that failure to do so would be a “straightforward” basis for a finding of contempt. Joint Resp. to Ct.’s Second Suppl. Br. Order (doc. no. 563) at 3-6. (Of course, whether defendants had indeed failed to comply with a decision by the arbitrator would be a question for the court to decide.) To the extent that a dispute concerns a dozen or more prisoners and the arbitrator’s decision is in fact appealed to the court, failure to comply with the resulting court order would obviously be a basis for a finding of contempt.20
d. Conclusion The court evaluated the arbitration provision in the parties’ settlement agreement with extreme care, given the host of serious concerns that arise when adjudications of individual civil-rights claims are shunted from the federal courts to alternative
20. In such a case, the movant would need to show by clear and convincing evidence that the non-movant (continued...)
95

mechanisms of dispute resolution. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L.J. 2680 (2015); Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 803 (2009).
However, the arbitration provision at issue here offers some benefits to class members in facilitating prompt resolution of disputes regarding noncompliance, and avoids many of the most significant pitfalls that often attend such clauses. Although some arbitration clauses expressly preclude aggregation of claims, see Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 78 (2011); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2000), this provision both permits aggregation and preserves judicial review of any dispute that affects
had failed to comply with the court’s order.
96

numerous prisoners or implicates systemic or facility-wide policies. And while some arbitration clauses sweep very broadly (or are interpreted by courts to do so), requiring arbitration of a wide array of disputes might arise between the parties, see Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 2014) (discussing the presumption in favor of arbitrability), this provision applies only to disputes arising from the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and not to freestanding claims that defendants have violated the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
After close consideration, the court therefore concludes that the arbitration provision, as construed by the parties’ binding stipulations, is fair and reasonable to the class members.
Finally, the court notes that, to the extent the parties’ stipulations clarify the meaning of a portion of the provision by expressly adopting one of multiple possible interpretations of it, they all adopt the interpretation that is least restrictive of class
97

members’ rights to raise disputes in federal court. The court therefore concludes that additional notice of the parties’ stipulations need not be provided to the members of the class prior to final approval and entry of the consent decree. See Keepseagle, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 313-14; Harris, 615 F. Supp. at 244.
However, the court will require the parties to prepare a notice, intelligible to the lay reader, describing the arbitration process as construed by these stipulations. This notice should be posted or distributed to class members either in advance of or in conjunction with the notice defendants will provide regarding the availability of the new ADA request and grievance process.
C. Class Counsel and Fees: Rules 23(g) and (h) i. Rule 23(g)
Rule 23(g) requires the court to appoint (and also to assess the suitability of plaintiffs’ counsel to serve as) class counsel. The rule requires the court
98

to consider “(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The court must conclude that class counsel will “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4).
Lawyers affiliated with the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz have represented named plaintiffs in litigating and negotiating the settlement of this case, and seek appointment as class counsel.21 As previously
21. The law firm of Zarzaur, Mujumdar, and Debrosse, has also participated extensively in the Phase 1 litigation, in representing ADAP. Because its attorneys do not represent the individual named class (continued...)
99

discussed, the record reflects that these attorneys have substantial experience in litigating class actions and in the complex substantive areas of both prisoners’-rights and disability-rights law.
These lawyers have also devoted an extraordinary amount of time and energy to identifying and developing the claims and evidence in this case. They identified plaintiffs, investigated their allegations, drafted a lengthy complaint, engaged in very extensive discovery (and litigation over it), appeared at numerous court hearings and conferences, participated in days of mediation, briefed a motion for class certification, and responded to questions raised by the court and comments made by class members regarding the settlement agreement.
Finally, the court cannot identify--and neither defendants nor the prisoners who have commented on the
members, they have not been named class counsel. However, the court understands that they are due to receive a portion of the attorneys’ fees discussed below.
100

settlement agreement have suggested--any reason to believe that these attorneys have not fairly and adequately represented the interests of the class, or will not do so in the future.
The court therefore concludes that plaintiffs’ counsel should be appointed class counsel.
ii. Rule 23(h) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) requires that when class counsel seek fees and costs “that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement,” they move for those fees and provide notice to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1). Class members (and also defendants, absent a settlement) must be given notice and an opportunity to object, and the court must find that the award sought is reasonable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2), (h)(3). The settlement agreement provides that defendants will pay plaintiffs’ counsel $ 1.25 million for their litigation of the Phase 1 claims up until settlement,
101

as well as additional fees of $ 195.00 per hour (subject to caps) for monitoring services. For litigation arising out of the consent decree, plaintiffs’ counsel will be entitled to fees (again, subject to caps) only if the court finds that their services were necessary and that they attempted to resolve the issue informally.
Because this provision was included in the settlement agreement, class members received notice of it. A few prisoners objected to the fee provision, arguing that the fees class counsel would receive were excessive. One prisoner argued that class counsel should receive a larger fee award. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the fees contemplated by the settlement agreement are appropriate.
Even when both parties agree to an award, the court has an independent responsibility to assess its reasonableness, in order to guard against the risk that class counsel might agree to enter into a settlement
102

less favorable to their clients in exchange for
inappropriately high fees. See Piambino v. Bailey, 610
F.2d 1306, 1328 (5th Cir. 1980).22 The court uses the
lodestar method, multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, see
Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir. 1988), and then considering whether an
upward or downward adjustment is warranted in light of
the factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).23
22. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
23. These factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional (continued...)
103

In support of their motion, plaintiffs’ counsel

have submitted evidence that they incurred

approximately $ 261,000 in expenses litigating Phase 1

of this case; a portion of the award would cover those

expenses.

As to the remainder of the award, plaintiffs’

counsel request compensation at a blended hourly rate

of $ 196 per hour. Evidence submitted by plaintiffs

shows that this rate is consistent with or below the

blended hourly rates deemed reasonable in other civil

rights cases in Alabama, and very substantially below

the rates at which the lawyers employed by law firms

ordinarily bill their clients. The court also finds

class

counsel’s

contention--supported

by

affidavits--that they have expended (at least) 5,050

hours in litigating Phase 1 of this case entirely

convincing, given the court’s own knowledge of the

amount of time numerous attorneys have spent in court,

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
104

in mediation, in depositions, and in site inspections. Based on these findings, the lodestar figure amounts to the $ 989,000 provided for in the settlement agreement.
After considering the Johnson factors, the court finds that no downward adjustment of the lodestar figure is warranted. This litigation, which has been ongoing since 2014, is extraordinarily large in scope; it concerns both current and future disabled prisoners at all state prison facilities, and it sought and achieved a remedial order that mandates a dramatic transformation in the way that the Department treats such prisoners. The range of complex legal and factual questions presented by the plaintiffs’ claims, and the amount of time plaintiffs’ attorneys spent both in preparing this case for trial and, more recently, in negotiating and securing approval of the settlement agreement, warrant the sizeable fee award. Moreover, the court is convinced that the experienced attorneys who litigated this case, and who took it on without any guarantee of compensation, would have been entitled to
105

a higher hourly rate had they litigated a contested fee motion.
Finally, the court notes that class counsel seek these fees pursuant to the fee provisions contained in the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12205) and the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794a), so their award is not limited by the PLRA’s restrictions on attorneys’ fees in prison litigation, which apply only to cases in which the attorneys’ fees are authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1).
D. Prison Litigation Reform Act “The PLRA strictly limits the prospective relief a federal court may order in cases concerning prison conditions.” Gaddis v. Campbell, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.). These strictures apply to consent decrees, and hence to this settlement. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1). The PLRA provides that a “court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds
106

that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further

than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal

right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A).

Furthermore, in conducting this

“need-narrowness-intrusiveness” inquiry, the court is

required to “give substantial weight to any adverse

impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal

justice system caused by the relief.” Id.

In some circumstances--such as when a court extends

prospective relief by making renewed findings that the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements continue to

be met in light of a “current and ongoing

violation”--the PLRA requires it to “engage in a

specific, provision-by-provision examination of [a]

consent decree[], measuring each requirement against

the statutory criteria.” Cason v. Steckinger, 231 F.3d

777, 785 (11th Cir. 2000). However, in the case of

such an extension or, as here, in submitting to the

court an initial settlement agreement, “[t]he parties

107

are free to make any concessions or enter into any stipulations they deem appropriate,” and the court does not need to “conduct an evidentiary hearing about or enter particularized findings concerning any facts or factors about which there is not dispute.” Id. at 785 n.8.
In this case, the parties agree that the consent decree satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). They so stipulate in the settlement agreement. Based on the court’s independent review of the settlement agreement, the court agrees.
The court further finds that the consent decree will not have an adverse effect on public safety or the operation of the criminal-justice system. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Quite the opposite is true. A primary purpose of the State’s prison system is to rehabilitate prisoners in its custody, many of whom will be released to rejoin society. See ADOC Admin. Reg. 002 at 2 (“The mission of the Alabama Department
108

of Corrections is to confine, manage and provide rehabilitative programs for convicted felons in a safe, secure and humane environment ....”). When the Alabama Department of Corrections provides accommodations for prisoners with disabilities in a manner and to an extent compliant with federal law, those prisoners will be significantly better able to access and benefit from the range of services and programming available during their incarceration.
Two other portions of the PLRA warrant discussion. First, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A) provides that prospective relief orders “shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener ... 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief [or] ... 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief under this paragraph ....” However, because the remedial steps set forth in the parties’ consent decree will require more than two years to implement, they have agreed, both in the agreement and by filing
109

written stipulations, that defendants may waive and have waived the right to seek termination of the consent decree pursuant to § 3626(b) until at least five years after the date of final approval. See Depriest v. Walnut Grove Corr. Auth., 2015 WL 3795020, at *6 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2015) (Reeves, J.) (“Nothing about the PLRA prohibits parties from agreeing to termination conditions different from those contained in the PLRA.” (citing cases)). The parties also agree that the consent decree will automatically terminate six years after the date of final approval, unless plaintiffs seek to extend it and the court finds extension warranted pursuant to § 3626(b)(3). The court concludes that the termination provisions of the consent decree comply with the PLRA, and that they are appropriate in light of the significance of the transformational reforms the agreement contemplates and this court will require.
Second, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f) imposes requirements on a district court appointing a special master in a
110

prison case. In order for such an appointment to be permissible during the remedial phase of a case, the court must find that the remedial phase will be “sufficiently complex to warrant the appointment.” § 3626(f)(1)(B). Additionally, the statute prescribes a mechanism for selecting a special master from lists submitted by the parties; it appears that the consent of both parties would satisfy the spirit, though perhaps not the letter, of the provision. See § 3626(f)(2). Also, § 3626(f)(5) requires the court to review whether a special master remains necessary on a twice-yearly basis, and § 3626(f)(6) imposes certain limitations on the special master’s power.
Furthermore, the PLRA defines the term “special master” to mean “any person appointed by a Federal court pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or pursuant to any inherent power of the court to exercise the powers of a master, regardless of the title or description given by the court.” § 3626(g)(8). Pursuant to Rule 53, a special master
111

ordinarily makes recommended factual findings which a district court reviews de novo upon objection; however, parties to a case may stipulate that a special master appointed upon their consent has the authority to make final, unreviewable factual findings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3)(B).
The arbitrator to be appointed pursuant to the consent decree, however, is not a special master. Neither the court nor the parties have ever suggested as much, and the parties stipulated that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f) is not applicable to the arbitrator, and expressly waived the right to challenge his decision or the consent decree on the basis of this provision.
In sum, the court is satisfied that its entry of the consent decree is in full compliance with the PLRA.
IV. CONCLUSION In Alexander v. Choate, Justice Marshall explained that Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to ensure that people with disabilities were no longer “shunted
112

aside, hidden, and ignored.” 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985)

(quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (1971) (statement of Rep.

Vanik)). Prisoners, looked down upon by society and

hidden from public view, are likewise at risk of such

treatment.

Absent the protections created and

processes mandated by the ADA and accompanying

regulations, and without effective oversight, prisoners

with disabilities are doubly damned.

This settlement reflects the Alabama Department of

Corrections’ commitment to making manifest the rights

of disabled prisoners in its custody; it represents the

shouldering of significant responsibility, and presents

an equally significant opportunity, by delineating a

years-long process of ensuring compliance with the

dictates of federal disability law.

The court

understands defendants’ investment in this process to

be genuine, and commends them for it.

The court also recognizes the important role played

by prisoners with disabilities in bringing this

litigation, and commends both the named plaintiffs and

113

the numerous prisoners who submitted comments for their advocacy on behalf both of themselves and of others.
Finally, the court expresses its appreciation to Magistrate Judge Ott, for his truly tireless efforts in helping the parties to reach this settlement agreement, and for his willingness to serve as the arbitrator.
* * * In accordance with the foregoing opinion, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) An injunctive-relief settlement class, defined
as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Correction who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness, or defect,” is certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).
114

(2) The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g).
(3) The parties’ settlement agreement (doc. no. 518), as amended, is approved.
(4) The objections to the settlement agreement (doc. nos. 578, 582, 593, 596, 606, 612, 623, 641, 652, 659, and 663) are overruled.
(5) The parties’ stipulations (doc. nos. 560, 563, 575, 576, 638, 696, 709, and 719) are adopted.
(6) The settlement agreement, as amended, is entered as a separate consent decree. Defendants are to commence compliance with its terms as interpreted by the above-entered stipulations.
115

(7) United States Magistrate Judge John Ott is appointed arbitrator pursuant to Section VII of the consent decree.
(8) Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees (doc. no. 703) is granted.
(9) The parties are to meet and confer and submit to the court by no later than September 23, 2016, a plan for providing notice to class members of the entry of this consent decree and for ensuring that they have access during the pendency of the consent decree to both it and this opinion. In particular, this notice must describe in lay terms the accommodation request and grievance processes set out in the decree, and must note the availability of arbitration.
DONE, this the 9th day of September, 2016. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A CLASS CERTIFICATION OPINION The plaintiffs in this putative class-action lawsuit are dozens of state prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP). The defendants are officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC): the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner of Health Services.1 They are sued in their official capacities only.

1. ADOC itself is also a party, but with respect to only claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the (continued...)

In Phase 2A of this case, with which this opinion

is concerned, ADAP and a subset of individual named

plaintiffs

assert

the

following

claims:

constitutionally inadequate mental-health treatment in

Alabama prison facilities and involuntary medication

without due process. They rely on the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive

relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights).2 The case

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, which are nearly settled and therefore not discussed in this opinion. See Joint Status Report (doc. no. 968) at 5 (“Plaintiffs and Defendants ADOC have agreed in substance to a settlement that resolves the Phase 2A ADA issues. These parties continue to work to resolve the Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys and monitoring fees for these issues.”). To the extent that the parties are not successful in reaching a final resolution of these claims, they have reserved them for later adjudication. See Phase 2 Order on Remaining ADA Claims (doc. no. 981).
2. This case has twice been bifurcated for the administrative convenience of the court and the parties. The claims in Phase 1, which the parties settled with a consent decree approved by the court, involve ADA claims alleging discrimination on the basis (continued...)
2

is proceeding on two parallel tracks consisting of
ADAP’s claims and the individual named plaintiffs’
claims.
In August 2016, more than two years after this case
was filed and after extensive discovery, the individual
plaintiffs formally moved for certification of a Phase
2 class, while ADAP pursued its claims separately as an
association whose constituents include the mentally ill
prisoners in ADOC’s custody.3
of and non-accommodation of physical disabilities. See Dunn v. Dunn, -- F.R.D. --, 2016 WL 4718216 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2016) (Thompson, J.). The claims in Phase 2B, which are set to go to trial after the Phase 2A claims (should they survive summary judgment), involve Eighth Amendment claims related to medical and dental care.
3. As the court explained to the parties during the briefing process, it will, at this time, decide the motion only as to the Phase 2A claims, although the motion was filed for both Phase 2A and Phase 2B. Plaintiffs describe the class they seek to certify for purposes of Phase 2A as a mental-health subclass of a larger health care class they seek to have certified. As this case has been bifurcated into mental-health care and medical/dental care phases, the court will consider whether the mental-health class certified here should be considered a subclass of any future health care class when considering whether to certify such a class.
3

For reasons that follow, the motion for class certification filed by the individual plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to simply as plaintiffs) will be granted in part and denied in part, and two classes certified. The court has narrowed the scope of the mental-health care Eighth Amendment class, and winnowed down the involuntary-medication due-process claim to the portion suitable for class certification.
I. Rule 23(c)(1)(B) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(B) requires a certification order to “define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses”; therefore, a court must consider the propriety of certification in relation to a specific putative class definition and specific putative class claims. Plaintiffs seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class consisting of “all persons with a serious mental health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject to Defendants’ mental health care
4

policies and practices in ADOC facilities.” Reply Br. (doc. no. 890) at 57.4

Pls.’

The first claim plaintiffs seek to bring on behalf

of this class is that defendants are violating the

4. Defendants note that plaintiffs initially sought certification of a class of all prisoners subject to defendants’ mental-health care policies and practices. Plaintiffs have clarified that they seek certification of a narrower class, limited to prisoners with serious mental illnesses. Because there is some case law to suggest that healthy prisoners cannot raise Eighth Amendment health care claims, the court will employ the class definition limited to prisoners (current or future) with serious mental illness, in an exercise of its discretionary authority to “reshape the boundaries and composition of the class” based on a “determination that reformulating the class will better serve the purposes of Rule 23 and the underlying policies of the substantive law than would denying certification altogether.” Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 564 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Tobias Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1897, 1925 (2014)). In doing so, the court notes that the effect of this choice of a narrower class definition on the progress of the case and on any eventual relief will be virtually nil. Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim does not concern the adequacy of mental-health care being provided to prisoners who are not seriously mentally ill. (Plaintiffs do contend that defendants fail to recognize many prisoners’ serious mental illnesses. The interests of class members in this category will be addressed at trial, because one of the practices plaintiffs challenge is (continued...)
5

Eighth Amendment by failing to provide constitutionally adequate mental-health care to prisoners with serious mental illnesses. Specifically, they allege that defendants have been deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm posed to the putative class members by a number of policies and practices (both separately and in combination). Although these policies and practices, according to both parties’ experts, sometimes contribute to each other, it is helpful to parse them in order to ensure that the putative class can properly challenge them.
Plaintiffs take the position that they need not demonstrate the suitability for class-wide adjudication of any particular policy or practice, and that they need only demonstrate that the overarching claim of inadequate mental-health care is appropriate for certification. But, as in Parsons v. Ryan, a similar recent case, the court must dive somewhat deeper. 289
defendants’ failure to adequately screen prisoners for mental illness.)
6

F.R.D. 513, 522-23 (D. Ariz. 2013) (Wake, J.) (certifying a state-wide class of prisoners challenging systemic deficiencies in both medical and mental-health care). Although the court agrees that plaintiffs have brought only one Eighth Amendment “claim,” this claim-as it has been formulated by plaintiffs--turns on evaluating the risk of harm posed by particular policies and practices. The court will need to ensure, therefore, that these policies and practices are common to the class, and that representatives have been put at risk by them. Defendants, for their part, seek to atomize the claims of plaintiffs by focusing on the minutiae of unimportant distinctions, failing to see the forest for the trees (and leaves).
The court is thus left with the task of reaching an appropriate middle ground, and defining the policies and practices at issue in a way that recognizes themes articulated in the allegations and the voluminous quantity of record evidence the court has reviewed, while ensuring that defendants are not left to face a
7

singular amorphous contention that the mental-health
care they are providing is not good enough. Despite
plaintiffs’ protestations, the headings in their
complaint do an admirable job in this respect, and the
court has drawn heavily upon them in formulating the
following list.
The eight policies and practices at issue in
plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim are:
(1) Failing to provide adequate numbers of and sufficiently qualified mental-health staff.
(2) Failing to provide adequate levels of custodial staffing to avoid regular security-related interruptions to or interference with the provision of mental-health care.
(3) Failing to identify mental illness or recognize the severity of mental illness, at initial screenings, in future classification and placement decisions, and in response to referrals.
(4) Failing to prescribe and manage psychotropic medication and its side effects appropriately.
(5) Failing to provide more than cursory psychotherapeutic care and counseling.
(6) Failing to protect prisoners who are suicidal or engage in self-harm by inadequately monitoring and treating them and providing inadequate follow-up care.
(7) Placing prisoners in segregation without regard to its harmful effects on their mental health.
(8) Disciplining prisoners based on behavior that results from mental illness.
8

In addition, plaintiffs seek to raise on behalf of
the class due-process claims related to involuntary
medication. These, too, require some disaggregation.
Plaintiffs seek to challenge three discrete policies or
practices:
(1) Denying substantive due process to prisoners subject to involuntary-medication orders by beginning or continuing to require them to be medicated absent a recent finding that they pose a danger to themselves to others.
(2) Denying procedural due process to prisoners subject to involuntary-medication orders by failing to provide them adequate notice of hearings and other protections provided for in the applicable regulation.
(3) Denying substantive and procedural due process to prisoners who are not subject to involuntary-medication orders by coercing consent.
For the reasons set forth below, the court will
certify two classes, as follows.
With respect to plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment
challenge to the eight policies and practices
enumerated above, the court will certify a class of
“all persons with a serious mental-health disorder or
illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject
to defendants’ mental-health care policies and
9

practices in ADOC facilities, excluding the work release centers and Tutwiler Prison for Women.” Plaintiffs (and defendants) have agreed that prisoners at the work release centers should be excluded from the class definition; the court will explain below, in the context of its discussion of commonality, why it has also decided to exclude the female prisoners at Tutwiler.
With respect to plaintiffs’ challenge to the policy or practice of denying procedural due process to prisoners subject to involuntary medication orders by failing to provide them adequate notice of hearings and other protections provided for in the applicable regulation, the court will also certify a class of “all persons with a serious mental-health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject to defendants’ formal involuntary medication policies and practices.” The court has decided, in an exercise of its discretion to manage this litigation, not to certify for class-wide litigation plaintiffs’
10

substantive due-process challenge to the policy or practice of requiring involuntary medication without a recent finding of dangerousness--which turns at least in significant part on an inherently individualized determination--or their challenge to the policy or practice of obtaining consent through coercion. However, the individual plaintiffs who have brought these claims will proceed to trial; ADAP, through its associational standing, may represent the interests of unnamed prisoners who are subject to these policies and practices.
II. Evidentiary Burden In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), the Supreme Court explained that “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule--that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law
11

or fact, etc.” 564 U.S. at 350. A court should only certify a class if it “is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).5
The Supreme Court has been clear that what the party seeking certification must “affirmatively demonstrate,” and what the court must find, is that the requirements for class certification are met--not that the class will prevail on its claims. As the Court put it in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013), it “totally misapprehend[s] the essential point” of this case law to suggest that certification is improper unless plaintiffs are able to prove that the common question “will be answered in their favor.” All they need to
5. While a few circuits have held that parties seeking certification must demonstrate their compliance with Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence, this is not the law in this circuit; the court further notes that its conclusions as to the appropriateness of class certification would not differ under this standard.
12

offer evidence to show--for purposes of certification--
is that there exists a common question, the answer to
which will be “apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
III. Daubert
The parties have raised Daubert objections to each
other’s experts. For purposes of the Phase 2A pretrial
motions, however, the only objections that must be
resolved are those to plaintiffs’ mental-health expert,
Dr. Kathryn Burns.6 Although the court has carefully
6. Defendants have also raised Rule 26 objections to the report offered by Dr. Burns. The court addressed these objections (like those plaintiffs made regarding defendants’ expert reports) by requiring both parties’ experts to supplement their reports with additional citations in order to facilitate the court’s review. The outstanding objections to the 50-page report offered by Dr. Burns do not hold water.
In some cases, defendants’ objections are to opinions which Dr. Burns, as a highly-experienced mental-health practitioner and administrator of a state prison system’s mental-health services, has plainly based on her own experience, such as her opinion that certified registered nurse practitioners “have less training, knowledge, skill and judgment, which is why (continued...)
13

considered all of the evidence in the record, it need not resolve plaintiffs’ objections to defendants’ experts until trial, because class certification is appropriate even assuming that defendants’ expert evidence is admissible. The court therefore assumes-for purposes only of this opinion--that it is. Defendants do not raise Daubert objections to the

they are considered mid-level clinicians and are

required by law to have a collaborative relationship

with a physician.” Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at

14. Defendants also object to instances in which Dr.

Burns gives a few examples of a particular phenomenon

she observes, but notes that she saw many more.

However, she identifies in her report all of the

prisoners she interviewed and those whose records she

reviewed, and she produced to defendants her notes;

notably, defendants’ experts relied on their notes to

inform plaintiffs which specific records they relied

upon in reaching their conclusions.

Moreover,

defendants were free to ask her for additional examples

during her day-long deposition.

In her lengthy report, Dr. Burns satisfied her obligation to explain “the basis and reasons” for her opinions, and to disclose to defendants “the facts or data” she considered in reaching her opinions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

14

reports of plaintiffs’ other Phase 2A experts, Dr.
Craig Haney7 and Eldon Vail.8
7. Although defendants have not raised any Daubert objections to Dr. Haney, their expert does criticize his reliance on statements by prisoners he interviewed in reaching his conclusion. However, Dr. Haney’s reliance on these statements was reasonable in light of the fact that he considered them among other sources of information, including observations, documents produced by defendants and MHM, testimony of ADOC and MHM employees, and medical records. The court notes that other courts have recognized that experts’ “consideration of [] inmates’ declarations and grievances as one of several sources informing his opinion is a valid methodology and does not render his opinion inadmissible.” Gray v. Cty. of Riverside, 2014 WL 5304915, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (Phillips, J.) (discussing evidence regarding prison medical care, as part of a class-certification evaluation).
Also, Dr. Haney explained in his deposition that the medical records he reviewed were in “disarray” and “weren’t helpful in conveying information” because they were “very difficult to read” and “had a lot that was missing from them,” that reviewing more of them would therefore have been only “marginally useful,” and that, although his “expectation was that the records would actually have been a very useful source of information,” he “was disabused of that notion when [he] began to look at them.” Haney Depo. (doc. no. 840-2) at 81-82, 187-88.
Moreover, as Dr. Haney points out, his opinions concern systemic and widespread deficiencies; although heavy reliance on any one prisoner’s self-report about his own mental-health care could potentially be (continued...)
15

suspect, Dr. Haney found that the self-reports of numerous prisoners corroborated each other and were supported by other evidence; he appropriately relied on this evidence to reach the broader conclusions on which this case will turn. See Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 28-29 (“[T]here was a remarkable amount of consistency in the data on which I relied--consistency in the observations that I made from facility to facility and consistency in what prisoners after prisoner told me, both about the damaging conditions of confinement to which they are exposed and the egregious treatment, or lack thereof, that they receive. ... Moreover, the prisoners’ observations were corroborated by the aggregate system-wide data that I have examined, as well [as] the deposition testimony of ADOC and MHM officials with oversight responsibilities....”); see also Haney Depo. (doc. no. 840-2) at 58-59 (“[N]o one particular prisoners giving me one particular opinion about something led me to conclude anything. ... [T]his particular gentleman’s expression to me, the expressions from other people to me about the mistreatment, was corroborated not only by other prisoners at other institutions, many of them, but also by the chief psychiatrist of the entire system. If this is the only person who told me this, then it would not have been something I would have put in my report or relied on. But it was ... apparently such a consistent theme that it bubbled up to the top of the system and became a concern by people in the system, running the system. So I felt confident in the fact it was a problem in the system.”).
8. Defendants did insert a very brief Daubert argument regarding Vail into a footnote. Because it is so peripherally raised, this objection is addressed (continued...)
16

1. Standard After the Supreme Court outlined a gatekeeping analysis for scientific expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and made that analysis applicable (with necessary modifications in the precise questions asked) to other technical expert testimony in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. V. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Eleventh Circuit explained that the purpose of this analysis is “to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony ... [and] to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). The appeals court went on to explain that under Federal
below in the context of a related objection to Dr. Burns.
17

Rule of Evidence 702, courts are to “engage in a rigorous three-part inquiry,” considering “whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The proponents of the expert testimony (here, plaintiffs) bear the burden of establishing that these three requirements are met. See id.
Ordinarily, “[t]he safeguards outlined in Daubert are less essential in a bench trial”; a judge need not gatekeep for herself. M.D. v. Abbott, 152 F. Supp. 3d 684, 709 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (Jack, J.) (citing Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F. 3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2000)), appeal dismissed (Apr. 5, 2016). However, the Eleventh
18

Circuit and others have held that when a court relies on expert testimony to find that a Rule 23 requirement has been met, the court must conduct a Daubert analysis and conclude that the expert’s opinions satisfy its standard. Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App’x 887, 890-91 (11th Cir. 2011); see also In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2015); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011). Some courts have noted, however, that the Daubert analysis conducted for purposes of class certification may be narrower than that conducted for purposes of a trial on the merits, because “the inquiry is limited to whether or not the expert reports are admissible to establish the requirements of Rule 23.” Fort Worth Employees' Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 301 F.R.D. 116, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Oetken, J.).
Assessing an expert’s qualifications is generally the most straightforward of these tasks. Defendants do not challenge Dr. Burns’s qualifications, and as discussed below, the court finds that she is
19

exceedingly well-qualified to opine on the matters she addresses in her report.
As for the court’s assessment of an expert’s methodology, the court is to determine “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is ... valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”9 Daubert, 609 U.S. at 592-93. The traditional factors a court may consider, where appropriate, are “(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular [expert] technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the [expert] community.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. However, the court of appeals has emphasized that,
9. Notably, this is not an all-or-nothing inquiry. “Even if a part of an expert’s testimony is based on unreliable methodology, the court should allow those parts that are reliable and admissible.” Lohr v. Zehner, 2014 WL 3175445, at *1 (M.D. Ala. July 8, 2014) (continued...)
20

particularly in cases like this one, involving non-scientific expert evidence, “[t]hese factors are illustrative, not exhaustive; not all of them will apply in every case, and in some cases other factors will be equally important.... Sometimes the specific Daubert factors will aid in determining reliability; sometimes other questions may be more useful. As a result, ‘the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.’ Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. Exactly how reliability is evaluated may vary from case to case....” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262; see also United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the question of whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad
(Thompson, J.) (citing United Fire and Cas. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 704 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2013)).
21

latitude to determine” (internal citations omitted)); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 889-92 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (Justice, J.), rev’d on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that an expert’s evaluation of the quality of the medical care provided by a prison system is “not the type of testimony that necessarily implicates Daubert’s requirement of scientific methodology”). To the extent that an expert witness relies “solely or primarily on experience, ... the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Morris v. Fla. Transformer, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (Thompson, J.) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note).10
10. Although Dr. Burns does rely on her experience to a significant extent in reaching some of the opinions she offers (specifically, with respect to the competencies of providers with different levels of (continued...)
22

As for helpfulness, “the court must ensure that the
proposed expert testimony is relevant to the task at
hand, ... i.e., that it logically advances a material
aspect of the proposing party’s case.” Allison v.
McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, for expert evidence to be helpful to the
finder of fact, it must offer insight “beyond the
understanding and experience of the average citizen.”
United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.
1985). Although the relevance standard for expert
evidence is higher than the liberal admissibility
policy set forth in Rules 401 and 402, see Allison, 184
qualifications, and the risks posed by relying on them to serve assessment and treatment functions), she does not rely solely or even primarily on her experience; she also explains at some length the ways her preexisting views regarding the effects of reliance on underqualified and unsupervised providers were borne out by the evidence she gathered during her inspections and in reviewing documents. Moreover, the court concludes that, to the extent that Dr. Burns relies on her own experience in reaching these conclusions, she has adequately explained why her experience supports her opinions in this case.
23

F.3d at 1309-10, Daubert itself makes clear that a court can deem expert evidence sufficiently helpful to be admissible but nonetheless conclude that it is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact for purposes of summary judgment. 509 U.S. at 595-96; see also Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2011) (same).
One final note bears mention. Here, because plaintiffs rely on the expert evidence of Dr. Burns with respect to their opposition to summary judgment and in support of their motion for class certification, the court is required first, to consider the admissibility of her opinions under Rule 702, and then to determine whether they, in conjunction with plaintiffs’ other evidence, are sufficient both to create disputes of material fact regarding the merits of plaintiffs’ claims for purposes of Rule 56, and to demonstrate the requirements of certification under Rule 23. As the court has explained previously, these analyses are “quite distinct” and “must be kept
24

separate.” Morris, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 (quoting Rudd v. General Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (Thompson, J.)). In this section of the opinion, the court will address only Rule 702 admissibility. Later in this opinion, it will address the role that this evidence plays in establishing compliance with Rule 23. Finally, in the court’s simultaneously issued opinion on summary judgment, it has addressed at some length why this evidence creates material disputes of fact as to the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.
2. Dr. Burns As a preliminary matter, although defendants do not question Dr. Burns’s qualifications, the court notes that they are quite impressive.11 Defendants’ mental-
11. Of course, sterling qualifications are, on their own, insufficient to defeat a Daubert challenge. See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1351-42 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile an expert’s overwhelming qualifications may bear on the (continued...)
25

health expert, Dr. Patterson, has himself recently recognized her to be a “top nationally recognized expert[] in the field of correctional mental health.” Rep. on Suicides Completed in the California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab. at 1, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-520 (E.D. Cal. March 13, 2013), ECF No. 4376. She currently serves as the Chief Psychiatrist of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (as she did for a period of four years in the late 1990s). She has also long been familiar with the provision of mental-health care in Alabama’s prisons, as she served as an expert in previous litigation that successfully obtained a remedial settlement, Bradley v. Harrelson. See Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Bradley v. Harrelson, No. 2:92-cv-70 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2001) (Albritton, J.), ECF No. 412.
As to Dr. Burns’s methodology, defendants essentially present two different arguments: that she
reliability of [her] testimony, they are by no means a guarantor of reliability.”)).
26

did not see enough firsthand ( of 15 major facilities,
102 prisoners), and that she (admittedly) did not
randomly select prisoners to interview.12 In other
prison cases, a number of courts have rejected Daubert
attacks on experts (offered by both plaintiffs and
defendants) on the grounds that their samples were
non-random, and that they did not consider enough
prisoners at enough facilities in order to extrapolate
conclusions about the system as a whole. In Ruiz, 37
F. Supp. 2d at 890-92, the court rejected the
12. Defendants also note that Dr. Burns criticized an audit conducted by MHM on the grounds that it involved only 10 facilities, and the non-random review of the records of 144 prisoners. This, they say, undermines her own findings as well. But the court is not convinced that this criticism substantially undercuts her conclusions; plaintiffs have taken the entirely reasonable position that, because the purpose of an audit (to track changes in the quality of care being delivered over time) fundamentally differs from that of an expert inspection (to aid the court in determining whether deficiencies in the mental-health care system create a substantial risk of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners), different methodologies are appropriate. In any event, even if Dr. Burns’s criticism of MHM’s methodology were applicable to her own work as an expert, it would hardly establish that (continued...)
27

defendants’ arguments that “in the absence of statistical proof of violations ..., the plaintiffs have not and cannot show system-wide violations,” explaining that although “[s]tatistical procedures can increase the court’s confidence in making inferences from a given set of data, ... this is an issue of weight, rather than admissibility of a given methodology. Statistical models are simply not the only method for making general inferences from specific data.”
As for non-random sampling, as the court put it in the context of the claims in Ruiz, “[t]he fact that 30 records show excessive use of force does not change because the records were selected non-randomly.” Id. at 891. See also Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1303 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (Karlton, J.) (rejecting a similar objection to expert declaration that the defendants contended were “unreliable insofar as they
the methodology she did employ was not sufficiently reliable to survive a Daubert challenge.
28

are based on medical files ‘pre-selected’ by

plaintiffs’ counsel”).

Another court recently

discussed at some length the use of non-random sampling

by prison experts. In Dockery v. Fisher, 2015 WL

5737608, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2015) (Barbour,

J.), the court recognized that non-randomized

qualitative research methods are both “accepted and

mainstream in the scientific community,” and, in the

view of some experts, “more applicable to a proper

evaluation of the delivery of health care at a prison.”

The court quoted plaintiffs’ expert as explaining that

“[w]hen sampling from people (patients, staff) and

documents in qualitative research, random samples are

to be avoided. Instead, the gold standard for sampling

is ‘judgment sampling’ or ‘purposeful sampling.’

Instead of using random number generators to select

samples, a judgment sample is chosen based on the

expertise and judgment of a subject matter expert with

knowledge of the system or process being assessed. The

goal is to obtain a sample which is as broad, rich, and

29

representative of the diversity of operational conditions as possible. ... Judgment samples are appropriate because ensuring that all potential observational units in a population and sampling time frame have equal probability of selection is often not the most desired or beneficial strategy. Rather, we look to the subject matter experts to guide which areas, times of day, or segments of the population are most important to study and understand.” Id. at *6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court also recognized the potential merit of defendants’ arguments against this methodological approach, but concluded that this went to the weight to be given the expert evidence, rather than its admissibility. Id.; see United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (D. Mass. 2006) (Saris, J.) (“It may well be that other methods ... may prove to be the best method of analysis. However, Daubert and Kumho Tire do not make the perfect the enemy of the reliable;
30

an expert need not use the best method of evaluation, only a reliable one.”).
In another recent case about the adequacy of prison health care, Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services., Inc., 2007 WL 1847385, at *26-27 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007) (Debevoise, J.), the court rejected a Daubert challenge to an expert on the grounds that he had reviewed only the 78 medical request forms submitted by the nine plaintiffs, who were among 1600 detainees housed at the facility at issue. Plaintiffs argued that his use of “convenience” rather than random sampling was unreliable and that “his sample size [was] too small to generate reliable statistics,” but the court agreed with defendants that these challenges went to the weight of his evidence rather than to its admissibility. The court and others recognized that this sort of sampling is particularly reasonable when it is part of a multifaceted review that considers not only the records and statements of individuals but also other sources such as deposition transcripts and other
31

documents that allows an expert to “draw general conclusions.” Id.; see also Parsons, 2014 WL 3721030, at *4.
Defendants cite a number of cases for the proposition that because Dr. Burns cited in her report only 29 examples of different individual prisoners receiving inadequate care or classification, the size of her sample was insufficient to allow her to draw conclusions about systemic inadequacies.13 These cases are, however, distinguishable from the case at bar. In Wal-Mart, the court concluded that 120 anecdotal affidavits describing instances of discrimination at 235 out of 3,400 stores were insufficient to “demonstrate that the entire company operates under a general policy of discrimination.” 564 U.S. at 358 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) The individual prisoners whose care Dr. Burns discusses
13. Dr. Burns has since supplemented the report to include citations explicitly referencing another 29 examples with respect to 14 additional prisoners, for a total of 58 instances and 43 prisoners.
32

make up a significantly larger and more representative portion of the class than did the affiants in Wal-Mart, and, more important, the evidence about them is being used for an entirely different purpose. In Wal-Mart, the affidavits represented only one in approximately 12,500 class members; here, ADOC recognizes as mentally ill by placement on the caseload about 3,500 prisoners, meaning that the 43 prisoners Dr. Burns cites (even setting aside her representation that these are but illustrative examples drawn from notes that include others) represent in the vicinity of one in 80 class members. Moreover, while the Wal-Mart affiants related only to one in every 15 or so stores, Dr. Burns drew from about two-thirds of a much smaller number (15) of major correctional facilities.
Moreover, and critically, the Court in Wal-Mart had already rejected the plaintiffs’ expert evidence, concluding that it did not establish that the company operated under a policy of discrimination; in the Court’s discussion of the affidavits, it was simply
33

explaining that they did not, on their own, suffice to
support the inference that such a policy existed. With
respect to all of Dr. Burns’s opinions, by contrast,
she cites other evidence to establish the existence of
a policy or practice (such as statements by prison
mental-health practitioners or internal documents). In
some cases, the existence of the policy or practice is
effectively undisputed; for example, defendants do not
disagree that a certain number of practitioners with
certain qualifications provide mental-health care to
prisoners. What they dispute, and what Dr. Burns cites
these prisoners to show, is that these policies and
practices place prisoners at a substantial risk of serious harm.14
14. Another one of defendants’ citations, Henderson v. City and County of San Francisco, 2006 WL 3507944, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Walker, J.), is distinguishable for the same reasons. In that case, plaintiffs were attempting to show that a sheriff had a practice of “routinely exonerat[ing] deputies of wrongdoing.” Plaintiffs had presented “almost no evidence” of this fact, but were given an opportunity to file a supplemental brief based on new discovery. They submitted 18 grievances selected by the plaintiffs (continued...)
34

The court will address the remainder of defendants’ case law--offered in support of their contention that Dr. Burns lacks a sufficient basis for her conclusions--more briefly. Although Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985), recognized the obvious point that a “sample size

from more than 200 filed by prisoners over a one-year

period in which over 6,000 prisoners were housed in the

facility; the grievances described only 14 alleged

incidents, and in five of those cases, the prisoners

were satisfied with the responses they had received.

This left nine complaints about “any kind of force,”

much less unjustified force.

The court quite

reasonably concluded that this was insufficient, on its

own, to create a dispute of material fact as to the

“existence of a pervasive custom of excessive force.”

The first key difference between Henderson and this case is that in Henderson, the court was presented with (a few) examples of documents plaintiffs simply asserted reflected excessive force, whereas here, far, far more voluminous evidence has been filtered through the expert judgment of Dr. Burns and resulted in her opinions. Moreover, even the facts on which Dr. Burns relied are easily distinguishable from the evidence deemed insufficient in Henderson: for one thing, Dr. Burns considered numerous different forms of evidence, including interviews, record reviews, inspections of facilities, internal documents, and testimony by mental-health care providers and administrators; for another, she considered facts regarding far more individuals--over a hundred, in fact.

35

[may be] too small” to draw certain conclusions from it, the issue in that case was worlds away: whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services had improperly relied on a study--which stated that “no broad conclusions can be drawn about the nature and extent of medical malpractice in this country” on the basis of the study--to reach a conclusion as to that very issue. Moreover, defendants suggest no basis for comparing the suitability of the sample size in the study at issue (or, indeed, what that sample size was) to that employed by Dr. Burns.
Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (Forrester, J.), stands for the similarly unremarkable proposition that an expert may lack “sufficient data and information” to reach a conclusion. But the expert at issue in that case does not appear to have sampled anything; he simply speculated, without much basis, about whether a lab technician should have identified a strain of yeast. The case is hardly on point. Gilliam v. City of
36

Prattville, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (Fuller, J.), concluded that, even if an unqualified expert had been qualified, his testimony would not have been reliable for numerous reasons, including that he had not examined the autopsies of the individual about whose death he was testifying and had offered no data or explanation to support his theory as to the cause of death or to refute other theories. Again, not on point. Finally, in United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., 2016 WL 3449833, at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016) (Lynn, J.), the court was required to determine how many false claims had been submitted by physicians, which in turn required assessments of “individual physicians’ judgment regarding individual patients.” The court concluded (contrary to the view of at least one court in this circuit) that statistical sampling and extrapolation could not be used by experts to establish liability in such a case. Defendants apparently believe this case is relevant because mental-health care providers (obviously) exercise some
37

judgment in caring for individual prisoners. This case is readily distinguishable, for two reasons: First, Dr. Burns has not engaged in statistical sampling or attempted to offer a precise quantitative assessment of whether specific instances of mental-health care were or were not adequate. Second, because it is the Commissioner and Associate Commissioner, not the mental-health practitioners who provide care, who are the defendants, this case does not turn on assessments of the case-specific “subjective clinical judgment” of mental-health staff, but rather on whether, in staffing, funding, and overseeing the operation of the mental-health care system, defendants have been deliberately indifferent to an objective risk of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners.
Defendants also cite a concurring opinion in EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 469-70 (4th Cir. 2015) (Agee, J.), which expresses the judge’s serious concern that the EEOC “continues to proffer expert testimony from a witness whose work has been roundly rejected in our
38

sister circuits.” This expert had attempted to offer
statistical evidence in support of a disparate impact
theory. His work “contained a plethora of analytical
fallacies”: although he had a complete data set, he
opted to “ignor[e]” years of relevant data from more
than half of the years and locations at issue,
resulting in “an egregious example of scientific
dishonesty.” Even within the subset of available data
he did consider, he had “cherry-picked” the data that
supported his conclusions. Dr. Burns, by contrast, is
not endeavoring to offer statistical evidence, and
opted for a sampling method that other courts have
recognized as appropriate for an expert in her field,
and that was especially reasonable in light of the restrictions on her ability to gather data.15 She has
15. Plaintiffs’ experts explained that, in contrast to their experience working on other similar cases, they had been provided an unusually limited level of access to information, and especially to medical records. See Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 12 (“[A]lthough I had a wealth of information on which to rely and base my opinion--certainly enough information to reach and support the conclusions that are stated in (continued...)
39

considered all of the data she obtained in reaching her conclusions. Had Dr. Burns been provided access to, and had it been feasible to review, a dramatically larger sample, and had she then opted to base her assessments only on a small subset of those records and interviews, the concerns of defendants might be better founded.
With respect to defendants’ contention that Dr. Burns did not tour all of defendants’ facilities, the court agrees with another court recently to consider this very issue that “otherwise admissible testimony based on investigation of some facilities but not all is still probative to some extent and any limitation goes to the weight of the opinions.” Parsons, 2014 WL 3721030, at *4. Moreover, as Judge Wake noted in that case, the number of tours plaintiffs’ experts were
the remainder of this Report--my fact-finding was limited in some unprecedented respects,” including “having access to prisoner files only during the relatively brief time that they could be reviewed on-site.”).
40

allowed to complete, as well as the length of time they were allowed to spend in each facility and the number of prisoners whose records they were allowed to review and whose interviews they were permitted to conduct was circumscribed by defendants during the course of an extremely lengthy and contentious discovery mediation. See id. (“Defendants’ strenuous objections to the burdensome nature of the multiple prison tours, [and] the Court’s reduction of that burden by limiting the number of tours ... weigh[s] against complete exclusion of the opinions.”) The fact that Dr. Burns also reviewed policies and quality assurance documents relevant to other facilities, and that she reviewed the depositions of those responsible for providing or overseeing care at other facilities, further weighs in favor of considering her opinions even as to facilities she did not personally visit.16
16. Defendants also raise, in a brief footnote, a Daubert challenge to plaintiffs’ correctional expert, Eldon Vail. The scope of this challenge is limited to the contention that “[b]ecause Mr. Vail did not visit (continued...)
41

As a last methodological point, defendants take
issue with Dr. Burns’s failure to review the entirety
of the medical records of all of the prisoners she
and has no knowledge regarding ADOC’s staffing policies at [a number of] facilities, he is not qualified under Daubert or Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to offer an opinion as to them.” ADOC’s Opp. to Class Cert. (doc. no. 810) at 8 n.3.
Defendants point to Vail’s negative answer to the question “Are you aware of anything the Alabama Department of Corrections does at Bullock Correctional Facility to make sure that there are an adequate number of correctional staff present, given the number of inmates incarcerated at that facility?” as evidence that has no knowledge of staffing policies at that facility. But his “no” answer does not indicate that he had no basis for an opinion about staffing at that facility; it indicates only that he did not know of the existence of measures defendants take to ensure adequate staffing levels; in light of his other evidence that many ADOC facilities are severely understaffed, he appears to believe that no such measures are taken or that they are unsuccessful.
In fact, Vail testified in his deposition that he did review, for purposes of extrapolating his findings, records stating the “number of inmates,” “number of staff,” and “design capacity” at each of the facilities in the system. Vail Depo. (doc. no. 810-1) at 96. Although defendants are certainly free to cross-examine Vail at trial if they believe that his reliance on these data resulted in inaccurate conclusions, they are an adequate basis for his expert opinion for purposes of Daubert.
42

interviewed, and contend that this reflects a failure

to confirm prisoners’ self-reports. First of all,

defendants concede that she did review the records of

many of those she discusses specifically in her report.

Furthermore, she may well have been able to reach

reliable conclusions with respect to some issues

without reviewing medical records. For example, to the

extent that she disagreed with the classification of a

severely mentally ill prisoner as an outpatient, she

could well have both assessed the apparent severity of

that prisoner’s illness and determined that he was

currently classified (and housed) as an outpatient

without reviewing any documents. As another example,

Dr. Burns described in her report observing prisoners

who had been prescribed certain antipsychotics who

exhibited movement disorders that are characteristic

side effects of these medications.

She is a

psychiatrist who is capable of recognizing such a

visible disorder without reference to records.

Finally, although bald reliance on the totally

43

uncorroborated statement of a single mentally ill individual might in some instances be questionable, Dr. Burns often describes statements by prisoners from her interviews as confirmatory of information she obtained from other sources, including directly from MHM. This is, therefore, not a basis to exclude her opinion, although defendants are free to cross-examine her on this point in order to undermine her conclusions at trial. See Allison, 184 F.3d at 1311 (explaining that Daubert analysis is “not intended to supplant the adversary system”).
In sum, the court concludes that Dr. Burns’s methodology is sufficiently reliable, and that her opinions are based on a sufficient quantity, and range of sources of, data, to be admissible as expert evidence under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
As for helpfulness, defendants insist that there is a “fit” problem between Dr. Burns’s report and the claims in this case, because her reports states that
44

various policies and practices subject prisoners to a
“risk of harm”; they object to her failure to use the
catchphrase from the case law, “substantial risk of
serious harm.” But as Dr. Burns herself pointed out in
her deposition, she has offered evidence helpful to the
court in making this ultimate legal determination. She
has described in some detail the harms that she
believes will, and in some instances did, result from
defendants’ policies and practices; it is the court’s
task to determine whether these harms are “serious,”
based on case law. Indeed, as Dr. Burns is not a legal
expert and would not be applying this case law, any
assessment she made as to the seriousness of these harms would not be very helpful.17 See Burkart v.
17. Defendants cite four cases that they contend support their position that there is not a sufficient “fit” between Dr. Burns’s opinions and the issues in this case. In these cases, however, the expert evidence at issue was totally unhelpful, whereas here the expert evidence is quite helpful but not sufficient on its own, absent some additional legal analysis by the court, to support liability. These cases all involve experts who, in one way or another, “fail[] to recognize ... the range of behavior between clearly (continued...)
45

unlawful and perfectly lawful.” Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 582 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court had not abused its discretion in excluding portions of expert reports in a copyright case, when the experts had opined that there was a “striking similarity”--an element of the cause of action--between the ideas in a painting and a theme park, but this opinion was unhelpful because only the expression of an idea, and not the idea itself, could be copyrighted, and the experts had offered no opinions as to the expressions of ideas in the painting and theme park); Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the district court had not abused its discretion in excluding portions of an expert report in which the expert asserted that there had been “an illegal price fixing conspiracy,” but “did not differentiate between legal and illegal pricing behavior, and instead simply grouped both of these phenomena under the umbrella of illegal, collusive price fixing,” explaining that “[t]his testimony could not have aided a finder of fact to determine whether appellees’ behavior was or was not legal”); United States v. Aegis Therapies, Inc., 2015 WL 1541491, at *6-9 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2015) (Wood, J.) (excluding an expert report in a case about improper Medicare billing because the expert report offered opinions in binary fashion (yes or no) as to whether each of 102 incidents of care were provided with the expectation that they would result in “significant improvement,” when the legally relevant question was whether they would result in “material improvement,” a different and lower standard). In these cases, the expert reports were unhelpful to the triers of fact because they merely identified an undifferentiated category of acts (of various kinds), some of which were lawful and some of which were unlawful; a given act’s (continued...)
46

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207,
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Each courtroom comes equipped
with a ‘legal expert,’ called a judge....”).
Similarly, it is up to the court to determine
whether the risk is sufficiently “substantial” to
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.18 Dr. Burns
has offered evidence going to the incidence of the
harms she has described; although her statements to
this effect are not statistically precise, they are
inclusion in that category gave the factfinder no information about its status as lawful or unlawful. The equivalent report in this case would be one merely identifying policies the expert believes should be changed, without offering information that would help the court determine which of the policies created a substantial risk of serious harm and which did not.
18. Defendants also forget that an Eighth Amendment violation can be established on the basis of a combination of conditions resulting jointly in a deprivation of adequate mental-health care. Whether or not the risk of harm from any particular challenged policy or practice is sufficiently substantial on its own to establish the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, plaintiffs may establish that some or all of them, together, do violate the Constitution. See Laube v. Haley, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Thompson, J.) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1994)). (continued...)
47

nonetheless very helpful. For example, she relies on
chart reviews, interviews with prisoners, depositions
of providers, and MHM quality assurance documents to
conclude that for prisoners at a number of the
facilities she toured, “virtually the only treatment
being provided is psychotropic medication,” that any
individual psychotherapy being provided was infrequent
and brief,19 and that very few or no outpatient therapy
groups were being offered. Burns Report (doc. no.
868-2) at 38-39. In this instance, the incidence of
19. Defendants respond to individual prisoners’ allegations that virtually no therapy is provided by citing medical records which sometimes show frequent contacts with mental-health professionals. But what plaintiffs complain of, and what Dr. Burns found in her inspections, was that prisoners were not receiving psychotherapy, not that they were having no contact whatsoever with mental-health professionals. Although this distinction may be harder to conceptualize with respect to mental-health care than to medical care, Dr. Burns explains that it is an important one. To offer an illustrative (if certainly imperfect) analogy, no one would dispute that to a prisoner with kidney failure, there is a world of difference between being “seen” by a nurse at the cell door who asks whether he is suffering from some of the symptoms of kidney (continued...)
48

harm is in her opinion extremely high. As another example, Burns opines that mental-health staff continue to prescribe certain long-acting antipsychotic injections even when they cause serious side effects such as severe restlessness, painful muscle spasms, and irreversible movement disorders; she reached this conclusion based on chart reviews and interviews with and observations of prisoners. Although her report does not reveal exactly what percentage of mentally ill prisoners are prescribed these medications, she does helpfully inform the court that “[m]any of the inmates interviewed displayed these types of movement disorders, but their prescriptions were continued rather than changed to medications less likely to cause these problems.” Id. at 42. In addition, she provides six examples of prisoners who suffered in this particular manner. Id. at 42-43. As a third example, Dr. Burns opines that prisoners with mental illness are
failure and gives him some dietary suggestions, and receiving dialysis treatment.
49

significantly underidentified; she believes that this underidentification stems from a deficient screening process that relies on unqualified and unsupervised staff to conduct evaluations. Although she does not state exactly what proportion of the prisoners with mental illness in ADOC custody she believes have not been identified, she does offer a number of statistics from other state prison systems; there is a range, but even the most conservative comparator statistics suggest substantial underidentification. Id. at 24-26.
As a final iteration of this argument, defendants contend that Dr. Burns is merely opining as to what care she thinks is good care or what care should be provided, and that this is not what the Constitution requires defendants to provide. Although defendants are quite correct that expert opinions as to desirable prison conditions are insufficient to establish constitutional minima, see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 n.13 (1981), their argument badly misconstrues the evidence Dr. Burns is offering. Although she does
50

express some opinions about how care should be provided (based, for example, on the fact that certain types of practitioners are “unqualified” to provide care without supervision, see Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 16), she then goes on to explain how the failure to provide care in this way causes harm to prisoners. For example, she presents evidence, discussed above, to support her conclusion that these unqualified and unsupervised staff frequently fail to diagnose mental illness.
The court concludes that Dr. Burns’s expert evidence will be helpful to the court in assessing whether the mental-health care provided to prisoners in Alabama falls below the constitutional floor, because she will bring to bear her experience, and the results of her investigation in this case, to help the court to understand the seriousness of the risk of harm posed by the challenged policies and practices. See Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1304 (rejecting a challenge that the
51

magistrate judge had “improperly relied on expert

testimony to establish constitutional minima”).

Lastly,

defendants

attack

Dr.

Burns’s

qualifications as well as her methodology with respect

to one fairly narrow issue: her ability to offer an

opinion regarding the adequacy of correctional

staffing. As for her qualifications, they note that

she admitted that she has never been responsible for

staffing a correctional facility with custody staff or

received any training in doing so. As for her

methodology, they note that she testified in her

deposition that she did not perform (as part of her

assignment in this case) any sort of staffing analysis

or review for adequacy the numbers of correctional

officers in any facility for any shift. The court is

not convinced by the argument regarding methodology; it

seems clear that an expert might reliably assess a

staffing level to be too low and therefore likely to

cause harm without determining what staffing level

would be appropriate. However, the court is more

52

troubled by the fact that although Dr. Burns is an esteemed expert in correctional mental health, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that her experience entitles her to opine on this separate, albeit related, issue. (Plaintiffs’ response, that she has been involved in “evaluating and informing internal operations of correctional systems” through her role as a correctional mental-health administrator, is not convincing.) The court will therefore not rely on her opinion on this specific issue for purposes of the pretrial motions.20 That all said, plaintiffs have in fact offered another expert, Eldon Vail, who is an experienced correctional administrator; defendants have not raised a Daubert challenge to his qualifications to address this issue, and the court has already rejected their contention that he lacks an adequate basis for his conclusions. His opinion on the inadequacies of correctional staffing and their effects on delivery of
20. If, at trial, plaintiffs can convince the court that Dr. Burns is qualified to testify on this topic, (continued...)
53

mental-health care is more detailed and better supported than Dr. Burns’s opinion on this point, though essentially in accord; the court will therefore consider his evidence instead of hers.
IV. Analysis Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 “establishes the legal roadmap courts must follow when determining whether class certification is appropriate.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003). The party seeking certification bears the burden of demonstrating that all of the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. Id. In order for any certification motion to succeed, the putative class representatives must show that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
it will consider her opinion. 54

the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(a). In addition, a class must clear one of three

additional hurdles: because the named plaintiffs in

this case seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class,

they must also show that “the party opposing the class

has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply

generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief

or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate

respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(2).

The court’s role at the class-certification stage

is not to decide the underlying claims, but rather to

determine whether the requirements for certification

are met. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.

156, 177-78 (1974).

“Merits questions may be

considered to the extent--but only to the extent--that

they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23

prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.”

55

Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194-95 (citation omitted). A party seeking class certification must “affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule”; that is, plaintiffs must offer evidence sufficient to satisfy the court that the various requirements of Rule 23 have been met. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
Commonality, in particular, “cannot be determined without a precise understanding of the nature of the underlying claims,” and a careful consideration of the evidence offered in support of the common thread, but “[o]f course, this does not mean that the plaintiffs must show at the class certification stage that they will prevail on the merits” of those claims. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 676 & n.19 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing, inter alia, Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he court should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits.”)).
Having articulated the framework for its analysis,
56

the court will proceed to consider each requirement for certification in turn.
1. Standing “[A]ny analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing”; only once the court finds that the named plaintiffs have standing may it consider whether they have “representative capacity, as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the rights of others.” Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987). To show Article III standing, the named plaintiffs must show that they have been injured, that their injuries are fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct, and that a judgment in their favor would likely redress their injuries. See Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2010). As defendants acknowledge, their arguments that the named plaintiffs lack standing to pursue the claims for which they seek certification “directly intersect[] and coincide[] with [their argument in their] pending
57

Motion for Summary Judgment”--that is, defendants argue that they lack standing because their claims are moot, unexhausted, precluded or barred by the statute of limitations.21 Defs.’ Opp. to Class Cert. (doc. no. 807) at 104. The court has engaged in an extensive discussion of all of these arguments in the course of its opinion denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It rejected all of them except to the extent that it agreed that a few of the named plaintiffs’ claims have become moot as a result of their releases from prison. As these plaintiffs have been dismissed from the case, they will not be certified as class representatives. Otherwise, defendants’ arguments that the named plaintiffs lack standing to bring the claims they seek to have certified are rejected for the reasons set forth in the summary-judgment opinion.
21. Oddly, they also argue that the named plaintiffs lack standing because their claims fail on the merits. But that is simply not how standing--a preliminary inquiry into whether a litigant is in an appropriate position to raise a claim--works.
58

2. Rule 23(a) A. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1)’s requirement of numerosity is satisfied if joinder--the usual method of combining similar claims--would be impracticable. Although there is no strict threshold, classes containing more than 40 members are generally large enough to warrant certification. See, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3.12 (5th ed.). “Moreover, the fluid nature of a plaintiff class--as in the prison-litigation context--counsels in favor of certification of all present and future members.” Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 510 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (Thompson, J.) (citing Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 878 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming a certified class of 31 present members as well as future members who could not be identified); Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965, 975 (D. Mass. 1981) (Freedman, J.) (finding numerosity after considering
59

“the fact that the inmate population at these facilities is constantly revolving”)); see also Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 868 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts must not focus on sheer numbers alone.... [T]he fact that the class includes unknown, unnamed future members also weighs in favor of certification.”); Reid v. Donelan, 297 F.R.D. 185, 189 (D. Mass. 2014) (Ponsor, J.) (certifying a class of detained plaintiffs and explaining that the numerosity threshold may be relaxed “when a party seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief, since the inclusion of future members increases the impracticability of joinder” (citing McCuin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 167 (1st Cir. 1987)); Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3.15 (5th ed.) (explaining that the inclusion of future class members “may make class certification more, not less, likely” and citing two decisions certifying classes of prisoners, Hill v. Butterworth, 170 F.R.D. 509, 514 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (Paul, J.) (“This Circuit has
60

held [that when] the alleged class includes future

[members], necessarily unidentifiable[,] ... the

requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is clearly met, for

joinder of unknown individuals is clearly

impracticable.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 145 F.R.D. 339, 346

(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Sweet, J.) (“The class action device

is particularly well-suited in actions brought by

prisoners due to the fluid composition of the prison

population. ... Class actions therefore generally tend

to be the norm in actions such as this.” and internal quotation marks omitted))).22

(citations

Plaintiffs have submitted evidence to show that in

February 2016, there were 3,416 prisoners on the

mental-health caseload (and argue that this figure

22. Recognition of prisoners’ relatively limited “access to the legal system ... has [also] led courts to certify classes in cases ... involv[ing] issues of common concern to inmates even when the potential class size is small and somewhat undefined.” Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422, 426 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (Albritton, J., adopting recommendation of Carroll, M.J.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
61

significantly understates the number of seriously

mentally ill prisoners in the State). This exceeds the

customary numerosity threshold by a factor of 85.

Defendants nonetheless have a bone to pick. They

contend that “this number ... says nothing about how

many individuals can claim an actual injury traceable

to the State’s policies and procedures.” Defs.’ Opp.

to Class Cert. (doc. no. 807) at 141. There are a

number of problems with this argument.

First, courts look at numerosity in a fairly

straightforward

fashion:

by

assessing

the

practicability of joinder, in light of the number of

people who fall within the definition of the class.

Movants for class certification do not need to present

evidence showing--one by one, many times over--that

individual putative class members can proceed on the

class claims; requiring as much would largely defeat

the efficiency benefits of class-wide adjudication, and

is unnecessary in light of the commonality requirement.

See Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11

62

(“[W]here joinder is impracticable, judicial economy weighs in favor of representative litigation of common issues for similarly situated plaintiffs.”). Instead, they need to show that the class representatives can proceed on claims which are common to the class.
Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding the size of the mental-health caseload goes directly to--indeed, conclusively resolves--the question whether more than 40 or so prisoners in ADOC custody have serious mental illnesses. And, again, the fact that the class contains as-yet-unknown future members also counsels strongly in favor of finding that Rule 23(a)(1) has been satisfied.
Second, even if the court were required to consider how many prisoners “can claim an actual injury traceable to the State’s policies and procedures,” rather than how many prisoners in ADOC custody have a serious mental illness, the court would reiterate that the actual injury being claimed in this case is exposure to the substantial risk of serious harm
63

stemming from those policies and procedures. If, as plaintiffs claim, defendants provide inadequate numbers of mental-health care providers and thereby subject all prisoners with serious mental illnesses to a substantial risk of serious harm, then all class members can claim an actual injury--even those who have not yet suffered serious harm.
Finally, and for the sake of thoroughly responding to a thoroughly unconvincing argument, the court notes that plaintiffs have indeed presented evidence (some of it not subject to any direct rebuttal) to show that numerous individuals have in fact already suffered a range of serious harms. The reports of their experts are filled with examples of prisoners who the experts opine have suffered serious harm after receiving care that was inadequate due to the failure of defendants to provide enough funding, staffing, and oversight.23 A
23. Indeed, in light of the impracticability of joinder in a prospective-relief case involving current and future prisoners, the number of named plaintiffs (continued...)
64

selection of these concrete harms includes: being denied necessary treatment other than psychotropic medication, being maintained on certain psychotropic medications despite suffering serious side effects and the availability of alternative medications, frequently missing doses of psychotropic medications or having them inappropriately or abruptly discontinued, being denied follow-up care after attempting to commit suicide, and being held in segregation without regard to the psychological deterioration it is causing.
Having addressed all of defendants’ objections, the court finds that plaintiffs have met the numerosity requirement for the Eighth Amendment class.
The court also finds that the plaintiffs have met the numerosity requirement for the procedural dueprocess class. Plaintiffs have submitted undisputed evidence showing that about 70 to 80 individuals were subject to involuntary-medication orders as of March
who have survived summary judgment would arguably be sufficient, on its own, to establish numerosity.
65

2016; therefore, this class--of prisoners subject to involuntary-medications orders--meets the presumptive numerosity threshold discussed above.
B. Commonality i. Eighth Amendment Claim Rule 23(a)(2) requires named plaintiffs seeking class certification to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court explained that “this does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law. ... [Rather,] [t]heir claims must depend upon a common contention ... [which] must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution--which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. What matters to class certification ... is not the raising of common ‘questions’--even in droves--but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common
66

answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”
564 U.S. at 350 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). In short, commonality requires a showing
that there is “some glue” holding the claims together.
Id. at 352. However, plaintiffs seeking to demonstrate
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) need not show that
common questions “predominate” over individual
questions as required under Rule 23(b)(3); indeed,
“even a single common question will do.” Wal-Mart, 564
U.S. at 359 (citations and alterations omitted).
In Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
commonality requirement because they had not offered
“significant proof” of a policy of discrimination that applied across the corporation’s numerous stores.24 Id.
24. It is worth emphasizing the critical difference between the common policy the plaintiffs did have enough evidence to demonstrate in Wal-Mart--a policy of delegating discretion to supervisors--and the policies and practices at issue here. The court explained in Wal-Mart that this was a “very common and presumptively reasonable way of doing business--one that [it had] said should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct.” 564 U.S. at 355 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, the policies (continued...)
67

at 353. Here, plaintiffs have identified eight
different specific policies or practices, and offered
significant proof that they are common to the class of
prisoners in Alabama with serious mental illnesses.25
and practices at issue here are very far from “a policy against having uniform [] practices.” Id.; see also Parsons, 754 F.3d at 681 (“[This case] involves uniform statewide practices created and overseen by two individuals who are charged by law with ultimate responsibility for health care and other conditions of confinement in all [state] facilities, not a grant of discretion to thousands of managers.”); Logory v. Cty. of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 143 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“Unlike Dukes, where commonality was destroyed where there was no common mode of exercising discretion that pervade[d] the entire company, here there is a solid [prison] policy that applied directly to all potential class members” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, it goes without saying that (as one example) the practice of providing prisoners with mental-health staff who are stretched far too thin and unqualified to provide the care for which they are responsible is certainly not a “presumptively reasonable” way of operating a prison system and should not be very common.
25. As another court recently explained, drawing on the imperfect but helpful analogy of what constitutes a policy or custom for purposes of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the common policy or practice “need not be formal or officially adopted.” Dockery v. Fischer, -F. Supp. 3d --, 2015 WL 5737608, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2015) (Barbour, J). A common policy can be (continued...)
68

This is all plaintiffs need to do for purposes of class
certification; they need to show that the policies and
practices they challenge are common, not (yet) that the
common policies and practices are unconstitutional.
Put differently, they need to demonstrate the existence
of common questions with common answers, not what those
common answers are. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194-95
(holding that merits questions are only to be
considered to the extent they are relevant to Rule 23
determination).
“express[ly] adopt[ed]” by legislative, executive, or administrative act, but it can also be “based on the defendant’s deliberate indifference”--that is, based on a showing that the defendants have “failed to respond to a need ... in such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations.” Id. at *8-10 (quoting Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 273 F.R.D. 314, 320-21 (D.D.C. 2011) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), and citing Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d, 532, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2012)). In this case, plaintiffs have offered evidence of common policies and practices that run the gamut from those that have been expressly adopted (such as the mental-health staffing levels defendants set by contract) to others which constitute a failure to act that evinces deliberate indifference (such as the practice of failing appropriately to (continued...)
69

The court will proceed as follows: First, it will discuss what must be shown to demonstrate that the policy or practice is common, generally and in the context of an Eighth Amendment substantial-risk-of-harm claim such as the one brought here. Second, it will discuss the evidence plaintiffs have offered to show that policies and practices they have challenged are indeed common to the class. Third and last, the court will address defendants’ arguments that dissimilarities among class members defeat commonality.
As a general matter, a policy or practice need not affect every member of a class in order to be “common.” See Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3.23 (5th ed.) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit has held that questions affecting ‘most,’ ‘a substantial number,’ or ‘a significant number’ of the class members will qualify as ‘common’ questions. This question has rarely been addressed outside the Fifth Circuit though courts that
monitor or provide follow-up care for prisoners in crisis).
70

have addressed it have adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach.”).
Moreover, “class members can assert such a single common complaint even if they have not all suffered actual injury; demonstrating that all class members are subject to the same harm will suffice.” Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (citing Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177-78 (reversing the denial of certification of a class of prisoners challenging the risks posed by unsafe prison conditions)). As another district court recently explained in a jail-conditions case, “the Fifth Circuit, like the Third, [has] expressly disagreed with the proposition that a policy must injure each class member to provide the foundation for class wide relief.” Jones v. Gusman, 296 F.R.D. 416, 465-66 (E.D. La. 2013) (Africk, J.) (citing M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 847-48 (5th Cir. 2012)). Instead, in M.D., the court of appeals explained that a valid claim for class-wide relief
71

could be “based on an allegation that the [defendant] engages in a pattern or practice of agency action or inaction--including a failure to correct a structural deficiency within the agency, such as insufficient staffing--with respect to the class,” even if plaintiffs do not contend that every member of the class has suffered an actual injury. 675 F.3d at 847-48 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
This case law supports a finding of commonality here, because being subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm is an actionable constitutional injury, even when a prisoner’s physical or mental condition has not yet been detrimentally impacted. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 681-83 (citing numerous cases, both within and outside the Eighth Amendment context, in which courts have found the commonality requirement satisfied, post-Wal-Mart, based on a systemic policy or practice that allegedly exposed the members of the class to an unconstitutional risk of harm); see also Dockery, 2015 WL 5737608, at *16-17 (recognizing as common questions
72

“whether [the challenged] conditions and health care

have

either

subjected

prisoners

to

an

unconstitutionally unreasonable risk of harm or,

conversely, were sufficient to provide humane

conditions of confinement”); Scott v. Clarke, 61 F.

Supp. 3d 569, 587 (W.D. Va. 2014) (Moon, J.)

(“Plaintiffs allege that the policies and practices at

FCCW--e.g., the defective sick call process; FCCW’s

refusal to refer or undue delay in referring prisoners

for specialized care; the failure to maintain

continuity in the provision of prescribed, potentially

life-sustaining medications; etc.--reflect substandard

medical care on the part of the Defendants. Whether

these policies and practices place the Plaintiffs and

other current and future FCCW prisoners at a

substantial risk of serious harm to which the

Defendants are deliberately indifferent implicates

questions of fact and law common to the entire putative

class.”); Jones, 296 F.R.D. at 465-67 (“Whether certain

conditions at OPP either by themselves, or through a

73

mutually enforcing effect, put inmates at a substantial risk of harm is amenable to a common answer. ... Similarly, whether OPP officials have been deliberately indifferent to any such risk can be demonstrated in a manner that is applicable to all class members. ... Class Plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment medical and mental-health care claims [likewise] warrant certification. ... Class Plaintiffs have identified discrete and particularized practices including, for example, medication and suicide prevention practices, as well as staffing inadequacies, that are mutually enforcing causes of OPP's deficient conditions. ... Accordingly, a class action is an appropriate vehicle for these claims.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hughes v. Judd, 2013 WL 1821077, at *9, *23-24 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013) (Pizzo, M.J.) (finding commonality and certifying a class with respect to a Fourteenth Amendment risk-of-harm claim challenging a sheriff’s failure to address a high level of violence among juvenile
74

detainees and practice of using pepper spray in response to this violence), report and recommendation adopted as modified on other grounds, 2013 WL 1810806 (M.D. Fla. April 30, 2013) (Merryday, J.); M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 45 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (Jack, J.) (finding commonality and certifying a class with respect to a Fourteenth Amendment risk-of-harm claim challenging a policy or practice of allowing caseworkers in a foster care system to carry excessive caseloads that posed a risk of harm to children).
The fact that not every mentally ill prisoner is subjected to precisely the same level of risk also does not defeat commonality. Indeed, the last time a judge in this court heard a “systemic attack on the way that mental health care is provided to acutely and seriously mentally ill inmates in the Alabama prison system,” it explained that “[t]hough there certainly may be some factual differences between the individual class members and the nature and severity of their illness, such individual differences do not defeat certification
75

because there is no requirement that every class member be affected by the institutional practice or condition in the same way.” Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422, 426 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (Albritton, J.); see also Parsons, 754 F.3d at 678-80 (“[A]lthough a presently existing risk may ultimately result in different future harm for different inmates--ranging from no harm at all to death--every inmate suffers exactly the same constitutional injury when he is exposed to a single statewide ADC policy or practice that creates a substantial risk of serious harm. ... Even if some inmates are exposed to a greater or idiosyncratic risk of harm by the policy and practice of not hiring enough staff to provide adequate medical care to all inmates, that single policy and practice allegedly exposes every single inmate to a serious risk of the same basic kind of harm.” (internal citations omitted)).
Plaintiffs have offered more than adequate evidence to establish the existence of the common policies and
76

practices they challenge.26 This evidence, discussed in the court’s opinion on summary judgment, could not be more different from the indefinite and speculative evidence offered by the expert in Wal-Mart, of a “culture” of discrimination manifested in millions of discretionary decisions. 564 U.S. at 353-54. Here, the experts point to very concrete policies and practices--such as using unsupervised and unqualified nurses to conduct intake screenings, or placing prisoners with serious mental illness in prolonged segregation--that undisputedly occur or that plaintiffs have offered considerable evidence (often in the form of admissions by MHM administrators) to show are

26. The court notes that, in addition to the expert

evidence discussed here, plaintiffs have offered

evidence regarding care they and a couple of dozen

putative class members have received, in order to

further illustrate the commonality of the policies and

practices they challenge. The evidence regarding the

named plaintiffs will be discussed below, in the

context of the typicality analysis.

Although

illustrative, the court need not and does not base its

decision regarding commonality on the declarations of

the unnamed class members; plaintiffs’ expert evidence

is more than sufficient.

77

widespread. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 678 (“The putative class and subclass members thus all set forth numerous common contentions whose truth or falsity can be determined in one stroke: whether the specified statewide policies and practices to which they are all subjected by ADC expose them to a substantial risk of harm. ... These policies and practices are the ‘glue’ that holds together the putative class and the putative subclass; either each of the policies and practices is unlawful as to every inmate or it is not.”). The only genuine debate in this case is as to the effects of these policies and practices--that is, whether or not they pose a substantial risk of serious harm. But this is not a question for the class-certification stage.
Instead of rehashing plaintiffs evidence in a second opinion, the court will simply note that plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Haney, reiterates at the conclusion of his report that the problems that he discussed in his reports were widespread and systemic. Unlike the expert in Wal-Mart, his conclusions are
78

based not on untethered theorizing, but on a large

quantity of concrete evidence. He explains as follows:

“[T]he observations that I made about

various ADOC facilities were remarkably

consistent throughout my tours--that is, with

only minor variations, virtually the same kinds

of problems surfaced in each of the facilities

that I inspected.

Moreover, there was

remarkable consistency in what prisoner after

prisoner in these separate facilities told me

(as documented in [the lengthy appendix to his

report]). It did not seem to matter whether

the prisoners I interviewed were selected

randomly for brief cell-front interviews,

selected

for

individual,

confidential

interviews after having been seen cell-front,

picked randomly from the facility’s prisoner

roster for individual confidential interviews,

or suggested by counsel for Plaintiffs--they

all told essentially the same kind of grim and

often tragic stories. In addition, because

many of them had been housed in other ADOC

facilities, they were in a position to confirm

that the problems--the mistreatment and

neglect--that they were encountering at their

present facility were not unique to that place

but rather existed in facilities throughout the

ADOC.

“In addition, these consistent accounts, and my own broad conclusion about systemic deficiencies throughout the Alabama prison system, are corroborated in many important respects by the candid observations and conclusions reached by an entirely different group of people--namely, mental health officials (employed by ... MHM [ADOC’s mental health contractor]) charged with system-wide

79

oversight responsibilities and the provision of mental health services in Alabama’s 15 major prisons. Their stated opinions provide strong support for my own observations about the system-wide magnitude of the very serious problems that I encountered.” Haney Report (doc. no. 868-4) at 158-59. As discussed at much greater length in the court’s opinion denying summary judgment, Dr. Burns, plaintiffs’ other mental-health expert, concurs, concluding that the “deficiencies in ADOC--inadequate staffing levels, qualifications, identification and classification, treatment and oversight of the mental health care--deny prisoners care for their serious mental illness leading to needless pain, suffering, self-injury, suicide and punishment for symptoms of untreated mental illness. These are systemic problems that can and should be addressed through changes to the mental health care delivery system.” Burns Report (doc. no. 868-2) at 52. Even Dr. Patterson, defendants’ own expert, recognizes that a number of the policies and practices being challenged are pervasive, including that the
80

“staffing of the facilities is insufficient and a

significant number of the mental health staff are

unlicensed practitioners” who had not received any

documented supervision. Patterson Report (doc. no.

679-9) at 47. Moreover, he recognizes that other

policies and practices, and concrete harms, stem from

this source.

For example, he observes “certain

deficiencies in adequately identifying inmates during

the reception and intake processes that are in need of

mental health services, and therefore the numbers of

inmates in need of mental health services are ...

underestimated and reflect the need for increased

numbers of and properly trained and credentialed mental

health staff, as well as the need for supervision by

registered nurses during the intake process to identify

those inmates in need of further evaluation for mental

health services.” Id. at 47.

Dr. Patterson is not merely suggesting that he

found a few--or even a lot--of prisoners who were not

identified; he is explaining that there is a consistent

81

pattern of failure attributable to a very specific set
of decisions about system-wide staffing. He agrees,
then, that insufficiency of mental-health staffing is a
pervasive problem, and that this causes prisoners not
to be identified as in need of treatment, across the
board. (Of course, not every mentally ill prisoner is
missed; rather, every mentally ill prisoner is at risk
of being missed.) It is thus undisputed--by the
parties’ experts if not by the parties--that at least
one of the policies or practices challenged by
plaintiffs is common to the class.27
27. Indeed, a decision about system-wide staffing seems quite obviously to be a common policy or practice. It is an express policy, which applies to all prisoners in the system. The adequacy of staffing levels cannot be evaluated meaningfully with respect to any particular prisoner. See M.D., 675 F.3d at 848 n.7 (suggesting that staffing levels are the type of condition that is generally applicable to a class of plaintiffs, in noting that “it is not clear how several of the State’s alleged failures, such as its failure to ... employ a sufficient number of caseworkers, can be considered [a] ‘day-to-day, case-by-case operational failure[]’”); Parsons, 754 F.3d at 679 (“[T]he plaintiffs allege that they are placed at risk of serious harm by a policy and practice of severe under-staffing across all ADC medical care facilities. (continued...)
82

Whether this policy or practice of understaffing
subjects mentally ill prisoners to a substantial risk
of serious harm is one question (of a number of them)
apt to drive the resolution of this litigation. Unlike
in Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs here have offered
considerable evidence to show that this policy or
practice is one of the reasons (indeed, the primary
reason) that they are at serious risk of receiving
inadequate care. This evidence is not merely of a
“common pattern or practice,” as in an oft-repeated
violation, but rather of a “common answer to the
crucial question why” prisoners have been put at a
As a result of this statewide policy and practice, they allege, the quality and availability of care across all ADC facilities is constitutionally deficient. This allegation presents questions of law and fact common to all members of the putative class. ... The question whether ADC's staffing policies pose a risk of serious harm to all ADC prisoners can thus be answered as to the entire class ‘in one stroke.’ Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Either ADC employs enough nurses and doctors to provide adequate care to all of its inmates or it does not do so; there is no need for an inmate-by-inmate inquiry to determine whether all inmates in ADC custody are exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm by ADC staffing policies.”).
83

substantial risk of serious harm, Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352: because ADOC provides inadequate numbers of and insufficiently qualified mental-health staff, resulting in, among other things, a failure to identify or recognize the acuity of mental illness in many prisoners. Plaintiffs here have done exactly what defendants accuse them of failing to do. Instead of attempting to distill “constellation of disparate but equally suspect practices” from varying experiences of class members, they have “identif[ied] the policy or custom they contend violated the [law] and then establish[ed] that the policy or custom is common to the class.” Lightfoot, 273 F.R.D. at 326; see also Parsons, 754 F.3d at 673 (agreeing with the district court that “the problems identified in the provision of health care are not merely isolated instances but, rather, examples of systemic deficiencies that expose all inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm,” because the evidence of the existence of a number of specific common policies and practices “suggests that
84

the root cause of the injuries and threats of injuries suffered by Plaintiffs is the systemic failures in the provision of health care generally”); Jones, 296 F.R.D. at 466 (“The facts and law also demonstrate that Class Plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment medical and mental health care claims warrant certification. These claims do not allege amorphous systemic deficiencies. Class Plaintiffs have identified discrete and particularized practices including, for example, medication and suicide prevention practices, as well as staffing inadequacies, that are mutually enforcing causes of OPP’s deficient conditions. Accordingly, a class action is an appropriate vehicle for these claims.” (citations and internal quotations marks omitted)).
Rather than discussing each of the remaining policies and practices at length, the court will merely discuss another example. With respect to the policy or practice of “placing prisoners in segregation without regard to its harmful effects on their mental health,”
85

the pertinent question is whether defendants treat
mentally ill prisoners alike in segregating them, not
whether this creates a substantial risk of serious harm
to such prisoners. Although Dr. Morgan disagrees with
Dr. Haney regarding the effects of this practice, and
opines that the mental-health monitoring and treatment
provided to prisoners in segregation is adequate, he at
no point offers any evidence to suggest that the
question--whether or not these policies and practices
create a substantial risk of serious harm--cannot be
adjudicated on a class-wide basis.28
28. Likewise, Dr. Morgan’s opinions as to the effects of understaffing or the efficacy of the assessment and classification system go to plaintiffs’ claims on the merits--that is, whether defendants’ policies place plaintiffs and putative class members at a substantial risk of serious harm. His opinions do not, however, undermine plaintiffs’ evidence that defendants’ policies and practices pose a common question capable of class-wide resolution; nothing Dr. Morgan says runs counter to the conclusion that these policies either do or do not create a substantial risk of serious harm to seriously mentally ill prisoners throughout the system.
Indeed, Dr. Morgan often relies heavily--sometimes entirely, to the exclusion of any consideration of the (continued...)
86

This distinguishes the case at bar from Sher v.
Raytheon Co., wherein the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
grant of class certification and remanded for
reconsideration because the district court had not
“evaluat[ed] and weigh[ed] conflicting expert
testimony,” and “decline[d] to declare a proverbial,
yet tentative winner” between these experts, at the
class-certification stage. 419 F. App’x 887, 890 (11th
Cir. 2011). In Sher, a case about release of toxins
into groundwater, the plaintiffs attempted to show that
they met the requirements for certification under Rule
actual treatment provided to any particular prisoners-on the existence of a formal system-wide policy to conclude that the mental-health care being provided throughout the system is adequate. See Morgan Report (doc. no. 865-1) at 19 (“[B]ased on my review of ADOC mental health policy, it is my opinion that the ADOC has a clearly defined mental health services system applicable to all inmates, including inmates on the mental health caseload, and these policies and procedures are consistent with national standards of practice.”). Whether or not Dr. Morgan’s bald reliance on these policies supports his conclusions is a matter for trial, but it certainly reflects his view that the Eighth Amendment claim in this case can be resolved with respect to all class members in one fell swoop.
87

23(b)(3) by presenting an expert who said that he could

map the underground area affected and create a

mathematical model to show how much the value of each

surrounding property had diminished without requiring

any individualized consideration; defendants’ experts,

by contrast, concluded that the identified area

included properties with no contamination and that the

mathematical model would not obviate the need for

individualized determinations of value diminution. Id.

at 889. Because the experts disagreed about whether

the plaintiffs met the requirements of Rule 23, such

that class-wide resolution was appropriate, it was

necessary to “declare a ... winner.” Id. at 890; see

also Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983-84 (holding that the

district court should have resolved a dispute between

the parties’ experts as to whether gender disparities

in promotion existed across the country or only in

certain areas, because plaintiffs would be unable to

show a common policy or practice unless they could show

consistent nationwide discrimination).

Here, Dr.

88

Morgan does not suggest that some identifiable subset of mentally ill prisoners is not at risk of placement in segregation (if he did, the court would need to weigh his evidence to determine whether plaintiffs had shown commonality); instead, Dr. Morgan simply disagrees that the practice of placing mentally ill prisoners in segregation places them at a substantial risk of serious harm.
Before concluding this discussion of commonality, the court will address defendants’ contention that commonality is defeated by variations between the conditions in different facilities and the differing mental-health needs of members of the class. Although it is true that there are some differences between the various men’s facilities,29 in terms of the populations incarcerated there and the ways that certain forms of
29. Plaintiffs’ experts did conclude that adequate mental-health care was being provided in the open residential treatment unit at Tutwiler, the only women’s prison in the State. However, as explained below, prisoners housed at Tutwiler will not be included in the class.
89

mental-health care are delivered (as an example, not
all major facilities have residential treatment units),
and in terms of the levels of staffing (some facilities
have some psychiatrist coverage while others have none
at all, and some facilities have especially severe
shortages of custodial staff while others have somewhat
more moderate shortages),30 this does not defeat
30. Defendants particularly press this point with respect to plaintiffs’ contention that the failure to provide adequate custodial staff interferes with the provision of mental-health care, noting that some facilities are more understaffed and some less. However, defendants’ own expert, Dr. Morgan, despite recognizing the existence of some variation in the level of understaffing by facility, states that “[custodial] understaffing remains a major concern across the ADOC. It is my opinion that correctional officer understaffing should be viewed as a correctional crisis within the ADOC, such that this crisis necessitates immediate action.” Morgan Report (doc. no. 671-1) at 11-12. He further notes that “[s]taff at all eight facilities that I visited noted understaffing.” Id. at 13. This amounts to a recognition that the practice of custodial understaffing is common across facilities. Dr. Morgan disagrees with plaintiffs’ experts as to the effect of this understaffing on the delivery of mental-health care. See id. at 31 (“The ADOC is significantly understaffed; however, this understaffing does not prohibit plaintiffs and other class members from receiving needed mental health services....”). But (continued...)
90

commonality for two principal reasons.
First, plaintiffs’ experts have cited evidence
showing, and concluded, that the practices at issue are
fairly consistent across the major facilities they
inspected, including all of the major hubs for
treatment of prisoners with mental illness; although
there were slight variations, they did not identify any
men’s facilities as positive outliers where the system
for providing mental-health care was appreciably
different (or where adequate mental-health care was
this question--whether the common policy or practice subjects mentally ill prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm by interfering with the delivery of their mental-health care--is a merits question for trial. Moreover, plaintiffs have pointed to admissions by mental-health staff that the lack of security staff has resulted in recurrent delays in or cancellations of mental-health treatment in different units at at least six of the major facilities. Minutes from a meeting of MHM administrators in January 2015 noted “widespread reports among several facilities of delays in seeing inmates for appointments due to security unavailability,” and reflected a need to “[k]eep going up the chain of ADOC command” to address this problem. CQI Meeting Minutes, Pls.’ Ex. 182 (doc. no. 850-82) at 121, MHM029619. A practice which is “widespread” and which requires high-level correctional intervention to address is common to the class.
91

being provided). Second, and perhaps more important, the named
plaintiffs’ records clearly reflect that they are transferred very frequently between a large number of different facilities; it is fair to presume that the other class members are too.31 In that sense, defining a subclass to include only those who are or will be housed at a subset of facilities would be a semantic distinction without much if any practical difference. The claim in this case revolves around a prospective risk of harm; even if some aspect of the mental-health care at a particular facility is idiosyncratically better or worse, it is clear that numerous class members not currently housed at that facility are likely to be exposed to it in the future.
Another comparison to Wal-Mart is instructive. In
31. Specifically, seriously mentally ill prisoners are often transferred due to their need to be housed in a residential treatment unit or a stabilization unit, which are available at only a few facilities. As a result, many of the putative class members are (continued...)
92

Wal-Mart, the fact that the class members worked at thousands of stores across the country made it impossible to show the existence of a common policy of discrimination based on discrimination at a subset of the stores. 564 U.S. at 356-58. But the female employees of Wal-Mart were not frequently moved to numerous different stores in different regions of the country at the whim of the defendant corporation. As the court pointed out, a woman working in Missoula, Montana, would be totally unaffected by discriminatory promotion practices at the stores in say, New Mexico. When a prisoner is in ADOC custody, however, he is subject to involuntary transfer at any time to another facility in the system, and therefore subject to the risks of harm that attend placement at those other facilities. Cf. Henderson, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1285-86 (holding that the claims of a prisoner who was transferred to a different facility were not moot
frequently transferred back and forth between other facilities and those with these specialized units.
93

because there was “more than a reasonable basis to believe that she will be subjected to segregation in [the same facility] again”).
Moreover, litigation of these system-wide issues would not preclude sensitivity to any salient differences between facilities in crafting a remedial order in the event that the court does find liability.32 The remedial order the Supreme Court affirmed in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), for instance, ordered the California prison system to reduce overcrowding (which was resulting in unconstitutional medical care) to a certain percentage of design capacity across the State, while allowing it flexibility to adjust for the distinctive features and needs of different institutions by having some facilities be more crowded and some less. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 970 n.64 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown
32. Defendants would, subject to the court’s consideration of objections raised by plaintiffs and independent approval, have the opportunity to propose the terms of any eventual remedial order.
94

v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).

However, as noted above, the court has decided to

define the class to exclude prisoners at Tutwiler

Prison for Women. Although there is expert evidence

regarding the mental-health care being provided at

Tutwiler, and although many of the same policies and

practices apply at that facility, there is no female

class representative; unlike male prisoners who are

frequently transferred between facilities, there are no

transfers between Tutwiler and the rest of the men’s

facilities, and no named plaintiff will ever be

incarcerated at Tutwiler.

The court therefore

concludes that it would be more appropriate for the

adequacy of mental-health care at Tutwiler to be litigated by way of ADAP’s associational standing.33

33. There was initially a female Phase 2A class representative, but she passed away during the pendency of this litigation. If ADAP did not have associational standing to bring this claim on behalf of the women at Tutwiler, the court would consider giving plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to add another female Phase 2A class representative. See, e.g., Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 147 F.R.D. (continued...)
95

Defendants also argue that differences in the
health care needs of class members preclude a finding
of commonality. For this proposition, they rely on
language from a Third Circuit decision, Rouse v.
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir. 1999):
“In light of the diverse medical needs of, and the different level of care owed to, each group of plaintiffs [specifically, ‘stable’ versus ‘unstable’ diabetics], the District Court erred in holding that all members of the plaintiff class alleged a violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Based on the evidence in the summary judgment record, there may be one or more subgroups of plaintiffs as to whom particular aspects of the care allegedly provided was not consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements and other subgroups as to whom particular aspects of the care was constitutionally adequate.”
But Rouse was an appeal from a denial of qualified
immunity (rather than an appeal from a
class-certification decision)34 with respect to class
60, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Stewart, J.) (granting a stay of proceedings until the plaintiffs could find a new class representative following the death of a representative).
34. Although Rouse involved injunctive-relief claims as well, the court was very clear that “[t]he (continued...)
96

claims for damages stemming from inadequate treatment in the past (rather than, as here, a purely prospective injunctive-relief class action alleging a current substantial risk of serious harm). In light of the posture of the case, the court’s instruction to the district court, to focus on differences in the medical needs of different subsets of the plaintiff claims, is totally unremarkable: if the care provided in the past was adequate for, say, ‘stable’ diabetics, they would not have suffered any retrospective constitutional violation, and would not be entitled to any damages. But here, such parsing is neither necessary nor appropriate: there are no damages to be apportioned, and, more important, even if a given class member admits that he has not in the past received care that
only issue in this appeal is whether the defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity,” a defense that applies only to individual-capacity damages claims and not to official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief. 182 F.3d at 196. Moreover, the court expressly stated that “[t]he question of class (continued...)
97

violated the Constitution, he is not precluded from raising a prospective Eighth Amendment claim that defendants are currently subjecting him to a substantial risk of serious harm. Also, as a factual matter, the allegations in Rouse involved much more fine-grained aspects of care for a particular disease (for example, whether monitoring of blood sugar a certain number of times per day was sufficient), whereas the allegations in this case involve overarching inadequacies of staffing which, plaintiffs’ experts have opined, contribute to a range of other systemic inadequacies that affect mentally ill prisoners irrespective of their particular diagnoses.
Finally, the court notes that it contemplated certifying subclasses, such as a subclass of those mentally ill prisoners receiving psychotropic medications, or a subclass of those held in segregation. However, the evidence in the record
certification ... is not before us, and we express no opinion on this issue.” Id. at 199 n.3.
98

reflects that about two-thirds of mentally ill prisoners receive such medication, and that mentally ill prisoners who are not taking medication are frequently urged to do so (indeed, plaintiffs have offered evidence to suggest that prisoners who refused medication have sometimes been threatened with removal from the mental-health caseload). The record also reflects that prisoners with mental illness regularly move into and out of these restrictive housing units. As a result, certifying such subclasses would be an exercise in legal formalism; the court is satisfied that, to the extent that these medication and segregation practices create a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners when they are taking medication or housed in segregation, this risk extends to all seriously mentally ill prisoners, who are all fairly likely to take medication and be placed in segregation at some point.
99

ii. Due Process Claim The court also finds that the procedural due-process class satisfies the commonality requirement. As with the Eighth Amendment claims, plaintiffs presented evidence through their expert, Dr. Burns, showing that prisoners across the ADOC system have not received adequate process before being subjected to involuntary medication. While the parties agree that the ADOC’s written policy is constitutionally adequate under Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 2010 (1990), Bui challenges whether the procedures are adequate in practice.35 This question applies to all class members, as they are all on involuntary-medication orders. The question can be answered in one stroke--namely, by determining whether ADOC’s involuntary-medication practices adequately
35. This question largely, although imperfectly, overlaps with a very concrete one: Is there, or is there not, a practice of failing to comply with ADOC’s written policy on involuntary medication? The answer to this question is the same for every member of the class.
100

protect due-process rights. See Hightower ex rel. Dehler v. Olmstead, 959 F. Supp. 1549, 1557 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (considering procedural due-process claims, among others, brought by a certified class of patients in a state hospital), aff’d sub nom. Hightower v. Olmstead, 166 F.3d 351 (11th Cir. 1998).
C. Typicality Although the commonality and typicality inquiries “tend to merge,” the typicality requirement--which is “somewhat of a low hurdle”--focuses the court’s attention on “whether a sufficient nexus exists between the claims of the named representatives and those of the class at large.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982); Taylor v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 181 F.R.D. 509, 517 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Albritton, J.); Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotations omitted). A class representative’s claims are typical if they “arise from the same event or pattern or
101

practice and are based on the same legal theory” as the class claims; they need not be identical. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 260, 275 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (Bowdre, J.). Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to identify class representatives able to challenge each of the policies and practices at issue in this case; although they frame this argument as going to adequacy, it actually sounds in typicality.
For purposes of typicality, plaintiffs need to show that there are named plaintiffs who have been exposed to the policies or practices that create the substantial risk of serious harm they challenge, not that they have actually suffered the harm in the past.36 So, for example, if lack of adequate medication
36. The remaining plaintiffs must also show--and have shown, as discussed in the court’s opinion on summary judgment--that they have serious mental-health needs.
102

management creates a substantial risk of a prisoner taking psychotropic medications suffering unnecessarily from serious side effects, there must be a named plaintiff who is taking psychotropic medication; he need not necessarily prove, at the class-certification stage (or, for that matter, at trial), that he has already suffered from side effects.
Hence, plaintiffs need to prove that there are named plaintiffs who (1) receive mental-health care from the mental-health care staff,37 (2) rely upon custodial staff to facilitate their receipt of mentalhealth treatment, (3) are assessed at intake, during classification reviews, and in response to referrals, (4) need or take psychotropic medications, (5) require psychotherapy, (6) engage or desire to engage in self-harm or to commit suicide, (7) are placed in segregation, and (8) receive disciplinary
37. More precisely, the question is not whether the named plaintiff does receive mental-health care, but whether he relies on the mental-health care staff for any care he does receive.
103

citations based on symptomatic behavior. There is no serious dispute,38 though, that all of the named plaintiffs fall within categories (1) and (3); that many of the named plaintiffs--including at least six who have been housed in segregation (Hartley, Jackson, Johnson, McCoy, Pruitt, and Williams)--fall within category (2); that at least eight (Braggs, Hartley, Johnson, McCoy, Pruitt, Wallace, and Williams) fall within category (4); and that at least two (in many

38. Again, defendants do argue, vehemently, that

the named plaintiffs have not offered evidence to show

that they, individually, have suffered past violations

of the Eighth Amendment as a result of these policies

and practices. (As discussed in the court’s opinion on

summary judgment, this is both incorrect and

irrelevant, because their claim concerns not past harm

but a future risk of harm that they contend exists

because they need mental-health care but can obtain it

only from a seriously deficient system.) For the

purpose of typicality, the named plaintiffs need only

show that they are exposed to a particular policy or

practice--for example, that they need mental-health

care, and that they can only obtain that care from the

limited number of mental-health staff defendants have

provided.

Whether or not that limit is

unconstitutionally harmful is a question for trial and

not for class certification.

104

cases, more) fall within each of the remaining
categories.39
Although they need not do so, plaintiffs have in
fact presented evidence that at least one of them has
not only been exposed to but harmed by the risk created
by each of the policies or practices at issue. Rather
than engage in an exhaustive discussion that would
largely rehash the extended section on individual harm
in the court’s opinion on summary judgment, the court
will instead mention illustrative examples.40
39. Defendants’ own expert, Dr. Patterson, recognized that at least Braggs, Hartley, Jackson, McCoy, and Wallace have required psychotherapeutic treatment; that at least Pruitt, Wallace, and Williams have engaged in self-harm (and that others have reported a desire to do so); and that at least Jackson, McCoy, Pruitt, Wallace, and Williams, have been housed in segregation. Although Dr. Patterson did mention a few disciplinary citations the named plaintiffs received, he did not discuss those citations that stemmed from symptomatic behavior (specifically, self-harm). He did opine, however, in general terms, that the “potential harm” of delays in providing mental-health treatment includes “disciplinary actions due to inadequate treatment.” Patterson Report (doc. no. 679-9) at 47.
40. The court refers the reader to this section of its summary-judgment opinion.
105

As for defendants’ policy or practice of failing to

provide adequate numbers of and sufficiently qualified

mental-health staff, plaintiffs have offered evidence

to show that the inadequate staffing has adversely

affected Hartley’s treatment: his treatment plans

repeat problem statements and goals without documenting

changes in his mental state, and that his treatment

team meetings are not attended by required staff

members.

In fact, defendants’ own mental-health

expert, Dr. Patterson, agrees with plaintiffs that

Hartley’s treatment plans, and his resulting

mental-health care, are inadequate. He further opines

that “Mental Health Treatment Planning” is “seriously

deficient, at least in part because of the lack of

adequate staffing.” Patterson Report (doc. no. 679-9)

at 52.

Plaintiffs have also offered evidence to show that

named plaintiffs have been exposed to and harmed by

defendants’ failure to provide sufficient custodial

staffing to avoid regular security-related interference

106

with the provision of mental-health care. For example, Jackson’s medical records indicate that a number of his mental-health appointments were canceled due to security issues arising from an insufficient number of ADOC officers.
With respect to the failure to identify or recognize the severity of mental illnesses, plaintiffs have offered evidence to show that although staff at a state mental hospital recognized, prior to Johnson’s incarceration in 1996, that he suffered from depression and was possibly psychotic (and potentially incompetent to stand trial), he was not placed on the mental-health caseload for almost two decades, until he was placed on suicide watch; at that point, he was recognized to be suffering from paraonia and possible delusions. Furthermore, although he was at this point referred for mental-health treatment, there appears to be no evidence that the mental-health staff ever received or acted upon the referral. Moreover, Dr. Burns pointed to McCoy as an example of a prisoner who was severely
107

ill and required residential care but was not being provided it due to his classification at an inappropriately low level.
Plaintiffs have offered evidence to show that named plaintiffs have been exposed to and harmed by defendants’ practice of failing to appropriately prescribe and manage psychotropic medication and its side effects. For example, Hartley’s medical records reflect that he has complained of a movement disorder caused by his antipsychotic medication, that treating this side effect has adversely affected his kidneys, and that he has requested and been denied an alternative antipsychotic medication which Dr. Burns explained would be less likely to cause a movement disorder.
With respect to defendants’ failure to provide more than cursory psychotherapeutic care and counseling, plaintiffs have offered evidence to show that Braggs has not received the regular therapy--for anxiety, major depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress
108

disorder--contemplated in his treatment plans; that

Pruitt’s repeated requests to speak to counselors have

been rejected; and that Wallace, despite his repeated

suicide attempts and self-harm, and diagnoses of

bi-polar disorder and intellectual disability, has not

consistently received group therapy.

Defendants’

expert, Dr. Patterson, agrees with plaintiffs that

Wallace’s care has been inadequate, due in part to the

lack of group therapy.

Plaintiffs have offered evidence to show that named

plaintiffs have been exposed to and harmed by

defendants’ practice of inadequately monitoring and

providing inadequate follow-up care to prisoners who

are suicidal or engage in self-harm. Over the course

of a six-month period, Pruitt was admitted to a crisis

cell as a result of self-injurious behavior at least

five times, for stretches sometimes lasting more than a

week. As to inadequate monitoring of the crisis cells,

Dr. Patterson recognized that there was no indication

in Pruitt’s records that he was seen by a psychiatrist

109

or nurse practitioner during any of these admissions. He was attacked by other prisoners during two different admissions (disinfectant was thrown in his face and burning fabric was thrown onto his leg). Dr. Burns notes that he was not placed on the mental-health caseload after these admissions and opines that he was therefore denied adequate follow-up care.
As to defendants’ placement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation without regard to its harmful effects on their mental health: McCoy has repeatedly been placed in segregation for extended periods of time, including one thirteen-month stretch, even though he was in a psychotic state and the mental-health staff had advised against prolonged isolation due to segregation’s effect on his stability. Deterioration of McCoy’s mental health during segregation was also documented in his records. Jackson was in segregation between 2007 and 2014; he was frequently transferred from one facility’s segregation unit to another’s. This extended stay in segregation has broken him down
110

mentally, according to his own testimony and the opinion of one of plaintiffs’ experts.
Plaintiffs have likewise presented evidence to show that Wallace and Pruitt have been harmed by defendants’ policy or practice of disciplining prisoners for behavior that stems from mental illness. Wallace received nine disciplinary citations for instances of cutting his wrists, and Pruitt has also received disciplinary tickets for creating a hazard when he engaged in self-harm.
Finally, with respect to the procedural due-process class, plaintiffs have presented evidence showing that the class representative, Bui, was exposed to and harmed by defendants’ involuntary-medication practices. He has been under an involuntary-medication order since November 2007, and the order has been renewed approximately every six months. Plaintiffs have shown that on some occasions, Bui was not present at his own involuntary-medication hearings; that many notices were given to him on the day of the hearing, or back-dated;
111

and that on several occasions, he did not have a lay advisor during the hearing to explain the purpose of the hearing or to help him present objections to the hearing panel’s findings.41
Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement has been satisfied with respect to both classes.
D. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This analysis “encompasses two separate inquiries: (1) whether any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives and the class;42 and (2) whether the representatives
41. Plaintiffs’ evidence shows at least that Bui’s own presence and that of a lay advisor should have been--and was not--documented.
42. For a conflict to defeat class certification, it must be “fundamental,” such as when “some party members claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that benefitted other members of the class.” Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1189.
112

will adequately prosecute the action.” Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted).43
“Adequate representation is usually presumed in the
absence of contrary evidence,” and generally exists for
injunctive-relief classes, because there is no monetary
pie to be sliced up. Access Now, Inc. v. Ambulatory
Surgery Ctr. Grp., Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 522, 528 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (Seitz, J.).
As noted above, defendants’ argument against the
adequacy of the named plaintiffs as class
representatives is that the named plaintiffs have not
43. Prior to the promulgation of Rule 23(g) regarding the adequacy of class counsel, courts considered that topic in the context of Rule 23(a)(4). Since Rule 23(g) was added in 2003, courts have been “slow in shifting the analysis of counsel’s adequacy from Rule 23(a)(4) to Rule 23(g),” but the leading treatise on the topic takes the position that the drafters of the rule intended courts to “locate their entire discussion of class counsel within the 23(g) analysis and restrict their analysis under Rule 23(a)(4) to the topic of adequacy of the proposed class representative.” Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:80 (5th ed.). As defendants have also taken this approach, the court will adopt it here.
113

themselves raised the claims they now seek to bring on behalf of the class; this argument goes to typicality rather than adequacy. In any event, as the court has already explained, this argument fails. Defendants have also reiterated in the section of their brief on adequacy their contentions that the named plaintiffs do not have justiciable claims. This argument, too, has already been addressed in the section on standing.
Defendants have not suggested that the named plaintiffs have conflicts of interest with the class, and the court concludes that no such conflict exists. As for whether they will adequately prosecute this action, defendants challenged two of the named plaintiffs based on statements in their depositions arguably reflecting that they do not intend to represent other prisoners in this case or do not understand their roles as class representatives. However, these plaintiffs have been released from custody; because their claims are now moot, they cannot serve as class representatives. The remaining named
114

plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Eighth Amendment class, and Bui is an adequate representative of the procedural due-process class.
3. Rule 23(b)(2) A class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2) in cases in which “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule 23(b)(2) has been liberally applied in the area of civil rights, including suits challenging conditions and practices at various detention facilities.” Bumgarner v. NCDOC, 276 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (Boyle, J.); see also Wright & Miller, 7AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1776 (3d ed.) (discussing the range of civil-rights actions certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), and explaining that “the class suit is a uniquely appropriate procedure in civil-rights cases”).
115

Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to say that the
rule’s requirements are “almost automatically satisfied
in actions primarily seeking injunctive relief.” Baby
Neal ex rel. Kanter, 43 F.3d at 59.
As plaintiffs have repeatedly explained and offered
evidence to demonstrate throughout the litigation of
this case, and as this court has found in addressing
the commonality requirement, the problems of which they
complain and the remedies they seek are systemic.44 The
44. As discussed above in the commonality context, the fact that some class members may have thus far received appropriate mental-health care and therefore might not yet have been harmed by the challenged policies and procedures does not defeat certification. Additionally, even if not all of the class members were subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm--that is, even if it were sure that the risk would not materialize with respect to some mentally ill prisoners--certification would still be appropriate. See Anderson v. Garner, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (Murphy, J.) (“‘[A]ll the class members need not be aggrieved by or desire to challenge the defendant’s conduct in order for one or more of them to seek relief under Rule 23(b)(2).’ Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Georgia, 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State, 99 F.R.D. 16, 35-36 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (“What is necessary is that the challenged conduct or lack of (continued...)
116

Supreme Court has approved of system-wide relief in prison cases involving “systemwide violation[s]” resulting from “systemwide deficiencies.” Plata, 563 U.S. at 532.
Defendants are quite right that a single injunction would not be appropriate if plaintiffs sought an order requiring that each named plaintiff be provided the specific forms of treatment he has been denied. They cite Wal-Mart for the proposition that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” 564 U.S. at 360. But Rule 23(b)(2) certainly does not preclude certification merely because the class members could bring separate claims regarding the adequacy of the particular treatment they have individually received--claims which, everyone agrees, could not be resolved with a single injunction
conduct be premised on a ground that is applicable to the entire class.”)).
117

or declaratory judgment--when those are not the claims they actually have brought in this lawsuit.
For some reason, defendants repeatedly misconstrue the claims in the case as demands for individual treatment of various kinds, and then proceed to argue that the individualized claims plaintiffs are not raising cannot be brought in the form of a class action.45 As the court explained at some length in its analysis of the applicable Eighth Amendment case law in its summary-judgment opinion, defendants’ position is unwarranted; plaintiffs are not seeking adjudication of demands for particular individualized treatment, and the challenge they are actually bringing--to systemic

45. In support of this reading of plaintiffs’

claims, defendants cite to deposition testimony wherein

the named plaintiffs, when asked by defense counsel

what concrete changes they would like to see in the

individual care they are currently being provided,

answer that question. These statements, however, are

not their claims.

Adequate staffing levels and

adequate amounts of residential treatment space are not

individual forms of treatment one can request; they are

conditions that make it possible for appropriate

treatment to be provided when and to the extent

necessary.

118

deficiencies that create a substantial risk of serious harm--are well recognized.
Defendants declare that “an alleged delay in care at St. Clair bears no relationship of any kind to allegedly insufficient staffing at Hamilton, or allegedly insufficient intake procedures at Kilby.” Defs.’ Opp. to Class Cert. (doc. no. 807) at 167. This position is controverted by the evidence in this case. Plaintiffs’ experts opine that all of these problems-and others--stem directly and ineluctably from a contractual arrangement that provides for inadequate numbers of and insufficiently qualified mental-health staff. Fundamentally, defendants err in forgetting that the language of Rule 23(b)(2) focuses on the nature of defendants’ acts and omissions and the suitability of class-wide relief, and does not require that the class-wide relief benefit each class member in precisely the same way. Here, plaintiffs seek a remedy for defendants’ decision to starve the mental-health care system in Alabama prisons of human and financial
119

resources, and relief would be appropriate for everyone subjected to the substantial risk of serious harm plaintiffs claim this creates--that is, prisoners with serious mental illness.
It would, in fact, be impossible to grant any meaningful relief on this claim without granting it on a class-wide basis. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360 (“The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the court could order, for example, that a particular prisoner who currently requires psychiatric care be seen by a psychiatrist, it cannot order that adequate staffing be provided to the extent necessary to address any one particular prisoner’s mental-health care needs as they develop in the future. Although deficiencies in the individual treatment now being provided could potentially (though much less efficiently) be addressed one by one, the risks defendants’ policies and practices pose to mentally ill
120

prisoners, whose needs change over time, could not. Moreover, any order remedying a systemic deficiency with respect to only one prisoner would rob Peter to pay Paul; the court would be playing a zero-sum game, shifting mental-health care resources from one prisoner to another.46 By the same token, there exists no individual remedy for the practice of filling residential treatment beds with segregation prisoners, thereby reducing the bed space available in those units and undermining the treatment provided there; the court obviously cannot order that a bed be reserved for each prisoner likely to require one, or order that a particular prisoner’s therapy in the residential treatment unit--but only his--not be disturbed.
Nor could the court address inadequate intake screenings without also addressing inadequate staffing levels, when the deficiencies in screening are caused
46. Additionally, no relief other than class-wide relief could address the needs of future prisoner with mental illness.
121

by the fact that there are not enough staff members qualified to conduct the screenings or supervise others in doing so. Moreover, as discussed above in the context of commonality, even ordering adequate staffing at a particular facility would not meaningfully redress the claims of prisoners currently housed at that facility, since the chance of a prisoner being moved to another one is very high.
The Rule 23(b)(2) cases to which defendants cite are all unavailing. In Lakeland Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Astellas U.S., LLC, 763 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2014), the court affirmed the denial of certification in a case where the plaintiff failed to identify the relief it sought other than “such declaratory and injunctive relief as appropriate in order to compel and ensure defendant[’s] future compliance with law.” Id. at 1291 (citation omitted).47
47. The Lakeland court also found that the undisputed evidence demonstrated both that no other member of the putative class had ever asked for the sort of license the plaintiff wanted the defendant to (continued...)
122

Here, by contrast, plaintiffs have described in
detail the specific policies and practices in which
they ask the court to order defendants to stop
engaging; to the extent that they seek an order
requiring defendants to formulate a plan for remedying
unconstitutional conditions, rather than setting out
the details of that plan themselves, they do so only
out of appropriate deference to the discretion of
prison administrators. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 689 n.
35 (explaining that requiring plaintiffs to articulate
with great precision the terms of the injunction they
seek is particularly inappropriate in “prison cases,
given that an injunction in any such case must closely
issue, and that it was very unlikely that any other member of the putative class would want to purchase that sort of license even if it were made available. In other words, the relief that the plaintiff asked for would not address the injury (if any) to the other members of the putative class. Here, plaintiffs have offered expert evidence (with which, in many instances, defendants’ mental-health expert actually agrees) to show that the policies and practices they challenge are generally applicable to prisoners with mental illness in the ADOC, and that the relief they seek would serve (continued...)
123

track the violations established by the evidence at

trial, that any such relief must comply with the

[Prison

Litigation

Reform

Act]’s

extensive

requirements, that prison officials must play a role in

shaping injunctions, that ultimate proof of some

violations but not others might easily change the

structure of a remedial plan, that conditions in

prisons might change over the course of litigation, and

that the class certification hearing is not a dress

rehearsal of the trial on the merits (let alone a dress

rehearsal of the remedy proceedings)”); Morrow v.

Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 198 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (Ward,

J.) (“Plaintiffs have set forth facts suggesting that

Defendants’ behavior was generally applicable to the

class as a whole, making injunctive relief appropriate.

The precise terms of the injunction need not be decided

at this stage, only that the allegations are such that

injunctive and declaratory relief are appropriate and

to redress the risk these policies and practices pose to all such prisoners.
124

that the class is sufficiently cohesive that an injunction can be crafted that meets the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d).”).
Defendants’ other cases fare no better. In Heffner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 443 F.3d 1330, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005), certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) damages class was reversed because the court concluded that the class members were not entitled to relief (in the form of a refund of a deductible) absent an individualized showing that they had in fact relied on a summary plan description indicating that no deductible would be charged. Similarly, in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 499 (7th Cir. 2012), the court reversed certification of a class in a case where “the intricate remedial scheme ... require[d] thousands of individual determinations of class membership, liability, and appropriate remedies,” explaining that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate when “the relief sought would merely initiate a process through which highly individualized
125

determinations of liability and remedy are made.”
Here, by contrast, no individualized determinations are
necessary or relevant. If the court grants relief, it
will do so across the board, in one fell swoop. This
relief will ensure that the statewide prison
mental-health care system, with which all class members
interact, is not operated pursuant to policies and
practices that subject all prisoners to a substantial
risk of serious harm.
This is exactly the kind of case for which Rule
23(b)(2) was intended.48
48. It is just as clear that the procedural due-process claim certified for class-wide resolution satisfies Rule 23(b)(2), as the relief requested here (an injunction requiring the provision of certain procedural protections, not only in policy but also in practice) would clearly apply to the class as a whole. By contrast, the failure to make constitutionally appropriate substantive determinations as to whether prisoners should be involuntarily medicated is less clearly susceptible to “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief ... respecting the class as a whole” under Rule 23(b)(2). Although a consistent refusal by those who authorize involuntary medication to consider some specific, discrete factor could arguably be susceptible to class-wide relief, even if further individual determinations would need to (continued...)
126

4. Rule 23(g) In order to certify a class, the court must also appoint class counsel. In so doing, the court “must consider ... (i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experiences in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(a). The court also “may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). Lawyers affiliated with the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
be made, the court concludes that this issue will more appropriately be litigated by Bui and ADAP than by a class.
127

Berkowitz have represented named plaintiffs in litigating and negotiating the settlement of this case, and they now seek appointment as class counsel.49 As previously discussed for purposes of certification of the Phase 1 class in this case, the record reflects that these attorneys have substantial experience in litigating class actions and in the complex substantive areas of both prisoners’-rights and disability-rights law.
Notably, defendants take issue with the adequacy of only a subset of named plaintiffs’ counsel. They argue that the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) should not be appointed as class counsel, but they do not make the same argument with respect to Baker, Donelson or ADAP, both of which represent the individual named plaintiffs.
49. Anil Mujumdar of the law firm of Zarzaur, Mujumdar & Debrosse has also participated extensively in the Phase 2A litigation, in representing only ADAP, not the named plaintiffs. Neither he nor the firm has requested to be appointed as class counsel.
128

In any event, defendants’ arguments with respect to

SPLC are not convincing. Although they focus on one

possible

deficiency

in

SPLC’s

pre-filing

investigation--namely, its failure to review the

medical and mental-health records of all named

plaintiffs prior to filing their complaint--they ignore

the detailed and involved investigation that SPLC and

plaintiffs’ other counsel conducted prior to (and

since) the filing of this case. Before filing suit,

plaintiffs’ counsel conducted a two-year investigation

into health care in ADOC facilities, interviewed

numerous prisoners, obtained some medical records, and

obtained some records from defendants and their medical

contractors through open records requests. They issued

a lengthy report on their findings, which discussed the

named plaintiffs in some detail. Especially in light

of the difficulty of investigating secure institutions, this was plainly adequate.50

50. The cases defendants cite as examples of inadequate pre-filing investigation bear little (continued...)
129

In addition, defendants argue that SPLC has taken
positions in conflict with its fiduciary obligations to
the putative class. Essentially, defendants complain
that when, earlier this year, the Alabama legislature
considered a proposal to invest hundreds of millions of
dollars in building four large new prison facilities in
the State, the president of SPLC sent a letter to a
number of legislators opposing its passage. Whether or
not this letter had any effect on legislative support
for, or the eventual defeat of, the bill, nothing in it
was in conflict with the interests of the putative
class his organization seeks to represent.
resemblance to the case at bar. In these cases, counsel’s deficiencies were glaring; they had failed to conduct even the most cursory inquiry into whether the proposed class representatives even existed--in Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 488 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (Hillman, J.), one was a “phantom,” who “counsel had named ... without knowing who, let alone where, [she] was”--or had failed to speak at all to at least one of the proposed class representatives prior to the morning of his deposition, see Williams v. Balcor Pension Investors, 150 F.R.D. 109, 120 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Zagel, J.).
130

As defendants themselves acknowledge, it was “the

opinion of the Commissioner [that] inmates in the ADOC

system would benefit from the [bill], because it would

alleviate problems caused by overcrowding and

understaffing.” Defs.’ Opp. to Class Cert. (doc. no.

807) at 171 (emphasis added).

SPLC’s president

expressed a different opinion, favoring a legislative

approach that prioritized “sentencing reform,” and

“demand[ed] that the prison system reform its

management practices.” Id.

Defendants’ argument incorrectly presupposes either

that the Commissioner’s view was indisputably correct,

or else that the only legislative alternatives were the

passage of the bill as proposed, on the one hand, and

no action at all on the other. This, too, is not the

case; there is a panoply of possible legislative

approaches to any issue as complex as prison reform.

The fact that an SPLC official expressed a preference

for options other than the one that happened to be on

the table at a particular moment hardly reflects an

131

abandonment of his fiduciary duty to his current or prospective clients.
Setting aside the fact that plaintiffs’ counsel are free to take a different position than the Commissioner, it is not entirely clear how and why-even accepting his position--the prison construction project would benefit the plaintiff class. According to the statement of the Commissioner quoted by defendants, the salient impact of the bill would be on overcrowding and understaffing.51 Moreover, as with any “transformation” of the size contemplated here, the prison construction project would presumably impact the delivery of health care in numerous ways--some positive and some negative, many hard to predict. Plaintiffs

51. Confusingly, however, it also appears to be

defendants’ contention in this litigation that

overcrowding and custodial understaffing do not result

in constitutionally inadequate health care. If this is

indeed their position, the court is uncertain why they

believe that impeding the passage of a bill designed to

address these issues would be adverse to the interests

of a class whose sole purpose in bringing this

litigation--obtaining

adequate

mental-health

care--would be unaided by this reform.

132

note in replying to this argument that the record reflects that the Commissioner has also suggested that his proposal would allow ADOC to dramatically cut the cost of providing health care. The court certainly passes no judgment on the merits of SPLC’s perspective, but it does seem perfectly reasonable for lawyers representing clients who seek more funding for health care to oppose a bill the proponent of which says would result in less funding for health care.
5. Ascertainability Defendants argue that the Eighth Amendment class certified here is not ascertainable. However, there is serious reason to doubt that the judicially created ascertainability requirement applies to Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Even if it does, this class meets the requirement. Although the Eleventh Circuit did hold in defendants’ primary case, Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012), that a class must
133

be “clearly ascertainable”--that is, “its members can

be ascertained by reference to objective criteria,”

Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 563 F.

App’x 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)--it did so in the context of a

Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, not, as here, a Rule

23(b)(2) injunctive-relief class. Defendants have not

cited, and the court is not aware, of any cases within

this circuit applying the ascertainability requirement

to a Rule 23(b)(2) class, much less any binding

precedent doing so.

Moreover, the circuits that have squarely addressed

the issue have generally concluded that the

ascertainability requirement does not apply to Rule

23(b)(2) injunctive-relief classes.

The recent

discussion of this issue by the Third Circuit is detailed and persuasive.52

52. Notably, the Third Circuit, like the Eleventh, has split from some other circuits in applying a “heightened” ascertainability requirement to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. See Mullins v. Direct Digital, (continued...)
134

In Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554 (3d Cir. 2015),
the court distinguished Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)
classes by noting that the latter “‘allows
certification in a much wider set of circumstances,’
including those ‘in which class-action treatment is not
as clearly called for,’” and explaining that because
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are an “‘adventuresome
innovation,’ Congress included additional ‘procedural
safeguards,’” such as individual notice and an
opportunity to opt-out. Id. at 560 (quoting Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. at 2558, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432). In
Rule 23(b)(2) classes, on the other hand, “‘[t]he key
... is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or
declaratory remedy warranted--the notion that the
LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659-72 (7th Cir. 2015) (disagreeing with Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012), and Karhu v. Vital Pharms., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015) (requiring that the “class definition contain[] objective criteria that allow for class members to be identified in an administratively feasible way ... [through a] manageable process that does not require much, in any, individual inquiry” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted))).
135

conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared

unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to

none of them.’” Id. at 561 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.

Ct. at 2557 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In sum, the court explained, “the identities

of individual class members are less critical in a

(b)(2) action than in a (b)(3) action.” Id.

As the court noted in Shelton, an advisory

committee note to Rule 23 describes cases which are

specifically

defined

in

terms

of

their

unascertainability as “illustrative” examples of Rule

23(b)(2) classes: “various actions in the civil rights

field where a party is charged with discriminating

unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members

are incapable of specific enumeration.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (emphasis

added). This court therefore agrees with the Third

Circuit that a requirement--directly contrary to the

express language of the advisory committee--“that the

members of the class be capable of specific

136

enumeration[] is inappropriate for (b)(2) classes.”53
Shelton, 775 F.3d at 561.
53. The court also adds the following observations. Requiring plaintiffs seeking certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class to demonstrate that they could determine conclusively and a priori who would and would not be a member of it would seriously undermine some of the most important functions of this type of litigation.
This is because (1) many civil rights cases involve challenges to discrimination on the basis of categories that are statutorily delineated by Congress in a legislative effort to protect the civil rights of people within them, and as discussed below, many of those categories are hard to assess in a perfectly objective fashion, and (2) other cases involve challenges to public entities’ failures to adequately assess individuals to whom they have an obligation to provide services.
Concluding that the requirement that a class member have a “serious mental illness” was not a sufficiently objective one would set the court atop a dangerously slippery slope. It would undercut Congress’s efforts to protect other groups, the bounds of which it defines in statute, such as people with disabilities. Other categories that have long formed the basis of civil rights violations (and the basis of class definitions in collective actions challenging those violations), like race, are hardly “objective.” Store records can reveal who bought defective products; determining who is or is not “Hispanic” is not so simple. Although a court can engage in this inquiry, it is certainly an individualized one.
(continued...)
137

As the Third Circuit recounted, two other circuits
have reached the same conclusion.54 In Shook v. El Paso
In addition, strict application of this standard to cases where the violation at issue is a failure to identify would create a Catch-22; it would be the height of irony for a prison system to be able to defeat certification of a class seeking to challenge its failure to identify prisoners with mental illness by arguing that that very failure made the class unascertainable.
54. As explained in the leading treatise on class action law, “early circuit cases” in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits applied the ascertainability requirement “without considering the unique nature of 23(b)(2) actions,” but “later district court cases in these circuits have adopted an intermediate position ... under which the requirement of ascertainability is applied less stringently in 23(b)(2) actions.” Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:7 (5th ed.). It also observes that “recent decisions either ... eschew the implied requirement of definiteness in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, or follow the intermediate approach, and treat definiteness as flexible ...[,] even in circuits that have traditionally applied the definiteness requirement to such class actions.” Id. (citing, among other cases, In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “a precise class definition is not as critical where certification of a class for injunctive or declaratory relief is sought under [R]ule 23(b)(2),” at least so long as notice and opt-out rights are not requested), and Kenneth R. ex. rel. Tri-City CAP, Inc./GS v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254, 264 (D.N.H. 2013) (McAuliffe, J.) (holding that a Rule 23(b)(2) class defined as containing persons with “serious mental (continued...)
138

Cty., 386 F.3d 963, 972 (10th Cir. 2004), the court explained that “many courts have found Rule 23(b)(2) well suited for cases where the composition of the class is not readily ascertainable; for instance, in a case where the plaintiffs attempt to bring suit on behalf of a shifting prison population.” The First Circuit has agreed. See Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that “the actual membership of [a Rule 23(b)(2)] class need not ... be precisely delimited,” because individual notice to class members is not required); see also Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 171-72 & n.115 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Scheindlin, J.) (citing cases). Shelton also pointed out the “significant” fact that the Supreme Court’s recent foray into Rule 23(b)(2), Wal-Mart, “lacks any inquiry into ‘ascertainability.’” 775 F.3d at 563.
illness” was sufficiently ascertainable (citation omitted))).
139

For these reasons, the court concludes that the class proposed in this litigation need not be ascertainable. That said, the court concludes in the alternative that even if the requirement did apply, plaintiffs’ proposed class definition would satisfy it.
Although defendants complain that the term “serious” mental illness is undefined, defendants themselves note in their motion for summary judgment that there is case law in this circuit articulating what counts as “serious” in the arena of Eighth Amendment mental-health claims: an illness “that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the need for a doctor’s attention.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[t]his standard has been acknowledged and used by other federal circuit and district courts,” and concluding that it was the “appropriate and guiding principle”). This is a rather straightforward, objective standard: a prisoner would
140

be a member of this class if he has been diagnosed as needing mental-health treatment or if he is very obviously mentally ill.55 Of course, because this is not a Rule 23(b)(2) damages class action, and class members will not be entitled to individual notice or have the right to opt out, the court need not actually conduct this inquiry to determine whether each prisoner is or is not a member of the class.
To conclude, the court will briefly address the other two cases defendants cite, both of which are unreported decisions by out-of-circuit district courts: Johannes v. Washington, 2015 WL 5634446 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2015) (Michelson, J.), and Schilling v. Kenton Cty., 2011 WL 293759 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bunning, J.). They are wholly consistent with the result reached here; indeed, Johannes actually
55. Indeed, the existence of prisoners who are very obviously mentally ill but who have not been diagnosed by prison mental-health staff as needing treatment would itself be compelling evidence of an Eighth Amendment violation.
141

recognizes that the ascertainability requirement
applies “less stringently” in Rule 23(b)(2) cases.
2015 WL 5634446, at *10. These cases declined to
certify or expressed concern about certifying what are
known as “fail-safe” classes--classes that are defined
in terms of the eventual merits adjudication. See
Schilling, 2011 WL 293579, at *5 (“A class definition
is ... too general where it requires the Court to
determine whether an individual's constitutional rights
have been violated in order to ascertain membership in
the class itself.”). In this case, a fail-safe class
would be one defined to consist of all prisoners who
have received constitutionally inadequate mental-health
care. Because plaintiffs have not proposed a fail-safe class, these cases suggest no reason not to certify.56
56. The court notes that some courts have in fact expressed a preference for fail-safe classes, in order to avoid the possibility that the class will include some members who have not been harmed by the challenged conduct. See Kenneth R., 293 F.R.D. at 264 (certifying a fail-safe class); Strouchler v. Shah, 286 F.R.D. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (refining a class definition to address an overbreadth objection, and in so doing, (continued...)
142

* * * The motion for class certification filed by the remaining named plaintiffs is granted in part and denied in part. The court will certify a class of all persons with a serious mental-health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject to defendants’ mental-health care policies and practices in ADOC facilities, excluding the work release centers and Tutwiler Prison for Women. The court will also certify a class of all persons with a serious mental-health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject to defendants’ formal involuntary-medication policies and practices.

creating a fail-safe class). The Fifth Circuit has

both “rejected a rule against fail-safe classes,” In re

Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2012), and also

explained that Rule 23(b)(2) classes can be certified

even when not all members of them have been harmed, see

Johnson v. Am. Credit Co. of Ga., 581 F.2d 526, 532

(5th Cir. 1978).

Bluntly put, this area of

class-action law is a mess. See Rubenstein, Newberg on

Class Actions § 3:6 (5th ed.).

143

The court will decline to certify a class for the individual plaintiffs’ due-process challenge regarding involuntary medication without a recent finding of dangerousness, or for their due-process challenge regarding coerced consent. However, the individual plaintiffs with these claims will proceed to trial, and ADAP, through its associational standing, may represent the interests of unnamed prisoners who are subject to these policies and practices.
An appropriate order will be entered. DONE, this the 25th day of November, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
144

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 1 of 17

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING ADA MENTAL HEALTH SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the parties jointly move the court to grant preliminary approval to their proposed ADA mental health settlement agreement in Phase 2A of this litigation; to approve the form of notice to class members of the proposed settlement agreement (attached as Exhibit A); to approve the form for objecting to or commenting on the proposed settlement agreement (attached as Exhibit B); and to approve the process for distributing these

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 2 of 17

documents and collecting comments, as further set out

below. Based on the entire record before the court,

the court finds as follows:

First, the court finds that the proposed settlement

agreement should be preliminarily approved, that notice

should be provided to interested parties, and that a

fairness hearing should be conducted.

The court further finds it appropriate to

provisionally certify a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive-relief

settlement class composed of “any current or future

inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama

Department of Corrections who has a disability as

defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B)

relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or

defect.” For reasons to be articulated in a final

decision regarding whether to approve the settlement,

the court preliminarily finds that the settlement class

meets the requirements of Rule 23(a)--numerosity,

commonality,

typicality,

and

adequacy

of

representation--as well as the requirement of Rule

2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 3 of 17
23(b)(2) that the issues involved “apply generally to the class,” such that “relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” The court preliminarily finds that plaintiffs’ counsel in this case can capably serve as and should be appointed class counsel, based on the factors outlined in Rule 23(g).
Finally, the court finds that the notice and comment forms attached as exhibits to this order, and the process for distributing and collecting these forms outlined below, constitute sufficient notice of and--together with the fairness hearing described below--opportunity to be heard on the proposed settlement agreement, as is required by due process and Rule 23(e).
It is therefore ORDERED that the joint motions for preliminary approval (doc. nos. 1175 and 1197) are granted as follows:
1. The proposed settlement agreement (doc. no. 1100) is preliminarily approved; final approval will be subject to a hearing and review by this
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 4 of 17
court of any objections to or comments about the agreement’s terms submitted by class members, and to the court’s resolution of certain outstanding issues identified in open court at a hearing held on February 16, 2017, and set for briefing below. 2. An injunctive-relief settlement class, defined as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or defect,” is provisionally certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). 3. The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlement class under Rule 23(g).
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 5 of 17

4. The Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) is

to provide notice of the proposed settlement

agreement as outlined below by March 6, 2017,

and to collect comments from class members as

further outlined below by the submission

deadline of April 5, 2017.

a. As a preliminary matter, the proposed

settlement agreement (doc. no. 1100) and

notice and comment forms (Exhibits A and

B) are to be translated into Spanish, and

printed in both Braille and large print,

and these alternative format documents are

to be distributed to each ADOC facility

prior to March 6, 2017.

Although

documents need not be posted in any

alternative format, any individual inmate

known to or believed by correctional

officers to read only Spanish or to be

vision-impaired

must

be

provided

individual copies of both the notice and

5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 6 of 17
comment forms in an appropriate alternative format, and must be provided the agreement itself in an appropriate alternative format upon request. As to an inmate who is illiterate or partially illiterate or reads only Spanish or is vision-impaired and has difficulty reading any of the different format documents or has difficulty writing, if that inmate requests that the forms or the agreement itself be read to him or her, or requests assistance in completing a comment form, this request must be promptly accommodated by ADOC. b. Copies of the proposed settlement agreement are to be made available for inmates to review in the law library of each ADOC prison or work-release facility or, for facilities that have no law library, in the area where information for
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 7 of 17
inmates is made available. At least one copy is to be made available per 100 inmates housed in any particular facility. c. A copy (including an alternative format copy, as appropriate) of the proposed settlement agreement is to be provided promptly upon request to any inmate who is not authorized or able to access the law library or other area where copies of the agreement are being made available. d. For inmates housed in dorms at ADOC’s prison or work-release facilities, the notice form is to be posted in each of the libraries and dorms of these facilities, wherever information for inmates is ordinarily posted. Sufficient copies of the comment form are to be made available to inmates housed in dorms in their facilities’ libraries and in their shift commanders’ offices.
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 8 of 17

e. Any inmate whose housing assignment is

other than a dorm is to be provided, by

hand delivery: (1) a copy of the notice

form, (2) a copy of the comment form, and

(3) a letter-sized envelope.

A

correctional officer employed by ADOC is

to distribute these papers. ADOC is to

maintain a roster that indicates, by name

and AIS number, each inmate to whom these

forms have been distributed. Inmates are

to sign this roster upon receipt of the

forms; in the event that an inmate refuses

to sign or rejects the forms, the

distributing officer is to note this on

the roster.

f. ADOC is to inform all inmates of the

notice and opportunity to object or

comment by means of a weekly oral

announcement, to be made during morning

count each Monday of the comment period,

8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 9 of 17

as follows: “Attention.

There is a

proposed settlement of the Braggs v. Dunn

Americans with Disabilities Act lawsuit

that affects all inmates. You have until

April 5, 2017, to provide written comments

about that settlement. You can review the

proposed settlement agreement in the law

library [for facilities that have no law

library, specify alternate location]. If

you are not able to access the law library

[for facilities that have no law library,

specify alternate location], a copy of the

agreement will be provided to you if you

request one from a correctional officer.

By April 5, 2017, you should place all

written comments in the ADA Settlement

Comment Box, located next to the inmate

request slip box. If you need a copy of

the comment form, you can get one from the

correctional officer supervising your

9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 10 of 17
living area or from the law library. If you cannot access the ADA Settlement Comment Box, you should ask a correctional officer to have your comment form collected and placed in the comment box.” g. At each ADOC prison or work-release facility, a secured box clearly labeled “ADA Settlement Comment Box” is to be placed adjacent to the box where inmate request slips are collected. This box may be a securely taped cardboard box, and must be of sufficient size to accommodate all comment forms that are submitted. This box is to be used exclusively for the collection of comment forms. h. Inmates who are allowed to move around within a facility are to be allowed to place their comment forms in the designated comment box. Comment forms are to be collected from those inmates who do
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 11 of 17

not have freedom of movement within a

facility as follows, with records of the

inmates from whom forms have been

collected to be maintained on rosters by

those responsible for the collection:

i. In segregation units, the forms are to

be collected by members of the

Institutional Segregation Review Board

during normal rounds and deposited in

the comment box.

ii. In

mental-health

units

and

stabilization units, the forms are to

be collected by the Captains who are

responsible for those units and

deposited in the comment box.

iii. In segregation units or holding units

at work-release facilities, the forms

are to be collected by the Wardens of

those facilities and deposited in the

comment box.

11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 12 of 17
i. The Warden of each ADOC facility is to certify in writing that the facility has complied with the above requirements regarding the provision of notice and the collection of forms, and that all comment boxes have been transmitted to ADOC’s general counsel as required below.
j. On the 20th day of the comment period, the Warden at each facility is to transmit to the office of ADOC’s general counsel the comment box(es) at the facility, and immediately replace the comment box(es) with a box or boxes of the same design and labeling as the box replaced. At the end of the final day of the comment period, the Warden at each facility is to transmit the replacement comment box(es) to the office of ADOC’s general counsel.
k. After each set of comment boxes is received by ADOC’s general counsel,
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 13 of 17
counsel for ADOC will promptly arrange with class counsel a time for the parties to meet at the headquarters of defendant Alabama Department of Corrections in Montgomery, Alabama, in order to confirm that comment boxes from all ADOC facilities have been received and to open those boxes. A representative of the clerk of court for the Middle District of Alabama will be in attendance when the boxes are opened and will personally transport all contents of the boxes to the courthouse for processing pursuant to Section 4(l). l. Each of these two sets of comments is to be scanned by the clerk of court and docketed as a single filing. At the same time as these comments are docketed, comments received by the clerk of court by mail by that date are also to be compiled
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 14 of 17
and docketed. Finally, on April 21, 2017, any additional comments received by the clerk of court by mail are to be compiled and docketed. The clerk of court is to retain the original copies of all comments, whether submitted to comment boxes or by mail.
i. To be clear, five compilations of comments are to be docketed and marked as follows: 1. First round of comments submitted to comment boxes. 2. First round of comments submitted by mail. 3. Second round of comments submitted to comment boxes. 4. Second round of comments submitted by mail. 5. Third round of comments submitted by mail.
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 15 of 17
5. By no later than May 1, 2017, the parties are to confirm in written filings with the court the following agreement, stipulated to during a hearing held in open court on February 16, 2017: This Agreement does not represent a settlement of all potential current and future claims that prisoners may bring under the ADA or Rehabilitation Acts.
6. By no later than May 1, 2017, the parties are to file pre-hearing briefs, both summarizing by topic and responding to the objections to and comments on the proposed settlement agreement that have been submitted by class members. These briefs must include citations to the page numbers on which any referenced objections or comments appear in the docketed compilations of responses.
7. By no later than May 1, 2017, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) will file a brief concerning the reasonableness of the
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 16 of 17
proposed settlement agreement, which will include one or more expert opinions addressing the adequacy of the settlement. 8. A fairness hearing is set for 10:00 a.m. on June 2, 2017, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. At this hearing, counsel for both parties must be prepared to respond to the objections and comments made by class members, as well as to the court’s concerns as outlined above. 9. After receiving objections and comments from class members, the court will determine from whom it intends to hear oral testimony. This testimony will be heard by videoconference from various ADOC facilities.
a. By no later than May 5, 2017, the parties are to file with the court their suggestions as to which inmates the court should hear testify. The parties are to
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205 Filed 02/22/17 Page 17 of 17
consult with the clerk of court about and file under seal a joint proposal as to arrangements for videoconferencing. b. By no later than May 10, 2017, the court will inform the parties which class members will testify, and which dates during the week of May 30, 2017, the court will hear testimony. c. By no later than May 12, 2016, the parties are to file a list of which class members will testify from which facilities. DONE, this the 22nd day of February, 2017.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205-1 Filed 02/22/17 Page 1 of 3

If you are an inmate with a mental health condition, read this notice.

Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement

You may be affected by the settlement of mental health claims made under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) in the lawsuit entitled Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM (previously Dunn v. Dunn), in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. This notice summarizes the claims included in this settlement and your rights under the settlement agreement.

1. What issues in the lawsuit have been settled? • Whether the ADOC has failed to make appropriate accommodations for people with mental health disabilities in its policies and procedures, in violation of the ADA and Section 504;

• Whether the ADOC has discriminated against inmates with mental health disabilities in the provision of and access to programs, benefits, and services; and

• Whether the ADOC has failed to provide appropriate programming designed for persons with intellectual disabilities in ADOC facilities.

The case involves other claims related to medical and mental health care that have not been settled and that will be decided by the Court.

2. Who is affected by this settlement? All class members are affected by this settlement. A class member is any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the ADOC who has a disability as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or defect.

Under the ADA, disability is defined as, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). This includes mobility, hearing or vision impairments.

If you have any questions about how this settlement affects you, contact the Class Counsel listed after question No. 6 on the third page of this notice.

3. What is the proposed settlement? The Plaintiffs and the ADOC have reached a proposed settlement that would release the ADOC from any further liability as to the mental health claims brought under the ADA by the plaintiff class. If the court approves the settlement agreement, you may be prevented in the future from bringing certain ADA mental health claims in federal court, because those claims were resolved by the settlement agreement. You may be required to ask an arbitrator appointed by the court to decide those claims, and you may not be able to appeal the arbitrator’s decision to the court.

The settlement agreement requires the ADOC to make numerous changes, all of which are subject to Court approval, including the following:

• identifying, screening, and tracking inmates with mental health disabilities; • modifying the procedure for requesting disability-based accommodations;

244832.3

1 of 3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205-1 Filed 02/22/17 Page 2 of 3

• appointing ADA Coordinators for each facility and statewide; • ensuring that inmates with mental health disabilities have equal access to educational and
rehabilitative classes and programs; • offering life skills / adaptive behavior classes for inmates with intellectual disabilities; • putting in place procedures for requesting ADA accommodations and for appealing denials
of such requests; and • permitting the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (“ADAP”) to monitor ADOC’s
compliance with the Settlement Agreement.

The settlement agreement requires the ADOC to pay fees to the court-approved monitor and attorneys’ fees to the lawyers who represented the class members.

You have the right to learn more about the settlement agreement. A copy is available in your prison law library. If there isn’t a library, the settlement agreement will be available in the area where other inmate information is made available in your facility. If you are unable to visit the law library or other area, you may request a copy of the settlement agreement from a correctional officer or class counsel and one will be provided to you.

4. Who represents the inmates affected by the settlement? The lawyers representing the inmates (“Class Counsel”) are Maria V. Morris of Southern Poverty Law Center, 400 Washington Avenue, Montgomery, AL 36104 and William Van Der Pol, Jr. of the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Box 870395, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487.

5. What are your options? The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama has preliminarily approved the settlement agreement but will hold a hearing to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate at _________ on __________, 2017, at the United States Courthouse, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. If you wish to testify, say so on the comment form you submit. The court will choose which inmates will be allowed to testify. The inmates who have been selected to testify will speak to the court by videoconference from an ADOC facility, and will not appear in court in person.

You have the right to make objections, comments or statements about the Settlement Agreement through the following methods:

1.

You may complete a form called "Response to Proposed Class Action Settlement." If

you have not been provided with a copy of the Response form, you may get one

from the officer supervising your living area or in your facility's law library. As

discussed in the Response form, you must place your completed Response form in

the box labeled "ADA Mental Health Settlement Comment Box" located in the area

where your facility's inmate request box is located. If you do not have access to the

area where the ADA Mental Health Settlement Comment Box is located, you should

provide your completed Response form to the following, depending on your housing

assignment, who will place your comments in the ADA Mental Health Settlement

Comment Box:

•

in Segregation Units, the forms will be collected by members of the

Institutional Segregation Review Board during normal rounds;

•

in the Infirmary, Mental Health Units, Stabilization Units, and Death Row,

the forms will be collected by the Captain who is responsible for those units;

244832.3

2 of 3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205-1 Filed 02/22/17 Page 3 of 3

•

in Segregation Units/Holding Units at Work Release Facilities, the forms will

be collected by the Warden.

2.

You may also mail your completed response form to the following address: Clerk of

Court, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, P.O. Box 711,

Montgomery, AL 36101-0711.

3.

You may use other paper to provide an objection, comment or statement about the

Settlement Agreement. If you do so, that paper MUST include the case name and

number (Braggs v Dunn, Case No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM) at the top of the

page. You MUST also include your full legal name, AIS number, all objections,

comments or statements you wish to make and the reasons for them, and your

signature.

4.

You may submit supporting papers (such as briefs, written evidence, and

declarations) to your objection, comment, or statement about the Settlement

Agreement. However, do not send originals because those will not be returned to

you.

ANY OBJECTIONS, COMMENTS OR STATEMENTS MUST BE PLACED IN THE ADA MENTAL HEALTH SETTLEMENT COMMENT BOX, PROVIDED TO THE RESPONSIBLE CORRECTIONAL OFFICER OR POST MARKED NO LATER THAN _________, 2017, TO BE CONSIDERED.

Any objections, comments, or statements that do not comply with the rules and deadlines listed in this Notice will not be heard or considered by the Court.

6. How can you get more information? If you have any question about any information in this notice or if you want a copy of the proposed settlement agreement, you may write or call the following offices of Class Counsel:

William Van Der Pol, Jr. ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487 (205) 348-4928

ADA Mental Health Settlement Questions SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 (334) 956-8200

244832.3

3 of 3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205-2 Filed 02/22/17 Page 1 of 2 Response to Proposed Class Action Settlement

You may be affected by the settlement of mental health claims made under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) in the lawsuit entitled Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM (previously Dunn v. Dunn).

A notice of the terms of the settlement has been posted in your facility and you can review a copy of the Proposed Settlement in the law library or, if there isn’t a library, in the area where other inmate information is made available in your facility. If you cannot go to the law library, you can request a copy of the Proposed Settlement from ADOC personnel or by writing to: William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Box 870395, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 35487 or ADA Mental Health Settlement Questions, Southern Poverty Law Center, 400 Washington Ave., Montgomery, Alabama, 36104.

If you are a prisoner with a mental health disability, you have a right to comment or object to the Proposed Settlement. If you wish to comment or object, please fill out this form and put it in the comment box at your facility that has been made available for accepting these comments. This box is located by the box where inmate request forms are placed and is marked “ADA Mental Health Settlement Comment Box”.

If, due to your housing assignment, you are not allowed access to the box, you should give the completed form (sealed in an envelope, if you wish) to the following persons who will place the form in the box:

• in Segregation Units, the forms will be collected by members of the Institutional Segregation Review Board during normal rounds;

• in the Infirmary, Mental Health Units, Stabilization Units, and Death Row, the forms will be collected by the Captain who is responsible for those units and deposited in the Comment Box;

• in Segregation Units/Holding Units at Work Release Facilities, the forms will be collected by the Warden.

You can also mail the completed form to: Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, P.O. Box 711, Montgomery, AL 36101-0711. If you need assistance in completing this form, please notify a Correctional Officer.

You must include your name, AIS Number, and signature on this form or it will not be considered.

ALL COMMENTS MUST BE PLACED IN THE ADA MENTAL HEALTH SETTLEMENT COMMENT BOX, PROVIDED TO THE APPROPRIATE ADOC OFFICER OR REPRESENTATIVE OR POST MARKED BY _____________ 2017, TO BE CONSIDERED.

Inmate Name (print)

AIS Number

Inmate Signature

Date

Do you object to or wish to comment on any of the following provisions of the Proposed Settlement Agreement? If so, please circle the topic and explain your comment
or objection below.

1503255.1

Page 1 of 2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1205-2 Filed 02/22/17 Page 2 of 2
Topics (circle one or more):

Housing / Grouping Prisoners with Disabilities to Provide Services

Life Skills / Adaptive Behavior Training for Prisoners with Intellectual Disabilities

Security Levels

Access to Programs

Emergencies

Access to Facilities

Identification of Disabilities

Quality Assurance / Monitoring

Tracking of Disabilities & Facility Transfers

Attorneys’ Fees

ADA Coordinators

Accommodation Request / Grievance Process Other ______________________________

Please write out the reasons for your objection/comment below or it will not be considered. You may attach additional pages and/or supporting documentation. Documents attached will not be returned.

Do you wish to testify under oath (by videoconference form an ADOC facility) about your opinions on the Proposed Settlement? Yes No

1503255.1

Page 2 of 2

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

)

2:14cv601-MHT

)

(WO)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER REGARDING SETTLEMENT OF PHASE 2A MENTAL HEALTH ADA CLAIMS

This matter is before the Court on The Parties’ Joint Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order. After considering the evidence and arguments submitted by the

Parties, the Court hereby rules as follows:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the Parties and over the subject matter

of this action. Venue is proper in this Court.

2. On January 11, 2017, the Parties mutually agreed to the “Settlement

Agreement Concerning Mental Health Claims Arising Under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” (See Doc. 1100, the

“Agreement.”)

3. Section III.1. of the Agreement provides that: “At the time of execution of this Agreement, some of the Parties are engaged in the trial of that portion of this Lawsuit denominated as Phase 2A. The Parties recognize that the trial of Phase 2A likely prevents them and the Court from completing, in an expeditious manner, the necessary preliminary and final approval filings, hearings and the like concerning this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the Parties consent to entry of a Temporary Restraining Order that requires the implantation of the requirements Section V. “Substantive Provisions” of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.”
4. In accordance with that provision, the Parties jointly moved for a temporary restraining order implementing Section V. of the Agreement. Section V. of the Agreement is incorporated as if fully set forth herein, along with any other provision of the Agreement necessary so that all inmates covered by the Agreement are provided with the services and benefits detailed in Section V. during the pendency of the Court’s preliminary and final approval of that Agreement.
5. Based upon a review of the documents presented to this Court, the Court finds that sufficient cause exists to grant the Parties’ motion.
6. Specifically, this Court finds that:
2

(i) The Plaintiffs are in imminent danger of suffering irreparable injury unless this Court enters a temporary restraining order requiring the implementation of Section V. of the Agreement;
(ii) The Plaintiffs have no other adequate remedy at law, and require an injunction;
(iii) The Plaintiffs appear likely to succeed on the merits of their claims covered by the Agreement;
(iv) The balance of equities weighs in favor of immediately implementing Section V. of the Agreement because the Parties have already agreed to its implementation; and
(v) There will be no adverse effect on the public interest – and indeed, that the public interest will be served – by requiring the implementation of Section V. of the Agreement.
(vi) Based on the joint agreement of the Parties and the Court’s independent assessment, the prospective relief contained in the Amended Agreement is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right.
3

Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that the parties’ joint motion (doc. no. 1123) for temporary restraining order is granted as follows:
1. The Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) shall immediately proceed with the implementation of the requirements of Section V. of the “Settlement Agreement Concerning Mental Health Claims Arising Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”
2. Regarding the provisions of the Phase 1 Settlement Agreement, ADOC shall apply the provisions of the Phase 1 Consent Decree (Doc. 728) to the class of Inmates defined by Section II.4. of the ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement (Doc. 1100) unless expressly indicated otherwise therein, provided however that the provisions of the Phase 1 Consent Decree (Doc. 728) shall not apply to inmates sentenced to death (“death row inmates”) to the extent their claims were “carved out” of the Phase 1 Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree as expressed in the Parties’ Joint Stipulation Concerning Revised Intellectual Testing of Death Row Inmates (Doc. 709), the Court’s Phase 1 Final Settlement Approval Order and Opinion (Doc. 727 at 66-69), the Joint Stipulation of Dismissal without Prejudice of Claims Brought on Behalf of Death Row Inmates Concerning Intellectual
4

Disability Issues (Doc. 911), and the Court’s Judgment Dismissing Claims related to

Prisoners on Death Row (Doc. 925).

3. Regarding the provisions of the Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training:

i.

Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training. ADOC shall provide

Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training for the following

individuals who are in ADOC’s physical custody for a period of

no less than 181 consecutive calendar days:

a. Any Inmate who is diagnosed as having an Intellectual Disability pursuant to the testing protocol described in the Phase 1 Consent Decree; or

b. Any Inmate who meets the IQ prong and the Adaptive Behavior prong as defined under the Phase I Consent Decree, but who does not meet the “age of onset” requirement of the DSM-V. This shall include Inmates who have developed a medical condition which substantially affects mental cognition and adaptive skills consistent with the standard set forth under the Phase 1 Consent Decree and whose primary care physician’s assessment concludes that such programming will be beneficial to the Inmate. In that instance, the Inmate’s primary care physician will prescribe programming specific to the Inmate’s needs and abilities; or

c. Any other Inmate whom ADOC determines would substantially benefit from such training.

ii.

Frequency of Provision of Programming.

a. Within six (6) months of identification of an Inmate meeting any of the above criteria, ADOC shall enroll an

5

Inmate meeting the criteria described above into the “Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training Program” (the "Program") as described herein. All reasonable and necessary accommodations will be afforded such Inmate consistent with the terms of the Phase I Consent Decree and the Acts. Routinely, all such topics contained within the Program shall be completed within six (6) calendar months of enrollment, The time for completion may be extended where a specific Inmate has such profound limitations such that he or she cannot participate in the Program at the same pace as other Inmates within the Program. If such were to occur, ADOC will evaluate and modify the Program on an individual basis for such Inmate to ensure that such Inmate is able to receive the fundamental portions of the information.
b. The Program will be provided to Inmates regardless of their security classification. The Program may be provided by ADOC Psychological Associates or similarly situated and trained individuals employed by ADOC or any third party contractor (collectively or individually, the “Instructor”). The number of Inmates enrolled in a particular ADOC facility’s Program will be small enough to ensure meaningful participation by affected Inmates, but in no event shall be greater than twenty (20) Inmates per class.
c. Thereafter, every other year, any such Inmates who remain within ADOC’s physical custody shall undergo a refresher class covering the topics in the Program. The refresher course may be a repeat of the entire Program that had been provided (updated as appropriate) or an abbreviated version of such program so long as the
6

abbreviated version returns the Inmate to the level of functioning he or she had attained at the completion of the initial Program.

iii.

Transfer of Inmates While They are Enrolled in the Program.

a. ADOC will attempt to minimize the transfer of Inmates while they are actively participating in the Program. If ADOC determines that an Inmate needs to be transferred to another ADOC facility while the Inmate is enrolled in the Program, then the sending institution will, within seven (7) working days of transfer, discuss in person, telephonically, or by email, with the receiving institution the current status, issues, and mental health needs of the transferring Inmate.

b. Inmates will be assigned a Case Manager at their assigned institution. This person’s responsibility will be to evaluate and review what Program courses, if any, the Inmate has not completed. The Case Manager will enroll the Inmate into any Program courses the Inmate has not completed. The Case Manager will meet with the Inmate a minimum of once per year to assess remedial needs.
c. Transfer of an Inmate will not constitute a reason, on its own, for a failure to complete the Program within the allotted six (6) month period as described herein.

iv.

Adaptive Behavior/Life Skill Programming Components.

a. The initial Program shall be at least twenty-two (22) hours in total duration. Inmates will be provided instruction concerning the topics included within the Program in classes not to exceed ninety (90) minutes each. The Instructor of a class must assess whether participating Inmates have fully understood the materials presented in that class. If an Inmate is unable to understand and retain

7

the information provided during a class, appropriate steps must be taken to solve this issue, to include providing the Inmate with additional classes. Any additional class required as a result shall not count against the twenty-two (22) hour period.
b. The following general topics and areas must be included within the Program:
A. Decision Making. The Program must include a topic to teach Inmates how to make good decisions, to identify skills and strategies to be employed in making such decisions, the existence, identity, and method to secure assistance when appropriate in making good decisions. The topic will cover how to avoid becoming a victim or being inappropriately influenced by other Inmates.
B. Stress Management. The Program will address this topic in order to alleviate and minimize stress within the prison context. This topic will be designed specifically for Inmates with limited cognitive abilities.
C. Communication Skill Building. This topic will consist of direct training regarding each method by which an Inmate may secure an accommodation, medical and mental health care, access to programming to include educational, vocational, and rehabilitative, other programming such as recreational, religious, and leisure (such as commissary). It also will include training on how an Inmate can stay informed about current regulations and any changes within the facility
8

where the Inmate is housed. This topic must include a discussion of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) and ADOC procedures for notifying the ADOC of a violation.
D. Risk Taking Consequences. This topic shall consist of modules outlining various common forms of risk taking activities and a practical discussion of the consequences of such actions. It shall include a discussion of drug usage, sexual activity, and violation of facility rules and regulations.
E. Self Help. This topic shall include a discussion of available methods by which an Inmate may develop necessary skills to become an independent self-advocate.
F. Accessing Prison Services. This topic should be taught in conjunction with “Communication Skill Building,” Section V.5(b)(iii), supra, and will consist of an overview of all available prison services both within the ADOC system generally and within the prison in which the Inmate is housed and how to access such available services.
G. Hygiene. This topic is designed to teach basic hygiene and the medical and social reasons for proper hygiene. Additional subtopics will address healthy living, such as diet, diabetic issues, and weight.
H. Self-Direction. This topic shall include a discussion and strategy designed to encourage an Inmate to make positive decisions and positively seek educational, vocational, and rehabilitative
9

programming. The programming shall actively encourage Inmates to make the best use of their time, and to actively seek appropriate outlets, rather than merely pass the time, while within the custody of ADOC.
I. Prison Rules. This topic shall include an in-depth review of prison rules to ensure than Inmates are aware of the existence and consequence for violation prison rules and regulations.
4. Further, the Parties shall implement any other provision of the
Agreement necessary so that all inmates covered by the Agreement are provided
with the services and benefits detailed in Section V. during the pendency of the
Court’s preliminary and final approval of the Agreement.
It is further ORDERED, by the agreement of the parties as expressed in open
court on January 19, 2017, that this temporary restraining order will remain in
effect until the court finally approves or rejects the parties’ Settlement Agreement
Concerning Mental Health Claims Arising Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
DONE, this the 19th day of January, 2017.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 1 of 302

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

LIABILITY OPINION AND ORDER AS TO PHASE 2A EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM

I. INTRODUCTION

3

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

5

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6

A. ADOC Facilities and Organizational Structure

8

B. MHM Organizational Structure

12

C. Summary of Factual Findings

15

1. Fact Witnesses

15

2. Expert Witnesses

24

IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT LEGAL STANDARD

30

V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

33

1

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 2 of 302

A. Serious Mental-Health Needs

34

B. Actual Harm and Substantial Risks of Serious Harm

Posed by Inadequate Care

39

1. Contributing Conditions

46

a. Overcrowding

47

b. Mental-Health Understaffing

49

c. Correctional Understaffing

59

2. Identification and Classification of Prisoners’

Mental-Health Needs

71

a. Inadequate Intake Process

72

b. Inadequate Referral Process

79

c. Inadequate Classification of Mental-Health Needs 83

d. Inadequate Utilization of Mental-Health Units 86

3. Inadequate Treatment Planning

89

4. Inadequate Psychotherapy

96

5. Inadequate Inpatient Care

109

a. Improper Use of Mental-Health Units

110

b. Inadequate Out-of-Cell Time and Programming 115

c. Lack of Hospital-Level Care

128

6. Inadequate Suicide Prevention and Crisis Care 133

a. Failure to Provide Crisis Care to Those Who Need

It

141

b. Placement of Prisoners in Crisis in Dangerous and

Harmful Settings

153

c. Inadequate Treatment in Crisis Care

157

d. Unsafe Crisis Cells

160

e. Inadequate Monitoring of Suicidal Prisoners 167

f. Inappropriate Release from Suicide Watch and

Inadequate Follow-up

173

7. Inappropriate Use of Disciplinary Actions

178

2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 3 of 302

8. Inappropriate Placement and Inadequate Treatment

in Segregation

190

a. Background on Segregation

193

i. Consensus among Correctional and

Mental-Health Professionals on Segregation

193

ii. ADOC’s Segregation Units

199

b. ADOC’s Segregation of Mentally Ill Prisoners 205

i. ADOC’s Segregation-Placement Practices 206

ii. Treatment and Monitoring in Segregation

Units

214

c. Segregation of Prisoners with Serious Mental

Illness

225

9. Tutwiler

230

10. Other Issues

236

C. Deliberate Indifference

242

1. ADOC’s Knowledge of Harm and Risk of Harm

250

2. ADOC’s Disregard of Harm and Risk of Harm

261

a. ADOC’s Failure to Exercise Oversight of the

Provision of Mental-Health Care

264

b. ADOC’s Unreasonable Responses to Identified

Deficiencies

276

D. Ongoing Violation

283

E. Ex parte Young Defenses

291

VI. CONCLUSION

299

I. INTRODUCTION The plaintiffs in this phase of this class-action lawsuit are a group of seriously mentally ill state prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), which represents mentally ill prisoners in
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 4 of 302
Alabama. The defendants are the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC), Jefferson Dunn, and the Associate Commissioner of Health Services, Ruth Naglich, who are sued only in their official capacities. The plaintiffs assert that the State of Alabama provides constitutionally inadequate mental-health care in prison facilities and seek injunctive and declaratory relief. They rely on the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment and as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights).
After a lengthy trial, this claim is now before the court for resolution on the merits. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments, the court finds for the plaintiffs in substantial part. Surprisingly, the evidence from both sides (including testimony from Commissioner Dunn and Associate Commissioner Naglich as well as that of all experts) extensively and materially supported the plaintiffs’ claim.
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 5 of 302
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This extremely complex case has been split into three phases: Phase 1 involved claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, claiming discrimination on the basis of physical disabilities and failure to accommodate those disabilities. The parties settled Phase 1. See Dunn v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (Thompson, J.). Phase 2A involves Eighth Amendment, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and due-process claims regarding mental-health care. The parties settled the Phase 2A ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim. The due-process claims are pending before the court for settlement approval.1 Phase 2B will focus on medical-care and dental-care claims under the Eighth Amendment.
1. Earlier in the litigation, the parties also reached a settlement regarding the distribution of razor blades to mentally ill prisoners.
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 6 of 302
This opinion resolves only the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate mental-health care.2 The court has certified a Phase 2A plaintiff class consisting of all persons with a serious mental illness who are, or will be, confined within ADOC’s facilities, excluding Tutwiler Prison for Women and the work-release centers. See Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (Thompson, J.). While mentally ill prisoners at Tutwiler are not part of the class, ADAP, as Alabama’s designated protection and advocacy organization for the mentally ill, brought claims on their behalf. A seven-week trial followed.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Mental-health care in this opinion refers to screening, treatment, and monitoring of mental illnesses,
2. The defendants did not raise or re-argue exhaustion of administrative remedies during or after the trial, and did not argue exhaustion in their post-trial filings as a reason they should prevail. See Defendants’ Post-Trial Brief (doc. no. 1282); see also Dunn v. Dunn, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (M.D. Ala. 2016).
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 7 of 302
as well as ADOC’s policies and practices regarding
mentally ill prisoners, including decisions on disciplinary sanctions and housing placements.3 Before
diving in to the details of weeks’ worth of testimony and
thousands of pages of documentary evidence regarding
mental-health care within ADOC, the court pauses to
provide some background information on ADOC and its
mental-health contractor, as well as a summary of the
factual findings.
3. The provision of mental-health care to Alabama's prisoners has been litigated at least three times before. See Laube v. Campbell, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.) (approving settlement agreement that provides for inpatient care, suicide prevention and treatment, crisis intervention, and counseling services in a class-action lawsuit brought on behalf of women incarcerated in Alabama); Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (Albritton, J.) (certifying a class of severely mentally ill male prisoners); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (Johnson, J.) (ordering the State to provide minimally adequate mental-health care, including identification of mentally ill prisoners and provision of care by qualified mental-health professionals), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part on other grounds, and remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 8 of 302

A. ADOC Facilities and Organizational Structure

ADOC runs 15 major facilities (14 for men and the

Tutwiler Prison for Women) and houses around 19,500 prisoners in its major facilities.4 Approximately 3,400

prisoners are on the mental-health caseload, meaning that

they receive some type of mental-health treatment, such

as counseling or psychotropic medications. MAJOR ADOC FACILITIES5

Facility

Location

Population

Bibb

Brent

1847

Bullock

Union Springs

1522

Donaldson

Bessemer

1474

Draper

Elmore

1144

Easterling

Clio

1457

Elmore

Elmore

1186

Fountain

Atmore

1242

4. ADOC also houses an additional 4,500 prisoners in work centers and work-release centers, bringing the total population in custody to around 24,000.

5. See Pl. Ex. 1260, September Statistical Report (doc. no. 1097-19).
8

2016

Monthly

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 9 of 302

Hamilton Holman Kilby Limestone St. Clair Staton Ventress Tutwiler

Hamilton Atmore Mt. Meigs Harvest Springville Elmore Clayton Wetumpka

275 941 1126 2214 975 1382 1254 880

Three of the major facilities, Bullock, Donaldson, and Tutwiler, serve as ‘treatment hubs’ for mental-health services, containing a residential treatment unit (RTU) and/or a stabilization unit (SU). These two types of units, together referred to as ‘mental-health units’ or ‘inpatient-care units,’ house and treat the most severely mentally ill prisoners. The rest of those on the mental-health caseload receive their care through outpatient services: they live in a unit that is not focused on treatment and ordinarily must go to a

9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 10 of 302
different part of the prison to see a mental-health provider.
Under the administrative regulations governing ADOC’s mental-health care, RTUs are for mental-health patients who suffer from “moderate impairment in mental health functioning” that puts them at risk in a general-population setting. Joint Ex. 107, Admin. Reg. § 613-2 (doc. no. 1038-130). RTUs are intended to provide a therapeutic environment to mentally ill patients and to help them develop coping skills necessary for placement in general population. RTUs can be ‘closed,’ meaning that each patient lives in an individual cell with little time spent outside the cell; ‘semi-closed,’ meaning that the patient still stays in an individual cell but is let out of the cell more often; or ‘open,’ meaning that the patient lives in an open dormitory with other RTU patients.
SUs are for patients who are suffering from acute mental-health problems--such as acute psychosis or other conditions causing an acute risk of self-harm--and have
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 11 of 302
not been stabilized through other interventions. SUs are intended to stabilize the patient as quickly as possible so that the patient can return to a less restrictive environment. All SU patients are housed in individual cells.
Altogether, the two male treatment hubs have 346 RTU beds and 30 SU beds: Bullock has 250 RTU beds and a 30-bed SU for male prisoners, and Donaldson has an additional 96-bed RTU. Tutwiler has 30 RTU beds and eight SU beds for women. These units provide services to about 2 % of ADOC’s overall population.
ADOC is headed by Commissioner Dunn. Associate Commissioner for Health Services Naglich heads the Office of Health Services (OHS), which is responsible for overseeing the provision of medical and mental-health care to prisoners. ADOC uses private contractors to deliver medical and mental-health care services to prisoners. Under the mental-health contract with a third-party vendor, OHS has access to the contractor’s internal documents and records, and the contractor is
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 12 of 302
required to send certain reports, such as monthly operating reports and annual contract-compliance reports, to OHS. The only OHS staff member with mental-health expertise is Dr. David Tytell, the chief clinical psychologist. Dr. Tytell serves as the main liaison between the mental-health contractor and ADOC, and communicates with the contractor’s program director at least weekly. ADOC also directly employs ‘psychological associates,’ who are counselors responsible for conducting certain psychological tests at intake and for providing group sessions and classes for non-mentally ill prisoners. They report to their respective facilities’ wardens, rather than OHS or the mental-health contractor.
B. MHM Organizational Structure MHM Correctional Services, Inc. is ADOC’s contractor for mental-health care. MHM is a for-profit corporation that provides medical and mental-health services to correctional facilities across the country.
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 13 of 302

MHM’s regional office in Alabama is headed by its

program director Teresa Houser. She serves as the main

liaison between ADOC and MHM. Dr. Robert Hunter, a

psychiatrist who serves as the medical director for the

Alabama regional office, is charged with supervising

psychiatrists and certified registered nurse

practitioners (CRNP) stationed at various ADOC facilities.

Both Houser and Hunter communicate frequently with ADOC

officials, including Associate Commissioner Naglich and

Dr. Tytell.

MHM employs a variety of administrative and clinical

personnel to fulfill its contract with ADOC. In its

regional

office,

Houser

supervises

various

administrators and managers, such as the continuous

quality improvement (CQI) manager, who conducts informal

audits of MHM’s performance, and the chief psychologist,

who supervises psychologists and conducts training for

MHM employees. At the facility level, MHM employs site

administrators to provide administrative oversight;

these administrators are counselors by training. MHM

13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 14 of 302
also employs approximately 45 full-time ‘mental-health professionals’ (MHPs), who are masters-level mental-health counselors, at prisons across the State. As of December 2016, MHM employed four psychiatrists and eight CRNPs in Alabama; these providers are qualified to diagnose mental illnesses, prescribe psychotropic medication, and provide psychotherapy across multiple facilities. MHM also employs three psychologists and three registered nurses (RNs) for the entire State. The RNs are stationed at the three treatment hubs, Bullock, Donaldson, and Tutwiler; they administer medication, provide crisis intervention, and supervise the licensed practical nurses (LPNs) at their facilities. MHM employs approximately 40 LPNs, individuals with 12 to 15 months of health-care training. The LPNs are responsible for conducting mental-health intake at Kilby and Tutwiler, monitoring medication compliance, maintaining medication records, and conducting side-effects monitoring tests for psychotropic medications. While the LPNs stationed in the mental-health treatment units are supervised by the
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 15 of 302
on-site RN, at all other places, including at intake screening, LPNs have no on-site supervision. Lastly, MHM employs six to eight activity technicians, who organize or assist in therapeutic, social, and recreational activities for patients in mental-health units.
C. Summary of Factual Findings 1. Fact Witnesses
Over the course of seven weeks, the court heard testimony as to whether ADOC’s mental-health care violates mentally ill prisoners’ constitutional rights. The trial opened with the testimony of prisoner Jamie Wallace, who suffered from severe mental illnesses, intellectual disability, and substantial physical disabilities. Wallace stated that he had tried to kill himself many times, showed the court the scars on arms where he made repeated attempts, and complained that he had not received sufficient treatment for his illness. Because of his mental illness, he became so agitated during his testimony that the court had to recess and
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 16 of 302
reconvene to hear his testimony in the quiet of the chambers library and then coax him into completing his testimony as if he were a fearful child. The court was extremely concerned, by what it had seen and heard from this plaintiff, about the fragility of his mental health. At the end of Wallace’s testimony and out of his presence, the court informed the attorneys for both sides that it wanted a full report on his mental condition and the steps that were being taken to address that condition. Unfortunately, and most tragically, ten days after Wallace testified, he killed himself by hanging. Because it appeared that adequate measures may not have been put in place to prevent Wallace’s suicide, the court put the parties into mediation to attempt to come up with immediate, interim procedures to prevent future prisoner suicides. The parties eventually came up with such procedures. Without question, Wallace’s testimony and the tragic event that followed darkly draped all the subsequent testimony like a pall.
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 17 of 302
The plaintiffs’ case then proceeded with testimony from Commissioner Dunn, who aptly described the prison system as wrestling with a “two-headed monster”: overcrowding and understaffing. Dunn Testimony at 26. The court also heard from Associate Commissioner Naglich and MHM’s program director Houser, for whom overcrowding and understaffing (both as to correctional staff, as noted by Dunn, and mental-health staff) were a mantra. They, with admirable candor, as with many other fact witnesses and the experts from both sides, essentially agreed that the staffing shortages, combined with persistent and significant overcrowding, contribute to serious systemic deficiencies in the delivery of mental-health care.
The inadequacies in the mental-health care system start at the door, with intake screening for prisoners who need mental-health care. ADOC boasts one of the lowest mental-illness prevalence rates among correctional systems in the country. But this is not because Alabama has fewer mentally ill prisoners than the
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 18 of 302

rest of the country or the best mental-health care system

for its prisoners; rather, according to experts from both

sides, this is because a substantial number--likely

thousands--of prisoners with mental illness are missed

at intake and referrals for evaluation and treatment are

neglected. As a result, many ADOC prisoners who need

mental-health care go untreated.

Even when identified, mentally ill prisoners receive

significantly inadequate care.

Mental-health and

correctional staffing shortages drive inadequate

treatment. Individual and group counseling sessions are

delayed or canceled due to shortages of counselors and

correctional officers to escort prisoners to the sessions

and to provide security. As a result, mental-health

staff often have to resort to cell-side contacts, which

cannot be considered substitutes for meaningful,

confidential, out-of-cell appointments.

Treatment

planning is often pro forma and not individualized and

fails to provide a meaningful and consistent course of

treatment. Mental-health units intended as a therapeutic

18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 19 of 302

environment for the most severely ill prisoners operate

like segregation units, with little counseling,

therapeutic programming, or out-of-cell time. ADOC does

not provide hospital-level care for those who need it.

ADOC also fails to provide adequate care to prisoners

expressing suicidality and undergoing mental-health

crises.

Mental-health staff fail to use appropriate

risk-assessment tools to determine suicide risk. ADOC

has an insufficient number of crisis, or ‘suicide-watch,’

cells--special cells for the protection of suicidal

prisoners. Because they have a limited number of cells

to work with, they gamble on which prisoners to put in

them and frequently discount prisoners’ threats of

self-harm and suicide. The insufficient number of crisis

cells also results in the use of unsafe rooms such as

shift offices to house suicidal prisoners.

The

suicide-watch cells that do exist are dangerous:

visibility into many of the cells is poor, making it

difficult to monitor; many cells have tie-off points for

ligatures that can be used for suicide attempts;

19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 20 of 302
dangerous items used for inflicting self-injury are often found. Prisoners in these cells receive less contact with and less monitoring by providers than the acuity of their condition demands. When they are released to general population or segregation, prisoners receive inadequate follow-up.
ADOC’s segregation practices inflict further harm on prisoners suffering from inadequate mental-health care. Due to the effects of isolation, placement in segregation endangers mentally ill prisoners, and the risk of harm increases with the length of isolation and the severity of their mental illness. This danger is compounded by the limited access to mental-health care and monitoring available within ADOC’s segregation units and dangerous conditions inside the cells. Despite these dangers, ADOC does not have a meaningful mechanism that prevents mentally ill prisoners from being placed in segregation for lengthy periods of time. Moreover, many mentally ill prisoners land in segregation due to symptoms of
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 21 of 302
mental illness. This combination of conditions is often deadly: most suicides in ADOC occur in segregation.
For years, ADOC has failed to respond reasonably to these problems. Despite knowledge of serious and widespread deficiencies, it has failed to remedy known problems and exercised very little oversight of its mental-health care contractor. Associate Commissioner Naglich, who is in charge of contract monitoring, admitted that she has been aware of the contractor’s deficient performance and inadequate quality-control process; however, she does not monitor the contractor to ensure that it provides minimally adequate care. Moreover, ADOC officials admitted on the stand that they have done little to nothing to fix problems on the ground, despite their knowledge that those problems may be putting lives at risk.
The psychological and sometimes physical harm arising from these systemic deficiencies is palpable. Unidentified and under-treated mental illness causes needless pain and suffering in the form of persistent or
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 22 of 302
worsening symptoms, decompensation, 6 self-injurious behavior, and suicide. The skyrocketing suicide rate within ADOC in the last two years is a testament to the concrete harm that inadequate mental-health care has already inflicted on mentally ill prisoners.
In fact, as explained earlier, the court had a close encounter with one of the tragic consequences of inadequate mental-health care during the trial. Over the course of the trial, two prisoners committed suicide, one of whom was named plaintiff Jamie Wallace. Prior to his suicide, defendants’ expert, Dr. Patterson, concluded based on a review of Wallace's medical records that the care he had received was inadequate. Dr. Haney, a correctional mental-health care expert, met Wallace months before his death, while he was housed in a residential treatment unit, and in his report expressed
6. Decompensation refers to exacerbation of symptoms of mental illness and impaired mental functioning; it calls for a “more structured or sheltered setting for more intensive treatment interventions.” Burns Testimony at vol. 1, 173.
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 23 of 302
serious concerns about the care he was receiving. 7 Wallace’s case was emblematic of multiple systemic deficiencies. Wallace testified, and his records reflected, that mental-health staff did not provide much in the way of consistent psychotherapeutic treatment, which is distinct from medications administered by nurses and cursory ‘check-ins’ with staff. MHM clinicians recommended that he be transferred to a mental-health hospital, but ADOC failed to do so. His psychiatrist at the time of his death testified that the medically appropriate combination of supervised out-of-cell time and close monitoring when he was in his cell was unavailable due to a shortage of correctional officers. As a result, Wallace was left alone for days in an isolated cell in a treatment unit, where he had enough time to tie a sheet unnoticed; because his cell was not suicide-proof, he was able to find a tie-off point from which to hang himself.
7. During their meeting, Wallace began to cry, leaned over the interview table, and told Dr. Haney, with tragic prescience, “[T]his place is killing me.” Joint Ex. 459, Haney Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043) at 40.
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 24 of 302
The case of Jamie Wallace is powerful evidence of the real, concrete, and terribly permanent harms that woefully inadequate mental-health care inflicts on mentally ill prisoners in Alabama. Without systemic changes that address these pervasive and grave deficiencies, mentally ill prisoners in ADOC, whose symptoms are no less real than Wallace’s, will continue to suffer.
2. Expert Witnesses Plaintiffs and defendants presented five experts in the correctional mental health and correctional administration fields.8 By and large, experts from both sides agreed that ADOC facilities are suffering from severe systemic deficiencies that are affecting the delivery of mental-health care. For example, experts from both sides agreed that ADOC suffers from severe
8. In a separate order with an opinion to follow, the court finds that four of the experts’ methodologies survive Daubert challenges. No objection was raised against plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Craig Haney.
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 25 of 302
overcrowding; correctional understaffing; mental-health staff shortages; deficient treatment planning; inadequate psychotherapy; inadequate use of mental-health units; inappropriate placement of segregation inmates; and inappropriate use of segregation for mentally ill prisoners.
Defendants’ correctional mental-health care expert, Dr. Raymond Patterson, is a forensic psychiatrist who has worked for various state and federal correctional institutions as a provider and as a consultant. In preparation for his testimony, he reviewed the individual plaintiffs’ medical records and deposition transcripts, visited and conducted audits of six facilities, and reviewed ADOC regulations, MHM policies and procedures, MHM monthly reports, and other expert reports. His conclusions regarding systemic deficiencies in ADOC’s mental-health care system largely tracked those of Dr. Kathryn Burns, one of the plaintiffs’ experts: he credibly concluded that ADOC needs more mental-health staff; ADOC’s identification and classification of mental
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 26 of 302
illness are inadequate; MHM’s unlicensed practitioners
should be supervised; treatment planning is deficient;
too few patients are getting inpatient care; ADOC should
provide hospitalization as an option for the most
severely ill patients; and suicide prevention measures are inadequate.9
Defense expert Robert Ayers is a correctional
administration expert who has been involved in the
California prison system for over 40 years. In
preparation for giving his opinion, Ayers reviewed
plaintiffs’ expert reports, visited six facilities, and
talked with ADOC and MHM staff during those visits. He
agreed with plaintiffs’ experts that ADOC facilities are
9. Based on his review of medical records and deposition testimony, Dr. Patterson also offered his opinions about whether individual plaintiffs’ care was adequate. However, because this is a case alleging systemic inadequacies in the delivery of mental-health care, the court need not determine the adequacy of care for any particular individual. Furthermore, because Dr. Patterson did not meet with any of the plaintiffs, and deposition transcripts, by Dr. Patterson’s own admission, are not a reliable source for determining credibility or making clinical diagnoses of an individual, the court gives little weight to his opinions as to whether the care provided to the individual plaintiffs was adequate.
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 27 of 302
understaffed and overcrowded. He opined that ADOC’s written policies related to mental-health care seemed to be adequate. However, he credibly explained that, mainly due to the severe understaffing and the lack of documentation, he had reasons to doubt that correctional officers and mental-health staff were actually complying with ADOC policies and procedures. He also concluded that ADOC was not providing an adequate level of care to all prisoners with mental-health needs.
Dr. Kathryn Burns, the chief psychiatrist for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, is a correctional mental-health expert for the plaintiffs. To prepare for her testimony, Dr. Burns visited nine major ADOC facilities, touring housing units, mental-health treatment areas, and crisis cells; she held formal interviews with 77 prisoners and spoke to an additional 25 prisoners at cell-front; she also reviewed documents such as medical records, ADOC regulations, MHM’s quality-improvement (or ‘continuous quality improvement’ or ‘CQI’) and multidisciplinary-team meeting minutes,
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 28 of 302
suicide tracking sheets, and audit results. Based on her review of this evidence, she identified a wide range of problems in the delivery of mental-health care, including: insufficient mental-health staffing and correctional staffing; inadequate identification and classification of mental illness; inadequate treatment, including cursory counseling appointments, inadequate treatment plans, dearth of group counseling, and inadequate use of mental-health units; and inadequate response to self-injurious behavior and mental-health crises. Dr. Burns credibly opined that these inadequacies, separately and taken together, subject mentally ill prisoners to a substantial risk of harm from untreated symptoms, continued pain and suffering, decompensation, self-injurious behavior, and suicide.
Dr. Craig Haney, a professor of psychology at the University of California Santa Cruz, is an expert for the plaintiffs in the psychological effects on prisoners of incarceration and particularly of segregation. His testimony focused on the state of segregation units and
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 29 of 302
their impact on prisoners’ mental health, based on his visits to seven facilities, interviews with numerous prisoners, and review of documents such as deposition transcripts of ADOC and MHM personnel, medical records, monthly statistical reports, and quality-assurance documents, among others. He testified that segregation units he saw were “degraded, dilapidated, deplorable,” and that these units and conditions have a significant negative psychological impact on prisoners. Haney Testimony at vol. 1, 79. Furthermore, he explained how ADOC’s segregation practices harm mental health of all prisoners, and especially that of prisoners who are already mentally ill.
Lastly, plaintiffs’ expert Eldon Vail is a correctional administration expert who has worked in corrections for over 30 years. Vail toured seven prisons, spending a day at each, and conducted confidential interviews with 42 prisoners. He also reviewed ADOC policies and procedures, meeting minutes, reports and logs generated by ADOC, deposition testimony of ADOC and
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 30 of 302
MHM personnel, and other documentary evidence. His testimony focused on matters of prison administration, including security, staffing, and behavior management, and the impact of these factors on the provision of mental-health care and on prisoners’ mental health. He credibly testified that the level of correctional understaffing at ADOC was so low as to be “shocking,” and that it has cascading effects on mental-health care: inadequate staff to transport prisoners to appointments and supervise treatment activities; inadequate staff to monitor segregation inmates, who have higher suicide risks; and overcrowded crisis cells filled with prisoners who feel unsafe due to violence in general-population dorms. Vail Testimony at vol. 1, 34.
IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT LEGAL STANDARD The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” extends to a State’s failure to provide minimally adequate medical care that “may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 31 of 302
any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Federal and state governments ... have a constitutional obligation to provide minimally adequate medical care to those whom they are punishing by incarceration.”). The State’s obligation to provide medical care to prisoners includes psychiatric and mental-health care. Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Failure to provide basic psychiatric and mental-health care states a claim of deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners.”). The ‘basic’ mental-health care that States must provide if needed by a prisoner includes not only medication but also psychotherapeutic treatment. See Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Even if this case involved failure to provide psychotherapy or psychological counselling alone, the court would still conclude that the psychiatric care was sufficiently similar to medical treatment to bring it within the embrace of Estelle.”). The State’s obligation remains
31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 32 of 302
even if it has contracted with private parties to provide medical care. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988). That is, the State is liable for the contractor’s unconstitutional policies and practices if the contractor is allowed to determine policy either “expressly or by default.” Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 706 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985).
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment challenge, plaintiffs must prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. This inquiry consists of both objective and subjective tests. The objective test requires showing that the prisoner has “serious medical needs,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, and either has already been harmed or been “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Subjectively, a prisoner must show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to that harm or risk of harm: that is, the official must have “known[] of and disregarded[] an
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 33 of 302
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837; see also Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003).
V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In this section, the court first discusses the basis for its finding that the plaintiffs have serious mental-health needs that require mental-health treatment. The court then lays out the common factors contributing to the substantial risks of harm in ADOC: shortages of mental-health staff, understaffing of correctional officers, and overcrowding. After that, the court proceeds through seven different ways in which ADOC’s mental-health care system has caused actual harm and a substantial risk of serious harm; the treatment of mentally ill prisoners at Tutwiler; issues on which the court does not, at this time, find for the plaintiffs; and the defendants’ knowledge of such harm and risks, and their failure to act in a reasonable manner to mitigate those risks. The section concludes with a discussion of
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 34 of 302
the defendants’ legal defenses based on Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
A. Serious Mental-Health Needs To prove an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate mental-health care, plaintiffs must show that they have serious mental-health care needs. A serious need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, courts may find the existence of serious needs even when prison staff have failed to recognize an inmate’s need for treatment. Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that plaintiff, whose requests to see a nurse had been rebuffed, demonstrated a serious medical need in that he had difficulty breathing and swollen, burning eyes, and a fellow inmate brought his condition to the attention of correctional officers), overruled on other grounds,
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 35 of 302
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). A serious mental-health care need was found where a doctor, nurse, and correctional officials recognized that a prisoner “engaged in self harm” and “showed outward signs of mania and depression.” Jacoby v. Baldwin Cty., 596 F. App’x 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2014).
One of the factors that courts consider in finding a serious medical need is “whether a delay in treating the need worsens it.” Danley, 540 F.3d at 1310. “The tolerable length of delay in providing medical attention depends on the nature of the medical need and the reason for the delay.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Factors relevant to determining the tolerable length of delay include the “seriousness of the medical need,” “whether the delay worsened the medical condition,” and “the reason for delay.” Id. at 1189.
Because this is a Rule 23(b)(2) class action lawsuit challenging defendants’ actions “on [a] ground[] that appl[ies] generally to the class”--that is, defendants’
35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 36 of 302
provision of inadequate mental-health care--the plaintiffs must show that serious mental-health needs exist on a system-wide basis, rather than on an individual basis. 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). As explained in the class-certification opinion, the plaintiffs’ claim and the remedies they seek are systemic. Braggs v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652, 667 (M.D. Ala. 2016). In other words, “plaintiffs are not seeking adjudication of demands for particular individualized treatment,” and any relief the court grants “would be appropriate for everyone subjected to the substantial risk of serious harm plaintiffs claim [ADOC’s inadequate mental-health care system] creates--that is, prisoners with serious mental illness.” Id. at 668.
It is clear that a number of prisoners in ADOC’s custody have serious mental-health needs, and the issue
10. Earlier in the litigation, this court certified a class consisting of “persons with a serious mental-health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject to defendants’ mental-health care policies and practices in ADOC facilities, excluding work-release centers and Tutwiler Prison for Women.” Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 640 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (Thompson, J.).
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 37 of 302
is undisputed. As a preliminary matter, MHM places
prisoners on the caseload only if they have been
diagnosed with a condition that requires treatment.
Therefore, all prisoners on the caseload meet the legal
requirement for having a serious mental-health need.
Prisoners on the mental-health caseload have wide-ranging
illnesses, such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder,
mood disorders, borderline personality disorder, anxiety,
and PTSD.11
11. The concept of ‘serious mental-health need’ in the Eighth Amendment context should not be confused with ‘serious mental illness,’ a term of art in the mental-health care field. As plaintiffs’ psychiatric expert Dr. Burns testified, ‘serious mental illness’ can be defined by three components: the diagnosis, the degree of disability, and the duration of the diagnosis or disability. Certain diagnoses are by definition serious mental illnesses, because they last a lifetime and are accompanied by debilitating symptoms; these diagnoses include bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder with psychotic features, and any other diagnoses with psychosis. Dr. Hunter, MHM’s medical director, agreed with this assessment, testifying that a person with well-controlled schizophrenia still has a serious mental illness, because it requires continued treatment, even if he or she is only mildly impaired at the moment. Other diagnoses, like anxiety and PTSD, may reflect a serious mental
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 38 of 302

Furthermore, the court heard testimony from multiple prisoners, both named plaintiffs and class members, who clearly exhibited serious mental-health needs. For example, plaintiff R.M. has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and admitted that he is out of touch with reality; he testified to what were obviously his delusions regarding his blood relationships to three different well-known terrorist figures and his owing billions of dollars to the United States treasury. Similarly, medical records made clear that plaintiff Q.B.

illness depending on the degree and duration of the

impairment.

Dr. Burns testified that ADOC’s

administrative definition of serious mental illness

tracks this understanding of serious mental illness. See

Joint Ex. 88, Admin. Reg. § 602 (doc. no. 1038-1039) at

11 (defining “serious mental illness” as “[a] substantial

disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or

memory such as those that meet the DSM IV criteria for

Axis I disorders ... [and] persistent and disabling Axis

II personality disorders.”). According to experts on

both sides, treatment of serious mental illnesses

requires, at a minimum, multidisciplinary efforts to

coordinate and implement interventions, including

psychotherapy or counseling, psychotropic medications,

and monitoring for signs of decompensation or progress.

It also requires careful treatment planning and

maintaining medical records in order to ensure continuity

of care.

38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 39 of 302
has suffered from years of delusion and hallucination; he was on involuntary psychiatric medication orders for years while in ADOC custody. Lastly, as explained earlier, plaintiff Jamie Wallace 12 had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, among other mental-health conditions, and he testified that he heard voices of his deceased mother telling him to cut himself. In sum, plaintiffs presented more than sufficient evidence establishing their serious mental-health needs.
Because only prisoners with serious mental-health needs have a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, when the court refers to ‘mentally ill prisoners’ in this opinion, it is referring to only those with serious mental-health needs.
B. Serious Harm and Substantial Risks of Serious Harm Posed by Inadequate Care
In addition to showing a serious medical need, plaintiffs must establish that they have been subjected
12. When the trial began, the court used full names of prisoner-witnesses, but the parties agreed to use initials after Jamie Wallace’s testimony.
39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 40 of 302
to serious harm, or a substantial risk of serious
harm--the second part of the ‘objective’ test under the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence--as a result of inadequate
mental-health care. Put another way, plaintiffs must
show that their serious medical need, “if left unattended,
‘poses a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Farrow v.
West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 n.13 (11th Cir. 2003)(quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Defendants
may be held liable for “incarcerating prisoners under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.13
13. While courts have sometimes used the “serious need” and “substantial risk of serious harm” tests interchangeably, they appear to be somewhat distinct: the “serious need” requirement examines whether a prisoner has a medical problem requiring attention; the “substantial risk of serious harm” test examines whether the defendant’s inattention to or mistreatment of the medical need threatens serious harm to the prisoner. Of course, a plaintiff may face a serious medical need because defendants’ inattention has caused or exacerbated a medical condition, see, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (concluding that prisoner’s claim based on potential future effects of exposure to tobacco smoke could be a viable Eighth Amendment claim), but this does not change the fact that the focus of the “serious need” inquiry is the prisoner’s condition, while the
40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 41 of 302
The “serious harm” requirement “is concerned with both the ‘severity’ and the ‘duration’ of the prisoner's exposure” to the harm, such that an exposure to harm “which might not ordinarily violate the Eighth Amendment may nonetheless do so if it persists over an extended period of time.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). While mere discomfort is insufficient to support liability, id., “unnecessary pain or suffering” qualifies as serious harm. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs may bring an Eighth Amendment challenge to a condition that is already inflicting serious harm on them at the time of the complaint or to prevent serious harm which is substantially likely to occur in the future--a substantial risk of serious harm. As the Supreme Court explained in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), a case in which a prisoner challenged his prolonged exposure to second-hand smoke, “a remedy for
“substantial risk of serious harm” inquiry focuses on the effects of inadequate health care.
41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 42 of 302
unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event,” because “the Eighth Amendment protects against future harms to inmates,” even when the harm “might not affect all of those exposed” to the risk and even when the harm would not manifest itself immediately. Id. at 33-34. In other words, plaintiffs must show “that they have been subjected to the harmful policies and practices at issue, not (necessarily) that they have already been harmed by these policies and practices.” Dunn v. Dunn, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1123 (M.D. Ala. 2016)(Thompson, J.). In the class-action context, the plaintiff class must show that it, as a whole, has been subjected to policies and practices that create a substantial risk of serious harm. Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 654 (M.D. Ala. 2016)(Thompson, J.).
Moreover, multiple policies or practices that combine to deprive a prisoner of a “single, identifiable human need,” such as mental-health care, can support a finding of Eighth Amendment liability. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Conditions of
42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 43 of 302
confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise--for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.”)(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized this ‘totality of conditions’ approach in prison-conditions cases. See, e.g., Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575–76 (11th Cir. 1985).
Mentally ill ADOC prisoners, defined here as prisoners with serious mental-health needs, have suffered harm and are subject to a substantial risk of serious harm due to ADOC’s inadequate mental-health care. Based on the trial testimony, the court finds seven interrelated areas of inadequacy: (1) identification and classification of prisoners with mental illness; (2) treatment planning; (3) psychotherapy; (4) inpatient mental-health care units; (5) crisis care and suicide
43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 44 of 302
prevention; (6) use of disciplinary actions for symptoms
of mental illness; and (7) use of segregation for
mentally ill prisoners. In all seven areas, experts from
both sides by and large agreed about significant flaws
affecting mentally ill prisoners.14 MHM and ADOC staff
also recognized and corroborated the existence and
severity of these issues. Even Associate Commissioner
Naglich essentially agreed that some of these were
14. The ‘stacked Swiss cheese’ analogy, well known in the healthcare and risk-management contexts, may be useful here. In this analogy, a layer of Swiss cheese represents a mechanism to prevent harm, and an error is a hole in that layer. Ideally, each layer is sufficiently redundant to catch or ameliorate errors and to prevent holes from lining up. However, if each hole is too big, errors from each layer compound and result in an inadequate system. See James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 Brit. Med. J. 768 (2000). Applied to this context, each layer of mental-health care within ADOC--identification of symptoms at intake and referral; treatment planning; provision of psychotherapy; inpatient care; crisis care; and consideration of mental health in prisoner placement decisions--is riddled with too many holes to prevent mentally ill prisoners from falling through the cracks. Moreover, each layer’s error is compounded by latent errors in inter-related layers of care: for example, delinquent counseling appointments fail to address a sudden deterioration in a prisoner’s condition, which is worsened by the lack of a properly functioning referral system and a suicide-watch protocol.
44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 45 of 302
problems so significant that they must be fixed as soon
as possible, because lives are at risk. 15 These
inadequacies, alone and in combination, subject mentally
15. As discussed later, some of the policies and practices affecting mentally ill prisoners are determined by ADOC, others by MHM: for example, ADOC is responsible for staffing decisions and placement of prisoners in mental-health units and segregation; MHM is responsible for policies and practices in intake screening, the referral system, treatment planning, and psychotherapy. However, ADOC is still liable for policies and practices determined by MHM, for three reasons. First, ADOC’s decisions regarding mental-health staffing, correctional staffing, and overcrowding have directly impacted MHM’s policies and practices, such as frequently delayed and cancelled counseling sessions and the use of LPNs to conduct intake screening. Second, for some of the practices, ADOC has expressly authorized MHM to determine them on its behalf by contracting out its constitutional obligation to provide mental-health care. Third, even when ADOC has not expressly authorized MHM to make these policies--that is, when MHM’s policies and practices contravene ADOC’s administrative regulations or contractual requirements--ADOC through its lack of oversight has de facto delegated its decision-making authority to MHM. See Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 706 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that “whe[n] a governmental entity delegates the final authority to make decisions,” either expressly or by default, then “those decisions necessarily represent official policy” in the context of contracting out medical care for prisoners). Therefore, the court finds that ADOC is liable for the policies and practices described here, despite the fact that MHM is the entity providing mental-health care and determining some of the policies and practices related to mental-health care.
45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 46 of 302
ill prisoners to actual harm and a substantial risk of
serious harm--including worsening of symptoms, increased
isolation, continued pain and suffering, self-harm and
suicide.
1. Contributing Conditions
Three conditions contribute to all of the
deficiencies in ADOC’s treatment of mentally ill
prisoners: understaffing of mental-health care providers,
understaffing of correctional officers, and overcrowding. 16 Associate Commissioner Naglich and
16. Defendants advanced a few versions of the argument that variability across different facilities negates ADOC’s liability: defendants argued that experts visiting seven, eight, or nine facilities instead of visiting all 15 facilities renders their opinions irrelevant or not reliable; that certain facilities are not as overcrowded as others; and that plaintiffs did not prove that every single facility suffers from a shortage of crisis cells. As explained in the commonality and typicality analyses in the class certification opinion, Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 655-66 (M.D. Ala. 2016), evidence of systemic practices that may have differing levels of impact at different facilities may establish liability against ADOC: mentally ill prisoners are subject to a substantial risk of serious harm from practices that are common in ADOC facilities no matter
46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 47 of 302
defendants’ expert witnesses largely agreed with plaintiffs that these conditions present significant challenges to the system today. Correctional and mental-health understaffing, both alone and in combination, impose substantial risks of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners, and overcrowding compounds these risks.
a. Overcrowding ADOC facilities are significantly and chronically overcrowded. Publically available information on ADOC’s inmate population and capacity plainly lays out the magnitude of overcrowding: ADOC’s September 2016 monthly statistical report states that ADOC held 23,328 prisoners in facilities that are designed to hold only 13,318; this brings the occupancy rate to over 175 %. Pl. Ex. 1260, September 2016 Monthly Statistical Report (doc. no.
where they are housed currently, because they may be housed in any of these facilities in the future due to ADOC’s frequent and unpredictable transfers of prisoners across facilities.
47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 48 of 302
1097-19) at 2, 4.17 Plaintiffs’ expert Vail testified
that the magnitude of overcrowding in ADOC is the worst
he has seen in his career in corrections and consulting
for other correctional systems across the country.
According to Vail, California, whose overcrowded
correctional system was found to be unconstitutional,
approached an occupancy rate of 170 %; a three-judge
court subsequently ordered the State to lower the
occupancy rate to 137.5 %, a target rate that was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.
493, 539-42 (2011). The sheer magnitude of overcrowding
within ADOC has meant that some ADOC facilities,
including Kilby, Bibb, Staton, and Easterling, house more
than double the number of prisoners they are designed to
hold. Pl. Ex. 1260, September 2016 Monthly Statistical
17. Parties have put forth evidence regarding the Alabama Prison Transformation Initiative, a proposal by the now-former Governor to build new prisons. At this point, the court does not see any need to determine the effects of the proposal, because the case at hand asks the court to evaluate whether the current state of mental-health care in existing ADOC facilities is constitutionally inadequate, rather than whether a hypothetical system of mental-health care in new prisons would be adequate.
48

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 49 of 302
Report (doc. no. 1097-19) at 4. Even maximum-security facilities use open-bay dormitories filled with wall-to-wall rows of double bunk beds, holding up to 240 prisoners in a single room, where officers do not have a line of sight on most of the prisoners they are assigned to supervise.

b. Mental-Health Understaffing

ADOC has maintained mental-health staffing levels

that are chronically insufficient across disciplines and

facilities. Witness after witness identified significant

mental-health staffing shortages as one of the major

reasons for ADOC’s inability to meet the rising

mental-health care needs of prisoners.

Most

significantly, Associate Commissioner for Health

Services Naglich admitted that MHM has been understaffed

since 2013 and remains understaffed today. MHM’s program

director Houser stated bluntly that MHM staffing

shortages make it difficult to “do the work required

under the contract,” and that the current caseload for

49

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 50 of 302
MHM staff does not meet an “acceptable standard.” Houser Testimony at vol. 2, 24-25.
Over the course of the trial, evidence showed that the mental-health caseload per MHM provider has been increasing since 2008, largely due to three reasons: (1) an increasing number of prisoners with mental-health needs across ADOC; (2) multiple budget cuts over the years; and (3) ADOC’s long-time refusal to increase the authorized number of mental-health staff positions despite repeated requests from MHM, even when an initiative to transfer some of the caseload to ADOC staff--so-called ‘blending of services’--was not implemented as planned.18
ADOC’s prisoner population has had increasing needs for mental-health services over the last decade. As multiple MHM providers and expert witnesses from both
18. After years of refusing to increase staffing, ADOC approved a small staffing increase in September 2016, shortly before the trial in this case, when it extended the contract with MHM for another year. However, both Associate Commissioner Naglich and MHM’s program director Houser testified that understaffing has persisted despite the recent increase.
50

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 51 of 302
sides testified, ADOC’s prisoner population has become more mentally ill over the last decade, both in terms of the number of individuals who need mental-health care and in terms of the acuity of mental-health care needs. MHM’s medical director, Dr. Hunter, testified that the number of prisoners receiving regular mental-health services within ADOC (also known as being ‘on the caseload’) has been increasing since 2003, which has been “concerning” and “tax[ing his] ability to adequately do” what he is required to do under the contract. Hunter Testimony at __. (For transcripts that are not yet finalized, the court leaves the page numbers blank.) He also explained that, since 2003, the number of prisoners coming into the system with severe mental illness has been increasing. MHM’s own documents showed that between 2008 and 2016, the mental-health caseload increased by 25 % across all facilities. Pl. Dem. Ex. 25, Pricing, Caseload and Staffing Comparison Over Time (doc. no. 1071-5).
As the need for mental-health services has been increasing substantially, MHM and ADOC have been hiring
51

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 52 of 302
fewer and fewer providers over the years, exacerbating the staffing shortage. In 2009, ADOC reduced MHM’s compensation under the contract and the number of authorized positions to be hired by MHM. In 2013, the state legislature further reduced ADOC’s mental-health care budget by 10 %. ADOC and MHM then re-negotiated their 2013 contract to reduce the previously agreed-upon “minimum required staffing,” cutting close to 20 full-time equivalent positions. Naglich Testimony 2-211; Pl. Dem. Ex. 140, MHM Staffing Increase Chart (doc. no. 1148-59); see also Pl. Dem. Ex. 25, Pricing, Caseload, and Staffing Comparison Over Time (doc. no. 1071-5). During that same contract renewal period, ADOC and MHM also reduced the number of positions that are covered by the contractual ‘staffing rebate’ provision, under which MHM must pay back ADOC if it does not fill all authorized positions. In other words, the revision allowed MHM to leave clinical staff positions unfilled without being penalized, even though the overall number of authorized positions had already been reduced. Houser described
52

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 53 of 302
this latter modification as a way to make the reduction in payment and staffing under the contract “more palatable for MHM.” Houser Testimony at vol. 1, 49.
Another driving force behind MHM’s mental-health understaffing is ADOC’s failure to implement the ‘blending of services’ initiative successfully. Houser explained that this initiative was established in 2009 in response to ADOC’s reduction in both the amount it would pay to MHM under the contract and in the staffing provided for in the contract: MHM’s caseload would be reduced by transferring treatment of prisoners with lower-acuity mental-health issues to ADOC’s psychological associates; the initiative was an “attempt to make sure that the inmates received mental health services” despite the staffing reduction and increasing caseloads. Houser Testimony at vol. 1, 14. However, ADOC failed to implement the initiative across its facilities: MHM’s staffing was reduced, but at many facilities, psychological associates did not take over any caseload from MHM. Naglich explained that, because
53

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 54 of 302
some wardens were resistant to letting psychological associates carry significant caseloads, MHM staff remained responsible for most of the patients, even though there were now fewer MHM providers than before. Houser testified that blending of services is not currently happening anywhere in ADOC in the way it was designed to happen, despite MHM’s reduced staffing levels. ADOC’s chief clinical psychologist Dr. David Tytell admitted that the initiative has failed to work. However, ADOC has not restored MHM’s staffing to the pre-2009 level.19
The result of ADOC’s refusal to increase MHM’s staffing level or even to restore staffing to the pre-2009 level has been chronic shortages of mental-health care providers. Dr. Hunter testified that the staffing shortage has had a significant impact on scheduling of psychiatric visits and medication management. Several mental-health counselors testified
19. Chronic mental-health understaffing is also compounded by vacancies that are left unfilled for many months.
54

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 55 of 302
that their caseloads have soared; Houser testified that MHP caseloads at some facilities have been twice what they should be, which is “never an acceptable standard.” Houser Testimony at vol. 2, 25. Increasing caseloads due to understaffing have also led to a high turnover rate among staff: according to Houser, staff resign because of their frustration with increasing caseloads, leaving the rest of the staff with even higher caseloads; recruiting also suffers because of the overwhelming caseloads that mental-health staff are expected to manage. MHM’s monthly operating report submitted to ADOC for May 2016 described the problem in stark terms: “Mental health caseloads are running high at many of the facilities. Staff has attempted to accommodate the increased numbers, however quality cannot be maintained at current staffing levels.” Joint Ex. 343 (doc. no. 1038-702) at 19. As explained in more detail in the following sections, this understaffing also has prevented MHM from providing care that complies with ADOC’s administrative regulations, the
55

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 56 of 302
contract, and professional standards for minimally adequate care in a prison system.20
Not surprisingly, experts from both sides opined that ADOC does not have a sufficient number of mental-health staff for a system of its size. Dr. Patterson, the defense expert, concluded based on his review of medical records and site visits that ADOC’s mental-health care system is significantly understaffed. Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Burns agreed with this assessment based on her review of medical records and MHM internal records, which revealed that caseloads for psychiatric providers and counselors were too large to allow for sufficient counselling or therapeutic group activities. Dr. Burns concluded that ADOC needs more psychiatric staff,
20. Examples of inadequate care caused by mental-health shortages include: lack of timely provision of counseling services; inadequate treatment planning; and inadequate monitoring of suicidal patients as well as those housed in mental-health units and segregation units.
56

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 57 of 302

psychologists, registered nurses, and activity technicians.21

MHM’s

corporate

office--which

exercises

contract-compliance oversight but does not directly

provide care in Alabama--has repeatedly raised

mental-health understaffing in the annual clinical

contract-compliance

review

reports

(hereafter

‘contract-compliance reports’) sent to Associate

Commissioner Naglich’s Office of Health Services.

21. Dr. Burns also testified that the mental-health staffing requirements in a 2001 settlement agreement between ADOC and a class of male prisoners provide a helpful benchmark for adequate staffing levels. See Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Bradley v. Harrelson, No. 2:92–cv–70 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2001) (Albritton, J.), ECF No. 412. Dr. Burns explained that while the number of ADOC prisoners in need of mental-health services has increased since the Bradley settlement, ADOC has entered into mental-health contracts that provide significantly fewer high-level practitioners, as well as more practitioners with lower levels of qualification, compared to the Bradley requirements. For example, under Bradley, ADOC was required to provide eight psychiatrists for approximately 20,600 prisoners; today, it employs five psychiatrists for close to 24,000 prisoners. While the staffing requirements derived from an out-of-court settlement do not set a constitutional floor for adequate mental-health care, the comparison with the Bradley settlement is relevant, though not dispositive, for determining whether the current staffing levels are adequate.
57

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 58 of 302
Starting in 2011, each annual contract-compliance report included information on multiple facilities that were suffering from staffing shortages, “compromising [MHM’s] ability to provide monthly follow-up for all caseload inmates.” Pl. Ex. 1190, 2011 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-8) at 15. The 2013 report also noted the impact of the staffing reduction that year, stating that “[d]espite the increase in the size of the caseload across ADOC, MHM’s contract has been compressed to include significant staffing cuts at all sites.” Pl. Ex. 114, 2013 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-4) at 1. The report also warned that, at Donaldson, where one of the two male residential treatment units is located, “[c]urrent staffing pattern does not support the delivery of adequate services to inmates and that they have been reduced to providing minimal and ‘triage-based’ services rather than effective and thoughtfully planned treatment.” Id. at 5. In 2016, MHM reported significant backlogs in treatment and staffing shortages at Donaldson and Bullock, the two male facilities that house ADOC’s
58

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 59 of 302
most seriously ill mental-health patients. Pl. Ex. 115, 2016 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-5). Even after the partial staffing increase in September 2016, Houser stated that MHM remains understaffed and pointed to mental-health understaffing as a cause for a plethora of issues, including insufficient identification of mental illness at intake and referrals; missed counseling appointments and group sessions; and inadequate monitoring of prisoners in mental-health crises.
Based on Associate Commissioner Naglich’s testimony and other evidence, the court finds that MHM has been consistently and significantly understaffed at least since 2013, and that it is still understaffed even after ADOC approved a small staffing increase in September 2016 as part of its one-year contract extension.
c. Correctional Understaffing In addition to mental-health understaffing and overcrowding, a significant shortage of correctional officers also hinders the delivery of mental-health care
59

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 60 of 302
and poses a substantial risk of harm to prisoners who need mental-health care. As with mental-health staffing shortages, witness after witness, including both defendants, testified that a significant shortage of correctional officers has been one of the biggest obstacles to providing mental-health care in ADOC. In Associate Commissioner Naglich’s words, the problem of insufficient mental-health staffing is “compounded by” the lack of sufficient correctional staffing at ADOC. Naglich Testimony at vol. 2, 208.
ADOC has reported an ever-increasing shortage of correctional officers in its annual reports and monthly operating reports since 2006. In 2010, ADOC summarized that “[c]orrectional staffing continues to fall short of required levels--impacting the inmate to officer ratio and overtime necessary to cover essential posts,” and reported that the shortage rate was 12.2 % at close-custody (highest security) facilities and 21.2 % at medium-security facilities. Joint Ex. 463, Vail Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1048) at 39 (quoting ADOC
60

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 61 of 302
Annual Report FY 2010). Essentially the same statement
regarding the officer shortage appeared in every annual
report until 2013, when the shortage rate across
facilities shot up to 43.3 %. The report in 2015 showed
officer shortage rates of over 25 % at 13 of the 15 major
prisons and over 50 % at six of those; the highest was
68 % at Bibb. Donaldson was barely under 25 %; only one
prison, Hamilton, the facility for the elderly and the
infirmed, was below 25 %. Id. at 39-40 (citing ADOC
Annual Report FY 2013, 2015). As of September 2016, ADOC
reported having filled only about half of the authorized
positions for correctional officers. Pl. Ex. 1260,
September 2016 Monthly Statistical Report (doc. no. 1097-19) at 16 (showing 51.1 % overall staffing level).22
22. Throughout the trial, there was confusion as to how ADOC defined ‘authorized positions’ for the purpose of deriving shortage rates published in their annual reports. During the defendants’ case, ADOC’s chief of staff Steve Brown finally clarified that the number of authorized positions was determined based on a staffing ratio of 1:6 or 1:7, which were ratios that ADOC considered close enough to the “ideal” ratio of one correctional officer for every five inmates. However, as plaintiffs’ expert Eldon Vail and ADOC officials explained, adequate staffing numbers cannot be calculated
61

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 62 of 302
by simply dividing the inmate population by the staffing ratio that is deemed to be ideal; rather, it requires a facility-by-facility determination that considers numerous variables, such as the layout and design of the facilities, level of security, level of programs and activities, and state and local standards and statutes. Vail also explained that 1:5 is not an “ideal” ratio but likely the average of staffing ratios from state correctional systems that responded to a survey conducted by the Association of State Correctional Administrators. The ratios also do not take multiple shifts and leave time into account. Therefore, while ADOC relied on the authorized position numbers derived from such calculations in its annual reports, the shortage rates in those reports are not reliable indicators of understaffing, except as a metric to measure change in staffing over time. However, as shown later, there is ample evidence, both from expert testimony and ADOC staff’s testimony, that ADOC suffers from a serious correctional staffing shortage.
It is alarming that ADOC has not conducted any staffing analysis in the last decade to determine exactly how many officers are needed to keep officers and prisoners safe within its facilities. It is also alarming that ADOC’s own reports have been relying on authorized-position numbers based on rudimentary ratios that do not take into consideration the actual layouts of facilities. This failure to conduct any staffing analysis is all the more troubling because at least one ADOC official, Associate Commissioner Grantt Culliver, has the expertise to conduct staffing analyses and has been training other state correctional officials on how to conduct staffing analyses. Vail also testified that it is not resource-intensive to obtain a staffing analysis from the National Institute of Corrections, since the Institute provides grants and other resources to state prison systems that host training for correctional officials in their own facilities, as ADOC has done.
62

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 63 of 302
The staffing level continued to drop throughout 2016, according to Associate Commissioner of Operations Grantt Culliver.
Understaffing has been a persistent, systemic problem that leaves many ADOC facilities incredibly dangerous and out of control. Defendants’ correctional administration expert Robert Ayers observed multiple high-security units not being monitored at all and an entire unit at Bibb overseen by a single control booth officer and a single officer on the floor; he opined that such understaffing was “not acceptable.” Ayers Testimony at __. Plaintiffs’ correctional administration expert Vail agreed with this conclusion and elaborated that many facilities are struggling to have sufficient numbers of correctional officers to station at least one officer per dorm--including the highest-security facilities, such as Holman and Kilby. Not surprisingly, a severe shortage of officers leads to dangerous and violent conditions, especially in high-security facilities with overcrowded
63

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 64 of 302

dormitories. 23 In these conditions, prisoners and

correctional officers alike are justifiably afraid for

their

safety--a

jarring

image

that

many

prisoner-witnesses and experts painted in their testimony.

For example, class member M.P., who is now housed in

Ventress, stated repeatedly how dangerous it was to be

in a general-population dorm at St. Clair; he was enormously relieved to be transferred to another prison.24

Multiple experts also testified that during their site

visits, prison officials did not allow them to enter

certain parts of the prison, such as the second and third

tiers of the Holman segregation unit and a whole half of

23. Vail explained that ADOC’s use of open dormitories in maximum-security facilities is almost unheard of in corrections.
24. The witness’s fear is well-warranted: St. Clair is the most violent facility in ADOC, accounting for a quarter of assaults with serious injuries within the system, while housing only 4 % of ADOC prisoners. Pl. Ex. 1260, September 2016 Monthly Statistical Report (doc. no.1108-37) at 4, 12.
64

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 65 of 302
Bibb, because the officials could not guarantee their safety.25
As a result of the officer shortage, ADOC has an exceedingly high overtime rate. Overtime rate refers to the proportion of the number of hours worked by correctional officers as overtime compared to the total number of hours worked. A high overtime rate undermines security and officer morale, which in turn has negative implications for mental-health care. ADOC’s chief of staff Steve Brown admitted that the current overtime rate of over 20 % is not sustainable in the long run, because it decreases retention of officers and increases the number of disciplinary actions against officers. Multiple vulnerability analyses--ADOC’s internal critical assessments of each facility’s security risks--also found that mandatory overtime and overuse of overtime have affected staff morale and contributed to
25. In fact, although the court has visited a number of prisons over the years, the United States Marshals Service, in consultation with defense counsel, advised against the court’s visit to Holman Correctional Facility in this case due to safety concerns.
65

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 66 of 302
high turnover rates. Pl. Ex. 146, Bullock Vulnerability
Analysis (doc. no. 1087-3); Pl. Ex. 185, Donaldson
Vulnerability Analysis (doc. no. 1087-6); Pl. Ex. 204
Elmore Vulnerability Analysis (doc. no. 1087-8).26
26. A related issue is the new set of staffing ratios that ADOC Chief of Staff Brown presented during the trial, which counted overtime hours performed by existing correctional officers as additional officers. These ratios are also misleading. First, according to plaintiffs’ expert Vail, counting overtime hours as additional full-time correctional officers is not the standard practice to determine whether correctional staffing is adequate. Second, these ratios do not take into consideration that officers working overtime are less effective than officers working standalone shifts, or that the overtime rate in ADOC is extremely high compared to other correctional systems, especially in facilities such as Donaldson, Kilby, St. Clair, Tutwiler, Draper, Holman, Bullock, and Easterling. Def. Dem. Ex. 19 (doc. no. 1148-60) (showing the eight facilities with 15 % or higher overtime rate). Furthermore, as with the authorized-position calculations discussed above, these ratios do not account for the fact that many ADOC facilities are designed with little direct line of sight from officer stations into prisoner living areas, and have dorms with rows and rows of bunk beds obstructing officers’ views; both factors require higher officer-to-inmate ratios than facilities with better line of sight or fewer bunked dorms.
Lastly, even if the court were to accept the current staffing ratios calculated by Brown’s staff as accurate, only two of the 14 facilities meet the 7:1 (for medium custody) or 6:1 (for close custody) thresholds. In other words, even using this overly inclusive metric to measure staffing sufficiency, ADOC is significantly understaffed.
66

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 67 of 302
This chronic and severe correctional understaffing has compromised mental-health care in many ways. Most significantly, as discussed in more detail in Part V.B.4, correctional officers are needed to provide security for mental-health programming and escort prisoners from their cells to appointments if they are not in general population. Due to insufficient correctional staffing, appointments and group activities are frequently canceled and delayed, significantly impairing MHM staff’s ability to provide treatment. See, e.g., Pl. Ex. 115, 2016 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-5) at 3 (MHM staff not being able to access patients at Bullock, Donaldson, Holman, St. Clair, and Staton due to correctional staffing shortages, and expressing concern about their own safety at five facilities); Pl. Ex. 105, 2014 MHM Implementation Review Report (doc. no. 1070-3) at 3 (20 to 70 % of mental-health appointments were canceled due to correctional officer shortages at the Donaldson residential treatment unit in 2014). Based on the testimony of Ayers, one of the defense experts, and
67

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 68 of 302
almost all MHM providers and managers who testified, the court is convinced that the correctional staffing level falls intolerably short of providing adequate care to prisoners who need to be escorted to their mental-health appointments.
Second, understaffing impacts correctional officers’ ability to supervise mentally ill prisoners effectively. According to plaintiffs’ expert Vail, understaffing compromises overworked correctional officers’ alertness and ability to respond to incidents, crises, and emergencies, and to exercise the patience and restraint necessary to supervise mentally ill prisoners. This effect is even more pronounced in segregation and crisis cells. Without sufficient correctional staff, officers are unable to check on prisoners isolated from the rest of the population as frequently as they must in order to guarantee their safety. As a result, decompensating prisoners go unnoticed, leading to extended suffering without access to treatment, and more frequent crisis situations.
68

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 69 of 302

Correctional

understaffing,

combined

with

overcrowding, also has a more direct impact on prisoners’

mental health. The combination of overcrowding and

understaffing leads to an increased level of violence,

both because of the difficulty of diffusing tension and

violence in an overcrowded open-dormitory setting, and

because of the lack of supervision by correctional

officers. See Pl. Ex. 1260, ADOC September 2016 Monthly

Statistical Report (doc. no. 1108-37) at 12 (reporting

nearly 200 assaults with serious injuries and seven

homicides in the fiscal year ending in September 2016).

