2:14-cv-04010-RMG Date Filed 10/15/14 Entry Number 1 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

Colleen Therese Condon and

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Anne Nichols Bleckley,

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Plaintiffs, )

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-v-

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Nimrata (Nikki) Randhawa Haley, in her )

official capacity as Governor of South

)

Carolina; Alan Wilson, in his official

)

capacity as Attorney General; and Irvin G. )

Condon in his official capacity as

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Probate Judge of Charleston County,

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Defendants. )

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Civil Action No.: _2_:_1_4_-_c_v_-0__4_0_1_0_-_R_M__G___
COMPLAINT (Declaratory and injunctive relief)
(Non-jury)

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. In defiance of the mandates of the U.S. Constitution and the rule of law,

Defendants will not allow same-sex couples, including Plaintiffs Colleen Therese Condon and

Anne Nichols Bleckley, to exercise their fundamental right to marry. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has ruled that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to

marry which cannot be denied or infringed absent a compelling state interest, and has rejected

all justifications put forward by the Commonwealth of Virginia to exclude same-sex couples from

marriage. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014). Now that the U.S. Supreme Court

on October 6, 2014 denied all petitions for certiorari in Bostic, and the Fourth Circuit has issued

its mandate, controlling law prohibits Defendants from imposing any further barriers to same-sex

couples’ exercise of this right in South Carolina.

2. The law in this Circuit is now clear:

The choice of whether and whom to marry is an intensely personal decision that alters the course of an individual’s life. Denying same-sex couples this choice prohibits them from participating fully in our society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot countenance.

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3. Despite this unequivocal and binding Fourth Circuit authority, which expressly recognized that the laws of all of the states in this Circuit, including South Carolina, “have similar bans,” Defendants and the State of South Carolina (“State”) are denying same-sex couple Colleen Therese Condon and Anne Nichols Bleckley (“Plaintiffs”) their fundamental right to marry each other in their home state.
4. Despite the recognition from a uniform chorus of courts and state officials in the Fourth Circuit that the Constitution of the United States prohibits a State or its officials from interfering with the right of individuals to marry the person of their choice, Defendants Governor Nikki Haley and Attorney General Alan Wilson stand alone in their continued attempt to systematically and illegally discriminate against individuals exercising their fundamental right to marry. By stepping in to institute proceedings to stop probate courts from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Wilson is violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and refusing to follow the law in this jurisdiction. Justice requires this Court act swiftly to restrain the unconstitutional acts of Defendants and to command Defendant Probate Judge Irvin G. Condon to issue the requested marriage license. Fortunately, there is no conflict between the state and federal courts, as the South Carolina Supreme Court has precluded the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples but specifically is looking to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina to decree whether those licenses must be issued.
VENUE AND JURISDICTION 5. Plaintiff Colleen Therese Condon (“Condon”) is a resident of the County of Charleston, State of South Carolina. 6. Plaintiff Anne Nichols Bleckley (“Bleckley”) is a resident of the County of Charleston, State of South Carolina. 7. Defendant Nimrata a/k/a Nikki Randhawa Haley (“Haley”) is the elected governor of the State of South Carolina. In her official capacity, she is the Chief Executive Officer of the State and is, pursuant to Article IV, Section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution, responsible
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for the execution of the laws of the State of South Carolina. Haley is sued in her official capacity.
8. Defendant Alan Wilson (“Wilson”) is the elected attorney general of the State of South Carolina. In his official capacity, the Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the State of South Carolina. It is his duty to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General maintains an office in Columbia, South Carolina. Wilson is sued in his official capacity pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 1 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina.
9. Defendant Judge Irvin G. Condon is the elected probate judge for the County of Charleston, State of South Carolina. Judge Condon’s duties include issuing marriage licenses and maintaining records relating to marriage licenses, including records of marriages that take place in states other than South Carolina where one or both parties to the marriage are South Carolina residents. When performing these functions Judge Condon must ensure compliance with relevant South Carolina as well as federal laws.
10. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge Defendants’ deprivation under color of state law of Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the United States Constitution, by (a) Defendants Haley and Wilson’s interference with Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to marry by, among other things, improperly instituting proceedings to enforce a state ban on marriage by same-sex couples, when such laws have already been declared unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit; and (b) Defendant Judge Condon’s withholding of the marriage license to which Plaintiffs are entitled.
11. This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because the matters in controversy arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
12. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all of the events that gave rise to Plaintiffs’ claims took place within the District of South Carolina.
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Further, Plaintiff Condon and Plaintiff Bleckley reside within the Charleston Division of the District of South Carolina, and a substantial part of the events that gave rise to all Plaintiffs’ claims took place within the Charleston Division.
13. This Court has the authority to enter a declaratory judgment and to provide declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
14. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they are domiciled in the State.
15. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief for the violation of their guarantees of liberty and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a result of a South Carolina Constitutional Amendment and statutes that expressly deny same-sex couples, including Plaintiffs, the freedom to marry, See S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15 and S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-10 (as amended to deny marriage by same-sex couples) and 20-1-15 (collectively hereinafter the “marriage ban” or “the ban”).
FACTS 16. Plaintiffs Condon and Bleckley are a loving and committed same-sex couple (“Plaintiffs” or “Plaintiff couple”). 17. Plaintiff Condon is a lawyer and an elected member of Charleston County Council since 2005. She earned her undergraduate degree in political science from the College of Charleston and her juris doctor from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She has a son who is 15. 18. Plaintiff Bleckley has worked in customer service for the same private employer for the last 12 years. She earned her a bachelor’s degree in English from Winthrop College. 19. In Bostic, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right of all individuals to marry the person of their choice, including the right to marry a same-sex spouse. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 376 (“the
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fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage”). The Bostic court specifically identified S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-10 (as amended) and 20-1-15 (“marriage bans”) as “similar” to that at issue and one of “a series of statutory and constitutional mechanisms” that States have “employed to prohibit legal recognition for samesex relationships.” Bostic, 760 F.3d at 367, FN 1.
20. On the morning of Wednesday, October 8, 2014, Condon and Bleckley applied for a marriage license at the Charleston County Probate Court and paid the requisite filing fee. Defendant Judge Condon accepted Condon and Bleckley’s application and filing fee.
21. Later the same day, October 8, 2014, Defendant Wilson (acting as South Carolina’s Attorney General) filed a Petition for Original Jurisdiction and Motion for a Temporary Injunction and Administrative Order with the South Carolina Supreme Court to stop Judge Condon from issuing Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples a marriage license. In so doing, Wilson committed the quintessential act that empowers federal courts to enjoin state officials, as “clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State,” he proceeded “to commence an action, . . . to enforce an unconstitutional state statute” and thus “may be enjoined from so doing by a Federal court.” Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908) (enjoining state attorney general).
22. Upon information and belief, Wilson acted at the direction of Haley in petitioning the South Carolina Supreme Court to stop Judge Condon from issuing marriage licenses to the Plaintiffs and other eligible same-sex couples on and after October 9, 2014.
23. On October 9, 2014, Plaintiff Bleckley was present at the Charleston County Probate Court’s office to pick up the Plaintiff couple’s marriage license. Defendant Judge Condon declined to issue the license for the sole reason that the proceedings instituted by Defendant Wilson resulted in an order from the South Carolina Supreme Court forbidding the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples before an order requiring such issuance had been entered by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
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24. But for the fact that they are of the same sex as one another, Plaintiffs are legally qualified to marry under the laws of South Carolina and wish to marry each other in the State. Each Plaintiff is over the age of 18, and neither Plaintiff is precluded from marriage as a result of having another spouse or being closely related to her life partner.
25. The marriage ban frustrates Plaintiff Condon and Plaintiff Bleckley’s dreams of being able to marry each other before their friends and families in South Carolina, as well as demeans their relationship in the eyes of society and their community. The ban also causes them economic injury and financial stress. Because Condon and Bleckley have been unable to secure their family relationships through marriage, they have paid for alternate, but inadequate and inferior protections such as wills and powers of attorney for health care.
26. Condon and Bleckley also are concerned about the dignitary harm that Condon’s teenage son may suffer from the couple’s inability to marry, especially now that he already understands that South Carolina law relegates Condon and Bleckley to being, in his words, “just partners,” and bars him from being part of a family with married parents. Plaintiffs fear that he will internalize the message he receives from his government that his family is not as worthy as other families and that he and his parents do not deserve the support for their relationships that other children and their parents receive. Additionally, because South Carolina bars Condon and Bleckley from marrying, they lack the financial safety net available to married couples and their children. For example, because Condon and Bleckley are not married, Bleckley is not eligible to receive Condon’s Social Security survivor benefits, and Condon is not eligible for insurance benefits through Bleckley’s employer.
27. Plaintiffs each seek the freedom to marry the one unique and irreplaceable person each loves, and thereby to assume the responsibilities and obtain the myriad protections, obligations and benefits conferred upon married couples and upon their children under state and federal law. The right to marry the person of one’s choice, and to direct the course of one’s life in this intimate realm without undue government interference is one of the
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fundamental liberty interests protected for all by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
28. The State also has deprived Plaintiffs of their guarantee of equality under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by denying Plaintiff couple and other lesbian and gay South Carolinians the right to marry the person of their choice based on their sexual orientation and sex. Through the marriage ban and through Defendants’ enforcement of the ban, the State and Defendants send a purposeful message that they view lesbians, gay men, and their children as second-class citizens who are undeserving of the legal sanction, respect, protections, and support that different-sex couples and their children receive automatically through marriage.
29. In Bostic, the United State Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the fundamental right to marriage includes the right of same-sex couples to marry, reasoning that “[i]f courts limited the right to marry to certain couplings, they would effectively create a list of legally preferred spouses, rendering the choice of whom to marry a hollow choice indeed.”
30. Defendants, and those subject to their supervision, direction, and control, intentionally performed, participated in, aided and/or abetted in some manner the acts alleged herein, proximately caused the harm alleged herein, and will continue to injure Plaintiffs irreparably if not enjoined.
31. South Carolina has enacted statutes that exclude same-sex couples from marriage. See S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15 and S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 (as amended) and § 20-1-15. These laws cannot be explained by reference to any legitimate public policies that might justify the disadvantages the marriage bans impose on same-sex couples who wish to marry. Rather, the history of these enactments and their own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex couples was more than a mere side effect of the various enactments – it was their essence.
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32. Barring same-sex couples from marriage disqualifies them from critically important rights and responsibilities under state law that different-sex couples rely upon to secure their commitment to each other, and to safeguard their families. By way of example only, same-sex couples are affected in the spheres of legitimation, adoption, family/spousal health insurance, family leave, death benefits, tax benefits; caretaking decisions; inheritance; and an orderly dissolution of a relationship that allocates assets fairly and protects the children of the marriage.
33. In addition to causing the tangible harms listed above, Plaintiffs are denied the unique social recognition that marriage conveys and the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during times of crisis or conflict. Without access to the familiar language and legal label of marriage, Plaintiff couple is unable instantly or adequately to communicate to others the depth and permanence of their commitment, or to obtain respect for that commitment as others do simply by invoking their married status.
34. The substantive and dignitary inequities imposed on committed same-sex couples, including Plaintiffs, include particular harms for same-sex couples’ children, who are equally deserving of the stability, permanence, and legitimacy that children of different-sex spouses enjoy. The marriage ban denies children of same-sex couples the dignity, legitimacy, rights, benefits, support, security, and obligations conferred on children whose parents are married. Children of same-sex couples, including Condon’s teenage son, must combat the common assumption, reinforced by South Carolina law, that as members of a family headed by an unmarried couple their bonds are impermanent, insubstantial, and unworthy of equal dignity and legitimacy because the couple has not made a marital commitment and taken on the obligations of marriage.
35. The State’s marriage ban, and Defendants’ enforcement of it, causes many private entities such as banks, insurers, and even health clubs, to likewise define “family” for purposes of an array of benefits and protections in ways that exclude same-sex couples and
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their children from important safety nets such as private employer-provided health insurance for family members. The State, and Defendants’ enforcement of the State’s marriage ban, also encourages disrespect of committed same-sex couples and their children, including Plaintiffs, by others in workplaces, schools, businesses, and other major arenas of life, in ways that would be less likely to occur and more readily corrected if marriage were available to same-sex couples.
36. No legitimate, let alone important or compelling, interest exists to exclude samesex couples from marriage. Bostic clearly recognized that marriage bans not only impose harm on same-sex couples and their children but also do nothing to protect or enhance the rights of different-sex couples. The Bostic court rejected every rationale proffered in support of Virginia’s substantively identical laws: federalism; history and tradition; defending “the people’s will”; protecting the institution of marriage; encouraging “responsible procreation”; an illogical “link between banning same-sex marriage and promoting optimal childrearing”; promoting the notion that marriage is “a framework for parenthood” and inveighing against the suggestion that marriage is “a vehicle for adults’ emotional fulfillment” in order to express the view that marriages of same-sex couples are morally inferior to those of their different-sex counterparts; to reinforce gender-specific roles in parenting; to reduce the incentive for same-sex couples to have children and/or to incentivize different-sex couples to have more children.
FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Deprivation of Due Process U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
37. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
38. Plaintiffs state this cause of action against Defendants in their official capacities for purposes of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
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39. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. The right to marry the unique and irreplaceable person of one’s choice and to direct the course of one’s life in this intimate realm without undue government restriction is one of the fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and was specifically held by the Fourth Circuit in Bostic to be a liberty enjoyed by different-sex couples and same-sex couples alike.
41. South Carolina Constitutional Amendment Article XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 (as amended), S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15, and all other sources of South Carolina law that preclude marriage for same-sex couples violate the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.
42. Thus, Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Deprivation of Equal Protection U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
43. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint not inconsistent herewith as though fully set forth herein.
44. Plaintiffs state this cause of action against Defendants in their official capacities for purposes of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
45. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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46. South Carolina Constitutional Amendment Article XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 (as amended), S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15, and all other sources of South Carolina law that preclude marriage for same-sex couples violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.
47. Defendants’ denying same-sex couples marriage licenses violates the right of Plaintiffs to equal protection by discriminating impermissibly on the basis of the Plaintiffs’ sexual orientation and sex, Same-sex couples such as Plaintiffs are identical to different-sex couples in all of the characteristics relevant to marriage. A. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation.
48. The marriage ban targets lesbian and gay South Carolinians as a class for exclusion from marriage and discriminates against each Plaintiff based on her sexual orientation, both facially and as applied.
49. Defendants’ exclusion of Plaintiffs from marriage based on Plaintiffs’ sexual orientation subjects Defendants’ conduct to strict or at least heightened scrutiny, which Defendants’ conduct cannot withstand because the exclusion does not even serve any legitimate governmental interests, let alone any important or compelling interests, nor does it serve any such interests in an adequately tailored manner.
50. Lesbians and gay men have suffered a long and painful history of discrimination in South Carolina and in the United States.
51. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual’s ability to contribute to society.
52. Sexual orientation is a core, defining trait that is so fundamental to one’s identity and conscience that a person may not legitimately be required to abandon it (even if that were possible) as a condition of equal treatment.
53. Sexual orientation is generally fixed at an early age and is highly resistant to change through intervention. No credible evidence supports the notion that such interventions
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are either effective or safe; indeed, they often are harmful and damaging. No mainstream mental health professional organization approves interventions that attempt to change sexual orientation, and virtually all of them have adopted policy statements cautioning professionals and the public about these treatments.
54. Lesbians and gay men are a discrete and insular minority, and ongoing prejudice against them continues seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes that might ordinarily be relied upon to protect minorities. Lesbians and gay men lack express statutory protection against discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and housing at the federal level and in more than half the states, including South Carolina; are systematically underrepresented in federal, state, and local democratic bodies; and have seen 30 states attempt to strip them of the right to marry by passing state constitutional amendments barring them from marriage. B. Discrimination Based on Sex.
55. South Carolina’s marriage ban discriminates against Plaintiffs on the basis of their sex, both facially and as applied, barring Plaintiffs from marriage, solely because each Plaintiff wishes to marry a life partner of the same sex. The sex-based restriction is plain on the face of South Carolina’s laws, which restrict marriage to “between one woman and one man,” S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15 and prohibit recognition of marriages in other states between persons of the same sex. See also S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10, (as amended) and S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15 (as amended).
56. Because of these sex-based classifications, Plaintiff Condon, for example, is precluded from marrying Plaintiff Bleckley because Condon is a woman and not a man; were Condon a man, she could marry Bleckley.
57. South Carolina’s marriage ban also impermissibly enforces conformity with sex stereotypes by excluding Plaintiffs from marrying the one person each Plaintiff loves, because
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Plaintiffs have failed to conform to the sex-based stereotypes that women should marry men, and that men should marry women.
58. The exclusion of Plaintiffs from marriage based on their sex, and the marriage ban’s requirement that Plaintiffs behave in conformity with sex-based stereotypes as a condition of being able to marry, cannot survive the heightened scrutiny required for sex-based classifications. C. Discrimination With Respect to Fundamental Rights and Liberty Interests Secured
by the Due Process Clause. 59. The marriage ban discriminates against Plaintiffs based on sexual orientation and sex with respect to access to the fundamental right to marry, and against Plaintiffs with respect to their liberty interests in dignity, autonomy, and family integrity and association. Differential treatment with respect to exercise of fundamental rights and liberty interests subjects Defendants’ conduct to strict or at least heightened scrutiny, which Defendants’ conduct cannot withstand.
FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 57 and 65) 60. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint not inconsistent herewith as though fully set forth herein. 61. This case presents an actual controversy because Defendants’ conduct, pursuant to directly applicable controlling authority, constitutes a present and ongoing denial of liberty and equal treatment to Plaintiffs, warranting the issuance of a declaratory judgment. 62. Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief to protect their constitutional rights and avoid the injuries described above. A favorable decision enjoining Defendants would redress and prevent the irreparable injuries to Plaintiffs identified herein, for which Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law or in equity.
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63. Defendants and the State will incur little to no burden in allowing same-sex couples to marry whereas the hardship for Plaintiffs of being denied liberty and equal protection is severe, subjecting them to an irreparable denial of their constitutional rights. The balance of hardships thus tips strongly in favor of Plaintiffs who, under controlling authority, will succeed on the merits of their case.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment: A. Declaring that the provisions relating to same-sex couples in S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15, and any other sources of South Carolina law that exclude same-sex couples from marriage, as well as the enforcement by Defendants thereof, violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; B. Permanently enjoining enforcement by Defendants of the provisions relating to same-sex couples in S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15, and any other sources of South Carolina law that exclude same-sex couples from marriage; C. Awarding Plaintiffs their costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other applicable laws; and D. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. E. The declaratory and injunctive relief requested in this action is sought against each Defendant; each of Defendant’s officers, employees, and agents; and against all persons acting in cooperation with any Defendant, or under a Defendant’s supervision, direction, or control.
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Respectfully submitted,
LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC.
Elizabeth L. Littrell (Georgia Bar No. 454949) 730 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1070 Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Phone: (404) 897-1880 Fax: (404) 897-1884 blittrell@lambdalegal.org
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS Pro Hac Vice Motion Pending

