Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 1 of 15
CLOSED,REF_TRL
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 9:18−cv−80810−WM

H.C. v. School Board of Palm Beach County School District et al Assigned to: Magistrate Judge William Matthewman Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/21/2018 Date Terminated: 03/06/2019 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

H. C. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.

represented by Diana Leigh Martin Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll, PLLC 2925 PGA Blvd. Suite 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 561−515−1400 Fax: 561−515−1401 Email: dmartin@cohenmilstein.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sabarish P Neelakanta SPN Law, LLC P.O. Box 740787 Boynton Beach, FL 33474−0787 561−350−0369 Email: sneelakanta@humanrightsdefensecenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore Jon Leopold Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC 2925 PGA Boulevard Suite 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 561−515−1400 Fax: 561−515−1401 Email: tleopold@cohenmilstein.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Masimba Maxwell Mutamba Human Rights Defense Center P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460 (561) 360−2523 Fax: (866) 735−7136 Email: mmutamba@humanrightsdefensecenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Marie Duncan Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561−655−8944 Fax: 655−5269 Email: mduncan@legalaidpbc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 2 of 15

M. F. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Asisa Rolle

represented by Diana Leigh Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sabarish P Neelakanta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore Jon Leopold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Masimba Maxwell Mutamba (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Marie Duncan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
T. M. a minor, by and though his parent and natural guardian, Jessica Joiner

represented by Diana Leigh Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sabarish P Neelakanta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore Jon Leopold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Masimba Maxwell Mutamba (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Marie Duncan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
H. C. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.

represented by Diana Leigh Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sabarish P Neelakanta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Masimba Maxwell Mutamba (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Marie Duncan

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 3 of 15

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff All Others Similarly Situated

represented by Diana Leigh Martin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sabarish P Neelakanta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore Jon Leopold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Masimba Maxwell Mutamba (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa Marie Duncan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Palm Beach County School District
Defendant Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office

represented by Lisa A. Carmona Office of General Counsel Palm Beach County School District 3320 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite 331 West Palm Beach, FL 33406 561−434 −8500 Fax: 561− 434−8105 Email: lisa.carmona@palmbeachschools.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adriana Mihaela Jisa Purdy Jolly Giuffreda & Barranco PA 2455 E Sunrise Boulevard Suite 1216 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304 954−462−3200X109 Fax: 462−3861 Email: Adriana@purdylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard A. Giuffreda Purdy Jolly Giuffreda Barranco & Jisa PA 2455 E Sunrise Boulevard Suite 1216 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304 954−462−3200 Fax: 462−3861 Email: richard@purdylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 4 of 15

Defendant School Board of Palm Beach County

represented by Jon Erik Bell School District of Palm Beach County 3300 Forest Hill Blvd Rm C−323 West Palm Beach, FL 33406 (561) 434−8500 Fax: (561) 434−8105 Email: jon.bell@palmbeachschools.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Esterman Pincus 3318 Forest Hill Blvd., Suite C−331 West Palm Beach, FL 33406 561−434−8748 Fax: 434−8105 Email: laura.pincus@palmbeachschools.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A. Carmona (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw, in his individual and official capacity

represented by Richard A. Giuffreda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Michael Gauger Chief Deputy of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, in his individual capacity

represented by Richard A. Giuffreda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Alfonso Starling Corrections Operations Major of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, in his individual capacity

represented by Richard A. Giuffreda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Frank Milo Corrections Security Major of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, in his individual capacity

represented by Richard A. Giuffreda (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/21/2018
06/21/2018 06/21/2018

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT H.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C., et al., against All Defendants. Filing fees $ 400.00 receipt number 113C−10753379, filed by H. C.. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summon(s), # 3 Summon(s), # 4 Summon(s), # 5 Summon(s), # 6 Summon(s))(Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 06/21/2018)

2 Clerks Notice of Judge Assignment to Judge William P. Dimitrouleas. (lbc) (Entered: 06/21/2018)

3 Clerks Notice to Filer re: Electronic Case. Parties Not Added. The Filer failed to add all parties associated with the case.Filer is instructed to add the additional parties by filing a Notice of Entry of Parties. It is not necessary to re−file this document. (lbc)

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 5 of 15

06/21/2018 06/21/2018 06/21/2018
06/21/2018 06/21/2018 06/21/2018 06/21/2018 06/21/2018 06/22/2018 06/25/2018
06/25/2018

(Entered: 06/21/2018)
4 Clerks Notice to Filer re: Summons(es) cannot be issued. The party(ies) on the summons(es) does not match the initiating documents (lbc) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
5 Notice of Entry of Parties Listed NOTE: New Filer(s) will appear twice, since they are also a new party in the case. New Filer(s)/Party(s): School Board of Palm Beach County, Ric Bradshaw, Michael Gauger, Alfonso Starling, Frank Milo, M. F., T. M., H. C. and All Others Similarly Situated. (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M.. Attorney Melissa Marie Duncan added to party All Others Similarly Situated(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Marie Duncan added to party H. C.(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Marie Duncan added to party M. F.(pty:pla), Attorney Melissa Marie Duncan added to party T. M.(pty:pla). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhbits B−O, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
7 Plaintiff's MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum of Law in Support by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M.. Responses due by 7/5/2018 (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
8 Order Requiring Counsel to meet and file Joint Scheduling Report and Joint Discovery Report. Signed by Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on 6/21/2018. (lk) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
9 ORDER REFERRING 6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by All Others Similarly Situated, M. F., T. M., H. C.. Motions referred to Judge William Matthewman. Signed by Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on 6/21/2018. (lk) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
10 REFERRAL to Magistrate Judge William Matthewman. Motions referred to Judge William Matthewman, per DE 9 . (vjk) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
11 ORDER denying without prejudice 7 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on 6/21/2018. (ls) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
12 ORDER setting telephonic status conference on 6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction: Telephonic status conference set for 6/28/2018 at 2:00 PM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 6/22/2018. (no00) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
13 NOTICE by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M. Summons in a Civil Action (Attachments: # 1 Summon(s) re−filed summons, # 2 Summon(s) re−filed summons, # 3 Summon(s) re−filed summons, # 4 Summon(s) re−filed summons) (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
14 Summons Issued as to Michael Gauger, Frank Milo, School Board of Palm Beach County, Alfonso Starling. (Attachments: # 1

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 6 of 15

06/25/2018 06/28/2018
06/28/2018
06/28/2018 06/28/2018 06/28/2018 06/29/2018 06/29/2018 07/02/2018

Summon(s), # 2 Summon(s), # 3 Summon(s))(lk) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
15 Summons Issued as to Palm Beach County Sheriff. (yha) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
16 NOTICE by Michael Gauger, Frank Milo, Palm Beach County Sheriff, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Alfonso Starling LIMITED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE. Attorney Richard A. Giuffreda added to party Michael Gauger(pty:dft), Attorney Richard A. Giuffreda added to party Frank Milo(pty:dft), Attorney Richard A. Giuffreda added to party Palm Beach County Sheriff(pty:dft), Attorney Richard A. Giuffreda added to party Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office(pty:dft), Attorney Richard A. Giuffreda added to party Alfonso Starling(pty:dft). (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
17 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman: Telephone Status Conference on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction held on 6/28/2018. Discussion held on scheduling the evidentiary hearing. The parties will confer. Joint Status Report due by Friday, July 13, 2018. Written order to be issued. Total time in court: 28 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Melissa Marie Duncan, Sabarish P Neelakanta, Theodore Jon Leopold, and Diana Leigh Martin for Plaintiffs, Richard A. Giuffreda for the PBSO Defendants, Eric Bell, Laura Pincus and Lisa Carmona for the PBC School Board. (Digital 14:04:17) (kza) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
18 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Jon Erik Bell on behalf of School Board of Palm Beach County. Attorney Jon Erik Bell added to party School Board of Palm Beach County(pty:dft). (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
19 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Laura Esterman Pincus on behalf of School Board of Palm Beach County. Attorney Laura Esterman Pincus added to party School Board of Palm Beach County(pty:dft). (Pincus, Laura) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
20 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Richard A. Giuffreda on behalf of Michael Gauger, Frank Milo, Palm Beach County Sheriff, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Alfonso Starling. See image at DE 16 (lk) (Entered: 06/29/2018)
21 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by T. M., M. F., H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), All Others Similarly Situated. School Board of Palm Beach County served on 6/28/2018, answer due 7/19/2018. (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 06/29/2018)
22 ORDER REQUIRING JOINT STATUS REPORT: Counsel for the parties shall confer on Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [DE 6]. (Joint Status Report due on or before 7/13/2018.) Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 6/29/2018. (kza) (Entered: 06/29/2018)
23 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by T. M., M. F., H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), All Others Similarly Situated. Palm Beach County Sheriff served on 6/29/2018, answer due 7/20/2018. (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 07/02/2018)

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 7 of 15

07/02/2018 07/02/2018 07/02/2018 07/03/2018 07/12/2018
07/13/2018 07/16/2018 07/16/2018

24 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by T. M., M. F., H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), All Others Similarly Situated. Alfonso Starling served on 6/29/2018, answer due 7/20/2018. (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 07/02/2018)
25 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by T. M., M. F., H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), All Others Similarly Situated. Michael Gauger served on 6/29/2018, answer due 7/20/2018. (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 07/02/2018)
26 SUMMONS (Affidavit) Returned Executed on 1 Complaint, with a 21 day response/answer filing deadline by T. M., M. F., H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), All Others Similarly Situated. Frank Milo served on 6/29/2018, answer due 7/20/2018. (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 07/02/2018)
27 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Lisa A. Carmona on behalf of Palm Beach County School District. Attorney Lisa A. Carmona added to party Palm Beach County School District(pty:dft). (Carmona, Lisa) (Entered: 07/03/2018)
28 Joint MOTION for Entry of Agreed HIPPA Protective Order and Joint Status Report by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M.. Attorney Sabarish P Neelakanta added to party H. C.(pty:pla). (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Agreed HIPPA Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit Joint Status Report)(Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
29 AGREED HIPAA QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER granting 28 Joint Motion for Entry of Agreed HIPPA Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 7/13/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
30 ORDER SETTING DISCOVERY PROCEDURE. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 7/16/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
31 ORDER SETTING EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DE 6] AND SETTING ADDITIONAL RELATED DEADLINES AND PROCEDURES: (3 day Evidentiary Hearing set for Wednesday, October 3, 2018 at 9:30 AM and will conclude Fiday, October 5, 2018 in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman.). On or before August 2, 2018, Defendants shall file a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction [DE 6]. On or before August 13, 2018, Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their Motion. On or before September 7, 2018, the parties shall file a joint notice with the Court stating the parties positions as to whether or not they believe it is necessary for the undersigned to view the correctional facility at issue prior to ruling on Plaintiffs Motion. On or before September 13, 2018, the parties shall exchange their expert reports related to the Motion. On or before September 18, 2018, the parties shall file and exchange their expert, witness, and exhibit lists related to the evidentiary hearing. On or before September 26, 2018, the parties shall complete the discovery process related to

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 8 of 15

07/19/2018 07/20/2018 07/20/2018 07/23/2018
08/02/2018 08/02/2018 08/02/2018 08/03/2018 08/13/2018 08/13/2018 08/13/2018

the Motion. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 7/16/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
32 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss 1 Complaint, by School Board of Palm Beach County. Responses due by 8/2/2018 (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
33 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Richard A. Giuffreda on behalf of Michael Gauger, Frank Milo, Palm Beach County Sheriff, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Alfonso Starling (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 07/20/2018)
34 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , MOTION to Dismiss 1 Complaint, ( Responses due by 8/3/2018) by Michael Gauger, Frank Milo, Palm Beach County Sheriff, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Alfonso Starling. (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 07/20/2018)
35 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Masimba Maxwell Mutamba on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M.. Attorney Masimba Maxwell Mutamba added to party All Others Similarly Situated(pty:pla), Attorney Masimba Maxwell Mutamba added to party H. C.(pty:pla), Attorney Masimba Maxwell Mutamba added to party H. C.(pty:pla), Attorney Masimba Maxwell Mutamba added to party M. F.(pty:pla), Attorney Masimba Maxwell Mutamba added to party T. M.(pty:pla). (Mutamba, Masimba) (Entered: 07/23/2018)
36 RESPONSE in Opposition re 6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by School Board of Palm Beach County. Attorney Lisa A. Carmona added to party School Board of Palm Beach County(pty:dft). Replies due by 8/9/2018. (Carmona, Lisa) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
37 RESPONSE in Opposition re 6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Michael Gauger, Frank Milo, Palm Beach County Sheriff, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Alfonso Starling. Replies due by 8/9/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Starling Affidavit & Exh A,B,C thereto, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Policies/Post Orders)(Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
38 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by T. M., M. F., H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), All Others Similarly Situated.(Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
39 ORDER Denying as moot 32 Motion to Dismiss; Denying as moot 34 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Denying as moot 34 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on 8/3/2018. See attached document for full details. (lk) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
40 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss 38 Amended Complaint, by School Board of Palm Beach County. Responses due by 8/27/2018 (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
41 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss 38 Amended Complaint, by School Board of Palm Beach County. Responses due by 8/27/2018 (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
42 REPLY to Response to Motion re 6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as to the Sheriff's Office filed by All Others

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 9 of 15

08/13/2018 08/13/2018 08/22/2018 08/24/2018
08/24/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018
08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018

Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
43 REPLY to Response to Motion re 6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as to the School Board filed by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
44 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
45 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Location and Number of Depositions Taken by Plaintiffs by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
46 ORDER SETTING HEARING AND REQUIRING EXPEDITED BRIEFING: Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 45 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Location and Number of Depositions Taken by Plaintiffs.(Response due by 8/27/2018, Reply due by 8/28/2018., Motion Hearing set for 8/29/2018 at 3:00 PM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman.) Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 8/24/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
47 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 38 Amended Complaint, M.F.'s Claims, as Moot, by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. Responses due by 9/7/2018 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (composite))(Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
48 NOTICE by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office re 46 Order,, Set/Reset Motion/R&R Deadlines and Hearings, 45 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Location and Number of Depositions Taken by Plaintiffs (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
49 PAPERLESS ORDER denying as moot 45 Motion for Protective Order. The Court appreciates the resolution of this discovery dispute by the parties' counsel. In light of the resolution of the discovery dispute, the Motion for Protective Order is DENIED AS MOOT and the hearing previously scheduled for August 29, 2018 is hereby cancelled. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 8/27/2018. (ak01) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
50 RESPONSE to Motion re 41 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss 38 Amended Complaint, filed by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M.. Replies due by 9/4/2018. (Duncan, Melissa) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
51 NOTICE by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office re 6 Plaintiff's MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 37 Response in Opposition to Motion, of Filing Exhibit 3 in Support of Defendant Sheriff's Response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3 − Starling Affidavit) (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
52 NOTICE by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office re 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 38 Amended Complaint, M.F.'s Claims, as Moot, of Filing Exhibit 2 in Support of his Motion to

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 10 of 15

09/04/2018 09/06/2018
09/06/2018
09/07/2018
09/07/2018
09/14/2018 09/18/2018 09/18/2018 09/18/2018 09/18/2018 09/18/2018 09/19/2018 09/19/2018

Dismiss M.F.'s Claims as Moot, for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 − Starling Affidavit) (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
53 REPLY to Response to Motion re 41 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss 38 Amended Complaint, filed by School Board of Palm Beach County. (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
54 NOTICE by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F. re: Joint Consent to Court Inspection (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
55 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Modify Expert Report Disclosure Date by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. Responses due by 9/20/2018 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
56 RESPONSE in Opposition re 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 38 Amended Complaint, M.F.'s Claims, as Moot, filed by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. Attorney Diana Leigh Martin added to party H. C.(pty:pla). Replies due by 9/14/2018. (Martin, Diana) (Entered: 09/07/2018)
57 AGREED ORDER MODIFYING EXPERT REPORT DISCLOSURE DATE: granting 55 Joint Motion for Modification of Expert Report Disclosure Date. Expert Report Disclosure Deadline is modified to change the date from 9/13/2018 to 9/18/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 9/7/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 09/07/2018)
58 REPLY to Response to Motion re 47 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 38 Amended Complaint, M.F.'s Claims, as Moot, filed by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
59 Witness List by Palm Beach County School District.. (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
60 Exhibit List by Palm Beach County School District.. (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
61 Exhibit List for Preliminary Injunction Hearing by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.. (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
62 Witness List for Preliminary Injunction Hearing by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.. (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
63 Exhibit and Witness List by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), M. F... (Langino, Adam) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
64 Exhibit List for Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Amended to include exhibit numbers) by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.. (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 09/19/2018)
65 Witness List for Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Amended to include witness numbers) by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.. (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 09/19/2018)

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 11 of 15

09/24/2018 09/24/2018 09/25/2018 09/27/2018
09/27/2018
10/01/2018 10/03/2018 10/04/2018 10/04/2018

66 Exhibit List (Amended) for Preliminary Injunction Hearing by Palm Beach County School District.. (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 09/24/2018)
67 Witness List (Amended) for Preliminary Injunction Hearing by School Board of Palm Beach County.. (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 09/24/2018)
68 ORDER SETTING TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE REGARDING UPCOMING EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: (Telephonic Status Conference set for 9/27/2018 at 2:45 PM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman.) Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 9/25/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 09/25/2018)
69 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman: Telephone Status Conference regarding Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction held on 9/27/2018. Counsel report that the parties will be meeting next week to attempt to resolve the case and request a continuance of the Evidentiary Hearing. The Court will reset the Evidentiary Hearing for November 5, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. and a Telephonic Status Conference will be set for October 4, 2018 at 2:00 p.m. Written order to be issued. Total time in court: 15 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Melissa Marie Duncan, Sabarish P Neelakanta, Diana Leigh Martin for Plaintiffs; Richard A. Giuffreda for Defendant Bradshaw, Lisa A. Carmona, Jon Erik Bell, Laura Esterman Pincus for Defendant School Board of Palm Beach County. (Digital 14:49:53) (kza) (Entered: 09/27/2018)
70 ORDER RESETTING EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DE 6] AND SETTING TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE: (Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/5/2018 at 9:30 AM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman., Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/4/2018 at 2:00 PM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman.) Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 9/27/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 09/27/2018)
71 Statement of: Interest by United States of America (Marks, Megan) (Entered: 10/01/2018)
72 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Adriana Mihaela Jisa on behalf of Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. Attorney Adriana Mihaela Jisa added to party Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office(pty:dft). (Jisa, Adriana) (Entered: 10/03/2018)
73 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman: Telephone Status Conference held on 10/4/2018. Counsel provided update on possible settlement of case. A Status Conference will be set for October 24, 2018 at 2:00 p.m. Total time in court: 15 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Melissa Marie Duncan, Sabarish P Neelakanta, Adriana Mihaela Jisa, Jon Erik Bell, (Digital 14:10:41) (no00) (Entered: 10/04/2018)
74 PAPERLESS ORDER Setting Status Conference: An in−person Status Conference is set for 10/24/2018 at 2:00 PM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 10/4/2018. (no00) (Entered: 10/04/2018)

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 12 of 15

10/24/2018
11/01/2018 11/01/2018 11/15/2018 11/16/2018 11/16/2018 11/20/2018 11/20/2018

75 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman: Status Conference held on 10/24/2018. Counsel for the parties report that a settlement has been reached between all parties pending approval of the Palm Beach School Board at a public meeting on November 14, 2018. The parties will file a Consent to U.S. Magistrate Jurisdiction form on or before Friday, November 2, 2018. The settlement agreement and motion for preliminary approval will be filed by Friday, November 16, 2018. The evidentiary hearing set for Monday, November 5, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. is cancelled in light of all counsel's representations that the matter has been resolved. (Consent to U.S. Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction Deadline 11/2/2018., Settlement Agreement/Motion for Preliminary Approval due by 11/16/2018.), (Status Conference set for 11/28/2018 at 2:00 PM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman.). Total time in court: 18 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Melissa Marie Duncan, Sabarish P Neelakanta, Diana Leigh Martin for Plaintiffs; Richard A. Giuffreda for Defendant Sheriff, Jon Erik Bell for Defendant Palm Beach County School Board. (Digital 14:00:45) (kza) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
76 Notice and Consent to Jurisdiction US Magistrate Judge signed by all parties . Filed by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
77 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge William Matthewman for Trial and the entry of Final Judgment.. Judge William P. Dimitrouleas no longer assigned as presider/referral judge(s) in case. Signed by Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on 11/1/2018. See attached document for full details. (lk) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
78 Joint MOTION Conditionally Approve Settlement, Certify Class, Appoint Class Counsel & Set Fairness Hearing by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 11/15/2018)
79 ORDER granting 78 Joint Motion to Conditionally Certify Class, Preliminarily Approve Class Settlement, Appoint Class Counsel and Set Fairness Hearing. Fairness Hearing set for 3/5/2019 at 2:00 PM in West Palm Beach Division before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 11/16/2018. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
80 NOTICE by School Board of Palm Beach County Declaration of Service of Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement Upon U.S. Attorney General and Florida Attorney General Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1715 (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
81 NOTICE by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office re 79 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Defendant Sheriff's Declaration of Service of Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement Upon U.S. Attorney General and Florida Attorney General, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1715 (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
82 NOTICE by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office re 81 Notice (Other), Defendant Sheriff's Corrected Declaration of Service of Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement Upon U.S. Attorney General and Florida Attorney General, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1715 (Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 11/20/2018)

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 13 of 15

11/28/2018
02/28/2019 03/05/2019 03/06/2019 04/19/2019 04/29/2019

83 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman: Status Conference held on 11/28/2018. Status updates provided by Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Court notes for the record that there was a scrivener's error in the caption of [DE 78] Joint MOTION to Conditionally Approve Settlement, Certify Class, Appoint Class Counsel & Set Fairness Hearing and in the caption of [DE 79] ORDER granting 78 Joint Motion to Conditionally Certify Class, Preliminarily Approve Class Settlement, Appoint Class Counsel and Set Fairness Hearing which reflected that Ric Bradshaw, the Sheriff of Palm Beach County is being sued in his individual capacity which is incorrect and that Ric Bradshaw, the Sheriff of Palm Beach County is being sued in his official capacity only. The parties will confer on the issue of attorney's fees and file any appropriate motion. Total time in court: 13 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Sabarish P Neelakanta, Melissa Marie Duncan and Diana Leigh Martin for Plaintiffs, Jon Erik Bell for Defendant School Board of Palm Beach County, Adriana Mihaela Jisa for Defendant Bradshaw. (Digital 14:05:16) (kza) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
84 Joint MOTION for Settlement Approval, Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. Responses due by 3/14/2019 (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
85 PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge William Matthewman: Fairness Hearing held on 3/5/2019. Argument held. The Court found the settlement: fair, reasonable and adequate. The Court will grant the Joint Motion and Memorandum for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Appointment of Class Counsel and Certification of Class [DE 84]. Written order to be issued. Total time in court: 32 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Sabarish P Neelakanta, Melissa Marie Duncan, Diana Leigh Martin for Plaintiffs, Richard A. Giuffreda for Defendant Ric Bradshaw and Jon Erik Bell for Defendant School Board of Palm Beach County. Court Reporter: Diane Miller, 561−514−3728 / Diane_Miller@flsd.uscourts.gov. (Digital 14:03:25) (kza) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
86 FINAL ORDER APPROVING CLASS−ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, APPOINTMENT OF CLASS COUNSEL AND CERTIFICATION OF CLASS: granting 84 Joint MOTION for Settlement Approval, Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel and denying as moot 6 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 41 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and 47 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The action is dismissed with prejudice. Closing Case. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 3/6/2019. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 03/06/2019)
87 Plaintiff's MOTION for Attorney Fees & Costs by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F., T. M.. Responses due by 5/3/2019 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Sabarish Neelakanta, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Melissa Duncan, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Theodore Leopold, # 4 Exhibit Declaration of Jack Scarola, # 5 Exhibit Spadaro v. Miramar, # 6 Exhibit Hankinson v. R.T.G.)(Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
88 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer as to 87 Plaintiff's MOTION for Attorney Fees & Costs by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, School Board of Palm Beach County. (Jisa, Adriana) (Entered:

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 14 of 15

04/29/2019
05/29/2019 05/30/2019 06/03/2019
06/03/2019 06/04/2019 06/04/2019 06/11/2019 06/11/2019

04/29/2019)
89 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 88 Joint Motion of Defendants Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw and the School Board of Palm Beach County for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Fees and Costs. The Court notes that Plaintiff has no objection to a 7−day extension of time, but objects to a 30−day extension. However, based upon the good cause shown, the Court will grant the 30−day extension requested by Defendants. Defendants shall file their responses to 87 Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Fees and Costs on or before June 3, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 4/29/2019. (no00) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
90 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Response to Plaintiffs' Verified Motion for Attorneys' Fees an dCosts [DE87] by Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. (Jisa, Adriana) (Entered: 05/29/2019)
91 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 90 Defendant Sheriff's Motion for Leave to File Response to Plaintiffs' Verified Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs in Excess of Page Limit. The Defendants' response may be up to 40 pages in length. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 5/30/2019. (no00) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
92 RESPONSE in Opposition re 87 Plaintiff's MOTION for Attorney Fees & Costs filed by Palm Beach County Sheriff. Replies due by 6/10/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U)(Giuffreda, Richard) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
93 Defendant's RESPONSE to 87 Plaintiff's MOTION for Attorney Fees & Costs by School Board of Palm Beach County. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit of J. Erik Bell, Esq.)(Bell, Jon) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
94 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
95 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 94 Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and costs. Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their 87 Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs on or before June 17, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 6/4/2019. (no00) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
96 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 06/11/2019)
97 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 96 Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Enlargement of Page Limit re: Reply to Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. Plaintiffs' reply in support of their Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs may be up to 20 pages in length. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 6/11/2019. (no00)

Case: 9:18-cv-80810 As of: 01/17/2020 04:10 PM EST 15 of 15

06/17/2019
10/07/2019 10/10/2019 10/10/2019 10/10/2019
10/22/2019 10/25/2019 12/03/2019

(Entered: 06/11/2019)
98 REPLY to Response to Motion re 87 Plaintiff's MOTION for Attorney Fees & Costs filed by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.), H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supp. Declaration of Attorney Neelakanta & Responses to Specific Objections, # 2 Exhibit Supp. Declaration of Attorney Duncan & Responses to Specific Objections, # 3 Exhibit Supp. Declaration of Attorney Leopold & Responses to Specific Objections)(Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
99 NOTICE of Change of Address by Sabarish P Neelakanta (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 10/07/2019)
100 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 87 Plaintiffs' Verified Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Joint Notice Deadline 10/24/2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 10/10/2019. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
101 NOTICE of Change of Address by Sabarish P Neelakanta (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
102 CLERK'S NOTICE − Attorney Admissions has not updated address and/or email information for attorney(s) Sabarish Neelakanta re 101 Notice of Change of Address. Attorney Sabarish Neelakanta is directed to update their information in CM/ECF. Pursuant to CM/ECF Administrative Procedures, upon the change of a Users e−mail address, mailing address, telephone or fax number, the User shall update their mailing address, telephone and fax numbers in CM/ECF Maintain User Account. (cco) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
103 NOTICE by School Board of Palm Beach County Regarding Apportionment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Between Defendants (Bell, Jon) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
104 JUDGMENT on Attorneys Fees and Costs. Fees and Costs awarded to Plaintiffs against Defendants. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on 10/25/2019. See attached document for full details. (kza) (Entered: 10/25/2019)
105 SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT by All Others Similarly Situated, H. C.(a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C. ), M. F. (Neelakanta, Sabarish) (Entered: 12/03/2019)

 
 Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/21/2018 Page 1 of 72

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Division: Case No.:

H.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.; M.F., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Asisa Rolle; T.M., by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jessica Joiner, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

v.

RIC BRADSHAW, Palm Beach County Sheriff, in his individual and official capacity; MICHAEL GAUGER, Chief Deputy of the Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office, in his individual capacity; ALFONSO STARLING, Corrections Operation Major for the Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office, in his individual capacity; FRANK MILO, Corrections Security Major for the Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office, in his individual capacity; SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY.
Defendants.
CLASS-ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This class action civil rights lawsuit challenges the solitary confinement of children
who are charged as adults, most of whom have not been convicted of any crime, at the Main
Detention Center ofthe Palm Beach County Jail ("Palm Beach County Jail" or "the Jail"), operated
by Defendant, the Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office ("Sheriffs Office").
2. While held in solitary confinement at the Jail, the Sheriffs Office and the
individually named Defendants subject these children to substantial risk of serious harm despite