According to Dr. Haney, plaintiffs’ expert on

correctional mental health and solitary confinement,

prisoners’ legitimate fear of violence is a common source

of anxiety and mental instability: for prisoners who

already suffer from mental illnesses, this environment

increases their likelihood of decompensation. The level

of danger and lack of control arising from overcrowding

and insufficient staffing also contributes to a punitive

culture, in which officers prioritize security concerns

69

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 70 of 302
over mental-health treatment and are quick to treat mental-health symptoms as behavioral problems; dealing with violence and emergencies also diverts correctional resources away from regular mental-health programming and treatment. Untreated or undertreated mental illness in turn creates a greater need for mental-health services, provision of which is limited by the very shortage of officers that created the increased need in the first instance. Furthermore, mental-health problems are much more likely to go unnoticed in overcrowded and understaffed prisons, because correctional officers who are spread too thin are less likely to notice any unusual behavior by a particular prisoner. These observations made by Dr. Haney all rang true in the evidence before the court. Lastly, as Dr. John Wilson, a psychologist who serves as one of the directors of MHM’s national Clinical Operations Department, explained to MHM’s program director Houser, “experience and research” confirm that suicides tend to increase with overcrowding, and “basic unrest at a systems level” can cause a spike
70

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 71 of 302
in suicides. Pl. Ex. 1224, October 1, 2015 Email from Wilson to Houser (doc. no. 1117-24) at 2. In fact, the suicide rate within ADOC has more than doubled in the last two years, as ‘unrest at a systems level’ continues to plague ADOC facilities. Taken together, ADOC’s low correctional-staffing level, in the context of its severely overcrowded prisons, creates a substantial risk of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners, including continued pain and suffering, decompensation, self-injury, and suicide.

2. Identification and Classification of Prisoners’ Mental-Health Needs

As one expert put it, ADOC’s mental-health care

system “falls apart at the door”: the system fails to

identify and classify appropriately those with mental

illnesses, and the effect of this under-identification

cascades through the system. Haney Testimony at vol. 1,

30.

Because of inadequate identification and

classification, seriously mentally ill prisoners

languish and decompensate in ADOC without treatment,

71

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 72 of 302
ending up in crisis care and engaging in destructive--sometimes fatal--self-harm.
Timely identification and appropriate classification of prisoners with mental illness are essential to a functioning mental-health care system. As experts explained, and as common sense would dictate, mental-health treatment cannot begin unless providers are aware of who needs treatment and for what. Failure to identify those who need mental-health services denies them access to necessary treatment, creating a substantial risk of harm to those who remain unidentified. See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming conclusion that systematic denial of access to treatment constitutes deliberate indifference to a serious medical need).
a. Inadequate Intake Process ADOC’s system for identifying prisoners with mental illness is significantly inadequate. According to three experts--defense expert Patterson and plaintiffs’
72

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 73 of 302
experts Burns and Haney--the percentage of prisoners within ADOC with mental illness (referred to as the ‘prevalence rate’) is substantially lower than the national average: the average rate of mental illness for men in correctional systems ranges between 20 % and 30 %; ADOC’s prevalence rate is between 14 % and 15 %. See Joint Ex. 346, June 2016 MHM Monthly Statistical Report (doc. no. 1038-708) at 1.
As experts from both sides testified, ADOC’s prevalence rate is abnormally low and reflects that the system is under-identifying prisoners with mental illness. Defense expert Dr. Patterson explained that experts do not expect to see much variation in actual prevalence rates across correctional systems, and that he has not seen anything that suggests that ADOC would have a lower prevalence rate than other correctional systems for any reason other than under-identification. Dr. Burns agreed and explained that it is highly likely that the abnormally low prevalence rate is due to under-identification, rather than because Alabama
73

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 74 of 302
prisoners have fewer mental-health issues compared to those in other States. She added that she does not know of any States that have lower prevalence rates than Alabama. Assuming that ADOC’s actual prevalence rate for mental illness actually tracks the national figure of between 20 % and 30 %, somewhere between 1,200 and 3,600 prisoners should be receiving mental-health care but are not, because between 5 % and 15 % of ADOC’s 24,000 prisoners have not been identified as having a mental illness.
A closer examination of the two main processes of identifying prisoners with mental-health care needs--intake and referral--sheds light on why ADOC’s prevalence rate is so low. First, ADOC’s mental-health screening process at intake fails to identify a substantial number of prisoners with mental-health issues. Licensed practical nurses, who have very limited training, are responsible for conducting mental-health screening for prisoners at intake at Kilby (for all male prisoners) and Tutwiler (for all female prisoners). No higher-level
74

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 75 of 302
provider supervises the LPNs during the intake process. The intake LPN fills out forms and questionnaires and decides whether to refer a prisoner for further examination by a psychiatrist or a nurse practitioner. If the LPN determines that a prisoner does not need to be referred to a psychiatrist or nurse practitioner, a mental-health code of MH-0, denoting no need for mental-health care, is entered into the system. Prisoners who are designated as MH-0 by an LPN do not receive any further evaluation or any mental-health treatment unless referred to mental-health services later by a staff member or the prisoners themselves. On the other hand, if the LPN refers the prisoner for evaluation, a psychiatric provider completes an evaluation, gives a diagnosis if appropriate, and assigns a mental-health code, which determines the level of care the prisoner subsequently receives and ranges from MH-0 (no
75

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 76 of 302
mental-health need) to MH-6 (in need of
hospitalization).27
Experts from both sides agreed, and the court finds,
that the intake screening process conducted by an LPN
without any on-site supervision by a higher-level
provider contributes to under-identification of
prisoners with mental illness. This is because LPNs, who
only have 12 to 15 months of general medical
27. Associate Commissioner Naglich testified that psychological associates, who have master’s degrees in counseling and are employed by ADOC, also have the ability to refer prisoners to psychiatric providers at intake. However, other evidence suggested that this rarely, if ever, happens. Dr. Hunter explained that ADOC’s intake process, which involves psychological tests, is a parallel track to MHM’s screening process, and that they do not overlap; the court interpreted this to mean that ADOC’s psychological associates do not interact with psychiatric providers on the MHM side for further evaluation of prisoners. In addition to Dr. Hunter’s testimony, no documentary evidence could be found to support Naglich’s assertion that psychological associates do refer prisoners for further examinations during the intake process. See also Joint Ex. 100, Admin. Reg. § 610 (doc. no. 1038-122) (detailing the mental-health screening process to be conducted by the contractor staff). Given Dr. Hunter’s familiarity with the intake process and the lack of any documentation of psychological associates’ referrals, the court finds that the initial intake process is primarily or entirely done by an LPN.
76

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 77 of 302
training--very little of which may be related to mental health--are not qualified to assess the presence or acuity of mental illness symptoms based on information obtained during the intake process. Intake forms that LPNs fill out include questions that require clinical assessments, rather than simple yes-or-no questions based on physical observations. See Joint Ex. 85, Admin. Reg. § 601 Mental Health Forms and Disposition (doc. no. 1038-106); Burns Testimony at vol. 1, 44-45. According to the experts, LPNs are not qualified to make such clinical assessments. Moreover, although LPNs may make referrals based on self-reported symptoms of mental illness, a proper intake system cannot solely rely on self-reporting to identify mental-health needs. As Dr. Burns testified, the use of unsupervised LPNs for intake mental-health screening presents an “obvious” risk of under-identification. Burns Testimony at vol.1, 61-62.28
28. Experts from both sides also observed that the intake process does not include an assessment for suicide risk, a serious systemic issue that may have contributed to the recent dramatic increase in the suicide rate. See Joint Ex. 461, Patterson Expert Report (doc. no.
77

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 78 of 302
The use of inadequately supervised LPNs for intake
is compounded by insufficient mental-health staffing.
Houser testified that MHM does not have sufficient
staffing or space to conduct mental-health screenings at
Kilby (where all male prisoners are screened), and her
staff have had to send prisoners to other facilities
without conducting the initial intake screening. This
in turn has increased the workload for mental-health
staff at the receiving facilities and has created delays
in the provision of mental-health care to those who need
treatment. Dr. Patterson, the defense expert, agreed
that insufficient staff at intake has led to insufficient
identification of prisoners with mental illness, and that
this failure to identify increases the risk of continued
1038-1046) at 69 (concluding that ADOC’s lack of suicide risk evaluation and management is an area of substantial concern); Burns Testimony at vol. 1, 63; Pl. Ex. 1267, 2015-2016 Chart of ADOC Suicides (doc. no. 1108-38) (showing 12 suicides between September 2015 and December 2016). ADOC has now implemented suicide risk assessments as part of their regular intake procedure based upon Dr. Patterson’s recommendation. However, as discussed in more detail later, ADOC has not incorporated suicide risk-assessment tools into other parts of the mental-health care system, despite Dr. Patterson’s recommendation to do so.
78

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 79 of 302
pain and suffering and potential suicides among those who are not receiving the mental-health care they need.
b. Inadequate Referral Process The other mechanism for identifying and classifying prisoners with mental illness, the referral process, is riddled with delays and inadequacies. The purpose of the referral process is to identify prisoners whose mental illnesses develop during their incarceration and prisoners whose mental-health needs were not identified during the intake process. Furthermore, the referral process enables the system to respond to the changing mental-health needs of prisoners as they arise, regardless of their initial mental-health assessment results. In a functioning system, referrals from prisoners or staff would be triaged based on the urgency of the articulated needs: some may warrant immediate action, such as placement in a suicide-watch cell or an immediate evaluation by a psychiatrist, while others may be addressed over a longer period of time. According to
79

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 80 of 302
Dr. Patterson, the defense expert, triaging is important because the assessment process enables clinicians to determine appropriate next steps, and delays in doing so pose a risk of untreated symptoms, including a risk of death from critical yet unmet treatment needs.
As with the intake screening procedure, experts from both sides concluded that ADOC’s referral process suffers from serious deficiencies. First, ADOC does not have a system to triage and identify the urgency of each request, and to make referrals according to the level of urgency. MHM’s contract-compliance reports have identified this issue year after year, starting in 2011: the reports stated that processed referral slips did not reflect acuity levels, and the logs of referrals did not record the relevant date and time information, making it impossible to ensure timely processing and referrals. Despite perennial indications that referral requests were being processed in a haphazard manner, ADOC still does not have any system of tracking and processing referrals to ensure that urgent requests are actually referred to
80

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 81 of 302
providers, or that providers are able to handle requests
in a timely fashion: an audit performed by defense
experts in May 2016 revealed that referral forms still do not note urgency levels that would enable triaging.29
Second, the referral process is inadequate because
correctional officers are ill-positioned to notice
behavioral changes. As plaintiffs’ expert Vail testified,
severe overcrowding and understaffing make it difficult
for correctional officers to notice behavioral changes.
It is simply unrealistic to rely on ADOC’s overburdened
correctional officers to identify and refer prisoners who
may need mental-health treatment, except perhaps for
those prisoners with the most obvious symptoms of mental
illness.
29. Plaintiffs have objected to the use of the audit results on Daubert grounds, contending that the methodology used to conduct the audit was not reliable and has not been accepted in the field of correctional mental-health care as a way of evaluating adequacy of care. Based on Dr. Patterson’s testimony on the methodology, the audit results are admitted. However, as will be explained more extensively in a separate Daubert opinion, limitations in the methodology and implementation of the audit have been taken into consideration in evaluating their weight.
81

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 82 of 302
In addition to delaying treatment or leaving mental-health symptoms untreated, ADOC’s broken referral process has contributed to the phenomenon of prisoners engaging in self-harm or other destructive behavior in order to get attention of mental-health staff. Experts described examples of “increasingly desperate acts” to get the attention of MHM and necessary services, such as self-injury, fire setting, and suicide attempts. Joint Ex. 460, Burns Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1044) at 29; Haney Testimony at vol. 1, 72 (describing frequent fires in segregation units as desperate attempts to get attention for their needs, including mental-health needs). The court also heard from class member J.A., who has repeatedly engaged in self-harm and expressed suicidal ideation. After summarizing his various attempts to obtain mental-health services while in segregation, including starting fires, J.A. observed, “[G]etting help in prison is harder than getting out of prison.” J.A. Testimony at __. These are snapshots of unnecessary pain and suffering that could be avoided or at least minimized
82

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 83 of 302
if prisoner requests for mental-health services were being addressed on a timely basis.
c. Inadequate Classification of Mental-Health Needs ADOC also fails to classify the severity of mental
illnesses accurately. The mental-health coding system is intended to reflect the level of functioning a mental-health patient has and correspond to his or her treatment needs and housing requirements. Through multiple revisions, the coding system now includes 13 different codes, ranging from MH-0 to MH-9, with sub-codes for some levels, such as MH-2d. In broad strokes, a higher numbered MH code reflects more intensive care needs: MH-0 refers to no mental-health care need; MH-1 and MH-2 refer to mild impairment or stable enough to receive only outpatient care; MH-3 through MH-5 refer to those who need inpatient care, in either the residential treatment unit (RTU) or intensive stabilization unit (SU); MH-6 refers to those who need
83

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 84 of 302
to be hospitalized. See Joint Ex. 105, Admin. Reg. § 613
(doc. no. 1038-127).30
Testimony from multiple witnesses and experts made
clear that ADOC’s mental-health coding system often fails
to accurately reflect prisoners’ mental-health needs.31
For example, plaintiff R.M. has been coded MH-2 and
housed in general population for most of his
incarceration since 1994, despite his severe paranoid
schizophrenia and resulting delusions. He was eventually
30. ADOC’s mental health coding system was amended twice in 2016. According to the latest version, a new level (MH-9) refers to those who cannot be transferred to any facility and must be held at the current housing facility. However, the description of the code does not give any specifics about the patient’s symptoms and only specifies who may revise such a code. Joint Ex. 107, Admin. Reg. § 613-2 (doc. no. 1038-130). There is no MH-7 or MH-8 in the system.
31. Dr. Burns explained that inappropriate classification of mentally ill patients partially stems from a lack of proper documentation in treatment plans and progress notes. Combined with a high turnover rate of staff and frequent transfers between facilities, inadequate documentation means that information about a patient’s symptoms and treatment is not well preserved. As a result, symptoms are evaluated without the context and history of each patient, leading to a higher risk of under-classifying and underestimating the acuity of mental illnesses.
84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 85 of 302
given a higher code and transferred to the Bullock RTU, but Dr. Burns testified that he may need an even higher level of care, and that he suffered from inadequate care while housed for years in an outpatient facility. Likewise, a prisoner identified as #12 in Dr. Burns’s report was clearly delusional and believed that televisions and radios were speaking to him; he was in an outpatient facility at the time of his interview with Dr. Burns, but needed to be in a long-term, inpatient facility due to the severity of his schizophrenic symptoms. An email from Associate Commissioner Naglich to Dr. Hunter in December 2015 discussed a schizophrenic prisoner who was clearly delusional and eventually killed another prisoner and threatened to kill a correctional officer; he had been coded as MH-1, which is intended to denote someone who is stabilized with a ‘mild’ impairment. Lastly, Dr. Haney gave examples of patients who have been repeatedly placed on suicide watch for engaging in self-harm and suicide attempts but were designated as MH-0--that is, not having any mental-health treatment
85

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 86 of 302
needs--including plaintiffs L.P and R.M.W., and former plaintiff J.D. Haney Testimony at vol. 2, 113-20; see Pl. Dem. Ex. 131, Movement History of Exemplar Plaintiffs (doc. no. 1126-10).
d. Inadequate Utilization of Mental-Health Units As experts from both sides concluded, ADOC does not adequately utilize residential treatment unit beds and fails to provide residential-level care to those who need it, leading to persistent or worsening symptoms. Defendants’ expert Dr. Patterson opined that roughly 15 % of prisoners on the mental-health caseload should be housed in RTU or intensive stabilization unit settings; in other words, approximately 515 ADOC prisoners should be housed in the RTU or the SU.32 However, only 310 of
32. These numbers are based on the number of patients currently on the mental-health caseload. Because ADOC misses a significant portion--at least 5 % of the inmate population, or a third of those who are already on the caseload--of those who need mental-health care during its intake screening and referral processes, it is likely that even more prisoners need residential mental-health care than calculated here.
86

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 87 of 302

the 376 RTU and SU beds were being used to house prisoners

with mental-health needs as of September 2016. Joint

Ex. 344, September 2016 Monthly Operating Report (doc.

no. 1038-703). This practice of not filling even

existing mental-health unit beds has persisted for years,

as reflected in MHM’s monthly operating reports. See,

e.g., Joint Ex. 321, December 2015 Monthly Operating

Report (doc. no. 1038-666) at ADOC0319118-19; Joint Ex.

320, December 2014 Monthly Operating Report (doc. no.

1038-665) at ADOC0319016-17 (showing 299 beds occupied

in December 2015 and 177 beds occupied in December

2014). 33

Dr. Patterson credibly opined that this

significant shortfall suggests ADOC has been

under-identifying those who need residential

treatment--a problem that starts with the inadequate

intake screening process. He also observed another flaw

in RTU admission management: he explained that those who

are repeatedly sent to the SU should be admitted to the

33. As explained in more detail later, many of the cells in the mental-health unit are being used to house segregation prisoners without any mental-health needs.
87

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 88 of 302
RTU to receive more long-term, intensive treatment, rather than being released back to general population after a stay in the SU. He also noted that prisoners who are admitted to RTUs often stay only for a short period, despite their pronounced needs for long-term treatment. Because there is little programming available in the RTU, the utility of an RTU placement is quickly exhausted, according to Patterson.
Dr. Burns agreed with Dr. Patterson’s assessment that ADOC needs to house more patients in the RTU, especially when RTUs have available beds. She also observed during her facility visits multiple prisoners who needed residential treatment but were in general population.
In sum, ADOC’s significantly inadequate identification and classification practices create a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners with mental illness. These practices result in a failure to treat or under-treatment of prisoners’ serious mental-health needs. As will be discussed later, these practices also have a downward-spiral effect on the rest of the system:
88

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 89 of 302
those who do not get needed treatment often end up in crisis cells, frequently receive disciplinary sanctions, and may be placed in segregation, where they have even less access to treatment and monitoring.
3. Inadequate Treatment Planning Correctional systems have a duty to provide minimally adequate mental-health care to prisoners with serious mental-health needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to psychiatric care under Estelle v. Gamble). Expert testimony from both sides established that such minimally adequate care requires treatment planning. Treatment planning is the foundation of all forms of health care; through the process, providers involved in the treatment identify the
89

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 90 of 302
patient’s target symptoms, treatment goals, and next steps, and coordinate long-term care as necessary. When staff from multiple disciplines--for example, psychiatric, psychological, nursing, and even correctional--are involved in a patient’s treatment, treatment planning should involve key people from each discipline in order to ensure consistent and informed treatment. Treatment planning is particularly important in the prison context, where prisoners have almost no ability to ensure the consistency of their own treatment; it is even more crucial in the context of ADOC, where prisoners are frequently transferred across correctional facilities and the staff turnover rate is high. As experts described, without coordinated long-term planning, treatment is often ineffective and runs a substantial risk of prolonging pain and suffering of those who have treatable mental illnesses. Failure to provide meaningful treatment planning constitutes a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of prison health care; such deviations can pose a substantial risk
90

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 91 of 302
of serious harm to those who have serious psychiatric
needs. Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.
1996) (noting that providing care where the quality is
“so substantial a deviation from accepted standards” can
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation).34
ADOC fails to provide adequate treatment planning.
First, experts for both sides found that ADOC’s treatment
plans are not individualized to each prisoner’s symptoms
and needs, resulting in ‘cookie-cutter’ plans that remain
the same even though there may have been changes in that
prisoner’s mental-health state. As defense expert Dr.
34. As an aside, the court notes that treatment planning can be viewed as serving similar purposes as medical recordkeeping, which also ensures continuity of care and coordination between different providers. Courts have held that maintaining accurate and complete records of mental-health treatment is an essential component of a minimally adequate mental-health care system. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Justice, J.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), opinion amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1577 (D. Idaho 1984) (Ryan, J.) (adopting the Ruiz standard of six essential components of a minimally adequate mental health treatment program, including complete and accurate records); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (Karlton, J.) (same).
91

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 92 of 302
Patterson explained, a patient’s lack of progress in treatment does not justify the use of a cookie-cutter treatment plan: providers should try different interventions that could be effective, rather than sticking to the same intervention when the patient is not responding to it. Likewise, treatment plans should reflect the changes in the treatment environment, such as an admission to the SU or placement on suicide watch. However, ADOC treatment plans often have general patient goal statements such as “identify triggers” or “identify coping mechanism” repeated in subsequent plans, without showing any progress or change in the mental state of the patient; they also often fail to reflect the fact that the patient has been placed in a different environment that would impact his or her mental health and treatment mode. Whether the rote repetition results from a lack of follow-through on the plans or mere sloppiness in filling out the plans, both present hazards to prisoners with mental illness.
92

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 93 of 302
ADOC’s treatment-team meetings are also inadequate. Treatment-team meetings are an essential part of the treatment planning process, where providers from various disciplines involved in the patient’s treatment discuss developments and next steps to ensure coordinated care. However, the meetings at ADOC happen haphazardly, with members of the treatment team missing from the meetings and signing new treatment plans on different days. This haphazard attendance creates a risk of different providers having an inconsistent approach or course of treatment for the same patient because some of the treatment team are unaware that a new treatment plan has been put into effect. Furthermore, the meetings frequently occur without any participant with prescription privileges, especially at some outpatient facilities where the only provider with prescription privileges is a nurse practitioner who visits the facility as infrequently as once per month. As a result, treatment plans are often developed without the input of a provider with expertise in psychotropic medication.
93

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 94 of 302
Experts from both sides agreed that ADOC’s treatment planning without all necessary participants is problematic and falls below the standard of care because it deprives patients of a coherent treatment plan and continuity of care.
Inadequate treatment planning subjects mentally ill prisoners to the risk of exacerbating symptoms, prolonged pain and suffering, serious injury from self-harm, and even death. As Dr. Burns explained, treatment plans serve an essential function of making sure that all providers’ treatment is consistent. Dr. Burns credibly opined that not having a consistent approach to a prisoner’s treatment poses a risk of exacerbating or neglecting problems that may arise from mental illness, such as self-injury. Specifically, according to Dr. Burns, failing to address the issue of repeated self-injury due to a lack of coordinated treatment and inconsistent approaches by different providers creates a substantial risk that patients will continue to engage in self-harm; these patients can eventually end up
94

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 95 of 302
disabled or dead as a result of continued self-harm. Defense expert Patterson agreed with Burns’s emphasis on the critical importance of coordinated treatment and identified inadequate treatment planning as one of the most significant deficiencies in ADOC’s mental-health care system.
In the context of ADOC, where transfers of prisoners and changes in providers are frequent, the impact of inadequate treatment planning is exacerbated. Because written treatment plans are generic, counselors and patients often have to start from scratch when patients are moved from counselor to counselor. A former mental-health professional testified that prisoners who are transferred to a new counselor are often adversely affected, not only because the counselor has to start anew the process of building rapport with the prisoner, but also because treatment plans and progress notes often contain insufficient information to enable a different provider to learn about the patient or continue a consistent course of treatment. Plaintiff C.J. also
95

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 96 of 302
testified to the difficulties in having to start over with a new counselor after each transfer. In sum, without the continuity of care and consistent treatment approaches provided through proper treatment planning, providers are substantially hindered from addressing symptoms of mental illness, exposing patients to continued pain and suffering, worsening self-injurious behavior, serious bodily injury, or even death.
4. Inadequate Psychotherapy Constitutionally adequate mental-health care in prisons requires more than simply providing psychotropic medications to mentally ill prisoners. Prison systems must provide not only psychotropic medication but also psychotherapy or counseling to prisoners who need it to treat their serious mental-health needs. See Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990) (adopting district court’s conclusion that “[e]ven if this case involved failure to provide psychotherapy or psychological counselling alone, the court would still
96

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 97 of 302
conclude that the psychiatric care was sufficiently similar to medical treatment to bring it within the embrace of Estelle.”). As Dr. Burns explained, from a clinical perspective, having both modalities of treatment--medication and counseling--is important because one particular modality does not work for everyone. According to Dr. Burns, research indicates that seriously mentally ill patients need counseling and medication, along with non-structured or recreational activities, and that psychotherapy is an effective and essential mode of treatment for mental illness. She credibly opined, and the court finds, that not providing individual or group therapy poses a substantial risk of serious harm, including continued symptoms, pain, and suffering, as well as self-harm and suicide attempts.
Insufficient mental-health and correctional staffing at ADOC undermines the availability and quality of individual and group counseling sessions. First, as explained earlier, inadequate mental-health staffing combined with the increasing number of prisoners on the
97

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 98 of 302
mental-health caseload has driven up the number of prisoners on each counselor’s caseload. As a result, both the frequency and quality of counseling sessions have suffered over time, according to both experts and MHM providers. MHM’s medical director Dr. Hunter testified that the caseload has increased in recent years to the point of taxing his staff’s ability to carry out MHM’s contractual obligation: MHM counselors’ caseloads have increased from 60 patients to between 80 and 90; some facilities have only one counselor, who treats more than 100 patients; nurse practitioners’ caseloads have increased from 10-15 patients per day to 20-25 patients per day.
MHM’s program director Houser also testified that caseloads for counselors were sometimes twice as much as they should be; as a result, she said, counselors are “continually getting behind.” Houser Testimony at vol. 2, 25. In addition to seeing patients, counselors also have to attend meetings, document their treatment actions, design treatment plans, go on rounds in segregation units,
98

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 99 of 302
and respond to crises as they arise.35 Due to counselors’
increasing caseloads and mounting job responsibilities,
individual counseling appointments are frequently
canceled or delayed. For example, during a spot audit
of the caseload at Bibb, 212 out of 213 cases had overdue
counseling appointments. Pl. Ex. 576, December 2, 2015
Email from Davis-Walker to Houser (doc. no. 1112-26).
Defense expert Patterson also observed that counseling
appointments are frequently delayed due to staffing
35. Much testimony centered around how long a typical counseling session lasts. The court heard conflicting testimony: some counselors testified that most sessions do not last longer than 30 minutes; some refused to give a more concrete estimate altogether, other than saying their sessions might range from ten minutes to two hours. Moreover, there is no documentary or otherwise reliable evidence establishing such numbers. Given the lack of documentation, the number of patients on each clinician’s caseload at any given moment is a more reliable proxy for the quality and frequency of therapy: even if some patients receive sufficiently long counseling sessions, the context of overwhelming caseloads means that the clinicians are not able to give such counseling sessions to most patients, by virtue of not having enough time in the day and having other duties. Therefore, the court finds that the overwhelming caseloads of psychiatric providers and counselors as relayed by Dr. Hunter and Houser are more indicative of the quality and frequency of counseling sessions for the vast majority of prisoners on the mental-health caseload.
99

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 100 of 302

shortages and opined that “these delays contribute to a

failure to provide necessary mental health services”; the

potential harm in such delayed appointments includes

“continued pain and suffering of mental health symptoms

including suicide and disciplinary actions due to

inadequate treatment.” See Joint Ex. 461, Patterson

Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1046) at 64.

Caseloads that are--as MHM’s Houser put it--much

higher than an “acceptable standard” may explain why so

many prisoners testified that ‘counseling sessions’ do

not amount to much. Dr. Patterson’s review of the medical

records within ADOC revealed that most progress notes

from counseling sessions only contained short

descriptions of symptoms, instead of reflecting clinical

judgments and overall assessments of the patient’s

progress.

Similarly, Dr. Burns noted that the

overwhelming majority of progress notes she reviewed

indicated that the patient was ‘fine,’ had ‘no

complaints,’ or had nothing to talk about. She explained

that a short, vague statement like “I’m alright” is not

100

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 101 of 302
a sufficient indicator of a stable mental-health state: instead of moving on to the next patient simply because the patient’s initial self-reporting does not expressly indicate distress, the clinician should probe deeper; notes on asking follow-up questions about medications, mood, job assignments, or disciplinary sanctions would reflect a proper counseling session. Based on the prisoners’ descriptions and the experts’ observations, the court finds that counseling sessions are often inadequate.
The chronic lack of sufficient correctional staffing has also contributed to frequent disruptions in the provision of psychotherapy. Dr. Burns credibly opined that insufficient correctional staff has interfered with access to treatment, as evinced by frequently canceled or delayed individual counseling sessions and group sessions. In particular, as she noted, the frequency of counseling sessions for those in segregation is especially low due to officer shortages: since segregation inmates must be escorted from their cells by
101

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 102 of 302

correctional officers, mental-health appointments are

frequently canceled or delayed when there are not enough

officers to cover both the essential security posts and

mental-health appointments.

Ayers, defendants’

correctional expert, also credibly opined that ADOC was

failing to respond to the needs of mentally ill prisoners

due to the correctional staffing shortage. Likewise, a

nurse practitioner at Donaldson credibly testified that

she has experienced a persistent problem of not being

able to see patients due to a lack of correctional

staffing, and that the problem has been getting worse

over the years. She and other providers testified that

when insufficient correctional staffing does not allow

prisoners to be escorted to the mental-health offices,

the mental-health providers may go to the cells

themselves and attempt to talk to their patients at the

cell-front. However, as agreed by MHM’s medical director

Hunter and experts Burns and Haney, these cell-front

check-ins are insufficient as counseling and do not

constitute actual mental-health treatment; Haney

102

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 103 of 302
explained that these contacts serve solely a monitoring purpose--that is, to ensure that the patient is responsive and not decompensating, rather than to treat the underlying mental illness. Indeed, while visiting five different facilities and their segregation units, the court observed the difficulty of standing outside a closed cell door to speak to a prisoner about mental-health needs: most cell doors are solid with small, perhaps 12-by-6-inch windows, some of which were completely fogged over and others shielded by wire mesh or obfuscated by paper pasted on the window, either by the prisoner or from outside; and most of these segregation or high-security cells are in large, auditorium-like spaces, where sounds echo throughout the units, resulting in a panoply of unintelligible yet very loud noises. Conducting a counseling session across the door in these loud spaces seemed nearly impossible: the court had a hard time imagining having a meaningful conversation in such an environment, let alone a conversation for the purposes of mental-health treatment.
103

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 104 of 302
As with these cell-front sessions, ADOC’s provision of psychotherapy often lacks confidentiality. Experts and other clinician witnesses explained that confidentiality between providers and patients is a hallmark of and a necessary condition for mental-health treatment, yet some ADOC facilities lack a confidential setting for counseling sessions. Obviously, cell-front interactions between mental-health staff and prisoners are not confidential, as many staff witnesses testified, and as the court observed firsthand. Moreover, many facilities lack mental-health offices with windows and doors that would ensure the visibility of the counseling session to the correctional officer who is providing security without sacrificing sound confidentiality. For example, as the court saw on its tour of St. Clair Correctional Facility, the walls in the mental-health offices do not extend from floor to ceiling, and they lack doors; in other words, the offices resemble tall cubicles. Anyone nearby, including other prisoners and the correctional officer who escorted the prisoner there,
104

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 105 of 302
could hear the content of a counseling session. Moreover, correctional officers often stand by the door of counseling offices with the door ajar for safety purposes, and counseling sessions are sometimes held in lieutenant’s offices where other correctional officers are present and holding disciplinary hearings. As Dr. Haney explained, prisoners often do not feel safe sharing their mental-health issues in the presence of correctional officers or other prisoners because what they share with the mental-health staff may make it easier for others to exploit them; as a result, the lack of confidentiality undermines the effectiveness and quality of counseling sessions.36
The quality of psychotherapy also suffers due to use of unsupervised, unlicensed counselors, referred to as ‘mental health professionals’ in ADOC. The court finds, based on expert testimony from both sides, that the lack
36. By the same token, Dr. Haney found it problematic that at some facilities ‘inmate newsletters’ identify exactly who is on the mental-health caseload, thereby increasing the stigma of mental-health care and discouraging prisoners from seeking mental-health treatment due to fear of exploitation by others.
105

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 106 of 302
of supervision for unlicensed MHPs is a significant, system-wide problem affecting the delivery of mental-health care within ADOC. ADOC’s own contract for mental-health care specifies that all MHPs must be licensed. However, only four out of 47 MHPs employed at ADOC were licensed as of February 2016, and this problem has persisted for years.37 The standard of care and state regulations mandate that an unlicensed counselor be supervised by a licensed psychologist, who is required to co-sign the counselor’s notes and review the treatment provided. Because MHM employs only three psychologists, most MHPs work at prisons without a psychologist, and the chief psychologist of MHM, Dr. Woodley, provides no actual supervision to unlicensed MHPs. In fact, most MHPs’ clinical work is supervised by their respective
37. Associate Commissioner Naglich testified that unlicensed counselors can work in ADOC facilities only if they obtain a license within six months of starting employment. However, this testimony was contradicted by the employment data, as well as Houser’s testimony that MHM cannot hire licensed counselors within the contract budget. Indeed, of the four current and former MHM counselors who testified at trial, none had become licensed despite having worked in ADOC for multiple years.
106

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 107 of 302
site administrators, who are also mostly unlicensed counselors with their own caseloads--in other words, the supervisors generally have the same level of credentialing and education as the MHPs they are supervising. If the site administrators have any problems, they consult with Dr. Woodley. Dr. Patterson, a defense expert, credibly opined that it is unacceptable for an unlicensed counselor, rather than a licensed psychologist, to supervise another unlicensed counselor. He identified the lack of supervision of unlicensed providers as a systemic deficiency.
ADOC’s provision of group therapy is also inadequate. Dr. Burns testified that infrequent and inadequate individual counseling can pose a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners with mental illness, if the same patients do not have access to group therapy. Burns further explained that group therapy is especially important in a correctional system, which often does not have enough resources to provide individual counseling to all of the prisoners who need psychotherapy. Group
107

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 108 of 302
sessions, like individual therapy, help prisoners with mental illness manage their symptoms, so that they do not deteriorate to the point of needing residential treatment; outpatient group therapy also enables mental-health staff to identify those who need more intensive treatment. Burns opined that therapy groups on depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and medication management issues should always be offered to those on the mental-health caseload, and that not offering such group treatment in the context of an under-resourced correctional mental-health system creates a substantial risk of harm to prisoners suffering from those illnesses. Despite the importance of group therapy for those who receive inadequate individual therapy, many seriously mentally ill ADOC prisoners with little access to individual therapy also have little access to group therapy. MHM’s program director Houser admitted that groups have been not happening at many facilities, including RTUs and SUs, due to the correctional staffing shortage.
108

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 109 of 302
In sum, mental-health understaffing, correctional understaffing, the use of unsupervised, unlicensed counselors, and lack of confidentiality all undermine the efficacy and frequency of psychotherapy for mentally ill prisoners within ADOC. These conditions have created a substantial risk of serious harm for those who need counseling services, leaving them at a greater risk for continued pain and suffering, self-injurious behavior, suicidal ideation, and, as discussed later, disciplinary actions in response to symptoms of mental illness.
5. Inadequate Inpatient Care Problems of inadequate psychotherapy and treatment planning become even more pronounced for prisoners in mental-health units, where ADOC houses the most severely mentally ill prisoners in its custody. Mental-health units (also referred to as inpatient units) include residential treatment units and intensive stabilization units. These units, which are located at Donaldson, Bullock, and Tutwiler, house about 2 % of prisoners
109

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 110 of 302
within ADOC’s custody.38 Given that prisoners housed in mental-health units have already been identified as having the most severe mental-health needs within ADOC, these patients are at higher risk of decompensation than other mentally ill prisoners if treatment is insufficient or if their housing environment is not therapeutic. And yet, despite ADOC and MHM’s awareness of these prisoners’ acute needs, the most severely mentally ill have been receiving grossly inadequate care; in fact, one of the experts described ADOC’s mental-health units as operating “almost exactly the same way” as segregation, as illustrated by the placement of segregation inmates without mental-health needs in the same unit and the inadequate out-of-cell time and treatment. Haney Testimony at vol. 2, 104.
a. Improper Use of Mental-Health Units ADOC has had a persistent and long-standing practice of placing segregation inmates without mental-health
38. Practices within Tutwiler’s mental-health units are discussed separately in Section V.B.9.
110

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 111 of 302
needs in mental-health units. This practice allows prisoners without mental-health needs to occupy beds that should be reserved for prisoners who have heightened mental-health care needs and seriously undermines the therapeutic purpose of the mental-health units. Starting in 2012 and continuing through 2016, in its yearly contract-compliance reports, quarterly continuous quality improvement (CQI) meetings, and monthly operating reports, MHM repeatedly discussed ADOC’s problematic placement of segregation inmates in the RTU and SU. ADOC’s own audit of the Donaldson RTU in 2013 also identified the presence of segregation inmates without mental-health needs as a problem. While Associate Commissioner Naglich testified that segregation inmates were moved out of the Bullock SU by the end of 2013, evidence showed that the problem continued through 2016. For example, Brenda Fields, a clinical operations associate from MHM’s corporate office, testified that the presence of segregation inmates in the RTUs and SUs was noted as a problem in early 2016. Most recently, in
111

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 112 of 302
December 2016, the list of prisoners in the Donaldson RTU included 13 segregation prisoners who did not have a mental-health code appropriate for mental-health units. Pl. Ex. 1264, December 2016 Donaldson Segregation List (doc. no. 1099-8) at 14; Culliver Testimony at __.
Dr. Tytell, ADOC’s chief clinical psychologist, explained that wardens place segregation inmates in the RTU or the SU when they do not have space for them elsewhere. He explained that MHM currently is expected to contact him or Naglich whenever this happens, but did not confirm whether this was always the case. Nevertheless, according to Tytell, the problem has been recurring. He conceded that it is ultimately the wardens, rather than the mental-health staff, who decide how cells in the mental-health units are used.
As all experts, MHM providers, and Dr. Tytell agreed, placing segregation inmates in a mental-health treatment unit is highly problematic. The reasons are multifold. First, having segregation inmates in the same unit as mental-health patients creates a security risk for
112

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 113 of 302
mental-health patients: the segregation inmates’ presence prevents programming from taking place and diverts correctional officers’ attention away from mental-health patients and their needs. MHM’s medical director Dr. Hunter testified that housing segregation prisoners in mental-health units compromises mental-health treatment, and that he has made this clear to ADOC. Dr. Woodley, MHM’s chief psychologist, informed ADOC that the presence of segregation inmates in the Bullock SU “undermine[s] the utility of this unit making it nearly impossible to operate it for its intended purposes.” Joint Ex. 323, February 2016 MHM Monthly Operating Report (doc. no. 1038-668) at 23.
Second, as Dr. Tytell and other experts explained, because mental-health inmates are particularly vulnerable, and those placed in segregation generally have behavioral problems, the presence of segregation inmates increases mental-health patients’ risk of being victimized through manipulation or violence. MHM and Dr. Tytell were aware of this risk, as one of the MHM staff
113

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 114 of 302
members explained during a CQI meeting that using the Bullock RTU as a “disciplinary dorm” is “putting our vulnerable [inmates] at risk.” Pl. Ex. 717, July 2015 Quarterly CQI Meeting Minutes (doc. no. 1044-11) at MHM029600. Associate Commissioner Naglich also agreed that segregation inmates in mental-health units can cause tension within the unit and anxiety to mental-health patients.
The housing of segregation inmates in mental-health units also contributes to the shortage of SU cells for those who actually need urgent mental-health treatment. Associate Commissioner Naglich acknowledged that patients awaiting SU admission could be in an “emergency” situation, as these patients require the highest level of care available within ADOC. Naglich Testimony at vol. 1, 208. However, since 2011, the Bullock SU has had a backlog of patients awaiting admission. While Naglich maintained that after the 2013 audit, ADOC actually moved all segregation inmates out of the Bullock SU in order to alleviate the backlog, she was unable to produce any
114

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 115 of 302
documentation supporting her testimony. (During her testimony Naglich reassured the court that she could produce documents showing that she did move segregation inmates out of the Bullock SU in 2013. However, when she did bring in documents purportedly showing such transfers, none of them actually showed that any segregation inmates were moved out of the SU.) Moreover, in 2016, MHM continued to report that segregation inmates were still present in the SU, and that SU cell shortages were causing delays for patients who need SU-level care. Clearly, the placement of segregation inmates in SU beds continues to affect the most severely ill.
b. Inadequate Out-of-Cell Time and Programming ADOC’s mental-health units often fail to serve their therapeutic purpose due to insufficient out-of-cell time and scarce programming for their patients. One of the plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Haney, who for multiple decades has studied isolation and segregation in correctional facilities, noted that ADOC’s ‘celled’ mental-health
115

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 116 of 302
units39 resemble and operate like segregation units.40
Experts on both sides pointed to specific traits of
ADOC’s mental-health units that contribute to this
segregation-like atmosphere and the lack of a therapeutic
milieu: the presence of segregation inmates within the
mental-health units, as explained above; a severe lack
of out-of-cell time; and a lack of meaningful treatment
activities.
Out-of-cell time is crucial for patients housed in
mental-health units. Without bringing patients out of
their cells for counselling sessions, treatment team
meetings, group sessions, and activities, placement in a
39. A part of each RTU is an ‘open RTU,’ consisting of dormitories with rows of beds, rather than individual cells.
40. Dr. Haney was not the only one who thought ADOC’s celled mental-health units were indistinguishable from segregation units. In the corrective-action plan provided to ADOC in 2013, MHM stated that “conceptualiz[ing] the [Bullock] SU as a treatment unit, not as segregation” was necessary to further the goal of stabilizing patients. Ironically, or perhaps not surprisingly, Associate Commissioner Naglich also had a hard time distinguishing between segregation units and stabilization units during her testimony, frequently referring to stabilization units as segregation units.
116

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 117 of 302
‘mental-health unit’ does no good for patients who need the highest level of care; careful observation and treatment cannot happen when confined in a small cell all day. In fact, without out-of-cell time and effective treatment, housing severely mentally ill prisoners in a mental-health unit is tantamount to “warehousing” the mentally ill. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1309 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming the district court’s finding that a state mental hospital was functioning as a “‘warehousing institution ... wholly incapable of furnishing treatment to the mentally [ill] and ... conducive only to the deterioration and debilitation of the residents’”)(quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Johnson, C.J.)). Furthermore, as Dr. Haney explained, out-of-cell time is especially important for mentally ill prisoners for two reasons. First, mentally ill prisoners experience more pressure and stress from a confined environment, and they have a more acute need to relieve that type of stress due to their vulnerable mental state; in other words, isolation
117

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 118 of 302
makes it more likely that their conditions will deteriorate. In that sense, out-of-cell time is in and of itself therapeutic. Second, out-of-cell time ensures that mental-health patients’ socialization skills do not atrophy to the point that they become uncomfortable with human interaction altogether.
Patients housed in ADOC’s mental-health units receive very little out-of-cell time. This puts them at a substantial risk of continued pain and suffering, decompensation, and self-harm. As Dr. Haney observed, at the Donaldson RTU, patients with serious mental illnesses are left inside their cells virtually all day, with no daily activities; this is similar to ADOC’s treatment of segregation inmates, whose out-of-cell time at ADOC does not exceed five hours per week. Dr. Burns concluded, and the court agrees, that the RTUs and SUs offer “little treatment except for psychotropic medication due to staffing level shortages of both treatment and custody staff.” Burns Testimony at vol. 1, 26. Dr. Haney also noted that an unduly harsh and
118

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 119 of 302
punitive practice limiting property makes mental-health units far from therapeutic and exacerbates prisoners’ idleness. He observed that mental-health unit inmates are allowed very little property, which means that they do not have books to read or other things to keep them engaged while spending the vast majority of their time in their cells. The court also observed firsthand the idleness of seriously mentally ill prisoners during its visits to Bullock and Donaldson’s mental-health units: the majority of prisoners in those units were lying in their cells, often in a fetal position and facing the wall; there appeared to be no way to engage in any remotely meaningful activity in the cell.
Dr. Patterson, the defense mental-health expert, testified that, in prisons around the country, the standard out-of-cell time for those in mental-health units is ten hours of structured therapeutic activity and ten hours of unstructured activity per week. While a standard practice within the industry does not necessarily set the constitutional floor, a substantial
119

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 120 of 302

deviation from the acceptable professional standard could

support a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Steele, 87 F.3d at 1269.

Patients in ADOC’s RTUs and SUs get a vanishingly

small amount of time outside their cells compared to the

standard practice. In 2013, MHM acknowledged that the

lack of programming was problematic for the Bullock SU,

telling ADOC that “[i]ncreased programming will assist

in staff’s ability to stabilize inmates sooner and

address the waiting list problem thus easing the

bottleneck.”

Pl. Ex. 689, MHM Corrective

Action - Donaldson May 2013 (doc. no. 1069-5) at 13-14.

As of June 2016, three years after the 2013 audit,

patients in the SU at Bullock were still getting about

30 minutes of individual therapeutic contact per week and

about 2.5 hours of non-therapeutic group contacts per

week. Joint Ex. 346, June 2016 Monthly Operating Report (doc. no. 1038-708) at 4.41

41. The presence of segregation inmates in the mental-health units contributes to the dearth of out-of-cell time afforded to mentally ill prisoners in
120

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 121 of 302

Prisoners in RTUs do not fare much better than in

the SUs: Dr. Patterson found that RTU programming--which

provides prisoners’ main opportunity to leave their

cells--is inadequate. 42

MHM and ADOC’s internal

documents also recognized this lack of out-of-cell time

for RTU inmates in the 2013 Donaldson audit: the audit

results revealed that no groups were being held for

Donaldson RTU patients, and that providers were having

difficulties keeping appointments due to correctional

staffing shortages.

MHM’s corrective-action plan

following the audit stated that “ADOC not enforcing the

those units. Dr. Haney testified that it is very difficult to operate a unit that has mixed populations, and that it is not surprising that a unit that contains both segregation inmates and mental-health patients would be treated like a segregation unit. This is partially because correctional officers get confused as to how to operate a unit with two conflicting purposes--discipline and treatment. Relatedly, having segregation inmates in the unit means that mental-health patients cannot be let out of their cells as easily, especially when correctional staffing is minimal or inadequate.
42. Tellingly, Dr. Patterson stated that while Tutwiler’s RTU programming is much better than RTUs at male facilities--Bullock and Donaldson--it is still only “close to adequate,” but not adequate. Patterson Testimony at vol. 1, 92.
121

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 122 of 302
out of cell time and not supporting MHM with the process” is a challenge in ensuring that RTU patients are let out of their cells daily. Pl. Ex. 689, MHM Corrective Action - Donaldson May 2013 (doc. no. 1069-5) at 12. The problem of inadequate out-of-cell time at the Donaldson RTU has continued in spite of the corrective-action plan: in early 2016, MHM’s corporate office recommended “continued advocacy for RTU patients to receive outdoor recreation.” Pl. Ex. 115, 2016 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-5) at 15. As of September 2016, Donaldson RTU patients were getting fewer than two group contacts per week on average. Joint Ex. 344, September 2016 Monthly Operating Report (doc. no. 1038-703) at 3.
In addition to the lack of general out-of-cell time, mental-health units also fail to provide an adequate amount of treatment to these severely mentally ill prisoners because of shortages of mental-health staff. MHM’s program director Houser testified that groups have not been taking place at many facilities, including RTUs and SUs; indeed, an alarmed site administrator at
122

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 123 of 302
Donaldson informed Houser in August 2015 that staffing losses at the facility have made it all but impossible to meet the needs of patients at the RTU. In December 2015, Houser asked Dr. Hunter to have one of the psychiatric providers at Bullock, Dr. Edward Kern, provide more services in the RTU in addition to his work in the SU. Dr. Hunter responded that, because the SU was so short-staffed and needed to be prioritized, shifting resources to the RTU would be difficult; he also noted that Dr. Kern had returned after a week of vacation to “what was essentially a zoo on [the SU].” Pl. Ex. 382, Email from Houser to Hunter (doc. no. 1112-6). The 2013 Donaldson audit also found that the psychiatric coverage was insufficient and the logs for RTU rounds by providers were not being kept, making it impossible to tell whether RTU patients were getting any check-ins or treatment or whether their progress was being monitored. Pl. Ex. 689, MHM Corrective Action - Donaldson May 2013 (doc. no. 1069-5) at 1-2.
123

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 124 of 302

The correctional staffing shortage also affects the

amount of therapeutic care that patients at Donaldson and

Bullock receive. Houser admitted that a lack of officers

for the RTUs and SUs often cause the cancellation of

group activities. The impact of the officer shortage was

also consistently documented by ADOC and in reports that

were sent to Associate Commissioner Naglich and OHS for

their review. For example, during OHS’s 2013 audit of

Donaldson, the auditors noted numerous deficiencies

caused by the correctional staffing shortage. First,

mental-health staff were manning laundry and showers

instead of providing mental-health care, because there

were not enough correctional officers to perform those

basic duties. Scheduled activities and out-of-cell time

were not being provided due to the correctional officer

shortage, and MHM’s corrective-action plan stated that

the “[RTU] has to be conceptualized as an RTU and not as

segregation.”

Pl. Ex. 689, MHM Corrective

Action - Donaldson May 2013 (doc. no. 1069-5) at 9. The

same was true at the Bullock SU: the problem of ‘access

124

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 125 of 302
to patients’--meaning that mental-health staff were unable to provide treatment to patients due to correctional officer shortage--was first identified in 2013, and then again in 2014 and 2016 contract-compliance reports. See Pl. Ex. 114, 2013 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-4); Pl. Ex. 105, 2014 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-3); Pl. Ex. 115, 2016 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-5). As Naglich testified, because there are simply not enough correctional officers, the problem of accessing patients in RTUs and SUs recurs on a regular basis, even when it has been temporarily alleviated through reassigning officers to particularly problematic areas. As a result, patients in the SU often receive their individual psychiatric contact via cell-front check-ins. As explained earlier, this utter lack of confidentiality negates the therapeutic utility of these contacts. Such cursory contacts with the most severely ill patients are gravely inadequate.
125

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 126 of 302
The severe effects of warehousing, rather than treating, seriously mentally ill prisoners was crystalized in two incidents at the Donaldson RTU, where two different patients set their cells on fire out of frustration about not getting let out of their cells. The internal email reporting one of the incidents explained that the problem of not letting patients out of their cells was due to correctional staffing shortages. Pl. Ex. 518, January 22, 2016 Email from Wynn-Scott to Houser (doc. no. 1112-18).
Jamie Wallace’s last 10 days in the Bullock stabilization unit further exemplify the inadequate treatment provided to the most severely ill patients: his medical records for his final 10 days reflected no group activities, one cell-side treatment plan note, and two psychiatric progress notes.
The lack of out-of-cell treatment in mental-health units adds the risk of harm posed by the harsh effects of isolation to that posed by inadequate treatment in general. As Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted,
126

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 127 of 302

inadequate treatment of patients in inpatient units can

lead to “additional exacerbation of their mental health

symptoms,” including further hallucinations and

delusions, and suicide. Naglich Testimony at vol. 3,

144-45. In addition, as experts testified, mentally ill

prisoners are at a substantial risk of decompensating and

being subject to prolonged pain and suffering when placed

in an isolated environment. In other words, ADOC’s

failure to provide adequate treatment and out-of-cell

time in mental-health units forces the most severely

mentally ill patients to face yet another risk factor for

decompensation, even though their placement was for the

specific purpose of alleviating the symptoms of their

mental illness.

Inadequate out-of-cell time and

treatment in this context therefore compounds the risk

of harm that is already inherent in a nonfunctioning

mental-health care system.

127

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 128 of 302
c. Lack of Hospital-Level Care ADOC also creates a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners at the most severe end of the mental-health spectrum, because it does not provide hospital-level care or a hospitalization option for prisoners housed there. According to experts from both sides, hospital-level care or hospitalization should be available when patients pose a danger to self or others and interventions in the SU do not improve their condition: due to the harmful effect of isolation in an SU cell, staying in the SUs cannot be a long-term solution for patients who experience repeated episodes of deterioration.
Although many ADOC prisoners require hospital-level care, very few actually receive it. Virtually all psychiatric providers who testified agreed that they knew or noticed ADOC prisoners who needed to be transferred to a hospital. ADOC’s administrative regulations dictate that those who are kept in the SU for over 30 days without stabilizing should be considered for hospitalization; the same provision also mandates that the treating psychiatrist recommend a transfer to a state psychiatric
128

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 129 of 302
hospital if the treatment team determines that all mental-health interventions possible within ADOC have been exhausted, and that the inmate has not responded to those interventions. Joint Ex. 138, Admin. Reg. § 634, Transfer to State Psychiatric Hospital (doc no. 1038-168). However, ADOC virtually never transfers patients to hospitals, except in the case of prisoners nearing the end of their sentence. Dr. Hunter and Associate Commissioner Naglich corroborated this point, and Dr. Kern could recall only four prisoners in the last six years who were transferred to a hospital before the end of their sentences. Dr. Kern explained that MHM tries to deal with acutely ill patients’ symptoms within ADOC even though ADOC cannot provide hospital-level care, instead of pursuing hospitalization as required by the administrative regulation, because the waiting list for a bed in a hospital can be six months long or longer.
Several factors differentiate hospital-level care from what is provided in ADOC, as defense expert Dr. Patterson explained. Hospitals are able to offer a high
129

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 130 of 302
level of monitoring for suicidal and decompensating patients while not isolating them in a cell: hospitals or hospital-like environments are better at treating severely mentally ill patients because patients can leave their rooms to request help from staff, instead of having to wait until correctional officers or mental-health staff check on them; most of the patients’ interactions in a hospital are based on doctor-patient or nurse-patient relationships, rather than guard-prisoner relationships; and the goal of the staff is to treat the patients, rather than to incarcerate them. Dr. Kern also admitted that dealing with patients who need hospital-level care within an SU or RTU is challenging because in those units, providers have a very limited ability to give patients out-of-cell time. He also added that, if he could, he would like to have SU patients “four to six, possibly eight hours out of their cell every day,” but that this is impossible because “there are not enough security staff.” Kern Testimony at 21. In other words, without a hospitalization option or
130

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 131 of 302
another method of providing hospital-level care, the providers are forced to choose between the benefits of close monitoring and restriction of activity and the harmful effects of isolation and losing socialization opportunities.
Both Dr. Patterson and Dr. Burns expressed strong disapproval of ADOC’s failure to provide hospital-level care. As Dr. Burns put it, waiting for an unstable patient’s end of sentence to transfer him or her to a hospital is akin to “someone with chest pain who has to wait until they’re released from prison to get taken to a hospital to have the chest pain treated. We wouldn’t do that in the case of chest pain. I’m not sure why we do it in the case of inmates with serious mental illness.” Burns Testimony at vol. 1, 168-69. Dr. Patterson opined that there should be a hospital-like setting or actual hospitalization of patients with the most severe cases of mental illness; he did not see any hospital-like environment within the ten facilities he toured. He also explained that placement in the stabilization unit, the
131

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 132 of 302
highest level of care available within ADOC, should be a time-limited treatment intervention, because the SU is a highly isolated setting and likely to exacerbate conditions of those prisoners experiencing acute symptoms; and that if a patient is not stabilized in the SU, the patient should be moved to a hospital. Patterson emphatically stated, without any qualification, that refusing to transfer patients to mental health hospitals until the end of their sentences is simply “wrong,” and that it puts the most severely ill patients at a substantial risk of harm. Patterson Testimony at vol. 1, 174. In other words, for the most severe cases of acute mental illness, there is no alternative to a hospital setting, due to these stark differences in treatment options and milieu.
The grave risk of serious harm in failing to provide hospital-level care to severely ill prisoners was quite obvious in the case of Jamie Wallace. Less than two months before he testified in court, clinicians recommended that Wallace be transferred to a hospital.
132

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 133 of 302
Despite the clinical recommendation, ADOC chose not to pursue hospital admission. In court, Wallace testified that voices in his head told him to kill himself; and indeed, he had attempted suicide multiple times. After testifying in court, highly agitated and destabilized, Wallace languished in a crisis cell and an SU cell before ending his life. Less than two weeks had passed since his testimony regarding inadequate mental-health care in ADOC.
6. Inadequate Suicide Prevention and Crisis Care Like its inpatient care, ADOC’s suicide-prevention procedures and crisis care suffer from serious deficiencies. Identification, treatment, and monitoring of those who have heightened suicide risks are important because they provide the last safety net before the worst possible outcome in mental-health care: suicide. Reflecting its importance, courts have held that a minimally adequate mental-health care system must have a functioning suicide-prevention program. See, e.g., Ruiz
133

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 134 of 302
v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Justice, J.) (“[I]dentification, treatment, and supervision of inmates with suicidal tendencies is a necessary component of any mental health treatment program.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), opinion amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1258 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Henderson, C.J.) (adopting the suicide-prevention program standard from Ruiz as part of “constitutional minima”); see also Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835-36 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Where prison personnel directly responsible for inmate care have knowledge that an inmate has attempted, or even threatened, suicide, their failure to take steps to prevent that inmate from committing suicide can amount to deliberate indifference.”); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that failure of a prison staff member to notify competent authorities
134

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 135 of 302
regarding the inmate’s dangerous psychiatric state and self-harm may constitute deliberate indifference).
Prisoners are at an elevated risk of suicide due to the conditions prevalent in ADOC facilities. As Dr. John Wilson, the psychologist from MHM’s national Clinical Operations Department, explained to MHM’s program director Houser, “[e]xperience and research confirm” the following: “Suicides increase with crowding, drugs, assaults, low staffing rates, lack of meaningful programming, and significant changes in facility mission/population such that inmates are moving between facilities more frequently or are uncertain about whether they will be housed or ... when there is basic unrest at a systems level, it can cause a spike.” Pl. Ex. 1224, October 1, 2015 Email from Wilson to Houser (doc. no. 1117-24) at 2. Given the widespread presence of these factors in ADOC, the need for effective suicide prevention and crisis care cannot be overstated.
Suicide prevention consists of assessing and managing suicide risk: assessing the risk entails using
135

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 136 of 302

a suicide risk-assessment tool to identify those who are

at heightened risk and the level of that risk; managing

the risk involves both short- and long-term care that

provides meaningful therapeutic contact to alleviate

suicide risk.

Suicide prevention also involves

physically restricting suicidal prisoners’ ability to

harm themselves. The short-term care provided to

prisoners who are undergoing acute mental-health crises

is called ‘crisis care.’

The standard of care in correctional mental-health

care and ADOC regulations require that a suicidal

prisoner be placed in a special cell that minimizes risks

of self-harm and suicide. These ‘crisis cells’ or

‘suicide-watch cells’ must be free of structural designs

that would facilitate self-harm or suicide attempts, such

as tie-off points where prisoners can tie a ligature to

hang themselves; they also must be free of items that

prisoners can use to harm themselves, such as sharp items

and ropes. Patients on suicide watch are stripped of

136

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 137 of 302
personal belongings and regular clothes and given a suicide-proof blanket and a suicide smock.
Both correctional officers and mental-health staff have the ability to place any prisoner on suicide watch, after which a mid- or high-level provider is required to conduct a thorough mental-health assessment that includes the use of a suicide risk-assessment tool.43 While on suicide watch, patients are to receive a high level of care in order to resolve the crisis and return to a less isolated and restrictive setting as soon as possible; such care includes close monitoring, daily re-evaluation of treatment plans, and frequent contacts with mid- or high-level providers such as psychiatrists and psychologists. If a patient on suicide watch is not stabilized within 72 hours, mental-health staff is required to evaluate the patient for admission to the
43. Suicide risk-assessment tools include a checklist of risk factors and protective factors, such as age, gender, length of sentence, contact with family, and engagement in treatment, just to name a few. These tools also require the clinician to make a holistic assessment based on the answers and the appropriate weight of each factor to estimate the overall risk of suicide.
137

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 138 of 302
stabilization unit. Discontinuing suicide-watch procedures requires an order from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or a nurse practitioner after an in-person evaluation.
ADOC prisoners in crisis may alternatively be placed in a crisis cell on mental health observation (MHO). MHO refers to a similar, short-term monitoring status for patients whose conditions are not as acute as those on suicide watch but still merit an observational status, or who have been recently released from suicide watch. Patients on MHO may be released only by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or nurse practitioner, but--unlike in suicide watch--the patients are allowed regular clothes and limited property.
ADOC’s suicide-prevention efforts and crisis care suffer from multiple inadequacies. First, ADOC and MHM’s use of a suicide risk-assessment tool is too limited to adequately identify those at high risk. Moreover, many prisoners at heightened risk of suicide or self-harm do not receive crisis care because of a severe shortage of
138

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 139 of 302
crisis cells and staffing, and due to a culture of skepticism towards threats of suicide. Second, suicidal prisoners are often placed in unsafe environments both because of the shortage of crisis cells and because many crisis cells contain unsafe physical structures, such as tie-off points, and dangerous items that can be used for self-harm. Third, prisoners who are identified as suicidal receive inadequate monitoring and treatment. Lastly, inappropriate releases from suicide watch and a lack of follow-up care often push suicidal prisoners back into crises again and again, driving up the demand for crisis cells and diverting resources away from day-to-day, long-term treatment.
ADOC’s inadequate crisis care and long-term suicide-prevention measures have created a substantial risk of serious harm, including self-harm, suicide, and continued pain and suffering. ADOC has experienced a dramatic increase in suicide rates in the last two years. Alabama’s reported suicide rate was five per 100,000 between 2000 and 2013; by fiscal year 2015-2016, the rate
139

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 140 of 302

had shot up to over 37 per 100,000. This is more than

double the national average of 16 suicides per 100,000

prisoners in state and federal correctional systems.

Patterson Testimony at vol. 2, 27; see also U.S.

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,

Mortality in Local Jails and State Prisons,

2000-2013 - Statistical Tables (2015) at Table 28. In

the fiscal year starting in October 2016, the rate is

projected to be over 60 per 100,000, based on the first

three months of the year. See Pl. Ex. 1267, 2015-2016

Chart of ADOC Suicides (doc. no. 1108-38). Defense

expert Dr. Patterson testified that he does not know of

any prison system that has a suicide rate over 25 or 30

per 100,000. It is in the context of the magnitude of

the suicide rate at ADOC that the court now considers

ADOC’s

failure

to

provide

a

functioning

suicide-prevention system.

140

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 141 of 302
a. Failure to Provide Crisis Care to Those Who Need It
ADOC fails to provide suicide-prevention services and crisis care to many prisoners who need it. This failure stems from inadequate identification of those who are at heightened risk of suicide, combined with a culture of cynicism toward prisoners’ threats of suicide and self-harm and a severe shortage of crisis cells. The majority of suicides in ADOC are committed by prisoners who are not on the mental-health caseload, which means that many of the prisoners’ needs were never identified through the intake or referral process, and no intervention happened before their deaths. See Pl. Ex. 1267, 2015-2016 chart of ADOC suicides (doc. no. 1108-38) (showing eight out of 11 suicides between September 2015 and December 2016 committed by those who were not on the mental-health caseload).
According to correctional mental-health experts on both sides, the administration of a suicide risk-assessment and management tool by a qualified provider is widely recognized to be an essential part of
141

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 142 of 302
mental-health care: it should be used as a part of the intake screening process and whenever a prisoner threatens or attempts to harm himself or actually does so. The purpose of a suicide risk-assessment tool is to assess whether a prisoner presents an increased risk of suicidal behavior in order to manage that risk through early intervention. As defense expert Dr. Patterson explained, the suicide risk-assessment tool must be completed in a face-to-face encounter by a high-level provider or a mid-level provider with high-level supervision, because the tool comes with clinical guidelines and requires clinical judgment.
ADOC and MHM did not use a suicide risk-assessment tool for many years and only recently began using one only at intake. While examining ADOC’s mental-health care in connection with this case, defense expert Patterson noticed that no suicide risk-assessment tool was being used, even though MHM had such a tool. Dr. Patterson recommended that a risk-assessment tool be used throughout the system, including at intake, upon
142

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 143 of 302
placement in a crisis cell, and any other time a prisoner is deemed to have a heightened suicide risk. He also specifically indicated that a casual assessment without using a form is not acceptable--a form with appropriate clinical guidelines should be used in each instance.
As a result of this exchange, which took place in the summer of 2016--more than two years after this lawsuit was filed--MHM began using a suicide risk-assessment tool at intake for new prisoners entering ADOC.44 However, contrary to Patterson’s recommendations, MHM is not using the assessment tool when prisoners threaten or engage in self-harm or are placed in crisis cells. For example, Dr. Patterson found no suicide risk assessment had been completed for plaintiff Jamie Wallace in December 2016 despite his repeated threats of self-harm and suicide and his stay in a crisis cell shortly before he killed himself. Prisoners who threaten suicide frequently do not receive any kind of
44. No efforts have been made to administer the risk-assessment tool to the vast majority of prisoners in the system, who went through intake before that date.
143

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 144 of 302

face-to-face assessment by high-level providers, let

alone one involving a risk-assessment tool. The failure

to perform proper suicide risk assessments to identify

prisoners with a heightened risk of suicidal behavior

places seriously mentally ill prisoners at an “obvious,”

substantial risk of serious harm. Burns Testimony at

vol. 1, 63.

A chronic shortage of crisis cells also contributes

to ADOC’s failure to provide crisis care to those who

need it. While the exact number of crisis cells

sufficient for any given prison system depends on the

needs of the population and the treatment options

available, it is clear that the number of crisis cells

in ADOC is grossly inadequate.

Witness after

witness--including Associate Commissioner Naglich and

MHM managers--agreed that having two crisis cells for

3,800 prisoners at the Staton-Draper-Elmore complex, two

crisis cells for 1,900 prisoners at Bibb, and two crisis

144

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 145 of 302
cells for 2,700 prisoners at Fountain, is insufficient.45
MHM’s medical director Hunter testified that the number
of crisis cells in each of the 15 major facilities within
ADOC is insufficient. In addition to the low number of
crisis cells across the system, the backlog of placements
at the Bullock stabilization unit has contributed to the
shortage: when the SU does not have a bed for the most
acutely ill prisoners, often due to the presence of
segregation inmates, mentally ill prisoners end up
staying in crisis cells for much longer than 72 hours,
though the explicit purpose of crisis cells is to serve as a short-term placement while the prisoner stabilizes.46
45. Plaintiffs’ expert Vail testified that inadequate outpatient and routine care would increase the need for crisis care, and inadequate crisis care would also increase the number of those who are placed on suicide watch over and over again, reinforcing the need for more crisis cells. Documentary evidence of prisoners being repeatedly placed on suicide watch supports this conclusion.
46. The O dorm at Kilby, a small cell block with 13 cells, has been used as overflow crisis cells for the rest of the system. Transferring suicidal prisoners from their home institution to crisis cells at a different institution, while preferable to housing them in a place that is not suicide-proof, poses a host of problems.
145

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 146 of 302
Because ADOC has a limited number of cells to work
with, ADOC and MHM staff gamble on which prisoners to put
in them and frequently discount prisoners’ threats of
self-harm and suicide, instead of properly evaluating
suicide threats by having a qualified provider administer
First, it takes multiple correctional officers to transport a prisoner, which exacerbates the problem of correctional-officer shortages and may not even be possible depending on the staffing level at the time the crisis is happening. Second, it jeopardizes the prisoner’s mental state even further, since changing the environment of someone who is already in crisis can add to the distress the prisoner is experiencing. Dr. Tytell referred to the transfer experience as potentially “traumatic.” Tytell Testimony at __. Third, it interferes with continuity of care, where the team that was familiar with the patient’s symptoms and treatment is no longer in charge of treatment, and a new team of providers must get up to speed to treat a new patient, all in the context of time-sensitive care.
A related issue that arose during the trial is how to characterize the O dorm at Kilby. Trial testimony showed that the O dorm is sometimes also used as a segregation overflow for Kilby. Pl. Ex. 1257, Duty Post Log for O Dorm (doc. no. 1097-20) (showing “seg walk” and “seg shower” as part of tasks completed by correctional officers in O dorm). This practice makes it more likely that Kilby will run out of crisis cells. It also raises the same concerns that experts and MHM providers expressed regarding housing suicidal prisoners in a segregation unit or housing mental-health patients with heightened treatment needs and increased vulnerability near segregation inmates in general, as explained in more detail in the section on segregation practices.
146

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 147 of 302
a suicide risk-assessment tool. For example, in CQI meetings and multidisciplinary staff meetings, MHM staff discussed “call[ing] their bluff” and “tak[ing] the gamble” on prisoners who threatened to commit suicide or severely injure themselves. Pl. Ex. 720, February 2014 Quarterly CQI Meeting Minutes (doc. no. 1044-14) at MHM029579; see also Pl. Ex. 718, April 2015 Quarterly CQI meeting minutes (doc. no. 1044-12) at MHM029570 (discussing concerns about feigning suicidality to avoid being sent to segregation and that it is ADOC’s responsibility to find a safe place for “genuinely suicidal inmates” (emphasis in original)). Discussions during these meetings included statements such as “99 % often do not act on their threats.” Pl. Ex. 721, January 2015 Quarterly CQI meeting minutes (doc. no. 1044-15) at MHM029614. Staff meeting minutes and medical records of patients also included conclusory statements suggesting that prisoners who are claiming suicidality and self-harm tendencies are in fact malingering or seeking ‘secondary gains’--such as getting out of a segregation cell, or
147

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 148 of 302
getting away from an enemy, or debt problems. In response to MHM staff’s use of this type of language in medical records, MHM’s Chief Psychologist, Dr. Woodley, instructed staff to not use “malingering” and “secondary gain” in written documentation because one “cannot know [a prisoner’s] motivations for certain.” Pl. Ex. 721, January 2015 Quarterly CQI meeting minutes (doc. no. 1044-15) at MHM029614. Contrary to this instruction, MHM staff continued to write off prisoners’ threats of self-harm as motivated by inmate-to-inmate debt or secondary gains, rather than conducting a proper assessment. In the March 2015 monthly operations report, MHM reported to ADOC that there have been “occasions where the inmate would not be placed on watch despite claiming to be suicidal, especially if the inmate is well known to the treatment staff as having a history of bluffing and/or no actual attempts.” Joint Ex. 328, March 2015 Monthly Operations Report (doc. no. 1038-673) at 14. A progress note from Jamie Wallace’s medical records dated five days before he committed suicide was
148

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 149 of 302
representative of this culture: it noted that Wallace was “using crisis cell/threats to get what he wants.” Joint Ex. 496, Jamie Wallace Medical Records (doc. no. 1037-1062) at ADOC0399861. In sum, MHM staff frequently treat threats of self-harm as behavioral rather than mental-health issues, writing off threats instead of delving deeper to address underlying mental-health needs through a mental-health evaluation and suicide risk assessment.47
This skeptical approach towards threats of self-harm poses substantial and obvious risks. First, those who should be on suicide watch may not receive the crisis care that they need and may kill or harm themselves. Gambling with threats of self-harm is dangerous: obviously, as experts and MHM staff agreed, not all
47. Some correctional officers also fail to take threats of self-harm seriously, and even worse, respond in dangerous ways. As Dr. Hunter testified, ADOC officers have responded to prisoners’ threats of self-harm with sarcasm or cracked jokes about suicidality, and even challenged inmates to follow through with suicide threats; on several occasions, ADOC officers essentially called a prisoner’s bluff and then that person attempted suicide.
149

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 150 of 302
prisoners who express suicidality are feigning it, and a number of prisoners do in fact become suicidal and engage in self-harm. Furthermore, the risk of misinterpreting a prisoner’s motivation is heightened by MHM’s failure to use a suicide risk-assessment tool after an instance or threat of self-harm. Second, hostile attitudes towards prisoners in mental health crises can “cause inmates to become more aggravated and agitated,” making it more difficult to treat the inmate. Houser Testimony at vol. 2, 160. Third, prisoners who make threats or engage in self-harm but are not actively suicidal may nevertheless suffer from underlying mental-health issues that need to be addressed.
As experts from both sides agreed, no bright line distinguishes ‘behavioral problems’ from ‘mental-health problems’: even if someone is engaging in self-harm for ‘secondary gains,’ a high-level clinician should evaluate the underlying mental-health issues, for four reasons. First, the presence of suicidality is not a yes-or-no question; according to the experts, it is well
150

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 151 of 302
established that suicide risk is on a continuum, and a
meaningful suicide-prevention program requires
monitoring for an increased risk of suicide. Second,
even in the absence of genuine suicidal ideation,
engaging in self-harm is a mental-health issue because
it indicates suffering from psychological distress and a
lack of proper coping mechanisms to resolve problems.
Therefore, instead of ignoring those who resort to
self-harm to seek attention, staff should provide
assistance.48 Third, as Dr. Burns cautioned, chalking up
48. Interestingly, on the topic of ‘secondary gains,’ plaintiffs’ expert Vail posited that with a functioning protective-custody system, in which prisoners who feel unsafe can be moved away from their enemies, the problem of trying to determine who is genuinely suicidal would be alleviated. While all prison systems have conflicts among prisoners and a risk of inmate-on-inmate violence, he explained, prisoners in other correctional systems who feel unsafe generally pursue other avenues to protect themselves, such as requesting protective custody or transfer, rather than requesting to be placed on suicide watch. According to Vail, prisoners generally do not request suicide watch solely for protection because suicide cells are not, generally speaking, a desirable environment. This testimony suggests that to the extent non-suicidal ADOC prisoners actually are electing such an undesirable cell environment for protection, either the protective custody system is inadequate, or general population dorms are ridden with so much violence that
151

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 152 of 302
instances of self-harm to behavioral problems not
deserving of treatment may actually encourage such
behavior: research in behavioral management shows that
negative reinforcement of self-harm is more likely to
prompt the prisoner to engage in more dramatic and even
lethal self-harm. Finally, people who engage in
self-harm can also accidentally kill or severely injure
themselves without having a specific intent to do so;
therefore, monitoring and assessment are necessary even
if a prisoner’s suicidality is deemed not genuine.
To emphasize, the court does not mean to suggest that
a prisoner must always be kept on suicide watch upon a
threat of suicide; as experts noted, some threats of
suicide or self-harm are not genuine. However, as the
experts explained, these threats should not be written
it is rational for prisoners to choose suicide-watch cells over the dangerous environment of general population. Vail’s observations also indicate that improving the protective-custody system and addressing the underlying problem of prisoner safety could be a safe and effective way of ensuring that only those who need crisis cells are placed there; it would also be a solution that does not involve placing suicidal prisoners at a substantial risk of serious harm by taking a gamble on whether prisoners are actually suicidal.
152

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 153 of 302
off without the use of an appropriate suicide risk-assessment tool by a qualified provider in a face-to-face evaluation. Based on the overall assessment of the evidence, the court finds that ADOC’s current practice was devoid of any system to ensure that suicidal prisoners are appropriately evaluated.
b. Placement of Prisoners in Crisis in Dangerous and Harmful Settings
Due to the chronic shortage of crisis cells, ADOC frequently places those on suicide watch in inappropriate environments, such as offices for correctional staff (also called ‘shift offices’), libraries, and segregation cells. These inappropriate placements put suicidal prisoners at a grave risk of self-harm and suicide.
ADOC and MHM have repeatedly placed suicidal prisoners in dangerous environments due to a lack of available crisis cells. MHM’s Dr. Hunter complained to ADOC in his March 2015 monthly operating report that ADOC officers at some facilities were placing prisoners on suicide watch in cells that are not crisis cells to avoid
153

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 154 of 302
having to travel. He was also aware of at least a dozen times when prisoners in crisis at Bibb Correctional Facility were placed in shift offices over the weekend while waiting for transportation to another facility. ADOC’s Dr. Tytell recalled multiple instances in 2015 in which prisoners in crisis were being housed in shift offices for multiple days; he admitted that this practice was inappropriate but commented, “[Y]ou have to work with what you got.” Tytell Testimony at __. During a 2016 ADOC tour, Dr. Haney found a prisoner who was housed in a mental-health office;49 the prisoner had been there for over a day without receiving any treatment, even though he was deemed to be suicidal. Lastly, at least one documented case of suicide in the last three years occurred while a prisoner awaiting crisis-cell placement was housed in a room behind a shift office.50 Houser Testimony at vol. 3, 55.
49. Dr. Haney also noted that this prisoner was locked in the office with no access to a bathroom.
50. A related problem is the inadequate mental-health staffing at prisons that provide only
154

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 155 of 302
This practice of placing suicidal prisoners in unsafe
environments increases the risk that prisoners will
engage in self-harm, including suicide attempts. The
consensus among the experts from both sides, as well as
MHM and ADOC staff, was that housing a suicidal inmate
in a space like a shift office is quite dangerous: not
only are these places full of items that can be used for
self-harm, but, depending on where the prisoner is placed,
such placements can also cut off suicidal prisoners from
the treatment that they desperately need.
Placing suicidal prisoners in cells that are either
in or adjacent to death row or segregation also poses a
number of problems. Holman Correctional Facility’s
suicide-watch cells are located on death row. As
plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Haney explained, the
outpatient mental-health care: those who are confined in crisis cells, or even more inappropriate settings, such as shift offices or libraries, do not have access to mental-health care over the weekend, because most outpatient-only prisons do not have mental-health staff on weekends. In other words, despite their ‘crisis’ condition, suicidal prisoners in these facilities are often left in a crisis cell or a non-suicide-proof environment for multiple days waiting to see a mental-health staff member.
155

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 156 of 302
“juxtaposition of prisoners who are potentially suicidal with prisoners who are under a sentence of death” is “extremely problematic” for those in the throes of a mental health crisis. Haney Testimony at vol. 1, 101-02; Joint Ex. 459, Haney Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043) at 35. Defense expert Dr. Patterson agreed: bringing prisoners in crisis from general population into a death-row unit would make them more likely to decompensate, because death-row units are not designed to be therapeutic; moreover, death-row units are largely self-contained and are subject to their own regulations that are likely harsher and more punitive than the regulations in an ordinary unit. Dr. Patterson also expressed concern that death-row inmates would retaliate against inmates in crisis cells, creating even more stress for these vulnerable prisoners.51
51. ADOC also sometimes places crisis-care inmates in stabilization units. This is problematic not so much for the suicidal inmates but for the others: according to Dr. Hunter of MHM, housing suicidal prisoners in crisis cells within an SU negatively impacts MHM’s ability to care for the severely mentally ill already in the unit.
156

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 157 of 302
c. Inadequate Treatment in Crisis Care The care provided to prisoners on suicide watch is also grossly inadequate. ADOC and MHM fail to provide adequate treatment to patients in crisis cells and, to make matters worse, frequently keep them in crisis cells for much longer than appropriate or necessary. As Dr. Burns credibly opined, out-of-cell counseling sessions for prisoners on suicide watch are important both because they can help eliminate suicidal thoughts and because they assist providers in meaningfully modifying treatment plans to address the causes of a crisis. However, prisoners on suicide watch and mental-health observation are not consistently receiving out-of-cell appointments with counselors. Prisoners are frequently kept for extended periods of time in crisis cells, instead of being transferred to an RTU or SU for intensive, longer-term treatment. According to ADOC’s administrative regulations, anyone who is on suicide watch for more than 72 hours should be considered for placement in a mental-health unit. As
157

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 158 of 302
experts on both sides agreed, crisis-cell placement is meant to be temporary and should not last longer than 72 hours, because the harsh effects of prolonged isolation in a crisis cell can harm patients’ mental health. However, since as far back as 2011, MHM has, by its own report, considered transferring prisoners in crisis to treatment units only in a small fraction of the crisis placements that last longer than 72 hours. See Pl. Ex. 1190, 2011 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-8) at 22 (in 2011, only 20 % of those housed in crisis cells for over 72 hours were considered for transfer); Pl. Ex. 105, 2014 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-105) at 11 (in 2014, 29 %); Pl. Ex. 115, 2016 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-3) at 11 (in 2016, 13 %). MHM’s CQI manager testified that extended stays in crisis cells are “sometimes” necessary because there is a “full house” in the appropriate treatment unit. Davis-Walker Testimony at vol. 2, 102. See also Pl. Ex. 1219, September 2014 Emails between MHM and ADOC (doc. no. 1047-10)(discussing a prisoner who was on suicide
158

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 159 of 302
watch for 25 days at Bibb, waiting for a transfer to Bullock SU).
Contrary to the CQI manager’s characterization, documentary evidence showed that prisoners are in fact frequently kept in crisis cells for much longer than 72 hours. See Pl. Ex. 721, January 2015 Quarterly CQI Meeting Minutes (doc. no. 1044-15) at 4 (showing examples of long crisis-cell stays, such as 240 hours at Limestone, 429 hours at Staton, and 620 hours at Ventress, and suggesting that weekend hours were not being counted); Pl. Dem. Ex. 141, 2016 Crisis Cell Placements (doc. no. 1156-2) (showing that a majority of facilities have multiple prisoners being housed in crisis cells for longer than 144 hours, some of them exceeding 200 hours, in 2016). At St. Clair, Dr. Haney confirmed that one of the prisoners he interviewed had been housed in a barren suicide-watch cell in the infirmary for five months--well beyond the intended duration of crisis-cell stays. These extremely lengthy stays in crisis cells contribute, in turn, to a shortage of crisis cells
159

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 160 of 302
throughout the system. They also illustrate that prisoners are not getting the treatment they need to stabilize and be moved out of crisis cells, or that ADOC and MHM are leaving these mentally ill prisoners in extremely isolated environments for longer than appropriate.

d. Unsafe Crisis Cells

Despite their purpose of preventing self-harm and

suicide, crisis cells in ADOC facilities are unsafe.

First, crisis cells are ridden with physical structures

that provide easy opportunities to commit suicide.

Experts from both sides agreed that having crisis cells

free of tie-off points is a critically important feature

of suicide prevention in prisons.

The National

Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), a

professional organization that promulgates standards for

correctional health care and provides accreditation to

facilities that follow those standards, requires that

crisis cells be free from tie-off points that can be used

160

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 161 of 302
for self-injurious behavior. 52 ADOC’s history makes clear the critical importance of this issue: all but one suicide within ADOC in the last two years happened by hanging. However, many of ADOC’s crisis cells have easily accessible tie-off points, such as sprinkler heads, hinges, fixtures, and vents, making them incredibly dangerous for suicidal prisoners. In fact, defense expert Dr. Patterson stated that making crisis cells suicide-proof is the “number-one issue” to be addressed. Patterson Testimony at vol. 1, 296.
Examples of unsafe crisis cells abound. As Dr. Haney noted and the court saw firsthand during prison visits in February 2017, in the Bullock SU, where some prisoners on suicide watch are kept, sprinkler heads are located

52. While professional standards like those

promulgated by NCCHC do not necessarily set the

constitutional floor for minimally adequate

mental-health care

under the Eighth Amendment,

substantial deviations from accepted standards can

indicate an Eighth Amendment violation. See Steele v.

Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that

providing care where the quality is “so substantial a

deviation from accepted standards” can constitute

deliberate indifference). Moreover, ADOC’s contract with

MHM requires MHM to comply with those standards.

161

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 162 of 302
directly above the sink and the toilet, making it easy for suicidal prisoners to climb up to tie a ligature on the sprinkler head. In fact, that is how Jamie Wallace committed suicide while housed in an SU cell at Bullock. As plaintiffs’ experts observed, crisis cells in St. Clair, Kilby, and Holman all have tie-off points; MHM’s Houser also admitted that many crisis cells across ADOC facilities are out of compliance with NCCHC standards for suicide cells because they have tie-off points.
Unsurprisingly, MHM staff have repeatedly expressed concerns about the safety of crisis cells in multiple facilities, as reflected in contract-compliance reports and CQI meeting minutes: in 2011, staff expressed concern about the unsafe features of crisis cells at Fountain; in 2012, staff reported concerns about the safety of Ventress crisis cells; in 2016, MHM’s contract-compliance report stated that crisis cells in Holman are unsafe because of the open bars on the doors.
Another dangerous aspect of many ADOC crisis cells is the difficulty of monitoring the prisoner inside. The
162

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 163 of 302
design of the cell doors and windows and the layout of the facilities often prevent a direct line of sight into the cell. For example, Dr. Haney testified that suicide-watch cells at Donaldson, located in the infirmary and known as Z-Cells, had grates over the windows that made it very difficult to see into a cell even when standing directly in front of a door and peering in. At St. Clair, Dr. Haney noted that suicide-watch cells were located in a hallway in the infirmary; they, too, were hard to see into and easy to ignore. Pl. Dem. Ex. 107, St. Clair Suicide Watch Cell (doc. no. 1125-62). Associate Commissioner of Operations Culliver noted that even though Holman crisis cells have barred fronts, it is nonetheless impossible to see into these cells from the officers’ cube located closest to them. Culliver also acknowledged that the solid crisis-cells doors at many facilities, including Bullock, Donaldson, Fountain, Kilby, and St. Clair, make it impossible for an officer or mental-health provider on the unit to see into the cells and check on the prisoners housed within them
163

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 164 of 302
without walking up to the door and looking through the small glass window.
ADOC’s practice of allowing prisoners in cells to cover the windows with paper or other material exacerbates the visibility problem. Dr. Haney noticed this practice in Donaldson, Holman, St. Clair, and Bibb, describing it as incredibly problematic because it blocks any type of monitoring entirely. Dr. Haney witnessed a particularly disturbing incident while touring Bibb. He entered the infirmary and went to speak with the prisoners housed in the crisis cells. As he was speaking to one, a lawyer touring the facility with him discovered that a prisoner in another crisis cell was, at that very moment, attempting to hang himself--the prisoner had somehow procured a cord to wrap around his neck and had attempted to cover the window with a blanket. Allowing prisoners to cover the windows of their cells is dangerous in any context, but it is particularly unacceptable for prisoners known to be suicidal. Due to the visibility problems with many ADOC suicide-watch
164

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 165 of 302
cells, defense expert Patterson opined that suicidal prisoners should be under direct, constant observation while in those cells. He also explained that camera observation by an officer at the control station may not be sufficient, because by the time that officer notices a suicide attempt, it might be too late; moreover, the officer likely has other responsibilities that would preclude careful monitoring of any single cell.
The dangerousness of crisis cells and the significant risk of harm caused by such conditions are compounded by ADOC’s rampant failure to prevent introduction of dangerous items into crisis cells. Admittedly, the parties in 2014 reached a settlement that prohibits ADOC officers from providing disposable razor blades to prisoners on suicide watch and in segregation. See January 16, 2015 Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction (doc. no. 84).53 However, the problem of
53. Defendants argued that inappropriate items found in crisis cells can no longer be part of the case because of this settlement. However, the problem is broader in scope: the settlement agreement to discontinue providing razor blades by no means discharges ADOC’s responsibility
165

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 166 of 302

dangerous items in crisis cells has continued, according

to a number of ADOC officials and MHM staff. Suicidal

prisoners have access to inappropriate items--such as

sharp implements--either because they bring the items

with them when placed on suicide watch and correctional

officers do not search them, or because correctional

officers or inmate ‘runners’ who perform various

housekeeping tasks around the unit bring the items to the

crisis cells. MHM’s Houser stated that prisoners have

access to improper items in safe cells at a number of

facilities, including specifically Donaldson, St. Clair,

Staton, and Holman; she was not sure whether this problem

had been addressed at any of these facilities. Dr. Hunter

of MHM and Associate Commissioner Culliver both testified

that finding sharp objects in a suicide-watch cell has

been a problem at Bibb, despite the installation of flaps

on cell doors that were intended to stem the flow of

contraband.

Lastly, Holman’s crisis cells are

particularly problematic, as Associate Commissioners

to ensure that objects with which suicidal prisoners can engage in self-harm are not found in crisis cells.
166

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 167 of 302
Naglich and Culliver admitted: although passing prisoners are able to slip items to those housed in crisis cells at a number of facilities, this sort of exchange is particularly easy at Holman, where the crisis cell doors have open bars. Yet, when asked what MHM had done to address this issue, Houser responded that after each incident, MHM staff would “ask [ADOC] to please do a better job.” Houser Testimony at vol. 3, 16. She could not identify any other efforts either by MHM or ADOC to address this issue.54
e. Inadequate Monitoring of Suicidal Prisoners The unsafe features of crisis cells heighten the importance of monitoring prisoners for signs of decompensation or suicide attempts. However, ADOC’s monitoring practices are woefully inadequate.
54. The risk of allowing suicidal prisoners access to sharp implements is obvious. However, as Dr. Burns explained, sharp items pose a serious risk even to prisoners who do not have any intention of killing themselves but engage in cutting; it is easy to cut too deep by accident and cause potentially fatal bleeding.
167

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 168 of 302

According to ADOC’s administrative regulations and

the standard of care for mental-health care in prisons,

suicide-watch checks should take place at staggered, or

random, intervals of approximately every 15 minutes,

rather than exactly every 15 minutes. For prisoners on

mental-health observation, these staggered checks should

occur approximately every 30 minutes.

Staggered

intervals prevent prisoners from timing their suicide

attempts, because otherwise they can predict exactly when

checks will occur. Such monitoring procedures are all

the more crucial when suicidal inmates are housed in

cells that have little visibility: as plaintiffs’ expert

Vail bluntly stated, without regular checks, “[Y]ou have

no idea if they’re alive or dead.” Vail Testimony at

vol. 1, 96.

Dr. Burns and Dr. Haney both testified that many of

the monitoring logs they had seen during their site

visits and document review had pre-printed times or had

handwritten pre-filled times at exact intervals. This

practice reflects prison staff’s lack of understanding

168

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 169 of 302
that checks should be performed at staggered intervals, and makes it impossible to ensure that staggered checks are actually happening. Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that staff are not permitted to use monitoring logs with pre-printed times, but that some continue to use them. She also testified that officers and staff are not permitted to handwrite times and signatures in advance of, or in lieu of, their actual checks. However, during the post-trial prison tours, the court came across multiple logs where times at 15- or 30-minute intervals had been pre-filled, even though the parties had agreed during the trial to correct this practice, and the court had ordered compliance with the agreement several weeks before the tours. This evidence of non-compliance greatly troubled the court, as it showed that policy changes are not being implemented on the ground even when a court order is involved.
For the most acutely suicidal, constant--rather than staggered-interval--watch is necessary. As Dr. Burns opined, correctional systems must have a constant-watch
169

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 170 of 302
procedure for individuals whose risk of suicide is the highest, due to their engagement in self-injurious behavior or threat of suicide with specific plans: if a prisoner is waiting for an opportunity to kill himself, it is too dangerous to walk away, and he must be constantly observed. For this reason, the NCCHC standards classify constant-watch procedures as an “essential” standard, and MHM is contractually obligated to follow all NCCHC standards.55
ADOC and MHM had not provided constant watch for acutely suicidal inmates prior to Jamie Wallace’s death. During the trial, in the wake of Jamie Wallace’s suicide, the court urged the parties to propose interim measures to prevent more suicides. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for temporary restraining order seeking to institute constant watch and other suicide-prevention measures. Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
55. NCCHC promulgates two types of standards: essential and important. As the terms would indicate, the distinction between the two denotes the relative importance of each standard. The essential standards are mandatory conditions for accreditation by NCCHC; only 85 % compliance with important standards is required.
170

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 171 of 302

Order (doc. no. 1075). The parties reached an interim agreement in early January. Phase 2A Interim Relief Order Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures (doc. no. 1102). The agreement mandated a constant-watch procedure for those deemed acutely suicidal and forbade using pre-printed or pre-filled forms for other types of suicide watch. While defense counsel represented to the court that it was Commissioner Dunn’s intent to keep the constant-watch procedure until told otherwise by the court or experts, the court also heard testimony that the current implementation of suicide-prevention measures and constant watch is not sustainable.56 The parties defined ‘constant watch’ as a “procedure that ensures one-on-one visual contact at all times, except to the

56. In addition, there were allegations of

non-compliance with the constant watch procedures at

Kilby. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew the Temporary

Restraining Order Regarding Suicide Prevention

Procedures (doc. no. 1171).

This allegation of

non-compliance will be discussed in infra Part V.D.

A separate issue is whether Commissioner Dunn’s representation that he will enforce the interim agreement indefinitely is binding on ADOC or his successors. This issue is taken up in Part V.D.
171

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 172 of 302
extent that the physical design allows an observer to maintain an unobstructed line of sight with no more than two people on suicide watch at once.” Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures (doc. no. 1102-1). MHM’s Houser testified that the implementation has been difficult because some facilities do not have a layout conducive to constant watch, due to the location of the windows on cell doors and structures that obstruct a direct line of sight into crisis cells. As a result, MHM has had to transfer some prisoners to other facilities. Another obstacle in the implementation stems from a lack of sufficient correctional staffing: for example, the Holman crisis cells, located on death row, are unsafe for mental-health staff, because without sufficient correctional staffing on duty, prisoners often throw objects from second and third tiers at the mental-health staff conducting constant watch on the first tier. Finally, according to Houser, the annual budget for a permanent constant-watch procedure is projected to be over $4 million, but MHM was initially provided only
172

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 173 of 302
$200,000 to meet the immediate needs of the interim agreement mandating constant watch.57
f. Inappropriate Release from Suicide Watch and Inadequate Follow-up
Prisoners are routinely released from suicide watch improperly and receive inadequate follow-up care after their release from suicide watch. These practices create a substantial risk of recurring self-injurious behavior and suicide.
As experts from both sides explained, suicidal prisoners should be released only with the approval of a psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or nurse practitioner) who has made a face-to-face assessment that their condition was sufficiently stabilized to warrant it. In 2016, MHM reported to ADOC that it was discharging patients from suicide watch without a face-to-face assessment; the decisions were based instead on whatever
57. Houser explained that prior to the interim agreement, MHM could not staff constant watch under the current contract amount and was not expected to do so, even though NCCHC standards mandate constant watch.
173

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 174 of 302
information lower-level mental-health staff communicated over the phone to on-call doctors and nurse practitioners. A nurse practitioner at Donaldson and St. Clair testified that generally she will not authorize the release of a prisoner from suicide watch at St. Clair without seeing him in person; however, when she is not at St. Clair (a significant majority of the hours in the week), staff call Dr. Hunter to authorize the release remotely. Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that this practice of authorizing suicide-watch release without a face-to-face evaluation was not specific to any particular facilities, but that it reflected a general shortage of psychiatrists; she further agreed that it put the prisoners at risk of premature release. Evidence also showed that prisoners have, on occasion, been released from suicide watch by correctional staff without any mental health assessment at all; this is even more unacceptable. See, e.g., Pl. Ex. 436, September 19, 2014 Email between Houser and ADOC (doc. no. 1074-26) (notifying Naglich about a death-row inmate who was
174

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 175 of 302
released from a crisis cell by ADOC officer, without notice or approval by mental-health staff).
According to experts on both sides, follow-up care is necessary upon release from suicide watch both for prisoners on the mental-health caseload and for those who are not. For those who are already on the mental-health caseload, follow-up care entails incorporating what providers learned from the most recent crisis into the prisoner’s treatment plans and modifying interventions in order to address the factors that contributed to the self-injurious behavior or suicidal ideation. For those who were not on the caseload, follow-up care allows providers to assess whether the prisoner’s risk of self-injury remains low, and to determine whether the prisoner should be added to the mental-health caseload to address underlying mental-health issues. As Dr. Burns credibly opined, the failure to provide follow-up care that addresses the root of self-injurious behavior creates a substantial risk that the self-injurious
175

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 176 of 302
behavior will continue and result in serious injury or death.
The follow-up care provided to many prisoners upon their release from suicide watch at ADOC is woefully inadequate. Both Dr. Haney and Dr. Burns observed multiple instances of prisoners who were released directly from crisis cells back into segregation, with little or no follow-up treatment in subsequent weeks. For example, experts observed that plaintiffs L.P., R.M.W., and C.J. and prisoner J.D. all had a pattern of cycling between crisis cells and segregation with little follow-up treatment after crisis-cell release. As explained further later, prisoners in segregation--even those on the mental-health caseload--have little access to meaningful treatment, due to severe staffing shortages that prevent prisoners from being brought out of their cells and a lack of group activities.
Once again, Jamie Wallace provides a concrete example of the lack of follow-up care and the resulting harm. During his testimony, he repeatedly insisted that he
176

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 177 of 302
rarely received therapeutic care when not on suicide watch. Dr. Burns corroborated his testimony, noting that despite his very acute mental illness, Wallace had only one individual counseling session in the two-month period following a suicide watch placement in 2015, and that his treatment plan did not change or reflect the fact that he came off of suicide watch in late August 2016. The same lack of follow-up care was repeated in 2016: he was discharged from suicide watch two days before he committed suicide; in those two days, he received no follow-up care.
In sum, the combination of inadequate identification of needs for crisis care, unsafe cells, inadequate monitoring, and inadequate treatment has created a substantial and grave risk of serious harm for ADOC’s prisoners who have a high risk of engaging in self-injurious behavior and suicide attempts.
177

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 178 of 302
7. Inappropriate Use of Disciplinary Actions ADOC has an unacceptable practice of disciplining mentally ill prisoners for behavior that stems from their mental illnesses and doing so without adequate regard for the disciplinary sanctions’ impact on mental health. Mentally ill prisoners are routinely disciplined for harming themselves or attempting to do so. These punitive practices in turn subject mentally ill prisoners to a substantial risk of decompensation and increased suffering. Cf. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (Karlton, J.) (“[B]eing treated with punitive measures by the custody staff to control the inmates' behavior without regard to the cause of the behavior, the efficacy of such measures, or the impact of those measures on the inmates' mental illnesses” violated seriously mentally ill prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1548-49 (D. Ariz. 1993) (Muecke, J.) (finding that using lockdowns to punish seriously mentally ill prisoners’
178

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 179 of 302
behavior stemming from their illness constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation).
Imposing disciplinary sanctions on prisoners for engaging in self-injury creates an additional risk of harm beyond that stemming from inadequate treatment. As plaintiffs’ expert Burns explained, because ADOC’s practice treats self-injury solely as a behavioral problem rather than a mental-health problem, it fails to address the underlying mental-health issues through treatment; responding to self-harm in this manner is likely to escalate the self-injurious behavior, potentially resulting in serious physical injury or even death. Furthermore, if a disciplinary action results in segregation, mentally ill prisoners are at an even higher risk of harm--as will be discussed in detail later--because of the detrimental effects of isolation and of the limited access to treatment, both of which can in turn worsen underlying mental illness.
The practice of punishing prisoners for engaging in self-harm is common and system-wide at ADOC, despite a
179

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 180 of 302

written policy purporting to prohibit it. ADOC’s

administrative regulation states that, although they are

not exempt from compliance with rules and regulations,

inmates “will not be punished for symptoms of a mental illness.”58 Joint Ex. 128, Admin. Reg. § 626 (doc. no.

1038-151).

ADOC has engaged in a practice of

automatically disciplining prisoners who engage in

self-injurious behaviors. In fact, Naglich’s Office of

Health Services deemed this practice problematic as early

as 2013, when it conducted an audit of services provided

in Donaldson.

As a result, MHM’s post-audit

58. Defendants elicited testimony from various practitioners and prisoners that it is sometimes appropriate to discipline a prisoner for a violation of administrative rules despite the fact that he suffers from a mental illness. But plaintiffs have not disputed this point. Instead, they have offered evidence to show that many mentally ill prisoners are punished as a direct result of their mental illness, which the experts credibly testified is harmful. For example, defense counsel asked multiple prisoners, including plaintiff Jamie Wallace and class member M.P., whether it was ‘appropriate’ to be disciplined for having a contraband--a razor blade, for example--in the cell; however, these prisoners actually had received disciplinary sanctions for engaging in self-injurious behavior, not for having contraband.
180

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 181 of 302
corrective-action plan stated that ADOC is to stop “automatically apply[ing] disciplinary sanctions to male inmates who engage in self-injurious behavior.” Pl. Ex. 689, MHM Corrective Action - Donaldson May 2013 (doc. no. 1069-5) at ADOC045459. 59 The person responsible for implementing this change was Dr. Ron Cavanaugh of OHS, who was to review files of prisoners who may have been sanctioned for symptoms of mental illness and send instructions on how to deal with self-injurious behavior to ADOC officials in charge of supervising the disciplinary process.
Although the 2013 corrective-action plan required follow-up action to address this issue, ADOC did not take meaningful action to change this practice, and prisoners continue to face sanctions for self-injurious behavior. Associate Commissioner Naglich’s staff could find no documentation of any file reviews conducted by Dr.
59. While the corrective-action plan for Donaldson specifies “male inmates,” Associate Commissioner Naglich testified that she understood the policy change--to cease automatic disciplinary sanctions for engaging in self-harm--applied to both male and female prisoners. Naglich Testimony at vol. 2, 135.
181

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 182 of 302
Cavanaugh or instructions sent to Associate Commissioner Culliver or the regional coordinators, who according to Naglich were the officials responsible for enforcing this policy change. Associate Commissioner Culliver was likewise not aware of any policy change or new instructions regarding self-harm and disciplinary sanctions. Dr. Tytell, who replaced Dr. Cavanaugh after his death and was aware of this issue at Donaldson, testified that he and Associate Commissioner Naglich have discussed that imposing disciplinary sanctions for self-injury continued to be a problem, including in the RTU and SU. However, Dr. Tytell has done nothing to monitor, let alone address, this issue. When asked what, if anything, she personally has done to implement this policy change, Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that she had reviewed only one single prisoner’s disciplinary record; in that case, she intervened to recommend that convictions be removed based on the indications in his medical records that he was decompensating at the time of the infraction.
182

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 183 of 302
Not surprisingly, in 2016, plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Burns credibly concluded that “desperate acts to get the attention of MHM staff and necessary services,” including self-injury and suicide attempts, “often result in disciplinary action and placement in segregation where mental health treatment is even more difficult to access.” Joint Ex. 460, Burns Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1044) at 29. She also saw evidence of prisoners with untreated serious mental illness being “essentially punished for symptoms of their psychiatric illness,” such as prisoners with bipolar disorder being placed in disciplinary segregation for untreated manic behaviors. Burns Testimony at vol. 1, 27-28.
A related problem is ADOC’s inadequate mental-health evaluation process for prisoners facing disciplinary charges. Not taking mental health into consideration when determining appropriate sanctions is dangerous because certain sanctions, such as placement in segregation, expose mentally ill prisoners to a
183

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 184 of 302

substantial risk of worsening symptoms and significantly

reduced access to monitoring and treatment.

Under

ADOC’s

administrative

regulations,

disciplinary actions against prisoners whose

mental-health code is MH-1 or above require consultation

with mental-health staff: once a prisoner on the caseload

is charged with a disciplinary infraction, MHM’s

mental-health counselors are required to conduct a

mental-health evaluation and complete a computerized

module. Ostensibly, this system allows the counselor to

have input into the disciplinary process and to

communicate in writing to the disciplinary hearing

officer: (1) whether “mental health issues affected the

inmate’s behavior at the time of the charge”; (2) whether

there are “mental health issues to be considered in

disposition if found guilty”; and (3) whether

mental-health staff would be present at the hearing.

Joint Ex. 467, Mental Health Consultation to the

Disciplinary Process, Inmate File of Jamie Wallace (doc.

no. 1038-1052) at ADOC031346.

184

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 185 of 302
However, the system falls far short in practice: these mental-health evaluations are often brief and perfunctory, and the counselors conducting them understand their role to be limited to an assessment of capacity or knowledge of their infraction, rather than providing input on the mental-health implications of any punishment. For example, Sharon Trimble, an MHM counselor at Kilby, testified that her evaluation process entails informing the prisoner of the charge against him, describing the incident at issue, letting him explain what happened, and making sure that he understands the reasons for a disciplinary hearing. This, in her view, amounts to an assessment of the prisoner’s competency; her evaluation concludes when the prisoner “say[s] that [he] did it.” Trimble Testimony at __. She does not otherwise assess whether the prisoner’s behavior is related to his mental illness, and she has never made recommendations as to the appropriateness of possible sanctions, including whether placement in segregation was contraindicated by the prisoner’s mental illness.
185

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 186 of 302
Strikingly, Associate Commissioner Naglich herself did not have a clear understanding of the purpose of the consultation process. While she understood that the consultation process should address whether “the mental health issues contribute[d] to the conduct,” she was unsure about whether it involved anything else. Naglich Testimony at vol. 2, 15. She understood the second question in the module--whether mental illness should be considered in determining the punishment--to relate not to the appropriateness of various sanctions in light of the prisoner’s mental illness but rather to be largely duplicative of the first question, regarding culpability. She believed it to be asking “how cognizant or responsible was the inmate at the time of the charge and should that be considered in the disposition if he’s found guilty.” Id.
As explained in the next section, and as agreed by experts on both sides, it is critical that mental illness be considered in determining punishment for infractions because placing mentally ill prisoners in segregation
186

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 187 of 302

significantly increases the risk of decompensation.

ADOC’s failure to ensure that mental-health staff can and

in fact do express their views as to whether particular

prisoners will be harmed by placement in segregation (or

some other disciplinary sanction) creates a substantial

risk of serious harm.

Moreover, the disciplinary consultation process

consistently fails to perform even the limited functions

Trimble and Naglich ascribed to it. ADOC’s 2013 audit

of Donaldson and a quality-improvement study conducted

by MHM around the same time recognized that mental-health

consultations were often acting as little more than a

rubber stamp. The Donaldson audit found that “answers

provided by [mental health] appeared to conflict with

patients’ clinically documented mental health

status”--in other words, the consultation documentation

from mental-health staff did not reflect the diagnoses

in the medical record of the prisoner who was being

disciplined.

Pl. Ex. 689, MHM Corrective

Action - Donaldson May 2013 (doc. no. 1069-5) at

187

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 188 of 302
ADOC045459. MHM found that “95 % were declared competent to stand hearing with no qualifiers for MH factors,” and, relatedly, “that [MHM’s] staff did not understand how to fill out form.” Pl. Ex. 715, July 2013 Quarterly CQI Meeting Minutes (doc. no. 1044-9) at 4. Not surprisingly, MHM counselor Trimble was aware of only one instance in the course of five years in which a prisoner was not sanctioned because his behavior was considered a result of his mental illness.
The consequences of ADOC’s policy of disciplining prisoners for engaging in self-harm combined with the dysfunctional consultation process are frequently egregious: when they attempt to hurt or kill themselves, mentally ill prisoners are routinely found guilty of and punished for “intentionally creating a security, safety, or health hazard,” and often are placed in segregation. For example, Jamie Wallace was given disciplinary sanctions and sent to segregation for self-injury and suicide attempts multiple times between 2013 and his suicide in 2016. See Joint Ex. 467, Inmate File of Jamie
188

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 189 of 302
Wallace (doc. no. 1038-1052) at ADOC031352 (Jan. 8, 2013, for cutting his neck with a metal top of a smokeless tobacco can); ADOC031661 (Feb. 3, 2013, attempting to hang himself); ADOC031341 (Nov. 12, 2013, penetrating his ears and bottom lip with a metal object); ADOC031528 (May 25, 2014, intentionally cutting his left wrist); see also Pl. Dem. Ex. 2, Summary of J.W. Suicide Attempts (doc. no. 1058-16) (showing six occasions of being sent to segregation for inflicting self-harm, and 12 disciplinary actions for self-harm in total). Records of plaintiff L.P. also reflect that he has received disciplinary segregation for self-harm incidents; plaintiff R.M.W. and class member M.P. testified that they have received multiple disciplinary actions for intentionally creating a security, safety, or health hazard when they had cut themselves. These instances of punitive response can also lead to even graver harm: Dr. Hunter, the medical director of MHM, acknowledged that the combination of a recent disciplinary action and the prospect of a segregation placement was a common factor among prisoners
189

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 190 of 302
who committed suicide. The trend in suicides since
October 2015 corroborated this testimony. In sum, ADOC’s
disciplinary process has inflicted actual harm and
created a substantial risk of serious harm for mentally
ill prisoners.
8. Inappropriate Placement and Inadequate Treatment in Segregation
Segregation--also known as restrictive housing or
solitary confinement--generally refers to the
correctional practice of keeping a prisoner in a cell for
22.5 hours or more a day, usually in a single-person cell,
only letting the prisoner out for brief ‘yard’ time and showers.60 In ADOC, segregation takes two different forms:
60. As Dr. Haney explained in his testimony before Congress, exercise time for segregation prisoners hardly involves a ‘yard.’ Pl. Ex. 1272, 2012 Congressional Testimony of Dr. Craig Haney (doc. no. 1126-3) at 5-6. Rather than an open space with greenery, the exercise yards that the court observed at ADOC facilities for segregation prisoners were often small and fenced in with concrete surfaces. Some of the facilities allow only one inmate at a time in a ‘cage,’ a subdivided section of the yard that is fenced in and hardly bigger than the segregation cell itself. Some of the yards, such as the one in Kilby, also had fences totally enclosing the yard,
190

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 191 of 302

disciplinary and administrative.

Disciplinary

segregation is a type of punishment whereby prisoners are

allowed to have extremely limited personal property in

their cells and lose privileges such as telephone use and

family visits. Administrative segregation is used to

separate prisoners from the general population, generally

for safety reasons; prisoners in administrative

segregation do not formally lose privileges, but are

still subject to some property restrictions and receive

little out-of-cell time.

Trial testimony revealed that segregation has a

profound impact on prisoners’ mental health due to the

harmful effects of isolation; this impact is worse for

those who are already mentally ill. According to the

experts, the risk of decompensation increases with the

duration of isolation and the severity of the prisoner’s

mental illness.

Plaintiffs ask the court to declare that, due to the

risk of harm, mentally ill prisoners as a general matter

including a fenced ceiling, truly evoking the feeling of a cage.
191

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 192 of 302
should never be placed in segregation. However, the court sees no need to reach that broad conclusion, for here, the evidence is overwhelming that the ADOC’s current segregation practices pose an unacceptably high risk of serious harm to prisoners with serious mental-health needs. As the testimony of experts and defense witnesses made abundantly clear, ADOC lacks a functioning process for screening out prisoners who should not be placed in segregation due to mental illness or ensuring that they are not sent there for dangerously long periods, and mentally ill prisoners in segregation receive inadequate treatment and monitoring. It is simply undeniable that these practices pose a grave danger to many mentally ill prisoners placed in segregation.
This section discusses the ways in which ADOC’s segregation practices place these prisoners at a substantial risk of serious harm. After explaining the consensus developed in recent years regarding the harmful psychological effects of segregation in general and on
192

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 193 of 302
mentally ill prisoners in particular, the discussion turns to the specific risks of harm posed by ADOC’s segregation practices. Finally, the court discusses the heightened level of danger segregation poses to those prisoners with the most serious mental-health needs--that is, those who have conditions classified as serious mental illnesses.
a. Background on Segregation i. Consensus among Correctional and Mental-Health
Professionals on Segregation Mental-health and correctional professionals have recognized that long-term isolation resulting from segregation, or solitary confinement, has crippling consequences for mental health. Dr. Craig Haney, who has studied the psychological effects of solitary confinement for more than 30 years, explained that isolation of the type experienced by prisoners in segregation has harmful psychological effects even on those who are not mentally ill, and even mentally healthy prisoners can develop mental illness such as depression, psychosis, and anxiety
193

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 194 of 302
disorder during a prolonged period of isolation. Summarizing years of research in his field, Dr. Haney explained: “[T]he nature and magnitude of the negative psychological reactions ... underscore the stressfulness and painfulness of this kind of confinement, the lengths to which prisoners must go to adapt and adjust to it, and the risk of harm that it creates. The potentially devastating effects of these conditions are reflected in the characteristically high numbers of suicide deaths, and incidents of self-harm and self-mutilation that occur in many of these units. ... These effects are not only painful but can do real harm and inflict real damage that is sometimes severe and can be irreversible. ... They can persist beyond the time that prisoners are housed in isolation and lead to long-term disability and dysfunction.” Joint Ex. 459, Haney Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043) at 130-31; see also Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (summarizing case law and historical texts that “understood[] and questioned” the “human toll wrought by
194

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 195 of 302

extended terms of isolation” and observing that “research

still confirms what this Court suggested over a century

ago: Years on end of near-total isolation exact a

terrible price.”)

The psychological harm from

segregation can also lead to symptoms like hallucinations,

chest pain, palpitations, anxiety attacks, and self-harm,

even among previously healthy people. Burns Testimony

at vol. 1, 209; see also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d

209, 225-26 (3d. Cir. 2017) (summarizing the “robust body

of legal and scientific authority recognizing the

devastating mental health consequences caused by

long-term isolation in solitary confinement,” including

“anxiety, panic, paranoia, depression, post-traumatic

stress disorder, psychosis, and even a disintegration of

the basic sense of self-identity,” as well as physical

harm). The depth of the psychological impact of such

isolated confinement conditions on human beings was also

reflected in Senator John McCain’s observation about his

prisoner-of-war experience in Vietnam: “[Solitary

confinement] crushes your spirit and weakens your

195

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 196 of 302
resistance more effectively than any other form of mistreatment. Having no one else to rely on, to share confidences with, to seek counsel from, you begin to doubt your judgment and your courage.” Pl. Ex. 1272, 2012 Congressional Testimony of Dr. Craig Haney (doc. no. 1126-3) at 9 (quoting from Richard Kozar, John McCain: Overcoming Adversity (2001) at 53).
The serious psychological harm stemming from segregation is even more devastating for those with mental illness. As Dr. Haney explained, mentally ill prisoners are highly likely to decompensate in such an isolated environment, and it is more difficult to deliver treatment to those in segregation units. In other words, mentally ill prisoners in segregation are hit with a double-whammy: they are exposed to a heightened risk of worsening symptoms, while having less access to treatment they need. As a result of the growing body of evidence on the destructive effects of segregation, a general consensus among correctional and psychiatric professionals, while not necessarily establishing a
196

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 197 of 302

constitutional floor, has developed in the last ten years: placement and duration of segregation should be strictly limited for mentally ill prisoners. For example, as the experts explained, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care has issued a position statement declaring that mentally ill prisoners should not be placed in segregation absent extenuating circumstances, and even in those circumstances, the stay should be shorter than 30 days.61

61. See National Commission on Correctional Health Care, Solitary Confinement Position Statement on Solitary Confinement, 2016; Burns Testimony at vol. 1, 204.

As Dr. Haney explained, prison systems around the

country are also moving away from using solitary

confinement in general--even for healthy people--unless

it is absolutely necessary. See, e.g., Joint Ex. 459,

Haney Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043) at 133

(referencing Rick Raemisch, My Night in Solitary, N.Y.

Times (Feb.

20, 2014), available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/opinion/my-night-in-s

olitary.html (describing the experience of the head of

the Colorado Department of Corrections spending 20 hours

in a segregation cell and the efforts to bring down the

number of mentally ill prisoners in administrative

segregation to single digits among 500 prisoners in

segregation); Terry Kupers, et al., Beyond Supermax

Administrative Segregation: Mississippi’s Experience

Rethinking Prison Classification and Creating

Alternative Mental Health Programs, 36 Crim. Just. &

197

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 198 of 302
Defense witnesses agreed that mentally ill prisoners should rarely be placed in segregation for prolonged periods of time. Dr. Hunter, MHM’s medical director, testified that it is “generally recognized” in the profession, including within ADOC, that prolonged segregation is deleterious to mental health, because of the combination of sensory deprivation and sensory overload: a severe lack of stimulation arises when confined to one space for over 23 hours a day without any meaningful social interactions; sensory overload comes from the chaotic environment of segregation units, filled with loud noises and malodors. Hunter Testimony at __. ADOC’s chief psychologist Dr. Tytell and MHM psychiatrist Dr. Kern also agreed that overwhelming research shows that prolonged isolation has gravely detrimental effects on mental health, especially for those with pre-existing mental illness. Lastly, Ayers, a defense expert, opined that based on his experience as a correctional
Behav. 1037 (2009) (describing the reforms in the Mississippi Department of Corrections significantly reducing the population in administrative segregation and its effect on misconduct, violence, and use of force)).
198

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 199 of 302
administrator, mentally ill prisoners should generally not be placed in segregation; if they are, it should only occur with the explicit approval and hands-on involvement of mental-health staff, and such prisoners should be placed on a fast-track to be moved into more therapeutic settings.

ii. ADOC’s Segregation Units

The court heard overwhelming evidence, including

from experts on both sides, that the conditions in ADOC’s

segregation units pose serious risks for mentally ill

prisoners--beyond the inherent psychological risks of

segregation.

ADOC prisoners receive very little

out-of-cell time; they are left idle for almost all hours

of the day with very little property allowed in the cell;

the physical conditions of the segregation cells are

often deplorable; and the design of the cells often makes

it difficult to monitor the well-being of the prisoners.

Associate Commissioner Culliver testified that they “try

to give them five hours a week” of out-of-cell time,

199

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 200 of 302
which means that even when ADOC officers are able to meet their goal, prisoners spend on average over 23 hours per day inside of a cell. Culliver Testimony at __. As for idleness, not only do segregation prisoners lack access to programming, but they are allowed very few items in their cells to occupy themselves: only a Bible and their current legal paperwork. As Dr. Haney credibly testified based on his extensive experience, it is quite unusual for segregation inmates to be denied access to any other books or a radio. Furthermore, segregation units within ADOC are in significant disrepair, exacerbating the inherent stress of being confined to a small cell and worsening its impact on mental health. As reflected by photographs admitted into the record and as the court witnessed firsthand during facility visits, segregation cells are often poorly lit, with little natural light and only small grated windows, if any. The court observed that they are often filled with the smell of burning paper and urine; some are extremely dirty with what appears to be dried excrement smeared on the walls and
200

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 201 of 302
floors; and loud noises travel through the segregation
units, some of which house from anywhere between 20 to
50 people on multiple levels.62 The court witnessed an
overpowering sense of abandonment and despair, with a
prolonged stay crushing all hope.63
The combination of the lack of any meaningful
activity or social contact and the stressors of living
in a dilapidated, filthy, and loud housing unit for
almost 24 hours per day results in a heightened risk of
decompensation for mentally ill prisoners and a
62. Dr. Haney also observed that Bullock’s segregation unit has a practice of removing mattresses from cells so that prisoners cannot rest on them during the day, which he described as “extraordinarily draconian.” Haney Testimony at vol. 1, 117. Pl. Dem. Ex. 60, Bullock Main Camp, B Dorm (doc. no. 1125-20). The court also observed that Kilby’s large segregation unit (also known as ‘big seg’) has extremely small cells that are only a foot or two longer than the length of a single-sized mattress and only a narrow strip of space that barely fits a toilet, in a stifling unit of fifty cells stacked on top of each other without any ventilation or transparent windows facing outside. Pl. Dem. Ex. 80 & 81, Kilby C Dorm (docs. no. 1125-38, 1125-39).
63. The court notes that the worst thing that could happen in this context is for the correctional officers and ADOC officials to get accustomed to such conditions.
201

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 202 of 302

heightened risk of developing serious mental-health needs for those who were initially healthy. In addition, as Dr. Haney credibly testified, it is much more difficult for staff to detect decompensation of prisoners while they are housed in segregation: when prisoners remain in their cells around the clock, mental-health staff have a harder time observing the patient and diagnosing illnesses effectively, and correctional officers and fellow prisoners also lack sufficient regular contact with the prisoner to notice the onset of symptoms of mental illness. This difficulty adds to the danger.64

64. Admittedly, ADOC uses double-celling in some

segregation units, which means putting two prisoners into

a single segregation cell. At first blush, this practice

might seem to mitigate the harmful effects of solitary

confinement. However, double-celled segregation has an

even more severe impact on the mental health of prisoners.

Dr. Haney credibly explained that double-celled prisoners

“in some ways ... have the worst of both worlds: they are

‘crowded’ in and confined with another person inside a

small cell but—and this is the crux of their ‘isolation’—

simultaneously isolated from the rest of the mainstream

prisoner population, deprived of even minimal freedom of

movement, prohibited from access to meaningful prison

programs, and denied opportunities for any semblance of

‘normal’ social interaction.”

Joint Ex. 459, Haney

Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043) at 109.

202

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 203 of 302
The design of ADOC’s cells and units in which they exist poses additional obstacles for effective monitoring in segregation units. ADOC segregation units often lack visibility into cells, both because of small windows on the doors, which are often grated or difficult to see through, and because of the layout of the cells and the units. Unfortunately, as experts from both sides testified, because of understaffing, officers cannot constantly walk near the cells and are generally unable to monitor what is going on inside. This means that mentally ill prisoners in segregation--including those identified as mentally ill, those with undiagnosed mental illnesses, and those who develop mental illness while in segregation--are at a heightened risk for decompensation without anyone noticing.
These problems exist throughout ADOC facilities. For example, Easterling’s unit has tiny windows on doors that do not allow correctional officers to observe inside without being directly in front of the door; as Dr. Haney credibly testified, correctional officers often do not
203

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 204 of 302
feel safe standing very close to the door because they risk having bodily fluids or food thrown at them through the food-tray slot or the cracks between the door and the wall. (Indeed, the court was repeatedly warned not to walk too close to the doors for that reason during facility tours.) As the court saw firsthand, Donaldson and St. Clair facilities have the same problem of very little visibility into the cells from the officers’ station, due to small windows and dim lighting. Lastly, Bibb’s segregation units might be the most egregious in terms of visibility: each housing unit has its own segregation unit of a few cells shut off from the rest of the unit, down a long hallway and through a door, with no line of sight from the central officer station and officers entering the space to check on the prisoners only periodically. Dr. Haney was surprised that such units were maintained, because prisoners in these cells have no way of alerting officers if anything was going wrong; they are completely dependent for their safety upon periodic trips that officers make from the central
204

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 205 of 302
officer station. In fact, Dr. Haney recommended that Bibb’s segregation units be closed immediately: he explained that he has never recommended any unit to be closed immediately in his four decades of doing this work, but he thought the risk of harm was too great at Bibb because so little monitoring is available. Defense correctional expert Ayers’s testimony also raised concerns: he credibly testified to his suspicion that, because of understaffing and safety concerns, correctional officers were not walking down the hallway away from the central cube at Bibb as frequently as they claimed.
b. ADOC’s Segregation of Mentally Ill Prisoners The evidence clearly establishes that placements of mentally ill prisoners in segregation endangers those prisoners, and that the risk of serious harm to those prisoners increases based on the seriousness of the prisoner’s illness, the length of the stay in segregation, and the dangerous conditions discussed above. Against
205

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 206 of 302
this backdrop, the court explains the ways in which ADOC’s placement practices and treatment of mentally ill prisoners in segregation create a substantial risk of serious harm.
i. ADOC’s Segregation-Placement Practices Due to the risks of decompensation created by segregation in general and by ADOC’s segregation units in particular, it is critically important that ADOC consider a prisoner’s mental health condition when deciding whether to place the prisoner in segregation, and if so, for how long. But here, overwhelming evidence makes clear that ADOC does not ensure that those with a heightened risk of serious harm from mental illness are not placed in segregation or that they are not sent there for dangerously long periods. 65 In particular, as
65. Experts from both sides explained that alternatives to placing mentally ill prisoners in segregation exist. Prison systems across the country, ranging from Maine to Mississippi, have reduced the number of prisoners in segregation generally, and significantly reduced the mentally ill population in
206

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 207 of 302
discussed earlier, ADOC does not have a functioning
system for evaluating mental-health risks when deciding
whether to place prisoners in segregation; it also fails
to evaluate these risks when determining the length of
any segregation placement. The result is that prisoners
whose mental illness makes them likely to be harmed by
segregation are placed there anyway.
ADOC’s current process for placing prisoners in
segregation does not adequately consider the impact of
segregation on mental health. As explained in the
section on disciplinary sanctions, ADOC’s administrative
regulations mandate that during disciplinary proceedings,
mental-health staff provide input to ADOC regarding the
impact of mental illness on the prisoner’s competency at
the time of the offense and at the time of the hearing
segregation. Joint Ex. 459, Haney Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043) at 133. For example, California operates a separate housing unit that is devoted to mentally ill prisoners who have committed disciplinary infractions. These units provide 20 hours of out-of-cell time per week, as well as structured and unstructured therapeutic activities. Arizona has begun similar reforms, providing more programming and out-of-cell time to mentally ill prisoners who committed disciplinary infractions. Haney Testimony at vol. 2, 154-55; Ayers Testimony at __.
207

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 208 of 302
and give recommendations for the disposition of the offense and the type of sanctions that should be imposed. However, as discussed earlier, MHM staff and ADOC officials expressed confusion as to what role, if any, mental-health staff should play in the disciplinary process, and mental-health staff largely have rubber-stamped ADOC’s decisions to send mentally ill prisoners to segregation.
Even when MHM has recommended against placing a particular prisoner or a group of mentally ill prisoners in segregation, there is evidence that ADOC has ignored such input. As MHM’s program director Houser testified, ADOC has overridden MHM’s recommendations that prisoners whose mental-health code is above MH-3 (which requires residential treatment in a mental-health unit) should not be placed in segregation; she also gave an example of a prisoner who was put in segregation despite MHM’s recommendation. She further explained that because MHM is not authorized to move any prisoners, ADOC can override MHM’s clinical judgment and house RTU patients
208

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 209 of 302

in segregation. Indeed, ADOC correctional staff are not

required to follow the recommendations of the

mental-health staff in disciplinary proceedings.

Likewise, while regulations require that prisoners in

segregation undergo periodic mental-health evaluations,

ADOC is not required to move the prisoner if the

mental-health evaluation reveals that continued

placement in segregation would be detrimental to the

prisoner’s mental health. Joint Ex. 127, Admin. Reg.

§ 625 (doc. no. 1038-150) (“The ADOC psychologist or

psychological associate will consult with the Warden or

designee when their [segregation] mental health

assessment indicates that continued placement in

[segregation] is contraindicated by changes in the

inmate’s mental status and functioning. Alternative

strategies to facilitate the stabilization will be offered.”).66

inmate’s

mental

66. There is sufficient evidence that these mental-health evaluations in segregation are inadequate, which will be discussed later in section V.B.10.
209

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 210 of 302
For their part, MHM staff have been hesitant to oppose ADOC on the placement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation. MHM staff discussed ADOC’s use of segregation on mentally ill prisoners during a staff meeting in 2013, expressing frustration that ADOC was over-using segregation on mentally ill prisoners: the meeting summary read, “DOC is over using segregation on MH inmates. They want to punish them. We must be diligent in calling it from a treatment perspective in disciplinary consult. Put MH as factor in the bad behavior. Long term segregation can be detrimental mental well-being. ... Do not recommend a disciplinary action. Say MH is a major factor. We are reluctant to do it because of influence of DOC.” Pl. Ex. 715, July 2013 Quarterly CQI Meeting Minutes (doc. no. 1044-9) at 4.
ADOC also fails to ensure that prisoners with serious mental-health needs are not subjected to extremely lengthy periods of segregation. Dr. Haney described examples of several plaintiffs and one former class member who have bounced between segregation units and
210

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 211 of 302

suicide-watch cells over lengthy periods of time; three

were never put on the mental-health caseload despite

repeated instances of self-harm. See Pl. Dem. Ex. 131,

Movement History of Exemplar Plaintiffs (doc. no.

1126-10).

In particular, plaintiff C.J.’s

eight-year-long movement history shows that he has been

in segregation or suicide-watch cells for all of those

eight years; his mental-health code was eventually

elevated to MH-2, but his treatment plan did not change despite his clear deterioration over the years.67 See

67. Plaintiff C.J. is also an example of prisoners who experience what was referred to during the trial as ‘segregation rotation,’ whereby a prisoner is sent from one segregation unit at a facility to another segregation unit at another facility every few months. C.J.’s movement history indicated that he has been rotating among three different segregation units in the last eight years, averaging eight months at each facility at a time. Pl. Dem. Ex. 131, Movement History of Exemplar Plaintiffs (doc. no. 1126-10). This practice, according to Associate Commissioner Culliver, is used to “give staff a break” and “give the inmate an opportunity to restart.” Culliver testimony at __. Culliver did not know how many people were on segregation rotation currently, or how many mentally ill prisoners are on segregation rotation.
This practice adds an additional set of risk factors to the already debilitating and harmful practice of housing mentally ill patients in segregation for
211

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 212 of 302
Joint Ex. 459, Haney Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043)
at A39.68
Not surprisingly given ADOC’s disregard for
segregation’s impact on mental health, mentally ill
prisoners are overrepresented in ADOC segregation. While
only 14 % of the ADOC population is on the mental-health
caseload, mentally ill prisoners make up 21 % of those
in segregation. Looking at individual facilities year
by year, most facilities’ segregation units have a far
prolonged periods of time. Dr. Haney testified that moving mentally ill prisoners from one environment to another disrupts treatment, because of lack of continuity of care and providers: a new set of staff must get to know the patient, and the usefulness of the information that staff have already gathered on the person gets lost when the prisoner is transferred. C.J. testified that he often has to start anew with new counselors at each facility, and when he goes back to the old facility after a year or two of absence, the former counselor is often no longer working there because of the high turnover rate. Furthermore, as Dr. Haney testified, frequent transfers of mentally ill prisoners have an adverse impact on their mental health because they have a more difficult time adjusting to new environments than those who are not mentally ill.
68. Dr. Haney also stated that cycling between segregation and general population may also indicate that those prisoners are likely suffering from the after-effects of prolonged stays in segregation, which are leading to more disciplinary infractions.
212

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 213 of 302

higher rate of mentally ill prisoners compared to the

general population: throughout 2014, 2015, and 2016, Bibb,

Easterling, Kilby, St. Clair, Staton, and Ventress each

had a disproportionately high number of mental-health

patients in segregation; Holman and Limestone’s

segregation population also had a disproportionately high

number of mental-health patients more than half of the

time period.

Only four of the 12 major male

facilities--Bullock,

Donaldson,

Fountain,

and

Hamilton--did not have disproportionate numbers of

mental-health patients in segregation for most of the three years.69 See Pl. Dem. Ex. 127, Overrepresentation

of the Mentally Ill in Segregation, 2014-2016 (doc. no.

1126-8).

Experts on both sides were alarmed by ADOC’s

systematic overuse of segregation for mentally ill

prisoners, who are most vulnerable to the risk of

deterioration in such an isolated environment. Ayers, a

69. The plaintiffs’ summary chart and MHM’s monthly operations reports count Draper and Elmore as part of Staton, because the three facilities are in the same complex.
213

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 214 of 302
defense expert for correctional administration who reviewed ADOC records, was troubled by forms he saw for administrative segregation in which the reason for segregation placement was ‘psychiatric.’ Dr. Haney and Dr. Burns were also troubled by the number of prisoners with unaddressed mental illnesses they encountered in segregation units. In sum, ADOC lacks a functioning process for screening out prisoners who should not be placed in segregation due to mental illness or ensuring that they are not sent there for dangerously long periods.

ii. Treatment and Monitoring in Segregation Units

ADOC prisoners with serious mental-health needs must

contend not only with dangerous and unhealthy conditions

in segregation units but also with significantly less

access to mental-health treatment.

Mental-health

patients’ needs are considerably greater in segregation

due to the harsh effects of isolation, yet instead of

receiving more treatment to mitigate these effects,

prisoners in segregation have less access to care than

214

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 215 of 302
in general population and are not adequately monitored for signs of decompensation. The court heard extensive evidence that, due to staffing shortages, mental-health treatment and monitoring in segregation are gravely more limited than in general population, and nonexistent at some facilities. This denial of minimal medical care contributes to the substantial risk that prisoners in segregation with serious mental-health needs will decompensate, experience increased pain and suffering, or worse, harm or kill themselves.
As Houser, MHM’s program director, credibly testified, even though mental-health patients’ needs are considerably greater in segregation due to the harsh effects of isolation, prisoners in segregation are not allowed to leave their cells for mental-health groups or therapeutic activities. As a result, mental-health patients in segregation receive less treatment than they
215

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 216 of 302
otherwise would outside segregation, despite their heightened need.70
On top of the lack of access to group therapy or other programming, ADOC’s segregation prisoners have very little access to individual treatment. For example, in the month of June 2016, the number of ‘seg interventions’--that is, out-of-cell treatment encounters with mental-health staff--at seven facilities with mentally ill prisoners in segregation was zero, despite having many, sometimes dozens of, mental-health patients in those units; three facilities had more than zero but fewer than five seg interventions. See Joint Ex. 346, June 2016 MHM Monthly Operations Report (doc. no. 1038-708) at 2.
The dearth of individual treatment in segregation is mainly due to correctional understaffing. Houser observed that mental-health patients in segregation were not getting the services they required, “not by [MHM’s]
70. According to Houser, MHM and ADOC discussed a pilot project for long-term treatment programming in the segregation unit at St. Clair, but the project never got off the ground because of the lack of support from ADOC.
216

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 217 of 302
choice,” but because of ADOC’s failure to bring inmates out of their segregation cells for treatment. Houser Testimony at vol. 2, 100. MHM staff have consistently complained of the difficulties of reaching patients in segregation due to the chronic correctional staffing shortage. See, e.g., Pl. Ex. 950, July 2014 Holman Multidisciplinary Meeting Minutes (doc. no. 1097-4) (reporting issues with psychiatric providers seeing patients in segregation due to “walks, feeding, and DOC shortage, etc.”); Pl. Ex. 1191, 2012 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-9) (noting the lack of documentation or notes for treatment of mentally ill prisoners in segregation).
In the absence of correctional officers to provide security and escort for segregation prisoners who need mental-health treatment, mental-health staff have to conduct cell-front check-ins, instead of actual treatment sessions. But because segregation units are not hospitable environments for a personal conversation--let alone confidential conversations--these interactions are
217

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 218 of 302

brief and sessions.71

cannot

replace

individual

counseling

‘Segregation rounds,’ whereby mental-health

counselors go around the segregation unit to check on the

well-being of prisoners, also are of limited utility due

to understaffing and visibility issues. ADOC regulations

require that these rounds happen at least twice per week.

As with other cell-front encounters, segregation rounds are not meant to replace individual psychotherapy. 72

71. As discussed in the section regarding sound confidentiality and psychotherapy, most ADOC segregation units are not conducive to having a cell-front conversation, due to heavy solid doors and very loud units with dozens of cells in a single unit. As the court saw during its tours of five prisons, none of the units--even the ones at Bibb, where only three cells are in a unit--were conducive to confidential conversations, because of the proximity to other cells and prisoners.
72. Furthermore, as Dr. Haney testified, while segregation rounds by mental-health staff are crucial for checking for signs of decompensation or crisis, they cannot replace periodic out-of-cell clinical assessments of prisoners’ mental-health status, because it is difficult to observe someone’s behavior and accurately assess the prisoner’s mental health through cell-front encounters.
One vivid example of ADOC’s failure to monitor segregation prisoners’ mental-health status concerned
218

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 219 of 302
However, within ADOC, segregation rounds do not
adequately serve even the limited purpose they are
intended to serve. Dr. Hunter described them as
‘drive-bys,’ sometimes even without verbal exchanges.
The cursory nature of the monitoring was further
crystalized by the testimony of staff who conduct these
rounds. Dr. Tytell, who served as an ADOC psychologist
at Donaldson before taking his current position,
testified that segregation rounds for over 120 prisoners
at Donaldson took between 1.5 hours and 2 hours,
including the time to walk between cell blocks--meaning
no more than one minute per prisoner on average. A former
counselor at Bibb testified that it would take her 35
minutes to an hour to complete the rounds at all six
plaintiff R.M.W. After a month of segregation placement during which she was twice sent to a crisis cell and had multiple episodes of self-injury, the segregation mental-health evaluation form indicated that the inmate was “appropriate for placement” and the recommendation was “segregation placement not impacting inmate’s mental health.” Joint Ex. 404, March 28, 2014 Review of Segregation Inmates - R.M.W. (doc. no. 1038-859) at MR017081. Nothing in her medical records suggests that a suicide-risk assessment was done after any of the episodes or before this review to ascertain the impact of segregation and likelihood of recurring self-harm.
219

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 220 of 302

housing units with 18 double-celled cells, meaning one

to two minutes per prisoner, including the time to walk

between six housing units. A lack of visibility into

many of these cells--due to small, sometimes covered

windows, blocked views, and safety concerns associated

with standing too close to the door--makes it even more

difficult to provide effective monitoring.

Even these cursory rounds by MHM staff do not

actually happen as often as they should, or at all at

some facilities.

The lack of documentation of

segregation rounds combined with the acute staffing

shortages led defense expert Ayers to doubt that ADOC was

able to conduct segregation rounds as often as required.

The site administrator for Holman confirmed Ayers’s

belief, by credibly testifying that insufficient

segregation rounds have been a problem at Holman since

2008 due to staffing shortages, and that the problem has

only worsened since then. According to her, at Holman,

instead of a separate mental-health segregation round, a

counselor accompanies the warden and other security

220

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 221 of 302
officers during a weekly segregation review board, where the warden and other officials walk from cell to cell to review each segregation prisoner’s status and potentially change the prisoner’s segregation sentence based on their conduct. Sometimes, she is able to visit only one prisoner in segregation per week due to the correctional staffing shortage.
Monitoring by ADOC staff in segregation is also ineffective. Correctional expert Vail credibly opined that ADOC lacked enough correctional staff to conduct monitoring rounds in segregation every 30 minutes--the level of monitoring in segregation units necessary to keep prisoners safe from self-harm and suicide. Indeed, he saw logs at ADOC that suggested that no segregation checks were done for multiple hours. Even defense expert Ayers, while not explicitly concluding that monitoring was inadequate, implied so by saying that better monitoring of segregation inmates would address the high suicide rates within ADOC.
221

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 222 of 302
This lack of monitoring is even more troubling given that ADOC segregation cells are not suicide-proof. Many segregation cells have grates, sprinkler heads, and other structures that could be used as tie-off points. Furthermore, during the facility tour, the court saw many segregation prisoners with ropes hanging across their cells as clothes lines, which can be easily used to commit suicide. Allowing prisoners to cover their cell door windows with papers further heightens the risk of suicide.
The dearth of individual encounters outside the cell, haphazard cell-front encounters, and inadequate monitoring in ADOC all show that ADOC fails to provide adequate treatment and monitoring.
In sum, the evidence is clear that ADOC’s segregation practices--inadequate screening for the impact of segregation on mental health, and inadequate treatment and monitoring--pose a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners with serious mental-health needs. This serious inadequacy also has effects on other areas of mental-health care. According to Dr. Haney, this is
222

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 223 of 302
because “[i]t’s very difficult to deliver adequate mental-health care in isolation units, and mentally ill prisoners deteriorate in isolated units. So the inadequacies of the mental health system actually are exacerbated by the use of isolation for mentally ill prisoners.” Haney Testimony at vol. 1, 29. In other words, ADOC’s segregation practices perpetuate a vicious cycle of isolation, inadequate treatment, and decompensation.
The skyrocketing number of suicides within ADOC, the majority of which occurred in segregation, reflects the combined effect of the lack of screening, monitoring, and treatment in segregation units and the dangerous conditions in segregation cells. Because prisoners often remain in segregation for weeks, months, or even years at a time, their decompensation may not become evident until it is too late--after an actual or attempted suicide.73 Since September 2015, seven of eleven suicides
73. While no aggregate data on the average or typical lengths of segregation stays were presented, the court, during its visits to six facilities, was able to view
223

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 224 of 302
within ADOC facilities happened in segregation units; of the four that have occurred since October 2016 (the current fiscal year), all but one involved a prisoner in segregation.74 As explained above, these suicide numbers are astounding compared to the national average across state prison systems. By subjecting mentally ill prisoners to its segregation practices, ADOC has placed prisoners with serious mental-health needs at a substantial risk of continued pain and suffering, decompensation, self-injurious behavior, and even death, and the court cannot close its eyes to this overwhelming evidence.
forms on the front of segregation cells showing how long the prisoner had been there: most were there for at least several weeks, some for months or even over a year. As discussed earlier, some inmates, like plaintiff C.J., are placed on ‘segregation rotation,’ which can keep prisoners in segregation units for years on end. Experts on both sides unequivocally denounced ADOC’s practice of prolonged segregation stays.
74. The only one that did not take place in segregation was plaintiff Wallace, who was in the Bullock stabilization unit. See Pl. Ex. 1267, 2015-2016 Chart of ADOC Suicides (doc. no. 1108-38).
224

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 225 of 302
c. Segregation of Prisoners with Serious Mental Illness
The court heard significant evidence that extended segregation--even absent consideration of the conditions at ADOC--poses a substantial risk of harm to all mentally ill prisoners, and plaintiffs asked the court to so conclude. However, as mentioned before, because ADOC’s segregation practices fall so far short of protecting prisoners with serious mental-health needs from a grave risk of decompensation and other harms, the court need not, at this time, decide whether segregation poses an unacceptably high risk of harm to all mentally ill prisoners as a general matter. That said, the testimony of the experts, clinicians who work for ADOC, and even Associate Commissioner Naglich herself overwhelmingly established that one particular subset of prisoners with serious mental-health needs should never be placed in segregation in the absence of extenuating circumstances: those who suffer from a ‘serious mental illness.’
As discussed earlier, ‘serious mental illness’ is a term of art in the field of psychiatry that refers to a
225

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 226 of 302
certain subset of particularly disabling conditions. Serious mental illness is defined by the diagnosis, duration, and severity of the symptoms. Certain diagnoses, such as schizophrenia and disorders accompanied by psychosis, are by definition serious mental illnesses, because they last a lifetime and are accompanied by debilitating symptoms; others, such as major depression and anxiety disorder, may be considered serious mental illnesses depending on the severity of the individual’s symptoms.
As Dr. Burns credibly opined based on the literature in the field, those who suffer from serious mental illness should not be put in segregation as a general matter because prisoners with serious mental illness experience worsening symptoms in such an isolated environment, and because they are likely to have reduced access to treatment in segregation units. Burns added that, even when extenuating circumstances exist, segregation placements for such prisoners should still be short term, and access to necessary treatment must be
226

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 227 of 302
provided. Indeed, as Dr. Burns pointed out, the American Correctional Association and the American Psychiatric Association take the position that seriously mentally ill people should not be placed in segregation unless absolutely necessary, and if so, they should only remain for the shortest duration possible--no longer than three to four weeks. American Correctional Association, Restrictive Housing Performance Based Standards, August 2016; American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Segregation of Prisoners with Mental Illness (2012).
Associate Commissioner Naglich candidly agreed with Dr. Burns that placing seriously mentally ill prisoners in segregation is “categorically inappropriate,” and that such placement is tantamount to “denial of minimal medical care.” Naglich Testimony at vol. 5, 73. She described a new mental-health coding system in development at ADOC that would prevent all prisoners with serious mental illness from being placed in segregation. While she could not tell the court when the “rollout” of
227

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 228 of 302
the new system would be complete, she assured the court that once completed, “no seriously mentally ill inmate would be housed in a segregation setting.” Naglich Testimony at vol. 5, 67. MHM’s program director Houser agreed with the bright-line rule against placing prisoners with serious mental illness in segregation: she explained that prisoners classified as MH-3 or above, which are designated for RTU or SU placements and considered to have a serious mental illness, should never be in segregation because “their mental health capacity would not allow them to be able to be maintained in such an environment.” Houser Testimony at vol. 2, 109.
While there was no dispute between the parties that placing seriously mentally ill prisoners in segregation amounts to denial of minimal care, a question was raised as to whether the new system that Associate Commissioner Naglich described has been implemented. Associate Commissioner Culliver, who has the primary responsibility for inmate placements, transfers, and correctional staffing levels, testified after Naglich that there had
228

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 229 of 302
not been any recent official policy change on the placement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation, and that he did not know about any changes that would prohibit officers from placing certain prisoners in segregation or would limit the duration of segregation placements. Naglich’s subordinate, Dr. Tytell, later testified that an effort to change the coding system began only after Naglich testified that the policy change was already being rolled out, and that no new official coding system existed. He further explained that she instructed him to email the wardens at Donaldson to move ten individuals whose mental-health code was MH-2 or higher out of segregation and into the RTU, only after her testimony in court. She did not instruct him to do so with any other facility, and Tytell was not aware of any other facilities moving mentally ill prisoners out of segregation units at the time of his testimony in January 2017. Based on the evidence presented--especially given Associate Commissioner Culliver’s lack of knowledge or involvement in a major change to segregation policy--the
229

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 230 of 302
court cannot conclude that ADOC has implemented this policy change of not placing prisoners with serious mental illness in segregation.75 Given the consensus on the substantial risk of harm of decompensation for these mostly severely mentally ill prisoners, the court concludes that it is categorically inappropriate to place prisoners with serious mental illness in segregation absent extenuating circumstances; even in extenuating circumstances, decisions regarding the placement should be with the involvement and approval of appropriate mental-health staff, and the prisoners should be moved out of segregation as soon as possible and have access to treatment and monitoring in the meantime.

9.

Tutwiler

As ADOC’s only major facility for women, Tutwiler

Prison for Women serves as the treatment hub for all

75. The court further notes that the system that Associate Commissioner Naglich described would prevent the placement of seriously mentally ill prisoners in segregation only if the mental-health coding system were accurately classifying prisoners’ mental-health needs.
230

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 231 of 302

female prisoners in Alabama. While the same factors

contributing

to

inadequate

mental-health

care--mental-health

understaffing,

correctional

understaffing, and overcrowding--apply to Tutwiler, the

provision of mental-health care at Tutwiler differs in

some ways. This is because Tutwiler administrators, as

a result of other litigation, have revised policies to

make

them

more

‘gender-responsive’

and

‘trauma-informed’--that is, responsive to female prisoners’ experience of past traumatic events.76 Some

76. Defense counsel suggested that the approval of certain policies at Tutwiler by monitors hired by the U.S. Department of Justice signifies that those policies are constitutionally adequate. However, there are two flaws with this argument. First, the DOJ monitor was not necessarily evaluating policies to ensure that mental-health care was adequate under the Eighth Amendment: the lawsuit that resulted in the monitoring was not about mental-health care, nor was the monitor’s job to set the constitutional floor of mental-health care. Second, the monitors’ approval of certain policies, such as segregation placement, does not mean that ADOC’s actual practices are constitutionally adequate.
231

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 232 of 302

of these revisions mental-health care.77

involve

regulations

governing

Yet, despite these policy changes, the care provided

to mentally ill prisoners at Tutwiler suffers from some

of the same inadequacies that affect mental-health care

for men. Tutwiler lacks adequate mental-health and

correctional staffing. As in the facilities for men, a

significant portion of mentally ill patients are not

being identified or appropriately classified; no suicide

risk-assessment tool is used outside of intake; and the

provision of counseling sessions is seriously inadequate.

The court has sufficient evidence before it to conclude

that these problems pose a substantial risk of serious

harm to Tutwiler prisoners with serious mental-health

needs.

Tutwiler suffers from the same serious deficiencies

in identification and classification of prisoners’

77. For example, newly implemented practices include limiting pre-disciplinary hearing segregation to 72 hours, submitting monitoring logs for segregation cells to an independent reviewer, and having a compliance visit to the stabilization unit every six months to ensure 15-minute interval checks.
232

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 233 of 302

serious mental-health needs.

The mental-health

identification and classification processes at Tutwiler

function the same way as at male correctional facilities:

an LPN conducts the initial intake screening, without any

on-site supervision by an RN or any other higher-level

provider. Tutwiler also lacks a triage system for

referral requests, and therefore requests to see a

mental-health provider do not get classified or tracked

to ensure that they are processed. The resulting

under-identification is apparent in the number of

prisoners on the mental-health caseload. Experts from

both sides testified that women in prison have a

significantly higher incidence rate of mental illness

compared to their male counterparts: the estimated rate

ranges between 75 to 80 %, according to Dr. Burns. At

Tutwiler, only 54 % of prisoners are on the mental-health

caseload. Joint Ex. 346, June 2016 Monthly Operating

Report (doc. no. 1038-708). As with the rest of the

system, experts from both sides testified that the low

rate stems from ADOC’s inadequate intake and referral

233

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 234 of 302
processes. Experts from both sides also testified that an insufficient number of prisoners are getting care in mental-health units at Tutwiler despite the severity of their illnesses. As explained above, such inadequate identification and classification of serious mental-health needs create a substantial risk of serious harm by failing to treat mental illness.
Expert testimony also showed that no suicide risk-assessment tool is being used at Tutwiler, except at intake, as is the case in male facilities. As explained earlier, failing to assess suicide risks of prisoners who threaten or attempt self-harm or suicide places those prisoners at a substantial risk of harm.
As at the male prisons, individual counseling sessions at Tutwiler are frequently delayed and canceled due to shortages of mental-health staff and correctional officers. An ADOC psychologist at Tutwiler testified that the correctional staffing shortage that causes such delays and cancellations of counseling sessions is a topic of discussion at almost every multidisciplinary
234

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 235 of 302
meeting. Furthermore, MHM contract-compliance reports and the minutes from CQI meetings consistently reported that Tutwiler’s caseload is “bursting at [the] seams,” and that MHM had difficulty meeting outpatient needs for counseling. Ex. 670, April 2015 Quarterly CQI Meeting Minutes (doc. no. 1056-7) at MHM031224; see also Pl. Ex. 532, 2015 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-7) at 4, 13 (“At Tutwiler, staff are attempting to manage extremely large caseloads, which at times can be very challenging”; “significant staffing shortages in psychiatry” reported at Tutwiler); Pl. Ex. 114, 2013 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-4) at 1-2 (discussing decrease in treatment availability at Tutwiler due to staffing cuts and increasing size of caseload across all facilities).
In sum, inadequate identification and classification of mental-health needs, inadequate screening for suicide risk, and inadequate psychotherapy create a substantial risk of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners at Tutwiler. On the other hand, while also concerned about
235

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 236 of 302
the number of crisis cells, suicide-watch placements, segregation placements, and treatment and monitoring available in segregation and in crisis care at Tutwiler, the court does not have sufficient evidence to find that those areas pose a substantial risk of serious harm to Tutwiler’s prisoners.78
10. Other Issues This section discusses several issues on which the court does not at this time find for the plaintiffs. First, there is substantial evidence that periodic mental-health evaluations for all prisoners in segregation are inadequate, but the court, out of an abundance of caution and exercising its discretion, leaves this issue to be further addressed by the parties. Second, evidence was insufficient to establish a substantial risk of serious harm arising from ADOC’s
78. The court also notes that the experts from both sides presented affirmative evidence that the care being provided in the Tutwiler RTU is adequate, or close to adequate.
236

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 237 of 302
medication management practices or the supervision of certified registered nurse practitioners.
On the first issue, substantial evidence suggested that ADOC is not conducting adequate periodic mental-health assessments of prisoners in segregation to identify those who become mentally ill while in segregation. Dr. Haney credibly opined that periodic out-of-cell assessments are necessary not only to monitor for decompensation among those identified as mentally ill, but also to identify prisoners not on the mental-health caseload who may develop mental illness while in segregation. Just as identification and classification of mental-health needs at intake are essential in a functioning mental-health care system, it is also essential to identify those who need mental-health treatment in segregation. ADOC’s own administrative regulation requires periodic mental-health assessments of prisoners in segregation, even for those who are not on the caseload, though it does not appear to require out-of-cell assessments. Joint Ex. 127, Admin. Reg. §
237

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 238 of 302
625 (doc. no. 1038-150). However, evidence suggested that such assessments at ADOC are cursory at best. For example, as discussed above, plaintiff R.M.W.’s segregation mental-health evaluation form completed in the same month when she was sent to suicide watch twice and had multiple incidents of self-injury simply had some check marks and stated “inmate appropriate for placement” and “segregation placement not impacting inmate’s mental health.” Joint Ex. 404, March 28, 2014 Review of Segregation Inmates R.M.W. (doc. no. 1038-859) at MR017081. No mention of her suicide-watch placements or self-injury episodes was included, and no suicide risk-assessment tool was completed. Ample evidence of correctional and mental-health understaffing--and the fact that staff are often unable to conduct segregation rounds consisting of much shorter, cursory cell-front interactions--also suggests that ADOC is unable to provide meaningful mental-health assessments of prisoners in segregation. However, the court believes that it should solicit more input from the parties before
238

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 239 of 302
determining whether ADOC is conducting adequate periodic mental-health assessments of prisoners in segregation. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment finding remains open as to this discrete issue, and the court will take it up with the parties after this opinion is issued.
Second, the court is able to conclude on the record before it that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to establish that prisoners in ADOC custody face a substantial risk of serious harm in two areas: medication management and supervision of certified registered nurse practitioners. Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to establish that ADOC’s medication management practices are inadequate based on ADOC allegedly letting cost concerns override clinical needs and not being responsive to patients’ concerns about side effects. While plaintiffs presented anecdotal evidence of providers’ refusal to continue previously prescribed medications or to switch medications despite continuing side effects, the court did not see any independent clinical assessments of these patients’
239

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 240 of 302

medication needs.

Absent any contrary clinical

assessments, credibility findings, or more direct

evidence of ADOC’s failure to prioritize patients’

clinical needs over medication costs, a constitutional

determination about the adequacy of these kinds of

medication decisions would invade the province of

psychiatric providers’ medical judgment. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (holding that matters for

"medical judgment" do not raise an Eighth Amendment

concern). The testimony established only that clinicians

talk about the cost of medications during meetings, and

that managers commend providers for keeping prices down

as a team; further, some prisoners were discontinued on

medications they were originally prescribed, but there

is no documentation about the reasons those medications

were discontinued. However, these unconnected dots are

not sufficient to find that ADOC prioritizes cost

concerns over clinical needs when making prescription

decisions, because the court is ill-equipped to discern

whether the decisions were clinically inappropriate.

240

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 241 of 302
Furthermore, even plaintiffs’ expert Burns found that keeping the cost of medications in mind when making prescribing decisions was not on its own inappropriate or unusual, especially because MHM clinicians’ requests for medications that are not pre-approved for use are almost always granted. In other words, absent contrary clinical findings, there is not enough evidence to find that ADOC systematically overrides clinical needs due to cost concerns such that its medication management practices are constitutionally inadequate.
In addition, plaintiffs argued that ADOC’s certified registered nurse practitioners were not properly supervised by psychiatrists. Evidence suggested that some of the CRNPs employed by MHM could not meet the state regulatory requirement that they collaborate with an on-site psychiatrist at least 10 % of the hours they work. However, evidence also showed that psychiatrists do supervise and collaborate with CRNPs through other, more informal channels. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to establish that inadequate supervision has
241

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 242 of 302
created a substantial risk of serious harm for mentally ill prisoners.
C. Deliberate Indifference Having found that ADOC’s mental-health care system creates substantial risks of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners (defined in this opinion as those with serious mental-health needs), the court now turns to the deliberate-indifference prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. In order to prove an Eighth Amendment violation, plaintiffs must show not only that state officials subjected mentally ill prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm, but also that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. As discussed below, despite being repeatedly informed that significant deficiencies existed, ADOC has disregarded and failed to respond reasonably to the actual harm and substantial
242

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 243 of 302
risks of serious harm posed by its deficient mental-health care system.79
To establish deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must show that defendants had subjective knowledge of the harm or risk of harm, and disregarded it or failed to act reasonably to alleviate it. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010). Officials must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and “draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The defendant’s subjective awareness of a risk of harm can be determined based on circumstantial evidence, including “the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842. In other words, if a particular risk was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the
79. Defendants also asserted that because the named ADOC officials were not involved in the direct provision of mental-health care to prisoners, they could not have been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ serious mental-health needs. This court has already rejected this argument. See Dunn v. Dunn, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1157-60 (M.D. Ala. 2016).
243

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 244 of 302
circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it,” such evidence permits a trier of fact to conclude that the officials had actual knowledge of the risk. Id. at 842-43 (internal citation omitted).
The disregard prong can be proven in many ways. In the area of medical care, disregard of a risk of harm may consist of “failing to provide care, delaying care, or providing grossly inadequate care,” when doing so causes a prisoner to needlessly suffer the pain resulting from his or her illness. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999). Put differently, Eighth Amendment liability may be found if a defendant with subjective awareness of a serious need provides “an objectively insufficient response to that need.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000). Although considered part of the subjective component, the requirement that the defendant disregard a risk of harm actually evaluates her response (or lack thereof) by an
244

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 245 of 302
objective ‘reasonableness’ standard. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
In some circumstances, a defendant’s disregard of a known risk is quite obvious. For example, the defendant might “simply refuse[] to provide” medical care known to be necessary. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (allegations that prisoner required a psychiatric evaluation that defendants refused to provide satisfies disregard requirement). If a defendant provides some medical care, the Constitution does not require that the care be “perfect” or the “best obtainable.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, a defendant’s disregard of the risk can still be found through “delaying the treatment,” providing “grossly inadequate care,” making “a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of treatment,” or providing “medical care which is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all.” McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (collecting cases). In other words, a choice to provide care known to be less effective because
245

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 246 of 302
it is easier or cheaper can constitute deliberate indifference. In the context of mental-health care, “the quality of psychiatric care can be so substantial a deviation from accepted standards as to evidence deliberate indifference to those serious psychiatric needs.” Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835 (11th Cir. 1990)). Deliberate indifference can also be found when “[a] prison official persists in a particular course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury” to the prisoner. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
In challenges to a correctional institution’s provision of medical care, evidence of systemic deficiencies can also establish the ‘disregard’ element of deliberate indifference. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. For example, this element may be met “by proving that there are ‘such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to
246

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 247 of 302
adequate medical care.’” Id. (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981)). As an evidentiary matter, these systemic deficiencies may be identified by a “series of incidents closely related in time” or “[r]epeated examples of delayed or denied medical care.” Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (11th Cir. 1986). Further, prison officials’ efforts to correct systemic deficiencies that “simply do not go far enough” when weighed against the risk of harm also support a finding of deliberate indifference, Laube v. Haley, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1251 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Thompson, J.), because such efforts are not “reasonable measures to abate” the identified substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
Finally, the defendant institution’s response to a known risk must be more blameworthy than “mere negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). In other words, the defendant must have disregarded the risk with “more than
247

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 248 of 302
ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). However, while an “inadvertent failure” to provide adequate medical care does not satisfy the deliberate-indifference standard, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, in challenges to health-care systems, repeated examples of negligent conduct support an inference of systemic disregard for the risk of harm facing mentally ill prisoners. See Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (“In class actions challenging the entire system of health care, deliberate indifference to inmates’ health needs may be shown by proving repeated examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff.”).
In an official-capacity suit, the suit is not “against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the [governmental] entity”; therefore, the deliberate-indifference inquiry focuses on the institution’s “historical indifference” to the identified risk of harm, rather than the named defendant
248

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 249 of 302
official’s personal indifference. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that substitution of a new defendant, “a dedicated public servant who is trying very hard to make [the prison] an efficient and effective correctional institution” does not preclude a deliberate-indifference finding); see also Laube, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (“[T]he real parties in interest are the responsible entities: the Department of Corrections and, ultimately, the State of Alabama.”).
This case is likely sui generis in the extent to which the top ADOC officials had personal knowledge of the substantial risks of serious harm posed by its deficient care and has not responded reasonably to those risks. Much of the evidence came from ADOC officials’ own mouths: defendants--particularly Associate Commissioner Naglich--and other officials readily admitted to the existence of serious deficiencies, the risk of harm arising from them, and ADOC’s failure to respond. As a result, although plaintiffs do not have to prove personal deliberate indifference by the named
249

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 250 of 302
defendants in order to establish institutional deliberate indifference, the court’s finding of deliberate indifference is well supported by defendants’ own admissions of knowledge and failure to act, in addition to the other circumstantial evidence more typically seen in official-capacity suits.
1. ADOC’s Knowledge of Harm and Risk of Harm The inadequacies plaguing ADOC’s mental-health care system were pervasive and well-documented in multiple ways: ADOC received monthly statistical reports and annual contract-compliance reports from MHM; ADOC communicated with senior MHM managers through emails and quarterly CQI meetings; ADOC received corrective-action plans from MHM after compliance reviews and audits; ADOC also performed two audits of MHM’s performance since 2011. As a result, ADOC has been well aware of the risks presented by the deficiencies in its mental-health care. ADOC has been well aware of the significant and adverse impact of overcrowding, mental-health
250

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 251 of 302
understaffing, and correctional understaffing on the provision of mental-health care. Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that, since 2010, MHM has been struggling to meet contractual requirements due to staffing cuts and increasing caseloads. In addition, MHM’s program director Houser repeatedly raised concerns about inadequate mental-health staffing with Naglich, requesting for over a year to amend the contract to increase staffing across facilities; she also told Naglich repeatedly that MHM needed more counselors in order to meet the rising demand, because ADOC’s psychological associates were not taking counseling caseloads from MHM providers as anticipated.
Both Dunn and Naglich have been aware that persistent correctional understaffing has interfered with MHM’s ability to provide mental-health care. According to Naglich, in the years since 2010, MHM has repeatedly informed ADOC that the lack of sufficient correctional staffing has been seriously impacting its ability to provide care. ADOC’s own audit of the Donaldson RTU in
251

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 252 of 302

2013 also revealed that check-in rounds, individual

appointments, and regularly scheduled activities had to

be delayed or canceled due to the limited number of

officers assigned to the mental-health unit. At least

since 2013, Naglich has repeatedly complained to ADOC’s

Commissioner, former Commissioner, and Associate

Commissioner of Operations about the chronic shortage of

correctional officers interfering with mental-health

care. She characterized correctional understaffing as

“probably one of the most serious problems facing the

department.” Naglich Testimony at vol.2, 174-75.

Ample evidence also demonstrates ADOC’s knowledge of

the risks of harm arising out of the specific

deficiencies in the treatment of mentally ill prisoners

discussed earlier. First, MHM managers repeatedly

informed ADOC in their reports and emails that the

deficiencies

arising

out

of

staffing

shortages--including difficulties in providing timely

counseling sessions and activities--were seriously

undermining their ability to provide care. Second,

252

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 253 of 302
Naglich admitted that that the failure to meet the mental-health needs of prisoners with serious mental illness--in other words, the risk of harm arising from failing to identify prisoners in need of mental-health care and providing them with the appropriate level of care--puts them at risk of decompensating.
ADOC was also well aware of the specific deficiencies. To begin, ADOC was aware that its processes for identifying and classifying mentally ill prisoners were inadequate. ADOC has had a persistently low prevalence rate of mental illness, and ADOC officials have known that LPNs with extremely limited training are responsible for identifying prisoners’ needs for mental-health services. Moreover, Associate Commissioner Naglich was informed of the persistent pattern of self-injury, attempted suicides, and suicides involving prisoners who had not been identified as mentally ill; MHM’s corporate office had repeatedly informed her in contract-compliance reports that requests for mental-health services were not being processed appropriately according to their urgency
253

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 254 of 302

level. In sum, the circumstances make clear that she had

been exposed to information concerning the problems and

thus ‘must have known’ about them. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842-43.

Deficiencies in treatment planning have been

longstanding, persistent, and well documented, including

in reports directly delivered to Associate Commissioner

Naglich.

MHM notified ADOC of the lack of

individualization of treatment plans for years in audits

and quarterly CQI meetings.

MHM’s annual

contract-compliance reports to ADOC between 2011 and 2016

also noted that treatment plans were inadequate across

all levels of care, from outpatient to crisis care.

ADOC’s own 2013 audit of Donaldson identified as a

problem that treatment team meetings--where treatment

planning occurs--frequently were held without all

necessary participants.

The problem of insufficient counseling services has

also been longstanding and well known. First, Naglich

admitted her knowledge of a persistent shortage of

254

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 255 of 302
counselors and increasing caseloads, as well as a chronic shortage of correctional officers for escorting prisoners to appointments. Second, multiple sources informed her and other ADOC officials of serious problems in the provision of group counseling services; she also admitted that the shortage of correctional officers hindered MHM’s ability to provide group therapy sessions. Contract-compliance reports given to Naglich repeatedly informed her that multiple facilities were not getting enough group counseling sessions over the years. MHM’s monthly operations reports to ADOC, which contain statistics on the number of individual treatment encounters and group sessions each month, also made clear that little group counseling was occurring at multiple prisons. For example, the monthly operations report for April 2016 showed that no outpatient group therapy was offered at Donaldson, Easterling, Kilby, or St. Clair. Moreover, MHM has repeatedly discussed the problem of increasing caseloads for counselors and the unavailability of group treatment at many facilities
255

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 256 of 302
during quarterly CQI meetings, which ADOC Chief Psychologist Tytell attends on behalf of the agency.
ADOC officials have also been aware of the array of well-documented problems plaguing inpatient-level care. MHM has been reporting low utilization rates for RTU and SU beds to Naglich and her office every month; Naglich admitted that she has been aware of the presence of prisoners in segregation without any mental-health needs in mental-health units, and that this disrupts the therapeutic environment; ADOC’s audit of Donaldson revealed that patients were not getting sufficient out-of-cell time and counseling; and Naglich has known that ADOC does not provide hospital-level care to patients who need it.
ADOC officials have been well aware of the inadequacies in suicide prevention and crisis care. Commissioner Dunn personally reviews suicide-incident reports and has been aware of the precipitous increase in the suicide rate in the last two years; he has been also aware that most of the suicides were committed by
256

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 257 of 302
hanging and in segregation. For her part, Naglich has known even of the specific, system-wide conditions that create substantial risks of suicide: she was notified of the chronic crisis-cell shortage80 and the backlog at the Bullock SU that has been driving the shortage; MHM complained to her about unsafe crisis cells with tie-off points and low visibility, and her office’s own audit included the same findings; and MHM repeatedly reported to Naglich that sharp items were found in crisis cells. Naglich also admitted that not having a constant-watch procedure for the most acutely suicidal inmates is a serious problem that poses a risk of harm in such a way that “someone could die.” Naglich Testimony at vol. 3, 228.
Perhaps most dramatically, ADOC has been aware of the actual harm and the substantial risk of serious harm that ADOC’s segregation practices pose to mentally ill
80. ADOC Associate Commissioner Culliver and the regional coordinator for medical care, Brendan Kinard, also have been aware of crisis-cell shortage and the resulting placement of suicidal prisoners in non-crisis cells for years.
257

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 258 of 302

prisoners. Commissioner Dunn has been aware of the fact

that mentally ill prisoners resided in segregation, and

that segregation could exacerbate their mental illness.

Naglich has been receiving monthly reports that showed

overrepresentation of mentally ill prisoners in

segregation. MHM staff repeatedly communicated to ADOC

officials--both orally and in writing--their concern

about ADOC’s placement of mentally ill prisoners in

segregation. MHM’s annual contract-compliance reports

between 2012 and 2016 reported that multiple facilities

had disproportionate numbers of prisoners on the

mental-health caseload in segregation and recommended

further review of the mental-health consultation process

and monitoring.

See Pl. Ex. 1191, 2012

Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-9); Pl. Ex. 114,

2013 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no. 1070-4); Pl.

Ex. 115, 2016 Contract-Compliance Report (doc. no.

1070-5). Moreover, MHM leadership has communicated the

grave and potentially lethal risks of such segregation

practices to ADOC officials, including Naglich. For

258

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 259 of 302
example, over the last four to five years on multiple occasions, Dr. Hunter, MHM’s medical director, has had discussions with ADOC leadership regarding mentally ill prisoners’ potential to deteriorate while in segregation. MHM’s program director Houser has repeatedly informed ADOC officials that placement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation should be avoided because of the potential harm to those prisoners. Naglich herself admitted that housing mentally ill prisoners in segregation is “categorically inappropriate.” Naglich Testimony at vol. 5, 73.
While aware of the substantial risk of serious harm posed by segregation, ADOC has also known that certain ADOC disciplinary practices result in frequent placement of mentally ill prisoners in segregation. Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that ADOC has had a practice of disciplining prisoners for engaging in self-injurious behaviors. Furthermore, both MHM’s and ADOC’s own audits revealed that the mental-health consultation component of the disciplinary process was
259

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 260 of 302
not properly functioning to keep mentally ill prisoners out of segregation.
Lastly, ADOC has also been aware of the inadequate monitoring and access to treatment for prisoners in segregation. ADOC’s chief psychologist Tytell informed Naglich that segregation rounds by mental-health staff were not being done properly and that mental-health patients in segregation were not receiving treatment. Furthermore, ADOC officials have been well aware that segregation placement has been a common factor among suicides. Indeed, the great danger to mentally ill prisoners in segregation is obvious: prisoners are locked away for weeks at a time in cells with little monitoring and easy access to the means to kill themselves. In other words, ADOC has been aware of the actual harm that has resulted from segregation practices, in addition to the substantial risk of serious harm that ADOC’s segregation practices have imposed on mentally ill prisoners.
260

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 261 of 302
In sum, evidence established that ADOC has been aware of the gross deficiencies found in its treatment of mentally ill prisoners.

2. ADOC’s Disregard of Harm and Risk of Harm

Despite its knowledge of actual harm and substantial

risks of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners, ADOC has

failed to respond reasonably to identified issues in the

delivery of mental-health care. On a global level, the

state of the mental-health care system is itself evidence

of ADOC’s disregard of harm and risk of harm: in spite

of countless reports, emails, and internal documents

putting ADOC on notice of the actual harm and substantial

risks of serious harm posed by the identified

inadequacies in mental-health care, those inadequacies

have persisted for years and years.

Suicide

risk-assessment tools are still not being used outside

of intake; referral requests are still not being triaged

according to their urgency levels; records from late 2016

indicated a continued lack of individualized treatment

261

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 262 of 302
plans and inadequate frequency of individual and group
counseling; segregation prisoners without mental-health
needs are still found in mental-health units; no
hospitalization option or hospital-level care for the
most severely ill exists; suicidal prisoners continue to
be housed in unsafe cells without adequate monitoring;
and mentally ill prisoners still are placed in
segregation without a meaningful mental-health
consultation process and have even less access to
treatment.81
81. Likewise, the current levels of mental-health and correctional understaffing and overcrowding also illustrates ADOC’s disregard of risk of harm. First, ADOC’s response to the shortages of mental-health and correctional staff have been objectively insufficient, because systemic and gross deficiencies arising from understaffing have persisted and effectively denied prisoners access to adequate mental-health care. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (holding that the ‘disregard’ prong under Estelle and Farmer can be satisfied through an “objectively insufficient response” by prison officials); Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505 (deliberate indifference can be established through “systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing” that effectively deny prisoners access to adequate medical care); see also Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1995)(Karlton, J.)(“[G]iven the nature and extent of the crisis and its duration,” defendants’ purported efforts to remedy the acute shortage of mental-health staff in the prison
262

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 263 of 302

In addition to its failure to respond reasonably to these deficiencies, ADOC’s disregard for the substantial

system were not sufficient to defeat a

deliberate-indifference finding).

Furthermore,

difficulties in recruiting do not negate the fact that

understaffing has caused this serious systemic deficiency.

See Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir. 1983)

(failure of a prison to fill authorized position weighs

“more heavily against the state than for it,” partly

because the authorized salary was woefully inadequate and

the prison’s effort was insufficient); Madrid v. Gomez,

889 F. Supp. 1146, 1227 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Henderson, J.)

(finding “recruitment difficulties do not excuse

compliance with constitutional mandates.”). In other

words, ADOC’s failure to provide mental-health and

correctional staffing sufficient to operate a minimally

adequate mental-health care system is in itself an

unreasonable response under the deliberate-indifference

standard.

The same logic applies to overcrowding. While it is

true that ADOC does not have the authority to release

prisoners or stem the inflow of prisoners from the

state’s criminal justice system, ADOC’s response to

overcrowding has been objectively insufficient. This is

because the court does not consider the overcrowding

problem in a vacuum. ADOC has been well aware of the

magnitude and impact of overcrowding on every facet of

its operations for years. ADOC’s efforts--belatedly

pushing for construction of new prisons in 2016, for

example--to alleviate the problem have been too little

and too late, as reflected in the current 170 % occupancy

rate.

Considering the institution’s historical

deliberate indifference to the problem of overcrowding,

rather than what ADOC has done under the current

leadership only, the court finds that ADOC has

disregarded to the harm and risk of harm caused by

overcrowding and understaffing.

263

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 264 of 302
risk of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners manifested itself in two additional ways: its persistent refusal to exercise any meaningful oversight of MHM’s delivery of care; and its unreasonable responses to critical incidents and discrete issues brought to their attention over the years.

a. ADOC’s Failure to Exercise Oversight of the Provision of Mental-Health Care

ADOC’s Office of Health Services, run by Associate

Commissioner Naglich, has done vanishingly little to

exercise oversight of the provision of care to mentally

ill prisoners. This failure exemplifies ADOC’s disregard

of the substantial risk of serious harm to mentally ill

prisoners within ADOC. Two facts provide important

context for understanding this failure: first, ADOC has

been well aware of the inadequacies in the treatment of

mentally ill prisoners discussed above; second, as

explained in this section, ADOC has known that MHM’s own

quality-control process is hopelessly inadequate in

implementing corrective actions.

Despite clear

264

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 265 of 302

indications that the same inadequacies persisted year

after year, and that its contractor has been failing to

implement corrective actions, ADOC chose to exercise

close to no oversight, abdicating its constitutional

obligation to ensure that the provision of mental-health care is minimally adequate.82 Such inaction is clearly

unreasonable and therefore amounts to deliberate

indifference.

As an initial matter, a brief overview of MHM’s

quality-control processes illustrates the unreasonable

nature of ADOC’s response.

Though designed for

‘continuous quality improvement,’ MHM’s quality-control

processes do not ensure that the identified deficiencies

82. In fact, instead of penalizing MHM for its known inadequacies, ADOC extended the contract with MHM for one more year in September 2016. Associate Commissioner Naglich credibly testified that, as a result of her negative view of MHM’s performance, she recommended awarding the mental-health contract in 2013 to another contractor, rather than renewing the contract with MHM; She likewise stated that before the department extended its contract with MHM in 2016, she told Commissioner Dunn that MHM was not “measuring up,” Naglich Testimony at vol. 4, 121, adding that Dunn was also dissatisfied with all the issues that ADOC has had with MHM. And yet, ADOC renewed the contract with MHM regardless.
265

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 266 of 302

are corrected, mainly because many of the necessary

corrective actions require cooperation and action by ADOC.

MHM’s corporate office’s annual contract-compliance

audit is the only system-wide review of MHM’s performance

that either MHM or ADOC conducts. Once the review is

complete, MHM sends a contract-compliance report, as well

as a corrective-action plan, to Naglich’s Office of Health Services.83 However, it is unclear whether anyone

within MHM monitors the implementation of corrective

actions.

Moreover, for many of the identified

deficiencies, MHM cannot address them effectively without

ADOC’s help: corrective actions--such as obtaining

adequate staff to facilitate therapy appointments and

83. One former MHM employee testified that these audit results are not reliable, because MHM staff on site pull medical records to be audited ahead of time and get them up to par before the corporate auditors review them. Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Burns also observed that the facility staff select the files for review, rather than the corporate office randomly selecting the files. While this testimony raises a concern that the reports may have minimized negative findings, the court relies on them to the extent the reports still found serious deficiencies in the provision of mental-health care.
266

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 267 of 302

group activities--often require action by ADOC officers and, crucially, more staffing.84 As a result, without

action on ADOC’s part, contract-compliance reports often

note the same problems recurring year after year: for

example, multiple annual reports found that treatment

plans were not updated consistently; that crisis cells

in various facilities were unsafe for suicidal prisoners;

and that prisoners in segregation and mental-health units

were not getting regular treatment due to the shortage of correctional officers.85

The

regional-level

quality-improvement

exercises--which includes quarterly audits and ‘spot

84. MHM’s corrective-action plans reflect this conundrum: while MHM is required to send a corrective-action plan in response, much of what is required to fix the deficiencies identified in contract-compliance reports involves ADOC actions. For example, follow-up findings in the corrective-action plan for 2016 included statements such as: “This is a work in progress. Due to the staffing issues currently are not being completed during the required time frame”; “Still working with the MHPs on ensuring that the treatment plan is completed during this time frame of admission.” Pl. Ex. 1247, July 2016 Bullock IP Corrective Action Plan (doc. no. 1099-10).
85. To be clear, the court notes that many identified problems could be fixed by MHM, but are not.
267

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 268 of 302

audits’ by MHM’s CQI manager--also do not seem to result

in corrective actions. In fact, the CQI manager admitted

that no one is responsible for ensuring that site

administrators address the issues identified through her

spot checks: she is only responsible for reporting the

findings, not addressing the problems; no documentation

of site-level follow-up is required. In her own words,

“the buck doesn’t stop with anyone.” Testimony at vol. 2, 152.86

Davis-Walker

86. Asked how she knows that MHM is meeting contract compliance goals if all follow ups are done at the site level and she does not see any of those results, the CQI manager responded, “[O]bviously, you do not understand quality.” Davis Walker Testimony at vol. 2, 237. She testified that the purpose of CQI is “refining [] process[es],” which she defined as determining how to collect data and reflect it in a database. Davis-Walker Testimony at vol. 1, 83. This singular focus on process rather than substance on her part led to one of the more bizarre exchanges of this trial: she insisted that all spot-audit results showing failures to meet contract or regulatory standards were exclusively attributable to data-entry problems, and never to any actual failure to provide appropriate care. For example, she insisted that noncompliance reported in the audit, such as treatment plans that were “outdated or requiring review,” reflected database entry problems, even though finding the date of the latest treatment plan did not involve looking in the database. Davis-Walker Testimony at vol. 2, 130-32. Needless to say, the court did not find credible her
268

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 269 of 302
Naglich was well aware of MHM’s inability to address identified problems. In fact, Naglich blamed MHM for most of the deficiencies in mental-health care at ADOC and expressed particular dissatisfaction with MHM’s CQI process: she complained in court that MHM identifies problems, but does not help ADOC solve those problems. But this was the proverbial pot calling the kettle black: in spite of her concerns about MHM’s internal oversight and her knowledge of deficiencies in care, Naglich and OHS--the only ADOC department with responsibility for monitoring mental-health care--have done almost nothing that resembles ‘quality-improvement’ or even bare-bones contract monitoring in response.
First, Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that she does not review the contract-compliance reports in full or take actions based on their findings. She asserted that Dr. Tytell, the only staff member at OHS with mental-health expertise, is responsible for reviewing the reports. However, Tytell denied ever
testimony that all identified problems are attributable to mere data entry errors.
269

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 270 of 302
receiving the reports or being responsible for reviewing them. 87 Not surprisingly, Naglich’s testimony also revealed that neither she nor anyone else in her office has taken any corrective measures in response to the numerous inadequacies identified in the reports.
Second, ADOC has failed to monitor MHM’s provision of mental-health care, despite having the tools to do so. ADOC’s contract with MHM grants it access to MHM’s files and the right to conduct scheduled and unannounced performance reviews. The contract also authorizes ADOC to assess fines for noncompliance found during formal audits. However, ADOC has not made use of these provisions. Since 2011, Naglich’s office has conducted only one informal audit--in response to a specific concern raised by a medical provider about a mentally ill inmate--and one ‘pilot audit,’ both of which were limited
87. Lynn Brown, the only other person within OHS who interacts with MHM regularly, also denied ever seeing the reports or being responsible for reviewing them.
270

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 271 of 302
to the Donaldson facility.88 (Only the first, informal audit produced a written report.) Despite Naglich’s own assessment that MHM was “not measuring up,” Naglich Testimony at vol. 4, 121, ADOC has not audited, even informally, mental-health care at any prison other than Donaldson, and has not conducted formal audits at any prisons. Because it has not conducted any formal audits, ADOC has not been able to assess MHM any fines for contractual noncompliance.
Even when ADOC conducted the informal audits at Donaldson, it did nothing to address the identified problems. The 2013 informal audit of Donaldson revealed that the care provided at the Donaldson RTU was deficient in many ways--so much so that Associate Commissioner Naglich described it as a “failed audit.” Naglich Testimony at vol. 2, 55. As discussed earlier in more detail in Section V.B.5, the audit revealed that providers had difficulties accessing patients because of
88. MHM’s program manager Houser explained that Naglich told her the ‘pilot audit’ would not “count” and that the results would not be used as an “I gotcha.” Houser Testimony at vol. 2, 176.
271

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 272 of 302

the correctional staffing shortage; group programming was

inadequate; bed space in the treatment units was used to

house segregation inmates; mental-health staffing was

inadequate; security for mental-health staff was

inadequate; and patients were not getting sufficient

out-of-cell time.

MHM’s corrective-action plan

identified tasks for both ADOC and MHM. However, Naglich

was unable to identify a single follow-up action taken

by her office or MHM to address any of these issues.

ADOC’s lead auditor, Brendan Kinard, admitted that OHS

did not do anything to resolve problems identified in the

Donaldson audit.

Associate Commissioner Naglich offered no reasonable

explanation when pressed about the reason for the lack

of follow-up after the dismal results of the 2013

Donaldson audit. She blamed the death of Dr. Cavanaugh,

the chief psychologist of OHS and Dr. Tytell’s

predecessor, who unexpectedly passed away in March 2014.

According to Naglich, Cavanaugh had been responsible for

contract monitoring, including conducting formal and

272

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 273 of 302
informal audits of MHM’s delivery of care, and for ensuring that the quality of mental-health care is adequate. However, Naglich’s excuse did not hold water: when asked to produce any documentation of audits or follow-ups done by Dr. Cavanaugh before he passed away, she was unable to do so; he apparently produced no written reports or emails about his findings or audits. According to MHM’s program director Houser, Cavanaugh conducted no system-wide or even facility-wide audits; he simply performed ‘reviews’ that did not result in corrective-action plans or written reports.
Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Tytell, who took Dr. Cavanaugh’s place later in 2014, made clear that ADOC still does little to ensure that MHM is meeting contractual requirements. Tytell admitted that he does not conduct any system-wide or facility-wide audits, and that he only examines patient records when he is trying to learn something about a specific patient. He attends MHM’s quarterly CQI meetings, which last a whole day, but he leaves around lunch time; he has missed one or two of
273

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 274 of 302
the four quarterly meetings in the last year. He does not look into issues raised at CQI meetings, unless specifically told to do so by Naglich. 89 Likewise, although he receives programming logs and monthly operations reports from MHM, Tytell does nothing with them because the information is “already old data” that is “a couple months behind.” Tytell Testimony at __.
The 2015 Donaldson ‘pilot audit’ also exemplified ADOC’s inadequate response to identified problems in the provision of mental-health care. While conducting the audit, Tytell became concerned that many of the medical records he was examining were not meeting the benchmarks, and called Associate Commissioner Naglich in the middle of the audit to report the “dismal” results. Tytell Testimony at __. Naglich simply told him to finish the audit. On the last day of the audit, Tytell informally
89. Lynn Brown, the other ADOC employee who attends the MHM CQI meetings but does not have any mental-health training, testified that she is not responsible for reporting from the meetings unless specifically told to do so. This office-wide lack of involvement in the CQI process further supports the finding that ADOC has chosen to abdicate its duty of ensuring that MHM’s delivery of mental-health care is minimally adequate.
274

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 275 of 302
discussed his preliminary findings in an exit interview with the site administrator and two people from MHM’s regional office. However, no one at OHS formally communicated with MHM regarding the problems found in the audit or gave written feedback, even though many of the same inadequacies from the 2013 audit were identified again, and Houser specifically asked for feedback. Because there was no written report, MHM did not develop any corrective-action plans.
After he revised the audit tools based on the ‘pilot audit’ results, Tytell asked Naglich whether OHS should re-audit Donaldson using the new tools. Naglich told him to not worry about it. Naglich also told him not to conduct any more audits of any other facilities. Tytell disagreed with the decision not to re-audit but did as he was told: as he explained, he “learned to stay in [his] lane,” that is, “to do as I am ordered.” Tytell Testimony at __. OHS has not conducted any audit using the revised audit tools since then.
275

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 276 of 302
In sum, in failing to exercise adequate oversight of MHM’s performance and to address deficiencies identified in the “failed” results of the 2013 Donaldson audit and the “dismal results” of the 2015 Donaldson audit, ADOC’s response to its knowledge of harm and risk of harm in the mental-health care system has been objectively unreasonable.
b. ADOC’s Unreasonable Responses to Identified Deficiencies
ADOC has also failed to respond reasonably to discrete issues that come to its attention, even when lives may be at stake. In response to many of the deficiencies identified above, ADOC officials admitted to doing nothing in response to being informed. ADOC officials also repeatedly testified that they simply told someone else about the risk of harm being created by deficient treatment of mentally ill prisoners, and took no other action, even though informing someone else within ADOC previously had failed to result in any change. Insisting upon a course of action that has already proven
276

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 277 of 302
futile is not an objectively reasonable response under the deliberate-indifference standard.
Examples of such unreasonable responses abound. First, as multiple ADOC and MHM staff admitted, sharp items in crisis cells have been a recurring problem in multiple facilities. When Dr. Tytell was asked about this problem, he simply stated: “I’m always told that things will be taken care of and things will be done. How to check up on it and follow up on it, I don’t know how unless I’m told that it happens again.” Tytell Testimony at __. Tytell’s statement epitomized ADOC’s inadequate response to problems that pose serious risks to prisoners: the sole ADOC official with mental-health expertise insists on passing the buck even when the issue involves self-harm by suicidal prisoners, and even when his past experience has clearly shown him that simply bringing problems to the attention of others does not fix those problems.
Associate Commissioner Naglich likewise shirked responsibility when asked about the issue of sharp items
277

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 278 of 302
found in crisis cells: even though she knew that correctional officers were not following protocol by failing to search crisis cells for sharp items that could be used for self-harm, she maintained that she does not have the authority to tell correctional officers to follow the protocols “because it’s a security concern, so all that we can do is relay that concern to security.” Naglich Testimony at vol. 4, 115. However, Associate Commissioner Culliver credibly testified that as an associate commissioner herself, Naglich has the authority to tell correctional officers to comply with administrative regulations and protocols.
Associate Commissioner Naglich’s testimony was also full of admissions that, despite knowledge of risks of harm, ADOC took no action at all. She admitted that she had known about problems regarding visibility into crisis cells at least since ADOC’s 2013 audit of Donaldson, but she did not know what, if anything, had been done to correct these problems in the years since. When asked why she has not done anything personally to address this
278

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 279 of 302

issue that she acknowledged as “critical,” she stated

that she does not have enough staff to do so. Naglich

Testimony at vol. 1, 173-74. Naglich also admitted that

ADOC officials did nothing in response to their own audit

finding that ADOC had a practice of automatically

applying disciplinary sanctions for self-injury.

Likewise, she took no action in response to MHM’s

repeatedly-expressed concern--which she shared--that

mentally ill prisoners are overrepresented in segregation,

until after she told the court that mentally ill

prisoners should not be in segregation.

She

unconvincingly testified that if she had been notified

that the mentally ill were disproportionately being

housed in segregation, she “would have looked at each one

of those facilities.” Naglich Testimony at vol. 5, 138.

Naglich, in fact, had been informed for years that

mentally ill prisoners have been overrepresented in segregation.90 Yet, she admitted that she never inquired

90 . As explained in the knowledge section, MHM managers, including Dr. Hunter and Houser, have both discussed this issue with her on multiple occasions. In
279

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 280 of 302
into the facilities reported to have disproportionate numbers of mentally ill prisoners in segregation.
ADOC’s response to the skyrocketing suicide rate also demonstrates a frankly shocking level of disregard for a known substantial risk of serious harm. At the highest level, Commissioner Dunn testified that he personally tracks suicide rates and has looked at incident reports; he is, of course, aware of the sharp increase in suicide rates in the last two years within ADOC. However, more than a month after this trial began, he testified that he has not ordered his staff to take any concrete measures other than asking his chief of staff, Steve Brown, to “look into it.” Dunn Testimony at vol. 1, 45. He has never attended any meetings regarding suicides, or asked for a written report or follow-up after suicide-related meetings that took place in October 2015 and October 2016.
Associate Commissioner Naglich was not only aware of the increase in the suicide rate, but also the risk factors for suicides. Yet, she and other ADOC officials
addition, MHM has been sending monthly operations reports and annual contract compliance reports stating the same.
280

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 281 of 302
made almost no effort to address the problem. In Naglich’s view, suicide is a risk for anyone with untreated mental illness--in other words, a lack of treatment, as well as a lack of acute care and suicide-prevention measures, places all mentally ill prisoners at risk of the most serious bodily harm possible. She attended an October 2015 meeting focused on the increase in suicide rates, where she learned that segregation placement was a common factor among suicides. However, neither she nor anyone else at ADOC took any action to change ADOC’s housing of mentally ill prisoners in segregation, and no follow-up meeting was scheduled until October 2016. During that 12-month period, six prisoners committed suicide, doubling the annual rate from 2015. After the second meeting, ADOC again took no action. Appallingly, ADOC officials directly responsible for mental health--Naglich and Tytell--and prisoner placement--Culliver--all admitted that they were aware of the sharp rise in suicides, participated in these two meetings on the suicide rate, and took no action.
281

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 282 of 302
Associate Commissioner Naglich attempted to explain
this lack of response by stating that a new mental-health
coding system prohibiting placement of seriously mentally
ill prisoners in segregation was in the middle of a
roll-out at the time of her testimony in December 2016.
However, as explained earlier, her representation was
disputed by the testimony of two of her colleagues, who
explained that OHS moved ten mentally ill prisoners out
of segregation into the Donaldson RTU only after her
testimony, and that there was no official policy change.91
In a way, Naglich’s belated transfer of the prisoners is
all the more damning: the fact that she and Dr. Tytell
91. Tytell also tried to evade responsibility by saying that he was not responsible for the actual transfer or monitoring of the transfer: he first contended that whether mentally ill prisoners are actually being transferred out of segregation was up to the wardens and site administrators, because they have the mental-health codes of prisoners in segregation; he insinuated that he did not have any way of monitoring the movement of mentally ill prisoners in and out of segregation. However, he then admitted that both himself and Associate Commissioner Naglich do have access to the mental-health codes of prisoners in segregation. At the time of his testimony, Dr. Tytell had never run a report to ascertain how many mentally ill prisoners remain to be moved out of segregation, and Naglich had never requested to see such a report.
282

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 283 of 302
could move ten RTU-level prisoners out of segregation and into the RTU over the course of a few weeks suggests that it was well within their ability to prevent seriously mentally ill prisoners from being housed in segregation. They could have taken this action in 2015, after the first meeting on suicides, or in 2016, after the second meeting, rather than waiting until January 2017. By that time, twelve more people, including a plaintiff in this lawsuit, had committed suicide.
D. Ongoing Violation Before granting injunctive relief against a state official for an Eighth Amendment violation, the court must find that the violation is ongoing and continuous in order to fall under the Ex parte Young exception of the Eleventh Amendment bar. 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997) (“An allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young fiction.”). In
283

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 284 of 302
interpreting this requirement, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “the ongoing and continuous requirement merely distinguishes between cases where the relief sought is prospective in nature, i.e., designed to prevent injury that will occur in the future, and cases where relief is retrospective.” Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999). In this case, plaintiffs are seeking prospective injunctive relief to remedy serious inadequacies in the mental-health care system that will continue to put mentally ill prisoners at a substantial risk of serious harm if not corrected. However, during the trial, defendants suggested that in three different areas of mental-health care at issue here, ADOC has started remedying the inadequacies, rendering plaintiffs’ claims as to those areas moot and not suitable for resolution by the court. The court disagrees, and addresses each area in turn.92
92. The interplay between the mootness inquiry and the ongoing-violation requirement under Ex parte Young is somewhat unsettled. However, the Eleventh Circuit, along with the Fifth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, has suggested that a threat of recurrence sufficient to
284

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 285 of 302
First, during the trial, defendants repeatedly
argued that the 2014 partial settlement between the
parties regarding the distribution of razor blades to
prisoners in crisis cells and segregation units has
rendered the issue of dangerous items in crisis cells
moot. However, the settlement deals solely with the
policy of distributing razor blades for shaving to
prisoners in those units, rather than the distinct issue
of keeping dangerous items--including but not limited to
render a claim not moot should also be sufficient for the ongoing-violation requirement. See Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharm. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2011) (treating a dispute regarding whether the plaintiff alleged an ongoing violation as a mootness inquiry); K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427, 439 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the contention that a non-moot claim did not meet the ongoing-violation requirement, because “[that] theory, if accepted, would work an end-run around the voluntary-cessation exception to mootness where a state actor is involved”); Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1047 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[A]t the point that a threatened injury becomes sufficiently imminent and particularized to confer Article III standing, that threat of enforcement also becomes sufficient to satisfy ... Ex parte Young.”)); see also Muhammad v. Crews, No. 4:14CV379-MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3360501, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2016) (Walker, J.) (summarizing the case law). Here, the court addresses both the mootness argument and the ongoing-violation argument, though the analyses overlap.
285

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 286 of 302
razor blades--from being introduced into crisis cells by other means. Multiple employees of ADOC and MHM testified that the presence of dangerous items in crisis cells has been an ongoing problem. Accordingly, the 2014 settlement of the razor-distribution issue does not moot this inquiry or prevent the court from finding an ongoing violation.
Second, defendants argued that the January 2017 interim agreement ‘revamping’ suicide prevention protocols moots the issue of suicide prevention and crisis care in general. However, as discussed earlier, suicide prevention encompasses much more than requiring constant watch for the most acutely suicidal prisoners and ensuring staggered-interval checks of others. In fact, various suicide prevention measures discussed in this case are not covered by the interim agreement, and defendants have not implemented them, despite their knowledge of the risk of harm posed by the current conditions. For example, as this court saw firsthand during its facility tours after the trial, segregation
286

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 287 of 302
cells and some crisis cells continue to have easily
accessible tie-off points, despite the fact that most
suicides happen in segregation cells. 93 Likewise,
despite the recommendation of defendants’ own expert that
a suicide risk-assessment tool be used for all prisoners
at a heightened risk of suicide, not just prisoners
coming through the intake process for the first time,
ADOC has failed to assess prisoners for suicide risks
outside of the intake process.94 When asked by the court
93. MHM’s program director Houser explained that ADOC started looking into fixing the doors on the Holman suicide watch cells (which have bars that can provide a tie-off point) during the last week of December 2016. This was close to a month after the trial had begun, and years after MHM started reporting to ADOC that Holman crisis cells are not safe. These belated actions illustrate that without a court order, ADOC will continue to look the other way despite the glaring deficiencies that put mentally ill prisoners at a substantial risk of serious harm, including death.
94. As discussed earlier, many prisoners who commit suicide while in ADOC custody are not actually on suicide watch at the time; in fact, many reside in general population units without receiving any mental-health treatment. This suggests that meaningful remedial suicide prevention efforts cannot be confined to those already identified as high risk, but also must include identifying those at high risk among the general population.
287

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 288 of 302
why this part of Dr. Patterson’s recommendation is not being followed, Associate Commissioner Naglich answered that she is “not sure where all it’s being used” and “it would be a question better asked of MHM.”95 Naglich Testimony at vol. 3, 231.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that even the limited remedial actions covered by the interim agreement have not been fully implemented. Allegations of noncompliance with the constant-watch procedure resulted in a modification of the interim agreement in order to allow plaintiffs’ counsel frequent monitoring visits to crisis cells. The court also witnessed firsthand during the post-trial site visits that essential parts of suicide-watch procedures were still not being followed: many forms for 15-minute and 30-minute staggered-interval checks of prisoners on suicide watch and mental-health observation were pre-filled and at exact intervals. ADOC’s inability to carry out the terms of the interim
95. The court attributes this lack of knowledge to the Associate Commissioner being overwhelmed due to understaffing.
288

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 289 of 302
agreement even in anticipation of this court’s announced visit illustrates a severe, ongoing dysfunction in the system, a striking indifference by ADOC to a substantial risk of serious harm, or both. Needless to say, the court finds that the inadequacies in ADOC’s suicide-prevention measures are ongoing.
Partly for this reason, the court declines to rely on Commissioner Dunn’s testimony that he intends to abide by the interim agreement’s constant-watch procedures until an expert or the court tells him otherwise. Dunn’s statement regarding his intent to enforce it indefinitely is not reliable given the evidence of noncompliance already shown and Houser’s testimony that the budget and the layout of crisis cells make constant watch unsustainable. In addition, Dunn’s statement of intention is not enforceable in court, especially given that the order approving the interim agreement specifically states that it does not resolve any of the issues raised in trial. See Interim Agreement on Suicide Prevention Measures (doc. no. 1102). In other words, defendants
289

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 290 of 302

have not satisfied the requirements for making a claim

moot by voluntary cessation: the Commissioner’s statement

cannot be said to have “completely and irrevocably

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation,” and

there is a reasonable expectation that the alleged

violation may recur, due to the risk and evidence of

non-compliance and the unenforceability of the

defendant’s statement in court.

See Reich v.

Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 102 F.3d

1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a request for

injunctive relief may become moot if: (1) “it can be said

with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation

that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim

relief or events have completely and irrevocably

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.”).

Third, defendants have also failed to show that the

inquiry into their segregation practices has become moot

or that they have stopped placing seriously mentally ill

290

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 291 of 302
prisoners in segregation.96 As discussed above, evidence suggests that the new coding system as described by Associate Commissioner Naglich has not yet been implemented. ADOC’s failure to address such an obvious risk of harm despite their knowledge of the issue for over two years vividly illustrates that the violation is ongoing and will continue if the defendants are left to their own devices.
E. Ex parte Young Defenses Defendants advance two arguments regarding the Ex parte Young doctrine: first, that the defendants, sued in their official capacities, lack the authority to implement the remedy, and therefore cannot be proper defendants; second, that the remedy would require the State to expend money, and therefore is barred by the
96. Defendants did not make this argument explicitly during the trial, but the court addresses it since Associate Commissioner Naglich’s contention regarding the new coding system could be construed as arguing that plaintiffs’ claim regarding ADOC’s segregation practice is now moot.
291

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 292 of 302
Eleventh Amendment--an argument that this court already rejected in the summary judgment opinion. Neither argument is viable under the Eleventh Amendment case law and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
The case law does not support the argument that the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner were not the proper defendants to sue due to their alleged lack of authority to implement the remedy. The Supreme Court rejected this line of argument in Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986), where the State of Mississippi contended that plaintiffs had not sued officials who could grant the relief requested, which was to remedy the State’s unequal distribution of the benefits from the State’s school land. The Court held that one of the named defendants, the Secretary of State, was a proper defendant because he was responsible under a state statute for “general supervision” of the local school officials’ administration of the lands in question; because of those responsibilities, he could be properly enjoined under Ex parte Young. Id. at 282 & n.14. The
292

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 293 of 302
Court’s holding ensured that if a state official violates the Constitution while carrying out a responsibility created by virtue of the defendant’s office, that defendant may be enjoined under Ex parte Young. See also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157 (explaining that “the fact that the state officer, by virtue of his office, has some connection with the enforcement of the act, is the important and material fact”). The defendant’s authority to implement the remedy was not relevant to the Ex Parte Young analysis.
This circuit has repeatedly held that defendants simply must have “‘have some connection with’ the unconstitutional act or conduct complained of” in order to be proper defendants for an injunctive-relief suit under Ex parte Young. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting and citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157 (internal alterations omitted)). For example, in Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit held that the Secretary of State is a proper defendant in a suit challenging the
293

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 294 of 302
legality of a state election law--even though that official cannot implement the relief of changing the law--since he has “both the power and the duty to ensure that [local boards of elections] comply with Georgia’s election code,” which “‘sufficiently connect[s] him with the duty of enforcement’” for the potentially unconstitutional law. Id. at 1319 (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 161). Conversely, in Summit Med. Assocs., PC v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999), the court found that a state prosecutor is not a proper defendant in a lawsuit challenging a private civil-enforcement statute creating a private cause of action, because a prosecutor has no connection with the enforcement of a civil statute that enables an affected private individual to sue. The application of Ex parte Young in the Eleventh Circuit as well as other circuits is palpably distinct from the defendants’ formulation, which elides the distinction between having “‘some connection’ ... with the conduct complained of,” Luckey, 860 F. 2d at 1015-16 (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
294

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 295 of 302
at 157), and the “authority to remedy the alleged wrongs.” Defs.’ Ex parte Young Trial Br. (doc. no. 1098) at 12.
Applying the proper formulation of Ex parte Young, the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner have the constitutional duty to provide minimally adequate mental-health care as the officials responsible for running the Alabama Department of Corrections and its Office of Health Services; therefore, they have “the ability to commit the unconstitutional act” of failing to provide minimally adequate mental-health care, and the Ex parte Young doctrine applies. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Defendants also seem to argue that any time a state official requires someone else’s cooperation in order to remedy a constitutional violation, that state official’s unconstitutional act is immune from suit. This cannot be. The Ex parte Young case law is replete with examples where a court finds the conduct of a state agency unconstitutional, even when the named defendants in their official capacities cannot remedy the violation alone.
295

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 296 of 302
For example, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Ex parte Young doctrine applied to a lawsuit challenging the adequacy of counsel provided to indigent criminal defendants in the State of Georgia in Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), quoting the “some connection” language from Ex parte Young. Remedying some of the allegations in that case, such as inadequate supervision of court-appointed criminal defense counsel, would have required third parties’ cooperation, including hiring new personnel to supervise defense attorneys and related budget appropriations--just as potential remedies proposed by the parties in this case might require an additional budget appropriation and the recruitment of new personnel. In other words, the fact that the named defendants in their official capacities may need third parties’ cooperation to carry out some of the potential remedies does not bar Ex parte Young’s applicability, because the doctrine only requires “some connection” between the alleged wrongdoing and the officials’ responsibility.
296

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 297 of 302
Defendants’ second argument--that the remedy would require state expenditures in violation of the Eleventh Amendment--is equally unavailing. Defendants argue that because the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner do not have the authority to appropriate more money to their own budget, they are immune from this lawsuit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an order requiring expenditure of state funds if it is ancillary to injunctive relief for an ongoing violation. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974), the Supreme Court noted that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits that had “fiscal consequences to state treasuries” that “were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature.” The Court in Edelman also observed that having to spend more money from the state treasury because the State needs to conform its conduct to the court order is an “ancillary effect” that is “a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young.”
297

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 298 of 302
Id. at 668. The Court reiterated this principle in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977), upholding a district court’s order requiring the State defendants to pay one-half of the additional costs attributable to a remedial education scheme to support school desegregation. In both of these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that the State must pay for ancillary costs of prospective, injunctive relief, regardless of whether the named defendants in their official capacities--who were standing in for the State based on the Ex parte Young fiction--had the ability to appropriate more money to their own budget. See also Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 772 F.3d 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that compliance with the terms of prospective injunctive relief will often necessitate the expenditure of state funds.”) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)). In fact, rather than precluding relief, courts have found inadequate funding to be a basis for finding of deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir. 1983).
298

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 299 of 302
In sum, defendants are not immunized from liability arising from ongoing constitutional violations simply because they lack financial resources or the authority to mandate certain specific measures that might remedy the violation. On the contrary, the Ex parte Young doctrine allows this court to find liability and ensure that the prison system provides minimally adequate mental-health care.
VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, the court holds that the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections and the Associate Commissioner of Health Services, in their official capacities, are violating the Eighth Amendment rights of the plaintiff class and of plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program’s constituents with serious mental-health needs who are in ADOC custody. Simply put, ADOC’s mental-health care is horrendously inadequate. Based on the abundant evidence presented in support of the Eighth Amendment claim, the court
299

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 300 of 302
summarizes its factual findings in the following roadmap, identifying the contributing factors to the inadequacies found in ADOC’s mental-health care system:
(1) Failing to identify prisoners with serious mental-health needs and to classify their needs properly;
(2) Failing to provide individualized treatment plans to prisoners with serious mental-health needs;
(3) Failing to provide psychotherapy by qualified and properly supervised mental-health staff and with adequate frequency and sound confidentiality;
(4) Providing insufficient out-of-cell time and treatment to those who need residential treatment; and failing to provide hospital-level care to those who need it;
(5) Failing to identify suicide risks adequately and providing inadequate treatment and monitoring to those who are suicidal, engaging in self-harm, or otherwise undergoing a mental-health crisis;
300

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 301 of 302
(6) Imposing disciplinary sanctions on mentally ill prisoners for symptoms of their mental illness, and imposing disciplinary sanctions without regard for the impact of sanctions on prisoners’ mental health;
(7) Placing seriously mentally ill prisoners in segregation without extenuating circumstances and for prolonged periods of time;97 placing prisoners with serious mental-health needs in segregation without adequate consideration of the impact of segregation on mental health; and providing inadequate treatment and monitoring in segregation.
The court further finds that persistent and severe shortages of mental-health staff and correctional staff, combined with chronic and significant overcrowding, are the overarching issues that permeate each of the above-identified contributing factors of inadequate mental-health care.
97. The court recognizes that ‘extenuating circumstances’ and ‘prolonged periods of time’ are somewhat ambiguous terms but leaves them to be defined during the remedy phase with the parties’ input.
301

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM Document 1285 Filed 06/27/17 Page 302 of 302
* * * Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the court and the parties will meet to discuss a remedy. The court emphasizes that given the severity and urgency of the need for mental-health care explained in this opinion, the proposed relief must be both immediate and long term. No partial final judgment shall issue at this time as to the claim resolved in this entry. DONE, this the 27th day of June, 2017.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 1 of 25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al.,

)

)

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.:

)

2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM

)

)

)

)

Defendants.

CONSENT DECREE CONCERNING MENTAL HEALTH CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND §504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, AND RESOLVING THE
PHASE 2A TRIAL OF THESE PROCEEDINGS

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 2 of 25
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................3 II. STATEMENT OF PARTIES, PURPOSE AND INTENT...............................................4 III. PRELIMINARY AND FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT ....7 IV. DEFINITIONS AND STIPULATIONS...........................................................................8 V. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS.....................................................................................12
1. Introduction...............................................................................................................12 2. Phase 1 Consent Decree............................................................................................12 3. Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training....................................................................13 4. Frequency of Provision of Programming..................................................................13 5. Transfer of Inmates While They are Enrolled in the Program..................................14 6. Adaptive Behavior/Life Skill Programming Components........................................15 VI. NOTICE ..........................................................................................................................17 VII. MONITORING...............................................................................................................18 VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS............................................................................19 IX. RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ..................................19 X. TERMINATION.............................................................................................................20 XI. AMENDMENTS ............................................................................................................21 XII. FUNDING.......................................................................................................................22 XIII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES.......................................................................22 XIV. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS .......................................................................................24

246932.7

Page 2 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 3 of 25
I. INTRODUCTION 1. On June 17, 2014, the individually named plaintiffs and the Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program (“ADAP”) filed the instant lawsuit (the “Lawsuit”) challenging, among other things, the compliance of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) with the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12111, et seq., including the ADA Amendment Acts of 2008, 42 USC 12001 et seq., (collectively, the “ADA”) and §504 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC § 701, et seq. (“Rehabilitation Act”) (the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are jointly referred to herein as the “Acts.”)
2. Certain of the Plaintiffs’ claims arising under the Acts were resolved, on a classwide basis, by order of September 9, 2016. See “Phase 1 Final Settlement Approval and Order” (doc. no. 727) (“Final Order.”) However, specifically excluded from and not resolved by the Final Order were any claims under the Acts of any current of future Inmate with a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) that relates solely to or arises solely from mental disease, illness, or defect. (doc. no. 727 at 114.) The Court entered a “Consent Decree Concerning Claims Arising Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Resolving the Phase 1 Trial of These Proceedings” (doc. no. 728) (“Phase 1 Consent Decree”) upon the entry of the Final Order.
3. Since the entry of the Final Order and Phase 1 Consent Decree, the Parties have worked to resolve the remaining claims brought by Plaintiffs under the Acts. The Parties believe that they have reached such a resolution and that, in order to avoid additional protracted, costly and uncertain litigation, it is in their respective best interests to resolve the remaining, unresolved issues arising under the Acts.

246932.7

Page 3 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 4 of 25
4. Accordingly, the Parties, by and through their respective counsel, jointly stipulate and agree to the following provisions to resolve those pending claims brought by Plaintiffs under the Acts that were not resolved by the Final Order and Phase 1 Consent Decree. II. STATEMENT OF PARTIES, PURPOSE, AND INTENT
1. Named defendant ADOC is the agency of the State of Alabama in charge of the state-owned and operated prisons and work release facilities in Alabama that currently or may in the future have physical custody of the individually named plaintiffs.
2. The individually named plaintiffs are currently, or may in the future be, in the physical custody of ADOC.
3. Plaintiff ADAP is the duly authorized protection and advocacy agency in the State of Alabama. It has asserted its associational standing to bring claims on behalf of current and future inmates within the physical custody of ADOC who have disabilities relating to or arising from mental disease, illness or defect.
4. The individually named plaintiffs seek class certification of their remaining, unresolved claims asserted in this Lawsuit under the Acts. As part of this agreed resolution of the claims, ADOC consents to the certification, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, of a class whose members (the “Class”) are defined as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or defect.” ADOC does not consent to class certification for any purpose other than the settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims under the Acts.
5. The individually named plaintiffs, the Class, and ADAP are collectively referred to herein as “Plaintiffs.”
6. The Plaintiffs and ADOC are collectively referred to as the “Parties.”

246932.7

Page 4 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 5 of 25
7. The purpose of this “Settlement Agreement Concerning Mental Health Claims Arising Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973” (“ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement”) is to settle and resolve all issues brought by Plaintiffs under the Acts that were not resolved by the Final Order (doc. no. 727) and Phase 1 Consent Decree (doc. no. 728) and that have not been dismissed prior to the date of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. It is the intent of the Parties by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement to resolve and settle all remaining claims brought in this Lawsuit under the Acts, specifically those raised in Count 4 of the Complaint, as amended, that have not heretofore been settled or dismissed.
8. The Parties may not use this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement for any purpose in this Lawsuit except as evidence of what has or has not been resolved by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.
9. Nothing in this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will be construed as an admission by ADOC of the violation of any law. To the contrary, ADOC denies every material allegation of the Complaint, as amended, and denies any liability to the Plaintiffs. This ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement does not constitute, and will not be construed as, an admission or evidence of any act of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of any Inmate, or of any violation of the Acts.
10. The Parties stipulate that nothing in this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will be used for any purpose outside of this Lawsuit or against any named Defendant in any other litigation that has been or may be filed against any named Defendant. Nothing in this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will be construed to require ADOC to do more than what is required

246932.7

Page 5 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 6 of 25
by the Acts, court decisions applying or interpreting the Acts, or rules and regulations interpreting the Acts.
11. The Parties believe that this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to protect the interests of all Parties concerning the issues contained herein. The Parties jointly file this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement with the Court and, as discussed more fully below, ask that the Court enter a temporary restraining order enforcing the Substantive Provisions of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement and thereafter issue an order directing notice to the Class, setting an objection period, and setting a fairness hearing for preliminary approval, conduct a fairness hearing, and that the Court then approve the Class and the settlement as final.
12. However, and in the event that this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement is not approved by the Court such that it settles and resolves, on a class basis, all remaining issues in this Lawsuit to be tried under the Acts, the Parties retain all of their pre-settlement litigation rights and defenses, including ADOC’s right to petition for interlocutory review of any order granting class certification. Additionally, and in the event that this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement is not approved by the Court such that it settles and resolves, on a class basis, all remaining issues in this Lawsuit to be tried under the Acts, any order entered by the Court to enforce any provision of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement (including, but not limited to, any temporary restraining order) shall be immediately dissolved and withdrawn and the Parties shall return to the status quo ante in the Lawsuit as if the Parties had not entered into this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. Any discussions, offers, or negotiations associated with this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will not be discoverable or offered into evidence or used in the Lawsuit or any other action or proceeding for any purpose, without

246932.7

Page 6 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 7 of 25
prejudice to Plaintiffs’ right to seek class certification, and ADOC’s right to oppose class certification. In such event, all Parties will stand in the same position as if this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement had not been negotiated, made or filed with the Court and the Court had not entered any temporary restraining order to enforce all or any portion of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. III. PRELIMINARY AND FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
1. Entry of Temporary Restraining Order. At the time of execution of this Agreement, some of the Parties are engaged in the trial of that portion of this Lawsuit denominated as Phase 2A. The Parties recognize that the trial of Phase 2A likely prevents them and the Court from completing, in an expeditious manner, the necessary preliminary and final approval filings, hearings and the like concerning this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the Parties consent to the entry of a Temporary Restraining Order that requires the implementation of the requirements Section V. “Substantive Provisions” of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. Within seven (7) days after all necessary signatories have executed this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, the Parties will submit the same to the Court and will jointly request the Temporary Restraining Order described above.
2. Preliminary Approval. No later than fourteen (14) days following the completion of testimony in the Phase 2A trial, the Parties will jointly submit this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement to the Court for preliminary approval, along with a proposed order for preliminary approval, a schedule for notice, proposed notices of preliminary approval, a schedule for an objection period, and a request for a fairness hearing under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

246932.7

Page 7 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 8 of 25

3. Final Approval. Within sixty (30) days of Preliminary Approval of the ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, the Parties will file with the Court any additional agreement or agreements, which will include notice provisions, a proposed Final Approval Order, and comply with all provisions of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so that the Court may, if it deems appropriate, grant final approval to this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. IV. DEFINITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
1. Phase 1 Consent Decree Definitions Adopted. Unless expressly stated herein, all terms used in this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement have the same definitions identified and used in the Phase 1 Consent Decree, all of which are adopted as if set out herein in full.
2. Defendant Naglich. The Parties stipulate that there are no individual or class claims, including putative class claims, under the Acts asserted against Defendant Ruth Naglich, named in her official capacity as Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections.
3. Official Capacity Defendant. Jefferson Dunn, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, is currently a named defendant in this Lawsuit with respect to the claims asserted under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and is, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, a party to the Phase 1 Consent Decree. However, he is not a named defendant with respect to the remaining claims raised in this Lawsuit under the Acts. To avoid certain possible issues with this proposed ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement that resolves all remaining claims asserted in this Lawsuit under the Acts, specifically, those claims asserted in Count 4 of the Complaint, as amended, it is hereby agreed:
(a) That, without the necessity of a separate amendment to the Complaint, Commissioner Dunn is, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama

246932.7

Page 8 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 9 of 25
Department of Corrections, added (1) as a defendant to the claims addressed in this proposed ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement and (2) as a named party to this proposed ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.
(b) That, should this proposed ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement not be approved by the Court, or any approval be later withdrawn or overturned, this provision shall be of no force or effect and the status quo ante restored with respect to Commissioner Dunn’s party status.
4. PLRA. (a) The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that, in any
civil action in which a court orders prospective relief, such prospective relief shall be terminable on motion of any party two (2) years after it is ordered. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b).
(b) The Parties agree that, for purposes of settling all remaining claims in Count 4 of the Complaint, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) does not require this Court to terminate prospective injunctive relief after two (2) years. Instead, Section 3626(b) merely allows a party to move to have such relief terminated.
(c) ADOC stipulates and agrees that its right to seek termination under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) may be waived by consent or agreement. See Depriest v. Walnut Grove Corr. Auth., No. 3:10-CV-663-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL 3795020, at *6 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2015) (“Nothing about the PLRA prohibits parties from agreeing to termination conditions different than those contained in the PLRA.”). This stipulation is consistent with the plain text of the PLRA. Section 3626(c) governs the approval of consent decrees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c). Subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 3626 requires that any consent decree must comply with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). That is, the prospective relief ordered in a consent decree must be narrowly drawn,

246932.7

Page 9 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 10 of 25
extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and must be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1) (requiring that any consent decree must satisfy the requirements of Section 3626(a).) Nothing in Sections 3626(a) or (c) prevents the Parties from agreeing to limit or alter their rights under Section 3626(b).
(d) Accordingly, and in consideration of the settlement of the claims resolved by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, ADOC agrees that it will not seek to terminate, under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), the prospective injunction mandated by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement until at least sixty (60) months after the date of the entry of the Phase 1 Consent Decree. Put another way, ADOC hereby waives its right to terminate the prospective injunctive relief mandated by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement until at least 60 months after the date of entry of the Phase 1 Consent Decree.
(e) The Parties stipulate and agree that this is a narrow and limited waiver that shall only apply to the prospective, injunctive relief ordered as part of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. The waiver is necessary due to the unique factual circumstances of this case. Specifically, the remedial plan set forth in this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will take more than two (2) years to implement, which would be beyond the two (2)year sunset provision of the PLRA.
(f) ADOC acknowledges and agrees that it may seek termination under Section 3626(b) between sixty (60) months and seventy-two (72) months after the date of entry of the Phase 1 Consent Decree. Upon a finding that ADOC has been in substantial compliance with this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement for the twelve (12) months before the motion to terminate is filed, this Court shall immediately terminate any prospective relief.

