Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 7 Filed: 08/16/07 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila

)

Khoury and Sean Driscoll,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

) No. 07 CV 4369

-vs-

)

) (Judge Kennelly)

Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, )

)

Defendants.

)

AMENDED COMPLAINT
Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs file this amended complaint and, by counsel, allege as follows:
1. This is a civil action arising unde r 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
2. Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury and Sean Driscoll are residents of the Northern District of Illinoi s. As set out below with greater specificity, plaintiffs were each denied psychotropic me dication while confined at the Cook County Jail as a result of defendants' official policies. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a class.
3. Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County. The Sheriff is sued in his official capacity only; Cermak Health Services is a division of the Cook County Bureau of Health which is in turn a division of defendant Cook County.

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4. On or about September 27, 2005, plaintiff Parish was transferred to the Cook County Jail (“Jail”) from th e Illinois De partment of C orrections (“IDOC”). Parish had received psychotropic medication on a daily ba sis while confined at the IDOC and, on information and belief, the IDOC sent Parish to the Jail with a two week suppl y of medication.
5. Pursuant to the rules, regulations, a nd procedures of the defendants, the Parish did not receive his required psychotropic medication until sometime after June 26, 2006, when, as the direct an d proximate result of the wr ongful denial of essential medication, Parish attempted to harm himself by cutting his wrist.
6. On or about August 29, 2006, plaintiff Oats was admitted to the J ail as a pre-trial detainee; Oats remained at the Jail for about five months until he was released following his acquittal.
7. Oats informed the intake personnel at the Jail that he ha d been taking psychotropic medication for about two years; notwithstanding this information, Oats was not provided with his essential medication until about October 1, 2006.
8. As the dir ect and pr oximate result of the wrongful denial of essential medication, Oats be gan to m anifest symptoms of paranoia and ha d difficulty in cooperating with counsel and assisting in his defense.
9. On or about November 5, 2005, plaintiff Leila Khoury was admitted to the Jail as a pre-trial detainee; Khoury has long standing mental health problems. Since 2001, Khoury had been taking a specific regiment of psychotropic medications prescribed by her psychiatrist to treat her condition. She remained in the Jail until January 3, 2006, when she

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was enlarged on bond. 10. Khoury came to the Jail following a psyc hiatric hospitalization at Christ
Hospital; following her admissi on to the Jail, Khoury c ontinuously informed the defendants that under the direction of her psychiatrist, she was required to take a specific regiment of psychotropic medication daily. Notwithstanding this information, Khoury was never provided with appropriate medication while at the Jail.
11. As the dir ect and pr oximate result of the wrongful denial of essential medication, Khoury had frequent bouts of crying, screaming, fighting, and other hysterical behavior.
12. On or about August 18, 2005, plaintiff Sean Driscoll was admitted to the Jail as a pre-trial detainee; Drisco ll remained at the Jail until Au gust 25, 2005, when he was enlarged on bail.
13. On admission to the Jail, Driscoll informed the intake personnel at the Jail that he had been taking psyc hotropic medication for severe anxiety disor der and that he required a daily dose of m ethadone. Notw ithstanding this inform ation, Driscoll never received the psychotropic medication and received methadone on only one occasion.
14. As the direct and pr oximate result of the wrongf ul denial of e ssential medication, Driscoll suffered extreme withdraw al symptoms and experienced great pain and suffering.
15. Plaintiffs have each been de prived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Cons titution of the United States as the result of the policies and procedures of the defendants which fail to ensure that inmates admitted to the Jail continue

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to receive their prescription medication. Th e defendants have adopted these policies in
deliberate indifference to the se rious health needs of persons entrusted to their care and
have caused damage to plaintiffs and others similarly situated.
16. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for the following class:
All persons confined at the Cook Count y Jail on and after August 3, 2005 w ho provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and w ho was not provide d with that m edication within 24 hour s thereafter.
17. Plaintiffs demand trial by jury.
Wherefore plaintiffs request that the Cour t order that this case may procee d as a
class action, that appr opriate damages be awarded to the individual plaintiff and to each
unnamed member of the proposed class, and that the Court award costs and fees pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
/s/ Thomas G, Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, IL. 60643 (773) 233-7900 Kenneth N. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 1240 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Attorneys for the Plaintiff

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 7 Filed: 08/16/07 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of August, 2007, I electronically ﬁled the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notiﬁcation of such ﬁling to the following: Daniel J. Fahlgren, Ass’t State’s Atty, 500 Daley Center, Chicago, IL 60602, and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non CM/ECF participants: none.
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman ______________________ Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC Number 08830399 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 1240 Chicago, IL 60604-2430 (312) 427-3200 (phone) (312) 427-3930 (fax) knf@kenlaw.com (email)

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 32 Filed: 05/21/08 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:90

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL PARISH, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) No. 07 C 4369 ) ) Judge Matthew F. Kennelly ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendant, the SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, through his attorney, RICHARD A. DEVINE, State's Attorney of Cook County, by his Assistant State's Attorney, Dan iel J. Fahlgren, moves this Honorable Court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. In support of this motion Defendant states the following.
INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs bring this civil rights action against The Sheriff of County in his official capacity, and against Cook County based on the policies of Cermak Health Services—the medical facility for the Cook County Jail , pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 2) Plaintiffs, who were pretrial detainees at the Cook County Jail at various times and for various periods of time, sue on behalf of many other persons who were admitted

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 32 Filed: 05/21/08 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:91
into the Cook County jail during a two year period. (Second Amended Complaint, pp. 2 et seq.) These present and former detainees seek to have this court certify this as a class action. (Id. p.15)
Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the policies and practices of Cermak Health Ser vices for screening and examining new detainees, each of them suffered a violation of their constitutional rights. Specifically they allege that acting pursuant to Cermak policies, Medical personnel, who are referred to in the Second Amended Complaint as “ Psych workers,” medical technicians” and “physicians,” in the jail refused them or delayed providing prescription medications and refused or delayed prescribing for them psychotropic medications. (Second Amended Complaint, generally). There is no allegation in the complaint that correctional officers or deputy Sheriffs or of any official from Cook County Jail who is not medical personnel from Cermak committed or omitted any act in violation of any Plaintiff’s constitutional rights .
Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint against him because Plaintiffs have no t alleged any policy for which he is responsible that may have caused them or other unnamed persons to suffer a violation of his or her constitutional rights. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable Section 1983 claim against him in his official capacity, and the Sheriff should be dismissed as a defendant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of complai nts that do not state an actionable claim. The Seventh Circuit Court reaffirmed the "liberal system of notice pleading" in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McCormick v. City of Chicago, et al., 230 F. 3d 319, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25686 (7th Cir. 2000) citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1161 (1993) However, a
2

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court is not required to "'ignore any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's claim...'" Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 341 (7th Cir. 1990), quoting Gray v. Dane County, 854 F.2d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1988). Moreover, a court should not strain to find inferences not plainly apparent from the face of the complaint. Coates v. Illinois St. Bd. of Ed., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff may not avoid dismissal by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts that fail to outline the basis of his claims. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1991).
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged a Section 1983 Official Capacity Claim Against The Sheriff of Cook County
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint does not state a Section 1983 claim against the Sheriff of Cook County in his official capacity, and should be dismissed. Actions brought against government officers in their official capacities are actually claims against the government entity for which the officers work. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). It is well settled that governmental employees cannot be held liable in their official capacities in a Section 1983 action unless a plaintiff can show that he suffered injuries of a constitutional magnitude as the result of an official custom, policy or practice . Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036 (1977). The Monell court rejected a theory of de facto respondeat superior liability on governmental entities. Id. at 2037.
Courts have identified three instances in which a municipality or official can be said to have violated the rights of a person because of its policy: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation, (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law,” or (3) an allegation that the constitutional
3

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injury was caused by a person with "final policymaking authority." Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 1994)(citatio ns omitted). More importantly, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipality, through its own deliberate conduct, was the moving force behind the alleged injury. County Comm'r of Bryan County v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
In Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.2d 151, 153 -54 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit stated:
“Allegations in a complaint are binding admissions...and admissions can of course admit the admitter to the exit from the federal courtho use...So when as in Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp. 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994) the complaint names an official in his official capacity (making it a suit against the office, that is, the governmental entity itself) without a clue as to what the authority of the office is or what policy of the office the plaintiff believes violated his rights, the suit is properly dismissed on the pleadings.” ( citations omitted).
Although a plaintiff is not held to a heightened standard of pleading in order to state a Monell claim, his official capacity claim must at a minimum include allegations in conclusory language that a policy existed, buttressed by facts alleging wrongdoing by the governmental entity. McCormick v. City of Chicago, et al., 230 F. 3d 319, 325 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25686,**16 (7th Cir. 2000).
Even applying the liberal notice pleading standard, Plaintiffs ' allegations are insufficient to state an official capacity claim against the Sheriff of Cook County. Plaintiffs allege that medical personnel provided inadequate or delayed medical treatment in the Cook County jail as a result of the policies of Cermak Health Services in prescribing and providing medication for the putative class members. However, Plaintiffs do not allege that the inadequate medical treatment
4

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 32 Filed: 05/21/08 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:94
policies were those of the Sheriff. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Sheriff had any role in formulating Cermak policies for assessing the psychological health of inmates or for prescribing medication for inmates. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff’s policies caused them to receive inadequate or delayed medical care.
Cermak Health Services of Cook County is a department of the Cook County Bureau of Public Health, and not a department under the control of the Sheriff of Cook County. Cermak has responsibility for providing health care for those detained in the Cook County Jail. The quality of healthcare provided by professionals employed at Cermak Health Services has nothing to do with the § 1983 liability of the defendants Sheriff of Cook County, as Cermak Health Service is a legal entity distinct from that of Defendants. Nyberg v. Puisis, 93 C 6602, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14004; 55 ILCS 55-37001 (N.D. Ill, J. Plunkett).
There is no allegation in the complaint that correctional officer s or deputy Sheriffs or of any official from Cook County Jail who is not medical personnel from Cermak committed or omitted any act in violation of any Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs’ allegations are not sufficient to state a Monell policy claim against the Sheriff of Cook County. Plaintiffs fail to allege that a policy, custom, or practice for which the Sheriff of Cook County is responsible was a cause or contributing cause for their alleged constitutional injury. Accordingly, under Monell, McCormick, Baxter by Baxter and their progeny, Plaintiffs fail to state an official capacity claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Sheriff, and he should be dismissed from this case.
CONCLUSION
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Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 32 Filed: 05/21/08 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:95

For the foregoing reasons, the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed against defendant Sheriff of Cook County for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respectfully Submitted, RICHARD A. DEVINE State’s Attorney of Cook County

By:

s/Daniel J. Fahlgren

Daniel J. Fahlgren

Assistant State’s Attorney

Torts and Civil Rights Litigation Section

500 Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 603-3304

6201163

6

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 58 Filed: 10/24/08 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:898

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL PARISH, CURTIS L. OATS,

)

LEILA KHOURY, SEAN DRISCOLL, CARLA )

LOFTON, ROY CLEAVES, LISA BROWN, )

DAN TAYLOR, DEAN MILLER, KEVIN

)

SANDERS, STACEY CLARK, and

)

CARLOTTE WATSON,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and

)

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 07 4369

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Michael Parish and eleven other plaintiffs have sued the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants maintained a policy or practice of deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs and thus violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights while they were confined at the Cook County Jail (CCJ). Plaintiffs have moved to certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion
Facts The Court takes the following facts from plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have implemented a policy of denying or delaying necessary prescription medication to detainees at CCJ. The policy allows medical

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technicians to deny various kinds of necessary prescribed medication solely on the basis of a “brief and cursory interview,” without inquiring into a detainee’s medical history and without consulting a physician. 2nd Am. Compl., ¶¶ A.c., B.c.
Plaintiffs divide their allegations into two general categories: psychotropic medication and non-psychotropic medication. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ policy allows medical technicians to deny prescribed psychotropic medication to detainees after a short interview. Instead, these detainees are routinely given anti-depressants, which are less costly than the psychotropic medications. Several of the plaintiffs reported suffering behavioral problems while on anti-depressants that they had not experienced while taking their prescribed psychotropic medication.
With respect to detainees who have been prescribed non-psychotropic medication, plaintiffs allege that medical histories are taken in overcrowded areas with little privacy. They also allege that the defendants’ policy allows medical technicians to discontinue prescribed medications required to prevent serious injury or death. The policy also prohibits physicians at the jail from prescribing medication for chronic pain. Finally, plaintiffs allege that there is no speedy or efficient procedure that allows a detainee to see a physician after a medical technician has denied any form of medication.
Parish alleges that he was transferred to the jail on September 27, 2005 from the Illinois Department of Corrections, where he had received psychotropic medication on a regular basis. Although he arrived at the jail with the medication, the medical technician concluded that Parish should no longer receive the psychotropic medication. Parish tried to obtain the medication for nine months. After an unsuccessful suicide attempt,
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Parish was finally prescribed the medication. Parish was released in 2006 but returned to the CCJ in 2007. Although Parish informed the medical technician of his need for psychotropic mediation, the medical technician again denied him the medication. Parish tried repeatedly to see a physician. Only after another unsuccessful suicide attempt was he finally permitted to see a physician who prescribed psychotropic medication.
The remaining plaintiffs all allege that at their intake interviews , they informed medical technicians of their condition and their prescribed medications. Nevertheless, the medical technicians denied them medications prescribed for conditions including mental illness, severe chronic pain, enlarged prostate, heart disease, acid reflux, congestive heart failure, asthma, hepatitis C, and a surgical wound. As a result, the plaintiffs suffered a variety of adverse consequences, including behavioral problems, severe pain, and an infection requiring hospitalization.
Plaintiffs filed suit in August 2007. They contend that defendants implemented a policy or practice at the CCJ of denying necessary prescribed medication in a manner that constitutes deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs have moved the Court to certify, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), a class of “all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter.”
Discussion The Court may certify a case as a class action if the party seeking certification demonstrates that it has met all the requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the
3

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requirements of 23(b). Under Rule 23(a), the party must prove that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; there are questions of law or fact common to the proposed class; the class representatives’ claims are typical of the claims of the class; and the representatives will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). In this case, plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3). To succeed, they must show that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Plaintiffs bear “the burden of demonstrating that certification is appropriate.” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court need not rely solely on the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint in assessing whether to certify a class, but instead “should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are required under Rule 23.” Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2001). A. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. Courts may not rely on conclusory allegations as to the size of a class or the impracticability of joinder, Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989), and may require that a plaintiff prove class size through affidavits or other evidence. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676. The plaintiff need not, however, specify the exact number of persons in the class. Marcial, 880 F.2d at 957.
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Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 58 Filed: 10/24/08 Page 5 of 11 PageID #:902
In this case, the proposed class consists of detainees who requested but were denied necessary prescribed medications while confined at CCJ on or after August 3, 2005. Plaintiffs first based their claim of numerosity on allegations that they had uncovered over 300 additional detainees who filed grievances concerning the denial of prescription medication. Defendants pointed out that there was no evidence that the grievances included people who were similarly situated to plaintiffs.
The Court requested that the plaintiffs submit additional evidence of numerosity. Plaintiffs submitted over 180 affidavits executed by putative class members, an excerpt of a report by the court-appointed monitor in Duran v. Sheahan, Case No. 74 C 2949 (N.D. Ill.), a 2008 report by the United States Department of Justice on conditions at CCJ, and the depositions of three former CCJ employees.
Defendants attack the affidavits as “cookie-cutter” documents with only “three or four-line complaints” but make no mention of the other evidence offered. Def. Supp. Resp. at 1. Defendants’ argument is unavailing. Other courts have accepted similar affidavits to support numerosity. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 06 C 0493, 2006 WL 3718041, at *3 n. 7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) (finding that the fact that fourteen affidavits submitted in support of class certification contained mostly boilerplate text did not diminish their likely veracity). The affidavits are statements made under oath, and defendants have not produced anything suggesting that they are false or untrustworthy. In addition, the reports by the court-appointed monitor and the Department of Justice reflect that numerous detainees have complained that they have been denied prescription medication. The Court finds the affidavits and the other evidence plaintiffs have submitted sufficient to establish the requisite numerosity.
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B. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of questions of law or fact common to the
class. “‘A common nucleus of operative facts is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).’” Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992)). A defendant’s pattern of standardized conduct generally is sufficient to constitute a common nucleus of operative facts. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that there are common questions of law and fact with respect to the existence and the constitutionality of the policy. Defendants argue that determining whether the decision to discontinue particular medications amounts to deliberate indifference requires an individualized inquiry.
Defendants’ argument improperly conflates the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement of predominance of common issues with the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of existence of common issues. In any event, defendants appear to have misconstrued plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ focus, at least for liability purposes, is on the defendants’ alleged policy of allowing unqualified personnel to usurp decisions made by medical doctors and other categorical policies, not on the particulars of individualized decisions. When “defendants have engaged in standardized conduct toward members of the proposed class,” the class satisfies Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. Keele, 149 F.3d at 594.
In this case, plaintiffs have identified two factual and legal issues common to the class: whether defendants enforce the alleged policy and whether that policy violates
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the Fourteenth Amendment. A common legal theory is generally sufficient to support commonality. Id. Plaintiffs’ claims clearly share the same legal theory and therefore meet the commonality requirement. See Arreola v. Godinez, --- F.3d ---, No. 07-1700, 2008 WL 4553059 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2008) (finding that jail detainees’ claims challenging the constitutionality of a medical policy met the commonality requirement); Young v. County of Cook, No. 06 C 552, 2007 WL 1238920, at *5 (N.D. Ill. April 25, 2007) (finding commonality requirement satisfied when detainee class challenged the constitutionality of a blanket strip search policy); Jackson, 2006 WL 3718041, at *4 (finding that plaintiffs’ challenge to jail’s standardized STD testing met the commonality requirement even though factual distinctions between class members existed). C. Typicality
The typicality requirement focuses on “whether the named representatives’ claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). The representatives’ claims are “typical if [they] arise[ ] from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise the claims of the other class members and [their] claims are based on the same legal theory.” Id. Factual distinctions between the representative parties’ claims and the class members’ claims does not destroy typicality so long as the claims share the same legal theory. Id.
Plaintiffs laid out their own factual allegations and later produced 180 affidavits in support of their claim of typicality. Again, defendants’ arguments focus on predominance rather than typicality. In essence, they argue that the named plaintiffs’
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claims vary as to the type of illness complained of and the type of medication at issue. Defendants also contend that medical follow-up differed drastically among the plaintiffs and that these differences destroy typicality.
Between the complaint and the supplemental affidavits, the plaintiffs have met their burden with respect to typicality. Although the affidavits differ with respect to the individual affiants’ particular medical needs and prescriptions, each affiant swore that she notified CCJ personnel of her condition and her prescription, and that she either never received the medication or received it days or weeks later. These are precisely the underpinnings of the named plaintiffs’ claims. Because the “representatives’ claims have the same essential characteristics of the class at large,” plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality requirement. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). D. Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). To satisfy this requirement, the interests of the representative parties must coincide with those of the rest of the class, and class counsel must be prepared and able to prosecute the action effectively. See Retired Police Ass’n, 7 F.3d at 598; Levie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 944, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Defendants do not challenge the adequacy of plaintiffs’ counsel, nor do they contend plaintiffs’ interests are at odds with those of other class members. Instead, defendants focus their objections on the individual plaintiffs’ alleged lack of credibility. In
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support, defendants list the criminal histories of eight plaintiffs, which include convictions for drug possession, robbery, and theft. Defendants assert that felons cannot be adequate class representatives, but they cite only a Second Circuit decision stating that district courts may consider credibility in adequacy of representation determinations. Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87 (2nd Cir. 1998).
This argument is lacking in merit. Several courts have certified or have approved the certification of classes of prisoner and detainee plaintiffs. Arreola, 2008 WL 4553059, at *8-*11; Jackson, 2006 WL 3718041, at *5. If defendants were correct, there would be no such thing as a class action in the prison or jail context. In any event, defendants have failed to provide any basis to believe that the named plaintiffs’ criminal histories differentiate them from other class members or make their interests different from those of the class as a whole. E. Predominance and superiority
Rule 23(b)(3) requires the Court to find “that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that the class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Generally, when a class challenges a uniform policy or practice, the validity of the policy or practice tends to be the predominant issue in the ensuing litigation. See General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982) (“Significant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees.”); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir.
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1992) (holding that certification was appropriate when plaintiffs alleged that defendant had “an ongoing scheme to defraud and deceive prospective students”).
Plaintiffs challenge what they allege are policies and practices applied to the entire detainee population. Defendants contend that a class would be unmanageable because there are too many individual issues. Defendants assert that to determine liability, the Court will have to examine at least nine specific questions, including the relative urgency of each individual’s need for medication, whether CCJ personnel were subjectively aware of each individual detainee’s serious medical need, and the actual harm suffered by each individual. They maintain that individual determinations are the only way to resolve a deliberate indifference claim.
As the Court previously noted, plaintiffs’ claims focus on the policy of allowing CCJ personnel lacking medical degrees to in effect overrule decisions made by medical doctors regarding their patients’ medical needs, as well as other allegedly categorically applied policies. Plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the creation and execution of these policy amounts to deliberate indifference. In this regard, the individual stories of particular detainees may be illustrative, but they are unlikely to be determinative of the issue of liability. The predominant issues in the litigation, at least with regard to liability, will be the existence and constitutionality of the defendants’ alleged policies. A class action is the most efficient device for this kind of case because the legality of the policies can be determined in one proceeding.
By contrast, determination of damages for the class members likely will have to be done individually, as the nature and extent of any harm are likely to vary from person to person. Rule 23, however, provides enough flexibility to deal with that while still
10

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certifying a class. The Court may bifurcate liability and damages trials or appoint a magistrate judge to preside over individual damages proceedings. Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). As the Seventh Circuit stated earlier this month, “[a]lthough the extent of each class member’s damages might vary, district judges can devise solutions to address that problem if there are substantial common issues that outweigh the single variable of damages amounts.” Arreola, 2008 WL 4553059, at *11 (noting that the presence of individual damages issues did not preclude certification of a class where the claim alleged deliberate indifference to the medical needs of jail detainees). This is precisely such a case. The core issues, which predominate over all others, are the common issues the Court has previously identified.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [docket no. 21]. The Court certifies the following class under Rule 23(b)(3): all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter. The case is set for a status hearing on November 13, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. Counsel are directed to confer regarding a proposed form of class notice and to submit a proposal or proposals to the Court by November 10, 2008.

Date: October 24, 2008

________________________________ MATTHEW F. KENNELLY United States District Judge

11

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/03/07 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:1

\. f\t.eD

i).UG - 3 7.007

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ftt;l.& 32007

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MICHAII. W. ~~:~::uRT
CLIRK, U.l. DIIT

EASTERN DIVISION

Michael Parish

)

07CV4369

v.

) )

JUDGE KENNELLy

Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County

MAG. JUDGE VALDEZ

COMPLAINT

Now comes Michael Parish, by and through his attorney, Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd, and

alleges as follows: 1. This is a civil action seeking damages against the defendant for committing acts
under color of law, which deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec.

1343 and 2201 and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1983 and 1988. 2. Plaintiff Michael Parish is a resident of the Northern District ofillinois. Mr. Parish
has a long history of mental illness including but not limited to being Bipolar. 3. Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County. The Sheriff is sued in

his official capacity only. 4. On or about September 27, 2005, plaintiff Parish was admitted to the Cook
County Jail ("Jail") from the Illinois Department of Corrections. Prior to being shipped to the Cook County Jail, Mr. Parish was receiving psychotropic medication while incarcerated at the I.D.O.C. On information and belief, a two week supply of the medication was sent to the Cook

County Jail when Mr. Parish was transferred. 5. Mr. Parish was assigned to Division Eleven at the Cook County Jail. After being
admitted to Division Eleven, plaintiff continuously made request to numerous correctional

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/03/07 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:2

officers to receive his psychotropic medication. The correctional officers, to whom plaintiff made these requests, acting in accordance with the rules , regulations, and procedures of the

defendants, denied plaintiff access to receive the medication. 6. On June 26, 2006, plaintiff cut his wrist in a misguided attempt to get the attention

of the correctional officers in order to receive medical attention.

7.

The Sheriff of Cook County has the responsibility and duty to develop policies

and procedures to ensure that inmates admitted to the Jail continue to receive their prescription

medication. 8. That the Sheriff has a practice/or policy of not continuing the medication
prescribed for detainees shipped from the I.D.O.C. to the Cook County Jail. 9. That the Sheriff and his employees are deliberately indifferent to the mental
health of the inmates by following a practice and policy of delaying inmates access to psychotropic medication, in violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth

Amendments. 10. That as a direct and proximate result of not providing the plaintiff with
psychotropic medication, plaintiff Parish incurred great physical, and emotional suffering and

anguish. Wherefore, Michael Parish prays for an award as follows: A. Award the plaintiff compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $50,000. B. Award the plaintiff court costs and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1988.

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/03/07 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:3

Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, II. 60643 773-233-7900

7 R~rectfully submitted, _
G J.ovV~. I ~·
Is/ Thomas G. Morrissey
Attorney for the Plaintiff

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:37

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila

)

Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy )

Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean )

Miller, Kevin Sanders, Stacey Clark, and )

Carlotte Watson,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-vs-

)

)

Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, )

)

Defendants.

)

No. 07 CV 4369 (Judge Kennelly)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Pursuant to leave of Court, plaintiffs file this amended complaint and, by counsel, allege as follows:
1. This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343.
2. Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois. Defendant Sheriff is sued in his official capacity only.
3. Defendants have a duty to screen each person processed into the Cook County Jail for medical and mental health problems. Defendants also have a duty to provide care and treatment for any prisoner at the jail who faces a substantial risk of serious harm without such care and treatment.

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:38
4. In the two-year period preceding the filing of this complaint, defendants have applied a variety of policies and practices which have caused serious harm to plaintiffs and others similarly situated. These policies and practices include the following:
A. Psychotropic Medication a. Persons entering the jail who are receiving anti-psychotic medication and appear to be “normal” are routinely denied these medications. b. The decision to discontinue psychotropic medication is made during the intake procedure by a person known as a “psych worker” who is not qualified to prescribe medication. c. Defendants have a policy or practice of allowing the “psych worker” to discontinue psychotropic medication based on a brief and cursory interview, without regard to the detainee’s medical history and without consultation with the physician who has prescribed the medication. d. After the “psych worker” has refused to allow a detainee to continue to receive psychotropic medication, a detainee must engage in bizarre behavior before he (or she) will receive a psychiatric re-evaluation. A common form of such behavior is to engage in acts of self-mutilation or to attempt suicide. e. The same type of unqualified “psych worker” who performed screening at intake also performs the re-evaluation; defendants have -2-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:39
authorized the “psych worker” to refuse to permit the detainee to be seen by a physician. f. Defendants appear to have a practice or policy of prohibiting physicians at the jail from prescribing costly anti-psychotic medication and instead encourage or require physicians at the jail to prescribe inexpensive anti-depressants which also function as a sedative, inducing drowsiness. B. Non-Psychotropic Medication a. Persons entering the jail with serious medical problems of an embarrassing or personal nature are not afforded appropriate privacy for disclosure of their medical condition; a detainee’s medical history is taken in a part of the jail known as the “R.C.D.C.,” a converted clothing room where detainees are held in overcrowded animal pens. b. Persons entering the jail with serious medical problems which are being treated with medication will not be permitted to continue that treatment, if, in the opinion of a medical technician, the detainee does not require that medication. c. Defendants have a policy or practice of allowing the medical technician to discontinue medication based on a brief and cursory interview, without regard to the detainee’s medical history and without consultation with the physician who has prescribed the medication.
-3-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:40
d. Defendants have a policy or practice of permitting the technician to make the decision to discontinue prescribed medication without consultation with a physician.
e. Defendants have a policy or practice of permitting the technician to make the decision to discontinue prescribed medication when the detainee arrives at the jail by ambulance from a hospital with a recent prescription for medication required to prevent death or serious illness.
f. Defendants have a policy or practice of permitting the technician to make the decision to discontinue prescribed medication when the detainee arrives at the jail with his (or her) prescribed medication required to prevent death or serious illness.
g. There is no quick, speedy, or efficient procedure through which a detainee may see a physician after the medical technician has decided to discontinue a detainee’s medication.
h. Defendants appear to have a practice or policy of prohibiting physicians at the jail from prescribing costly medication which had been appropriately prescribed for the detainee before he (or she) was admitted to the jail.
i. Defendants appear to have a practice or policy of prohibiting physicians at the jail from prescribing appropriate medication for prisoners who enter the jail with medical conditions causing chronic pain. -4-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:41
5. Plaintiffs and many others similarly situated have been injured by defendants’ above referred policies. Accordingly, plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter.
6. Plaintiffs and the facts concerning the manner in which each has been harmed by defendants’ policies and practices are as follows: Michael Parish
7. Plaintiff Michael Parish was transferred to the jail from the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) on or about September 27, 2005.
8. Parish received psychotropic medication on a daily basis while confined at the IDOC and arrived at the jail with a two week supply of medication.
9. Parish was interviewed by a “psych worker” upon his admission to the jail; the “psych worker” concluded that Parish should not receive psychotropic medication.
10. Thereafter, Parish made several unsuccessful attempts to overturn the decision of the “psych worker” to discontinue his psychotropic medication.
11. Parish was unable to obtain medication for about nine months until, after an unsuccessful suicide attempt, Parish was seen by a physician who prescribed medication.
-5-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:42
12. Parish was released from custody in April of 2006 following his acquittal; thereafter, plaintiff was re-admitted to the jail on a new charge in November of 2007.
13. On his re-admission to the jail in 2007, Parish informed the “psych worker” about his need for psychotropic medication.
14. The “psych worker” did not consider Parish’s medical history at the jail and refused to allow Parish to continue to receive psychotropic medication.
15. Parish thereafter made repeated efforts to obtain the required medication. As a result of these efforts, which included episodes of self-mutiliation, Parish was interviewed on three occasions by a “psych worker.” Each time, the “psych worker” concluded that Parish did not require medication and refused to permit Parish to be examined by a physician.
16. Parish was finally able to see a physician in March of 2008, following an unsuccessful suicide attempt, and was prescribed psychotropic medication. Curtis Oats
17. Plaintiff Curtis Oats was admitted to the jail as a pre-trial detainee on or about August 29, 2006. Oats remained at the jail for about five months until he was released following his acquittal.
18. On admission to the jail, Oats informed the intake personnel that he had been taking anti-psychotic medication, as well as medication for gout and high blood pressure. Oats told the “psych worker” at intake that he had been taking a
-6-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 7 of 16 PageID #:43
particular anti-psychotic medication, that he wanted to continue to take that medication, and that without his medication he experienced paranoia and depression.
19. Oats started to receive high blood pressure medication and gout medication about three days after his admission to the jail.
20. Oats was seen by a physician about three weeks after his admission to the jail. The physician refused to prescribe any anti-psychotic medication and instead prescribed two inexpensive anti-depressants, one of which also functioned as a sedative.
21. Oats first began to receive psychotropic medication in October of 2006.
22. After receiving the psychotropic medication which had been prescribed by the jail physician, Oats became tired and disoriented and felt as if he was in a zombie like state. Oats began to manifest symptoms of paranoia and had difficulty in cooperating with counsel and assisting in his defense. Leila Khoury
23. Plaintiff Leila Khoury was admitted to the jail on or about November 5, 2005 and remained incarcerated there until January 3, 2006, when she was enlarged on bond.
24. Khoury was admitted to the jail following a psychiatric hospitalization at Christ Hospital.
25. At the direction of a “psych worker,” Khoury was not given any psychotropic medication upon her admission to the jail.
-7-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 8 of 16 PageID #:44
26. After Khoury had been at the jail for about a week, she exhibited a variety of abnormal symptoms, including frequent bouts of crying, screaming, fighting, and other hysterical behavior.
27. As a result of the above referred behavior, Khoury was re-evaluated on about three occasions by a “psych worker.” On each occasion, the “psych worker” concluded that Khoury did not require medication and would not be permitted to see a physician.
28. Khoury exhibited abnormal behavior at court appearances, prompting the judge presiding at her criminal case to enter an order directing that Khoury be examined by appropriate medical personnel. Defendants ignored this order.
29. Khoury’s family arranged for Khoury’s treating physician to communicate in writing with the jail to inform them of the various psychotropic mediations he had prescribed for Khoury. Defendants ignored this information.
30. In December of 2005, Khoury’s mother spoke with a psychologist at the jail and persuaded him to look into Khoury’s plight. As a result of this intervention, plaintiff was seen by a physician at the jail.
31. The physician refused to prescribe the psychotropic medication which had previously been prescribed for Khoury and instead prescribed an inexpensive anti-anxiety medication.
-8-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 9 of 16 PageID #:45
Sean Driscoll 32. On or about August 18, 2005, plaintiff Sean Driscoll was admitted to
the jail as a pre-trial detainee; Driscoll remained at the jail until August 25, 2005, when he was enlarged on bail.
33. On admission to the jail, Driscoll informed a “psych worker” that he had been taking psychotropic medication for severe anxiety disorder.
34. The “psych worker” refused to permit Driscoll to continue on his psychotropic medication.
35. As the direct and proximate result of the wrongful denial of essential medication, Driscoll experienced great pain and suffering. Carla Lofton
36. Plaintiff Carla Lofton was admitted to the jail in 2006. 37. Lofton informed the “psych worker” on admission to the jail that she had been taking psychotropic medication. 38. The “psych worker” decided that Lofton did not require psychotropic medication and refused to allow Lofton to be seen by a physician. 39. Lofton was unable to see a physician and obtain medication until an unsuccessful suicide attempt.
-9-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 10 of 16 PageID #:46
Roy Cleaves 40. Plaintiff Roy Cleaves was admitted to the jail in April of 2007. 41. Cleaves informed the “psych worker” on admission to the jail of his
specific psychiatric diagnosis and of the fact that he had been taking anti-psychotic medication for several years.
42. The “psych worker” concluded that Cleaves did not require any psychotropic medication and refused to allow Cleaves to be seen by a physician.
43. Thereafter, Cleaves made daily requests to see a physician to obtain treatment for symptoms he was experiencing.
44. After several weeks, Cleaves was permitted to see a physician; Cleaves told the physician about his symptoms, medical history, diagnosis, and prescribed medication. The physician told Cleaves that he could not, as a matter of jail policy, prescribe the anti-psychotic medication, but could instead prescribe an anti-depressant.
45. Cleaves was transferred from the jail to the Illinois Department of Corrections in about July of 2007. Cleaves received anti-psychotic medication while confined at the IDOC. Lisa Brown
46. Plaintiff Lisa Brown was admitted to the jail in April of 2007. 47. Brown informed the “psych worker” on admission to the jail that she had been taking anti-psychotic medication.
-10-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 11 of 16 PageID #:47
48. Brown informed the medical technician on admission to the jail of a serious health problem for which she was taking medication on a daily basis and which was likely to cause her death or serious injury if the medication was discontinued.
49. Brown remained at the jail for about two weeks until the criminal charges against her were dismissed.
50. Brown did not receive any medication during her stay at the jail. 51. While deprived of her anti-psychotic medication, Brown experienced visual and auditory hallucinations, had suicidal thoughts, and exhibited uncontrollable rages. Dan Taylor 52. Plaintiff Dan Taylor was admitted to the jail in September of 2006. 53. Taylor informed the medical technician on admission to the jail that he had two ruptured disks and a swollen nerve and was taking pain medication. Taylor also told the technician that he had an enlarged prostate and was taking prescription medication for that condition. 54. Taylor did not see a physician at intake to the jail and did not receive any of his prescribed medication. 55. Taylor made frequent complaints following his admission to the jail about his need for pain and prostate medication.
-11-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:48
56. Taylor was permitted to see a physician after about five months of frequent complaints. The physician prescribed pain medication and a muscle relaxant and referred plaintiff to a urologist.
57. Taylor did not receive the pain medication until about four weeks after it had been prescribed by the jail physician.
58. Taylor was not permitted to see a urologist for about two months after he had seen the jail physician.
59. After examining Taylor, the urologist concluded that Taylor should continue to receive the medication he had been taking on admission to the jail. Another four weeks elapsed before the jail provided Taylor with this medication. Dean Miller
60. Plaintiff Dean Miller was admitted to the jail in March of 2008. 61. Miller arrived at the jail by ambulance, following emergency surgery at Christ Hospital. 62. Miller was in the custody of the Sheriff while at Christ Hospital, and spent his final day at the hospital shackled to his bed, pursuant to a policy of the Sheriff. 63. Christ Hospital discharged Miller with instructions that he continue to receive a specific antibiotic and that the dressing on his surgical wound be changed and the wound cleaned several times a day.
-12-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 13 of 16 PageID #:49
64. Miller did not receive any antibiotics whatsoever for two days following his arrival at the jail. Nor did jail personnel clean and change the dressing on plaintiff’s surgical wound.
65. A physician prescribed a less effective and less costly antibiotic on Miller’s third day at the jail.
66. Miller was enlarged on bond on his third day at the jail and received emergency medical treatment for the infection caused by the jail’s refusal to provide appropriate medication.
67. Before his release from the jail, Miller had complained about back pain and advised jail officials that, before his arrest, he had been taking appropriately prescribed prescription pain medication. A physician at the jail refused to provide plaintiff with this medication, advising plaintiff that the jail did not dispense such costly medications. Kevin Sanders
68. Plaintiff Kevin Sanders was admitted to the jail in December of 2007. 69. Sanders informed the medical technician on admission to the jail that he had recently had a heart valve replaced and was taking a variety of prescription medication relating to his heart problems. Sanders also informed the technician that his prescription medication was with his inventoried property at the jail. 70. The technician refused to permit Sanders to see a physician and Sanders was admitted to the jail without medication.
-13-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 14 of 16 PageID #:50
71. Sanders became ill because the jail had refused to allow him to take his medication. Stacey Clark
72. Plaintiff Stacey Clark was admitted to the jail in December of 2007. 73. Clark informed the medical technician on admission to the jail that he suffered from acid reflux and was taking prescription medication to control this condition. 74. The technician refused to permit Clark to see a physician and Clark was admitted to the jail without medication. 75. Clark experienced great pain and suffering at the jail because he was not permitted to take appropriate medication for his serious medical condition. Carlotte Watson 76. Plaintiff Carlotte Watson was admitted to the jail in January of 2008. 77. Watson informed the “psych worker” on admission to the jail that she was taking a prescription anti-depressant. 78. The “psych worker” concluded that Watson did not require an anti-depressant. 79. Watson informed the medical technician on admission to the jail that she was taking specific prescription medication for congestive heart failure, asthma, and hepatitis C. 80. The medical technician referred Watson to a physician, who prescribed medication for congestive heart failure.
-14-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:51
81. Watson waited four days after seeing the physician before she receive medication for her congestive heart failure.
82. The physician referred to above refused to allow plaintiff to continue to receive the prescribed medication for asthma and hepatitis C.
83. Watson experienced great pain and suffering and physical injury because she was not permitted to take appropriate medication for her serious medical conditions.
84. Plaintiffs demand trial by jury.
Wherefore plaintiffs request that the Court order that this case may proceed as a class action, that appropriate damages be awarded to the individual plaintiffs and to each unnamed member of the proposed class, and that the Court award costs and fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 1240 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10249 S Western Ave. Chicago, IL. 60643 (773) 233-7900 Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
-15-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 21 Filed: 03/31/08 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:52