SOUTH CAROLINA EQUALITY COALITION, INC.
s/Nekki Shutt_____________________ M. Malissa Burnette (Fed. I.D. No.:1616) Nekki Shutt (Fed. I.D. No.: 6530) CALLISON TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC 1812 Lincoln Street Post Office Box 1390 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 Telephone: 803-404-6900 Facsimile: 803-404-6901 mmburnette@callisontighe.com nekkishutt@callisontighe.com
s/Victoria L. Eslinger________________ Victoria L. Eslinger (Fed. I.D. No.:738) NEXSEN PRUET, LLC P.O. Drawer 2426 Columbia, South Carolina 29202-2426 Telephone: 803-253-8249 Facsimile: 803-253-8228 veslinger@nexsenpruet.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

Colleen Therese Condon and Ann Nichols Bleckley,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Nimrata (Nikki) Randhawa Haley, in her official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; Alan Wilson, in his official capacity as Attorney General; and Irvin G. Condon, in his official capacity as Probate Judge of Charleston County,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2: 14-401O-RMG

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ORDER

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Plaintiffs, a same sex couple seeking to marry, challenge South Carolina's statutory and

constitutional provisions prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-10,20-1-15; S.C. Constitution Art. XVII § 15.1 Plaintiffs assert such provisions of

South Carolina law infringe upon their fundamental right to marry, a liberty interest protected by

the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. (Dkt. No.1). Plaintiffs argue that the Fourth Circuit's recent

decision in Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Schaefer v. Bostic, l35

