CONSENT DECREE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

GARY KNOP , et al.,

)

Plaintiffs, )

V. PERRY M. JOHNSON, et al.,

) C.A. No. G84-651-CA5 ) Hon. Richard A. Enslen
)

Defendants. )

ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF F. WARREN BENTON AS MONITOR

This Order is issued pursuant to the Court's decision on

December 22, 1994 regarding implementation of a legal access plan.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dr. F. Warren Benton is appointed as

monitor as set forth as follows:

I. Authority

1. This appointment is made pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.

706.

2. The Monitor shall have unlimited access to all

buildings and premises under the control of the Michigan Department

of Corrections at the facilities subject to this action. He shall

have the authority to conduct tours of these facilities, buildings,

and premises as necessary.

3. The Monitor shall have unlimited access to all

relevant records, files, and papers maintained by the Michigan

Department of Corrections, to the extent necessary to perform his

duties as detailed in this Order. The defendants and plaintiffs

shall not refuse reasonable requests for documents. The Monitor

Knop v.Johnson

PC-MI-006-003

2 shall have ready access to all other papers relating to this case that are filed in the Court.
4. The Monitor shall have access to all pertinent staff members and employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections. He may engage in both formal and informal conferences with such staff members and employees, including confidential or group interviews, and such persons shall cooperate with him fully and shall respond to all reasonable inquiries and requests relating to compliance efforts. The Department of Corrections shall designate a representative to have the sole responsibility to coordinate tours of the relevant institutions or facilities, to assist in gathering documents, and to provide any additional reports or information that the Monitor may request.
5. Lawyers representing the plaintiffs or defendants, whether in this action or related actions concerning the Department of Corrections and its facilities, shall not attend tours undertaken by the Monitor or otherwise participate in the Monitor's activities without notice to the parties and permission of the Court. The Monitor may consult with attorneys for either party, and such attorneys may consult with the Monitor. In either instance, notice to the Court and opposing parties is not required. Substantive written communications to or from either party shall be copied to the parties and the Court.
6. The Monitor may conduct confidential interviews with any prisoner or with groups of prisoners incarcerated at facilities subject to this litigation.

3 7. The Monitor may attend, upon his oral or written request, any formal or informal institutional or central administrative meeting or proceeding conducted by Department of Corrections staff relevant to compliance issues in this action. The Department of Corrections shall not refuse such requests. 8. The Monitor may require Department of Corrections staff to prepare, where appropriate, written responses to any questions raised by him. 9. The Monitor may, subject to the approval of the Court, hire such other persons as he determines to be necessary to carry out his duties. The amount, coverage, and payment of fees for such associates shall be governed by the terms governing the fees and expenses as provided for in Part II of this Order. 10. The Monitor shall give Department of Corrections officials reasonable notice of all tours, unless he believes that such notice will interfere with the factfinding process. The Monitor, when possible, shall notify the Department of Corrections, in advance of each tour, of any needs or arrangements that should be made, such as for staff interviews or confidential interviews with inmates. 11. Any and all disputes concerning the interpretation of this Order shall be resolved by the Court, with appropriate notice and opportunity to respond by the parties. 12. The Monitor shall have the unqualified right to contact the Court, without notice to either party, with any questions he may have concerning this Order, or concerning any

4 other aspect of this litigation. The Court shall respond to such contacts with or without notice to either party.
13. The Monitor may discuss with the parties, and periodically propose for approval by the Court, a schedule of forthcoming hearings. The schedule will identify the issues to be covered in each hearing, and will include deadlines prior to the hearing for the submission of compliance reports by the defendants, for submission of any expert reports, and for submission of major motions.
14. The Monitor may require the parties to meet jointly with him to attempt to resolve differences. II. Authorized Fees and Expenses
1. All fees and expenses will be paid by the defendants. Any disputes regarding fees and expenses under this Section will be submitted promptly to the Court for resolution.
2. The Monitor shall be compensated at the rate of $95.00 per hour for work performed under this Order. The Monitor may, at his option, designate that the fees be made payable directly to himself, or to the John Jay College of Criminal Justice where he is employed as Professor.
3. The Monitor shall also be reimbursed for all reasonable and customary expenses incurred in the course of the performance of the duties outlined in this Order, including but not limited to airfare, cabfare, car rentals, parking, hotels, meals, tips, telephone calls, postage, and photocopying costs. Typist

5 expenses are specifically excluded from the reimbursement provisions of this Order.
4. If an expenses arises that is not customary and is over twenty-five dollars ($25.00), the Monitor shall seek authorization from the parties prior to submitting a bill. Authorization of the parties shall be in writing. No reasonable expenses will be denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HONORABLE RICHARD AT~ENSLEN United States District Judge

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

GARY KNOP; JOHN FORD; WILLIAM LOVETT, II; RAMANDO VALEROSO; GUS JANSSON; PAT SOMMERVILLE; VERNARD COHEN; T. JON SPYTMA; ROBERT SHIPP; BUTCH DAVIS; RON MIXON; and KERWIN COOK,
All individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated;
Plaintiffs,
v
PERRY M. JOHNSON; ROBERT BROWN, JR.; DALE FOLTZ; JOHN JABE; THEODORE W. KOEHLER; JOHN PRELESNIK; and JACK BERGMAN,
Defendants.
EVERETT HADIX; RICHARD MAPES; PATRICK C. SOMMERVILLE; ROOSEVELT HUDSON, JR.; BRENT E. KOSTER; LEE D. McDONALD; DARRYL STU RGES; ROBERT FLEMSTER; WILLIAM LOVETT; JAMES COVINGTON;

File No.1 :84 CV 651 HON. RICHARD ALAN ENSLEN

FRANK THOMAS; JAMES HADDIX; JAMES ALEXANDER; AL BUTTONS; JAMES CHIPMAN; PERRY ALAN DAVIS; MICHAEL ANTHONY GRAY; MARK LEMOTHE; CYLESTER NUNNALLY; TED RHODE; ORVEL SIMMONS; TED SULLIVAN; and MARK A. COLEMAN;
Plaintiffs,
v
PERRY M. JOHNSON; BARRY MINTZES; CHARLES ANDERSON; WILLIAM F. GRANT; DALE FOLTZ; DANIEL TRUDELL; DUANE SHOLES; JOHN JABE; JAMES POGATS; ROY RIDER; CHARLES USTESS; DON P. LEDUC; ROBERT BROWN, JR.; GRAHAM ALLEN; ELTON I. SCOTT; PAM WITHROW; FRANK ELO; MARJORIE VAN OCHTEN; and JOHN PRELESNIK;
Defendants.

File No. 4:92:CV:11 0 HON. RICHARD ALAN ENSLEN
ORDER

In accordance with the Opinion issued this date;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction is GRANTED until December 1, 1996;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants shall continue to fund Prison Legal

Services of Michigan, Inc. until December 1, 1996, subject to extension by this Court,

unless before that time they submit to the Court, and the Court approves, an alternative

interim plan;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the funding provided to PLSM by defendants shall

be used to assist inmates only in cases involving challenges to their sentences or

convictions, or involving the conditions of their confinement;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants' Final Plans for the Legal Writer

Program in Hadix v. Johnson, dated May 30, 1996 and filed June 19, 1996 (did. #727)

is ADOPTED with the modifications set forth in the accompanying Opinion;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants' Final Plans for the Legal Writer

Program in Knop v. Johnson, dated May 30, 1996 and filed June 20, 1996 (did. #1242)

is ADOPTED with the modifications set forth in the accompanying Opinion.

Dated in Kalamazoo, MI:

-4':-1 A~ RICHARD ALAN ENSLEN Chief Judge

 
 -COMPLAINT

•"3 :i> <[*

a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

GARY KNOP, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. PERRY M. JOHNSON, et al.,

C.A. No. G84-651 CA5
Knop v. Johnson

— PC-MI-006-001
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, by their undersigned attorneys, move this court for an order pursuant to Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to file an amended complaint. The grounds for this motion are set forth in the accompanying memorandum.
A copy of the proposed amended complaint is filed with this motion.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this court grant plaintiffs1 motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

Elizabeth Alexander
Mary'E. McClymont
National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 402 Washington, D.C. 20036 202/331-0500

William Fette American Civil Liberties Fund of Michigan 222 S. Westnedge Ave. Kalamazoo, Mich. 49007 616/382-1030

Counsel for Plaintiffs

c

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

GARY KNOP, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. PERRY M. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.

C.A. No. G84-651 CA5

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

I.

FACTS

The plaintiffs' original complaint was filed in June

1984. In addition to this motion to amend the complaint the

plaintiffs have also filed a motion to add parties. If this

motion is granted, the proposed amended complaint would reflect

these parties, the allegations pertaining to them, and an

amplification of some of the original allegations.

II.

ARGUMENT

(1) The filing of an amended complaint will allow the

addition of the parties to be reflected clearly in the record.

(2) In the course of discovery by touring the prison

facilities the plaintiffs have discovered some minor factual

errors in the original complaint and have discovered some

additional factual matters, intimately connected to the

conditions of confinement originally alleged.

(3) There is no unfair surprise or other prejudice to
the defendants in presenting these amplified allegations.
(4) This litigation was originally instituted as a
totality of conditions challenge to conditions at the three major
prisons and the amplified factual allegations are closely related
to the original allegations and should aid the Court and the
defendants by setting forth in greater detail the claims against
the defendants.
(5) The proposed amended complaint does not change the
nature of the relief requested. It is filed in good faith as
soon as reasonably possible after the facts became available to
plaintiffs as a result of discovery. The filing of the amended
complaint will not delay in any manner the prosecution of this
suit.
(6) Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
states.that "...leave [to amend the pleadings of a party] shall
be freely given when justice so requires." Under the liberal
standard set forth in the leading case by the Supreme Court
interpreting Rule 15, it is apparent that leave to amend should
be granted:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, e t c -the leave sought should, as the rules

require, be "freely given." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182-183 (1962).
For the above reasons, plaintiffs request that the motion for leave to amend complaint be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

Elizajzeth Alexander
Mary E. McClymont National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 402 Washington, D.C. 20036
202/331-0500

William Fette American Civil Liberties Fund of Michigan 222 S. Westnedge Ave. Kalamazoo, Mich. 49007 616/382-1030

Counsel for Plaintiffs

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES^ DISTINCT COURT f WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN^ j *

GARY KNOP, JOHN FORD, WILLIAM LOVETT, II, RAMANDO VALEROSO, GUS JANSSON, PAT SOMMERVILLE, VERNARD COHEN, T. JON SPYTMA, ROBERT SHIPP, BUTCH DAVIS, RON MIXON, KERWIN COOK, SCOTT HICKS, ROBERT ROSE, TROY ROBERTS, and VIRECCE GANT,II individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PERRY M. JOHNSON, ROBERT BROWN, Jr., DALE FOLTZ, JOHN JABE, THEODORE KOEHLER, JOHN PRELESNIK JACK BERGMAN, and WM. ABSHIRER, in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants.

C.A. No. G84-651 CA5
Knop v. Johnson
Hill III II llllllll "Plj.jjf .Q06-002

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
On behalf of themselves and the class alleged herein, plaintiffs state the following for their complaint against defendants:

I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This is a class action brought by plaintiffs on

behalf of all prisoners who are or will be confined by the

Michigan Department of Corrections and at the State Prison of

Southern Michigan (including the Reception and Guidance Center),

in Jackson, Michigan [hereinafter Jackson]; the Michigan

2 I
Reformatory in Ionia, Michigan [hereinafter Ionia]% the Riverside
i
Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan [hereinafter Riverside] and the Marquette Branch Prison [hereinafter Marquette] (including the Michigan Intensive Programming Center [hereinafter MIPC]), in Marquette, Michigan. Plaintiffs contend that the totality of conditions, at these institutions falls beneath standards of human decency, inflicts needless suffering on prisoners and creates an environment that threatens prisoners' mental and physical well being and results in the unnecessary deterioration of prisoners confined there. Plaintiffs further contend that their access to the courts are denied or impeded by, the actions or non-actions of defendant Johnson while they are confined by the Michigan Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs further contend that the conditions at the above institutions violate the rights of the prisoners under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. The claims for relief are filed under 42 U.S.C.

§1983 to redress injuries suffered by plaintiffs and the class

they represent for deprivation under color of state law of rights

secured under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The claims also arise directly under the First, Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction

over the claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3).

3. Venue in the Western District of Michigan is proper

under 28 U.S.C. §1392(a).

Defendants Dale F ^ l t z and John
i

Prelesnik reside in the Eastern District of Michigan; all other

defendants reside in the Western District of Michigan.

III.

PARTIES

4. Each of the plaintiffs is currently a prisoner

within the Michigan Department of Corrections.

5. Plaintiffs Gary Knop and John Ford are currently

confined at the Central Complex of Jackson.

6. Plaintiffs William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso and

T. Jon Spytma are currently confined at the North Complex of.

Jackson.

7. Plaintiffs Gus Jansson and Pat Sommerville are

currently confined at the South Complex of Jackson.

8. Plaintiff Vernard Cohen is currently confined at

the Michigan Reformatory at Ionia.

9. Plaintiffs Robert Shipp and Butch Davis are

currently confined at Marquette.

10. Plaintiffs Ron Mixon and Kerwin Cook are currently

confined at the MIPC, Marquette.

11. Plaintiffs Scott Hicks, Robert Rose, Troy Roberts,

and Virecce Gant,II are currently confined at the Riverside

Correctional Facility at Ionia.

12. Plaintiffs John Ford, Vernard Cohen, Robert Shipp,

Virecce Gant,II, and Ron Mixon are black. All other plaintiffs

are white or Hispanic.

13. Defendant Perry M. Johnson is the Acting Director

of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Underj Michigan law,
i
he is empowered, subject to rules and regulations adopted by the Michigan Corrections Commission, to supervise and control the affairs of the Department, including the promulgation of rules and regulations that provide for the management and control of state penal institutions.
14. Defendant Robert Brown, Jr., is Deputy Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections. As such, he directs the Bureau of Correctional Facilities, which administers the State Prison of Southern Michigan, the Michigan Reformatory and the Marquette Branch Prison.
15. Defendant Dale Foltz is the Regional Administrator of the State Prison of Southern Michigan. As such, he has certain powers and duties related to the control, governance and supervision of that facility.
16. Defendant John Jabe is the Warden of the Michigan Reformatory. As such, he has certain powers and duties related to the control, governance and supervision of that facility.
17. Defendant Theodore Koehler is the Warden of the Marquette Branch Prison. As such, he has certain powers and duties related to the control, governance and supervision of that facility.
18. Defendant John Prelesnik is the Administrator of the Reception and Guidance Center. As such, he has certain powers and duties related to the control, governance and supervision of that facility.
19. Defendant Jack Bergman is the Administrator of the

Michigan Intensive Programming Center. As such, he has certain powers and duties related to the control, governance and supervision of that facility.
20. Defendant William Abshirer is the Superintendent of the Riverside Correctional Facility. As such, he has certain powers and duties related to the control, governance and supervision of that facility.
21. All defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities.

IV.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

22. This is a class action under Rule 23(a) and

23(b)(l) and (2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

23. Plaintiffs are representative parties of a class of

all persons confined at the above prisons, or who may be so

confined in the future, and who are now confined with the

Michigan Department of Corrections, or who may be so confined in

the future.

24. Plaintiffs Gary Knop, John Ford, William Lovett,

II, Ramando Valeroso, T. Jon Spytma, Gus Jansson and Pat

Sommerville are the representative parties of a subclass of all

prisoners confined at Jackson or who may be so confined in the

future.

25. Plaintiff Vernard Cohen is the representative party

of a subclass of all prisoners confined at Ionia or who may be so

confined in the future.

26. Plaintiffs Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon and

Kerwin Cook are the representative parties of a sfubclass of a l l
i
prisoners confined at Marquette or who may be so confined in the future.
27. Plaintiffs Hicks, Rose, Roberts, and Gant arethe representative parties of a subclass of all prisoners confined at Riverside or who may be so confined in the future.
28. Plaintiffs are members of the class and their claims are typical of all class members. Plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
29. The class is so numerous that joinder of the • members is impracticable. Current members of the class number in the thousands.
30. This lawsuit challenges the totality of conditions of confinement at the three prisons and there are questions of law and fact common to the class.
31. This lawsuit also challenges access to the courts provided by defendant Johnson to all prisoners confined within the Michigan Department of Corrections.
32. This lawsuit also challenges the use of Riverside Psychiatric Center to treat mental patients and the confinement of inmates in cells at Riverside Correctional Facility without toilets and wash basins.
33. The defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

f
i

V.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Physical Plant

34. Jackson, Ionia, and .Marquette are large,

noisy, antiquated and poorly designed prisons.

35. Jackson is the world's largest walled

prison. It holds approximately 5500 inmates in an area covering

over two million square feet. Some individual cellblocks hold

over 500 inmates each, more than professional corrections

standards recommend for an entire prison. Jackson's size and

design exacerbate overcrowding and contributes to the failures to#

provide adequate staffing, '"nmate classification, staff

management, and security.

36. Ionia holds approximately 1400 younger

inmates. It contains two cellblocks each holding nearly 500

inmates. There is also a large Adjustment Center and a total of

three dormitories.

37. Marquette is a maximum security prison holding

approximately 850 inmates. There are seven cellblocks. The

MIPC is located behind Marquette. The MIPC was designed as a

behavior modification facility and contains approximately 80

inmates.

38. At Marquette most inmates cells are slightly

larger thant 40 square feet; Ionia cells are 49 square feet.

Dormitories are severely overcrowded and areas at Jackson not

designed for inmate housing are being used to house prisoners,

resulting in unsanitary and unsafe conditions. Recreation

facilities which could relief the overcrowding are^inadequate or, i
when they exist at all, so understaffed as to reduce their

availability. Marquette does not have an indoor exercise

facility, despite its extremely cold winters. Approximately 1000

Jackson inmates are denied any facilities for indoor exercise.

39. Because of the size and linear design of

housing units, surveillance and security is unusually

difficult. The cellblocks at Jackson and Ionia are more than 300

feet long. The Jackson cellblocks are five tiers high and guards

cannot see or hear all inmates for whose safety they are

responsible. At both Jackson and Marquette inmates have been,

thrown over the railings on gallery catwalks.

40. Plumbing at all three prisons is dangerously

antiquated and lacks minimal maintenance.

Although the

defendants have recently begun to repair cross-connected plumbing

lines, numerous instances of cross-connections of sewage lines

with potable water lines exist. This condition makes possible

contamination of the water supply and constitutes a severe public

health hazard.

41. Many toilets, lavatories, and showers are in

poor condition, resulting in sewage leaks. In many cases, hot

and cold water temperatures are poorly controlled.

42. Many Riverside inmates are confined overnight

in cells that do not contain a toilet or wash basin. Each inmate

is required to perform bodily functions in a plastic bottle which

remains in his cell until the morning or on the cell floor.

43. Each inmate confined at{ Riverside's

disciplinary unit does not have a toilet and wash basin in their

cell. The inmate is required to perform bodily functions in a

plastic bottle which remains in his cell until a guard will empty

it or on the floor or the inmate must pound on the cell door to

attract the attention of a guard to be released from the cell so

he can use a toilet and then a wash basin.

44. Ventilation is completely inadequate. The

lack of ventilation exacerbates the risk of airborne disease

caused by the overcrowding. Strong odors of human waste are

commonplace. At Marquette, quiet and detention cells have,

literally no ventilation.

Temperature levels are poorly

maintained in the cellblocks, with wide variations between the

top and bottom tier.

45. Lighting within the prison living areas is

inadequate in all three prisons. Detention cells generally have

no light fixtures, and these cells at Marquette do not have

access to natural light.

46. Housekeeping and maintenance are grossly inadequate. Vermin and filth are widespread, creating a public health risk. Jackson is infested with birds as well as rodents. Inmate clothes, bedding and mattresses are inadequately cleaned. Barbering facilities are unsanitary, thereby making possible the spread of diseases.

clothing.

47. Inmates are not provided with proper winter

48. The food service areas at all three prisons

10

are infested with insects and rodents. Lighting /is inadequate.

Food is served at unsafe temperatures. Overall conditions in the

food service areas and milk pasteurization operations at Jackson

and Marquette constitute public health hazards.

49. Life safety provisions against fire and smoke

hazards present an immediate risk of harm and are completely

deficient.

50. The huge cellblocks at Jackson and Ionia are

not subdivided with fire walls or doors, so that smoke could

spread throughout the cellblock. Antiquated locking systems in

many cells would require individual unlocking in an emergency..

In many cases, exits are blocked, poorly designed, too remote, or

unmarked. Many cellblocks lack smoke or heat detectors, fire

alarms, sprinklers or fire hose. Staff and inmate education for

emergency procedures is lacking. These fire safety deficiencies

are particularly serious in view of the dangerous understaffing

at the facilities.

B. Protection from harm

51. Jackson, Marquette, and Ionia suffer from an

atmosphere of violence.

Inmate/inmate attacks, including

stabbing, are commonplace at Jackson.

52. The prisons lack employment, educational and

recreational opportunities, resulting in pervasive idleness. The

lack of meaningful inmate programming contributes to the level of

violence at the institutions.

53. Staffing levels are completely inadequate to

provide for inmate safety. These dangerously low staffing levels

11

are rendered even wore inadequate because Ojf poor staff

-i

management, communications, and training.

These staffing

inadequacies were a major cause of the May, 1981 riots at the three facilities.

54. Inmates are not properly classified.

Overcrowding results in inappropriate and frequently unsafe

placements for inmates. Classification decisions are primarily

determined by the availability of an inmate bunk rather than

individual inmate characteristics.

55. Although a majority of the inmates are black,

disproportionately few staff members are black.

Certain,

desirable inmates jobs are disproportionately assigned to white

inmates. Cafeteria serving lines are generally segregated by

race. Black inmates are assigned to punitive segregation in

disproportionate numbers; white inmates are assigned to

protective custody in disproportionate numbers. Certain white

staff display attitudes of racially motivated hostility to black

inmates. Racial tension contributes to the atmosphere of

violence at the prisons.

56. Because of the atmosphere of violence, a large

number of inmates seek the comparative safety of protective

custody. But the locking systems and staff protection are

totally inadequate in the protective custody sections at

Marquette and Jackson. Inmates in protective custody have even

less opportunity for out-of-cell programming than inmates in

general population.

Medical care and legal access are

restricted. Ionia holds protective custody prisoners in an open

12

dormitory under conditions that are entirely inappropriate for
i
this status. C. Health Services 57. The Jackson hospital .unit provides medical
care for inmates from throughout the Michigan system. The hospital unit is located in a deteriorating converted cellblock. Many areas in the unit are dirty and suffer from inadequate maintenance. The operating rooms pose serious and unnecessary risks to the inmate population.

58. The Jackson North Complex Unit characterized by poor layout, lack of privacy disorganization.

is and.

59. The medical examining room at Ionia is dirty and inadequate.

60. At all three prisons, there is a serious shortage of qualified medical staff. As a result, the prisons

are substituting untrained, unlicensed personnel for professional staff. These untrained or inadequately trained staff attempt to screen and diagnose inmate medical complaints and provide treatment.

61. As a result of the shortage of appropriately

trained staff and the involvement of correctional officers in the health care referral system, inmates lack adequate access to health care. Although access for all inmates is inadequate, inmates in segregation status suffer particularly great obstacles

to obtaining medical care.

62. The reception program at Jackson suffers from

13

inadequate staff and incomplete screening procedures. The
i
prisons lack appropriate programs for the treatment of chronic

diseases and the provision of medical diets and necessary

prostheses. Medical records are poorly organized.

63. The overcrowding, violence, idleness and poor

physical condition of the prisons create very high levels of

stress among the prisoners. As a result, mental health services

are particularly needed by a high proportion of inmates.

64. The facilities, staff and procedures in the

prisons' mental health care units are all deficient. In many

cases the provisio of mental health care is so inadequate as to.

make it probable that inmates' mental conditions will worsen.

65. The

Riverside

Correctional

Facility

established to provide mental health care to prisoners is

deficient. In many cases, the provision of mental health care is

so inadequate as to make it probable that inmates' mental

conditions will worsen.

66. Mental health services are so understaffed

that chronically psychotic and other seriously mentally troubled

inmates, including inmates committed to the Michigan prison

system after a finding of guilt and mental illness, pursuant to

M.S.A. §29.1059, receive no care. Most staffing time is spent on

initial assessment and, in some cases, therapy for sex offenders.

67. Although Marquette is designed to house

inmates with the most severe behavioral problems in the system,

there is no psychiatric staff and the staff offers no

psychotherapy.

14
68. The psychological stress on prisoners is most i
exacerbated at MIPC, which was originally designed as a behavior modification program. At MIPC, the inmates' cells are monitored for sound, cell doors are opened electronically by guards in remote control booths, cell lights are controlled by the guards, and there are spy-windows along catwalks running above the cells that allow secret observation. Inmates confined under these inhumane conditions of extreme social and sensory deprivation and lack of control over the environment are at grave risk for mental decompensation, particularly paranoia.
69. There is no reliably functioning system for, inmates to request mental health services.
70. The maintenance of psychiatric records is inconsistent. Throughout the system, psychotropic drugs are prescribed as virtually the only form of treatment and monitoring for side effects of the drugs is not consistently performed. Staff underdiagnose psychosis and other serious psychological disturbances.
71. The cells used in the system for observation of suicidal or mentally ill prisoners are stark, depressing and disorienting, and in certain circumstances can induce severe mental decompensation.
72. Inmates needing outpatient care, such as rape victims or inmates recovering from an episode of psychotic decompensation, are denied such care, which is absolutely necessary to prevent serious long-lasting psychological injury under the stressful conditions prevailing in the prisons.

15
73. Inmates who are prescribed ov^r the counter
-i
medication by medical personnel must purchase these from the commissary store, whether they are an indigent or have money in their account but none in their possession, or go without medication.
D« Access to the Courts 74. Michigan does not provide attorneys,
paralegals, or professionally trained persons to assist inmates with habeas corpus petitions or similar challenges to their convictions or with challenges to their conditions of confinement.
75. MIPC has no law library. The law libraries at the other prisons are inadequate and inmate access to the existing collections is severely limited. Inmates are not provided with meaningful assistance in using the libraries, with the result that inmates without training in legal research cannot effectively use the legal collections.
76. Inmates at MIPC or in administrative segregation, protective custody, or punitive segregation may not visit a law library physically. Alternate provisions for such inmates are totally inadequate.
77. Indigent inmates throughout the Michigan prison system are not provided adequate access to the courts as a result of limitations on free copying, postage, legal supplies, and related items.
E. Totality of Conditions 78. Jackson, Ionia and Marquette are overcrowded

16
facilities with antiquated, unsafe, unsanitary/ and strained physical facilities. These prisons operate in an atmosphere of violence aggravated by insufficient, undertrained staff; poor classification; racial discrimination and tension; and inadequately staffed and equipped medical, mental health and legal services. The totality of these circumstances has caused and is causing irreparable harm to the members of the plaintiff class.

VI.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

79. Paragraphs 1-78 are incorporated herein by.

reference.

80. The totality of circumstances at Jackson,

Marquette, Riverside, and Ionia, including the condition of the

physical plants, the lack of protection from harm, the racial

discrimination, the lack of adequate physical and mental health

services, the lack of direct access to toilets and wash basins

and the lack of legal services subjects inmates to cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

VII.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

81. Paragraphs 1-33 and 5 5 are incorporated herein by

reference.

82. The racial segregation and discrimination against

black inmates denies inmates the equal protection of the laws in

17

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the ^'United States Constitution.

VIII. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 83. Paragraphs 1-33 and 74-76 ire incorporated herein
by reference. 84. The denial of reasonable access to the courts to
inmates for the purposes of challenging their convictions or challenging their conditions of confinement denies such inmates the right to reasonable access to the courts pursuant to the First, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States. Constitution.

IX.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

85. Wherefore, plaintiffs pray for the following

relief:

A. that this Court determine, pursuant to Rule 23

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that this action is a

proper class action and that plaintiffs are proper class

representatives;

B. that the Court enter a declaratory judgment

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, declaring that the totality of the

circumstances of confinement, and the facilities, programs and

policies of Jackson, Ionia, and Marquette violate the rights of

the plaintiffs and the class they represent to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment, to the equal protection of the laws, and

18 r
to access to the courts, pursuant to the First, Sixth, Eighth and
•i
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; C. that, following a hearing and the development
of appropriate specific remedies in each area of constitutional violations, the Court enter a permanent injunction that will serve to prevent defendants, their agents, employees and those persons acting in concert with them from:
1. failing to provide inmates with proper space, noise control, sanitation, plumbing, ventilation, lighting and temperature control within the cells;
2. failing to provide clean and healthful, food services;
3. failing to take proper life safety measures to protect inmates from injury or death;
4. failing to take appropriate steps to reduce violence and tension, including providing an appropriate level of staffing, staff training, surveillance, programs to reduce inmate idleness and tension;
5. failing to provide adequate inmate classification;
6. failing to end racial segregation and discrimination;
7. failing to provide adequate qualified staff, facilities, and procedures for the provision of medical care;
8. failing to provide adequate qualified staff, facilities and procedures for the provision of necessary

19
psychiatric and psychological care, including outpatient care and
•i
care for inmates in special statuses; 9. failing to provide a comprehensive
program for the provision of access to the courts; 10. failing to provide over the counter
medication prescribed by medical personnel to inmates; D. that defendants pay the costs, expenses and
attorneys' fees for this action, as authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
E. that the Court grant such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

<£1 iza£eth Alexander Mary E. McClymont National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 402
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/331-0500

William Fette American Civil Liberties Fund of Michigan 222 S. Westnedge Ave. Kalamazoo, Mich. 49007 616/382-1030

Counsel for Plaintiffs

 
 United States District Court Western District of Michigan (Southern Division (1)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:84−cv−00651−RAE

CLOSED

Knop, et al v. Johnson, et al Assigned to: Senior Judge Richard Alan Enslen Demand: $0

Case in other court:

related case, G84−63CA

Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

plaintiff

Gary Knop individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

Date Filed: 06/11/1984 Date Terminated: 09/10/2002 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro National Prison Project of the ACLUF 733 15th St., NW, Ste. 620 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 393−4930 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce J. Ennis Jenner &Block 601 13th St. NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 639−6049 TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. Jenner &Block 601 13th St. NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 639−6049 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Alexander National Prison Project of the ACLUF 915 15th St., NW, 7th Fl. Washington, DC 20005 (202) 393−4930 Email: ealexander@npp−aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D. Schneider Jenner &Block LLP (DC) 1099 New York Ave., NW, Ste. 900 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 639−6049 Email: mschneider@patlaw.com TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia A. Streeter 221 N Main St., Ste. 300 Ann Arbor, MI 48104 (734) 222−0088 Email: pas@patstreeter.com LEAD ATTORNEY

plaintiff John Ford individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
plaintiff

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara Jenner &Block 601 13th St. NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 639−6049 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette Cornell Dalzell Fette Ramey &Shek 117 W Cedar St. Kalamazoo, MI 49007−5286 (269) 381−4950 Email: wjjfette@att.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

William Lovett, II individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
plaintiff Ramando Valeroso individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff
Gus Jansson individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff Pat Sommerville individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
plaintiff Vernard Cohen individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff
T. Jon Spytma individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff Robert Shipp individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
plaintiff Butch Davis individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

plaintiff
Ron Mixon individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

plaintiff Kerwin Mark Cook individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated; named as Kerwin Cook (no middle name)
V. defendant Perry M. Johnson

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce J. Ennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Alexander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D. Schneider (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theresa A. Chmara (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William L. Fette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt MI Dept Attorney General (ENRA−Lansing) Environment, Natural Resources &Agriculture Division P.O. Box 30755 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 373−7540 Email: SchmidtBA@michigan.gov TERMINATED: 10/22/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee MI Dept Attorney General

defendant Robert Brown, Jr.

(Alcohol−Lansing) Alcohol &Gambling Enforcement Division P.O. Box 30736 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 241−0210 Email: mcgeheed@michigan.gov TERMINATED: 01/07/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman MI Dept Attorney General (Corrections) Corrections Division P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335−7021 Email: friedmanL@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson MI Dept Attorney General (Public Service) Public Service Division 6545 Mercantile Way, Ste. 15 Lansing, MI 48911 (517) 241−6680 Email: NickersonM@michigan.gov TERMINATED: 08/18/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw Michigan Department of Attorney General Labor Division P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 373−2560 Email: przekopshaws@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Durk McAra Michigan Department of Attorney General Health Professionals Division 120 N Washington Sq. P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909−7717 (517) 373−7584 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/07/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

defendant Dale Foltz
defendant John Jabe

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Durk McAra (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/07/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Durk McAra (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address)

defendant Theodore W. Koehler
defendant John Prelesnik

TERMINATED: 01/07/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Durk McAra (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/07/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Durk McAra (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY

defendant Jack Bergman
unknown

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/07/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Durk McAra (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/22/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/07/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/18/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susanne Durk McAra (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

F. Warren Benton
unknown Diane Hartmus
movant James E. Lanni #220271 named as James Lanni (no middle initial) TERMINATED: 11/16/1993
movant James E. Lanni #220271 named as James Lanni (no middle initial) TERMINATED: 11/16/1993 movant Robert Lee #154803, Jr. TERMINATED: 11/02/1994
movant Ronald C.W. Hammond #184214 TERMINATED: 11/02/1994
movant Mark Summerlin #224283 TERMINATED: 11/02/1994
movant James C. Reilly #203296 TERMINATED: 08/16/1999

represented by F. Warren Benton 149 Beach Ave. Larchmont, NY 10538 PRO SE
represented by Diane Hartmus 679 Catherine Street Peekskill, NY 10566 PRO SE
represented by James E. Lanni #220271 #220271 Cotton Correctional Facility 3510 N Elm Rd. Jackson, MI 49201 (517) 780−5000 PRO SE
represented by James E. Lanni #220271 (See above for address) PRO SE
represented by Robert Lee #154803, Jr. #154803 Michigan Reformatory 1342 W Main St. Ionia, MI 48846 (616) 527−2500 PRO SE
represented by Ronald C.W. Hammond #184214 #184214 Michigan Reformatory 1342 W Main St. Ionia, MI 48846 (616) 527−2500 PRO SE
represented by Mark Summerlin #224283 #224283 Michigan Reformatory 1342 W Main St. Ionia, MI 48846 (616) 527−2500 PRO SE
represented by James C. Reilly #203296 #203296 Parnall Correctional Facility 1790 E Parnall Jackson, MI 49201−9037 (517) 780−6004 PRO SE

movant James Charles Cannon #237039 TERMINATED: 08/16/1999
movant Wellington L. Drake #229939 TERMINATED: 08/16/1999
movant Mark H. Roberts #197305 named as Charles M.H. Roberts TERMINATED: 02/03/2000
movant William T. Mears #180220 TERMINATED: 02/03/2000
movant Albert Eugene McKinley #177679 TERMINATED: 02/03/2000
movant Avis A. Fee #265115 TERMINATED: 02/03/2000

represented by James Charles Cannon #237039 #237039 Parnall Correctional Facility 1790 E Parnall Jackson, MI 49201−9037 (517) 780−6004 PRO SE
represented by Wellington L. Drake #229939 #229939 Parnall Correctional Facility 1790 E Parnall Jackson, MI 49201−9037 (517) 780−6004 PRO SE
represented by Mark H. Roberts #197305 #197305 Parnall Correctional Facility 1790 E Parnall Jackson, MI 49201−9037 (517) 780−6004 PRO SE
represented by William T. Mears #180220 #180220 Parnall Correctional Facility 1790 E Parnall Jackson, MI 49201−9037 (517) 780−6004 PRO SE
represented by Albert Eugene McKinley #177679 #177679 Parnall Correctional Facility 1790 E Parnall Jackson, MI 49201−9037 (517) 780−6004 PRO SE
represented by Avis A. Fee #265115 #265115 Parnall Correctional Facility 1790 E Parnall Jackson, MI 49201−9037 (517) 780−6004 PRO SE

Date Filed 12/13/1989

# Docket Text
1101 TRANSCRIPT filed for hearing on Motion to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Cross−Appeal held before Mag. Rowland on 8/16/89 and transcribed by Nancy E. Gass, C.E.R. (rlw) (Entered: 03/29/1990)

12/21/1989 02/20/1990 04/05/1990 04/06/1990
04/23/1990 05/07/1990 05/14/1990 05/16/1990
05/17/1990
05/17/1990 06/21/1990 07/17/1990 07/17/1990
08/20/1990 10/15/1990 01/07/1991

1102 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by Donald S. McGehee, Assistant Atty Gen on behalf of defendants w/stamped Proof of Service (rlw) (Entered: 03/29/1990)

1103 QUARTERLY REPORT (STATUS REPORT) of toilet monitor at Riverside Correctional Facillity by David T. Prichard (rlw) (Entered: 03/29/1990)

1104 LETTER dated 3/29/90 from David Prichard, Court Monitor, directed to Judge Enslen re three monitoring provision concerns (kkr) (Entered: 04/18/1990)

1105 ORDER (2 pages) by Judge Richard A. Enslen directing pltfs and defts to file written Responses w/in 30 days from date of this Order to 3/29/90 Letter from David Prichard raising three monitoring provision concerns (cc: all counsel) (kkr) (Entered: 04/18/1990)

INFORMATION copy from CCA dismissing the appeal ( 20 pages) (rlw) (Entered: 04/25/1990)

1106 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to Toilet Monitor's Report [1103−1] w/attachment 1 w/Certificate of Service (rlw) (Entered: 05/14/1990)

1107 REPORT (second in a series of four reports w/in the segregation and reception units at the Ionia Riverside Correctional Facility) (STATUS REPORT) (rlw) (Entered: 06/19/1990)

1108

MOTION by plaintiffs for temporary restraining order to restrain defts from transferring pltf T.J. Spytma from Egeler Facility , and for preliminary injunction to restrain defts from transferring pltf T.J. Spytma from Egeler Facility w/Declaration by E. Alexander w/Memorandum in Support w/Certificate of Service (rlw) (Entered: 06/19/1990)

1109

ORDER (1 pages) by Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance w/oral opinion of 5/l6/90 denying pltfs' motion for temporary restraining order to restrain defts from transferring pltf T.J. Spytma from Egeler Facility [1108−1] denying pltfs' motion for preliminary injunction to restrain defts from transferring pltf T.J. Spytma from Egeler Facility [1108−2] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/19/1990)

1110 ORDER (2 pages) by Judge Richard A. Enslen that the non−severed claims in this matter are dismissed w/prejudice (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/19/1990)

RECORD on Appeal returned from CCA re appeals filed 9/2l/87, l2/2/87 and l2/ll/87 (rlw) (Entered: 07/12/1990)

1111 OPINION (4 pages) by Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (dkm) (Entered: 07/20/1990)

1112

ORDER (2 pgs) in accordance w/Opinion by Judge Richard A. Enslen: IT IS ORDERED that the Toilet Monitor shall observe the orientation process on toilet usage with the segregation/reception units; Toilet Monitor be allowed, if he requests, to conduct private interviews w/inmates; each instance of urination or defecation w/in a cell shall be logged &reviewed by the Toilet Monitor &included in his quarterly reports &provided in paragraph 9 of "Defts' Plan for Monitoring Inmate Access to Sanitary Toilet Facilities" filed on 5/3/89 (cc: all counsel) (dkm) (Entered: 07/20/1990)

1113 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by pltf's counsel, The National Prison Project (ACLUF), in Washington, DC w/Certificate of Svc (dkm) (Entered: 09/08/1990)

1114 REPORT by David T. Prichard, Court Monitor (STATUS REPORT) regarding observations at Riverside Correctional Facility w/attachments (rlw) (Entered: 10/15/1990)

1115

LETTER to court from Asst. Atty. General Donald S. McGehee indicating that he has been transferred to the Tort Defense Division within the Dept. of Attorney General, effective 11/26/90; as of that date he was no longer authorized to serve as counsel for defts (Jack Bergman, John Prelesnik, Theodore W. Koehler, John Jabe, Dale Foltz, Robert Brown Jr., &Perry M. Johnson); therefore Susan Przekop−Shaw will continue to represent these defts &remain as primary counsel (dkm) (Entered: 01/18/1991)

03/01/1991 04/09/1991
09/05/1991 09/09/1991 12/06/1991 06/10/1992 09/01/1992 09/02/1992 11/16/1992 11/16/1992
01/05/1993 01/07/1993 01/22/1993
02/25/1993
02/26/1993 03/04/1993 03/23/1993
05/10/1993

1116 REPORT (STATUS REPORT) by David T. Prichard, Court Monitor, regarding the reporting of Paragraph 9 in the "Defendants' Plan for Monitoring Inmate Access to Sanitary Toilet Facilities" (dkm) (Entered: 03/11/1991)

1117 REQUEST (Letter) to Court by David T. Prichard, Court Monitor, requesting acceptance of a new procedure to improve accuracy of recording inmates usage of bathroom facilities at the Riverside Correctional Facility to be in compliance with the court's order w/attached Figures 1−2 (dkm) (Entered: 04/18/1991)

1118 REPORTS (STATUS REPORT) by David T. Prichard, Court Monitor concerning toilet activity w/attachments (rlw) (Entered: 09/13/1991)

1119 SUPPLEMENT to report [1118−1] submitted by David T. Prichard, Court Monitor (rlw) (Entered: 09/13/1991)

1120 STATUS REPORT by David T. Prichard, Court Monitor summarizing prisoner activity beginning 5/l/9l through ll/20/9l (rlw) (Entered: 12/06/1991)

1121 REPORT (STATUS REPORT) by David T. Prichard, Monitor summarizing prisoner activity taking place between 2/4/92 and 6/5/92 (rlw) (Entered: 06/16/1992)

1122 NOTICE by defendants of Withdrawal of Appearance by Donald S. McGehee (rlw) (Entered: 09/01/1992)

1123 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by Barbara A. Schmidt on behalf of defendants w/stamped Proof of Service (rlw) (Entered: 09/02/1992)

1124 SLIP OPINION from CCA that Parts I,III and IV A of the remedial ordered entered by the district court in Knop,Case Nos. 88−1563/88−1634, are vacated, and both cases are remanded to the district court (ghl) (Entered: 12/28/1992)

1125

MANDATE from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that Parts I,III and IV A of the remedial order entered by the district court in Knop, Case Nos.88−1563/88−1634, are vacated, and both cases are remanded to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion (ghl) (Entered: 12/28/1992)

1126 MOTION by plaintiffs for status conference ( hearing) w/memorandum, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/05/1993)

1127 BRIEF In RESPONSE by defts to pltfs' motion for status conference [1126−1] w/stamped prf of svc (dkm) (Entered: 01/08/1993)

1128 ORDER (3 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen ; compliance hearing is rescheduled to 1:30 p.m. beginning 3/4/93 and continuing 3/5, 3/11, 3/12 1993 ; parties shall file lists of witnesses by 2/19/93; granting pltfs' motion for status conference (hearing) [1126−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 01/26/1993)

1129

ORDER from CCA remanding the matter back to District Court [Appeal [1125−1] The appellee cross−appellants' motion for remand is granted in light of this Court's ruling in Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 966 (6th Cir. 1992). Moreover, this Court remands this case without prejudice to the parties' ability to appeal the district court's ultimate attorney's fee award. (ghl) (Entered: 03/11/1993)

RECORD on Appeal returned from CCA in Grand Rapids Clerk's Office (rlw) (Entered: 03/19/1993)

PROCEEDING before Judge Richard A. Enslen; Status Conf. in chambers on 3/4/93 at 1:30 p.m. re "Access to Courts" issue; defts will submit a plan to the Court by 6/1/93; pltfs must respond by 7/1/93 (rlw) (Entered: 03/09/1993)

1130

MANDATE from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals The appellee cross−appellants' motion for reman is granted in light of this Court's ruling in Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 966 (6th Cir. 1992). Moreover, this Court remands this case without prejudice to the parties' ability to appeal the district court's ultimate attorney's fee award (ghl) (Entered: 03/26/1993)

1131 LETTER to court from prisoner James Lanni requesting copies of addresses of parties (rlw) (Entered: 05/13/1993)

05/10/1993 05/10/1993 05/28/1993 05/28/1993
06/04/1993 06/15/1993 06/21/1993 07/27/1993
07/30/1993
08/03/1993
08/03/1993 08/31/1993
09/07/1993 09/07/1993 10/06/1993 10/06/1993

1132 MOTION to intervene by James Lanni w/brief in support w/attachments, motion for waiver of fees and costs, affidvit of indigency (rlw) (Entered: 05/13/1993)

1133 MOTION by movant James Lanni for substituted service w/affidavit in support (rlw) (Entered: 05/13/1993)

1134 OPINION (4 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/01/1993)

1135

JUDGMENT: (2 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance w/opinion denying motion for substituted service [1133−1], granting movant's motion for waiver of fees and costs; denying motion to intervene by James Lanni [1132−1]; that any appeal in this matter by petitioner, proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/01/1993)

1136 ORDER (2 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen that defts shall submit a legal access plan consistent w/Sixth Circuit decision in this case 977 F.2d 996 no later than 6/15/93; pltfs' response due no later than 7/15/93 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/07/1993)

1137 LETTER to court from defendants w/attached copy of defts' Legal Access Plan, submitted consistent with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in this case (rlw) (Entered: 06/16/1993)

1138 MAIL RETURNED, [1134−1] addressed to pltf's counsel Theresa A. Chmara, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Bruce J. Ennis, Mark D. Schneider of Jenner &Block marked "moved not forwardable". Copies remailed 6/21/93 to new address (rlw) (Entered: 06/21/1993)

1139

MAIL RETURNED as addressed to Theresa A. Chmara for Opinion and Judgment [1134−1] on behalf of pltfs Kerwin Cook, Ron Mixon, Butch Davis, Robert Shipp, T. Jon Spytma, Vernard Cohen, Sommerville, Gus Jansson, Ramando Valeroso, William Lovett II, John Ford, Gary Knop (remailed 7/28 to new address) (rlw) (Entered: 07/28/1993)