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 31st day of March, 2008, I electronically ﬁled

the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will

send notiﬁcation of such ﬁling to the following:

Daniel J. Fahlgren, Ass’t

State’s Atty, 500 Daley Center, Chicago, IL 60602, and I hereby certify that I

have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non

CM/ECF participants: none.

/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman ______________________ Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC Number 08830399 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 1240 Chicago, IL 60604-2430 (312) 427-3200 (phone) (312) 427-3930 (fax) knf@kenlaw.com (email)

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL PARISH, CURTIS L. OATS, LEILA KHOURY, SEAN DRISCOLL, CARLA LOFTON, ROY CLEAVES, LISA BROWN, DAN TAYLOR, DEAN MILLER, KEVIN SANDERS, STACEY CLARK and CARLOTTE WILSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 07 C 4369 ) ) Judge John Z. Lee ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In this class action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs have sued the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County alleging that Cook County Jail (CCJ) has policies and practices of deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Matthew F. Kennelly certified, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), a class of “all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter.” Parish v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., No. 07 C 4369, 2008 WL 4812875, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008). The parties then conducted discovery, and fact and expert discovery has concluded. Defendants have moved to decertify the class. After holding several hearings on the motion and receiving supplemental briefing, the Court denies the motion to decertify the class.

Facts The facts as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint were set forth in Judge Kennelly’s Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the motion for class certification, and the Court need not repeat them in detail here. In August 2007, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Defendants implemented various categorical policies that denied or delayed the dispensing of necessary prescription medication to detainees at CCJ. 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ A.c., B.c. Such policies, according to Plaintiffs, constitute deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Judge Kennelly certified the following class under Rule 23(b)(3): “all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter.” Parish, 2008 WL 4812875, at *6. In doing so, he stated that Plaintiffs based their theory of liability on Defendants’ alleged policy of allowing unqualified personnel to usurp decisions made by medical doctors and other categorical policies. Id. at *3. Defendants did not seek appellate review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). The case was then reassigned to Judge Gary Feinerman upon appointment to the bench. The parties conducted and completed fact and expert discovery. The case has since been reassigned to this Court’s docket. Defendants subsequently moved to decertify the class arguing that Judge Kennelly erred in certifying the class and that certain facts revealed during discovery require decertification. Because the Court had several questions regarding the nature and scope of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court held a number of hearings and ordered supplemental briefing on the motion to decertify.
2

This enabled the parties to clarify their positions in their statements to the Court and written submissions.
Discussion Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(C), “[a]n order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). “Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). However, “[i]n the absence of materially changed or clarified circumstances, or the occurrence of a condition on which the initial class ruling was expressly contingent, courts should not condone a series of rearguments on the class issues by . . . the opponent of the class . . . .” 3 W. Rubenstein, A. Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 7:47 (4th ed. 2011).1 In addition, the scope of review of Judge Kennelly’s ruling is further limited because “law-of-the-case principles are applicable when a case is transferred to a new judge midway through litigation; in general, the successor judge is discouraged from reconsidering the decisions of the transferor judge.” Gilbert v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 2010); see Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 680 (7th Cir. 2005). “The successor judge should depart from the transferor judge’s decision only ‘if he has a conviction at once strong and reasonable that the earlier ruling was wrong, and if rescinding it would not cause undue harm to the party that had benefitted from it.’” Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 902 (quoting HK Sys., Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 553 F.3d 1086, 1089 (7th Cir. 2009)).

1

Defendants rely on Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007), as persuasive

authority for the proposition that, on a motion to decertify, the Court must stringently examine whether

Plaintiffs have established they are similarly situated. See Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Decertify Class 2.

Unlike the facts of this case, however, the Anderson court discussed the similarly situated requirement in

the context of denying a motion to decertify at the second stage of an FLSA class action alleging class-

wide age discrimination. Thus, the Court does not find Anderson applicable here.

3

With these principles in mind, the Court concludes that there are no materially changed or clarified circumstances or changes in the law requiring decertification. Furthermore, the Court does not have a strong and reasonable conviction that Judge Kennelly’s ruling was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to decertify. I. Asserted Policies
After Defendants moved to decertify the class, the Court asked Plaintiffs to clarify the various categorical policies upon which they base their deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiffs assert that CCJ had several unconstitutional policies. Pls.’ Mem. Resp. Defs.’ Suppl. Br. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 6–7; ECF No. 308. These categorical policies were alleged in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint:
A. Policy 1 (“Psychotropic Medication Screening Policy”) Plaintiffs assert that, after a cursory review, an unqualified intake screener, without consulting a physician, would discontinue psychotropic medication after a detainee provided notice that it had been prescribed by the detainee’s psychologist or psychiatrist. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4.A.b, 4.A.c, 4.A.d. For example, Parish alleges that, although he arrived at the jail with the medication in 2005, the intake screener exercised his or her discretion and concluded that Parish should no longer receive the psychotropic medication. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Only after Parish attempted suicide did CCJ provide him with the psychotropic medication. Id. ¶ 11. When Parish returned to the CCJ in 2007, he notified the intake screener that he had been prescribed psychotropic medication, but he did not receive the medication until after he attempted suicide again. Id. ¶¶ 12–16.
4

B. Policy 2 (“Anti-Depressant Swap Screening Policy”) According to Plaintiffs, in those instances when CCJ screeners did not discontinue treatment of the detainee’s mental health issues altogether, they regularly would replace previously prescribed psychotropic medications with less-costly anti-depressants that were ineffective in treating detainees’ psychoses. Id. ¶ 4.A.f; see Parish, 2008 WL 4812875, at *1. Under this theory, Plaintiffs assert that, even if intake screeners determined that some treatment for mental disorders is necessary, the screeners then would have no choice but to swap the medications for cheaper alternatives. Plaintiffs further assert that the Anti-Depressant Swap Policy is not limited to intake screeners, but also applied to physicians, who treat detainees at CCJ throughout their stay. But the only paragraph in the Second Amended Complaint that even arguably could be construed to allege that this policy extended beyond the intake process is Paragraph A.f. When viewed in context, however, it is apparent that this claim too is limited to the intake process. Indeed, all of Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the other policies, including a similar allegation made with respect to non-psychotropic medications, are limited to the intake process. And the entire focus of the Second Amended Complaint, when read as a whole, is on the intake process. See, e.g., 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4.A.a; 4.B.a, b, f, h, i.; see also id. ¶ 5 (stating that “plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005, who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter”). These are the allegations that framed Judge Kennelly’s certification of a class consisting of “all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided
5

notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter.” Parish, 2008 WL 4812875, at *6. As such, his certification of the class clearly was based on the policies allegedly employed at CCJ during the intake process, rather than policies that may have applied to the rest of a detainee’s stay. That said, to the extent that Plaintiffs contend that physicians also were involved in implementing these intake policies, such conduct would fall within the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint and Judge Kennelly’s certification order. Accordingly, the Court views the Anti-Depressant Swap Screening Policy as applying to screeners and physicians involved in the initial intake process.
C. Policy 3 (“Nonpsychotropic Medication Screening Policy”) Plaintiff also allege that an unqualified intake screener, without consulting a physician, would discontinue nonpsychotropic medication after a detainee provided notice that it had been prescribed by the detainee’s physician. Id. ¶¶ 4.B.b–4.B.i. Examples of these medications included those prescribed to treat the detainee’s asthma, diabetes, congestive heart failure, infection, pain, enlarged prostate, acid reflux, and hepatitis C. Id. ¶¶ 53, 63, 69, 73, 79.2 D. Policy 4 (“Post-Screener-Denial Policy”) According to Plaintiffs, after an intake screener discontinued prescribed nonpsychotropic medication, CCJ would not provide a speedy procedure that allowed a detainee to see a physician in order to override the intake screener’s determination. Id. ¶ 4.B.g.

2

Although Plaintiffs had asserted in open court that they based their deliberate indifference claim

on CCJ’s methadone tapering policy, they have since conceded that they are only asserting that

methadone is one of the medications under the Nonpsychotropic Screen Policy that was not provided

within 24 hours after the detainee notified the intake screener that the detainee had been prescribed a

particular dosage of methadone. Pls.’ Mem. Resp. Defs.’ Suppl. Br. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 12–13.

6

E. Policy 5 (“Hospital-to-CCJ Transfer Policy”) Plaintiffs also assert that CCJ had a policy of discontinuing prescribed nonpsychotropic medication even when a detainee was transferred from a hospital to CCJ with prescribed medications relating to the conditions for which the detainee was hospitalized. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 4.B.e. This policy is based on the presumption that detainees who arrive at CCJ in this manner were required to go through a different intake process than all other detainees such that this policy was not redundant of the Nonpsychotropic Screening Policy. Furthermore, the class description includes class members who could assert a deliberate indifference claim based on the Hospital-to-CCJ Transfer Policy. F. Policy 6 (“No Privacy Policy”) Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that CCJ conducted intake evaluations in overcrowded areas with little privacy. Id. ¶ 4.B.a; see Pls.’ Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Class Cert. at 3–4, ECF No. 40 (arguing that a detainees are disinclined to divulge information about being HIV-positive in such an environment). Because Judge Kennelly certified the class as including only those detainees who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need, however, detainees who did not tell the intake screener that they had been prescribed a particular medication for a serious health need are not members of the class. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not asserted that Judge Kennelly erred in adopting the class definition that they themselves proposed. Accordingly, because no one that fits within the class definition could assert the No Privacy Policy, it cannot form the basis for the class’s deliberate indifference claim. The Court therefore views Judge Kennelly’s class certification ruling as recognizing five policies as they are alleged by Plaintiffs: (1) the Psychotropic Medication Screening Policy; (2)
7

the Anti-Depressant Swap Screening Policy; (3) the Nonpsychotropic Medication Screening

Policy; (4) the Post-Screener-Denial Policy; and (5) the Hospital-to-CCJ Transfer Policy.

Plaintiffs assert that, although there have been some improvements, these policies have

continued to exist throughout the entire class period, i.e., from August 3, 2005, to present. See

Pls.’ Mem. Resp. Defs.’ Suppl. Br. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 15–19. And Defendants simply have

not conclusively established that any changes made to CCJ’s intake screening over the years

have mooted the five categorical intake policies on which Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference

claim is based. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 1–25; Defs.’ Suppl. Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Decertify at 9–12.3 With these policies in mind, the Court proceeds to the Rule 23 analysis.

II. Class Prerequisite

As an implicit prerequisite to class certification, courts require “ascertainability,” or, in

other words, “that classes be defined clearly and based on objective criteria.” Mullins v. Direct

Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015). Three typical problems arise as to

ascertainability: (1) the class definition is so vague, amorphous, or imprecise that a court cannot

determine who should receive notice; (2) the class definition is based on subjective criteria such

as a person’s state of mind; and (3) the class is defined in terms of success on the merits so that a

class member either wins or by losing, falls out of the class and is not bound by the judgment (a

“fail-safe class”). Id. at 659–660.

Here, Defendants argue that the class definition presents an impermissible “fail-safe

class.” See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 22–23. Again, a fail-safe class is “a class

which would be bound only by a judgment favorable to plaintiffs but not by an adverse

judgment.” Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1980). In other words, a fail-safe

3

Of course, whether Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue as to a material fact regarding whether

the five policies existed throughout the class period and whether the policies have violated their

constitutional rights will be assessed on summary judgment.

8

class is “defined in a way that precludes membership unless the liability of the defendant is established. When the class is so defined, once it is determined that a person, who is a possible class member, cannot prevail against the defendant, that member drops out of the class.” Kamar v. RadioShack Corp., 375 F. App’x 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that a fail-safe class “is palpably unfair to the defendant, and is also unmanageable—for example, to whom should the class notice be sent?”).
The Court notes that, prior to their motion to decertify the class, Defendants did not object to the class definition and failed to even mention this issue anywhere in their brief in opposition to class certification. See Defs.’ Resp. Pls.’ Mot. Class Certification at 1–15; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify Class at 22–23. The class definition has not changed since Plaintiffs first proposed it in their motion to certify the class years ago. See Pls.’ Mot. Certify Class Action at 1. Defendants did not seek appellate review of Judge Kennelly’s class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Judge Kennelly adopted Defendants’ proposal with regard to how class members should be notified and Plaintiffs have provided notice of the pendency of the case to 105,168 potential class members. Because Defendants have not met their burden in establishing that it is proper to revisit the issue at this late date, the Court denies the motion to decertify on this basis.
In any event, Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. The class definition in this case is not a circular one that determines the scope of the class only after liability attaches. Defendants rely on Adashunas, 626 F.2d at 603, but that case is distinguishable. There, plaintiffs proposed a class consisting of “children entitled to a public education who have learning disabilities and who are not properly identified and/or who are not receiving a special education.” Id. The court held that such a definition constituted a fail-safe class because only those class members who
9

proved they had a learning disability would be bound by any judgment, while those who were unable to prove they had a learning disability would be free to sue defendants anew because they were not members of the class. Id. at 604.
In contrast to the class definition in Adashunas, here if it is determined that Defendants did not maintain any of the asserted categorical policies or that a certain policy did not create a substantial risk of harm to detainees, such a judgment would bind all persons confined on or after August 3, 2005, who had provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who had not been provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter. Membership in the class is not dispositive of liability. Furthermore, because any prescription medication notification is indicated on intake or transfer records, the parties are able to determine who is a member of the class. Thus, even if the Court were to reach the merits of whether the class definition creates a fail-safe class, the Court would deny the motion to decertify on this ground.
Defendants’ argument regarding the threshold prerequisites that must be considered prior to engaging in a Rule 23 analysis does not leave the Court with a strong and reasonable conviction that class certification was improvidently granted. The Court therefore proceeds to the Rule 23 analysis. III. Rule 23(a) Requirements
“A plaintiff who moves for class certification must satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a), as well as at least one subsection of Rule 23(b).” Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2012); see Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, ___ U.S. ____, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). Defendants argue that Judge Kennelly erred in holding that Plaintiffs had satisfied Rule
10

23(a)’s requirements of numerosity, commonality, and typicality. Defendants also contend that a change in the law and newly uncovered facts undermine the finding that these requirements have been met.
A. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). A class with as few as forty members has been held to satisfy the numerosity requirement. See Swanson v. Am. Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 n.9 (7th Cir. 1969); see also Pruitt v. City of Chi., 472 F.3d 925, 926–27 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Sometimes even 40 plaintiffs would be unmanageable.”). Judge Kennelly held that Plaintiffs satisfied numerosity after reviewing 180 affidavits executed by putative class members in Duran v. Sheehan, No. 74 C 2949. Defendants argue that the affidavits were unsworn and thus do not constitute evidence of numerosity. Defs.’ Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 3–4. An affidavit is properly sworn under oath if it declares under penalty of perjury that the statements contained in an affidavit are true. Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004). Because each of the 180 affidavits contains such a declaration, Judge Kennelly properly considered them. Parish, 2008 WL 4812875, at *3; see Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Decertify, Ex. A, Sworn Declarations. Furthermore, in each affidavit the detainee states that the intake personnel was told that he or she was taking prescription medication to treat a particular condition and that the detainee never received the medication. See, e.g., Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Decertify, Ex. A, Sworn Declarations. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to decertify on this ground.
11

B. Commonality Next, Defendants argue Judge Kennelly erred in holding that there are questions of law or fact common to the class because, at the time of his ruling, he did not have the guidance of WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011). See Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Decertify Class at 2. The Court disagrees. Commonality requires “questions of law or fact common to the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), although “even a single common question will do,” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he Supreme Court explained in Wal-Mart that superficial common questions—like . . . whether each class member ‘suffered a violation of the same provision of law’—are not enough.” Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). Rather, putative class plaintiffs’ “claims must depend upon a common contention . . . [t]hat . . . must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Thus, “the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves,” is not enough; the key to commonality is whether a classwide proceeding can “generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Because this has always been a part of the Rule 23 inquiry, numerous courts have held that Wal-Mart did not change the law regarding class certification. See N.B. ex rel. Buchanan v. Hamos, No. 11 C 6866, 2012 WL 1953146, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2012) (Pallmeyer, J.) (stating that Wal-Mart does not change the analysis of class certification issues and “the Seventh Circuit has recognized . . . the holding in [Wal-Mart] does not apply where [injury] results from a defendant’s
12

standardized conduct toward proposed class members, such as generalized policies that affect all class members in the same way”); Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., No. 92 C 3409, 2012 WL 2953217, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2012) (Gettleman, J.) (“[I]t hardly needs stating that neither [Wal-Mart] nor Jamie S. ‘changed’ the law on class certification.”); see also McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 487–90 (7th Cir. 2012) (allowing, post-Wal-Mart, class certification for a disparate impact claim challenging company-wide policies allowing brokers to form their own teams and distributing accounts based on broker performance).
Because Wal-Mart does not represent a change in the law, that case, in and of itself, does not provide a basis for revisiting Judge Kennelly’s ruling as to commonality. Moreover, Judge Kennelly’s ruling was correct. Judge Kennelly held that a class-wide proceeding would generate a common answer as to whether Defendants had policies of allowing intake screeners to discontinue a detainee’s prescription medication or to swap out previously prescribed medication with an ineffective substitute without consulting a physician. This common answer will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims of over 100,000 putative class members in one fell swoop. Accordingly, the Court is not left with a strong conviction that Judge Kennelly erred in holding that Plaintiffs satisfied the commonality requirement.
The Court notes that, in support of their motion to decertify the class, Defendants primarily argue that discovery has revealed that Plaintiffs are unable to prove that the categorical policies on which they base their deliberate indifference claim existed or, if they existed, that the policies violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 8–11; Defs.’ Suppl. Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify at 2–3. But such questions go to the heart of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim and are more appropriately left for summary judgment. See Tyson Foods,
13

Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, ___ S. Ct. ____, No. 14-1146, 2016 WL 1092414, at * 9 (Mar. 22, 2016) (“[T]he concern about the proposed class is not that it exhibits some fatal dissimilarity but, rather, a fatal similarity—[an alleged] failure of proof as to an element of the plaintiffs’ cause of action—courts should engage that question as a matter of summary judgment, not class certification.”); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A court may not say something like ‘let’s resolve the merits first and worry about the class later’ . . . or ‘I’m not going to certify a class unless I think that the plaintiffs will prevail.’”). The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to decertify on these grounds.
C. Typicality “The question of typicality in Rule 23(a)(3) is closely related to the preceding question of commonality.” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). A “plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente v. Stokeley–Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). Although “[t]he typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members,” the requirement “primarily directs the district court to focus on whether the named representatives’ claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Id. In support of their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs provided over a hundred putative class members’ sworn affidavits stating that intake screeners were notified that the detainee’s physician had prescribed medication to treat a medical condition, but the detainee never received the prescription or received it days, weeks, or even months later. See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–83; Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Certify Class, Ex. 1, Affidavits. Plaintiffs aver that they
14

all were impacted by Defendants’ categorical intake policies of allowing untrained intake screeners to usurp decisions made by medical doctors. Furthermore some detainees provide sworn affidavits recounting how CCJ refused to provide prescribed psychotropic medications only to replace them with ineffective, less costly anti-depressants. Because each class member’s claim arises from the same policies of Defendants, the named Plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the typicality requirement.
In response, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs “have no common experiences save incarceration and this lawsuit.” See Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Decertify Class at 6. Defendants point to inconsistencies between the named Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the denial of psychotropic medication and Dr. Lynn Sanders’ seventy-one page summary of Plaintiffs’ medical records in order to show that no such policy exists or that class members were not harmed. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify Class at 14–18, 23–25. Defendants also argue that discovery has revealed that certain of the putative class members have not suffered a substantial risk of harm, such that the named plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of the class. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify Class at 23–25. But, again, such arguments strike at the merits of Plaintiffs’ case and are more properly addressed on summary judgment. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 823 (7th Cir. 2012) (“All of this is at best an argument that some class members’ claims will fail on the merits if and when damages are decided, a fact generally irrelevant to the district court’s decision on class certification.”); see also Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] class will often include persons who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct; indeed this is almost inevitable because at the outset of the case many of the members of the class may be unknown, or if they are known still the facts bearing on their claims may be unknown. Such a possibility or
15

indeed inevitability does not preclude class certification . . . .”). In sum, Defendants have failed to establish that typicality is an issue that should be revisited at this time or that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirement.
D. Adequacy of Named Class Members’ Representation “The final subdivision of Rule 23 requires that the representative parties fairly and adequately represent the class.” Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018. “A class is not fairly and adequately represented if class members have antagonistic or conflicting claims.” Id. Further, the named representative must have a “sufficient interest in the outcome to assure that she will adequately and fairly represent the class.” Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. Gen. Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980). Defendants do not claim that the named Plaintiffs have antagonistic or conflicting claims. Instead, they argue that the ultimate treatment received by each Plaintiff differed. Although the length of delay in providing medication may affect damages, it does not render the named Plaintiffs inadequate representatives of the class claims. Each class member’s claim is based on Defendants’ purported policy of permitting unqualified persons to discontinue medication previously prescribed by a detainee’s physician upon Plaintiffs’ arrival at CCJ, or the policy of swapping out psychotropic medication with cheaper, ineffective anti-depressants upon intake at CCJ. Whether Plaintiffs will be able to create a triable issue as to the existence of such policies is an issue for summary judgment or trial, and whether each Plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove damages resulting from the policies can be addressed at a subsequent stage of this litigation.
16

IV. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements “To qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), a class must meet two requirements
beyond the Rule 23(a) prerequisites: Common questions must ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual members’; and class resolution must be ‘superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). “The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
“Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement is satisfied when common questions represent a significant aspect of [a] case and . . . can be resolved for all members of [a] class in a single adjudication.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (quotation omitted). In other words, “common questions can predominate if a common nucleus of operative facts and issues underlies the claims brought by the proposed class.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Rule 23(b)(3) merely requires that individual questions “not predominate over the common questions affecting the class as a whole.” Id. “Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class members predominate begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011).
“The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment includes a proscription against deliberately indifferent treatment towards prisoners.” Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2012). “Although the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted persons,
17

pretrial detainees . . . are entitled to the same basic protections under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.” Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010). Therefore, courts “apply the same legal standards to deliberate indifference claims brought under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
To state such a claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he had a serious medical need, and (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to it.” Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001). As for the first element, “[a]n objectively serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). With regard to the second element, “[i]t is enough to show that the defendants actually knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and acted or failed to act in disregard of that risk.” Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002).
Defendants argue that because the deliberate indifference standard requires a factintensive inquiry, individual issues will predominate over any issues common to the class and a class action is not superior to individual lawsuits. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Decertify Class at 8–10, 20–21. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims will require individual inquiries regarding whether any delay in obtaining prescribed medication proximately caused the detainee’s injury.
When Judge Kennelly granted the motion to certify the class, he was keenly aware that “individual stories of particular detainees may be illustrative.” Parish, 2008 WL 4812875, at *5. He held, however, that “[t]he predominant issues in the litigation, at least with regard to liability, will be the existence and constitutionality of the defendants’ alleged policies.” Id. Consistent with Judge Kennelly’s ruling, the Seventh Circuit has since stated that “the need for individual
18

proof [of proximate causation] alone does not necessarily preclude class certification” and a “district court has the discretion to . . . certify[] a class for liability alone where damages or causation may require individualized assessments.” Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
Numerous district courts throughout this circuit have certified class actions in which detainees have challenged a specific jail policy that applied equally to all class members on the theory that the policy constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., No. 09 C 529, 2010 WL 4791509, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2010) (CCJ policy of denial of adequate dental care to detainees as violation of Fourteenth Amendment), aff’d, Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Flood v. Dominguez, 270 F.R.D. 413, 422 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (policy of depriving detainees of bedding, heat, personal hygiene items, exercise, and adequate meal portions as violation of Fourteenth Amendment); Young v. Cty. of Cook, No. 06 C 552, 2007 WL 1238920, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (CCJ policy of subjecting detainees to strip search and cavity search as violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Jackson v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., No. 06 C 493, 2006 WL 3718041, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) (CCJ policy of urethral swabbing of detainees for sexually transmitted diseases without consent as violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); cf. Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 800 (7th Cir. 2008) (remanding denial of Rule 23(b)(3) class certification for detainees challenging policy of denying crutches where CCJ argued that each prisoner’s case would be different and noting, “even if each damages calculation will be fact-bound to some degree, many of the issues involved in this case . . . would be common among all potential class members”); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class certification in mass environmental
19

tort case in which the district court “reserved for individual hearings if and when Met-Coil is determined to have contaminated the soil and water under the class members’ homes in violation of federal or state law”). Defendants have not pointed to any development in the litigation or change in the law that would require the Court to revisit Judge Kennelly’s ruling in this regard.
Moreover, even if the Court were to revisit Judge Kennelly’s ruling, it is not left with the strong conviction that predominance and superiority have not been satisfied in this case. As for predominance, Plaintiffs challenge the purported policies of (1) allowing unqualified persons, upon a detainee’s initial appearance at CCJ, to override the decisions of medical doctors by denying doctor-prescribed psychotropic and/or nonpsychotropic medication and (2) mandating that intake screeners swap previously prescribed psychotropic medications with ineffective antidepressants. These policies affect every class member regardless of how he or she enters CCJ. As noted by Judge Kennelly, whether CCJ’s policy exists and is constitutional will be the primary focus of this litigation. As Judge Kennelly recognized, the necessity of follow-up proceedings to determine claimant-specific issues with regard to causation and damages does not preclude certification in this case.
Defendants argue that common issues do not predominate because Plaintiffs must prove causation of injury as to each individual class member at the liability stage. But this is not the case. Rather, to establish liability, Plaintiffs must prove that (1) Defendants knew that failing to provide detainees with their prescribed medications within 24 hours of intake created a substantial risk of harm4 and (2) Defendants disregarded that risk by implementing the five policies in question.