246932.7

Page 10 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 11 of 25
(g) ADOC acknowledges and agrees that, unless this Court makes the specific findings required by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3), the prospective relief required by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will terminate seventy-two (72) months after the date of entry of the Phase 1 Consent Decree.
(h) The Parties further stipulate and agree that any motion to terminate the prospective, injunctive relief ordered or agreed upon by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement must be heard by the Court and may not be heard or decided by the arbitrator described in the Phase 1 Consent Decree.
(i) This stipulation is consistent with the language of the PLRA. Section 3626(b)(3) states that, upon a motion to terminate, prospective, injunctive relief “shall not [immediately] terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) (emphasis added).
(j) For the purposes of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, the Parties interpret this provision as requiring the Court to hear any motion to terminate brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3626.
(k) Further, the Phase 1 Consent Decree requires that “If, upon request for termination, the Court concludes that the ADOC is in Substantial Compliance with all terms and conditions of this Amended Agreement, then the Court may terminate jurisdiction of the portion or portions of this case subject to this Amended Agreement.” (Doc. 518 at 73) (emphasis added). The Parties expressly adopt this requirement as part of this ADA Mental Health Settlement

246932.7

Page 11 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 12 of 25
Agreement. Thus, the Parties have not delegated the decision on the request for termination to the arbitrator and agree that it would be decided by this Court.
5. Dismissed Claim. No provision of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement applies, or is intended to apply, to the identification, tracking and accommodation of any intellectual disability of any current or future Inmate in the custody of ADOC under a death sentence. Any such claim or claims was or were specifically excluded from the Phase 1 Consent Decree and thereafter dismissed from this Lawsuit, without prejudice, on joint motion of the parties on November 4, 2016. See doc. nos. 727, 911 and 925. The Parties agree that the intent of this provision is to remove from the resolution of the claims Plaintiffs have asserted under the Acts any claim concerning the identification, tracking and accommodation of any intellectual disability of any current or future Inmate in the custody of ADOC under a death sentence and does not allow for, create or provide any new or additional manner or method by which any such inmate could challenge his or her death sentence. V. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
1. Introduction. The Parties have jointly developed and agreed upon certain provisions described below that are designed to provide for care, services, accommodations, programs, and activities for Inmates consistent with the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement and the Acts. These provisions are intended to ensure that Inmates are not, on the basis of disability, exposed to substantial harm and that Inmates are not, on the basis of disability, subject to discrimination.
2. Phase 1 Consent Decree. The provisions of that portion of the Phase 1 Consent Decree (doc. no. 728) entitled V. “Substantive Provisions” are adopted as of set forth herein at length and apply to the claims resolved and settled by this ADA Mental Health Settlement

246932.7

Page 12 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 13 of 25
Agreement. The Parties further agree that this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement applies the provisions of the Phase 1 Consent Decree to the class of Inmates defined by Section II. 4. of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement unless expressly indicated otherwise herein.
3. Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training. ADOC agrees to provide Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training for the following individuals who are in ADOC’s physical custody for a period of no less than 181 consecutive calendar days:
(a) Any Inmate who is diagnosed as having an Intellectual Disability pursuant to the testing protocol described in the Phase 1 Consent Decree; or
(b) Any Inmate who meets the IQ prong and the Adaptive Behavior prong as defined under the Phase I Consent Decree, but who does not meet the “age of onset” requirement of the DSM-V. This shall include Inmates who have developed a medical condition which substantially affects mental cognition and adaptive skills consistent with the standard set forth under the Phase 1 Consent Decree and whose primary care physician’s assessment concludes that such programming will be beneficial to the Inmate. In that instance, the Inmate’s primary care physician will prescribe programming specific to the Inmate’s needs and abilities; or
(c) Any other Inmate whom ADOC determines would substantially benefit from such training.
4. Frequency of Provision of Programming. (a) Within six (6) months of identification of an Inmate meeting any of
the above criteria, ADOC shall enroll an Inmate meeting the criteria described above into the “Adaptive Behavior/Life Skills Training Program” (the “Program”) as described herein. All reasonable and necessary accommodations will be afforded such Inmate consistent with the terms of the Phase 1 Consent Decree and the Acts. Routinely, all such topics contained within the

246932.7

Page 13 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 14 of 25
Program shall be completed within six (6) calendar months of enrollment. The time for completion may be extended where a specific Inmate has such profound limitations such that he or she cannot participate in the Program at the same pace as other Inmates within the Program. If such were to occur, ADOC will evaluate and modify the Program on an individual basis for such Inmate to ensure that such Inmate is able to receive the fundamental portions of the information.
(b) The Program will be provided to Inmates regardless of their security classification. The Program may be provided by ADOC Psychological Associates or similarly situated and trained individuals employed by ADOC or any third party contractor (collectively or individually, the “Instructor”). The number of Inmates enrolled in a particular ADOC facility’s Program will be small enough to ensure meaningful participation by affected Inmates, but in no event shall be greater than twenty (20) Inmates per class.
(c) Thereafter, every other year, any such Inmates who remain within ADOC’s physical custody shall undergo a refresher class covering the topics in the Program. The refresher course may be a repeat of the entire Program that had been provided (updated as appropriate) or an abbreviated version of such program so long as the abbreviated version returns the Inmate to the level of functioning he or she had attained at the completion of the initial Program.
5. Transfer of Inmates While They are Enrolled in the Program. (a) ADOC will attempt to minimize the transfer of Inmates while they
are actively participating in the Program. If ADOC determines that an Inmate needs to be transferred to another ADOC facility while the Inmate is enrolled in the Program, then the sending institution will, within seven (7) working days of transfer, discuss in person, telephonically, or by

246932.7

Page 14 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 15 of 25
email, with the receiving institution the current status, issues, and mental health needs of the transferring Inmate.
(b) Inmates will be assigned a Case Manager at their assigned institution. This person’s responsibility will be to evaluate and review what Program courses, if any, the Inmate has not completed. The Case Manager will enroll the Inmate into any Program courses the Inmate has not completed. The Case Manager will meet with the Inmate a minimum of once per year to assess remedial needs.
(c) Transfer of an Inmate will not constitute a reason, on its own, for a failure to complete the Program within the allotted six (6) month period as described herein.
6. Adaptive Behavior/Life Skill Programming Components. (a) The initial Program shall be at least twenty-two (22) hours in total
duration. Inmates will be provided instruction concerning the topics included within the Program in classes not to exceed ninety (90) minutes each. The Instructor of a class must assess whether participating Inmates have fully understood the materials presented in that class. If an Inmate is unable to understand and retain the information provided during a class, appropriate steps must be taken to solve this issue, to include providing the Inmate with additional classes. Any additional class required as a result shall not count against the twenty-two (22) hour period.
(b) The following general topics and areas must be included within the Program:
(i) Decision Making. The Program must include a topic to teach Inmates to how to make good decisions, to identify skills and strategies to be employed in making such decisions, the existence, identity, and method to secure

246932.7

Page 15 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 16 of 25
assistance when appropriate in making good decisions. The topic will cover how to avoid becoming a victim or being inappropriately influenced by other Inmates.
(ii) Stress Management. The Program will address this topic in order to alleviate and minimize stress within the prison context. This topic will be designed specifically for Inmates with limited cognitive abilities.
(iii) Communication Skill Building. This topic will consist of direct training regarding each method by which an Inmate may secure an accommodation, medical and mental health care, access to programming to include educational, vocational, and rehabilitative, other programming such as recreational, religious, and leisure (such as commissary). It also will include training on how an Inmate can stay informed about current regulations and any changes within the facility where the Inmate is housed. This topic must include a discussion of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) and ADOC procedures for notifying the ADOC of a violation.
(iv) Risk Taking Consequences. This topic shall consist of modules outlining various common forms of risk taking activities and a practical discussion of the consequences of such actions. It shall include a discussion of drug usage, sexual activity, and violation of facility rules and regulations.
(v) Self Help. This topic shall include a discussion of available methods by which an Inmate may develop necessary skills to become an independent self-advocate.
(vi) Accessing Prison Services. This topic should be taught in conjunction with “Communication Skill Building,” Section V.5(b)(iii), supra, and

246932.7

Page 16 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 17 of 25
will consist of an overview of all available prison services both within the ADOC system generally and within the prison in which the Inmate is housed and how to access such available services.
(vii) Hygiene. This topic is designed to teach basic hygiene and the medical and social reasons for proper hygiene. Additional subtopics will address healthy living, such as diet, diabetic issues, and weight.
(viii) Self-Direction. This topic shall include a discussion and strategy designed to encourage an Inmate to make positive decisions and positively seek educational, vocational, and rehabilitative programming. The programming shall actively encourage Inmates to make the best use of their time, and to actively seek appropriate outlets, rather than merely pass the time, while within the custody of ADOC.
(ix) Prison Rules. This topic shall include an in-depth review of prison rules to ensure than Inmates are aware of the existence and consequence for violation prison rules and regulations. VI. NOTICE 1. ADOC will post the provisions of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement in each institution’s law library, or if there is no law library, the area where other Inmate information is made available in its prison and work release facilities. ADOC will amend inmate handbooks to include the provisions of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. The substance of what will be posted in the libraries and in the inmate handbooks will be drafted by ADOC and Plaintiffs jointly. All such documents will be available in alternative formats to include large print and Braille.

246932.7

Page 17 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 18 of 25
VII. MONITORING 1. The Parties agree that monitoring of ADOC’s compliance with the terms of this
ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement is necessary and that ADAP will serve as the monitor. ADOC will allow ADAP reasonable access to facilities, documents, staff, procedures, logs, records, Inmates, and other similar informational sources in order to ensure that compliance. ADAP will be entitled to conduct interviews with Inmates and staff to assess compliance with the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.
2. ADAP agrees to be bound by any Protective or Court Orders entered in this Lawsuit to protect the confidentiality of Inmate records and sensitive security information.
3. ADAP will prepare a written report on ADOC’s efforts to meet the requirements of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement and any plan to effectuate its terms at least quarterly. Each report will indicate all areas in which the ADOC is, or is not, in Substantial Compliance. Such report will be provided to ADOC and all counsel of record. If ADAP believes that ADOC is not in Substantial Compliance with the terms and provisions of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement and any plan to effectuate its terms, ADAP will provide written recommendations of actions that it believes necessary to achieve Substantial Compliance with the terms of the provision or provisions. ADOC will then have twenty (20) days to provide written comments, objections, or remedial action plans in response. The Parties will meet and confer to attempt to address deficiencies identified by ADAP.
4. Monitoring will continue for a period consistent with the time period for monitoring expressed in the “Monitoring” provision of section VI. of the Phase 1 Consent Decree, regardless of whether ADOC does or does not build new prisons. In the event that ADOC has undertaken to

246932.7

Page 18 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 19 of 25
build new prisons, but has not completed that construction as of January 1, 2020, monitoring will continue until two (2) years after the completion of the prisons.
5. If ADAP finds evidence of any violation of law which does not involve the subject matter of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, it is obligated to report that to the ADOC General Counsel, or her designee. VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
1. The Parties agree to resolve disputes arising under this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement through the “Dispute Resolution Process” outlined in section VII., “Dispute Resolution Process” of the Phase 1 Consent Decree, as clarified by certain stipulations and agreements set forth in doc. nos. 518, 563, 575, 638, and 696, all approved by the Court in the Final Order, except for disputes concerning the termination of any consent decree that may be entered in this matter discussed in Section IV.4 of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, supra. IX. RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT
1. The Parties consent to the reservation and exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over disputes between the Parties and among the Parties arising out of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.
2. For purposes of jurisdiction and enforcement of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement only, the Parties jointly request the Court to find that the same satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) in that it is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the federal rights of the Plaintiffs.

246932.7

Page 19 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 20 of 25
3. The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, once approved, until the agreement is terminated.
4. This ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement may be enforced only by the Parties hereto. Nothing contained in this agreement is intended, or will be construed, to evidence an intention to confer any right or remedy upon any person other than the Parties hereto. X. TERMINATION
1. ADOC may seek a termination of its obligations under this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement upon a finding that it is in Substantial Compliance with its terms and has maintained Substantial Compliance for at least twelve (12) consecutive months. ADOC may not obtain a termination of its obligations under this agreement until five (5) years following the date of the Final Order.
2. If, upon request for termination, the Court concludes that the ADOC is in Substantial Compliance with all terms and conditions of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, then the Court may terminate jurisdiction of the portion or portions of this case subject to this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.
3. The Parties will work in good faith to achieve Substantial Compliance with all terms and conditions of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement within the its expressed time parameters. If Plaintiffs believe that ADOC is not in or progressing toward Substantial Compliance with the terms and conditions of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs may move for an order extending jurisdiction over this matter beyond the maximum time period contemplated herein. To extend jurisdiction, Plaintiffs will be required to establish by substantial evidence and the Court will expressly find that ADOC is not in Substantial Compliance with this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement or any subsequent Order entered by the Court.

246932.7

Page 20 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 21 of 25
XI. AMENDMENTS 1. By mutual agreement, the Parties may change terms of this ADA Mental Health
Settlement Agreement (except for the Monitoring provisions expressed herein), including but not limited to the timetables for taking specific actions, provided that such modifications are memorialized in writing, signed by the Parties or through their counsel, and approved by the Court.
2. ADOC may not make any substantial changes to any policy, procedure, regulation, or rule that conflicts with the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. ADOC will supply or make available to Plaintiffs’ counsel any policies, procedures, regulations, or rules implementing the provisions of this agreement for their review and comment.
3. The Alabama Prison Transformation Initiative (“APTI”) is expected to be considered during or before the 2017 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature. In the event the Alabama Legislature passes the APTI on or before the conclusion of the 2017 Regular Session of Alabama Legislature such that it has authorized bonding authority for the construction of new prison facilities, the Parties agree to meet and re-evaluate the deadlines discussed herein and in the Phase 1 Consent Decree. If the Parties cannot agree upon amended or supplemental deadlines for these provisions, based on the construction of new facilities authorized by the APTI, the Parties will submit those issues to the “Dispute Resolution Process” discussed in the Phase 1 Consent Decree.
4. ADOC may not approve any changes in policy, procedure, regulation, or rule by its Medical and/or Mental Health provider that conflicts with the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. XII. FUNDING

246932.7

Page 21 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 22 of 25
1. The Parties acknowledge that implementation of the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement and any plan necessary to effectuate its terms are subject to the availability and receipt of appropriated funds.
2. The Parties further acknowledge that the lack of funding does not preclude the Court from entering an Order to achieve compliance with this agreement that comports with the applicable provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, and with other applicable law, provided that ADOC reserves the right to assert that the lack of funding should be taken into account in any remedial order.
3. ADOC agrees to make all possible good faith efforts to seek all necessary funding to implement the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree as to whether there is sufficient funding to implement this agreement, the Parties will meet and confer, and if necessary, consult with the Court. In the event that the Parties remain unable to agree, any of the Parties may seek assistance of the Court. XIII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES
1. Attorney Fees and expenses. ADOC agrees to pay attorneys’ fees and associated costs to counsel for the Plaintiffs in the total amount of $250,000.00. This sum is in addition to, and in supplement of, those sums ADOC has paid or agreed to pay to Plaintiffs’ counsel in the Phase 1 Consent Decree. Plaintiffs agree that ADOC may pay this sum on or before thirty (30) days of the Court’s final approval of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. Such payments will be remitted to the law firm of Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse. Interest on such sums is waived. ADOC acknowledges that counsel for Plaintiffs have been involved in the prosecution of other claims in this case beyond those resolved by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. ADOC acknowledges that payment of the above sum is for work and

246932.7

Page 22 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 23 of 25
associated costs on the claims resolved herein and that Plaintiffs’ counsel reserve the right to seek additional attorneys’ fees and costs for claims not addressed by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.
2. Monitoring fees and expenses. The fee amounts to be paid to Plaintiffs’ counsel for monitoring services related to obligations created by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will be capped at, and not exceed, a total of the following amounts that are in addition to those expressed in the Phase 1 Consent Decree:
a. Year One: $12,000.00 b. Year Two: $12,000.00 c. Year Three: $12,000.00 d. Year Four: $12,000.00 e. Year Five: $12,000.00 f. Year Six: $12,000.00 For purposes of describing the above periods, the time commences upon final approval of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement by the Court. Plaintiffs’ counsel agrees that they will not seek nor petition the Court for an award of fees and expenses for monitoring services related to the obligations created by this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement greater than the above sums. Plaintiffs’ counsel will provide ADOC itemized hours expended for these monitoring services on a quarterly basis. ADOC agrees to pay an hourly rate of $195.00 for services rendered in the monitoring process. In the event of any dispute concerning the sums billed or to be paid for monitoring services, the Parties will meet and confer and attempt to agree upon payment for monitoring services rendered. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree upon the reasonable

246932.7

Page 23 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 24 of 25

number of hours expended, either party may seek assistance of the arbitrator or the Court if the Parties remain unable to agree.
3. The annual caps and hourly rates described herein do not apply to: (a) Plaintiffs’ motions to enforce the terms of this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement; and (b) Plaintiffs’ opposition to any motions filed by ADOC arising out of this agreement. No fees and expenses will be awarded to Plaintiffs’ counsel for such motions or oppositions unless the Court finds: (a) that the motion or opposition was necessary to enforce substantial rights under the Acts; and (b) that Plaintiffs attempted to resolve the matter and or narrow the issues as much as possible by meeting and conferring with ADOC, taking full opportunity of recourse to the mediation process before presenting the issues to the Court. Plaintiffs’ counsel agree that they may not seek attorneys’ fees and costs totaling more than $200,000 per year on motions to enforce the terms of the Phase 1 Consent Decree and this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement. XIV. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
1. This ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement constitutes the entire agreement among the Parties as to all claims contained herein. Each party represents that it has full legal authority to enter into and execute this ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement.
2. This ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement may not be altered or amended, except in writing signed by all Parties or their representatives.
3. This ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement will be binding on all successors, assigns, employees, agents, and all other working on behalf of Plaintiffs and ADOC.
4. This ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement may be executed in counterparts and such counterparts will be provided to all Parties immediately upon execution.
* * *

246932.7

Page 24 of 25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1291 Filed 06/28/17 Page 25 of 25
It is ORDERED that the defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with them, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(B) & (C), are enjoined and restrained from failing to comply with all of the above provisions.
DONE, this the 28th day of June, 2017. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

246932.7

Page 25 of 25

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 1 of 81

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ADA FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL OPINION I. INTRODUCTION
The individual plaintiffs in Phase 2A of this lawsuit are prisoners with serious mental illnesses in the custody of the defendants, the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC or the Department) and its Commissioner, Jefferson Dunn. The Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Alabama’s protection and advocacy organization for people with disabilities, is also a plaintiff.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 2 of 81
In this phase, the plaintiffs assert the claim that the Department is in violation of two statutes: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794. See Fifth Amended Complaint (doc. no. 805). For ease of reference, the court will refer to both statutes as the ADA. The plaintiffs claim that systemic deficiencies within the Department result in discrimination against, and the Department’s failure to accommodate, prisoners with mental disabilities. These deficiencies include the failure to (1) implement a system for identifying prisoners with disabilities; (2) institute a system for receiving accommodation requests and a grievance procedure for challenging denied accommodations; (3) appoint ADA coordinators; (4) adequately train personnel regarding the requirements of the ADA; (5) develop an ADA transition plan and corresponding policies and procedures; (6) remove architectural barriers affecting prisoners with
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 3 of 81

disabilities; (7) provide reasonable accommodations,

such as auxiliary and visual aids and services, to

those with disabilities; and (8) enable those with

disabilities to access various types of programming and

services.

The plaintiffs seek injunctive and

declaratory relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Following months

of negotiations, the parties have settled these

contentions.

This case has twice been bifurcated for

administrative convenience of the court and the

parties. In September 2015, this case was divided into

two distinct phases, with the first phase, Phase 1,

involving ADA claims unrelated to mental health and the

second phase involving all other claims. Then, in

September 2016, Phase 2 of this case was further

bifurcated into Phase 2A, encompassing an Eighth

Amendment claim related to the treatment of prisoners

with mental illness, involuntary-medication claims, and

an ADA claim of prisoners with only mental

3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 4 of 81
disabilities; and Phase 2B, involving Eighth Amendment claims related to medical and dental care.
The parties reached a settlement of the plaintiffs’ Phase 1 ADA claims for prisoners with physical disabilities. After an exhaustive approval process, the court approved the Phase 1 settlement agreement, see Dunn v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652 (M.D. Ala. 2016), which resulted in a consent decree.
During the Phase 2A trial, the parties, with the able assistance of United States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott of the United States District Court for Northern District of Alabama, reached a settlement of the remainder of the plaintiffs’ ADA claims: the Phase 2A ADA claim now before the court concerning prisoners with only mental disabilities. After a hearing, the court preliminarily approved the proposed Phase 2A ADA settlement agreement. In its preliminary approval order, the court provisionally certified a settlement class and established a procedure for providing putative class members with notice of the agreement and
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 5 of 81
an opportunity to object and submit comments on the agreement’s fairness.
After receiving written comments from putative class members, the court held three days of fairness hearings. During the first two days, the court heard from a representative group of putative class members--selected by the court with the input of the parties--who had submitted comments on the proposed agreement. During the third day, counsel for the parties responded to various comments made by various witnesses and other questions raised by the court. Additionally, the court considered affidavits, submitted by ADAP, from experts in the mental-health field opining on the adequacy, fairness, and reasonableness of the agreement.
After the hearing, the court entered an order granting final approval of the proposed phase 2A ADA settlement agreement and granted the parties’ request that their settlement agreement be entered as a consent decree. See Phase 2A ADA Final Settlement Approval
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 6 of 81
Order (doc. no. 1290). This opinion explains the court’s reasons for doing so.
II. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT Broadly speaking, the agreement does two things: (1) it applies the provisions of the Phase 1 ADA settlement agreement to prisoners with only mental disabilities; and (2) it requires the Department to administer an adaptive-behavior and life-skills course for mentally disabled inmates. The settlement agreement applies the substantive provisions of the Phase 1 ADA settlement to prisoners with only mental disabilities. These include, most relevantly, requirements that the Department: conduct a self-assessment to identify necessary changes to policies concerning disabled prisoners’ ability to communicate and access programs, and create a transition plan, listing changes to be made and deadlines for those changes; provide reasonable accommodations for disabled prisoners to access the
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 7 of 81
programs offered by the Department; make individualized assessments of disabled prisoners housed in residential treatment and stabilization units to ensure that they have reasonable access to the Department’s programs; screen, test, track, and periodically re-evaluate prisoners for disabilities or changes in disability status; avoid increasing a prisoner’s security level solely based upon a disability; implement a procedure for receiving and processing prisoners’ requests for accommodations and appeals of denials, including specified forms, repositories to submit forms, and assistance for prisoners in completing and submitting forms; appoint an ADA coordinator for each of its facilities, as well as a state-wide coordinator, to handle ADA requests, process appeals, produce monthly reports, and assess compliance; provide initial and annual ADA training to correctional officers and enhanced training to ADA coordinators; create a quality-assurance program that includes audits of the identification of disabled prisoners and of
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 8 of 81
accommodation requests and appeals. See Dunn, 318 F.R.D. at 658–59. As these provisions are already being put in place for prisoners with physical disabilities, the practical effect of the settlement is primarily to make these provisions enforceable by prisoners with solely mental disabilities.
In addition to the incorporation of these Phase 1 provisions, the parties agree to four closely related “Substantive Provisions,” which provide for the creation and administration of an adaptive-behavior and life-skills course for the settlement class. More specifically, these provisions include:
Adaptive-Behavior and Life-Skills Training: The Department will provide adaptive-behavior and life-skills training for a period lasting no less than 181 consecutive calendar days to certain individuals.
Frequency of Provision of Programming: The Department will enroll appropriately identified prisoners into an adaptive-behavior and life-skills training program within six months of identification.
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 9 of 81
Prisoners should complete the program within six months, except for individuals with profound limitations. An appropriately trained individual will lead the program. Finally, any prisoner who remains in the Department’s custody shall undergo a refresher course on the same topics every other year, so long as and until the prisoner returns to the level of functioning attained at the completion of the initial program.
Transfer of Prisoners While They Are Enrolled in the Program: The Department will attempt to minimize the transfer of prisoners while they are enrolled in the adaptive-behavior and life-skills training program. If a prisoner is transferred during the course of a program, the sending and receiving institutions will work with the prisoner to mitigate any harm that may result from the transfer, including, assigning a case manager to the prisoner, enrolling the prisoner into courses the prisoner has not completed, and meeting with the prisoner to discuss any remedial needs.
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 10 of 81

Adaptive-Behavior

and

Life-Skills

Program

Components: The Department will provide an initial

adaptive‑behavior and life‑skills training program that

includes 22 hours of instruction, not to exceed 90

minutes per class, addressing the following general

topics: (1) decision making; (2) stress management; (3)

communication skill building; (4) risk-taking

consequences; (5) self-help; (6) accessing prison services; (7) hygiene; (8) self-direction; and (9)

prison rules.

In addition to these substantive provisions, the

settlement agreement contains the following

implementation provisions, which were also included in

the Phase 1 consent decree:

Monitoring: ADAP will monitor the Department’s

compliance with the consent decree, and will be

entitled to access relevant documents and to conduct

interviews with prisoners and staff. ADAP will prepare

quarterly reports on the Department’s compliance

containing written recommendations for any necessary

10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 11 of 81
changes, and the parties will meet and confer to address any reported deficiencies.
Dispute-Resolution Process: Both the named plaintiffs and unnamed class members (either with or without representation by class counsel) must arbitrate claims that the Department is not in compliance with the consent decree. If the Department’s alleged non-compliance impacts fewer than 12 prisoners, the arbitrator’s decision will be final. If 12 or more prisoners are affected, the arbitrator’s decision may be appealed to the court for review under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Termination: After five years, the Department may request termination of the consent decree, which will terminate after six years unless plaintiffs request, and the court grants, an extension.
Amendment: The parties may mutually amend the agreement. The parties agree to re-evaluate deadlines in the transition plan if Alabama passes legislation to construct new prison facilities.
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 12 of 81
Funding: The Department will make good-faith efforts to obtain necessary funding to comply with the agreement.
Attorneys’ Fees: Finally, the agreement states that the Department will pay plaintiffs’ attorneys $ 250,000.00 in fees and costs, as well as additional fees of $ 195.00 per hour (subject to caps) for monitoring services, and fees for any litigation necessary to enforce the resulting consent decree.
Additionally, as in Phase 1, the parties agreed that no part of the agreement applies to death-row prisoners. The court previously dismissed “any claim initially brought in this action or remaining in Phase 2A or 2B of this action that ADOC fails to identify, track, and accommodate the intellectual disabilities of death row inmates.” Judgment Dismissing Claims Related to Prisoners on Death Row (doc. no. 925). Accordingly, the parties simply reiterate their intent to “remove from the resolution of the claims Plaintiffs have asserted under the Acts any claim concerning the
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 13 of 81
identification, tracking and accommodation of any intellectual disability of any current or future Inmate in the custody of ADOC under a death sentence ....” Proposed Phase 2A ADA Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1100) at 12.
Finally, the agreement is predicated on--and defendants consent to--the certification of a settlement class consisting of “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or defect.” Id. at 4. For the reasons that follow, the court found class certification and final approval of the agreement appropriate.
III. DISCUSSION Judicial policy favors the settlement of class actions. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). However, “the settlement process is
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 14 of 81
more susceptible than the adversarial process to certain types of abuse and, as a result, a court has a heavy, independent duty to ensure that the settlement is ‘fair, adequate, and reasonable.’” Paradise v. Wells, 686 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (Thompson, J.) (citation omitted). In addition to analyzing the fairness of the proposed agreement, the court must ensure that it is not illegal, or against public policy. See id.
In approving this agreement, the court had to make four determinations. First, because the agreement was predicated upon class certification, the court had to determine whether the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) were met. Second, the court assessed whether Rule 23(e)’s procedural and substantive protections, ensuring that the settlement class was given notice and an opportunity to comment on or object to the agreement, were satisfied. Third, because the proposed settlement included an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel, Rule 23(h)
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 15 of 81

required the court to find that such a fee award is

“reasonable.”

Finally, the court evaluated the

proposed settlement’s compliance with the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626, which

establishes certain requirements for affording

prospective relief in cases involving prisons,

including when that prospective relief takes the form

of a court-enforceable settlement. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1) & (c)(1).

A. Class Certification: Rules 23(a) and (b) In its final approval order, the court certified a class of prisoners to which the agreement applies. Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(a) if the putative class representatives can show that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative

15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 16 of 81
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
In addition to the Rule 23(a) requirements, a class action is maintainable only if it falls within one of three categories of cases set forth in Rule 23(b). Here, the plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2). To qualify under 23(b)(2), a plaintiff must show that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that generally apply to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). This requirement applies whether or not the parties contest settlement approval. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620–22 (1997).
Previously, the court provisionally certified a settlement class defined to include “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B)
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 17 of 81
relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or
defect.” Phase 2A Preliminary Settlement Approval
Order (doc. no. 1205) at 2. Having considered the
parties’ joint statement in support of the proposed
settlement, the court concluded that final class
certification was appropriate for purposes of this
settlement.
The court notes that, in conducting this analysis,
it had the benefit of briefing on a contested motion
for class certification filed prior to settlement of
the Phase 2A ADA claim.1 Although defendants no longer
1. After consideration of plaintiffs’ contested motion for class certification of the Phase 2 claims, the court granted class certification as to plaintiffs’ Phase 2A Eighth Amendment and involuntary-medication claims. See Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 639 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 2016). However, the court specifically reserved ruling on class certification as to the plaintiffs’ remaining Phase 2A ADA and Phase 2B claims. See id. Accordingly, for purposes of approving this settlement, the court could not rely on its previous Phase 2A class-certification order. Instead, the court had to decide whether class certification is appropriate as to--and in light of the settlement of--these claims. Moreover, in a separate order and in light of this opinion, the court will deny the plaintiffs' motion for class certification as to their Phase 2A ADA claim as moot.
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 18 of 81
contest certification for purposes of and in light of this settlement, see Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement (doc. no. 1175), the court has assured itself that, for the reasons discussed below, none of the arguments defendants previously offered against class certification warranted denial of certification for purposes of approving the settlement.
1. Standing “[A]ny analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing”; only if the court finds that the named plaintiffs have standing may it consider whether they have “representative capacity, as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the rights of others.” Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987). “The Supreme Court has explained that the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing under Article III consists of three elements: an actual or imminent injury, causation, and redressability.” Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 19 of 81
Florida, 641 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
The individual named plaintiffs clearly have standing to assert the ADA claim brought in Phase 2A and now resolved in the instant agreement.2 These prisoners are in the custody of defendants, have a mental disability that qualifies for the protection of the ADA, and claim they have been denied reasonable accommodations as a result of the policies and procedures of defendants. A judgment in plaintiffs’ favor would remedy these alleged violations, just as will the consent decree. Therefore, these plaintiffs have standing to proceed.
2. Not all of the plaintiffs named in the complaint raised a Phase 2A ADA claim. The following named plaintiffs did so, and are therefore named class representatives: Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, Roger McCoy, Robert “Myniasha” Williams, and Quang Bui. The court has excluded from this list former plaintiff Jamie Wallace, who died before certification of the settlement class, but otherwise would have qualified.
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 20 of 81
2. Mootness In addition, the plaintiffs’ Phase 2A ADA claim is not moot. Mootness, like standing, is a threshold question of justiciability. See Harrell v. The Florida Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that the three strands of justiciability are standing, ripeness, and mootness (citing Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ and an actual controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the litigation.” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1975 (2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 1993). Before agreeing to settle, the Department had argued that certification of a Phase 2A ADA settlement
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 21 of 81

should not be granted because the Phase 2A ADA claim

was moot; they contended that the Phase 1 ADA

settlement covered all potential ADA claims for all

prisoners, including those with solely mental

disabilities--who are the focus of the Phase 2A

agreement.

However, the Phase 1 consent decree

expressly excludes inmates whose disabilities “relate

solely to or aris[ing] solely from mental disease,

illness, or defect.” Phase 1 ADA Consent Decree (doc.

no. 728) at 5. Because prisoners with solely mental

disabilities were expressly excluded from the Phase 1

consent decree--and nothing has changed with respect to

the allegations of these prisoners--the claim of the

proposed settlement class presented a live case or

controversy against the Department, and their claim was

not moot.

3. Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) In approving the Phase 2A settlement agreement, the court also found that the requirements of Rule 23(a)

21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 22 of 81
and Rule 23(b)(2) have been satisfied and that class certification was appropriate.
a. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement is satisfied if joinder--the usual method of combining similar claims--would be impractical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Although there is no strict numerical threshold, classes containing more than 40 members are generally found adequate to warrant class certification. See, e.g., Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, where “class wide discrimination has been alleged,” as is the case here, “plaintiff[s] need not show the precise number of members in the class,” as the numerosity requirement is “less significant.” Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, plaintiffs still must make “some showing, affording the district court the
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 23 of 81
means to make a supported factual finding that the class actually meets the numerosity requirement.” Vega, 564 F.3d at 1267 (emphasis original).
In this case, the plaintiffs submitted evidence that, as of February 2016, there were 3,416 prisoners on the mental-health caseload. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (doc. no. 669) at 113 (citing (MHM Monthly Report, February 2016)). As discussed in the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment opinion, only prisoners with mental illnesses serious enough to require treatment are placed on the caseload. See Braggs v. Dunn, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 2773833 at *9 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2017). Furthermore, as the court found during the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment trial, many prisoners with mental illness are not identified due to deficiencies in ADOC’s intake and referral systems; therefore, the number of prisoners with serious mental illness is likely higher. See id. at *18–21. While the mental illness of some of these individuals may not meet the
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 24 of 81
definition of disability under the ADA, it is safe to assume that well over 40 prisoners would so qualify. In sum, the settlement class is sufficiently numerous. Moreover, even if the class were small, “the fluid nature of a plaintiff class--as in the prisonlitigation context--counsels in favor of certification of all present and future members.” Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 510 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (Thompson, J.) (citing Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 878 (11th Cir. 1986), and Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965, 975 (D. Mass. 1981) (Freedman, J.)); see also Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422, 426 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (Albritton, J.) (noting that class certification in cases involving issues of common concern to prisoners is often “a common-sense approach,” “even when the potential class is small and somewhat undefined”).
Based on the likely number of class members and the fluidity of the class, the court finds that joinder
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 25 of 81
would be impractical and that the plaintiff class is sufficiently numerous to warrant class certification.
b. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires plaintiffs seeking class certification to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). There is no requirement “that all ... question[s] of law or fact raised by the dispute be common.” Vega, 564 F.3d at 1268 (citation omitted). Instead, “[c]ommonality requires [only] that there be at least one issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of the putative class members.” Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 (5th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted)). Indeed, “even a single common question will do ....” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011) (alterations included; citations and quotations omitted).
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 26 of 81
In their pre-settlement opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, defendants had argued that commonality was lacking because the putative class was “expansive,” encompassing prisoners with a wide range of disabilities, and that plaintiffs sought to “challenge the entire panoply of possible ADA violations.” Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (doc. no. 476) at 23. They argued that the plaintiffs’ claim was “not a single, homogenous claim,” except at “the highest level of abstraction,” but rather “many different ADA claims touching on many different ADA requirements that Plaintiffs[] ha[d] lumped together for purposes of this lawsuit.” Id. at 23.
However, as discussed at length in the Phase 1 settlement approval opinion, defendants’ former objections on this basis were misguided. See Dunn, 318 F.R.D. at 662–666. It is not the denial of individual accommodations for those with mental disabilities--but rather the denial of a system that would have the
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 27 of 81
effect of ensuring that the prisoner plaintiffs and others are appropriately accommodated--that was the basis of plaintiffs’ claim of liability under the ADA. In other words, plaintiffs claimed that the Department has employed methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating against prisoners with disabilities, namely by: (1) employing no system or an inadequate system for identifying and tracking prisoners with disabilities; (2) employing no system or an inadequate system for prisoners to request accommodations and submit grievances regarding failure to accommodate; (3) failing to appoint or train ADA coordinators or other administrators responsible for oversight of compliance with the ADA; (4) failing to train staff regarding the requirements of the ADA; (5) failing to promulgate policies and procedures regarding the treatment of prisoners with disabilities; and (6) failing to draft a plan for identifying and addressing areas of non-compliance with the requirements of the ADA. These questions are common to the class, and
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 28 of 81
susceptible to common answers “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. Accordingly, the commonality element of Rule 23(a) was met.
c. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires the named plaintiffs’ claim to be “typical of the claims or defenses of the class” as a whole. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). While the commonality and typicality inquiries both “focus on whether a sufficient nexus exists between the legal claims of the named class representatives and those of individual class members[,] ... typicality refers to the individual characteristics of the named plaintiff in relation to the class.” Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2000). A class representative’s claims are typical if they “arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory” as the class claims taken as a whole. Williams, 568 F.3d at 1357 (citation
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 29 of 81

omitted); see In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257

F.R.D. 260, 275 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (Bowdre, J.).

In this case, the named plaintiffs’ claim satisfied

the typicality requirement because it was identical to

those of the settlement class as a whole: namely, that

the Department employed methods of administration which

resulted in discrimination against prisoners with

mental disabilities.

Accordingly, the typicality

requirement was met.

d. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires the court to find that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This analysis “encompasses two separate inquiries: (1) whether any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives and the class; and (2) whether the representatives will adequately prosecute the action.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). For a conflict to

29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 30 of 81
defeat class certification, it must be “fundamental,”
such that “some party members claim to have been harmed
by the same conduct that benefitted other members of
the class.” Id.
In this case, there was no conflict of interest
between the named representatives and the class as a
whole. Most of the reforms the settlement requires
facially benefit all mentally disabled prisoners. For
example, requiring ADOC to establish an ADA grievance
procedure should benefit all prisoners with mental disabilities in seeking and receiving accommodations.3
Moreover, the development of a system that correctly
3. Indeed, evidence from the implementation of the Phase 1 consent decree, and to the extent applicable, the agreement at issue here--which went into effect through a temporary restraining order--shows that the reforms have already produced positive results. See Supplemental Brief Regarding the ADA Accommodation and Appeals Process (doc. no. 1268). According to the parties, 123 ADA requests for accommodations have been made across all facilities, 43 of which have been granted; 12 requests are still pending. In addition, 12 appeals have been made from denials of said requests; three of those resulted in an accommodation. In addition, ADAP conducted a qualitative review of these figures and found that only one denied request clearly should have been granted.
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 31 of 81

identifies inmates with mental disabilities will serve to benefit all inmates with mental disabilities. See Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, 464 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (Gold, J.) (“The requested injunctive relief will provide substantially equal benefits and relief to all members of the class through increased accessibility and the coordinated removal of physical and communication barriers.”). While some class members may not qualify for the adaptive-behavior and life-skills course,4 this is not a fundamental conflict serious enough to undermine the settlement.
In addition, the court was convinced that the named representatives and their counsel would adequately

4. The

settlement

provides

that

the

adaptive‑behavior and life‑skills training program will

be available to prisoners diagnosed with an

intellectual disability; prisoners who meet the IQ and

adaptive-behavior requirements defined under the Phase

1 consent decree, but who do not meet the “age of

onset” requirement of the DSM-V; and prisoners who ADOC

determines would “substantially benefit” from the

program.

See Proposed Phase 2A ADA Settlement

Agreement (doc. no. 1100) at 13.

31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 32 of 81
represent the settlement class. “The vigor with which [] named representative[s] and [their] counsel will pursue the class claim[] is assessed by considering the competency of counsel and the rationale for not pursuing further litigation.” Id. (citing Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1533 (11th Cir. 1985)). “The adequate representation requirement involves questions of whether plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and of whether plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the rest of the class.” Griffin, 755 F.2d at 1533. Plaintiffs’ counsel have significant experience in the prosecution of cases such as this one and have vigorously prosecuted this case. Additionally, plaintiffs’ rationale for not pursuing further litigation is solid: they have obtained substantial reforms through the settlement, and the court sees no reason to believe that they would have obtained more relief by prolonging the litigation.
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 33 of 81

Accordingly,

the

court

found

that

the

adequacy-of-representation prong is satisfied.

4. Rule 23(b)(2) A class action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(2) if (1) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class and (2) final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); see also Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 705 F.2d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Subsection (b)(2) was ‘intended primarily to facilitate civil rights class actions, where the class representatives typically sought broad injunctive relief against discriminatory practices.” (citation omitted)). “Rule 23(b)(2) has been liberally applied in the area of civil rights, including suits challenging conditions and practices at various detention facilities, as well as claims for violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.” Bumgarner v.

33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 34 of 81
NCDOC, 276 F.R.D. 452, 457–58 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (Boyle, J.); see also Wright & Miller, 7AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1776 (3d ed.) (explaining that “the class suit is uniquely appropriate procedure in civil-rights cases, which generally involve an allegation of discrimination against a group as well as the violation of rights of particular individuals”).
As previously explained in the commonality discussion, liability in this case is premised on the notion that ADOC’s policies and procedures result in systematic discrimination against the members of the settlement class because of their mental disabilities. ADOC’s actions--or refusals to act--thus apply generally to the class. In addition, injunctive relief in the form of a consent decree is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Therefore, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 35 of 81

B. Settlement Approval: Rule 23(e)

Under Rule 23(e), the settlement of a class action

requires court approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A).

The court may approve a settlement that is binding on a

class only if it determines that the settlement is

“fair, adequate, and reasonable and is not the product

of collusion between the parties.” Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977).5 This review is

“essential to ensure adequate representation of class

members who have not participated in shaping the

settlement.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory

committee's note. In reviewing a settlement, courts

must determine whether notice to the class was

adequate, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), and must examine

comments and objections from class members as well as

the opinion of class counsel. See Laube v. Campbell,

5. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 36 of 81
333 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.).
1. Notice to Class Members Rule 23(e) requires that notice to the class be provided “in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “The court must ensure that all class members are informed of the agreement[] and have the opportunity to voice their objections.” Laube, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). In this case, class members were provided adequate opportunities to learn about the proposed settlement and offer objections or make comments about it. The court’s order preliminarily approving the agreement contained specific procedures for the Department to give notice of the proposed agreement to members of the provisionally certified class and to distribute an approved notice and comment form. The notice form included a description of the case, a
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 37 of 81
definition of the class, a list of the provisions of the settlement agreement, an indication of its preclusive effects, and notice of the agreement concerning attorneys’ fees. Additionally, the notice included directions for obtaining a copy of the agreement, contact information for class counsel, along with an invitation for prisoners to inquire about the settlement, an announcement of the fairness hearing, and instructions for prisoners to exercise their right to comment about or object to the settlement. The comment form allowed respondents to select from a list of general topics at issue, and to indicate whether they wished to testify at a fairness hearing.
The notice form was posted in each dormitory and library within the prison system, and copies of the comment form were made available in the libraries and shift commanders’ offices. Copies of the agreement were made available for viewing in the law library or another location within each facility and were provided upon request to any prisoner lacking access to that
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 38 of 81

location. Prisoners who were not housed in dormitories

were hand-delivered a copy of the notice and comment

forms and a pre-stamped envelope.

Weekly oral

announcements also notified all prisoners of the

settlement and opportunity to comment or object.

The notice and comment forms and copies of the

proposed agreement were made available in English,

Spanish, Braille, and in large print. Upon request,

prisoners were to receive assistance in reading the

documents and in writing comments.

During the comment period, a weekly announcement

was made in every housing unit in each ADOC facility,

informing inmates about the proposed settlement and

reminding inmates of the date by which any comments were required to be filed.6

6. The Department was required to read the following announcement every Monday morning for the duration of the comment period: “Attention. There is a proposed settlement of the Braggs v. Dunn Americans with Disabilities Act lawsuit that affects all inmates. You have until April 5, 2017, to provide written comments about that settlement. You can review the proposed settlement agreement in the law library [for facilities that have no law library, specify alternate

38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 39 of 81
Secure and clearly labeled comment boxes were
placed in each facility for prisoners to submit comment
forms, and the Department’s staff was required to
collect comment forms from prisoners lacking the
freedom of movement within their facilities. The
comment boxes and forms were transmitted to the
Department’s general counsel, and a representative of
the clerk of court met with the parties to open the
comment boxes. Prisoners were also given the option to
submit comments by mail directly to the clerk of court.
Notice of the proposed agreement was posted by
March 6, 2017, and prisoners were given until April 5,
location]. If you are not able to access the law library [for facilities that have no law library, specify alternate location], a copy of the agreement will be provided to you if you request one from a correctional officer. By April 5, 2017, you should place all written comments in the ADA Settlement Comment Box, located next to the inmate request slip box. If you need a copy of the comment form, you can get one from the correctional officer supervising your living area or from the law library. If you cannot access the ADA Settlement Comment Box, you should ask a correctional officer to have your comment form collected and placed in the comment box.” Phase 2A ADA Settlement Agreement Preliminary Approval Order (doc. no. 1205) at 9–10.
39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 40 of 81

2017, to submit comments. Comments received by mail

after this date were also docketed. More than one

hundred prisoners submitted comments or objections to

the proposed agreement.

While far fewer prisoners

submitted comments during the Phase 2A ADA settlement

comment period than during the Phase 1 ADA settlement comment period,7 the court is satisfied with the number

of comments submitted during this phase, because much

of the agreement is merely an incorporation of the

substantive provisions from the Phase 1 ADA consent

decree, which many members of the Phase 2A settlement

class previously had an opportunity to comment on.

One matter concerning the submission of comments

warrants additional discussion. On May 12, 2017, the

court received a letter apparently signed by eight

prisoners housed at Donaldson Correctional Facility’s

segregation unit. The signatory prisoners requested an

update on the status of Phase 2 of this lawsuit. Of

7. Over 550 prisoners commented during the Phase 1 settlement approval process. See Dunn, 318 F.R.D. at 669.

40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 41 of 81
particular concern were a couple of statements suggesting that prisoners in segregation at Donaldson Correctional Facility had not received any notice, whatsoever, of the status of this lawsuit.
The court subsequently ordered the parties to investigate the allegations stated in the letter, and to file a joint report of their findings. The parties filed a joint report of their findings and reported that the prisoners had received sufficient notice. In the report, counsel for the parties contended that many of the prisoners who signed the letter either refused to view the settlement or provide comments on it when give an opportunity to do so. The Department was required to maintain records of its distribution of the notice of settlement to prisoners in segregation units. The parties attached records to their joint report showing the prisoners’ names, identification and bed numbers, the date, a signature of a witness correctional officer, and a box marked “Received paperwork, refused to sign” for each of the signatory
41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 42 of 81
prisoners of the letter. Additionally, because the court received four comments from prisoners at Donaldson, that facility must have complied to some extent with the notice and comment procedure provided for in the court’s preliminary settlement approval order.
Finally, during their investigation into allegations contained in the letter, ADAP was given the opportunity to interview each of the signatory prisoners to the letter. During the fairness hearing, ADAP's counsel reported that they were satisfied that these prisoners had in fact been given an opportunity to view and provide comments on the settlement agreement. And, moreover, any complaints they had were irrelevant to the agreement. For each of these reasons, the court is satisfied that the prisoners within ADOC were given adequate notice and an opportunity to comment on the proposed agreement.
42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 43 of 81

2. Objections and Comments a. Prisoner Comments
Prisoners who submitted comments to the court raised a range of issues, many of which were relevant; some of which were not.8 Out of the relevant comments received, the court heard testimony from 13 prisoners during fairness hearings conducted over the course of two days--partially in person at the federal courthouse, and partially by videoconference (due to the impracticality of visiting a large number of prisons). Prisoners were selected primarily based on the substance of their comments.

8. While a few comments were completely unrelated

to this lawsuit, many prisoners wrote about legal

claims brought in this lawsuit but which were not the

subject of the current agreement. Specifically, many

prisoners wrote about receiving inadequate health care.

Counsel estimate that “[a]pproximately forty-seven (47)

inmates submitted comments ... relating to an

individualized medical or mental health issue--e.g., a

request for specific medical treatment.”

Joint

Statement in Support of Proposed Settlement (doc. no.

1243) at 19.

43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 44 of 81

Of the directly pertinent comments and testimony,

the vast majority expressed discontent with existing

prison conditions, rather than with the adequacy or

fairness of the agreement or of any specific provision

of it.

Indeed, many expressed support for the

agreement.9 Generally, the relevant comments fell into

four loosely defined categories, including: (1) access

to programs, (2) identification, (3) the grievance

process, and (4) housing and related security-level

determinations. Each of these categories will be

discussed further below.

Access to Programs: Eight prisoners commented on

the need for access to programs consistent with the

adaptive-behavior and life-skills training program

provided for in the agreement. Some prisoners stated

9. To the extent possible, the court construed each comment as referring to the agreement. After a careful review of each comment, the court assigned it to one or more categories based upon the substance of the comment itself. Nevertheless, the court had to disregard 27 comment forms because they were either incomplete or blank, provided no reason for circling a particular (pre-identified) comment topic, or were indecipherable or otherwise irrelevant to the agreement.

44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 45 of 81
directly that they would benefit from access to the program provided for in the agreement. Others noted that access to the program would be beneficial to them for coping with their disabilities while imprisoned within ADOC and for their overall rehabilitation. Finally, some prisoners complained that they have never had access to any programs because of their disabilities and submitted that such access would be beneficial.
As mentioned earlier, the agreement provides that the adaptive-behavior and life-skills training program for prisoners with mental disabilities must include a variety of courses; be completed within a six-month period, unless an extension is otherwise necessary; be taught by trained individuals; be small enough to ensure “meaningful participation by affected inmates”; and be repeated periodically to ensure competence in program courses. See Proposed Phase 2A ADA Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1100) at 14. These conditions should ensure that the program will be beneficial to
45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 46 of 81
prisoners who are enrolled in it. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the courses will cover such topics as decision making, stress management, communication skill building, risk-taking consequences, self-help, accessing prison services, hygiene, self-direction, and prison rules; these topics should assist prisoners in coping with the conditions of their confinement, and help rehabilitate them for life outside of prison. See id. at 16–17.
Finally, those prisoners who would most benefit from the adaptive-behavior and life-skills training program should have access to it under the terms of the agreement. The agreement provides that the following categories of prisoners will be enrolled in the program: prisoners diagnosed with an intellectual disability; prisoners who meet the IQ and adaptive-behavior requirements defined under the Phase 1 consent decree, but who do not meet the “age of onset” requirement of the DSM-V; and prisoners who ADOC
46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 47 of 81
determines would “substantially benefit” from the program. See id. at 13.
Identification: Identification was the most frequent topic of relevant comments on the agreement: 11 prisoners commented on the procedures for identifying inmates with disabilities. Some commented favorably about the added requirements for identifying prisoners with disabilities, saying it would be beneficial because it would assist the Department in providing disabled prisoners with appropriate treatment, care, and accommodations and, more broadly, that it would protect prisoners from harm.
Other prisoners commented that the identification process should include training for Department staff to recognize and respond to prisoners with disabilities. These prisoners complained that their disabilities are frequently ignored by Department staff. They further complained that many disabled prisoners had received disciplinaries for their reactions to certain stimuli--reactions which resulted from their mental
47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 48 of 81
disabilities. The agreement addresses these complaints to the extent that it requires ADOC officials and staff to be trained to recognize prisoners with disabilities and to provide accommodations where appropriate. Specifically, the agreement provides--by incorporation of the Phase 1 consent decree--that “ADOC will provide initial and periodic training concerning the provisions and requirements of the ADA to both security staff ... and ADA Coordinators.” Phase 1 ADA Consent Decree (doc. no. 728) at 55–57.
Some prisoners commented that the Department should consider a prisoner’s mental-health history, including any mental-health records, in making a determination about whether a prisoner has a mental-health disability. The agreement covers this concern, because it requires the Department to consider any previously identified disabilities when the Department screens prisoners for disabilities. Id. at 27.
Some commenters suggested that prisoners should be identified not only as they enter the prison system,
48

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 49 of 81

but also after exposure to the prison system, to

determine whether such exposure has had any effect on

their mental health or disability status.

The

agreement addresses these concerns as well. It states

that “ADOC will continue to periodically screen,

evaluate and test Inmates for disabilities while

Inmates are in ADOC’s custody to ensure that any change

in an Inmate’s disability status is identified, treated

and accommodated.” Id. at 32. Additionally, if a

prisoner is found to have a disability that was

previously undiagnosed, or if a disability, previously

known, is discovered to have materially changed, “ADOC

will take all necessary steps to determine whether, and

to what extent, that disability may be reasonably

accommodated.” Id. at 34.

Grievance Process: Seven prisoners commented about

the grievance process. Some complained that there is

no procedure for seeking an ADA accommodation. Others

commented that, under the agreement, were they to make

a formal request for an accommodation, they would not

49

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 50 of 81
be guaranteed to receive a response from any Department employee--much less an accommodation. Prisoners also complained that the grievance process takes too long. Each of these concerns is addressed in the agreement.
The agreement establishes a grievance procedure for each ADOC facility. “Effective February 1, 2017, any Inmate who has, or believes he or she has, a disability as defined by the Acts may make Requests for Accommodations and pursue Appeals of decisions concerning Requests for Accommodations.” Proposed Phase 2A ADA Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1100) at 46.
The agreement further provides for the appointment of an ADA coordinator who is required to “receive and respond to all ADA Request Forms for that facility or transmit ADA appeals to the Statewide ADA Coordinator.” Phase 1 ADA Consent Decree (doc. no. 728) at 48–54.
Finally, the agreement contains strict deadlines for responding to prisoner requests for accommodations. The agreement states: “Facility ADA Coordinators will,
50

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 51 of 81

upon receipt [of a request for accommodation or other

ADA form], immediately review all ADA requests to

determine whether a request concerns an urgent

situation. In the event of an urgent situation, the

Facility ADA Coordinator will respond to the request in

writing and provide, if required, the requested

accommodation within three (3) days of receipt of the

request, not including weekends and holidays. In all

other situations, the Facility ADA Coordinator will

respond to the request in writing within ten (10) days

of receipt of the request, not including weekends or

holidays.” Id. at 51.

Housing and Related Security-Level Determinations:

Ten prisoners commented on the procedures for housing

and security-level determinations. Many of these

complaints centered on the concern that prisoners with

disabilities are at a higher risk of abuse,

mistreatment, or violence from other prisoners because

of their disabilities.

They claimed that this

increased risk--and any resulting injuries--is

51

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 52 of 81
discrimination against these prisoners on the basis of disability. Other prisoners complained that they have been denied transfers to facilities or to areas within their current facilities because of their disabilities. They suggested the agreement should weigh factors other than their disability in making housing or security-level determinations.
In some ways, these concerns are addressed by added procedures that identify prisoners with disabilities, as previously discussed, and by those provisions that require the Department to accommodate prisoners with disabilities. Indeed, the agreement contains “new procedures concerning the identification of inmates with disabilities in order to assign inmates with disabilities to facilities that are appropriate for their individualized needs.” Phase 1 ADA Consent Decree (doc. no. 728) at 19. The agreement also has provisions that prevent the denial of access to facilities or programs because of a person’s disability. If the Department restricts access to
52

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 53 of 81
programming for prisoners housed in the residential treatment units or stabilization units of a particular prison, “ADOC must conduct an individualized assessment as to why such programming would pose a risk to the Inmate or others, or why the Inmate’s current mental health status precludes being able to meaningfully participate in the [adaptive-behavior and life-skills training] Program.” Id. at 25. Furthermore, the agreement provides that the Department will assign security levels without regard to disability. See id. at 36.
Other Objections: Finally, prisoners made several other objections, including objections to the quality-assurance plan, the monitoring provisions, and the provision for attorneys’ fees. One prisoner complained that, although he had been receiving treatment as an accommodation for his mental-health disabilities, he is not improving. Construed as a comment on the quality of accommodations he is receiving for his mental-health disabilities, the court
53

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 54 of 81

finds that this concern is addressed in the agreement.

The agreement provides for a quality-assurance program

to ensure that the Department is meeting its legal

obligations under the ADA on a continuing basis.

Next, four prisoners commented on the inability of

prisoners to ensure that the Department will comply

with all of the provisions in the agreement. The

agreement, however, provides a monitoring mechanism to

ensure that the Department is in compliance. The

parties have agreed to allow ADAP to serve as an

independent monitor to ensure that the Department

complies with the settlement terms.

Finally, one prisoner objected specifically to the

attorneys’ fee provision of the agreement.

The

prisoner complained that it is not fair for the

attorneys to receive significant compensation for their

services but for the prisoners, who have suffered

disability discrimination, to receive nothing by way of

monetary compensation. Prisoners voiced this concern

during the Phase 1 settlement approval process as well.

54

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 55 of 81
There, the court explained that, although the court understands that commenters alleging past harms may feel that they are entitled to damages, the plaintiffs here have sought only injunctive relief for their claims. Moreover, an unnamed class member cannot be precluded from bringing a claim for damages stemming from the same conditions challenged in the class action if the class representatives sought only injunctive or declaratory relief. See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1031 (11th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases). Therefore, prisoners who wish to seek monetary compensation for violations of the ADA are not foreclosed from doing so by the settlement.
Conclusion: After a careful review of all the comments and objections filed by class members, the court was satisfied that none of the prisoners’ comments called into serious question the fairness of the agreement, in whole or in part.
55

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 56 of 81
b. Comments from ADAP The court considered appointing a guardian ad litem to advocate for the interests of the unnamed class members who, due to cognitive and communication-related disabilities, are incapable of understanding the terms of the settlement agreement or of submitting intelligible comments on them. However, as it did during the Phase 1 settlement approval process, the court found that ADAP, which has a federal mandate to advocate for and ensure the protection of disabled Alabamians, was best situated to voice the concerns of these class members. The court therefore instructed ADAP to file a brief discussing whether the settlement agreement was a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of the clams of class members with mental disabilities. The court further requested ADAP to supplement its brief with one or more expert opinions addressing the fairness of the agreement to ensure that the basis of ADAP’s opinions were sufficiently reliable.
56

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 57 of 81
ADAP filed a brief in support of the agreement. In it, ADAP submitted the opinions of two experts in the mental-health field: Dr. Robert Babcock, a licensed psychologist and Board Certified Behavioral Analysis; and Dr. Timothy Stone, a licensed psychiatrist and Medical Director of the Chilton-Shelby Mental Health Center. See ADAP’s Submission of Independent Expert Opinions in Support of Proposed Settlement (doc. no. 1244). Both experts were given access to the Phase 1 and Phase 2A ADA settlement agreements. Additionally, both Dr. Babcock and Dr. Stone consulted outside scholarly sources in reaching their opinions on the overall fairness of the agreement. After a thorough review, ADAP, along with Dr. Babcock and Dr. Stone, found the agreement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Affidavit of Robert A. Babcock, Ph.D., BCBA-D (doc. no. 1244-3) at 15; Affidavit of Timothy Stone, M.D. (doc. no. 1244-4) at 3.
57

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 58 of 81
c. View of Class Counsel In addition to considering the views of class members, the court considered the opinion of class counsel. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1215 (5th Cir. 1978); Gaddis v. Campbell, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.). Class counsel contended that the proposed agreement was a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of plaintiffs’ Phase 2A ADA claim. Counsel submitted that the “Settlement Agreement is the product of arm’s-length, serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations between knowledgeable counsel who have vigorously prosecuted and defended this litigation.” Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval (doc. no. 1175) at 2. Moreover, counsel pointed out that the terms of this agreement are similar (indeed, they are to a large extent identical) to the terms of the Phase 1 consent decree that this court earlier approved and that the relief contemplated by the agreement is extensive.
58

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 59 of 81
Before the fairness hearing, however, the court requested supplemental briefing on whether the processes established in the agreement for seeking accommodations or appealing denials of requests for accommodations are meaningfully available to prisoners with mental disabilities. The parties filed a joint supplemental brief with regard to this question.
In their brief, the parties state that the joint duties of ADOC (with its identification, referral, and reporting duties) and ADAP (with its accounting and oversight duties) create a system of shared responsibility over prisoners with mental disabilities to ensure that they have meaningful access to the benefits of the agreement. The agreement provides mechanisms for ADOC to identify prisoners with mental disabilities, including by providing additional training to ADOC employees. The agreement further provides that ADAP will have reasonable access to “facilities, documents, staff, procedures, logs, records, inmates, and other similar informational
59

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 60 of 81

sources in order to ensure [] compliance.” Phase 1 ADA

Consent Decree (doc. no. 728) at 69. If ADAP finds

ADOC is not in substantial compliance with the

agreement, then ADAP may provide recommendations for

bringing ADOC into compliance with the terms of the

Phase 1 consent decree or the agreement.

Id.

Additionally, ADAP can review ADA accommodation

requests submitted to ADOC and decisions made on those

requests.

If ADAP finds that prisoners with

mental-health disabilities are not taking advantage of

these procedures at either level, ADAP may notify ADOC

of its findings and suggest ways to improve the

accommodation and grievance procedures. Or, if none of

that works, ADAP can initiate the arbitration

proceedings on behalf of particular prisoners or bring

an action before the court to modify the agreement as a

whole.

Upon consideration of the comments and objections

from class members, as well as the views of ADAP,

independent experts, and class counsel, the court found

60

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 61 of 81
that none of the comments seriously called into question the fairness, adequacy, or reasonableness of the agreement.

3. Court's Assessment

Based on the evidence and argument presented by the

parties and class members, the court determined that

the Phase 2A ADA settlement is fair, adequate, and

reasonable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “Relevant

factors include the stage in the proceedings; the

plaintiffs’ likelihood of success at trial [on

remaining issues]; the complexity, expense, and likely

duration of the lawsuit; and the range of possible

recovery.” Laube, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.

The substantive provisions of the agreement

represent a highly favorable result for the plaintiff

class.

Plaintiffs challenged the Department’s

treatment of disabled prisoners at a systemic level.

They argued that the Department’s policies and

procedures were grossly inadequate to ensure compliance

61

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 62 of 81
with the ADA and that, because of these inadequate policies and procedures, prisoners were being discriminated against on the basis of disability.
The Phase 2A ADA agreement, in conjunction with the Phase 1 agreement, essentially gives the class all of the ADA remedies plaintiffs sought at the outset of this litigation. Notably, even if plaintiffs had proceeded to and prevailed at trial on their Phase 2A ADA claim, the parties would have still been confronted with the task of fashioning a remedial plan. Any such plan would likely have closely resembled that contained in the Phase 2A ADA settlement agreement with which the court was presented. Moreover, because systemic changes are involved (for example, the creation and implementation of a new computer system, and assessment and training of tens of thousands of people), it would not have been feasible to order significantly more rapid compliance than is contemplated in the agreement. If anything, settlement means that change will come more quickly.
62

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 63 of 81
During and shortly following the preliminary approval hearing, the court expressed significant concerns regarding two particular aspects of the settlement agreement: first, whether the parties intended to incorporate any of the stipulations the parties entered into during the Phase 1 settlement approval process into the Phase 2A ADA settlement agreement; and, second, whether the agreement represented a settlement of all potential current and future claims that prisoners could bring under the ADA.
a. Phase 1 Stipulations The first question the court had was whether, and if so which, stipulations entered into during the Phase 1 ADA settlement approval process were meant to be incorporated into the Phase 2A ADA settlement agreement. The parties entered into a number of stipulations during the Phase 1 settlement approval process, including those found in documents numbers 560, 563, 575, 576, 638, 696, 709, and 719.
63

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 64 of 81
Accordingly, during the preliminary approval hearing, the court asked the parties whether they intended to incorporate all or some of these stipulations into the agreement.
The parties filed a joint notice with the court, stating that all but one stipulation, document number 709, from the Phase 1 consent decree were intended to be incorporated into the Phase 2A ADA settlement agreement. The parties stipulate that the “‘Phase 1 Joint Stipulation Concerning Revised Intellectual Testing of Death Row Inmates’ (‘Joint Stipulation’) does not apply to the Settlement Agreement before the Court. (Doc. 709).” Joint Notice (doc. no. 1197) at 2. The parties further confirmed that, “Nothing in the Phase 2 ADA Settlement Agreement presently before the Court ... relates to testing of inmates on death row for intellectual disabilities,” as the court has dismissed all claims relating to prisoners sentenced to death. Joint Statement in Support of the Proposed Settlement (doc. no. 1243) at 2 n.1. The parties
64

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 65 of 81
affirmed that all other stipulations from Phase 1 of this case, between the Phase 1 preliminary approval hearing and the entry of the Phase 1 consent decree, apply to the Phase 2A ADA agreement. Id.
As a result, the following stipulations from Phase 1 were incorporated into the agreement and consent decree: document numbers 560, 563, 575, 576, 638, 696, and 719. The Department will not be required to change its practices regarding the testing of death-row prisoners for intellectual disabilities.
b. Individual Claims The court requested an additional stipulation that the agreement does not represent a settlement of all potential current and future claims that prisoners may bring under the ADA. The court wanted to make clear that individual prisoners may still bring claims for discrimination under the ADA if they are seeking a remedy outside of the protections provided in the agreement.
65

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 66 of 81

As mentioned previously, there had been some

confusion about what claim plaintiffs were actually

asserting under the ADA. The Department argued that

the plaintiffs’ claim was “not a single, homogenous

claim,” except at “the highest level of abstraction,”

but rather “many different ADA claims touching on many

different ADA requirements that Plaintiffs[] ha[d]

lumped together for purposes of this lawsuit.”

Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

Certification (doc. no. 476) at 23-24.

Plaintiffs

responded that they are not seeking individual

accommodations under the ADA; instead, the basis of

liability in this case is the notion that ADOC’s

policies and procedures result in systematic disability

discrimination against the plaintiff class.

Accordingly, the court requested a specific stipulation

from the parties as to whether prisoners could still

maintain a cause of action under the ADA for any

individualized disability discrimination.

66

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 67 of 81

The parties filed a stipulation that provides that

there in fact “could be claims arising under the [ADA]

or [the Rehabilitation Act] ... which may not be

covered by the terms of the Phase 2A ... Settlement

Agreement.” Stipulation Concerning ADA Mental Health

Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1239) at 2 (emphasis

original).

The parties further stipulated that

prisoners are not required to submit individual claims

to the dispute-resolution process outlined in the

settlement agreement, unless they are seeking to

enforce the terms of the agreement itself. However, if

a prisoner seeks to file an individual claim, he or she

cannot use the agreement in the new lawsuit and,

moreover, must separately comply with all of the

procedural prerequisites provided under the PLRA and

under any other applicable law. See id. Finally, the

stipulation provides that ADOC shall not be limited by

the agreement in asserting any defenses it may wish to

assert in any future litigation concerning claims

falling outside the scope of this agreement.

67

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 68 of 81
C. Class Counsel and Fees: Rules 23(g) and (h) 1. Rule 23(g)
Rule 23(g) requires the court to appoint (and also to assess the suitability of plaintiffs’ counsel to serve as) class counsel. The rule requires the court to consider “(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). Before appointing them as class counsel, the court must conclude that plaintiffs’ counsel will “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4).
In this case, lawyers for the plaintiff class include lawyers affiliated with the Southern Poverty Law Center, ADAP, and the law firm of Baker, Donelson,
68

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 69 of 81
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz. In addition, lawyers from the firm Zarzaur, Mujumdar, and Debrosse have represented the interests of ADAP in this litigation.10
As during the Phase 1 settlement approval proceedings, the court found that plaintiffs’ counsel have fairly and adequately represented the interests of the Phase 2A ADA plaintiff class. The court echoes the observations it expressed during Phase 1, see Dunn, 318 F.R.D. at 680, and finds that the lawyers for the plaintiff class have devoted an enormous amount of time identifying, developing, and pursuing the claim for the plaintiff class; that they have substantial experience and knowledge in litigating class actions of this sort; and, finally, that they have shown great dedication to representing the interests of the plaintiff class. The court, therefore, appointed plaintiffs’ counsel as counsel for the Phase 2A ADA settlement class.
10. As was the case during Phase 1, counsel from the firm Zarzaur, Mujumdar, and Debrosse have not been named as class counsel because they represent only ADAP. However, the court understands that they are due to receive a portion of the attorneys’ fees discussed below.
69

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 70 of 81
2. Rule 23(h) Rule 23(h) provides that, “In a class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). To award attorneys’ fees, however, a court must ensure that the parties have complied with the following procedures: (1) a claim for an award of attorneys’ fees must be made by motion; (2) the class members must be given notice and an opportunity to object to the motion; and (3) the court must find that the award sought is reasonable. See id. The agreement provides that the Department will pay plaintiffs’ counsel $ 250,000.00 in fees and costs, as well as additional fees of $ 195.00 per hour (subject to caps) for monitoring services and fees for any litigation necessary to enforce the resulting consent decree, but only if the court finds the litigation
70

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 71 of 81
necessary and that plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to resolve the issue informally, without litigation.
Because this provision was included in the agreement, class members received notice of the plaintiff class attorneys’ request for attorneys’ fees during the comment period. One prisoner objected to the fee provision; however, as mentioned previously, the prisoner merely argued that the provision of fees to class counsel was unfair, given the fact that prisoners were not also being awarded monetary damages. But again, because the agreement does not foreclose the opportunity for class members to seek monetary damages for individual claims, and because the plaintiffs have sought only injunctive relief and not damages in this case, this concern is unfounded.
Nevertheless, even when both sides agree to an award of attorneys’ fees, the court has an independent responsibility to assess its reasonableness, in order to guard against the risk that class counsel might agree to enter into a settlement less favorable to
71

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 72 of 81
their clients in exchange for inappropriately high fees. See Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1144 (11th Cir. 1985) (“When the class attorneys succeed in reaping a golden harvest of fees in a case involving a relatively small recovery, the judicial system and the legal profession are disparaged. ... The practice of awarding attorneys' fees is one that has been delicate, embarrassing and disturbing for the courts .... This embarrassment is rooted in the fact that the bitterest complaints [about the legal profession] from laymen [are directed at] the windfall fees and featherbedding that lawyers have managed to perpetuate through ... their influence with the judiciary. For the sake of their own integrity, the integrity of the legal profession, and the integrity of Rule 23, it is important that the courts should avoid awarding windfall fees and that they should likewise avoid every appearance of having done so.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
72

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 73 of 81
To determine whether an attorneys’ fee arrangement is reasonable, the court uses the lodestar method. It does so by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, see Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988), and then considering whether an upward or downward adjustment is warranted in light of the factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). Those factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
73

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 74 of 81
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
In support of the attorneys’ fee agreement, plaintiffs’ counsel submitted evidence that they incurred approximately $ 243,000 in litigation expenses on the Phase 2A ADA claim. Plaintiffs’ counsel expended over 900 hours of billable time on this portion of the case. The $ 243,000 request represents a blended rate of $ 264.00 per hour, which the parties jointly agree represents a reasonable hourly rate for litigation of this kind. Moreover, the parties agreed on the record during the fairness hearings that the request for attorneys’ fees was reasonable.
After considering the Johnson factors, the court finds that the fee is reasonable and no downward adjustment of the lodestar figure is warranted. This settled claim, which has been ongoing since 2014, is extraordinarily large in scope; it concerns both current and future prisoners with mental disabilities at all state prison facilities, and it sought and
74

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 75 of 81
achieved a remedial order that mandates a dramatic transformation in the way that the Department treats such prisoners. The range of complex legal and factual questions presented by the plaintiffs’ claim, and the amount of time plaintiffs’ attorneys spent both in preparing this claim for trial and in negotiating and securing approval of the settlement agreement, warrant the sizeable fee award.
Finally, the court notes that class counsel sought these fees pursuant to the fee provisions contained in the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12205) and the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794a), so their award is not limited by the PLRA’s restrictions on attorneys’ fees in prison litigation, which apply only to cases in which the attorneys’ fees are authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
D. Prison Litigation Reform Act The PLRA provides that a “court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further
75

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 76 of 81

than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal

right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the violation of the Federal right.”

18 U.S.C. § 3623(a)(1)(A).

In conducting this

‘need-narrowness-intrusiveness’ inquiry, a court is

required to “give substantial weight to any adverse

impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal

justice system caused by the relief.” Id.

While the requirement to engage in a

need-narrowness-intrusiveness analysis must be met in

some circumstances, “[t]he parties are free to make any

concessions or enter into any stipulations they deem

appropriate” when submitting an initial settlement to

the court, and the court does not need to “conduct an

evidentiary hearing about or enter particularized

findings concerning any facts or factors about which

there is not dispute.” Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d

777, 785 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000).

Here, the parties agreed that the consent decree

satisfies

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness

76

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 77 of 81

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Based on

the court’s independent review of the agreement, the

court agrees.

The court further finds--and the parties again

stipulate--that the consent decree will not have an

adverse effect on public safety or the operation of the

criminal

justice

system.

See

18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A). Once the Department fulfills its

obligations under the agreement and prisoners are able

to access accommodations for their mental disabilities,

those prisoners will be significantly better able to

access and benefit from the range of services and

programming during their incarceration. Furthermore,

with increased training of staff, identification of

prisoners with mental disabilities, and a

quality-assurance process in place, the Department will

better be able to ensure the safe operation of the

prison system and the safety of those prisoners.

In addition, the PLRA’s requirement that any

prospective relief order must terminate within two

77

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 78 of 81
years after court approval (or one year after the court’s denial of termination of a prospective relief order), see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A), and the requirements for appointing a special master in a prison case, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f), are inapplicable here. First, the termination deadlines are inapplicable--as they are inapplicable for the Phase 1 consent decree--because the defendants have waived their right to seek termination of the consent decree until five years after the date of final approval. Second, the court has not appointed a special master, but rather an arbitrator--United States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott--pursuant to the consent decree. The parties stipulate that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f) is not applicable to the appointment of an arbitrator, and have in any case expressly waived the right to challenge his decision or the consent decree on this basis.
78

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 79 of 81
In sum, the court is satisfied that its entry of the consent decree is in full compliance with the PLRA.
IV. CONCLUSION “Courts must be sensitive to the State’s interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011). However, when as here the policies and procedures of a prison system result in systemic discrimination against those with disabilities--especially those with mental disabilities, who are less likely than ordinary persons (not to mention prisoners) to be able protect their own interests--courts may not allow that discrimination to continue simply to avoid any intrusion into the realm of prison administration. See also id. (referring to the court’s obligations to remedy constitutional violations under the Eighth Amendment).
79

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 80 of 81
As was the case during Phase 1, the parties’ settlement of the Phase 2A ADA claim reflects the Alabama Department of Corrections’ commitment to making manifest the rights of disabled prisoners in its custody; it represents the shouldering of significant responsibility, and presents an equally significant opportunity, by delineating a years’ long process of ensuring compliance with the dictates of federal disability law. The court understands the Department’s investment in this process to be genuine, and commends it for it.
The court also, again, recognizes the important role played by prisoners with mental disabilities in bringing this litigation, and commends both the named plaintiffs, as well as the numerous prisoners who submitted comments, for their advocacy on behalf of both themselves and others.
Finally, the court would like to extend a special thank you for the tireless efforts of United States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott. Without his efforts--and,
80

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1311 Filed 07/25/17 Page 81 of 81
indeed, much of his time--the court is convinced that this agreement would not have been possible.
DONE, this the 25th day of July, 2017. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 1 of 19

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION CONSENT DECREE

This matter having come before the court on the

Joint Motion for Approval of the Parties’ Settlement

Agreement and Entry of Stipulated Order; the court

having ordered the provision of adequate notice to

members of the plaintiff class of the terms of this

order, having received and considered the written

objections from members of the plaintiff class related

to the contents of this order, having held a fairness

hearing on August 23, 2017, having reviewed the

filings, documents, orders and/or admissible evidence

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 2 of 19
which are currently filed of record with the court, and having considered the arguments of counsel for the parties and the other premises herein; and for the reasons to be set forth in a separate opinion, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1. Notice Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(1). Reasonable notice of the proposed settlement was provided to the plaintiff class in the manner directed by the court by separate order. Members of the plaintiff class were then afforded an opportunity to submit comments and objections to the court concerning the proposed settlement. A fairness hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) was held on August 23, 2017, at which the court heard arguments and testimony.
2. Rule 23(e)(2) Findings. The court, having considered the arguments and testimony at the hearing, the comments submitted by class members, and the entire record in this case, concludes that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 3 of 19
3. Revised Involuntary Medication Policy. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of this order and the process identified herein, the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") will implement a revised policy and practice regarding the involuntary medication of inmates with mental illnesses. The court finds the revisions in the applicable Administrative Regulation (“AR”) No. 621, if fully implemented, extend no further than necessary to resolve the violations of federal due process rights alleged by Quang Bui, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (“ADAP”), and the plaintiff class in the third cause of action in the fifth amended complaint, including, but not limited to, plaintiffs’ allegations that:
a. The ADOC failed to afford due process to those inmates who were subject to involuntary medication proceedings while in ADOC custody. (See Fifth Amended Complaint (doc. no. 805));
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 4 of 19
b. The ADOC’s prior involuntary medication process “f[e]ll far short of what due process requires” (doc. no. 805, ¶ 4);
c. The ADOC and its mental health vendor allegedly maintained a “policy and practice of medicating mentally ill prisoners against their will without providing due process to determine whether the individuals can be forced to take medication” (doc. no. 805, ¶ 190);
d. “The widespread and pervasive practice is that many prisoners in ADOC custody are denied due process” (doc. no. 805, ¶ 453);
e. The ADOC allegedly violated the “due process rights [of prisoners in its custody] by involuntarily medicating prisoners in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution” (doc. no. 805, ¶ 453);
f. The ADOC’s involuntary medication process failed to include the necessary due process protections found to be constitutional in
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 5 of 19
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1999) (doc. no. 888, at 162-163); and g. “Plaintiffs Bui, Hartley, Dillard, Terrell, and McCoy’s due process rights have been violated by Defendants’ policies and practices of providing either constitutionally inadequate due process or no process at all with regard to involuntary medication” (doc. no. 888, p. 164). A true and correct copy of the revised Involuntary Medication policy, AR 621, is attached as Exhibit 1 hereto. 4. Dismissal of Bui’s Involuntary Medication Claim. Pursuant to the provision in the parties’ settlement agreement (doc. no. 1248-1) for the dismissal with prejudice of any and all claims asserted by Bui regarding the involuntary medication policies and/or practices, these claims are dismissed with prejudice. 5. No Admission of Liability. Nothing in the parties’ settlement agreement (the “Agreement”) or this
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 6 of 19
order will be construed as an admission by the ADOC, Commissioner Dunn, or Associate Commissioner Naglich of the violation of any law. To the contrary, ADOC, Commissioner Dunn, and Associate Commissioner Naglich deny every material allegation of the complaint, as amended, in this case and deny any liability to the plaintiffs. Neither the Agreement nor this order constitute, nor will be construed as, an admission or evidence of any act or omission of any kind. Nothing in the Agreement or this order will be used for any purpose outside of the above-captioned matter or against the ADOC and/or any of its officials, officers, representatives, agents or employees. Nothing in the Agreement or this order will be construed to require ADOC to do more than what is required by law within the Eleventh Circuit. Nothing herein shall be considered as evidence or an admission of any kind to be utilized and/or relied upon by the court in its evaluation of liability as to any other claim asserted in the fifth
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 7 of 19
amended complaint or any subsequent evaluation by the court of any proposed remedial scheme.
6. Provision of Mental Health Records to ADAP. a. Starting on the fifth day of the second month after final approval of the Agreement, ADOC shall provide to ADAP a roster of all inmates who participated in an involuntary medication hearing, whether initial or renewal during the prior month. The roster shall include the following information: (i) the name of each inmate, (ii) each inmate’s AIS #, (iii) each inmate’s current facility assignment as of the date of the involuntary medication hearing, (iv) the current DSM-V diagnosis for each inmate, (v) the name of the medication administered on an involuntary basis for each inmate, and (vi) whether the subject hearing was a “new” or “renewed” request for each inmate. Within five days of production of said roster, plaintiffs’ counsel may designate up to
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 8 of 19
four inmates whose mental health records shall be produced by ADOC to ADAP. Within 14 days of receipt of notification, ADOC shall provide the following documents from the four inmates’ medical and mental health records:
(1) all documents reviewed by the Involuntary Medication Committee in connection with the prior month’s involuntary medication hearing for each of the four inmates; (2) all documents generated by the Involuntary Medication Committee or any appeal therefrom with regard to the prior month’s involuntary medication hearings for each of the four inmates; (3) the notices of the most recent involuntary medication hearings issued to the four inmates; (4) any notices issued to the four inmates regarding the opportunity to appeal the
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 9 of 19
decision regarding their most recent involuntary medication proceedings; (5) the documents containing the final decision upon any appeal from any of the four inmates regarding the prior month’s involuntary medication proceedings; and (6) any other documents provided to any of the four inmates by the Involuntary Medication Committee or regarding the prior month’s involuntary medication hearings. In addition to the foregoing, the ADOC will also produce for each of the four selected inmates the last seven months of their medical records included in the records tabbed as: Mental Health, IVM, Orders and Labs and the current Master Problem List. b. ADAP may prepare and submit to ADOC a written, monthly report regarding ADOC’s efforts to meet the requirements of the Agreement, specifically its efforts to comply with the revised AR 621. See Ex. 1. Any such report shall be limited to
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 10 of 19
ADOC’s efforts to comply with the Agreement. Under no circumstances shall the Agreement or this order be construed as granting and/or permitting ADAP the authority to oversee and/or review anything other than the ADOC’s compliance with the Agreement. ADAP’s review and reporting shall be limited to oversight of the ADOC’s compliance with the revised Administrative Regulation No. 621 attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Each monthly report may indicate all areas in which the ADOC is, or is not, in substantial compliance with the Agreement. This monthly report may be provided to the Commissioner via his counsel of record. If ADAP believes that ADOC is not in substantial compliance with the terms and provisions of the Agreement or this order, ADAP may provide written recommendations of actions that it believes necessary to achieve substantial compliance with the terms of the
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 11 of 19
provision or provisions. ADOC will then have 30 days to provide written comments, objections, or remedial action plans in response to the monthly report. In the event of any disagreement among the parties related to any remedial actions, the parties will meet and confer within 10 days of ADOC’s written response to attempt to resolve any such disagreement. c. The provision of records as set forth in this provision will continue under these terms from the date of this order for a period of 24 months thereafter. For this 24-month period, neither ADAP nor plaintiffs’ counsel will be compensated for their services beyond the compensation found under ¶ 7 infra entitled “Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses,” except for any attorneys’ fees necessary to enforce the terms of this order in a court proceeding in which the court determines the plaintiffs prevail or
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 12 of 19
the parties agree to the payment of attorneys’ fees accrued in the course of such proceedings. d. ADAP, their counsel and any monitor conducting this review, shall be bound by any protective or court orders entered in this action to protect the confidentiality of inmate records and sensitive security information. 7. Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses.1 The Alabama Department of Corrections shall remit to counsel for plaintiffs payment in the amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Thousand and 0/100 Dollars ($ 230,000.00), which shall constitute payment for any and all attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred, charged and/or otherwise generated by counsel for the Plaintiff IVM Class from the inception of the action through the final conclusion of this matter. The parties further agree that the above-referenced sum shall be paid by the ADOC no later than 60 days from the date of this order and
1. The court has independently evaluated the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and expenses agreed upon by the parties, and as will be explained in a separate opinion, finds the fees reasonable.
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 13 of 19
that such payment shall be made payable to “The Southern Poverty Law Center.” The parties acknowledge and agree that the payments reflected in this paragraph constitute payment in full for any and all attorneys’ fees and expenses claimed by Bui, ADAP and/or any other party to the litigation for the claims resolved herein. Excluding the payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses provided herein and any attorneys’ fees or expenses recoverable in any action to enforce the terms of the Agreement or this order, Bui, ADAP and their respective counsel voluntarily, completely and unconditionally waive any and all right to seek the recovery of any monies of any kind from any defendant in this action for any and all attorneys’ fees and/or expenses incurred, charged and/or otherwise generated by counsel for the Plaintiff IVM Class after the date of the Agreement for the claims resolved herein. Moreover, nothing in the Agreement or this order requires ADOC to remit payment to any party for the recovery of attorneys’ fees inconsistent with the limitations
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 14 of 19
imposed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act or the restrictions imposed within the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
8. Resolution of All Involuntary Medication Claims. In exchange for the promises, covenants, terms and conditions set forth in the parties’ Agreement and described herein, the IVM Class, Bui and ADAP agreed that this order resolves any and all claims for prospective injunctive relief which were asserted in the “Third Cause of Action: Deprivation of Due Process Prior to Involuntarily Medicating Prisoners” of the fifth amended complaint (doc. no. 805) and/or which could have been raised in this action related to the process of involuntarily medicating any individual in the custody of the ADOC. As such, no member of the IVM Class shall assert any procedural due process claims seeking prospective injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment against the Alabama Department of Corrections, the ADOC Commissioner in his official capacity, the ADOC Associate Commissioner for Health
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 15 of 19

Services in her official capacity, the ADOC’s agents,

employees, representatives, vendors and/or contractors

of any kind during the term of this Agreement.

Furthermore, Bui shall not assert any substantive due

process claims seeking prospective injunctive relief

under the Fourteenth Amendment against the Alabama

Department of Corrections, the ADOC Commissioner in his

official capacity, the ADOC Associate Commissioner for

Health Services in her official capacity, the ADOC’s

agents, employees, representatives, vendors and/or

contractors of any kind during the term of the

Agreement and this order.

9. Placement of Agreement in Law Libraries. The

ADOC will place a copy of the parties’ Agreement in the

law library at every ADOC facility where one exists.

10. No Monetary Compensation.

Excluding the

payment of attorneys’ fees and costs to counsel for the

plaintiff class in this action, nothing contained in

this order creates, mandates or constitutes any

obligation of any defendant, the State of Alabama

15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 16 of 19
and/or the Alabama Department of Corrections to compensate, pay or otherwise provide any monetary payment of any kind to any inmate formerly housed, currently housed or housed in the future in any correctional facility operated by or at the direction of the Alabama Department of Corrections. Moreover, nothing in this order creates any basis for any purported or actual class member to seek any financial recovery or monetary benefit of any kind from any defendant, the State of Alabama and/or the Alabama Department of Corrections.
11. No Appeal. All parties have waived all rights to seek any appeal from and/or appellate review of this order.
12. Court’s Retention of Jurisdiction to Enforce the Order. Upon the entry of this order, the clerk of court for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama is to administratively close the involuntary medication claim, Count III in the fifth amended complaint, in this case in a manner
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 17 of 19
consistent with the normal procedures of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, but the court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce this order.
13. Expiration of Order. Unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties or extended by order of the court or unless a motion to extend the term of this order is then pending, this order shall expire by its own terms at 12:00 p.m. (Central Daylight Savings Time) on September 6, 2019. In the event that any such pending motion identified above (as of September 6, 2019) is denied, this order shall expire on the date on which such motion is denied by the court.
14. No Waiver of Privilege. Nothing in this order or undertaken pursuant to this order constitutes or is intended to constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege of any kind.
15. Findings Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). The court specifically finds that the prospective relief in this order is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 18 of 19
necessary to correct the violations of federal rights as alleged by the plaintiff class in the third cause of action, alleging substantive and procedural due process violations in the involuntary medication of mentally ill prisoners, in the fifth amended complaint, is the least intrusive means necessary to correct these violations, and will not have an adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system. Accordingly, this order complies in all respects with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).
16. Dispute Resolution. In the event of any dispute related to the terms and conditions of any final stipulated order and/or any final agreement between the parties, the parties shall submit to mediation before United States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott prior to filing any document with the court related to the alleged matters which are the subject of the dispute. To the extent that any party files any such motion or pleading with the court without first submitting the matter to mediation, any such filing
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1354 Filed 09/06/17 Page 19 of 19
shall be dismissed without prejudice pending the outcome of mediation.
17. No Additional Employment Obligations. Nothing in the parties’ Agreement or this order shall be construed in any way as creating any obligation of any kind upon any defendant, the State of Alabama or the Alabama Department of Corrections to hire, retain and/or employ any consultant, advisor, correctional officer, medical professional or other individuals of any kind. Nothing in this paragraph shall excuse or negate any obligation of the ADOC to comply with Administrative Regulation 621.
18. No Violation of any Other Applicable Orders. Nothing in this order is intended to create any obligation or requirement which would result in the violation of any other currently existing order entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
DONE, this the 6th day of September, 2017. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 1 of 46

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY-MEDICATION SETTLEMENT FINAL APPROVAL OPINION I. INTRODUCTION
This class-action lawsuit brought by a group of seriously mentally ill prisoners in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC or Department) is before the court on a promised opinion explaining why, in partial resolution of this litigation, it previously approved a settlement of the group’s claims challenging the Department’s involuntary-medication policies and procedures.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 2 of 46

The plaintiffs in this phase, Phase 2A, of the

lawsuit are a group of seriously mentally ill state

prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program

(ADAP), which represents mentally ill prisoners in

Alabama.

The defendants are ADOC Commissioner

Jefferson Dunn and the ADOC Associate Commissioner of

Health Services Ruth Naglich, who are both sued in only

their official capacities.

The plaintiffs claim that the Department’s

involuntary-medication policies and procedures deprive

prisoners of due process of law in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See Fifth Amended Complaint (doc. no. 805) at

137–38.

Specifically, they contend that the

Department’s involuntary-medication policies and

procedures: (1) deny prisoners subject to

involuntary-medication orders substantive due process

by requiring them to be medicated absent a recent

finding of dangerousness; (2) deny prisoners subject to

involuntary-medication orders procedural due process by

2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 3 of 46
failing to provide them with adequate notice of hearings and other protections provided for in the applicable regulation; and (3) deny prisoners who are not subject to involuntary-medication orders substantive and procedural due process by coercing consent to take medications that they otherwise would refuse. The plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights). Following months of negotiations, the parties have settled these claims.
This case has twice been bifurcated for administrative convenience of the court and the parties. In September 2015, this case was divided into two distinct phases: Phase 1, which involves claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794) (both of which statutes are, for ease of reference, referred to as the ADA), but which claims
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 4 of 46
are unrelated to mental health; and Phase 2, which involves all other claims. A year later, in September 2016, the court further bifurcated this case into Phase 2A, encompassing an Eighth Amendment claim related to the treatment of prisoners with mental illness, an ADA claim of prisoners with only mental disabilities, and involuntary-medication claims; and Phase 2B, involving Eighth Amendment claims related to medical and dental care. The court has already granted relief on several of the plaintiffs’ claims.
In September 2016, the court approved a settlement of the plaintiffs’ Phase 1 ADA claims for prisoners with physical disabilities. See Dunn v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (Thompson, J.). The court subsequently entered the parties’ settlement as a consent decree.
In June 2017, the court found the Department liable on the plaintiffs’ Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claim. See Braggs v. Dunn, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2017 WL 2773833 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2017) (Thompson, J.). Based upon a
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 5 of 46

veritable mountain of evidence, the court found the

Department’s provision of mental-health care to be

“horrendously inadequate” and constitutionally

deficient under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at *68.

In July 2017, the court approved a settlement of

the plaintiffs’ Phase 2A ADA claim, relating to

prisoners with mental disabilities, see Braggs v. Dunn,

-- F.R.D. --, 2017 WL 3151261 (M.D. Ala. July 25, 2017)

(Thompson, J.), which resulted in the court entering a

consent decree.

The parties, with the able assistance of United

States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott, have now reached a

settlement on the plaintiffs’ only remaining

unaddressed

claims

for

Phase

2A:

the

involuntary-medication claims.

The court had

previously certified a class for the plaintiffs’

involuntary-medication claims. See Braggs v. Dunn, 317

F.R.D. 634 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (Thompson, J.).

The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary

approval of the proposed settlement of the

5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 6 of 46
involuntary-medication claims. After a hearing on the joint motion, the court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement. In its preliminary approval order, the court established a procedure for providing class members with notice of the agreement and an opportunity to object and submit comments on the agreement’s fairness.
After receiving written comments from class members, the court held two days of fairness hearings in August 2017. During the first day, the court heard from a representative group of class members--selected by the court with input of the parties--who had submitted comments on the proposed agreement. During the second day, counsel for the parties responded to various witnesses’ comments and questions raised by the court.
After the fairness hearings, the court, on September 6, 2017, entered an order granting final approval of the Proposed Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement and granted the
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 7 of 46
parties’ request to enter their settlement agreement as a consent decree. This opinion discusses the court’s reasons for doing so.
II. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT Generally speaking, the proposed settlement is designed to address all disputed issues related to involuntarily medicating ADOC inmates and remedy all claims arising from that process. It is meant to include all procedural and substantive due-process claims. See Proposed Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1248-1) at 5. The agreement includes the following eight substantive provisions: Revised Involuntary-Medication Regulation: The Commissioner agrees to adopt and implement the revised Administrative Regulation (AR) 621, which is the Department’s involuntary-medication regulation. The revised regulation contains the following provisions, in relevant part: (1) a policy against threatening or
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 8 of 46

coercing prisoners to accept psychotropic medications;

(2) a requirement that the Department consider and

document whether there is a current and substantial

likelihood of serious physical harm towards self or

others when deciding to place a prisoner on an

involuntary-medication order; (3) a requirement that

the Involuntary Medication Review Committee find that

involuntary-medication is in the patient’s best medical

interest

before

deciding

to

issue

an

involuntary-medication order; (4) a policy requiring an

independent and knowledgeable advisor to review

involuntary-medication orders and assist prisoners in

challenging an adverse involuntary-medication order,

where appropriate; (5) the creation of an

involuntary-medication review board, consisting of

providers who were not involved in the patient’s

treatment; and (6) a requirement that a patient be

afforded an opportunity to be unmedicated for 30 days

if on an involuntary-medication order for 180 days.

8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 9 of 46
Dismissal of Claims: The parties agree, and jointly move, to dismiss plaintiff Quang Bui’s claims with prejudice.
No Admission of Liability: The parties submit that the agreement may not be construed as an admission of liability against Commissioner Dunn, Associate Commissioner Ruth Naglich or the Department. Moreover, nothing in the agreement is to be construed as evidence of liability as to any claim or case against the Department or any of its officials.
Placement of Agreement in Law Libraries: The Department agrees to place the agreement, including the revised involuntary-medication regulation, in the law library of every major correctional facility.
Provision of Mental-Health Records to ADAP: The Department will provide information and documentation to ADAP for review on a monthly basis for 24 months, including (1) a roster of all prisoners on involuntary-medication orders; and (2) all medical, mental-health, or other records concerning the
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 10 of 46

Department’s

involuntary-medication

proceedings

pertaining to up to four prisoners on

involuntary-medication orders.

Collaborative Oversight: ADAP may then prepare and

submit a monthly report to the Department regarding the

Department’s compliance with this agreement and the

revised involuntary-medication regulation, including by

providing any recommendations it believes necessary to

ensure the Department is in substantial compliance with

the agreement or the revised involuntary-medication

regulation. The Department may object, comment on, or

provide a remedial plan to any suggestions contained in

ADAP’s monthly report.

Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses: The Department will

pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys $ 230,000.00 in fees and

costs. This agreement, unlike the parties’ settlements

of the plaintiffs’ ADA claims, does not provide for

additional fees for monitoring services or fees

associated with any litigation necessary to enforce the

agreement or any resulting consent decree.

10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 11 of 46
Disposition of Claims: The parties also agree that the settlement fully resolves the plaintiffs’ “Third Cause of Action: Deprivation of Due Process Prior to Involuntarily Medicating Prisoners” claims in the Fifth Amended Complaint. As a result, no member of the certified settlement class may bring a claim that the revised involuntary-medication regulation deprives prisoners of procedural due process during the settlement term. Finally, the parties agree that named plaintiff Bui will not to assert a substantive due-process claim seeking prospective injunctive relief against the Department concerning its revised involuntary-medication regulation.
In addition to these substantive provisions, the agreement contains the following “Other Terms and Conditions:”
No Monetary Compensation: Nothing in the agreement imposes any obligation to provide any form of monetary payment to any current or future prisoners housed within the Department.
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 12 of 46
No Appeal: The parties have agreed to waive the right to appeal the imposition of the agreement.
Court’s Retention of Jurisdiction: The parties agree that, after the court’s approval of the agreement, the court will retain jurisdiction to enforce it.
Expiration of Agreement: The agreement shall expire at 12:00 p.m. on September 6, 2019, two years after the court entered its final approval order.
No Waiver of Privilege: The parties agree that the agreement does not constitute a waiver, now or in the future, of any applicable privilege provided by law.
Stipulation relating to the PLRA: Although discussed in greater detail below, the parties agree, and jointly stipulate, that this agreement fully complies with the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).
Dispute-Resolution Process: Prior to seeking review before this court, the parties agree to submit any claims relating to the Department’s compliance with the
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 13 of 46
terms of the agreement or the revised involuntary-medication regulation to mediation before United States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott.
Modification of Agreement: The parties may mutually agree to amend the agreement. Otherwise, the parties may not seek to amend or modify this agreement, except to extend the term of the agreement beyond two years.
Duty to Hire: The Department is under no obligation to hire additional employees as a result of the agreement, except that the Department must ensure its compliance with the revised involuntary-medication regulation.
Other: Finally, the parties agree that the agreement does not--and is not intended to--violate any preexisting court order in this case; that, to the extent possible, the agreement shall be interpreted under the laws of the State of Alabama; that any invalid provision shall be severable from the remainder of the agreement; that the agreement represents the entire understanding and agreement between the parties;
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 14 of 46
and that all signatures on the agreement constitute an effective signature to the agreement as a whole.
After an exhaustive notice and comment period, followed by a series of fairness hearings, and upon consideration of all the evidence presented in this case related to the Department’s involuntary-medication policies and procedures, the court was satisfied that the parties proposed settlement represented a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement for purposes of the plaintiffs’ involuntary-medication claims.
III. DISCUSSION Judicial policy favors the settlement of class actions. See Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). However, “the settlement process is more susceptible than the adversarial process to certain types of abuse and, as a result, a court has a heavy, independent duty to ensure that the settlement is ‘fair, adequate, and reasonable.’” Paradise v. Wells, 686 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (M.D. Ala. 1988)
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 15 of 46

(Thompson, J.) (citation omitted). In addition to

analyzing the fairness of the proposed agreement, the

court must ensure that it is not illegal, or against

public policy. See id.

In approving this agreement, the court had to make

three determinations.

First, the court assessed

whether the procedural and substantive protections

provided by Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure were satisfied. Second, because the proposed

settlement included an award of attorneys’ fees to the

plaintiffs’ counsel, Rule 23(h) required the court to

determine whether such a fee award was “reasonable.”

Finally, the court evaluated the proposed settlement’s

compliance with the PLRA, which establishes certain

requirements for affording prospective relief in cases

involving prisons, including when that prospective

relief takes the form of a court-enforceable

settlement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) & (c)(1).

A. Settlement Approval: Rule 23(e)

15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 16 of 46
Under Rule 23(e), the settlement of a class action requires court approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A). The court may approve a class action settlement only if it determines that the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties.” Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977).1 In determining whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, courts must determine whether notice to the class was adequate, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), and must examine comments and objections from class members as well as the opinion of class counsel. See Laube v. Campbell, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.).
1. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 17 of 46
1. Notice to Class Members Rule 23(e) requires that notice to the class be provided “in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “The court must ensure that all class members are informed of the agreement[] and have the opportunity to voice their objections.” Laube, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). In this case, class members were provided adequate opportunities to learn about the proposed settlement and offer objections to or make comments about it. The court’s order preliminarily approving the parties’ proposed settlement contained specific procedures for the Department to give notice to members of the certified involuntary-medication class. The order also required the Department to distribute approved notice and comment forms. The notice form included a description of the plaintiffs’ involuntary-medication claims; a definition of the certified settlement class; a list of the revisions to
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 18 of 46
the involuntary-medication regulation; an indication of ADAP’s role in monitoring the Department’s compliance with the agreement; notice of the provision for attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs’ counsel; directions for providing questions or comments on the agreement and the revised involuntary-medication regulation; an announcement of the fairness hearings; and instructions for prisoners to exercise their right to object to or comment about the proposed settlement. The comment form allowed respondents to select from a list of general topics at issue, and to indicate whether they wished to testify about the agreement at a fairness hearing.
The notice form was posted in the law library, dining areas, and mental-health office waiting areas of each ADOC or work-release facility. Notice forms were placed next to the shower area in each residential treatment unit (RTU) or in the infirmaries for prisoners housed in those units. In addition, notice
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 19 of 46
forms were hand delivered to prisoners on the mental-health caseload in those units.
The notice form was also placed in each living unit in the open RTUs at Tutwiler, Bullock, and Donaldson correctional facilities. A copy of the notice form, the comment form, and a pre-addressed envelope were provided by hand to prisoners in the Intensive Stabilization Units, closed RTUs, semi-open RTUs, or crisis cells. Finally, copies of the agreement were provided upon request to any prisoner lacking access to those areas where notices were located.
The notice and comment forms and copies of the proposed agreement were made available in English, Spanish, Braille, and in large print. Upon request, prisoners were to receive assistance in reading the documents and in writing comments.
A copy of a comment form was to be provided along with a copy of the notice form. The Department was required to keep a roster, by name and AIS number, of all prisoners who had received notice of the agreement.
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 20 of 46
After distributing the notice and comment forms, the Department collected prisoner comments. Prisoners were also given the option to submit comments by mail directly to the clerk of court.
Notice of the proposed agreement was posted by June 2, 2017, and prisoners were given until July 17, 2017, to submit comments. The court received more than 200 prisoner comments by mail or from the facilities themselves, which were thereafter docketed for review.

2. Objections and Comments a. Prisoner Comments
Prisoners raised a variety of issues relating to the proposed settlement agreement in their comments submitted to the court.2 Moreover, based on the

2. To the extent possible, the court construed

prisoners’ comments as referencing the agreement.

However, the court found that only 23 prisoners

provided objections or comments that were directly

relevant

to

the

agreement

or

revised

involuntary-medication regulation. The court had to

disregard 197 comment forms because they were either

incomplete or blank, provided no reason for circling a

particular (pre-identified) comment topic, were

20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 21 of 46

suggestions of counsel and the court’s own review of

the relevant prisoner comments, the court selected 12

prisoners to testify during fairness hearings conducted

on August 23, 2017. The hearing were conducted by

videoconference due to the impracticability of visiting

a large number of prisons or having prisoners appear

in-person in court .

The relevant comments and testimony fell into five

loosely defined categories: (1) concerns about the

Department using coercion to obtain consent to medicate

prisoners; (2) suggested revisions to the revised

involuntary-medication regulation; (3) doubts about

ADAP’s role in monitoring the Department; (4) requests

related to attorneys’ fees; and (5) concerns about

procedures for terminating an involuntary-medication

order. Each of these categories is discussed below.

Coercion: Five prisoners expressed concerns that

the

Department

might

use

the

revised

involuntary-medication regulation to coerce prisoners:

indecipherable, or were otherwise irrelevant to the agreement, as a whole.

21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 22 of 46

either that the Department might coerce prisoners to

take their medication involuntarily by means other than

the involuntary-medication procedure; or that the

Department might use the involuntary-medication

procedure as a punitive measure to get prisoners to

conform to certain behavior.

The revised involuntary-medication regulation

directly addresses these concerns, and in several ways.

On the first page of the revised regulation, it states:

“In no instance shall an inmate be threatened ... with

the use of force or a threat of disciplinary actions

such as segregation, loss of privileges, or loss of

good time, as a means to coerce the inmate to accept

psychotropic medications ....”

Proposed Phase 2A

Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement (doc. no.

1248-1) at 44. It further, unequivocally, states: “The

use of involuntary-medication as a punitive measure is

strictly prohibited.” Id. at 47. Therefore, the court

found these prisoners’ concerns to be groundless in

22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 23 of 46

light

of

the

terms

of

the

revised

involuntary-medication regulation.

Revision to the Administrative Regulation: Three

prisoners made suggested revisions to the revised

involuntary-medication regulation.

One prisoner

remarked that (some) involuntary-medication orders

should not automatically expire after six months or

that (some) prisoners should not automatically be taken

off of their involuntary-medication regimen, if they

still need their medications. Two other prisoners

suggested that the revised involuntary-medication

regulation should not require prisoners to be taken off

of their involuntary-medication orders “cold turkey” in

all cases. These concerns, however, are addressed in

the revised involuntary-medication regulation.

First,

the

revised

involuntary-medication

regulation does not mandate that all prisoners be taken

off their involuntary-medication regimens, regardless

of circumstances, after six months. Instead, the

regulation provides, in Section O, that: “Continuation

23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 24 of 46

of the authorization for involuntary-medication will be

re-evaluated after the initial 180-day order to

continue to involuntarily medicate the inmate .... An

inmate will be given a thirty (30) day respite at the

completion of the initial 180 day order to

involuntarily medicate.” Id. at 49.

Second, the revised involuntary-medication

regulation does not require prisoners to be taken off

their medication ‘cold turkey.’

The regulation

provides, in relevant part, that during the period of

respite between involuntary-medication orders, “Should

an inmate ... show signs of deterioration in his/her

mental health, the treating psychiatrist may order a

continuation of the authorization for involuntary

medication for a second 180-day interval.” Id. at 50.

And, as is the case for any prisoner, the decision to

involuntarily medicate a prisoner must be accompanied

by a “[s]tatement that the administration of the

contemplated psychotropic medication is in the inmate’s

best medical interest.” Id. at 46. Accordingly, the

24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 25 of 46

revised involuntary-medication regulation already

addresses these proposed revisions, and the objections

on those bases were not well founded.

Monitoring: Monitoring was the most frequent topic

of the relevant comments about the agreement: eight

prisoners commented about ADAP’s ability to monitor the

Department’s compliance with their own administrative

regulation effectively and made suggestions for

improving the monitoring services provided for in the

agreement. One comment, characteristic of the requests

for improved monitoring, states, “ADOC does not go by

polic[ies] already implemented and will not go by this

Administrative Regulation.”

Others state that

monitoring should use an “element of surprise,” or that

monitoring services should be provided by an

independent third-party monitoring group.

The

agreement addresses each of these concerns.

As the parties note in their Joint Submission

Regarding Inmate Comments, the settlement agreement

provides for extensive monitoring for a two-year

25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 26 of 46

period. As a part of the arrangement, ADAP is

permitted to review four prisoners’ records that are

subject to involuntary-medication orders during each

month of the agreement. ADAP can also submit a monthly

report to ADOC regarding ADOC’s compliance, and the

court retains jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.

See Joint Submission Regarding Inmate Comments (doc.

no. 1317) at 2.

In light of the monitoring

arrangement, the court found that the agreement

sufficiently addresses the prisoners’ concerns.

Attorneys’ Fees: Two prisoners objected

specifically to the attorneys’ fee provision of the

agreement. Both prisoners claimed that, because they

are the “victims” of the alleged constitutionally

deficient

involuntary-medication

policies

and

procedures, they are also entitled to monetary

compensation for the pain and suffering they

experienced under the former regulation.

However, as the court has remarked on similar

comments for both the Phase 1 and Phase 2A ADA

26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 27 of 46
settlements, although the court understands that commenters alleging past harms may feel that they are entitled to damages, the plaintiffs here have sought only injunctive relief for their claims. Moreover, an unnamed class member cannot be precluded from bringing a claim for monetary damages stemming from the same policies or procedures challenged in this class action, since the class representatives sought only injunctive or declaratory relief. See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1031 (11th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases). Therefore, prisoners who wish to seek monetary compensation for violations of due process under the former involuntary-medication policies or procedures are not foreclosed from doing so by the agreement.
Terminating an Involuntary-Medication Order: Finally, four prisoners complained generally that they had been on involuntary-medication orders for prolonged periods of time. One prisoner claimed that he has been on an involuntary-medication order for six years; another claimed that he has been on an
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 28 of 46
involuntary-medication order, without reprieve, for almost 20 years. Construed as a complaint that the revised involuntary-medication regulation should allow prisoners to come off their involuntary-medication order, under certain circumstances, after the initial involuntary-medication order lapses, the court found that the revised involuntary-medication regulation addresses this concern as well.
Section P of the revised involuntary-medication regulation addresses the concerns raised in these comments, as it provides that the procedures set in place by the new regulation must be complied with before the continuation of an involuntary-medication order that has been in place for at least 365 days of the past 16 months. Proposed Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1248-1) at 50.
Those procedures require, among other things: documentation of the need to medicate a prisoner involuntarily; evidence that alternatives to or
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 29 of 46
attempts at treatment other than involuntary-medication are or would be futile; an evaluation by the Involuntary Medication Review Committee to determine whether involuntarily medicating a prisoner is in the prisoner’s best medical interest; an opportunity for the prisoner to present evidence against an involuntary-medication regimen; a decision by a majority of the Involuntary Medication Review Committee, including the vote of the psychiatrist; documentation explaining the reasons for the decision to initiate the involuntary-medication order; and an opportunity for the prisoner, with the assistance of an independent advisor, to appeal an adverse involuntarymedication order. Id. at 46–49. Therefore, because of the safeguards set in place by the new policies, the prisoners’ concerns are unfounded.
Conclusion: After a careful review of all the comments and objections filed by class members and the testimony of prisoners at the fairness hearings, the court found that none of the prisoners’ comments
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 30 of 46
seriously called into question the fairness of the agreement, in whole or in part.
b. Views of Class Counsel In addition to considering the views of class members, the court considered the opinion of class counsel. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1215 (5th Cir. 1978); Gaddis v. Campbell, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.). Class counsel contended that the proposed agreement was a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of the plaintiffs’ Phase 2A involuntary-medication claims. At the fairness hearing on August 24, 2017, counsel argued that the agreement was “rigorously negotiated” and was “reached through a great deal of hard work on a variety of disputed issues.” Counsel firmly believed this settlement was advantageous to the certified class and complied with the requirements of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 235 (1990).
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 31 of 46

Additionally, before the fairness hearing, the

court requested supplemental briefing on “whether the

revised Administrative Regulation 621 creates an avenue

for judicial review of an adverse involuntary

medication order” and “if the regulation does create an

avenue for judicial review, how it does so.” Phase 2A

Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement Preliminary

Approval Order (doc. no. 1253) at 10–11.

In the parties’ joint brief in response, the

parties’ stated that the “Revised Administrative

Regulation 621 (the ‘Regulation’) contains an avenue

for

judicial

review

of

an

adverse

involuntary-medication order. Specifically, Section J

of the ‘Procedures’ section of the Regulation provides

that ‘[t]he inmate shall be informed of the right to

appeal any decision to a court of appropriate

jurisdiction.’ An adverse involuntary medication order

falls squarely within ‘any decision’ that may be

appealed to a court of competent jurisdiction.” Joint

Brief Regarding Judicial Review of an Adverse

31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 32 of 46
Involuntary Medication Order (doc. no. 1318) at 1–2 (internal citations omitted).
The parties further stated that a prisoner may seek judicial review in state court through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or in federal court by asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, noting that the internal administrative appeal process for appealing an adverse involuntary-medication order constitutes the administrative remedy that must be exhausted under the PLRA in order to pursue a § 1983 claim. Id. at 2–3.
Accordingly, the court found that the agreement contained an avenue for judicial review that is consistent with the requirements of Harper. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 216 (noting that an “inmate may seek judicial review of a committee decision in state court by means of a personal restraint petition or extraordinary writ”).
As to the second question--how the regulation provides an avenue for judicial review--the parties stated that, “A prisoner will be informed of the right
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 33 of 46
to judicial review in the Notice of Involuntary Medication Hearing (ADOC Form MH-029).” Joint Brief Regarding Judicial Review of an Adverse Involuntary Medication Order (doc. no. 1318) at 3, which “informs a prisoner subject to an adverse involuntary medication order of the right ‘[t]o seek judicial review in a court of appropriate jurisdiction if the administrative appeal is denied.’” Id. This, too, is sufficient and consistent with the requirements of Harper.
Upon consideration of the views of class counsel, the court found that nothing addressed by the parties seriously called into question the fairness, adequacy, or reasonableness of the agreement.
3. Court's Assessment Based on the evidence and argument presented by the parties and class members, the court determined that the proposed settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). In making that determination, the court considered a variety of
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 34 of 46
“[r]elevant factors”, including “the stage in the proceedings; the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success at trial [on the remaining issues]; the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the lawsuit; and the range of possible recovery.” Laube, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
The substantive provisions of the agreement represent a highly favorable result for the plaintiff class. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the Department’s involuntary-medication policies and procedures “f[e]ll far short of what due process requires.” Fifth Amended Complaint (doc. no. 805) at 3. The agreement essentially gives the class all of the remedies the plaintiffs sought at the outset of this litigation. Notably, even if the plaintiffs had proceeded to and prevailed at trial on their Phase 2A involuntary-medication claims, the parties would have still been confronted with the task of fashioning a revised Administrative Regulation. Any such regulation
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 35 of 46

would likely have closely resembled the revised

regulation attached to the settlement agreement.

Accordingly, upon an independent review of prisoner

comments and the views of class counsel, the court

found the agreement to represent a fair, adequate, and

reasonable

settlement

of

the

plaintiffs’

involuntary-medication claims.

B. Attorneys’ Fees: Rule 23(h) Rule 23(h) provides that, “In a class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). To award attorneys’ fees, however, a court must ensure that the parties have complied with the following procedures: (1) the parties filed a motion for attorneys’ fees; (2) the class members must be given notice and an opportunity to object to the motion; and (3) the court must find that the award sought is reasonable. See id.

35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 36 of 46
The settlement agreement provides that the Department will pay the plaintiffs’ counsel $ 230,000.00 in fees and costs, which include any and all costs associated with or generated by class counsel in initiating and litigating the plaintiffs’ involuntary-medication claims and fees associated with ADAP’s role in monitoring the Department’s compliance with the agreement. See Proposed Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1248-1) at 28–29.
Because the provision of attorneys’ fees was included in the proposed settlement, class members received notice of the plaintiffs’ class attorneys’ request for attorneys’ fees during the comment period. Two prisoners objected to the fee provision; however, as mentioned previously, these prisoners merely argued that the provision of fees to class counsel was unfair, given the fact that they were not also being awarded monetary damages. But again, because the agreement does not foreclose the opportunity for class members to
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 37 of 46
seek monetary damages for individual claims, and because the plaintiffs have sought only injunctive relief and not damages in this case, this concern is unfounded.
Nevertheless, even when both sides agree to an award of attorneys’ fees, the court has an independent obligation to assess its reasonableness, in order to guard against the risk that class counsel might agree to enter into a settlement less favorable to their clients in exchange for inappropriately high fees. See Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1144 (11th Cir. 1985) (“When the class attorneys succeed in reaping a golden harvest of fees in a case involving a relatively small recovery, the judicial system and the legal profession are disparaged. ... The practice of awarding attorneys' fees is one that has been delicate, embarrassing and disturbing for the courts. ... This embarrassment is rooted in the fact that the bitterest complaints [about the legal profession] from laymen [are directed at] the windfall fees and featherbedding
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 38 of 46
that lawyers have managed to perpetuate through ... their influence with the judiciary. For the sake of their own integrity, the integrity of the legal profession, and the integrity of Rule 23, it is important that the courts should avoid awarding windfall fees and that they should likewise avoid every appearance of having done so.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
To determine whether an attorneys’ fee award is reasonable, the court uses the lodestar method. It does so by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, see Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988), and then considering whether an upward or downward adjustment is warranted in light of the factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). Those factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly;
38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 39 of 46

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney

due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in

the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or

contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client

or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the

results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and

ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of

the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and

(12) awards in similar cases.

In support of the attorneys’ fee request, the

plaintiffs’ counsel submitted evidence that they have

incurred, or will incur, approximately $ 230,000.00 in

litigation

expenses

on

the

Phase

2A

involuntary-medication claims and fees associated with

ADAP’s role in monitoring the Department’s compliance

with the agreement and revised involuntary-medication

regulation. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

(doc. no. 1346). The plaintiffs’ counsel expended over

476.3 total hours of billable time on this portion of

39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 40 of 46
the case as of the date of signing the settlement and “significant time for almost four (4) months” after signing the agreement. Id. at 3. It is impossible to determine the exact number of hours that ADAP will spend monitoring the implementation of the new policies under the settlement agreement after final settlement approval and during the settlement term, but the parties jointly agree that the $ 230,000.00 request represents a reasonable fee for litigation of this kind. Moreover, the parties agreed on the record during the fairness hearings that the request for attorneys’ fees was reasonable.
After considering the Johnson factors, the court found that the fee was reasonable and no adjustment of the lodestar figure was warranted. These settled claims, which have been ongoing since 2014, are extraordinarily large in scope; they concern both current and future prisoners on and subject to involuntary-medication orders; and they sought and achieved a remedial order that mandates a dramatic
40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 41 of 46
transformation in the way the Department treats such prisoners. The range of complex legal and factual questions presented by the plaintiffs’ claims, and the amount of time the plaintiffs’ attorneys reasonably spent both in preparing these claims for trial and in negotiating and securing approval of the settlement agreement, warrant the sizeable fee award.

C. PLRA

The PLRA provides that a “court shall not grant or

approve any prospective relief unless the court finds

that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further

than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the violation of the Federal right.”

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

In conducting this

“need-narrowness-intrusiveness” inquiry, a court is

required to “give substantial weight to any adverse

impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal

justice system caused by the relief.” Id.

41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 42 of 46

While the requirement to engage in a

need-narrowness-intrusiveness analysis must be met in

some circumstances, “[t]he parties are free to make any

concessions or enter into any stipulations they deem

appropriate” when submitting an initial settlement to

the court, and the court does not need to “conduct an

evidentiary hearing about or enter particularized

findings concerning any facts or factors about which

there is not dispute.” Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d

777, 785 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000).

Here, the parties agreed that the proposed

settlement satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Proposed

Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement

(doc. no. 1248-1) at 12. Based on the court’s

independent review of the agreement, the court agreed.

The court further found--and the parties

stipulated--that the settlement agreement will not have

an adverse effect on public safety or the operation of

the criminal justice system.

See 18 U.S.C.

42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 43 of 46

§ 3626(a)(1)(A). To the contrary, once the Department

implements

the

agreed-upon

revised

involuntary-medication regulation, prisoners will be

afforded more notice and given an increased opportunity

to challenge an adverse involuntary-medication order.

Furthermore, the documentation that the Department is

required to maintain will ensure that reviews of

involuntary-medication decisions afford prisoners the

process they are due. And, finally, the Department

will retain the ability to use involuntary-medication

orders to treat prisoners who truly need to be

medicated without their consent.

In addition, the PLRA’s requirement that any

prospective relief order must terminate within two

years after court approval (or one year after the

court’s denial of termination of a prospective relief

order) is satisfied. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A).

As explained previously, the agreement is set to

terminate two years after the court approved the

settlement.

43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 44 of 46

Moreover, the requirements for appointing a special

master in a prison case, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f), are

inapplicable here.

The parties agreed to the

appointment of United States Magistrate Judge John E.

Ott to serve as a mediator, not a special master, for

any “dispute related to the terms and conditions of ...

this Agreement.”

Proposed Phase 2A Involuntary

Medication Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1248-1) at

13. Finally, to the extent 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f) may

still be applicable, the parties have expressly waived

the right to challenge Judge Ott’s decision or this

settlement on that basis.

In sum, the court is satisfied that its entry of a

consent decree is in full compliance with the PLRA.

IV. CONCLUSION In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court recognized that prisoners possess “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs under the Due

44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 45 of 46

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 494 U.S.

at 221–22. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently

recognized the need to balance its “longstanding

adherence to the principle that inmates retain at least

some constitutional rights despite incarceration with

the recognition that prison authorities are best

equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison

administration.” Id. at 223–24.

The parties’ settlement reflects a commitment

towards balancing those interests. It also represents

years of dedication towards ensuring compliance with

the dictates of the Constitution.

The court

understands both parties’ investment in this process to

be genuine, and commends them for it.

The court also, again, recognizes the important

role played by prisoners, who, in this context, are

subject to the Department’s involuntary-medication

regime, as well as the numerous prisoners who submitted

comments, for their advocacy on behalf of themselves

and others.

45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1486 Filed 11/27/17 Page 46 of 46

Finally, the court would like to extend a special

thank you for the tireless efforts of United States

Magistrate Judge John E. Ott. Without his efforts, the

court is convinced that this agreement would not have

been possible.

For all of the above reasons, the court approved

and adopted, as its own partial final judgment, the

parties'

settlement

of

the

plaintiffs'

involuntary-medication claims.

DONE, this the 27th day of November, 2017.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

46

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1603 Filed 02/08/18 Page 1 of 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

AMENDED ORDER (REPLACING DOC. NO. 1601)

During an evidentiary hearing on February 7, 2018,

the plaintiffs presented evidence (plaintiffs'

demonstrative exhibit 167, an excerpt of which is

attached) that allegedly reflects that the Alabama

Department of Corrections has held approximately 20

inmates with serious mental illness in segregation

housing units for periods of more than 30 days between

February 1, 2017, and January 31, 2018--including

several for significantly longer periods. Because, as

the defendants recognize, it is categorically

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1603 Filed 02/08/18 Page 2 of 3
inappropriate to place inmates with serious mental illness in segregation for longer than 30 days at a time, it is ORDERED, as to each of the inmates listed in the attached excerpt of plaintiffs’ demonstrative exhibit 167, that, by February 9, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., the defendants are to (1) confirm that the inmate has been removed from segregation, give the date of removal, and explain where that inmate has moved to, or (2) explain why that inmate has not been removed from segregation, which explanation shall also include the length of time the inmate has remained in segregation (including the dates of each stint) during the period covered in the exhibit and the dates of any crisis or medical/mental-health placements during that period.
Because plaintiffs’ demonstrative exhibit 167 was based upon a limited sample of information provided from defendants, the court does understand that the list is not complete. Nor does the court conclude, at this time, that the list is accurate. However, given
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1603 Filed 02/08/18 Page 3 of 3
the urgency of this issue, the court opts to act now upon this initial sample.
Furthermore, the court focuses in this order on inmates with serious mental illness in segregation for longer than 30 days because the parties agree that placement for that length of time is categorically inappropriate for such inmates. However, this order should not be read to suggest that placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in segregation for 30 days or less is appropriate.
DONE, this the 8th day of February, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARDS BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON DUNN, in his official )

capacity as Commissioner

)

of the Alabama Department of

)

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-00601-MHT-GMB J. Thompson

PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
REQUIRING THE IMMEDIATE CLOSURE OF BIBB CORRECTIONAL FACILITY’S SEGREGATION UNITS

Plaintiffs seek immediate relief closing the segregation units at Bibb

Correctional Facility. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The circumstances surrounding these

units are well known to the Court. On January 20, 2017, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr.

Craig Haney recommended that the segregation units at Bibb Correctional Facility

be closed immediately because of the risk of harm they pose—a recommendation

he had never made in any prison. Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1239

(M.D. Ala. 2017) (Liability Opinion); Dr. Craig Haney, Jan. 20, 2018 Trial Tr., at

140:5-143:14, 165:13-21. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Kathryn Burns testified

that the Bibb segregation units were “very concerning” and that she had not “seen
1

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 2 of 20
units like that in a long time.” Dr. Kathryn Burns, Dec. 12, 2106 Trial Tr., at 214:5-215:23. As the Court noted in its liability opinion, even Defendants’ own security expert, Robert Ayers, “credibly testified to his suspicion that, because of understaffing and safety concerns, correctional officers were not walking down the hallway away from the central cube at Bibb as frequently as they claimed.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1239.
Now, over a year later and despite the Court’s Liability Opinion, Defendants have done nothing to address the deficiencies in the segregation units at Bibb. Staffing deficiencies remain beyond critical, and information presented during this remedial trial on segregation indicated an extraordinary risk for prisoners housed in these units. There are few, if any, correctional rounds, mental health rounds, and little or no out-of-cell time. And prisoners with mental illnesses, including serious mental illnesses, remain housed in the units. Such gross violations of the State’s basic obligation to provide for the safety and health of prisoners while they are in state custody creates, and perpetuates, a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners housed in segregation. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1192 (articulating Eighth Amendment standard). Moreover, such conditions present an imminent risk of harm to prisoners located in the segregation units. The Court should not let this situation remain unaddressed until the conclusion of the segregation remedial phase or beyond.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 3 of 20
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs move the Court to order Defendants to (1) immediately close the segregation units at Bibb; (2) move all prisoners currently placed in the units to other correctional facilities or other housing after an expedited review of their individual situations and healthcare needs, if any; (3) report to the Court by Monday, February 12, 2018, at 5:00 p.m. regarding the status of each prisoner currently held in the Bibb segregation units; and (4) keep the segregation units closed until Defendants can appropriately renovate or replace the units to address inadequacies with the physical plant and provide appropriate staffing, monitoring, and treatment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. The Physical Layout of the Bibb Segregation Units
In its Liability Opinion, the Court found that Bibb’s segregation units: might be the most egregious in terms of visibility: each housing unit has its own segregation unit of a few cells shut off from the rest of the unit, down a long hallway and through a door, with no line of sight from the central officer station and officers entering the space to check on the prisoners only periodically. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1239; see also Pls. Dem. Ex. 137.1 On February 9, 2018, Associate Commissioner Grantt Culliver confirmed2 that cubicle officers
1 There are thirty-six (36) segregation cells at Bibb. Pls. Ex. 1404. 2 Because Associate Commissioner Culliver’s testimony referred to herein occurred today, Plaintiffs do not yet have even a rough transcript to cite. However,
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 4 of 20
cannot see into the segregation units at Bibb and that officers must physically enter the unit to observe and check on prisoners housed in segregation. Associate Commissioner Culliver further confirmed that duty post logs and correctional officer rounds logs indicate that security checks are not happening as they should in the Bibb segregation units, with prisoners going hours and even days without being seen by a correctional officer.
ADOC’s own facilities assessment consultants, Goodwyn Mills, recommended in fall 2017 that ADOC create an entirely new segregation unit for Bibb because of the current lack of “visual control.” Pls. Ex. 1344 at 65. Yet Defendants have done nothing to relocate or increase visibility within the Bibb segregation units, nor have they presented any plan to do so. See Doc. 1533 (Defs.’ Segregation Remedial Plan) at 36-39. Further, Defendants have not moved any prisoners to other segregation units in other facilities even though Associate Commissioner Culliver confirmed that space was available system-side; apparently, it is just too difficult to transport them.
II. People with Mental Illness in Segregation Bibb Correctional Facility continues to house prisoners in segregation at a
disproportionate rate. As of January 10, 2018, 38% of prisoners housed in segregation at Bibb were on the mental-health caseload, compared to just 17.8% of these representations are made based on the best recollection of all Plaintiffs’ counsel who were present.
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 5 of 20
the total Bibb population on the caseload. Pls. Ex. 1404 (Jan. 10, 2018 ADOC Segregation Roster); Pls. Ex. 1376 (Jan. 2018 MHM Master Roster); Pls. Ex. 1393 at 1 (Dec. 2017 MHM Monthly Report).
Though the Court held in June 2017 that prisoners with serious mental illness should not be housed in segregation absent extenuating circumstances, as of January 10, 2018, there were five (5) prisoners with serious mental illness housed in segregation at Bibb. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1247; Pls. Dem. Ex. 166 (Prisoners Nos. 11, 44, 122, 131, 132). Two (2) of those prisoners were also listed on a segregation roster from on or around December 12, 2017, giving rise to an inference they had been housed in segregation for over thirty days. Pls. Dem. Ex. 166 (Prisoners Nos. 11 and 44).
Additionally, a total of thirteen (13) individuals at Bibb listed on the January 10, 2018 segregation roster were on the mental-health caseload. Pls. Dem. Ex. 164 (Prisoner Nos. 28, 65, 110, 111, 128, 135, 142, 280, 294, 297, 311, 313, 350). Of those individuals, seven (7) were also listed on a segregation roster from on or around December 12, 2017, giving rise to an inference they had been housed in segregation for over thirty days. Pls. Dem. Ex. 164 (Prisoner Nos. 28, 65, 110, 111, 128, 135, 142).
Furthermore, within the past year, there were ten (10) instances of individuals who were discharged from suicide watch directly to segregation at
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 6 of 20
Bibb. Pls. Ex. 1401 (Jan.-Dec. 2017 Suicide Prevention Monitoring Logs). Commissioner Naglich testified on February 7, 2018, that this practice is not appropriate and would be especially problematic for a person with a mental illness. Ruth Naglich, Feb. 7, 2018 R.D. Trial Tr., at 211:23-212:7.
Finally, as of January 2018, at Bibb, there were 100 individuals with categorical serious mental illness diagnoses who were coded as MH-1. Pls. Dem. Ex. 165. Defendants’ current coding scheme requires these individuals to be coded as MH-2 or higher. Ruth Naglich, Feb. 7, 2018 R.D. Trial Tr., at 121:19-24. Because ADOC’s current policy only prohibits the placement of individuals coded as MH-2 or higher from being placed in segregation, these people are at risk of being placed in segregation because they are miscoded, and therefore, they face a substantial risk of serious harm. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1247. In fact, three individuals with categorical serious mental illness who were miscoded as MH-1 were placed in segregation at Bibb during December 2017 or January 2018. Pls. Dem. Ex. 165-SEG (highlighting Prisoner Nos. 139, 337, 664).
III. Correctional Officer Rounds Are Not Occurring Correctional officer rounds in the Bibb segregation units are not happening
at the frequency ADOC’s own policy requires. ADOC Administrative Regulation 434 requires security officers to observe prisoners housed in segregation every thirty minutes and to note such checks on a duty post log. Pls. Ex. 1399 (Admin.
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 7 of 20
Reg. 434) at 8. On February 9, 2018, Associate Commissioner Culliver testified that he would not be surprised to know that correctional officer rounds are not occurring as required due to understaffing. Indeed, as of October 2017, Bibb was only staffed at 23% of the authorized correctional officer positions. Pls. Ex. 1308 (June 2017 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report) at 16 (listing authorized correctional officer numbers); Pls. Ex. 1323 (Correctional Officer Staffing Numbers).3 Four months ago, Defendants received preliminary staffing recommendations for Bibb from their security consultants, Merle and Margaret Savage. The Savages recommended that ADOC station one correctional officer in each segregation unit at Bibb twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week. Doc. 1374-2 at 13 (Savages’ Preliminary Staffing Recommendations for Bibb).
Duty post logs from Bibb segregation units reflect that correctional officer rounds are not occurring every thirty (30) minutes and that, at times, hours and even days pass without correctional officer rounds happening. Pls. Ex. 1406 (Bibb Correctional Officer Rounds Logs). Indeed, the logs confirm that one prisoner, C.C., who has been diagnosed with Bipolar II disorder, went four (4) days without being checked on by a correctional officer. Pls. Ex. 1376 (Jan. 2018 MHM Master Roster) at 9; Pls. Ex. 1406 (Bibb Correctional Officer Rounds Logs)
3 On February 9, 2018, Associate Commissioner Culliver testified that Bibb was currently staffed at 28-30% of the authorized correctional officer positions. But it was unclear the basis of this conclusion and/or whether this number included supervisory officers.
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 8 of 20
at ADOC0413834, ADOC0416080-82 (showing no entries at all into the segregation unit from January 5 through January 8, 2018).
Furthermore, some correctional officer rounds logs from Bibb are signed by Correctional Cubicle Officers (CCOs), who have not received training at the Academy. See, e.g., Pls. Ex. 1406 (Bibb Duty Post Logs) at ADOC0413836-37, ADOC0413857-64; see also Jefferson Dunn, Nov. 30, 2017 Trial Tr., at 79:1-86:9. These officers are not allowed to interact with prisoners because they have not received adequate training. Jefferson Dunn, Nov. 30, 2017 Trial Tr., at 79:1-86:9. On February 9, 2018, Associate Commissioner Culliver testified that, based on the logs, it is not possible to know whether CCOs themselves conducted the rounds or simply signed the form. If CCOs are in fact conducting segregation rounds, prisoners are placed at a further risk of irreparable harm because they are being directly supervised only by untrained officers.
IV. Mental-Health Rounds Are Not Occurring Mental-health rounds in the Bibb segregation units are not happening at the
frequency ADOC’s own policy requires. ADOC’s own policy requires mentalhealth segregation rounds four days per week. Jt. Ex. 126 (ADOC Admin. Reg. 624) at 2. While mental-health rounds logs from Bibb reflect that mental-health rounds occurred on six days during a two-week period, the duty post logs from the same period reflect zero entries by mental-health staff into the segregation units at
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 9 of 20
Bibb. Compare Pls. Ex. 1433 (Bibb Mental Health Rounds Logs) (documenting rounds on six days during a two-week period) with Pls. Ex. 1406 (Bibb Duty Post Logs) at ADOC0416080-82. The rounds logs contain almost no substantive notes regarding prisoners’ mental-health status, further evidencing the cursory contact, if any, between mental-health staff and prisoners in segregation, some of whom have serious mental illnesses. See Pls. Ex. 1433 (Bibb Mental Health Rounds Logs).
V. Out-of-Cell Time Is Not Provided to Prisoners Housed in Segregation at Bibb
Prisoners housed in segregation at Bibb are not receiving out-of-cell time. The logs maintained for prisoner C.C., who has a Bipolar II diagnosis, reflect that he received one exercise walk between December 28, 2017, and January 26, 2018. Pls. Ex. 1406 (Bibb Segregation Logs) at ADOC0416080-82. And class member M.P., who has a serious mental illness diagnosis of Psychotic Disorder Unspecified, received no exercise walks between December 10, 2017, and January 12, 2018. Id. at ADOC0416111-15; Pls. Ex. 1376 (Jan. 2018 MHM Master Roster). The Court has found that out-of-cell time is critical for prisoners with serious mental illness who are housed in residential treatment units and failure to provide it results in a substantial risk of serious harm. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1213-17, 1267-68. Similarly, the failure to provide out-of-cell time to prisoners with serious mental illnesses housed in segregation only compounds the risk of harm segregation poses to this population. See id. at 1240 n.65 (noting that other
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 10 of 20
states operate housing units for people with mental illnesses who have committed disciplinary infractions that provide up to twenty (20) hours of out-of-cell time per week as well as therapeutic activities).
LEGAL STANDARD
To obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs possible harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction would not disserve the public interest. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 788 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015). If a temporary restraining order is sought, the moving party must also show that immediate and irreparable injury will result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).4
ARGUMENT
4 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B), the attorney for the movant seeking a temporary restraining order must “certif[y] in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Today, counsel for the parties conferred briefly. No agreement on segregation at Bibb has been reached, but Plaintiffs have expressed their willingness to continue to discuss the issue should Defendants find evidence that the conditions in segregation are less dire than the duty post logs and other ADOC records show. However, given the extraordinary nature of the evidence of risk of harm in segregation at Bibb, Plaintiffs do not believe they should postpone bringing this motion.
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 11 of 20
I. Defendants Continue to Be Deliberately Indifferent to Substantial Risks of Serious Harm to Prisoners Housed in the Segregation Units at Bibb.
The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials adequately meet the serious mental health needs of prisoners. See Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986). It also requires that officials “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to prisoner safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but “the cases are also clear that it is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. Where officials have actual knowledge that prisoners are at substantial risk of serious harm, but “disregard[] that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable manner,” they violate the Eighth Amendment. Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (“It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.”)
The Court has already found Defendants deliberately indifferent with respect to segregation conditions system-wide and noted its particular concern with the
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 12 of 20
situation at Bibb. Nevertheless, Defendants have not taken any actions to correct the deficiencies at this specific facility. As deeply disturbing as the facts are here, the response of ADOC officials is even more so. While acknowledging that the situation in the segregation units at Bibb “concerned” him, Associate Commissioner Culliver questioned the veracity of ADOC’S own documents and advocated for keeping the units open despite the severe risks to prisoners, merely because it would be too difficult to transport them to another facility. Moreover, as of February 9, 2018, his stated plan of action was not to review immediately each prisoners’ situation and house them elsewhere where possible, but to gather the various logs together and to discuss the situation with the Bibb warden. Furthermore, there is no plan to address the lack of visibility into the segregation cells caused by the way the units were constructed. This de facto lack of response merely demonstrates the continued deliberate indifference of Defendants to the substantial risk of serious harm faced by seriously mentally ill prisoners in the segregation units at Bibb.
II. Defendants’ Failure to Adequately Supervise, Monitor, and Treat Prisoners in the Segregation Units at Bibb Creates a Substantial Threat of Irreparable Injury.
The injuries at issue in this Motion—suicide, serious self-injury, or decompensation—are patently imminent and irreparable. There is no question that the vast majority of suicides and suicide attempts in the ADOC system have
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 13 of 20
occurred while the prisoner was housed in segregation. Pls. Ex. 1267; see also Braggs, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (citing Dr. Craig Haney regarding the “characteristically high numbers of suicide deaths and incidents of self-harm and self-mutilation” that occur in segregation). Further, the Court has already noted that “[t]he serious psychological harm stemming from segregation is even more devastating for those with mental illness.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. at 1237 (emphasis added).
As stated above, as recently as January 20, 2018, there were five (5) prisoners with serious mental illness currently housed in segregation at Bibb, and two (2) of them may have been in segregation more than 30 days. Similarly, there were thirteen (13) individuals on the mental-health caseload in segregation, and seven (7) may have been housed in segregation for over thirty days. The risks to these individuals is even more acute considering the lack of any monitoring by health or security staff, virtually no out-of-cell time, and the dearth of mental health treatment. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1245. There are literally days in which not one official has entered the segregation units at Bibb. This cannot be allowed to continue—particularly when Defendants have empty segregation cells in other facilities. Defendants’ promises of more staffing, monitoring, and treatment, or their references to the purportedly limiting effect of the application of “extenuating circumstances” on the placement of seriously mentally ill prisoners in
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 14 of 20
segregation, rings hollow against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. And in any event, none of these measures alter the physical deficiencies in how the units were constructed in the first place. The Court “need not await a tragic event” before it may act. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.”).
As set forth above, Defendants’ conduct and knowing failure to act constitutes an ongoing violation of their constitutional duty to adequately protect the safety of prisoners located in the segregation units at Bibb. An ongoing constitutional violation also constitutes irreparable harm in and of itself. See Laube v. Haley, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1251 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (“The existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes proof of an irreparable harm…”) (quoting Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 n.3 (7th Cir.1978)).
III. The Threatened Injury to Seriously Mentally Ill Prisoners at Risk of Serious Injury or Death Significantly Outweighs the Harm of Issuing an Injunction Against Defendants.
In light of the previous findings of the Court in the Liability Opinion, the testimony of Associate Commissioner Culliver that virtually no action is being taken to address the particular and singular issues with respect to the segregation units at Bibb, and the incontrovertible proof that seriously mentally ill prisoners continue to be placed in the units, there is no legitimate question that the threatened
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 15 of 20
injury to prisoners significantly outweighs any purported harm to Defendants. See Laube, 234 F. Supp. at 1252 (finding that the defendants would “suffer no harm from providing sufficient staff and adequate facilities to reduce the risk of assault and harm to women prisoners”); see also Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Lack of funds for facilities cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical care and treatment for inmates.”). Defendants have failed their constitutional duty to adequately monitor and treat prisoners located in segregation generally, but particularly at Bibb. And their intransigence continues unabated. In these circumstances, Plaintiffs respectfully submit, the Court must act.
IV. A Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Would Be in the Public Interest.
The public has a substantial interest in not only safeguarding the rights afforded under the Constitution generally, but also specifically in protecting prisoners in the segregation units at Bibb from preventable death, self-harm, or decompensation. See Laube, 234 F. Supp. at 1252 (“[T]here is a strong public interest in requiring that plaintiffs’ constitutional rights no longer be violated, as well as in prevention of the foreseeable violence that will occur if present conditions persist.”). Defendants have disregarded their constitutional obligation to adequately monitor and treat prisoners housed in the segregation units at Bibb, and the public would be served by an injunction requiring them to adhere to their
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 16 of 20
constitutional duty by not just monitoring and treating prisoners in segregation but by closing the Bibb segregation units altogether.
V. Plaintiffs Should Not Be Required to Post Bond Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
The Court should require no security or nominal security under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), as Plaintiffs and class members are prisoners seeking compliance with their basic civil rights and injunctive relief to prevent further death and serious injury. See BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., LLC, 425 F.3d 964, 971 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is well-established that the amount of security required by the rule is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and the court may elect to require no security at all.”) (quotations and ellipses omitted); Complete Angler, LLC v. City of Clearwater, Fla., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Waiving the bond requirement is particularly appropriate where a plaintiff alleges the infringement of a fundamental constitutional right.”); see also All States Humane Game Fowl Org., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., No. 308-CV-312-J-33MCR, 2008 WL 2949442, at *13 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2008) (“Plaintiffs bring a constitutional law complaint and allege infringement of fundamental rights. The action that they fear, permanent destruction of their roosters, is a considerable loss to face. The Court finds it appropriate to waive the bond requirement in this case.”).
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 17 of 20

RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiffs seek an order requiring Defendants to (1) immediately close the segregation units at Bibb; (2) move all prisoners currently placed in the units to other correctional facilities or other housing after an expedited review of their individual situations and healthcare needs, if any; (3) report to the Court by Monday, February 12, 2018, at 5:00 p.m. regarding the status of each prisoner currently held in the Bibb segregation units; and (4) keep the segregation units closed until Defendants can appropriately renovate or replace the units to address inadequacies with the physical plant.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction as set forth in this Motion.

Dated: Feb. 9, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Maria V. Morris___________________ Maria V. Morris One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104

Rhonda Brownstein (ASB-3193-O64R) Maria V. Morris (ASB-2198-R64M) Grace Graham (ASB-3040-A64G) Latasha L. McCrary (ASB-1935-L75M) Jonathan Blocker (ASB-6818-G19I) Caitlin J. Sandley (ASB-5317-S48R)
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 18 of 20

SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 Telephone: (334) 956-8200 Facsimile: (334) 956-8481 rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org maria.morris@splcenter.org grace.graham@splcenter.org latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org jonathan.blocker@splcenter.org cj.sandley@splcenter.org

William Van Der Pol, Jr. (ASB-2112-114F)

Glenn N. Baxter (ASB-3825-A41G)

Lonnie J. Williams

Barbara A. Lawrence

Andrea J. Mixson

Alabama Disabilities Advocacy

Program

Box 870395

Tuscaloosa, AL 35487

Telephone: (205) 348-4928

Facsimile:

(205)

348-3909

wvanderpoljr@adap.ua.edu

gnbaxter@adap.ua.edu

lwilliams@adap.ua.edu

blawrence@adap.ua.edu

amixson@adap.ua.edu

Lisa W. Borden (ASB-5673-D57L)

William G. Somerville, III (ASB-6185-E63W)

Andrew P. Walsh (ASB-3755-W77W)

Dennis Nabors

Patricia Clotfelter (ASB-0841-F43P)

Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz PC

420 20th Street North, Suite 1400

Birmingham, AL 35203

Telephone: (205) 328-0480

Facsimile:

(205)

322-8007

lborden@bakerdonelson.com

18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 19 of 20
wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com awalsh@bakerdonelson.com dnabors@bakerdonelson.com pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com Gregory M. Zarzaur (ASB-0759-E45Z) Anil A. Mujumdar (ASB-2004-L65M) Diandra S. Debrosse (ASB-2956-N76D) Denise Wiginton Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 983-7985 Facsimile: (888) 505-0523 gregory@zarzaur.com anil@zarzaur.com diandra@zarzaur.com denise@zarzaur.com ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1614 Filed 02/09/18 Page 20 of 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have on this 9th day of February, 2018, electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

David R. Boyd, Esq. John G. Smith, Esq. John W. Naramore, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101-0078 dboyd@balch.com jgsmith@balch.com jnaramore@balch.com
William R. Lunsford, Esq. Melissa K. Marler, Esq. Stephen C. Rogers, Esq. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C. 655 Gallatin Street, SW Huntsville, AL 35801 blunsford@maynardcooper.com mmarler@maynardcooper.com srogers@maynardcooper.com
Anne Hill, Esq. Elizabeth A. Sees, Esq. Joseph G. Stewart, Jr., Esq. Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, AL 36104 anne.hill@doc.alabama.gov elizabeth.sees@doc.alabama.gov joseph.stewart@doc.alabama.gov

Steven C. Corhern, Esq. Balch & Bingham LLP Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201-0306 scorhern@balch.com
Mitesh Shah, Esq. Luther M. Dorr, Esq. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C. 1901 6th Avenue North, Suite 2400
Birmingham, AL 35203 mshah@maynardcooper.com rdorr@maynardcooper.com
Deana Johnson, Esq. Brett T. Lane, Esq.
MHM Services, Inc. 1447 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 500 Atlanta, GA 30309 djohnson@mhm-services.com btlane@mhm-services.com
/s/ Maria V. Morris_______________ One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs

20

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 1 of 210

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A REMEDIAL OPINION ON IMMEDIATE RELIEF FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION

In this long-standing lawsuit, the court previously

found that the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC)

has failed to provide adequate mental-health care to

inmates in its custody in violation of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Braggs

v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (Thompson,

J.), Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14CV601-MHT, 2019 WL

539050, --- F. Supp. 3d --- (M.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2019)

(Thompson, J.). More recently, in the wake of 15 inmate

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 2 of 210
suicides in a 15-month period, the plaintiffs asked for immediate suicide-prevention relief. For reasons that follow, the court concludes that these suicides, as well as other evidence in the record, show that ADOC continues to fail to provide adequate suicide-prevention measures and, thus, subjects inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm, including self-harm, continued pain and suffering, and suicide. The risk of suicide is so severe and imminent that the court must redress it immediately. Therefore, the court will grant the plaintiffs’ motion for immediate relief by making permanent most provisions of an interim suicide-prevention agreement that the parties reached early in this litigation; by adopting, in large measure, the recommendations proposed by experts for both parties; and by requiring court monitoring that is limited to the immediate relief ordered here. By agreement of the parties, the issue of non-immediate suicide-prevention relief will be resolved by the court later.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 3 of 210
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The plaintiffs in this class-action lawsuit include a group of seriously mentally ill state prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), which represents mentally ill prisoners in Alabama. During the liability trial, and in response to the suicide of class member Jamie Wallace just days after he testified, the parties agreed to a series of interim suicide-prevention measures. See Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1). The court reduced this ‘interim agreement’ to an order. See Interim Relief Order (doc. nos. 1106, 1106-1). In June 2017, the court issued a liability opinion in which it found that ADOC’s mental-health care for prisoners in its custody was, “[s]imply put, ... horrendously inadequate” and violated the Eighth Amendment. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1267. The court more specifically found that “ADOC’s inadequate crisis care and long-term suicide-prevention measures have created a substantial risk of serious harm, including self-harm, suicide, and continued pain and suffering.”
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 4 of 210

Id. at 1220.

The “serious” suicide-prevention

deficiencies identified by the court included ADOC’s

failure to provide crisis care to those who need it;

placement of prisoners in crisis in dangerous and harmful

settings, including unsafe crisis cells; inadequate

treatment for prisoners in crisis care; inadequate

monitoring of suicidal prisoners; inappropriate release

of prisoners from suicide watch; and inadequate follow-up

care for prisoners released from suicide watch. See id.

at 1218-31. Moreover, the court found that these risks

are particularly heightened for prisoners with serious

mental illnesses. “Serious mental illness” (SMI) is a

term of art used in the field of psychiatry which refers

to “a subset of particularly disabling conditions ...

defined by the diagnosis, duration, and severity of the

symptoms.” Id. at 1246. Certain conditions are always

considered SMIs, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,

and major depressive disorder. See id. at 1186 n.6.

Over a period of months, the court adopted several

‘remedial orders’ regarding mental-health care that

4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 5 of 210

touched on suicide prevention.1

To fashion a

comprehensive suicide-prevention remedy, the parties

agreed to, and the court accepted, a process whereby Drs.

Mary Perrien and Kathryn Burns, the defendants’ and

plaintiffs’ correctional mental-health experts,

respectively, would “assess ADOC facilities and

operations related to suicide prevention and provide a

report with recommendations to resolve the constitutional

violation determined by the Court in the Liability

Opinion and Order.” Joint Notice (doc. no. 2014) at 1;

Order (doc. no. 2020) (adopting the parties’ plan for

assessing suicide-prevention measures).

On January 18, 2019, before the parties’ experts

completed their report, and in response to a series of

suicides, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion

regarding the placement of high-risk prisoners in

1. “After two months of mediation to develop a comprehensive remedial plan, it became apparent that the remedy was too large and complex to be addressed all at once. Therefore, the court severed the remedial phase into discrete issues, to be addressed seriatim.” Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT, 2018 WL 985759 at * 1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2018) (Thompson, J.).
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 6 of 210

segregation. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction (doc.

no. 2276) at 1. The court construed it as seeking

permanent, albeit immediate, relief. See Order (doc. no.

2345).

On March 8, the experts filed (1) a report with

recommendations for relief, (2) a report identifying a

subsection of those recommendations to be implemented

immediately in light of the recent suicide crisis

plaguing ADOC, and (3) case summaries of many of the

recent suicides.

See Joint Expert Report and

Recommendations, Immediate Relief Recommendations, Joint

Expert Case Summaries (doc. nos. 2416-1, 2416-4, 2416-2).

Their reports were the product of an extensive and

thorough study, in which they reviewed thousands of

documents from ADOC, toured multiple facilities, and

interviewed both prisoners and staff.

In March and April, the court held a trial to

determine whether immediate and non-immediate

suicide-prevention relief is needed and, if so, what it

should be. The parties and the court decided during the

6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 7 of 210
hearing that the portion of the hearing on non-immediate suicide-prevention relief would be continued to a future date. This opinion addresses only immediate relief in response to the ongoing substantial and pervasive inadequacies in ADOC’s suicide-prevention efforts, exemplified by the 15 suicides that have occurred since December 2017.
As immediate relief, the plaintiffs first request that the court enter an order making permanent most of the provisions of the interim agreement. The agreement addressed licensing of mental-health professionals; suicide-watch procedures, including inmates’ placement on and discharge from suicide watch, follow-up appointments upon discharge, and documentation requirements; and suicide risk assessments, including a monthly evaluation of assessments.
The plaintiffs also request that the court adopt as an order the experts’ second report. This report identifies a subsection of their recommendations that should be implemented on an immediate and permanent
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 8 of 210
basis. These ‘immediate relief recommendations’ address suicide-watch follow-ups, referrals to higher levels of care, preventing discharge from suicide watch to segregation, training for staff, security checks in segregation, confidentiality, and immediate life-saving intervention. In addition, the plaintiffs seek interim monitoring of the immediate relief.
Finally, the plaintiffs also argue that the defendants are placing mentally ill prisoners in units that, while not labelled as segregation or restrictive housing, impose equally severe restrictions on out-of-cell time, and the same accompanying risk of serious harm, particularly suicide. Therefore, they contend, the court’s relief should extend to these “segregation like” settings.
The court heard substantial evidence suggesting that prisoners in certain units receive very little out-of-cell time. However, the court needs more time to consider the evidence, and may decide to solicit additional input from the parties before deciding this
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 9 of 210
critical issue. Therefore, the court’s findings remain open as to this discrete issue, and the court will take it up after this opinion is issued.
II. RECENT SUICIDES2 Fifteen men in ADOC custody have committed suicide since December 30, 2017, an average of almost one suicide per month. An examination of their cases illustrates severe and systemic inadequacies in ADOC’s suicide-prevention efforts. Many of the inadequacies, detailed in the 15 cases below, are instances of ADOC’s pervasive and substantial noncompliance with the interim agreement and other remedial measures that they agreed to implement; that is, they are examples of what ADOC recognized are “systemic failures to comply with court orders.” Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738.3 Other
2. The court relies upon the record from the liability trial and all prior remedial hearings. However, in the interests of avoiding repetition, the court does not describe that evidence here.
3. On February 15, 2019, Deborah Crook, ADOC’s Director of Mental Health Services, wrote to the
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 10 of 210
inadequacies, while not necessarily constituting
noncompliance with specific remedial orders to date, show
ADOC’s failure to live up to its obligations under the
Eighth Amendment. In sum, both types of deficiencies
summarized in the 15 cases below demonstrate that
immediate relief is necessary to address the substantial
department’s mental-health vendor, Wexford, complaining of “a number of troubling failures by Wexford.” Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738. Specifically, she wrote that “ADOC has identified the following systemic failures to comply with court orders in Braggs: (1) Failure to input the SMI designation for all inmates into the Health Services Module; (2) Failure to complete the Suicide Risk Assessment (SRA) by a Qualified Mental Health Professional (QMHP) when an inmate is placed in a crisis cell; (3) Failure to place an inmate on acute suicide watch with constant observation (rather than MHO) when risk factors for potential suicidality are present until a psychologist or psychiatrist is consulted; (4) Failure to document consultation with a psychiatrist or psychologist prior to discharging an inmate from crisis placement; and (5) Failure to complete or timely complete pre-placement screenings and 7-day assessments for inmates placed in a restrictive housing unit (‘RHU’).” Id. Crook noted that “Wexford’s failures are serious in nature,” and “have the potential to contribute to additional harm to inmates in the care and custody of the ADOC.” Id. As the liability opinion makes clear, Wexford’s failures are ADOC’s failures. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1188-89, 1193 n.15 (“The State’s obligation remains even if it has contracted with private parties to provide medical care.”).
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 11 of 210
risk of serious harm to which prisoners remain exposed. Rashaud Morrissette
On March 8, 2019, Rashaud Morrissette hanged himself with a belt in the shower of a segregation unit at Fountain prison. See Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 184; Pls. Ex. 2661 at ADOC0470542. ADOC’s suicide-prevention failures in his case include that before entering segregation, he did not receive a critical preplacement screening for issues such as whether he was at risk of suicide or had a serious mental illness (SMI). See Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 185; Burns Apr. 9, 2019, Rough Draft (R.D.) Trial Tr. at 191; see generally Pls. Ex. 2692.
Matthew Holmes Matthew Holmes killed himself on February 14, 2019, roughly 12 hours after being transferred from mental-health observation (MHO) to segregation at Limestone prison. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 169, 186. (MHO is a short-term placement that does not have the same level of
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 12 of 210
protections as suicide watch.) ADOC’s suicide-prevention failures in his case include (1) not placing him in suicide watch despite his being suicidal, and (2) placing him in segregation despite his having a SMI, and without adequately assessing his suicide risk or referring him for the emergency mental-health care he needed. Specifically: • On February 11, 2019, Holmes was improperly placed in
MHO, rather than suicide watch. See Defs. Ex. 3613 at SPA_13585. A “Psychiatrist/CRNP Progress Note” on February 12 indicates that he had recently become suicidal after being placed in segregation, and that he had twice attempted suicide in 2010. Id. at SPA_13582. As acknowledged by Deborah Crook, ADOC’s Director of Mental Health Services, Holmes met the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC)’s definition of nonacutely suicidal, and therefore, under the interim agreement, should have been placed on at least nonacute suicide watch (rather than MHO), at which point a suicide risk assessment
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 13 of 210
would have been required. See Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 55.4 • Because he was not placed on suicide watch, he did not receive a suicide risk assessment. See id. at 55-56. Furthermore, the parties’ experts, Drs. Burns and Perrien, flagged that while in MHO, Holmes’s contacts with mental-health staff were conducted inside his cell, “rather than in a confidential area out of cell.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 4; see also Defs. Ex. 3613 at SPA_13581-84. • On February 14, he was ordered released from MHO to segregation per the order of a nurse practitioner who “wrote no note in the chart explaining the rationale for this decision or the level of risk assessed.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 4. Holmes’s February 13 treatment plan review had stated that he
4. Dr. Edward Kern, ADOC’s Director of Psychiatry, similarly testified that Holmes should have been placed on either acute or nonacute suicide watch rather than MHO. See Kern March 29, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2483) at 108. Crook also recognized that there were areas in Holmes’s case that violated the interim agreement. See Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 58.
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 14 of 210
was “not making progress toward treatment plan goals,” Defs. Ex. 3613 at SPA_13577; however, suddenly, the next day, the treatment plan review concluded that he had “completed treatment goal,” id. at SPA_13576; see also Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 4. • The segregation pre-placement screening completed on February 14 at 11:45 a.m. noted that Holmes had a SMI, and that there were “yes” responses to the following three questions: (1) Are you feeling sad, hopeless, or depressed? (2) Have you ever intentionally hurt yourself or attempted suicide? (3) Have you had any serious problems with a significant other, family member or friend recently? See Defs. Ex. 3613 at SPA_13571. As noted by the parties’ experts, despite these responses, Holmes “was not diverted from segregation placement and an ‘urgent’ rather than ‘emergent’ referral to mental health was made.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 4. • Later that night, he was discovered hanging from an
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 15 of 210
overhead light fixture in his segregation cell. See id. • Drs. Burns and Perrien concluded that his case “illustrates the problems with use of MHO rather than approved suicide watch levels, poor documentation of rationale for release from watch, failure to generate an emergency referral to mental health in response to a positive pre-placement screen and releasing SMI inmates from watch directly into segregation.” Id.
Daniel Gentry Daniel Gentry hanged himself at the Donaldson prison Residential Treatment Unit (RTU) on February 6, 2019. ADOC’s suicide-prevention failings include not placing him on suicide watch despite his making clear that he wanted to die, not conducting a suicide risk assessment when indicated, and inadequate review of his suicide. Specifically: • A few weeks before his death, on January 24, 2019, a mental-health progress note reported that Gentry had asked a correctional officer to kill him. See Pls.
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 16 of 210
Ex. 2314 at SPA_13258. In response, he was placed in MHO that day. See id. As plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Burns testified, the MHO placement was inappropriate, because “with someone who’s actively voicing the wish that someone kill him, you would expect to start a suicide watch, either acute or nonacute, but not just mental health observation status.” Burns Apr. 9. 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 94. • Five days into his MHO placement, Gentry continued to report “auditory hallucinations and a desire for someone to kill him.” Pls. Ex. 2314 at SPA_13275. His records indicate that he did not receive a suicide risk assessment in relation to his MHO placement. See generally Pls. Ex. 2314. • On January 31, 2019, Gentry was released from MHO to the RTU at Donaldson. See id. at SPA_13235; Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3. A week later, on February 6, he was discovered hanging from a light fixture inside his cell during a security check. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 17 of 210
3. The correctional officers waited several minutes for medical staff, who upon arriving, told them to remove the sheet from his neck and initiated CPR. See id. Dr. Burns testified that this intervention was inadequate, as the officers should not have waited for medical staff to arrive before removing the noose and beginning CPR. See Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 204. Indeed, both Drs. Burns and Perrien noted with respect to Gentry’s suicide that correctional officers “need additional training and drills regarding first aid and responding to hanging attempts.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3. This observation coincides with the experts’ more general recommendation that ADOC policy and practice be revised to ensure that as soon as two security staff are present, “CPR should be immediately initiated while whatever method of suicide is eliminated.” Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 29. • In carrying out their suicide-prevention assessment,
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 18 of 210
Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive any medical or
security reviews of the suicide, see Joint Expert Case
Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3, even though, in their
expert opinion, ADOC must conduct such reviews in cases
of suicides, see Joint Expert Report and
Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 34. Here, and in
the other cases detailed in this section in which Drs.
Burns and Perrien did not receive medical or security
reviews, the court infers from ADOC’s failure to
provide the reviews that either the reviews were never
conducted, or that--like the limited sample of
documents reviewing suicides that they did
receive--they were generally inadequate.5
5. In response to the plaintiffs’ assertion that Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive medical or security reviews in multiple cases, the defendants repeatedly stated in a post-trial filing that “Drs. Burns and Perrien requested ‘non-privileged’ documents. These medical reviews were conducted by Wexford, and Wexford maintains they are privileged documents.” Defendants’ Response to Amended Chart (doc. no. 2500-1) at 4-17. This argument is unpersuasive. To start, it attempts to excuse only the failure to provide the experts with medical reviews but says nothing about the failure to provide security reviews. And as to the medical reviews, despite ample opportunity, the defendants provided no
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 19 of 210
Paul Ford Paul Ford killed himself in segregation at Kilby prison on January 16, 2019, following two prior suicide attempts in segregation in 2018, and less than a month after being released from suicide watch. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3. ADOC’s suicide-prevention failures in his case include inadequate (1) follow-up mental-health appointments after release from suicide watch, (2) suicide risk assessments, and (3) mental-health assessments while in segregation. Specifically: • In April 2018, while in segregation, Ford set fire to his cell and attempted to hang himself. See id.; Pls. Ex. 2309 at SPA_9757. On July 30, he again attempted to hang himself while in segregation and was placed on suicide watch. See Pls. Ex. 2309 at SPA_9741.
evidence to support their contention--made after the remedial hearing ended--that (1) Wexford conducted the reviews, or (2) that Wexford had in fact asserted that they were privileged. In short, the defendants make no argument concerning the security reviews, and their privilege argument for the medical reviews is untimely and unsupported.
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 20 of 210

• Following his release from suicide watch on August 2,

he was placed in segregation, but records indicate

that, following discharge from suicide watch, he did

not receive the required three-, seven-, and 30-day

follow-up appointments. See id. at SPA_9730; see

generally Pls. Ex. 2309.

• Ford’s initial mental-health assessment in segregation

failed to note his history of suicide attempts and left

the “assessment” section blank.

See id. at

SPA_9728-29.

• On December 12, he cut his wrist while in segregation,

for which he was charged with a disciplinary violation.

See id. at SPA_9670.

• Ford was placed on suicide watch on December 12. See

id. at SPA_9702. A suicide risk assessment on December

20

stated

that

he

had

no

recent

“suicidal/self-injurious” behavior or ideation, even

though he had cut his wrist just eight days earlier.

Id. at SPA_9674. He was released from suicide watch

around December 21 and placed back in segregation at

20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 21 of 210
Kilby. See Pls. Ex. 2352 at ADOC0462881; Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3. Records indicate that, in contravention of the interim agreement, staff did not complete the follow-up appointments after his release from suicide watch. See generally Pls. Ex. 2309; Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 108; Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 123-24. • On January 16, 2019, Ford was found hanging from his segregation cell door. See Pls. Ex. at SPA_9656. Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive medical or security reviews of his suicide. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3. While ADOC conducted a ‘quality improvement’ (QI) assessment of the case, both Drs. Burns and Perrien testified that it did not constitute an adequate review of the suicide. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 114-15.
Roderick Abrams Roderick Abrams committed suicide on January 2, 2019,
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 22 of 210
the same day he was placed in segregation. Rampant suicide-prevention failures plagued his case, including failing to place him on suicide watch when he expressed suicidality, repeatedly failing to screen him for mental-health issues prior to placing him in segregation, failing to complete mental-health appointments due to staffing and space shortages, and failing to immediately initiate life-saving measures when he was found hanging in his cell. Specifically: • Records indicate that Abrams was initially held in
segregation between August 23 and December 4, 2018, see Pls. Ex. 2346 at ADOC0462894-95, without receiving a segregation preplacement screening, see generally Pls. Ex. 2304. • A nursing record from September 3 reported that Abrams had suicidal thoughts and had told people he was going to hang himself. See id. at SPA_9559. Despite being suicidal, Abrams remained in segregation instead of being placed on suicide watch, see id. at SPA_9560, and did not receive a suicide risk assessment at that
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 23 of 210
point, see Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 69. • The segregation initial assessment conducted on September 4--several days after the seven-day timeframe in which it should have been completed--failed to mention that the day before, Abrams had told nursing staff that he was suicidal. See Pls. Ex. 2304 at SPA_9582-83. • Records indicate that, while in segregation, space and security staff shortages prevented Abrams from having his scheduled mental-health appointments on November 20, 27, and 30, and December 4. See id. at SPA_9601; Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3. • On approximately December 21, he was placed on suicide watch after stating that he was suicidal. See Pls. Ex. 2304 at SPA_9596, SPA_9599. Apparently, he had gone to the infirmary to have stab wounds checked on, and then felt increased anxiety about returning to a particular prison block. See id. A mental-health progress note from December 26 also reported that he
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 24 of 210

had safety concerns and wanted to change institutions

because of a conflict he had with gang-affiliated

inmates due to his sexuality. See id. at SPA_9594.

His records do not contain a single crisis treatment

plan. See generally Pls. Ex. 2304.

• Abrams was released from suicide watch on December 26,

see id. at SPA_9571, and sometime between then and

January 2, he was placed in segregation, see Crook Apr.

2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 181; Defendants’

Response to Amended Chart (doc. no. 2500-1) at 14. The

records indicate that he did not receive a segregation

preplacement screening. See Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial

Tr. (doc. no. 2488) at 181-82; see generally Pls. Ex.

2304. Nor did he receive a three-day follow-up after

being discharged from suicide watch. See generally

Pls. Ex. 2304. The parties’ experts noted that despite

his stay on suicide watch, he was not placed on the

mental-health caseload.

See Joint Expert Case

Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3; Pls. Ex. 2305 at

SPA_9791.

24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 25 of 210
• The segregation duty post logs indicate that, during the week running up to his suicide, there were several times where there was an hour, or even two hours, between security checks, see Vail Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 149, even though ADOC policy requires that security checks in segregation be conducted every 30 minutes.
• On January 2, 2019, at approximately 7:00 p.m., more than an hour after the last security check, see id., a correctional officer making a security check discovered Abrams hanging from a vent cover inside his cell, see Pls. Ex. 2307 at SPA_10451. At 7:11 a.m., he was cut down and medical staff initiated CPR, according to one officer’s report. See id. at SPA_10452. According to both experts, this emergency response time was “inadequate to save life,” as “11 minutes from discovery to cut down is more than enough time for death to occur.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 3.
• Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive a medical
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 26 of 210
review. See id. at 3. ADOC’s quality improvement report stated that there were no areas for improvement in mental-health treatment or institutional operation, and recommended no corrective actions. See Pls. Ex. 2305 at SPA_9792-93.6
Ryan Rust On December 21, 2018, Ryan Rust was discovered in his segregation cell “sitting on [the] floor with one end of [a] belt around his neck and the other end tied to a bar in the window of the cell.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2. His case illustrates ADOC’s failures to complete follow-up appointments after a crisis placement and to conduct timely security checks in segregation in the immediate lead-up to a suicide. Specifically: • Rust was placed on suicide watch from approximately
6. The defendants contend that a “final” QI review completed on March 4, 2019, found some shortcomings. Defendants’ Response to Amended Chart (doc. no 2500-1) at 14. However, the defendants never submitted evidence of this “final” review, which, in any case, was completed three months after Abrams’s suicide and after three more prisoners had killed themselves.
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 27 of 210
November 5 to 16, 2018, see Pls Ex. 2298 at SPA_9880-81, but his records indicate that he did not receive any follow-up appointments after his release, see generally Pls. Ex. 2298. • Rust attempted to escape and was returned to segregation on December 20 or 21. See id. at SPA_9869, SPA_9872; Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2. On December 21, shortly after his segregation placement, he was discovered hanging in his cell. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2. • Prior to his death, Rust had received three separate segregation pre-placement screenings on December 20 and 21. See Pls. Ex. 2298 at SPA_9867-74. According to Drs. Burns and Perrien, the “reason for three pre-placement screenings was not clear. At best, the three completed screenings raise questions about inefficiencies in the system regarding redundant work and/or poor communication among nursing staff; at worst, they raise concerns regarding the authenticity and validity of the screenings.” Joint Expert Case
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 28 of 210
Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2. As Dr. Burns elaborated, in the worst-case scenario, it represented “an attempt to say that the screening was done when the screening wasn’t done, and still very poorly coordinated because they did it three times.” Burns Apr. 9, 2018, R.D. Trial Tr. at 190. • Based on his review of the duty post logs, plaintiffs’ expert Eldon Vail testified that about an hour passed from the last security check to the time Rust was discovered hanging. See Vail Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial. Tr. at 151; see also Pls. Ex. 2662 at ADOC0469207 (duty post log indicating that more than an hour had passed). • Drs. Burns and Perrien reported inadequate review of Rust’s suicide. Specifically, they stated that they did not receive a medical review, and that the psychological autopsy was “limited” and did “not contain any psychological information.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2. They did receive a document labeled only “Ryan Chas Rust,” whose authorship and purpose was unclear, but did “identify
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 29 of 210
deficiencies in mental health follow-ups, treatment planning and logistics.” Id.
Kendall Chatter On November 25, 2018, Kendall Chatter was discovered hanging from the ceiling of his cell in the temporary holding unit at Staton prison. ADOC’s failures in his case include not transitioning him from acute to non-acute suicide watch prior to releasing him from suicide watch, not providing follow-up appointments after he was released from suicide watch, and not checking his cell even though he was intensely yelling and banging on his cell in the immediate lead-up to his suicide. Specifically: • On November 16, 2018, Chatter cut his right wrist, possibly after being sexually assaulted. See Defs. Ex. 3577 at SPA_10176-81. He was placed on acute suicide watch that same day, see id. at SPA_10180, and then released directly to MHO the next day, without any intervening period on non-acute suicide watch, see id. at SPA_10178. He was released from MHO on November
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 30 of 210

20. See id. at SPA_10164; Joint Expert Case Summaries

(doc. no. 2416-2) at 2.

• His records indicate that he did not receive three- or

seven-day follow-ups after being released from suicide

watch. Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2488)

at 35. Director of Mental Health Services Crook said

that the failures to do the follow-ups were violations

of the interim agreement, but that she did not

immediately discover the violations because no one in

her office did a detailed review of his mental-health

records until February 2019, more than two months after

he died. See id. at 35-40.

• On November 25, Chatter loudly and intensely yelled and

banged against his cell for a prolonged period of time.

See Defs. Ex. 3577 at SPA_10200; Joint Expert Case

Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2; Pls. Ex. 2401 at

SPA_13483.

The correctional shift supervisor

instructed his officer to “just allow him to continue

banging and being disruptive and he would get tired and

stop,” according to a written reprimand of the

30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 31 of 210
supervisor. Pls. Ex. 2401 at SPA_13483. Shortly after Chatter started making noise--according to one record, less than an hour later--a correctional officer distributing meals discovered him hanging from the ceiling by a sheet tied around his neck. See id. at SPA_10200-01. • ADOC’s review of the suicide was inadequate. No medical or security reviews were provided to Drs. Burns and Perrien. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2. Furthermore, according to the experts, the “mental health QI review contained little information and no recommendations for improvement in spite of failing to provide follow-up after watch placement and failure to provide an actual mental health assessment after referral from security 11/14/18. ... The Psychological Autopsy states both that the treatment plan was up to date and included goals that were implemented but also states that there were no goals on the treatment plan because he wasn’t on the mental health caseload.” Id.
31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 32 of 210

Mark Araujo

Mark Araujo used a sheet to hang himself from a door

in his segregation cell at Limestone prison on November

23, 2018. Inadequacies in his case include not properly

responding to his request for mental-health attention

after he was placed in segregation, and not adequately

reviewing his suicide. Specifically:

• On October 29, 2018, during his initial mental-health

assessment following placement in segregation, Araujo

requested to be placed on the mental-health caseload

and begin medication.

See Pls. Ex. 2291 at

SPA_10221-22. Yet, according to Drs. Burns and

Perrien, he was not seen by mental-health staff prior

to his death almost a month later. See Joint Expert

Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2.

• Drs. Burns and Perrien noted that the “QI review

contains no recommendations” and that the psychological

autopsy also “contained little information--and

neglected to note that he wanted [mental-health] help

and asked for it 10/29/18 when seen in seg[regation].”

32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 33 of 210
Id. John Barker
John Barker hanged himself from a vent cover in his cell at St. Clair prison on September 26, 2018. Deficiencies in his case include housing him in segregation despite his serious mental illness (SMI), and inadequate interventions to save his life after he was discovered hanging. Specifically: • Despite being flagged as having a SMI, major depressive
disorder, see Pls. Ex. 1758 at SPA_3343-44, Barker had been housed in segregation for several months in the lead-up to his suicide, see Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1. • On September 1, 2018, mental-health personnel recommended his administrative referral for removal from segregation due to his SMI diagnosis, see Pls. Ex. 1758 at SPA_3343-44, but records indicate that he was released from segregation on September 24, just two days before his suicide, see Joint Expert Case
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 34 of 210
Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1.7 • On September 26 at 6:30 p.m., a correctional officer
observed Barker hanging from a vent cover over a toilet in his cell. See id. Troublingly, “[n]o actions [were] taken until 6:36 p.m. when medical [staff] arrived at which time [they] entered cell, cut prisoner down and began CPR.” Id. Drs. Burns and Perrien concluded that the correctional officer response was inadequate because, as explained above, security officers “must intervene and begin life-sustaining efforts rather than waiting for medical,” and also because the medical emergency response time of six minutes was inadequate. Id. • Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive security or medical reviews of the suicide, and the mental-health review “was cursory and found no problems and no areas
7. It is not clear from the records whether he remained in segregation between September 1 and September 24, or rather had been released after the September 1 recommendation for removal, and then readmitted to segregation. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1.
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 35 of 210
for improvement.” Id. Ross Wolfinger
Ross Wolfinger was discovered hanging in his segregation cell at Fountain prison on August 22, 2018, less than a month after cutting his wrist and being placed in acute suicide watch. His case shows ADOC’s failure to provide adequate treatment following release from suicide watch to segregation, the falsification of security logs and failure to conduct security checks in segregation in the time immediately leading up to his suicide, and the failure to initiate life-saving measures immediately when he was discovered. Specifically: • Wolfinger’s records state that on July 26, 2018, he was
placed on acute suicide watch after attempting suicide by cutting his left wrist with a razor blade. See Pls. Ex. 1823 at SPA_4134, SPA_4187-90. He remained on acute suicide watch until July 31, see id. at SPA_4167, when he was placed on nonacute suicide watch, id. at SPA_4153. • On August 3, he was discharged from nonacute suicide
35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 36 of 210
watch to segregation. See Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 117; Pls. Ex. 1823 at SPA_4155, SPA_4163. The records indicate that he did not receive adequate follow-ups after his release from suicide watch. See Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 119; see generally Pls. Ex. 1823. • According to Dr. Burns, Wolfinger’s suicide risk was elevated by ADOC’s failure to provide adequate treatment to him when he was returned to segregation. See Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 119. • The night of Wolfinger’s death, the correctional officer assigned to conduct security checks every 30 minutes in Wolfinger’s area of segregation not only failed to do a single check, but also put false information in his duty post log indicating that he had completed the required checks, according to an ADOC memorandum discussing disciplinary action against the officer. See Pls. Ex. 2403 at SPA_13487. The memorandum states that the correctional officer’s
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 37 of 210
actions “resulted in” Wolfinger’s death. Id. at SPA_13488. • On August 22, around 1:00 a.m., Wolfinger was discovered hanging in his cell. See id. Drs. Burns and Perrien reported that the immediate intervention was inadequate: he was “discovered hanging at 12:57 a.m.,” but “there was no intervention except to call for assistance which arrived at 1:03 a.m. No intervention until others arrived and then he was cut down and taken to HCU [the health care unit], arriving there at 1:08 a.m. LPNs attempted CPR and ambulance was called.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 2. • Drs. Burns and Perrien also criticized the inadequate reviews of Wolfinger’s suicide. No medical review was provided; the QI program review did not make any recommendations; the psychological autopsy provided no additional analysis or information. See id.
Jeffery Borden On June 3, 2018, Jeffery Borden, who had been
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 38 of 210
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, hanged himself on death row at Holman prison. See Pls. Ex. 1643 at ADOC0424844. His case is an example of ADOC failing to adequately intervene with potential life-saving measures and inadequately completing a suicide incident review. Specifically: • Neither the correctional officers who originally found
him hanging nor the nurse that later arrived at the scene attempted CPR or other life-saving efforts. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1; Pls. Ex. 1760 at SPA_2965. • Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive a medical or security review. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1.
Timothy Chumney On May 12, 2018, “[w]ithin 1 day of being released from MHO to a housing unit where he expressed concern for his safety from other inmates,” Timothy Chumney “was discovered hanging in his [segregation] cell having tied a bed sheet to a cell window and then around his neck.”
38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 39 of 210
Id. ADOC’s failures in his case include inadequate treatment planning, not placing him on suicide watch even though he was found to have a moderate risk of suicide, and an inadequate review of his suicide. Specifically: • On May 7, 2018, Chumney was determined to be at a
“moderate” risk for suicide, after telling medical staff that he had suicidal ideation at night and would rather harm himself than have someone else harm him. Pls. Ex. 1646 at ADOC0425086. That same day, however, he was admitted to MHO instead of suicide watch. See id. at ADOC0425042. • On May 11, Chumney was discharged from MHO. See id. at ADOC0425011. The next day, at approximately 3:05 a.m., correctional officers conducting security rounds discovered him hanging from his segregation cell window in Limestone prison. See Pls. Ex. 1780 at SPA_3144; Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1. • Dr. Burns and Perrien criticized that no “CPR, actual medical assessment or life-sustaining measures [were] attempted. LPN responding to the emergency said to
39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 40 of 210
leave him in the cell on the unit and called the physician to pronounce him dead. Hours later, the deputy coroner arrived and ‘confirmed inmate Chumney deceased.’” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1. • ADOC also inadequately reviewed his suicide. Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive medical or security reviews; the mental-health QI program review had no criticism or recommendation for anyone; the psychological autopsy revealed no additional or substantive information. See id. • Drs. Burns and Perrien further criticized that there was “[n]o transitional care planned; treatment plan called only for a monthly contact with treatment coordinator and quarterly appointment with CRNP,” and there was “[n]o plan to follow more closely (or intervene to prevent placement in [segregation] based on his anxiety and paranoia).” Id.
Robert Martinez By the time Robert Martinez took his life on March
40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 41 of 210
31, 2018, he had been in segregation at St. Clair prison for more than one year. Pls. Ex. 1493 at ADOC0420976-77. In his case, ADOC’s failures included not conducting security rounds in segregation and not timely cutting him down when he was found hanging. • Two weeks before his death, he told mental-health staff
that he was “doing real bad” and needed to go to a psychiatric ward. Id. at ADOC0421023. ADOC left him in segregation and failed to connect him with mental-health staff. • Correctional officers failed to conduct security checks in Martinez’s unit for at least two hours during the morning of his suicide. See A.A. Apr. 23, 2018, R.D. Trial Tr. at 203-04. • When ADOC staff discovered Martinez hanging from a sheet tied to a vent in his cell, they waited more than 30 minutes before cutting him down, a delay that, in the experts’ words, was “inexcusable and inhumane.”8
8. A nurse and correctional officer doing pill call in segregation discovered him unresponsive at 12:25 p.m.; medical staff arrived at 12:35 p.m., and he was not cut
41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 42 of 210
Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1.
Billy Thornton
Billy Thornton died on March 2, 2018, as the result
of a head injury he sustained when attempting to hang
himself in segregation at Holman prison on February 26.
See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1;
Stewart Apr. 23, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 1797) at 57.
The failures by ADOC in his case include not placing him
on suicide watch after he was found attempting to hang
himself and said he wanted to kill himself, and not
completing suicide risk assessments or providing
follow-up appointments after releasing him from crisis
down until 12:58 p.m. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1. According to the experts, the “[m]edical emergency response time of 10 minutes is unacceptable” and the “[f]ailure to cut the inmate down for more than 30 minutes after discovery is inexcusable and inhumane.” Id. The defendants claim that the failure to cut down Martinez’s body “was due to the officers’ chain of command communication process,” and note that the incident occurred the day before Wexford’s contract began. Defendants’ Response to Amended Chart (doc. no. 2500-1) at 5. The court does not see how this in any way excuses what the experts described as ADOC’s “inexcusable and inhumane” failure to cut him down for more than 30 minutes.
42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 43 of 210
watch. • A nursing record from December 27, 2017 reports that
Thornton said he wanted to kill himself, had been found attempting to hang himself, had suicidal thoughts, and auditory hallucinations of “kill, kill yourself.” Pls. Ex. 1489 at ADOC0420855. Drs. Burns and Perrien testified that he should have been placed on suicide watch; however, the records show that he was improperly placed on MHO. See id. at ADOC0420856; Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 89-90. • The records indicate that no suicide risk assessment was conducted at the time. See Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 90; see generally Pls. Ex. 1489. • Records indicate that he did not receive adequate follow-up appointments after release from MHO on January 2 or 3, 2018, given that he actually should have been placed on suicide watch rather than MHO. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1; Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 121; Stewart Apr. 23, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 1797) at
43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 44 of 210
50-52; see generally Pls. Ex. 1489. • Thornton was again transferred to crisis watch on
February 22, and then released back to segregation on February 23. See Stewart Apr. 23, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 1797) at 6-8. The records indicate that Thornton did not receive follow-up attention after his release from crisis watch. See Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1. • On February 26, as a correctional officer was speaking to him in his segregation cell, Thornton “stepped onto his bed put a shoe string around his neck and was hanging from the light fixture,” according to an incident report. Pls. Ex. 1488 at ADOC0421089. As the officer reached toward Thornton, the string broke, and Thornton fell and hit his head on the floor. See id. • Officers put Thornton in a wheelchair and took him to the medical unit. See id. According to Drs. Burns and Perrien, the “decision to place him in wheelchair after sustaining head/neck injury rather than a back
44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 45 of 210
board and/or calling for medical to respond requires further review and supports need for additional and on-going first aid training for correctional staff.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1. • Thornton died on March 2 as a result of the head injury. See id.; Stewart Apr. 23, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 1797) at 57; Pls. Ex. 1488 at ADOC0421089. • ADOC’s review of the incident leading to Thornton’s death was inadequate. Drs. Burns and Perrien did not receive a medical or security review; and the mental-health QI review “did not identify any issues with mental health’s failure to provide any follow-up to Mr. Thornton after crisis placements.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 1. • Ultimately, Dr. Burns testified that she believed ADOC’s noncompliance with the interim agreement increased Thornton’s risk of suicide, “because the risk was never measured and quantified, in spite of multiple crisis placements,” and “there doesn’t appear to be any effort to reduce that risk.” Burns Dec. 7, 2019, Trial
45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 46 of 210
Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 106. Ben McClure
On December 30, 2017, Ben McClure jumped to his death from the top tier of a dormitory at Limestone prison. See Incident Report (doc. no. 1966-25) at 2; Pls. Ex. 1669 at ADOC0424820. ADOC failed to initiate immediate life-saving measures. Namely, the officers who found McClure did not immediately conduct CPR, but rather waited until Licensed Practice Nurses arrived a few minutes later, according to ADOC reports. See id. As stated above, Drs. Burns and Perrien emphasized that CPR should be initiated as soon as two security staff are present, regardless of whether medical staff has arrived. See Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 29.
III. DISCUSSION A. Permanent Injunction Requirements The plaintiffs’ emergency motion seeks permanent, albeit immediate, relief. To obtain a permanent
46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 47 of 210
injunction, plaintiffs must show: (1) actual success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered without an injunction; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to public interest. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 2004). As discussed below, the plaintiffs meet all these requirements.
i. Success on the Merits: Eighth Amendment Violation The plaintiffs satisfy the first requirement for a
permanent injunction because they have succeeded on the merits of their claim. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment challenge, plaintiffs must show that: (1) objectively, prisoners had serious medical needs and either had already been harmed or were subject to a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) subjectively, the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that harm or risk of harm; that is, they knew and disregarded an excessive
47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 48 of 210
risk to inmate health or safety. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1189. As the court held in 2017, the plaintiffs met this standard and therefore established an Eighth Amendment violation, given that ADOC’s mental-health care for prisoners was, “[s]imply put, ... horrendously inadequate” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1267.
The court specifically found that ADOC’s inadequate suicide prevention contributed to the Eighth Amendment violation. As the court explained, deficient suicide prevention--both alone and in combination with six other inadequacies--"subject[s] mentally ill prisoners to actual harm and a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1193. ADOC’s suicide prevention was found to be deficient in multiple ways. These included inadequately identifying prisoners at risk of suicide, providing inadequate treatment and monitoring to at-risk prisoners, as well as inappropriately releasing prisoners from suicide watch and not giving them follow-up care. See id. at 1220, 1231. Additionally, the court found that the “skyrocketing number of suicides within ADOC, the
48

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 49 of 210
majority of which occurred in segregation,” reflected the “combined effect” of inadequate screening for the impact of segregation on mental health, and inadequate treatment and monitoring in segregation units. Id. at 1245.
As extensively detailed in the liability opinion, see id. at 1194-1200, ADOC’s “persistent and severe shortages” of mental-health and correctional staff significantly contributed to all these deficiencies. Id. at 1268. Since then, the court has repeatedly reaffirmed the centrality of mental-health and correctional understaffing to ADOC’s mental-health care failings, and thus, Eighth Amendment violations. See Braggs, 2019 WL 539050, --- F. Supp. 3d --- at *5, 9-10; Braggs v. Dunn, 2019 WL 78949, --- F. Supp. 3d --- at *1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2019) (Thompson, J.); Braggs v. Dunn, 2018 WL 5410915, --- F. Supp. 3d --- at *1 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2018) (Thompson, J.).
Now, in addition to the liability findings, the court further finds that the substantial and pervasive deficiencies identified in the 15 recent suicides
49

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 50 of 210

demonstrate that ADOC’s suicide-prevention efforts

remain inadequate and continue to contribute to the

ongoing Eighth Amendment violation originally found in

the liability opinion.

ADOC still has serious

deficiencies in the identification of prisoners at risk

of suicide, as well as in their treatment, monitoring,

and follow-up care. The deficiencies include:

• Failing to place suicidal prisoners on suicide watch;

• Failing to conduct suicide risk assessments;

• Failing to appropriately monitor prisoners on

suicide watch;

• Failing to put prisoners on the mental-health

caseload when appropriate;

• Inadequate treatment planning; and

• Inadequate follow-up treatment after release from

suicide watch.

ADOC’s segregation practices also continue to suffer

from the serious flaws the court found in the 2017

liability opinion, including:

• Inadequate screening of prisoners for suicidality

50

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 51 of 210
and SMIs prior to placing them in segregation; • Placing prisoners with SMIs in segregation absent
extenuating circumstances;9 and • Failing to conduct 30-minute security checks in
segregation, and failing to make sure the checks are staggered. Given these serious inadequacies in segregation practices, it is unsurprising that, similar to the liability opinion’s finding in June 2017 that the “majority” of suicides occurred in segregation, Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1245, ADOC recognized nearly two years later, in March 2019, that the “majority of inmates who committed suicide within ADOC have been men who were alone in a restrictive housing cell,10 after being released from suicide watch.” Pls. Ex. 2706 (Mar. 21,
9. The liability opinion found that “one particular subset of prisoners with serious mental-health needs should never been placed in segregation in the absence of extenuating circumstances: those who suffer from a ‘serious mental illness.’” Id. at 1245-46.
10. The term “restrictive housing” is simply another name for segregation, and the parties and the court use them interchangeably.
51

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 52 of 210
2019, Daniels’s memorandum announcing directive). These continuing deficiencies are compounded by
ADOC’s repeated failure to initiate immediate life-saving measures. Although not identified in the liability opinion, this problem clearly exacerbates ADOC’s inadequate suicide-prevention efforts, and illustrates that prisoners remain at substantial risk of serious harm.
Critically, mental-health and correctional understaffing remains a driving force behind the suicide-prevention deficiencies putting prisons at risk. As of December 2018, ADOC reported that 62 % of correctional officer positions were vacant, see March 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report (doc no. 2386-1) at 3, and as of September 2018, 23.6 % of the mental-health positions were vacant, see December 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report (doc. no. 2378-1) at 9. Commissioner Dunn admitted that ADOC is currently “struggling” to comply with court orders because of inadequate staffing levels, Dunn Apr. 1, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 145, and
52

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 53 of 210
affirmed that understaffing remains one of the problems driving the spike in suicides. See id. at 154-55.
In addition to showing that prisoners remain at a substantial risk of serious harm, the 15 suicides also demonstrate that ADOC continues to act with deliberate indifference. As found in the liability opinion, “the state of the mental-health care system is itself evidence of ADOC’s disregard of harm and risk of harm: in spite of ... notice of the actual harm and substantial risks of serious harm posed by the identified inadequacies in mental-health care, those inadequacies have persisted for years and years.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1256. Almost two years since the court wrote those words, the inadequacies continue to persist, as evidenced by the problems pervading the recent suicides.
Furthermore, many of the inadequacies in the 15 suicides constitute noncompliance with the interim agreement and other remedial orders that ADOC agreed to implement. ADOC’s continued inability to carry out the terms of the interim agreement and other remedial
53

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 54 of 210
measures thus far illustrates “a striking indifference by ADOC to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1264.
Finally, ADOC’s inadequate internal review of the 15 suicides shows ongoing deliberate indifference, just like the court originally found deliberate indifference in part because ADOC had “done vanishingly little to exercise oversight of the provision” of mental-health care. Id. at 1257. ADOC’s ongoing broader failures to self-monitor are also extensively detailed in the monitoring section below.
ADOC has recently adopted some promising measures to improve suicide prevention, such as the March 21, 2019, announcement by ADOC Deputy Commissioner Charles Daniels of a directive generally prohibiting the release of inmates from suicide watch directly to segregation. See Pls. Ex. 2706. However, as elaborated below, the measures are insufficient to address the scope of a problem that is many years in the making, and, as they were implemented quite recently, it remains to be seen
54

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 55 of 210
whether they will even be effectively implemented. In any case, several of the key measures came only after the spike in suicides had taken more than a dozen lives, and after the plaintiffs brought attention the problem by requesting emergency relief. Put differently, the measures have been too little, too late.
To conclude, while the liability findings by themselves would justify the relief ordered here, the court’s additional factual findings concerning inadequate suicide prevention in the 15 recent suicides underscores that the constitutional violation remains ongoing and requires immediate relief. Accordingly, the plaintiffs satisfy the first requirement for a permanent injunction.
With this in mind, the court will now briefly discuss why the plaintiffs satisfy the remaining requirements for a permanent injunction.
ii. Remaining Permanent Injunction Requirements The plaintiffs meet the remaining three requirements
55

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 56 of 210

for a permanent injunction.

As to the second

requirement, the immediate and substantial risk of

suicide, as reflected in the recent wave of suicides,

satisfies the irreparable harm inquiry. As to the third,

the threatened injury absent an injunction--a higher risk

of suicides and suffering--outweighs any harm the

injunction would cause, particularly because, as

discussed below, the defendants agree with or claim to

be already enacting most of the measures the plaintiffs

seek. Finally, an injunction is not adverse to the public

interest, for “the public interest is served when

constitutional rights are protected.” Democratic Exec.

Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir.

2019).

B. The Defendants’ Arguments Against Relief i. The Defendants’ Notice Argument
The defendants contend that any relief based on provisions of the interim agreement would exceed the scope of the evidentiary hearing on this matter, because
56

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 57 of 210
they did not have the opportunity to present evidence on the interim agreement at the hearing. See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2499) at 13-17. The court rejects this argument. The defendants had adequate notice as to the scope of the requested immediate relief: In the plaintiffs’ pretrial brief, the interim agreement was among the provisions that they requested be immediately implemented. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief (doc. no. 2435) at 15 (requesting entry of an order for the relief provided in the Interim Order as “immediate permanent relief”). The defendants also had an opportunity to cross Dr. Burns on the interim agreement.
Nevertheless, the court recognizes that the defendants likely were confused as to this issue. During the discussion about restricting the trial to immediate relief, it was not specifically mentioned that the interim agreement was encompassed in the immediate relief the court would be considering, and defense counsel seemed to be focused on the supplemental recommendations.
57

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 58 of 210
Furthermore, the defendants’ lead attorney was out sick at the time of the discussion, and his associate may not have realized that the immediate relief requested by the plaintiffs encompassed the interim agreement.
Because there is an urgent need for immediate relief, and because the defendants previously agreed to the terms of the interim agreement, the court will issue an order for relief today that includes many of the agreement’s provisions. However, if the defendants disagree with the parts of the order addressing the interim agreement and would like another opportunity to present evidence about it, the court will consider their evidence and modify or vacate the relevant portions of this opinion and order if appropriate.
ii. The Defendants’ Arguments on Mootness and Ongoing and Continuous Violation
The defendants argue that steps they have taken since the start of the litigation to improve suicide prevention render unnecessary many, if not all, aspects of the relief the plaintiffs request. They frame this argument
58

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 59 of 210
in several ways. First, they contend that their remedial actions mean that certain requested provisions would fail to meet the requirement of an “ongoing and continuous” violation, Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999), a phrase drawn from caselaw on the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, see 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Second, they contend that claims to certain requested relief are moot because they voluntarily ceased the offending conduct.11
As to the first argument, the defendants rely on the statement in Summit that the Ex parte Young exception

11. The defendants also contend that certain

provisions are unnecessary in light of improvements ADOC

has made, and thus do not satisfy the

PLRA’s needs-narrowness-intrusiveness test.

As

discussed below, the PLRA arguments fail for essentially

the reasons as the mootness and Ex parte Young

contentions do.

To the extent that the defendants rely on the PLRA's

"current and ongoing violation" language, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(b)(3), their reliance is misplaced. The PLRA

refers to an "ongoing" violation in its provision on

terminating relief: “Prospective relief shall not

terminate if the court makes written findings based on

the record” that such relief meets the

needs-narrowness-intrusiveness

standard.

Id.

Therefore, the “current and ongoing requirement is

distinct from the standard governing the initial entry

59

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 60 of 210
“applies only to ongoing and continuous violations of federal law.” 180 F.3d at 1337. The plaintiffs in Summit sought to enjoin the enforcement of a criminal law, but the defendants argued that the case should be dismissed because there was no ongoing and continuous violation. The court rejected that argument, explaining that “[t]he ongoing and continuous requirement merely distinguishes between cases where the relief sought is prospective in nature, i.e., designed to prevent injury that will occur in the future, and cases where relief is retrospective.” Id. at 1338. The court further opined that the requirement for ongoing and continuous violations is satisfied “where there is a threat of future enforcement [of the law] that may be remedied by prospective relief.” Id. Applying that reasoning to the case at hand, the court must answer the question whether the plaintiffs face a threat of being subjected in the future to the challenged prison conditions that may be remedied by
of injunctive relief.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 61 of 210
prospective relief. As shown by the earlier discussion of the court’s findings, and as detailed below, the court finds that there is a continuing threat of the plaintiffs being subjected in the future to the challenged prison conditions and that this continuing threat may be remedied by prospective relief.
As to their second argument, the defendants cite three cases to support their contention that their remedial actions have mooted certain requested relief. First, the defendants cite County of Los Angeles v. Davis, where the Supreme Court reiterated that, “as a general rule, voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does ... not make the case moot.” 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that a case may become moot if two conditions are met: “(1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation ... that the alleged violation will recur ... , and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the
61

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 62 of 210
effects of the alleged violation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The defendants also cite two subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases explaining--with respect to voluntary cessation--that when the defendant is a government actor rather than a private citizen, “there is a rebuttable presumption that the objectionable behavior will not recur.” Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cty., Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2004)). Troiano involved a lawsuit for injunctive relief to address a county’s alleged failure to make auxiliary audio devices available in voting booths. See id. at 1278. The court held that the case was moot based on the defendant’s voluntary installation of the audio devices in all precincts and strong evidence that they would be available in all future elections, including the fact that the defendant ended the allegedly illegal practice prior to receiving notice of the litigation. See id. at 1285-86. Coral
62

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 63 of 210
Springs involved a challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional city ordinance. See 371 F.3d at 1323-24. There, the court clarified that the repeal of an ordinance moots a challenge to it unless the court finds that it is “reasonably likely” to be reenacted or it is replaced with another constitutionally suspect law. 371 F.3d at 1330, 1331 n.9.
Taken together, these mootness cases stand for the following propositions. A claim may become moot through voluntary cessation only if there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. If the defendant is a governmental actor, and the defendant has eliminated the challenged conduct or law, that defendant is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the conduct or law will not recur.
Two Eleventh Circuit cases not cited by the defendants specifically address the issue of when injunctions targeting Eighth Amendment violations become
63

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 64 of 210

unnecessary due to a prison system’s remedial efforts.

See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010);

LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993). In

these cases, the defendants argued that injunctive relief

was unnecessary because they had taken steps to address

the challenged condition or practice by the time of

trial.

Faced with these arguments, the courts

“recognized that ‘[s]ubsequent events, such as

improvements in the allegedly infirm conditions of

confinement, while potentially relevant, are not

determinative’ of whether injunctive relief is no longer

warranted.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1320 (quoting LaMarca,

995 F.2d at 1541).12 The Eleventh Circuit opined that,

12. While not explicitly using the term “moot” in the discussion, the LaMarca court clearly had that jurisdictional inquiry in mind. In reviewing the applicable standard, the court explained that “[j]urisdiction may abate if there is no reasonable expectation the alleged violations will recur and if intervening events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violations. To defeat jurisdiction on this basis, however, defendants must offer more than their mere profession that the conduct has ceased and will not be revived.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1542 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the LaMarca and Thomas courts both applied
64

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 65 of 210
when defendants attempt to avoid injunctions based on changes they made after a suit started, they “must satisfy the heavy burden of establishing that these such events ‘have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violations.’” Id. (quoting LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1542); compare Cty. of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631 (reciting same standard). Applying that heavy burden in Thomas, for example, the court held that, “[a]lthough DOC’s recent reforms may represent affirmative responses to recognized deficiencies in its ability to address the needs of its growing mentally ill inmate population, the defendants have not established that they have eradicated the effects of the constitutional violations found by the district court.” Id. at 1321 (internal citations omitted).
Applying these precepts, the court holds that the plaintiffs’ claims for relief are not moot. As elaborated below, unlike in the cases cited by the
the same mootness standard as the Cty. of Los Angeles case that the defendants cite. See 440 U.S. at 631.
65

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 66 of 210
defendants, it is not clear here that the challenged practices have ceased; in other words, the defendants have not satisfied their “heavy burden” of establishing that the steps they have taken have “completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violations.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1321 (quoting LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1542); see also Cty. of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631. Because the practices have not ceased, the defendants are not entitled to a rebuttable presumption that those practices will not recur. However, even if the court were to conclude that the unconstitutional conditions had ceased, and the rebuttable presumption therefore applied, the court would still find that it is reasonably likely that those conditions will recur. The voluminous evidence of ADOC’s repeated failures to comply with its own policies and the court’s orders, and of ADOC’s lack of substantial progress in addressing its severe understaffing problem--which lies at the root of its inadequate suicide-prevention measures--overcomes
66

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 67 of 210
the “rebuttable presumption that the objectionable behavior will not recur.” Troiano, 382 F.3d at 1283.
Throughout this case and in the suicide-prevention trial, the court has seen time and again compelling evidence of ADOC’s inability to ensure that its ground-level staff comply with directives from the top, not to mention with the orders of this court. In the suicide-prevention trial, the court saw ample evidence that the noncompliance continues, as demonstrated by the circumstances surrounding the recent suicides. The history of this case is replete with evidence of directives given and corrective action plans created that have been doomed to irrelevance because of a lack of follow-through to ensure the directives were obeyed and the plans put into action. The heart of the matter is understaffing--the overriding problem that makes all of ADOC’s other problems so difficult to solve. Without sufficient staff, ADOC will continue to have great difficulty both with carrying out all of the changes it
67

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 68 of 210
needs to make, and with adequately supervising its staff’s compliance with its directives.
The court now turns to the defendants’ specific mootness and Ex parte Young-based challenges to Drs. Burns and Perrien’s immediate relief recommendations.
1. The Defendants’ Efforts to Eliminate Improper Use of Mental-Health Observation
The defendants argue that it is unnecessary for the court to include in its remedial order the experts’ recommendation that mental-health observation (MHO) not be used as a part of suicide prevention, because there is no ongoing and continuous violation of federal law to address, and because ADOC and Wexford voluntarily ceased the practice. See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2499) at 18-21. They argue that ADOC policy does not authorize the use of MHO for suicidal prisoners and that the policy is being revised to make this clearer; that they have expressed concern about the issue with their vendor and the vendor has taken action; and that some data indicates that the
68

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 69 of 210
use of MHO for suicide watch is declining. See id. They also point to testimony they contend shows that the use of MHO for suicide watch has ended.
ADOC’s actions, while commendable, are insufficient to show that the use of MHO for suicidal inmates has been completely and irrevocably eradicated. Furthermore, the court finds that, even if the use of MHO for suicidal inmates has abated to some extent, there is still a significant threat--and it is reasonably likely--that the dangerous practice will continue.
First, the testimony as to whether MHO has stopped being used for suicidal prisoners is far from conclusive. On February 15, 2019, Crook wrote a letter to Wexford, ADOC’s vendor, notifying it of the improper use of MHO, among other “systemic failures to comply with court orders.” Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738. Crook testified that, since sending the letter, she has not received any reports suggesting that MHO is being used for suicidal inmates. See Crook Apr. 4, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2487) at 34. However, it is not clear that she would
69

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 70 of 210
receive such reports if this were happening. Crook also testified to seeing an increase in the number of people in acute suicide watch and a decrease in those in MHO. See id. at 33. She concluded from those numbers “that MHO is being utilized less as a first placement for crisis cell.” Id. at 34 (emphasis added). Notably, she stopped short of saying the practice had ended. The defendants also point to ADOC Psychiatry Director Kern’s belief that MHO is no longer being used for suicide watch. See Kern Mar. 29, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2483) at 112. But the court does not credit this testimony because the only basis he provided for it was his and his colleagues’ verbal communications with Wexford personnel. See id. at 112-16. Kern admitted that, in spite of the seriousness of the matter, he had not verified his belief by looking at the appropriate logs. See id. at 113. Although Wexford’s Program Director for Mental Health Barbara Coe testified that her company would not put suicidal prisoners on MHO, see Coe Apr. 4, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 199, the court cannot rely on her promise,
70

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 71 of 210
particularly when Wexford was not supposed to be using MHO in that way in the first place, see LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1542 (“[D]efendants must offer more than their mere profession that the conduct has ceased and will not be revived.”).
The defendants argue that Wexford has implemented a formal corrective action plan regarding the misuse of MHO. See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2499) at 19. Yet, the corrective action plan the defendants submitted as evidence does not even mention MHO. See Defs. Ex. 3657 at ADOC0475742-46 (Wexford Suicide Prevention Corrective Action Plan, Initiated January 17, 2019). Crook testified that to fix the MHO problem identified in her letter, Wexford has “given an absolute directive to [its] staff that people will no longer be on MHO if they are declaring suicidality.” Crook, Apr. 3, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2486) at 51. But she also testified that she had not seen a copy of Wexford’s directive. See id. at 52. More generally, Crook admitted that she has
71

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 72 of 210
insufficient staff to keep up with all of the monitoring of court orders that ADOC needs to do. See id. at 68-69; Crook Apr. 1, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2485) at 11-12. Thus, the court cannot conclude at this time that she will be able to ensure compliance with the directive.
Finally, the court rejects the defendants’ argument that there is no longer a violation because their policy does not authorize the use of MHO for suicidal prisoners. Crook testified that ADOC’s policy prohibiting the use of MHO for suicidal prisoners has been in place since 2005. See Crook Apr. 4, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2487) at 32-33. As ADOC’s repeated and admitted placement of suicidal prisons on MHO shows, however, the existence of that policy did nothing to stop the practice. While Dr. Kern testified that ADOC is currently updating the policy to make it clearer that MHO should not be used for suicide watch, he said the update was not yet finalized. See Kern Mar. 29, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2483) at 108-09. Even after the updated policy is finalized, it will provide little assurance that the practice will not
72

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 73 of 210
recur: Noncompliance with ADOC policy has been a recurring theme for MHO use and other areas throughout this case, as shown in many of the suicides discussed above.
In sum, the court concludes that there is a continued significant threat of placement of suicidal inmates in MHO that could be remedied by injunctive relief; that the defendants have not established that they have eradicated the effects of the constitutional violations found by the court; and that to the extent ADOC’s recent remedial efforts have eliminated the use of MHO for suicidal prisoners, it is reasonably likely that those conditions will recur. Therefore, the requested relief is not moot.
2. The Defendants’ Efforts to Eliminate Transfers from Suicide Watch to Segregation
In a March 21, 2019, memorandum, ADOC Deputy Commissioner of Operations Daniels announced a directive prohibiting the transfer of prisoners from suicide watch to segregation “unless there is no alternative due to well-documented exceptional circumstances or exigent
73

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 74 of 210
circumstances arising from an inmate’s behavior.” Pls. Ex. 2706. The memorandum states that, if an inmate cannot be safely discharged to a unit other than segregation, Daniels or his designee must approve the temporary segregation placement. See id. The defendants argue that this directive moots and renders unnecessary the entry of a remedial order enforcing the experts’ recommendations regarding prisoners in segregation who have been placed on suicide watch.
While promising, the memorandum announcing the directive is insufficient evidence that ADOC has completely and irrevocably eradicated the practices addressed by the experts’ recommendation, or that the practices will not recur. If followed, the directive could largely address the experts’ recommendation on this issue. But it is too soon to tell how well it will be followed: Daniels issued the memorandum just a week before the start of the suicide-prevention trial. The defendants will need to present evidence of sustained compliance with the directive over a longer period of
74

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 75 of 210

time to convince the court that ADOC has successfully

ended the practice.13

Moreover, as stated earlier, this case is replete

with examples of directives and policies being issued but

not followed. So long as the correctional understaffing

problem continues, measuring and ensuring compliance with

directives will remain difficult for ADOC. In addition,

the continuing severe correctional staffing shortage

creates pressure to use segregation for potentially

violent prisoners.

Without adequate correctional

staffing, fights and misconduct will continue unabated,

and segregation will continue to be the first option for

managing such prisoners. See Vail Dec. 22, 2016, Trial

Tr. (doc. no. 1207) at 81, 90 (discussing how

overcrowding and understaffing lead to more violence and

misconduct, creating a higher need for segregation; and

testifying that segregation is “the typical prison

response” to violence and misconduct).

13. The court would be willing to reconsider the continued need for this relief upon such a showing after a significant period of time has passed.
75

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 76 of 210
In sum, the court is not at all convinced that the directive has succeeded in eliminating the problem it seeks to address, and finds that the problem is reasonably likely to recur.14

3. Training for Nursing Staff

The defendants contend that the court should not

enter an order on the experts’ recommendation to train

all nursing staff on how to complete segregation

pre-placement screenings.

See Immediate Relief

14. During the suicide-prevention trial, Drs. Burns and Perrien testified that Daniels’s directive appeared to render “moot” their recommendation on the placement of inmates after their discharge from suicide watch. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 185-86. Of course, mootness is a legal concept upon which the experts are not qualified to opine; whether a claim is moot is a legal decision for the court. The court interprets their statements to mean that Daniels’s directive addresses the concern raised in their recommendation, and that it was an appropriate way to act, but not as an opinion that the directive has already eradicated the problem it addresses. Since Daniels announced the directive after they submitted their report and recommendations to the court, and shortly before their testimony, the experts could not have meant to express an opinion as to the directive’s actual impact on practices at the facilities.
76

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 77 of 210
Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 3. While the defendants do not object to the experts’ recommendation, they argue that they are already providing comprehensive training to nurses conducting pre-placement screenings, and that a previously issued remedial order already requires such training. See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2499) at 39-40. They also assert that they issued a new policy in December 2018 on segregation pre-placement screenings that contains detailed instructions. See id. at 40. Accordingly, they contend, there is no ongoing constitutional violation in this area. See id. The court disagrees.
As discussed above, the Ex parte Young analysis looks at whether there is a threat of future harm from the challenged prison conditions that may be remedied by prospective relief. The answer here is clearly yes. The parties’ experts undertook an extensive and thorough investigation of the state of suicide prevention in ADOC, looking at thousands of documents, touring four
77

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 78 of 210
facilities, and interviewing prisoners as well as ADOC and Wexford staff. See Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 4. Based on their study, they concluded that training for nurses assessing prisoners going into segregation is insufficient. Specifically, they found that training “should provide greater detail about indicators to look for as well as include how to place someone on immediate watch after hours and how to initiate an emergent referral.” Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 3. Nurses should be trained on an “easy in” model, meaning that, if a nurse is “uncertain in any way about a case, the inmate is placed on watch.” Id. The existing remedial order does not address these issues; it simply says that nurses shall be “trained in the screening process.” Order and Injunction on Segregation Remedy (doc. no. 1815-1) at 2.
Moreover, Drs. Burns and Perrien’s findings about ADOC’s deficient preplacement screenings show that, well after the 2017 liability opinion and 2018 segregation
78

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 79 of 210
remedy order, nurses still are not well-trained enough to adequately screen inmates. See Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416 1) at 14-15 (finding “[n]o instances of prisoners being diverted from [segregation] or placed on watch as a result of pre-placement screening ... despite multiple subsequent placements on suicide watch and mental health observation from [segregation]”). Perhaps most notably, the fact--recognized by ADOC--that the majority of suicides by prisoners in its custody are men released from suicide watch into segregation is compelling circumstantial evidence that nurses need to be better trained in screening inmates before they are placed in segregation. See Pls. Ex. 2706 (Mar. 21, 2019, Daniels’s memorandum announcing directive). For example, Matthew Holmes killed himself within roughly 12 hours of being placed in segregation, after ADOC “fail[ed] to generate an emergency referral to mental health in response to a positive pre-placement screen.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 4.
79

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 80 of 210
Finally, while the defendants note that they have promulgated a new policy on preplacement screening, the policy they cited nowhere references any required training. See Defs. Ex. 3647. Even if it did, the record has repeatedly shown that ADOC’s enactment of a policy often does not translate to ground-level compliance.
In sum, the court concludes that there remains a significant threat of nurses conducting inadequate pre-placement screening of prisoners going into segregation, and that injunctive relief could remedy this threat.
4. Security Checks in Segregation The defendants argue that the court should not enter an order implementing the experts’ recommendation that “30-minute custody rounds in segregation must be enforced consistent with existing policy,” Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 4, because the plaintiffs failed to show an ongoing constitutional violation regarding security checks in segregation, see
80

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 81 of 210
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order and Opinion (doc. no. 2499) at 40. The court disagrees.15
An ongoing and continuous violation exists for purposes of Ex parte Young when there is a threat of future harm from the challenged prison condition that may be remedied by prospective relief. As discussed earlier, the court has found, based on the evidence at the suicide-prevention trial, that inadequate monitoring of prisoners in segregation continues to be a substantial problem in ADOC, so there is a threat of future harm.
To support their ongoing-violation argument, the defendants point to their existing policy requiring 30-minute checks on prisoners in segregation, see Pls. Ex. 1399, which, they note, the plaintiffs’ experts agree is an appropriate policy, see Vail Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial. Tr. at 141; Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 37-38. However, as the evidence has shown, like other policies in ADOC, the existence of the 30-minute policy
15. The defendants also argue that relief would violate the PLRA. That argument is addressed in the PLRA section below.
81

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 82 of 210
does not mean that it will be followed.16 Indeed, the
whole purpose of the experts’ recommendation is that the
policy be enforced.
The defendants also cite evidence presented at the
suicide-prevention trial that several wardens and their
staff have taken steps to ensure that 30-minute checks
are regularly conducted in their facilities, and that
16. Ross Wolfinger killed himself in segregation during a shift in which the correctional officer assigned to Wolfinger’s area of segregation failed to do any 30-minute checks. See Pls. Ex. 2403 at SPA_13487. An ADOC memorandum about the suicide says the officer’s actions “resulted in” Wolfinger’s death. See id. at SPA_13488. Curiously, despite this admission, the defendants highlight that Dr. Burns testified that she did not determine whether 30-minute checks would have prevented any of the suicides she reviewed in her assessment. See Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 38. This testimony proves little to nothing for the defendants, given that Dr. Burns did not say whether she even set out to determine whether there was a causal connection between the failure to conduct rounds and specific suicides, or that she had the necessary information to make that determination. In any case, the testimony of the defendants’ own expert, Dr. Perrien, indicates that she believed such a causal connection possibly existed in some suicides. She said that “there were cases where it’s possible that if 30-minute rounds were occurring, perhaps those individuals may have been rescued. May have been identified. May not have completed suicide.” Perrien, Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 193-94.
82

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 83 of 210

certain discovered violations have been corrected. This

evidence falls short of establishing that ADOC has

“completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the

alleged violations,” let alone that there not a serious

threat of the problem recurring. Thomas, 614 F.3d at

1321. While it is undeniably important that wardens take

appropriate disciplinary action when they discover

violations, the evidence did not convince the court that

ADOC is catching most violations. Instead, the court

came away convinced that ADOC’s confirmation of

compliance remains insufficient.

At the

suicide-prevention trial, the court heard ample evidence

of substantial and pervasive problems in complying with

the policy to conduct security checks every 30 minutes.

For example, plaintiffs’ expert Vail testified that,

based on the segregation duty post logs that he has

reviewed, ADOC has not demonstrated a consistent and

sustained practice of conducting 30-minute security

checks. See Vail Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 156.

He said that of the six or seven facilities he reviewed,

83

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 84 of 210

only one “passed muster.” Id. Most troublingly, the

logs from Holman prison showed two entire (eight- or

12-hour) shifts in which not a single security check was

logged, and other days in which more than two hours passed

before a security check was logged. See id. at 155.

Finally, given the continuing correctional

understaffing, the court finds that inadequate checks are

likely to be a recurring problem. See Perrien Apr. 9,

2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 195 (testifying that it is her

understanding that ADOC is unsure whether it can follow

its own segregation-rounds policy in “particularly

understaffed facilities”). The evidence fell far short

of showing that the problem of inadequate security checks

had been eradicated, that the problem poses no threat of

future harm to the plaintiffs, or that ADOC has developed

a functional system for ensuring that such checks occur

in all segregation units.

As explained above,

substantial and pervasive inadequacies identified by the

court remain that may be remedied by injunctive relief.

84

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 85 of 210
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a court cannot order prospective relief addressing prison conditions unless it “finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Whether the relief meets the PLRA’s “need-narrowness-intrusiveness” requirement is “determined with reference to the constitutional violations established by the specific plaintiffs before the court.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 531 (2011). In making the determination, courts are required to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).17
17. These requirements are consistent with this court’s previous statement that courts must remedy constitutional violations, see Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011), even though prison officials in cases challenging prison conditions “should be given considerable deference in determining an appropriate remedy for the constitutional violations involved.”
85

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 86 of 210

For the following reasons, and based on a

comprehensive review of the record,18 the court concludes

that virtually all of the immediate suicide-prevention

relief requested here satisfies the PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement.

Severe

inadequacies in ADOC’s suicide-prevention efforts

contribute to the ongoing Eighth Amendment violation that

the court originally found in the liability opinion, and

reaffirms today. The relief ordered is narrowly tailored

to address these inadequacies, which relate to, among

other areas, identifying inmates at risk of suicide,

treating and monitoring them, and providing them

follow-up care. Furthermore, as elaborated below, not

Laube v. Haley, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Thompson, J.) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979)).
18. The court reviewed the whole record, including the evidence presented during the liability trial as well as the additional remedial phase hearings up to this point. The court has heard testimony from, among others, mental-health experts selected by both parties, ADOC officials, ADOC correctional staff, plaintiff class members, and the defendants Commissioner Dunn and Associate Commissioner Naglich.
86

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 87 of 210
only do the opinions of both parties’ experts support the need for the relief, but the defendants themselves have at least agreed, or not objected, to many of the relief’s provisions, and in some instances have themselves suggested the relief. See Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1); Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2499) at 13.

i. Particularized Findings

As required by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,

the court will make “particularized findings, on a

provision-by-provision basis, that each requirement

imposed”

here

meets

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. Cason v.

Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 785 (11th Cir. 2000); see also

United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corrs., No.

12-22958-CIV, 2015 WL 4768247 at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12,

2015) (Seitz, J.) (interpreting Cason’s application of

the “need-narrowness-intrusiveness” requirement to

termination proceedings of consent decrees as requiring

87

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 88 of 210
“a district court to make particularized findings as to
each element” of injunctive relief). In discussing the
evidence that supports these findings, the court’s
analysis will largely focus on a single inquiry: is the
provision necessary to correct the constitutional
violation established by the plaintiffs? This is for
both practical and logical reasons. Logically speaking,
if the court determines the relief is necessary to
correct the violation found by the court, it follows that
the relief is (1) “narrowly drawn,” (2) “extends no
further than necessary,” and (3) “is the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).19 Relatedly, and practically speaking,
19. To explain: if the ordered relief is necessary to correct the violation, then--by definition--no other form of relief would be sufficient to correct it. And if no other form of relief is sufficient correct the violation, then the ordered relief is--by definition--"narrowly drawn” and the “least intrusive means necessary” to correct it; any narrower or less intrusive relief would not be sufficient. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Similarly, if the ordered relief is necessary, then it "extends no further than necessary,” because any part of the relief extending further than what is necessary would render it unnecessary. Id.
88

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 89 of 210

because the three components of the requirement (need,

narrowness, intrusiveness) really blend into a single

inquiry, evidence showing compliance with one component

often also shows compliance with the others. It would

make for an excessively redundant and lengthy (more so

than it already is) opinion to analyze each component

separately and thus frequently repeat the same evidence

for why it is satisfied, especially given the redundancy

already

created

by

the

requirement

for

provision-by-provision findings.

ii. The Interim Agreement The genesis of the interim agreement traces back to the suicide of Jaime Wallace, a plaintiff class member who had severe mental illnesses, as well as intellectual and physical disabilities. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d.

However, the court offers these observations as general ones, for the court is reluctant to be so confident as to say there are no exceptions. What the court can say is that there do not appear to be any exceptions insofar as the comments apply here.
89

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 90 of 210
at 1184. At the liability trial, he recounted the many times he had tried to kill himself, showed the scars on his arms where he made repeated attempts, and told the court that he had not received enough treatment for his illnesses. Ten days after testifying, he hanged himself in prison and died. Wallace’s suicide prompted the court to halt proceedings and allow the parties to mediate immediate, interim measures to prevent future suicides. The parties reached the interim agreement, which the court adopted as an interim order. See Interim Agreement and Order (doc. nos. 1106, 1106-1).
For the following reasons the court now finds that the vast majority of the terms of the interim agreement--as modified by Drs. Burns and Perrien’s recommendations--are narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the defendants’ constitutional violation, and are the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. In making this finding, the court gives “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
90

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 91 of 210

system caused by the relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

The court will next make particularized findings for

each provision, but three overarching reasons in support

of the PLRA findings bear emphasizing at the outset.

First, where, as here, the provisions of relief ordered

by a court are adopted from an agreement jointly drafted

and reached by the parties, it is compelling evidence

that

the

provisions

comply

with

the

needs-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria. See Morales

Feliciano v. Calderon Serra, 300 F. Supp. 2d 321, 334

(D.P.R. 2004) (Perez-Gimenez, J.) (“The very fact that

the defendants chose to join the plaintiffs in selecting

this remedy would seem to mean--and must be taken to

mean--that they understood it to be precisely tailored

to the needs of the occasion, that it is narrowly drawn

and least intrusive—in fact not intrusive at all.”);

Benjamin v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d 333, 344 (S.D.N.Y.