1140

MOTION by plaintiffs to exceed page limitation for their joint response in opposition to defts' remedial plan to comply with decision of the US Court of Appeals in Hadix v Johnson and remedial plan to comply with decision of US Court of Appeals in Knop v Johnson w/brief in support w/PROPOSED joint response, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/30/1993)

1141

ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation for their joint response in opposition to defts' remedial plan to comply with decision of the US Court of Appeals in Hadix v Johnson and remedial plan to comply with decision of US Court of Appeals in Knop v Johnson [1140−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 08/03/1993)

1142 OPPOSITION by plaintiffs to defts' remedial plan to comply with decision of the US Court of Appeals in this case [1125−1] (rlw) (Entered: 08/04/1993)

1143

ORDER rejecting pleading (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland − movant James Lanni's the omission of a brief in support of motion for permissive intervention pursuant to Local Rule 27(a) and the omission of a motion for brief to expand time pursuant to Local Rule 27(a) (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 08/31/1993)

1144 MOTION by movant James Lanni to intervene w/brief in support (rlw) (Entered: 09/08/1993)

1145 MOTION by movant James Lanni to extend time 180 days to answer or otherwise move with respect to the permissive intervention w/brief in support (rlw) (Entered: 09/08/1993)

1146 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees in the amount of $2,197,108.39 w/brief in support, Exhibits 1−5, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/07/1993)

1147 THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL APPLICATION by plaintiffs for attorneys' fees w/Exhibits A−Q, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/07/1993)

10/22/1993 10/22/1993 10/26/1993 10/28/1993 11/12/1993 11/15/1993 11/16/1993
11/19/1993 11/23/1993
12/03/1993 12/03/1993
12/10/1993 12/21/1993 12/21/1993
12/27/1993 12/27/1993 02/17/1994

1148 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION: terminating attorney Barbara A. Schmidt for defts and substituting attorney Susanne Durk McAra (rlw) (Entered: 10/22/1993)

1149 MOTION by defendants to extend time for responding to pltfs' motion for award of fees w/brief in support (rlw) (Entered: 10/22/1993)

1150 NOTICE of hearing: before Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland on defts' motion to extend time for responding to pltfs' motion for award of fees [1149−1]; is set for 10:00 a.m. on 11/17/93 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/26/1993)

1151 OPPOSITION by plaintiffs to defts' motion to extend time for responding to pltfs' motion for award of fees [1149−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/28/1993)

1152 PROOF OF SERVICE by defendant for Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, Request for Admissions (rlw) (Entered: 11/15/1993)

1153 MOTION by movant James Lanni to consolidate cases 1:84−cv−651, 1:84−cv−63 assigned to Judge Enslen and case No. 4:93−cv−176 assigned to Judge Gibson (rlw) (Entered: 11/16/1993)

1154 ORDER (2 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen denying movant James Lanni's motion to extend time 180 days to answer or otherwise move with respect to the permissive intervention [1145−1], denying movant James Lanni's motion to intervene [1144−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/16/1993)

1155 PROOF OF SERVICE by plaintiffs for Request to Produce Documents and Interrogatories (rlw) (Entered: 11/22/1993)

1156 STIPULATION AND ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland: granting an extensioin of time for defts to answer pltfs' motion for attorney fees in the amount of $2,197,108.39 [1146−1] until 12/15/93 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/23/1993)

1157 PROOF OF SERVICE by defendants for Offer of Judgment in favor of pltfs and against defts for a total sum of $811,364(rlw) Modified on 01/13/1994 (Entered: 12/03/1993)

1158

ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland denying James Lanni's motion to consolidate cases 1:84−cv−651, 1:84−cv−63 assigned to Judge Enslen and case No. 4:93−cv−176 assigned to Judge Gibson [1153−1]; denying James Lanni's motion to extend time 180 days to answer or otherwise move with respect to permissive intervention 1144 1145 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) Modified on 12/06/1993 (Entered: 12/06/1993)

1159 PROOF OF SERVICE by plaintiffs for Response to defts' Interrogatories, Response to Produce Documents, Response to defts' Request for Admissions (rlw) (Entered: 12/13/1993)

1160 PROOF OF SERVICE by defendants for Offer of Judgment w/attached Offer of Judgment in the amount of $925,561 in favor of pltfs and against defts (rlw) (Entered: 12/21/1993)

1161 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland rejecting Jerry Binion's Motion to Appeal the Magistrate's Order of 12/3/93 because he is neither a party to this action nor a movant to the Motion to Intervene and to Extend Time denied by the Magistrate's Order of 12/3/93 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/21/1993)

1162 OPINION (3 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/28/1993)

1163 ORDER (3 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance w/opinion denying Jerry Binion's appeal of the magistrate's 12/3/93 order (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/28/1993)

1164 STIPULATION AND ORDER (2 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for attorney fees [1146−1] including pltfs' First, Second and Third Supplemental Applications; attorneys' fees, costs and expenses are settled in full for the sum of $1,125,561.00; judgment shall accrue interest unless defts pay this

02/18/1994 02/28/1994
02/28/1994 03/03/1994 03/03/1994
03/03/1994 03/03/1994
03/04/1994 04/07/1994 04/11/1994 04/15/1994 04/25/1994 04/29/1994 05/04/1994

amount w/in 30 days (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 02/18/1994)

1165 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs for rejection of the defts' remedial plan for providing access to the Courts and requesting a compliance review process for the certain access to Courts provisions w/brief in support, attachment 1, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/22/1994)

1166

MOTION by defendants to file instanter w/brief in support w/PROPOSED brief in support of defts' legal access plan and in opposition to pltfs' joint motion to reject the legal access plan and Hadix defts' response to pltfs' motion to require submission of the Huron Valley Psychiatric Hospital statement regarding program, staffing, operation and space use w/stamped proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/01/1994)

1167 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of their motion for rejection of the defts' remedial plan for providing access to the Courts and requesting a compliance review process for the certain access to Courts provisions [1165−1] (rlw) (Entered: 03/04/1994)

1168 ORDER (3 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen granting defts' motion to file instanter [1166−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/04/1994)

1169

OPPOSITION by defendants to pltfs' joint motion for rejection of the defts' remedial plan for providing access to the Courts and requesting a compliance review process for the certain access to Courts provisions [1165−1] w/brief in support of defts' legal access plan w/Exhibits 1−5, proof of service (rlw) Modified on 03/04/1994 (Entered: 03/04/1994)

1170 AFFIDAVITS of William Bailey, Marjorie Van Ochten which were inadvertently omitted from defts' brief in support of the defts' legal access plan and in opposition to the plts' joint motion to reject the legal access plan [1169−1] (rlw) (Entered: 03/04/1994)

PROCEEDING before Judge Richard A. Enslen; hearing on legal access in both Hadix and Knop; remainder of hearing, which related solely to Hadix, concerned objections to the courts jurisdiction, pltfs request for attorneys fees incurred in opposing defts motion for a protective order and a motion for submission by defts of their Huron Valley Psychiatric Hospital Statement; the motion for the Huron Valley Psychiatric Hospital Statement was withdrawn; J. Martin, Reporter (Exhibit List attached) (rlw) Modified on 03/07/1994 (Entered: 03/07/1994)

1171 REQUEST by the Court for Interrogatories to defts (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/04/1994)

1172 MOTION by defendants to extend time until 4/15/94 in which to answer Court Interrogatories to deft w/brief in support w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/12/1994)

1173 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion to extend time until 4/15/94 in which to answer Court Interrogatories to deft [1172−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/12/1994)

1174 RESPONSE by defendants to Court Interrogatories w/Exhibits 1−8, stamped proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/18/1994)

1175 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time for response to defts' answers to interrogatories from the court regarding legal access from 4/22 to 5/11, 1994 w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/25/1994)

1176 ORDER Rejecting pleading (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland − Robert Lee, Jr.'s Motion to Enforce Judgment because leave of the court to intervene is required (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/02/1994)

1177 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to extend time for response to defts' answers to interrogatories from the court regarding legal access from 4/22 to 5/11, 1994 [1175−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/04/1994)

05/11/1994 07/25/1994 08/24/1994 09/12/1994
09/14/1994
09/29/1994
09/29/1994 09/29/1994 10/03/1994 10/20/1994
10/20/1994
11/02/1994
11/07/1994 11/22/1994 11/28/1994 11/28/1994 11/29/1994

1178 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defts' responses to the Court's Interrogatories 1174 w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/12/1994)

1179 RESPONSE by defendants to Courts Interrogatory No. 8 1171 w/17 page attachment, stamped proof of service (rlw) Modified on 07/26/1994 (Entered: 07/26/1994)

1180 REPLY by plaintiffs regarding defts' responses to the Court's Interrogatory No. 8 dated 7/22/94 relating to access to the Courts [1179−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/24/1994)

1181

MOTION to intervene by Robert Lee Jr., Ronald C.W. Hammond, Mark Summerlin w/affidavits of Robert Lee, Jr., Ronald C.W. Hammond w/PROPOSED Motion to Enforce Judgment, Affidavits of Robert Lee, Jr., Kahlil Karnard Harvey, Arthur Hill, Jason Armour, Mark Summerlin, Keith Sanders, Roland Banks w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/13/1994)

1182 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland directing counsel for the class (Streeter &Alexander) to file a response to Motion for Leave to File Motion to Intervene (Motion to Enforce Judgment) by 10/1/94 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 09/14/1994)

1183 JOINT NOTICE by plaintiffs of taking deposition duces tecum of any and all person(s) defts will call to testify on 10/20/94 in suppor of their proposed plan to provide access to the courts and continuing on 10/12/94, 10/17/94 at 2 p.m.(rlw) Modified on 09/29/1994 (Entered: 09/29/1994)

1184 JOINT NOTICE by plaintiffs of taking deposition duces tecum of persons who prepared or contributed to the defts' proposed training curriculum on 10/12/94 at 9 a.m. in Lansing, MI (rlw) (Entered: 09/29/1994)

1185 PROOF OF SERVICE by plaintiffs for pldg. Nos. 1183−1184 (rlw) (Entered: 09/29/1994)

1186 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to intervene by Robert Lee Jr., Ronald C.W. Hammond, Mark Summerlin [1181−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/03/1994)

1187 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland rejecting Mark Hall's Motion for Enforcement of an Order because the filer is not a party to this action and must request leave of the court to intervene (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/20/1994)

PROCEEDING before Judge Richard A. Enslen − hearing on legal access issue on remand from Sixth Circuit; witnesses called by pltf − Wilbur, Levine; witnesses called by deft Linda J. Mort; J. Martin, Reporter (Exhibit List attached) (rlw) Modified on 10/25/1994 (Entered: 10/25/1994)

1188 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland denying motion to intervene by Robert Lee Jr., Ronald C.W. Hammond, Mark Summerlin [1181−1] Mark Summerlin, Ronald C.W. Hammond, Robert Lee terminated (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/03/1994)

1189 SUBMISSION (SUPPLEMENT) by defendants on additional proof and final argument w/Exhibits 1−12 (rlw) (Entered: 11/09/1994)

1190 MOTION by plaintiffs to exceed page limitation w/PROPOSED Response to defts' Submission of Additional Proof and Final Argument, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/23/1994)

1191 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltf's motion to exceed page limitation [1190−1] to file response to defts' submission of additional proof and final argument (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/28/1994)

1192 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defts' submission of additional proof and final argument w/attachment A, 13−15 (rlw) (Entered: 11/28/1994)

1193 AMENDED MOTION by plaintiffs to exceed page limitation to file response w/PROPOSED amended response to defts' submission of additional proof and final

12/05/1994 12/06/1994 12/22/1994 12/22/1994
01/23/1995 01/24/1995 03/17/1995 03/20/1995 03/24/1995 04/26/1995 04/26/1995 04/26/1995
04/28/1995 05/31/1995 06/07/1995 06/07/1995 06/15/1995

argument w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/30/1994)

1195 AMENDED RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defts' submission of additional proof and final argument 1186 (rlw) (Entered: 12/06/1994)

1194 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' amended motion to exceed page limitation to file response [1193−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/06/1994)

1196 OPINION (22 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/28/1994)

1197

ORDER (8 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance w/opinion granting pltfs' motion for rejection of the defts' remedial plan for providing access to the Courts and requesting a compliance review process for the certain access to Courts provisions [1165−1]; granting Hadix pltfs' motion to reject defts' remedial plan for access to courts [270 in case 4:92−cv−110] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/28/1994)

1198 CONSENT (RESPONSE) by plaintiffs to appointment of monitor pursuant to Order 1197 w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/23/1995)

1199 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to Court's order 1197 , consent to the appointment of Dr. F. Warren Benton to monitor the legal access remedial plan (rlw) (Entered: 01/24/1995)

1200 LETTER to court from movant Robert Lee Jr. advising the Court that he did not ever receive a copy of the 11/2/94 Order which denied his motion to intervene − order remailed 3/23/95 (rlw) (Entered: 03/23/1995)

1201 MOTION by defendants to extend time 90 days to comply with Court Order of 12/22/94 w/brief in support, Exhibit 1, stamped proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/23/1995)

1202 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defts' motion to extend time 90 days to comply with Court Order of 12/22/94 [1201−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/27/1995)

1203 ORDER (5 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen of appointment of F. Warren Benton as Monitor (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/27/1995)

1204 OPINION (4 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/27/1995)

1205

ORDER (3 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance w/opinion granting defts' motion to extend time 90 days to comply with Court Order of 12/22/94 [1201−1]; that the 90 day deadline for trial implementation of the revised plan at the Michigan Reformatory specified in the 12/22/94 order, Para. 11 is extended to 180 days from 12/22/94; that is 6/19/95. Any other deadlines dependent on the deadline specified in Para. 11 are similarly extended (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/27/1995)

1206 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defts' motion to extend time 90 days to comply with Court Order of 12/22/94 [1201−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/01/1995)

1207 REVISED INTERIM PLAN (NOTICE) by defendants for Legal Assistance as Mandated by the Order on 12/22/94 w/stamped proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/02/1995)

1208 CORRECTED REVISED INTERIM PLAN FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE (NOTICE) by defendants w/stamped proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/09/1995)

1209 CORRECTED REVISED LEGAL ACCESS PLAN (NOTICE) by defendants (rlw) (Entered: 06/09/1995)

1210 MOTION by defendants to enjoin public disclosure and issemination of legal access competency test w/brief in support, attchment, stamped proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/15/1995)

07/07/1995 10/03/1995
10/16/1995 11/06/1995 12/08/1995 01/31/1996
02/05/1996 02/25/1996 02/29/1996 03/04/1996 03/15/1996 03/18/1996
03/19/1996
03/22/1996
03/22/1996 03/26/1996

1211 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that the competency test submitted by defts shall be treated as confidential − ATTACHED to this order is the SEALED competency test (2 pgs) (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 07/12/1995)

1212

ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that the Dept of Correction file a brief no later than 10/16/95 in support of its request that the Clerk of the Court electronically track inmate lawsuits that are prepared with assistance from the Legal Access Pilot Project; pltfs may file a responsive brief no later than 10/25/95 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/10/1995)

1213 MEMORANDUM by defendants pursuant to the order [1212−1] addressing electronic tracking w/certificate of service, attachment (rlw) (Entered: 10/17/1995)

1214 STATUS REPORT by defendants of legal writer's pilot program, as ordered on 12/22/94 w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/07/1995)

1215 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by defendants adding attorney Leo H. Friedman w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 12/11/1995)

1216 ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that the defts' evaluation report shall be submitted no later than 2/5/96; that pltfs shall submit thier response to defts' report no later than 3/15/96; Status Conf is set for 2:00 p.m. on 3/22/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 02/01/1996)

1217 EVALUATION (NOTICE) by defendants of the Revised Interim Plan for Legal Assistance w/attached Plan, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/06/1996)

1280 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen extending the preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 an additional period of sixty days or until 4/1/97 subject to the conditions of the injunction (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 02/26/1997)

1218 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen dismissing as moot defts' motion to enjoin public disclosure and issemination of legal access competency test [1210−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/01/1996)

1219 ADDENDUM (SUPPLEMENT) by defendants to Evaluation of the Revised Interim Plan for Legal Assistance [1217−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/06/1996)

1220 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time until 3/18/96 to file response to defts' Revised Interim Plan for Legal Assistance w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/15/1996)

1221 MOTION by plaintiffs to exceed page limitation to file Joint Response of the Hadix and Knop pltfs in Opposition to defts' Evaluation of Revised Interim Plan for Legal Assistance w/brief in support, proof of service, PROPOSED Response (rlw) Modified on 03/25/1996 (Entered: 03/18/1996)

1222 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to extend time until 3/18/96 to file response to defts' Revised Interim Plan for Legal Assistance [1220−1]; pltfs shall file their response on or before 3/18/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/20/1996)

1223 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation to file Joint Response of the Hadix and Knop pltfs in Opposition to defts' Evaluation of Revised Interim Plan for Legal Assistance [1221−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/25/1996)

1224 RESPONSE by pltfs in opposition to defts' Evaluation of Revised Interim Plan for Legal Assistance [1217−1] w/Exhibits A−D (Exhibit D is SEALED) (rlw) (Entered: 03/25/1996)

1225

ORDER (4 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that the parties and the independent expert are to meet no later than 4/22/96 re a revised plan for legal assistance; defts to submit a revised plan for legal assistance no later than 5/17/96; pltfs response due by 5/27/96; defts have until 6/7/96 to reply to pltfs' response; hearing is set for 6/21/96 regarding the final version of the legal assistance plan; parties and the independent expert will meet on 6/20/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/26/1996)

04/24/1996 05/09/1996 05/17/1996 05/20/1996
05/23/1996 05/23/1996 05/24/1996
05/30/1996 06/03/1996 06/04/1996 06/07/1996
06/10/1996
06/11/1996 06/11/1996 06/11/1996 06/14/1996 06/17/1996

1226 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Interrogatories to pltfs and Request for Production of Documents Relating to Access to Courts (rlw) (Entered: 04/26/1996)

1227 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Notice of Taking De Bene Esse Deposition of Dr. Osa Coffey (rlw) (Entered: 05/10/1996)

1228 MOTION by defts to extend time deadlines established for the final access to the Court Plan and request for adjournment of the June 20 and 21, 1996 court proceedings w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/17/1996)

1229 OPPOSITION by pltfs to defts' motion to extend time deadlines established for the final access to the Court Plan [1228−1], motion for adjournment of the June 20 and 21, 1996 court proceedings [1228−2] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/20/1996)

1230 ERRATA (SUPPLEMENT) by pltfs to the 3/15/96 joint response [1224−1] of the Hadix and Knop pltfs in opposition to defts' evaluation of revised interim plan for legal assistance w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/23/1996)

1231 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for answers to defts interrogatories and requests for production of documents relating to access to courts (rlw) (Entered: 05/23/1996)

1232 ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland denying Defendant's motion to extend time deadlines established for the final access to the Court Plan [1228−1], denying defendant's motion for adjournment of the June 20 and 21, 1996 court proceedings [1228−2] (cc: all counsel) (bd) (Entered: 05/28/1996)

TRANSCRIPT of Legal Access to Courts Issue; testimony of witnesses Wilber, Levine, Mort held 10/20/94 before Judge Richard A. Enslen; transcribed by Jarratt W. Martin (see 4:92−cv−110 pldg. No. 708) (rlw) (Entered: 05/31/1996)

1233 MOTION by defts for leave to file Final Plan for the Legal Writer Program w/brief in support, Exhibits 1−2, certificate of service, PROPOSED Final Plan for the Legal Writer Program Dated May 30, 1996 (rlw) (Entered: 06/03/1996)

1234 OBJECTIONS by defts to the 5/24/96 order of the Magistrate denying defts' motion for enlargment of time deadlines established for the Final Access to the Court Plan [1232−1] w/certificate of servie (rlw) (Entered: 06/05/1996)

1235

AMENDED ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen ; that this Court's Order of 3/26/96 1225 is amended in that the hearing regarding the final version of the legal assistance plan is rescheduled to 6/20/96 ; parties may submit post−hearing briefs no later than 7/8/96; responses no later than 7/15/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) Modified on 06/27/1996 (Entered: 06/07/1996)

1236 PETITION by defts for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for C. Pepper Moore, Alfredo Robinson and T. Jon Spytma to appear at the hearing regarding access to the courts which is set for 6/20/96 w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/11/1996)

WRIT of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issued to Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan for C. Pepper Moore to appear as a witness on 6/20/96 at 8:30 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 06/11/1996)

WRIT of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issued to Warden, Egeler Facility for Alfredo Robinson to appear as a witness on 6/20/96 at 8:30 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 06/11/1996)

WRIT of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issued to Warden Carol Howes, Lakeland Correctional Facility for T. Jon Spytma to appear as a witness on 6/20/96 at 8:30 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 06/11/1996)

1237 OBJECTIONS by defts to pltfs' petition for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum of T. Jon Spytma [1236−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/14/1996)

1238 PETITION by pltfs for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for Brent E. Koster to appear as a witness on 6/20/96 w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/18/1996)

06/17/1996 06/18/1996 06/18/1996 06/20/1996 06/20/1996 06/20/1996 06/27/1996
07/22/1996 07/29/1996 07/30/1996
08/01/1996 08/01/1996
08/02/1996
08/02/1996 08/09/1996 09/13/1996 09/23/1996 09/23/1996

1239 OPPOSITION by pltfs to defts' proposed Final Plan for Legal Writers [1217−1] w/attachment, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
1240 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that this Court's Writ of Habeas corpus Ad Prosequendum as to T. Jon Spytma entered 6/11/96 is quashed (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
WRIT of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued to Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan for Bren E. Koster to appear as a witness on 6/20/96 at 8:30 a.m. (seal) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
1241 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion for leave to file Final Plan for the Legal Writer Program [1233−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/20/1996)
1242 FINAL PLAN FOR THE LEGAL WRITER PROGRAM DATED 5/30/96 (NOTICE) by defts (rlw) (Entered: 06/20/1996)
PROCEEDING before Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; hearing held on the legal access plan on 6/20/96 ; J. Martin, Reporter (rlw) (Entered: 06/21/1996)
1243 AMENDED ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that this Court's order of 6/7/96 1225 is amended to reflect that the parties shall file their post−hearing briefs regarding the final plan for legal assistance no later than 7/29/96; responses due no later than 8/5/96 (rlw) (Entered: 06/27/1996)
1244 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltf for Request for Attorney Fees and Costs (rlw) (Entered: 07/23/1996)
1245 MOTION by defts to extend time until 8/1/96 to file briefs on the final plan for legal assistance pursuant to the 6/27/96 Amended Order; responsive briefs then due 8/9/96 w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/30/1996)
1246 ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion to extend time until 8/1/96 to file briefs on the final plan for legal assistance pursuant to the 6/27/96 Amended Order; responsive briefs then due 8/9/96 [1245−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 07/30/1996)
1247 BRIEF by defts on access to the Courts, as required by the order of 6/27/96 [1243−1] w/attachment A, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/01/1996)
1248 MOTION by pltfs to exceed page limitation w/brief in support, PROPOSED Joint Post−Hearing Brief Regarding the Inadequacies of defts' Remedial Plan for Providing Meaningful Access to the Courts, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/02/1996)
1249 ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation [1248−1] to file Joint Post−Hearing Brief Regarding the Inadequacies of defts' Remedial Plan for Providing Meaningful Access to the Courts (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 08/02/1996)
1250 BRIEF (post−hearing) by pltfs regarding in the Inadequacies of defts' Remedial Plan for Providing Meaningful Access to the Courts pursuant to amended order [1235−2] w/Exhibits A−D (rlw) (Entered: 08/02/1996)
1251 REPLY by defts to pltfs' Joint Post−Hearing Brief Regarding the Inadequacies of defts' Remedial Plan for Providing Meaningful Access to the Courts [1250−1] w/attachment B, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/12/1996)
1252 MOTION by pltfs to exceed page limitation to file brief in support of Motion for Attorney Fees w/brief in support w/PROPOSED Motion for Attorney Fees (rlw) (Entered: 09/13/1996)
1253 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation to file brief in support of Motion for Attorney Fees [1252−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 09/23/1996)
1254 MOTION by pltfs for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment w/brief in support, Exhibits A−N (rlw) Modified on 04/22/1997 (Entered: 09/23/1996)

09/24/1996
09/25/1996 09/26/1996
09/26/1996
09/27/1996 09/30/1996 10/01/1996 10/01/1996
10/02/1996 10/10/1996 10/25/1996 10/29/1996 10/29/1996 11/05/1996

1255

STIPULATION requesting that defts' response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1] shall be due on or before 10/11/96; pltfs' reply in support of their motion for attorney fees shall be due on or before 10/25/96 (rlw) (Entered: 09/25/1996)

1256 MOTION by pltfs for temporary restraining order enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts , and for preliminary injunction enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts w/brief in support, Exhibits A−C, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/25/1996)

1257

ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting stipulation [1255−1] that defts' response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1] shall be due on or before 10/11/96; pltfs' reply shall be due on or before 10/25/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 09/26/1996)

1258

NOTICE of hearing: setting pltfs' emergency motion for temporary restraining order enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts [1256−1] and for preliminary injunction enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts [1256−2] at 2:00 p.m. on 9/30/96 in Grand Rapids, MI (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 09/26/1996)

1259 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' emergency motion for temporary restraining order enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts [1256−1] and for preliminary injunction enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts [1256−2] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/01/1996)

PROCEEDING before Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; granting pltfs' preliminary injunction for 60 days, in a limited manner; Court also approved the defts' final plan for legal access w/modifications; witness called by pltfs − Sandra Girard; D. Calsbeek, Reporter (rlw) (Entered: 10/03/1996)

1260 OPINION (16 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/02/1996)

1261

ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance w/opinion granting pltfs' motion for temporary restraining order enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts [1256−1] and for preliminary injunction enjoining defts from interfering w/pltfs' rights to access to the courts [1256−2]; defts' Final Plans for the Legal Writer Program 1242 is adopted w/the modifications set forth in the accompanying opinion (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/02/1996)

TRANSCRIPT of hearing on motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction held 9/30/96 before Judge Richard A. Enslen; transcribed by Diane C. Calsbeek, Reporter (see 4:92−cv−110 pldg. No. 813) (rlw) (Entered: 10/07/1996)

1262 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/11/1996)

1263 REPLY by pltfs (all) to defendants' response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1]; w/attachments; w/Cert of Serv (bd) (Entered: 10/28/1996)

1264 NOTICE OF APPEAL to Circuit Court by defts re: opinion 1260 and order [1261−1] entered on 10/1/96 w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/31/1996)

1265 RECEIPT #202925 in the amount of $105.00 submitted by defts for appeal fee (rlw) (Entered: 10/31/1996)

MAILED information copies to CCA consisting of Notice of Appeal [1264−1], docket sheet and opinion 1260 and order 1261 (cc: District Judge and all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/05/1996)

11/20/1996 11/25/1996
11/25/1996 11/27/1996 12/03/1996 12/06/1996 12/06/1996
12/10/1996
12/10/1996 12/12/1996 01/10/1997 01/22/1997 01/31/1997 02/19/1997 02/24/1997 02/25/1997 03/17/1997 03/18/1997
03/31/1997

1266 REQUEST by pltfs for extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 w/brief in support, attachment, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
1267 MEMORANDUM by pltfs in support of their motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1] w/attachments, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/25/1996)
1268 TRANSMISSION FORM showing notice of appeal [1264−1] filed by CCA on 11/18/96 and assigned CCA 96−2397 (rlw) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
1269 TRANSCRIPT ORDER Form from appellant's atty indicating that the transcript is already on file (rlw) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
1270 LETTER to court from defts w/attached schedules for implementation of the Legal Writer Programs (rlw) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
TRANSCRIPT of testimony of Elizabeth Ferguson; direct examination of Dr. Start; testimony of Dr. Shansky held 9/5/96 before Judge Richard A. Enslen; transcribed by Jarratt W. Martin (see 4:92−cv−110 #833) (rlw) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
TRANSCRIPT of testimony of cross examination of Dr. Start; testimonies of Dr. Davis, Dr. Hutchinson, Dr. James, and Mr. Moore held 9/6/96 before Judge Richard A. Enslen; transcribed by Jarratt W. Martin (see 4:92−cv−110 #834) (rlw) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
1271 SUPPLEMENT by defts in opposition to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1] w/attachment, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
1272 STIPULATION to withdraw pltfs' request [1266−1] for extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 (rlw) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
1273 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen extending preliminary injunction for a period of sixty days or until 2/1/97 subject to the conditions of the injunction issued 10/1/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
1274 NOTICE by Court to Court of Appeals advising that the record is being retained by the District Court pursuant to Rule 11, F.R.A.P. (rlw) (Entered: 01/10/1997)
1275 DESIGNATION for Record on Appeal by defts re: CCA #96−2397 appeal [1264−1] (rlw) (Entered: 01/22/1997)
1276 INFORMATION copy from CCA # 96−2397 appeal [1264−1] of a ruling on the Appellant's Consolidated Proof Brief (tlb) (Entered: 02/03/1997)
1277 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for Request for Attorney Fees and Costs for the period 7/1/96 through 12/31/96 (rlw) (Entered: 02/19/1997)
1278 STIPULATION by defts and the Knop pltfs to withdraw pltfs' joint request for extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 [1266−1] (rlw) (Entered: 02/25/1997)
1279 MOTION by defts to supplement record on appeal re legal access w/attachments, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/26/1997)
1281 STIPULATION regarding attorney fees and costs for the period July 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996 requesting an extension until 4/4/497 for pltfs to file a motion for any disputed portion of their attorneys fees and costs (rlw) (Entered: 03/18/1997)
1282 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland that pursuant to the stipulation of the parties [1281−1] pltfs may have until 4/4/97 to file a motion for the disputed portion of attorney fees and costs for the time period of 7/1/96 through 12/31/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/18/1997)
1283 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting defts' motion to supplement record on appeal re legal access filed 2/25/97 [1279−1] (cc: all counsel) (mrs) (Entered: 03/31/1997)

04/04/1997 04/09/1997 04/09/1997 04/14/1997 04/14/1997 04/14/1997 04/21/1997 04/22/1997 04/23/1997
04/28/1997 05/09/1997 05/14/1997 05/15/1997
05/23/1997 05/23/1997
05/27/1997 05/30/1997 05/30/1997 05/30/1997

1284 MOTION by pltfs to extend time to file motion for attorney fees w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/04/1997)

1285 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to extend time to file motion for attorney fees [1284−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/09/1997)

1286 MOTION by pltfs to exceed page limitation to file motion and brief w/PROPOSED motion for attorney fees, brief in support, Exhibits A−L, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/09/1997)

1287 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation to file motion and brief [1286−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/14/1997)

1288 MOTION by pltfs for attorney fees for the period July 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996 w/brief in support (rlw) Modified on 04/22/1997 (Entered: 04/14/1997)

1289 EXHIBITS A−L in support of pltfs' motion for attorney fees (rlw) (Entered: 04/14/1997)

1290 STIPULATION that defts shall have until 5/9/97 to file a response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for the period July 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996 [1288−1] (rlw) (Entered: 04/22/1997)

1291 STATUS REPORT by defts on implementation of the schedule for the legal writer program w/certificate of service (rlw) Modified on 12/23/1997 (Entered: 04/23/1997)

1292 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland upon stipulation of the parties 1290 defts may have until 5/9/97 to file a response to pltfs' motion for the disputed portion of attorney fees and costs for the time period of 7/1/96 through 12/31/96 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/23/1997)

1293 ORDER from CCA; re: CCA # 96−2397 granting defts motion to file instanter consolidated joint appendix (rlw) (Entered: 04/29/1997)

1294 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for the period July 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996 [1288−1] w/attachment, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/09/1997)

1295 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by defts adding attorney Michael A. Nickerson w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/15/1997)

1296 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1] w/attachment 1, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/15/1997)

1297 OPINION (16 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (mrs) (Entered: 05/23/1997)

1298

ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting motion for attorney fees for time expended related to monitoring health issues pursuant to Section II of the Hadix Consent Judgment [1254−1], and granting motion for attorney fees for the period July 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996 [1288−1] (cc: all counsel) (mrs) (Entered: 05/23/1997)

1299 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for Joint Interrogatories to defts Regarding Status of Legal Writer Programs (rlw) (Entered: 05/28/1997)

1300 NOTICE OF APPEAL to Circuit Court by defts re: opinion 1297 and order [1298−1] entered on 5/23/97 w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/02/1997)

1301 MOTION by defts for approval of defts' bond staying judgment on appeal w/brief in support, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/02/1997)

1302 RECEIPT #203302 in the amount of $105.00 submitted by defts for appeal fee (rlw) (Entered: 06/02/1997)

06/03/1997 06/09/1997 06/09/1997 06/11/1997
06/23/1997 06/23/1997 06/23/1997 06/26/1997 06/30/1997 07/01/1997 07/01/1997 07/01/1997 07/03/1997
07/07/1997 07/07/1997 07/07/1997 08/04/1997 08/08/1997 08/27/1997

MAILED information copies to CCA consisting of Notice of Appeal [1300−1], docket sheet, opinion 1297 and order 1298 (cc: District Judge and all counsel) (rlw) Modified on 06/03/1997 (Entered: 06/03/1997)

1303 RESPONSE by pltf to defts' motion for approval of defts' bond staying judgment on appeal [1301−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/09/1997)

1304 TRANSMISSION FORM showing notice of appeal [1300−1] filed by CCA on 6/6/97 and assigned CCA 97−1611 (rlw) (Entered: 06/10/1997)

1305

ORDER Granting Defendants' Motion for Approval of Defendants' Bond Staying Judgment on Appeal (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen re [1301−1]; a surety for the total sum of atty fees, costs and interest, bond is set in the amount of 10% of the total sum of attys fees and costs awarded in this Court's Opinion and Order dated 05/23/97; further, upon Defendants' depositing w/Court such 10% bond, this Court's Judgment of 05/23/97 which is currently on appeal be stayed. (cc: all counsel) (bd) (Entered: 06/12/1997)

1306 TRANSCRIPT ORDER Form from appellant's atty indicating no hearings held (rlw) (Entered: 06/24/1997)

1307 STIPULATION to third extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 6/1/97 (rlw) (Entered: 06/24/1997)

1308 STIPULATION to fourth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 8/1/97 (rlw) (Entered: 06/24/1997)

1309 MOTION by defts to extend time by 30 days to file answers to pltfs' joint interrogatories to defts regarding status of legal writer programs w/affidavit of Barbara Hladki (rlw) (Entered: 06/27/1997)

1314 RECEIPT #302485 in the amount of $1,392.79 submitted by defts for bond staying judgment on appeal (rlw) (Entered: 07/03/1997)

1310 MOTION by pltfs for a fifth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 10/1/97 (to extend time) (rlw) (Entered: 07/01/1997)

1311 OPPOSITION by pltfs to defts' motion to extend time by 30 days to file answers to pltfs' joint interrogatories to defts regarding status of legal writer programs [1309−1] (rlw) (Entered: 07/01/1997)

1312 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for pldg. Nos. 1310−1311 (rlw) (Entered: 07/01/1997)

1313 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland denying defts' motion to extend time by 30 days to file answers to pltfs' joint interrogatories to defts regarding status of legal writer programs [1309−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 07/03/1997)

1315 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting the parties stipulation [1307−1] for a thrid extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 6/1/97 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) Modified on 07/09/1997 (Entered: 07/09/1997)

1316 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting the parties stipulation [1308−1] for a fourth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 8/1/97 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 07/09/1997)

1317 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for a fifth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 10/1/97 (to extend time) [1310−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 07/09/1997)

1318 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for request for attorney fees and costs for the period 1/1/97 thrugh 7/31/97 by Federal Express to defts' representative Leo Friedman (mrs) (Entered: 08/04/1997)

1319 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for response to pltfs' joint interrogatories to defts regarding status of legal writer programs (rlw) (Entered: 08/11/1997)

1320 ORDER from CCA; re: CCA # 97−1611 that defts/appellants' motion to file instanter defts/appellants' consolidated proof brief is granted w/certificate of service

09/15/1997 09/16/1997
09/23/1997 09/30/1997 10/03/1997 10/06/1997 10/09/1997 10/28/1997 11/17/1997 11/19/1997 12/05/1997 12/08/1997 12/16/1997
12/22/1997 12/24/1997 12/24/1997 12/30/1997 01/05/1998 01/09/1998

(rlw) (Entered: 08/27/1997)
1321 STIPULATION to extend time until 9/23/97 to file motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs (rlw) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
1322 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting stipulation of the parties [1321−1] that pltfs have until 9/23/97 to file a motion related to unresolved attorney fees and costs for the period from 1/1/97 to 6/30/97 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 09/16/1997)
1323 MOTION by pltfs for attorney fees w/brief in support, Exhibits A−C, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/24/1997)
1324 STIPULATION to sixth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 12/1/97 (rlw) (Entered: 09/30/1997)
1325 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting stipulation for a sixth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 12/1/97 [1324−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
1326 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for attorney fees [1323−1] w/attachment 1, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/07/1997)
1327 REPLY by pltfs' to defts' response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees [1323−1] w/attachment 1, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/09/1997)
1328 FRAP 11 CERTIFICATE of Record tansmitted to CCA re: CCA # 96−2397; 97−1611, appeal [1300−1], appeal [1264−1] (rlw) (Entered: 10/28/1997)
1329 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by pltfs in support of their motion for attorney fees [1323−1] w/attachment, certificate of servie (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
1330 COMPLIANCE REPORT (STATUS REPORT) by Barbara Hladki, Manager (Consent Decree Unit) on the implementation of the legal writer program (rlw) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
1331 STIPULATION to seventh extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 2/1/98 (rlw) (Entered: 12/05/1997)
1332 ORDER (1 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting the parties stipulation [1331−1] for a seventh extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 2/1/98 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/09/1997)
1333 ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for attorney fees [1323−1] and that defts shall make immediate payment of undisputed atty fees and that disputed atty fees are awarded as requested but payment is stayed pending appeal (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/16/1997)
1334 RESPONSE (Joint) by pltfs to defts' legal writer compliance report [1291−1] w/attachments, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 12/23/1997)
1335 NOTICE OF APPEAL to Circuit Court by defts re: order [1333−1] entered on 12/16/97 w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 12/30/1997)
1336 RECEIPT #203766 in the amount of $105.00 submitted by defts for appeal fee (rlw) (Entered: 12/30/1997)
MAILED information copies to CCA consisting of Notice of Appeal [1335−1], docket sheet and order 1333 (cc: District Judge and all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/30/1997)
1337 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for Joint Second Interrogatories to defts regarding Status of Legal Writer Programs (rlw) (Entered: 01/06/1998)
1338 MOTION (joint) by pltfs to compel answers to interrogatories regarding status of legal writer programs w/brief in support, attachments A−B1−B5, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/12/1998)

01/15/1998 01/16/1998 01/16/1998
01/20/1998 01/22/1998 01/26/1998
01/26/1998
01/29/1998 01/29/1998 02/03/1998 02/04/1998
02/04/1998 02/06/1998 02/17/1998 02/19/1998
02/25/1998 03/06/1998

1339 STIPULATION to eighth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 4/1/98 (rlw) (Entered: 01/16/1998)
1340 MOTION by defts to extend time until 2/2/98 to file response to pltfs' joint motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding status of legal writer programs w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/16/1998)
1341 MOTION by defts to extend time until 2/2/98 to file response to pltfs' motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding accommodations for the medically handicapped at SPSM, Facility B w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/16/1998)
1342 TRANSMISSION FORM showing notice of appeal [1335−1] filed by CCA on 1/15/98 and assigned CCA 98−1037 (rlw) (Entered: 01/21/1998)
1343 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting the parties stipulation for an eighth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 4/1/98 [1339−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 01/23/1998)
1344 ORDER (1 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion to extend time until 2/2/98 to file response to pltfs' joint motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding status of legal writer programs [1340−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 01/26/1998)
1345 ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion to extend time until 2/2/98 to file response to pltfs' motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding accommodations for the medically handicapped at SPSM, Facility B [1341−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 01/26/1998)
1346 MOTION by pltfs for immediate payment of uncontested attorney fees w/brief in support, Attachments A−E, certificate of service (rlw) Modified on 01/30/1998 (Entered: 01/30/1998)
1347 ERRATA (MEMORANDUM) by pltfs to brief in support of motion for immediate payment of uncontested attorney fees (revised page 3) [1346−1] (rlw) (Entered: 01/30/1998)
1348 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' joint motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding status of legal writer programs [1338−1] w/affidavit of Barbara Hladki, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/04/1998)
1349 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for immediate payment of uncontested attorney fees [1346−1]; the fees shall be paid by defts to National Prison Project $17,299.50, Patricia Streeter $22,979.25, Michael Barnhart $19,552.50 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 02/04/1998)
1350 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Response to pltfs' Joint Second Interrogatories to defts regarding status of Legal Writer Programs (rlw) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
1351 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding status of legal writer programs [1338−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/06/1998)
1352 WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (NOTICE) by pltfs attorney Mark Schneider (rlw) (Entered: 02/18/1998)
1353 ORDER (3 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding status of legal writer programs [1338−1]; defts shall produce the requested documents on or before 3/5/98 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 02/19/1998)
1354 JOINT MOTION by pltfs for order of payment of uncontested attorneys' fees w/brief in support and cert of svc (mrs) (Entered: 02/25/1998)
1355 STIPULATION for entry of protective order concerning confidentiality of information submitted in response to Nos. 6 &7 of pltfs' joint interrogatories to defts regarding status of legal writer programs (rlw) (Entered: 03/09/1998)

03/20/1998 03/20/1998 03/25/1998 03/30/1998 04/10/1998 04/17/1998 04/20/1998 04/22/1998 04/27/1998 04/27/1998 04/29/1998 04/29/1998 05/04/1998 05/05/1998
05/08/1998
05/11/1998

1356 STIPULATION to ninth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 6/1/98 (rlw) (Entered: 03/20/1998)

1357 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting stipulation to ninth extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 6/1/98 [1356−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/20/1998)

1358 ORDER from CCA; re: CCA #98−1037 granting deft's request to file instanter the proof brief (rlw) (Entered: 03/25/1998)

1359 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for order of payment of uncontested attorneys' fees [1354−1]; see order for fees approved for payment (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/30/1998)

1360 MOTION by pltfs for payment of balance of uncontested attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,982.50 w/brief in support, attachment A, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/13/1998)

1361 MOTION by pltfs for contempt of the 2/18/98 order compelling production of certain discovery related to defts' Legal Writer Programs w/brief in support, Exhibits A−C, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/20/1998)

1362 MOTION by defts to extend time to file response to pltfs' joint motion for payment of balance of uncontested attorneys' fees w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/21/1998)

1363 OPPOSITION by pltfs to defts' motion to extend time to file response to pltfs' joint motion for payment of balance of uncontested attorneys' fees [1362−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/23/1998)

1364 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion to extend time to file response to pltfs' joint motion for payment of balance of uncontested attorneys' fees [1362−1]; defts have until and including 4/30/98 to file their response (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/28/1998)

1365 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that w/in 14 days the parties may file a legal memorandum supporting the entry of the proposed order for sealing discovery relating to the Legal Writer Program (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/28/1998)

1366 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' joint motion for contempt of the 2/18/98 order compelling production of certain discovery related to defts' Legal Writer Programs [1361−1] w/Exhibit 1, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/30/1998)

1367 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' joint motion for payment of balance of uncontested attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,982.50 [1360−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/30/1998)

1368 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for contempt of the 2/18/98 order compelling production of certain discovery related to defts' Legal Writer Programs [1361−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/04/1998)

1369

ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' joint motion for payment of balance of uncontested attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,982.50 [1360−1]; fees are approved and shall be paid immediately upon the resolution in pltfs' favor of defts' petition for rehearing by the 6th Circuit as follows: Nat'l Prison Project $7,991.50; Patricia Streeter $8,006.25; Michael Barnhart $3,742.50 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/06/1998)

1370

MOTION by defts to terminate all aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and associated orders and plans relating to access to courts in Hadix: to dissolve the October 1, 1996 preliminary injunction enjoining defts from terminating funding of PLSM; and to terminate all further remedial relief in both Knop and Hadix on the issue of access to court w/brief in support, Exhibit 1, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/11/1998)

1372 RESPONSE by defts in support of the Stipulation for a Protective Order [1355−1] w/affidavit of Marjorie Van Ochten, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/13/1998)

05/12/1998 05/13/1998 05/15/1998 05/18/1998
05/19/1998 05/26/1998 05/29/1998 06/01/1998
06/03/1998
06/09/1998 06/10/1998 06/15/1998 06/15/1998

1371 REPLY by pltfs in support of pltfs' joint motion for order of payment of contested attorneys' fees [1360−1] w/attachments, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/12/1998)

1373 AMENDED REPLY by pltfs in support of their joint motion for order of payment of uncontested attorneys' fees [1371−1] w/attachments, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/13/1998)

1374 NOTICE by pltf of taking deposition of Dinah Y. Moore, Administrator of the Special Programs Unit on 5/21/98 at 10 a.m. in defts' offices w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/18/1998)

1375

MOTION by pltfs to extend time 30 days to respond to defts' Motion to Terminate All Aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and Associated Orders and Plans Relating to Access to Courts in Hadix; to Dissolve the 10/1/96 Preliminary Injunction Enjoining defts from Terminating Funding of PLSM; and to Terminate all Further Remedial Relief in Both Knop and Hadix on the Issue of Access to Court[s] w/brief in support, Exhibits A−C, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/19/1998)

1376 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen denying pltfs' joint motion for contempt of the 2/18/98 order compelling production of certain discovery related to defts' Legal Writer Programs [1361−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/20/1998)

1377 MOTION by pltfs for order to adopt stipulation to a tenth extension of the preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 6/30/98 w/brief in support w/attachment− stipulation, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/27/1998)