4

Plaintiffs point to eleven medications and contend that there is a substantial risk of injury if the

provision of each of these medications is delayed by 24 hours. Plaintiffs, however, have not yet moved to

create subclasses of detainees with regard to these medications for trial purposes.

20

As for superiority, Defendants assert that, because an individualized follow-up assessment of causation and damages is required, litigating Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims as a class is not superior to litigating them individually. Once again, Defendants have not alerted the Court to any development in the litigation or a change in the law that would warrant revisiting Judge Kennelly’s determination as to this issue.
In any event, the Court does not have a strong conviction that Judge Kennelly was wrong when he determined that litigating this case as a class action would be superior to litigating each Plaintiff’s claim individually. Judicial economy is best served by a single class action challenging the constitutionality of CCJ’s purported policies rather than a multiplicity of individual lawsuits premised upon essentially the same issues. Because many of the potential class members would not recover enough in damages to justify bringing their own claim, for them, a class action represents the only viable method for vindicating any constitutional violation that may have occurred. Nor have potential class members shown an interest in pursuing such actions individually, and Defendants have not informed the Court of any litigation brought by individual class members indicating such interest. The fact that there will be follow-up proceedings with regard to claimant-specific issues does not necessarily mean that a class action is not the superior method for determining the existence and legality of the alleged policies in one proceeding. See Mejdrech, 319 F.3d at 911 (“If there are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimantspecific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.”); see also Arreola, 546 F.3d at 801 (“Although the extent of each class member’s personal damages might vary, district judges can
21

devise solutions to address that problem if there are substantial common issues that outweigh the single variable of damages amounts.”). Thus, the Court concludes that a class action is the superior method for litigating Plaintiffs’ claims.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies Defendants’ motion and supplemental

motion to decertify the class action [177, 300].

SO ORDERED

ENTER: 3/31/16

______________________________________ JOHN Z. LEE U.S. District Judge

22

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 331 Filed: 04/17/18 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:13744

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL PARISH, CURTIS L. OATS, LEILA KHOURY, SEAN DRISCOLL, CARLA LOFTON, ROY CLEAVES, LISA BROWN, DAN TAYLOR, DEAN MILLER, KEVIN SANDERS, STACEY CLARK, and CARLOTTE WILSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 07 C 4369 ) ) Judge John Z. Lee ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER A certified class of pretrial detainees has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County. Plaintiffs allege that the Cook County Jail (CCJ) has policies and practices of denying or delaying medication prescribed to detainees when they enter CCJ. The class alleges that these policies and practices constitute deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants have moved to bar the testimony of four of Plaintiffs’ experts: Dr. Steven Whitman, Dr. Pablo Stewart, Dr. Julie Holland, and Dr. Lambert King. For the reasons provided herein, the motions are denied.
Legal Standard The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 702 and the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

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509 U.S. 579 (1993). See United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) (“At this point, Rule 702 has superseded Daubert, but the standard of review that was established for Daubert challenges is still appropriate.”). Rule 702 allows the admission of testimony by an expert—that is, someone with the requisite “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”—to help the trier of fact “understand the evidence or . . . determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. An expert witness is permitted to testify when (1) the testimony is “based on sufficient facts or data,” (2) the testimony is “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) the witness has “reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Id. The proponent of an expert witness bears the burden of demonstrating that the expert’s testimony would satisfy the Daubert standard by a preponderance of the evidence. Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2009).
Under Daubert, the district court must act as the evidentiary gatekeeper, ensuring that Rule 702’s requirements of reliability and relevance are satisfied before allowing the finder of fact to hear the testimony of a proffered expert. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999). District courts have broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). In considering whether to admit expert testimony, district courts employ a three-part framework that inquires whether: (1) the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert’s testimony is reliable; and (3) the expert’s testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a factual issue. See Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893–94 (7th Cir. 2011).
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With regard to the reliability of an expert’s methodology, courts consider factors such as whether the methodology can and has been tested, whether it has been subject to peer review, whether it has a known or potential rate of error, and whether it is generally accepted among the relevant community. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). Under this framework, “shaky expert testimony may be admissible, assailable by its opponents through cross-examination,” and criticisms of the testimony’s quality speak not to admissibility but to the weight that the testimony should be accorded by the trier of fact. Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 762 (7th Cir. 2010).
Analysis I. Dr. Steven Whitman
Plaintiffs rely on Dr. Steven Whitman to provide a quantitative analysis of CCJ’s intake and prescription data. Dr. Whitman is a statistician, who analyzes health data. Whitman Report, ECF No. 188-1, at 2. He has a masters degree in biostatistics from the University of Pittsburgh and a PhD in biostatistics from Yale University. Id. at 13. He is currently the Director of the Sinai Urban Health Institute, a research institute that focuses on improving the health of urban communities using data analysis and community engagement. Id. at 2. He was formerly the Director of the Epidemiology Program at the Chicago Department of Public Health, as well as the Senior Epidemiologist at the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University. Id. During his career as a biostatistician and epidemiologist, Dr. Whitman has been responsible for data collection and analysis in research studies about HIV, AIDS, breast and cervical cancer, asthma, diabetes, and epilepsy. Id. at 14–16. Dr. Whitman began his career in academia as a college math professor. Id. at 2.
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A. Qualifications Defendants first contend that Dr. Whitman is unqualified to provide an expert opinion in this case because he is an epidemiologist who studies diseases, not correctional medicine. Quantitative analytical skills, however, may be applied to any data set, regardless of subject matter. For example, in Obrycka v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 2372, 2011 WL 2600554, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2011), another court in this district held that Dr. Whitman was qualified to provide quantitative analysis regarding the rate at which investigations into allegations of police misconduct were found meritorious in certain police districts, as well as a comparison of that rate to rates in other police districts. Although that case had nothing to do with health data, Dr. Whitman was found to be qualified to perform a mathematical analyses of the data. Likewise, the Court holds that Dr. Whitman’s experience in providing quantitative analyses of data throughout his career provides a sufficient foundation to proffer his quantitative analysis in this case. B. Reliability
1. Reliability of the Methodology Defendants also attack Dr. Whitman’s methodology. Dr. Whitman provides data analysis of CCJ’s intake and prescription records with regard to certain non-psychotropic1 and psychotropic2 medications. Whitman Report, at 2. Dr. Whitman determines the length of time between the date a prisoner was prescribed medication at his or her intake examination

1

Dr. Whitman analyzes the data with regard to eleven prescribed non-psychotropic medications:

(1) albuterol; (2) amlodipine; (3) enalapril; (4) epilepsy medication; (5) glipizide; (6) HIV medication; (7)

hydrochlorothiazide; (8) insulin; (9) lovastatin; (10) metformin; and (11) metoprolol. Id. at 30. Dr.

Whitman separately analyzes delays in dispensing methadone from March 20, 2009, to May 3, 2010. Id.

at 187, 190.

2

Dr. Whitman also analyzes six prescribed psychotropic medications: (1) chlorpromazine; (2)

clonazepam; (3) fluoxetine and sertraline; (4) gabapentin; (5) lorazepam and diazepam; and (6)

venlafaxine. Id. at 132.

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(“prescribed date”) and the date that prescription was dispensed (“fill date”). Id. at 8–9. Dr. Whitman divides that data into five time periods: (1) October 1, 2006, to March 30, 2007; (2) October 1, 2007, to March 30, 2008; (3) October 1, 2008, to March 30, 2009; (4) October 1, 2009, to March 30, 2010; and (5) October 1, 2010, to March 30, 2011. Id. at 7. With regard to each medication analyzed, Dr. Whitman also determines whether there is a statistically significant difference between the prescription rates (i.e., the rates at which a prescription was filled) during the first and last time periods and the likelihood that the difference could be the result of chance. Id. at 111 (albuterol), 112 (amlodipine), 114 (enalapril), 116 (epilepsy medication), 117–18 (glipizide), 123–26 (insulin), 127–28 (metformin), 129–31 (metoprolol), 175–77 (chlorpromazine), 178–79 (chlonazepam), 180–182 (fluoxetine and sertraline), 182–83 (gabapentin), 184–85 (lorazepam and diazepam), 186–87 (venlafaxine).
As an initial matter, Defendants move to bar Dr. Whitman because his analysis of compiled data was not available to them. Apparently, Plaintiffs had asked Defendants to contribute $6,800 to help defray the cost of Dr. Whitman’s compilation of Defendants’ raw data.3 Plaintiffs later requested that Defendants contribute only $1,500. See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Bar Whitman, at 12 n.4, ECF No. 218. Plaintiffs wrote a letter to Defendants, stating that, based on Defendants’ lack of response to the request for $1,500, Plaintiffs assumed that Defendants had abandoned their request for production of the compilation. See Pls.’ Ex. 92, 5/7/12 Letter from K. Flaxman to F. Catania, ECF No. 221-14. Plaintiffs asked Defendants to let them know whether their assumption was mistaken. See id. Defendants have not pointed to any communication in which Defendants corrected Plaintiffs’ assumption. Nor have Defendants

3

Although Defendants allude to the theory that Dr. Whitman’s compilation became his proprietary

document, Defendants have failed to provide any exhibit to support this theory. See Defs.’ Mot. Bar.

Whitman, at 6, ECF No. 188 (generally referencing a letter but failing to provide an exhibit number or the

letter).

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relied on any court filings seeking to compel production of the compilation. A party cannot sit on its rights and later seek to bar the opposing party’s expert simply because the expert’s compilation was offered at a cost. In other words, the time to speak up was then, not now. Given these unique facts, this is not a situation in which an expert’s data has not been made available to the opposing party. Therefore, the Court declines to bar Dr. Whitman’s testimony on this ground.
Next, Defendants contend that Dr. Whitman’s method for tabulating the data is unclear. Putting aside the fact that Defendants’ confusion as to the tabulated data might have been obviated if they had timely asserted their right to obtain it, Dr. Whitman’s report adequately explains his methodology.
As Dr. Whitman explains it, he first merged the data files supplied by Defendants that include detainees’ prescribed dates and fill dates. Whitman Report, at 2–4; see Whitman Dep. at 31, ECF No. 188-3. With regard to the tabulation of data for the eleven non-psychotropic drugs and the six psychotropic drugs, Dr. Whitman used a detainee’s first name, last name, and birth date to match the records in each dataset. Whitman Report, at 6. Second, because Defendants’ data files contained information from overlapping time periods, he eliminated any redundant data from those periods. Id. at 3–8. Third, Dr. Whitman eliminated data that resulted from data entry errors by using coding mechanisms to ensure that (1) the prescribed and fill dates occurred after the booking date, (2) the fill date occurred before a detainee’s discharge date, and (3) the fill date occurred after the prescribed date. Id. at 6–8. Fourth, Dr. Whitman eliminated data regarding prescriptions unrelated to the intake process—such as refills or prescriptions written after CCJ conducted a second health assessment 14 days after intake—by considering only those fill dates that occurred within 14 days or less after a detainees’ booking date. Id. Finally, at each step, Dr.
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Whitman ensured that he accurately matched and omitted data by verifying three test subjects for each drug and each time period. Id. at 7–8. With regard to his methodology of extracting methadone dispensing records from the raw data files, Dr. Whitman matched records by using a detainee’s Correctional Institution Management Information System number, which is unique to each inmate and each instance of admission to CCJ. Id. at 8. Dr. Whitman then tabulated the prescribed and fill dates from March 20, 2009, to May 3, 2010. Id. Dr. Whitman’s thorough explanation as to how he tabulated the data spans eleven pages of his report, and the Court finds his explanation to be sufficiently clear.
Defendants also contend that Dr. Whitman has not explained why he selected particular time periods for analyzing the intake data. Defs.’ Mot. Bar Whitman, at 3. Not so. For each year between 2006 and 2011, Dr. Whitman analyzed intake data from the same 195-day period from September 17 to March 30. Whitman Report, at 4. For prescription data, he analyzed the 181-day period from October 1 to March 30. Id. at 6. Dr. Whitman explains that his analysis is based on the assumption that any prescription written after a detainee has been housed at CCJ for over fourteen days is unrelated to the intake process at issue in this case. Id. Accordingly, he used coding mechanisms to eliminate any prescription record date that is more than 14 days past the intake date. Id. Dr. Whitman states that this is why the intake data period begins 14 days prior to the prescription record data for each year. Id. The selection of the range of months as a basis for comparison is a factual matter to be determined by a jury. To the extent that Defendants wish to ask Dr. Whitman why he selected the particular range of months from each year, they may do so on cross-examination.
Furthermore, Dr. Whitman concludes that there has been a statistically significant increase in the rate of dispensing certain prescription medications on the day of admission
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between the 2006–07 and 2010–11 periods. Defendants argue that statistically significant changes may be observed with trivial outcomes. Criticisms of the testimony’s quality, however, speak not to admissibility but to the weight that the testimony should be accorded by the trier of fact. Metavante, 619 F.3d at 762. To this end, Defendants are free to press Dr. Whitman with this line of questioning if and when he testifies.
2. Reliability of the Underlying Data Next, Defendants attack Dr. Whitman’s analysis as unreliable, claiming it is based on faulty data. “A district court enjoys broad latitude both in deciding how to determine reliability and in making the ultimate reliability determination.” Bryant v. City of Chi., 200 F.3d 1092, 1098 (7th Cir. 2000). “The soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the expert’s conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact, or, where appropriate, on summary judgment.” Smith, 215 F.3d at 718. In support of their argument that Dr. Whitman’s analysis relies on faulty data, Defendants point to Dr. Whitman’s statement that a “huge majority of the data that [was] received was often confusing or imperfect.” Whitman Dep. at 32. What Dr. Whitman meant by this cherry-picked quotation becomes clear when it is put into context. Dr. Whitman stated that the data files provided by Defendants were confusing or imperfect because they often lacked inmate identification numbers. Id. at 32–35. But Dr. Whitman explained that he was ultimately able to utilize an inmate’s first name, last name, and birth date to match the data from various data sets. Id. at 33–34. Dr. Whitman also explained that, because the different data sets supplied by Defendants pertained to overlapping time periods, he eliminated any data that was redundant. To
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the extent that Defendants wish to challenge any of Dr. Whitman’s assumptions to match or eliminate data, they may do so on cross-examination.
Furthermore, Defendants state that Dr. Whitman’s reliance on CCJ’s prescription records is erroneous because his comparison of prescribed dates and filled dates ignores that CCJ intake personnel are permitted to dispense medication from “par stock” during the intake evaluation without a written prescription.4 But Dr. Whitman’s stated assumption that all intake personnel are required to write a prescription for medication that subsequently is transmitted to the CCJ pharmacy finds support in the record. At least one of CCJ’s physician assistants has stated that CCJ intake personnel are not allowed to prescribe psychotropic medications. See Stadnicki Dep. at 145–46, ECF No. 174-5. Thus, Defendants’ argument regarding the use of par stock by intake personnel would not apply to Dr. Whitman’s analyses of psychotropic medications. With regard to non-psychotropic medications, there is evidence that CCJ’s intake personnel actually wrote prescriptions whenever medication was distributed from par stock, the CCJ’s pharmacy received a copy of that prescription for entry into the recordkeeping system, and administration of such medication was noted in the detainee’s records. See Trammel Dep. at 114–16, ECF No. 174-5; Stadnicki Dep. at 101–03, 105–08, 113; Martinez Dep. at 79–80, 87–88, ECF No. 174-6. Of course, on cross-examination, Defendants may challenge Dr. Whitman’s assumption that, regardless of whether a medication is dispensed from par stock or the pharmacy, the prescription records reflect a medication’s prescribed date and filled date. But Defendants have not established that Dr. Whitman’s methodology is unreliable based upon the use of “par stock.”

4

Defendants do not explain which prescription medications that Dr. Whitman analyzed are

affected by the “par stock” policy.

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C. Assisting the Trier of Fact Defendants also argue that Dr. Whitman’s opinion regarding a statistically significant increase in certain prescription rates is not relevant because it will not assist the trier of fact in determining the cause of the increase. “[I]n order for an expert’s testimony to qualify as ‘relevant’ under Rule 702 it must assist the jury in determining any fact at issue in the case.” Smith, 215 F.3d at 720. “No one piece of evidence has to prove every element of plaintiff’s case; it need only make the existence of ‘any fact that is of consequence’ more or less probable.” Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 425 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401). Together with other testimony and evidence, Dr. Whitman’s statistical analyses of the prescription rates may help the trier of fact determine whether the rate of dispensation of prescription medications during any of the five time periods supports a finding that Defendants were deliberate indifference to detainees’ medical needs. In addition, Dr. Whitman’s analysis— together with a Department of Justice report (DOJ Report) issued on July 11, 2008, Pls.’ Ex 28, DOJ Report, ECF No. 174-9, outlining CCJ’s systemic failings with regard to its intake screening process—is relevant to whether CCJ’s intake process was constitutionally deficient at the time that the DOJ Report was issued, and whether and to what extent the prescription rates improved thereafter. This is sufficient to satisfy the relevant requirement. Defendants also question the relevance of Dr. Whitman’s methadone analysis, which studied whether CCJ abided by its policy of tapering a detainee’s use of methadone over a period of 21 days. But Plaintiffs have abandoned this claim and now assert a more narrow claim, alleging that methadone is one of the non-psychotropic medications not provided within 24 hours after the detainee has notified the intake screener that he or she had been prescribed methadone. See Pls.’ Mem. Resp. Defs.’ Suppl. Br. Mot. Decertify, at 13, ECF No. 308. In this regard,
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Defendants’ argument is well-taken, but Dr. Whitman’s analysis as to the number of methadone prescriptions filled on the day of intake, as well as every day up to the fourteenth day, is relevant and, together with the other evidence, will assist the trier of fact in determining whether there was a policy or practice of denying or delaying methadone dispensation. See Whitman Report, at 188, 191.
For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to bar Dr. Whitman’s testimony. II. Dr. Pablo Stewart
Plaintiffs offer Dr. Pablo Stewart to opine about CCJ’s intake process as it relates to psychiatric care and methadone treatment. Dr. Stewart, a clinical professor of psychiatry at the University of California San Francisco School of Medicine, has over thirty years of experience in managing, monitoring, and reforming mental health systems in correctional settings, as well as consulting governments and agencies regarding the treatment of substance abuse. Pablo Report, at 2–4, ECF No. 187. He has served as a psychiatric director for a correctional facility in San Francisco. Id. at 4. Dr. Stewart also has served as a primary investigator for the DOJ with regard to a mental health correctional facility for juveniles in Michigan. Id. at 10. In addition, he has consulted both governmental and private agencies on a variety of psychiatric, forensic, substance abuse, and organizational issues and has testified as an expert in many cases involving the delivery of mental health care at correctional institutions. Id. at 5–10.
According to Dr. Stewart, CCJ’s intake screening procedures are inadequate for several reasons: (1) intake personnel are authorized to discontinue prescriptions for psychotropic medications previously prescribed by physicians, even though the intake personnel are not qualified to do so; (2) detainees do not receive their psychotropic medications in a timely fashion; and (3) detainees suffer from the abrupt discontinuation of psychotropic medications, as
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well as methadone.5 Stewart Report, at 20–25. For their part, Defendants argue that these opinions should be barred, because Dr. Stewart fails to apply a valid methodology, has relied on false assumptions, and provides only a general opinion as to the risks caused by a delay in the delivery of medication that will be unhelpful to the jury. Defs.’ Mot. Bar Stewart, at 2–13, ECF No. 185. None of these arguments are persuasive.
A. Reliability of the Methodology Defendants first contend that Dr. Stewart’s methodology is invalid and unreliable because it is not as extensive as the methodology he previously employed when evaluating intake procedures at a mental health correctional facility for juveniles. In the prior evaluation, Dr. Stewart: (1) walked through the intake process from beginning to end while touring the facility to understand the process of identifying, evaluating, and treating those in need of mental health care; (2) reviewed the facility’s policies and procedures; (3) determined whether employees were adhering to the policies and procedures; (4) interviewed members of the class of detainees; and (5) reviewed relevant records. Id. at 4. In this case, Dr. Stewart (1) inspected and spoke with personnel in the intake screening areas and the in-patient psychiatric units; (2) reviewed Dr. Avery Hart’s deposition testimony regarding CCJ’s psychotropic drug dispensation policies and practices; (3) reviewed Dr. Whitman’s statistical analyses to determine the length of time between the date when psychotropic medication was prescribed and the date when it was dispensed;6 (4) reviewed the

5

For example, Dr. Stewart asserts that detainees who do not receive the full dose of methadone

previously prescribed by their physicians experience gratuitous pain. Stewart Report, at 2, ECF No. 187.

6

Defendants also argue that Dr. Stewart provides no valid opinion of his own and is merely is a

mouthpiece for Dr. Whitman and the DOJ Report. This argument misinterprets Dr. Stewart’s expert

report. Dr. Stewart does not simply parrot Dr. Whitman and the DOJ Report, as Defendants claim.

Rather, Dr. Stewart offers his own opinion that, assuming Dr. Whitman’s statistical analysis about delays

in psychotropic medication dispensation and the findings in the DOJ Report are true, then detainees have

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DOJ Report and the August 14, 2008, Court Monitoring Report issued in Duran v. Sheahan, which discussed the adequacy of CCJ’s intake screening policies and practices; (5) interviewed four members of the class; and (6) reviewed their medical records. See Stewart Report, at 15; id., App. 3, List of Exs. Referred to by Experts; Stewart Dep. Exs., ECF No. 324-1; see also Pls.’ Ex 28, DOJ Report, ECF No. 174-9; Duran v. Sheahan, 07C2949, 8/14/08 Court Monitoring Report, ECF No. 1027.
Contrary to Defendants’ contention, Dr. Stewart’s present methodology is substantially similar to the one he employed in the prior occasion. In both cases, the methodology involved on-site inspection, knowledge of the applicable policies and practices, familiarity with certain class members and their medical records, and a review of how the policies and practices were being applied. Thus, to the extent that Defendants argue that Dr. Stewart’s methodology in this case is unreliable because it differs from his prior methodology, their argument is unpersuasive.
Defendants also argue that Dr. Stewart’s methodology is unreliable because he interviewed and reviewed the medical records of only four class members. Were this the sole sum of Dr. Stewart’s work, the Court would be included to agree. But Dr. Stewart did more than that. As discussed above, among other things, he inspected the intake areas at CCJ, familiarized himself with CCJ’s policies regarding intake procedures and dispensation of medication, and reviewed Dr. Whitman’s statistical analysis for hundreds of detainees. Whether Dr. Stewart should have interviewed more than just four detainees goes to the weight of his testimony rather than its admissibility. See SquirtCo v. Seven–Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (“In
not received in a timely fashion psychotropic medications to treat their serious health needs. Stewart Report, at 1–2. In this way, Dr. Stewart presents his own expert opinion as a medical doctor well-versed in the delivery of mental health care at correctional institutions. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to bar Dr. Stewart’s expert testimony on this basis is denied.
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evaluating survey evidence, technical deficiencies go to the weight to be accorded them, rather than to their admissibility.”).
B. Reliability of the Underlying Assumptions Next, Defendants challenge the reliability of nine factual assumptions underlying Dr. Stewart’s opinion. The reliability of such factual assumptions, however, is not to be weighed by the Court in limine, but rather is to be “tested by the adversarial process and determined by the jury.” Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 732 F.3d 796, 808 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Wilbern v. Culver Franchising Sys., Inc., No. 13 C 3269, 2015 WL 5722825, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2015) (denying motion to strike damages expert and noting that “the validity of the expert’s factual assumptions is not the focus under a pre-trial Daubert inquiry”). Because Dr. Stewart’s assumptions go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of his testimony, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to bar his opinions on this ground.7

7

The Court notes that some of these purported assumptions are not assumptions at all. For

example, Defendants fail to point to, and the Court cannot find, any portion of Dr. Stewart’s report that

relies on an assumption that the receiving area operated 24-hours a day or that Dr. Puisis believed that the

prior delivery system was inadequate. See Defs.’ Mot. Bar Stewart, at 5–6 (assumptions 1, 3, 4, and 6).

Nor could a magistrate’s judge’s description of Dr. Stewart’s analysis in a different case possibly be an

assumption on which Dr. Stewart bases his opinion in this case. See id. at 6 (assumptions 7 and 8).

In addition, other assumptions have become moot. Dr. Stewart’s assumption about detainees’ length of stay and the 21-day methadone tapering program has been mooted by Plaintiffs’ narrowing of their methadone claim. See id. (assumption 9). Another assumption that initial mental health screenings were performed in a noisy, non-private setting has been mooted by the class definition. See id. at 5 (assumption 2). The certified class includes only those detainees who provided notice that they had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need. Thus, if the setting prevented a detainee from providing such notice, that detainee would not be a member of the class.

This leaves one assumption that Defendants contend is false. According to Defendants, Dr. Stewart assumes that, prior to October 2010, detainees would not see a psychiatrist right away upon intake. See id. at 6 (assumption 5); see Stewart Report, at 23–24 (stating that, prior to November 2010, a detainee entering CCJ could not see a psychiatrist that day, but could be admitted into the infirmary for observation and see a psychiatrist the next day). Defendants, however, do not point to any portion of the record that undermines this assumption. See Defs.’ Mot. Bar Stewart, at 6. Nor do they even explain in general terms why this assumption is false.
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C. Assisting the Trier of Fact Defendants further argue that, to the extent that Dr. Stewart will testify that a delay in medications will result in more risk to the detainee, the opinion is too vague and obvious to assist the average juror. Dr. Stewart outlines the uses of the following medications to treat certain medical conditions and the effects of abruptly discontinuing them, even for a brief period of time: chlorpromazine (Thorazine); clonazepam (Klonopin); fluoxetine and sertraline (Prozac, Zoloft); gabapentin (Neurontin); lorazepam and diazepam (Ativan, Valium); venlafaxine (Effexor); and methadone. An average juror, lacking a medical background or training, would be unfamiliar with the medical conditions at issue, the prescription medications used to treat them, and the effect of discontinuing the medications for a period of time. See Hudson v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (stating that prescription of a drug for treatment of a medical condition “is not a matter of common knowledge or within the experience of laymen”), aff’d, 375 F. App’x 596 (7th Cir. 2010); Cox v. Ann, No. 12-CV-2678-DDC-GLR, 2015 WL 859064, at *18 (D. Kan. Feb. 27, 2015) (“A layperson does not possess the knowledge to determine whether the medication prescribed to plaintiff can create dependencies leading to serious withdrawal symptoms.”). Accordingly, Dr. Stewart’s explanations will assist the trier of fact in understanding the effects of a delay in the administration of these medications to detainees, which is one of the central issues in this case. III. Dr. Julie Holland Defendants next move to bar the expert testimony of Dr. Julie Holland, a board-certified psychiatrist specializing in pharmacology—the study of the effects of drugs on one’s mood, sensation, thinking, and behavior. See Defs.’ Mot. Bar. Holland, at 1, ECF No. 183. Dr. Holland
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was an attending physician in the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program at Bellevue Hospital in New York City from 1996 to 2005. Holland Report, at 2, ECF No. 183-1. For the past eleven years, she has served as a Clinical Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the New York University School of Medicine. Id. at 1. In addition, Dr. Holland currently has a private practice as a psychopharmacologist. Id.
Plaintiffs rely on Dr. Holland in four ways. First, Dr. Holland describes the uses for and potential effects of the sudden discontinuation of the following psychotropic drugs: chlorpromazine (Thorazine); clonazepam (Klonopin); fluoxetine and sertraline (Prozac, Zoloft); gabapentin (Neurontin); lorazepam and diazepam (Ativan, Valium); and venlafaxine (Effexor). Id. at 4–7. Second, Dr. Holland explains that a proper intake procedure should evaluate a detainee’s psychological issues, by obtaining any current complaints, a history of symptoms, a history of any medications prescribed, and the detainee’s current prescription medications. Id. at 7–11. Third, after reviewing Dr. Whitman’s statistical analysis of the time period for delivering psychotropic drugs, Dr. Holland concludes that “[f]rom October 2006, to November 2010, detainees entering the Jail did not receive in a timely fashion prescription medication required by the detainee for serious psychiatric health needs.” Id. at 1. Finally, Dr. Holland opines that the “failure of the Jail to provide in a timely fashion prescription medication required by the detainee for serious psychiatric health needs was likely to harm persons who had previously been prescribed medication for serious psychiatric problems.” Id.
Defendants first question Dr. Holland’s qualifications to offer these opinions, noting that Dr. Holland does not have any medical experience in a correctional setting and currently does not have physician privileges to admit patients to any hospital. This may be so, but as a psychiatrist specializing in pharmacology with extensive experience treating patients in a
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psychiatric emergency room, Dr. Holland’s work experience and education qualify her to attest to proper intake procedures for psychotropic drugs generally, as well as the uses of specific psychotropic medications and the dangers of abruptly discontinuing them.
Additionally, Defendants contend that Dr. Holland did not use any methodology in reaching her conclusions and, if she did, did not describe it in her report. This argument is also unpersuasive. Dr. Holland states that, based on her experience as a psychiatrist and her knowledge of pharmacology, she is knowledgeable of the risks of withdrawal symptoms and psychological changes caused by the abrupt discontinuation of various psychotropic medications. Furthermore, she is capable of assessing the dangers associated with abruptly restarting such medications at original doses after discontinuation. Her assessment of these risks and dangers presumes that Dr. Whitman’s statistical analysis is correct. This explanation is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 702 and Daubert.8
Defendants also challenge the reliability of Dr. Holland’s assumption that CCJ inmates, who had been prescribed medication prior to intake, had actually been taking that medication, such that a delay in dispensation would have a deleterious effect. But such a factual assumption can be “tested by the adversarial process and determined by the jury,” Manpower, 732 F.3d at 808, and Defendants will be able to cross-examine Dr. Holland regarding this assumption if and when the opportunity arises.
Furthermore, Defendants argue that Dr. Holland’s conclusions are not sufficiently tied to the litigation because her knowledge is not derived from the actual experience of any class member. It is true that Dr. Holland did not interview class members or review their medical

8

Because Dr. Holland’s opinions are limited to psychotropic medications and the risks of abruptly

discontinuing and restarting them, Defendants’ argument that she should have reviewed evidence

regarding non-psychotropic medications and other topics outside the scope of her opinions provides no

support for their motion.

17

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records. However, she reviewed CCJ’s intake policies, practices, and procedures, as well as statistical data showing periods of delay between the prescription and dispensation of psychotropic medications during the class period. Her review of these materials is sufficient to tie her opinions to this litigation.
Finally, Defendants argue that Dr. Holland’s opinions will be of no assistance to the jury. The Court disagrees. Dr. Holland provides testimony based on specialized knowledge and expertise that is outside the province of the average juror. For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to bar the expert testimony of Dr. Holland. IV. Dr. Lambert King
Dr. Lambert King is the Director of the Department of Medicine at Queens Hospital Center, a public hospital. King Report, at 1, ECF No. 209. He has substantial experience in the field of correctional medicine, including providing clinical health care at CCJ in Chicago, managing health care at Rikers Island in New York City, and acting as a court-appointed expert to evaluate medical services in the Maricopa County Jails in Arizona. Id. at 1–2.
Dr. King’s opinions are limited to non-psychotropic medications. First, Dr. King asserts that, from October 1, 2006, to November 2010, a significant number of detainees entering the CCJ did not timely receive non-psychotropic medication prescribed for serious health needs. Id. at 5. Second, Dr. King concludes that the failure of the CCJ’s medical services to provide timely prescription medication for serious medical conditions recklessly placed large numbers of detainees at risk for physical harm, morbidity, and mortality. Id. at 5–6. Dr. King also provides examples of such risks: acute exacerbation of asthma, acute coronary syndrome, myocardial infarction, epileptic and withdrawal seizures with associated injuries, uncontrolled diabetes, diabetic ketoacidosis, hypertension, and stroke. Id. Third, Dr. King states that, assuming the
18

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dispensation delays described in Dr. Whitman’s statistical analysis are true, during the base period of October 1, 2006, to March 30, 2007, there were systemic and unconscionable deficiencies in the quality of health care being provided to detainees who suffered from serious medical conditions, including hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, epilepsy, HIV infection, and asthma. Id. at 10. Lastly, Dr. King states that CCJ’s methadone tapering policy that automatically reduces a detainee’s methadone dosage caused gratuitous physical pain and psychological discomfort. Id. at 7.
Defendants do not challenge Dr. King’s qualifications. Rather, they argue that he failed to apply a methodology he had employed in another case and that his opinions are not relevant or reliable. Defs.’ Mot. Bar King, at 2–5, ECF No. 184.
As to the first argument, Defendants contend that Dr. King did not apply the methodology he had used when acting as the court-appointed evaluator of medical health care services in the Maricopa County Jails. There, he examined 72 to 89 randomly selected patient records. Defendants claim that he should have, but did not, conduct a similar analysis here. But, Dr. King did examine Dr. Whitman’s data analysis in this case, and that data incorporated the prescription records for all detainees who used non-psychotropic medications for the months from October 1 to March 30 for a five-year period. Although Dr. King did not look at any particular detainee’s medical chart, the tabulation of data provided him with the data necessary to support his opinions.
Defendants also attack Dr. King’s assumption that each of the detainees, for whom CCJ personnel prescribed medication upon intake, suffered from a serious medical condition. But “a course of prescription medicine is evidence that . . . [a person] suffers from a serious medical condition requiring continuous treatment—that is, the medicine is designed to treat the
19

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condition.” Jones v. C&D Techs., Inc., 684 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2012); McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 889 (7th Cir. 2016) (“An objectively serious medical condition is one that a physician has diagnosed as needing treatment . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]f [a]. . . [j]ail had a policy that directed the sheriff’s personnel to throw away all prescription medications brought in by detainees or prisoners without even reading the label and without making alternative provisions for the affected individuals, the County would be liable assuming that such a policy would, on its face, violate . . . the Due Process clause . . . .”); see also Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing withdrawal symptoms caused by delays in prescribed methadone treatment is a “significant medical issue”). Because Whitman’s data upon which Dr. King relies is based upon prescriptions of non-psychotropic medication issued by CCJ personnel at intake, Dr. King’s reliance upon the data does not bar him from testifying under Rule 702 or Daubert.
Finally, Defendants argue that Dr. King’s opinion would not assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Although Defendants aver that Dr. King’s opinion would be unhelpful because he has manipulated the relevant figures and statistics, they have not provided a single example to illustrate their point. Moreover, Plaintiffs note that they do not intend to rely on Dr. King for statistical analysis. Rather, they will rely on Dr. King only for opinions within his expertise regarding the consequences of discontinuing certain prescribed non-psychotropic medications.9 Because such specialized knowledge is outside the purview of the average juror, the Court finds that Dr. King’s opinions will help the jury understand the range of potential effects caused by delaying certain non-psychotropic medications.