S. Ct. 308 (2014), is controlling. (Dkt. No. 13). Defendants Nikki Haley and Alan Wilson, sued

I S.C. Constitution Art. XVII, § 15 provides that a "marriage between one man and one woman is the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10(B)-(C) prohibit marriage between two men or two women and § 20-1-15 provides that "[a] marriage between persons of the same sex is void ab initio and against the public policy of the State."
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in their official capacities as the Governor and Attorney General of South Carolina, assert that matters related to marital status are reserved exclusively to the states. (Dkt. No. 29 at 11-29; Dkt. No. 33-1 at 8-26).2 These two defendants further argue that the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Bostic is wrongly decided because that court improperly disregarded the controlling law of Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310 (1971), summarily dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), and the Fourth Circuit's own precedent in finding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment created a fundamental right of same sex couples to marry. (Dkt. No. 29 at 5-11; Dkt. No. 33-1 at 2-8; Dkt. No. 34 at 2-3). Defendant Condon, who began accepting same sex marriage applications on October 8, 2014, in compliance with Bostic, presently "takes no position regarding the merits ofthe Plaintiffs' claims for relief." (Dkt. No. 35 at 6).
Plaintiffs have now moved for summary judgment and seek declaratory and injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 13). Defendants Haley and Wilson oppose that motion. As further set forth below, the Court finds that Bostic provides clear and controlling legal authority in this Circuit and that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Legal Standard A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.s. 317,322 (1986). All facts and inferences from those facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston,
2Defendants Wilson and Haley incorporated into their memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 34) their briefs in support oftheir motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 33-1) and in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 29). Therefore, the Court has considered and cited to Defendants Haley and Wilson's other memoranda in passing upon Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
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929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conc1usory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, Baber v. Hosp. Corp. ofAm., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992).
Factual Background The essential facts involved in this litigation are not contested. Plaintiffs applied for a marriage license in the office of Defendant Condon, the duly elected Probate Judge of Charleston County, on October 8, 2014, and he accepted the Plaintiffs' application and filing fee. Defendant Condon indicated at that time that he was prepared to issue Plaintiffs a marriage license upon the expiration of the mandatory 24-hour waiting period. Later that same day, Defendant Wilson, acting in his official capacity as Attorney General of South Carolina, initiated an action in the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court seeking an injunction prohibiting Defendant Condon from granting a marriage license to Plaintiffs until a pending federal constitutional challenge had been heard and decided. (Dkt. Nos. 13-4, 13-8, 13-10, 13-11). In response to the Attorney General's petition, the South Carolina Supreme Court accepted the matter in its original jurisdiction for the sole purpose of entering an order enjoining any probate judge from issuing a marriage license to a same sex couple pending disposition of the legal challenge to South Carolina's same sex marriage ban in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. State ex rei. Wilson v. Condon, - - - S.E.2d - - - -, 2014 WL 5038396, at *2 (S.c. Oct. 9, 2014). Thereafter, on October 15,2014, Plaintiffs initiated this action in the Charleston Division of the United States District Court for the District of South
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Carolina.3 Discussion
A. Standing A threshold question in every federal case is whether the plaintiff has standing to bring
the action. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" that will be sufficient to warrant the party's "invocation of federal-court jurisdiction." Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citation omitted). This requires the plaintiff to show: (1) she is "under threat of suffering 'injury in fact' that is concrete and particularized"; (2) "the threat [is] actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (3) the threatened injury is "fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant"; and (4) it is likely that "a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury." Id.
The Bostic Court found that two of the plaintiffs, a same sex couple seeking to marry under Virginia law, had standing because the state's same sex marriage ban had prevented the couple from obtaining a marriage license. Bostic, 760 F3d at 372. The Fourth Circuit found
3 When the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its order in Wilson v. Condon on October 9,2014, the sole pending challenge to South Carolina's statutory and constitutional provisions relating to same sex marriage involved a same sex couple that had been lawfully married in the District of Columbia and sought recognition of their marital status by the State of South Carolina. Bradacs v. Haley, C.A. No. 3:13-2351 (D.S.C.). This action, brought by Plaintiffs Condon and Bleckley, represents the first legal effort by a same sex couple to challenge the denial of an application for a South Carolina marriage license. The Bradacs case is presently pending before Judge Michelle Childs in the Columbia Division of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Judge Childs recently ruled that the plaintiffs in Bradacs, because they were legally married in the District of Columbia, had no standing to assert a challenge to South Carolina's ban on same sex marriage. Bradacs v. Haley, C.A. No. 3:132351, Dkt. No. 89 at 13 n.7 (D.S.C. November 10,2014).
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that "this license denial constitutes an injury" to these plaintiffs sufficient to provide them standing. Id.
In light of the uncontested facts set forth above, it is clear that Plaintiffs have the type and degree of injury to have standing to assert their claims. Plaintiffs' application for a marriage license, and the denial ofthat license under South Carolina's laws prohibiting same sex marriage, make their injury "concrete" and "actual" and that injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action." Id. Further, Plaintiffs' injuries are fairly traceable to the action and/or inaction of Defendants Wilson and Condon, as explained below, and a favorable judicial decision could redress Plaintiffs' injuries. B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants Haley and Wilson have further argued that an action against them is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. No. 29 at 29-32). It is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against officers of the state where a plaintiff has (1) sued a state officer for ongoing violations of federal law; (2) seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief; and (3) the state officer is "clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings ... to enforce against parties affected [by] an unconstitutional act." Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-156 (1908).
No party challenges the naming of Defendant Condon as a proper party defendant to this action. As the duly elected probate judge of Charleston County, Defendant Condon is vested with the authority to take applications for and to issue marriage licenses to eligible couples. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-220, 20-1-260, 20-1-270. Further, it is uncontested that Plaintiffs applied to
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Defendant Condon for a marriage license and that the state statutory and constitutional provisions under challenge in this action barred the issuance of the license.
The Bostic Court specifically addressed this issue in regard to the clerk of the circuit court for the city of Norfolk who had the responsibility under Virginia law to issue and record marriage licenses. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 371. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an action against the defendant clerk of court because he "bears the requisite connection to the enforcement of the Virginia Marriage Laws due to his role in granting and denying applications for marriage licenses." Id. at n.3. Similarly, Defendant Condon's role under the South Carolina statutory scheme for the issuance of marriage licenses makes him an appropriate defendant in this constitutional challenge, and the action against him is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Defendant Wilson and Haley argue that they are not appropriate defendants because the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against them. They are correct that there must be a meaningful nexus between the named defendant and the asserted injury of the plaintiff. By itself, a generalized duty of a named defendant to uphold the laws is not sufficient. E.g. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 2010).
Defendant Wilson has a duty as the state's chief prosecutor and attorney to enforce the laws of the state. He has recently initiated litigation in the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court in regard to the same sex marriage laws under challenge, specifically seeking to enjoin Judge Condon from issuing marriage licenses to Plaintiffs and other same sex couples. See Wilson v. Condon, 2014 WL 5038396. He has also indicated an intention in filings in this Court to vigorously enforce the state law provisions at issue in this litigation and to
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challenge efforts by Plaintiffs to vindicate their claimed fundamental right to marry under the United States Constitution. Thus, like the Attorney General in Ex parte Young, Defendant Wilson is "clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws ofthe state" and has in fact threatened and commenced actions "to enforce against parties" provisions of state law allegedly violating the Federal Constitution. 129 U.S. at 155-56. As such, Defendant Wilson is a proper defendant in this action, and the claims against him are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.4 See id.; Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1201-1203 (lOth Cir. 2014); cj McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding Ex parte Young exception did not apply because the state Attorney General "ha[d] not enforced, threatened to enforce, or advised other agencies to enforce" the statutory provision at issue).
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Haley are not nearly so straightforward. It is clear that simply being the state's chief executive sworn to uphold the laws is not sufficient to invoke Ex parte Young. The Court has before it little evidence to support an argument that Defendant Haley has taken enforcement action or engaged in other affirmative acts to obstruct Plaintiffs' asserted fundamental right to marry. Cj Bowling v. Pence, 2014 WL 4104814 at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19,2014) (reversing a prior order dismissing the Governor of Indiana as a defendant after he took "affirmative action to enforce the statute"). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Haley are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and she is, therefore,
4 Judge Childs reached the same conclusion in the Bradacs case. No. 3:l3-2351, Dkt. No. 89 at 20 ("Defendant Wilson cannot take such action to specifically enforce the laws at issue and then hope to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity under a theory that he simply has only 'general authority."').
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dismissed as a defendant in this action.5 C. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendant Wilson argues that Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to South Carolina's ban on same sex marriage is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the South Carolina Supreme Court recently granted a stay in Wilson v. Condon, 2014 WL 5038396. (Dkt. No. 29 at 3-5). Defendant misapprehends the nature and scope of this doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that a losing party in a state court proceeding may not file an action in federal district court to review and reject a state court judgment. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Rooker-Feldman is a "narrow" doctrine and "applies only when a federal court is asked to review the final decisions of a state court." Morkel v. Davis, 513 F. App'x 724, 727 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original); Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 ("This Court has repeatedly held that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.") (internal quotations omitted); David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward Cty., Fla., 200 F.3d 1325, 1332 (lIth Cir. 2000) (holding Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the state court's "denial ofthe temporary injunction is not a final or conclusive judgment on the merits").
The state court proceeding relied on by Defendant Wilson was an action brought by him, in his capacity as Attorney General of South Carolina, in the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court against Defendant Condon, the probate judge of Charleston County,
5 Again, Judge Childs reached the same conclusion. Bradacs, No. 3:13-2351, Dkt. No. 89 at 18.
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after Condon announced his intention to issue marriage licences in adherence to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bostic. At the time, the only case pending in United States District Court for the District of South Carolina relating to the State's refusal to recognize same sex marriage was Bradacs v. Haley, C.A. No. 3:13-2351, an action by a same sex couple married in the District of Columbia who sought to have their marriage recognized under South Carolina law. The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted the Wilson v. Condon case in its original jurisdiction and stayed any issuance of marriage licenses to same sex couples by South Carolina Probate Judges pending the disposition ofthe constitutional questions in federal district court "for the limited purpose of maintaining the status quo until the Federal District Court can resolve the case pending before it." Wilson v. Condon, 2014 WL 5038396, at *2.
Subsequent to the South Carolina Supreme Court's grant of the stay in Wilson, Plaintiffs initiated this action in the Charleston Division of the United States District Court challenging state statutes and constitutional provisions prohibiting same sex marriage and seeking the issuance of a marriage license. The stay granted by the South Carolina Supreme Court is hardly a final judgment on the merits but simply an understandable effort by the South Carolina Supreme Court to maintain the status quo while the federal district courts addressed the constitutionality of the State's same sex marriage ban. The South Carolina Supreme Court clearly intended the federal court to rule on the constitutionality of the same sex marriage ban and for the state courts to abstain from doing so, as it ordered that "unless otherwise ordered by this Court, the issue of the constitutionality of the foregoing state law provisions shall not be considered by any court in the South Carolina Unified Judicial System while that issue remains pending before the Federal District Court." 2014 WL 5038396, at *2. The South Carolina Supreme Court's grant ofa stay
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to temporarily maintain the status quo did not (and could not) interfere with or impair the Plaintiffs' right to seek protection of what they assert is a fundamental right to marry in the United States District Court or this Court's ability to exercise its jurisdiction and to provide Plaintiffs, if vindicated, appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief.6 D. Absentia Doctrines
Defendant Wilson argues that this Court should abstain under Younger. However, the Younger doctrine only applies in three "exceptional" circumstances: interference with state criminal prosecutions, interference with civil enforcement proceeds akin to criminal prosecutions, and interference with "civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Sprint Commc 'n, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 588,587, (2013) (holding these three categories "define Younger's scope"). However, Defendants have not argued that this case presents any of these exceptional circumstances. "Because this case presents none of the circumstances the [Supreme] Court has ranked as 'exceptional,' the general rule governs: The pendency of an action in a state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction." Id. at 588 (internal quotations omitted).