1378 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for order to adopt stipulation to a tenth extension of the preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 6/30/98 [1377−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/29/1998)

1379

ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' joint motion to extend time 30 days to respond to defts' Motion to Terminate All Aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and Associated Orders and Plans Relating to Access to Courts in Hadix; to Dissolve the 10/1/96 Preliminary Injunction Enjoining defts from Terminating Funding of PLSM; and to Terminate all Further Remedial Relief in Both Knop and Hadix on the Issue of Access to Court[s] [1375−1]; pltfs shall have until and including 6/26/98 to file their response to defts' motion (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/03/1998)

1380

MEMORANDUM by defts in support of their motion to terminate all aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and associated orders and plans relating to access to courts in Hadix: to dissolve the October 1, 1996 preliminary injunction enjoining defts from terminating funding of PLSM; and to terminate all further remedial relief in both Knop and Hadix on the issue of access to court [1370−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/08/1998)

1381

MOTION by pltfs for preliminary injunction of Rule 65 of FRCP that preserves the operation and funding of the office of the Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. and, if necessary for temporary restraining order , and for shortening defts' time for response to 6/17/98 w/brief in support, Exhibits A−C, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/09/1998)

1382 JOINT MOTION by pltfs (4:92−cv−110) for sanctions for certain legal contentions w/brief in support, Attachments 1−4, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/10/1998)

1383 NOTICE by deft of taking deposition de bene esse of Sandra L. Girard on 6/23/98 at 9:30 a.m. in Lansing, MI w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/15/1998)

1384

MOTION by pltfs to adopt stipulation to an eleventh extension of the preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 8/1/98 allowing pltfs to withdraw their request for shortening defts' time to respond to pltfs' pending motion for a preliminary injunction , for a telephone status conference w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/16/1998)

06/15/1998 06/15/1998 06/15/1998 06/18/1998
06/18/1998 06/19/1998
06/22/1998 06/24/1998 06/26/1998 06/26/1998
06/26/1998 06/29/1998
07/01/1998
07/02/1998 07/06/1998

1385 STIPULATION to eleventh extension of preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 8/1/98 (rlw) (Entered: 06/16/1998)

1386 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for pldg. Nos. 1384−1385 (rlw) (Entered: 06/16/1998)

1387 LETTER to court from F. Warren Benton regarding legal access w/attachment (rlw) (Entered: 06/16/1998)

1388

ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion to adopt stipulation to an eleventh extension of the preliminary injunction issued 10/1/96 to 8/1/98 allowing pltfs to withdraw their request for shortening defts' time to respond to pltfs' pending motion for a preliminary injunction [1384−1], granting motion for a telephone status conference [1384−2] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/19/1998)

1390 MOTION by defts to extend time until 7/15/98 to file a response to pltfs' joint motion for a preliminary injunction and, if necessary, a temporary restraining order, and for shortening defts' time for response w/brief in support, Exhibits A−B, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 06/23/1998)

1389

ORDER (1 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; that the Court grants permission for F. Warren Benton to hire Diane Hartmus to assist him in determing complilance with respect to the referenced motions; setting motion for preliminary injunction of Rule 65 of FRCP that preserves the operation and funding of the office of the Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. [1381−1] at 9:00 a.m. on 7/22/98 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/19/1998)

1391 RESPONSE by pltfs to the letter from Dr. F. Warren Benton, Independent Monitor re the legal access plan [1387−1] (rlw) (Entered: 06/23/1998)

1392 MOTION by defts (all) to extend time (of 10 days) to file response to pltfs' joint motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 (bd) (Entered: 06/24/1998)

1393 OPPOSITION by pltfs to defts' motion to extend time until 7/15/98 to file a response to pltfs' joint motion for a preliminary injunction and, if necessary, a temporary restraining and for shortening defts' time for response [1390−1]; w/Cert. of Service (bd) Modified on 06/26/1998 (Entered: 06/25/1998)

1394

(joint) OPPOSITION by pltfs (all) to defts' motion to terminate all aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and associated orders and plans relating to access to courts in Hadix: to dissolve the October 1, 1996 preliminary injunction enjoining defts from terminating funding of PLSM; and to terminate all further remedial relief in both Knop and on the issue of access to court [1370−1]; w/Appendix A; w/Proof of Service (bd) (Entered: 06/26/1998)

1395 RESPONSE by pltfs to defts' motion to extend time (of 10 days) to file response to pltfs' joint motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 [1392−1]; w/Cert of Service (bd) (Entered: 06/26/1998)

1396

ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting defts' motion to extend time until 7/15/98 to file a response to pltfs' joint motion for a preliminary injunction and, if necessary, a temporary restraining order, and for shortening defts' time for response [1390−1]; pltfs' reply brief shall be due in the Kalamazoo Clerk's Office on or before 4 p.m. on 7/20/98 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 06/29/1998)

1397

ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting defts' motion to extend time (of 10 days) to file response to pltfs' joint motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 [1392−1]; defts have until and including 7/6/98 to file a response; defts shall serve their response on pltfs by express mail no later than 7/7/98 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 07/01/1998)

1398 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' joint motion for sanctions for certain legal contentions [1382−1] w/Exhibits 1−2, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/02/1998)

1399 LETTER to court from Independent Expert, F. Warren Benton requesting that the newly appointed Monitor, Diane Hartmus be added to the court's docket (rlw) (Entered: 07/06/1998)

07/13/1998 07/14/1998 07/14/1998
07/15/1998
07/16/1998 07/16/1998 07/17/1998 07/17/1998 07/17/1998 07/21/1998 07/22/1998
07/22/1998 07/22/1998 07/22/1998
07/23/1998
07/23/1998 07/23/1998 07/27/1998 07/27/1998

1400 NOTICE by pltfs of taking deposition duces tecum of Steve Ramey on 7/17/98 at 10 a.m. in Lansing, MI w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/13/1998)

1401 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for sanctions for certain legal contentions [1382−1] w/affidavit, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/14/1998)

1402

OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for preliminary injunction of Rule 65 of FRCP that preserves the operation and funding of the office of the Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. [1381−1] for temporary restraining order [1381−2], for shortening defts' time for response to 6/17/98 [1381−3] w/Exhibits 1−2, A−M, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/15/1998)

1403 PETITION by pltfs for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum as to Alredo Robinson and Keith Schramm, housed in the Egeler Facility and Ronald Kovaleski, housed at the Parnall Facility to appear at the hearing set for 7/22/98 (rlw) (Entered: 07/15/1998)

WRIT issued to Warden, Egeler Facility as to Alfredo Robinson and Keith Schramm to appear at the hearing set for 7/22/98 at 9 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 07/16/1998)

WRIT issued to Warden, Parnall Facility as to Ronald Kovaleski to appear at a hearing set for 7/22/98 at 9 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 07/16/1998)

1404 PETITION by pltfs for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for Harold Frieson and David Lytal to appear on 7/22/98 w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/17/1998)

WRIT issued to Warden, Charles Egeler Correctional Facility for David Lytal to appear on 7/22/98 at 8:30 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 07/17/1998)

WRIT issued to Warden Charles Egeler Correctional Facility for Harold Frieson to appear on 07/11/98 at 8:30 a.m. (bd) (Entered: 07/20/1998)

1408 MOTION by defts to quash subpoena duces tecum dated 07/17/98 w/proof of service (bd) (Entered: 07/22/1998)

1405

REPLY Brief by pltfs in support of motion for preliminary injunction of Rule 65 of FRCP that preserves the operation and funding of the office of the Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. [1381−1], motion for temporary restraining order [1381−2], motion for shortening defts' time for response to 6/17/98 [1381−3]; w/attachment; w/Cert of Serv (bd) (Entered: 07/22/1998)

1406 EXHIBIT LIST submitted by pltfs (bd) (Entered: 07/22/1998)

1407 WITNESS LIST submitted by pltfs (bd) (Entered: 07/22/1998)

PROCEEDING before Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; hearing held as to motion for preliminary injunction of Rule 65 of FRCP that preserves the operation and funding of the office of the Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. [1381−1] [1381−2]; witnesses called by pltf − Harold Frieson, Keith Schram, Sandra Girard, Stephen Raney; writs continued as ordered; J. Reinardy, Recorder (rlw) (Entered: 07/23/1998)

PROCEEDING before Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; motion for preliminary injunction continued; witnesses called by pltf − Barbara R. Levine; witnesses called by defts − Dinah Moore, Stephen Ramey, Douglas Whitley, Barbara Hladki; J. Reinardy, Recorder (rlw) (Entered: 07/24/1998)

WRIT issued to Warden Egeler FAcility as to Alfredo Robinson to appear at a hearing set for 7/23/98 at 9 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 07/24/1998)

WRIT issued to Warden, Parnall Facility as to Ronald Kovaleski to appear at a hearing set for 7/23/98 at 9 a.m. (rlw) (Entered: 07/24/1998)

1409 CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Patricia A. Streeter on behalf of pltfs (rlw) (Entered: 07/28/1998)

1410 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Subpoena on Steven Ramey (rlw) (Entered: 07/28/1998)

07/28/1998 07/29/1998 07/29/1998
07/30/1998
08/05/1998 08/11/1998 08/13/1998 08/26/1998 08/28/1998
08/28/1998
09/01/1998 09/15/1998 09/17/1998 09/23/1998 09/23/1998 09/29/1998 10/05/1998

1411 MOTION by pltfs to exceed page limitation to file brief w/PROPOSED post−hearing summation in support of motion for a preliminary injunction, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/28/1998)

1412 REPORT (STATUS REPORT) by Diane Hartmus, Special Monitor on the Legal Writer Program for July 1998 (rlw) (Entered: 07/29/1998)

1413 SUMMATION (RESPONSE) by defts to the hearing on pltfs' motion for preliminary injunction of Rule 65 of FRCP that preserves the operation and funding of the office of the Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. [1381−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/29/1998)

1414 ORDER (4 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen denying pltfs' motion for preliminary injunction of Rule 65 of FRCP that preserves the operation and funding of the office of the Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. [1381−1], [1381−2], [1381−3], (cc: all counsel) (bd) (Entered: 07/30/1998)

TRANSCRIPT of preliminary injunction held 7/22/98; 7/23/98 before Judge Richard A. Enslen; transcribed by James L. Reinardy (see 4:92−cv−110 pleading No. 1082) (rlw) (Entered: 08/06/1998)

1415 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen denying as moot defts' motion to quash subpoena duces tecum dated 07/17/98 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 08/11/1998)

1416 LETTER to court from pltfs advising that the parties have resolved the matters raised in defts' motion to quash subpoena dated 7/21/98 − subpoena withdrawn (rlw) (Entered: 08/13/1998)

1417 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation to file brief [1411−1] (cc: all counsel) (mrs) (Entered: 08/26/1998)

1418

SUMMATION (RESPONSE) by pltfs to defts' motion to terminate all aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and associated orders and plans relating to access to courts in Hadix: to dissolve the October 1, 1996 preliminary injunction enjoining defts from terminating funding of PLSM; and to terminate all further remedial relief in both Knop and Hadix on the issue of access to court [1370−1] w/Exhibits 1−2, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/28/1998)

1419

SUMMATION (RESPONSE) by defts to Hadix/Knop hearing on defts' motion to terminate all aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and associated orders and plans relating to access to courts in Hadix: to dissolve the October 1, 1996 preliminary injunction enjoining defts from terminating funding of PLSM; and to terminate all further remedial relief in both Knop and Hadix on the issue of access to court [1370−1] w/Exhibits 1−5, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/28/1998)

1420 MOTION by pltfs to strike defts' summation w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/01/1998)

1421 MOTION by pltfs to extend time until 9/29/98 to file motion regarding attorneys' fees w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/17/1998)

1422 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion to strike defts' summation [1420−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/17/1998)

1423 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting motion to extend time until 9/29/98 to file regarding attorneys' fees [1421−1] (cc: all counsel) (seal) (Entered: 09/24/1998)

1424 ORDER (2 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen granting in part and denying in part motion to strike defts' summation [1420−1]; defts' attachment 5 is stricken (cc: all counsel) (seal) Modified on 09/24/1998 (Entered: 09/24/1998)

1425 MOTION by pltfs to set hourly rate for attorneys fees w/brief in support, Exhibits A−I, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/29/1998)

1426 MOTION by pltfs to extend time until 10/16/98 to respond to defts' summation w/brief in support, certificate of service(rlw) Modified on 10/06/1998 (Entered:

10/06/1998 10/07/1998 10/08/1998
10/08/1998
10/13/1998 10/16/1998 10/20/1998 10/21/1998 10/23/1998 10/26/1998 10/28/1998 10/29/1998 10/29/1998
10/29/1998 10/29/1998

10/05/1998)

1427 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion to extend time until 10/16/98 to respond to defts' summation [1426−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/06/1998)

1428 CORRECTED MOTION by pltfs to set hourly rate for attorneys fees w/brief in support, attachments A−I, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/07/1998)

1429 MOTION by pltfs for a temporary restraining order , for a preliminary injunction , for shortening time for response by defts to this motion , for waiver of bond and to exceed page limitation for brief in support of this motion w/brief in support, Exhibits 1−6, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/08/1998)

1430

ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen setting for hearing pltfs' motion for a temporary restraining order [1429−1] and for a preliminary injunction [1429−2] for 8:30 a.m. on 10/29/98, granting pltfs' motion for shortening time for response by defts to this motion [1429−3], setting for hearing pltfs' motion for waiver of bond [1429−4] for 8:30 a.m. on 10/29/98, granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation for brief in support of this motion [1429−5] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/09/1998)

1431 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' corrected motion to set hourly rate for attorneys fees [1428−1] and pltfs' original motion to set hourly rate for attorneys fees [1425−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/14/1998)

1432 COMMENTS (REPLY) by pltfs regarding the July 1998 Report of the Special Monitor on the Legal Writer Program [1412−1] w/Exhibits 1−A − 1−C, Certificate of Service (rlw) (Entered: 10/19/1998)

1433 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion to set hourly rate for attorneys fees [1428−1] w/attachment, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/20/1998)

1434 CORRECTED COMMENTS (REPLY) by pltfs regarding the July 1998 Report of the Special Monitor on the Legal Writer Program [1432−1] w/Exhibits 1A−1C, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/22/1998)

1435 NOTICE by pltfs of filing the original declaration of Sandra Girard in connection w/the hearing set for 10/27/98 on pltfs' motion for a preliminary injunction w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/23/1998)

1436 MOTION by defts to exceed page limitation to file brief w/PROPOSED brief in opposition to pltfs' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/27/1998)

1437 REPLY BRIEF by pltfs in support of pltfs' motion for a temporary restraining order [1429−1], motion for a preliminary injunction [1429−2], motion for waiver of bond [1429−4] w/attachment 1, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/28/1998)

1438 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting defts' motion to exceed page limitation to file brief [1436−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/29/1998)

PROCEEDING before Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting in part and denying in part pltfs' motion for a preliminary injunction [1429−2], motion for waiver of bond is unnecessary [1429−4]; further briefing to follow; J. Reinardy, Recorder (rlw) (Entered: 10/30/1998)

1439 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for a temporary restraining order [1429−1] for a preliminary injunction [1429−2] and for waiver of bond [1429−4] w/Exhibits 1−2 (rlw) (Entered: 10/30/1998)

1440

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that pltfs' motion for preliminary injunction is granted in part and denied in part; defts are enjoined from distributing or posting the 9/24/98 Notice to Prisoners in any facility subject to the Consent Decree; pltfs shall file a brief w/in 15 days of this order on whether this preliminary injunction should continue as a premanent injunction; motion for bond is waived as unnecessary (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 10/30/1998)

11/06/1998 11/10/1998 11/12/1998 11/12/1998
11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/20/1998
11/20/1998 11/30/1998 12/01/1998
12/11/1998 12/11/1998 12/14/1998 12/14/1998 12/15/1998 01/08/1999 01/13/1999

1441 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' corrected motion to set hourly rate for attorneys fees [1428−1]; see order for specifics (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/06/1998)

1442 TRANSCRIPT of preliminary injunction proceedings held 10/29/98 before Judge Richard A. Enslen; transcribed by James L. Reinardy (rlw) (Entered: 11/10/1998)

1443 OPINION (15 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/12/1998)

1444

ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen denying defts' motion to terminate all aspects of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section VI, 1−14) and associated orders and plans relating to access to courts in Hadix: to dissolve the October 1, 1996 preliminary injunction enjoining defts from terminating funding of PLSM; and to terminate all further remedial relief in both Knop and Hadix on the issue of access to court [1370−1], denying pltfs' motion for sanctions for certain legal contentions [1382−1]; the Court reaffirms its decision of 7/30/98 denying relief as to the pltfs' motion for preliminary injunction as to court−ordered funding (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/12/1998)

1445 STIPULATION to posting corrected notice regarding MDOC funding of Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. w/attached corrected notice (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

1446 MOTION by pltfs for entry of order regarding corrected notice and request to extend time to brief the permanency of the 10/29/98 injunction for two weeks, until 11/30/98 w/brief in support (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

1447 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for pldg. Nos. 1445−1446 (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

1448 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that pursuant to the parties stipulation [1445−1] defts shall post the attached corrected Notice Regarding MDOC Funding of Prison legal Services of Michigan, Inc. for a minimum of 45 days (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/20/1998)

1449 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs motion request to extend time to brief the permanency of the 10/29/98 injunction for two weeks, until 11/30/98 [1446−2] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/20/1998)

1450 MOTION by pltfs for order prohibiting re−posting of incorrect notice regarding MDOC funding of Prison legal Services of Michigan, Inc. w/stipulation in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 12/01/1998)

1451 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen based upon the stipulation of the parties pltfs' motion for order prohibiting re−posting of incorrect notice regarding MDOC funding of Prison legal Services of Michigan, Inc. [1450−1] is granted (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 12/02/1998)

1452 NOTICE OF APPEAL to Circuit Court by defts from opinion 1443 and order [1444−1] entered on 11/12/98 (seal) (Entered: 12/15/1998)

1453 RECEIPT #103599 in the amount of $105.00 submitted by defts for appeal fee (seal) (Entered: 12/15/1998)

1454 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for Joint Interrogatories to defts regarding status of legal Writer Programs (seal) (Entered: 12/15/1998)

1455 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Notice of Appeal (seal) (Entered: 12/15/1998)

MAILED information copies to CCA consisting of Notice of Appeal [1452−1], docket sheet opinion 1443 and order 1444 (cc: District Judge and all counsel) (seal) (Entered: 12/15/1998)

1456 TRANSMISSION FORM showing notice of of appeal [1452−1] filed by CCA on 1/6/99 and assigned CCA 99−1007 (rlw) (Entered: 01/08/1999)

1457 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Response and Objections to pltfs' Joint Interrogatories to defts Regarding Status of Legal Writer Program (rlw) (Entered: 01/14/1999)

01/19/1999 02/17/1999 02/22/1999 02/23/1999 02/24/1999
03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/17/1999
03/19/1999 03/29/1999 04/06/1999 04/07/1999
04/07/1999
04/09/1999 04/09/1999 04/12/1999

1458 TRANSCRIPT ORDER Form from appellant's atty ordering transcript from hearings held 7/22/98 and 7/23/98 (rlw) (Entered: 01/20/1999)

1459 MOTION (joint with 4:92−cv−110) by pltfs to compel discovery regarding status of legal writer programs w/brief in support, Exhibit a, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/17/1999)

1460 MOTION by defts to extend time until 3/17/99 to file response to plts' joint motion for order compelling discovery regarding status of Legal Writer programs w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/23/1999)

1461 RESPONSE by pltfs to defts' motion to extend time until 3/17/99 to file response to plts' joint motion for order compelling discovery regarding status of Legal Writer programs w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/23/1999)

1462 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion to extend time to file response to plts' joint motion for order compelling discovery regarding status of Legal Writer programs; defts shall file their response on or before 3/15/99 (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 02/24/1999)

1463 MOTION by pltfs to extend time until 4/9/99 to file motion for attorneys fees and expenses w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/15/1999)

1464 STIPULATION to extend time until 4/9/99 to file motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs (rlw) (Entered: 03/15/1999)

1465 OPPOSITION by defts in response to pltfs' motion to compel discovery regarding status of legal writer programs [1459−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/16/1999)

1466 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to extend time until 4/9/99 to file motion for unresolved attorneys fees and expenses for the period 7/1/98 to 12/31/98 [1463−1] and pursuant to the parties stipulation (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/17/1999)

1467 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' joint motion to compel discovery regarding status of legal writer programs [1459−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/19/1999)

1468 ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' joint motion to compel discovery regarding status of legal writer programs [1459−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/29/1999)

1469 OBJECTIONS by defts to order [1468−1] granting pltfs' joint motion for order compelling discovery regarding status of Legal Writer Programs w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/06/1999)

1470 SLIP OPINION from CCA re: CCA # 96−2397; appeal [1264−1] that the district court's grant of final injunctive relief must be reversed and the case remanded; affirming the district court's grant of a prelilminary injunction to the pltfs (rlw) (Entered: 04/07/1999)

1471

JUDGMENT (MANDATE) from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re: CCA #: 96−2397; reversing and remanding the Decision of the District Court the grant of final injunctive relief; affirming the district court's grant of preliminary injunction to pltfs in order to maintain the status quo until a hearing on the merits can be concluded Appeal [1264−1] (rlw) (Entered: 04/07/1999)

1472 SECOND STIPULATION extending time until 4/15/99 to file motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs for the period 7/1/98 to 12/31/98 (rlw) (Entered: 04/09/1999)

1473 MOTION by pltfs to extend time (second) until 4/15/99 to file motion for attorneys fees and expenses w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/12/1999)

1474 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland rejecting Affidavit of Fact by Allan White−Bey because he is not a party to the action (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/12/1999)

04/12/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/21/1999 04/22/1999 04/23/1999
04/26/1999 04/27/1999 04/28/1999 04/29/1999 05/10/1999 05/12/1999 05/18/1999 05/25/1999
05/28/1999 06/01/1999 06/21/1999

1475 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting stipulation [1472−1] for a second extension of time until 4/15/99 to file motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/13/1999)

1476 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Request for Admissions and Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (rlw) (Entered: 04/15/1999)

1477 MOTION by pltfs for attorney fees for the period from 7/1/98 through 12/31/98 and for costs w/brief in support, Exhibits A−I, Certificate of Service (rlw) (Entered: 04/15/1999)

1478 MOTION by defts to extend time until 5/10/99 to file response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees and costs w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/21/1999)

1479 MOTION by pltfs to extend time until 4/28/99 to file response to defts' objections to order granting discovery regarding legal writer programs w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/22/1999)

1480 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltfs' motion to extend time until 4/28/99 to file response to defts' objections to order granting discovery regarding legal writer programs [1479−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/23/1999)

1481 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for Joint Request to Produce (rlw) (Entered: 04/27/1999)

1482 RESPONSE by defts to pltfs' motion for extension of time to file response to defts' objections to order granting discovery regarding legal writer programs [1479−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/27/1999)

1483 RESPONSE by pltfs to defts' objection [1482−1] to order granting pltfs' joint motion for order compelling discovery regarding status of legal writing program w/attachments 1−4, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/28/1999)

1484 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen that deft's objection 1469 to the order of 3/29/99 is denied; discovery shall continue as previously ordered (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 04/29/1999)

1485 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for the period from 7/1/98 through 12/31/98 [1477−1], and for costs [1477−2] w/Exhibits 1−2, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/11/1999)

1486 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland dismissing as moot defts' motion to extend time until 5/10/99 to file response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees and costs [1478−1] (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/12/1999)

1487 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for attorney fees for the period from 7/1/98 through 12/31/98 [1477−1] and for costs [1477−2] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/18/1999)

1488

ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for attorney fees for the period from 7/1/98 through 12/31/98 [1477−1] and for costs [1477−2] to the extent that pltfs are awarded attorney fees and expenses in the amounts requested which shall be paid immediately w/exceptions of the portions of fees in excess of the $112/per hr limitation and the fees relating to legal access (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/25/1999)

1489 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Response to pltfs' Joint Request to Produce Regarding Medical and Mental Health Care and Legal Access (rlw) (Entered: 06/01/1999)

1490 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Response to pltfs' Joint Interrogatories Regarding Status of Legal Writer Programs (rlw) (Entered: 06/02/1999)

1491 ORDER from CCA; re: CCA # 99−1007 that pltfs' motion is granted; the portion of the 11/12/98 opinion and order of the district court denying the defts' motion to terminate is vacated; the appeal is remanded to the district court for further proceedings (rlw) (Entered: 06/22/1999)

07/09/1999 07/19/1999 07/19/1999 07/28/1999 07/29/1999 08/02/1999 08/03/1999 08/16/1999
08/16/1999 08/18/1999
08/23/1999 08/31/1999 08/31/1999 09/13/1999
09/16/1999 09/30/1999 11/02/1999 11/09/1999

1492 MOTION by pltfs to extend time until 8/9/99 to file supplemental discovery response w/brief in support, Attachments 1−6, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 07/09/1999)
1493 CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Diane Hartmus to 679 Catherine Street, Peekskill, NY 10566 (rlw) (Entered: 07/20/1999)
1494 MANDATE from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re: CCA #: 99−1007; remanding to the district court for further proceedings re appeal [1452−1] (rlw) Modified on 07/21/1999 (Entered: 07/21/1999)
1495 MANDATE from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re: CCA # 96−2397; issuing pursuant to court's disposition filed 4/1/99 (tlb) (Entered: 07/29/1999)
1496 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting pltf's motion to extend time until 8/9/99 to file supplemental discovery response [1492−1] (cc: all [EOD Date 7/29/99] (mrs) (Entered: 07/29/1999)
1497 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for extension of time to file supplemental discovery response w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/03/1999)
1498 MOTION by Jamie C. Reilly, J.C. Cannon and Wellington L. Drake to intervene as interested parties/plaintiffs w/brief in support, proof of service, Addendum A−B (rlw) (Entered: 08/05/1999)
1499 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen denying motion to intervene as interested parties/plaintiffs [1498−1] by prisoners Jamie C. Reilly, J.C. Cannon and Wellington L. Drake (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 8/16/99] (rlw) (Entered: 08/16/1999)
1500 OBJECTIONS by defts to motion to intervene as interested parties/plaintiffs [1498−1] by prisoners Jamie C. Reilly, J.C. Cannon and Wellington L. Drake w/proof of service, exhibits 1−2 (rlw) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
1501 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION: terminating attorney Michael A. Nickerson for defts Perry M. Johnson, Robert Brown, Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore W. Koehler, John Prelesnik, Jack Bergman and substituting attorney Leo H. Friedman (rlw) Modified on 08/19/1999 (Entered: 08/19/1999)
1502 AFFIDAVIT of Sandra Ashton Earls as Exhibit 2 in defts' response in opposition to prisoners motion to intervene as interested parties/pltfs [1500−1] (rlw) (Entered: 08/24/1999)
1503 MOTION by pltfs to extend time until 9/30/99 to file motion for attorneys fees and expenses w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
1504 STIPULATION extending time until 9/30/99 for pltfs to file a motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs (rlw) Modified on 08/31/1999 (Entered: 08/31/1999)
1505 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland granting defts' motion to extend time until 9/30/99 to file motion for attorneys fees and expenses [1503−1]; pltfs have until 9/30/99 (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 9/13/99] (mrs) (Entered: 09/13/1999)
1506 MEMORANDUM by James C. Reilly, James Charles Cannon, Wellington L. Drake in support of their motion to intervene as interested parties/plaintiffs [1498−1] (rlw) (Entered: 01/13/2000)
1507 MOTION by pltfs for attorney fees for the period from 1/1/99 through 6/30/99 , and for costs for the period from 1/1/99 through 6/30/99 w/brief in support, Exhibits 1−3, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 09/30/1999)
1508 MOTION (supplemental) by pltfs for attorney fees for the period 1/1/99 through 6/30/99 , for costs w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
1509 ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for attorney fees for the period 1/1/99 through 6/30/99 [1508−1] and for costs [1508−2] (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 11/9/99] (rlw) (Entered: 11/09/1999)

11/15/1999
11/15/1999
11/15/1999 11/17/1999
12/06/1999 12/06/1999 12/14/1999
01/31/2000
02/02/2000 02/03/2000 02/09/2000 02/16/2000 02/22/2000 02/23/2000 02/25/2000 03/02/2000 03/02/2000 03/10/2000

1510 ORDER from CCA; re: CCA # 97−1611 (appeal #1300) affirming in part and reversing in part defts' appeal of the district court's opinion re pltfs' motions for attorneys' fees for the time period between 1/1/96 and 12/31/96; this matter is remanded for further proceedings (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1999)

1511 ORDER from CCA; re: CCA # 98−1037 (appeal #1335) that the district court's order of 12/16/97 is reversed insofar as it is based upon an hourly rate in excess of the maximum rate established and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1999)

1512 SUPPLEMENT from CCA re mandate [1471−1] w/attched page 11 w/correction as to footnote 3 (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1999)

1513

AMENDED ORDER (2 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion for attorney fees for the period from 1/1/99 through 6/30/99 [1507−1] and for costs for the period from 1/1/99 through 6/30/99 [1507−2]; defts are ordered to immediately pay the outstanding fees (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 11/17/99] (rlw) (Entered: 11/17/1999)

1514 MANDATE from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re: CCA #: 97−1611; dismissing the appeal [1300−1] (rlw) (Entered: 12/07/1999)

1515 MANDATE from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re: CCA #: 98−1037; dismissing the appeal [1335−1] (rlw) (Entered: 12/07/1999)

1516

ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance w/CCA Order of 11/10/99; that order [1298−1] and order [1333−1] are vacated to the extent of all attorney fees previously ordered in excess of the hour rate of $112.50 per hour for legal work performed after 4/26/96 (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 12/14/99] (rlw) (Entered: 12/14/1999)

1517 MOTION to intervene by Charles M.H. Roberts, William T. Mears, Albert Eugene McKinley, Avis A. Fee w/brief in support w/attched PROPOSED Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion to Add Recently Discovered Information to Complaint, Certificate of Service, attachments (rlw) (Entered: 02/01/2000)

1518 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland rejecting a letter w/attachments from a Charles M.H. Roberts because he is not a party to this action (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 2/2/00] (rlw) (Entered: 02/02/2000)

1519 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Doyle A. Rowland denying motion to intervene by Charles M.H. Roberts, William T. Mears, Albert Eugene McKinley, Avis A. Fee [1517−1] (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 2/3/00] (rlw) (Entered: 02/03/2000)

1520 PROOF OF SERVICE by defts for Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (rlw) (Entered: 02/10/2000)

1521 OBJECTIONS/COMMENTS by defts to the Court Monitor's 2/7/00 scheduling proposal w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/16/2000)

1522 NOTICE by pltfs that they do not object to the proposed recommendation for remand procedure filed by the special monitor for legal access issues w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/23/2000)

1523 MOTION by pltfs for order requiring notice to the plaintiff class w/brief in support, Attachments 1−3, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/23/2000)

1524 REMAND PROPOSAL (NOTICE) by special monitor Diane Hartmus (rlw) (Entered: 02/25/2000)

1525 RESPONSE by pltfs to defts' objections/comments to the Court Monitors' February 2, 2000 scheduling proposal [1521−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/02/2000)

1526 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for order requiring notice to the plaintiff class [1523−1] w/Exhibits 1−2, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/07/2000)

1527 MOTION by pltfs to exceed page limitation to file brief w/PROPOSED motion and brief for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class (rlw) Modified on 03/10/2000 (Entered: 03/10/2000)

03/10/2000 03/10/2000 03/13/2000 03/13/2000 03/13/2000 03/14/2000 03/15/2000 03/20/2000
03/29/2000 03/31/2000
03/31/2000 04/12/2000 04/14/2000 04/18/2000 05/04/2000
05/04/2000
05/09/2000

1528 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for order requiring notice to the plaintiff class [1523−1] (rlw) (Entered: 03/10/2000)
1529 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltf for pldg. Nos. 1527−1528 (rlw) (Entered: 03/10/2000)
1530 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation to file brief [1527−1] (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 3/13/00] (rlw) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
1531 MOTION by pltfs for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class w/brief in support, attachments 1−2 (rlw) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
1532 MEMORANDUM (corrected copy) by pltfs in support of their motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/14/2000)
1533 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by pltfs for Response to defts' Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (rlw) (Entered: 03/14/2000)
1534 STIPULATION allowing for an enlargement of time until 4/4/00 for defts to file a response to pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' couonsel to members of the class w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/15/2000)
1535 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting the parties stipulation [1534−1]; defts have until 4/4/00 to file their response to pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 3/20/00] (rlw) (Entered: 03/20/2000)
1536 MOTION by defts to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents w/brief in support, Exhibits 1−2, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/30/2000)
1537 NOTICE of hearing: before Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr. on defts' motion to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents [1536−1]; is set for 2:00 p.m. on 5/4/00 in Grand Rapids, MI (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 03/31/2000)
1538 RESPONSE by defts to pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1] w/exhibits 1−3, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/03/2000)
1539 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1] w/attachments 1−2, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/12/2000)
1540 REPLY MEMORANDUM (corrected version) by pltfs to [1539−1] in support of pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of class w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/17/2000)
1541 OPPOSITION by pltfs to defts' motion to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents [1536−1] w/attachments, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 04/18/2000)
1542 NOTICE of hearing: before Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley on pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1] is set for 11:00 a.m. on 6/20/00 in Kalamazoo, MI (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
PROCEEDING before Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr.; re deft's motion to compel answers to interrog and production of docs [1536−1]; motion granated in part and denied in part; defense counsel to prepare order; ct recorder: F. Hunter; Tape B99−B100 (ddk) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
1543 ORDER (2 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr. granting in part and denying in part defts' motion to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents [1536−1] (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 5/11/00] (rlw) (Entered: 05/11/2000)

05/12/2000 05/17/2000
05/19/2000 05/22/2000
06/30/2000
07/03/2000 07/03/2000 08/30/2000 09/18/2000 09/29/2000 09/29/2000 10/02/2000 10/02/2000 10/04/2000
10/06/2000 10/16/2000

1544 MOTION (consent) by pltfs for rescheduling oral argument on pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class w/brief in support, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/15/2000)

1545

ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr. granting pltfs' consent motion for rescheduling oral argument on pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1544−1], before Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr. on motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1]; motions set for hearing at 2:00 p.m. on 6/30/00 (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 5/18/00] (mrs) (Entered: 05/18/2000)

1546 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltfs for responses to defts' interrogatories and request for discovery (mrs) (Entered: 05/19/2000)

1547

AMENDED ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr. granting pltfs' motion for rescheduling oral argument on pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1544−1] setting pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1] at 2:00 p.m. on 6/30/00 before Mag Brenneman (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 5/24/00] (rlw) (Entered: 05/24/2000)

PROCEEDING before Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr. re pltfs' motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1]; opinion to issue; G. Frayer, court recorder; tape B142 (krv) (Entered: 07/10/2000)

1548 PROOF OF SERVICE by pltf for supplemental discovery regarding pltfs' legal access claims (rlw) (Entered: 07/05/2000)

1549 CHANGE OF ADDRESS by pltfs' counsel Patricia A. Streeter (rlw) (Entered: 07/05/2000)

1550 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; Status Conf is adjourned until 9:00 a.m. on 9/29/00 (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 8/30/00] (rlw) (Entered: 08/30/2000)

1551 ORDER (4 pgs) by Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman Jr. denying motion for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class [1531−1] (cc: all counsel on 9/19/00) [EOD 9/19/00] (mj) (Entered: 09/19/2000)

1552 MOTION by pltfs to exceed page limitation to file brief w/certificate of service, PROPOSED objections to order of magistrate judge entered on 9/15/00 (rlw) (Entered: 09/29/2000)

PROCEEDING before Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; Status Conf held at 9:00 a.m. on 9/29/00; Kathleen Thomas, Reporter (rlw) (Entered: 09/29/2000)

1553 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen granting pltfs' motion to exceed page limitation to file brief [1552−1] (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 10/2/00] (rlw) (Entered: 10/02/2000)

1554 OBJECTIONS by pltfs to order of Magistrate Judge [1551−1] (rlw) (Entered: 10/02/2000)

1555 ORDER (4 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen denying as moot pltfs' motion for order requiring notice to the plaintiff class [1523−1] denying as moot defts' objections to the Court Monitor's Scheduling Proposal [1521−1] (cc: all counsel) Date 10/4/00] (rlw) (Entered: 10/04/2000)

1556 RESPONSE by defts to pltfs' objections to order of magistrate judge [1554−1] w/Exhibits 1−3, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 10/06/2000)

1557 ORDER (3 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen denying pltfs' objections [1554−1] to Magistrate Judge's order of 9/15/00 denying pltfs' motions for orders related to communications from pltfs' counsel to members of the class (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 10/16/00] (rlw) (Entered: 10/16/2000)

12/11/2000 03/20/2001 03/30/2001 04/27/2001 05/02/2001 06/08/2001 09/04/2001 11/05/2001 11/06/2001 11/13/2001
11/13/2001 11/19/2001
11/20/2001
11/23/2001
11/30/2001 12/03/2001 12/03/2001

1558 CHANGE OF ADDRESS by pltfs' attorney Elizabeth Alexander w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 12/13/2000)

1559 ORDER (1 pg) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; Status Conf is scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on 4/27/01 (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 3/20/01] (rlw) (Entered: 03/20/2001)

1560 MAIL RETURNED [1559−2] addressed to pltfs atty Bruce J. Ennis w/note "deceased please remove name from service list" (rlw) (Entered: 03/30/2001)

PROCEEDING before Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; Status Conf held at 9:00 a.m. on 4/27/01; order to follow; not reported (rlw) (Entered: 05/01/2001)

1561 ORDER (4 pgs) by Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen; Discovery Conf is set for 1:30 p.m. on 6/20/01 before Mag. Carmody; see order for specific response deadlines (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 5/3/01] (rlw) (Entered: 05/03/2001)

1562 REPORT by defts on their remedial plans for fire safety, temperature, ventilation, and Facility A, proof of service, Exhibits 1−2 (rlw) (Entered: 06/11/2001)

1563 REPORT on the Legal Writer Program (STATUS REPORT) by Special Monitor Diane Hartmus for August (rlw) (Entered: 09/05/2001)

1565 MOTION (Expedited) by defts to relieve compliance with Section VI−10 of the Consent Decree and the Court's May 5, 1988 Opinion and Order in Knop v Johnson w/brief in support, Exhibits 1−4, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/07/2001)

1564 MOTION by pltfs for order to show cause , for order enjoining defts' changes to the legal mail policy and for an order expediting the briefing w/brief in support, attachments 1−6, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/06/2001)

1566

NOTICE of hearing: that the hearing presently secheduled before Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody will also consider pltfs' motion for order to show cause [1564−1], for order enjoining defts' changes to the legal mail policy [1564−2], for an order expediting the briefing [1564−3] and defts' motion to relieve compliance with Section VI−10 of the Consent Decree and the Court's May 5, 1988 Opinion and Order in Knop v Johnson [1565−1] at 2:00 p.m. on 11/15/01 in Grand Rapids, MI (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/13/2001)

1567 NOTICE by defts to the Court of changes to the operation of the State Prison of Southern Michigan − Central Complex, the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility and the Michigan Reformatory w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/14/2001)

1568 MOTION by defts to exceed page limitation to file response in opposition w/PROPOSED Response in Opposition to pltfs' Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Order Enjoining defts' Changes to the Legal Mail Policy (rlw) (Entered: 11/21/2001)

1570

NOTICE of hearing: before Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody on motion for order to show cause [1564−1]; motion for order enjoining defts' changes to the legal mail policy [1564−2]; motion for an order expediting the briefing [1564−3]; motion to relieve compliance with Section VI−10 of the Consent Decree and the Court's May 5, 1988 Opinion and Order in Knop v Johnson [1565−1] are set for 1:00 p.m. on 12/4/01 in Grand Rapids, MI (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 11/23/2001)

1569 RESPONSE by pltfs to defts' expedited motion to relieve compliance with Section VI−10 of the Consent Decree and the Court's May 5, 1988 Opinion and Order in Knop v Johnson [1565−1] w/attachments 1−5, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/23/2001)

1571 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody granting defts' motion to exceed page limitation to file response in opposition [1568−1] (cc: all counsel on 11/30/01) [EOD 12/3/01] (mj) Modified on 12/03/2001 (Entered: 12/03/2001)

1572 OPPOSITION by defts to pltfs' motion for order to show cause [1564−1] for order enjoining defts' changes to the legal mail policy [1564−2] for an order expediting the briefing [1564−3] w/Exhibits 1−11 (rlw) (Entered: 12/03/2001)

1573 REPLY by pltfs to defts' response to pltfs' motion for order to show cause [1564−1] for order enjoining defts' changes to the legal mail policy [1564−2] for an order

01/02/2002
01/07/2002 01/08/2002 01/14/2002 01/15/2002 01/17/2002 01/24/2002 01/30/2002 02/08/2002 02/14/2002
03/04/2002 03/05/2002 03/06/2002 03/06/2002
03/14/2002

expediting the briefing [1564−3] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 12/03/2001)

1574

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody that defts be ordered to propose a substitute for their current wholesale disregard for the Hadix Consent Decree and the Knop Order which is narrowly tailored to address the MDOC's "new" security concerns while preserving inmates' presumptive right to the confidentiality of genuine legal mail (11 pgs) (cc: all counsel) (rlw) (Entered: 01/03/2002)

TRANSCRIPT of motion hearing held 12/4/01 before Magistrate Judge Ellen s. Carmody; transcribed by Patricia R. Pritchard, CER (see 4:92−cv−110 #1538) (rlw) Modified on 01/11/2002 (Entered: 01/11/2002)

1577 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE by defts of changes to the operation of the State Prison of Southern Michigan − Central Complex w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/17/2002)

1576 OBJECTIONS by defts to Report and Recommendation [1574−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/15/2002)

1575 OBJECTIONS by pltfs to Report and Recommendation [1574−1] w/attachments 1−11, certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/15/2002)

1578 SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE by defts for changes to the operation of the Michigan Reformatory [1577−1] w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/17/2002)

1579 MOTION by defts to dismiss pursuant to the Court's 10/3/00 Order regarding legal access , or in the alternative for expedited hearing pursuant to the Sixth Circuit court of Appeals' 4/1/99 Opinion w/brief in support, Exhibits 1−2, proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/24/2002)

1580 RESPONSE by pltfs to defts' objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [1576−1] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 01/30/2002)

1581 RESPONSE by pltfs to defts' motion to dismiss pursuant to the Court's 10/3/00 Order regarding legal access [1579−1], [1579−2] w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 02/11/2002)

1582

ORDER (3 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen adopting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION as supplemented herein by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody that defts be ordered to propose a substitute for their current wholesale disregard for the Hadix Consent Decree and the Knop Order which is narrowly tailored to address the MDOC's "new" security concerns while preserving inmates' presumptive right to the confidentiality of genuine legal mail [1574−1], granting pltfs' objection [1575−1], denying defts' objection [1576−1] (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 2/14/02] (rlw) (Entered: 02/14/2002)

1583 RESPONSE by defts to Order[1582−1]; defts' filing pursuant to the District Court's February 14, 2002 Order w/prf of svc (mrs) (Entered: 03/04/2002)

1584 STIPULATION of parties for dismissal and termination of prospective relief regarding plts' access to Court claims w/prf of svc (mrs) (Entered: 03/05/2002)

1585 ORDER (1 pg) by Judge Richard A. Enslen that the hearing scheduled to commence on 3/11/02 is adjourned; that all writs for prisoner attendance are Quashed; and that the hearing will be rescheduled by subsequent notice of this Court (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 3/7/02] (mrs) (Entered: 03/07/2002)

1586

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL (2 pgs) by Judge Richard A. Enslen in accordance with the parties' stipulation of 3/1/02 [1584−1] that all proposective relief as to pltfs' access to court claims are terminated; that pltfs' access to court claims are dismissed; that the purposes of this Order, the pltfs' legal mail claims are not included with the scope of pltfs' access to court claims; and that defts' motion to dismiss of 1/23/02 (dkt # 1579) is deemed resolved in accordance with the Stipulation (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 3/7/02] (mrs) (Entered: 03/07/2002)

1587 OBJECTIONS by pltfs to defts' response [1583−1] pursuant to the District Court's 2/14/02 order w/certificate of service (rlw) (Entered: 03/14/2002)

03/25/2002 04/02/2002 04/30/2002 05/02/2002 09/06/2002
09/09/2002 09/10/2002 10/31/2002 11/05/2002 11/28/2003 06/21/2004

1588 RESPONSE by deftx to pltfs' objections to defts' filing pursuant to the District Court's 2/14/02 order [1587−1] w/proof of service, attachment (rlw) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
1589 STIPULATION for the termination of jurisdiction over Section I−P (water temperature) of the Consent Decree entered on 5/13/85 (rlw) (Entered: 04/02/2002)
1590 STIPULATION of the parties regarding implemention of MDOC's revised Legal Mail Policy w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 05/01/2002)
1591 ORDER (1 pg) by Judge Richard A. Enslen approving the parties stipulation regarding implementation of MDOC's revised legal mail policy [1590−1] (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 5/2/02] (rlw) (Entered: 05/02/2002)
1592 ORDER (1 pg) by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody rejecting Request for Information from Darrell Waller because he is not listed as a part to the action and there is no original signature (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 9/10/02] (rlw) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
1593 STIPULATION of the parties and termination of prospective relief regarding pltfs' Legal Mail Claims w/proof of service, proposed order (rlw) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
1594 ORDER OF DISMISSAL (1 pg) by Judge Richard A. Enslen that pltf's legal mail claims are dismissed; dismiss case (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 9/10/02] (rlw) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
1595 MOTION by defts for release and return of supersedeas bond in the amount of $1,392.79 w/proof of service (rlw) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
1596 ORDER (1 pg) by Judge Richard A. Enslen granting defts' motion for release and return of supersedeas bond in the amount of $1,392.79 [1595−1] (cc: all counsel, financial administrator) [EOD Date 11/5/02] (rlw) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
1597 LETTER from M. Polkowski, Financial Administrator to Leo H. Friedman, Assistant Attorney General enclosing the Supersedeas Bond in the amount of $1,392.79 pursuant to Order granting defts' motion (rlw) (Entered: 12/02/2003)
1598 ORDER (1 pg) by Judge Richard A. Enslen rejecting Motion for RElief from 2/14/04 Order because the filers Richard Thompson and Ronald Jordan are not parties to this action (cc: all counsel) [EOD Date 6/21/04] (rlw) (Entered: 06/21/2004)