9

In addition, Defendants resurrect their argument that CCJ’s prescription records do not account

for medication dispensed from CCJ’s “par stock.” But, as noted above, this argument does not help

Defendants.

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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies Defendants’ motions to bar Plaintiffs’

experts Dr. Whitman, Dr. Stewart, Dr. Holland, and Dr. King [183] [184] [185] [188].

SO ORDERED

ENTER: 4/17/18

______________________________________ JOHN Z. LEE U.S. District Judge

21

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 1 of 38 PageID #:13773

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL PARISH, CURTIS L. OATS, LEILA KHOURY, SEAN DRISCOLL, CARLA LOFTON, ROY CLEAVES, LISA BROWN, DAN TAYLOR, DEAN MILLER, KEVIN SANDERS, STACEY CLARK and CARLOTTE WILSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) 07 C 4369 ) ) Judge John Z. Lee ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER A certified class of pretrial detainees at the Cook County Jail (“CCJ”) has sued the Sheriff of Cook County, as well as Cook County itself, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendants’ intake practices at CCJ were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ serious medical needs in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that intake screeners were allowed to prohibit detainees from receiving medication that had been prescribed to them prior to their admission, without the benefit of an in-person evaluation by a licensed medical professional. According to Plaintiffs, this practice delayed them from receiving treatment for serious health needs. Second, Plaintiffs claim that, even on those occasions that an intake screener did refer a detainee for a medical evaluation and medication was prescribed as a result, CCJ did not dispense the medication in a timely manner. Third, Plaintiffs claim that CCJ employed a twenty-one day methadone tapering program that caused unnecessary pain to detainees

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 2 of 38 PageID #:13774

who needed methadone treatment. Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment [173], and

Defendants have separately cross-moved for summary judgment [190] [193] as to these claims.1

For the reasons provided herein, Defendants’ motions are granted in part and denied in part, and

Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

I. The Parties

Factual Background2

The Court previously certified, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), a class of “all persons

confined at the [CCJ] on and after August 3, 2005[,] who provided notice that he or she had been

taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with

appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter.” See Parish v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., No. 07 C

4369, 2008 WL 4812875, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008); see also Parish v. Sheriff of Cook Cty.,

No. 07 C 4369, 2016 WL 1270400, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2016) (denying motions to decertify).

CCJ is one of the largest single-site county pre-detention facilities in the United States.

Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 5, ECF No. 174. And, at all times relevant to the class period, Cermak

Health Services (“Cermak”), a public entity administered by the Cook County Health and

Hospitals System Board, provided health services to CCJ detainees. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 8.

Responsibility for CCJ is vested in the Sheriff, see 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-6017, and he has

sole supervision over CCJ’s operations. See DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cty., 209 F.3d 973,

976 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Moy v. Cty. of Cook, 640 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ill. 1994)). The Sheriff’s

expenses are funded by Cook County. 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-1106.

1

Defendants request that the Court strike certain exhibits within their memorandum in opposition to

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Defs.’ Resp. Pls.’ Mot Partial Summ. J. at 6, ECF No.

203. Because the Court has not relied on the exhibits that are the subject of the motion, the request is denied

as moot.

2

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

2

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II. Intake Screening at CCJ Between August 2005 and 2010, CCJ utilized the following intake procedures.3 A. Initial Medical Screening During the relevant time period, CCJ admitted approximately 250 to 300 new detainees
per day. See Pls.’ Ex. 11, Trammel Dep. at 64:12–10, ECF No. 174-5; Pls.’ Ex. 21, Cook Cty. Appropriations 2007 Fiscal Year, at 2, ECF No. 174-7; Pls.’ Ex. 22, Cook Cty. Appropriations 2008 Fiscal Year, at 2, ECF No. 174-8. As part of the intake process, a detainee first met with a correctional medicine technician (“CMT”), who conducted a brief interview to determine what, if any, health issues the detainee had. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 18. The CMT then filled out a form, known as a “bruise sheet,” indicating whether the detainee reported suffering from any health conditions and whether the detainee was taking prescription medication. Id.; see Trammel Dep. at 116:12–118:3.
CMTs are not licensed physicians, licensed physician assistants, or licensed nurse practitioners and, thus, cannot write prescriptions. See Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 19; Pls.’ Ex. 37, Hart Dep. III at 69:11–12, ECF No. 174-12. A notation by a CMT on the bruise sheet that a particular detainee had a health condition or was taking prescription medication, in and of itself, did not trigger further evaluation of the detainee by a Physician Assistant (“PA”). Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 18; see Trammel Dep. at 35:20–36:17 (stating there is no CCJ policy or practice requiring a detainee who reported taking a medication to be evaluated by a PA or physician).

3

Although the parties agree that certain CCJ intake policies, practices, and customs existed through

the fall of 2010, neither party has presented evidence as to when a particular practice ended. See, e.g., Pls.’

LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 18. The parties agree that the following modifications were made: (1) emergency

medical technicians, registered nurses, and a psychiatrist were hired to screen detainees at intake; (2) a

detainee did not have to spend a night at the psychiatric ward in order to receive psychotropic medication

at intake; and (3) typically, a detainee received his or her prescription medications before the detainee

reached his or her housing unit. See Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 38. But there is no evidence as to when

these modifications occurred.

3

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Rather, a detainee received a medical evaluation only when the CMT wrote “PA” on the bruise sheet or when a CMT or a correctional officer physically accompanied a detainee to a PA’s examination room. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 18; see Trammel Dep. at 41:2-10, 45:1–11; Pl.’s Ex. 14, Martinez Dep. at 49:6:8, ECF No. 174-6.
Between 2005 and 2009, the intake area was staffed by three PAs, and four PAs thereafter. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 19. The PAs began seeing new detainees referred by CMTs at approximately 5:00 p.m. each day. Martinez Dep. at 48:15–21. At least one PA stated that, on average, he spent five to seven minutes with each referred detainee. Pls.’ Ex. 12, Stadnicki Dep. at 79:12–16, ECF No. 174-5. Other than the bruise sheet, PAs did not have access to a detainee’s medical records during intake, even if the detainee previously had been incarcerated at CCJ. Trammel Dep. at 63:12–21. Whether the PAs called a detainee’s physician to confirm that a detainee had been prescribed medication is a matter of dispute. Compare Trammel Dep. at 63:23– 64:10 (stating he made an attempt), with Stadnicki Dep. at 54:16–56:9 (stating that the phone in the intake area was used only sporadically to call a detainee’s family member or the Cermak ER).
PAs could prescribe and dispense certain non-psychotropic medications during the intake process. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 20; Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 62, ECF No. 195. Glen Trammel, a PA, testified that he was legally required to create a written prescription whenever he prescribed medication during intake or dispensed medication in the form of a sevenday-dose blister pack. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 20; Martinez Dep. at 71:18–24; see Trammel Dep. at 115:9–17. Trammel also stated that, although he was unaware of any CCJ policy requiring him to do so, he would note on the bruise sheet that he had prescribed medication. Trammel Dep. at 116:12–118:3; see Martinez Dep. at 27:2–5; see also Defs.’ Ex. 18, Marquez Dep. at 99:4–18, ECF No. 199-3.
4

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On those occasions that a PA prescribed or dispensed medication during intake, a pharmacy technician would manually enter that information into CCJ’s data system. Martinez Dep. at 84:13– 85:9. If a medication was not available in the intake area, the PA was responsible for referring a detainee to the emergency room. Id. at 86:4–97:8. If a medication was prescribed and dispensed to a detainee on the day of admission in the emergency room, that information was entered into the computer system by a pharmacy technician. Id. at 87:13–17; see Pls.’ Ex. 36, Blackwell Dep. (“Blackwell Dep.”) at 61:17–21, ECF No. 174-12.
As of 2009, at the end of each day, a group comprised of three PAs reviewed the bruise sheets for detainees who had not been evaluated by a PA. Trammel Dep. at 39:11–19. If a PA noticed that a CMT had included a detainee’s medical history or an abnormal vital sign on a bruise sheet, the PA might write on the bruise sheet that the detainee could require follow-up in the housing division where he or she was assigned. Stadnicki Dep. at 77:2–8. Once a detainee was transferred to a housing division, a detainee would need to fill out a health request form in order to receive another medical evaluation or wait for a health maintenance examination, which was performed annually. Id. at 78:18–23.
B. Mental Health Screening In addition to seeing a CMT, a new CCJ detainee also spoke with a mental health screener (“MHS”). Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 18, 22. An MHS was not required to be a licensed medical professional and could not write prescriptions. Id. ¶ 22. During the relevant time period, MHSs did not have access to the information provided by a detainee to a CMT or a detainee’s medical records, even if the detainee previously had been incarcerated at CCJ. Pls.’ Ex. 34, Stewart Report at 21, ECF No. 174-11. If a detainee indicated to the MHS that he or she was taking psychotropic medication, an MHS typically asked the detainee to identify the name of the medication, the medication regimen,
5

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and the date the medication was last taken. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 22; Pls.’ Ex. 15, Hart Dep. I (“Hart Dep. I”) at 27:4–9, 31: 11–19, ECF No. 174-6. If an MHS found that the information obtained from the detainee was reasonably credible and indicated an active serious mental illness, the detainee would receive a secondary evaluation by the MHS or a psychologist. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 22; Stewart Report at 21. A detainee would not be referred for a secondary evaluation just because he or she was taking psychotropic medication. Martinez Dep. at 53:16– 19.
When a detainee indicated during a secondary evaluation that he or she was regularly taking medication for a mental health problem, the detainee was told that he or she would be required to stay in Cermak’s psychiatric unit, rather than with the general population, in order to receive a prescription from the psychiatrist. Stewart Report at 21; Hart Dep. I at 48:2–6; 53:3–6; 53:14– 54:12. According to Dr. Avery Hart, the interim director of Cermak in 2008, if a condition did not come up in the evaluations, the detainee needed to submit a health service request form in the division in which he or she was housed. Hart Dep. I at 85:6-11.
C. CCJ’s Methadone Tapering Program CCJ utilized a methadone tapering program for detainees who needed drug treatment. For non-pregnant program participants, the program typically reduced the dosages of methadone given to them over a twenty-one-day period, until they were eliminated altogether. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 75. Sean Driscoll, a detainee, was admitted to CCJ on January 26, 2009. Sander Aff. at 12. Because he was receiving methadone treatment in an outside clinic, he was referred to CCJ’s methadone program upon intake. Id. According to Driscoll, because of the tapering of the methadone doses, he experienced aching in his knees, sweating, chills, vomiting, and hallucinations. Pls.’ Reply Ex. 47, Driscoll Dep. (“Driscoll Dep.) at 142, ECF No. 221-1.
6

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III. Delay in Dispensing Medication Prescribed at Intake Plaintiffs also claim that CCJ unnecessarily delayed the dispensation of medication to
detainees, who received prescriptions during intake; Defendants contest this assertion. In support their respective positions, the parties offer a number of experts.
A. Dr. Steven Whitman Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Steven Whitman is a biostatistician and epidemiologist. He was asked to analyze the prescription drug and methadone data provided by CCJ, as well as CCJ’s prescription records regarding certain non-psychotropic4 and psychotropic5 medications. Whitman Report at 3. Using this data, Dr. Whitman measured, for each of the medications that he reviewed, the length of time that passed between, on the one hand, when a detainee was admitted to the CCJ (“intake date”) and received a prescription for the medication (“prescribed date”) and, on the other,

4

Dr. Whitman analyzed data regarding the following non-psychotropic medications: (1) albuterol;

(2) amlodipine besylate; (3) enalapril; (4) HIV medication; (5) hydrochlorothiazide; (6) insulin; (7)

lovastatin; (8) metformin; and (9) metoprolol. Pls.’ Ex. 32, Whitman Report (“Whitman Report”) at 30,

ECF No. 174-9. Albuterol is prescribed to treat asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

(“COPD”). Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 61. Amlodipine besylate is prescribed to treat high blood pressure

and chest pain. Id. ¶ 62. Enalapril is prescribed to treat high blood pressure and heart failure. Id. ¶ 63.

HIV medications are prescribed to treat patients with HIV infection. Id. ¶ 64. Hydrochlorothiazide is

prescribed to treat high blood pressure and fluid retention caused by heart disease, among other conditions.

Id. ¶ 65. Insulin is prescribed to treat diabetes mellitus. Id. ¶ 66. Lovastatin is prescribed to lower one’s

cholesterol. Id. ¶ 67. Metformin is prescribed to treat type 2 diabetes. Id. ¶ 68. Metoprolol is prescribed

to treat high blood pressure and chest pain. Id. ¶ 69. Dr. Whitman separately analyzes delays in the

dispensing of methadone from March 20, 2009, to May 3, 2010. Id. at 188–91.

5

Dr. Whitman also analyzed data regarding the following psychotropic medications: (1)

chlorpromazine; (2) clonazepam; (3) fluoxetine and sertraline; (4) gabapentin; (5) lorazepam and diazepam;

and (6) venlafaxine. Whitman Report at 132. Chlorpromazine is prescribed to treat symptoms of

schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 52. Clonazepam is prescribed to

control seizures and to relieve anxiety. Id. ¶ 53. Fluoxetine and sertraline are prescribed to treat depression.

Id. ¶ 54. Gabapentin is prescribed to treat seizures, neuropathic pain, bipolar disorder, and anxiety. Id. ¶

55. Lorazepam and diazepam are prescribed to control seizures; anxiety; panic attacks; irritable bowel

syndrome; insomnia, nausea and vomiting from cancer treatment; as well as the agitation, hallucinations,

and lowered seizure threshold caused by alcohol withdrawal. Id. ¶ 56. Venlafaxine is prescribed to treat

depression. Id. ¶ 57.

7

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when the medication was actually dispensed to the detainee (“fill date”). And he evaluated that data over time. Whitman Report at 8–9. Dr. Whitman also analyzed whether a statistically significant difference existed between the rates at which a prescription was filled (i.e., the “prescription rates”) over time.
To do this, Dr. Whitman divided the data into five time periods: (1) October 1, 2006, to March 30, 2007; (2) October 1, 2007, to March 30, 2008; (3) October 1, 2008, to March 30, 2009; (4) October 1, 2009, to March 30, 2010; and (5) October 1, 2010, to March 30, 2011. Id. at 7. Based upon his analysis, Dr. Whitman concluded that CCJ took longer to fill prescriptions for the medications at issue in 2006-07 than in 2010-11, and this difference was statistically significant and could not be attributed to mere chance. He also concluded that prescription rates were statistically higher during the 2010-11 period as compared to the 2006-07 period, and that the difference could not be due to mere chance. See id. at 110 (albuterol), 112 (amlodipine besylate), 113 (enalapril), 119 (HIV medications), 122 (hydrochlorothiazide), 123 (insulin), 126 (lovastatin), 127 (metformin), 129 (metoprolol), 175–77 (chlorpromazine), 177–79 (chlonazepam), 180–82 (fluoxetine and sertraline), 182–83 (gabapentin), 184–85 (lorazepam and diazepam), 186–87 (venlafaxine).
Dr. Whitman separately analyzed the time it took for CCJ to dispense methadone to newly admitted detainees between March 20, 2009, and May 3, 2010. Id. at 187, 190–91. He concluded that only 226 of 1,483 methadone prescriptions, or roughly 15%, were provided with methadone within four days of admittance. Id. at 191.
B. Dr. Lambert King and Dr. Pablo Stewart Plaintiffs also offer Dr. Lambert King and Dr. Pablo Stewart to testify as to the dispensation of non-psychotropic and psychotropic medication at CCJ. Both experts have experience managing, monitoring, and reforming health systems in correctional settings. Pls.’ Ex. 33, King
8

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Report at 2–3, ECF No. 174-10; Stewart Report at 2–4. To reach their conclusions, they relied on their own expertise, court-ordered compliance reports, Dr. Whitman’s statistical analysis, and a report issued by the U.S. Department of Justice report (which will be discussed below). King Report at 5–6; Stewart Report at 15. In addition, Dr. Stewart interviewed four detainees—Teria Beasley, Andre White, John Holmes, and Jess Mason—and examined portions of their medical charts and deposition testimony. Stewart Report at 15; see Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 56.
According to Dr. King, from October 2006 to November 2010, significant numbers of detainees who entered CCJ did not receive non-psychotropic prescription medication for serious medical conditions in a timely manner. King Report at 5. Furthermore, Dr. King determined that CCJ’s failure to timely dispense these medicines recklessly placed large numbers of detainees at risk for physical harm, morbidity, and mortality. Id.
Dr. Stewart opined, based upon Dr. Whitman’s analysis, that although CCJ’s intake process may have improved over time, many newly admitted detainees had to wait approximately one week to receive non-psychotropic medications and as much as two to three days for psychotropic medication. Stewart Report at 15–16. As a result, Dr. Stewart concluded that CCJ’s intake practices before October 2010 were likely to harm persons who had previously been prescribed medication for serious medical and mental health problems. Id. at 2–3.
Both Drs. King and Stewart also asserted that CCJ’s 21-day methadone tapering policy caused gratuitous pain to all detainees who were subjected to the policy. King Report at 6; Stewart Report at 2. In addition, Dr. Stewart found that, of those detainees who eventually received methadone within fourteen days of being admitted to CCJ between 2009 and 2011, fifteen percent had to wait several days before receiving their first dose. Stewart Report at 30.
9

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C. Dr. Lynn Sander and Dr. Avery Hart For their part, Defendants offer Dr. Lynn Sander and Dr. Avery Hart. Dr. Sander is an internist and an independent consultant in the field of correctional healthcare. See Cook Cty.’s Reply Ex. L.R., Sander Report at 1, ECF No. 245-7. In that role, she has monitored Delaware’s mental healthcare system for compliance with reforms required by a remedial settlement agreement with the DOJ. Id. Here, Dr. Sander reviewed, among other things, the medical records, depositions, and declarations of thirty-three class representatives and other witnesses. See generally id.; Sander Aff. Dr. Sander also conducted a site visit to observe CCJ’s intake area in October 2011. Defs.’ Ex. 2, Sander Dep. at 67:15–17, ECF No. 195-2. Dr. Sander determined that the medical and mental health treatment that CCJ provided to the thirty-three detainees satisfied the requisite standard of care. Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 12–44. Dr. Avery Hart was employed by Cermak for 20 years and became its Chief Medical Officer in 2008. Hart Dep. I at 8:1–3. Based on his knowledge of the intake procedures and his work experience, Dr. Hart opined that CCJ’s intake systems, policies, and procedures were adequate to meet the medical and mental health needs of detainees entering CCJ throughout the class period. Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 47; Cook Cty.’s Ex. 12, Hart Dep. of 4/18/12 (“Hart Dep. 4/18/12”), at 14:21–20:16, ECF No. 195-2. With regard to the methadone tapering program, Dr. Hart concluded that, if a detainee’s participation in a methadone program before admission is not verified, medication other than methadone may be prescribed to alleviate withdrawal symptoms. Defs.’ LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. ¶ 74, ECF No. 204.
10

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IV. Department of Justice Report on CCJ’s Intake Procedures
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) formally investigated conditions at CCJ.
The DOJ issued a report of its findings on July 11, 2008 (“DOJ Report”).6 Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3)
Stmt. ¶¶ 33–35. In it, the DOJ stated that the “medical care provided at CCJ falls below the
constitutionally required standards of care” with respect to intake screening and medication
administration. Id. ¶ 34. Pls.’ Ex. 28, DOJ Report (“DOJ Report”) at 42, ECF No. 174-9.
As for CCJ’s medical screening process at intake, the DOJ found that it was “grossly
inadequate.” DOJ Report at 45.
Generally accepted correctional medical standards require that incoming inmates be screened by staff trained to identify and triage serious medical needs, including drug and alcohol withdrawal, communicable diseases, acute or chronic needs, mental illness, and potential suicide risks. CCJ’s intake screening fails to identify such needs and increases the risk of serious harm.
Id. at 44–45 (cited by Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 33); see id. at 43, 59–60 (cited by Pls.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 34–35).
The DOJ also concluded that CCJ’s mental health screening procedures at intake were
“completely inadequate.”
The policy governing the CCJ mental health screening process is completely inadequate. Insufficiently trained MHSs perform mental health initial intake screening at CCJ. This screening is not accomplished under appropriate medical supervision. The system allows technicians, who are not adequately or appropriately trained in detecting mental illness, to query inmates and detainees regarding their mental health history.
Id. at 60. The DOJ found that no psychiatrists were assigned to supervise or support the intake
area where the initial mental health screening took place. Id. at 61.

6

The DOJ Report is admissible evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii), which provides an

exclusion in civil cases to the hearsay rule for “factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.”

See ECF No. 321 (citing Daniel v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 742 (7th Cir. 2016)).

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In support of these conclusions, the DOJ compared the percentage of detainees who received medical evaluations by PAs or physicians at CCJ to the percentage of inmates nationwide who require such care. For instance, the DOJ determined that, nationwide, more than 30% of inmates have acute or chronic conditions that would necessitate a medical or mental health evaluation by a physician or PA on the first day of admission. At CCJ, however, only 15% of new detainees received a medical evaluation during a June 2007 visit, only 5% during a July 2007 onsite visit, and, on average, only 5% of detainees were identified as having psychiatric problems.7 Id. at 43, 61 (cited by Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 33). The DOJ found that CCJ’s “numbers depart[ed] significantly from what would be expected in CCJ’s inmate population, which strongly suggested that CCJ’s intake screening process is incomplete and inadequate.” Id.
The DOJ investigation also found systemic problems with medication administration, noting that CCJ frequently failed to “provide critical medications to inmates without delay or lapses.” Id. at 51. The investigation also revealed “delays ranging from days to weeks for inmates having their psychotropic medications started after their admission to CCJ.” Id. at 64. The DOJ concluded that these “significant delays, errors, and lapses in medication administration . . . contributed to needless suffering and inmate hospitalizations.” Id. at 51.
In addition, the DOJ determined that CCJ had failed to provide detainees with access to important information, such as its rules and regulations on how to access medical and mental health care and how to file a grievance. Id. at 83–84. This is contrary to the “[g]enerally accepted correctional practice requir[ing] that newly admitted inmates are given an opportunity to learn about the facility rules and regulations, services that are available, [and] policies and procedures

7

The DOJ Report noted that “the County's Director of Psychiatric Services acknowledged that the

screening process was flawed and one would expect the percentage of inmates identified with psychiatric

problems to be as much as ten percent.” Id.

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Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 13 of 38 PageID #:13785
that affect the inmate . . . .” Id. at 42. Although intake personnel told DOJ investigators that detainees were offered a copy of the inmate handbook upon admission, the investigators saw only a small stack of handbooks behind a counter in the strip-search area of the receiving room, and did not see any of the hundreds of detainees actually carrying a handbook. Id. Moreover, CCJ maintained no record of whether a handbook was offered to a detainee or whether a detained accepted one. Id. The DOJ recommended that CCJ develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure that detainees have access to health care, can utilize an adequate grievance process, and are informed of CCJ’s policies and procedures upon admission. Id. at 79, 83–84.
Legal Standard Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must “view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2014). “Once the party moving for summary judgment uncovers a hole in the opponent’s case, the nonmoving party that bears the ultimate burden at trial must show that there is evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.” Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). “Material facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit.” Id. at 598–99. “The judge must ask whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence supporting a plaintiff's position is insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id.
Analysis Section 1983 provides a private right of action against persons acting under color of state law who violate constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees.”
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Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 14 of 38 PageID #:13786
Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1991). “The protections for pre-trial detainees [under the Fourteenth Amendment] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner, and we frequently consider the standards to be analogous.” Washington v. LaPorte Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As for Plaintiffs’ claims against Cook County and Sheriff Dart in his official capacity, “[e]ver since the Supreme Court decided Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the availability of entity liability under section 1983 has been established.” Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Glisson, 138 S. Ct. 109 (2017). An entity “that has contracted to provide essential government services is subject to at least the same rules that apply to public entities.” Id. at 378–79 (citing Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2014); Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982)).
There are three ways to establish Monell liability under § 1983. Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379. First, a plaintiff may establish that “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35 (2010); see Glisson, 849 F.3d 378 (“[I]f institutional policies are themselves deliberately indifferent to the quality of care provided, institutional liability is possible.”). Second, a plaintiff may establish that the action was “pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; see League of Women Voters of Chi. v. City of Chi., 757 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that municipal liability may also be based on “a common practice that is so widespread and well settled that it constitutes a custom or practice”). Third, a plaintiff may show that a constitutional violation “was
14

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 15 of 38 PageID #:13787
committed (that is, authorized or directed) at the policymaking level of government.” Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011). I. Sheriff of Cook County
The Sheriff raises two primary arguments in support of his motion. See Sheriff’s Mem. Law Supp. Summ. J. 1–5, ECF No. 191; Sheriff’s LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶¶ 1–8, ECF No. 192. First, the Sheriff argues that summary judgment should be granted in his favor because he is entitled to rely on Cermak’s medical staff to meet the medical needs of CCJ detainees. Put another way, the Sheriff contends that he should not be held responsible because the challenged intake policies were not his policies, but those of CCJ’s medical provider, Cermak.
Under Illinois law, “the sheriff shall . . . be responsible for the hiring and training of all personnel necessary to operate and maintain the jail.” See 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 125/3; Moy v. Cty. of Cook, 640 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ill. 1994); see DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cty., 209 F.3d 973, 976 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Illinois sheriffs have final policymaking authority over jail operations.”); see 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 125/2. The Sheriff is correct that Cermak is the entity that provides medical care to detainees at CCJ. Pls.’ LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8; see Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 687 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006). “But the constitutional duty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to provide adequate health care rests on the custodian”—here, the Sheriff. See Daniel v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 2016); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 125/2 (“The Sheriff of each county in this State shall be the warden of the jail of the county[.]”); see also Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664– 65 (7th Cir. 2012). The Sheriff’s reliance on Cermak to provide medical care to detainees does not excuse him from liability under § 1983. See King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that a defendant “cannot shield itself from § 1983 liability by contracting out its duty to provide medical services”).
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Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 16 of 38 PageID #:13788
Furthermore, to the extent that the Sheriff relies completely upon Cermak’s policies, customs, and practices in these matters, he has delegated his final decision-making authority to Cermak for the provision of medical services, thereby adopting them as his own. See id. at 1020 (the “company’s policy becomes that of the County if the County delegates final decision-making authority to it”).
Second, the Sheriff argues in a similar vein that no reasonable jury could find him liable because, according to Cermak’s policies, the sole discretion as to medical care rests with the responsible physician, not him. See Sheriff’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. (citing Cermak Policy 0108A-02 (“Matters of medical, mental health and dental judgment are the sole province of the responsible physician and the chief dentist.”)). But this argument misunderstands the issues raised in this litigation. Plaintiffs’ position is that Cermak’s intake practices (as adopted by the Sheriff) unreasonably denied and delayed the dispensation of prescription medication necessary to treat the serious medical needs of the class members, without regard to the medical judgment of Cermak’s physicians. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. II. Cook County
Turning to Cook County, Plaintiffs assert that the county also should be held liable for CCJ’s allegedly unconstitutional intake policies and practices. As noted, however, the Sheriff has final policymaking authority over jail operations and the provision of medical services to detainees. See 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-6017; 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 125/2; id. 125/17. Furthermore, “the sheriff’s statutory duties with respect to [CCJ] are independent of and unalterable by any governing body.” Moy, 640 N.E.2d at 929 (finding that the Cook County Sheriff is an independently elected officer, that no employment relationship exists between Cook County and Sheriff, and that employees of the Jail are solely under Sheriff’s control); see DeGenova, 209 F.3d at 976 (citing Moy, 640 N.E.2d at 929). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs contend that Cook
16

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 17 of 38 PageID #:13789
County is directly liable for the allegedly unconstitutional intake policies, practices, and customs at CCJ, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Cook County as a matter of law.
That said, Defendant Cook County is required by statute to fund the Sheriff’s expenses, including any judgments entered against the Sheriff in his official capacity. 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-1106; Davis, 452 F.3d at 687 n.1 (“Cook County is a unit of local government that finances the Cook County Jail.”). Therefore, Cook County remains an indispensable party in this limited capacity. Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cty., 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). III. Deliberate Indifference Claim8
Plaintiffs and the Sheriff have filed cross motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim that the Sheriff exhibited deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the class members. “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . . [and includes] intentionally interfering with . . . treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiffs must establish that: (1) each of them had an objectively serious medical condition that posed a substantial risk; (2) the defendant knew of the risk; (3) the defendant failed to act in disregard of that risk; and (4) the defendant’s indifference caused some injury. See Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 2017); Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).
A. Objectively Serious Medical Conditions That Pose a Substantial Risk In support of their motion, Plaintiffs argue that they have established an objectively serious medical need. “An objectively serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician

8

In its briefs, the County raised various substantive arguments in support of its motion for summary

judgment that go to Plaintiffs’ claims against the Sheriff. The Court will address these arguments as though

the Sheriff raised them on his own behalf.