2001) (Baer, J.) (reasoning that an agreement between the

parties that is incorporated into an order “constitutes

strong evidence” of compliance with the

91

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 92 of 210
need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement); cf. Cason, 231 F.3d at 785 n.8 (“Of course, we do not mean to suggest that the district court must ... enter particularized findings concerning any facts or factors about which there is no dispute.”). Indeed, common sense dictates that, as a general proposition, a penal institution would release to a court or other outside entity only as much of its discretion and authority as it believes the law and facts require.
Second, despite agreeing to them, ADOC has consistently failed to comply with the provisions of the interim agreement. And more generally, the ongoing inadequacies in ADOC’s suicide-prevention efforts show that the agreement remains urgent and necessary.
Third, in their briefing, the defendants make no specific objections to the interim agreement’s requirements. Their arguments against them relate to only notice and mootness. As explained above, those arguments are meritless.
92

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 93 of 210
1. Licensed Mental-Health Professionals at Treatment Hubs
In the liability opinion, the court found that “[t]he
quality of psychotherapy ... suffers due to use of
unsupervised, unlicensed counselors, referred to as
‘mental health professionals’ [(MHPs)].” Braggs, 257 F.
Supp. 3d at 1211. The lack of supervision for unlicensed
MHPs was found to be “a significant, system-wide problem
affecting the delivery of mental-health care within
ADOC.” Id.
The interim agreement addresses this problem. The
relevant provision requires that each “Major Facility”20
have at least one full-time licensed MHP,21 and that the
20. “A Major Facility is defined as all ADOC facilities except any designated community based facility (“work release”) or community work center.” Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 1 n.2.
21. The agreement defines a licensed MHP as “any individual who has satisfied the licensing requirements promulgated by the Alabama Board of Examiners in Counseling” and “currently holds a valid license from the Alabama Board of Examiners in Counseling.” Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 1 n.1. Although the court ordered that, as of June 4, 2018, the term “MHP” in this case “shall refer only to a licensed mental-health professional,” and that “unlicensed mental-health
93

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 94 of 210

treatment hubs--Bullock, Donaldson, and Tutwiler--have

at least two full-time licensed MHPs. See Interim

Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 1. The agreement further

requires that two licensed MHPs be on site for at least

eight hours per day every business day at each treatment

hub, and that at least one MHP be at each treatment hub

on the weekends and holidays. See id.

The court finds that ordering immediate and

permanent implementation of this provision constitutes

relief that is narrowly drawn, extends no further than

necessary to correct the defendants’ constitutional

violation, and is the least intrusive means necessary

to correct the violation.

See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A).

In addition to the original liability findings,

evidence presented at the suicide-prevention trial

further demonstrates that the provision is necessary.

providers may receive other titles, but will no longer be referred to as ‘MHPs,’” Order (doc. no. 1864), this opinion uses the term “licensed MHP” to be abundantly clear that these positions should be licensed.
94

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 95 of 210
Dr. Burns testified that the required numbers of licensed MHPs in major facilities and treatment hubs are the “minimum numbers of people” that must be available “to provide an adequate suicide prevention program.” Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 133. In her view, there is no less intrusive requirement that would still be effective. See id. Crucially, MHPs must have the required licensing to be able to work independently, without supervision. Id. at 129-30. According to Dr. Burns, they must be available every day, including weekends, to check on inmates, including those who have been placed on suicide watch. See id. at 130. Adequate licensed MHP staffing is also needed to complete the suicide risk assessments and follow-up appointments required elsewhere in this opinion. Finally, the defendants agreed to include this requirement in the interim agreement, which is strong evidence that it satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria. See, e.g., Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
95

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 96 of 210
2. Who May Present a Prisoner for Suicide Watch The liability opinion found that ADOC fails to “provide suicide-prevention services and crisis care to many prisoners who need it,” in part due to “inadequate identification of those who are at heightened risk of suicide.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1221. The systemwide understaffing of both mental-health care providers and correctional officers contributes to this problem. See id. at 1193. Against this backdrop, the interim agreement provides that all employees of ADOC and its mental-health and medical-care contractor (currently Wexford) have the authority to “present a person to mental health or medical staff for assessment for suicide watch.” Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 1. Whoever places the inmate on watch must notify appropriate Wexford staff.22 See id. If the inmate is identified when no Wexford staff is on-site, the appropriate Wexford on-call staff
22. References to Wexford apply to any subsequent mental-health care contractor that may replace Wexford.
96

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 97 of 210

must be notified. See id.

The court finds that ordering immediate and

permanent implementation of this provision constitutes

relief

that

satisfies

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

Dr. Burns testified that this provision is necessary,

given that an adequate suicide-prevention program must

have “a low threshold” for putting someone on suicide

watch until their risk is fully assessed. Burns Apr. 8,

2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 134. To have the required “low

threshold” for suicide-watch placement, both

correctional and mental-health staff must have the

authority to initiate the referral process by presenting

them to mental-health or medical staff for assessment.

Furthermore, correctional and mental-health

understaffing remains a serious problem. As of December

2018, ADOC reported that 62 % of correctional officer

positions were vacant, see March 2019 Quarterly Staffing

Report (doc no. 2386-1) at 3, and as of September 2018,

97

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 98 of 210
23.6 % of the mental-health positions were vacant, see December 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report (doc. no. 2378-1) at 9. The more understaffed ADOC is, the fewer the eyes on prisoners, and the more necessary it is that the broadest possible scope of employees at the facilities be authorized to identify inmates for a potential placement on suicide watch.
The need to clearly authorize correctional staff to refer inmates for suicide watch is also demonstrated by recent instances in which correctional officers should have referred inmates to mental-health, but did not. For example, as detailed above, less than two weeks after cutting his wrist, being placed on suicide watch, and then returning to segregation, Kendall Chatter loudly yelled and banged on his segregation cell for a sustained period. In response, the correctional shift supervisor instructed his subordinate to let him keep banging and yelling until he tired himself out. Shortly after Chatter started making the noise--according to one record, less than an hour later--he was found hanging.
98

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 99 of 210

Finally, the defendants agreed to include this

requirement in the interim agreement, which is strong

evidence

that

it

satisfies

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g.,

Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344.

3. Constant Watch Until Initial Assessment for Suicide Watch
As found in the liability opinion, ADOC’s monitoring of suicidal prisoners is “woefully inadequate.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. Unsafe features of crisis cells--such as physical structures that provide opportunities to commit suicide, obstacles to visibility into a cell, and access to dangerous items such as sharp implements--“heighten the importance of monitoring prisoners for signs of decompensation or suicide attempts.” Id.
The interim agreement provides that, “[u]pon being presented to mental health or medical staff for assessment for suicide watch, each person will be maintained under ‘constant watch’ at least until they
99

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 100 of 210

have been evaluated” using a suicide risk assessment.

Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 1. “Constant

watch” is a procedure defined in the agreement as

ensuring one-on-one visual contact at all times, except

to the extent the physical design of the cell gives the

observer a continuous unobstructed view of up to two

people on watch. See id.

The court finds that ordering immediate and

permanent implementation of this provision constitutes

relief

that

satisfies

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

Dr. Burns testified that an adequate

suicide-prevention program requires that once a prisoner

is identified to be assessed for suicide watch, he must

remain on constant watch until the assessment is

completed. See Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at

133-34. As she explained, a less intrusive requirement

would be insufficient, because if a person is at risk,

he must be subject to continuous watch until someone can

100

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 101 of 210
“truly assess” the level of risk. Id. at 134. Along similar lines, Dr. Raymond Patterson, the defendants’ correctional mental-health care expert, opined at the liability trial that suicidal prisoners should be under direct, constant watch while in suicide-watch cells. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1228. He testified that camera observation by an officer at a control station “may not be sufficient, because by the time that officer notices a suicide attempt, it might be too late,” and that, in any case, “the officer likely has other responsibilities that would preclude careful monitoring of any single cell.” Id.
Furthermore, the defendants agreed to include this provision in the interim agreement, which also shows that it satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g., Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344. At the same time, however, ADOC has repeatedly failed to comply with the spirit of the provision, demonstrating the need to order its immediate implementation. As detailed above, in several of the recent cases of suicides, ADOC
101

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 102 of 210
responded to the men’s expressed suicidality by placing them on MHO instead of constant watch. See also Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738 (Crook’s letter to Wexford identifying the systemic “[f]ailure to place an inmate on acute suicide watch with constant observation (rather than MHO) when risk factors for potential suicidality are present until a psychologist or psychiatrist is consulted”).
4. Suicide Risk Assessment After Initial Placement on Suicide Watch
Previously this court found that ADOC’s “failure to perform proper suicide risk assessments to identify prisoners with a heightened risk of suicidal behavior places seriously mentally ill prisoners at an ‘obvious,’ substantial risk of serious harm.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1221.
The interim agreement addresses inadequate suicide risk assessments. The relevant provision requires that once an inmate is placed on constant, he must receive a suicide risk assessment to determine whether he is “acutely” or “nonacutely” suicidal. Interim Agreement
102

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 103 of 210
(doc. no. 1106-1) at 1-2. Specifically, the suicide risk
assessment must (1) be conducted in an out-of-cell,
confidential setting, either by (2) licensed
psychiatrists or psychologists (with specific provisions
applying if via telepsychiatry),23 or (3) by Certified
Registered Nurse Practitioners (CRNPs) or licensed MHPs
if they are in person and afterwards confirmed with a
psychiatrist or psychologist, and (4) only if the CRNPs
and licensed MHPs have first completed approved training
on suicide prevention, assessing suicidality, and suicide
watch procedures. See id. at 1-2.24
23. It goes without saying that when ADOC uses telepsychiatry for any of the treatment provided pursuant to the ordered provisions of the interim agreement, it must comply with the telepsychiatry requirements set forth in the Psychotherapy and Confidentiality Remedial Order (doc. no. 1899-1) at 8. That is, in advance of the telepsychiatry session, the psychiatric provider shall be provided with the “inmate-patient’s most recent mental health treatment plan, laboratory reports (if applicable), physician orders, problem list, and mental health progress notes for the past six (6) months.” Id.
24. The required qualifications for personnel conducting suicide risk assessments will be considered further in the course of the remedial proceeding on suicide-prevention measures for which the plaintiffs do not seek immediate implementation. See Joint Expert
103

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 104 of 210

The court finds that ordering immediate and

permanent implementation of this provision constitutes

relief

that

satisfies

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

As explained in the liability opinion, adequate

mental-health care requires face-to-face risk

assessments by appropriately qualified practitioners:

“[T]he administration of a suicide risk-assessment and management tool by a qualified provider is widely recognized to be an essential part of mental-health care: it should be used as a part of the intake screening process and whenever a prisoner threatens or attempts to harm himself or actually does so. ... As defense expert Dr. Patterson explained, the suicide risk-assessment tool must be completed in a face-to-face encounter by a high-level provider or a mid-level provider with high-level supervision, because the tool comes with clinical guidelines and requires clinical judgment.”

Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1221.

Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1). While the court herein orders these qualification and training requirements for persons conducting suicide risk assessments, such requirements may be altered in light of evidence presented at the proceeding on the non-immediate remedies.
104

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 105 of 210
Consistent with this finding in the liability opinion, Dr. Burns more recently testified that the provision in the interim agreement is necessary for an adequate suicide-prevention program, because it ensures standardized, accurate assessments, and that the evaluators are properly trained--as well as licensed and approved by law--to conduct independent assessments. See Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 135. Furthermore, both Drs. Burns and Perrien testified that it is important to have these kinds of mental-health contacts in an out-of-cell, confidential setting, see Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 11, 199-201, and both recommend that ADOC be required to immediately adhere to confidentiality requirements, see Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 4.
Director of Mental Health Services Crook testified that she agrees with the provision’s qualification requirements, as well as its requirement that the MHPs and CRNPs receive training prior to completing the assessments. See Crook Apr. 2, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no.
105

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 106 of 210

2488) at 17. Indeed, as with the other provisions in the

interim agreement, the defendants agreed to include this

provision in the interim agreement, which also supports

the

finding

that

it

satisfies

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g.,

Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344.

Critically, however, ADOC has repeatedly failed to

comply with the provision. Crook specifically identified

the systemic “[f]ailure to complete the Suicide Risk

Assessment (SRA) by a Qualified Mental Health

Professional (QMHP) when an inmate is placed in a crisis

cell.” Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738. As detailed above,

in several of the recent 15 suicides, ADOC either

inadequately conducted risk assessments or altogether

failed to do them. Another compliance problem is that,

as Drs. Burns and Perrien found, mental-health staff

began providing suicide risk assessments prior to

receiving the requisite training. See Joint Expert

Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 10.

Indeed, Dr. Burns was never asked to review and approve

106

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 107 of 210

the training, as required by the interim agreement. See Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 114.

5. Applying Definitions of “Acutely Suicidal” and “Nonacutely Suicidal”

The interim agreement provides that, when conducting

the suicide risk assessment to determine if an inmate is

“acutely suicidal” or “nonacutely suicidal,”

mental-health staff must apply those terms as they are

defined by the National Commission on Correctional Health

Care standard MH-G-04.25

The court finds that ordering immediate and

permanent implementation of this provision constitutes

relief

that

satisfies

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

25. The NCCHC defines “acutely suicidal” prisoners as “those who are actively engaging in self-injurious behavior and/or threaten suicide with a specific plan.” Pls. Ex. 2658 at 39. It defines “nonacutely suicidal” prisoners as “those who express current suicidal ideation (e.g., expressing a wish to die without a specific threat or plan) and/or have a recent history of self-destructive behavior.” Id.
107

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 108 of 210
The defendants agreed to include this provision in the interim agreement, which shows that it satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g., Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344.26 Indeed, ADOC’s contract with Wexford requires it to comply with NCCHC standards--providing further evidence that the provision is not intrusive. See Pls. Ex. 1302 at 3. Finally, the court heard overwhelming evidence that ADOC has placed prisoners on levels of watch and observation that are incommensurate to their risk of self-harm, and that these erroneous placements affect the level of treatment and monitoring that the inmates receive. Applying these definitions going forward is necessary to ensure consistency and accuracy in identifying suicide risk, so that inmates receive appropriate treatment and monitoring.
26. The 2015 NCCHC standards in effect when the interim agreement was reached do not significantly differ from the current standards. Compare Pls. Ex. 1463 at 110 (2015 NCCHC standards), with Pls. Ex. 2658 at 39 (2018 NCCHC standards).
108

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 109 of 210

6. Constant Watch for Acutely Suicidal Prisoners

Previously this court found that, “[f]or the most

acutely

suicidal,

constant--rather

than

staggered-interval--watch is necessary.” Braggs, 257 F.

Supp. 3d. at 1229. As the court explained, “correctional

systems must have a constant-watch procedure for

individuals whose risk of suicide is the highest, due to

their engagement in self-injurious behavior or threat of

suicide with specific plans: if a prisoner is waiting for

an opportunity to kill himself, it is too dangerous to

walk away, and he must be constantly observed. For this

reason, the NCCHC standards classify constant-watch

procedures as an ‘essential’ standard.” Id.

The interim agreement says that “any person who is

determined to be acutely suicidal shall be monitored

through a constant watch procedure.” Interim Agreement

(doc. no. 1106-1) at 2.27 The court finds that ordering

27. As mentioned above, the interim agreement defines the “constant watch” procedure as ensuring one-on-one visual contact at all times, except to the extent the physical design of the cell gives the observer
109

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 110 of 210
immediate and permanent implementation of this provision constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
To start, the court already concluded that constant watch is “necessary” for inmates who are at the highest risk of suicide. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d. at 1229. “Acutely suicidal”-- as opposed to “nonacutely suicidal”--inmates are the ones who have the highest risk. The court also makes the PLRA findings here largely for the same reasons that the court identified above in finding that requiring constant watch until a person receives a suicide risk assessment satisfies the PLRA. If constant watch is necessary to protect a potentially suicidal person whose risk level is not yet determined, a fortiori constant watch is necessary when they have already been determined to have the highest possible risk of suicide.
a continuous unobstructed view of up to two people on watch. See Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 1 n.3.
110

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 111 of 210
The defendants and both parties’ experts have widely recognized the necessity of the requirement, given that acutely suicidal individuals are at “imminent risk of self-harm.” Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 82; see Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 136 (testifying that constant watch is necessary for acutely suicidal inmates); Kern Mar. 28, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2482) at 116 (testifying that an acutely suicidal inmate must be placed on constant watch); Naglich Dec. 20, 2016, Trial Tr. at 232-34 (acknowledging during the liability trial that ADOC’s failure to provide constant watch to acutely suicidal inmates was a problem that needed to be addressed immediately--“th[at] afternoon” even--because their lives were at risk). Dr. Burns testified that these same procedures “have been in place in multiple systems for decades.” Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 137. And Dr. Perrien testified that it was her understanding that certain components of the interim agreement, including acute watch, “would forever remain in place ... [b]ecause those just are a function of any
111

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 112 of 210
suicide prevention program.” Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 58-59.
Furthermore, the defendants agreed to include this provision in the interim agreement, which also shows that it satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g., Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344. Nevertheless, ADOC still has not revised its suicide-prevention policies to require constant watch for acutely suicidal prisoners. See Jt. Ex. 132 (ADOC Admin. Reg. 629); Jt. Ex. 133 (ADOC Admin. Reg. 630). Worse yet, ADOC has not adequately complied with the requirement, demonstrating the need to order immediate implementation. For example, while “Person Incarcerated at Tutwiler”28 was on constant watch, she was seen placing an object in her mouth, and shortly thereafter cutting herself--without any reported intervention. See Pls. Ex. 2323 (medical records of Person Incarcerated at Tutwiler). In none of the
28. The parties and the court agreed to refer to this individual as “Person Incarcerated at Tutwiler” rather than by her initials due to the uniquely identifiable nature of her initials and to protect her confidentiality.
112

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 113 of 210
facilities visited by Drs. Burns and Perrien “were the ‘watchers’ positioned appropriately to permit full visibility into the safe cells or constant visibility of the inmates being observed.” Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 26.
7. Close Watch for Nonacutely Suicidal Prisoners According to “the standard of care for mental-health care in prisons, suicide-watch checks should take place at staggered, or random, intervals of approximately every 15 minutes, rather than exactly every 15 minutes.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. Consistent with this standard of care, the interim agreement requires that any inmate determined to be nonacutely suicidal must be monitored through a “close watch” procedure that “ensures monitoring by ADOC staff at staggered intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes.” Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 2. The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent implementation of this provision constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness
113

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 114 of 210
requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). First, as the court explained in the liability
opinion, “[s]taggered intervals prevent prisoners from timing their suicide attempts, because otherwise they can predict exactly when checks will occur. Such monitoring procedures are all the more crucial when suicidal inmates are housed in cells that have little visibility: as plaintiffs’ expert Vail bluntly stated, without regular checks, ‘[Y]ou have no idea if they’re alive or dead.’” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. The “unsafe features” of ADOC’s suicide watch cells “heighten the importance” of the close watch procedure. Id.
Second, Dr. Burns testified that the close-watch procedures are a necessary component of an adequate suicide-prevention program. See Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 136. She said that same “close watch procedures have been in place in multiple systems for decades.” Id. at 137.
Third, the defendants agreed to include the close watch provision in the interim agreement, which also
114

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 115 of 210

shows

that

it

satisfies

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g.,

Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344.

Fourth, despite agreeing to the requirement, ADOC

repeatedly failed to comply with it. Matthew Holmes was

placed in MHO instead of suicide watch even though, as

Mental Health Services Director Crook admitted, he met

the NCCHC’s definition of nonacutely suicidal. Less than

a week later, he killed himself. Similarly, Timothy

Chumney was placed in MHO instead of suicide watch,

despite being classified as having a moderate risk of

suicide. Like Holmes, he killed himself less than a week

later.

8. Suicide Watch Observation Logs The interim agreement requires that both constant and close watch be “contemporaneously documented at staggered intervals not to exceed 15 minutes on a record maintained on each individual cell door. Upon discharge from suicide watch, these records will be maintained in
115

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 116 of 210
a facility-based suicide watch log and in the individual prisoner’s medical record.” Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 2.
The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent implementation of this provision constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). This provision is needed to ensure that ADOC properly implements the constant and close watch procedures, which are essential protections for suicidal inmates. In short, without the required documentation, there is no way to know whether ADOC is carrying out the mandated observation. If the logs are pre-filled--as they have been repeatedly during this litigation--it “makes it impossible to ensure that staggered checks are actually happening.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. Such a situation would be untenable. ADOC cannot be left to its own devices to comply with court orders. As the court monitoring section below demonstrates, ADOC officials and staff must be held accountable--both internally and to
116

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 117 of 210

the court--for carrying out remedial orders, especially

the suicide watch requirements, which can have life or

death consequences.

That the defendants agreed to include this provision

in the interim agreement, yet have had problems complying

with it, also demonstrates the need for ordering its

immediate implementation. Shortly after the parties

reached the agreement, the court found noncompliance:

“Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that

staff are not permitted to use monitoring logs

with pre-printed times, but that some continue

to use them. She also testified that officers

and staff are not permitted to handwrite times

and signatures in advance of, or in lieu of,

their actual checks. However, during the

post-trial prison tours, the court came across

multiple logs where times at 15- or 30-minute

intervals had been pre-filled, even though the

parties had agreed during the trial to correct

this practice, and the court had ordered

compliance with the agreement several weeks

before the tours.

This evidence of

non-compliance greatly troubled the court, as it

showed that policy changes are not being

implemented on the ground even when a court order

is involved.”

Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. Although the experts

recently reported “significant progress” in this area,

see Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no.

117

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 118 of 210
2416-1) at 26,29 noncompliance has continued since the liability opinion, see, e.g., Burns Dec. 6, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2254) at 144, 147, 165-67 (testifying about unstaggered logs and precalculated times); Pls. Ex. 1823 at SPA_4177 (showing unstaggered logs on acute suicide watch).
9. Administrative Regulations Regarding Suicide Prevention
The interim agreement required ADOC to revise Administrative Regulation 630--which mandated 15-minute intervals for monitoring on suicide watch--so that it reflects the constant and close watch procedures set forth in the agreement. See Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 2. Two years later, the defendants have still not incorporated this requirement into Administrative Regulation 630, which was last updated in 2005. See Jt.
29. The experts recommend that “[a]ll facilities should have their observation logs reviewed to ensure that the progress observed during the site visits extends beyond those facilities.” Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 27.
118

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 119 of 210
Ex. 133 (ADOC Admin. Reg. 630). The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent
implementation of this provision constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
As Dr. Burns testified, “the administrative regulation is the department’s policy for all intents and purposes ... and needs to contain the information that’s also contained in this [interim agreement] with the different levels of watch.” Burns Dec. 6, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2254) at 128. Put simply, ADOC is more likely to comply with the court’s orders if they are incorporated into its own policies. Furthermore, that the defendants agreed to include this provision in the interim agreement shows that it satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g., Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
10. Monthly Evaluations of Suicide Risk Assessments The interim agreement requires that all suicide risk
119

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 120 of 210
assessments be reviewed monthly by certain clinical staff at ADOC’s Office of Health Services (OHS)--which is responsible for overseeing the provision of medical and mental-health care to prisoners--and Wexford. Based on this review, the clinical staff “will issue immediate corrective actions and training if necessary.” Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 2.
The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent implementation of this provision constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
Requiring senior clinical staff to review the quality of suicide risk assessments is necessary given that, as found in the liability opinion, ADOC’s “failure to perform proper suicide risk assessments ... places seriously mentally ill prisoners at an ‘obvious,’ substantial risk of serious harm.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d. at 1221. More recently, Dr. Kern confirmed that clinicians should exercise oversight of suicide risk assessments to determine that clinical judgment is
120

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 121 of 210
appropriate. See Kern Mar. 28, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2482) at 118.
The defendants agreed to include this provision in the interim agreement, showing that it satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard. See, e.g., Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344. But Crook admitted that OHS staff did not begin the required monthly reviews of the suicide risk assessments until March 2019, more than two years after the defendants agreed to do them. See Crook Apr. 1, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2485) at 43-44.
Finally, the need for review of the assessments is underscored by ADOC’s ongoing failure to properly conduct them. See, e.g., Burns Dec. 6, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2254) at 134-35, 137-43, 146-47. For example, Paul Ford’s suicide risk assessment stated that he had no recent “suicidal/self-injurious” behavior or ideation, even though he had cut his wrist just eight days earlier. See Pls. Ex. 2309 at SPA_9674. Shortly after, he was released back into segregation, and killed himself less than a month later.
121

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 122 of 210
11. Discharge from Suicide Watch
In the liability opinion, the court concluded that
“[p]risoners are routinely released from suicide watch
improperly.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d. at 1230. As the
defendants’ and plaintiffs’ experts explained at the
time, “suicidal prisoners should be released only with
the approval of a psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or
nurse practitioner) who has made a face-to-face
assessment that their condition was sufficiently
stabilized to warrant it.” Id. But that was not
occurring:
“In 2016, [the then-mental-health care vendor] reported to ADOC that it was discharging patients from suicide watch without a face-to-face assessment; the decisions were based instead on whatever information lower-level mental-health staff communicated over the phone to on-call doctors and nurse practitioners. ... Associate Commissioner Naglich admitted that this practice of authorizing suicide watch release without a face-to-face evaluation was not specific to any particular facilities, but that it reflected a general shortage of psychiatrists; she further agreed that it put the prisoners at risk of premature release. Evidence also showed that prisoners have, on occasion, been released from suicide watch by correctional staff without any mental health assessment at all; this is even
122

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 123 of 210
more unacceptable.”
Id. at 1230-31.
The interim agreement provides the following
requirements for discharging a prisoner from suicide
watch (also referred to as “discharge protocols”):
“10. A person may be discharged from suicide watch following an out of cell, confidential evaluation according to the following terms.
a. Licensed psychiatrists or licensed psychologists may conduct these evaluations either in person or by telepsychiatry. In the event that they are conducted by telepsychiatry, the person being evaluated will be in a room with a mental health professional (licensed or otherwise), psychological associate (licensed or otherwise), or CRNP.
b. CRNPs may conduct these evaluations but only if they are conducted in person. Upon conducting any such evaluation, a CRNP must confirm their assessment with a psychiatrist or psychologist either in person, by telepsychiatry, or over the phone. The psychiatrist or psychologist must be provided with and review the risk assessment and the notes of the mental health evaluations and counseling that have been conducted in the past 14 days.
c. Once the licensed MHPs are in place at each facility, they may conduct these evaluations but only if they are conducted in person and confirmed with a psychiatrist or psychologist as described in [10].b.
123

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 124 of 210
above.
d. A person may not be discharged from suicide watch via telepsychiatry until the person conducting the evaluation has sought input from the MHP or counselor who has been primarily responsible for providing mental health services to the person on suicide watch, except in exceptional circumstances, which shall be documented.
e. Prior to conducting any such evaluations, licensed MHPs and CRNPs must complete a training on suicide prevention, assessing suicidality, and procedures of suicide watch. This training must be approved by Associate Commissioner Ruth Naglich, Dr. David Tytell, Dr. Robert Hunter, Dr. Charles Woodley (or any subsequent replacements), and the agreed-upon monitor or Plaintiffs’ experts if the agreed-upon monitor has not yet been retained.
f. Each patient placed on constant watch will be reduced to a close watch prior to release from suicide watch.”
Interim Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 2-3.
The court will adopt these requirements, with the
slight modification that Drs. Burns and Perrien must
approve the training for licensed MHPs and CRNPs.30 The
30. Drs. Burns and Perrien each testified that they would be willing to assist ADOC with any additional
124

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 125 of 210
court finds that ordering immediate and permanent implementation of these requirements constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
First, the findings and expert testimony from the liability trial cited above concerning the failure to use proper discharge practices show that the ordered protocols are necessary. Dr. Burns also recently testified that the protocols are necessary for an adequate suicide-prevention program, explaining that suicide risk must be assessed by “someone who’s independently licensed to exercise their judgment using a standardized assessment to make decisions about the level of risk.” Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 137.
Second, although the defendants’ agreed to the protocols in the interim agreement, which in and of itself is strong evidence of PLRA compliance, see, e.g.,
training that becomes necessary. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 24.
125

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 126 of 210
Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344, they have repeatedly failed to comply with them since the liability trial. Indeed, Mental Health Services Director Crook identified the systemic “[f]ailure to document consultation with a psychiatrist or psychologist prior to discharging an inmate from crisis placement.” Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738.
Third, ADOC’s acknowledgement that the majority of suicides in its system have involved men released from suicide watch to segregation is compelling evidence of the urgent need to adopt these minimally adequate discharge protocols. See Pls. Ex. 2706.
12. Suicide Watch Follow-Up Appointments In the liability opinion, the court found that inmates “receive inadequate follow-up care after their release from suicide watch,” contributing to a “substantial risk of recurring self-injurious behavior and suicide.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1230. To address this deficiency, the interim agreement
126

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 127 of 210

requires that, upon release from suicide watch, each

inmate will have at least three confidential and

out-of-cell follow-up appointments.

See Interim

Agreement (doc. no. 1106-1) at 3-4.

The interim

agreement provides that “follow-up examinations do not

take the place of otherwise scheduled mental-health

appointments, though they may occur in connection with

or contiguous with such appointments.” Id. at 3. The

interim agreement also allowed follow-up appointments to

be conducted either by licensed psychiatrists or

psychologists, or alternatively by CRNPs or licensed

MHPs. See id. at 4. If CRNPs or MHPs conduct the

evaluations, they must do so in person and confirm their

assessment with a psychiatrist or psychologist. Prior

to conducting any such follow-up examinations, licensed

MHPs and CRNPs must complete an approved training on

suicide prevention, assessing suicidality, and

procedures of suicide watch. See id.

The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent

implementation of these requirements--as slightly

127

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 128 of 210

modified by the experts’ recommendations--31constitutes

relief

that

satisfies

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A).

First, in the liability trial, experts on both sides

opined that “follow-up care is necessary upon release

from suicide watch.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1231.

As the court found, for prisoners already on the

mental-health caseload, follow-ups allow providers to

incorporate what they learned from the most recent crisis

into the inmate’s treatment plans and modify

interventions to “address the factors that contributed

to the self-injurious behavior or suicidal ideation.”

Id. For inmates not already on the mental-health

38. In the immediate relief recommendations, Drs. Burns and Perrien recommend modifying the interim agreement’s follow-up appointment requirements as to the number and schedule of follow-ups. See Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 2. They recommend that each person receive a minimum of four, rather than three, follow-up appointments and recommend a different timeframe in which these appointments must occur. See id. These recommendations, which the plaintiffs seek to adopt, are discussed below in the section on the immediate recommendations’ compliance with the PLRA.
128

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 129 of 210

caseload, follow-ups allow “providers to assess whether

the prisoner's risk of self-injury remains low, and to

determine whether the prisoner should be added to the

mental-health caseload to address underlying

mental-health issues.” Id. The court credited Dr.

Burns’s testimony, as summarized by the court, that “the

failure to provide follow-up care that addresses the root

of self-injurious behavior creates a substantial risk

that the self-injurious behavior will continue and result

in serious injury or death.” Id.32

Second,

credible

testimony

from

the

suicide-prevention trial also supports the need for the

follow-up requirements. See, e.g., Perrien Apr. 9, 2019,

R.D. Trial Tr. at 113. (testifying that follow-ups are

“absolutely necessary”); Naglich Apr. 5, 2019, R.D. Trial

Tr. at 99 (testifying that absent a significant security

reason, she supports the recommendation for confidential

32. This substantial risk is exemplified by the suicide of Jamie Wallace, who was released from suicide watch, received no follow-up care, and committed suicide two days later. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1231.
129

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 130 of 210
and out-of-cell mental health contacts); Burns Dec. 6, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2254) at 130 (testifying that follow-ups needed to be done out of cell and in a confidential setting).
Third, the defendants agreed to the requirements in the interim agreement. See Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 344. Yet, they have repeatedly failed to comply with them, which further shows that they must be implemented immediately. For example, as discussed above, in several of the recent cases of suicides, ADOC failed to complete required follow-ups following release from crisis placements. Furthermore, ADOC’s February 2019 Holman Self-Audit states that follow-ups were “completed late due to Site administrators misunderstanding of the frequency of follow-ups.” Pls. Ex. 2616.
In the next section, the court will discuss the required number and frequency of the follow-up appointments.
iii. Expert Recommendations on Immediate Suicide-Prevention Relief 130

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 131 of 210
The court now turns to making particularized PLRA findings for each provision in Drs. Burns and Perrien’s recommendations for immediate relief. See Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4). For the reasons that follow, the court, having given substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of the State’s criminal justice system as a result of the requested relief, finds that the relief based on these recommendations, as described below, is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the defendants’ constitutional violation, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct that violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
Before turning to the individual recommendations, the court pauses to note several factors that support the determination that the relief complies with the demands of the PLRA. First, the recommendations were drafted jointly by both parties’ experts, based upon an extensive, thorough, and lengthy study of the state of suicide prevention in ADOC. At trial, the experts testified that
131

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 132 of 210
their recommendations, with a few minor exceptions discussed below, are necessary for adequate suicide prevention and are no more intrusive than necessary. Lastly, the defendants for the most part do not take issue with the substance of the recommendations, and often claim to already be implementing them. See Defendants’ Annotations to the Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2451); see generally Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2499). These factors strongly support a finding that this relief complies with the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements.
1. Eliminating the Inappropriate Use of Mental-Health Observation
In the liability opinion, the court found that ADOC’s monitoring of suicidal prisoners is “woefully inadequate.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. As discussed earlier, this failure has continued, in part because suicidal prisoners have been placed in mental-health observation (MHO) rather than suicide watch. Drs. Burns and Perrien recommend eliminating the
132

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 133 of 210
use of MHO as a component of suicide prevention. See Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 2. The doctors concluded that “[t]he only acceptable watches for people with issues related to suicide and/or self-harm are acute and non-acute watch.” Id.
The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent implementation of a ban on the use of MHO for suicidal inmates constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
First, both experts testified that this ban is necessary. As both Drs. Burns and Perrien testified, placement of suicidal inmates on MHO status presents several dangers. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D Trial Tr. at 79-87. First, prisoners in MHO are monitored only every 30 minutes, as opposed to every 15 minutes for nonacute suicide watch or constant observation for acute suicide watch. “[O]nce every half an hour, ... is not adequate to prevent suicides.” Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 79. Second,
133

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 134 of 210
prisoners on suicide watch receive a number of critical protections and assessments that those on MHO do not. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D Trial Tr. at 79-87. For example, prisoners on suicide watch must be assessed for continued suicidality and risk of self-harm before they can be released from suicide watch, whereas prisoners on MHO are not required to have such an assessment before release. Dr. Perrien explained that, in two completed ADOC suicides she examined, the prisoner had been released from MHO within 12 hours or a day before committing suicide, and there was no record that a suicide risk assessment has been done. “Had they not been placed on MHO status,” she explained, “the suicide risk assessment would have been completed prior to them being discharged.” Id. at 85; see also id. (explaining that, had they been on suicide watch, they also would have received appropriate assessments during the watch period, been considered for referral to higher levels of care, and received post-watch follow-up treatment); id. at 86 (explaining that prisoners on
134

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 135 of 210
suicide watch receive a specialized treatment plan to reduce suicide risk).
Furthermore, in the experts’ view, the practice of placing suicidal prisoners on MHO was not limited to a few instances. As Dr. Burns testified for herself and Dr. Perrien, “we were concerned about the numbers of cases we saw in which people who should have been on a more acute level of watch, such as acute suicide watch or nonacute suicide watch, were actually just being maintained on mental health observation status.” Id. at 79. She also expressed concern that MHO was being used as a proxy for suicide watch because of the lesser requirements it imposes on staff. Id.
The defendants argue that the recommended action is not necessary because they have already eliminated the use of MHO for suicidal prisoners. For the same reasons set forth in the earlier section on mootness, see Section III(B)(ii)(1), the court rejects this argument.
The court further finds that the relief at issue is narrowly tailored and no more intrusive than necessary.
135

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 136 of 210
Both doctors testified that the recommended prohibition could not be any more limited and still be effective to address the identified risks, and that it was the least intrusive option to address the concern. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D Trial Tr. at 87.
2. Suicide Watch Follow-Up Examinations As previously discussed, “[t]he follow-up care provided to many prisoners upon their release from suicide watch at ADOC is woefully inadequate.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1231. During the liability trial, both parties’ experts testified that “follow-up care is necessary upon release from suicide watch both for prisoners on the mental-health caseload and for those who are not.” Id. The court found that “the failure to provide follow-up care that addresses the root of self-injurious behavior creates a substantial risk that the self-injurious behavior will continue and result in serious injury or death.” Id.; see id. (discussing the lack of follow-up care received by class member Jamie
136

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 137 of 210

Wallace).

The parties’ interim agreement required at least

three follow-up examinations by mental-health staff

within three, seven, and 30 days of an inmate’s release

from suicide watch. See Interim Agreement (doc. no.

1106-1) at 3.

In their immediate relief

recommendations, the experts recommend changes to the

number and timing of follow-ups for people released from

suicide watch; whereas the interim agreement required

three follow-ups, the experts recommend a minimum of

four, and they recommend that the series of three

examinations restart if the prisoner is transferred

before the final examination in the series. See

Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no 2416-4) at 2;

Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D Trial Tr. at

109-110. In their written recommendation, the experts

proposed the following schedule for crisis placement

follow-up visits:

“The first three follow-up examinations will occur upon release from watch and upon return to the sending facility or expected housing; these examinations will occur on the three

137

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 138 of 210
consecutive days upon release. The fourth follow-up examination will occur on the tenth day following release from watch. If the inmate is placed in temporary housing (e.g., housed at Kilby for days one through three post-watch and then moved to the sending facility; moved to SLU [Structured Living Unit] for days one through three post-watch then moved to RHU [Restrictive Housing Unit, or segregation]), that will be noted as a significant post-watch transition impacting the inmate’s post-watch adjustment and risk level, requiring the post-watch follow-up examination schedule to be reset; another round of the four follow-up examinations will take place starting the day following movement.”
Id.
The court finds that ordering immediate and
permanent implementation of a modified version of the
experts’ recommendation on post-suicide-watch follow-up
examinations constitutes relief that satisfies the
PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
Although the recommendation is quite specific, the
court concludes that it is necessary based on the
testimony of the parties’ experts. The doctors based
their recommendation on the specific conditions they saw
in their examination of ADOC, particularly the frequent
138

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 139 of 210
transfers between prisons of inmates coming off of suicide watch in ADOC. Id. at 112. The recommendation was designed to address the pattern of “suicides that occurred shortly after releases from watch, and the need to be sure in a system in which people frequently move that there is adequate follow-up during transitions.” Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 114.
As Dr. Burns explained, the first three follow-ups need to occur on a daily basis after release from suicide watch due to the elevated risk of suicide during that time period. See Burns Apr. 109, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 10. It is also necessary to reset the clock and provide an inmate with another three consecutive days of evaluations if the inmate is transferred again before the final evaluation: As Dr. Perrien explained, “the period post watch is a vulnerable time” and when “someone is being moved, that increases the stress that an already vulnerable person experiences.” Id. at 112.
According to Dr. Burns, the prior policy of three follow-ups was insufficient in practice, because
139

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 140 of 210

prisoners were frequently transferred to one prison for

suicide watch, then transferred to another prison before

the required follow-ups had been completed; upon arrival

at the new facility, the inmate would not be seen by

mental health for another three weeks--too long given the

vulnerability of the inmate. Id. See also Burns Apr.

10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 29 ( “We know more than we

did two years ago when the [Interim] [O]rder was

initially agreed upon with respect to transition times

and how dangerous and vulnerable people are during that

time.”).

Dr. Burns credibly testified that the

recommended four follow-up evaluations and repeat

follow-ups after transitions are necessary to “to save

patient lives.” Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D Trial Tr. at 28;

see also Burns Apr. 8, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 140-41

(explaining t h e recommendation for four follow-ups and

that some correctional systems require more follow-ups).

Although the court is convinced of the necessity of

the recommended four follow-up examinations to prevent

suicide and self-harm, the court concludes that it is

140

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 141 of 210
not necessary that the fourth evaluation occur 10 days after release from suicide watch. Both experts agreed that the fourth examination need not occur on the tenth day; all that is needed is to check back in on the prisoner’s mental health after the immediate transition period. Accordingly, the court leaves the determination of how many days after release from suicide watch the fourth examination should occur up to ADOC, based on consultation with Dr. Perrien.
With that modification, the court finds that the recommended relief is narrowly tailored and no more intrusive than necessary. As discussed above, the experts tailored their recommendation to the particular practices they found in ADOC. During Drs. Burns and Perrien’s joint testimony, Dr. Burns testified that the follow-up requirements could not be any more limited and still effectively address the suicide risk that was identified by the court in the liability opinion, and that the proposal was the least intrusive recommendation that would be appropriate “[i]n this situation”; Dr.
141

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 142 of 210
Perrien did not disagree on either point. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 115.
The defendants argue that this requirement is overly intrusive because it mandates the precise number and timing of follow-up appointments, and they contend it leaves no room for clinical judgment. However, the court finds that a minimum number of follow-up examinations needs to be set based on the testimony of the experts. Dr. Perrien testified that, based on her experience and expertise a correctional psychologist, “there needs to be a minimum number” of follow-ups set “in the ADOC.” See id. at 114. Furthermore, as Dr. Burns testified, ADOC frequently did not comply with the earlier requirement of three follow-ups--thus, the court cannot simply trust that ADOC will provide an adequate number of follow-ups without a court order. As for the clinical judgment issue, both experts rejected the idea that the proposed relief unduly interferes with the providers’ clinical judgment; they noted that their proposed policy requires the exercise of clinical judgment in deciding
142

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 143 of 210
what actions to take based on the examinations. In sum, the recommended relief, as modified, meet the requirements of the PLRA.
3. Referrals to Higher Level Care In the liability phase, the court observed that suicidal ADOC prisoners were frequently “kept in crisis cells for much longer than 72 hours,” and that these very long stays “illustrate that prisoners are not getting the treatment they need to stabilize and be moved out of crisis cells, or that ADOC and [the private mental-health care provider] are leaving these mentally ill prisoners in extremely isolated environments for longer than appropriate.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1226. The court found that “crisis-cell placement is meant to be temporary and should not last longer than 72 hours, because the harsh effects of prolonged isolation in a crisis cell can harm patients’ mental health.” Id. at 1226. However, only a small fraction of the prisoners in crisis placements that last longer than 72 hours are
143

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 144 of 210
transferred to treatment units. See id.
To address this issue, Drs. Burns and Perrien
recommend the following:
“We recommend compliance with existing policy requiring inmates on watch for 72 hours be considered for referral to higher levels of care. If not referred, the clinical rationale should be documented in the medical chart, at minimum, and tracked in the crisis utilization log or similar. If the inmate remains on watch for 168 hours, the treatment team should meet to review a referral to a higher level of care. If the inmate is not referred to a higher level of care, the rationale should be documented in the medical chart, at minimum, and tracked in the crisis utilization log. If the inmate remains on watch for 240 hours or longer, referral to a higher level of care shall occur with notification of referral to OHS and vendor regional mental health management. In addition, inmates who are returned to watch status within 30 days of release from a watch and/or who have three watch placements within six months shall be referred to a higher level of care; OHS should be immediately notified of any inmates who meet these criteria but are not referred and provided with the clinical rationale.”
Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at
2-3.
The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent
implementation of this recommendation constitutes relief
that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness
144

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 145 of 210
requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). As the experts explained, the purpose of the
recommendation is to ensure that ADOC and mental-health providers consider providing a higher level of mental health care when placement in suicide watch does not resolve a problem over a lengthy period of time, or when a prisoner repeatedly becomes suicidal over a longer period. The experts’ testimony and other evidence in the record establish a clear need for implementation of this recommendation. Both experts identified this recommendation as needing to be addressed urgently to reduce the risk of suicide in ADOC. In their assessment of suicide prevention in ADOC, Drs. Burns and Perrien came across multiple instances in which people remained on suicide watch for longer than 72 hours without any indication that they were considered for a higher level of care; this issue appeared repeatedly amongst inmates who subsequently committed suicide. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 139-40, 148.
While ADOC already has a policy requiring referral
145

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 146 of 210

to a higher level of care for prisoners on suicide watch

for 72 hours, relief from the court is still necessary.

As shown by the experts’ findings and other evidence in

the record, there is frequent noncompliance with the

policy. See Pls. Exs. 2371 (Jan. 2019 Bullock Crisis

Cell Utilization Log), 2419 (Jan. 2019 St. Clair Crisis

Cell Utilization Log) (showing crisis placements longer

than 72 hours); Kern Mar. 29, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no.

2483) at 84-85 (testifying about crisis cell utilization

log showing placements longer than 72 hours).

The court further finds that relief proposed is not

unnecessarily intrusive. Dr. Burns credibly testified

that the recommendation could not be narrower and still

be effective in terms of suicide prevention. See Burns

and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 146-47.

Furthermore, the experts’ recommendation appears to be

less intrusive than the ADOC’s own administrative

regulation in most respects.33

The current ADOC

33. Indeed, defendant Naglich testified that she does not disagree with the recommendation of an evaluation after 72 hours on watch for referral to a
146

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 147 of 210
regulation states: “If placement on Suicide Watch does not begin to resolve the inmate crisis within 72 hours, the inmate will be transferred to a SU [stabilization unit].”). See Jt. Ex. 133 (Admin. Reg. 630) at 4. In other words, the ADOC policy imposes a mandatory referral to a higher level of care at 72 hours unless the prisoner was already assigned to the stabilization unit prior to being placed on suicide watch. In contrast, the experts’ recommendation merely requires consideration of referral to a higher level of care, and documentation if the treatment team decides against the referral. The experts’ recommendation would not mandate referral to a higher level of care until the inmate has been on suicide watch for a full 10 days.
The experts’ recommendation would go beyond ADOC’s policy in that it would impose a new requirement of a consideration of referral for a prisoner who has been
higher level of care. See Naglich, Apr. 5, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 89 90. As explained above, the defendants’ agreement to a policy weighs in favor of finding that it is narrowly tailored and is no more intrusive than necessary.
147

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 148 of 210

sent to suicide watch three times in the prior six months

or returned to suicide watch within 30 days of release.

Although the recommendation as written appears to require

referral to a higher level of care for such prisoners,

the experts both explained in their testimony that the

referral should not be mandatory; if the inmate is not

referred, the clinicians would merely need to document

their reasoning and inform the Office of Health Services.

As the recommendation does not require a referral, the

court finds that it is narrowly drawn and not more

intrusive than necessary.

At trial, Dr. Burns and Dr. Perrien’s testimony

differed on one issue: whether, after an inmate has

remained on suicide watch for 240 hours, ADOC must refer

or merely consider referring the inmate to higher level

care.

Consistent with the immediate relief

recommendations, Dr. Burns testified that there should

be a mandatory referral to a higher level of care if an

individual remained on suicide watch for 240 hours. See

Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 134. Dr. Perrien

148

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 149 of 210
testified that she would recommend that at 240 hours, ADOC be required to again consider a referral to a higher level of care; she would not impose a mandatory referral. See Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 134-35. The court accepts the expert opinion of Dr. Burns as to the need for mandatory referral at 240 hours on suicide watch, because her opinion takes into account the actual conditions in suicide watch in ADOC. Based on the conditions of some of the ADOC suicide watch cells she had seen, she explained, an extended stay in some ADOC suicide watch cells is “frankly, punitive” with “very limited opportunity for mental health treatment.” Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 136. An inmate who has been on suicide watch for 240 hours has already spent ten days “with no clothes, on limited diet, limited opportunity for out-of-cell time, and just individual interventions daily for now ten days and ha[s]n’t gotten better. ... [T]he point is to either discharge them or to get them to a higher level of care,” she explained.
149

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 150 of 210
Id. at 135-36.34 Based on the testimony the court has heard over the course of this case, and the court’s own prior observation of ADOC suicide watch cells, the court agrees.
4. Preventing Discharge from Suicide Watch to Segregation
ADOC routinely discharges inmates from suicide watch directly to segregation. For instance, in the month of January 2019 at Easterling prison, 15 inmates were discharged from suicide watch to segregation. See Pls. Ex. 2396 at 4-5 (Jan. 2019 Suicide Watch Report). Most suicides in correctional facilities, including ADOC, occur in segregation. See Pls. Ex. 2706 (Mar. 21, 2019, Daniels’s memorandum announcing directive); Perrien Apr.
34. Because Dr. Perrien’s opinion did not directly address the impact of the poor conditions in ADOC suicide watch cells, the court gave it less weight than that of Dr. Burns. Dr. Perrien’s disagreement was based on her observation that in some other prison systems she has seen, a 10-day stay in suicide watch might not be unusual. However, she acknowledged that such a stay would be a long time in the ADOC, because the conditions in ADOC cells she saw were “not a great place to be.” Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 136.
150

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 151 of 210
9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 151 (testifying that most suicides in correctional facilities occur in segregation).
To address the problem of inmates being discharged from suicide watch directly to segregation, Drs. Burns and Perrien recommend a “multi-pronged approach.” Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 3. First, they recommend that prisoners placed on watch who might be discharged to segregation “be evaluated not only for suicide risk, but also re-evaluated for the presence of a serious mental illness.” Id. If the person is found to have a serious mental illness (SMI), he or she should be evaluated for referral to higher-level care and sent to the SLU on an expedited basis if mental-health staff determine that a referral to a Residential Treatment Unit (RTU) or Stabilization Unit (SU) is not clinically indicated. See id. Second, they recommend that even if an inmate is not on the mental-health caseload but is “determined to be at or above moderate acute or chronic risk of self-harm,” he or she “should
151

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 152 of 210
be placed on the mental-health caseload to provide increased clinical monitoring and intervention.” Id.
On March 21, 2019, the week before the suicide-prevention trial, newly hired Deputy Commissioner of Operations Charles Daniels announced a directive prohibiting the discharge of inmates from suicide watch to segregation, “unless there is no alternative due to well-documented exceptional circumstances or exigent circumstances arising from an inmate’s behavior.” See Pls. Ex. 2706 (Mar. 21, 2019, Daniels’s memorandum announcing directive). “Instead, these individuals will be placed, based on clinical and security considerations, into a setting where they are less isolated and will be afforded an increased level of mental health services.” Id. Daniels’s memorandum announcing the directive further states that, “If an inmate cannot be safely discharged to any housing unit other than [segregation], the Deputy Commissioner of Operations (or his designee) must approve the temporary [segregation] placement.” Id.
152

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 153 of 210
As Daniels’s memorandum shows, ADOC recognizes that it is inappropriate to discharge prisoners from suicide watch to segregation absent exceptional circumstances. See id. The court appreciates Daniels’s initiative on this matter and is hopeful that his directive will begin to address some of the systemic problems associated with this risk of harm.
The court will combine Deputy Commissioner Daniels’s directive with the experts’ recommendations and order the following:
(1) Prisoners discharged from suicide watch shall not be transferred to a segregation unit unless there is no alternative due to well-documented exceptional circumstances or exigent circumstances arising from an inmate’s behavior.
(2) All inmates who have been placed on suicide watch who are being considered for discharge to segregation shall be evaluated not only for suicide risk, but also evaluated for the presence of a serious mental illness. If found to have a SMI, they must be evaluated for
153

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 154 of 210
referral to a higher level of care (RTU or SU). If not referred to the RTU or SU, the clinical rationale must be documented in the medical record and the inmate transferred on an expedited basis to a Structured Living Unit (SLU). If the inmate is not on the mental-health caseload but is determined to be at or above moderate acute or chronic risk of self-harm, the inmate must be placed on the mental-health caseload and provided increased clinical monitoring and intervention.
(3) Any transfer from suicide watch to segregation must be approved by the Deputy Commissioner of Operations or his designee.
The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent implementation of these requirements constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
The court makes these findings based on the continued serious risk of harm faced by prisoners discharged to segregation from suicide watch, the immediacy of which
154

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 155 of 210
is evident in the recent rash of suicides in ADOC prisons. As Daniels’s memorandum recognizes, “[t]he majority of inmates who committed suicide within ADOC have been men who were alone in a restrictive housing cell, after being released from suicide watch.” Pls. Ex. 2706.
Sections (1) and (3) of the ordered relief are already required by Daniels’s announced directive. The defendants argue that the directive therefore renders the relief unnecessary. The court rejects this argument for essentially the same reasons, detailed in Section III(B)(ii)(2), that the court rejected the defendants’ mootness contention. These reasons include, among others, that it is far from safe to assume that the directive will be followed, especially given ADOC’s continued understaffing and its repeated failures to effectively implement its own policies at the ground level. Moreover, that the defendants agree with the directive’s requirements weighs in favor of finding that they meet the needs-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria.
As for section (2) of the ordered relief, it is
155

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 156 of 210
critical that, in the limited cases where a prisoner is being considered for discharge from suicide watch to segregation, that prisoner be provided with extra protection, including re-evaluation and placement on the mental-health caseload if necessary. Furthermore, Dr. Burns and Dr. Perrien testified that this relief is necessary to address ADOC’s constitutional violations. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 149-56. Dr. Burns specifically testified that this relief could not be narrower or less intrusive and still address the constitutional violations found by the court.
5. Training for All Nursing Staff on Segregation Preplacement Screenings
In the liability opinion, the court found that “ADOC’s current segregation practices pose an unacceptably high risk of serious harm to prisoners with serious mental-health needs,” and that “ADOC lacks a functioning process for screening out prisoners who should not be placed in segregation due to mental
156

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 157 of 210
illness.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1236. On May 3, 2018, the court issued an order that
addressed segregation preplacement screenings. See Order and Injunction on Segregation Remedy (Pre-Placement, Mental-Health Rounds, Periodic Evaluations) (doc. nos. 1815, 1815-1). It required ADOC to screen all inmates prior to placement in segregation in order to determine “[w]hether the inmate can be placed into restrictive housing or must be diverted to another location such as placement on crisis status and placement in an infirmary or other diversionary placement.” Id. (doc. no. 1815-1) at 2.
To address the preplacement screening issues, Drs. Burns and Perrien recommend the following relief: “training for all nursing staff completing [segregation] pre-placement screenings. While the forms indicate when crisis watch should be considered, training should provide greater detail about indicators to look for as well as include how to place someone on immediate watch after hours and how to initiate an emergent referral.
157

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 158 of 210

The model should be ‘easy in;’ this means that it should

not be difficult to place an inmate on watch. An example

would be if nursing is uncertain in any way about a case,

the inmate is placed on watch.” Immediate Relief

Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 3.

The court will order preplacement-screening training

for all nursing staff who perform preplacement screenings

in segregation or supervise nurses performing

preplacement screenings.

This training shall be

completed no later than 30 days after entry of this order

and nursing staff should be retrained on an annual basis.

The training shall provide granular detail about

indicators that nurses should look for and include an

explanation of the process for placing people on

immediate watch after business hours, as well as how to

initiate an emergent referral. The training shall also

ensure that suicide-watch placement is “easy in,” which

is to say that if a nurse is uncertain about a prisoner’s

need for watch, the inmate should be placed on watch

preventatively until further evaluation by mental-health

158

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 159 of 210
staff. The training module shall be reviewed and approved by Drs. Burns and Perrien, who testified that they would be willing to assist ADOC with training. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 24.
The court finds that this relief satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The ordered relief satisfies the PLRA for essentially the same reasons, detailed above in Section III(B)(ii)(3), that the court rejected the defendants’ contention that there is no ongoing constitutional violation in this area. These reasons include, among others, that Drs. Burns and Perrien’s findings about ADOC’s deficient preplacement screenings show that nurses still are not well-trained enough to adequately screen inmates; see Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416 1) at 14-15, as well as the fact--recognized by ADOC--that the majority of suicides by prisoners in its custody are men released from suicide watch into segregation, see Pls. Ex. 2706 (Mar. 21, 2019, Daniels’s memorandum announcing
159

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 160 of 210

directive).

These suicides in segregation are

compelling circumstantial evidence that nurses need to

be better trained. For example, Matthew Holmes killed

himself within roughly 12 hours of being placed in

segregation, after ADOC “fail[ed] to generate an

emergency referral to mental health in response to a

positive pre-placement screen.” Joint Expert Case

Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at 4.

Additionally, the defendants have agreed that

preplacement screenings and training are necessary. See

Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and

Order (doc. no. 2499) at 39-40. Their agreement weighs

in favor of a finding that this relief meets the PLRA

requirements.

Furthermore, Drs. Burns and Perrien agreed that the

training requirement could not be more limited and still

address the constitutional violations flowing from

inadequate preplacement screenings. See Burns and

Perrien Apr. 4, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 192.

6. Security Checks in Segregation Every 30 Minutes 160

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 161 of 210
In the liability opinion, the court found that ADOC conducted deficient correctional monitoring in segregation units--also known as segregation checks or rounds. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1244.
To address this ongoing problem, Drs. Burns and Perrien recommend that “30-minute custody rounds in segregation must be enforced consistent with existing policy.” Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 4. Existing ADOC policy, in turn, provides that “[o]bservation of an inmate in disciplinary segregation shall be conducted at least every thirty (30) minutes and shall be annotated on the duty post log.” Pls. Ex. 1399 at 7 (ADOC Admin. Reg. 434(V)(J)(4)(b)). As elaborated below, the court will order the defendants to immediately implement the experts’ recommendation.
Drs. Burns and Perrien’s recommendation did not detail exactly how ADOC should go about enforcing its existing segregation-rounds policy. See Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 4. However, at the suicide-prevention trial, they suggested two possible
161

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 162 of 210
alternatives: (1) placing logbooks at opposite ends of a unit in order to incentivize walking from one end to the other to fill out the log for each security check, or (2) a guard patrol system, whereby officers carry a device that automatically records their presence at each door as they approach it. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 194-96. As to the first option, Dr. Perrien admitted: “[Y]ou could still ... pre[-]enter times and cells. But the idea is to, as much as possible, get people to complete logs and data, and then you have supervisory staff at the facility who come through those restrictive housing units and look at those logs to make sure that they’re not being pre[-]filled out.” Id. at 195.35
The experts’ suggestions of placing logs at either end of the unit or utilizing a guard patrol system make
35. Both correctional expert Vail and Deputy Commissioner Daniels also recommended having correctional supervisors make rounds in segregation units to confirm whether security checks are happening. See Vail Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 162; Daniels Mar. 28, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 200-01.
162

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 163 of 210
a great deal of sense, and the court hopes that ADOC will
seriously consider implementing one of them.
Nevertheless, at this time, the court will not order the
defendants to implement either alternative, because,
based on the current record, such a requirement would
excessively intrude into the details of prison
management.
Instead, to ensure ADOC enforces its own policy, the
court will order the defendants to adopt the system of
supervisory review and confirmation that they proposed
in their post-trial brief. See Defendants’ Response
(doc. no. 2249) at 45-46. Specifically, the defendants
agreed to implement the following plan until the court
enters an order concerning global monitoring:
“1. ADOC will require the restrictive housing commander over each restrictive housing unit at its major facilities to conduct unannounced rounds in each restrictive housing unit, including reviewing the duty post logs and other documentation attached to the duty post logs for the unit. Each restrictive housing commander must certify in writing on a quarterly basis that he or she conducted unannounced rounds in each restrictive housing unit for which he or she serves as the commander. The senior-ranking warden at each major ADOC correctional facility
163

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 164 of 210
with a restrictive housing unit shall maintain the written certification from the restrictive housing commander at the warden’s facility.
2. ADOC will require the immediate supervisor for each restrictive housing commander to review duty post logs on a quarterly basis for the restrictive housing units under the commander’s oversight to determine whether security checks occurred.
3. Each major ADOC correctional facility will issue a written report on a quarterly basis to Deputy Commissioner Charles Daniels or, if the report is from Tutwiler, to Deputy Commissioner Wendy Williams summarizing the findings from the unannounced rounds in restrictive housing and the review of the duty post logs, as well as summarizing any corrective action with respect to a failure to complete security checks or properly document the checks in in the duty post log.”
Id. The defendants ask the court to approve the proposal.
The court is willing to approve the defendants’
proposal. That said, the court has serious concerns it
will be insufficient to ensure that overstretched
officers do their rounds correctly. The proposal does
not contain the experts’ suggested measures of placing
logs on both ends of the unit or utilizing an electronic
guard patrol system. Also troublingly, the proposal does
not require review of video evidence where available.
164

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 165 of 210
Despite these concerns, the court will defer to the defendants in giving them an opportunity to show that their approach works. In adopting the defendants’ proposal, the court relies in good faith on the assumption that ADOC will conduct unannounced rounds on a sufficiently frequent basis to catch noncompliance, and will review logs for irregularities that reveal potential noncompliance, such as 30-minute checks recorded at identical intervals, or time entries added to the same line as another entry, rather than to its own line. The court relies on the wardens and supervisors to address such red flags aggressively.
The court finds that ordering the defendants to immediately implement Drs. Burns and Perrien’s recommendation--and to adopt the system of supervisory review and confirmation that they proposed in their post-trial brief--constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
165

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 166 of 210
Two years have passed since the liability opinion found that inadequate monitoring of prisoners in segregation contributes to the constitutional violations. Substantial evidence presented at the suicide-prevention trial shows that the problem persists. As discussed above, Ross Wolfinger killed himself in segregation during a shift in which the correctional officer assigned to his area of segregation failed to do any 30-minute checks. See Pls. Ex. 2403 at SPA_13487. An ADOC memorandum says the officer’s actions “resulted in” Wolfinger’s death. See id. at SPA_13488. Dr. Perrien’s testimony indicates that the failure to conduct 30-minute rounds may have also led to suicides in other cases. She said that “there were cases where it’s possible that if 30-minute rounds were occurring, perhaps those individuals may have been rescued. May have been identified. May not have completed suicide.” Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 193-94.
Many of the duty post logs presented at the suicide-prevention trial show long periods of time
166

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 167 of 210
without security checks. Plaintiffs’ security expert Vail reviewed nearly one thousand pages of duty post logs from Holman, Kilby, Fountain, Easterling, Bullock, and Tutwiler prisons that were produced for the suicide-prevention remedial trial. See Vail, Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 145. Based on his review, he concluded that, as a system, ADOC continues to struggle to conduct adequate security checks. See id. at 147. At Holman prison, Vail identified entire shifts in which not one security check was logged; on other days, there were delays of two to more than three hours between logged checks. See id. at 155. Moreover, he testified that the logs from every facility that he reviewed, save for Bullock, had “plenty of problems.” Id. at 147-48; see also id. at 149-59 (explaining the problems he identified at each facility).
A number of logs contained evidence of inaccuracy at best and falsification at worst, indicating that security checks may be happening much less frequently than written. Particularly concerning are security checks
167

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 168 of 210
documented as occurring at exact 30-minute intervals, as they were on the night Ross Wolfinger committed suicide. Vail testified that such checks would give him concern because checks are supposed to be staggered and unpredictable. See id. at 154. Warden Wright testified that, if she came across logs that listed security checks occurring every 30 minutes on the hour and 30 minutes past the hour, she would definitely need “to check to verify that the rounds were made.” Wright Apr. 4, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 101. Nevertheless, the court heard substantial evidence that, between February and late March 2019, security checks repeatedly were logged exactly every 30 minutes to the minute. See, e.g., id. at 101-03; Gordy Apr. 5, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 158-59; see also Pls. Ex. 2552 (Aug. 16-22, 2018, Fountain Duty Post Logs showing multiple officers on multiple days filling in security logs at :00 and :30 hours).
The court also saw clear evidence of logs being pre-filled. The duty-post log from a segregation unit at Kilby showed security checks at exact intervals, line
168

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 169 of 210
after line. On one line, where a 4:30 security check had already been filled in, someone added to the same line a different event at 4:19; later, someone recorded an 8:15 event on the same line showing a security check at 8:00. The most likely explanation is that 30-minute security checks on the half-hour were pre-filled, so there was no room to add other events to the log on their own lines. See Price, Apr. 12, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 110-13 (testifying about Pls. Ex. 2588 at ADOC0468652 (Feb. 12, 2019, Kilby Duty Post Logs).
In addition, ADOC has not yet corrected the severe correctional staffing shortage that has been a primary cause of the inadequate monitoring of prisoners in segregation. See March 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report (doc. no. 2386-1) at 3 (showing that, as of December 31, 2018, the defendants reported that only 1,083 of the 3,326 assigned correctional officer positions at ADOC were filled). During the liability trial, the court heard extensive evidence tying the inadequate monitoring of prisoners in segregation to ADOC’s severe staffing
169

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 170 of 210
shortage. When correctional officers have too many responsibilities due to understaffing, corners will inevitably be cut. Given that the staffing shortage has not significantly changed since entry of the liability opinion, and indeed may have gotten worse, the court is confident that the examples of inadequate segregation monitoring presented to the court in the remedial trial are only the tip of the iceberg. See, e.g., Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 195 (testifying that it is her understanding that that ADOC is unsure whether it can follow its own segregation-rounds policy in “particularly understaffed facilities”).
Finally, the court disagrees with the defendants’ argument that a remedial order requiring them to comply with their segregation-rounds policy or to implement their proposed oversight is unnecessary because they are willing to do so voluntarily. As illustrated by the evidence discussed above, ADOC’s oversight to date has failed to ensure that officers consistently comply with the department’s segregation-rounds policy, and the
170

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 171 of 210
plaintiffs continue to be exposed to an immense threat of future harm due to inadequate monitoring in segregation. Moreover, that the defendants voluntarily agree to enforce and implement oversight of their own policy is further evidence that ordering them to do so satisfies the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness test. Cf. Morales Feliciano, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 334 (“The very fact that the defendants chose to join the plaintiffs in selecting this remedy would seem to mean--and must be taken to mean—that they understood it to be precisely tailored to the needs of the occasion, that it is narrowly drawn and least intrusive--in fact not intrusive at all.”).
7. Confidentiality In the liability opinion, the court found that “ADOC’s provision of psychotherapy often lacks confidentiality.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1210. The “lack of confidentiality [] undermine[s] the efficacy and frequency of psychotherapy for mentally ill prisoners
171

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 172 of 210

within ADOC. These conditions have created a substantial

risk of serious harm for those who need counseling

services.” Id. at 1212. In June 2018, the court entered

two remedial orders incorporating stipulations by the

parties intended to address this problem.

See

Psychotherapy and Confidentiality Remedial Order (doc.

no. 1899-1) at 4; Order and Injunction on Confidentiality

(doc. nos. 1900, 1900-1). Those orders were to be

implemented by September 2018. In addition to those

remedial orders, the interim agreement provides that

suicide risk assessments and suicide watch follow-up

appointments must be conducted in confidential,

out-of-cell settings. See Interim Agreement (doc. no.

1106-1) at 1-3.

Evidence presented at the suicide-prevention trial

confirmed that the defendants are not in compliance with

the obligations in the two remedial orders and interim

agreement. Drs. Burns and Perrien found “repeated

examples of custody staff intrusions into the provision

of mental health contacts through their presence during

172

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 173 of 210
clinical encounters and pressure on clinical staff that minimized inmate concerns and reports of suicidality.” Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 16.
To address this issue, Drs. Burns and Perrien recommend that ADOC adhere to the confidentiality requirements to which it has already agreed, including: (1) “clinical contacts should be confidential without the presence of custody staff unless there is a significant security reason as determined by the clinician,” (2) “[e]valuations must be conducted in person, out of cell and in a place offering sound confidentiality,” and (3) “[d]ocumentation (e.g. suicide risk assessment, progress note) should clearly indicate that the contact was in a confidential space, conducted at cell front, or other specific non-confidential setting.” Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 4.
The court finds that ordering immediate and permanent implementation of this recommendation constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s
173

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 174 of 210

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

The defendants agree with this recommendation but

argue that this relief is unnecessary because previous

remedial orders already cover this issue.

See

Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and

Order (doc. no. 2499) at 47. The court rejects this

argument. The record shows that ADOC continues to

violate the terms of previous remedial orders covering

this issue.

ADOC fails to provide adequate

confidentiality during clinical encounters to inmates,

comply with the agreements they made with the plaintiffs,

and comply with court orders regarding confidentiality.

8. Immediate Life-Saving Measures Rapidly responding to a suicide attempt can make the difference between life and death. The experts recommend “IMMEDIATE intervention (upon appropriate number of security staff present; this should be two officers) in the event of suicide in progress--cut down, remove noose,
174

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 175 of 210

and begin life-saving measures and continue until a

physician declares death.”

Immediate Relief

Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 4.

The court finds that ordering immediate and

permanent implementation of this recommendation

constitutes relief that satisfies the PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. See 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

The 15 recent suicides include multiple instances in

which ADOC correctional officers discovered inmates

hanging in their cells, yet failed to immediately cut

them down, remove the noose, and initiate CPR. For

example, when ADOC staff discovered Robert Martinez

hanging from a sheet tied to a vent in his cell, they

waited more than 30 minutes before cutting him down, a

delay that, in the experts’ words, was “inexcusable and

inhumane.” Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2)

at 1; see also Joint Expert Report and Recommendations

(doc. no. 2416-1) at 8 (“[T]here are very serious delays

in the response time of custody and medical staff to

175

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 176 of 210
begin CPR, first aid, or to take other life-saving actions (such as cutting down an inmate discovered hanging and removing the noose from around his neck). Delays of 10 minutes or more to respond and take action were not uncommon in the cases reviewed and that is simply too long for preservation of life.”)
ADOC’s Dr. Kern and Crook testified that they agree with the recommendation. See Kern Mar. 29, 2019, (doc. no. 2483) at 132; Crook Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 20. The defendants argue, however, that this relief is not necessary because they already agreed to implement it. The court rejects this argument. As discussed above, that the defendants agree with the recommendation supports the finding that it is not intrusive and meets the PLRA test. Furthermore, despite the defendants’ agreement with the recommendation, ADOC has repeatedly failed to timely intervene with life-saving measures.
D. Monitoring In late 2018, the defendants and the plaintiffs each
176

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 177 of 210
proposed global monitoring schemes--comprised of both internal and external monitors--to assess ADOC’s compliance with the remedial orders in this litigation. Both parties agreed that court monitoring is necessary. The court is considering the parties’ proposals and has not yet resolved the issue. In the meantime, the plaintiffs request that the court impose interim monitoring limited to the immediate suicide-prevention relief. For the reasons elaborated below, the court finds that both internal and external monitoring of the immediate relief is urgently needed and will therefore order it here.
i. The Need for Court Monitoring There is a dire need for court monitoring of ADOC’s compliance with the immediate suicide-prevention relief. First, this need is demonstrated by the finding in the liability opinion that ADOC fails to self-monitor its provision of mental-health care. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1257-60. As the court explained, ADOC “has
177

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 178 of 210
done vanishingly little to exercise oversight of the provision of care to mentally ill prisoners”. Id. at 1257.
Second, the need for monitoring is shown by the fact that, since the liability opinion, ADOC has consistently failed to identify and correct problems with its suicide-prevention system, including its noncompliance with remedial measures that the defendants agreed to implement. As Dr. Burns testified at the monitoring trial in December 2018, the interim agreement “hasn’t been reviewed or acted upon or self-monitored, to my knowledge, in any way in the two years that it’s been in place.” Burns Dec. 6, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2254) at 170.36 She testified that none of the documents she had thus far received as part of her and Dr. Perrien’s assessment of suicide prevention indicated that ADOC had
36. Dr. Burns similarly testified that “there isn’t anything to make me think that [ADOC has] done what’s required to, for example, implement the suicide interim order--the suicide prevention interim order fully or to self-monitor it in any way.” Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 209 (emphasis added).
178

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 179 of 210
studied whether it was complying with the interim agreement, and that she was generally not aware of ADOC’s having identified any instances of noncompliance with the agreement. See id. at 169. As of April 2019, Drs. Burns and Perrien said that they had not yet seen ADOC meaningfully self-monitor its ability to comply with its suicide-prevention policies. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 214-15.37
One glaring example of ADOC’s failure to self-monitor is its inadequate reviews of prisoners’ suicides. In December 2018, Dr. Burns testified that ADOC’s reviews of suicides and serious suicide attempts that she had received were not adequate. See Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 102. This made her concerned that “things that might have been found and corrected still exist and put people at risk.” Id. Her fears were borne out: Six prisoners killed themselves since she
37. Dr. Perrien said that ADOC recently hired staff who she believes can meaningfully monitor, but that she had not yet seen them do it. See Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 214-15.
179

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 180 of 210
testified; and, as detailed above, their cases were rife
with inadequacies in suicide prevention. As of March
2019, three months after her testimony, both she and Dr.
Perrien reported that ADOC’s reviews of suicides remained
deficient. See Joint Expert Report and Recommendations
(doc. no. 2416-1) at 7, 34-35 (noting, for example, that
“[p]erhaps even more disturbing than [the] delayed
response to suicide attempts in progress, was the lack
of any documentation that ADOC or the vendor identified
this very serious problem or took any steps to address
it);38 Joint Expert Case Summaries (doc. no. 2416-2) at
38. Drs. Burns and Perrien further reported: “We received no reviews completed by custody or medical addressing the clinical mortality and administrative reviews necessary for suicides. ... There was also no documentation that any formal discussion occurred between custody, medical, and mental health (ADOC and their vendor) to review the review by mental health and identify improvements for implementation. In general, QI program reviews were cursory and summarized personal and correctional history but didn’t look at or critique the mental health care provided. Even when medical response was untimely (or non-existent), the conclusion was that medical and security responded ‘according to policy and standards’ and there were no recommendations.” Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 34-35. They also reported that “there were significant areas for improvement” in the “psychological
180

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 181 of 210
1-3. Drs. Burns and Perrien’s report also specifically
identified problems with internal oversight by Wexford, ADOC’s mental-health vendor. See Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 3. For example, they found that Wexford audited “the presence or absence of documents rather than any measure of quality, completeness or accuracy.” Id. In this same vein, the court was troubled by the testimony of Barbara Coe, Wexford’s Program Director for Mental Health, who admitted that none of the vendor’s auditors are clinicians, and who was not entirely sure whether Wexford was auditing compliance with the court’s orders. See Coe Apr. 5, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 14-18.
Perhaps most notably, the testimony of senior ADOC officials confirmed that ADOC is not adequately monitoring suicide-prevention measures. ADOC Psychiatry Director Kern oversees the clinical aspects of the
autopsies/reconstructions,” as they were “completed in a cursory manner, did not contain a summary narrative, and contained no findings.” Id. at 35.
181

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 182 of 210
department’s mental-health program, and his duties on the OHS team include providing “a clinical perspective” in working to ensure remedial orders are implemented. Kern Mar. 28, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2482) at 10, 25. He testified that, to his knowledge, OHS had “not specifically audited the suicide prevention process” since he had become Director of Psychiatry approximately one year ago. Id. at 44. Dr. Kern is on a task force charged with implementing the remedial orders, but testified that the last time that team met was early in the fall of 2018. See id. at 26. Despite the recent spike in suicides, he said that, overall, in 2019, he had participated in just one formal meeting that was devoted specifically to reviewing suicides and discussing suicide prevention. See id. at 29.
ADOC Mental Health Services Director Crook also described deficiencies in internal monitoring of suicide prevention. Quality assurance is a significant aspect of her job. Crook Apr. 1, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2485) at 40. Yet, she testified that, prior to February
182

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 183 of 210
2019, she had not done anything to determine whether MHO
was being used in place of suicide watch. See Crook Apr.
4, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2487) at 72. She also
testified that OHS staff did not begin monthly reviews
of suicide risk assessments until March 2019, even though
the interim agreement adopted more than two years earlier
required such reviews. See Crook Apr. 1, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2485) at 43-44.39 Crook further testified that
she has not done anything to monitor whether
mental-health staff is exercising its authority to tell
correctional staff to remove someone from segregation,
and whether correctional staff is heeding mental-health
staff when asked. See Crook Apr. 3, 2019, Trial Tr.
(doc. no. 2486) at 9-10.
39. In December, Dr. Burns testified that she had not seen any evidence that OHS staff was reviewing the risk assessments. See Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 283-84. She said: “I haven’t seen, even though the interim order is a year and a half, almost two years old, evidence that there’s been corrective action to ensure that the risk assessments are being done at the appropriate times and that they’re being reviewed and implemented. And I would have expected at this point, after a couple of years, that those things would be prioritized.” Id. at 283.
183

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 184 of 210

Crook candidly admitted she does not have the staff

to monitor all areas of the remedial orders entered thus

far in this litigation. See Crook Apr. 1, 2019, Trial

Tr. (doc. no. 2485) at 11-12; Crook Apr. 3, 2019, Trial

Tr. (doc. no. 2486) at 68-69 (“Our team is not large

enough to go to every single facility and look at every

single aspect of the remedial orders.”). As elaborated

below, Crook’s testimony is consistent with the

defendants’ proposed global monitoring scheme for all the

remedial orders, a separate matter the court is currently

considering.

Namely, in their global monitoring

proposal, the defendants concede that ADOC does not have

the internal resources or capacity to effectively

monitor, which is why their plan “necessarily requires

the initial assistance of” an external monitoring team.

Defendants’ Proposed Monitoring Plan (doc. no. 2115) at

2. Critically, the defendants’ global monitoring

proposal also explicitly recognizes that external

monitoring

meets

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement, an admission

184

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 185 of 210
that further supports finding that external monitoring is necessary for the immediate relief ordered here. See Defendants’ Pretrial Monitoring Brief (doc. no. 2145) at 36.
To her credit, faced with inadequate resources, Crook said she has prioritized monitoring suicide prevention. See Crook Apr. 3, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2486) at 10. For example, she testified that, in December 2018 and February 2019, OHS conducted audits of, among other areas, suicide watch assessments, suicide watch discharge, and suicide watch monitoring. See Crook Apr. 4, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2487) at 67-68. Also to her credit, as mentioned above, on February 15, 2019, she sent a letter to Wexford notifying it of “systemic failures to comply with court orders in Braggs.” Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738. She testified that her letter led Wexford to take action. See Crook Apr. 4, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2487) at 74. Crucially, however, she also recognized that she sent the letter only after 14 suicides had occurred in 14 months. See id. It also
185

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 186 of 210
bears emphasizing that she sent the letter a month after the plaintiffs filed their emergency motion seeking immediate relief on suicide prevention, which raises questions about whether ADOC would have acted when it did without pressure from the plaintiffs and the likelihood of immediate court review. In fact, an inference could be drawn that the timing of Crook’s letter is additional proof that outside oversight increases the likelihood of swift compliance with court orders.
Furthermore, while Crook is to be commended for audits related to suicide prevention, it is deeply troubling that Dr. Kern, who provides a “clinical perspective” in monitoring remedial orders, apparently was not even aware that the audits occurred. Kern Mar. 28, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2482) at 25, 44. It is also deeply concerning that, as Crook testified, she does not know the degree to which ADOC is currently following the policies it adopted to implement remedial orders-policies that she agreed are “necessary” for suicide prevention. Crook Apr. 4, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no.
186

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 187 of 210
2487) at 62-63. In short, the monitoring efforts have been too
little, too late.40 Third, the need for monitoring is demonstrated by
ADOC’s failure to comply with the interim agreement and other remedial measures related to suicide prevention that they also agreed to implement. ADOC’s pervasive noncompliance is detailed throughout this opinion, including in the section summarizing recent suicides. Strikingly, ADOC itself has recognized “systemic failures to comply with court orders in Braggs.” Pls. Ex. 2710 at ADOC0475738; see also Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 282-84 (explaining how failures in the area of suicide prevention led her to conclude that she had not seen evidence that ADOC was using its best efforts to comply with remedial orders). Noncompliance with
40. See, e.g., Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1320-21 (stating that when defendants rely on intervening events occurring after a suit has been filed to argue that injunctive relief is not warranted, they “must satisfy the heavy burden of establishing that these such events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violations”).
187

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 188 of 210

remedial requirements supports the need for court

monitoring. See Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 49 (2d

Cir. 2003) (upholding district court’s finding that

external

monitoring

satisfied

the

PLRA’s

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement, “particularly

in light of the district court’s finding that the City’s

compliance with its remedial responsibilities has been

consistently incomplete and inadequate”), overruled on

other grounds by Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.

2009). This makes sense: The more someone fails to do

something he agreed to do, the bigger the need to

supervise whether he does it in the future.

It bears highlighting that correctional

understaffing significantly contributes to ADOC’s

noncompliance with remedial measures, and thus the need

for monitoring. The liability opinion found that

“persistent and severe” correctional understaffing was

an “overarching” issue permeating inadequate

mental-health care. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1268.

Almost two years later, the problem remains dire: As of

188

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 189 of 210
December 31, 2018, the defendants reported that only 1,083 of the 3,326 assigned correctional officer positions at ADOC were filled. See March 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report (doc. no. 2386-1) at 3. As the plaintiffs’ expert Eldon Vail testified, this understaffing means that “there’s just not staff available to move [an] offender from a cell to the [mental-health] treatment environment.” Vail Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial. Tr. at 113. Because ongoing understaffing continues to contribute to inadequate care and noncompliance with remedial measures, understaffing also shows that monitoring is needed.
Fourth and finally, both Drs. Burns and Perrien testified that it is important for the court to know whether ADOC is implementing the immediate relief. See Burns and Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 206-07.
ii. Parties’ Positions on Monitoring The plaintiffs propose that the court appoint an interim external monitor to assess ADOC’s implementation
189

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 190 of 210

of the immediate suicide-prevention relief.

See

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2478)

at 128-29. They further propose that the monitor conduct

both document review and site visits, as well as use any

other method of gathering information that the monitor

deems necessary. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs propose

that the monitor be Dr. Perrien, who is the defendants’

expert consultant.

By contrast, the defendants oppose monitoring for

immediate relief, essentially arguing that the court

should wait to impose a global monitoring scheme that

covers all remedial orders. See Defendants’ Response to

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opinion and Order (doc. no. 2499)

at 48-50. The defendants previously proposed a global

monitoring plan, which the court is currently considering

alongside the plaintiffs’ proposed plan.

The court rejects the defendants’ arguments.

Monitoring of the immediate relief ordered here can no

more wait for a global monitoring scheme than the

immediate relief can wait for the remaining

190

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 191 of 210
suicide-prevention relief to be resolved. Both are needed now, as they both go together. For the reasons discussed below, the court will establish an interim external monitor of the immediate relief, whose monitoring activities will consist of both document review and site visits. The court will also require ADOC to institute an internal monitoring scheme dedicated to the immediate relief.
iii. The PLRA and Monitoring The parties disagree about whether court monitoring is “prospective relief” and therefore subject to the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The defendants contend that it is. By contrast, the plaintiffs argue that, to the extent monitoring is limited to informing the court whether the defendants comply with court orders, the requirement does not apply, because such monitoring constitutes a means to relief, as opposed to “prospective relief” within the
191

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 192 of 210
meaning of the PLRA. Id. The caselaw is unclear as to whether the
need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement applies to court monitoring. Some district courts have held that monitoring is a means to relief, rather than “prospective relief,” and therefore is not subject to the requirement. See, e.g., Carruthers v. Jenne, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300-01 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (Hoeveler, J.) (“Clearly monitoring is not an ‘ultimate remedy’ and only aids the prisoners in obtaining relief.”); Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 342-43 (holding that monitoring “cannot be relief” and to find otherwise “would conflate relief with the means to guarantee its provision”). On the other hand, the Second Circuit stated in dictum that it was “somewhat problematic” for the district court in the case before it to conclude that monitoring is not relief within the meaning of the PLRA. Fraser, 343 F.3d at 48-49. The appellate court reasoned that placing the monitoring body beyond the reach of the PLRA would “frustrate[e] one of the Act’s broad goals of limiting ‘the micromanag[ing]
192

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 193 of 210
[of] State and local prison systems.’” Id. at 49 (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. S 14611, 14626 (Sen. Dole) (1995)). Additionally, because the monitoring body at issue had “substantial responsibilities,” there was “no easy distinction between relief itself and the monitoring of relief.” Id. After making these observations, the Second Circuit refrained from resolving whether monitoring constituted prospective relief, because it held that the district court had made the appropriate need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings. See id.
Ultimately, this court need not resolve whether monitoring is “prospective relief” subject to the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement, because, as elaborated below, the monitoring ordered here satisfies the requirement. So, to the extent monitoring must meet the requirement, it does.
iv. Ordered Monitoring Relief 1. External Monitoring
The court will establish an external monitor. To
193

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 194 of 210

the extent that the PLRA applies to court monitoring,

external

monitoring

meets

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. The reasons

identified above for why monitoring is necessary also

show why external monitoring satisfies the requirement.

Those include the liability opinion’s finding of ADOC’s

inadequate oversight of mental-health care, ADOC’s

failure to internally monitor problems with suicide

prevention and compliance with remedial orders, as well

as ADOC’s systematic noncompliance with agreed-to

remedial measures related to suicide prevention. See

Fraser, 343 F.3d at 49 (rejecting the argument that

external, rather than internal, monitoring did not

satisfy the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement

particularly given that the defendant’s “compliance with

its remedial responsibilities has been consistently

incomplete and inadequate”).

Furthermore, Dr. Burns testified that external

monitoring of the immediate relief is necessary, given

that “suicide is the worst outcome and requires some

194

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 195 of 210
immediate response and attempts to remedy.” Burns Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 209. Waiting for ADOC to create its own monitoring plan for immediate relief would simply take too long, she opined. See id. at 208.
Granted, Dr. Perrien did not view external monitoring as necessary, and instead endorsed the idea that ADOC come up with its own plan to monitor the immediate relief, potentially with the help of an outside consultant. See Perrien Apr. 9, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 211. Her main reason for preferring internal monitoring, however, is unconvincing. Specifically, Dr. Perrien was concerned with a potential lack of continuity between the interim monitor ordered here, and the global monitoring scheme that the court is considering ordering for all the remedial orders--an issue that the court has yet to resolve. See id. at 210; Perrien Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 62. Yet Dr. Perrien’s concern with continuity actually weighs in favor of external monitoring. This is because under both the defendants’ and the plaintiffs’ proposed global monitoring plans,
195

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 196 of 210
external monitors would begin the monitoring process, which would then gradually transition to an internal team. Indeed, the defendants propose that all quarterly evaluations during the first year of monitoring “shall be conducted exclusively” by the external monitoring team, as opposed to the internal team. Defendants’ Proposed Monitoring Plan (doc. no. 2115) at 13. Therefore, continuity of monitoring is best assured by having an external interim monitor, just as there would be external monitors when global monitoring begins under both the defendants’ and the plaintiffs’ plans. Finally, the court sees no reason why the interim monitoring plan could not require, to the extent possible, an easy transition to a global monitoring plan.
The defendants have conceded that the external monitoring proposed in their global monitoring plan meets the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement, which provides further support for finding that the requirement is met here with respect to external monitoring for immediate relief. See Defendants’ Pretrial Monitoring
196

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 197 of 210
Brief (doc. no. 2145) at 36 (“The ADOC structured the Plan ... so that each requirement meets” the PLRA standard). In their global monitoring plan, the defendants admit that ADOC does not have the internal resources or capacity to effectively monitor, which is why their plan “necessarily requires the initial assistance of” an external monitoring team. Defendants’ Proposed Monitoring Plan (doc. no. 2115) at 2. This admission is as much true about the immediate need for interim external monitoring for suicide prevention as it is about global external monitoring.
Finally, the testimony of Crook and Dr. Kern specifically supports the need for external monitoring. Both admitted that OHS does not currently have the capacity to monitor compliance with all the remedial orders. See Crook Apr. 3, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2486) at 68-69; Kern Mar. 29, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2483) at 165. Crucially, Crook said that, given this lack of capacity, the external monitoring that the defendants proposed in their global monitoring plan is
197

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 198 of 210
the “direction that we are looking towards.” Crook Apr. 4, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2487) at 60. Dr. Kern similarly testified that, if there was an external and internal compliance team, as proposed by the defendants for the global scheme, it “would very much help us” to ensure compliance with the remedial orders. Kern Mar. 29, 2019, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2483) at 165. That two senior ADOC officials charged with compliance oversight view external monitoring as part of the solution to their lack of monitoring capacity convincingly shows the need for external monitoring here. Placing the responsibility for monitoring additional remedial measures ordered here exclusively on ADOC’s shoulders would only exacerbate its lack of capacity.
In short, external monitoring satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement because ADOC has proven that it simply is not up to the task.
2. Site Visits and Document Review The court will order that the external monitor
198

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 199 of 210
conduct both document review and site visits. The defendants shall timely furnish all documents and arrange for all site visits requested by the external monitor in the exercise of his or her professional judgment, unless the defendants file an objection with the court to a particular request based on extraordinary circumstances, such as an extreme security risk. (The objection would likely be handled by one of the two magistrate judges involved in this case--the one handling mediation of outstanding issues or the one helping the court handle disputes.)
To the extent that the PLRA applies to court monitoring, the ordered site visits and document review meet the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. The reasons identified above for why monitoring is necessary also show why both document review and site visits satisfy the requirement.
Moreover, both Vail’s and Dr. Burns’s testimony showed why site visits are essential. Vail testified that, in monitoring, “there’s really no substitute for
199

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 200 of 210
the ability to be on site.” Vail Apr. 3, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 176. Interviews with prisoners reveal “[d]isconnects between what the documentation says and what actually occurred.” Id. And when a monitor is able to interview officers and prison administrators, “you get a much better picture of what really happens versus what the documentation in the policy says.” Id. Similarly, Dr. Burns testified that site visits are important because they allow monitors to review many aspects of compliance that pure paperwork does not capture, such as the adequacy of the referral process, whether staff received required training, how mental-health rounds are conducted, whether treatment team meetings are structurally appropriate, and whether observation logs comport with actual practice. See Burns Dec. 6, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2254) at 52-56, 167. Dr. Burns specifically recommended site visits for monitoring of the immediate relief. See Burns Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 61-62.
While Dr. Perrien testified that monitoring of the
200

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 201 of 210
immediate relief could be accomplished exclusively based on document review, without site visits, see Perrien Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 63,41 this view is undercut by her and Dr. Burns’s joint finding that ADOC’s production of documents for their suicide-prevention assessment was plagued with problems, see Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 2-4. Dr. Burns and Perrien’s report is worth quoting at length: “Documents produced throughout this process were frequently poorly labeled with no accompanying description of why a particular document was provided or to which request it pertained; multiple files were identified only with Bates numbers and may have been inmate records, monthly reports, crisis logs, training materials or any one of several other materials requested.” Id. at 3-4. Overall, “production was poorly organized which we believe reflects a similar lack of
41. Dr. Perrien acknowledged that “there is value throughout a case in doing site visits as a course of an overall monitoring program.” Perrien Apr. 10, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 63.
201

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 202 of 210
organization and consistency across institutions that must be corrected to implement a suicide prevention program.” Id. at 4. The experts’ observations are consistent with what this court has observed to be ADOC’s repeated inability to timely produce requested documentation throughout the remedial process, which strongly indicates a lack of an organized and well-functioning internal information system. See, e.g., Order Regarding Document Production (doc. no. 2345) at 2 (noting the defendants’ failure to timely produce required information about the reasons prisoners with SMIs are placed in segregation and segregation-like settings, which was “surprising in light of the importance of the issue”).
In short, if ADOC’s document production for the suicide-prevention assessment was so disorganized that the experts found that it “must be corrected,” Joint Expert Report and Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-1) at 4, and the court has similarly found serious problems with ADOC’s document production, why should the external
202

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 203 of 210

monitor be forced to exclusively rely on documents?

Furthermore, the defendants’ proposed global

monitoring plan provides for initial site visits by the

external monitoring team to all facilities not previously

visited, and allows the external team to request

additional visits based on their professional judgement.

See Defendants’ Proposed Monitoring Opinion (doc. no.

2295) at 13. The defendants’ proposed global monitoring

plan also gives the external monitoring team the

authority to identify what documents to review, id., and

places within the external monitoring team’s discretion

how many documents to review, id. at 27. The defendants

conceded that both of these aspects of their proposed

global

monitoring

plan

meet

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness

requirement,

which

provides further support for finding that the requirement

is met here with respect to the interim monitor’s

activities. See Defendants’ Pretrial Monitoring Brief

(doc. no. 2145) at 36.

Finally, the court will impose certain limits on the

203

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 204 of 210
site visits to ensure that the relief is narrowly tailored. The defendants can object to a particular site visit (or document request, for that matter), based on extraordinary circumstances. And site visits will be limited to two days at each facility, which ensures they are not overly intrusive. See Vail Nov. 29, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2340) at 64 (testifying that a site visit by a monitoring team for a few days would not be unnecessarily disruptive, but that a visit for “weeks” might be); Burns Dec. 7, 2018, Trial Tr. (doc. no. 2256) at 242 (testifying that site visits would be disruptive if they lasted 30 days, but not three or four days).

3. Periodic Reports to the Court

The court will order that the interim external

monitor periodically report to the court his or her

assessments of ADOC’s compliance with the immediate

suicide relief. To the extent that the PLRA applies to

court monitoring, periodic reporting meets the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement.

By

204

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 205 of 210
definition, court monitors must periodically report their findings to the court; without communicating the information they obtain, they are not monitoring.

4. Duration of Interim External Monitor

The court will order that the interim external

monitor serve in his or her capacity of exclusively

monitoring the immediate suicide-prevention relief until

the monitor or monitors for a future global monitoring

scheme are operating. Alternatively, if the court does

not order a global monitoring remedy, or if within two

years after the entry of this order the global monitoring

scheme has not begun implementation, the court will

simply rely on the process set forth by the PLRA for

determining when to end the monitoring ordered here.

This means that, at any point at least two years after

the entry of this order, any party or intervenor may move

to terminate the monitoring.

See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(b)(1)(A)(i). The court will terminate the

monitoring unless it finds, after an evidentiary hearing,

205

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 206 of 210

that external monitoring remains necessary to correct a

current and ongoing constitutional violation, and that

the

monitoring

continues

to

meet

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness test. See id. at

§ 3626(b)(3); see also Cason, 231 F.3d at 782-83.

To the extent that the PLRA applies to court

monitoring, the ordered duration of monitoring here meets

the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. The

reasons identified above for why monitoring is necessary

also show why the duration ordered here satisfies the

requirement. Furthermore, the duration provision simply

mirrors the processes set forth in the PLRA for

determining when to terminate relief.

5. Internal Monitoring The court will require ADOC to establish a formal internal monitoring scheme focused on the immediate suicide-prevention relief ordered here. To the extent that the PLRA applies to court monitoring, the requirement to establish internal
206

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 207 of 210

monitoring meets the need-narrowness-intrusiveness

requirement. The reasons identified above for why

monitoring is necessary also show why internal monitoring

satisfies the requirement.

Moreover, internal monitoring is a component of the

defendants’ proposed global monitoring structure. The

defendants conceded that the internal monitoring in their

global

monitoring

plan

meets

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness

requirement,

which

provides further support for finding that the requirement

is met here. See Defendants’ Pretrial Monitoring Brief

(doc. no. 2145) at 36.

6. Open Components of Monitoring The monitoring relief described thus far provides a general structure for monitoring of the immediate suicide-prevention measures. Virtually all the details of the internal monitoring must be filled in. Many details also still need to be filled in for external monitoring, including but not limited to the frequency
207

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 208 of 210
with which the interim monitor will report to the court, what performance measures and audit tools to use, whether the monitor can make unannounced site visits, and the monitor’s authority and restrictions relating to communicating with the parties and ADOC staff. Crucially, the question of who will serve as the interim external monitor also is not resolved here.
The court will order that the parties have 14 days from today’s date to meet with Magistrate Judge John Ott to attempt to agree upon the remaining details of the external and internal monitoring schemes. If they cannot reach an agreement, then the defendants shall submit a proposal within 21 days from today’s date that includes both external and internal monitoring schemes, and the plaintiffs shall have 28 days from today’s date to respond. The proposal and response may include candidates to serve as the interim external monitor. The plans for both external and internal monitoring shall be crafted flexibly to allow, as much as possible, the easiest transition to the anticipated global monitoring
208

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 209 of 210

scheme.

To the extent that the PLRA applies to this

provision, the ordered process for filling in the

remaining details of monitoring meets the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. The reasons

identified above for why monitoring is necessary also

shows why the remaining details cannot simply be left up

to the defendants.

Finally, in finding that each of the ordered

monitoring

provisions

satisfies

the

need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement, the court

gave “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public

safety or the operation of a criminal justice system

caused by the relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The

court finds that there is no such adverse impact; and

that in fact, the ordered monitoring provisions, by

helping to improve mental-health care for prisoners, will

serve only to enhance public safety and the operation of

a criminal justice system.

209

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 2525 Filed 05/04/19 Page 210 of 210
IV. CONCLUSION The defendants argue that they cannot prevent all suicides in ADOC. It is true that, as in the free world, not all suicides can be prevented. But this reality in no way excuses ADOC’s substantial and pervasive suicide-prevention inadequacies. Unless and until ADOC lives up to its Eighth Amendment obligations, avoidable tragedies will continue. DONE, this the 4th day of May, 2019.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1290 Filed 06/28/17 Page 1 of 4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ADA FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL ORDER

Based upon the representations of counsel at the

fairness hearing held in open court on June 2, 2017, on

the proposed settlement of the plaintiffs’

mental-health claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, and upon consideration of the proposed

settlement, the joint motion for approval of the

proposed settlement, the objections to the proposed

settlement, and other related filings; and with the

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1290 Filed 06/28/17 Page 2 of 4
understanding that an opinion will follow explaining the court’s reasoning, it is ORDERED as follows:
(1) An injunctive-relief settlement class, defined as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or defect,” is certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).
(2) The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g).
(3) The objections to the settlement agreement (doc. nos. 1214, 1216, 1219, 1221, 1224, 1231, and 1238) are overruled.
(4) The joint motion for approval of the proposed settlement (doc. no. 1175) is granted, and the settlement agreement (doc. no. 1100) is approved.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1290 Filed 06/28/17 Page 3 of 4
(5) The parties’ stipulations (doc. nos. 560, 563, 575, 576, 638, 696, 719, 1197, and 1239) are adopted.
(6) The settlement agreement (doc. no. 1100) is entered as a consent decree.
(7) The temporary restraining order entered on January 19, 2017 (doc. no. 1124), which, until now, has remained in effect, is lifted; however, the deadlines established in the proposed settlement (doc. no. 1100) are effective as of January 19, 2017.
(8) United States Magistrate Judge John Ott is appointed as arbitrator pursuant to § VIII of the consent decree.
(9) Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees (doc. no. 1271) is granted.
(10) By no later than noon on July 12, 2017, the parties are to meet and confer and submit to the court a plan for providing notice to class members of the entry of this consent decree and for ensuring that they have access to the decree during its pendency. In particular, the notice must describe in lay terms that
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1290 Filed 06/28/17 Page 4 of 4
are understandable to the extent possible to a person of limited education, the accommodation-request, grievance, and arbitration processes set out in the decree.
DONE, this the 28th day of June, 2017. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 1 of 37

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A UNDERSTAFFING REMEDIAL OPINION

Previously this court found that the State of Alabama

provides inadequate mental-health care in its prisons in

violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against

cruel and unusual punishment. See Braggs v. Dunn, 257

F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (Thompson, J.).

The court now finds that the State’s proposed plan to

remedy

one

overarching

aspect

of

the

violation--correctional

and

mental-health

understaffing--is minimally adequate and acceptable,

albeit with minor modifications.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 2 of 37
I. Background A. Procedural Background The plaintiffs in this class-action lawsuit include a group of mentally ill prisoners in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC or Department). The defendants are ADOC Commissioner Jefferson Dunn and the ADOC Associate Commissioner of Health Services Ruth Naglich, who are both sued in only their official capacities. In a liability opinion entered on June 27, 2017, this court found that ADOC’s mental-health care for prisoners in its custody was, “[s]imply put, ... horrendously inadequate.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1267. The court laid out seven factors contributing to the Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 1267-68. In addition, it found that “persistent and severe shortages of mental-health staff and correctional staff” constitute an “overarching issue[] that permeate[s] each of the ... contributing factors of inadequate mental-health care.” Id. at 1268. “[G]iven the severity and urgency of the
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 3 of 37
need for mental-health care explained in [the] opinion,” the court emphasized, “the proposed relief must be both immediate and long term.” Id.
After two months of mediation to develop a comprehensive remedial plan, it became apparent that the remedy was too large and complex to be addressed all at once. The court therefore severed the remedy into several discrete issues, to be addressed seriatim. See Phase 2A Revised Remedy Scheduling Order on Eighth Amendment Claim (doc. no. 1357). The court explained: “To be sure, in a sense all of the contributing factors identified in the court’s June 27 opinion warrant urgent resolution. Indeed, a continuing Eighth Amendment violation, because it is ‘cruel and unusual,’ could be viewed as in need of swift and serious attention of both courts and the parties involved. Yet the court is convinced that breaking down the issues in the above manner will, in the long run, result in a more efficient, timely, and full resolution of this aspect of this litigation.” Id. at 7-8.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 4 of 37
Because of the centrality of understaffing to other problems in ADOC’s provision of mental-health care, it was determined that this issue “must be addressed at the outset,” and that “the earlier the problem is attacked the better.” Id. at 4-5. Accordingly, on October 9, 2017, the defendants submitted a proposed remedial plan on understaffing, to which the plaintiffs were allowed to respond. The court then held a nine-day evidentiary hearing, and heard oral argument, in late 2017 on whether the plan should be adopted as proposed, and whether a remedial order should be entered at this time. After oral argument, the parties were instructed to submit proposed orders. Because the plan changed in certain respects over the course of this process, the defendants submitted a revised timeline.
B. Liability Findings as to Understaffing In addition to the seven “contributing factors” to the Eighth Amendment violation, the court more specifically found that persistent and severe shortages
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 5 of 37
of correctional and mental-health staff have “cascading effects” that “contribute to all of the deficiencies in ADOC’s treatment of mentally ill prisoners.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1188, 1193. The court noted: “ADOC has maintained mental-health staffing levels that are chronically insufficient across disciplines and facilities. Witness after witness identified significant mental-health staffing shortages as one of the major reasons for ADOC’s inability to meet the rising mental-health care needs of prisoners.” Id. at 1194. Indeed, ADOC Commissioner Dunn described understaffing, along with overcrowding, as a “two-headed monster” facing the prison system. Id. at 1184.
Moreover, as the court explained, ADOC’s understaffing problem is self-compounding: shortages in mental-health staff lead to unbearably high caseloads for mental-health staff members, which in turn causes turnover and further understaffing, and even higher caseloads. Id. at 1196. The Department’s lack of correctional staff “leaves many ADOC facilities
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 6 of 37
incredibly dangerous and out of control” and causes “prisoners and correctional officers alike” to be “justifiably afraid for their safety.” Id. at 1198. As multiple witnesses testified at the understaffing remedial hearing, this legitimate perception of danger to correctional staff--which is a direct result of understaffing--begets further understaffing: it is a major impediment to recruitment and retention.
The court found that understaffing underlies ADOC’s deficient mental-health care in several ways. The shortage of mental-health staff has resulted in “a plethora of issues, including insufficient identification of mental illness at intake and referrals; missed counseling appointments and group sessions; and inadequate monitoring of prisoners in mental-health crises.” Id. at 1197. Further, the shortage in correctional staffing inhibits the delivery of adequate mental-health care because it prevents ADOC from escorting inmates to their mental-health appointments; hinders correctional officers’ ability to supervise
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 7 of 37

mentally ill prisoners; and diminishes officers’ ability

to identify and refer potentially mentally ill prisoners

for treatment.

Id. at 1200-04.

Correctional

understaffing “also has a more direct impact on

prisoners’ mental health” in that “[t]he combination of

overcrowding and understaffing leads to an increased

level of violence” in ADOC facilities. Id. at 1200. In

addition, the court found that the lack of both

correctional and mental-health staffing results in

inadequate monitoring of prisoners in segregation, and

contributes to “a vicious cycle of isolation, inadequate

treatment, and decompensation.” Id. at 1243-45.

II. Legal Standard The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a “court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 8 of 37
of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). In conducting this ‘need-narrowness-intrusiveness’ inquiry, a court is required to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” Id.
“As this court has stated before, [prison officials in cases challenging prison conditions] should be given considerable deference in determining an appropriate remedy for the constitutional violations involved.” Laube v. Haley, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Thompson, J.) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979)); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (“[F]ederal courts have ... reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”).
Nevertheless, courts retain a responsibility to remedy constitutional violations. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687, n.9 (1978)). “Courts must be sensitive to the State’s interest in punishment, deterrence, and
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 9 of 37

rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to

experienced and expert prison administrators faced with

the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers

of convicted criminals. Courts nevertheless must not

shrink from their obligation to enforce the

constitutional rights of all ‘persons,’ including

prisoners. Courts may not allow constitutional violations

to continue simply because a remedy would involve

intrusion into the realm of prison administration.” Id.

at 511. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Accordingly,

the

deference

afforded

prison

administrators in remedying constitutional violations

must not be “complete.” See King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d

889, 897 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Plata, 563

U.S. at 511).

III. Discussion A. The Defendants’ Proposed
Remedial Plan The defendants’ proposed remedial plan has evolved in some respects during the course of the evidentiary
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 10 of 37
hearing and oral argument. Accordingly, the court now
sets out its understanding of the plan, including minor
tweaks, which it today adopts.
1. Correctional Staffing
a. The Savages’ Staffing Analyses. In order to
determine how many officers are needed to address ADOC’s
correctional understaffing problem, the defendants have
retained experts Margaret and Merle Savage to conduct
comprehensive staffing analyses at each of ADOC’s major
facilities, with the exception of the Julia Tutwiler
Prison for Women.1 By the time of the evidentiary
1. A staffing analysis of Tutwiler was recently conducted by The Moss Group pursuant to a Consent Decree in United States v. Alabama, Case No. 2:15-cv-368-MHT-TFM (M.D. Ala.) (Thompson, J.). Although that case involved sexual harassment and assault of inmates, rather than mental-health care, the parties have agreed that the analysis provides an adequate basis for determining Tutwiler’s current correctional staffing needs, and that the Savages need not conduct a separate staffing analysis of Tutwiler at this time. The court understands that the Savages will therefore use The Moss Group’s analysis in formulating their recommendations for Tutwiler, and-along with the analyses of other facilities--their recommendations for ADOC’s system as a whole. In addition, to the extent that future remedial orders
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 11 of 37
hearing, the Savages had already completed preliminary
analyses at three facilities: Bibb Correctional Facility,
Donaldson Correctional Facility, and Hamilton Aged and
Infirmed Center. According to the defendants’ plan, the
Savages are to complete final staffing analyses for all
15 major facilities except Tutwiler, as well as
short- and long-term recommendations for all major
facilities including Tutwiler, by May 1, 2018.2
require the Savages to reevaluate facilities based on new programmatic needs or other changes in circumstances, any such reevaluations will necessarily include Tutwiler because the current staffing analysis does not account for those changes.
2. In the defendants’ proposed remedial plan (doc. no. 1374), in the defendants’ pretrial brief (doc. no. 1478), throughout the nine-day evidentiary hearing on understaffing, and during the post-trial oral argument on January 24, 2018, the defendants maintained that the proposed remedy as to understaffing would apply to all 15 major ADOC facilities, with the exception that the Savages would not conduct a staffing analysis at the Tutwiler facility at this time because one has recently been done (as discussed above). However, the defendants’ proposed opinion, as an apparent afterthought, suggested that the court limit its supervision of the remedial plan’s implementation to six facilities, on the theory that the plaintiffs allegedly had failed to establish a violation based on correctional or mental-health understaffing at the other ADOC facilities. The defendants subsequently admitted that they are “not aware
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 12 of 37
All parties agree that any dispute related to the
Savages’ recommendations should first be put before
United States Magistrate Judge John Ott for mediation and
that, if and when Judge Ott concludes that all or part
of the dispute cannot be successfully mediated, any
party may then put the dispute, to the extent it is not
resolved, to United States Magistrate Judge Gray M.
Borden for consideration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636,
with allowable review, in turn, by this court pursuant
to § 636. (The court, however, reserves the discretion
of any section of the Court’s liability opinion in which the Court indicated an intent to limit its liability findings to [those six facilities].” Response to Court’s February 2, 2018 Order (doc. no. 1595) at 1. Moreover, as the court and the defendants have repeatedly recognized, all of ADOC’s major prisons--and in particular the prisons for men--form part of an interlocking system. The court cannot fully appreciate what is happening, and what needs to be done, at a subset of these facilities without receiving a full evidentiary picture of what is happening in the system overall. For example, it would make little sense to order increased staffing at one understaffed prison if the staffing were to be filled by merely transferring staff from another, slightly less understaffed facility. It therefore declines to adopt the suggested limitation, which could fatally hinder its ability to remedy the constitutional violation found.
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 13 of 37
to hear and resolve any dispute itself without the parties having gone through mediation or presented the dispute to Judge Borden for consideration.)
The court finds that the Savages, who have conducted correctional staffing analyses in more than 10 correctional systems, and who each possess over 40 years of experience in prison management and staffing, are qualified to conduct the staffing analysis.
While the plaintiffs do not challenge the Savages’ qualifications to conduct a staffing analysis and do not dispute that a staffing analysis must be conducted, they have expressed concerns about how the first three preliminary analyses were conducted. Accordingly, plaintiffs sought to have their correctional expert, Eldon Vail, collaborate with the Savages before the conclusion of the staffing analyses. During the understaffing remedial hearing, the Savages met with Vail and reached an agreement as to how they would collaborate through the remainder of the staffing-analysis process. Per the agreement, as Ms. Savage testified, the Savages
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 14 of 37
will produce to Vail the post plan, institutional profile, and activities chart for each facility as they are completed for Vail’s review and consideration. The Savages will also produce these materials for the three facilities they have already preliminarily assessed: Bibb, Donaldson, and Hamilton. The Savages and Vail will then schedule a conference call to discuss any questions or areas of concern. The Savages will also provide any additional information needed for the conference call discussions. Finally, if Vail deems it necessary, he will travel to one of the facilities at the conclusion of the Savages’ visit so that they can walk through their process with him and address any remaining questions or concerns. Neither party objects to the agreement reached by the Savages and Vail. Therefore, the court adopts this agreement as part of the defendants’ remedial plan.
b. Consultant Analyses of Compensation and Recruitment and Retention. The defendants propose employing consultants to determine how to recruit, hire, and retain more correctional officers. The evidence
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 15 of 37
presented at the remedial hearing, including the Savages’ preliminary analyses of Bibb, Donaldson, and Hamilton, plainly indicated that the understaffing remedy will require ADOC to hire significant numbers of additional correctional officers. Yet ADOC, despite its purported efforts to hire more officers, has in fact continued to hemorrhage correctional staff since the time of the June 2017 liability opinion--that is, when this court had already found that “persistent and severe shortages of ... correctional staff” was an “overarching issue[]” that contributed to the defendants’ Eighth Amendment violation. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1268. Much of the problem, then, appears to be not whether but how ADOC can effectively increase the number of correctional officers. Accordingly, the defendants have retained two consulting firms to aid in the implementation of the Savages’ recommendations, as modified by any agreements between the parties or orders of the court.
The defendants have retained Troy University’s “Center for Public Service” and Stephen Condrey, Ph.D.,
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 16 of 37
to “conduct a comprehensive analysis of the compensation and benefits offered by ADOC to correctional staff, including a comparison of ADOC compensation and benefits for correctional staff to the compensation and benefits afforded by law enforcement agencies at the state, county, and local level.” Defendants’ Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Correctional and Mental Health Staffing (doc. no. 1374) at 13-14. Condrey is to submit his recommendations by April 1, 2018. Defendants’ Timeline for Correctional and Mental Health Staffing (doc. no. 1583) at 1.
Here the court merely observes, as it suggested at the evidentiary hearing, that the level of compensation and benefits required to be on an equal competitive footing with other employers in the same market may differ from that required to hire expeditiously a significant number of new staff, as may be required by the ultimate staffing plan. Recommendations aimed at the former may miss the mark in helping the defendants execute their remedial plan. The defendants may
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 17 of 37
therefore want Condrey to grapple with this potential issue.
The defendants have also retained Brian Bateh and his team at the firm of Warren Averett to “conduct a comprehensive analysis of ADOC’s policies, practices, and procedures relating to or affecting the recruitment, employment, and retention of correctional staff.” Id. at 13. Bateh is to submit his recommendations by November 1, 2018. Id. at 2.
The court, having reviewed the qualifications of Bateh and Condrey and heard their testimony at the remedial evidentiary hearing, and seeing no objections from the plaintiffs, finds that they are qualified to perform the above analyses.
2. Mental-Health Staffing The defendants’ plan to the extent it addresses mental-health understaffing contains two “centerpieces.” Defendants’ Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Correctional and Mental Health Staffing (doc. no. 1374)
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 18 of 37

at 16. In the short run, a Request for Proposal (“RFP”)

issued in July 2017 will nearly double the number of ADOC

mental-health staff when implemented. In the long run,

ADOC has retained three consultants to develop

mental-health staffing ratios, which will be used along

with the Department’s caseload numbers to generate an

appropriate number of mental-health staff. In addition,

between January 2017 and October 2017, ADOC increased its

spending on mental-health staff by approximately five

million dollars and added approximately 60

full-time-equivalent positions (“FTEs”).

a. July 2017 Request for Proposal. As the first step

to address mental-health understaffing, the defendants

in July 2017 released an RFP for a new mental-health

services vendor.

The RFP is designed to add

approximately 125 FTEs, nearly doubling the number of

psychiatrists, psychologists, certified registered nurse

practitioners, licensed mental-health professionals, and

registered nurses. As such, it represents a significant

and commendable start to addressing ADOC’s mental-health

18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 19 of 37

understaffing.

Both sides to this litigation

acknowledge, however, that this increase will ultimately

be insufficient to remedy the violations shown.

Although, in the past, ADOC has through negotiations

with vendors allowed the provision of fewer positions

than called for in a given RFP, both Commissioner Dunn

and his counsel assured the court at the remedial hearing

that the resulting contract will not go below the

staffing numbers provided in the July 2017 RFP. In

addition, the defendants’ plan provides that “ADOC will

require the contractor to fully staff the positions and

will impose strict financial penalties if the contractor

fails to do so, except for certain delineated support

positions.” Id. at 18.

Under the original timeline published with the RFP,

the contract was to be awarded by September 4, 2017, and

implemented by January 1, 2018. On September 1, 2017,

the vendor selection date was extended to October 16,

2017, and the implementation date was extended to April

1, 2018. At the time of the understaffing remedial

19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 20 of 37
hearing in late 2017, the vendor had not yet been selected, though ADOC had informed bidders that it was beginning negotiations with Wexford Health Sources. Commissioner Dunn testified that an award would be made by the end of December 2017, and that he would do everything in his power to meet the implementation date of April 1, 2018. However, under the timeline recently submitted to the court, implementation is merely to begin by April 1, 2018, with the RFP positions to be fully filled by July 1, 2018. Although the court today enters a remedial order adopting the defendants' proposed timeline, it notes that it has already deferred to their repeated delays in executing the contract for and implementing the RFP, and there can be no more delays.
b. Mental-Health Staffing Ratios. The second, long-run “centerpiece” of the defendants’ plan is to develop mental-health staffing ratios, which will be used along with the Department’s future caseload numbers to generate an appropriate number of mental-health staff. To produce the ratios, ADOC has retained consultants
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 21 of 37
Catherine Knox, M.S.N., R.N., CCHP-RN, Jeffrey L. Metzner, M.D., and Mary Perrien, Ph.D.
According to the defendants’ proposed timeline, the consultants are to begin work to develop the mental-health ratios on September 1, 2018, in order to allow time for ADOC to implement fully the July 2017 RFP and for new mental-health staff to adjust to their positions. The consultants are to submit finalized mental-health staffing ratios by March 1, 2019.
All parties agree that any dispute related to the ratio recommendations should first be put before United States Magistrate Judge John Ott for mediation and that, if and when Judge Ott concludes that all or part of the dispute cannot be successfully mediated, any party may then put the dispute, to the extent it is not resolved, to United States Magistrate Judge Gray M. Borden for consideration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, with allowable review, in turn, by this court pursuant to § 636. (The court, however, reserves the discretion to hear and resolve any dispute itself without the parties having
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 22 of 37
gone through mediation or presented the dispute to Judge Borden for consideration.)
ADOC is then to modify its contract with the mental-health vendor in accordance with the mental-health staffing ratios, as modified by any agreements between the parties or orders of the court, by August 15, 2019. By November 15, 2019, ADOC’s vendor is to implement the finalized staffing ratios as required by the modified contract, with all mental-health staffing positions to be filled consistent with the contract by February 15, 2020. Knox, Metzner, and Perrien are to review implementation of the finalized staffing ratios under the modified contract, and to make any recommendations for revising those ratios by January 15, 2020.
The court, having reviewed the qualifications of Knox, Metzner, and Perrien, having heard their testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and seeing no objections from the plaintiffs, finds that they are qualified to produce the mental-health ratios, and to oversee and review their implementation, as described above.
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 23 of 37
3. Office of Health Services Staffing ADOC’s Office of Health Services (OHS), headed by Associate Commissioner for Health Services Naglich, is “the only ADOC department with responsibility for monitoring mental-health care,” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1258, which ADOC contracts out to a private, third-party vendor. As the court found, however, OHS “has done vanishingly little” to exercise oversight, engage in quality improvement, or take corrective measures in response to identified deficiencies in care. Id. at 1257-58. Associate Commissioner Naglich’s testimony at the liability trial revealed that these failures were due in significant part to severe understaffing within OHS, and that Naglich and others had unsuccessfully sought additional OHS staff on multiple occasions since 2008. Naglich further testified that she believes having an independent contract monitor or additional OHS staffing to perform contract monitoring would be beneficial. Specifically, she testified that
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 24 of 37
OHS needs at least two psychologists, preferably in the regional offices, in addition to David Tytell (OHS’s chief psychologist) to monitor and audit the mental-health vendor’s contract compliance. During the understaffing remedial hearing, Naglich again testified that more OHS staff is needed.
In preparation for the remedial hearing, the court specifically ordered the defendants to “present evidence of their plan to forthwith and adequately staff the Office of Health Services ..., including benchmarks for the implementation of that plan.” Pretrial Order: Phase 2A Correctional Understaffing Issues (doc. no. 1436) at 4. In response to the court’s concerns, the defendants submitted a new organizational structure for the mental-health functions within OHS, see 2018-2019 OHS Organizational Chart (doc. no. 1478-1), and on November 30, 2017, submitted a timeline for hiring additional OHS personnel, see Defs’ Ex. 3000 (doc. no. 1515-124).3
3. Although the court asked the defendants to submit their OHS staffing plan, Associate Commissioner Naglich testified that the plan was developed in the spring or
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 25 of 37
With regard to mental-health services, the new OHS staffing plan provides for three regional clinical registered nurses who will oversee both medical and mental-health nursing. Those positions are not new. Two of those positions are currently filled. The OHS staffing plan provides for a new ombudsman position, which has not yet been filled. ADOC has received State Personnel Board approval for that position. Commissioner Dunn testified, in November 2017, that ADOC could begin seeking a qualified candidate through the state register within 30 days. Commissioner Dunn projected, consistent with the proposed timeline, that it could take three to four months to fill the position.
The plan provides for a Clinical Director of Psychiatry, a position that is not yet filled. Commissioner Dunn testified, in November 2017, that the position would be appointed and would not require any additional approvals before it could be advertised. He
summer of 2017--that is, perhaps even prior to the liability opinion entered on June 2017.
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 26 of 37
also testified that he had instructed his staff to begin advertising for this position within seven to 10 days of his testimony. He estimated, consistent with the proposed timeline, that it could take up to nine months to fill this position.
The OHS plan calls for having two psychologists, one in each region, and a Director of Mental Health. Tytell, who currently serves as Director of Psychology, will fill the Northern Regional Psychologist position. The Southern Regional Psychologist Position remains unfilled. Commissioner Dunn estimated in November 2017, consistent with the proposed timeline, that it would take between four and six months to fill this position once the State Personnel Department has approved it.
The Director of Mental Health will be a health services administrator who provides administrative but not clinical oversight. ADOC requested in the late spring or early summer of 2017 that the State Personnel Department create this position. The position remains unfilled. Commissioner Dunn estimated in November 2017,
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 27 of 37
consistent with the proposed timeline, that it would take between four and six months to fill this position once the State Personnel Department has approved it.
B. The Plaintiffs’ Response to the Proposed Plan
In response to the defendants’ plan, the plaintiffs raise several serious concerns, including that the number of ADOC correctional officers has precipitously declined since the liability trial in late 2016 and early 2017, and, indeed, even since the liability opinion was entered in late June 2017. Moreover, the defendants have repeatedly delayed negotiating, executing, and implementing the July 2017 RFP.
The plaintiffs argue that a remedial order is necessary at this time and is not unduly intrusive, given the severity and urgency of the violations shown, and the defendants’ longstanding deliberate indifference to these violations.4 They therefore request a series of
4. As the liability opinion noted, “This case is likely sui generis in the extent to which the top ADOC
27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 28 of 37
specific measures, many of which are grounded, to a certain extent, in the recommendations of ADOC’s own experts and officials. Notably, the plaintiffs argue that a remedial order should require the defendants to meet specific hiring benchmarks for correctional officers at four six-month intervals, based initially on ADOC’s own number of already authorized positions, and subsequently on the Savages’ recommendations.5 With regard to mental-health understaffing, the plaintiffs similarly propose that the defendants be immediately ordered to begin increasing staff according to the provisional mental-health staffing ratios developed by Knox, Metzner, and Perrien, see ADOC’s Provisional Mental
officials had personal knowledge of the substantial risks of serious harm posed by its deficient care and has not responded reasonably to those risks.” Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1252.
5. The plaintiffs point out that the Savages’ preliminary analyses of three ADOC facilities recommend staffing numbers that are fairly similar to the number of authorized positions, and the plaintiffs therefore argue that a first benchmark could be based on the latter figure before the completion of the Savages’ recommendations.
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 29 of 37
Health Staffing Ratios (doc. no. 1374-4), and that the hiring goals in the order later be adjusted when the consultants develop finalized ratios.6
Finally, because, under the PLRA, remedial orders are terminable upon the motion of any party or intervenor after two years, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1), the plaintiffs expressed concern that the defendants’ plan will not remedy the understaffing violation within a two-year time period. However, both defendants and plaintiffs have acknowledged this fact and agreed that the understaffing problem will likely require several years to remedy. Moreover, even when a motion to terminate is made, the PLRA allows the court to extend a remedial order upon specific findings that it remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation, and that the order continues to meet the
6. The defendants maintained during the evidentiary hearing and at oral argument that these “Provisional Mental Health Staffing Ratios” were not prepared by their mental-health consultants for potential implementation, but were merely examples of what the ultimate work product would consist of, and should therefore not be used as an initial target.
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 30 of 37
need-narrowness-intrusiveness test. Id. § 3626(b)(3); see also Cason v. Seckinger , 231 F.3d 777, 782-83 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that, upon a motion to terminate a remedial order governed by the PLRA, plaintiffs must be given an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate a current and ongoing violation).
C. The Court’s Position The court agrees with the plaintiffs that, in light of the serious and longstanding violations shown, and the lack of progress on understaffing--indeed, in many ways, regression--since trial, a remedial order is necessary. The State of Alabama cannot be allowed to kick the can down the road. However, as the evidence and argument have demonstrated, the defendants’ proposed plan represents a serious, albeit concededly minimal, effort to remedy a complex and difficult problem. Despite the immediate need to remedy understaffing, and distressing indications that the problem may have worsened since the liability
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 31 of 37
opinion, it may simply not be possible to turn this ship around on a dime. The defendants will, therefore, be given an opportunity to implement its proposed remedy and to demonstrate that it is producing meaningful and immediate results. The court today, therefore, enters a remedial order adopting the defendants’ plan, albeit with some modifications.7 With regard to the deadlines adopted, the court emphasizes that the defendants are not to delay implementation until the last minute, but are to begin immediately and swiftly upon receiving the relevant recommendations.
While the court, in deference to the State and in its discretion, today declines to order the recommendations proposed by the plaintiffs, it will not abdicate its constitutional duty “to enforce the constitutional rights of all ‘persons,’ including prisoners.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011).
7. For example, the timeline in the remedial order for hiring additional OHS personnel reflects the outer ranges--that is, the longest--of the estimates provided by the defendants on November 30, 2017. See Defs’ Ex. 3000 (doc. no. 1515-124).
31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 32 of 37
In overseeing the defendants’ implementation of their plan, the court will “not allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison administration.” Id. Rather, it will remain poised to step in should the defendants fail to uphold their commitment, or should the plan prove inadequate to remedy, in a timely fashion, the violations shown.
IV. PLRA Requirements Section 3626(a)(1) of the PLRA requires district courts to make particularized findings that each provision of prospective relief ordered satisfies the ‘need-narrowness-intrusiveness’ requirement. See United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2015). This court now makes such findings, and concludes that the ordered relief complies with the PLRA. With regard to correctional understaffing, the defendants’ plan to use the Savages’ staffing analyses
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 33 of 37
and resulting recommendations will provide the defendants with a comprehensive understanding of the ADOC’s correctional staffing needs and with an opportunity for all parties to respond and resolve any disputes that may arise. Further, as the defendants explained, and in light of ample evidence from all parties that ADOC faces a serious and complex problem in hiring and retaining correctional officers, the analyses and recommendations to be prepared by Bateh and Condrey are necessary for the defendants to understand how to implement the Savages’ recommendations. The court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation found, and is the least intrusive means of doing so.
With regard to mental-health understaffing, all parties recognize that the implementation of the July 2017 RFP constitutes a necessary first step to address ADOC’s mental-health understaffing. Further, as the defendants recognize, the mental-health consultants’ analyses and recommended ratios will provide the
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 34 of 37
defendants with a comprehensive understanding of the ADOC’s mental-health staffing needs and with an opportunity for all parties to respond and resolve any disputes that may arise. The court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation found, and is the least intrusive means of doing so.
As Associate Commissioner Naglich testified extensively at the liability trial and remedial hearing, additional OHS staffing is necessary to monitor and oversee the third-party vendor’s provision of mental-health care. The court finds that the proposed relief, which adopts the defendants’ proposed OHS structure and outer timeline for hiring those positions, is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation found, and is the least intrusive means of doing so.
The defendants have proposed quarterly reporting requirements, and the court will enact those requirements in its remedial order. The court finds that the quarterly
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 35 of 37
reporting requirements comply with the PLRA because ongoing reporting, as proposed by the defendants, is necessary to apprise the court of whether the defendants’ plan is addressing ADOC’s correctional and mental-health understaffing effectively and as quickly as possible, and to alert the court if additional measures are needed. Thus, the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation found, and is the least intrusive means of doing so.
In addition, the defendants ask that “[n]o quarterly report ... be admissible against the State, ADOC, its employees, contractors, or contractor’s employees in any civil action or other proceeding.” Defendants’ Pretrial Brief and Witness and Exhibit List (doc. no. 1478) at 33. The court cannot agree to this condition, primarily because the purpose of the reports is to inform the plaintiffs and the court about what is occurring, so that they may act on this knowledge as necessary. It is difficult to understand how the parties and the court are
35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 36 of 37
to use the reports to this end if they are not admissible in any civil action, as the proposed language now states. If the defendants, in fact, intended that the reports be admissible in this action but not in others, they may again raise that issue later for the court’s consideration.
Finally, the court finds that the proposed relief will have no adverse effect on public safety or the operation of the criminal-justice system. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). As numerous ADOC officials testified at the liability trial and remedy hearing, and as this court has previously found, correctional understaffing at ADOC facilities has resulted in a dangerous environment for both ADOC staff and inmates. Moreover, ADOC’s persistent and severe lack of mental-health staff has resulted in inmates with serious mental-health needs being under-identified and inadequately treated. Requiring the defendants simply to execute their plan to remedy what ADOC officials have acknowledged is a serious and urgent problem can, if anything, be expected to have
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1656 Filed 02/20/18 Page 37 of 37
a positive impact on public safety and the operation of the criminal-justice system.
*** For the reasons given above, the court will enter an order adopting the defendants’ proposed plan, with some modifications, as a remedy for understaffing. DONE, this the 20th day of February, 2018.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751 Filed 04/09/18 Page 1 of 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION RE: BIBB SEGREGATION REMEDY

On April 4, 2018, the parties submitted

stipulations in open court regarding the issues raised

in the plaintiffs’ “emergency motion for temporary

restraining order or a preliminary injunction requiring

the immediate closure of Bibb Correctional Facility’s

segregation units.” They agreed that the stipulations

should be reduced to an enforceable order and further

agreed to some clarifications of the stipulations.

Accordingly it is ORDERED as follows:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751 Filed 04/09/18 Page 2 of 3
(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1748), as clarified in open court on April 4, 2018, are approved.
(2) Pursuant to the stipulations, the plaintiffs’ emergency motion for temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction requiring the immediate closure of Bibb Correctional Facility’s segregation units (doc. no. 1614) is withdrawn with prejudice.
(3) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 4, 2018.
As part of the clarifications made in open court on April 4, 2018, it is further ORDERED that, with regard to subsection II.2.ii of the attached provisions, defendants Dunn and Naglich are affirmatively to inform clinicians (as that term was clarified in open court on April 4, 2018), in a manner that is documented, (1) that they have both the authority AND the obligation to inform corrections when they have “determined that [an] inmate’s likelihood of decompensation requires a
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751 Filed 04/09/18 Page 3 of 3
transfer to an RTU, SLU, or Stabilization Unit (SU)” and (2) that such a determination is not merely giving advice to corrections, but that it will trump any decision to the contrary and will be carried out promptly.
DONE, this the 9th day of April, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 1 of 9

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT

Unless otherwise specified below, the processes and

procedures outlined below will be implemented by the

ADOC within sixty (60) days of the date of the

recitation of these Stipulations to the Court.

I. RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT STAFFING 1. Within thirty (30) months of the date of these
stipulations, ADOC will fill all six (6) mandatory posts identified as “Restrictive Housing Officer ABCDEF” (collectively, the “Bibb RHU Posts” or

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 2 of 9
individually, “Bibb RHU post”) for both twelve hour shifts, as mandated by the Post Plan developed and provided by Russ and Meg Savage for Bibb Correctional Facility (“Bibb”), if the units remain open. 2. Until ADOC fills all Bibb RHU posts, ADOC will house all inmates on the mental health caseload who are placed in Restrictive Housing at Bibb together within a single Restrictive Housing Unit, and the ADOC must fill both 12-hour shifts of the RHU Post associated with the single Restrictive Housing Unit.
II. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS WITH A SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 1. ADOC will transfer inmates with a Serious Mental Illness (SMI) from Bibb’s Restrictive Housing Unit consistent with the following provisions: a. For the period between May 1, 2018, and June 30, 2018, inmates with an SMI who are housed in Bibb’s Restrictive Housing Unit absent
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 3 of 9

exceptional circumstances must be moved to a

Residential Treatment Unit (RTU) or Structured

Living Unit (SLU) within five (5) calendar days

of placement on the unit.

b. For the period between July 1, 2018, and August

30, 2018, inmates with an SMI who are housed in

Bibb’s Restrictive Housing Unit absent

exceptional circumstances must be moved to an

RTU or SLU within seventy-two (72) hours of

placement on the unit.

c. Beginning on September 1, 2018, and continuing

thereafter, inmates with an SMI who are housed

in Bibb’s Restrictive Housing Unit absent

exceptional circumstances must be moved to an

RTU or SLU within forty-eight (48) hours of

placement on the unit, excluding weekends and

holidays.

In the event of a holiday or

weekend, the inmate shall be transferred before

12:00 p.m. on the next non-holiday or weekday.

3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 4 of 9
2. Prisoners with an SMI who are housed in Bibb’s Restrictive Housing Unit under exceptional circumstances will be removed from Restrictive Housing or transferred to an RTU or SLU as soon as practicable, but consistent with the following provisions: a. Under no circumstance will ADOC house an inmate with an SMI in Restrictive Housing: i. For more than thirty (30) days, or ii. When a clinician has determined that the inmate’s likelihood of decompensation requires a transfer to an RTU, SLU, or Stabilization Unit (SU).
3. If the transfer of an inmate with an SMI to an RTU or SLU is delayed, ADOC will work to resolve the delay as soon as practicable.
4. Counsel for ADOC will notify counsel for Plaintiffs within seven (7) days of any occasion when the ADOC does not transfer an inmate consistent with the terms of this Stipulation. ADOC counsel will also
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 5 of 9
provide the name of the inmate, the receiving institution and the date of his transfer.
III. CARE FOR PRISONERS WITH A SMI WHILE IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING AT BIBB
Prisoners with an SMI who are housed in Bibb’s Restrictive Housing Unit will receive the same level of mental health care and out-of-cell time as inmates housed in a SLU after they have been housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit for a period of seventy-two (72) hours.
IV. LEVEL OF CARE FOR INMATES WITHOUT A SMI WHO ARE ON THE MENTAL HEALTH CASELOAD HOUSED AT BIBB
Prisoners on the mental health caseload in Restrictive Housing shall be provided at least the same level of treatment as they received outside of Restrictive Housing.
V. PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENTS AND CLAIMS PERTAINING TO INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING WHO ARE NOT ON THE MENTAL-HEALTH CASELOAD
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 6 of 9
In its liability opinion, the Court found that “the [ADOC] fails to identify and classify appropriately those with mental illnesses.” (Doc. No. 1285 at 71). In addition, Plaintiffs maintain that individuals who do not currently have a serious mental health need may develop one while assigned to a restrictive housing unit. Nothing contained in these Stipulations shall limit, restrict, waive, or otherwise address any of Plaintiffs’ arguments pertaining to the two groups of inmates identified in the preceding sentence. Plaintiffs expressly preserve these arguments until such time as the Court (a) rules on the pending argument pertaining to inmates who may develop mental illness as a result of his or her assignment to Restrictive Housing (see Doc. Nos. 1364, 1390, 1434 and 1532), and (b) addresses any subsequent remedial relief pertaining to inmates in Restrictive Housing who have an undiagnosed mental illness or develop a mental illness as a result of his or her assignment to a Restrictive Housing Unit.
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 7 of 9
VI. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR ALL PRISONERS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH CASELOAD IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING
1. All inmates on the mental health caseload in Restrictive Housing at Bibb will be afforded an opportunity to shower every other day. Any refusal by an inmate to shower will be documented by ADOC.
2. All inmates on the mental health caseload in Restrictive Housing at Bibb will be afforded an opportunity for at least five (5) hours of out-ofcell exercise time per week. Any refusal by an inmate to participate in out-of-cell exercise time will be documented by ADOC.
VII. DOCUMENT AND VIDEO PRODUCTION FOR OVERSIGHT PURPOSES
1. ADOC will produce the duty post logs for all Restrictive Housing Units at Bibb monthly. Production will occur on the tenth (10th) day of each month and will include logs for each day during the previous month.
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 8 of 9
2. Quarterly, beginning June 1, 2018, Plaintiffs may identify up to six (6) twelve (12) hour periods of time of which video surveillance is to be produced. a. Selection of each of the twelve (12) hour time frames that is to be produced shall be communicated to defense counsel at least ten (10) days in advance of the selected time frame. b. Defense counsel shall not disclose to ADOC any identified time period in advance. c. Within fourteen (14) days following the selected time frame, defense counsel shall produce the video of selected times to Plaintiffs. d. Production shall include videos for each of the six (6) pods for each selected twelve (12) hour time frame. e. Each video produced under this section shall be marked as “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” pursuant to the existing protective order.
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1751-1 Filed 04/09/18 Page 9 of 9
f. In the event that a technical issue prevents the production of video for a selected time frame, Plaintiffs shall be permitted to select another time frame for which video will be produced under the same procedures addressed above in Section VII.2.(a)-(e).
g. If technical difficulties prevent video production for one (1) or more Restrictive Housing Units, but not every Restrictive Housing Unit, selection and production of a replacement time frame shall be limited to the pods influenced by the technical difficulty. The production shall occur under the same procedures addressed above in Section VII.2.(a)-(e).

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792 Filed 04/25/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL-HEALTH IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION REMEDY (CODING)

On April 23, 2018, the parties submitted

stipulations to the court regarding mental-health

intake. In open court on April 24, 2018, they agreed

that the stipulations should be reduced to an

enforceable order and further agreed to some

clarifications of the stipulations. Accordingly, it is

the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792 Filed 04/25/18 Page 2 of 2
(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1779), as clarified in open court on April 24, 2018, and as attached this order, are approved.
(2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 24, 2018 and as attached this order.
DONE, this the 25th day of April, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 1 of 7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT

The parties agree to submit the following

stipulations to the court regarding (a) the ADOC’s

mental health coding system, and (b) the implementation

of the SMI flag and new MH coding system (the

“Stipulation”):

1. Serious Mental Illness (“SMI”)

1.1. The parties’ prior stipulations regarding the SMI

designation or flag are set forth in the Order

dated March 30, 2018. Doc. No. 1720.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 2 of 7
1.2. Because the court accepts this Stipulation in resolution of the issues pertaining to the ADOC’s SMI designation or flag:
1.2.1. By July 1, 2018, ADOC will begin assessing all incoming inmates to determine whether they should be designated as experiencing a “serious mental illness” as defined above and assigning the SMI designation as part of the intake process.
1.2.2. ADOC shall assess all inmates on the mental health caseload and, to the extent clinically indicated, assign the SMI designation no later than September 30, 2018.
1.2.3. For the purpose of implementation of this Stipulation, inmates who carry a diagnosis in the ADOC of any Psychotic Disorder, Bipolar Disorders, or Major Depressive Disorder can be automatically assigned the SMI designation based upon their diagnosis, rather than upon an individualized SMI evaluation.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 3 of 7
1.2.4. Beginning July 1, 2018, all inmates on the mental health caseload shall undergo evaluation for an SMI Designation during their next scheduled treatment team meeting.
1.2.5. Any inmate assigned to restrictive housing who has not undergone a screening for an SMI Designation shall undergo screening, as described in the pre-placement screening protocol developed by Drs. Burns and Perrien, prior to placement in restrictive housing, and shall within 7 days of placement in restrictive housing, have the 7-day mental health assessment described by Drs. Burns and Perrien.
1.2.6. Until such time as ADOC develops the technological capability to include the SMI designation in IMAS or other ADOC software, mental health staff shall report to ADOC each week the individuals at each facility who have the SMI designation. The listing of inmates at each facility with an SMI designation shall be
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 4 of 7
provided on a weekly basis to the Warden of the respective facilities, who shall determine who, among the facility staff, must be provided with the list to ensure compliance with the Stipulation.
2. Revised Mental Health Coding 2.1. New Coding System: The ADOC shall implement a
mental health coding system, consisting of the following mental health codes: 2.1.1. Mental Health Code A: assigned to inmates who
are not currently receiving ongoing mental health service and are not on the caseload; 2.1.2. Mental Health Code B: assigned to inmates who require outpatient mental health services at intervals of ______,1 and have demonstrated stable coping skills for a period of six months or more and can be housed in facilities that do
1. The applicable interval shall be determined by the court after hearing evidence and argument during the Psychotherapy Remedial trial.
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 5 of 7
not provide daily on-site coverage by mental health staff; 2.1.3. Mental Health Code C: assigned to inmates who require outpatient mental health services at intervals of 30 to 60 days, have any diagnosed mental disorder (excluding substance use disorders) currently associated with an impairment in psychological, cognitive, or behavioral functioning that substantially interferes with the person’s ability to meet the ordinary demands of living and must be housed in facilities that provide daily on-site coverage by mental health; 2.1.4. Mental Health Code D: assigned to inmates who are receiving chronic or acute mental health services and require placement in a specialized housing unit; 2.1.5. Any inmate’s assigned Mental Health Code shall be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, by the
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 6 of 7
inmate’s treatment team at each treatment team meeting. 2.2. Implementation of Revised Mental Health Coding: because the court accepts this Stipulation in resolution of the issues pertaining to the ADOC’s mental health coding system, the ADOC shall implement the mental health coding system, as defined in Section 2, above, consistent with the following: 2.2.1. ADOC shall begin using the Revised Mental Health Coding System for inmates arriving through the intake process beginning no later than the latter of: January 1, 2019, or one hundred twenty (120) days after the court issues its Remedial Order on Psychotherapy setting the interval of care for inmates assigned to Mental Health Code B. 2.2.2. On or before April 1, 2019, all inmates on the mental health caseload shall be re-coded pursuant to the Revised Mental Health Coding
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1792-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 7 of 7
System. This shall occur during their next scheduled treatment team meeting. 2.2.3. All inmates currently coded as MH-O shall be converted to Mental Health Code A under the Revised Mental Health Coding System, though such coding shall be reconsidered at the time of referral for evaluation and/or in the event of an assessment by a member of the mental health staff.
7

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794 Filed 04/25/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL-HEALTH IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION REMEDY (INTAKE)

On April 23, 2018, the parties submitted

stipulations to the court regarding Mental Health

Intake. In open court on April 24 and 25, 2018, they

agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an

enforceable order and further agreed to some

clarifications of the stipulations. Accordingly, it is

the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794 Filed 04/25/18 Page 2 of 2
(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1780), as clarified in open court on April 24 and 25, 2018, are approved.
(2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 24 and 25, 2018.
DONE, this the 25th day of April, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 1 of 21

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT

Unless otherwise specified below, the processes and

procedures outlined below will be implemented by the

ADOC within sixty (60) days of the date of the

recitation of these stipulations to the court.

I. Intake Mental Health Assessment An RN with mental health training will conduct a mental health receiving screening as soon as possible, and no later than twelve (12) hours, upon an inmate’s arrival in the ADOC.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 2 of 21
The RN will document the mental health receiving screening on ADOC Form MH-011, Reception Mental Health Screening Evaluation.
The mental health RN conducting the screening shall conduct a mental health receiving screening in accordance with the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare (“NCCHC”) standard M-E-02.
All mental health staff should report suspected abuse of an inmate to the appropriate authority. Inmates arriving with signs of recent trauma should be referred immediately for medical observation and treatment.
At a minimum, mental health receiving screening staff should be trained on how to make the required observations, how to determine the appropriate disposition of an inmate based on responses to questions and observations, and how to document findings on the receiving screening form.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 3 of 21
The mental health RN will refer the inmate for a psychiatric evaluation if the inmate reports, at a minimum:
(1) Current prescription for psychiatric medications; (2) Any in-patient mental health hospitalization; (3) Mental health treatment within the last year; (4) Past or current suicidal acts or ideation; (5) Trauma (history of victimization or abuse); (6) Head injuries (with or without loss of
consciousness); (7) Gender dysphoria; (8) Hallucinations or delusions or; (9) When the inmate’s presentation suggests the need
for psychiatric evaluation. If the inmate reports a current prescription for psychiatric medications, ADOC will attempt to verify with the prescriber or pharmacy within twelve (12) hours of the intake screening and ensure continuity of medication.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 4 of 21
If the prescription cannot be verified within twelve (12) hours, the inmate shall be seen by a psychiatrist or CRNP within twenty-four (24) hours of intake screening during regular working hours. Weekend and holiday response can be via Tele-health when necessary, to ensure appropriate medication.
If the inmate reports receiving mental health services, and can correctly report the prior mental health provider, a records request from the prior provider will be made within seventy-two (72) hours of the intake screening.
All health records from the prior facility of incarceration should be requested within the seventytwo (72) hour time frame, if they are not presented at intake.
If the inmate reports receiving mental health services and cannot remember or correctly identify the prior mental health provider, the mental health staff will reasonably attempt to locate his prior records.
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 5 of 21
The mental health RN performing the intake screening will triage the mental healthcare needs of the inmate. When a referral is indicated the mental health nurse shall designate if the need is emergent, urgent or routine.
(1) Emergent need - the mental health RN conducting the intake screening believes there is an imminent risk of injury to the inmate or others or that the need for mental health services is otherwise emergent.
(2) Urgent need - the mental health RN conducting the intake screening believes the mental health services should be provided in the near future, but not immediately.
(3) Routine need - the mental health RN conducting the intake screening believes that the inmate requires assessment on a routine basis. The on-site or on-call psychiatrist shall be
contacted immediately to evaluate an inmate when the RN determines that the mental health screening suggests
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 6 of 21
that an inmate may be at risk for harm to self or others or may be experiencing acute psychosis (emergent).
If the on-site psychiatrist is not available, the inmate will be placed on watch status until the evaluation can be completed. The on-call psychiatrist will be contacted for additional instructions. The mental health staff of the ADOC vendor will:
(1) Be trained in identifying inmates at risk for self-harm or potentially in need of immediate mental health assistance when conducting the reception mental health screenings;
(2) Conduct the reception mental health screening when an inmate is admitted to the ADOC and before the inmate is placed in a housing area that does not provide constant correctional officer observation;
(3) Review transfer medical documentation prior to conducting the reception mental health screening to
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 7 of 21
optimize available information about the inmate’s mental status or treatment; (4) Conduct the mental health screening in an area permitting inmate confidentiality and encouraging inmate self-reporting; (5) Provide the inmate an initial description of the mental health services available in the ADOC, how to access these services and the grievance process for mental health related complaints; (6) Document the initial mental health screening on ADOC Form MH-011, Reception Mental Health Screening Evaluation; and (7) File original forms in the inmate’s Healthcare record and forward a copy to the ADOC Psychologist responsible for reception mental health evaluations.
II. Social History Assessment, Suicide Risk Assessment, and Testing
A Psychologist or licensed mental health professional within fourteen (14) days of the intake
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 8 of 21
screening, will conduct a Social History Assessment (SHA) of every inmate. The mental health professional will utilize a standardized mental health screening form and SHA within the OHS module. In addition, a Suicide Risk Assessment (SRA) will be completed consistent with attached Exhibit A. The completed SRA will be placed in the inmate health record.
The OHS approved SRA items shall be in accordance with NCCHC Standard M-E-04.
The standardized mental health screening form, Social History Assessment and Suicide Risk Assessment shall, be utilized by the psychologist or licensed mental health professional in assessing the need for a referral to the psychiatrist for evaluation for placement on the mental health caseload.
A licensed psychologist, psychiatrist or CRNP collaborating with a psychiatrist will assign a mental health code. The licensed professional will review the required completed intake screening and assessment results prior to assigning a mental health code.
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 9 of 21
These designated professionals will complete and sign the ADOC Mental Health Coding form in accordance with AR 613. The mental health clerk or other trained support staff may enter the assigned mental health code into the OHS module as transcribed by the licensed professional on the coding form.
Before an inmate is transferred from Kilby Correctional Facility or Tutwiler Prison for Women after his or her initial intake or before an inmate is placed in a segregation unit at Kilby Correctional Facility or Tutwiler Prison for Women immediately following his or her initial intake, the Social History Assessment Suicide Risk Assessment, Testing and if referred, the Reception Psychiatric Evaluation must be completed. If ADOC seeks to place an incoming prisoner into segregation immediately, the prisoner must be placed on mental health observation until such time as the inmate is evaluated by mental health staff qualified to diagnose mental health conditions to determine if the prisoner has a serious mental illness
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 10 of 21
as defined in the Stipulations of the parties reflected in Doc. No. 1720.
III. Reception Psychiatric Evaluation A psychiatrist will evaluate referred inmates within seven (7) working days of the referral (except in cases where it is determined in the receiving screening or reception mental health evaluation that an immediate psychiatric evaluation is required). If immediate psychiatric evaluation is ordered, the psychiatrist will evaluate the inmate within twentyfour (24) hours of the referral. The evaluations shall include review of the inmate’s health record and direct examination of the inmate. The evaluation will include, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) Current complaint (2) Psychiatric history (3) Prior mental health treatment (4) Prior use of psychotropic medication
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 11 of 21
(5) Pertinent medical history (including history of head injuries with or without loss of consciousness)
(6) Substance abuse history (7) Pertinent personal history (including
education, victimization, history of trauma or abuse) (8) Pertinent family history including family history of mental illness (9) Mental status examination (10) Risk for suicide and violence (11) Brief social history (12) DSM 5 diagnosis (13) Psychiatric input for treatment plan Any mental health or intellectual disability test results that are not available at the time of the psychiatric evaluation shall be reviewed by the psychiatrist within fourteen (14) days of the complete battery of test results becoming available. If, in the psychiatrist’s clinical judgment, the test results are
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 12 of 21
clinically significant and may indicate a different assessment than the initial psychiatric evaluation, the psychiatrist shall re-evaluate the inmate within fourteen (14) days of reviewing the tests.
If the inmate has been transferred to another facility the need for a reevaluation by the receiving facility psychiatrist, psychologist or collaborating CRNP will document on the ADOC Intra-system Inmate Healthcare Communication Form. The receiving facility healthcare staff shall review, sign and schedule the required follow-up.
IV. Assignment of a Mental Health Code At intake, all inmates entering the system will be assigned a mental health code, as outlined in ADOC AR 613, by a psychologist, psychiatrist or CRNP in collaboration with a psychiatrist. Mental Health Coding is captured in the OHS Healthcare module and documented in the inmate Healthcare record.
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 13 of 21
Mental health professionals are responsible for providing pertinent mental health status information to the ADOC Classification Supervisor. ADOC Classification personnel consider and utilize the inmate’s mental health code in the institutional assignment of the inmate. The mental health coding process is a HIPAA compliant process.
V. Miscellaneous Provisions Each of the steps listed above must be conducted in a location and manner that provides for confidentiality. Nothing in this agreement supersedes or eliminates any mental health testing requirements of the ADA Consent Decree to include administration of appropriate tests for Intellectual Deficits or Learning Disabilities.
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 14 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 15 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 16 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 17 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 18 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 19 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 20 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1794-1 Filed 04/25/18 Page 21 of 21

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815 Filed 05/03/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON SEGREGATION REMEDY (PRE-PLACEMENT, MENTAL-HEALTH ROUNDS, PERIODIC EVALUATIONS)

On April 26, 2018, the parties submitted a second

set of stipulations to the court regarding segregation

remedy, specifically as to the issues of pre-placement

assessments, mental-health rounds, and periodic

assessments. In open court on April 27, 2018, they

agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an

enforceable order and further agreed to some

clarifications of the stipulations. In addition, the

parties subsequently submitted a revised mental-health

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815 Filed 05/03/18 Page 2 of 2
assessment form (doc. no. 1810-1), and the defendants submitted a clarification on the monitoring and accountability process when clinicians indicate that segregation placement is contraindicated (doc. no. 1811). Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows:
(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1798), as clarified in open court on April 27, 2018, as modified in subsequent submissions (doc. nos. 1810 & 1811), and as attached to this order, are approved.
(2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 27, 2018, and as modified in subsequent submissions (doc. nos. 1810 & 1811).
DONE, this the 3rd day of May, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815-1 Filed 05/03/18 Page 1 of 9

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT

ATTACHMENT

The parties agree that the below stipulations resolve all of the issues related to the screening of inmates at the time of placement in restrictive housing, mental health rounds in restrictive housing and periodic mental health assessments in restrictive housing. In the event that the Court accepts these stipulations, the Alabama Department of Corrections will implement the terms of this stipulation no later than 60 days from the date of the Court’s entry of an order reflecting these terms.
I. Restrictive Housing Pre-Placement Screening:
a. Prior to placement in restrictive rousing, each person shall be screened by an RN or LPN who has been trained in the screening process and is supervised by an RN.
b. The screening shall include an assessment of:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815-1 Filed 05/03/18 Page 2 of 9
1. whether the inmate has been flagged as seriously mentally ill
2. whether the inmate is at imminent risk of suicide or serious self-harm
3. whether the inmate exhibits debilitating symptoms of a serious mental illness; and
4. whether the inmate requires emergency medical care
c. The results of the screening shall be used to determine:
1. Whether the inmate can be placed into restrictive housing or must be diverted to another location, such as placement on crisis status and placement in an infirmary or other diversionary placement
2. Whether the inmate requires a medical and/or mental health referral
d. The screener shall use and document the assessment on the form that is submitted as Exhibit A, Segregation Admission Screening form. The Form may be altered in format, but not in substance without agreement of the parties.
II. Mental Health Rounds:
a. Mental health rounds in restrictive housing are conducted in each restrictive housing unit at least weekly and occur between the hours of 8:00 AM and 4:00 PM.
b. Mental health rounds are conducted by a QMHP. A QMHP is defined as, a licensed MHP, a licensed psychological associate, a psychologist, a mental health CRNP or a psychiatrist.
c. Mental Health Rounds include:
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815-1 Filed 05/03/18 Page 3 of 9
1. A review of duty post logs and segregation unit record sheets for information about inmates’ participation in recreation, showers, meal consumption and sleep patterns;
2. Discussion with the post officer(s) as to whether they have noticed any behavior changes of any inmate;
3. Walking through the restrictive housing unit, stopping at every cell and making visual contact with the inmate(s) inside the cell;
4. Verbal communication with the inmate including a brief inquiry into how the inmate is doing, whether he/she needs to talk to mental health privately or has any other mental health need; and
5. Briefly viewing the condition of the inmate’s hygiene, behavior, affect, physical condition and the condition of the cell (neat and orderly, trash, food, bodily fluids, smoke, etc.).
d. Documentation of Mental Health rounds include:
1. Notation of QMHP date and time of entry and exit from the restrictive housing unit in the CO duty post log; and
2. A brief notation about each inmate in restrictive housing on the mental health rounds form and if there has been any significant change in the inmate’s condition or additional mental health follow-up is indicated, a brief progress note will also be entered in the specific inmate’s medical record.
e. The mental health rounds forms shall be chronologically filed and maintained by the mental health manager.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815-1 Filed 05/03/18 Page 4 of 9
f. The QMHP shall use the Mental Health Rounds Form submitted as Exhibit B. The Form may not be materially altered without agreement of the parties.
III. Periodic Mental Health Assessments
a. Within 7 days of placement in restrictive housing, each person will be assessed by a QMHP.
b. The assessment shall include a review of the person’s past response to having been in restrictive housing and inquiry into:
1. whether the offender has a present suicide ideation;
2. whether the offender has a history of suicidal behavior;
3. whether the offender is presently prescribed psychotropic medication;
4. whether the offender has a current mental health complaint;
5. whether the offender is being treated for mental health problems;
6. whether the offender has a history of inpatient and outpatient psychiatric treatment; and
7. whether the offender has a history of treatment for substance abuse.
Mental status examination including:
1. general appearance and behavior;
2. evidence of abuse and/or trauma; and
3. current symptoms of psychosis, depression, anxiety, and/or aggression
Disposition of offender:
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815-1 Filed 05/03/18 Page 5 of 9
1. no mental health referral;
2. referral to mental health care service; or
3. referral to appropriate mental health care service for emergency treatment
c. If assignment to restrictive housing continues beyond 30 days, a behavioral health assessment by QMHP is completed at least every 30 days for offenders with a diagnosed behavioral health disorder and more frequently if clinically indicated.
d. For offenders without a behavioral health disorder, an assessment by QMHP is completed every 90 days and more frequently if clinically indicated.
e. The 7-day and subsequent periodic assessments are conducted out-of-cell, in a space offering sound confidentiality.
f. Offenders confined in restrictive housing continue to minimally receive the same treatment interventions they received prior to placement in restrictive housing and more frequent or intensive interventions if clinically indicated.
g. Mental health staff have the authority to have an inmate removed from restrictive housing if it is determined that continued placement in restrictive housing is contraindicated as evidenced by changes in the inmate’s mental state and functioning. In these instances, the inmate must be removed from restrictive housing within 72-hours or sooner if the QMHP determines the need for removal is more urgent or an emergency. The inmate shall be placed into a mental health setting that is appropriate to the level of care he/she requires.
h. The QMHP shall use the Mental Health Assessment/Report Form submitted as Exhibit C. The
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1815-1 Filed 05/03/18 Page 6 of 9
Form may be altered in format, but not in substance without agreement of the parties.
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 18105-1 Filed 05/023/18 Page 17 of 39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 18105-1 Filed 05/023/18 Page 28 of 39

SEGREGATION: MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT/REPORT

Inmate Name

Number

SMI flag YES NO Date placed in seg:

□ Initial assessment □ 30-day □ 90-day
Date of Assessment

In accordance with ACA Standards: All inmates placed in segregation shall be interviewed by a QMHP to assess the offender’s basic mental health condition within 7 days of placement. The mental health assessment is completed every 30 days for inmates with a diagnosed behavioral health disorder remaining in segregation and at 90 day intervals for offenders without a behavioral health disorder who remain in segregation – unless more frequent assessments are clinically indicated. Mental health assessments are conducted out-of-cell, face-to-face and in an area that provides sound confidentiality unless the clinician determines it is unsafe to do so. The reasons the assessment is not confidential shall be clearly documented on the back of this form.
Mental health screening questions (Answer all questions)

YES NO

1

Current thoughts of suicide or plan

2

History of suicide attempts/behaviors

3

Current prescription psychotropic medication

4

History of inpatient mental health treatment (psychiatric hospitalization)

5

History of treatment in RTU

6

History of outpatient mental health treatment

7

History of substance abuse treatment

8

Current mental health complaint

If yes, describe:

Behavioral Observations (Check all that apply)

□ Aggressive □ Agitated □ Anxious □ Delusional

□ Hallucinating □ Hyperactive □ Irrational □ Labile

□ Lethargic □ Loose associations □ Manipulative □ Paranoid/suspicious

□ Passive □ Withdrawn □ Tearful

Mental Status Examination (Write in brief description in each category) Appearance:

Mood:

Affect:

Speech:

Thought form & content:

Intellectual functioning:

Orientation:

Concentration: 1

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 18105-1 Filed 05/023/18 Page 39 of 39 Memory: Other: Assessment: Disposition: □ No mental health referral (check all that apply) □ Routine mental health referral to be seen within 3 days by QMHP
□ Psychotropic medication referral □ Emergency mental health referral to be seen within the hour □ Medical referral □ Custody referral □ Administration referral for removal from segregation □ Conduct mental health assessment at higher frequency: every ____ days
Signature, printed name and discipline of person completing this assessment:
2

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821 Filed 05/07/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL-HEALTH IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION REMEDY (REFERRAL)

On April 24 and May 2, 2018, the parties submitted

stipulations regarding mental-health referrals. They

agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an

enforceable order and further agreed to some

clarifications of the stipulations during on-the-record

hearings on April 24 and May 7, 2018. Accordingly, it

is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as

follows:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821 Filed 05/07/18 Page 2 of 2
(1) The stipulations (doc. nos. 1786 and 1814), as clarified during on-the-record hearings on April 24 and May 7, 2018, and as attached to this order as Attachments A and B, are approved.
(2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions (Attachments A and B), as clarified during on-the-record hearings on April 24 and May 7, 2018.
DONE, this the 7th day of May, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-1 Filed 05/07/18 Page 1 of 7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT A

ADOC agrees to implement the matters set forth

below within ninety (90) days of the Court’s acceptance

of these Stipulations.

1. Training Pertaining to Mental Health Referrals

1.1. All persons working within any ADOC major

facility who have any direct contact with inmates

must complete the Comprehensive Mental Health

Training Curriculum. The ADOC and its mental health

vendor shall develop the Comprehensive Mental Health

Training Curriculum pertaining to suicide prevention

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-1 Filed 05/07/18 Page 2 of 7
and self-harm and the role of ADOC personnel in these areas. Such Curriculum shall be approved by Dr. Kathy Burns. 1.2. As it pertains to this Stipulation, “ADOC major facility” includes one or more of the major adult correctional facilities operated by or on behalf of ADOC (including Bibb Correctional Facility, Bullock Correctional Facility, Donaldson Correctional Facility, Easterling Correctional Facility, Elmore Correctional Facility, Fountain Correctional Facility, Hamilton Aged and Infirmed Center, Holman Correctional Facility, Kilby Correctional Facility, Limestone Correctional Facility, St. Clair Correctional Facility, Staton Correctional Facility, Tutwiler Prison for Women, and Ventress Correctional Facility), but excludes any community-based facilities and community work centers. The Comprehensive Mental Health Training Curriculum shall include the following critical areas pertinent to the referrals for mental health evaluations or services:
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-1 Filed 05/07/18 Page 3 of 7

1.2.1. The early warning signs or symptoms of

mental illness;

1.2.2. The availability of mental health services

within the ADOC;

1.2.3. The nature and extent of mental health

services available within the ADOC; and

1.2.4. The process for referring inmates for

mental health evaluations.

1.3.

The Comprehensive Mental Health Training

Curriculum shall be submitted to Dr. Kathy Burns for

approval no later than November 1, 2018. Dr. Burns

shall provide any input or revisions no later than

December 1, 2018. If the ADOC accepts all of Dr.

Burns’ proposed edits or revisions to the

Comprehensive Mental Health Training Curriculum, then

ADOC shall implement the training no later than

February 1, 2019. Any dispute over revisions to the

proposed Comprehensive Mental Health Training

Curriculum by Dr. Kathy Burns shall be submitted to

mediation before Judge John Ott for resolution.

3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-1 Filed 05/07/18 Page 4 of 7
2.1. Emergent referrals - required in the event that the designated triage nurse conducting the triage of the referral believes there is an imminent risk of injury to the inmate or others or that the need for mental health services is otherwise emergent. 2.1.1. Such referrals shall result in a clinical assessment and/or intervention by an MHP, psychologist, mental health CRNP or psychiatrist as soon as possible but no more than 3 hours of receipt of the referral; and 2.1.2. Custody or mental health staff must maintain constant, line of sight, observation of any inmate after receipt of any referral until assessed by an MHP, psychologist, mental health CRNP or psychiatrist.
2.2. Urgent referrals - required in the event that the triage nurse conducting the triage of the referral believes the mental health services should be
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-1 Filed 05/07/18 Page 5 of 7

provided in the near future, but not immediately.

Such referrals shall result in a clinical assessment

and/or intervention by an MHP, psychologist, mental

health CRNP or psychiatrist within 24 hours of

referral.

2.3. Routine referrals – required in the event that

the triage nurse conducting the triage of the

referral believes that the inmate requires assessment

on a routine basis. Such referrals shall result in a

clinical assessment and/or intervention by an MHP,

psychologist, mental health CRNP or psychiatrist

within 14 calendar days of referral.

3. Referral Logs:

3.1. The mental health staff within each major ADOC

facility shall maintain a “Mental Health Referral

Log.”

3.2.

Each referral made to mental health staff shall

be logged immediately after receipt of the referral

and updated as necessary after triage. The Site

Administrator or that person’s designee shall be

5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-1 Filed 05/07/18 Page 6 of 7
responsible for logging of the information into the “Mental Health Referral Log”. 3.3. The information set forth in the “Mental Health Referral Log” shall include the following:
3.3.1. Name of the inmate referred; 3.3.2. The date and time when the staff member
became aware of the need for a referral; 3.3.3. Date, manner, and time the referral was
made by correctional, medical, mental health or other prison staff; 3.3.4. Identification of the referral source; 3.3.5. Identification of the designated triage nurse who triaged the referral; 3.3.6. Date and time of triage; 3.3.7. Designation of referral by the triaging nurse (i.e. emergent, urgent or routine); 3.3.8. Identification of staff to whom referral was assigned; 3.3.9. Date and time of the initial clinical contact after the referral;
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-1 Filed 05/07/18 Page 7 of 7

3.3.10. Disposition of referral; and

3.3.11. Facility name.

4. Other Related Stipulations:

4.1.

The process and procedures set forth in this

Stipulation shall not be utilized as an alternative

to the sick call process or the process for

requesting mental health services.

4.2.

Until further Orders of the Court, or a

subsequent agreement between the parties pertaining

to suicide prevention, the referral and procedures of

the Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention

Measures shall apply to suicidal inmates and/or

inmates engaging in self-harm.

7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-2 Filed 05/07/18 Page 1 of 7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT B

Additional Stipulations Regarding Mental Health Referrals

ADOC agrees to implement the matters set forth

below within ninety (90) days of the entry of an Order

by the Court adopting and/or accepting these

Stipulations.

1. Sources of Mental Health Referrals.

1.1. Any individual working within ADOC may refer any

inmate within a major facility for assessment by

mental health personnel.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-2 Filed 05/07/18 Page 2 of 7
1.2. Self-Referral by Inmates: Inmates may express concerns regarding their mental health condition or may request mental health services, verbally to a correctional officer or mental health staff, or in writing by completing a sick call request slip.
1.3. Referral by Non-Mental Health Staff: When an inmate informs non-mental health staff (including correctional staff) of the need for mental health care, or non-mental health staff (including correctional staff) recognize the need for mental health assessment or intervention, such non-mental health staff must refer an inmate for assessment or intervention by the mental health staff.
2. Mental Health Referral Form and Triaging of Mental Health Referrals.
2.1. Each Major Facility shall designate one (1) nurse to serve as the triage nurse on each shift. Additionally, each residential treatment unit within the ADOC major facilities may designate an additional triage nurse for purposes of triaging mental health
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-2 Filed 05/07/18 Page 3 of 7
referrals of inmates within the residential treatment unit. The designated triage nurse shall be at least a Registered Nurse with mental health training, including a general knowledge of mental health issues and psychiatric medications. 2.2. An emergent or urgent mental health referral must be communicated verbally, in person or by telephone, to the mental health staff as soon as possible, but in no case longer than one (1) hour. 2.3. All referrals shall be recorded on MH-XXX (ADOC Mental Health Referral Form) and submitted to mental health within two (2) hours of the need for a mental health referral becoming apparent to the referring individual.
2.3.1. Blank MH-XXX forms shall be available in the health care unit, mental health care unit, and in designated shift offices in each ADOC major facility. Completed forms shall be placed in a designated location in
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-2 Filed 05/07/18 Page 4 of 7
the mental health area in each ADOC major facility. 2.3.2. The designated triage nurse shall routinely and regularly monitor the designated area for completed forms upon every return from leaving the office unattended. The box shall be checked a minimum of every hour and at the end of each triage nurse’s shift. 2.3.3. MH-XXX shall include the following information: 2.3.3.1. The inmate’s name; 2.3.3.2. The inmate’s housing assignment, if
known; 2.3.3.3. The name and job title of the
referring individual; 2.3.3.4. The date and time when the need for a
mental health referral became apparent to the referring individual;
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-2 Filed 05/07/18 Page 5 of 7
2.3.3.5. If a written referral, the date and time the MH-XXX was completed;
2.3.3.6. Identification of the triage nurse; 2.3.3.7. The date and time the triage was
conducted by the triage nurse; and 2.3.3.8. The triaging nurse’s determination as
to whether the referral is emergent, urgent, or routine, as defined in Section 2 of the Stipulation Regarding Mental Health Referral Process (Doc. 1786). 2.4. The designated triage nurse shall review each referral within one (1) hour of the date and time when the triage nurse first received the referral, whether it be written or verbal. 2.4.1. The triage nurse shall determine whether the referral is emergent, urgent, or routine, as defined in these Stipulations. 2.4.2. Routine referrals shall be communicated to the mental health staff on the next
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-2 Filed 05/07/18 Page 6 of 7
business day by leaving MH-XXX in a designated location. 2.4.3. If the triage nurse determines that the referral is emergent or urgent, the triage nurse shall initiate contact with the oncall MHP or psychologist within one (1) hour of receipt of the referral. The oncall MHP or psychologist shall determine whether further referral to the psychiatrist is warranted or whether a change in the status of the referral is warranted. 2.5. Any change to the status of the referral as emergent, urgent, or routine shall be noted on the Mental Health Referral Log, Section 3 of the Stipulation Regarding Mental Health Referral Process (Doc. 1786). 2.6. All non-mental health staff, including security staff, with routine interaction with inmates shall complete the Comprehensive Mental Health Training
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1821-2 Filed 05/07/18 Page 7 of 7
Curriculum, as required within Section 1 of the Stipulation Regarding Mental Health Referral Process (Doc. 1786), within thirty (30) days of assignment to a major facility. Until the earlier of May 1, 2019, or forty-five (45) days after implementation of the Comprehensive Mental Health Training Curriculum has begun, all referrals by non-mental health staff shall be oral. The training shall provide specific instruction on how to properly characterize what is an emergent, urgent, or routine referral.
7

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861 Filed 06/04/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON SEGREGATION REMEDY (STOPGAP MEASURES FOR REMOVING INMATES WITH SERIOUS
MENTAL ILLNESS FROM SEGREGATION)

On May 30 2018, the parties submitted a stipulation

to the court regarding segregation remedy, specifically

as to the issue of removing inmates with serious mental

illness from segregation. During an on-the-record

conference on June 1, 2018, they agreed that the

stipulation should be reduced to an enforceable order,

and that the stipulation represents a “stopgap” or

“interim” measure, such that the issue of a systemic,

long-term remedy is still before the court for

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861 Filed 06/04/18 Page 2 of 2
resolution as part of the segregation remedy. The parties also agreed to other clarifications of the stipulation. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows:
(1) The stipulation (doc. no. 1855), as clarified during an on-the-record conference on June 1, 2018, and as attached to this order, is approved.
(2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified during an on-the-record conference on June 1, 2018.
DONE, this the 4th day of June, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 1 of 8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT

ATTACHMENT

Defendants JEFFERSON DUNN (“Commissioner Dunn”) and

RUTH NAGLICH (“Naglich” and, collectively with

Commissioner Dunn, “the State”) hereby agree to the

following steps for the near-term removal of inmates

with serious mental illness from restrictive housing,

consistent with the priority list attached as Exhibit A

(the “List”) (filed under seal), and avoiding the

placement of inmates with a serious mental illness

(“SMI”) in restrictive housing in the future.

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 2 of 8
I. Movement of Prisoners The Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) has moved, and will continue to move, inmates on the List from restrictive housing to alternative housing placements. For example, ADOC can confirm the movement of C.G. and L.H. from restrictive housing at the Tutwiler Prison for Women, and of D.G. from restrictive housing at the Kilby Correctional Facility. All inmates on the List will be moved out of restrictive housing based on their priority as stated on the List no later than July 9, 2018. The highest priority designation is A; the lowest is C. Starting on May 24, 2018, ADOC will move inmates on the List to general population, the Structured Living Unit (“SLU”) at Donaldson Correctional Facility as beds become available—including filling any existing capacity in the SLU, or Residential Treatment Units or Stabilization Units, if clinically appropriate. ADOC will move up to five (5) inmates per day, three (3) days per week.
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 3 of 8
ADOC will evaluate whether inmates on the List in
preventative status may be placed in general population
in another ADOC facility. Any movement of inmates in
preventative status to another ADOC facility shall
proceed independently of the expansion of the number of
SLU beds discussed below.
To expand the capacity of SLU housing, starting on
May 24, 2018, ADOC will convert Donaldson’s V Block to
a SLU. ADOC selected Donaldson’s V Block because of
its proximity to the existing SLU in Donaldson’s W
Block. For ADOC to bring Donaldson’s V Block online as
a SLU, ADOC must complete a number of tasks, including:
• ADOC must relocate 93 general population inmates from Donaldson’s Y Block1 to other Donaldson housing units and other ADOC facilities.
• Next, ADOC must clean, repair,2 and paint Donaldson’s Y Block, which will take approximately four (4) days.
1. Donaldson’s Y Block is currently a general population housing unit, but it will become a behavior modification housing unit.
2. In terms of repairs, ADOC anticipates that some sinks, toilets, and lighting may need to be placed back in working condition.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 4 of 8
• ADOC must transition the behavior modification inmates from Donaldson’s X Block3 to Donaldson’s Y Block.
• When Donaldson’s X Block is vacated, then ADOC must clean, repair, and paint it, which will take approximately four (4) days.
• ADOC must relocate 27 inmates from Donaldson’s V Block4 into Donaldson’s X Block.
• Then, ADOC must clean, repair, and paint Donaldson’s V Block, which will take approximately four (4) days.
• ADOC can then begin using Donaldson’s V Block as a SLU.
Once Donaldson’s V Block is available for use as an
SLU, ADOC will start moving the inmates from the list
into Donaldson and complete the process by July 9,
2018. ADOC anticipates that it will have Donaldson’s V
Block converted to a SLU by mid-June 2018.
On Monday of every week, starting on June 4, 2018
and continuing until all persons on the List have been
removed from restrictive housing, ADOC will provide to
Plaintiffs a report of all inmates on the List who have
been removed from restrictive housing, the date they
3. Donaldson’s X Block is currently a behavior modification housing unit, but it will become an open Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”).
4. Donaldson’s V Block is currently an open RTU, but it will become a SLU.
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 5 of 8
were removed from restrictive housing, and the location where they are housed. For inmates on the List who are in preventative status who have not been moved, ADOC shall provide a short summary of the reasons they have not been moved and any progress toward moving them.
II. Ongoing Monitoring ADOC will continue to monitor the mental status of inmates in restrictive housing consistent with ADOC Administrative Regulation 624. ADOC will continue to evaluate and assess inmates in restrictive housing consistent with ADOC Administrative Regulation 625. Based on the monitoring, evaluation, and assessment of inmates in restrictive housing, ADOC will remove any inmate from restrictive housing when the mental health staff determine that continued placement in restrictive housing is contraindicated, as evidenced by changes in the inmate’s mental state and functioning.
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 6 of 8
III. Efforts to Minimize Near-term Placement of Inmates with SMI in Restrictive Housing
Between the date of this stipulation and the time when the stipulations concerning mental health coding, SMI designation and flag, pre-placement assessments, mental health rounds, and periodic assessments are implemented, ADOC will take steps to identify and expedite the transfer of inmates with a SMI out of restrictive housing, absent exceptional circumstances. (Doc. Nos. 1792-1, 1815-1). ADOC will send the Site Manager for Wexford Health Sources, Inc. a weekly list identifying inmates on the mental health caseload at that Site Manager’s facility who are in restrictive housing and the length of their stay in restrictive housing. When mental health personnel perform mental health rounds or conduct a counseling session, they will evaluate the diagnosis and SMI designation for that inmate. If the mental health provider makes or confirms a diagnosis and designates the inmate as possessing a SMI, or otherwise determines that the
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 7 of 8
inmate is decompensating in restrictive housing, then
the mental health provider will notify the Warden. The
Warden will be responsible for making arrangements to
transfer inmates out of restrictive housing.
ADOC will continue to implement the stipulations
concerning mental health coding, SMI designation and
flag, pre-placement assessments, mental health rounds,
and periodic assessments within the mutually agreed
timeframes. (Doc. Nos. 1792-1, 1815-1). For example,
consistent with the parties’ stipulations:
• By July 1, 2018, ADOC will begin assessing all incoming inmates to determine whether they should be designated as experiencing a SMI and assign the SMI designation as part of the intake process (Doc. No. 1792-1 at 2);
• By September 30, 2018, ADOC will access all inmates on the mental health caseload and, to the extent clinically indicated, assign the SMI designation (id.);
• Beginning July 1, 2018, all inmates on the mental health caseload will undergo an evaluation for a SMI designation during his or her next scheduled treatment team meeting (id. at 3);
• Any inmate assigned to restrictive housing who has not been evaluated for a SMI designation will be screened prior to placement in restrictive housing consistent with the agreedupon screening tool (id.; Doc. No. 1815-1 at 12); and 7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1861-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 8 of 8
• Mental health staff will perform mental health rounds and assessments, removing inmates from restrictive housing if they determine that continued placement in restrictive housing is contraindicated, as evidenced by changes in the inmate’s mental state and functioning (id. at 2-5).
8

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865 Filed 06/04/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL-HEALTH INDIVIDUALIZED TREATMENT PLANNING REMEDY

On May 30, 2018, the parties submitted stipulations

regarding individualized treatment planning. They

agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an

enforceable order and further agreed to some

clarifications of the stipulations during an

on-the-record hearing on June 1, 2018. Accordingly, it

is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as

follows:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865 Filed 06/04/18 Page 2 of 2
(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1853), as clarified during an on-the-record hearing on June 1, 2018, and as attached to this order, are approved.
(2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions as clarified during on-the-record hearing on June 1, 2018.
DONE, this the 4th day of June, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 1 of 29

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT

ADOC agrees to implement the matters set forth

below within one-hundred eighty (180) days of the

Court’s acceptance of and entry of an Order regarding

these Stipulations.

1. Treatment Teams

1.1 Each inmate-patient on the mental health caseload

shall have a designated treatment team.

1.2 Treatment teams shall meet at regular intervals as

mandated by the inmate-patient’s assigned mental

health code and appropriate level of psychotherapy

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 2 of 29

in order to formulate/revise the inmate-patient’s

treatment plan, review progress notes, discuss the

condition of the inmate-patient, and address the

inmate-patient’s progress.

1.3 Members of a treatment team

1.3.1 Treatment teams shall include at least the

following individuals:

1.3.1.1 A Psychiatrist or CRNP (if the

inmate-patient is on mental health

medications);

1.3.1.2 The inmate-patient’s assigned

psychologist or MHP; and

1.3.1.3 The

inmate-patient,

unless

contraindicated (see 1.4.3).

1.3.1.4 A member of the medical staff

when the mental health provider

determines that the presence of a

primary medical provider is

necessary in order to address the

impact of a medical condition on

2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 3 of 29

1.3.2

the inmate-patient’s treatment

plan.

For inmate-patients in a Residential

Treatment Units (RTU), Restrictive Housing

Unit (RHU), Structured Living Unit (SLU),

or Intensive Stabilization Unit (SU), the

treatment team shall also include the

following individuals, if such a class of

individuals is regularly assigned to that

unit:

1.3.2.1 A mental health nurse;

1.3.2.2 An activity technician for the

inmate-patient’s assigned mental

health unit; and

1.3.2.3 A member of the correctional staff

regularly assigned to the inmate-

patient’s housing unit.

1.3.2.4 The senior clinician who is a part

of the team (psychiatrist, CRNP,

or

psychologist)

may

add

3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 4 of 29
additional members to the team if clinically indicated. 1.3.3 For inmate-patients in the SU or RTU Level 1, the Treatment Team shall include a psychiatrist. 1.3.4 Each treatment team shall be organized and chaired by the inmate-patient’s assigned MHP. 1.3.5 Additional members may be added to the treatment team as the chair determines it is clinically appropriate. 1.4 Treatment team meetings 1.4.1 Treatment team meetings shall include a review of progress notes, participation in out-of-cell or out-of-housing unit activity including group therapy and activity groups, medication compliance, crisis placements, disciplinary actions, recent traumatic events, and other information as appropriate.
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 5 of 29

1.4.2

Treatment team meetings shall occur on the following timeframes, unless otherwise indicated due to clinical necessity or a change in circumstances described in Section 2: 1.4.2.1 Treatment team meetings for
inmate-patients on the outpatient caseload occur at intervals not to exceed nine (9) months. 1.4.2.2 SLU treatment team meetings shall occur at intervals not to exceed ninety (90) days. 1.4.2.3 For inmate-patients on the RTU Level 1, treatment team meetings shall occur at intervals not to exceed twenty-one (21) days. 1.4.2.4 For inmate-patients on the RTU Level 2, treatment team meetings shall occur at intervals not to exceed forty-five (45) days.

5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 6 of 29
1.4.2.5 For inmate-patients on the RTU Level 3, treatment team meetings shall occur at intervals not to exceed sixty (60) days.
1.4.2.6 SU treatment team meetings shall occur at intervals not to exceed three (3) days.
1.4.2.7 Acute suicide watch, non-acute suicide watch, mental health observation, or any other kind of crisis placement treatment team meetings shall occur at intervals not to exceed three (3) days.
1.4.2.8 Commencing on December 1, 2019, the timeframes in this Section 1.4.2 shall be modified as follows:
1.4.2.8.1 The timeframe in 1.4.2.1 shall be six (6) months.
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 7 of 29

1.4.3

1.4.2.8.2 The timeframe in 1.4.2.3

shall be seven (7) days.

1.4.2.8.3 The timeframe in 1.4.2.4

shall be fourteen (14) days.

1.4.2.8.4 The timeframe in 1.4.2.5

shall be thirty (30 ) days.

Inmate-patient presence

1.4.3.1 Each inmate-patient shall be

allowed to attend and be allowed

to participate in the treatment

team meetings unless:

1.4.3.1.1 The inmate-patient poses an

unreasonable risk to mental

health or correctional staff;

or

1.4.3.1.2 If information is to be

discussed about the inmate-

patient

would

be

psychologically detrimental

for the inmate-patient, then

7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 8 of 29

this information may be

discussed

without

the

presence of the inmate-

patient, either at the

beginning or the end of the

treatment team meeting.

1.4.3.2 In the event that the inmate-

patient’s presence is not allowed,

the reason shall be documented in

the inmate-patient’s mental health

records, and the portion of the

meeting from which the inmate-

patient was excluded shall be

identified.

1.4.3.3 Inmate-patients shall not be

disciplined for failure or refusal

to attend treatment team meetings.

Inmate-patients

shall

be

encouraged, but not forced, to

attend treatment team meetings.

8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 9 of 29

1.4.4

Additional treatment team member presence 1.4.4.1 Whenever possible, all members of
the treatment team shall attend each team meeting. 1.4.4.2 In the event that the clinician, the inmate-patient’s MHP, or the inmate-patient is unable to attend a treatment team meeting, the meeting shall be postponed and rescheduled for the next business day in which the clinician, the inmate-patient’s MHP, and the inmate-patient are available. If someone other than the clinician, the inmate-patient’s MHP, or the inmate-patient is unable to attend, the meeting shall occur. Any member of the team who did not attend the meeting shall review the notes of the meeting the

9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 10 of 29

1.4.5

lesser of twenty-one (21) days, or at least one day before the next regularly scheduled treatment team meeting, whichever is sooner, and add any additional modifications to the plan as clinically appropriate. Records of each treatment team meeting shall be kept in the respective inmatepatient’s mental health record and shall consist of the following: 1.4.5.1 The date of the treatment team meeting; 1.4.5.2 The attendees of the treatment team meeting; 1.4.5.3 Notes about each treatment team meeting; and 1.4.5.4 Any changes to the inmatepatient’s treatment plan as a

10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 11 of 29
result of the treatment team meeting.
2. Individualized Plans 2.1 Each inmate on the mental health caseload shall
have a treatment plan created within the appropriate timeframe following his or her addition to the caseload. This treatment plan shall be amended and updated as necessary until the inmatepatient is either removed from the mental health caseload or leaves ADOC custody. 2.2 Initial treatment plans shall be created within the following timelines following inmate-patient’s placement on the mental health caseload, unless otherwise indicated due to a clinical necessity: 2.2.1 Outpatient treatment plans shall be
finalized within fourteen (14) days of placement on the mental health caseload.
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 12 of 29
2.2.2 Treatment plans shall be finalized within three (3) working days of an inmatepatient’s placement in an SLU.
2.2.3 Treatment plans shall be finalized within three (3) working days of an inmatepatient’s placement in an RTU, regardless of the level of placement.
2.2.4 Treatment plans shall be finalized within two (2) working days of an inmatepatient’s placement in an SU.
2.2.5 Treatment plans for inmate-patients placed on acute suicide watch, non-acute suicide watch, mental health observation, or any other kind of crisis placement shall be finalized within one (1) working day of placement in a crisis or mental health observation cell.
2.3 Each treatment plan shall be individualized to each inmate-patient. Treatment plans shall reflect changes in goals, plans to achieve goals, changes
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 13 of 29
in mental health status/symptoms, and amended timeframes to reach goals. For any unmet goal, the treatment plan will identify the unmet goal and any adjustment or plan to assist the inmate-patient in reaching the unmet goal. 2.4 Treatment plans shall include the following information: 2.4.1 The inmate-patient’s age, mental health
code, current Earliest Possible Release Date or Minimum Eligibility Parole Date, current housing assignment type and custody level; 2.4.2 All diagnoses from the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, identified problems, and treatment goals in objective, measurable terms; 2.4.3 Treatment services and other institutional services designed to impact the identified problems and achieve individual treatment
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 14 of 29
objectives on both a long-term and shortterm basis, as appropriate, and who is responsible for providing the service; 2.4.4 Specific structured activities and unstructured activities for the minimum number of hours provided for each treatment level, unless otherwise clinically indicated, and who is responsible for providing the service; 2.4.5 An identification of unmet treatment goals and an explanation why those treatment goals were not met; 2.4.6 Frequency and duration of services to be provided; and 2.4.7 Aftercare and clinical pre-release plans, including identification of the staff member responsible for creation of those plans. 2.5 Treatment plan amendments as a result of housing placement changes
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 15 of 29

2.5.1 2.5.2

Treatment teams shall meet to review and update treatment plans promptly following major events during the inmate-patient’s incarceration, including, but not limited to, the following situations: 2.5.1.1 Movement in and out of an SU; 2.5.1.2 Movement in and out of an RTU; 2.5.1.3 Movement within levels of an RTU; 2.5.1.4 Movement in and out of an SLU; 2.5.1.5 Movement to and from a Restrictive
Housing Unit; 2.5.1.6 Movement to and form a crisis
cell; 2.5.1.7 Placement on or removal from
mental health observation; or 2.5.1.8 Return from hospitalization for a
mental health need. Timeframes for amending treatment plans 2.5.2.1 All movements in and out of an SU
shall be reflected in an amended

15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 16 of 29

2.5.3

treatment plan within two (2) working days; 2.5.2.2 All movements in and out of an RTU shall be reflected in an amended treatment plan within three (3) working days; 2.5.2.3 All movements in and out of an SLU shall be reflected in an amended treatment plan within three (3) working days; and 2.5.2.4 All movements in and out of acute suicide watch, non-acute suicide watch, mental health observation, any other crisis cell placement, or return from mental health hospitalization shall be reflected in an amended treatment plan within two (2) working days. Amendments after placement or release from these housing units shall focus on

16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 17 of 29
continuing treatment, responding to the effects of the housing changes, and assisting in the inmate-patient’s immediate needs, and planning for reintegration into lower level treatment if clinically appropriate. 2.5.4 Section 2.2 as it relates to acute and non-acute suicide watch, mental health observation, or any other crisis placement does not supersede the current Interim Suicide Prevention agreement approved by the Court and is not intended to foreclose any remedy the parties may agree to, or the Court may Order during the Suicide Prevention Remedial Trial. 2.6 Treatment plans shall be reviewed and amended, if necessary, contemporaneously with a change in the inmate-patient’s mental health code. 2.7 Treatment plans shall be amended contemporaneously with the treatment team’s decision to pursue
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 18 of 29
involuntary medication, need for emergency administration of psychotropic medications, or decision to discontinue all mental health medication. Treatment plans need not be amended in the event that the dosage or frequency of medication is changed or when some, but not all, mental health medications are discontinued. Instead, routine changes in medication, including the change in dosage and frequency, shall be addressed at periodic treatment team meetings. 2.8 Treatment plans shall be reviewed by the inmatepatient’s MHP within ten (10) days of an inmatepatient’s release from segregation. This timeframe shall be reduced to three (3) days on December 1, 2019.
3. Inmate Transfer 3.1 In order to ensure continuity of care, the inmate-
patient's mental health code and condition shall be
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 19 of 29
considered in making determinations concerning transfer. 3.1.1 The transfer of inmate-patients in the RTU
or SU (MH Code D) will be permitted to accommodate an inmate-patient’s change in level of care occasioned by an improvement or deterioration in mental health condition. Transfers to other facilities having the same level of care as the inmate-patient’s current facility will not occur without approval of the treatment team. The treatment team shall weigh the reason for the transfer against concerns about continuity of care. 3.1.2 Decisions regarding transfer of outpatient inmate-patients (MH Code B and C) will not occur without consultation with the treatment team. The treatment team shall weigh the reason for the transfer against concerns about continuity of care.
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 20 of 29
3.1.3 Inmate-patients with an SMI flag may only be transferred upon approval of the inmate-patient’s treatment team.
3.2 In the event of a transfer of an inmate-patient on the mental health caseload, there must be a transfer note written by the inmate-patient’s MHP at the transferring facility to the inmatepatient’s new MHP at the receiving facility. 3.2.1 This transfer note will include a discussion of the inmate-patient’s mental health background, current needs, and the next steps for treatment the transferring facility would have taken if not for the transfer. 3.2.2 The transfer note for inmate-patients receiving outpatient care must occur within five (5) business days of the inmate-patient’s transfer. 3.2.3 The transfer note for inmate-patients in mental health housing units must be sent
20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 21 of 29

to the receiving facility prior to the

inmate-patient’s transfer.

3.2.3.1 This transfer note requirement

does not apply to inmate-patients

being moved within the same ADOC

facility or from one ADOC

facility’s holding cell to another

ADOC facility’s crisis cell under

the suicide prevention interim

agreement or any superseding

stipulation or remedial order

regarding suicide prevention.

3.2.3.2 The transfer note shall be on Form

XXX. The purposes of Form XXX is

to eliminate, as much as possible,

disruption in the inmate-patients

care.

3.2.3.3 Form XXX shall include, at a

minimum,

the

following

information:

21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 22 of 29

3.2.3.3.1 Any

individualized

treatment

or

compliance

strategies that have been

successful;

3.2.3.3.2 Individualized treatment

or compliance strategies

that have been unsuccessful;

3.2.3.3.3 Clinically

relevant

information about the inmate-

patient’s background, such as

prior history of abuse,

family

history,

or

difficulties in the course of

treatment or compliance; and

3.2.3.3.4 Any other information

which may assist a new mental

health provider in gaining

insight and rapport with the

inmate-patient.

22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 23 of 29
3.3 The treatment team at the receiving facility of an inmate-patient transfer shall meet promptly following the transfer of the inmate-patient in order to review the existing treatment plan, address the impact of a facility change on the inmate-patient, and adjust structured activity goals based on available programming in the receiving facility. 3.3.1 In the event that an inmate-patient on the outpatient caseload is transferred, the inmate-patient’s new treatment team shall meet within fourteen (14) calendar days of the inmate-patient’s transfer. 3.3.2 In the event that an inmate-patient housed in an SLU, RTU, or SU is transferred to a different facility, the inmate-patient’s treatment team shall meet within three (3) working days of the inmate-patient’s transfer.
23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 24 of 29
4. Mental Health Progress Notes 4.1 Substantive nature of progress notes
4.1.1 Mental Health Progress Notes shall be made each time there is a significant clinical encounter between an inmate-patient and a member of the inmate-patient’s Treatment Team or other member of the mental health staff. For purposes of Section 4.1, a “significant clinical encounter” means any communication and interaction between an inmate-patient and any member of the mental health staff involving an exchange of information used in the treatment of the inmate-patient, excluding any casual exchanges, administrative communications, or other communications which do not relate to the inmate-patient’s mental condition or the ongoing mental health treatment.
24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 25 of 29

4.1.2 4.1.3

All Mental Health Progress Notes are to be kept in the inmate-patient’s mental health record and available to all other members of the inmate-patient’s treatment team. Notes shall be in “SOAP” (Subjective, Objective, Assessment, Plan) format, and include the following information: 4.1.3.1 Name and position of the
individual making the note; 4.1.3.2 Date, start and stop time of the
interaction with the inmatepatient; 4.1.3.3 Nature of the interaction; 4.1.3.4 Reason for the interaction; 4.1.3.5 Notes about the interaction; 4.1.3.6 A summary of any conclusions drawn or actions or recommendations taken as a result of the interaction; and

25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 26 of 29
4.1.3.7 Any changes in mental health medication, including dosage, frequency, and prescription.
4.1.4 The person making the note shall print and sign their name on the note.
4.1.5 The note shall be sufficiently detailed so that a treating mental health provider would be able to continue treatment using the information provided in the note.
4.1.6 If the encounter is at cell-front, the progress note shall so indicate.
4.2 Correlation of mental health progress notes with treatment plans 4.2.1 Progress notes shall address one or more problems identified in the inmatepatient’s treatment plan, how the encounter addressed the particular problem(s), and the progress in resolving the problem(s).
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 27 of 29

4.2.2 4.2.3

All progress notes made after the most recent treatment plan or amendment shall be considered when the treatment plan is reviewed at the next treatment team meeting, or other appropriate review as discussed in Section 2 above. All progress notes of treatment sessions or other clinical counseling encounters shall include the start and end time of each session. Start and stop times are not required when the contact is primarily concerning medication management with a provider.

5. Staff Turnover

5.1. The following provisions shall apply in the event

that a member of an inmate-patient’s treatment

team, other than correctional staff, ends his or

her

employment,

either

voluntarily

or

involuntarily, with the mental health provider:

27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 28 of 29
5.1.1. If the employee ending employment provides or is provided fourteen (14) days or more notice of termination, then the employee shall be required, to the extent possible, to prepare transfer notes on FORM XXX for any inmate-patients under his or her care. This applies to providers conducting group treatment sessions.
5.1.2. It shall be the responsibility of the Mental Health Manager to ensure that the requirement of Section 5.1.1 is complied with by a departing employee, including review completed Form XXXs.
5.1.3. Vacancies in treatment team members due to staff turnover, shall be filled on the earlier of: a) thirty (30) days, or b) at least 24 hours before the date and time of the next regularly scheduled treatment team meeting for that inmate-patient.
6. No Amendment to Stipulations or Remedial Orders. 28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1865-1 Filed 06/04/18 Page 29 of 29
Nothing in this Stipulation supersedes or limits the requirements of other stipulations or Remedial Orders in this matter.
29

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899 Filed 06/19/18 Page 1 of 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL-HEALTH PYSCHOTHERAPY AND CONFIDENTIALITY REMEDY

On June 8, 2018, the parties submitted stipulations

regarding psychotherapy and confidentiality. They

agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an

enforceable order and further agreed to some

clarifications of the stipulations during an

on-the-record hearing on June 13, 2018. They submitted

amended stipulations incorporating some of those

clarifications on June 14, 2018. On June 18, 2018,

during an on-the-record hearing, the parties further

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899 Filed 06/19/18 Page 2 of 3
agreed that the stipulations prohibit placement of segregation inmates in the residential treatment units--that is, the RTU, SU, and SLU units--and require that placement of any inmate in those units be based on clinical judgment. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows:
(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1893) as clarified during on-the-record hearings on June 13 and June 18, 2018, amended on June 14, 2018, and as attached to this order, are approved.
(2) Pursuant to the stipulations, and by agreement of the parties made on-the-record on June 18, 2018, segregation inmates are prohibited from being placed in the residential treatment units--that is, the RTU, SU, and SLU units--and placement of any inmate in those units must be based on clinical judgment.
(3) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899 Filed 06/19/18 Page 3 of 3
with the stipulations (doc. no. 1983) as clarified during on-the-record hearings on June 13 and June 18, 2018, amended on June 14, 2018, and as attached to this order. DONE, this the 19th day of June, 2018.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 1 of 48

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT

ADOC agrees to implement the matters set forth

below within ninety (90) days of the Court’s acceptance

of and entry of an Order regarding these Stipulations

(the “Implementation Date”).

1. General Provisions

1.1. Treatment Modalities

1.1.1. Mental health treatment services shall be

tailored to adequately meet the clinical needs

of each inmate-patient considering the

functional level, readiness for treatment,

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 2 of 48
insight into mental illness, and motivation for treatment. 1.1.2. Residential mental health units (RTUs, SUs, SLUs) shall have available at least: psychoeducational groups, individual therapy, group psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy, and activity therapy. 1.1.3. Facilities with solely outpatient mental health care shall have available, at least: psycho-educational groups, individual therapy, group psychotherapy, and pharmacotherapy. 1.1.4. Psychotherapy shall be evidence-based. 1.1.5. Group psychotherapy shall be offered on topics such as medication management, cognitive retraining, stress management, social skills, and anger management in sufficient quantity to accommodate the treatment services prescribed for the population of each facility. 1.1.6. If an intervention or program that is set forth in the treatment plan is not offered in
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 3 of 48
the facility in which the inmate-patient is housed, either the inmate-patient will be moved to allow the inmate-patient to participate in that intervention, or the intervention will be offered in the facility where the inmate-patient is housed. However, no inmate-patient in need of residential care may be moved to a facility not offering residential care. If an ADOC facility offering residential care does not have a given program or intervention, then that program or intervention shall be provided at the facility with residential care capacity. 1.1.7. The relative timing of the appointments with the psychiatric provider and the counselor shall be determined by clinical judgment based on the needs of the inmate-patient. 1.1.8. Each inmate-patient will have access to the treatment modalities prescribed by his or her treatment team.
3

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 4 of 48
1.1.9. Placement in restrictive housing shall not be a basis for denying or delaying the inmatepatient’s access to the interventions prescribed in his or her treatment plan or for deferring prescription of such interventions until after the inmate-patient is released from restrictive housing.
1.1.10. The minimum treatment requirements for care at the various levels of care are listed below. The amount of treatment required by each inmate-patient shall be determined by his or her treatment team, based on their clinical judgment.
1.2. Confidentiality 1.2.1. Individual counseling sessions, medication management encounters, and therapeutic groups shall take place out-of-cell in a setting that provides for confidentiality, unless that is not possible due to safety concerns, based upon
4

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 5 of 48

clinical determinations. If confidentiality is

not possible for an individual counseling

session, medication management encounter, or

therapeutic group, then that fact, the reason,

and the actions taken to maximize

confidentiality shall be documented in the

progress note for that individual counseling

session, medication management encounter, or

therapeutic group.

For purposes of this

Stipulation, a “medication management encounter”

means a discussion between a physician or CRNP

and an inmate-patient about medication

recommendations, informed consent, efficacy,

adherence, side effects, or other related

topics.

1.3. Documentation obligations 1.3.1. All contacts for purpose of providing mental health services shall be documented in the inmate-patient’s mental health records.
5

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 6 of 48
1.3.2. A progress note filed in the inmatepatient’s mental health record will document each significant clinical interaction. For purposes of this Stipulation, a “significant clinical interaction” means any communication and interaction between an inmate-patient and any member of the mental-health staff involving the exchange of information used in the treatment of that inmate-patient, excluding any casual exchanges, administrative communications, or other communications which do not relate to the inmate-patient’s mental-health condition or on-going mental-health treatment.
1.3.3. Progress notes shall be created for all significant clinical encounters, consistent with Section 4 of the Treatment Team and Planning Stipulations.
1.3.4. A Form XXX (similar to the Individual Group Participation Progress Note attached hereto as Exhibit A) will be prepared for each inmate-
6

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 7 of 48
patient participating in a group activity or therapy and will be maintained in each inmatepatient’s medical record. Additionally, all group activities and therapy will be recorded in a log identifying the date, start and stop time, the leader or facilitator of the activity or therapy, the participants, the nature of the activity or therapy, and whether it is counted as a structured therapeutic activity or as an unstructured activity. 1.3.5. For persons housed in cells, if any of the out-of-cell counseling, group activities, or other treatment interventions cannot safely be accommodated out-of-cell, based on a clinical determination at the time of the counseling, activity, or intervention, such determination shall be documented in the documentation of the encounter (progress note or log), including the fact that the determination was made, the basis for such determination, and the person who made
7

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 8 of 48
the determination. The psychiatric provider, counselor, or group facilitator can make this determination.
1.4. Telepsychiatry 1.4.1. A psychiatric provider treating an inmatepatient via telepsychiatry shall be provided, in advance of the telepsychiatry session, the inmate-patient’s most recent mental health treatment plan, laboratory reports (if applicable), physician orders, problem list, and mental health progress notes from the past six (6) months.
1.5. Triage of mental health sick call requests 1.5.1. Mental health staff shall triage requests for mental health services submitted through the sick call process within 2 working days of receipt of the request by any medical or mental health staff, pursuant to the provisions in the
8

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 9 of 48
Stipulation Regarding Mental Health Referral Process, Doc. 1786.
1.6. Oversight Period 1.6.1. The Parties have not agreed upon what monitoring, reporting or oversight should be required. The Parties will brief the Court separately regarding the appropriate monitoring, reporting and oversight procedures.
2. Treatment requirements: Outpatient 2.1. MH-A 2.1.1. Inmate-patients who are not on the mental health caseload shall be seen by mental health staff (either ADOC staff or vendor staff) in the event of a mental health crisis, after receipt of a mental health referral, or for follow up, as clinically indicated.
2.2. MH-B
9

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 10 of 48
2.2.1. Treatment Team 2.2.1.1. An initial treatment team meeting will occur within fourteen (14) days of an inmatepatient’s assignment of the mental health code MH-B. 2.2.1.2. After the initial treatment plan is developed, the inmate-patient’s treatment team will review the inmate-patient’s treatment plan and meet consistent with Section 1.4.2 of the Treatment Team and Planning Stipulations, and more often if clinically indicated.
2.2.2. Psychiatric Provider Appointment Intervals 2.2.2.1. If the inmate-patient is prescribed psychiatric medications, then the inmatepatient will have an opportunity to see his or her psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or CRNP) at intervals not exceeding ninety (90) days and more often if clinically indicated.
10

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 11 of 48
2.2.2.2. For inmate-patients assigned to work release, after six (6) months and two (2) appointments with the psychiatric provider during the period at work release, the treatment team may evaluate the inmatepatient and, if clinically appropriate, reduce the frequency for seeing the psychiatric provider to intervals not exceeding one hundred twenty (120) days.
2.2.3. Counselor Appointment Intervals 2.2.3.1. Each inmate-patient will have an opportunity to see his or her counselor (MHP or psychologist) at intervals not exceeding ninety (90) days and more often if clinically indicated. 2.2.3.2. For inmate-patients assigned to work release, after six (6) months and two (2) appointments with the counselor during the period at work release, the treatment team may evaluate the inmate-patient and, if
11

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 12 of 48
clinically appropriate, reduce the frequency for seeing the counselor to intervals not exceeding one hundred twenty (120) days.
2.3. MH-C 2.3.1. Treatment Team 2.3.1.1. An initial treatment team meeting will occur within fourteen (14) days of an inmatepatient’s assignment of the mental health code MH-C. 2.3.1.2. After the initial treatment plan is developed, the inmate-patient’s treatment team will review the inmate-patient’s treatment plan and meet consistent with Section 1.4.2 of the Treatment Team and Planning Stipulations, and more often if clinically indicated. 2.3.2. Psychiatric Provider Appointment Intervals 2.3.2.1. If the inmate-patient is prescribed psychiatric medications, then the inmate-
12

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 13 of 48
patient will have an opportunity to see his or her psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or CRNP) at intervals not exceeding ninety (90) days and more often if clinically indicated. 2.3.3. Counselor Appointment Intervals 2.3.3.1. Each inmate-patient will have an opportunity to see his or her counselor (MHP or psychologist) at an interval of thirty (30) to sixty (60) days and more often if clinically indicated.
3. Treatment Requirements: Structured Living Unit
3.1. A Structured Living Unit (SLU) is a diversionary outpatient unit for persons with serious mental illness or who are otherwise found to be inappropriate for a restrictive housing placement in lieu of a restrictive housing placement. Inmate-patients in need of residential-level care shall not be housed in the SLU.
13

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 14 of 48
3.2. Initial assessment 3.2.1. Within twenty-four (24) hours of an inmatepatient’s arrival in the SLU, a registered nurse (“nurse”) shall assess each inmate-patient to ensure continuity of medication and determine whether the inmate-patient has any urgent or emergent medical or mental health needs. 3.2.2. A nurse shall complete an initial nursing assessment within seventy-two (72) hours of an inmate-patient’s arrival in the SLU. 3.2.3. A psychiatrist or CRNP (in collaboration with a psychiatrist who will review the initial psychiatric assessment performed by the CRNP) shall complete the initial psychiatric assessment of inmate-patient within three (3) working days of an inmate-patient’s arrival in the SLU. 3.2.4. A counselor (a psychologist or licensed MHP) shall complete an initial assessment within
14

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 15 of 48
seventy-two (72) hours of an inmate-patient’s arrival in the SLU.
3.3. Treatment 3.3.1. Inmate-patients in the SLU shall have structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time as provided below. Any individual out-of-cell interactions with the treatment team, psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or CRNP), counselor (psychologist or licensed MHP), or group facilitator or therapeutic groups will count towards the applicable structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time. 3.3.2. Inmate-patients in the SLU shall have unstructured out-of-cell time as provided below. This out-of-cell time is in addition to the structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time. 3.3.3. The provision of unstructured out-of-cell time shall begin immediately upon arrival at the
15

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 16 of 48
SLU, without waiting for the initial treatment team meeting. 3.3.4. The implementation schedule for providing structured therapeutic and unstructured out-ofcell time shall be as follows: 3.3.4.1. No later than September 15, 2018: Two
(2) hours of structured, therapeutic out-ofcell time and four (4) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; 3.3.4.2. No later than March 15, 2019: four (4) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and six (6) hours of unstructured outof-cell time per week; 3.3.4.3. No later than September 15, 2019: Six (6) hours of structured, therapeutic out-ofcell time and eight (8) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; and 3.3.4.4. No later than March 15, 2020: Ten (10) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell
16

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 17 of 48
time and ten (10) hours of unstructured outof-cell time per week.
4. Treatment Requirements: Residential Care 4.1. Intensive Stabilization Unit 4.1.1. Initial assessments 4.1.1.1. An inmate-patient may be admitted to the SU from any ADOC facility or an inpatient hospital. 4.1.1.2. A mental health nurse shall complete the initial nursing assessment within four (4) hours of an inmate-patient’s admission to the SU. 4.1.1.3. A psychiatrist or CRNP (in collaboration with the psychiatrist who will meet with the inmate-patient, review and approve or modify the initial psychiatric assessment performed by the CRNP) shall complete the initial psychiatric assessment as follows:
17

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 18 of 48
4.1.1.3.1. If an inmate-patient’s SU admission occurs between 7 a.m. on Monday and 3 p.m. on Friday, then the psychiatric assessment will occur within twenty-four (24) hours of an inmate-patient’s admission to the SU; or
4.1.1.3.2. If an inmate-patient’s SU admission occurs after 3 p.m. on a Friday or on a weekend or holiday, then:
4.1.1.3.2.1. a psychiatrist or CRNP (in collaboration with the psychiatrist) will enter initial orders for the inmate-patient based upon a telephone consultation with a mental health nurse after the nursing assessment; and
4.1.1.3.2.2. the psychiatric assessment will occur on the next business day following the date of the inmatepatient’s SU admission.
18

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 19 of 48
4.1.1.4. A counselor (licensed MHP or psychologist) shall complete a mental health assessment within twenty-four (24) hours of an inmate-patient’s admission to the SU.
4.1.2. Treatment 4.1.2.1. An inmate-patient’s treatment team shall meet and review the treatment plan consistent with Section 1.4.2 of the Treatment Team and Planning Stipulations, and more often if clinically indicated. 4.1.2.2. Until December 1, 2019, at least two (2) times per week, the inmate-patient shall have a confidential, out-of-cell clinical encounter with the psychiatrist or CRNP. At least one (1) of these two (2) weekly encounters will be with the psychiatrist. 4.1.2.3. Starting December 1, 2019, at least three (3) times per week, the inmate-patient shall have a confidential, out-of-cell clinical encounter with the psychiatrist or
19

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 20 of 48

CRNP. At least one (1) of these three (3)

weekly encounters will be with the

psychiatrist.

4.1.2.4. The psychiatrist must be a member of the

treatment team. If the CRNP conducts 50% or

more of the encounters described in §§

4.1.2.2 and 4.1.2.3., the CRNP must also be a

member of the treatment team.

4.1.2.5. The inmate-patient shall have daily (7

days a week) interaction with a mental health

nurse.

4.1.2.6. The inmate-patient shall have daily (7

days a week) confidential, out-of-cell

counseling with the assigned psychologist or

licensed MHP.

4.1.2.7. Inmate-patients in the SU shall have

structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time as

provided

below,

unless

clinically

contraindicated. Any individual out-of-cell

interactions with the treatment team,

20

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 21 of 48
psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or CRNP), counselor (psychologist or licensed MHP), or group facilitator or therapeutic groups will count towards the applicable structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time. 4.1.2.8. Inmate-patients in the SU shall have unstructured out-of-cell time as provided below, unless clinically contraindicated. This out-of-cell time is in addition to the structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time. 4.1.2.9. The implementation schedule for providing structured therapeutic and unstructured out-of-cell time shall be as follows: 4.1.2.9.1. No later than September 15, 2018:
Two (2) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and two (2) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; 4.1.2.9.2. No later than March 15, 2019: Five (5) hours of structured, therapeutic out-
21

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 22 of 48
of-cell time and five (5) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; 4.1.2.9.3. No later than September 15, 2019: Eight (8) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and eight (8) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; and 4.1.2.9.4. No later than March 15, 2020: Ten (10) hours of structured, therapeutic outof-cell time and ten (10) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week. 4.1.3. Length of Stay 4.1.3.1. An inmate-patient’s assignment to the SU shall be clinically determined. 4.1.3.2. Until full implementation described in §4.1.2.9.4. above, on an inmate-patient’s fifteenth (15th) day in the SU, if the inmatepatient has not stabilized sufficiently to be transferred to the RTU or general population, then the treatment team shall consider
22

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 23 of 48

hospitalization

and

may

recommend

hospitalization if clinically appropriate.

Reconsideration of the appropriateness of

hospital-level care shall occur at least

every fifteen (15) days thereafter, with such

reconsideration documented in the inmate-

patient’s medical record. Starting with the

first reconsideration at thirty (30) days in

the SU, reconsideration shall be conducted in

a case conference including the treatment

team and the mental health vendor’s

psychiatric director. Such case conference

shall be repeated every fifteen (15) days

thereafter until the inmate-patient is

sufficiently stabilized to progress to RTU

Level 1 or is transferred to a higher level

of care. A copy of the documentation related

to the case conference will be transmitted to

the ADOC Director of Psychiatry for

administrative oversight purposes.

23

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 24 of 48

4.1.3.3. Upon full implementation of §4.1.2.9.4.

above, on an inmate-patient’s thirtieth (30th)

day in the SU, if the inmate-patient has not

stabilized sufficiently to be transferred to

the RTU or general population, then the

treatment team and the mental health vendor’s

psychiatric

director

shall

consider

hospitalization

and

may

recommend

hospitalization if clinically appropriate.

Reconsideration of hospital-level care shall

occur at least every fifteen (15) days

thereafter, including the participation of

the mental health vendor’s psychiatric

director,

with

such

reconsideration

documented in the inmate-patient’s medical

record. A copy of the documentation related

to the case conference will be transmitted to

the ADOC Director of Psychiatry for

administrative oversight purposes.

24

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 25 of 48
4.1.3.4. ADOC’s mental health vendor shall maintain a log identifying all inmatepatients who have resided in the SU:
4.1.3.4.1. More than fifteen (15) days, prior to full implementation of §4.1.2.9.4. above; and
4.1.3.4.2. More than thirty (30) days, after full implementation of §4.1.2.9.4. above.
4.1.3.5. The log shall include the dates and participants of the psychiatric evaluations required in the preceding paragraphs.
4.1.3.6. The number of people remaining in the SU longer than fifteen (15) days prior to full implementation of §4.1.2.9.4 or longer than 30 days thereafter shall be reviewed and considered in the continuous quality improvement (CQI) process.
4.1.4. Discharge from Intensive Stabilization Unit 4.1.4.1. From the SU, an inmate-patient may be discharged to an RTU (any level), an
25

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 26 of 48
inpatient psychiatric hospital, or to general population.
4.2. Residential Treatment Unit Level 1 4.2.1. Initial assessments 4.2.1.1. An inmate-patient may be admitted to the RTU Level 1 from any ADOC facility or from an inpatient hospital. 4.2.1.2. If an inmate-patient is admitted directly to the RTU Level 1 from any location other than the RTU or the SU, an initial assessment shall be completed as follows: 4.2.1.2.1. A nurse shall complete the initial nursing assessment within twenty-four (24) hours of an inmate-patient’s arrival in the RTU Level 1. 4.2.1.2.2. A psychiatrist or CRNP (in collaboration with a psychiatrist who will meet with the inmate-patient, review and approve or modify the initial psychiatric
26

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 27 of 48

assessment performed by the CRNP) shall

complete

the

initial

psychiatric

assessment:

4.2.1.2.2.1. If an inmate-patient’s RTU Level

1 admission occurs between 7 a.m. on

Monday and 3 p.m. on Friday, then the

psychiatric assessment will occur

within twenty-four (24) hours of an

inmate-patient’s admission to the RTU

Level 1; or

4.2.1.2.2.2. If an inmate-patient’s RTU Level

1 admission occurs after 3 p.m. on a

Friday or on a weekend or holiday,

then:

4.2.1.2.2.2.1. a psychiatrist or CRNP (in

collaboration with the psychiatrist)

will enter initial orders for the

inmate-patient based upon a

telephone consultation with a mental

27

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 28 of 48
health nurse after the nursing assessment; and 4.2.1.2.2.2.2. the psychiatric assessment will occur on the next business day following the date of the inmatepatient’s RTU Level 1 admission. 4.2.1.2.3. A counselor (a psychologist or licensed MHP) shall complete an initial assessment within twenty-four (24) hours of an inmate-patient’s arrival in the RTU Level 1. 4.2.1.3. Until December 1, 2019, if an inmatepatient is admitted to the RTU Level 1 from another level of the RTU or from the SU and any member of the inmate-patient’s treatment team changes, the new member(s) of the treatment team must review the inmatepatient’s mental health record prior to the first treatment team meeting in the RTU Level 1.
28

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 29 of 48
4.2.1.4. Starting December 1, 2019, if an inmatepatient is admitted to the RTU Level 1 from another level of the RTU or from the SU and any member of the inmate-patient’s treatment team changes, the new member(s) of the treatment team must review the inmatepatient’s mental health record and meet with the inmate-patient prior to the first treatment team meeting in the RTU Level 1.
4.2.2. Treatment 4.2.2.1. The treatment team shall meet and review the treatment plan consistent with Section 1.4.2 of the Treatment Team and Planning Stipulations, and more often if clinically indicated. 4.2.2.2. Until December 1, 2019, the inmatepatient shall have at least two (2) confidential, out-of-cell clinical encounters each week with a psychiatrist or CRNP. At
29

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 30 of 48
least every other week, at least one (1) encounter shall be with the psychiatrist. 4.2.2.3. Starting December 1, 2019, the inmatepatient shall have at least three (3) confidential, out-of-cell clinical encounters each week with a psychiatrist or CRNP. At least every other week, at least one (1) encounter shall be with the psychiatrist. 4.2.2.4. The psychiatrist must be a member of the treatment team. If the CRNP conducts 50% or more of the encounters described in §§ 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3., the CRNP must also be a member of the treatment team. 4.2.2.5. The inmate-patient shall have at least two (2) interactions per week with a mental health nurse. 4.2.2.6. Until December 1, 2019, the inmatepatient shall have at least two (2) confidential, out-of-cell counseling sessions
30

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 31 of 48

each week with the assigned psychologist or

licensed MHP.

4.2.2.7. Starting December 1, 2019, the inmate-

patient shall have at least three (3)

confidential, out-of-cell counseling sessions

each week with the assigned psychologist or

licensed MHP.

4.2.2.8. Inmate-patients in the RTU Level 1 shall

have structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time

as provided below, unless clinically

contraindicated. Any individual out-of-cell

interactions with the treatment team,

psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or CRNP),

counselor (psychologist or licensed MHP), or

group facilitator or therapeutic groups will

count towards the applicable structured,

therapeutic out-of-cell time.

4.2.2.9. Inmate-patients in the RTU Level 1 shall

have unstructured out-of-cell time as

provided

below,

unless

clinically

31

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 32 of 48
contraindicated. This out-of-cell time is in addition to the structured, therapeutic outof-cell time. 4.2.2.10. The implementation schedule for providing structured therapeutic and unstructured out-of-cell time shall be as follows: 4.2.2.10.1. No later than September 15, 2018:
Two (2) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and two (2) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; 4.2.2.10.2. No later than March 15, 2019: Five (5) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and five (5) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; 4.2.2.10.3. No later than September 15, 2019: Eight (8) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and eight (8) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; and
32

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 33 of 48
4.2.2.10.4. No later than March 15, 2020: Ten (10) hours of structured, therapeutic outof-cell time and ten (10) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week.
4.2.3. Length of Stay 4.2.3.1. An inmate-patient’s length of stay shall be clinically determined. 4.2.3.2. If an inmate-patient stays on RTU Level 1 for thirty (30) days, the treatment team and the mental health vendor’s psychiatric director shall have a case conference to determine the reasons for the inmatepatient’s failure to stabilize sufficiently to progress to RTU Level 2. Such case conference shall be repeated every thirty (30) days thereafter until the inmate-patient is sufficiently stabilized to progress to RTU Level 2 or is transferred to a higher level of care.
33

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 34 of 48
4.2.3.3. The number of people remaining in RTU Level 1 longer than thirty (30) days shall be reviewed and considered in the CQI process.
4.2.4. Discharge from RTU Level 1 4.2.4.1. From the RTU Level 1, an inmate-patient may be discharged to a SU, a RTU (any level), an inpatient psychiatric hospital, or to general population.
4.3. Residential Treatment Unit Level 2 4.3.1. Initial assessments 4.3.1.1. An inmate-patient may be admitted to the RTU Level 2 from any ADOC facility or from an inpatient psychiatric hospital. 4.3.1.2. If an inmate-patient is admitted directly to the RTU Level 2 from any location other than the RTU or the SU, an initial assessment shall be completed as follows: 4.3.1.2.1. Within twenty-four (24) hours of in inmate-patient’s arrival in the RTU, a
34

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 35 of 48

nurse shall assess each inmate-patient to

ensure continuity of medication and

determine whether the inmate-patient has

any urgent or emergent medical or mental

health needs.

4.3.1.2.2. A nurse shall complete the initial

nursing assessment within forty-eight (48)

hours of an inmate-patient’s arrival in

the RTU Level 2.