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

~-- J ~ '''':" r'!: .' , l

.II :~_ ;._ - J

"

,I,I' /'")jU' f)'~ ~! • 'i

GARY KNOP, et aI, Plaintiffs,
v. PERRY M. JOHNSON, et aI,
_____D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_s.__________1

File No. 4:84-CV-651 HON. RICHARD A. ENSLEN

DEFENDANTS' FINAL PLAN FOR THE LEGAL WRITER PROGRAM DATED MAY 30, 1996
1. The attached document entitled "Knop v. Johnson Final Plan for the
Legal Writer Program" is incorporated herein.
2. This plan is submitted to satisfy three (3) orders of the Court, as follows:
a. The March 26, 1996 District Court Order and Opinion requiring Defendants to submit a revised plan for legal assistance by May 17, 1996;
b. The December 22, 1994 District Court Order and Opinion permitting Defendants to submit the plan in a form that they propose following a pilot or trial implementation of the program; and
c. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' 1992 decision in this case, Knop v. Johnson, 977 F. 2D 966 (6th Cir. 1992).
3. This plan is also submitted consistent with Public Law 104-134, an
omnibus act whose Title VIII is designated the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
signed into law on April 26, 1996. Section 802 of Title VIII amends 18 U.S.c. § 3626,
in part, by requiring the following:

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. 18 U.s.C. §3626 (a)(l)
"Prospective relief" is defined by this act as "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages". 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7).
4. The rule of statutory construction holds that a court is to apply the law
in effect at the time it renders its decision. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S.
....; 128 L.Ed 2d 229; 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1496 (1995). "[W]here the congressional intent is
clear [as to the retroactive effect of the law], it governs. Id.; accord Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990). That application of the
prospective relief provision of the PLRA applies to the access to court issue currently
on appeal before this Court is evidenced by section 802(b)(1) of the Act :
(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT.-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 3626 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by this section, shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title.
5. The "Final Plan for the Legal Writer Program", as attached, is
consistent with this statutory directive; corrects the constitutional violations found
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in its 1992 decision; and reflects a remedy that
is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive to the operation of the correctional
system. Defendants' final plan is being submitted under the assumption that it will

become a court order. (One part of the plan has not been finalized relative to the criteria that defines what intelligence level of the prisoner is constitutionally necessary to prepare coherent pleadings. Seg, Plan § LA.) Defendants intend to comply with the plan by essentially mirroring the legal writer program currently in operation at the Michigan Reformatory.
RELIEF The Court is requested to accept this proposal as the Final Plan of the Legal Writer Program.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. KELLEY
Att me General~

usan Prze op-Shaw (P30495) Assistant Attorney General Corrections Division P.O. Box 30216 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7021

Date: May 31,1996

1/8802228/PLANI

0:'. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document(s) was served upon the attorneys of record

or parties appearing in pro ~er in the above cause by mailing the same to them at their respective address

with p....ge fully prep... t "eon, on the ,1<1 day

Q~

av;~d ~7

Final Plan for the Legal Writer Program Knop. et al v Johnson, et al
977F.2d996 (6th Circuit 1992) May 30.1996
Michigan Department of Corrections Kenneth L. McGinnis, Director

INTRODUCTION
Defendants submit this document as their proposed Final Plan pursuant to the District Court order of December 22, 1994. This plan is consistent with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Knot> v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992).
By submitting this fmal plan, Defendants do not agree that everything that was ordered by the District Court in the December 22, 1994 Order is legally mandated by the United States Constitution, and preserve their objections to the plan, pending fmal order ofthe federal court. As acknowledged by the District Court during the March 22, 1996 Status Conference, this final plan is being submitted subject to the U.S. Supreme Court decision anticipated to be issued in the case of Lewis v. Casey. and the other applicable case law issued since the December 22, 1994 Order was entered in this case. This plan is subject to provision of 18 U.S.C. §3626 et ai, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Title VIII ofP.L. 104-134 signed into law on April 26, 1996.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section I - Criteria for Prisoners Needing Assistance

1

A. Identification of Eligible Prisoners Needing Assistance

1

B. Notification to Prisoners of How to Obtain Assistance

2

Section II - Criteria for Selection of Legal Writers and Legal Writer Students

2

A. Identification of Legal Writers

2

Section III - Training Program for Legal Writers

3

A. Scope of Training

3

B. Competency Exam

3

C. Delivery of Training

3

Section IV - Access to Services

3

Section V - Legal Writer Duties and Responsibilities

4

A. Assistance to Prisoners in Segregation

4

B. Legal Writers

5

Section VI - Staff Supervision

5

Section VII - Implementation, Monitoring, and Termination

5

A. Interim Services

5

B. Schedule for Implementation

5

1. Michigan Reformatory
2. State Prison of Southern Michigan - South 3. Egeler Correctional Facility - Cell blocks 1 and 2 only
4. Marquette Branch Prison

C. Monitoring

6

D. Termination

7

I. CRITERIA FOR PRISONERS NEEDING ASSISTANCE
The prisoner legal writers will provide assistance to eligible prisoners who signify a desire for assistance and who meet anyone of the following criteria:
(l) Those prisoners who cannot read and write English.
(2) Those prisoners who lack the intelligence necessary to prepare coherent pleadings.
(3) Prisoners eligible for services outside of segregation will continue to receive and be eligible for services while in segregation. Other prisoners in segregation will be eligible if there is evidence that the prisoner is unable to identify the books or materials needed to be used to develop a legible and coherent pleading, and faces a ten-day deadline.
A. Identification of Eligible Prisoners Needing Assistance
Categories 1 and 2: Identification of prisoners in Categories 1 and 2 above will be determined by the appropriate Departmental staff.
Those prisoners who cannot read and write English above a 6.0 grade level will be eligible for assistance. This criteria is chosen based upon existing case law and is conditioned upon the future final decision by the federal court as to what grade level is constitutionally necessary.
The pilot program ordered by this Court did not afford enough time or data to determine whether a higher grade level is constitutionally justified. On an interim basis, the Department intends to provide assistance to those prisoners who cannot read and write English above 8.9 as measured by the test chosen by the Department. Any prisoner who has obtained a OED will not be eligible for assistance. This interim criteria was chosen in order to facilitate activities of the Legal Writer Program already developed and implemented and to afford time to obtain additional data.
Where the test is written in English, it is assumed that the reading and language scores of any nonEnglish speaking prisoner will be below the chosen grade level for assistance. If an eligible prisoner subsequently achieves competency at the chosen grade level or above, that prisoner will not be eligible for services. In these situations, a prisoner will be retested prior to being declared ineligible.
Category 3: Identification of prisoners in Category 3 will occur as the result of a screening process. Using the kite system, any prisoner classified to administrative segregation, may request assistance.
1

B. Notification to Prisoners of How to Obtain Assistance
All incoming prisoners will be given notice at the institutional orientation regarding the assistance that is available, and how to obtain that assistance. All prisoners already assigned to the facility will be given notice regarding the assistance that is available, and how to obtain assistance.
Notification will be provided to prisoners who request legal assistance based on the screening process described in Section 1. This notification to prisoners may also advise prisoners that additional assessment will be required to determine their eligibility for assistance. Prisoners who refuse to participate in the testing and assessment process will be considered ineligible for assistance until such time that they agree to cooperate.
Until the screening process is completed, any prisoner requesting assistance, which is within the scope ofthe program, and who has a pending deadline will be provided assistance. If the prisoner is determined to be ineligible for service once the screening process is completed, assistance will be discontinued.
Prisoners may request assistance by using the institutional kite system. Final determination to classify a prisoner as eligible for assistance will be made by the Legal Writer Program staff responsible for this program with assistance as needed from other staff.
II. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF LEGAL WRITERS AND LEGAL WRITER STUDENTS
Consistent with this plan, the Department will provide training programs. Sufficient legal writers needed to assist eligible prisoners who signify a desire for assistance will be identified and trained as determined by the Department. To be eligible for the Legal Writer Training Program, a prisoner must meet all of the criteria established by the Department.
A. Identification
Final determination to classify a prisoner as a legal writer student or legal writer will be made by the Classification Director with the recommendation of the appropriate Classification Committee. An eligible prisoner who passes the required course work as well as the competency exam may be classified as a legal writer. This classification does not guarantee any prisoner a work assignment in this classification.
The Department reserves the right at its sole discretion to evaluate, on an individual basis, any prisoner who is determined to have had legal writer training at the post secondary level or above. Prisoners who meet this criteria must be able to successfully pass a competency test prior to being considered for classification as a legal writer.
Removal of prisoners from the legal writer student or legal writer classification will occur based on
2

criteria approved by the Director of the Department of Corrections.

III. TRAINING PROGRAM FOR LEGAL WRITERS

A. Scope of Training

Training will be provided in the following areas:

(1)

Federal and State court systems including post conviction relief afforded by MCR

6.500, et. seq. and federal habeas corpus claims.

(2)

Administrative Law Including Department Administrative Rules, and prisoners rights

in administrative hearings for purposes of exhaustion of remedies.

(3)

Criminal Law and Procedures including issue identification and constitutional rights

of the accused.

(4)

Constitutional rights of prisoners.

(5)

Research and writing including preparation of approved court forms and briefs.

A standardized curriculum will be used in all training programs which will be reviewed and updated, by the Department as necessary.

B. Competency Exam

Before a legal writer student is eligible to be assigned as a legal writer and assist other prisoners, he must successfully pass a competency test developed by and/or chosen by the Department. Obtaining a passing score on the competency test does not guarantee that a prisoner will be classified to an assignment as a legal writer. However, to be eligible to take the competency test, legal writer students must obtain passing scores on each unit of instruction determined to be appropriate by the Department.

C. Delivery of Training

The number of prisoners selected for each class will be determined by Departmental staff administering this program. Legal writer students must attend all classes. There will be no excused absences. If a prisoner is absent from a class, he will be terminated from the program.

IV. ACCESS TO SERVICES

Prisoners who are determined to be eligible for assistance and who signify a desire for the assistance of a legal writer, as outlined in this plan, will be provided the services of a legal writer. To obtain

3

assistance, eligible prisoners must send a kite to the Legal Writer Program institutional office requesting assistance. Upon receipt of the kite, the callout system will be activated for general population prisoners.

Interpreters will be made available for non-English speaking prisoners whose English skills are such that they cannot effectively communicate with their assigned legal writer.

Sufficient numbers of legal writers, as determined by the Department, will be assigned to provide assistance to prisoners who qualifY for assistance and signifY a desire for assistance. Meetings between prisoners and their assigned legal writer will occur, based on security needs.

Prisoners in segregation may signifY a desire for assistance in two ways. First, they may make a verbal request to their counselor. Secondly, they may send a kite to the Legal Writer Program institutional office.

V. LEGAL WRITER DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Legal writers will be authorized to help eligible prisoners who signifY a desire for assistance in the following areas:

(1)

Collateral attacks upon a prisoner's conviction including petitions for habeas corpus

relief or motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 6.500 for

the sole purpose of exhausting State remedies.

(2)

Constitutional and civil rights actions related to conditions of confinement.

Legal writers will not provide legal representation but will provide assistance to eligible prisoners to enable access to the courts. Legal writers will assist prisoners with preparation of court approved forms as well as any other pleadings necessary to initiate a case authorized by this plan. The assistance provided by the legal writers will be preparation of intelligible pleadings, and shall not include collateral matters related to the pleading such as discovery requests. Confidentiality associated with legal representation is not applicable to the assistance provided by the legal writers.

A. Assistance to Prisoners in Segregation

Prisoners in segregation who are not permitted to go to the Law Library may kite the institutional librarian to receive legal materials and references that are not available in the mini law library cell. Additionally, using the process defined in Section IV, eligible prisoners in segregation may signifY an interest in obtaining assistance from a legal writer. To be eligible to receive assistance from a legal writer, prisoners in segregation must meet the criteria for eligibility as defined in Section 1.

4

B. Legal Writers
Legal writers will be assigned to an appropriate work area as determined by the Department. Photocopying and postage costs will be the responsibility of the prisoner receiving legal assistance. Legal writers will not be allowed to keep other prisoners' legal work in their cell or room. Any
prisoner legal documents being used in the preparation ofpleadings can be secured in the legal writer
work area.
VI. Staff Supervision
A Central Office Coordinator will be designated to oversee the implementation of the Legal Writer Program. The Department will designate staff at each facility to provide oversight of the Legal Writer Program.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING, AND TERMINATION
A. Interim Services
Until such time that the Legal Writer program is fully implemented, any pleadings which have been started for a prisoner may be completed by the assigned legal writer, in the case of institutional transfer ofthe prisoner receiving service. The pleading, once completed by the legal writer, may be mailed to the prisoner at his new institutional placement. Once the pleading is completed, continued correspondence between the legal writer and prisoner who received assistance is not anticipated. However, if correspondence is necessary, as determined by the Legal Writer Program staff, it will be governed by Departmental policy.

B. Schedule for Implementation

This implementation schedule is subject to the court adopting the plan proposed by the Department. If the Court orders changes in the plan, the Department will need to re-evaluate and revise the proposed schedule.

1.

Michigan Reformatory

Continue to assess incoming prisoners to determine eligibility for assistance.

Continue to provide legal assistance to all eligible prisoners.

July 1996 Begin the second Legal Writer Training Program at the Michigan Reformatory

5

2.

State Prison of Southern Michigan - South

September 1996 Identify prisoners who are potential legal writer students OctoberlNovember 1996 Deliver legal writer training December 1996 Initiate Legal Writer Services

3.

Egeler Correctional Facility - Cell blocks 1 and 2 only:

Under the current construction schedule, the Egeler Correctional Facility will close during the fall of 1996. As such, specifics relative to implementation of this plan at this facility are not addressed.

4.

Marquette Branch Prison

September 1996 Identify prisoners who are potential legal writer students OctoberlNovember 1996 Deliver legal writer training December 1996 Initiate Legal Writer Services

The implementation schedule is based upon the current construction schedule at the remaining Knop facilities. However, if the remaining cell blocks of the Knop facilities close at times other than currently projected, the Department will revise this schedule.

C. Monitoring

Monitoring and oversight of all institutional Legal Writer Programs will be established and administered by the Central Office Legal Writer Program Coordinator. During the first 90 days following implementation of services at each facility, the Legal Writer Program Coordinator will review selected pleadings which have been developed and filed to determine if the pleadings are timely and intelligible, written in coherent English, reflecting exposure to a modicum of legal research and the rudiments of prisoner rights law.

The work product of all new legal writers will be reviewed, as deemed necessary, by the Central Office Legal Writer Program Coordinator to determine if it is timely and intelligible, written in coherent English, reflecting exposure to a modicum of legal research and the rudiments ofprisoner rights law.

Monitoring of this plan or any resulting order is not applicable to the new facilities which are

6

· .
planned, and under construction. D. Termination The Department will advise the Court and the parties, through counsel, when the plan has been implemented and meets it's constitutional goal. The Court's jurisdiction over the prospective relief ordered by this plan shall be terminated no later than provided by 18 U.S.C. §3626 et aI, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Title VIII ofP.L. 104-134 signed into law on April 26, 1996.
7

 
 700 F.Supp. 1457 (1988)
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John
Prelesnik, and Jack Bergman, Defendants.
No. G84-651.
United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.
December 6, 1988.
1458 *1458 Adjoa Aiyetoro, Mark J. Lopez, Elizabeth Alexander Nat. Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Mich., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
OPINION
ENSLEN, District Judge.
On April 12, 1988, plaintiffs filed their petition for attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That petition seeks, in part, reimbursement for fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs' counsel in their role as amicus curiae in United States v. Michigan, No. G84-63 (W.D.Mich.). On July 5, 1988, defendants' filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending that plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation for fees and costs incurred during their participation in United States v. Michigan, because they are not a party to that litigation, because they were not a "catalyst" for the entry of the consent decree and state plan for compliance in that litigation, and because they are not entitled to fees and costs incurred in a case in which they participate as amicus curiae. Plaintiffs contend that their participation in United States v. Michigan is necessary to protect their interests in this case and that they have prevailed on the issues raised in their complaint by participating in the implementation of the consent decree in United States v. Michigan.
Procedural Background
An understanding of the plaintiffs' role in United States v. Michigan requires a reiteration of the procedural background of that case, and of the instant litigation. On January 18, 1984, the United States filed its complaint in United States v. Michigan, challenging the constitutionality of conditions of confinement at three major penal institutions in Michigan: The State Prison of Southern Michigan; the Michigan Reformatory and the Marquette Branch Prison. Because United States v. Michigan is an action under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j ("CRIPA"), it joins as defendants the state itself and a number of state officials. On February 23, 1984, the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, representing a class consisting of the prisoners in those institutions, filed a motion to participate in United States v. Michigan as amicus curiae, for the purpose of challenging the parties' proposed consent decree in that action. The Court granted them leave to participate as amicus curiae and considered their objections to the proposed consent decree.
On June 11, 1984, the complaint in Knop v. Johnson was filed. Plaintiffs are a class consisting of the prisoners 1459 confined in the institutions involved in United States v. Michigan, and the complaint raises many *1459 issues
also addressed in United States v. Michigan. Plaintiffs' counsel is the National Prison Project of the American Civil

Liberties Union. Many of the defendants in Knop are also defendants in United States v. Michigan. Since Knop is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, the state is not a defendant.
On July 16, 1984, a consent decree was filed, with the approval of the Court, in United States v. Michigan. Since that date, the Court has held numerous hearings designed to determine the defendants' compliance with the terms of that decree. Counsel for the plaintiffs in Knop v. Johnson have participated in each of those hearings as amicus curiae.
Because the complaint in Knop v. Johnson raised many claims already under consideration in United States v. Michigan, including overcrowding, sanitation, food service, mental health services and medical care, as well as several claims not addressed in United States v. Michigan, the Court severed the latter issues for trial and deferred consideration of the non-severed claims. The severed issues proceeded to trial, and plaintiffs were granted judgment on many of their claims, while defendants succeeded on other claims. See, Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.Mich.1987). The Court recently entered its final order on the claims resolved at trial and those issues are on appeal. See, Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636 (W.D.Mich.1988).
During this entire period, counsel for the Knop plaintiffs continued to participate as amicus curiae in United States v. Michigan. After the Court approved the consent decree and state plan for compliance in that case, plaintiffs' counsel directed their efforts toward enforcing the decree's provisions, while continuing to request an enhanced status in that case. Plaintiffs have been allowed to conduct discovery in Knop v. Johnson on the non-severed claims, using the information gathered at compliance hearings in United States v. Michigan. See e.g., Knop v. Johnson Order of March 23, 1988. In August, 1987, I granted them leave to proceed in United States v. Michigan as litigating amicus curiae, conditioned upon their voluntary dismissal of the non-severed claims in Knop v. Johnson and their acceptance of the consent decree in United States v. Michigan as a full settlement of those claims. See, United States v. Michigan, 116 F.R.D. 655 (W.D.Mich.1987). On July 29, 1988, I approved the voluntary dismissal of the non-severed claims in Knop v. Johnson, dismissing those claims without prejudice, and indicating that the dismissal would be amended to dismiss the claims with prejudice if the Sixth Circuit affirmed my order granting the Knop plaintiffs litigating amicus curiae status in United States v. Michigan. While the Knop defendants did not actively oppose the dismissal of these claims, they have not consented to a settlement of these claims and continue to oppose the Court's order granting the plaintiffs' litigating status in United States v. Michigan.
Prior to my order of July 29, 1988, in Knop v. Johnson, plaintiffs' role in United States v. Michigan was confined to commenting upon the various compliance reports created in that case, participating in limited fashion in the compliance hearings, and making suggestions to the Court on how it ought to resolve compliance issues which have arisen. They were not allowed to file motions to modify or to enforce the consent decree or state plan in United States v. Michigan. As I indicated above, however, plaintiffs have conducted discovery in Knop on issues raised in United States v. Michigan and have presented the information gathered through that process to the Court at compliance hearings in United States v. Michigan. As litigating amicus curiae, the Knop plaintiffs will have the ability to file motions to modify or enforce the provisions of the consent decree and state plan.
The Court has consistently allowed the Knop plaintiffs to participate as amicus curiae in United States v. Michigan because the pendency of the latter action has, as a practical matter, impaired their ability to protect their interests in Knop. This is so, primarily, because the Court has deferred trial on the non-severed claims in Knop because it 1460 is already considering *1460 those claims through the implementation of the consent decree in United States v. Michigan. In addition, the Court has allowed the Knop plaintiffs to participate as amicus because they are the inmates in the consent decree institutions whose interests are sought to be protected by that decree. While I have never fully adopted the Knop plaintiffs' argument that the United States fails to adequately protect the inmates' interests, I have always acknowledged the need for them to have an independent advocate in the compliance proceedings in United States v. Michigan. While they have not always been successful in their efforts, see, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 680 F.Supp. 270 (W.D.Mich.1988) (declining to enjoin defendants' use of food loaf in all instances), it cannot be disputed that the Knop plaintiffs have admirably served their intended function in United States v. Michigan by bringing potential compliance issues to the Court's attention and by advocating the inmates' interests during compliance hearings.[1]

Motion for Summary Judgment
Following their successful trial of the severed claims in Knop v. Johnson, the Knop plaintiffs filed their motion for attorneys fees in that case. In their amended petition, filed November 28, 1988, plaintiffs request $2,171,102.41 in fees and costs. A portion of the fees and costs requested are attributable to the Knop plaintiffs' participation as amicus in United States v. Michigan. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to fees and costs associated with United States v. Michigan because they are prevailing parties in Knop v. Johnson and their participation in United States v. Michigan served to further and protect their interests in the Knop litigation. They argue that participation in United States v. Michigan was "useful and of a type ordinarily necessary" to secure the final result obtained in Knop. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air. 478 U.S. 546, 561, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3096, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (fees awarded in Clean Air Act litigation for time spent in administrative and judicial proceedings to enforce consent decree). Plaintiffs further argue that a prevailing party may recover fees for work performed in collateral proceedings as amicus where that work is necessary to protect the plaintiffs' interests in the central litigation. Thus, they do not seek attorneys fees for their participation in United States v. Michigan as " amicus qua amicus," rather, they seek fees because their participation in United States v. Michigan was necessary to protect their interest in the non-severed claims in Knop v. Johnson.
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees for time spent on United States v. Michigan because they are not "prevailing parties" in United States v. Michigan. First, the defendants argue that plaintiffs do not have an adjudication on the merits of any of the non-severed claims and that those claims are not sufficiently related to the claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed to justify an award of 1461 fees. Second, the defendants argue that *1461 plaintiffs may not be said to have obtained relief through settlement, since their lawsuit was not a "catalyst" for the consent decree in United States v. Michigan. See, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1006, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3465, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Kentucky Association for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 718 F.2d 182, 186 (6th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir.1981). While the Knop amicus have been involved in certain compliance issues arising after the entry of the consent decree, the defendants argue that this activity does not entitle them to fees. Since the consent decree was necessarily broad, both in its scope and in its language, defendants argue that efforts designed to interpret and refine the terms of the consent decree do not constitute success on a "central issue" in the United States v. Michigan case. Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees for their work in United States v. Michigan because they participated in that case voluntarily as amicus, and are not parties to that litigation. See, Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.1987) (denying attorneys fees to amici).
Standard
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the narrow questions presented to the Court are whether there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." F.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court may not try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion, but is empowered only to determine whether there are issues to be tried. In re Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc., 668 F.2d 905, 908 (6th Cir.1982). See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The question presented by defendants' motion for summary judgment is essentially one of law: whether plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees and costs incurred during their participation as amicus curiae in United States v. Michigan. While there may be disputes as to which hours claimed are attributable to that participation and which are not, I find that the issue is ripe for summary resolution, since it is primarily a legal issue. I also note that my decision in Knop v. Johnson is currently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether plaintiffs actually are the "prevailing party" in that litigation. For purposes of this motion, however, I will assume that the Knop plaintiffs will prevail on appeal and that they are "prevailing parties" in Knop v. Johnson, at least to the extent that they prevailed at trial.

Discussion
42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows the Court to award attorneys fees to a prevailing party in civil rights litigation. A party is a prevailing party where it "succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). See also, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3279, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983) ("to be a `prevailing party,' one must succeed on the `central issue,' or `essentially succee[d] in obtaining the relief he seeks in his claims on the merits'"); Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Township of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 450 note 7 (6th Cir.1986); Kentucky Association for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 718 F.2d 182, 186 (6th Cir.1983) (denying fees where plaintiffs prevailed on "some issues but not on the central issue"); Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981). The fact that a lawsuit raising constitutional claims is settled or resolved on nonconstitutional grounds does not preclude an award of fees. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1006, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3465, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 1462 (1980) ("The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than through *1462 litigation does not weaken her claim to fees"). In such cases, "plaintiffs may recover attorney's fees if their lawsuit was a substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants to end their unconstitutional behavior." Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1981). See also, Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir.1984); Commissioners Court of Medina County, Texas v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 440 (D.C.Cir.1982); Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the Supreme Court held that, "Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that which is reasonable in light of the results obtained." Id. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943. Thus, plaintiffs may recover fees for time spent on claims upon which they prevailed and for time spent on related, but unsuccessful claims. See, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1006-07, 104 S.Ct. at 3465-66; Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Township of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 454-55 (6th Cir.1986). Where the successful and unsuccessful claims are "aimed at achieving different results or where they are based on different facts and different legal theories," Seaway, at 455, the plaintiff may not recover fees for time expended on the unsuccessful claims, even though plaintiff may be entitled to fees for the successful claims.
Under this standard, it appears clear that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees for the hours spent on United States v. Michigan solely because they prevailed on some of the severed claims in Knop. The severed claims involved access to toilets at Riverside Correctional Facility, adequate winter clothing, racial discrimination in job assignments, cafeteria serving lines and inmate discipline, and access to the courts. The non-severed claims involve overcrowding, fire safety, sanitation, food service, classification of prisoners, protection from harm, medical care and mental health care. The non-severed claims, those addressed in United States v. Michigan, rely upon different facts and different legal theories, and would have resulted in different relief had they proceeded to trial and had plaintiffs succeeded in proving constitutional violations. Since they are not sufficiently related to the claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed, attorneys' fees may not be awarded for time spent on these claims solely because plaintiffs prevailed on the severed claims.
Plaintiffs do not, however, rely upon their success on the severed claims to establish their entitlement to the fees at issue on this motion. Instead, plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to these fees because their participation in United States v. Michigan was necessary to protect their interests in the non-severed claims. The essence of plaintiffs' argument is that, "A prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees for work performed in collateral proceedings as amicus if the work was necessary to further and protect plaintiffs' interests in the central litigation." Response to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2. They argue that their participation in United States v. Michigan was necessary because the Court deferred consideration of their nonsevered claims due to the pendency of United States v. Michigan.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). In that case, a citizens group sued the state of

Pennsylvania's Department of Transportation to force the state to begin a vehicle emission inspection and maintenance program consistent with the Clean Air Act. The parties entered into a consent decree requiring the state's Department of Transportation to seek legislation for contracts with private garage owners to establish 1463 inspection sites. If unsuccessful at this attempt, the Department of Transportation agreed to establish its *1463 own regulations certifying private garages to perform the required inspections. The state legislature refused for a number of years to establish the inspection program, and plaintiffs' counsel incurred fees and costs in securing compliance with the consent decree. This compliance work included involvement in administrative proceedings at the federal and state level, as well as submitting an amicus brief in a related state court action.
The Court approved an award of attorneys' fees for these efforts, noting that counsel's appearance in the administrative proceedings, "was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief for their client as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom which secured Delaware Valley's initial success in obtaining the consent decree." Id. at 558, 106 S.Ct. at 3094. The Court further held that, "measures necessary to enforce the remedy ordered by the District Court cannot be divorced from the matters upon which Delaware Valley prevailed in securing the consent decree.... [P]ost judgment monitoring of a consent decree is a compensable activity for which counsel is entitled to a reasonable fee." Id. at 559, 106 S.Ct. at 3095.[2] The Court also found that counsel were entitled to fees for their efforts before state and federal administrative agencies, noting that, "for time spent pursuing optional administrative proceedings properly to be included in the calculation of a reasonable attorney's fee, the work must be `useful and of a type ordinarily necessary' to secure the final result obtained from the litigation." Id. at 561, 106 S.Ct. at 3096.
The Supreme Court has considered whether involvement in state court or administrative proceedings may be compensable in a subsequent federal court petition for attorneys fees in a number of cases. In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980), the Court held that fees were available to a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action for time spent in state court and administrative proceedings, since Title VII required plaintiffs to pursue state remedies as a prerequisite to relief in federal court. In Webb v. Dyer County Board of Education, 471 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 1923, 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985), the Court denied fees for time spent on optional state administrative proceedings, since the plaintiff challenged his termination from public employment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not require exhaustion of state remedies, rather than under Title VII. The Court held that, "The time that is compensable under § 1988 is that `reasonably expended on the litigation.' When the attorney's fee is allowed `as part of the costs' ... it is difficult to treat time spent years before the complaint was filed as having been `expended on the litigation' or to be fairly comprehended as `part of the costs' of the civil rights action." Id. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 1928. The Court also noted that plaintiff's counsel did not argue that the prior state proceedings were "both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached before settlement." Id. at 243, 105 S.Ct. at 1928.
In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), the Court denied fees incurred during state administrative proceedings. The plaintiffs in Smith alleged violations of the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., ("EHA") and asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of due process and equal protection. Their complaint alleged that the state had inappropriately denied a free public education to a handicapped child, and that certain state administrative proceedings denied them due process because the decisionmaker was not impartial. The Court held that plaintiffs' substantive constitutional claims and their claim under the EHA were virtually identical, but found that the EHA was the exclusive remedy 1464 for the substantive claims. Ordinarily, plaintiffs who assert *1464 related constitutional and nonconstitutional claims may recover fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even if the case is resolved on nonconstitutional grounds. In this case, however, the Court denied fees. Since the EHA was the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs' substantive claims, and since that statute did not provide for an award of fees, the Court found that an award of fees under § 1988 would be contrary to Congress' intent in passing the EHA.
The Court further held that plaintiffs' success on their due process claim was insufficient to support an award of fees for time spent pursuing the EHA claim though state administrative agencies, since the substantive and procedural claims were unrelated. The Court denied fees, noting that:

[The] due process claim and the substantive claim on which petitioners ultimately prevailed involved entirely separate legal theories and, more important, would have warranted entirely different relief.
. . . . .
We conclude that where, as here, petitioners have presented distinctly different claims for different relief, based on different facts and legal theories, and have prevailed only on a nonfee claim, they are not entitled to a fee award simply because the other claim was a constitutional claim that could be asserted through § 1983.
Id. at 1015, 104 S.Ct. at 3470. Thus, although the Court acknowledged that fees for time spent in related state proceedings would sometimes be recoverable under § 1988, the Court refused to award such fees where the constitutional claim upon which plaintiffs' prevailed was unrelated to the claim pursued through the collateral proceedings.
These cases do not support an award of fees to the plaintiffs in this case for their participation in United States v. Michigan. In each of the cases awarding fees, the collateral proceedings were related to the claims upon which plaintiff had already prevailed. For example, in Delaware Valley, the administrative proceedings at issue were necessary to enforce the consent decree plaintiffs secured in their federal court action. In New York Gaslight Club, the fees were awarded because participation in the state administrative proceedings was a prerequisite to maintaining the federal civil rights litigation. In contrast, fees for participation in optional administrative proceedings were inappropriate in Webb, because the administrative proceedings were too far removed from the federal litigation to be considered a portion of that action and because the plaintiff failed to establish that the proceedings were necessary to "advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached before settlement." Webb, 471 U.S. at 243, 105 S.Ct. at 1928. In Smith, fees were denied because the civil rights claim upon which plaintiffs prevailed was not sufficiently related to the claim pursued through the state administrative proceedings.
Similarly, in this case the claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed are unrelated to the claims pursued through United States v. Michigan. They rely upon different facts and legal theories, and would have secured materially different relief had plaintiffs pursued them to trial and prevailed. While plaintiffs have incurred fees and costs in an effort to enforce a consent decree, they are not parties to that consent decree, as were the plaintiffs in Delaware Valley.
Plaintiffs cite a number of lower court cases awarding fees for time spent acting as amicus curiae in other litigation. In each of those cases, however, the time expended as amicus curiae was expended on issues related to the claims upon which the plaintiffs eventually prevailed. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 578 F.Supp. 1262 (D.Ariz.1984), for example, was an antitrust action challenging fee settling practices at a number of hospitals. The prevailing party filed an amicus brief in a Supreme Court antitrust case addressing peer review fee arrangements. While the court acknowledged that the two cases involved different issues, it awarded counsel fees for a portion of the time spent on the amicus brief because it concluded that a paying client might have 1465 authorized its *1465 counsel to participate in the Supreme Court case as amicus. Id. at 1268-69. In Coleman v. Block, 589 F.Supp. 1411, 1419 (D.N. D.1984), the court awarded fees for time spent on an amicus brief since the case in which the plaintiffs' counsel participated as amicus was "crucial to plaintiffs prevailing on the § 1981 issue in this case," an issue upon which the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed. Id. at 1419. In DuBose v. Pierce, 579 F.Supp. 937 (D.Conn.1984), the plaintiffs participated as amicus in three cases raising identical challenges to a practice of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and plaintiffs prevailed on their claim in the central litigation that the practice was unlawful.
Again, in each of these cases, the plaintiffs participated as amicus curiae in cases involving the same or similar issues as those involved in their own litigation. They eventually prevailed on the issues in their litigation which were related to the issues in which they participated as amicus curiae. Here, however, the claims upon which plaintiffs have prevailed in Knop are not related to the claims in United States v. Michigan which plaintiffs pursue in their role as amicus curiae. The cases cited do not support an award of fees to plaintiffs for their work in United States v. Michigan.

Smith v. Fussenich, 487 F.Supp. 628 (D.Conn.1980) provides the strongest support for plaintiffs' position. In that case, the New York Legal Action Center ("NYLAC") appeared as amicus in a class action suit challenging a Connecticut statute which prohibited convicted felons from working as private detectives or security guards. NYLAC eventually entered its appearance as counsel for the plaintiff class, and the original counsel waived its right to attorney's fees. After plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their claim, the court awarded attorneys fees to NYLAC for the time spent as amicus and for the time spent as counsel for plaintiffs. The court justified its award of fees by noting that "[T]he applicant actively pursued plaintiffs' interests not only as amicus but also as counsel of record and, as a civil rights organization has not exacted any fees or costs from the plaintiffs. Moreover, the ... lawyers who represented the plaintiffs prior to the applicant's formal appearance have waived their rights to fees. Under these circumstances we believe that fairness and equity require that appropriate counsel fees be awarded for the applicant's services as an amicus in the early stages of this case." Id. at 630.
The Smith court's appeal to fairness and equity certainly favor plaintiffs' position in this case. Here, plaintiffs' counsel, like the counsel in Smith, have vigorously pursued their clients' interests both as amicus and as counsel for the plaintiff class. In addition, the United States, as plaintiff in United States v. Michigan, is ineligible for attorneys fees. However, unlike Smith, plaintiffs' counsel has participated as amicus only on claims on which the plaintiffs have yet to prevail. While Smith supports the proposition that attorneys fees for time spent as an amicus are compensable under § 1988, it does not support an award of fees in this case.
If plaintiffs' are entitled to fees for time spent on United States v. Michigan, it must be because their participation in that case has made them "prevailing parties" on the non-severed claims in Knop. Defendants argue that plaintiffs are not properly characterized as "prevailing parties," because the pendency of Knop v. Johnson was not a "catalyst" in the defendants' decision to enter into the United States v. Michigan consent decree. They argue that this decree was prompted instead by the United States' CRIPA action against them. In support of this contention, the defendants note that the United States' CRIPA action was filed in January, 1984 and that they agreed to a consent decree before the Knop plaintiffs filed their lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants further argue that the Knop plaintiffs' participation in compliance hearings is not compensable under § 1988 because it has not involved the "central issue" in United States v. Michigan, which defendants define as "broad reforms in numerous areas of prison conditions." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 8. 1466 Defendants *1466 argue that in any institutional litigation, "Questions of interpretation, compliance standards and modification are inevitable.... The necessary evolution in the details of compliance, however do not represent the main or central issue." Id. Thus, the defendants conclude, the fact that plaintiffs have participated in compliance hearings, and may have succeeded in convincing the Court to adopt a more strict interpretation of the consent decree's requirements does not render them "prevailing parties" on the non-severed claims.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980), a civil rights plaintiff does not lose his or her right to attorneys simply because the case is settled or resolved "`without formally obtaining relief'" (quoting, S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976)). Where civil rights plaintiffs settle an action or vindicate their constitutional rights informally, their eligibility for attorneys fees depends upon whether "plaintiffs' lawsuit was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought in a manner desired by the litigation." Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir.1981) (quoting, Iranian Students Association v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir.1979)). In evaluating a claim for attorneys fees under such circumstances, "courts have emphasized the nature of the relief obtained, the chronology of events and the role of the civil rights action in activating change." Robinson, 652 F.2d at 465-66. Plaintiffs must demonstrate a causal connection between the litigation in which fees are sought and the relief eventually obtained. Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir.1984). Where multiple litigation addresses the same or similar constitutional claims, and relief is obtained through only one of those cases, plaintiffs in the remaining cases may still be eligible for attorneys fees. As the Second Circuit noted in Gerena-Valentin:
While there is no first-in-time rule governing the award of counsel fees where multiple litigation is brought, a duplicative action which contributes virtually nothing to the ultimate result cannot justify an award of counsel fees. The purpose of such awards is to "encourage the redress of civil rights violations." Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d 652, 655 (7th Cir.1980). Where that goal is fully

achieved by a single well-managed action, an award of compensation to late-comers who add nothing of value would encourage the bringing of superfluous litigation solely for an award of fees.
Id. 739 F.2d at 759.
Similarly, plaintiffs may be eligible for an award of fees where they have secured the defendants' voluntary compliance with their demands, even if they do not secure formal, judicial relief. As the Fifth Circuit held in Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.1981), "[I]t is enough that [plaintiff's] suit has served to vindicate his rights, whether by court decision, consent judgment or voluntary compliance by the defendant after the filing of the suit." Id. at 26. In such cases, "The proper focus is on whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the central issue, as exhibited by the fact the he has obtained the primary relief sought. ... [I]t is also necessary that his suit be, if not the sole reason for his success, at least a major factor in bringing it about. A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case." Id.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs would not be entitled to fees for their activities in United States v. Michigan if they sought fees directly in that case, because plaintiffs have not prevailed on a central issue in United States v. Michigan. Defendants point out that they had resolved the merits of the CRIPA action before counsel for the Knop plaintiffs sought to intervene or to participate as amicus in that action, and that they have never attempted to 1467 evade their obligations under the consent decree.[3]*1467 Since claims related to overcrowding, medical and mental health care, sanitation, fire safety, protection from harm, classification and food service were addressed by the consent decree and state plan for compliance before the Knop plaintiffs intervened as amicus and before they filed their lawsuit, the defendants conclude that the Knop plaintiffs have not been a catalyst or substantial factor motivating the reforms that have been accomplished through United States v. Michigan. They further argue that, as volunteers, the Knop plaintiffs are not entitled to fees for work in United States v. Michigan, since they are not parties to that lawsuit within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See, Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.1987).
While I think that the defendants substantially understate the degree to which the Knop plaintiffs have participated in United States v. Michigan, I must agree with them that an award of attorneys fees for that work would be improper. The Knop plaintiffs have neither secured a favorable adjudication on their non-severed claims nor have they settled those claims with the defendants. Instead, they voluntarily dismissed those claims under F.R. Civ.P. 41(a)(2), knowing that the defendants did not agree to their enhanced participation in United States v. Michigan, and knowing that a subsequent award of attorneys fees for work in that case was doubtful at best. In the opinion offering them litigating amicus curiae status, I noted that:
It is not the Court's intention to subject defendants to attorney fees liability by granting the Knop amicus' request. If the Knop amicus does request payment of its attorneys fees, moreover, the Court anticipates, without prejudging the issue, that defendants legitimately could argue that the Knop amicus is not a prevailing "party" because defendants have not agreed to a settlement of the remaining Knop issues. The Knop plaintiffs, rather, would have voluntarily dismissed their claims on those issues under rule 41(a)(2) in exchange for being given litigating status in this case. Alternatively, a waiver of attorney fees could be a condition of the Knop plaintiffs' dismissal under rule 41(a)(2) of their remaining claims in Knop.
United States v. Michigan, 116 F.R.D. 655, 664 (W.D.Mich.1987). It was with this understanding that the Knop plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their non-severed claims and to accept the consent decree as a complete resolution of those claims. Id. at 660. They could have rejected the Court's offer and pressed their non-severed claims, in the hope of obtaining broader relief. They chose instead to participate in United States v. Michigan as amicus, a choice I appreciate because it conserves judicial resources, but a choice which precludes an award of attorneys' fees. Under these circumstances, I think it unfair to subject the defendants to attorney fees liability for fees incurred as a result of the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of their non-severed claims.
In addition, I note that the Knop plaintiffs' counsel originally sought to proceed in United States v. Michigan, as amicus curiae before the Knop lawsuit was filed. They were, at that point, "volunteers" as the term is used in Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.1987). At the onset of their participation in United States v. Michigan, counsel for the Knop plaintiffs knew that the consent decree addressed the majority of the issues raised in their

non-severed claims. While the Court took pains to insure that the decree would not moot a future lawsuit based upon the same conditions, see, United States v. Michigan, 680 F.Supp. at 952 (bench opinion of June 22, 1984), the plaintiffs knew when they filed their complaint that the defendants had already agreed to remedial measures 1468 addressing most of the non-severed claims.[4]*1468 Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Knop lawsuit was a catalyst or substantial factor motivating the defendants to voluntarily remedy those conditions.
Moreover, in considering the history of the Knop plaintiffs' involvement in United States v. Michigan, I cannot find a single instance where the plaintiffs were successful in forcing the defendants to take some remedial action not already contemplated by the consent decree. The plaintiffs have certainly pressed for strict enforcement of that decree, and have at times been successful in raising compliance issues ignored by the United States, or in pointing out mistaken interpretations of the decree. See, supra note 1. Despite these efforts, however, they have never succeeded in expanding the scope of the consent decree.
The plaintiffs enumerate several "successes" in their brief on the motion for summary judgment, suggesting that they have indeed been successful in obtaining enhanced relief for their clients through participation in United States v. Michigan. While there is no doubt that the plaintiffs' participation in that case has been of value to the Court and that they have been zealous in advocating the interests of the class, most if not all of the remedial measures enumerated by the plaintiffs were the result of collective enforcement efforts by the United States, the Court, through its Independent Expert, and the Knop amicus. For example, the Court appointed an Independent Expert on its own motion, not plaintiffs', although plaintiffs certainly supported that appointment. See, United States v. Michigan, 680 F.Supp. at 953 (bench opinion of June 21, 1985). Similarly, the mental health issues they point to resulted in a contempt citation against the defendant on the United States' request for sanctions. See, id. at 991. While the amicus' arguments against the state's second proposed mental health plan were certainly persuasive to the Court, they were not the only reason for the Court's rejection of that plan or for the contempt citation.[5] Plaintiffs also point to the overcrowding area as evidence of their value in advocating the inmates' interests at compliance hearings. While their efforts in this regard cannot be gainsaid, it is also clear that their most recent suspicions of non-compliance turned out to be unfounded and did not result in sanctions against the defendants. See, March 1988 Report of the Independent Expert, pages 9-14.
It is clear that the participation of the Knop plaintiffs as amicus in United States v. Michigan has led to a stricter interpretation of the consent decree than might have resulted had the United States pursued this action alone. To that extent, the Knop plaintiffs have certainly advanced the interests of the class. But the question is not whether 1469 their participation in United States v. Michigan has been valuable to the class or to the Court. Rather, *1469 the issue is whether it has made them prevailing parties on the non-severed claims in Knop v. Johnson because their participation in United States v. Michigan was a catalyst or substantial factor motivating the defendants to take the remedial actions they have taken. I cannot hold that it has, because the substantive aspects of the consent decree and state plan for compliance were agreed to by the defendants before the Knop plaintiffs appeared on the scene, and because plaintiffs have never secured for their clients relief in excess of that to which the defendants had already agreed. See, Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981).
As defendants argue, plaintiffs would not be entitled to an award of fees in United States v. Michigan because they are not parties to that litigation. Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.1987), cited by the defendants, is an instructive case. In that case, several non-profit organizations participated as amici in a lawsuit challenging conditions at Texas juvenile facilities. While the amici were allowed to participate "as parties," they never purported to represent that plaintiff class nor did they seek to intervene as plaintiffs. In addition, the amici did not participate in extensive settlement negotiations which eventually terminated the lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit reversed an award of attorney fees to the amici, holding that the award was not justified under 42 U.S.C. § 1988:
The statutory language of § 1988 is unambiguous: "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. And the legislative history makes it clear that fees are to be limited to actual parties involved in the suit.... Counsel for amici never purported to represent plaintiffs in this litigation and were never asked to do so.
. . . . .