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being well aware of the physical and psychological harm solitary confinement has on these children, and choosing to do nothing about it.
3. Defendants, the Palm Beach County School Board ("School Board"), the Sheriffs Office, and the individually named Defendants, acting in concert, also routinely deny these incarcerated children educational services, including services needed to address their disabilities. The Florida Constitution mandates the provision of education (FLA. CoNST., Art. IX, § l(a)), and the Sheriffs Office and School Board are statutorily required to provide children incarcerated at the Jail educational services. Accordingly, the Sheriffs Office and the School Board are legally mandated to provide access to education for these children, but have failed to do so.
4. These practices constitute serious violations of the children's constitutional rights, including their rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; their rights to procedural due process prior to any deprivation of their liberty or property interests as afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment; their rights to receive educational services and programming under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"); and their rights to be free from discrimination as provided by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
5. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, and those children similarly situated, pray for injunctive and declaratory relief and demand an end to these detrimental and toxic policies and practices. Without immediate intervention, these children will continue suffering inhumane treatment, physical and psychological harm, and acute and long term mental health issues from the prolonged isolation.
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JURISDICTION
6. This action arises under the United States Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment provision for procedural due process, and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes actions to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights, privileges and immunities secured to all Plaintiffs and Class Members by the laws of the United States. This action is also brought on behalf of certain Plaintiffs and Sub-Class members with a qualifying disability pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482.
7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as well as any claims seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Rules 57 and 65 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has authority to award costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
8. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and based thereon alleges that in engaging in the conduct alleged herein, Defendants acted with the intent to injure, vex, annoy and harass Plaintiff, and subjected Plaintiffto cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs rights with the intention of causing Plaintiff injury and depriving it of its constitutional rights. As a result of the forgoing, Plaintiff seeks exemplary and punitive damages against the individual Defendants.
VENUE
9. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(l) and (b)(2). Defendants have their official residence in the Southern District ofFlorida.
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A substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims in this action occurred in this district.
PARTIES
I. The Named Plaintiffs 10. H.C. is a 16-year-old boy originally from Honduras currently detained in solitary
confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail. H.C. is being held at the Jail prior to his trial status and has not been convicted of any crime related to his present incarceration. H.C. has continuously been held in solitary confinement since December 1, 2017, when he entered the Jail - more than seven months ago. H. C. received no procedural due process protections prior to his placement in solitary confinement, nor has he received any periodic review of his classification. H.C is at substantial risk of serious harm to his physical and mental health because of the Sheriffs Office solitary confinement policies. He is also being excluded from receiving proper educational instruction and services compared to children in general population. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian, Jenny C.
11. M.F. is an African-American 17-year-old boy detained at the Palm Beach County Jail. M.F. is currently being held at the Jail prior to his trial status and has not been convicted of any crime related to his present incarceration. M.F. was continuously held in solitary confinement for approximately six months. M.F. has a disability as defined by the IDEA, ADA and Section 504. M.F. never received any procedural due process protections prior to his placement in solitary confinement, nor did he received any periodic review of his classification. M.F. was, and continues to be, at substantial risk of serious harm to his physical and mental health because of the Sheriffs Office solitary confinement policies. M.F. was also excluded from receiving proper educational instruction and services compared to children in general population while in solitary
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confinement. M.F. continues to be at risk of being denied an education, or to receive services or accommodations because of his disability as a consequence of the Sheriffs Office solitary confinement policies. M.F. appears in this action through his mother and guardian, Asisa Rolle.
12. T.M. is an African-American 17-year-old boy detained at the Palm Beach County Jail. T.M. is being held at the Jail prior to his trial and has not been convicted of any crime related to his present incarceration. T.M. was continuously held in solitary confinement at the Jail for 20 days. T.M. has a disability as defined by the IDEA, ADA and Section 504. T.M. never received any procedural due process protections prior to his placement in solitary confinement, nor did he received any periodic review of his classification. T.M. was, and continues to be, at substantial risk of serious harm to his physical and mental health because of the Sheriffs Office solitary confinement policies. T.M. was also excluded from receiving proper educational instruction and services compared to children in general population while in solitary confinement. T.M. continues to be at risk of being denied an education, or to receive services or accommodations because of his disability as a consequence of the Sheriffs Office solitary confinement policies. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian, Jessica Joiner.
II. The Defendants 13. Ric Bradshaw is the Sheriff of Palm Beach County and head of the Palm Beach
County Sheriffs Office. The Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office manages the Palm Beach County Jail, a county jail facility located in West Palm Beach, Florida, that houses both pre-trial and sentenced adult inmates, as well as direct-filed children (i.e., children charged for crimes as adults). Sheriff Bradshaw has final governing authority for Palm Beach County Jail and has supervisory authority for all unconstitutional policies and practices challenged by the Plaintiffs.
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Sheriff Bradshaw is sued in his individual and official capacity. The Palm Beach County Jail receives federal funding and is a public entity within the meaning of Title II of the ADA.
14. Michael Gauger is the Chief Deputy for the Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office. Chief Deputy Gauger is responsible for the management of the Correctional Operations for the Palm Beach County Jail, and is personally involved in authorizing, maintaining, and enforcing the unconstitutional solitary confinement policies and customs challenged by Plaintiffs. ChiefDeputy Gauger is sued in his individual capacity.
15. Alfonso Starling is the Corrections Operations Major for the Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office. Major Starling oversees the units engaged in correctional standards and staff development, correctional support services, and inmate management of the Palm Beach County Jail, and is personally involved in authorizing, maintaining, and enforcing the unconstitutional solitary confinement policies and customs challenged by Plaintiffs. Major Starling is sued in his individual capacity.
16. Frank Milo is the Corrections Security Major for the Palm Beach County Jail. Major Milo oversees the management of the Main Detention Center of the Palm Beach County Jail and is personally involved in authorizing, maintaining, and enforcing the unconstitutional solitary confinement policies and customs challenged by Plaintiffs. Major Milo is sued in his individual capacity.
17. The School Board of Palm Beach County is a public entity governing the public schools of the Palm Beach County School District ("School District"), pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 1001.42 (2017). The Palm Beach County Jail is located in Palm Beach County, Florida, and the Palm Beach County School District is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all free public schools in Palm Beach County, including being the educational provider for
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incarcerated individuals held at the Palm Beach County Jail. The School District is a recipient of federal funds for its educational programs. The School District has ultimate responsibility for the promulgation and enforcement of all school district policies and procedures and is responsible for the overall management of educational services within Palm Beach County, including those required to be given to incarcerated children.
FACTS Solitary Confinement ofChildren at the Palm Beach County Jail
18. Located in West Palm Beach, Florida, the Palm Beach County Jail is a 2,166-bed correctional facility that primarily houses pre-trial, un-sentenced adults, as well as direct-filed children facing adult charges. "Direct-filed" male children are housed pre-trial on the top floor of the Jail, separate from the adult prisoners, while female children are typically held in the medical unit. On information and belief, as of May 31, 2018, approximately 21 children are being held at the Jail on direct-file charges.
19. The children held in solitary confinement are placed inside small cells approximately 6' x 12' -for 23 to 24 hours a day. They are often held in solitary confinement for weeks, several months, or in some instances, more than a year while their cases remain pending. The cell contains a combined toilet and sink, a stainless steel desk and bolted-down stool, a steel bed with a thin mattress, and an overhead fluorescent light. The cell is entered through a large metal door which swings out. The door has two small plexiglass windows, one situated toward the floor and one toward the top of the door, which are scratched to such an extent that they are impossible to see through. The door has a metal panel slot that can only be unlocked from outside of the cell, through which food trays are passed.
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20. These children are permitted at most one hour, typically three days per week, of solitary recreation - time alone inside a caged basketball court, surrounded by concrete walls and metal fencing. Moreover, these children are permitted to shower only three times per week, which often occurs prior to recreation. Consequently, the children end up being returned to confinement dirty, with no opportunity to shower again for days.
21. At issue in this case are Defendants' operating procedures and practices allowing prisoners (including children) to be locked in solitary confinement for administrative and disciplinary concerns. Disciplinary solitary confinement is imposed for rule violations, such as making noise or fighting, or engaging in other rule violations, whereas administrative solitary confinement is supposed to be used only when a prisoner "poses a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, or other inmates." See Palm Beach Sheriffs Office Operating Procedures #919.00. However, direct-filed children report that the Sheriffs Office confines them in isolation when there are co-defendants ("keep-aways") in the same unit. There is no limitation placed on such administrative solitary confinement decisions, and children are being held indefinitely.
22. In both situations, the Sheriffs' Office provides no opportunity for the children to contest their placement in solitary prior to their confinement, nor are there any periodic reviews of their classification. Sheriffs Office operating procedures further require Defendants to take into consideration the physical, mental, social and educational maturity of the child prior to making classification decisions. Yet, children at the Jail are not interviewed, evaluated or assessed for any mental health or learning disabilities prior to or during their solitary confinement. On information and belief, the Sheriff Office and School Board have a policy and custom of failing to comply with these minimum standards with regard to children in solitary confinement.
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23. Moreover, children held in solitary confinement are required to be observed every 10 minutes, yet children report that no such observations are made. Rather, children are kept in their locked cells, a condition commonly referred to as "the Box" or "deadlock", with little to no interaction with other people. Children report that Sheriff's Office correctional officers remain in their desk area, only to emerge for their required obligations, such as delivering trays of food. Children in solitary confinement describe hours of calling out to Jail staff for water, to use the telephone, or to have some human interaction, only to have their pleas ignored, or receive threats of intimidation or removal to the mental health unit.
24. These children have no meaningful social interaction, educational access, environmental stimulation, basic human contact, access to music or television, and practically no ability to hear or see outside of their cells. Children coping with mental health disabilities receive no contact from mental health professionals regarding their well-being. The only avenues of communication for children in confinement are to speak through vents in their cells or yell loudly enough for others to hear them through the cell walls and doors.
25. Yet, ifthese children, many ofwhom already suffer from mental health issues, react adversely to their confinement by yelling, banging on their metal cell doors, or attempting conversation with other children, they are punished with loss of privileges, such as phone calls to their parents, or a trip to the "psych ward", where children report that they are taken to the mental health unit, stripped naked, and made to wear a paper gown for hours or days inside a cold, locked cell.
26. Nearly every aspect of solitary confinement at the Jail is dehumanizing. When children are first brought to solitary confinement, they are strip-searched and their personal
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property is taken from them. The deputies handcuff the children held in solitary confinement almost every time they are outside of their cells.
27. Frequently, the children report having difficulty sleeping, and being unable to maintain a normal day-night sleep cycle. The impairment to sleep have left many ofthese children confused, agitated, and vulnerable to hallucinatory psychoses.
28. Compounding these detrimental effects is a complete failure to provide access to basic educational services and denying those children with disabilities access to special education supports and services, responsibilities shared by the Sheriffs Office and the School District. The duty to educate children at the Jail is a joint effort by the Sheriffs Office and the School Board and embodied in a cooperative agreement discussing the responsibilities of each party to ensure delivery of appropriate educational services. The agreement at issue, "Cooperative Agreement between The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida and The Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office (Jail)" ("Education Agreement"), is dated July 1, 2016, and has been and continues to be in full force and effect through June 30, 2018.
29. On information and belief, no child in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail receives regular educational instruction comparable to their peers. The children in solitary confinement may receive, at most, packets of work shoved under a cell door or have brief moments to speak with a teacher standing outside of their locked door. These children cannot view educational instruction because the windows on their cell doors are scratched up to the point that it is nearly impossible to discern what is being written on the chalkboard, nor are they able to hear the teachers' lessons through the solid metal doors. Additionally, for children with disabilities, highly specialized instruction, accommodations, and appropriate related services are not offered or meaningfully available in solitary confinement.
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30. On information and belief, the School Board and Sheriffs Office, though aware of the substandard access to educational services available to children in solitary confinement and its obligation to provide quality educational services under federal and state law, has taken no measures to ensure substantial delivery of education to these children. In fact, the School Board and Sheriffs Office have moved some instruction to a separate classroom, outside of the central area of the wing with locked cells, entirely excluding the children in solitary confinement from instruction.
Risk ofHarm ofSolitary Confinement to Clzildren 31. Defined by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care as "the housing of an adult or juvenile with minimal rare meaningful contact with other individuals," solitary confinement is harmful to both adults and children. As children are still developing psychologically, neurologically, and socially, they are especially susceptible to psychological harm when they are isolated from others. 32. Evidence-based research universally agrees that children, like those housed in the Palm Beach County Jail in solitary confinement, suffer serious harm to their mental health. Children in solitary confinement have committed suicide, developed psychosis and post-traumatic stress disorders, and have experienced major depression, agitation, suicidal ideation, suicidal intent, self-mutilation, and suicidal behavior. Research into suicides at juvenile correctional facilities, for example, shows that the majority of children who commit suicide had a history of being placed in isolation. Depression, which is prevalent among children held in solitary, moreover, carries a 10% to 15% mortality rate. Thus, solitary confinement increases the risk of suicide substantially compared to the general population.
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33. Children emerging from solitary confinement often develop long-term trust issues with adults, including paranoia, anger and hatred. Consequently, these children have difficulty fonning therapeutic relationships necessary to address mental health concerns resulting from solitary confinement. Medical research on adolescent brains further explains why children are more vulnerable to the risk of long-term harm. In the adolescent brain, the connections between the frontal lobe and the mid-brain have not fully developed. As a result, trauma to children can cause permanent changes in brain development and create a higher risk of developing pervasive psychiatric conditions like paranoia and anxiety. As solitary confinement is a significant traumatic experience for children, there is a high likelihood of causing permanent changes to their brains.
34. Furthermore, research shows that more than 60% of children within the criminal justice system suffer from pre-existing trauma or mental health issues. The likelihood of latent trauma in these children makes the risk of harm precipitated by solitary confinement even worse. Combining the children's past trauma, mental illnesses, and disabilities with solitary confinement results in exponentially detrimental outcomes.
35. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges support the end of solitary confinement for youth and have each called on correctional facilities to halt the use of solitary confinement of children. International bodies, such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations, have recognized the harmful psychological effects ofsolitary confinement on children, and have even likened it to torture. Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring the death penalty for juveniles to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment), Graham v. Florida,
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560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), have also focused attention on the relative immaturity of the adolescent brain. It is clear that this developing neuroscience on the effects of solitary confinement on children has had profound impact on how the criminal justice system, and courts, view the treatment of children in the correctional setting.
36. In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice has ended the use of solitary confinement of children in all federal prisons following a 2012 report finding that "[n]owhere is the damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than when it involves solitary confinement." Similarly, many state and city officials are implementing bans on solitary confinement in adult jails and prisons. For example, the Onondaga County Justice Center in Syracuse, New York, pursuant to a 2017 settlement agreement, stopped the use of disciplinary isolation for children held in the facility. At Rikers Island, the second largest jail in the country, the City Corrections Commissioner and Mayor banned the use of solitary confinement for children in 2014. A number of other jurisdictions, including Hinds County Jail in Mississippi, Rutherford County in Tennessee, Los Angeles County, and the New York Department of Con·ections, have also adopted reforms or entered into agreements abolishing solitary confinement of children.
37. Despite this national trend to eliminate solitary confinement of children, the Sheriffs Office continues to utilize this archaic method to contain direct-filed children under its care.
Defendants are Fully Aware ofthe Risks ofSolitary Confinement to Children and Have Deliberately Chosen to Ignore Those Risks
38. In August 2015, the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA), in conjunction with the Liman Program of Yale Law School, published a report regarding solitary confinement, which addressed the national concern over solitary isolation and supported efforts to
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"limit or end extended isolation." I Similarly, in April 2016, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) adopted a position statement that all juveniles should be excluded from solitary confinement of any duration because isolation is particularly harmful for juveniles. Defendants have ready access to these industry guidelines concerning solitary confinement and should consult these best practices as a matter of course.
39. Even more confounding is that confining children in solitary has been shown to be counterproductive to the safety and good order desired at the Palm Beach County Jail. Research shows that isolation increases misbehavior, agitation, and aggression in children, prompting many correctional facilities to replace the practice with positive behavior management strategies for children in their custody, which, in tum, has reduced rates of violence and misbehavior. These institutions, as a last resort, may use brief, temporary confinement - measured in hours and not days, months, or years - in conjunction with appropriate mental health facilitators, and only for situations in which imminent danger to the child or another person is present. To the contrary, the Sheriffs Office effectively ignores best practices in the management of children within a correctional setting, exposing these children to dehumanizing, unnecessary and often-times lengthy captivity in isolation.
40. Jail staff are required to document and report through the chain of command any prisoner who appears to them, or any staff member, to be in need of mental health interventions. However, the process of mental health intervention at the Jail is more regularly used as a threat for misbehavior, as it involves being taken to the mental health unit, stripped of all clothing and
I Liman Program & Ass'n of State Corr. Adm'rs, Time-In-Cell: The ASCA-Liman 2014 National Survey of Administrative Segregation in Prison, 15 (Aug. 2015), available at https://law.yale.edu/system/files/arealcenter/liman/document/ascaliman administrativesegregatiomeport.pdf (last visited June 7, 20 18).
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belongings, being forced to wear only a paper gown, and being housed in a cell near adults exhibiting extreme behaviors.
41. On information and belief, children in solitary confinement at the Jail routinely try to bring attention to the conditions at the Jail, but such complaints have been routinely ignored. Staff at the Jail, moreover, discourage children from writing grievances, or otherwise fail to respond or tum in the children's grievances. Some also respond to grievances or other complaints by stating that nothing is going to change with their conditions of confinement, further undermining and foreclosing efforts to seek redress administratively. On information and belief, all grievance requests from the children in solitary to be removed from confinement and be given access to education have been denied by Defendants.
The Defendants' Disciplinary Confinement Policies and Practices Discriminate Against Children with Disabilities
42. Placing vulnerable prisoners, like children, and/or those with mental health issues, intellectual disabilities or brain injuries into solitary confinement is "the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe." Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
43. Defendants regularly house children with disabilities in solitary confinement to a greater degree than children without disabilities. These children are disabled, and are qualified to participate in education and programming, but are denied benefits from these programs due to their solitary confinement. Defendants violate the ADA and Section 504 by housing children with disabilities in solitary confinement, failing to accommodate each child's particular vulnerabilities to the isolating conditions, denying them meaningful access to programs and services, and failing to identify and/or recognize behavior related to their disabilities.
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44. At the Jail, children with mental health disabilities are disciplined for nonconforming and erratic behaviors related to their conditions, some of which could have been avoided if Defendants provided adequate mental health care or accommodations. For instance, children diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder may exhibit impulsive behavior, such as fighting with peers. Instead of designing a system with reasonable accommodations meant to positively reinforce preferred behavior or use mental health services to intervene and deescalate a situation, the Jail punishes these children with solitary confinement.
45. The isolating conditions these children are exposed to and the complete lack of any accommodations cause symptomatic behaviors to escalate, leading to disciplinary infractions. In response, these children are locked in isolation for longer periods of time, creating a never ending cycle of escalating mental health-related behavior and punishment for that behavior. Defendants' failure to make reasonable accommodations to their disciplinary policy and practice, discriminates against children with disabilities.
46. Each day in disciplinary confinement results in the loss of legally-required education and opportunities to participate in programming and services. Defendants' continued failure to integrate children with disabilities into the services, programs, and activities at the Jail constitutes a violation of the integration mandate of the ADA.
47. Accordingly, Defendants' policies and practices of solitary confinement ofchildren with disabilities at the Jail directly violate the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Children in Solitary Confinement at tlze Jail are Denied Access to Meaningful Educational Services
48. Under the Education Agreement, the Sheriffs Office is obligated to provide both a safe environment and the educational space for the provision of educational services to incarcerated children, so as to comply with all state and federal laws, such as the IDEA and Section
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Sheriffs Office must also plan activities which do not conflict with the School Board's provision of a minimum of 300 minutes of daily instruction, 250 days per calendar year. The School Board has the obligation under the Education Agreement to provide the children at the Jail an education that meets state and federal laws, provide resource personnel for special education students and English Language Learner students, provide educational materials, maintain attendance records of students, and deliver an educational program for students 300 minutes each school day under the school calendar.
49. Collaboration between the Sheriffs Office and the School Board is also required under the Education Agreement, including communication to effectuate educational services, transition planning for youth leaving the Jail, and meeting requirements of the former No Child Left Behind (now Every Student Succeeds Act) federal education mandates. These requirements demonstrate the awareness and intent of both the Sheriffs Office and the School Board to deliver sufficient educational services to the children at the Jail. Despite that awareness, the Sheriffs Office and the School Board routinely deny meaningful access to educational programming to children held in solitary confinement.
50. On the contrary, children in solitary confinement are systematically denied access to education and special education. Children held in solitary confinement are locked in their cells for the duration of the school day. They cannot see through the windows in the cell doors. They cannot hear through the metal doors of their cells. They receive packets of work shoved under their doors. They have limited access to educational materials and books. They do not receive classroom instruction.
51. When children are informed that they will be subject to solitary confinement, Defendants do not evaluate the impact of the confinement on their schooling. Children placed in
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disciplinary confinement receive no notice that when accused of misbehavior, isolation will result in a complete denial of meaningful educational instruction, or that they will be cut off from their regular class work. Children placed in administrative confinement, furthermore, are also afforded no procedural due process and are denied access to these education services for seemingly limitless amounts of time. Even when an infraction or confinement reason has nothing to do with school, children are removed from all education and related services and programming without any notice or opportunity to be heard.
52. State and local juvenile and adult correctional facilities are required to comply with the IDEA. Yet, children with IEPs in solitary confinement at the Jail are denied a free appropriate public education. Delivery of instruction cannot be met through a metal door where children cannot see or hear. A student with intellectual disabilities held in confinement cannot receive the required differentiated instruction while isolated in a cement cell. Minimal time with a teacher on the other side of the locked cell does not enable special education students to meet IEP goals. A student with a specific learning disability in solitary confinement cannot receive the highly specialized instruction required to meaningfully deliver educational programming.
53. The children who request additional support in school are largely ignored, minimally attended to, and given easier work if they ask too many questions. Because of these repeated failures to provide meaningful education, the children in solitary confinement do not demonstrate proficiency in academic or behavioral goals on their IEPs.
54. Moreover, Defendants deny due process to children with disabilities in solitary confinement by failing to determine whether a child's behavior is a manifestation of their disabilities. Under the IDEA, a child with disabilities is entitled to a manifestation determination if they will be excluded from school for 10 consecutive days or more, or if the child is subjected
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to series of disciplinary removals totaling more than 10 days in a school year. In that event, a meeting of the relevant members of the child's IEP team must be held, after inviting the child's parents to determine if behavior resulting in the discipline is a manifestation of the child's disability. If so, the school must return the child to class, and develop appropriate supports to address the behavior. In the alternative, if the child's IEP is not being properly implemented, the removal from the educational setting will not be permitted. None of these procedural protections are provided to those children with disabilities who are housed in solitary confinement at the Jail.
55. Likewise, children with unidentified disabilities in solitary confinement are not evaluated and accommodated for these disabilities and children with existing disabilities are not re-evaluated to ensure delivery of appropriate educational services, as required by the IDEA.
56. Furthermore, children held in isolation at the Jail and protected under the ADA and Section 504 do not receive accommodations formulated to allow them access to educational cun-iculum. For example, a packet of worksheets slid under a metal cell door does not provide access for a student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder who may need assignments to be broken down into smaller items. Likewise, a teacher standing outside of a locked door for a few minutes does not satisfy an accommodation such as checking for comprehension or encouragement to stay on task. Without these necessary accommodations, the children are denied rights under Section 504, requiring access to educational cun-iculum.
Defendants have a Pattern and Practice of Unlawful Deprivations in the Solitary Confinement of Children
57. The deplorable conditions of solitary confinement of children at the Jail are not isolated incidents. There is a clear thread, with unifying similarities, not only for children cun-ently held in solitary confinement at the Jail, but also for those who previously had to endure the inhumane practices. All ofthese children were or are being held at the Jail in solitary confinement
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as pre-trial detainees; all ofthem have histories ofabuse, trauma, or disabilities, and did not receive any mental health treatment or counseling; all of them experience some form of physical and/or mental harm because of the solitary confinement conditions; all were denied any due process protections and none were given opportunities to engage in the education and programming offered to their peers; and all special education, highly specialized instruction, accommodations, and related services, were, as a matter of course, systematically denied to these children because of the solitary confinement policies implemented at the Jail.
Individual Allegations ofPlaintiffs Currently Held at the Jail I. Plaintiff H.C. 58. Sixteen year old H.C. lived with his mom, with whom he is very close. He enjoys reading and spending time outside. H.C. is an English Language Leamer student who requires additional assistance from his teachers to be successful in school. 59. H.C. entered the Jail on December 1, 2017, at which time he was immediately placed in solitary confinement. When H. C. asked the deputies why he could not be with the other children in general population, he was told that he had keep-aways and would be held in solitary confinement. 60. H.C. was not given any notice or opportunity to be heard before being placed in solitary confinement. H.C. was not given notice that he would not be able to attend school with his peers as a result of the solitary confinement. He was not notified that he could appeal his solitary confinement status, nor was he given a copy of inmate rules from the Jail describing the grievance policy. He has been given no end date to his isolation, and instead is left to languish indefinitely in his cell.
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61. Solitary confinement feels lifeless for H.C. He is depressed, feels extreme stress, and sadness as a result of solitary confinement. He finds himself sleeping throughout the day to attempt to manage the endless isolation.
62. H.C. tries to use his opportunities for recreation when he can, although he is alone inside a walled-in basketball court. He is given his daily meals on a tray through a slot in his cell door. H.C.'s calls to his mom are his only permitted social contact. H.C. is allowed brief showers, lasting no more than 15 minutes, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
63. It is difficult for H.C. to see through the windows in his cell as they are scratched to such an extent that it is impossible to view anything outside of his cell. H.C. can only hear voices on the outside of his cell if the speaker is projecting loudly.
64. If H.C. wants to drink water, he tries to offer his cup through the flap in his door, hoping a deputy will fill it with water from the drinking fountain. Otherwise, he is left with trying to drink the water from the sink adjoining the toilet in his cell, which H.C. says has an unusual smell and bad taste. Some deputies will fill his water cup, but others ignore his requests, telling him, "I'm not your mom."
65. For school, H.C. is given worksheets from teachers in the school under his cell door, but the papers are in English, and H.C. must wait for a teacher who can communicate with him to offer assistance. He does not understand most of what is being said even when he can hear a teacher.
66. H.C. is uncertain as to whether it is acceptable for Jail staff to hit children at the Jail. On one occasion, approximately three weeks ago, there was a fight on the unit. After breaking up the fight, the Jail staff came into H.C.'s cell, apparently because he was too close to his locked cell door during the fight. Multiple Jail staffentered his cell, grabbed H.C. 's arm and held it behind
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his back, shoved a knee into his neck, and punched him in the face, leaving a mark. H.C. witnessed a similar incident with another child also held in solitary confinement.
II. Plaintiff M.F. 67. Seventeen year old M.F. loves listening to, singing, and writing music. He misses being with his family. When he gets out ofjail he hopes to go to college to become an architect. 68. M.F. is a pretrial detainee and will remain at the Jail until the resolution of his criminal case. M.F. has been held at the Jail since January 17, 2018. He was placed in solitary administrative confinement for six months due to keep away conditions with co-defendant children. 69. M.F. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Conduct Disorder. He is prescribed medication to deal with his mental health issues. The jail is aware of M.F.'s mental health needs, as he entered from the juvenile detention center and was placed directly in the mental health unit of the Jail. 70. M.F. reports that his experience in the mental health unit was traumatic. He was stripped of all clothing, possessions, and confined to a freezing cold cell for 24 hours a day. For the first 2 days of his stay in the mental health unit, M.F. was not even given a paper gown, but left naked with just a "suicide blanket." M.F. was not allowed access to educational programming, showers, recreation, phone calls, or visits while held in the mental health unit. M.F. stayed in the mental health unit at the Jail for 3 days before being moved to solitary administrative confinement, where he was confined for six months. However, despite receiving medication and counseling prior to his arrival at the Jail, he has not received medication or therapy, even while in confinement. He is an individual with a disability as defined by the IDEA, ADA and Section 504.
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71. In school prior to the Jail, M.F. obtained services through an IEP for a speech impairment, had a Behavior Intervention Plan, and received accommodations to address his individual educational needs. M.F.' s disabilities affect his ability to complete school work, pay attention, follow directions, and make appropriate decisions. Since his arrival at the Jail, he has received no educational services, including those previously provided for through his IEP. He never received a notice or a hearing about prohibition from education classes as a condition of administrative confinement. M.F. previously earned his GED, but he is still entitled to educational services and related services through his IEP, though none have been provided. Defendants have held no IEP meeting with M.F. to explore the delivery of educational or related services.
72. In isolation, M.F. only received visits from his attorneys. He received his meals through a flap in the metal door of his cell. He could not lift himself up enough to see out of the top window in the door of his cell and both that window and the one close to the ground are scratched so badly that he was unable to see through either ofthem. Unless someone was speaking loudly and clearly on the other side of his door, he could not hear them properly.
73. M.F. also has an injured leg, for which a doctor outside of the Jail previously prescribed him the use of a leg brace with a metal rod. Upon entering the Jail, the nursing staff confirmed with the community doctor that the leg brace was needed. However, after approximately one month in solitary confinement, deputies searched his cell and took away the leg brace because ofthe metal rod. No replacement brace was offered and, although M.F.'s leg is not fully healed, he has been given no additional medical attention.
74. M.F. felt like he was "going crazy" in the Box. M.F. enjoys reading, but rarely received new books, so he re-read the same books over and over again. He started to talk to himself while in the Box. He passed the time in the Box by pacing or role playing- audibly acting out
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scenes from television or movies. M.F. only went out of his cell for recreation a few times in his six months in isolation. He was seldom offered recreation and he did not ask to go because he felt that the hours pass easier if he was not aware of the distinction between day and night. He began having visual hallucinations and saw the words on the pages of his books "wiggle" and the pages move independently.
75. M.F. exhibited symptoms that directly correlated with his placement in solitary confinement and the accompanying social deprivation. M.F. was irritable, agitated, and anxious. He felt completely cut off from others and discouraged about his future. He had nothing to do in his cell. He could not sleep at night because he was not given his prescribed medication and because he heard banging from the cell next to him. M.F. was not been able to receive any meaningful therapy or counseling services in the Jail while in solitary confinement. No mental health workers came to his cell. Prior to placing him in isolation, no one from the Jail spoke with M.F. about his disabilities. M.F. 's mother received a letter from the Sheriffs Office upon his entry into the Jail requesting consent for a mental health examination, which made M.F. and his mother believe that M.F. would soon begin receiving medication and counseling for his mental health conditions. However, that treatment did not occur.
76. M.F. filed a grievance requesting that he be freed from solitary confinement and that he be allowed to receive any educational programming or services. After several weeks of not receiving any response, M.F. filed another grievance asking for a status on his previous grievance request. The Sheriffs office responded that they were not aware of any grievances that he filed, and stating that he is in solitary confinement because of the "keep separates" in the Jail. Despite the fact that Sheriffs Office policy does not require grievances to be sent to a specific department within the Jail, the response also requested that M.F. write another grievance to
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classification concerning any housing changes. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, M.F. wrote a grievance to classification, but has yet to receive any formal response. Rather, M.F. was told by a deputy that he would not have any success in changing his housing status by filing the grievances because of the other co-defendant children housed in the Jail.
77. After six months in confinement, M.F. was eventually placed in the general population with the other children when a co-defendant was moved off his floor.
III. PlaintiffT.M 78. T.M. is a 17-year-old boy who has been at the Jail for approximately five months. T.M. has an IEP in school for specific learning disability and language impairment. T.M. has a qualifying disability under the IDEA, ADA and Section 504. 79. T.M. received a disciplinary report after an altercation with another child. As the argument was escalating, a deputy was on duty nearby, but did not intervene until a physical fight occurred. Although the other child hit him first, the deputy on duty said that T.M. was the aggressor. T.M. received a disciplinary report and a consequence of20 days in disciplinary solitary confinement. The other child did not receive any disciplinary report. 80. Disciplinary solitary confinement was difficult for T.M. He could not sleep while in solitary confinement. He could not see out of the scratched up windows in his cell. He could hear when people on the other side of his door spoke loudly. He talked to himself and imagined stories in his head to pass the time. He was not permitted to have any recreation or telephone calls. In disciplinary solitary confinement, T.M. was allowed to take showers on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, for no more than five minutes. That 15 minutes per week of shower time was the only time T.M. would be out of his cell each week. During disciplinary solitary confinement, T.M. experienced complete isolation.
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81. School offered no respite for T.M. while in solitary confinement. Teachers would slide worksheets on the side of his door, but he did not complete them. No changes were made to T.M.'s instruction as a result ofhis solitary confinement status.
82. T.M. was not visited by a medical or mental health professional while in solitary confinement. T.M. had spinal surgery for scoliosis in May 2018 and continues to experience pain. However, he has received no medical treatment while at the Jail.
83. T.M. was "houseman" for two months prior to his disciplinary report. In order to achieve this position, he had to demonstrate a positive behavior record. Being houseman meant that T.M. had good behavior and was given additional responsibilities. His positive track record was not taken into account when T.M. was placed in disciplinary solitary confinement. He did not have the opportunity to challenge the confinement decision nor was he made aware of the opportunity to grieve the consequence.
Individual Allegations ofChildren Previously Held in Solitary Confinement at the Jail 84. Plaintiffs are not the only children that Defendants have held in solitary confinement. Other examples ofthe Defendants' practice are set forth in~~ 85-144 below. Though no longer held at the Jail, the experiences ofthese former child detainees illustrate the toxic system of solitary confinement at the Jail, and deprivations of due process, access to education and services, and detrimental isolation accompanying that harm. I. Plaintiff J.E. 85. Sixteen year old J.E. likes basketball and reading. He misses spending time with his family. Prior to being incarcerated, J.E. lived with his mom in Lake Worth, Florida. When J.E. gets out of the Palm Beach County Jail, he wants to go to school and would like to be a welder when he grows up.
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86. J.E. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Conduct Disorder, and Mood Disorder since he was about 12 years old. J.E. has a Section 504 Plan (which provides a blueprint of supports designed to remove barriers for students with disabilities, so that the student has equal access to educational curriculum) in school based on his disabilities, and before being incarcerated at the Jail, he was in the 101h Grade at Lake Worth High School. He struggles to do well in reading and writing without extra support from his teachers, however, he has received no evaluation for special education services under the IDEA.
87. J.E.'s disabilities make it difficult for him to pay attention for extended periods of time, and make him feel anxious, depressed, and impulsive. He is an individual with a disability as defined by the ADA and Section 504.
88. J.E. is a pretrial detainee and has been at the Jail since January 17, 2018. He will be held at the Jail until his criminal case is resolved.
89. J.E. was placed in solitary confinement for six months as an administrative placement due to having co-defendant children who are also incarcerated.
90. In solitary confinement, J.E. was permitted to take brief, 10-15 minute showers on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Opportunities to go to a walled-in basketball court for solitary recreation were sporadic. He did not have any visitors except from his attorneys and his probation officer. His only social contact in solitary confinement was through calls to his mom, but she was unable to speak to him as much as he would have liked because she could not talk while she was working.
91. In J.E.'s cell, there is a metal frame bed with a thin mattress, a single piece toilet and sink combination, and a stainless steel desk and stool that are bolted into the wall and floor. Meals are delivered through a locked, sliding box situated in the door. To drink water, J.E. must
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use the sink adjoining the toilet. The water is discolored if the taps are not run frequently and the water has an unusual, sewage-like odor. While he was in solitary confinement, some deputies would pennit J.E. to place his cup through the sliding box in the door and fill it from the drinking fountain water used by the children who are not in solitary. Other times, deputies refused to get J.E. drinking fountain water, stating, "I'm not your water boy." In solitary confinement, J.E. was required to be handcuffed each time he left his cell, including to showers, recreation, medical, and legal visits.
92. J.E. is completely under the control of the deputies at the Jail. For instance, J.E. is able to operate the light in his cell with a switch. However, on at least two occasions while he was in solitary confinement, a deputy responding at nighttime to noise on the wing, deliberately turned on brightly emanating emergency lights, and left them on so that the children were unable to sleep. Another time, while J.E. was in solitary confinement, he had been given pants to wear that deputies later decided were not the correct ones for him. Rather than exchange the pants for proper ones, they took his only pair, leaving him undressed for hours. In response to situations such as these, J.E. is curtly dismissed by deputies, who state, "You don't like it? Don't get yourself arrested."
93. J.E. had little to do in "the Box." Being locked in his cell for so long made him feel depressed, alone, and in his own words, "delusional". He paced the available 4'x10' area in his cell, saying that he often can't stop moving. He constantly felt that he did not have enough space. He lost approximately 20 pounds after entering solitary confinement at the Jail. He had recently begun to read, but did not receive many new books during his six months in the Box, so he was stuck re-reading the same books over and over again. The lack of stimulation became so bad that if he was not pacing, he just stared at the wall all day. J.E. hardly slept at night, and could get only
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a few hours of sleep before being woken up for the 3:00a.m. breakfast service at the Jail. J.E. says that isolation, "does something to you. It's crazy."
94. J.E. had begun having visual and auditory hallucinations in solitary confinement. He heard screaming at night and would stare at the blank wall in his cell and "watch" a full television show. Other children held at the Jail have covertly communicated with him, telling J.E. that if he banged on the door to get attention, he would be sent to the psych unit, where children have their clothing taken from them, are given a paper gown, and locked in a very cold mental health unit cell. Fearing reprisal, J.E. experienced frequent headaches and burning sensations in his throat at night, but did not tell anyone about them. No health care professional went to visit J.E. or talked to him about his physical or mental well-being.
95. J.E. exhibited symptoms that directly correlated with his placement in solitary confinement. J.E. felt stressed, anxious, angry, and hopeless. He rarely received visitors. No one from the Jail's mental health staff has ever checked on him while he was in isolation, despite the fact that he previously received counseling in the community. J.E.'s mother called the Jail to describe his disabilities and how they would worsen in confinement, but there was no change in his status or care.
96. In solitary confinement, J.E. could not meaningfully attend education classes or programming. He had no notice or hearing regarding the termination of typical education classes as a condition of administrative confinement. He sporadically received packets ofworksheets, slid to him under the door, for his education. J.E. could not see any class occurring outside ofhis cell as the small windows on his cell door is entirely scratched. J.E. could not hear the instruction very well as he had to stand and listen through the cracks around the door frame, and teachers who hold class on the bottom floor many meters away from the solitary confinement cells, do not speak at a
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volume loud enough to be heard through the door. Teachers did not help him with the worksheets, and he could not complete them on his own. J.E. tried to ask for help but he felt that because there were too many children in the unit, and teachers did not have time to spend helping him. In solitary confinement, J.E. felt forgotten by the teachers. Despite the clear deficiencies in instruction, Defendants have made no attempts to alter their practices or work to ensure that educational services are properly delivered to children in solitary.
97. J.E. filed grievances while incarcerated at the Jail requesting that he be removed from solitary confinement and expressing his desire to participate in educational programming. After filing an initial grievance, J.E. received a response from the Sheriffs Office stating that he was in administrative confinement and that they would look into adjusting his placement. Weeks later, after having not received any further response, J.E. filed an appeal of his previous grievance to the division commander concerning his request for removal from confinement and access to education. This time, the Sheriffs Office responded by asking that he "stop filing frivolous grievances". J.E. appealed once again, wanting to know what is happening with his request, or to discuss a solution. The Sheriffs Office responded that because he has three "keep separates," he "will remain in administrative confinement" until such time that his co-defendant children are no longer in the Jail.
98. After six months in solitary confinement, J.E. was permitted to join the other children in general population after one of his co-defendants was released from Jail.
II. W.G. 99. W.G. is an African-American 16-year-old boy who was held at the Palm Beach
County Jail in solitary confinement for approximately 10 months prior to his trial and before any conviction of a crime, beginning when he was 14 years old. W.G. is under the legal custody ofhis
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grandmother and supervision of the Department of Children and Families after being removed from the custody of his biological parents. When he grows up, he wants to work in landscaping or have a pressure cleaning business.
100. W.G. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. He has an IEP for an intellectual disability, criteria for which includes an IQ below 70, and Specific Learning Disability. He has a difficult time focusing in school and requires specialized instruction to learn. He is on a differentiated curriculum in school due to his disability. W.G. qualifies as an individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 504.
101. W.G. was charged as an adult and moved to the Jail on January 9, 2017, when he was 14 years old. At first, W.G. was placed in general population with the other children on the 12th floor. After about two weeks, W.G. got into a fight with other children and received a disciplinary report. He was told that he would receive a 20 day disciplinary solitary confinement sentence as a result of his rule infraction. However, despite receiving no further disciplinary reports, W.G. was held in solitary confinement for the next ten months, until his move from the Jail on October 27, 2017.
102. When initially placed in confinement, W.G. asked deputies that he be able to get out of the Box, but was told that he had to stay away from children on both wings ofthe 12th floor as a result of his fight. W.G was never told that he could write a grievance but rather was led to believe that he would be held in confinement indefinitely, with no possibility of recourse. He did not write a formal grievance and did not know how to use the grievance process. Eventually, W.G. lost hope and stopped asking to get out. No one from the Jail inquired as to W.G.'s intellectual or mental health disabilities prior to or during his placement in the Box. No one from the Jail ever offered additional assistance due to his intellectual or mental health disabilities.
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103. The Box provided no physical or social stimulation for W.O. He gained weight in solitary confinement due to lack ofexercise. In fact, after leaving the Box, his body "hurt to move" as it had been inactive for such a long time. During his 10 months in solitary confinement, W.O. only had visits from his attorney and his Department of Children and Families case manager. Any time he left his cell, W.O. was handcuffed. W.O. adapted his sleep schedule as do many children in isolation, sleeping during the day and being awake at night. W.O. tried to utilize his oppmiunities for recreation, but was often denied the privilege because other children were utilizing the recreation space, and he was not allowed to have any interaction with them.
104. W.O. wanted to read to "keep from going crazy" in confinement, but he is not a strong reader and new books were not regularly offered. W.O. wanted to write songs to occupy his time, but he found that he could not focus enough to do so.
105. W.O. began experiencing headaches, as well as back pam from a previous automobile accident. He made a sick call and was given "red pills" from the Jail medical staff, which were charged to his canteen funds. The pills did not help relieve any pain or stress. W.O. felt that he needed glasses to see while in confinement, but he never had any vision screening.
106. W.O.'s interactions with Jail staff exacerbated the overwhelmingly negative conditions of confinement. When coupled with the limitations of his disabilities, W.O. would easily become irritable and frustrated. He would yell for the deputies on duty, in a desperate attempt to engage in some social interaction. W.O. would repeatedly try to talk to Jail staff, by asking to use the phone, for water, and for soap, but the deputies would ignore him. He would beat on his door to get attention, only to be threatened by deputies to a fight. Deputies also routinely threatened to take away W.O.'s showers, phone calls, and attorney visits. Some deputies would even refuse to let W.O. out of the Box for recreation. Other times, deputies would "toss"
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his cell during searches, deliberately tearing up or throwing away W.O.'s possessions. Deputies would bang on the door to wake him up and if he didn't get out of bed in five minutes, he would have a 24 hour lockdown in his cell, without any privileges. To drink water while in deadlock, W.G. would have to ask the deputies to bring him water with a cup sent through the food flap of the door. Some deputies would refuse, leaving drinking water from the sink as the only option. The sink, adjoining the toilet, would often have discolored, odorous water, which W.G. would try to run until it became clear in order to drink it.
107. W.G. reports that children on the 12th floor are well aware that the mental health unit is a place where inmates are sent, stripped of their clothing and belongings, given a paper gown, and forced into a locked, cold cell. Although he never went to the mental health unit, W.G. heard deputies make threats to children in confinement who were loud or disruptive, such as deputies saying, "What's that? You're going to kill yourself?" so the deputies could retaliate by sending the children to the mental health unit.
108. For educational instruction, W.G. would need to stand the entire time in order to try to see through the badly scratched window in his door or hear through the cracks around the door frame. Due to his back injuries, standing is painful for W.G. He explained this issue to the teachers, but no accommodations were made, nor were any alternatives to delivering the education curriculum devised. His only option remained standing and trying to see and hear through the metal door of his cell. W.G. was given some work for school under his door. He could not access his educational services and struggled working independently with reading and math. He cannot read big words. He would yell through the door if he had a question, and some of the school staff would respond, but then leave quickly as they had to give attention to others. W.G. participated in one IEP meeting on May 25,2017, but his attendance was perfunctory, lasting only 10 minutes.
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Eventually, W.G. gave up on trying to observe school or engage school staff from the confines of

his Box and would stay asleep instead. After his release from the Jail, at an IEP meeting on

November 28, 2017, the support facilitator who worked with W.G. at the Jail acknowledged in

conference notes that there were several accommodations that W.G. was unable to receive while

in confinement at the Jail.

109. W.G.'s family has noticed a difference in him, which they attribute to his solitary

confinement. They report that he does not feel comfortable with his peers, and is constantly

concerned with aggressive or negative attacks from them. With W.G.'s young age and his history

of confinement, should he ever return to the Jail as a child, he would likely go right back to the

Box.

III.

Jeziah Guagno

110. Jeziah Guagno ("Jeziah") is a biracial 18-year-old male who entered the Jail as a

16 year old child and was placed in solitary confinement at the Jail. When Jeziah turned 18, he

was moved to the adult side of the Jail, where he remained in solitary confinement. In total, he

was held in solitary confinement for approximately 21 months.

111. Jeziah enjoys reading and would like to be a mechanic or city employee when he

returns to the community. He misses playing sports, especially football, going to the library, and

helping to take care of his younger siblings.

112. Jeziah has been diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Conduct Disorder,

and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. In school, he has an IEP for an Emotional

Behavioral Disability. His childhood was overshadowed by abuse and instability in his home

placements, and he was adjudicated dependent and placed under the custody and supervision of

the Department of Children and Families. He has been prescribed psychotropic medication for his

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disability and participated in counseling in the community and through school. Jeziah qualifies as an individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 504.
113. Jeziah was charged as an adult at age 16 and was held in confinement on the 12th floor, for approximately 17 months. Upon turning 18 years old in December 2017, Jeziah continued to be held in solitary confinement on one of the adult floors of the Jail until his move from the Jail, approximately four months later.
114. When Jeziah was first placed at the Jail from March to July 2016, he was 16 years old. He received a disciplinary report after a fight with another youth, and spent about three months in solitary confinement. During that time, he was exercising his telephone privilege, which usually would have been 15 minutes on the phone. However, before his phone call was to end, a deputy unplugged the phone. As the telephone was his only social interaction while in isolation, he was upset when that time ended early. He flooded his cell with water from the toilet.
115. The deputies on duty told him to "cuff up", where he had to put his hands behind his back to be handcuffed. While handcuffed, he was pushed against a wall, and a deputy hit him while his back was turned. He resisted and fell to the floor. The deputies stomped on him and his face was slammed against the cement floor, breaking his two front teeth. His chin was split open, which later required sutures. He was taken to the mental health unit, where he had his clothes taken from him, given a paper gown, and was locked in another cell overnight without receiving any medical attention.
116. The following day, J.G was taken to the medical unit of the Jail. He was given gauze to keep in his mouth to soak up the blood. A few days later Jeziah was taken out of the Jail to have surgery to remove the remnants of his front teeth which were impacted in his gums. He was given ill-fitting dentures that clipped on to his other teeth and returned to solitary confinement.
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The incident report described the assault by the deputies as a slip and fall. When Jeziah tried to file a grievance about the use of force and ensuing injuries, he was told that the time to make a claim had expired. Jeziah was told by Jail staff that one of the deputies who hurt him was reassigned, along with the sergeant who was on duty, but Jeziah has witnessed that the other two deputies who were involved in the assault are still on assignment at the Jail.
117. At one point, Jeziah was released from the Jail to his father, but two weeks later, in August 2016, Jeziah returned to the Jail. Based on the disciplinary report from his previous stay at the Jail, Jeziah was immediately placed in solitary confinement upon his return. This time, he was placed in administr~tive solitary confinement and was told that classification would review his isolation each week. However, he remained in solitary confinement for the next 16 months and received no information about any review of his isolation during that time.
118. Jeziah continued to be a target for the deputies while in confinement. For instance, about two weeks after his return to the Jail, a deputy accused Jeziah of failing to return his food tray. Despite Jeziah's assertions that he had returned the food tray, the deputy entered his cell and pepper sprayed him. When the tray was not found in his cell and Jeziah argued that the deputy should not be coming into his cell alone, Jeziah was moved to the other wing on the 12th floor.
119. Also, Jeziah still had his denture clips, but found them to be loose and uncomfortable. He took them out when he would sleep, but did not have a special container for them, so he used a covered cup, filled with water, in which to keep them. On or about October 2017, while his denture clips were in his room, but not in his mouth, deputies "tossed" Jeziah's cell and threw away his denture piece. The incident was not documented so Jeziah could not have them replaced. A deputy involved in the original incident where his teeth were slammed on the floor simply looked at him and laughed when the dentures were thrown away.
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120. While Jeziah was in confinement, another Palm Beach Sheriffs Office staff member told Jeziah that she would have other inmates assault him when he got out of confinement. Jeziah called the PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) hotline, but received no follow up in response. In December 2017, weeks before his 18th birthday, Jeziah was released from solitary confinement. He was in constant fear of receiving a disciplinary report and being returned to the Box. Jeziah was indeed assaulted by another prisoner approximately one week after his placement with the other children in general population. As a result of that incident, Jeziah received a disciplinary report and was returned to solitary confinement.
121. While he was in confinement as a child, deputies regularly provoked him and triggered him to react by threatening and taunting him. Corrections officers repeatedly knocked on Jeziah's cell door during the night to keep him from falling asleep. While in solitary confinement, Jeziah had his recreation and access to drinking water from the fountain taken away by deputies. Deputies threatened Jeziah at least 10 times with a trip to the "psych cell," the mental health unit where he would have no clothes, a paper gown, and be locked in a cold cell if he didn't be quiet. He had instances where all of his personal items, including drawings, paperwork, sweaters, socks, undergarments, and the sheets off of his bed would be taken from him for hours at a time as punishment for banging on his door or talking to other children.
122. In confinement, Jeziah felt total isolation. While on the 12th floor of the Jail, he would spend 23-24 hours per day alone. He would repeatedly ask the deputies what time it was in order to engage in some social interaction. He would get to a point of such extreme frustration that he would act out. After he had been in isolation for 11 months, Jeziah began to draw pictures or rip them from books or newspapers and paste them to the wall of his cell with toothpaste, trying to find something to do.
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123. Jeziah estimates that he lost approximately 20 pounds while in confinement. His sleep patterns became completely irregular. Even after moving to the adult floors of the Jail, Jeziah had multiple days of insomnia. He has become extremely anxious and constantly feels pent up with energy. He has not received any ofhis prescribed medication for his mental health conditions since coming to the Jail more than one and a half years ago. He had been receiving counseling from the school district as a related service through his IEP, but that stopped completely in June 2017 without any prior written notice from the school district. After approximately four or five months in solitary confinement, Jeziah requested a sick call and told the Jail doctor that he was depressed and needed medication. The doctor told him that he would get in touch with Jeziah's guardian, his grandmother, but Jeziah never heard anything after that.
124. Jeziah also reached the point during his solitary confinement that he harmed himself, cutting his fingers on a metal piece in his cell, so that he had an excuse to be taken out of his cell. He required 12 stitches from his injury. He did not receive any mental health treatment from the Jail despite this incident, and his history of mental illness, disability, or presenting behaviors.
125. Jeziah filed multiple grievances regarding his confinement. His grievances would be ignored, returned as not able to be processed, or returned without a reason as to why he was still held in isolation. At one point, after Jeziah had been in isolation for more than a year, a Captain at the Jail talked to him and said he would review his status and let him out of the Box, but this change never occurred. Jeziah continued to file grievances, but some deputies refused to accept the grievances and other deputies would tell him to turn it in to the deputy on the next shift. Other times he would be told by Jail staffthat his grievances got lost. Jeziah felt overwhelmingly frustrated and angry about continuing to be held in solitary confinement, exacerbating the
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symptoms of his disability that were compounded by almost a year and a half of isolation. His release from solitary confinement eventually happened three months after the conversation with the Jail Captain in December 2017, the month Jeziah tumed 18 years old.
126. The lack of access to educational programming, especially services required by his IEP, caused frustration for Jeziah when he was in the Box. At an IEP meeting, he explained to school staff that it was difficult to see and hear any of the class instruction while he was in the Box, but his concems were not recorded in conference notes nor addressed by school staff. Jeziah could not see out of the scratched plexiglass window of his cell, felt that he could not keep up with what was happening in the class, was told to work on his own with papers slid under his door, failed to receive the help needed to understand the work, and attempted to listen to school through the gaps in the sides and bottom of the cell door. Jeziah was routinely told by school staff that they would come by after they were done teaching, but he would usually receive no more than a minute or two of attention, which was wholly insufficient to be considered a free, appropriate public education.
127. When he received educational services outside of the Box, J.G, recalls that his grades were better, he could sit near a teacher, and that he received instructional support throughout the school day. When he was placed in solitary confinement, Jeziah received no notice that his educational services would be removed as a condition of his isolation. Eventually, Jeziah found no reason at all to wake up when educational services took place on the other side of his cell door because he was unable to hear lessons that were presented. After Jeziah's move to the adult floors, an IEP meeting was held on February 13, 2018, and the conference notes state that, "Under the circumstances of confinement he has not been able to gain regular access to school, which has
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negatively impacted his academic success." Despite this knowledge on the part of Defendants, no

attempts have been made to improve the method ofinstruction for children in solitary confinement.