4.3.1.2.3. A psychiatrist or CRNP (in

collaboration with a psychiatrist) shall

complete

the

initial

psychiatric

assessment as follows:

4.3.1.2.3.1. Until December 1, 2019, if an

inmate-patient’s RTU Level 2 admission

occurs between 7 a.m. on Monday and 3

p.m. on Friday, then the psychiatric

assessment will occur within forty-

eight (48) hours of an inmate-patient’s

admission to the RTU Level 2;

35

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 36 of 48
4.3.1.2.3.2. Starting December 1, 2019, if an inmate-patient’s RTU Level 2 admission occurs between 7 a.m. on Monday and 3 p.m. on Friday, then the psychiatric assessment will occur within twentyfour (24) hours of an inmate-patient’s admission to the RTU Level 2;or
4.3.1.2.3.3. If an inmate-patient’s RTU Level 2 admission occurs after 3 p.m. on a Friday or on a weekend or holiday, then:
4.3.1.2.3.3.1. a psychiatrist or CRNP (in collaboration with the psychiatrist) will enter initial orders for the inmate-patient based upon a telephone consultation with a mental health nurse after the nursing assessment; and
4.3.1.2.3.3.2. the psychiatric assessment will occur on the next business day
36

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 37 of 48
following the date of the inmatepatient’s RTU Level 2 admission. 4.3.1.2.4. Until December 1, 2019, a counselor (a psychologist or licensed MHP) shall complete an initial assessment within forty-eight (48) hours of an inmatepatient’s arrival in the RTU Level 2. 4.3.1.2.5. Starting December 1, 2019, a counselor (a psychologist or licensed MHP) shall complete an initial assessment within twenty-four (24) hours of an inmate-patient’s arrival in the RTU Level 2. 4.3.1.3. Until December 1, 2019, if an inmatepatient is admitted to the RTU Level 2 from another level of the RTU or from the SU and any member of the inmate-patient’s treatment team changes, the new member(s) of the treatment team must review the inmatepatient’s mental health record prior to the
37

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 38 of 48
first treatment team meeting in the RTU Level 2. 4.3.1.4. Starting December 1, 2019, if an inmatepatient is admitted to the RTU Level 2 from another level of the RTU or from the SU and any member of the inmate-patient’s treatment team changes, the new member(s) of the treatment team must review the inmatepatient’s mental health record and meet with the inmate-patient prior to the first treatment team meeting in the RTU Level 2. 4.3.2. Treatment 4.3.2.1. The treatment team shall meet and review the treatment plan consistent with Section 1.4.2 of the Treatment Team and Planning Stipulations, and more often if clinically indicated. 4.3.2.2. The inmate-patient shall have at least weekly confidential, out-of-cell clinical encounters with the psychiatrist or CRNP.
38

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 39 of 48
4.3.2.3. The inmate-patient shall have at least weekly confidential, out-of-cell counseling with the assigned psychologist or licensed MHP.
4.3.2.4. A daily interaction with a mental-health nurse documented in the inmate-patient’s mental-health record. The daily interaction with a mental-health nurse will take place outside the inmate-patient’s cell in a location that provides for confidentiality.
4.3.2.5. Inmate-patients in the RTU Level 2 shall have structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time as provided below, unless clinically contraindicated. Any individual out-of-cell interactions with the treatment team, psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or CRNP), counselor (psychologist or licensed MHP), or group facilitator or therapeutic groups will count towards the applicable structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time.
39

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 40 of 48

4.3.2.6. Inmate-patients in the RTU Level 2 shall

have unstructured out-of-cell time as

provided

below,

unless

clinically

contraindicated. This out-of-cell time is in

addition to the structured, therapeutic out-

of-cell time.

4.3.2.7. The implementation schedule for

providing structured therapeutic and

unstructured out-of-cell time shall be as

follows:

4.3.2.7.1. No later than September 15, 2018:

Two (2) hours of structured, therapeutic

out-of-cell time and four (4) hours of

unstructured out-of-cell time per week;

4.3.2.7.2. No later than March 15, 2019: four

(4) hours of structured, therapeutic out-

of-cell time and six (6) hours of

unstructured out-of-cell time per week;

4.3.2.7.3. No later than September 15, 2019:

Six (6) hours of structured, therapeutic

40

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 41 of 48
out-of-cell time and eight (8) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; and 4.3.2.7.4. No later than March 15, 2020: Ten (10) hours of structured, therapeutic outof-cell time and ten (10) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week. 4.3.3. Length of Stay 4.3.3.1. An inmate-patient’s length of stay shall be clinically determined. 4.3.4. Discharge from RTU Level 2 4.3.4.1. From the RTU Level 2, an inmate-patient may be discharged to SU, a RTU (any level), an inpatient psychiatric hospital, or to general population.
4.4. Residential Treatment Unit Level 3 4.4.1. Initial assessments
41

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 42 of 48
4.4.1.1. An inmate-patient may be admitted to the RTU Level 3 from an RTU Level 1 or 2, or from an SU.
4.4.1.2. Until December 1, 2019, if any member of the inmate-patient’s treatment team changes, in the transfer from the SU or other level of the RTU, the new member(s) of the treatment team must review the inmate-patient’s mental health record prior to the first treatment team meeting in the RTU Level 3.
4.4.1.3. Starting December 1, 2019, if an inmatepatient is admitted to the RTU Level 3 from another level of the RTU or from the SU and any member of the inmate-patient’s treatment team changes, the new member(s) of the treatment team must review the inmatepatient’s mental health record and meet with the inmate-patient prior to the first treatment team meeting in the RTU Level 3.
4.4.2. Treatment
42

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 43 of 48

4.4.2.1. After the initial treatment team

meeting, the treatment team will meet and an

inmate-patient’s treatment plan will be

reviewed consistent with Section 1.4.2 of the

Treatment Team and Planning Stipulations, and

more often if clinically indicated.

4.4.2.2. The

inmate-patient

shall

have

confidential clinical encounters with the

psychiatrist or CRNP at intervals not to

exceed fourteen (14) days for the first six

(6) weeks on RTU Level 3. After six (6)

weeks, if clinically appropriate, the

psychiatrist or CRNP can reduce to the

frequency of encounters to intervals not to

exceed thirty (30) days. To the extent

inmate-patients in RTU Level 3 are housed in

cells, these clinical encounters will not

take place at the inmate-patient’s cell.

4.4.2.3. The

inmate-patient

shall

have

confidential counseling session with the

43

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 44 of 48
assigned psychologist or licensed MHP at intervals not to exceed fourteen (14) days for the first six (6) weeks on RTU Level 3. After six (6) weeks, if clinically appropriate, the counselor can reduce to the frequency of encounters to intervals not to exceed thirty (30) days. To the extent inmate-patients in RTU Level 3 are housed in cells, these counseling sessions will not take place at the inmate-patient’s cell. 4.4.2.4. An inmate-patient will have a daily interaction with a counselor (licensed MHP or psychologist). The daily interaction with a counselor will take place in a location that provides for confidentiality. To the extent inmate-patients in RTU Level 3 are housed in cells, these interactions will not take place at the inmate-patient’s cell. 4.4.2.5. For inmate-patients who are determined to need to stay in the RTU indefinitely,
44

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 45 of 48
after six (6) months on the RTU Level 3, the following minimum treatment requirements can be reduced as follows, consistent with clinical judgment: 4.4.2.5.1. An inmate-patient will be seen by a
psychiatrist or CRNP for a psychiatric evaluation at intervals not exceeding ninety (90) days. 4.4.2.5.2. An inmate-patient will have an interaction with a counselor (licensed MHP or psychologist) at intervals not to exceed thirty (30) days. 4.4.2.6. Inmate-patients in the RTU Level 3 shall have structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time as provided below. Any individual out-ofcell interactions with the treatment team, psychiatric provider (psychiatrist or CRNP), counselor (psychologist or licensed MHP), or group facilitator or therapeutic groups will
45

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 46 of 48
count towards the applicable structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time. 4.4.2.7. Inmate-patients housed in a dormitorystyle RTU Level 3 will have the same amount of time outside their dormitory as inmates of the same security level who are not mentally ill. Inmate-patients housed in a cell-style RTU Level 3 will have unstructured out-ofcell time as provided below. This out-ofcell time is in addition to the structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time. 4.4.2.8. The implementation schedule for providing structured therapeutic and unstructured out-of-cell time shall be as follows: 4.4.2.8.1. No later than September 15, 2018:
Two (2) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and four (4) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week;
46

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 47 of 48
4.4.2.8.2. No later than March 15, 2019: four (4) hours of structured, therapeutic outof-cell time and six (6) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week;
4.4.2.8.3. No later than September 15, 2019: Six (6) hours of structured, therapeutic out-of-cell time and eight (8) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week; and
4.4.2.8.4. No later than March 15, 2020: Ten (10) hours of structured, therapeutic outof-cell time and ten (10) hours of unstructured out-of-cell time per week or the same amount of unstructured out-ofcell time as other prisoners of the same security level, whichever is greater.
4.4.3. Length of Stay 4.4.3.1. An inmate-patient’s length of stay shall be clinically determined.
4.4.4. Discharge from RTU Level 3
47

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-GMB Document 1899-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 48 of 48
4.4.4.1. From the RTU Level 3, an inmate-patient may be discharged to a SU, RTU (any level), an inpatient psychiatric hospital, or to general population.
5.No Amendment to Stipulations or Remedial Orders. Nothing in this Stipulation supersedes or limits the requirements of other stipulations or Remedial Orders in this matter.
48

 
 Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1900 Filed 06/19/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON CONFIDENTIALITY

On June 15, 2018, the parties submitted

supplemental stipulations regarding confidentiality.

They agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to

an enforceable order and further agreed to some

clarifications of the stipulations during an

on-the-record hearing on June 18, 2018. Accordingly,

it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as

follows:

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1900 Filed 06/19/18 Page 2 of 2
(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1894), as clarified during an on-the-record hearing on June 18, 2018, and as attached to this order, are approved.
(2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions as clarified during on-the-record hearing on June 18, 2018.
DONE, this the 19th day of June, 2018. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1900-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 1 of 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as

)

Commissioner of

)

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

ATTACHMENT

Stipulation Regarding Confidentiality

The Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) agrees

to implement the matters set forth below within ninety

(90) days of the Court’s acceptance of and entry of an

Order regarding these Stipulations.

• A correctional officer (a) assigned to a

medical or mental health unit (including an Intensive

Psychiatric Stabilization Unit, a Residential Treatment

Unit, a Structured Living Unit), (b) assigned to a

treatment team, or (c) who regularly receives protected

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1900-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 2 of 3
health information (as defined in the Confidentiality Agreement attached as Exhibit A) will be trained on confidentiality during Specialized Mental Health Training consistent with ADOC Administrative Regulation 604 entitled “Confidentiality in Mental Health Services and Mental Health Documentation” (as amended by Change #1 to AR 604).
• At the conclusion of the Specialized Mental Health Training, each correctional officer must agree to and sign the Confidentiality Agreement attached as Exhibit A.
• A correctional officer (a) assigned to a medical or mental health unit (including an Intensive Psychiatric Stabilization Unit, a Residential Treatment Unit, a Structured Living Unit), (b) assigned to a treatment team, or (c) who regularly receives protected health information may not receive protected health information or be present for the communication of protected health information, as defined in Exhibit A, until the correctional officer receives the Specialized
2

Case 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-WC Document 1900-1 Filed 06/19/18 Page 3 of 3
Mental Health Training and signs the Confidentiality Agreement attached as Exhibit A.
• A copy of a correctional officer’s signed Confidentiality Agreement must be placed (1) in his or her personnel file and (2) a central location within the medical or mental health unit at his or her assigned ADOC facility.
3

CCaassee22:1:144--ccvv--0000660011--MMHHTT--GWMCB DDooccuummeenntt11980904--22 FFilieledd0066/1/195/1/188 PPaaggee11ooff22

State of Alabama

KAY IVEY GOVERNOR

Alabama Department of Corrections JEFFERSON DUNN COMMISSIONER
301 S. Ripley P. O. Box 301501 Montgomery, AL 36130

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
Correctional officers with access to confidential health records are required by law and policy to safeguard confidential information. As an Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) employee, I agree to the following as a condition of my employment with the ADOC:
1. I understand that inmates have a legal privacy right to their protected health information. For purposes of this Confidentiality Agreement, “protected health information” means documents, communications, or information concerning the physical or mental health conditions of an inmate and the provision of care, services, or supplies related to the health of an inmate, including, for example, documents, communications, and information about an inmate’s diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, test result, evaluation, assessment, and medical or mental health record. Protected health information also includes information expressed by the inmate for the purpose of treatment or in a treatment team meeting.
2. I understand that I may receive an inmate’s protected health information as I perform the official duties of my job. It is my legal duty to keep confidential any protected health information I read, see, or hear.
3. I understand that protected health information must not be disclosed inside or outside of the ADOC to persons (such as ADOC employees, inmates, friends, and family) who lack a legitimate health-related need to know the protected health information. I will avoid inadvertent disclosure of protected health information through the communication of protected health information in a public or non-confidential environment.
4. I understand that I am prohibited from using any protected health information to harass or abuse an inmate.
5. I will report all known violations of ADOC privacy and security policies to my supervisor or another person in my chain-of-command immediately.
6. If my employment with the ADOC ends, then I will continue to be bound by my obligation under this Confidentiality Agreement.
7. I understand that any violation of this Confidentiality Agreement may result in disciplinary action and/or termination in accordance with ADOC Administrative Regulation 208 entitled “Employee Standards of Conduct and Discipline” (as amended by Change #1 to AR 208).

CCaassee22:1:144--ccvv--0000660011--MMHHTT--GWMCB DDooccuummeenntt11980904--22 FFilieledd0066/1/195/1/188 PPaaggee22ooff22 By signing below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand the terms of this
Confidentiality Agreement and ADOC Administrative Regulation 604 entitled “Confidentiality in Mental Health Services and Mental Health Documentation” (as amended by Change #1 to AR 604). Signature __________________________________________ Date ___________________ Print Name ________________________________________ A copy of this signed Confidentiality Agreement must be placed (1) in the employee’s personnel file and (2) a central location within the medical or mental health unit at the employee’s assigned ADOC facility.
2

 
 Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019) 2019 WL 5459721
2019 WL 5459721 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
Edward BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Jefferson S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of
Corrections, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT |
Signed 10/24/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Patricia Clotfelter, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Birmingham, AL, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiffs Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Chandler Clements, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Rick Martin, Willie McClendon, Roger McCoy, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Matthew Mork, Bradley Pearson, Leviticus Pruitt, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Brian Sellers, Augustus Smith, Hubert Tollar, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner, Jamie Wallace, Robert Myniasha Williams, Roger Moseley, Quang Bui, Charlie Henderson, Sheila Allen, William Sullivan, Serena English, Valerie Wheeler, Justin Hall, Raymond Bosarge, Cordara Dunner, Karen Norris, Cherritha Harris, Brittany Ellis, Tomas Snyder.
Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Gregory Martin Zarzaur, Denise Wiginton, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Birmingham, AL, Diandra S. Debrosse Zimmermann, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Wilmington, DE, Glenn Nelson Baxter, Andrea Jane Mixson, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Lisa Wright Borden, Patricia Clotfelter, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Birmingham, AL, Caitlin J. Sandley, Grace Graham, Jack

Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, David Clay Washington, Jonathan Michael Barry-Blocker, Lynnette Kim Miner, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Ashley Nicole Austin, Barbara Ann Lawrence, Lonnie Jason Williams, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff All Plaintiffs.
David Randall Boyd, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Gary Lee Willford, Jr., Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee, Alabama Department of Corrections Legal, Montgomery, AL, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr., Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, Matthew Reeves, William Richard Lunsford, Alyson Lee Smith, Melissa K. Marler, Melissa Neri, Pro Hac Vice, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn.
David Randall Boyd, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Department of Corrections, Montgomery, AL, Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections.
PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 It is ORDERED that the parties’ joint motion to continue evidentiary hearing on supplemental liability opinion remedy (doc. no. 2626), as clarified by the parties’ subsequent joint statement (doc. no. 2639), is granted and the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows:

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019) 2019 WL 5459721
DONE, this the 24th day of October, 2019. All Citations Slip Copy, 2019 WL 5459721

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019) 2019 WL 5459721

 
 Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019) 2019 WL 6833843
2019 WL 6833843 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
Edward BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Jefferson S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of
Corrections, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT |
Signed 12/13/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Vestavia Hills, AL, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Patricia Clotfelter, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Birmingham, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiffs Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Chandler Clements, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Rick Martin, Willie McClendon, Roger McCoy, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Matthew Mork, Bradley Pearson, Leviticus Pruitt, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Brian Sellers, Augustus Smith, Hubert Tollar, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner, Jamie Wallace, Robert Myniasha Williams, Roger Moseley, Quang Bui, Charlie Henderson, Sheila Allen, William Sullivan, Serena English, Valerie Wheeler, Justin Hall, Raymond Bosarge, Cordara Dunner, Karen Norris, Cherritha Harris, Brittany Ellis, Tomas Snyder.
Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Gregory Martin Zarzaur, Denise Wiginton, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Birmingham, AL, Diandra S. Debrosse Zimmermann, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Wilmington, DE, Glenn Nelson Baxter, Andrea Jane Mixson, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Vestavia Hills, AL, Caitlin J. Sandley, Grace Graham, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, David Clay Washington, Jonathan Michael

Barry-Blocker, Lynnette Kim Miner, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Patricia Clotfelter, Lisa Wright Borden, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Birmingham, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Ashley Nicole Austin, Barbara Ann Lawrence, Lonnie Jason Williams, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff All Plaintiffs.
David Randall Boyd, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Gary Lee Willford, Jr., Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee, Alabama Department of Corrections Legal, Montgomery, AL, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr., Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, Matthew Reeves, William Richard Lunsford, Alyson Lee Smith, Melissa K. Marler, Melissa Neri, Pro Hac Vice, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn.
David Randall Boyd, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Department of Corrections, Montgomery, AL, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections.
ORDER REGARDING REDACTION OF HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Before the court is a joint notice regarding parties’ proposed redactions to transcript of a hearing held on October 21, 2019. Initially, defendants filed a request for redaction of the entire transcript until the ADA Consultant’s Report is publicly disclosed. After plaintiffs objected to the redaction of the entire transcript, the court set the issue for oral argument. The parties then submitted a joint notice of “mutually agreeable redactions” to the transcript. Joint Notice Regarding Redactions to the October 21, 2019 Hearing Transcript (doc. no. 2677).

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019)
2019 WL 6833843
This joint request, which proposes the redaction of only a small part of the hearing transcript, will be granted for the reasons that follow.
A “strong common law presumption of public access” applies to trial records. Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802-804 (11th Cir. 1983). Indeed, “[t]he common-law right of access to judicial proceedings, an essential component of our system of justice, is instrumental in securing the integrity of the process.” Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Todd v. Daewon Am., Inc., 2014 WL 2608454, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (Thompson, J.) (“[T]here is the general, albeit qualified, right of the public to access to court records. One legal writer put it this way: ‘Essential to the rule of law is the public performance of the judicial function. The public resolution of court cases and controversies affords accountability, fosters public confidence, and provides notice of the legal consequences of behaviors and choices. ... This right is rooted in the common law.’ Robert Timothy Reagan, Sealing Court Records and Proceedings: A Pocket Guide (Federal Judicial Center) (2010) at 1 (footnotes omitted)).
But this right of access “may be overcome by a showing of good cause, which requires balanc[ing] the asserted right of access against the other party’s interest in keeping the information confidential.” Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts consider, among other things, “whether allowing access would impair court functions or harm legitimate privacy interests, the degree of and likelihood of injury if made public, the reliability of the information, whether there will be an opportunity to respond to the information, whether the information concerns public officials or public concerns, and the availability of a less onerous alternative to sealing the documents.” Id. Whether good cause exists depends upon the “nature and character of the information in question,” id., but generally requires more than a “conclusory and speculative” rationale, id. at 1248.
The United States Constitution also guarantees a “constitutional right of access,” but this right “has a more limited application in the civil context than it does in the criminal.” Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1310. The Eleventh Circuit has not definitively answered “the question of whether or not there is a constitutional right of access to civil trials,” Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1570, though it has “extended the scope of the constitutional right of access to include civil actions pertaining to the release or incarceration of prisoners and their confinement.” Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1310 (citations omitted).

*2 If the constitutional right of access does apply, the parties must demonstrate that the redactions are “necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose” and that less intrusive alternatives were considered. Newman, 696 F.2d at 802 (citations omitted). Further, the court would need to ensure that the restriction on access was narrowly tailored. See id.
The parties jointly submitted the proposed redactions. But because of the public’s strong interest in access to judicial records, the court believes it should not rely solely on the parties’ views, and rather should conduct its own independent review to ensure that the self-evident public’s interest is thoroughly and thoughtfully considered in addition to the views and interests of the parties. Here, after conducting an independent assessment of the proposed redactions and interests at play, the court is satisfied that the parties have met the requirements of the First Amendment if they apply. The court thus does not discuss the “good cause” analysis required by the common law, which is a less-stringent standard. See generally Clark v. Bamberger, 2016 WL 1183180, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (Thompson, J.) (describing the “lesser ‘good cause’ showing to overcome the common-law right of access”).
The parties’ proposed redactions consist largely of the names of prisons (and sub-sections of prisons) as relate to construction priorities, the timing of various phases of construction, and associated transition plans. Defendants argue that public disclosure of the information would “compromise the security of ADOC facilities and the safety of inmates, volunteers, and staff at ADOC facilities.” State’s Request for Redaction (doc. no. 2662) at 2. Further, they note that, given that the information is susceptible to change, an unredacted hearing transcript might ultimately misinform the public. Id.
The public, of course, has a substantial interest in such information: “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies” is “at the heart of the interest protected by the right of access.” Romero, 480 F.3d at 1246 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). But the security of those inside the prison, and the safe and successful operation of Department of Corrections facilities more generally, is a compelling interest shared by defendants and the public at large. See, e.g., Fawaad v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 1996) (agreeing that “maintaining security in a prison constitutes a compelling governmental interest”); Harris v. Forsyth, 735 F.2d 1235, 1235 (11th Cir. 1984). The information at issue here risks compromising these goals: although the “the mere possibility of prison violence is not sufficient to justify keeping judicial records

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019)
2019 WL 6833843
confidential,” Braggs v. Dunn, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (Thompson, J.) (emphasis added), disclosure of the specific phasing and timing of inmate movement and prison construction could pose a meaningful threat to the security of inmates and staff. Further, the relatively limited redactions are narrowly tailored to minimize harm, often encompassing only names and dates. The court also finds persuasive the additional explanations provided at the October 21 hearing, which are themselves the subjects of redaction. But the reasons available publicly are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment. And, finally, the redacted information will be released after a delay, serving the public’s interest in eventual access.
*3 Based on its review of the information in the redacted portions of the hearing transcript, therefore, the court finds that the redactions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. (Unsurprisingly, given the similar contents of the documents at issue, the court granted an analogous motion requesting leave to file the ADA Consultant’s Report under seal. See Joint Motion for Leave to File ADA Report Under Seal (doc. no. 2630);

Text Order Granting Joint Motion (doc. no. 2632).)
***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the parties’ proposed redactions are approved and that defendants’ transcript redaction request (doc. no. 2662) is granted, albeit only to the extent of the parties’ proposed redactions (doc. no. 2677). The unredacted hearing transcript shall not be made publicly available until the ADA Consultant’s Report is publicly disclosed, pursuant to the parties’ joint notice regarding the agreed-upon implementation schedule for ADA alterations (doc. no. 2605).
DONE, this the 13th day of December, 2019.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 6833843

 
 Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019) 2019 WL 7041620
2019 WL 7041620 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
Edward BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Jefferson S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of
Corrections, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT |
Signed 12/19/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Vestavia Hills, AL, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Patricia Clotfelter, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Birmingham, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiffs Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Chandler Clements, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Rick Martin, Willie McClendon, Roger McCoy, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Matthew Mork, Bradley Pearson, Leviticus Pruitt, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Brian Sellers, Augustus Smith, Hubert Tollar, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner, Jamie Wallace, Robert Myniasha Williams, Roger Moseley, Quang Bui, Charlie Henderson, Sheila Allen, William Sullivan, Serena English, Valerie Wheeler, Justin Hall, Raymond Bosarge, Cordara Dunner, Karen Norris, Cherritha Harris, Brittany Ellis, Tomas Snyder.
Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Gregory Martin Zarzaur, Denise Wiginton, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Birmingham, AL, Diandra S. Debrosse Zimmermann, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Wilmington, DE, Glenn Nelson Baxter, Andrea Jane Mixson, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Vestavia Hills, AL, Caitlin J. Sandley, Grace Graham, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, David Clay Washington, Jonathan Michael

Barry-Blocker, Lynnette Kim Miner, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Lisa Wright Borden, William Glassell Somerville, III, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Birmingham, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Ashley Nicole Austin, Barbara Ann Lawrence, Lonnie Jason Williams, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff All Plaintiffs.
David Randall Boyd, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Gary Lee Willford, Jr., Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee, Alabama Department of Corrections Legal, Montgomery, AL, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr., Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, Matthew Reeves, William Richard Lunsford, Alyson Lee Smith, Melissa K. Marler, Melissa Neri, Pro Hac Vice, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn.
David Randall Boyd, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Department of Corrections, Montgomery, AL, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections.
PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON A PROCESS TO IDENTIFY FUNCTIONAL SEGREGATION
Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 The plaintiffs have twice asked this court, as part of both the segregation remedial trial and the suicide-prevention remedial trial, to extend relief to units that allegedly function as segregation, even though the defendants do not formally label them as such. While this court explained in its liability opinion that segregation “generally refers to the correctional practice of keeping a prisoner in a cell for 22.5 hours or more a day,” Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 2017), calculating the amount of out-of-cell time has proven

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019)
2019 WL 7041620
more difficult than the definition might suggest. As a result, during a subsequent on-the-record hearing on December 6, 2019, the court asked both parties how to determine whether a cell or unit is functioning as segregation. See Dec. 6, 2019 Status Conference Tr. (doc. no. 2686) at 88:21-25.
The plaintiffs and defendants each argued that the court should adopt their expert’s recommendations. See id. at 88:21-90:12 (plaintiffs’ argument), 92:11-16 (defendants’ argument). During the suicide-prevention trial, both plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Burns and defendants’ expert Dr. Perrien agreed with the court’s use of a functional definition of segregation based on the amount of out-of-cell time a person receives. See Apr. 9, 2019 Rough Draft (R.D.) Trial Tr. at 165:20-166:7.* As the court pointed out, both experts also jointly recommended that the court extend certain relief to units functioning as segregation, even if not formally labelled as such. In response to questions about where to apply their recommendation for “30-minute custody rounds in segregation,” Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416-4) at 4, the plaintiffs’ expert explained that such rounds “should happen in any place that’s functioning as a segregation unit or a segregation-like unit,” Apr. 9, 2019 R.D. Trial Tr. at 193:6-11. The defendants’ expert agreed that her “understanding was [that their recommendation applied to] units that are segregation or functioning as segregation.” Id. at 193:13-14. In Dr. Perrien’s view, the two experts made this joint recommendation in order to address the acute risk of suicide in these settings. See id. at 193:17-194:1.
*2 Following the suicide-prevention trial, the court ordered the defendants to conduct security checks every 30 minutes in formal segregation, see Braggs v. Dunn, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1273-74 (M.D. Ala. 2019), but reserved the issue of whether to extend such relief to functional segregation, for the simple reason that if the court were to extend relief to certain cells or units functioning as segregation, there would need to be a process for how to identify such cells or units, see id. at 1228. To that end, the court notes several significant methodological disagreements that, as a preliminary matter, would need to be resolved to develop such a process. For example, since the court initially suggested that the defendants could use the average amount of out-of-cell time per day as a way to identify functional segregation, see Order (doc. no. 2282) at 2 n.* (emphasis added), there has been a question whether the average should be calculated over the course of a week, month, quarter, or some other period of time, see, e.g. Defs.’ Br. on ‘Segregation-Like’ Issue (doc. no. 2646) at 20. Further, although the defendants initially represented that “[d]etermining the average out-of-cell time would require

ADOC to review the duty post logs for each individualized cell for the relevant period of time,” Defs.’ Mot. for Recons. (doc. no. 2300) at 14, they later challenged the plaintiffs’ reliance on duty post logs as evidence of out-of-cell time, pointing to Warden Christopher Gordy’s testimony that “there’s several logs, other logs, that are attached to the duty post logs that reflects inmates’ out-of-cell time,” Apr. 5, 2019, R.D. Trial Tr. at 224:16-22. Finally, the parties also disagreed about whether to count time spent in all out-of-cell activities or only particular out-of-cell activities. The experts disagreed too, at least in part. Based on their testimony, the court understands that Dr. Burns would not count activities such as showers, haircuts, pill call, sick call, diabetic finger sticks, the taking of vital signs, or the picking up of meal trays as out-of-cell time. See Apr. 8, 2019 R.D. Trial Tr. at 118:2-119:2; see also Apr. 10, 2019 R.D. Trial Tr. at 143:12-19. In contrast, the court understands that Dr. Perrien would, at least if it were practical to do so. See Apr. 10, 2019 R.D. Trial Tr. at 143:20-25.
Because Dr. Burns and Dr. Perrien suggested that they would count out-of-cell time differently, the plaintiffs proposed that the court give the defendants an opportunity to come up with a complete process to determine when a cell or unit is functioning as segregation; the defendants agreed to that idea and that Dr. Perrien should be allowed to develop the proposal. See Dec. 6, 2019 Status Conference Tr. (doc. no. 2686) at 90:17-24 (plaintiffs’ proposal), 95:15-17 (defendants’ acceptance), 95:22-23 (plaintiffs’ acceptance). As Dr. Perrien herself explained, “there needs to be a way to track who received what ... out-of-cell time.” Apr. 10, 2019 R.D. Trial Tr. at 143:23-24. With that understanding, and with the parties’ agreement, the court will give Dr. Perrien an opportunity to find a way.
To be clear, the court is interested in a methodological proposal for how to determine which cells or units function as segregation, not an evaluation of the specific evidence presented during the suicide-prevention trial. For example, the proposal could address on which form defendants should record out-of-cell activities, for which types of cells or units, and with what specificity. In addition, the proposal could distinguish between out-of-cell activities based on the length of the activity (brief versus extended), as was discussed during the latest status conference, see Dec. 6, 2019 Status Conference Tr. (doc. no. 2686) at 91:22-92:2, as well as the frequency of the activity (regular versus irregular), the purpose of the activity (social or not), or some other characteristic of the activity.
More generally, regardless of the specifics, the proposal

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2019) 2019 WL 7041620

should address how it balances the importance of identifying cells or units for which relief may be appropriate with the goals of creating a manageable, not overly burdensome, and yet objectively verifiable process.

defendants deem appropriate. The plaintiffs are to respond by noon on Friday, February 7, 2020.
DONE, this the 19th day of December, 2019.

*** All Citations

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants are to file with the court, by noon on Friday, January 24, 2020, a

Slip Copy, 2019 WL 7041620

report by Dr. Perrien proposing a process for the

defendants to determine when a cell or unit is functioning

as segregation, accompanied by any commentary the

Footnotes

*

The court has previously cited to rough drafts of transcripts not yet docketed, including this particular rough draft of

testimony from the suicide-prevention remedial trial. See, e.g., Braggs v. Dunn, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1229 (M.D.

Ala. 2019) (citing the same rough draft of the April 9, 2019 testimony). As a general matter, the rough drafts cited in

this opinion and order and throughout this litigation accurately reflect the court’s independent memory of the

testimony. Further, both the plaintiffs and the defendants have also specifically cited to rough drafts of the

suicide-prevention trial and do not contest their accuracy. See, e.g. Pls.’ Br. on Segregation-Like Units (doc. no. 2645)

at 3 (citing the same rough draft of the April 9, 2019 testimony); Defs.’ Br. Regarding ‘Segregation-Like’ Issue (doc.

no. 2646) at 9 (citing rough drafts of testimony from April 4, 5, 10, and 12, 2019).

 
 Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2020) 2020 WL 398557
2020 WL 398557 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
Edward BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Jefferson S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT |
Signed 01/14/2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Vestavia Hills, AL, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Patricia Clotfelter, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Birmingham, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiffs Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Chandler Clements, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Rick Martin, Willie McClendon, Roger McCoy, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Matthew Mork, Bradley Pearson, Leviticus Pruitt, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Brian Sellers, Augustus Smith, Hubert Tollar, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner, Jamie Wallace, Robert Myniasha Williams, Roger Moseley, Quang Bui, Charlie Henderson, Sheila Allen, William Sullivan, Serena English, Valerie Wheeler, Justin Hall, Raymond Bosarge, Cordara Dunner, Karen Norris, Cherritha Harris, Brittany Ellis, Tomas Snyder.
Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Gregory Martin Zarzaur, Denise Wiginton, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Birmingham, AL, Diandra S. Debrosse Zimmermann, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Wilmington, DE, Glenn Nelson Baxter, Andrea Jane Mixson, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.
Andrew Philip Walsh, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Vestavia Hills, AL, Caitlin J. Sandley, Grace Graham, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, David Clay Washington, Jonathan Michael Barry-Blocker, Lynnette Kim Miner, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Patricia Clotfelter, Lisa Wright Borden, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Zarzaur, Birmingham, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Ashley Nicole Austin, Barbara Ann Lawrence, Lonnie Jason Williams, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff All Plaintiffs.
David Randall Boyd, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Gary Lee Willford, Jr., Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee, Alabama Department of Corrections Legal, Montgomery, AL, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr., Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, Matthew Reeves, William Richard Lunsford, Alyson Lee Smith, Melissa K. Marler, Melissa Neri, Pro Hac Vice, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn.
David Randall Boyd, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Department of Corrections, Montgomery, AL, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections.

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2020)
2020 WL 398557
PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON VITEK ISSUE
Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Pending before the court is the issue of whether the transfer of prisoners from the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) to outside hospitals for mental-health care requires the due process protections outlined in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). The court has concerns that this issue is properly before it for resolution. This opinion sets forth those concerns.
The Vitek issue arose in the process of determining a remedy for the court’s finding that ADOC fails to provide hospital-level mental-health care to those who need it, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1217 (M.D. Ala. 2017). The State first proposed a plan to remedy this issue, which included transferring prisoners in need of hospital-level care to an outside private hospital. See State’s Proposed Remedial Plan on Hospital-Level Care (doc. no. 1514) at 3. The plaintiffs then raised concerns about the State’s failure to include in its plan procedural due process protections for prisoners transferred to outside hospitals against their wishes, which the plaintiffs contend are required by Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). Since that time, the parties have negotiated and entered into stipulations regarding the provision of hospital-level care, see Stipulations Regarding Hospital-Level Care (doc. nos. 2383-1 and 2383-2), which the court recently entered as a temporary injunction, see Interim Injunction Regarding Hospital-Level Care (doc. no. 2717). These stipulations exclude the issue of the applicability of Vitek, as the parties previously jointly requested that the court decide that issue and stated that they would negotiate to develop a Vitek-compliant procedure if the court determines that Vitek applies. See Joint Proposal (doc. no. 2308) at 1-2. In the meantime, the State has also contracted with a private hospital to provide hospital-level care, see Contract Review Report (doc. no. 2289-2), and prisoners have already been transferred there for such care.
A hearing on the applicability of Vitek is now set for January 24, 2020. However, upon review of the procedural history of this issue and the parties’ arguments, the court has a threshold concern of whether it can properly decide the applicability of Vitek in this case.
First, the court questions whether, in the current posture of the case, it can decide the issue. Relying solely on the Eighth Amendment, the court found the defendants were liable because ADOC provided virtually no hospital-level care, despite the presence of prisoners in need of such intensive treatment. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1217. The court held that “hospital-level care or hospitalization should be available when patients pose a danger to self or others and interventions in the [stabilization unit] do not improve their condition.” Id. The court then turned to the issue of a remedy for this Eighth Amendment violation. A due process claim was neither pleaded nor addressed in the liability opinion. The court has serious doubts about its ability to order a remedy for which it did not find any violation in its liability opinion.
*2 The court is also concerned whether any due process remedy it might order would satisfy the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The PLRA provides that a “court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Id. The court has made no finding that the State has violated the due process rights of individuals in need of hospital-level care by transferring them to a hospital against their wishes and without adequate procedure. How can the court fashion a remedy that is no more than necessary to address a violation where no violation has been found?
Second, no prisoner has complained that ADOC is involuntarily providing him with hospital-level care in violation of due process. Indeed, since the court found liability, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) has conferred with a number of prisoners who were transferred to receive hospital-level care, and none has objected. This lack of a complaining prisoner has practical implications. It is conceivable that no prisoner will object in the reasonably foreseeable future, for it is reasonable to conclude that prisoners would likely view staying in a hospital as much more preferable to residing in one of Alabama’s prisons. And, if and when a prisoner does complain, it is unclear what the nature of the circumstances would be then. The State might simply yield to a prisoner’s objection and not provide such care. (The court is not sure how the plaintiffs would respond to such a circumstance.) Or, if the State should decide to seek to provide such care in the face of a prisoner’s objection, the liability opinion left open the possibility that the State could provide hospital-level care in an actual hospital or in a hospital-like setting. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1218. At that time, the State might be able to provide hospital-level care either in one of the prisons it says it plans to build or otherwise in a hospital-like setting in one of its current prisons, circumventing a situation arguably triggering Vitek protections. See Plaintiffs’ Brief (doc. no. 2289) at 4

Braggs v. Dunn, Slip Copy (2020) 2020 WL 398557
(describing the Vitek case as requiring protections where “ADOC cannot provide the level of care necessary to treat that patient within the walls of an ADOC facility”). In short, the applicability of Vitek could vary based on many facts that could arise in the future. Without concrete facts, the court is concerned that it could do no more than offer a hypothetical answer.
Because the court is raising this threshold matter for the first time, an on-the-record conference call will be scheduled to discuss how to proceed.
* * *
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that an on-the-record conference call is set for January 15, 2020, at 2:00 p.m., to discuss how to proceed on the matter discussed above.
DONE, this the 14th day of January, 2020.
All Citations Slip Copy, 2020 WL 398557

 
 Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 1 of 408
MHT−ClerkA,MHT−ClerkD
U.S. District Court Alabama Middle District (Montgomery) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:14−cv−00601−MHT−JTA

Braggs et al v. Dunn et al Assigned to: Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson Referred to: Honorable Judge Jerusha T. Adams Related Cases: 2:19−mc−03852−MHT−JTA
2:20−cv−00132−SMD Cause: 42:12102 Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 446 Civil Rights: Americans with Disabilities − Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Joshua Dunn on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

represented by Alison Hardy Prison Law Office 1917 Fifth St Berkeley, CA 94710 510−280−2621 Email: ahardy@prisonlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Andrew Philip Walsh Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP 1500 Urban Center Drive, Suite 450 Vestavia Hills, AL 35242 205−709−8990 Fax: 205−709−8979 Email: Andy.Walsh@WilsonElser.com TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC 614 S. Hull St Montgomery, AL 36104 334−223−3014 Fax: 334−263−0960 Email: brosen@bakerdonelson.com TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel Brooklyn Defender Services 177 Livingston Street, 7th Floor New York New York, NY 11201 2023322033 Fax: 2023322033 Email: bmenschel@bds.org TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick Prison Law Office 1917 Fifth St Berkeley, CA 94710 510−280−2621

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 2 of 408
Email: ckendrick@prisonlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Donald Specter Prison Law Office 1917 Fifth St Berkeley, CA 94710 510−280−2621 Email: dspecter@prisonlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Ebony Glenn Howard Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: ebony.howard@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho Southern Poverty Law Center 150 E. Ponce de Leon Ave. Suite 340 Decatur, GA 30030 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: eunice.cho@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen Southern Poverty Law Center Post Office Box 2087 Montgomery, AL 36102 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8480 Email: richard.cohen@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program P. O. Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 205−348−4928 Fax: 205−348−3909 Email: jphackney@adap.ua.edu TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 3 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: maria.morris@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell Southern Poverty Law Center P O Box 370037 Miami, FL 33137 786−347−2056 Email: miriam.haskell@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC 420 20th St N − Ste 1400 Wells Fargo Tower Birmingham, AL 35203 205−328−0480 Fax: 205−322−8007 Email: pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson Prison Law Office 1917 Fifth St Berkeley, CA 94710 510−280−2621 Email: revenson@prisonlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Rhonda C. Brownstein Southern Poverty Law Center Post Office Box 2087 Montgomery, AL 36102−2087 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman Prison Law Office 1917 Fifth Street Berkeley, CA 94710 510−280−2621 TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 4 of 408

Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36116 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: valentina.restrepo@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz 420 20th Street North; Suite 1400 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−250−8375 Fax: 205−488−3775 Email: wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 36587 205−348−4928 Fax: 205−348−3909 Email: wvanderpoljr@adap.ua.edu TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Alex Ball on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 07/25/2014

represented by Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 5 of 408

Plaintiff
Edward Braggs on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 6 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Tedrick Brooks on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 7 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 8 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Gary Lee Broyles on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 9 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 10 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Richard Businelle on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 11 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 12 of 408

Plaintiff
Bobby Copeland on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 06/25/2015

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 13 of 408

TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Howard Carter on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 14 of 408
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 15 of 408

Plaintiff
Chandler Clements on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 16 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 17 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Dillard on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 18 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 19 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christopher Gilbert on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 20 of 408
TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 21 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Dwight Hagood on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 22 of 408
TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 23 of 408

Plaintiff
Daletrick Hardy on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 24 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Sylvester Hartley on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 25 of 408
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 26 of 408

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christopher Jackson on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 27 of 408
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 28 of 408

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Brandon Johnson on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 29 of 408
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 30 of 408

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Maner on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 31 of 408
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 32 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Rick Martin on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 33 of 408

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Willie McClendon on behalf of himself and all others

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 34 of 408

similarly situated

TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 35 of 408

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Roger McCoy on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 36 of 408
TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 37 of 408

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jermaine Mitchell on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 38 of 408
TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 39 of 408

TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kenneth Moncrief on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 40 of 408
TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 41 of 408

TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Tommie Moore on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 42 of 408
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 43 of 408

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Matthew Mork on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 44 of 408

Plaintiff
Zerrick Naylor on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2015

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 45 of 408
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 46 of 408

Plaintiff
Bradley Pearson on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 47 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 48 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Leviticus Pruitt on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 49 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 50 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Turner Rogers on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 51 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 52 of 408

Plaintiff Jonathan Sanford on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/20/2015
Plaintiff

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 53 of 408

Timothy Sears on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 54 of 408

Plaintiff
Brian Sellers on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 55 of 408
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 56 of 408

Plaintiff
Augustus Smith on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 57 of 408
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 58 of 408

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Richard Terrell on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 11/25/2016

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 59 of 408
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 60 of 408

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Hubert Tollar on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 61 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 62 of 408

Plaintiff
Daniel Tooley on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 63 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Joseph Torres on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 64 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 65 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Donald Ray Turner on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 66 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 67 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
William Villar on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/20/2015

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 68 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jamie Wallace on behalf of himself and all others

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 69 of 408

similarly situated

TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 70 of 408

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Myniasha Williams on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 71 of 408
TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 72 of 408

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anil Ashok Mujumdar ZARZAUR 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 205−983−7985 Email: anil@zarzaur.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 73 of 408
Diandra S. Debrosse Zimmermann Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. 123 Justison Street Wilmington, DE 19801 302−622−7000 Fax: 888−505−0523 Email: ddebrosse@gelaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenn Nelson Baxter Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program PO Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 205−348−3119 Fax: 205−348−3909 Email: gnbaxter@adap.ua.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory Martin Zarzaur Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse 2332 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35205 205−983−7985 Fax: 888−505−0523 Email: gregory@zarzaur.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea Jane Mixson Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487−0395 205−348−7679

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 74 of 408

Fax: 205−348−3909 Email: amixson@adap.ua.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Denise Wiginton Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse 2332 2nd Ave N Birmingham, AL 35203 205−983−7985 Fax: 888−505−0523 Email: denise@zarzaur.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
All Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caitlin J. Sandley Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8471 Email: cj.sandley@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 75 of 408
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Grace Graham Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8468 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: grace.graham@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 06/11/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaqueline Aranda Osorno Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−398−2718 Email: jaqueline.aranda@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristi L. Graunke Southern Poverty Law Center 150 East Ponce de Leon Ave. Suite 340 Decatur, GA 30030 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5845 Email: kristi.graunke@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 08/21/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 76 of 408
TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natalie Lyons Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: natalie.lyons@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anil Ashok Mujumdar (See above for address)
Ashley Nicole Austin Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program P O Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 205−348−4928 Fax: 205−348−3909 Email: aaustin@adap.ua.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barbara Ann Lawrence Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program P. O. Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487−0395 205−348−4928

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 77 of 408

Fax: 205−348−3909 Email: blawrenc@adap.ua.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brock Boone Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 956−8468 Fax: (334) 956−8481 Email: brock.boone@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Clay Washington Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8466 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: david.washington@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Michael Barry−Blocker Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: jonathan.blocker@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa Wright Borden Baker Donelson 420 20th Street North; 14th Floor Birmingham, AL 35203 205−244−3803 Email: lborden@bakerdonelson.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lonnie Jason Williams Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program Box 870395 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487−0395 205−348−4928 Fax: 205−348−3909 Email: lwilliams@adap.ua.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynnette Kim Miner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 WASHINGTON AVE Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: lynnette.miner@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Roger Moseley

represented by

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 78 of 408
Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 79 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Quang Bui

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 80 of 408
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 81 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Cherry Baker TERMINATED: 06/25/2015

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 82 of 408
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 83 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Charlie Henderson

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 84 of 408
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 85 of 408

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Paul Folsom TERMINATED: 05/02/2016

represented by Alison Hardy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Corene Kendrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald Specter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 86 of 408

Plaintiff
Sheila Allen on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah B Evenson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Linda Norman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 87 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 88 of 408

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
William Sullivan on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brent L Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke Menschel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ebony Glenn Howard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Cho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Patrick Hackney (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/02/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 89 of 408

TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam Haskell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Valentina Restrepo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/26/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Serena English

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 90 of 408

TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Valerie Wheeler

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 91 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Justin Hall

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Raymond Bosarge

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 92 of 408

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cordara Dunner

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 93 of 408

Plaintiff Karen Norris
Plaintiff

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 94 of 408

Cherritha Harris

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brittany Ellis

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 95 of 408

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tomas Snyder

represented by Andrew Philip Walsh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/13/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Richard Cohen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/29/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Latasha Lanette McCrary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maria Viette Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Clotfelter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rhonda C. Brownstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Glassell Somerville , III

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 96 of 408
(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Van Der Pol , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Kim Thomas in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 02/27/2015
Defendant Ruth Naglich in her official capacity as Associate commissioner of health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections

represented by Janine McKinnon McAdory Wettermark & Keith LLC 3595 Grandview Parkway; Suite 350 Birmingham, AL 35243 205−212−3343 Fax: 205−994−7521 Email: jmcadory@wkfirm.com TERMINATED: 02/27/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mitesh Bansilal Shah Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC 1901 6th Avenue North; Suite 2400 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−254−1178 Fax: 205−254−1999 Email: mshah@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 02/27/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Richard Lunsford Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 655 Gallatin Street Huntsville, AL 35801 256−551−0171 Fax: 256−512−0119 Email: blunsford@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 02/27/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anne Adams Hill Alabama Department of Corrections 301 South Ripley Street Montgomery, AL 36104 334−353−3884 Fax: 334−353−3891 Email: Anne.Hill@doc.alabama.gov TERMINATED: 06/21/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryan Arthur Coleman Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC 1901 Sixth Avenue North 2400 Regions/Harbert Plaza Birmingham, AL 35203 205−254−1192

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 97 of 408
Fax: 205−254−1999 Email: bcoleman@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 12/08/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Randall Boyd Balch & Bingham LLP PO Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101 334−8348500 Fax: 866−783−2739 Email: dboyd@balch.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Anne Sees Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division P O Box 301501 Montgomery, AL 36104 334−353−3857 Fax: 334−353−3891 Email: elizabeth.sees@doc.alabama.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Evan Patrick Moltz Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C. 1901 Sixth Avenue North 2400 Regions/Harbert Plaza Birmingham, AL 35203 205−254−1873 Fax: 205−254−1999 Email: emoltz@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 11/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janine McKinnon McAdory (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/10/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jenelle Rae Evans Balch & Bingham, LLP P O Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−226−8760 Fax: 205−488−5686 Email: jevans@balch.com TERMINATED: 02/09/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John W. Naramore Balch & Bingham LLP 105 Tallapoosa Street (36104) Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101 334−269−3144 Fax: 334−269−3115 Email: jnaramore@balch.com TERMINATED: 01/16/2019

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 98 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Garland Smith Balch & Bingham LLP PO Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101−0078 334−834−6500 Fax: 334−269−3115 Email: jgsmith@balch.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Gordon Stewart , Jr. Alabama Dept of Corrections P O Box 301501 Montgomery, AL 36130 334−353−4859 Fax: 334−353−3891 Email: joseph.stewart@doc.alabama.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Luther Maxwell Dorr , Jr. Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C. 1901 Sixth Avenue North 2400 Regions Harbert Plaza Birmingham, AL 35203 205−254−1030 Fax: 205−254−1999 Email: rdorr@maynardcooper.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Reeves Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 655 Gallatin St Huntsville, AL 35801 256−551−0171 Fax: 256−512−0119 Email: mreeves@maynardcooper.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Leon Edwards Balch & Bingham LLP P O Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201 205−226−3401 Fax: 205−488−5893 Email: medwards@balch.com TERMINATED: 02/15/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mitchell David Greggs Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC 1901 Sixth Avenue North; Suite 2400 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−254−1874 Fax: 205−254−1999 Email: mgreggs@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 12/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 99 of 408
Mitesh Bansilal Shah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/07/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven C Corhern Balch & Bingham P O Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201 205−226−8765 Fax: 205−488−5798 Email: scorhern@balch.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Richard Lunsford (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alyson Lee Smith Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 655 Gallatin St Huntsville, AL 35801 256−551−0171 Fax: 256−512−0119 Email: asmith@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 07/03/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Stephen Kuffner Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC 655 Gallatin Street SW Huntsville, AL 35801 256−512−0107 Fax: 256−512−0119 Email: ckuffner@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 12/06/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dustin David Key Maynard Cooper & Gale 655 Gallatin St Huntsville, AL 35801 256−512−0119 Email: dkey@maynardcooper.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gary Lee Willford , Jr. Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division P O Box 301501 Montgomery, AL 36104 334−353−5495 Fax: 334−353−3891 Email: gary.willford@doc.alabama.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa K. Marler Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC 655 Gallatin St Huntsville, AL 35801 256−551−0171

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 100 of 408

Email: mmarler@maynardcooper.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Neri Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 655 Gallatin St Huntsville, AL 35801 256−551−0171 Fax: 256−512−0119 Email: mneri@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 11/15/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Paul Huff Maynard Cooper & Gale PC 855 Gallatin Street Huntsville, AL 35801 256−551−0171 Fax: 256−512−0119 Email: mhuff@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 01/08/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee Alabama Department of Corrections Legal P O Box 301501 Montgomery, AL 36130−1501 334−353−3857 Fax: 334−353−3891 Email: Stephanie.Smithee@doc.alabama.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Clarence Rogers Maynard Cooper and Gale PC 655 Gallatin Street Huntsville, AL 35801 256−551−0171 Fax: 256−512−0119 Email: srogers@maynardcooper.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections

represented by Christopher Fred Heinss THE HEINSS LAW FIRM, LLC 2100 FIRST AVENUE NORTH SUITE 600 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−208−1420 Fax: 800−856−9028 Email: chris@heinsslaw.com TERMINATED: 11/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Randall Boyd (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jenelle Rae Evans (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2017

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 101 of 408
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Eric Getty Balch & Bingham LLP P O Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201 205−226−8789 Fax: 205−488−5662 Email: egetty@balch.com TERMINATED: 07/27/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John W. Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Garland Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Leon Edwards (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/15/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mitesh Bansilal Shah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/07/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Nettles Han Nettles Han Law, LLC | A Member Firm of Red Mountain La 2100 First Ave N, Suite 600 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−383−2296 Fax: 800−856−9028 Email: susan@nettleshanlaw.com TERMINATED: 08/02/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alyce Robertson Addison Home Buliders Licensure Board 445 Herron Street Montgomery, AL 36104 334−242−2230 Fax: 334−263−1397 Email: alyce.addison@hblb.alabama.gov TERMINATED: 03/02/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anne Adams Hill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/21/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Anne Sees

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 102 of 408

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gordon Stewart , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven C Corhern (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Richard Lunsford (See above for address)

Defendant
Billy Sharp in his official capacity as Interim Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 04/13/2015

represented by Janine McKinnon McAdory (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Garland Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitesh Bansilal Shah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Richard Lunsford (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/13/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jefferson S. Dunn in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections

represented by Anne Adams Hill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/21/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bryan Arthur Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Randall Boyd (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Anne Sees (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan Patrick Moltz (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 103 of 408
TERMINATED: 11/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janine McKinnon McAdory (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/10/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jenelle Rae Evans (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John W. Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Garland Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Gordon Stewart , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Luther Maxwell Dorr , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Reeves (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Leon Edwards (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/15/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mitchell David Greggs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mitesh Bansilal Shah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/07/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven C Corhern (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 104 of 408

William Richard Lunsford (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alyson Lee Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/03/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Stephen Kuffner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/06/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dustin David Key (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary Lee Willford , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa K. Marler (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Neri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/15/2019 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Paul Huff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Clarence Rogers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant MHM Correctional Services, Inc.

represented by Brett T Lane MHM Services, Inc. 1447 Peachtree St NE − Ste 500 Atlanta, GA 30309 404−347−4134 Fax: 404−745−8897 Email: btlane@mhm−services.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deana Johnson MHM Services, Inc. 1447 Peachtree Street NE; Suite 500 Atlanta, GA 30309 404−347−4134 Email: djohnson@mhm−services.com LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 105 of 408

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Corizon Health, Inc.

represented by Matthew Reeves (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/07/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa K. Marler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Clarence Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Richard Lunsford (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Kim Thomas

represented by Bryan Arthur Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/08/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan Patrick Moltz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/16/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa K. Marler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell David Greggs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitesh Bansilal Shah (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/07/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Clarence Rogers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Richard Lunsford (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 106 of 408

Movant Gary E. Walker TERMINATED: 08/16/2016 Movant Jay W. Isbell Movant Carl Arthur Perry Movant Ken Dover
Movant Barbara Coe

represented by Philip Piggott Webster Henry 2 Perimeter Park South; Suite 445 East Birmingham, AL 35243 205−986−4400 Fax: 205−380−3485 Email: ppiggott@websterhenry.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Philip Piggott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/17/2014
06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF against Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Kim Thomas ( Filing fee $ 400.00 receipt number 4602032296), filed by Dwight Hagood, Daniel Tooley, Brandon Johnson, Hubert Tollar, Rick Martin, Alex Ball, Brian Sellers, Joshua Dunn, Turner Rogers, Augustus Smith, Zerrick Naylor, William Villar, Robert Dillard, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Jackson, Jermaine Mitchell, Jamie Wallace, Leviticus Pruitt, Richard Terrell, Christopher Gilbert, Willie McClendon, Jonathan Sanford, Chandler Clements, Richard Businelle, Bradley Pearson, Robert Myniasha Williams, Sylvester Hartley, Timothy Sears, Edward Braggs, John Maner, Kenneth Moncrief, Joseph Torres, Matthew Mork, Roger McCoy, Donald Ray Turner, Daletrick Hardy, Bobby Copeland, Tommie Moore, Tedrick Brooks, Howard Carter. (Attachments: # 1 Filing Fee Receipt)(dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
2 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
3 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Joshua Dunn. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
4 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Alex Ball. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
5 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Edward Braggs. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
6 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Tedrick Brooks. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
7 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Gary Lee Broyles. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
8 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Richard Businelle. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 107 of 408

06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014

9 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Bobby Copeland. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
10 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Howard Carter. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
11 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Chandler Clements. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
12 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Robert Dillard. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
13 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Christopher Gilbert. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
14 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Dwight Hagood. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
15 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Daletrick Hardy. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
16 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Sylvester Hartley. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
17 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Christopher Jackson. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
18 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Brandon Johnson. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
19 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by John Maner. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
20 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Rick Martin. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
21 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Willie McClendon. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
22 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Roger McCoy. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
23 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Jermaine Mitchell. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
24 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Kenneth Moncrief. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
25 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Tommie Moore. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
26 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Matthew Mork. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
27 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Zerrick Naylor. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
28 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Bradley Pearson. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
29 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Leviticus Pruitt. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
30 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Turner Rogers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
31 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Jonathan Sanford. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
32 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Timothy Sears. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 108 of 408

06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/26/2014
06/27/2014
07/25/2014 07/25/2014
07/28/2014 07/28/2014 07/28/2014 07/28/2014
08/08/2014
08/08/2014
08/08/2014

33 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Brian Sellers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
34 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Augustus Smith. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
35 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Richard Terrell. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
36 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Hubert Tollar. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
37 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Daniel Tooley. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
38 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Joseph Torres. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
39 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Donald Ray Turner. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
40 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by William Villar. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
41 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Jamie Wallace. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
42 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Robert Myniasha Williams. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
43 Motion for Miriam Haskell to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602032360) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt)(dmn, ) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
44 TEXT ORDER granting 43 Motion for Miriam Haskell to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 6/27/2014. (dmn, )(NO PDF attached) (Entered: 06/27/2014)
45 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs.(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/25/2014)
***Attorney Maria V Morris, Ebony Glenn Howard, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, William Van Der Pol, Jr., James Patrick Hackney added for Cherry Baker, Quang Bui, Charlie Henderson, and Roger Moseley. (dmn, )(see Doc. 45 for pdf) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
46 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Kim Thomas served on 7/28/2014, answer due 8/18/2014. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
47 Summons Issued as to Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, and Kim Thomas and returned to counsel for personal service. (dmn, ) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
48 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Ruth Naglich served on 7/28/2014, answer due 8/18/2014. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
49 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Alabama Department of Corrections served on 7/28/2014, answer due 8/18/2014. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
50 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 45 Amended Complaint by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, and Kim Thomas. (Smith, John) Modified on 8/11/2014 to add additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
51 ORDER granting 50 Motion for Extension of Time and the time for defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint is EXTENDED to and including 8/29/2014. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/8/14. (djy, ) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
***Attorney David Randall Boyd added for Alabama Department of Corrections. Attorney William Richard Lunsford, and Mitesh Shah added for Ruth Naglich, and

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 109 of 408

08/08/2014 08/29/2014 09/03/2014 09/04/2014 09/04/2014 09/04/2014
09/04/2014 09/04/2014 09/05/2014 09/05/2014
09/05/2014 09/11/2014 09/16/2014

Kim Thomas. (dmn, )(see Doc. 50 for pdf) (Entered: 08/11/2014)
***Attorney Michael Leon Edwards, and Susan Nettles Han added for Alabama Department of Corrections. (dmn, )(see Doc. 50 for pdf) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
52 ANSWER to 45 Amended Complaint (First) by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Kim Thomas.(Smith, John) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
53 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Kim Thomas. (Smith, John) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
54 NOTICE of Appearance by Alyce Robertson Addison on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Addison, Alyce) (Entered: 09/04/2014)
55 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth Anne Sees on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Sees, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/04/2014)
56 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Howard Carter, Joshua Dunn, Daletrick Hardy, Leviticus Pruitt, Robert Myniasha Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41, # 42 Exhibit 42, # 43 Exhibit 43, # 44 Exhibit 44, # 45 Exhibit 45, # 46 Exhibit 46)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/04/2014)
BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of 56 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Howard Carter, Joshua Dunn, Daletrick Hardy, Leviticus Pruitt, Robert Myniasha Williams. (dmn, ) (This document has no pdf attached, see Doc. 56 for pdf.) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
***Attorney Latasha Lanette Mccrary added for All Plaintiffs. (dmn, ) (see Doc. 56 for pdf) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
57 RULE 26(f) ORDER directing the parties to file the Rule 26(f) report containing the proposed discovery plan as further set out in the order. Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 9/26/2014. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/5/2014. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
58 BRIEFING ORDER re 56 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Daletrick Hardy, Joshua Dunn, Leviticus Pruitt, Howard Carter, Robert Myniasha Williams. Motion Submission Deadline set for 10/3/2014 without oral argument. It is further ORDERED that the defendants file a response, which shall include a brief, on or before 9/26/2014. The plaintiffs may file a reply brief on or before 10/3/2014. ORDER setting out briefing schedules for dispositive motions. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/5/2014. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
59 NOTICE of Appearance by Anne Adams Hill on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Hill, Anne) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
60 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
61 [VACATED PURSUANT TO COURT 238 ORDER.] ORDER: It is ORDERED that the terms of the discovery plan set out in the 60 Report are ADOPTED and INCORPORATED herein, and that the deadlines pertaining to the class certification phase of the litigation are as follows: (1) Plaintiffs shall submit their expert disclosure(s) to Defendants on or before 6/3/2015, and shall make their expert(s) available for deposition on or before 7/24/2015. Defendants shall submit their expert disclosure(s) to Plaintiffs on or before 7/1/2015, and shall make their expert(s) available for deposition on or before 8/14/2015. (2) Motions to Amend the pleadings and to add parties shall be filed (a) by Plaintiffs on or before 2/20/2015; (b) by Defendants on or before 3/6/2015. (3) Plaintiffs shall file any motion for class certification and supporting materials on or before 9/4/2015. Discovery related to class certification will cease when the motion is filed. The parties shall follow the

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 110 of 408

09/26/2014 10/03/2014
11/17/2014 11/19/2014 11/20/2014 11/21/2014
11/24/2014 11/24/2014 11/25/2014

briefing schedule set out in the 60 Report, but when briefing the class certification motion, the parties should adhere to the court's 58 General Briefing Order. It is further ORDERED that within 30 days of the court's ruling on class certification, the parties shall meet and confer about any remaining discovery issues and shall jointly submit a report proposing deadlines for final discovery, the submission of dispositive motions, and a trial setting. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/16/2014. (dmn, ) Modified on 9/4/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 09/16/2014)
62 RESPONSE in Opposition re 56 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Kim Thomas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Smith, John) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
63 REPLY to Response to Motion re 56 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Regarding Razor Blades filed by Howard Carter, Joshua Dunn, Daletrick Hardy, Leviticus Pruitt, Robert Myniasha Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− ADOC Administrative Regulation 435, # 2 Exhibit 2 − ADOC Administrative Regulation 434, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Reply Declaration of Daletrick Hardy Regarding Razor Blades, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Reply Declaration of Jonathan Sanford Regarding Razor Blades, # 5 Exhibit 5 − ADOC 1977 Handbook of Rules and Information for Inmates (excerpt), # 6 Exhibit 6 − Reply Declaration of Richard Businelle Regarding Razor Blades, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Reply Declaration of Robert Dillard Regarding Razor Blades, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Reply Declaration of Richard Terrell Regarding Razor Blades, # 9 Exhibit 9 − ADOC Administrative Regulation 613, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Administrative Regulation 602, # 11 Exhibit 11 − Monthly Report of MHM to ADOC, April 2014 (excerpt), # 12 Exhibit 12 − Reply Declaration of Jamie Wallace Regarding Razor Blades, # 13 Exhibit 13 − Reply Declaration of William Villar Regarding Razor Blades)(McCrary, Latasha) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
64 Case REASSIGNED to Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Chief Judge William Keith Watkins no longer assigned to the case. (scn, ) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 11/24/2014 10:30 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
65 MOTION for Leave to Depose Incarcerated Plaintiffs by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Kim Thomas. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/20/2014)
66 ORDER that the 65 Motion for Leave to Depose Incarcerated Named Plaintiffs is GRANTED as further set out in the order. The persons having custody of JOSHUA DUNN, DALETRICK HARDY, BRIAN SELLERS, HUBERT TOLLAR, RICK MARTIN, HOWARD CARTER, SYLVESTER HARTLEY, CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, and QUANG BUI are DIRECTED to prodice each plaintiff for deposition. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 11/21/2014. Copy furnished to Transfer Agent. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
67 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/24/2014 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:39 − 11:21.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
68 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
69 ORDER as follows: (1) The plaintiffs' 56 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction is set for an Evidentiary Hearing on 2/9/2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The court hopes the evidentiary hearing will last no more than five days. (2) Before 12/19/2014, the parties are to file a joint statement of the agreed−upon facts and a joint statement setting forth the different versions of the not−agreed−upon facts for the preliminary−injunction hearing. (3) By 2/2/2015, all discovery for the preliminary−injunction hearing is to be completed. (5) By 2/5/2015, the parties are to meet and notify the court which exhibits are admissible by agreement and which are not. By said date, they are also to submit to the courtroom deputy, for marking, copies of all exhibits. (6) The time−period for responding to discovery relating to the preliminary−injunction hearing is shortened to three−business days. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/25/2014. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/25/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 111 of 408

11/25/2014 11/26/2014 11/26/2014
12/01/2014 12/02/2014 12/09/2014 12/11/2014
12/11/2014

70 PROTECTIVE ORDER granting 68 Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Protective Order as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 11/25/2014. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
71 ORDER: It is ORDERED that, by January 16, 2015, the parties are to get with the Magistrate Judge and the U.S. Marshal to arrange for the presence of any state inmates at the hearing on the preliminary−injunction motion currently scheduled for February 9, 2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/26/2014. Copies furnished to USM, Transfer Agent. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/26/2014)
72 [VACATED PURSUANT TO COURT 238 ORDER.] ORDER: On 11/24/2014, this court held an on−the−record conference call with counsel for all parties present. It is ORDERED that the 61 Scheduling Order is amended as follows and as further set out in the order: Non−Jury Trial set for 3/14/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Final Pretrial Conference set for 2/1/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 1/27/2016. The class certification motion is set for Oral Argument on 6/24/2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The court will have a resolution of the class certification issue by 7/15/2015. Discovery due by 11/2/2015. Motions due by 10/2/2015. By no later than 28 days before trial, the parties are to get with the Magistrate Judge and the U.S. Marshal to arrange for the presence of any state inmates. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/26/2014. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG, Transfer Agent, USM.(dmn, ) Modified on 9/9/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 11/26/2014)
73 ORDER: With regard to the upcoming preliminary−injunction hearing, it is ORDERED that an on−the−record in−person Status Conference is set for 1/29/2015 at 10:00 AM in chambers library in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/1/2014. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG.(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/01/2014)
74 NOTICE of Appearance by Valentina Restrepo on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Restrepo, Valentina) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
75 ORDER that the clerk of the court is to mail (or email) to counsel for all parties in this case the current filings in McBee v. Daniels, 2:14cv1204−MHT (M.D. Ala.). While the court believes that all counsel should be aware of some of the claims in the pro se McBee lawsuit, the court is not suggesting that the McBee claims have merit, that they should be part of the Dunn litigation, or that counsel should be appointed to represent McBee. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/9/2014. Copies mailed and emailed to counsel as directed.(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/09/2014)
76 ORDER: Having considered the mutual consent of the parties as well as the nature of this action, the court finds that this matter is appropriate for mediation pursuant to Rule 16.1 of this court's Local Rules. Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) All aspects of mediation shall be private, confidential, and privileged from discovery. Furthermore, the mediator is disqualified as a witness, consultant, attorney, or expert in any pending or future action relating to the dispute, including actions between persons not parties to the mediation process. No subpoenas, citations, writs, discovery paper, or other process shall be served at or near the location of any mediation session upon any person entering, leaving, or attending any mediation session. (2) Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the court hereby appoints G. Douglas Jones, Esq., as mediator in this matter. The costs of mediation shall be borne equally by the parties. Counsel and the parties shall endeavor in good faith to resolve the case through mediation. Each party must be represented at the mediation by a representative or representatives with full authority to negotiate a settlement. The mediation shall be completed on or before March 6, 2015. Within ten (10) days following mediation, the mediator will report to the court only that a settlement was reached or mediation was conducted and no settlement agreements were reached, whether each party acted in good faith to resolve the matter, and nothing more. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/11/2014. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/11/2014)
77 NOTICE of Appearance by William Glassell Somerville, III on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Somerville, William) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 112 of 408

12/11/2014 12/18/2014 12/19/2014 12/19/2014 12/31/2014
01/09/2015 01/12/2015 01/12/2015 01/13/2015 01/14/2015 01/16/2015
02/17/2015 02/19/2015

***Attorney Brent T. Rosen, William Glassell Somerville, III, and Andrew Philip Walsh added for All Plaintiffs. (dmn, ) (see Doc. 77 for pdf) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 12/19/2014 01:30 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
78 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 12/19/2014 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 1:32 − 1:41.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
79 ORDERED that the 12/19/2014, deadline for parties to file a joint statement setting forth the agreed−upon facts and the not−agreed−upon facts for the preliminary injunction hearing is extended to 1/9/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/19/2014. (wcl, ) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
80 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Telephone Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on November 24, 2014, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/21/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/31/2015. (djy, ) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
81 ORDER: At the request of the parties, it is ORDERED that the 12/19/2014 deadline for parties to file a joint statement setting forth the agreed−upon facts and the not−agreed−upon facts for the preliminary injunction hearing is extended further to 1/12/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/9/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
82 Response to 69 Order, 56 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Joint Request for Continuance of Evidentiary Hearing by Howard Carter, Joshua Dunn, Daletrick Hardy, Leviticus Pruitt, Robert Myniasha Williams. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 1/13/2015 to clean up text and reflect this document is a "Joint Request" (Motion). (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
JOINT REQUEST for Continuance of Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiffs' 56 Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Howard Carter, Joshua Dunn, Daletrick Hardy, Leviticus Pruitt, Robert Myniasha Williams. (dmn, ) (This document has no pdf attached, see Doc. 82 for pdf.) (Entered: 01/13/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 1/14/2015 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/13/2015)
83 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/14/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:07 − 10:16.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
84 ORDER: Pursuant to the parties' 82 Memorandum of Understanding and based on the representations made on the record on 1/14/2015, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The 82 Joint Request for Continuance is granted. (2) The 56 Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied without prejudice, with leave to renew on or before 4/13/2015, and with leave then to be reinstated as if it had been filed on the original filing date. If the motion is renewed and reinstated, the court will set a new hearing date after conferring with counsel for the parties. (3) The Status Conference set for 1/29/2015, and the Evidentiary Hearing set for 2/9/2015 are canceled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/16/2014. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
85 NOTICE of Appearance by Janine Alicia McKinnon on behalf of Ruth Naglich, Kim Thomas (McKinnon, Janine) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
86 MOTION for Extension of Pre−Trial Deadlines Class Certification and Discovery Deadlines re 72 Order, by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/20/2015 to clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/19/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 113 of 408

02/20/2015
02/20/2015 02/20/2015 02/23/2015 02/23/2015
02/24/2015 02/24/2015 02/24/2015 02/26/2015 02/26/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 03/02/2015

87 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Relating to Performance Audits by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Medical care audit tools, # 2 Exhibit Mental health audit tools, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs' First Requests, # 4 Exhibit Defendants' Responses, # 5 Exhibit Emails re setting meet and confer, # 6 Exhibit Plaintiffs' meet and confer letter, # 7 Exhibit Official Capacity Defendants' meet and confer letter, # 8 Exhibit ADOC meet and confer letter, # 9 Exhibit Plaintiffs' 2nd meet and confer letter, # 10 Exhibit Defendants' 2nd meet and confer letter, # 11 Exhibit Scott v Clarke, # 12 Exhibit Excerpts of Linton Deposition)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
88 ORDER that plaintiffs' 86 Motion for Extension of Deadlines is set for an in−person hearing on 3/2/2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Defendants are to file a response to the motion by no later than 2/24/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/20/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
89 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit Scott v Clarke 11−20−14 Order, # 3 Exhibit Scott v. Clarke 11−25−14 Order, # 4 Exhibit Huntsville − Order)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
90 ORDER that plaintiffs' 89 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is granted. The court assumes that defendants have no objection to the allowance of the amendment; however, if they do, they must file their objection within seven days from the date of this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/23/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
91 ORDER re 87 Motion to Compel Production of Documents Relating to Performance Audits filed by All Plaintiffs. Oral Argument set for 3/2/2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. The opposing party shall file a written response not later than two (2) days prior to argument. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 2/23/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB.(dmn, ) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
92 Joint MOTION for Teleconference by Ruth Naglich, Kim Thomas (Billy Sharp), Alabama Department of Corrections, and All Plaintiffs. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 2/25/2015 to add additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference re 92 Joint Motion for Telephone Conference set for 2/26/2015 08:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
93 TEXT ORDER granting 92 Motion for telephone conference. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/24/2015. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
94 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/26/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 8:13 − 8:41.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/26/2015)
95 MOTION to Withdraw 87 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Relating to Performance Audits by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/26/2015)
96 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Addison, Alyce) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
97 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on 2/26/2015, it is ORDERED that the motion for extension (doc. no. 86 ) is granted only to the extent that the parties, with the help of mediator Douglas Jones, are to submit proposed new deadlines by 3/2/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/27/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
98 ORDER as follows: (1) The 95 Motion to Withdraw the 87 Motion to Compel is GRANTED; and (2) The Oral Argument set before the undersigned on 3/2/2015 is CANCELLED. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 2/27/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB.(dmn, ) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
99 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Billy Sharp, Ruth Naglich, and Alabama Department of

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 114 of 408

03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/03/2015
03/05/2015 03/05/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/13/2015
03/16/2015

Corrections, adding Paul Folsom as newly named Plaintiff, filed by All Plaintiffs.(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/3/2015 to reflect actual title, to correct filer, and to add name of newly named plaintiff. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
100 TEXT ORDER granting 96 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on March 2, 2015. (No PDF document attached to this entry.) (scn, ) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
*** Attorney Alyce Robertson Addison terminated. (scn, ) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
101 Joint MOTION for Extension of All Pre−Trial Deadlines in the 72 Scheduling Order, and the 76 Order regarding the the deadline for completing mediation, by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/3/2015 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
102 [VACATED PURSUANT TO COURT 238 ORDER.] ORDER that the 101 Joint Motion for Extension is granted and that the 72 Scheduling Order is amended as further set out in the order and as follows: Class certification motion, with brief due by 8/3/2015. Opposition brief due 8/17/2015. Reply brief due by 8/24/2015. Class Certification hearing (Oral Argument) set for 8/26/2015 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Decision on class certification due by 9/16/2015. Dispositive motions & Daubert motions due 12/21/2015. Discovery due by 1/11/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/3/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (Deadline terminated: Oral Argument set for 6/24/2015.)(dmn, ) Modified on 9/9/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 03/03/2015)
103 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answers to 99 Second Amended Complaint, by Alabama Department of Corrections, and Billy Sharp. (Smith, John) Modified on 3/6/2015 to add additional filer and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/05/2015)
104 TEXT ORDER granting 103 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Answer due from Alabama Department of Corrections on 3/30/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/5/2015. (dmn, )(NO PDF attached) (Entered: 03/05/2015)
105 NOTICE of Appearance by Gregory Martin Zarzaur on behalf of Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Zarzaur, Gregory) (Main Document 105 replaced on 3/6/2015 to correct caption and certificate of service.) (dmn, ). Modified on 3/6/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 03/06/2015)
106 NOTICE of Correction re 105 Notice of Appearance. The original pdf contained typographical errors and did not contain a proper electronic signature. The corrected pdf is attached to this notice. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected pdf of Doc. 105 )(dmn, ) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
107 NOTICE of Appearance by Diandra Sima Debrosse on behalf of Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Zarzaur, Gregory) Modified on 3/9/2015 to include correct name of attorney requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
108 NOTICE of Appearance by Anil A. Mujumdar on behalf of Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Zarzaur, Gregory) Modified on 3/9/2015 to include correct name of attorney requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
***Attorney Anil Ashok Mujumdar, and Diandra S Debrosse added for Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (dmn, ) (see Doc. 107 and 108 for pdfs) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
109 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Relating to Non−Plaintiffs by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for Production of Documents, # 2 Exhibit 2 − The States Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for Production of Documents, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Excerpts of Deposition Transcript, May 9, 2013 Deposition of Larry Linton)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
110 ORDER Setting oral argument on the 109 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents : for 3/31/2015 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer, in Courtroom 4A, US Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL; the opposing party shall file a written response no later than 2 days prior to argument. Signed by Honorable

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 115 of 408

03/18/2015 03/20/2015
03/20/2015 03/20/2015
03/20/2015 03/20/2015 03/20/2015 03/20/2015 03/20/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/25/2015 03/26/2015

Judge Terry F. Moorer on 3/16/15. Furnished to calendar group & CB.(djy, ) (Entered: 03/16/2015)
111 MOTION to Dismiss Jonathan Sanford as a Plaintiff by Jonathan Sanford. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
112 ORDER that: (1) The 111 Request to Dismiss is granted. (2) (2) Plaintiff Jonathan Sanfords claims are dismissed without prejudice, and he is terminated as a party to this action. The court assumes that the defendants have noobjection to the allowance of the dismissal; however, if they do, they must file the objection within seven days from the date of this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/20/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
113 Motion for Alison Hardy to Appear Pro Hac Vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/23/2015 to add name of attorney requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
114 Motion for Donald Spencer to Appear Pro Hac Vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Admitting Donald Specter)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/23/2015 to add name of attorney requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
115 Motion for Sara Norman to Appear Pro Hac Vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Admitting Sara Norman)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/23/2015 to add attorney name requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
116 Motion for Corene Kendrick to Appear Pro Hac Vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Admitting Corene Kendrick)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/23/2015 to add attorney name requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
117 Motion for Rebekah Evenson to Appear Pro Hac Vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Admitting Rebekah Evenson)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/23/2015 to add attorney name requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
118 Pro Hac Vice Filing fees for Alison Hardy, Donald Specter, Sara Norman, Corene Kendrick, and Rebekah Evenson received re Motions (Doc. Nos. 113 , 114 , 115 , 116 , and 117 ): $ 250.00, receipt number 4602036131 (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
***Attorney Donald H. Specter,Alison Hardy,Sara Linda Norman,Corene T. Kendrick, and Rebekah B. Evenson added PRO HAC VICE for All Plaintiffs. (dmn, )(see Doc. Nos. 113 , 114 , 115 , 116 , and 117 for pdfs) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
119 TEXT ORDER granting 113 Motion for Alison Hardy to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/23/2015. (dmn, ) (NO PDF attached) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
120 TEXT ORDER granting 114 Motion for Donald Spencer to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/23/2015. (dmn, ) (NO PDF attached) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
121 TEXT ORDER granting 115 Motion for Sara Norman to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/23/2015. (dmn, ) (NO PDF attached) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
123 TEXT ORDER granting 116 Motion for Corene Kendrick to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/23/2015. (dmn, ) (NO PDF attached) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
122 TEXT ORDER granting 117 Motion for Rebekah Evenson to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/23/2015. (dmn, ) (NO PDF attached) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
124 MOTION for Protective Order To Treat Plaintiffs' Medical Records As Confidential by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Turner Rogers Excerpt)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
125 SUGGESTION OF DEATH Upon the Record as to Plaintiff Bobby Copeland by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 03/26/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 116 of 408

03/26/2015 03/30/2015 03/30/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 04/01/2015 04/08/2015 04/08/2015
04/08/2015 04/08/2015 04/10/2015 04/13/2015

126 RESPONSE in Opposition re 109 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Relating to Non−Plaintiffs filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Billy Sharp. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit of Ruth Naglich)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
127 Partial MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint, by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Billy Sharp. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/31/2015 to clarify docket text pursuant to PDF document (scn, ). (Entered: 03/30/2015)
128 ANSWER to 99 Second Amended Complaint, by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Billy Sharp.(Smith, John) Modified on 3/31/2015 to correct docket text, remove relationship to 1 Complaint and create relationship to 99 Second Amended Complaint (scn, ). (Entered: 03/30/2015)
129 NOTICE of Non−Compliance to Attorneys Alison Hardy, Corene T. Kendrick, Donald H. Specter, Rebekah B. Evenson, and Sara Linda Norman. (Attachments: # 1 Standing ORDER, # 2 Form)(scn, ) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
NOTICE of Docket Text Correction re 128 Answer to reflect correcting docket text to Answer to 99 Second Amended Complaint and to correct docket relationships. (No PDF document attached to this entry.) (scn, ) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
131 Minute Entry for Motion Hearing re: 109 Motion to Compel Production of Documents relating to Non−Plaintiffs held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 3/31/2015. (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:09−11:43.) (cb, ) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
130 ORDER directing that the 127 MOTION to Dismiss is set for Submission, without oral argument, on 4/22/2015, with any Opposition brief due by 4/15/2015, and any Reply to the opposition due by 4/22/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/1/15. (djy, ) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
132 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Donald Specter, Alison Hardy, Sara Norman, Rebekah Evenson, and Corene Kendrick by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kendrick, Corene) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
133 ORDER re 109 Motion to Compel Production of Document Relating to Non−Plaintiffs. ORDER as follows: (1) Both pre−class certification discovery and discovery on the merits of the claims shall proceed as previously scheduled. (2) To the extent the plaintiffs seek records relating to pregnancy, the Motion to Compel is DENIED as further set out in the order. (3) To the extent the parties seek to discovery medical and mental health records of non−plaintiffs, the Motion to Compel is GRANTED with the aforementioned limitations as further set out in the order. The defendants and/or entity in possession of the pharmaceutical records shall produce such information to the plaintiffs on or before June 9, 2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
134 TEXT ORDER granting 132 Motion for Donald Specter, Alison Hardy, Sara Norman, Rebekah Evenson, and Corene Kendrick to Withdraw as Attorneys. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/8/2015. (dmn, ) (NO PDF attached) Modified on 4/8/2015 to include Alison Hardy as one of the attorneys withdrawing, inadvertently left out when filed. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
*** Attorney Corene Kendrick; Sara Linda Norman; Donald Specter; Rebekah B Evenson and Alison Hardy terminated pursuant to Court Text Order (Doc. #134). (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
135 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 84 Order, by Alabama Department of Corrections, Joshua Dunn, Ruth Naglich, and All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Amendment to MOU)(Smith, John) Modified on 4/13/2015 to add additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
136 ORDER: Pursuant to the 135 Joint Request, it is ORDERED that Jefferson S. Dunn shall replace Billy Sharp as a defendant in this case, as to all future filings as well as to the docket sheet. Jefferson S. Dunn substituted for Billy Sharp (in his official capacity as Interim Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections). Attorney Janine McKinnon McAdory, John Garland Smith, Mitesh Shah, and William

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 117 of 408

04/13/2015
04/13/2015 04/14/2015 04/15/2015 04/20/2015 04/21/2015 04/21/2015
04/21/2015 04/22/2015 04/24/2015 04/24/2015

Richard Lunsford added for Jefferson S. Dunn. Attorney Mitesh Shah; John Garland Smith; William Richard Lunsford and Janine McKinnon McAdory terminated as counsel for Billy Sharp. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/13/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
137 ORDER as follows: (1) The 135 Joint Request regarding plaintiffs' motion is granted. (2) The 84 Order of 1/16/2015 is amended to allow plaintiffs until 5/13/2015, to renew their motion for preliminary injunction with regard to Easterling Correctional Facility, the segregation units at Holman, Bibb, and St. Clair Correctional Facilities, and L Dorm at Kilby Correctional Facility. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/13/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
138 ORDER directing defendants TO SHOW CAUSE as to why the 124 Motion to Treat Plaintiffs' Medical Records as Confidential, consistent with the Protective Order previously entered in this matter, should not be granted. Show Cause Response due by 4/28/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/13/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
139 INTERIM MEDIATION REPORT filed in response to 102 Order, by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) Modified on 4/15/2015 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
140 RESPONSE in Opposition re 127 Partial MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Zerrick Naylor, Bradley Pearson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Sentencing Orders for Bradley Pearson, # 2 Exhibit 2− Sentencing Order for Zerrick Naylor, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Order of Probation for Bradley Pearson)(McCrary, Latasha) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
141 MOTION to Withdraw William Villar as a Named Plaintiff by William Villar. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
142 ORDER that, in the future, all motions must bear the notation in their styles as to whether they are "unopposed" or "opposed" by the non−movants. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/20/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
143 JUDGMENT: It is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that plaintiffs' 141 Motion for William Villar to Withdraw as a named plaintiff is granted and that plaintiff Villar is dismissed and terminated as a party with prejudice. The court assumes that the non−movants have no objection to the allowance of the dismissal; however, if they do, they must file the objection within seven days from the date of this judgment. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to FRCP 58. This case is not closed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/20/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
144 Response to Order re 133 Order on Motion to Compel,,, Objection to Magistrate Judge's Order by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Wilcox Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Shulman Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Blanck Declaration)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
145 REPLY to Plaintiffs' 140 Opposition to 127 Partial MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 4/23/2015 to create link to Doc. 140 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
146 Response to Order re 133 Order on Motion to Compel,,, 144 Response to Order, Corrected Objection to Magistrate Judge's Order (Corrections to Exhibits Only) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Wilcox Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Shulman Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Blanck Declaration)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
147 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/31/2015, before Judge Terry F. Moorer; Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405; Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction; After that date it may be obtained through PACER; NOTICE OF

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 118 of 408

04/28/2015 04/28/2015
04/28/2015 04/29/2015 04/30/2015
04/30/2015
04/30/2015
04/30/2015 04/30/2015

INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS; Redaction Request due 5/15/2015; Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/26/2015; Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/23/2015. (wcl, ) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
148 NOTICE of Appearance by Rhonda C. Brownstein on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Brownstein, Rhonda) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
149 UNOPPOSED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Its Response to Named Plaintiffs' Motion to Treat Named Plaintiffs' Medical Records as Confidential by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Smith, John) (Additional attachment(s) (FILED UNDER SEAL conventionally) added on 4/29/2015 : # 2 Response, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F) (dmn, ). Modified on 4/29/2015 to include Response with Exhibits FILED UNDER SEAL pending ruling on Motion. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
151 *SEALED* RESPONSE to Named Plaintiffs' 124 MOTION to Treat Named Plaintiffs' Medical Records as Confidential filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(dmn, ) (FILED UNDER SEAL pursuant to Court 150 Order.) (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
150 ORDER that the unopposed 149 Motion to File its Response to Named Plaintiffs' Motion to Treat Named Plaintiffs' Medical Records as Confidential Under Seal filed by Defendants be and is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file the Response and any attachments thereto under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/29/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
152 MOTION to Compel ADEQUATE SITE INSPECTIONS BY EXPERTS AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER BY THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE (OPPOSED) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Hackney Email re Site Visits, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Smith & McCrary Emails re Site Visits, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Lunsford Email re Site Visits, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Wilcox Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 5− Blanck Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Vail Declaration, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Excerpt of Shansky Declaration − Coleman/Plata, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Excerpt of Stern Declaration − Dockery, # 9 Exhibit 9 − Excerpt of LaMarre Declaration − Dockery, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Excerpt of Vail Declaration − Dockery, # 11 Exhibit 11 − Minute Order in Hernandez re Expert Inspections)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
153 ORDER that a Scheduling and Status Conference and Oral Argument on this matter be and is hereby set on 5/8/2015 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 4A in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. The parties should be prepared to discuss whether modification of the scheduling order is appropriate, specifically whether bifurcation of discovery is appropriate, whether discovery is feasible within the current trial schedule, and/or whether other options are available for conducting discovery which is practical for all parties. The parties should also be prepared to discuss all 30 discovery requests. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/30/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB.(dmn, ) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
154 ORDER: Because the magistrate judge has today entered an order setting a status conference for 5/8/2015, to revisit, apparently, all discovery matters, it is ORDERED that the court will not, in the meantime, address plaintiff's 144 objection to the magistrate judge's order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents relating to non−plaintiffs and their 152 motion to compel adequate site inspections by experts and request for expedited resolution of this matter by the district court judge. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/30/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
155 Unopposed MOTION to Dismiss 8th Amendment Claims of Plaintiff Jermaine Mitchell by Jermaine Mitchell. (Hackney, James) Modified on 5/1/2015 to include "unopposed." (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
Set/Reset Hearing: Class Certification Hearing (Oral Argument) set for 8/26/2015 at 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson placed back on docket; terminated in error on 4/30/2015 when another oral argument hearing was set; overrode original setting. (dmn, )(NO PDF attached) (Entered: 05/12/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 119 of 408

04/30/2015 05/01/2015 05/07/2015
05/08/2015 05/08/2015 05/11/2015 05/12/2015 05/12/2015
05/12/2015
05/14/2015 05/14/2015 05/18/2015 05/18/2015 05/19/2015

MOTION for Expedited Resolution by the District Judget by All Plaintiffs. (dmn, ) (This document has no pdf attached, see Doc. 152 for pdf.) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
156 ORDER as follows: (1) Plaintiff Jermaine Mitchell's 155 Unopposed Motion to Dismiss is granted. (2) Plaintiff Mitchell's 8th Amendment claims are dismissed. (3) Plaintiff Mitchell's ADA claims remain pending. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/1/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/01/2015)
157 RESPONSE in Opposition re 152 MOTION to Compel ADEQUATE SITE INSPECTIONS BY EXPERTS AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER BY THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE (OPPOSED) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/07/2015)
158 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Stewart, Joseph) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
160 Minute Entry for Oral Argument, Status and Scheduling conferences held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer held on 5/8/2015 (PDF available for court use only)(Recording Time 9:15−4:54.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
159 NOTICE of Appearance by John Eric Getty on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Getty, John) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
161 NOTICE of Appearance by Glenn Nelson Baxter on behalf of Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Baxter, Glenn) (Entered: 05/12/2015)
162 MOTION for Extension of Deadline All Deadlines Relating to Class Certification re 102 Order, Terminate Motions, Set Deadlines/Hearings, Set Scheduling Order Deadlines,,,,,,,, UNOPPOSED by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Email exchange between M. Morris, W. Lunsford and M. Shah, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Excerpt of docket, Scott v. Clarke)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/12/2015)
163 ORDER: On 5/8/2015, this court held Oral Argument on the Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Order Granting the Motion to Compel Production of Documents relating to Non−Plaintiffs. The court notes that most of the Plaintiffs requests are overbroad; however, because the goal of the undersigned is to enter a ruling which will effectively prepare the parties for trial set on 3/16/2016, the court declines to deny the majority of requests in their entirety. It is ORDERED that the 133 Order entered by the undersigned on 4/8/2015 be and is hereby MODIFIED as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 5/12/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/12/2015)
164 PROTECTIVE ORDER granting 124 Motion for a HIPAA Protective Order as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 5/14/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
165 SUGGESTION OF DEATH Upon the Record as to Plaintiff Cherry Baker by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference re 144 Appeal, 152 Discovery Motion, 162 Motion for Extension of deadlines and [125 and 165] Suggestions of Death set for 5/18/2015 04:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
166 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 5/18/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 4:08 − 4:39.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
167 ORDER ON APPEALS FROM MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDERS: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) With regard to the magistrate judge's discovery 133 Order, the plaintiffs' 144 Objection is overruled without prejudice. (2) With regard to the magistrate judge's discovery 163 Order, the plaintiffs are to file an objection, if any, by 5:00 p.m. on 5/19/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/19/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/19/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 120 of 408

05/19/2015
05/19/2015 05/19/2015
05/19/2015
05/19/2015
05/19/2015 05/20/2015 05/20/2015 05/20/2015

168 ORDER ON SUGGESTIONS OF DEATHS: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) In light of the suggestions of the deaths of plaintiffs Sherry Baker and Bobby Copeland (doc. nos. 165 and 125 ), if the plaintiffs' counsel intend to replace these plaintiffs with other inmates (as opposed to making a substitution pursuant to Rule 25(a) of the FRCP), the plaintiffs counsel are to make the replacements by no later than 6/23/2015. (2) If the plaintiffs counsel agree that there should be no substitution pursuant to Rule 25(a), the plaintiffs counsel are to dismiss plaintiffs Baker and Copeland by no later than 6/23/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/19/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
169 EXPERT SITE INSPECTION ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The plaintiffs' 152 Request for Expedited Resolution by the District Judge is denied as moot. (2) The plaintiffs' 152 Motion to Compel Adequate Site Inspections by Experts is referred to the magistrate judge for initial resolution. (3) The expert site inspections now scheduled or in progress are to be proceed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/19/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
170 [VACATED PURSUANT TO COURT 238 ORDER.] SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULING ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The plaintiffs' 162 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Deadlines relating to Class Certification is granted. (2) The 72 Scheduling Order is further amended as follows: (A) The schedule for class−certification proceedings, including the hearing set for 8/26/2015, set forth in the amendment to the scheduling order (doc. no. 102 ) is canceled. (B) The schedule for class−certification proceedings should instead be in two phases as further set out in the order. (C) The following other deadlines in the amendment to the 102 Scheduling Order are to remain the same as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/19/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (Deadline terminated: Class Certification Hearing (Oral Argument) set for 8/26/2015.) (dmn, ) Modified on 9/9/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 05/19/2015)
171 STATUS CONFERENCES ORDER: It is ORDERED that status conferences (in which the court will discuss discovery progress as well as any other matters of concern) are set for the following dates, Status Conference set for 6/24/2015 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, Status Conference set for 8/26/2015 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, Status Conference set for 10/28/2015 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, Status Conference set for 12/22/2015 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Three business days prior to each status conference, the parties are to file a joint report as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/19/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
172 ORDER: Pursuant to the 102 Amended Scheduling Order, the parties were on yesterday, 5/18/2015, to have filed a second joint interim mediation report, but did not do so. Because this is the second time the parties have missed a deadline (they failed to file the first joint interim mediation report on 4/10/2015), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) By 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, 5/20/2015, the parties are to file the second joint interim mediation report. (2) By 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, 5/20/2015, counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants are to file separate statements as to why they are missing deadlines and what they propose to do to assure that future deadlines are not missed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/19/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
173 OBJECTION to the Magistrate Judge's 163 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents Relating to Non−Plaintiffs (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Walsh, Andrew) Modified on 5/20/2015 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
174 Response to Order re 172 Order,, by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
175 SECOND INTERIM MEDIATION REPORT filed in response to this Court's Orders (Doc. 102 and 172 ), by All Plaintiffs. (Somerville, William) Modified on 5/20/2015 to create links to Doc. 102 and 172 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
176 STATEMENT regarding Missed Deadlines filed in response to Court 172 Order, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Somerville, William) Modified on 5/20/2015 to create link to Doc.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 121 of 408

05/20/2015 05/21/2015
05/22/2015
05/22/2015 05/22/2015 05/22/2015
05/22/2015 05/22/2015 05/22/2015 05/22/2015 05/22/2015 05/26/2015

172 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
177 ORDER that Oral Argument on the 152 Motion to Compel Adequate Site Inspections by Experts be and is hereby set on 6/5/2015 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 4A in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 6/20/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
178 SEALED Emergency MOTION for Hearing in camera on Possible Intentional Spoliation of Evidence by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of B Strength, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of M Morris, # 3 Exhibit C − Photographs of Shredded Documents, # 4 Exhibit D − Declaration of S Attwood, # 5 Exhibit E − Email between M Morris & B Lunsford)(Brownstein, Rhonda) (FILED UNDER SEAL PURSUANT TO COURT 179 ORDER.] Modified on 5/22/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 05/21/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference 178 Emergency MOTION for Hearing in camera on Possible Intentional Spoliation of Evidence by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of B Strength, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of M Morris, # 3 Exhibit C − Photographs of Shredded Documents, # 4 Exhibit D − Declaration of S Attwood, # 5 Exhibit E − Email between M Morris & B Lunsford) set for 5/22/2015 12:45 PM in by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
179 ORDER: At the oral request of counsel for defendants, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff's 178 Emergency Motion for Hearing is placed under seal pending a conference call on the motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
180 NOTICE of Appearance by Jack Richard Cohen on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Cohen, Jack) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
181 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on 5/22/2015, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The plaintiffs emergency motion for hearing (doc. no. 178 ) shall remain under seal until further order of the court. (2) All filings related to this motion shall also be under seal. So as to assure that the clerks office knows to seal a document, the filer should note in the style under the case number the following: "Sealed per order (doc. no. 181 )." Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
182 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on 5/22/2015, it is ORDERED that the defendants are allowed until 5/27/2015, to file a response to the plaintiffs' objection (doc. no. 173 ) to the magistrate judge's amended discovery order (doc. no. 163 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
183 SEALED ORDER re 178 Motion for Emergency Hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
184 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on May 22, 2015, it is ORDERED that 4 of the second interim mediation report (doc. no. 175 ) is struck. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
185 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on May 22, 2015, it is ORDERED that the parties are to file, by 9:00 a.m. on May 26, 2015, their resolution of the randomness issue raised in plaintiffs objection (doc. no. 173 ) to the magistrate judges amended discovery order (doc. no. 163 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
187 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 5/22/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 1:03 − 2:08 and 2:37 − 2:42.) (ajr, ) (Entered: 05/26/2015)
186 STIPULATION Regarding Selection of Documents For Production by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 5/28/2015 to include additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/26/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 122 of 408

05/27/2015 05/27/2015 06/02/2015
06/02/2015 06/03/2015
06/03/2015 06/04/2015
06/04/2015
06/05/2015 06/08/2015 06/08/2015 06/09/2015 06/10/2015

188 ORDER that the 186 Stipulation is adopted as the order of the court and thus the parties are to comply with the stipulation as an order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/27/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
189 RESPONSE to Named Plaintiffs' 173 Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Order Granting Named Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 5/28/2015 to clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
190 NOTICE of Appearance by Mitchell David Greggs on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Greggs, Mitchell) Modified on 6/2/2015 to remove Alabama Department of Corrections as a filer; and to add Jefferson S. Dunn as the correct filer, wrong party selected when filing. (dmn, ) (Main Document 190 replaced on 6/2/2015 to remove an attorney's name.) (dmn, ). (Entered: 06/02/2015)
191 NOTICE of Correction re 190 Notice of Appearance. The original pdf contained one attorney name in error. The corrected pdf is attached to this notice. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected pdf of Doc. 190 )(dmn, ) (Entered: 06/02/2015)
192 ORDER that the Oral Argument set on 6/5/2015 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 4A is RESET to be conducted by telephone conference before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. Counsel for Defendants Naglich and Dunn shall set up the conference call. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 6/3/2015. Copies furnished to calendar, CB.(dmn, ) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
193 SEALED REPORT by Plaintiffs. (filed under seal pursuant to Court 181 ) (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/04/2015)
194 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE in Opposition to Named Plaintiffs' 152 MOTION to Compel ADEQUATE SITE INSPECTIONS BY EXPERTS AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER BY THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE (OPPOSED) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 6/5/2015 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/04/2015)
195 REPLY to Response to Motion re 152 MOTION to Compel ADEQUATE SITE INSPECTIONS BY EXPERTS AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER BY THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE (OPPOSED) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF ELDON VAIL, # 2 Exhibit 2− DECLARATION OF DR. KATHRYN A. BURNS, # 3 Exhibit 3 − SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DR. PETER BLANCK)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/04/2015)
196 Minute Entry for Oral Argument held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 6/5/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 11:12−12:38.) (cb, ) (Entered: 06/05/2015)
197 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (McAdory, Janine) (Entered: 06/08/2015)
***Attorney Mitchell David Greggs added for Jefferson S. Dunn. (dmn, )(see Doc. 197 for pdf) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
198 MOTION for Extension of Deadline (Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time for Production) by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 6/10/2015 to clarify text to correct filers as reflected in PDF document (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 06/09/2015)
199 ORDERED as follows: 1. To the extent the plaintiffs seek to speak with prisoners in a manner other than the manner agreed upon in the Agreement, the Motion is DENIED. Doc. 152 . 2. To the extent the plaintiffs seek to pose general questions to ADOC employees or healthcare personnel regarding the identification or location of items and/or areas in a facility, the Motion is GRANTED. Doc. 152 . 3. To the extent the plaintiffs seek to pose more probing questions to ADOC employees or healthcare personnel during the site inspections, the Motion is DENIED. Doc. 152 . 4. The parties shall continue to conduct site visits in the manner set forth in sections 10 and 14 of the Agreement. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 6/10/2015. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 123 of 408

06/10/2015 06/10/2015 06/11/2015 06/15/2015 06/15/2015
06/19/2015 06/23/2015 06/23/2015
06/24/2015 06/25/2015 06/25/2015
06/25/2015 06/26/2015

200 TEXT ORDER granting 197 Motion for Janine McAdory to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/10/15. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
*** Attorney Janine McKinnon McAdory terminated pursuant to 200 order (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
201 NOTICE of Appearance by Melissa K. Marler on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Marler, Melissa) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
202 Objection to re 199 Order on Motion to Compel,, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Article re Assault at St. Clair)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
203 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Oral Argument, Status Conference, and Scheduling Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on May 8, 2015, before Judge Terry F. Moorer. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/6/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/16/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/14/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
204 JOINT STATEMENT Regarding the Status of Discovery by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Alabama Department of Corrections, and Ruth Naglich . (Morris, Maria) Modified on 6/22/2015 to add additional filers and reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/19/2015)
205 TEXT ORDER Resetting Telephone Conference now set for 6/24/15 at 10:00 am to 6/24/2015 02:00 PM in by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/23/2015. (ag, ) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
206 MOTION for Leave to Amend 1 Complaint to Replace Plaintiffs Who Are Deceased, Pursuant to Order on Suggestions of Deaths, Doc. 168 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Redlined [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 6/24/2015 to clean up text and create links to Doc. 1 and 168 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
207 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 6/24/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 2:10 − 3:01.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
208 ORDER: By agreement of the parties and based on the representations made on the record on 6/24/2015, it is ORDERED that the 198 Motion for Extension of Deadline is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/25/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/25/2015)
209 ORDER that the plaintiffs' 206 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is granted as further set out in the order. Plaintiffs Cherry Baker and Bobby Copeland are dismissed without prejudice, and Sheila Allen and William Sullivan are added as plaintiffs. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/25/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/25/2015)
210 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Third) against Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, filed by All Plaintiffs.(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/25/2015)
211 ORDER: Based on the representations made during an on−the−record conference call held on 6/24/2015, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs are allowed until 7/8/2015, to submit supplemental briefing and evidence on the defendants' 127 Partial Motion to Dismiss; that the defendants' response is due by 7/22/2015; and that said motion will be considered under submission, without oral argument, as of 7/22/2015. Motion Submission Deadline set for 7/22/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/26/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/26/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 124 of 408

06/26/2015
06/26/2015 06/29/2015 07/01/2015 07/01/2015 07/01/2015 07/06/2015 07/06/2015 07/08/2015 07/10/2015 07/10/2015 07/22/2015 07/27/2015

212 ORDER: Based on the representations made during an on−the−record conference call held on 6/24/2015, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The plaintiffs' 202 Objection to the magistrate judge's 199 order on the plaintiffs' 152 Motion to compel adequate site inspections by experts is set for submission, without oral argument, on 7/6/2015. Motion Submission Deadline set for 7/6/2015. (2) The defendants are to file their response by 7/1/2015. (3) The plaintiffs may file a reply by 7/6/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/26/2015. (dmn, ) Modified on 6/26/2015 to include reply text, omitted in error. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
NOTICE of Docket Text Correction re 212 Order. The referenced docket entry was modified to include the following text: "(3) The plaintiffs may file a reply by 7/6/2015," omitted in error when originally docketed. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
213 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by the parties in this case, if any there be, as to why a similar order to the Order, Doc No 207 entered in 3:06cv1113−WKW, by Chief Judge W. Keith Watkins is not warranted in this case, as further set out in order; Show Cause Response due by 7/1/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/29/15. (djy, ) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
214 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 213 Order to Show Cause,. (Smith, John) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
215 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 202 Objection to The Magistrate Judge's Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Adequate Site Inpsections by Experts filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 7/2/2015 to clarify text to reflect that Exhibits A, B & C are contained within main PDF document (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 07/01/2015)
216 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by All Plaintiffs re 213 Order to Show Cause,. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
217 STATUS REPORT − Third Joint Interim Mediation Report by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/06/2015)
218 REPLY in Support of Objection to the Magistrate Judge's 199 Order on Motion to Compel,, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Brownstein Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Morris Declaration)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 7/7/2015 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 07/06/2015)
219 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF opposing Defendants' 127 Partial MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint, 140 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Declaration of Peter Blanck, # 2 Exhibit 2− Declaration of Donald Ray Turner)(McCrary, Latasha) Modified on 7/9/2015 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ). (Entered: 07/08/2015)
220 MOTION to Strike 218 Reply Brief, The State's Motion to Strike the Declarations of Rhonda C. Brownstein and Maria V. Morris by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/10/2015)
221 The State's ANSWER to 210 Amended Complaint (Third Amended Complaint) by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.(Smith, John) (Entered: 07/10/2015)
222 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of 127 Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Supplemental) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) Modified on 7/23/2015 to clarify text to create link to 127 (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 07/22/2015)
223 (VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 2124 ORDER)OPINION AND ORDER: It is ORDERED that the discovery process in this case is restructured as follows: (1) First, any party seeking resolution of a discovery dispute must file a request for mediation with the magistrate judge. (2) Mediation will take place with the magistrate judge as mediator. (3) Because the resolution of discovery disputes has been so contentious in this case, any and all discovery disputes resolved by mediation must be reduced to writing. The court will not recognize any oral agreements. (4) The

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 125 of 408

07/28/2015 07/28/2015 07/30/2015 08/04/2015
08/10/2015 08/13/2015 08/21/2015 08/26/2015 08/27/2015 08/28/2015 08/28/2015
09/01/2015

parties may file an appropriate objection or motion for resolution of those discovery disputes not resolved in mediation before the magistrate judge. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/27/2015. (dmn, ) Modified on 10/23/2018 (kh, ). (Entered: 07/27/2015)
224 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen C. Rogers on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
225 ORDER: It is ORDERED that paragraph number 4 of the 223 Order and Opinion entered on 7/27/2015, is amended and clarified as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/28/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
226 MOTION for Discovery (Request for Discovery Mediation) by All Plaintiffs. (Somerville, William) (Entered: 07/30/2015)
227 ORDER: Upon consideration of the Order of the District Judge regarding mediation of discovery (Doc. 223 & 225 ) and the 226 Motion for Discovery filed by Plaintiffs, it is ORDERED that, to the extent the plaintiffs request mediation, the Motion for Discovery is GRANTED. This matter shall be set for a Mediation Conference on Monday, 8/10/2015 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 4A before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. It is further ORDERED as follows: (1) Required Attendance as further set out in the order. (2) Confidential Mediation Statements: On or before 8/7/2015, by 12:00 noon each party shall deliver to the undersigned Judge a confidential mediation statement as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 8/4/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) (Entered: 08/04/2015)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 8/10/2015. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 9:30−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 8/13/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 8/21/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
228 TEXT ORDER: Resetting Status Conference now set for 8/26/15 to 8/28/2015 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The parties' joint statement is due by noon on August 27, 2015. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/26/2015. (ag, ) (Entered: 08/26/2015)
229 STATUS REPORT (Second Joint Discovery Status Report) by All Plaintiffs. (Somerville, William) (Entered: 08/27/2015)
230 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 8/28/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (war, ) (Entered: 08/28/2015)
231 ORDER: Based on the representations of the parties made during the telephone conference on the record today, and based on the parties' representations in their 229 Second Joint Discovery Status Report, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The parties shall file, by noon on 9/2/2015, a report reducing all resolved discovery disputes to writing, as required by the court's 223 Opinion and Order regarding mediation of discovery disputes. (2) The parties shall list in the report all currently unresolved disputes. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/28/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 08/28/2015)
232 ORDER directing the parties file a joint Report setting forth how they (either together or separately) think that this case should be presented to the court for resolution on or before noon on 9/2/2015; further ORDERING that an in−person Status Conference is set for 9/3/2015 @ 02:00 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the FMJ US Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/1/15. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 09/01/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 126 of 408

09/02/2015 09/02/2015 09/03/2015 09/04/2015 09/04/2015 09/04/2015 09/08/2015
09/08/2015

233 JOINT STATEMENT regarding Presentation of the Case, filed by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, and Ruth Naglich . (Morris, Maria) Modified on 9/3/2015 to reflect actual title and to include additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/02/2015)
234 JOINT STATEMENT regarding Discovery Mediation filed by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn, and Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 9/3/2015 to reflect actual title and add additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/02/2015)
235 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 9/3/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Haley Tunnell.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
236 ORDER: Based on the representations made at the status conference on the record on 9/3/2015, it is ORDERED that the parties are to file, at or before 9:00 AM on 9/9/2015, a joint report (1) reducing all resolved discovery disputes to writing and (2) listing all disputes that remain unresolved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/4/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
237 ORDER: Based on the representations made at the status conference on the record on 9/3/2015, it is ORDERED that the parties are to file, at or before 9:00 AM on 9/9/2015, a proposed HIPAA−compliant protective order that (1) requires that all covered materials be returned or destroyed (not only upon request) and (2) protects materials pertaining not only to the named plaintiffs but also to all current, former, and future prisoners. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/4/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
238 ORDER that the prior scheduling orders (doc. nos. 61 , 72 , 102 , 170 ) are vacated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/4/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
239 NEW SCHEDULING ORDER: This case will be tried in two phases; first, in Phase 1, the court will consider certification of the putative non−mental−health ADA subclass(es) and hear the non−mental−health ADA claims; second, in Phase 2, the court will consider certification of the other putative classes and hear all other claims. In Phase 1, Final Pretrial Conference set for 5/16/2016 at 10:00 AM in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Phase 1 is set for Non−Jury Trial on 6/20/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The court anticipates that this trial will last four weeks. In Phase 2, Final Pretrial Conference set for 9/12/2016 at 10:00 AM in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Non−Jury Trial set for 10/17/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The court anticipates that this trial will last eight weeks. The pretrial conferences will be on the record and held in Chambers 200FMJ in Montgomery, AL. Joint Proposed Pretrial Order due NOT LATER THAN THREE BUSINESS days prior to the pretrial conference. Dispositive Motions (i.e., motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment) and Daubert motions shall be filed no later than 35 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase. A brief and all supporting evidence shall be filed with any such motion. The opposing parties will be permitted to file responses within 21 days after such motions are due, and the moving parties will be permitted to file replies within 7 days after the responses are due. Motions to amend the pleadings or to add parties shall be filed no later than 35 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase. Motions for class certification shall be filed no later than 35 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase. All fact Discovery shall be completed for both phases no later than 70 days prior to the pretrial conference for Phase 1. All expert discovery shall be completed no later than 42 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase, except as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
240 EXPERT 'CRIB SHEET' ORDER: It is ORDERED that counsel proposing to present an expert to testify at the trials in Phases 1 and 2 are to prepare a summary of that experts testimony in lay language. Any term the meaning of which is not obvious must be defined. The summary should briefly describe the testimony the expert will present to the court, and conclude by explaining what role this evidence will play in the case. The summary may be no longer than four pages for each expert, and must be

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 127 of 408

09/08/2015
09/08/2015 09/08/2015
09/08/2015 09/08/2015 09/08/2015 09/08/2015

both shared with opposing counsel and filed with the court no less than two business days before the expert will be presented at trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
241 [VACATED PURSUANT TO COURT 289 ORDER.] NEW STATUS CONFERENCES ORDER: It is ORDERED that on−the−record status conferences (in which the court will discuss discovery progress as well as any other matters of concern) are set for the following dates at 10:00 AM, with the parties to arrange for the status conferences to be conducted by telephone: October 28, and December 22, 2015, and January 21, February 18, March 14, April 12, and August 9, 2016. Three business days prior to each status conference, the parties are to file a joint report as to the status of discovery and identifying any other issues that should be brought to the courts attention for discussion. Status Conference set for 10/28/2015, 12/22/2015, 1/21/2016, 2/18/2016, 3/14/2016, 4/12/2016, and 8/9/2016 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG.(dmn, ) Modified on 12/16/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 09/08/2015)
242 VIDEOCONFERENCING ORDER: It is ORDERED that, to the extent that any party seeks to present testimony via videoconference at either phase of the trial, the party shall make arrangements for such testimony with Chief Deputy Clerk of Court Trey Granger and Courtroom Deputy Anthony Green, by no later than the date of the pretrial conference for the relevant phase of the trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. Copies furnished to Clerk, TG, AG.(dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
243 PRISONER ATTENDANCE ORDER: It is ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall meet and confer to develop a plan for the attendance of prisoners in ADOC custody at each phase of trial. The parties shall plan for and arrange the transportation of the prisoners in ADOC custody and allow for plaintiffs counsels consultation with the prisoners prior to, during, and following court proceedings. The parties must have their plans for the prisoners attendance and any meetings prior to and following court proceedings coordinated through and approved by the United States Marshals Service. For both trial phases, the parties will submit their plan to the court no later than 28 days before the trial, and certify that the plan has been approved by the United States Marshal Service. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. Copy furnished to USM.(dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
244 FACILITIES VISITATION ORDER: Based on the representations of the parties at the status conference held on the record on 9/3/2015, it is ORDERED, with regard to both trial phases that: (1) On or before 42 days before each trial, the plaintiffs, after conferring with defense counsel, are to submit, under seal, a proposed plan for the court to visit correctional facilities in connection with the trial, including which facilities the court should visit, the reasons for the visit(s), and proposed logistics for the visit(s). (2) Defendants may file, under seal, a response within 14 days of plaintiffs submissions. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
245 STIPULATIONS ORDER: It is ORDERED that, on the date of each of the two pretrials, all parties shall prepare and file a joint statement of all stipulations and admissions of fact and of documents that might avoid unnecessary proof at trial. Therefore, the stipulations, etc. need not be included in the proposed pretrial orders. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
246 TRAIL BRIEFS ORDER: It is ORDERED that, for each of the two phases of this litigation, the plaintiffs shall submit a trial brief, to consist of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 21 days before trial, and the defendants shall submit a trial brief, to consist of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 14 days before trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
247 ADMITTED EXHIBITS ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows for each of the two phases of this litigation: (1) Two business days before each trial, all parties are to file a joint statement listing all exhibits (by exhibit numbers) to which there are no objections to admission. (2) The deputy clerk is to mark all exhibits listed on the

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 128 of 408

09/08/2015 09/09/2015 09/09/2015 09/11/2015
09/11/2015 09/14/2015 09/17/2015
09/24/2015 09/29/2015 10/01/2015 10/05/2015 10/06/2015

statement as admitted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
248 ORDER that 244 Order is placed under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
249 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 236 Order, Notice of Tenative Discovery Mediation Agreement (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
250 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 236 Order, Notice of Final Discovery Mediation Agreement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Walsh, Andrew) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
251 ORDER: Based on the representations of the parties in the 250 Notice of final discovery mediation agreement, it is ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiffs' objections to the orders regarding plaintiffs' motion to compel production of document relating to non−plaintiffs (doc. nos. 144 , 146 , and 173 ) are overruled as moot. (2) Plaintiffs objection to the order regarding plaintiffs motion to compel adequate site inspections by experts (doc. no. 202 ) is overruled as moot. (3) Defendants motion to strike declarations (doc. no. 220 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/11/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
252 Motion for Deana Johnson to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602038302.) by non−party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit 2, Proposed Order, # 3 Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt)(dmn, ) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
253 TEXT ORDER granting 252 Motion Deana Johnson to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2015. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
254 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Telephone Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on June 24, 2015, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 10/8/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/19/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/16/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
255 MOTION to Amend 239 Scheduling Order, (Expert Disclosure Requirements) by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) Modified on 9/28/2015 to clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/24/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference RE: 255 Motion to Amend/Correct 239 Scheduling Order set for 10/1/2015 at 09:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (Entered: 09/29/2015)
256 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 10/1/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:10 − 9:27.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
257 Joint MOTION to Amend 239 Scheduling Order, by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, and Ruth Naglich. (Somerville, William) Modified on 10/6/2015 to add additional filers and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
258 OPINION AND ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The defendants' 127 Partial Motion to Dismiss is denied as to standing. (2) As to mootness, the motion is reserved and set for a Motion Hearing on 12/16/2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (3) The plaintiffs are to submit a pre−hearing brief outlining the evidence they intend to present and explaining why that evidence supports their positions on mootness no later than 21 days before the hearing; the defendants are to respond no later than 14 days before the hearing; and the plaintiffs may reply no later than seven days before the hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/6/2015. Copies furnished to

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 129 of 408

10/07/2015
10/08/2015 10/09/2015
10/12/2015 10/12/2015 10/12/2015 10/12/2015 10/23/2015 10/28/2015 11/02/2015
11/16/2015 11/18/2015 11/25/2015 11/25/2015

calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
259 (VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 529 ORDER) MODIFIED EXPERT DISCOVERY ORDER: It is ORDERED that the defendants' 255 Motion to Amend the Court's Scheduling Order is denied as moot and that the parties' 257 Joint Motion to Amend the Court's Scheduling Order is granted as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/7/2015. (dmn, ) Modified on 6/10/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 10/07/2015)
260 NOTICE of Appearance by Patricia Clotfelter on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Clotfelter, Patricia) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
261 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on September 3, 2015, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Haley Tunnell with Dunn, King & Associates, Telephone number 334−263−0261. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 10/30/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/9/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/7/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
262 NOTICE of Appearance by Bryan A. Coleman on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Lunsford, William) Modified on 10/14/2015 to reflect correct attorney name making appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 10/12/2015)
263 NOTICE of Appearance by Evan P. Moltz on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Lunsford, William) Modified on 10/14/2015 to reflect correct attorney name making appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 10/12/2015)
***Attorney Bryan Arthur Coleman added for Jefferson S. Dunn, and Ruth Naglich. (dmn, )(see Doc. 262 ) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
***Attorney Evan Patrick Moltz added for Jefferson S. Dunn, and Ruth Naglich. (dmn, ) (see Doc. 263 ) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
264 STATUS REPORT Third Joint Discovery Status Report by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
265 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 10/28/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10−07 − 10:26.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
266 NEW PROTECTIVE ORDER: Further to the court's 237 Order of 9/4/2015, based upon the agreement of the parties, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1), it is ORDERED as follows: SECTION 1. Prior Protective Orders. This order shall supersede and replace the original protective order (doc. no. 164 ) entered by the court with respect to discovery and disclosure, as well as the consent protective order previously entered by the magistrate judge (doc. no. 70 ) and as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/2/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
267 ORDER that the Status Conference, now set for 12/22/2015, is reset for 12/16/2015 at 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, the same time as an already scheduled hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/16/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG.(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
Reset Deadlines as to 127 Partial MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint: Motion Hearing and Status Conference set for 12/16/2015 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ is RESET to 12/16/2015 10:00 AM in COURTROOM 2F before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (war, ) (Entered: 11/18/2015)
268 MOTION to Withdraw Zerrick Naylor (Unopposed) by Zerrick Naylor. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
269 JUDGMENT: It is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that plaintiffs' 268 Unopposed Motion for Zerrick Naylor to withdraw as a named plaintiff

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 130 of 408

11/25/2015
12/01/2015 12/02/2015 12/04/2015
12/07/2015
12/08/2015 12/08/2015 12/08/2015
12/08/2015

is granted and that plaintiff Naylor is dismissed and terminated as a party with prejudice. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to FRCP 58. This case is not closed.Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/25/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
270 PRE−HEARING BRIEF in Opposition to Defendants 127 Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4 (FILED UNDER SEAL))(Hackney, James) Modified on 11/30/2015 to reflect actual title, create link to Doc. 127 , and to include full name of exhibit and reflect that exhibits 2 and 4 are filed under seal. (dmn, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/11/2015 (rec'd from chambers on 12/11/2015): # 5 Exhibit 2 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 6 Exhibit 4 (FILED UNDER SEAL)) (dmn, ). Modified on 12/11/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 11/25/2015)
271 MOTION Request for Discovery Mediation Regarding Privilege Assertions by MHM by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 12/2/2015 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
272 PRE−HEARING BRIEF in support of 127 Motion to Dismiss All Claims of Plaintiff Bradley Pearson as Moot, re 258 Order, and 270 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition, filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Smith, John) Modified on 12/3/2015 to create link to Doc. 127 and to clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
273 ORDER that the Status Conference and Hearing (Motion Hearing) now set for 12/16/2015, are reset for 12/15/2015 at 9:00 AM, and that all unexpired deadlines in the court's 258 Order regarding the hearing are adjusted accordingly. Motion Hearing reset for 12/15/2015 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Status Conference set for 12/15/2015 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/4/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
274 ORDER GRANTING plfs 271 MOTION (Request) for Discovery Mediation Regarding Privilege Assertions by MHM; setting Mediation Conference for 12/18/2015 @ 09:00 AM before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer, in Courtroom 4A, as further set out in order; confidential mediation statements due on or before 12/16/2015 by 12:00 noon each party shall deliver directly to the undersigned, and should not be filed with the Clerk nor served upon the other parties, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 12/7/15. Furnished to calendar group & CB.(djy, ) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
275 TEXT ORDER: Setting Status Conference & Motion Hearing set for 12/15/2015 09:00 AM in Courtroom 2A before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/8/2015. (previously set for 2FMJ Courtroom)(ag, ) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
276 REPLY to State's 272 Pre−Hearing Brief filed by All Plaintiffs. (Hackney, James) Modified on 12/9/2015 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
Set/Reset Hearings due to overridden in error: Status Conference set for 12/15/2015 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 2A in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Status Conference set for 1/21/2016 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Status Conference set for 2/18/2016 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Status Conference set for 3/14/2016 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Status Conference set for 4/12/2016 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Status Conference set for 8/9/2016 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (see Doc. 241 for pdf) (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/14/2015)
Set/Reset Motion Hearing as to 127 Partial MOTION to Dismiss due to oversight on first entry resetting (see Text Order, Doc. 275 ): Motion Hearing set for 12/15/2015 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 2A before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 12/14/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 131 of 408

12/09/2015
12/09/2015 12/10/2015 12/11/2015
12/11/2015 12/11/2015 12/14/2015 12/14/2015 12/15/2015
12/16/2015
12/16/2015 12/16/2015

277 MOTION for Protective Order by MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Johnson, Deana) (Main Document 277 replaced on 12/14/2015 due to original pdf was only a proposed order, no motion.) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/14/2015 due to original main document was only the proposed protective order and the main document pdf had to be replaced: # 1 Proposed Protective Order) (dmn, ). Modified on 12/14/2015 (dmn, ). (Entered: 12/09/2015)
278 ORDER that the clerk of the court is to provide a certified sign−language interpreter in order to accommodate plaintiff Bradley Pearson during his testimony at a hearing in this case to be held on December 15 and 16, 2015.Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/9/2015. Copy furnished to Clerk of Court.(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/09/2015)
279 MHM PROTECTIVE ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The 277 Motion for Protective Order is granted as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/10/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/10/2015)
280 ORDER: Further to the court's 278 Order of 12/9/2015, it is ORDERED that the clerk of court is to provide three certified sign−language interpreters as necessary to accommodate plaintiff Bradley Pearson throughout the hearing in this case to be held on December 15 and 16, 2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/11/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, Clerk of Court, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
281 MOTION to Exclude the Affidavit Testimony of Dr. Peter Blanck, Ph.D filed in support of 219 Supplemental Brief (Doc. 219 −1)by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) Modified on 12/11/2015 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
282 ORDER that plaintiffs are to respond to the defendants' 281 Motion to Exclude the affidavit testimony of Dr. Peter Black by no later than 5:00 PM on 12/14/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/11/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
283 NOTICE of Correction re 277 MOTION for Protective Order. The original pdf did not contain a motion, only a proposed order. The motion pdf along with the original pdf of the proposed order is attached to this notice. (Attachments: # 1 Motion for Protective Order, # 2 Proposed Protective Order)(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/14/2015)
284 REPLY in Opposition to State's 281 MOTION to Exclude the Affidavit of Dr. Peter Blanck, filed in response to 282 Order, and re 219 Reply Brief, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Hackney, James) Modified on 12/21/2015 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/14/2015)
285 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference/Motion Hearing held on 12/15/2015 re 127 Partial MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Billy Sharp, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Department of Corrections (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (war, )***SEALED PORTION OF HEARING*** (Entered: 12/15/2015)
286 ACCOMMODATIONS ORDER: Based on the representations made at the hearingheld in open court on 12/15/2015, it is ORDERED that the parties are to communicate to the Clerk of the Court any requests for accommodations, either for parties who will attend proceedings or for witnesses who will testify, by no later than 14 days prior to the pretrial conference for each phase. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
287 ORDER: Based on the representations made at a hearing held in open court on 12/15/2015, it is ORDERED that the defendants' 127 Partial Motion to Dismiss; and 281 Motion to Strike are denied without prejudice and with leave to renew, whether in conjunction with a motion for summary judgment or at trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
288 MODIFIED DAUBERT ORDER: Based on the representations made at a hearing held in open court on 12/15/2015, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Section 2 of the 239 New Scheduling Order entered by the court on 9/8/2015, is amended to read in its entirety as further set out in the order. (2) Section 4 of the 239 New Scheduling Order

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 132 of 408

12/16/2015
12/18/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/24/2015 12/28/2015
12/30/2015 01/04/2016 01/05/2016 01/05/2016

is amended to include at the end of the existing text the following as further set out in the order. (3) The 246 Trial Briefs Order entered by the court on 9/8/2015, is amended to include at the end of the existing text the following as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2015. (dmn, ) Modified on 6/10/2016 (kh, ). (VACATED WITH RESPECT TO PHASE 2 PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 529 ORDER) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
289 IN−PERSON STATUS CONFERENCES ORDER: Based on the representations made at a hearing held in open court on 12/15/2015, it is ORDERED that the 241 New Status Conferences Order previously entered by the court on 9/8/2015 is vacated. So that the court can ensure that discovery is moving at the needed speed and because the court believes that it is a good idea to have periodic face−to−face meetings between counsel and the court, it is further ORDERED that on−the−record status conferences (in which the court will discuss discovery progress as well as any other matters of concern) are set for the following dates at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama: January 21, February 18, March 14, April 12, and August 9, 2016. Status Conferences set for 1/21/2016, 2/18/2016, 3/14/2016, 4/12/2016, and 8/9/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Counsel for every party must be present in person; however, additional counsel may participate by telephone or video conference if necessary, so long as the court is informed at least three business days prior to the status conference of the need for such arrangements. Three business days prior to each status conference, the parties are to file a joint report as to the status of discovery and identifying any other issues that should be brought to the court's attention for discussion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
Minute Entry for Mediation held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer held on 12/18/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 01/04/2016)
290 MOTION to Compel Production of Improperly Withheld Evidence and Request for Expedited Treatment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Responses to Subpoena, # 2 Exhibit B − Excerpt of MHM Deposition, # 3 Exhibit C − MHM Privilege Log)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference RE: to discuss how to proceed on 290 MOTION to Compel Production of Improperly Withheld Evidence and Request for Expedited Treatment set for 12/28/2015 09:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (war, ) Modified on 12/23/2015 (war, ). (Entered: 12/23/2015)
291 First MOTION to Continue Telephone Conference Regarding Document No. 290 by MHM Correctional Services, Inc.. (Johnson, Deana) (Entered: 12/24/2015)
292 ORDER GRANTING MHM's 291 MOTION to Continue to the extent that the Telephone Conference is reset for 1/5/2016 @ 07:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; further ORDERING that the non−movants are to file, by no later than 5:00 p.m. on 1/4/2016, briefs fully addressing any grounds upon which they oppose the motion to compel, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/28/15. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
293 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven C Corhern on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Corhern, Steven) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
294 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 290 MOTION to Compel Production of Improperly Withheld Evidence and Request for Expedited Treatment filed by MHM Correctional Services, Inc.. (Johnson, Deana) (Entered: 01/04/2016)
295 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/5/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time FTR: 7:09 AM − 7:54 AM.) (war, ) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
296 ORDER: Based on representations made on the record during a telephone conference held on 1/5/2016, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (MHM), is to file all of the documents at issue in plaintiffs motion to compel (doc. no.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 133 of 408

01/06/2016
01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/11/2016 01/12/2016
01/12/2016

290 ), under seal and for purposes of in camera review, by no later than 5:00 p.m. on 1/7/2016. (2) MHM is to file a supplemental brief responding to that motion by no later than 5:00 p.m. on 1/8/2016. (3) Plaintiffs are to file a reply by no later than 5:00 p.m. on 1/11/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/5/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
298 SEALED DOCUMENT filed in response to 290 Motion to Compel and 296 Order. (djy, ) (Attachment(s): # 1 Ref. 45, # 2 Ref 46, # 3 Ref 47) , # 4 Ref 48, # 5 Ref 49, # 6 Ref 50, # 7 Ref 51, # 8 Ref 52, # 9 Ref 53, # 10 Ref 54) , # 11 Ref 55, # 12 Ref 56, # 13 Ref 57, # 14 Ref 58, # 15 Ref 59, # 16 Ref 60), # 17 Ref 61, # 18 Ref 62, # 19 Ref 63, # 20 Ref 64, # 21 Ref 66, # 22 Ref 67, # 23 Ref 68, # 24 Ref 71, # 25 Ref 72, # 26 Ref 73, # 27 Ref 74, # 28 Ref 75, # 29 Ref 76, # 30 Ref 77, # 31 78), # 32 79, # 33 80, # 34 81, # 35 82, # 36 Ref 96, # 37 Ref 97, # 38 Ref 98, # 39 Ref 99, # 40 Ref 100, # 41 Ref 101, # 42 Ref 102, # 43 Ref 103, # 44 Ref 104), # 45 Ref 105, # 46 Ref 106, # 47 Ref 107, # 48 Ref 108, # 49 Ref 109, # 50 Ref 110, # 51 Ref 111, # 52 Ref 112, # 53 Ref 127, # 54 Ref 128, # 55 Ref 129, # 56 Ref 130) , # 57 Ref 131, # 58 Ref 132, # 59 Ref 133, # 60 Ref 134, # 61 Ref 135, # 62 Ref 136, # 63 Ref 137, # 64 Ref 138, # 65 Ref 150, # 66 Ref 151, # 67 Ref 152, # 68 Ref 153, # 69 Ref 154, # 70 Ref 155, # 71 Ref 156), # 72 Ref 157, # 73 Ref 158, # 74 Ref 159, # 75 Ref 160, # 76 Ref 161, # 77 Ref 162) (djy, ). Modified on 1/11/2016 to create links to Doc. 290 and 296 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
297 Joint MOTION to Conduct Limited Fact Discovery Beyond Discovery Cut−Off Deadline by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, and Alabama Department of Corrections. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 1/11/2016 to reflect actual title and add additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
299 NON−PARTY SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to Plaintiffs' 290 Motion to Compel, Production of Improperly Withheld Evidence and Request for Expedited Treatment, MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' subpoena to the extent it seeks production of MHM's privileged quality assurance documents, and in the alternative, MOTION to Enter a Protective Order filed by MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Johnson, Deana) Modified on 1/11/2016 to reflect actual title and to include additional motions (see page 11). (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
300 ORDERED that the parties' 297 joint motion for permission to conduct limited fact discovery beyond the deadline of 3/7/2016, set by the court's new 239 scheduling order is granted to the extent requested in the motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/8/2016. (wcl, ) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
301 REPLY in Support of 290 MOTION to Compel Production of Improperly Withheld Evidence and Request for Expedited Treatment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Filed Under Seal pursuant to Court 296 Order, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Filed Under Seal pursuant to Court 296 Order, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Filed Under Seal pursuant to Court 296 Order)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 1/12/2016 to edit title. (dmn, ) (Attachment 3, 4, and 6 replaced on 1/13/2016 to include SEALED pdf of each attachment, filed conventionally on 1/12/2016, see Doc. 303 , Notice of Filing.) (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/11/2016)
302 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Telephone Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/5/2016 in Montgomery, AL, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/2/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/12/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/11/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
303 NOTICE of Filing the named Court Exhibit 3, Exhibit 4, and Exhibit 6 filed as attachments UNDER SEAL to 301 Reply in Support of 290 Motion to Compel, and filed in response to Court 296 Order, by All Plaintiffs. (see Doc. 301 for SEALED pdfs of Exhibit 3, 4, and 6) (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/13/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 134 of 408

01/12/2016 01/14/2016 01/15/2016 01/15/2016 01/18/2016 01/18/2016 01/21/2016
01/21/2016 01/21/2016
01/21/2016
01/21/2016

304 Motion for Brett T. Lane to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602039697.) by MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit 2, Proposed Order, # 3 Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt)(dmn, ) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
305 TEXT ORDER granting 304 Motion for Brett T. Lane Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/14/16. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
306 MOTION Expedited Mediation Regarding Pace of Production of Documents Pursuant to Mediation Agreement by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
307 STATUS REPORT (FOURTH JOINT) by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
308 MOTION to Compel, or, in the alternative, Deem Admitted by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) Modified on 1/19/2016 to remove repetitive text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/18/2016)
309 RESPONSE to Named Plaintiffs' 306 MOTION for Expedited Discovery Mediation Regarding Pace of Production of Documents Pursuant to Mediation Agreement filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 1/19/2016 to clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/18/2016)
310 ORDER: Upon consideration of the Order of the District Judge regarding mediation of discovery (Doc. 223 & 225 ), the 306 Motion for Expedited Mediation, the 308 Motion to Compel, and the 309 Response, it is ORDERED that the 306 Motion for Expedited Mediation be and is hereby GRANTED. This matter and any other related discovery matters shall be set for a Mediation Conference on 2/8/2016 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 4A before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. On or before 2/4/2016 by 12:00 noon each party shall deliver directly to the undersigned Judge a confidential mediation statement as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 1/21/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) Modified on 1/21/2016 to correct mediation date to 2016 not 2015 as originally docketed. (dmn, ) (Main Document 310 replaced on 1/21/2016 to correct mediation hearing date to 2/8/2016 instead of 2015 as originally filed/docketed.) (dmn, ). Modified on 1/21/2016 (dmn, ). (Entered: 01/21/2016)
Reset Hearing: Mediation Conference set for 2/8/2016 (not 2/8/2015 as originally set) at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 4A before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. (dmn, ) (see 310 Order for pdf) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
311 SEALED NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference/Motion Hearing Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on December 15, 2015, in Montgomery, AL, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/11/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/22/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/20/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
312 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference/Motion Hearing Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on December 15, 2015, in Montgomery, AL before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/11/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/22/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/20/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
313 NOTICE of Correction re 310 Order. The original pdf contained a typographical error in the year (2015 instead of 2016) on the Medication Hearing date. The corrected pdf is attached to this notice. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected pdf of Doc. 310 )(dmn, )

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 135 of 408

01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016
01/22/2016 01/26/2016 01/27/2016
01/27/2016

(Entered: 01/21/2016)
314 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record at a Status Conference held on 1/21/2016, it is ORDERED that the Status Conference currently set for 4/12/2016, see In−Person Status Conferences Order (doc. no. 289 ) at 2, is reset to 4/15/2016, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The requirements of the 289 In−Person Status Conference Order otherwise remain in effect. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/21/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG.(dmn, ) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
315 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 1/21/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (war, ) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
Reset STATUS CONFERENCE Deadlines: Status Conference set for 2/18/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson (see 289 Order). Status Conference set for 3/14/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson (see 289 Order). Status Conference set for 4/15/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson (see 314 Order). Status Conference set for 8/9/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson (see 289 Order). Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. **These are not new deadlines, old deadlines being placed back onto docket due to dates removed/terminated by CM/ECF system when 314 Order and 315 Minute Entry were entered on the docket.** (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
316 ORDER: During a status conference held on the record on 1/21/2016, the parties explained to the court that they anticipated raising at the mediation before the magistrate judge currently set for 2/8/2016, see 310 Order, issues in addition to those already identified in their filings, see 306 Motion for Expedited Mediation, 309 Response to Motion for Expedited Mediation, and 308 Motion to Compel or Deem Admitted. It is therefore ORDERED, by agreement of the parties, that the parties are to submit directly to the magistrate judge, by no later than noon on 1/27/2016, a joint statement setting forth any discovery disputes other than those expressly identified in prior filings which they wish to mediate. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/22/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
317 Emergency MOTION to Compel Compliance with the Discovery Schedule (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: Email and attachment, Depo proposal for December 14 January 19", # 2 Exhibit 2: Emails and attachment, Depo Proposals − 12−17−15, # 3 Exhibit 3: Emails re Proposed Deposition Schedule..., # 4 Exhibit 4: Emails re Expert Inspection Proposals, # 5 Exhibit 5: Email re ADA expert visits, # 6 Exhibit 6: Email re Joint statement of discovery disputes)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/26/2016)
318 OPINION AND ORDER: Because the court concludes, based on its in camera review of the documents that MHM has withheld, that the documents are protected neither by the state−law privilege MHM invoked nor by any other federal common−law or statutory quality−assurance or peer−review privilege, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The plaintiffs motion to compel (doc. no. 290 ) is granted as further set out in the opinion and order. (2) MHM Correctional Services, Inc., is promptly to produce, in accordance with the protective order soon to be entered, the documents identified in its privilege log dated 12/23/2015 (doc. no. 290 −3), by the following reference numbers and (inclusive) ranges: 14, 16, 45−68, 71−82, 96−112, 127−138, and 150−162. (3) Within seven days of the date of todays order, the parties and MHM are to confer and submit a joint proposed protective order as outlined in the above opinion. If, after making good−faith efforts, the parties and MHM cannot reach an agreement as to the precise terms of that order, they may submit separate proposals. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/27/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(dmn, ) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
319 ORDER re 317 Emergency MOTION to Compel. It is ORDERED that a Mediation Conference is set for 1/27/2016 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 4A in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. It is further ORDERED that the attorneys with full authority to negotiate and settle discovery issues for Plaintiffs and Defendants shall appear at the Mediation Conference. Signed by Honorable Judge

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 136 of 408

01/27/2016 01/27/2016 01/27/2016
01/28/2016
02/03/2016
02/04/2016 02/04/2016
02/04/2016 02/05/2016 02/05/2016 02/05/2016
02/05/2016 02/08/2016

Terry F. Moorer on 1/27/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
320 Joint STATEMENT OF ISSUES for Discovery Mediation filed in response to 316 Order, by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 1/28/2016 to reflect actual title and that this is not an actual motion. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
321 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held in chambers on 1/27/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time FTR: 5:00 PM − 5:08 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 01/28/2016)
Set Hearing: Mediation Conference set for 2/8/2016 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 4A in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. This is not a new hearing date, prior date being placed back on docket due to date removed/terminated by CM/ECF system when 319 Order entered on docket. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 01/28/2016)
322 OPINION AND ORDER as follows: (1) The deadline for fact discovery of 3/7/2016, as set out in the courts new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ), is extended only to the extent articulated on the record on 1/27/2016; specifically, plaintiffs experts may conduct the site inspections enumerated on the dates indicated by plaintiffs counsel and agreed to by defense counsel. This order shall not be construed to grant any extension other than those explicitly articulated on the record on 1/27/2016. (2) The plaintiffs emergency motion to compel compliance with the discovery schedule (doc. no. 317 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/28/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/28/2016)
323 PROPOSED CONSENT PROTECTIVE ORDER governing Quality Assurance Documents to be filed by Non−Party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. filed in response to 318 Order, filed by MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Johnson, Deana) Modified on 2/4/2016 to reflect the actual title. Document is not a motion, wrong event code selected when filed. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
324 NOTICE of Appearance by William Richard Lunsford on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/04/2016)
325 CONSENT PROTECTIVE ORDER ("2nd MHM Protective Order") (with Exhibit A, Acknowlegment and Agreement to be Bound) governing Quality Assurance Documents to be Produced by Non−Party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/4/2016. (dmn, ) Modified on 2/11/2016 to include "2nd MHM Protective Order" text. (dmn, . Modified on 2/11/2016: Supplemented by 335 Order. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/04/2016)
***Attorney Matthew B. Reeves added for Jefferson S. Dunn, and Ruth Naglich. (dmn, ) (see Doc. 324 for pdf) (Entered: 02/05/2016)
326 MOTION to Quash Motion to Quash Subpoena by Kim Thomas. (Lunsford, William). (Entered: 02/05/2016)
327 MOTION to Quash Motion to Quash Subpoenas by Corizon Health, Inc.. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/05/2016)
328 PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT to 325 Consent Protective Order Governing Quality Assurance Documents To Be Produced By Non−Party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/8/2016 to clarify text to reflect as also filed on behalf of MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (qc/djy, ). Modified on 2/11/2016 to reflect actual title of document, not a motion, supplement to motion. The wrong event code was selected when filed. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/05/2016)
***Attorney Matthew Brett Reeves,Melissa K. Marler,Stephen C. Rogers for Corizon Health, Inc. added pursuant to 327 motion (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference RE: MHM Deposition Resolution set for 2/9/2016 10:30 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (war, ) (Entered: 02/08/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 137 of 408

02/08/2016 02/08/2016 02/09/2016
02/09/2016
02/09/2016 02/10/2016 02/11/2016 02/11/2016
02/11/2016

329 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 2/8/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (war, ) (Entered: 02/09/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 2/8/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:00−3:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 03/14/2016)
330 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record during an in−person meeting with counsel on 2/8/2016, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) A telephonic hearing is set for 2/9/2016 at 10:30 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson to discuss all outstanding discovery disputes related to non−party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. Counsel for the parties and MHM are to participate in this hearing. (2) The parties, as well as non−parties MHM and Corizon Health, Inc., are to submit to the court by no later than 5:00 PM on Thursday, 2/11/2016, a joint report as further set out in the order. (3) An in−person hearing (oral argument) is set for Friday, 2/12/2016 at 5:00 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson to discuss all unresolved substantive objections to production of documents in the possession of MHM and Corizon. To the extent that a party or non−party wishes to raise such an objection, counsel for that party or non−party must be present at this hearing. (4) An in−person hearing (oral argument) is set for Saturday, 2/13/2016 at 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, to discuss all unresolved objections regarding requests for production of documents attached to deposition notices. (5) The clerk of court is to arrange for the Frank M. Johnson, Jr. United States Courthouse Complex to be open and staffed by court security officers on the evening of Friday, 2/12/2016, and on Saturday, 2/13/2016, in order to accommodate the above hearings. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/9/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG.(dmn, ) (Entered: 02/09/2016)
331 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER: Pursuant to the court's 330 Order of 2/9/2016, and in light of the fact that the parties and non−parties have been instructed to meet and confer in an effort to address all objections regarding requests for production of documents attached to deposition notices, and any other disputes resolving the pace of production, it is ORDERED that the parties and non−parties MHM Correctional Services, Inc., and Corizon Health, Inc., are to file with the court by no later than 8:00AM on Saturday, 2/13/2016, a joint report identifying any such objections or disputes that remain unresolved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/9/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/09/2016)
332 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference Re: MHM Deposition Resolution held on 2/9/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (kcf, ) (Entered: 02/09/2016)
333 NOTICE of Appearance by Brooke Menschel on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
334 PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT to 325 Consent Protective Order Governing Quality Assurance Documents To Be Produced By Non−Party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. by MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Johnson, Deana) Modified on 2/11/2016 to reflect actual title of document, not a motion, supplement to motion. The wrong event code was selected when filed. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
335 SUPPLEMENT TO 325 CONSENT PROTECTIVE ORDER governing Quality Assurance Documents to be Produced by Non−Party MHM Correctional Services, Inc. It is hereby ORDERED that the 325 2nd MHM Protective Order is supplemented as follows: If any party, or other recipient of MHMs confidential Quality Assurance Materials, intends to file a motion, brief or other paper that contains information set forth in or derived from such confidential materials, then such party or recipient shall (i) file the motion, brief or other paper electronically with such confidential information redacted and (ii) file an unredacted copy of the motion, brief or other paper under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/11/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 2/12/2016 12:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/11/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 138 of 408

02/11/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016
02/12/2016
02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/16/2016 02/17/2016 02/17/2016

336 STATUS REPORT Joint Report on the Status of Discovery Disputes by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Corizon Health, Inc., and MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 2/12/2016 to add additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
337 TEXT ORDER Cancelling oral arguments currently set for 2/12/16 and 2/13/16. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
338 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/12/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 12:08 − 12:24.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
339 ORDER directing that the parties and non−parties are to file with the court no later than midnight on 2/12/2016, the final schedule of all remaining depositions and expert site inspections to which they agreed at the February 8 hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/15. (djy, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
340 ORDER directing that the following motions are denied in part and granted in part and that the discovery issues reflected in the following document is resolved: (1) defs' 308 Motion to Compel or in the alternative deem admitted; (2) former party Kim Thomas's 326 Motion to Quash subpoena; (3) non−party Corizon Health, Inc.'s 327 Motion to Quash subpoena; (4) 320 joint statement of issues for discovery mediation; the only issue identified in this statement that remains unresolved is the plfs concern regarding the pace of production; as indicated in a separate, simultaneously filed order, the resolution of this issue will be overseen by the magistrate judge. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
341 ORDER directing that the remaining unresolved discovery issue identified in the 320 joint statement of issues for discovery mediation, regarding the pace of production, is referred to the magistrate judge for mediation to be conducted as follows: (1) the parties and non−parties are to submit weekly joint reports updating the magistrate judge regarding the pace of production until the deadline for fact discovery of 3/7/2016; (2) if necessary, the parties and non−parties are propmtly to discuss any disputes identified in their joint reports in mediattion with the magistrate judge. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
342 Motion for Eunice Hyunhye Cho to Appear Pro Hac Vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Certificate of Good Standing for Eunice Cho)(Menschel, Brooke) Modified on 2/16/2016 to include attorney name requesting appearance. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
343 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs of Deposition and Site Inspection Calendar, agreed by all Parties filed in response to 339 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: Deposition and Site Inspection Schedule)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/16/2016 to create link to Doc. 339 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
***Attorney Eunice Hyunhye Cho added PRO HAC VICE for All Plaintiffs. (dmn, ) (see doc. 342 for pdf) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
344 TEXT ORDER granting 342 Motion for Eunice Hyunhye Cho to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2016. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
345 TEXT ORDER: Resetting Status Conference now set for 2/18/2016 at 10:00 am to 09:00 AM on 2/18/16 before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/17/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
346 ORDER re 341 Order. It is ORDERED that a Status and Scheduling Conference and Mediation of any unresolved issues related to the pace of production as identified in the parties' and non−parties' weekly report be and are hereby set for 2/26/2016 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 4A in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. It is further ORDERED that the attorneys with full authority to negotiate and settle discovery issues for Plaintiffs and Defendants shall appear at the Mediation Conference. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 2/17/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/17/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 139 of 408

02/17/2016 02/18/2016 02/18/2016 02/22/2016 02/22/2016 02/23/2016 02/23/2016
02/24/2016
02/26/2016 02/29/2016

347 Pro Hac Vice Filing fee received for Eunice Cho re 342 Motion: $ 50.00, receipt number 4602040045 (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/18/2016)
348 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 2/18/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/18/2016)
349 NOTICE: The court notifies the parties that, contrary to its oral statements at a status conference held on the record on 2/18/2016, the court will not respond to letters received from either named plaintiffs or putative class members in this case. Instead, any such letters received by the court will be held by the clerk of the court for the parties to review at their convenience. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/18/2016)
350 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 2/23/2016 09:00 AM in by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/22/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/22/2016)
351 JOINT statement regarding STATUS of discovery of All Parties Regarding Discovery by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/23/2016 to clarify text and to reflect as also filedon behalf of Dunn, Naglich, & Alabama Department of Corrections (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 02/22/2016)
352 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/23/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
353 ORDER REGARDING RETALIATION CLAIM directing the the parties' oral request to continue the depositions currently scheduled for 2/26/2016 is granted; the continuance is based on the following agreed−upon representations made by the parties on 2/23/2016; (1) The depositions currently scheduled for 2/26/16, relate to only the plaintiffs' retaliation claim; (2) the depositions currently scheduled for 2/26/16, relate to only the plaintiffs' retaliation claim; (3) the retaliation claim is a non−class claim, and thus any settlement of it need not be approved by the Court; (4) the retaliation claim is currently scheduled to be tried in the second phase of this litigation; (5) If the parties are ultimately unable to resolve the retaliation claim, the February 26 depositions will be rescheduled for the latter part of March 2016; further ORDERING that, by no later than 3/4/2016, the parties are to inform the court whether the retaliation claim has settled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/23/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
354 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on February 8, 2016, in Montgomery, AL before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/16/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/28/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/24/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/24/2016)
355 Minute Entry for Scheduling Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer held on 2/26/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 2:01−2:57.) (cb, ) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
RESET ALL STATUS CONFERENCE DEADLINES to get them back on deadline/hearing report (some deadlines were removed by minute entries entered by CRDs): Status Conference set for 3/14/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson (as per 289 Order). Status Conference set for 4/15/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson (as per 314 Order). Status Conference set for 8/9/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson (as per 289 Order). Copy furnished to Clerk of Court. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 140 of 408

03/04/2016 03/07/2016 03/07/2016 03/07/2016 03/07/2016
03/07/2016 03/07/2016 03/07/2016
03/07/2016
03/08/2016 03/08/2016

356 Joint REQUEST for Limited Extension of Discovery Beyond Discovery Cut−Off Deadline re 239 Scheduling Order, by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich, Corizon Health, Inc., MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/7/2016 to include additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/04/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference re 356 joint motion for extension of discovery deadline set for 3/7/2016 02:45 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
357 JOINT STIPULATION of Dismissal with Prejudice concerning "Fifth Cause of Action" of Plaintiffs' Complaint (Joint) by Alabama Department of Corrections, Joshua Dunn, Dwight Hagood, Timothy Sears, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) Modified on 3/8/2016 to add additional filers. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
358 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 3/7/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 2:52 − 3:01.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
359 ORDER that the 356 Joint Request by the parties, Corizon Health, Inc., and MHM Correctional Services, Inc., for a limited extension of the discovery deadline of 3/7/2016, as set by the court's 239 New Scheduling Order, is granted as follows: (1) The parties may conduct the deposition of defendant Ruth Naglich on a mutually acceptable date prior to 4/11/2016. (2) The parties and MHM may conduct the depositions of Dr. Robert Hunter and Theresa Houser on mutually acceptable dates prior to 4/30/2016. (3) Corizon may complete production of credentialing files no later than 3/8/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/7/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
360 MOTION to Compel by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
361 MOTION to Compel an Adequate Privilege Log and the Production of Any Improperly Withheld Documents from Non−Party Corizon, Inc. (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Responses to Subpoena Duces Tecum to Corizon, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Corizon's Supplemental Privilege Log)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/8/2016 to reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
362 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Related to the Mortality Review Process from Corizon, Inc. (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Sentinel Event Process, # 2 Exhibit 2 − example of Sentinel Event Report, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Responses to Subpoena, Excerpt, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Corizon's Initial Privilege Log, # 5 Exhibit 5 − filed under seal, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Corizon ADOC Contract, Excerpt, # 7 Exhibit 7 − filed under seal)(Morris, Maria) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/9/2016, filed UNDER SEAL conventionally: # 8 Unredacted Main Document (FILED UNDER SEAL)) (Attachment 5 replaced on 3/9/2016) (dmn, ) (Attachment 7 replaced on 3/9/2016) (dmn, ) Modified on 3/9/2016 to replace attachments 5 and 7 and to include the Unredacted (SEALED) copy of motion as an additional attachment. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
363 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to DIscovery Mediation and Other Agreements (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Larry Linton Excerpt, # 2 Exhibit 2 − filed under seal, # 3 Exhibit 3 − filed under seal, # 4 Exhibit 4 − filed under seal, # 5 Exhibit 5 − emails between MHM and Plaintiffs, # 6 Exhibit 6 − MHM Responses to Subpoena)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced on 3/9/2016) (dmn, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 3/9/2016) (dmn, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 3/9/2016) (dmn, ). Modified on 3/9/2016 to replace Attachments 2, 3, and 4; filed UNDER SEAL conventionally. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
364 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal an Unredacted Complete Version of Doc. 362 and 363 in accordance with the procedure set forth in the 2/11/2016 Order, by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/8/2016 to include additional text and create links to Doc. 362 and 363 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/08/2016)
365 TEXT ORDER granting 364 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/8/2016. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 03/08/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 141 of 408

03/08/2016
03/08/2016
03/08/2016 03/08/2016 03/09/2016 03/09/2016 03/10/2016 03/10/2016 03/10/2016

366 JUDGMENT: Pursuant to the 357 Joint stipulation of dismissal, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that the Fifth Cause of Action: Retaliation in Violation of Prisoners First Rights to Communicate with Counsel and to File Lawsuits Regarding Conditions of Confinement, see Third Amended Complaint (doc. no. 210 ), is dismissed with prejudice, with costs taxed as paid. No parties are terminated, and all other claims against the defendants remain. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to FRCP 58. This case is not closed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/8/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/08/2016)
367 ORDER re 360 Motion to Compel, 361 Motion to Compel, 362 Motion to Compel, and 363 Motion to Compel. Upon consideration of the 341 Order directing the Magistrate Judge to mediate discovery issues, it is ORDERED that a Mediation of these matters be and is hereby set for 3/10/2016 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 4A in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. It is further ORDERED that the attorneys with full authority to negotiate and settle discovery issues for Plaintiffs, Defendants, and non−party Corizon, Inc., shall appear at the Mediation Conference. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 3/8/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/08/2016)
368 NOTICE OF FILING SEALED UNREDACTED Documents by All Plaintiffs re 362 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Related to the Mortality Review Process from Corizon, Inc. (Opposed) (Attachments: # 1 SEALED Unredacted Doc. #362, Motion to Compel, # 2 SEALED Exhibit 5 to Unredacted Doc. #362, Motion to Compel, # 3 SEALED Exhibit 7 to Unredacted Doc. #362, Motion to Compel)(dmn, ) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
369 NOTICE OF FILING SEALED Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 by All Plaintiffs re 363 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to DIscovery Mediation and Other Agreements (Opposed) (Attachments: # 1 SEALED Exhibit 2 to 363 Motion to Compel, # 2 SEALED Exhibit 3 to 363 Motion to Compel, # 3 SEALED Exhibit 4 to 363 Motion to Compel)(dmn, ) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
370 ORDER that the Mediation set for 3/10/2016 be and is hereby CANCELLED. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 3/9/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, CB. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
371 Joint MOTION to Conduct Limited Fact Discovery Beyond Discovery Cut−Off Deadline by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Moltz, Evan) Modified on 3/10/2016 to add additional filers and reflect actual title. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
372 ORDER that ALL pending motions (Docs. 360 , 361 , 362 , 363 , and 371 ) are set for Oral Argument (Motion Hearing) at the Status Conference to be held on 3/14/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/10/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
373 ORDER directing the non−movants TO SHOW CAUSE as to why the 360 Motion to Compel, 361 Motion to Compel, 362 Motion to Compel, and 363 Motion to Compel, should not be granted. Show Cause Response due by 8:00 AM on 3/14/2016. It is further ORDERED that a courtesy copy of any response to this order or exhibit thereto filed under seal shall be delivered to chambers no later than the deadline set above. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/10/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
374 ORDER: At the request of the parties, it is ORDERED that the Status Conference currently set for 3/14/2016, see 289 In−Person Status Conferences Order, and the Oral Argument (Motion Hearing) on all pending motions also set for that date, see 372 Order, are reset for 10:00 AM on 3/17/2016, in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Counsel for each party, as well as for non−parties Corizon, Inc., and MHM Correctional Services, Inc., must be present. It is further ORDERED that the deadline for responding to the court's 373 Order to Show Cause why the motions to compel should not be granted is extended to 5:00 PM on 3/16/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/10/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/10/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 142 of 408

03/10/2016 03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016
03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016

Motions No Longer Referred to the Magistrate Judge: 362 MOTION to Compel, 360 MOTION to Compel, 361 MOTION to Compel, and 363 MOTION to Compel. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 3/15/2016 12:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (war, ) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
375 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 3/15/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (war, ) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
376 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement) by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Smith, John) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
377 ORDER that the 376 Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Settlement of the Claims to be Tried in Phase 1 of this case is set for hearing (Motion Hearing) at 10:00 AM on 3/17/2016 in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/16/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
378 MOTION for Leave to File Response in Opposition to the 362 Motion to Compel Documents Relating to the Mortality Review Process Under SEAL by Corizon Health, Inc. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/16/2016 to create link to Doc. 362 , clean up text. (dmn, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/16/2016 due to original pdf did not contain a proper electronic signature: # 1 Corrected Certificate of Service) (dmn, ). Modified on 3/16/2016 (dmn, ). (Entered: 03/16/2016)
379 TEXT ORDER granting 378 Motion for Leave to File Corizon Health, Inc.'s Response in Opposition to the 362 Motion to Compel Documents Relating to the Mortality Review Process Under SEAL. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/16/2016. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
380 RESPONSE to 373 Order to Show Cause re Plaintiff's 363 Motion to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to Discovery Mediation and Other Agreements (Opposed) filed by MHM Correctional Services, Inc.. (Lane, Brett) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and to create link to Doc. 373 , wrong event code selected when originally filed. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
381 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF in Support of 360 MOTION to Compel Complete Production from Named Plaintiffs in Response to the State's Second Request for Production filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
382 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF in Support of 360 MOTION to Compel Complete Answers from Named Plaintiffs in Response to the State's Requests for Admission filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
383 RESPONSE in Opposition to Named Plaintiffs' 361 MOTION to Compel Production of an Adequate Privilege Log and the Production of any Improperly Withheld Documents from Corizon, Inc. filed by Non−Party Corizon Health, Inc. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
384 RESPONSE in Opposition to Named Plaintiffs' 363 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to Discovery Mediation and Other Agreements (Opposed) filed by Non−Party Corizon Health, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
385 RESPONSE in Opposition to Named Plaintiffs' 363 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to Discovery Mediation and Other Agreements (Opposed) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 143 of 408

03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/17/2016 03/17/2016 03/17/2016 03/17/2016
03/17/2016
03/18/2016 03/18/2016

386 RESPONSE to 373 Order to Show Cause re 360 MOTION to Compel filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − email re extension for responding, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Meet and Confer Letter)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and create link to Doc. 360 ; wrong event code selected when originally filed. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
391 *SEALED* RESPONSE in Opposition to the 362 MOTION to Compel Documents Relating to the Mortality Review Process filed by Non−party Corizon Health, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2 with Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit 3 with Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit 4)(dmn, ) (Entered: 03/17/2016)
387 ORDER that the Status Conference and Motion Hearing currently set for 10:00 AM on 3/17/2016, see Orders (doc. nos. 374 , 377 ), is reset for 1:00 PM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on the same date. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/17/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/17/2016)
388 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiff's expert Michael Puisis Declaration in Support of Plaintiff's 362 Motion to Compel Documents Relating to the Mortality Review Process (pursuant to 325 Consent Protective Order), by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/17/2016 to created links to Doc. 325 and 362 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/17/2016)
389 TEXT ORDER granting 388 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/17/2016. (dmn, )(NO PDF) (Entered: 03/17/2016)
390 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF in Support of 362 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Related to the Mortality Review Process filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Declaration of Dr. Michael Puisis FILED UNDER SEAL (see 400 Notice of Filing), # 2 Exhibit 2 Declaration of Dr. Kathryn A Burns, # 3 Exhibit 3 Declaration of Dr. Craig Haney)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/17/2016 to reflect actual title and clean up text. (dmn, ) (Attachment 1 replaced on 3/31/2016; SEALED Declaration filed conventionally, see Doc. 400 .) (dmn, ). Modified on 3/31/2016 (dmn, ). (Entered: 03/17/2016)
392 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 3/17/2016 re 376 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, 362 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Related to the Mortality Review Process from Corizon, Inc. (Opposed) filed by All Plaintiffs, 360 MOTION to Compel filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, 361 MOTION to Compel Production of Adequate Privilege Log from Corizon, Inc. filed by All Plaintiffs, 363 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to DIscovery Mediation and Other Agreements (Opposed) filed by All Plaintiffs, 371 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline Discovery Cut−Off on Limited Matters filed by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Department of Corrections (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
393 ORDER that the parties' 371 Joint Motion for Permission to Conduct the Deposition of Cassandra Lee on a mutually agreeable date prior to 4/30/2016 is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
394 ORDER as follows: (1) The 376 Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement is set for Motion Hearing at 10:00 AM on 4/15/2016 in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (2) By no later than on noon on 4/13/2016, the parties are jointly to file with the court the "plan" as further set out in the order. (3) The expert discovery, dispositive motion, and class certification deadlines for Phase 1 set in the 239 New Scheduling Order are reset as follows: (i) the unexpired expert discovery deadlines for Phase 1 are all extended by seven days; (ii) the dispositive motion and class certification deadlines for Phase 1 are extended to 4/22/2016, and the response and reply deadlines are extended accordingly. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/18/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 144 of 408

03/18/2016 03/18/2016 03/18/2016 03/18/2016 03/18/2016 03/29/2016 03/30/2016
04/06/2016 04/06/2016 04/13/2016 04/14/2016

395 ORDER that plaintiffs' 361 Motion to Compel an Adequate Privilege Log is granted to the extent stated during a hearing held in open court on 3/17/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
396 ORDER that the plaintiffs' 363 Motion to Compel Production of Documents is granted in part, denied in part, and denied as moot in part, as stated during a hearing held in open court on 3/17/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
397 ORDER that the defendants' 360 Motion to Compel is granted to the extent stated during a hearing held in open court on 3/17/2016, and based on the parties representations that they will meet and confer in order to draft stipulations responsive to the defendants requests for admissions and file these stipulations with the court no later than 4/30/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
398 ORDER that the plaintiffs' 362 Motion to Compel Production of Documents related to Corizon, Inc.'s mortality review process is granted to the extent stated during a hearing held in open court on 3/17/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
399 ORDER: Based on the representations made during a conference call held on the record on 3/15/2016, and during a hearing held in open court on 3/17/2016, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs counsel and their retained experts are permitted to take and retain un−blurred photographs of documents posted on the walls and windows of Alabama Department of Corrections facilities they inspect. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
400 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing Court Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Dr. Michael Puisis UNDER SEAL) to Doc. 390 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Documents Relating to the Mortality Review Process. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Declaration of Dr. Michael Puisis to Doc. 390 FILED UNDER SEAL pursuant to Court 389 Order)(dmn, ) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
401 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on March 17, 2016, in Montgomery, AL before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/20/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/2/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/28/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
402 (VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 403 ORDER) ORDERED that the pretrial conference currently set for May 16, 2016, is reset for May 17, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., with all unexpired deadlines tied to this date adjusted accordingly. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/6/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) Modified on 4/6/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 04/06/2016)
403 ORDERED that the order entered earlier today (doc. no. 402 ) is vacated. It is further ORDERED that the pretrial conference currently set for May 16, 2016, is reset for May 17, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., and that all other deadlines, including those set in the courts order of March 18, 2016 (doc. no. 394 ) remain unchanged. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/6/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
404 STATUS REPORT Joint Report Concerning Settlement by Alabama Department of Corrections, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, All Plaintiffs. (Smith, John) Modified on 4/14/2016 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 04/13/2016)
405 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Notice of Partial Renewal of Motion to Compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/14/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 145 of 408

04/14/2016 04/14/2016 04/14/2016 04/15/2016
04/15/2016 04/15/2016 04/18/2016
04/18/2016
04/18/2016 04/18/2016
04/18/2016

406 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Phase 1 Class Certification Motion (Unopposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/14/2016)
407 MOTION for Order to Court Mediation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/14/2016)
Renewed Motion to Compel by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (no pdf document attached to this entry see docket entry 405 for pdf. Attorney used incorrect event code) (kh, ) Modified on 5/10/2016 to reopen document (kh, ). (Entered: 04/18/2016)
408 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 4/15/2016 re 376 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, 406 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Phase 1 Class Certification Motion (Unopposed) filed by All Plaintiffs, 407 MOTION for Order to Court Mediation filed by All Plaintiffs (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
409 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Response to Court's Questions regarding Timing of Class Certification Decision (Corhern, Steven) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
***Attorney John W. Naramore added for Alabama Department of Corrections. (dmn, ) (see Doc. 409 for pdf) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
410 ORDER that the 407 Motion to Order Mediation is granted. The parties are directed to mediate the provisions of the plan described in the parties proposed settlement agreement (doc. no. 376 −1). The court appoints as the mediator United States Magistrate Judge Terry Moorer. Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) is required to bring appropriate knowledgeable personnel with decision−making authority to each mediation session. ADOC will provide the plaintiffs and the mediator with a schedule of topics to be discussed and the ADOC personnel to be present at each mediation session by 4/18/2016. Mediation will commence on 4/19/2016, and will continue from day to day thereafter until 4/29/2016, or until the parties have reached agreement on the terms of the plan, whichever first occurs. Nothing herein shall prevent the parties from having settlement discussions in addition to those required by this order. Mediation Conference set for 4/19/2016 before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/18/2016. Copies furnished to calendar, AG, CB.(dmn, ) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
411 ORDER: In light of the fact that the deadline for filing a Phase 1 class−certification motion, as currently set, will leave the court with only 20 business days between the filing of the plaintiffs' reply and the commencement of trial, the defendants' reasonable request that they be apprised of this court's decision regarding certification no later than five business days prior to trial, see Defendants' 409 Response, and the possibility that the court will require oral argument in order to reach a decision regarding certification, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' 406 Motion for further extension of the deadline for filing Phase 1 class−certification motion is denied. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/18/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
412 ORDERED that defendants' 405 renewed motion to compel is granted in part, denied in part, and set for further submission in part, as set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/18/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
413 ORDERED that this matter be and is hereby set for a mediation conference on April 19, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 4A, United States Courthouse, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. The ADOC may transmit the schedule of topics and the list of attendees to the undersigned at propord_moorer@almd.uscourts.gov. The schedule is solely for the courts use inpreparing for the mediation conference. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/18/2016. (furn: CB, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
414 Objection to Report of Defendant ADOC's Expert, David L. Runnels, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/18/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 146 of 408

04/18/2016 04/19/2016
04/19/2016 04/20/2016 04/21/2016
04/21/2016 04/21/2016 04/22/2016 04/22/2016 04/22/2016 04/22/2016 04/23/2016 04/23/2016 04/23/2016 04/23/2016 04/23/2016

415 RESPONSE to Discovery Request from Jefferson Dunn, et al by All Plaintiffs.(Restrepo, Valentina) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
416 (VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 529 ORDER) ORDERED that the pretrial conference currently set for September 12, 2016, is reset for September 9, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., and that all other deadlines remain unchanged. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/19/2016. (furn: calendar, press)(kh, ) Modified on 6/10/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 04/19/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/19/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/20/2016. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
417 ORDER: Upon consideration of the plaintiffs' objection to an expert report (doc. no. 414 ), it is ORDERED that counsel for all parties are to do the following: (1) Meet, in person, by no later than May 6, 2016, to attempt to resolve this objection and any additional objections to expert reports arising before that date; and (2) File a jointly prepared report by May 11, 2016, (a) as to which issues in the objection(s) are resolved and which ones remain unresolved and (b), for each and every unresolved issue, setting forth in detail the position of each side. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/21/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
418 ORDERED that Phase 2 of this litigation is referred to United States Magistrate Judge John Ott, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, for mediation. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/21/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/21/2016. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
419 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
420 TEXT ORDER granting 419 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/22/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) Modified on 4/22/2016 to add a document number to the entry (kh, ). (Entered: 04/22/2016)
421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/22/2016. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
422 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
423 Evidentiary Submission re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I Exhibits 1−4 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
424 Evidentiary Submission re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I Exhibits 5−10 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5, # 2 Exhibit 6, # 3 Exhibit 7, # 4 Exhibit 8, # 5 Exhibit 9, # 6 Exhibit 10)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
425 Evidentiary Submission re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I Exhibits 11−20 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 11, # 2 Exhibit 12, # 3 Exhibit 13, # 4 Exhibit 14, # 5 Exhibit 15, # 6 Exhibit 16, # 7 Exhibit 17, # 8 Exhibit 18, # 9 Exhibit 19, # 10 Exhibit 20)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
426 Evidentiary Submission re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I Exhibits 21−36 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21, # 2 Exhibit 25, # 3 Exhibit 26, # 4 Exhibit 30, # 5 Exhibit 31, # 6 Exhibit 32, # 7 Exhibit 33, # 8 Exhibit 34, # 9

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 147 of 408

04/23/2016 04/23/2016 04/23/2016 04/25/2016 04/25/2016 04/26/2016 04/26/2016 04/26/2016
04/26/2016
04/26/2016

Exhibit 35, # 10 Exhibit 36)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
427 Evidentiary Submission re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I Exhibits 37−46 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 37, # 2 Exhibit 38, # 3 Exhibit 39, # 4 Exhibit 40, # 5 Exhibit 41, # 6 Exhibit 42, # 7 Exhibit 43, # 8 Exhibit 44, # 9 Exhibit 45, # 10 Exhibit 46)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
428 Evidentiary Submission re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I Exhibits 47−53 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 47, # 2 Exhibit 48, # 3 Exhibit 49, # 4 Exhibit 50 − to be filed under seal, # 5 Exhibit 51, # 6 Exhibit 52, # 7 Exhibit 53)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
429 Evidentiary Submission re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I Exhibit 54 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 54)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
430 NOTICE of Filing Under Seal by All Plaintiffs re 422 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 50)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/26/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer: on 4/25/2016. (No PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
431 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Joint Motion for Extension of Discovery Deadline as to Phase I Expert Depositions by Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs. (Han, Susan) Modified on 4/26/2016 modified to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 04/26/2016)
432 TEXT ORDER granting 431 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/26/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/26/2016)
433 MOTION for Leave to File Corrected Memorandum and Exhibits in Support of Class Certification (Phase I) by Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Roger Moseley, Bradley Pearson, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Declaration of Anil Mujumdar, # 2 Exhibit 2−Proposed Corrected Memorandum, # 3 Exhibit 3−Proposed Corrected Evidentiary Submissions, # 4 Exhibit 4−Proposed Corrected Ex 6, # 5 Exhibit 5−Proposed Corrected Ex 7, # 6 Exhibit 6−Proposed Corrected Ex 8, # 7 Exhibit 7−Proposed Corrected Ex 9, # 8 Exhibit 8−Proposed Corrected Ex 10)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/26/2016)
434 Evidentiary Submission re 433 MOTION for Leave to File Corrected Memorandum and Exhibits in Support of Class Certification (Phase I) Additional Exhibits filed by Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Roger Moseley, Bradley Pearson, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 9−Proposed Corrected Ex 12, # 2 Exhibit 10−Proposed Corrected Ex 13, # 3 Exhibit 11−Proposed Corrected Ex 14, # 4 Exhibit 12−Proposed Corrected Ex 15, # 5 Exhibit 13−Proposed Corrected Ex 17, # 6 Exhibit 14−Proposed Corrected Ex 18, # 7 Exhibit 15−Proposed Corrected Ex 19, # 8 Exhibit 16−Proposed Corrected Ex 20, # 9 Exhibit 17−Proposed Corrected Ex 21, # 10 Exhibit 18−Proposed Corrected Ex 22, # 11 Exhibit 19−Proposed Corrected Ex 25, # 12 Exhibit 20−Proposed Corrected Ex 31)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/26/2016)
435 Evidentiary Submission re 434 Evidentiary Submission,,,, 433 MOTION for Leave to File Corrected Memorandum and Exhibits in Support of Class Certification (Phase I) Additional Exhibits filed by Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Roger Moseley, Bradley Pearson, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21−Proposed Corrected Ex 32, # 2 Exhibit 22−Proposed Corrected Ex 33, # 3 Exhibit 23−Proposed Corrected Ex 43, # 4 Exhibit 24−Proposed Corrected Ex 44, # 5 Exhibit 25−Proposed Corrected Ex 45, # 6 Exhibit 26−Proposed Corrected Ex 46, # 7 Exhibit 27−Proposed Corrected Ex 47, # 8 Exhibit 28−Proposed Corrected Ex 48, # 9 Exhibit 29−Proposed Corrected Ex 49, # 10 Exhibit

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 148 of 408

04/26/2016 04/27/2016 04/27/2016
04/27/2016 04/28/2016 04/29/2016 04/29/2016 04/29/2016 05/02/2016
05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/02/2016

30−Proposed Corrected Ex 55)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/26/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/26/2016. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
436 MOTION to Dismiss Paul Folsom as a Plaintiff by Paul Folsom. (Restrepo, Valentina) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
437 ORDER: Phase 2 of this case has been referred to the undersigned for mediation. Accordingly, it is set for a Telephone Status Conference on Tuesday, 5/3/2016 at 04:15 PM before Honorable Judge John E. Ott. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 4/27/2016. Copies furnished to calendar, AG. (dmn, ) Modified on 4/27/2016 to include calendar text. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/27/2016. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/28/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
438 MOTION for Discovery : PLAINTIFFS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF FINDING THAT THE TIMING OF PRODUCTION OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH EXPERTS IS GOVERNED BY RULE 26(a)(2) by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 5/2/2016 to term the event code. Attorney used the incorrect event code. This is a reply not a motion(kh, ). (Entered: 04/29/2016)
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF FINDING THAT THE TIMING OF PRODUCTION OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH EXPERTS IS GOVERNED BY RULE 26(a)(2) filed by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 438 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/29/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:00−5:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
439 JUDGMENT: Defendants having orally informed the court that they have no objection, it is the ORDERED, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that plaintiffs' 436 motion for Paul Folsom to withdraw as named plaintiff is granted and that plaintiff Folsom is dismissed and terminated as a party with prejudice. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/2/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
440 ORDERED that the court's order of April 18, 2016 (doc. no. 412 ) is amended to correct a typographical error as follows: The two references on the third page of the order to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "26(b)(5)(C)" are stricken and replaced with "26(b)(4)(C).". Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/2/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
441 ORDER: Counsel for defendant the Alabama Department of Corrections having orally informed the court that it does not object to the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a corrected memorandum and exhibits in support of Phase 1 class certification (doc. no. 433 ), it is ORDERED that said motion is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/2/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
442 ORDER: No settlement having been reached by the deadlines set in this courts orders of March 18, 2016 (doc. no. 394 ), and April 18, 2016 (doc. no. 410 ), it is ORDERED that this case will proceed to non−jury trial on June 20, 2016, as further set out in the New Scheduling Order (doc. no. 239 ). It is therefore further ORDERED that the parties' joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement concerning claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (doc. no. 376 ) is denied without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/2/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 149 of 408

05/04/2016 05/04/2016 05/04/2016
05/04/2016 05/04/2016 05/04/2016 05/04/2016
05/06/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016
05/09/2016

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/4/2016 01:15 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
443 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2)(Smith, John) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
444 ORDER: In accordance with the telephone conference call in this matter, the "Phase 2" mediation will proceed as enumerated: 1. The undersigned will conduct telephone planning sessions with the parties on May 10, 2016, as follows: Plaintiffs' counsel at 9:15 a.m. − 11:15 a.m. and Defendants' counsel at 5:00 p.m. − 7:00 p.m. The call−in number is 888−808−6929 and the pass code is 59177632. An in−person session with all counsel will be conducted on May 23, 2016, commencing at 8:00 a.m. The court will do another order scheduling the parties for the day after the May 10, 2016 session. 3. Counsel should plan and make arrangements for a day with the experts during the week of June 6, 2016.4. A final mediation session or sessions will be scheduled no later than the week of June 13, 2016. A more specific date will be set after the May 23, 2016 session. The parties will not be required to make written submissions to the court for the mediation. They will have the opportunity to submit materials if they deemed it helpful on any particular issue or matter. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 5/4/2016. (furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
445 MOTION Disqualify the Southern Poverty Law Center by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
446 RESPONSE to Motion re 445 MOTION Disqualify the Southern Poverty Law Center filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
447 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 5/4/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
448 ORDERED that defendants' 445 emergency motion to disqualify the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) is denied, albeit with leave to raise the arguments contained therein regarding SPLC's suitability as counsel for the putative classes in this case in defendants' response to plaintiffs' Phase 1 motion for class certification (doc. no. 421 ). It is further ORDERED that, if defendants wish to seek the disqualification of SPLC from representation of the individual named plaintiffs, they are to file a separate motion to that effect by no later than May 13, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/4/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
449 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #40 FILED UNDER SEAL FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW re 412 Order on Motion to Compel filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 DECLARATION OF MARIA V. MORRIS, # 2 Exhibit A to DECLARATION OF MARIA V. MORRIS, # 3 Exhibit B to DECLARATION OF MARIA V. MORRIS, # 4 DECLARATION OF WENDY VIA)(kh, ). (Entered: 05/06/2016)
450 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline re Meeting and Reporting regarding Plaintiffs' Objection to Runnels' Report re 417 Order,, by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 5/9/2016 to as filed on behalf of additional parties. (kh, ). (Entered: 05/09/2016)
451 MOTION for Leave to File Requested Documents for In Camera Review by the Court by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
452 ORDERED that the parties' joint request for the extension of deadlines regarding plaintiffs objection to the report of defense expert David Runnels (doc. no. 450 ) is granted to the following extent: The parties are to meet, in person, no later than May 13, 2016, to attempt to resolve this objection, and file a jointly prepared report by May 16, 2016 (not May 18, as requested), as to which issues in the objection are resolved and which issues remain and, for each and every unresolved issue, setting forth in detail the position of each side. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/9/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
453 TEXT ORDER granting 451 MOTION for Leave to File Requested Documents for In Camera Review by the Court. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 150 of 408

05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016
05/10/2016
05/10/2016
05/10/2016 05/10/2016 05/10/2016
05/10/2016

5/9/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
454 Witness List by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
455 Deposition Designations by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
456 Exhibit List for Phase I by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
457 Exhibit List by Alabama Department of Corrections.. (Han, Susan) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
458 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
459 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs re 453 Order on Motion for Leave to File (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Attachment to Exhibit 1)(kh, ) (Attachment 1 & Attachment 2 replaced on 5/10/2016 − previously pdf documents in incorrect order) (kh, ). Modified on 5/10/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 05/10/2016)
460 SEALED DOCUMENT − Plaintiffs' Facility Visitation Plan for the Phase I Trial. (docketed as separate docket entry pursuant to directives of chambers) (kh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
461 SEALED DOCUMENT − Response to 412 order (NAMED PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE, SINCE JANUARY 1, 2012, ACCESSED SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS WHILE NOT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS). (Attachments: # 1 Attachment − Social Media Postings) (docketed as separate docket entry pursuant to directives of chambers)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
462 RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS ORDER: During the upcoming trials in both Phases 1 and 2 of this case, the court will accommodate counsel for all religious holidays. However, it is ORDERED that as each such holiday approaches, counsel are to remind the court, no less than 14 days in advance of the holiday, of the need. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/10/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
463 NON−EXPERT WITNESS SUMMARY ORDER: The court having previously ordered counsel for the parties to submit expert 'crib sheets' summarizing the testimony to be given by experts they intend to call (doc. no. 240 ), it is also ORDERED that, no later than 8:00 a.m. on each day of both phases of trial, counsel are to share with opposing counsel and file with the court a brief summary of each non−expert witness they intend to call that day. Each summary should be no more than half of one page in length, and should include the name of the witness, a brief description of his or her role in and relevance to the case, and a brief summary of the topics his or her testimony will address. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/10/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
464 ORDERED that defendants' 405 motion to compel is denied as moot with respect to defendants' request for production # 52. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/10/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
465 ORDERED that defendants' 405 motion to compel is denied as moot with respect to defendants' requests for production # 54 & # 55. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/10/2016. (kh, ). (Entered: 05/10/2016)
466 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/15/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/31/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/10/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
467 ORDERED that plaintiffs are to show cause, in a filing to be submitted under seal and by no later than noon on May 13, 2016, why they should not be required to produce

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 151 of 408

05/11/2016 05/11/2016
05/12/2016
05/12/2016 05/13/2016
05/13/2016
05/13/2016 05/13/2016 05/13/2016

this message to defendants. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/10/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
468 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 467 Order to Show Cause, of Production to Defendants (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
469 ORDER: In light of the representation by plaintiffs in their notice of production (doc. no. 468 ) that they have produced to defendants the communication at issue in this court's order of May 10, 2016 (doc. no. 467 ), it is ORDERED that plaintiffs need not file any further response to that show−cause order. It is further ORDERED that defendants' motion to compel (doc. no. 405 ) is denied as moot with respect to defendants' request for production # 40. As all pending issues identified in this court's order (doc. no. 412 ) with respect to defendants' motion to compel (doc. no. 405 ) have now been resolved, the clerk of court is DIRECTED to terminate said motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/11/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
470 (VACATED PURSUANT THE THE COURT'S 817 ORDER) ELECTRONIC FILING OF SEALED DOCUMENTS ORDER: It is ORDERED that, in the future, when the parties file any documents or exhibits under seal, they are to furnish to the clerk of court, along with and at the same time as they submit the paper documents for filing, a compact disc containing PDF−format files. Each individual document or exhibit is to be submitted as a separate, clearly named PDF file no larger than 10 megabytes in size. The electronic files must be identical to the paper documents or exhibits presented. The parties are responsible for the readability and accuracy of the electronic files. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/12/2016. (kh, ) Modified on 9/30/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 05/12/2016)
471 MOTION to Substitute brief to include citations to final deposition transcripts by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Corhern, Steven) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
472 ORDERED that defendants' unopposed 471 motion to for leave to file a substitute brief is granted to the extent that defendants are to file a corrected opposition brief and final expert deposition transcripts by no later than 5:00 p.m. on May 18, 2016 (not May 20, 2016, as requested). The clerk of court is DIRECTED to docket this corrected opposition brief and the attached exhibits as a new entry, and not to replace the original filings, which are to remain on the docket. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
473 NOTICE REGARDING TRIAL STIPULATIONS: So as to dramatically shorten the length of trial and in order to avoid the presentation of unnecessary evidence, counsel for all parties are reminded that they should have engaged in good faith efforts to reduce all undisputed facts to written stipulations and that these stipulations are to be filed with the court on the dates of the pretrial conferences. See Stipulations Order (doc. no. 245 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
474 MOTION for Leave to File Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Han, Susan) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
475 TEXT ORDER granting 474 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/13/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
476 RESPONSE in Opposition re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 −− 2014 ADOC Annual Report, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 −− Hillberry Report (sealed), # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3 −− Health Classification, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4 −− Declaration of Angie Baggett (sealed), # 5 Exhibit Ex. 5 −− AR 400 Classification (sealed), # 6 Exhibit Ex. 6 −− Classification Manual (sealed), # 7 Exhibit Ex. 7 −− Declaration of George Adams, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 9 −− Declaration of James Williams, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 10 −− Deposition of P. Billups (sealed), # 10 Exhibit Ex. 11 −− Deposition of K. Jones (sealed), # 11 Exhibit Ex. 12 −− Deposition of Dr. Peter Blanck (sealed), # 12 Exhibit Ex. 13 −− Deposition of Timothy Sears (sealed), # 13 Exhibit Ex. 14 −− Deposition of Edward Braggs (sealed), # 14 Exhibit Ex. 15 −− Deposition of Christopher Gilbert (sealed))(Smith, John). (Attachment 2 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 152 of 408

05/13/2016
05/13/2016
05/16/2016 05/16/2016 05/16/2016 05/17/2016 05/17/2016

replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 05/13/2016)
477 Evidentiary Submission re 476 Response in Opposition to Motion,,, Exhibits 16−26 filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 16 −− Deposition of K. Peters (sealed), # 2 Exhibit Ex. 17 −− Medical Records of T. Brooks (sealed), # 3 Exhibit Ex. 18 −− Deposition of T. Brooks (sealed), # 4 Exhibit Ex. 19 −− ROUGH Deposition of David Runnels (sealed), # 5 Exhibit Ex. 20 −− Deposition of Veronica Moore (sealed), # 6 Exhibit Ex. 21 −− Declaration of Guy Noe, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 22 −− Deposition of Bobby Barrett (sealed), # 8 Exhibit Ex. 23 −− Deposition of Gary Broyles (sealed), # 9 Exhibit Ex. 24 −− Trade School Chart (sealed), # 10 Exhibit Ex. 25 −− AR 460, # 11 Exhibit Ex. 26 −− Emails from Sherry Lightner)(Smith, John) (Attachment 2 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 05/13/2016)
478 Evidentiary Submission re 476 Response in Opposition to Motion,,, Exhibits 27−39 filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 27 −− Hamilton SOP Classification Specialist (sealed), # 2 Ex. 28 −− Classification Inmate Summary of John Maner (sealed), # 3 Ex. 29 −− Deposition of Ruth Naglich (sealed), # 4 Ex. 30 −− Deposition of John Maner (sealed), # 5 Ex. 31 −− Intra−System Transfer Form (sealed), # 6 Ex. 32 −− Declaration of Ruth Naglich (sealed), # 7 Ex. 33 −− Report of David L. Runnels (sealed), # 8 Ex. 34 −− Hamilton ADA Grievance Procedure, # 9 Ex. 35 −− Tutwiler SOP ADA Grievance, # 10 Ex. 36 −− Deposition of J. Gilbert (sealed), # 11 Ex. 37 −− Report of Dr. Peter Blanck (sealed), # 12 Ex. 38 −− Hamilton ADA Grievance Appeal form, # 13 Ex. 39 −− Deposition of T. Holcomb (sealed))(Smith, John) (Attachment 1 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 5/16/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 05/13/2016)
479 JOINT STATUS REPORT Regarding Plaintiffs' Objections to Runnels Report by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 5/17/2016 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 05/16/2016)
480 RESPONSE in Opposition re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I CORRECTED BRIEF pursuant to this Court's Order of May 12, 2016 filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 SEALED Exhibit CORRECTED Exhibit 19 −− FINAL Deposition of David Runnels)(Smith, John) Modified on 5/16/2016 to reflect Exhibit 19 as SEALED (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 05/16/2016)
481 Deposition Designations Defendants Deposition Designations in Response to Plaintiffs' Deposition Designations for Phase I Trial by Alabama Department of Corrections.. (Getty, John) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
482 ORDERED that the parties are to file these stipulations with the court by no later than June 6, 2016. No further extension of this deadline will be granted. It is the express obligation of both parties to ensure that this filing is timely submitted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/17/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
483 PHASE 1 TRIAL SCHEDULE: (1) Each and every day, Monday through Friday, court will begin at 9:00 a.m. and last until 5:00 p.m., with 15−minute breaks around 10:30 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., and with an hour for lunch at noon. (2) Attorneys are to be in court, ready to proceed, each morning by no later than 8:40 a.m. (3) Court will be in recess on July 4, 2016, and for the week of July 25−29, 2016. (4) If the trial is proceeding slower than expected, daily court could begin at 8:00 a.m. and last past 5:00 p.m., and there could be court on July 4 and on Saturdays. Signed by Honorable

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 153 of 408

05/17/2016 05/17/2016
05/17/2016 05/18/2016
05/18/2016 05/19/2016
05/20/2016 05/20/2016 05/20/2016
05/20/2016 05/21/2016

Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/17/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
484 ORDERED that plaintiffs' 421 motion for Phase 1 class certification is set for oral argument on May 26, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/17/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
485 PHASE 1 PRETRIAL ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The non−jury trial of this cause, which is to last approximately 20 days, is set for June 20, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. at the United States Courthouse in Montgomery, Alabama. (2) Trial briefs are to be filed in accordance with and by the deadlines set in the trial briefs order (doc. no. 246 ), as amended by the modified Daubert order (doc. no. 288 ). All deadlines not otherwise affected by this order will remain as set forth in the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) entered by the court, and all subsequent orders modifying it as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/17/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
486 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference held on 5/17/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
487 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record during the Phase 1 pretrial conference held on May 17, 2016, it is ORDERED that the objections plaintiffs raised to the report of defense expert David Runnels (doc. no. 414 ) and maintained in the parties' joint report regarding the status of those objections (doc. no. 479 ) are to be addressed as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/18/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
488 NOTICE of Appearance by Jaqueline Aranda Osorno on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
489 TABLES OF CONTENTS ORDER: For the convenience of the court and in order to promote the clear organization of written submissions, it is ORDERED that any future motion, brief, memorandum, or like filing exceeding 25 pages in length is to include a table of contents listing all headings in the document and indicating the pages on which those headings appear. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/19/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
490 NOTICE of Appearance by Lisa Wright Borden on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
491 MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
492 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Kenneth Moncrief, Tommie Moore, Roger Moseley, Bradley Pearson, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
493 REPLY BRIEF re 422 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Kenneth Moncrief, Tommie Moore, Bradley Pearson, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/21/2016)
494 Evidentiary Submission Exhibits 1−10 filed by Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Kenneth Moncrief, Tommie Moore, Bradley Pearson, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs summary chart, # 2 Exhibit 2 − to be filed under seal, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4 − to be filed under seal, # 5 Exhibit 5 − to be filed under seal, # 6 Exhibit 6 − to be filed under seal, # 7 Exhibit 7 − to be filed under seal, # 8 Exhibit 8 − to be filed under seal, # 9 Exhibit 9 − to be filed under seal, # 10 Exhibit 10 − to be filed under seal)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 154 of 408

05/21/2016
05/21/2016
05/23/2016 05/23/2016 05/23/2016
05/23/2016 05/23/2016 05/23/2016 05/23/2016 05/24/2016 05/24/2016

on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 05/21/2016)
495 Evidentiary Submission re 493 Reply Brief, Exhibits 11−22 filed by Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Kenneth Moncrief, Tommie Moore, Roger Moseley, Bradley Pearson, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 11 − to be filed under seal, # 2 Exhibit 12 − to be filed under seal, # 3 Exhibit 13 − to be filed under seal, # 4 Exhibit 14 − to be filed under seal, # 5 Exhibit 15 − to be filed under seal, # 6 Exhibit 16 − to be filed under seal, # 7 Exhibit 17 − to be filed under seal, # 8 Exhibit 18 − to be filed under seal, # 9 Exhibit 19, # 10 Exhibit 20, # 11 Exhibit 21, # 12 Exhibit 22)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 5/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 05/21/2016)
496 Evidentiary Submission re 493 Reply Brief, Exhibit 23 filed by Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Kenneth Moncrief, Tommie Moore, Roger Moseley, Bradley Pearson, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 23)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/21/2016)
497 TEXT ORDER granting 491 MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/23/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
498 Response to Order re 243 Order,,, Parties' Joint Plan regarding Plaintiff's Attendance at Trial by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Sees, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
499 ORDER: The court has particular interest in addressing at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for Phase 1 class certification (doc. no. 421 ) set for May 26, 2016, certain specific, important questions. It is therefore ORDERED that the parties are to submit, by no later than 4:00 p.m. on May 25, 2016, supplemental briefs directly answering, and be prepared to discuss further at oral argument, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/23/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
500 ORDER: It is ORDERED that the parties' joint plan for prisoner attendance at the Phase 1 trial (doc. no. 498 ) is approved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/23/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
501 Witness List by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
502 DEFENDANT ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 460 VISITATION PLAN by Alabama Department of Corrections. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
503 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs re 494 Evidentiary Submission and 495 Evidentiary Submission. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
504 JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING PHASE 1 TRIAL EXHIBITS by Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs,Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) Modified on 5/25/2016 to clarify the docket text and add as filed on behalf of the additional parties(kh, ). (Entered: 05/24/2016)
505 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/24/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 155 of 408

05/24/2016 05/25/2016 05/25/2016
05/25/2016
05/25/2016 05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/26/2016
05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/27/2016

506 STIPULATION of Facts as to Phase I (Joint) by Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Smith, John) Modified on 5/25/2016 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 05/24/2016)
507 NOTICE. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/25/2016. (kh, ) . (Entered: 05/25/2016)
508 Response to Order re 499 Order, Supplemental Briefing on Class Certification by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Christopher Jackson, John Maner, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Roger Moseley, Bradley Pearson, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
509 RESPONSE in Opposition re 499 Order, 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I, Defendant's Supplemental Brief filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) Modified on 5/25/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship by adding links to docs 421 and 499 and remove the erroneous link to doc 433 (kh, ). (Entered: 05/25/2016)
510 (STRICKEN AS AN ERRONEOUS DUPLICATE DOCKET ENTRY) Response to Order by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) Modified on 5/26/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 05/25/2016)
511 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney on behalf of Valentina Restrepo by All Plaintiffs. (Restrepo, Valentina) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
512 NOTICE of Error re 510 Response to Order is hereby STRICKEN as an erroneous duplicate docket entry. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
513 TEXT ORDER granting 511 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/26/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
*** Attorney Valentina Restrepo terminated pursuant to the 513 order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) . (Entered: 05/26/2016)
514 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 5/26/2016 re 421 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase I filed by All Plaintiffs (PDF available for court use only). (Motion Hearing not held Settlement discussed) (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
515 ORDER: Counsel for the parties having stated in open court on May 26, 2016, that they have reached a proposed settlement of Phase 1, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The Phase 1 trial, now set to begin on June 20, 2016, is canceled. (2) All deadlines, to the extent that they address Phase 1, are suspended. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/26/2016. (Term: Non−Jury Trial set for 06/20/2016) (Furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
516 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
517 TEXT ORDER granting 516 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/26/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
518 Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) Modified on 5/26/2016 to clarify the docket text(kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/26/2016: # 2 Sealed Exhibit) (kh, ). (Entered: 05/26/2016)
519 ORDER directing as follows: (1) a HEARING on whether the parties 518 proposed settlement of Phase 1 should be preliminarily approved is set for 6/3/2016 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in Courtroom 2FMJ, FMJ US Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL; (2) by 6/1/2016, the parties are to submit their proposed logistical procedures and forms for giving notice to and receiving comments from putative class members. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/27/2016. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 05/27/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 156 of 408

05/31/2016 06/01/2016 06/01/2016
06/02/2016 06/03/2016
06/03/2016 06/06/2016 06/09/2016 06/10/2016
06/10/2016 06/10/2016

520 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement Concerning Claims Arising Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Smith, John) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
521 ORDERED that the second joint motion for preliminary approval of the parties' settlement of Phase 1 (doc. no. 520 ) is set for hearing on June 3, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/1/2016. (furn: Calendar, AG) (kh, ) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
522 ORDER: In light of the pending joint motion for preliminary approval of the parties' settlement of Phase 1 (doc. no. 520 ), it is ORDERED that the pending motions related to the trial of that phase−−namely, plaintiffs' motion for Phase 1 class certification (doc. no. 421 ), and the parties' joint motion for entry of an order on Phase 1 trial exhibits (doc. no. 504 )−−are denied with leave to renew should the court not approve the proposed settlement. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/1/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
523 Response to Order re 519 Order, Set Hearings,,,, [Joint] Parties' Proposed Logistical Procedures and Forms for Providing Notice of Proposed Settlement and Receiving Comments from Putative Class Members by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3 − Responses to Proposed Class Action Settlement)(Smith, John) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
524 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 6/3/2016 re 520 Joint MOTION for Settlement (Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement Concerning Claims Arising Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (war, ) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
525 ORDERED that an in−person status conference on Phase 2 of this case is set for June 9, 2016, at 1:30 p.m. This status conference will be held in chambers. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/3/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
526 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Stipulations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/06/2016)
530 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 6/9/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
527 PHASE 2 IN−PERSON STATUS CONFERENCES ORDER: ORDERED that on−the−record status conferences are set for the following dates at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama: June 29, 2016; July 22, 2016; and August 10, 2016. Counsel for every party must be present in person as further set out; It is further ORDERED that the status conference currently set for August 9, 2016, is cancelled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/10/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
528 SEALED ORDER. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/10/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
529 PHASE 2 PRETRIAL AND MOTION DEADLINES ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The order this court entered on April 19, 2016 (doc. no. 416 ), resetting the Phase 2 pretrial conference, is vacated. (2) The court's new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) is amended as follows: the first sentence of the third paragraph of Section 1 is amended to read: "In Phase 2, a pretrial conference is scheduled for September 2, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Montgomery, Alabama." (3) The court's modified Daubert order (doc. no. 288 ), which amended the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ), is vacated with respect to Phase 2. (4) Section 2 of the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) is amended with respect to Phase 2 to read in its entirety: "SECTION 2. Dispositive motions (i.e., motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment) shall be filed no later than July 29, 2016, as further set out. "The opposing parties will be permitted to file responses no later than August 17, 2016, and the moving parties will

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 157 of 408

06/10/2016 06/13/2016
06/13/2016

be permitted to file replies no later than August 23, 2016." (5) Section 4 of the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) is amended with respect to Phase 2 to read in its entirety, SECTION 4. Motions for class certification shall be filed no later than July 29, 2016, as further set out. (6) The court's trial briefs order (doc. no. 246 ) is amended to include at the end of the existing text the following: "Each party is to address in these briefs all Daubert issues to be resolved at trial involving challenges to expert evidence raised or likely to be raised by either party, and including any unresolved challenges previously raised by either party in litigation on dispositive and class certification motions. Absent exceptional circumstances, separate Daubert motions will not be entertained. These issues will be taken up at trial and resolved during its course or after its conclusion in an eventual opinion on the merits." (7) The court's modified expert discovery order (doc. no. 259 ), which amended the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ), is vacated. (8) Section 6 of the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) is amended with respect to Phase 2 to read in its entirety: "SECTION 6. All Phase 2 fact discovery is complete. "All Phase 2 expert discovery shall be completed no later than August 22, 2016." (9) Section 7 of the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) is amended with respect to Phase 2 to read in its entirety: "SECTION 7. The parties shall disclose to each other the identity and general area of expected testimony of ANY person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 701, 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence no later than July 5, 2016, except that defendant will be permitted to present testimony from rebuttal experts whose identities were not disclosed by that date, so long as those rebuttal experts had not yet been retained as of that date and their identities and general areas of expected testimony were disclosed no later than July 18, 2016, as further set out. (10) All other deadlines tied to the date of the Phase 2 pretrial conference, whether set in the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) or otherwise, are adjusted accordingly. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/10/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
531 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections of Response to Court's questions raised at the preliminary approval hearing on June 3, 2016 (Smith, John) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
532 PHASE 1 PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT APPROVAL ORDER: It is therefore ORDERED that the joint motion for preliminary approval (doc. no. 520 ) is granted as follows: 1. The proposed settlement agreement (doc. no. 518 ) is preliminarily approved, as further set out in order. An injunctive−relief settlement class, is provisionally certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy program, and Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g). The Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) is to provide notice of the proposed settlement agreement as further outlined below by June 24, 2016, and to collect comments from class members as further outlined below by the submission deadline of July 25, 2016, as further set out in order. By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are to file a joint supplemental brief addressing comprehensively and in detail the following questions raised previously by the court at a hearing held in open court on June 3, 2016, as further set out. By no later than August 17, 2016, the parties are to file pre−hearing briefs, both summarizing by topic and responding to the objections to and comments on the proposed settlement agreement that have been submitted by class members, as further set out. A fairness hearing is set for 10:00 a.m. on August 31, 2016, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. At this hearing, counsel for both parties must be prepared to respond to the objections raised and comments made by class members, as well as to the courts concerns as outlined above. The court will determine, after receiving objections and comments from class members, from which of them it intends to hear oral testimony. This testimony will be heard by videoconference from various ADOC facilities, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/13/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Attachment 2 (Exhibit B) replaced on 6/14/2016 per direction of chambers) (kh, ). Modified on 6/14/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 06/13/2016)
533 ORDER: It is ORDERED that any Phase 2 dispositive and class−certification motions are set for oral argument on September 2, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 158 of 408

06/14/2016
06/15/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/20/2016
06/20/2016 06/20/2016
06/22/2016

the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/13/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
534 PHASE 1 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ORDER: Upon further consideration of the parties' proposed Phase 1 settlement agreement (doc. no. 518 ), and in addition to the briefing ordered in this court's Phase 1 preliminary settlement approval order (doc. no. 532 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) By no later than June 20, 2016, plaintiffs are to file a brief addressing whether the court should appoint a guardian ad litem to represent at the fairness hearing the interests of class members who are incompetent or otherwise unable to understand or comment on the terms of the settlement agreement. This brief is to respond to the position taken by defendants on this question in their notice of response (doc. no. 531 ). (2) By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are to address in detail in a joint filing the bases on which they propose that the court grant final certification of the proposed class. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/14/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference re Phase I Settlement set for 6/17/2016 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
535 MOTION for Leave to File Documents under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
536 MOTION Expedited Mediation of Discovery Dispute by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
537 TEXT ORDER granting 535 Motion for Leave to File documents under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/17/16. (NO PDF document attached to this notice).(djy, ) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
538 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 6/17/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
539 SECOND PHASE 1 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ORDER: Upon further consideration of the parties' proposed Phase 1 settlement agreement (doc. no. 518 ), and in addition to the briefing ordered in this courts Phase 1 preliminary settlement approval order (doc. no. 532 ) and Phase 1 supplemental briefing order (doc. no. 534 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are to confirm in a written filing with the court their agreement, stipulated to during a telephone conference held on the record on June 17, 2016, that under the terms of their proposed settlement agreement and applicable law, as further set out in order. (2) By no later than July 15, 2016, the parties are to file a joint supplemental brief, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/20/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
540 Response to Order re 534 Order,,, Regarding Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem by All Plaintiffs. (Hackney, James) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
541 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 6/17/2016, before Judge Honorable Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/11/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/21/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/19/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
542 ORDERED as follows: (1) The 536 Motion for Expedited Mediation is GRANTED. (2) This matter be and is hereby set for a mediation conference on Monday, June 27, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 4A, United States Courthouse, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 6/22/2016. (furn: calendar, CB)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 159 of 408

06/22/2016 06/24/2016 06/27/2016 06/29/2016 06/29/2016
06/29/2016 06/29/2016 06/29/2016 06/29/2016
06/29/2016 07/06/2016 07/07/2016
07/08/2016 07/11/2016

543 ORDERED that the Mediation Conference set for June 27, 2016, be and is hereby RESET to Wednesday, June 29, 2016, at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 4A, United States Courthouse, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 6/22/2016. (furn: calendar, CB)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
544 STATUS REPORT Jointly Prepared By All Parties by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
545 MOTION to Continue / Re−Set Status Conferences by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
546 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 6/29/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
547 ORDERED that defendants' motion to reset status conferences (doc. no. 545 ) is granted as follows: (1) The status conferences set in this court's Phase 2 In−Person Status Conferences Order (doc. no. 527 ) for July 22, 2016, and August 10, 2016, are reset for July 20, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., and August 15, 2016, at 1:00 p.m., respectively, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/29/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
(PARTIED ARE INSTRUCTED TO DISREGARD THIS ENTRY − PLEASE REFER TO 547 FOR HEARING DATES) Set Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/22/2016 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (furn calendar, ag)(kh, ) Modified on 6/29/2016 to reflect court entry only (kh, ). (Entered: 06/29/2016)
Set Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/20/2016 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Cancelled: Status Conference set for 7/22/2016 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson previously set in error. (furn calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
Set Status Conference set for 8/15/2016 01:00 PM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson previously deleted in error while correcting another status conference deadline. (furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
548 ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program is to file its motion for leave to amend the complaint to assert its associational standing by no later than July 6, 2016. If defendants oppose this motion, they are to respond by no later than July 13, 2016, and plaintiffs are to reply by no later than July 15, 2016. (2) Plaintiffs are to file an outline of their allegations by no later than July 13, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/29/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held before Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 6/29/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:30−3:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 07/13/2016)
549 MOTION for Leave to File [Proposed] Fourth Amended Complaint by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 − [Proposed] Fourth Amended Complaint)(Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
550 PHASE I OPINION AND ORDER ON NEED FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The court will not appoint a guardian ad litem at this time in this litigation. (2) By no later than August 17, 2016, plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program is to file a brief setting forth in detail its position as to why the settlement agreement promotes the interests, and fairly resolves the claims, of prisoners with cognitive and communication− elated disabilities so severe that they would likely be unable to understand the terms of the agreement or submit intelligible comments on them. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/7/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/07/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 7/11/2016 01:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
551 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 7/11/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 160 of 408

07/12/2016 07/12/2016
07/12/2016 07/13/2016 07/14/2016
07/14/2016 07/14/2016 07/15/2016

Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
552 NEW PHASE 2 STATUS CONFERENCES ORDER: ORDERED that in addition to the status conferences currently scheduled for July 20, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., and August 15, 2016, at 1:00 p.m., pursuant to the courts order of June 29, 2016 (doc. no. 547 ), an additional status conference is set for September 2, 2016, at 10:00 a.m.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/12/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
553 NEW PHASE 2 SCHEDULING ORDER: It is ORDERED that the following unexpired Phase 2 deadlines, as set in the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) and Phase 2 pretrial and motion deadlines order (doc. no. 529 ), are reset as follows: The pretrial conference set for September 2, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., is reset to September 28, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. The dispositive and class−certification motions deadline of July 29, 2016, is extended to August 19, 2016. The deadline for completion of all expert discovery of August 22, 2016, is extended to September 12, 2016. The Phase 2 trial, now set to begin on October 17, 2016, is continued until November 7, 2016. It is further ORDERED that the court's order of June 14, 2016 (doc. no. 533 ), setting the Phase 2 dispositive and class− certification motions for oral argument on September 2, 2016, is amended to set any such motions for oral argument on September 28, 2016. It is further ORDERED that the deadlines set in this court's order of June 29, 2016 (doc. no. 548 ), for briefing regarding plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program's motion for leave to amend the complaint to assert its associational standing, and for plaintiffs to file an outline of their allegations, remain the same. Finally, it is ORDERED that all other deadlines tied to the date of the Phase 2 pretrial conference, whether set in the new scheduling order (doc. no. 239 ) or otherwise, are adjusted accordingly. No deadlines related to Phase 1 have been affected by this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/12/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
554 PHASE 2 ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING BRIEFING ORDER: It is ORDERED that this court's order of June 29, 2016 (doc. no. 548 ), is amended to extend the deadline for defendants to respond to plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program's motion for leave to amend their complaint to assert associational standing (doc. no. 549 ) to July 22, 2016, and to extend the deadline for plaintiffs to reply to July 27, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/12/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
555 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 548 Order, Filing of Trial Outline (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Outline, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Vail, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Puisis, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Shulman, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Burns, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Haney)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/13/2016)
556 PHASE 1 COMMENT BOX ORDER: With the agreement of the parties and for purposes of logistical convenience, it is ORDERED that Section 4(k) of the Phase 1 Preliminary Settlement Approval Order (doc. no. 532 at 12−13) is amended to permit the comment boxes to be opened at the headquarters of defendant Alabama Department of Corrections in Montgomery, Alabama, rather than at the United States Courthouse. A representative of the clerk of court will be in attendance when the boxes are opened and will personally transport all contents of the boxes to the courthouse for processing pursuant to Section 4(l) of that order. All other provisions related to the collection of comments remain unaltered. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/14/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/14/2016)
557 (STRICKEN as erroneous docket entry−See Docket entry 558 ) MOTION to Compel The State's Emergency Motion to Declassify as "Attorneys' Eyes Only" the Patient Keys in Named Plaintiffs' Expert Reports by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 7/18/2016 (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 07/14/2016)
558 MOTION to Compel The State's Emergency Motion to Declassify as "Attorneys' Eyes Only" the Patient Keys in Named Plaintiffs' Expert Reports by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit a)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/14/2016)
559 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline Joint Supplemental Brief addressing two specific issues (DOC 532 at 14−16) re 532 Order by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) Modified on 7/15/2016 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Entered: 07/15/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 161 of 408

07/15/2016 07/15/2016
07/15/2016 07/15/2016 07/15/2016 07/18/2016
07/18/2016 07/18/2016 07/19/2016 07/19/2016 07/19/2016
07/19/2016 07/19/2016
07/19/2016

560 STIPULATION [JOINT] Concerning Provisions of PLRA as it Related to Phase 1 Settlement by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
561 PHASE 1 BRIEFING DEADLINE EXTENSION ORDER: It is ORDERED that the parties' joint motion (doc. no. 559 ) for an extension of the deadline for supplemental briefing in response to Sections 5(a) and 5(b) of the Phase 1 Preliminary Settlement Approval Order (doc. no. 532 ) is granted to the extent that the parties may submit their responses to those sections by no later than noon on July 22, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/15/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
562 Response to Order re 534 Order,,, at 2 Joint Brief in Support of Class Certification by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
563 Response to Order re 539 Order,,, [Joint Response to Court's Second Supplemental Briefing Order] by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
564 STATUS REPORT (Joint) by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 7/18/2016 to clarify text to reflect as also filed on behalf of Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 07/15/2016)
565 NOTICE of Error re 557 MOTION to Compel The State's Emergency Motion to Declassify as "Attorneys' Eyes Only" the Patient Keys in Named Plaintiffs' Expert Reports which is hereby STRICKEN as an erroneous duplicated docket entry. Parties should refer only to Docket entry 558 , which is the same document with its' Exhibit A attached. (djy, ) (Entered: 07/18/2016)
566 (VACATED pursuant to 568 ) ORDER directing that plfs are to respond to the defs' 558 MOTION to Compel no later than 9:00 am. on 7/19/2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/18/16. (djy, ) Modified on 7/19/2016 (djy, ). (Entered: 07/18/2016)
567 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 558 MOTION to Compel The State's Emergency Motion to Declassify as "Attorneys' Eyes Only" the Patient Keys in Named Plaintiffs' Expert Reports Notice of Withdrawal (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/18/2016)
568 ORDER DENYING as moot 558 MOTION to Compel, as further set out in order; VACATING the 566 Order requiring plfs' to respond. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/19/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 07/19/2016)
569 Objection to The State's Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to the Expert Reports Offered by Named Plaintiffs filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/19/2016)
570 MOTION to Compel supplementation of certain documents from defs and request for expedited treatment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2−SEALED, # 3 Exhibit 3−SEALED, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8−SEALED, # 9 Exhibit 9−SEALED)(djy, ) (Entered: 07/20/2016)
Motions No Longer Referred to Judge Moorer, system referral in error: 570 MOTION to Compel (djy, ) (Entered: 07/20/2016)
578 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−FACILITIES (Attachments: # 1 Alex City, # 2 Atmore CWC, # 3 Bibb, # 4 Birmingham WR, # 5 Bullock, # 6 Childersburg, # 7 Decatur, # 8 Draper, # 9 Easterling, # 10 Elba, # 11 Elmore, # 12 Fountain, # 13 Frank Lee WR, # 14 Hamilton A&I, # 15 Holman, # 16 Kilby, # 17 Limestone, # 18 Loxley, # 19 Mobile CBF, # 20 Montgomery Womens, # 21 Red Eagle, # 22 Southern Poverty, # 23 St. Clair, # 24 Staton, # 25 Tutwiler, # 26 Ventress)(djy, ) (Attachment 23 replaced on 7/25/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/1/2016 to correct Alex City PDF document to include 4 missing pages) (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 07/22/2016)
582 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court Part 1, # 2 Comments mailed to Court Part 2, # 3 Comments mailed to Court Part 3, # 4 Comments mailed

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 162 of 408

07/20/2016 07/21/2016 07/21/2016
07/21/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/25/2016 07/25/2016 07/26/2016

to Court Part 4, # 5 Comments mailed to Court Part 5)(djy, ) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
571 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 7/20/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 7/25/2016: # 1 Court's Exhibit) (kh, ). (Entered: 07/20/2016)
572 ELECTRONIC COURTESY COPY ORDER, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/21/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 07/21/2016)
573 PHASE 2 DISCOVERY ORDER directing as follows: (1) With respect to plfs' request for supplementation of credentialing documentation and peer reviews, defs are to respond by no later than 7/22/16, and plfs may reply by no later than 7/27/16; Defs are to file under seal and, for purposes of in camera review, the peer−review files at issue by no later than 7/27/2016, as further set out in order; (2) with respect to plfs' request to receive or review the mortality reviews of the three deceased named plfs, defs are to respond by no later than 7/22/16, and plfs may reply by no later than 7/27/16; Defs are to collect these files at the offices of defense counsel by no later than 7/27/16, but need not submit them to the court at this time; further ORDERING that the following agreement, reached and memorialized in writing by the parties at the status conference held on the record on 7/20/16, is entered on the record in this case as a binding stipulation, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/21/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 07/21/2016)
574 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher Fred Heinss on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Heinss, Christopher) (Entered: 07/21/2016)
575 Joint Brief Regarding Scope of Arbitration by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) Modified on 7/25/2016 to clarify the docket text and add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. (kh, ). (Entered: 07/22/2016)
576 Response to Order re 532 Order, Terminate Motions, Set Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Joint Brief Addressing Court's Question Regarding Addition of Official Capacity Defendants to Phase 1 Claims and Settlement by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
577 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
579 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Brent L. Rosen by All Plaintiffs. (Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
580 TEXT ORDER granting 577 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal; granting 579 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/22/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
*** Attorney Brent L Rosen terminated pursuant to the 580 text order. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
581 THE STATE'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 570 MOTION TO COMPEL SUPPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANTS AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED TREATMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
583 RESPONSE to Motion re 549 MOTION for Leave to File [Proposed] Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
584 NOTICE of Correction re 578 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−FACILITIES, to enter the corrected pdf of Exhibit 23 − St. Clair Facility to the referenced document into the record. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 23 − St. Clair Facility)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
593 RESPONSE TO PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
585 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Getty, John) (Entered: 07/26/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 163 of 408

07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/29/2016
07/29/2016 08/01/2016
08/01/2016
08/01/2016 08/01/2016

586 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Disclosures of Experts (Heinss, Christopher) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
587 MOTION for Leave to File Unredacted Brief under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
588 TEXT ORDER granting 587 MOTION for Leave to File Unredacted Brief under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/27/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
589 TEXT ORDER granting 585 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/27/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
*** Attorney John Eric Getty terminated pursuant to the 589 text order. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
590 REPLY to Response to Motion re 570 MOTION to Compel Supplementation (Redacted) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Corizon Contract Excerpts)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
591 CORIZON HEALTH, INC.'S NOTICE OF FILING. (Attachments: # 1 Peer−Review Files − Part 1, # 2 Peer−Review Files − Part 2, # 3 Peer−Review Files − Part 3, # 4 Peer−Review Files − Part 4)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/28/2016)
592 PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' 581 RESPONSE TO MOTION TO COMPEL SUPPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/28/2016)
594 PHASE 1 ORDER ON 593 OBJECTION FROM FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER: Upon consideration of the objection to the proposed settlement of Phase 1 of this case filed by the Federal Public Defender on behalf of three of its clients on Alabama's death row (doc. no. 593 ), it is ORDERED that, on or before August 10, 2016, the parties are to solicit−−and relate to the court−−the views of the Equal Justice Initiative, which represents a significant number of prisoners on Alabama's death row, regarding the substance of the objection and any proposal put forth by the parties to resolve it. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order, as well as a copy of the objection, to the Equal Justice Initiative at 122 Commerce Street, Montgomery, Alabama, 36104. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/29/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
595 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 − ADAP's Reply to Defendants' Objection)(Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
596 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−FACILITIES SECOND COLLECTION (Attachments: # 1 Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, # 2 Birmingham WR, # 3 Bibb, # 4 Bullock, # 5 Decatur, # 6 Donaldson, # 7 Draper, # 8 Easterling, # 9 Elmore, # 10 Fountain, # 11 Hamilton, # 12 JO Davis, # 13 Kilby, # 14 Limestone, # 15 Loxley, # 16 Montgomery Womens, # 17 Red Eagle, # 18 Southern Poverty, # 19 St. Clair, # 20 Staton, # 21 Tutwiler, # 22 Ventress)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
597 ORDERED that plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Programs motion (doc. no. 595 ) for an extension of the time in which to file its reply brief (doc. no. 595 −1) set out in the courts Phase 2 Associational Standing Briefing Order (doc. no. 554 ), which none of the defendants opposes, is granted. The clerk of court is DIRECTED to docket the brief. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/1/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
598 REPLY to Response to Motion re 549 MOTION for Leave to File [Proposed] Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
599 MOTION to Strike 555 Notice (Other), the Expert Reports offered byDr. Craig Haney and Eldon Vail by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 08/01/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 164 of 408

08/01/2016 08/01/2016 08/02/2016 08/02/2016
08/02/2016 08/02/2016 08/02/2016 08/02/2016 08/03/2016 08/03/2016

600 NOTICE of Correction re 578 Notice to correct Alex City PDF document to include 4 missing pages regarding Ramson, Lindsey, Humphrey, and Halley (Attachments: # 1 attachment Alex City to Docket entry 578 )(djy, ) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
601 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Han, Susan) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 8/2/2016 09:30 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
602 PHASE 2 DISCOVERY OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs motion to compel (doc. no. 570 ) is granted as further set out below. (2) By no later than August 3, 2016, defendants or non−party Corizon Health, Inc., are to produce all practitioner peer−review documents in their possession or control related to physicians, dentists, and mid−level providers, whether or not contained within a credentialing file, subject to the exceptions outlined in the parties' joint report (doc. no. 336 at 3), contingent on payment by plaintiffs' counsel of the attorneys' fees and costs of litigating the portion of this motion pertaining to the inclusion of dentists. Defendants are allowed until August 17, 2016, to file a request for reimbursement pursuant to this paragraph. (3) By no later than August 3, 2016, the parties and non−party Corizon are to confer and arrange a date and time prior to August 12, 2016, on which defendants or Corizon are to make available for review by plaintiffs' counsel and their experts the mortality reviews for the three formerly named plaintiffs who are now deceased, contingent on payment by plaintiffs' counsel of the attorneys' fees and costs of litigating the portion of this motion pertaining to mortality reviews. Defendants are allowed until August 17, 2016, to file a request for reimbursement pursuant to this paragraph. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/2/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
603 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 8/2/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
604 TEXT ORDER granting 601 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/2/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
*** Attorney Susan Nettles Han terminated pursuant to the 604 text order. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
605 ORDER: Upon consideration of defendant Alabama Department of Corrections' motion to strike the expert reports offered by Dr. Craig Haney and Eldon Vail (doc. no. 599 ), it is ORDERED that plaintiffs are to respond by no later than August 9, 2016, and that defendants may reply by no later than August 12, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/2/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
606 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT SECOND COLLECTION (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court − Part 1, # 2 Comments mailed to Court − Part 2)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
607 PHASE 1 FAIRNESS HEARING COMMENTER SELECTION ORDER: Further to the court's Phase 1 Preliminary Settlement Approval Order (doc. no. 532 ), it is ORDERED that, by no later than August 17, 2016, the parties are jointly to submit a list of those prisoners, from among those who have submitted comments on the Phase 1 settlement agreement, whom the parties believe should testify by videoconference in connection with the fairness hearing. This list may be submitted in tandem with the parties' pre−hearing brief, and should divide the prisoners into categories based on the substantive focus(es) of their written comments. The parties should indicate why they believe these prisoners should testify. The parties should focus in selecting them primarily, though not exclusively, on prisoners who have identified perceived inadequacies in the terms of the settlement agreement or concerns germane to the Phase 1 claims they contend have not been addressed adequately or will not be remedied successfully by the agreement, as opposed to prisoners who have objected merely to the current existence of conditions the agreement is expressly designed to remedy. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/3/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/03/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 165 of 408