Amici's counsel stepped in and out of the litigation, and did not even participate in the protracted settlement negotiations that resolved the controversy. We do not deprecate their purpose or service, but the fact that amici's counsel, while representing amici, rendered services beneficial to the class does not establish an entitlement to fees.
. . . . .
Amici are no parties to the litigation. Thus, amici are not entitled to fees under § 1988.
We do not doubt the contribution of amici, but it does not follow that as volunteers they are entitled to be reimbursed for counsel fees by parties who neither sought nor caused the court to seek their aid.
Id. at 732-33.
Clearly, there are substantial differences between the amici described in Morales and the Knop plaintiffs. The Knop plaintiffs represent the class of prisoners at the consent decree institutions, although the United States represents those prisoners' interests as well. Further, the Knop plaintiffs have not stepped in and out of the United States v. Michigan litigation, as amici did in Morales. Rather, they participate to the extent permitted by the Court in each compliance hearing and in the pre-hearing conferences between counsel and the Independent Expert mandated by the Court. But Morales establishes, rather persuasively, that amici are not entitled to fees under § 1988, since they are in essence "volunteers" and since the statute limits the authority to award fees to parties in civil rights litigation. Thus, if the Knop plaintiffs sought attorneys fees directly in United States v. Michigan for their efforts in that case, they would not be entitled to such an award.
Similarly, plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of fees under Knop v. Johnson because they are not "prevailing parties" on the non-severed claims and because their non-severed claims are insufficiently related to the claims upon which they prevailed to support an award of fees. As I indicated earlier, the cases cited by plaintiffs do not support an award of fees for their work as amici because in each of the cases cited, the work done in collateral proceedings was related to claims upon which the plaintiff had prevailed. Here, that is not the case, since the 1470 plaintiffs have not prevailed *1470 on the claims related to United States v. Michigan.
Conclusion
I conclude, therefore, that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. The plaintiffs are prevailing parties in Knop v. Johnson on the severed claims and are entitled to full compensation for their work on those claims. They are not, however, prevailing parties on the non-severed claims. Those claims are not sufficiently related to the severed claims to support an award of fees on that basis. Further, the claims have been voluntarily dismissed in exchange for the right to participate as litigating amicus in United States v. Michigan. Plaintiffs have neither settled those claims nor secured a favorable adjudication of them. While their participation in United States v. Michigan has certainly aided the Court in interpreting the consent decree and has worked to the benefit of the plaintiff class, it has not resulted in the defendants taking remedial measures they would not have taken absent the amicus' participation. I conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs have not been a catalyst or substantial factor in the relief obtained in United States v. Michigan and that they are not entitled to attorneys fees on that basis. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is, therefore, granted.
[1] The Knop plaintiffs point to the following successes in United States v. Michigan: (1) the appointment of an independent expert in 1985, an action supported by amici and opposed to both plaintiff and defendants, Order of August 5, 1985; (2) the adoption of a modified plan to provide mental health services responding to concerns raised by amici in 1986, Order of October 29, 1986; (3) the denial of defendants' motion to modify the mental health plan on the basis of an epidemiological study conducted by defendants, the flaws of which were pointed out by amici, Opinion of September 25, 1987; (4) a 1986 order holding defendants in contempt for failing to propose a mental health plan they were prepared to implement; (5) a 1987 order finding defendants not in compliance with certain fire safety requirements, based primarily upon the objections of amici; (6) a 1987 order

finding the defendants in contempt for failing to remedy overcrowding at the Reception and Guidance Center at the State Prison of Southern Michigan. In each of these instances, the United States failed to object to the defendants' proposed actions, and the Court based its findings primarily upon objections raised by the amici and the independent expert. In a number of other instances, the Knop amicus have been instrumental in defining compliance issues and in raising objections which ultimately caused the Court to modify stipulations entered into between the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, Opinions of July 15, 1986, July 28, 1987.
[2] A number of lower courts have also held that time spent monitoring compliance with a consent decree is compensable under § 1988. Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727 (1st Cir.1984); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir.1980); Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.1980); Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979).
[3] The Court agrees that the defendants have never sought in bad faith to subvert the provisions of the consent decree or to avoid their obligations under that document. At the most, the defendants have, quite understandably, adopted a narrower interpretation of the decree than that advocated by the Knop plaintiffs and usually than the interpretation adopted by the Court.
[4] Counsel for the Knop plaintiffs participated as amicus in the hearing on the proposed consent decree in United States v. Michigan, objecting that the decree was too vague and questioning whether the Department of Justice would vigorously protect the inmates' interests. See, United States v. Michigan, 680 F.Supp. 928, 942-43 (W.D.Mich.1987) (reprinting bench opinion of March 23, 1984). I rejected the parties' original proposed consent decree on the ground that it was impermissibly vague, and the parties returned to Court in June, 1984 with a decree satisfying my objection. See, Id. at 949-50 (bench opinion of June 22, 1984). I note that, although I have at times chided the Department of Justice for its lack of vigor on certain compliance issues, I have never adopted the Knop plaintiffs' argument that the United States is only a "nominal plaintiff" in United States v. Michigan, nor do I think that is a fair characterization of the government's efforts in that litigation.
The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit between the rejection of the first consent decree and the hearing adopting that decree. While their objections to the original decree were instrumental in my decision to reject that document, the Knop plaintiffs were not involved in the negotiations which lead to the current consent decree. In addition, during the course of their involvement in United States v. Michigan, the Knop plaintiffs have never successfully attacked the substantive terms of the decree nor have they ever been allowed to pursue an expansion of its terms. In accepting their current status as litigating amicus, the Knop plaintiffs agreed to accept the decree as a final resolution of their non-severed claims. Their involvement in United States v. Michigan has been limited to monitoring the defendants' compliance with a decree defendants consented to without prompting by the Knop plaintiffs.
[5] The Knop plaintiffs were, however, successful in pointing out analytical flaws in the defendants' epidemiological study, thwarting the defendants' most recent attempt to modify their mental health plan.
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 655 F.Supp. 871 (1987)
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spyima, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John
Prelesnik, and Jack Bergman, Defendants.
No. G84-651.
United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.
February 27, 1987.
8723 *872 *873 Elizabeth Alexander, Adjoa Aiyetoro, Nkechi Taifa-Caldwell, Nat. Prison Project, Washington, D.C., Patricia Streeter, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Thomas Nelson, Brian McKenzie, David Edick, Atty. General's Office, Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
OPINION
ENSLEN, District Judge.
This case presently is before the Court for decision on defendants' motions for involuntary dismissal, filed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"); defendants' February 24, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment on the legal mail issue; and plaintiffs' July 1, 1986 motion to reconsider denial of motions to strike witnesses and to impose sanctions upon defendants. The Court listened to plaintiffs' evidence in this case in August and October of 1986. In December of 1986 defendants filed six motions for involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. The Court accepted rather extensive memoranda on defendants' motions for the following reasons: (1) it thought that there might be some merit to such motions; and (2) given the amount of evidence plaintiffs have introduced, I thought that I might benefit from the parties' discussions of such evidence and applications of the applicable legal standards to it. The parties' submissions certainly have assisted the Court in assimilating plaintiffs' evidence and gaining a better understanding of the legal and factual issues I need to decide either now or at the conclusion of the entire proceeding. The break in the trial between October, 1986 and its resumption on March 16, 1987, moreover, has enabled me to review significant portions of the extensive record.
As I will discuss in this opinion, defendants have for the most part failed to convince me that I should grant their motions for involuntary dismissal, and I thus will decline to rule on defendants' request for entry of a judgment in their favor until all of the evidence the parties wish to present is before me. In this opinion I will first discuss the standard I must employ in deciding defendants' rule 41(b) motions. I then will discuss defendants' specific motions. Finally, I will consider plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. The Court realizes that this opinion is rather short given the amount of evidence in the record and the length of the memoranda the parties have submitted on defendants' motions. The opinion's length, however, does not in this instance accurately reflect the amount of time the Court has devoted to reading and analyzing the parties' submissions and to reviewing the evidence in the file. It reflects, rather, that I need not enter extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law unless I decide to grant defendants' motions, and my unwillingness to engage in an extensive discussion of the evidence at this time when I will have to do so at the conclusion of the trial. The following discussion is intended primarily to assist the parties in focusing their presentations in the remainder of this case. In general, the Court believes that plaintiffs have put forth substantial and meritorious claims for relief and feels that both sides would benefit from some discussion, however slight, of those claims at this time.

Rule 41(b) Standard

Rule 41(b) provides as follows:

For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a

874

defendant may move for *874 dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,

in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the

defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may

move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right

to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the

plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court

renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in

Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this

subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an

adjudication upon the merits.

FRCP 41(b). As the language of the rule indicates, in considering a rule 41(b) motion the Court must evaluate the evidence and is entitled to determine the credibility of plaintiffs' witnesses. See Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 148 F.2d 407, 410 (6th Cir.1945); see generally 5 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 41.13[4] (2d ed. 1986). Plaintiffs are not necessarily entitled to prevail on defendants' motions, moreover, simply because they may have established a prima facie case; the Court, rather, must determine whether they have established their entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1981); Ash v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 483 F.2d 289, 291-92 (6th Cir.1973); Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 154-55 (8th Cir.1977). The Court possesses substantial discretion in deciding whether to enter judgment at this time or to withhold making a decision on the merits until the conclusion of defendants' presentation, however, and I note that the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have cautioned district courts about "the inconvenience that results from a promiscuous use of Rule 41(b) dismissals." Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784, 793 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1975); see also SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 659 (9th Cir.1980) ("a trial court should be reluctant to grant the motion except in clear cases because an appellate reversal for error in granting the motion may require an entire new trial"). It also is inefficient, however, to continue to try issues that are not in dispute or that are not material to the ultimate disposition of this case. As I indicated previously, therefore, I will attempt, given the brevity of the opinion, to give as much guidance to the parties as possible.

Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Regarding MIPC

Defendants first motion for involuntary dismissal concerns the effect of their decision to convert the Michigan Intensive Programming Center ("MIPC") into a protective custody unit for the Marquette Branch Prison. As a result of this decision, MIPC is now designated as A-Block of the MBP. Defendants argue that because of this change, the Court should dismiss all claims against MIPC. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that this motion is utterly without merit. As I will discuss in connection with defendants' other motions, plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence that unconstitutional conditions of confinement exist at A-Block. A mere change in name certainly does not result in the elimination of those conditions. See Liles v. Ward, 424 F.Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). A change in that institution's function may alleviate those conditions in whole or in part. Proof of that, however, will be part of defendants' burden when they present their side of the case, and the Court sees no basis for entering a judgment at this time in defendants' favor regarding plaintiffs' claims against A-Block.

Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Regarding Winter Clothing

875 Defendants' second motion concerns plaintiffs' claim that inmates are not provided *875 adequate winter clothing. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 47. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' evidence demonstrates that inmates are

provided adequate winter clothing. Defendants also argue that in any event, plaintiffs have failed to establish a constitutional violation, particularly given that they cannot aggregate conditions of confinement to create a "totality of conditions" that may be unconstitutional. See Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir.1985). Plaintiffs respond that they have produced sufficient evidence to establish both that inmates are not provided adequate winter clothing and that this situation is unconstitutional. The Court finds that defendants are not entitled to judgment at this time for the following reasons.
First, plaintiffs may establish a constitutional violation by showing that they are being deprived "of `life's necessities.'" Id., quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Adequate clothing is one of life's necessities to which inmates are entitled. Walker, 771 F.2d at 926, quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir.1982); see also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 419 (6th Cir.1984) (listing clothing as one of the basic necessities of life); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F.Supp. 1388, 1410 (N.D.Ca.1984) ("Clothing is a basic area of Eighth Amendment concern"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, & remanded, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.1986); Balla v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 595 F.Supp. 1558, 1575 (D.Idaho 1984) (finding the clothing there to be "patently insufficient to protect [the] inmates from the cold in the winter months"). Plaintiffs do not allege that the clothing defendants provide them is "garish, illfitting, degrading and humiliating to wear." Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 132 (2d Cir.1978), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). They argue, rather, that defendants simply have failed to provide them with clothing that is suitable for Michigan winter weather. The Court agrees that plaintiffs have established a basis for finding that defendants do not provide them with adequate winter clothing.
Plaintiffs have submitted credible evidence indicating that not all inmates are provided with adequate winter clothing. See, e.g., Transcript ("T") at 1961-63 (Hines); 2022-23 & 2026 (Griffen); 1336-37 & 1343-44 (Kingon); & 1379 (Conley-Bey). Defendants do appear to provide inmates with clothing that is adequate for moderate to warm temperatures, see T at 1842 (Cochran), and to provide adequate winter clothing for inmates who work outside for extended periods of time. See T at 1539-40 (Braska). Defendants appear, moreover, to be manufacturing a warmer kind of winter jacket. See T at 1967-68 & 2013-14 (Hines). This new coat, however, is being distributed only to selected institutions, T at 1968-69 (Hines), and as I stated previously not all inmates are adequately supplied with winter clothing. Finally, plaintiffs have produced credible evidence that defendants' failure to have supplied all inmates with adequate winter clothing has caused them to suffer some pain. See, e.g., T at 1966 (Hines); 2023 (Griffin); 2582 (Shelly); & 2506-07 (Phillips). Plaintiffs certainly have not produced compelling testimony regarding the pain they suffer from lack of winter clothing. Given defendants' failure to have demonstrated any penological justification for failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate winter clothing, however, the evidence plaintiffs have produced is sufficient to defeat defendants' motion for an involuntary dismissal. See Walker, 771 F.2d at 925 ("`Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of pain are those that are "totally without penological justification"'") (quoting Chapman, 452 U.S. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399).
For the above reasons, the Court will decline to enter judgment for defendants on the winter clothing issue, at least at this time.
Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Regarding Legal Mail
Defendants' third rule 41(b) motion concerns their regulations governing plaintiffs' receipt of legal mail from, 876 among *876 other persons, attorneys and the courts. The parties disagree about the system defendants should
employ to secure plaintiffs' right to confidential communications with their attorneys and the courts while concurrently protecting defendants' legitimate security interests. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2983-85, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on this issue on February 24, 1986. In an oral opinion rendered on June 2, 1986 the Court stated that it was confused as to the nature of the parties' disagreements, and on June 6th it ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue. The Court was unable to rule on defendants' motion prior to trial, and plaintiffs apparently thus decided to present evidence on the legal mail issue. I now find that I should deny defendants' motion for summary judgment and also their rule 41(b) motion on the legal mail issue, in part because the Court is unclear as to how defendants' system for treating legal mail as privileged actually operates and therefore does not

believe that it has an adequate factual basis for making a final determination of whether that system is constitutional. In the remaining portion of the trial, the parties should focus on clarifying how the system operates at the various institutions.
Defendants' system for treating legal mail as privileged, meaning that plaintiffs have the right to be present when it is opened and inspected for contraband, is contained in two administrative rules and a policy directive. Administrative Rule 791.6603(4) provides that "[p]ursuant to a specific written request by a resident, mail which is clearly identified as coming from the resident's designated attorney or the corrections ombudsman shall be opened and inspected for contraband in the resident's presence." This rule clearly places the burden on the inmate to invoke his right to be present when mail coming from his attorney, whom he must designate in advance, or the corrections ombudsman is inspected for contraband. Administrative Rule 791.6615(2) provides, however, that in addition to mail from an inmate's designated attorney or the corrections ombudsman, mail from courts, public officials, the director of the department of corrections, and the corrections commission shall also be treated as confidential, and thus presumably opened only in the inmate's presence if he so requests. Finally, Policy Directive PD-BCF-63.03 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon written request by a prisoner to the institution's mail room supervisor, mail which is clearly designated as being from the prisoner's designated attorney, the courts, or from the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman, shall be opened and inspected for contraband in the prisoner's presence." Like Administrative Rule 791.6603(4), this policy directive places the burden on the inmate to invoke his right to be present when confidential communications are inspected for contraband. It goes beyond that administrative rule, however, to require that the inmate's request be directed to the mail room supervisor and to encompass mail from the courts as well as mail from the inmate's designated attorney and from the corrections ombudsman.
It is apparent from the plain language of these standards that there are some conflicts between them. Plaintiffs have introduced testimony, moreover, indicating that the different institutions tend to interpret and to apply them differently. At the SPSM and the MBP, once an inmate has written to the mailroom and indicated that he has an attorney, the mailroom makes a notation that any mail the inmate receives that is clearly marked as coming from an attorney (not necessarily a designated attorney), a court, or the corrections ombudsman is to be treated as privileged mail, and the inmate is entitled to be present when the mail is inspected for contraband. T at 530 (Wilbur). At the MR, however, the mailroom will not treat mail as being privileged unless it comes from the inmate's specifically designated attorney. T at 530-31 (Wilbur). Mail from an attorney other than the one whom 877 the inmate has designated apparently will not be treated as privileged, and thus will be inspected for *877 contraband outside of the inmate's presence.
As the Court understands plaintiffs' case, they essentially raise two objections to defendants' system for treating legal mail as privileged. First, they object to defendants' decision to require the inmates to take some affirmative step to invoke their right to be present when their legal mail is inspected for contraband. Plaintiffs argue that defendants' system facilitates unknowing waivers of the right to be present when legal mail is inspected for contraband, noting in particular that inmates tend to be confused as to how they should invoke this right. They urge the Court to require defendants to implement a system whereby rather than being required affirmatively to invoke their right to be present when their legal mail is inspected, inmates are automatically guaranteed this right and are given the option to "opt-out" of the system and choose not to be present when their legal mail is inspected. T at 593-94 (Wilbur); see Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Privileged Mail Policy at 4.
Second, and relatedly, defendants' system, at least as it is being implemented at the MR, results in a situation where an inmate who does not know the identity of his attorney has no means of invoking his right to be present when mail from that attorney is inspected for contraband. This situation could arise in at least two contexts. First, whenever an inmate is appointed an attorney in a case, there is a chance that the initial communication from that attorney to the inmate will be inspected for contraband outside of the inmate's presence because the inmate will have been unable to notify the mailroom of that attorney's existence and identity. Second, in a class-action context, where one attorney or one set of attorneys are representing a number of inmates, the inmates similarly may be unable to invoke their right to be present when mail from such attorney(s) is inspected for contraband. In either of these two contexts, an inmate could be deprived of his right to be present when his legal mail is inspected for contraband. See Taylor v. Strerrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir.1976). I think that this possibility and

evidence suggesting that requiring inmates to invoke their right to be present when their legal mail is inspected has caused some inmates unintentionally to waive that right require the Court to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue.
My review of defendants' rule 41(b) motion, plaintiffs' response, and the evidence plaintiffs have introduced at trial leads me to conclude, moreover, that I also should not enter judgment in defendants' favor on this issue at this time. I do not believe that plaintiffs have presented a particularly persuasive case on the legal mail issue. For the following four reasons, however, I will decline to decide that issue at this time. First, at least with regard to how it is being implemented at the Michigan Reformatory, defendants' policy on its face may result in situations where an inmate has no effective means for invoking his right to be present when his legal mail, i.e., mail from his attorney, the courts, or the corrections ombudsman, is opened and inspected for contraband. Defendants will bear the burden during their phase of the trial of attempting to alleviate the Court's concern in this regard. Second, plaintiffs have presented some evidence suggesting that defendants' privileged mail policy is confusing to the inmates and results in situations where the inmates unintentionally waive their privileged mail rights. See, e.g., Ex. 155; Ex. 169; T at 3131-34 (Purchis); T at 593-94 (Wilbur). This evidence is not strong, but it is in the record and there is no contrary evidence suggesting that inmates generally understand defendants' privileged mail policy and are able to invoke their privileged mail rights. Third, the Court does not believe that there is any evidence in the record as to why defendants have decided to adopt an "opt-in" as opposed to an "opt-out" policy. I believe that defendants indicated in their motion for summary judgment on this issue that they adopted this 878 policy because inmates complained about constantly having to go to the mailroom to have their legal mail *878 inspected in their presence and an "opt-in" policy is administratively more efficient. Defendants have not introduced evidentiary support for these reasons, however, and in addition have not explained why an optin as opposed to an opt-out policy better resolves these two problems. Finally, as I indicated previously I still am not clear on how defendants' system operates at the various institutions and would like to listen to some more evidence on that issue.
For the above reasons, the Court will decline to grant defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of the legal mail issue.
Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Regarding Lack of Lavatory Facilities at RCF
Defendants' next motion for involuntary dismissal concerns plaintiffs' claim that many inmates confined at the Riverside Correctional Facility are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because they are "confined overnight in cells that do not contain a toilet or wash basin" and are "required to perform bodily functions in a plastic bottle which remains" in their cell until the morning. FAC ¶ 42. As defendants note in their motion, plaintiffs raise this claim on behalf of five separate groups of inmates: (1) those general population inmates who are confined in cells without toilets; (2) the reception and guidance center admittees who are sent to seven building, first floor; (3) the protective custody inmates who are confined in seven building, third floor; (4) the administrative segregation inmates who also are confined in seven building, third floor; and (5) the inmates who are placed in eleven building, east wing, for mental health treatment. Defendants argue that the uncontested evidence establishes that all of these inmates are confined in clean cells, are allowed out on a regular basis to use the common lavatory facilities, have not suffered any health problems associated with the lack of toilets and sinks in their cells, suffer at most from occasional lapses in defendants' system of releasing inmates from their cells to use the bathroom, and are confined in cells that conform to American Correctional Association ("ACA") standards. In addition, defendants argue that the uncontested evidence shows that the general population inmates are locked in their cells only for count and thus have virtually unlimited access to the bathroom facilities. In response, plaintiffs argue that inmates confined in cells at the RCF that do not have toilets or sinks are subjected to a serious risk of harm in that they are often given used urinals, are not given proper supplies for cleaning their urinals, have their requests for bathroom release ignored, are often forced to defecate in their cells, and are often forced to dispose of their urine and feces by dumping it into the courtyard. They also argue that defendants' actions subject inmates to psychological and physical pain. Finally, plaintiffs observe that mental

health inmates who are confined in eleven building also are subject to additional inflictions of psychological and physical pain because of defendants' bathroom policy.
The Court believes that plaintiffs' case is the strongest on this issue. Plaintiffs presented compelling testimony on the following points:
0907Inmates often are given used urinals that not only are dirty and smelly but obviously present a risk to their health. E.g. T at 1058-59 (Roberts); 1075-76 (Mrozsk); & 1733 (Scott).
0907Inmates often are not allowed out to use the bathroom when they need to do so. E.g. T at 1704-05 (Harp); 1886 (Chipman).
0907Inmates occasionally are forced to defecate in their cells. E.g. T at 1887 (Chipman); 1430-31 (Redson); Ex. 29 at 29 (Waterman Dep.).
0907Several inmates are forced to eat in their cells despite having no washbasin or toilet. E.g. T at 1094-95 (Wysocki); 1075 (Mrozsk).
0907Inmates often are unable to secure proper cleaning supplies for their urinals. E.g. T at 1734-35 (Scott); 1054-55 (Roberts).
879 0907Inmates have suffered psychological pain from having to defecate or urinate in *879 their cells. E.g. T at 1095 (Wysocki); 1060 (Roberts); 1041-42 (Lashuay).
The Court discussed the legal basis for plaintiffs' claim in its June 2nd oral opinion in which it denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue. I will not repeat that discussion here, but rather will simply address defendants' contention that plaintiffs' claims do not satisfy the eighth amendment standards the Supreme Court established in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). In Rhodes the Supreme Court clarified that the eighth amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that "involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" and are "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment." Id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. In examining whether conditions of confinement violate the eighth amendment, a court must examine their effect on the inmates. If such conditions result "in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs" or "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities", then they may be found to be unconstitutional. Id.; see also id. at 367, 101 S.Ct. at 2410 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A court is under the obligation to examine the actual effect of challenged conditions upon the well-being of the prisoners") (emphasis in original); Walker, 771 F.2d at 925 (noting that under Rhodes prison conditions may be unconstitutional if they deprive prisoners of "`essential food, medical care or sanitation'") (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348, 101 S.Ct. at 2400). The Court also notes in regard to the Rhodes standard that the Supreme Court observed that among "`unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are `totally without penological justification'". Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citations omitted).
In this case, plaintiffs' evidence shows that certain inmates confined at the RCF are both being deprived of basic sanitation requirements and being forced to endure inflictions of psychological and physical pain, and to suffer significant risks to their physical well-being, absent any established penological justification for such treatment. I am not at this time going to review all of the pertinent case law in this area. I believe it is sufficient for purposes of deciding the present motion for me to observe that I believe that many inmates who are confined at the RCF in cells without toilets or washbasins are being deprived of their constitutional rights under the eighth amendment, as the Supreme Court has interpreted those rights in Rhodes and other cases. Defendants correctly argue that in the abstract, it may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for prison administrators to confine inmates in cells without sinks, toilets, and hot and cold running water. Administrators may be able adequately to compensate for such physical plant deficiencies with release policies that allow inmates regular access to bathroom facilities. As the Supreme Court indicated in Rhodes, however, a court cannot look at prison conditions in the abstract. That was the error the district court committed in Rhodes. In this case, plaintiffs have established that defendants' bathroom release policy and other means of compensating for the RCF's physical plant deficiencies do not operate effectively. Defendants now bear the burden of establishing that the situation is not as bad as it presently appears to be to the Court.

For the above-stated reasons, the Court will deny defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal on this issue, for the most part. I will grant defendants' motion insofar as it concerns the general population inmates who are confined at the RCF. The Court's understanding of plaintiffs' evidence is that the general population inmates are confined in their cells only at count-time, and are otherwise free to use the common bathroom facilities. See T at 790 (Court noted that "the evidence in the case shows that the general group is never locked in its cell"). I do not, moreover, believe that any of plaintiffs' testimony concerning the receipt of dirty urinals, defecation and urination in cells, or the dumping of feces and urine into the courtyard involves general population inmates.
880 *880 Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Concerning Access to Courts
Defendants' next motion concerns plaintiffs' claim that defendants have failed to guarantee inmates their constitutional right of "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Plaintiffs argue in essence that defendants maintain an insufficient number of law books to service the inmate population; that defendants' collection is deficient in some critical areas; that inmates, particularly those who are confined in segregation units, are not allowed adequate access to the law libraries; that defendants fail to provide legal assistance to those inmates who are unable to use the libraries effectively; and that inmates have suffered harm from defendants' failure to have provided them with effective access to legal resources. Defendants respond, and argue in their motion for involuntary dismissal, that they maintain an adequate collection of law books at all of the subject institutions; that inmates are in general provided an adequate opportunity to use the law libraries, and that plaintiffs have at best established a few isolated incidents where some inmates may have been denied access; that inmates who are unskilled in legal research and analysis can seek assistance from jail-house lawyers, professional librarians, inmate law clerks, and, at least at the SPSM, Prison Legal Services; and that in any event, plaintiffs have not established that inmates have suffered harm from any defects that may exist in defendants' system of access to the courts. The Court will divide its discussion of this motion into two parts. First, I will briefly review the law on this issue that I discussed in my June 2nd opinion on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Second, I will briefly discuss my general understanding of plaintiffs' evidence. As with defendants' other motions, the Court finds that it is unable to enter a judgment in defendants' favor, at least at this time. I further believe that along with the lack of toilets issue, this issue presents plaintiffs' strongest chance of succeeding on the merits of their claims.
The Court gave a rather lengthy discussion of the access to courts issue in its June 2, 1986 oral opinion on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Transcript of June 2, 1986 at 34-46. I will not repeat that entire discussion here. I think that it is important, however, for me to reiterate a couple of key parts of that opinion. First, I note again that the parties do not appear to disagree that the governing standard the Court must apply in deciding plaintiffs' legal access claim is whether defendants provide inmates "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495; see also Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 288 (6th Cir.1983) ("Prison officials are charged with the responsibility of assuring that inmate access to the courts is `adequate, effective and meaningful'") (citation omitted). Second, the Court determined in its June 2nd opinion that it must apply two criteria in determining whether defendants have satisfied this standard. First, I must consider whether some source of professional legal information, whether in the form of an adequately stocked law library, attorneys, or some combination of the two, is available to all inmates. Second, I must consider whether "for those inmates who possess insufficient intellectual or educational abilities to permit reasonable comprehension of their legal claims", defendants make some provision for "them to communicate with someone who, after consultation with the legal learning source, is capable of translating their complaints into an understandable presentation." Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F.Supp. 1536, 1549 (W.D.Ky.1984); see Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075, 1096 (E.D.Mich.1979). As I noted in my June 2nd opinion, I believe that this formulation of defendants' obligation is consistent with the position most courts have taken on this issue, although the case law admittedly is not always clear and the parties are free of course to attempt to persuade me otherwise.
Given this understanding of the applicable case law, I believe that plaintiffs have established their entitlement to 881 relief by a preponderance of the evidence, absent any *881 rebuttal from defendants. I base this conclusion on

the following factual determinations, noting as I discuss plaintiffs' case that the following discussion is tentative and is not to be construed by the parties in any way as my final decision on these issues:
0907Although defendants maintain extensive collections of law books at certain institutions, in particular the SPSM, their collections at other institutions appear to be inadequate. Plaintiffs presented a significant amount of evidence, for example, indicating that the collection at the Marquette Branch Prison simply is not adequate to service the inmate population. See, e.g., Exs. 61 & 62. Inmates confined at the Trusty Division at Marquette, moreover, often are forced to use what defendants refer to as an "unofficial" law library, but is in actuality little more than a miscellaneous collection of mostly out-of-date books. See T at 1670-72. Finally, plaintiffs' evidence strongly suggests that the collections defendants maintain in the so-called "mini-law libraries" are pathetic, to say the least. The Court fails to understand how defendants can expect an inmate confined in a segregation unit to be able to perform adequate legal research in such a library. Given that legal research, as the attorneys well know, often entails extensive cross-checking and running down dead-end leads, an inmate who is forced to perform his legal research in such a library and to rely on a "kite" system for acquiring books from the main law library is at a serious disadvantage. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1109-10 (9th Cir.1986).
0907Inmates occasionally are denied access to the law library system. This access problem has two components. The first component concerns the adequacy of defendants' collection of law books. As I indicated previously, the Court heard a significant amount of testimony indicating that inmates often are unable to find the books they need when they are allowed to use the law libraries. This problem is particularly significant for inmates, such as those confined in segregation units or in minimum security units, who must rely on the kite system to secure books from the main libraries or who must transfer to a different institution in order to gain physical access to a main law library. I will not resolve at this time the parties' dispute over the significance of exhibits documenting the percentage of requested books that are actually delivered to the inmates. Compare Defendant's Brief at 14 with Plaintiffs' Brief at 6-7. I believe it is sufficient for now for me to note that defendants have failed to convince that I need not accept any more evidence on this issue.
The second component is that defendants occasionally deny physical access to the law libraries to inmates who are entitled to such access. The Court does not believe that this is a significant problem for general population inmates. The primary problems with these inmates appear to be that they occasionally are denied more than six hours per week of access, and that they occasionally are arbitrarily denied access, such as when a librarian or a guard denies them access apparently for no valid reason. The problem is more serious for segregation inmates, who apparently often have difficulty in gaining access even to the mini-law libraries or are required to use such libraries at bizarre times.
0907The legal assistance defendants provide to inmates who use the law libraries and need such assistance often is poor. The inmate law clerk system appears to be the strongest part of defendants' legal assistance mechanism. Even this system, however, has its weak points. The Court accepted credible evidence, for example, that inmate law clerks are forbidden to offer legal assistance to other inmates and often are punished for doing so. Plaintiffs' evidence indicates, moreover, that defendants' claim that they employ professional librarians at all of the law libraries is at best misleading. Simply put, the Court believes that defendants bear a heavy burden in demonstrating that the law librarians are competent and able to perform their duties fairly and impartially, and that each institution employs a professional librarian on a consistent basis. Finally, the Court has heard no significant 882 evidence *882 suggesting that "jailhouse lawyers" are able to assist inmates effectively. Plaintiffs' evidence suggests, rather, that defendants, for good reasons, attempt to maintain fairly tight control over jailhouse lawyer contracts, and that the jailhouse lawyers who are able to assist other inmates are not necessarily equal to the task at hand.
0907Finally, the Court heard credible evidence that the alleged deficiencies in defendants' system of legal access have caused many inmates to suffer harm. Mr. Braska testified, for example, that he had a complaint dismissed because he was unable to perform the research he needed in order to respond to a "rebuttal." T at 1541-43. Mr. Kemp-Bey testified as to the frustration he experienced in attempting to respond to a Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. T at 1610-17. Mr. Cade similarly testified to his inability to conduct necessary research to respond to a motion to dismiss. T at 2463-64. Finally, Mr. Kingon also testified as to his inability to secure the cases he needed to respond to a motion for summary disposition. T at 1329-30. The Court recognizes that pro se

pleadings are judged under a lesser standard than pleadings that are drafted by an attorney. The advantage a pro se petitioner enjoys, however, is limited, and a party who is able to conduct legal research on the pertinent issues is much better off. I believe, moreover, that the kinds of harm inmates in the plaintiff class have suffered constitute a denial of access to the courts under Walker. See Walker, 771 F.2d at 932 (indicating that an inmate may be able to establish a constitutional deficiency by showing that "`he has somehow been prejudiced in any of his ... lawsuits'") (quoting Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir.1978)). The Sixth Circuit held in Walker that inmates enjoy no constitutional right to a specified amount of law library time. A court, rather, must measure the adequacy of defendants' system of legal access by the inmates' ability to gain access to the courts through that system. In this case, plaintiffs have established a credible claim that they are not able to gain adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts through defendants' system.
For the above reasons, the Court will decline to grant defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of this claim. I reiterate that although this opinion in no way binds me from ruling otherwise at the conclusion of the trial, I believe that plaintiffs have presented a substantial claim that defendants have denied them their constitutional right of access to the courts. Plaintiffs may not succeed on this claim at the end of trial, but at the present time the evidence preponderates in their favor.
Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Racial Discrimination Claim
The last and most difficult rule 41(b) motion the Court must resolve concerns plaintiffs' claims that black inmates are discriminated against on the basis of their race. The parties have filed detailed and, for the most part, wellwritten memoranda on defendants' motion. In these memoranda, the parties dispute vigorously the facts in the record, the inferences and conclusions the Court should draw from those facts, and the legal standards the Court should apply in deciding plaintiffs' claims. The Court has read the parties' memoranda with great care and has reviewed selected portions of the record. I believe that given the amount and somewhat ambiguous nature of the evidence plaintiffs have introduced on this issue, the fact-intensive nature of the legal determinations the Court is required to make, and the importance our society places on treating people, including prison inmates, fairly and impartially and not on the basis of their race and color, it would be judicially inefficient and unwise for me to attempt to resolve plaintiffs' racial discrimination claims at this time. This is an issue that requires a considered and thoughtful analysis based on all of the relevant evidence that the parties wish to introduce. I thus will "decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence" on this issue. FRCP 41(b). To assist the parties, however, I offer the following tentative discussion of the facts.
883 *883 Plaintiffs' claims basically fall into four areas. The first area concerns the use of racial slurs. The Court heard a significant amount of testimony on the use of racial slurs by guards and other staff at the subject institutions. Any use of racial slurs is, of course, a serious matter. To some extent, however, I heard less testimony on the use of racial slurs than I may have expected, particularly at institutions such as the MBP and the MIPC (A-Block) where the custodial staff is overwhelmingly white and the inmate population is predominately black. It is my impression, moreover, that a significant number of the slurs that are made come from a relatively small number of defendants' staff. Finally, the Court does not believe that plaintiffs have established an overwhelmingly persuasive basis for me to hold the named defendants liable for whatever racial slurs are made. There is evidence in the record suggesting that the named defendants are aware of incidences of racial slurs and have failed to take effective action to stop them. As with plaintiffs' other claims of racial discrimination, however, the question of supervisory liability will be a difficult one for the Court to resolve.
The second area concerns segregated dining halls. The Court has two comments to make on this area. First, it believes that plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence, absent any rebuttal by the defendants, that segregation does occur in the dining areas. Second, I am not sure that I can hold defendants liable for this segregation. In my June 2nd opinion I stated that "inmate self-selection is not necessarily a defense to liability," citing Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc). T at 49. I did not suggest, however, that inmate self-selection could never be a defense to liability. See Bazemore v. Friday, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 3012-13, 92 L.Ed.2d 315, 335-36 (1986) (holding that the "mere continued existence of single race clubs does not make out a constitutional violation" where "one's choice of a club is entirely voluntary").

The third area concerns job placement. The Court has three comments to make on this area. First, I will consider whether defendants' Policy Directive PD-DWA-64.01 is unconstitutional, either facially or as implemented by defendants. I believe that plaintiffs have fairly placed this policy directive in issue both by their pleadings and by their evidence, and defendants are on notice that they should address it in their presentation. Second, the Court heard evidence suggesting that apart from the effect of this policy directive, racial discrimination does occur in the job assignment process. Finally, there remains the issue of supervisory liability. As plaintiffs note, supervisory liability would be clear if the Court were to find the policy directive racially discriminatory. In other aspects of job discrimination, however, defendants' liability is not so clear.
The final area concerns plaintiffs' allegations that black inmates are disproportionately assigned to administrative segregation and punitive detention and that white inmates are disproportionately given protective custody status. I have three comments to make on this area. First, my ultimate resolution of plaintiffs' claims will depend substantially on my view of plaintiffs' statistics. Defendants have launched a cogent attack on those statistics, and the Court is not sure how much reliance it can place on them. Second, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that it can consider their claim of discriminatory assignment to administrative segregation. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum on this issue on July 1, 1986. The Court believes that plaintiffs adequately raised their claim of discriminatory placement in administrative segregation in their first amended complaint, during discovery, and at trial. Defendants thus are on notice that they should be prepared to rebut such claim. Third, defendants rely heavily in their attack on plaintiffs' claims on suggestions that reasons other than racially discriminatory motives explain any disproportionate placements in punitive detention, administrative segregation, and protective custody that occur. They should be prepared to discuss and to introduce evidence on those other reasons when the trial resumes.
884 *884 In summary, defendants have failed to convince the Court that it should dismiss plaintiffs' claims of racial discrimination, and I believe that such claims are too important to be resolved in ruling on a rule 41(b) motion. I thus will decline to enter judgment at this time on those claims.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
Plaintiffs' motion concerns issues the Court was forced to resolve on the first day of trial. Plaintiffs request the Court to reconsider in part the decisions it made on June 2nd and to impose the following sanctions on defendants for discovery and pre-trial abuses: (1) strike Camille Camp as a witness; (2) strike Andrew Jackson as a witness; and (3) require defendants to reimburse plaintiffs for the costs they incurred in deposing Lawrence Stiffman, James Luckey, Paul Wuford, and Janet Pratt. The Court has considered plaintiffs' motion, defendants' response, and plaintiffs' reply. Without rehashing old arguments, the Court will resolve plaintiffs' motion to reconsider as follows:
First, I will reinstate my order striking Andrew Jackson as a witness. T at 92. I simply cannot allow defendants to get away with circumventing Magistrate Rowland's decision to strike this witness.
Second, with regard to Camille Camp, I am going to grant plaintiffs' motion to reconsider in part and to order defendants to pay the costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, plaintiffs incurred in deposing Ms. Camp.
Third, the Court will deny plaintiffs' motion to reconsider in all other respects.
Conclusion
As the Court stated at the beginning of this opinion, it realizes that the opinion is fairly brief given the extensive record in this case and the detailed memoranda the parties filed on defendants' motions. I have concluded, however, that it would not be proper for me to render judgment at this time, and thus will decline to do so until the close of all the evidence. I hope, however, that the opinion will assist the parties in the second part of this trial. I also expect that by now the parties have a more accurate assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. In that regard the Court will order counsel for the parties to meet, in person, sometime before the resumption of the trial to discuss settlement of any or all of the issues presently before the Court.