IV.

Brice Daniels

128. Brice Daniels ("Brice") is an African-American 18-year-old male who was held at

the Palm Beach County Jail in solitary confinement prior to trial or conviction, beginning when

he was 16 years old.

129. Brice spent more than 11 months in solitary confinement at the Jail. He entered the

Jail on December 5, 2016, at 16 years old, and after about two weeks was placed in administrative

confinement due to keep-away conditions with other children. He was released from solitary

confinement in November 2017, one month before his 18th birthday, when his keep-aways left the

Jail.

130. Brice is diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and bipolar

disorder and has an IEP in school. He was prescribed psychotropic medication in the community

and discussed his diagnoses and medication with classification at the Jail. However, he was never

visited by a psychiatrist or therapist from the Jail while in solitary confinement. Brice is an

individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 504.

131. Brice internalized much of the isolation that he experienced in his nearly one year

in solitary confinement. The idea that he was enclosed behind four walls was one that he tried to

avoid thinking about, for fear of "going crazy". At first, Brice would exercise his limited

opportunities to go outside of his cell to the walled in basketball court for solitary recreation. He

wouldn't move around, but would sit outside on the cement ground, close his eyes, try to listen for

birds calling around him, and just breathe. After about six months in solitary confinement, he

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refused to go outside at all because the presence of air and life outside, juxtaposed with his stale

and lifeless confinement, was too difficult to process.

132. Brice passed the time by doing anything he could within solitary confinement- he

kicked his door, threw things in his cell, talked to himself, sang, and danced. One time, he was

being too loud in his cell and was sent to the mental health unit for two days because of a false

allegation that he was going to kill himself. The trip to the mental health unit involved losing the

privilege of having clothes, being given a paper gown, and being locked in a cold cell without

phone calls, showers, or recreation.

133. Educational instruction was nearly impossible for Brice to participate in while in

the Box. Brice would have to stand at the door for the duration of the instruction. He would

receive worksheets under the door. He would call to teachers but receive no response. Defendants

were aware of the difficulties in attending educational programs while in solitary confinement, but

made no attempts to deliver instruction in another manner. Brice did not receive a free appropriate

public education or any evaluations to ensure delivery of appropriate educational services during

his almost one year in solitary confinement.

134. Brice filed multiple grievances regarding his confinement status. One time he

received no response. The second time he received his grievance back with a signature but without

an answer as to when he could be released. To the third grievance that Brice wrote, Defendants

responded that he had too many keep-aways to be released from confinement. Brice received no

additional disciplinary reports during his more than 11 months in confinement, but was held

without access to the offered educational programming, social interaction, and mental stimulation

he so desperately needed.

V.

Jeff Omelus

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135. Jeff Omelus is a Haitian-American 18-year-old male who was held at the Palm Beach County Jail in solitary confinement prior to trial or conviction for 146 days while he was 17 years old.
136. Jeff has a close relationship with his father. His mother lives in Haiti and he does not speak with her frequently. He enjoys riding dirt bikes and playing basketball. He would like to be a small engine mechanic.
137. Jeff entered the Jail in August 2017. Jeff was in solitary confinement at the Jail for approximately five months. He was initially placed in confinement after a disciplinary report, from about September 26, 2017, to October 11, 2017. He was later moved to general population for a couple ofweeks and then re-entered solitary confinement at the end of October, 2017. J.O was kept in solitary confinement until his move from the Jail on February 28, 2018. When not imprisoned, Jeff spoke often to the guidance counselors at all of his schools in the community, but was not offered these services in the Jail, even after his documented crisis stabilization unit interventions in the Jail.
138. Jeffs experiences in solitary confinement mirror many of the experiences of the other children. He was permitted only a brief shower on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and maybe an additional day if he had a court hearing. He was offered recreation inconsistently and his opportunity for recreation depended on the scheduling of all of the other children in solitary confinement. Jeff gained about 20 pounds in the Box due to his inability to move. Jeff found sleep difficult in the Box. He looked forward to his time to speak to his father on the phone, which was his only social connection. He had to drink water out of the sink adjoining the toilet, which was discolored, had a bad odor, and tasted different than "normal" drinking water. Sometimes deputies would provide water in a cup through the food flap of the locked, metal door, but others
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would refuse, saying, "I'm not your water boy." Jeff also experienced threats from Jail deputies. For instance, when trying to control Jeffs actions, one deputy stated, "Didn't you hear what happened to J--?", referring to Jeziah and the assault by deputies causing him to lose his front teeth. Another time, someone urinated under the door of Jeffs cell. He asked deputies repeatedly for a mop to clean his cell, but was ignored. When he finally gave up and washed the urine with water from his sink, he was accused of trying to flood the room and received a disciplinary report along with ten days without recreation. In solitary confinement, Jeff became despondent and hopeless.
139. Jeff was sent to the mental health unit at the Jail on two occasions. The first time, Jeff was in general population with the other children on the 12th floor. He was on the bed in his cell, reading a book, when children on the other sides of his cell were banging on the doors of their cells. A deputy carne to Jeffs cell and accused him of making noise. When Jeff denied making the noise, the deputy falsely accused Jeff of saying he was going to kill himself. Two deputies carne into his cell, put their knees in his back and hit him so they could handcuff him with his arms behind his back. He was taken to South 3A, the mental health unit on the 3rd floor of the Jail. His outer garments and undergarments were ripped off of him by deputies using a hook. Jeff felt so violated- being a child in handcuffs having his clothes ripped off of his body by grown men with batons and pepper spray -he likens it to a sexual assault. He was given only a paper gown which was thin, ripped easily, and was completely open in the back. Then he was confined to a cold, locked cell. As a result ofthe incident, Jeff was given a disciplinary report and 10 days disciplinary confinement.
140. The second time that Jeff was sent to the mental health unit was in December 2017. While in solitary confinement, Jeff stood on his desk to speak to another youth in the neighboring
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cell through a crack in the wall. A deputy told Jeff to get off of the desk, but Jeff did not immediately comply. As a result, the deputy called the sergeant and accused Jeff of trying to kill himself by jumping off of the desk. He experienced the same process as the first time: handcuffed, dragged to the "psych ward," clothes ripped from his body, and left in a cold, locked cell. The mental health unit cells have a glass wall on the front so the inmates can be observed at all times. Because children in the mental health unit are placed with adults in surrounding cells, they are supposed to have a partition placed in front of the glass wall of their cells to shield them from the view of the adults, especially given their unclothed state. However, Jeff was left for the entire stay without a partition to protect him from the view of the adult prisoners around him. He remained in the mental health unit for the entire weekend. When he returned to the 12th floor, he was once again in solitary confinement. He was not evaluated by any mental health or educational professional.
141. Jeff was not able to participate meaningfully in educational instruction while in solitary confinement. He did not receive any notice or hearing that he would not be able to participate in the typical educational programming while in solitary confinement. In his cell, Jeff would receive packets of work instead of actual class participation. No one would follow up to ensure that he understood or completed his packets of work. Jefftried to stand by the cell door to see what was happening during educational instruction, but the window was scratched so badly that he could not see through it. Also, Jeffhad a pole and stairs in front ofhis cell, further obscuring his ability to see the classroom board. Jeff would call out loudly from his cell to teachers for help, but they would rarely respond. Some teachers would come to his door for a few minutes, but then would need to return to teaching the rest of the children in general population. Some teachers would refuse to come to the cell door at all. Jeff told the education staff that he could not see or
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hear the instruction, but no attempts were made by Defendants to change the method of instruction and accommodate the children in solitary confinement.
142. Jeff began having visual and auditory hallucinations in solitary confinement. He saw a third arm coming from his body and began hearing voices, especially at night. Jeff reports that his father would drive to the parking lot of the Jail each night and flash his headlights so Jeff could see them, which would be the only reprieve he had from the constant sense of loneliness.
143. Initially, when Jeff inquired of deputies about filing a grievance about his solitary confinement status, deputies told him it was useless to write grievances. Then, once he began writing formal grievances, he never heard back. He tried again to file a grievance with a different deputy, but again received no response. He asked a deputy what was happening with his grievances and the deputy responded that Jeff had keep-aways and they would not let him out. Jeff even spoke to the Sergeant, but was told that there was no possibility of getting out.
144. The lasting effects from solitary confinement are plainly evident to Jeff and those around him. Although his visual hallucinations have stopped, he continues to hear voices. The voices are both male and female. Other children and adults that interact with Jeff now say that the Jail "messed him up." He is told that he speaks unusually. His gait is abnormal, with a widelegged wobble that was not present before entering the Box. He feels himself snap at others for no reason. His sleep patterns have not returned to normal and he doesn't sleep at night. He does not trust anyone around him. His heightened paranoia about others means that he must have a seat at the back of the room in class because he feels he needs to keep watch on those around him. These changes to Jeffs physical and mental health exemplify the long-term negative impact of solitary confinement.
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CLASS ALLEGATIONS 145. Plaintiffs bring the First, Second and Third Causes of Action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of all present and future children (i.e. children under the age of eighteen and charged as adults) who are now or will be incarcerated in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail. All class members face a substantial risk ofserious harm as a result ofthe Defendants' segregation management policies and practices and denial of constitutionally protected due process prior to placement in solitary. 146. A sub-class of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail and are in need of special education and related services ("IDEA Subclass"), bring the Fourth Cause ofAction pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 147. A subclass of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail because of their disabilities ("ADA and 504 Subclass"), bring the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, seeking, declaratory and injunctive relief. 148. All four requirements of rule 23(a) are satisfied:
a. Numerosity: Joinder of aU class members is impracticable because of the size of the class and the characteristics of the class members. At any given time, all of the children incarcerated at the Palm Beach County Jail are at a significant risk of unconstitutional placement in solitary confinement, unlawful denial of educational services, and unlawful discrimination because of disability-related misbehavior. Every
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month, additional class members cycle in and out of the Palm Beach County Jail. Many of these children are unable to file lawsuits on their own because of their youth, special education needs, disabilities, lack of financial resources, and length of time they will be incarcerated.
a. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to all members of the class, including, but not limited to whether the Defendants' policies and practices of placing children in solitary confinement have resulted in and will continue to result in in a violation of the class members' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether Defendants' practice of locking children with disabilities in isolation based on their disabilities violates the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, whether the Defendants have unlawfully denied educational services in violation of the class members' Fourteenth Amendment rights and whether the Defendants have violated the IDEA subclass members' rights under the IDEA.
b. Typicality: The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. All named Plaintiffs are currently or previously have been incarcerated at the Palm Beach County Jail in solitary confinement. Each named Plaintiff has been subjected to the challenged policies and practices.
c. Adequacy of Representation: The named Plaintiffs, their representatives, and class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests ofthe class. The named Plaintiffs and their representatives have no interests in this matter that are antagonistic to other class members. Class counsel have many years of experience in civil and prisoner rights litigation and class actions.
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149. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate under rule 23(b)(2) because the Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Fourteenth Amendment- Cruel and Unusual Conditions, 42 U.S. C.§ 1983) (As to Defendants SheriffRic Bradshaw; Michael Gauger; Alfonso Sterling; and Frank Milo)
150. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if specifically alleged herein.
151. These Defendants are persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 152. The Defendants' actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs' and putative class members' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. By the policies and practices described herein, Defendants have deprived and continues to deprive Plaintiffs and the class of the minimal civilized measure oflife's necessities, and have violated their basic human dignity and their right to be free from cruel and unusual conditions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 153. Defendants have a policy, pattern or practice of routine use of solitary confinement of children at the Palm Beach County Jail. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. As described above, Defendants' practice ofsolitary confinement subjects Plaintiffs to, among other harmful conditions: 23-24 hours per day in a single cell-for days, weeks or months at a time-locked behind a solid metal door, with minimal furniture other than a low bed and a combination toilet/sink; lack of access to educational programming while in solitary confinement; lack of access to programs and services related to their learning or mental health disabilities; and lack of access to meaningful exercise and social interaction. This solitary
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confinement creates a substantial risk of serious emotional, psychological and physical harm to Plaintiffs.
154. Prolonged exposure to these deprivations of basic human needs inflicts permanent psychological and physical injury on Plaintiffs and the class they represent. In addition to Plaintiffs' current psychological and physical pain, the likelihood that Plaintiffs and the class will remain in solitary confinement for the foreseeable future subjects Plaintiffs and the class they represent to a significant risk of debilitating and petmanent mental illness and physical harm. Defendants' continuation of class members' solitary confinement for many months or years under the debilitating and extreme conditions strips human beings of their basic dignity and humanity in violation of contemporary standards of human decency and constitutes cruel and unusual conditions prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
155. Defendants use solitary confinement against children with deliberate indifference, in that they are or should be aware of the substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs caused by excessive use of solitary confinement but continue to subject Plaintiffs to such confinement and have failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm.
156. Defendants, all state employees, have acted or failed to act and are continuing to act or fail to act under color of state law.
157. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to address the harms described herein. Plaintiffs are entitled declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The relief sought by Plaintiffs is necessary to prevent continued and further injury. Unless enjoined by the Court, Defendants will continue to subject the Plaintiffs and other Class members to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Eighth Amendment- Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 (As to Defendants SheriffRic Bradshaw; Michael Gauger; Alfonso Sterling; and
Frank Milo) 158. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-159 above as if specifically alleged herein. 159. The Defendants' actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs' and putative class members' rights under the Eighth Amendment. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 160. By imposing a policy and practice of solitary confinement described herein, Defendants have subjected Plaintiffs to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants subject Plaintiffs and the class to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury from the use of solitary confinement, and have violated their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These policies and practices have been and continue to be implemented by Defendants and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert under color of state law, in their official capacity, and are the proximate cause ofthe Plaintiffs' and the class's ongoing deprivation ofrights secured under the Eighth Amendment. 161. Plaintiffs are entitled declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Fourteenth Amendment- Procedural Due Process, 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 (As to All Defendants)
162. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-163 above as if specifically alleged herein.
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163. Defendants' policy of placing children in solitary confinement subjects Plaintiffs and the class to a significant deprivation of their liberty and property interests without any procedural safeguards. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
164. The conditions and the duration of Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and Class Members in solitary confinement is a deprivation of a liberty interest that constitutes an atypical and significant hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of jail life because of the harsh and isolated conditions and the lengthy duration of confinement in those conditions. The children in solitary confinement, as compared to other individuals in the Jail, have significantly less or no access to social interaction, environmental stimulation, programs and activities, physical exercise, and personal property. They are also subjected to, as compared to other individuals in the jail, significantly more oppressive security measures, including cell searches and restraints.
165. Additionally, Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in education. The Sheriffs Office and School Board are contractually obligated to provide education to all children held at the Jail. The IDEA requires a free, appropriate public education to disabled children at the Jail. The ADA and Section 504 demand educational access for disabled children at the Jail.
166. The routine practice of distributing worksheets under a cell door, providing no assistance in completing the work, denying children in solitary the ability to see the educational instruction being given, and sometimes holding class in a separate room and excluding the children in solitary confinement entirely, fails to provide meaningful access to education. Accordingly, solitary confinement with the accompanying denial of access to education, deprives the children of their property interest.
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167. Because prolonged placement in solitary confinement constitutes a significant and atypical hardship, and because the children at the Jail are denied meaningful education, Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs and class members of their liberty and propetiy interests without due process of law by denying them (1) a hearing with advance written notice before initial placement in solitary confinement, (2) the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (3) written reasons for the decision, (4) counsel-substitute for disabled individuals or in a case with complex issues, and (5) meaningful and timely periodic review of their continued long-term and indefinite detention in solitary confinement and meaningful notice of what they must do to earn release, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
168. The costs to Defendants of providing such procedural safeguards would be minimal, and any such costs are outweighed by the great risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty or property that exists under Defendants' current policies and practices.
169. The policies and practices complained of herein have been and continue to be implemented by Defendants and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert under color of state law, in their official capacity.
170. Plaintiffs are entitled declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S. C.§§ 1400 et. seq. (As to All Defendants)
171. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 172 above as ifspecifically alleged herein.
172. Plaintiffs' Class members include a sub-class of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are or will be held
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in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail and are in need of special education and related services ("IDEA Subclass"), 20 USC§§ 1400 et seq.
173. Many of these children are identified or should be identified for special education and related services under IDEA. Therefore, the IDEA Sub-Class qualify as children with disabilities for the purposes of IDEA.
174. The Defendants' actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named IDEA Sub-Class members and the rights ofthe putative IDEA Sub-Class members. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
175. Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities are entitled to receive a free appropriate public education also known as "FAPE." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(l)(a).
176. IDEA defines a child with a disability as a child "with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities" "who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3).
177. The School Board ofPalm Beach County is a public agency because it is a "political subdivision[] ofthe State that [is] responsible for providing education to children with disabilities" (34 C.F.R. § 300.33) and because it is a local education agency ("LEA") which is defined as a "public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19); 34 C.F.R. § 300.328(a). As a result, the School Board has the duty to provide a FAPE to all
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students with disabilities, including those who have been suspended or expelled from school. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(l), 1413(a). This duty extends to school-eligible persons with disabilities who are incarcerated in juvenile and adult correctional facilities. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(iv).
178. The Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office is a public agency because it runs a correctional facility "involved in the education of children with disabilities" (34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)), and it is a "political subdivision[] of the State that [is] responsible for providing education to children with disabilities." 34 C.F.R. § 300.33. State and local juvenile and adult correctional facilities are required to comply with the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(l). As such, the Sheriffs Office has the same duties as the School Board. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b). Yet, children with IEPs in solitary confinement at the Jail are denied a free appropriate public education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a).
179. IDEA requires Defendants to meet certain obligations including, but not limited to: a. Providing a free appropriate public education to all students with disabilities
(20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(l)(a)); b. Identifying, locating and evaluating all children with known or suspected
"disabilities residing in the State... who are in need of special education and related services" (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l)(A)) and having in effect policies and procedures to ensure this happens (34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a));
c. Upon identification, conducting a full and individual initial evaluation before the initial provision of special education and related services to a child with a disability in all areas of suspected disability and thereafter a re-evaluation every three years (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(A), (2)(B)) or whenever educational or related services needs,
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including improved academic achievement and functional performance, if the child

warrants a reevaluation (34 C.F.R. § 300.303(a));

d. Developing and implementing an appropriate Individualized Education

Program (IEP) for each child with a disability, defined as a written statement; that is

developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with 210 U.S.C. § 1414(d), which must

include, but is not limited to including:

1.

a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement

and functional performance (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i));

11.

a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and

functional goals (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(ii));

111.

a description of the measurement of the annual goals and the

reporting ofthese goals (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(III));

IV.

for children over 16 years of age, annually updated appropriate

measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition assessments

related to training, education, employment, and, where appropriate, independent

living skills (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(VIII)(aa)); and

v.

in the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child's learning or

that of others, consideration of the use of positive behavioral interventions and

supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior (20 USC §

1414(d)(3)(B)(i)).

e.

Holding an IEP team meeting at least annually (20 U.S.C. §

1414(d)(4)(A)(i));

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f.

When students with an IEP enter a new school setting, providing

"comparable" services to their previous IEP for the next 30 days at which

point, either adopting the prior IEP or developing, adopting and

implementing a new IEP (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C); 34 C.F.R. §

300.323(e));

g.

If behavior leads to removal from school for more than 10 days or to

removal for less than 10 days but is based on behavior that constitutes a

pattern, continuing to provide educational services so as to enable the child

to continue to participate in the general education curriculum (34 C.F.R. §

300.530(d));

h.

If behavior leads to removal from school for more than 10 days or to

removal for less than 10 days but is based on behavior that constitutes a

pattern, convening an immediate IEP meeting to determine if the behavior

is a manifestation of the student's disability (20 USC§ 1415(k); 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.530(e); 34 C.F.R. § 300.536(a)(2);

1.

If the behavior is a manifestation of disability, (1) conducting a functional

behavior/analysis assessment and implement a behavioral intervention

plan; or (2) reviewing and modifying existing behavioral intervention plan;

and (3) returning student to placement from which he or she was removed,

unless it involved weapons, drug possession, or serious bodily injury (at

which time student would be placed in an interim alternative educational

setting for not more than 45 school days) (20 USC§ 1415(k); 34 C.F.R. §

300.530(f)&(g));

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J.

If, on the other hand, the behavior was not a manifestation of disability,

providing FAPE and services to the student no later than the 11th

cumulative day of removal (20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C); 34 C.F.R. §

300.530(c)); and

k.

Implementing procedural safeguards for children with disabilities,

consisting, at a minimum, of notice to parents or guardians of their

procedural rights regarding the identification, evaluation, or education

placement of their child or the provision of a FAPE to their child, and the

right to present complaints and to an impartial due process hearing on such

complaints (20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6), 1415).

180. By failing to identify, evaluate, recommend, and then provide a FAPE (including

appropriate IEPs, special education, and related services to eligible students in solitary

confinement), and by failing to provide procedural safeguards specified in the statute

implementing the IDEA (including manifestation determinations) to students in solitary

confinement, Defendants have impeded students' rights to a free appropriate public education,

have significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process

regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to their students, and/or have

deprived students of educational benefits.

181. As a result, Defendants have violated and continue to violate rights secured by 20

U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and its implementing regulations at 34 C.F.R. §§ 300 et seq.

182. Because Defendants' discriminatory and wrongful conduct is ongoing, declaratory

and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. Further, as a direct result of Defendants' actions,

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the IDEA Sub-Class are suffering irreparable harm, including lost education opportunities. Therefore, speedy and immediate relief is appropriate.
183. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3).
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Title II ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act. (As to All Defendants)
184. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 205 above as if specifically alleged herein.
185. The Defendants' actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate a subclass of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail because of their disabilities ("ADA and 504 Subclass"). This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
186. The ADA and 504 Subclass seeks declaratory and injunctive relief remedying these ongoing and systemic violations.
187. Title II of the ADA states, in pertinent part: [N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 188. Defendants were, at all times relevant to this action, and are currently "public entities" within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and provided and provide a "program, service or activity" including educational and rehabilitative programs, services and activities in the Palm Beach County Jail.
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189. The ADA and 504 Subclass were, at all times relevant to this action, and are currently "qualified individuals with disabilities" within the meaning ofTitle II of the ADA. They have impairments that substantially limit a major life activity, and they were and/or are all housed at the Palm Beach County Jail qualified-with or without reasonable accommodation-to participate in the programs, services, and activities in the Palm Beach County Jail.
190. Congress directed the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to write regulations implementing Title II's prohibition against discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12134. Pursuant to this mandate, the DOJ has issued regulations defining the forms of discrimination prohibited by Title II ofthe ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 et. seq.
191. In providing any aid, benefit, or service, a public entity "may not ... [d]eny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service," "[a]fford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others," "[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity ... as that provided to others," or "[o]therwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others[.]" 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)(i), (ii), (iii), and (vii).
192. A public entity "shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability[.]" 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (emphasis added).
193. Nor may a public entity (1) "impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to
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be necessary[,]" 28 C.F.R.§ 35.130(b)(8); or (2) "utilize criteria or methods of administration ... that have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability ... or the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity's program with respect to individuals with disabilities[.]" 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i)(ii).
194. A public entity is also prohibited from aiding and perpetuating discrimination against persons with disabilities in the programs, services, or activities it provides. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)(v).
195. Defendants have violated the rights of the ADA and 504 Subclass secured by Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
a. When the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participating in and deny them the benefits of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities by reason of their disabilities. Specifically, the ADA and 504 Subclass are excluded by reason of their disabilities in that the behaviors that lead to their being placed in solitary confinement are a direct result of their disability.
b. Solitary confinement has a disproportionate burden on members of the ADA and 504 Subclass by reason of their disabilities that results in further solitary confinement and further denial of educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities than their non-disabled peers. As such, when the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participation in and deny them the benefits of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities by reason of their disabilities.
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c. The denial of education and rehabilitative serv1ces during solitary confinement leaves the ADA and 504 Subclass further behind in their education and rehabilitation than their non-disabled peers because, by reason oftheir disabilities, disabled children require additional assistance to access the general education curriculum and rehabilitative programs. Consequently, when members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants deny them equal opportunity to benefit from Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities and/or provide the ADA and 504 Subclass with a benefit that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity as the benefits offered to their non-disabled peers.
d. Defendants also fail to make reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, and procedures even though such modifications are necessary to avoid discriminating against the ADA and 504 Subclass by, inter alia, not identifying and tracking members of the ADA and 504 Subclass who require reasonable accommodations, not inquiring into whether behaviors of members of the ADA and 504 Subclass leading to disciplinary measures are disability-related, not modifying school disciplinary policies and practices to ensure that school officials have responsibility for discipline during school hours, and not modifying solitary confinement policies and practices to ensure that members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are not disproportionately burdened by such policies and practices by reason of their disabilities. 196. Defendants have adopted and implemented policies and practices with regard to solitary confinement that have a disparate impact on children with disabilities. Specifically, Defendants by their policies and practices impose and apply eligibility criteria-i.e., requirements that children not be in solitary confinement in order to receive educational and rehabilitative
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services-that screen out or tend to screen out the ADA and 504 Subclass from fully and equally enjoying, by reason of their disabilities, any of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services or activities.
197. By denying educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities while children with disabilities are locked in solitary confinement and by using solitary confinement for children with disabilities, Defendants utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting the ADA and 504 Subclass to discrimination by reason of their disabilities. These methods of administration also have the purpose and effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishments of the objectives of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities with respect to the ADA and 504 Subclass.
198. Defendants also aid and perpetuate discrimination against persons with disabilities in Defendants' programs, services or activities by, inter alia, maintaining policies and practices that allow for discrimination by each Defendant and that permit the discrimination of the other coDefendants to continue unchecked.
199. When the ADA and 504 Subclass are in school, Defendants deny them "meaningful access" to education by violating the relevant regulations.
200. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35. 130(b)(ii), a public entity may not "[a]fford a qualified individual with a disability an oppmiunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others..."
201. Defendants fail to provide children with disabilities the special education and related services they require, by reason of their disabilities, to equally access education in Palm Beach County Jail.
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202. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(iii), a public entity may not "[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others..."
203. Defendants fail to provide disabled children with educational services that they require-because of their disabilities-that are as effective in affording children with disabilities equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, and to reach the same level of achievement as provided to others.
204. Because Defendants' discriminatory and wrongful conduct is ongoing, declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. Further, as a direct result of Defendants' actions, the ADA and 504 Subclass are suffering irreparable harm, including lost education opportunities. Therefore, speedy and immediate relief is appropriate.
205. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12133, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (As to All Defendants)
206. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 207 above as ifspecifically alleged herein.
207. The Defendants' actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the ADA and 504 Subclass rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The ADA and 504 Subclass seek declaratory and injunctive relief remedying these ongoing and systemic violations.
208. Section 504 provides, in pertinent part: 63

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No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance[.] 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
209. Each Defendant was, at all times relevant to this action, and is currently a recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and provided and provides a "program or activity" where "program or activity" is described as "all the operations of' the recipient which includes the educational and rehabilitative programs and activities in the Palm Beach County Jail. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).
210. The ADA and 504 Subclass were, at all times relevant to this action, and are currently "otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities" within the meaning of Section 504 as they all have impairments that substantially limit a major life activity, and they were and/or are all housed at the Palm Beach County Jail qualified-with or without reasonable accommodation-to participate in the programs, services, and activities ofthe Jail.
211. The Department of Justice is charged under Executive Order 12250 with coordinating the implementation of Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 28 CFR § 41.1.
212. In providing any aid, benefit, or service, a recipient of federal financial assistance "may not ... [d]eny a qualified handicapped person the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service," "[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others," "[p]rovide a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity ... as that provided to others," or "[o]therwise limit a qualified handicapped
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person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others[.]" 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(i), (ii), (iii), and (vii).
213. A recipient of federal financial assistance shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
214. Nor may a recipient of federal financial assistance "utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap and/or (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program or activity with respect to handicapped persons..." 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4)(i), (ii).
215. A recipient of federal financial assistance is also prohibited from aiding and perpetuating discrimination against a qualified handicapped person by providing significant assistance to an agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of handicap. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(v).
216. Defendants have violated the rights of the ADA and 504 Subclass secured by Section 504 and its implementing regulations.
a. When members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participating in and deny them the benefits of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities solely by reason of their disabilities. Specifically, the ADA and 504 Subclass are excluded by reason of their disabilities in that the behaviors that lead to their being placed in solitary confinement are a direct result of their disability.
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b. Solitary confinement has a disproportionate burden on the ADA and 504 Subclass solely by reason of their disabilities that results in further solitary confinement and further denial of educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities than their non-disabled peers. As such, when members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participation in and deny them the benefits of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities solely by reason of their disabilities.
c. The denial of education and rehabilitative services during solitary confinement leaves the ADA and 504 Subclass further behind in their education and rehabilitation than their non-disabled peers because, solely by reason of their disabilities, disabled children require additional assistance to access the general education curriculum and rehabilitative programs. Consequently, when members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants deny them equal opportunity to benefit from Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities and/or provide members of the ADA and 504 Subclass with a benefit that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity as the benefits offered to their non-disabled peers.
d. Defendants also fail to make reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, and procedures even though such modifications are necessary to avoid discriminating against members ofthe ADA and 504 Subclass by, inter alia, not identifying and tracking members of the ADA and 504 Subclass who require reasonable accommodations, not inquiring into whether behaviors exhibited by members of the ADA and 504 Subclass leading to disciplinary measures are disability-related, not modifying school disciplinary policies and practices to ensure that school officials have responsibility
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for discipline during school hours, and not modifying solitary confinement policies and practices to ensure that members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are not disproportionately burdened by such policies and practices by reason of their disabilities. 217. Defendants have adopted and implemented policies and practices with regard to solitary confinement that have a disparate impact on children with disabilities. Specifically, Defendants by their policies and practices impose and apply eligibility criteria-i.e., requirements that children not be in solitary confinement in order to receive educational and rehabilitative services-that screen out or tend to screen out members of the ADA and 504 Subclass from fully and equally enjoying, solely by reason of their disabilities, any of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services or activities. 218. By denying educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities while children with disabilities are locked in solitary confinement and by using solitary confinement for children with disabilities, Defendants utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting members of the ADA and 504 Subclass to discrimination solely by reason of their disabilities. These methods of administration also have the purpose and effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishments of the objectives of Defendants' educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities with respect to members of the ADA and 504 Subclass. 219. Defendants also aid and perpetuate discrimination against persons with disabilities in Defendants' programs, services or activities by, inter alia, maintaining policies and practices that allow for discrimination and that permit the discrimination of each co-Defendant to continue unchecked.
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220. When members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are in school, Defendants deny them "meaningful access" to education by violating the relevant regulations.
221. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(ii), a public entity may not "[a]fford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others..."
222. However, Defendants fail to provide children with disabilities the special education and related services they require-solely by reason of their disabilities-to equally access education in the Palm Beach County Jail.
223. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(iii), a public entity may not "[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others..."
224. Defendants fail to provide disabled children with educational services that they require-solely by reason of their disabilities-that are as effective in affording children with disabilities equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, and to reach the same level of achievement as provided to others.
225. Moreover, when the ADA and 504 Subclass are in school, Defendants deny them FAPE as secured by Section 504's regulations by inter alia:
a. Failing to provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in Defendants' jurisdiction (45 C.F.R. § 84.33(a));
b. Failing to provide special education and related aids and services that are designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of non-handicapped persons are met (45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)).
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226. Because Defendants' discriminatory conduct is ongoing, declaratory relief and
injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. Further, as a direct result of Defendants' actions,
members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are suffering irreparable harm, including lost educational
opportunities. Therefore, speedy and immediate relief is appropriate.
227. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794a, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive
relief and to recover from Defendants the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing
this action.
REQUESTS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
a. Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
b. Declare that Defendants' acts and omissions violated the named Plaintiffs' and class members' rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;
c. Declare that Defendants' acts and omissions violated the named Plaintiffs' and class members' rights under the Procedural Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
d. Declare that Defendants' acts and omissions violated the IDEA Sub-Class members' rights under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482;
e. Declare that Defendants' acts and omissions violated the ADA and Section 504 SubClass members' rights under Title II ofthe ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213;
f. Declare that Defendants' acts and omissions violated the ADA and Section 504 SubClass members' rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794;
g. Enter all necessary and appropriate injunctive relief (including, but not limited to, policies, procedures, training, supervision, and monitoring) to end the ongoing violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal law;
h. Award the Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,42 U.S.C. § 12205, and 42 U.S.C. § 1415;
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1. Award damages to the Plaintiffs, including costs to provide for injuries, mental health and medical treatment;
J. Award compensatory education for educational benefits denied; and k. Grant any other relief that the Court deems necessary and proper.

Dated: June 21,2018.

Respectfully submitted,
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC 2925 PGA Boulevard, Ste. 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
/s/ Theodore J. Leopold Theodore J. Leopold, Esq. Florida Bar No. 705608 tleopold@cohenmilstein.com Diana L. Martin. Esq. Florida Bar No. 624489 dmartin@cohenmilstein.com Telephone: 561-515-1400 Facsimile: 561-515-1401
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER
1028 N. Federal Highway Lake Worth, FL 33460
/s/ Sabarish P. Neelakanta Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq. Florida Bar No. 26623 sneelakanta@hrdc-law .org Telephone: (561) 360-2523 Facsimile: 866-735-7136
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF PALM BEACH Co., INC. EDUCATION ADVOCACY PROJECT
423 Fern St., Ste. 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401
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Is/ Melissa Duncan Melissa Duncan, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0796921 mduncan@legalaidpbc.org Telephone: (561) 655-8944, ext. 243 Facsimile: (561) 655-5269
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 CERTIFICATION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, by signing below, I certify to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that this complaint: (1) is not being presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) is supported by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Rule 11.
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC 2925 PGA Boulevard, Ste. 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
Is/ Theodore J. Leopold Theodore J. Leopold, Esq. Florida Bar No. 705608 tleopold@cohenmilstein.com Diana L. Martin. Esq. Florida Bar No. 624489 dmartin@cohenmilstein.com Telephone: 561-515-1400 Facsimile: 561-515-1401
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER 1028 N. Federal Highway Lake Worth, FL 33460
Is/ Sabarish P. Neelakanta Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq. Florida Bar No. 26623 sneelakanta@hrdc-law .org Telephone: (561) 360-2523
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Facsimile: 866-735-7136
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF PALM BEACH Co., INC. EDUCATION ADVOCACY PROJECT 423 Fern St., Ste. 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Is/ Melissa Duncan
Melissa Duncan, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0796921 mduncan@legalaidpbc.org Telephone: (561) 655-8944, ext. 243 Facsimile: (561) 655-5269 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.

By Electronic Mail
Lisa Rubin, Esq. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office rubinl@pbso.org

Is/ Melissa Duncan
By: Melissa Duncan, Esq.

Julie Ann Rico, Esq. General Counsel, Palm Beach County School District Julieann.rico@palmbeachschools.org

Attorneys for the Defendants

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 Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 11 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/22/2018 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

H.C., et al.,

CASE NO.: 18 -cv-80810-WPD

Plaintiffs,

v.

RIC BRADSHAW, et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________________/

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [DE 7],

filed on June 21, 2018. The Court has considered the Motion and the record, and is otherwise

fully advised in the premises.

In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs acknowledge that this case is still in its infancy, having just

been filed today, and requests that the Court allow them to amend their motion with the benefit of

discovery. However, the early practicable time contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(c)(1)(A) does not contemplate such a motion being filed before there is insufficient information

in the record for the Court to make a proper determination of whether to certify the action as a class

action.

Nonetheless, all parties in this action are on notice that Plaintiffs want to certify this matter

as a class action. The Court is denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification as premature on

procedural grounds only; it makes no conclusions regarding the substance of the Motion.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

Certification [DE 7] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as premature.

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 11 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/22/2018 Page 2 of 2 DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida this
21st day of June, 2018.
Copies furnished to: Counsel of record

 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 9:18-cv-80810-WPD

H.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.; M.F., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Asisa Rolle, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

RIC BRADSHAW, Palm Beach County Sheriff, in his official capacity; and SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY,
Defendants.