08/04/2016
08/04/2016 08/05/2016
08/05/2016 08/05/2016 08/05/2016 08/09/2016 08/09/2016 08/09/2016
08/09/2016 08/09/2016

608 (VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 713 ORDER)PHASE 2 EXPERT OBJECTIONS ORDER: Upon consideration of defendants' objections to the expert reports offered by plaintiffs (doc. no. 569 ), it is ORDERED that these objections are set for submission on September 19, 2016. By no later than September 12, 2016, defendants are to file a new brief updating the court as to any of the previously raised objections which remain, and identifying with specificity any and all portions of the expert reports to which they maintain an objection. Plaintiffs are to respond by no later than September 16, 2016, and defendants are to reply by no later than September 19, 2016. The briefing schedule (doc. no. 605 ) set regarding the motion to strike expert reports (doc. no. 599 ) remains in effect with respect to that motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/4/2016. (kh, ) Modified on 8/30/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 08/04/2016)
609 NOTICE of Appearance by Jenelle Rae Evans on behalf of Alabama Department of Corrections (Evans, Jenelle) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
610 PHASE 2 OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The motion for leave to amend plaintiffs' complaint (doc. no. 549 ) filed by plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) is granted. (2) If defendants conclude that additional discovery−−limited to the question whether ADAP is entitled to assert associational standing−−is necessary, they are to file a request that discovery be reopened, specifying what discovery they seek, within five days of the date this order is issued. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/5/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
611 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.(Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
612 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−FACILITIES MAILED TO COURT FROM Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court from ADAP)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
613 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT THIRD COLLECTION (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
614 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
615 TEXT ORDER granting 614 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/9/16. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
616 RESPONSE in Opposition re 599 MOTION to Strike 555 Notice (Other), the Expert Reports offered byDr. Craig Haney and Eldon Vail filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpt of Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 2016, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Excerpt of Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 2015, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Excerpt of Deposition of Ruth Naglich, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Excerpt of Deposition of Robert Hunter, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Excerpt of Deposition of Joshua Dunn, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Excerpt of Deposition of Laura Ferrell, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Excerpt of Deposition of Lesleigh Dodd, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Excerpt of Deposition of Michelle Ellington, # 9 Exhibit 9 − ADOC April 2016 report, # 10 Exhibit 10 − ADOC July 2015 report, # 11 Exhibit 11 − NCCHC Position Statement on Isolation, # 12 Exhibit 12 − filed under seal, # 13 Exhibit 13 − filed under seal, # 14 Exhibit 14 − filed under seal, # 15 Exhibit 15 − filed under seal, # 16 Exhibit 16 − filed under seal, # 17 Exhibit 17 − filed under seal)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 12, 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 and 17 replaced on 8/10/2016 to attach SEALED EXHIBITS to entry) (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 08/09/2016)
617 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Views of the Equal Justice Initiative to the Objection from the Federal Defender re 594 Order,,, by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
618 NOTICE of filing SEALED Exhibits by All Plaintiffs re 616 Response in Opposition to Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 12−SEALED, # 2 Exhibit 13−SEALED, # 3 Exhibit 14−SEALED, # 4 Exhibit 15−SEALED, # 5 Exhibit 16−SEALED, # 6 Exhibit 17−SEALED)(djy, ) (Entered: 08/10/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 166 of 408

08/10/2016
08/10/2016
08/10/2016 08/11/2016
08/11/2016 08/11/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016
08/12/2016 08/15/2016 08/15/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016

619 ORDER directing that the deadline (see doc no 594 ) by which the parties are to solicit and relate to the court the views of EJI on the objection to the Phase 1 settlement filed by the Federal Public Defender on behalf of three prisoners on death row (doc no 593 ) is extended to 8/17/2016; further ORDERING that the parties are to submit any response to the views expressed by EJI either in conjunction with the August 17 filing or else in a separate filing by no later than noon on 8/19/16, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/10/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 08/10/2016)
620 ORDER directing that def ADOC's 599 MOTION to Strike the Expert Reports of Dr. Craig Haney and Eldon Vail is set for Oral argument on 8/15/2016 @ 01:00 PM, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in conjunction with the status conference already set for that time. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/10/16. Furnished to calendar & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 08/10/2016)
621 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report Regarding the August 15, 2016 Status Conference by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plainitiffs. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 8/16/2016 to add as filed on behalf the plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 08/10/2016)
622 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery [Joint Request to Conduct One Expert Deposition Beyond Expert Discovery Deadline] by Alabama Department of Corrections, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, All Plaintiffs. (Smith, John) Modified on 8/16/2016 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 08/11/2016)
623 PRO SE MOTION for Extension of time to object to the settlement by Gary E. Walker. (djy, ) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
Objection to Settlement Agreement filed by Gary E. Walker. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 623 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
624 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 8/12/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (jct, ) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
625 REPLY BRIEF re 616 Response in Opposition to Motion,,,, Commissioner Jefferson Dunn and Associate Commissioner Ruth Naglich's Reply to Named Plaintiffs' Opposition to ADOC's Motion to Strike the Expert Reports of Dr. Craig Haney and Eldon Vail filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
626 REPLY to Response to Motion re 599 MOTION to Strike 555 Notice (Other), the Expert Reports offered byDr. Craig Haney and Eldon Vail filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
627 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 8/15/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/15/2016)
641 Objection to Settlement Agreement (Motion for Extension of Time) filed by Jay W. Isbell. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 8/16/2016 09:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
628 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 8/16/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
629 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER SEAL by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/16/2016 to clarify the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 08/16/2016)
630 MOTION to Stay re 553 Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,, The State's Motion to Stay the State's Dispositive Motion Deadline by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
631 ORDERED that the parties' joint request to conduct one expert deposition beyond the expert discovery deadline (doc. no. 622 ) is granted to the extent that the parties may

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 167 of 408

08/16/2016
08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016
08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/16/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016

conduct the deposition of Robert Ayers, Jr., on September 13, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
632 ORDERED that plaintiffs' oral motion to extend the deadline to file pretrial stipulations, which defendants do not oppose, is granted, and that the courts stipulations orders (doc. nos. 245 & 473 ) are modified to reflect that the parties are to file their pretrial stipulations no later than October 17, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
633 MOTION to Seal Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Exhibits that Contain Confidential Information by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
634 ORDER re 630 Defendants' motion to stay the dispositive motion deadline, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs are to respond by no later than noon on August 17, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
635 ORDERED that defendants' oral motion to extend the deadline to answer plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint (doc. no. 611 ), which plaintiffs do not oppose, is granted. Defendants are to file their answer by no later than August 26, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
636 ORDERED that defendants are to file a report regarding the status of the potential dispute identified in the parties' joint status report (doc. no. 621 ) by no later than August 22, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
637 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record during a Phase 1 status conference held on August 15, 2016, the clerk of the court is DIRECTED to treat the pro se motion for extension of time in which to object to the settlement agreement (doc. no. 623 ) as an objection to the settlement, and docket it accordingly. It is further ORDERED that the parties are to respond comprehensively to this objection in their fairness hearing briefs; in particular, they are to specify exactly how many days during the comment period Holman Prison was on lockdown, and for how many days during that period prisoners were otherwise unable to access the law library. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
638 Response to Order re 532 Order, Terminate Motions, Set Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 518 Amended Document (Parties Joint Stipulation Regarding Doc. 518 per Doc. 532) by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
639 TEXT ORDER granting 629 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER SEAL. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
640 TEXT ORDER granting 633 MOTION to Seal Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Exhibits that Contain Confidential Information. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
642 MOTION for Leave to File The State's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/16/2016)
643 TEXT ORDER granting 642 Motion for Leave to File The State's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/17/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
644 RESPONSE to Motion re 630 MOTION to Stay re 553 Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,, The State's Motion to Stay the State's Dispositive Motion Deadline filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
645 STIPULATION Regarding Certain Objections to Certain Documents by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs . (Moltz, Evan) Modified on 8/18/2016 to add as filed on additional parties(kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
646 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, All Plaintiffs. (Smith, John)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 168 of 408

08/17/2016
08/17/2016 08/17/2016
08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016

Modified on 8/17/2016 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
647 ORDER: Upon consideration of defendants' motion to stay the deadline for dispositive motions (doc. no. 630 ), and plaintiffs' response to that motion (doc. no. 644 ), it is ORDERED that the motion is granted to the extent that the deadline for filing a dispositive motion is extended to September 2, 2016, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/17/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
648 TEXT ORDER granting 646 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/17/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
649 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal [Joint Proposal Regarding Videoconferencing for Phase 1 Settlement Fairness Hearing] by Alabama Department of Corrections, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, All Plaintiffs. (Smith, John) Modified on 8/17/2016 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
650 Response to Order re 550 Memorandum Opinion and Order,, by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
651 TEXT ORDER granting 649 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/17/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
652 Response to Order re 594 Order,,, 619 Order,, re the Views of EJI by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Mujumdar, Anil) Modified on 8/18/2016 to add as filed on bahalf of additional parties(kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
653 The State's Notice of Resolution by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 602 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Lunsford, William) Modified on 8/18/2016 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
654 JOINT STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT re 518 Amended Document filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Main Document 654 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). Modified on 8/18/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
655 Evidentiary Submission re 654 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of Joint Statement in Support of Settlement Agreement filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Ex. A −− Warden Affidavits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B−1 Alex City Notice Form, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B−2 Atmore Notice Form, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit B−3 Bibb Notice Form, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit B−4 Bullock Notice Form Infirmary, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit B−5 Bullock Notice Form MHS Unit, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit B−6 Bullock Notice Form Segregation Unit, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit B−7Bullock Notice Form, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit B−8 Camden Notice Form, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit B−9 CCWC Notice Form, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit B−10 Childersburg Notice Form Part 1, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit B−11 Childersburg Notice Form Part 2, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit B−12 Decatur Notice Form, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit B−13 Donaldson Notice Form Part 1, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit B−14 Donaldson Notice Form Part 2, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit B−15 Draper Notice Form, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit B−16 Easterling Notice Form Part 1, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit B−17 Easterling Notice Form Part 2, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit B−18 Easterling Notice Form Part 3, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit B−19 Easterling Notice Form Part 4, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit B−20 Elba Notice Form)(Smith, John) (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/18/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 169 of 408

08/17/2016
08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/18/2016 08/18/2016 08/18/2016

(kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
656 Evidentiary Submission re 654 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of Joint Statement in Support of Settlement Agreement filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit B−21 Elmore Notice Form, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B−22 Fountain Notice Form, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B−23 Hamilton A & I Notice Form, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit B−24 Holman Death Row Notice Form, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit B−25 Holman Segregation Notice Form, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit B−26 Kilby Notice Form, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit B−27 Limestone Notice Form, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit B−28 Mobile Work Release Notice Form, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit B−29 St. Clair A Dorm Notice Form, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit B−30 St. Clair C Dorm Notice Form, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit B−31 St. Clair D Dorm Notice Form, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit B−32 St. Clair E Dorm Notice Form, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit B−33 St. Clair Infirmary Notice Form, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit B−34 Staton Notice Form, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit B−35 Tutwiler Notice Form, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit B−36 Ventress Notice Form, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit C Final Settlement Agreement WORD Spanish, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit D Final Settlement Agreement LARGE PRINT, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit E NOTICE− Spanish, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit F NOTICE−LARGE PRINT, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit G Comment form Spanish, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit H Comment form LARGE PRINT)(Smith, John) (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
657 Evidentiary Submission re 654 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of Joint Statement in Support of Settlement Agreement filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit I Master List of Inmate Comments, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit J Comments Sorted by Facility, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit K−List of Inmates Concerned about Accommodations, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit L List of Inmates Concerned about Identification of Disabilities, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit M List of Inmates Concerned with RMTAA, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit N List of Inmates Concerned with Architecture, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit O List of Inmates Concerned with Grievance Process, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit P List of Inmates Concerned with Attorneys Fees, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit Q List of Inmates Who Have Objections, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit R Declaration of Terry Raybon, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit S Proposed List of Inmates to Testify at Fairness Hearing)(Smith, John) (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/18/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
658 JOINT STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT by Alabama Department of Corrections and All Plaintiffs re 654 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support filing of Redacted Brief in Support of Class Action Settlement (Smith, John) Modified on 8/18/2016 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 08/17/2016)
659 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT FOURTH COLLECTION (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
660 PHASE 1 ORDER REQUIRING ADDITIONAL STIPULATION directing that the parties are to submit to the court, by no later than 8/26/2016, a joint stipulation stating that they affirmatively agree that 18 USC 3626(f) is not applicable to the arbitrator to be appointed per the terms of their settlement agreement, that this arbitrator will not be a special master, and that they expressly waive the right to challenge his decisions or the consent decree on the basis of 3626(f), as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/18/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
661 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 619 Order,, by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 08/18/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 170 of 408

08/18/2016 08/19/2016 08/19/2016
08/19/2016 08/19/2016 08/19/2016 08/22/2016
08/22/2016
08/22/2016 08/22/2016 08/22/2016 08/23/2016

663 Objection to Settlement Agreement filed by Carl Arthur Perry Jr. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
662 SEALED ORDER. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/19/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
664 ORDERED that the 661 motion is granted and the deadline set by the court's previous order (doc. no. 619 ) is extended to August 24, 2016. Although the movant requested an extension only of the deadline for its own response, the deadline for the responses of all parties is extended accordingly, in light of the desirability of a joint response. The court will not entertain any additional request for a further extension of this deadline. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/19/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
666 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Proposed Amended Complaint − Redline, # 2 Appendix Proposed Amended Complaint − Clean)(Morris, Maria) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/22/2016: # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/19/2016)
669 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 665 MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
667 PHASE 2 ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORTS: Upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint (doc. no. 666 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Defendants are to respond to the motion for leave to amend by no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 24, 2016. (2) Plaintiffs are to reply by no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 26, 2016. (3) The motion for leave to amend is set for oral argument at 3:00 p.m. on August 29, 2016 in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. It is further ORDERED that defendants motion to strike plaintiffs' expert reports (doc. no. 599 ) is set for oral argument at the same time. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/22/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
668 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of PHASE 2 IN−PERSON STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 8/15/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 9/12/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/22/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/21/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
670 Response to Order re 636 Order, The State's Report in Compliance with the August 16, 2016 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Shah, Mitesh) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
671 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections re 553 Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,, [Rebuttal Expert Report by Robert D. Morgan, Ph.D.] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rebuttal Expert Report by Robert D. Morgan, Ph.D.)(Smith, John) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
672 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Filing of Rebuttal Expert Report of Robert L. Ayers, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rebuttal Expert Report of Robert L. Ayers, Jr.)(Smith, John) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
673 PHASE 1 FAIRNESS HEARING ORDER REGARDING SEALING: It is ORDERED that the parties are granted leave to file their responses to the court's orders regarding the commenters to testify at the fairness hearings (doc. nos. 532 and 662 ) under seal; the parties need not file motions to this effect. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/23/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/23/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 171 of 408

08/23/2016 08/23/2016 08/23/2016
08/23/2016
08/23/2016

674 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II of Filing under Seal (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 674 Notice (Other), 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II (Redacted) and Public Exhibits filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Deposition Excerpts − Bui, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Deposition Excerpts − Coogan, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Deposition Excerpts − Crocker, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Deposition Excerpts − Darbouze, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Deposition Excerpts − Davis−Walker I, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Deposition Excerpts − Davis−Walker II, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Deposition Excerpts − Dodd, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Deposition Excerpts − Dunn, # 9 Exhibit 9 − sealed, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Deposition Excerpts − Greer, # 11 Exhibit 11 − intentionally omitted, # 12 Exhibit 12 − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 13 − Deposition Excerpts − Hood, # 14 Exhibit 14 − Deposition Excerpts − Houser I, # 15 Exhibit 15 − Deposition Excerpts − Houser II, # 16 Exhibit 16 − Deposition Excerpts − Hunter, # 17 Exhibit 17 − Deposition Excerpts − Kinard, # 18 Exhibit 18 − Deposition Excerpts − Linton, # 19 Exhibit 19 − Deposition Excerpts − Lovelace, # 20 Exhibit 20 − interntionally omitted)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
676 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21 − Deposition Excerpts − Naglich I, # 2 Exhibit 22 − Deposition Excerpts − Naglich II, # 3 Exhibit 23 − Deposition Excerpts − Pavlakovic, # 4 Exhibit 24 − Deposition Excerpts − Rahming, # 5 Exhibit 25 − intentionally omitted, # 6 Exhibit 26 − Deposition Excerpts − Sullivan, # 7 Exhibit 27 − intentionally omitted, # 8 Exhibit 28 − Deposition Excerpts − Woodley, # 9 Exhibit 29 − Deposition Excerpts − Kern, # 10 Exhibit 30 − Deposition Excerpts − King, # 11 Exhibit 31 − Deposition Excerpts − Dillard, # 12 Exhibit 32 − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 33 − sealed, # 14 Exhibit 34 − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 35 − sealed, # 16 Exhibit 36 − sealed, # 17 Exhibit 37 − sealed, # 18 Exhibit 38 − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 39 − sealed, # 20 Exhibit 40 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). Modified on 8/24/2016 (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
677 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 41 − sealed, # 2 Exhibit 42 − sealed, # 3 Exhibit 43 − sealed, # 4 Exhibit 44 − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 45 − sealed, # 6 Exhibit 46 − sealed, # 7 Exhibit 47 − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 48 − sealed, # 9 Exhibit 49 − intentionally omitted, # 10 Exhibit 50 − sealed, # 11 Exhibit 51 − sealed, # 12 Exhibit 52 − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 53 − sealed, # 14 Exhibit 54 − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 55 − sealed, # 16 Exhibit 56 − sealed, # 17 Exhibit 57 − sealed, # 18 Exhibit 58 − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 59 − sealed, # 20 Exhibit 60 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
678 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 61 − sealed, # 2 Exhibit 62 − sealed, # 3 Exhibit 63 − sealed, # 4 Exhibit 64 − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 65 − sealed, # 6 Exhibit 66 − sealed, # 7 Exhibit 67 − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 68 − sealed, # 9 Exhibit 69 − sealed, # 10 Exhibit 70 − sealed, # 11 Exhibit 71 − sealed, #

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 172 of 408

08/23/2016 08/23/2016

12 Exhibit 72 − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 73 − sealed, # 14 Exhibit 74 − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 75 − sealed, # 16 Exhibit 76 − sealed, # 17 Exhibit 77 − sealed, # 18 Exhibit 78 − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 79 − sealed, # 20 Exhibit 80 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
679 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 81 − sealed, # 2 Exhibit 82 − sealed, # 3 Exhibit 83 − sealed, # 4 Exhibit 84 − Puisis Report − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 85 − De Lap Report − sealed, # 6 Exhibit 86 − Greifinger Report − sealed, # 7 Exhibit 87 − Keldie Report − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 88 − Knox Report − sealed, # 9 Exhibit 89 − Patterson Report − sealed, # 10 Exhibit 90 − ADOC 2010 Annual Report, # 11 Exhibit 91 − ADOC 2015 Annual Report, # 12 Exhibit 92 − Medical Services Contract, # 13 Exhibit 93 − Corizon March 2016 Monthly Report to ADOC, # 14 Exhibit 94 − Corizon 2014 Annual Report to ADOC − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 95 − Highest Acuity Report − sealed, # 16 Exhibit 96 − Tutwiler Corizon Policy − sealed, # 17 Exhibit 97 − sealed, # 18 Exhibit 98 − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 99 − sealed, # 20 Exhibit 100 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship.(kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/24/2016: # 21 Exhibit 93 Part 2) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
680 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 101 − sealed, # 2 Exhibit 102 − sealed, # 3 Exhibit 103 − sealed, # 4 Exhibit 104 − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 105 − sealed, # 6 Exhibit 106 − Scabies Spreadsheet, # 7 Exhibit 107 − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 108 − sealed, # 9 Exhibit 109 − ADOC Living Wills Policy, # 10 Exhibit 110 − Corizon 2014 Annual Report to ADOC − sealed, # 11 Exhibit 111 − Corizon Credentialing Process − sealed, # 12 Exhibit 112 − Corizon Clinical Performance Enhancement Policy − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 113 − Corizon Chronic Disease Management Policy − sealed, # 14 Exhibit 114 − Corizon Credentialing Policy − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 115 − Corizon Sentinel Event Review, # 16 Exhibit 116 − Easterlin SOP, # 17 Exhibit 117 − Corizon Clinical Performance Enhancement Policy − Kilby − sealed, # 18 Exhibit 118 − Bibb MAC Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 119 − Donaldson Multidisciplinary Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 20 Exhibit 120 − Corizon Monthly Report, Oct. 2013 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship(kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/26/2016: # 21 Exhibit 108 − sealed Part B) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/26/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 173 of 408

08/23/2016 08/23/2016 08/23/2016

(kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
681 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 121 − OHS Policy E−7, # 2 Exhibit 122 − OHS Policy H−1, # 3 Exhibit 123 − Corizon Policy P−C−02.00, # 4 Exhibit 124 Sullivan Grievances − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 125 − Sick Call Tracking Logs − sealed, # 6 Exhibit 126 − Peer Review Documentation − sealed, # 7 Exhibit 127 − Sullivan Grievances − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 128 − sealed, # 9 Exhibit 129 − sealed, # 10 Exhibit 130 − sealed, # 11 Exhibit 131 − sealed, # 12 Exhibit 142 − Fountain MAC Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 133 − Hamilton Photos, # 14 Exhibit 133 − Hamilton infirmary photo, # 15 Exhibit 135 − Kilby photo, # 16 Exhibit 136 − Kilby infirmary photo, # 17 Exhibit 137 − Kilby Medical Records Room photo, # 18 Exhibit 138 − Audit Reports − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 139 − Audit Reports − sealed, # 20 Exhibit 140 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/26/2016: # 21 Exhibit 138 − Audit Reports − sealed Part B) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/26/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
682 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 141 − sealed, # 2 Exhibit 142 − Fountain MAC Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 3 Exhibit 143 − Bullock MAC Meeting Minutes, # 4 Exhibit 144 − Limeston MAC Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 145 − CDAA Resource Binder − sealed, # 6 Exhibit 146 − CDAA − sealed, # 7 Exhibit 147 − Bibb MAC Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 148 − intentionally omitted, # 9 Exhibit 149 − intentionally omitted, # 10 Exhibit 150 − Corizon Oral Care Policy − sealed, # 11 Exhibit 151 − intentionally omitted, # 12 Exhibit 152 − intentionally omitted, # 13 Exhibit 153 − Mental Health Services Contract, # 14 Exhibit 154 − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 155 − intentionally omitted, # 16 Exhibit 156 − Bradley Expert Report, # 17 Exhibit 157 − intentionally omitted, # 18 Exhibit 158 − Exceprt MHM Response to RFP − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 159 − intentionally omitted, # 20 Exhibit 160 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
683 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 161 − Bullock Meeting Notes − sealed, # 2 Exhibit 162 − intentionally omitted, # 3 Exhibit 163 − Bullock Multidisciplinary Meeting − sealed, # 4 Exhibit 164 − Bullock Multidisciplinary Meeting − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 165 − intentionally omitted, # 6 Exhibit 166 − St Clair Multidisciplinary Meeting − sealed, # 7 Exhibit 167 − Tutwiler Multidisciplinary Meeting − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 168 − intentionally omitted, # 9 Exhibit 169 − MHM 2015 Annual Contract Review − sealed, # 10 Exhibit 170 − sealed, # 11 Exhibit 171 − sealed, # 12 Exhibit 172 − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 173 − sealed, # 14 Exhibit 174 − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 175 − intentionally omitted, # 16 Exhibit 176 − sealed, # 17 Exhibit 177 − sealed, # 18 Exhibit 178 − MHM Psychological Reconstructions − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 179 − intentionally omitted, # 20 Exhibit 180 − Easterling Multidisciplinary Meeting − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/31/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 174 of 408

08/23/2016
08/23/2016 08/23/2016
08/24/2016 08/24/2016

(kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
684 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 181 − intentionally omitted, # 2 Exhibit 182 − sealed, # 3 Exhibit 183 − sealed, # 4 Exhibit 184 − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 185 − Reception Mental Health Screening, # 6 Exhibit 186 − ADOC Psychological Evaluation, # 7 Exhibit 187 − intentionally omitted, # 8 Exhibit 188 − BJS Mortality in Prisons and Jails Excerpt, # 9 Exhibit 189 − MHM RFP Response Appendix G, # 10 Exhibit 190 − MHM RFP Response Excerpt, # 11 Exhibit 191 − Photo of Suicide Watch Check Sheet, # 12 Exhibit 192 − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 193 − intentionally omitted, # 14 Exhibit 194 − intentionally omitted, # 15 Exhibit 195 − intentionally omitted, # 16 Exhibit 196 − intentionally omitted, # 17 Exhibit 197 − intentionally omitted, # 18 Exhibit 198 − intentionally omitted, # 19 Exhibit 199 − intentionally omitted, # 20 Exhibit 200 − Easterling Multidisciplinary Meeting − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
685 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 201 − Referral to Mental Health, # 2 Exhibit 202 − sealed, # 3 Exhibit 203 − intentionally omitted, # 4 Exhibit 204 − intentionally omitted, # 5 Exhibit 205 − intentionally omitted, # 6 Exhibit 206 − intentionally omitted, # 7 Exhibit 207 − Medication Error Reports − sealed, # 8 Exhibit 208 − intentionally omitted, # 9 Exhibit 209 − intentionally omitted, # 10 Exhibit 210 − intentionally omitted, # 11 Exhibit 211 − AR633, # 12 Exhibit 212 − intentionally omitted, # 13 Exhibit 213 − intentionally omitted, # 14 Exhibit 214 − intentionally omitted, # 15 Exhibit 215 − intentionally omitted, # 16 Exhibit 216 − intentionally omitted, # 17 Exhibit 217 − intentionally omitted, # 18 Exhibit 218 − intentionally omitted, # 19 Exhibit 219 − intentionally omitted, # 20 Exhibit 220 − intentionally omitted)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
686 Evidentiary Submission re 675 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 221 − intentionally omitted, # 2 Exhibit 222 − intentionally omitted, # 3 Exhibit 223 − MHM CQI Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 4 Exhibit 224 − MHM CQI Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 5 Exhibit 225 − MHM CQI Meeting Minutes − sealed, # 6 Exhibit 226 − intentionally omitted, # 7 Exhibit 227 − intentionally omitted, # 8 Exhibit 228 − intentionally omitted, # 9 Exhibit 229 − sealed, # 10 Exhibit 230 − intentionally omitted, # 11 Exhibit 231 − Amendment to 2008 Mental Health Services Contract, # 12 Exhibit 232 − Kilby CAP − sealed, # 13 Exhibit 233− Corizon March 2015 Monthly Report − sealed, # 14 Exhibit 234 − Fountain CAP − sealed, # 15 Exhibit 235 − sealed, # 16 Exhibit 236 − MHM Staffing Rebates − sealed, # 17 Exhibit 237 − Peer Review Certificate − sealed, # 18 Exhibit 238 MHM CQI Meeting − sealed, # 19 Exhibit 239 − sealed)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 8/31/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/23/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 8/24/2016 02:45 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
687 PHASE 1 ORDER SETTING ADDITIONAL FAIRNESS HEARINGS: It is ORDERED that additional fairness hearings, at which the court will hear testimony (both in person and by means of videoconference) from prisoners who submitted comments regarding the Phase 1 settlement agreement, are set for August 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., and August 30, 2016, at 8:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 175 of 408

08/24/2016
08/24/2016 08/24/2016 08/24/2016 08/24/2016 08/24/2016 08/25/2016 08/25/2016
08/25/2016 08/25/2016

Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/24/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) Modified on 8/24/2016 to correct the text (kh, ). (Entered: 08/24/2016)
688 PHASE 2 ORDER ON PRODUCTION PRIOR TO EXPERT DEPOSITIONS: Based on the representations made during a telephone conference held on the record on August 24, 2016, and upon consideration of defendants' report on a potential discovery dispute (doc. no. 670 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) By no later than 3:00 p.m. on August 28, 2016, plaintiffs are to produce to defendants all notes taken and any other materials relied upon by Dr. Kathryn Burns in preparing her expert report. (2) By no later than 7:00 p.m. on August 30, 2016, plaintiffs are to produce to defendants all notes taken and any other materials relied upon by Dr. Craig Haney in preparing his expert report. (3) By no later than noon on August 31, 2016, defendants are to file either a report confirming to the court that they have received the above production or, if they have not, a motion to compel it. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/24/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
689 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 8/24/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 2:52 − 3:27.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
690 RESPONSE to Motion re 666 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint (Joint) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Smith, John) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
691 MOTION to Clarify Deadlines by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
692 RESPONSE to Motion re 666 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint (Corrected) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Smith, John) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
693 Response to Order re 594 Order,,, 647 Order on Motion to Stay, 619 Order,, Phase 1 Parties' Response to Objections Concerning Death Row Inmates by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
694 PHASE 2 ORDER ON MOTION TO CLARIFY DEADLINES: It is ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to clarify (doc. no. 691 ) is granted to the extent that the deadline for responding to dispositive motions is suspended and will be reset later. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/25/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
695 PHASE 1 ORDER ON STIPULATION REGARDING TESTING OF PRISONERS ON DEATH ROW: Because the parties' response regarding objections to the Phase 1 settlement agreement concerning death−row prisoners (doc. no. 693 ) is essentially a stipulation, because the stipulation modifies rather than clarifies the meaning of the settlement agreement as drafted, and because the stipulation will require changes not only to the intellectual−testing provision at issue, Section V.5.I.C.2, but also to the other sections of the agreement describing which claims have been settled and which remain live for adjudication in Phase 2, it is ORDERED that the parties are to draft and file said stipulation by no later than August 29, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/25/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
696 Response to Order re 660 Order,, Parties Joint Stipulation Concerning Applicability of 18 U.S.C. 3626(f) by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
697 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 6/9/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 9/15/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/26/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/23/2016. (kh, ) (Entered:

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 176 of 408

08/25/2016 08/26/2016
08/26/2016
08/26/2016 08/26/2016 08/26/2016 08/26/2016 08/26/2016 08/29/2016 08/29/2016 08/29/2016 08/29/2016

08/25/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference re 691 M/to clarify deadlines set for 8/26/2016 09:30 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
698 SECOND PHASE 2 ORDER ON MOTION TO CLARIFY DEADLINES: Based on the representations made and for the reasons stated during a telephone conference held on the record on August 26, 2016, it is ORDERED that the portion of plaintiffs' motion to clarify deadlines (doc. no. 691 ) in which they request that the court set a deadline of September 5, 2016, for plaintiffs experts to file reports rebutting the reports of defendants rebuttal experts is denied. Plaintiffs are to file any and all rebuttal reports by the deadline of August 29, 2016, as set in the courts New Phase 2 Scheduling Order (doc. no. 553 ). As plaintiffs' motion to clarify deadlines has now been resolved in full, see Phase 2 Order on Motion to Clarify Deadlines (doc. no. 694 ), the clerk of court is DIRECTED to terminate it. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/26/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
699 PHASE 2 ORDER RESETTING ARGUMENT ON MOTIONS: Based on the representations made during a telephone conference held on the record on August 26, 2016, and with the agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that the court's Phase 2 Order on Motions for Leave to Amend and to Strike Expert Reports (doc. no. 667 ) is amended to the extent that the oral argument on those motions currently set for 3:00 p.m. on August 29, 2016, is reset for 1:30 p.m. on the same day. As the court explained during the conference, the argument will not begin until the fairness hearing set for that morning has concluded. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/26/2016. (furn: Calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
700 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 8/26/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time FTR: 9:33 AM − 9:57 AM.) (war, ) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
701 REPLY to Response to Motion re 666 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
702 ANSWER to 611 Amended Complaint (The State's Answer to Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint) by Alabama Department of Corrections.(Smith, John) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
703 First MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phase 1 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit J. Patrick Hackney, # 2 Affidavit Maria Morris, # 3 Affidavit Anil Mujumdar, # 4 Affidavit Patricia Clotfelter, # 5 Affidavit Robert Segall, # 6 Affidavit Robert Marshall)(Hackney, James) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
704 PHASE 1 PARTIES' JOINT SUBMISSION CONCERNING TESTIMONY TO BE PRESENTED AT THE PHASE 1 SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS HEARING. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
705 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen C. Rogers on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
706 NOTICE of Appearance by Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Dorr, Luther) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pro Ami Hearing begun on 8/29/2016 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
707 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 8/29/2016 re 599 MOTION to Strike 555 Notice (Other), the Expert Reports offered byDr. Craig Haney and Eldon Vail filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, 666 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by All Plaintiffs (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/29/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 177 of 408

08/29/2016 08/29/2016 08/29/2016 08/30/2016
08/30/2016
08/30/2016 08/30/2016
08/31/2016 08/31/2016 08/31/2016 09/01/2016 09/01/2016 09/02/2016 09/02/2016

708 NOTICE of Appearance by Natalie Lyons on behalf of All Plaintiffs (kh, ) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
709 Response to Order re 695 Order,,, [Phase 1 Parties' Joint Stipulation Concerning Revised Intellectual Testing of Death Row Inmates] by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
710 Objection to Defendants' Experts' Reports filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
711 PHASE 2 ORDER EXTENDING EXPERT DISCOVERY DEADLINE: Based on the representations made during a hearing held on the record on August 29, 2016, it is ORDERED that the parties' joint oral motion to extend until September 16, 2016, the deadline for deposing defense expert Dr. Robert Greifinger, is granted. All other expert discovery deadlines remain unchanged. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/30/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
712 PHASE 2 ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE: ORDERED that the Phase 2 status conference currently set for September 2, 2016, is continued generally and will be rescheduled by further notice. The deadline for the parties joint status report to be submitted in advance of this conference is continued accordingly. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/30/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pro Ami Hearing continues on 8/30/2016 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). Hearing to conclude on 8/31 (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
713 PHASE 2 BRIEFING ORDER ON OBJECTIONS TO EXPERT REPORTS: Upon consideration of plaintiffs' objections to the expert reports offered by defendants (doc. no. 710 ) and defendants' objections to the expert reports offered by plaintiffs (doc. no. 569 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The courts Phase 2 Expert Objections Order (doc. no. 608 ) is vacated. (2) The above objections are set for submission on September 26, 2016. (3) By no later than September 19, 2016, the parties are to file new briefs updating the court as to any of the previously raised objections with remain, and identifying with specificity any and all portions of the expert reports to which they maintain objections. (4) The parties offering the experts to whom these objections are maintained are to respond by no later than September 22, 2016, and the objecting parties are to reply by no later than September 26, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/30/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
714 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 688 Order,,, of Compliance to Order (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
715 Minute Entry for proceedings concluded before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 8/31/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Plaintiffs Exhibits List, # 3 Defendants Exhibit List) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
716 Response to Order re 688 Order,,, [ADOC's Statement Concerning Documents to be Produced by Dr. Craig Haney] by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference re severability of the arbitration provision of the settlement agreement set for 9/1/2016 03:30 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
717 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 9/1/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 9/2/2016 12:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 09/02/2016)
718 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 9/2/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/02/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 178 of 408

09/02/2016
09/06/2016 09/06/2016 09/07/2016 09/07/2016 09/08/2016 09/08/2016
09/09/2016 09/09/2016 09/09/2016

719 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Telephone Conference Excerpt of Proceedings, Arbitration Severability Stipulation (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 9/1/2016, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 9/23/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/3/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/1/2016. (djy, ) (Entered: 09/02/2016)
720 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 09/06/2016)
721 Objection to re 672 Notice (Other), 671 Notice (Other), Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Rebuttal Expert Reports filed by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 09/06/2016)
722 TEXT ORDER granting 720 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/7/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
*** Attorney Matthew Reeves terminated pursuant to the 722 text order. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
723 PHASE 2 ORDER ON ADDITIONAL EXPERT OBJECTIONS: Upon consideration of plaintiffs' objections to defendants' rebuttal expert reports (doc. no. 721 ), it is ORDERED that these objections are set for briefing and submission according to the schedule set in the court's Phase 2 Briefing Order on Objections to Expert Reports (doc. no. 713 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
724 PHASE 2 BRIEFING ORDER ON ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING: ORDERED as follows: (1) By no later than September 19, 2016, plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program is to file a brief affirmatively setting forth the basis for its asserted associational standing and explaining the scope of this standing. This brief is to discuss any relevant case law and any evidence plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program believes is pertinent to its assertion of standing. (2) If defendants wish to contest plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program's associational standing with respect to any, some, or all claims, they are to do so in the context of their summary judgment motion, and plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program is to reply in conjunction with plaintiffs' response opposing the motion.(3) To the extent that the parties believe that plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program's associational standing with respect to any, some, or all claims is pertinent to the adjudication of plaintiffs' motion for class certification, they are free to raise it in their forthcoming briefing on that motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
725 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
726 TEXT ORDER granting 725 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
727 PHASE 1 FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL OPINION AND ORDER: ORDERED as follows: (1) An injunctive−relief settlement class, defined as "any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Correction who has a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12012 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise solely from mental disease, illness, or defect," is certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). (2) The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g). (3) The parties' settlement agreement (doc. no. 518 ), as amended, is approved. (4) The objections to the settlement agreement (doc. nos. 578 , 582 , 593 , 596 , 606 , 612 , 623 , 641 , 652 , 659 , and 663

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 179 of 408

09/09/2016
09/09/2016 09/09/2016 09/09/2016 09/09/2016
09/09/2016 09/09/2016 09/09/2016 09/09/2016 09/09/2016

) are overruled. (5) The parties' stipulations (doc. nos. 560 , 563 , 575 , 576 , 638 , 696 , 709 , and 719 ) are adopted. (6) The settlement agreement, as amended, is entered as a separate consent decree. Defendants are to commence compliance with its terms as interpreted by the above−entered stipulations. (7) United States Magistrate Judge John Ott is appointed arbitrator pursuant to Section VII of the consent decree. (8) Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees (doc. no. 703 ) is granted. (9) The parties are to meet and confer and submit to the court by no later than September 23, 2016, a plan for providing notice to class members of the entry of this consent decree and for ensuring that they have access during the pendency of the consent decree to both it and this opinion. In particular, this notice must describe in lay terms the accommodation request and grievance processes set out in the decree, and must note the availability of arbitration. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
728 CONSENT DECREE CONCERNING CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND §504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, AND RESOLVING THE PHASE 1 TRIAL OF THESE PROCEEDINGS: It is ORDERED that the defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with them, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(B) & (C), are enjoined and restrained from failing to comply with all of the above provisions, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
729 NOTICE OF ONLINE CITATION: Because the court has, in the opinion filed today, cited to an online report that could later become unavailable, the report is attached to this notice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
730 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing under Seal (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
731 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Compliance with Order to Provide Supplemental Disclosures Regarding Defendants' Notice of Impact of Overcrowding and Understaffing on the Provision of Medical and Mental Health Care (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Supplemental Disclosures (redacted))(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
732 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Errata re Exhibits in Support of Motion for Class Certification (Morris, Maria) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 1 Exhibit 92 Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 92 Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 92 Part 3, # 4 Exhibit 92 Part 4, # 5 Exhibit 92 Part 5, # 6 Exhibit 100, # 7 Exhibit 101, # 8 Exhibit 102, # 9 Exhibit 104, # 10 Exhibit 105, # 11 Exhibit 106, # 12 Exhibit 107, # 13 Exhibit 110, # 14 Exhibit 119, # 15 Exhibit 124, # 16 Exhibit 125, # 17 Exhibit 126, # 18 Exhibit 128, # 19 Exhibit 129, # 20 Exhibit 132, # 21 Exhibit 133, # 22 Exhibit 134, # 23 Exhibit 1135, # 24 Exhibit 136, # 25 Exhibit 137) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 26 Exhibit 138, # 27 Exhibit 140, # 28 Exhibit 155, # 29 Exhibit 158, # 30 Exhibit 160, # 31 Exhibit 191, # 32 Exhibit 211, # 33 Exhibit 229, # 34 Exhibit 239) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/09/2016)
733 PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 665 CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
734 PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED EVIDENTIARY SUBMISSION IN SUPPORT OF 665 MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
742 Pro Se MOTION to Amend by Carl Arthur Perry. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
Motion for Leave to File Corrected Exhibits to their Phase 2 Motion for Class Certification by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 732 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
MOTION to Intervene construed in the court's 744 order by Carl Arthur Perry. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 742 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 180 of 408

09/12/2016 09/13/2016 09/13/2016 09/13/2016
09/14/2016 09/14/2016 09/14/2016 09/16/2016
09/16/2016
09/16/2016 09/19/2016
09/19/2016 09/19/2016

735 Objection to The State's Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to the Expert Reports Offered by Named Plaintiffs filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
736 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion to Certify Class (Amended) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
737 Evidentiary Submission in Support of Motion to Certify Class (Amended Listing − Identifying exhibits by proposed class or subclass) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
738 PHASE 2 ORDER ON ADDITIONAL EXPERT OBJECTIONS: Upon consideration of defendants' objections to plaintiffs' rebuttal expert reports (doc. no. 735 ), it is ORDERED that these objections are set for briefing and submission according to the schedule set in the court's Phase 2 Briefing Order on Objections to Expert Reports (doc. no. 713 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
739 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DEPOSITION TO PRESERVE THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF HUBERT TOLLAR by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
740 RESPONSE to Motion re 739 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DEPOSITION TO PRESERVE THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF HUBERT TOLLAR filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
741 TEXT ORDER granting 739 Motion MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DEPOSITION TO PRESERVE THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF HUBERT TOLLAR. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
743 PHASE 2 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CORRECTED EXHIBITS: The court being orally informed that defendants do not oppose plaintiffs motion (doc. no. 732 ) for leave to file corrected exhibits to their Phase 2 motion for class certification, it is ORDERED that this motion (doc. no. 732 ) is granted. It is further ORDERED that plaintiffs are to provide the court with replacement courtesy copies of all exhibits to their class−certification motion. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to substitute the corrected exhibits for those originally docketed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
744 ORDER ON PRO SE MOTION TO AMEND: Upon consideration of the pro se motion to amend (doc. no. 742 ) filed by Carl Perry, Jr., a prisoner in the custody of defendant the Alabama Department of Corrections, it is ORDERED that this motion is construed as a motion to intervene and denied. Perrys motion pertains to allegations that correctional officials have interfered with his pending habeas litigation; it is therefore not germane to this case, which concerns defendants treatment of prisoners with disabilities and medical and mental illnesses. If he wishes to challenge this alleged interference, Perry will need to file a separate lawsuit. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to Perry. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/16/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
745 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections [Notice of Filing Memorandum] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Memorandum)(Smith, John) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
746 ORDER ON REMAINING PHASE 1 ISSUE: By no later than October 14, 2016, the parties are to meet and confer and submit to the court a joint proposal as to how the court should proceed regarding the issue carved out from the Phase 1 settlement−−intellectual−disability testing of prisoners sentenced to death. See Phase 1 Final Settlement Approval Op. and Order (doc. no. 727 ) at 68−69. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
747 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Renewed Objections to Defendants' Expert Reports Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
748 NEW PHASE 2A SCHEDULING ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record during a telephone conference held on September 2, 2016, and by the agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that Phase 2 of this case is further bifurcated

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 181 of 408

09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016
09/19/2016 09/19/2016

into two sub−phases, Phase 2A and Phase 2B. During Phase 2A, the court will hear the Eighth Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act claims related to treatment of and discrimination based exclusively on mental illness; during Phase 2B, the court will hear the Eighth Amendment claims related to medical and dental care. The court will issue an opinion regarding liability with respect to the Phase 2A claims before trying the Phase 2B claims. It is further ORDERED, again by the agreement of the parties, that the following unexpired Phase 2 deadlines as set in the court's New Phase 2 Scheduling Order (doc. no. 553 ) are reset as follows with respect to Phase 2A: (1) The Phase 2A pretrial conference set for September 28, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., is reset to November 2, 2016, at 10:00 a.m.; (2) Defendants are to file amended expert reports by no later than September 30, 2016. (3) Defendants are to file their dispositive motions by no later than September 23, 2016. Plaintiffs are to file their responses by no later than October 12, 2016, and defendants are to file their replies by no later than October 19, 2016. (4) Defendants are to respond to plaintiffs' motion for class certification by no later than September 28, 2016, and plaintiffs are to reply by no later than October 11, 2016. (5) The dispositive and class−certification motions may address both Phase 2A and Phase 2B, but the parties must carefully identify which portions of their arguments and evidence go to which of the two sub−phases, as further set out. (6) Daubert arguments are to be set forth pursuant to the procedure outlined in the court's Phase 2 Pretrial and Motion Deadlines Order (doc. no. 529 )−−that is, in conjunction with the parties' motions briefing. (7) The parties are to file their witness and exhibit lists for the Phase 2A trial by no later than October 24, 2016, and any objections to those lists by no later than November 14, 2016. (8) The Phase 2A trial, now set to begin on November 7, 2016, is continued until December 5, 2016. The court is informed that this trial should last between three and four weeks. (9) All other unexpired deadlines tied to the date of the Phase 2 pretrial conference or trial, whether set in the court's New Scheduling Order (doc. no. [239), the court's Trial Briefs Order (doc. no. 246 ), or otherwise, are adjusted accordingly. Finally, the parties are notified that deadlines for litigation of Phase 2B will be set by future order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar) (kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
749 TEXT ORDER granting 747 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Renewed Objections to Defendants' Expert Reports Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/16/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
750 ORDER: Counsel in the Phase One settlement are to participate in a telephone conference call with the undersigned at 2:00 p.m. on September 20, 2016. The call−in number is 888−808− 6929 and the pass code is 5917763. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 9/19/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
751 Objection to re 731 Notice (Other), The State's Objection to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Disclosures and Responses (Doc 731−1) and Motion to Strike filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
752 PHASE 2 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURES AND MOTION TO STRIKE: Upon consideration of defendants' objection to plaintiffs' supplemental disclosures and responses and motion to strike (doc. no. 751 ), it is ORDERED that plaintiffs are to file a sealed response by no later than September 20, 2016. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to place defendants' objection and motion (doc. no. 751 ) under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
753 Objection to re 735 Objection to The State's Supplement to its Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to the Expert Reports Offered by Named Plaintiffs filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
754 Reply to response to order to show cause re 724 Order,,,, regarding ADAP's Associational Standing filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpt from Deposition of James Tucker, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of James Tucker, # 3 Exhibit Desgination of ADAP as P&A, # 4 Exhibit

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 182 of 408

09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/20/2016
09/20/2016
09/20/2016 09/20/2016 09/20/2016 09/22/2016 09/22/2016
09/22/2016 09/22/2016 09/22/2016 09/22/2016

PATBI grant award, # 5 Exhibit PAAT & PAIR grant award, # 6 Exhibit PAIMI grant award, # 7 Exhibit PADD grant award, # 8 Exhibit ADAP Organizational chart, # 9 Exhibit Aris Agreement, # 10 Exhibit MOU between ADAP, SPLC & ADOC, # 11 Exhibit Correspondance to ADOC, # 12 Exhibit Cruel Confimement Report)(Hackney, James) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
756 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 755 Plaintiffs Renewed Objections to Defendants' Expert Reports (kh, ) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
MOTION to Strike by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 751 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/17/2017)
755 Response to Order re 713 Order,,, 710 Objection to Plaintiffs Renewed Objections to Defendants' Expert Reports by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 3)(Menschel, Brooke) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/20/2016: # 2 Main Document (Unredacted), # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/20/2016)
757 ORDER: Counsel in the Phase One settlement are to participate in a second telephone status conference call with the undersigned at 2:00 p.m. on October 4, 2016. The call−in number is 888−808−6929 and the pass code is 5917763. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 9/20/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
758 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing under Seal − PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENT AL DISCLOSURES AND MOTION TO STRIKE (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
759 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 752 Order (kh, ) Modified on 9/21/2016 (kh, ). (Duplicate document filed in the drop box with documents from docket entry 760 . This document is the same document as docket entry 758 filed at different times ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
760 PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURES AND MOTION TO STRIKE by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
761 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Supplement to Their Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to the Expert Reports Offered by Named Plaintiffs by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
762 NEW PHASE 2A STATUS CONFERENCES ORDER: It is ORDERED that additional in−person, on−the−record status conferences are set for October 7 and 20, and November 18, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. All requirements pertaining to preparation for and attendance at status conferences set forth in the Phase 2 In−Person Status Conferences Order (doc. no. 527 ) remain in effect. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/22/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
763 TEXT ORDER granting Plaintiffs' 761 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/22/2016. (NO PDF) (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
764 RESPONSE to Motion re 747 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Renewed Objections to Defendants' Expert Reports Under Seal filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Heinss, Christopher) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
765 REPLY BRIEF re 755 Response to Order, The State's Response to Named Plaintiffs' Renewed Objections to the State's Expert Reports filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/22/2016)
766 Response to Order − Response to Defendants' Supplement to Their Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to Plaintiffs' Expert Reports by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Excerpt of Deposition of Dr. Michael Puisis, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Excerpt of Deposition of Dr. Kathryn Burns)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/22/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 183 of 408

09/23/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016
09/23/2016

767 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher Stephen Kuffner on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Kuffner, Christopher) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
768 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
769 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 769 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
770 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment − The State's Narrative Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 770 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
771 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment −The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−1, # 2 Exhibit 1−2, # 3 Exhibit 2−1, # 4 Exhibit 2−2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5−1, # 8 Exhibit 5−2, # 9 Exhibit 5−3, # 10 Exhibit 5−4, # 11 Exhibit 5−5, # 12 Exhibit 5−6, # 13 Exhibit 5−7, # 14 Exhibit 5−8, # 15 Exhibit 5−9, # 16 Exhibit 5−10, # 17 Exhibit 5−11, # 18 Exhibit 6, # 19 Exhibit 7−1, # 20 Exhibit 7−2, # 21 Exhibit 8−1, # 22 Exhibit 8−2, # 23 Exhibit 8−3, # 24 Exhibit 8−4, # 25 Exhibit 8−5, # 26 Exhibit 8−6, # 27 Exhibit 8−7, # 28 Exhibit 8−8, # 29 Exhibit 8−9, # 30 Exhibit 8−10, # 31 Exhibit 8−11, # 32 Exhibit 8−12, # 33 Exhibit 8−13, # 34 Exhibit 8−14, # 35 Exhibit 8−15, # 36 Exhibit 8−16, # 37 Exhibit 9, # 38 Exhibit 10, # 39 Exhibit 11, # 40 Exhibit 12)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 31 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
772 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 13, # 2 Exhibit 14−1, # 3 Exhibit 14−2, # 4 Exhibit 14−3, # 5 Exhibit 15−1, # 6 Exhibit 15−2, # 7 Exhibit 15−3, # 8 Exhibit 15−4, # 9 Exhibit 15−5, # 10 Exhibit 15−6, # 11 Exhibit 15−7, # 12 Exhibit 15−8, # 13 Exhibit 15−9, # 14 Exhibit 15−10, # 15 Exhibit 15−11, # 16 Exhibit 15−12, # 17 Exhibit 15−13, # 18 Exhibit 15−14, # 19 Exhibit 15−15, # 20 Exhibit 16, # 21 Exhibit 17, # 22 Exhibit 18−1, # 23 Exhibit 18−2, # 24 Exhibit 18−3, # 25 Exhibit 18−4, # 26 Exhibit 18−5, # 27 Exhibit 18−6, # 28 Exhibit 18−7, # 29 Exhibit 18−8, # 30 Exhibit 18−9, # 31 Exhibit 18−10, # 32 Exhibit 18−11, # 33 Exhibit 18−12, # 34 Exhibit 18−13, # 35 Exhibit 18−14, # 36 Exhibit 19, # 37 Exhibit 20−1, # 38 Exhibit 20−2)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 184 of 408

09/23/2016 09/23/2016

replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 31 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
773 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21−1, # 2 Exhibit 21−2, # 3 Exhibit 21−3, # 4 Exhibit 21−4, # 5 Exhibit 21−5, # 6 Exhibit 21−6, # 7 Exhibit 21−7, # 8 Exhibit 21−8, # 9 Exhibit 21−9, # 10 Exhibit 21−10, # 11 Exhibit 21−11, # 12 Exhibit 21−12, # 13 Exhibit 21−13, # 14 Exhibit 21−14, # 15 Exhibit 21−15, # 16 Exhibit 21−16, # 17 Exhibit 21−17, # 18 Exhibit 22, # 19 Exhibit 23−1, # 20 Exhibit 23−2, # 21 Exhibit 23−3, # 22 Exhibit 23−4, # 23 Exhibit 23−5, # 24 Exhibit 24−1, # 25 Exhibit 24−2, # 26 Exhibit 24−3, # 27 Exhibit 24−4, # 28 Exhibit 24−5, # 29 Exhibit 24−6, # 30 Exhibit 25−1, # 31 Exhibit 25−2, # 32 Exhibit 25−3, # 33 Exhibit 25−4, # 34 Exhibit 25−5, # 35 Exhibit 25−6, # 36 Exhibit 25−7, # 37 Exhibit 25−8, # 38 Exhibit 25−9, # 39 Exhibit 25−10, # 40 Exhibit 26, # 41 Exhibit 27)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 41 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 31 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
774 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 28−1, # 2 Exhibit 28−2, # 3 Exhibit 28−3, # 4 Exhibit 28−4, # 5 Exhibit 28−5, # 6 Exhibit 28−6, # 7 Exhibit 28−7, # 8 Exhibit 28−8, # 9 Exhibit 28−9, # 10 Exhibit 28−10, # 11 Exhibit 28−11, # 12 Exhibit 29, # 13 Exhibit 30−1, # 14 Exhibit 30−2, # 15 Exhibit 31−1, # 16 Exhibit 31−2, # 17 Exhibit 32, # 18 Exhibit 33−1, # 19 Exhibit 33−2, # 20 Exhibit 33−3, # 21

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 185 of 408

09/23/2016 09/23/2016

Exhibit 34−1, # 22 Exhibit 34−2, # 23 Exhibit 34−3, # 24 Exhibit 35, # 25 Exhibit 36−1, # 26 Exhibit 36−2, # 27 Exhibit 37−1, # 28 Exhibit 37−2, # 29 Exhibit 37−3, # 30 Exhibit 37−4, # 31 Exhibit 37−5, # 32 Exhibit 37−6, # 33 Exhibit 37−7, # 34 Exhibit 38, # 35 Exhibit 39, # 36 Exhibit 40−1, # 37 Exhibit 40−2, # 38 Exhibit 40−3, # 39 Exhibit 40−4, # 40 Exhibit 40−5, # 41 Exhibit 40−6, # 42 Exhibit 40−7, # 43 Exhibit 40−8, # 44 Exhibit 40−9, # 45 Exhibit 40−10)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 31 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 41 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 42 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 44 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 44 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
775 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 40−11, # 2 Exhibit 40−12, # 3 Exhibit 40−13, # 4 Exhibit 40−14, # 5 Exhibit 40−15, # 6 Exhibit 40−16, # 7 Exhibit 40−17, # 8 Exhibit 40−18, # 9 Exhibit 40−19, # 10 Exhibit 40−20)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
776 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 40−21, # 2 Exhibit 40−22, # 3 Exhibit 40−23, # 4 Exhibit 40−24, # 5 Exhibit 40−25, # 6 Exhibit 40−26, # 7 Exhibit 40−27, # 8 Exhibit 40−28, # 9 Exhibit 40−29, # 10 Exhibit 41, # 11 Exhibit 42−1, # 12 Exhibit 42−2, # 13 Exhibit 43−1, # 14 Exhibit 43−2, # 15 Exhibit 43−3, # 16 Exhibit 44)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 9/29/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 9/29/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 9/29/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 9/29/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 9/29/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 9/29/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 9/29/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 186 of 408

09/23/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016

(kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 9/29/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
777 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 1 Exhibit 45−1) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 2 Exhibit 45−2, # 3 Exhibit 45−3, # 4 Exhibit 45−4, # 5 Exhibit 46−1, # 6 Exhibit 46−2, # 7 Exhibit 46−3, # 8 Exhibit 46−4, # 9 Exhibit 46−5, # 10 Exhibit 46−6, # 11 Exhibit 46−7, # 12 Exhibit 46−8, # 13 Exhibit 46−9, # 14 Exhibit 46−10, # 15 Exhibit 46−11, # 16 Exhibit 46−12, # 17 Exhibit 46−13, # 18 Exhibit 46−14, # 19 Exhibit 47, # 20 Exhibit 48−1, # 21 Exhibit 48−2, # 22 Exhibit 48−3, # 23 Exhibit 48−4, # 24 Exhibit 48−5, # 25 Exhibit 49−1, # 26 Exhibit 48−2, # 27 Exhibit 48−3, # 28 Exhibit 48−4, # 29 Exhibit 48−5, # 30 Exhibit 48−6, # 31 Exhibit 48−7, # 32 Exhibit 48−8, # 33 Exhibit 49−9, # 34 Exhibit 50) (kh, ). Modified on 9/29/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
778 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William). (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 1 Exhibit 51, # 2 Exhibit 52, # 3 Exhibit 53, # 4 Exhibit 54−1, # 5 Exhibit 54−2, # 6 Exhibit 54−3, # 7 Exhibit 55−1, # 8 Exhibit 55−2, # 9 Exhibit 56, # 10 Exhibit 57−1, # 11 Exhibit 57−2, # 12 Exhibit 58−1, # 13 Exhibit 58−2, # 14 Exhibit 58−3, # 15 Exhibit 59, # 16 Exhibit 60, # 17 Exhibit 61−1, # 18 Exhibit 61−2, # 19 Exhibit 61−3, # 20 Exhibit 62−1, # 21 Exhibit 62−2, # 22 Exhibit 62−3, # 23 Exhibit 62−4, # 24 Exhibit 62−5, # 25 Exhibit 62−6, # 26 Exhibit 62−7, # 27 Exhibit 62−8, # 28 Exhibit 62−9, # 29 Exhibit 62−10, # 30 Exhibit 63, # 31 Exhibit 64) (kh, ). Modified on 9/29/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
779 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William)(Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 1 Exhibit 65, # 2 Exhibit 66, # 3 Exhibit 67−1, # 4 Exhibit 67−2, # 5 Exhibit 68, # 6 Exhibit 69, # 7 Exhibit 70, # 8 Exhibit 71, # 9 Exhibit 72, # 10 Exhibit 73, # 11 Exhibit 74, # 12 Exhibit 75, # 13 Exhibit 76, # 14 Exhibit 77, # 15 Exhibit 78, # 16 Exhibit 79−1, # 17 Exhibit 79−2, # 18 Exhibit 80−1, # 19 Exhibit 80−2, # 20 Exhibit 80−3, # 21 Exhibit 80−4, # 22 Exhibit 81, # 23 Exhibit 82, # 24 Exhibit 83−1, # 25 Exhibit 83−2, # 26 Exhibit 84−1, # 27 Exhibit 84−2, # 28 Exhibit 84−3, # 29 Exhibit 85) (kh, ). Modified on 9/29/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
780 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William)(Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 1 Exhibit 86−1, # 2 Exhibit 86−2, # 3 Exhibit 87−1, # 4 Exhibit 87−2, # 5 Exhibit 87−3, # 6 Exhibit 88, # 7 Exhibit 89−1, # 8 Exhibit 89−2, # 9 Exhibit 90−1, # 10 Exhibit 90−2, # 11 Exhibit 91−1, # 12 Exhibit 91−2, # 13 Exhibit 91−3, # 14 Exhibit 92, # 15 Exhibit 93−1, # 16 Exhibit 93−2, # 17 Exhibit 94−1, # 18 Exhibit 94−2, # 19 Exhibit 94−3, # 20 Exhibit 95, # 21 Exhibit 96−1, # 22 Exhibit 96−2, # 23 Exhibit 97−1, # 24 Exhibit 97−2, # 25 Exhibit 98, # 26 Exhibit 99, # 27 Exhibit 100−1, # 28 Exhibit 100−2, # 29 Exhibit 100−3, # 30 Exhibit 100−4, # 31 Exhibit 100−5, # 32 Exhibit 100−6, # 33 Exhibit 100−7, # 34 Exhibit 100−8, # 35 Exhibit 100−9, # 36 Exhibit 100−10, # 37 Exhibit 100−11) (kh, ). Modified on 9/29/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
781 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 1 Exhibit 101, # 2 Exhibit 102, # 3 Exhibit 103−1, # 4 Exhibit 103−2, # 5 Exhibit 104, # 6 Exhibit 105, # 7 Exhibit 106, # 8 Exhibit 107, # 9 Exhibit 108, # 10 Exhibit 109, # 11 Exhibit 110−1, # 12 Exhibit 110−2, # 13 Exhibit 110−3, # 14 Exhibit 111−1, # 15 Exhibit 111−2, # 16 Exhibit 111−3, # 17 Exhibit 111−4, # 18 Exhibit 111−5, # 19 Exhibit 111−6, # 20 Exhibit 111−7, # 21 Exhibit 111−8, # 22 Exhibit 111−9, # 23 Exhibit 111−10, # 24 Exhibit 111−11, # 25 Exhibit 111−12, # 26 Exhibit 111−13, # 27 Exhibit 111−14, # 28 Exhibit 112, # 30 Exhibit 113) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 187 of 408

09/23/2016
09/23/2016 09/23/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016
09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016

782 Evidentiary Submission re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Evidentiary Submission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 9/29/2016 (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/29/2016: # 1 Exhibit 114−1, # 2 Exhibit 114−2, # 3 Exhibit 114−3, # 4 Exhibit 114−4, # 5 Exhibit 114−5, # 6 Exhibit 115, # 7 Exhibit 116, # 8 Exhibit 117, # 9 Exhibit 118, # 10 Exhibit 119, # 11 Exhibit 120, # 12 Exhibit 121, # 13 Exhibit 122, # 15 Exhibit 123, # 16 Exhibit 124, # 17 Exhibit 125−1, # 18 Exhibit 125−2, # 19 Exhibit 125−3, # 20 Exhibit 126, # 21 Exhibit 127, # 22 Exhibit 128, # 23 Exhibit 129, # 24 Exhibit 130, # 25 Exhibit 131, # 26 Exhibit 132, # 27 Exhibit 133, # 28 Exhibit 134, # 29 Exhibit 135, # 30 Exhibit 136, # 31 Exhibit 137, # 32 Exhibit 138, # 33 Exhibit 139, # 34 Exhibit 140, # 35 Exhibit 141, # 36 Exhibit 142, # 37 Exhibit 143, # 38 Exhibit 144, # 39 Exhibit 145, # 40 Exhibit 146−1, # 41 Exhibit 146−2, # 43 Exhibit 146−3, # 44 Exhibit 146−4) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
783 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Phase 2 ADA Claims by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
784 REPLY BRIEF re 754 Reply to response to order to show cause,, in Response to Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program's Brief on Associational Standing filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Edwards, Michael) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
785 ORDER: Counsel involved in the Phase One "intellectual−disability testing of prisoners sentenced to death" are to participate in a telephone status conference call with the undersigned at 2:00 p.m. on September 27, 2016.1 The call−in number is 888−808−6929 and the pass code is 5917763. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 9/26/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
786 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of MOTION HEARING RE: MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT DEPOSITIONS Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 8/29/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 10/17/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/27/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/27/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
787 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Their Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to Expert Reports Offered by Defendants by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
788 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal ADOC's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Disclosures by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
789 TEXT ORDER granting 787 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Their Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to Expert Reports Offered by Defendants. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
790 TEXT ORDER granting 788 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal ADOC's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Disclosures. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2016. (no pdf document attached to this order)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
791 REPLY BRIEF re 766 Response to Order, The State's Reply to Named Plaintiffs' Response to the State's Supplement to its Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to the Expert Reports Offered by Named Plaintiffs filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
792 MOTION for Leave to File The State's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/26/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 188 of 408

09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/27/2016 09/27/2016 09/27/2016
09/27/2016 09/27/2016
09/27/2016
09/28/2016

793 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Notice to Class Members of Entry of Consent Order re Phase I by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program . (Morris, Maria) Modified on 9/27/2016 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties(kh, ). (Entered: 09/26/2016)
794 REPLY BRIEF re 752 Order,, 751 Objection to, 758 Notice (Other) Reply Brief in Support of Its Objections to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosures filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Corhern, Steven) (Main Document 794 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/26/2016)
799 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 797 PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO THEIR RULE 26(a)(2) OBJECTIONS TO EXPERT REPORTS OFFERED BYDEFENDANTS (kh, ) (Entered: 09/27/2016)
795 TEXT ORDER granting 792 Motion for Leave to File The State's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/27/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/27/2016)
796 TEXT ORDER granting 793 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Notice to Class Members of Entry of Consent Order re Phase I. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/27/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/27/2016)
797 REPLY to Response to Motion re 787 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Their Rule 26(a)(2) Objections to Expert Reports Offered by Defendants Redacted and Public Exhibits filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − September 21, 2016 e−mail from William Lunsford to Maria Morris, # 2 Exhibit 2 − September 25, 2016 e−mail from Maria Morris to William Lunsford, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Robert Morgan, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Excerpts from Deposition of Robert Ayers)(Morris, Maria) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/27/2016: # 5 Main Document (Unredacted)) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/27/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/27/2016)
798 Response to Order re 727 Memorandum Opinion and Order,,,,,,,, (Joint) Phase 1 Parties' Plan for Providing Notice Regarding Entry of Consent Decree by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Settlement of ADA Portion of Lawsuit)(Smith, John) (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/28/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/27/2016)
800 PHASE 2 OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT REPORTS AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT: It is therefore ORDERED as follows: (1) Defendants' 599 Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Experts' Reports is denied as further set out in the order. (2) Plaintiffs' 666 Motion for Leave to Amend Their Complaint is granted as further set out in the order. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/27/2016. (dmn, ) (Entered: 09/27/2016)
801 ORDER: Counsel involved in the Phase One "intellectual−disability testing of prisoners sentenced to death," including counsel for Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama and the Federal Defenders in Montgomery, are hereby ordered to participate in a mediation with the undersigned at 8:30 a.m. on Friday, October 7, 2016, at the U.S. Courthouse, Montgomery, Alabama. All counsel are required to "meet and confer" prior to the mediation regarding their respective positions on the issues presented in this aspect of the case. Counsel shall inform the undersigned via email at ott_chambers@alnd.uscourts.gov by noon, Thursday, October 6, 2016, of their positions and proposed solutions concerning the issues discussed in the telephone conference call earlier today. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record and upon Kacey Keeton at kacey_keeton@fd.org and Charlotte Morrison at cmorrison@eji.org. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 9/27/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/27/2016)
802 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal (1) Defendants' Objections and Motion to Strike Certain Declarations in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; and (2) ADOC's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 09/28/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 189 of 408

09/28/2016 09/28/2016 09/28/2016 09/28/2016 09/28/2016 09/28/2016
09/28/2016 09/28/2016
09/28/2016 09/29/2016 09/30/2016

803 TEXT ORDER granting 802 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER SEAL. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/28/2016. (no pdf no document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
804 PHASE 1 ORDER APPROVING NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT: Upon consideration of the parties' corrected proposed notice to class members of the settlement of Phase 1 of this case (doc. no. 798 −1), and the parties' plan for posting it and accompanying documents pertaining to the consent decree (doc. no. 798 ), it is ORDERED that this notice and plan are approved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/28/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
805 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Fifth) against Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, filed by All Plaintiffs.(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
806 MOTION to Strike 736 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 806 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/28/2016)
807 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 807 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/28/2016)
808 Evidentiary Submission re 807 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 147−1, # 2 Exhibit 147−2, # 3 Exhibit 147−3, # 4 Exhibit 147−4, # 5 Exhibit 147−5, # 6 Exhibit 147−6, # 7 Exhibit 147−7, # 8 Exhibit 147−8, # 9 Exhibit 147−9, # 10 Exhibit 147−10, # 11 Exhibit 148−1, # 12 Exhibit 148−2, # 13 Exhibit 148−3, # 14 Exhibit 149−1, # 15 Exhibit 149−2, # 16 Exhibit 149−3, # 17 Exhibit 149−4, # 18 Exhibit 150−1, # 19 Exhibit 150−2, # 20 Exhibit 150−3, # 21 Exhibit 151−1, # 22 Exhibit 151−2, # 23 Exhibit 151−3, # 24 Exhibit 152, # 25 Exhibit 153, # 26 Exhibit 154, # 27 Exhibit 155, # 28 Exhibit 156, # 29 Exhibit 157, # 30 Exhibit 158, # 31 Exhibit 159, # 32 Exhibit 160, # 33 Exhibit 161, # 34 Exhibit 162, # 35 Exhibit 163, # 36 Exhibit 164, # 37 Exhibit 165, # 38 Exhibit 166, # 39 Exhibit 167, # 40 Exhibit 168, # 41 Exhibit 169, # 42 Exhibit 170, # 43 Exhibit 171, # 44 Exhibit 172, # 45 Exhibit 173, # 46 Exhibit 174, # 47 Exhibit 175−1, # 48 Exhibit 175−2, # 49 Exhibit 175−3, # 50 Exhibit 175−4, # 51 Exhibit 176, # 52 Exhibit 177, # 53 Exhibit 178, # 54 Exhibit 179)(Lunsford, William) . Modified on 9/30/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 09/28/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 9/29/2016 04:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
809 MOTION to Strike Certain Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix A to the State's Objections and Motion to Strike Certain Declarations, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A −− Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures, # 3 Exhibit Ex. B −− Plaintiffs' Supp. Initial Disclosures & Resp.)(Corhern, Steven) (Main Document 809 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/28/2016)
810 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A −− Deposition of Eldon Vail)(Corhern, Steven) (Main Document 810 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/30/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/28/2016)
811 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 9/29/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (war, ) (Entered: 09/29/2016)
812 JUDGMENT: In light of the most recent amended complaint and by agreement of the parties, as expressed during a telephone conference held on the record on September 29, 2016, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that plaintiffs Paul Folsom, Zerrick Naylor, Jonathan Sanford, and William Villar are again dismissed and terminated as parties to this case with prejudice. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This case is not closed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/30/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 190 of 408

09/30/2016 09/30/2016 09/30/2016 09/30/2016 09/30/2016
09/30/2016
09/30/2016

Checklist)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
813 ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff Jermaine Mitchell's Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed with prejudice. (2) To the extent that plaintiff Mitchell raises claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act which have not yet been resolved through settlement, these claims remain pending. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/30/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
814 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
815 TEXT ORDER granting 814 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/30/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
816 PHASE 2A ORDER RESETTING STATUS CONFERENCE: By agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that the New Phase 2A Status Conferences Order (doc. no. 762 ) is amended to the extent that the status conference currently set for October 7, 2016, is reset for October 13, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/30/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
817 NEW ELECTRONIC FILING OF SEALED DOCUMENTS ORDER: It is ORDERED that the previous Electronic Filing of Sealed Documents Order (doc. no. 470 ) is vacated, and that, in the future, when the parties file any documents or exhibits under seal, they are to furnish to the clerk of court only a compact disc containing PDF−format files. Each individual document or exhibit is to be submitted as a separate, clearly named PDF file no larger than 10 megabytes in size. The parties are responsible for the readability and accuracy of the electronic files. The parties are, for purposes of this case alone, no longer to file paper copies of sealed documents or exhibits. However, paper courtesy copies must still be provided to chambers. The clerk of court is generally DIRECTED to file these electronic documents or exhibits under seal, and to preserve the compact discs containing them in the case file. It is further ORDERED that by no later than October 7, 2016, the parties are to retrieve from the clerk of court all paper copies of sealed documents and exhibits filed in this case since August 1, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/30/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
818 PHASE 2 ORDER REFERRING REMAINING ADA CLAIMS AND EXPERT DISPUTES FOR MEDIATION: Based on the representations made by counsel for the parties during a telephone conference held on the record on September 29, 2016, and within the parameters stated by the court during that conference, it is ORDERED that the following issues are referred to United States Magistrate Judge John Ott for mediation, with precedence to be given to the portions of these issues pertaining to the litigation of Phase 2A: (1) What, if any, Americans with Disabilities Act claims remain unresolved, and how to resolve them. (2) How defendants will make available to plaintiffs' counsel and their experts the medical records that defendants' experts reviewed in their audits, in a manner that is prompt and reasonably efficient for both parties. (3) How to resolve the fact that both parties' experts have, in some instances, failed to cite to specific facts (or identify the sources of those facts) in support of their opinions, in order to ensure that the opposing parties, as well as the court, are able to identify and assess the bases for these opinions. It is further ORDERED that by no later than noon on October 3, 2016, the parties are to contact Judge Ott to discuss arrangements for mediating these issues. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/30/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
819 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on Thursday, September 29, 2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 191 of 408

09/30/2016 09/30/2016 10/03/2016 10/04/2016 10/04/2016 10/05/2016 10/06/2016
10/06/2016
10/07/2016

10/21/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/31/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/29/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
820 NOTICE of FILING re 814 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by All Plaintiffs (kh, ) Modified on 10/4/2016 to create the docket entry relationship (kh, ). (Entered: 10/04/2016)
821 PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 809 MOTION TO STRIKE CERTAIN DECLARATIONS SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 10/7/2016 02:45 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 10/03/2016)
822 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Its Objections and Motion to Strike Certain Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
823 REPLY BRIEF re 809 MOTION to Strike Certain Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, 821 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition (THE STATES REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO STRIKE CERTAIN DECLARATIONS SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (UNDER SEAL)) filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Corhern, Steven) (Main Document 823 replaced on 10/5/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/04/2016)
824 TEXT ORDER granting 822 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Its Objections and Motion to Strike Certain Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/5/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/05/2016)
825 ORDER: Counsel involved in the Phase One arbitration issues are hereby ordered to participate in a telephone conference call with the undersigned at 3:00 p.m. today using the same call−in number previously provided. Counsel involved in the Phase One "intellectual−disability testing of prisoners sentenced to death," including counsel for Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama and the Federal Defenders in Montgomery, are hereby ordered to participate in a telephone conference call with the undersigned at 3:30 p.m. today using the same call−in number previously provided. Counsel involved in the issues of what Phase One ADA issues remain in the Phase Two case and concerning Phase Two production of medical expert records are hereby ordered to participate n a telephone conference call with the undersigned at 4:00 p.m. today using the same call−in number previously provided. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record and upon Kacey Keeton at kacey_keeton@fd.org and Charlotte Morrison at cmorrison@eji.org. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 10/6/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
826 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 9/2/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 10/27/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/7/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/4/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 10/7/2016 02:45 PM in by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson which was inadvertently terminated in error. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 192 of 408

10/07/2016 10/07/2016
10/10/2016 10/11/2016
10/11/2016 10/11/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016
10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016

827 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 10/7/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (war, ) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
828 PHASE 2 ORDER REGARDING LIST OF UNDISCLOSED DECLARANTS: Based on the representations made during a telephone conference held on the record on October 7, 2016, it is ORDERED that by no later than October 11, 2016, plaintiffs are to file a list of any individuals whose declarations defendants have offered in support of their motion for summary judgment or in opposition to plaintiffs motion for class certification which plaintiffs contend were not adequately disclosed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/7/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
829 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report Regarding the October 13, 2016 Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/10/2016)
830 PHASE 2 ORDER ON EXPERT CITATIONS: It is ORDERED that the parties are to file any supplemental citations to the reports of those experts relevant to Phase 2A of this case−−both the two experts whose reports have been marked and the others on whom the parties intend to rely at trial−−by no later than October 17, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/11/2016. (kh, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/11/2016: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Attachment 2) inadvertently omitted in error (kh, ). (Entered: 10/11/2016)
831 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
832 Response to Order re 828 Order,, List of Previously Undisclosed Declarants by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − State's Initial Disclosure)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
833 TEXT ORDER granting 831 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/12/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
834 State's ANSWER to 805 Amended Complaint (Fifth) by Alabama Department of Corrections.(Smith, John) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
835 REPLY BRIEF re 784 Reply Brief, 754 Reply to response to order to show cause,, filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
836 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/7/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/2/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/14/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
837 RESPONSE to Motion re 783 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Phase 2 ADA Claims filed by All Plaintiffs. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
838 MOTION to Strike Certain Documents Filed By Defendants in support of Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Class Certification by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpt of Hearing Transcript)(Morris, Maria. (Entered: 10/12/2016)
839 REPLY to Response to Motion re 665 MOTION to Certify Class for Phase II filed by Edward Braggs, Quang Bui, Richard Businelle, Howard Carter, Robert Dillard, Joshua Dunn, Daletrick Hardy, Sylvester Hartley, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, Roger McCoy, Kenneth Moncrief, Leviticus Pruitt, Richard Terrell, Jamie Wallace, Robert Myniasha Williams. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
852 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 10/14/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 193 of 408

10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/13/2016

853 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 844 Evidentiary Submission, 840 Evidentiary Submission, 850 Evidentiary Submission (kh, ) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
888 PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DUNN AND NAGLICHS 768 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
889 PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL AND DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS re 807 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) Modified on 10/21/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 10/21/2016)
890 PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TOMOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
840 Evidentiary Submission re 770 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, 769 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 807 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Kathryn Burns − filed under seal, # 2 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Craig Haney − filed under seal, # 3 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Michael Puisis − filed under seal, # 4 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Jay Shulman − filed under seal, # 5 Exhibit Deposition of Eldon Vail − filed under seal, # 6 Exhibit Deposition of Robert L. Ayers, Jr. − filed under seal, # 7 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Barbara De Lap − filed under seal, # 8 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Robert Greifinger − filed under seal, # 9 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Carl J. Keldie − filed under seal, # 10 Exhibit Deposition of Catherine Knox − filed under seal, # 11 Exhibit Deposition of Robert Morgan − filed under seal, # 12 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Raymond F. Patterson − filed under seal, # 13 Exhibit Declaration of Dr. Michael Puisis, October 10, 2016 − filed under seal, # 14 Exhibit Rebuttal Report of Dr. Kathryn Burns − filed under seal, # 15 Exhibit Rebuttal Report of Dr. Craig Haney − filed under seal, # 16 Exhibit Rebuttal Report of Dr. Michael Puisis − filed under seal, # 17 Exhibit Rebuttal Report of Dr. Jay Shulman − filed under seal, # 18 Exhibit Rebuttal Report of Dr. Michael Puisis − Key − filed under seal, # 19 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Augustus Smith − filed under seal, # 20 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Bobby Gene Carter − filed under seal, # 21 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Brandon Johnson − filed under seal, # 22 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Brian Sellers − filed under seal, # 23 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Chandler Clements − filed under seal, # 24 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Charlie Henderson − filed under seal, # 25 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Christopher Jackson − filed under seal, # 26 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Christopher Gilbert − filed under seal, # 27 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Daletrick Hardy − filed under seal, # 28 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Dwight Hagood − filed under seal, # 29 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Edward Braggs − filed under seal, # 30 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Howard Carter − filed under seal, # 31 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Hubert Tollar − filed under seal, # 32 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Jamie Wallace − filed under seal, # 33 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff John Maner − filed under seal, # 34 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Joseph Torres − filed under seal, # 35 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Joshua Dunn − filed under seal, # 36 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Kenneth Moncrief − filed under seal, # 37 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Leviticus Pruitt − filed under seal, # 38 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Matthew Mork − filed under seal, # 39 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Quang Bui − filed under seal, # 40 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Richard Businelle − filed under seal, # 41 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Richard Terrell − filed under seal, # 42 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Rick Martin − filed under seal, # 43 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Robert Dillard − filed under seal, # 44 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Robert Myniasha Williams − filed under seal, # 45 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Roger McCoy − filed under seal, # 46 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Roger Moseley − filed under seal, # 47 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Sheila Allen − filed under seal, # 48 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Sylvester Hartley − filed under seal, # 49 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Tedrick Brooks − filed under seal, # 50 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Timothy Sears − filed under seal)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 31 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 194 of 408

10/13/2016 10/13/2016 10/13/2016
10/13/2016

10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 41 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 42 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 44 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 46 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 47 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 48 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 49 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 50 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/13/2016)
841 PHASE 2B ORDER ON EXPERT CITATIONS: Based on the representations made during the status conference held on the record today, it is ORDERED that the court's Phase 2 Order on Expert Citations (doc. no. 830 ) is amended to the extent that the deadline for filing any supplemental citations to the reports of those experts relevant to Phase 2B of this case is November 7, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
842 PHASE 2A ORDER TRIAL STIPULATIONS EXTENSION ORDER: Based on the representations made during the status conference held on the record today, and by the agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that the deadline for the parties' Phase 2A pretrial stipulations, as set in the court's order of August 16, 2016 (doc. no. 632 ), is extended to November 7, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
843 PHASE 2A ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR DEFENDANTS' DAUBERT REPLY: Based on the representations made during the status conference held on the record today, it is ORDERED that defendants' oral motion−−which plaintiffs do not oppose−−for an extension of the deadline by which defendants must respond to the Daubert arguments raised in plaintiffs' opposition to summary judgment, is granted, to the extent that the court's New Phase 2A Scheduling Order (doc. no. 748 ) is amended to permit defendants to file this response by no later than October 22, 2016. This deadline is a Saturday; by that date, defendants must either file their brief by CM/ECF or, if it is to be filed under seal, place it in the drop box and submit the brief electronically to chambers. This order does not otherwise alter the deadline for defendants' reply brief in support of summary judgment, which remains October 19, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
844 Evidentiary Submission re 770 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, 769 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 807 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Tommie Moore − filed under seal, # 2 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Turner Rogers − filed under seal, # 3

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 195 of 408
Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff William Sullivan − filed under seal, # 4 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Plaintiff Willie McClendon − filed under seal, # 5 Exhibit Declaration of Rick Martin, October 7, 2016 − filed under seal, # 6 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter − filed under seal, # 7 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Michelle Ellington − filed under seal, # 8 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Charles Woodley − filed under seal, # 9 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Wilcotte Rahming− filed under seal, # 10 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Hugh Hood − filed under seal, # 11 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016 (Dep. II) − filed under seal, # 12 Exhibit Excerpts of Brandon Johnsons Medical Records − filed under seal, # 13 Exhibit Excerpts of Christopher Jacksons Medical Records − filed under seal, # 14 Exhibit Excerpts of Daletrick Hardys Medical Records − filed under seal, # 15 Exhibit Excerpts of Sheila Allens Medical Records − filed under seal, # 16 Exhibit Excerpts of Robert Dillards Medical Records − filed under seal, # 17 Exhibit Excerpts of Roger McCoys Medical Records − filed under seal, # 18 Exhibit Excerpts of Quang Buis Medical Records − filed under seal, # 19 Exhibit Excerpts of Rick Martins Medical Records − filed under seal, # 20 Exhibit Excerpts of Christopher Gilberts Medical Records − filed under seal, # 21 Exhibit Excerpts of Matthew Morks Medical Records − filed under seal, # 22 Exhibit Excerpts of Dwight Hagoods Medical Records − filed under seal, # 23 Exhibit Excerpts of Howard Carters Medical Records − filed under seal, # 24 Exhibit Excerpts of Richard Terrells Medical Records − filed under seal, # 25 Exhibit Excerpts of William Sullivans Medical Records − filed under seal, # 26 Exhibit Excerpts of Edward Braggs Medical Records Excerpts of William Sullivans Medical Records − filed under seal, # 27 Exhibit Excerpts of Roger Moseleys Medical Records − filed under seal, # 28 Exhibit Excerpts of Turner Rogers Medical Records − filed under seal, # 29 Exhibit Excerpts of Joseph Torres Medical Records − filed under seal, # 30 Exhibit Excerpts of Timothy Sears Medical Records − filed under seal, # 31 Exhibit Excerpts of Charlie Hendersons Medical Records − filed under seal, # 32 Exhibit Excerpts of Hubert Tollars Medical Records − filed under seal, # 33 Exhibit Excerpts of Sylvester Hartleys Medical Records − filed under seal, # 34 Exhibit Excerpts of Joshua Dunns Medical Records − filed under seal, # 35 Exhibit Excerpts of Chandler Clements Medical Records − filed under seal, # 36 Exhibit Excerpts of Tommie Moores Medical Records − filed under seal, # 37 Exhibit Excerpts of Tedrick Brooks Medical Records − filed under seal, # 38 Exhibit Excerpts of Robert Myniasha Williams Medical Records − filed under seal, # 39 Exhibit Excerpts of Augustus Smiths Medical Records − filed under seal, # 40 Exhibit Excerpts of Willie McClendons Medical Records − filed under seal, # 41 Exhibit Defendants Expert Disclosures − filed under seal, # 42 Exhibit Excerpts of Institutional File of Quang Bui − filed under seal, # 43 Exhibit Email from L. Scott to K. Doniver, re Businelle parole, September 26, 2016 − filed under seal, # 44 Exhibit Excerpts of Institutional File of Richard Businelle − filed under seal, # 45 Exhibit Excerpts of Richard Terrells Inmate File − filed under seal, # 46 Exhibit NCCHC Isolation Position − filed under seal, # 47 Exhibit APA Position on Segregation − filed under seal, # 48 Exhibit ADOC Admin. Reg. 602 − filed under seal, # 49 Exhibit ADOC Admin. Reg. 602, Change 1 − filed under seal, # 50 Exhibit ADOC Admin. Reg. 602, Change 2 − filed under seal)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/26/2016: # 51 Exhibit Excerpts of Brandon Johnsons Medical Records − filed under seal Part 2) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 196 of 408

10/13/2016 10/13/2016 10/13/2016 10/13/2016 10/13/2016 10/13/2016

replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 31 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/26/2016: # 52 Exhibit Excerpts of Christopher Jacksons Medical Records − filed under seal Part 2) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/26/2016: # 53 Exhibit Excerpts of Sylvester Hartleys Medical Records − filed under seal Pt2, # 54 Exhibit Excerpts of Sylvester Hartleys Medical Records − filed under seal Pt3, # 55 Exhibit Excerpts of Sylvester Hartleys Medical Records − filed under seal Pt4) (kh, ). (Attachment 41 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 42 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 44 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 46 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 47 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 48 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 49 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 50 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/13/2016)
845 PHASE 2A ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE: Based on the representations made during the status conference held on the record today, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to strike (doc. no. 838 ) is denied without prejudice with respect to the first three of the four enumerated issues (the affidavit of Angie Baggett, the declaration of Dr. Robert Greifinger, and the 2016 MHM grievance policy and Teresa Houser's description of that policy). However, defendants are to respond to the contentions of the plaintiffs with respect to those issues by no later than October 21,2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
846 PHASE 2 ORDER ON RECENTLY PRODUCED DOCUMENTS: Based upon the representations made on the record during the status conference today, it is ORDERED that the issue, raised by plaintiffs in the status report (doc. no. 829 ), of defendants' reliance on documents produced after the close of fact discovery is referred to United States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott for mediation. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
847 PHASE 2 ORDER ON PRODUCTION OF MEDICAL RECORDS: Based upon the representations made on the record during the status conference today, it is ORDERED that, if plaintiffs wish to pursue the issue raised today and in the status report (doc. no. 829 ) regarding production of complete copies of the medical records of their additional declarants, they must by October 17, 2016, file a motion articulating their request, stating clearly what they request and the basis of their entitlement to it. Upon consideration of any such motion, the court will provide an opportunity for defendants to respond. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
848 PHASE 2 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE: Based upon the representations made on the record during the status conference today, and, in particular, given defendants' emphasis upon the need for prompt resolution of their motions to strike declarations offered by plaintiffs, it is ORDERED that defendants shall file a response to the fourth enumerated issue in plaintiffs' motion to strike (doc. no. 838 )−−that is, plaintiffs' contention that defendants have relief on the affidavits of undisclosed individuals−−on or before October 21, 2016. The plaintiffs' motion to strike shall remain pending as to this issue. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
849 PHASE 2B ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS REQUEST TO PHOTOGRAPH: Based upon the representations made on the record during the status conference today, it is ORDERED that, on or before October 21, 2016, the parties shall meet and confer and report back to the court regarding plaintiffs request to photograph one of the named plaintiffs, as discussed in the status report (doc. no. 829 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/13/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
850 Evidentiary Submission re 770 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, 769 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 807

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 197 of 408
BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpts of Institutional File of Roger McCoy filed under seal, # 2 Exhibit March 2014 email thread re Compliance Report: Issue: 1403−PRI−, # 3 Exhibit Email from M. Morris to K. Thomas re Tollars need for biopsy May 30,, # 4 Exhibit R. Hunter Psychiatric Progress Note filed under seal, # 5 Exhibit OHS Medical Furlough Release Tracking Log filed under seal, # 6 Exhibit ADOC, Institutional Vulnerability Analysis: St. Clair Correctional, # 7 Exhibit Excerpts of Jamie Wallaces Medical Records filed under seal, # 8 Exhibit Excerpts of Institutional File of Jamie Wallace filed under seal, # 9 Exhibit July 2016 Monthly Report, Ala. Dept of Corrections filed under seal, # 10 Exhibit Mayo Clinic, ANA test filed under seal, # 11 Exhibit Mayo Clinic, Lupus filed under seal, # 12 Exhibit Status Conf. Tr., March 17, 2016 filed under seal, # 13 Exhibit Mayo Clinic, Mirtazapine filed under seal, # 14 Exhibit Mayo Clinic, Olanzapine filed under seal, # 15 Exhibit Nat. Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., 2015 Local Climatological Data, # 16 Exhibit Institutional File of Robert Dillard filed under seal, # 17 Exhibit Greifinger Invoice, March 28, 2016 filed under seal, # 18 Exhibit Mayo Clinic, Hyponatremia filed under seal, # 19 Exhibit Independent Review of Clinical Health Services for Prisoners, 8 Int. J., # 20 Exhibit Audit Tools filed under seal, # 21 Exhibit Excerpts of Corizon Staffing Hours, 2012 filed under seal, # 22 Exhibit Excerpts of Corizon Staffing Hours, 2014 filed under seal, # 23 Exhibit Excerpts of Sylvester Hartleys Inmate File filed under seal, # 24 Exhibit Infirmary Bed Report, July 7, 2014 filed under seal, # 25 Exhibit ADOC website, Mobile Community Based Facility/Community Work, # 26 Exhibit Federal Bureau of Prisons Hepatitis C Clinical Practice Guidelines, June, # 27 Exhibit Federal Bureau of Prisons Hepatitis C Clinical Practice Guideline, March, # 28 Exhibit Dr. Jay Shulman Report Key filed under seal, # 29 Exhibit Eldon Vail Report Key filed under seal, # 30 Exhibit Sick Call Slip, January 22, 2015, Henderson Dep. Ex. 170 filed under seal, # 31 Exhibit Sick Call Slip, February 11, 2015, Henderson Dep. Ex. 170 filed under seal, # 32 Exhibit Inmate Request Slip, January 15, 2015, Henderson Dep. Ex. 170 filed under seal, # 33 Exhibit Excerpts from Bibb Correctional Facility MAC Meeting Minutes:, # 34 Exhibit Excerpts of John Maners Medical Records filed under seal, # 35 Exhibit Excerpts of Institutional File of Brandon Johnson filed under seal, # 36 Exhibit Excerpts of Edward Braggs Classification and Movement History filed under seal, # 37 Exhibit Newman v. Alabama unpublished filed under seal, # 38 Exhibit Excerpts of Richard Businelles Medical Records filed under seal, # 39 Exhibit Excerpts of Kenneth Moncriefs Medical Records filed under seal, # 40 Exhibit Excerpts of Brian Sellers Medical Records filed under seal, # 41 Exhibit Excerpts of Leviticus Pruitts Medical Records, # 42 Exhibit Declaration of Tedrick Brooks, June 30, 2016 filed under seal, # 43 Exhibit Shepherd v. Corizon, Corizon Special Report filed under seal, # 44 Exhibit Corizon Annual Report to ADOC 2010 filed under seal, # 45 Exhibit ADOC Health Services Manual filed under seal, # 46 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Lesleigh Dodd filed under seal, # 47 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Dr. David Gams filed under seal, # 48 Exhibit Mayo Clinic, Hemorrhoids filed under seal, # 49 Exhibit Tedrick Brooks Grievance, August 15, 2012 filed under seal, # 50 Exhibit Excerpts from Tedrick Brooks ADOC Institutional File filed under seal, # 51 Exhibit Excerpts from Robert Myniasha Williams ADOC Institutional File filed under seal, # 52 Exhibit Harvard Health Ltr., Supplemental Nutrition Drinks filed under seal, # 53 Exhibit Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Nat. Heart, Lung, and Blood Inst., BMI, # 54 Exhibit ADOC website, Face page, Tracey Grissom filed under seal, # 55 Exhibit Email from S. Corhern to M. Morris re Resolution of Motion to Strike, # 56 Exhibit Email from M. Morris to A. Hill, et al. re Inmate Hubert Tollar, AIS, # 57 Exhibit Plaintiff Dunns Response to Defendants First Set of Interrogatories,, # 58 Exhibit Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures, October 14, 2014 filed under seal, # 59 Exhibit Executive Leadership, Ala. Dept of Corrections filed under seal, # 60 Exhibit Declaration of Maria Morris, October 12, 2016 filed under seal, # 61 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Ruth Naglich, April 7, 2016 (Naglich Dep. II) filed under seal, # 62 Exhibit OHS Audit of Donaldson RTU 2013 filed under seal, # 63 Exhibit Access to Care Form, PHS filed under seal, # 64 Exhibit Access to Care Form, Corizon, October 2013 filed under seal, # 65 Exhibit Grievances of William Sullivan filed under seal, # 66 Exhibit Shepherd v. Corizon, Affidavit of Donny Myers filed under seal, # 67 Exhibit Shepherd v. Corizon, Declaration of Larry Shepherd filed under seal, # 68 Exhibit MHM Mental Health Services Implementation Review Report, 2014 filed under seal, # 69 Exhibit MHM Clinical Contract Compliance Report, 2013 filed under seal, # 70 Exhibit Inmate Orientation to Mental Health Services filed under seal, # 71 Exhibit Email from L. Ferrell to B. Kinard, Confusion email, February 28, 2014 filed

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 198 of 408
under seal, # 72 Exhibit Email from R. Naglich to L. Linton et al., Inconsistent Grievance Practice, # 73 Exhibit Email from R. Naglich to K. Dover et al., Grievance Practice Twists, # 74 Exhibit Email from B. Kinard to A. Woods et al., Inmate Grievance Process, # 75 Exhibit Email from L. Ferrell to B. Andrews, Obtaining Grievance Forms email,, # 76 Exhibit Email from L. Brown to B. Kinard regarding death of a prisoner, April, # 77 Exhibit MHM 2014 audit filed under seal, # 78 Exhibit MHM 2013 audit filed under seal, # 79 Exhibit Excerpts from ADOC Health Services Manual Policy E−7 filed under seal, # 80 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Brenda Fields filed under seal, # 81 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 82 Exhibit CQI Meeting Minutes filed under seal, # 83 Exhibit Email from R. Naglich to S. Naglich re x−rays, September 19, 2014 filed under seal, # 84 Exhibit Email from L. Ferrell to R. Naglich re Holman, September 15, 2014 filed under seal, # 85 Exhibit June 2014 MHM Monthly Report filed under seal, # 86 Exhibit Email from A. Baggett to R. Naglich re Dwight Hagood, November 7,, # 87 Exhibit Greifinger report in Scott v. Clarke filed under seal, # 88 Exhibit Correspondence between Caren Short (SPLC), Anne Hill and Bill, # 89 Exhibit Excerpt of Transcript of Hearing, March 17, 2016 filed under seal, # 90 Exhibit Excerpt of Video Deposition of Plaintiff Hubert Tollar, September 19,)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 70 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 71 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 72 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 71 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 73 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 74 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 75 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 76 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 77 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 78 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 79 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 80 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 81 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 82 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 84 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 85 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 86 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 86 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 87 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 88 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 89 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 51 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 52 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 53 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 54 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 55 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 56 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 57 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 58 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 58 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 59 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 60 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 61 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 62 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 62 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 63 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 64 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 65 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 66 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 67 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 68 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 69 replaced on 10/26/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 31 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 41 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 42 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 42 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 10/27/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 44 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 46 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 47 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 48 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 49 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 50 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 10/28/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 199 of 408

10/13/2016
10/14/2016 10/14/2016
10/14/2016
10/14/2016 10/14/2016 10/14/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016

(kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 10/28/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/28/2016: # 91 Exhibit Audit Tools filed under seal Pt2) (kh, ). (Attachment 83 replaced on 10/31/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/13/2016)
851 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 10/13/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Main Document 851 replaced on 10/14/2016) (ag, ). (Entered: 10/13/2016)
854 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Class Certification Brief with Supplemental Citations Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
855 PHASE 2A TRIAL HOLIDAY RECESS ORDER: It is ORDERED that the trial of Phase 2A of this case will be in recess beginning at the close of court on December 22, 2016, until the morning of January 3, 2017; that is, trial will not be held from December 23, 2016, through January 2, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/14/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
856 TEXT ORDER granting 854 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Class Certification Brief with Supplemental Citations Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/14/2016. (no pdf documents attached to this order)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
857 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Phase I Parties" Report Regarding Intellectual Testing of Death Row Inmates (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
878 SEALED BRIEF in support of 665 motion by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) Modified on 7/25/2017 pursuant to instructions of chambers this is not a motion (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 10/19/2016)
879 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs re 878 SEALED MOTION (kh, ) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
858 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
859 ORDERED: 1. By the close of business on October 24, 2016, counsel for the defendants are to provide plaintiffs' counsel with electronic copies for each of the designated patients (a) the master problem list, (b) the portions of the mental health record for each inmate for the 12 months preceding the date of the original audit, and (c) the medical administration records for each inmate for the 12 months preceding the date of the original audit. To the extent that specific documents or the number or period of the specific documents reviewed for a particular audit tool item are not identified within an audit tool, the defendants will undertake to provide an explanation of the process by which documents within the selected portions of a patient file were selected for review by the audit team. Thereafter, any tweaking of the production will be submitted to the undersigned for the continuation of the review process. 2. The production and use of the same by counsel must be in accordance with the privacy protective order previously entered in this case. 3. This matter is set for an October 31, 2016, 4:00 p.m. telephone conference with the undersigned, using the call−in number (888−808−6929) and pass code (5917763). It is anticipated that counsel for the plaintiffs will conduct the necessary review of the documents provided during the following week (by October 31, 2016). The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 10/17/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/17/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 200 of 408

10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016
10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/17/2016 10/18/2016
10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/19/2016

860 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 10/17/2016 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Entered: 10/17/2016)
861 TETX ORDER granting 858 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/17/2016. (no pdf document attached this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
862 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Filed Under Seal, # 2 Exhibit B − Filed Under Seal)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 2 replaced on 10/18/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 10/18/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/17/2016)
863 REPLY BRIEF re 839 Reply to Response to Motion, The State's Reply Memorandum of Law as to Daubert Issues in Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Class Certification filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 863 replaced on 10/18/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/17/2016)
864 TEXT ORDER granting 860 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/17/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
865 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections of Filing of Rebuttal Report of Robert D. Morgan PhD with Supplemental Citations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Smith, John) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
866 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Filing of Rebuttal Report of Robert L. Ayers Jr. with Supplemental Citations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Smith, John) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
867 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
868 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 830 Order,, Expert Report with Supplemental Citations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kathryn Burns Supplemental Citations List, # 2 Exhibit Kathryn Burns Report with Supplemental Citations, # 3 Exhibit Craig Haney Supplemental Citations List, # 4 Exhibit Craig Haney Expert Report with Supplemental Citations, # 5 Exhibit Eldon Vail Supplemental Citations List, # 6 Exhibit Eldon Vail Report with Supplemental Citations)(Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
869 SEALED MOTION by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Attachment to Exhibit 2 (Part 1), # 4 Attachment to Exhibit 2 (Part 2))(kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
870 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs re 869 SEALED MOTION (kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
872 Notice of Filing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 862 Notice (kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
871 PHASE 2 BRIEFING ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL INTRODUCTION OF COMPLETE MEDICAL RECORDS: Upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion to compel introduction of complete medical records (doc. no. 869 ), it is ORDERED that defendants are to respond by no later than October 20, 2016, and plaintiffs are to reply by no later than October 21, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/18/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
873 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
874 TEXT ORDER resetting Status Conference now set for 10/20 to 10/24/2016 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/18/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
875 MOTION to Strike 853 Notice (Other) by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 875 replaced on 10/20/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/19/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 201 of 408

10/19/2016 10/19/2016 10/19/2016 10/19/2016 10/20/2016 10/20/2016 10/20/2016
10/20/2016 10/20/2016 10/20/2016 10/21/2016
10/21/2016
10/21/2016

876 REPLY BRIEF re 853 Notice (Other) The State's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 876 replaced on 10/20/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/19/2016)
877 Evidentiary Submission re 876 Reply Brief filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 180, # 2 Exhibit 181 − FILED UNDER SEAL, # 3 Exhibit 182, # 4 Exhibit 183 − FILED UNDER SEAL)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 2 replaced on 10/19/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 10/19/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/19/2016)
880 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections re 804 Order, 798 Response to Order, ADOC's Statement Concerning Notice (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
881 REPLY BRIEF re 783 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Phase 2 ADA Claims filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Corhern, Steven) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
882 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
883 PHASE 2 ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE: It is ORDERED that defendants' motions to strike (doc. nos. 806 & 875 ) briefs filed by plaintiffs are denied under the conditions set forth. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/20/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
884 PHASE 2 ORDER ON EXPERT OBJECTIONS: Upon further consideration of the parties' objections to each other's expert reports pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (doc. nos. 569 , 710 , 721 , 735 , 753 , 755 , 764 , 765 , 766 , 791 , 797 ), it is ORDERED that the court will reserve these objections, carry them with the case, and consider them, as and to the extent necessary, in deciding the pending summary−judgment and class−certification motions, and at trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/20/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
885 TEXT ORDER granting 882 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/20/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
886 RESPONSE in Opposition re 869 SEALED MOTION to Compel Production of Non−Party Declarants' Medical Records filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 886 replaced on 10/21/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/20/2016)
Set Hearings: Status Conference set for 10/24/2016 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
887 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 869 SEALED MOTION − Redacted Version of Motion: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE MEDICAL RECORDS IN THEIR ENTIRETY PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 106 : filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Sealed document, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Declaration of Maria V. Morris)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
891 RESPONSE to Motion re 838 MOTION to Strike Certain Documents Filed By Defendants in support of Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Class Certification filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T)(Lunsford, William) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/24/2016: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T) (kh, ). (Main Document 891 replaced on 10/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/21/2016)
892 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/21/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 202 of 408

10/24/2016
10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016

893 ORDER: All counsel involved in the Phase Two Mental Health Trial are hereby ordered to participate in a telephone status call with the undersigned at 4:00 p.m. on Monday, October 24, 2016, using the following call−in number and passcode: (888−808−6929 and 5917763). The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 10/24/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
894 TEXT ORDER granting 892 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/24/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
895 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Shah, Mitesh) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
896 TEXT ORDER granting 895 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/24/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entty)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
897 STATUS REPORT (Joint) Regarding Photographing Plaintiff Timothy Sears by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
898 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 10/24/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
899 REPLY BRIEF The State's Response to Named Plaintiffs' Daubert Objections to the State's Experts filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 899 replaced on 10/24/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/24/2016)
900 Deposition Designations by Alabama Department of Corrections.. (Smith, John) (Main Document 900 replaced on 10/25/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/25/2016: # 1 Exhibit A) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/24/2016)
901 Witness List by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/25/2016: # 1 Exhibit A) (kh, ). (Main Document 901 replaced on 10/25/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/24/2016)
902 Exhibit List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Shah, Mitesh) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/25/2016: # 1 Exhibit A) (kh, ). (Main Document 902 replaced on 10/25/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/24/2016)
903 PHASE 2 ORDER ON DEADLINES AND REFERRALS FROM OCTOBER 24, 2016 STATUS CONFERENCE : Based on the representations made on the record during a status conference on October 24, 2016, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) By no later than the close of business today, the parties are to file electronically or by submission to the clerk of the court any filings which were submitted to chambers over the weekend due to the outage of the court's electronic filing system. (2) By no later than October 28, 2016, the parties are to file their joint motion to dismiss the outstanding Phase 1 claims regarding the testing of prisoners on death row for intellectual disabilities. (3) By no later than October 28, 2016, the parties are to file a joint status report apprising the court of their progress towards settlement of the remaining Phase 2A ADA claims. (4) By no later than October 28, 2016, plaintiffs are to file a reply to defendants' response to the contentions regarding the declarations of Dr. Greifinger and Ms. Houser in their motion to strike (doc. no. 838 ). (5) By no later than October 31, 2016, plaintiffs are to reply to defendants' not−yet−docketed Response to Named Plaintiffs' Daubert Objections to the State's Experts. (6) In conjunction with the parties' pretrial stipulations, to be filed on November 7, 2016, per the courts Phase 2A Trial Stipulations Extension Order (doc. no. 842 ), and without waiving any arguments as to the legal significance of a custody status, the parties are specifically to stipulate as to the current custody status of each of the named plaintiffs (for example, housed at a particular facility, furloughed, paroled, etc.). It is further ORDERED, by the agreement of the parties, that the following issues are referred to United States Magistrate Judge John Ott for mediation: (1) Settlement of the Phase 2A due process claims regarding involuntary medication. (2) Formulation of a schedule for depositions as well as production of the medical records of plaintiffs' Phase 2A declarants prior to the commencement of trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/24/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/24/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 203 of 408

10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/24/2016 10/28/2016
10/28/2016 10/28/2016 10/28/2016 10/28/2016 10/28/2016 10/28/2016 10/28/2016 10/31/2016
10/31/2016

904 PLAINTIFFS' FACILITY VISITATION PLAN FOR THE PHASE 2A TRIAL by All Plaintiffs re 244 Order (Morris, Maria) Modified on 10/25/2016 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Main Document 904 replaced on 10/25/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/24/2016)
905 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Main Document 905 replaced on 10/25/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/24/2016)
906 Exhibit List for the Phase 2A Trial by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Main Document 906 replaced on 10/25/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/24/2016)
907 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 906 Exhibit List, 904 Notice (Other), 905 Witness List − Filed under Seal (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
908 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
909 PHASE 2 ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE DECLARATIONS AND DISCLOSURES directing as follows: (1) the 809 and 838 MOTIONS to Strike are denied to the extent that the challenged declarations will not be excluded by the court, as further set out in order; (2) the defs may depose the challenged declarants relevant to the phase 2A trial before said trial, and all others after the phase 2A trial, at time to be determined later; (3) The scheduling of said depositions is referred to United States Magistrate Judge John G. Ott for mediation. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/28/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
910 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich of filing Joint Report Concerning Phase 2A ADA Claims (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
911 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich of filing The Parties' Joint Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice of Claims Brought on Behalf of Death Row Inmates Concerning Intellectual Disability Issues (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
912 *** SEALED ORDER, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/28/16. Emailed to all counsel, as directed.(djy, ) . (Entered: 10/28/2016)
913 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Objections to Certain Documents Filed in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Class Certification and Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
914 REPLY BRIEF re 838 MOTION to Strike Certain Documents Filed By Defendants in support of Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Class Certification filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Main Document 914 replaced on 10/31/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/28/2016)
Proposed Pretrial Order sent to court (Joint) by All Plaintiffs (NO PDF Document attached to this entry). (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
915 RESPONSE in Opposition re 875 MOTION to Strike 853 Notice (Other) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Menschel, Brooke) (Main Document 915 replaced on 10/31/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/31/2016: # 1 Exhibit 1) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/28/2016)
916 TEXT ORDER granting 913 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Objections to Certain Documents Filed in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Class Certification and Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/31/2016. (no pdf document attached this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference RE: Retaliation set for 10/31/2016 11:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (war, ) (Entered: 10/31/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 204 of 408

10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 10/31/2016 11/01/2016 11/02/2016 11/03/2016 11/03/2016 11/04/2016
11/04/2016
11/07/2016

917 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 10/31/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time FTR: 11:16 AM − 11:33 AM.) (war, ) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
918 Motion for Kristi L. Graunke to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602042945.) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Original Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Filing Fee Receipt)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
919 REPLY BRIEF in Support of Plaintiffs' Daubert Objections to Defendants' Proposed Experts filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
920 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 900 Deposition Designations of Filing Plaintiffs' Counter Designations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
921 TEXT ORDER granting 918 Motion for Kristi L. Graunke to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/1/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference w/Oral Arguments begun on 11/2/2016 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
922 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference/Oral Arguments concluded on 11/3/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
923 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections re 920 Notice (Other) Defendants' Rebuttal Deposition Designations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
924 ORDERED: 1. The proposed stipulations of fact are due to the court on November 21, 2016. As discussed during the call, the parties are to review the opposing party's statement of facts with the intent of identifying what facts can be stipulated. The initial submission that was due on November 7, 2016, is no longer necessary. 2. The defendants anticipate that the that the electronic copies of their trial exhibits will be provided to the plaintiffs' counsel by November 9, 2016. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' objections are due to be filed by November 16, 2016. The defendants' responses are due November 23, 2016. This does not alter the dates when the defendants' objections to the plaintiffs' exhibits are due and when the plaintiffs' responses thereto are due. 3. To monitor compliance with this order, regular telephone conferences will be scheduled. The first call will be Monday, November 7, 2016, at 4:00 p.m. The call−in number is 888−808−6929 and the pass code is 5917763. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 11/4/2016. (furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
925 JUDGMENT DISMISSING CLAIMS RELATED TO PRISONERS ON DEATH ROW: Pursuant to the joint stipulation of dismissal (doc. no. 911 ), it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that the following claims are dismissed without prejudice, with the parties to bear their own costs: any claim initially brought in this action or remaining in Phase 2A or 2B of this action that ADOC fails to identify, track, and accommodate the intellectual disabilities of death row inmates. All other claims remain pending. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This case is not closed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/4/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
926 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/13/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/28/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/8/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/6/2017. (kh, ) (Entered:

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 205 of 408

11/07/2016
11/08/2016 11/08/2016
11/08/2016 11/08/2016 11/08/2016 11/08/2016 11/08/2016

11/08/2016)
927 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/24/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/28/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/8/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/6/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
Proposed Pretrial Order sent to court − Joint Proposed Order by all Parties, filed by All Plaintiffs (NO PDF Document attached to this entry). (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
928 PHASE 2A ORDER ON PRETRIAL HEARING: It is ORDERED that: (1) The non−jury trial of this cause, which is to last approximately 40 days, is set for December 5, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. at the United States Courthouse in Montgomery, Alabama; (2) Trial briefs must be filed by the deadlines set in the courts Trial Briefs Order (doc. no. 246); (3) Exhibits are to be prepared in accordance with the directions of the clerk of the court; (4) All deadlines not otherwise affected by this order will remain as set forth in the New Phase 2A Scheduling Order (doc. no. 748) entered by the court on September 19, 2016, and the prior orders it incorporates by reference; and (5) All understandings, agreements, deadlines, and stipulations contained in this pretrial order shall be binding on all parties unless this order be hereafter modified by order of the court. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/8/2016. (furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
929 PHASE 2A PRISONER ATTENDANCE ORDER: Based on the representations made during the pretrial conference held on the record on November 2, 2016, it is ORDERED that the courts Prisoner Attendance Order (doc. no. 243 ) is amended to the extent that the parties are immediately to confer with the clerk of the court and the United States Marshal and develop a plan for the transportation of prisoners to and from the courthouse, and for plaintiffs counsel to consult with prisoners prior to, during, and following court proceedings. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
930 PHASE 2 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' ONGOING PRODUCTION: Based on the representations made during the pretrial conference held on the record on November 2, 2016, it is ORDERED that by no later than November 9, 2016, the parties are to file their written agreement regarding ongoing production by defendants. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
931 PHASE 2A ORDER ON DISCLOSURE OF ORDER OF WITNESSES AT TRIAL: Based on the representations made during the pretrial conference held on the record on November 2, 2016, it is ORDERED that the parties are to meet and confer and, by no later than five business days before the commencement of trial, submit to the court an agreed−upon schedule for disclosing the order in which each side plans to call witnesses at trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
932 PHASE 2A ORDER ON COPIES OF WITNESS SUMMARIES: Based on the representations made during the pretrial conference held on the record on November 2, 2016, it is ORDERED that the parties are to provide the court with five hard copies (four for chambers and one for the courtroom deputy to file), as well as an electronic copy by e−mail, of the summaries required pursuant to the court's Expert 'Crib Sheet' Order (doc. no. 240 ) and Non−Expert Witness Summary Order (doc. no. 463 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
933 PHASE 2A ORDER ON EXHIBIT SPREADSHEETS: Based on the representations made during the pretrial conference held on the record on November 2, 2016, it is ORDERED that by no later than five business days before the commencement of trial, the parties are to submit to the court a spreadsheet document listing each and every exhibit to be offered by any party and indicating clearly in additional columns (1)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 206 of 408

11/08/2016
11/08/2016 11/08/2016 11/09/2016 11/09/2016 11/09/2016 11/09/2016
11/09/2016 11/09/2016 11/09/2016 11/10/2016
11/10/2016 11/10/2016
11/10/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016

whether it is a joint exhibit to which there are no objections and, for any exhibit to which there are objections, listing (2) those objections and (3) the responses to them. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
934 PHASE 2B ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CITATIONS TO EXPERT REPORTS: Based on the representations made during the pretrial conference held on the record on November 2, 2016, it is ORDERED that the deadline for submitting supplemental citations to the Phase 2B expert reports, as set in the Phase 2B Order on Expert Citations (doc. no. 841 ), is extended to November 21, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/8/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 11/8/2016 at 03:30 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (war, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
935 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/8/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (war, ) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
936 STIPULATION re 930 Order, Agreement Regarding Phase 2A Supplemental Production by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
937 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael Paul Huff on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Huff, Michael) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
938 TEXT ORDER Telephone Conference set for 11/9/2016 10:30 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/9/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
939 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/9/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:38 − 10:57.) (ag, ) (Main Document 939 replaced on 11/9/2016) (ag, ). (Entered: 11/09/2016)
940 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 11/9/2016 02:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/9/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
941 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 940 Order, Set Hearings Notice of Filing of Investigative Retainer (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
942 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/9/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 2:53 − 2:53.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
943 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment The State's Supplemental Submission in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Named Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
944 Evidentiary Submission re 943 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 184)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
945 REPLY BRIEF The State's Memorandum Regarding SPLC's Claim of Attorney−Client Privilege with Non−Plaintiff Inmates filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
946 Response to Order Regarding Attorney−Client Relationship by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Morris Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Email serving Counsel)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
948 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
949 TEXT ORDER granting 948 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/14/2016. (no pdf document attached to

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 207 of 408

11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016
11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/15/2016 11/15/2016
11/15/2016 11/15/2016 11/15/2016
11/15/2016 11/15/2016

this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
950 Objection to re 905 Witness List filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/15/2016: # 1 Exhibit A) (kh, ). (Main Document 950 replaced on 11/15/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/14/2016)
951 Objection to re 906 Exhibit List filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/15/2016: # 1 Exhibit A) (kh, ). (Main Document 951 replaced on 11/15/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/14/2016)
952 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and exhibits to Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Deposition Designations by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
953 Objection to re 920 Notice (Other) Plaintiffs' Deposition Counter Designations filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
954 MOTION for Extension of Deadline by All Plaintiffs. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
955 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
956 Objection to Defendants' Deposition Designations filed by All Plaintiffs. Additional attachment(s) added on 11/15/2016: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12) (kh, ). Modified on 11/15/2016 (kh, ). (Entered: 11/14/2016)
957 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing Under Seal − Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exhibits to Objections to Defendants' Deposition Designations (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
958 Objection to Defendants' Proposed Witness List filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Objections to Specific Witnesses)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
966 PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING PHASE 2A by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
959 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 11/15/2016 09:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
960 TEXT ORDER granting 952 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and exhibits to Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Deposition Designations. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
961 TEXT ORDER granting 954 Motion for Extension of Deadline. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
962 TEXT ORDER: Resetting Status Conference now set for 11/18/2016 at 10:00 to 11:00 AM in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2016. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
963 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/15/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Main Document 963 replaced on 11/15/2016) (ag, ). (Entered: 11/15/2016)
964 MOTION to Withdraw by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Heinss, Christopher) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
965 TEXT ORDER granting 964 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered:

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 208 of 408

11/15/2016 11/15/2016 11/15/2016 11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/17/2016
11/17/2016 11/17/2016
11/17/2016

11/15/2016)
*** Attorney Christopher Fred Heinss terminated pursuant to the 965 order. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
967 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 11/15/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
968 STATUS REPORT − Joint Report for Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
969 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 966 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law − Redacted Version (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
972 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibit to Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Exhibit List for the Phase 2A Trial by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
973 TEXT ORDER granting 972 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibit to Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Exhibit List for the Phase 2A Trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/16/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
974 Objection to re 902 Exhibit List filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Filed Under Seal, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 11/17/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/16/2016)
975 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 974 Objection to Defendants' Exhibit List, Exhibit Filed Under Seal (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
976 ORDER: Counsel for all parties involved in the Phase Two trial on December 5, 2016, are hereby ordered to participate in a telephone conference with the undersigned today at 4:30 p.m. Each party is to have representative counsel on the call. We will use the courts call−in number. Should any counsel need the number, the undersigned should be contacted. Topics to be discussed include the witness lists for trial (particularly the defendants may call list); the logistics of identifying witnesses for trial and the arrangements for having them available as needed; fact stipulations; and the status of the involuntary medication settlement prospects of the case. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 11/17/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
977 ORDERED that the clerk of court shall seal the order resolving the attorney−client privilege issue as to two prisoners (doc. no. 971 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/17/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
978 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of ORAL ARGUMENTS − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/2/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/8/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/19/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/15/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
979 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of ORAL ARGUMENTS − VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/3/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/8/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/19/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 209 of 408

11/18/2016 11/18/2016 11/18/2016 11/21/2016
11/21/2016 11/21/2016
11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016
11/21/2016

2/15/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
980 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 11/18/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (jct, ) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
981 PHASE 2 ORDER ON REMAINING ADA CLAIMS: it is ORDERED that, because the parties have reached a tentative substantive settlement of the remaining Phase 2 Americans with Disabilities Act claims, these claims will be reserved for adjudication, if and to the extent necessary, during Phase 2B of this case. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/18/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
982 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal the revised expert reports of Dr. Carl Keldie, Dr. Barbara De Lap, and Catherine Knox by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
983 ORDER: Counsel for all parties involved in the Phase Two trial on December 5, 2016, are hereby ordered to participate in a telephone conference with the undersigned today at 4:30 p.m. Each party is to have representative counsel on the call. We will use the court's call−in number. Should any counsel need the number, the undersigned should be contacted. Topics to be discussed include the status of the stipulations for trial and document production. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 11/21/2016. (furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
984 TEXT ORDER granting 982 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal the revised expert reports of Dr. Carl Keldie, Dr. Barbara De Lap, and Catherine Knox. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
985 PHASE 2A ORDER: ORDERED that, by 9:00 p.m. on November 21, 2016, the parties are to submit to the court complete deposition transcripts of the following deponents, because some citations to depositions in expert reports were not included in the excerpts submitted as exhibits: Dr. Robert Hunter, Teresa Houser (November 2015 and April 2016), and Brenda Fields. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
986 MOTION for Leave to File State's Trial Brief and State's Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to State's Witness List Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
987 TEXT ORDER granting 986 MOTION for Leave to File State's Trial Brief and State's Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to State's Witness List Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
988 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
989 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Exhibits for the Phase 2A Trial, Expert Reports of Dr. Michael Puisis and Dr. Jay Shulman with Additional Citations for the Phase 2A Trial and Exhibits, Deposition Transcript and Exhibits of Dr. Robert Hunter, Deposition Transcript and Exhibits of Teresa Houser taken in November 2015 and April 2016, Deposition Transcript and Exhibits of Brenda Fields and Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Witness List for the Phase 2A Trial by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
990 ORDER granting 989 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Exhibits for the Phase 2A Trial, Expert Reports of Dr. Michael Puisis and Dr. Jay Shulman with Additional Citations for the Phase 2A Trial and Exhibits, Deposition Transcript and Exhibits of Dr. Robert Hunter, Deposition Transcript and Exhibits of Teresa Houser taken in November 2015 and April 2016, Deposition Transcript and Exhibits of Brenda Fields and Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Witness List for the Phase 2A Trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 210 of 408

11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016
11/21/2016

991 ORDERED that the Alabama Department of Correction's non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 988 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
992 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Shah, Mitesh) (Main Document 992 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Main Document 992 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2016)
993 TRIAL BRIEF by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Main Document 993 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2016)
994 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 841 Order, The State's Notice of Filing Expert Reports with Supplemental Citations for Phase 2B (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Lunsford, William) (Attachment 1 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2016)
995 Objection to re 958 Objection to Plaintiffs' Objections to State's Witness List filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J)(Smith, John) (Attachment 1 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2016)
996 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 985 Order, Notice of Compliance (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Evidentiary Submission, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Deposition Transcrip of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Exhibit 1 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Exhibit 2 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Exhibit 3 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Exhibit 4 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Exhibit 5 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Exhibit 6 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Exhibit 7 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Exhibit 8 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 11 Exhibit 10− Exhibit 9 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 12 Exhibit 11 − Exhibit 10 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 13 Exhibit 12 − Exhibit 11 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 14 Exhibit 13 − Exhibit 12 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 15 Exhibit 14 − Exhibit 13 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 16 Exhibit 15 − Exhibit 14 to Deposition of Dr. Robert Hunter, # 17 Exhibit 17 − Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 18 Exhibit 18 − Exhibit 1 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 19 Exhibit 19 − Exhibit 2 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 20 Exhibit 20 − Exhibit 3 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 21 Exhibit 21 − Exhibit 4 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 22 Exhibit 22 − Exhibit 5 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 23 Exhibit 23 − Exhibit 6 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2016, # 24 Exhibit 24 − Exhibit 7 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 25 Exhibit 25 − Exhibit 8 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 26 Exhibit 26 − Exhibit 9 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 27 Exhibit 27 − Exhibit 10 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 28 Exhibit 28 − Exhibit 11 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 29 Exhibit 29 − Exhibit 12 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 30 Exhibit 30 − Exhibit 13 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 31 Exhibit 31 − Exhibit 14 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015, # 32 Exhibit 32 − Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 33 Exhibit 33 − Exhibit 1 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 34 Exhibit 34 − Exhibit 2 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 35 Exhibit 35 − Exhibit 3 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 36 Exhibit 36 − Exhibit 4 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 37 Exhibit 37 − Exhibit 5 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 38 Exhibit 38 − Exhibit 6 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 39 Exhibit 39 − Exhibit 7 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 40 Exhibit 40 − Exhibit 8 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 41 Exhibit 41 − Exhibit 9 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 42 Exhibit 42 − Exhibit 10 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 43 Exhibit 43 − Exhibit 11 to

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 211 of 408
Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 44 Exhibit 44 − Exhibit 12 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 45 Exhibit 45 − Exhibit 13 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 46 Exhibit 46 − Exhibit 14 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 47 Exhibit 47 − Exhibit 15 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 48 Exhibit 48 − Exhibit 16 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 49 Exhibit 49 − Exhibit 17 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 50 Exhibit 50 − Exhibit 18 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 51 Exhibit 51 − Exhibit 19 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 52 Exhibit 52 − Exhibit 20 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 53 Exhibit 53 − Exhibit 21 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 54 Exhibit 54 − Exhibit 22 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 55 Exhibit 55 − Exhibit 23 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 56 Exhibit 56 − Exhibit 24 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 57 Exhibit 57 − Exhibit 25 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 58 Exhibit 58 − Exhibit 26 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 59 Exhibit 59 − Exhibit 27 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 60 Exhibit 60 − Exhibit 28 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 61 Exhibit 61 − Exhibit 29 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 62 Exhibit 62 − Exhibit 30 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 63 Exhibit 63 − Exhibit 31 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 64 Exhibit 64 − Exhibit 32 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 65 Exhibit 65 − Exhibit 33 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 66 Exhibit 66 − Exhibit 34 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 67 Exhibit 67 − Exhibit 35 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 68 Exhibit 68 − Exhibit 36 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 69 Exhibit 69 − Exhibit 37 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 70 Exhibit 70 − Exhibit 38 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 71 Exhibit 71 − Exhibit 39 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 72 Exhibit 72 − Exhibit 40 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 73 Exhibit 73 − Exhibit 41 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 74 Exhibit 74 − Exhibit 42 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 75 Exhibit 75 − Exhibit 43 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 76 Exhibit 76 − Exhibit 44 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 77 Exhibit 77 − Exhibit 45 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 78 Exhibit 78 − Exhibit 46 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 79 Exhibit 79 − Exhibit 47 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 80 Exhibit 80 − Exhibit 48 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 81 Exhibit 81 − Exhibit 49 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 82 Exhibit 82 − Exhibit 50 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, April 22, 2016, # 83 Exhibit 83 − Deposition of Brenda Fields, # 84 Exhibit 84 − Exhibit 1 to Deposition of Brenda Fields, # 85 Exhibit 85 − Exhibit 2 to Deposition of Brenda Fields, # 86 Exhibit 86 − Exhibit 3 to Deposition of Brenda Fields, # 87 Exhibit 87 − Exhibit 4 to Deposition of Brenda Fields, # 88 Exhibit 88 − Exhibit 5 to Deposition of Brenda Fields)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 83 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 84 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 85 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 86 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 87 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 88 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/30/2016: # 89 Exhibit 88 − Exhibit 5 to Deposition of Brenda Fields Part 2) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 212 of 408

replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 41 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 42 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 44 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 46 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 47 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 48 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 49 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 50 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 51 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 52 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 53 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 54 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 55 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 56 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 57 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 57 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 58 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 59 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 60 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 61 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 62 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 63 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 64 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 65 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 66 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 67 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 66 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 67 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 68 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 69 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 70 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 71 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 72 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 73 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 74 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 75 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 76 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 77 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 78 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 79 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 80 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 49 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 82 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 81 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 11/30/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/1/2016: # 90 Exhibit 31 − Exhibit 14 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015 Part 2, # 91 Exhibit 31 − Exhibit 14 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015 Part 3, # 92 Exhibit 31 − Exhibit 14 to Deposition of Teresa Houser, November 20, 2015 Part 4) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 12/1/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/21/2016

997 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 953 Objection to Plaintiffs' Deposition Counter−Designations filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Responses to Objections to Deposition Counter−Designations)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/21/2016 998 STIPULATION of Facts by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/21/2016 999 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 934 Order, Notice of Compliance (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Expert Report of Dr. Michael Puisis with Additional Citations)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 11/22/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/21/2016 1000 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing under Seal (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/21/2016 1001 PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS 951 Objection filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/22/2016)

11/21/2016 1002 PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 950 Objection by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(kh, )

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 213 of 408

(Entered: 11/22/2016)

11/22/2016

1003

PHASE 2 ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The court being informed that the parties have reached a tentative settlement of the remaining Phase 2 Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, and pursuant to the court's Phase 2 Order on Remaining ADA Claims (doc. no. 981 ), it is ORDERED that defendant Alabama Department of Corrections motion for partial summary judgment (doc. no. 783) is denied with leave to renew. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/22/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/22/2016)

11/22/2016 1004 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/22/2016)

11/22/2016 1005 Response to Order re 931 Order, Parties Joint Statement Regarding Order of Call by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/22/2016)

11/23/2016 1006 TEXT ORDER granting 1004 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/23/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/23/2016)

11/23/2016 1007 Objection to re 974 Objection to Plaintiffs' Objections to State's Exhibit List filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) (Attachment 1 replaced on 11/23/2016) (kh, ). (Main Document 1007 replaced on 11/23/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/23/2016)

11/23/2016

1008

PHASE 1 CLASS REPRESENTATIVES ORDER: ORDERED that the court's Phase 1 Final Settlement Approval Opinion and Order (doc. no. 727 ) is amended so that the order reflects, as stated at page 18 footnote 4 of the opinion, that the following named plaintiffs have been appointed representatives of the Phase 1 settlement class, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/23/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/23/2016)

11/25/2016 1009 PHASE 2A ADAP SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/25/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/25/2016)

11/25/2016

1010

PHASE 2A ADAP SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER, in accordance with the opinion entered today, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows with regard to the Phase 2 claims of this case: (1) Summary judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program with respect to its associational standing to bring its Phase 2A claims in this case; (2) Plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Programs Phase 2A claims will proceed to trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/25/16. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist)(djy, ). (Entered: 11/25/2016)

11/25/2016 1011 PHASE 2A INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/25/16. (djy,). (Entered: 11/25/2016)

11/25/2016

1012

PHASE 2A INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER, in accordance with the opinion entered today, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court with regard to the Phase 2A part of this case on the individual plaintiff' claims: (1) The 768 motion for summary judgment filed by defs Jefferson Dunn, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, and Ruth Naglich, Associate Commissioner of Health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections, is granted against plaintiffs Richard Businelle, Howard Carter, Robert Dillard, Joshua Dunn, Daletrick Hardy, Kenneth Moncrief, and Richard Terrell, and these plfs are terminated as parties; Summary judgment is granted on the merits of plf Hardy's claim, and plfs Businelle, Carter, Dillard, Dunn, Moncrief, and Terrel's claims are dismissed without prejudice as moot; (2) The motion is granted as to plf Sylvester Hartley's involuntary−medication due−process claim. However, plf Hartley is not terminated as a party; (3) The motion is otherwise denied with respect to the individual plfs' Phase 2A claims; (4) The mental−health care Eighth Amendment claims of plfs Hartley, Edward Braggs, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, Roger McCoy, Leviticus Pruitt, Jamie Wallace, and Robert Myniasha Williams, and the involuntary−medication due−process claims of plfs Quang Bui and McCoy, will proceed to trial; directing the clerk to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 FRCP. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 214 of 408

Thompson on 11/25/16. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist)(djy, ) (Entered: 11/25/2016)

11/25/2016 1013 PHASE 2A CLASS CERTIFICATION OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/25/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/25/2016)

11/25/2016

1014

PHASE 2A CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER, in accordance with the opinion entered today, it is ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that: The 665 motion for class certification filed by the remaining plfs asserting mental−health care Eighth Amendment and involuntary−medication due−process claims is granted in part and denied in part; (2) The motion is reserved for further consideration in Phase 2B with respect to the Phase 2B medical−care claims; (3) Two classes are certified pursuant to FederalRules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2); (4) A mental−health care Eighth Amendment plf class is defined and certified as consisting of "all persons with a serious mental−health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject to defs' mental−health care policies and practices in ADOC facilities, excluding the 13 work release centers and Tutwiler Prison for Women."; (5) Plfs Edward Braggs, Sylvester Hartley, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, Roger McCoy, Leviticus Pruitt, Jamie Wallace, and Robert Myniasha Williams are appointed as the representatives of the Eighth Amendment class; (6) An involuntary−medication procedural due−process plf class is certified as consisting of "all persons with a serious mental−health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be, subject to defs' formal involuntary−medication policies and practices."; (7) Plf Quang Bui is appointed as the representative of the procedural due−process class;(8) No class is certified with respect to the involuntary−medication substantive due−process claim brought by plaintiff Bui. He will be allowed to pursue this claim individually; (9) No class is certified with respect to the involuntary−medication substantive and procedural due−process claim brought by plf McCoy. He will be allowed to pursue this claim individually; (10) The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and the law firmof Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz are appointed as class counsel for both classes under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 23(g).. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/25/16. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist)(djy, ) (Entered: 11/25/2016)

11/28/2016

1015

PHASE 2B CLASS CERTIFICATION RESOLUTION ORDER directing that the 665 MOTION for class certification filed by the individual named plfs is reserved for further consideration with respect to the Pase 2B medical and dental care claims; the clerk is not to terminate this motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

11/28/2016

1016

PHASE 2B SUMMARY JUDGMENT RESOLUTION ORDER directing that the 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Jefferson Dunn, and Ruth Naglich is reserved for further consideration with respect to the Phase 2B medical and dental care claims, as further set out in order; directing the clerk not to terminate this motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

11/28/2016

1017

FINAL PHASE 2A STATUS CONFERENCE ORDER: ORDERED that a final Phase 2A status conference, to discuss any remaining unresolved logistical or other issues, is set for 9:30 a.m. on December 2, 2016. The parties are to arrange for the conference to be conducted by telephone. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

11/28/2016 1018 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Attorney and Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request for Phase 2A Trial (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

11/28/2016 1019 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Class Counsel's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 11/28/2016)

11/29/2016 1020 ORDERED that the state's attorney and non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1018 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/29/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/29/2016)

11/29/2016 1021 ORDERED that the plaintiffs' non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1019 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/29/2016. (kh, )

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 215 of 408

(Entered: 11/29/2016)

11/29/2016 1022 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1018 Notice (Other) The State's Supplemental Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request for Phase 2A Trial (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/29/2016)

11/30/2016 1023 NOTICE of Appearance by John Garland Smith on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

11/30/2016 1024 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1018 Notice (Other) The State's Revised Supplemental Technology Request for Phase 2A Trial (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

11/30/2016

***Attorney David Randall Boyd,Michael Leon Edwards,Jenelle Rae Evans,Steven C Corhern for Jefferson S. Dunn and Ruth Naglich added pursuant to 1023 notice of appearance (NO PDF Document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/01/2016 1025 ORDER directing that the state's 1022 supplemental non−attorney staff technology request is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/1/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/01/2016 1026 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Compliance to Provide Exhibits (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/01/2016 1027 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth Anne Sees on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Sees, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/01/2016 1028 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/01/2016 1029 Exhibit List of All Parties by All Plaintiffs.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Menschel, Brooke) (Attachment 1 replaced on 12/2/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/01/2016

***Attorney Anne Adams Hill,Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr for Jefferson S. Dunn and Ruth Naglich added pursuant to 1027 Notice (NO PDF Document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/02/2016

TEXT ORDER granting 1028 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/2/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/02/2016 1030 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 12/2/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Main Document 1030 replaced on 12/2/2016) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/05/2016

1031

ORDER: Based on the representations made during a status conference held on the record on December 2, 2016, and by agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants to introduce medical records in entirety (doc. no. 869 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/5/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)

12/05/2016 1032 ORDER: Based on the representations made during a status conference held on the record on December 2, 2016, it is ORDERED that the state's revised supplemental attorney and non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1024 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/5/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)

12/05/2016

1033

PHASE 2A TRIAL SCHEDULE: (1) Each and every day, Monday through Friday, court will begin at 9:00 a.m. and last until 5:00 p.m., with 15−minute breaks around 10:30 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., and with an hour for lunch at noon. (2) Attorneys are to be in court, ready to proceed, each morning by no later than 8:45 a.m.(3) If the trial is proceeding slower than expected, daily court could begin at 8:00 a.m. and last past 5:00 p.m., and there could be court on Saturdays. (4) Holiday recess will take place as set forth in the court's holiday recess order (doc. no. 855 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/5/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)

12/05/2016 1034 ORDERED that: (1) Defendants are to file an updated may−call witness list by December 14, 2016; (2) The parties are to reach an agreement or otherwise notify the court on the Phase 2 ADA claims by December 16, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 216 of 408

Myron H. Thompson on 12/5/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)

12/05/2016

1035

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/2/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/27/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/5/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/6/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)

12/05/2016 1036 NOTICE of PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS SUMMARIES, DEC. 5, 2016, by All Plaintiffs. (filed w/o signature pursuant to directives of chambers) (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)

12/05/2016

1037

PHASE 2A REBUTTAL EXHIBIT ORDER: It is ORDERED that, when introducing an exhibit not listed on any party's exhibit list or trial pad for the purpose of admitting at trial as a rebuttal exhibit while questioning a witness, counsel shall follow the following procedures: (1) Provide a paper copy to the witness; (2) Provide three additional copies to the court, and two to opposing counsel; (3) Have the exhibit marked before it is introduced; and (4) Provide an electronic copy to opposing counsel and the court at the end of the day. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/5/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)

12/05/2016

1038

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial begun on 12/5/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/6/2016: # 2 Exhibit J−1, # 3 Exhibit J−2, # 4 Exhibit J−3, # 5 Exhibit J−4, # 6 Exhibit J−5, # 7 Exhibit J−6, # 8 Exhibit J−7, # 9 Exhibit J−8, # 10 Exhibit J−9, # 11 Exhibit J−10, # 12 Exhibit J−11, # 13 Exhibit J−12, # 14 Exhibit J−13, # 15 Exhibit J−14, # 16 Exhibit J−15, # 17 Exhibit J−16, # 18 Exhibit J−17, # 19 Exhibit J−18, # 20 Exhibit J−19, # 21 Exhibit J−20, # 22 Exhibit J−21, # 23 Exhibit J−22, # 24 Exhibit J−23, # 25 Exhibit J−24, # 26 Exhibit J−25, # 27 Exhibit J−26, # 28 Exhibit J−27, # 29 Exhibit J−28, # 30 Exhibit J−29, # 31 Exhibit J−30, # 32 Exhibit J−31, # 33 Exhibit J−32, # 34 Exhibit J−33, # 35 Exhibit J−34, # 36 Exhibit J−35, # 37 Exhibit J−36, # 38 Exhibit J−37, # 39 Exhibit J−38, # 40 Exhibit J−39, # 41 Exhibit J−40, # 42 Exhibit J−41, # 43 Exhibit J−42, # 44 Exhibit J−43, # 45 Exhibit J−44, # 46 Exhibit J−45, # 47 Exhibit J−46, # 48 Exhibit J−47, # 49 Exhibit J−48, # 50 Exhibit J−49, # 51 Exhibit J−50, # 52 Exhibit J−51, # 53 Exhibit J−52, # 54 Exhibit J−53, # 55 Exhibit J−54, # 56 Exhibit J−55, # 57 Exhibit J−56, # 58 Exhibit J−57, # 59 Exhibit J−58, # 60 Exhibit J−59, # 61 Exhibit J−60, # 62 Exhibit J−61, # 63 Exhibit J−62, # 64 Exhibit J−63, # 65 Exhibit J−64, # 66 Exhibit J−65, # 67 Exhibit J−66, # 68 Exhibit J−67, # 69 Exhibit J−68, # 70 Exhibit J−69, # 71 Exhibit J−70, # 72 Exhibit J−71, # 73 Exhibit J−72, # 74 Exhibit J−73, # 75 Exhibit J−74, # 76 Exhibit J−75, # 77 Exhibit J−76, # 78 Exhibit J−77) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/13/2016: # 79 Exhibit J−78 part 1, # 80 Exhibit J−78 part 2) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/13/2016: # 81 Exhibit D−2910, # 82 Exhibit D−2911−1, # 83 Exhibit D−2911−2, # 84 Exhibit D−2911−3, # 85 Exhibit D−2911−4, # 86 Exhibit D−2911−5, # 87 Exhibit D−2911−6, # 88 Exhibit D−2911−7, # 89 Exhibit D−2911−8, # 90 Exhibit 29−11−9, # 91 Exhibit D−2911−10, # 92 Exhibit D−2911−11, # 93 Exhibit D−2911−12, # 94 Exhibit D−2911−13 end) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/13/2016: # 95 Exhibit J−79) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/13/2016: # 96 Exhibit J−80 part 1, # 97 Exhibit J−80 part 2, # 98 Exhibit J−80 part 3, # 99 Exhibit J−80 part 4, # 100 Exhibit J−80 part 5, # 101 Exhibit J−80 part 6, # 102 Exhibit J−81, # 103 Exhibit J−82, # 104 Exhibit J−83, # 105 Exhibit J−84, # 106 Exhibit J−85, # 107 Exhibit J−86, # 108 Exhibit J−87, # 109 Exhibit J−88, # 110 Exhibit J−89) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/13/2016: # 111 Exhibit J−90, # 113 Exhibit J−91, # 114 Exhibit J−92, # 115 Exhibit J−93, # 116 Exhibit J−94, # 117 Exhibit J−95, # 118 Exhibit J−96, # 119 Exhibit J−97, # 120 Exhibit J−98, # 121 Exhibit J−99, # 122 Exhibit J−100, # 123 Exhibit J−101, # 124 Exhibit J−102, # 125 Exhibit J−103, # 126 Exhibit J−104, # 127 Exhibit J−105, # 128 Exhibit J−106, # 130 Exhibit J−107, # 131 Exhibit J−108, # 132 Exhibit J−109, # 133 Exhibit J−110), # 134

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 217 of 408
Exhibit J−111, # 135 Exhibit J−112, # 136 Exhibit J−113, # 137 Exhibit J−114, # 138 Exhibit J−115, # 139 Exhibit J−116, # 140 Exhibit J−117, # 141 Exhibit J−118, # 142 Exhibit J−119, # 143 Exhibit J−120, # 144 Exhibit J−121, # 145 Exhibit J−122, # 146 Exhibit J−123, # 147 Exhibit J−124, # 148 Exhibit J−125, # 149 Exhibit J−126, # 150 Exhibit J−127, # 151 Exhibit J−128, # 152 Exhibit J−129, # 153 Exhibit J−130, # 154 Exhibit J−131, # 162 Exhibit J−132, # 163 Exhibit J−133, # 164 Exhibit J−134, # 165 Exhibit J−135, # 166 Exhibit J−136, # 167 Exhibit J−137, # 168 Exhibit J−138, # 169 Exhibit J−139) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/14/2016: # 170 Exhibit J−140, # 172 Exhibit J−141, # 173 Exhibit J−142, # 174 Exhibit J−143, # 175 Exhibit J−144, # 176 Exhibit J−145, # 177 Exhibit J−146, # 178 Exhibit J−147, # 179 Exhibit J−148, # 180 Exhibit J−149, # 182 Exhibit J−150 part 1, # 183 Exhibit J−150 part 2, # 184 Exhibit J−150 part 3, # 185 Exhibit J−150 part 4) # 186 Exhibit J−151 part 1, # 187 Exhibit J−151 part 2, # 188 Exhibit J−151 part 3, # 189 Exhibit J−152 part 1, # 190 Exhibit J− 152.2, # 191 Exhibit J−152 part 3, # 192 Exhibit J−152 part 4, # 193 Exhibit J−152 part 5, # 194 Exhibit J−152 part 6, # 195 Exhibit J−153, # 196 Exhibit J−154, # 197 Exhibit J−155 part 1, # 198 Exhibit J−155 part 2, # 199 Exhibit J−155 part 3, # 200 Exhibit J−156, # 201 Exhibit J−157 part 1, # 202 Exhibit J−157 part 2, # 203 Exhibit J−157 part 3, # 204 Exhibit J−158, # 205 Exhibit J−159, # 206 Exhibit J−160 part 1, # 207 Exhibit J−160 part 2, # 208 Exhibit J−160 part 3, # 209 Exhibit J−160 part 4, # 210 Exhibit J−160 part 5, # 211 Exhibit J−160 part 6) # 212 Exhibit J−161, # 213 Exhibit J−162, # 214 Exhibit J−163 part 1, # 215 Exhibit J−163 part 2, # 216 Exhibit J−163 part 3, # 217 Exhibit J−163 part 4, # 218 Exhibit J−163 part 5, # 219 Exhibit J−163 part 6, # 220 Exhibit J−163 part 7, # 221 Exhibit J−163 part 8, # 222 Exhibit J−163 part 9, # 223 Exhibit J−163 part 10, # 224 Exhibit J−163 part 11, # 226 Exhibit J−164, # 227 Exhibit J−165 part 1, # 228 Exhibit J−165 part 2, # 229 Exhibit J−165 part 3, # 230 Exhibit J−165 part 4, # 231 Exhibit J−165 part 5, # 232 Exhibit J−166 part 1, # 233 Exhibit J−166 part 2, # 234 Exhibit J−166 part 3, # 235 Exhibit J−166 part 4, # 236 Exhibit J−166 part 5, # 237 Exhibit J−167, # 238 Exhibit J−168, # 239 Exhibit J−169, # 240 Exhibit J−170) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/14/2016: # 242 Exhibit J−171, # 243 Exhibit J−172, # 244 Exhibit J−173, # 245 Exhibit J−174, # 246 Exhibit J−175, # 247 Exhibit J−176, # 248 Exhibit J−177, # 249 Exhibit J−178, # 250 Exhibit J−179, # 251 Exhibit J−180, # 252 Exhibit J−181, # 253 Exhibit J−182, # 254 Exhibit J−183, # 255 Exhibit J−184, # 256 Exhibit J−185, # 257 Exhibit J−186, # 258 Exhibit J−187 part 1, # 259 Exhibit J−187 part 2, # 260 Exhibit J−187 part 3, # 261 Exhibit J−187 part 4, # 262 Exhibit J−187 part 5, # 263 Exhibit J−187 part 6, # 264 Exhibit J−188, # 265 Exhibit J−189, # 266 Exhibit J−190 part 1, # 267 Exhibit J−190 part 2, # 268 Exhibit J−190 part 3, # 269 Exhibit J−190 part 4, # 270 Exhibit J−190 part 5, # 271 Exhibit J−190 part 6, # 272 Exhibit J−190 part 7, # 273 Exhibit J−190 part 8, # 274 Exhibit J−190 part 9, # 275 Exhibit J−190 part 10, # 276 Exhibit J−190 part 11, # 277 Exhibit J−190 part 12, # 278 Exhibit J−190 part 13, # 279 Exhibit J−190 part 14, # 280 Exhibit J−190 part 15, # 281 Exhibit J−190 part 16, # 282 Exhibit J−190 part 17, # 283 Exhibit J−190 part 18, # 284 Exhibit J−190 part 19, # 285 Exhibit J−190 part 20) # 286 Exhibit J−191 part 1, # 287 Exhibit J−191 part 2, # 288 Exhibit J−191 part 3, # 289 Exhibit J−192 part 1, # 290 Exhibit J−192 part 2, # 291 Exhibit J−192 part 3, # 292 Exhibit J−192 part 4, # 293 Exhibit J−193 part 1, # 294 Exhibit J −193 part 2, # 295 Exhibit J−193 part 3, # 296 Exhibit J−193 part 4, # 297 Exhibit J−193 part 5, # 298 Exhibit J−194, # 299 Exhibit J−195, # 300 Exhibit J−196, # 301 Exhibit J−197, # 302 Exhibit J−199, # 303 Exhibit J−200) # 304 Exhibit J−201 part 1, # 305 Exhibit J−201 part 2, # 306 Exhibit J−201 part 3, # 307 Exhibit J−201 part 4, # 308 Exhibit J−201 part 5, # 309 Exhibit J−202 part 1, # 310 Exhibit J−202 part 2, # 311 Exhibit J−202 part 3, # 312 Exhibit J−203 part 1, # 313 Exhibit J−203 part 2, # 314 Exhibit J−203 part 3, # 315 Exhibit J−204 part 1, # 316 Exhibit J − 204 part 2, # 317 Exhibit J−205.1, # 318 Exhibit J−205 part 2, # 319 Exhibit J−206 part 1, # 320 Exhibit J−206 part 2, # 321 Exhibit J−206 part 3, # 322 Exhibit J−206 part 4, # 323 Exhibit J−207 part 1, # 324 Exhibit J−207 part 2, # 325 Exhibit J−208, # 326 Exhibit J−209) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/15/2016: # 327 Exhibit J−210 part 1, # 328 Exhibit J−210 part 2, # 329 Exhibit J−210 part 3, # 330 Exhibit J−210 part 4, # 331 Exhibit J−210 part 5, # 332 Exhibit J−210 part 6, # 333 Exhibit J−210 part 7, # 334 Exhibit J−210 part 8, # 335 Exhibit J−210 part 9, # 336 Exhibit J−210 part 10, # 337 Exhibit J−211 part 1, # 338 Exhibit J−211 part 2, # 339 Exhibit J−212, # 340 Exhibit J−213, # 341 Exhibit J−214 part 1, # 342 Exhibit J−214 part 2, # 343 Exhibit J−214 part 3, # 344 Exhibit J−214 part 4, # 345 Exhibit J−214 part 5, # 346 Exhibit J−215 part 1, # 347 Exhibit J−215 part 2, # 348 Exhibit J−215 part 3, # 349 Exhibit J−215 part 4, # 350 Exhibit J−215

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 218 of 408
part 5, # 351 Exhibit J−215 part 6, # 352 Exhibit J−215 part 7, # 353 Exhibit J−215 part 8, # 354 Exhibit J−215 part 9, # 355 Exhibit J−215 part 10, # 356 Exhibit J−215 part 11, # 357 Exhibit J−215 part 12, # 358 Exhibit J−215 part 13, # 359 Exhibit J−215 part 14, # 360 Exhibit J−215 part 15, # 361 Exhibit J−215 part 16, # 362 Exhibit J−215 part 17, # 363 Exhibit J−215 part 18, # 364 Exhibit J−215 part 19, # 365 Exhibit J−215 part 20, # 366 Exhibit J−215 part 21, # 367 Exhibit J−215 part 22, # 368 Exhibit J−215 part 23, # 369 Exhibit J−216 part 1, # 370 Exhibit J−216 part 2, # 371 Exhibit J−216 part 3, # 372 Exhibit J−216 part 4, # 373 Exhibit J−217, # 374 Exhibit J−218 part 1, # 375 Exhibit J−218 part 2, # 376 Exhibit J−218 part 3, # 377 Exhibit J−219 part 1, # 378 Exhibit J−219 part 2, # 379 Exhibit J−219 part 3, # 380 Exhibit J−219 part 4, # 381 Exhibit J−219 part 5, # 382 Exhibit J−219 part 6, # 384 Exhibit J−220) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 385 Exhibit J−221, # 386 Exhibit J−222 part 1, # 387 Exhibit J−222 part 2, # 388 Exhibit J−222 part 3, # 389 Exhibit J−222 part 4, # 390 Exhibit J−222 part 5, # 391 Exhibit J−222 part 6, # 392 Exhibit J−222 part 7, # 393 Exhibit J−222 part 8, # 394 Exhibit J−222 part 9, # 395 Exhibit J−222 part 10, # 396 Exhibit J−222 part 11, # 397 Exhibit J−222 part 12, # 398 Exhibit J−222 part 13, # 399 Exhibit J−222 part 14, # 400 Exhibit J−222 part 15, # 401 Exhibit J−222 part 16, # 402 Exhibit J−222 part 17, # 403 Exhibit J−223 part 1, # 404 Exhibit J−223 part 2, # 405 Exhibit J−223 part 3, # 406 Exhibit J−223 part 4, # 407 Exhibit J−223 part 5, # 408 Exhibit J−223 part 6, # 409 Exhibit J−223 part 7, # 410 Exhibit J−223 part 8, # 411 Exhibit J−224, # 412 Exhibit J−225 part 1, # 413 Exhibit J−225 part 2, # 414 Exhibit J−225 part 3, # 415 Exhibit J−225 part 4, # 416 Exhibit J−225 part 5, # 417 Exhibit J−225 part 6, # 418 Exhibit J−225 part 7, # 419 Exhibit J−225 part 8, # 420 Exhibit J−225 part 9, # 421 Exhibit J−225 part 10, # 422 Exhibit J−225 part 11, # 423 Exhibit J−226, # 424 Exhibit J−227, # 425 Exhibit J−228, # 426 Exhibit J−229, # 427 Exhibit J−230) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 428 Exhibit J−231 part l, # 429 Exhibit J−231 part 2, # 430 Exhibit J−231 part 3, # 431 Exhibit J−231 part 4, # 432 Exhibit J−231 part 5, # 433 Exhibit J−231 part 6, # 434 Exhibit J−231 part 7, # 435 Exhibit J−231 part 8, # 436 Exhibit J−231 part 9, # 437 Exhibit J−231 part l0, # 438 Exhibit J−231 part 11, # 439 Exhibit J−231 part 12, # 440 Exhibit J−231 part 13, # 441 Exhibit J−231 part 14, # 442 Exhibit J−232 part 1, # 443 Exhibit J−232 part 2, # 444 Exhibit J−232 part 3, # 445 Exhibit J−232 part 4, # 446 Exhibit J−232 part 5, # 447 Exhibit J−232 part 6, # 448 Exhibit J−232 part 7, # 449 Exhibit J−232 part 8, # 450 Exhibit J−232 part 9, # 451 Exhibit J−232 part 10, # 452 Exhibit J−232 part 11, # 453 Exhibit J−232 part 12, # 454 Exhibit J−232 part 13, # 455 Exhibit J−232 part 14, # 456 Exhibit J−233 part 1, # 457 Exhibit J−233 part 2, # 458 Exhibit J−234 part 1, # 459 Exhibit J−234 part 2, # 460 Exhibit J−234 part 3, # 461 Exhibit J−234 part 4, # 462 Exhibit J−234 part 5, # 463 Exhibit J−234 part 6, # 464 Exhibit J−234 part 7, # 465 Exhibit J−234 part 8, # 466 Exhibit J−235 part 1, # 467 Exhibit J−235 part 2, # 468 Exhibit J−235 part 3, # 469 Exhibit J−235 part 4, # 470 Exhibit J−236 part 1, # 471 Exhibit J−236 part 2, # 472 Exhibit J−236 part 3, # 473 Exhibit J−237 part 1, # 474 Exhibit J−237 part 2, # 475 Exhibit J−237 part 3, # 476 Exhibit J−237 part 4, # 477 Exhibit J−237 part 5, # 478 Exhibit J−237 part 6, # 479 Exhibit J−237 part 7, # 480 Exhibit J−237 part 8, # 481 Exhibit J−237 part 9, # 482 Exhibit J−238, # 483 Exhibit J−239, # 484 Exhibit J−240) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 485 Exhibit J−241, # 486 Exhibit J−242 part 1, # 487 Exhibit J−242 part 2, # 488 Exhibit J−242 part 3, # 489 Exhibit J−242 part 4, # 490 Exhibit J−243, # 491 Exhibit J−244 part 1, # 492 Exhibit J−244 part 2, # 493 Exhibit J−244 part 3, # 494 Exhibit J−244 part 4, # 495 Exhibit J−244 part 5, # 496 Exhibit J−244 part 6, # 497 Exhibit J−244 part 7, # 498 Exhibit J−244 part 8, # 499 Exhibit J−244 part 9, # 500 Exhibit J−244 part 10, # 501 Exhibit J−244 part 11, # 502 Exhibit J−244 part 12, # 503 Exhibit J−244 part 13, # 504 Exhibit J−244 part 14, # 505 Exhibit J−244 part 15, # 506 Exhibit J−244 part 16, # 507 Exhibit J−244 part 17, # 508 Exhibit J−244 part 18, # 509 Exhibit J−244 part 19, # 510 Exhibit J−244 part 20, # 511 Exhibit J−245, # 512 Exhibit J−246, # 513 Exhibit J−247 part 1, # 514 Exhibit J−247 part 2, # 515 Exhibit J−248, # 516 Exhibit J−249, # 517 Exhibit J−250) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 518 Exhibit J−251, # 519 Exhibit J−252 part 1, # 520 Exhibit J−252 part 2, # 521 Exhibit J−252 part 3, # 522 Exhibit J−252 part 4, # 523 Exhibit J−252 part 5, # 524 Exhibit J−252 part 6, # 525 Exhibit J−252 part 7, # 526 Exhibit J−252 part 8, # 527 Exhibit J−253 part 1, # 528 Exhibit J−253 part 2, # 529 Exhibit J−253 part 3, # 530 Exhibit J−253 part 4, # 531 Exhibit J−253 part 5, # 532 Exhibit J−253 part 6, # 533 Exhibit J−253 part 7, # 534 Errata J−254, # 535 Exhibit J−255, # 536 Exhibit J−256, # 537 Exhibit J−257 part 1, # 538 Exhibit J−257

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 219 of 408
part 2, # 539 Exhibit J−257 part 3, # 540 Exhibit J−258, # 541 Exhibit J−259 part 1, # 542 Exhibit J−259 part 2, # 543 Exhibit J−260) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 544 Exhibit J−261, # 545 Exhibit J−262, # 547 Exhibit J−263 part 1, # 548 Exhibit J−263 part 2, # 549 Exhibit J−263 part 3, # 550 Exhibit J−263 part 4, # 551 Exhibit J−263 part 5, # 552 Exhibit J−263 part 6, # 553 Exhibit J−263 part 7, # 554 Exhibit J−263 part 8, # 555 Exhibit J−263 part 9, # 557 Exhibit J−263 part 10, # 558 Exhibit J−264 part 1, # 559 Exhibit J−264 part 2, # 560 Exhibit J−264 part 3, # 561 Exhibit J−264 part 4, # 562 Exhibit J−264 part 5, # 563 Exhibit J−264 part 6, # 564 Exhibit J−264 part 7, # 565 Exhibit J−264 part 8, # 566 Exhibit J−264 part 9, # 567 Exhibit J−264 part 10, # 568 Exhibit J−265 part 1, # 569 Exhibit J−265 part 2, # 570 Exhibit J−265 part 3, # 571 Exhibit J−265 part 4, # 572 Exhibit J−265 part 5, # 573 Exhibit J−265 part 6, # 574 Exhibit J−265 part 7, # 575 Exhibit J−265 part 8, # 576 Exhibit J−265 part 9, # 577 Exhibit J−265 part 10, # 578 Exhibit J−265 part 11, # 579 Exhibit J−265 part 12, # 580 Exhibit J−265 part 13, # 581 Exhibit J−265 part 14, # 582 Exhibit J−265 part 15, # 583 Exhibit J−266, # 584 Exhibit J−267 part 1, # 585 Exhibit J−267 part 2, # 586 Exhibit J−267 part 3, # 587 Exhibit J−267 part 4, # 588 Exhibit J−268 part 1, # 589 Exhibit J−268 part 2, # 590 Exhibit J−268 part 3, # 591 Exhibit J−268 part 4, # 592 Exhibit J−268 part 5, # 593 Exhibit J−269 part 1, # 594 Exhibit J−269 part 2, # 595 Exhibit J−270) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 596 Exhibit J−271, # 597 Exhibit J−272 part 1, # 598 Exhibit J−272 part 2, # 599 Exhibit J−272 part 3, # 600 Exhibit J−272 part 4, # 601 Exhibit J−272 part 5, # 602 Exhibit J−272 part 6, # 603 Exhibit J−273, # 604 Exhibit J−274 part 1, # 605 Exhibit J−274 part 2, # 606 Exhibit J−274 part 3, # 607 Exhibit J−274 part 4, # 608 Exhibit J−274 part 5, # 609 Exhibit J−274 part 6, # 610 Exhibit J−274 part 7, # 611 Exhibit J−275, # 612 Exhibit J−276, # 613 Exhibit J−277 part 1, # 614 Exhibit J−277 part 2, # 615 Exhibit J−278 part 1, # 616 Exhibit J−278 part 2, # 617 Exhibit J−278 part 3, # 618 Exhibit J−278 part 4, # 619 Exhibit J−278 part 5, # 620 Exhibit J−278 part 6, # 621 Exhibit J−278 part 7, # 622 Exhibit J−278 part 8, # 623 Exhibit J−278 part 9, # 624 Exhibit J−279, # 625 Exhibit J−280) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 626 Exhibit J−281, # 627 Exhibit J−282, # 628 Exhibit J−283, # 629 Exhibit J−284, # 630 Exhibit J−285, # 631 Exhibit J−286, # 632 Exhibit J−287, # 633 Exhibit J−288, # 634 Exhibit J−289, # 635 Exhibit J−290, # 636 Exhibit J−291, # 637 Exhibit J−292, # 638 Exhibit J−293, # 639 Exhibit J−294, # 640 Exhibit J−295, # 641 Exhibit J−296, # 642 Exhibit J−297, # 643 Exhibit J−298, # 644 Exhibit J−299, # 645 Exhibit J−300, # 646 Exhibit J−301, # 647 Exhibit J−302, # 648 Exhibit J−303, # 649 Exhibit J−304, # 650 Exhibit J−305, # 651 Exhibit J−306, # 652 Exhibit J−307, # 653 Exhibit J−308, # 654 Exhibit J−309, # 655 Exhibit J−310, # 656 Exhibit J−311, # 657 Exhibit J−312, # 658 Exhibit J−313, # 659 Exhibit J−314, # 660 Exhibit J−315, # 661 Exhibit J−316, # 662 Exhibit J−317, # 663 Exhibit J−318, # 664 Exhibit J−319, # 665 Exhibit J−320) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 666 Exhibit J−321, # 667 Exhibit J−322, # 668 Exhibit J−323, # 669 Exhibit J−324, # 670 Exhibit J−325, # 671 Exhibit J−326, # 672 Exhibit J−327, # 673 Exhibit J−328, # 674 Exhibit J−329, # 675 Exhibit J−330, # 676 Exhibit J−331, # 677 Exhibit J−332, # 678 Exhibit J−333, # 679 Exhibit J−334 part 1, # 680 Exhibit J−334 part 2, # 681 Exhibit J−334 part 3, # 682 Exhibit J−335 part 1, # 683 Exhibit J−335 part 2, # 684 Exhibit J−335 part 3, # 685 Exhibit J−336 part 1, # 686 Exhibit J−336 part 2, # 687 Exhibit J−337 part 1, # 688 Exhibit J−337 part 2, # 689 Exhibit J−338 part 1, # 690 Exhibit J−338 part 2, # 691 Exhibit J−338 part 3, # 692 Exhibit J−338 part 4, # 693 Exhibit J−339, # 695 Exhibit J−340 part 1, # 696 Exhibit J−340 part 2, # 697 Exhibit J−340 part 3) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 698 Exhibit J−341 part 1, # 699 Exhibit J−341 part 2, # 700 Exhibit J−341 part 3, # 701 Exhibit J−342, # 702 Exhibit J−343, # 703 Exhibit J−344 part 1, # 704 Exhibit J−344 part 2, # 705 Exhibit J−344 part 3, # 706 Exhibit J−345 part 1, # 707 Exhibit J−345 part 2, # 708 Exhibit J−346 part 1, # 709 Exhibit J−346 part 2, # 710 Exhibit J−346 part 3, # 711 Exhibit J−347 part 1, # 712 Exhibit J−347 part 2, # 713 Exhibit J−347 part 3, # 714 Exhibit J−348 part 1, # 715 Exhibit J−348 part 2, # 716 Exhibit J−348 part 3, # 717 Exhibit J−348 part 4, # 718 Exhibit J−349 part 1, # 719 Exhibit J−349 part 2, # 720 Exhibit J−349 part 3, # 721 Exhibit J−350 part 1, # 722 Exhibit J−350 part 2, # 723 Exhibit J−350 part 3, # 724 Exhibit J−350 part 4, # 725 Exhibit J−350 part 5) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 726 Exhibit J−351, # 727 Exhibit J−352, # 728 Exhibit J−353, # 729 Exhibit J−354, # 730 Exhibit J−355, # 731 Exhibit J−356, # 732 Exhibit J−357, # 733 Exhibit J−358, # 734 Exhibit J−359, # 735 Exhibit J−360, # 736 Exhibit J−361, # 737 Exhibit J−362, # 738 Exhibit J−363, # 739 Exhibit J−364, # 740 Exhibit J−365, # 741 Exhibit J−366, #

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 220 of 408
742 Exhibit J−367, # 743 Exhibit J−368, # 744 Exhibit J−369, # 745 Exhibit J−370) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 746 Exhibit J−371, # 747 Exhibit J−372, # 748 Exhibit J−373, # 749 Exhibit J−374, # 750 Exhibit J−375, # 751 Exhibit J−376 part 1, # 752 Exhibit J−376 part 2, # 753 Exhibit J−376 part 3, # 754 Exhibit J−376 part 4, # 755 Exhibit J−376 part 5, # 756 Exhibit J−376 part 6, # 757 Exhibit J−376 part 7, # 758 Exhibit J−376 part 8, # 759 Exhibit J−376 part 9, # 760 Exhibit J−377 part 1, # 761 Exhibit J−377 part 2, # 762 Exhibit J−377 part 3, # 763 Exhibit J−377 part 4, # 764 Exhibit J−377 part 5, # 765 Exhibit J−377 part 6, # 766 Exhibit J−377 part 7, # 767 Exhibit J−378, # 768 Exhibit J−379 part 1, # 769 Exhibit J−379 part 2, # 770 Exhibit J−380) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 771 Exhibit J−381 part 1, # 772 Exhibit J−381 part 2, # 773 Exhibit J−381 part 3, # 774 Exhibit J−381 part 4, # 775 Exhibit J−381 part 5, # 776 Exhibit J−381 part 6, # 777 Exhibit J−381 part 7, # 778 Exhibit J−381 part 8, # 779 Errata J−381 part 9, # 780 Exhibit J−381 part 10, # 781 Exhibit J−381 part 11, # 782 Exhibit J−381 part 12, # 783 Exhibit J−381 part 13, # 784 Exhibit J−381 part 14, # 785 Exhibit J−381 part 15, # 786 Exhibit J−381 part 16, # 787 Exhibit J−381 part 17, # 788 Exhibit J−381 part 18, # 789 Exhibit J−382, # 790 Exhibit J−383 part 1, # 791 Exhibit J−383 part 2, # 792 Exhibit J−384, # 793 Exhibit J−385, # 794 Exhibit J−386, # 795 Exhibit J−387 part 1, # 796 Exhibit J−387 part 2, # 797 Exhibit J−387 part 3, # 798 Exhibit J−387 part 4, # 799 Exhibit J−387 part 5, # 800 Exhibit J−387 part 6, # 801 Exhibit J−387 part 7, # 802 Exhibit J−387 part 8, # 803 Exhibit J−387 part 9, # 804 Exhibit J−387 part 10, # 805 Exhibit J−387 part 11, # 806 Exhibit J−387 part 12, # 807 Exhibit J−387 part 13, # 808 Exhibit J−387 part 14, # 809 Exhibit J−387 part 15, # 810 Exhibit J−387 part 16, # 811 Exhibit J−387 part 17, # 812 Exhibit J−387 part 18, # 813 Exhibit J−387 part 19, # 814 Exhibit J−387 part 20, # 815 Exhibit J−388 part 1, # 816 Exhibit J−388 part 2, # 817 Exhibit J−388 part 3, # 818 Exhibit J−389, # 819 Exhibit J−390 part 1, # 820 Exhibit J−390 part 2, # 821 Exhibit J−390 part 3, # 822 Exhibit J−390 part 4) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 823 Exhibit J−391, # 824 Exhibit J−392 part 1, # 825 Exhibit J−392 part 2, # 826 Exhibit J−392 part 3, # 827 Exhibit J−392 part 4, # 828 Exhibit J−392 part 5, # 829 Exhibit J−392 part 6, # 830 Exhibit J−392 part 7, # 831 Exhibit J−393 part 1, # 832 Exhibit J−393 part 2, # 833 Exhibit J−394, # 834 Exhibit J−395, # 835 Exhibit J−396 part 1, # 836 Exhibit J−396 part 2, # 837 Exhibit J−397, # 838 Exhibit J−398 part 1, # 839 Exhibit J−398 part 2, # 840 Exhibit J−398 part 3, # 841 Exhibit J−399 part 1, # 842 Exhibit J−399 part 2, # 843 Exhibit J−399 part 3, # 844 Exhibit J−399 part 4, # 845 Exhibit J−399 part 5, # 846 Exhibit J−399 part 6, # 847 Exhibit J−399 part 7, # 848 Exhibit J−399 part 8, # 849 Exhibit J−399 part 9, # 850 Exhibit J−399 part 10, # 851 Exhibit J−399 part 11, # 852 Exhibit J−400) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 853 Exhibit J−401, # 854 Exhibit J−402 part 1, # 855 Exhibit J−402 part 2, # 856 Exhibit J−403, # 857 Exhibit J−404 part 1, # 858 Exhibit J−404 part 2, # 859 Exhibit J−404 part 3, # 860 Exhibit J−404 part 4, # 861 Exhibit J−405, # 862 Exhibit J−406 part 1, # 863 Exhibit J−406 part 2, # 864 Exhibit J−407 part 1, # 865 Exhibit J−407 part 2, # 866 Exhibit J−407 part 3, # 867 Exhibit J−407 part 4, # 868 Exhibit J−407 part 5, # 869 Exhibit J−407 part 6, # 870 Exhibit J−407 part 7, # 871 Exhibit J−408, # 872 Exhibit J−409, # 873 Exhibit J−410 part 1, # 874 Exhibit J−410 part 2, # 875 Exhibit J−410 part 3, # 876 Exhibit J−410 part 4, # 877 Exhibit J−410 part 5) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 878 Exhibit J−411, # 879 Exhibit J−412, # 880 Exhibit J−413 part 1, # 881 Exhibit J−413 part 2, # 882 Exhibit J−413 part 3, # 883 Exhibit J−413 part 4, # 884 Exhibit J−414 part 1, # 885 Exhibit J−414 part 2, # 886 Exhibit J−414 part 3, # 887 Exhibit J−414 part 4, # 888 Exhibit J−414 part 5, # 889 Exhibit J−414 part 6, # 890 Exhibit J−414 part 7, # 891 Exhibit J−414 part 8, # 892 Exhibit J−414 part 9, # 893 Exhibit J−414 part 10, # 894 Exhibit J−414 part 11, # 895 Exhibit J−414 part 12, # 896 Exhibit J−415 part 1, # 897 Exhibit J−415 part 2, # 898 Exhibit J−416, # 899 Exhibit J−417 part 1, # 900 Exhibit J−417 part 2, # 901 Exhibit J−418, # 903 Exhibit J−419, # 904 Exhibit J−420) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 905 Exhibit J−421, # 906 Exhibit J−422 part 1, # 907 Exhibit J−422 part 2, # 908 Exhibit J−422 part 3, # 909 Exhibit J−423, # 910 Exhibit J−424, # 911 Exhibit J−425 part 1, # 912 Exhibit J−425 part 2, # 913 Exhibit J−426, # 914 Exhibit J−427, # 915 Exhibit J−428, # 916 Exhibit J−429 part 1, # 917 Exhibit J−429 part 2, # 918 Exhibit J−429 part 3, # 919 Exhibit J−430) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 920 Exhibit J−431 part 1, # 921 Exhibit J−431 part 2, # 922 Exhibit J−431 part 3, # 923 Exhibit J−431 part 4, # 924 Exhibit J−431 part 5, # 925 Exhibit J−431 part 6, # 926 Exhibit J−431 part 7, # 927 Exhibit J−431 part 8, # 928 Exhibit J−431 part 9, #

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 221 of 408
929 Exhibit J−431 part 10, # 930 Errata J−431 part 11, # 931 Exhibit J−431 part 12, # 932 Exhibit J−431 part 13, # 933 Exhibit J−431 part 14, # 934 Exhibit J−431 part 15, # 935 Exhibit J−431 part 16, # 936 Exhibit J−431 part 17, # 937 Exhibit J−431 part 18, # 938 Exhibit J−431 part 19, # 939 Exhibit J−431 part 20, # 940 Exhibit J−431 part 21, # 941 Exhibit J−431 part 22, # 942 Exhibit J−431 part 23, # 943 Exhibit J−432, # 944 Exhibit J−433 part 1, # 945 Exhibit J−433 part 2, # 946 Exhibit J−433 part 3, # 947 Exhibit J−433 part 4, # 948 Exhibit J−433 part 5, # 949 Exhibit J−433 part 6, # 950 Exhibit J−433 part 7, # 951 Exhibit J−433 part 8, # 952 Exhibit J−433 part 9, # 953 Exhibit J−433 part 10, # 954 Exhibit J−433 part 11, # 955 Exhibit J−433 part 12, # 956 Exhibit J−433 part 13, # 957 Exhibit J−433 part 14, # 958 Exhibit J−433 part 15, # 959 Errata J−433 part 16, # 960 Exhibit J−434 part 1, # 961 Exhibit J−434 part 2, # 962 Exhibit J−434 part 3, # 963 Exhibit J−434 part 4, # 964 Exhibit J−434 part 5, # 965 Exhibit J−434 part 6, # 966 Exhibit J−434 part 7, # 967 Exhibit J−434 part 8, # 968 Exhibit J−434 part 9, # 969 Exhibit J−434 part 10, # 970 Exhibit J−434 part 11, # 971 Exhibit J−434 part 12, # 972 Exhibit J−434 part 13, # 973 Exhibit J−434 part 14, # 974 Exhibit J−435 part 1, # 975 Exhibit J−435 part 2, # 976 Exhibit J−436, # 977 Exhibit J−437, # 978 Exhibit J−438, # 979 Exhibit J−439 part 1, # 980 Exhibit J−439 part 2, # 981 Exhibit J−439 part 3, # 982 Exhibit J−439 part 4, # 983 Exhibit J−440 part 1, # 984 Exhibit J−440 part 2, # 985 Exhibit J−440 part 3, # 986 Exhibit J−440 part 4, # 987 Exhibit J−440 part 5) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 988 Exhibit J−441, # 989 Exhibit J−442 part 1, # 990 Exhibit J−442 part 2, # 991 Exhibit J−442 part 3, # 992 Exhibit J−443, # 993 Exhibit J−444 part 1, # 994 Exhibit J−444 part 2, # 995 Exhibit J−444 part 3, # 996 Exhibit J−445 part 1, # 997 Exhibit J−445 part 2, # 998 Exhibit J−445 part 3, # 999 Exhibit J−445 part 4, # 1000 Exhibit J−445 part 5, # 1001 Exhibit J−445 part 6, # 1002 Exhibit J−445 part 7, # 1003 Exhibit J−445 part 8, # 1004 Exhibit J−446 part 1, # 1005 Exhibit J−446 part 2, # 1006 Exhibit J−446 part 3, # 1007 Exhibit J−446 part 4, # 1008 Exhibit J−446 part 5, # 1009 Exhibit J−447 part 1, # 1010 Exhibit J−447 part 2, # 1011 Exhibit J−447 part 3, # 1012 Exhibit J−448 part 1, # 1013 Exhibit J−448 part 2, # 1014 Exhibit J−449 part 1, # 1015 Exhibit J−449 part 2, # 1016 Exhibit J−450) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 1017 Exhibit J−451, # 1018 Exhibit J−452, # 1019 Exhibit J−453, # 1020 Exhibit J−454 part 1, # 1021 Exhibit J−454 part 2, # 1022 Exhibit J−454 part 3, # 1023 Exhibit J−454 part 4, # 1024 Exhibit J−454 part 5, # 1025 Exhibit J−454 part 6, # 1026 Exhibit J−454 part 7, # 1027 Exhibit J−454 part 8, # 1028 Exhibit J−454 part 9, # 1029 Exhibit J−454 part 10, # 1030 Exhibit J−454 part 11, # 1031 Exhibit J−454 part 12, # 1032 Exhibit J−454 part 13, # 1033 Exhibit J−454 part 14, # 1034 Exhibit J−454 part 15, # 1035 Exhibit J−455, # 1036 Exhibit J−456) (war, ). (Attachment 79 replaced on 12/21/2016) (war, ). (Attachment 80 replaced on 12/21/2016) (war, ). (Attachment 80 replaced on 12/21/2016) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 1037 Exhibit J−457 Part 1, # 1038 Exhibit J−457 Part 2, # 1040 Exhibit J−457 Part 3, # 1041 Exhibit J−457 Part 4, # 1042 Exhibit J−458, # 1043 Exhibit J−459, # 1044 Exhibit J−460 Part 1, # 1045 Exhibit J−460 Part 2) (war, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 1046 Exhibit J−461, # 1047 Exhibit J−462, # 1048 Exhibit J−463, # 1049 Exhibit J−464, # 1050 Exhibit J−465, # 1051 Exhibit J−466, # 1052 Exhibit J−467 Part 1, # 1053 Exhibit J−467 Part 2, # 1054 Exhibit J−467 Part 3, # 1055 Exhibit J−468, # 1056 Exhibit J−469 Part 1, # 1057 Exhibit J−469 Part 2, # 1058 Exhibit J−469 Part 3, # 1059 Exhibit J−469 Part 4, # 1060 Exhibit J−469 Part 5, # 1061 Exhibit J−469 Part 6, # 1062 Exhibit J−469 Part 7, # 1063 Exhibit J−469 Part 8, # 1064 Exhibit J−469 Part 9, # 1065 Errata J−469 Part 10, # 1066 Exhibit J−469 Part 11, # 1067 Exhibit J−469 Part 12, # 1068 Exhibit J−470) (war, ). Modified on 1/31/2017 to withdraw J−458 and J−462 by plaintiffs on 1/30 oral request (ag, ). (Entered: 12/06/2016)
12/06/2016 1039 MOTION to Quash Motion To Quash In Part Trial Subpoena Served on Defendant Jefferson Dunn by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
12/06/2016 1040 MOTION to Withdraw by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Greggs, Mitchell) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
12/06/2016 1041 TEXT ORDER granting 1040 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/6/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/06/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 222 of 408

12/06/2016 1042 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Kuffner, Christopher) (Entered: 12/06/2016)

12/06/2016 1043 TEXT ORDER granting 1042 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/6/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/06/2016)

12/06/2016

*** Attorney Mitchell David Greggs terminated pursuant to the 1041 text order. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/06/2016)

12/06/2016

*** Attorney Christopher Stephen Kuffner terminated pursuant to the 1043 text order. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/06/2016)

12/06/2016

1044

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial held on 12/6/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit P−381, # 3 Exhibit P−383, # 4 Exhibit P−390, # 5 Exhibit P−564, # 6 Exhibit P−669, # 7 Exhibit P−713, # 8 Exhibit P−714, # 9 Exhibit P−715, # 10 Exhibit P−716, # 11 Exhibit P−717, # 12 Exhibit P−718, # 13 Exhibit P−719, # 14 Exhibit P−720, # 15 Exhibit P−721, # 16 Exhibit P−722, # 17 Exhibit P−723, # 18 Exhibit P−724, # 19 Exhibit P−725, # 20 Exhibit P−726, # 21 Exhibit P−727, # 22 Exhibit P−728, # 23 Exhibit P−729, # 24 Exhibit P−730, # 25 Exhibit P−731) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/06/2016)

12/07/2016

1045

PHASE 2A ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH IN PART TRIAL SUBPOENA SERVED ON DEFENDANT JEFFERSON DUNN directing that, by no later than 5:00 p.m. on 12/9/2016, plfs are to respond to defs' 1039 MOTION To Quash In Part Trial Subpoena Served on Defendant Jefferson Dunn. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/7/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 12/07/2016)

12/07/2016 1046 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Admitting Certain Categories of MHM Documents by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 12/07/2016)

12/07/2016

1047

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial CONTINUES on 12/7/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Pla Exh 367, # 3 Pla Exh 387, # 4 Pla Exh 426, # 5 Pla Exh 1110, # 6 Pla Exh 1215) (war, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/8/2016: # 7 Exhibit Pla Exh 515, # 8 Exhibit Pla Exh 413, # 9 Exhibit Pla Exh 384, # 10 Exhibit Pla Exh 1219, # 13 Exhibit Pla Exh. 1226, # 14 Exhibit Pla. Exh. 318, # 15 Exhibit Pla Exh 375) (war, ). (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016 1048 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016 1049 TEXT ORDER granting 1046 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/8/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016 1050 TEXT ORDER granting 1048 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/8/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016 1051 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Jefferson S. Dunn. (Coleman, Bryan) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016 1052 Objection to The State's Supplemental Objection to the Admission of Certain Plaintiffs' Exhibits filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Main Document 1052 replaced on 12/8/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016 1053 TEXT ORDER granting 1051 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/8/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016

*** Attorney Bryan Arthur Coleman terminated pursuant to the 1053 text order. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016 1054 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing Under Seal (Graunke, Kristi) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 223 of 408

12/08/2016 1055 PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ADMITTING CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF MHM DOCUMENTS INTO EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 801(d)(2)(C) & (D) AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULE 803(6) by All Plaintiffs (kh, ) (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/08/2016

1056

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/8/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit P−473, # 3 Exhibit p−1097, # 4 Exhibit D−2266, # 5 Exhibit D−2267) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/12/2016: # 6 Exhibit P−670 Part 1, # 7 Exhibit P−670 Part 2, # 8 Exhibit P−670 Part 3 end) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/08/2016)

12/09/2016 1057 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1039 MOTION to Quash Motion To Quash In Part Trial Subpoena Served on Defendant Jefferson Dunn filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Excerpts from Deposition of Commissioner Jefferson Dunn)(McCrary, Latasha) (Entered: 12/09/2016)

12/09/2016

1058

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/9/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit P−794, # 3 Exhibit P−796, # 4 Exhibit P−798, # 5 Exhibit P−800, # 6 Exhibit P−802, # 7 Exhibit P−803, # 8 Exhibit P−969, # 9 Exhibit P−984, # 10 Exhibit P−991, # 11 Exhibit P−992, # 12 Exhibit P−1006, # 13 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative #1, # 14 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative #2) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/12/2016: # 15 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #1, # 16 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #2, # 17 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #3, # 18 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #3−1, # 19 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #3−2, # 20 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #4, # 21 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #5, # 22 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #6, # 23 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #7, # 24 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #8, # 25 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #9) (ag, ). Modified on 12/15/2016 (ag, ). (Entered: 12/09/2016)

12/12/2016

1059

ORDER: Counsel for all parties involved in the Phase Two ADA settlement, are hereby ordered to participate in a telephone conference with the undersigned tomorrow, December 13, 2016, at 7:15 a.m. Each party is to have representative counsel on the call. General Counsel for ADOC is also a necessary participant. We will use the courts call−in number ((888) 808−6929) and passcode (5917763). The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 12/12/2016. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/12/2016)

12/12/2016 1060 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/12/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/12/2016)

12/13/2016 1061 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/13/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit D−2913) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/13/2016)

12/13/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge John E. Ott: Settlement Conference (Telephone) held on 12/13/2016 (No PDF attached). (ag, ) (Entered: 12/16/2016)

12/14/2016 1062 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Moltz, Evan) (Entered: 12/14/2016)

12/14/2016 1063 TEXT ORDER granting 1062 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/14/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/14/2016)

12/14/2016 1064 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Moltz, Evan) (Entered: 12/14/2016)

12/14/2016 1065 Updated Witness List by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/14/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 224 of 408

12/14/2016

1066

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/14/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/14/2016: # 2 Exhibit D−2912, # 3 Exhibit Defendant's Demonstrative Exhibit #3, # 4 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #4, # 5 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #5) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/15/2016: # 6 Exhibit P−592, # 7 Exhibit p−843, # 8 Exhibit P−844, # 9 Exhibit P−850, # 10 Exhibit P−856, # 11 Exhibit P−861) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/15/2016: # 12 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #13, # 13 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #14, # 14 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #15, # 15 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #16, # 16 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #17, # 17 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #18, # 18 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #19, # 19 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #20) (ag, ). Modified on 12/15/2016 (ag, ). (Entered: 12/14/2016)

12/15/2016

1067

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/15/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #1, # 3 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #2, # 4 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #3, # 5 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #4, # 6 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #5, # 7 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #6, # 8 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #7, # 9 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #8) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2016: # 10 Exhibit P−795, # 11 Exhibit P−799, # 12 Exhibit P−805, # 13 Exhibit P−966, # 14 Exhibit P−968, # 15 Exhibit P−970, # 16 Exhibit P−974, # 17 Exhibit P−981, # 18 Exhibit P−982, # 19 Exhibit P−988, # 20 Exhibit P−994) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2016: # 21 Exhibit P−1005) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/15/2016)

12/16/2016

1068

ORDER: Counsel for all parties involved in the Phase Two ADA settlement are hereby ordered to participate in a Settlement conference on Friday, December 23, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. in the chambers of Honorable Judge John E. Ott at the Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse in Birmingham, Alabama. The deadline for reporting to District Judge Myron H. Thompson on the status of the Phase Two ADA settlement is continued generally. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 12/16/2016. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. Copies served upon counsel as directed.(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/16/2016)

12/16/2016

1069

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial held on 12/16/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #23, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #24, # 4 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative #9) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2016: # 5 Exhibit P−689) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/20/2016: # 6 Exhibit P−681−1, # 7 Exhibit P−681−2, # 8 Exhibit P−681−3, # 9 Exhibit P−681−4, # 10 Exhibit P−681−5, # 11 Exhibit P−681−6, # 12 Exhibit P−681−7, # 13 Exhibit P−681−8, # 14 Exhibit P−681−9, # 15 Exhibit P−681−10, # 16 Exhibit P−681−11, # 17 Exhibit P−681−12, # 18 Exhibit P−681−13, # 19 Exhibit P−681−14, # 20 Exhibit P−681−15) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/16/2016)

12/19/2016

1070

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial held on 12/19/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/20/2016: # 2 Exhibit D−2914) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/20/2016: # 3 Exhibit P−105, # 4 Exhibit P−114, # 5 Exhibit P−115, # 6 Exhibit P−116, # 7 Exhibit P−532, # 8 Exhibit P−1190, # 9 Exhibit P−1191) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/19/2016)

12/20/2016

1071

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/20/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2016: # 2 Exhibit P−1244, # 3 Exhibit P−1245, # 4 Exhibit P−1246, # 5 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #25) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/20/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 225 of 408

12/21/2016 1072 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Graunke, Kristi) (Entered: 12/21/2016)

12/21/2016 1073 TEXT ORDER granting 1072 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/21/2016. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/21/2016)

12/21/2016

1074

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/21/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 2 Exhibit P−149, # 3 Exhibit P−325, # 4 Exhibit P−366, # 5 Exhibit P−379, # 6 Exhibit P−386, # 7 Exhibit P−394, # 8 Exhibit P−399, # 9 Exhibit P−405, # 10 Exhibit P−408, # 11 Exhibit P−413) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 12 Exhibit Defendant's Demonstrative #10, # 13 Exhibit Defendant's Demonstrative Exhibit #11) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 14 Exhibit P−1247, # 15 Exhibit P−1248) (ag, ). Modified on 12/22/2016 (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 16 Exhibit P−1228, # 17 Exhibit P−555, # 18 Exhibit P−550, # 19 Exhibit P−549) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 20 Exhibit P−96) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 21 Exhibit P−531) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 22 Exhibit P−316) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 23 Exhibit P−397) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 24 Exhibit P−418) (ag, ). Modified on 12/22/2016 (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/22/2016: # 25 Exhibit P−421, # 26 Exhibit P−436, # 27 Exhibit P−522) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/21/2016)

12/22/2016 1075 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− NCCHC Essential Standard, # 2 Exhibit 2−under seal)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced on 12/22/2016) (kh, ). (Entered: 12/22/2016)

12/22/2016

1076

ORDER: Counsel for all parties involved in the Phase Two ADA settlement are hereby notified that the mediation set for Friday, December 23, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. has been reset to take place in the Ceremonial Courtroom and Chambers at the Frank M. Johnson, Jr. United States Courthouse in Montgomery, Alabama. Absent further order of the undersigned, all counsel involved in the disputes surrounding the proper handling and treatment of suicidal inmates are to be present for mediation on Friday, December 23, 2016, at noon in the foregoing location. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 12/22/2016. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)

12/22/2016 1077 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)

12/22/2016

1078

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 12/22/2016 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit D−2915, # 3 Exhibit D−2916) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/27/2016: # 4 Exhibit P−121, # 5 Exhibit P−124) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/22/2016)

12/23/2016 1079 ORDERED that defendants shall file a response to plaintiffs' emergency motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (doc. no. 1075 ) on or before 5:00 p.m. on January 4, 2016. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/23/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/23/2016)

12/27/2016 1080 ORDER directing that the Phase 2A trial will resume on 1/4/2017, at 8:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/27/16. Furnished to calendar group, AG & WR.(djy, ) (Entered: 12/27/2016)

12/27/2016 1081 ORDER directing that the deadline for defs to file a response to plf's 1075 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Orderor Preliminary Injunction is reset from 1/4/2017 to 1/9/2017 @ 5:00 p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/27/16. (djy, ) (Entered: 12/27/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 226 of 408

12/28/2016

1082

ORDER directing that all counsel involved in the disputes surrounding the proper handling and treatment of suicidal inmates are to appear at a Settlement Conference on 1/3/2017 @ 09:00 AM before Honorable Judge John E. Ott, in Courtroom 2F, FMJ US Courthouse, Montgomery, AL; directing the clerk to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 12/28/16. Furnished to calendar group, AG & WR.(djy, ) (Entered: 12/28/2016)

01/03/2017

1083

PHASE 2A TRIAL START TIME ORDER: It is ORDERED that the trial of Phase 2A of this case will henceforth begin each day the court is in session at 8:00 a.m., unless the court specifies a different start time for any particular day. Counsel are to be present and seated no later than 7:45 a.m. each day. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/3/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/03/2017)

01/03/2017 1084 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Non−Attorney Staff Revised Technology Request (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 01/03/2017)

01/04/2017

1085

PHASE 2A MLK DAY ORDER: Because the trial of Phase 2A of this case is moving more slowly than expected, it is ORDERED that trial will be held on January 16, 2017−−the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.−−unless the court indicates otherwise between now and then. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/4/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/04/2017)

01/04/2017 1086 ORDERED that plaintiffs' revised non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1084 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/4/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/04/2017)

01/04/2017

1087

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/4/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/5/2017: # 2 Exhibit P−139, # 3 Exhibit P−146, # 4 Exhibit P−176, # 5 Exhibit P−182, # 6 Exhibit P−185) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/5/2017: # 7 Exhibit P−194, # 8 Exhibit P−204, # 9 Exhibit P−223, # 10 Exhibit P−229, # 11 Exhibit P−235, # 12 Exhibit P−239, # 13 Exhibit P−240, # 14 Exhibit P−282, # 15 Exhibit P−295, # 16 Exhibit P−296, # 17 Exhibit P−454, # 18 Exhibit P−585, # 19 Exhibit P−612, # 20 Exhibit P−616, # 21 Exhibit P−636, # 22 Exhibit P−648, # 23 Exhibit P−1126, # 24 Exhibit P−1129, # 25 Exhibit P−1131, # 26 Exhibit P−1182) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/5/2017: # 27 Exhibit D−2598) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/5/2017: # 28 Exhibit P193−1 Part 1, # 29 Exhibit P−193−1 Part2, # 30 Exhibit P−193−1 Part3, # 31 Exhibit P−193−1 Part4, # 32 Exhibit P−193−1 Part5, # 33 Exhibit P−193−1 Part6, # 34 Exhibit P−193−1 Part7, # 35 Exhibit P−193−1 Part8, # 36 Exhibit P−193−1 Part9, # 37 Exhibit P−193−1 Part10, # 38 Exhibit P−193−1 Part11, # 39 Exhibit P−193−1 Part12, # 40 Exhibit P−193−1 Part13, # 41 Exhibit P−193−1 Part14, # 42 Exhibit P−193−1 Part15, # 43 Exhibit P−193−1 Part16, # 44 Exhibit P−193−1 Part17, # 45 Exhibit P−193−1 Part18, # 46 Exhibit P−193−1 Part19, # 47 Exhibit P−193−1 Part20, # 48 Exhibit P−193−1 Part21, # 49 Exhibit :−193−1 Part22, # 50 Exhibit P−193−1 Part23, # 51 Exhibit P−193−1 Part24, # 52 Exhibit P−193−1 Part25, # 53 Exhibit P−193−1 Part26, # 54 Exhibit P−193−1 Part27, # 55 Exhibit P−193−1 Part28, # 56 Exhibit P−193−1 Part29, # 57 Exhibit P−193−1 Part30, # 58 Exhibit P−193−1 Part31, # 59 Exhibit P−193−1 Part32, # 60 Exhibit P−193−1 Part33, # 61 Exhibit P−193−1 Part34, # 62 Exhibit P−193−1 Part35, # 63 Exhibit P−193−1 Part36, # 64 Exhibit P−193−1 Part37, # 65 Exhibit P−193−1 Part38, # 66 Exhibit P−193−1 Part39, # 67 Exhibit P−193−1 Part40, # 68 Exhibit P−193−1 Part41, # 69 Exhibit P−193−1 Part42, # 70 Exhibit P−193−1 Part43, # 71 Exhibit P−193−1 Part44, # 72 Exhibit P−193−1 Part45, # 73 Exhibit P−193−1 Part46, # 74 Exhibit P−193−1 Part47, # 75 Exhibit P−193−1 Part48, # 76 Exhibit P−193−1 Part49, # 77 Exhibit P−193−1 Part50, # 78 Exhibit P−193−1 Part51, # 79 Exhibit P−193−1 Part52, # 80 Exhibit P−193−1 Part53, # 81 Exhibit P−193−1 Part54, # 82 Exhibit P−193−1 Part55, # 83 Exhibit P−193−1 Part56, # 84 Exhibit P−193−1 Part57, # 85 Exhibit P−193−1 Part58, # 86 Exhibit P−193−1 Part59, # 87 Exhibit P−193−1 Part60, # 88 Exhibit P−193−1 Part61, # 89 Exhibit P−193−1 Part62, # 90 Exhibit P−193−1 Part63, # 91 Exhibit P−193−1 Part64, # 92 Exhibit P−193−1 Part65, # 93 Exhibit P−193−1 Part66, # 94 Exhibit P−193−1 Part67, # 95 Exhibit P−193−1 Part68, # 96 Exhibit P−193−1 Part69, # 97 Exhibit P−193−1 Part70, # 98 Exhibit P−193−1 Part71, # 99 Exhibit P−193−1 Part72, # 100 Exhibit P−193−1 Part73, # 101 Exhibit P−193−1 Part74, # 102 Exhibit P−193−1 Part75, # 103 Exhibit P−193−1 Part76, # 104 Exhibit P−193−1 Part77, # 105 Exhibit P−193−1 Part78, #

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 227 of 408

106 Exhibit P−193−1 Part79, # 107 Exhibit P−193−1 Part80, # 108 Exhibit P−193−1 Part81, # 109 Exhibit P−193−1 Part82, # 110 Exhibit P−193−1 Part83, # 111 Exhibit P−193−1 Part84, # 112 Exhibit P−193−1 Part85, # 113 Exhibit P−193−1 Part86, # 114 Exhibit P−193−1 Part87, # 115 Exhibit P−193−1 Part88, # 116 Exhibit P−193−1 Part89, # 117 Exhibit P−193−1 Part90, # 118 Exhibit P−193−1 Part91, # 119 Exhibit P−193−1 Part92, # 120 Exhibit P−193−1 Part93, # 121 Exhibit P−193−1 Part94, # 122 Exhibit P−193−1 Part95, # 123 Exhibit P−193−1 Part96, # 124 Exhibit P−193−1 Part97, # 125 Exhibit P−193−1 Part98, # 126 Exhibit P−193−1 Part99, # 127 Exhibit P−193−1 Part100, # 128 Exhibit P−193−1 Part101, # 129 Exhibit P−193−1 Part02, # 130 Exhibit P−193−1 Part103, # 131 Exhibit P−193−1 Part104, # 132 Exhibit P−193−1 Part105, # 133 Exhibit P−193−1 Part106, # 134 Exhibit P−193−1 Part107, # 135 Exhibit P−193−1 Part108, # 136 Exhibit P−193−1 Part109, # 137 Exhibit P−193−1 Part110, # 138 Exhibit P−193−1 Part111, # 139 Exhibit P−193−1 Part112, # 140 Exhibit P−193−1 Part113, # 141 Exhibit P−193−1 part114, # 142 Exhibit P−193−1 Part115, # 143 Exhibit P−193−1 Part116, # 144 Exhibit P−193−1 Part117, # 145 Exhibit P−1193−1 Part118, # 146 Exhibit P−193−1 Part119, # 147 Exhibit P−193−1 Part120, # 148 Exhibit P−193−1 Part121, # 149 Exhibit P−193−1 Part122, # 150 Exhibit P−193−1 Part123, # 151 Exhibit P−193−1 Part124) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/04/2017)

01/05/2017 1088 MOTION To Sequester Members of the Class Who are Not Named Plaintiffs from the Courtroom Unless they are Appearing to Testify by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 01/05/2017)

01/05/2017

1089

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/5/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/6/2017: # 2 Exhibit P−214) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/6/2017: # 3 Exhibit P−225, # 4 Exhibit P−227, # 5 Exhibit P−243, # 6 Exhibit P−251, # 7 Exhibit P−719, # 8 Exhibit P−1252, # 9 Exhibit P−1253, # 10 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #12, # 11 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #13) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/9/2017: # 12 Exhibit P−135) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/05/2017)

01/05/2017 1090 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 1/6/2017 11:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/5/2017. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/05/2017)

01/05/2017 1091 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1088 MOTION To Sequester Members of the Class Who are Not Named Plaintiffs from the Courtroom Unless they are Appearing to Testify filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/05/2017)

01/06/2017 1092 TRIAL BRIEF on Standing to Assert Peer Review Privilege by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Shah, Mitesh) (Entered: 01/06/2017)

01/06/2017

***Attorney Jaqueline Aranda Osorno for All Plaintiffs added. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/06/2017)

01/06/2017 1093 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition TO DEFENDANTS ASSERTION OF THE PURPORTED CQI PRIVILEGE AND IN SUPPORT OF ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CQI DOCUMENTS filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/06/2017)

01/06/2017 1094 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/6/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/06/2017)

01/09/2017

1095

PHASE 2A ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SEQUESTER: Based on the representations made during a telephone conference held on the record on January 6, 2017, it is ORDERED that defendants' motion to sequester members of the class who are not named plaintiffs from the courtroom unless they are appearing to testify (doc. no. 1088 ) is granted to the extent stated during that telephone conference. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/9/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/09/2017)

01/09/2017 1096 PHASE 2A SATURDAY TRIAL ORDER: Because the trial of Phase 2A of this case is moving more slowly than expected, it is ORDERED that trial will be held on Saturday, January 14, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/9/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/09/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 228 of 408

01/09/2017

1097

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/9/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/10/2017: # 2 Exhibit P−220, # 3 Exhibit P−944, # 4 Exhibit P−950, # 5 Exhibit P−958, # 6 Exhibit P−959, # 7 Exhibit P−1110, # 8 Exhibit P−1131, # 9 Exhibit P−1255−1, # 10 Exhibit P−1255−2, # 11 Exhibit P−1255−3, # 12 Exhibit P−1255−4, # 14 Exhibit P−1256−1, # 15 Exhibit P−1256−2, # 16 Exhibit P−1256−3, # 17 Exhibit P−1256−4, # 18 Exhibit P−1259, # 19 Exhibit P−1260) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/10/2017: # 20 Exhibit P−1257, # 21 Exhibit P−1258, # 22 Exhibit Joint Demonstrative Exhibit 1, # 23 Exhibit Joint Demostrative Exhibit 2, # 24 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #26, # 25 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #27, # 26 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #28, # 27 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #29, # 28 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #30, # 29 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #31, # 30 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #32, # 31 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #33) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/09/2017)

01/10/2017 1098 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support The State's Submission Regarding Ex Parte Young filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/10/2017)

01/10/2017

1099

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/10/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/11/2017: # 2 Exhibit Defendant's Demonstrative #14) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/11/2017: # 3 Exhibit Defendant's Demonstrative #15, # 4 Exhibit D−2917) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/11/2017: # 5 Exhibit P−422, # 7 Exhibit P−521, # 8 Exhibit P−1264 Part 1, # 9 Exhibit P−1264 − Part 2) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/12/2017: # 10 Exhibit P−1247) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/10/2017)

01/11/2017 1100 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Joint Settlement Agreement Concerning Mental Health Claims Arising Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Smith, John) (Entered: 01/11/2017)

01/11/2017 1101 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/11/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/11/2017)

01/12/2017

1102

PHASE 2A INTERIM RELIEF ORDER REGARDING SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES: The parties having agreed in open court on January 12, 2017, to the attached "Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures" and to when the agreement will terminate, it is ORDERED that defendants shall comply with the agreement until the court enters a final order in Phase 2A of this case, as further set out. Accordingly, it is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs' oral motion to withdraw, made in open court on January 12, 2017, is granted and that the plaintiffs' emergency motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (doc. no. 1075 ) is withdrawn without prejudice. The parties agree that the agreement is only an interim measure and does constitute a final resolution of any of the issues currently before the court. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/12/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/12/2017)

01/12/2017 1103 ORAL MOTION to Withdraw 1075 TRO by All Plaintiffs. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/12/2017)

01/12/2017 1104 ORAL ORDER granting 1103 Motion to Withdraw 1075 M/TRO. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/12/2017. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/12/2017)

01/12/2017

1105

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/12/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/13/2017: # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #34, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #36, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #39, # 5 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #40, # 6 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #41, # 7 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #42, # 8

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 229 of 408

Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #43, # 9 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #46, # 10 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #47, # 11 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #48, # 12 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #49, # 13 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #51, # 14 Exhibit Pllaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #52) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/13/2017: # 15 Exhibit P−331, # 16 P−444, # 17 Exhibit P−1261) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/12/2017)

01/13/2017

1106

AMENDED PHASE 2A INTERIM RELIEF ORDER REGARDING SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES: The parties having agree in open court on 1/12/2017, to the attached "Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures" and to when the agreement will terminate, it is ORDERED that defendants shall comply with the agreement until the court enters a final order in Phase 2A of this case. Furthermore, the agreement states: "The above−referenced terms and conditions reflect a voluntary interim agreement reached by the parties in this action and, in exchange for the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Plaintiffs will move towithdraw the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order without prejudice and expressly reserving the right to re−file and/or seek additional relief at any point in the future. Accordingly, it is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs oral motion to withdraw, made in open court on 1/12/2017, is granted and that the plaintiffs emergency motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (doc. no. 1075 ) is withdrawn without prejudice. The parties agree that the agreement is only an interim measure and does not constitute a finalresolution of any of the issues currently before the court. It is further ORDERED that the courts previous Phase 2 Interim Relief Order Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures (doc. no. 1102 ) is vacated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/13/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures)(dmn, ) (Entered: 01/13/2017)

01/13/2017

1107

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/13/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/14/2017: # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #35, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #37, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #38, # 5 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #44) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/17/2017: # 6 Exhibit P−122, # 7 Exhibit P−351, # 8 Exhibit P−1105) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/17/2017: # 9 Exhibit P−485, # 10 Exhibit P−507, # 11 Exhibit P−533, # 12 Exhibit P−538, # 13 Exhibit P−563, # 14 Exhibit P−567, # 15 Exhibit P−569, # 16 Exhibit P−681−Part 1, # 17 Exhibit P−681−Part 2, # 18 Exhibit P−681−Part 3, # 19 Exhibit P−681−Part 4, # 20 Exhibit P−681−Part 5, # 21 Exhibit P−681−Part 6, # 22 Exhibit P−681− Part 7, # 23 Exhibit P−681−Part 8, # 24 Exhibit P−681− Part 9, # 25 Exhibit P−681− Part 10, # 26 Exhibit P−681− part 11, # 27 Exhibit P−681−Part 12) (ag, ). Modified on 1/31/2017 (ag, ). (Entered: 01/13/2017)

01/14/2017

1108

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/14/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #16, # 3 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #17, # 4 Exhibit D−2918) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/17/2017: # 5 Exhibit P−485, # 6 Exhibit P−507, # 7 Exhibit P−533, # 8 Exhibit P−538, # 9 Exhibit P−563, # 10 Exhibit P−567, # 11 Exhibit P−569, # 12 Exhibit P−681−Part 1, # 13 Exhibit P−681−Part 2, # 14 Exhibit P−681−Part 3, # 15 Exhibit P−681−Part 4, # 16 Exhibit P−681−Part 5, # 17 Exhibit P−681−Part 6, # 18 Exhibit P−681− Part 7, # 19 Exhibit P−681−Part 8, # 20 Exhibit P−681− Part 9, # 21 Exhibit P−681− Part 10, # 22 Exhibit P−681− part 11, # 23 Exhibit P−681−Part 12, # 24 Exhibit P−681−Part 13, # 25 Exhibit P−681− Part 14, # 26 Exhibit P−681− Part 15, # 27 Exhibit P−1041, # 28 Exhibit P−1051, # 29 Exhibit P−1052, # 30 Exhibit P−1054, # 31 Exhibit P−1056, # 32 Exhibit P−1057, # 33 Exhibit P−1063, # 34 Exhibit P−1066, # 35 Exhibit P−1074, # 36 Exhibit P−1076, # 37 Exhibit P−1260) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/18/2017: # 38 Exhibit P−1267, # 39 Exhibit P−1268) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/14/2017)

01/15/2017 1109 MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Graunke, Kristi) (Entered: 01/15/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 230 of 408

01/16/2017 1110 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing Under Seal (Graunke, Kristi) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/16/2017 1111 REPLY BRIEF re 1098 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support Regarding Ex parte Young filed by All Plaintiffs. (Brownstein, Rhonda) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/16/2017

1112

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/16/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/17/2017: # 2 Exhibit P−292, # 3 Exhibit P−294, # 4 Exhibit P−314, # 5 Exhibit P−333, # 6 Exhibit P−382, # 7 Exhibit P−392, # 8 Exhibit P−396, # 9 Exhibit P−453, # 10 Exhibit P−454, # 11 Exhibit P−469, # 12 Exhibit P−474, # 13 Exhibit P−493, # 14 Exhibit P−496, # 15 Exhibit P−507, # 16 Exhibit P−509, # 17 Exhibit P−513, # 18 Exhibit P−518, # 19 Exhibit P−529, # 20 Exhibit P−536, # 21 Exhibit P−544, # 22 Exhibit P−545, # 23 Exhibit P−551, # 24 Exhibit P−562, # 25 Exhibit P−568, # 26 Exhibit P−576, # 27 Exhibit P−644−Part 1, # 28 Exhibit P−644 Part 2, # 29 Exhibit P−644 Part 3, # 30 Exhibit P−644 Part 4, # 31 Exhibit P−644 Part 5, # 32 Exhibit P−644 Part 6, # 33 Exhibit P−644 Part 7, # 34 Exhibit P−644 − Part 8, # 35 Exhibit P−644− Part 9, # 36 Exhibit P−644− Part 10, # 37 Exhibit P−644−Part 11) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/17/2017: # 38 Exhibit P−481) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/16/2017 1118 PLAINTIFFS' JOINT TRIAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF QUANG BUI'S AND PLAINTIFF ADAP'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS RELATED TO INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/18/2017)

01/17/2017 1113 TEXT ORDER granting 1109 Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/17/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017 1114 ORDERED that defendant Jefferson Dunn's motion to quash in part the subpoena issued to him by plaintiffs (doc. no. 1039 ) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth in open court during trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/17/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017

1115

PHASE 2A ORDER ON FILING OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN CAMERA UNDER SEAL: ORDERED that the clerk of the court is to place under seal, with access restricted to only court officials, the documents submitted to the court for in camera review in connection with the testimony of defendant Jefferson S. Dunn. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/17/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017

1117

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/17/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/18/2017: # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #25) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/18/2017: # 4 Exhibit P−135 − Part 1, # 5 Exhibit P−135− Part 2, # 6 Exhibit P−173− Part 1, # 7 Exhibit P−173− Part 2, # 8 Exhibit P−135− Part 3, # 9 Exhibit P−222, # 10 Exhibit P−375, # 11 Exhibit P−387, # 12 Exhibit P−388, # 13 Exhibit P−399, # 14 Exhibit P−439, # 15 Exhibit P−442, # 16 Exhibit P−445, # 17 Exhibit P−446, # 18 Exhibit P−463, # 19 Exhibit P−511, # 20 Exhibit P−560, # 21 Exhibit P−713, # 22 Exhibit P−715, # 23 Exhibit P−723, # 24 Exhibit P−1224, # 25 Exhibit P−1246) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/18/2017: # 26 Exhibit P−316) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/18/2017 1119 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/18/2017)

01/18/2017 1120 TEXT ORDER granting 1119 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/18/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/18/2017)

01/18/2017

1121

REPLY BRIEF re 1118 Trial Brief The State's Response to Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Brief in Support of Plaintiff Quang Bui's and Plaintiff ADAP's Substantive Due Process Claims Related to Involuntary Medication filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/19/2017: # 1 SEALED RESPONSE) (djy, ). (Entered: 01/18/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 231 of 408

01/18/2017

1122

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/18/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/20/2017: # 2 Exhibit P−1269) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/20/2017: # 3 Exhibit P−420, # 4 Exhibit P−431, # 5 Exhibit P−675 corrected, # 6 Exhibit P−1215) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/18/2017)

01/19/2017 1123 Joint MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order [Proposed] Temporary Restraining Order)(Smith, John) (Entered: 01/19/2017)

01/19/2017

1124

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER REGARDING SETTLEMENT OF PHASE 2A MENTAL HEALTH ADA CLAIMS: ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the Court that the parties' 1123 Joint MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order is granted, as further set out in order; further ORDERING, by the agreement of the parties as expressed in open court on 1/19/2017, that this temporary restraining order will remain in effect until the court finally approves or rejects the parties' Settlement Agreement concerning mental health claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/19/17. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/19/2017)

01/19/2017

1125

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/19/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/20/2017: # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #13, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #44, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #55, # 5 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #69, # 6 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #90, # 7 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #91, # 8 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #133, # 9 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #134, # 10 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #135) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/20/2017: # 11 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #1, # 12 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #46, # 13 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #47, # 14 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #48, # 15 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #51, # 16 Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #52, # 17 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #57, # 18 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #58, # 19 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #59, # 20 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #60, # 21 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #61, # 22 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #62, # 23 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #63, # 24 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #64, # 25 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #65, # 26 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #66, # 27 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #67, # 28 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #68, # 29 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #70, # 30 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #71, # 31 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #72, # 32 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #73, # 33 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #74, # 34 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #75, # 35 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #77, # 36 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #78, # 37 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #79, # 38 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #80, # 39 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #81, # 40 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #82, # 41 Exhibit Plaintiff Demonstrative #83, # 42 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #84, # 43 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #85, # 44 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #86, # 45 Exhibit P−Demo #87, # 46 Exhibit P−Demo #88, # 47 Exhibit P − Demo #89, # 48 Exhibit P−Demo #92, # 49 Exhibit P − Demo #93, # 50 Exhibit P− Demo #94, # 51 Exhibit P − Demo #95, # 52 Exhibit P− Demo #96, # 53 Exhibit P − Demo #97, # 54 Exhibit P − Demo #98, # 55 Exhibit P − Demo #99, # 56 Exhibit P− Demo #100, # 57 Exhibit P − Demo #101, # 58 Exhibit P − Demo #102, # 59 Exhibit P − Demo #104, # 60 Exhibit P − Demo #105, # 61 Exhibit P −Demo #106, # 62 Exhibit P − Demo #107, # 63 Exhibit P − Demo #108, # 64 Exhibit P − Demo #109, # 65 Exhibit P − Demo #110, # 66 Exhibit P − Demo #111, # 67 Exhibit P − Demo #112, # 68 Exhibit P − Demo #113, # 69 Exhibit P − Demo #114, # 70 Exhibit P − Demo #115, # 71 Exhibit P − Demo #116, # 72 Exhibit P − Demo #118, # 73 Exhibit P − Demo #119, # 74 Exhibit P − Demo #120, # 75 Exhibit p− Demo #122, # 76 Exhibit P− Demo #123, # 77 Exhibit P − Demo #124, # 78 Exhibit P − Demo #125, # 79 Exhibit P − Demo #126, # 80 Exhibit P − Demo #129, # 81 Exhibit P − Demo #130) (ag, ). Modified on 1/31/2017 (ag, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 1/31/2017) (ag, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 1/31/2017) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/20/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 232 of 408

01/20/2017

1126

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/20/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/23/2017: # 2 Exhibit P−1271, # 3 Exhibit P−1272) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/23/2017: # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #138, # 5 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #139, # 6 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #76, # 7 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #103, # 8 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #127, # 9 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #128, # 10 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demostrative Exhibit #131, # 11 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstative Exhibit #137) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/23/2017: # 12 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #130) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/13/2017: # 13 Exhibit P−1271 Part 1, # 14 Exhibit P−1271 Part 2, # 15 Exhibit P−1271 Part 3, # 16 Exhibit P−1271 Part 4, # 17 Exhibit P−1271 Part 5, # 18 Exhibit P−1271 Part 6, # 19 Exhibit P−1271 Part 7, # 20 Exhibit P−1271 Part 8, # 21 Exhibit P−1271 Part 9) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/20/2017)

01/23/2017

1127

PHASE 2A ORDER ON HEARING ON PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF ADA MENTAL HEALTH SETTLEMENT: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) A hearing on whether the court should preliminarily approve the Phase 2A class settlement agreement concerning mental health claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (doc. no. 1100 ) is set for hearing on February 16, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) By February 12, 2017, the parties are to submit their proposed logistical procedures and forms for giving notice to and receiving comments from putative class members. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/23/2017. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

01/23/2017

1128

PHASE 2A RESUMPTION OF TRIAL ORDER: It is ORDERED that the Phase 2A trial shall resume on January 30, 2017, at 8:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/23/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

01/23/2017

1129

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON ADAP'S ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING AND EXHAUSTION: it is ORDERED that the court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: (1) ADAP has associational standing to bring the Phase 2A claims in this case. (2) The court finds that ADAP attempted to resolve informally the issues identified in the letter it sent to defendants prior to initiating this lawsuit, but it determined that its individual and systemic claims would not be resolved within a reasonable time, given the fact that there was not "a meeting of the minds about how both sides might work together to achieve a resolution." Tucker Depo. (doc. no. 754 −1) at 175. Although the statute does not require that a system's determination to this effect be reasonable, the court further finds that ADAP's determination was indeed reasonable. ADAP therefore complied with the exhaustion requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. 10807(a). (3) Furthermore, ADAP need not have complied with this requirement, as it was exempt pursuant to 10807(b), which allows the immediate filing,without any attempt at exhaustion, of "any legal action instituted to prevent or eliminate imminent serious harm to a mentally ill individual." The court finds that ADAP initiated this lawsuit in order to challenge a number of policies and practices that ADAP contended created a grave risk of severe harm to mentally ill prisoners on a daily basis, including deficiencies in crisis care such as permitting access by suicidal prisoners to razors. (4) ADAP could not have as a factual matter, and need not have as a legal matter, exhausted the grievance process purportedly provided by ADOC's mental health contractor to prisoners, even had this process been available within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/23/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

01/23/2017 1130 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Key of Initials Used in the Phase 2A Trial by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

01/23/2017 1131 TEXT ORDER granting 1130 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Key of Initials Used in the Phase 2A Trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/23/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 233 of 408

01/23/2017 1132 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 1/24/2017 10:00 AM in telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/23/2017. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

01/23/2017 1137 PLAINTIFFS' KEY OF INITIALS USED IN PHASE 2A TRIAL by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/23/2017

Set Hearings: Status Conference set for 2/16/2017; 10:00 AM, in 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson pursuant to the 1127 order. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2017)

01/24/2017 1133 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/24/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/24/2017)

01/25/2017 1134 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal: Chart Summarizing Evidence Presented by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/25/2017 1135 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing Plaintiffs' Key of Initials Used in Phase 2A Trial Under Seal (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/25/2017 1136 TEXT ORDER granting 1134 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal: Chart Summarizing Evidence Presented. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/25/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/25/2017

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 1/26/2017 10:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/25/2017 1138 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Of Filing Sealed Document: Plaintiffs' Chart Summarizing Evidence Presented (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/25/2017 1140 Plaintiffs' Chart Summarizing Evidence Presented by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017 1139 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Status Conference held on 1/26/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (jct, ) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/27/2017 1141 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Joint Submission Regarding the State's Hearsay Objections (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/27/2017)

01/30/2017 1142 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/30/2017 1143 ORAL MOTION for Judgment on Partial Findings by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/30/2017 1144 ORAL ORDER denying 1143 Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings without prejudice. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/2017. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/30/2017

1145

PHASE 2A ORDER on defendants' may−call list, For the reasons stated in open court on January 30,2017, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs 958 objections to defendants may−call witness list is overruled as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/17. (djy, ) Modified on 1/30/2017 to correct typographical error in text (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/30/2017 1147 ORDER DENYING without prejudice 1142 MOTION for Judgment on partial findings, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/17. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/30/2017

1148

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial continues on 1/30/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 2 Exhibit P−142) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 3 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #18) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 4 Exhibit D−2919, # 5 Exhibit D−2920, # 6 Exhibit D−2921, # 7 Exhibit D−2922, # 8 Exhibit D−2923, # 9 Exhibit D−2924, # 10 Exhibit D−2925, # 11 Exhibit D−2926, # 12 Exhibit D−2927, # 13 Exhibit D−2928, # 14 Exhibit D−2929, # 15 Exhibit D−2930, # 16 Exhibit