ORDER
In accordance with the opinion dated February 27, 1987;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' claims involving the Michigan Intensive Programming Center is DENIED; the Court will decline to render any judgment on such claims until the close of all the evidence;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' claim of inadequate winter clothing is DENIED; the Court will decline to render any judgment on such claim until the close of all the evidence;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' lack of access to toilets claim is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part; except with respect to the general population inmates, for whom defendants' motion is GRANTED, the Court will decline to render any judgment on such claim until the close of all the evidence;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' legal mail claim is DENIED; the Court will decline to render any judgment on such claim until the close of all the evidence;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 24, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants' legal mail policy is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' access to courts claim is DENIED; the Court will decline to render any judgment on such claim until the close of all the evidence;
885 *885 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' racial discrimination claims is DENIED; the Court will decline to render any judgment on such claims until the close of all the evidence;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' July 1, 1986 motion to reconsider denial of motions to strike witnesses and to impose sanctions upon defendants is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall meet, in person, at least five (5) days before the resumption of trial to discuss settlement of any or all of the issues presently before the Court.
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 667 F.Supp. 467 (1987)
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John
Prelesnik, and Jack Bergman, Defendants.
No. G84-651.
United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.
August 10, 1987.
4689 *468 *469 Elizabeth Alexander, Adjoa Aiyetoro & Nkechi Taifa-Caldwell National Prison Project, Washington, D.C., Patricia Streeter, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Thomas Nelson, Brian McKenzie, David Edick, Michigan Office of the Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
OPINION
ENSLEN, District Judge.
This is a prison case that concerns conditions of confinement at four major prisons in the Michigan system. It is a class action proceeding in which the plaintiff class is composed of all prisoners who are or will be confined by the Michigan Department of Corrections at the State Prison of Southern Michigan ("SPSM"), located in Jackson, Michigan; the Michigan Reformatory ("MR"), located in Ionia, Michigan; the Riverside Correctional Facility ("RCF"), also located in Ionia, Michigan; and the Marquette Branch Prison ("MBP") (including the former Michigan Intensive Programming Center ("MIPC"), which now is designated as A-Block of the MBP), located in Marquette, Michigan.
The defendants in the case are the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"), who now is Robert Brown, Jr.; the Deputy Director of the MDOC and the Director of the Bureau of Correctional Facilities, who now is Daniel Bolden; the Warden of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, who currently is John Jabe and who for most of the relevant time period was Dale Foltz; the Warden of the Michigan Reformatory, who currently is Pamela Withrow and who for most of the relevant time period was John Jabe; the Administrator of the Reception and Guidance Center, John Prelesnik; the Warden of the Marquette Branch Prison, Theodore Koehler; and the 470 Warden of the Riverside *470 Correctional Facility, who currently is Denise Quarles and who for part of the relevant time period was William Abshirer. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, new defendants automatically have been substituted for original defendants as they have succeeded them in office. The Court notes here that although Jack Bergman was named as a defendant in his former capacity as the Administrator of the MIPC, he effectively has been dropped from the action because the MIPC has been converted into A-Block of the MBP, under the control of Warden Koehler.
In their first amended complaint, filed on April 16, 1985, plaintiffs raised numerous grounds for relief against defendants. On March 20, 1986 the Court severed the following four issues for immediate trial: (1) whether the lack of toilets and washbasins in certain locked cells at the RCF violates plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment; (2) whether defendants' alleged failure to provide plaintiffs with proper winter clothing also violates their Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment; (3) whether defendants engage in racially discriminatory actions concerning job assignments, cafeteria serving lines, and the placement of inmates in administrative segregation, punitive detention, and protective custody in violation of plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the law; and (4) whether defendants are unlawfully interfering with plaintiffs' constitutional right of access to federal and state

court systems. This last issue includes the issue of whether defendants' system for handling inmates' incoming legal mail is constitutional. On May 14, 1986 the Court declined to sever for immediate trial plaintiffs' claim that defendants are not providing them with constitutionally adequate mental health care because it has conducted numerous hearings on that issue in connection with the Consent Decree entered in the related case of United States v. Michigan, No. G84-63 (W.D.Mich.).
After numerous pretrial motions, hearings, and other skirmishes between the parties, many of which Magistrate Rowland handled, the Court conducted a thirty-five day bench trial on the severed issues that was spread over five months: June 1986, August 1986, October 1986, March 1987, and April 1987. During the trial it listened to testimony from 103 witnesses 0907 seventy-eight for the plaintiffs and twenty-five for the defendants 0907 and received hundreds of exhibits into evidence. There remain some unresolved evidentiary motions that I will decide when I discuss the substantive issue to which the evidence pertains. In accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the following opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on the severed issues.
Introduction to the Case
The prisoners who have brought this action are confined in Michigan's oldest and largest prisons. The Marquette Branch Prison, which is located in Michigan's Upper Peninsula, far away from the State's major population centers, is both a maximum security and a minimum security facility. The maximum security inmates are housed inside the walls of the prison. The inside prison has a rated capacity of 606 inmates, which is broken down into three groups: 249 administrative segregation cells; 262 cells for inmates in the general population group; and 95 protective custody cells. The administrative segregation units of the prison house the system's most difficult to manage inmates and is predominately black. Pls. Exh. 510B. The prison also has a trustee division, which houses the minimum security inmates and currently is predominately white. Pls. Exh. 521A. The staff of the institution is overwhelmingly white. Pls.Exh. 521Q; Transcript ("T") of 3-16-87 at 12. The protective custody unit, which used to be the MIPC, also is predominately white, although it is more evenly divided between black inmates and white inmates than the rest of the institution. T of 3-17-87 at 93.
The systems' largest facility is the State Prison of Southern Michigan, which is located in Michigan's Lower 471 Peninsula near the major population centers of Lansing, *471 Grand Rapids, and Detroit. The SPSM currently is
composed of three complexes: the central complex, the south complex, and the north complex. The central complex houses close custody inmates, which is the security level just below maximum security, and includes inmates confined to administrative segregation and protective custody. Inmates confined in the central complex are involved in this case only on the racial discrimination claim. The north complex is a medium security facility, while the south complex is a minimum security facility. The inmates confined in the central complex are overwhelmingly black; the racial compositions of the south and north complexes are more evenly divided between black inmates and white inmates.
The Michigan Reformatory and the Riverside Correctional Facility also are located in Michigan's Lower Peninsula. The MR houses both minimum security and close custody inmates. The minimum security inmates are housed in the institution's trustee division. The close custody inmates are housed inside the walls of the institution, are primarily if not exclusively under the age of twenty-five, and are predominately black. The RCF is located near the Reformatory and contains four housing groups that are relevant to this case: protective custody, administrative segregation, general population, and inmates going through reception or quarantine. Some of the cells in this institution do not have a toilet or washbasin inside the cell. Located in the same group of buildings as the RCF is the Riverside Psychiatric Center ("RPC"), which also contains some cells that do not have a toilet or washbasin within the cell.
The Court will divide its discussion of the severed issues into five parts: (1) legal mail; (2) lack of adequate winter clothing; (3) lack of in-cell toilets and washbasins at the RCF and the RPC; (4) access to courts; and (5) racial discrimination. Following my discussion of the substantive issues, I will briefly discuss for the benefit of the parties the appealability under rule 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292 of my judgments on those issues. Since plaintiffs' claims generally implicate different constitutional provisions, I will discuss the applicable legal standards in

connection with each substantive claim rather than in a general discussion at this point in the opinion. The Court does observe that one overriding standard it has considered and applied throughout this opinion is the substantial deference it must give state prison officials, who have the difficult task of determining how to run their institutions. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). Due to considerations of comity and federalism, a federal court should hesitate to interfere in the operation of state prison systems, and should do so only when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of inmates. See Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 437-39 (6th Cir.1984). If a constitutional violation does exist, however, then it unquestionably is the Court's duty to remedy it. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).
Rulings on the Severed Issues
I. Plaintiffs' Legal Mail Claim
The Court will divide its discussion of plaintiffs' legal mail claim into three parts. First, I will discuss the applicable legal standards. Secondly, I will discuss defendant's system of providing privileged treatment for inmates' incoming legal mail. Finally, I will discuss whether defendants' system is unconstitutional in any respect.
Inmates retain "all first amendment [and other constitutional] rights not incompatible with their status as prisoners, `or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.'" Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir.1985), quoting in part Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). The Supreme Court has recognized that in the context of incoming inmate correspondence, a penal institution's legitimate security needs justify certain measures that may infringe on inmates' First Amendment and Sixth 472 Amendment rights, as well as their right of access to the courts. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 *472 U.S. 396, 412-413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1810-1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). These measures, as with other measures affecting inmates' constitutional rights, are valid if they are "reasonably related" to the institution's security needs or other "legitimate penological interests". Turner v. Safley, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64, 79 (1987). In evaluating whether a particular measure satisfies this standard, a court must examine whether there is "a `valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it"; whether "the governmental objective [is] ... a legitimate and neutral one"; whether "alternative means of exercising the right ... remain open to prison inmates"; the "impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and whether there are any ready alternatives to the challenged regulation. Id. ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d at 79-80. In the legal mail context, prison officials bear the burden of putting "forth legitimate reasons for interfering with a prisoner's incoming mail." Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir.1986).
The Supreme Court has held that prison officials may open legal mail sent to inmates and inspect it for the presence of contraband, although they cannot read the mail. Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2983-85, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The Supreme Court indicated in Wolff, however, and several courts have explicitly held, that an inmate has the right to be present when prison officials open his legal mail and inspect it for contraband. Id. at 577, 94 S.Ct. at 2985; see, e.g., Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Parrish, 800 F.2d at 604 (citing cases). Employing the standard established in Turner, it is fair to say that the Supreme Court has already determined that a prison regulation that allows officials to open and to inspect an inmates' incoming legal mail for contraband is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and thus is constitutionally valid, particularly if the inmate is allowed to be present during the inspection process. See id. at 603-04. The real issue in this case, thus, is whether there is anything about Michigan's system in particular that is unconstitutional.
Michigan's system for treating legal mail as privileged, meaning that plaintiffs have the right to be present when the mail is opened and inspected for contraband, is contained in two administrative rules and a policy directive. Administrative Rule 791.6603(4) provides that "[p]ursuant to a specific written request by a resident, mail which is clearly identified as coming from the resident's designated attorney or the corrections ombudsman shall be opened and inspected for contraband in the resident's presence." This rule clearly requires the inmate to invoke his right to be present when mail coming from his attorney, whom he must designate in advance, or from the

corrections ombudsman is inspected for contraband. The second Administrative Rule, rule 791.6615(2), apparently supplements rule 791.6603(4) by providing that in addition to mail from an inmate's designated attorney and from the corrections ombudsman, prison officials shall treat as confidential mail communications between inmates and courts, public officials, the director of the Department of Corrections, and the corrections commission. Finally, Policy Directive PD-BCF-63.03 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon written request by a prisoner to the institution's mail room supervisor, mail which is clearly designated as being from the prisoner's designated attorney, the courts, or from the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman, shall be opened and inspected for contraband in the prisoner's presence." This policy directive is similar to rule 791.6603(4), except that it clarifies that an inmate must send his request for confidential treatment to the mail room supervisor for his institution and it encompasses mail from a court as well as mail from an attorney and the corrections ombudsman.
As the policy directive indicates, inmates must renew their request for confidential treatment of their legal mail 473 each time they are transferred to a new institution. Pls. *473 exh. 404-A at 12; cf. T. at 3131-33. The testimony at
trial also indicated that each institution has a different method for handling privileged legal mail. At the SPSM and the MBP, once an inmate has notified the mailroom that he has an attorney, the mailroom makes a notation that any mail the inmate receives that is clearly marked as coming from an attorney (not necessarily the inmate's designated attorney), a court, or the corrections ombudsman is to be treated as privileged mail. T at 530. The MR employs a different system, however, under which mail from a court or the corrections ombudsman is automatically treated as privileged, but mail from an attorney is not treated as privileged unless the inmate specifically designates the attorney. Id. at 530-31; pls. exhs. 155 (grievance response) & 496 at 1.
The privileged mail policy, including the institutions differing interpretations of it, is not, moreover, adequately explained to the inmates. The resident guidebooks for the various institutions do not contain a clear and correct explanation of the policy. The guidebook for the SPSM-North Complex, pls. exh. 404-C, in fact contains no discussion of the policy, while the guidebook for the MBP is misleading in that it does not inform inmates they must take action to have their legal mail treated as a privileged communication. During the orientation process the inmates are given a general guidebook to read that does explain the privileged mail policy, and the policy is explained to them orally as well at that time. Pls. exh. 404-A at 12; 3-18-87 T at 24. An inmate is not allowed to keep this guidebook, however, and upon his arrival at an institution he is given that institution's guidebook. Copies of the general guidebook are not, moreover, readily available for inmates to read. Finally, on occasion inmates who have requested privileged treatment for their legal mail find that their mail has been opened and inspected outside of their presence, although the Court is convinced that these openings are rarely, if ever, intentional.
Plaintiffs raise essentially three claims against defendants' legal mail policy. First, they argue that the policy improperly requires the inmates to invoke their right to be present when their legal mail is opened and inspected for contraband. Secondly, they argue that the institutions differing interpretations and applications of the privileged mail policy creates confusion among the inmates. Finally, they argue that many inmates are not aware of the policy. They request the Court to invalidate the requirement that inmates must request privileged status for their legal mail.
The Court agrees that certain aspects of defendants' legal mail policy, both as it is written and as it is implemented, violate the inmates' constitutional right to be present when prison officials open their legal mail and inspect it for contraband. I do not find that defendants' policy unconstitutionally shifts to the inmates the burden of invoking this right. I agree that defendants bear the burden of putting forth legitimate reasons for their policy. The Supreme Court, though, already has sanctioned the "policy" of inspecting legal mail for contraband. The issue here is defendants' method of implementing the inmates' right to be present when that inspection occurs, i.e., whether inmates should be required to opt-in to the system or be considered "in" the system and allowed to optout of it. The Court believes that this is the kind of decision that courts generally should leave to the discretion of prison officials. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that defendants' decision to place the burden on the inmates by itself infringes on their First or Sixth Amendment rights or their right of access to the courts. Compare Guajardo v. Estelle, 432 F.Supp. 1373, 1381 (S.D.Tex.1977) (court found no legitimate basis for a "requirement that inmates specially request that inspection of incoming attorney mail take place only in their presence") aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court thus sees no basis for invalidating that

requirement, even though I agree with plaintiffs that the reasons for this policy are at best obscure. See 3-17-87 T 474 at 60-61. Plaintiffs simply have not supported their claim that the present system *474 unduly increases the
possibility that an inmate will erroneously be denied privileged treatment of his legal mail. At best, plaintiffs have established that isolated incidents of error occur in a system that handles thousands of pieces of mail. See 3-23-87 T at 59.
If defendants are going to use such a policy, however, they must implement it in a manner that will allow inmates a full and informed opportunity to invoke their right to be present when their legal mail is opened and inspected for contraband. I find that the way in which defendants presently administer their opt-in system does not achieve that goal. As the Court already has discussed, the guidebooks given to the inmates at the subject facilities do not adequately explain the system. The Court cannot, moreover, accept defendants' contentions that inmates fully understand the system. There is no evidence that the general inmate guidebook, which does explain the system, is routinely available to the inmates; I cannot place much credence on the testimony of high level officials, such as Director Brown, who testified they did not know of any inmate confusion regarding the policy because such individuals are not in daily contact with the inmates; and plaintiffs produced evidence of confusion among both inmates and staff. See, e.g., T at 1526-27; pls. exh. 169 (staff misstating the policy at MBP). Although the evidence on this point is not overwhelming, the Court finds it sufficient to establish that defendants' method of implementing their opt-in system unduly infringes on the inmates' right to be present when their legal mail is opened and inspected for contraband.
In particular, the Court finds that there are three unconstitutional flaws in defendants' system. First, each institution implements the policy differently, and the differences are not adequately explained to the inmates. Indeed, even Director Brown did not know there are differences between the institutions. 3-18-87 T at 25. Second, an inmate must renew his request whenever he is transferred to a new institution. Given the number of transfers which the Court heard testimony on at trial, it finds that this requirement unduly infringes on the inmates' right to be present when their legal mail is opened and inspected. Finally, and most importantly, the requirement that an inmate specifically designate an attorney, at least as it is implemented at the Reformatory, can cause inmates unintentionally to waive this right. This situation can arise in two contexts. First, whenever an inmate is appointed an attorney in a case there is a chance that defendants will inspect the initial communication from that attorney to the inmate for contraband outside of the inmate's presence because the inmate will have been unable to notify the mailroom of the attorney's existence and identity. Secondly, in a class-action context, where one attorney or set of attorneys represent a number of inmates, the inmates similarly may be unable to invoke their right to be present when their legal mail is opened and inspected.
The Court accordingly will grant plaintiffs partial relief on this issue, and will require defendants to submit a revised system for allowing inmates to invoke their right to be present when their clearly marked legal mail, i.e., mail from attorneys, the courts, and the corrections ombudsman, is opened and inspected for contraband that will remedy these constitutional defects. Defendants' submission will be due sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion. Plaintiffs will have thirty (30) days to respond to the submission. The Court thereafter will issue a final judgment on the issue.
To provide some guidance for defendants, the Court observes that the revised system should contain the following features. First, it should cover mail from an inmate's attorney, from a court, and from the corrections ombudsman. See Taylor, 532 F.2d at 475. Secondly, the policy should be uniform throughout the subject institutions. Thirdly, an inmate should not be required to renew his request for privileged treatment whenever he is transferred. An inmate should be given the choice during the orientation process of receiving privileged 475 treatment for his clearly marked legal mail, and if he exercises his right to *475 be present when the mail is inspected he should maintain that right whenever he is transferred among the subject institutions unless and until he decides to revoke his request. Fourthly, an inmate should not be required to designate a specific attorney, but rather only to state whether he wants privileged treatment for his legal mail. The requirement in rule 791.6603(4) that the mail be clearly identified as legal mail adequately informs prison officials that it may require special handling. See Harrod v. Halford, 773 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2254, 90 L.Ed.2d 699 (1986). The Court believes that the SPSM's system for handling privileged mail, under which no specific attorney is designated but an inmate rather is simply marked as wanting privileged treatment for his legal mail, adequately protects the inmates' constitutional rights in this respect. See 3-23-87 T at 57-59 (testimony of

Thomas Phillips). Finally, the Court recognizes plaintiffs' contention that on occasion their legal mail is read. I find no evidence that these incidents, if they occur at all, are widespread, however, and thus will grant plaintiffs no relief on that issue.
II. Plaintiffs' Winter Clothing Claim
Plaintiffs claim that defendants do not provide them with clothing that is adequate for Michigan winters. First Amended Complaint ¶ 47. The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has interpreted these words "`in a flexible and dynamic manner'", drawing upon objective criteria that reflect "`the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345-46, 101 S.Ct. at 2398-99 (citations omitted). Under the Eighth Amendment, a State may not incarcerate inmates under conditions that "involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain," which includes "inflictions of pain ... that are `totally without penological justification'", or under conditions that are "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment." Id. at 346-47, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citations omitted). In particular, conditions can be cruel and unusual if, considered alone or in combination, they "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399; Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920 (6th Cir.1985).
Several courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have stated that adequate clothing is one of the necessities of life of which State prison officials cannot deprive an inmate. E.g., Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 419 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 156, 83 L.Ed.2d 93 (1985); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F.Supp. 1388, 1410-11 (N.D.Cal.1984); aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986). An inmate is not entitled to the clothing of his choice, and prison officials do not violate the Constitution simply because the clothing they provide may not be aesthetically pleasing or may be illfitting. See Williams v. Duckworth, 598 F.Supp. 9, 16 (N.D.Ind.1983), aff'd mem., 749 F.2d 34 (7th Cir.1984); Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 132-33 (2d Cir.1978), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). States must, however, provide inmates with clothing that is at least minimally adequate for the conditions under which they are confined. Prison officials thus violate the Constitution if they provide inmates with clothing that is "patently insufficient to protect [them] from the cold in the winter months." Balla v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 595 F.Supp. 1558, 1575 (D.Idaho 1984). Inmates exposed to harsh winter conditions without proper winter clothing may indeed suffer "inflictions of pain" that are "totally without penological justification," in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Defendants' clothing policy is set out in Policy Directive PD-BCF-51.01, which provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll newly committed prisoners" will receive an unlined jacket and that "[w]inter coats, blue corduroy headgear with 476 earmuffs, and long underwear, if requested will be issued to prisoners employed outside in cold weather." *476 In accordance with the policy, inmates are not provided gloves or boots unless they are assigned to an outside work detail, in which event they receive adequate winter clothing. E.g., T at 1539-40; T at 1337; T at 2587; see defs. exhs. 385 & 387 (boots and vests). Inmates at the MR and the SPSM in addition are not provided hats; most inmates at the MBP do receive knitted hats, and at least some apparently receive long underwear as well. Pls. exh. 397; T at 1379; T at 1963. The Court has examined the jackets that inmates generally receive during the orientation process. Pls. exhs. 511A & 511B. Exhibit 511A is a lightweight, unlined jacket that is totally inadequate for winter wear. Exhibit 511B is a similar jacket that has a medium-weight lining. Although it is a better winter jacket than exhibit 511A because of the lining, exhibit 511B also is inadequate for winter wear. The Court can take judicial notice of the severity of Michigan winters, and firmly believes that both of these two jackets fail to provide inmates with adequate protection from the cold and snow. Inmates presented credible testimony about the jackets' inadequacy for winter wear. E.g., T at 1963-64; T at 2023. Although there was not a significant amount of testimony about inmates becoming seriously ill due to exposure to the cold, the Court does not believe that inmates are required to establish that they have become seriously ill, or that some of them have died, before being entitled to relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement. There was abundant evidence, moreover, that inmates, except possibly those confined in segregation units, have to go outside to go to meals, to use the telephone, when they are transferred to other institutions, to go to jobs and other appointments, and for recreational periods.

Defendants did introduce evidence at trial that they are producing and distributing a new coat, defs. exh. 315, that the Court considers to be adequate for winter wear. 3-18-87 T at 119-26. Between March, 1985 and March, 1987 defendants had manufactured and shipped 17,286 of the new coats. Id. at 120. A substantial portion of those coats had been sent to the subject facilities. Id. at 120-21. Well over half of the inmates at those facilities, however, did not have the new coat during the 1986-1987 winter. T at 242-47; T at 248-58. The Court observes here that it found both Mr. Hines and Mr. Valeroso to be very credible witnesses. In addition, defendants introduced no evidence that they have changed their policy concerning hats, gloves, and boots. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that defendants do not provide all inmates who are unable to provide adequate winter clothing on their own with an adequate winter coat, a hat, gloves, and boots. Even inmates who possess their own coats, moreover, must give them up when they are transferred, and risk never seeing them again.
The Court finds, based on the facts in the record, that defendants are failing to provide inmates with adequate winter clothing. As I stated previously, the unlined coat and the coat with the light cotton lining are unsuitable for winter wear, and to force inmates to venture outside in them constitutes the infliction of substantial pain without an adequate penological justification. Moreover, inmates often are forced to forego outdoor exercise due to the lack of adequate winter clothing. Although exercise and other recreational pursuits are not necessarily a core concern of the Eighth Amendment, under certain circumstances a deprivation of recreational opportunities can violate the Constitution. See Walker, 771 F.2d at 927-28. Inmates who lack adequate winter clothing, particularly those confined at the MBP where the winters are long and harsh, face a substantial risk of such a constitutional deprivation. See T at 1964-66. Even if this were not the case, however, the Court finds, as it stated previously, that defendants are violating the Constitution by exposing inmates to winter weather without providing them with adequate clothing.
The Court realizes that defendants now are manufacturing an acceptable winter coat. As I already have found, 477 however, a majority of the inmates at the subject facilities do not have it. Defendants' official *477 policy,
moreover, pls. exh. 396, requires only that inmates be given an unlined jacket. The Court thus believes it properly can order defendants to provide adequate winter coats, and that this issue is not moot and does not fall under Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), for two reasons. First, a majority of the inmates at the subject facilities have not yet received the new coat. Second, a voluntary cessation of unconstitutional conduct does not preclude a court from granting injunctive relief where it is not convinced that the unconstitutional conduct will not reoccur. In this case, the Court is not so convinced because defendants' official policy on coats has not changed. Finally, defendants produced no evidence that they routinely provide inmates with gloves, hats, and boots. The Court finds that hats and gloves or mittens are required winter clothing at the subject facilities. The Court also finds, however, that boots are not required if inmates are given adequate winter socks and if walkways and outdoor exercise areas are kept free of snow.
One final point the Court will discuss on this issue is defendants' claim that they are not responsible for any constitutional deprivations that may be occurring. Due to the Eleventh Amendment, and under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, plaintiffs have sued defendants in both their official and individual capacities. The Supreme Court recently clarified that "[a]s long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114, 121 (1985). Given the Eleventh Amendment, the only way a plaintiff can reach state action is to sue individual officers of the State in their official capacities. See id. 473 U.S. at 167, 105 S.Ct. at 3106 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d at 122 n. 14 ("implementation of state policy or custom may be reached in federal court only because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State"). In an official-capacity action, however, "a governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a `moving force' behind the deprivation." Id. 473 U.S. at 167, 105 S.Ct. at 3106, 87 L.Ed.2d at 122 (citation omitted). The Court thus must apply the Monell standard, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), in deciding whether defendants are responsible for any constitutional deprivations plaintiffs may be suffering. See Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.1987). This standard is similar to the standard for supervisory liability that the parties have argued in their written submissions. See Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 872-74 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833, 103 S.Ct. 75, 74 L.Ed.2d 73 (1982). The Court need not discuss this issue further at

this time, however, because defendants' actions and inactions regarding winter clothing clearly represent official policy, and it is pursuant to official policy that plaintiffs' constitutional rights are being violated.
In accordance with the above discussion, the Court will grant plaintiffs relief on this issue, and will enter a judgment enjoining defendants to provide inmates with constitutionally adequate winter coats, hats, gloves, and, under specified circumstances, boots. Inmates are exempt from this order if they are confined in areas where they do not have to go outside during the winter. Defendants, however, must provide adequate winter clothing to inmates during all institutional transfers.
III. Plaintiffs' Lack of Access to Toilets Claim
Plaintiffs' third claim concerns only those inmates who are confined at the RCF and the RPC. Certain cells in these two buildings do not have toilets and wash basins in them. Consequently, inmates must use central lavatory facilities. This lack of in-cell sanitary facilities has caused inmates on occasion to have to urinate and to defecate in their cells in nonflushable receptacles. Plaintiffs contend that this situation violates their right under 478 the Eighth Amendment not to be subject to conditions of confinement that constitute cruel and *478 unusual punishment. Defendants respond that they have a system for releasing inmates from their cells to use the central lavatory facilities that works well, with only occasional sporadic breakdowns, and that no inmate is suffering from cruel and unusual conditions of confinement simply because he does not have a toilet and a washbasin in his cell.
As the Court discussed previously in connection with plaintiffs' winter clothing claim, the Eighth Amendment prohibits States from incarcerating inmates under conditions that, among other things, involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. This standard encompasses inflictions of pain that are totally without penological justification and conditions of confinement that deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities. Among the necessities of life the Eighth Amendment protects is sanitary living conditions and personal hygiene. Walker, 771 F.2d at 926 & 928. The amendment, moreover, also reaches out to protect the basic dignity of man, which is its primary underlying concept. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 597, 21 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion). It ensures that the State exercises its power to punish "within the limits of civilized standards." Trop, 356 U.S. at 100, 78 S.Ct. at 598. In the context before the Court, where prison officials are not required to balance against the safety and constitutional rights of inmates "competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff and other inmates," inmates need not prove "[a]n express intent to inflict unnecessary pain." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, ___, 106 S.Ct 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 260-62 (1986). Although mere "inadvertence or error in good faith" will not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, prison officials cannot unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain on inmates. Id. 475 U.S. at 1084, 106 S.Ct. at ___, 89 L.Ed.2d at 260-61.
When faced with a situation where inmates are confined in cells without toilets and washbasins and are forced to depend on corrections officials for access to those facilities, courts can and have followed one of three different approaches. First, a court can find that it is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment to confine an inmate in a situation where he may have to defecate or urinate in a nonflushable toilet or other receptacle, particularly when the inmate has no means of cleansing himself after performing his bodily functions. Several courts have followed this approach, finding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to "lock[] a person, for any significant period of time, in a cell lacking a flush toilet and a washbowl." Flakes v. Percy, 511 F.Supp. 1325, 1332 (W.D.Wisc.1981); see also LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir.1972) ("Causing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be permitted"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 49, 38 L.Ed.2d 123 (1973); Strachan v. Ashe, 548 F.Supp. 1193, 1202 (D.Mass.1982) (objecting to the use of a "soil pot"); Heitman v. Gabriel, 524 F.Supp. 622, 626 (W.D.Mo.1981) ("[n]o inmate shall be confined for more than one hour in any locked cell which does not have working plumbing"); Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F.Supp. 114, 157 (S.D.N.Y.1977) ("it falls today below an acceptable level of humaneness to confine a prisoner of any sex where he or she must solicit freedom to use a toilet"), rev'd in part and remanded, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.1978), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Negron v. Preiser, 382 F.Supp. 535, 539 n. 4 & 543 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (declining to find a constitutional

violation where "only those patients who are free to leave the cells when they choose, or those patients who are so acutely agitated that they overly threaten to use the toilet facilities to harm themselves or others" will be confined in cells without toilets); cf. Groseclose v. Dutton, 609 F.Supp. 1432, 1437 (M.D.Tenn.1985) (noting potential problems where "meals must be eaten in the cells, often near a malodorous cement commode"), appeal 479 dismissed, 788 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.1986); Blake v. Fair, 563 F.Supp. *479 836 (D.Mass.1983) (finding unconstitutional conditions where, among other things, inmates were confined in a cage area without a toilet or a sink).
A second approach would be to consider that a constitutional violation occurs in a class action context only when the prison's system of releasing inmates to use toilet facilities is inadequate, and instances of inmates not being released to use the facilities are sufficiently frequent that they face a substantial risk of being forced to defecate or urinate in their cells and not being able readily to dispose of their body wastes. Under this approach, a court may grant injunctive relief only if it finds a pattern or practice of noncompliance with a regular release program, or the absence of such a program. See Osborn v. Manson, 359 F.Supp. 1107, 1112 (D.Conn.1973) (holding that defendants may confine inmates in cells without toilets if the inmates are "permitted to use bathroom facilities at reasonable intervals and ... permitted to exercise outside their cells for one hour per day"); cf. Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.1978) (upholding district court order that did not require defendants to install toilets in cells but only to install them "at the site of existing water and sewer lines"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927, 99 S.Ct. 312, 58 L.Ed.2d 320 (1979). Prison officials do not violate the Constitution, this approach holds, merely because they confine inmates in cells without toilets and inmates occasionally are forced to defecate or urinate in their cells without the benefit of a flushable toilet and a washbasin.
A final approach would be to hold that prison officials violate the Constitution only if the conditions of confinement pose a serious risk of harm to the inmates' health. Under this approach, even a pattern or practice of inmates not being released to use the bathroom facilities, and thus being forced to defecate or urinate in their cells, would not violate the Constitution if it did not pose a serious risk of harm to the inmates' physical health. See Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51, 61 (D.Conn.1985) (finding that forcing dormitory inmates to wait to use the bathroom does not cause "significant adverse health effects"; the court contrasted the situation, however, with one where inmates may experience "serious problems of toilets that [do] not flush, leaking toilets, wet floor and water shutdowns"); cf. Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir.1985) (finding food service conditions adequate where there was "no evidence of outbreaks of food poisoning, diarrhea, or other diseases which are indicative of unhealthy conditions in the preparation or handling of food"); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F.Supp. 1052, 1123 (M.D. Tenn.1982) (the Eighth Amendment requires conditions that are "sanitary enough so that inmates are not exposed to an unreasonable risk of disease"); Collins v. Haga, 373 F.Supp. 923, 926 (W.D.Va.1974) (the court found sanitary conditions to be adequate, in part because "there is no indication that any inmate has become ill by reason of the conditions").
Having reviewed the case law and the parties' written submissions on this issue, the Court concludes that the first view properly interprets and implements the core values of the Eighth Amendment. It is too late in the development of our societal values to permit prison officials to confine inmates in cells where they do not have free access to toilet facilities and a washbasin. I fully agree with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that "[c]ausing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be permitted." LaReau, 473 F.2d at 978; see also Bel v. Hall, 392 F.Supp. 274, 277 (D.Mass. 1975) ("[d]eprivation of elementary sanitary facilities automatically and without having disobeyed any of the institutional rules is not only hazardous to health but connotes an institutional disdain for the inmates which is bound to have a cumulative effect and to produce in them feelings of depression and despair"). Exposing an inmate to a situation where he may be forced to defecate or urinate in his own cell without the presence of proper toilet facilities or a washbasin violates the basic human dignity the Eighth Amendment protects. See Flakes, 511 F.Supp. at 1329-32.
480 *480 Even if I were to follow the second approach, moreover, the evidence in this case, which I will discuss in the following paragraphs, is more than adequate to support a finding that defendants are violating the Eighth Amendment rights of those inmates confined at the RCF who do not have free access, i.e., without staff assistance, to toilet facilities and washbasins. Plaintiffs have established by more than a preponderance of the evidence that defendants do not adequately provide these inmates necessary access to toilet facilities and a

washbasin, and thus subject them to a substantial risk of having to defecate or urinate in their room without the benefit of a flushable toilet or a washbasin.
Finally, the Court must reject the third approach, which defendants urge me to adopt. In this context, I believe that requiring plaintiffs to establish that they face a substantial risk of physical harm due to the conditions at the RCF does not give proper weight or respect to the somewhat intangible value of human dignity. The evidence does demonstrate, however, that inmates who are forced to defecate and urinate in their cells at the RCF are exposed to a health risk. See T at 743-47 & 758-60. The Court found Mr. Duel's testimony on this point to be specific and credible. Although Mr. Duel could not quantify the health risk posed to the inmates, the Court finds that a not insubstantial risk does exist, particularly given that inmates are not always provided adequate facilities and materials for cleaning their urinals, i.e., they often have to clean them in the same sinks in which they brush their teeth and wash up and often are given no cleansers to use. T at 1032 & 1055-56 (R & GC); T at 1059, 1414-15, 1806, & 1889 (Protective Custody); T at 1076 & 1093-94 (Administrative Segregation); and T at 1734 (RPC).
To compensate for the lack of toilets and washbasins in certain cells at the RCF and the RPC, defendants attempt to maintain a policy of allowing inmates out of their cells to use the toilet facilities. Since defendants' policy tends to vary with each housing group at the institutions, the Court will discuss it in connection with a separate discussion of the status of each group. Defendants also maintain a regular policy of cleaning the hallways and other common areas at these facilities, and of providing inmates with ample opportunities to clean their own cells on a regular basis. The Court specifically finds that the RCF and the RPC generally are clean facilities, that defendants maintain clean hallways, and, with the exception of areas where urine may be spilled on the floor, see pls. exh. 376a, that the cells are clean. Defs. exhs. 373, 374, 378, 379, & 381. The issue in this context, however, is not necessarily the general sanitary condition of defendants' physical facilities, but whether inmates are given adequate access to toilet facilities. I will discuss this issue separately for each of the four population groups that defendants house at the RCF and the RPC.
The first population group the Court will discuss is the inmates confined in the Reception and Guidance Center, which is located in 7-Building on the first and second floors. Sixty-seven of the cells on the first floor and sixtythree of the cells on the second floor of seven building do not contain toilets or washbasins. Pls. exh. 27 at 13. Inmates are confined in this facility for an average period of two weeks while they are going through orientation and awaiting transfers to other institutions. 4-24-87 T at 20. During that two-week period, they are locked in their cells approximately eighteen hours per day and are allowed out of their cells three times a day for meals and once a day for recreation. Pls. exh. 388; T at 1353-54. They are given a urinal on their arrival at the Reception Center and are told to use it, and to attempt to attract the attention of an officer if they have an emergency. T at 1033, 1054, & 1353. At least two inmates were given a used urinal. T at 1414-15 & 1742. Several inmates testified that they were forced to use the urinals, and on occasion even to defecate in their cells, because they were unable to use the regular toilet facilities. T at 1033 (urinate); T at 1054 (urinate); T at 2298 (urinate); T at 481 1061 (urine in courtyard from inmates in 7-2 quarantine); T at 2296-97 (defecate); T at 2298 *481 (urinate). This testimony was buttressed by testimony of urine and feces being thrown into the courtyard by inmates confined in the Reception area and the Protective Custody area. T at 1046 (feces and urine); T at 1061-62 (feces and urine); T at 1068 (feces and urine); T at 1078-79 (feces); T at 1417 (inmates in quarantine dumping urinals); T at 1436-37 (feces and urine); T at 1707 (feces); & T at 1885 (inmate dumped urinal out of window).
The Court does not find that inmates throw urine and feces into the courtyard on a daily basis. I do find, however, that it occurs often enough to support a finding that defendants fail to provide inmates in the Reception area with regular access to bathroom facilities and that such inmates often are forced to urinate and defecate in their cells. In this regard, I specifically find that Mr. Waterman's trial testimony was not credible and was insufficient to rebut plaintiffs' evidence. It was not credible because it contradicted his detailed deposition testimony on this issue. Even if it were credible it was insufficient because Mr. Waterman did not deny at trial that inmates frequently throw urine and feces out the windows; he merely stated that it was not a "daily" occurrence. 3-25-87 T at 146.
Defendants in their post-trial submissions have pointed the Court to nothing in the record demonstrating that they provide inmates confined at the Reception Center with regular access to bathroom facilities. The logs they submitted in support of their claim that they provide inmates with such access apparently concern only the protective custody and administrative segregation units. See pls. exh. 362. As I will discuss later in this opinion,

moreover, even those logs do not adequately support defendants' position. In summary, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that inmates confined in the Reception area are expected to use their urinals, do use their urinals in their cells, and on occasion even are forced to defecate in their cells. The Court already has found, moreover, that defendants do not always provide these inmates with adequate cleaning materials for their urinals.
The second population group housed in seven building is the protective custody unit, which is housed on the third floor of the building. Ninety-six of the cells on this floor do not have toilets or washbasins. Protective custody inmates are locked in their cells during the night, from approximately 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. to approximately 6:00 or 6:30 a.m. During the day they generally are out of their cells on assignments or just around the housing unit. Pls. exh. 27 at 14-15; see T at 1034. As with the Reception Center inmates, inmates in protective custody are provided with urinals and are told to use them. 3-23-87 T at 107; T at 1040; T at 1704. Several inmates testified that they have had to urinate and to defecate in their cells because they could not get out to use the toilet facilities. T at 1040-44 (defecate and urinate); T at 1059-61 (defecate and urinate); T at 1415-17 (defecate); T at 1430-31 (defecate); T at 1704-05 (defecate); & T at 1886-88 (defecate). This testimony also was buttressed by testimony that inmates confined in the protective custody units dump urine and feces out of their windows.
Defendants established on their cross-examination of some of the inmates that correctional officers frequently let inmates out during the night to use the toilet facilities. T at 1708-09; T at 1903. The bathroom logs defendants submitted, moreover, also demonstrate that the correctional officers frequently let inmates out of their cells during the night to use the facilities. Such logs do not, and cannot, however, indicate the number of times the correctional officers have ignored inmate requests to use the toilet facilities. The Court finds that plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that inmates frequently are forced or required to urinate or to defecate in their cells, and face a substantial risk of not being allowed to use the toilet facilities when they need to do so. Finally, as I already have found, defendants do not always supply these inmates with adequate cleaning supplies for their urinals, and on occasion have provided inmates with used urinals. T at 1058-59.
482 *482 Defendants argue that the Court should not consider the situation of the protective custody inmates because they are phasing out that unit and are replacing those inmates with general population inmates, who are given adequate access to toilet facilities. Warden Quarles testified at trial that defendants are converting the protective custody unit to a general population unit, and expect to finish that project by the summer. 4-24-87 T at 21-22. The Court has no evidence, however, that this transition actually has occurred. I agree with plaintiffs, moreover, that even if the transition has occurred defendants have failed to demonstrate that "`there is no reasonable expectation ...' that the alleged violation will recur." County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (quoting in part United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 898, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)). Absent some kind of assurance that defendants will only confine in these cells inmates who will have free access to toilet facilities, without staff assistance, the Court believes it properly can enjoin any unconstitutional conditions that exist regarding the lack of toilets in them.
The third population group housed in seven building is the administrative segregation unit. These inmates are confined in their cells most of the time, being allowed out only to use the toilet facilities and for a daily recreation period of one hour. Pls. exh. 29 at 17. There are approximately twenty inmates confined in the segregation unit. Defs. exh. 313. Correctional officers make regular bathroom runs four or five times a day, during which time inmates are allowed out of their cells to use the toilet facilities. Pls. exh. 369; Seg.Record dated 11-18-85. In addition, correctional officers make rounds on the unit every one-half hour, during which time inmates can request to be allowed to use the toilet facilities. 4-24-87 T at 19; pls. exh. 27 at 15; pls. exh. 29 at 21.
These requests are not always granted, however, particularly during the late night and early morning hours. Defendants' green log book for the segregation unit indicates that inmates are occasionally allowed out of their cells during the early morning hours to use the toilet facilities. Once again, however, the logs do not reflect the times when an inmate is not allowed out of his cell to use the facilities. See T at 1091-93; T at 1890-91; T at 1077. Plaintiffs' evidence of administrative segregation inmates being forced to defecate or urinate in their cells is less convincing than their evidence on inmates confined in protective custody and in the Reception Center. Instances of these inmates being forced to urinate or defecate in their cells present significant constitutional concerns, however, because they are locked in their cells most of the time and must eat their meals in their cells. See pls. exh. 30 at 11; pls. exh. 29 at 14-15. They are not, moreover, always allowed to wash themselves before

mealtimes. T at 1094; T at 1077. Under such circumstances, the Court finds that defendants are violating the Eighth Amendment rights of the administrative segregation inmates by confining them in cells without toilets or washbasins.
As a concluding note on the administrative segregation inmates, the Court observes that the parties dispute whether the current American Correctional Association standards for Adult Correctional Institutions require defendants to give inmates in segregation units free access to toilet facilities. Defendants argue that standard 2-4130 of the January 1986 supplement indicates that prison officials are not required to provide inmates in segregation units with free access to toilet facilities. Plaintiffs respond that the January 1986 revisions did not affect standard 2-4135, which does require prison officials to provide inmates in segregation units with free access to toilet facilities. Plaintiffs attached standard 2-4135 to their post-trial brief on this issue. The Court believes that plaintiffs probably have the better of this argument. I do not find the ACA standards on this issue to be persuasive one way or the other, however. This is one issue on which the Court finds expert opinion to be helpful, but not persuasive. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 2400 n. 13.
483 *483 The final population group the Court will consider is the inmates confined in the Riverside Psychiatric Center, which is in 11 building. Forty-eight of the rooms in the east wing of this building do not have toilets or washbasins in them. Most of the inmates confined in these rooms are not locked in their cells and are allowed free access to toilet facilities, except during the relatively brief count times. 3-25-87 T at 148 & 159. Some inmates, however, are in seclusion, during which time they are not free to leave their cells to use the toilet facilities. Id. at 151-52. Approximately one to three inmates may be on seclusion at a time in the east wing of the building, although the number could be as high as twelve. Id. at 152-53 & 157. Many of these inmates take psychotropic medications that increase their thirst for liquids, and consequently also increase the frequency of their urination. T at 3300-04.
To cope with this problem, defendants occasionally place urinals in the seclusion cells. 3-25-87 T at 157. These inmates also are offered a toilet break every two hours and are checked every fifteen minutes, during which time they may request to use the bathroom. Id. at 152. It appears, however, that nurses occasionally may delay allowing an inmate in seclusion out to use the bathroom if he or she believes the inmate is merely playing games. Id. at 159. In addition, there is evidence that not more than two inmates are allowed out of their rooms at any one time to use the bathroom facilities. See pls. exh. 368. Finally, there was some evidence that inmates confined at the RPC in cells without toilets have urinated and defecated in their cells. T at 1736-37 & 1740-41; T at 1897.
Defendants contend that even inmates in cells with toilets at the RPC occasionally urinate and defecate in their cells, and that "the problem in 11 building has more to do with the medical problems of individual inmates, rather than the physical plant." They cite to Dr. Bort's deposition testimony, introduced by the plaintiffs, in support of their contention. The Court has reviewed the admitted portions of Dr. Bort's deposition and finds nothing in them indicating that inmates in cells with toilets urinate and defecate on the floor of the cell. Dr. Bort did testify at his deposition, however, that the State Department of Mental Health is opposed to placing toilets in the cells at Riverside. Pls. exh. 4 at 11. Plaintiffs' psychiatric expert, Dr. Rundle, testified, moreover, that patients may urinate and defecate on the floor even when they have direct access to toilet facilities and that most mental health hospitals have some seclusion rooms without toilets and sinks. T at 3314. Dr. Rundle did indicate he disagrees with defendants' use of the seclusion rooms at Riverside and with the Department of Mental Health's rationale for not wanting toilets in the cells. T at 3314-16.
In accordance with the above discussion, the Court concludes that defendants are violating the Eighth Amendment by confining inmates in cells without toilets or washbasins at the RCF and not allowing such inmates free access to central toilet facilities. The basis for the Court's holding differs for the various population groups confined at this facility. With respect to the inmates confined at the Reception Center and in protective custody, the preponderance of the evidence clearly demonstrates that these inmates are not allowed adequate access to the central toilet facilities, and often are required to urinate or defecate in their rooms without the benefit of a flushable toilet facility. Defendants, moreover, expect inmates to use the urinals they give them when they first enter the facility. Under both the first and second of the three approaches to this issue it discussed at the beginning of this section, the Court finds that defendants are violating the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates confined in the Reception Center and in protective custody. Simply put, it violates the basic dignity of these

inmates to require them to urinate and to defecate into improper containers and to live in close proximity to their body wastes. Defendants are using a medieval building in the 1980s.
The situation is a little different for the inmates in the administrative segregation unit and the inmates in the 484 Riverside Psychiatric *484 Center. Defendants have established that inmates in the administrative segregation
unit generally are allowed access to toilet facilities. The Court cannot, however, ignore the significant risk, which plaintiffs have established exists, that these inmates may be required to defecate or urinate in their cells, particularly in the late night and early morning hours. This risk is exacerbated by the lack of washbasins or other cleaning materials in the cells and by the fact that these inmates are forced to eat in their cells, often times without the opportunity to clean up before the meal. The Court thus finds that defendants' treatment of the administrative segregation inmates at the RCF also violates the Eighth Amendment. It violates the Eighth Amendment to lock an inmate, for any significant period of time, in a cell without an operable toilet and washbasin. Even though the administrative segregation inmates are not forced to urinate or defecate in their cells as frequently as the Reception Center and protective custody inmates are, the risk that they will have to do so exists and it is defendants' official policy of not having toilets or washbasins in those cells which subject them to that risk.
The Court declines to find an Eighth Amendment violation with respect to those inmates confined at the RPC. The only Eighth Amendment problem in this unit concerns inmates who are on seclusion status. Inmates who are not in seclusion have regular access to toilet facilities, and I cannot accept plaintiffs' argument that I should issue an order covering all of the cells in eleven building simply because defendants may at some time use them for other purposes. The evidence produced at trial established that defendants currently limit toilet access only for inmates in seclusion; there was little, if any, evidence that this policy may change in the future. With regard to the seclusion inmates, I cannot ignore Dr. Bort's testimony that the Department of Mental Health is opposed to placing toilets in the cells and Dr. Rundle's testimony that most mental health hospitals have and employ seclusion rooms that do not have toilets or washbasins. Dr. Rundle indicated that defendants are not properly employing the seclusion rooms at Riverside, but plaintiffs produced no other evidence on that issue. I thus cannot find that it violates contemporary standards of decency for defendants to confine inmates at the RPC in seclusion cells without toilets or washbasins.
The Court thus will enter an order granting plaintiffs partial relief on this issue. Since it is defendants' official policy to confine inmates at the RCF in cells without toilets, there can be no question as to their responsibility for the constitutional violations that are occurring. I am not unsympathetic, however, to defendants' need for these administrative segregation and protective custody cells. I therefore will not, at this time, adopt plaintiffs' suggestion that I enjoin defendants from confining any inmate, absent emergency conditions, in a cell without an operative toilet and washbasin for more than forty minutes. Rather, I will give defendants sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion to produce a plan for remedying the deficiencies that exist at the RCF. Plaintiffs shall then have thirty (30) days to comment on the plan. The Court thereafter will either accept defendants' plan, order defendants to produce a revised plan, or impose its own plan on defendants.
IV. Plaintiff's Access to Court's Claim
Plaintiffs' fourth claim is that defendants are denying them their constitutional right of access to the courts by failing to satisfy their obligation to assist inmates "in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing" them "with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Before discussing the merits of plaintiffs' claim, the Court will address two preliminary matters.
The first preliminary matter concerns the case of Walker v. Johnson, which was remanded, in part, by the Sixth 485 Circuit to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in 1985. Walker v. Mintzes, *485 771 F.2d 920 (6th
Cir.1985). One of the issues discussed by the Sixth Circuit, and remanded to the District Court, was whether the Michigan prison system provides inmates confined at the SPSM, the MR, and the MBP with adequate access to the courts. The class of inmates involved in the Walker proceeding apparently is the same class of inmates that is involved in this proceeding. Unfortunately, neither of the parties to this case informed the Court that the Sixth

Circuit had remanded the access to courts issue to Judge Newblatt for further proceedings, or requested the Court to stay any proceedings on that issue since it already was before Judge Newblatt. Defendants did file a motion for partial dismissal on September 25, 1985 that was based in part on the Walker decision. They did not discuss the access to courts issue in their motion and brief, however, and did not request the Court to defer to the proceedings before Judge Newblatt. The Court realized for the first time the nature of the issue and the status of the proceedings before the Eastern District as it was preparing this opinion.
It may be regrettable that there have been two federal court proceedings involving the same issue and the same class of inmates. Nevertheless, given the status of these proceedings, I see no reason not to decide plaintiffs' claim. It simply is too late in the game for me not to decide the access to courts issue. In addition, I note that Judge Newblatt issued his decision in 1982. I have no idea what evidence Judge Newblatt had before him and have only his opinion as evidence of the condition of Michigan's law library system at that time. The Court thus does not believe it is in any way precluded from ruling on plaintiffs' claim, except of course to the extent that it must follow the Sixth Circuit's rulings in Walker on this issue.
The second preliminary matter is defendants' April 23, 1987 request that I take judicial notice of state and federal court records concerning lawsuits brought by three inmates who testified on the access to courts issue. Defendants contend that these records impeach part or all of the witnesses' testimony and indicate that they provide inmates with adequate access to the courts. Plaintiffs oppose defendants' request. They argue, in essence, that the Court should not grant the request because defendants waited until the last moment to file it, and thus precluded them from presenting rebuttal evidence, and because the Court had prevented them from submitting rebuttal grievances on the ground that defendants would not have an opportunity to explain or to rebut the grievances.
Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[a] court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information." Paragraph (e) of the rule provides that a party is entitled to "an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed" while paragraph (f) states that "[j]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding." As defendants argue, courts routinely take judicial notice of court records. E.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cullen, 791 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1986); Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 3180, 49 L.Ed.2d 1192 (1977). Moreover, also as defendants argue, the records they seek to introduce are relevant to this proceeding. Plaintiffs do not contest the records' accuracy or, for the most part, their relevancy.
Rule 201 and the cases defendants cite in their briefs seemingly require the Court to take judicial notice of the court records. I believe, however, that the rule is not as mandatory as it appears to be, and under the peculiar circumstances of this case deny defendants' request. I base my decision on three grounds.
First, judicial notice is an alternative means of proof that is subject, like all other offers of evidence, to rules 403 and 611(a). See Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 301-02, 57 S.Ct. 724, 729, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937) ("notice, even when taken, has no other effect than to relieve one of the parties to a 486 controversy of the burden of resorting to the usual forms of evidence"; "`[i]t does *486 not mean that the opponent is prevented from disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it disputable'") (citation omitted); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control Group Int'l, 762 F.2d 454, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) ("it is clear that the court's power to take judicial notice `at any stage' may be circumscribed by other considerations"). Secondly, defendants did not give plaintiffs fair notice of their intent to request the Court to take judicial notice of the court records. The relevant witnesses testified in August, 1986 (August 13th (Kingon), August 15th (Kemp-Bey), and August 25th (Cade)). Yet defendants did not produce the court records until April 23, 1987, only five days (including two weekend days) before the end of trial, thereby effectively denying plaintiffs any opportunity to present the three inmates as rebuttal witnesses. Arguably plaintiffs were able in their June 9, 1987 reply brief to rebut any inferences the Court could draw from the records. Normally, the Court would accept such a written submission in lieu of live rebuttal testimony. I decline to do so here, however, because the credibility of the witnesses is important and defendants are in effect offering the records in lieu of, or as a supplement to, their crossexamination of the inmates.
Finally, defendants' request simply strikes me as being unfair, and I believe that it would be inconsistent with my other evidentiary rulings to grant it. I have tried to be fair to both parties in admitting evidence while remaining

cognizant of the fact that I must determine what conditions presently exist in the subject institutions. In trying to achieve these goals, I have excluded some evidence I arguably should have admitted and have admitted some evidence I arguably should have excluded. In this instance, given defendants' inexcusable delay in requesting me to take judicial notice of the court records, I deny their request. I note, however, that the records concern only three of the inmates who testified on the access to courts issue and that even without this testimony, plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to satisfy their burden of proof.
Turning now to the merits of plaintiffs' claim, this was a difficult issue to decide. As I will discuss, plaintiffs' proofs, although adequate, were not overwhelming. In addition, the published case law is in conflict, with courts enunciating interesting, thoughtful, and sometimes widely varying views on access to the courts. This also is an area in which this Court, like most other federal district courts, has substantial personal knowledge of the issues and of the difficulties inmates face in presenting their concerns to a court. I have reviewed numerous prisoner petitions, some of which were well-written and well-researched, and others of which reflected a complete lack of legal knowledge and of the ability to write coherent sentences and paragraphs. Finally, this is an area in which the Court, as one who uses legal resources and hears and decides cases on a daily basis, has a special interest. Nevertheless, the Court must decide plaintiffs' claim in accordance with the law and the evidence produced at trial. I will discuss my factual findings, the legal standards I must consider, and finally my conclusions of law. Any legal conclusions I may make in my factual discussion shall be considered part of my conclusions of law.
Defendants' Law Library System
Defendants have chosen to meet their obligation to assist inmates "in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers" primarily by providing them with law libraries. They have contracted with Prison Legal Services of Michigan to provide some representation to inmates at the SPSM. Pls. exh. 108. Prison Legal Services cannot, however, represent inmates in civil rights actions against the Department of Corrections or its employees; it has insufficient staff to meet the demands of the inmates; and its services are available only to inmates confined at the SPSM. See T at 505-06. At each institution, therefore, defendants maintain a main law library that most of the general population inmates can use. Inmates in administrative segregation, punitive detention, and protective 487 custody, and many minimum security inmates, do not, however, have direct physical access *487 to these main law libraries. For these inmates, defendants attempt to satisfy their legal obligation by providing them with access to "mini-law libraries" and by allowing them to request books from the main law library. Since defendants have chosen to provide inmates with law libraries, I must evaluate their adequacy and must determine whether they provide inmates with meaningful access to the courts. Since each of the institutions has a different library structure, I will discuss them separately.
First, I consider the facilities available at the State Prison of Southern Michigan. Two complexes of this institution, the north complex and the south complex, are involved in this issue. Both complexes have their own law libraries that contain the required minimum collection. See pls. exh. 115. Each library, in addition, has access to the central complex law library, which contains many materials that are not on the required list. 3-19-87 T at 118; see defs. exh. 258 & 278a. Defendants inventory their holdings on a semi-annual basis and regularly order and receive updated materials and replacements for materials that have been reported lost or damaged. See defs. exhs. 257, 257a, 253, 252a, 251b, 251c & 251d; pls. exh. 120 & 121; 3-19-87 T at 158-60; 3-23-87 T at 12-14. The inventories occasionally are disorganized and imprecise in identifying missing volumes. See pls. exh. 121. I find, however, that the north complex and south complex law librarians generally keep their collections up-to-date and in order. I also find, though, that there are certain materials not required by official policy, see PD-BCF-61.01, and which these libraries do not otherwise have in their collections, to which the inmates should have direct access: (1) a complete set of the Wright and Miller treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure, which the Court itself regularly uses (the libraries carry only volumes 1-3A of this treatise; although the central complex library carries the complete treatise, given its value to those pursuing federal court litigation, the north and south complex libraries also should carry it); (2) Michigan civil jury instructions (the law libraries carry only the criminal jury instructions); and (3) all of the local court rules for the state and federal courts (it appears that only the north complex library carries the federal local court rules).