AMENDED CLASS-ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This class action civil rights lawsuit challenges the solitary confinement of children
who are charged as adults, most of whom have not been convicted of any crime, at the Main
Detention Center of the Palm Beach County Jail (“Palm Beach County Jail” or “the Jail”), operated
1 Plaintiffs file this Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B). The filing of this Amended Complaint renders moot Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Caring People, Inc. v. Dunn, 15-CV-81155-KAM, 2015 WL 12720331, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2015) (“In lieu of responding to the motion [to dismiss], Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Because the amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint, Defendant Dunn’s motion to dismiss is moot.”) (citations omitted); Quirindongo v. Fazio, 10-60132-CIV, 2010 WL 11601237, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2010).
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by the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) under the direction of Defendant Ric Bradshaw, Palm Beach County Sheriff.
2. While held in solitary confinement at the Jail, the Sheriff’s Office subjects these children to substantial risk of serious harm despite being well aware of the physical and psychological harm solitary confinement has on these children, and choosing to do nothing about it.
3. Defendants, acting in concert, also routinely deny these incarcerated children educational services, including services needed to address their disabilities. The Florida Constitution mandates the provision of education (FLA. CONST., Art. IX, § 1(a)), and the Sheriff’s Office and School Board are statutorily required to provide educational services to children incarcerated at the Jail. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board are legally mandated to provide access to education for these children, but have failed to do so.
4. These practices constitute serious violations of the children’s constitutional rights, including their rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; their rights to procedural due process prior to any deprivation of their liberty or property interests as afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment; their rights to receive educational services and programming under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”); and their rights to be free from discrimination as provided by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
5. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, and those children similarly situated, pray for injunctive and declaratory relief and demand an end to these detrimental and toxic policies and practices. Without immediate intervention, these children will continue suffering
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inhumane treatment, physical and psychological harm, and acute and long term mental health issues from the prolonged isolation.
JURISDICTION 6. This action arises under the United States Constitution’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment provision for procedural due process, and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes actions to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights, privileges and immunities secured to all Plaintiffs and Class Members by the laws of the United States. This action is also brought on behalf of certain Plaintiffs and Sub-Class members with a qualifying disability pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. 7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as well as any claims seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has authority to award costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
VENUE 8. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2). Defendants have their official residence in the Southern District of Florida. A substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims in this action occurred in this district.
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PARTIES I. The Named Plaintiffs
9. H.C. is a 16-year-old boy originally from Honduras currently detained in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail. H.C. is being held at the Jail prior to his trial status and has not been convicted of any crime related to his present incarceration. H.C. has continuously been held in solitary confinement since December 1, 2017, when he entered the Jail - more than seven months ago. H.C. received no procedural due process protections prior to his placement in solitary confinement, nor has he received any periodic review of his classification. H.C is at substantial risk of serious harm to his physical and mental health because of the Sheriff’s Office solitary confinement policies. He is also being excluded from receiving proper educational instruction and services compared to children in general population. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian, Jenny C.
10. M.F. is an African-American 17-year-old boy detained at the Palm Beach County Jail. M.F. is currently being held at the Jail prior to his trial status and has not been convicted of any crime related to his present incarceration. M.F. was continuously held in solitary confinement for approximately six months. M.F. has a disability as defined by the ADA and Section 504. M.F. never received any procedural due process protections prior to his placement in solitary confinement, nor did he receive any periodic review of his classification. M.F. was, and continues to be, at substantial risk of serious harm to his physical and mental health because of the Sheriff’s Office solitary confinement policies. M.F. was also excluded from receiving proper educational instruction and services compared to children in general population while in solitary confinement. M.F. continues to be at risk of being denied an education, or to receive services or accommodations
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because of his disability as a consequence of the Sheriff’s Office solitary confinement policies. M.F. appears in this action through his mother and guardian, Asisa Rolle.
II. The Defendants 11. Ric Bradshaw is the Sheriff of Palm Beach County and head of the Palm Beach
County Sheriff’s Office. The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office manages the Palm Beach County Jail, a county jail facility located in West Palm Beach, Florida, that houses both pre-trial and sentenced adult inmates, as well as direct-filed children (i.e., children charged for crimes as adults). The Palm Beach County Jail receives federal funding and is a public entity within the meaning of Title II of the ADA. Sheriff Bradshaw has final governing authority for Palm Beach County Jail and has supervisory authority for all unconstitutional policies and practices challenged by the Plaintiffs. Sheriff Bradshaw has ultimate responsibility for the promulgation and implementation of Sheriff’s Office policies, procedures, and practices and for the management of the Palm Beach County Jail. As incarcerated children, Plaintiffs were under the custody and control of the Sheriff’s Office. At all material times hereto, Sheriff Bradshaw was an employee or agent of the Sheriff’s Office and at the relevant times described in this Complaint, was acting within the scope and course of his employment and was acting under color of state law. Sheriff Bradshaw is sued in his official capacity.
12. The School Board of Palm Beach County is a public entity governing the public schools of the Palm Beach County School District (“School District”), pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 1001.42 (2017). The Palm Beach County Jail is located in Palm Beach County, Florida, and the Palm Beach County School District is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all free public schools in Palm Beach County, including being the educational provider for incarcerated individuals held at the Palm Beach County Jail. The School District is a recipient of
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federal funds for its educational programs. The School District has ultimate responsibility for the promulgation and enforcement of all school district policies and procedures and is responsible for the overall management of educational services within Palm Beach County, including those required to be given to incarcerated children.
FACTS Solitary Confinement of Children at the Palm Beach County Jail
13. Located in West Palm Beach, Florida, the Palm Beach County Jail is a 2,166-bed correctional facility that primarily houses pre-trial, un-sentenced adults, as well as direct-filed children facing adult charges. “Direct-filed” male children are housed pre-trial on the top floor of the Jail, separate from the adult prisoners, while female children are typically held in the medical unit. On information and belief, as of May 31, 2018, approximately 21 children are being held at the Jail on direct-file charges.
14. The children held in solitary confinement are placed inside small cells – approximately 6’ x 12’ - for 23 to 24 hours a day. They are often held in solitary confinement for weeks, several months, or in some instances, more than a year while their cases remain pending. The cell contains a combined toilet and sink, a stainless steel desk and bolted-down stool, a steel bed with a thin mattress, and an overhead fluorescent light. The cell is entered through a large metal door which swings out. The door has two small plexiglass windows, one situated toward the floor and one toward the top of the door, which are scratched to such an extent that they are impossible to see through. The door has a metal panel slot that can only be unlocked from outside of the cell, through which food trays are passed.
15. These children are permitted at most one hour, typically three days per week, of solitary recreation – time alone inside a caged basketball court, surrounded by concrete walls and
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metal fencing. Moreover, these children are permitted to shower only three times per week, which often occurs prior to recreation. Consequently, the children end up being returned to confinement dirty, with no opportunity to shower again for days.
16. At issue in this case are Defendants’ operating procedures and practices allowing prisoners (including children) to be locked in solitary confinement for administrative and disciplinary concerns. Disciplinary solitary confinement is imposed for rule violations, such as making noise or fighting, or engaging in other rule violations, whereas administrative solitary confinement is supposed to be used only when a prisoner “poses a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, or other inmates.” See Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office Operating Procedures #919.00. However, direct-filed children report that the Sheriff’s Office confines them in isolation when there are co-defendants (“keep-aways”) in the same unit. There is no limitation placed on such administrative solitary confinement decisions, and children are being held indefinitely.
17. In both situations, the Sheriff’s Office provides no opportunity for the children to contest their placement in solitary prior to their confinement, nor are there any periodic reviews of their classification. Sheriff’s Office operating procedures further require Defendants to take into consideration the physical, mental, social and educational maturity of the child prior to making classification decisions. Yet, children at the Jail are not interviewed, evaluated or assessed for any mental health or learning disabilities prior to or during their solitary confinement. On information and belief, the Sheriff’s Office and School Board have a policy and custom of failing to comply with these minimum standards with regard to children in solitary confinement.
18. Moreover, children held in solitary confinement are required to be observed every 10 minutes, yet children report that no such observations are made. Rather, children are kept in their locked cells, a condition commonly referred to as “the Box” or “deadlock”, with little to no
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interaction with other people. Children report that Sheriff’s Office correctional officers remain in their desk area, only to emerge for their required obligations, such as delivering trays of food. Children in solitary confinement describe hours of calling out to Jail staff for water, to use the telephone, or to have some human interaction, only to have their pleas ignored, or receive threats of intimidation or removal to the mental health unit.
19. These children have no meaningful social interaction, educational access, environmental stimulation, basic human contact, access to music or television, and practically no ability to hear or see outside of their cells. Children coping with mental health disabilities receive no contact from mental health professionals regarding their well-being. The only avenues of communication for children in confinement are to speak through vents in their cells or yell loudly enough for others to hear them through the cell walls and doors.
20. Yet, if these children, many of whom already suffer from mental health issues, react adversely to their confinement by yelling, banging on their metal cell doors, or attempting conversation with other children, they are punished with loss of privileges, such as phone calls to their parents, or a trip to the “psych ward”, where children report that they are taken to the mental health unit, stripped naked, and made to wear a paper gown for hours or days inside a cold, locked cell.
21. Nearly every aspect of solitary confinement at the Jail is dehumanizing. When children are first brought to solitary confinement, they are strip-searched and their personal property is taken from them. The deputies handcuff the children held in solitary confinement almost every time they are outside of their cells.
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22. Frequently, the children report having difficulty sleeping, and being unable to maintain a normal day-night sleep cycle. The impairment to sleep have left many of these children confused, agitated, and vulnerable to hallucinatory psychoses.
23. Compounding these detrimental effects is a complete failure to provide access to basic educational services and denying those children with disabilities access to special education supports and services, responsibilities shared by the Sheriff’s Office and the School District. The duty to educate children at the Jail is a joint effort by the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board and embodied in a cooperative agreement discussing the responsibilities of each party to ensure delivery of appropriate educational services. The agreement at issue, “Cooperative Agreement between The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida and The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (Jail)” (“Education Agreement”), is dated July 1, 2016, and has been and continues to be in full force and effect through June 30, 2018.
24. On information and belief, no child in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail receives regular educational instruction comparable to their peers. The children in solitary confinement may receive, at most, packets of work shoved under a cell door or have brief moments to speak with a teacher standing outside of their locked door. These children cannot view educational instruction because the windows on their cell doors are scratched up to the point that it is nearly impossible to discern what is being written on the chalkboard, nor are they able to hear the teachers’ lessons through the solid metal doors. Additionally, for children with disabilities, highly specialized instruction, accommodations, and appropriate related services are not offered or meaningfully available in solitary confinement.
25. On information and belief, the School Board and Sheriff’s Office, though aware of the substandard access to educational services available to children in solitary confinement and its
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obligation to provide quality educational services under federal and state law, has taken no measures to ensure substantial delivery of education to these children. In fact, the School Board and Sheriff’s Office have moved some instruction to a separate classroom, outside of the central area of the wing with locked cells, entirely excluding the children in solitary confinement from instruction.
Risk of Harm of Solitary Confinement to Children 26. Defined by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care as “the housing of an adult or juvenile with minimal rare meaningful contact with other individuals,” solitary confinement is harmful to both adults and children. As children are still developing psychologically, neurologically, and socially, they are especially susceptible to psychological harm when they are isolated from others. 27. Evidence-based research universally agrees that children, like those housed in the Palm Beach County Jail in solitary confinement, suffer serious harm to their mental health. Children in solitary confinement have committed suicide, developed psychosis and post-traumatic stress disorders, and have experienced major depression, agitation, suicidal ideation, suicidal intent, self-mutilation, and suicidal behavior. Research into suicides at juvenile correctional facilities, for example, shows that the majority of children who commit suicide had a history of being placed in isolation. Depression, which is prevalent among children held in solitary, moreover, carries a 10% to 15% mortality rate. Thus, solitary confinement increases the risk of suicide substantially compared to the general population. 28. Children emerging from solitary confinement often develop long-term trust issues with adults, including paranoia, anger and hatred. Consequently, these children have difficulty forming therapeutic relationships necessary to address mental health concerns resulting from
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solitary confinement. Medical research on adolescent brains further explains why children are more vulnerable to the risk of long-term harm. In the adolescent brain, the connections between the frontal lobe and the mid-brain have not fully developed. As a result, trauma to children can cause permanent changes in brain development and create a higher risk of developing pervasive psychiatric conditions like paranoia and anxiety. As solitary confinement is a significant traumatic experience for children, there is a high likelihood of causing permanent changes to their brains.
29. Furthermore, research shows that more than 60% of children within the criminal justice system suffer from pre-existing trauma or mental health issues. The likelihood of latent trauma in these children makes the risk of harm precipitated by solitary confinement even worse. Combining the children’s past trauma, mental illnesses, and disabilities with solitary confinement results in exponentially detrimental outcomes.
30. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges support the end of solitary confinement for youth and have each called on correctional facilities to halt the use of solitary confinement of children. International bodies, such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations, have recognized the harmful psychological effects of solitary confinement on children, and have even likened it to torture. Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring the death penalty for juveniles to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), have also focused attention on the relative immaturity of the adolescent brain. It is clear that this developing neuroscience on
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the effects of solitary confinement on children has had profound impact on how the criminal justice system, and courts, view the treatment of children in the correctional setting.
31. In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice has ended the use of solitary confinement of children in all federal prisons following a 2012 report finding that “[n]owhere is the damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than when it involves solitary confinement.” Similarly, many state and city officials are implementing bans on solitary confinement in adult jails and prisons. For example, the Onondaga County Justice Center in Syracuse, New York, pursuant to a 2017 settlement agreement, stopped the use of disciplinary isolation for children held in the facility. At Rikers Island, the second largest jail in the country, the City Corrections Commissioner and Mayor banned the use of solitary confinement for children in 2014. A number of other jurisdictions, including Hinds County Jail in Mississippi, Rutherford County in Tennessee, Los Angeles County, and the New York Department of Corrections, have also adopted reforms or entered into agreements abolishing solitary confinement of children.
32. Despite this national trend to eliminate solitary confinement of children, the Sheriff’s Office continues to utilize this archaic method to contain direct-filed children under its care.
Defendants are Fully Aware of the Risks of Solitary Confinement to Children and Have Deliberately Chosen to Ignore Those Risks
33. In August 2015, the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA), in conjunction with the Liman Program of Yale Law School, published a report regarding solitary confinement, which addressed the national concern over solitary isolation and supported efforts to “limit or end extended isolation.” 2 Similarly, in April 2016, the National Commission on
2 Liman Program & Ass’n of State Corr. Adm’rs, Time-In-Cell: The ASCA-Liman 2014 National Survey of Administrative Segregation in Prison, 15 (Aug. 2015), available at
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Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) adopted a position statement that all juveniles should be excluded from solitary confinement of any duration because isolation is particularly harmful for juveniles. Defendants have ready access to these industry guidelines concerning solitary confinement and should consult these best practices as a matter of course.
34. Even more confounding is that confining children in solitary has been shown to be counterproductive to the safety and good order desired at the Palm Beach County Jail. Research shows that isolation increases misbehavior, agitation, and aggression in children, prompting many correctional facilities to replace the practice with positive behavior management strategies for children in their custody, which, in turn, has reduced rates of violence and misbehavior. These institutions, as a last resort, may use brief, temporary confinement - measured in hours and not days, months, or years - in conjunction with appropriate mental health facilitators, and only for situations in which imminent danger to the child or another person is present. To the contrary, the Sheriff’s Office effectively ignores best practices in the management of children within a correctional setting, exposing these children to dehumanizing, unnecessary and often-times lengthy captivity in isolation.
35. Jail staff are required to document and report through the chain of command any prisoner who appears to them, or any staff member, to be in need of mental health interventions. However, the process of mental health intervention at the Jail is more regularly used as a threat for misbehavior, as it involves being taken to the mental health unit, stripped of all clothing and belongings, being forced to wear only a paper gown, and being housed in a cell near adults exhibiting extreme behaviors.
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/ascaliman_administrativesegregationreport.pdf (last visited June 7, 2018).
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36. On information and belief, children in solitary confinement at the Jail routinely try to bring attention to the conditions at the Jail, but such complaints have been routinely ignored. Staff at the Jail, moreover, discourage children from writing grievances, or otherwise fail to respond or turn in the children’s grievances. Some also respond to grievances or other complaints by stating that nothing is going to change with their conditions of confinement, further undermining and foreclosing efforts to seek redress administratively. On information and belief, all grievance requests from the children in solitary to be removed from confinement and be given access to education have been denied by Defendants.
The Defendants’ Disciplinary Confinement Policies and Practices Discriminate Against Children with Disabilities
37. Placing vulnerable prisoners, like children, and/or those with mental health issues, intellectual disabilities or brain injuries into solitary confinement is “the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe.” Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
38. Defendants regularly house children with disabilities in solitary confinement to a greater degree than children without disabilities. These children are disabled, and are qualified to participate in education and programming, but are denied benefits from these programs due to their solitary confinement. Defendants violate the ADA and Section 504 by housing children with disabilities in solitary confinement, failing to accommodate each child’s particular vulnerabilities to the isolating conditions, denying them meaningful access to programs and services, and failing to identify and/or recognize behavior related to their disabilities.
39. At the Jail, children with mental health disabilities are disciplined for nonconforming and erratic behaviors related to their conditions, some of which could have been avoided if Defendants provided adequate mental health care or accommodations. For instance,
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children diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder may exhibit impulsive behavior, such as fighting with peers. Instead of designing a system with reasonable accommodations meant to positively reinforce preferred behavior or use mental health services to intervene and deescalate a situation, the Jail punishes these children with solitary confinement.
40. The isolating conditions these children are exposed to and the complete lack of any accommodations cause symptomatic behaviors to escalate, leading to disciplinary infractions. In response, these children are locked in isolation for longer periods of time, creating a never ending cycle of escalating mental health-related behavior and punishment for that behavior. Defendants’ failure to make reasonable accommodations to their disciplinary policy and practice, discriminates against children with disabilities.
41. Each day in disciplinary confinement results in the loss of legally-required education and opportunities to participate in programming and services. Defendants’ continued failure to integrate children with disabilities into the services, programs, and activities at the Jail constitutes a violation of the integration mandate of the ADA.
42. Accordingly, Defendants’ policies and practices of solitary confinement of children with disabilities at the Jail directly violate the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Children in Solitary Confinement at the Jail are Denied Access to Meaningful Educational Services
43. Under the Education Agreement, the Sheriff’s Office is obligated to provide both a safe environment and the educational space for the provision of educational services to incarcerated children, so as to comply with all state and federal laws, such as the IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Sheriff’s Office must also plan activities which do not conflict with the School Board’s provision of a minimum of 300 minutes of daily instruction, 250 days per calendar year. The School Board has the obligation under the Education Agreement to provide
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the children at the Jail an education that meets state and federal laws, provide resource personnel for special education students and English Language Learner students, provide educational materials, maintain attendance records of students, and deliver an educational program for students 300 minutes each school day under the school calendar.
44. Collaboration between the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board is also required under the Education Agreement, including communication to effectuate educational services, transition planning for youth leaving the Jail, and meeting requirements of the former No Child Left Behind (now Every Student Succeeds Act) federal education mandates. These requirements demonstrate the awareness and intent of both the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board to deliver sufficient educational services to the children at the Jail. Despite that awareness, the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board routinely deny meaningful access to educational programming to children held in solitary confinement.
45. On the contrary, children in solitary confinement are systematically denied access to education and special education. Children held in solitary confinement are locked in their cells for the duration of the school day. They cannot see through the windows in the cell doors. They cannot hear through the metal doors of their cells. They receive packets of work shoved under their doors. They have limited access to educational materials and books. They do not receive classroom instruction.
46. When children are informed that they will be subject to solitary confinement, Defendants do not evaluate the impact of the confinement on their schooling. Children placed in disciplinary confinement receive no notice that when accused of misbehavior, isolation will result in a complete denial of meaningful educational instruction, or that they will be cut off from their regular class work. Children placed in administrative confinement, furthermore, are also afforded
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no procedural due process and are denied access to these education services for seemingly limitless amounts of time. Even when an infraction or confinement reason has nothing to do with school, children are removed from all education and related services and programming without any notice or opportunity to be heard.
47. State and local juvenile and adult correctional facilities are required to comply with the IDEA. Yet, children with IEPs in solitary confinement at the Jail are denied a free appropriate public education. Delivery of instruction cannot be met through a metal door where children cannot see or hear. A student with intellectual disabilities held in confinement cannot receive the required differentiated instruction while isolated in a cement cell. Minimal time with a teacher on the other side of the locked cell does not enable special education students to meet IEP goals. A student with a specific learning disability in solitary confinement cannot receive the highly specialized instruction required to meaningfully deliver educational programming.
48. The children who request additional support in school are largely ignored, minimally attended to, and given easier work if they ask too many questions. Because of these repeated failures to provide meaningful education, the children in solitary confinement do not demonstrate proficiency in academic or behavioral goals on their IEPs.
49. Moreover, Defendants deny due process to children with disabilities in solitary confinement by failing to determine whether a child’s behavior is a manifestation of their disabilities. Under the IDEA, a child with disabilities is entitled to a manifestation determination if they will be excluded from school for 10 consecutive days or more, or if the child is subjected to series of disciplinary removals totaling more than 10 days in a school year. In that event, a meeting of the relevant members of the child’s IEP team must be held, after inviting the child’s parents to determine if behavior resulting in the discipline is a manifestation of the child’s
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disability. If so, the school must return the child to class, and develop appropriate supports to address the behavior. In the alternative, if the child’s IEP is not being properly implemented, the removal from the educational setting will not be permitted. None of these procedural protections are provided to those children with disabilities who are housed in solitary confinement at the Jail.
50. Likewise, children with unidentified disabilities in solitary confinement are not evaluated and accommodated for these disabilities and children with existing disabilities are not re-evaluated to ensure delivery of appropriate educational services, as required by the IDEA.
51. Furthermore, children held in isolation at the Jail and protected under the ADA and Section 504 do not receive accommodations formulated to allow them access to educational curriculum. For example, a packet of worksheets slid under a metal cell door does not provide access for a student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder who may need assignments to be broken down into smaller items. Likewise, a teacher standing outside of a locked door for a few minutes does not satisfy an accommodation such as checking for comprehension or encouragement to stay on task. Without these necessary accommodations, the children are denied rights under Section 504, requiring access to educational curriculum.
Defendants have a Pattern and Practice of Unlawful Deprivations in the Solitary Confinement of Children
52. The deplorable conditions of solitary confinement of children at the Jail are not isolated incidents. There is a clear thread, with unifying similarities, not only for children currently held in solitary confinement at the Jail, but also for those who previously had to endure the inhumane practices. All of these children were or are being held at the Jail in solitary confinement as pre-trial detainees; all of them have histories of abuse, trauma, or disabilities, and did not receive any mental health treatment or counseling; all of them experience some form of physical and/or mental harm because of the solitary confinement conditions; all were denied any due process
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protections and none were given opportunities to engage in the education and programming offered to their peers; and all special education, highly specialized instruction, accommodations, and related services, were, as a matter of course, systematically denied to these children because of the solitary confinement policies implemented at the Jail.
Individual Allegations of Plaintiffs Currently Held at the Jail I. Plaintiff H.C. 53. Sixteen-year-old H.C. lived with his mom, with whom he is very close. He enjoys reading and spending time outside. H.C. is an English Language Learner student who requires additional assistance from his teachers to be successful in school. 54. H.C. entered the Jail on December 1, 2017, at which time he was immediately placed in solitary confinement. When H.C. asked the deputies why he could not be with the other children in general population, he was told that he had keep-aways and would be held in solitary confinement. 55. H.C. was not given any notice or opportunity to be heard before being placed in solitary confinement. H.C. was not given notice that he would not be able to attend school with his peers as a result of the solitary confinement. He was not notified that he could appeal his solitary confinement status, nor was he given a copy of inmate rules from the Jail describing the grievance policy. He has been given no end date to his isolation, and instead is left to languish indefinitely in his cell. 56. Solitary confinement feels lifeless for H.C. He is depressed, feels extreme stress, and sadness as a result of solitary confinement. He finds himself sleeping throughout the day to attempt to manage the endless isolation.
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57. H.C. tries to use his opportunities for recreation when he can, although he is alone inside a walled-in basketball court. He is given his daily meals on a tray through a slot in his cell door. H.C.’s calls to his mom are his only permitted social contact. H.C. is allowed brief showers, lasting no more than 15 minutes, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
58. It is difficult for H.C. to see through the windows in his cell as they are scratched to such an extent that it is impossible to view anything outside of his cell. H.C. can only hear voices on the outside of his cell if the speaker is projecting loudly.
59. If H.C. wants to drink water, he tries to offer his cup through the flap in his door, hoping a deputy will fill it with water from the drinking fountain. Otherwise, he is left with trying to drink the water from the sink adjoining the toilet in his cell, which H.C. says has an unusual smell and bad taste. Some deputies will fill his water cup, but others ignore his requests, telling him, “I’m not your mom.”
60. For school, H.C. is given worksheets from teachers in the school under his cell door, but the papers are in English, and H.C. must wait for a teacher who can communicate with him to offer assistance. He does not understand most of what is being said even when he can hear a teacher.
61. H.C. is uncertain as to whether it is acceptable for Jail staff to hit children at the Jail. On one occasion, approximately three weeks ago, there was a fight on the unit. After breaking up the fight, the Jail staff came into H.C.’s cell, apparently because he was too close to his locked cell door during the fight. Multiple Jail staff entered his cell, grabbed H.C.’s arm and held it behind his back, shoved a knee into his neck, and punched him in the face, leaving a mark. H.C. witnessed a similar incident with another child also held in solitary confinement.
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II. Plaintiff M.F. 62. Seventeen-year-old M.F. loves listening to, singing, and writing music. He misses being with his family. When he gets out of jail he hopes to go to college to become an architect. 63. M.F. is a pretrial detainee and will remain at the Jail until the resolution of his criminal case. M.F. has been held at the Jail since January 17, 2018. He was placed in solitary administrative confinement for six months due to keep away conditions with co-defendant children. 64. M.F. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Conduct Disorder. He is prescribed medication to deal with his mental health issues. The jail is aware of M.F.’s mental health needs, as he entered from the juvenile detention center and was placed directly in the mental health unit of the Jail. 65. M.F. reports that his experience in the mental health unit was traumatic. He was stripped of all clothing, possessions, and confined to a freezing cold cell for 24 hours a day. For the first 2 days of his stay in the mental health unit, M.F. was not even given a paper gown, but left naked with just a “suicide blanket.” M.F. was not allowed access to educational programming, showers, recreation, phone calls, or visits while held in the mental health unit. M.F. stayed in the mental health unit at the Jail for 3 days before being moved to solitary administrative confinement, where he was confined for six months. However, despite receiving medication and counseling prior to his arrival at the Jail, he has not received medication or therapy, even while in confinement. He is an individual with a disability as defined by the ADA and Section 504. 66. In school prior to the Jail, M.F. obtained services through an IEP for a speech impairment, had a Behavior Intervention Plan, and received accommodations to address his individual educational needs. M.F.’s disabilities affect his ability to complete school work, pay
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attention, follow directions, and make appropriate decisions. Since his arrival at the Jail, he has received no educational services, including those previously provided for through his IEP. He never received a notice or a hearing about prohibition from education classes as a condition of administrative confinement. M.F. previously earned his GED, but he is still entitled to educational services and related services through his IEP, though none have been provided. Defendants have held no IEP meeting with M.F. to explore the delivery of educational or related services.
67. In isolation, M.F. only received visits from his attorneys. He received his meals through a flap in the metal door of his cell. He could not lift himself up enough to see out of the top window in the door of his cell and both that window and the one close to the ground are scratched so badly that he was unable to see through either of them. Unless someone was speaking loudly and clearly on the other side of his door, he could not hear them properly.
68. M.F. also has an injured leg, for which a doctor outside of the Jail previously prescribed him the use of a leg brace with a metal rod. Upon entering the Jail, the nursing staff confirmed with the community doctor that the leg brace was needed. However, after approximately one month in solitary confinement, deputies searched his cell and took away the leg brace because of the metal rod. No replacement brace was offered and, although M.F.’s leg is not fully healed, he has been given no additional medical attention.
69. M.F. felt like he was “going crazy” in the Box. M.F. enjoys reading, but rarely received new books, so he re-read the same books over and over again. He started to talk to himself while in the Box. He passed the time in the Box by pacing or role playing – audibly acting out scenes from television or movies. M.F. only went out of his cell for recreation a few times in his six months in isolation. He was seldom offered recreation and he did not ask to go because he felt that the hours pass easier if he was not aware of the distinction between day and night. He began
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having visual hallucinations and saw the words on the pages of his books “wiggle” and the pages move independently.
70. M.F. exhibited symptoms that directly correlated with his placement in solitary confinement and the accompanying social deprivation. M.F. was irritable, agitated, and anxious. He felt completely cut off from others and discouraged about his future. He had nothing to do in his cell. He could not sleep at night because he was not given his prescribed medication and because he heard banging from the cell next to him. M.F. was not been able to receive any meaningful therapy or counseling services in the Jail while in solitary confinement. No mental health workers came to his cell. Prior to placing him in isolation, no one from the Jail spoke with M.F. about his disabilities. M.F.’s mother received a letter from the Sheriff’s Office upon his entry into the Jail requesting consent for a mental health examination, which made M.F. and his mother believe that M.F. would soon begin receiving medication and counseling for his mental health conditions. However, that treatment did not occur.
71. M.F. filed a grievance requesting that he be freed from solitary confinement and that he be allowed to receive any educational programming or services. After several weeks of not receiving any response, M.F. filed another grievance asking for a status on his previous grievance request. The Sheriff’s office responded that they were not aware of any grievances that he filed, and stating that he is in solitary confinement because of the “keep separates” in the Jail. Despite the fact that Sheriff’s Office policy does not require grievances to be sent to a specific department within the Jail, the response also requested that M.F. write another grievance to classification concerning any housing changes. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, M.F. wrote a grievance to classification, but has yet to receive any formal response. Rather, M.F. was told by a
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deputy that he would not have any success in changing his housing status by filing the grievances because of the other co-defendant children housed in the Jail.
72. After six months in confinement, M.F. was eventually placed in the general population with the other children when a co-defendant was moved off his floor.
Individual Allegations of Children Previously Held in Solitary Confinement at the Jail 73. Plaintiffs are not the only children that Defendants have held in solitary confinement. Other examples of the Defendants’ practices are set forth below. I. T.M 74. T.M. is a 17-year-old boy who was at the Jail for approximately five months. T.M. has an IEP in school for specific learning disability and language impairment. T.M. has a qualifying disability under the ADA and Section 504. 75. T.M. received a disciplinary report after an altercation with another child. As the argument was escalating, a deputy was on duty nearby, but did not intervene until a physical fight occurred. Although the other child hit him first, the deputy on duty said that T.M. was the aggressor. T.M. received a disciplinary report and a consequence of 20 days in disciplinary solitary confinement. The other child did not receive any disciplinary report. 76. Disciplinary solitary confinement was difficult for T.M. He could not sleep while in solitary confinement. He could not see out of the scratched up windows in his cell. He could hear when people on the other side of his door spoke loudly. He talked to himself and imagined stories in his head to pass the time. He was not permitted to have any recreation or telephone calls. In disciplinary solitary confinement, T.M. was allowed to take showers on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, for no more than five minutes. That 15 minutes per week of shower time was the
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only time T.M. would be out of his cell each week. During disciplinary solitary confinement, T.M. experienced complete isolation.
77. School offered no respite for T.M. while in solitary confinement. Teachers would slide worksheets on the side of his door, but he did not complete them. No changes were made to T.M.’s instruction as a result of his solitary confinement status.
78. T.M. was not visited by a medical or mental health professional while in solitary confinement. T.M. had spinal surgery for scoliosis in May 2018 and continues to experience pain. However, he received no medical treatment while at the Jail.
79. T.M. was “houseman” for two months prior to his disciplinary report. In order to achieve this position, he had to demonstrate a positive behavior record. Being houseman meant that T.M. had good behavior and was given additional responsibilities. His positive track record was not taken into account when T.M. was placed in disciplinary solitary confinement. He did not have the opportunity to challenge the confinement decision nor was he made aware of the opportunity to grieve the consequence.
II. J.E. 80. Sixteen-year-old J.E. likes basketball and reading. He misses spending time with his family. Prior to being incarcerated, J.E. lived with his mom in Lake Worth, Florida. When J.E. gets out of the Palm Beach County Jail, he wants to go to school and would like to be a welder when he grows up. 81. J.E. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Conduct Disorder, and Mood Disorder since he was about 12 years old. J.E. has a Section 504 Plan (which provides a blueprint of supports designed to remove barriers for students with disabilities, so that the student has equal access to educational curriculum) in school based on his disabilities, and
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before being incarcerated at the Jail, he was in the 10th Grade at Lake Worth High School. He struggles to do well in reading and writing without extra support from his teachers, however, he has received no evaluation for special education services under the IDEA.
82. J.E.’s disabilities make it difficult for him to pay attention for extended periods of time, and make him feel anxious, depressed, and impulsive. He is an individual with a disability as defined by the ADA and Section 504.
83. J.E. is a pretrial detainee and has been at the Jail since January 17, 2018. He will be held at the Jail until his criminal case is resolved.
84. J.E. was placed in solitary confinement for six months as an administrative placement due to having co-defendant children who are also incarcerated.
85. In solitary confinement, J.E. was permitted to take brief, 10-15 minute showers on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Opportunities to go to a walled-in basketball court for solitary recreation were sporadic. He did not have any visitors except from his attorneys and his probation officer. His only social contact in solitary confinement was through calls to his mom, but she was unable to speak to him as much as he would have liked because she could not talk while she was working.
86. In J.E.’s cell, there is a metal frame bed with a thin mattress, a single piece toilet and sink combination, and a stainless steel desk and stool that are bolted into the wall and floor. Meals are delivered through a locked, sliding box situated in the door. To drink water, J.E. must use the sink adjoining the toilet. The water is discolored if the taps are not run frequently and the water has an unusual, sewage-like odor. While he was in solitary confinement, some deputies would permit J.E. to place his cup through the sliding box in the door and fill it from the drinking fountain water used by the children who are not in solitary. Other times, deputies refused to get
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J.E. drinking fountain water, stating, “I’m not your water boy.” In solitary confinement, J.E. was required to be handcuffed each time he left his cell, including to showers, recreation, medical, and legal visits.
87. J.E. is completely under the control of the deputies at the Jail. For instance, J.E. is able to operate the light in his cell with a switch. However, on at least two occasions while he was in solitary confinement, a deputy responding at nighttime to noise on the wing, deliberately turned on brightly emanating emergency lights, and left them on so that the children were unable to sleep. Another time, while J.E. was in solitary confinement, he had been given pants to wear that deputies later decided were not the correct ones for him. Rather than exchange the pants for proper ones, they took his only pair, leaving him undressed for hours. In response to situations such as these, J.E. is curtly dismissed by deputies, who state, “You don’t like it? Don’t get yourself arrested.”
88. J.E. had little to do in “the Box.” Being locked in his cell for so long made him feel depressed, alone, and in his own words, “delusional”. He paced the available 4’x10’ area in his cell, saying that he often can’t stop moving. He constantly felt that he did not have enough space. He lost approximately 20 pounds after entering solitary confinement at the Jail. He had recently begun to read, but did not receive many new books during his six months in the Box, so he was stuck re-reading the same books over and over again. The lack of stimulation became so bad that if he was not pacing, he just stared at the wall all day. J.E. hardly slept at night, and could get only a few hours of sleep before being woken up for the 3:00 a.m. breakfast service at the Jail. J.E. says that isolation, “does something to you. It’s crazy.”
89. J.E. had begun having visual and auditory hallucinations in solitary confinement. He heard screaming at night and would stare at the blank wall in his cell and “watch” a full television show. Other children held at the Jail have covertly communicated with him, telling J.E.
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that if he banged on the door to get attention, he would be sent to the psych unit, where children have their clothing taken from them, are given a paper gown, and locked in a very cold mental health unit cell. Fearing reprisal, J.E. experienced frequent headaches and burning sensations in his throat at night, but did not tell anyone about them. No health care professional went to visit J.E. or talked to him about his physical or mental well-being.
90. J.E. exhibited symptoms that directly correlated with his placement in solitary confinement. J.E. felt stressed, anxious, angry, and hopeless. He rarely received visitors. No one from the Jail’s mental health staff has ever checked on him while he was in isolation, despite the fact that he previously received counseling in the community. J.E.’s mother called the Jail to describe his disabilities and how they would worsen in confinement, but there was no change in his status or care.
91. In solitary confinement, J.E. could not meaningfully attend education classes or programming. He had no notice or hearing regarding the termination of typical education classes as a condition of administrative confinement. He sporadically received packets of worksheets, slid to him under the door, for his education. J.E. could not see any class occurring outside of his cell as the small windows on his cell door is entirely scratched. J.E. could not hear the instruction very well as he had to stand and listen through the cracks around the door frame, and teachers who hold class on the bottom floor many meters away from the solitary confinement cells, do not speak at a volume loud enough to be heard through the door. Teachers did not help him with the worksheets, and he could not complete them on his own. J.E. tried to ask for help but he felt that because there were too many children in the unit, and teachers did not have time to spend helping him. In solitary confinement, J.E. felt forgotten by the teachers. Despite the clear deficiencies in instruction,
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Defendants have made no attempts to alter their practices or work to ensure that educational services are properly delivered to children in solitary.
92. J.E. filed grievances while incarcerated at the Jail requesting that he be removed from solitary confinement and expressing his desire to participate in educational programming. After filing an initial grievance, J.E. received a response from the Sheriff’s Office stating that he was in administrative confinement and that they would look into adjusting his placement. Weeks later, after having not received any further response, J.E. filed an appeal of his previous grievance to the division commander concerning his request for removal from confinement and access to education. This time, the Sheriff’s Office responded by asking that he “stop filing frivolous grievances”. J.E. appealed once again, wanting to know what is happening with his request, or to discuss a solution. The Sheriff’s Office responded that because he has three “keep separates,” he “will remain in administrative confinement” until such time that his co-defendant children are no longer in the Jail.
93. After six months in solitary confinement, J.E. was permitted to join the other children in general population after one of his co-defendants was released from Jail.
II. W.G. 94. W.G. is an African-American 16-year-old boy who was held at the Palm Beach
County Jail in solitary confinement for approximately 10 months prior to his trial and before any conviction of a crime, beginning when he was 14 years old. W.G. is under the legal custody of his grandmother and supervision of the Department of Children and Families after being removed from the custody of his biological parents. When he grows up, he wants to work in landscaping or have a pressure cleaning business.
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95. W.G. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. He has an IEP for an intellectual disability, criteria for which includes an IQ below 70, and Specific Learning Disability. He has a difficult time focusing in school and requires specialized instruction to learn. He is on a differentiated curriculum in school due to his disability. W.G. qualifies as an individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 504.
96. W.G. was charged as an adult and moved to the Jail on January 9, 2017, when he was 14 years old. At first, W.G. was placed in general population with the other children on the 12th floor. After about two weeks, W.G. got into a fight with other children and received a disciplinary report. He was told that he would receive a 20-day disciplinary solitary confinement sentence as a result of his rule infraction. However, despite receiving no further disciplinary reports, W.G. was held in solitary confinement for the next ten months, until his move from the Jail on October 27, 2017.
97. When initially placed in confinement, W.G. asked deputies that he be able to get out of the Box, but was told that he had to stay away from children on both wings of the 12th floor as a result of his fight. W.G was never told that he could write a grievance but rather was led to believe that he would be held in confinement indefinitely, with no possibility of recourse. He did not write a formal grievance and did not know how to use the grievance process. Eventually, W.G. lost hope and stopped asking to get out. No one from the Jail inquired as to W.G.’s intellectual or mental health disabilities prior to or during his placement in the Box. No one from the Jail ever offered additional assistance due to his intellectual or mental health disabilities.
98. The Box provided no physical or social stimulation for W.G. He gained weight in solitary confinement due to lack of exercise. In fact, after leaving the Box, his body “hurt to move” as it had been inactive for such a long time. During his 10 months in solitary confinement, W.G.
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only had visits from his attorney and his Department of Children and Families case manager. Any time he left his cell, W.G. was handcuffed. W.G. adapted his sleep schedule as do many children in isolation, sleeping during the day and being awake at night. W.G. tried to utilize his opportunities for recreation, but was often denied the privilege because other children were utilizing the recreation space, and he was not allowed to have any interaction with them.
99. W.G. wanted to read to “keep from going crazy” in confinement, but he is not a strong reader and new books were not regularly offered. W.G. wanted to write songs to occupy his time, but he found that he could not focus enough to do so.
100. W.G. began experiencing headaches, as well as back pain from a previous automobile accident. He made a sick call and was given “red pills” from the Jail medical staff, which were charged to his canteen funds. The pills did not help relieve any pain or stress. W.G. felt that he needed glasses to see while in confinement, but he never had any vision screening.
101. W.G.’s interactions with Jail staff exacerbated the overwhelmingly negative conditions of confinement. When coupled with the limitations of his disabilities, W.G. would easily become irritable and frustrated. He would yell for the deputies on duty, in a desperate attempt to engage in some social interaction. W.G. would repeatedly try to talk to Jail staff, by asking to use the phone, for water, and for soap, but the deputies would ignore him. He would beat on his door to get attention, only to be threatened by deputies to a fight. Deputies also routinely threatened to take away W.G.’s showers, phone calls, and attorney visits. Some deputies would even refuse to let W.G. out of the Box for recreation. Other times, deputies would “toss” his cell during searches, deliberately tearing up or throwing away W.G.’s possessions. Deputies would bang on the door to wake him up and if he didn’t get out of bed in five minutes, he would have a 24-hour lockdown in his cell, without any privileges. To drink water while in deadlock,
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W.G. would have to ask the deputies to bring him water with a cup sent through the food flap of the door. Some deputies would refuse, leaving drinking water from the sink as the only option. The sink, adjoining the toilet, would often have discolored, odorous water, which W.G. would try to run until it became clear in order to drink it.
102. W.G. reports that children on the 12th floor are well aware that the mental health unit is a place where inmates are sent, stripped of their clothing and belongings, given a paper gown, and forced into a locked, cold cell. Although he never went to the mental health unit, W.G. heard deputies make threats to children in confinement who were loud or disruptive, such as deputies saying, “What’s that? You’re going to kill yourself?” so the deputies could retaliate by sending the children to the mental health unit.
103. For educational instruction, W.G. would need to stand the entire time in order to try to see through the badly scratched window in his door or hear through the cracks around the door frame. Due to his back injuries, standing is painful for W.G. He explained this issue to the teachers, but no accommodations were made, nor were any alternatives to delivering the education curriculum devised. His only option remained standing and trying to see and hear through the metal door of his cell. W.G. was given some work for school under his door. He could not access his educational services and struggled working independently with reading and math. He cannot read big words. He would yell through the door if he had a question, and some of the school staff would respond, but then leave quickly as they had to give attention to others. W.G. participated in one IEP meeting on May 25, 2017, but his attendance was perfunctory, lasting only 10 minutes. Eventually, W.G. gave up on trying to observe school or engage school staff from the confines of his Box and would stay asleep instead. After his release from the Jail, at an IEP meeting on November 28, 2017, the support facilitator who worked with W.G. at the Jail acknowledged in
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conference notes that there were several accommodations that W.G. was unable to receive while

in confinement at the Jail.

104. W.G.’s family has noticed a difference in him, which they attribute to his solitary

confinement. They report that he does not feel comfortable with his peers, and is constantly

concerned with aggressive or negative attacks from them. With W.G.’s young age and his history

of confinement, should he ever return to the Jail as a child, he would likely go right back to the

Box.

III.

Jeziah Guagno

105. Jeziah Guagno (“Jeziah”) is a biracial 18-year-old male who entered the Jail as a

16-year-old child and was placed in solitary confinement at the Jail. When Jeziah turned 18, he

was moved to the adult side of the Jail, where he remained in solitary confinement. In total, he

was held in solitary confinement for approximately 21 months.

106. Jeziah enjoys reading and would like to be a mechanic or city employee when he

returns to the community. He misses playing sports, especially football, going to the library, and

helping to take care of his younger siblings.