17

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 18 of 38 PageID #:13790
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Zentmyer v. Kendall Cty., Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)).
“A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious . . . .” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 620. Instead, courts consider various factors, including: (1) whether the failure to treat the condition “could result in further significant injury,” Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373 (internal quotation marks omitted); (2) whether it was a condition “that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment,” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 523 (7th Cir. 2008); (3) whether the condition “significantly affect[ed] an individual’s daily activities,” id.; or (4) whether the condition involves “chronic and substantial pain,” id.
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether asthma, diabetes, high cholesterol, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate withdrawal, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, and schizophrenia are objectively serious health needs. But Plaintiffs have presented evidence that (1) the medical professionals at CCJ found these conditions worthy of treatment, (2) the conditions significantly affected the daily life activities of detainees, and (3) the failure to treat the particular condition could have resulted in further significant injury. See Pls.’ Reply Ex. 78, Bailey Decl. (“Bailey Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–6, 9, 13 (seizure disorder), ECF No. 221-10; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 83, Beasley Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6, 15–16 (bipolar disorder), ECF No. 221-12; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 66, Gerl Dep. at 110:2–18 (opiate withdrawal), ECF No. 221-5; Pl.’s Reply Ex. 81, Granderson Decl. (“Granderson Decl.”) ¶¶ 4–6, 8, ECF No. 22111 (hypertension, diabetes); King Report at 5 (high cholesterol); Pls.’ Reply Ex. 69, Lee Decl. (“Lee Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 15–16 (depression/bipolar disorder/anxiety), ECF No. 221-6; Cook Cty. Reply Ex. 42, Stuckey Dep. at 103:9–15 (HIV), ECF No. 245-3; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 77, White Decl. (“White Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 5, 8, 13 (schizophrenia), ECF No. 221-10; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 75, Woodard Decl. ¶¶ 3–
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4, 12 (asthma), ECF No. 221-9; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 61, Raba Dep. (“Raba Dep.”) at 22:19–21 (diabetes), ECF No. 221-2; id. at 84:20–85:4 (high cholesterol); Stewart Report at 26–27 (schizophrenia). What is more, Plaintiffs have offered the opinions of Dr. King and Dr. Stewart that these conditions constitute objectively serious health needs. See King Report at 5–6; Stewart Report at 26–30.
Furthermore, numerous courts have held that conditions such as asthma, diabetes, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate withdrawal, seizure disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, and schizophrenia present objectively serious health needs. See, e.g., Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 942 (6th Cir. 2018) (bipolar disorder); Pittman, 746 F.3d at 775 (depression); Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2013) (hypertension); Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 678 (7th Cir. 2012) (schizophrenia); Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2008) (asthma); Davis, 452 F.3d at 695–96 (methadone treatment for opiate withdrawal); Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2000) (HIV); Van Hoorelbeke v. Hawk, 70 F.3d 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1995) (diabetes); Brame v. Dart, No. 09 C 3966, 2010 WL 5330741, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2010) (seizure disorder); Lacy v. Shaw, 357 F. App’x 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2009) (anxiety disorder). Cf. Shenk v. Cattaraugus Cty., 305 F. App’x 751, 754 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating in dicta that anxiety “appears to satisfy at least two of the . . . factors, anxiety being a condition that a doctor would find important, and which can affect one’s daily activities.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of establishing a triable issue of fact as to whether asthma, diabetes, high cholesterol, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate withdrawal, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, and schizophrenia constitute objectively serious health needs.
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B. Whether the Sheriff Was Subjectively Aware of the Risk “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (citation omitted). “[I]f the risk is obvious, so that a reasonable man would realize it, we might well infer that [the defendant] did in fact realize it; but the inference cannot be conclusive, for we know that people are not always conscious of what reasonable people would be conscious of[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To prove knowledge, a plaintiff may adduce evidence that a substantial risk was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it.” Id. at 842–43. And, of course, “a prison official may ‘not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.’” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8). Here, Plaintiffs contend that the Sheriff knew of the risk based upon a number of events, beginning in 1996. First, Plaintiffs argue, the case Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Department, 95 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1996), provided the Sheriff with notice of the substantial risks caused by CCJ’s deficient intake procedures. In Donald, the plaintiff claimed that his heart medication had been confiscated by CCJ personnel at intake, and that, as a result, he suffered a heart attack two days later. Id. at 551. When the defendant moved to dismiss the Monell claim against CCJ, the plaintiff disavowed asserting any claim based on an official policy or procedure and stated that he was suing the
20

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individual tortfeasors based on their own actions. Id. at 553. The district court dismissed the Monell cause of action because the plaintiff had not alleged a pattern or policy. See id.; Donald v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s, No. 93 C 530, 1994 WL 23077, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1994), rev’d, 95 F.3d at 562. The plaintiff moved for relief from judgment, listing the individual defendants, and the district court denied the motion, holding that, by the time the plaintiff had provided the names of the individuals, the claims against the defendants in their individual capacity were time-barred. Donald, 95 F.3d at 553.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment without considering whether the amended complaint could have related back to original complaint or, alternatively, whether the statute of limitations could be subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 562. Stating that the plaintiff’s “initial complaint clearly alleged facts sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment against at least some individual officers,” the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had failed “to provide ample opportunity for Donald to amend the complaint to render it legally viable.” Id. at 554.
Salient for our purposes, the plaintiff in Donald did not appeal the dismissal of his Monell claim, but, rather, appealed the denial of the motion seeking to amend the complaint to sue officers in their individual capacity. Thus, the appellate court had no occasion to address the CCJ’s official intake practices. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could not find that Donald put the Sheriff on notice that CCJ’s intake practices created a substantial risk to the health of class members.
Additionally, Plaintiffs cite to a May 2001 Court Monitoring Report (“Duran Report”) submitted by the John Howard Association in Duran v. Sheahan, 74 C 2949, which criticized various aspects of CCJ’s receiving room, including the space and design of the psychiatric
21

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 22 of 38 PageID #:13794
assessments area, the lack of areas for observation and isolation of detainees with psychiatric or medical conditions, and the distance between the receiving room and the Cermak facility where acute health problems were diagnosed and treated. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 13. Plaintiff also refer to a June 10, 2004, request by Dr. John Raba, who was the Chief Operating Officer of Cermak, for the construction of a new receiving facility and a new residential unit for chronically medically and mentally ill detainees. Id. ¶ 16. Lastly, Plaintiffs cite to a post 2005 letter from a Cermak PA to CCJ’s Interim Medical Director and Chief Operating Officer describing the lack of privacy and hygiene in the intake area. Trammel Dep. at 51:4–16; see Stadnicki Dep. at 40:9–13; 41:13–21.
But all three of these instances involve perceived problems with the physical layout of CCJ’s intake area. By contrast, the claims here deal with the actual medical screening and medication administration practices employed by CCJ at intake. Accordingly, the Court holds that no rational jury could find that these events provided the Sheriff with notice of a substantial risk of harm caused by CCJ’s intake practices.
Additionally, Plaintiffs point to the DOJ Report and argue that its findings placed the Sheriff on notice of the substantial risks caused by CCJ’s medication administration practices at intake. As noted, the DOJ concluded in its report that CCJ inadequately trained intake employees with regard to identifying and triaging serious medical needs, including drug and alcohol withdrawal, communicable diseases, acute or chronic needs, mental illness, and potential suicide risks. DOJ Report at 43.
In addition, the DOJ discussed several instances where CCJ fell below the constitutionally required standards of care.
Nadia H. died in late 2006, one day after being booked into CCJ, likely of withdrawal syndrome. During intake, she reported a history of heroin addiction, yet staff failed to document her drug use and
22

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 338 Filed: 05/30/19 Page 23 of 38 PageID #:13795
history of addiction. Despite knowledge that Nadia had a history of addiction, staff disregarded her emergent condition and placed her in general population. The next day she was found dead in her cell.
Id. at 44.
In June 2007, Lyle P. was booked into CCJ. At intake, Lyle reported his HIV infection and his strong adherence to his medication regimen, but he did not receive his medication prescription. Nearly two weeks passed before he was finally seen by an infectious disease specialist. Because of the two week lapse in medication, the specialist chose to delay treatment, which further enhanced the risks for Lyle to develop potentially-fatal drug resistance.
Id. at 45.
In 2007, Stella R. had a prescription for Coumadin and a prescription for hypertension medication, yet CCJ staff failed to order her prescriptions. Stella went nearly 20 days without her prescriptions. It was only after we brought this medication error to CCJ's attention that Stella had her prescriptions ordered.
Id.
Seth P. was seen for a psychiatric consult during our July 2007 onsite visit. Seth had been admitted to CCJ three to four weeks prior to the consult and, after initial screening, had been placed in the general population. No records were available or requested at the time of the consult. The psychiatrist evaluated Seth and assessed him as exhibiting grandiose thinking and hyperactivity, prescribed medications, and ordered Seth to be admitted to CCJ's acute psychiatric unit for further evaluation. Immediately following the psychiatric consult, Seth was sent to an outside emergency room for evaluation for a possible fracture of his right hand. Upon his return to CCJ, the intake MHS, who was not aware of the recent psychiatric assessment due to the inadequate record keeping, determined independently that Seth was to be admitted to the general population. The result was that Seth received no further psychiatric evaluation and did not receive the prescribed antipsychotic medication ordered by the psychiatrist.
Id. at 61–62. A reasonable jury could conclude that the DOJ Report provided the Sheriff with
notice that CCJ’s medication dispensation practices at intake posed a pervasive and substantial
risk to the serious medical conditions of detainees. See id. at 7, 9, 42.
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For their part, Defendants do not argue that the DOJ Report failed to provide the Sheriff notice or that the Sheriff was subjectively unaware of the substantial risks outlined therein. Instead, Defendants object to the admissibility of the DOJ Report. But, because the DOJ Report is being offered to prove notice and not to establish the truth of the matter asserted therein, it does not fall within the rule against hearsay. Furthermore, as noted, to the extent it is hearsay, it is admissible under Rule 803(8)(A)(iii). See Daniel, 833 F.3d at 738.
Defendants also contend that an order entered in United States v. Cook County, 10 C 2946, reserved their right to contest the findings and conclusions in the DOJ Report. See Defs.’ LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. ¶ 33 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 26, Agreed Order (“Agreed Order”) ¶ 5 [sic], 10 C 2946). But whether Defendants preserved the right to contest the contents of the DOJ Report in separate litigation is immaterial to the issue of whether the DOJ Report provided the Sheriff with notice that CCJ’s intake practices created a substantial health risk to detainees with serious health conditions.
Defendants are correct that the mere fact that the DOJ Report was sent to the Sheriff is not conclusive proof of his subjective knowledge that CCJ’s intake practices posed a substantial risk of serious harm to detainees. But it is certainly sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to the extent of his knowledge starting in July 11, 2008. On the other hand, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims are based on events that took place prior to that date, they have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the extent of the Sheriff’s knowledge of the risks at issue. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion is denied, and the Defendants’ cross-motions are granted to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to impose liability upon the Sheriff for the period prior to July 11, 2008.
As for what this ruling means for the class, a “certified class has a legal status separate from and independent of the interest asserted by the named plaintiff.” Whitlock v. Johnson, 153
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F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 1998); see E. Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12 (1977) (stating that, after a class is certified, “the class members would not need to be mooted or destroyed because subsequent events or the proof at trial had undermined the named plaintiffs’ individual claims.”). Inasmuch as any of the named Plaintiffs cannot assert deliberative indifference claims based on the above-identified medical conditions after July 11, 2008, their claims are dismissed. As for the others, they may remain as named Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs may seek leave to designate other members of the class as named Plaintiffs to the extent necessary under Rule 23.9

9

Defendants argue that three of the class representatives, Roy Cleaves, Carla Lofton, and Dan

Taylor, cannot represent the class because they were in custody when this lawsuit was filed and had not

exhausted their administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). See Cook Cty.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2, 23, ECF No. 191 (“Several Class Representative

are barred under the PLRA.”). The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense for which the defendants carry the burden

of proof.” Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2018). Because Cleaves’ and Lofton’s claims

seem to be based solely on alleged constitutional violations that occurred prior to July 11, 2008, the Sheriff’s

arguments are moot.

As for Taylor, he became a named Plaintiff in this lawsuit on March 31, 2008. Pls.’ LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 4, ECF No. 221. Defendants do not provide any evidence that Taylor was incarcerated in CCJ or a facility of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) on March 31, 2008. The Sheriff believes that, because CCJ records show that Taylor was released from CCJ into IDOC custody on November 26, 2007, to serve a four-year sentence, Taylor was in IDOC custody on March 31, 2008. Cook Cty.’s Ex. 13, Kramer Decl. Exs., CIMIS Standard Inquiry dated 4/10/08, ECF No. 195-2. The Sheriff, however, has not provided evidence regarding the date on which Taylor was released from IDOC custody. Curiously, the Sheriff does not explain how, if Taylor was in IDOC custody serving a four-year sentence, he was arrested and admitted into CCJ on May 8, 2008, as indicated by Taylor’s booking history records. See Defs.’ Ex. 13, Kramer Decl. Exs., Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Office Booking History Print Screen, at 29 (showing that Taylor entered CCJ on May 8, 2008, and again on August 5, 2008), ECF No. 198.

What is more, there is evidence in the record that CCJ’s intake practices failed to provide detainees access to information about CCJ’s grievance policy. See DOJ Report at 42, 83–84. A plaintiff is not obligated to exhaust administrative remedies that are unavailable. Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2016). Remedies are unavailable when there are “omissions by prison personnel, particularly failing to inform the prisoner of the grievance process.” Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2016). Moreover, it is unclear when CCJ adopted remedial measures to cure the deficiency. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have raised a genuine dispute as to whether administrative remedies were available to Taylor, and the Sheriff may seek an evidentiary hearing on this issue under Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008).
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C. Whether the Sheriff Failed to Act in Disregard of the Risk “Prison officials must provide inmates with medical care that is adequate in light of the severity of the condition and professional norms.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir. 2015). In a class action, deliberate indifference “can be demonstrated by proving there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in . . . procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care.” Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, “repeated examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff can sufficiently evidence deliberate indifference.” Kelley v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence that a plaintiff received “some medical care does not automatically defeat a claim of deliberate indifference if a fact finder could infer the treatment was so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate a medical condition.” Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, “[n]ot every refusal of medical treatment will constitute deliberate indifference, but if the cost of treating a substantial medical need is low, an official’s refusal to act is more likely to evidence deliberate indifference.” Carpenter v. Sullivan, 695 F. App’x 147, 150 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2004), and Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1999)).
1. Intake Screening Practices CCJ’s intake procedures during the class period required that a new detainee be evaluated in-person by a licensed medical professional before receiving prescription medication. Pls.’ LR
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56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 19. And, to receive an in-person evaluation, the detainee first must receive a referral from the CMT or MHS, neither of whom is a licensed medical professional. See Trammel Dep. at 41:2-10, 45:1–11; Martinez Dep. at 49:6:8. Plaintiffs cite to the experience of a number of class members to demonstrate that this procedure was grossly deficient. For the reasons stated above, the relevant examples are those that took place after July 11, 2008.
Daniel Gerl and Nicholas Morris told a CMT that they were taking methadone for opiate withdrawal, but neither was referred to a PA for an in-person evaluation, and neither received a prescription for methadone while at CCJ. See Gerl Dep. at 130–31; Sander Aff. at 34; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 72, Morris Decl. ¶¶ 4–6, ECF No. 221-8.
Teria Beasley and Yvette Lee told an MHS at intake that they were taking medication for bipolar disorder. Lee also stated that she was taking medication for depression. But, again, neither were referred for further evaluation by a psychiatrist, and neither received any psychotropic medication.10 Beasley Decl. ¶¶ 10–12, 14; Lee Dec. ¶¶ 11–15; Sander Aff. at 40, 64.
Plaintiffs also rely on the DOJ’s findings that CCJ’s medical screening process was “grossly inadequate” and the mental health screening was “completely inadequate.” DOJ Report at 45, 60. This report is admissible for the reasons already discussed. Moreover, the report was

10

Beasley and Lee were told by an MHS that, in order to receive psychotropic medications, they

would have to be admitted into CCJ’s psychiatric ward. See Beasley Decl. ¶ 10; Lee Decl. ¶ 12. Because

they were afraid of being housed in the psychiatric ward, they did not request a transfer. See Beasley Decl.

¶ 12; Lee Decl. ¶ 13.

According to Dr. Stewart, because most detainees in need of psychotropic medication did not require the level of care provided by the psychiatric ward, which housed prisoners with extremely serious mental illnesses, the practice of requiring a detainee to be assigned to the psychiatric ward discouraged most detainees from requesting and receiving needed psychotropic medication. Stewart Report at 24; see Pls.’ Ex. 63, Parish Dep. at 150:13-17 (“Well, I had spent the night before up on 2N with people screaming and smearing feces on their walls and walking, yelling, and being restrained . . . [I recall] having to watch staff jump on people and it’s traumatic being up there.”). The practice of requiring detainees to be housed in the psychiatric ward in order to be prescribed psychotropic medications has been eliminated (although the record is silent as to when). See Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 38.
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not “controverted” by the Agreed Order entered in United States v. Cook County, 10 C 2946, as Defendants claim. Defs.’ LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. ¶ 33 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 26, Agreed Order (“Agreed Order”) ¶ 5 [sic], 10 C 2946). Rather, the Agreed Order only preserved Defendants’ rights to contest the findings in the report. Agreed Order ¶ 4 (“The [DOJ’s] findings letter and the conclusions therein are contested by Defendants. Furthermore, by entering into this Agreed Order, Defendants to this action do not waive the right to contest the July 11, 2008 findings letter or any of the conclusions set for therein.”).
The Sheriff also points to Dr. Hart’s opinion that CCJ’s intake system during the class period was adequate to meet the medical and mental health needs of detainees entering CCJ. Id. ¶ 47; see Hart Dep. 4/18/12, at 14:21–20:16. Defendants also rely on Dr. Sander’s conclusion that the treatment of detainees during this time comported with the community standard of care. Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 12–44; Sander Aff. at 34 (Gerl), 42, (Lee), 46 (Morris), 64 (Beasley).
In the end, both Plaintiffs and Defendants have presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CCJ’s screening practices delayed or denied necessary treatment of the serious health needs faced by new detainees at CCJ.
2. Delayed Dispensation of Medication Prescribed at Intake In addition, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, even when a PA prescribed medication at intake, detainees experienced substantial delays in receiving it or did not receive it at all. The record includes the following examples that occurred after July 11, 2008. At intake, a PA prescribed John Hendrix, Lance Woodard, and Terry Tharpe albuterol to treat their asthma, but none of them received an inhaler before they were released from CCJ. Pls.’ Reply Ex. 86, Hendrix Decl. (“Hendrix Decl.”) ¶¶ 10–11, ECF No. 221-13; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 75, Woodard Decl. (“Woodard Decl.”) ¶¶ 8–12, ECF No. 221-9; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 73, Tharpe Decl.
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(“Tharpe Decl.”) ¶¶ 10–12, 14, ECF No. 221-9; Sander Aff. at 47–48, 50–51, 69. Hendrix was incarcerated for six weeks, Woodard for four days, and Tharp for eight days. Hendrix Decl. ¶¶ 10–11; Woodard Decl. ¶ 8; Tharpe Decl. ¶¶ 10–12, 14; Sander Aff. at 47–48, 50–51, 69.
Veronica Stuckey and LaDon Pilcher received prescriptions for HIV medication at intake. But Stuckey did not receive the medication until twenty-one days later, and Pilcher did not receive it until three days later. Pls.’ Reply Ex. 84, Stuckey Decl. ¶¶ 10–11, ECF No. 221-13; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 74, Pilcher Decl. ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No. 221-9; Sander Aff. at 49, 64–65.
Jess Mason was prescribed hypertension medication, but there is no record that he received the medication before he was released twenty-three days later. Pls.’ Reply Ex. 82, Mason Decl. ¶¶ 16–17, ECF No. 221-12; Sander Aff. at 59.
Rodney Bailey was prescribed seizure medication upon intake, but the medication was not dispensed. He suffered a seizure three days after he arrived at CCJ. Bailey Decl. ¶¶ 11–13; Sander Aff. at 54.
John Holmes was prescribed medication to treat depression at intake on October 25, 2010, but there is no indication that the medication was ever dispensed. See Sander Aff. 67.
In addition to these particular examples, Dr. Whitman analyzed the time it took for CCJ to dispense certain medications, once they were prescribed. In particular, he focused on nonpsychotropic medications prescribed for asthma (albuterol), diabetes (insulin, glipizide, metformin), HIV infection (atazanavir, atazanavir sulfate, efavirenz, efavirenz-emtricitabine-t, lamivudine, lopinavir-ritonavir, ritonavir, tenofovir, tenofovir disporoxil fuma, zidovudine), and hypertension (amlodipine besylate, enalapril, metoprolol, hydrochlorothiazide). Whitman Report at 1–131. He also studied psychotropic medications necessary to treat anxiety and seizure disorder (clonazepam, lorazepam, and diazepam), bipolar disorder (gabapentin), depression (fluoxetine,
29

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sertraline, venlafaxine) and schizophrenia (chlorpromazine). Id. at 132–87; Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 52–57, 61–69.11
Using this data, Dr. Whitman measured, for each medication, the length of time between the date a detainee with a chronic health need was admitted into CCJ (“intake date”) and the date that a prescription was dispensed (“fill date”) to treat the detainee’s chronic health need. Whitman Report at 8–9. In doing so, Dr. Whitman divided the data into time periods: (1) October 1, 2008, to March 30, 2009 (“08–09”); (2) October 1, 2009, to March 30, 2010 (“09–10”); and (3) October 1, 2010, to March 30, 2011 (“10–11”). Id. at 7.
The following charts represent a summary of the results of Dr. Whitman’s study. Under each column labeled with the particular time period, “08–09,” “09–10,” and “10–11,” the chart includes the percentage of detainees during that particular time period, who received the denoted prescription medication within one day of being admitted into CCJ. The last column, labeled “# in 10–11 > week,” represents the number of detainees during the 2010-11 time period, who had to wait a length of time greater than a week before receiving his or her medication.

11

Plaintiffs also rely on Dr. Whitman’s conclusion that there was a statistically significant

improvement in the time it took to dispense medication between the “06–07” period and the “10–11” period.

See, e.g., id. at 110, 112–13, 119, 122–23, 126–27, 129, 175–77, 177–79, 180–82, 182–83, 184–85, 186–

87. Plaintiffs suggest that a reasonable jury could infer from these data that the improvements were not a

result of chance, but affirmative remedial actions taken by the Sheriff to address a known problem.

Although the logic is less than compelling, it is sufficient to survive summary judgment.

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Dr. Whitman’s data indicate that considerable percentages of detainees had to wait more than a day to receive the medication that had been prescribed at intake. And, during the 2010– 2011 time period, an appreciable number of detainees had to wait more than a week before they received their medication.
Furthermore, Dr. Whitman analyzed methadone prescribed for the treatment of opiate withdrawal. Whitman Report at 8, 188–91. Methadone dispensing records from March 20, 2009, to May 3, 2010, were matched to a detainee’s inmate number to determine the length of time between a detainee’s admission date and the date methadone was first dispensed. Id. at 8. As summarized in the following chart, Dr. Whitman’s study demonstrated that a significant percentage of detainees who were designated into the methadone program had to wait more than
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one day to receive the first dosage of methadone, including 25 detainees who had to wait more than a week.
According to Dr. Stewart, a person suffering from drug addiction will experience extremely painful withdrawal symptoms after four days without methadone. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 74. Effects include nausea, vomiting, muscle aches, increased heart rate, and sometimes an increased respiratory rate. Id. ¶ 76. Defendants, however, deny that detainees experiencing opiate withdrawal were left completely untreated for four days and assert that other drugs may have been prescribed to alleviate withdrawal symptoms. See Defs.’ LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. ¶ 74. But this is a factual issue to be left to the jury.
The Sheriff also attacks Dr. Whitman’s entire analysis, arguing that the underlying data is flawed, because it only reflects only when the dispensation of a medication was recorded in the system, not when the medication was actually dispensed to the detainee. Defs.’ Reply Ex. L.R., Sander Report at 25, ECF No. 245-7; see also Blackwell Dep. at 61:17–21. Indeed, according to Dr. Sander, when a PA dispensed medications at intake, there were times when the dispensing information was not entered into CCJ’s computer system until several days later due to staffing
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issues. Sander Report at 25.12 But it is unclear from the record exactly which medications a PA could or could not dispense at intake. See, e.g., Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 60.13 Furthermore, the Sheriff’s argument would not apply to psychotropic drugs, which a PA could not dispense on his or her own. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 20; Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 9. In any event, such challenges are more appropriately raised in cross-examination at trial, rather than at the summary judgment stage.
Plaintiffs also rely on Dr. King and Dr. Stewart to corroborate the delay in disbursal of medication prescribed at intake. According to Dr. King, a significant number of detainees, who were admitted to CCJ between October 2006 and November 2010, did not receive nonpsychotropic prescription medication in a timely manner. King Report at 5. Dr. King also concluded that, while circumstances had improved by the 2010–2011 time period, the records indicated that many detainees still did not receive medication for serious health needs until a week after intake. Id. at 6–7. From this, Dr. King opined that CCJ’s failure to provide timely prescription medication for serious medical conditions recklessly placed large numbers of detainees at risk for physical harm, morbidity, and mortality. Id. at 6.
Dr. Stewart, in turn, concluded that the intake practices at CCJ pre-October 2010 were likely to harm persons, who had previously been prescribed psychotropic medication. Stewart Report at 2–3. Dr. Stewart continued that, although CCJ’s intake screening process may have improved over time, a significant number of detainees still did not receive their prescription

12

The Sheriff has pressed the identical arguments in support of a motion to bar Dr. Whitman’s expert

opinion in its entirety, which the Court has denied.

13

At a minimum, at intake, a PA could prescribe and dispense albuterol inhalers for asthma,

metformin and glipizide for diabetes, and carbamazepine for seizure disorders. Def. Cook Cty.’s LR

56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 61. But that is the full extent of the record.

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medications until they have been at the jail for more than a week and did not receive psychotropic medication to treat depression until the second or third day after admission. Id. at 15–16.
And Plaintiffs again rely on the DOJ Report that found that CCJ frequently failed to “provide critical medications to inmates without delay or lapses.” DOJ Report at 51. In fact, the DOJ concluded that there were “delays ranging from days to weeks for inmates having their psychotropic medications started after their admission to CCJ.” Id. at 64. The DOJ also determined that these “significant delays, errors, and lapses in medication administration . . . contributed to needless suffering and inmate hospitalizations.” Id. at 51.
In response, Defendants rely upon the opinions offered by Dr. Sander and Dr. Hart. Both expressed the opinion that the treatment of the detainees met the community standards of care, and that CCJ’s intake systems, policies, and procedures were adequate to meet the medical and mental health needs of the detainees throughout the class period. Def. Cook Cty.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 12–44, 47; Hart Dep. of 4/18/12 at 14:21–20:16.
Such contradictory evidence create a genuine issue as to whether CCJ’s intake practices significantly delayed the dispensation of medications that were prescribed to detainees during intake.
3. Methadone Tapering Policy To support their claim that CCJ’s methadone tapering policy was grossly deficient after July 11, 2008, Plaintiffs refer to the experience of Driscoll, who was admitted to CCJ on January 26, 2009, and placed in CCJ’s twenty-one-day methadone tapering program. See Driscoll Dep. at 115, 124. Driscoll received his first dose of methadone within twenty-four hours of admission, and lower dosages until the dosage was eventually decreased to zero. Sander Aff. at 13. According to Driscoll, as a result, he experienced aching in his legs, sweating, chills, vomiting, and hallucinations. Id. at 142.
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In addition to Dr. Whitman’s statistical analysis, Plaintiffs rely on the opinions of Dr. King and Dr. Stewart, both of whom determined that CCJ’s methadone tapering policy caused gratuitous pain to enrolled detainees. King Report at 7; Stewart Report at 2, 29–30. However, Defendant’s expert, Dr. Sander, determined that Driscoll’s treatment met the community standards of care. Sander Aff. at 13. This competing evidence again creates a genuine issue of fact for trial regarding the constitutionality of CCJ’s methadone tapering policy.
D. Whether the Delay in Treatment Caused Harm “A delay in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if it exacerbates an injury or prolongs the detainee’s pain, depending on the ‘seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.’” Carpenter, 695 F. App’x at 150–51 (quoting Perez, 792 F.3d at 778); see Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (7th Cir. 2012). “In cases where prison officials delayed rather than denied medical assistance to an inmate, courts have required the plaintiff to offer ‘verifying medical evidence’ that the delay (rather than the inmate’s underlying condition) caused some degree of harm.” Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007); see Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996). “That is, a plaintiff must offer medical evidence that tends to confirm or corroborate a claim that the delay was detrimental.” Williams, 491 F.3d at 715. “Clearly, expert testimony that the plaintiff suffered because of a delay in treatment would satisfy the requirement.” Id. But expert testimony is not required. See Gil, 381 F.3d at 662 (holding that a detainee’s stating he felt pain from an infection after the denial of a single dose of prescribed antibiotic, and felt better after it was administered, was sufficient to withstand summary judgment on the issue of causation); see also Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 865 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming a jury verdict where a plaintiff lacked expert testimony as to causation); Williams, 491 F.3d at 715–16 (affirming the denial of judgment as a matter of law where “a reasonable jury could
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have concluded from the medical records that the delay unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated [the plaintiff’s] pain and unnecessarily prolonged his high blood pressure”); Egebergh v. Nicholson, 272 F.3d 925, 928, 2001 WL 1491831 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity because a jury could infer that depriving an arrestee of one insulin shot exposed him to substantial danger).14
Furthermore, “[p]roximate cause is a question to be decided by a jury, and only in the rare instance that a plaintiff can proffer no evidence that a delay in medical treatment exacerbated an injury should summary judgment be granted on the issue of causation.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 624– 25; see Ortiz v. City of Chi., 656 F.3d 523, 534–35 (7th Cir. 2011). “[I]f the plaintiff offers evidence that allows the jury to infer that a delay in treatment harmed an inmate, there is enough causation evidence to reach trial.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 624–25.
Cook County contends that Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue regarding whether any delay resulting from CCJ’s intake practices proximately caused harm to any particular detainee. Detainees, however, have either testified or declared under the penalty of perjury that the delay in receiving their prescribed medications did harm them. Pls.’ Reply Exs. 41–86, Detainees’ Deps. and Decls. For example, asthma sufferers describe the pain and discomfort of not being able to breathe without albuterol. Hendrix Decl. ¶¶ 7, 15; Woodard Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12 (required emergency treatment at CCJ due to lack of an inhaler). HIV sufferers indicate that they contracted mouth infections because they did not receive their HIV medications. Sander Aff. at 66 (stating that Stuckey was seen on sick call for mouth lesions six days after intake); Pilcher Decl.

14

Furthermore, “[d]amages are not an element of liability in a deliberate indifference claim.” Cotts

v. Osafo, 692 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003)

(approving an award of nominal damages for Eighth Amendment violations), and Tyus v. Urban Search

Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 265 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that it is not harmless error to require a plaintiff to prove

“actual injury” when it is not an element of the claim)).

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¶ 14. A detainee with hypertension describes experiencing elevated blood pressure without his medication. See, e.g., Mason Decl. ¶¶ 12, 20. At least one detainee with a seizure disorder suffered a seizure and was brought to the emergency room three days after admission. Bailey Decl. ¶¶ 11– 13. Those with bipolar disorder attest to being unable to sleep and feeling uncontrolled mood swings, dizziness, jitteriness, and panic attacks. See Beasley Decl. ¶ 6; Lee Decl. ¶¶ 8, 16; Pls.’ Reply Ex. 52, Cleaves Dep. at 106, ECF No. 221-1. Those with depression felt suicidal, tired, and disoriented, and required psychiatric hospitalization shortly after being released from CCJ. See Lee Decl. ¶¶ 16–17 (checked into psychiatric ward at hospital a week after release); Holmes Decl. ¶¶ 21, 24b (police found him lost and in park and hospitalized him for psychiatric issues within a week after release from CCJ). One detainee with schizophrenia recounts how, until he received his medication, he became an insomniac and felt anxious, scared, jittery, and extremely paranoid to the point of fearing for his life. Pls.’ Reply Ex. 79, Mikel Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, ECF No. 221-11. Methadone users describe experiencing hallucinations, vomiting, and pain when they did not receive methadone or received a tapered dose under the methadone policy. Gerl Dep. at 110; Morris Decl. ¶ 18; Driscoll Dep. at 142.
Plaintiffs’ experts corroborate these testimonials. According to Dr. King, interruption in taking any of the non-psychotropic medications analyzed by Dr. Whitman, even for a few days, can pose a serious health risk for some patients. Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 60.15 These include acute exacerbation of asthma, acute coronary syndrome, myocardial infarction, life-threatening infections, epileptic and withdrawal seizures with associated injuries, uncontrolled diabetes, diabetic ketoacidosis, hypertension, and stroke. King Report at 5–6. Dr. Holland confirmed the

15

Defendants challenge the proposition that an interruption of these medications for a few days poses

a serious health risk. However, Defendants’ denial of this fact statement is unsupported by their citation to

the record. Defs.’ LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. ¶ 60 (citing a portion of Dr. Howard’s deposition that was not

included in Defendants’ exhibits in response to Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment).

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types of adverse symptoms the detainees experienced when their psychotropic medications were

discontinued. See Pls.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 52–57; Pls.’ Ex. 35, Holland Report, at 5–12, ECF

No. 174-11. From this, a jury could reasonably conclude that CCJ’s intake policies caused

Plaintiffs harm.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied, and

Cook County’s and the Sheriff’s cross-motions are granted in part and denied in part.

Cook County’s motion is granted with regard to its direct liability,but is denied to the extent

that Cook County is an indispensable party that must fund any judgment against the Sheriff. The

Sheriff’s motion is granted as to (1) claims asserting constitutional violations occurring prior to

July 11, 2008; and (2) claims based on medical conditions other than asthma, diabetes, high

cholesterol, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate withdrawal, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder,

bipolar disorder, depression, and schizophrenia. In all other respects, the Sheriff’s motion is

denied.