6 Defendants Wilson and Haley also argue that this Court should decline to consider this case until a decision is reached in Bradacs under the first-to-file rule. (Dkt. No. 29 at 35-37). However, Defendants acknowledge that "[t]he most basic aspect of the first to file rule is that it is discretionary," and that "[t]he decision and the discretion belong to the district court." Id. at 36 (quoting Plating Res., Inc. v. UTI Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 899, 903 (N.D. Ohio 1999). Further, Judge Childs has already ruled that the issue central to this action, Plaintiffs' right to marry as a same sex couple, is not before her because the plaintiffs in Bradacs have no standing to assert the claim because they are already legally married. Given the differing factual scenarios at issue in Bradacs and the case sub judice as well as the fundamental nature of the right at issue, the Court declines to wait until a judgment is entered in Bradacs to address Plaintiffs' claims.
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Defendant Wilson also argues that this Court should decline to consider this case until a decision is reached in Bradacs under the first-to-file rule. (Dkt. No. 29 at 35-37). However, Defendants acknowledge that "the most basic aspect of the first to file rule is that it is discretionary," and that "[t]he decision and the discretion belong to the district court." (ld. at 36 (quoting Plating Res., Inc. v. UTI Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 899, 903 (N.D. Ohio 1999». Further, Judge Childs has already ruled that the issue central to this action-Plaintiffs' right to marry as a same sex couple-is not before her because the plaintiffs in Bradacs are already married and, thus, do not have standing to assert the claim. Given the differing factual scenarios at issue in Bradacs and the case sub judice as well as the fundamental nature of the right at issue, the Court declines to wait until a judgment is entered in Bradacs to address Plaintiffs' claims. D. Merits of the Constitutional Claims
In addressing Plaintiffs' constitutional claim to a fundamental right to marry, this Court does not write on a blank canvas. In United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), the United States Supreme Court struck certain provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). Those provisions denied the surviving spouse of a state-sanctioned same sex marriage under New York law the benefits of a federal estate tax deduction available to surviving spouses of opposite sex marriages. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that DOMA "writes inequality into the entire United States Code" by identifying "a subset of state-sanctioned marriages" and making "them unequal." Id. at 2694. The Court reasoned that by denying certain federal benefits to members of same sex marriages, DOMA imposed "a disability on the class" that violated their "personhood and dignity" in violation of their liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 2695-96.
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Although the Windsor holding dealt only with the validity of certain provisions of federal statutory law, Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, correctly predicted that an assault on state same sex marriage bans would follow Windsor. Id. at 2710.
In the approximately 17 months since the Windsor decision, federal courts in virtually every circuit and in every state with a same sex marriage ban have heard lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of such state law provisions. These suits commonly involve challenges by same sex couples seeking marriage licenses and/or same sex couples validly married in another state attempting to obtain home state recognition of their marital status. Four Federal Courts of Appeal have held that state law bans on same sex marriage violate the constitutional rights of same sex couples: the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and, most importantly for our purposes, the Fourth Circuit. Further, the United States Supreme Court, on October 6, 2014, declined to grant review ofthe decisions of the Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, leaving their judgments in place. See Latta v. Otter, - - - F.3d - - - -,2014 WL 4977682 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2014 WL 4425162 (Oct. 6, 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. July 18,2014), cert. denied, 2014 WL 3854318 (Oct. 6,2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2014 WL 3841263 (Oct. 6, 2014). One appellate court, the Sixth Circuit, recently held there is no constitutional right to same sex marriage, overturning lower court decisions in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.7 Additionally, a clear majority of federal district courts that have addressed this issue
7 DeBoer v. Snydner, - - - F.3d - -. ·,2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6,2014), overturning lower court decisions in Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Henry v. Himes, - - - F. Supp. 2d - - - -, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14,2014); DeBoer v.
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have found state same sex marriage bans unconstitutional.8
Plaintiffs accurately note that four out of five appellate court decisions and the
overwhelming majority of the district court decisions favor their position. On the other hand,
Defendants, while acknowledging the body of recent case law going mostly against them, argue
that at least one appellate court and a few district courts have adopted their arguments and the
United States Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the issue. While this debate over
precedent and constitutional principle is interesting, this Court finds most persuasive the clearly
stated authority ofthe Fourth Circuit's seminal decision in Bostic. It is axiomatic that a decision
of a circuit court, not overruled by the United States Supreme Court, is controlling precedent for
Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 684680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21,2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
8 See Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-cv-0622 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7,2014); Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-2518, 2014 WL 5598128 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014); Connolly v. Jeanes, No. 2: 14-cv-00024, 2014 WL 5320642 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17,2014); Majors v. Horne, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - - -,2014 WL 5286743 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16,2014); Fisher-Borne v. Smith, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - - -, 2014 WL 5138914 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 14,2014); Hamby v. Parnell, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - - -, 2014 WL 5089399 (D. Alaska Oct. 12,2014); Gen. Synod ofthe United Church ofChrist v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790 (W.D.N.C. 2014); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Bowling v. Pence, - - - F. Supp. 2d - - - -, 2014 WL 4104814 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19,2014); Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-1817, 2014 WL 3634834 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014) (preliminary injunction), made permanent by 2014 WL 5312541 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (S.D. Ind. 2014), affd, 766 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2014); Wolfv. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014), ajJ'd, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. May 20,2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. May 19,2014); Latta v. Otter, - - - F. Supp. 2d - - - -, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13,2014), ajJ'd, 2014 WL 4977682 (9th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014),
ajJ'd 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. us. ex rei. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D.
Okla. 2014), ajJ'd, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), ajJ'd, 755 F.3d 1193 (lOth Cir. 2014). But see Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, - -F. Supp. 3d - - - -, 2014 WL 5361987 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2014); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014).
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the district courts within the circuit. E.g., United States v. Brown, 74 F. Supp. 2d 648,652 (N.D.W.Va.1998).
The Bostic plaintiffs included a same sex couple who had unsuccessfully sought a marriage license under Virginia law. The Virginia same sex marriage ban prohibited "marriage between persons of the same sex." Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2. Judge Henry Floyd, writing for the Bostic majority, noted that the Virginia statute was "similar" to the ban imposed under South Carolina law found in S.C. Constitution Art. XVII, § 15 and S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-10 and 201-15. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 368 n.l. The issues before the Bostic court were exhaustively briefed by the parties as well as by numerous amicus briefs, including an amicus briefjoined by the State of South Carolina and submitted by Defendant Wilson. (Dkt. No. 13-12).
As a preliminary matter, the Bostic Court addressed Virginia's argument that the United States Supreme Court's summary dismissal of a 1971 Minnesota Supreme Court decision upholding the state's same sex marriage ban in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), summarily dismissed for "want of a substantial federal question," 409 U.S. 810 (1972), was controlling. The Bostic Court rejected that argument, concluding that "doctrinal developments,,9
9Defendant Wilson argues that Fourth Circuit decisions do not "recognize that a Circuit Court or a District Court is at liberty to decide that a summary decision by the Supreme Court has been abandoned or superseded by 'doctrinal developments.'" (Dkt. No. 29 at 7). However, the United States Supreme Court recognized this very point in Hicks. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (holding that where the Supreme Court "has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise") (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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in the more than forty years since Baker undermined any remaining force of the Supreme Court's summary dismissal in Baker. 10 760 F.3d at 373.
The Bostic Court next turned its attention to the substantive claims of Plaintiffs, concluding that they had a "fundamental right" to marry, which is protected by the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 375-78. In reaching that conclusion, the Bostic Court traced the Supreme Court's recognition of the "expansive liberty interest" in the "right to marry." Id at 376. The Court discussed Supreme Court decisions invalidating Virginia's interracial marriage ban in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), striking a Wisconsin statute that required a person with child support obligations to obtain a court order to marry in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1978), and overturning a Missouri statute that prohibited prisoners from marrying in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,94-97 (1987). The Fourth Circuit held that these authorities established a liberty interest in "a broad right to marry" and that the previous Supreme Court decisions in Windsor and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), "firmly position same-sex relationships within the ambit of the Due Process Clauses' protection." 760 F.3d at 374.
Since the Bostic Plaintiffs had a fundamental right to marry, the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's effort to bar their marriage was subject to strict scrutiny under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, as such, could be justified only by a compelling state interest. Id at 375-77. Bostic then examined Virginia's
10 Such doctrinal developments include equal protection decisions that hold sex-based classifications are quasi-suspect and warrant intermediate scrutiny and the Supreme Court's decisions in Windsor and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which recognize that same sex couples have a constitutional right to make their own "moral and sexual choices." Bostic, 760 F.3d at 374.
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various asserted state interests in maintaining its same sex marriage banII and found that none constituted a compelling state interest. Id. at 377-384.
Defendant Wilson argues that the "domestic relations exception" deprives federal courts ofjurisdiction over this case, and this Court is mandated to abstain from addressing Plaintiff s federal constitutional right to marry their same sex partner. (Dkt. No. 33-1 at 5-8). Contrary to Defendant Wilson's contention, the Bostic Court did address the state asserted right to control marital relations. The Fourth Circuit carefully analyzed the competing constitutional principles of state control of marital relations and the federal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the fundamental right of Hberty, including the "intensely personal choice" of "whom to marry." Id at 378-80. Citing to Loving and Windsor, the Bostic Court concluded that states must exercise their authority over marital relations "without trampling constitutional guarantees" of same sex couples and rejected Virginia's claim that principles of federalism required a different outcome. Id. at 378-80. It held that while states have the authority to regulate domestic relations and marriage, "[s]tate laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect the constitutional rights of persons." Id. at 379 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691).12
11 These interests included the State's interest in maintaining control over the definition of marriage, the history and tradition of opposite sex marriage, protection of the institution of marriage, encouragement of responsible procreation, and promotion of the optimal child rearing environment. Bostic, 760 F. 3d at 378.
12 Defendant Wilson's reliance on Elk Grove v. United Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) is misplaced, as Newdow's prudential standing analysis was explicitly abrogated in Lexmark In! 'I., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014). In Lexmark, the Supreme Court held that "[j]ust as a court cannot apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied, ... it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because 'prudence' dictates." Id. at 1388.
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Defendant Wilson also points to the recent Sixth Circuit decision in DeBoer for the
proposition that federalism and respect for state and voter prerogatives should trump Plaintiffs'
liberty claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 34). DeBoer concluded that same
sex couples should not look to the courts to protect their individual rights but to the "usually
reliable state democratic processes" for relief. 2014 WL 5748990, at *1. The Bostic Court rejected that argument, observing that the "very purpose of the Bill of Rights13 was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections." Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379 (quoting W Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)) (footnote in original).
After discussing all ofthese arguments, the Bostic Court concluded:
We recognize that same-sex marriage makes some people deeply uncomfortable. However, inertia and apprehension are not legitimate bases for denying same-sex couples due process and equal protection of the laws. Civil marriage is one of the cornerstones of our way of life. It allows individuals to celebrate and publicly declare their intentions to form lifelong partnerships, which provide unparalleled intimacy, companionship, emotional support and security. The choice of whether and whom to marry is an intensely personal decision that alters the course of an individual's life. Denying same-sex couples this choice prohibits them from participating fully in our society, which is precisely
13 The Fourteenth Amendment is not part of the Bill of Rights, but the excerpt from Barnette is relevant here due to the Fourteenth Amendment's similar goal of protecting unpopular minorities from government overreaching, see Regents ofUniv. ofCal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293 (1978), and its role in rendering the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48,88 S.Ct. 1444,20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).