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 234 of 408

D−2931, # 17 Exhibit D−2932) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 18 Exhibit P−168, # 19 Exhibit P−325, # 20 Exhibit P−806, # 21 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #2, # 22 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #3, # 23 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #3−1, # 24 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #3−2, # 25 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #4, # 26 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #5, # 27 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #6, # 28 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #7, # 29 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #8, # 30 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #9, # 31 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #10, # 32 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #11, # 33 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #11−1, # 34 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #11−2, # 35 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #11−3, # 36 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #12, # 37 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #16, # 38 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #21, # 39 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #22, # 40 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #23, # 41 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #24, # 42 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #26, # 43 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #27, # 44 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #28, # 45 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #29, # 46 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #30, # 47 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #31, # 48 Exhibit Plaintiff Demonstrative #34, # 49 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #35, # 50 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #36, # 51 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #37, # 52 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative #38, # 53 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demo Exhibit #45, # 54 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demo Exhibit #49, # 55 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demo Exhibit #50, # 56 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demo Exhibit #54, # 57 Exhibit Plaintiff Demo Exhibit #132, # 58 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demo Exhibit #136, # 59 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demo Exhibit #140) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 60 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #19) (ag, ). Modified on 1/31/2017 (ag, ). (Attachment 54 replaced on 1/31/2017) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2017: # 61 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #2) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/31/2017

1149

PHASE 2A HEARSAY OPINION AND ORDER: ORDERED as follows: defendants' hearsay objections to MHM Correctional Services, Inc.'s meeting minutes, employee emails, incident reports, and audit documents are overruled. To the extent that these documents contain hearsay within hearsay, the court finds that statements made by employees of MHM Correctional Services, Inc., Corizon, and the Alabama Department of Corrections are admissible under the business−records exception, because they were acting in the regular course of business when reporting to the recorders of that information. The court further finds statements made by prisoners reported in these documents are, based on the request of plaintiffs, admitted at this time for only the purpose of establishing notice−−that is, that the prisoners made these statements and that those who participated in the meetings, email communications, incident reports, and audit documents (and those privy to the resulting documents) were aware of them. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/31/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/31/2017)

01/31/2017 1150 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 01/31/2017)

01/31/2017 1151 TEXT ORDER granting 1150 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/31/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/31/2017)

01/31/2017 1152 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial held on 1/31/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/1/2017: # 2 Exhibit D−2933) (ag, ). (Entered: 01/31/2017)

02/01/2017 1154 Renewed ORAL MOTION for Judgment of Partial Findings by defendants by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/01/2017)

02/01/2017 1155 ORAL ORDER denying 1154 Renewed Motion ORAL MOTION for Judgment of Partial Findings by defendants. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/1/2017. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/01/2017)

02/01/2017 1156 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial held on 2/1/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #141, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #142, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 235 of 408

Demonstrative Exhibit #142−1) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/6/2017: # 5 Exhibit P−1258 Parti 1, # 6 Exhibit P−1280 Part 2) (ag, ). (Entered: 02/01/2017)

02/02/2017

1158

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Non−Jury Trial completed on 2/2/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants Demo Exhibit #20) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/2/2017: # 2 Exhibit Defendants Demonstrative Exhibit #21) (ag, ). (Main Document 1158 replaced on 2/6/2017) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/13/2017: # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #143) (ag, ). (Entered: 02/02/2017)

02/02/2017

1161

PHASE 2A ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on February 2, 2017, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs shall submit to the court by February 9, 2017, any remaining contentions regarding alleged noncompliance with the Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures (doc. no. 1102 −1) at the O dorm of Kilby Correctional Facility. If no filing on this issue is submitted by February 9, 2017, the court will consider this issue waived. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2017)

02/02/2017 1162 PHASE 2A ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on February 2, 2017, it is ORDERED that defendants are allowed until February 9, 2017, to submit a summary chart of their evidence if they so desire. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2017)

02/03/2017

1164

PHASE 2A NOTICE REGARDING DUE PROCESS CLAIMS: The court still views the due process claims as needing swift resolution. They should not be put on the back burner. If they have merit, the inmate class and ADAP need relief as soon as possible. Therefore, "time is still of the essence" in the parties' mediation of these claims. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/3/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/03/2017)

02/09/2017 1165 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Facilities Site Visits held on 2/9/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/09/2017 1166 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew the Temporary Restraining Order Regarding Suicide Prevention Procedures by All Plaintiffs. (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/09/2017 1167 TEXT ORDER granting 1166 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew the Temporary Restraining Order Regarding Suicide Prevention Procedures. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/9/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/09/2017 1168 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Evans, Jenelle) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/09/2017 1169 TEXT ORDER granting 1168 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/9/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/09/2017

*** Attorney Jenelle Rae Evans terminated pursuant to the court's 1169 order. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/09/2017

1170

MOTION To exclude Defendants' Demonstrative Exhibit 19 and related testimony, or alternatively to permit Plaintiffs to supplement the record with responsive testimony from their security expert Eldon Vail by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Plaintiffs' Fourth Request for Production of Documents, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of Eldon Vail, # 3 Exhibit B−1 − Staffing ratio article)(McCrary, Latasha). Added an alternative motion to permit supplementation of the record on 2/14/2017 pursuant to the court's 1184 Phase 2A Order (kh, ). (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/09/2017

1171

Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew the Temporary Restraining Order Regarding Suicide Prevention Procedures by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/10/2017 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/10/2017: # 1 Exhibit 1−Filed Under Seal, # 2 Exhibit 2−Filed Under Seal, # 3 Exhibit 3−Filed Under Seal, # 4 Exhibit 4−Filed Under Seal, # 5 Exhibit 5−Filed Under Seal, # 6 Exhibit 6−Filed Under Seal) (kh, ). (Entered: 02/09/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 236 of 408

02/09/2017

1172

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Facilities Tour (St. Clair Correctional Facility) held on 2/10/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/13/2017: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit #143) (ag, ). (Entered: 02/10/2017)

02/09/2017 1173 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs re 1171 Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew the Temporary Restraining Order Regarding Suicide Prevention Procedures(kh, ) (Entered: 02/10/2017)

02/10/2017

1174

ORDER: All counsel involved in the disputes leading to the recent filing of the motion for a temporary restraining order regarding acute suicide risks are ORDERED to appear at a settlement conference at 1:15 p.m. on Monday, February 13, 2017, in the jury room on the Third Floor at the Hugo L. Black Federal Courthouse in Birmingham, Alabama. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 2/10/2017. (furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/10/2017)

02/10/2017

1175

Joint MOTION for Settlement (for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement Concerning Mental Health Claims Arising Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabiliation Act of 1973 by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Proposed Notice of Settlement, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Response Form)(Smith, John) (Entered: 02/10/2017)

02/10/2017 1176 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Facilities Site Visit held on 2/10/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/13/2017)

02/13/2017

1177

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RUTH NAGLICH VOLUME 1 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/16/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/15/2017. (kh, ) . (Entered: 02/13/2017)

02/13/2017

1178

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RUTH NAGLICH VOLUME 2 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/19/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/15/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/13/2017)

02/13/2017

1179

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RUTH NAGLICH VOLUME 3 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/20/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/15/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/13/2017)

02/13/2017 1180 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RUTH NAGLICH VOLUME 4 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/21/2016,

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 237 of 408

before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/15/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/13/2017)

02/13/2017

1181

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RUTH NAGLICH VOLUME 5 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/22/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/15/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/13/2017)

02/14/2017 1182 TEX ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 2/14/2017 11:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2017. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017 1183 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/14/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017

1184

PHASE 2A ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on February 14, 2017, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' motion to exclude evidence (doc. no. 1170 ) is treated as both a motion to exclude evidence and an alternative motion to permit supplementation of the record. (2) The motion to exclude evidence (doc. no. 1170 ) is denied. (3) By 5:00 p.m. on February 16, 2017, defendants are to file a response to the alternative motion to permit supplementation of the record (doc. no. 1170 ). (4) Pending resolution of the alternative motion to permit supplementation (doc. no. 1170 ), Chief Deputy Clerk Trey Granger is to proceed with immediate arrangements for the evidence to be received by videoconferencing should the court grant said motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2017. (kh, ). (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/15/2017 1185 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Michael L. Edwards) by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Edwards, Michael) (Entered: 02/15/2017)

02/15/2017 1186 TEXT ORDER granting 1185 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney (Michael L. Edwards). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/15/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2017)

02/15/2017

*** Attorney Michael Leon Edwards terminated pursuant to the court 1186 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2017)

02/16/2017 1187 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 2/16/2017 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 02/16/2017)

02/16/2017 1188 STIPULATION re 1171 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order (Renewed) by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/16/2017)

02/16/2017 1189 TEXT ORDER granting 1187 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2017)

02/16/2017 1190 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Hearing on Preliminary Approval of ADA Mental Health Settlement held on 2/16/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/16/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 238 of 408

02/16/2017

1191

RESPONSE to Motion re 1170 MOTION To exclude Defendants' Demonstrative Exhibit 19 and related testimony, or alternatively to permit Plaintiffs to supplement the record with responsive testimony from their security expert Eldon Vail MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − ADOC's Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' 4th RPD)(Corhern, Steven) (Entered: 02/16/2017)

02/16/2017 1192 MOTION to Supplement the Record by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/16/2017)

02/16/2017 1193 JOINT STATUS REPORT by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/17/2017)

02/17/2017

1194

PHASE 2A ORDER: Upon consideration of the parties' stipulation of monitoring procedures for suicide prevention protocols (doc. no. 1188 ), it is ORDERED that the stipulation is set for hearing on February 21, 2017, at 10:30 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/17/2016. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/17/2017)

02/17/2017

1195

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' alternative motion to supplement the trial record (doc. no. 1170 ) is granted. (2) A hearing for supplemental oral argument and possibly supplemental testimony from expert Eldon Vail is set for February 21, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (3) Plaintiffs, with the help of the clerk of the court, are to arrange for the testimony by videoconferencing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/17/2017. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/17/2017)

02/17/2017

1196

PHASE 2 OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE: It is ORDERED that: (1) Defendants' first motion to strike (doc. no. 751 ) is denied. (2) The court reaffirms its order (doc. no. 909 ) denying defendants' second motion to strike (doc. no. 809 ) and granting leave to depose the challenged declarants, with the following clarification: defendants will not recover any fees or expenses from plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, and plaintiffs will not be allowed to recover attorneys fees and expenses (that they would otherwise be entitled to under the fee−shifting statutes should they prevail) in connection with the litigation of defendants second motion to strike (doc. no. 809 ) and with the taking of the challenged declarants' depositions. (3) The court reaffirms its orders (doc. nos. 845 & 909 ) denying plaintiffs motion to strike (doc. no. 838 ), but with prejudice, and with the following clarification: plaintiffs are granted leave to depose Darryl Ellis, the Director of Nursing at Staton Correctional Facility, at a time to be determined in the future. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/17/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/17/2017)

02/20/2017 1197 Joint MOTION for Settlement [Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement Concerning Mental Health Claims Arising Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973] by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/20/2017)

02/21/2017

1198

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing and Oral Argument held on 2/21/2017 re 1170 MOTION To exclude Defendants' Demonstrative Exhibit 19 and related testimony, or alternatively to permit Plaintiffs to supplement the record with responsive testimony from their security expert Eldon Vail MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by All Plaintiffs (PDF available for court use only), Oral Argument (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/21/2017)

02/21/2017

Proposed Pretrial Order sent to court Regarding Stipulation Resolving Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order by All Plaintiffs (NO PDF Document attached to this entry). (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/21/2017)

02/22/2017 1199 PHASE 2A ORDER: ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record (doc. no. 1192 ) is denied without prejudice. It is time that the Phase 2A litigation on liability come to an end and that the issues be resolved reasonably soon. The additional evidence plaintiffs seek is not sufficiently important to justify more delay.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 239 of 408

Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/22/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/22/2017

1200

PHASE 2A SUPPLEMENTAL INTERIM RELIEF ORDER REGARDING SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES: Upon consideration of plaintiffs' renewed motion for a temporary restraining order (doc. no. 1171 ) and the parties' stipulation for resolution of the motion, (doc. no. 1188 ), it is ORDERED: (1) Plaintiffs' counsel will be permitted to engage in limited monitoring of the implementation of the interim agreement through unannounced site checks, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/22/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/22/2017 1201 ORDERED that plaintiffs' renewed motion for a temporary restraining order (doc. no. 1171 ) is withdrawn without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/22/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/22/2017

1202

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF TERESA HOUSER − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/14/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/27/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/22/2017

1203

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF TERESA HOUSER − VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/16/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/27/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/22/2017

1204

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF TERESA HOUSER − VOLUME III Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/17/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/27/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/22/2017

1205

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING ADA MENTAL HEALTH SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the parties jointly move the court to grant preliminary approval to their proposed ADA mental health settlement agreement in Phase 2A of this litigation; to approve the form of notice to class members of the proposed settlement agreement (attached as Exhibit A); to approve the form for objecting to or commenting on the proposed settlement agreement (attached as Exhibit B); and to approve the process for distributing these documents and collecting comments, as further set out below. It is therefore ORDERED that the joint motions for preliminary approval (doc. nos. 1175 and 1197 ) are granted as follows: 1. The proposed settlement agreement (doc. no. 1100 ) is preliminarily approved; final approval will be subject to a hearing and review by this court of any objections to or comments about the agreements terms submitted by class members, and to the courts resolution of certain outstanding issues identified in open court at a hearing held on February 16, 2017, and set for briefing below. 2. An injunctive−relief settlement class, defined as

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 240 of 408

any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections who has a disability as defined, as further set out. 3. The Southern Poverty Law Center, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlement class under Rule 23(g). 4. The Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) is to provide notice of the proposed settlement agreement as outlined below by March 6, 2017, and to collect comments from class members as further outlined below by the submission deadline of April 5, 2017, as further set out. 5. By no later than May 1, 2017, the parties are to confirm in written filings with the court the following agreement, stipulated to during a hearing held in open court on February 16, 2017: This Agreement does not represent a settlement of all potential current and future claims that prisoners may bring under the ADA or Rehabilitation Acts. 6. By no later than May 1, 2017, the parties are to file pre−hearing briefs, both summarizing by topic and responding to the objections to and comments on the proposed settlement agreement that have been submitted by class members. These briefs must include citations to the page numbers on which any referenced objections or comments appear in the docketed compilations of responses. 7. By no later than May 1, 2017, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) will file a brief concerning the reasonableness of the proposed settlement agreement, which will include one or more expert opinions addressing the adequacy of the settlement. 8. A fairness hearing is set for 10:00 a.m. on June 2, 2017, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. 9. After receiving objections and comments from class members, the court will determine from whom it intends to hear oral testimony. This testimony will be heard by videoconference from various ADOC facilities. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/22/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/27/2017

1206

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF STEVE BROWN (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/30/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/20/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/30/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/29/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/27/2017)

02/27/2017

1207

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF ELDON VAIL − VOLUME I (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/22/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/20/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/30/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/29/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/27/2017)

02/28/2017

1208

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings − EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF ELDON VAIL VOLUME II (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/4/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/21/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/31/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/29/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/01/2017)

03/03/2017 1209 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF J.W. (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/5/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 241 of 408

Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/24/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/3/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/1/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/03/2017 1210 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/03/2017 1211 JOINT STATUS REPORT by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Department of Corrections and All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/03/2017

1212

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of HEARING ON APPROVAL OF PHASE 2A SETTLEMENT Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 2/16/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/24/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/3/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/1/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/09/2017

1213

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF KATHRYN BURNS − VOLUME 1 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/12/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/30/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/10/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/7/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/09/2017)

03/14/2017 1214 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/14/2017)

03/16/2017 1215 JOINT INTERIM REPORT by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Department of Corrections and All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/21/2017 1216 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/21/2017)

03/21/2017

1217

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF KATHRYN BURNS − VOLUME 2 (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/13/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/11/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/19/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/21/2017)

03/21/2017

1218

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF ELDON VAIL − VOLUME 1 (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/22/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 242 of 408

INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/11/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/19/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/21/2017)

03/24/2017 1219 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Attachment 1 replaced on 4/4/2017) (kh, ). (Entered: 03/24/2017)

03/27/2017 1220 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Compliance with Order from Feb. 2, 2017 Conference (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/27/2017)

03/29/2017

1221

CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − FACILITIES (Attachments: # 1 Bibb, # 2 Bullock, # 3 Decatur Work Release, # 4 Draper, # 5 Easterling−received by Sees (ADOC), # 6 Easterling, # 7 Fountain, # 8 Hamilton A&I, # 9 Kilby, # 10 Limestone, # 11 Montgomery Women's Facility, # 12 St. Clair, # 13 Staton, # 14 Tutwiler)(djy, ) (Entered: 03/31/2017)

03/31/2017 1222 PARTIES' JOINT STATUS REPORT REGARDING DUE PROCESS CLAIMS by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/03/2017)

04/03/2017

1223

ORDERED that the status conference to discuss the resolution of plaintiffs' due process claims relating to involuntary and coerced medication, now set for April 4, 2017, is reset for April 11, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/3/2017. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/03/2017)

04/04/2017 1224 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/04/2017)

04/11/2017 1225 PHASE 2A ORDER: It is ORDERED that the status conference set for today at 10:00 a.m. is to be by conference call rather than in person. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/11/2017. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/11/2017)

04/11/2017 1226 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 4/11/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Main Document 1226 replaced on 4/12/2017) (ag, ). (Entered: 04/11/2017)

04/12/2017

1227

PHASE 2A STATUS CONFERENCE ORDER: ORDERED that another status conference to discuss the resolution of plaintiffs' due process claims relating to involuntary and coerced medication is set for Monday, April 25, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/12/2017. (furn: agreen, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/12/2017)

04/12/2017 1228 TEXT ORDER resetting the Phase 2A status conference from Monday, April 25, 2017, to Tuesday, April 25, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/12/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/12/2017)

04/14/2017

1229

ORDER: Counsel for MHN are to participate in a telephone conference call with the undersigned on Monday, April 17, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. Counsel and a representative for ADOC are to participate in a telephone call with the undersigned at on Monday, April 17, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. Counsel for plaintiffs that are involved in the involuntary medication settlement discussions are to be on standby from 10:00 a.m. until 11:30 a.m. should the undersigned need to bring them into the discussions with ADOC and MHN. The call−in number and passcode are the same as the court has previously used. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 4/14/2017. (furn: calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/14/2017)

04/17/2017 1230 NOTICE of Appearance by Lonnie Jason Williams on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Williams, Lonnie) (Entered: 04/17/2017)

04/17/2017 1231 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − FACILITIES (Attachments: # 1 Easterling, # 2 Tutwiler, # 3 Ventress)(kh, ) (Entered:

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 243 of 408

04/17/2017)

04/18/2017 1232 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/18/2017)

04/19/2017 1233 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/19/2017)

04/20/2017 1234 PHASE 2A ORDER: It is ORDERED that the parties are to file a joint status report on the due process claims by 5:00 p.m. on April 24, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/20/2017. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/20/2017)

04/20/2017

1235

MEDIATION ORDER: The Involuntary Medication claims are hereby SET for mediation on Monday, 4/24/2017 at 09:00 AM in chambers of the undersigned in Birmingham, Alabama before Honorable Judge John E. Ott. The General Counsel and the President of MHN and the General Counsel and the Commissioner of ADOC are required to attend in person unless excused by the undersigned. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 4/20/2017. Copies furnished to calendar group. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/20/2017)

04/21/2017

1236

AMENDED MEDIATION ORDER: Involuntary Medication Mediation is hereby RESET for Monday, 4/24/2017, at 01:00 PM, in the chambers of the undersigned, Hugo Black US Courthouse, Third Floor, 1729 Fifth Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama; DIRECTING the Clerk to serve a copy of this order upon counsel of record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 4/21/2017. (furn: calendar) (Mediation for 4/24/2017 @ 9AM reset to 1PM) (wcl, ) (Entered: 04/21/2017)

04/25/2017

1237

PHASE 2A ORDER: The court having been orally informed that the parties have reached a settlement of all the due process claims' subject to final approval by the appropriate state officials, it is ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for today is canceled and that the parties are to submit the proposed settlement to the court by no later than May 5, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/25/2017. (term: Status Conference set for 04/25/2017) (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/25/2017)

04/26/2017 1238 CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − MAILED TO COURT (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/26/2017)

04/26/2017 1239 STIPULATION re 1205 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Terminate Motions, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Concerning ADA Mental Health Settlement Agreement by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 04/26/2017)

04/27/2017 1240 NOTICE of Appearance by Caitlin J Sandley on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 04/27/2017)

05/01/2017 1241 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal (Joint Pre−hearing Brief in Support of the Phase 2 Settlement Agreement) by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/01/2017)

05/01/2017 1242 TEXT ORDER granting 1241 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/1/2017.(no pdf document attached this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/01/2017)

05/01/2017

1243

BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of Phase 2 ADA Settlement Agreement filed by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix PUBLIC VERSION Joint Prehearing Brief, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A −− Warden Affidavits re Notice Procedures, # 3 Exhibit Ex. B −− Settlement Agreement (Spanish), # 4 Exhibit Ex. C −− Settlement Agreement (Large Print), # 5 Exhibit Ex. D −− Notice (Spanish), # 6 Exhibit Ex. E −− Notice (Large Print), # 7 Exhibit Ex. F −− Comment Form (Spanish), # 8 Exhibit Ex. G −− Comment Form (Large Print), # 9 Exhibit Ex. H −− Summary of Inmate Comments (under seal))(Smith, John) (Entered: 05/01/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 244 of 408

05/01/2017

1244

BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 1100 Notice (Other), 1205 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Terminate Motions, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Babcock CV, # 2 Stone CV, # 3 Affidavit Babcock Affidavit, # 4 Affidavit Stone Affidavit)(Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 05/01/2017)

05/04/2017 1245 NOTICE of Appearance by Barbara Ann Lawrence on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Lawrence, Barbara) (Entered: 05/04/2017)

05/04/2017

1246

MEDIATION ORDER: Counsel involved in the Involuntary Medication mediation are to be in the chambers of the undersigned at 2:30 p.m. today at the Hugo L. Black U.S.Courthouse, Third Floor, 1729 Fifth Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama.The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order upon counselof record. Signed by Honorable Judge John E. Ott on 5/4/2017. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/04/2017)

05/05/2017 1247 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections of Proposed Testifying Inmates (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A −− List of Proposed Testifying Inmates)(Smith, John) (Entered: 05/05/2017)

05/05/2017

1248

Joint MOTION for Settlement and Preliminary Approval by Jefferson S. Dunn. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Settlement Agreement Concerning Involuntary Medication Claims, # 2 Exhibit B − Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement about Involuntary Medication, # 3 Exhibit C − Proposed Order Preliminarily Approving Parties' Proposed Settlement Agreement)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/05/2017)

05/08/2017

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/9/2017 02:45 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 05/08/2017)

05/09/2017 1250 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 5/9/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/09/2017)

05/10/2017 1251 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn re 1248 Joint MOTION for Settlement and Preliminary Approval (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B − Revised)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/10/2017)

05/11/2017

1252

ORDER: As part of the fairness hearing process with regard to the Phase 2A class proposed settlement concerning mental health claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, it is ORDERED that the court will hear testimony, both in person and by means of videoconference, from the designated inmates on May 18 and 19, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama.The fairness hearing set for June 2, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., remains as scheduled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/11/2017. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/11/2017)

05/11/2017

1253

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the parties jointly move the court to grant preliminary approval of their proposed Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement in Phase 2A of this litigation; to approve the form of notice to class members of the proposed settlement agreement ("notice form") (attached as Exhibit A); to approve the form for objecting to or commenting on the proposed settlement agreement ("comment form") (attached as Exhibit B); and to approve the process for providing notice and collecting comments from interested parties, as further set out. Based on the entire record before the court, the court finds as follows: First, the court finds that the proposed settlement agreement should be preliminarily approved, that notice should be provided to interested parties, and that a fairness hearing should be conducted. The court further finds it appropriate to provisionally certify a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive−relief settlement class composed of "all persons with a serious mental health disorder or illness who are now, or will in the future be subject to defendants' formal involuntary medication policies and practices." For reasons to be articulated in a final decision regarding whether to approve the settlement, the court preliminarily finds that the settlement class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a)−− numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation−−as well as the

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 245 of 408

requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) that the issues involved "apply generally to the class," such that "relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." The court preliminarily finds that plaintiffs' counsel in this case can capably serve as and should be appointed class counsel, based on the factors outlined in Rule 23(g). Finally, the court finds that the notice and comment forms attached as exhibits to this order, and that the process for distributing and collecting these forms outlined below, constitute sufficient notice of and−−together with the fairness hearing described below−−opportunity to be heard on the proposed settlement agreement, as is required by due process and Rule 23(e). It is therefore ORDERED that the joint motion for preliminary approval and notice of proposed settlement (doc. nos. 1248 ) is granted as follows, as further set out. A fairness hearing is set for 10:00 a.m. on August 23, 2017, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. At this hearing, counsel for both parties must be prepared to respond to the objections and comments made by class members, as well as to the court's concerns as outlined above, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/11/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement About Involuntary Medication, # 2 Response to Proposed Class Action Settlement)(furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/11/2017)

05/12/2017

1254

ORDER: The court having realized that it previously certified a class of inmates for the plaintiffs' involuntary−medication claims and approved counsel for the class, see Class Certification Order (doc. no. 1014 ), it is ORDERED that the references to conditional class−certification and to approval of class counsel, in the opinion and order preliminarily approving the settlement of the involuntary−medication claims (doc. no. 1253 ), are deleted as unnecessary. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/12/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/12/2017)

05/12/2017

1255

ORDER: Attached is a letter, apparently signed by eight inmates at Donaldson Correctional Facility, complaining that they and others in "segregation" have not received any notices about this litigation. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that counsel for both sides in this litigation are to look into this matter and, on or before May 26, 2017, file a joint report of their findings. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/12/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Letter)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/12/2017)

05/12/2017

1256

MOTION to Re−open Discovery for Phase 2B (Opposed) by Sheila Allen, Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Quang Bui, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Sylvester Hartley, Charlie Henderson, Christopher Jackson, Brandon Johnson, John Maner, Rick Martin, Willie McClendon, Roger McCoy, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Matthew Mork, Roger Moseley, Leviticus Pruitt, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Brian Sellers, Augustus Smith, William Sullivan, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner, Robert Myniasha Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpt of Deposition of Dr. Hugh Hood, 3/10/16)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/12/2017)

05/15/2017 1257 MOTION for Leave to File Response to the Courts Phase 2A Notice and Order on Commenters to Testify at Fairness Hearing by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/15/2017)

05/15/2017 1258 TEXT ORDER granting 1257 Motion for Leave to File Response to the Courts Phase 2A Notice and Order on Commenters to Testify at Fairness Hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/15/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/15/2017)

05/15/2017 1259 RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S PHASE 2A NOTICE AND ORDER ON COMMENTERS TO TESTIFY AT FAIRNESS HEARING by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/16/2017)

05/16/2017 1260 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections and All Plaintiffs of filing of Witness Matrix for Fairness Hearing on Phase 2A ADA Settlement Agreement (Smith, John) Modified on 5/16/2017 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 05/16/2017)

05/18/2017 1261 ORDER Setting oral argument re: 1256 MOTION to Re−open Discovery for Phase 2B on 6/26/2017 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the FMJ US Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL; defendants are to file a Response by 6/12/2017; plfs may file a Reply by 6/19/2017, as further set

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 246 of 408

out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/18/17. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)

05/18/2017 1262 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 5/18/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)

05/19/2017 1263 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 5/19/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/19/2017)

05/24/2017

Set Hearings: Fairness hearing set for 6/2/2017, at 10:00 AM in 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (previously cleared in error − no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/24/2017)

05/25/2017 1264 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs. (Smith, John) Modified on 5/26/2017 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. (kh, ). (Entered: 05/25/2017)

05/26/2017 1265 TEXT ORDER granting 1264 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/26/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/26/2017)

05/26/2017

1266

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF CRAIG HANEY − VOLUME 1 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/19/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/16/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/26/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/24/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/26/2017)

05/26/2017 1267 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs re 1255 Order, Joint Report regarding Donaldson Segregation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits A − T, # 2 Exhibit Exhibits U − Y)(Smith, John) Modified on 5/26/2017 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiff (kh, ). (Entered: 05/26/2017)

05/30/2017 1268 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections Joint Supplemental Brief Regarding Meaningful Access to ADA Accommodation and Grievance Procedures (Smith, John) (Entered: 05/30/2017)

05/31/2017

1269

ORDERED that the order preliminarily approving the involuntary medication settlement (doc. no. 1253 ) is amended to reflect that the fairness hearing, now set for August 23, 2017, is reset for August 24, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/31/2017. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/31/2017)

06/01/2017 1270 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 1100 Notice (Other) Supplemental Brief Regarding the ADA Accommodation and Appeals Process filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/01/2017

1271

MOTION for Attorney Fees Plaintiffs' Motion In Support of An Award of the Agreed Upon Costs And Attorneys' Fees In the Phase 2 ADA Settlement Agreement (Doc. 1100) by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of William Van Der Pol, Jr., # 2 Exhibit Affidavit of Anil A. Mujumdar, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Randall C. Marshall)(Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/02/2017 1272 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Fairness Hearing held on 6/2/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/02/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 247 of 408

06/02/2017

1273

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF CRAIG HANEY − VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/20/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/23/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/3/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/02/2017)

06/08/2017 1274 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Reeves on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 06/08/2017)

06/12/2017 1275 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1256 MOTION to Re−open Discovery for Phase 2B (Opposed) filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/12/2017)

06/12/2017

MOTION for temporary stay of discovery by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See docket entry 1275 ). (djy, ) (Entered: 06/13/2017)

06/19/2017

1276

REPLY BRIEF re 1256 MOTION to Re−open Discovery for Phase 2B (Opposed) filed by Sheila Allen, Edward Braggs, Tedrick Brooks, Gary Lee Broyles, Christopher Gilbert, Dwight Hagood, Charlie Henderson, Christopher Jackson, John Maner, Rick Martin, Willie McClendon, Jermaine Mitchell, Tommie Moore, Matthew Mork, Roger Moseley, Leviticus Pruitt, Turner Rogers, Timothy Sears, Brian Sellers, Augustus Smith, William Sullivan, Daniel Tooley, Joseph Torres, Donald Ray Turner, Robert Myniasha Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Letter from M Morris to B Lunsford, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Letter from B Lunsford to Morris)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/19/2017)

06/20/2017

1277

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND F. PATTERSON − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/31/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/11/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/18/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/20/2017)

06/22/2017

1278

ORDER: Because the court is still deeply engaged in the resolution of the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claim, it is ORDERED that the oral argument on the motion to re−open discovery (doc. no. 1256 ) is reset from June 26, 2017, to July 14, 2017 at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/22/2017. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2017)

06/23/2017

1279

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF DR. RAYMOND F. PATTERSON VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 2/1/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/14/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/24/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/21/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/23/2017 1280 SEALED DOCUMENT − (PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED) OPINION ON DAUBERT CHALLENGES IN PHASE 2A received in chambers on 2/28/2017 and filed as

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 248 of 408

directed by the court). (kh, ) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/23/2017 1281 SEALED DOCUMENT − (PROPOSED) OPINION FINDING EIGHTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IN THE 19 ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS received in chambers on 3/1/2017 and filed as directed by the court. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/23/2017 1282 SEALED DOCUMENT − The State's Submission of Proposed Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law received in chambers on 3/21/2017 and filed as directed by the court. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/23/2017 1283 SEALED DOCUMENT − The States Submission of Proposed Order and Opinion on Daubert Challenges received in chambers on 3/21/2017 and filed as directed by the court. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/27/2017

1284

DAUBERT ORDER AS TO PHASE 2A EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to exclude Robert Ayers and portions of Dr. Raymond Patterson's testimony (doc. no. 888 ) and the defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Kathryn Burns and Eldon Vail (docs. no. 807 & 810 ) are denied. An opinion explaining the reasons for this ruling will follow. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/27/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/27/2017

1285

LIABILITY OPINION AND ORDER AS TO PHASE 2A EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the court and the parties will meet to discuss a remedy. The court emphasizes that given the severity and urgency of the need for mental− health care explained in this opinion, the proposed relief must be both immediate and long term. No partial final judgment shall issue at this time as to the claim resolved in this entry. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/27/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/27/2017

1286

ORDERED that the hearing on the motion to re−open discovery (doc. no. 1256 ), now set for July 14, 2017, is reset for July 12, 2017, at 2:00 p.m., in the Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/27/2017. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/27/2017

1287

ORDERED that defendants' motion for temporary stay of discovery (doc. no. 1275 ) is set for hearing on July 12, 2017, at 2:00 p.m., in the Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/27/2017. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/27/2017

1288

ORDERED that an in−chambers, on−the−record status conference to discuss how to proceed on the remedy issue with regard to the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claim is set for July 12, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. Magistrate Judge John Ott agrees to be present as well. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/27/2017. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/27/2017

1289

ORDERED that the unresolved issue of periodic mental−health assessments of prisoners in segregation, described in the recent Phase 2A Eighth Amendment liability opinion and order (doc. no. 1285 ), at 237−39, is set for a status conference on July 12, 2017, at 2:00 p.m., in the Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M.Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/27/2017. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/27/2017

Set Hearings: STATUS Conference set for 7/12/2017, 02:00 PM, in chambers, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson previously cleared in error pursuant to the 1288 order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) Modified on 6/28/2017 to correct the date (kh, ). (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/28/2017 1290 PHASE 2A ADA FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) An injunctive−relief settlement class, defined as "any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability as defined in 42U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. 705(9)(B) relating to or arising from

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 249 of 408

mental disease, illness, or defect," is certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). (2) The Southern Poverty Law Center, the AlabamaDisabilities Advocacy Program, and the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz are appointed as class counsel to represent the settlementclass under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g). (3) The objections to the settlement agreement (doc. nos. 1214 , 1216 , 1219 , 1221 , 1224 , 1231 , and 1238 ) are overruled. (4) The joint motion for approval of the proposed settlement (doc. no. 1175 ) is granted, and the settlement agreement (doc. no. 1100 ) is approved. (5) The parties' stipulations (doc. nos. 560 , 563 , 575 , 576 , 638 , 696 , 719 , 1197 , and 1239 ) are adopted. (6) The settlement agreement (doc. no. 1100 ) is entered as a consent decree. (7) The temporary restraining order entered on January 19, 2017 (doc. no. 1124 ), which, until now, has remained in effect, is lifted; however, the deadlines established in the proposed settlement (doc. no. 1100 ) are effective as of January 19, 2017. (8) United States Magistrate Judge John Ott is appointed as arbitrator pursuant to VIII of the consent decree. (9) Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees (doc. no. 1271 ) is granted. (10) By no later than noon on July 12, 2017, the parties are to meet and confer and submit to the court a plan for providing notice to class members of the entry of this consent decree and for ensuring that they have access to the decree during its pendency. In particular, the notice must describe in lay terms that are understandable to the extent possible to a person of limited education, the accommodation− request, grievance, and arbitration processes set out in the decree. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/28/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/28/2017)

06/28/2017

1291

CONSENT DECREE CONCERNING MENTAL HEALTH CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, AND RESOLVING THE PHASE 2A TRIAL OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/28/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/28/2017)

06/30/2017 1292 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by William Richard Lunsford re 1279 Transcript,, (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/30/2017)

07/11/2017 1293 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections re 1290 Order,,,,,,,,, Terminate Motions,,,,,,,, Phase 2A ADA Settlement Notice (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Settlement (ADA))(Smith, John) (Entered: 07/11/2017)

07/12/2017

1294

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS −TESTIMONY OF DAVID TYTELL Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/18/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/14/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/10/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/12/2017)

07/12/2017

1295

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: In Chambers Conference held on 7/12/2017; Motion Hearing held on 7/12/2017 re MOTION to Stay filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich ; Status Conference held on 7/12/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 07/12/2017)

07/13/2017

1296

(VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 1357 ORDER) PHASE 2A REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on July 12, 2017, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The issue of remedy is set for an evidentiary hearing on November 13, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) The parties are allowed until September 1, 2017, to devote 100 % of their time in this litigation to mediating the issue of remedy before Magistrate Judge John Ott. By September 5, 2017, the parties are to file, under seal, a report as to their efforts. (3) By October 2, 2017, the defendants are to file their proposed remedial plan, with a supporting brief explaining how it is

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 250 of 408

adequate; by October 16, 2017, the plaintiffs are to respond; and by October 23, 2017, the defendants may file a reply. (4) An on−the−record first pretrial hearing on the issue of remedy (to discuss deadlines for expert disclosure, witness list, etc.) is set for September 8, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (5) An on−the−record second pretrial hearing on the issue of remedy is set for October 30, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/13/2017. (furn: calendar,ag)(kh, ) Modified on 9/13/2017 (kh, ). (Entered: 07/13/2017)

07/13/2017

1297

PHASE 2B SCHEDULING ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on July 12, 2017, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The submission of the following motions is continued until further order of the court: a. Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class for Phase 2 (doc. no. 665 ); b. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 768 ); c. Plaintiffs' motion to re−open discovery (doc. no. 1256 ); d. Defendants' motion for temporary stay (doc. no. 127 5). (2) An on− the−record status conference is set for September 8, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/13/2017. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/13/2017)

07/13/2017

1298

(VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 1833 ORDER) LITIGATION STATUS REPORTS: Based on the representations made on the record on July 12, 2017, and so as to keep track of how this litigation is progressing, it is ORDERED that, on the first Monday of January, April, July, and October of each year, the parties are to file, under seal, a joint report, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/13/2017. (kh, ) Modified on 5/15/2018 (kh, ). (Entered: 07/13/2017)

07/13/2017 1299 DAUBERT OPINION AS TO PHASE 2A EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/13/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/13/2017)

07/13/2017

1300

ORDER: For reasons stated on the record on July 12, 2017, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The parties' proposed Phase 2A ADA settlement notice (doc. no. 1293 ) is not approved. (2) By no later than July 26, 2017, the parties are "informally" to submit to the court a proposed new notice that addresses the court's concerns. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/13/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/13/2017)

07/14/2017 1301 Transcript Redaction Request re 1279 Transcript,, by attorney William Richard Lunsford. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/14/2017)

07/18/2017 1302 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by William Richard Lunsford re 1294 Transcript,, (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/18/2017)

07/19/2017 1303 MOTION to Redact 1279 Transcript,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) . (Entered: 07/19/2017)

07/19/2017

1304

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 7/12/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/9/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/17/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/19/2017)

07/19/2017

1305

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/24/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/9/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/17/2017. (kh,

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 251 of 408

) (Entered: 07/19/2017)

07/19/2017

1306

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/26/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/9/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/17/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/19/2017)

07/19/2017 1307 TEXT ORDER granting 1303 MOTION to Redact 1279 Transcript. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/19/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry(kh, ) (Entered: 07/19/2017)

07/21/2017

1308

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF ROBERT L. AYERS, JR. Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 2/1/2017, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/11/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/19/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/21/2017)

07/21/2017 1309 EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS TESTIMONY OF DR. RAYMOND F. PATTERSON VOLUME II Redaction re 1279 Transcript,, (kh, ) (Entered: 07/21/2017)

07/24/2017

1310

CLERK'S NOTICE of FILING PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − MAILED TO COURT re 1253 PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Attachments: # 1 Part 1 Comments A−I, # 2 Part 2 Commets J−R, # 3 Part 3 Comments S−Z)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/24/2017)

07/25/2017 1311 PHASE 2A ADA FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL OPINION re 1290 PHASE 2A ADA FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL ORDER. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/25/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/25/2017)

07/25/2017

1312

ORDER: In accordance with footnote 1 of the Phase 2A ADA final settlement approval opinion (doc. no. 1311 ), it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for class certification (doc. nos. 665 ) is denied as moot as to the plaintiffs' Phase 2A ADA claim. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/25/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/25/2017)

07/28/2017 1313 PHASE 2A ADA CLAIM ORDER directing that the parties' attached notice of final settlement of Phase 2A ADA claim is approved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/28/17. (Attachments: # 1 notice of settlement)(djy, ) (Entered: 07/28/2017)

08/02/2017 1314 MOTION to Redact 1294 Transcript,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/02/2017)

08/03/2017 1315 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as to why 1314 MOTION to Redact 1294 Transcript, should not be granted. Show Cause Response due by 8/10/2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/3/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/03/2017)

08/03/2017 1316 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−FACILITIES (Attachments: # 1 Alex City WR, # 2 Bullock, # 3 Fountain, # 4 Hamilton, # 5 Limestone, # 6 Loxley WR, # 7 Mobile WR)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/03/2017)

08/07/2017 1317 Response to Order Joint Submission Regarding Inmate Comments on Proposed Settlement of Involuntary Medication Claims by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 252 of 408

(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/07/2017)

08/07/2017 1318 Response to Order re 1253 Memorandum Opinion and Order,,,,,,,,,,,,, Set Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,, Terminate Motions,,,,,,,,,,,, Joint Brief Regarding Judicial Review of An Adverse Involuntary Medication Order by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Form MH−029)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/07/2017)

08/09/2017 1319 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibit to Notice of Proposed Prisoner Testimony by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 08/09/2017)

08/09/2017 1320 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Additional Exhibit to Notice of Proposed Prisoner Testimony by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 08/09/2017)

08/09/2017

1321

TEXT ORDER granting 1319 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibit to Notice of Proposed Prisoner Testimony; granting 1320 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Additional Exhibit to Notice of Proposed Prisoner Testimony. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/9/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/09/2017)

08/09/2017

1322

Response to Order re 1253 Memorandum Opinion and Order,,,,,,,,,,,,, Set Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,, Terminate Motions,,,,,,,,,,,, Joint Notice of Proposed Prisoner Testimony at Fairness Hearing for Involuntary Medication Settlement by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/10/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/10/2017) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/09/2017)

08/09/2017

1323

NOTICE− SEALED JOINT PROPOSAL REGARDING VIDEOCONFERENCING FOR PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS HEARING by All Plaintiffs re 1253 Memorandum Opinion # 1 Sealed Joint Proposal Regarding Videoconferencing for Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Fairness Hearing)(Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) Modified on 8/10/2017 (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/10/2017) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/09/2017)

08/10/2017 1324 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections re 1313 Order ADOC's Statement Concerning Notice (Smith, John) (Entered: 08/10/2017)

08/10/2017 1325 RESPONSE to Motion re 1314 MOTION to Redact 1294 Transcript,, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/10/2017)

08/11/2017

1326

PHASE 2A ORDER SETTING ADDITIONAL FAIRNESS HEARING ON INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT: It is ORDERED that a fairness hearing is set for August 23, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ, at the United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama, at which time the court will hear testimony from inmate commenters on the proposed settlement. The court will hear oral argument from the parties at the previously set hearing on August 24, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/11/2017. (kh, )(furn: calendar, ag) (Entered: 08/11/2017)

08/11/2017 1327 PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT ORDER ON COMMENTERS TO TESTIFY AT FAIRNESS HEARING. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/11/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/11/2017)

08/14/2017 1328 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Howard, Ebony) (Entered: 08/14/2017)

08/14/2017 1329 TEXT ORDER granting 1328 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Ebony Glenn Howard terminated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/14/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/14/2017)

08/16/2017 1330 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Haskell, Miriam) (Entered: 08/16/2017)

08/16/2017 1331 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/16/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 253 of 408

08/16/2017 1332 TEXT ORDER granting 1330 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Miriam Haskell terminated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2017)

08/16/2017 1333 TEXT ORDER granting 1331 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2017)

08/16/2017 1334 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney and Notice of Change of Address by All Plaintiffs. (Cho, Eunice) (Entered: 08/16/2017)

08/16/2017 1335 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 1327 Order Notice of Filing of Joint Submission and Notice of Inmate Testimony Concerning the Proposed Involuntary Medication Settlement (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 08/17/2017)

08/16/2017 1337 JOINT SUBMISSION AND NOTICE OF INMATE TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE PROPOSED INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT by Alabama Department of Corrections, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, All Plaintiffs, re 1327 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/17/2017)

08/17/2017 1336 Response to Order re 1327 Order Joint Submission and Notice of Inmate Testimony Concerning the Proposed Involuntary Medication Settlement by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Witness Matrix, # 2 Exhibit B−Comment Compilation)(Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 08/17/2017)

08/18/2017 1338 TEXT ORDER granting 1334 Motion for Eunice Cho to Withdraw as Attorney for plaintiffs. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/18/17. (NO PDF Document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017

*** Attorney Eunice Cho terminated pursuant to 1338 Text order (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017 1339 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017 1340 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Lyons, Natalie) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017 1341 TEXT ORDER granting 1340 Motion for Natalie Lyons to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/18/17. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017

*** Attorney Natalie Lyons terminated pursuant to 1341 Text order (No PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017 1342 TEXT ORDER granting 1339 Motion for Jaqueline Aranda Osorno to Withdraw as Attorney for plaintiffs. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/18/17. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017

*** Attorney Jaqueline Aranda Osorno terminated pursuant to 1342 text order (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017 1343 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Graunke, Kristi) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/18/2017

NOTICE of Change of Address by Kristi L. Graunke. (No pdf attached to this entry − See doc 1343 for pdf) (wcl, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

08/21/2017 1344 TEXT ORDER granting 1343 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/21/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/21/2017)

08/21/2017

*** Attorney Kristi L. Graunke terminated pursuant to the 1344 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 08/22/2017)

08/23/2017 1345 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Fairness Hearing held on 8/23/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/23/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 254 of 408

08/23/2017 1346 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Morris Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Van Der Pol Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Mujumdar Affidavit, # 4 Exhibit Borden Declaration)(Mujumdar, Anil) (Entered: 08/23/2017)

08/24/2017 1347 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 8/24/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/24/2017)

08/25/2017 1348 PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO REDACT: It is ORDERED that the defendants' motion to redact portions of Dr. David Tytell's transcript (doc. no. 1314 ) is denied. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/25/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/25/2017)

08/25/2017

1349

PHASE 2A REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER: So as to accommodate United States Magistrate Judge John Ott's schedule, it is ORDERED that the on−the−record first pretrial hearing on the issue of remedy (to discuss deadlines for expert disclosure, witness lists, etc.), now set for September 8, 2017, is reset to September 7, 2017, at 8:00 a.m., in chambers. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/25/2017. (furn: AG, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/25/2017)

08/25/2017

1350

PHASE 2B SCHEDULING ORDER: So as to accommodate United States Magistrate Judge John Ott's schedule, it is ORDERED that the on−the−record status conference now set for September 8, 2017, is reset to September 7, 2017, at 8:00 a.m., in chambers. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/25/2017. (furn: AG, Calendar(kh, ) (Entered: 08/25/2017)

09/01/2017 1351 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 2 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS − Mailed to Court (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) . (Entered: 09/01/2017)

09/05/2017 1352 JOINT MEDIATION STATUS REPORT filed by All Plaintiffs, AlabamaDepartment of Corrections, Jefferson Dunn, Ruth Naglich and Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/06/2017

1353

PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT FINAL APPROVAL ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The objections to the settlement agreement (doc. nos. 1310 , 1316 , & 1322 −2) are overruled. (2) The settlement agreement (doc. no. 1248 −1) is approved. (3) The settlement agreement (doc. no. 1248 −1) is entered as a consent decree. (4) United States Magistrate Judge John E. Ott is appointed to serve as mediator pursuant to § 16 of the consent decree entered today. (5) Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees (doc. no. 1346 ), which defendants do not oppose, is granted. (6) Pursuant to the provision in the settlement agreement (doc. no. 1248 −1) for the dismissal with prejudice of any and all claims asserted by plaintiff Quang Bui regarding the involuntary−medication policies and/or practices, these claims are dismissed with prejudice. (7) By no later than September 20, 2017, the parties are to meet and confer and submit to the court a plan for providing notice to class members of the entry of this consent decree and for ensuring that they have access to the decree during its pendency. The notice of settlement should describe in layperson's terms the involuntary−medication policy and procedure, as well as how a prisoner may go about challenging an involuntary−medication order or a violation of the policy requiring an involuntary−medication order before using force or coercion to administer medication to a prisoner. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/6/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/06/2017 1354 PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION CONSENT DECREE. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/6/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Administrative Regulation 621)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/07/2017

1355

ORDER: Based upon the Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Consent Decree approved by the court (doc. no. 1354 ), it is unclear whether the forms mentioned in Section VII of Administrative Regulation 621 (doc. no. 1354 −1) will need to be updated in light of the new requirements contained in the consent decree. It is, therefore, ORDERED that, on or before September 13, 2017, the parties are to submit to the court a joint statement as to whether the forms will require an update in light of the consent decree. In this statement, the parties should explain why the forms will or will not require updating. Signed by Honorable Judge

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 255 of 408

Myron H. Thompson on 9/7/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/07/2017)

09/07/2017 1356 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 9/7/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (war, ) (Entered: 09/07/2017)

09/13/2017

1357

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The Phase 2A Remedy Scheduling Order on Eighth Amendment Claim (doc. no. 1296 ) is vacated. (2) As to understaffing of both correctional and mental−health staff, (A) A pretrial hearing is set for October 23, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (B) By October 9, 2017, the parties are to submit a joint proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (C) A hearing on the issue is set for November 13, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (3) As to the provision of hospital−level care, (A) A pretrial hearing is set for December 4, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (B) By November 20, 2017, the parties are to submit a joint proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (C) A hearing on the issue is set for December 18, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (4) As to the segregation issues, (A) A pretrial hearing is set for January 16, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (B) By January 3, 2018, the parties are to submit a joint proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (C) A hearing on the issues is set for January 29, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2017. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2017)

09/13/2017

1358

Joint Submission Regarding Modification of Involuntary Medication Forms by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − MH−028, # 2 Exhibit 2 − MH−029, # 3 Exhibit 3 − MH−030, # 4 Exhibit 4 − MH−031, # 5 Exhibit 5 − MH−040)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 9/14/2017 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 09/13/2017)

09/21/2017 1359 Response to Order to Submit Plan for Notice to Involuntary Medication Class by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/21/2017)

09/22/2017

1360

ORDER setting an on−the−record Status Conference for 9/26/2017 @ 08:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in chambers, 200 FMJ, FMJ US Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL; Magistrate Judge Ott will also be present. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/22/17. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 09/22/2017)

09/22/2017 1361 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrea Jane Mixson on behalf of Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Mixson, Andrea) (Entered: 09/22/2017)

09/25/2017

1362

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 9/7/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 10/16/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/26/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/25/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/25/2017)

09/26/2017 1363 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 9/26/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/26/2017)

09/26/2017 1364 PHASE 2A LIABILTY ORDER RE SEGREGATION: It is ORDERED that, on or before October 13, 2017, the plaintiffs are to file a brief that, along with supporting legal argument, points to where the relevant evidence is in the current record on this issue; that, on or before October 27, 2017, the defendants

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 256 of 408

are to file a reply; and that, on or before November 3, 2017, the plaintiffs may file a response. In their filings, the parties are also to address whether additional evidence, expert testimony, and an evidentiary hearing are needed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2017)

09/26/2017

1365

OPINION AND ORDER: Based on the representations during an on−the−record status conference on September 26, 2017, it is ORDERED that, rather than the parties filing a joint proposal to address the issue of understaffing−−with regard to both correctional and mental−health staff, and with regard to both immediate and long−term relief−−defendants are to file a proposal on this issue by October 9, 2017, and plaintiffs are to submit a response by October 19, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2017)

09/28/2017

1366

ORDERED: (1) that the dental claim is severed from the medical claim; and (2) that, with regard to the following motions, the movants shall file new briefs limited to the dental claim by October 16, 2017, the non−movants shall respond by October 30, 2017, and the movants may file a reply by November 13, 2017: a. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (doc. no. 665 ); b. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 768); c. Plaintiffs' motion to re−open discovery (doc. no. 1256 ); and d. Defendants motion for temporary stay (doc. no. 1275 ). It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs are to file a new motion to amend, limited to the dental claim, by October 16, 2017, the defendants are to respond to the motion by October 30, 2017, and the plaintiffs may file a reply by November 13, 2017. The motion should be limited to the dental claim. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/28/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/28/2017)

09/28/2017

1367

ORDERED that the order entered on September 13, 2017 (doc. no. 1357 ), is amended to reflect that the pretrial hearing (regarding understaffing), now set for October 23, 2017, is reset for October 30, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in chambers. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/28/2017. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/28/2017)

10/02/2017 1368 NOTICE of Appearance by Denise Wiginton on behalf of Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Wiginton, Denise) (Entered: 10/02/2017)

10/03/2017 1369 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of filing of Joint Status Report (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/03/2017)

10/03/2017 1370 JOINT LITIGATION STATUS REPORT filed by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson Dunn, Ruth Naglich and Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/04/2017)

10/06/2017 1371 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Brooke Menschel by All Plaintiffs. (Menschel, Brooke) (Entered: 10/06/2017)

10/06/2017 1372 TEXT ORDER granting 1371 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Brooke Menschel terminated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/6/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/06/2017)

10/09/2017 1373 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as to the Dental Claim by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/09/2017)

10/09/2017 1374 Response to Order re 1357 Order,,,,,,, Set Hearings,,,,,, The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Correctional and Mental Health Staffing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/09/2017)

10/10/2017 1375 TEXT ORDER granting 1373 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as to the Dental Claim. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/10/2017. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 10/10/2017)

10/11/2017

1376

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS TESTIMONY OF R.W. Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/9/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 257 of 408

Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/1/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/9/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/11/2017)

10/12/2017

1377

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF A.S. − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/15/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2017)

10/12/2017

1378

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF A.S. − VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/16/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2017)

10/12/2017

1379

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF C.J. − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/13/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2017)

10/12/2017

1380

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF C.J. − VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/14/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2017)

10/12/2017

1381

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF K.N. Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/12/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2017)

10/12/2017 1382 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF J.A. Proceedings (PDF ACCESS

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 258 of 408

RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/10/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2017)

10/13/2017

1383

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF LESLEIGH LANE DODD Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/9/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/3/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

1384

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF DR. ROBERT HUNTER − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/6/2016, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/3/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

1385

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF DR. ROBERT HUNTER VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/7/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/3/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

1386

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF DR. ROBERT HUNTER VOLUME III Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/6/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/3/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

1387

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF M.P. VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/8/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/3/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 259 of 408

Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

1388

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF M.P. VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/9/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/3/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/13/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017 1389 MOTION for Leave to File the State's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Dental Claims Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

1390

BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 1364 Order,, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF LIABILITY FINDING RELATED TO FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY MONITOR AND TREAT PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION WHO HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS NEEDING MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Summary Chart re Persons in Segregation, 2012−2016)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/16/2017

1391

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF GRANTT CULLIVER VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/9/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1392 TEXT ORDER granting 1389 Motion for Leave to File the State's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Dental Claims Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/16/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017

1393

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF CASSANDRA LEE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/12/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017

1394

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF GRANTT CULLIVER − VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/10/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1395 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF SCOTT HOLMES, Ph.D. Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/16/2017, before

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 260 of 408

Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017

1396

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF WENDY WILLIAMS, Ed.D. Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/30/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017

1397

MOTION for Discovery ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS REGARDING DEFENDANTS PROPOSED PLAN TO REMEDY CORRECTIONAL AND MENTAL HEALTH UNDERSTAFFING by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − June 2017 ADOC Monthly Report, # 2 Exhibit 2 − January 2017 ADOC Monthly Report, # 3 Exhibit 3 − July 2017 ADOC Monthly Report, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Tutwiler Monitoring Report, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Amended RFP Dates, # 6 Exhibit 6 − AR 613, Amendment 2, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Defendants' July 5, 2016 Disclosure of Experts)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1398 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Proposed Sixth Amended Complaint, Regarding Dental Care, # 2 Exhibit 2 − ADOC facesheet for Plaintiff William Sullivan)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1399 MOTION for Discovery Motion to Re−Open Discovery Regarding Dental Claim (Opposed) by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1400 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 768 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Dental Claims filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1401 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1402 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 1275 Response in Opposition to Motion The State's Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Temporary Stay filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017 1403 MOTION to Certify Class Regarding Dental Claims by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017

1404

Evidentiary Submission in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Bibb MAC Meeting Minutes, # 2 Exhibit Fountain MAC Meeting Minutes, # 3 Exhibit Hamilton A&I MAC Meeting Minutes, # 4 Exhibit Holman MAC Meeting Minutes, # 5 Exhibit St. Clair MAC Meeting Minutes, # 6 Exhibit Staton MAC Meeting Minutes, # 7 Exhibit Medical Records of Brittany Ellis, # 8 Exhibit Medical Records of Cherritha Harris, # 9 Exhibit Medical Records of Cordara Dunner, # 10 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of William Sullivan, # 11 Exhibit Medical Records of Justin Hall, # 12 Exhibit Medical Records of Leviticus Pruitt, # 13 Exhibit Medical Records of Matthew Mork, # 14 Exhibit Medical Records of Sheila Allen, # 15 Exhibit Medical Records of Tedrick Brooks, # 16 Exhibit Medical Records of William Sullivan, # 17 Exhibit 2012 Corizon Contract, # 18 Exhibit 2015 Corizon Contract Extension, # 19 Exhibit 2015−2016 Corizon Statistics, # 20 Exhibit May 2017 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, # 21 Exhibit

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 261 of 408

April 2016−June 2017 Corizon Hours Works, # 22 Exhibit Bibb OHS Dental Audits, # 23 Exhibit Declaration of Farrell Bedsole, # 24 Exhibit Declaration of Tedrick Brooks, # 25 Exhibit Businelle Nursing Encounter Tool, # 26 Exhibit CDAA Resource Binder, # 27 Exhibit Corizon Oral Care Policy, # 28 Exhibit Corizon Policy PS−01 Sentinel Event Review, # 29 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. Barbara De Lap, # 30 Exhibit Excerpts of Deposition of Robert Dillard, # 31 Exhibit Donaldson OHS Dental Audits, # 32 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. Jay D. Shulman − Key, # 33 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. Jay D. Shulman, # 34 Exhibit Expert Rebuttal Report of Dr. Jay D. Shulman)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/16/2017

1405

Evidentiary Submission in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. Michael Puisis − Key, # 2 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. Michael Puisis, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Cordara Dunner, # 4 Exhibit NCCHC, 2014 Standards, P−E−06 Oral Care, # 5 Exhibit Easterling OHS Dental Audits, # 6 Exhibit Expert Report of Eldon Vail − Key, # 7 Exhibit Expert Report of Eldon Vail, # 8 Exhibit Expert Report of Eldon Vail, App'x 1, # 9 Exhibit Fountain OHS Dental Audits, # 10 Exhibit 2015 ADOC Annual Report, # 11 Exhibit Holman OHS Dental Audit, # 12 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Hugh Hood, # 13 Exhibit Sick Call Request of John Maner, # 14 Exhibit July 2017 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, # 15 Exhibit Kilby OHS Dental Audits, # 16 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Charles King, # 17 Exhibit May 2017 Corizon Monthly Report, # 18 Exhibit May 2017 Corizon Statistics, # 19 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Ruth Naglich, 4.7.16, # 20 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Ruth Naglich, 12.7.15, # 21 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Jay Shulman, # 22 Exhibit Declaration of Tomas Snyder, # 23 Exhibit St. Clair OHS Dental Audit, # 24 Exhibit Ventress OHS Dental Audit, # 25 Exhibit Declaration of John Weaver, # 26 Exhibit Declaration of Valerie Wheeler, # 27 Exhibit Declaration of Raymond Bosarge, # 28 Exhibit Declaration of Karen Norris, # 29 Exhibit Declaration of Serena English, # 30 Exhibit Declaration of Matthew Mork, # 31 Exhibit Declaration of Leviticus Pruitt, # 32 Exhibit 2014 Corizon Annual Report, # 33 Exhibit Easterling SOPs C−45 and C−42, # 34 Exhibit 2010 ADOC Annual Report)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/18/2017

1407

ORDER: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' request for expedited discovery (doc. no. 1397 ) is set for an on−the−record hearing on October 30, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in the chambers library. (2) Defendants are to file a written response to the motion by noon on October 25, 2017. Plaintiffs may reply by noon on October 27, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/18/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2017)

10/19/2017

1408

Objection to Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan for Correctional Mental Health Staffing filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Eldon Vail, # 2 Exhibit 2 − ADOC APTI Report, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Tutwiler Compliance Report, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Mental Health Staffing Matrix, # 5 Exhibit 5 − CV of Eldon Vail, # 6 Exhibit 6 − CV of Dr. Pablo Stewart, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Jones v. Gusman 5th Compliance Report, # 8 Exhibit 8 − August 2017 ADOC Monthly Statistics)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/19/2017)

10/20/2017 1409 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by William Richard Lunsford re 1383 Transcript,, (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/20/2017)

10/20/2017 1410 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by William Richard Lunsford re 1384 Transcript,, 1385 Transcript,, 1386 Transcript,, (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/20/2017)

10/23/2017 1411 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by John Garland Smith re 1394 Transcript,, 1391 Transcript,, (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/23/2017)

10/23/2017 1412 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by John Garland Smith re 1396 Transcript,, (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/23/2017)

10/25/2017 1413 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1397 MOTION for Discovery ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS REGARDING DEFENDANTS PROPOSED PLAN TO REMEDY CORRECTIONAL AND MENTAL HEALTH UNDERSTAFFING filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/25/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 262 of 408

10/25/2017

1414

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 9/26/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/27/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/23/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/25/2017)

10/26/2017 1415 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Brief in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Disputed and Additional Facts and some Exhibits by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/26/2017)

10/26/2017

1416

TEXT ORDER granting 1415 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Brief in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Disputed and Additional Facts and some Exhibits. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/26/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/26/2017)

10/27/2017

1417

REPLY BRIEF re 1397 MOTION for Discovery ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS REGARDING DEFENDANTS PROPOSED PLAN TO REMEDY CORRECTIONAL AND MENTAL HEALTH UNDERSTAFFING filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Order in Armstrong, # 2 Exhibit 2− Docket Excerpt from Skinner v. Uphoff, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Sept. 26, 2017 Status Conference Transcript Excerpt)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/27/2017)

10/27/2017 1418 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 1390 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/27/2017)

10/30/2017 1419 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference and Discovery Hearing held on 10/30/2017 (PDF available for court use only)(Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017 1420 RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017 1421 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1403 MOTION to Certify Class Regarding Dental Claims filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Supplemental Affidavit of Darryl Ellis)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017 1422 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1399 MOTION for Discovery Motion to Re−Open Discovery Regarding Dental Claim (Opposed) filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017 1423 MOTION to Strike 1405 Evidentiary Submission,,,,,,, 1404 Evidentiary Submission,,,,,,, The State's Objection and Motion to Exclude Portions of Named Plaintiffs' Evidentiary Submission in Support of Motion for Certification of a Dental Class by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017 1424 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1398 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Supplemental Affidavit of Darryl Ellis)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017

1425

Evidentiary Submission in Opposition to Defendants' 1400 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpts from Deposition of William Sullivan, # 2 Exhibit 2 − William Sullivan Medical Records − (sealed), # 3 Exhibit 3 − William Sullivan Medical Records − (sealed), # 4 Exhibit 4 − William Sullivan Medical Records − (sealed), # 5 Exhibit 5 − William Sullivan Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 6 − 2012 Corizon Contract − (sealed), # 7 Exhibit 7 − 2015 Corizon Contract Extension − (sealed), # 8 Exhibit 8 − 2015−2016 Corizon Statistics − (sealed), # 9 Exhibit 9 − 2014 Corizon Annual Report − (sealed), # 10 Exhibit 10 − May 2017 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, # 11 Exhibit 11 − July 2017 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, # 12 Exhibit 12 − Aug. 2017 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, #

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 263 of 408

13 Exhibit 13 − May 2017 Corizon Monthly Report − (sealed), # 14 Exhibit 14 − May 2017 Corizon Statistics − (sealed), # 15 Exhibit 15 − Easterling Standard Operating Procedures C−45 and C−42 − (sealed), # 16 Exhibit 16 − CDAA Resource Binder − (sealed), # 17 Exhibit 17 − Corizon Oral Care Policy − (sealed), # 18 Exhibit 18 − NCCHC, 2014 Standards for Health Services in Prisons, P−E−06 Oral Care, # 19 Exhibit 19 − Expert Report of Dr. Barbara A. De Lap − (sealed), # 20 Exhibit 20 − Expert Report of Dr. Jay D. Shulman KEY − (sealed), # 21 Exhibit 21 − Expert Report of Dr. Jay D. Shulman, # 22 Exhibit 22 − Expert Rebuttal Report of Dr. Jay D. Shulman, # 23 Exhibit 23 − Expert Report of Dr. Michael Puisis Key − (sealed), # 24 Exhibit 24 − Expert Report of Dr. Michael Puisis, # 25 Exhibit 25 − Expert Report of Eldon Vail Key − (sealed))(Morris, Maria) Modified on 10/31/2017 to clarify text to create link to 1400 (qc/djy, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 10/31/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/2/2017: # 26 Exhibit 6 − 2012 Corizon Contract − (sealed) Part 2) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 11/2/2017) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017

1426

Evidentiary Submission (CONTINUED from 1425 ) in Opposition to Defendants' 1400 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 26 − Expert Report of Eldon Vail with Supplemental Citations, # 2 Exhibit 27 − Expert Report of Eldon Vail Supplemental Citations Appendix 1, # 3 Exhibit 28 − Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Hugh Hood, # 4 Exhibit 29 − Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Charles King, # 5 Exhibit 30 − Excerpts from Deposition of Dr. Jay D. Shulman, # 6 Exhibit 31 − Excerpts from Deposition of Ruth Naglich (April 7, 2016), # 7 Exhibit 32 − Excerpts from Deposition of Ruth Naglich (December 7, 2015), # 8 Exhibit 33 − Excerpts from Deposition of Jefferson Dunn, # 9 Exhibit 34 − Bibb MAC Meeting Minutes − (sealed), # 10 Exhibit 35 − Fountain MAC meeting minutes − (sealed), # 11 Exhibit 36 − Hamilton A&I MAC meeting minutes − (sealed), # 12 Exhibit 37 − Holman MAC meeting minutes − (sealed), # 13 Exhibit 38 − St. Clair MAC meeting minutes − (sealed), # 14 Exhibit 39 − Staton MAC meeting minutes − (sealed), # 15 Exhibit 40 − Email from C. Davenport to R. Naglich, panoramic x−ray machine − (sealed), # 16 Exhibit 41 − Email from L. Ferrell to R. Naglich, ADOC Denture Audit − (sealed), # 17 Exhibit 42 − Email from L. Linton to R. Naglich, Panoramic Radiographs − (sealed), # 18 Exhibit 43 − Email from R. Naglich to L. Ferrell, Need Help Please − (sealed), # 19 Exhibit 44 − Letter from Maria Morris to Kim Thomas, # 20 Exhibit 45 − Printout from ADOC Website)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 10/31/2017 to clarify text to reflect as continued from 1425 and create link to 1400 (qc/djy, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 11/3/2017) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017 1428 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs (kh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2017)

10/30/2017 1429 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2017)

10/31/2017 1427 NOTICE by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan Notice of Filing of Sealed Documents − Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Certain Exhibits Thereto (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/31/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 264 of 408

10/31/2017 1430 PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL AND DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS by All Plaintiffs. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2017)

11/01/2017

1431

ORDERED as follows: (1) Defendants' motion to strike (doc. no. 1423 ) is denied without prejudice. Defendants' motion is not needed in light of their objection. (2) Defendants' objection (doc. no. 1423 ) to the plaintiffs' evidentiary submission (doc. nos. 1404 , 1405 ) will be considered on the merits with plaintiffs' reply, which is due by November 13, 2017. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/1/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/01/2017)

11/01/2017

Case reassigned to Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer no longer assigned to the case as referral judge (NO PDF Document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 11/01/2017)

11/02/2017

1432

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND DISCOVERY HEARING Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/30/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/23/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/4/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/31/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/02/2017)

11/03/2017

1433

PRETRIAL ORDER: PHASE 2A UNDER STAFFING ISSUE: It is ORDERED that the parties are to follow the following procedures: In the liability opinion entered on June 27, 2017, this court found that "persistent and severe shortages of mental−health staff and correctional staff" constitute an "overarching issue[]" that permeates the seven enumerated factors contributing to the defendants" Eighth Amendment violation. Because of the way understaffing permeates other issues, it is the most pressing issue and must be addressed first during this remedy phase. In addition, understaffing will take significant time to address, because it will likely require the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) to recruit, train, and retain significant numbers of correctional andmental−health staff. As the court has held, this issue is urgent, and requires both immediate and long−term relief. What needs to be done to begin this process, however−−such as conducting a staffing analysis of ADOC's facilities−−is relatively straightforward and must begin right away, as further set out. It is further ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for expedited discovery (doc. no. 1397 ) is denied without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/3/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/03/2017

1434

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF LIABILITY FINDING RELATED TO FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY MONITOR AND ASSESS PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION WHO HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS NEEDING MENTAL−HEALTH SERVICES filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − April 2017 ADOC Report Excerpt, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Email from M Morris to B Lunsford, # 3 Exhibit 3 − April 2017 ADOC Report Excerpt, v.2, # 4 Exhibit 4 − May 2017 ADOC Report Excerpt, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Email from M Morris to B Lunsford, # 6 Exhibit 6 − August 2017 ADOC Report Excerpt)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/06/2017 1435 MOTION to Clarify Nature of Nov. 13 Hearing by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/06/2017)

11/06/2017

1436

PRETRIAL ORDER − PHASE 2A CORRECTIONAL UNDERSTAFFING ISSUES: ORDER resetting Hearing now set for 11/13/2017 1357 to 11/27/2017 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in Courtroom 2FMJ of the FMJ US Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL; further ORDERING that the parties shall present evidence on and discuss the following issues at the November 27 hearing as to the defs' short−term efforts to address understaffing as to the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claim, as further set out in order; further ORDERING that the defs shall present evidence of their plan to forthwith and adequately staff the Office of Health Services (OHS), including benchmarks for the implementation of that plan. The plfs shall be prepared to present any evidence they may have in response to the defs' evidence; further ORDERING that, by no later than 11/20/2017, the parties are to submit a list of witnesses and

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 265 of 408

exhibits they plan to use at the hearing, and, by 11/21/2017, the parties are each to submit a pretrial brief, as further set out in order; further ORDERING that, with regard to the issue of mental−health understaffing, the defs shall present evidence in camera as to the status of mental−health staffing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/6/17. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/06/2017)

11/06/2017 1437 ORDER denying plfs' 1435 Motion for clarification. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/6/17. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/06/2017)

11/06/2017 1438 MOTION to Seal or, MOTION to Redact 1394 Transcript,, 1391 Transcript,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/06/2017)

11/07/2017 1439 ORDER directing that the 1438 Motion to Seal or Redact is granted only as to the request for redaction, and is denied as to the request for sealing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/7/17. (re: 1394 Transcript and 1391 Transcript). (djy, ) (Entered: 11/07/2017)

11/08/2017 1440 MOTION to Continue the November 27, 2017 Hearing and Motion for Clarification by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William). Added MOTION for clarification as reflected in main PDF document on 11/9/2017 (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 11/08/2017)

11/09/2017

1441

PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION SETTLEMENT ORDER directing that the parties attached notice of final settlement of Phase 2A involuntary medication claim is approved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/9/17. (Attachments: # 1 Notice: Due process rights in involuntary medication process)(djy, ) (Entered: 11/09/2017)

11/09/2017

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 11/9/2017 02:30 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/09/2017)

11/09/2017 1442 RESPONSE to Motion re 1440 MOTION to Continue the November 27, 2017 Hearing and Motion for Clarification MOTION to Clarify filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpt of Oct. 30 Transcript)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/09/2017)

11/09/2017 1443 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/9/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 2:35 − 3:05.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/09/2017)

11/09/2017 1444 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/09/2017)

11/10/2017 1445 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/10/2017)

11/10/2017 1446 Response to Order : Joint Proposal for Hearing Dates for Remedial Hearing Regarding Staffing by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/10/2017)

11/13/2017

1447

TEXT ORDER granting 1444 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class; granting 1445 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/13/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017 1448 REPLY BRIEF re 1421 Response in Opposition to Motion in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017

1449

Evidentiary Submission re 1448 Reply Brief, in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Shulman Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit De Lap Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit SEALED − NCCHC Guidelines from CDAA Resources Binder, # 4 Exhibit Shulman Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Lippert v. Ghosh Monitoring Report, # 6 Exhibit SEALED −

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 266 of 408

May 2016 Dental Audits, # 7 Exhibit SEALED − C.W. Med. Records, # 8 Exhibit SEALED − C.B. Med. Records, # 9 Exhibit SEALED − B.B. Med. Records, # 10 Exhibit SEALED − L.T. Med. Records, # 11 Exhibit SEALED − B. G. Med. Records, # 12 Exhibit SEALED − W. B. Med. Records, # 13 Exhibit SEALED − M. N. Med. Records, # 14 Exhibit SEALED − A. F. Med. Records, # 15 Exhibit SEALED − H. R. Med. Records, # 16 Exhibit SEALED − W. E. Med. Records, # 17 Exhibit SEALED − E. B. Med. Records, # 18 Exhibit SEALED − R. A. Med. Records, # 19 Exhibit SEALED − L. G. Med. Records, # 20 Exhibit SEALED − D. M. Med. Records, # 21 Exhibit SEALED − J. T. Med. Records, # 22 Exhibit SEALED − P. C. Med. Records, # 23 Exhibit SEALED − J. W. Med. Records, # 24 Exhibit SEALED − J. Y. Med. Records, # 25 Exhibit SEALED − H. T. Med. Records, # 26 Exhibit SEALED − R. T. Med. Records, # 27 Exhibit SEALED − R. W. Med. Records, # 28 Exhibit SEALED − L. R. Med. Records, # 29 Exhibit SEALED − J. P. Med. Records, # 30 Exhibit SEALED − B. H. Med. Records, # 31 Exhibit SEALED − G. H. Med. Records, # 32 Exhibit SEALED − M. W. Med. Records, # 33 Exhibit SEALED − G. V. Med. Records, # 34 Exhibit SEALED − H. W. Med. Records, # 35 Exhibit SEALED − M. L. Med. Records, # 36 Exhibit SEALED − J. H. Med. Records, # 37 Exhibit SEALED − M. W. Tutwiler Med. Records, # 38 Exhibit SEALED − T. L. Med. Records, # 39 Exhibit SEALED − H. L. Med. Records, # 40 Exhibit SEALED − K. K. Med. Records, # 41 Exhibit SEALED − N. J. Med. Records, # 42 Exhibit SEALED − K. E. Med. Records, # 43 Exhibit SEALED − M. J. Med. Records, # 44 Exhibit SEALED − A. E. Med. Records, # 45 Exhibit SEALED − A. C. Med. Records, # 46 Exhibit SEALED − L. W. Med. Records, # 47 Exhibit SEALED − M. G. Med. Records)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 3 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 12 replaced on 11/15/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 16 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 17 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 18 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 19 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 20 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 21 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 22 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 26 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 28 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 29 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 30 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 31 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 32 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 33 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 34 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 35 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 36 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 37 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 38 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 39 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 40 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 41 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 42 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 43 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 44 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 45 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 46 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Attachment 47 replaced on 11/17/2017) (kh, ). (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017

1450

REPLY BRIEF re 1424 Response in Opposition to Motion in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Allen Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit Brooks Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit Mork Deposition Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − part 1 of 4, # 5 Exhibit Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − part 2 of 4, # 6 Exhibit Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − part 3 of 4, # 7 Exhibit Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − part 4 of 4)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017 1451 PRETRIAL ORDER THREE: PHASE 2A UNDERSTAFFING REMEDY HEARING: It is ORDERED that the motion to continue and for clarification (doc. no. 1440 ) is granted only as follows: (1) The court adopts the parties' proposed dates (doc. no. 1446 ) for the evidentiary hearing on the issue of

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 267 of 408

understaffing remedy, and sets an evidentiary hearing on the issue of remedy for understaffing on the following dates: Defendants witnesses: November 29 − December 1, 2017; December 5 − 8, 2017; December 12 − 13, 2017; Plaintiffs' witnesses: December 14 − 15, 2017; December 18, 2017; The hearing will begin each day at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U. S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) Counsel for the parties are to arrange with the clerk of the court for those witnesses who will testify by videoconferencing.(3) By no later than November 20, 2017, the parties are each to submit a list of witnesses, the dates they expect each witness will testify, an estimate of how long their testimony will take, the specific topic(s) each witness will address, and whether the witness needs to testify in camera in whole or in part.(4) By no later than November 20, 2017, the parties are each to submit a list of exhibits they plan to use. (5) By November 21, 2017, the parties are each to submit a pretrial brief (a) summarizing all of the evidence they expect to present at the hearing, and (b) setting forth their arguments as to the impact of the PLRA on this understaffing remedy phase. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/13/2017. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) Modified on 11/13/2017 (kh, ). (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017

1452

MOTION to Compel Complete Responses to Discovery Requests, and Request to Be Heard on an Expedited Basis by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Email re Informal Discovery Requests, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Responses to Requests, # 3 Exhibit 3 − ADOC CO Application Process, # 4 Exhibit 4 − ADOC CO Examination Schedule, # 5 Exhibit 5 − October 30, 2017 Hearing Transcript Excerpt, # 6 Exhibit 6 − June 2017 ADOC Monthly Report, # 7 Exhibit 7 − July 2017 ADOC Monthly Report, # 8 Exhibit 8 − August 2017 Monthly Report, # 9 Exhibit 9 − 2016 ADOC Annual Report Excerpt, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Amended RFP Dates)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017 1453 REPLY BRIEF re 1429 Sealed Document filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, John) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017 1454 REPLY BRIEF in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Re−Open Discovery filed by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017 1455 REPLY BRIEF re 1275 Response in Opposition to Motion, 1402 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support The State's Reply in Support of the Motion for Temporary Stay filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017 1456 Response to Order regarding Hearing Dates, Request to Change One Date by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017 1459 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 1449 Evidentiary Submission (Reply in Support of Their Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class) (kh, ) (Entered: 11/14/2017)

11/13/2017

MOTION to Reset one day of the Evidentiary Hearing by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 1456 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2017)

11/14/2017

1457

TEXT ORDER: This matter is set for a telephonic status conference before the undersigned on November 14, 2017, at 3:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve five or more participant telephone lines (not including the court), the plaintiff is instructed (1) to inform the court of this immediately; and (2) to arrange the call and, once every participant is on the line, to call chambers directly at (334) 954−3975. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 11/14/2017. (furn: calendar, wr) (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/14/2017)

11/14/2017 1458 TEXT ORDER: The text order entered today scheduling a status conference on the motion to compel is amended to state that the call shall be arranged by the plaintiff if the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines including the court. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 268 of 408

on 11/14/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/14/2017)

11/14/2017 1460 MOTION to Withdraw by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Moltz, Evan) (Entered: 11/14/2017)

11/14/2017 1461 MOTION for Discovery − MOTION FOR EXPERT DEPOSITIONS ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS REGARDING CORRECTIONAL AND MENTAL HEALTH UNDERSTAFFING by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpt of Oct. 30 Transcript)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/14/2017)

11/14/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held on 11/14/2017 (NO PDF ATTACHED). (Recording Time FTR: 3:03 PM − 3:23 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 11/14/2017)

11/15/2017

1462

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/9/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/6/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/18/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/13/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2017)

11/15/2017

1463

ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to reset one day of the evidentiary hearing (doc. no. 1456 ) is denied without prejudice. The court has been informed that the parties are making alternative arrangements for plaintiffs' expert to testify. The parties should inform the court of those arrangements when they have been finalized. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2017)

11/15/2017

1464

ORDER: Based upon the representations made during the telephone conference held on November 14, 2017, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendants are to provide any uncontested discovery responses to Plaintiffs no later than noon on Thursday, November 16, 2017. 2. A telephone conference is set for Thursday, November 16, 2017, at 4:00 p.m. to discuss which discovery issues remain outstanding (Docs. 1452 & 1461 ). The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), the plaintiff is instructed (1) to inform the court no less than one business day in advance of the scheduled call; and (2) to arrange the call and to provide chambers with call−in instructions no later than one business day in advance of the scheduled call by email to Morgan_Sport@almd.uscourts.gov. Chambers will call in to the scheduled call directly. 3. Defendants shall file responses to Plaintiffs' pending discovery motions (Docs. 1452 & 1461 ) no later than Thursday, November 16, 2017, at 5:00 p.m. 4. Plaintiffs' discovery motions (Docs. 1452 & 1461 ) are set for a hearing on Friday, November 17, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 4E of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. Federal Courthouse Annex. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 11/15/2017. (furn: calendar, WR)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2017)

11/15/2017 1465 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadlines and Continue Hearing on Hospital−Level Care by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/15/2017)

11/16/2017 1466 TEXT ORDER granting 1460 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/16/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

11/16/2017

*** Attorney Evan Patrick Moltz terminated pursuant to the court's 1466 order). (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

11/16/2017

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 11/17/2017 09:30 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 269 of 408

11/16/2017 1467 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1461 MOTION for Discovery − MOTION FOR EXPERT DEPOSITIONS ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS REGARDING CORRECTIONAL AND MENTAL HEALTH UNDERSTAFFING filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

11/16/2017

1468

RESPONSE in Opposition re 1452 MOTION to Compel Complete Responses to Discovery Requests, and Request to Be Heard on an Expedited Basis filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

11/16/2017

1469

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME I − REDACTED − EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF GRANTT CULLIVER Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/9/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/7/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/18/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/14/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

11/16/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Telephone Conference held on 11/16/2017 (NO PDF ATTACHED)(Recording Time FTR: 4:02 PM − 4:31 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

11/16/2017 1470 MOTION to Clarify Pretrial and Trial Procedures by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/16/2017)

11/17/2017

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 11/17/2017 09:30 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017 1471 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/17/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Telephone Conference held on 11/17/2017 (NO PDF ATTACHED). (Recording Time FTR: 10:00 AM − 10:46 AM.) (war, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

1472

PHASE 2A ORDER ON UNDERSTAFFING REMEDY HEARING: Based on the representations made on the record on November 17, 2017, it is ORDERED as follows as to plaintiffs' motion for clarification (doc. no. 1470 ): (1) The motion is denied without prejudice as to the issue of exhibit lists. The parties are to present the issue to the magistrate judge if they are unable to resolve it themselves. (2) The motion is granted to the extent that at least two class representatives, residing at the same facility (otherwise at least one representative), are to participate, by videoconferencing, in the Phase 2A understaffing remedy hearing on the dates previously indicated. The parties are to contact the clerk of the court forthwith to arrange for the videoconferencing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/17/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

1473

ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs' request for expert depositions (Doc. 1461 ) is DENIED. 2. Plaintiffs' motion to compel (Doc. 1452 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. As to Request No. 10, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks the identities of the individuals involved in ADOC's social media campaigns and Construction Management RFQ. b. As to Request No. 20, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED to the extent that the responsive documents have not already been produced. c. As to Request No. 21, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. d. As to Request Nos. 27 and 29, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED. e. Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED to the extent it requests formal signing and verification of Defendants' responses. f. Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED AS MOOT as to all other outstanding requests. All supplemental responses and documents ordered to be produced during the hearing shall be provided to Plaintiffs' counsel by close of business on November 22, 2017. Signed

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 270 of 408

by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 11/17/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

1474

PHASE 2A ORDER ON HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE REMEDY: Based on the representations made on the record on November 17, 2017, it is ORDERED that the motion to extend and continue hearing (doc. no. 1465 ) is granted to the extent that the "Phase 2A Revised Remedy Scheduling Order on Eighth Amendment Claim" (doc. no. 1357 ) is amended as follows as to the issue of hospital−level care: (1) By December 15, 2017, defendants must submit a proposal on how to proceed as to hospital−level care. (2) By January 5, 2018, plaintiffs must submit a response to defendants' proposal as to hospital−level care. (3) A pretrial hearing as to hospital−level care is set for January 16, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (4) An evidentiary hearing on the issue of hospital−level care is set for January 29, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/17/2017. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

Set Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/13/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson pursuant to the the court's 1451 order. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

Set Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/29/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/30/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/1/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/5/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/6/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/7/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/8/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/12/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/13/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/14/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/15/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/18/2017 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (**previously cleared in error − hearings set pursuant to the court's 1451 order)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/20/2017 1475 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Staffing Remedial Trial Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/20/2017)

11/20/2017 1476 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/20/2017)

11/20/2017 1477 Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs (Morris, Maria) Modified on 11/22/2017 to clarify the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 11/20/2017)

11/20/2017 1478 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Pretrial Brief and Witness and Exhibit List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/20/2017)

11/21/2017 1479 Amended Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs (Morris, Maria) Modified on 11/22/2017 to clarify the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2017)

11/21/2017 1480 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Pretrial Brief Summarizing the Evidence to be Presented and Addressing the Impact of the PLRA on this Stage of the Remedial Process by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/21/2017)

11/22/2017 1481 ORDERED that the plaintiffs' non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1477 ), as amended (doc. no. 1479 ), is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/22/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/22/2017)

11/22/2017 1482 Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Smith, John) Modified on 11/22/2017 to clarify the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 11/22/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 271 of 408

11/22/2017 1483 Technology Request for Phase 2A Remedial Trial Regarding Staffing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Lunsford, William) Modified on 11/22/2017 to clarify the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 11/22/2017)

11/22/2017

1484

REPLY BRIEF re 529 Order The State's Supplemental Brief Regarding Expert Objections Improperly Raised in Named Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification of a Dental Class filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 11/27/2017 to clarify the docket text(kh, ). (Entered: 11/22/2017)

11/27/2017

1485

MOTION to Compel Complete, Expedited Responses to Informal Discovery Request Nos. 31−56 (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs' Additional Informal Discovery Requests, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Defendants' Responses, # 3 Exhibit 3 − October 30 Hearing Transcript Excerpts)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/27/2017 1486 PHASE 2A INVOLUNTARY−MEDICATION SETTLEMENT FINAL APPROVAL OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/27/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/27/2017

1487

SHOW−CAUSE ORDER: In its third pretrial order regarding the understaffing remedy hearing (doc. no. 1451 ), the court required the parties to comply with the following provision: "By no later than November 20, 2017, the parties are each to submit a list of witnesses, the dates they expect each witness will testify, an estimate of how long their testimony will take, the specific topic(s) each witness will address, and whether the witness needs to testify in camera in whole or in part." It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The defendants are to show cause, if there be any, in writing by 12:00 noon today as to whether they have complied with this provision; if not, whether they sought and obtained permission from the court not to comply; and, if not, why permission was not obtained. (2) If the defendants have not complied with this provision, they are to do so by 12:00 noon today. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/27/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/27/2017 1488 ORDERED that the defendants' non−attorney staff technology requests (doc. nos. 1482 and 1483 ) are granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/27/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/27/2017

1489

TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Doc. 1485 ) is set for hearing by telephone on November 27, 2017, at 3:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3975 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), the plaintiff is instructed to arrange the call and to provide chambers with call−in instructions in advance of the scheduled call by email to Morgan_Sport@almd.uscourts.gov. Chambers will call in to the scheduled call directly. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 11/27/2017. (furn: calendar, wr)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/27/2017 1490 REPLY BRIEF re 1487 Order to Show Cause,,, filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/27/2017 1491 Minute Entry for Motion Hearing held on 11/27/2017 re 1485 MOTION to Compel Complete, Expedited Responses to Informal Discovery Request Nos. 31−56 (Opposed) held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 3:01−3:51.) (cb, ) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/27/2017 1492 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Amended Staffing Remedial Trial Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

11/28/2017

1493

ORDERED that the joint litigation status report (doc. no. 1370 ) is set for discussion in open court on November 30, 2017, at 8:30 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Counsel for the parties should be prepared to discuss the report in detail at that time. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2017.(furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/28/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 272 of 408

11/28/2017

1494

ORDER: Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Complete, Expedited Responses to Informal Discovery Request Nos. 3156 (Doc. 1485 ). The court held a hearing by telephone regarding this motion on November 27, 2017. For the reasons articulated by the court during the hearing, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to compel (Doc. 1485 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as further set out in order. All supplemental responses and documents ordered to be produced during the hearing shall be provided to Plaintiffs' counsel by close of business on December 1, 2017. In ordering these supplemental responses, the court has made no determination of whether Defendants' consultants qualify as testifying experts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Defendants' supplemental responses shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege against the disclosure of any information not included in those responses. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 11/28/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/28/2017)

11/28/2017

1495

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING TRIAL WITNESSES: It is ORDERED that, no later than 8:00 a.m. of each day of trial, counsel are to file with the court and provide to opposing counsel the summaries required by orders entered on September 8, 2015 (doc. no. 240 ) and May 10, 2016 (doc. no. 463 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/28/2017)

11/29/2017 1496 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 240 Order,, 463 Order,,, 1495 Order, The State's Witness Summaries for November 29, 2017 (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/29/2017)

11/29/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing begun on 11/29/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/29/2017)

11/30/2017

1497

ORDER: It is ORDERED that the Phase 2A liability issue of "adequate periodic mental−health assessments of prisoners in segregation" is set for oral argument on December 1, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Counsel should be prepared to discuss the issue, and the relevant record, in detail. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/30/2017. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/30/2017)

11/30/2017 1498 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 11/30/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/30/2017)

11/30/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 11/30/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/30/2017)

12/01/2017 1499 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 240 Order,, 463 Order,,, 1495 Order, The State's Witness Summary for December 1, 2017 (Smith, John) (Entered: 12/01/2017)

12/01/2017

1500

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF JEFFERSON S. DUNN Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/30/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/22/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/1/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/01/2017)

12/01/2017 1501 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument held on 12/1/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/01/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 273 of 408

12/01/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/1/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/01/2017)

12/01/2017

1502

ORDER: For the hearings set on December 5−8, 2017, December 12−15, 2017, and December 18, 2017, it is ORDERED that the Alabama Department of Corrections is to coordinate with the United States Marshal to ensure the presence of two prisoners at these hearings. The two prisoners have already been identified to the Alabama Department of Corrections. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/1/2017. (furn: adoc transport, usms)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/01/2017)

12/04/2017 1503 ORDERED that the hearing tomorrow, December 5, 2017, will begin at 8:00 a.m., recess at 10:00 a.m., and resume at 1:00 p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/4/2017. (furn: adoc transport, usms, calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/04/2017)

12/04/2017

1504

PHASE 2A SCHEDULING ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on December 1, 2017, it is ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiffs shall submit their proposed opinion on the Eighth Amendment liability issue relating to periodic mental−health evaluations in segregation by January 5, 2018; (2) Defendants are allowed until January 19, 2018, to submit any response or proposed opinion; and (3) Plaintiffs are allowed until January 26, 2018, to submit any reply. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/4/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/04/2017)

12/05/2017 1505 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State's Witness Summary for December 5, 2017 (Smith, John) (Entered: 12/05/2017)

12/05/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/5/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/05/2017)

12/06/2017 1506 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State's Witness Summary for December 6, 2017 (Smith, John) (Entered: 12/06/2017)

12/06/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/6/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/06/2017)

12/07/2017

1507

TEXT ORDER: ORDERED that the parties shall convene for a telephonic status conference on December 8, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), the plaintiffs are instructed (1) to inform the court no less than one business day in advance of the scheduled call; and (2) to arrange the call and, once every participant is on the line, to call chambers directly at (334) 954−3975. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 12/7/2017. (furn: ag, calendar, wr)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/07/2017)

12/08/2017

1508

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Excerpt of Bench Trial Proceedings preliminary remarks prior to examination of witnesses (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on December 1, 2017, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/29/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/8/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/8/2018. (djy, ) (Entered: 12/08/2017)

12/08/2017

1509

ORDER directing that Defs are to produce the following documentation to Plfs no later than the close of business on 12/12/2017: (1) Movement Histories for inmates W.B., R.R., and A.S., as identified during the conference; (2) Current segregation unit rosters for each ADOC facility; and (3) Current inmate code lists for each ADOC facility in the format previously produced as ADOC040923164. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 12/8/17. (djy,

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 274 of 408

) (Entered: 12/08/2017)

12/08/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held on 12/8/2017 (NO PDF ATTACHED)(Recording Time FTR: 2:00 PM − 3:13 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 12/08/2017)

12/12/2017 1510 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 240 Order,, 463 Order,,, 1495 Order, The State's Witness Summary for December 12, 2017 (Smith, John) (Entered: 12/12/2017)

12/12/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/12/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/12/2017)

12/13/2017 1511 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Witness Summary for Dec. 13, 2017 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/13/2017)

12/13/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/13/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/13/2017)

12/14/2017 1512 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Witness Summaries for Dec. 14, 2017 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/14/2017)

12/14/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/14/2017 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/14/2017)

12/15/2017 1513 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Witness Summary for Dec. 15, 2017 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/15/2017)

12/15/2017 1514 Response to Order re 1474 Order,,,,, Terminate Motions,,,,, Set Hearings,,,, The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Hospital−Level Care by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/15/2017)

12/15/2017

1515

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 12/15/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 2 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1300) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 3 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1301) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 4 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1302) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 5 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1303) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 6 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1304) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 7 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1305) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 8 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1306) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 9 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1307) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 10 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1308) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 11 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1309) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 12 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1310) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 13 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1312) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 14 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1313) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 15 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1314) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 16 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1315) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 17 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1316) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 18 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1317) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 19 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1318) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 20 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1319) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 21 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1320) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 22 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1321) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 23 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1322) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 24 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1323) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 25 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1324) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 26 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1325) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 27 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1326) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 28 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1327) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 29 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1328) (ag, ). (Additional

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 275 of 408
attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 30 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1329) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 31 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1330) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 32 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1331) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 33 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1332) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 34 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1333) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 35 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1334) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 36 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1335) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 37 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1336) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 38 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1337) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 39 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1338) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 40 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1339) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 41 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1340) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 42 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1341) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 43 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1342) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 44 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1343) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 45 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1345) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 46 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1346) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 47 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1347) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 48 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1348) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 49 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1349) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 50 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1350) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 51 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1351) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 52 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1352) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 53 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1353) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 54 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1354) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 55 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1355) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 56 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1356) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 57 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1357) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 58 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1358) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 59 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1359) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 60 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1360) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 61 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 150) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 62 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 151) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 63 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 152) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 64 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 153) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 65 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 154) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 66 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 155) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 67 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 156) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 68 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 157) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 69 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 158) (ag, ). Modified on 12/18/2017 (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 70 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 159) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 71 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 160) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/18/2017: # 72 Exhibit Pla Dem Ex. 161) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 73 Exhibit D−2934) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 74 Exhibit D−2936) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 75 Exhibit D−2937) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 76 Exhibit D−2938) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 77 Exhibit D−2939) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 78 Exhibit D−2940) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 79 Exhibit D−2941) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 80 Exhibit D−2942) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 81 Exhibit D−2943) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 82 Exhibit D−2944) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 83 Exhibit D−2945) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 84 Exhibit D−2946) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 85 Exhibit D−2948) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 86 Exhibit D−2949) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 87 Exhibit D−2952) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 88 Exhibit D−2953) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 89 Exhibit D−2954) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 90 Exhibit D−2955) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 91 Exhibit D−2956) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 92 Exhibit D−2957) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 93 Exhibit

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 276 of 408

D−2960) (ag, ). Modified on 12/19/2017 (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 94 Exhibit D−2961) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 95 Exhibit D−2962) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 96 Exhibit D−2963) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 97 Exhibit D−2964) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 98 Exhibit D−2965) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 99 Exhibit D−2966) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 100 Exhibit D−2967) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 101 Exhibit D−2968) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 102 Exhibit D−2969) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 103 Exhibit D−2970) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 104 Exhibit D−2971) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 105 Exhibit D−2972) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 106 Exhibit D−2975) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 107 Exhibit D−2976) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 108 Exhibit D−2977) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 109 Exhibit D−2978) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 110 Exhibit D−2979) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 111 Exhibit D−2980) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 112 Exhibit D−2981) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 113 Exhibit D−2982) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 114 Exhibit D−2983) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 115 Exhibit D−2984) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 116 Exhibit D−2985) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 117 Exhibit D−2986) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 118 Exhibit D−2987) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 119 Exhibit D−2988) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 120 Exhibit D−2989) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 121 Exhibit D−2990) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 122 Exhibit D−2992) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 123 Exhibit D−2993) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 124 Exhibit D−3000) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 125 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 22) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 126 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 23) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 127 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 24) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 128 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 25) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 129 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 26) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 130 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 27 amended) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 131 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 28 amended) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 132 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 29) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 133 Exhibit Def Dem Ex 30) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 134 Defendants Exhibit List) (ag, ). Modified on 12/19/2017 (ag, ). DEFENDANTS EXHIBITS 2973 AND 2974 ON THUMB DRIVE WITH CASE FILE (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 135 Plaintiffs Exhibit List Staffing Remedial) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2017: # 136 Plaintiffs Exhibit List Amended Staffing Remedial) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2017: # 137 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1311 (Part 1)) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2017: # 138 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1311 (Part 2)) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2017: # 139 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1344 (Part 1)) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2017: # 140 Exhibit Pla. Ex. 1344 (Part 2)) (ag, ). (Entered: 12/18/2017)

12/18/2017

1516

PHASE 2A UNDERSTAFFING ORDER FOR POST−HEARING MEDIATION: The court having received all evidence regarding understaffing, as to both correctional and mental health, what remains is to hear oral argument and require appropriate post−trial submissions. However, before proceeding with argument and post−trial submissions, the court believes mediation would be beneficial. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the parties are to engage immediately in mediation with Judge Ott regarding the Phase 2A remedy for understaffing, both correctional and mental−health. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/18/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/18/2017)

12/18/2017 1517 TEXT ORDER setting a Telephone Conference for 12/19/2017 at 09:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson RE: "Understaffing Remedy". Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/18/17. (NO PDF

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 277 of 408

ATTACHED)(war, ) Modified on 12/18/2017 (war, ). (Entered: 12/18/2017)

12/18/2017 1518 MOTION for Status Conference Regarding Placement of Persons with Serious Mental Illness in Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/18/2017)

12/19/2017 1519 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 12/19/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/19/2017)

12/19/2017

1520

SCHEDULING ORDER FOR JANUARY LITIGATION STATUS REPORT: Based on the representations made on the record on December 19, 2017, it is ORDERED that the joint litigation status report previously due on January 1, 2018, is now due on January 8, 2018. The remaining status reports are to continue to be filed on the schedule set out in the Order for Litigation Status Reports (doc. no. 1298 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/19/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/19/2017)

12/19/2017

1521

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for status conference (Doc. 1518 ) is GRANTED, and the parties shall convene for a telephonic status conference on Thursday, December 21, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. to discuss the placement of persons with serious mental illness in segregation. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), Plaintiffs are instructed (1) to inform the court no less than one business day in advance of the scheduled call; and (2) to arrange the call and, once every participant is on the line, to call chambers directly at (334) 954−3975 or to provide chambers with call−in instructions. The parties are specifically instructed to be prepared to articulate to the court specific proposed procedures for resolving the parties' dispute concerning the placement of persons with serious mental illness in segregation and to be prepared to provide the court with these proposed procedures in writing. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 12/19/2017. (furn: calendar, wr)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/19/2017)

12/19/2017

1522

SCHEDULING ORDER FOR PHASE 2A REMEDY: SEGREGATION: Based on the representations made on the record on December 19, 2017, and in open court on December 15, 2017, it is ORDERED that the briefing schedule for the proposed Phase 2A remedy regarding segregation (doc. no. 1357 ) is modified as follows: (1) The defendants are to submit a proposed remedial plan by January 5, 2018, which they may amend on or before January 8, 2018. (2) The plaintiffs are to respond to the defendants' proposal by January 15, 2018. (3) The pretrial hearing, now set for January 16, 2018, is reset for January 23, 2018 at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (4) An evidentiary hearing on the issue, now set for January 29, 2018, is reset for February 5, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/19/2017. (furn:calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/19/2017)

12/19/2017 1523 TEXT ORDER: Status Conference set for 12/21/2017 at 10:00am has been rescheduled for 03:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 12/19/2017. (furn: calendar, wr)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/19/2017)

12/20/2017

1524

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Accordingly, for the reasons and based on the representations made on the record on December 19, 2017, it is ORDERED as follows with regard to the remaining contributing factors not previously set for hearing: (1) As to the defendants' failure to identify prisoners with serious mental−health needs and to classify their needs properly, as well as the defendants' failure to provide sufficient out−of−cell time and treatment to those who need residential treatment, (A) By February 2, 2018, the defendants are to submit a proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (B) By February 9, 2018, the plaintiffs are to submit a response. (C) A pretrial hearing is set for February 14, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (D) A

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 278 of 408

hearing on the issue is set for February 26, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) As to the defendants' failure to provide individualized treatment plans to prisoners with serious mental−health needs, (A) By February 14, 2018, the defendants are to submit a proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (B) By February 21, 2018, the plaintiffs are to submit a response. (C) A pretrial hearing is set for March 1, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (D) A hearing on the issue is set for March 5, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (3) As to the defendants' failure to provide psychotherapy by qualified and properly supervised mental−health staff and with adequate frequency and sound confidentiality, (A) By March 9, 2018, the defendants are to submit a proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (B) By March 16, 2018, the plaintiffs are to submit a response. (C) A pretrial hearing is set for March 20, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (D) A hearing on the issue is set for March 26, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (4) As to defendants' failure to identify suicide risks adequately and to provide adequate treatment and monitoring to those who are suicidal, engaging in self−harm, or otherwise undergoing a mental−health crisis, (A) By March 30, 2018, the defendants are to submit a proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (B) By April 6, 2018, the plaintiffs are to submit a response. (C) A pretrial hearing is set for April 11, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (D) A hearing on the issue is set for April 16, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (5) As to defendants' imposition of disciplinary sanctions on mentally ill prisoners for symptoms of their mental illness, and imposing disciplinary sanctions without regard for the impact of sanctions on the prisoners' mental health, (A) By April 11, 2018, the defendants are to submit a proposal on how to proceed as to both immediate and long−term relief. (B) By April 18, 2018, the plaintiffs are to submit a response. (C) A pretrial hearing is set for April 30, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in chambers. (D) A hearing on the issue is set for May 7, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/20/2017. (furn: calendar, AG)(kh, ) Modified on 12/20/2017 (kh, ). (Entered: 12/20/2017)

12/21/2017

1525

Response to Order Plaintiffs Proposed Procedures for Resolving the Parties Disputes Regarding the Placement of Seriously Mentally Ill Prisoners in Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − 12−1−17 Transcript Excerpt, # 2 Exhibit 2 − 12−21−16 Transcript Excerpt, # 3 Exhibit 3 − 11−30−16 Rough Draft Transcript Excerpt, # 4 Exhibit 4 − 12−14−17 Rough Draft Transcript Excerpt, # 5 Exhibit 5 − October 2017 MHM Numbers)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/21/2017)

12/21/2017

1526

ORDERED that, from this day forward and for all filings, all parties are to indicate in the case style, under the civil action number, the name of the judge (Judge Thompson, Judge Ott, or Judge Borden, for example) for whom the filing is intended. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/21/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/21/2017)

12/21/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held on 12/21/2017 (NO PDF ATTACHED).(Recording Time FTR: 3:01 PM − 3:39 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 12/21/2017)

12/22/2017

1527

PHASE 2A UNDERSTAFFING REMEDY ORDER: The court having given the parties until mid−January 2018 to mediate the understaffing remedy issue, it is ORDERED that the issue is set for on−the−record oral argument on January 19, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. The parties are to arrange for the argument to be conducted by telephone. Oral Argument set for 1/19/2018 02:00 PM in telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/22/2017. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/22/2017)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 279 of 408

12/26/2017

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 12/27/2017 09:30 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 12/26/2017)

12/27/2017 1528 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 12/27/2017 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:34 − 10:12.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/27/2017)

12/29/2017

1529

DISCOVERY ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on December 27, 2017, it is ORDERED and REAFFIRMED that Magistrate Judge Gray Borden shall continue to handle all discovery in this case, including the remedy aspects of the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claim. The court recognizes the tension between allowing adequate remedy discovery and resolving the remedy issues as expeditiously as possible. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/29/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/29/2017)

01/02/2018

1530

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: SEGREGATION directing that, in their submissions of January 5, 8, and 15, 2018, see Order (doc. no. 1522 ), the parties are (1) to address, with all other relevant matters, the plfs proposal for procedures for resolving the parties' disputes regarding the placement of prisoners with serious mental illness in segregation (doc. no. 1525 ), as well as (2) to make suggestions of what role, if any, the magistrate judge should, and by law may, play in the fashioning of a remedy in response to the court's 6/27/2017, finding of liability as to segregation; further ORDERING that the parties may engage in additional discovery as outlined in Part III of this opinion and order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/2/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/02/2018)

01/02/2018

1531

ORDER directing that the attached opinion in United States v. Walker, 2:17cr116−MHT (M.D. Ala. Dec. 28 2017) (doc. no. 56 ), is made a part of the record in this case for informational purposes. Defense counsel are to furnish a copy of the Walker opinion to the named defendants. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/2/18. (Attachments: # 1 attachment opinion 2:17cr116−MHT)(djy, ) (Entered: 01/02/2018)

01/05/2018 1532 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs OF FILING OF PROPOSED OPINION FINDING EIGHTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IN THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FAILURE TO MONITOR AND ASSESS PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/05/2018)

01/05/2018

1533

Response to Order re 1357 Order,,,,,,, Set Hearings,,,,,, The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Segregation by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/05/2018)

01/05/2018 1534 Response to Order re 1514 Response to Order, 1474 Order,,,,, Terminate Motions,,,,, Set Hearings,,,, Plaintiffs' Response to the State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Hospital−Level Care by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 01/05/2018)

01/08/2018 1535 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Huff, Michael) (Entered: 01/08/2018)

01/08/2018 1536 TEXT ORDER granting 1535 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/8/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/08/2018)

01/08/2018

*** Attorney Michael Paul Huff terminated pursuant to the 1536 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/08/2018)

01/08/2018 1537 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing of Sealed Document − Joint Status Report (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/08/2018)

01/08/2018 1538 JOINT LITIGATION STATUS REPORT filed by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson Dunn, Ruth Naglich and Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/09/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 280 of 408

01/10/2018

1539

SEALED ORDER: While the court understands that the issue of understaffing is set for oral argument on January 19, 2018, there is an urgency to resolving the issue as soon as possible. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs are to submit their proposed opinion by January 15, 2018, and the defendants are to respond by January 22, 2018, and the plaintiffs may file a reply by January 29, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/10/2018)

01/11/2018 1540 MOTION to Withdraw by G. Douglas Jones. (Jones, Gordon) (Entered: 01/11/2018)

01/11/2018 1541 TEXT ORDER granting 1540 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/11/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/11/2018)

01/11/2018

*** Attorney Gordon Douglas Jones terminated pursuant to the 1541 text order.(no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/11/2018)

01/11/2018

1542

PHASE 2A ORDER MODIFYING ORDER ON HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE REMEDY: Based on the representations in the parties' joint litigation status report (doc. no. 1538 ), it is ORDERED that the scheduling order on the hospital−level care remedy (doc. no. 1474 ) is modified as follows: (1) The pretrial hearing, now set for January 16, 2018, is reset for January 23, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. (2) The evidentiary hearing, now set for January 29, 2018, is reset for February 5, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/11/2018)

01/12/2018 1543 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan on Segregation Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/12/2018)

01/12/2018 1544 TEXT ORDER granting 1543 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits to Plfs' Response to Defs' Proposed Remedial Plan on Segregation Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/12/18. (NO PDF Document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 01/12/2018)

01/12/2018 1545 NOTICE of Appearance by Grace Graham on behalf of All Plaintiffs (djy, ) (Entered: 01/12/2018)

01/15/2018

1546

TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Segregation Remedial Plan by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − MHM Master Roster, filed under seal, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Prisoners with Serious Mental Illness in Segregation, filed under seal, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Numbers of Prisoners on the Mental Health Caseload in Segregation, # 4 Exhibit 4 − DSM−5 Severity Specifiers for Bipolar and Depressive Disorders)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 1/18/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 1/18/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/15/2018)

01/15/2018 1548 NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs (kh, ) (Entered: 01/18/2018)

01/16/2018

1547

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/8/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 3234−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/6/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/16/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/16/2018)

01/19/2018

1549

REPLY BRIEF re 1532 Notice (Other) The State's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposed Opinion Finding Eighth Amendment Violations in the Alabama Department of Corrections's Failure to Monitor and Assess Prisoners in Segregation filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Opinion)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

01/19/2018 1550 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/19/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 281 of 408

01/22/2018 1551 MOTION : Request for Expedited Status Conference with Judge Borden Regarding Discovery Related to Trial on February 5, 2018 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Informal Discovery Requests re Hospital−Level Care, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Informal Discovery Requests re Segregation)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/22/2018

1552

PHASE 2A ORDER MODIFYING ORDERS ON UNDERSTAFFING, HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE, AND SEGREGATION: Based on the representations made during an on−the−record conference call on January 19, 2018, it is ORDERED that the scheduling order on the understaffing remedy (doc. no. 1527 ), the scheduling order on the hospital−level care remedy (doc. no. 1542 ), and the scheduling order on the segregation remedy (doc. no. 1522 ), are modified as follows: (1) The oral argument on the issue of the understaffing remedy, now set for January 19, 2018, is reset for January 24, 2018, at 3:00 p.m. (2) The pretrial hearing on the issue of the hospital−level care remedy, now set for January 23, 2018, is reset for January 24, 2018 at 3:00 p.m. (3) The pretrial hearing on the issue of the segregation remedy, now set for January 23, 2018, is reset for January 24, 2018 at 3:00 p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/22/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/22/2018

1553

TEXT ORDER: ORDERED that the motion (Doc. 1551 ) is GRANTED. A telephonic status conference is scheduled for Wednesday, January 24, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), the plaintiffs are instructed (1) to inform the court no less than one business day in advance of the scheduled call; and (2) to arrange the call and to provide the court will call−in instructions. If the defendants would like to respond to plaintiffs' motion, they may do so no later than close of business on Tuesday, January 23, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 1/22/2018. (furn: wr, calendar) (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/22/2018

Reset Hearings: Oral Argument set for 1/24/2018 03:00 PM in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (reset from 1/19/2018 pursuant to the 1552 order ) (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/22/2018

Reset Hearings: Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/24/2018 03:00 PM in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (reset from 1/23/2018 pursuant to the 1552 order ) (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/22/2018

1554

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/14/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/12/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/22/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/23/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/22/2018

1555

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/16/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/12/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/22/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/23/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/22/2018 1556 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/17/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 282 of 408

may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/12/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/22/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/23/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

01/23/2018 1557 RESPONSE to Motion re 1551 MOTION : Request for Expedited Status Conference with Judge Borden Regarding Discovery Related to Trial on February 5, 2018 filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Ruth Naglich)(Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 01/23/2018)

01/24/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held on 1/24/2018 (NO PDF ATTACHED).(Recording Time FTR: 10:00 AM − 11:15 AM.) (war, ) (Entered: 01/24/2018)

01/24/2018

1558

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/21/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/14/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/26/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/24/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/24/2018)

01/24/2018

1559

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion (Doc. 1551 ) is GRANTED as follows: Defendants are to respond to the "informal" requests for production served on January 9, 2018, as further set out. All responses and documents ordered to be produced shall be provided to Plaintiffs' counsel no later than January 31, 2018. Plaintiffs' motion to compel is DENIED in all other respects and Defendants are not to respond to the requests for production and interrogatories served on January 9, 2018, except as specifically set out above, as the court finds the remaining discovery requests to be overly broad, disproportionate to the needs of the case, or unduly burdensome. It is further ORDERED that counsel for all parties shall meet and confer in person or by telephone no later than January 31, 2018 regarding a proposal for the administration of future discovery disputes during the remedial phase of this litigation. Specifically, the parties are to discuss the appropriate role for Chief Magistrate Judge John E. Ott in this process and whether there is a substantial need for a standard schedule calculated in relation to the trial phasesfor the parties to serve discovery requests, to file responses and objections, and to raise any remaining disputes with the undersigned. To the extent the parties agree on a proposal, it should be submitted to the court as a joint filing. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 1/24/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/24/2018)

01/25/2018 1560 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument held on 1/25/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/25/2018)

01/25/2018

1561

PHASE 2A ORDER RESETTING REMEDIAL HEARING ON HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE AND SEGREGATION: It is ORDERED that the remedial hearing on the segregation and hospital−level care issues, now set for February 5, 2018, is reset for February 7, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/25/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/25/2018)

01/25/2018

1562

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/27/2017, before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 283 of 408

WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/15/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/26/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/25/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/25/2018)

01/25/2018

Reset Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 2/7/2018 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (previously set with the incorrect year− no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/25/2018)

01/26/2018

Set Hearings: (1) Hearing set for 2/26/2018 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (2) Hearing set for 3/5/2018 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (3) Hearing set for 4/16/2018 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (4) Hearing set for 5/7/2018 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (5) Hearing set for 2/7/2018 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (6) Hearing set for 3/26/2018 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (Hearings set pursuant to the 1524 order which were previously cleared in error while setting the hearing in the 1561 order. no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/26/2018)

01/26/2018

1563

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on January 24, 2018, it is ORDERED that, with regard to the joint status reports (doc. no. 1298 ), the parties are to confer with United States Magistrate Judge Gray Borden to come up with a new format that is more informative and efficient. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/26/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/26/2018)

01/26/2018

1564

ORDER: Pursuant to the court's 1563 order, the parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer in an effort to prepare a joint proposal for improving the format of their joint status reports, and are ORDERED to submit that proposal to the undersigned no later than 2/16/2018, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 1/26/2018. (alm, ) (Entered: 01/26/2018)

01/26/2018

1565

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 1549 Reply Brief, (Attachments: # 1 SEALED − Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Proposed Opinion Finding Eighth Amendment Violations in the Alabama Department of Corrections' Failure to Monitor and Assess Prisoners in Segregation)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 1/29/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/26/2018)

01/29/2018

1566

OPINION AND ORDER RE: HEAT SENSITIVITY: It is ORDERED that counsel for all parties, after reviewing a transcript of the hearing on August 23, 2017, and after conferring with each other, file a joint report regarding the status, in this litigation, of the issue of heat sensitivity experienced by prisoners taking psychotropic medication−−including whether these prisoners still risk suffering from overheating due to placement in cells without air conditioning and what progress, if any, has been made toward remedying the situation−−by no later than February 12, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2018)

01/29/2018 1567 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 1539 Order, (Attachments: # 1 SEALED − Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Proposed Opinion on Correctional and Mental−Health Staffing Remedies)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 1/30/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/29/2018)

01/30/2018 1568 Motion for Clarification or, in the alternative, Request for Additional Status Conference re 1559 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 1/30/2018 to clarify the docket text. (kh, ). (Entered: 01/30/2018)

01/30/2018 1569 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Smith, John) (Entered: 01/30/2018)

01/30/2018

1570

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that the motion it set for a telephonic status conference set for today, January 30, 2018, at 3:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), the movant is instructed (1) to inform the court immediately; and (2) to arrange the call and to provide the court immediately with call−in instructions. Signed by Honorable

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 284 of 408

Judge Gray M. Borden on 1/30/2018. (furn: calendar, wr) (no pdf document attached to this order)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2018)

01/30/2018

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 1/30/2018 04:00 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/30/2018)

01/30/2018

1571

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING REMEDIAL HEARING ON HOSPITAL LEVEL CARE AND SEGREGATION: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The remedial hearing on hospital−level care and segregation will begin each day, including the first day, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) Counsel for the parties are to arrange with the clerk of the court for those witnesses who will testify by videoconferencing. (3) By no later than February 2, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., the parties are each to submit a list of witnesses, the dates they expect each witness will testify, an estimate of how long their testimony will take, the specific topic(s) each witness will address, and whether the witness needs to testify in camera in whole or in part. (4) By no later than February 2, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., the parties are each to submit a list of exhibits they plan to use. (5) By February 6, 2018, at noon, the parties are each to submit a pretrial brief (a) summarizing all of the evidence they expect to present at the hearing, and (b) setting forth their arguments as to the impact of the PLRA on remedy. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2018)

01/30/2018

1572

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING THE REMEDIAL HEARING ON HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE AND SEGREGATION: It is ORDERED that, no later than 8:00 a.m. of each day of the remedial hearing on hospital−level care and segregation, counsel are to file with the court and provide to opposing counsel the summaries required by orders entered on September 8, 2015 (doc. no. 240 ) and May 10, 2016 (doc. no. 463 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2018)

01/30/2018 1573 ORDERED that the defendants' non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1569 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2018)

01/30/2018 1576 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/30/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)

01/30/2018 1577 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held by telephone on 1/30/2018 (NO PDF ATTACHED)(Recording Time FTR: 3:01 PM − 3:47 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)

01/31/2018

1574

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME II − FAIRNESS HEARING Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 8/24/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/21/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/5/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/1/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)

01/31/2018

1575

ORDERED that Defendants' motion (Doc. 1568 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, it is ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Request for Production No. 7, served on January 9, 2018, by producing all movement histories since February 1, 2017 for (1) each of the ten potential witnesses previously identified by Plaintiffs, and (2) each person on the MHM Master Roster who also appears on the December 2017 segregation roster and whose last name starts with A, J, S, or W. It is further ORDERED that the responsive documents for category (1) shall be produced no later than close of business on January 31, 2018. The responsive documents for category (2) shall be produced no later than close of business on February 5, 2018. In addition, any responsive documents for category (2) that are ready for production by close of business on February 2, 2018 shall be produced at that time. Defendants' motion

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 285 of 408

is DENIED in all other respects. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 1/31/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)

01/31/2018 1578 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Morris, Maria). (Entered: 01/31/2018)

01/31/2018 1579 ORDER: It is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1578 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/31/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)

01/31/2018

1580

ORDER: For the hearing set to begin on February 7, 2018, it is ORDERED that the Alabama Department of Corrections is to coordinate with the United States Marshal to ensure the presence of the prisoners at this hearing. The prisoners have already been identified to the Alabama Department of Corrections. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/31/2018. (furn: usms, adoc transport, clerk, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)

01/31/2018 1581 JOINT SUBMISSION REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF FUTURE DISCOVERY DISPUTES by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/1/2018 to clarify the docket text(kh, ). (Entered: 01/31/2018)

02/01/2018 1582 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Technology Request (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/01/2018)

02/01/2018 1583 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Timeline for Correctional and Mental Health Staffing (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/01/2018)

02/01/2018 1584 MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 2/2/2018 to clarify the docket text.(kh, ). (Entered: 02/01/2018)

02/02/2018 1585 ORDERED that the defendants' non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1582 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018 1586 ORDER denying 1584 Motion to Extend Deadline, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018

1587

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING ALL REMEDIAL HEARINGS: For all Phase 2A remedial hearings, it is ORDERED that, at least five business days before a hearing, the Alabama Department of Corrections is to coordinate with the United States Marshal and the Clerk of the Court to ensure the presence of the prisoners who will testify live at that hearing. At least 10 business days before that hearing, counsel for plaintiffs are to furnish the names of such prisoners to defense counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2018.(kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018

1588

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING ALL REMEDIAL HEARINGS: For all Phase 2A remedial hearings, it is ORDERED that, no later than 8:00 a.m. of each day of a remedial hearing, counsel are to file with the court and provide to opposing counsel the summaries required by orders entered on September 8, 2015 (doc. no. 240 ) and May 10, 2016 (doc. no. 463 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018

1589

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING ALL REMEDIAL HEARINGS: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) All Phase 2A remedial hearings will begin each day, including the first day, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) By no later than 10 business days before the first day of a remedial hearing, counsel for the parties are to arrange with the clerk of the court for those witnesses who will testify by videoconferencing, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018

1590

ORDER: In the defendants' proposed remedial plan (doc. no. 1374 ), in the defendants' pretrial brief (doc. no. 1478 ), throughout the nine−day evidentiary hearing on understaffing, and during the post−trial oral argument on January 24, 2018, the defendants maintained that the proposed remedy as to understaffing would apply to all of ADOC's major facilities, with the exception

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 286 of 408

that the Savages would not conduct a staffing analysis at the Tutwiler facility at this time (as agreed upon by the parties), as further set out. Because the court presumes that the defendants are not attempting to relitigate liability at the remedial stage, it is ORDERED that defendants shall, by February 5, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., point to the section(s) of the liability opinion, if any, in which the court limited its liability findings to those six facilities. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018

1591

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/30/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/5/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/3/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018 1592 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018 1593 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 1571 Order,,,, Plaintiffs' Pretrial Submission Identifying Witnesses and Exhibits (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018 1594 NOTICE The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Identification, Classification, and Residential Unit Out−of−Cell Time and Treatment by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1524 Order (Lunsford, William) Modified on 2/2/2018 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/05/2018 1595 Response to Order re 1590 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/05/2018)

02/05/2018 1596 NOTICE of Appearance by Jonathan Michael Barry−Blocker on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Barry−Blocker, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/05/2018)

02/06/2018 1597 TRIAL BRIEF : Summary of Evidence to Be Presented, Remedial Trial on Segregation and Hospital−Level Care by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/06/2018)

02/06/2018 1598 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Pretrial Brief Regarding Remedial Hearing on Hospital−Level Care and Segregation by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/06/2018)

02/06/2018 1599 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : PLAINTIFFS AMENDED PRETRIAL SUBMISSION IDENTIFYING WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/06/2018)

02/07/2018 1600 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summaries for February 7, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/07/2018)

02/07/2018

1601

ORDER: During an evidentiary hearing on February 7, 2018, the plaintiffs presented evidence (plaintiffs' demonstrative exhibit 167, an excerpt of which is attached) that allegedly reflects that the Alabama Department of Corrections has held approximately 20 inmates with serious mental illness in segregation housing units for periods of more than 30 days between February 1, 2017, and January 31, 2018−−including several for significantly longer periods. Because, as the defendants recognize, it is categorically inappropriate to place inmates with serious mental illness in segregation for longer than 30 days at a time, it is ORDERED, as to each of the inmates listed in the attached excerpt of plaintiffs' demonstrative exhibit 167, that, by February 9, 2018, at 5:00 p.m.,the defendants are to (1) confirm that the inmate has been removed from segregation, give the date of removal, and explain where that inmate has moved to, or (2) explain why that inmate has not been removed from segregation, which explanation shall also include the length of time the inmate has remained in segregation (including the dates of each stint) during the period covered in the exhibit and the dates of any crisis or medical/mental−health placements during that period, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/7/2018.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 287 of 408

(Attachments: # 1 Time in Segregation Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/07/2018)

02/07/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing begun on 2/7/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/08/2018)

02/08/2018 1602 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State Witness Summaries for February 8, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/08/2018)

02/08/2018

1603

AMENDED ORDER (REPLACING DOC. NO. 1601 ) During an evidentiary hearing on February 7, 2018, the plaintiffs presented evidence (plaintiffs' demonstrative exhibit 167, an excerpt of which is attached) that allegedly reflects that the Alabama Department of Corrections has held approximately 20 inmates with serious mental illness in segregation housing units for periods of more than 30 days between February 1, 2017, and January 31, 2018−−including several for significantly longer periods. Because, as the defendants recognize, it is categorically inappropriate to place inmates with serious mental illness in segregation for longer than 30 days at a time, it is ORDERED, as to each of the inmates listed in the attached excerpt of plaintiffs demonstrativeexhibit 167, that, by February 9, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., the defendants are to (1) confirm that the inmate has been removed from segregation, give the date of removal, and explain where that inmate has moved to, or (2) explain why that inmate has not been removed from segregation, which explanation shall also include the length of time the inmate has remained in segregation (including the dates of each stint) during the period covered in the exhibit and the dates of any crisis or medical/mental−health placements during that period. Because plaintiffs' demonstrative exhibit 167 was based upon a limited sample of information provided from defendants, the court does understand that the list is not complete. Nor does the court conclude, at this time, that the list is accurate. However, given the urgency of this issue, the court opts to act now upon this initial sample, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/8/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/08/2018)

02/08/2018

1604

SECOND ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made in open court on February 7, 2018, it is ORDERED that the deadlines and dates set in the additional Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. no. 1524 ) are further revised as follows: Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 2/14/2018 reset to 2/26/2018, at 10:00 AM, in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 2/26/2018 reset to 3/12/2018, 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 3/1/2018 reset to 4/4/2018, 10:00 AM, in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 3/5/2018 reset to 4/9/2018, 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 3/20/2018 reset to 6/1/2018, 10:00 AM, in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 3/26/2018 reset to 6/11/2018, 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 4/11/2018 reset to 9/4/2018, 10:00 AM, in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 4/16/2018 reset to 9/10/2018, 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 4/30/2018 reset to 10/12/2018, 10:00 AM, in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 5/7/2018 reset to 10/22/2018, 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/8/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/08/2018)

02/08/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 2/8/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018 1605 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summaries for February 9, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 288 of 408

02/09/2018 1606 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018

1607

ORDER: Based on the testimony of defendant Associate Commissioner Ruth Naglich on February 7, 2018, it is ORDERED that defendant Associate Commissioner Ruth Naglich is to return to the stand on February 14, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., to explain whether and why, as indicated by the plaintiffs demonstrative exhibit 165, there were approximately 900 inmates in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections in December 2017− January 2018 with a mental−health code of MH−1 who have a categorical serious mental illness. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/9/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018 1608 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction to Close the Bibb Correctional Facility Segregation Unit by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018

1609

TEXT ORDER granting 1608 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction to Close the Bibb Correctional Facility Segregation Unit. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/9/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018 1610 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1585 Order, 1582 Notice (Other) The State's Revised Technology Request (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018 1611 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018 1612 TEXT ORDER granting 1611 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/9/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018 1613 RESPONSE TO COURT'S FEBRUARY 8, 2018 1603 AMENDED ORDER by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018

1614

Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction for Immediate Closure of Bibb Correctional Facility Segregation Unit by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 2/9/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/09/2018

1615

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction to Close the Bibb Correctional Facility Segregation Unit (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 2/12/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 2/13/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/12/2018 1616 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State's Witness Summaries for February 12, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018 1617 ORDER: It is ORDERED that the defendants' revised non−attorney staff technology request (doc. no. 1610 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 289 of 408

02/12/2018

1618

ORDER:Based on the representations made in open court on February 9, 2018, and based on the agreement of both parties, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The joint report regarding the issue of heat sensitivity experienced by prisoners taking psychotropic medication, previously due on February 12, 2018, see Opinion and Order (doc. no. 1566 ), is now due on February 19, 2018. (2) The joint report regarding the ADA settlement arbitration procedure, including how a prisoner is to invoke that procedure, previously due on February 12, 2018, is now due on February 19, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018

1619

ORDERED as follows: (1) The plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order (doc. no. 1614 ) is denied. (2) By Thursday, February 15, 2018, at noon, the defendants are to respond to the motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 1614 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018 1620 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018 1621 NOTICE of Appearance by Alyson Lee Smith on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Smith, Alyson) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018 1622 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Text from 2018 State of the State Address)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018

1623

ORDERED that defense counsel are to file with the court by 5:00 p.m. on February 14, 2018, the information requested by plaintiffs as to an additional 131 inmates (as a follow−up to defendants response regarding the 21 inmates (doc. no. 1613 ). The defendants information should include, at least, the information sought in the courts order of February 8, 2018 (doc. no. 1603 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018 1624 TEXT ORDER that the evidentiary hearing will begin at 8:00 am and conclude at 6:00 pm for the remainder of this week (2/13 − 2/16). Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/12/2018)

02/12/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 2/12/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/13/2018 1625 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State's Witness Summary for February 13, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/13/2018 1626 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/13/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 2/13/2018 (No PDF attached). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/14/2018 1627 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 1628 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1622 Notice (Other) Amended Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − 2018 State of the State Address)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 1629 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Revised Technology Request (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 1630 TEXT ORDER: ORDERED that The State's Revised Technology Request (doc. no. 1629 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 1631 THIRD ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: At the request of the parties orally made on February 13, 2018, it is ORDERED that the deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 290 of 408

claim (doc. nos. 1524 and 1604 ) are further revised such that the deadlines and dates for the "Individual Treatment Plans" and "Psychotherapy" are inverted as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 1632 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 1633 TEXT ORDER granting 1632 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 2/14/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 1634 MOTION to Seal Documents produced in Response to this Court's Order of February 14, 2018 by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/15/2018 1635 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/15/2018)

02/15/2018 1636 TEXT ORDER granting 1634 Motion to Seal Documents produced in Response to this Court's Order of February 14, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/15/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2018)

02/15/2018

1637

RESPONSE in Opposition re 1614 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction for Immediate Closure of Bibb Correctional Facility Segregation Unit filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Captain John Hutton Part 1, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Captain John Hutton Part 2, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Captain John Hutton Part 3, # 4 Exhibit Declaration of Captain John Hutton Part 4, # 5 Exhibit Declaration of Sharon Kirk, # 6 Exhibit Declaration of Marie Borden, # 7 Exhibit Declaration of Angel Badea, # 8 Exhibit Declaration of Glenda Black, # 9 Exhibit Declaration of Edward Ellington)(Smith, John) (Entered: 02/15/2018)

02/15/2018 1638 MOTION for Hearing REGARDING INFORMAL DISCOVERY PRIOR TO REMEDIAL TRIAL ON CLASSIFICATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND RESIDENTIAL UNITS OUT−OF−CELL TIME AND TREATMENT by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/15/2018)

02/15/2018

1639

TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's request for a status conference (Doc. 1638 ) is GRANTED as follows. The parties shall convene for a telephone status conference on February 21, 2018 at 2:00 p.m. Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to make arrangements for this call and to inform the court of the call−in information in advance. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer, in person or by telephone, in an attempt to resolve the issues raised in Plaintiffs' request, and no later than close of business on February 20, 2018 shall submit a joint report regarding the status of plaintiff's informal discovery requests relating to the March 12, 2018 remedial hearing, which shall identify all remaining areas of disagreement and set out each party's position on each discovery request still in dispute. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/15/2018. (furn: calendar, wr)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2018)

02/15/2018 1641 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1623 Order, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/15/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continued on 2/15/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018 1640 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 291 of 408

02/16/2018

1642

ORDER RE: SEGREGATION AND "131 INMATES": Based on the representations made in open court on February 16, 2018, it is ORDERED as follows: By February 20, 2018, at noon, the defendants are to file with the court a list of those members of the 131 inmates with serious mental illness previously identified, see Order (doc. no. 1623 ), who are currently placed in segregation, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018

1643

ORDER RE: SEGREGATION LIST: Based on the representations made in open court on February 16, 2018, it is ORDERED as follows: Until further notice, defendants are to produce to plaintiffs, by each Monday at noon, a list of inmates in Alabama Department of Corrections custody who are currently housed in segregation, which shall include the mental−health code of each inmate. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018

1644

ORDER RE: SEGREGATION REBUTTAL WITNESS LIST: Based on the representations made in open court on February 16, 2018, it is ORDERED as follows: By February 21, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., the defendants are to file a list of witnesses they intend to call to provide rebuttal evidence to the evidence presented by plaintiffs at the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment evidentiary hearing on segregation remedy. The list shall include a summary of each witness's testimony. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018

1645

ORDER RE: HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE AND "13 OR SO INMATES": Based on the representations made in open court on February 16, 2018, it is ORDERED that the defendants are, by February 23, 2018 at 5:00 p.m., to file with the court a list of the '13 or so' inmates alleged by the plaintiffs as in need of hospital−level mental−health care or in need of assessment for whether they need hospital−level mental−health care. If the defendants are unable to identify those inmates based on the representations of plaintiffs' counsel, defense counsel are, by February 18, 2018, at noon, to notify. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018 1646 ORAL ORDER that the defendants produce to the plaintiffs the generated list of inmates in segregation along with their MH code each Monday. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018

1647

ORDER RE: HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE SCHEDULE: Based on the representations made in open court on February 16, 2018, it is ORDERED that, by February 19, 2018, at noon, the parties are jointly to file a proposed schedule for the hearing on the hospital−level care issue. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 2/16/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018

1648

AMENDED ORDER RE: HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE SCHEDULE (REPLACING DOC. NO. 1647 ): Based on the representations made in open court on February 16, 2018, it is ORDERED that, by February 21, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., the parties are jointly to file a proposed schedule for the hearing on the hospital−level care issue. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/16/2018

1649

Response to Order re 1604 Order Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposal Regarding Identification, Classification, and Residential Unit Out−of−Cell Time and Treatment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Training Classes Available at All Facilities, # 2 Exhibit B − NCCHC)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/16/2018 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/19/2018 1650 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1566 Memorandum Opinion and Order,, Joint Report of the Parties (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/19/2018)

02/20/2018 1651 PHASE 1 ORDER RE: ADA SETTLEMENT ARBITRATION PROCEDURE: Based on the representations made in open court on February 15, 2018, and based on the agreement of both parties, it is ORDERED that the joint report

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 292 of 408

regarding the ADA settlement arbitration procedure, including how a prisoner is to invoke that procedure, previously due on February 19, 2018, is now due on February 23, 2018, at 5:00 p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/20/2018.(kh, ) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018 1652 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018 1653 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018 1654 ORDERED that, by February 27, 2018, the plaintiffs are to reply to the defendants' response (including video evidence) (doc. no. 1637 ) to the motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 1614 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018 1655 TEXT ORDER granting 1652 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal; granting 1653 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/20/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018 1656 PHASE 2A UNDERSTAFFING REMEDIAL OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018

1657

PHASE 2A UNDERSTAFFING REMEDIAL ORDER: In accordance with the opinion entered this day, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that defendants Commissioner Jefferson Dunn and Associate Commissioner of Health Services Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with their remedial plan (as modified by later filings, including a timeline, and the orders and the accompanying opinion of the court) for understaffing in the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC). The defendants are to comply with ALL deadlines in the plan, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018 1658 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1642 Order, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018

1659

JOINT REPORT ON THE STATUS PLAINTIFFS' INFORMAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS PERTAINING TO DEFENDANTS PROPOSED REMEDIAL PLAN ON INTAKE, REFERRALS, CLASSIFICATION AND THE RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT UNITS AND STABILIZATION UNITS by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/21/2018 to add as filed on behalf of addditional parties(kh, ). (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/21/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held by telephone on 2/21/2018 (NO PDF ATTACHED). (Recording Time FTR: 2:00 PM − 2:17 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 02/21/2018)

02/21/2018

1660

ORDER: Based upon the representations made during the telephone conference held on today's date, it is ORDERED as follows: (1). No later than March 5, 2018, Defendants are to respond to the informal discovery requests served on February 2, 2018. (2). As to Interrogatory No. 17, Defendants may elect either to (a) respond to the interrogatory based solely on their review of each inmate's Master Problem List, or (b) produce to Plaintiffs a copy of the Master Problem List for all inmates within the scope of the request. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/21/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/21/2018)

02/21/2018 1661 AMENDED NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1658 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 2/21/2018 to clarify to the docket text. (kh, ). (Entered: 02/21/2018)

02/21/2018 1662 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/21/2018)

02/21/2018 1663 Joint Proposed Schedule for Hospital Level Care Remedial Trial by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, and All Plaintiffs re 1648 Order, (Lunsford, William) Modified on 2/22/2018 to add as filed on behalf of

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 293 of 408

additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 02/21/2018)

02/22/2018 1664 MOTION to Expedite to Exclude Improper Rebuttal Witnesses and for Proper Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/22/2018)

02/23/2018 1665 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/23/2018)

02/23/2018 1666 TEXT ORDER granting 1665 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/23/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/23/2018)

02/23/2018 1667 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline Joint Report Concerning the ADA Arbitration Request Procedure re 1651 Order, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/23/2018)

02/23/2018 1668 MOTION to Strike 1637 Response in Opposition to Motion,, Defendants' Declarations and Exhibits to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/23/2018)

02/23/2018 1669 Response to Order re 1645 Order,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/23/2018)

02/23/2018 1670 Amended MOTION to Strike 1637 Response in Opposition to Motion,, Defendants' Declarations and Exhibits to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − E−mail − Clarification re Rebuttal Witnesses)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/23/2018)

02/26/2018 1671 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summaries for February 26, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/26/2018)

02/26/2018 1672 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/26/2018)

02/26/2018 1673 TEXT ORDER granting 1667 JOINT MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINES. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/26/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2018)

02/26/2018

1674

ORDER: By agreement of the parties as set forth in their Joint Proposed Schedule for Hospital Level Care (doc. no. 1663 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Defendants have notified plaintiffs that ADOC has seven inmates cleared to receive hospital−level care for their mental−health needs, at this time. Subject to an unforeseen event or issue, at least three of these prisoners should have been transferred to CRCC by 11:59 P.M. on Saturday, February 24, 2018, and the remaining four prisoners will be transferred to CRCC by 11:59 P.M. on Wednesday, March 7, 2018. Defendants shall file with the court a certification, under seal, showing the names, AIS numbers, and admission dates and times for each such group within one business day after admission. (2) The parties are to resume mediation on the hospital−level care remedy before the Honorable John Ott, on or before Monday, April 1, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/26/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2018)

02/26/2018

1675

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that the deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. nos. 1524 , 1604 and 1631 ) are further revised such that a hearing on the hospital−level care issue is set for July 9, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. Except for the addition of this hearing date, there are no changes, as further set out. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2018)

02/26/2018

1676

Joint Report Concerning the ADA Arbitration Request Procedure in Response to 1651 Order by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Stewart, Joseph) Modified on 2/27/2018 to clarify the docket text and add as filed on behalf of additional parries.(kh, ). (Entered: 02/26/2018)

02/26/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 2/26/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 294 of 408

Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/26/2018)

02/27/2018 1677 NOTICE by Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn The State's Witness Summaries for February 27, 2018 (Smith, John) Modified on 2/27/2018 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 02/27/2018)

02/27/2018

1678

ORDER: For the reasons stated in open court on February 26, 2018, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The due process issue involving the transfer of inmates for inpatient mental−health care, is set for an evidentiary hearing on July 9, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., during the evidentiary hearing on hospital−level care remedy. The parties should be prepared to present evidence regarding the nature of CRCC and its relationship to ADOC. (2) Pending the resolution of the Vitek issue, and as an interim measure, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program ("ADAP") is to consult with inmates determined by the defendants to require transfer for hospital−level mental−health care. ADOC is to assess if those inmates have any objections to their transfer or, if the consultation takes place after transfer, to their continued placement for such care, and shall determine whether any objections should be brought to the courts attention. The defendants are to provide ADAP access to inmates for such consultations, if possible prior to the inmates' transfer. The court believes that this interim measure best balances the inmates' need for immediate relief with the need that the Vitek issue be resolved carefully and deliberatively. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/27/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/27/2018)

02/27/2018

1679

REPLY BRIEF re 1614 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction for Immediate Closure of Bibb Correctional Facility Segregation Unit, 1637 Response in Opposition to Motion,, in Support of Their Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Requiring the Immediate Closure of Bibb Correctional Facility's Segregation Units filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Bibb Segregation − Jan. 4 − 8, 2018, # 2 Exhibit B − Bibb Segregation − Feb. 1 − 8, 2018)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/27/2018)

02/27/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing begun on 2/27/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/27/2018)

02/27/2018 1686 CERTIFICATION OF CRCC ADMISSION by Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn (kh, ) (Entered: 03/01/2018)

02/28/2018 1680 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summaries for February 28, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 02/28/2018)

02/28/2018 1681 ORDER RE: HEAT SENSITIVITY: It is ORDERED that the parties' joint report regarding the status of the issue of "heat sensitivity" (doc. no. 1650 ) is approved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/28/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/28/2018)

02/28/2018

1682

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing concluded on 2/28/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/7/2018: # 2 Exhibits List) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/13/2018: # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs Exhibits List) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/13/2018: # 4 Exhibit Defendants Exhibit List #1, # 5 Exhibit Defendant Exhibit #2, # 6 Exhibit Defendants Exhibit List #3, # 7 Exhibit Defendants Exhibiits List #4) (ag, ). Modified on 3/13/2018 (ag, ).(ALL EXHIBITS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS ON DISC AND THUMB DRIVES IN BINDER WITH THE CASE FILE) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/24/2018: # 8 Exhibit Pla. Dem Exh. 183) (ag, ). (Entered: 02/28/2018)

03/01/2018

1683

ORDER: As stated in open court on February 26, 2018, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 1614 ) is folded into the resolution of the issue of segregation remedy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). The court will consider only "admissible evidence" presented at the segregation remedy hearing. Thus, if the defendants want the court to consider the videos and testimony regarding them, they must present the videos and related testimony as evidence (in an understandable form) at the hearing. The court will also consider whether to enter a partial, interim relief order on an expedited

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 295 of 408

basis prior to entering any more comprehensive remedial order on segregation. It is further ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to strike (doc. no. 1670 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/1/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/01/2018)

03/01/2018 1684 ORDERED that plaintiffs' expedited motion to exclude improper rebuttal witnesses and for proper witness list (doc. no. 1664 ) is denied. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/1/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/01/2018)

03/01/2018

1685

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: At the oral request of the parties made on February 28, 2018, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. nos. 1524 , 1604 , 1631 and 1675 ) are further revised such as follows: Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 3/12/2018 reset to 3/21/2018, 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 4/4/2018 reset to 6/1/2018, 10:00 AM, in chambers, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 4/9/2018 reset to 6/11/2018, 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/1/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/01/2018)

03/01/2018

1687

PHASE 2A ORDER RE: SEGREGATION REMEDY: Based on the representations made in open court on February 28, 2018, it is ORDERED that the parties are to report back to the court on or before March 19, 2018, on the following issues:(1) The issues that the parties are "confident" that they can reach an agreement on, as further set out. (2) The issues that the parties are "hopeful" that they can reach an agreement on, as further set out. (3) The issues that the parties "do not anticipate" being able to come to agreement, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/1/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/01/2018)

03/01/2018 1688 Defendants' Notice of Filing − Quarterly Staffing Report by Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn (Attachments: # 1 A − Quarterly Staffing Report)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/02/2018)

03/02/2018

1689

PHASE 2A ORDER RE: SEGREGATION REMEDY: The court having received all evidence regarding the segregation remedy, with the possible exceptions of the "videotapes and affidavit witnesses," it is ORDERED that the parties are to notify the court by March 20, 2018, as to how the court should proceed with regard to these two pieces of evidence. Furthermore, assuming the parties will not want the court to consider any additional live, in−court evidence, it is ORDERED that post−trial briefing is as follows: (1) By March 24, 2018, the parties should submit to the court a joint statement, as further set out. (2) The defendants are to submit post−trial briefs (in the form of a proposed opinion) by April 3, 2018. The plaintiffs are to do the same by April 10, 2018. The defendants may file a reply by April 17. 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/2/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/02/2018)

03/05/2018

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 3/5/2018 03:00 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 03/05/2018)

03/05/2018 1690 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 3/5/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/05/2018)

03/06/2018

1691

ORDER: Pursuant to the parties' segregation−remedy stipulations made in open court on February 28, 2018, and the representations made on the record on March 5, 2018, it is ORDERED that, on or before noon on March 8, 2018, the parties are to file a joint statement as the specific date when the "Burns and Perrien training module" will be developed and available for use by all the appropriate mental−health staff. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/6/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/06/2018)

03/07/2018 1692 JOINT MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 1691 Order,, by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn, Ruth Naglich and Alabama Department of Corrections. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/7/2018 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ).

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 296 of 408

(Entered: 03/07/2018)

03/07/2018 1693 TEXT ORDER granting 1692 JOINT MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 1691 Order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/7/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/07/2018)

03/08/2018

1694

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: At the oral request of the parties made on 2/28/18, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. nos. 1524 , 1604 , 1631 and 1675 ) are further revised such as follows: Evidentiary Hearing for Identification/Classification issue previously set for 3/21/2018 @ 9:00 a.m. RESET to 4/4/2018 @ 09:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in Courtroom 2FMJ, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/8/18. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 03/08/2018)

03/08/2018

Corrected Hearings pursuant to 1694 order: Evidentiary Hearing set for 4/4/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 6/11/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 7/9/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 9/10/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 10/22/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/08/2018)

03/13/2018

1695

JOINT STATUS REPORT − Regarding Training Module on Serious Mental Illness Designation by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn and Ruth Naglich, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program . (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/14/2018 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 03/13/2018)

03/16/2018

1696

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Request for Status Conference Regarding Informal Discovery Prior to Remedial Trial on Classification, Identification and Residential Unit Out−Of−Cell Time and Treatment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs' Informal Discovery Requests, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Defendants' Responses and Objections to Informal Discovery Requests, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Wexford Contract − signature page, # 4 Exhibit 4 − March 6th e−mail, # 5 Exhibit 5 − March 12th e−mail)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/16/2018)

03/16/2018

MOTION − Plaintiffs' Request for Status Conference Regarding Informal Discovery Prior to Remedial Trial on Classification, Identification and Residential Unit Out−Of−Cell Time and Treatment by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 1696 for pdf. Attorney e−filed with the incorrect event code.)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/16/2018)

03/16/2018

1697

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that the motion (Doc. 1696 ) is GRANTED, and this matter is set for a telephonic status conference on March 22, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), Plaintiffs are instructed (1) to inform the court at least one business day before the scheduled conference call; and (2) to arrange the call and to provide the court with call−in instructions at least one business day before the scheduled conference call. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 3/16/2018. (furn: calendar, wr)(no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 03/16/2018)

03/19/2018 1698 STATUS REPORT (Joint) Regarding Segregation−Related Issues by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn and Ruth Naglich, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program . (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/20/2018 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties, (kh, ). (Entered: 03/19/2018)

03/19/2018 1699 MOTION Add Topic to Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/19/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 297 of 408

03/20/2018 1700 TEXT ORDER granting 1699 Motion to Add Topic to Status Conference. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 3/20/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/20/2018)

03/20/2018 1701 Response to Order re 1689 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/23/2018 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 03/20/2018)

03/22/2018 1702 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held on 3/22/2018 (NO PDF ATTACHED)(Recording Time FTR: 2:20 PM − 2:30 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 03/22/2018)

03/22/2018

1703

ORDER: Based upon the representations made during the telephone conference held on this date, it is ORDERED that Defendants are to provide responses to the two discovery requests in dispute no later than the close of business on March 27, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 3/22/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/22/2018)

03/24/2018 1704 Response to Order re 1689 Order,,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/24/2018)

03/26/2018

Motions No Longer Referred to Magistrate Judge Borden, pursuant to instructions of Judge Thompson's chambers: 1399 MOTION for Discovery Motion to Re−Open Discovery Regarding Dental Claim (Opposed) (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/26/2018)

03/26/2018

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 3/27/2018 07:45 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 03/26/2018)

03/27/2018 1705 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 3/27/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 7:50 − 8:19.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/27/2018)

03/28/2018

1706

ORDER directing as follows: (1) the parties are to present the remaining evidence regarding segretation remedy beginning on 4/4/2018; (2) since the parties are presenting additional evidence, the court will set new deadlines for the segregation remedy post−trial briefs at the hearing on 4/4/2018, or later. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/28/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/28/2018)

03/28/2018 1707 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/28/2018)

03/28/2018 1708 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Pretrial Submission Summarizing Evidence and the Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on Remedy by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/28/2018)

03/28/2018 1709 PHASE 2 PRETRIAL BRIEF on plf's emergency motion for preliminary injunction, etc. by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/29/2018 to clarify text to reflect as Phase 2 pretrial brief re: motion for preliminary injunction (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 03/28/2018)

03/28/2018 1710 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 1589 Order,, PLAINTIFFS PRETRIAL SUBMISSION IDENTIFYING WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS FOR THE REMEDIAL TRIAL ON IDENTIFICATION, CLASSIFICATION, AND RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT UNITS (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/28/2018)

03/28/2018 1711 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/28/2018)

03/28/2018

Exhibit List for the Hearing on plf's motion for preliminary injunction regarding Bibb Corr Fac segregation units and identification, classification and residential unit out−of−cell time and treatment by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See Docket entry 1707 ). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/28/2018

Witness List and Exhibit List for the remedial trial on identification, classification, and residential treatment units by All Plaintiffs (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See Docket entry 1710 . (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 298 of 408

03/28/2018

MOTION for non−attorney staff technology request by All Plaintiffs. (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See Docket entry 1711 ). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018 1712 TEXT ORDER granting 1711 Motion for non−attorney staff technology request for hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/29/18. Furnished to Clerk, AG & US Marshal. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018 1713 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Smith, John) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018

MOTION for non−attorney staff technology request by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See docket entry 1713 ). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018 1714 TEXT ORDER granting 1713 Motion for non−attorney staff technology request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/29/18. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). Furnished to Clerk, AG, & US Marshal. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018

1715

MOTION to Compel COMPLIANCE WITH THE PHASE 2A UNDERSTAFFING REMEDIAL ORDER, REQUEST FOR CONSIDERATION ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Email Exchange Between Eldon Vail and the Savages, # 2 Exhibit 2−3.14.2018 Email from M. Morris to B. Lunsford RE Savages' Collaboration, # 3 Exhibit 3−3.16.2018 Email from M. Morris to Def. Counsel RE Savages' Collaboration)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018 1716 ORDER Pursuant to the court's 1683 order of 3/1/2018, it is ORDERED that the 1668 motion to strike is denied as moot as well. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/29/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018

1717

PHASE 2B ORDER directing as follows: (1) the following motions are denied without prejudice and with leave to renew: Plfs' 665 Motion to Certify Class for Phase II; plfs' 1256 Motion to re−open discovery for Phase 2B; and plf's 1403 Motion to Certify Class regarding dental claim; (2) defs' 1275 Motion for a temporary Stay is denied; (3) the following motions are granted: plf's 1398 Motion to Amend and plf's 1399 Motion to re−open Discovery regarding dental claim; an opinion will follow explaining the bases for this ruling. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/29/18. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist) (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018

1718

ORDER directing that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636, matters relating to this courts remedial 1656 opinion and 1657 order regarding understaffing are referred to United States Magistrate Judge Gray Borden, with allowable review, in turn, by this court pursuant to 636, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/29/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018 1719 MOTION to Present Limited Additional Evidence in Remedial Trial on Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/29/2018)

03/29/2018

1721

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Excerpt of Bench Trial Proceedings Testimony of Margaret Hayes Savage (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/5/2017, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/19/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/30/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/27/2018. (djy, ) . (Entered: 03/30/2018)

03/30/2018

1720

PHASE 2A ORDER RE: SEGREGATION REMEDY directing that the following stipulations made by the parties in open court on 2/28/2018, as clarified during an on−the−record conference call on 3/5/2018, are approved: (1) the ADOC will use the definition of serious mental illness (SMI) that has been adopted and published by the American Correctional Association, which is set forth in plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibit 174; (2) Dr. Kathryn Burns and Dr.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 299 of 408

Mary Perrien will work together to develop a training module for the ADOC's mental−health staff, as further set out in order; (3) the SMI designation will be independent from the ADOC's mental−health coding system and will be identified by a flag or a warning signal, or a signal somewhere else within the electronic system; (4) an SMI designation may only be made by an individual who is a member of the ADOC's vendor's mental−health staff who is authorized under Alabama law to diagnose a mental−health condition; further ORDERING that, pursuant to the parties joint statement (doc. no. 1695), the Burns and Perrien training module is to be complete by 5/31/2018, and ADOC is to make the training module available for use by appropriate mental−health staff by 7/31/2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/30/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/30/2018)

03/30/2018

1722

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Excerpt of Bench Trial Proceedings Testimony of Brian Bateh (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/6/2017, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/20/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/30/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/28/2018. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/30/2018)

03/30/2018 1723 ORDER directing that defendants are to file a response to the 1719 MOTION to Present Limited Additional Evidence in Remedial Trial on Segregation by noon on 4/2/2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/30/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/30/2018)

03/30/2018 1724 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Technology Request (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 03/30/2018)

03/31/2018 1725 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1657 Order,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Dr. Stephen Condrey's Report)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/31/2018)

04/02/2018 1726 TEXT ORDER granting 1724 The State's Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/2/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/02/2018)

04/02/2018 1727 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1719 MOTION to Present Limited Additional Evidence in Remedial Trial on Segregation filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 04/02/2018)

04/02/2018 1728 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 04/02/2018)

04/02/2018

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 4/3/2018 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 04/02/2018)

04/02/2018 1729 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 1298 Order, Notice of Filing Joint Status Report (Attachments: # 1 Under Seal − Joint Status Report)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 4/3/2018) (djy, ). (Entered: 04/02/2018)

04/03/2018

1730

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Excerpt of Bench Trial Proceedings testimony of Grantt Culliver Volume I (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 2/8/2018, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/24/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/4/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/2/2018. (djy, ) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/03/2018 1731 ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claims

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 300 of 408

(doc. nos. 1524 , 1604 , 1631 , 1675 , 1685 , and 1694 ) are further revised as follows: IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION Evidentiary Hearing set for 4/4/18 at 9:00 a.m. is RESET for 4/17/2018 @ 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing set for 6/11/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/3/18. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/03/2018

1732

ORDER directing that the issue of plaintiffs' immediate access to Holman prison to interview certain inmates concerning the issue presented in the motion to present limited additional segregation evidence re: 1719 MOTION is referred to Magistrate Judge Gray Borden for resolution. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/3/18. (djy, ). (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/03/2018

1733

ORDER GRANTING 1719 MOTION to Present Limited Additional Evidence in Remedial Trial on Segregation ; Evidentiary Hearing to hear evidence is set for 4/16/2018 @ 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; the evidence cited in the motion is relevant because it directly relates to the issue of segregation remedy, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/3/18. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/03/2018

1734

ORDER directing that plfs file a motion for access to Holman prison no later than 4/4/2018; directing plfs to articulate precisely the nature of the requested relief; defs may file a response to plf's motion no later than 4/5/2018, at which time the matter will be under submission without oral argument unless otherwise directed. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/3/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/03/2018 1735 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 4/3/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.)(FTR 10:14 − 11:01) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/03/2018 1736 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Amended Bibb Segregation and Identification, Classification and Residential Treatment Units Remedial Trials Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/04/2018 1737 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summaries for April 4, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 04/04/2018)

04/04/2018

1738

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: At the oral request of defense counsel, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. nos. 1524 , 1604 , 1631 , 1675 , 1685 , 1694 and 1731 ) are further revised as follows: IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION− Evidentiary Hearing set for 4/17/18 at 9:00 a.m. reschedule to 4/24/2018 at 9:00 a.m., as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/3/18. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(kh, ) (Entered: 04/04/2018)

04/04/2018

1739

ORDERED that the evidentiary hearing pursuant to the plaintiffs' motion to present limited additional segregation evidence (doc. no. 1719 ), now set for April 16, 2018, is reset for April 23, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/4/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/04/2018)

04/04/2018

1740

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF GRANTT CULLIVER− VOL II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 2/9/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/25/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/7/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 301 of 408

7/3/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/04/2018)

04/04/2018 1741 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 4/4/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/04/2018)

04/04/2018 1742 Response to Order re 1734 Order, Plaintiffs' Motion for Access to Prisoners at Holman Correctional Facility by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Kriste Doniver, # 2 Exhibit 2 − E−mails from Morris to Stewart)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/04/2018)

04/04/2018

MOTION for Access to Prisoners at Holman Correctional Facility by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docek entry 1742 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/05/2018 1743 Response to Order re 1734 Order, Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Access to Prisoners at Holman Correctional Facility by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/05/2018)

04/06/2018

1744

PHASE 2A ORDER: SEGREGATION REMEDY: The court having received all evidence regarding the segregation remedy−−with the exception of the evidence concerning the alleged suicide at Holman, to be heard on April 23, 2018−−what remains is to hear oral argument and require appropriate post−trial submissions. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that oral argument is set for that defendants are to submit post−trial briefs (in the form of a proposed opinion) by May 11, 2018. The plaintiffs are to do the same by May 21, 2018. The defendants may file a reply by May 25, 2018. It is further ORDERED that oral argument is set for June 11, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ,One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/6/2018. (kh, )(furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/06/2018

1745

ORDER: Pending before the court is the plaintiffs' Motion for Access to Prisoners at Holman Correctional Facility (Doc. 1742 ), to which the defendants have filed an opposition brief (Doc. 1743 ). For the reasons stated below, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Accordingly, and consistent with the findings set forth above, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion (Doc. 1742 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: 1. Plaintiffs' counsel shall be allowed to interview the eight inmates referenced in their motion. 2. The defendants shall facilitate plaintiffs' counsel's access to Holman for the purpose of conducting inmate interviews on April 11, 2018 for a total of no less than 90 minutes. 3. The defendants shall facilitate plaintiffs' counsels access to Holman for the purpose of conducting inmate interviews on one other date prior to April 20, 2018 for a total no less than 90 minutes. 4. If they have not already done so, plaintiffs' counsel shall provide to defense counsel the names and Alabama Institutional Serial Numbers of the eight inmates to be interviewed by the close of business on April 6, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/6/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/06/2018

1746

AMENDED PHASE 2A ORDER: SEGREGATION REMEDY (Replacing doc. no. 1744 ): The court having received all evidence regarding the segregation remedy−−with the exception of the evidence concerning the alleged suicide at Holman, to be heard on April 23, 2018−−what remains is to hear oral argument and require appropriate post−trial submissions. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants are to submit post−trial briefs (in the form of a proposed opinion) by May 11, 2018. The plaintiffs are to do the same by May 21, 2018. The defendants may file a reply by May 25, 2018. It is further ORDERED that oral argument is set for June 11, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/6/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/06/2018 1747 MOTION to Present Limited Additional Evidence During Remedial Trial on Segregation Regarding an Additional Suicide in Segregation (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 302 of 408

04/06/2018 1748 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Joint Submission of Stipulations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Stipulations regarding Bibb County Correctional Facility Segregation Units)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/06/2018 1749 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 4/6/2018 04:15 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/6/18. (NO PDF ATTACHED)(war, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/06/2018 1750 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 4/6/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time FTR: 4:22 pm − 4:44 pm.) (war, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/09/2018

1751

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION RE: BIBB SEGREGATION REMEDY − On April 4, 2018, the parties submitted stipulations in open court regarding the issues raised in the plaintiffs' "emergency motion for temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction requiring the immediate closure of Bibb Correctional Facility's segregation units." They agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an enforceable order and further agreed to some clarifications of the stipulations. Accordingly it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1748 ), as clarified in open court on April 4, 2018, are approved. (2) Pursuant to the stipulations, the plaintiffs' emergency motion for temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction requiring the immediate closure of Bibb Correctional Facility's segregation units (doc. no. 1614 ) is withdrawn with prejudice. (3) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich areENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 4, 2018. As part of the clarifications made in open court on April 4, 2018, it is further ORDERED that, with regard to subsection II.2.ii of the attached provisions, defendants Dunn and Naglich are affirmatively to inform clinicians (as that term was clarified in open court on April 4, 2018), in a manner that is documented, (1) that they have both the authority AND the obligation to inform corrections when they have "determined that [an] inmate's likelihood of decompensation requires a transfer to an RTU, SLU, or Stabilization Unit (SU)" and (2) that such a determination is not merely giving advice to corrections, but that it will trump any decision to the contrary and will be carried out promptly. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/9/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/09/2018)

04/09/2018

1752

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that this matter is set for a telephone status conference on Thursday, April 12, 2018, at 3:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), Plaintiffs are instructed (1) to inform the court at least one business day before the scheduled conference call; and (2) to arrange the call and to provide the court with call−in instructions at least one business day before the scheduled conference call. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/9/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(furn: calendar, wr)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/09/2018)

04/09/2018 1753 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1747 MOTION to Present Limited Additional Evidence During Remedial Trial on Segregation Regarding an Additional Suicide in Segregation (Opposed) filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/09/2018)

04/11/2018

1754

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS SECOND REQUEST TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON SEGREGATION: Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' second request to present limited additional evidence regarding segregation (doc. no. 1747 ) is granted. That evidence is to be heard at the hearing on April 23, 2018, regarding the first alleged suicide. (2) Plaintiffs are, by April 13, 2018, to identify to defendants any witnesses they anticipate calling on this issue. (3) Upon hearing the above evidence, the evidence regarding segregation remedy will be closed until the entry of any remedial order. Additional evidence will not be heard by the court absent extraordinary circumstances, as described in this opinion and order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered:

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 303 of 408

04/11/2018)

04/12/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Telephone Conference held on 4/12/2018 (NO PDF ATTACHED). (Recording Time FTR: 3:02 PM −3:22 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 04/12/2018)

04/13/2018 1755 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/13/2018)

04/13/2018

1756

MOTION Status Conference Regarding Informal Discovery by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − Informal Discovery Requests for Upcoming Hearing − Holman, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 − RE_Informal Discovery Requests for Upcoming Hearing − St. Clair, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3 − RE_Informal Discovery Requests for upcoming Hearing, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4 − RE_Informal Discovery Requests for Upcoming Hearing)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/13/2018)

04/13/2018 1757 MOTION Status Conference To Compel Access to Holman re 1754 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,, by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Emails re Access to Holman Prisoners)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 4/16/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 04/13/2018)

04/16/2018 1758 ORDER denying 1757 Motion for Immediate Status Conference to Compel Access to Prisoners at Holman Correctional Facility, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2018)

04/16/2018

1759

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that the motion (Doc. 1756 ) is GRANTED. This matter is set for a telephone status conference tomorrow, Tuesday, April 17, 2018, at 1:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), Plaintiffs are instructed (1) to immediately inform the court; and (2) to arrange the call and to provide all participants, including the court, with call−in instructions as soon as possible but no later than 2 hours before the scheduled conference call. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/16/2018. (furn: wr, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2018)

04/16/2018 1760 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Second Amended Exhibit List for Limited Additional Segregation Remedial Evidence and the Identification, Classification and Residential Treatment Units Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/16/2018)

04/17/2018

1761

ORDER: Based upon the representations made during the telephone conference held on April 17, 2018, it is ORDERED that, on a rolling basis and to be completed no later than noon on April 19, 2018, the defendants are to produce the following documentation responsive to the plaintiffs' ORDER informal discovery requests (Docs. 1756 −1 & −2) regarding the alleged suicides at Holman and St. Clair, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/17/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/17/2018)

04/17/2018 1762 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Pretrial Submission Summarizing Evidence and the Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on Remedy Regarding Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/17/2018)

04/17/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden: Status Conference held on 4/17/2018 (NO PDF ATTACHED). (Recording Time FTR: 1:02 PM − 1:35 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/18/2018

1763

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. no. 1738 ) is further revised as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/18/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/18/2018)

04/19/2018

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 4/19/2018 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 04/19/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 304 of 408

04/19/2018 1764 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 4/19/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:07 − 10:47.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/19/2018)

04/19/2018 1765 TEXT ORDER: Evidentiary Hearing set for 4/23/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/19/2018. (previously set to begin at 10:00)(ag, ) (Entered: 04/19/2018)

04/19/2018

1766

ORDERED as follows: 1) By 9:00 a.m. on Monday, April 23, 2018, the parties are to submit the stipulations reached with respect to intake, referral and classification. 2) By 12:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 24, 2018, the parties are each to submit an affirmative statement clearly delineating what the liability opinion requires to remedy the deficiencies in the residential treatment units. The affirmative statement should include pincites to the reported opinion, see Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (Thompson, J.), to indicate what in the opinion supports the asserted position. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/19/2018)

04/19/2018

Set Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 4/23/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 4/24/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 6/11/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 7/9/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 9/10/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 10/22/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson previously cleared in error by the 1765 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 04/19/2018)

04/19/2018 1767 MOTION to Quash Subpoena by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Jeanetta Thomas, # 2 Exhibit B))(Lunsford, William). (Entered: 04/19/2018)

04/19/2018 1768 ORDER: It is ORDERED that, on or before noon on April 20, 2018, plaintiffs are to file a response to defendants' motion to quash subpoena (doc. no. 1767 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/19/2018)

04/19/2018 1769 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Smith, John) (Entered: 04/19/2018)

04/20/2018 1770 MOTION for Staff Technology Request by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 1769 )(kh, ) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

04/20/2018 1771 TEXT ORDER granting 1770 MOTION for Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/20/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

04/20/2018

1772

ORDER: On the afternoon of April 19, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to quash the plaintiff's subpoena of non−party Jeanetta Thomas (doc. no. 1767 ), whom the subpoena commanded to appear to testify on Monday, April 23. The court immediately ordered plaintiffs to respond by the following day at noon, see Order (doc. no. 1768 ), and attempted to set up an emergency on−the−record phone call to discuss the merits of defendants' motion. In light of short timing and oral representations from defense counsel that they are unable to attend any such phone call on April 20, 2018, it is ORDERED that the defendants are, in the meantime, to prepare for non−party Jeanetta Thomas to testify and produce any necessary documents in the event that the court does not grant the motion after an on−the−record hearing on the motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

04/20/2018

1773

RESPONSE in Opposition re 1767 MOTION to Quash Subpoena filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Proof of Service Perfected on Jeanetta Thomas pn April 19, 2018, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Map of Distance Between St. Clair and Montgomery Federal Courthouse, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Teresa Houser's Responses to Subpoena Dated Jan. 26, 2018, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Emails Between Maria Morris and Bill Lunsford Dated April 12, 13, and 16, 2018, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Declaration of Tonya

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 305 of 408

White−Evans, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Email from Tonya White−Evans to All Parties)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

04/20/2018

1774

ORDER: It is ORDERED that the dfts' 1767 motion to quash is set for hearing on 4/23/2018, at 9:00 AM, in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/20/2018. (Furnished: Calendar & AG)(alm, ) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

04/20/2018 1775 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Third Amended Exhibit List for Limited Additional Segregation Remedial Evidence and the Identification, Classification and Residential Treatment Units Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

04/23/2018 1776 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

04/23/2018 1777 STATUS REPORT Regarding Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

04/23/2018 1778 ORAL ORDER denying 1767 Motion to Quash. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/23/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

04/23/2018 1779 STIPULATION re 1766 Order,, Mental Health Coding and SMI Implementation Stipulations by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

04/23/2018 1780 STIPULATION re 1766 Order,, Stipulations Regarding Mental Health Intake by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

04/23/2018 1781 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 4/23/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/23/2018)

04/24/2018 1782 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summaries for April 24, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018 1783 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018 1784 ORDER denying 1767 Motion to Quash, for the reasons stated in open court on 4/23/2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/24/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018 1785 ORDER directing that, by no later than 12:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 24, 2018, the parties are to submit the stipulations reached with respect to referral, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/24/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018 1786 STIPULATION re 1766 Order,, Stipulation Regarding Mental Health Referral Process by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018 1787 Response to Order re 1766 Order,, The State's Statement Regarding Residential Treatment Units In The Liability Opinion by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018

1788

MOTION for Order re 1717 Order on Motion to Certify Class,,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,, Order on Motion to Stay,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,, Order on Motion for Discovery,,,,, Plaintiffs' Motion for Scheduling Order (Opposed) by Sheila Allen, Tedrick Brooks, Matthew Mork, Leviticus Pruitt, William Sullivan. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018 1789 Response to Order re 1766 Order,, Plaintiffs' Brief Delineating What the Mental−Health Liability Opinion Requires to Remedy the Deficiencies in ADOC's Residential Treatment Units by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/24/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/24/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 306 of 408

04/25/2018 1790 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summary for April 25, 2018 (Smith, John) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/25/2018

1791

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on April 24, 2018, regarding the Phase 2A remedial trial on identification and classification, it is ORDERED that, no later than 12:00 p.m. on Monday, April 30, 2018, the parties are to submit their revised stipulations reached with respect to mental−health referrals. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/25/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/25/2018

1792

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL−HEALTH IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION REMEDY (CODING): On April 23, 2018, the parties submitted stipulations to the court regarding mental−health intake. In open court on April 24, 2018, they agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an enforceable order and further agreed to some clarifications of the stipulations. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows:(1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1779 ), as clarified in open court on April 24, 2018, and as attached this order, are approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 24, 2018 and as attached this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/25/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/25/2018

1793

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on April 23, 2018, regarding the Phase 2A remedial trial on segregation, it is ORDERED that, no later than 12:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 25, 2018, the parties are to submit the stipulations reached with respect to issues submitted to Dr. Burns and Dr. Perrien, including but not necessarily limited to: assessments prior to placement in segregation, mental−health rounds, and periodic assessments. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/25/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/25/2018

1794

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL−HEALTH IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION REMEDY (INTAKE: On April 23, 2018, the parties submitted stipulations to the court regarding Mental Health Intake. In open court on April 24 and 25, 2018, they agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an enforceable order and further agreed to some clarifications of the stipulations. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDG]MENT and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The stipulations (doc. no. [1780), as clarified in open court on April 24 and 25, 2018, are approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 24 and 25, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/25/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/25/2018 1795 Response to Order Plaintiffs' Summary of the Segregation Remedial Evidence Relating to the Holman and St. Clair Suicides by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/25/2018

1796

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on April 23, 2018, regarding the Phase 2A remedial trial on segregation, it is ORDERED that, no later than 12:00 p.m. on Thursday, 4/26/2018, the parties are to submit the stipulations reached with respect to issues submitted to Dr. Burns and Dr. Perrien, including but not necessarily limited to: assessments prior to placement in segregation, mental−health rounds, and periodic assessments. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/25/2018.(djy, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/25/2018

1797

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Excerpt of Bench Trial Proceedings testimony of Cynthia Stewart (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on April 23, 2018, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/16/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/29/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/24/2018. (djy, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 307 of 408

04/25/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/25/2018 (No PDF attached, see final minute entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/26/2018 1798 STIPULATION re 1796 Order,, Regarding Pre−Placement in Segregation Screening, Mental Health Rounds in Segregation, and Periodic Assessments in Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

04/27/2018 1799 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Witness Summaries (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/27/2018)

04/27/2018 1800 Response to Order re 1674 Order,,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/27/2018)

04/27/2018

1801

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing concluded on 4/27/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) Modified on 5/1/2018 (ag, ). (Plaintiffs exhibits on Disc and Thumb drive in binder with case file) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2018: # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs Exhibits List) (ag, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/18/2018: # 3 Defendants Demo #49, # 4 D Demo #50) (ag, ). (Entered: 04/27/2018)

04/30/2018

1802

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on April 27, 2018, regarding the Phase 2A remedial trial on identification and classification, it is ORDERED that, the stipulations regarding referral, currently due on Monday, April 30, 2018 at 12:00 p.m., are due no later than 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday, May 2, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/30/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/30/2018)

04/30/2018

1803

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on April 27, 2018, regarding the segregation remedy stipulations on pre−placement assessments, mental−health rounds, and periodic assessments, it is ORDERED that, no later than 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday, May 2, 2018, the parties are to submit revised stipulations including a new periodic assessment form, which is to include a box for indicating when more frequent assessments are indicated, and at what intervals. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/30/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/30/2018)

04/30/2018

1804

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on April 27, 2018, regarding the segregation remedy stipulations on pre−placement assessments, mental−health rounds, and periodic assessments, it is ORDERED that, no later than 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday, May 2, 2018, the defendants are to file a response to the court's inquiry about monitoring and accountability when clinicians indicate that segregation placement is contraindicated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/30/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/30/2018)

04/30/2018 1805 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Proposed Dates Regarding the Briefing Schedule for Residential Treatment Units (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/30/2018)

05/01/2018 1806 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 05/01/2018)

05/01/2018 1807 TEXT ORDER granting 1806 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/1/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/01/2018)

05/01/2018

1808

PHASE 2A ORDER RE: RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT REMEDY because the parties have entered into stipulations as to intake and classification and intend to enter into a stipulation regarding referral, and because the court has now received all evidence as to the remaining issue to be resolved in this aspect of the litigation, that is, the residential treatment remedy, it is ORDERED that post−trial briefing is as follows: (1) By May 7, 2018, the parties should submit to the court a joint statement (a) describing the defendants' plan exactly and currently and (b) identifying what issues remain to be resolved by the court. (2) The defendants are to submit a post−trial brief(in the form of a proposed opinion) by May 11, 2018. The plaintiffs are to do the same by May 21, 2018. The defendants may file a reply by May 25, 2018. It is further ORDERED that oral argument is set for June 11, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 308 of 408

M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex,One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/1/2018. (kh, ) Modified on 5/1/2018 (kh, ). (Entered: 05/01/2018)

05/02/2018 1809 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline Submit Stipulations on Mental Health Referrals re 1802 Order, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, All Plaintiffs. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 5/2/2018 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 05/02/2018)

05/02/2018 1810 Response to Order re 1803 Order,, Joint Submission of Revised Segregation Mental−Health Periodic Assessment Form by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Mental Health Assessment Report Form)(Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 05/02/2018)

05/02/2018 1811 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1804 Order,, (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/02/2018)

05/02/2018 1812 TEXT ORDER granting 1809 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline Submit Stipulations on Mental Health Referrals re 1802 Order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/2/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/02/2018)

05/02/2018 1813 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1657 Order,, (Attachments: # 1 Errata A − Savages' Correctional Staffing Analysis Report to ADOC)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/02/2018)

05/02/2018 1814 STIPULATION Additional Stipulations Regarding Mental Health Referrals by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/02/2018)

05/03/2018

1815

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON SEGREGATION REMEDY (PRE−PLACEMENT, MENTAL−EALTH ROUNDS, PERIODIC EVALUATIONS): Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1798 ), as clarified in open court on April 27, 2018, as modified in subsequent submissions (doc. nos. 1810 & 1811 ), and as attached to this order, are approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified in open court on April 27, 2018, and as modified in subsequent submissions (doc. nos. 1810 & 1811 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/3/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/03/2018)

05/03/2018

1816

ORDER: Upon consideration of the parties' stipulations regarding mental−health referrals (doc. nos. 1786 and 1814 ), it is ORDERED that an on−the−record hearing is set for 9:00 a.m. on May 7, 2018. The parties are to arrange for the hearing to be conducted by conference call. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/3/2018. (furn: calendar, ag, court reporters)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/03/2018)

05/03/2018

1817

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/27/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/24/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/4/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/1/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/03/2018)

05/04/2018

1818

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. no. 1763 ) are further revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing and Oral Argument set for 7/9/18 at 9:00 a.m. reset 7/23/18 at 9:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/4/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/04/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 309 of 408

05/07/2018 1819 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 5/7/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Main Document 1819 replaced on 5/7/2018) (ag, ). (Entered: 05/07/2018)

05/07/2018

1820

ORDER: Based upon the representations made during the telephone conferences held on March 22, April 12, and April 17, 2018, and for good cause, ORDERED that the parties are to submit a joint proposal for the revised format for their quarterly Litigation Status Reports (see Doc. 1298 ) to propord_borden@almd.uscourts.gov no later than May 14, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 5/7/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/07/2018)

05/07/2018

1821

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL−HEALTH IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION REMEDY (REFERRAL): On April 24 and May 2, 2018, the parties submitted stipulations regarding mental−health referrals. They agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an enforceable order and further agreed to some clarifications of the stipulations during on−the−record hearings on April 24 and May 7, 2018. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The stipulations (doc. nos. 1786 and 1814 ), as clarified during on−the−record hearings on April 24 and May 7, 2018, and as attached to this order as Attachments A and B, are approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions (Attachments A and B), as clarified during on−the−record hearings on April 24 and May 7, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/7/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A, # 2 Attachment B)(kh, )</font (Entered: 05/07/2018)

05/07/2018 1822 Response to Order re 1808 Order,,,, Joint Response to Court's May 1, 2018 Phase 2A Order Re: Residential Treatment Remedy by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/07/2018)

05/08/2018

1823

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 5/7/2018, commencing at 9:07 a.m., before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/29/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/8/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/6/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/08/2018)

05/09/2018

1824

ORDERED that the Expedited Motion (Doc. 1715 ) is DENIED as moot with leave to refile in the event of future disputes associated with the consultants' collaborative process. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 5/9/2018. (kh, ) Modified on 5/9/2018 to add the correct judge's signature. (kh, ). (Entered: 05/09/2018)

05/09/2018 1825 Response to Order re 1674 Order,,, Certification of BBMC Admission by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/09/2018)

05/10/2018

1826

AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Complaint − Dental Claim against All Defendants, filed by Brandon Johnson, Rick Martin, Brian Sellers, Turner Rogers, Roger Moseley, Christopher Jackson, Christopher Gilbert, Willie McClendon, Brittany Ellis, Sylvester Hartley, Timothy Sears, William Sullivan, Joseph Torres, Matthew Mork, Cherritha Harris, Roger McCoy, Daletrick Hardy, Tedrick Brooks, Dwight Hagood, Daniel Tooley, Hubert Tollar, Serena English, Tomas Snyder, Zerrick Naylor, Augustus Smith, Gary Lee Broyles, Jermaine Mitchell, Leviticus Pruitt, Chandler Clements, Sheila Allen, Bradley Pearson, Justin Hall, Robert Myniasha Williams, Raymond Bosarge, Paul Folsom, Karen Norris, Charlie Henderson, Quang Bui, Edward Braggs, John Maner, Valerie Wheeler, Cordara Dunner, Tommie Moore, Donald Ray Turner.(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/10/2018)

05/11/2018 1827 MOTION to Compel Access to Prisoners in the Alabama Department of Corrections by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Doniver Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 2 −

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 310 of 408

Emails between M Morris and J Stewart, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Sandley Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Emails between M Morris and B Lunsford, M Reeves, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Excerpt of ADOC Monthly Statistical Report for March 2018, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Teehan Declaration)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/11/2018)

05/11/2018 1828 Response to Order re 1744 Order,,,, Set Hearings,,, The State by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/11/2018)

05/11/2018 1829 Response to Order re 1808 Order,,,, The State's Proposed Opinion Regarding Residential Out−of−Cell Time and Treatment Remedy by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/11/2018)

05/11/2018 1830 Response to Order re 1524 Order,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Set Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,,, The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Psychotherapy and Treatment Planning by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/11/2018)

05/14/2018

1831

ORDER: Upon consideration of the plaintiffs' Second Motion for Access to Prisoners in the Alabama Department of Corrections (Doc. 1827 ), it is ORDERED as follows: 1. The parties shall meet and confer, in person or by telephone, regarding the motion and the plaintiffs' request for access to ADOC inmates. 2. Following this conference, but no later than May 18, 2018, the parties shall file a joint proposal for the procedure whereby plaintiffs' counsel may request legal visits of ADOC inmates regarding this litigation, including any variation by facility. The proposal should address contingencies like the psychologist conflict referenced in the plaintiffs' motion. To the extent there are specific areas of disagreement, the joint proposal shall state each party's position and the basis for the same. In drafting this proposal, the parties should know that the court intends for all future disputes over inmate access to be governed by the proposed procedure and without the court's intervention. 3. Upon receipt of the parties' joint proposal, the plaintiffs' motion (Doc. 1827 ) shall be under submission without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 5/14/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/14/2018)

05/14/2018 1832 Response to Order re 1820 Order, Joint Proposal for Format of Joint Litigation Status Reports by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/14/2018)

05/15/2018

1833

(VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 1910 ORDER) NEW ORDER REGARDING LITIGATION STATUS REPORTS: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The previous order requiring the filing of litigation status reports (doc. no. 1298 ) is vacated. (2) On the first Monday of January, April, July, and October of each year, the parties are to file, under seal, a joint report reflecting the following in accordance with their joint proposal for revised format (doc. no. 1832 ), as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/15/2018. (kh, ) Modified on 6/28/2018 (kh, ). (Entered: 05/15/2018)

05/15/2018

1834

PHASE 2B ORDER REGARDING DENTAL CLAIM It is ORDERED that: (1) The motion for scheduling order (doc. no. 1788 ) is granted. (2) By May 31, 2018, the parties are to submit a document setting forth their proposed dates to be incorporated into a scheduling order for the Phase 2B dental claim. To the extent the parties disagree as to the proposed dates or have objections, the joint report should reflect those accordingly. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/15/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/15/2018)

05/18/2018 1835 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Deadline to File Response to Sixth Amended Complaint re 1826 Amended Complaint,,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/18/2018)

05/18/2018 1836 TEXT ORDER granting 1835 Motion for Extension of Deadline and extending the deadline to June 4, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/18/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/18/2018)

05/18/2018 1837 Response to Order re 1831 Order,,,,, Joint Proposal regarding Procedures for Plaintiffs' Counsel's Access to ADOC Prisoners by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/18/2018)

05/21/2018 1838 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME I EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF SHARON TRIMBLE

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 311 of 408

Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/9/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/11/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/21/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

05/21/2018

1839

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME II EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF SHARON TRIMBLE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/15/2016, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/11/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/21/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

05/21/2018 1840 Response to Order re 1818 Order,, Set Hearings, Plaintiffs' Proposed Opinion and Order on Treatment and Out−of−Cell Time In Residential Treatment and Stabilization Units by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

05/21/2018 1841 NOTICE of Appearance by David Clay Washington on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Washington, David) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

05/21/2018 1842 Response to Order re 1818 Order,, Set Hearings, Proposed Remedial Opinion Regarding Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

05/23/2018

1843

ORDER ON LEGAL VISIT PROCEDURES: Upon consideration of the Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Access to Prisoners in the Alabama Department of Corrections (Doc. 1827 ), and upon review of the Joint Proposal for Legal Visit Request Procedures (Doc. 1837 ), it is ORDERED that the motion (Doc. 1827 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and that legal visits for ADOC inmates relating to this litigation shall be accomplished as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 5/23/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/23/2018)

05/24/2018

1844

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of PRETRIAL HEARING Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/24/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/14/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/25/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/22/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/24/2018)

05/24/2018 1845 MOTION Status Conference with Judge Borden Regarding Discovery Related to Trial on June 11, 2018 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Informal Discovery Requests re Psychotherapy and Treatment Planning, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Emails re Informal Discovery)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/24/2018)

05/25/2018

1846

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that the motion for status conference (Doc. 1845) is GRANTED. This matter is set for a telephonic hearing on May 31, 2018 at 3:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call (334) 954−3648 five minutes before the start of the call and to enter passcode 246848. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. If the telephone conference will involve six or more participant telephone lines (including the court), Plaintiffs are instructed (1) to inform the court at least one business day in advance of the scheduled call, and (2) to arrange the call and to provide all participants, including the court, with call−in instructions no later than one business day before the scheduled call. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 5/25/2018. (furn: cb, calendar)(no pdf documents attached to

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 312 of 408

this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2018)

05/25/2018

1847

ORDER RE: PHASES 1 and 2A ADA ARBITRATION NOTICE: Pursuant to the Phase 1 and Phase 2A ADA settlement agreements, the parties were required "to prepare a notice, intelligible to the lay reader, describing the... process" by which prisoners may arbitrate claims under the agreement, which "should be posted ordistributed to class members." Phase 1 Final Settlement Approval Opinion and Order (doc. no. 727 ); see also Phase 2A Settlement Agreement (doc. no. 1100 )at 19 (incorporating the dispute resolution process in the Phase 1 Consent Decree). Accordingly, the parties submitted a proposed notice to the court on February 26, 2018. See Proposed ADA Arbitration Notice (doc. no. 1676 −1). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the issue of revising the proposed form to meet the concerns of the clerk of the court and the docketing unit supervisor, and any other concerns that may surface, is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Gray Borden for recommendation for resolution after meeting with the attorneys and other appropriate persons. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/25/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2018)

05/25/2018 1848 Response to Order re 1818 Order,, Set Hearings, 1830 Response to Order Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan on Psychotherapy and Treatment Planning by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/25/2018)

05/25/2018 1849 REPLY BRIEF re 1829 Response to Order The State's Reply in Support of Proposed Opinion Regarding Residential Out−of−Cell Time and Treatment Remedy filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/25/2018)

05/25/2018 1850 REPLY BRIEF re 1828 Response to Order Reply in Support of the State's Proposed Opinion Regarding Segregation Remedy filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/25/2018)

05/30/2018 1851 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Regarding Individualized Treatment Planning (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 05/30/2018)

05/30/2018 1852 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/30/2018)

05/30/2018 1853 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Amended Stipulations Regarding Individualized Treatment Planning (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 05/30/2018)

05/30/2018 1854 TEXT ORDER granting 1852 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal. (no pdf document attached this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 05/30/2018)

05/30/2018 1855 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Stipulations Regarding Removing Inmates with Serious Mental Illness from Restrictive Housing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Under Seal − Inmate Priority Spreadsheet)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 5/31/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 05/30/2018)

05/31/2018 1856 Response to Order re 1834 Order on Motion for Order, Joint Response to Court's May 15, 2018 Phase 2B Order Regarding Dental Claim by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/31/2018)

05/31/2018

Minute Entry for Status Conference held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 5/31/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 3:00−3:25.) (cb, ) (Entered: 06/07/2018)

06/01/2018

1857

ORDER: Based upon the representations made during the telephone conference held on May 31, 2018, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendants are to provide the documents responsive to document request nos. 3, 4, 915 and 17 and the information responsive to interrogatory nos. 1 and 2 to Plaintiffs no later than the close of business on June 6, 2018. 2. If any responsive documents or information cannot be provided by this deadline because they are in the possession and control of Wexford Health Services, Inc. or any other third party, Defendants must provide a written record to Plaintiffs by the deadline detailing their efforts to obtain the information from the relevant third party. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 6/1/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/01/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 313 of 408

06/01/2018 1858 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich NOTICE OF FILING (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit EXHIBIT A − QUARTERLY STAFFING REPORT − UNDER SEAL)(Smith, John) (Attachment 1 replaced on 6/1/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 06/01/2018)

06/01/2018 1859 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference held on 6/1/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018

1860

ADDITIONAL PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. no. 1818) are further revised as follows: Oral Argument previously set for 6/11/2018 is reset for 6/13/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Oral Argument (Regarding Residential Treatment (RTUs)) previously set for 6/11/2018 is reset for 6/13/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 6/11/2018 is reset for 6/13/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearing (Settled with stipulations)set for 6/11/18 at 9:00 a.m. is Cancelled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/4/2018. (furn: calendar, ag) (kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018

1861

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON SEGREGATION REMEDY (STOPGAP MEASURES FOR REMOVING INMATES WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS FROM SEGREGATION). Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The stipulation (doc. no. 1855 ), as clarified during an on−the−record conference on June 1, 2018, and as attached to this order, is approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified during an on−the−record conference on June 1, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/4/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018

1862

ORDER RE: PROCESS TO MODIFY SEGREGATION LIST: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, no later than noon on June 6, 2018, the parties are to confer and submit a joint proposal as to how to modify the Order Re: Segregation List (doc. no 1643 ) in order to clearly and efficiently include SMI flags in the weekly segregation rosters. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/4/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018 1863 NOTICE of Appearance by Ashley Nicole Austin on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Austin, Ashley) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018

1864

PHASE 2A ORDER ON USE OF THE TERM "MHP": Pursuant to the agreement of the parties on the record on June 1, 2018, it is ORDERED that, from this point for ward, when the parties or the court use the term "MHP," that term shall refer only to a licensed mental−health professional; unlicensed mental−health providers may receive other titles, but will no longer be referred to as "MHPs.". Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/4/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018

1865

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL−HEALTH INDIVIDUALIZED TREATMENT PLANNING REMEDY: Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows:(1) The stipulations (doc. no. [1853}), as clarified during anon−the−record hearing on June 1, 2018, and as attached to this order, are approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions as clarified during on−the−record hearing on June 1, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/4/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018

1866

PHASE 2A ORDER ON CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CONFIDENTIALITY: Based on representations made during an on−the−record hearing on June 1, 2018, it is ORDERED that, by no later than noon on June 15, 2018, the parties are to file a joint, supplemental stipulation regarding the confidentiality obligations ofcorrectional officers. The stipulation shall require an affirmative

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 314 of 408

obligation by correctional officers to ensure inmate−patient confidentiality, provide consequences for breach, and a way for officers to acknowledge those obligations and consequences. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/4/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018

1867

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE AND DEATH ROW INMATES: Based on the representations made on the record on June 1, 2018, it is ORDERED that, by noon on June 8, 2018, plaintiffs are to submit to the court affirmative statements from Equal Justice Initiative and the Federal Defenders as their views of impact of defendants hospital−level care plan (doc. no. 1514 ) and interim measures, see Order (doc. no. 1674 ), on death row inmates. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/4/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018 1868 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM The State's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Complaint by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/04/2018 1869 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 1868 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM The State's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Complaint filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/04/2018)

06/06/2018 1870 Response to Order re 1862 Order, Regarding Modification of Production of Segregation Roster to Include SMI Designations (Jointly Filed by all Parties) by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 6/7/2018 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants. (kh, ). (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/06/2018 1871 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/06/2018 1872 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Pretrial Brief Regarding Psychotherapy by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/06/2018 1873 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Pretrial Submission Summarizing Psychotherapy Remedial Evidence and the Impact of The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on Remedy by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/06/2018 1874 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/06/2018 1875 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/06/2018)

06/06/2018

MOTION for PLAINTIFFS NON−ATTORNEY STAFF TECHNOLOGY REQUEST by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 1875 for pdf. Attorney used the incorrect event code)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/07/2018)

06/06/2018

Joint Motion and Proposal to Modify the Court's Order on Weekly Production of Segregation Lists by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 1870 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2018)

06/07/2018 1876 TEXT ORDER granting 1875 Motion for Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/7/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(furn: mdal clerk)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/07/2018)

06/07/2018

1877

ORDERED as follows: (1) The joint motion to modify the court's order regarding segregation lists (doc. no. 1870 ) is set for oral argument on June 13, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) By noon on June 11, 2018, defendants are to file a response to the two "additional provisions" in the "Plaintiffs' Position" in said motion. (3) By noon on June 12, 2018, plaintiffs are to file a reply. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/7/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/07/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 315 of 408

06/07/2018 1878 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Technology Request for the Hearing on Psychotherapy (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 06/07/2018)

06/07/2018

MOTION for The State's Technology Request for the Hearing on Psychotherapy by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 1878 for pdf. Attorney used the incorrect event code)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/08/2018 1879 TEXT ORDER granting 1878 Motion for The State's Technology Request for the Hearing on Psychotherapy. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/8/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/08/2018 1880 Response to Order re 1867 Order,, Notice of Affirmative Statement from the Federal Defender and the Equal Justice Initiative Regarding Hospital Level of Care by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/08/2018 1881 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of filing of Stipulations Regarding Psychotherapy and Confidentiality (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Stipulations regarding Psychotherapy and Confidentiality)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/08/2018

1882

ORDERED that: (1) The parties' notice of affirmative statement from the Federal Defender and the Equal Justice Initiative regarding hospital−level care (doc. no. 1880 ) is set for oral argument on June 13, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) By 5:00 p.m., on June 12, 2018, the parties are to file a joint statement as to how the court has handled, in the past, the carving out of matters relating to "death row inmates,"and whether a similar or different approach should be used here. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/8/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/08/2018 1883 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Segregation Trends over Time (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Segregation Trends over Time)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/11/2018

1884

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING PSYCHOTHERAPY: It is ORDERED that the issue of whether the court should approve and adopt the stipulations regarding psychotherapy and confidentiality (doc. no. 1881 ) is set for hearing on June 13, 2018 at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/11/2018)

06/11/2018 1885 Response to Order The State's Response to the Court's June 7, 2018 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/11/2018)

06/11/2018 1886 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal the Exhibit to Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Regarding the Parties' Joint Motion and Proposal to Modify the Court's Order Regarding the Production of Segregation Rosters by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/11/2018)

06/12/2018

1887

TEXT ORDER granting 1886 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal the Exhibit to Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Regarding the Parties' Joint Motion and Proposal to Modify the Court's Order Regarding the Production of Segregation Rosters. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/12/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/12/2018

1888

REPLY BRIEF re 1877 Order,, Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Regarding the Parties' Joint Motion and Proposal To Modify The Court's Order Regarding The Production of Segregation Rosters filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Under Seal − June 11, 2018 Restrictive Housing Roster)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 6/12/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/12/2018 1889 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/12/2018 1890 Response to Order re 1882 Order,, Joint Statement Regarding Hospital−Level Care and Death Row Inmates by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 316 of 408

06/13/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument begun on 6/13/2018 (No PDF). (Hearing to reconvene on 6/18) (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/13/2018)

06/14/2018

1891

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE AND DEATH−ROW INMATES: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that death−row inmates do not opt out of the hospital−level care provided by the Alabama Department of Corrections pursuant to these proceedings. Counsel for plaintiffs are to arrange for appropriate representatives of the Equal Justice Initiative and the Federal Defenders to receive copies of this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/14/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/14/2018)

06/14/2018

1892

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 6/1/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/5/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/16/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/12/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/14/2018)

06/14/2018 1893 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing of Amended Stipulations regarding Psychotherapy and Confidentiality (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Amended Stipulations regarding Psychotherapy and Confidentiality)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/14/2018)

06/15/2018 1894 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Joint Filing of Stipulation Regarding Confidentiality (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Stipulation Regarding Confidentiality, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Confidentiality Agreement)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/15/2018)

06/18/2018

1895

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of HEARING Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 6/13/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/19/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/17/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/18/2018)

06/18/2018 1896 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Arguments held on 6/18/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/19/2018)

06/19/2018

1897

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on June 18, 2018, with regard to the pending motion to modify the defendants production of weekly segregation lists (doc. no. 1870 ), it is ORDERED that the defendants are to file a brief, no later than June 26, 2018, explaining whether the current mental−health care provider for the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) maintains lists or other data in aggregate form−−that is, above the level of individual medical records−−containing the diagnoses of inmates on the mental−health caseload, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/19/2018)

06/19/2018

1898

ORDER REGARDING MENTAL−HEALTH UNITS: At a hearing in open court on June 18, 2018, the plaintiffs requested that the court order, as part of its remedial order on mental−health units, that the defendants create enforceable admissions criteria for placement in the mental−health units akin to those allegedly used in other prison systems. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, by noon on June 26, 2018, the plaintiffs are to submit to the court example admissions criteria from other prison systems. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/19/2018)

06/19/2018 1899 PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL−HEALTH PYSCHOTHERAPY AND CONFIDENTIALITY REMEDY: Accordingly, it is

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 317 of 408

the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1893 ) as clarified during on−the−record hearings on June 13 and June 18, 2018, amended on June 14, 2018, and as attached to this order, are approved. (2) Pursuant to the stipulations, and by agreement of the parties made on−the−record on June 18, 2018, segregation inmates are prohibited from being placed in the residential treatment units−−that is, the RTU, SU, and SLU units−−and placement of any inmate in those units must be based on clinical judgment. (3) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the stipulations (doc. no. 1983 ) as clarified during on−the−record hearings on June 13 and June 18, 2018, amended on June 14, 2018, and asattached to this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/19/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/19/2018)

06/19/2018

1900

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON CONFIDENTIALITY: On June 15, 2018, the parties submitted supplemental stipulations regarding confidentiality. They agreed that the stipulations should be reduced to an enforceable order and further agreed to some clarifications of the stipulations during an on−the−record hearing on June 18, 2018. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as (1) The stipulations (doc. no. 1894 ), as clarified during an on−the−record hearing on June 18, 2018, and as attached to this order, are approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions as clarified during on−the−record hearing on June 18, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/19/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Attachment 2)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/19/2018)

06/20/2018 1901 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alabama Department of Corrections. (Hill, Anne) (Entered: 06/20/2018)

06/21/2018 1902 TEXT ORDER granting 1901 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/21/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/21/2018)

06/21/2018

*** Attorney Anne Adams Hill terminated pursuant to the 1902 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 06/21/2018)

06/22/2018

1903

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING SEGREGATION LISTS: Based on the representations made in open court on June 18, 2018, it is ORDERED that the joint motion and proposal to modify the court's order on weekly production of segregation lists (doc. no. 1870 ) is granted, and the court's previous order (doc. no. 1643 ) is modified, to the following extent: (1) the defendants may produce the weekly restrictive housing report by each Tuesday at noon; and (2) by July 17, 2018, the defendants will begin producing restrictive housing reports that will include an information field indicating whether each inmate has received an SMI flag, has been assessed for an SMI flag and determined not to need one, or has not been assessed for an SMI flag. The remaining issues in the parties' joint motion and proposal remain pending for this court's resolution. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/22/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2018)

06/22/2018

1904

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING SEGREGATION LIST: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the joint motion and proposal to modify the court's order on weekly production of segregation lists (doc. no. 1870 ) is denied to the extent that the plaintiffs requested relief as to the automatic assignment of certain SMI flags. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/22/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2018)

06/22/2018

1905

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of ORAL ARGUMENTS Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 6/18/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/13/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/23/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 318 of 408

9/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2018)

06/25/2018

1906

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 1898 Order,, Notice of Filing of Examples of Admission Criteria For Mental−Health Units (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Pennsylvania Access to Care Policy, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Coleman Program Guide − EOP and MHCB, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Ohio RTU Protocol, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Ohio MHSOS Policy, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Colorado − RTP Policy)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/25/2018)

06/25/2018

1907

RESPONSE in Opposition re 1868 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM The State's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Complaint Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Allen Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Brooks Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Mork Deposition Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − 1 of 4, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − 2 of 4, # 6 Exhibit 4 − Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − 3 of 4, # 7 Exhibit 4 − Pruitt Deposition Excerpts − 4 of 4, # 8 Exhibit 5 − Sullivan Deposition Excerpts)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/25/2018)

06/26/2018 1908 Response to Order The State's Response to the Court's June 19, 2018 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/26/2018)

06/27/2018 1909 REPLY BRIEF re 1897 Order,, 1908 Response to Order Plaintiffs' Brief in Response to Defendants' Response to the Court's June 19, 2018 Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 06/27/2018)

06/28/2018

1910

NEW ORDER REGARDING LITIGATION STATUS REPORTS It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The previous order requiring the filing of litigation status reports (doc. no. 1833 ) is vacated. (2) On the first Monday of January, April, July, and October of each year, the parties are to file, under seal, a joint report reflecting the following in accordance with their joint proposal for revised format (doc. no. 1832 ) as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/28/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/28/2018)

07/02/2018 1911 ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the sixth amended complaint (doc. no. 1868 ) is set for submission on July 9, 2018, with all briefs due by said date. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/2/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/02/2018)

07/02/2018 1912 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Response to the Correctional Staffing Analysis by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/02/2018)

07/02/2018 1913 TEXT ORDER granting 1912 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Response to the Correctional Staffing Analysis. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/2/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/02/2018)

07/02/2018 1914 JOINT LITIGATION STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich (kh, ) (Entered: 07/02/2018)

07/02/2018 1915 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 1813 CORRECTIONAL STAFFING ANALYSIS by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/02/2018)

07/02/2018

1916

MOTION for Order to Show Cause : PLAINTIFFS FIRST NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE AND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − RFP Addendum 1, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Excerpt of March 2018 Contract Review Agenda, # 3 Exhibit 3 − 2018 MH Staff Requirements, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Excerpt of Transcript of June 1 Pre−trial Conference, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Email of June 6 regarding staffing report, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Emails regarding production of Mental Health Staffing Numbers, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Wexford Mental Health Job Postings, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Wexford Mental Health Nursing Job Postings, # 9 Exhibit 9 − Summary of Wexford Mental Health Job Postings in Alabama)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/02/2018)

07/06/2018 1917 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Plaintiffs' Corrected Response to the Correctional Staffing Analysis by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 319 of 408

07/06/2018 1918 TEXT ORDER granting 1917 Motion for Leave to File under seal plfs' corrected response to the correctional staffing analysis. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/6/18. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/06/2018 1919 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (McCrary, Latasha) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/06/2018

1920

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Plaintiffs' Corrected Response to Correctional Staffing Analysis (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Corrected Response to Correctional Staffing Analysis, # 2 Exhibit A − Corrected Staffing Chart, # 3 Exhibit B − Additional Positions Recommended)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 7/9/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 7/9/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 7/9/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/06/2018

1921

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that a Telephone Conference will be held on Monday, July 9, 2018 at 9:00 AM CST before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson to discuss the Hospital Level Care and 1916 Motion for Order to Show Cause. Conference call number will be sent out on Monday, July 9, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/6/2018. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/06/2018

1922

CORRECTED TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that a Telephone Conference originally set for Monday, July 9, 2018, will now be held on Tuesday, July 10, 2018 at 9:00 AM CST before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson to discuss two issues: Hospital Level Care and the 1916 Motion for Order to Show Cause. The conference call in number will be issued on Monday, July 9, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/6/2018. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (NO PDF) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/09/2018 1923 TEXT ORDER granting 1919 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/9/2018. (no pdf dociment attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/09/2018)

07/09/2018 1924 RESPONSE in Support re 1868 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM The State's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Complaint filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/09/2018)

07/10/2018 1925 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 7/10/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 07/10/2018)

07/11/2018

1926

ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' motion for show−cause order (doc. no. 1916 ) is granted as follows. The parties are to engage forthwith in mediation before Magistrate Judge John E. Ott regarding both issues presented in the plaintiffs' motion, namely, both the "reporting" and "implementation" issues. By the date set forth below, the parties are to file a joint statement to the court explaining what issues, if any, have been resolved. To the extent that the issues have not been resolved, defendants are to file, by said date, a response showing cause as to why they should not be held in contempt. (2) The parties' oral request, made on−the−record on July 10, 2018, with regard to hospital−level care is granted as set forth below. (3) The remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. no. 1860 ) are, accordingly, revised as further set out below. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/11/2018. (Reset: Evidentiary Hearing and Oral Argument set for 7/23/18 at 9:00 a.m to 10/22/2018 at 9:00am) (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/11/2018)

07/19/2018

1927

PHASE 2A ORDER ON MONITORING: ORDERED that (1) The issue of monitoring for the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment remedy, apart from any reporting requirements, is to be addressed as a separate, discrete issue, following the resolution of the other Phase 2A remedial issues. This order does not in any way suspend or vacate any existing requirements under this court's previous orders. (2) By separate order, the court will establish a briefing and hearing scheduled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/19/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 320 of 408

07/19/2018

1928

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is therefore ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. no. 1926 ) are, accordingly, revised as follows to add: (MONITORING) Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/11/2018, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Final Pretrial Conference set for 11/27/2018, at 10:00 AM, in chambers, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/19/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/19/2018)

07/19/2018 1929 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 1926 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 07/19/2018)

07/20/2018

1930

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that (1) the joint motion for extension of deadlines (doc. no. 1929 ) is granted, and (2) the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim (doc. no. 1928 ) are, accordingly, revised as follows: Joint Statement and/or Defendants' Response to Show−Cause Order Re: Mental−Health Understaffing set for 7/23/2018 reset to 8/1/2018, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/20/2018)

07/30/2018 1931 MOTION to Dismiss Voluntarily The Named Plaintiffs Who Are No Longer In ADOC Custody by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/30/2018)

07/30/2018 1932 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/30/2018)

07/31/2018

1933

[VACATED PURSUANT TO COURT 1934 ORDER.] ORDER PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDERON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM (1) GRANTING 1932 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline and (2) the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim 1930 are accordingly revised, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/31/18. (djy, ) Modified on 8/1/2018 (dmn, ). (Entered: 07/31/2018)

08/01/2018

1934

ORDER REGARDING CORRECTIONAL STAFFING ANALYSIS: It is ORDERED as follows: (1) The order resetting a new deadline for the joint statement and/or defendants response to the show−cause order (doc. no. 1933 ) is vacated. The court continued the wrong deadline. (2) The joint request for an extension (doc. no. 1932 ) is granted. The deadline to mediate any dispute regarding the correctional staffing analysis−−a deadline set in the States Timeline for Correctional Staffing (doc. no. 1583 ) and incorporated into this courts Remedial Order on Understaffing (doc. no. 1657 )−−is extended to August 8, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/1/2018. (dmn, ) (Entered: 08/01/2018)

08/01/2018 1935 STATUS REPORT (Joint) Regarding Mediation of Plaintiffs First Notice of Non−Compliance and Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/01/2018)

08/01/2018

1936

RESPONSE in Opposition re 1916 MOTION for Order to Show Cause : PLAINTIFFS FIRST NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE AND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Ruth Naglich, # 2 Declaration of Elaine Gedman, # 3 Declaration of Ken Dover, # 4 Declaration of Brian Bateh)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/01/2018)

08/02/2018

1937

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM directing that: (1) the plfs are to reply to defs' 1936 Response to the show cause order and the parties are to arrange for an on−the−record Conference Call to discuss contempt issue on 8/13/2018 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; and (2) the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order 1930 are, accordingly, revised as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/2/18. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 08/02/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 321 of 408

08/07/2018 1938 Response to Order re 1906 Notice (Other), 1898 Order,, The State's Response to Plaintiffs' Notice of Filing of Examples of Admission Criteria for Mental−Health Units by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/07/2018

1939

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − EXCERPT TESTIMONY OF EDWARD KERN, M.D. VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/24/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/28/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/7/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/07/2018

1940

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/25/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/28/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/7/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/07/2018 1941 MOTION for Leave to File under Seal Exhibits to Pls.' Reply in Support of Their First Notice of Non−Compliance and Motion for Order to Show Cause by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/07/2018

1942

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWARD KERN VOLUME II Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/25/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 8/28/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/7/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/07/2018 1943 TEXT ORDER granting 1941 MOTION for Leave to File under Seal Exhibits to Pls.' Reply in Support of Their First Notice of Non−Compliance and Motion for Order to Show Cause. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/7/2018. (no pdf document attached to this order)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/09/2018 1944 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline TO MEDIATE ANY DISPUTES REGARDING THE CORRECTIONAL STAFFING ANALYSIS by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/09/2018 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 08/09/2018)

08/09/2018

1945

Reply to response to order to show cause as to Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − MH Treatment Requirements July 1 or after, # 2 Exhibit 2 − May 2018 Suicide Watch Report (Sealed), # 3 Exhibit 3 − June 2018 Suicide Watch Report (Sealed), # 4 Exhibit 4 − Aug. 7, 2018 Segregation List (Sealed), # 5 Exhibit 5 − Excerpt of Feb. 2018 MHM Monthly Operating Report (Sealed), # 6 Exhibit 6 − Excerpt of March 2018 MHM Monthly Operating Report (Sealed))(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/10/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/10/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/10/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/10/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/10/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 8/10/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/10/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/09/2018)

08/09/2018 1946 NOTICE of FILING by All Plaintiffs re 1945 Reply to response to order to show cause,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Exhibit 4, # 4 Exhibit 5, # 5

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 322 of 408

Exhibit 6)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/10/2018)

08/10/2018

1947

ORDER: It is ORDERED that the issue of alleged contempt, see Pls.' Mot. for Show Cause Order (doc. no. 1916 ), now set for a conference call, is reset for an in−person hearing this Monday, August 13, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/10/2018. (term: Telephone Conference set for 08/13/2018) (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/10/2018)

08/10/2018

1948

ORDERED that the joint motion for extension of deadline to mediate any disputes regarding the correctional staffing analysis (doc. no. 1944 ) is set for an in−person hearing this Monday, August 13, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/10/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/10/2018)

08/10/2018

1949

CORRECTED ORDER: It is ORDERED that the issue of alleged contempt, see Pls.' Mot. for Show Cause Order (doc. no. 1916 ), now set for a conference call, is reset for an in−person status conference this Monday, August 13, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/10/2018. (term: in−chambers hearing set for 8/13/2018(furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/10/2018)

08/13/2018

1950

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 8/13/2018 re 1944 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline TO MEDIATE ANY DISPUTES REGARDING THE CORRECTIONAL STAFFING ANALYSIS filed by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 08/13/2018)

08/14/2018 1951 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Suicide Prevention and Crisis Care (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Indiana Executive Directive #08−07)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/14/2018)

08/15/2018

1952

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on August 13, 2018, it is ORDERED that: (1) The joint motion for extension of deadline to mediate any disputes regarding the correctional staffing analysis (doc. no. 1944 ) is granted. (2) The following deadlines, as set forth in the defendants' proposed timeline (doc. no. 1583 ) and as adopted in the court's Phase 2A Eighth Amendment remedial order regarding understaffing (doc. no. 1657 ), are modified as follows: (a) The deadline for the parties to mediate with Magistrate Judge John E. Ott any dispute regarding the correctional staffing analysis, now set for August 8, 2018, is reset to January 15, 2019; (b) The deadline for Magistrate Judge Gray M. Borden to decide any remaining dispute regarding the correctional staffing analysis, now set for September 15, 2018, is reset to March 1, 2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/15/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/15/2018)

08/17/2018

1953

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of MOTION HEARING Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 08/13/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 9/7/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/17/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/15/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/17/2018)

08/17/2018

1954

MOTION Status Conference with Judge Borden Regarding Discovery Related to Trial on September 10, 2018 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Suicide Prevention Informal Discovery Requests − Redacted, # 2 Exhibit 2− Emails Re Informal Disco, # 3 Exhibit 3 − 8.16.18 Letter to Maria Morris − Discovery)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/17/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 323 of 408

08/20/2018

1955

TEXT ORDER granting 1954 MOTION Status Conference with Judge Borden Regarding Discovery Related to Trial on September 10, 2018 and further ordering that the parties shall convene for a telephonic status conference on August 20, 2018 at 4:00 PM to discuss discovery dispute procedures. No later than five minutes prior to the start of the call, the parties are directed to call (877) 336−1831 and enter access code 5328913#. If the parties encounter any technical problems, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 8/20/2018. (furn: calendar, cb)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/20/2018)

08/20/2018 1956 TEXT ORDER resetting Status Conference previously set for 8/20/2018 at 4:00pm reset to 8/21/2018 at 09:00 AM by telephone. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 8/20/2018. (furn: calendar, cb)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/20/2018)

08/20/2018

1957

(VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 2124 ORDER) ORDER ON DISCOVERY PROTOCOL: The court being of the opinion that it should re− impose the discovery−resolution protocol established in its order on July 27, 2015 (doc. no. 223 ), it is ORDERED, with regard to all aspects and phases of this case, as follows: (1) Any party seeking resolution of a discovery dispute must FIRST file a request for mediation with Magistrate Judge Gray M. Borden, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/20/2016. (kh, ) Modified on 10/23/2018 (kh, ). (Entered: 08/20/2018)

08/20/2018 1958 TEXT ORDER resetting Status Conference previously set for 8/21/2018 at 9:00am reset to 8/21/2018 at 2:00pm by telephone. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 8/20/2018. (furn: calendar, cb)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/20/2018)

08/21/2018 1959 Minute Entry for Status Conference held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 8/21/2018. No pdf attached to this entry. (Recording Time 2:00−2:10.) (cb, ) (Entered: 08/21/2018)

08/23/2018 1960 NOTICE by Sheila Allen, Raymond Bosarge, Tedrick Brooks, Cordara Dunner, Brittany Ellis, Serena English, Justin Hall, Cherritha Harris, Matthew Mork, Karen Norris, Leviticus Pruitt, Tomas Snyder, William Sullivan, Valerie Wheeler of Request for Discovery Mediation (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/23/2018)

08/27/2018 1961 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal the Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Suicide Prevention Remedial Plan by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 08/27/2018)

08/27/2018 1962 TEXT ORDER granting 1961 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal the Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Suicide Prevention Remedial Plan. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/27/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/27/2018)

08/28/2018 1963 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits to Joint Notice Regarding Assessments of Persons Placed in Restrictive Housing Since July 1, 2018 Under Seal by All Plaintiffs and Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/28/2018 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 08/28/2018)

08/28/2018 1964 TEXT ORDER granting 1963 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits to Joint Notice Regarding Assessments of Persons Placed in Restrictive Housing Since July 1, 2018 Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/28/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/28/2018)

08/28/2018

1965

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs and Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich Joint Notice Regarding Assessments of Persons Placed in Restrictive Housing Since July 1, 2018 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − SEALED − Restrictive Housing Report for 7/17/2018, # 2 Exhibit 2 − SEALED − Restrictive Housing Report for 7/24/2018, # 3 Exhibit 3 − SEALED − Restrictive Housing Report for 7/31/2018, # 4 Exhibit 4 − SEALED − Restrictive Housing Report for 8/7/2018, # 5 Exhibit 5 − SEALED − Restrictive Housing Report for 8/14/2018, # 6 Exhibit 6 − SEALED − Restrictive Housing Report for 8/21/2018, # 7 Exhibit 7 − SEALED − Restrictive Housing Report for 8/28/2018)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/29/2018 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ).