To the extent that any named Plaintiff may base a surviving claim on alleged constitutional

violations occurring on or after July 11, 2008, and to the extent that Plaintiffs wish to substitute

class representatives, Plaintiffs shall file a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint

within 28 days.

SO ORDERED

ENTER: 5/30/19

______________________________________ JOHN Z. LEE United States District Judge

38

 
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Exhibit 1

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 385-1 Filed: 12/10/19 Page 2 of 23 PageID #:13902

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Michael Parish, et al., Plaintiffs,
-vsSheriff of Cook County and Cook County,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No. 07 CV 4369 ) ) ) (Judge Lee) ) )

CLASS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

I. RECITALS

1. Nature of the Litigation. On August 3, 2007, the plaintiff,

Michael Parish, filed this case alleging violations of rights under the Four-

teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution regarding the dis-

continuation of medication that had been prescribed to him for a serious

health need. Thereafter, Curtis Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla

Lorton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark,

Kevin Sanders, and Carlotte Wilson joined the case as additional plaintiffs.

At all times relevant to the Complaint, Cook County designated Cermak

Health Services, a division of the Cook County Health and Hospital Sys-

tem, as the evaluator and provider of medical care to detainees at the Cook

County Jail.

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 385-1 Filed: 12/10/19 Page 3 of 23 PageID #:13903
2. Class Certification. On October 24, 2008, the district court ordered that the case proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3). The certified class consisted of: “All persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter.”
3. Preparation for Trial. The parties engaged in extensive discovery of documents and computer records. Each of the named plaintiffs answered written discovery and appeared for deposition. The parties conducted an additional twenty-four depositions of fact witnesses. Plaintiffs produced reports from four expert witnesses; defendants produced reports from two expert witnesses. The parties deposed each expert witness and filed cross-motions for summary judgment in September of 2012. In addition, the defendants filed a motion to decertify the plaintiff class.
4. The CRIPA Litigation: On May 13, 2010, the defendants in this action entered into an agreed order with the United States to resolve an action brought under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (“CRIPA”), United States v. Cook County, Illinois, et al., No. 10-cv-2946. Defendants constructed a new facility for processing detainees entering the Cook County Jail and implemented a variety of poli-
-2-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 385-1 Filed: 12/10/19 Page 4 of 23 PageID #:13904
cies and procedures that addressed the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this case. On August 30, 2013, the Medical Monitoring Team in the CRIPA litigation concluded that Cook County was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the intake screening aspects of the agreed order.
5. Important Rulings: On March 31, 2016, the Court denied the defendants’ motion to decertify the class. On April 17, 2018, the Court denied defendants’ motions to bar Plaintiffs’ experts. On May 30, 2019, the Court ruled on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider two aspects that ruling; the Court denied that motion as moot in light of the settlement negotiations described below.
6. Settlement Process. Recognizing the risk, uncertainty, and delay of contested litigation, the parties enlisted the assistance and guidance of Magistrate Judge Andrew Rodovich to explore the possibility of compromising all matters at issue. At a settlement conference held on September 5, 2019, Magistrate Judge Rodovich provided the parties with a recommendation for a proposed resolution of all matters at issue in this case. The parties have accepted that recommendation.
7. Certification by Class Counsel. Class counsel are skilled and experienced in class actions, have investigated the facts and the applicable
-3-

Case: 1:07-cv-04369 Document #: 385-1 Filed: 12/10/19 Page 5 of 23 PageID #:13905
law, and believe that it is in the best interest of the class to enter into this Agreement.
8. Denial of Liability. Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County vigorously contest and deny each and every claim and all material allegations by the plaintiffs.
Cook County nonetheless has concluded that it is in its best interests and in the best interests of the citizens of Cook County that the action be settled on the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement. Cook County reached this conclusion after considering the factual and legal issues in the action, the substantial benefits of a final resolution of the action, the expense that would be necessary to defend the action through trial and any appeals that might be taken, the benefits of disposing of protracted and complex litigation, and the desire of Cook County to conduct its business unhampered by the distractions of continued litigation.
Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County enter into this Agreement without acknowledging any fault, liability, or wrongdoing of any kind. Neither this Agreement, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be construed as an admission or concession by Cook County or the Sheriff of Cook County of the truth of any of the allegations made in the action, or of any liability,
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fault, or wrongdoing of any kind whatsoever on the part of Cook County or the Sheriff of Cook County.
9. Non-Precedential Settlement. To the extent permitted by law, neither this Agreement, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be offered as evidence or received in evidence in any pending or future civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding, to establish any liability or admission by Cook County and/or the Sheriff of Cook County, except in any proceedings brought to enforce the Agreement.
Neither this Agreement, nor any pleading or other paper related in any way to this Agreement, nor any act or communication in the course of negotiating or implementing this Agreement, shall be deemed an admission by Cook County and/or the Sheriff of Cook County that certification of a class is appropriate in any other litigation, or otherwise shall preclude Cook County and/or the Sheriff of Cook County from opposing or asserting any argument it may have with respect to certification of any class in any proceeding. Moreover, the parties agree that this settlement shall not be used as precedent in any way as to any subsequent conduct of Cook County or the Sheriff of Cook County except as set forth herein.
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II. DEFINITIONS
10. In addition to the foregoing, the following terms shall have the
meanings set forth below:
a. “Cook County” means Cook County, the Cook County Health and Hospital System, Cermak Health Services or and/or any other successors, assigns or legal representatives thereof.
b. “Sheriff” means the Sheriff of Cook County and/or any other successors, assigns or legal representatives thereof.
c. “Class Period” means the time between August 3, 2005 and August 30, 2013.
d. “Potential Class Members” are all persons who entered the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005, through August 30, 2013, who were taking prescription medication for a serious health need and did not receive that medication within 24 hours after entry into the Jail.
e. “Agreement” means this Class Settlement Agreement. f. “Released Persons” means Cook County, the Cook County
Health and Hospital System, Cermak Health Services, Cook County’s counsel, the Sheriff of Cook County, the Sheriff’s counsel, and any of their past, present or future boards, commissions, members, directors, officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof. g. “Preliminary Approval Date” means the date the Court grants preliminary approval of this Agreement. h. “Final Approval Date” means the date that the Court grants final approval of this Agreement. i. “Final Settlement Date” means the date on which either of the following events has occurred: (a) if no objection is interposed to this proposed settlement, the “final approval date.” (b) If an objection is interposed to this proposed settlement and there is no appeal from the Final Approval Order, thirty-one (31) days after the Court enters the Final
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Approval Order and any objector has been provided with notice that the Court entered the Final Approval Order. (c) If an appeal is taken from the Final Approval Order, seven (7) days after a reviewing court either affirms the Final Approval Order or denies review and either all avenues of appeal have been exhausted or the time for seeking further appeals has expired. j. “Settlement Fund” means the fund established to compensate class members and pay Class Members, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, and administration of this settlement. k. “Class Notice” means the form authorized by the court to be sent to Potential Class Members. III. RELIEF 11. Monetary Relief to the Class. To resolve all claims at issue
in this case, the parties have agreed that as the consideration for this
Agreement, Cook County will establish a settlement fund in the amount of
$7,500,000 (seven million five hundred thousand dollars).
12. Incentive Payments. These sums will be paid, without any
deduction for fees or costs, to the named plaintiffs and to the class mem-
bers who appeared for deposition as follows:
a. Original Plaintiff Michael Parish: $25,000. b. Additional Plaintiffs $15,000 each: Curtis Oats, Leila
Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lorton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, and Carlotte Wilson. c. Exemplars $5,000 each: Sabrina Alexander, Rodney Bailey, Beria Beasley, Bobbie Berry, Jennifer Farrar, Daniel Gerl, Bernard Granderson, John Hendrix, John Holmes, Jerod Horne, Yvette Lee, Jess Mason, Willie
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Mikel, Nicholas Morris, LaDon Pilcher, Veronica Stuckey, Terry Tharpe, Andre White, and Lance Woodard. 13. Payments to Class Members. The parties, while recognizing that each class member may have a distinct claim for damages, agree that the expense, uncertainty, and delay inherent in providing each class member with an individual determination of damages outweighs the benefits of a distribution based on date of occurrence. Each class member shall receive one award even if he (or she) claims to have experienced an unreasonable delay in receiving previously prescribed medication on more than one admission to the Cook County Jail. The amount to be paid to each claimant shall be computed by assigning two points to each class member who entered the Jail before January 1, 2011 and one point for each class member who entered the Jail on and after January 1, 2011 through August 30, 2013.1 A person who would qualify as a class member in more than one stay at the Jail shall receive a single award for the highest available time period.
1 Plaintiffs’ statistical data showed that the problems with providing medication to new admittees were greatly reduced by January 1, 2011. August 30, 2013 is the date that the Medical Monitor in the CRIPA litigation concluded that defendants were in substantial compliance with intake procedures.
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The dollar value of each point for the first installment shall be determined by dividing the total sum available for the unnamed members of the class by the total number of points assigned to all claimants. If the Court approves the awards agreed to by the parties, there will be $3,965,000 (three million nine hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars) available for distribution to the class. No class member shall receive more than $200 (two hundred dollars).
Class counsel believes that some class members will not receive mailed notice of this settlement and will first learn about the settlement after payment of the first installment. Accordingly, class members may submit claim forms in the nine-month period following the payment of the first installment. Payment shall be made to these “second wave” claimants at the same amount as paid in the first installment to the extent possible: if the total amount of these second wave payments exceeds the amount remaining after payment of the first installment, the amount to be paid to each “second wave claimant” shall be proportionately reduced.
14. Opt Out: Notice of this proposed settlement shall advise class members that they may opt-out of this settlement and file individual actions. Defendants agree that they will not assert failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a defense to any lawsuit brought by a class member
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who opts out of this lawsuit. Defendants will, however, insist on the limitations on damages set by the PLRA for any person who opts out and filed an individual lawsuit while in custody. Class counsel are not required to represent class members who opt-out of this settlement.
15. Reversion to Defendants. Any portion of the settlement fund that is not expended in payment of damages for class members, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, and administration expenses shall revert to Defendant Cook County.
16. Payment to Class Counsel. Attorneys’ fees and costs were not finally negotiated until after full agreement had been reached on the monetary relief for the class. The parties agreed that subject to the approval of the Court, class counsel will, without objection from Defendants, be reimbursed for costs, including expert expenses, to be paid from the settlement fund, in an amount not to exceed $250,000. Subject to the approval of the Court and without objection from Defendants, class counsel will also receive payment as attorney fees from the settlement fund in the amount of $2,500,000, or one-third of the settlement fund.
17. Administration of the Settlement. The settlement will be administered by an independent entity, to be selected by class counsel, with the consent of Defendants, which shall not be unreasonably withheld.
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Defendants have agreed to pay up to $500,000 for the actual costs of administration of the settlement. Any unused portion of this amount shall revert to Defendants.
IV. NOTICE AND CLAIMS PROCEDURE
18. By February 14, 2018, notice of the settlement, and information about the date and time of the fairness hearing will be sent by first class mail to the last ascertainable address of each Class Member. “Ascertainable” means the last known address appearing in the records of the Sheriff of Cook County as enhanced by the United States Postal Service change of address database.
19. To participate in this settlement, each Class Member must submit a sworn Claim Form (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) postmarked no later than the date certain established on the final Class Notice (attached hereto as Exhibit 2). The Class Notice will include a forwarding and return address, which will be a Post Office Box controlled by the Class Administrator.
V. DECEASED, DISSOLVED, BANKRUPT, OR INCAPACITATED CLASS MEMBERS
20. Where a Class Member is deceased and a payment is due to that Class Member, upon receipt of a proper notification and documentation, settlement payment shall be made in accordance with Illinois law.
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21. Where the debts of a Class Member have been declared in bankruptcy, or are the subject of an open and ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, and a payment is due to the Class Member, upon receipt of proper notification and documentation, the settlement payment shall be made to such Class Member in accordance with applicable United States Bankruptcy Code laws.
VI. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CLASS
22. The Class Notice shall list class counsels’ addresses. Other than as provided for in this Agreement, communications relating to the action or this Settlement with persons receiving Class Notices and Potential Class Members shall be through class counsel. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent Cook County, the Sheriff, their employees, agents, or representatives from communicating with Potential Class Members or Class Members in the normal course of their operations.
VII. CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT AND EFFECT OF DISAPPROVAL, CANCELLATION, OR TERMINATION OF STIPULATION
23. If the Court disapproves this Agreement or fails to rule, or if the Court enters the Final Judgment but it is reversed or vacated on appeal, this Agreement shall be null and void and of no force and effect. If the Court materially modifies any provision of the Agreement or proposed Fi-
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nal Judgment, or if either is materially modified on appeal or remanded to the Court for modification, any party shall have the option of terminating this Agreement and withdrawing consent to the entry of the Final Judgment, in which case this Agreement shall be null and void and of no force and effect.
24. If any financial obligation is imposed upon Cook County or the Sheriff in addition to or greater than those specifically set out in this Agreement, Cook County and the Sheriff may withdraw their consent to the entry of the Final Judgment, in which case this Agreement shall be null and void and of no force and effect.
VIII. OBJECTIONS
25. A Class Member may file a notice of intent to object to the proposed settlement. The written notice of intent to object must be filed with the Clerk of the Court not later than 7 days before the date set for the Final Settlement Hearing.
IX. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
26. Plaintiff and class counsel warrant and represent that no promise or inducement has been offered or made for this Agreement except as set forth herein, that this Agreement is executed without any reliance whatsoever on any statements or representations not contained
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herein, including but not limited to any statements, conduct, disclosure or non-disclosure or representations regarding discovery in the action, and that this Agreement reflects the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the terms of the Release. The warranties and representations made herein shall survive the execution and delivering of this Agreement and shall be binding upon the heirs, representatives, successors and assigns of the parties.
X. RELEASES
27. Upon the Effective Date, Plaintiffs, all Class Members, and their heirs, trustees, executors, administrators, principals, beneficiaries, assigns and successors will be bound by the Final Judgment and conclusively deemed to have fully released, acquitted and forever discharged, as defined in paragraph 9(d). All people and entities who meet the Class Definition and who have not timely filed “opt out” forms shall be forever barred from prosecuting their own lawsuit asserting any of the claims at issue in this litigation and they and their heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, agents, partners, successors and assigns shall be deemed to have fully released and forever discharged the Released Persons (defined below) from all Released Claims (defined below).
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28. “Released Persons” means Cook County, Cook County’s counsel, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff’s counsel, and any of their past, present or future boards, commissions, members, directors, officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof.
29. “Released Claims” means and includes any and all Unknown Claims, known claims, and rights, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, debts, liens, contracts, liabilities, agreements, interest, costs, expenses or losses, for the acts alleged or which are or could have been alleged by the named plaintiffs or the Potential Class Members in this action, or relate in any way whatsoever to failure to provide medication that had previously been prescribed for a serious health need within 24 hours of entry to the Cook County Jail between August 3, 2015 and August 30, 2013.
XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
30. The parties hereto and their undersigned counsel agree to undertake their best efforts and mutually cooperate to effectuate this Agreement and the terms of the settlement set forth herein, including taking all steps and efforts contemplated by this Agreement, and any other steps and efforts which may become necessary by order of the Court or otherwise. The parties hereto further agree to defend this Agreement
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against objections made to final approval of the Settlement or in any appeal of the Final Judgment or collateral attack on the Agreement or Final Judgment. Class counsel will not seek from Cook County, Cook County’s counsel, the Sheriff of Cook County, the Sheriff’s counsel, and any of the Sheriff’s and/or Cook County’s past, present or future officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof any additional compensation, including attorney fees, cost, expenses or reimbursements for any work that may be involved in defending this Agreement.
31. The undersigned counsel represent that they are fully authorized to execute and enter into the terms and conditions of this Agreement on behalf of their respective clients.
32. Except as otherwise provided between the parties, this Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and supersedes any prior agreements or understandings between them. All terms of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals, and shall be construed as if drafted by all parties hereto. The terms of this Agreement are and shall be binding upon each of the parties hereto, their agents, attorneys, employees, successors and assigns, and upon all other persons
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claiming any interest in the subject matter hereof through any of the parties hereto, including any Class Member.
33. Any claim form or opt out form must be signed individually by a Class Member, not as or on behalf of a group, class, or subclass, except that such claim form or opt-out form may be submitted on behalf of an individual Class Member by the executor or administrator of a deceased Class Member’s estate, or the legal guardian of a Class Member who has been declared incompetent.
34. To the extent permitted by law, this Agreement may be pleaded as a full and complete defense to, and may be used as the basis for an injunction against, any action, suit or other proceeding which may be instituted, prosecuted or attempted in breach of this Agreement.
35. Funding of Administration of the Settlement: Within fortyfive (45) days after the Court has given its preliminary approval to this proposed settlement, Cook County shall pay to the Client Fund Account of Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. (“the Flaxman firm”), the sum of $500,000 (five hundred thousand dollars) so that the Flaxman firm may hire a Claim Administrator to administer the settlement and receive interim fees associated with providing notice to class members. The Flaxman Firm shall pay to the Claim Administrator the amounts due for payments to class members
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who submit timely claims. The Flaxman Firm shall provide undersigned Defense counsel with all invoices from the Claim Administrator when such invoices are paid.
36. Funding of the Settlement: Within forty-five (45) days after the Court has entered final approval of the terms of the proposed class settlement (“Final Settlement Date”), Cook County shall pay to the Client Fund Account of Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. the sum of $7,000,000 (seven million dollars). Upon funding of the settlement, class counsel shall be entitled to receive the total amount of fees and costs approved by the Court. Payments to counsel shall be made notwithstanding the existence of any timely filed objections thereto, or potential for appeal therefrom, or collateral attack on this Agreement or any part thereof, subject to class counsel’s obligation to make appropriate refunds or repayments to Defendants if and when, as a result of any appeal and/or further proceedings on remand, or successful collateral attack, the award of attorneys’ fees or cost award is reduced or reversed.
37. Payment of Claims. If the Court enters the Final Settlement Order, the Claims Administrator shall within forty-five (45) days after the Final Approval Date mail the Class Member Payments to those Class Members who submitted a valid and timely claim.
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Within 60 days of the Final Settlement Date, class counsel shall provide Defendants with copies of all releases and opt out forms signed by class members and Potential Class Members.
38. Change of Time Periods. All time periods and dates described in this Agreement are subject to the Court’s approval. These time periods and dates may be changed by agreement of the parties without notice to the Class.
39. Binding on Successors. This Agreement binds and benefits the Parties’ respective successors, assigns, legatees, heirs, and personal representatives.
40. Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the attached exhibits contain the entire agreement between the Parties and constitute the complete, final and exclusive embodiment of their agreement with respect to the settlement of the Lawsuit. This Agreement and the attached exhibits supersede any and all prior agreements, arrangements or understandings, whether written or oral, express or implied, between them relating to the subject matter hereof. The Parties agree that there are no understandings, written, oral, express, implied or otherwise, except as set forth in this Agreement and the attached exhibits, and that in entering into this Agreement, no Party has relied, or is entitled to rely, upon any promise,
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inducement, representation, statement, assurance or expectation unless it is contained herein in writing.
41. Exhibits. The exhibits to this Agreement are integral parts of the Agreement and are incorporated into this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
42. Modifications and Amendments. No amendment, change or modification to this Agreement will be valid unless in writing signed by the Parties or their counsel.
43. Construction and Interpretation. Neither the Parties nor any of the Parties’ respective attorneys will be deemed the drafter of this Agreement for purposes of interpreting any provision in this Agreement in any judicial or other proceeding that may arise between them. This Agreement has been, and must be construed to have been, drafted by all the Parties to it, so that any rule that construes ambiguities against the drafter will have no force or effect.
44. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which constitutes an original, but all of which together constitutes one and the same instrument. Several signature pages may be collected and annexed to one or more documents to form a complete coun-
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terpart. Photocopies or PDF copies of executed copies of this Agreement shall be treated as originals.
45. Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is declared by the Court to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement will continue in full force and effect.
46. Waiver. No delay on the part of either Party in the exercise of any right, power or remedy shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single or partial exercise of any right, power or remedy preclude the further exercise thereof, or the exercise of any other right, power or remedy.
47. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois and without regard to conflict of laws principles.
48. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. Other than the payments set out above, each Party shall bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs relating in any way to the Lawsuit or this Agreement, or the subject matter of any of them.
49. Cooperation to Obtain Court Approval. The Parties agree to cooperate fully to execute any documents and take all additional actions which are consistent with and which may be necessary or appropriate to secure the Court’s preliminary and final approval of this Agreement.
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50. Enforcement and Reservation of Jurisdiction. The parties agree that the Court will reserve jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this Agreement. If the Court approves the settlement, it will enter an order of dismissal that will dismiss the litigation with prejudice as to all Class Members, except those persons who have timely filed “opt out” forms.
Agreed to, this __ day of December, 2019 /s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman
Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC No. 830399 Joel A. Flaxman 200 S. Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 (signatures continued on next page) Patrick W. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 S. Western Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60643 Attorneys for the Class /s/ Francis J. Catania Francis J. Catania, ASA 500 Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 An Attorney for Defendants
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 Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 1 of 33
CASREF,PC Scan,PROTO,TERMED,VALDEZ
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:07−cv−04369

Parish v. Sheriff of Cook County et al Assigned to: Honorable John Z. Lee Demand: $50,000 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Michael Parish
Plaintiff Curtis L. Oats

Date Filed: 08/03/2007 Date Terminated: 06/05/2020 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Thomas Gerard Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey 10150 South Western Ave. Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233−7900 Email: tgmorrisseylaw@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. 200 S Michigan Ave Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427−3200 Email: jaf@kenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C. 200 South Michigan Avenue Suite 201 Chicago, IL 60604−6107 (312) 427−3200 Email: knf@kenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick William Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 South Western Ave. Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233−7900 Email: patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor 230 S. Dearborn St. Room 844 Chicago, IL 60604 312−353−6990 Email: scanlon.stacey.l@dol.gov TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 2 of 33

Plaintiff Leila Khoury
Plaintiff Sean Driscoll
Plaintiff Carla Lofton
Plaintiff Roy Cleaves
Plaintiff Lisa Brown

Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 3 of 33

Plaintiff Dan Taylor
Plaintiff Dean Miller
Plaintiff Stacey Clark
Plaintiff Kevin Sanders

Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 4 of 33

Plaintiff Carlotte Wilson
Plaintiff Jejuann James Plaintiff Darron Brewer

Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey L. Scanlon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2011
represented by Jejuann James PRO SE
represented by Darron Brewer PRO SE

V. Defendant Sheriff of Cook County
Defendant Cook County

represented by Francis J. Catania Cook County State's Attorney Richard J Daley Center 50 W Washington St Room 530 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5440 Email: francis.catania@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Joseph Creighton Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney of Cook County 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5111 Email: andrew.creighton@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 03/26/2019
Daniel J. Fahlgren State's Attorney of Cook County 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−3304 Email: dfahlgr@cookcountygov.com TERMINATED: 01/26/2009
represented by Francis J. Catania (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 5 of 33

Movant Calvin E Lomax
Movant Mario D. Hawkins TERMINATED: 06/16/2009
Movant Winston Day

Andrew Joseph Creighton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2019
Daniel J. Fahlgren (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2009
represented by Calvin E Lomax N−30567 Moline − EMO 100 Hillcrest Road East Moline, IL 61244 (309) 343−4212 PRO SE
represented by Mario D. Hawkins 4909 West Huron Street Chicago, IL 60644 (773) 379−6981 PRO SE

Date Filed 08/03/2007 08/03/2007 08/03/2007 08/03/2007 08/09/2007 08/16/2007 08/16/2007 08/24/2007 08/24/2007
08/27/2007

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Michael Parish; Jury Demand.(vcf, ) (Entered: 08/06/2007)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet. (vcf, ) (Entered: 08/06/2007)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Michael Parish by Thomas Gerard Morrissey. (vcf, ) (Entered: 08/06/2007)
5 SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County. (vcf, ) (Entered: 08/06/2007)
6 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County by Daniel J. Fahlgren (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
7 AMENDED complaint by Michael Parish against Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/16/2007)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Michael Parish by Kenneth N Flaxman (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/16/2007)
9 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County for extension of time to file answer , motion or otherwise plead. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 08/24/2007)
10 NOTICE of Motion by Daniel J. Fahlgren for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer 9 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 8/30/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 08/24/2007)
11 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing set to 9:00 a.m. on 10/11/2007 before Judge Kennelly, in Chambers, Room 2188. Parties are to review and comply with Judge Kennelly's standing initial order, which may be found on his web page, located at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE/KENNELLY/mfkpage.htm. Counsel for plaintiff (s) are ordered to cause a copy of this order to be delivered forthwith to each defendant in the same manner that summons has been or is being served on each defendant. (or, ) (Entered: 08/27/2007)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 6 of 33

08/30/2007 10/04/2007 10/04/2007 10/04/2007 10/11/2007
11/07/2007 12/11/2007 01/14/2008 03/17/2008
03/31/2008 04/02/2008 04/08/2008 04/08/2008 04/14/2008
04/14/2008 04/15/2008
04/17/2008
05/21/2008

12 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Defendants' Motion to enlarge time 9 is granted. Response to complaint is to be filed by 10/10/2007Mailed notice (rp, ) (Entered: 08/30/2007)
13 ANSWER to amended complaint by Cook County(Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
14 ANSWER to amended complaint by Sheriff of Cook County(Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
15 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County re answer to amended complaint 14 , answer to amended complaint 13 (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
16 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Status hearing pursuant to Rule 16(b) held on 10/11/2007 with attorneys for both sides. Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures are to be made by 11/1/2007. Class discovery is to be completed by 3/3/2008. Status hearing continued to 11/7/2007 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 10/11/2007)
17 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Status hearing held on 11/7/2007 and continued to 12/11/2007 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
18 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Status hearing held on 12/11/2007 and continued to 1/14/2008 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
19 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Status hearing held on 1/14/2008 and continued to 3/17/2008 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
20 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held on 3/17/2008 and continued to 4/11/2008 at 09:30 AM.) Plaintiff's oral motion for leave to file amended complaint to add new plaintiff is granted and is to be filed by 3/31/2008. Motion for class certification is to be noticed for the status hearing date. (or, ) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
21 SECOND AMENDED complaint by Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller against all defendants (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
22 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing date of 4/11/2008 is vacated and reset for 4/17/2008 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 04/02/2008)
23 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County for extension of time to file answer regarding amended complaint 21 −SECOND. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 04/08/2008)
24 NOTICE of Motion by Daniel J. Fahlgren for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 23 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/15/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 04/08/2008)
25 MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson to certify class (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/14/2008)
26 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to certify class 25 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/17/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/14/2008)
27 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Defendants' motion to enlarge time is granted. Response to second amended complaint is to be filed by 5/22/08. The case remains set for status hearing on 4/17/08 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 04/15/2008)
28 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held on 4/17/2008 and continued to 7/31/2008 at 09:30 AM. Response to motion for class certification is due 6/5/2008. Reply brief is due 6/26/2008. Ruling set to 7/31/2008 at 9:30 AM. n notice (or, ) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
29 ANSWER to amended complaint by Cook County(Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2008)

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05/21/2008 05/21/2008 05/21/2008 05/21/2008 05/29/2008
06/04/2008
06/04/2008 06/18/2008 06/26/2008 06/26/2008 06/26/2008
07/09/2008
07/31/2008
08/01/2008 08/01/2008 08/05/2008 08/05/2008

30 NOTICE by Cook County re answer to amended complaint 29 (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
31 MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
32 MEMORANDUM by Sheriff of Cook County in support of motion to dismiss 31 the Second Amended Complaint. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
33 NOTICE of Motion by Daniel J. Fahlgren for presentment of motion to dismiss 31 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 5/29/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
34 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Motion hearing held. MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. 31 is denied for the reasons stated in open court.Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
35 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County to MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson to certify class 25 (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 06/04/2008)
36 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County re response to motion, 35 to Certify Class. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 06/04/2008)
37 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:This case is set for oral argument on plaintiffs motion for class certification on 7/24/08 at 3:30 p.m. (10minutes per side). Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
38 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County to reset Date for Oral Argument (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
39 NOTICE of Motion by Daniel J. Fahlgren for presentment of motion to reset 38 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 7/9/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
40 REPLY by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson to motion to certify class 25 , response to motion, 35 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
41 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Motion to reschedule oral argument is granted. The oral argument of 7/24/08 is vacated. The Court has determined that it does not require argument on the pending motion and expects to rule as scheduled on the previously set ruling date of 7/31/08. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 07/18/2008)
42 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held on 7/31/2008,and continued to 10/9/2008 at 09:30 AM. Plaintiff's supplemental brief in support of motion for class is due 9/4/2008. Reply due by 9/25/2008. (or, ) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
43 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 08/01/2008)
44 NOTICE of Motion by Daniel J. Fahlgren for presentment of motion for protective order 43 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 8/6/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 08/01/2008)
45 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Protective Order)(Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
46 AMENDED NOTICE of Motion by Daniel J. Fahlgren for presentment of motion for protective order 45 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 8/12/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 08/05/2008)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 8 of 33

08/12/2008 08/19/2008 08/20/2008 09/04/2008
09/25/2008
09/25/2008 10/09/2008 10/16/2008 10/16/2008 10/20/2008 10/24/2008
10/24/2008 11/13/2008 11/19/2008 11/19/2008 11/25/2008

47 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Motion for protective order is entered and continued to 8/19/2008 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
48 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Motion for protective order is granted. Order to follow. (or, ) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
49 PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 8/20/2008.(ef, ) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
50 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish, Cook County, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson in support of motion to certify class 25 [SUPPLEMENTAL] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit exhibit 7, part 1, # 8 Exhibit exhibit 7 part 2, # 9 Exhibit Exhbiit 7, part 3, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit 10, # 13 Certificate of Service)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/04/2008)
51 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson to certify class 25 −SUPPLEMENTAL Memorandum of Law. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 09/25/2008)
52 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County re response in opposition to motion, 51 to Certify Class− Response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Law. (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 09/25/2008)
53 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held on 10/9/2008. Ruling on motion to certify by mail. (or, ) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
54 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to Depose Prisoner (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
55 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 54 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 10/21/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
56 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Plaintiffs motion to depose prisoner Jermain Brown, who is in the custody of the Cook County Sheriff, is granted (prisoner no. 2004−0026019). Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
57 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants plaintiffs motion for class certification [docket no. 21]. The Court certifies the following class under Rule 23(b)(3): all persons confined at the Cook County Jail on and after August 3, 2005 who provided notice that he or she had been taking prescription medication for a serious health need and who was not provided with appropriate medication within 24 hours thereafter. The case is set for a status hearing on 11/13/08 at 9:30 a.m. Counsel are directed to confer regarding a proposed form of class notice and to submit a proposal or proposals to the Court by 11/10/08. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 10/27/2008)
58 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 10/24/2008.(ef, ) (Entered: 10/27/2008)
59 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 12/15/2008 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 11/17/2008)
60 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish for protective order (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
61 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for protective order 60 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/25/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
62 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Plaintiffs' motion for entry of a qualified protective order is granted. Plaintiffs' counsel are directed to provide an electronic version of the proposed order for signature, following the instructions on

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11/26/2008 12/10/2008 12/10/2008 12/10/2008 12/10/2008 12/10/2008
12/10/2008 12/10/2008 12/15/2008 12/18/2008
01/16/2009
01/16/2009 01/21/2009 01/26/2009 01/26/2009
01/26/2009

Judge Kennelly's web page. (tlm) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
63 PROTECTIVE Order signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/26/2008.Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
64 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael ParishPlaintiffs' Motion Concerning Notice to Persons Detained at Cook County Jail (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
65 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 64 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/16/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
66 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit One, # 2 Exhibit Two)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
67 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 66 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/16/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
68 MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson Concerning Notice to Persons Detained at Cook County Jail [CORRECTED] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
69 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 66 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/16/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
70 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 66 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/16/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
71 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 12/18/2008 at 11:00 AM. Motion to compel is entered and continued to status hearing date. (or, ) (Entered: 12/15/2008)
72 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 12/18/08 and continued to 1/26/09 at 9:30 a.m. Motion by Plaintiff to compel 66 is granted as to paragraph 2 and terminated as moot as to paragraph 3. Production to be submitted by 1/08/09. Motion by Plaintiff Concerning Notice to Persons Detained in Cook County 64 , 68 is entered and briefed as follows: Response is due by 1/16/09. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
73 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson Concerning Notice to Persons Detained at Cook County Jail [CORRECTED][CORRECTED]68 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
74 NOTICE by all defendants re response in opposition to motion,, 73 (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
75 REPLY by Plaintiff Michael Parish to response in opposition to motion,, 73 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/21/2009)
76 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County by Francis J. Catania (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/26/2009)
77 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Enter attached Memorandum Opinion and Order regarding class notice. The Court directs the parties to make the further submissions required in the text of the Memorandum Opinion by no later than 2/3/09. The Court sets the case for further argument and ruling on 2/6/09 at 9:30 a.m. (tlm) (tlm). (Entered: 01/26/2009)
78 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 2/9/2009 at 9:30 AM. Status hearing of 2/6/2009 is vacated. Francis Catania is granted leave to substitute his appearance for Daniel Fahlgren. (ef, ) (Entered: 01/27/2009)