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the type of segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot countenance. Id. at 384. The defendants in Bostic, as well as the unsuccessful defendants in the Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions, sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The parties seeking certiorari asserted essentially every argument advanced below and in this action, including the contention that Baker v. Nelson constituted controlling authority and was inconsistent with the appellate court decisions finding a fundamental right of same sex couples to marry. 2014 WL 4351585 (Bostic petition for certiorari); 2014 WL 4418688 (Bogan petition for certiorari); 2014 WL 3867714 (Bishop petition for certiorari); 2014 WL 3867706 (Kitchen petition for certorari). On October 6, 2014, the United States Supreme Court declined to review the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bostic, as well as the decisions in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, and the stay that had been granted the state of Virginia pending appeal was promptly lifted. 2014 WL 4230092 (U.S. Oct. 6,2014); 2014 WL 4960335 (4th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014). Within days ofthe Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Bostic, Judge Max Cogburn of the Western District ofNorth Carolina issued a terse two-page order declaring North Carolina's same sex marriage ban "unconstitutional as a matter oflaw." General Synod a/the United Church a/Christ v. Resinger, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - - -, 2014 WL 5092288 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2014). Judge Cogburn observed that the issue before him was "neither a political issue nor a moral issue" but simply a "legal issue" on what is "now settled law in the Fourth Circuit." Id. at
*1 (emphasis in original). He then issued a permanent injunction against enforcement of all
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applicable state statutory and constitutional provisions relating to the North Carolina ban on same sex marriage. Id.
A few days later, Judge William Osteen of the Middle District of North Carolina also issued an order declaring the North Carolina same sex marriage ban unconstitutional in light of Bostic. Fisher-Borne v. Smith, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - - -, 2014 WL 5138914 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2014). Judge Osteen observed that a "decision by a circuit court is binding on this court" and that he could not discern any meaningful difference between the North Carolina same sex marriage ban statute and the Virginia statute declared unconstitutional in Bostic. Id. at *2.
Soon after the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Bostic, West Virginia state officials announced they would no longer enforce the state's same sex marriage ban in light ofthe Fourth Circuit's decision. Maryland, by legislation, had authorized same sex marriage in 2013. Thus, at the time Plaintiffs filed this action, South Carolina was the only state within the Fourth Circuit that continued to prohibit same sex marriage.
This Court has carefully reviewed the language of South Carolina's constitutional and statutory ban on same sex marriage and now finds that there is no meaningful distinction between the existing South Carolina provisions and those of Virginia declared unconstitutional in Bostic. The South Carolina statutory ban on same sex marriage provides that "marriage between persons of the same sex is void ab initio and against the public policy of the State" and explicitly bans marriage between two men and two women. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-10, 20-1-15. The Virginia statute declared unconstitutional in Bostic stated that "[a] marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited." Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2. The South Carolina constitutional provision under challenge states that "[a] marriage between one man and one woman is the only lawful domestic
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union that shall be valid or recognized in this State," and the Virginia constitutional provision declared unconstitutional in Bostic stated that "only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions." S.c. Constitution Art. XVII, § 15; Va. Constitution Art. I, § IS-A.
Defendant Wilson argues that this Court should not follow Bostic because the Fourth Circuit disregarded its own precedents and should have considered the United States Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Baker v. Nelson (finding that same sex marriage did not present a substantial federal question) binding despite the more recent Supreme Court language from Windsor (finding that a federal law failing to recognize same sex marriages violated the Fifth Amendment and failing to cite Baker). (Dkt. No. 29 at 5-11). While a party is certainly free to argue against precedent, even very recent precedent, the Fourth Circuit has exhaustively addressed the issues raised by Defendants and firmly and unambiguously recognized a fundamental right of same sex couples to marry and the power of the federal courts to address and vindicate that right. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 377-84. Regardless of the passion of Bostic's opponents, the predictability and stability of our judicial decisionmaking is dependent upon lower courts respecting and enforcing the decisions of higher appellate courts. Not every decision is heard and decided by the United States Supreme Court (in fact very few are), and lower federal courts are not free to disregard clear holdings of the circuit courts of appeal simply because a party believes them poorly reasoned or inappropriately inattentive to alternative legal arguments. Coherent and consistent adjudication requires respect for the principle of stare decisis and the basic rule that the decision of a federal circuit court of appeals left undisturbed by United States Supreme Court review is controlling on the lower courts within the circuit. This
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principle, along with the foundational rule that the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land and state laws that run contrary to constitutionally protected rights of individuals cannot be allowed to stand, are among the body of doctrines that make up what we commonly refer to as the rule of law.
The Court finds that Bostic controls the disposition of the issues before this Court and
establishes, without question, the right of Plaintiffs to marry as same sex partners. The arguments of Defendant Wilson simply attempt to relitigate matters already addressed and
resolved in Bostic. Any effort by Defendant Wilson or others to overrule Bostic should be
addressed to the Fourth Circuit and/or the United States Supreme Court. Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby declares that S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10(B)-
(C), S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15 and S.C. Constitution Art XVII, § 15, to the extent they seek to prohibit the marriage of same sex couples who otherwise meet all other legal requirements for marriage in South Carolina, unconstitutionally infringe on the rights of Plaintiffs under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and are invalid as a matter of law. In order to protect and vindicate Plaintiffs' rights under the United States Constitution, this Court hereby issues the following permanent injunction and enjoins Defendant Wilson and Condon, their officers, agents, servants and employees, from:
1. Enforcing S.C. Constitution Art. XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. §§20-1-10 and 20-115 or any other state law or policy to the extent they seek to prohibit the marriage of same sex couples;
2. Interfering in any manner with Plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry or in the issuance of a marriage license to Plaintiffs; and/or
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3. Refusing to issue to Plaintiffs a marriage license if, but for their sex, they are otherwise qualified to marry under the laws of South Carolina.
E. Request for Stay Defendant Wilson urges this Court, in the event it grants Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and request for permanent injunctive relief, to stay the effect of its order pending appeal or, in the alternative, to grant a temporary stay pending the Fourth Circuit's review of a request for an appeal stay. (Dkt. No. 36). A stay "is not a matter of right" and the party seeking a stay bears the burden of demonstrating the presence of the exacting standards for the granting of such relief. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009). The standards for granting a stay closely resemble the standards for the grant of a preliminary injunction, including (1) "a strong showing" that the party requesting the stay will succeed on the merits; (2) the presence of irreparable injury by the party seeking the stay; (3) whether the stay will substantially injure other parties to the litigation; and (4) whether the public interest is served by the grant of the stay. Id. at 434.
In light of the Court's analysis set forth above and its conclusion that Bostic is controlling authority, it is quite evident that Defendant Wilson cannot carry his burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits. Further, the Defendant Wilson has not set forth any meaningful evidence of irreparable injury should the petition for a stay be denied. On the other hand, Plaintiffs, who seek to exercise their fundamental right to marry, have put forward evidence of irreparable injury should a stay be granted. It is well settled that any deprivation of constitutional rights "for even minimal periods of time" constitutes irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); llA Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure
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§ 2948.1 (3d ed. 2014) ("Where there is an alleged deprivation of constitutional right[s] ... most courts hold no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary."). Moreover, same sex marriage bans have been found to impose on same sex couples "profound legal, financial, social
and psychic harms" that are "considerable." Latta, - - - F.3d - - - -, 2014 WL 4977682, at *11;
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d at 658. Finally, the public interest is best served by the denial of a stay that would allow the continued enforcement of a state law found to be unconstitutional.
Having denied Defendant Wilson's motion to stay this Court's injunction pending appeal, the Court must consider whether a temporary stay is appropriate to allow the Fourth Circuit an opportunity to consider the Defendant's petition to stay pending appeal in an orderly and reasonable fashion. This factual scenario is similar to the situation presented to the district court in Marie v. Moser, No. 2:14-2518, 2014 WL 5800151 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014). The Tenth Circuit, of which the District of Kansas is a part, had previously ruled that same sex bans in Oklahoma and Utah were unconstitutional in Bishop v. Smith and Kitchen v. Herbert, and the United States Supreme Court had denied review in both cases. The district court in Marie observed that while it was unwilling to issue a stay pending appeal because the defendant could not meet the legal standard for the grant of an appeal stay, the issue of a temporary stay of one week (until November 11,2014) to allow the Tenth Circuit to consider the defendant's request was the "safer and wiser course." Id. at 37-38. The Tenth Circuit denied the request for a stay on November 7,2014, and the defendant then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a stay. On November 10,2014, Justice Sotomayor stayed the district court's order in Marie pending a response from the plaintiffs and further order of the Court. Moser v. Marie, - - - S. Ct. - - - -, 2014 WL 5816952 (Nov. 10,2014).
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This Court finds that a brief one-week stay in the enforcement of this Court's injunction is appropriate to allow the Fourth Circuit to receive Defendant's Wilson's petition for an appeal stay and to consider that request in an orderly fashion. This may also allow the pending request for an appeal stay in Marie to be addressed by Justice Sotomayor or the full United States Supreme Court. 14 Therefore, the Court grants a temporary stay of the Court's injunction in this matter until November 20,2014, at 12:00 noonY
Conclusion Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 13) is GRANTED. This Court hereby issues the following permanent injunction and enjoins Defendant Wilson and Condon, their officers, agents, servants and employees, from: 1. Enforcing S.C. Constitution Art. XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. §§20-1-10 and 20-1-
15 or any other state law or policy to the extent they seek to prohibit the marriage of same sex couples; 2. Interfering in any manner with Plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry or in the issuance of a marriage license to Plaintiffs; and/or
14 On October 8, 2014, Justice Kennedy issued a temporary stay ofthe Ninth Circuit order in Latta v. Otter, which declared the Idaho same sex ban unconstitutional. Two days later, on October 10,2014, the full Court denied the stay, and the previously issued temporary stay by Justice Kennedy was vacated. 135 S.Ct. 345 (2014).
15 The Court is mindful that the strict application of the four part test for the granting of a stay would result in the denial of even this one-week temporary stay. However, sometimes the rigid application of legal doctrines must give way to practicalities that promote the interest of justice. Providing this Court's colleagues on the Fourth Circuit a reasonable opportunity to receive and consider Defendant Wilson's anticipated petition for an appeal stay justifies this brief stay of the Court's injunctive relief in this matter.
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3. Refusing to issue to Plaintiffs a marriage license if, but for their sex, they are
otherwise qualified to marry under the laws of South Carolina. 16
Defendant Wilson's motion for a stay (Dkt. No. 36) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. Defendant Wilson's motion for an appeal stay is DENIED. Defendant
Wilson's motion for a temporary stay is GRANTED until November 20, 2014, at 12:00 noon.
Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 12) and Defendants' motion to dismiss
(Dkt. No. 33) are DENIED as moot. Defendant Haley is dismissed as a party pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment. Any motion by Plaintiffs for an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 will be considered upon appropriate motions of the parties.
16 Counsel for Defendant Condon has raised with the Court a potential dilemma Defendant Condon might confront if this Court granted Plaintiffs injunctive relief effectively requiring him to issue to them a marriage license and the South Carolina Supreme Court failed to dissolve the stay in Wilson v. Condon (as it has pledged to do) once the constitutionality of South Carolina's same sex marriage ban was determined by a federal district court. 2014 WL 5038396 at *2. It is without question true that the South Carolina Supreme Court could not properly issue orders to a defendant in federal litigation that would have the purpose or effect of limiting the injunctive powers of the federal district court or direct him not to comply with a federal court order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (allowing a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment"); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242-43 (1972) (holding § 1983 "is an Act of Congress that falls within the 'expressly authorized' exception" of the Antiinjunction Act). This Court reads Wilson v. Condon as having no such purpose and was designed simply to maintain the status quo regarding the issuance of same sex marriage licenses by South Carolina probate judges until a federal district court had the opportunity to address the constitutional challenge to the same sex marriage ban. Any decision to stay the effect of a decision of a federal district court judgment would be the responsibility of the federal trial or appellate courts, and no state court could properly issue any order interfering with that judgment or directing federal court litigants to act contrary to the federal court judgment. Therefore, this Court anticipates that the South Carolina Supreme Court's stay will be dissolved upon notice of this Court's decision, as it has previously indicated its intention to do so. Should this assumption prove incorrect, the parties should promptly advise this Court.
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AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Charleston, South Carolina November jg, 2014