107. Jeziah has been diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Conduct Disorder,

and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. In school, he has an IEP for an Emotional

Behavioral Disability. His childhood was overshadowed by abuse and instability in his home

placements, and he was adjudicated dependent and placed under the custody and supervision of

the Department of Children and Families. He has been prescribed psychotropic medication for his

disability and participated in counseling in the community and through school. Jeziah qualifies

as an individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 504.

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108. Jeziah was charged as an adult at age 16 and was held in confinement on the 12th floor, for approximately 17 months. Upon turning 18 years old in December 2017, Jeziah continued to be held in solitary confinement on one of the adult floors of the Jail until his move from the Jail, approximately four months later.
109. When Jeziah was first placed at the Jail from March to July 2016, he was 16 years old. He received a disciplinary report after a fight with another youth, and spent about three months in solitary confinement. During that time, he was exercising his telephone privilege, which usually would have been 15 minutes on the phone. However, before his phone call was to end, a deputy unplugged the phone. As the telephone was his only social interaction while in isolation, he was upset when that time ended early. He flooded his cell with water from the toilet.
110. The deputies on duty told him to “cuff up”, where he had to put his hands behind his back to be handcuffed. While handcuffed, he was pushed against a wall, and a deputy hit him while his back was turned. He resisted and fell to the floor. The deputies stomped on him and his face was slammed against the cement floor, breaking his two front teeth. His chin was split open, which later required sutures. He was taken to the mental health unit, where he had his clothes taken from him, given a paper gown, and was locked in another cell overnight without receiving any medical attention.
111. The following day, Jeziah was taken to the medical unit of the Jail. He was given gauze to keep in his mouth to soak up the blood. A few days later Jeziah was taken out of the Jail to have surgery to remove the remnants of his front teeth which were impacted in his gums. He was given ill-fitting dentures that clipped on to his other teeth and returned to solitary confinement. The incident report described the assault by the deputies as a slip and fall. When Jeziah tried to file a grievance about the use of force and ensuing injuries, he was told that the time to make a
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claim had expired. Jeziah was told by Jail staff that one of the deputies who hurt him was reassigned, along with the sergeant who was on duty, but Jeziah has witnessed that the other two deputies who were involved in the assault are still on assignment at the Jail.
112. At one point, Jeziah was released from the Jail to his father, but two weeks later, in August 2016, Jeziah returned to the Jail. Based on the disciplinary report from his previous stay at the Jail, Jeziah was immediately placed in solitary confinement upon his return. This time, he was placed in administrative solitary confinement and was told that classification would review his isolation each week. However, he remained in solitary confinement for the next 16 months and received no information about any review of his isolation during that time.
113. Jeziah continued to be a target for the deputies while in confinement. For instance, about two weeks after his return to the Jail, a deputy accused Jeziah of failing to return his food tray. Despite Jeziah’s assertions that he had returned the food tray, the deputy entered his cell and pepper sprayed him. When the tray was not found in his cell and Jeziah argued that the deputy should not be coming into his cell alone, Jeziah was moved to the other wing on the 12th floor.
114. Also, Jeziah still had his denture clips, but found them to be loose and uncomfortable. He took them out when he would sleep, but did not have a special container for them, so he used a covered cup, filled with water, in which to keep them. On or about October 2017, while his denture clips were in his room, but not in his mouth, deputies “tossed” Jeziah’s cell and threw away his denture piece. The incident was not documented so Jeziah could not have them replaced. A deputy involved in the original incident where his teeth were slammed on the floor simply looked at him and laughed when the dentures were thrown away.
115. While Jeziah was in confinement, another Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office staff member told Jeziah that she would have other inmates assault him when he got out of confinement.
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Jeziah called the PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) hotline, but received no follow up in response. In December 2017, weeks before his 18th birthday, Jeziah was released from solitary confinement. He was in constant fear of receiving a disciplinary report and being returned to the Box. Jeziah was indeed assaulted by another prisoner approximately one week after his placement with the other children in general population. As a result of that incident, Jeziah received a disciplinary report and was returned to solitary confinement.
116. While he was in confinement as a child, deputies regularly provoked him and triggered him to react by threatening and taunting him. Corrections officers repeatedly knocked on Jeziah’s cell door during the night to keep him from falling asleep. While in solitary confinement, Jeziah had his recreation and access to drinking water from the fountain taken away by deputies. Deputies threatened Jeziah at least 10 times with a trip to the “psych cell,” the mental health unit where he would have no clothes, a paper gown, and be locked in a cold cell if he didn’t be quiet. He had instances where all of his personal items, including drawings, paperwork, sweaters, socks, undergarments, and the sheets off of his bed would be taken from him for hours at a time as punishment for banging on his door or talking to other children.
117. In confinement, Jeziah felt total isolation. While on the 12th floor of the Jail, he would spend 23-24 hours per day alone. He would repeatedly ask the deputies what time it was in order to engage in some social interaction. He would get to a point of such extreme frustration that he would act out. After he had been in isolation for 11 months, Jeziah began to draw pictures or rip them from books or newspapers and paste them to the wall of his cell with toothpaste, trying to find something to do.
118. Jeziah estimates that he lost approximately 20 pounds while in confinement. His sleep patterns became completely irregular. Even after moving to the adult floors of the Jail, Jeziah
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had multiple days of insomnia. He has become extremely anxious and constantly feels pent up with energy. He has not received any of his prescribed medication for his mental health conditions since coming to the Jail more than one and a half years ago. He had been receiving counseling from the school district as a related service through his IEP, but that stopped completely in June 2017 without any prior written notice from the school district. After approximately four or five months in solitary confinement, Jeziah requested a sick call and told the Jail doctor that he was depressed and needed medication. The doctor told him that he would get in touch with Jeziah’s guardian, his grandmother, but Jeziah never heard anything after that.
119. Jeziah also reached the point during his solitary confinement that he harmed himself, cutting his fingers on a metal piece in his cell, so that he had an excuse to be taken out of his cell. He required 12 stitches from his injury. He did not receive any mental health treatment from the Jail despite this incident, and his history of mental illness, disability, or presenting behaviors.
120. Jeziah filed multiple grievances regarding his confinement. His grievances would be ignored, returned as not able to be processed, or returned without a reason as to why he was still held in isolation. At one point, after Jeziah had been in isolation for more than a year, a Captain at the Jail talked to him and said he would review his status and let him out of the Box, but this change never occurred. Jeziah continued to file grievances, but some deputies refused to accept the grievances and other deputies would tell him to turn it in to the deputy on the next shift. Other times he would be told by Jail staff that his grievances got lost. Jeziah felt overwhelmingly frustrated and angry about continuing to be held in solitary confinement, exacerbating the symptoms of his disability that were compounded by almost a year and a half of isolation. His
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release from solitary confinement eventually happened three months after the conversation with the Jail Captain in December 2017, the month Jeziah turned 18 years old.
121. The lack of access to educational programming, especially services required by his IEP, caused frustration for Jeziah when he was in the Box. At an IEP meeting, he explained to school staff that it was difficult to see and hear any of the class instruction while he was in the Box, but his concerns were not recorded in conference notes nor addressed by school staff. Jeziah could not see out of the scratched plexiglass window of his cell, felt that he could not keep up with what was happening in the class, was told to work on his own with papers slid under his door, failed to receive the help needed to understand the work, and attempted to listen to school through the gaps in the sides and bottom of the cell door. Jeziah was routinely told by school staff that they would come by after they were done teaching, but he would usually receive no more than a minute or two of attention, which was wholly insufficient to be considered a free, appropriate public education.
122. When he received educational services outside of the Box, Jeziah recalls that his grades were better, he could sit near a teacher, and that he received instructional support throughout the school day. When he was placed in solitary confinement, Jeziah received no notice that his educational services would be removed as a condition of his isolation. Eventually, Jeziah found no reason at all to wake up when educational services took place on the other side of his cell door because he was unable to hear lessons that were presented. After Jeziah’s move to the adult floors, an IEP meeting was held on February 13, 2018, and the conference notes state that, “Under the circumstances of confinement he has not been able to gain regular access to school, which has negatively impacted his academic success.” Despite this knowledge on the part of Defendants, no attempts have been made to improve the method of instruction for children in solitary confinement.
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IV.

Brice Daniels

123. Brice Daniels (“Brice”) is an African-American 18-year-old male who was held at

the Palm Beach County Jail in solitary confinement prior to trial or conviction, beginning when

he was 16 years old.

124. Brice spent more than 11 months in solitary confinement at the Jail. He entered the

Jail on December 5, 2016, at 16 years old, and after about two weeks was placed in administrative

confinement due to keep-away conditions with other children. He was released from solitary confinement in November 2017, one month before his 18th birthday, when his keep-aways left the

Jail.

125. Brice is diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and bipolar

disorder and has an IEP in school. He was prescribed psychotropic medication in the community

and discussed his diagnoses and medication with classification at the Jail. However, he was never

visited by a psychiatrist or therapist from the Jail while in solitary confinement. Brice is an

individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 504.

126. Brice internalized much of the isolation that he experienced in his nearly one year

in solitary confinement. The idea that he was enclosed behind four walls was one that he tried to

avoid thinking about, for fear of “going crazy”. At first, Brice would exercise his limited

opportunities to go outside of his cell to the walled in basketball court for solitary recreation. He

wouldn’t move around, but would sit outside on the cement ground, close his eyes, try to listen for

birds calling around him, and just breathe. After about six months in solitary confinement, he

refused to go outside at all because the presence of air and life outside, juxtaposed with his stale

and lifeless confinement, was too difficult to process.

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127. Brice passed the time by doing anything he could within solitary confinement – he kicked his door, threw things in his cell, talked to himself, sang, and danced. One time, he was being too loud in his cell and was sent to the mental health unit for two days because of a false allegation that he was going to kill himself. The trip to the mental health unit involved losing the privilege of having clothes, being given a paper gown, and being locked in a cold cell without phone calls, showers, or recreation.
128. Educational instruction was nearly impossible for Brice to participate in while in the Box. Brice would have to stand at the door for the duration of the instruction. He would receive worksheets under the door. He would call to teachers but receive no response. Defendants were aware of the difficulties in attending educational programs while in solitary confinement, but made no attempts to deliver instruction in another manner. Brice did not receive a free appropriate public education or any evaluations to ensure delivery of appropriate educational services during his almost one year in solitary confinement.
129. Brice filed multiple grievances regarding his confinement status. One time he received no response. The second time he received his grievance back with a signature but without an answer as to when he could be released. To the third grievance that Brice wrote, Defendants responded that he had too many keep-aways to be released from confinement. Brice received no additional disciplinary reports during his more than 11 months in confinement, but was held without access to the offered educational programming, social interaction, and mental stimulation he so desperately needed.
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V.

Jeff Omelus

130. Jeff Omelus is a Haitian-American 18-year-old male who was held at the Palm

Beach County Jail in solitary confinement prior to trial or conviction for 146 days while he was

17 years old.

131. Jeff has a close relationship with his father. His mother lives in Haiti and he does

not speak with her frequently. He enjoys riding dirt bikes and playing basketball. He would like

to be a small engine mechanic.

132. Jeff entered the Jail in August 2017. Jeff was in solitary confinement at the Jail for

approximately five months. He was initially placed in confinement after a disciplinary report,

from about September 26, 2017, to October 11, 2017. He was later moved to general population

for a couple of weeks and then re-entered solitary confinement at the end of October, 2017. J.O

was kept in solitary confinement until his move from the Jail on February 28, 2018. When not

imprisoned, Jeff spoke often to the guidance counselors at all of his schools in the community, but

was not offered these services in the Jail, even after his documented crisis stabilization unit

interventions in the Jail.

133. Jeff’s experiences in solitary confinement mirror many of the experiences of the

other children. He was permitted only a brief shower on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and

maybe an additional day if he had a court hearing. He was offered recreation inconsistently and

his opportunity for recreation depended on the scheduling of all of the other children in solitary

confinement. Jeff gained about 20 pounds in the Box due to his inability to move. Jeff found

sleep difficult in the Box. He looked forward to his time to speak to his father on the phone, which

was his only social connection. He had to drink water out of the sink adjoining the toilet, which

was discolored, had a bad odor, and tasted different than “normal” drinking water. Sometimes

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deputies would provide water in a cup through the food flap of the locked, metal door, but others would refuse, saying, “I’m not your water boy.” Jeff also experienced threats from Jail deputies. For instance, when trying to control Jeff’s actions, one deputy stated, “Didn’t you hear what happened to J--?”, referring to Jeziah and the assault by deputies causing him to lose his front teeth. Another time, someone urinated under the door of Jeff’s cell. He asked deputies repeatedly for a mop to clean his cell, but was ignored. When he finally gave up and washed the urine with water from his sink, he was accused of trying to flood the room and received a disciplinary report along with ten days without recreation. In solitary confinement, Jeff became despondent and hopeless.
134. Jeff was sent to the mental health unit at the Jail on two occasions. The first time, Jeff was in general population with the other children on the 12th floor. He was on the bed in his cell, reading a book, when children on the other sides of his cell were banging on the doors of their cells. A deputy came to Jeff’s cell and accused him of making noise. When Jeff denied making the noise, the deputy falsely accused Jeff of saying he was going to kill himself. Two deputies came into his cell, put their knees in his back and hit him so they could handcuff him with his arms behind his back. He was taken to South 3A, the mental health unit on the 3rd floor of the Jail. His outer garments and undergarments were ripped off of him by deputies using a hook. Jeff felt so violated – being a child in handcuffs having his clothes ripped off of his body by grown men with batons and pepper spray – he likens it to a sexual assault. He was given only a paper gown which was thin, ripped easily, and was completely open in the back. Then he was confined to a cold, locked cell. As a result of the incident, Jeff was given a disciplinary report and 10 days disciplinary confinement.
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135. The second time that Jeff was sent to the mental health unit was in December 2017. While in solitary confinement, Jeff stood on his desk to speak to another youth in the neighboring cell through a crack in the wall. A deputy told Jeff to get off of the desk, but Jeff did not immediately comply. As a result, the deputy called the sergeant and accused Jeff of trying to kill himself by jumping off of the desk. He experienced the same process as the first time: handcuffed, dragged to the “psych ward,” clothes ripped from his body, and left in a cold, locked cell. The mental health unit cells have a glass wall on the front so the inmates can be observed at all times. Because children in the mental health unit are placed with adults in surrounding cells, they are supposed to have a partition placed in front of the glass wall of their cells to shield them from the view of the adults, especially given their unclothed state. However, Jeff was left for the entire stay without a partition to protect him from the view of the adult prisoners around him. He remained in the mental health unit for the entire weekend. When he returned to the 12th floor, he was once again in solitary confinement. He was not evaluated by any mental health or educational professional.
136. Jeff was not able to participate meaningfully in educational instruction while in solitary confinement. He did not receive any notice or hearing that he would not be able to participate in the typical educational programming while in solitary confinement. In his cell, Jeff would receive packets of work instead of actual class participation. No one would follow up to ensure that he understood or completed his packets of work. Jeff tried to stand by the cell door to see what was happening during educational instruction, but the window was scratched so badly that he could not see through it. Also, Jeff had a pole and stairs in front of his cell, further obscuring his ability to see the classroom board. Jeff would call out loudly from his cell to teachers for help, but they would rarely respond. Some teachers would come to his door for a few minutes, but then
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would need to return to teaching the rest of the children in general population. Some teachers would refuse to come to the cell door at all. Jeff told the education staff that he could not see or hear the instruction, but no attempts were made by Defendants to change the method of instruction and accommodate the children in solitary confinement.
137. Jeff began having visual and auditory hallucinations in solitary confinement. He saw a third arm coming from his body and began hearing voices, especially at night. Jeff reports that his father would drive to the parking lot of the Jail each night and flash his headlights so Jeff could see them, which would be the only reprieve he had from the constant sense of loneliness.
138. Initially, when Jeff inquired of deputies about filing a grievance about his solitary confinement status, deputies told him it was useless to write grievances. Then, once he began writing formal grievances, he never heard back. He tried again to file a grievance with a different deputy, but again received no response. He asked a deputy what was happening with his grievances and the deputy responded that Jeff had keep-aways and they would not let him out. Jeff even spoke to the Sergeant, but was told that there was no possibility of getting out.
139. The lasting effects from solitary confinement are plainly evident to Jeff and those around him. Although his visual hallucinations have stopped, he continues to hear voices. The voices are both male and female. Other children and adults that interact with Jeff now say that the Jail “messed him up.” He is told that he speaks unusually. His gait is abnormal, with a widelegged wobble that was not present before entering the Box. He feels himself snap at others for no reason. His sleep patterns have not returned to normal and he doesn’t sleep at night. He does not trust anyone around him. His heightened paranoia about others means that he must have a seat at the back of the room in class because he feels he needs to keep watch on those around him.
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These changes to Jeff’s physical and mental health exemplify the long-term negative impact of solitary confinement.
140. Though no longer held at the Jail, the experiences of these former child detainees illustrate the toxic system of solitary confinement at the Jail, and deprivations of due process, access to education and services, and detrimental isolation accompanying that harm.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 141. Plaintiffs bring the First, Second and Third Causes of Action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of all present and future children (i.e. children under the age of eighteen and charged as adults) who are now or will be incarcerated in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail. All class members face a substantial risk of serious harm as a result of the Defendants’ segregation management policies and practices and denial of constitutionally protected due process prior to placement in solitary. 142. A sub-class of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail and are in need of special education and related services (“IDEA Subclass”), bring the Fourth Cause of Action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 143. A subclass of all current and future children with psychiatric and/or intellectual disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail (“ADA and 504 Subclass”), bring the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, seeking, declaratory and injunctive relief.
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144. All four requirements of rule 23(a) are satisfied: a. Numerosity: Joinder of all class members is impracticable because of the
size of the class and the characteristics of the class members. At any given time, all of the children incarcerated at the Palm Beach County Jail are at a significant risk of unconstitutional placement in solitary confinement, unlawful denial of educational services, and unlawful discrimination because of disability-related misbehavior. Every month, additional class members cycle in and out of the Palm Beach County Jail. Many of these children are unable to file lawsuits on their own because of their youth, special education needs, disabilities, lack of financial resources, and length of time they will be incarcerated.
b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to all members of the class, including, but not limited to whether the Defendants’ policies and practices of placing children in solitary confinement have resulted in and will continue to result in in a violation of the class members’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether Defendants’ practice of locking children with mental health and/or intellectual disabilities in isolation based on their disabilities violates the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, whether the Defendants have unlawfully denied educational services in violation of the class members’ Fourteenth Amendment rights and whether the Defendants have violated the IDEA subclass members’ rights under the IDEA.
c. Typicality: The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. All named Plaintiffs are currently or previously have been incarcerated at the Palm Beach County Jail in solitary confinement. Each named Plaintiff has been subjected to the challenged policies and practices.
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d. Adequacy of Representation: The named Plaintiffs, their representatives, and class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. The named Plaintiffs and their representatives have no interests in this matter that are antagonistic to other class members. Class counsel have many years of experience in civil and prisoner rights litigation and class actions. 145. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate under rule 23(b)(2) because the Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Fourteenth Amendment - Cruel and Unusual Conditions, 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Against Defendant Sheriff Ric Bradshaw) 146. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 9-11, 13-36, 43-46, 52-141, and 144145 above as if specifically alleged herein. 147. The Defendant Sheriff is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 148. The Defendant Sheriff’s actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and have violated, continue to violate, or are at a substantial risk of violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the putative class members. By the policies and practices described herein, the Defendant Sheriff has deprived and continues to deprive Plaintiffs and class members of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and have violated their basic human dignity and their right to be free from cruel and unusual conditions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Each Plaintiff and putative class member is subject to a real and
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immediate threat of violation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment due to the Defendant Sheriff’s policies and practices regarding the use of solitary confinement.
149. The Defendant Sheriff has a policy, pattern, or practice of routine use of solitary confinement of children at the Palm Beach County Jail. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. As described above, this practice of solitary confinement subjects Plaintiffs to, among other harmful conditions: 23-24 hours per day in a single cell—for days, weeks or months at a time—locked behind a solid metal door, with minimal furniture other than a low bed and a combination toilet/sink; lack of access to educational programming while in solitary confinement; lack of access to programs and services related to their learning or mental health disabilities; and lack of access to meaningful exercise and social interaction. This solitary confinement creates a substantial risk of serious emotional, psychological, and physical harm to Plaintiffs. The putative class members have been subjected to the above conditions of solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail or are subject to a real and immediate threat of being subject to such conditions.
150. Prolonged exposure to these deprivations of basic human needs has inflicted permanent psychological and physical injury on Plaintiffs, and the putative claims members have either suffered such injuries or are subject to a real and immediate threat of suffering such injuries. In addition to Plaintiffs’ current psychological and physical pain, the likelihood that Plaintiffs will remain in solitary confinement for the foreseeable future subjects Plaintiffs to a significant risk of debilitating and permanent mental illness and physical harm, and the putative class members are subject to a real and immediate threat of suffering the harms caused by prolonged solitary confinement. The Defendant Sheriff’s continuation of juvenile solitary confinement for many months or years under the debilitating and extreme conditions strips the children of their basic
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dignity and humanity in violation of contemporary standards of human decency and constitutes cruel and unusual conditions prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Sheriff has and continues to implement these unconstitutional policies and practices, which are the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ and the class members’ ongoing deprivation of, or substantial threat to, rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment.
151. The Defendant Sheriff’s use solitary confinement against children with deliberate indifference, in that they are or should be aware of the substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs caused by excessive use of solitary confinement but continue to subject Plaintiffs to such confinement and have failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm.
152. The Defendant Sheriff has acted or failed to act and is continuing to act or fail to act, including through his agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert, under color of state law.
153. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to address the harms described herein. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The relief sought by Plaintiffs is necessary to prevent continued and further injury. Unless enjoined by the Court, the Defendant Sheriff will continue to subject the Plaintiffs and other Class members to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Eighth Amendment - Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against Defendant Sheriff Ric Bradshaw) 154. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 9-11, 13-36, 43-46, 52-141, and 144145 above as if specifically alleged herein.
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155. The Defendant Sheriff is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 156. The Defendant Sheriff’s actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and have violated, continue to violate, or are at a substantial risk of violating the Eight Amendment rights of the putative class members. By the policies and practices described herein, the Defendant Sheriff has deprived and continues to deprive Plaintiffs and class members of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution. Each Plaintiff and putative class member is subject to a real and immediate threat of violation of their rights under the Eight Amendment due to the Defendant Sheriff’s policies and practices regarding the use of solitary confinement. 157. The Defendant Sheriff has a policy, pattern, or practice of routine use of solitary confinement of children at the Palm Beach County Jail. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. As described above, this practice of solitary confinement subjects Plaintiffs to, among other harmful conditions: 23-24 hours per day in a single cell—for days, weeks or months at a time—locked behind a solid metal door, with minimal furniture other than a low bed and a combination toilet/sink; lack of access to educational programming while in solitary confinement; lack of access to programs and services related to their learning or mental health disabilities; and lack of access to meaningful exercise and social interaction. This solitary confinement creates a substantial risk of serious emotional, psychological, and physical harm to Plaintiffs. The putative class members have been subjected to the above conditions of solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail or are subject to a real and immediate threat of being subject to such conditions.
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158. As a result of the Defendant Sheriff’s policy and practice of solitary confinement described herein, Plaintiffs have been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and the putative class members have either been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment or are subject to a real and immediate threat of suffering such punishment. In addition to Plaintiffs’ current psychological and physical pain, the likelihood that Plaintiffs will remain in solitary confinement for the foreseeable future subjects Plaintiffs to a significant risk of debilitating and permanent mental illness and physical harm, and the putative class members are subject to a real and immediate threat of suffering the harms caused by prolonged solitary confinement. The Defendant Sheriff’s continuation of juvenile solitary confinement for many months or years under the debilitating and extreme conditions strips the children of their basic dignity and humanity in violation of contemporary standards of human decency and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Sheriff has and continues to implement these unconstitutional policies and practices, which are the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ and the class members’ ongoing deprivation of, or substantial threat to, rights secured under the Eighth Amendment.
159. The Defendant Sheriff uses solitary confinement against children with deliberate indifference, in that he is or should be aware of the substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs caused by excessive use of solitary confinement but continues to subject Plaintiffs to such confinement and has failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm.
160. The Defendant Sheriff has acted or failed to act and is continuing to act or fail to act, including through his agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert, under color of state law.
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161. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to address the harms described herein. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The relief sought by Plaintiffs is necessary to prevent continued and further injury. Unless enjoined by the Court, the Defendant Sheriff will continue to subject the Plaintiffs and other Class members to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Fourteenth Amendment – Procedural Due Process, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against Defendant Sheriff Ric Bradshaw) 162. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 9-11, 13-36, 43-46, 52-141, and 144145 above as if specifically alleged herein. 163. The Defendant Sheriff is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 164. The Defendant Sheriff’s policy and practice of placing children in solitary confinement subjects Plaintiffs and the putative class members to a significant deprivation of their liberty interests without any procedural safeguards. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 165. The conditions and the duration of the Defendant Sheriff’s placement of Plaintiffs and putative class members in solitary confinement is a deprivation of a liberty interest that constitutes an atypical and significant hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of jail life because of the harsh and isolated conditions and the lengthy duration of confinement in those conditions. The children in solitary confinement, as compared to other individuals in the Jail, have significantly less or no access to social interaction, environmental stimulation, programs and activities, physical exercise, and personal property. They are also subjected to, as compared to
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other individuals in the jail, significantly more oppressive security measures, including cell searches and restraints.
166. Because prolonged placement in solitary confinement constitutes a significant and atypical hardship, the Defendant Sheriff has deprived Plaintiffs and class members of their liberty interest. Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs and the putative class members of these interests without providing them due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Such failures to provide due process include denying Plaintiffs and putative class members (1) a hearing with advance written notice before initial placement in solitary confinement, (2) the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (3) written reasons for the decision, (4) counsel-substitute for disabled individuals or in a case with complex issues, or (5) meaningful and timely periodic review of their continued long-term and indefinite detention in solitary confinement and meaningful notice of what they must do to earn release. Each Plaintiff and putative class member is subject to a real and immediate threat of violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment due to the Defendant Sheriff’s policies and practices regarding the use of solitary confinement.
167. The costs to the Defendant Sheriff of providing such procedural safeguards would be minimal, and any such costs are outweighed by the great risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty that exists under Defendant’s current policies and practices.
168. The policies and practices complained of herein have been and continue to be implemented by the Defendant Sheriff and its agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert under color of state law, in their official capacity.
169. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to address the harms described herein. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well
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as costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The relief sought by Plaintiffs is necessary to prevent continued and further injury. Unless enjoined by the Court, the Defendant Sheriff will continue to subject the Plaintiffs and other Class members to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Fourteenth Amendment – Procedural Due Process, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against Both Defendants) 170. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 9-12, 13-36, 43-46, 52-141, and 144145 above as if specifically alleged herein. 171. Defendants are persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 172. Defendants, acting in concert, have a policy and practice of subjecting Plaintiffs and the putative class members to a significant deprivation of their property interests without any procedural safeguards. This custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 173. Plaintiffs and the putative class members have a protected property interest in education. The Sheriff’s Office and School Board are contractually and legally obligated to provide education to all children held at the Jail. 174. Defendants’ policy and practice of distributing worksheets under a cell door, providing no assistance in completing the work, denying children in solitary the ability to see the educational instruction being given, and sometimes holding class in a separate room and excluding the children in solitary confinement entirely, fails to provide meaningful access to education. Accordingly, solitary confinement with the accompanying denial of access to education, deprives the children of their property interest.
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175. Because Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs and the putative class members of these interests without providing them due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Such failures to provide due process include denying Plaintiffs and putative class members (1) a hearing with advance written notice before initial placement in solitary confinement, (2) the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (3) written reasons for the decision, (4) counsel-substitute for disabled individuals or in a case with complex issues, or (5) meaningful and timely periodic review of their continued denial of educational services while in solitary confinement and meaningful notice of what they must do to receive proper education. Each Plaintiff and putative class member is subject to a real and immediate threat of violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment due to the Defendants’ policies and practices regarding the denial of education to children held in solitary confinement.
176. The costs to Defendants of providing procedural safeguards would be minimal, and any such costs are outweighed by the great risk of erroneous deprivation of education that exists under Defendants’ current policies and practices.
177. The policies and practices complained of herein have been and continue to be implemented by Defendants and their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert under color of state law, in their official capacity.
178. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to address the harms described herein. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The relief sought by Plaintiffs is necessary to prevent continued and further injury. Unless enjoined by the Court, Defendants will
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continue to subject the Plaintiffs and other Class members to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et. seq.
(Against Both Defendants) 179. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 10-12, 13-36, 43-46, 47-50, 52, 62129, 140, 142, and 144-145 above as if specifically alleged herein. 180. Plaintiff M.F. brings this action on behalf of himself and the subclass of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail and are in need of special education and related services (“IDEA Subclass”), 20 USC §§ 1400 et seq. 181. Many of these children are identified or should be identified for special education and related services under IDEA. Therefore, the members of the putative IDEA Subclass qualify as children with disabilities for the purposes of IDEA, as does Plaintiff M.F. 182. The Defendants’ actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the rights of M.F. to receive a free appropriate education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(a), and have violated, continue to violate, or are at a substantial risk of violating the right the putative IDEA subclass members have to a FAPE. 183. IDEA defines a child with a disability as a child “with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities” “who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3).
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184. The School Board of Palm Beach County is a public agency because it is a “political subdivision[] of the State that [is] responsible for providing education to children with disabilities” (34 C.F.R. § 300.33) and because it is a local education agency (“LEA”) which is defined as a “public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19); 34 C.F.R. § 300.328(a). As a result, the School Board has the duty to provide a FAPE to all students with disabilities, including those who have been suspended or expelled from school. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1), 1413(a). This duty extends to school-eligible persons with disabilities who are incarcerated in juvenile and adult correctional facilities. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(iv).
185. The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office is a public agency because it runs a correctional facility “involved in the education of children with disabilities” (34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)), and it is a “political subdivision[] of the State that [is] responsible for providing education to children with disabilities.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.33. State and local juvenile and adult correctional facilities are required to comply with the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(1). As such, the Sheriff’s Office has the same duties as the School Board. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b). Yet, children with IEPs in solitary confinement at the Jail are denied a free appropriate public education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a).
186. IDEA requires Defendants to meet certain obligations including, but not limited to: a. Providing a free appropriate public education to all students with disabilities
(20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(a)); b. Identifying, locating and evaluating all children with known or suspected
“disabilities . . . who are in need of special education and related services” (20 U.S.C. §
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1412(a)(1)(A)) and having in effect policies and procedures to ensure this happens (34

C.F.R. § 300.111(a));

c. Upon identification, conducting a full and individual initial evaluation

before the initial provision of special education and related services to a child with a

disability in all areas of suspected disability and thereafter a re-evaluation every three years

(20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A), (2)(B)) or whenever educational or related services need,

including improved academic achievement and functional performance, if the child

warrants a reevaluation (34 C.F.R. § 300.303(a));

d. Developing and implementing an appropriate Individualized Education

Program (IEP) for each child with a disability, defined as a written statement; that is

developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with 210 U.S.C. § 1414(d), which must

include, but is not limited to including:

i.

a statement of the child’s present levels of academic achievement

and functional performance (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i));

ii.

a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and

functional goals (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii));

iii.

a description of the measurement of the annual goals and the

reporting of these goals (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(III));

iv.

for children over 16 years of age, annually updated appropriate

measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition assessments

related to training, education, employment, and, where appropriate, independent

living skills (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(VIII)(aa)); and

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v.

in the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child's learning or

that of others, consideration of the use of positive behavioral interventions and

supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior (20 USC §

1414(d)(3)(B)(i)).

e.

Holding an IEP team meeting at least annually (20 U.S.C. §

1414(d)(4)(A)(i));

f.

When students with an IEP enter a new school setting, providing

“comparable” services to their previous IEP for the next 30 days at which

point, either adopting the prior IEP or developing, adopting and

implementing a new IEP (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C); 34 C.F.R. §

300.323(e));

g.

If behavior leads to removal from school for more than 10 days or to

removal for less than 10 days but is based on behavior that constitutes a

pattern, continuing to provide educational services so as to enable the child

to continue to participate in the general education curriculum (34 C.F.R. §

300.530(d));

h.

If behavior leads to removal from school for more than 10 days or to

removal for less than 10 days but is based on behavior that constitutes a

pattern, convening an immediate IEP meeting to determine if the behavior

is a manifestation of the student’s disability (20 USC § 1415(k); 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.530(e); 34 C.F.R. § 300.536(a)(2));

i.

If the behavior is a manifestation of disability, (1) conducting a functional

behavior/analysis assessment and implement a behavioral intervention

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plan; or (2) reviewing and modifying existing behavioral intervention plan;

and (3) returning student to placement from which he or she was removed,

unless it involved weapons, drug possession, or serious bodily injury (at

which time student would be placed in an interim alternative educational

setting for not more than 45 school days) (20 USC § 1415(k); 34 C.F.R. §

300.530(f)&(g));

j.

If, on the other hand, the behavior was not a manifestation of disability,

providing FAPE and services to the student no later than the 11th

cumulative day of removal (20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C); 34 C.F.R. §

300.530(c)); and

k.

Implementing procedural safeguards for children with disabilities,

consisting, at a minimum, of notice to parents or guardians of their

procedural rights regarding the identification, evaluation, or education

placement of their child or the provision of a FAPE to their child, and the

right to present complaints and to an impartial due process hearing on such

complaints (20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6), 1415).

187. By failing to identify, evaluate, recommend, and then provide a FAPE (including

appropriate IEPs, special education, and related services to eligible students in solitary

confinement), and by failing to provide procedural safeguards specified in the statute

implementing the IDEA (including manifestation determinations) to students in solitary

confinement, Defendants have impeded students’ rights to a free appropriate public education,

have significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process

regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to their students, and/or have

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deprived students of educational benefits. Each member of the putative IDEA subclass is subject to a real and immediate threat of their rights to a FAPE being violated by Defendants’ policies and practice.
188. As a result, Defendants have violated and continue to violate rights secured by 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and its implementing regulations at 34 C.F.R. §§ 300 et seq.
189. Because Defendants’ discriminatory and wrongful conduct is ongoing, and Plaintiffs and the IDEA subclass members have no adequate remedy at law, declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). Plaintiffs and the IDEA subclass members would be unable to obtain these remedies in an administrative action. Further, as a direct result of Defendants’ actions, the members of the IDEA subclass are suffering irreparable harm, including lost education opportunities. Therefore, speedy and immediate relief is appropriate.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(Against both Defendants) 190. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 10-46, 51-52, 62-129, 140, and 143145 above as if specifically alleged herein. 191. Plaintiff M.F. bring this action on behalf of himself and the subclass of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail (“ADA and 504 Subclass”). 192. Plaintiffs M.F. and the ADA and 504 Subclass seek declaratory and injunctive relief remedying these ongoing and systemic violations.
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193. Title II of the ADA states, in pertinent part: [N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 194. Defendants were, at all times relevant to this action, and are currently “public entities” within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and provided and provide a “program, service or activity” including educational and rehabilitative programs, services and activities in the Palm Beach County Jail. 195. Plaintiffs M.F. and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass were, at all times relevant to this action, and are currently “qualified individuals with disabilities” within the meaning of Title II of the ADA. They have impairments that substantially limit a major life activity, and they were and/or are all housed at the Palm Beach County Jail qualified—with or without reasonable accommodation—to participate in the programs, services, and activities in the Palm Beach County Jail. 196. Congress directed the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to write regulations implementing Title II’s prohibition against discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12134. Pursuant to this mandate, the DOJ has issued regulations defining the forms of discrimination prohibited by Title II of the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 et. seq. 197. In providing any aid, benefit, or service, a public entity “may not ... [d]eny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service,” “[a]fford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others,” “[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity ... as that provided to others,” or “[o]therwise limit a qualified
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individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others[.]” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), and (vii).
198. A public entity “shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability[.]” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (emphasis added).
199. Nor may a public entity (1) “impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary[,]” 28 C.F.R.§ 35.130(b)(8); or (2) “utilize criteria or methods of administration … that have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability … or the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to individuals with disabilities[.]” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i)(ii).
200. A public entity is also prohibited from aiding and perpetuating discrimination against persons with disabilities in the programs, services, or activities it provides. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(v).
201. Defendants have violated the rights Plaintiffs M.F. and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass secured by Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
a. When Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participating in and deny them the benefits of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities.
b. Solitary confinement has a disproportionate burden on Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass by reason of their disabilities that results in further
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solitary confinement and further denial of educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities than their non-disabled peers. As such, when Plaintiffs M.F.. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participation in and deny them the benefits of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities.
c. The denial of education and rehabilitative services during solitary confinement leaves Plaintiffs M.F. and the ADA and 504 Subclass members further behind in their education and rehabilitation than their non-disabled peers because, by reason of their disabilities, disabled children require additional assistance to access the general education curriculum and rehabilitative programs. Consequently, when Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants deny them equal opportunity to benefit from Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities and/or provide them with a benefit that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity as the benefits offered to their non-disabled peers.
d. Defendants also fail to make reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, and procedures even though such modifications are necessary to avoid discriminating against Plaintiffs M.F. and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass by, inter alia, not identifying and tracking those who require reasonable accommodations, not inquiring into whether behaviors leading to disciplinary measures are disability-related, not modifying school disciplinary policies and practices to ensure that school officials have responsibility for discipline during school hours, and not modifying solitary confinement policies and practices to prevent disproportionately burdening those with disabilities.
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202. Defendants have adopted and implemented policies and practices with regard to solitary confinement that have a disparate impact on children with disabilities. Specifically, Defendants by their policies and practices impose and apply eligibility criteria—i.e., requirements that children not be in solitary confinement in order to receive educational and rehabilitative services—that screen out or tend to screen out the those with disabilities under the ADA or section 504 from fully and equally enjoying, by reason of their disabilities, any of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services or activities.
203. By denying educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities while children with disabilities are locked in solitary confinement and by using solitary confinement for children with disabilities, Defendants utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass to discrimination by reason of their disabilities. These methods of administration also have the purpose and effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishments of the objectives of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities with respect to Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass.
204. Defendants also aid and perpetuate discrimination against persons with disabilities in Defendants’ programs, services or activities by, inter alia, maintaining policies and practices that allow for discrimination by each Defendant and that permit the discrimination of the other coDefendants to continue unchecked.
205. Defendants deny Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 subclass “meaningful access” to education by violating the relevant regulations.
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206. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35. 130(b)(ii), a public entity may not “[a]fford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others. . .”
207. Defendants fail to provide children with disabilities the special education and related services they require, by reason of their disabilities, to equally access education in Palm Beach County Jail.
208. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(iii), a public entity may not “[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others. . .”
209. Defendants fail to provide disabled children with educational services that they require that are as effective in affording children with disabilities equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, and to reach the same level of achievement as provided to others.
210. Because Defendants’ discriminatory and wrongful conduct is ongoing, and Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. And, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12133, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Plaintiffs and the ADA and 504 subclass members would be unable to obtain these remedies in an administrative action. Further, as a direct result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs M.F and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are suffering irreparable harm, including lost education opportunities. Therefore, speedy and immediate relief is appropriate.
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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.
(Against both Defendants) 211. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 10-46, 51-52, 62-129, 140, and 143145 above as if specifically alleged herein. 212. Plaintiff M.F. bring this action on behalf of himself and the subclass of all current and future children with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are or will be held in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail (“ADA and 504 Subclass”). 213. The Defendants’ actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the rights of Plaintiff M.F. under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and have violated, continue to violate, or are at a substantial risk of violating the rights of the ADA and 504 subclass members under the Act. Plaintiffs M.F. and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass seek declaratory and injunctive relief remedying these ongoing and systemic violations. 214. Section 504 provides, in pertinent part: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance[.] 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 215. Each Defendant was, at all times relevant to this action, and is currently a recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and provided and provides a “program or activity” where “program or activity” is described as “all the operations of” the recipient which includes the educational and rehabilitative programs and activities in the Palm Beach County Jail. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).
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216. Plaintiffs M.F. and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass were, at all times relevant to this action, and are currently “otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities” within the meaning of Section 504 as they all have impairments that substantially limit a major life activity, and they were and/or are all housed at the Palm Beach County Jail qualified—with or without reasonable accommodation—to participate in the programs, services, and activities of the Jail.
217. The Department of Justice is charged under Executive Order 12250 with coordinating the implementation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 28 CFR § 41.1.
218. In providing any aid, benefit, or service, a recipient of federal financial assistance “may not ... [d]eny a qualified handicapped person the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service,” “[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others,” “[p]rovide a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity ... as that provided to others,” or “[o]therwise limit a qualified handicapped person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others[.]” 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(i), (ii), (iii), and (vii).
219. A recipient of federal financial assistance shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
220. Nor may a recipient of federal financial assistance “utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap and/or (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or
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substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program or activity with respect to handicapped persons...” 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4)(i), (ii).
221. A recipient of federal financial assistance is also prohibited from aiding and perpetuating discrimination against a qualified handicapped person by providing significant assistance to an agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of handicap. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(v).
222. Defendants have violated the rights of the ADA and 504 Subclass secured by Section 504 and its implementing regulations.
a. When Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participating in and deny them the benefits of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities.
b. Solitary confinement has a disproportionate burden on Plaintiffs M.F. and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass by reason of their disabilities that results in further solitary confinement and further denial of educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities than their non-disabled peers. As such, when Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants exclude them from participation in and deny them the benefits of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities.
c. The denial of education and rehabilitative services during solitary confinement leaves Plaintiffs M.F. and the ADA and 504 Subclass members further behind in their education and rehabilitation than their non-disabled peers because, by reason of their disabilities, disabled children require additional assistance to access the general education curriculum and rehabilitative programs. Consequently, when Plaintiffs M.F. and
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members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are locked in solitary confinement, Defendants deny them equal opportunity to benefit from Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities and/or provide them with a benefit that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity as the benefits offered to their non-disabled peers.
d. Defendants also fail to make reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, and procedures even though such modifications are necessary to avoid discriminating against Plaintiffs M.F. and the members of the ADA and 504 Subclass by, inter alia, not identifying and tracking those who require reasonable accommodations, not inquiring into whether behaviors leading to disciplinary measures are disability-related, not modifying school disciplinary policies and practices to ensure that school officials have responsibility for discipline during school hours, and not modifying solitary confinement policies and practices to prevent disproportionately burdening those with disabilities. 223. Defendants have adopted and implemented policies and practices with regard to solitary confinement that have a disparate impact on children with disabilities. Specifically, Defendants by their policies and practices impose and apply eligibility criteria—i.e., requirements that children not be in solitary confinement in order to receive educational and rehabilitative services—that screen out or tend to screen out those with disabilities under the ADA or section 504 from fully and equally enjoying, by reason of their disabilities, any of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services or activities. 224. By denying educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities while children with disabilities are locked in solitary confinement and by using solitary confinement for children with disabilities, Defendants utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass to discrimination by reason
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of their disabilities. These methods of administration also have the purpose and effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishments of the objectives of Defendants’ educational and rehabilitative programs, services, and activities with respect to Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass.
225. Defendants also aid and perpetuate discrimination against persons with disabilities in Defendants’ programs, services or activities by, inter alia, maintaining policies and practices that allow for discrimination and that permit the discrimination of each co-Defendant to continue unchecked.
226. Defendants deny Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 subclass “meaningful access” to education by violating the relevant regulations.
227. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(ii), a public entity may not “[a]fford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others. . .”
228. However, Defendants fail to provide children with disabilities the special education and related services they require—solely by reason of their disabilities—to equally access education in the Palm Beach County Jail.
229. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(iii), a public entity may not “[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others. . .”
230. Defendants fail to provide disabled children with educational services that they require—by reason of their disabilities—that are as effective in affording children with disabilities
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equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, and to reach the same level of achievement as provided to others.
231. Moreover, when Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 subclass are in school, Defendants deny them FAPE as secured by Section 504’s regulations by inter alia:
a. Failing to provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in Defendants’ jurisdiction (45 C.F.R. § 84.33(a));
b. Failing to provide special education and related aids and services that are designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of non-handicapped persons are met (45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)). 232. Because Defendants’ discriminatory conduct is ongoing, and Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, declaratory relief and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. And, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794a, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. Plaintiffs and the ADA and 504 subclass members would be unable to obtain these remedies in an administrative action. Further, as a direct result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs M.F. and members of the ADA and 504 Subclass are suffering irreparable harm, including lost educational opportunities. Therefore, speedy and immediate relief is appropriate.
REQUESTS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
a. Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
b. Declare that Defendants’ acts and omissions violated the named Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;
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c. Declare that Defendants’ acts and omissions violated the named Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights under the Procedural Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

d. Declare that Defendants’ acts and omissions violated Plaintiff M.F. and the IDEA Subclass members’ rights under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482;

e. Declare that Defendants’ acts and omissions violated Plaintiff M.F. and the ADA and Section 504 Subclass members’ rights under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213;

f. Declare that Defendants’ acts and omissions violated Plaintiff M.F. and the ADA and Section 504 Subclass members’ rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794;

g. Enter all necessary and appropriate injunctive relief (including, but not limited to, policies, procedures, training, supervision, and monitoring) to end the ongoing violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal law;

h. Award the Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and 42 U.S.C. § 1415;

i. Award compensatory education for educational benefits denied; and

j. Grant any other relief that the Court deems necessary and proper.