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02/03/2009 02/03/2009
02/03/2009
02/04/2009 02/09/2009
02/18/2009 02/18/2009 03/18/2009
04/01/2009 04/02/2009 04/21/2009 04/21/2009 04/22/2009
05/07/2009 05/27/2009 06/02/2009 06/15/2009 06/16/2009

79 MEMORANDUM motion for miscellaneous relief, 68 by Michael Parish (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
80 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson Concerning Notice to Persons Detained at Cook County Jail [CORRECTED][CORRECTED]68 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 14_10)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
81 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION CONCERNING NOTICE TO PERSONS ALLEGED TO BE DETAINED AT COOK COUNTY JAIL (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
82 MEMORANDUM response in opposition to motion,, 80 by Michael Parish Supplementeal Memorandum Concerning Notice to Persons Detained at Cook County Jail (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/04/2009)
83 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held. Plaintiff's motion concerning notice to persons detained at Cook County is granted in part for the reasons stated in open court. Parties have one (1) week to negotiate an agreed proposed protective order. Telephone conference set for 3/18/2009 at 9:00a.m. Mailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 02/09/2009)
84 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Enter agreed protective order.Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
85 AGREED PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 2/18/2009.(ef, ) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
86 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held with defendants' attorney calling in to report he could not reach plaintiffs' attorney. Status hearing continued to 4/1/2009 at 09:00 AM. The hearing will be held in Judge Kennelly's chambers (Room 2188). (or, ) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
87 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing pursuant to Rule 16(b) held with attorneys for both sides. Status hearing continued to 6/15/2009 at 09:30 AM. for the purpose of setting a discovery schedule. (or, ) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
88 LETTER from Calvin Lomax dated 3/30/09. (gcy, ) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
89 MOTION to intervene instanter by movant Mario D. Hawkins. (ef, ) (Entered: 04/22/2009)
90 APPLICATION by Movant Mario D. Hawkins for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ef, ) (Entered: 04/22/2009)
91 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:The Court directs the attorneys representing the class to respond within fourteen days to the motion to intervene filed by Mario Hawkins 89 . The Court defers ruling on Hawkins motion to proceed in forma pauperis 90 until after a response is filed. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
92 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Michael Parish to motion to intervene 89 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
93 MOTION by Movant Mario D. Hawkins in opposition instanter. (Exhibits) (ef, ) (Entered: 06/02/2009)
94 NOTICE by Calvin E Lomax of Change of Address. (ef, ) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
95 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 7/9/2009 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 06/15/2009)
96 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The Court denies Mario Hawkins' motion to intervene [# 89], his motion for leave to proceed in formapauperis [# 90], and his "motion in opposition instanter" {# 93]. The latter document establishes that Mr. Hawkins is not a member of the class of plaintiffs that the Court previously certified in this case, because he was admitted to the Cook County Jail and allegedly

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 11 of 33

06/23/2009
07/09/2009 07/09/2009
07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/14/2009 07/16/2009
08/04/2009 08/05/2009
08/05/2009 09/09/2009 09/09/2009 10/02/2009 10/02/2009 10/02/2009

denied medication before the earliest date covered by the definition of the class. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
97 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The judge in this case has been assigned another case, Arocho v. Cook County Jail, Case No. 09 C 1159, a pro se suit by a Cook County Jail detainee challenging denial of prescribed medications. Counsel in the present case are directed to review the complaint in the Arocho case to determine if the plaintiff is a member of the class and are directed to file a status report by 7/7/09 advising the Court of their determination and, if the plaintiff is a member of the class, whether he was sent notice and has opted out of the class in the present case. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
98 STATUS Report concerning Eric Arocho by Michael Parish (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
103 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 7/16/2009 at 09:30 AM. Status report regarding Arocho case is to be filed by 7/10/2009. Motion to compel is to be noticed for the status hearing date. (or, ) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
99 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County to compel Depositions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
100 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion to compel 99 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 7/16/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
101 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County for protective order modification (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
102 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for protective order 101 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 7/16/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
104 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to compel (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
105 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Motion to compel 99 is granted in part as discussed in open court. Status hearing held. Motions to compel and for protective order are entered and continued to 8/5/2009 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
106 STATUS Report on preparation of joint discovery plan by Michael Parish (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/04/2009)
107 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Motion for protective order 101 is granted; Motion to compel 104 is granted. Enter protective order. Status hearing set for 10/8/2009 at 09:30 am. (For further details see separate order.) Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
108 AMENDED PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 8/5/2009.(ef, ) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Enter Supplemental Protective Order. (For further details see separate order.) Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
110 SUPPLEMENTAL PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 9/9/2009.(ef, ) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
111 ANSWER to amended complaint by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
112 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County re answer to amended complaint 111 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
113 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Cook County(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/02/2009)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 12 of 33

10/02/2009 10/05/2009 10/06/2009
10/08/2009 11/04/2009 11/16/2009 01/25/2010 02/11/2010 02/22/2010 04/07/2010 05/27/2010 06/02/2010 06/03/2010
09/07/2010 09/07/2010 09/13/2010
09/13/2010

114 NOTICE by Cook County re answer to complaint 113 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
115 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County by Andrew Joseph Creighton (Creighton, Andrew) (Entered: 10/05/2009)
116 Joint Discovery Plan by Michael Parish, Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin Sanders, Carlotte Wilson (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/06/2009)
117 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 11/12/2009 at 09:30 AM. Fact discovery is ordered closed 6/30/2009. (or, ) (Entered: 10/08/2009)
118 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:On the court's own motion, the Status hearing set for 11/12/09 is stricken and reset to 11/16/2009 at 09:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 11/04/2009)
119 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 2/17/2010 at 09:30 AM. Cutoff date for fact discovery is corrected as 6/30/2010. (or, ) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
120 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing set for 2/17/2010 is vacated and reset to 2/22/2010 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 01/25/2010)
121 NOTICE by Calvin E Lomax of Change of Address(Exhibit). (tlm) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
122 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 4/7/2010 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
123 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 5/27/2010 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 04/07/2010)
124 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing held and continued to 6/3/2010 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
125 STATUS Report and Discovery Plan by Michael Parish (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/02/2010)
126 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held and continued to 9/14/2010 at 09:30 AM. Jury Trial set for 3/5/2012 at 09:45 AM. Plaintiffs are tender declarations as stated in par. 6 of 6/2/10 status report by 9/6/10. Depositions as described in par. 9 of status report are to be completed by 10/29/10. Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures on psychotropic aspect of case are due 10/4/10 for plaintiffs and 1/15/11 for defendants; expert discovery to be completed by 3/15/11. Fact discovery on all aspects of case is to be completed by 6/30/11. Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures on non−psychotropic aspects of case are due 7/31/11 for plaintiffs and 9/15/11 for defendants; expert discovery to be completed by 10/28/11. Dispositive motion deadline is 11/30/11. (or, ) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
127 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to reassign case (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
128 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to reassign case 127 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 9/14/2010 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
129 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Case having been reassigned to the initial calendar of Judge Gary Feinerman, status hearing set for 9/14/2010, notice of motion hearing set for 9/14/2010, jury trial set for 3/5/2012 dates are vacated. (or, ) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
130 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that, pursuant to the Executive Committee Order entered on August 23, 2010, the civil cases on the attached list have been selected for reassignment to form the initial calendar of the Honorable Gary Feinerman, therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the attached list of 270 cases be reassigned to the Honorable Gary Feinerman. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 13 of 33

09/16/2010
09/29/2010 10/20/2010 10/27/2010
01/31/2011 02/03/2011 02/10/2011 02/10/2011 02/15/2011

this order shall become effective on Tuesday, September 14, 2010. Mailed notices(ef, ) (Entered: 09/14/2010)
131 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:This case has been reassigned to the calendar of District Judge Gary Feinerman. The parties are directed to prepare a joint status report adhering to the form set forth on Judge Feinerman's website (http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov, to "District Judges," to "Judge Gary Feinerman," to "Cases Reassigned to Judge Feinerman" under Case Management Procedures). If the parties cannot agree on a joint statement as to any particular issue(s), their respective positions should be recited. If no defendant has appeared, the plaintiff(s) shall so note and shall prepare the status report. The joint status report shall be filed no later than September 29, 2010, with two courtesy copies to the Courtroom Deputy, Room 1012.This matter is set for a status conference on October 12, 2010, at 10:00 a.m. An attorney for each represented party shall appear; pro se parties shall appear as well. If lead trial counsel does not appear on behalf of a represented party, the attorney that does appear should be fully prepared to discuss all aspects of the case, including settlement. To the extent not already stricken by the predecessor district judge, all pending status dates, hearing dates (other than preliminary or final approval hearings on class certification motions), and trial dates are stricken. All other dates, including briefing schedules, motion deadlines, discovery schedules, and pretrial order deadlines, shall remain intact.Mailed notice. (jlj, ) (Entered: 09/16/2010)
132 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman: By agreement of the parties, status hearing previously set for 10/12/2010 131 is stricken and reset to 10/27/2010 at 9:30 a.m. The joint status report shall be filed no later than 10/20/2010 with two courtesy copies to the Courtroom Deputy, Room 1012. Mailed notice. (jlj, ) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
133 STATUS Report [JOINT] by Michael Parish (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/20/2010)
134 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Status hearing and motion hearing held. Depositions described in paragraph 9 of status report 125 shall be completed by 1/31/2011. Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures regarding psychotropic issues shall be made by 2/28/2011; Defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures regarding psychotropic issues shall be made by 6/1/2011. Sworn declarations from unnamed class members regarding interruption of psychotropic medication shall be made by 2/2/2011. Jury trial set for 3/5/2012 126 is stricken. Plaintiffs' motion to reassign cases 127 is denied because the cases do not satisfy Local Rule 40.4(b)(4), as noted in open court. Status hearing set for 2/15/2011 at 9:30 a.m.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
135 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Lisa Brown, Stacey Clark, Roy Cleaves, Sean Driscoll, Leila Khoury, Carla Lofton, Dean Miller, Curtis L. Oats, Michael Parish, Kevin Sanders, Dan Taylor, Carlotte Wilson by Stacey Lynn Scanlon (Scanlon, Stacey) (Entered: 01/31/2011)
136 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Due to the trial calendar of this court, status hearing set for 2/15/2011 134 is re−set to 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 02/03/2011)
137 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to reset expert disclosures on psychotropic issues, etc. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/10/2011)
138 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to reset 137 before Honorable Gary Feinerman on 2/15/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/10/2011)
139 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Status hearing held and continued to 4/7/2011 at 9:30 a.m. Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion to modify discovery schedule 137 is granted. By 3/15/2011, Plaintiff shall identify for Defendants all class representatives who intend to remain class representatives and all unnamed class members who will testify at trial. By 3/15/2011, all class representatives who intend to remain class representatives shall answer interrogatories. Deadline for Defendants to depose class representatives and unnamed class members who will testify at trial extended to 5/31/2011. Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures on psychotropic and non psychotropic issues shall be served by 8/1/2011; Defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures due by 10/3/2011.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 02/15/2011)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 14 of 33

04/07/2011 04/28/2011 04/28/2011 05/02/2011 06/02/2011
06/02/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/07/2011 06/09/2011
06/10/2011 06/13/2011
08/02/2011 08/25/2011

140 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman: Status hearing held and continued to 6/15/2011 at 9:00 a.m. By agreement of the parties, deadline for Defendants to depose class representatives and unnamed class members who will testify at trial is extended to 6/30/2011.Mailed notice (pm, ) (Entered: 04/08/2011)
141 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Lisa Brown, Stacey Clark, Roy Cleaves, Sean Driscoll, Leila Khoury, Carla Lofton, Dean Miller, Curtis L. Oats, Michael Parish, Kevin Sanders, Dan Taylor, Carlotte Wilson to withdraw as attorney Stacey Scanlon (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
142 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 141 before Honorable Gary Feinerman on 5/5/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
143 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Motion to withdraw as attorney 141 is granted. Attorney Stacey Scanion is granted leave to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs. Motion hearing scheduled for 5/5/2011 142 is stricken. Attorney Stacey Lynn Scanlon terminated.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 05/02/2011)
144 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A 1 Rule 30b6 Notice, # 2 Exhibit A 2 Rule 30b6 Notice, # 3 Errata B New Depo Notices, # 4 Exhibit C Req Prod Docs, # 5 Exhibit D Interrogatories, # 6 Exhibit E Notice deps, # 7 REMOVED PER COURT ORDER DATED 6/9/11, # 8 Exhibit G Req for 1365 Charts)(Catania, Francis) (ea, ).(Docket text modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 6/10/2011 (ea, ). (Entered: 06/02/2011)
145 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for protective order, 144 before Honorable Gary Feinerman on 6/9/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
146 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to Withdraw exhibit F and substitute Correct Exhibit F (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit F Smith Transcript)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
147 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 146 , motion for protective order, 144 before Honorable Gary Feinerman on 6/9/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/03/2011)
148 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in Opposition to motion for protective order, 144 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
150 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Motion hearing held. Motion to withdraw and substitute Exhibit F to Defendants' motion for protective order 146 is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to withdraw from the docket Exhibit F to the motion for a protective order [144−7]. Defendants shall file the substitute Exhibit as a separate document. Defendants' motion for a protective order 144 is entered and continued to 6/15/2011 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
149 STIPULATION regarding order on motion to reset, status hearing, motion hearing, set/reset hearings,,,,,,,,,,,, 139 , motion for protective order, 144 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
151 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Pursuant to the parties' stipulation 149 , Defendants' motion to dismiss or for protective order 144 is withdrawn without prejudice. All outstanding fact discovery shall be completed by 8/1/2011. Plaintiffs shall make Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures by 10/3/2011. Defendants shall make Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures by 12/5/2011. No further extensions on discovery. Status hearing scheduled for 6/15/2011 140 150 is stricken and re−set for 8/2/2011 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 06/13/2011)
152 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Status hearing held and continued 1/17/2012 at 9:00 a.m. Expert depositions shall be taken by 1/31/2012. Dispositive motions shall be filed by 3/12/2012.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 08/02/2011)
153 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to reset expert disclosure schedule (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/25/2011)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 15 of 33

08/25/2011 08/29/2011
12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/14/2011
02/14/2012 02/15/2012
04/19/2012 04/20/2012 04/20/2012 04/24/2012 04/25/2012
06/01/2012

154 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to reset 153 before Honorable Gary Feinerman on 8/29/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
155 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman: Motion hearing held on 8/29/2011. Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to reset expert disclosure schedule 153 is granted. Expert disclosure schedule is modified as follows: Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures are due by 11/2/2011; Defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures are due by 1/5/2012. Expert deposition shall be taken by 3/1/2012. Dispositive motions shall be filed by 4/11/2012. Status hearing set for 1/17/2012 is stricken and reset to 2/15/2012 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 08/30/2011)
156 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time Agreed (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
157 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of extension of time 156 before Honorable Gary Feinerman on 12/15/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
158 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Agreed motion for enlargement of time for defendants' expert report and expert discovery and dispositive motions 156 is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures are due by 2/7/2012. Expert deposition shall be taken by 4/5/2012. Dispositive motions shall be filed by 5/16/2012. Status hearing set for 2/15/2012 155 to stand. Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 12/14/2011)
159 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:For the 2/15/2012 status hearing, the parties are respectfully requested to review the complaint in Brewer v. Cook County, 11 C 7508 (N.D. Ill.), and to be able to address whether Mr. Brewer is a member of the class in this case. Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
160 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Status hearing held and continued to 4/25/2012 at 9:00 a.m. Dispositive motions shall be filed by 5/16/2012; responses to dispositive motions due by 6/27/2012; replies due by 7/18/2012. Briefs are limited to 7000 words. Defendants indicated that they may move to decertify the class.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
161 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Due to the trial calendar of this court, status hearing set for 4/25/2012 160 at 9:00 a.m. is re−set for 8:45 a.m.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
162 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to reset summary judgment schedule [AGREED] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
163 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to reset 162 before Honorable Gary Feinerman on 4/25/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
164 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Motion hearing scheduled for 4/25/2012 at 9:00 a.m. 162 is re−set for 8:45 a.m.Mailed/Telephoned notice. (jlj) (Entered: 04/24/2012)
165 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Status hearing held and continued to 7/11/2012 at 9:30 a.m. Motion hearing held. Motion to re−set summary judgment schedule 162 is granted. Dispositive motions shall be filed by 7/2/2012; responses due by 8/6/2012; replies due by 8/27/2012. Both sides indicated that they will file summary judgment motions, and Defendants indicated that they will move to de−certify the class.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
167 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that, pursuant to the Executive Committee Order entered on May 18, 2012, the civil cases on the attached list have been selected for reassignment to form the initial calendar of the Honorable John Z. Lee, therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the attached list of 323 cases be reassigned to the Honorable John Z. Lee IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall become effective on Tuesday, June 5, 2012. Case reassigned to the Honorable John Z. Lee for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 6/1/2012. Mailed Notice (td, ) (Entered: 06/05/2012)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 16 of 33

06/04/2012 06/07/2012 06/07/2012 06/11/2012
07/02/2012 07/02/2012 07/02/2012
07/02/2012
07/02/2012 07/02/2012 07/05/2012 07/05/2012
07/05/2012 07/05/2012
07/16/2012 08/02/2012 08/06/2012

166 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman:Status hearing scheduled for 7/11/2012 165 is stricken.Mailed notice. (jlj) (Entered: 06/04/2012)
168 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to clarify previously entered orders establishing summary judgment schedule and procedure (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
169 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to clarify 168 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 6/13/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
170 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: The court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to clarify 168 and sets the following cross−motion for summary judgment briefing schedule as set out in Judge Lee's standing order as modified with the 7,000 word limit as set in Judge Feinerman's order of 2/16/12: plaintiffs' cross motion due 7/2/12; defendants' response and cross motion due 8/6/12; plaintiffs' reply and response to defendants' cross motion due 9/7/12; defendants' reply in support of their cross motion due 10/5/12. Any Daubert motion or motion to decertify the class shall be filed with the party's opening brief and follow the above briefing schedule. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
171 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to file instanter Their Motion to Decertify the Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Motion to Decertify, # 2 Exhibit Memorandum)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
172 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion to file instanter 171 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 7/5/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
173 MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Lisa Brown, Stacey Clark, Roy Cleaves, Sean Driscoll, Leila Khoury, Carla Lofton, Dean Miller, Curtis L. Oats, Kevin Sanders, Dan Taylor, Carlotte Wilson for partial summary judgment (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
174 RULE 56 (c)(1) Statement by Michael Parish regarding motion for partial summary judgment 173 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−5, # 2 Exhibit 6, # 3 Exhibit 7 (part 1), # 4 Exhibit 7 (part 2), # 5 Exhibit 8−13, # 6 Exhibit 14−19, # 7 Exhibit 20−25, # 8 Exhibit 26−27, # 9 Exhibit 28−30, # 10 Exhibit 31−32, # 11 Exhibit 33−35, # 12 Exhibit 36−40)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
175 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in support of motion for partial summary judgment 173 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
176 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to bar proposed expert testimony (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
177 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County Motion to Decertify the Class (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
178 MEMORANDUM (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Order Certifying Class, # 2 Exhibit B Depostion Dr Hart, # 3 Exhibit C Depostion Dr Hart, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E Supp Mot Certify, # 6 Exhibit F Ganier, # 7 Exhibit G Dr Howard, # 8 Exhibit H McNutt, # 9 Exhibit J Curtis Oats, # 10 Affidavit L Summary of Voluminous Records, # 11 Declaration of Counsel Word Count)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
179 NOTICE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
180 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion for leave to file instanter a motion to decertify the class action 171 is granted. Plaintiff's response to defendant's motion to decertify 177 due by 8/2/12; defendant's reply due by 8/9/12. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
181 NOTICE by Calvin E Lomax of Change of Address. (ea, ) (Entered: 07/19/2012)
182 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in Opposition to motion for miscellaneous relief 177 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/02/2012)
183 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to bar Expert Julie Holland (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Report, # 2 Exhibit 7 Deposition Holland, # 3

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 17 of 33

08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012
08/06/2012
08/06/2012 08/06/2012

Exhibit 11 Deposition King, # 4 Exhibit 23 Deposition Whitman)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
184 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to bar Expert King (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 11 Depostion King, # 2 Exhibit 2 Sander)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
185 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to bar Report and testimony of Dr. Stewart (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
186 EXHIBIT L of Lynn Sander, MD regarding motion to bar 185 (Catania, Francis)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Removed per court order dated 8/14/12.) Modified on 8/15/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
187 EXHIBIT A Stewart's Report by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County (Catania, Francis)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
188 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to bar Expert Report Dr. Whitman (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Report of Dr Whitman, # 2 Exhibit 11 Deposition King, # 3 Exhibit 23 Whitman Deposition)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
189 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to strike Letter by DOJ (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
190 MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County for summary judgment (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
191 MEMORANDUM by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County of law in support of Sheriff of Cook County';s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Catania, Francis) (Docket Text modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
192 RULE 56 C, LR 56.1 (a) (1) and (3) Statement by Sheriff of Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 190 , motion for summary judgment 191 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Answer to Complaint, # 2 Affidavit Sheriff, # 3 Affidavit Kristine Mueller)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
193 MOTION by Defendant Cook County for summary judgment (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
194 MEMORANDUM by Cook County in support of motion for summary judgment 193 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
195 RULE 56 (c) LR 56.1 (a) (1) (2) (3) Statement by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Answer to Second Amend Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 2 Sander Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 3 Thomas Deposition)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
196 EXHIBIT L by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit 4 Affidavit Dr Raba, # 2 Exhibit 5 Deposition Dr. Wrobel, # 3 Exhibit 6 County Jail Standards, # 4 Exhibit 7 Dr. Holland Deposition)(Catania, Francis)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Removed per court order dated 8/14/12) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
197 EXHIBIT 8 by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 9 Dr. Howard Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 10 Mr. Miller Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 11 Dr. King Deposition, # 4 Exhibit 12 Dr Hart Deposition)(Catania, Francis)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
198 EXHIBIT 13 by Defendant Cook County in Support of MOTION by Defendant Cook County for summary judgment 193 Peter Kramer (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 14 Dr. Hart Depo 05102011)(Catania, Francis)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
199 RULE 56 (c) LR 56.1 (a)(1) Statement by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 16 PA Davis Deposition, # 2

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08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/06/2012
08/06/2012 08/06/2012 08/07/2012 08/08/2012 08/08/2012 08/09/2012

Exhibit 17 PA Fowler Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 18 PA Marquez Deposition)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
200 RULE 56 (c0 LR 56.1 (a)(1) Statement by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 19 Dr. Stein Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 20 Ms. Beasley Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 21 Mr. Holmes Deposition, # 4 Exhibit 22 Mr. Fasano Deposition)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
201 RULE 56 (c) LR 56.1(a)(1) Statement by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 23 Whitman Deposition, # 2 Affidavit 24 Interrogatory Answers, # 3 Affidavit 25 Affidavit Frank Oles)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
202 RULE 56 (c0 LR 56.1(a)(1) Statement by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 15 Dr Stewart Deposition)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
203 RESPONSE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability. 173 (Catania, Francis) (Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
204 RESPONSE by Defendant's to plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement. (Catania, Francis) (Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
205 RULE 56 LR 56.1 (b)(3)(B) Statement of Additional Facts requiring Denial of Plaintiffs' Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 Sander Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 5 Wrobel Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 7 Holland Deposition, # 4 Exhibit 9 Howard Deposition)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
206 RULE 56 LR 56.1(b)(1) Statement additional materials in support (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 11 Dr. King Dep, # 2 Exhibit 14 Dr Hart Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 18 PA Fowler Deposition, # 4 Exhibit 19 Dr. Stein Deposition)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
207 RULE 56 LR 56.1(b)(1) Statement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 23 Dr. Whitman, # 2 Exhibit B Deposition of Blackwell, # 3 Exhibit H Depo 5/10/11 Dr Hart, # 4 Affidavit K Affidavit K. Mueller, # 5 Affidavit L Affidavit Dr. Sander Summary, # 6 Affidavit P Affidavit Dr. Puisis, # 7 Affidavit R Affidavit of Dr. Raba)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
208 RULE 56 LR 56.1 (b)(1) Statement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit S PA Stadnicki Deposition, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs' #11 PA Trammell, # 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs' #14 PA Martinez, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs' #15 Dr. Hart, # 5 Exhibit Plaintiffs' #20, # 6 Exhibit Plaintiffs' #37)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/06/2012)
209 EXHIBIT A to DOC 184 Report of Dr. King by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County (Catania, Francis)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 8/7/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 08/06/2012)
210 RULE 56 (c) LR 56.1(a)(1) Statement by Cook County regarding motion for summary judgment 193 exhibit L not filed properly (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit L Sander Aff and Summary)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/07/2012)
211 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to File Response instanter and to substitute filed exhibit (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Bar, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit to proposed Response)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/08/2012)
212 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 211 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 8/14/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/08/2012)
213 REPLY by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County Motion to Decertify the Class 177 , memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/09/2012)

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08/09/2012 08/14/2012 08/14/2012 08/14/2012
09/14/2012 09/14/2012 09/14/2012 09/14/2012
09/14/2012 09/14/2012 09/14/2012 09/14/2012
09/14/2012 09/14/2012 09/14/2012 09/14/2012

214 NOTICE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County re reply to response to motion, 213 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/09/2012)
215 RESPONSE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to bar proposed expert testimony 176 with leave granted to file out of time (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Disclosure)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/14/2012)
216 NOTICE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County re response in opposition to motion, 215 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 08/14/2012)
217 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion for miscellaneous relief 211 is granted without objection. The clerk is directed to remove documents 186 and 196 , and defendant is granted leave to substitute 210 in their place. Defendant's request for leave to file instanter their response to Plaintiff's motion to bar expert testimony is also granted; reply due 9/14/12. Defendant is also granted leave to file a separate motion to bar the use of the 2008 Department of Justice letter to Thomas Dart and Todd Stroger; plaintiff to file a response by 9/14/12. The oral motion to depose Dr. Raba within two weeks is also granted. A status hearing is set for 9/20/12 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 08/15/2012)
218 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in Opposition to motion to bar 188 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
219 RESPONSE by Michael Parishin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to strike Letter by DOJ 189 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
220 RULE 56 (b)(3) Statement by Michael Parish regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
221 RULE 56.1(b)(3) Statement by Michael Parish regarding motion for summary judgment 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 40−59, # 2 Exhibit 60−63, # 3 Exhibit 64, # 4 Exhibit 65, # 5 Exhibit 66−67, # 6 Exhibit 68−70, # 7 Exhibit 71, # 8 Exhibit 72, # 9 Exhibit 73−75, # 10 Exhibit 76−78, # 11 Exhibit 79−81, # 12 Exhibit 82−83, # 13 Exhibit 84−87, # 14 Exhibit 88−93)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
222 RESPONSE by Michael Parish regarding to defendants Sheriff's Local Rule 56.1(a)(2) Statement (Document 192) (Flaxman, Kenneth)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 9/17/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 09/14/2012)
223 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in Opposition to Defendant Sheriff's for summary judgment (Document 190) 190 (Flaxman, Kenneth)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 9/17/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 09/14/2012)
224 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parishin Opposition to Defendant Cook County's motion for summary judgment (Document 193) 193 (Flaxman, Kenneth)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 9/17/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 09/14/2012)
225 REPLY by Michael Parish to MOTION by Plaintiffs Michael Parish, Lisa Brown, Stacey Clark, Roy Cleaves, Sean Driscoll, Leila Khoury, Carla Lofton, Dean Miller, Curtis L. Oats, Kevin Sanders, Dan Taylor, Carlotte Wilson for partial summary judgment 173 , memorandum in opposition to motion 203 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
226 REPLY by Michael Parish to MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to bar proposed expert testimony 176 , response in opposition to motion, 215 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
227 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in Opposition to motion to bar 185 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
228 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parishin Opposition to MOTION to bar Expert Testimony from Dr. Lambert King (Document 184) 184 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 9/17/2012 (ea, ). (Entered: 09/14/2012)
229 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parishin in Opposition to MOTION to bar Expert testimony from Dr. Julie Holland (Document 183) Julie Holland 183 (Flaxman, Kenneth)(Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.) Modified on 9/17/2012 (ea, ).