Richard Mark Gergel United States District

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 2:14-cv-04010-RMG Date Filed 08/10/15 Entry Number 69 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

Colleen Therese Condon and Anne

)

Nichols Bleckley,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Alan Wilson, in his official capacity )

as Attorney General; and Irvin G.

)

Condon, in his official capacity as Judge )

of Probate of Charleston County,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-4010-RMG ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' petition for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the prevailing party in an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. (Dkt. No. 46). Plaintiffs seek an award of$148,044.00 in attorneys' fees based on hourly rates ranging from $175.00 to $400.00 per hour, $3,239.50 in paraprofessional fees at rates from $90.00 to $115.00 per hour, and costs of$1,426.48. (/d. at 22-23). Defendant Wilson has filed a memoranda in opposition to this motion, arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiffs' fee request is excessive, the work of Plaintiffs' counsel was inconsequential because the law had already been settled by other courts, and the State should not be "punished" for defending its ban on same sex marriage contained in its statutory and constitutional law. (Dkt. Nos. 55; 67).

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Legal Standard It is well settled that a district court may award a prevailing party attorneys' fees in an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This attorney fee provision encourages private litigants to act as "private attorneys general" and plays an important role in the vindication of fundamental rights protected under the American Constitution. Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A fee award under § 1988 is not a sanction or punishment against a defendant, and a defendant's good faith defense of an unconstitutional state law does not disqualify a plaintiff from an award of attorney's fees. Lefemine v. Wideman, 758 F.3d 551,555-56 (4th Cir. 2014). Only in "rare occasions," where the award of an attorney's fee would be "unjust," should a prevailing plaintiff in a § 1983 action be denied an attorney's fee award under § 1988. /d. Such a rare, special circumstance would be where a "plaintiffs success is purely technical or de minimus" or the plaintiff obtained "only a Pyrrhic victory." Pitro/o v. Cty. ofBuncombe, 589 F. App'x 619,630 (4th Cir. 2014). In calculating a proper fee award for a prevailing plaintiff, the Court should utilize the "lodestar" method as a starting point, which involves a calculation of the hours "reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 ( 1984). The reasonableness of the computed lodestar figure should then be measured under the standards set forth in Barber v. Kimbrells, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir. 1978), which include (1) time and labor expended; (2) novelty and difficulty of the issues raised; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in undertaking the representation; (5) the customary fee for similar work; (6) attorney' s expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) amount in
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controversy and results obtained; (9) the expertise, reputation and ability of counsel; (1 0) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; (11) the undesirability of the case within the legal community; and (12) fee awards in similar cases. Although all of the Barber factors are important, a critical issue, after determining the lodestar figure and subtracting hours unrelated to successful claims, is the "degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff." Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, Va., 774 F.3d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 2014).
Factual Background The instant action was filed by Plaintiffs on October 15,2014, challenging the constitutionality of South Carolina's ban on same sex marriage contained in state statutory and constitutional law. This litigation followed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014), declaring a
similar Virginia provision unconstitutional. By the time Plaintiffs filed this action, South Carolina was the only state in the Fourth Circuit that continued to enforce its same sex marriage ban.
Plaintiffs filed motions for a preliminary injunction and for summary judgment on October 22, 2014, and Defendants Wilson and Haley filed memoranda in opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction on November 3, 2014, and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on November 10,2014. (Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 29, 34).1 These memoranda vigorously contested various procedural and substantive issues and challenged the Fourth
1 Defendant Condon took the position in his Answer that Plaintiffs were entitled to marry as a same sex couple under the United States Constitution and joined in Plaintiffs' request for relief from this Court. (Dkt. No. 27). Plaintiffs have indicated they do not seek an attorney fee award against Defendant Condon.
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Circuit's recently issued Bostic decision as wrongly decided. The issues raised by Defendants Wilson and Haley included such procedural issues as standing, Eleventh Amendment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the abstention doctrine, and substantive issues regarding the application of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause to Plaintiffs' asserted claims as a same sex couple to marry. A considerable portion of the Defendants' briefs focused on their argument that the Fourth Circuit was profoundly misguided and mistaken in its Bostic decision. (Dkt. No. 29, 34). Plaintiffs responded to this comprehensive attack on their legal position in a memorandum filed on November 5, 2014. (Dkt. No. 32).
By order dated November 12,2014, this Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and addressed in a 26-page order the various procedural and substantive issues argued by Defendants. The Court did grant Defendant Haley's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds but denied that same motion in regard to Defendant Wilson. The Court stayed the effect of its order until November 20, 2014, to allow the Defendant a reasonable opportunity to seek an appellate court stay. (Dkt. No. 37).2 Defendant filed an appeal of the Court's order and applied to the Fourth Circuit for an emergency stay on November 13,2014. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for an emergency stay on November 17, 2014. The Fourth Circuit denied Defendant's request for a stay on November 18, 2015. (Dkt. No. 43). The Defendant then sought an emergency stay from the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiffs were preparing to file a response to this emergency petition when the United States Supreme Court denied the Defendant's motion to stay on November 20, 2014. At noon on
2 For ease of reference, the Court will hereafter refer to Defendant Wilson as "Defendant."
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November 20, 2014, Plaintiffs had accomplished a complete litigation victory, prevailing in their constitutional claim ofa right to marry as a same sex couple.
Plaintiffs filed a petition for an attorneys' fee award on December I 0, 2014, and the Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition on January 16, 2015. (Dkt. No. 46, 55). Plaintiffs filed a reply on February 9, 2015. (Dkt. No. 60). The Court thereafter agreed, at the parties' joint request, to stay the attorney fee award issue pending the United States Supreme Court's ruling on the same sex marriage issue. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefe/1 v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (June 26, 2015), this Court moved to address the outstanding fee award issue. Plaintiffs advised the Court on July 30, 2015, that they wished to stand on their present briefs and Defendant filed a supplemental brief on August 5, 2015. (Dkt. Nos. 65, 67).
Discussion
At the outset, the Court notes that the legal work done by counsel on all sides of this dispute was consistently excellent. The research was thorough, the reasoning was cogent, and the briefs were well written. The defense mounted was undertaken with as much skill and passion as was provided in any state, but the natural and predictable consequence of mounting such a vigorous defense was that it required opposing counsel to expend considerable time addressing the issues raised.
In the course of this litigation, the Court heard some criticism from Plaintiffs of the State mounting such a vigorous defense of its ban on same sex marriage. Defendant now criticizes Plaintiffs' counsel for expending significant time advocating their clients' positions. But in the Court's view, the conduct of all of the attorneys in this litigation reflects the highest calling of
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service to their clients, their profession, and to the Court by zealously and skillfully advancing the claims or defenses of their clients. The genius of the American system ofjustice is that it provides an open forum to litigate difficult and emotionally charged issues in a civil and orderly way. Rather than criticize or condemn counsel for the parties, the Court praises their efforts.
Plaintiffs filed with the Court a petition setting forth its claim for an award of fees and costs and attached affidavits of six attorneys who sought to have fees awarded for their legal services to Plaintiffs. (Dkt. Nos. 46, 46-2, 46-3, 46-4, 46-5, 46-6, 46-7). Three of the attorneys for which a fee award is sought, M. Malissa Burnette, Nek.ki Shutt, and Jacqueline Pavlicek, practice in the Columbia, South Carolina law firm of Callison Tighe and four of the attorneys practice in a Section 501(c)(3) public interest law firm, Lamba Legal. The record establishes that the Callison Tighe attorneys are skillfullitigators and the Lamba Legal attorneys bring considerable expertise in their specialized practice of advancing the legal rights of the LGBT community.
The record reflects that on or about October 10,2014, the Callison Tighe attorneys commenced work on this litigation and immediately associated the Lamba Legal attorneys to assist them. (Dkt. No. 46-3 at 10). This was an extraordinarily dynamic and fast moving time on the marriage equality litigation front, and Plaintiffs' counsel initiated their lawsuit with the clear goal of achieving a complete and rapid victory for Plaintiffs through reliance on the Fourth
Circuit's recent decision in Bostic. Since this approach required significant litigation resources
over a relatively limited period of time, the association by the Callison Tighe attorneys ofLamba Legal attorneys was reasonable and appropriate.
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The legal work performed by plaintiffs' counsel can roughly be categorized into three stages: (1) the initial legal work to obtain the District Court's judgment, which involved researching and preparing a complaint, motions and memoranda supporting a preliminary injunction and summary judgment, and a reply memorandum to Defendant's opposition to their motions for dispositive relief 3; (2) the work involved in responding to Defendant's efforts to obtain an emergency stay from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court; and (3) the fee petition that is now before the Court. Although the legal work in this matter was done in a relatively compressed period of time, there is no doubt that a great deal of work was required ofPlaintiffs' counsel. That work was performed skillfully and efficiently without undue duplication by Plaintiffs' legal team.
The Defendant's brief in opposition to an attorney fee award opens with the suggestion that the work of Plaintiffs' counsel was of no consequence because other courts had already settled the issues in this litigation. (Dkt. No. 55 at 1). If that is so, one might reasonably ask why the State filed a 57-page brief raising a broad array of procedural and substantive issues, including a methodical attack on recent Fourth Circuit precedent. The Court does not suspect for a moment that the State attorneys were not sincere in advancing what they asserted were meritorious legal positions, and the Court does not doubt the need of Plaintiffs' counsel to vigorously contest the arguments advanced by the Defendant. Simply stated, the Defendant cannot engage in a no holds bar defense and then complain that Plaintiffs' counsel expended considerable but reasonable time responding to that defense.
3 The parties advised the Court that they did not believe an evidentiary hearing was necessary and did not seek oral argument on the dispositive motions.
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Defendant argues that no fee award is appropriate here because this would act as a punishment for defending an existing state law and constitutional provision, and the legal issue was unsettled until the United States Supreme Court ruled. (Dkt. Nos. 55 at 9; 67 at 1-1 0). This argument badly misapprehends the law in the Fourth Circuit. A fee award under § 1988 is not a punishment for "bad defendants" or only for defendants who defend an unconstitutional law in bad faith. Lefemine v. Wideman, 758 F.3d at 557. There is no "good faith defense" or qualified immunity defense for defendants under the Attorney Fee Award Act. Instead, the Act "is meant to compensate civil rights attorneys who bring civil rights cases and win them." /d., quoting Williams v. Hanover Hous. Auth., 113 F.3d 1294, 1302 (1st Cir. 1997).
An important issue in determining both the appropriateness and the amount of an award is the degree and significance of the success realized by Plaintiffs. Pitrolo v. Cty. ofBuncombe, NC, 589 F. App'x at 630. Despite submitting a 22-page brief in opposition to an attorney fee award and a 14-page supplemental brief, this issue was only minimally addressed by Defendant. Plaintiffs began this litigation asserting a right as a same sex couple to marry, which the State of South Carolina prohibited by law. They sought a declaration that these provisions of State law were unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting Defendants from interfering with their right to marry. Upon the completion of this litigation, they had obtained complete relief. This complete litigation victory has benefitted themselves and thousands of other same sex couples in South Carolina. Plaintiffs' success in this litigation weighs heavily in favor of a reasonable attorney fee award.
The Defendant described the hours sought to be reimbursed by Plaintiffs' counsel as "outrageously excessive" and "shocked the conscience." (Dkt. No. 55 at 2, 5). The Defendant
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specifically points to time expended by Plaintiffs' counsel preparing the complaint, the memoranda in support of dispositive relief, and the memorandum in reply to Defendant's filing. (!d. at 11-13). At the time of the filing ofthis lawsuit, there were literally dozens of recent appellate and district court decisions to review and complex issues to address. The Court is, of course, intimately aware of the legal issues contested in this matter, having personally read the parties' voluminous filings and the significant body of relevant case law. The Court finds that the time expended by Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter to have been reasonable and not excessive.
The Defendant makes specific complaint about Lamba Legal attorney Elizabeth Littrell traveling from Atlanta, Georgia to Charleston, South Carolina to meet her clients, which was characterized as "completely unnecessary." (!d. at 15). The Court respectfully disagrees with this criticism, since an experienced specialist counsel, such as Ms. Littrell, may well gain valuable insight into her case by personal contact with her clients. The Defendant also opposes the efforts of Plaintiffs' counsel to be reimbursed for time expended responding to the Defendants' petition for an emergency stay in the United States Supreme Court because the Court denied the stay before Plaintiffs' counsel had the opportunity to file their opposing memorandum. (/d.). The legal work challenged was generated by the Defendant's emergency petition, and the time was reasonably expended. The fact that the Supreme Court denied the petition rapidly and without benefit of Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum does not provide a basis to deny reimbursement for this work.
The Defendant does raise legitimate issues about a few areas in which Plaintiffs' counsel seek reimbursement. First, Defendant questions an award for time expended from October 7-9, 2014, which appears to involve legal work associated with an unsuccessful effort to intervene in
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South Carolina Supreme Court litigation titled State v. Condon. This included research and
preparation of a motion to intervene in that action. (Dkt. Nos. 46-2 at 7~ 46-3 at 10~ 67-2). The first legal services provided for this lawsuit appear to have occurred on October l 0, 2014, with the time sheet entry " [w]ork on marriage equality lawsuit." (Dkt. No. 46-3 at 10). The Court finds the time expended by Plaintiffs' counsel before October 10, 2014, is not reimbursable. Thus, the Court disallows during this time period 16.9 hours sought by Attorney Burnette, 21.3 hours sought by Attorney Shutt, and 2.7 hours by Attorney Pavlicek. (Dkt. Nos. 46-2 at 7; 46-3 at 10).
Second, Defendant questions reimbursement for time expended by Plaintiffs' counsel providing legal advice or information to persons other than the Plaintiffs themselves. Time records indicate that immediately before and at the time of the expiration of this Court's stay on November 20, 2014, Attorneys Burnette and Shutt were preparing materials and expending time attempting to explain the implications of the Court' s order to non-parties to this litigation. (Dkt. Nos. 46-2 at 9; 46-3 at 19). While this work is certainly commendable and was undoubtably a valuable public service, it is not a reimbursable legal service under § 1988 in this litigation. Thus, the Court disallows 2.5 hours sought by Attorney Burnette on November 19, 2014, and 3.4 hours on November 19, 2014, and 6.6 hours on November 20, 2014, sought by Attorney Shutt. (Jd.).
Except for the adjustments set forth above, the Court finds the remainder of the fees requested by Plaintiffs, which total 390.25 hours, to have been "reasonably expended on the litigation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at 888. The Court has itemized these allowable hours per attorney at the conclusion ofthis order.
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Counsel for the parties have pointed the Court to attorney fee awards and requests in other same sex marriage cases, some which have been substantially larger than the fees requested here and a few have been smaller. (Dkt. Nos. 60-1; 67 at 12). In the course of evaluating the Plaintiffs' fee request, the Court reviewed the attorney's fee requested in a related case in this
District, Bradacs v. Wilson, C.A. No.3: 13-2351, Dkt. No. 113 (D.S.C.). Although Bradacs and Condon dealt ultimately with different legal questions, there was certainly overlap on a number of issues. The attorneys in Bradacs have sought approval for 269.15 hours. !d. at 6.
There was at least one major difference in the legal tasks undertaken by counsel in the
two cases. Counsel in this action, Condon v. Wilson, were required to expend considerable time
contesting the Defendant's petitions for an emergency stay in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. This resulted in 68 attorney hours being expended by Plaintiffs' counsel resisting the Defendant's emergency petitions between November 13 and November 20,2014. (Dkt. No. 46-2 at 9; 46-3 at 17-19; 46-4 at 7; 46-5 at 7; 46-7 at 7-8). The rapid filing and response times on these petitions created a period of intense activity by Plaintiffs' counsel, essentially making this an "all hands on deck" situation. While the Defendant
in Bradacs also sought a stay, minimal work was required by the Bradacs counsel because the United States Supreme Court denied a stay in Condon almost immediately after the Bradacs
emergency stay petition was filed, effectively bringing the merits portion of both cases to an end.
Once the attorneys fees expended in responding to the emergency stay petitions in Condon are factored out, the attorney time expended in Bradacs and Condon are not materially
different.
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2:14-cv-04010-RMG Date Filed 08/10/15 Entry Number 69 Page 12 of 15
Plaintiffs have sought reimbursement at hourly rates ranging from $175.00 to $400.00 per hour for attorneys. (Dkt. No. 46 at 22). Plaintiffs filed affidavits from practicing attorneys supporting the reasonableness of these rates. (Dkt. No. 46-8, 46-9). Defendant has not indicated any objection to these hourly rates. The Court finds the hourly rates to be reasonable and approves them as requested. Plaintiffs also request approval of 31.7 hours of paraprofessional services at hourly rates ranging from $90.00 to $115.00 per hour, for a total reimbursement of $3,239.50, and costs of $1 ,426.48. (Dkt. No. 46 at 22-23). Defendant has made no objection to these proposed costs and paraprofessional fees. The Court finds these costs and paraprofessional fees reasonable and approves them as requested.
After finding the hourly rates and hours requested (as adjusted above) to be reasonable, the Court examined the potential award under the standards set forth in Barber v. Kimbrells, Inc., 577 F.2d at 226, to further assess the reasonableness of the proposed award. The factors considered were as follows:
I. Time and labor expended: The Court finds the time and labor expended by counsel, as adjusted, to be reasonable and necessary. This factor weighs heavily in favor of a reasonable fee award.
2. Novelty and difficulty of the issues raised: The Court finds the procedural and substantive issues to be complex and required a high degree of skill and expertise. This factor weighs heavily in favor of a reasonable fee award.
3. The skill required to perform the legal work: This case involved adjudication of complex constitutional issues at the district court and appellate court levels and required the highest degree of legal skill. This factor weighs heavily in favor of a reasonable fee award.
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2:14-cv-04010-RMG Date Filed 08/10/15 Entry Number 69 Page 13 of 15
4. The attorneys' opportunity costs in undertaking this representation: Counsel have offered no evidence to support this factor.
5. Customary fee for similar work: Plaintiffs have offered persuasive evidence that the hourly rates requested were reasonable and consistent with customary fees in similar matters in the legal marketplace.
6. Attorneys' expectations at the outset of this litigation: Counsel have offered no evidence to support this factor.
7. Time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances: This case required an extensive devotion oftime over limited period oftime. This is not a significant factor in determining the reasonableness of the fee requested.
8. Results obtained: Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding South Carolina's statutory and constitutional ban on same sex marriage. They obtained complete relief. This factor weighs heavily in favor ofa reasonable fee award.
9. The expertise. reputation and ability of counsel: Counsel have considerable experience and demonstrated outstanding ability in the performance of their duties on behalfof Plaintiffs. This factor weighs heavily in favor of a reasonable fee award.
10. The nature and length of the relationship between attorney and client: Counsel has offered no evidence regarding this factor.
11. Undesirability ofthe case within the legal community: Counsel has offered no evidence to support this factor.
12. Fee awards in similar cases: As discussed above, the fee requests and awards in similar cases have varied, and the fees requested here fall within a range of reasonableness in
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2:14-cv-04010-RMG Date Filed 08/10/15 Entry Number 69 Page 14 of 15