Dated: August 2, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC 2925 PGA Boulevard, Ste. 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

/s/ Theodore J. Leopold Theodore J. Leopold, Esq. Florida Bar No. 705608 tleopold@cohenmilstein.com Diana L. Martin. Esq. Florida Bar No. 624489 dmartin@cohenmilstein.com Telephone: 561-515-1400 Facsimile: 561-515-1401

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER 1028 N. Federal Highway Lake Worth, FL 33460

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/s/ Sabarish P. Neelakanta____ Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq. Florida Bar No. 26623 sneelakanta@hrdc-law.org Telephone: (561) 360-2523 Facsimile: 866-735-7136
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF PALM BEACH CO., INC. EDUCATION ADVOCACY PROJECT 423 Fern St., Ste. 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401
__/s/ Melissa Duncan________ Melissa Duncan, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0796921 mduncan@legalaidpbc.org Telephone: (561) 655-8944, ext. 243 Facsimile: (561) 655-5269
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 CERTIFICATION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, by signing below, I certify to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that this complaint: (1) is not being presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) is supported by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Rule 11.
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC 2925 PGA Boulevard, Ste. 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
/s/ Theodore J. Leopold Theodore J. Leopold, Esq. Florida Bar No. 705608 tleopold@cohenmilstein.com Diana L. Martin. Esq. Florida Bar No. 624489 dmartin@cohenmilstein.com Telephone: 561-515-1400 Facsimile: 561-515-1401
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HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER 1028 N. Federal Highway Lake Worth, FL 33460

/s/ Sabarish P. Neelakanta____ Sabarish P. Neelakanta, Esq. Florida Bar No. 26623 sneelakanta@hrdc-law.org Telephone: (561) 360-2523 Facsimile: 866-735-7136

LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF PALM BEACH CO., INC. EDUCATION ADVOCACY PROJECT 423 Fern St., Ste. 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401

/s/ Melissa Duncan_______ Melissa Duncan, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0796921 mduncan@legalaidpbc.org Telephone: (561) 655-8944, ext. 243 Facsimile: (561) 655-5269

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.
/s/ Sabarish Neelakanta, Esq._______ By: Sabarish Neelakanta, Esq.

By Electronic Mail

Jon Erik Bell, Esq. Palm Beach County School District jon.bell@palmbeachschools.org

Lisa A. Carmona, Esq. Palm Beach County School District lisa.carmona@palmbeachschools.org

Laura Esterman Pincus, Esq. Palm Beach County School District laura.pincus@palmbeachschools.org

Richard A. Giuffreda, Esq. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office richard@purdylaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendants

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 Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 79 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/16/2018 Page 1 of 4

U N ITED ST ATE S D ISTRIC T C O U RT SO UTH ERN D ISTR ICT O F FLO R IDA

CivilN o.l8-cv-8o8lo-M atthew m an

H .C .,am inor,by and through hisparentand natural guardian,Jenny C .;and M .F.,am inor,by and through hisparentand naturalguardian,A sisaRollc,on behalf ofthemselvesandallotherssimilarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
RlC BR AD SH AW ,Palm Beach County Sheriff,in his individualand officialcapacity;and SCHO O L BOA RD OF PA LM BEA CH CO UN TY , D efendants.

FILED l)y

D.C.

N2V 15 2212
s'revEs M LARIMORE
SC.UDE.RoKFtF)kbî.D-ISWT.RcBT..

O R DER G R AN TIN G JO IN T M O TION T O C O N DITIO NA LLY C ERTIFY CLA SS
PRELIMINARILYAPPROVECLASSSETTLEMENTyAPPOINTCLASSCOUNSV ,
AND SET FAIRNESSHEARING IDE 781 The Court,having considered the parties'JointM otion to Conditionally Certify Class,
A ppointClassCounsel,Prelim inarily Approve Settlem ent,and seta FairnessH earing filed on
November15,2018(tdM otion'')gDE781,hereby:
FIN DS A ND O R DER S:
ThisOrderincorporatesbyreferencetheSettlementAgreementfiledasExhibitA gDE 78-11to theM otion. Thedefinitionsin theSettlementAgreementand alltennsand
conditionsstated therein shallbe incorporated in this Orderby reference and shallhave
thesam e forceand effect.

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 79 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/16/2018 Page 2 of 4
2. TheCourtfindsforpurposesofsettlementonly thattheprerequisitesfora classaction
underRule23(a)and (b)(2)oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure havebeen satisfied in that:(a)theClassisso num erousthatjoinderofa11m embersisim practicable',(b) therearequestionsoflaw orfad common to the Class;@)the Plaintiffs'claimsare
typicalofthoseoftheClass;and (d)thePlaintiffswillfairly and adequatelyprotectthe
interestsofthe Class.
Accordingly,pursuantto Rule23(a)and (b)(2)oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure, thefollowingSettlem entClassand SettlementSub-classes(collectivelytheû$C1ass'')are
certified:
Settlem entC lass:
i. Allpresentandfuturejuveniles(i.e.individualstmdertheageof18and charged asadults)who are now orwillbe incarcerated in segregated
housing w hile in the custody ofthe Palm Beach County Sheriffs Oftice
(Cdsheriff'sOftèce'').
b. Settlem entSub-classes:
i. Allpresentandfuturejuveniles(Le.individualsundertheageof18and charged asadults)with disabilities,asdetined by thelndividualswith
D isabilities Education A ct, w ho are now or w ill be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody ofthe SherifpsOffice and are in need ofspecialeducation evaluations,instnlction,accom m odations,and
relatedservices(tûIDEA subclass''l'and Allpresentand futurejuveniles(i.e.individualsundertheageof18 and charged asadults)with disabilities,asdefined by the Americanswith
D isabilitiesA ctand Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation A ctof 1973,w ho arenow orw illbeincarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody
oftheSheriffsOffice(SCADA and504Subclass'').
4. The Courttindsthatthe Law Firm ofCohen M ilstein Sellers& Toll,PLLC,the Hum an
Rights D efense Center,and the LegalA id Society ofPalm Beach County,Inc.,have
extensive experience in prosecuting class action cases, and appoints the following
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Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 79 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/16/2018 Page 3 of 4
attorneys as Class Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure:
TheodoreJonLeopold,Esq. D ianaLeighM artin,Esq. Cohen M ilstein Sellers& Toll,PLLC 2925PG A Boulevard Suite 200 Palm Beach G ardens,FL 33410 561-515-1400 Fax:561-515-1401
Email:tleopold@ cohenmilstein.com Email:dmartin@cohenmilstein.com
Sabarish P Neelakanta,Esq. M asimbaM utamba,Esq. Hum an RightsDefenseCenter P.O .Box 1151 LakeW orth,FL 33460 561-360-2523 Fax:866-735-7136
Email:sneelakanta@ hrdc-law.org Email:mmutamba@ hrdc-law.org
M elissaM arieD uncan LegalAid Society ofPalm Beach County 423FenzStreet Suite 200 W estPalm Beach,FL 33401 561-655-8944 Fax:655-5269
Email:mduncan@ legalaidpbc.org
The Court grants prelim inary approval of the Settlem ent A greem ent as being fair,
reasonableandadequatetotheClass,subjecttofurtherconsiderationandfinalapproval
attheFairnessH earing.
6. Because thisproposed Class Settlementis certified under Rule 23(b)(2),the Class
m em bers cannot itopt out''of the Settlem ent,nor are the parties required to provide
noticeto theClass. Notice ofthe Settlem entA greem entasrequired by the ClassA ction
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Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 79 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/16/2018 Page 4 of 4
FairnessAct,28 U.S.C.j17l5(b),totheU.S.Attorney General,theFloridaAttorney
General'sOffice,and/orany othernecessarypartiesshallbemadeasrequiredbylaw . A Faim essH earing willbe held on Tuesday,M arch 5,2019,at2:00 p.m .in the W est Palm BeachDivisionbeforeUnited StatesM agistrateJudgeW illiam M atthewman atthe U.S.D istrict Courthouse located at 701 Clem atis Street, W est Palm Beach,Florida
33401incourtroom sixonthethirdfloor. Atthehearing,theCourtwillconsider:(a) objections and comments on the proposed SettlementAgreement;(b) whetherthe
Settlem entA greem entshould be finally approved as fair,reasonable,and adequate,'and
(c)whetheritshallbeentered astheFinalJudgm entin thisaction. Pm suanttoCAFA, 28 U.S.C.j1715(d),finalapprovalofthe SettlementAgreementshallnotbe issued
earlierthan 90 daysafternoticeoftheSettlem entA greem entism adepursuantto CA FA ,
28U.S.C.j1715(b). 8. TheCourtretainsjurisdiction to considera11furtherapplicationsarising outoforin
cormectionw ith the Settlem entAgreem ent. D O N E A ND O RD ER ED in C m bersatW estPalm B each,Palm Beach County,in the
southem /J D istrictofFlorida,this dayofNovember, 2018.
W ILLIA M M A TT EW M AN UN ITED STA TES M A GISTRA TE JU D GE
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 Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 78-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/15/2018 Page 1 of 43
H.C. at al v. PBSO et al., Civil Action No.: 9:18-cv-80810 Settlement Agreement
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Civil No. 18-cv-80810 – Dimitrouleas/Matthewman
H.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.; M.F., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Asisa Rolle, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
RIC BRADSHAW, Palm Beach County Sheriff, in his official capacity; SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, Defendants.
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 1. THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”) as to the class injunctive claims is made and entered into as of the date this Agreement is signed, by and among the Defendants Sheriff Ric Bradshaw (“Sheriff’s Office”), in his official capacity, and the School Board of Palm Beach County (“School Board”) on behalf of themselves and all their officers, directors, employees, former employees, agents, predecessors, divisions, successors, administrators, and assigns (collectively “Defendants”), and H.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C., and M.F., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated individuals (collectively “Plaintiffs”). Defendants and Plaintiffs are collectively referred to as the “Parties.”
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H.C. at al v. PBSO et al., Civil Action No.: 9:18-cv-80810 Settlement Agreement
A. Recitals 2. WHEREAS, this Agreement addresses and resolves certain disputes arising from and relating to the lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Civil Action: 18-cv-80810) (“Action”) concerning allegations that: a) the Sheriff’s Office policy and practice of holding juveniles in their custody in solitary confinement (“segregated housing”) for upwards of 23 hours a day violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and denied these juveniles procedural due process prior to and during the deprivation of their liberty interests; and b) the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board in concert denied these juveniles procedural due process by depriving them of their property interest in education, and failed to provide free and appropriate public education and mandated process, as well as equal access to education, programs, services and activities in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”). 3. WHEREAS, subsequent to Plaintiffs filing of the Class-Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief on June 21, 2018, along with a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and briefing regarding the same, and filing of the Amended Class-Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief on August 2, 2018, the Parties engaged in expedited discovery into the claims and issues at bar. 4. WHEREAS, by agreement of the Parties, the Court continued the hearing on the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief in order to permit the Parties to engage in settlement negotiations; 5. WHEREAS, the Parties thereafter conducted extensive settlement negotiations to resolve the class injunctive claims in the lawsuit, with the assistance of Plaintiffs’ experts in
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H.C. at al v. PBSO et al., Civil Action No.: 9:18-cv-80810 Settlement Agreement
prison operations as well as juvenile mental health, in order to achieve a comprehensive resolution of all class claims for injunctive relief raised in the Amended Complaint;
6. WHEREAS, the Parties stipulate to certification of a Settlement Class as follows: a) a class of all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office; b) a subclass of all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office and are in need of special education evaluation, instruction, accommodations, and related services (“IDEA subclass”); and c) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office (“ADA and 504 Subclass”). The Parties will jointly move for preliminary approval of the class-action settlement, conditional certification of the settlement class, and appointment of Plaintiffs’ Counsel as class counsel.
7. WHEREAS, the Parties acknowledge that neither this Agreement nor any consideration exchanged hereunder shall be regarded as an admission of any fact, allegation, liability, or responsibility of any kind by either of the Parties for any purpose. This Agreement shall not be admissible in any proceeding, except as is necessary in a proceeding to enforce the terms of this Agreement or to establish or prove the defenses of payment, release, accord and satisfaction, waiver, or estoppel, or as otherwise required by Court order. However, in order to avoid the expense, delay, uncertainty, and burden of litigation, the Parties have agreed to a
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H.C. at al v. PBSO et al., Civil Action No.: 9:18-cv-80810 Settlement Agreement
settlement of the class injunctive terms alleged in the Amended Complaint filed in this action.
This written Agreement memorializes the terms of the settlement reached by the Parties;
8. WHEREAS the Parties represent and agree that this Agreement is fair, reasonable
and adequate to protect the interests of all parties and the class;
9. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by
and between the Parties, as follows:
Definitions
Cell-side educational services and programming: The facilitation of educational services and programming to juveniles while they are housed inside a segregated housing cell.
Co-defendants or keep separates: Any juvenile in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office who has a co-defendant or other juvenile housed within the same facility with whom they cannot have direct contact with because of pending criminal charges or disciplinary separation.
Educational services and programming: Implementation of appropriate educational instruction, interventions, accommodations, testing, and evaluations, as well as additional activities to promote learning beyond the traditional academic curriculum, provided to juveniles in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office.
Individual Education Plan (IEP): A written statement of an educational program of goals, services, instruction, and accommodations, specific to a juvenile’s needs, that is developed, reviewed, and revised for a juvenile identified as having a disability under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Jail school: The educational system administered by the School Board within any of the correctional facilities operated by the Sheriff’s Office.
Juvenile: Any individual under the age of 18 with pending adult charges and in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office.
Mental health professional: Qualified mental health professionals who meet the educational and licensure/certification criteria specified by their respective professional disciplines, such as psychiatric nursing, psychiatry, psychology, and social work as defined in Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Corrections Operating Procedure #914.01 (§IV(G)) See Exhibit 1 - COP #914.01: Basic Medical Programs.
Regular school day: A regular school day shall be 8:00am to 2:45pm Monday through Friday.
Segregation Review Committee (SRC): A group of Sheriff’s Office representatives from
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H.C. at al v. PBSO et al., Civil Action No.: 9:18-cv-80810 Settlement Agreement
classification, security, and a representative from the health care provider as well as a School Board designee that meets weekly to discuss all prisoners who are held in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office. As part of this Agreement, the parties agree to hold a weekly juvenile SRC meeting in conjunction with the general meeting.
School Based Team (SBT): A problem-solving team comprised of a group of multidisciplinary professionals, who meet regularly to develop action plans for struggling students and work to remove academic, behavioral, and social-emotional barriers to students’ learning.
School Based Team Meeting: Gatherings of the SBT regarding individual students to use a formal problem-solving process, analyze student referral and baseline data, identify student strengths and areas for improvement, develop intervention plans, including expected outcomes, monitor student progress toward goals, collaborate with community agencies when necessary, and communicate regularly with parents regarding their child’s progress.
Segregated Housing: Segregated housing shall mean any type of confinement of a juvenile in an individual cell separated from the general population for any duration or reason including, but not limited to, those defined within Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Corrections Operating Procedure #918.00 (§IV(A)). See Exhibit 2 - COP #918.00: Special Management Units.
Substantial breach: A substantial breach must be either: (i) sufficiently frequent and widespread so as to be pervasive; or (ii) a breach that deviates from a material provision in a way that denies an essential benefit of this Agreement to class members. Minimal or isolated failures, noncompliance with mere technicalities, or temporary failure to comply during a period of otherwise sustained compliance will not constitute a substantial breach of a material term.
Juvenile Segregated Housing Policies
10. Segregated housing of juveniles by the Sheriff’s Office, shall be limited in time and use as follows:
a. Monday through Friday: Any juvenile classified into segregated housing for any reason other than protective custody shall be allowed out of their cells throughout the regular school day with other juveniles in general population so long as there are no co-defendants or keep-separates in the same housing pod:
i. In the event that there are co-defendants or keep separates in the same housing pod, the Sheriff’s Office shall implement a rotating schedule that utilizes alternative accommodations within the correctional facility in order to prevent co-defendants or keep separates from having direct contact with each other. A copy of a proposed rotation schedule is attached herewith. See Exhibit 3 – Rotation Schedule/Alternative Housing Options.
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1. The Sheriff’s Office shall evaluate whether any keep separate designations or other restrictions on direct contact with other juveniles can be modified or eliminated during each weekly juvenile Segregation Review Committee (“SRC”) meeting pursuant to ¶ 10(e) herein.
2. Weekends & Holidays: The Sheriff’s Office shall utilize an expanded rotation schedule for co-defendants and keep separates that allows for greater time in programs, recreation or other facility accommodations in order to minimize the duration of time spent in segregated housing as described in Exhibit 3 – Rotation Schedule/Alternative Housing Options.
a. Disciplinary referrals: For any juvenile in segregated housing on weekends and holidays because of a disciplinary referral, the Sheriff’s Office shall minimize the amount of time the juvenile will spend in segregated housing by utilizing an expanded rotation schedule and by implementing an alternative behavior management policy as provided in ¶ 10(i)(ii)(1) herein.
b. The Parties recognize that all legitimate and reasonable security and safety concerns related to the operation of the jail facilities is of paramount importance.
ii. In the event that the number of juveniles in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office who have co-defendants or keep separates exceeds the number of available accommodations within the correctional facility such that the Sheriff’s Office cannot apply the rotation schedule fairly and equally, the Sheriffs’ Office shall notify Plaintiffs’ Counsel within 3 business days as provided in ¶ 20(c) herein and provide alternative housing options or strategies within 7 business days thereafter.
1. The Parties shall be governed by the safe harbor provision described in ¶20(i) herein to resolve the issues prior to filing any enforcement action.
b. Within 24 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) of any juvenile being placed in segregated housing for any reason:
i. The Sheriff’s Office and the School Board shall confer to determine how best to allow equal access, including any accommodations, to juvenile educational services and programming outside of the segregation cell.
1. The Sheriff’s Office and School Board shall maintain notes and
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documentation from these conferences.
ii. The Sheriff’s Office shall refer the juvenile to a mental health professional for evaluation and to determine whether any accommodations are necessary.
c. The Sheriff’s Office shall bring all juveniles out of segregated housing during the regular school day in order for the School Board to facilitate educational services and programming:
i. There shall be no cell-side facilitation of educational services and programming to juveniles in segregated housing.
1. The Sheriff’s Office shall provide room and/or facility accommodations and staffing in order to assist the School Board in facilitating juvenile educational services and programming outside of segregated housing.
ii. In the event that a juvenile refuses to come out of segregated housing for educational services and programming, the Sheriff’s Office shall not place the juvenile on “lockdown” or other form of segregated housing for the remainder of the school day.
1. The Sheriff’s Office and the School Board must re-assess the juvenile’s willingness to join the educational services and programming prior to each period.
2. The Sheriff’s Office shall provide access to a School Board guidance counselor or other designee to meet with the juvenile regarding the school refusal.
a. If the School Board guidance counselor or other designee determines that the juvenile is willing to rejoin the period, the Sheriff’s Office shall allow the juvenile to do so.
3. The Sheriff’s Office shall within 24 hours refer the juvenile to a mental health professional for evaluation and to determine whether any accommodations are necessary.
d. The Sheriff’s Office shall bring all juveniles out of their segregated housing cells in order to facilitate juvenile programing to include, but not limited to, those programs listed in Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Corrections Operating Procedure #923.00(VIII). See Exhibit 4 – COP # 923.00: Juvenile Admission, Classification and Housing.
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i. There shall be no cell-side facilitation of programming to juveniles in segregated housing.
ii. The Sheriff’s Office shall provide room and/or facility accommodations and staffing in order to facilitate juvenile programming.
e. The Sheriff’s Office shall attend the weekly juvenile SRC meeting.
i. The weekly juvenile SRC meetings shall be attended by at least one Sheriff’s Office staff member from security, classification, programs, medical and mental health
ii. At the weekly juvenile SRC meetings, the Sheriff’s Office shall:
1. Discuss classifications of any juveniles in segregated housing and evaluate alternative housing options to include, but not limited to, elimination or modification of any keep separate designations;
2. Discuss any disciplinary referrals or decisions to classify juveniles in segregated housing and whether alternative disciplinary sanctions can be used to include, but not limited to, those addressed in the proposed alternative behavior management policy pursuant to ¶10(i)(ii)(1) herein;
3. Discuss any barriers to providing services, accommodations, and evaluations to juveniles, to include the School Board using evidence-based positive behavioral interventions approved by the Sheriff's Office to address any issues concerning disruption safety, security and good order, and possible accommodations;
4. Discuss any concerns the School Board has regarding the delivery of educational instruction or programming to juveniles;
5. Discuss any juveniles refusing to participate in school;
6. Discuss any juveniles exhibiting medical and mental health concerns and evaluate alternatives to segregated housing; and
7. Review any grievances regarding conditions of confinement or educational services filed by juveniles.
iii. The Sheriff’s Office members participating in the weekly juvenile SRC meetings shall maintain notes including copies of any documents
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reviewed during these meetings (i.e. grievances, disciplinary referrals, etc.).
f. Sheriff’s Office shall allow all juveniles, regardless of classification, to have recreation 7 days a week
g. Sheriff’s Office shall allow all juveniles, regardless of classification, to have showers 7 days a week
h. Sheriff’s Office shall not unreasonably withhold phone or visitation privileges from any juvenile.
i. By January 10, 2019, the Sheriff’s Office shall draft a new and/or modified handbook and policies specific to juveniles held in its custody to include, but not limited to those listed herein, and within the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Corrections Operating Procedure #918.00 (§V), See Exhibit 2 - COP #918.00: Special Management Unit:
i. Intake, Housing, classification, and admission; ii. Discipline;
1. By January 10, 2019, the Sheriff’s Office shall provide the Parties’ Counsel with a proposed alternative behavior management policy regarding disciplinary issues in lieu of, or in the alternative to, 23 hour a day segregated housing, that takes into consideration, among other issues, any medical or mental health concerns of the juvenile.
iii. Medical and mental health; iv. Educational services and programming; v. Grievance procedure; and vi. Staff Training
Juvenile Educational Instruction and Programming Policies
11. The School Board shall provide appropriate educational services and programming to juveniles in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office.
a. The School Board shall provide all educational services and programming to juveniles outside of their cells, except to those juveniles who refuse to attend school, as described in and pursuant to ¶11(c), below.
b. The School Board shall provide sufficient staff to provide educational services and programming to all juveniles, including those in segregated housing and other locations within the Sheriff’s Office facilities.
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c. The School Board shall include procedures for juveniles who refuse to attend educational services and programming in its training and materials, as follows:
i. If a juvenile refuses to attend school, then School Board shall immediately contact a guidance counselor or other School Board designee to visit with the juvenile regarding the refusal to attend educational services and programming.
1. Such visits shall be documented to include the reasons given for the refusal and any accommodations discussed or considered.
ii. The School Board shall address a juvenile’s refusal through School Based Team (SBT)/Individual Education Plan (IEP) meetings to plan appropriate interventions using evidence-based positive behavioral interventions approved by the Sheriff’s Office.
iii. The School Board shall discuss any refusals of educational services and programming by juveniles at the weekly juvenile SRC meetings.
12. The School Board shall hold a SBT meeting or IEP meeting for any juvenile entering the custody of the Sheriffs’ Office within two weeks of such entry.
a. The School Board shall subsequently hold a quarterly SBT or IEP meeting for each juvenile held in custody by the Sheriff’s Office.
b. The School Board shall maintain written records for each of these meetings.
c. The School Board shall submit proposed attendees for IEP meetings, including parent/guardian and School Board employees, to the Sheriff’s Office for approval, at least 10 days prior to meeting date.
d. The Sheriff’s Office shall provide meeting space to accommodate IEP meeting participants.
13. The School Board shall have an Exceptional Student Education compliance specialist conduct site visits at the Jail school at least once per quarter to audit students’ Individual Education Plans.
14. All School Board staff employed within the existing Jail school operated by the Sheriff’s Office shall be required to attend an initial School Board training session regarding the terms of this Agreement, as well as any Sheriff’s Office policies and procedures that would affect the facilitation of educational services and programming to juveniles.
a. The School Board shall develop written training materials by January 10,
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2019.

i. The School Board shall include attendance policies in the training and materials, including the requirement that if a juvenile is held in segregated housing during educational services and programming, that juvenile will be marked absent.

ii. The School Board shall provide training to existing Jail school staff regarding the Agreement by January 10, 2019.

b. The School Board’s Jail school administrator shall provide new staff orientations within 7 days of commencing a position within any correctional facility operated by the Sheriff’s Office.

15. The School Board shall provide necessary instructional materials to juveniles in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office upon receipt of approval for safety and security.

a. Within 30 days of the date of this Agreement, the School Board shall provide a reading specialist to the existing Jail school to assess for required reading interventions for juveniles in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office.

i. Within 60 days from this site visit by the reading specialist, the School Board will provide a list of any necessary educational materials for reading interventions to the Sheriff’s Office for safety and security approval.

b. The School Board and Sheriff’s Office shall cooperate to enable safe use of computers at the existing Jail school for educational services and programming.

c. The School Board shall provide the Sheriff’s Office with at least 10 days’ notice of any new or supplemental educational materials to be used for educational services and programming for juveniles at the Jail school.

i. In the event that any materials are disallowed because of verifiable security risks, the School Board shall locate alternative materials and resubmit the list to the Sheriff’s Office for safety and security approval.

16.

The School Board’s Jail school administrator or designee shall attend the weekly

juvenile SRC meetings.

a. At the weekly juvenile SRC meetings, the School Board shall:

i. Discuss any barriers to providing services, accommodations, interventions, evaluations to juveniles;

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ii. Discuss any concerns the school district has regarding the delivery of educational services and programming to juveniles;

iii. Discuss any juveniles refusing to participate in school; and

iv. Review any grievances regarding educational services and programming filed by juveniles.

b. The School Board and Sheriff’s Office shall maintain notes of juvenile SRC meetings, including documents reviewed.

17.

The School Board shall provide quarterly district oversight to ensure Jail school

compliance with English Language Learner (ELL) policies and procedures through

site visits, student record reviews, and provision of training.

18.

The School Board shall provide a written communication to parents/legal

guardians of juveniles in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office regarding availability

of access to academic information through the Student Information System (SIS)

and methods to communicate with Jail school administrators and teachers.

Term

19.

No party shall move to terminate the Agreement for a period of five (5) years.

Monitoring

20.

Except as otherwise provided herein, Plaintiffs’ Counsel in cooperation with

designated experts shall oversee implementation and compliance with the

injunctive terms of this Agreement for a period of two (2) years as follows:

a. First Year of Monitoring (January 2019 – December 2019):

i. Designation of Experts:

1. Plaintiff’s Counsel, in its discretion, shall utilize the assistance of a Corrections Expert and an Education Expert for purposes of monitoring compliance.

a. Said experts shall advise and consult with Plaintiffs’ Counsel as to whether the Sheriffs’ Office or the School Board are in substantial breach of any material term of this Agreement.

i. In the event that any substantial breach is identified, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall within 24 hours notify Defendants’ Counsel of the

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substantial breach. The Sheriffs’ Office or the School Board shall have 30 days thereafter to provide notice to all parties that it has corrected or will correct any issues concerning the same, including a description of the steps it has or will take to ensure it is no longer in substantial breach (nothing herein shall prevent the parties from negotiating in good faith a resolution to any claimed substantial breach informally);
ii. If the Sheriff’s Office or the School Board does not correct and/or provide a plan to correct any provisions found to be in substantial breach, then Plaintiffs may file a motion with the Court seeking specific enforcement of the terms of this Agreement, reinstatement of the claims for prospective relief in the lawsuit, or an extension of the duration of this Agreement by up to one additional year, including monitoring activities. It shall be Plaintiffs’ burden in making such a motion to demonstrate that Defendants are in substantial breach of a material term of the Agreement.
iii. In the event that any non-substantial breach is identified, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall within 24 hours notify Defendants’ Counsel of the nonsubstantial breach and negotiate in good-faith to resolve the matter to ensure compliance with the Agreement.
2. Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall provide notice and contact information of any expert designation at least 60 days prior to any quarterly on-site visit as stated herein;
a. Defendants’ shall have 5 days from said notice to object to the expert designation. Any objection must be based upon genuine and verifiable concerns as to the expert’s qualifications and/or impartiality.
b. Upon such an objection, the Parties’ shall within 5 days thereafter negotiate in good-faith to resolve any disputes as to the expert designation or, if needed, utilize private mediation services.
c. Should the expert designation dispute continue to
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remain unresolved, then the objecting party may seek leave from the District Court pursuant to its authority and retention of jurisdiction, for relief.
d. If no objection is received, then the designated expert shall be deemed acceptable by the Parties.
ii. Quarterly On-Site Visits:
1. The Sheriff’s Office shall provide Plaintiffs’ experts and/or Plaintiffs’ Counsel access to any Sheriff’s Office facility housing juveniles on a quarterly basis beginning in January 2019 as follows:
a. Plaintiffs’ experts and/or Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall provide at least 14 days prior notice to Counsel for Sheriff’s Office and School Board before conducting any on-site visit;
2. Plaintiffs’ experts and/or Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall have full and complete access to any Sheriff’s Office facility that houses juveniles, the medical and mental health units, as well as any room or other accommodation used for educational services and programming, recreation, or the facilitation of any other juvenile programs or services;
3. Plaintiffs’ experts and/or Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall have full and complete access to any Sheriff’s Office or School Board staff member who has or has had any interaction with juveniles;
4. Plaintiffs’ experts and/or Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall have full and complete access to any juvenile who, at the time of the monitoring activities, is or has been held in segregated housing.
iii. Document Production
1. Sheriff’s Office:
a. On or before the fifteenth day in January, April, July and October of each year beginning January 2019, and prior to any quarterly on-site visit, the Sheriff’s Office shall provide to Plaintiffs’ Counsel the following documents, records and other information regarding any juvenile who during the quarterly period was or is being held in segregated housing:
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i. Medical and mental health screening and evaluation records (any documents produced shall be covered by the HIPAA Protective Order entered in this Action);
ii. Bunk rosters and/or daily population sheets;
iii. Logs, notes, and documents (i.e. grievances, disciplinary reports, confinement orders or notations, etc.) reviewed during weekly juvenile segregation review committee meetings;
iv. Training documents for Sheriff’s Office employees working with juveniles;
v. Handbooks or policies concerning juveniles;
2. School Board:
a. On or before the fifteenth day in January, April, July and October of each year beginning January 2019, and prior to any quarterly on-site visit, the School Board shall provide to Plaintiffs’ Counsel the following documents, records and other information regarding any juvenile who during the quarterly period was or is being held in segregated housing:
i. Log of dates of school-based team and individual education plan meetings for each student with a unique number, as well as interventions utilized and revised;
ii. Logs of weekly juvenile segregation review committee meetings;
iii. Dates of site visits from Exceptional Student Education specialist;
iv. Any updates to written training material and new employee orientation training logs;
v. English Language Learner oversight logs, including dates of records review and site visits;
vi. List of any educational materials that were denied by the Sheriff’s Office as provided in ¶
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15, and any alternative educational materials considered or used;
vii. The number of juvenile students referred for initial Exceptional Student Education evaluations and any re-evaluations, and the number of completed evaluations and reevaluations;
viii. Numbers and dates of refusals for educational services and programming; and
ix. Information regarding absences due to segregated housing, though the School Board does not make a representation that this information is accurate.
b. Second Year of Monitoring (January 2020 to December 2020)
i. The Sheriff’s Office shall allow access to on-site visits to Plaintiffs’ Counsel, if necessary, as provided in ¶20(a)(ii) herein on a bi-annual basis.
ii. The Sheriff’s Office and School Board shall produce documents to Plaintiffs’ Counsel as provided in ¶20(a)(iii) herein on a bi-annual basis.
iii. Any substantial breach of a material term of the Agreement shall continue to be governed by the safe harbor provision described in ¶20(a)(i) herein prior to enforcement.
c. Notices. All documents, information, or notices described herein shall be provided to each of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in electronic form via e-mail and/or electronic file at:
Theodore Jon Leopold, Esq. Diana Leigh Martin, Esq.
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC 2925 PGA Boulevard Suite 200
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 561-515-1400
Fax: 561-515-1401 Email: tleopold@cohenmilstein.com Email: dmartin@cohenmilstein.com
Sabarish P Neelakanta, Esq.
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Masimba Mutamba, Esq. Human Rights Defense Center
P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460
561-360-2523 Fax: 866-735-7136 Email: sneelakanta@hrdc-law.org Email: mmutamba@hrdc-law.org
Melissa Marie Duncan Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County
423 Fern Street Suite 200
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561-655-8944 Fax: 655-5269
Email: mduncan@legalaidpbc.org
d. Monitoring Fees and Costs. Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall invoice the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board for monitoring fees and costs separately as follows:
i. First Year of Monitoring (January 2019 – December 2019):
1. Sheriff’s Office:
a. On a quarterly basis beginning January 2019, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall invoice the Sheriff’s Office for monitoring activities to include fees and costs for Plaintiffs’ designated expert not to exceed $4,500.00 per quarter.
i. The Sheriff’s Office and School Board shall pay Plaintiffs’ Counsel invoice within 30 days of receipt.
ii. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall at any time during the term of this Agreement have the right to seek, by motion to the District Court, an award of monitoring fees and costs in excess of $4,500.00 per quarter if circumstances, actions or events require Plaintiffs’ designated expert and/or Plaintiffs’ Counsel to significantly increase monitoring time and efforts due to any failure by the Sheriff’s Office to maintain substantial compliance with the Agreement.
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iii. Prior to filing any such motion, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall notify counsel for Defendants via email and first-class regular U.S. Mail of their intent to file a motion seeking additional fees. Within ten (10) business days of this notice, the Parties shall meet and confer in good faith to resolve the dispute. The time by which the Parties may meet and confer shall not exceed thirty (30) days of the date of the notice. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek from the District Court reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with such a motion.
2. School Board:
a. On a quarterly basis beginning January 2019, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall invoice the School Board for monitoring activities to include fees and costs for Plaintiffs’ designated expert not to exceed $3,000.00 per quarter.
i. The School Board shall pay Plaintiffs’ Counsel invoice within 30 days of receipt.
ii. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall at any time during the term of this Agreement have the right to seek, by motion to the District Court, an award of monitoring fees and costs in excess of $3,000.00 per quarter if circumstances, actions or events require Plaintiff’s designated expert and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel to significantly increase monitoring time and efforts due to any failure by the School Board to maintain substantial compliance with the Agreement.
iii. Prior to filing any such motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel shall notify counsel for Defendants via email and first-class regular U.S. Mail of their intent to file a motion seeking additional fees. Within ten (10) business days of this notice, the Parties shall meet and confer in good faith to resolve the dispute. The time by which the Parties may meet and confer shall not exceed thirty (30) days of the date of the notice. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek from the District
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Court reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with such a motion.
ii. Second Year of Monitoring (January 2020 – December 2020):
1. On a bi-annual basis beginning January 2020, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall invoice the Sheriff’s Office and School Board for monitoring activities to include fees and costs for Plaintiffs’ Expert as follows:
a. Sheriff’s Office bi-annual invoice shall not exceed $2,500.00.
b. School Board’s bi-annual invoice shall not exceed $1,000.00.
2. The Sheriff’s Office and School Board shall pay Plaintiffs’ Counsel invoices within 30 days of receipt.
a. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall at any time during the term of this Agreement have the right to seek, by motion to the District Court, an award of monitoring fees and costs in excess of the bi-annual amounts stated above, if circumstances, actions or events require Plaintiffs’ Counsel to significantly increase monitoring time and efforts due to any failure by the Sheriff’s Office or the School Board to maintain substantial compliance with the Agreement.
b. Prior to filing any such motion, Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall notify counsel for Defendants via email and first-class regular U.S. Mail of their intent to file a motion seeking additional fees. Within ten (10) business days of this notice, the Parties shall meet and confer in good faith to resolve the dispute. The time by which the Parties may meet and confer shall not exceed thirty (30) days of the date of the notice. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek from the District Court reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with such a motion.
Compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)
21. The parties stipulate, based upon the entire record, that the relief provided in this Agreement is narrowly drawn and extends no further than necessary to correct violations of federal rights, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct violations of federal rights.
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Retention of Jurisdiction and Consent to Magistrate
22. The District Court shall retain jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Agreement and the Parties for the purpose of enabling any of the Parties to apply to the Court at any time for such further order, direction, and relief as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or interpretation of this Agreement or to effectuate or enforce compliance with its terms, including any award of attorneys’ fees and costs. All parties consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction and to submit the Agreement to the District Court for approval and retention of jurisdiction.
23. The Parties further agree and consent to the U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Florida, for purposes of retention of jurisdiction and enforcement of the Agreement as provided herein.
Dismissal of Action
24. Upon final approval of the Agreement by the District Court, class certification, and appointment of class counsel, the Parties shall file a Joint Motion for Dismissal and Order of Dismissal. In filing the Joint Motion and Order of Dismissal, it is the intention of the Parties that the District Court retain jurisdiction over the Agreement pursuant to ¶¶ 22-23 supra.
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
25. The Parties shall engage in good-faith negotiations over reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for Plaintiffs’ counsel and agree to retention of jurisdiction by the District Court regarding the same pursuant to ¶¶ 22-23 supra.
Release
26. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement and as separate consideration for the agreements contained herein, Named Plaintiffs, the Plaintiff Class and SubClasses hereby absolutely, fully and forever release, relieve, waive, relinquish, and discharge Defendants and their successors, predecessors, related entities, departments, subsidiaries, representatives, assigns, agents, partners, officers, directors, managers, insurers, shareholders, and employees (“Released Parties”), of, and from, any and all known claims for equitable, declaratory relief, or compensatory education, subject to the following limitations: (i) this waiver shall not apply to claims based on acts or omissions arising after the date of execution of this Agreement; (ii) this waiver shall be limited to the allegations made in the Amended Complaint (which do not include claims for monetary damages); this waiver shall not apply to any claim for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this Action, enforcement and/or compliance with the Agreement.
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27. Named Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class and Sub-Classes acknowledge their intention that, upon execution by the Parties and approval by the Court, this Agreement, except as expressly provided for herein, shall be effective as a full and final accord and satisfaction and settlement of and as a bar to all of the claims in the Action.
Stipulation as to Class Certification
28. The parties agree that this matter is appropriate for certification as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The class is defined as: a) a class of all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office; b) a subclass of all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office and are in need of special education evaluation, instruction, accommodations, and related services (“IDEA subclass”); and c) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office (“ADA and 504 Subclass”). The Parties agree that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, there are questions of law and fact common to the class, the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class, and the plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Parties agree that the segregated housing policies that are the subject of this action apply generally to the class, making relief appropriate for the class as a whole. Defendants agree that they shall not move to decertify the class for the duration of this Agreement and shall not unreasonably oppose the designation by Plaintiffs of new class representatives if necessary.
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)
29. Within 10 days of the date that this Agreement is filed in the District Court for Preliminary Approval, the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board will provide the Notice of this Settlement Agreement as required by the CAFA (28 U.S.C. § 1715(b)) to the U.S. Attorney General, the Florida Attorney General’s Office, and/or any other necessary parties.
Fairness Hearing
30. The Parties shall jointly request that the District Court schedule and conduct a Fairness Hearing to address the fairness of this Agreement settling Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants and to decide whether there shall be Final Approval of the settlement embodied in this Agreement. At the Fairness Hearing, the Parties shall jointly move for and recommend certification of the Class and Final Approval of
21