The law libraries' physical facilities are cramped, particularly at the south complex, but adequate. See defs. exhs. 327-28 & 331-34. The north complex law library is housed in the academic school, along with the general library, and seats 18-22 inmates (which includes general library inmates). 3-23-87 T at 7 & 24. The north complex has never turned any inmates away because of space limitations. Id. at 10. Books are available in the library on a call-out basis; the inmate requests a book from the inmate law clerk, who then retrieves it for him. An inmate can request up to three books at a time. By system-wide policy, each inmate is entitled to six hours of library time per week, in two-hour segments, plus extra time if needed. In addition, the law libraries are supposed to be open a minimum of 25 hours per week, with at least one-half of those hours after 5:00 p.m. or on weekends. See pls. exh. 130; def. exhs. 256 & 274. The north and south complex law libraries generally are open for the required number of hours, although there are times when they are closed, particularly in the north complex, due to staff absences. T at 950-51. The closures, however, although regrettable and a situation defendants certainly should rectify, are not sufficiently frequent to infringe on the inmates' right of access to the courts.
The south complex law library is housed in a trailer that can accommodate about nine inmates at a time. Although the available space is small, the librarian testified that he never has had to turn anyone away because of lack of space, 3-19-87 T at 152, and the evidence in the record does not establish that the small space is a significant problem. As with the north complex library, books are available to inmates by request and each inmate generally is limited to three books at a time. Inmate access to both libraries generally is on a call-out basis, pursuant to 488 which an inmate submits *488 a request to use the law library, and then is placed on a call-out sheet by the librarian or inmate law clerk and allowed to go to the library by the correctional officers for his housing unit. See defs. exh. 256 & 274. In the south complex, some inmates have a detail to the law library, pursuant to which they are allowed to go to the library at a scheduled time on a regular basis. The Court heard some evidence that inmates are not able to use the law library because its hours conflict with academic or work assignments, e.g., T at 2542-43 & T at 951; that inmates are denied access to the law libraries; and that inmate law clerks, particularly in the north complex, deny access to inmates they do not like. These situations are not, however, sufficiently frequent or egregious to infringe on the inmates' right of access to the courts, although I certainly condemn them. The call-out system of library access is susceptible of, and occasionally subject to, abuse by staff and inmate law clerks. The evidence does not demonstrate, however, that it is being improperly implemented at the north and south complexes on a class-wide basis.
In terms of staffing, both libraries are headed by civilian law librarians. The south complex librarian has an associates degree in library technology; the north complex librarian has a bachelor's degree, but no specialized training in librarianship. Both librarians have attended a two-day state sponsored workshop on legal research. They are not, however, allowed to assist inmates in legal research, other than to offer advice on where to look for guidance. See 3-19-87 T at 1661 3-23-87 T at 34 & 49; pls. exh. 142. I specifically find that the librarians are not qualified or competent to perform legal research, or even to offer inmates sound legal advice on where to research their specific problems. In particular, I heard no evidence from defendants indicating that their two-day legal research workshop is adequate training for the librarians, and I seriously doubt that it could be. The central complex librarian, who directly supervises the north and south complex librarians, does have a master's degree in library science from the University of Michigan and significant experience working in law libraries. There was no evidence, however, that she provides advice on inmate requests for legal assistance.
In addition to the civilian staff, the law libraries hire inmates to act as law clerks. They generally attempt to hire as clerks inmates who have shown an interest in, and some knowledge of, legal research. See 3-19-87 T at 113-14. They do not, however, have a formal training program for the inmate law clerks, and more importantly do not allow them to assist other inmates in their legal research. E.g., 3-19-87 T at 167; pls. exh. 138. In general, the record more than adequately demonstrates, for all of the institutions, that inmates usually must conduct legal research and draft complaints and other pleadings on their own. Inmates are not allowed to assist each other absent written authorization from prison officials or unless they are co-defendants. See pls. exhs. 113-P, 114, & 99. Few inmates use the written legal agreements for assistance, primarily because they are not always approved and because one of the inmates to the contract may be transferred to another institution, thereby effectively severing the relationship. See, e.g., T at 534-35, 548-49, 557, 583, & 653-54; T at 981-82.

In addition, the often-fabled jailhouse lawyers or writ-writers are, at least in the Michigan system, too few and often too uninformed to provide adequate assistance to the inmates. T at 543-44; T at 1541-42 (jailhouse lawyer unavailable after complaint was filed; case later dismissed); T at 1603-12 (general difficulties with jailhouse lawyers; had to pay one $150.00); T at 1656-59 (had to pay inmate $25.00; inmate later transferred); T at 1692-93 (staff, but not the named defendants, discouraged inmate from assisting other inmates); T at 1162-68 (payment for services of jailhouse lawyers); T at 1770-75 (payment for services; also problems when "lawyer" transferred); T at 2118 (could not pay charge for jailhouse lawyer); T at 2398-99 (payment for services); T at 2440-41 (indicating demand for money for services); T at 2657-58 (law librarian forbade inmate assistance 489 absent *489 approved contract); & T at 3139 (inmate transferred before contract was approved). The payment of money for these services can, of course, create serious conflicts among the inmate population, cf. T at 940, and defendants commendably attempt to regulate the situation by requiring an approved written contract of assistance. As the Court already has found, however, inmates rarely use defendants' system and the system cannot assure assistance to inmates who require it. Indeed, defendants do not vigorously argue that inmates have adequate access to legal assistance from either other inmates or official staff.
I shift my focus now to the Michigan Reformatory. The MR offers inmates legal assistance in the form of a main law library and three "mini-law libraries." The so-called mini-law libraries are available to inmates confined in administrative segregation and protective custody, and inmates who are in transition from one housing unit or institution to another. It appears that one "mini-law library" has been closed, 3-23-87 T at 84 & 97-98, and that defendants currently have "mini-law libraries" only for inmates in administrative segregation (the Adjustment Center) and protective custody. The MR also has a dormitory unit, which houses minimum security inmates. By policy, inmates in this unit who wish to use a law library must request a temporary transfer to the SPSM. Pls. exh. 115. All other inmates at the MR have access to the main law library.
The main law library is housed in a building along with the general library. 3-23-87 T at 72; see defs. exh. 317. The space is adequate for the inmates' needs. Inmates generally have access to the law library on a call-out basis. 3-23-87 T at 87-89. As was the case with the SPSM libraries, the Court heard testimony indicating inmates occasionally are denied access to the law library, either because of improper actions by the inmate law clerks or because of staff error. In addition, the MR has had difficulty maintaining regular hours because it was without a head librarian for a while in 1986 and 1987. It recently hired a head librarian, however, who has a MLS degree in librarianship and experience working in prison law libraries. Defs. exh. 385 at ¶ 6. The Court heard no evidence, moreover, indicating that the inmates as a class had difficulty getting access to the main law library or that inmates have been denied access to the courts because of this situation.
The main law library maintains the required legal materials as well as some supplemental materials. Like the SPSM law libraries, however, the MR library does not have a complete set of the Wright and Miller treatise, the Michigan civil jury instructions, or the local rules for the federal district courts. In addition, the MR apparently carries an out-of-date treatise on habeas corpus law that was published in 1969. This is a glaring omission given the number of habeas writs filed in this Court. Defendants do not, moreover, conduct adequate inventories of the collection to ensure that it is kept up-to-date. See defs. exh. 284. The Court thus has no assurance that the MR collection is adequate for the inmates' needs.
The situation in the "mini-law libraries" is even worse. These "libraries," by policy, are required to carry only an extremely limited selection of materials. Pls. exh. 115. Although inmates can request books from the main law library, the "mini-law libraries" contain no digests and few treatises in which an inmate can locate cases to request from the main law library. In addition, defendants' exhibit 283 indicates that the I-Block mini-law library carries an out-of-date treatise on habeas corpus law and only a nutshell treatise on criminal law and procedure (although it does have the Gillespie treatise on Michigan criminal law and procedure). Even then, required materials often are missing from the libraries. T at 553-55; pls. exh. 161; 3-23-87 T at 84. Inmates confined in administrative segregation rarely, if ever, have direct access to assistance from other inmates or from staff. There also was some testimony that inmates are not always aware they can request books from the main law library and do not always receive what they have requested. See T at 2807; T at 1721. Even without these obstacles, 490 inmates in *490 these mini-law library units generally are allowed to request only five books at a time, three times

a week, from the main law library. As I will discuss later in this opinion, this access is not adequate for a segregation inmate to be able to prepare a meaningful complaint.
Defendants staff the MR library with a head librarian and an assistant librarian. The head librarian has an advanced degree in librarianship and experience working in prison law libraries. The assistant librarian has a bachelor's degree in social work. Though they are qualified prison librarians, both persons, like the SPSM librarians, cannot provide much assistance to the inmates. In addition, the Court's findings on other sources of inmate assistance at the SPSM, particularly in terms of the inmate clerks and jailhouse lawyers, apply also to the Michigan Reformatory. I find in particular that inmates in the segregation unit, in protective custody, and in the transition unit generally do not have access to sources of legal assistance other than the "mini-law libraries," which, as I have found, are pathetically inadequate, and the main law library via book requests, which does not provide them an adequate opportunity to conduct meaningful legal research. Plaintiffs' exhibit 101 and Mr. Graves' testimony indicate that protective custody inmates are allowed direct access to the law library twice a week. Although this evidence contradicts defendants' policy directive, the Court finds that protective custody inmates are allowed limited access to the main law library for three hours per week. They still, however, primarily depend on the mini-law library and requests for books from the main law library for their research. See 3-23-87 T at 93.
The final institution to be analyzed is the Marquette Branch Prison. Like the MR, the MBP services its inmates through a main law library and a system of "mini-law libraries." The main law library is located in the general population section of the institution, in the academic school. It can accommodate approximately fifteen (15) inmates at a time and appears to be large enough to serve the general population inmates' needs. 3-24-87 T at 115-16; see defs. exhs. 324-326. There are five "minilaw libraries," which are located in A-Block (protective custody), B-Block, D-Block, E-Block, and F-Block. 3-24-87 T at 132. As was the case at the MR, these mini-law libraries and whatever books the inmates can procure from the main law library provide segregation and protective custody inmates with their only access to legal assistance. In addition, there are inmates confined at the trustee division, which is outside of the prison walls, who also are serviced through the main law library. The trustee division has a small collection of books, but it cannot really be called any kind of a library.
The main law library at the MBP contains all of the books required by policy, and the librarian at the institution inventories the collection twice a year to keep it up-to-date. See defs. exhs. 299a, 299b, & 299c. There is no indication in the record that this library contains much beyond the required collection, except for a prisoner selfhelp litigation manual. 3-24-87 T at 132. In addition, the library does not contain the materials the Court already has found should be added to the collections at the MR and the SPSM. See supra at 38-39. The mini-law libraries also contain the materials required by official policy, and the Court is satisfied that the librarian at the MBP keeps the mini-law library collections reasonably up-to-date. Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Wilbur, testified that when he toured the "mini-libraries" in April, 1986 several items were missing from them. T at 564-66 & 572. In addition, several inmates testified as to missing materials. E.g., T at 2256; T at 2112; & T at 2214. Defendants' librarian, Ms. Baker, testified, moreover, that she had had some difficulties with the "mini-law library" collections. 3-24-87 T at 131. She also testified, though, and defendants' exhibit 299c indicates, that the collections currently are in good shape. Id. at 133. The Court thus finds that defendants maintain the required materials at the "mini-law libraries."
The general population inmates generally have adequate access to the main law library. The library is open 27.5 491 hours per *491 week, defs. exh. 297a, and each inmate is allowed six hours of access per week, plus additional
time if needed. Id. Although the Court is troubled by the lack of adequate night-time and weekend hours, which appears to violate defendants' official policy, pls. exh. 115 at 3; see pls. exh. 61, and even though there was testimony indicating inmates have been improperly denied additional law library time, see T at 1973-74, the Court does not find that inmates have been hindered in pursuing their cases because of the main law libraries' hours. As is the case at the MR, the head librarian at the MBP has a master's degree in library science, but does not assist inmates in their legal research. The inmate law clerks who assist the librarian also do not assist inmates in their legal research. 3-24-87 at 139-40. In addition, the Court adopts here its prior findings concerning inmate access to legal assistance from staff or other inmates.

In the segregation units, inmates are supposed to have access to the "mini-law libraries" for two hours per week. Unlike the general population inmates, the segregation inmates experience some difficulty in getting even this limited access. See T at 2596; T at 2255; T at 2051; & T at 1613-15. Inexplicably, inmates in one of the segregation blocks are even required to use the mini-law library during the middle of the night. T at 566-67; T at 1177 & 1199; & T at 1284. When the inmates do get access to a mini-law library, they often find it inadequate for their use. E.g., T at 2596-97; T at 2255-56; & T at 1615. In addition, there was substantial testimony and documentation (see pls. exhs. 70, 91 & 102) indicating that inmates often are unable to get even the fifteen books a week they are allowed to receive from the main law library.
Defendants' exhibit 250A indicates that inmates in A-Block (formerly the MIPC) receive a number of books from the main law library. Even assuming, however, that the main law library can and does fill 80% of the requests segregation inmates submit, see 3-24-87 T at 127, an inmate still will receive only an average of twelve books per week. As is the case with the MR mini-law libraries, moreover, the MBP mini-law libraries contain few, if any, digests or treatises from which inmates can get case citations and thus know what case books to request from the main law library. It is impossible for them to conduct effective legal research under such a system, and the system is inadequate to provide them with effective access to the courts. See infra at 56. The situation is much the same in the trustee division, which has only a small law library and thus must depend on the main law library for most of its legal materials.
In summary, I find that the main law library at the MBP does not contain a sufficient number of the required materials to service properly the general population inmates, the segregation and protective custody inmates, and the inmates at the trustee division. The main law library simply has to serve too many different housing units for the collection it has. Cf. pls. exh. 61. The situation is different than one where a number of inmates are using the same library. In the latter context, one copy of a book may suffice because any one inmate will have the book out for a maximum of two hours. If a book is sent to a segregation unit or to the trustee division, however, then it may be unavailable to other inmates for several days.
As the preceding factual discussion indicates, inmates at the subject facilities, particularly those who do not have direct access to the main law libraries, often are unable to conduct meaningful legal research or to gain assistance from persons who have some legal knowledge. I find that because of these barriers to legal research and deficiencies in defendants' law library system, inmates often are unable to file meaningful complaints or to defend properly their complaints against motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. Some inmates are able to use the system to prepare effective complaints and to gain relief on their claims. See T at 966-67; T at 987-89 (with attorney assistance on the criminal cases); T at 1755 (responded to motions); T at 2816 (got 492 misconduct setaside); & T at 3143 (recovered *492 monetary award). A far greater number of inmates, however, are unable to use the system to gain meaningful access to judicial forums. See T at 1174-78 & 1247 (case dismissed; had trouble responding to motion); T at 1282-86 (unable to access books); T at 1541-45 & 1548 (unable to prepare effective response; made only one request for books); T at 1612-17 (could not respond to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation); T at 1658-62 (unable to respond to court orders); T at 1673-76 (delays in getting books; could not get two books at all); T at 1721 & 1725 (access delayed for ten months); T at 1767-69, 1776-77, 1787-88, 1819-20 (unable to respond to Report and Recommendation and to motion for summary judgment; suit is still pending); T at 1850 & 1851-5 (lost in library; had difficulty with administrative segregation library); T at 2211-14 (had difficulty with administrative segregation library); T at 2300-03 (unable to file delayed appeal); T at 2435-41 (could not use law library; did not know what to do); T at 2594-95, 2596-97, 2598, 2604-10 (although has filed suits and responded to motions, had difficulty getting adequate access to materials); T at 2661-67 (could not file timely, effective response to Reports and Recommendations); T at 3014 (could not file meaningful habeas corpus petition; could not respond to state's submission).
I am aware that some inmates do not use their full efforts in pursuing their legal grievances. I also am aware that defendants, because of security and other concerns, may legitimately restrict certain inmates' access to the law libraries and other sources of legal assistance. For all inmates, and particularly for inmates confined in the segregation units, inmates in protective custody, and certain minimum security inmates, however, the Court finds, as a factual matter, that defendants do not provide adequate access to legal materials or other sources of legal

assistance, that defendants have not justified this denial of access, and that this denial of access has precluded inmates from filing meaningful legal papers and from effectively pursuing their legal remedies.
In addition to the adequacy of defendants' law libraries, including whether inmates who need assistance from other persons are able to get it, plaintiffs also challenge defendants' policies, procedures, and practices concerning photocopying of cases, complaints, and other legal documents; inmates' ability to call their attorneys; visits by attorneys to inmate clients; the care of inmates' legal materials during transfers; and inmates' access to notaries. In each of these areas, although inmates occasionally have difficulty and sometimes are hindered in their efforts to pursue legal remedies, I do not find, as a factual matter, that plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a need for judicial intervention.
Defendants' Constitutional Obligation
Any analysis of an access to courts issue must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). In Bounds the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of "whether States must protect the right of prisoners to access to the courts by providing them with law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge." Id. The Court, elaborating on its prior decisions in Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971) (per curiam), and Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), answered that question affirmatively, holding that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498; see Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 288 (6th Cir.1983) ("Prison officials are charged with the responsibility of assuring that inmate access to the courts is `adequate, effective and meaningful'") (citation omitted); Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d 639, 640 (6th Cir.1983) (a State must provide a prisoner with either a law library or "the assistance of legallytrained personnel"). State officials are 493 given substantial discretion in deciding how to *493 implement the holding of Bounds, and a court reviewing a State's system must evaluate it "as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional standards." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832, 97 S.Ct. at 1500. Whatever system a State chooses, however, must ensure that "inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful."
The vagueness of the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds has led lower federal courts to issue differing interpretations of what a State must do to ensure that inmates have meaningful access to the courts. Some courts have indicated that a State need only provide inmates with access to an adequate collection of law books, regardless of whether the inmates are able to use the materials. See Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 229-30 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 673, 93 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987); Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir.1985); Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1984); see also Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1437-38 (11th Cir.1985) (inmates are not constitutionally entitled to an attorney if the State provides access to an adequate collection of law books), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 313, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986). Other courts, however, and in particular two district courts in this circuit, have found that a State may not always be able to satisfy its obligation under Bounds simply by providing inmates with access to a collection of law books. See Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F.Supp. 1536, 1549 (W.D.Ky. 1984); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075, 1096 (E.D.Mich.1979); see also Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1985) (indicating that an adequate law library under Bounds includes "inmate law clerks trained to assist inmates with legal problems"); Battle v. Anderson, 614 F.2d 251, 255-56 (10th Cir.1980) (indicating that an adequate supply of law books combined with access to writ writers and inmate law clerks may suffice under Bounds); Cody v. Hillard, 599 F.Supp. 1025, 1060-61 (D.S.D.1984) (following Glover), aff'd, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.1986), reh'g granted, Oct. 28, 1986. In a follow-up on the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds itself, moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently upheld a district court's finding that the State of North Carolina had failed to provide an adequate law library for inmates because, in part, it had not implemented a program for "the training and placement of ... inmate paralegals." Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299, 1302 (4th Cir.1987).
From its analysis of the published case law the Court has concluded that a State seeking to satisfy its obligation under Bounds generally must provide a program of access that satisfies two criteria. First, the program must provide some source of legal information, whether in the form of an adequately stocked law library, attorneys, or

some combination of the two, to all inmates. Secondly, "for those inmates who possess insufficient intellectual or educational abilities to permit reasonable comprehension of their legal claims, provision must be made to allow them to communicate with someone who, after consultation with the legal learning source, is capable of translating their complaints into an understandable presentation." Kendrick, 586 F.Supp. at 1549; see Glover, 478 F.Supp. at 1096. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bounds, in which the Court indicated a State may be required to provide some additional assistance to inmates who are unable to perform legal research on their own. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823-24 & 826, 97 S.Ct. at 1495-96, 1497; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577-80, 94 S.Ct. at 2985-86 (holding that States must allow inmates to assist each other in civil rights and habeas actions).
It is not inconsistent, moreover, with the Sixth Circuit's admonitions that a State is required only to provide either an adequate law library or trained legal assistance. See Penland v. Warren County Jail, 759 F.2d 524, 531-32 & 531 n. 7 (6th Cir.1985) (en banc). A State that provides an inmate with access to an adequate law library is not obligated to provide that inmate with a professionally trained assistant to conduct his legal research, draft his 494 complaint, and try his case. See Hooks, 775 F.2d at 1437-38. Simply holding that an inmate is not *494 entitled to both an adequate law library and access to an attorney does not, however, resolve the issue of whether a State must provide at least a minimal amount of assistance 0907 for example, inmate law clerks or paralegals who can assist an inmate in his research and explain to him how to file a competent complaint or how to respond to a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment 0907 to inmates who because of illiteracy or similar intellectual or educational handicaps simply cannot use a law library without assistance. The Court believes that a fair reading of Bounds demonstrates that the Supreme Court expected that States would provide such assistance to inmates who need it: the assistance, if needed, would be one component of an adequate law library.
Nevertheless, in deciding an access to courts claim a court must evaluate the State's system as a whole. If inmates have adequate access to the courts under the State's system, then the system, or plan, is not unconstitutional simply because it does not satisfy the two criteria stated above. As the Sixth Circuit has held, "[w]e are concerned with a right of access to the courts, not necessarily to a prison law library." Walker, 771 F.2d at 932 (emphasis in original). Inmates are not entitled to "some minimum amount of time in the prison law library"; they bear the initial burden, rather, of demonstrating that the State's system has impeded their access to the courts. Id.; see also Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (6th Cir.1987) (sufficient access was provided where the inmate appeared before the trial court, which questioned him carefully about his claim); Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1021 (7th Cir.1987) (States are required to provide inmates "that quantum of access to prison libraries 0907 not total or unlimited access 0907 which will enable them to research the law and determine what facts may be necessary to state a cause of action"); Cepulonis, 732 F.2d at 3 & 5 (access is denied if inmates have inadequate time to conduct legal research).
Once the inmates have established a prima facie case that they have been denied access to the courts, however, the burden shifts to the State to establish that its system or plan of access is constitutionally adequate under Bounds. Smith, 813 F.2d at 1302; Campbell, 787 F.2d at 225-26; Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1981). Some courts have indicated that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case simply by demonstrating that they have inadequate access to a law library. See Cepulonis, 732 F.2d at 4; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F.Supp. 1388, 1403 & 1413 (N.D.Cal. 984), aff'd in relevant part, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.1986); Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 772-73 (5th Cir.1986). Finally, in analyzing defendants' system the Court must consider that under Bounds a State is obligated only to assist inmates in "the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers," i.e., nonfrivolous complaints and petitions that meet all procedural prerequisites and adequate responses to motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826 & 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1497, 1498. A State is not obligated to do anything more than assist inmates at the pleading stage. Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 854-55 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985); see Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 84-85 (5th Cir.1986).
The Constitutional Adequacy of Defendants' System
The first issue the Court must decide in evaluating the adequacy of defendants' system is whether plaintiffs have met their initial, prima facie, burden of establishing that the system is inadequate in any respect. In accordance

with its factual findings, the Court finds that they have. The Court concludes, and holds, that defendants' present system denies inmates appropriate, i.e., adequate, effective, and meaningful, access to the courts. Defendants' statistics, see defs. exhs. 304, 383, & 387, demonstrate that the plaintiffs, as a class, have access to the courts in the sense that they are able to file complaints and petitions for relief. The Supreme Court emphasized in Bounds, 495 however, that States must assist inmates in the preparation and filing of nonfrivolous claims that meet all *495 procedural prerequisites, and in preparing responses to the State's arguments. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826, 97 S.Ct. at 1497. Defendants' statistics do not demonstrate that inmates have adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts. A complaint or petition is not meaningful or adequate if it cannot survive a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, e.g., failure to exhaust state court remedies, lack of jurisdiction, or failure to name the proper parties, or if it fails to state a proper claim for relief.
An inmate also is denied meaningful access to the courts if he is unable to respond to a Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, or if he is unable to meet a court-established deadline for filing an amended complaint, or if he does not know he may be able to convince a court to reconsider a decision made because he had missed a deadline, simply because he is unable to gain access to a library or to use legal materials. As a district court judge who has reviewed and decided numerous prisoner complaints and petitions, I know that many inmates do not respond to Reports and Recommendations and court orders. Because of the evidence I considered in this case, I have a deeper appreciation of the difficulties inmates face in filing a meaningful complaint and in defending the validity of that complaint. More importantly, as I already have found, defendants' present plan for meeting their obligation under Bounds is inadequate, and because of the plan's inadequacies inmates are being denied their constitutional right of access to the courts.
The inadequacies of defendants' plan vary somewhat depending on the inmate population group. The general population inmates, who have direct personal access to the main law libraries, must deal with four inadequacies in defendants' system. First, the main law libraries do not contain certain materials that an inmate needs to file a meaningful complaint. Specifically, all of the main law libraries should contain a complete set of the Wright and Miller treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure; a set of Michigan civil jury instructions; the local court rules for the state courts (if they have any) and for the federal courts; and an up-to-date habeas corpus treatise. Secondly, at the Michigan Reformatory defendants should conduct regular and effective inventories of the law libraries. I find that the present inventories are inadequate to ensure that all of the required books are available to the inmates, and that the inventory in the record indicates that significant portions of the collection are missing. Thirdly, the MBP main law library must expand the amount of duplicate materials it carries so that it can service the inmates properly. I conclude, as a matter of law, that inmates have been denied meaningful access to the courts at the MBP because they have been unable to secure necessary law books. Fourthly, and finally, defendants are denying inmates their constitutional right of access to the courts by failing to provide assistance to those general population inmates who are unable to use the law libraries effectively. As I have found, inmates cannot secure meaningful assistance from either staff or other inmates. I reiterate that I am not requiring defendants to provide trained attorneys to assist inmates who have access to an adequate collection of law books. They are required, however, to provide some kind of research and other preliminary assistance to inmates who need it.
The situation of inmates who are confined to administrative segregation, protective custody, and certain minimum security areas, and consequently have little or no direct access to the main law libraries, is even more critical.[1] Defendants attempt to satisfy their obligation under Bounds by providing these inmates with access to "mini-law libraries" and the opportunity to request books from the main law libraries. I already have found, as a factual 496 matter, *496 that this system is inadequate, and now hold, in agreement with several other courts, that this system is unconstitutional as well. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1109-1110; Green, 801 F.2d at 772; Williams v. Lane, 646 F.Supp. 1379, 1389 & 1407 (N.D. Ill.1986); Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F.Supp. 106, 110 (W.D.Ky.1983). Defendants may well have legitimate security reasons for not allowing these inmates access to the main law libraries, although they produced no evidence of such reasons at trial, and an inmate is not entitled to unrestricted access to the law library on his own terms. See Grossman, 812 F.2d at 1021; Campbell, 787 F.2d at 227-29. Defendants, however, still must satisfy their obligation under Bounds. If they do not wish to provide adequate law libraries for these inmates, i.e., access to an adequate collection of law books and minimal legal assistance to those inmates who need it, they must provide them with access to legally trained personnel. See

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1109-10; Cepulonis, 732 F.2d at 4-5; Holt, 702 F.2d at 640. I hold that by failing to provide these inmates with access either to an adequate law library or to adequately trained legal assistance, defendants are violating the requirements of Bounds and plaintiffs' right of access to the courts. I further hold that even absent any proof of harm to these inmates (I find, however, that there is harm), defendants' system on its face is constitutionally inadequate. No person, not even a trained attorney, can prepare an effective complaint without adequate access to law books.
In accordance with the above discussion, the Court will require defendants to prepare a plan to remedy the defects in their current law library system. This plan shall address the following issues: (1) supplementing the main law library collections; (2) ensuring that the MR conducts regular and effective inventories of its law library collections; (3) providing some research and explanatory assistance to inmates who use the main law libraries; and (4) providing either direct access to legal assistance or direct access to adequate law libraries, including access to both law books and assistance for inmates who require it, for inmates who presently do not have direct access to the main law libraries. Defendants shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion to submit their plan. Plaintiffs then shall have thirty (30) days to respond to the plan. The Court thereafter will enter a final injunctive order requiring defendants to implement an appropriate remedial plan. It would greatly assist the Court, of course, and would facilitate the entry of a final order, if the parties could agree on an appropriate remedial order.
V. Plaintiffs' Racial Discrimination Claim
Plaintiffs' final claim is that defendants are discriminating against black inmates on the basis of their race. This claim is contained in one paragraph of plaintiffs' first amended complaint.
55. Although a majority of the inmates are black, disproportionately few staff members are black. Certain desireable inmates jobs are disproportionately assigned to white inmates. Cafeteria serving lines are generally segregated by race. Black inmates are assigned to punitive segregation in disproportionate numbers; white inmates are assigned to protective custody in disproportionate numbers. Certain white staff display attitudes of racially motivated hostility to black inmates. Racial tension contributes to the atmosphere of violence at the prisons.
First Amended Complaint ¶ 55. At trial, plaintiffs introduced evidence suggesting that white inmates are disproportionately assigned to protective custody; that black inmates are disproportionately assigned to administrative segregation and punitive detention or segregation; that some correctional officers subject black inmates to racial harassment in the form of racial slurs and other kinds of racially oriented misconduct; that the subject institutions' dining halls are racially segregated; and that black inmates are discriminated against in the employment process. I first will analyze the legal standards I must apply in deciding plaintiffs' claims. I then will 497 discuss and decide each claim separately. In *497 deciding these claims, I have considered not only the parties' post-trial submissions, but also the materials they submitted on defendants' Rule 41(b) motion and plaintiffs' supplemental pretrial brief on this issue. Before addressing the merits of plaintiffs' claims, however, I will resolve three evidentiary disputes and will decide defendants' renewed motion to decertify the class on this claim.
The first evidentiary matter to resolve is defendants' May 7, 1987 motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Ronald Christensen, plaintiffs' statistics expert, which was given on June 3rd, 4th, and 5th, 1986. The impetus for defendants' motion was the Court's decision to exclude part of the testimony of their racial discrimination expert, Camille Camp, because they had not provided plaintiffs with sufficient notice of the statistical data underlying Ms. Camp's proposed testimony. See 4-24-87 T at 45-69. They advance two grounds in support of their motion. First, they argue that the Court erred in striking Ms. Camp's testimony and that "it is manifest and unfair to apply the rigorous standards to exclude the important testimony of Defendants' experts while allowing the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert to stand." Motion to Strike at 4-5. Secondly, defendants argue that plaintiffs similarly did not give them advance notice of the statistical data underlying Dr. Christensen's testimony. See Affidavit of David G. Edick. Plaintiffs urge the Court to deny defendants' motion, arguing that with two minor exceptions they complied fully with the Court's pretrial order and order scheduling events in supplying defendants with Dr. Christensen's data and that defendants could have recalled Dr. Christensen for further cross-examination.

I will deny defendants' motion for two reasons. First, I reject defendants' attempt to reargue the merits of my ruling on Ms. Camp. Defendants cited none of the cases they discuss in their motion when they asked me on April 27th to reconsider my decision, despite having had the weekend to research the issue. 4-27-87 T at 235-36. It is too late now for defendants again to ask me to reconsider my ruling. Secondly, the situations regarding Dr. Christensen and Ms. Camp are dissimilar in two significant respects. In the first place, with some minor exceptions, it appears that plaintiffs complied with the order scheduling events and the pretrial order in supplying Dr. Christensen's data to the defendants. In the second place, I indicated at trial that defendants could request permission to recall Dr. Christensen for further cross-examination if they needed additional preparation time. T at 122-24 & 297. I do not believe defendants ever requested permission to cross-examine Dr. Christensen further. The Court's indications, if any, that defendants could respond to Dr. Christensen's testimony with rebuttal evidence rather than cross-examination did not, of course, excuse them from complying with the Court's orders and a fundamental standard of fairness in presenting their testimony. The Court appreciates the significance of Ms. Camp's proposed testimony. I see no reason, however, either to reconsider my decision on that testimony or to strike Dr. Christensen's testimony, and therefore deny defendants' motion.
The second evidentiary dispute concerns Mr. Chapman's testimony. At the Court's request, the parties videotaped Mr. Chapman's testimony on November 6, 1986 in Washington, D.C. I have reviewed portions of the videotape and the entire transcript of Mr. Chapman's testimony. I have ruled on the objections made during his testimony and on the exhibits plaintiffs sought to introduce through him. Those rulings can be found in footnote two to this opinion.[2]
498 *498 The third evidentiary matter concerns whether the Court should grant preclusive effect to the results of major misconduct and administrative segregation hearings within the Michigan prison system. In other words, defendants argue that because these hearings are quasi-judicial in nature, plaintiffs cannot now argue that they are infected with racial discrimination and cannot challenge the results of the hearings on that basis. See University of Tennessee v. Elliot, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). Plaintiffs disagree, and request the Court to rule that they "are not precluded from presenting evidence that the results of disciplinary or reclassification hearings are the product of racial discrimination." Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 7.
The Court declines to decide this issue for two reasons. First, I do not believe plaintiffs are challenging the major misconduct or administrative segregation (reclassification) hearings themselves as being racially motivated. Their argument, rather, is that due to racial discrimination black inmates receive a disproportionate number of major misconduct tickets and hence are disproportionately assigned to punitive detention and administrative segregation. I disagree in particular with defendants' statement that "all grievances which were precipitated by the receipt of a major misconduct ticket ... amount to a collateral attack on the major misconduct hearing report." Defendant's Brief at 7. That the inmate may properly have been found guilty of the charge does not address the issue of whether the ticketing officer was racially motivated.
Secondly, the evidence suggests that racial discrimination is not a defense to a major misconduct ticket or a proper issue to be raised in a reclassification hearing. To the extent, then, that plaintiffs are challenging the outcomes of the major misconduct and administrative segregation hearings, they are entitled to do so because defendants have not established that the issue of racial discrimination can be raised and decided in those hearings, and thus have not properly raised the issue of whether the Court should give the hearings' outcomes preclusive effect. For the above reasons, the Court finds that it need not decide whether it should grant preclusive effect to the outcomes of defendants' major misconduct and administrative segregation hearings.
499 During trial, defendants again requested the Court to decertify the plaintiff *499 class on the issue of racial discrimination. T at 480-81. The Court reserved ruling on defendants' motion until the end of trial. Id. at 528-29. The parties have filed post-trial briefs on defendants' motion, which the Court repeatedly has denied in the past because defendants could not establish that there exists an intra-class conflict or genuine antagonism between the white inmates and the black inmates such that plaintiffs' attorneys cannot adequately represent the entire class on the racial discrimination issue. See Opinion of July 15, 1986; Opinion of August 29, 1985. The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions, the evidence in the record, and the relevant cases. To the extent that defendants are requesting the Court to decertify the plaintiff class on the claims discussed in plaintiffs' May 27,