comparison to other cases.

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the hours, rates and total compensation set

forth below are reasonable and satisfy the reasonableness standards of Barber and other Fourth

Circuit precedents for the award of attorneys' fees. Therefore, the Court hereby approves and

awards reasonable attorneys' fees against Defendant Wilson in his official capacitl pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1988 as follows:

Hours

Rate

Total

M. Malissa Burnette

98.45

$350.00

$34,457.50

Nekki Shutt

101.90

$325.00

$33,117.50

Jacqueline Pavlicek

4.80

$175 .00

$ 840.00

Elizabeth Littrell

142.80

$325 .0 0

$46,410.00

Gregory Nevins

22.00

$375 .00

$ 8,250.00

Camilla Taylor

11.70

$350.00

$ 4,095.00

Jon Davidson

8.60

$400.00

$ 3,440.00

Total

390.25

$130,610.00

Additionally, the Court approves reimbursement of paraprofessional fees of$3,239.50

and costs of costs of$1 ,426.48. Thus, the total award of fees and costs is $135,275.98.

4 Defendant Wilson urges this Court to grant any attorney fee award in this litigation against the State of South Carolina, rather against him in his official capacity and references
authorities in support ofthat approach. (Dkt. No. 55 at 19-21). The Court' s difficulty with this
request is that the Court would be imposing liability on an entity that is not a named party in this litigation. The Court finds the reasoning of Judge Currie in Summers v. Adams, C.A. No. 3:082265-CMC, 2010 WL 2179571 at *7 (D.S.C. May 26, 2010) persuasive on this point, and the Court will grant the fee award against Defendant Wilson in his official capacity.
-14-

2:14-cv-04010-RMG Date Filed 08/10/15 Entry Number 69 Page 15 of 15 AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

August I<? , 2015 Charleston, South Carolina

Richard Mark Gergel United States District Court

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 Case: 2:14-cv-4010 As of: 11/07/2015 03:11 PM EST 1 of 9

U.S. District Court District of South Carolina (Charleston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:14−cv−04010−RMG

CLOSED

Bleckley et al v. Wilson et al Assigned to: Honorable Richard M Gergel Case in other court: 4CCA, 14−02241 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Anne Nichols Bleckley
Plaintiff Colleen Therese Condon

Date Filed: 10/15/2014 Date Terminated: 08/10/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Elizabeth L Littrell Lambda Legal 730 Peachtree Street NE Suite 1070 Atlanta, GA 30308 404−897−1880 Email: blittrell@lambdalegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Malissa Burnette Callison Tighe and Robinson PO Box 1390 Columbia, SC 29202−1390 803−404−6900 Email: mmburnette@callisontighe.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nekki Shutt Callison Tighe and Robinson PO Box 1390 Columbia, SC 29202−1390 803−256−2371 Fax: 803−256−6431 Email: nekkishutt@callisontighe.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Lamonte Eslinger Nexsen Pruet Jacobs and Pollard PO Drawer 2426 Columbia, SC 29202 803−253−8249 Fax: 803−253−8277 Email: veslinger@nexsenpruet.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth L Littrell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Malissa Burnette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:14-cv-4010 As of: 11/07/2015 03:11 PM EST 2 of 9

V. Defendant Nimrata Randhawa Haley in her official capacity as Governor of South Carolina TERMINATED: 11/12/2014 also known as Nikki TERMINATED: 11/12/2014
Defendant Alan Wilson in his official capacity as Attorney General
Defendant

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nekki Shutt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Lamonte Eslinger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ian Parks Weschler Office of Attorney General (SC) PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803−734−3718 Email: iweschler@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Emory Smith , Jr SC Attorney General's Office PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803−734−3970 Fax: 803−734−3677 Email: esmith@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Dewayne Cook SC Attorney General's Office PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803−734−3792 Fax: 803−734−3524 Email: bcook@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ian Parks Weschler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Emory Smith , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Dewayne Cook (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 2:14-cv-4010 As of: 11/07/2015 03:11 PM EST 3 of 9

Irvin G Condon in his official capacity as Probate Judge of Charleston County

John Shannon Nichols Bluestein and Nichols PO Box 7965 Columbia, SC 29202 803−779−7599 Fax: 803−779−8995 Email: jsnichols@bntdlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard S Rosen Rosen Rosen and Hagood PO Box 893 Charleston, SC 29402 843−577−6726 Fax: 843−724−8036 Email: rsrosen@rrhlawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/15/2014
10/15/2014 10/15/2014 10/15/2014
10/17/2014 10/21/2014 10/21/2014 10/22/2014
10/22/2014 10/22/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Irvin G Condon, Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0420−5593365.), filed by Colleen Therese Condon, Anne Nichols Bleckley. Service due by 2/17/2015(jbry, ) (Entered: 10/15/2014)
2 Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon.(jbry, ) (Entered: 10/15/2014)
3 Summons Issued as to Irvin G Condon, Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson. (jbry, ) (Entered: 10/15/2014)
5 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Elizabeth L. Littrell ( Filing fee $ 250 receipt number 0420−5594897) by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 11/3/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission of Elizabeth Littrell, # 2 Supporting Documents Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Proposed Order Granting Pro Hac Vice Admission)No proposed order.(Shutt, Nekki) (Attachment 3 replaced on 10/17/2014) (sshe, ). Modified on 10/17/2014 to replace attachment with corrected proposed order (sshe, ). (Entered: 10/15/2014)
7 ORDER granting 5 Motion of Elizabeth L Littrell to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Plaintiffs Colleen Therese Condon and Anne Nichols Bleckley. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 10/17/2014.(sshe, ) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
8 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Colleen Therese Condon, Anne Nichols Bleckley. Nimrata Randhawa Haley served on 10/20/2014, answer due 11/10/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service)(Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
9 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Colleen Therese Condon, Anne Nichols Bleckley. Alan Wilson served on 10/20/2014, answer due 11/10/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service)(Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
10 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 10/24/2014 at 11:00 AM before Honorable Richard M Gergel. Attorneys must initiate telephone conference. Hearing will be held in courtroom #3. Court Staff needed. (ltap,) Modified text on 10/23/2014 (erav,). (Entered: 10/22/2014)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by John Shannon Nichols on behalf of Irvin G Condon (Nichols, John) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
12 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 11/10/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Order, General Synod of the United Church of Christ, et al. v. Resinger,et. al., # 3 Exhibit 2 − Affidavit of Colleen Condon, # 4 Exhibit 3 −

Case: 2:14-cv-4010 As of: 11/07/2015 03:11 PM EST 4 of 9

10/22/2014
10/23/2014 10/23/2014
10/23/2014 10/23/2014 10/23/2014 10/23/2014 10/24/2014

Affidavit of Anne Nichols Bleckley, # 5 Exhibit 4 − News Release from Attorney General Alan Wilson, # 6 Exhibit 5 − News Article from Greenville Online, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Statement of Judge Condon, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Petition for Original Jurisdiction and Motion for Temporary Injunction, # 9 Exhibit 8 − South Carolina Supreme Court Order, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Verified Complaint, Bradacs v. Haley, # 11 Exhibit 10 − Amici Curiae Brief, Bostic v. Schaefer)No proposed order.(Shutt, Nekki) Modified on 10/24/2014 to reference 20 Additional Attachment filed 10/24/2014(sshe, ). (Entered: 10/22/2014)
13 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 11/10/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support of Summary Judgment, # 2 Exhibit List, # 3 Exhibit 1 − Order, General Synod of the United Church of Christ, et al. v. Resinger, et al., # 4 Exhibit B − Affidavit of Colleen Condon, # 5 Exhibit C − Chart of Comparison Comparing SC Marriage Ban to VA marriage Ban, # 6 Exhibit D − News Release from Attorney General Alan Wilson, # 7 Exhibit E − New Article from Greenville Online, # 8 Exhibit F − Statement of Judge Condon, # 9 Exhibit G − Petition for Original Jurisdiction and Temporary Injunction, # 10 Exhibit H − Affidavit of Anne Nichols Bleckley, # 11 Exhibit I − South Carolina Supreme Court Order, # 12 Exhibit J − Brief of States as amici curiae in Support of Reversal, # 13 Exhibit K − Orders of Other States)No proposed order.(Shutt, Nekki) Modified on 10/24/2014 to reference 21 Additional Attachment filed 10/24/2014(sshe, ). (Entered: 10/22/2014)
14 TEXT ORDER: Plaintiffs have filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 12). The time for Defendants to respond to that motion is hereby shortened to 11/3/14. Any reply from Plaintiffs is due on or before noon on 11/5/14. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 10/23/14. (ltap, ) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
15 TEXT ORDER: When the Court originally scheduled the status conference in this matter for 10/24/13 at 11:00 a.m., the Court anticipated but had not yet received a motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was filed late yesterday afternoon and the Court earlier today entered an order for a briefing schedule on that motion. The parties should be prepared to address the following issues at the status conference on 10/24/14: (1) Do any of the parties desire to have the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction? (2) Do any of the parties desire oral argument on the motion for preliminary injunction? (3) Various issues the Court would like the parties to address in their responsive briefs on the motion for preliminary injunction. The Court will not expect the parties to participate in any substantive argument on the merits during the 10/24/14 status conference. In light of the press inquiries the Clerk's Office has received regarding the 10/24/14 status conference, the telephone conference will be conducted in a courtroom at the Charleston Federal Courthouse. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 10/23/14. (ltap, ) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by James Emory Smith, Jr on behalf of Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson (Smith, James) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard S Rosen on behalf of Irvin G Condon (Rosen, Richard) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
18 MOTION to Expedite Ruling by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 11/10/2014. No proposed order.(Burnette, Mary) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
19 MOTION to Amend/Correct Time for Defendants to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 11/10/2014. No proposed order.(Burnette, Mary) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
20 Additional Attachments to Main Document 12 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . First attachment description: Amended Certificate of Service . (Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 10/24/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-4010 As of: 11/07/2015 03:11 PM EST 5 of 9