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H.C. at al v. PBSO et al., Civil Action No.: 9:18-cv-80810 Settlement Agreement
this Agreement. The Fairness Hearing shall take place on a date in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1715.
Miscellaneous Provisions
31. Construction of Agreement and Counsel. Should any of the provisions or terms of this Agreement require judicial interpretation, it is agreed that the court interpreting or construing this Agreement shall not apply a presumption that such provision(s) or term(s) shall be more strictly construed against one party by reason of the rule of construction that a document is to be construed more strictly against the party who prepared it, it being agreed that all Parties and their respective counsel have participated in the preparation and review of this Agreement. Further, the Parties specifically acknowledge and agree that each has retained separate, independent counsel to represent them.
32. Binding Effect. This Agreement is binding upon Plaintiffs, the Class and Subclasses, the Defendants named in this lawsuit in their official capacities, and on Defendants’ successors in office, employees and agents for the duration of the term of this Agreement.
33. Authority. By signing this Agreement, the Parties represent and warrant that each person signing this Agreement on behalf of them has the authority to execute this Agreement and to bind Defendants, the Sheriff’s Office and School Board, and Plaintiffs respectively.
34. Exhibits. The terms of all Exhibits attached hereto are fully incorporated into this Agreement and are an integral part thereof. The terms of this Agreement, where applicable, are fully incorporated into all Exhibits and are, where applicable, an integral part thereof. To the extent that there are any conflicts or inconsistencies between the terms of this Agreement and any of the Exhibits, the terms of this Agreement shall control.
35. Completeness of Document. This Agreement contains the entire understanding between the parties with respect to the matters set forth herein, and there are no representations, warranties, agreements, arrangements, or undertakings, oral or written, between or among the parties hereto relating to the subject matter of the Agreement which are not fully expressed herein.
36. Modification of Agreement. Any modification of or addition to this Agreement must be in writing, signed by Defendants and Plaintiffs’ Class Counsel.
37. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in separate counterparts, which, taken together, shall comprise one agreement.
38. Facsimile/Electronic Signatures. A facsimile or electronic representation of a signature shall be deemed as effective as an original signature.
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EXHIBIT 1

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PBSO 15

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PBSO 16

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PBSO 17

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EXHIBIT 2

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PBSO 26

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PBSO 27

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PBSO 28

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PBSO 29

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PBSO 30

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PBSO 31

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EXHIBIT 3

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EXHIBIT 4

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PBSO 22

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PBSO 23

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PBSO 24

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PBSO 25

 
 Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 1 of 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Case No. 18-Civ-80810-Dimitrouleas/Matthewman
H.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Jenny C.; M.F., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, Asisa Rolle,
Plaintiffs, v. RIC BRADSHAW, Palm Beach County Sheriff, in his official capacity; SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY
Defendants. /
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I. Introduction
Plaintiffs allege that their placement in solitary confinement1 at the Palm Beach County Jail causes them serious harm including, for children with disabilities, a lack of access to special education and related services. Defendants do not dispute that children with disabilities in solitary confinement are not receiving the special education and related services to which they are entitled. Rather, each Defendant alleges that the other is to blame for the denial of access to

1

Plaintiffs use the term “solitary confinement” to refer to a unit within the Jail consisting

of small, individual cells, each approximately six feet by twelve feet. Am. Compl. ¶ 13-14, ECF

No. 38. According to Plaintiffs, children in solitary confinement remain in their cells for 23-24

hours a day, for several months or even a year at a time, and are not permitted to participate in

any group activities, including school. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. The United States has referred to

similar conditions of confinement as “restrictive housing,” however, we adopt the Parties’

terminology in this Statement of Interest for purposes of clarity before the Court.

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 2 of 13

special education services. Under federal law, however, both Defendants are responsible for ensuring that eligible children with disabilities at the Jail receive special education and related services. Defendants cannot avoid responsibility by claiming the other is responsible.
The United States submits this Statement of Interest to affirm and clarify the protections afforded to children with disabilities by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012) (IDEA) and its implementing regulations.2
II. Interest of the United States The United States files this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012), which authorizes the Attorney General “to attend to the interests of the United States” in any case pending in federal court.3 The United States has an interest in the enforcement of the provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act that gives the Attorney General the authority to seek declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Constitution or federal law by entities responsible for “the incarceration of juveniles.”4 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2012) (Section 12601) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141). The United States has a history of remedying violations of the IDEA pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority under Section 12601 and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act § 1997 (CRIPA), and thus has an interest in ensuring the appropriate and consistent interpretation of the IDEA and its

2

The United States takes no position as to whether Defendants are violating the IDEA.

3

The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 517 is as follows: “The Solicitor General, or any officer of

the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the

United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the

United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States.”

4

Under relevant Florida law, the terms “juvenile,” “child,” and “youth” are synonymous

and defined as “any person under the age of 18 or any person who is alleged to have committed a

violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of 18 years.” Fla. Stat.

§ 985.03(7) (2018).

2

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 3 of 13

implementing regulations. Accordingly, the United States believes that its views regarding the application of the IDEA to children with disabilities at the Jail will be of interest to the Court in resolving the IDEA issues presented in this case.
III. Background The Palm Beach County Jail is a correctional facility located in West Palm Beach, Florida that houses more than 2,000 inmates. Am. Compl. ¶ 13; Def. Bradshaw’s Resp. to Mot. For Prelim. Inj. at 2, ECF No. 37. The Jail houses both adult inmates as well as children (i.e., under the age of 18) charged with adult crimes. Am. Compl. ¶ 13; Def. Bradshaw’s Resp. to Mot. For Prelim. Inj. at 2. Plaintiffs are two individuals who are or were minors at the time they were charged with adult crimes and confined to the Jail’s solitary confinement unit, and a putative class of “all present and future children (i.e., children under the age of eighteen and charged as adults) who are now or will be incarcerated in solitary confinement at the Palm Beach County Jail. Pls.’ Mot. For Class Cert. E at 1, ECF No. 7; Am. Compl. ¶ 9-10. The putative class includes a subclass of children with disabilities “in need of special education and related services (“IDEA Subclass”).” Am. Compl. ¶ 142.5 Plaintiffs allege that members of the IDEA Subclass do not receive the special education and related services identified in their “individualized education programs (IEP)”6 and required by the IDEA. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. At best, members of the IDEA Subclass

5

The IDEA Subclass in the instant case is limited to children under the age of 18. Am.

Compl. ¶ 13. Therefore, this case does not address the application of the IDEA to some students

with disabilities between the ages of 18 and 21 in adult correctional facilities. See generally

34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(2); § 300.320.

6

An “individualized education program” is a written statement, developed by the child’s

teachers and other relevant professionals, setting out the plan for meeting the academic and

related needs of a child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).

3

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 4 of 13
allegedly receive “packets of work shoved under a cell door or have brief moments to speak with a teacher standing outside of their locked door.” Am. Compl. ¶ 24. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants violate the IDEA by failing to identify, evaluate, recommend and provide special education and related services to the IDEA Subclass. Am. Compl. ¶ 187. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants also violate the IDEA by failing to provide specific procedural safeguards, including “manifestation determinations,”7 required by the IDEA to ensure that children with disabilities have access to special education and related services. Am. Compl. ¶ 187.
Defendant Ric Bradshaw is the Sheriff of Palm Beach County and, as head of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, has final governing authority over the Jail. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Defendant School Board of the Palm Beach County School District is responsible for the oversight and overall management of public education services in Palm Beach County, including the provision of education services to children at the Jail. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. In a “Cooperative Agreement between The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida and The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (Jail),” dated July 1, 2016 and attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Defendants state they are “mutually committed to cooperate in the development of a program designed to offer high quality educational services” to children with disabilities, and set forth their individual and collective responsibilities for the provision of educational services at the Jail. See Pls.’ Mot. For Prelim. Inj. Ex. A-6 at 1, ECF No. 6-1.

7

A “manifestation determination” is a comprehensive review conducted by a child’s team

of teachers and other relevant professionals whenever he or she is removed from an educational

placement for more than 10 school days for disciplinary reasons. 20 U.S.C § 1415(k)(1)(E). The

purpose of the review is to determine whether the questioned behavior was caused by, or had a

direct and substantial relationship to, the child’s disability or the failure to implement the child’s

IEP. 20 U.S.C § 1415(k)(1)(E).

4

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Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on June 21, 2018, alleging that the conditions of solitary confinement at the Jail violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as well as federal laws, including the IDEA. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. On the same date, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction requesting immediate relief for all claims, including the IDEA claim. ECF 6.
On August 2, 2018, Defendants filed responses to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In responding to Plaintiffs’ Motion, neither the Sheriff nor the School Board contends that children with disabilities in solitary confinement have the access required by the IDEA to special education and related services. See Def. Bradshaw’s Resp. to Mot. For Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 37; Def. School Bd.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. For Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 36. Rather, both Defendants essentially blame each other for this denial of access. See, e.g., Def. Bradshaw’s Resp. to Mot. For Prelim. Inj. at 4 (referencing Defendants’ Cooperative Agreement and stating that “[t]he Sheriff’s Office does not interfere with School Board employees’ duties and obligations regarding the provision of educational instruction services.”); Def. School Bd.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. For Prelim. Inj. at 5 (alleging that “every claimed denial of services stemmed solely from circumstances within [the Sheriff’s Office’s] control.”). As explained below, however, both Defendants are responsible for ensuring that eligible children with disabilities at the Jail receive special education and related services.
5

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IV. Discussion A. Defendants Share Responsibility for Providing Special Education Services to
Eligible Children with Disabilities at the Jail. To receive federal grants pursuant to the IDEA, states must ensure that a “free appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school.” 8 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1412. The IDEA defines “free appropriate public education” as “special education and related services” that conform to specific statutory requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).9 IDEA regulations broadly describe the public agencies within a state that are obligated to ensure access to a free appropriate public education as “all political subdivisions of the State that are involved in the education of children with disabilities,” and specifically identify “local educational agencies” and “State and local juvenile and adult correctional facilities” as covered by the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(1)(ii) and (iv). A “local educational agency” is “a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State.” 20 U.S.C. §1401(19)(A). In Florida, children with disabilities who are detained in a county detention facility “shall be offered educational services by the local school district in which the facility is located.” Fla. Stat. § 951.176(2) (2018). Thus, the School District

8

As noted, the IDEA Subclass in the instant case is limited to children under the age of 18.

Am. Compl. ¶ 13.

9

See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (defining “child with a disability” as a child with an

impairment who “needs special education and related services.”).

6

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 7 of 13
is a local educational agency under the IDEA and obligated to ensure that eligible children with disabilities at the Jail receive a free appropriate public education.
As the governing authority of a local correctional facility “involved in the education of children with disabilities,” the Sheriff’s Office is likewise obligated to ensure that eligible children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(1)(iv). Florida law requires that the Sheriff’s Office develop a cooperative agreement with the School Board to address “the provision of educational services” to children with disabilities at the Jail. Fla. Stat. § 951.176(2). Consistent with this law, Defendants’ Cooperative Agreement acknowledges the parties’ mutual obligation to ensure the provision of special education services to children at the Jail, and sets forth their respective and collective responsibilities. See Pls.’ Mot. For Prelim. Inj. Ex. A-6 at 1, ECF No. 6-1 (both Defendants pledging to “cooperate in the development of a program designed to offer high quality educational services to . . . persons with disabilities” and “develop and support joint initiatives that will facilitate the effective and efficient delivery of services for youth served in the educational Program.”).
The Sheriff contends that he is not responsible for the denial of special education and related services to the IDEA Subclass because the duty to provide education to children at the Jail lies with the School Board. Def. Bradshaw’s Resp. to Mot. For Prelim. Inj. at 4 (referencing Defendants’ Cooperative Agreement and stating that “[t]he Sheriff’s Office does not interfere with School Board employees’ duties and obligations regarding the provision of education instruction services.”). The School Board likewise contends that it is not responsible for the denial of special education and related services to children with disabilities in solitary confinement because it has no “discretion as to the placement of juveniles into solitary
7

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 8 of 13
confinement.” Def. Sch. Bd.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3, ECF 32 (also noting that the “custody of the juveniles and control of the jail is alleged to be solely within the purview of the Sheriff and his employees.”).
As explained above, however, both Defendants are public agencies with obligations under the IDEA. Public agencies cannot avoid their IDEA obligations by allowing another entity to interfere with carrying out its responsibilities. The IDEA’s statutory scheme accounts for situations where, as here, a non-educational public agency in the State shares responsibility for providing special education and related services to children with disabilities, and expressly requires that States have mechanisms, such as Defendants’ Cooperative Agreement, in place to address these situations. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12); 34 C.F.R. § 300.154; Fla. Stat. § 951.176(2). The IDEA does not exempt one public agency from its duty to provide special education services because another public agency shares that duty.10 B. The IDEA Requires Defendants to Provide Eligible Students with Special Education
and Related Services. Congress enacted the IDEA in 1975 to ensure that children with disabilities that affect their ability to learn receive a “free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988). With limited exceptions for certain students aged 18 through 21 that are inapplicable in this case, students with disabilities in adult correctional facilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(1)(iv); § 300.101; § 102; § 300.324 (d)(1)(i).
10 The United States takes no position on issues of state law, including the proper interpretation of the Cooperative Agreement between the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board.
8

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 9 of 13 The IDEA also contains specific procedural safeguards to protect the education rights of
children with disabilities, including “manifestation determination” reviews for children removed from their educational placement for more than 10 school days for disciplinary infractions. 20 U.S.C § 1415(k)(1)(E).11 Moreover, whether or not the disciplinary infraction prompting a change of placement is determined to be a manifestation of a child’s disability, after a child with a disability has been removed from his or her placement for 10 cumulative school days, the education provider must provide the services necessary to allow the child “to continue to participate in the general education curriculum . . . and to progress toward meeting the goals set out in the child’s IEP” during any subsequent days of removal. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(i) (2012), 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(2). Defendants’ shared duty to provide special education and related services does not cease when otherwise eligible children with disabilities are assigned to the solitary confinement unit.
11 See supra note 7. 9

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 10 of 13

V. Conclusion The IDEA requires public agencies involved in the education of children with disabilities, such as the Sheriff’s Office and School Board, to provide special education and related services to children with disabilities at the Jail, including otherwise eligible children in solitary confinement. Defendants cannot avoid their responsibilities under the IDEA by blaming each other. Each have independent and shared responsibilities for the provision of special education and related services to children with disabilities at the Jail.12

Dated: October 1, 2018

Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for the United States:
JOHN M. GORE Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief Special Litigation Section
SHELLEY R. JACKSON Deputy Chief Special Litigation Section
/s/ Megan R. Marks JACQUELINE CUNCANNAN MEGAN R. MARKS (Special Florida Bar No. A5502302) Attorneys U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Patrick Henry Building, 5th Floor Washington, DC 20530

12 The United States takes no position on any other claims or issues not specifically addressed in this Statement of Interest.
10

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 11 of 13 Phone: (202) 616-2556 Facsimile: (202) 514-4883 E-mail: jacqueline.cuncannan@usdoj.gov
11

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 12 of 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by operation of the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system on October 1, 2018, on all counsel or parties of record on the Service List below.

/s/ Megan R. Marks

.

MEGAN R. MARKS

Attorney for the United States

SERVICE LIST
For the Plaintiffs:
Diana Leigh Martin Theodore Jon Leopold Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll, PLLC 2925 Pga Blvd. Suite 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 561-515-1400 Fax: 561-515-1401 Email:Dmartin@cohenmilstein.Com Email:Tleopold@cohenmilstein.Com
Sabarish P Neelakanta Masimba Maxwell Mutamba Human Rights Defense Center P.O. Box 1151 Lake Worth, FL 33460 561-360-2523 Fax: 866-735-7136 Email:Sneelakanta@humanrightsdefensecenter.Org Email:Mmutamba@humanrightsdefensecenter.Org
Melissa Marie Duncan Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561-655-8944 Fax: 655-5269 Email:Mduncan@legalaidpbc.Org
12

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WPD Document 71 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/01/2018 Page 13 of 13
For Defendant Palm Beach County School Board: Jon Erik Bell Laura Esterman Pincus Lisa A. Carmona Office of General Counsel Palm Beach County School District 3320 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite 331 West Palm Beach, FL 33406 561-434 -8500 Fax: 561- 434-8105 Email:Jon.Bell@palmbeachschools.Org Email:Laura.Pincus@palmbeachschools.Org Email:Lisa.Carmona@palmbeachschools.Org For Defendant Palm Beach County Sheriff: Richard A. Giuffreda Purdy Jolly Giuffreda Barranco & Jisa PA 2455 E Sunrise Boulevard Suite 1216 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33304 USA 954-462-3200 Fax: 462-3861 Email:Richard@purdylaw.Com
13

 
 Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 1 of 29

UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT SO UTHERN D ISTRICT OF FLORID A

CivilN o.18-cv-80810-M atthewm an

H .C .,etal., Plaintiffs,
V S.
R IC BR AD SH A W ,e/al., Defendants.

FILED BY

D,C.

02T 1t)2g15
CALNEGREKLUASE.ONISO-I1.LCE'E s.n.osz/t.$,-w.Rn.

O R D ER G M N TIN G IN PAR T A ND DEN Y IN G IN PA R T PLA IN TIFFS'W R IFIED M OTION FOR ATTORNEYS'FEESAND CO STS (DE 871
TH IS CAU SE isbeforetheCourtuponPlaintiffs',H .C.,am inor,byandthroughhisparent and naturalguardian,Jermy C.;M .F.,a m inor,by and through his parentand naturalguardian,
AsisaRolle;andT.M .,byandthroughhisparentandnatlzralguardian,JessicaJoiner(collectively, Csplaintiffs'')VerifedM otionforAttorneys'FeesandCosts(tsM otion'')(DE 87J.DefendantItick Bradshaw,Palm BeachCountySheriff(sçtheSheriff'),hasfiledaResponse(DE 921,Defendant SchoolBoardofPalm Beach County (CçtheSchoolBoard'')hastiledaResponse EDE 931,and PlaintiffshavefiledaReply(DE 981.Thismatterisnow ripeforreview.
BA CK G R O UN D
OnJtme21,2018,PlaintiffsfiledaClass-ActionComplaintforlnjunctiveandDeclaratory Relief(DE 1jandaM otionforPreliminaryInjunction(DE6).PlaintiffsfiledtheirFirstAmended ComplaintonAugust2,2018(DE38j.TheCourtscheduledanevidentiaryhearingontheM otion forPreliminaryInjunctionandsetotherdeadlinesrelatedtothemotion.(DE 31q.OnNovember
15,2018,afterthepartieshadengaged in discovery,filed andresponded totw o setsofm otionsto

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 2 of 29
dismiss,fullybriefedtheM otionforPreliminarylnjtmction,andfiledwitnessandexhibitlists,the
parties filed a JointM otion to Conditionally Certify Class,Prelim inarily A pprove Settlem ent,
AppointClassCotmsel,and SetFairnessHearing gDE 78). TheCourtenteredanOrdergrantingtheparties'JointM otion(DE 791.ARertheCourt
held a fairness hearing on M arch 5,2019,it entered a Final Ordyr Approving Class-A ction
SettlementAgreement,AppointmentofClassCotmselandCertification ofClass(DE 861.The Courtdismissçd theactipn withprejudice.f#.Additionally,theCourtretainedjurisdiction çsto
consideral1furtherapplications arising outoforin cormection w ith the Settlem entA greem ent, includingm onitoring,enforcem ent,and attorneys'feesand costs.''1d.atp.4.
II. M O TIO N .R ESPO N SES.AN D REPL Y In their M otion,Plaintiffs argue thatthey are the prevailing parties and thatthey are
entitledtoattorneys'feesandcostsintheamountof$645,822.78.(DE 87,pp.6,22).Plaintiffs specificallycontendthattheyareentitledtoattorneys'feesandcostspursuantto42U.S.C.j1988 (forSection 1983claims),42U.S.C.j12205(forADA claims),20U.S.C.j1415(i)(3)@ )(for IDEA claims),and29U.S.C.j794a(b)(forRehabilitationActclaims).(DE 87,p.7).According toPlaintiffs,CohenM ilsteinbilled324.25hoursandbilled$148,050.00infees,theHum anRights
D efenseCenterbilled586.70hoursandbilled$198,852.50infees,andLegalAidSocietyofPalm Beach County billed 450.85 hours and billed $227,011.25 in fees.1d. Plaintiffs' counsel
discounted all of the claim ed attorneys' fees by 10% for a total attorneys' fee aw ard of $606,526.00.1d.atp.7.Plaintiffsarealsoclaiming$39,296.78incostsincurredbytheirattorneys. f#.Finally,Plaintiffsassertthatthey obtained substantialsuccess,thatthehotzrly ratesthey seek fortheirattorneysarereasonable,thatthey seek com pensation forareasonablenum berofhotlrs,
andthattheirattorneysexercisedtheirbillingjudgmentbycuttingal1billableholzrsby10% .1d.at

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 3 of 29
pp.9-20).
In his Response,the Sheriff argues thatthis w as (inota contentious law suitand itwas
resolvedratherquickly.''(DE 92,p.21.TheSheriffconcedesthatPlaintiffsaretheprevailing
parties and are entitled to reasonable fees and costs, but he challenges the reasonableness of Plaintiffs'counsel'sholzrlyratesandthereasonablenessofthenllm berofhoursexpended.f#.atp. 4.H ealsochallengesthetaxablecostssoughtbyPlaintiffsasuntim elyandm ostofthenon-taxable litigation expensesasunreasonable.Id.The SheriffcontendsthatPlaintiffsshouldbeawarded
$260,690.50in attorneys'feesand $131.33 in costs,foratotalof$260,821.83.1d.atp.39.The
Sheriff'sspeciticargumentsandobjectionsshallbediscussedinmoredetaillaterinthisOrder. In itsResponse,the SchoolBoardjoinsand adopts the objections,arguments,and
calculationssetforthintheSheric sResponse.gDE 93,p.1).TheSchoolBoardalsorequeststhat
the Colzrtperm itthepartiesto çisubm itsupplem entalm em orandaregardingthe apportionm entof fees and costsoncethe Courthasnzled on the reasonablenessand nm ountofPlaintiffs'feesand costs.''Id atp.2.
In reply,Plaintiffs argue thatDefendants'objectionsEsdo notwarrantorjustify the
w holesale reduction ofPlaintiffs'attorneysifeesby nearly 61% ,nor are theirproposed hourly ratesforPlaintiffs'counselconsistentw ith the prevailing m arketratesin Palm Beach County.''
(DE 98,p.1).AccordingtoPlaintiffs,Defendants'objectionstothefeesandcostsclaimedarealso
largely without m erit.Id.Plaintiffs also seek attorneys' fees for the litigation based on the attorneys'feesandcostsissue.f#.atp.18.IntheirReply,Plaintiffsseek$631,736.25inattorneys' feesand$30,644.39incosts,foratotalof$662,380.64.1d.atp.21.

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 4 of 29
111. DISCU SSIO N A . Attornevs'Fees
1. Attorneys'FeesA reA ppropriate asPlaintiffsA re the Prevailin: Party There is no dispute thatPlaintiffs are entitled to an aw ard ofattorneys'fees and costs
ptlrsuantto42U.S.C.j1988(b)(foraSection1983claim,itthecoultinitsdiscretion,mayallow theprevailingparty,otherthantheUnitedStates,areasonableattorney'sfeeaspartofthecosts''); pursuantto42 U.S.C.j 12205 (forADA claims,the court,in itsdiscretion,ttmay allow the
prevailing party,otherthan the U nited States,a reasonable attorney's fee,including litigation expenses,and costs,and the United Statesshallbe liableforthe foregoing the sam e asaprivate
individual');pursuantto20U.S.C.j1415(i)(3)(B)(1)(forIDEA claims,thecourt,initsdiscretion,
Gim ay awardreasonableattorneys'feesaspartofthecoststoaprevailingparty whoistheparentof
achildwithadisability');andpursuantto29U.S.C.j794a(b)(forRehabilitationActclaims,ttthe
court,in itsdiscretion,m ay allow theprevailingparty,otherthan theU nited States,areasonable
attorney'sfeeaspartofthecosts'').
The parties' settlem ent gives Plaintiffs prevailing party status because the settlem ent
çlyieldedeitheranawardbythecourtofatleastsomereliefonthemeritsofhisclaim orthejudicial
im prim atur of a change in the legal relationship between thePlaintiffand the D efendants.''
Madden'v.JustBelieveRecoveryCtn,LLC,No.2:18-CV-14446,2019W L 3282154,at*3(S.D. Fla.July 16,2019)(citingSmalbeinv.City ofDaytonaBeach,353 F.3d 901,905(11th Cir. 2003)).The settlement and the Court's approval of the settlement clearly meet the test
forprevailingparty status.M oreover, D efendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys'feesand costs.Finally,in theCourt'sFinalOrderA pproving Class-A ction
SettlementAgreement,AppointmentofClassCotmselandCertification ofClassgDE 861,the
4

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 5 of 29
Courtexplicklyretainedjurisdictiontoconsidera11furtherapplicationsconcerningattorneys'fees
and costs.Thus,theonly issuebefore theundersigned istheam ountoftheattorneys'feesand
costsaw ard.
2. L aw R eaardin: C alculation ofA ttorneys'Fees A reasonableattorneys'feeawardisçsproperly'calculated by m ultiplyingthentlmberof
hoursreasonably expended onthelitigation timesareasonablehotlrlyrate.''Am.CivilLiberties
Unionv.Barnes,168F.3d423,427(11thCir.1999)(quotingBlum v.Stenson,465U.S.886,888 (1994:.Thisçûlodestar''maythenbeadjustedfortheresultsobtainedbytheattorney.SeeBarnes, 168F.3dat427(citingLorangerv.Stierheim,10Fk3d776,781(11thCir.1994:.Silndetermining
w hatisaçreasonable'hourlyrateandw hatnum berofcompensablehoursistreasonable,'thecourt istoconsiderthe 12factorsenum eratedinJohnsonv.GeorgiaHighwayExpress,Inc.,488F.2d
714 (5th Cir.1974).''Bivinsv.Wrap ItUp,Inc.,548F.3d 1348,1350 (11th Cir.2008).These
factors are:
(1)thetimeandlaborrequired;(2)thenoveltyanddiffcultyofthequestions;(3) the skillrequisiteto perform the legalserviceproperly;(4)thepreclusion of employmentbytheattorneyduetoacceptanceofthecase;(5)thecustomaryfee; (6)whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent;(7)timelimitationsimposedbytheclient orthecircumstances;(8)the amountinvolvedandtheresultsobtained;(9)the experience,reputqtion,andabilityoftheattorneys;(10)theGsundesirability''ofthe case;(11)thenatureandlengthoftheprofessionalrelationshipwiththeclient;and (12)awardsinsimilarcases. Id.at1350n.2(citationomitted).
The reasonable hourly rate is detined asthe (Gprevailing m arketrate in the relevantlegal
com m unity for sim ilar services by law yers of reasonably com parable skills,experience,and
reputation.''Barnes,168F.3dat436(quotingNormanv..HousingAuth.ofM ontgomery,836F.2d 1292 1299 (11th Cir.1999))1Thefeeapplicantbearstheburden ofestablishingtheclaimed

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 6 of 29

m arketrate.SeeBarnes,168F.3d at427.TheCourtm ay use itsown experiencein assessing the

reasonablenessofattom eys'fees.Norman,836F.2dat1299.

W ith regard to the type ofevidence thatthe fee claim qntshould produce in supportofa

claim ,in Barnes,theEleventh Circuithasstatedthat

Etlheiçfeeapplicantbearstheburden ofestablishing entitlem entand docum enting
theappropriatehoursandhourlyrates.''Norman,836F.2dat1303. Thatburden includestlsupplying the cotu'tw ith specificand detailed evidence from which the courtcan determinethe reasonablehourly rate.Further,feecounselshouldhave m aintained recordsto show thetim e spenton thedifferentclaim s,and thegeneral
subject matter ofthe time expenditmes oughtto be setoutwith sufficient
particularitysothatthedistrictcourtcanassessthetim eclaimedforeach activity . . . . A w ell-prepared feepetition also w ould includea sllm m ary,groupingthetim e
entriesbythenattzreoftheactivityorstageofthecase.''1d.(citationsomitted).

168F.3d at427.

In subm ittingarequestforattom eys'fees,feeapplicantsarerequiredtoexerciseGsbilling

judgment.''Barnes,168F.3dqt428(quotingHensleyv.Eckerhart,461U.S.424,434(1983)).lf

fee applicantsdo notexclude(texcessive,redtm dant,orotherw iseunnecessary''hours,w hich are

hours(Cthatw ould beunreasonableto billto a clientandthereforeto one'sadversary irrespective

of theskill,reputationorexperienceofcounseln''thecourtmustexercisebillingjudgmentfor

them.SeeBarnes,168F.3dat428(quotingNorman,836F.2dat1301(emphasisinoriginall).The
burden restson them ovanttosubm itarequestforfeesthatw illenablethecourtto determ inehow

m uch tim ew asreasonably expended.foranger,10F.3d at782.

3. Plaintiffs'Requestfora Blended R ateisD enied

Plaintiffsareseekingablendedhourlyrateof$525perhourfortheworkperform edbyall

attorneysinthiscase.(DE 87,p.16j.AccordingtoPlaintiffs,thatblendedhourlyrateçttakesinto

accounttheatlorneys'respectiveexperience levels,yearsinpractice,specializedknow ledgeasto

the salient issues ,

and custom

ary m

arketratesin theSou'thern D istrictofFloridaandPalm

Beach

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 7 of 29
County in particular.''Id Plaintiffs have provided the D eclaration ofJack Scarola,Esq.,to supportthe attorneys'
ratesrequested.gDE 87-4j.Mr.ScarolaopinesthatGtplaintiffs'counsel'sproposedblendedrates
of$525 forcounseland $200 forparalegalsisappropriate in thism atter.These am otmts are market,andnotpremium ratesforPlaintiffs'counselfortheworkperfonnedinthiscase.''1d.atp. 5.M r.ScarolaalsostatesthatStcomplexfederallitigationinthisdistricttypicallyrangesfrom $500
toover$900perhotlr,absentspecialcircum stancessuchasprobonorepresentation.....gclom plex federallitigationinthisdistricttypicallyrangesfrom $450perhourtoover$800.''1d.According toMr.Scarola,ççlalnhourlyrateofeven$525isflolongerapremium rateintheUnitedStates
DistrictCourtforthe Southern D istrictofFlorida,andisavery conselwativeblended raterelative to Plaintiffs'law yers'experienceand credentials.''fJ.
The Sheriffargues in response thatM r.Scarola'saffdavitfailsto offerusefulevidence.
gDE 92,p.171.TheSheriffmaintainsthat::$525isastaggeringhourlyrate,higherthanistypically
awardedintheSouthFloridam arketfornon-classactioncivilrightslawsuits.Counselprovideno basisforsuchahighhourlyrateforeachattorney.''Id atp.8.TheSheriffhasfiledtheDeclaration
ofValentinRodriguez,Esq.(DE 92-52tosupportitsposition.Afterestablishinghisexpertise,M r.
Rodriguez opinesthat,(dthe blended rate of$525 is nota faircalculation ofhow Plaintiffs'
attorneysshouldbecompensated.''1d.at!23.
A fter carefulreview ofthe papersand in lightofthe Court'sbw n experience,the Court
rejectsPlaintiffs'suggestionofapplyingablendedrateof$525perhourtoeachattorney.SeeFJW
Tactical,LLC v.Producdve Prod.Enten,LLC,N o.15-CIV -61741,2018 W L 3110799,at*10
(S.D.Fla.Apr.11,2018),reportandrecommendationadoptedsubnom.TYR Tactical,LLC v. ProtectiveProd.Enterprises,LLC,No.15-CV-61741,2018W L 3109624 (S.D.Fla.Apr.30,

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 8 of 29
2018),amende4 No.15-CV-61741,2018 W L 2672391(S.D.Fla.June 5,2018)(rejecting a blended rate of$525);see also Hermosilla,2011 W L 9364952,at*12 (explaining thata $500-$600hourlyrateisttextraordinary''in South Floridamarket).TheCourtdoesnotbelievea
blendedrate isfairorappropriatein thiscase.A blended rateisespecially inappropriatein acase likethisonew heretheattorneyshavevery differentlevelsofexperienceand very differentlevels of expertise in civilrights and class action litigation.The Courtfnds itm ore appropriate to
i
determ ine thereasonablehourly rateforeach attorney than to apply a blended rate.Even though this individual approach is m ore tim e-consum ing and labor-intensive for the Court, it is, nonetheless,necessary to fairly determ ineareasonablehourlyrateforPlaintiffs'counsel.Thus, the Courtwillconsidereach attorney in turn.
4. Plaintiffs'C ounsels'R easonableH ourlv R ates Plaintiffsare represented bythree 1aw tqnns:Cohen M ilstein,theH um an RightsDefense Center,and the LegalA id Society ofPalm Beach County in thiscase.Each ofthethree entities separately billed forPlaintiffs'legalw ork,and each entity isseparately discussed below .
a. C ohen M ilstein Attornevs
TheodoreJ.Leopold,Esq.,ofCohenM ilstein filed aDeclaration (DE 87-3)tosupport Plaintiffs'M otion.Plaintiffsareseekingablendedrateof$525perhourforM r.Leopold,DianaL.
M artin,Esq.,andAdam J.Langino,Esq.,whiletheyareseekingarateof$200perhourforTatum
W hiddon,aparalegalatthetlrm.(DE 87,p.16;DE 87-3,p.6q.
The SheriffcontendsthatM r.Leopold'sspecialized know ledgeand experiencew ith class actionsw as(çnotneeded''in this case.1d.atp.14.The Sheriff also arguesthatM r.Leopold's supelwision of other attorneys w as not required in this case because attom eys Duncan and N eelakantaw erealready supervisingtheattorneys.1d.atp.14.ln sum ,the SheriffassertsthatM .r.
8

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 9 of 29
Leopold'sspecialized experiencewasnotrequiredforanyofthetaskshecarriedoutinthiscase. Id.atp.15.TheSheriffalso assertsthatM r.Langino w asdoing m uch ofthesam ew ork asother attorneysin the case.fJ.W ith regard to M s.M artin,hearguesthatherspecialized know ledge of classactionsand appellate issuesw asunnecessary in thiscase.f#.atp.16.TheSheriffm aintains thatCohen M ilstein hasnotprovidedproofofthe hourly ratetheattorneysbillapaying clientor the hotlrly rate they have been awarded by any court.1d.According to the Sheriff,a more reasonablehourlyrateforeach oftheCohenM ilsteinatlorneysis$295.1d.TheSheriffhasfiled
theDeclarationofValentinRodriguez,Esq.gDE 92-51,whoopinesthattheappropriatehotlrlyrate forM r.Leopold,M r.Langino,andM s.M artinis$295perhour,andtheappropriatehourlyratefor paralegalW hiddonis$100perhour.Id.at!24.
In reply,Plaintiffs argue thatM r.Rodriguez's fee declaration m akes broad conclusory
opinionsand(tseekstodim inishesgsic)thevaluegsicjnon-profitorlegalâidlawyerscanseekin civilrightsactions.''(DE 98,p.14).Plaintiffscontend thatMr.Leopold Stprovided strategict
discretionandw isecounselbaseduponhism any yearslitigatingcom plex classactionsthatshould
be compensated ata rate consistentwith his experience (which would reasonably exceed $800/hour).''f#.atp.17.PlaintiffsalsoarguethatattorneysM artinandLanginotthavesignificant
classaction experienceand w orked to perfectPlaintiffs'action forclasstreatm entfrom theirlitial stagesofthelitigation tluoughitsconclusion.''f#.atpp.17-18.Finally,withregardtoparalegal
W hiddon,Plaintiffsassertthatanhourlyrateof$200perhourisconsistentwithotheropinionsin thisdistrictand thattheSheriffhasprovided no legalauthority forhissuggested rateof$100per
hour.1d.atp.18. TheCourtw illnow considereach ofthethree Cohen M ilstein attorneysandtheparalegal
irlttlrll.