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 20 of 33

09/16/2012 09/16/2012 09/20/2012 09/27/2012 09/27/2012 09/28/2012
10/15/2012
10/15/2012 10/15/2012 10/15/2012 10/15/2012 10/15/2012
10/15/2012 10/15/2012 10/15/2012 10/15/2012
10/17/2012

(Entered: 09/14/2012)
230 NOTICE by Michael Parish re Rule 56 statement, 221 [filing of index to exhibits] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/16/2012)
231 NOTICE by Michael Parish re notice of filing 230 , Rule 56 statement, 221 [corrected volume numbers] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/16/2012)
232 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: By the court's own motion, the status hearing scheduled for 9/20/12 at 9:30 a.m. is reset to 11/20/12 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
233 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time Agreed (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 09/27/2012)
234 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of extension of time 233 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 10/2/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 09/27/2012)
235 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: Defendant's agreed motion for extension of time to file reply briefs 233 is granted; defendant's reply to summary judgment due on 10/15/12. No appearance is required on 10/2/12 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 09/28/2012)
236 AMENDED Rule 56 statement, 195 County Of Cooks Re−Filed Exhibits To (Doc 195) Local Rule 56.1 Statement Of Material Facts As To Which It Contends There Is No Genuine Issue And That Entitle Defendant To A Judgment As A Matter Of Law (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit Dr. Raba, # 2 Exhibit Dep of Dr. Wrobel, # 3 Exhibit County Jail Standards, # 4 Exhibit Dep of Dr. Holland)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
237 REPLY by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to response in opposition to motion 229 Testimony from Dr Julie Holland (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
238 REPLY by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to response in opposition to motion 228 to Bar Testimony of Dr. King (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
239 REPLY by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to memorandum in opposition to motion 227 to Bar Testimony of Dr. Stewart (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
240 REPLY by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to memorandum in opposition to motion 218 to Bar Testimony of Steven Whitman (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
241 RULE 56 DEFENDANT COUNTY OF COOKS L.R. 56.1(a) REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS 56.1(b)(3) Resp Statement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 24A, # 2 Exhibit 26, # 3 Exhibit 27, # 4 Exhibit 28, # 5 Exhibit 29, # 6 Exhibit 30, # 7 Exhibit 30A, # 8 Exhibit 31, # 9 Exhibit 35, # 10 Exhibit 36, # 11 Exhibit 37, # 12 Exhibit 38, # 13 Exhibit 39, # 14 Exhibit 40, # 15 Exhibit 41, # 16 Exhibit 42, # 17 Exhibit 43, # 18 Exhibit 44, # 19 Exhibit 52, # 20 Exhibit LR Sander Report, # 21 Exhibit X Correspondence)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
242 REPLY by Cook County to response in opposition to motion 224 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
243 RULE 56 56.1(a) 3 Reply Statement to Plaintiffs' Response (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
244 REPLY by Sheriff of Cook County to response in opposition to motion 223 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
245 RULE 56 L.R. 56.1(a) Reply Statement Additional exhibits to DOC 241 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 40 Mason, # 2 Exhibit 41 Beasley, # 3 Exhibit 42 Stuckey, # 4 Exhibit 43 Holmes, # 5 Exhibit 44 Hendrix, # 6 Exhibit 42 Hart, # 7 Exhibit L R Sander Verified Report of Expert, # 8 Exhibit X Correspondence)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
246 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to file instanter for Leave to File Instanter a Reply Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Response [Doc 219] to

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 21 of 33

10/17/2012 10/17/2012 10/19/2012 10/19/2012 10/19/2012 10/19/2012 10/22/2012
11/19/2012 01/17/2013 01/25/2013 01/25/2013 01/25/2013 03/22/2013 11/07/2013 11/07/2013

Motion to Bar Use of the July 11, 2008 Letter from the United States Department of Justice {Doc 189] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Catania, Francis) (Clerk's Office modified docket text.) (Entered: 10/17/2012)
247 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion to file instanter, 246 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 10/23/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/17/2012)
248 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Reply Instanter 246 is granted. No appearance is required at the motion hearing set for 10/23/12 at 9:00 a.m. All other dates to stand.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/17/2012)
249 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish for leave to file suggestion of intervening authority (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/19/2012)
250 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 249 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 10/24/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/19/2012)
251 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to strike Rule 56 statement, 245 , Rule 56 statement,, 241 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/19/2012)
252 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief, 251 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 10/24/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/19/2012)
253 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court grants Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file suggestion of intervening authority 249 and Plaintiffs' motion to strike pages 1−85 and 89 of Document 241, as well as exhibits filed by defendants as Documents 241 −1 through 241 −21 251 because (1) Local Rule 56.1 does not provide for a reply to the non movant's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement; and (2) to the extent that these stricken submissions are intended to be a motion to strike, such a motion is moot because the Court, as a matter of course in ruling on summary judgment motions, makes determinations as to whether any particular fact statement is supported by materials contemplated by Rule 56(c). Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
254 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: The status hearing set for 11/20/12 is reset for 1/23/2013 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
255 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee:The status hearing set for 1/23/13 at 9:00 a.m. is stricken. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
256 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County Leave to File Suggestion of Intervening Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Holloway v Delaware County)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
257 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 256 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 1/31/2013 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
258 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court grants defendants' motion for leave to file suggestion of intervening authority 256 . No appearance on the motion is necessary. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
259 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court takes under advisement plaintiffs' motion to bar 176 and defendants' motions to bar 183 , 184 , 185 , 188 , 189 and will rule on them in conjunction with the motions for summary judgment and to decertify the class. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 03/22/2013)
260 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to supplement and file suggestion of intervening authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
261 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion to supplement 260 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 11/13/2013 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/07/2013)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 22 of 33

11/08/2013 11/12/2013 11/12/2013 11/13/2013 11/13/2013 11/13/2013 11/15/2013 12/17/2013 12/23/2013
01/15/2014 01/27/2014 01/27/2014 01/31/2014 07/28/2014 07/29/2014 09/11/2014

262 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee:Defendants' motion for leave to file suggestion of intervening authority 260 is granted. No appearance is required on the motion. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
263 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish for leave to file reply to suggestion of intervening authority (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
264 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for leave to file 263 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 11/19/2013 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
265 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee:Plaintiff's motion for leave to file reply to suggestion of intervening authority 263 is granted. No appearance is required on the motion.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
266 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County for Leave to file Surreply Response (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Surreply)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
267 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 266 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 11/19/2013 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
268 MINUTE entry before Honorable John Z. Lee: Defendants' motion for leave to file a sur−reply response to correct plaintiff's misstatement regarding intervening authority 266 is granted. No appearance is required on the motion. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
269 NOTICE by Calvin E Lomax of Change of Address. (ph, ) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
270 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Defendants have filed a motion to decertify the class that previously was certified by Judge Kennelly on October 24, 2008. Having reviewed the briefs and voluminous exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court orders the parties to submit supplemental briefs with respect to the question of whether a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and effectively adjudicating the controversy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Specifically, Plaintiffs are directed to address the following issues with as much particularity as possible. (1) Given the class as it is currently comprised, what is Plaintiffs' proposal as to how this action should be tried? (2) What precise issues will be tried on a class−wide basis? (3) Assuming that Plaintiffs prevail as to these class−wide issues, what issues will remain for individualized determinations, and how and by whom would those individualized determinations be made? These issues should be discussed with as much specificity as possible. Because Plaintiffs bear the burden to demonstrate the propriety of class certification, Plaintiffs are to file the opening supplemental brief, which is limited to ten pages and due by January 15, 2014. Defendants should file their response supplemental brief limited to ten pages by January 27, 2014. Plaintiffs may file a reply supplemental brief limited to five page by January 31, 2014. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/23/2013)
271 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Michael Parish to text entry,,,,, 270 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
272 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to text entry,,,,, 270 , Response 271 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
273 NOTICE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENT ON CERTIFICATION & FORM OF TRIAL (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
274 REPLY by Plaintiff Michael Parish to text entry,,,,, 270 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
275 DOCUMENT ENTERED IN ERROR (Modified by Clerk's Office on 7/29/2014) (td, ). (Entered: 07/29/2014)
276 NOTICE of Correction regarding 275 . (td, ) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
277 Exhibit List of Summary Judgment Exhibits by Michael Parish. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/11/2014)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 23 of 33

09/22/2014 09/29/2014
09/29/2014 11/05/2014 11/06/2014 12/02/2014

278 LETTER from James Phillips dated 8/14/2014. (Exhibits) (ea, ) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
279 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court finds that a hearing is necessary to discuss issues raised in Defendants' motion to decertify 177 and the parties' cross motions for summary judgment [ 173 , 190 , 193 ]. The Court sets a hearing on Wednesday, November 5, from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m., at which those issues will be raised by the Court and discussed. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
280 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Michael Parish to letter 278 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
281 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Status hearing held on 11/5/14. Status hearing set for 12/12/14 at 1:30 p.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 11/05/2014)
282 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Michael Parish to questions posed by Court on Nov 5, 2014 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
283 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/5/2014 before the Honorable John Z. Lee. Court Reporter Contact Information: ALEXANDRA ROTH, alexandra_roth@ilnd.uscourts.gov, (312) 408−5038.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

12/10/2014 12/29/2014 12/31/2014 01/21/2015 02/10/2015 02/16/2015 02/23/2015
04/01/2015
04/01/2015
04/02/2015 04/02/2015

Redaction Request due 12/23/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/2/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/2/2015. (Roth, Alexandra) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
284 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: The status hearing set for 12/12/14 is reset to 1/22/15 at 10:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
285 MAIL returned for document # 283 sent to Calvin Lomax returned as undeliverable ; released. (las, ) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
RE−MAILED document 283 to Calvin Lomax at home address. (las, ) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
286 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:The status hearing set for 1/22/15 is reset to 2/24/15 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
289 MAIL returned for document # 283 that had been resent to Calvin E Lomax home address returned as undeliverable ; return to sender. (las, ) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
287 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Michael Parish by Patrick William Morrissey (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 02/16/2015)
288 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:The status hearing set for 2/24/15 is reset for 4/2/2015 at 09:00 AM. No appearance required on 2/24/15.Mailed notice (air, ) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
290 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Lisa Brown, Stacey Clark, Roy Cleaves, Sean Driscoll, Leila Khoury, Carla Lofton, Dean Miller, Curtis L. Oats, Michael Parish, Kevin Sanders, Dan Taylor, Carlotte Wilson by Joel A. Flaxman (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
291 ORDER: Enter Order on Decertification Motion Issues. [For further details see order] − Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 4/1/2015. Mailed notice (np, ) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
292 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to clarify , modify, or vacate order of April 1, 2015 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
293 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Status hearing held on 4/2/15. At the hearing, the Court raised various issues related to Defendants' motion to decertify the class as well as the parties' respective cross−motions for summary judgment. Based

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 24 of 33

04/17/2015 04/17/2015 04/17/2015 04/21/2015
05/05/2015 05/05/2015 05/15/2015 05/15/2015
05/15/2015 05/15/2015 05/18/2015 05/18/2015

upon the issues raised at the hearing and in the parties' prior submissions, the Court believes that supplemental briefing with respect to Defendants' motion to decertify would assist the Court in deciding the motion. As such, the Court directs Defendants to file a supplemental brief in support of their motion to decertify. The supplemental brief should be no more than 20 pages and address the issues relevant to class certification that were discussed at the prior hearings and/or raised as part of the parties' summary judgment papers. This supplemental brief should be filed by 4/23/15. Plaintiffs in turn are directed to file a supplemental response brief addressing these arguments on or before 5/4/15. This too will be limited to 20 pages. Lastly, Defendants may file a supplemental reply brief by 6/4/15 limited to 15 pages. Plaintiffs' motion to clarify, modify or vacate the order of April 1, 2015 292 is granted in part and denied in part. The Court's 4/1/15 order is vacate to the extent it is inconsistent with this order. The motion is denied in all other respects. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
294 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to file Supplemental Motion to Decertify Class (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
295 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of extension of time 294 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 4/22/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
296 RESPONSE by Michael Parish to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to file Supplemental Motion to Decertify Class 294 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
297 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Defendants' motion for extension of time to file supplemental brief 294 is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants to file a supplemental brief in support of their motion to decertify. The supplemental brief should be no more than 20 pages and address the issues relevant to class certification that were discussed at the prior hearings and/or raised as part of the parties' summary judgment papers. This supplemental brief should be filed by 5/15/15. Plaintiffs in turn are directed to file a supplemental response brief addressing these arguments on or before 5/29/15. This too will be limited to 20 pages. Defendants may file a supplemental reply brief by 6/18/15 limited to 15 pages. No appearance is required on the motion.Mailed notice (ca, ) Modified on 4/22/2015 (ca, ). (Entered: 04/21/2015)
298 NOTICE by Thomas Gerard Morrissey of Change of Address (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/05/2015)
299 NOTICE by Patrick William Morrissey of Change of Address (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 05/05/2015)
300 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County Motion to Decertify the 23(b)(3) Class (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
301 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County in support of motion for miscellaneous relief 300 to Decertify the 23(b)(3) Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
302 Exhibit List by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
303 NOTICE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County re exhibit list 302 , MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County Motion to Decertify the 23(b)(3) Class 300 , memorandum in support of motion,, 301 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
304 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish for extension of time to file response to defendants' supplemental brief in support of motion to decertify (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
305 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 304 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 5/27/2015 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/18/2015)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 25 of 33

05/21/2015
05/21/2015 06/12/2015 06/15/2015

306 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Plaintiffs' motion to extend time to respond to defendants' supplemental brief in support of motion to decertify 304 is granted. Plaintiffs' response is due by 6/12/15. No appearance is required on the motion.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
307 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Minute order 306 is amended: Defendant's reply is due by 6/26/15. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
308 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in Opposition to motion for miscellaneous relief 300 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
309 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 4/2/2015 before the Honorable John Z. Lee. Court Reporter Contact Information: ALEXANDRA ROTH, alexandra_roth@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312) 408−5038.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

06/26/2015 06/26/2015 08/13/2015 03/31/2016
03/31/2016 06/17/2016 06/22/2016
07/11/2016 07/13/2016
07/13/2016 08/17/2016

Redaction Request due 7/6/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/16/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/14/2015. (Roth, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
310 REPLY by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to memorandum in support of motion,, 301 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 20, # 2 Exhibit 21)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
311 NOTICE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County re reply to response to motion 310 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
312 LETTER from Calvin E. Lomax dated 08/10/2015. (sxw, ) (Entered: 08/19/2015)
313 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion and order, the Court denies Defendants' motion and supplemental motion to decertify the class action [177, 300]. [For further details see memorandum opinion and order.]Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
314 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 3/31/16Mailed notice(ca, ). (Entered: 03/31/2016)
315 MOTION by Movant Winston Day Requesting Status (mr, ) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
316 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court grants Movant Winston Day's motion requesting information regarding the status of this case 315 . Plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment 173 , Defendants' cross motions for summary judgment 193 190 , as well as the parties' motions to bar 176 183 184 185 188 189 are still pending before the Court. The Court will issue its rulings on these pending motions by mail. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
317 MOTION for Status by Craig Mrazek. (eg,) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
318 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court grants Movant Craig Mrazek's motion for status 317 for the same reasons as stated in the Court's 6/22/16 minute entry. Defendants' cross motions for summary judgment 193 190 , as well as the parties' motions to bar 176 183 184 185 188 189 are still pending before the Court. The Court will issue its rulings on these pending motions by mail. The Court directs counsel for the class to mail copies of the Court's rulings with regard to Winston Day and Craig Mrazek's motions to Day and Mrazek.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 07/13/2016)
319 NOTICE by Michael Parish re order on motion for miscellaneous relief,,, text entry,, 318 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/13/2016)
320 STATUS Request by Calvin E Lomax. Mailed copy of docket sheet to Calvin Lomax. (dc, ) (Entered: 08/18/2016)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 26 of 33

10/26/2016
04/21/2017
04/21/2017 06/01/2017 06/01/2017 06/01/2017 06/02/2017 12/15/2017 12/21/2017 04/17/2018
04/17/2018 03/26/2019 04/02/2019 04/03/2019 04/03/2019 04/09/2019

321 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Based on the parties' arguments and the facts of this case, and in light of the Seventh Circuit's recent opinion in Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728 (7th Cir.2016), which held that the July 11, 2008 Department of Justice letter is admissible as evidence under the exception for factual findings from a legally authorized investigation, the Court exercises its discretion and denies Defendants' motion to bar the letter 189 . Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
322 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: By April 25, 2017, Plaintiffs shall either (1) provide the exhibits included in the "List of Exhibits Referred to by Plaintiffs' Experts", referenced by Defendants in ECF No. 183−1 at 12, ECF No. 209 at 34, ECF No. 187 at 63, and referenced by Plaintiffs in ECF No. 174−11 at 114; or (2) provide cross−references to where the Court may find each of these exhibits in the volumes of the parties' summary judgment exhibits. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
323 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Michael Parish to text entry,, 322 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
324 Transcript and exhibits by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Stewart Depo Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit ECF 202−1 Prior filed, # 3 Exhibit Notice of Filing Transcript)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
325 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County to seal ECF 324−1 Exhibits to Transcript (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
326 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion to seal 325 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 6/7/2017 at 09:00 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
327 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Motion to seal the transcript exhibits of Pablo Stewart's deposition filed as ECF 324−1 325 is granted. The clerk is directed to seal the transcript. No appearance is required on the motion.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
328 LETTER from Roderick Moore dated 12/11/2017 (Envelope not postmarked). (sxb, ) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
329 NOTICE by Michael Parish re letter 328 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
330 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion and order, the Court denies Defendants' motions to bar Plaintiffs' experts Dr. Whitman, Dr. Stewart, Dr. Holland, and Dr. King 183 184 185 188 . [For further details see memorandum opinion and order]. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
331 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 4/17/18.Mailed notice(ca, ) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
332 WITHDRAWING Andrew J. Creighton as counsel for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County and substituting Francis J. Catania as counsel of record (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 03/26/2019)
333 WITHDRAWING Daniel J. Fahlgren as counsel for Defendants Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County and substituting Daniel J. Fahlgren as counsel of record (Fahlgren, Daniel) (Entered: 04/02/2019)
334 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to set date for ruling (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/03/2019)
335 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 334 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 4/10/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/03/2019)
336 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Plaintiffs motion to set date for ruling is granted. The Court sets a ruling date of May 30, 2019. No appearance is necessary on the motion. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 27 of 33

05/30/2019
05/30/2019 05/30/2019
05/31/2019 07/08/2019 07/08/2019 07/08/2019 07/08/2019 07/08/2019 07/09/2019
07/09/2019 07/10/2019

337 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion and order, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 173 is denied, and Cook County's 193 and the Sheriff's 190 cross−motions are granted in part and denied in part. Cook County's motion 193 is granted with regard to its direct liability, but is denied to the extent that Cook County is an indispensable party that must fund any judgment against the Sheriff. The Sheriff's motion is granted as to (1) claims asserting constitutional violations occurring prior to July 11, 2008; and (2) claims based on medical conditions other than asthma, diabetes, high cholesterol, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate withdrawal, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, and schizophrenia. In all other respects, the Sheriff's motion is denied. To the extent that any named Plaintiff may base a surviving claim on alleged constitutional violations occurring on or after July 11, 2008, and to the extent that Plaintiffs wish to substitute class representatives, Plaintiffs shall file a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint within 28 days. [For further details see memorandum opinion and order]. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
338 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 5/30/19. Mailed notice(ca, ) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
339 ORDER : Plaintiffs move to bar certain expert testimony from Lynn Sanders, as well as Richard Blackwell, Avery Hart, Jonathan Howard, Leslie Stein, and Nneka Jones 176 . The Court need only decide the motion as to Dr. Sanders, however, because the remainder of the motion is moot. See Pls'. Reply Supp. Mot. Bar Expert Testimony ("Pls.' Reply") at 7 (stating that Plaintiffs' objections to opinion testimony of Hart, Howard, Stein, Blackwell, and Jones are moot), ECF No. 226. As to Dr. Sanders, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 5/30/19. [For further details see order].Mailed notice(ca, ) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
340 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Status hearing set for 7/9/19 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
341 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish refer for settlement proceedings (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2019)
342 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 341 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 7/11/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2019)
343 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish for reconsideration regarding memorandum opinion and order 338 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2019)
344 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for reconsideration 343 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 7/11/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2019)
345 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in support of motion for reconsideration 343 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2019)
346 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Status hearing held on 7/9/19. Plaintiff's motion to refer the case for settlement proceedings 341 is granted. This case is referred to Magistrate Judge Valdez for a settlement conference. Defendant's response to Plaintiff's motion to reconsider 343 shall be due by 7/30/19; reply due by 8/6/19. Status hearing set for 9/26/19 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 07/10/2019)
347 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Maria Valdez for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: Settlement conference.(ca, )Mailed notice. (Entered: 07/10/2019)
348 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: This case has been referred to Judge Valdez to conduct a settlement conference. The parties are ordered to appear for status on July 23, 2019 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1041 to set a settlement conference date. The parties are further directed to consult with their respective clients before the status date to determine the dates of unavailability for a settlement conference that may be set within the next three to four months. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 07/10/2019)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 28 of 33

07/10/2019 07/19/2019 07/23/2019 07/23/2019
07/23/2019 07/24/2019 07/30/2019 07/30/2019 08/02/2019 08/06/2019 08/06/2019

349 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:The Court set a briefing schedule on the motion to reconsider. No appearance is required on 7/11/19.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 07/10/2019)
354 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 348 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (ec, ) (Entered: 07/25/2019)
350 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 7/23/19. The parties were offered the following dates for settlement conference: 8/13, 8/27, 9/5, and 9/19 at 9:30 a.m. Status hearing is set for 8/6/19 at 10:00 a.m. Parties will advise the Court at the next hearing which settlement conference date will be selected. Parties are encouraged to continue engaging in meaningful settlement discussions. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
351 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Parties have agreed on a date, therefore, this case is set to 9/5/19 at 09:30 a.m. with Recalled Magistrate Judge Andrew Rodovich, in Chambers 1046 for settlement conference. Upon arrival, parties are to contact Judge Valdez's chambers for further instructions. Judge Valdez requires full compliance with the Court's Standing Order on Settlement Conference found on Judge Valdez's website available at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov, or the parties can contact courtroom deputy, Lisa Provine, at (312)408−5135 for a copy. Failure to comply with the provisions of the Court's Standing Order may result in the unilateral cancellation of the settlement conference by the Court. Absent leave from the Court, cancellation will result if the Plaintiff fails to submit to chambers copies of the settlement letters 21 days prior to the settlement conference. THE FACT THAT A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED, DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE PARTIES SHOULD STOP ENGAGING IN SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS AMONG THEMSELVES. The Court finds that too often the parties put settlement talks on hold until the settlement conference with the Magistrate Judge. The Court expects that many cases can be resolved among the parties without the need for court−supervised mediation. If your informal discussions are unsuccessful, the Court will conduct the conference but will expect the parties to apprise her of the status of their ongoing settlement discussions. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
353 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 348 sent to Calvin E Lomax returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (ec, ) (Entered: 07/25/2019)
352 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: On the Court's own motion, status hearing set for 8/6/19 is stricken and reset to 8/20/19 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 07/24/2019)
355 RESPONSE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish for reconsideration regarding memorandum opinion and order 338 343 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/30/2019)
356 NOTICE by Cook County, Sheriff of Cook County re response in opposition to motion 355 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/30/2019)
358 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 350 , 351 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received; therefore future mailings will not be sent until a new address is provided to the Clerk's Office using a Notification of Change of Address or Pro Se Appearance form (ek, ) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
357 REPLY by Plaintiff Michael Parish to response in opposition to motion 355 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/06/2019)
359 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 352 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received; therefore future mailings will not be sent until a new address is provided to the Clerk's Office using a Notification of Change of Address or Pro Se Appearance form (ek, ) (Entered: 08/07/2019)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 29 of 33

08/12/2019
08/13/2019
08/16/2019 08/16/2019 08/16/2019 08/20/2019 08/27/2019 09/05/2019
09/06/2019
09/06/2019 09/12/2019 09/20/2019
09/20/2019 09/25/2019 09/25/2019

363 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 350 , 351 sent to Calvin E Lomax returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received; therefore future mailings will not be sent until a new address is provided to the Clerk's Office using a Notification of Change of Address or Pro Se Appearance form (lma, ) (Entered: 08/20/2019)
364 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 352 sent to Calvin E Lomax returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received; therefore future mailings will not be sent until a new address is provided to the Clerk's Office using a Notification of Change of Address or Pro Se Appearance form (lma, ) (Entered: 08/20/2019)
360 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to amend/correct [modify settlement procedure] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/16/2019)
361 [AGREED] NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to amend/correct 360 before Honorable Maria Valdez on 8/20/2019 at 10:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/16/2019)
362 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Pursuant to this Court's standing order governing motions, hearing set for 8/20/19 at 10:00 a.m. is reset to 10:15 a.m. the same day. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 08/16/2019)
365 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Magistrate Judge status and motion hearing held on 8/20/19. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiffs' Agreed Motion To Modify Settlement Procedure 360 is granted. Settlement conference set for 9/5/19 to stand. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 08/20/2019)
371 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 362 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (kl, ) Modified on 10/2/2019 (ecw, ). (Entered: 09/30/2019)
366 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrew P. Rodovich: Settlement conference held on 9/5/19 before recalled Magistrate Judge Andrew Rodovich. A tentative settlement was reached. A telephone status with Judge Rodovich is set for 9/20/19 at 1:00 p.m. Plaintiff's counsel is to initiate the call. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
367 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrew P. Rodovich: The minute entry dated 9/5/19, docket entry 366 is amended as follows: Settlement conference held on 9/5/19 before recalled Magistrate Judge Andrew Rodovich. A telephone status with Judge Rodovich is set for 9/20/19 at 1:00 p.m. Plaintiff's counsel is to initiate the call. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
372 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 362 sent to Calvin E. Lomax returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (axc, ) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
368 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:In light of the continuing settlement discussions between the parties, the Court strikes without prejudice Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration 343 . Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 09/12/2019)
369 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrew P. Rodovich: TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE held on 9/20/2019, before Magistrate Judge Andrew P. Rodovich. Ptfs appeared by attys Thomas Morrissey, Kenneth Flaxman. Dfts appeared by atty Francis Catania. Telephonic Status Conference SET for 10/11/2019 at 1:00 PM. Plaintiff to initiate the call. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 09/20/2019)
374 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 366 , 367 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (axc, ) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
370 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: By agreement of the parties, the status hearing set for 9/26/19 is reset to 10/22/19 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 09/25/2019)
373 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 366 , 367 sent to Calvin E. Lomax returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (jg, ) (Entered: 10/03/2019)

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10/04/2019 10/09/2019 10/11/2019
10/22/2019
10/23/2019 10/30/2019 11/21/2019 12/02/2019 12/03/2019 12/09/2019 12/10/2019
12/10/2019 12/16/2019 12/17/2019
12/26/2019 01/13/2020 01/29/2020

375 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 369 sent to Calvin E Lomax returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (ec, ) (Entered: 10/07/2019)
376 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 369 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (jg, ) (Entered: 10/09/2019)
377 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrew P. Rodovich: TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE held on 10/11/2019, before Magistrate Judge Andrew P. Rodovich. Pltfs appeared by atty Thomas Morrissey. Dfts appeared by atty Francis Catania. Discussions continue and progress has been made. Plaintiffs to file a status report by 12/2/2019. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
378 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Status hearing held on 10/22/19. Counsel reports that he will present the recommendation at the November County Board meeting. Status hearing set for 12/12/19 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/23/2019)
379 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:By agreement of the parties, the status hearing set for 12/12/19 is reset to 12/10/19 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/23/2019)
380 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 377 returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (kl, ) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
381 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 377 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (jg, ) (Entered: 11/21/2019)
382 STATUS Report by Michael Parish (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/02/2019)
383 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez:All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 12/03/2019)
384 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:The status hearing set for 12/10/19 is reset to 12/19/19 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)
385 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to approve consent judgment [preliminary approval] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Final Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit 2 Proposed Class Notice, # 3 Exhibit 3 Proposed Claim Form, # 4 Exhibit 4 Proposed Optout Form, # 5 Exhibit 5 Proposed Notice of Exclusion)(Flaxman, Kenneth) Modified on 12/10/2019 (mc, ). (Entered: 12/10/2019)
386 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to approve consent judgment, 385 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 12/17/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/10/2019)
387 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:The status and motion hearing hearing set for 12/17/19 at 9:00 a.m. is reset to 12/17/19 at 11:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/16/2019)
388 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Motion hearing held on 12/17/19. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement 385 granted. Notices should be sent out to the settlement class by 2/28/20; any objections are due by 5/8/20. A motion for final approval and petition for attorneys' fees and costs is due by 5/15/20. A final fairness hearing is set for 6/5/20 at 11:00 a.m.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/18/2019)
389 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 383 sent to Roderick Moore returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact information received. (pj, ) (Entered: 12/31/2019)
390 MOTION by Plaintiff Jejuann James to be made a class member (Exhibit). (Envelope postmarked 1/7/2020). (mc, ) (Entered: 01/14/2020)
391 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Michael Parish to motion for miscellaneous relief 390 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/29/2020)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 31 of 33

03/04/2020 03/04/2020 03/10/2020
03/10/2020
03/16/2020
03/27/2020 03/30/2020
03/31/2020 03/31/2020 04/06/2020 04/08/2020 04/15/2020 04/24/2020
04/28/2020 05/07/2020

392 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to reset Dates for Mailing Class Notice [AGREED] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/04/2020)
393 AGREED NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to reset 392 before Honorable John Z. Lee on 3/10/2020 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/04/2020)
394 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Motion hearing held on 3/10/20. Jejuann James request to be made a class member 390 is denied as moot. He is already a putative member of the class. Agreed motion to reset the dates for mailing class notice 392 granted. The notices will be sent out on 3/20/20; any objections from putative class members are due by 5/15/20. The motion for final approval and petition for fees is due by 5/29/20. The parties should submit a proposed order and contact the courtroom deputy when they have done so. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 03/10/2020)
395 ORDER : On consideration of plaintiff's motion to reset dates, defendants having agreed to the request,IT IS ORDERED: 1) Notices shall be mailed by March 20, 2020.2) Claims forms shall be received by May 8, 2020.3)Class members may submit objections by May 15, 2020.4) Motion for final approval and petition for fees be filed by May 29, 2020.5) All other dates to stand. Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 3/10/20.Mailed notice(ca, ) (Entered: 03/10/2020)
396 ORDER Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 16, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Amended General Order. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/16/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
398 LETTER from Timothy Jackson. (Envelope postmarked 3/27/2020) (mc, ) (Entered: 04/08/2020)
397 ORDER Seconded Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 30, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Second Amended General Order. Amended General Order 20−0012, entered on March 17, 2020, and General Order 20−0014, entered on March 20, 2020, are vacated and superseded by this Second Amended General. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/30/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 03/31/2020)
400 LETTER from Demetrius Lee Johnson dated 3/30/2020. (Envelope postmarked 3/31/2020). (mc, ) (Entered: 04/15/2020)
402 OBJECTIONS to the proposed settlement by Bobby Tatum. (Envelope postmarked 3/31/2020). (mc, ) (Entered: 04/15/2020)
401 LETTER from U.C. Davis. (Envelope postmarked 4/6/2020). (mc, ) (Entered: 04/15/2020)
399 OBJECTION to proposed settlement by Darron Brewer (mc, ) (Entered: 04/08/2020)
403 LETTER and comment to the court in the proposed settlement concerning the above captioned case from Amir Disdarevic dated 4/8/2020. (Envelope postmarked 4/15/2020). (mc, ) (Entered: 04/23/2020)
404 ORDER Third Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on April 24, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Third Amended General Order. Parties are must carefully review all obligations under this Order, including the requirement listed in paragraph number 5 to file a joint written status report in most civil cases. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 4/24/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
410 WRITTEN OBJECTIONS to class action settlement by Eric Bernard; Notice. (Envelope postmarked 4/28/2020). (mc, ) (Entered: 05/14/2020)
405 STATUS Report [JOINT] by Michael Parish (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/07/2020)

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 32 of 33

05/08/2020 05/11/2020 05/12/2020 05/12/2020 05/13/2020
05/14/2020 05/19/2020 05/19/2020 05/19/2020 05/26/2020
05/26/2020

406 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court has forwarded letters it has received from Trina D. Murphy, Melvin Nelson, Miguel Rocha, Mario Picazo, and Marvin Stone to Plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel shall send a copy of the letters to the settlement administrator. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/08/2020)
416 CERTIFICATE of Service by Unknown Anjenai Bolton. (Envelope postmarked 5/11/2020) (mc, ) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
407 MOTION by potential Plaintiff George Fernandez to be provided Plaintiff class member settlement claim forms and for an extension of time to submit claims forms. (mc, ) (Entered: 05/12/2020)
408 RESPONSE by Michael Parish to MOTION by Unknown George Fernandez for extension of time 407 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2020)
409 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Potential class member George Fernandez has filed a motion to be provided class member settlement claim forms and for an extension of time to submit the forms 407 . Class representative Michael Parish has responded, stating that, although the claims forms were sent to his last known address, they will be re−sent to Fernandez's current address. In addition, Parish's response informs Fernandez that the settlement agreement allows class members to submit claims within the nine−month period following the original due date of May 9, 2020, or, in other words, by February 9, 2021. Because Parish's response addresses Fernandez's requests, the motion is stricken as moot 407 .Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/13/2020)
417 OBJECTIONS in opposition to proposed settlement. (Exhibit) (Envelope postmarked 5/14/2020). (mc, ) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
411 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: The Court has forwarded a letter it has received from Darryl Davis to Plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel shall send a copy of the letter to the settlement administrator.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
412 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:The Court has forwarded letters it has received from Joshua Burton and Jeannette Fisher to Plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel shall send a copy of the letter to the settlement administrator.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
413 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee:Minute order 412 is corrected: The Court has forwarded a letter it has received from Jeannette Fisher to Plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel shall send a copy of the letter to the settlement administrator.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
414 ORDER ORDER Fourth Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on May 26, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. For non−emergency motions, no motion may be noticed for presentment on a date earlier than July 15, 2020. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 5/26/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
415 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: On December 17, 2019, the Court scheduled the final approval hearing regarding the proposed class action settlement and petition for attorneys' fees for Friday, June 5, 2020, at 11:00 a.m. 388 Since that date, the COVID−19 pandemic arrived in this country, and we all have been dealing with the various restrictions that it has placed on our daily lives. The courthouse also has been closed since mid−March to minimize the spread of the virus. That said, the Court recognizes that notice of the final approval hearing already has been sent to the approximately 250,000 putative class members. Moreover, while a number of class members have submitted questions about the proposed settlement, there are very few, if any, objections, and no class member has requested an opportunity to voice an objection at the final approval hearing. Therefore, the Court finds that the interests of the putative class and the interests of justice will be furthered by proceeding with the final approval hearing as scheduled. However, to minimize the risks of spreading the coronavirus, the Court finds it necessary to conduct the final approval hearing via telephone conference. Accordingly, the final approval hearing will be conducted via telephone conference on Friday, June 5, 2020, at 11:00 a.m. The call−in number is 888−273−3658 and the access code is 1637578. Any putative class members, members

Case: 1:07-cv-4369 As of: 06/07/2020 04:05 PM CDT 33 of 33

05/29/2020 06/04/2020 06/05/2020

of the public, and interested media also may call into this hearing. All participants should review the Court's standing order regarding telephone conferences that is on Judge Lee's website, which can be found at: https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge−info.aspx?4Qf5zc8loCI5U7rfMP9DHw== All persons granted remote access to proceedings are reminded of the general prohibition against photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting of court proceedings. Violation of these prohibitions may result in court−imposed sanctions, including removal of court issued media credentials, restricted entry to future hearings, denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the Court. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
418 MEMORANDUM by Michael Parish in support of approval of class action settlement (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
419 MOTION by Plaintiff Michael Parish to supplement motion to approve class action settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Report of Administrator)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/04/2020)
420 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Z. Lee: Final Approval Hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the class action settlement 418 and motion to supplement 419 . See Final Settlement Agreement, ECF No. 385−1. This case is hereby terminated. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/05/2020)