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 324 of 408

(Attachment 4 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/28/2018)

08/28/2018

1966

Response to Order re 1937 Order,,, Set Hearings,, Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Suicide Prevention Remedial Plan by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Wexford Job Posting, # 2 Exhibit 2 − SEALED − Credentialing File of Ruby Burden, # 3 Exhibit 3 − SEALED − July 2018 Suicide Watch Report, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Chart of Recent Suicides 2017−18, # 5 Exhibit 5 − SEALED − Excerpt of June 2018 Wexford Monthly Report, # 6 Exhibit 6 − SEALED − Excerpts of July 2018 Suicide Watch Logs, # 7 Exhibit 7 − SEALED − Excerpts of June 2018 Suicide Watch Logs, # 8 Exhibit 8 − SEALED − May 8, 2017 Letter, # 9 Exhibit 9 − SEALED − Jan. 9, 2018 Letter, # 10 Exhibit 10 − SEALED − April 10, 2018 − Suicide Prevention Compliance Letter, # 11 Exhibit 11 − SEALED − May 1, 2018 − Suicide Prevention Compliance Letter, # 12 Exhibit 12 − 2018 NCCHC Suicide Prevention Standard, # 13 Exhibit 13 − SEALED − March 17, 2017 Letter re Monitoring of Interim Agreement, # 14 Exhibit 14 − SEALED − April 3, 2017 Email, # 15 Exhibit 15 − SEALED − Compilation of Suicide Reports, # 16 Exhibit 16 − WHNT News 19 June 8, 2018 Internet article, # 17 Exhibit 17 − 2004 ACA Single−Occupancy Cells Standard, # 18 Exhibit 18 − 2004 ACA Multiple−Occupancy Rooms − Cells Standard, # 19 Exhibit 19 − 2010 Supplement ACA Performance Based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, # 20 Exhibit 20 − 2004 ACA Inmate Housing Noise Level Standard, # 21 Exhibit 21 − 2004 ACA Temperature and Humidity Standard, # 22 Exhibit 22 − 2004 ACA Suicide Prevention and Intervention Standard, # 23 Exhibit 23 − SEALED − April 19, 2017 Email about Bibb Bench, # 24 Exhibit 24 − SEALED − Legal Visit Request Email, # 25 Exhibit 25 − SEALED − Incident Reports for Ben McClure, # 26 Exhibit 26 − Excerpt of Deposition of Dr. John Peasant, # 27 Exhibit 27 − SEALED − Excerpt of May 7, 2018 Segregation List, # 28 Exhibit 28 − Ruby Burden AL Nursing Board Licensure Report)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 14 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 23 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 24 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 25 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 27 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 8/29/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 08/28/2018)

08/28/2018 1967 NOTICE of FILING by, All Plaintiffs re 1965 Joint Notice Regarding Assessments of Persons Placed in Restrictive Housing Since July 1, 2018 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

08/29/2018

1968

NOTICE of FILING by All Plaintiffs re 1966 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED SUICIDE PREVENTION REMEDIAL PLAN (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Exhibit 5, # 4 Exhibit 7, # 5 Exhibit 8, # 6 Exhibit 9, # 7 Exhibit 10, # 8 Exhibit 11, # 9 Exhibit 13, # 10 Exhibit 14, # 11 Exhibit 15, # 12 Exhibit 23, # 13 Exhibit 24, # 14 Exhibit 25, # 15 Exhibit 27)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

08/29/2018

1969

ORDERED that the joint notice regarding assessments of persons placed in restrictive housing (doc. no. 1965) is set for an on−the−record status conference on September 4, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the chambers library. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/29/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

08/30/2018 1970 ORDERED that the "mental−health diagnosis information" issue is set for an on−the−record status conference on September 4, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. in the chambers library. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/30/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/30/2018)

08/30/2018 1971 ORDERED that the following items are set for an update discussion on September 4, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. in the chambers library: (1) the hospitalization issue, (2) the mental−health understaffing issue and (3) the filing of ADA

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 325 of 408

arbitration requests with the court.(kh, ) (Entered: 08/30/2018)

08/31/2018 1972 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/31/2018)

08/31/2018 1973 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Phase 2A Pretrial Brief Regarding Suicide Prevention and Crisis Care by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/31/2018)

08/31/2018 1999 FINAL Minute Entry for Mediation held on the following dates 8/21/2018 and 8/30/2018 before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. No pdf attached to this entry. (cb, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/01/2018

1974

MOTION to Compel PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION REMEDIAL TRIAL AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RESOLUTION (OPPOSED) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Suicide Prevention Informal Discovery Requests_Redacted, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Response to Informal Discovery Regarding Suicide Prevention, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Supplemental Suicide Prevention Informal Discovery Requests_Redacted, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Response to Supplemental Suicide Prevention Informal Discovery Requests)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/01/2018)

09/04/2018 1975 Motion for Melissa C. Neri to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Certificate of Good Standing)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 9/4/2018 to add the attorney's name (kh, ). (Entered: 09/04/2018)

09/04/2018 1976 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Suicide Prevention Remedial Pretrial Brief Summarizing Evidence and the Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on Remedies by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/04/2018)

09/04/2018 1977 TEXT ORDER granting 1975 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/4/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/04/2018)

09/04/2018 1978 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/04/2018)

09/04/2018 1979 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1657 Order,, Quarterly Staffing Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Filed Under Seal))(Smith, John) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/6/2018: # 2 Exhibit A) (kh, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 9/6/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/04/2018)

09/04/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference begun on 9/4/2018 (NO PDF ). (Conference to resume on 9/6/18) (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/05/2018 1980 ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to compel (doc. no. 1974 ) is granted as set forth in the hearing on September 4, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/05/2018

1981

OPINION AND ORDER: As to the unresolved issue identified in the court's opinion and order of June 22, 2018 (doc. no. 1904 ), the court stated during an on−the− record status conference on September 4, 2018, that it believes, from the evidence presented, that the problems underlying this issue are threefold, as further set out. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the parties are to attempt jointly to develop a scheme by which the plaintiffs and the court can verify that the defendants can now be trusted to accurately and timely identify SMI inmates (both categorical and non−categorical ones) who are considered for, or in, segregation. The parties will be given two weeks to develop, through mediation, this scheme. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/05/2018 1982 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal the Joint Status Report on Hospital−Level Care by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/05/2018 1983 PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on September 4, 2018, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 326 of 408

the Phase 2A remedy schedulingorder for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing added 9/18/2018 at 9:00am; Pretrial Hearing previously set for 9/4/2018 at 10:00am rescheduled for 9/6/2018 at 8:00am; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 9/10/2018 at 9:00am rescheduled for 9/12/2018 at 9:00am. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/5/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/05/2018

1984

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on September 4, 2018, it is ORDERED that, on or before September 18, 2018, the parties are to reduce to writing and submit to the court, after receiving input from the staff of the clerk of the court, the process by which inmates are to file, and the court is to handle internally, arbitration requests made pursuant to the ADA settlement as approved by the court, see Dunn v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652 (M.D. Ala. 2016). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/05/2018

Set Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 9/12/2018 09:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson previously omitted in error for cm/ecf calendar purposes (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) Modified on 9/5/2018 to create the docket entry relationship(kh, ). (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/05/2018 1985 TEXT ORDER granting 1982 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal the Joint Status Report on Hospital−Level Care. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/5/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/06/2018 1986 Objection to re 1978 Witness List filed by Ruth Naglich. (Stewart, Joseph) (Entered: 09/06/2018)

09/06/2018 1987 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference begun on 9/4 and concluded on 9/6/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Defendants Exhibit) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/06/2018)

09/06/2018

1988

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING ALL REMEDIAL HEARINGS: Based on the representations made on the record on September 6, 2018, it is ORDERED that, for all Phase 2A remedial hearings in the future, at least 10 business days before a hearing, counsel for the parties are to exchange lists of exhibits they, in good faith, intend to introduce. Proffering counsel shall have such evidence marked for identification prior to the hearing. The list shall identify specifically and separately by exhibit number each document to be offered, and general or bulk designations are not allowed. Unless specifically agreed among the parties or allowed by the court for good cause shown, the parties shall be precluded from offering such evidence not so furnished and identified. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/6/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/06/2018)

09/06/2018

1989

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on September 6, 2018, it is ORDERED that defendants' objection to inmate witnesses (doc. no. 1986) is overruled, albeit subject to sanctions being imposed on plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel admit that they "dropped the ball." Moreover, it is important that court orders, and the deadlines in them, be respected if there is to be an orderly and fair resolution of issues in this litigation, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/6/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/06/2018)

09/06/2018 1990 MOTION re 1980 Order on Motion to Compel The State's Motion for Relief from the Court's September 5, 2018, Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/06/2018)

09/06/2018

1991

TEXT ORDER re 1990 MOTION re 1980 Order on Motion to Compel The State's Motion for Relief from the Court's September 5, 2018, Order filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich: Telephone Conference set for 9/6/2018 04:30 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/6/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 09/06/2018)

09/06/2018 1993 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 9/6/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 327 of 408

Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 1992 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference re discovery set for 9/7/2018 03:15 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/7/2018. (counsel use the telephone conference line)(ag, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 1994 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Notice Regarding the State's Motion for Relief from the Court's September 5, 2018 Order (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 1995 Response to Order re 1983 Order,,, Set Hearings,, Plaintiffs' Proposed Prima Facie Findings of Fact Regarding Mental−Health Understaffing Remedies by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 1996 ORDER: Based on defendants' notice (doc. no. 1994 ), it is ORDERED that defendants are to produce the documents in request number 33 by September 10, 2018 at 5:00 p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/7/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 1997 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Supplemental Notice Regarding The State's Motion for Relief from the Court's September 5, 2018 Order (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 1998 Filing fee received re 1975 Motion for Melissa C. Neri to Appear Pro Hac Vice : $ 50.00, receipt number 4602050593 (kh, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 2000 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs (kh, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 2001 JOINT STATUS REPORT ON HOSPITAL LEVEL CARE by Alabama Department of Corrections, All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 2002 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs JOINT NOTICE OF AGREEMENTS FROM MEDIATION REGARDING SUICIDE PREVENTION DISCOVERY (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/07/2018 2003 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 9/7/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/10/2018 2004 Response to Order re 1983 Order,,, Set Hearings,, The State's Response to Plaintiffs' "Proposed Prima Facie Findings of Fact Regarding Mental Health Understaffing Remedies" by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/10/2018

2005

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on September 7, 2018, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing set for 9/12/2018 reset for 9/17/2018, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/10/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/10/2018

2006

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on September 4, September 6, and September 7, 2018, it is ORDERED that, with regard to the upcoming contempt hearing, the parties are to exchange, by noon on September 12, 2018, lists of exhibits they, in good faith, intend to introduce. Proffering counsel shall have such evidence marked for identification prior to the hearing. The list shall identify specifically and separately by exhibit number each document to be offered, and general or bulk designations are not allowed. Unless specifically agreed among the parties or allowed by the court for good cause shown, the parties shall be precluded from offering such evidence not so furnished and identified. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/10/2018 2007 ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on September 7, 2018, it is ORDERED that defendants are to file by 5:00 p.m. on September 11,

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 328 of 408

2018 a report containing the following information regarding request number 34 of plaintiffs' motion to compel (doc. no. 1974 ): (1) The number of individuals to whom the request pertains; and (2) The name of the facility in which each individual is housed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/11/2018 2008 ORDERED that, on or before 8:00 a.m on September 18, 2018, the parties are to file statements as to what, if any, significance may be drawn from the latest quarterly staffing report (doc. no. 1979 −1). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/11/2018 2009 MOTION to Clarify re 1988 Order,,, 2006 Order,,, Regarding Pretrial Deadlines by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/11/2018

2010

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ON SUICIDE PREVENTION HEARING ON MOTIONS TO COMPEL Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 9/4/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 10/2/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/11/2018

2011

ORDERED that paragraphs numbered 2 and 3 in the court's order of February 2, 2018 (doc. no. 1589 ), apply to the upcoming contempt hearing, with the deadlines in the paragraphs shortened from five and 10 business days to three business days. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/11/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/11/2018 2012 TEXT ORDER setting on−the−record Telephone Conference for 9/12/2018 at 1:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/11/2018. (kcf, ) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/11/2018 2013 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2007 Order, The State's Notice Regarding The Court's September 10, 2018 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Report)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/12/2018 2014 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Joint Notice Regarding Process for Assessing Suicide Prevention (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/12/2018)

09/12/2018 2015 Exhibit List for Mental Health Staffing Contempt Evidentiary Hearing by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/12/2018)

09/12/2018 2016 MOTION Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Technology Request for Mental Health Staffing Contempt Evidentiary Hearing by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/12/2018)

09/12/2018 2017 Exhibit List The State's Exhibit List for the Contempt Hearing Related to Mental Health Staffing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/12/2018)

09/12/2018 2018 TEXT ORDER granting 2016 Motion for Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Technology Request for Mental Health Staffing Contempt Evidentiary Hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/12/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/12/2018)

09/12/2018 2026 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 9/12/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 1:10 − 1:56.) (kcf, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018

2019

ORDERED that defendants' motion for relief (doc. no. 1990 ) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth by the court during a series of hearings, including that the defendants are to furnish the documents in request numbers 33 and 34 by 5:00 p.m. on September 28. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 329 of 408

09/13/2018

2020

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING PLAN FOR ASSESSING SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES: Based on the representations made on the record on September 12, 2018, it is ORDERED that: (1) The court accepts the parties' proposed plan for assessing suicide prevention measures (doc. no. 2014 ); and (2) The parties are to comply with the plan. The court will set specific deadlines by a separate order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018

2021

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on September 12, 2018, it is ORDERED that, for the contempt hearing beginning on September 18, 2018, the parties are to exchange the actual exhibits by September 13, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018

2022

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on September 7, 2018, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order forthe Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing set for 9/18/2018 at 09:00 AM; Evidentiary Hearing added for 9/19/2018 at 09:00 AM; Evidentiary Hearing added for 9/20/2018 at 07:00 AM; Evidentiary Hearing added for 9/24/2018 09:00 AM; Evidentiary Hearing added for 9/25/2018 (half day) at 09:00 AM; Evidentiary Hearing added for 10/1/2018 at 09:00 AM; as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018

2023

REVISED PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING ALL REMEDIAL HEARINGS: It is ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for clarification (doc. no. 2009 ) is granted as follows with regard to all remaining remedial hearings: as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018 2024 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Smith, John) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018

MOTION for THE STATES NON−ATTORNEY STAFF TECHNOLOGY REQUEST by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (attorney used the incorrect event code − no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 2024 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018 2025 TEXT ORDER granting 2024 Motion for THE STATES NON−ATTORNEY STAFF TECHNOLOGY REQUEST. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/13/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018 2027 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018 2028 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs AMENDED NON−ATTORNEY STAFF TECHNOLOGY REQUEST (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/13/2018 2029 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

09/14/2018

2030

ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for an order to show cause (doc. no. 1916 ) is granted, and that the defendants show cause why they should not be held in contempt at the evidentiary hearing set on September 18, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018

MOTION for Plaintiffs' Amended Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (attorney used the incorrect event code− no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 2028 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018 2031 TEXT ORDER granting 2028 Motion for Plaintiffs' Amended Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 330 of 408

09/14/2018 2032 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Amended Technology Request for the Contempt Hearing Related to Mental Health Staffing (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018

MOTION for The State's Amended Technology Request for the Contempt Hearing Related to Mental Health Staffing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (attorney used the incorrect event code− no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 2032 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018 2033 TEXT ORDER granting 2032 Motion for The State's Amended Technology Request for the Contempt Hearing Related to Mental Health Staffing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018

2034

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING CONTEMPT HEARING: For clarification purposes, it is ORDERED that, no later than 8:00 a.m. of each day of the contempt hearing beginning on September 18, 2018, counsel are to file with the court and provide to opposing counsel the summaries required by orders entered on September 8, 2015 (doc. no. 240 ) and May 10, 2016 (doc. no. 463 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018

2035

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RUTH NAGLICH − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/29/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 10/5/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/15/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/13/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018 2036 Exhibit List (Amended) for Contempt Hearing Regarding Mental−Health Staffing by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/14/2018 2037 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/14/2018)

09/17/2018 2038 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2039 TEXT ORDER granting 2038 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/17/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2040 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2041 Exhibit List (Amended) for Contempt Hearing Regarding Mental−Health Staffing by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2042 TEXT ORDER granting 2040 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/17/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2043 Response to Order re 1984 Order,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Arbitration Order)(Smith, John) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2044 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiff's Statement of the Significance of the September 4, 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report, # 2 Alabama Regional Office Monthly Client Report − June 2018, # 3 Correctional Staffing Levels, 2017−2018)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2045 MOTION to Unseal Document : MOTION TO UNSEAL DEFENDANTS QUARTERLY STAFFING REPORTS by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 1/2/2019 (djy, ). (Entered: 09/17/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 331 of 408

09/17/2018 2046 Response to Order re 2008 Order, by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Under Seal, # 2 Exhibit 2 Under Seal)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/17/2018 2047 Response to Order re 2008 Order, The State's Statement Regarding the Significance of the September 4, 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

09/18/2018 2048 THE STATE'S REVISED PHASE 2A PROPOSED REMEDIAL PLAN ON HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Corrected Certificate of Service)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/18/2018)

09/18/2018 2049 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Contempt Hearing Witness Summaries, Sept. 18, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/18/2018)

09/18/2018

2050

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO UNSEAL: It is ORDERED that the motion to unseal (doc. no. 2045 ) is set for oral argument on September 18, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/18/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/18/2018)

09/18/2018 2051 NOTICE of Appearance by Melissa Neri on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Neri, Melissa) (Entered: 09/18/2018)

09/18/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing begun on 9/18/2018 (No PDF attached, see final minute entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018 2052 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Contempt Hearing Witness Summaries and Expert Crib Sheet, Sept. 19, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018

2053

ORDER REGARDING ARBITRATION PROCESS FOR ADA ACCOMMODATION REQUESTS: Accordingly, based on the parties' submission (doc. no. 2043 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) In the event that an inmate desires to request arbitration following the denial of an appeal of a request for accommodation, the inmate will submit a "Request for Arbitration" as described in the Arbitration Process Notice. Joint Report (doc. no. 1676 −1). The inmate is to mail the Request for Arbitration to the clerk of the court for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama and shall include reference to the above case name and case number. (2) Upon receipt, the clerk's office shall file the Request for Arbitration in this case and assign a miscellaneous case number to the request. The clerk's office will then forward the request to the arbitrator. All subsequent filings and entries concerning the arbitration request, including filings, hearings, and rulings, will be under the miscellaneous case number. Defendants are precluded, pursuant to the terms of the ADA consent decree (doc. no. 728 ), from filing a request for arbitration. (3) In the event that the arbitrator denies the inmate's request for accommodation during the arbitration process, the inmate may file an appeal of the arbitrator's decision if the issue involves 12 or more inmates. Defendants are precluded, pursuant to the terms of the ADA consent decree (doc. no. 728 ), from filing an appeal of the arbitrator's decision. The inmate will send the appeal of the arbitrator's decision to the clerk's office. The clerks office will then file the appeal in both the miscellaneous case and in the main case, 2:14cv601. The appeal of the arbitrator's decision will be assigned to the United States District Court Judge assigned to this case. Any pleadings and proceedings on the appeal will continue to be filed under the miscellaneous case number. The final decision of the district judge shall be filed in both the miscellaneous case and main case. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018

2054

PHASE 2A ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO UNSEAL: Based on the representations made in open court on September 18, 2018, and by agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that the motion to unseal (doc. no. 2045 ) is granted with respect to mental−health staffing for past and future quarterly staffing reports. See Understaffing Remedial Order (doc. no. 1657 ) at 7−9. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2018.(kh, )

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 332 of 408

(Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018 2055 MOTION to Quash or Modify Subpoenas by Ken Dover, Barbara Coe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Piggott, Philip) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018 2056 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 9/19/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018

ORAL MOTION for Clarification by Jefferson S. Dunn. (ag, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018

2057

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION: It is ORDERED that defendants' motion for clarification, made on the record on September 19, 2018, is set for oral argument, by conference call, on September 20, 2018, at 1:30 p.m.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2018.(furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018

2058

PHASE 2A ORDER CONTINUING CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS: Based on the representations made on the record on September 19, 2018, it is ORDERED that the resolution of the plaintiffs' motion for order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt (doc. no. 1916 ) is continued generally pending acceleration of the consideration and resolution of the remedial issue of monitoring. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018

2059

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MONITORING SCHEDULE: Based on the representations made on the record on September 19, 2018, it is ORDERED that, on or before noon on September 21, 2018, the parties are to file a joint report as to their efforts to agree upon a schedule to expedite consideration and resolution of the remedial issue of monitoring. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018

2060

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on September 19, 2018, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing on Contempt Issue 9/20, 9/24, 9/25 (half day), and 10/1/18 are continue generally; Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 10/22/2018 reset for 1/28/2019; Final Pretrial Conference added for 3/18/2019; Evidentiary Hearing added for 3/25/2019; Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 10/12/2018 reset for 1/7/2019; as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/19/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/19/2018 2061 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Withdrawal of Subpoenas for the Mental Health Understaffing Contempt Evidentiary Hearing (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

09/20/2018 2062 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Statement Regarding Standards for Civil Contempt (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

09/20/2018 2063 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Notice Regarding The Contempt Standard (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

09/20/2018

2064

PHASE 2A ORDER DENYING MOTION TO QUASH Pursuant to the plaintiffs' notice of withdrawal of subpoenas (doc. no. 2061 ), it is ORDERED that the motion to quash or modify subpoenas (doc. no. 2055 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/20/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

09/20/2018 2065 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 9/20/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

09/20/2018 2066 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2054 Order on Motion to Unseal Document, Notice of Filing Partially Unsealed Quarterly Staffing Reports and Request for Discovery Mediation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − March 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report, # 2 Exhibit B − June 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report, # 3

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 333 of 408

Exhibit C − September 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 09/20/2018)

09/21/2018 2067 STATUS REPORT ON PARTIES EFFORTS TO AGREE UPON A SCHEDULE TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE REMEDIAL ISSUE OF MONITORING, Jointly Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/21/2018)

09/21/2018 2068 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/21/2018)

09/21/2018 2069 TEXT ORDER granting 2068 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/21/18. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 09/21/2018)

09/24/2018

2070

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO UNSEAL: It is ORDERED that the plaintiffs are to file by 12:00 p.m. on September 25, 2018, a response to the defendants' notice of filing partially unsealed quarterly staffing reports. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/24/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/24/2018)

09/25/2018 2071 REPLY to Response to Motion re 2045 MOTION to Unseal Document : MOTION TO UNSEAL DEFENDANTS QUARTERLY STAFFING REPORTS filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/25/2018)

09/26/2018

2072

MOTION for the Inclusion of Segregation in the Suicide Prevention Assessment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − September 13, 2018, Declaration of Dr. Kathryn A. Burns, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Chart of Recent Suicides, Dec. 2017 − Aug. 2018, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Filed Under Seal, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Filed Under Seal, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Filed Under Seal)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 3 replaced on 9/26/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 9/26/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 9/26/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 09/26/2018)

09/26/2018 2073 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2072 MOTION for the Inclusion of Segregation in the Suicide Prevention Assessment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3, # 2 Exhibit 4, # 3 Exhibit 5)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2018)

09/26/2018

2074

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING SUICIDE PREVENTION ASSESSMENT: Upon consideration of the plaintiffs' motion for the inclusion of segregation in the suicide prevention assessment (doc. no. 2072 ), it is ORDERED that the defendants are to file a response by 12:00 p.m. on October 3, 2018, and the plaintiffs may file a reply by 5:00 p.m. on October 5, 2018.The court will decide later whether to set the motion for oral argument or a hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2018)

09/26/2018

2075

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO UNSEAL: ORDERED that: (1) An evidentiary hearing on the remaining issue(s) in the motion to unseal (doc. no. 2045 ) is set for October 23, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) The parties are allowed to conduct expedited discovery, including on the information the court requested of the defendants during the September 18 hearing. (3) The parties are to file their pre−trial briefs (summarizing the evidence to be presented and discussing the law) by 5:00 p.m. on October 19, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2018)

09/26/2018 2076 PHASE 2A OPINION REGARDING MONITORING ISSUE SCHEDULE. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/26/2018)

09/26/2018

2077

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: In accordance with the opinion entered today regarding the monitoring remedial issue, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2Aremedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows:Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 12/11/2018 rescheduled for 11/7/2018; Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 11/27/2018 rescheduled for 11/1/2018, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/26/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, )

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 334 of 408

(Entered: 09/26/2018)

09/28/2018 2078 MOTION to Continue The State's Request for Scheduling Teleconference or, in the alternative, Motion to Continue by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/28/2018)

09/28/2018 2089 FINAL Minute Entry for Mediation Conference held for the month of September before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 9/28/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (cb, ) (Entered: 10/10/2018)

10/01/2018 2079 NOTICE of FILING by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Joint Litigation Status Report)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/02/2018)

10/03/2018 2080 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2072 MOTION for the Inclusion of Segregation in the Suicide Prevention Assessment filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/03/2018)

10/04/2018

2081

ORDER: It is ORDERED that the joint litigation status report (doc. no. 2079 −1) is set for an on−the−record status conference on October 23, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. in the chambers library. The court would like to discuss with counsel progress made in carrying out court orders. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/4/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/04/2018)

10/04/2018 2082 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2078 MOTION to Continue The State's Request for Scheduling Teleconference or, in the alternative, Motion to Continue Remedial Trial on Monitoring filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/04/2018)

10/04/2018 2083 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 10/5/2018 09:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/4/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 10/04/2018)

10/05/2018 2084 REPLY to Response to Motion re 2072 MOTION for the Inclusion of Segregation in the Suicide Prevention Assessment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/05/2018 2085 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 10/5/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/05/2018

2086

ORDER REGARDING PRE−HEARING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MOTION TO UNSEAL: Based on the representations made on the record on October 5, 2018, and with regard to the upcoming October 23, 2018, hearing on the remaining issue(s) in the motion to unseal quarterly staffing reports (doc. no. 2075 ), it is ORDERED as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/05/2018

2087

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO CONTINUE MONITORING REMEDIAL HEARING: Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that the defendants motion to continue (doc. no. 2078 ) is denied to the extent that the monitoring remedial hearing will remain as set for November 7, 2018; and it is granted to the extent that the monitoring remedial hearing will recess for November 13−16, 2018, to allow defendant Commissioner Jefferson S. Dunn and counsel to attend the Association of State Correctional Administrators meeting. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/5/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/05/2018

2088

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING SUICIDE PREVENTION ASSESSMENT GRANTING 2072 MOTION to include segregation in the suicide prevention assessment to be conducted by Drs. Mary Perrien and Kathryn Burns to the extent that: (1) Drs. Perrien and Burns must determine the scope of the assessment−−including whether it should cover any matters related to restrictive housing−−based exclusively on their own professional expertise and experience; (2) Drs. Perrien and Burns are DIRECTED that their decision as to the scope of the assessment shall not be influenced in any way by the parties' positions on the matter; (3) In conducting the assessment and making recommendations, Drs. Perrien and Burns should be cognizant of the remedial orders already in effect. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/5/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 335 of 408

10/15/2018

2090

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/5/2018, before Honorable udge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/5/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/15/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/14/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/15/2018)

10/15/2018

2091

MOTION to Compel Production of Discovery Responses for Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Motion to Unseal Quarterly Staffing Reports and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Informal Discovery Requests, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Narrative Responses, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Steve Brown e−mail)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 5/2/2019 (kh, ). (Entered: 10/15/2018)

10/15/2018

2092

MOTION to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − E−mail with Requests Attached − redacted, # 2 Exhibit 2 − E−mail re production of Easterling and Donaldson Referral Logs and Referrals − redacted, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Holman Referral Log − redacted)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/15/2018)

10/15/2018 2093 TEXT ORDER Telephone Conference re 2091 M/Compel etc. set for 10/16/2018 08:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/15/2018. (All counsel use the court's conference call number) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/15/2018)

10/15/2018

2094

ORDER: Upon consideration of the plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of documents for the remedial trial on monitoring and their request for expedited resolution (doc. no. 2092 ), it is ORDERED that the defendants are to file a response to the motion by October 17, 2018, at 11:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/15/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/15/2018)

10/15/2018

Motions No Longer Referred: ORAL MOTION for Clarification (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 10/15/2018)

10/16/2018 2095 TEXT ORDER Telephone Conference re 2092 M/Compel set for 10/18/2018 03:00 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/16/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018 2096 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 10/16/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018

2097

ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to compel (doc. no. 2091 ) is granted and that the defendants are to file under seal detailed responses to each pending interrogatory and document request by October 18, 2018 at 10:00 a.m.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/16/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018

2098

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/16/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/6/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/14/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018 2099 Exhibit List The State's Exhibit and Witness List for the Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Defendants' Quarterly Staffing Reports by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 336 of 408

10/16/2018 2100 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Pretrial Submission Summarizing Evidence and Law Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Quarterly Staffing Reports by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018 2101 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Witness and Exhibit Lists for Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Unseal Quarterly Staffing Reports by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018 2102 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Phase 2A Pretrial Brief for Hearing Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Defendants' Quarterly Staffing Report by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018 2103 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018 2104 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Margaret Savage)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/16/2018

MOTION for Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 2103 for pdf. Attorney used the incorrect event code)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/17/2018)

10/17/2018 2105 TEXT ORDER granting 2103 Motion for Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/17/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/17/2018)

10/17/2018

2106

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS − EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MOTION TO UNSEAL Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 9/18/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/7/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/19/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/17/2018)

10/17/2018 2107 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 10/18/2018 03:00 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/17/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 10/17/2018)

10/17/2018

2108

RESPONSE in Opposition re 2092 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Ken Dover, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of Edward Ellington)(Smith, Alyson) (Entered: 10/17/2018)

10/17/2018 2109 MOTION State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 10/17/2018)

10/18/2018 2110 ORDER granting 2109 Motion for State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/18/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

10/18/2018 2111 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 State's Response to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests Related to Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Defendants' Quarterly Staffing Reports (kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

10/18/2018 2112 TEXT ORDER cancelling Telephone Conference set for 10/18/2018 at 03:00 PM. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/18/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

10/18/2018

2113

ORDER: It is ORDERED that, by October 19, 2018, at 5:00 p.m., the plaintiffs are to file a detailed reply to the defendants' response in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents for the remedial trial regarding monitoring (doc. no. 2108 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/18/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 337 of 408

10/18/2018

2114

ORDER: It is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents for the remedial trial regarding monitoring and their request for expedited resolution (doc. no. 2092 ) is set for a hearing on October 23, 2018, at 8:30 a.m., in the chambers library. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/18/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

10/18/2018 2115 Response to Order re 2077 Order,,, Set Hearings,, The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Compliance Oversight by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Performance Measurements)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

10/19/2018

2116

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 9/7/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/19/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/17/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/19/2018)

10/19/2018

2117

REPLY BRIEF re 2092 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Redacted Email, # 2 Exhibit 2 − 2017 ADOC Annual Report, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Feb. 2018 Contract Review Committee Agenda Excerpt)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/19/2018)

10/19/2018 2118 Exhibit List and Witness List, First Amended, Regarding Hearing on Motion to Unseal Quarterly Staffing Reports by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/19/2018)

10/22/2018 2119 MOTION The State's Technology Request for the Hearing Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Defendants' Quarterly Staffing Report by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/22/2018 2120 TEXT ORDER granting 2119 The State's Technology Request for the Hearing Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Defendants' Quarterly Staffing Report. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/22/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/22/2018 2121 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Motion to Unseal Evidentiary Hearing Expert Crib Sheet and Witness Summaries, Oct. 23, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/23/2018 2122 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Unseal Evidentiary Hearing Expert Crib Sheet and Witness Summaries, Oct. 23, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/23/2018)

10/23/2018 2123 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1588 Order, The State's Witness Summary for October 23, 2018 (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 10/23/2018)

10/23/2018

2124

ORDERED that:(1) The court's orders providing for mediation of discovery disputes (doc. nos. 223 and 1957 ) before a magistrate judge are vacated. This process proved to be inefficient. (2) The parties, in engaging in discovery, are to comply in full with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Discovery in this case is no longer governed by the parties' practice engaging in so−called "informal discovery." That practice did not work. (3) Discovery matters are referred to the Middle District of Alabama Magistrate Judge assigned to this case to be resolved formally in accordance with this court's local practice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/23/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/23/2018)

10/23/2018

2125

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on October 23, 2018, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents for remedial trial regarding monitoring and request for expedited resolution (doc. no. 2092 ) is granted to the following extent: (1) On or before 9:00 a.m. on October 24, 2018, plaintiffs are to pose to defendants the discovery requests at issue in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (2) On or before noon on October 27, 2018, defendants are to respond to said requests in

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 338 of 408

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/23/2018. (kh, ) Modified on 10/23/2018 (kh, ). (Entered: 10/23/2018)

10/23/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing begun on 10/23/2018 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/23/2018)

10/24/2018 2126 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Motion to Unseal Evidentiary Hearing Witness Summaries, Oct. 24, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018 2127 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1588 Order, The State's Witness Summary for October 24, 2018 (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018 2128 NOTICE of Appearance by Gary Lee Willford, Jr on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Willford, Gary) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018

2129

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on October 24, 2018, it is ORDERED that the order entered on October 23, 2018 (doc. no. 2125 ) is vacated, and that plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents for remedial trial regarding monitoring and request for expedited resolution (doc. no. 2092 ) is granted to the following extent: (1) On or before 9:00 a.m. on October 24, 2018, plaintiffs are to pose to defendants the discovery requests at issue in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (2) On or before noon on October 26, 2018, defendants are to respond to said requests in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is further ORDERED that a telephone status conference to discuss the specific trial dates for the monitoring issue is set for October 26, 2018, at 1:30p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/24/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018 2130 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 10/24/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Court's Exhibits) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018 2131 Exhibit List The State's Exhibit and Witness List for the Phase 2A Evidentiary Hearing on Compliance Oversight by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/24/2018 2132 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Witness and Exhibit Lists for Monitoring Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/24/2018)

10/25/2018

2133

BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2115 Response to Order, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Newman Opinion Dismissing Case with Prejudice, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Bradley Settlement, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Bradley Final Monitoring Report, # 4 Exhibit 4 − ADOC 2006 Annual Report Excerpt, # 5 Exhibit 5− Pennsylvania Settlement, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Arizona Settlement, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Excerpt of Recent Coleman Special Master Report (California), # 8 Exhibit 8 − Virginia Settlement, # 9 Exhibit 9 − Illinois Settlement, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Orleans Parish Prison Stipulated Agreement, # 11 Exhibit 11 − Massachusetts Settlement)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/25/2018)

10/26/2018 2134 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 10/26/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 1:37 − 1:55.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/26/2018)

10/26/2018

2135

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM directing that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/7/2018 and 11/8/2018 @ 09:00 AM in Montgomery, Alabama before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/20/2018 and 11/21/2018 @ 09:00 AM in Montgomery, Alabama before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/26/2018, 11/27/2018, 11/28/2018, 11/29/2018 and 11/30/2018 @ 09:00 AM in Montgomery, Alabama before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 1/28/2019 @ 09:00 AM in

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 339 of 408

Montgomery, Alabama before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 3/25/2019 @ 09:00 AM in Montgomery, Alabama before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/26/18. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 10/26/2018)

10/29/2018

2136

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' ORAL MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants' oral motion to clarify, made in open court on September 19, 2018, is granted to the extent that it is DECLARED that the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (doc. no. 1657 )−− and the ADOC contract referred to in it−−required that defendants were to ensure that all 263.2 mental−health FTEs listed in the contract's "minimum staffing requirements" were filled by July 1, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/29/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/29/2018)

10/29/2018 2137 MOTION for Leave to File to File Under Seal Some Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/29/2018)

10/29/2018

2138

TEXT ORDER granting 2137 MOTION for Leave to File to File Under Seal Some Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring and Request for Expedited Resolution. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/29/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/29/2018)

10/29/2018

2139

MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring, Request for Fees and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Monitoring Requests for Production of Documents, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Defendants' Responses and Objections to Request for Production re Monitoring Remedial Trial, # 3 Exhibit 3 − SEALED Wardens Meeting Sign−ins, # 4 Exhibit 4 − SEALED − ADOC Sick Call Log, # 5 Exhibit 5 − SEALED − Exemplar of Multidisciplinary Meeting Minutes, # 6 Exhibit 6 − SEALED − Exemplar CQI Meeting Minutes, # 7 Exhibit 7 − SEALED − Exemplars of CQI Major Occurrence Reports, # 8 Exhibit 8 − NCCHC Suicide Prevention Program MH−G−04, # 9 Exhibit 9 − SEALED − E−mail from MHM to OHS Staff re rebates, # 10 Exhibit 10 − SEALED − E−mail from Corizon to OHS re contract compliance issue, # 11 Exhibit 11− SEALED − September 2018 Suicide Watch Report, # 12 Exhibit 12 − ADOC Monthly Statistical Report − March 2018, # 13 Exhibit 13 − ADOC Monthly Statistical Report − July 2018)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 10/29/2018 to correct the text. (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 6 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 9 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 10 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 10/30/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 10/29/2018)

10/29/2018 2140 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference re 2139 M/Compel set for 10/29/2018 04:30 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/29/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 10/29/2018)

10/29/2018 2142 NOTICE of FILING EXHIBITS by All Plaintiffs re 2139 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring, Request for Fees and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) (kh, ) (Entered: 10/30/2018)

10/30/2018 2141 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 10/30/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 4:38 − 6:13.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/30/2018)

10/31/2018

2143

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/26/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 340 of 408
that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/21/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/3/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/29/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
10/31/2018 2144 TRIAL BRIEF regarding Monitoring by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Chart of Major Differences between the Proposals of the Parties)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
10/31/2018 2145 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Phase 2A Pretrial Brief Regarding Compliance Oversight by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
10/31/2018 2146 Minute Entry for Mediation Conferences held from 10/1/2018 to 10/31/2018 before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. No pdf attached to this entry. (cb, ) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
11/01/2018 2147 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference held on 11/1/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
11/02/2018 2148 MOTION to Seal Motion for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
11/02/2018 2149 TEXT ORDER granting 2148 MOTION to Seal Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/2/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
11/02/2018 2150 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − Warren Averett Report)(Reeves, Matthew) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/2/2018 to attach the unredacted Exhibit A under seal: # 2 Unredacted Exhibit A Report) (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 11/02/2018)
11/02/2018 2151 NOTICE of filing report under seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2150 Notice. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
11/02/2018 2152 MOTION Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
11/05/2018 2153 MOTION The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 2154 TEXT ORDER granting 2152 Motion for Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request; granting 2153 Motion for The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/5/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 2155 ORDERED that the paragraph numbered (3) in the order entered on June 19, 2018 (doc. no. 1899 ), is amended to reflect that the correct document number is 1893 , not 1983 . Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/5/2018.(kh, ) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 2156 TEXT ORDER setting a Telephone Conference regarding monitoring issue for 11/5/2018 at 4:30 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/5/2018. (kcf, ) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 2157 MOTION to Unseal Document 2151 Notice (Other) filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, 2150 Notice (Other), filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich : Motion to Unseal Warren Averett Report by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 2158 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' First Amended Witness and Exhibit Lists for Monitoring Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 2159 MOTION The State's Technology Request for the Hearing Regarding Monitoring by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 2162 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 11/5/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (kcf, ) (Entered: 11/06/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 341 of 408

11/06/2018 2160 TEXT ORDER granting 2159 Motion The State's Technology Request for the Hearing Regarding Monitoring. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/6/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/06/2018)

11/06/2018

2161

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO UNSEAL: It is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to unseal the Warren Averett Report (doc. no. 2157 ) is set for an on−the− record status conference on November 7, 2018, at 8:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/6/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/06/2018)

11/06/2018 2163 CERTIFICATION OF CBMC ADMISSION by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/06/2018)

11/06/2018 2164 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Second Amended Witness and Exhibit Lists for Monitoring Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/06/2018)

11/06/2018 2165 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Monitoring Remedial Trial Witness Summary for Nov. 7, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/06/2018)

11/07/2018

2166

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF RUTH NAGLICH Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 2/7/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/28/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/10/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/5/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/07/2018)

11/07/2018 2167 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Monitoring Remedial Trial Witness Summary for Nov. 8, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/07/2018)

11/07/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing begun on 11/7/2018 (No PDF, see final minute entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/08/2018)

11/08/2018 2168 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 11/8/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/09/2018)

11/09/2018

2169

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Excerpt of Bench Trial Proceedings testimony of Ruth Naglich Volume II (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on November 30, 2017, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/30/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/10/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/7/2019. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/09/2018)

11/09/2018

2170

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Evidentiary Hearing on Issue of Contempt and Oral Argument on Motion to unseal Proceedings Volume I (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on September 18, 2018, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/30/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/10/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/7/2019. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/09/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 342 of 408

11/15/2018 2171 MOTION Requesting Ruling re 2139 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents for Remedial Trial Regarding Monitoring, Request for Fees and Request for Expedited Resolution (Opposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/15/2018)

11/19/2018

2172

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO UNSEAL WARREN AVERETT REPORT: It is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to unseal the Warren Averett Report (doc. no. 2157 ) is set for submission, without oral argument, on December 3, 2018, with the defendants to respond by November 26, 2018, and the plaintiffs to reply by December 3, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/19/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/19/2018)

11/19/2018 2173 Plaintiff's Third Amended Witness and Exhibit Lists for Monitoring Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 11/19/2018 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Entered: 11/19/2018)

11/20/2018 2174 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1588 Order, The State's Witness Summary for November 20, 2018 (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

11/20/2018 2176 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 11/20/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

2175

ORDER: For the reasons stated in open court on November 20, 2018, it is ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiffs' motion requesting a ruling, etc. (doc. no. 2171 ) and plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents for remedial trial regarding monitoring, etc. (doc. no. 2139 ) are granted in part to the extent set out below. (2) In response to plaintiffs' document request numbers 22, 23, and 24, as set forth in document number 2139 , defendants are to produce documents limited to the scope agreed upon by the parties in court today−−namely, those documents that mention mental−health care−−by no later than noon on November 30, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

2177

ORDERED that:(1) Plaintiffs' motion requesting a ruling, etc. (doc. no. 2171 ) and their motion to compel production of documents for remedial trial regarding monitoring, etc. (doc. no. 2139 ) are granted in all remaining respects to the extent set forth below. (2) In response to the plaintiffs' document request number 26, as set forth in their motion to compel (doc. no. 2139 , the defendants are to produce documents limited to all communications that include one or more of the following terms and variations thereof: "audit," "compliance," "fail," "pay back," "penalty," "damages," "contract," and agreement; and that are communications between Wexford and the following individuals: defendant Jefferson S. Dunn, defendant Ruth Naglich, Dr. Edward Kern, Dr. David Tytell, Deb Crook, Sekeena Holt, Brandon Kinard, Lynn Brown, Kay Wilson, Rosie Brisbane, and Stacey Brink. As to defendant Dunn, the documents are to be produced by no later than 7:00 a.m. on November 26, 2018; as to the other individuals, the documents are to be produced by no later than noon on November 30, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/21/2018

2178

MOTION to Modify re 2135 Order,,,,, Set Hearings,,,, Regarding Scheduling of Witnesses for Monitoring Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Oct. 26 Hearing Tr. Excerpt, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Email from MVM to BL re scheduling)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 12/4/2018 to reflect granted pursuant to the 2188 order (kh, ). (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/26/2018 2179 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Monitoring Remedial Trial Witness Summaries for Nov. 26, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/26/2018)

11/26/2018 2180 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summary for November 26, 2018 (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 11/26/2018)

11/26/2018 2181 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/26/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 343 of 408

11/26/2018 2182 TEXT ORDER granting 2181 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/26/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/26/2018)

11/26/2018

2183

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/5/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/17/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/27/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/25/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/26/2018)

11/26/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing begun on 11/26/2018 (No PDF, see final minute entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/26/2018)

11/26/2018 2184 MOTION to Alter Judgment Notice and Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate October 29, 2018 Order on Motion for Clarification Regarding Staffing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supplemental Declaration of Elaine Gedman)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/26/2018)

11/26/2018 2187 THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO UNSEAL THE WARREN AVERETT REPORT by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/28/2018)

11/27/2018 2185 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summary for November 27, 2018 (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 11/27/2018)

11/27/2018

2186

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO ALTER, AMEND, OR VACATE CLARIFICATION ORDER: It is ORDERED that the defendants' motion to alter, amend, or vacate the court's order on their oral motion for clarification regarding mental−health staffing (doc. no. 2184 ) is set for a hearing on December 11, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. The plaintiffs are to file a response by December 5, 2018, and the defendants may file a reply by December 7, 2018. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/27/2018. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/27/2018)

11/27/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 11/27/2018 (No PDF, hearing to resume on 11/29 at 10:30 ). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) Modified on 11/30/2018 (ag, ). (Entered: 11/27/2018)

11/28/2018

2188

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on November 27, 2018, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion requesting modification of the scheduling order for the monitoring remedial trial (doc. no. 2178 ) is granted as set forth below and the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/28/18 and 11/30/18 at 9:00 a.m. are cancelled. Evidentiary Hearing added for 11/29/18 at 10:30 a.m.; 12/6/18 at 10:00 a.m.; 12/7/18 at 9:00 a.m.; and 12/11/18 at 9:00 a.m.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(term: Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/28/2018 and 11/30/2018)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/28/2018)

11/28/2018 2189 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Monitoring Remedial Trial Expert Crib Sheet for Nov. 29, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/28/2018)

11/29/2018 2190 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Joint Filing of Summary of Monitoring Structure in Parsons v. Ryan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Parsons v. Ryan Monitoring Structure Summary, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Parsons v. Ryan Settlement Stipulation, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Parsons v. Ryan Performance Measures)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 11/29/2018)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 344 of 408

11/29/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 11/29/2018 (No PDF, see final minute entry). Hearing to resume on 12/6 at 9:00 (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 11/30/2018)

12/03/2018 2191 REPLY BRIEF In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Warren Averett Report filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 −Condrey Compensation Recommendations)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/03/2018)

12/03/2018 2192 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1657 Order,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Quarterly Staffing Report)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/03/2018)

12/03/2018 2193 Exhibit List Fourth Amended Witness and Exhibit List for Monitoring Remedial Trial by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/03/2018)

12/03/2018 2194 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/04/2018)

12/05/2018

2195

MOTION for Order to Show Cause as to Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt and Response to Defendants' Notice of Inability to Comply and Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit MH Staffing Jul−Sep 2018, # 2 Exhibit MH Staffing Advanced Training by Position and Facility Jul−Sep 2018)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/05/2018)

12/06/2018 2196 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Monitoring Remedial Trial Expert Crib Sheet for Dec. 6, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/06/2018)

12/06/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/6/2018 (No PDF see final minute entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/07/2018 2197 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Monitoring Remedial Trial Expert Crib Sheet and Witness Summary for Dec. 7, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/07/2018 2198 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1588 Order, The State's Witness Summary for December 7, 2018 (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/07/2018

2199

ORDER directing that both parties are to file briefs on the following issues by 12/17/2018, with any response brief from either party due on 12/21/2018; (1) Does the need−narrowness−intrusiveness requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), codified in 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), apply to court−ordered monitoring? (2) Relatedly, would the PLRAs need−narrowness−intrusiveness requirement apply to a monitoring order if the monitoring is viewed as enforcing a previously entered order that the court already found to satisfy the PLRA?. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/7/18. (djy, ) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/07/2018 2200 ORAL MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Mitesh Shah) by Alabama Department of Corrections. (ag, ) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/07/2018 2201 ORAL ORDER granting 2200 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Mitesh Bansilal Shah terminated. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/7/2018. (ag, ) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/07/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 12/7/2018 (No PDF, see final minute entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/07/2018

2202

REPLY BRIEF re 2195 MOTION for Order to Show Cause as to Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt and Response to Defendants' Notice of Inability to Comply and Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to the Notice of Inability to Comply and Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/10/2018 2203 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Monitoring Remedial Trial Witness Summary for December 11, 2018 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/10/2018)

12/10/2018 2204 Exhibit List Plaintiffs' Exhibit List for December 11, 2018 Evidentiary Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate by All Plaintiffs.. (Morris, Maria)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 345 of 408

(Entered: 12/10/2018)

12/11/2018 2205 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich The State's Witness Summary for December 11, 2018 (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 12/11/2018)

12/11/2018 2206 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing held on 12/11/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/11/2018)

12/12/2018

2207

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: (1) The plaintiffs' motion to reopen the contempt proceedings (doc. no. 2195 ) is granted. (2) The plaintiffs' motion for order to show cause (doc. no. 2195 ) is granted. (3) The defendants are to show cause in writing by noon on December 21, 2018, as well as at the evidentiary hearing on January 7, 2019, as why they should not be held in contempt. (4) The plaintiffs may file a reply by noon on January 4, 2019. (5) The previously continued contempt proceedings, See Order of Continuance (doc. no. 2058 ), are to resume on, and the renewed contempt proceedings are set for, January 7, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/12/2018. (furn:ag,calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/12/2018)

12/12/2018

2208

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER: ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM Based on the representations made on the record on December 11, 2018, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Oral Argument re 2184 added for 1/7/2019 @ 9:00am; Pretrial Hearing added 1/7/19 at 8:00 a.m as futher set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/12/2018. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/12/2018)

12/14/2018 2209 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 12/14/2018)

12/14/2018 2210 TEXT ORDER granting 2209 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/14/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/14/2018)

12/14/2018

2211

ORDER: By oral agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that: (1) By noon on December 21, 2018, the parties will file exhibit and witness lists, exchange exhibits, and arrange for any witnesses that need to testify by videoconference. (2) No further pre−trial briefing is necessary for the January 7, 2019, contempt hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/14/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/14/2018)

12/14/2018 2212 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2187 State's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal the Warren Averett Report. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Jackie Graham)(kh, ). (Entered: 12/17/2018)

12/17/2018

2213

Response to Order re 2199 Order,, Plaintiffs' Responses to the Court's Questions Regarding the Applicability of the PLRA Needs−Narrowness−Intrusiveness Requirement to Court−Ordered Monitoring by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Parsons − Order Regarding Appointment of Independent Expert, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Coleman − Order Regarding Independent Investigator)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/17/2018)

12/17/2018 2214 Response to Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/17/2018)

12/21/2018 2215 Exhibit List The State's Witness and Exhibit List for the Renewed Contempt Hearing Related to Mental Health Staffing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 2216 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Response to Renewed Motion for Contempt re 2207 Memorandum Opinion and Order,,,, Terminate Motions,,,, Order to Show Cause,,,, Set Hearings,,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 346 of 408

(Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 2217 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 2218 TEXT ORDER granting 2216 Motion for Extension. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/21/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 2219 REPLY BRIEF re 2214 Response to Order Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Brief Regarding the Application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Court Monitoring filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018

2220

RESPONSE to Motion re 2195 MOTION for Order to Show Cause as to Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt and Response to Defendants' Notice of Inability to Comply and Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Second Supplemental Declaration of Elaine Gedman)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 2221 Response to Order re 2213 Response to Order, 2199 Order,, The State's Response Regarding the Application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Court Monitoring by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 2222 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2060 Order,,,, Order Cancelling Deadline,,,, Set Hearings,,, The State's Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Disciplinary Sanctions (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018 2223 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018

MOTION for Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 2223 for pdf. Attorney used the incorrect event code)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/26/2018)

12/26/2018 2224 TEXT ORDER granting 2223 Motion for Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/26/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/26/2018)

12/26/2018 2225 MOTION The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 12/26/2018)

12/27/2018 2226 TEXT ORDER granting 2225 MOTION: The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/27/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/27/2018)

12/28/2018 2227 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of filing of PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS PROPOSED PHASE 2A REMEDIAL PLAN ON DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 12/28/2018)

01/02/2019

2228

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER directing that the plf's 2045 MOTION to unseal quarterly staffing reports is granted to the extent that for each past and future quarterly staffing report filed by the defendants, the defendants are, initially, to file the facility−specific correctional data under seal and then, five months after the last day of quarter covered by the report, to refile the data unsealed. None of the other information in the quarterly reports shall be filed under seal, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/2/19. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/02/2019)

01/02/2019 2229 MOTION Technology Request for the Renewed Contempt Hearing Related to Mental Health Staffing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 01/02/2019)

01/02/2019 2230 TEXT ORDER granting state's 2229 technology request for the renewed contempt hearing related to Mental Health Staffing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/2/19. (NO PDF Document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 01/02/2019)

01/04/2019 2231 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 347 of 408

01/04/2019 2232 TEXT ORDER granting 2231 Motion for Leave to File exhibits under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/4/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019

2233

REPLY BRIEF re 2220 Response to Motion, Plaintiffs' Reply In Support Of Renewed Motion for Order to Show Cause as to Why Defendants Should Not Be Held In Contempt of the Court's Understaffing Remedial Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Rasho − Order, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Rasho − Permanent Injunction, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Newspaper article, # 4 Exhibit 4 − SEALED − September 2018 Suicide Watch Report, # 5 Exhibit 5 − SEALED − November 2018 Suicide Watch Report)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019 2234 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL SEALED TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 12/11/18, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019

2235

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Excerpt of Proceedings re: Monitoring Testimony of Mr. James Tucker (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/11/18, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/25/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/4/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/4/2019. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019

2236

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings testimony of Elaine Gedman (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on December 11, 2018, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Tricia Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/25/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/4/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/4/2019. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019 2237 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs : Joint Filing of STIPULATIONS REGARDING MENTAL HEALTH STAFFING PURSUANT TO THE UNDERSTAFFING REMEDIAL ORDER (DOC. 1657) AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS ORAL MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION (DOC. 2136) (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019

2238

TEXT ORDER continuing Pretrial Hearing on disciplinary sanctions set for 1/7/2019, from 8:00 AM to 10:00 AM in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/4/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). Furnished to calendar group and AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019

2239

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2237 Notice (Other) Joint Filing of STIPULATIONS REGARDING MENTAL HEALTH STAFFING PURSUANT TO THE UNDERSTAFFING REMEDIAL ORDER (DOC. 1657) AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS ORAL MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION (DOC. 2136) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Stipulations)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

01/04/2019 2242 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2233 Reply Brief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 4, # 2 Exhibit 5)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/07/2019)

01/07/2019 2240 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference held on 1/7/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/07/2019)

01/07/2019 2241 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Response to the State's Revised Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Hospital−Level Care by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 01/07/2019)

01/07/2019 2243 TEXT ORDER granting 2241 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Response to the State's Revised Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 348 of 408

Hospital−Level Care. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/7/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/07/2019)

01/07/2019

2244

REPLY BRIEF re 2048 Sealed Document Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Revised Phase 2A Proposed Remedial Plan on Hospital−Level Care filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED − Contract Review Report of ADOC and Brookwood Baptist Health − October 2018)(Van Der Pol, William) (Attachment 1 replaced on 1/8/2019) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/07/2019)

01/07/2019 2246 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2244 Reply Brief, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/07/2019 2247 JOINT LITIGATION STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich (kh, ) (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/08/2019

2245

ORDERED that the stipulations regarding mental−health staffing pursuant to the understaffing remedial order and subsequent clarification order (doc. no. 2239 −1) are set for an in−person hearing on January 17, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/8/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Main Document 2245 replaced on 2/14/2019) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/08/2019

2248

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM Based on the representations made on the record on January 7, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Oral Argument previously set for 1/17/2019 reset to 1/16/2019, 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/8/2019. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/10/2019

2249

(NOT TO BE RELEASED−SEE DOCKET ENTRY 2273 for PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION) NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING− VOLUME 1 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/7/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/31/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/10/2019. (kh, ) Modified on 8/12/2019 (djy, ). (Entered: 01/10/2019)

01/10/2019

2250

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING− VOLUME 4 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/26/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/31/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/10/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/10/2019)

01/10/2019

2251

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING − VOLUME 2 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/8/2018, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/31/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/10/2019. (kh, ) (Entered:

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 349 of 408

01/10/2019)

01/11/2019 2252 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 01/11/2019)

01/11/2019 2253 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/11/2019)

01/11/2019

2254

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING − VOLUME 7 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/6/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/1/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/11/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/11/2019)

01/11/2019 2255 MOTION to Seal by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 01/11/2019)

01/14/2019

2256

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING − VOLUME 8 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/7/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/4/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/14/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/14/2019 2257 TEXT ORDER granting 2255 Motion to Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/14/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/14/2019 2258 Witness List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/14/2019 2259 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Hospital−Level Remedial Pretrial Brief Summarizing Evidence and the Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on Remedies by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/14/2019 2260 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing of Proposed Phase 2A Opinion Regarding Monitoring (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/14/2019 2261 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Phase 2A Pretrial Brief Regarding Hospital−Level Care by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − ADOC RFP No. 2018−04, # 2 Exhibit B − Brookwood's Response to RFP No. 2018−04, # 3 Exhibit C − Proposed AR 640)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/16/2019 2262 MOTION to Withdraw by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Naramore, John) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/16/2019 2263 TEXT ORDER granting 2262 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/16/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/16/2019

*** Attorney John W. Naramore terminated pursuant to the court's 2263 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/16/2019 2264 REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION (2:19−mc−3852−MHT−GMB) by Patrick Joseph Charest re 2053 ORDER REGARDING ARBITRATION PROCESS FOR ADA ACCOMMODATION REQUESTS (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Documents)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 350 of 408

01/16/2019 2265 MOTION to Redact 2249 Transcript,, Plaintiffs' Motion for Redaction by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/16/2019 2266 MOTION Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request for the Hospital−Level Care and Disciplinary Sanctions Evidentiary Hearings by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/16/2019 2267 Response to Order re 2248 Order,,, Set Hearings,, The State's Notice Regarding Application of Involuntary Medication Procedures to Hospital−Level Care by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/16/2019 2268 Response to Order re 2248 Order,,, Set Hearings,, The State's Supplemental Brief on the Due Process (Vitek) Issue by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Bradley Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit B − Photographs, # 3 Exhibit C − AR634 and Change #1)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/16/2019 2269 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument held on 1/16/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs Exhibit List, # 2 Plaintiffs Exhibits) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/17/2019 2270 TEXT ORDER granting 2266 Motion − Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request for the Hospital−Level Care and Disciplinary Sanctions Evidentiary Hearings. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/17/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/17/2019)

01/17/2019 2271 ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for redaction (doc. no. 2265 ) is granted. The clerk of the court is to arrange for the redaction of the 2249 transcript. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/17/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/17/2019)

01/17/2019 2272 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/17/2019)

01/17/2019 2273 Redaction re 2249 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING− VOLUME 1 Proceedings. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019 2274 TEXT ORDER granting 2272 Motion for Leave to File exhibits to plf's emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction under seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/18/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019 2275 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs. (Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019

2276

Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit SEALED − October 2018 Suicide Watch Report, # 2 Exhibit SEALED − Ryan Rust Medical Records, # 3 Exhibit Anniston Star article about Roderick Abrams, # 4 Exhibit ADOC emails re: Paul Ford on MHO, # 5 Exhibit SEALED − November 16−30, 2018 Suicide Watch Logs, # 6 Exhibit SEALED − 9.18.18 Restrictive Housing Report, # 7 Exhibit SEALED − 11.20.18 Restrictive Housing Report, # 8 Exhibit SEALED − August 2018 Suicide Watch Report, # 9 Exhibit SEALED − November 2018 Suicide Watch Report, # 10 Exhibit SEALED − December 2018 Suicide Watch Report, # 11 Exhibit SEALED − 12.25.18 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 12 Exhibit Suicides in ADOC from Dec. 2017 − Jan.2019, # 13 Exhibit Prisoners with Mental Illness in Segregation 2012−2018, # 14 Exhibit Repeated Segregation and Crisis Placements, # 15 Exhibit SEALED − Repeated Segregation and Crisis Placements KEY, # 16 Exhibit Jan. 17, 2019 ADOC News Release, # 17 Exhibit May 23, 2018 Declaration of Paul Ford, # 18 Exhibit SEALED − 8.14.18 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 19 Exhibit SEALED − 9.25.18 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 20 Exhibit SEALED − Aug. 2018 Crisis Cell Utilization Logs, # 21 Exhibit SEALED − Sept. 2018 Crisis Cell Utilization Logs, # 22 Exhibit SEALED − 1.15.19 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 23 Exhibit SEALED − 4.2.18 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 24

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 351 of 408

Exhibit Pls. Dem. Ex. 168 Prisoners with Mental Illness in Seg. 2012−2017, # 25 Exhibit SEALED − Dec. 1−15, 2018 Suicide Watch Logs)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019

2277

TEXT ORDER Setting OTR Hearing on 2276 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation: Motion Hearing set for 1/18/2019 at 04:00 PM by conference call before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/18/2019. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) Modified on 1/18/2019 to include OTR. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019

2278

NOTICE of Filing by All Plaintiffs re 2276 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 2 Exhibit 2 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 3 Exhibit 5 − Part 1 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 4 Exhibit 5 − Part 2 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 5 Exhibit 5 − Part 3 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 6 Exhibit 5 − Part 4 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 7 Exhibit 5 − Part 5 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 8 Exhibit 5 − Part 6 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 9 Exhibit 6 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 10 Exhibit 7 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 11 Exhibit 8 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 12 Exhibit 9 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 13 Exhibit 10 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 14 Exhibit 11 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 15 Exhibit 15 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 16 Exhibit 18 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 17 Exhibit 19 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 18 Exhibit 20 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 19 Exhibit 21 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 20 Exhibit 22 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 21 Exhibit 23 (FILED UNDER SEAL), # 22 Exhibit 25 (FILED UNDER SEAL))(wcl, ) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019

2279

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 1/18/2019 re 2276 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation filed by All Plaintiffs (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019 2280 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Phase 2A Pretrial Brief Regarding Disciplinary Actions by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/18/2019

MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as related to the pending remedial issue of suicide prevention by All Plaintiffs, as treated in the court's 2345 order. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 2276 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/14/2019)

01/22/2019

2281

ORDER RE ELECTRONIC FILING OF SEALED DOCUMENTS: It is ORDERED that counsel for all parties are reminded of the requirements in the New Electronic Filing of Sealed Documents Order entered on September 20, 2016 (doc. no. 817 ), regarding the electronic filing of documents and exhibits under seal. It is further ORDERED that the New Electronic Filing of Sealed Documents Order (doc. no. 817 ) is amended to the following extent only: the size limit for each individual document or exhibit to be submitted on a compact disc is increased from 10 megabytes in size to 25 megabytes in size. It is further ORDERED that, should a document or exhibit exceed 25 megabytes in size, it is the responsibility of the party submitting the document, not the clerk of court, to divide the document into appropriately sized documents, and that the clerk of court shall not be responsible for downloading documents from a site on the internet. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/22/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2019)

01/22/2019

2282

PHASE 2A ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ON SMI PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION: Upon consideration of plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction regarding placement of high−risk prisoners in segregation (doc. no. 2276 ), and based on the representations made on the record during the conference call on January 18, 2019, it is ORDERED that the motion for a temporary restraining order is granted to the following extent at

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 352 of 408

this time (but shall remain pending for consideration of the entry of additional relief in the future): (1) Defendants are to submit under seal, by January 29, 2019, a chart listing each prisoner in the Alabama Department of Corrections with a serious mental illness (SMI) who is housed in segregation−−or in a segregation−like setting*−−as of todays date. (2) For each such SMI prisoner, the chart must list the prisoners date of entry into (and if applicable, exit from) segregation or a segregation−like setting; the prison and unit where the prisoner is (or, if since released, was) housed in segregation or a segregation−like setting; the reason(s) for the placement; and the reason(s) the prisoner has not been released from segregation or a segregation−like setting as of today. (3) In addition, for each such SMI prisoner, if the prisoner has been placed in segregation or a segregation−like setting more than once during the last year, the chart must also list, for each such placement, the prisoner's dates of entry into and exit from segregation or a segregation− like setting since January 1, 2018; the prison and unit where the prisoner was housed during the placement; the reason(s) for the initial placement in segregation or a segregation−like setting; and the reason(s) the prisoner remained in segregation or a segregation−like setting. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/22/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2019)

01/22/2019

2283

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich re 2239 Notice (Other), of Joint Filing of Amended Stipulations Regarding Mental Health Staffing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Amended Stipulations Regarding Mental Health Staffing, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Redline of Prior Stipulations)(Morris, Maria) Modified on 1/23/2019 to add as filed on behalf of Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich. (kh, ). (Entered: 01/22/2019)

01/22/2019 2284 MOTION Resolution of Dispute Regarding Correctional Staffing Numbers re 1813 Notice (Other), 1920 Notice (Other), by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − ACA Correctional Officer Training Standards)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/22/2019)

01/23/2019 2285 MOTION State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 01/23/2019)

01/23/2019 2286 TEXT ORDER granting 2285 Motion− State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/23/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 01/23/2019)

01/23/2019 2287 REPLY BRIEF re 2267 Response to Order Plaintiffs' Reply Brief on Involuntary Medication Procedures in Hospitals Providing Hospital−Level Care filed by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 01/23/2019)

01/23/2019 2288 MOTION Technology Request by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, Alyson) (Entered: 01/23/2019)

01/23/2019

2289

REPLY BRIEF re 2268 Response to Order, Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief on the Due Process (Vitek) Issue filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Brookwood Baptist Hospital Response to RFP No. 2018−04, # 2 Exhibit B − Contract Review Report Contract C180051817 (CBMC))(Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 01/23/2019)

01/24/2019 2290 TEXT ORDER granting 2288 Motion Technology request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/24/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 01/24/2019)

01/24/2019 2291 TEXT ORDER setting a Conference Call for 1/25/2019 @ 03:00 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/24/19. Furnished to calendar group & AG (NO PDF document attached to this notice).(djy, ) (Entered: 01/24/2019)

01/25/2019

2292

Joint MOTION Parties request that the Court enter the Stipulations as an Order Joint Notice of Filing of Stipulations Regarding the Provision of Hospital−Level Care by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Administrative Regulation 640, # 2 Exhibit B − Hospital Stipulations)(Van Der Pol, William) Modified on 1/25/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 01/25/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 353 of 408

01/25/2019 2293 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/25/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/25/2019)

01/28/2019

2294

ORDER: At the oral requests of the parties with regard to the disciplinary− sanctions remedial issue and the hospital−level−care remedial issue (including the Vitek and involuntary−medication sub−issues), it is ORDERED that the hearings, now set for January 28, 2019, are reset for January 29, 2019, at 10:30 a.m., in in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/28/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/28/2019 2295 REPLY BRIEF re 2260 Notice (Other) The State's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposed Phase 2A Monitoring Opinion filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − The State's Phase 2A Proposed Opinion Regarding Compliance Oversight)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/29/2019 2296 ORDER: It is ORDERED that all hearings set for January 29, 2019, are canceled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/2019. (term: Evidentiary Hearing Set for 01/29/2019) (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019

2297

ORDER: The court having been orally informed that the parties have resolved the disciplinary−sanctions remedial issue, it is ORDERED that the parties are allowed until noon on January 30, 2019, to file their stipulations as to this issue. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019

2298

ORDERED that the parties; stipulations for resolution of the hospital− level−care remedial issue (doc. no. 2292 ) (including the involuntary−medication sub−issue but not the Vitek sub−issue) are set for a hearing on February 7, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. It is further ORDERED that the parties are allowed until noon on January 30, 2019, to submit their joint proposal for how the court is to proceed on the Vitek sub−issue. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019

2299

ORDERED as follows: 1. The parties are to confer and to file with the court by February 1, 2019 a mutually agreeable date in February of 2019 on which to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion. 2. The Defendants shall file a response to Plaintiffs' pending motion (Doc. 2284 ) by February 8, 2019. 3. On or before February 15, 2019, the Plaintiffs may file a reply in support of the motion. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 1/29/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019 2300 MOTION for Extension of Time and MOTION for Reconsiderationa re 2282 Order on Motion for TRO,,,,,,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Cheryl Price)(Lunsford, William). Added MOTION for Reconsideration on 1/29/2019 and clarify the docket text(kh, ). (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019

2301

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL−HEALTH UNDERSTAFFING: After discussing some clarifications of the stipulations during an on−the−record hearing on January 16, 2019, the parties submitted amended stipulations on January 22, 2019 (doc. no. 2283 − 1), and requested that the court enter them as an enforceable order. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court asfollows: (1) The amended stipulations (doc. no. 2283 −1) attached to this order−−and as clarified during the on−the−record hearing−−are approved. (2) Plaintiffs Edward Braggs, et al. and defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions, as clarified during the on−the−record hearing. It is further ORDERED that, pursuant to the amended stipulations, defendants' motion for reconsideration (doc. no. 2184 ) and plaintiffs' contempt motion (doc. no. 1916 ) and renewed contempt motion (doc. no. 2195 ) are withdrawn. The withdrawals are with prejudice as to the issues raised in the motions on or before the date the court approves the

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 354 of 408

amended stipulations. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019 2302 ORDER directing that plfs file a response to the 2300 MOTION for an extension of time and for Reconsideration by 1/30/2019 at 5:00 p.m., as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/19. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019 2303 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for Extension of Time and Motion for Reconsideration Under Seal by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019 2304 TEXT ORDER granting 2303 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for Extension of Time and Motion for Reconsideration Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019

2305

TEXT ORDER setting On−the−Record conference call re 2300 MOTION for Extension of Time and MOTION for Reconsideration for 1/31/2019 at 03:00 PM, by telephone, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/29/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) Modified on 1/29/2019 to clarify the date (kh, ). (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019 2306 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019 2307 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2297 Order, Stipulation Regarding Phase 2A Mental Health Consultation to the Disciplinary Process (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019 2308 Response to Order re 2298 Order,,, Set Hearings,, Joint Proposal On How To Proceed On Hospital−Level Care Due Process (Vitek) Issue by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019

2309

ORDERED that the parties' stipulations for the mental−health consultation to the disciplinary process (doc. no. 2307 ) are set for a hearing on February 7, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019

2310

ORDERED that, in accordance with the parties' joint proposal regarding the Vitek issue (doc. no. 2308 ), (1) the parties are to make their filings as set forth in the proposal and (2) the Vitek issue is set for submission and resolution on February 5, 2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/30/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019

2311

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/18/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/20/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/4/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/30/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019

2312

RESPONSE in Opposition re 2300 MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 2282 Order on Motion for TRO,,,,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time and Motion for Reconsideration filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Jan. 22, 2019 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 2 Exhibit Nov. 2018 Facility Master Rosters − Combined, # 3 Exhibit Jan. 29, 2019 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 4 Exhibit J.A. Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Paul Ford Medical Records, # 6 Exhibit Kendall Chatter − Staton − (SEIR−MH004), # 7 Exhibit Jeffery Borden − Psych Autopsy, # 8 Exhibit AR 433 Admin Seg, # 9 Exhibit Jan. 29,

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 355 of 408

2019 Morris Rogers Email Exchange, # 10 Exhibit Paul Ford Seg History, # 11 Exhibit A.A. Seg History, # 12 Exhibit A.M. Seg History, # 13 Exhibit A.F. Seg History, # 14 Exhibit B.S. Seg History, # 15 Exhibit B.A. Seg History, # 16 Exhibit B.S. Seg History, # 17 Exhibit B.M. Seg History, # 18 Exhibit B.T. Seg History, # 19 Exhibit C.H. Seg History, # 20 Exhibit C.A. Seg History, # 21 Exhibit C.S. Seg History, # 22 Exhibit C.R. Seg History, # 23 Exhibit D.C. Seg History, # 24 Exhibit D.C. Seg History, # 25 Exhibit D.P. Seg History, # 26 Exhibit D.T. Seg History, # 27 Exhibit D.C. Seg History, # 28 Exhibit D.S. Seg History, # 29 Exhibit E.W. Seg History, # 30 Exhibit F.M. Seg History, # 31 Exhibit F.J. Seg History, # 32 Exhibit G.W. Seg History, # 33 Exhibit J.A. Seg History, # 34 Exhibit J.C. Seg History, # 35 Exhibit J.D. Seg History, # 36 Exhibit L.D. Seg History, # 37 Exhibit L.S. Seg History, # 38 Exhibit L.M. Seg History, # 39 Exhibit L.C. Seg History, # 40 Exhibit L.W. Seg History, # 41 Exhibit M.M. Seg History, # 42 Exhibit N.G. Seg History, # 43 Exhibit N.H. Seg History, # 44 Exhibit P.H. Seg History, # 45 Exhibit R.G. Seg History, # 46 Exhibit R.W. Seg History, # 47 Exhibit R.A. Seg History, # 48 Exhibit R.H. Seg History, # 49 Exhibit R.K. Seg History, # 50 Exhibit R.T. Seg History, # 51 Exhibit R.M. Seg History, # 52 Exhibit R.S. Seg History, # 53 Exhibit S.C. Seg History, # 54 Exhibit S.A. Seg History, # 55 Exhibit S.E. Seg History, # 56 Exhibit S.H. Seg History, # 57 Exhibit S.J. Seg History, # 58 Exhibit T.R. Seg History, # 59 Exhibit T.B. Seg History, # 60 Exhibit V.H. Seg History, # 61 Exhibit AR 403 Disciplinary Hearing Procedures for Major Rules Violations, # 62 Exhibit Seg. Placements of People with SMI on Jan. 22, 2019 List KEY, # 63 Exhibit Seg. Placements of People with SMI on Jan. 22, 2019 Seg. List)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced on 1/31/2019) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 1/31/2019) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019

2313

NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2312 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (kh, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2019: # 1 Exhibit 1 Jan. 22, 2019 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 2 Exhibit 3 Nov. 2018 Facility Master Rosters − Combined, # 3 Exhibit 4 Jan. 29, 2019 Restrictive Housing Roster, # 4 Exhibit 5 J.A. Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 6 Paul Ford Medical Records, # 6 Exhibit 7 Kendall Chatter − Staton − (SEIR−MH004), # 7 Exhibit 8 Jeffery Borden − Psych Autopsy, # 8 Exhibit 9 AR 433 Admin Seg, # 9 Exhibit 10 Jan. 29, 2019 Morris Rogers Email Exchange, # 10 Exhibit 11 Paul Ford Seg History, # 11 Exhibit 12 A.A. Seg History, # 12 Exhibit 13 A.M. Seg History, # 13 Exhibit 14 A.F. Seg History, # 14 Exhibit 15 B.S. Seg History, # 15 Exhibit 16 B.A. Seg History, # 16 Exhibit 17 B.S. Seg History, # 17 Exhibit 18 B.M. Seg History, # 18 Exhibit 19 B.T. Seg History, # 19 Exhibit 20 C.H. Seg History, # 20 Exhibit 21 C.A. Seg History, # 21 Exhibit 22 C.S. Seg History, # 22 Exhibit 23 C.R. Seg History, # 23 Exhibit 24 D.C. Seg History, # 24 Exhibit 25 D.C. Seg History, # 25 Exhibit 26 D.P. Seg History, # 26 Exhibit 27 D.T. Seg History, # 27 Exhibit 28 D.C. Seg History) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2019: # 28 Exhibit 29 D.S. Seg History, # 29 Exhibit 30 E.W. Seg History, # 30 Exhibit 31 F.M. Seg History, # 31 Exhibit 32 F.J. Seg History, # 32 Exhibit 33 G.W. Seg History, # 33 Exhibit 34 J.A. Seg History, # 34 Exhibit 35 J.C. Seg History, # 35 Exhibit 36 J.D. Seg History, # 36 Exhibit 37 L.D. Seg History, # 37 Exhibit 38 L.S. Seg History, # 38 Exhibit 39 L.M. Seg History, # 39 Exhibit 40 L.C. Seg History, # 40 Exhibit 41 L.W. Seg History, # 41 Exhibit 42 M.M. Seg History, # 42 Exhibit 43 N.G. Seg History, # 43 Exhibit 44 N.H. Seg History, # 44 Exhibit 45 P.H. Seg History) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2019: # 45 Exhibit 46 R.G. Seg History, # 46 Exhibit 47 R.W. Seg History, # 47 Exhibit 48 R.A. Seg History, # 48 Exhibit 49 R.H. Seg History, # 49 Exhibit 50 R.K. Seg History, # 50 Exhibit 51 R.T. Seg History, # 51 Exhibit 52 R.M. Seg History, # 52 Exhibit 53 R.S. Seg History, # 53 Exhibit 54 S.C. Seg History, # 54 Exhibit 55 S.A. Seg History, # 55 Exhibit 56 S.E. Seg History, # 56 Exhibit 57 S.H. Seg History, # 57 Exhibit 58 S.J. Seg History, # 58 Exhibit 59 T.R. Seg History, # 59 Exhibit 60 T.B. Seg History, # 60 Exhibit 61 V.H. Seg History, # 61 Exhibit 62 AR 403 Disciplinary Hearing Procedures for Major Rules Violations, # 62 Exhibit 63 Seg. Placements of People with SMI on Jan. 22, 2019 List KEY) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/31/2019: # 63 Ex. 2 − Seg. Placements of People with SMI on Jan. 22, 2019 Seg. List) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/31/2019)

01/31/2019 2314 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/31/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 356 of 408

02/01/2019 2315 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2308 Response to Order Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Frank Thomas)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

02/01/2019 2316 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich re 2299 Order, Joint Proposal Regarding Scheduling of Hearing on Correctional Staffing Dispute (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/4/2019 to reflect as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 02/01/2019)

02/04/2019 2317 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Supplemental Exhibits to Plaintiffs Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/04/2019

2318

ORDERED as follows: 1. No later than 5:00 p.m. on February 8, 2019, the Parties shall file Exhibit and Witness Lists and exchange any exhibits that have not previously been filed with the court or exchanged as exhibits for an evidentiary hearing or trial. 2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Incorporation of Eldon Vails Adjustments to the Savages' Staffing Analysis Pursuant to the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (Doc. 2284 ) is set for an evidentiary hearing commencing on February 12, 2019 at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom 4A, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. Federal Building and United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. If not completed on February 12, the hearing shall continue on February 13 until completed, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/4/2019. (furn: calendar, cb)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/04/2019

2319

TEXT ORDER granting 2317 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Supplemental Exhibits to Plaintiffs Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/4/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/04/2019

2320

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2278 Notice (Other),,,, Plaintiffs' Supplemental Submission in Support of Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Chart of Recent Suicides Dec. 2017 − Jan. 2019, # 2 Exhibit 2 − SEALED − Mark Araujo − Limestone − (SEIR−MH004−Social Assessment), # 3 Exhibit 3 − SEALED − Kendall Chatter − (SEIR−MH004−MEDICAL RECORDS), # 4 Exhibit 4 − SEALED − Roderick Abrams − (SEIR−MH004−MEDICAL RECORDS), # 5 Exhibit 5 − SEALED − Roderick Abrams − Quality Improvement Review)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 2 replaced on 2/4/2019) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 2/4/2019) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 2/4/2019) (kh, ). (Attachment 5 replaced on 2/4/2019) (kh, ). (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/04/2019

2321

NOTICE of FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2320 PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION REGARDING PLACEMENT OF HIGH−RISK PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION (kh, ) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/04/2019

2322

REPLY BRIEF re 2260 Notice (Other) In Support of Plaintiffs' Proposed Opinion Regarding Phase 2A Monitoring filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − Tutwiler_Findings_Letter, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 − Coleman − Order Regarding Independent Investigator, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3 − Coleman − Michael Golding Declaration, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4 − Excerpt of Coleman 27th Round Report, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 5 − Coleman − Order Describing Plan to Start Transferring Monitoring Responsibility, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 6 − Structural Reform Litigation in Prison Dental Care)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

02/05/2019

2323

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of EXCERPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF ELDON VAIL Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/5/2017, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 357 of 408

purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/26/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/8/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/6/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/05/2019)

02/05/2019 2324 REPLY BRIEF re 2315 Notice (Other) Plaintiffs' Responsive Evidence on the Due Process (Vitek) Issue filed by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 02/05/2019)

02/05/2019

2325

NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1657 Order,, 2228 Memorandum Opinion and Order,,, Terminate Motions,, Notice of Filing Quarterly Staffing Reports (Attachments: # 1 March 1, 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report, # 2 June 1, 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report, # 3 September 4, 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/05/2019)

02/07/2019

2326

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/31/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/28/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/8/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/07/2019)

02/07/2019 2327 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument held on 2/7/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/07/2019)

02/08/2019

2328

TEXT ORDER: Evidentiary Hearing set for 2/12/2019, at 11:00am will now be held at 10:00 AM, in CR 4A, before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/8/2019. (term Evidentiary Hearing set for 2/12/2019 at 11:00am) (furn: calendar, cb)(kh, )(no pdf document attached to this entry) (Entered: 02/08/2019)

02/08/2019 2329 Witness List and Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/11/2019 to clarify the text(kh, ). (Entered: 02/08/2019)

02/08/2019 2330 Witness List and Exhibit List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) Modified on 2/11/2019 to clarify the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 02/08/2019)

02/08/2019 2331 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2284 MOTION Resolution of Dispute Regarding Correctional Staffing Numbers re 1813 Notice (Other), 1920 Notice (Other), filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/08/2019)

02/11/2019

2332

PHASE 2A SUPPLEMENTAL LIABILITY OPINION AND ORDER ON PERIODIC MENTAL−HEALTH EVALUATIONS OF PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, by noon on February 18, 2019, counsel for plaintiffs and defendants, after conferring with each other in an attempt to reach agreement, are to file a joint report of suggestions of how proceed as to relief in light of the above opinion. The court recognizes that February 18 is a holiday, but there now appears to be an urgency regarding the resolution of the issue of segregation. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/11/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2019)

02/11/2019

2333

ORDER: Based on the representations made in open court on February 7, 2019, it is ORDERED that counsel for all defendants are submit in writing by noon on February 14, 2019, a statement as to whether all defendants agree that all of the remedial stipulations previously approved and adopted by the court meet the PLRA's 'need−narrowness−intrusiveness' requirements. Counsel for all plaintiffs said that they do. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/11/2019.(kh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2019)

02/11/2019 2334 PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 358 of 408

February 7, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy schedulingorder for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised asfollows: Pretrial Hearing previously set for 3/18/2019 reset to 4/2/2019, Evidentiary hearing previously set for 3/25/2019 reset to 4/9/2019, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/11/2019. (furn: calendar, ag) (kh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2019)

02/11/2019 2335 First Amended Witness List and Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/11/2019 to clarify the docket text.(kh, ). (Entered: 02/11/2019)

02/11/2019

2336

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that the parties shall convene for a telephonic status conference on February 11, 2019 at 3 p.m. to discuss the hearing set for February 12, 2019. No later than five minutes prior to the start of the call the parties are directed to call this chamber's conference call number. If the parties do not already have the conference call number and access code, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920 before the call. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/11/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(furn: cb, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2019)

02/11/2019 2337 TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that the telephonic status conference set for February 11, 2019 to discuss the hearing set for February 12, 2019 is reset for 4:30 p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/11/2019. (furn: calendar, cb) (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2019)

02/11/2019

Minute Entry for Status Conference held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden held on 2/11/2019. No pdf attached. (Recording Time 4:30−4:55.) (cb, ) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

02/12/2019 2338 TEXT ORDER: The Evidentiary Hearing set for 2/12/2019, at 10:00 am will now be held at 1:00 PM, in CR 4A. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/12/2019. (furn: calendar, cb) (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

02/12/2019 2339 TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that a Status Conference is set for 2/12/2019, at 10:00 AM, in chambers, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/12/2019. (furn: calendar, ag) (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

02/12/2019

2340

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING VOLUME 6 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/29/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/5/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/15/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

02/12/2019

2341

Minute Entry for Evidentiary Hearing re 2284 Motion for Incorporation of Eldon Vail's Adjustments to the savages' Staffing Analysis Pursuant to the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/12/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (cb, ) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

02/12/2019 2342 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 2/12/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/13/2019)

02/13/2019

2343

ORDERED as follows: 1. The parties have until February 15, 2019 to seek relief from the March 1, 2019 deadline (Doc. 1952 ) imposed for the resolution of correctional staffing analysis issues. 2. The evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Incorporation of Eldon Vail's Adjustments to the Savages' Staffing Analysis Pursuant to the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (Doc. 2284 ) is continued generally. 3. On or before February 22, 2019, the parties shall file a joint notice of proposed, agreed−upon dates during which to conduct the

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 359 of 408

evidentiary hearing on the Plaintiff's motion. Doc. 2284 . This notice shall contain two separate alternative periods of two consecutive days during which the parties' experts are available to appear in person for the evidentiary hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/13/2019. (kh, ) Modified on 2/13/2019 to reflect Evidentiary Hearing set for 2/12/2019 is continued generally) (kh, ). (Entered: 02/13/2019)

02/14/2019 2344 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Smithee, Stephanie) (Entered: 02/14/2019)

02/14/2019

2345

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION ON SMI PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION: ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction regarding placement of high−risk prisoners in segregation (doc. no. 2276) is now treated as solely a motion for a preliminary injunction related to the pending remedial issue of suicide prevention. (2) To provide the court with necessary information on prisoners with SMI in segregation, defendants shall: (a) By February 28, 2019, develop a 'review process' that collects and consolidates information on at least a weekly basis for each prisoner in the Alabama Department of Corrections with SMI who is housed in segregation. For each such SMI prisoner, the following information must be collected and recorded: the prisoner's date of entry into (and, if applicable, exit from) segregation; the prison and unit where the prisoner is housed; a summary of the reason(s) the prisoner was initially placed in segregation; a summary of the reason(s) the prisoner has not been released from segregation; and the number of times the prisoner has been placed in segregation within the last year. (b) Beginning on March 7, 2019, and continuing only until the court issues its ruling on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, submit this information to the court under seal on a weekly basis, with service to plaintiffs. (3) Defendants' motion for an extension of time (doc. no. 2300 ) is granted to the extent that, by February 19, 2019, defendants shall produce the information ordered by the court on January 22, 2019 (doc. no. 2282 ) regarding inmates diagnosed with SMI housed in segregation on that date.(4) Defendants' motion for reconsideration (doc. no. 2300 ) is granted only to the following extent. (a) The parties shall attempt to reach an agreement on which housing units in ADOC constitute "segregation−like settings" for the purpose of the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (b) By February 21, 2019, the parties shall submit to the court a list of the agreed−upon segregation−like settings, as well as the settings about which they may not be able to reach an agreement. The report shall address whether the parties agree that the following locations constitute segregation−like settings: Kilby Unit O, Kilby Unit P, All D−5 Units in Tutwiler, all behavior modification units in Donaldson, and all death row units. (c) The order (doc. no. 2282 ) for defendants to submit information on prisoners ith SMI in 'segregation−like settings' is held in abeyance until further order of the court. (5) The parties shall attempt to reach an agreement on 'methods' defendants can use to verify that security rounds are being properly conducted in segregation and segregation−like settings. By February 21, 2019, the parties shall submit a joint proposal to the court summarizing those methods. (6) By February 28, 2019, the parties shall submit a joint report to the court (a) identifying other prison systems in the country, including but not limited to systems in Colorado, Pennsylvania, Washington, and North Dakota, that do not place (or significantly limit the placement of) prisoners with SMI in segregation, and (b) describing how they do so. The parties also shall submit a copy of these prison systems relevant policies. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/14/2019)

02/14/2019

2346

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM Based on the representations made on the record on February 7 and 12, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing added for 3/12/2019, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H.Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2019. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/14/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 360 of 408

02/15/2019

2347

ORDERED that counsel for all defendants are submit in writing by noon on March 1, 2019, rather than February 14, 2019, a statement as to whether all defendants agree that all of the remedial stipulations previously approved and adopted by the court meet the PLRA's 'need−narrowness−intrusiveness' requirements. Counsel for all plaintiffs said that they do. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2019)

02/15/2019

2348

ORDER: Six deadlines were set for noon on February 14, 2019. See Orders (doc. nos. 2333 and 2334 ). At the oral request of Magistrate Judge Ott, the three PLRA−related deadlines were extended to noon on March 1, 2019. See Orders (doc. nos. 2346 and 2347 ). The parties, however, failed to meet the following three non−PLRA−related deadlines that were not extended: (1) HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE, as further set out, (2) DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS, as further set out, (3) DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS, as further set out. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, by 5:00 p.m. today, the parties are to file a statement as to why the three non− PLRA−related deadlines were not met. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2019)

02/15/2019

2349

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM At the oral request of Magistrate Judge Ott, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows, as further out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/15/2019)

02/15/2019 2350 MOTION to Expedite Discovery and for Scheduling Order in Advance of Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/15/2019)

02/15/2019 2351 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 1952 Order on Motion for Extension of Deadline by All Plaintiffs Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/19/2019 to add as behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 02/15/2019)

02/15/2019 2352 Response to Order re 2348 Order,, Joint Statement in Response to Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/15/2019)

02/18/2019 2353 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich of Filing of Joint Report Regarding How to Proceed in Light of Supplemental Liability Opinion (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/19/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants(kh, ). (Entered: 02/18/2019)

02/19/2019

2354

ORDERED that the parties' joint motion for extension of dispute−resolution deadline (doc. no. 2351 ) is referred to Magistrate Judge Gray M. Borden for resolution. The resetting of the deadline, now and in the future, is referred to Judge Borden for determination at his discretion. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/19/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/19/2019)

02/19/2019

2355

TEXT ORDER: It is ORDERED that the parties shall convene for a telephone hearing regarding the Motion for Expedited Discovery (Doc. 2350 ) on February 20, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. No later than five minutes prior to the start of the call the parties are directed to call the chambers conference call number. If the parties do not already have the conference call number and access code, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920 before the call. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/19/2019. (furn:calendar, cb)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/19/2019)

02/19/2019 2356 TEXT ORDER: The telephone hearing regarding the Motion for Expedited Discovery (Doc. 2350 ) on February 20, 2019 is reset for 3:00 p.m.. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/19/2019. (furn:calendar, cb)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/19/2019)

02/19/2019 2357 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/20/2019)

02/20/2019 2358 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of LIBRARY CONFERENCE HEARING ON MOTION FOR TRO Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 361 of 408

FOR 90 DAYS) held on 2/12/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/13/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/25/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/21/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/20/2019)

02/20/2019

Minute Entry for Motion Hearing re: 2350 Motion to Expedite Discovery and for Scheduling Order in Advance of Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/20/2019 (No pdf attached to this entry). (Recording Time 3:00−3:32.) (cb, ) (Entered: 02/20/2019)

02/21/2019

2359

PHASE 2A BRIEFING ORDER ON REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS IN SUPPLEMENTAL LIABILITY OPINION: It is ORDERED that, by March 5, 2019, the parties shall each submit a brief identifying (a) any prior or existing relief that, if implemented, may remedy the constitutional violations found in the court's supplemental liability opinion (doc. no. 2332 ), as further set out Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/21/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/21/2019 2360 MOTION for Protective Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/21/2019

2361

ORDERED as follows: 1. The Plaintiffs have until February 22, 2019 to respond to the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. Doc. 2360 . 2. The Defendants have until February 25, 2019 to file with the court a list of the documents and information requested by Plaintiffs that reasonably can be produced by March 8, 2019. 3. The Defendants are to begin production by February 25, 2019 of the documents described in this list. 4. The court will conduct a telephone hearing on the Motion for Protective Order at 2:00 p.m. on February 26, 2019 and will address only those documents that, according to the Defendants, cannot reasonably be produced within the time allowed. The telephone hearing is to be placed through the chambers conference call line using the chambers number and access code. If any party lacks that information, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920 before the call. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/21/2019. (furn: cb, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/21/2019 2362 MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 2345 Order,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Terminate Motions,,,,,,,,,,,,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) Modified on 2/22/2019 to reflect granted pursuant to the court's 2365 order (kh, ). (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/21/2019 2363 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich of Filing of JOINT PROPOSAL FOR SCHEDULING OF HEARING REGARDING CORRECTIONAL STAFFING NUMBERS (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/21/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants(kh, ). (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/21/2019 2364 Response to Order re 2345 Order Joint Report Regarding Segregation−Like Settings by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/21/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/22/2019

2365

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that the unopposed motion for extension (doc. no. 2362 ) is granted and the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/22/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2019)

02/22/2019 2366 MOTION for Leave to File Some Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Response to the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/22/2019)

02/22/2019 2367 TEXT ORDER granting 2366 Motion for Leave to File Some Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Response to the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 362 of 408

Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/22/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2019)

02/22/2019

2368

RESPONSE in Opposition re 2360 MOTION for Protective Order Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − Mike Cason, AL.com Feb. 14, 2019 article, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 − Jean Cole, The News Courier article, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3 − Email with Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4 − Feb. 20−21, 2019 Emails Regarding Motion for Protective Order, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 5 − Excerpts of Feb. 12, 2019 Hearing Transcript −−, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 6 − Excerpts of Jan. 31, 2019 Hearing Transcript, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 7 − Feb. 8, 2019 ADOC News Release, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 8 − Drs. Burns' and Perrien's Sept. 28, 2018 Document Requests, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 9 − Email from Dr. Kathy Burns to B. Lunsford and M. Morris, # 10 Exhibit Ex. 10 − Declaration of Tonya White−Evans, # 11 Exhibit Ex. 11 − filed under seal − Wexford Monthly Statistics, October 2018, # 12 Exhibit Ex. 12 − Email from S. Rogers to M. Morris regarding discovery, # 13 Exhibit Ex. 13 − State's Oct. 26, 2018 Responses and Objections to Plfs Request for Production re Monitoring Remedial Trial, # 14 Exhibit Ex. 14 − Excerpts of Sept. 7, 2018 Hearing Transcript)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/22/2019)

02/22/2019 2373 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2368 Response in Opposition to 2360 Motion, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 11 − Sealed Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 11 − Sealed Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 11 − Sealed Part 3, # 4 Exhibit 11 − Sealed Part 4, # 5 Exhibit 11 − Sealed Part 5, # 6 Exhibit 11 − Sealed Part 6)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2019)

02/25/2019 2369 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of filing of JOINT PROPOSAL FOR DEADLINES IN ADVANCE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION REGARDING PLACEMENT OF HIGH−RISK PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/25/2019)

02/25/2019 2370 Response to Order re 2361 Order Setting Hearing on Motion,,, The State's Notice in Response to the February 21, 2019 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/25/2019)

02/26/2019

2371

ORDERED that the dispute over what constitutes "segregation−like" settings, see Phase 2A Revised Remedy Scheduling Order (doc. no. 2345 ), is set for an evidentiary hearing on March 12, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama, with the parties to present their arguments regarding the issue in their "responses" filed pursuant to their proposal for deadlines (doc.no. 2369 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/26/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2019)

02/26/2019 2372 ORDERED that the parties' joint proposal (doc. no. 2369 ) is adopted as the order of the court. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/26/2019.(kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2019)

02/26/2019 2374 Response to Order re 2361 Order Setting Hearing on Motion,,, The State's Supplemental Notice in Response to the February 21, 2019 Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/26/2019)

02/26/2019

Minute Entry for Motion Hearing re 2360 Motion for Protective Order held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/26/2019. NO PDF ATTACHED TO THIS ENTRY. (Recording Time 2:00−3:00.) (cb, ) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

02/27/2019

2375

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 2360 Motion for Protective Order. It is further ORDERED that Defendants are to produce the following documents and provide the following information to Plaintiffs' counsel on a rolling basis as soon as practicable and no later than March 8, 2019, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/27/2019.(kh, ) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

02/28/2019

2376

ORDER: For the reasons stated in the court's Order of February 27, 2019 (Doc. 2375 ), and to the extent stated in that Order, the Motion for ExpeditedDiscovery and for Scheduling Order (Doc. 2350 ) is GRANTED. Upon considera tion of the parties' Joint Proposal on scheduling (Doc. 2363 ), it is ORDERED that the Joint Motion for Extension of Deadline (Doc. 2351 ) is GRANTED, and the deadline set forth in the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (Doc. 1656 at 1012) for

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 363 of 408

the resolution of all disputes relating to the Savages' recommendations regarding correctional understaffing is extended to July 1, 2019. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Incorporation of Eldon Vail's Adjustments to the Savages' Staffing Analysis Pursuant to the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (Doc. 2284 ) is set for an evidentiary hearing commencing on May 1, 2019 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 4A, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. Federal Building and United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. If not completed on May 1, the hearing shall continue on May 2 and 3, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 2/28/2019. (furn: calendar, cb)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/28/2019)

02/28/2019 2377 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2345 Order The State's Notice Regarding A "Review Process" Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/28/2019)

02/28/2019 2378 Notice of Filing December 3, 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1657 Order 2228 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Attachments: # 1 December 3, 2018 Quarterly Staffing Report)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/1/2019 to clarify the text (kh, ). (Entered: 02/28/2019)

02/28/2019

2379

Response to Order re 2345 Order,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Terminate Motions,,,,,,,,,,,,, Joint Report on other Prison Systems' Policies Regarding the Placement of Prisoners with Serious Mental Illnesses in Restrictive Housing by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − CO 0650_03_04152018 form A watch change, # 2 Exhibit 2 − CO 0650_04_01012019, # 3 Exhibit 3 − ME 18.06.01(AF) − INTENSIVE MENTAL HEALTH UNIT, # 4 Exhibit 4 − North Dakota Correctional Facility Standards−Revision June 2018, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Pennsylvania seg settlement, # 6 Exhibit 6 − PA 802 Administrative Custody Procedures, # 7 Exhibit 7 − PA 13.08.01 Access to Mental Health Care, # 8 Exhibit 8 − WA 320250, # 9 Exhibit 9 − WA 320255 − Restrictive Housing, # 10 Exhibit 10 − WA 630500 − MH Services, # 11 Exhibit 11 − asca_liman_2018_workingtolimit, # 12 Exhibit 12− asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housing_revised_sept_25_2018_−_embargoed_unt, # 13 Exhibit 13 − Alaska Policies and Procedures)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 02/28/2019)

02/28/2019 2380 Joint Proposal for Verifying Security Rounds by All Plaintiffs Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 2/28/2019 as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 02/28/2019)

03/01/2019

2381

ORDERED that an on−the−record pretrial conference is set for March 5, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., on the following matters: plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2276 ) and the parties' dispute over what constitutes "segregation−like" settings (doc. no. 2345 ). The clerk of the court is arrange for the pretrial to be conducted by telephone. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/1/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

03/01/2019 2382 Response to Order re 2333 Order,, The State's Statement Regarding The PLRA's "Need−Narrowness−Intrusiveness" Requirements by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

03/01/2019 2383 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2349 Order, Joint Notice of Filing the Amended Stipulation Regarding the Provision of Hospital−Level Care (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit A − Administrative Regulation 640)(Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

03/01/2019 2384 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2349 Order, Joint Notice of Filing the Amended Stipulation Regarding Phase 2A Mental Health Consultation to the Disciplinary Process (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit A − Administrative Regulation 403)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

03/01/2019 2385 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 1657 Order,, Notice of Filing Recommended Staffing Ratios for Mental Health Services (Attachments: # 1 Recommended Staffing Ratios for Mental Health Services)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

03/01/2019 2386 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/04/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 364 of 408

03/04/2019 2387 MOTION re 2382 Response to Order Plaintiffs' Request for Status Conference Concerning Defendants' Statement Regarding the PLRA's "Need−Narrowness−Intrusiveness" Requirements by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/04/2019)

03/04/2019

2388

ORDER: It is ORDERED that the agenda for the pretrial conference on March 12, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., will include (in addition to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2276 ) and the joint report regarding segregation−like settings (doc. no. 2364 ), the following items for general discussion, including what the next steps, if any, should be taken, as futhrt set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/4/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/04/2019)

03/04/2019

2389

AMENDED ORDER: It is ORDERED that the agenda for the pretrial conference on March 5, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., will include (in addition to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2276 ) and the joint report regarding segregation−like settings (doc. no. 2364 , the following items for general discussion, including what the next steps, if any, should be taken, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/4/2019.(kh, ) (Entered: 03/04/2019)

03/04/2019 2390 MOTION Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/04/2019)

03/04/2019 2391 Witness and Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/5/2019 to clarify the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 03/04/2019)

03/04/2019 2392 Exhibit List The State's Witness and Exhibit List for the Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/04/2019)

03/05/2019 2393 TEXT ORDER granting 2390 Motion for Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/6/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

03/05/2019 2394 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference held on 3/5/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

03/05/2019 2395 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal to Plaintiffs Notice of Filing of Supplemental Evidence Relating to Proposal for Verifying Security Rounds by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

03/05/2019 2396 TEXT ORDER granting 2395 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal to Plaintiffs Notice of Filing of Supplemental Evidence Relating to Proposal for Verifying Security Rounds. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/5/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

03/05/2019 2397 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2359 Memorandum Opinion and Order, The State's Notice in Response to the Court's Phase 2A Briefing Order on Remedies for Violations in the Supplemental Liability Opinion (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

03/05/2019 2398 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2359 Memorandum Opinion and Order, : Filing of Plaintiffs PHASE 2A BRIEF ON REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED IN SUPPLEMENTAL LIABILITY OPINION (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

03/06/2019

2399

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/5/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/27/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/8/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/4/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 365 of 408

03/07/2019 2400 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Notice Regarding a Review Process Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019

2401

TEXT ORDER granting 2400 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Notice Regarding a Review Process Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/7/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019

2402

ORDER: Based on the representations made during an on−the−record status conference on March 5, 2019, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs are allowed until 5:00 p.m. on March 7, 2019, to respond to "The State's Notice Regarding a 'Review Process' Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing" (doc. no. 2377 ), and defendants are allowed until 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 2019, to file a reply. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/7/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019 2403 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Notice Regarding a Review Process Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019

2404

ORDER: Based on the representations made during an on−the−record status conference on March 5, 2019, it is ORDERED plaintiffs are allowed until 5:00 p.m. on March 8, 2019, to supplement their statements in the "Joint Proposal for Verifying Security Rounds" (doc. no. 2380 ), and defendants are allowed until 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 2019, to file a reply to the supplement. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/7/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019

2405

TEXT ORDER granting 2403 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Notice Regarding a Review Process Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/7/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019

2406

REPLY BRIEF re 2377 Notice (Other) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' "Notice Regarding A 'Review Process' Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing" filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Defendants' Failure to Track Prisoners in Segregation, # 2 Exhibit 2 − SEALED N.H. Movement History, # 3 Exhibit 3 − SEALED November 20, 2018 Segregation Roster, # 4 Exhibit 4 − SEALED J.A. Movement History, # 5 Exhibit 5 − SEALED December 18, 2018 Segregation Roster, # 6 Exhibit 6 − SEALED Key to Exhibit 1)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019 2407 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2406 Reply Brief,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Exhibit 4, # 4 Exhibit 5, # 5 Exhibit 6)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019 2408 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/07/2019 2409 RESPONSE to Motion re 2276 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/08/2019

2410

REPLY BRIEF re 2380 Response to Order Notice of Filing of Supplemental Evidence Relating to Proposal for Verifying Security Rounds filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − SEALED Disciplinary Action − Ross Wolfinger)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 1 replaced on 3/8/2019 to attach SEALED DOCUMENT) (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 03/08/2019)

03/08/2019

2411

TEXT ORDER setting on−the−record Conference Call for Monday, 3/11/2019 @ 8:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson using the chambers conference call number; The subject of the call will be the motion for preliminary injunction hearing on Tuesday, in light of the experts' suicide report which is be filed today. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/8/19. Furnished to calendar group & AG (NO PDF Document attached to this notice).(djy, ) (Entered: 03/08/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 366 of 408

03/08/2019 2412 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 03/08/2019)

03/08/2019

2413

TEXT ORDER granting 2412 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal to Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners in Segregation. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/8/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/08/2019)

03/08/2019 2414 NOTICE of filing by All Plaintiffs re 2410 Reply Brief, (Attachments: # 1 Sealed Ex 1 to 2410 )(djy, ) (Entered: 03/08/2019)

03/08/2019

2415

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL Proceedings REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING VOLUME 5 (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/27/2018, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 3/29/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/8/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/6/2019. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/08/2019)

03/08/2019

2416

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Filing of Suicide Prevention Assessment Report and Associated Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Report and Recommendations on Suicide Prevention in the Alabama Department of Corrections, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Appendix − Suicide Record Reviews, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Sample Staff Referral Form, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Supplemental Recommendations on Suicide Prevention in the Alabama Department of Corrections)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/08/2019)

03/11/2019 2417 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 3/11/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/11/2019)

03/11/2019

2418

REPLY BRIEF re 2409 Response to Motion, Plaintiffs' Reply In Support Of Their Emergency Motion For Preliminary Injunction Regarding Placement of High−Risk Prisoners In Segregation filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Chart of Recent Suicides Dec. 2017 − Feb. 2019, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Nov. 2018 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, # 3 Exhibit 3 − SEALED − March 5, 2019 Segregation Roster)(Morris, Maria) (Attachment 3 replaced on 3/12/2019) (kh, ). (Entered: 03/11/2019)

03/11/2019 2420 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs re 2418 Reply Brief, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/12/2019)

03/12/2019

2419

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on March 11, 2019, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion for a status conference is granted (doc. no. 2387 ) and the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 3/12/2019 reset for 3/18/2019, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Oral Argument set for 3/18/2019, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson regarding the following document numbers: 2353 , 2397 , 2398 , 2383 , 2382 , 2345 , 2380 , 2410 , 2414 , 2345 , 2364 , 2377 , 2406 −07, 2345 , 2379 , 2357 , 2408 , 2276 , 2014 , 2384 , 2374 , as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/12/2019. (furn: calendar, ag) (kh, ) (Entered: 03/12/2019)

03/12/2019 2421 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/12/2019)

03/12/2019 2422 REPLY BRIEF re 2380 Response to Order The State's Reply in Support of its Proposal for Verifying Security Rounds in Restrictive Housing filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Supplemental Declaration of Cheryl Price)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/12/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 367 of 408

03/12/2019

2423

REPLY BRIEF re 2377 Notice (Other) The State's Reply in Support of its Proposed Review Process Relating to SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Brian Grimmer, # 2 Exhibit B − Supplemental Declaration of Cheryl Price)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/12/2019)

03/13/2019 2424 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 3/14/2019 08:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson.. Entered by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/13/2019. (ag, ) (Entered: 03/13/2019)

03/14/2019

2425

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on March 14, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Oral Argument set for 3/27/2019, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson regarding the following document numbers: 2345 , 2380 , 2410 , 2414 , 2364 , 2377 , 2406 −07, 2379 , 2357 , 2408 , as further set out in order. Final Pretrial Conference previously set for 4/2/19, at 10:00 a.m. RESET for 3/25/2019, at 10:00 AM, by telephone, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearings previously set for 3/18/2019 and 4/9/2019 RESET for 3/27/19 through 4/10/19, at 9:00 a.m. each day, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/14/2019. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/14/2019)

03/14/2019

2426

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on March 14, 2019, it is ORDERED that, by March 21, 2019, the parties are to resubmit the Joint Notice of Filing the Amended Stipulation Regarding Phase 2A Mental Health Consultation to the Disciplinary Process (doc. no. 2384 ) in its entirety so as to revise paragraph numbered 3 to reflect (1) the deadline for ADOC to begin implementing the training issue if the parties are successful at reaching an agreement after mediation before Judge Ott and (2) the means for resolving the training issue if parties are unsuccessful at reaching an agreement after mediation before Judge Ott. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/14/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/14/2019)

03/15/2019

2427

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on March 14, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Oral Argument set for 5/14/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson regarding the following document numbers: 2353 , 2397 , 2398 , 2383 , 2382 , 2384 , as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/15/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

03/15/2019

2428

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/14/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/5/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/15/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

03/19/2019

2429

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON MONITORING − VOLUME 3 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/20/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/9/2019. Redacted Transcript

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 368 of 408

Deadline set for 4/19/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/17/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/19/2019)

03/19/2019 2430 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 3/19/2019, at 11:00 AM, by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/19/2019. (furn: calendar, ag) (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/19/2019)

03/19/2019 2431 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 3/19/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/19/2019)

03/19/2019 2432 NOTICE of Filing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/19/2019)

03/21/2019

2433

NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich and All Plaintiffs re 2426 Order,, Joint Notice of Filing the Second Amended Stipulation Regarding Phase 2A Mental Health Consultation to the Disciplinary Process (Attachments: # 1 Second Amended Stipulation Regarding Phase 2A Mental Health Consultation to the Disciplinary Process)(Reeves, Matthew) Modified on 3/22/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 03/21/2019)

03/22/2019 2434 TRIAL BRIEF The State's Phase 2A Pretrial Brief Regarding Suicide Prevention by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/22/2019 2435 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Phase 2A Suicide Prevention Remedial Trial Pretrial Brief by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/22/2019 2436 Witness and Exhibit List by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 3/25/2019 to correct the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/22/2019 2437 Witness and Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/25/2019 to correct the docket text (kh, ). (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/25/2019 2438 MOTION The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 03/25/2019)

03/25/2019 2439 TEXT ORDER granting 2438 Motion − The State's Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/25/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/25/2019)

03/25/2019

2440

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on March 25, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Oral Argument previously set for 3/27/2019 RESET for 3/28/2019, at 9:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Evidentiary Hearings previously set to start on 3/27/2019 RESET for 3/28/201919 through 4/10/2019, at 9:00 a.m. each day, except at 1:00 p.m. on 3/29/2019, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/25/2019. (furn: ag, calendar) (kh, ) (Entered: 03/25/2019)

03/25/2019 2441 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Pretrial Conference held on 3/25/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/25/2019)

03/26/2019 2442 MOTION Technology Request for Evidentiary Hearing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 03/26/2019)

03/26/2019 2443 TEXT ORDER granting 2442 Motion − Technology Request for Evidentiary Hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/26/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/26/2019)

03/26/2019 2444 MOTION Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/26/2019)

03/26/2019 2445 First Amended Witness and Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 3/26/2019 to correct the docket text. (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 369 of 408
5/1/2019: # 1 Nov. 2018 Combined Facility Master Rosters, # 2 February and March 2018 Segregation Rosters, # 3 April and May 2018 Segregation Rosters, # 4 June and July 2018 Segregation Rosters, # 5 August and September 2018 Segregation Rosters, # 6 October and November 2018 Segregation Rosters, # 7 December 2018 and January 2019 Segregation Rosters, # 8 February 2019 Segregation Roster, # 9 Chart of Inmates with Serious Mental Illness in Restrictive Housing as of January 22, 2019, # 10 Report on SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing as of January 22, 2019 and Prior RHU Placements Since January 2018 for SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing as of January 22, 2019, # 11 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Segregation Remedial Plan, # 12 Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Suicide Prevention Plan, # 13 Feb. 8, 2019 ADOC News Release, # 14 Training: Suicide Risk Assessment, Prevention & Intervention) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/1/2019: # 16 P−2279 Training: Suicide Prevention) (kh, ). (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/1/2019: # 17 P−2280 Wexford Mental Health Statistics and Supporting Documents, October 2018 part 1, # 18 P−2280 Wexford Mental Health Statistics and Supporting Documents, October 2018 part 2, # 19 P−2280 Wexford Mental Health Statistics and Supporting Documents, October 2018 part 3, # 20 P−2280 Wexford Mental Health Statistics and Supporting Documents, October 2018 part 4) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/1/2019: # 21 P−2281 Wexford Mental Health Statistics and Supporting Documents, November 2018) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/1/2019: # 28 P−2282 Wexford Mental Health Statistics and Supporting Documents, December 2018, # 29 P−2283 Timothy Chumney MH004, # 30 P−2284 Timothy Chumney Psychological Autopsy, # 31 P−2285 Jeffery Borden MH004, # 32 P−2286 Jeffery Borden Psychological Autopsy, # 33 P−2287 Ross Wolfinger MH004, SEIR, # 34 P−2288 Ross Wolfinger Psychological Autopsy, # 35 P−2289 Ross Wolfinger Psychological Autopsy, # 36 P−2290 John Barker Psychological Autopsy, # 37 P−2291 Mark Aruajo MH004, SEIR, Incident Report, Duty Officer Report, Medical Records, # 38 P−2292 Mark Araujo SEIR, Mortality Review, Death Summary) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/1/2019: # 39 P−2293 Mark Araujo Psychological Autopsy, # 40 P−2294 Kendall Chatter SEIR, MH004, Medical Records, Duty Officer Report, # 41 P−2295 Kendall Chatter Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 42 P−2296 Kendall Chatter SEIR, # 43 P−2297 Kendall Chatter Psychological Autopsy, # 44 P−2298 Ryan Rust Medical Records, # 45 P−2299 Ryan Rust Record Review, # 46 P−2300 Ryan Rust Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 47 P−2301 Ryan Rust MH004, # 48 P−2302 Ryan Rust − SEIR, # 49 P−2303 Ryan Rust Psychological Autopsy, # 50 P−2304 Roderick Abrams Medical Records, # 51 P−2305 Roderick Abrams MH004) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/1/2019: # 52 P−2306 Roderick Abrams − SEIR, # 53 P−2307 Roderick Abrams Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 54 P−2308 Roderick Abrams Record Review, # 55 P−2309 Paul Ford SEIR, MH004, Medical Records, # 56 P−2310 Paul Ford Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 57 P−2311 Daniel Gentry Duty Officer Report, # 58 P−2312 Daniel Gentry MH004, # 59 P−2313 Daniel Gentry − SEIR, # 60 P−2314 Daniel Gentry Medical Records, # 61 P−2315 W.G. − Medical Records, # 62 P−2316 W.G. Nov. 2018 Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 63 P−2317 W.G. Nov. 2018 SEIR, # 64 P−2318 W.G. Dec. 2018 Incident Report) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2019: # 65 P−2319 W.G. Dec. 2018 SEIR) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2019: # 66 P−2320 T.S. Medical Records Part1, # 67 P−2320 T.S. Medical Records Part2, # 68 P−2320 T.S. Medical Records Part3, # 69 P−2320 T.S. Medical Records Part4, # 70 P−2320 T.S. Medical Records Part5) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2019: # 71 P−2321 T.S. SEIR, MH004, # 72 T.S. Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 73 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part1, # 74 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part2, # 75 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part3, # 76 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part4t, # 77 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part5, # 78 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part6, # 79 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part7, # 80 P−2323 Q.M. Medical Records Part8) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2019: # 81 P−2324 Q.M. SEIR, MH004, # 82 P−2325 Q.M. Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 83 P2326 J.A. Movement History, # 84 P−2327 John Barker Movement History, # 85 P−2328 D.C. Movement History, # 86 P−2329 Kendall Chatter Movement History, # 87 P−2330 J.C. Movement History, # 88 P−2321 A.D. Movement History, # 89 P−2332 A.F. Movement History, # 90 P−2333 Daniel Gentry Movement History) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2019: # 91 P−2334 Q.M. SEIR, MH004, # 92 P−2335 Q.M. Duty Officer and Incident Reports, # 93 P−2336 J.A. Movement History, # 94 P−2337 John Barker Movement History, # 95 P−2338 D.C. Movement History, # 97 P−2339 Ben

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 370 of 408
McClure Movement History, # 98 P 2340 B.R.S. Movement History, # 99 P−2341 B.S. Movement History, # 100 P−2342 C.S. Movement History, # 101 P−2343 J.T. Movement History, # 102 P2344 C.T. Movement History, # 103 P−2345 E.W. Movement History, # 104 P−2346 Roderick Adams Movement History, # 105 P−2347 R.A. Movement History, # 106 P−2348 Mark Araujo Movement History, # 107 P−2349 M.B. Movement History, # 108 P−2350 L.B. Movement History, # 109 P−2351 Timothy Chumney Movement History, # 110 P−2352 Paul Ford Movement History) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2019: # 111 P−2353 R.G. Movement History, # 112 P−2354 N.G. Movement History, # 113 P−2355 R.R.G. Movement History, # 114 P−2356 W.G. Movement History, # 115 P−2357 M.H. Movement History, # 116 P−2358 R.H. Movement History, # 117 P−2359 T.H. Movement History, # 118 P−2360 Matthew Holmes Movement History, # 119 P−2361 P.H. Movement History, # 120 P−2362 N.H. Movement History) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/3/2019: # 121 P−2363 R.M. Movement History, # 122 P−2364 Q.M. Movement History, # 123 P−2365 Ryan Rust Movement History, # 124 P−2366 T.S. − Movement History, # 125 P−2367 L.L.S. Movement History, # 126 P−2368 L.S. Movement History, # 127 P−2369 Ross Wolfinger Movement History, # 128 P−2370 January 2019 Bibb − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 129 P−2371 January 2019 Bullock − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 130 P−2372 January 2019 and September 2018 Bullock − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 131 P−2373 January 2019 Donaldson − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 132 P−2374 January 2019 Easterling − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 133 P−2375 January 2019 and December 2018 Fountain − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 134 P−2376 January 2019 Hamilton A&I − Crisis Cell Utilization) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/3/2019: # 135 P−2377 January 2019 Holman − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 136 P−2378 January 2019 St. Clair − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 137 P−2379 January 2019 Tutwiler − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 138 P−2380 January 2019 Kilby − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 139 P−2381 January 2019 Limestone − Crisis Cell Utilization) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/6/2019: # 140 P−2382 January 2019 Limestone − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 141 P−2383 January 2019 Limestone − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 142 P−2384 January 2019 Limestone − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 143 P−2385 January 2019 Tutwiler − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 144 P−2386 January 2019 Staton − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 145 P−2387 January 2019 Staton − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 146 P−2388 January 2019 Tutwiler − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 147 P−2389 January 2019 Tutwiler − January 2019 Ventress − Crisis Cell Utilization, # 148 P−2390 Tutwiler Segregation Duty Post Log for L−Dorm / 2.12.19 2.15.19, # 150 P−2391Tutwiler Segregation Duty Post Log for L−Dorm / 2.16.19−2.18.19, # 151 P−2392 October 2018 Wexford Monthly Client Report) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/7/2019: # 152 P−2393 December 2018 Wexford Monthly Client Report, # 153 P−2394 November 2018 Wexford Monthly Client Report, # 155 P−2395 CAP−Suicide Prevention, # 156 P−2396 Suicide Watch Report January 2019) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/9/2019: # 157 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 1, # 158 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 2, # 159 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 3, # 160 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 4, # 161 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 5, # 162 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 6, # 163 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 7, # 164 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 8, # 165 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 9, # 166 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 10a, # 167 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 10b, # 168 p−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 10c) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/9/2019: # 169 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 10d1, # 170 p−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 10d2, # 171 P−2397 Suicide Watch Logs January 1−15, 2019 Part 10d3) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/9/2019: # 172 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 1, # 173 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 2, # 174 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 3, # 175 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 4, # 176 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 5, # 177 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 6, # 178 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 7, # 179 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 8, # 180 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 9, # 181 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 10, # 182 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 11, # 183 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 12a, # 184 p−2398 Suicide Watch Logs January 16−31, 2019 Part 12b) (kh, ).

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 371 of 408
(Additional attachment(s) added on 5/10/2019: # 185 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 1, # 186 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 2, # 187 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 3, # 188 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 4, # 189 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 5, # 190 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 6, # 191 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 7, # 192 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 8, # 193 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 9, # 194 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 10, # 195 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 11, # 196 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 12a, # 197 Suicide Watch Logs February 1−15, 2019 Part 12b) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/15/2019: # 198 P−2400 Crisis Cells and Overflow Cells Information, # 199 P−2401 Disciplinary Action K.C, # 200 P−2402 Disciplinary Action K.C, # 201 P−2303 Disciplinary Action R.W., # 202 P−2404 Incident Report D.G., # 203 P−2405 K.C. Medical Records, # 204 P−2406 Matthew Holmes − Duty Officer Report, # 205 P−2407 Matthew Holmes − Incident Report, # 206 P−2408 Matthew Holmes Medical Records, # 207 P−2409 Suicide Watch Report November 2018) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/15/2019: # 208 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 1, # 209 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 2, # 210 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 3, # 211 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 4, # 212 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 5, # 213 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 6, # 214 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 7, # 215 P−2410 Suicide Watch Logs November 16−30, 2018 Part 8) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/15/2019: # 216 P−2411 Suicide Watch Report December 2018, # 217 P−2419 January 2019 St. Clair Crisis Cell Utilization, # 218 P−2420 A.D. Inst. File) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/22/2019: # 219 P−2421 A.F. Inst. File, # 220 P−2422 C.H. Inst. File, # 221 P−2423 Joint Proposal for Preliminary Injunction Hearing Deadlines, # 222 P−2424 March 2019 Segregation Rosters, # 223 P−2425 Bibb Segregation Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.15.19, # 224 P−2426 Bibb Segregation Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19−2.18.19, # 225 P−2427 Bullock Segregation Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19 2.14.19, # 226 P−2428 Bullock Segregation Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19−2.18.19, # 227 P−2429 Bullock SU Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19 2.19.19, # 228 P−2430 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 229 P−2431 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 230 P−2432 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 231 P−2433 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 232 P−2434 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 233 P−2435 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 234 P−2436 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 235 P−2427 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 236 P−2438 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 237 P−2439 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 238 P−2440 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 239 P−2441 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 240 P−2442 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 241 P−2443 Donaldson EFGH Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 242 P−2444 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 243 P−2445 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 244 P−2446 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 245 P−2447 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 246 P−2448 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 247 P−2449 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 248 P−2450 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 249 P−2451 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 250 P−2452 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 251 P−2453 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 252 P−2454 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 253 P−2455 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 254 P−2456 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 255 P−2457 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 256 P−2458 Donaldson I&J Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 257 P−2459 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.1.19, # 258 P−2460 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.2.19, # 259 P−2461 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.3.19, # 260 P−2462 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.6.19, # 261 P−2463 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/22/2019: # 262 P−2464 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 263 P−2465 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 264 P−2466 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/6/2019: # 265 P−2467 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 266 P−2468 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.1.19, # 267 P−2469 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.2.19−2.3.19, # 268 P−2470 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.3.19−2.4.19, # 269 P−2471 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.6.19 2.7.19, # 270 P−2472 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.13.19, # 271 P−2743

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 372 of 408
Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19−2.16.19, # 272 P−2474 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19−2.17.19, # 273 P−2475 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19−2.18.19, # 274 P−2476 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 1.31.19, # 275 P−2477 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.4.19, # 276 P−2478 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.5.19, # 277 P−2479 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 278 P−2480 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 279 P−2481 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 1.31.19−2.1.19, # 280 P−2482 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 1.31.19, # 281 P−2483 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.5.19, # 282 P−2484 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19−2.14.19, # 283 P−2485 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 284 P−2486 Donaldson RSTU Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 285 P−2487 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 286 P−2488 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 287 P−2489 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 288 P−2490 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 289 P−2491 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 290 P−2492 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 291 P−2493 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 292 P−2494 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 293 P−2495 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19−2.17.19, # 294 P−2496 Donaldson Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 295 P−2497 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 296 p−2498 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 297 P−2499 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 298 P−2500 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 299 P−2501 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs/ 2.17.19, # 300 P−2502 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 301 P−2503 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 302 P−2504 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 303 P−2505 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 304 P−2506 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 305 P−2507 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 306 P−2508 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 307 P−2509 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 308 P−2510 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 309 P−2511 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/6/2019: # 310 P−2512 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 311 P−2513 Hamilton Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.18.19, # 312 P−2514 A.D. MH Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 313 P−2515 A.F. MH Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 314 P−2516 Bullock Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 315 P−2517 Bullock Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 316 P−2518 C.H. MH Records, Feb. 2018 Feb.2019, # 317 P−2519 D.J. Inst. File, # 318 P−2520 D.J. MH Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 319 P−2521 D.G. Inst. File, # 320 P−2422 D.G. MH Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 321 P−2523 Depression and Anxiety Group Logs / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 322 P−2524 Donaldson Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 323 P−2525 Donaldson Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 324 P−2526 Donaldson RTU Group Log / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 325 P−2527 Easterling Grief and Loss Group Roster / Feb. 2019, # 326 P−2528 Easterling Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 327 P−2529 Easterling Group Attendance Roster / Jan. 2019, # 328 P−2530 F.J. Inst. File, # 329 P−2531 Hamilton Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 330 P−2532 Hamilton Group Attendance Roster / Dec. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 331 P−2533 Holman Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 332 P2534 J.A. Inst. File, # 333 P−2535 Kilby − Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 334 P−2536 L.S. Inst. File, # 335 P−2537 Limestone Group Attendance Roster/ Feb. 2019, # 337 P−2538 Limestone Group Attendance Roster / Feb. 2019) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/7/2019: # 338 P−2539 Paul Ford Inst. File, # 339 P−2440 Q.M. Inst. File, # 341 P−2541 St. Clair Group Attendance Roster / Feb. 2019, # 342 P−2542 Tutwiler Group Attendance Roster / Jan.−Feb. 2019, # 343 P−2543 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 344 P−2544 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 345 P−2545 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 346 P−2546 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 347 P−2547 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 348 P−2548 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 349 P−2549 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 350 P−2550 Easterling Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 351 P−2551 Fountain Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.18.19) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/10/2019: # 352 P−2552 Fountain Seg. Duty Post Logs / 8.16.18−8.22.18, # 353 P−2553 F.J. MH Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 354 P−2554 Holman H Duty Post Logs / 5.28.18−6.3.18, # 355 P−2555 Holman H Duty Post Logs / 12.15.18−12.21.18, # 356 P−2556 Holman Seg. and Death Row Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.18.19, # 357 p−2557 J.A. Medical Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 358 P−2558 Kilby Seg. Duty Post Logs / 1.10.19−1.16.19, # 359 P−2559 Kilby MNOP Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19−2.18.19, # 360 P−2560 Kilby MNOP Duty Post Logs /

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 373 of 408
2.12.19−2.15.19, # 361 P−2561 L.S. MH Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 362 P−2562 Limestone Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.18.19, # 363 P−2563 Limestone Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.8.19−2.14.19, # 364 P−2564 Limestone Seg. Duty Post Logs / 11.17.18−11.23.18, # 365 P−2565 Limestone Seg. Duty Post Logs / 12.25.18−12.31.18, # 366 P−2567 R.R.G. Records, Feb. 2018−Feb. 2019, # 367 P−2568 St. Clair Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.14.19, # 368 P−2569 St. Clair Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19−2.18.19, # 369 P−2570 St. Clair Seg. Duty Post Logs / 12.27.18−1.2.19, # 370 P−2571 St. Clair Seg. Duty Post Logs / 12.27.18−12.31.18, # 371 P−2572 Staton G Dorm Duty Post Logs / 11.19.18−11.25.18, # 372 P−2573 Ventress Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.15.19) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/10/2019: # 373 P−2574 Ventress Seg. Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19−2.19.19, # 374 P−2575 Ventress Seg. Duty Post Logs / 11.29.18−12.6.18, # 375 P− 2576 Bullock H Unit Roster, # 376 P−2577 2.15.2019 Email from Daniels to Ellington, # 377 P−2578 Donaldson V&W Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 378 P−2579 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 380 P−2580 Donaldson X&Y Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 381 P−2581 Donaldson Z Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19−2.19.19, # 382 P−2582 Donaldson RTU, SLU, BMU Rosters, # 383 P−2583 2.6.19 Email from Ellington to Daniels, # 384 P−2584 2.15.19 Email from Ellington to Daniels, # 385 P−2585 2.15.19 Email from Ellington to Daniels, # 386 P−2586 R.G. Inst. File) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/10/2019: # 387 P−2857 R.R.G. Inst. File, # 388 P−2588 Kilby C&D Duty Post Logs / 2.12.19, # 389 P−2589 Kilby CDEFL Duty Post Logs / 2.13.19, # 390 P−2590 Kilby CDEFL Duty Post Logs / 2.14.19, # 391 P−2591 Kilby CDEFL Duty Post Logs / 2.15.19, # 392 P−2592 Kilby CDEFL Duty Post Logs / 2.16.19, # 393 P−2593 Kilby CDEFL Duty Post Logs / 2.17.19, # 394 P−2594 Kilby CDEFL Duty Post Logs / 2.18.19, # 395 P−2595 Kilby Seg−Like Rosters, # 396 P−2596 2.15.19 Email from Naglich to Daniels, # 397 P− 2597 State's Answers to Plaintiffs Interrogatories re Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 398 P−2598 Tutwiler Seg. Duty Post Logs / 11.22.18−11.23.18, # 399 P−2599 Tutwiler Seg. Duty Post Logs / 11.24.18−11.25.18, # 400 P−2600 Tutwiler Seg. Duty Post Logs / 11.26.18−11.28.18, # 401 P−2601 Tutwiler Seg. Duty Post Logs / 11.28.18−11.29.18, # 402 P−2602 Ross Wolfinger Inst. File, # 403 P−2603 Report and Recommendations on Suicide Prevention in the Alabama Department of Corrections, # 404 P−2604 Appendix − Suicide Record Reviews, # 405 P−2605 Sample Staff Referral Form, # 406 P−2606 Supplemental Recommendations on Suicide Prevention in the Alabama Department of Corrections, # 407 P−2607 September 2018 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, # 408 P−2608 November 2018 ADOC Monthly Statistical Report, # 409 P−2609 ADOC−Wexford MH CQI Presentation − JAB changes 2−22−19, # 410 P−2610 Advanced Suicide Prevention Sign−In Sheet, # 411 P−2611 BIBB February Self−Audit, # 412 P−2612 BIBB NOVEMBER Self−Audit, # 413 P−2613 BULLOCK February Self−Audit, # 414 P−2614 BULLOCK NOVEMBER MH Self−Audit, # 415 P−2515 Combined Mental Health Audit Tool MASTER, # 416 P−2516 Combined Mental Health Audit Tool MASTER, # 417 P−2617 Copy of DONALDSON February Self−Audit, # 418 P−2618 Copy of EASTERLING February Self−Audit, # 419 P−2519 Copy of VENTRESS February Self−Audit, # 420 P−2620 DONALDSON NOVEMBER MH Self−Audit, # 421 P−2621 Easterling − Suicide Crisis CAP, # 422 P−2622 EASTERLING February Self−Audit, # 423 P−2623 EASTERLING MH NOVEMBER SELF−AUDIT) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/10/2019: # 424 P−2624 February 19 Training, # 425 P−2625 FOUNTAIN February Self−Audit, # 426 P−2626 FOUNTAIN NOVEMBER Self−Audit, # 427 P−2627 HAMILTON February Self−Audit, # 428 P−2628 HAMILTON NOVEMBER MH Self−Audit, # 429 P−2629 HOLMAN NOVEMBER MH Self−Audit, # 430 P−2630 KILBY February Self−Audit, # 431 P−2631 KILBY NOVEMBER Self−Audit, # 432 P−2632 Limestone − Suicide Prevention CAP, # 434 P−2633 LIMESTONE February Self−Audit, # 435 P−2634 LIMESTONE NOVEMBER Self−Audit, # 436 P−2635 Matthew Holmes − (SEIR), # 437 P−2636 St. Clair February Self−Audit, # 438 P−2637 St. CLAIR NOVEMBER MH Self−Audit, # 439 P−2638 STATON−ELMORE February Self−Audit, # 440 P−2639 STATON−ELMORE NOVEMBER MH Self−Audit, # 441 P−2640 Suicide Prevention Measures Audit Tool FINAL, # 442 P−2641 Suicide Prevention Measures SELF−AUDIT STATEWIDE TOTALS, # 443 P−2642 Suicide Watch Tools v.02.27.2019, # 444 P−2643 TUTWILER February Self−Audit, # 445 P−2644 TUTWILER NOVEMBER MH Self−Audit, # 446 P −2645 VENTRESS NOVEMBER Self−Audit, # 447 P−2646 CO M.H. Written Reprimand, # 448 P−2647 Suicide Attempts, # 449 P−2648 February 2019 Suicide Prevention Report) (kh, ).

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 374 of 408
(Additional attachment(s) added on 6/11/2019: # 450 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 1, # 451 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 2, # 452 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 3, # 453 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 4, # 454 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 5, # 455 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 6, # 456 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 7, # 457 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 8, # 458 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 9, # 459 P−2649 February 16−28, 2019 Suicide Monitoring Logs Part 10, # 460 P−2650 Phase 2A Order re Segregation Remedy, # 461 P−2651 Amended Stipulation Regarding Phase 2A Mental Health Consultation to the Disciplinary Process, # 462 P−2652 Administrative Regulation 403, # 463 P−2653 Amended Stipulation Regarding the Provision of Hospital−Level Care, # 464 P−2654 Administrative Regulation 640, # 465 P−2655 Phase 2A Order and Injunction on Mental−Health Understaffing, # 466 P−2656 Declaration of Cheryl Price, # 467 P−2657 Wexford Health Behavioral Health Services Guidelines, # 468 P− 2658 NCCHC Standards for Health Services in Prison, # 469 P−2659 T.L. MH Records, Jan. 2018−Jan. 2019, # 470 P−2660 Duty Officer Report − suicide of Matthew Holmes, # 471 P−2661 Duty Officer Report − suicide of Rashaud Morrissette, # 472 P−2662 Holman Seg. Duty Post Logs / 12.15.18−12.21.18, # 473 P−2663 Duty Officer Report − J.B., # 474 P−2664 Incident Report Suicide Attempt of J.B.) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/11/2019: # 475 P−2665 J.B. Inst. File Part 1, # 476 P−2665 J.B. Inst. File Part 2, # 477 P−2665 J.B. Inst. File Part 3, # 478 P−2665 J.B. Inst. File Part 4, # 479 P−2665 J.B. Inst. File Part 5, # 480 P−2665 J.B. Inst. File Part 6, # 481 P−2666 Duty Officer Report Suicide Attempt of J.H., # 482 P−2667 J.H. Classification Summary, # 483 P−2668 Incident Report Suicide Attempt of J.H., # 484 P−2669 Incident Report Suicide of Matthew Holmes, # 485 P−2670 Incident Report Suicide of Rashaud Morrissette, # 486 P−2671 Notice of Filing and SMI−RHU Report for 03/19/2019, # 487 P−2672 Psychological Autopsy − Paul Ford, # 488 P−2673 Psychological Autopsy − Roderick Abrams) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/11/2019: # 489 P−2674 Donaldson Seg. and Death Row Duty Post Logs / 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 490 P−2675 Holman Seg. and Death Row Correctional Facility Duty Post Logs / 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 491 P−2676 St. Clair A Unit Duty Post Logs / 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 492 P−2677 Staton G Dorm Duty Post Logs / 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 493 P−2678 Matthew Holmes Inst. File Part 1, # 495 P−2678 Matthew Holmes Inst. File Part 2, # 496 P−2678 Matthew Holmes Inst. File Part 3, # 497 P−2678 Matthew Holmes Inst. File Part 4, # 498 P−2678 Matthew Holmes Inst. File Part 5, # 499 P−2678 Matthew Holmes Inst. File Part 6, # 500 P−2679 Hayes Suicide Resistance Checklist, # 501 P−2680 C.H. MH Records, March 1, 2018 March 1, 2019, # 502 P−2681 D.M. MH Records, March 1, 2018−March 1, 2019, # 503 P−2682 D.B. MH Records, March 1, 2018−March 1, 2019, # 504 P−2683 M.B. MH Records, March 1, 2018−March 1, 2019, # 505 P−2684 J.D. MH Records, March 1, 2018−March 1, 2019, # 506 P−2685 Tutwiler DR Duty Post Logs 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 508 P−2686 Tutwiler DR Duty Post Logs 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 509 P−2687 Tutwiler D Duty Post Logs 2.22.19−2.28.19, # 510 P−2688 Tutwiler RTU Duty Post Logs 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 511 P−2689 Tutwiler SU Duty Post Logs 2.22.19−3.1.19, # 512 P−2690 Joint Notice of Filing the Amended Stipulation Regarding the Provision of Hospital−Level Care, # 513 P−2691 Rashaud Morrissette Institutional File, # 514 P−2692 Rashaud Morrissette Mental Health Records, # 515 P−2693 Rashaud Morrissette Inmate Movement History, # 516 P−2694 Matthew Holmes Mental Health Records, # 517 P−2695 Matthew Holmes Quality Improvement Program: Review of Inmate Suicide or Life−Threatening Attempt, # 518 P−2696 Duty Officer Report Attempted Suicide of C.T., # 519 P−2697 Incident Report Attempted Suicide of C.T., # 520 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 1, # 521 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 2, # 522 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 3, # 523 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 4, # 524 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 5, # 525 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 6, # 526 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 7, # 527 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 8, # 528 P−2698 C.T. Institutional File Part 9, # 529 P−2699 C.T. Mental Health Records, # 530 P−2700 C.T. Inmate Movement History, # 531 P−2701 J.H. Medical Records, # 532 P−2702 J.H. Inmate Movement History, # 533 P−2703 J.H. Suicide Attempt Report, # 534 P−2704 J.B. Mental Health Records, # 535 P−2705 J.B. Inmate Movement History) (kh, ). (Entered: 03/26/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 375 of 408

03/26/2019 2446 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/26/2019)

03/26/2019 2447 TEXT ORDER granting 2444 Motion − Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/26/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/26/2019)

03/27/2019

2448

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Pretrial Conference Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/25/2019, before Judge Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/17/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/29/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/25/2019. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/27/2019)

03/27/2019 2449 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for March 28, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/27/2019)

03/28/2019

2450

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on the representations made on the record on March 28, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearings previously set to start on 3/28/2019 RESET for 3/28/2019 through 4/10/2019, at 9:00 a.m. each day, except at 10:00 a.m. on 3/29/2019, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/28/19. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 03/28/2019)

03/28/2019 2451 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2416 Notice (Other), Notice of Filing Outline in Response and Annotations to the Suicide Prevention Report and Recommendations by Drs. Mary Perrien and Kathryn Burns (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/28/2019)

03/28/2019 2452 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for March 29, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/28/2019)

03/28/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument begun on 3/28/2019 (No PDF, see final minute entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/28/2019)

03/29/2019 2453 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Zimmermann, Diandra) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

03/29/2019 2454 TEXT ORDER granting 2453 Motion for Diandra S. Debrosse Zimmermann to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/29/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

03/29/2019 2455 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2451 Notice (Other), Plaintiffs' Notice of Filing Reply Annotations to Defendants' Annotations to the Suicide Prevention Report and Recommendations of Drs. Kathryn Burns and Mary Perrien (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs' Annotations)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

03/29/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument continues on 3/29/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

03/31/2019 2456 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Responses to Mental−Health Staffing Ratios re 1657 Order,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 03/31/2019)

04/01/2019 2457 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 1, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/01/2019)

04/01/2019 2458 TET ORDER granting 2456 Motion for Extension of Deadlines to Submit Regarding Mental−Health Staffing Ratio. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/1/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/01/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 376 of 408

04/01/2019 2460 NOTICE OF FILING by Alabama Department of Corrections, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Joint Litigation Status Report)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/01/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/1/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/02/2019 2459 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 2, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/02/2019 2461 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Amended Joint Litigation Status Report)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/02/2019 2463 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/03/2019)

04/02/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/2/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/03/2019)

04/03/2019 2462 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 3, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/03/2019)

04/03/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/3/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

04/04/2019 2464 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 4, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

04/04/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/4/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

04/04/2019 2465 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Brownstein, Rhonda) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

04/05/2019 2466 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 5, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

04/05/2019 2467 TEXT ORDER granting 2465 Motion for Rhonda Brownstein to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/5/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

04/05/2019

*** Attorney Rhonda C. Brownstein terminated pursuant to 2467 TEXT ORDER (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

04/05/2019 2468 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Plaintiffs' Partial Summary of Mental Healthcare Inadequacies Relating to Recent Suicides (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Partial Summary of Mental Healthcare Inadequacies Relating to Suicides)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

04/05/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/5/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

04/08/2019 2469 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 8, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/08/2019)

04/08/2019

2470

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 2 − EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF J.A. − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/29/2019, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 4/29/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/9/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 377 of 408

7/8/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/08/2019)

04/08/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/8/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

04/09/2019 2471 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 9, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

04/09/2019 2472 Statement from Defendants by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (kh, ) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

04/09/2019

2473

NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Plaintiffs' Summary of Mental Healthcare Inadequacies Relating to Recent Suicides and Recent Serious Suicide Attempts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs' Summary of Mental Healthcare Inadequacies Relating to Recent Suicides and Recent Serious Suicide Attempts)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

04/09/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continiues on 4/9/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

04/09/2019 2474 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/10/2019)

04/10/2019 2475 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Witness Summary for April 10, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/10/2019)

04/10/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/10/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/10/2019)

04/11/2019 2476 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Plaintiffs' Amended Summary of Mental Healthcare Inadequacies Relating to Recent Suicides and Recent Serious Suicide Attempts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Amended Chart of Recent Suicides and Serious Suicide Attempt Inadequacies)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/11/2019)

04/12/2019 2477 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich State's Witness Summaries for April 12, 2019 (Smith, John) (Entered: 04/12/2019)

04/12/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing continues on 4/12/2019 (No PDF attached, See Final Minute Entry). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

04/15/2019 2478 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' Proposed Phase 2A Opinion and Order on Immediate Suicide Prevention Remedies (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

04/15/2019

2479

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Evidentiary Hearing concluded on 4/15/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List) (Exhibits to be submitted in whole by both sides)(ag, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/3/2019: # 2 D−0000 − MONTLIB−#260173−v1−Suicide_Prevention_Trial_Exhibits_March_28−April_12, # 3 D−2992 (P−1339) Proposed OHS Staffing, # 4 D−3523 − Site Plan for Kilby, # 5 D−3639 − Duty Officer Report − Marci Green, # 6 D−3642 − MH E−02 − Mental Health − Receiving Screening, # 7 D−3643 − MH E−04 − Mental Health − Assessment and Evaluation, # 8 D−3644 − MH E−04(a) − Mental Health − Serious Mental Illness Designation, # 9 D−3645 − MH E−04(b) − Mental Health Coding, # 10 D−3646 − MH E−05.5 − Mental Health Referrals, # 11 D−3647 − MH E−07(a) − Restrictive Housing − Pre−Placement Screening, # 12 D−3648 − MH E−07(b) − Restrictive Housing − Assessment and Report − Qualified Mental Health Professional) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/3/2019: # 13 D−3649 − MH E−07(c) − Restrictive Housing Mental Health Rounds, # 14 D−3650 − MH G−04 − Suicide−Self−Injury Risk Assessment Clinical Guidelines, # 15 D−3651 − Doc. No. 2451−1 − Outline of State's Response to the Suicide Prevention Recommendations, # 16 D−3652, # 17 D−3653 − ACA Standard on Communicable Disease, # 18 D−3654 − ACA Standard on TB and MRSA, # 19 D−3655 − April 2, 2019 Restrictive Housing Report − ADOC0475651−ADOC0475699, # 20 D−3657 Wexford Letter to

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 378 of 408

Deb Crook − ADOC0475739−ADOC0475752, # 21 D−3658 − 008 − MH Referral Form, # 22 D−3659 − Donaldson Death Row, # 23 D−3660 − Donaldson Death Row (2)) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/3/2019: # 24 D−3662 − Therapeutic Chair Photo, # 25 D−3663 − Therapeutic Cubicle Photo, # 26 D−3664 − Donaldson Duty Post Logs Feb. 12, 2019 − ADOC0475777−ADOC0475807, # 27 D−3665 − Donaldson Duty Post Logs Feb. 13, 2019 − ADOC0475808−ADOC0475839, # 28 D−3666 − 03.23.19 Holman DPL, # 29 D−3667 − 03.24.19 Holman DPL, # 30 D−3668 − 03.25.19 Holman DPL, # 31 D−3669 − 03.26.19 Holman DPL, # 32 D−3670 − Holman − Bed Roster for P Unit (April 2019), # 33 D−3671 − Holman − Bed Roster for P Unit (Jan. 2018), # 34 D−3672 − Holman DR Rec Room, # 35 D−3673 − Holman DR Yard, # 36 D−3674 − Holman P Cell Photo 2, # 37 D−3675 − Holman P Cell Photo) (kh, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/3/2019: # 38 D−3676 − Holman P Cells Inactive, # 39 D−3677 − Holman Schematic, # 40 D−3679 − Kilby M−Dorm Isolation #5, # 41 D−3680 − Kilby M−Dorm Isolation#1, # 42 D−3681 − Kilby N−Dorm Isolation #2, # 43 D−3682 − Kilby O−Dorm Cell, # 44 D−3683 − Kilby P−Ward Isolation Cells, # 45 D−3685 − Gov. Iveys Op−Ed, # 46 Def. Dem. Ex. 54 − Out of Cell Activities in Y Unit−Donaldson) (kh, ). (Entered: 04/15/2019)

04/15/2019 2480 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2385 Notice (Other) Notice of Filing the State's Revisions to the Mental−Health Staffing Ratios (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − The State's Revisions to the Mental−Health Staffing Ratios)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

04/15/2019 2481 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Response to Proposed Opinion re 2478 Notice (Other) by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

04/16/2019

2482

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION − VOLUME I − Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/28/2019, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/7/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/17/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019

2483

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 2 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/29/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/7/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/17/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019

2484

ORDER: Based on the representations made in court on April 15, 2019, it is ORDERED that the issue whether certain documents sought by plaintiffs in the suicide prevention remedial trial are protected by the attorney−client privilege or work−product doctrine is referred to Magistrate Judge Gray Borden for resolution. The documents−−which were furnished to, but not filed with, the court−−will be given to Magistrate Judge Borden. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/16/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019

2485

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION − EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF DEBORAH CROOK − VOLUME I Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/1/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 379 of 408

that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/7/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/17/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019

2486

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION − EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF DEBORAH CROOK − VOLUME 3 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/3/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/7/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/17/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019

2487

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION − EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS − TESTIMONY OF DEBORAH CROOK − VOLUME 4 Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/4/2019, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/7/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/17/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019

2488

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 4 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/2/2019, before Judge Honorable Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/7/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/17/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/15/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019

2489

ORDER AND OPINION: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to unseal the Warren Averett report (doc. no. 2157 ) is granted. Defendants shall immediately unseal the Warren Averett report in its entirety. A more detailed opinion will follow. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/16/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019 2490 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2481 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Response to Proposed Opinion re 2478 Notice (Other) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019 2491 ORDERED that defendants' motion for extension (doc. no. 2481 ) is granted to the extent that defendants' responses are due by 4:00 p.m. on April 18, 2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/16/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019 2492 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2489 Memorandum Opinion and Order,, Terminate Motions, Notice of Filing Unredacted Warren Averett Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Un−redacted Warren Averett Report)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/16/2019 2493 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/17/2019 2494 ORDERED that the parties shall convene for a telephonic conference on April 22, 2019 at 10:00 a.m. to discuss the issue of whether certain documents sought by Plaintiffs in the suicide prevention remedial trial are protected by the attorney−client privilege or work−product doctrine. No later than five minutes

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 380 of 408

prior to the start of the call, the parties are directed to call the chambers conference call number using the access code previously provided. If any party does not have the contact information, please contact chambers directly at (334) 954−3920. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/17/2019. (furn: cb, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/17/2019)

04/17/2019 2495 MOTION to Unseal Document : Transcript of Hearing on April 15, 2019 by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/17/2019)

04/17/2019

2496

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to unseal the transcript from April 15, 2019 (doc. no. 2495 ) is granted to the extent that, unless defendants file an objection by April 18, 2019 at 4:00 p.m., the parties are to arrange for the filing of an unsealed transcript of the in camera hearing held on April 15, 2019, whenever that transcript becomes available. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/17/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/17/2019)

04/18/2019 2497 MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 2495 MOTION to Unseal Document : Transcript of Hearing on April 15, 2019, 2496 Order on Motion to Unseal Document, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019

2498

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of (SEALED DOCUMENT)− IN−CAMERA PROCEEDINGS − REGARDING UNSEALING OF REPORT Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/15/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/9/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/20/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/17/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019 2499 REPLY BRIEF re 2478 Notice (Other) The State's Response to Plaintiffs' Proposed Phase 2A Opinion and Order on Immediate Suicide Prevention Remedies filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019 2500 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2476 Notice (Other), Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/18/2019 2501 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Amended Filing: Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Chart of Recent Suicides and Serious Suicide Attempt Inadequacies (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/19/2019 2502 ORDER: Upon consideration of defendants' motion for extension (doc. no. 2497 ), it is ORDERED that plaintiffs file a response to said motion by 3:00 p.m. on April 19, 2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/19/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

04/19/2019 2503 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2497 MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 2495 MOTION to Unseal Document : Transcript of Hearing on April 15, 2019, 2496 Order on Motion to Unseal Document, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Transcript Transmission Email)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

04/19/2019 2504 ORDERED that defendants' motion for an extension of deadline (doc. no. 2497 ) is granted to the extent that defendants are allowed until noon on April 22, 2019 to file an objection to plaintiffs' motion to unseal (doc. no. 2495 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/19/2019.(kh, ) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

04/22/2019

Minute Entry for Telephone Conference held before Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden held on 4/22/2019. NO PDF ATTACHED TO THIS ENTRY (Recording Time 10:00−10:16.) (Entered: 04/22/2019)

04/22/2019 2505 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2495 MOTION to Unseal Document : Transcript of Hearing on April 15, 2019 filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/22/2019)

04/22/2019 2506 REPLY BRIEF re 2495 MOTION to Unseal Document : Transcript of Hearing on April 15, 2019 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/22/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 381 of 408

04/23/2019 2507 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/24/2019 2508 REPLY BRIEF re 2284 MOTION Resolution of Dispute Regarding Correctional Staffing Numbers re 1813 Notice (Other), 1920 Notice (Other), filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpts of NIC Prison Staffing Analysis Manual)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/24/2019 2509 Exhibit List The State's Amended Witness and Exhibit List for the Phase 2A Evidentiary Hearing on the Correctional Staffing Dispute by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich.. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/24/2019 2510 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/25/2019

2511

NOTICE: Now before the court is the issue of immediate remedial relief on suicide prevention. After extensive engagement with the issues, the court has concluded that they are extremely complex and will require additional time to resolve. Therefore, the court now plans to issue its opinion and order next week. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/25/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 04/25/2019)

04/26/2019 2512 MOTION for J. Richard Cohen to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Cohen, Jack) Modified on 4/26/2019 (kh, ). Modified on 5/28/2019 (kh, ). (Entered: 04/26/2019)

04/26/2019

2513

REPLY BRIEF re 2284 MOTION Resolution of Dispute Regarding Correctional Staffing Numbers re 1813 Notice (Other), 1920 Notice (Other), The State's Pretrial Brief for the Phase 2A Evidentiary Hearing on the Correctional Staffing Dispute filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 04/26/2019)

04/26/2019 2514 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Pretrial Brief for May 1, 2019 Evidentiary Hearing on Correctional Staffing Analysis by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 04/26/2019)

04/30/2019

2515

Joint Notice re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Incorporation of Eldon Vail's Adjudgments to the Savages' Staffing Analysis Pursuant to the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich and All Plaintiffs (Reeves, Matthew) Modified on 4/30/2019 to clarify the docket text and filed on behalf of additional parties. (kh, ). (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019 2516 TEXT ORDER: Upon consideration of the Joint Notice (Doc. 2515 ), it is hereby ORDERED that the evidentiary hearing set for May 1, 2019 is CANCELED. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 4/30/2019. (furn: calenda, cb)(no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019 2517 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

05/01/2019

2518

ORDER: Upon consideration of the Joint Notice filed on April 30, 2019, which represents that the plaintiffs intend to withdraw their Motion for Incorporation of Eldon Vail's Adjustments to the Savages' Staffing Analysis Pursuant to the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (Doc. 2284 ), it is ORDERED that this motion (Doc. 2284 ) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden on 5/1/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

05/01/2019 2519 Amended MOTION Amended Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Named Plaintiffs Who Are No Longer In ADOC Custody by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

05/01/2019 2520 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing of PLAINTIFFS INITIAL BRIEF REGARDING PLRA REQUIREMENTS FOR UPCOMING ORAL ARGUMENT ON MAY 14, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

05/01/2019 2521 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support The State's Initial Brief Regarding Application of the PLRA's Need−Narrowness−Intrusiveness Requirements to the Phase 2A Remedial Issues filed by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 382 of 408

05/01/2019

2522

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME I − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 3/28/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/22/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/3/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/30/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

05/03/2019

2523

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 3 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/1/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 5/24/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/3/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/1/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/03/2019)

05/03/2019 2524 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2515 Notice (Other), Amended Joint Notice re Plaintiffs' Motion for Incorporation of Eldon Vail's Adjustments to the Savages' Staffing Analysis Pursuant to the Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 05/03/2019)

05/04/2019 2525 PHASE 2A REMEDIAL OPINION ON IMMEDIATE RELIEF FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/4/19. (djy, ) (Entered: 05/04/2019)

05/04/2019

2526

PHASE 2A REMEDIAL JUDGMENT ON IMMEDIATE RELIEF FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION directing as follows: (1) plfs' 2276 MOTION for immediate relief is granted as set forth in this judgment; (2) Defs Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the following requirements, which, for the most part, come verbatim from the Interim Agreement Regarding Suicide Prevention Measures (doc. no. 1106 −1) between the plaintiffs and the defendants, as further set out in judgment; (3) Defendants Dunn and Naglich are further ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the following requirements, which, for the most part, come from the experts' Immediate Relief Recommendations (doc. no. 2416 −4), as further set out in judgment; (4) As set forth in the opinion entered today, the court will establish an interim external monitoring scheme and shall require the defendants to establish a formal internal monitoring scheme. The parties have 14 days from today's date to meet with United States Magistrate Judge John Ott to attempt to agree upon the details of the external and internal monitoring schemes that are not already resolved in the opinion, as further set out in judgment; (5) the reserved issue of 'segregation−like cells' is set for an in−person Status Conference in the chambers library on 5/14/2019 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; directing the clerk to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 FRCP. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/4/19. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist). Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 05/04/2019)

05/07/2019 2527 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/08/2019)

05/08/2019 2528 Response to Order re 2427 Order,,, Set Hearings,, The State's Response Regarding Application of the PLRA's Need−Narrowness−Intrusiveness Requirements to the Phase 2A Remedial Issues by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/08/2019)

05/08/2019 2529 REPLY BRIEF re 2521 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support, FOR UPCOMING ORAL ARGUMENT ON MAY 14, 2019 REGARDING PLRA NEED−NARROWNESS−INTRUSIVENESS FINDINGS filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/08/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 383 of 408

05/13/2019 2530 OPINION AND ORDER: Based on the reasons detailed, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to unseal the Warren Averett report in its entirety. See Unsealing Order (doc. no. 2489 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/13/2019)

05/13/2019

2531

OPINION AND ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to unseal the transcript from the hearing on April 15, 2019 (doc. no. 2495 ) is granted. The defendants shall immediately arrange to unseal the transcript in its entirety. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/13/2019)

05/14/2019 2532 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument held on 5/14/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/14/2019)

05/14/2019 2533 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/14/2019)

05/15/2019

2534

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of LIBRARY CONFERENCE − ORAL ARGUMENT/STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 5/14/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/5/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/17/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/15/2019)

05/15/2019 2535 REPLY BRIEF re 2480 Notice (Other), Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Consultants' Mental Health Staffing Ratios and Defendants' Proposed Revisions Thereto filed by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/15/2019)

05/15/2019 2536 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2301 Order,,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Quarterly Mental Health Staffing Report)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/15/2019)

05/16/2019

2537

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Evidentiary Hearing set for 7/8/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 7/9/2019, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 7/10/2019, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; regarding (Doc. nos. 2353 , 2397 , & 2398 , 2383 , 2408 −1, 2384 , 2382 , 1780 , 1794 , 1779 , 1792 , 1786 , 1814 , 1821 , 1853 , 1865 , 1893 , 1899 , 1720 , 1748 , 1751 , 1798 , 1810 , 1811 , & 1815 . Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/28/2019, at 09:00 AM, in chambers before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Status Conference set for 6/4/2019, at 02:00 PM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/16/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/16/2019)

05/16/2019

2538

ORDER: Upon consideration of the plaintiffs' objection (doc. no. 2535 ) to the defendants' proposed revisions (doc. no. 2480 ) to the consultants' mental− health staffing ratios (doc. no. 2385 −1), it is ORDERED that the defendants file a response to said objection by May 23, 2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/16/2019. (kh, ) Modified on 5/16/2019 to correct the docket text to add the word "order" at the beginning. (kh, ). (Entered: 05/16/2019)

05/16/2019

2539

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on May 14, 2019, it is ORDERED that, by May 17, 2019, at 5:00 p.m., the parties are file a joint report on their "pursuit of a path" toward "global resolution" of this case and related cases and proceedings. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/16/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/16/2019)

05/17/2019 2540 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 2539 Order, Joint Report Re: "Pursuit of a Path" Toward "Global Resolution" (Borden, Lisa) (Entered: 05/17/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 384 of 408

05/20/2019

2541

*** SEALED − NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of DISCUSSION ON WARREN AVERETT REPORT REMAINING SEALED Proceedings held on 4/3/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/20/2019)

05/20/2019

2542

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 5 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/3/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/10/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/20/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/19/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/20/2019)

05/21/2019 2543 MOTION to Clarify Scheduling Order by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019 2544 TEXT ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 5/22/2019, at 09:00 AM, by telephone, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/21/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019 2545 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/22/2019 2546 TEXT ORDER RESETTING: Telephone Conference set for 5/22/2019, at 11:00 AM, by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/22/2019 2547 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 5/22/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/22/2019

2548

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on May 22, 2019, and pursuant to the court's order on May 13, 2019 (doc. no. 2531 ), it is ORDERED that the clerk of the court is to unseal the sealed transcript filed on April 18, 2019 (doc. no. 2498 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/22/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/23/2019

2549

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM GRANTING the plf's 2543 MOTION to Clarify, etc. and the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2 A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/23/19. (djy, ) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/23/2019 2550 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Proposals on External and Internal Monitoring Schemes re 2549 Order,, Terminate Motions, Unopposed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/23/2019 2551 REPLY BRIEF re 2535 Reply Brief Response to Plaintiffs' Response to the State's Consultants' Mental Health Staffing Ratios and the State's Proposed Revisions Thereto filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/23/2019

2552

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDERON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM, GRANTING 2550 MOTION for Extension and that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/23/19. (djy, ) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/24/2019 2553 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Filing of JOINT REPORT ON STIPULATIONS AND ORDERS AT ISSUE FOR THE PLRA EVIDENTIARY HEARING SCHEDULED TO BEGIN JULY 8, 2019 (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/24/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 385 of 408

05/28/2019 2554 Response to Order re 2552 Order,, Terminate Motions, Plaintiffs' Report Regarding Whether Any Liability Findings from the Phase 2A Liability Opinion Have Not Been Addressed During the Remedial Process by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 05/28/2019)

05/28/2019 2555 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019 2556 TEXT ORDER granting 2512 MOTION for J. Richard Cohen to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/29/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019

*** Attorney Jack Richard Cohen terminated pursuant to the 2556 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/31/2019

2557

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 6 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/4/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 6/21/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/1/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/29/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 05/31/2019)

05/31/2019 2558 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2228 Memorandum Opinion and Order,,, Terminate Motions,, Notice of Filing March 1, 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report (Attachments: # 1 March 1, 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 05/31/2019)

05/31/2019 2559 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Proposals on External and Internal Monitoring Schemes re 2552 Order,, Terminate Motions, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 05/31/2019)

05/31/2019 2560 Joint MOTION to Stay by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Agreement)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 5/31/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. (kh, ). (Entered: 05/31/2019)

06/03/2019 2561 TEXT ORDER RESETTING: Status Conference set for 6/4/2019 from 2:00 PM to 3:00 PM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/3/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/03/2019)

06/03/2019 2562 Response to Order re 2549 Order,, Terminate Motions, The State's Response to Plaintiffs' Report Regarding Whether Any Liability Findings From the Phase 2A Liability Opinion Have Not Been Addressed During the Remedial Process by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/03/2019)

06/03/2019 2563 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/03/2019)

06/03/2019 2564 MOTION to Alter Judgment 2525 Memorandum Opinion and Order by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 06/03/2019)

06/04/2019 2565 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/04/2019)

06/04/2019 2566 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 6/4/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/05/2019)

06/07/2019

2567

ORDER: Upon further consideration of the parties' joint motion to stay (doc. no. 2560 ) and agreement (doc. no. 2560 −1), the court is left unsure whether the stipulations on hospital−level care (doc. no. 2383 , 2383 −1, & 2383 −2) and disciplinary sanctions (doc. no. 2384 , 2384 −1, & 2384 −2) are enforceable during the 90−day stay. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, by 6 p.m. today, the parties jointly shall file a statement explaining the status of these stipulations during the pendency of the stay. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 386 of 408

Thompson on 6/7/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/07/2019)

06/07/2019 2568 Response to Order re 2567 Order,, Joint Statement Regarding Status of Stipulations During the Stay by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) (Entered: 06/07/2019)

06/10/2019

2569

ORDER: Based on the representations made on the record on June 4, 2019, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The parties' joint motion to stay (doc. no. 2560 ) is granted and the parties are to comply with their agreement (doc. no. 2560 −1) as set forth in this order. By agreement of the parties, the 90 days in the agreement expire on September 6, 2019. (2) The proceedings in this case are stayed until September 6, 2019, as to the following matters: (A) Phase 2B proceedings, that is, the medical and dental−care claims, including resolution of all pending motions. (B) All matters listed as set for hearing (and related deadlines) or under submission in the Phase 2A Revised Remedy Scheduling Order (doc. no. 2552), with the exception of the remedial orders and stipulations listed under "Miscellaneous," part (1)(A) (although the hearing and related deadlines on these remedial orders and stipulations are stayed). (C) The court's Phase 2A Remedial Opinion on Immediate Relief for Suicide Prevention (doc. no. 2525 ) and Phase 2A Remedial Judgment on Immediate Relief for Suicide Prevention (doc. no. 2526 ). (3) Proceedings in this case are not stayed as to the following matters: (A) Phase 1 proceedings, that is, the ADA and IVM matters. (B) The Phase 2A Understaffing RemedialOpinion (doc. no. 1656 ) and Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (doc. no. 1657 ). (C) The 90−day suicide prevention order proposed by the parties and entered below today. (D) The remedial orders and stipulations listed under "Miscellaneous," part (1)(A), in the Phase 2A Revised Remedy Scheduling Order (doc. no. 2552 ). (4) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED, until September 6, 2019, from failing to comply with the following provisions of the 90−day suicide prevention order proposed by the parties (doc. no. 2560 −1), as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/10/2019. (furn: calendar, ag) (term: Final Pretrial Conference 06/28/2019, Evidentiary Hearing 07/08/2019, Evidentiary Hearing 07/09/2019, Evidentiary Hearing 07/10/2019)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/10/2019

2570

ORDER: Pursuant to paragraph A(6)(a) of the parties' agreement to a 90−day stay (doc. no. 2560 −1), it is ORDERED that an in−person on−the−record scheduling conference is set for September 3, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/10/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/10/2019 2571 ORDERED that defendants' unopposed motion for an extension of time (doc. no. 2559 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/10/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/11/2019 2572 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Grace Graham by All Plaintiffs. (Graham, Grace) (Entered: 06/11/2019)

06/11/2019 2573 TEXT ORDER granting 2572 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Grace Graham. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/11/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 06/11/2019)

06/11/2019

*** Attorney Grace Graham terminated pursuant to the court's [2573 ] text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 06/11/2019)

06/11/2019 2574 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/11/2019)

06/18/2019 2575 SEALED Notice of filing re: 2345 ORDER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(djy, ) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

06/25/2019 2576 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/25/2019)

06/26/2019

Case Reassigned to Honorable Judge Wallace Capel, Jr; Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden no longer assigned to the case as referral judge. (no pdf document attached to

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 387 of 408

this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 06/26/2019)

06/26/2019

2577

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 6/4/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 7/17/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/29/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/24/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/26/2019)

06/28/2019

2578

ORDER: By oral agreement of the parties, it is ORDERED that the order regarding litigation status reports (doc. no. 1910 ) is stayed pursuant to, and for the length of time set forth in, the order for stay pending mediation (doc. no. 2569 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/28/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/28/2019)

07/02/2019 2579 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/02/2019)

07/03/2019 2580 MOTION to Withdraw as attorney by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, Alyson). Added MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney on 7/3/2019, wrong event code used during docketing (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 07/03/2019)

07/03/2019 2581 TEXT ORDER granting 2580 Motion for Alyson Smith to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/3/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 07/03/2019)

07/03/2019

*** Attorney Alyson Lee Smith terminated pursuant to 2581 TEXT ORDER (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 07/03/2019)

07/03/2019 2582 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney David Clay Washington by All Plaintiffs. (Morris, Maria) (Entered: 07/03/2019)

07/03/2019 2583 TEXT ORDER granting 2582 Motion for David Clay Washington to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/3/19. (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 07/03/2019)

07/09/2019 2584 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/09/2019)

07/16/2019 2585 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/16/2019)

07/23/2019 2586 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/23/2019)

07/30/2019 2587 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/30/2019)

08/06/2019 2588 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/06/2019)

08/09/2019 2589 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Mental−Health Staffing re 1657 Order,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/12/2019 2590 ORDERED that the defendants' motion to extend deadlines related to mental−health staffing (doc. no. 2589 ) is granted as requested. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/12/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/12/2019)

08/12/2019 2591 MOTION for Leave to File by Alabama Department of Corrections, Ruth Naglich and Jefferson S. Dunn. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 8/16/2019 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 08/12/2019)

08/13/2019 2592 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1813 Notice (Other) The State's Amended Motion for Leave to Disclose the Savages' Staffing Analysis Report and ADOC's Quarterly Staffing Reports to the United States Department of Justice by Alabama Department

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 388 of 408

of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 08/13/2019)

08/13/2019

2593

ORDERED as follows: (1) The defendants' amended motion for leave to disclose the Savages' Staffing Analysis Report and ADOC's Quarterly Staffing Reports to the United States Department of Justice (doc. no. 2592 ) is granted. (2) The defendants' prior motion for leave to disclose the Savages' Staffing Analysis Report and ADOC's Quarterly Staffing Reports to the United States Department of Justice (doc. no. 2591 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/13/2019)

08/13/2019 2594 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/13/2019)

08/14/2019 2595 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 08/14/2019)

08/15/2019 2596 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline The 90−Day Stay re 2569 Order by All Plaintiffs, Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Morris, Maria) Modified on 8/16/2019 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 08/15/2019)

08/19/2019

2597

ORDERED that: (1) The joint motion to extend deadlines (doc. no. 2596 ) is granted. (2) The existing schedule in the order entered on June 20, 2019 (doc. no. 2569 ), is modified as follows: (a) A party seeking to lift the stay and reset the remaining Phase 2A deadlines shall notify the other party on or before August 26, 2019. (b) The existing stay shall expire on September 13, 2019, unless renewed pursuant to the terms of the order entered on June 10, 2019 (doc. no. 2569 ). (c) The in−person status conference, currently set for September 3, 2019, is continued to September 6, 2019, at 1:00 p.m.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/19/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/19/2019)

08/20/2019 2598 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/20/2019)

08/23/2019

*** Attorney Latasha Lanette McCrary and David Clay Washington terminated pursuant to the 1923 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 08/23/2019)

08/26/2019 2599 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Deadline to Notify Other Party of Intent to Lift the Stay and Reset Remaining Phase 2A Deadlines re 2597 Order by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) Modified on 8/27/2019 to clarify the text. (kh, ). (Entered: 08/26/2019)

08/27/2019 2600 TEXT ORDER granting 2599 Motion for Extension of Deadline. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/27/2019. (no pdf document attached to this enty)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/27/2019)

08/27/2019 2601 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/27/2019)

09/03/2019 2602 NOTICE by Alabama Department of Corrections, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing June 3, 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 09/03/2019)

09/03/2019 2603 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/04/2019)

09/04/2019 2604 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/04/2019)

09/05/2019 2605 JOINT NOTICE REGARDING THE AGREE UPON IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR THE ADA ALTERATIONS by All Plaintiffs (Van Der Pol, William) Modified on 9/5/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 09/05/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 389 of 408

09/06/2019 2606 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Joint Filing of Agreements on Suicide Prevention Measures and Mental Health Staffing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Agreed−upon Suicide Prevention Remedies)(Morris, Maria) (Entered: 09/06/2019)

09/06/2019 2607 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 9/6/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 09/06/2019)

09/09/2019

2608

ORDER REGARDING FURTHER EXTENSION OF STAY: Based on the representations made on the record on September 6, 2019 with regard to the stay of the proceedings in this case pursuant to the orders of the court entered on June 10 and August 19, 2019 (doc. nos. 2569 and 2597 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The stay entered pursuant to the orders of the court entered on June 10 and August 19, 2019 (doc. nos. 2569 and 2597 ) is limited to only the following issues: monitoring; PLRA findings; the court's remedial opinion and judgment for immediate relief regarding suicide prevention (doc. nos. 2525 and 2526 ); and the motion to alter, amend, or vacate (doc. no. 2564 ). The stay is under the conditions set forth in the courts order June 10, 2019 (doc. no. 2569 ). (2) The new stay shall expire on December 13, 2019, at 5:00 p.m. (3) An in−person status conference regarding the stay is set for December 6, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (4) If a party intends to seek an extension of the stay beyond December 13, 2019, that party must notify the other parties in writing by no later than noon on November 22, 2019. (5) The issue of monitoring is set for submission and resolution by the court, without oral argument, as of December 13, 2019, at 5:00 p.m. All evidence has already been presented to the court. (6) With regard to the issue of PLRA findings: (A) An evidentiary hearing is set for March 2, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (B) A pretrial conference is set for February 21, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (C) By February 7, 2020, the parties are to file a joint statement of ALL the orders, stipulations, and agreements (with document numbers cited) for which the court must make findings as to whether they comply with the PLRA. (D) By February 12, 2020, and with citations to the record in support of their arguments, the plaintiffs are to file prehearing briefs as to why these orders, stipulations, and agreements comply with the PLRA. (E) By February 18, 2020, and with citations to the record in support of their arguments, the defendants are to file a response. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2019. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2019)

09/09/2019

2609

ORDERED that, with regard to the parties' proposed suicide prevention measures (doc. no. 2606 ), an in−person hearing is set for November 15, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2019)

09/09/2019

2610

ORDERED that, with regard to the parties proposed mental−health staffing agreement (doc. no. 2606), an in−person hearing is set for November 15, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2019)

09/09/2019 2611 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Maria V. Morris by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 09/09/2019)

09/09/2019

2612

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM Based on the representations made on the record on September 6, 2019, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/12/2019 and 1/24/2020, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; In−person Hearing set for 11/12/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 390 of 408

Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2019)

09/09/2019 2613 TEXT ORDER granting 2611 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Maria V. Morris. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/9/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/09/2019)

09/10/2019

*** Attorney Maria Viette Morris terminated pursuant to the court's 2613 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/10/2019

Set Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 3/2/2020, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson previously omitted in error. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/10/2019 2614 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline re 2606 Notice (Other) to Agree on Mental−Health Staffing Matrix by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Sandley, Caitlin) Modified on 9/10/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants. (kh, ). (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/10/2019 2615 TEXT ORDER granting 2614 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/10/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/10/2019 2616 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/12/2019

2617

PHASE 1 ADA ALTERATIONS ORDER: Based on the representations made during a status conference on the record on September 6, 2019, with regard to the parties' proposed implementation schedule for ADA alterations (doc. no. 2605 ), it is ORDERED that: (1) An in−person hearing is set for October 18, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. (2) By noon on October 10, 2019, the parties are to file a joint statement that addresses the following as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/12/2019. (furn:ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/12/2019)

09/13/2019 2618 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing Mental−Health Staffing Matrix (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Mental Health Staffing Appendix)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 09/13/2019)

09/16/2019 2619 Joint MOTION Reschedule Hearing for October 18, 2019 re 2617 Order,,, Set Hearings,, by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Smith, John) (Entered: 09/16/2019)

09/18/2019

2620

TEXT ORDER GRANTING 2619 Joint MOTION Reschedule Hearing for October 18, 2019 re 2617 Order RESETTING the 10/18/2019Status Conference on Phase 1 ADA issues to 10/21/2019 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in courtroom 2FMJ Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/18/19. Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 09/18/2019)

09/20/2019 2622 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report on a Scheme to Idenitfy Inmates with a Serious Mental Illness in Restrictive Housing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich and All Plaintiffs. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 9/24/2019 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 09/20/2019)

09/24/2019

2623

ORDER: The parties filed, on September 20, 2019 (doc. no. 2622 ), a joint status report on a scheme to identify inmates with serious mental illness in segregation. The court understands the import of the report to be that the matter at issue will be addressed in the parties' ongoing effort at mediation on the monitoring issue and that, should mediation fail, would be put to the court to consider as part of the monitoring remedy. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, if the court has misunderstood, the parties should so inform the court within five business days from today. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/24/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/24/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 391 of 408

09/24/2019 2624 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/24/2019)

10/01/2019 2625 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/01/2019)

10/03/2019 2626 Joint MOTION to Continue Evidentiary Hearing on Supplemental Liability Opinion Remedy by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 10/03/2019)

10/04/2019 2627 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, and Ruth Naglich Joint Notice of Agreement Regarding Productions Relating to People with Serious Mental Illness in Restrictive Housing (Sandley, Caitlin) Modified on 10/10/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants(kh, ). (Entered: 10/04/2019)

10/08/2019 2628 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich and All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) . Modified on 10/10/2019 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties(kh, ). (Entered: 10/09/2019)

10/11/2019 2629 Response to Order re 2617 Order,,, Set Hearings,, Joint Statement ADA Implementation by All Plaintiffs. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 10/11/2019)

10/11/2019 2630 Joint MOTION for Leave to File ADA Report Under Seal by All Plaintiffs, Ruth Naglich and Jefferson S. Dunn . (Van Der Pol, William) Modified on 10/15/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants (kh, ). (Entered: 10/11/2019)

10/15/2019 2631 NOTICE of Appearance by Lynnette Kim Miner on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Miner, Lynnette) (Entered: 10/15/2019)

10/15/2019 2632 TEXT ORDER granting 2630 Joint MOTION for Leave to File ADA Report Under Seal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/15/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/15/2019)

10/15/2019 2633 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/15/2019)

10/16/2019 2634 ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, on or before noon on October 23, 2019, the parties are to file a joint statement answering the questions posed in this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/16/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/16/2019)

10/17/2019 2635 NOTICE of FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 ADA Report Under Seal Part 1, # 2 ADA Report Under Seal Part 2, # 3 ADA Report Under Seal Part 3, # 4 ADA Report Under Seal Part 4)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/17/2019)

10/21/2019 2636 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 10/21/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 10/21/2019)

10/22/2019

2637

ORDERED that: (1) The parties' joint notice (doc. no. 2605 ), as subsequently clarified both by the parties' joint statement (doc. no. 2629 ) and during an on−the−record hearing on October 21, 2019, is treated as a motion to modify the Phase 1 consent decree (doc. no. 728 ). (2) By noon on October 29, 2019, the parties are to file a joint or individual brief demonstrating that the legal requirements for modification of a consent decree, as requested in the motion to modify the Phase 1 consent decree, are met under Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), and other applicable Supreme Court and circuit law. (3) By noon on October 29, 2019, the parties are to also file with the court the proposed notice to be sent to the class summarizing the proposed modification of the consent decree, as the parties agreed in their joint statement (doc. no. 2629 ) and mentioned during the October 21 hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/22/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/22/2019)

10/22/2019 2638 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/22/2019)

10/23/2019 2639 Response to Order re 2634 Order Joint Statement Regarding Joint Motion to Continue Evidentiary Hearing on Supplemental Liability Opinion by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 10/23/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 392 of 408

10/24/2019

2640

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: It is ORDERED that the parties' joint motion to continue evidentiary hearing on supplemental liability opinion remedy (doc. no. 2626 ), as clarified by the parties' subsequent joint statement (doc. no. 2639 ), is granted and the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: In−person Hearing set for 11/12/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; Evidentiary Hearing set for 3/2/2020 at 10:00am, 1/24/2020 at 10:0am, 1/27/2020−1/28/2020 at 9:00am and 3/3/2020 − 3/5/2020 at 9:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 10/24/2019. (term: Status Conference set for 11/15/2019, Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/12/19,) (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/24/2019)

10/24/2019

Set Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 3/5/2020, at 09:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Status Conference set for 12/6/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson previously omitted in error. (furn: calendar, ag) (kh, ) (Entered: 10/24/2019)

10/29/2019 2641 REPLY to Response to Motion re 2630 Joint MOTION for Leave to File ADA Report Under Seal filed by Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 10/29/2019)

10/29/2019 2642 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/30/2019)

10/31/2019

2643

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE − PROPOSED ADA IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 10/21/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 11/21/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/2/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/29/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2019)

11/05/2019 2644 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/05/2019)

11/05/2019 2645 Response to Order re 2612 Order,,, Set Hearings,, Plaintiffs' Brief on "Segregation−Like" Issues by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 11/05/2019)

11/05/2019 2646 Response to Order re 2640 Order,,,, Set Hearings,,, The State's Brief Regarding The "Segregation−Like" Issue by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/05/2019)

11/06/2019

2647

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Because of a scheduling conflict, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: In−person hearing set for 11/13/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/6/2019. (term: In Person Hearing set for 11/12/2019) (furn:ag calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/06/2019)

11/06/2019

2648

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM; Because of a scheduling conflict, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: In−person hearing set for 11/20/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/6/2019. (term: In Person Hearing set for 11/13/2019) (furn:ag calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/06/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 393 of 408

11/06/2019 2649 MOTION Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 11/06/2019)

11/07/2019 2650 TEXT ORDER granting 2649 Motion for Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/7/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/07/2019)

11/11/2019 2651 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction by William Richard Lunsford re 2643 Transcript,, (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/11/2019)

11/12/2019 2652 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/13/2019)

11/13/2019 2653 Joint MOTION to Continue The November 20, 2019 Hearing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 11/18/2019 (kh, ). (Entered: 11/13/2019)

11/14/2019

Set Hearings: Telephone Conference RE: 2653 Joint Motion to Continue set for 11/14/2019 01:00 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (war, ) (Entered: 11/14/2019)

11/14/2019 2654 MOTION to Withdraw by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Neri, Melissa) (Entered: 11/14/2019)

11/14/2019 2655 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Quarterly Mental Health Staffing Report)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 11/14/2019)

11/14/2019 2658 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference RE: Motion to Continue held on 11/14/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 1:06 PM − 1:21 PM.) (war, ) (Entered: 11/15/2019)

11/15/2019 2656 TEXT ORDER granting 2654 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2019)

11/15/2019

*** Attorney Melissa Neri terminated pursuant to the court's 2656 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2019)

11/15/2019

2657

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: In−person hearings set for 11/20/2019 RESET for 12/6/2019, at 10:00 AM, in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/15/2019. (furn: calendar, ag) (Term: In person Hearing set for 11/20/2019)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/15/2019)

11/18/2019

Case Reassigned to Honorable Judge Jerusha T. Adams; Honorable Judge Wallace Capel, Jr no longer assigned to the case as referral judge. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/18/2019)

11/19/2019 2659 NOTICE of filing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(djy, ) (Entered: 11/20/2019)

11/20/2019 2660 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline November 22, 2019 Deadline re 2608 Order,,,,,,,,,,, Set Hearings,,,,,,,,,, by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 11/20/2019)

11/20/2019

2661

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM GRANTING 2660 Joint MOTION and the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/20/19. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/20/2019)

11/21/2019 2662 Transcript Redaction Request re 2643 Transcript,, by attorney William Richard Lunsford. (Lunsford, William) (Entered: 11/21/2019)

11/22/2019 2663 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by the Plfs, if any there be, as to why dfts' 2662 request for redaction; Show Cause Response due by noon on 12/2/2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/22/2019. (amf, ) (Entered: 11/22/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 394 of 408

11/26/2019 2664 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/26/2019)

11/27/2019 2665 NOTICE of Appearance by Jaqueline Aranda Osorno on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Aranda Osorno, Jaqueline) (Entered: 11/27/2019)

12/02/2019 2666 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by All Plaintiffs re 2663 Order to Show Cause. (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/02/2019

2667

ORDER: Upon consideration of plaintiffs' response to this court's order to show cause (doc. no. 2666 ), it is ORDERED that defendants' request for redaction (doc. no. 2662 ) is set for oral argument on December 6, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/2/2019. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/02/2019 2668 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing September 3, 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/02/2019 2669 MOTION Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology Request by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/02/2019 2670 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing Quarterly Staffing Report (Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/02/2019

2671

ORDER: This court has under submission the parties' joint oral motion to modify the Phase 1 consent decree. See Order (doc. no. 2637 ) at 1. Based on the entire record before the court, including the parties' joint notice (doc. no. 2605 ), joint statement (doc. no. 2629 ), and joint brief (doc. no. 2641 ), as well as the on−the−record hearings on September 6 and October 21, 2019, it is ORDERED that the oral motion for proposed modification (doc. no. 2637 ) is preliminarily granted, with final approval subject to a hearing, to be set later, and review by the court of any objections to or comments about its terms submitted by class members, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/2/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/02/2019 2672 TEXT ORDER granting 2669 Motion for Plaintiffs' Non−Attorney Staff Technology. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/2/2019. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/02/2019 2673 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/03/2019)

12/03/2019

2674

ORDER: When this court preliminarily approved modifications to the Phase 1 consent decree, it disagreed that the proposed notice submitted to the court was sufficient and explained that it will take up the content of the notice in a subsequent order. See Order (doc. no. 2671 ) at 3−4. In light of the fact that the original notice approved by this court provided that the parties make available to class members a copy of the Phase 1 consent decree, see Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement (doc. no. 532 −1) at 2 (announcing this), and the fact that the proposed modifications to the consent decree have evolved piecemeal over time, see Order (doc. no. 2637 ) at 1 1 (cataloging this), such that no single document is authoritative, it is ORDERED that, in order to facilitate and assure clear notice of the proposed modification and to aid enforcement, the parties are to reduce their modifications of the Phase 1 consent decree to a single, comprehensive document, to be jointly submitted to the court by noon on December 5, 2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/3/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/03/2019)

12/03/2019 2675 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/04/2019)

12/04/2019

2676

ORDERED that the proposed modification to the Phase 1 consent decree, see Order (doc. no. 2671 ), is set for a status conference on December 6, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. The court wants to discuss, among other things, the reduction of the proposed modification to a single, comprehensive document; the proposed notice to the class; the circulation

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 395 of 408

of notice to the class; and a date for a fairness hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/4/2019. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/04/2019)

12/05/2019 2677 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich and All Plaintiffs Joint Notice Regarding Redactions to the October 21, 2019 Hearing Transcript (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) Modified on 12/6/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. (kh, ). (Entered: 12/05/2019)

12/05/2019 2678 Response to Order re 2674 Order Joint Response to Order to Summarize Modifications by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich and All Plaintiffs. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 12/6/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (kh, ). (Entered: 12/05/2019)

12/06/2019 2679 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Status Conference held on 12/6/2019 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 12/06/2019)

12/06/2019 2680 MOTION to Intervene by Patrick Joseph Charest. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/09/2019

2681

ORDER REGARDING EXPIRATION OF STAY: Based on the representations made in open court on December 6, 2019, with regard to the stay of the proceedings in this case pursuant to the orders of the court entered on June 10, August 19, and September 9, 2019 (doc. nos. 2569 , 2597 , and 2608 ), it is ORDERED that the stay will expire on December 13, 2019, at 5:00 p.m.. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/9/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/09/2019

2682

PHASE 2A ORDER ON MENTAL−HEALTH CASELOAD REPORT: Based on the representations made in open court on December 6, 2019, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The parties are to file with the court by December 20, 2019, at 5:00 p.m., a joint report updating the court as to the most recent mental−health caseload numbers, including the overall size of the caseload, the number of individuals with each mental−health designation, and the number of individuals in need of residential−level mental−health treatment, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/9/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/09/2019

2683

PHASE 2A ORDER ON SUICIDE PREVENTION JUDGMENT: The parties having agreed to the following in open court on December 6, 2019, it is ORDERED that the court's Phase 2A Remedial Judgment on Immediate Relief for Suicide Prevention (doc. no. 2526 ) will go into effect on December 13, 2019, immediately after the expiration of the stay, see court orders (doc. nos. 2569 , 2507 and 2608 ), if the parties do not reach an agreement before that date that their proposed suicide− prevention stipulations (doc. no. 2601 −1) should go into effect as an enforceable order under the PLRA. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/9/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/09/2019

2684

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE: Patrick Joseph Charest has filed a document (doc. no. 2680 ) in which he seeks to intervene in this case to object to defendants' transcript redaction request (doc. no. 2662 ). It is ORDERED that the document (doc. no. 2680 ) is treated as a motion to intervene and said motion is denied. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/9/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/09/2019

2685

PHASE 1 ORDER ON MODIFICATIONS TO CONSENT DECREE: Following an on−the−record hearing on December 6, 2019, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs are to arrange to provide the court, via email, by 5:00 p.m. on December 20, 2019, a joint package containing proposals for the following: (1) notice to the class, (2) method of notice, (3) comment form, (4) period of comment, and (5) date of fairness hearing. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/9/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/09/2019 2686 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 12/6/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G.

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 396 of 408

Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/9/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/9/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/10/2019 2687 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/11/2019)

12/11/2019

2688

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON MENTAL−HEALTH STAFFING REMEDY: On September 6, 2019, the parties submitted stipulations (doc. no. 2606 ) regarding mental− health staffing. Pursuant to these stipulations, the parties on September 13 filed an agreed−upon mental−health staffing matrix (doc. no. 2618 −1). The parties agreed that these stipulations should be reduced to an order, which they agree will be enforceable under the court's initial understaffing remedial order and opinion containing PLRA findings. The parties further agreed to some clarifications of these stipulations during an on−the−record hearing on December 6. Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The stipulations (doc. no. 2606 ), as clarified during the on−the−record hearing on December 6, 2019, and as attached to this order as Attachment A, are approved. (2) The mental−health staffing matrix (doc. no. 2618 −1), as attached to this order as Attachment B, is approved.(3) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions (Attachments A and B), as clarified during the on−the−record hearing on December 6, 2019. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/11/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A, # 2 Attachment B)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/11/2019)

12/12/2019

2689

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/23/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/2/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/13/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/11/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/12/2019)

12/12/2019

2690

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/24/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/2/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/13/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/11/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/12/2019)

12/13/2019

2691

ORDER REGARDING REDACTION OF HEARING TRANSCRIPT: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the parties' proposed redactions are approved and that defendants' transcript redaction request (doc. no. 2662 ) is granted, albeit only to the extent of the parties' proposed redactions (doc. no. 2677 ). The unredacted hearing transcript shall not be made publicly available until the ADA Consultant's Report is publicly disclosed, pursuant to the parties' joint notice regarding the agreed−upon implementation schedule for ADA alterations (doc. no. 2605 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/13/2019)

12/13/2019 2692 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs (Van Der Pol, William) (Entered: 12/13/2019)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 397 of 408

12/13/2019

2693

PHASE 2A ORDER ON CORRECTIONAL STAFFING REPORT: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the parties are to file a joint notice, by noon on Friday, December 20th, with the following: (1) The total actual number of cubicle correctional officers, basic correctional officers, and correctional officers, each reported separately, as of September 30, 2019, which the court understands to be the relevant date for the latest quarterly staffing report (doc. no. 2670), and as of June 30, 2019, which the court understands to be the relevant date for the September 2019 quarterly staffing report (doc. no. 2668 ), using the term "actual" as it is used in the quarterly staffing reports.* (2) A proposal for how the parties may report such information in future staffing reports. (3) A comparison of the qualifications, pay, responsibilities, and limitations, if any, of a cubicle correctional officer, basic correctional officer, and correctional officer. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/13/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/13/2019)

12/13/2019

2694

(VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 2697 ORDER) PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON SUICIDE−PREVENTION REMEDY: Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The stipulations (doc. nos. 2606 −1 and 2692), as clarified during the on−the−record hearing on December 6, 2019, and as attached to this order as Attachment A and B, are approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the attached provisions (Attachments A and B), as clarified during the on−the−record hearing on December 6, 2019, effective immediately and until April 1, 2020. (3) Submission of the defendants' motion to alter, amend, or vacate the Phase 2A Remedial Opinion and Judgment on Immediate Relief for Suicide Prevention (doc. no. 2564 ) is continued generally. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/13/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A, # 2 Attachment B)(kh, ) Modified on 12/16/2019 (kh, ). (Entered: 12/13/2019)

12/13/2019

2695

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/25/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/3/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/13/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/12/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/13/2019)

12/13/2019

2696

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/27/2018, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/3/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/13/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/12/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/13/2019)

12/16/2019 2697 ORDERED that the court's prior order (doc. no. 2694 ), which was entered in error, is vacated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/16/2019)

12/16/2019

2698

PHASE 2A ORDER AND INJUNCTION ON INTERIM SUICIDE−PREVENTION REMEDIES: Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The joint agreement (doc. no. 2692 ) is approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with paragraphs A.6.f and A.6.g. and sections B, C, and D of the interim suicide prevention agreement (doc. no. 2560 −1) until 5:00 p.m., on April 1, 2020. (3) Pursuant to the parties' agreement, and upon consideration of the ordered relief and the evidence heard by the court, the court finds that this time−limited relief meets the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A). (4)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 398 of 408

Enforcement of the court's Phase 2A Remedial Judgment on Immediate Relief for Suicide Prevention (doc. no. 2526 ) remains stayed until 5:00 p.m., on April 1, 2020. (5) Submission of defendants' motion to alter, amend, or vacate the Phase 2A Remedial Opinion and Judgment on Immediate Relief for Suicide Prevention (doc. no. 2564 ) is again continued generally. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/16/2019)

12/16/2019

2699

PHASE 2A ORDER APPROVING SUICIDE−PREVENTION AGREEMENT: On September 6, 2019, the parties submitted stipulations (doc. no. 2606 −1) regarding suicide−prevention measures. The parties further agreed to some clarifications of these stipulations during an on−the−record hearing on December 6, 2019. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the stipulations (doc. no. 2606 −1), as clarified during the hearing on December 6, 2019, and as attached to this order as Attachment A, are approved, subject to latter consideration of whether they comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/16/2019)

12/16/2019

2700

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on current circumstances, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Hearing on termination or extension of interim suicide prevention order (doc. nos. 2569 & 2698 ) set for 3/2/20 at 10:00 a.m., as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/16/2019. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/16/2019)

12/17/2019 2701 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) Modified on 1/3/2020 to clarify text to reflect as also filed on behalf of Jefferson Dunn not Braggs (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 12/18/2019)

12/19/2019

2702

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON A PROCESS TO IDENTIFY FUNCTIONAL SEGREGATION: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants are to file with the court, by noon on Friday, January 24, 2020, a report by Dr. Perrien proposing a process for the defendants to determine when a cell or unit is functioning as segregation, accompanied by any commentary the defendants deem appropriate. The plaintiffs are to respond by noon on Friday, February 7, 2020. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/19/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/19/2019)

12/20/2019 2703 REPLY BRIEF re 2693 Order,,,, The State's Response to the Court's Phase 2A Order on Correctional Staffing Report filed by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 12/20/2019)

12/20/2019 2704 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich and All Plaintiffs re 2693 Order Joint Notice Regarding The Court's Phase 2A Order on Correctional Staffing Report (Lunsford, William) Modified on 12/20/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the plaintiffs.(kh, ). (Entered: 12/20/2019)

12/20/2019 2705 Response to Order re 2682 Order Joint Report Regarding the Mental Health Caseload by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn and Ruth Naglich. (Sandley, Caitlin) Modified on 12/20/2019 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants(kh, ). (Entered: 12/20/2019)

12/20/2019

2706

Joint Notice and MOTION to Stay and MOTION to Continue Hearings by All Plaintiffs, Ruth Naglich, Jefferson S. Dunn, Alabama Department of Corrections. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Agreement)(Sandley, Caitlin). Added MOTION to Continue on 1/2/2020 (wcl, ). Modified on 1/2/2020 to clarify the docket text and to add the dfts as filers (wcl, ). (Entered: 12/20/2019)

12/23/2019

2707

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: In light of both this court's recent opinion and order on a process to identify functional segregation (doc. no. 2702 ) as well as the plaintiffs' unopposed request to respond to the defendants regarding the correctional staffing report (doc. no. 2704 ), it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 399 of 408

Amendment claim are revised as follows: Plaintiffs to file response regarding correctional staffing report (Doc. nos. 2693 , 2703 , 2704 ) on 1/3/2020 at 1:00pm; Hearing on "segregation− like" issue (Doc. nos. 2645 , 2646 , 2702 ) on 3/2/2020 at 10:00 a.m.; Pretrial conference on "segregation−like" issue (Doc. nos. 2645 , 2646 , 2702 ) on 2/21/2020 at 10:00 a.m., as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/23/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/23/2019)

12/23/2019 2708 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 12/23/2019)

12/27/2019

2709

ORDER REGARDING JOINT MOTION TO STAY AND CONTINUE: Upon consideration of the parties' joint motion to stay and continue hearings (doc. nos. 2706 & 2706 −1), it is ORDERED that the motion is set for a status conference is set for January 7, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. The parties are to arrange for a conference call to be conducted by telephone. It is further ORDERED that the parties are to file a joint response by noon on Friday, January 3, 2020, with answers to the following questions, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/27/2019. (furn: calendar, ag) (kh, ) (Entered: 12/27/2019)

12/31/2019 2710 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (FILED UNDER SEAL))(wcl, ) (Entered: 01/02/2020)

01/03/2020 2711 REPLY BRIEF re 2703 Reply Brief, Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to the Court's Phase 2A Order on Correctional Staffing Reporting (Doc. 2703) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 01/03/2020)

01/03/2020 2712 Response to Order Joint Response to the Court's Dec. 27, 2019 Order Regarding Joint Motion to Stay and Continue by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 01/03/2020)

01/06/2020 2713 NOTICE of Appearance by Ebony Glenn Howard on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Howard, Ebony) (Entered: 01/06/2020)

01/07/2020

2714

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 1/7/2020 re 2706 Joint Notice and MOTION to Stay and MOTION to Continue filed by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich, Alabama Department of Corrections (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/07/2020)

01/07/2020 2715 NOTICE Of Filing Under Seal Weekly Report of SMI Inmates In Restrictive Housing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/08/2020)

01/10/2020

2716

PHASE 2A OPINION AND INTERIM INJUNCTION WITH REGARD TO ELEVEN JOINT STIPULATIONS: Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the following orders, as identified by the parties, until 5:00 p.m. on May 11, 2020: (1) Order and Injunction re: Bibb Segregation Remedy (doc. nos. 1751 & 1751 −1); (2) Order and Injunction on Mental−Health Identification and Classification (Coding) (doc. nos. 1792 & 1792 −1); (3) Order and Injunction on Mental−Health Identification and Classification Remedy (Intake) (doc. nos. 1794 & 1794 −1); (4) Order and Injunction on Segregation Remedy (Pre−Placement, Mental−Health Rounds, Periodic Evaluations) (doc. nos. 1815 & 1815 −1); (5) Order and Injunction on Mental−Health Identification and Classification Remedy (Referral) (doc. nos. 1821 , 1821 −1, & 1821 −2); (6) Order and Injunction on Segregation Remedy (Stopgap Measures for Removing Inmates with Serious Mental Illness from Segregation) (doc. nos. 1861 & 1861 −1); (7) Order and Injunction on Mental−Health Individualized Treatment Planning Remedy (doc.nos. 1865 & 1865 −1); (8) Order and Injunction on Mental−Health Psychotherapy and Confidentiality Remedy (doc. nos. 1899 & 1899 −1); (9) Order and Injunction on Confidentiality (doc. nos. 1900 , 1900 −1, & 1900 −2); (10) Order and Injunction on Mental−Health Understaffing (doc. nos. 2301 & 2301 −1); and (11) Order re: Segregation Remedy (doc. no. 1720 ). It is further

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 400 of 408

ORDERED that, pursuant to the parties' agreement (doc. nos. 2706 & 2712 ), as well as the representations made on the record during the January 7, 2020, status conference and the court's detailed prior review of each stipulation in open court, the court finds that the relief in each of the above 11 stipulations, separately and in conjunction with all other relief so far in this case, meets the "need−narrowness−intrusiveness" requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), for the period from December 20, 2019, to May 11, 2020. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/10/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/10/2020)

01/10/2020

2717

PHASE 2A OPINION AND INTERIM INJUNCTION WITH REGARD TO STIPULATION ON PROVISION: OF HOSPITAL−LEVEL CARE: Accordingly, for the same reasons previously described in the court's Phase 2A Opinion and Interim Injunction with Regard to Eleven Stipulations (doc. no. 2716 ), it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that: (1) The amended stipulation (doc. nos. 2383 −1 & 2383 −2), as attached to this order and as clarified and as revised to reflect changes agreed upon in open court on February 7, 2019, is approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the stipulation until 5:00 p.m., on May 11, 2020. (3) Pursuant to the parties' agreement (doc. nos. 2706 & 2712 ), as well as the representations made on the record during the January 7, 2020, status conference and the court's prior detailed review of the stipulation in open court, the court finds that this relief, separately and in conjunction with all other relief so far in this case, meets the "need−narrowness−intrusiveness" requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), for the period from December 20, 2019 to May 11, 2020. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/10/2020. (kh, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/13/2020: # 1 Attachment) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/10/2020)

01/10/2020

2718

PHASE 2A OPINION AND INTERIM INJUNCTION WITH REGARD TO STIPULATION ON MENTAL− HEALTH CONSULTATION TO THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS: Accordingly, for the same reasons previously described in the court's Phase 2A Opinion and Interim Injunction with Regard To Eleven Stipulations (doc. no. 2716 ), it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that: (1) The stipulation (doc. no. 2433 −1), as attached to this order and as clarified and as revised to reflect the changes agreed upon in open court on February 7, 2019, is approved. (2) Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Ruth Naglich are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from failing to comply with the stipulation until 5:00 p.m. on May 11, 2020. (3) Pursuant to the parties' agreement (doc. nos. 2706 & 2712 ), as well as the representations made on the record during the January 7, 2020, status conference and the court's prior detailed review of the stipulation in open court, the court finds that this relief, separately and in conjunction with all other relief so far in this case, meets the "need−narrowness−intrusiveness" requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), for the period from December 20, 2019 to May 11, 2020. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/10/2020. (kh, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/13/2020: # 1 Attachment) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/10/2020)

01/10/2020 2719 Response to Order Plaintiffs' Brief Regarding Most Recent Factual Circumstances of Hospital−Level Care and Vitek Applicability by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Letter Regarding Notification, # 2 Exhibit B − Redacted Roster)(Austin, Ashley) (Entered: 01/10/2020)

01/10/2020

2720

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Upon consideration of the parties' joint motion to stay and continue hearings (doc. no. 2706 ), as clarified both by the parties' joint response (doc. no. 2712 ) and in open court during the subsequent January 7, 2020, status conference, it is ORDERED that said motion is granted and that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Evidentiary hearing on remedy for violations found in supplemental liability opinion. (Doc. nos. 2353 , 2397 , & 2398 ) RESET from 1/24/2020 at 10:00 a.m. and 1/27/2020 thru 1/28/2020 at 9:00 a.m. to 4/13/2020 − 4/17/2020 at 9:00am; Hearing on "segregation−like" issue

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 401 of 408

(Doc. nos. 2645 , 2646 , 2702 ) RESET from 3/2/2020 to 4/13/2020 − 4/17/2020 at 9:00am; Pretrial conference on "segregation−like" issue (Doc. nos. 2645 , 2646 , 2702 )RESET from 2/21/2020 at 10:00 a.m. to 3/30/2020 at 10:00 a.m; Hearing on termination or extension of interim suicide prevention order (doc. nos. 2569 & 2698 ) RESET from 3/2/2020 at 10:00 a.m. to 4/13/2020 at 9:00 a.m.; Evidentiary hearing on whether the stipulations and orders listed above as complying with the PLRA until May 11, 2020 will continue to comply with the PLRA after May 11, 2020 (doc. no. 2706 , 2712 ) RESET FROM 3/2/2020 at 10:00 a.m., and 3/3/2020 thru 3/5/2020 at 9:00 a.m. to 4/13/2020 at 9:00 a.m. through 4/17/2020, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/10/2020. (furn: calendar, ag)(Term: Evidentiary hearing set for 1/27/2020 − 1/28/2020 at at 9:00am; Hearing set for 3/2/2020 at 10:00 a.m.; Pretrial conference on 2/21/2020 at 10:00 a.m.)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/10/2020)

01/10/2020 2721 NOTICE OF FILING by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Joint Litigation Status Report − SEALED)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/13/2020)

01/13/2020 2722 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Walsh, Andrew) (Entered: 01/13/2020)

01/13/2020 2723 TEXT ORDER granting 2722 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/13/2020. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/13/2020)

01/13/2020

*** Attorney Andrew Philip Walsh terminated pursuant to the court's 2723 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/13/2020)

01/13/2020 2724 NOTICE of Correction re 2717 order to attach the previously omitted attachment to the order. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) . (Entered: 01/13/2020)

01/13/2020 2725 NOTICE of Correction re 2718 order to attach the previously omitted attachment to the order. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(kh, ) . (Entered: 01/13/2020)

01/14/2020

2726

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON VITEK ISSUE: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that an on−the−record conference call is set for January 15, 2020, at 2:00 p.m., to discuss how to proceed on the matter discussed above. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/14/2020. (furn: calendar, ag) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/14/2020)

01/14/2020 2729 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/15/2020)

01/15/2020

2727

PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING ALL HEARINGS AND EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS: For all upcoming Phase 2A "hearings" and "evidentiary hearings," see Scheduling Order (doc. no. 2720 ), it is ORDERED as follows, unless otherwise specified: (1) By no later than 10 business days before the first day of a hearing or evidentiary hearing, counsel for the parties are to arrange with the clerk of the court for witnesses who will testify or parties who will participate by videoconferencing, if any. (2) By no later than five business days before the first day of a hearing or evidentiary hearing at 5:00 p.m., the parties are each to submit and file a list of witnesses, if any, the dates they expect each witness will testify, an estimate of how long their testimony will take, the specific topic(s) each witness will address, and whether the witness needs to testify in camera in whole or in part. (3) By no later than five business days before the first day of a hearing or evidentiary hearing at 5:00 p.m., the parties are each to submit and file a list of exhibits they plan to use, if any. (4) All briefs filed in connection with a hearing or evidentiary hearing should (a) summarize all of the evidence a party expects to present, if any, and (b) discuss the impact of the PLRA, if applicable. (5) By no later than 8:00 a.m. of each day of a hearing or evidentiary hearing, counsel are to file with the court and provide to opposing counsel summaries of the testimony of expert witnesses and non−expert witnesses, if any, as described in prior orders (doc. nos. 240 & 463 ). (6) This order replaces this court's prior orders regarding all remedial hearings (doc. nos. 1588 & 1589 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/15/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/15/2020)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 402 of 408

01/15/2020

2728

PHASE 2B ORDER EXTENDING STAY: Upon consideration of the parties' joint motion to stay (doc. no. 2706 −1), as clarified by the parties' joint response (doc. no. 2712 ), it is ORDERED that the Phase 2B proceedings in this case are stayed generally, including the resolution of all pending motions. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/15/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/15/2020)

01/15/2020

2730

PHASE 2A ORDER ON CORRECTIONAL STAFFING REPORT: Upon consideration of the parties' joint notice (doc. no. 2704), the defendants' response (doc. no. 2703 ), and the plaintiffs' reply (doc. no. 2711 ), and based on the representations made on the record during the January 7, 2020, status conference, it is ORDERED that the issue of correctional staffing is set for a status conference for Friday, February 21, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., with the parties to arrange for a conference call to be conducted by telephone. It is further ORDERED that in anticipation of the status conference the parties are to file a joint report updating the court about the issue by Wednesday, February 19, 2020, at noon. It is further ORDERED that in the interim the parties are to discuss at least the following with Judge Ott, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/15/2020. (furn: ag, calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/15/2020)

01/15/2020

2731

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Based on recent developments, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: Vitek issue: Conference call to discuss how to proceed in light of court's Jan. 14 opinion (doc. no. 2726 ) set for 1/15/2020 at 2:00pm RESET for 1/17/2020 at 9:00am, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/15/2020. (Term: on−the−record conference call (telephone conference)set for 1/15/2020)(furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/15/2020)

01/15/2020 2732 NOTICE of Appearance by Dustin David Key on behalf of Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Key, Dustin) (Entered: 01/15/2020)

01/16/2020 2733 Witness List by All Plaintiffs. (Austin, Ashley) (Entered: 01/16/2020)

01/16/2020 2734 Witness and Exhibit List for the Phase 2A Evidentiary Hearing on the Vitek Issue by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Reeves, Matthew) Modified on 1/17/2020 to clarify text to add Exhibit List (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 01/16/2020)

01/16/2020 2735 Response to Order re 2726 Order,, Set Hearings, Joint Response to the Opinion and Order on Vitek Issue by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Lunsford, William) Modified on 1/17/2020 to clarify text to reflect as also filed on behalf of All Plaintiffs, and Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 01/16/2020)

01/17/2020 2736 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/17/2020 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/17/2020)

01/17/2020

2737

PHASE 2A ORDER ON VITEK ISSUE, based on the parties' joint 2735 response and the representations made on the record on 1/17/2020 it is ORDERED that: (1) The Vitek issue is dismissed without prejudice; (2) All Vitek−related orders (including briefing deadlines) are terminated; (3) The evidentiary hearing set for 1/24/2020, is cancelled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/17/2020. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist). Furnished to calendar group & AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 01/17/2020)

01/17/2020

2738

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM directing that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: In−person pretrial conference on segregation−like issue (doc. nos. 2645 , 2646 , 2702 ). reset from 3/30/2020 @ 10:00 to 4/6/2020 @ 10:00 AM in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson; directing Parties to give notice and explanation of whether they will seek an extension of the interim suicide prevention order (doc. nos. 2569 & 2698 ) deadline reset from 4/3/2020 @ 10:00 a.m. to 3/20/2020 at 12:00 p.m.; In−person pretrial conference on PLRA issue reset from 4/3/2020 @ 10:00 a.m. to 4/6/2020 at 10:00 a.m. in CR 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 403 of 408

Myron H. Thompson on 1/17/2020. Furnished to calendar group & AG (reset from PTC 3/30/2020 & 4/3/2020).(djy, ) (Entered: 01/17/2020)

01/21/2020 2739 NOTICE Of Filing Under Seal Weekly Report of SMI Inmates in Restrictive Housing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/21/2020)

01/21/2020

2741

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 1/7/2020, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/11/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/21/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/20/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2020)

01/22/2020

2740

PHASE 1 ORDER FOR NOTICE, COMMENT, AND HEARING REGARDING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO ADA SETTLEMENT: When this court preliminarily approved modifications to the Phase 1 consent decree, it disagreed that the proposed notice submitted to the court was sufficient and disagreed that a fairness hearing was not required. See Order (doc. no. 2671 ) at 3. Following an on−the−record hearing on December 6, 2019, the court ordered the parties to provide an updated proposal for both a notice and comment form as well as the method of notice and the period of comment. See Order (doc. no. 2685 ) at 1. After informally reviewing the parties proposal, the court now finds that the notice and comment forms as attached to this order, the process for distributing and collecting these forms as outlined below, and the fairness hearing also as described below together constitute sufficient notice of and opportunity to be heard on the proposed modifications to the settlement agreement, as is required by due process. It is therefore ORDERED that The Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) is to provide notice of the proposed modifications to the settlement agreement as further outlined below by February 10, 2020, and to collect comments from class members as further outlined below by the submission deadline of March 9, 2020. It is further ORDERED as follows: (1) A fairness hearing is set for 9:00 a.m. on April 13, 2020, in the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, Courtroom 2FMJ, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. At this hearing, counsel for both parties must be prepared to respond to the objections raised and comments made by class members. (2) The proposed modifications to the Phase 1 settlement (doc. no. 2678 ) and the attached notice and comment forms are to be translated into Spanish, and printed in both Braille and large print, and these alternative format documents are to be distributed to each ADOC facility prior to February 10, 2020. Although posted documents need not be provided in any alternative format, any individual inmate known to or believed by correctional officers to read only Spanish or to be vision−impaired must be provided individual copies of both the notice and comment forms in an alternative format, and must be provided both the proposed modifications to the settlement agreement as well as the original settlement agreement itself in an appropriate alternative format upon request. If an inmate who has difficulty reading any of the alternative format documents or who has difficulty writing requests that the notice form or the proposed modifications to the settlement agreement be read to him or her or requests assistance in completing a comment form, this request must be accommodated by ADOC. (3) Copies of the proposed modifications to the settlement agreement as well as the original settlement agreement itself are to be made available for inmates to review in the law library of each ADOC prison or work−release facility or, for facilities that have no law library, in the area where information for inmates is made available. At least one copy is to be made available per 100 inmates housed in any particular facility. (4) A copy (including an alternative format copy, as appropriate) of the proposed modifications of the settlement agreement or the original settlement agreement is to be provided promptly upon request to any inmate who is not authorized or able to access the law library or other area where copies of the proposed modifications of the settlement agreement and the original settlement agreement are being made

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 404 of 408
available. (5) For inmates housed in dorms at ADOC's prisons or work−release facilities, the notice form is to be posted in each of the libraries and dorms of these facilities, wherever information for inmates is ordinarily posted. Sufficient copies of the comment form are to be made available to inmates housed in dorms in their facilities libraries and in their shift commanders' offices. (6) For inmates housed in Restrictive Housing Units, infirmaries, Mental Health Units, Crisis Cells, and Death Row, the notice form is to be posted next to the shower area, and shall be delivered by hand to every inmate listed as having a mobility or vision impairment on the Office of Health Services' Special Needs Report by February 10, 2020. ADOC is to maintain a roster that indicates, by name and AIS number, each inmate to whom these forms have been distributed. Inmates are to sign this roster upon receipt of the forms; in the event that an inmate refuses to sign or rejects the forms, the distributing officer is to note this on the roster. (7) ADOC is to inform all inmates of the notice and opportunity to object or comment by means of a statement placed within the newsletter at each facility that produces a newsletter for the duration of the comment period. The statement shall read as follows: "There are proposed modifications to the settlement agreement in Braggs v. Dunn regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act. You have until March 9, 2020, to provide written comments. Notices are posted throughout the facility." (8) At each ADOC prison or work−release facility, a secured box clearly labeled ADA Settlement Comment Box is to be placed adjacent to the box where inmate request slips are collected. This box may be a securely taped cardboard box, and must be of sufficient size to accommodate all comment forms that are submitted. This box is to be used exclusively for the collection of comment forms. (9) Inmates who are allowed freedom of movement within a facility are to be allowed to place their comment forms in the designated comment box. Comment forms are to be collected from those inmates who do not have freedom of movement within a facility as follows, with records of the inmates from whom forms have been collected to be maintained on rosters by those responsible for the collection: a. In Restrictive Housing Units at correctional facilities, the forms are to be collected by members of the Institutional Segregation Review Board during normal rounds and deposited in the comment box. b. In Restrictive Housing Units or holding units at work−release facilities, the forms are to be collected by any correctional officer or supervisor and deposited in the comment box. c. In infirmaries, mental−health units, crisis cells, and on death row, the forms are to be collected by the Captains or other supervisors who are responsible for those units and deposited in the comment box. (10) At the end of the final day of the comment period, the Warden at each facility is to transmit the comment box(es) to the office of ADOC's general counsel. Further, the Warden at each facility is to certify in writing that the facility has complied with the above requirements regarding the provision of notice and the collection of forms. (11) After each set of comment boxes is received by ADOC's general counsel, counsel for ADOC will promptly arrange with class counsel and a representative of the clerk of the court for the Middle District of Alabama a time for the parties to meet at the United States Courthouse in Montgomery in order to confirm that comment boxes from all ADOC facilities have been received and to open those boxes. (12) The comments contained in the comment boxes are to be scanned by the clerk of the court and publicly docketed as a single filing. (13) The comments received by the clerk of the court by mail are also to publicly docketed. (14) ADOC will reasonably cooperate in making arrangements to provide class members the opportunity to meet with class counsel in anticipation of the fairness hearing. This include the possibility of congregate meetings at facilities where multiple class members have interest in meeting with class counsel. (15) By no later than noon on March 30, 2020, the parties are to file pre−hearing briefs, either jointly or separately, both summarizing by topic and responding to the objections to and comments on the proposed modifications to the settlement agreement that have been submitted by class members. These briefs must include citations to the page numbers on which any referenced objections or comments appear in the docketed compilations of responses. (16) The court will determine, after receiving objections and comments from class members, from which of them it intends to hear oral testimony. This testimony will be heard by videoconference from various ADOC facilities. a. By no later than March 30, 2020, the parties are to consult with the clerk of court and file under seal a joint proposal as to

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 405 of 408

arrangements for videoconferencing b. By no later than April 6, 2020, the court will inform the parties which class members will testify. c. By no later than April 10, 2020, the parties are to file a list of which class members will testify from which facilities. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/22/2020. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/22/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Attachment 2)(furn: calendar, ag) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/22/2020)

01/23/2020

2742

PHASE 1 ORDER AMENDING PROCESS FOR CLERK TO DOCKET COMMENTS REGARDING PROPOSED ADA MODIFICATIONS: It is ORDERED that rather than have the parties meet with a representative of the clerk of the court at the United States Courthouse in Montgomery after the close of the scheduled comment period, see Phase 1 Order for Notice, Comment, and Hearing Regarding Proposed Modifications to ADA Settlement (doc. no. 2740 ) at 9 11, the parties are instead to meet with a representative of the clerk of the court at the Central Office of the Alabama Department of Corrections in Montgomery. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/23/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2020)

01/23/2020

2743

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 7 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/5/2019, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/13/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/24/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/22/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2020)

01/23/2020

2744

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 8 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/8/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/13/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/24/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/22/2020. (kh, ) Modified on 1/27/2020 (kh, ). (Entered: 01/27/2020)

01/24/2020

2745

NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of VOLUME 9 − REMEDIAL TRIAL ON SUICIDE PREVENTION Proceedings (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 4/9/2019, before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia G. Starkie, Telephone number 334−262−1221. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 2/14/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/24/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/23/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 01/27/2020)

01/28/2020 2746 NOTICE OF FILING Under Seal Weekly Report of SMI Inmates In Restrictive Housing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2020)

02/04/2020 2747 NOTICE OF FILING Under Seal Weekly Report of SMI Inmates In Restrictive Housing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/05/2020)

02/05/2020

2748

Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 728 Order,, Joint Motion to Further Amend the Phase 1 Consent Decree, for Preliminary Approval of the Modifications, to Approve the Proposed Notice, and to Extend Deadlines Regarding the Proposed Modifications to ADA Settlement by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lunsford, William) (Entered: 02/05/2020)

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 406 of 408

02/06/2020

2749

TEXT ORDER setting Telephone Conference for 2/6/2020 @ 3:15 PM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/6/2020. Furnished to calendar group & AG. (NO PDF document attached to this notice).(djy, ) Modified on 2/6/2020 to clarify text (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 02/06/2020)

02/06/2020 2750 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/6/2020 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/06/2020)

02/07/2020

2751

PHASE 1 ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING FURTHER PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO ADA CONSENT DECREE: Accordingly, based on these representations and for the reasons previously detailed in this court's prior order preliminarily approving modifications to the Phase 1 consent decree (doc. no. 2671 ), it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The parties' joint motion to preliminarily approve further modifications to the Phase 1 consent decree (doc. no. 2748 ) is granted. (2) In order to facilitate and assure clear notice of the proposed modification and to aid enforcement, the parties previously reduced their modifications of the Phase 1 consent decree to a single, comprehensive document (doc. no. 2678 ). The parties are to file an updated version of this document, such that the summary includes the proposed modifications previously preliminarily approved as well as the further proposed modifications now preliminarily approved, by February 7, 2020. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/7/2020.(kh, ) (Entered: 02/07/2020)

02/07/2020 2752 Updated Joint Summary of ADA Modifications by All Plaintiffs, Jefferson S. Dunn, and Ruth Naglich. (Van Der Pol, William) Modified on 2/10/2020 to clarify the docket text and add as filed on behalf of the defendants. (kh, ). (Entered: 02/07/2020)

02/10/2020

2753

PHASE 1 ORDER UPDATING NOTICE, COMMENT, AND HEARING PROCESS FOR ADA MODIFICATIONS: Accordingly, after an on−the−record status conference on February 6, 2020, and an informal review of the parties' proposed notice and comment forms, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The comment period will begin on February 19, 2020, rather than on February 10, 2020, as previously set in this court's Phase 1 Order for Notice, Comment, and Hearing (doc. no. 2740 ). (2) The comment period will end on March 20, 2020, rather than on March 9, 2020, as previously set in this court's Phase 1 Order for Notice, Comment, and Hearing (doc. no. 2740 ). (3) All other dates in this court's Phase 1 Order for Notice, Comment, and Hearing (doc. no. 2740 ) will remain the same. (4) The parties are to use the latest summary of proposed modifications (doc. no. 2752 ) rather than the initial summary of proposed modifications (doc. no. 2678 ) referenced in this court's Phase 1 Order for Notice, Comment, and Hearing (doc. no. 2740 −1) (5) The parties are to use the attached notice form, which reflects the updated end of the comment period, the additional proposed modifications to the Phase 1 consent decree (doc. no. 2751 ), and the updated summary of all modifications (doc. no. 2752 ), rather than the notice form previously approved in this court's Phase 1 Order for Notice, Comment, and Hearing (doc. no. 2740 −1). (6) The parties are to use the attached comment form, which reflects the updated end of the comment period, rather than the comment form previously approved in this court's Phase 1 Order for Notice, Comment, and Hearing (doc. no. 2740 −2). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/10/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Attachment 2)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/10/2020)

02/11/2020

2754

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: During the February 6, 2020, status conference, the parties discussed the expected length of time needed for the upcoming April hearings. Based on those on−the− record representations, as well as the court's need to modify the timing and method of the upcoming February 21, 2020, status conference on correctional staffing, such that it will be at 2:00 p.m. rather than 10:00 a.m. and by telephone conference rather than in person, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as follows: STAFFING: Status conference call on issue of correctional staffing report (doc. no. 2730 ) previously set for 2/21/20 at 10:00 a.m. RESET to 2/21/20 at 2:00 p.m. by telephone; SEGREGATION: In−person evidentiary hearing on remedy for

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 407 of 408

violations found in supplemental liability opinion. (doc. nos. 2353 , 2397 , & 2398 ) previously set for 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. through 4/17/20 RESET to 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. through 5/1/20; In−person hearing on "segregation−like" issue (doc. nos. 2645 , 2646 , 2702 ) previously set for 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. through 4/17/20 RESET to 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. through 5/1/20; SUICIDE PREVENTION: In−person hearing on termination or extension of interim suicide prevention order (doc. nos. 2569 & 2698 ) set for 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. RESET to 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. through 5/1/20; PLRA: In−person evidentiary hearing on whether the stipulations and orders listed above as complying with the PLRA until May 11, 2020 will continue to comply with the PLRA after May 11, 2020 (doc. no. 2706 , 2712 ) set for 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. through 4/17/20 RESET to 4/13/20 at 9:00 a.m. through 5/1/20. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/11/2020. (furn: calendar, ag)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2020)

02/11/2020 2755 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2020)

02/14/2020 2756 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 02/14/2020)

02/18/2020 2757 NOTICE of Filing Under Seal Weekly Report of SMI Inmates In Restrictive Housing by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/18/2020)

02/19/2020 2758 REPLY BRIEF re 2738 Order,,,, Set Hearings,,, Joint Report on Agreement for Process to Evaluate Permissible Posts for Basic Correctional Officers and Correctional Cubicle Operators, and Correctional Staff Reporting filed by All Plaintiffs. (Sandley, Caitlin) (Entered: 02/19/2020)

02/21/2020 2759 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/21/2020 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Patricia G. Starkie.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/21/2020)

02/25/2020 2760 NOTICE of Appearance by Brock Boone on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Boone, Brock) (Entered: 02/25/2020)

02/25/2020 2761 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2020)

02/26/2020

2762

(VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 2763 ORDER)PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING CORRECTIONAL STAFFING REPORTING: The parties are set to file a quarterly correctional staffing report on March 2, 2020. See Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (doc. no. 1657 ) at 7 4. The most recent staffing report (doc. no. 2670 ) combined the number of correctional officers (COs), basic correctional officers (BCOs), and cubicle correctional officers (CCOs) into a single measure of correctional staff. As a result, the court asked for (doc. no. 2693 ) and the parties subsequently provided (doc. no. 2704 ) a supplement to the staffing report breaking out the total number of COs, BCOs, and CCOs. The court expects that the format of the staffing reports will be modified in the future. See Joint Report (doc. no. 2758 ) at 2 2. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, until the format of the quarterly staffing reports is modified, the parties are to include a breakdown of the total number of COs, BCOs, and CCOs for the relevant time period either (1) in each staffing report, or (2) in a supplementary notice filed at the same time. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/26/2020. (kh, ) Modified on 2/26/2020 (kh, ). (Entered: 02/26/2020)

02/26/2020

2763

AMENDED PHASE 2A ORDER REGARDING CORRECTIONAL STAFFING REPORTING: The defendants are set to file a quarterly correctional staffing report on March 2, 2020. See Phase 2A Understaffing Remedial Order (doc. no. 1657 ). The most recent staffing report (doc. no. 2670 ) combined the number of correctional officers (COs), basic correctional officers (BCOs), and cubicle correctional officers (CCOs) into a single measure of correctional staff. As a result, the court asked for (doc. no. 2693 ) and the parties subsequently provided (doc. no. 2704 ) a supplement to the staffing report breaking out the total

Case: 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-JTA As of: 03/16/2020 06:26 PM CDT 408 of 408

number of COs, BCOs, and CCOs. The court expects that the format of the staffing reports will be modified in the future. See Joint Report (doc. no. 2758 ). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, until the format of the quarterly staffing reports is modified, the defendants are to include a breakdown of the total number of COs, BCOs, and CCOs for the relevant time period either (1) in each staffing report, or (2) in a supplementary notice filed at the same time. It is further ORDERED that the previous order entered on February 26, 2020 (doc. no. 2762 ), is vacated. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/26/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2020)

02/27/2020

2764

PHASE 2A REVISED REMEDY SCHEDULING ORDER ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: Upon consideration of the parties' agreement on a process to evaluate correctional staffing recommendations and reporting (doc. no. 2758 ), as well as representations made on the record during a status conference on February 21, 2020, it is ORDERED that the remaining deadlines and dates for the Phase 2A remedy scheduling order for the Eighth Amendment claim are revised as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/27/2020. (kh, ) (Entered: 02/27/2020)

03/02/2020 2765 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing Quarterly Staffing Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rogers, Stephen) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/3/2020: # 2 Exhibit A − Unredacted Copy) (kh, ). (Entered: 03/02/2020)

03/02/2020 2766 NOTICE by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich Notice of Filing December 2, 2019 Quarterly Staffing Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rogers, Stephen) (Entered: 03/02/2020)

03/02/2020 2767 NOTICE OF FILING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich re 2765 Notice of Filing Quarterly Staffing Report (kh, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/3/2020: # 1 Exhibit A − SEALED) (kh, ). (Entered: 03/03/2020)

03/03/2020 2768 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/03/2020)

03/05/2020 2769 Clerk's NOTICE of filing PHASE 1 CLASS MEMBERS COMMENTS−MAILED TO COURT (First Collection 2/24/2020 − 3/5/2020) (Attachments: # 1 Comments mailed to Court)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/05/2020)

03/10/2020 2770 NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL WEEKLY REPORT OF SMI INMATES IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING by Jefferson S. Dunn, Ruth Naglich (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sealed)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/11/2020)