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 10 of 29
M r.Leopold M r.Leopold is a partner at Cohen M ilstein and a m em ber of the firm 's Executive
Committee.(DE 87-3,p.21.Hehasbeenpracticinglaw forover30yearsandhastriedcomplex
law suitsthroughoutthe country.1d.M r.Leopold has been consistently recognized by leading peer-review edpublications.fJ.H electuresfrequentlyonvariouslegalissues,hasauthored several legal publications, and has earned Florida Bar Civil Trial Certification. Id. Upon careful consideration ofa1loftherelevantfilingsandbased on itsow n independentexperience,theCourt
finds thatan hotlrly rate of $500 is reasonable forM r.Leopold in this case.SeeTillman v.
Advanced Pub.Safety Inc.,No.15-CV-81782,2018W L 5768570,at*4 (S.D.Fla.Nov.2, 2018),report.andrecommendationadopte4 No.15-81782-C1V,2018W L 6424899 (S.D.Fla. Nov.21,2018)(tinding a rate of$500 reasonable foran attorney with over30 years of experience);Martinv.CreativeMgmt.Grp.,Inc.,No.10-23159-C1V,2014W L 11804564,at*2 (S.D.Fla.Jan.23, 2014);Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prod. Grp., LLC,No. 16-80076-CIV,2018W L 2460295,at*5(S.D.Fla.Apr.25,2018),reportandrecommendation adopte4 No.9:16-CV-80076,2018W L 2446196 (S.D.Fla.M ay 31,2018)(finding $500per hourreasonableforleadcounselandpartnerwhohaspracticed1aw forover30years).
M r.Lancino M r.Langino isofcounselatCohen M ilstein and isa m em berofthefirm 'sCom plex Tort
Litigationpracticegroup.(DE 87-3,p.2j.Hehastriedmorethan20jurytrialcasesandhasbeen
consistently recognized by leading peer-review ed publications.1d.at pp.2-3.M r.Langino is t
M artindale-H ubbellA V rated.Id.atp.3.H ehasbeen practicing 1aw forapproxim ately 13 years. 1d.atpp.3,52.Upon caref'ulconsideration ofa11of the relevantfilings and based on its ow n
independentexperience,theCourtfipdsthatanhourlyrateof$375isreasonableforM r.Langino
10

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 11 of 29

in this case.

M s.M artin
M s.M artin isofcounselatCohen M ilstein and isamem berofthefirm'sCatastrophic

lnjury& W rongfulDeath,ConsumerProtection,M anagedCareAbuse,andUnsafe& Defective Productspracticegroups.(DE 87-3,p.3).Shefocusesherpracticeonappellatelitigationandtrial
support.1d.M s.M artin hasw ritten nlim erouslegalarticles and hasbeen recognized by leading

peer-reviewedpublications.ld atpp.4,60-61.Shehaspracticed1aw forapproximately 17years.

1d atp.57.Upon carefulconsideration of a11ofthe relevantfilings and based on its own

independentexperience,theCourtfindsthatanhourlyrateof$400isreasonableforM s.M artinin

this case.

M s.W hiddon Tatum W hiddon is a paralegalatCohen M ilstein and a m em berofthe finu's Com plex

TdalLitigationpracticegroup.(DE 87-3,p.4j.Uponcaref'ulconsiderationofa11oftherelevant
tilingsandbasedonitsownindependentexperience,theCourtfindsthatanhourlyrateof$150is

reasonableforparalegalW hiddoninthiscase.SeeFreestreamAircrajtUSALtd.v.Chowdly,No.

16-CV-81232,

W L 4785458, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017) (finding ,a

paralegal'shourlyrateof$150tobereasonable);BrownJordanlnternational,lnc.,r.Carmicle,

No.14-60629-CV,2017W L5633312,at*6(S.D.Fla.Aug.7,2017),reportandrecommendation
adoptedsub.nom.BrownJordan Intl,Inc.v..Carmicle,No.0?14-CV-60629,2017 W L 5632811

(S.D.Fla.Aug.22,2017)(reducingparalegal'shourlyratefrom $190.00to$175.00);HPC US
Fund J f.#. Wood,2016 W L 7636373,at*2 (S.D.Fla.Apr.22,201à) (reducing
paralegal'shourlyratefrom $150to$125).

11

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 12 of 29
b. TheH um an R ightsD efenseC enterA ttornevs
Sabarish P.Neelakanta,Esq.,filed a Declaration (DE 87-11in supportofPlaintiffs'
M otion.A ccording to the D eclaration and to theM otion,Plaintiffsare seeking ablended rateof
$525perhourforM r.Neelakanta,DanielM arshall,Esq.,andM asimbaM utam ba,Esq.,whilethey areseekingarateof$200perhourforKathyMoses,aparalegal.gDE 87,p.16;DE87-1,p.6,101.
TheSheriffcontendsthatM r.N eelakanta,M r.M arshall,andM r.M assim bahavefailed to
provideanyproofofthehourlyratetheyhavebeenawardedinthepast.(DE92,p.11).According
totheSheriff,hehasdiscoveredthatM r.N eelakantawasawardedarateof$230ina2015Eastern DistrictofVirginiacase.1d.TheSheriffhasalsoidentifedcaseswhereM r.N eelakantarequested
low erratesforhim selfand theotherattorneysandparalegal,butthecourtsin thosecaseshavenot yetm adeadecisionregardingfees.JJ.atpp.11-12.M ostrecently,intheApril2019caseofPrison
LegalNewsv.Inch,CaseNo.4:12-cv-239-M W /CAS (N.D.Fla.),M r.Neelakanta soughtan
hourly rate of$425,M r.M arshallsoughtan hourly rate of$375,and M r.M utamba soughtan hourlyrateof$295.f#.atp.12.TheSheriffrecom mendsthatM r.Neelkanta'sratebereducedto $400 perhotlr,M r.M arshall's and M r.M utamba'srates be reduced to $295 perhour,and paralegalM oses'ratebereducedto$100p8rhour.1d.atpp.12-13.
TheSheriffhasfiledtheDeclarationofValentinRodriguez,Esq.(DE 92-5)tosupportits
position.M r.Rodriguezbelievesthattheappropriatehourly rateforM r.Neelakantais$400per hour,the appropriate hourly rate forM r.M artin and M r.M utam ba is $295 perhour,and the appropriatehourlyrateforparalegalM osesis$100perholzr.Id at!24.
/
In reply, Plaintiffs argue that M r.Rodriguez's fee declaration should not be given
considerationbytheCourt.(DE 98,p.14j.Plaintiffsnextarguethatthethreeothercasesinwhich
the H um an R ights D efense Center requested particular hourly rates çthave no bearing on the 12

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 13 of 29
prevailingm arketratethatshould beaw arded in theSouthernD istrictofFlorida.Indeed thesefee
petitionswerepredicatedonthemarketratesuniquetothosejtuisdictions.''1d.atp.16.Plaintiffs
alsopointoutthat,whileM r.Neelakantam ayhavesought$425perhourinPrisonLegalNewsv. lnch,PlaintiffsSçprofferthatablendedrateof$525/110urasanaverageormiddlepointbetweenthe
relativeexperienceand contributionsofthe law yersengaged in thecase atbaristhebetterm etric for determ ining the hpurly rate.'' 16l Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the hourly rates
recommendation inPrisonLegalNewsv.InchforDanM arshall($475.00/hour)andM asimba M utama($295/hour)areonlyinstructivetotheextentthattheCoul'telectstoforegotheblended
ratecalculation.Otherthan M r.M utam ba.theseratesarestillhigherthan D efendants'proposal.''
The Courtnotesthat,outofa11ofthecasescited by the Sheriff,theonly casethatisfrom thisCircuitand isparticularly helpfulin bothtem poralandgeographicalproxim ity isPrisonLegal
Newsv.Inch,whichisattachedtotheSheriff'sResponseasExhibitD (DE 92-42.Inthatcase,on April12,2019,intheNoryhernDistrictofFlorida,theplaintiffsoughtanhourlyrateof$425for M r.Neelakanta,$475forMr.M arshall,$295forM r.M utamba,and$160forparalegals.(DE 92-4,p.15j.W hiletherehasbeennoOrderrulingontheappropriatehourlyratesatthispoint,itis
beneficialfortheCourtto seetheratestheattorneysrequested on an individualbasisintthatcase. TheCoul'tw illnow considereach ofthethreeH um anR ightsD efenseCenterattorneysand
theparalegalin t'urn. M r.N eelakanta
M r.N eelakanta,the litigation directorand generalcounselfortheH um an RightsD efense
Center,hasbeenpracticinglaw for13years.(DE 87-1,p.2).Hehasbeenleadcotmselincivil
rightscasesin 15 statesand alm ostexclusivelyfocuseshispracticeon crim inal,civil,and hum an 13

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 14 of 29

rightslaw .1d.M r.Neelakantaisalsoan activemem berofseveraldifferentlegalcommitteesand

associations,speaks atCLE's,conferencesand w orkshops concerning prisonerand dvilrights

litigqtion,and m akesfrequentm edia appearanceson theseissues.Id Upon caref'ulconsideration

of a11 of the

relevantfilings,based

on

theCourt'som

lindependentexperience ,

and

based

on

M

r.

Neelakanta'srelevantexpertise,theCourtfindsthatanhourlyrateof$400 isreasonableforM r.

N eelakantainthiscase.

M r.M arshall

M r.M arshall is a staff attorney for the H um an Rights D efense Center and has been

practicing1aw for17years.gDE 87-1,p.4).Mr.M arshallisaboardcertifiedcriminaltrial1aw
attorney andisaform erpublicdefenderwho servedas170th chiefofthefelonydivision andcounty courtresource director.1d.Upon carefulconsideration ofa11oftherelevantfilingsand based on

theCourt'sownindependentexperience,theCourttindsthatanhotlrlyrateof$400isreasonable
forM r.M arshallin thiscase.

M r.M utam ba

Mr.MutambaisastaffattorneyfortheHumanRightsDefenseCenter.(DE 87-1,p.5q.He
hasbeen practicing1aw since2012andpreviouslyw orked attw o civil1aw ûrm s.f#.Upon careful

considerationofa1loftherelevantflingsandbasedon theCourt'sown independentexperience,

theCourtfindsthatanhourlyrateof$295isreasonableforM r.M utambainthiscase.
M s.M oses

Ms.M osesistheseniorlitigationparalegalwiththeHumanRightsDefenseCenter.(DE 87-3,p.5).Sheholdsabachelor'sdegreeinjournalism andanassociate'sdegreeinparalegal
studies.f#.Upon carefulconsideration ofal1oftherelevantfilingsandbased on theCourt'sown independentexperience,theCourtfindsthatanhourlyrateof$150isreasonableforM s.M osesin

14

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 15 of 29

this case.

l
c. L egalAid Societv Attornevs

M elissa D uncan,Esq.,of the LegalA id Society of Palm Beach County,Inc.,filed a

Declaration (DE 87-21insupportofPlaintiffs'M otion.AccordingtotheDeclarationandtothe
M otion,Plaintiffsare seeking a blended rate of$525 perhourforM s.Duncan and Danielle
Capitini,Esq.,whiletheyareseekingarateof$200perhourforTamm Coutee,aparalegal.(DE 87,p.16,.DE 87-2,p.5).
TheSheriffcontendsthatM s.DuncanprovidednoproofofthehourlyratetheLegalAid
attolmeyshavebeenawardedinthepast.gDE 92,p.13q.TheSheriffrepresentsthat,ina2015case againstthePalm BeachCounty SchoolBoard,M s.Duncanrequestedanhourlyrateof$250,and paralegalCouteerequestedanhourlyrateof$95.1d.TheSheriffassertsthatam orereasonable
hourlyrateforM s.Duncaninthiscaseis$350,andareasonablehourlyrateforparalegalCoutee in thiscase is$100.ld TheSheriffarguesthatM s.Capitini'stasksin thiscaseweretasksthat could havebeen com pleted byaparalegalandthatM s.Capitinihasvery littlelegalexperience.Id. atpp.13-14.AccordingtotheSheriff,amorereasonablehourlyrateforM s.Capitiniis$175,and dçthisisa generoushourly rateconsideringthiswasprobablyherfirstassignm entasalicensed

attorney,and she wasclearly learning.''f#.atp.14.
TheSheriffhasfiledtheDeclarationofValentinRodriguez,Esq.(DE 92-5)tosupporthis. position.M r.Rodriguez opines thatthe appropriate hourly rate for M s.Duncan is $350,the
appropriate hourly rate forM s.Capitiniis $175,and the appropriate hourly rate forparalegal

Couteeis$100perhour.f#.at!24.
In reply,Plaintiffsarguethata2015 setllem entletterdoesnotacm ally establish thatM s.
Dtmcan'smarketrateas$250perùour.(DE98,p.17q.AccordingtoPlaintiffs,Eo uncan'srelative

15

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 16 of 29
experienceandexpertiseineducation1aw andtheleadrolesheassumedinthiscaseshould,atthe very least,suggestan hourly rate analogousto attorney N eelakanta.''Id.Plaintiffs also contend that$175perhourisanunreasonably1ow marketrateforM s.Capitiniandthatsheisentitledtoa rate ofatleast$225perhoureven asatsrst-yearlaw yer.Id
The Courtwillconsidereach LegalA id Society attorney in turn. M s.Duncan
M s.DuncanisthesupervisingattorneyoftheEducationAdvocacyProjectoftheLegal AidSocietyofPalm BeachCounty,lnc.(DE 87-2,p.11.Shehasbeenpracticing1aw for15years
andhasw orked fortheLegalA id Society form orethan 14 years.f#.atp.2.H erpracticefocuses
onchildren'srightslaw,includingjuveniledelinquencyanddependency,aswellaseducationlaw.
fJ.M s.D uncan is a regularspeakeratlegaleventsregarding children's law and education.Id. U pon caref'ulconsideration ofa11ofthe relevantfilings,based on the Court's own independent experience,and based on M s.D uncan'srelevantexpertise,the Courtfindsthatan hourly rate of $400isreasonableforM s.Dtmcaninthiscase.
M s.Capitini
'M s.CapitiniisastaffatlorneyfortheLegalAidSociety.(DE 87-2,p.3).Shewasadmitted
totheFloridaB arin2018.16lUpon carefulconsideration ofa11oftherelevantfilingsand based On theCourt'sownindependentexperience,th:Courtfindsthatanhourlyrateof$200isreasonable forM s.Capitiniin thiscase.
M s.C outee
Tatum Coutee isaparalegalattheLegalAid Socie'ty.(DE 87-2,p.4!.Sheholdsa
bachelor'sdegree in English and hàs over 15 yearsofexperience asaparalegal,w ith a focusin
family,juvenileandeducationcases.Id Uponcaref'ulconsiderationofal1oftherelevantfilings
16

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 17 of 29
andbasedontheCourt'sownindependentexperience,theCourtfndsthatanhourlyrateof$150
isreasonableforparalegalCoutee in thiscase. 5. N um berofH oursR easonablv Expended
The Sheriff has review ed every tim e entry from each of Plaintiffs' attorneys and
paralegals,specificallystatedhisobjections,andexplainedhisobjections.(DE 92,Ex.G-Qq.He arguesthatm anyofthehourssoughtareexcessive,redundant,and/orulmecessary.(DE 92,p.21j.
M ore specifically,the Sheriffarguesthatm ultiple attorneysshould nothave billed forattending
depositionsandmeetingswithjuvenilesatthejailorforcompletingthesameprojectswithout
describing theirspecitic contributions.Id atpp.22-27.H e also contendsthattheattorneysbilled
excessivelyforemailexchangesandconferences.1d.atpp.27-28.AccordingtotheSheriftlm any
ofthetim eentriescontainvagueentriesandblockbilling.f#,atpp.28-29.Healsom aintainsthat Plaintiffscalm otrecoverforthetim e theirattorneysbilled com m unicating w ith potentialclients beforethefirstretainerW aSSigned 0n OraboutJanuary29,2018.Id.atpp.29-31.N ext,theSheriff assertsthatPlaintiffs calm otrecover attorneys'fees forhours spenton clericaland secretarial tasks.Id atpp.31-32.
ln their Reply,Plaintiffs first argue thatan across-the-board reduction,rather than an
hour-by-hourreview,isappropriateinacasesuchasthisone.(DE 98,p.5j.Theyhavecategorized theSheriffsspecificobjectionsandprovidedresponsestoeach inExhibits1-3.1d atpp.5-6.
A ccording to Plaintiffs,pre-suitactivities thatare litigation-related are recoverable.1d.atp.6. N ext,theyarguethatthe'yareentitledtoattorneys'feesforworkthatisreasqnable,necessary,and non-duplicative,andthefactthatm ultipleattorneysw orked on thiscasedoesnotm atteraslongas they w erenotunreasonably doingthesam ew ork.f#.atp.7.Plaintiffscontendthatattendanceby
multipleattorneysatthedepositionsandmeetingswithjuvenileswasnecessary andthatitwas
17

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 18 of 29
necessaryandreasonableformultipleatlorneystocontributetothesameprojects.1d atpp.7-10.
They also arguethatthe intem alemailexchangesand conferencesrelated to litigation strategy, experts,and discovery,orto discussionsw ith otherattorneysengaged in sim ilarlitigation,and, thus,the hotlrs billed forthe em ails and conferences are reasonable and recoverable.1d atpp. 10-11.Plaintiffsrepeatedlyem phasizethattheyhavealready cuttheirhoursby 10% to accountfor anydeûciencies.Id atp.11.Finally,Plaintiffsassertthattheirattorneys'tim eentriesareneither
vaguenorexcessiveandthattheirattom eys'10% billingjudgmentsufticientlyaccountsforany
clericaloradm inistrativetasks.1d.atpp.11-12. a.'R evisionsto A ttornevs'FeesRequested bv Plaintiffs
In theexhibitsto Plaintiffs'Reply,Plaintiffshavem odified the attorneys'fees they are .
seeking.TheyhavebothreducedsomeofthehourssoughtbasedonPlaintiffs'objectionsandalso addedadditionaltimeforreviewingPlaintiffs'objections,draftingtheresponsestotheobjections,
drafting theReply,and com m unicatingw ith co-cotm sel.Thus,theH um an RightsD efenseCenter
isnow claiming594.15attorneyhoursand28.10paralegalhours(DE 98-1,.p.3),theLegalAid
Society ofPalm B each County isnow claim ing 430.40 attorney hoursand 29.80 paralegalhotlrs
(DE 98-2,p.3),andCohenM ilsteinisnow claiming264.50attorneyhoursand68.25paralegal hotlrs(DE 98-3,p.3).
b. TheC ourt'sFindincsastotheN um berofH oursR easonablv Expended In orderto determ inethereasonablentlm berofhoursexpended by Plaintiffs'counsel,the
Courthascarefully reviewedtheparties'arguments,theSheriff'sobjectionsto thetime entries (DES92-7,92-8,92-9,92-10,92-11,92-12,92-13,92-14,92-15,92-16,and92-171,andPlaintiffs' responsestotheobjections(DES98-1,98-2,and98-3j.TheCout'twilladdresseachofthegeneral categoriesofobjectionsinturn.
18

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 19 of 29
First,itdoesappearthat,in theirannotatedbilling entriesattached to theirR eply,Plaintiffs
haveresolvedtheobjectionstoclericaltasks,blockbilling,andvaguebillingentries.Plaintiffs
havevoluntarily cuttheirtim eand/orhaveprovided f'urtherdetailfortheseentries. Second, the Sheriff is Sscorrect that tim e spent Clooking for and soliciting potential
plaintiffs'isnotcom pensable.Barnes,168 F.3d at436.In contrast,tim espentbeforethe form al
(
com m encem entoflitigation,onm atterssuch asattom ey-clientinterview sandinvestigation ofthe
case,iscompensable.''Floresv.fojtsTown VillasCondo.Ass'n,Inc.,No.17-20368-C1V,2017 (
W L 7792712, at *3 (S.D.Fla.Sept. 1,2017),reportand l-ecommendation adopte4 No. 1:17-CV-20368- , 2017 W L 7796111 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26j 2017 (citing Webbv.Bd ofEduc.,471U.S.234,250(1985).TheCotu'tnotesthatthereappearstobeamixof
com pensable and non-com pensablepre-litigation activitieslisted in theattorney billingentries.lt is im possible to the Courtto discern into w hich category som e of the billing entries fall.For
example,onNovember11,2017,M r.Neelakantabilledforçsgelmailstoandfrom M D re:Potential juvenileplaintiffsrepresentedbyPBC publicdefender'softsce.''gDE 98-1,p.9q.Similarly,on December13,2017,hebilledforStgmqeetingwithpotentialplaintiffsatPBCjailre:juveniles.''1d. atp.12.Theothera'ttolmeysinthecasesimilarlybilledformeetingwiihprospectiveplaintiffs.
See,e.g.,DE 98-2,p.10. Third, while the Court will not reduce the hours billed solely on the basis
thatm ultipletim ekeepersw ere involved,them ultipletim ekeepersare problem atic to the extent they appeared to have perform ed duplicative orexcessive w ork.See Tillm an v.Advanced Pub.
SJ.#@,Inc.,N(j.15-CV-81782,2018W L 5768570,at*7 (S.D.Fla.Nov.2,2018),reportand recommendationadopte4 No.15-81782-CIV,2018W L6424899(S.D.Fla.Nov.21,2018).This
issueofduplicativeorexcessivehoursisthem ostprolitscproblem in thebillingrecords.See,e.g.,
19

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 20 of 29

DE 98-1,p.18;DE 98-1,p.23;DE 98-2,p.19;D E 98-2,p.25;D E 98-3,p.8;DE 98-3,p.25.

Having considered each ofthedeficienciesin the billing recordsand Plaintiffs'voluntary

reduction ofsom e ofthe hours,the Courtstillfinds itnecessary to reduce the num berofhottrs

billed.EsW hen adistrictcourtfindsthenum berofhoursclaim ed isunreasonablyhigh,thecourthas

twochoices;itmayconductanholzr-by-houranalysisoritm ayreducetherequestedhourswithan

across-the-boardcut.''Bivins,548F.3dat1350(citingforanger,10F.3dat783).Gtlrflrialcourts
need not,and indeed should not,becom e green-eyeshade accountants.The essential goal in

shiftingfees(toeitherparty)istodoroughjustice,nottoachieveauditingperfection.Sotrial
courtsm aytakeintoaccounttheiroverallsensrofasuit,andm ayuseestimatesincalculatingand

allocatinganattorney'stime.''Foxv.Vice,563U.S.826,838(2011)(citingHensley,461U.S.at 437).Hem,theCourtrejectsPlaintiffs'suggestionthatthebillablehoursbecutby10%.TheCourt alsomjectsDefendant'spositionthatPlaintiffs'billablehoursshouldbecutby50%.Instead,the
CourtfndsitappropriatetoreducePlaintiffs'counsels'hourswith an across-the-boardcutand

reducethehoursby 20% . 6. Calculation ofA ttornevs'FcesAw ard
In thebelow chart,theCourthasreduced eachti> ekeeper'shoursby20% 1. The Coul'thas

also reduced each hourly rate,asdiscussed above.

Tim ekeeper

H ourly R ate H oursR ecoverable R ecoverableFees

SabarishNeelakanta

$400

MasimbaM utamba . $295

414.4(20% of518) 11.4(20% of14.25)

$165,760.00 ' $3,363.00

1Foreachtimekeeper,theCourtisreducingtheEçrevisedhoursbasedonDefendants'objections''listedbyPlaintiffs intheattachmentstotheirReplyEDES98-1,982,and98-31,TheCoul'tisalsoreducingby20% theadditionalhours àpentreviewingtheSheriff'sobjections,draAingthereplybriet drahingtheresponsestotheobjections,and
comm unicatingwith co-counsel.ld
20

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 21 of 29

DanM arshall

$400

KathyV oses

$150

M elissaDuncan

$400

DanielleCapitini

$200

Tatum Coutee

$150

Theodore Leopold

$500

DianaM artin

$400

Adam Langino

$375

Tatum W hiddon

$150

T O TAL

9.52(20% of11.90) $3,808.00'

19.22(20% of24.10) $2,892.00

316.76(20% of395.95) $126,704.00

18(20% of22.50)

$3,600.00

17.28(20% of21.60) $2,592.00

20,2(20% 0625.25) $10,100.00

126.8(20% of158.5) $50,720.00

38.4(20% of48)

$14,400.00

46.8(20% of58.50) $7,020.00

$390,959,00

B. Costs
lntheirM otion,Plaintiffsseekcostsintheamountof$39,296.78fortravelexpenses,filing
andservicefees,legalresearch,depositions,printing,andexpertwitnessfees.gDE 87,p.211.
5
Plaintiffs are seeking those costsundersection 1988 and section 12205 oftheA DA .f#.In their Reply,Plaintiffsconcedethattheirtaxable costsin theamountof$8,668.77 areprocedurally
time-barred.gDE 98sp.191.Theyarestillseekingnon-taxablecostsandlitigationexpbnsesinthe
amountof$28,198.44.Id.atp.21.
Section 1988provides:Sûgijnanyactionorproceedingtoenfbrceaprovisionofgsection 19811...thecourt,initsdiscretion,mayallow theprevailingparty,otherthantheUrlitedStates,a reasonableattonzey'sfeeaspartofthecosts.''42U.S.C.j1988(b).M oreimportantly,42U.S.C.j
12205 çdpçrm its a prevailing party in an A DA action to recover its attorney's fees,costs,and litigation expenses.''Kennedy v.Bonom Enterprises,Inc.,N o.18-CV -62175,2019 W L 1429513,
at*1-2(S.D.Fla.M ar.29,2019)9seealso42U.S.C.j12205.Specifically,j12205provides:
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Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 22 of 29
Inanyactionoradm inistrativeproceedingcom mencedpursuanttothischapter,the courtoragency,in its discretion,m ay allow theprevailing party,otherthan the U nited States,areasonableattorney'sfee,including litigation expenses,and costs, and the U nited States shall be liable for the foregoing the sam e as a private individual. ltappearsbased onthetilingsthatthepartiesultim ately prim arily rely ontheAD A statutein their argum entsregarding costs. Here, Plaintiffs.entered into a settlem ent w ith D efendants. Thus, Plaintiffs are the
prevailing party.SeeAm.DisabilityAss'n,Inc.v.Chmielarz,289 F.3d 1315,1321(11th Cir. 2002).The Sheriffdoesnotseem to dispute Plaintiffsentitlementto non-taxable costs and
litigation expensespursuantto section 12205,butratherhedisputestheam ountofthosecostsand
expenses.(DE92,p.35j.Hedoesnotobjectto$133.31ofthecosts,however.1d.
1. CostsforVideo-R ecording.D eposition Exhibits.and D uplication C osts
Plaintiffs are seeking $2,097.55 in deposition video-recording fees and $348.40 in
deposition exhibitsandduplicationcosts.(DE 98,p.1% .TheSheriffobjectstothesecostsas untimely becausehebelievesthey fallwithin taxablecostsunder 19U.S.C.j 1920,and,as explainedabove,thepartiesagreethatanytaxablecostsareprocedurallytime-barred.gDE 92,pp. 33-351.Plaintiffsarguethatthesecostsarenon-taxablebecausetheyare(çextras''thataregenerally nottaxable.(DE 98,p.191.
ûsl-flheextraservicesprovidedbythestenographerarerecoverableasnon-taxablecosts
undertheSCA .''Brow nJordanInt'l,Inc.v.Carm icle,N o.14-60629-CV ,2017,W L 5633312,at*8
(S.D.Fla.Aug.7,2017),reportand recommendation adopte4 N0.0:14-CV-60629,2017 WL 5632811(S.D.Fla.Aug.22,2017)(citingChov.Koam Med.Servs.P.C.,524F.Supp.2c1202,212 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (where plaintiff prevailed on federal statute that provided for recovery
ofnon-taxablecosts,courtaw arded com bined taxable and non-taxablecostsfor.cotuierservices,
72

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 23 of 29
reproduction,telephone,facsimile,postage,deposition services,deposition/hearing transoripts,
anddatabaselegalservices);seealsoBvsAcquisitionCo.,LLC v.Brown,2015W L 12921971,at *9 (S.D.Fla.Aug.5,2015)(courtawarded asnon-taxablecojtsthoseexpensesthatwerenot recoverableastaxablecoststmderj 1920).Inlightoftherelevantcaselaw,theCourtfindsit appropriateto awardPlaintiffsthe$348.40incun'edbytheircounselfol'deposition exhibitsand
outsideduplioating asnon-taxable expenses.
W ithregardtothe$2,097.55indepositionvideo-recordingfees,therelevant1aw isGtgiln orderforavideodepositiontobetaxableg,)theprevailingpartymustshow whyitwasnecessary
to haveboth avideodepositionand atranscribeddepositionforuse in thecase.''Ow Buland v.
NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,No.17-24167-C1V,2019 W L 2254829,at *2 (S.D.Fla.Apr.29, 2019),reportand recommendationadopte4 No.17-CV-24167-PCH,2019 W L 2254703 (S.D. Fla.M ay20,2019);seealsoGeorgev.Fla.Dep'tofcorrections,No.07-80019-CIV,2008W L 2571348,at*7(S.D.Fla.M ay23,2008)(citationomitted).Inthispadicularcase,wherePlaintiffs
initially claim ed both transcription feesand video deposition courtreporterfeesascostsin their
'
M otion,Plaintiffsarticulated nobasisforclaim ing both setsoffees.Plaintiffslaterconceded that they areno longerentitled to recoverforthetranscriptcostsbecause theirrequestw asuntim ely.
gDE 98,pp.18-19j.Inlightoftheforegoing,theCourtdoesfindthatthevideocourtreporterfees
are non-taxàble costs thatPlaintiffscan recover.Therefore,the Courtw illaw ard Plaintiffsthe
$2,097.55indepositionvideo-recordingcosts.N otranscriptionfeesshallbeawarded.
2. C ostsforR esearch
The Sheriffcontendsthatthe $453.70 in research costs soughtby Cohen M ilstein are non-com pensable and thatthereisno evidencethatthelegalresearch w asconducted inreference
totheADA claim.(DE 92,p.362.Plaintiffsarguethatcomputerized legalresearch costsare
23

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 24 of 29
recoverableandthattheyhyveprovidedspecificinvoices,asrequired.gDE 98,p.20j.çt-f'heCourt
has discretion to determ ine w hether the cost of online legalresearch should be
recoverable.''Rubensteinv.Fla.Bar,No.14-CV-20786,2015W L 1470633,at*7(S.D.Fla.M ar. 31,2015),reportandrecommendation adopte4 No.14-C1V-20786,2015 W L 11216722 (S.D. Fla.Apr.22,2015);Gof clubsWwlyv.HostawayCorp.,2012W L2912709,*6(S.D.Fla.July 16,2012).TheCourtfindsthat,inthiscase,Plaintiffshavenotprovidedsufficientexplanationfor
the necessity orreasonablenessofthe research and have failed to establish any lirlk betw een the legalresearch and theA D A claim .Therefore,the Courtwilldeny thecost.
3. FeesforTravelA gent
TheSheriffobjectstothe$50infeesforuseofatravelagenttsastotallyunnecessaryand utterlyunreasonabletopassontotheDefendant.''(DE 92,p.361.IntheirReply,Plaintiffsagreeto excludethiscost.gDE 98,p.21q.Therefore,theCourtwillnotawardthe$50cost.
4. TravelTim eforA ttornev M artin
TheSheriffobjectstoDianaM atin'srequestforreimbursementfor$14.28incostsshe incurredfortravelto andfrom astatusconferenceonN ovem ber30th. gDE 92,p.36j.Accordingto
the Sheriff,no status conference took place on thatdate.Id Itis clear to the CourtthatM s. M artin'stravelexpensesw ereincurredtravelingtotheN ovem ber28,2018statusconference.The
t
Courtfindsthat$14.28 in costsshould beaw arded toPlaintiff. 5. C ostofM ealsServed atSettlem entConference
TheSheriffarguesthatCohen M ilstein cannotobtainreim bursem entfor$244.32in costs forprovidinglunch atthesettlem entconferencebecausem ealsarenotcom pensableandthecostis
(Gcompletelyttnreasonable.''(DE 92,p.371.AccordingtoPlaintiffs,theydidnotrequestthatlunch beprovided.f#.IntheirReply,Plaintiffsagreetoexcludethiscost.gDE 98,p.211.Therefore,the
24

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 25 of 29
Coul'twillnotawardthe$244.32cost.
6. ExpertW itnessFees
Plaintiffsareseekingreim bursementfora$6,842.40expertfeeforM r.LeanderParkerand
a$20,288.59expel'tfeeforDr.LouisKraus.(DE 92,p.37).AccordingtotheSheriff,thefeeshave
notbeen shown toberelated totheADA causeofactionand aretmreasonable.1d.The Sheriff subm itsthat,to the extentthe Courtdecidesagainsttotally excluding the fees,the ççexpertfees should be divided by 7,asthe cause ofaction underTitle11oftheA D A representsone ofthe 7 causesofacyion broughtby thePlaintiffs.''1d.atp.28.
Plaintiffsarguethattheexpertw itnessfeesarefullyrecoverableundertheA m ericansw ith
DisabilitiesActandthattheyhaveprovidedinvoicesforboth oftheirexperts.gDE 98,p.20q.
A ccording to Plaintiffs,$çD r.K rausprovided invaluabletestim ony and expertise on theim pactof solitary confinem entpoliciesand denialofspecialeducation servicesto disabled children,''w hile W arden LeanderParkertsprovided insightinto operationaland policy considerations w ithin the Jailconcerning accom modationsthatcanorshouldhavebeeninplacedfordealingwithchildren w ith disabilities.''Id. ln sum ,Plaintiffs assertthat both experts provided testim ony lldirectly applicabletothedisabledchildrenhousedattheJailandhow Defendants'policiesandpractices ran afoulofthe ADA.''f#.atp.21.Furtherm ore,according to Plaintiffs,there is Gtno legal
authoritysupportingDefendantsEsicqclaim thattheexpertfeesshouldbeparsedordividedby sevenrepresentingeach causeofaction.To thecontrary,suchparsinghave (sic)been strictly
precluded.''Id $&A prevailing A D A plaintiffm ay recoverexpertfees asa litigation expense.''H ansen v.
Deercreek Plaza,LLC,420 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1353 (S.D.Fla.2006) (citing fovell Chandler,303F.3d 1039,1058(9th Cir.2002));seealsoSierrav.JRF,Inc.,N o.16-62111-C1V,
25

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 26 of 29
2017W L 1929961,at*2(S.D.Fla.Jan.9,2017).CtA coul'tmayreduceanexpert'sfee,however,
wherethefeeisexcessive.''A ccess4All,Inc.v.A tl.H otelCondo.Ass'n,Inc., N o.04-61740-CIV ,
2006W L 8431482,at*7(S.D.Fla.Apr.27,2006)(citingAccessfortheDisable4 Inc.,v.CSM Props.P'shè.,2005W L 1528662,*2 (M .D.Fla.June25,2005)).Here,theCourtfindsthat
Plaintiffshave established thatthetwo expertw itnessesw ere relevantto Plaintiffs'AD A d aim . TheCotu'talso agreesw ith PlaintiffsthattheSheriffhascitedno authorityto supporthisassertion thattheexpertw itnessfeesshould bedivided by seven.
TheCourthasalsoreviewedthecostsincurredbyPlaintiffsforLeanderParker.(DE 87-3, p.126).M r.Parkerbilledatarateof$137.50andbilledatotalof29.8hoursfortasksincluding reviewing documents,taking ajailtour,participating in interviews,attending deposition,and participatinj in conferencecalls.1d.Healso charged forhistravel.1d.atpp.126,154-165.The
Courtfindsthatthe$6,842.40 in expertfeesincurredbyPlaintiffsforM r.LeanderParkerto be reasonable.
Dr.LouisKrauscharged $15,000 ($5,000 perday forthree days)forthreefu11days assistingwiththeconsentdecreeandconductinginterviewsinFlorida.(DE 87-3,pp.136,1391.
W henhebilledonanhourlybasis,Dr.Krausbilledatarateof$400.1d.atp.139.Hebilled 8.75 hoursfordocum entreview,phoneconsultations,and documentpreparation.1d.Dr.Krausalso
chargedforhistraveltoFlorida.(DE 87-3,pp.136,1392.TheCourtfindsthatthe$20,288.59in
expertfeesincurredby PlaintiffsforD r.K rausto bereasonable. TotalAw ard ofC osts
TheCourtwillaward Plaintiffsthefollowing costs:$133.31in tm-objectedto expenses,
$348.40fordeposition exhibitsandoutsideduplicating,$2,097.55in depositionvideo-recording fees,$14.28incostsforattorneyM artin'stravel,$6,842.40inexpertfeesforLeanderParker,and
26

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 27 of 29
the$20,288.59inexpertfeesforDr.Kraus.Thetotalcostsaw ardis$29,724.53. C.Post-iudem entInterest
Plaintiffsarestatutorily entitledtopost-judgmentinterestpursuantto 28U.S.C.j1961, Glwhichprovidesforintereston anym oneyjudgmentrecovered in districtcotu'tin acivilcase.'' G reatLakeslns.SE v.Aarvik,N o.18-CVL60705,2019 W L 224533.2,at*5(S.D.Fla.Mar. 2019),reportand recommendation adopte4 No.18-CV-60705,2019 WL 2245146 (S.D.Fla. M ar.29,2019).TheSupremeCourtandtheEleventhCircuithaveexplained,'Clwlhenadistrict courttaxescostsagainstalosingjarty,theawardofcostsbearsinterestfrom thedateofthe originaljudgment.''BanW tlanticv.BlytheEastmanPaineWebber,Inc.,12F.3d1045,1052(11th Cir.1994)(citingGeorgiaAss'nofRetardedCitizensv.McDaniel,855F.2d794,799(11th Cir. 1988)).Pursuanttosection 1961(a),courtsdeterminethepost-judgm entinterestbylookingtothe
Stw eekly average l-yearconstantm aturityTreasuryyield,aspublished bytheBoard ofG overnors
oftheFederalReserveSystem,forthecalendarweekprecedingl)thedateofthejudgment.''28 U.S.C.j1961(a);seealsoBanW tlantic,12F.3dat1052;US.S.E.C.v.Carrillo,325F.3d1268, 1271(11th Cir.2003).Plaintiffsshall,therefore,be awardedpost-judgmentinterestwhen the Courtentersajuctgm entonattorneys'feesandcosts.
D .FurtherBriefina on A pportionm ent TheSchoolBoardhasrequestedthatitbepermittedtoaddresstheissueofapportionm ent between the Sheriffand the SchoolBoard afterthe Courtnlled on the reasonableness ofthe
attolmeys'feesandcosts.(DE 93,pp.1-2).TheCourtwillprovidePlaintiffs,theSheriff,andthe SchoolBoardtheopportunitytoconferontheapportionmentissueandthen fileajointnotice statingeachparty'sposition.ThejointnoticeshallbefiledOnorbefpreOctober24,2019.
27

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 28 of 29
IV . C O N CLU SIO N Thisis a case where a11partiesw ere represented by excellent,ethical,and professional counsel.The Courtappreciates the efforts and hard w ork of allcounselin this im portantcase.
Plaintiffs'M otionsought$606,526.00inattorneys'fees,alongwith$39,296.78incosts,foratotal
amountsoughtof$645,822.78.(DE 87,p.7).The SheriffsResponse,which wasjoined and
adoptedbytheSchoolBoard,assertsthatPlaintiffsshouldbeawarded$260,690.50inattorneys'
feesand$131.33incosts,foratotalamotmtof$260,821.83.(DE 92,p.39j.Then,inPlaintiffs' Reply,Plaintiffsincreased theaward.soughtto$631,736.25in attorneys'feesand$30,644.39in costs,foratotalof$662,380.64.TheCoul'tdisagreeswithbothparties'positions.Plaintiffsseek
toom uch,and theSheriffsuggeststoo little. A ftervery carefully considering the parties'papers,the applicable law ,the Court's ow n
experience, and the entire docket in this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to
attorneys'feesin theamountof$390,959.00 and costsintheam ountof$29,724.53,foratotal awardof$420,683.53.lnreachingitsawardofattom eys'feesandcostsinthiscase,theCourthas
endeavored to be fair to a1l parties and their cotm selin determ ining a reasonable aw ard of attorneys'feesand costs.
In lightoftheforegoing,theCourtO RD ERS asfollow s:
1. Plaintiffs'VerifiedM otionforAttorneys'FeesandCosts(DE 87)isGRANTED IN
PA RT A N D D ENIED IN PA RT . Plaintiffs,H .C.,a m inor,butand through his parentand naturalguardian,Jelm y C .; M .F.,am inor,by and through hisparentand naturalguardian,A sisaRolle;and T.M ., by and through hisparentand nattlralguardian,Jessica Joinershallbe aw arded their attorneys'feesintheamountof$390,959.00andcostsintheam ountof$29,724.53,for
28

Case 9:18-cv-80810-WM Document 100 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2019 Page 29 of 29
atotalaward of$420,683.53,againstDefendantRickBradshaw,Palm Beach County
Sheriffand D efendantSchoolBoard ofPalm Beach County. 3. The partiesshallfile a JointN otice on orbefore October 24,2019,stating their
positions on apportionm ent of the attorneys' fees and costs between the two D efendants.
4. Thereafter,theCourtwillenterajudgmentastoattorneys'feesandcosts.
DO NE and O RD ER ED in Cham bersatW estPalm Beach,Palm Beach Cotm ty,Florida,
this10 ayofOctober,2019.
W ILLIA M M A T EW M AN U nited StatesM agistrateJudge
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