10/24/2014 10/24/2014
10/28/2014
10/29/2014 10/30/2014 11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/03/2014
11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/05/2014 11/07/2014 11/10/2014 11/10/2014

21 Additional Attachments to Main Document 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment . First attachment description: Amended Certificate of Service . (Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
23 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Honorable Richard M Gergel: Telephone Conference held on 10/24/2014. Court denies on the record 19 Motion to Amend/Correct time for defendant's respond to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Court takes under advisement 18 Motion to Expedite. Court Reporter Debbie Potocki. (erav, ) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
24 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of telephone conference held on 10−24−14, before Judge Richard M. Gergel. Court Reporter/Transcriber Debra Potocki, Telephone number/E−mail 843−723−2208/potockidebra@bellsouth.net. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties have 7 calendar days from the filing of the transcript to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction.. Redaction Request due 11/18/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/1/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/26/2015. (dpotocki, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
25 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson. Response to Motion due by 11/17/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
26 TEXT ORDER granting 25 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 10/30/14.(ltap, ) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
27 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Irvin G Condon.(Nichols, John) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
28 Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Irvin G Condon.(Nichols, John) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
29 RESPONSE in Opposition re 12 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and alternative Motion / Request for Stay Response filed by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson.Reply to Response to Motion due by 11/13/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Addendum Attachment A − Comparison of VA and SC law, # 2 Addendum Attachment B − 1712 Statute, # 3 Addendum Attachment C − 1871 Revised Statutes)(Smith, James) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
30 Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson.(Smith, James) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
31 RESPONSE to Motion re 12 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Response filed by Irvin G Condon.Reply to Response to Motion due by 11/13/2014 (Nichols, John) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
32 REPLY to Response to Motion re 12 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Response filed by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Memorandum and Order in Marie v. Moser)(Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 11/05/2014)
33 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson. Response to Motion due by 11/24/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support)No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
34 RESPONSE in Opposition re 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment Response filed by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson.Reply to Response to Motion due by 11/20/2014 (Smith, James) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
35 RESPONSE to Motion re 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment Response filed by Irvin G Condon.Reply to Response to Motion due by 11/20/2014 (Nichols, John) (Entered: 11/10/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-4010 As of: 11/07/2015 03:11 PM EST 6 of 9

11/11/2014 11/12/2014
11/13/2014 11/13/2014 11/13/2014 11/18/2014 11/25/2014 11/25/2014 12/10/2014 12/15/2014

36 MOTION to Amend/Correct 29 Response in Opposition to Motion, Amended Motion for Stay by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan Wilson. Response to Motion due by 12/1/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
37 ORDER granting 13 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court hereby issues the following permanent injunction and enjoins Defendant Wilson and Condon, their officers, agents, servants and employees, from: 1. Enforcing S.C. Constitution Art. XVII, § 15, S.C. Code Ann. §§20−1−10 and 20−115 or any other state law or policy to the extent they seek to prohibit the marriage of same sex couples; 2. Interfering in any manner with Plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry or in the issuance of a marriage license to Plaintiffs; and/or 3. Refusing to issue to Plaintiffs a marriage license if, but for their sex, they are otherwise qualified to marry under the laws of South Carolina. Defendant Wilson's motion for a stay (Dkt. No. 36 ) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant Wilson's motion for an appeal stay is DENIED. Defendant Wilson's motion for a temporary stay is GRANTED until November 20, 2014, at 12:00 noon. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 12 ) and Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 33 ) are DENIED as moot. Defendant Haley is dismissed as a party pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Any motion by Plaintiffs for an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 will be considered upon appropriate motions of the parties. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 11/12/2014.(sshe, ) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
39 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 37 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion to Expedite, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, by Alan Wilson. − Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0420−5642561. The Docketing Statement form, Transcript Order form and CJA 24 form may be obtained from the Fourth Circuit website at www.ca4.uscourts.gov (Smith, James) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
40 Transmittal Sheet for Notice of Appeal to USCA re 39 Notice of Appeal, The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (sshe, ) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
41 ASSEMBLED INITIAL ELECTRONIC RECORD TRANSMITTED TO FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS re 39 Notice of Appeal, Electronic record successfully transmitted. (sshe, ) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
43 ORDER of USCA denying motion for stay pending appeal and denying alternate request for a temporary stay as to 39 Notice of Appeal, filed by Alan Wilson (sshe, ) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
44 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 12/12/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Motion for Extension)Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.(Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
45 TEXT ORDER The parties' consent motion for extension of time (Dkt. No. 44 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs may file a petition for attorney's fees and costs on or before December 10, 2014, and Defendants may file a response on or before January 7, 2015. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the Direction of Honorable Richard M Gergel on 11/25/2014.(sshe, ) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
46 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 1/5/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Affidavit of M. Malissa Burnette, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Affidavit of Nekki Shutt, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Affidavit of Jon Davidson, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Affidavit of Camilla Taylor, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Affidavit of Gregory Nevins, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Affidavit of Elizabeth Littrell, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Affidavit of David Rothstein, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Affidavit of J. Lewis Cromer)No proposed order.(Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
47 ORDER of USCA as to 39 Notice of Appeal, filed by Alan Wilson. Upon consideration of submissions relative to the motion for stay or continuance of

Case: 2:14-cv-4010 As of: 11/07/2015 03:11 PM EST 7 of 9

12/15/2014
12/29/2014 12/31/2014 01/05/2015
01/12/2015 01/13/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015 01/21/2015 01/22/2015 01/22/2015 01/23/2015

appeal pending a final decision by the United States Supreme Court regarding the petitions for writ of certiorari in DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14−1341, 2014 WL 5748990 and any petition for writing of certiorari filed in the instant case, the court grants the motion. The parties shall notify the 4CCA when the Supreme Court has issued its rulings. (sshe, ) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
48 ORDER of USCA as to 39 Notice of Appeal, filed by Alan Wilson. The court consolidates Case No. 14−2241(L) and Case No. 14−2337 (3:13−cv−2351−JMC). Entry of appearance forms and disclosure statements filed by counsel and parties to the lead case are deemed filed in the secondary case. In light of the order entered this day in case No. 14−2241, both cases are now in abeyance. All briefing schedules are rescinded. (sshe, ) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
49 MOTION to Stay re 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion to Deny or Defer Attorneys Fees by Alan Wilson. Response to Motion due by 1/15/2015. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 12/29/2014)
50 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion to Hold Deadline in Abeyance by Alan Wilson. Response to Motion due by 1/20/2015. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
51 TEXT ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Deny or Defer Attorney's Fees (Dkt. No. 49) is DENIED without prejudice. The Court hereby resets the deadline for Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees (Dkt. No. 46) to January 14, 2014. Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to Motion for Attorney Fees (Dkt. No. 50), which requested the Court to hold its response deadline in abeyance until a ruling on Dkt. No. 49, is denied as moot. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 1/5/2015.(ltap, ) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
52 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Alan Wilson. Response to Motion due by 1/29/2015. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
53 TEXT ORDER granting 52 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees. Response to Motion due by 1/16/2014. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 1/13/15.(ltap, ) (Entered: 01/13/2015)
54 RESPONSE to Motion re 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees Response filed by Irvin G Condon.Reply to Response to Motion due by 1/26/2015 (Nichols, John) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
55 RESPONSE in Opposition re 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees Response filed by Alan Wilson.Reply to Response to Motion due by 1/26/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Addendum Attachment A − Planned Parenthood Order, # 2 Addendum Attachment B − Southeast Booksellers Order)(Smith, James) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
56 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Return in Opposition to Petition for Attorneys Fees by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. Response to Motion due by 2/9/2015. No proposed order.(Burnette, Mary) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
57 TEXT ORDER granting 56 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to Return in Opposition to Petition for Attorneys Fees. Replies due by 2/9/2015. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 1/22/15.(ltap, ) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
58 MOTION to Stay re 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees Renewed Motion to Deny or Defer Attorney's Fees by Alan Wilson. Response to Motion due by 2/9/2015. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
59 TEXT ORDER: Defendant has moved for the Court to deny without prejudice or to defer a decision on Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in Bourke v. Beshear, No. 14−574, 2015 WL 213651 (January 16, 2015), in which the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari. (Dkt. No. 58). The Court is informed that

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Plaintiffs consent to this motion. (Id. at 9). The Court is persuaded that based on recent developments judicial economy is best served by delaying a decision on Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees pending at least a decision in Bourke. Plaintiffs are directed to file their reply brief, if they desire to submit one, by the designated deadline of 2/9/15. Once Bourke is decided, the Court will then determine whether to take up the Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees or to defer action pending disposition of the Fourth Circuit appeal. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 1/23/15.(ltap,) Modified on 1/23/2015 to change the designation deadline. (erav,). (Entered: 01/23/2015)
60 REPLY to Response to Motion re 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Plaintiffs Response filed by Anne Nichols Bleckley, Colleen Therese Condon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Summary of Plaintiffs' Motion Practice in Comparable Cases)(Burnette, Mary) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
61 TEXT ORDER: Plaintiffs have pending before the Court a motion for attorneys' fees (Dkt. No. 46). The Court delayed action on this motion pending the outcome of the United States Supreme Court's action on related appeals. (Dkt. No. 59). Now that the United States Supreme Court has issued its order in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (June 26, 2015), this Court must determine whether to address the attorneys' fee petition now or to defer action pending the disposition of the Fourth Circuit appeal. The parties are directed to file a status report within 10 days from this order indicating whatever preferences the parties may have and whether the parties would like the Court to direct mediation of this matter. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 7/9/15. (ltap, ) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
62 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by Alan Wilson. (Smith, James) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
63 AMENDED TEXT ORDER: As a follow up to the Court's text order of 7/9/15 (Dkt. No. 61) and the parties' joint response (Dkt. No. 62), the Court enters the following schedule for the completion of briefing of the attorneys' fee issue: (1) Plaintiffs may file a supplemental response to their motion for attorneys' fees, including any fees sought for appellate work, within 20 days of this order; (2) Defendant Wilson may file a response within 20 days thereafter; (3) Plaintiffs may file a reply within 7 days thereafter. The Court has entered a somewhat more abbreviated schedule than requested by the parties because the pending attorneys' fee petition is on the Court's six month list due for disposition by 9/30/15 and the time provided is sufficient for supplemental briefing. Since Plaintiffs have indicated that they do not seek attorneys' fees against Defendant Condon, it will not be necessary for him to file any additional responses to Plaintiffs' petition for attorneys' fees. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 7/20/15. (ltap, ) Modified on 7/20/2015 per chambers(sshe, ). (Entered: 07/20/2015)
64 USCA MANDATE re Order, granting motion to voluntarily dismiss this case pursuant to FRAP Rule 42(b), takes effect this date as to 39 Notice of Appeal, filed by Alan Wilson (Attachments: # 1 4CCA Order)(sshe, ) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
65 Letter from Nekki Shutt, Esquire to Judge Gergel regarding ruling on Attorneys fees and costs. (Shutt, Nekki) (Entered: 07/30/2015)
66 TEXT ORDER: The Court has been advised by Plaintiffs' counsel that her clients do not intend to make any additional filing regarding their petition for attorneys' fees and costs. Since this matter has already been fully briefed by the parties and Plaintiffs have indicated no intention to make additional claims for fees or costs since the original fee submissions, the Court finds that no additional responses by the parties are necessary. If any party seeks to submit any additional authorities to the Court that have arisen since the matter was initially briefed, any supplemental briefing may be submitted on or before 8/5/15. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Richard M Gergel on 7/30/15. (ltap, ) (Entered: 07/30/2015)

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67 RESPONSE in Opposition re 46 MOTION for Attorney Fees Supplemental Response filed by Alan Wilson.Reply to Response to Motion due by 8/17/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit The State news article 4.26.15, # 2 Exhibit Motion to Intervene − St. v. Condon)(Smith, James) (Entered: 08/05/2015)
69 ORDER granting 46 Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $130,610.00, paraprofessional fees in the amount of $3,239.50 and costs in the amount of $1,426.48 reflecting a total judgment for fees and costs of $135,275.98. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 8/10/2015.(vdru, ) (Entered: 08/10/2015)
71 SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT re 69 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, by Alan Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Addendum Satisfaction of Judgment)(Smith, James) (Entered: 10/27/2015)