1986 Pre-Trial Brief, i.e., that due to intentional racial discrimination "the large majority of prisoners in administrative and punitive segregation are Black, while the large majority of those in protective custody are Caucasian" and "the highest job levels and most desirable jobs are filled disproportionately by Caucasian prisoners, while the majority of Black prisoners are relegated to less prestigious jobs," the Court denies their motion. On these issues, I adhere to my earlier ruling that plaintiffs can adequately represent the interests of both black inmates and white inmates because "if Defendants' practices and policies are racially discriminatory, both black and white inmates are the victims of the resultant racial tensions in the prisons" and "have a common interest in alleviating these conditions." Opinion of Aug. 29, 1985 at 6.
The Court in particular finds defendants' arguments regarding protective custody, administrative segregation, and punitive detention to be specious. Plaintiffs never have suggested that defendants should maintain a racial balance in any of these housing areas; they merely argue that defendants should cease their alleged practice of assigning inmates to these areas on the basis of their race. With regard to plaintiffs' employment discrimination claim, as defined above, there is no evidence in the record indicating that to grant relief on this claim would impair any legitimate interests of the white inmates. See Social Services Union v. County of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir.1979). The issue is a close one. Given that the named plaintiffs consist of both black inmates and white inmates, and given the particularly damaging effects of racial discrimination in a closed prison environment, however, the Court will adhere to its prior decisions on this issue.
Shortly before the start of trial, though, plaintiffs altered their racial discrimination in employment claim. For the first time, they argued that defendants' "anti-discrimination" policy, PD-DWA-64.01, is unconstitutional because it sets a ceiling on minority employment. See Response to Defendants' First Motion in Limine at 9. Although the trial transcript may not reflect my feelings, I was bemused by the seeming discrepancy between plaintiffs' pre-trial brief and their response to defendants' first motion in limine. Plaintiffs did not attack defendants' policy in their pre-trial brief, arguing instead that "racially stereotypic attitudes on the part of a majority Caucasian staff have led to disproportionate overrepresentation of Black prisoners ... in lower levels of jobs and the least desirable jobs." Pre-Trial Brief at 8. Nor did they attack it in their May 16, 1986 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In a supplemental brief filed during the trial, however, plaintiffs argued that defendants' policy "requires job discrimination against Black job applicants whenever Blacks already comprise an arbitrarily determined percentage of existing employment in a particular job category." Supplemental Brief on the Issue of Racial Discrimination at 1. They endorsed the policy, though, "insofar as it sets a floor for Black employment," believing that such a floor "is mandated based on defendants' past history of discrimination" against black inmates. Id. at 8.
I allowed plaintiffs to proceed with this claim because, as I already have indicated, I was not sure where plaintiffs 500 were going and defendants did not claim they were unduly prejudiced in having to defend *500 against it.
Plaintiffs' post-trial brief clearly demonstrates, however, that the Court cannot allow the class to continue on the issue of the validity of defendants' "anti-discrimination" policy. In their brief, plaintiffs reiterate their argument that the policy places a ceiling on black employment, and contend that while past discrimination against black inmates justifies continuation of the policy as a floor on black employment, i.e., as an affirmative action tool, it should not be used as a means of limiting black employment in any particular job category. They ask the Court to modify "defendants' current anti-discrimination policy to provide that the plus or minus 10% of Black prisoners representation in the population be a goal, not a ceiling, for all job assignments. After the defendants reach that goal for the entire system, race should not be a factor in job assignments; rather the assignments thereafter should be made solely on the basis of qualification at the time of making application." Plaintiffs' May 15, 1987 Trial Brief at 25. Plaintiffs argue in support of their position that "Black prisoners testified they were denied jobs because these jobs had been reserved for Caucasian prisoners"; that the policy is an affirmative action program; that evidence of defendants' past and present discrimination against black inmates "supports the development of the policy to protect the rights of Black prisoners" and "the continuation of a race conscious policy for the assignment of Black prisoners to jobs"; that "[t]he record contains no evidence of a like history of discrimination against Caucasian prisoners"; and that the policy "improperly serves as a race-conscious program to benefit Caucasian prisoners." Id. at 1-3.
It is clear from plaintiffs' arguments and the evidence they introduced at trial that on this issue the interests of the black inmates and the white inmates diverge. There is no evidence in the record to counter plaintiffs' request that the Court continue the policy as a floor on black inmate employment because neither of the parties had any

reason to present such evidence. Like the plaintiffs, defendants want to continue the policy. See 4-27-87 T at 170-71. No one at trial argued that the policy also should be maintained as a floor on the employment of white inmates who also may be denied employment because of the policy, or that the policy should not be continued as a floor on black inmate employment. Once plaintiffs brought defendants' policy into the case and began arguing that it should be continued as a floor on black inmate employment, the interests of the black inmates and the white inmates diverged. I do not believe plaintiffs' counsel can adequately represent the interests of the entire class on this specific issue and I find that the potential intra-class conflicts are too significant to allow the class to remain certified on it. See Droughn v. FMC Corp., 74 F.R.D. 639, 643 (E.D.Pa. 1977). The Court accordingly grants defendants' motion in part and decertifies the plaintiff class to the extent that plaintiffs challenge defendants' anti-discrimination policy. See General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). I regret having to take this action. Given the clear intra-class conflict posed by plaintiffs' challenge to the policy, however, I have no choice. I will consider plaintiffs' employment discrimination claim on the issues raised in their pre-trial brief.
Turning now to the merits of plaintiffs' claim, State prison officials, like all other government officers, are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of intentional or purposeful racial discrimination, except possibly for "`the necessities of prison security and discipline.'" Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334, 88 S.Ct. 994, 995, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968) (Black, J., concurring)). They cannot discriminate on the basis of race in inmate housing, McClelland v. Sigler, 456 F.2d 1266, 1267 (8th Cir.1972); United States v. Wyandotte County, 480 F.2d 969, 970 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068, 94 S.Ct. 577, 38 L.Ed.2d 473 (1973); in inmate discipline, Finney v. Arkansas Board 501 of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1974); McCray v. Bennett, 467 F.Supp. *501 187, 195-96 (M.D.Ala.1978), or in inmate employment. Gates v. Collier, 349 F.Supp. 881, 887 & 901 (N.D.Miss.1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.1974); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F.Supp. 402, 410-11 & 421 (E.D.Okla.1974). Prison officials cannot, moreover, justify racial discrimination by reference to vague fears of inmate violence if racial segregation is not continued. Wyandotte County, 480 F.2d at 971-72; Mickens v. Winston, 462 F.Supp. 910, 911-12 (E.D.Va.1978), aff'd mem., 609 F.2d 508 (4th Cir.1979). They have an affirmative duty, rather, "to remedy unlawful practices." Blevins v. Brew, 593 F.Supp. 245, 248 (W.D.Wisc.1984). If inmates can establish that "discriminatory purpose [is] a motivating factor" in any of the decisions made by prison officials, then the officials must prove "that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 & n. 21, 97 S.Ct. 555, 556 n. 21, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). With these standards in mind, I turn to plaintiffs' claims.
I begin by addressing plaintiffs' claim that white inmates are disproportionately assigned to protective custody and that black inmates are unable to get into protective custody. Plaintiffs presented two kinds of evidence in support of this claim. First, they presented statistical evidence, which was statistically significant, demonstrating that although blacks constitute a majority of the inmate population in the subject institutions, a majority or other disproportionate percentage of the inmates in protective custody are white. T at 277-79; pls. exhs. 510-D, 510-F, 510-H, & 521-M; see pls. exhs. 47 at 11 & 48 at 20. Secondly, they presented evidence suggesting that the MR staff person responsible for assigning inmates to protective custody may have a stereotypic view of black inmates, believing them to be streetwise and violence prone and hence not in need of protective custody, T at 35-36 & 112-13; that a couple of inmates may have received racially disparate treatment regarding assignment to protective custody, T at 3084-85; T at 3073 & 3086; T at 1364-67; pls. exhs. 460-C, 460-L, & 648-A; T at 2315-16; and that one black who did get into protective custody at the MR was subsequently subjected to racially discriminatory treatment that led him to request reassignment to the general population. T at 3070-73.
The Court finds that black inmates are not intentionally discriminated against on a class-wide basis in terms of placement in protective custody, and will deny plaintiffs' claim for relief on that ground, for several reasons. Plaintiffs' statistical evidence does not, by itself, support a finding that defendants intentionally discriminate against black inmates in this area. Although the statistical disparities are significant, they are not the kind of "clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race," that would support an equal protection claim. See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564. Plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient supporting evidence to establish that the statistical disparities are the product of intentional racial discrimination against black inmates. A few, unrebutted, incidents of apparent discrimination, spread over the approximately four-year time frame of this lawsuit, simply do not provide a sufficient basis for this Court to infer a racially discriminatory intent and to impose

class-wide liability on the defendants. This is true even though all of the incidents occurred at the MR and even if I accept plaintiffs' assessment of Deputy Adams' attitude toward black inmates. Plaintiffs, moreover, produced evidence of only one black inmate who had requested, but been denied, placement in protective custody. T at 1366-67. Although this incident, and the other incidents of apparent racially discriminatory treatment to which inmates testified at trial, was regrettable, it does not justify granting plaintiffs the class-wide relief they seek. Finally, the Court found credible defendants' testimony that their official policy is that all inmates are put in protective custody upon request. 3-16-87 T at 86-87.
Plaintiffs' next claim is that black inmates are discriminatorily assigned to administrative segregation and punitive 502 detention/segregation. *502 Again, they seek to support their claim with a combination of statistical data
indicating there is a statistically significant disproportionate number of black inmates in administrative segregation and punitive detention, and testimonial and documentary evidence suggesting that this disproportionality is the result of intentional racially discriminatory treatment of black inmates. With regard to the latter prong of their proof, plaintiffs request the Court to conclude that black inmates live in a racially tense atmosphere punctuated by racial disturbances, racial slurs and other racially demeaning behavior by white staff members that provoke black inmates, and disparate ticketing of white and black inmates for violating institutional rules. They also request the Court to find that approximately fifty (50%) percent of the placements in administrative segregation are triggered by tickets for non-assaultive offenses; that non-assaultive offenses are subjective, and thus subject to the whims and prejudices of individual correctional officers; that black inmates receive a disproportionate number of nonassaultive misconduct tickets, in particular tickets for insolence; and that the overwhelmingly white correctional staff, particularly at the MBP, hold racially stereotypic views of black inmates 0907 which they are in part taught at the new employee training school 0907 that lead them to treat black inmates differently than white inmates in the disciplinary process.
Plaintiffs' claim and evidence presents a difficult issue for the Court to decide. Their statistical evidence, which defendants for the most part did not rebut, evinces a disturbing pattern of disproportionate assignments of black inmates to punitive detention, and frequently subsequently to administrative segregation. Under Michigan's disciplinary system, a correctional officer can ticket an inmate for violating institutional rules. The tickets can be either for major misconduct or for minor misconduct. See pls. exh. 404-A at 2-2h. If the ticket be for major misconduct, the inmate faces some rather severe penalties and is entitled to a hearing before a hearing officer, who is an attorney not subject to the direct control of correctional officials. See M.C.L. 791.251-.252; 3-16-87 T at 88. The hearing officer determines whether the inmate is guilty of the charged offense and determines the punishment if he finds the inmate guilty. See M.C.L. 791.252(k); defs. exh. 101.
A major misconduct charge, moreover, may lead to the inmate being placed in administrative segregation. Inmates are placed in administrative segregation if a prison security classification committee determines that "they cannot be managed with general group privileges because they need protection, are escape risks or their behavior is a serious threat to property, themselves, staff, fellow prisoners or the safety and security of the facility." Id. This reclassification process apparently is outlined in two administrative rules, rule 791.4405 and rule 791.3315, see defs. exh. 42, which the parties, for whatever reason, failed to introduce into evidence. Even without the benefit of these rules, however, the Court can find that inmates who receive major misconduct tickets face placement in punitive segregation, pursuant to a finding of guilt and a determination of punishment by the hearing officer, and reclassification to administrative segregation, pursuant to a determination by the security classification committee.
I also find that plaintiffs do not allege that the hearing officers themselves are racially motivated, and I specifically find that there is no evidence in the record to support such a contention. See Chapman T. at 202. I further find that with the possible exception of one or two persons, plaintiffs do not allege that the security classification committees are racially biased toward black inmates, and I specifically find that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the committees intentionally discriminate against black inmates in placing inmates in administrative segregation. At best, plaintiffs have suggested that the Deputy Warden at the MR may harbor a stereotypic view about black inmates that may affect his decisions on whether to assign inmates to administrative segregation. 503 Even then, plaintiffs have not established *503 that he has ever intentionally discriminated against a black inmate in placing him in administrative segregation. Cf. T at 271; pls. exh. 510-G (disproportionate number of black inmates in administrative segregation at the MR is not statistically significant). Moreover, even were I to accept

plaintiffs' view that actions taken pursuant to "preconceived ideas and often unconscious prejudices" can constitute intentional discrimination, see Finney, 505 F.2d at 209; see generally Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan.L.Rev. 317 (1987), they have not demonstrated by specific evidence that any person on a security classification committee who may hold a racially stereotypic view of black inmates has, because of that view, disproportionately assigned them to administrative segregation.
Plaintiffs rest their case, rather, on the ticketing practices of correctional officers. They have introduced evidence indicating that certain correctional officers harbor racial biases against black inmates; that black inmates occasionally are given tickets for reacting violently to racial slurs from correctional officers; that certain correctional officers ticket black inmates while ignoring the similar conduct of white inmates; that black inmates receive a disproportionate number of major misconduct tickets for non-assaultive offenses, which tend to be subjective; and that the overwhelmingly white correctional staff may harbor stereotypic views about black inmates that may lead them to discriminate against them. Plaintiffs further contend that this disparate ticketing constitutes an informal policy or practice for which the Court can hold the Department of Corrections responsible because the Department implicitly or explicitly encourages such treatment by ignoring inmate grievances of racially discriminatory treatment; not disciplining staff for engaging in racially discriminatory behavior; improperly rejecting inmate grievances of racial discrimination related to the major misconduct hearing process; maintaining an ineffective affirmative action plan for hiring black staff; and maintaining an ineffective program for preparing new employees to interact with black inmates.
In evaluating plaintiffs' claim, the Court must consider "the totality of the relevant facts." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was [or is] a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564. In making this inquiry, the Court should consider, among other factors, whether defendants' actions adversely affect one race more than the other; any prior history of discriminatory practices; the opportunity for discretion to enter into the decision-making process; and any other evidence reflecting the intent of the relevant decision-makers. Id. at 266-67, 97 S.Ct. at 564; McCray, 467 F.Supp. at 195-96.
As I have opined, plaintiffs' statistical evidence of disproportionate placement of black inmates in administrative segregation and punitive segregation is disturbing and significant. I find as a factual matter that a significant percentage of the major misconduct tickets that can lead to placement in administrative segregation are given for non-assaultive offenses that tend to depend on the discretion of the ticketing officer, pls. exh. 711; that black inmates tend to receive more major misconduct tickets, and in particular more tickets for insolence, than white inmates, pls. exhs. 521-S & 521-T[3]; that the disproportionate number of black inmates confined to administrative segregation at the SPSM and the MBP is statistically significant, T at 268, 270, & 275-76; pls. exhs. 510-C & 510-E; that the disproportionate number of black inmates confined to punitive segregation at the SPSM and the MR is statistically significant, T at 271-72 & 276; pls. exhs. 510-C & 510-G; and that black inmates 504 tend to receive a disproportionate number of non-assaultive *504 major misconduct tickets. Chapman T at 85-86 (threatening behavior, disobeying a direct order, and insolence).
I further find that certain correctional officers are racially biased against black inmates, as evinced by their use of racial slurs and other inappropriate racially motivated behavior. See, e.g., T at 960-62 ("burrheads, rugheads, or walking brillo head"), 969-70 ("take your black ass upstairs"), & 972-73 ("smart ass nigger," "half breed"); T at 984-85 (Bojangles tap dance routine); T at 1178 ("jungle bunny, black bastard, black nigger); T at 1276-77 ("niggers, black son-of-a-b's, black m.f.'s"); T at 1374-75 ("nigger this, nigger this, your nigger mammy"); T at 1464 ("these black niggers from Detroit"); T at 1518-19; T at 1809 ("you niggers are all alike"); T at 1854 ("I will kill you, nigger"); T at 1979 ("niggers"); T at 2055-56 ("niggers"); T at 2152-53 ("ex-slaves"); T at 2245-47 (officer yelled insults to inmates over the loudspeaker); and T at 2258-61 ("half-breed, half white boy, half nigger"). This is just a partial listing of the credible testimony I heard on the use of racial slurs and other inappropriate behavior by certain correctional staff. Defendants, moreover, did not attempt to rebut this testimony even though the inmate witnesses specifically named several guards that had engaged in such behavior.
I also find that certain correctional staff occasionally ticket black inmates for acts of misconduct while ignoring similar action by white inmates. See, e.g., T at 1180; T at 1272-74; T at 1468-71; and T at 3203-05. Finally, I find

that inmates occasionally are given tickets for reacting violently, with words or physical conduct, to racial slurs and other racially derogatory conduct by staff members. See T at 1278-79; T at 1462-63; T at 1915; T at 2135-36; T at 2809-10; & T at 3185-86.
The evidence does not, however, demonstrate that the correctional staff in general intentionally discriminates against black inmates in handing out major misconduct tickets or that the white correctional staff as a whole, or even a majority of the staff, harbor stereotypic views about black inmates that lead them to discriminate against them in handing out tickets. I also do not find that the Department, acting through the named defendants and others with policy-making authority, implicitly or explicitly approves, condones, ratifies, or supports whatever incidents of racially discriminatory ticketing may occur. The evidence does not show that defendants implicitly condone or encourage the issuance of racially motivated tickets by failing to take action to prevent such activity. The evidence also does not demonstrate that defendants' new employee training materials are linked to this problem. Even if I accept Mr. Chapman's testimony on the materials, plaintiffs have not linked the training the new employees receive to incidents of discriminatory ticketing.
Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that plaintiffs have not established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants intentionally discriminate against black inmates in either the administrative segregation or the punitive segregation process.[4] An intent to discriminate against black inmates is not, on a classwide basis, a motivating factor in defendants' actions. I reach this conclusion primarily for five reasons: (1) Plaintiffs' statistical evidence, although significant both statistically and as evidence of discriminatory intent, does not by 505 itself support a finding of discriminatory intent. (2) As I already have found, plaintiffs produced little *505 or no evidence that the hearing officers intentionally discriminate against black inmates, although Dr. Christensen did testify that black inmates tend to receive longer sentences than white inmates. T at 302-03. (3) Also as I have already found, plaintiffs produced little or no evidence that the members of the security classification committees intentionally discriminate against black inmates. Defendants' exhibit 101 suggests, moreover, that the committees consider more than simply whether the inmate has received a major misconduct ticket in deciding whether to place him in administrative segregation. See also 3-16-87 T at 84. (4) Plaintiffs simply have not established that black inmates, as a class, are subjected to racially motivated major misconduct ticketing practices. They produced evidence that certain correctional officers are racially biased, but did not establish that these officers disproportionately ticket black inmates as compared to white inmates. They also produced evidence of scattered incidences of discriminatory ticketing, but again did not establish that these incidences are widespread. (5) Finally, I cannot conclude that whatever discrimination in the disciplinary process does occur results from a policy, practice, or custom, whether formal or informal, of the Department of Corrections. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).
This was a difficult issue for me to decide, as were the other racial discrimination issues, and I certainly do not intend by my opinion to exonerate the Department of Corrections entirely. Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof. I, however, found their evidence to be deeply disturbing. The Department, moreover, did not rebut plaintiffs' extensive testimony of individual incidents of racially discriminatory conduct by correctional officers and did not provide a rational explanation for the racial disparity in inmates confined in administrative segregation and punitive detention. Deputy Director Bolden's historical explanation was interesting, but vague and not supported by any evidence. See 3-16-87 T at 84-86. Thus, although the Court denies plaintiffs' request for relief and enters judgment for defendants on this issue, it certainly encourages defendants to explore the situation and to attempt to remedy whatever individual wrongs are occurring.
Plaintiffs also contend that defendants subject black inmates to racial harassment in the form of racial slurs. In the Court's February 27, 1987 opinion on defendants' Rule 41(b) motions, it considered the evidence on racial slurs as a separate ground for relief as well as evidence of defendants' discriminatory intent in assigning inmates to administrative segregation and punitive detention. Opinion of Feb. 27., 1987 at 21-22. Upon further consideration of plaintiffs' pleadings, the parties' written submissions, and the evidence produced at trial, the Court is not certain that plaintiffs intended to raise the use of racial slurs against black inmates as a separate ground for relief. I will decide the issue, however, for two reasons. First, plaintiffs presented substantial evidence on the use of racial slurs by correctional staff and defendants had an adequate opportunity to rebut that evidence. Secondly, the parties discuss the racial slur issue as a separate claim for relief in their written submissions. See Plaintiffs' September 17, 1986 Supplemental Brief on the Issue of Racial Discrimination at 16-19; Defendants'

December 9, 1986 Motion for Involuntary Dismissal at 14-20; Plaintiffs' December 22, 1986 Brief in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 5-6; Defendants' January 20, 1987 Reply to Plaintiffs' Brief at 4-8.
Although the courts are not in complete agreement on this issue, I believe that prison officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of black inmates if they intentionally subject them to a pattern of racial harassment. The use of rough language in a prison context, even if such language offends the sensibilities of inmates, does not violate the Constitution. See Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir.1986). Even an occasional racial slur, unconnected to other acts of racial harassment or abuse, does not violate the Constitution. Prison officials 506 do violate the Constitution, however, if they intentionally subject black inmates to a pattern of racial harassment. *506 Cf. Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185-86 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that "[s]exual harassment of female employees by a state employer constitutes sex discrimination for purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment"). If the instances of racial harassment are sufficiently frequent so as to create an atmosphere of racial tension and hostility, then the equal protection clause is violated even if the harassment is not connected to other kinds of official action, such as a denial of employment or placement in administrative segregation. In considering such a claim on a class-wide basis, a court must consider the frequency of the acts of racial harassment; the need and justification, if any, for such actions; the degree of injury suffered by the inmates; and whether the actions were taken in good faith or "maliciously and sadistically for the sole purpose of causing harm." See Burton, 791 F.2d at 100. In addition, of course, the Court must consider whether any unconstitutional harassment that does exist reflects a policy, practice, or custom of the Department of Corrections.
I have already discussed the instances of racial slurs supported by the evidence in this case. I reiterate that the testimony quoted in this opinion is only a portion of the credible testimony I heard on the use of racial slurs, and other acts of racial harassment, by correctional staff. I further find that defendants have not contested the existence of this harassment, although they certainly contest that it is widespread or provides a basis for relief, and have not established any need or justification for it. The racial slurs, moreover, are not made in good faith but rather for the sole purpose of antagonizing black inmates and inflict emotional and psychological pain on the inmates. Finally, I find that the use of racial slurs is sufficiently frequent to support a claim for class-wide relief. I specifically do not find that most correctional staff engage in this kind of behavior. A sufficiently large number do, however, to expose black inmates to a constitutionally intolerable atmosphere of racial harassment.
This finding does not end my inquiry, though. There remains the issue of whether this atmosphere of racial harassment reflects a policy, practice, or custom of the Department of Corrections. Defendants argue vigorously that it does not. They observe that their official policy forbids employees from discriminating "on any racial, sexual, or ethnic basis"; defs. exh. 93; that they have a well-established inmate grievance procedure which allows inmates to file grievances alleging racial discrimination directly with the Central Office, see T at 138-54; see also defs. exh. 100 (establishing a Warden's Forum); that they have an active affirmative action policy for their employees, see defs. exhs. 87, 17, & 18; 3-18-87 T at 60-89; that they provide new employees with extensive training on human relations in a prison setting, see defs. exhs. 90, 124, & 128; and that they maintain an effective employee disciplinary system. See defs. exhs. 109, 110, & 319a. Plaintiffs respond that defendants' policies, while they look good on paper, are ineffective. In particular, they argue that the inmate grievance procedure and defendants' employee disciplinary policy fail to prevent the use of racial slurs and other forms of racial harassment.
On this issue, I find that plaintiffs have established that the racial harassment from which black inmates suffer because of racial slurs represents a policy, practice, or custom of the Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs presented an extremely strong case on this issue. Defendants acknowledged that their staff uses racial slurs, see, e.g., 3-17-87 T At 4; 3-17-87 T at 142; 3-18-87 T at 33-34, but testified that they rarely, if ever, discipline staff members for engaging in racially discriminatory behavior. See 3-17-87 T at 142-43; 3-19-87 T at 13; 3-18-87 T at 34-35. The inmate grievance system is ineffective in rectifying the racial slur situation: defendants almost uniformly demand substantiation, accept the staff officer's denial, and reject the grievance. See, e.g., 3-19-87 T at 13; pls. exhs. 204, 208, 223, 249, 252, 254, 525, 537-1, 548, 574, & 755; see also T at 2681-83 (SPSM Warden 507 ignored inmate racial complaints). Even when an inmate *507 provides the names of inmate witnesses, the grievance may be rejected without an investigation of the inmates. See pls. exh. 258. Finally, and most egregiously, the Court heard repeated, credible, testimony about certain correctional officers who use racial slurs

on a consistent basis, with no rebuttal from defendants or any attempt to show that such officers have been the subject of disciplinary action. See, e.g., T at 1310, 1809, 2055-56, 2137, & 2590-91.
In light of this evidence, the Court must conclude that the Department of Corrections explicitly or implicitly authorizes, approves, or knowingly acquiesces in the unconstitutional harassment of black inmates by certain staff officers. See Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d at 874. The Sixth Circuit has indicated that notice alone of unconstitutional conduct is insufficient to establish supervisory or municipal liability. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d at 421. A practice does constitute Departmental policy or custom, however, when high-level supervisory officials are aware it occurs and by their actions inform their subordinates they will take no action to prevent it. Brandon v. Allen, 645 F.Supp. 1261, 1269 (W.D.Tenn.1986) ("A practice is to be deemed an official custom ... if it occurs with sufficient frequency and notoriety as to make it known to responsible supervisory officials and those officials decline to take effective action to end that practice").
The Department is making some effort to address racial grievances as they arise, to maintain employee discipline, and to promote affirmative action programs within its work force. Mr. Chapman, moreover, (1) could not, in my opinion, offer any sound advice on how supervisory officials should react when a correctional officer denies making a racial slur and it is just his word against that of the inmate, Chapman T at 137-40; (2) approved of the Department using a former inmate to handle grievances at the third step, id. at 204; and (3) suggested only that defendants could improve the situation by investigating racial slur grievances more seriously and monitoring the grievances for patterns. Id. at 125. I cannot, however, accept defendants' testimony that they take seriously grievances and other complaints about racial slurs. The named defendants, as individuals, do not condone the use of racial slurs. In their official capacities as members of the Department of Corrections, however, they consciously, voluntarily, and with reckless indifference to the rights of black inmates have failed to implement policies that would prevent this situation from occurring, and affirmatively encourage its continuation. Similarly, the vast majority of the correctional officers in the Department do not use racial slurs. It takes only a minority, however, to create an atmosphere of racial harassment.
In summary, defendants have adopted the kind of attitude toward this situation that supports a finding that the use of racial slurs towards black inmates exists as an official or unofficial policy or custom of the Department of Corrections. Cf. Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1189 (municipal liability existed where "[c]omplaints by the victims of sexual harassment were addressed superficially if at all, ... the department had no policy against sexual harassment[,] ... sexual harassment was the general, on-going, and accepted practice at the ... Department, and high-ranking, supervisory, and management officials responsible for working conditions at the department knew of, tolerated, and participated in the harassment"). I will give defendants sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion to submit a proposed solution to this problem. Plaintiffs will have thirty (30) days to respond to defendants' proposal.
The fourth racial discrimination claim is plaintiffs' contention that defendants intentionally segregate by race the dining room servers, the serving lines, and the eating areas. I find that the inmate dining lines (except at the central complex, where there is only one line) and the inmate eating areas generally are segregated by race. Defendants' photographs indicate that the dining lines and the eating areas occasionally are racially integrated. Defs. exhs. 344, 345, 347, 348, 366, 367, 370, & 371. The overwhelming weight of the testimony, however, from 508 both defendants' witnesses and plaintiffs' witnesses, was *508 that the dining lines and the eating areas are segregated by race. E.g., T at 2239-41; T at 2332-33; T at 3076; T at 2027-28; 3-17-87 T at 116; 3-17-87 T at 163. I find that the inmate serving lines occasionally are segregated by race. T at 2028; T at 3059-60; T at 3044. I also find that on rare occasions, individual staff members direct inmates to a particular line or area of the dining hall. T at 2367-68; T at 972. I do not find that this occurs on a regular, or even a frequent, basis, and I specifically do find that the correctional staff almost always allows inmates to choose which line they wish to enter. See T at 1931; T at 2121; T at 2178; T at 2277-78; T at 2350-52; T at 2375-77. I also do not find sufficient evidence in the record for me to conclude that defendants' staff assigns inmate servers to the serving line by race.
Plaintiffs posit three arguments in support of their claim. First, they argue that defendants historically have officially segregated their dining lines and eating areas. Secondly, they argue that defendants have the ability to desegregate the dining lines and the seating areas (either by establishing only one dining line or by requiring inmates to go into integrated lines) and to desegregate the serving lines (by assigning the servers to integrated lines). Thirdly, they argue that in a prison context, inmates cannot freely choose where to eat, sleep, or work. The

Court has carefully considered plaintiffs' arguments and finds that it must reject them and enter judgment for the defendants on this issue.
I do not find that defendants historically have had officially segregated dining lines and eating areas. The only testimony on this issue came from the former Director of the Department of Corrections, Perry Johnson, who testified that "[d]uring the 1950s, the department ... practiced that kind of de facto segregation throughout the prison system, in which there was considerable segregation in housing and extensive segregation with respect to institutional assignments." 3-17-87 T at 41. Although this testimony supports an inference that defendants intentionally segregated the dining halls by race in the 1950s, the Court is not required to draw that inference and there is no explicit testimony that any intentional discrimination that did exist in the dining halls in the 1950s lasted into the 1960s and the 1970s. See pls. exhs. 47 at 11 (noting that inmates integrate themselves in the dining rooms) & 48 at 21 (noting only the presence of racial segregation in the dining halls). Plaintiffs' historical evidence on this issue is remote, speculative, and not very persuasive, particularly given the rapid turnover of inmates in a prison system.
Secondly, although defendants may have the ability to desegregate the dining areas, they must do so only if their current actions violate the inmates' constitutional right to be free from racially discriminatory treatment. In this context, absent prior de jure segregation, an explicit acknowledgment of prior intentional de facto segregation, or a finding of present intentional segregation, defendants are not affirmatively obligated to eradicate the presently existing segregation in the dining halls. See Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879, 95 S.Ct. 143, 42 L.Ed.2d 119 (1975); accord Bazemore v. Friday, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 3016-17, 92 L.Ed.2d 315, 339-41 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
Finally, the Court finds little evidence to suggest that inmates do not voluntarily choose a dining line or an eating area. I recognize that often in a prison setting, "where hostility of every kind is rampant, freedom of choice is but a gauze for discrimination." Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc), cert dismissed sub nom., Ledbetter v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 27, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981). The dining hall situation in this case, however, is far different than the housing situation in Jones, where a newly admitted black inmate was given the "choice" of confinement in a "cell crowded with white prisoners, some convicted of major felonies," or a 509 cell crowded with black prisoners. Id. I agree with plaintiffs that this situation also is different *509 than the 4-H and Homemaker Clubs issue the Supreme Court decided in Bazemore because in a prison setting inmates generally must go to the dining hall and prison officials have the authority to establish dining lines and eating areas. Compare Bazemore, ___ U.S. at ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. at 3012-13, 92 L.Ed.2d at 335-36. Absent evidence, however, that defendants presently direct inmates into particular lines or eating areas, or otherwise affirmatively encourage segregation in the dining halls, the Court finds no basis for granting plaintiffs the relief they request.
Plaintiffs' final racial discrimination claim is that defendants intentionally discriminate against black inmates by assigning white inmates to the highest job levels and the most desirable jobs while assigning black inmates to the lowest job levels and the less prestigious jobs. In support of this claim, plaintiffs offered statistical evidence indicating that black inmates are disproportionately underrepresented in the most desirable jobs, i.e., the industry and maintenance jobs; are disproportionately overrepresented in the least desirable jobs, in particular the kitchen assignments; and are disproportionately underrepresented in the highest job levels within each job category. They sought to prove that these disparities reflect intentionally discriminatory actions by the defendants and persons to whom they have delegated policy-making authority by introducing testimony and other evidence indicating that persons responsible for employment assignments have racially discriminatory attitudes and that black inmates have suffered from specific incidences of discrimination. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of proof on this issue.
The Court can make a number of factual findings from the evidence. Inmates in general tend to prefer jobs in the Michigan State Industries, in other kinds of industrial work, and in maintenance, and tend to dislike jobs in the kitchen. See, e.g., T at 211-12; pls. exh. 7 at 79; pls. exh. 273 at 20; pls. exh. 48 at 20; pls. exh. 718 at 56 & 60. Furthermore, plaintiffs' statistics indicate that racial disparities exist in inmate employment, i.e., the racial balance in some job categories is not proportional to the racial balance of the institution as a whole. These disparities exist in particular in the kitchen assignments at the subject institutions, where black inmates tend to be

overrepresented, see pls. exhs. 521-C, 521-D, 521-E, 521-F, 521-I, & 521-K, and in the industry and maintenance assignments at the subject institutions, where black inmates tended to be underrepresented. See pls. exhs. 521-C, 521-D, 521-E, 521-F, 521-G, 521-H, 521-I, 521-J, & 521-K. In general, as Dr. Christensen concluded, in "the most desired jobs ... there is an under-percentage of non-whites" while in "the least desired jobs of kitchen, there is an over-percentage of non-whites." T at 223.
The statistics do not, however, show any overwhelming racial disparities in inmate employment. In addition, they demonstrate that on many occasions the disparity, if any, is insignificant. See pls. exhs. 521-C (1982 0907 CC Kitchen & SC Factory & Maintenance); 521-D (1983 0907 CC Factory & Maintenance, NC Kitchen, & SC Kitchen & Factory); 521-E (1984 0907 CC Factory & Maintenance, NC Kitchen, Factory, & Maintenance, & SC Kitchen & Factory); 521-F (1985 0907 CC Maintenance, NC Kitchen, Factory, & Maintenance, & SC Factory & Maintenance); 521-G (1984 0907 MBP-I Kitchen, Factory, & Maintenance; 1983-MBP-I Kitchen & Maintenance; 1982-MBP-I Kitchen, Factory & Maintenance); 521-H (1985 0907 MBP-I Kitchen); 521-I (1986 0907 MBP-I Kitchen; MBP-T Kitchen, Factory, & Maintenance); 521-J (1984-MR Kitchen, Factory & Maintenance; 1983 0907 MR Kitchen & Factory; 1982 0907 MR Kitchen & Factory); & 521-K (1985 0907 MR-Inside Factory). The general trends are as Dr. Christensen suggests, but the statistical evidence is not overwhelmingly persuasive, and in fact is much less persuasive than the statistical evidence on racial disparities in administrative segregation, punitive detention, and protective custody. I note in particular that the statistics for the MBP, pls. exhs. 521-G, 521-H, & 521-I, are not persuasive in 510 light of plaintiffs' contention *510 that black inmates in this institution suffer the most from racially discriminatory treatment.
There also is evidence of racial disparities in pay levels within job categories. Again, the evidence suggests that blacks are underrepresented at the higher levels and overrepresented at the lower levels. Pls. exhs. 521-M, 521N, 521-O, & 521-P. As with the other statistical evidence, however, these exhibits do not provide significantly persuasive support for plaintiffs' claim. There was credible testimony that on occasion black inmates are discriminatorily assigned to less desirable jobs, are discriminatorily passed over for promotions in favor of white inmates, and are not assigned employment for which they are well-qualified. See, e.g., T at 2002-03; T at 2858-59; T at 2916 (kitchen all black); T at 3074-75 (hard kitchen jobs handled by blacks; easy jobs handled by whites); T at 3022 (whites had clerical jobs); pls. exh. 436C (discussing plans to assign additional white inmates to industries even though blacks apparently were underrepresented and available); T at 2786-91 (passed over for set-up man in favor of whites); T at 2711-14 (passed over for jobs as ordering clerk and head clerk in favor of whites); T at 3160-65 & 3172 (promoted more slowly than white inmates); & T at 3001-05 (white inmates with less seniority received promotions first). I cannot find, however, that these instances of discriminatory treatment are widespread or represent a general pattern of treatment of black inmates. Some of the instances, for example, appeared to reflect simple mistakes or oversight on the part of correctional staff. E.g., id. at 3005-06 (white supervisor assisted witness in getting promotion to a seven position).
Plaintiffs presented credible testimony of racially biased attitudes on the part of some of the correctional staff involved in inmate employment. See pls. exh. 35 at 59-60 (classification director for the SPSM-CC and part of the NC indicated belief that blacks are afraid of electricity and should not be assigned to maintenance); T at 2687 (same person using racially derogatory remark); pls. exh. 712 (supervisor at SPSM Machine Shop called MDOC Director a "nigger"; did not realize the remark was offensive); pls. exh. 450 (assistant business manager given counselling memorandum for using racial slur); T at 1990 (civilian kitchen supervisor stated she did not "trust niggers"); T at 1452 (MBP librarian referred to law clerk as "her boy"); T at 2368-69 (custodial supervisor asked "nationality" of college trained black inmate who objected to custodial training assignment); & T at 1979 (MBP food service director stated "he didn't want any niggers working" in the clerk's position because "he couldn't trust them"). I do not, however, find that this bias is widespread, that black inmates regularly are denied desirable employment or higher level positions within a job category because of such bias, or that the Department either is aware of intentionally discriminatory job actions or implicitly or explicitly condones or encourages such actions. The Court does not agree that the legislative reports on the 1981 riots "describe [an] abundance of" racially stereotypic attitudes by staff who "hire prisoners for jobs and promote them on these jobs," see plaintiffs' Dec. 22, 1986 rule 41(b) brief at 15; that, in general, "staff supervising jobs in the subject institutions ... succumb to the attitude that Caucasian prisoners are more capable of functioning independently and supervising the work of prisoners within their departments," id. at 14; or that a significant "number of staff responsible for the assignment

of prisoners to jobs and the promotion of prisoners within the job have racially demeaning attitudes towards people of color." Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 8.
Certainly, and regrettably, incidents of intentional racial discrimination occur in inmate employment in the subject facilities. Defendants made no attempt to rebut plaintiffs' testimony on these incidents. In particular, the Court was shocked at the apparent attitude of the Director of Classification at the SPSM toward black inmates, as evinced by the deposition statement it cited previously. It does not find, however, that plaintiffs have linked such attitudes 511 to a pattern, or even frequent incidents, of *511 racially discriminatory treatment of black inmates. The Court also was disturbed by plaintiffs' evidence on kitchen assignments. The statistical evidence shows that blacks are rather consistently overrepresented on such assignments at the SPSM, and there is a significant amount of testimony in the record indicating that within these assignments, black inmates are given the least desirable jobs. See T at 3021-23 (kitchen assignments at the central complex). Even in this area, however, the Court does not find that plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence to establish that any intentional or purposeful discrimination that may occur constitutes a policy, practice, or custom of the Department of Corrections.
In accordance with the above findings of fact, I conclude that I must reject plaintiffs' claim of racial discrimination in inmate employment. I do not reject this claim because the Department has formulated some sound policies in this area or because the named defendants conclusorily testified that the policies are implemented. I reject it, rather, because plaintiffs have not established the necessary link between the acts of misconduct that occur and any policy, custom, or practice of the Department of Corrections. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371, 96 S.Ct. at 604; Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. They have not, moreover, established that those supervisory staff who apparently do have racially discriminatory attitudes are responsible for the statistical disparities in black employment. They come the closest to this at the SPSM-CC. Even there, however, black inmate representation in employment is not consistently and drastically disproportionate to their representation in the inmate population, see pls. exhs. 521C, 521-D, 521-E, & 521-F, and there is little other evidence of a pattern of intentionally discriminatory treatment by the Department of Corrections. Compare Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1189 (departmental liability established where "sexual harassment was the general, on-going, and accepted practice").
The Court in one sense has been somewhat reluctant in reaching the conclusions it has on plaintiffs' racial discrimination claims. I believe, of course, that they are required under the law and by the evidence presented at trial. I reiterate, however, that I was deeply disturbed by plaintiffs' evidence. Racial discrimination has been and is such a societal plague that I firmly believe every governmental entity is obligated, albeit not always constitutionally required, to expend every effort to eradicate it completely from public life. This moral and societal obligation extends in particular to the Michigan Department of Corrections, to which society has entrusted the care, treatment, and punishment of those who predominantly come from the politically, economically, and socially powerless sectors of our society, and which has almost complete and total control over its inmate population. I regret that the Department is not completely meeting that obligation.
In accordance with the above opinion, the Court will enter a Judgment and Order granting plaintiffs partial relief on their severed claims. With regard to the appealability of my Judgment and Order, despite my earlier request that the parties brief the issue of the application of Rule 54(b) certification, I agree with plaintiffs that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides the proper guidance. For the sake of clarity, and recognizing that the Sixth Circuit may well disagree on whether they are immediately appealable, the Court will indicate its intent as to its decisions. I intend my decisions on the following claims for relief, granting or denying injunctive relief, to be final: (1) the lack of adequate winter clothing; (2) the lack of adequate access to toilet and lavatory facilities at the RPC; and (3) racial discrimination, except for the racial slurs claim. I intend for my decisions on the remaining substantive claims for relief to become final grants of injunctive relief when I order defendants to implement appropriate remedial plans. See Groseclose v. Dutton, 788 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.1986).
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
In accordance with the opinion dated August 10, 1987;
512 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' request for relief concerning defendants' *512 system of handling incoming legal mail is GRANTED and that JUDGMENT is entered FOR plaintiffs and AGAINST defendants on

this issue; defendants shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion to submit a revised system for allowing inmates to invoke their constitutional right to be present when their clearly marked legal mail is opened and inspected for contraband;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered FOR plaintiffs and AGAINST defendants on plaintiffs' claim that they are denied adequate winter clothing in violation of the Eighth Amendment; defendants are hereby ENJOINED to provide inmates with constitutionally adequate winter coats, hats, gloves, and, under the circumstances specified in the opinion, boots;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered FOR plaintiffs and AGAINST defendants on plaintiffs' claim that inmates at the Riverside Correctional Facility are denied adequate access to toilet and lavatory facilities in violation of the Eighth Amendment; defendants shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion to submit a plan for remedying the constitutional deficiencies that exist at the RCF;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered FOR defendants and AGAINST plaintiffs on plaintiffs' claim that inmates at the Riverside Psychiatric Center are denied adequate access to toilet and lavatory facilities in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered FOR plaintiffs and AGAINST defendants on plaintiffs' claim that inmates at the subject facilities are denied their fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts; defendants shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion to submit a plan to remedy the constitutional defects in their current system of providing inmates with access to the courts;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered FOR defendants and AGAINST plaintiffs on plaintiffs' claim that black inmates at the subject facilities are, as a class, subjected to intentional racial discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; JUDGMENT, however, is entered FOR plaintiffs and AGAINST defendants on plaintiffs' claim that they are subjected to racial harassment in the form of racial slurs; defendants shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this opinion to submit a proposed solution for this violation;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' April 23, 1987 Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' May 7, 1987 Motion to Strike Testimony of Ronald Christensen is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' oral motion to decertify the plaintiff class on the racial discrimination issue is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; the class is decertified and no judgment is rendered for either party on the issue of the constitutional validity of defendants' anti-discrimination in inmate employment policy.
[1] Also critical is the situation of those inmates who receive reports and recommendations or motions while they are in transit between institutions. They have absolutely no access to a law library or any other source of legal information for assistance in preparing an effective response. In addition, many inmates either lose their personal legal materials during these transitions or have to wait a considerable period of time before regaining possession of them.
[2] The Court makes the following rulings on the evidentiary objections made during Mr. Chapman's testimony. The objections are listed by page number: 23 0907 overruled; 24-25 0907 overruled; 26 0907 overruled; 28 0907 overruled; 30-31 0907 overruled; 31-34 0907 overruled; 37-38 0907 overruled; 38 0907 overruled; 39 0907 overruled; 40 0907 overruled; 41 0907 sustained; 56 0907 overruled; 59-60 0907 overruled; 60-62 0907 overruled; 66 0907 overruled as being moot; 72-73 0907 overruled; 77 0907 overruled; 78-82 0907 overruled, but the answer on page 82 is limited to the obvious, i.e., that defendants' rejection of racial slur grievances tends to discourage inmates from filing such grievances; the evidence does not suggest that this situation exacerbates the treatment of black inmates; defendants' motion to strike the answer is denied; 86 0907 sustained; the answer is not tied to evidence of racial motivation; it could be admissible if it were linked up; 87 0907 sustained; there is no evidence that racially motivated correctional officers issued the tickets; 92 0907 sustained; there is no evidence that Meyers, Bills, and Pringle knew each other; there is no foundation for the perception of unequal treatment; 95-96 0907 sustained; the answer assumes that Sullivan's

statement and reason for wanting to be in detention are true; 116-18 0907 overruled; the objection is untimely and the opinion is within the expert's knowledge based on statistics, interviews, tours, and evidence presented to him; 130-31 0907 overruled; questions regarding background and prejudices are proper; 131 0907 overruled; 133 0907 sustained; irrelevant; 134 0907 sustained; irrelevant; 136 0907 overruled; 142-43 0907 sustained; the question on religious beliefs is improper; 145-46 0907sustained unless it is established that the quotation came from Myrdal; 150-51 0907sustained; the witness cannot opine about a study he does not know about; 151-54 0907 sustained for the same reason; 154 0907 overruled; 156-57 0907 overruled; 158-59 0907 sustained; the Court is not interested on the witness' "surprise"; 160-61 0907 overruled; the witness is familiar with the study; 168 0907 sustained; compound question; 171 0907 overruled; untimely; 171-74 0907 moot; the question was not answered; 176 0907 overruled; 177 0907 overruled; 180 0907 overruled; 181 0907 overruled; 188 0907 overruled; 189 0907 sustained; the exhibit is not in evidence; 190 0907 sustained for the same reason; 192-93 0907 sustained for the same reason; 195-98 0907 most of the question was not answered; the objection is sustained because the document is not in evidence and was not on defendants' exhibit list; 210 0907 overruled; 214 0907 overruled.
In addition to these rulings, the Court will allow in the following exhibits: (1) exhibit 421 is admitted as evidence on which a race relations expert can rely. The staff response to the racial complaint can assist the expert in evaluating staff responses to inmate racial complaints. The Court will ignore the sex discrimination aspect of the complaint. The exhibit is admitted to give the witness another source of information for his opinion on whether racial grievances are useless. It is not admitted as substantive evidence of discrimination. (2) 477e and 477f are admitted over defendants' objections. (3) 576 and 793 are admitted.
[3] The Court discounts the significance of these two exhibits slightly because it agrees with defendants that the statistics would be more significant if they were broken out by institution.
[4] I observe that according to defendants' post-trial memorandum regarding race discrimination, they do "generally assign prisoners to segregation on the basis of race." Memorandum at 3. This statement unfortunately is but one example of the many errors defendants have made in their written submissions throughout this case. See also id. at 9 ("Obviously, Defendants cannot withdraw to bigger reach of the 9,000 employees in the Department of Corrections at all times, but, fails to establish that there is a pattern and practice of racial derogatory remarks which Defendants have chosen to ignore"). These errors, which include not only typographical errors but also sentences and even entire paragraphs that are completely nonsensical, have sorely taxed the Court's patience and have made it difficult to understand defendants' arguments.
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 667 F.Supp. 512 (1987)
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John
Prelesnik, and Jack Bergman, Defendants.
No. G84-651.
United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.
August 20, 1987.
5134 *513 *514 Elizabeth Alexander, Adjoa Aiyetoro, & Nkechi Taifa-Caldwell, Nat. Prison Project, Washington, D.C., Patricia Streeter, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Thomas Nelson, Brian McKenzie, David Edick, Michigan Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
OPINION
ENSLEN, District Judge.
There are ten motions pending before the Court in this case: (1) plaintiffs' motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of 515 the Federal *515 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary
judgment regarding jobs, idleness, rehabilitation, and education; (3) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding recreational activities; (4) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding sanitation; (5) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding medical care; (6) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding unsafe food; (7) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding fire and smoke hazards; (8) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding overcrowding; (9) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding classification; and (10) defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding mental health care. The Court had withheld decision on defendants' motions for partial summary judgment pending the conclusion of the trial on the severed issues. Since that trial is over, I believe that I should decide these motions before the parties expend too much time and money on the remaining issues without the benefit of my thoughts on them. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, and will deny the remaining motions.
I. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11
On February 25, 1986, the deadline Magistrate Rowland had established for the filing of substantive motions in this case, defendants filed twenty motions regarding various aspects of plaintiffs' case. In a bench opinion rendered on June 2, 1986 the Court decided ten of those motions, and ordered defendants to show cause why it should not sanction them under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for having filed six of those ten motions without the "requisite belief formed after reasonable inquiry that they were well grounded in fact or warranted under existing law." Transcript of June 2, 1986 Hearing at 66. In addition, the Court indicated that it also was considering sanctioning defendants for having filed their "motions with the intent to harass or delay the plaintiffs' [pursuit of] ... their claims, and not because the motions ... had any merit." Id. at 67. The parties have filed memoranda in support of their positions on this issue.
Rule 11 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. The Advisory Committee Notes explain that the rule "stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances." Id. Advisory Committee Notes. The Committee also observed, however, that although the new standard "is more stringent than the original good-faith formula", "[t]he rule is not 516 intended to chill *516 an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." Id. It cautioned that courts are "expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted." Id. If a court finds that an attorney has violated rule 11, however, it has no choice but to impose sanctions, although it does enjoy wide discretion in "deciding the nature and extent of sanctions to impose." INVST Financial Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 401 (6th Cir.1987).
The Sixth Circuit recently stated that "[t]he conduct of counsel that is the subject of sanctions will be measured by an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances." Id. Using this objective standard, a court must impose sanctions "if a reasonable inquiry discloses the pleading, motion, or paper is (1) not well grounded in fact, (2) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or (3) interposed for any improper purpose such as harassment or delay." Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C.Cir.1985). Defendants argue here that the Court cannot sanction them for having filed legally untenable motions unless it determines that the motions were "frivolous" and lacked even "arguable merit." There is some case law support for this position. See Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.1985) (rule 11 has been violated "where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands"). A court must apply the frivolous standard, however, in light of rule 11's measure of a competent attorney who has conducted a reasonable inquiry into the issues:
A good faith belief in the merit of a legal argument is an objective condition which a competent attorney attains only after "reasonable inquiry." Such inquiry is that amount of examination into the facts and legal research which is reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Of course, the conclusion drawn from the research undertaken must itself be defensible. Extended research alone will not save a claim that is without legal or factual merit from the penalty of sanctions.
... [W]e affirm that Rule 11 sanctions shall be assessed if the paper filed in district court and signed by an attorney or an unrepresented party is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper is not filed in subjective bad faith.
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir.1986). A court must take care, though, in applying rule 11 not "to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law." Eastway Construction Corp., 762 F.2d at 254.
In addition to motions that are legally untenable, rule 11 applies to motions that are filed "to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "the conduct forming the basis of the charge of harassment must do more than in fact bother, annoy or vex the complaining party. Harassment under rule 11 focuses upon the improper purpose of the

signer, objectively tested, rather than the consequences of the signer's act, subjectively viewed by the signer's opponent." Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831-32. The Ninth Circuit also noted in Zaldivar, although it did not decide the issue, that "[t]he filing of excessive motions ..., even if each is well grounded in fact and law, may under particular circumstances be `harassment' under Rule 11...." Id. at 832 n. 10. One can argue strongly, moreover, that the filing of excessive motions that are not well grounded in fact or law does constitute harassment under rule 11.
With these standards in mind, the Court will examine defendants' motions and the propriety under rule 11 of their decision to file twenty potentially dispositive motions on the last day they could do so. This discussion is 517 composed of two parts. First, *517 I will discuss whether defendants filed the six motions I cited in my June 2nd bench opinion with the requisite "knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry" that they were "well grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Next, I will examine whether defendants interposed their twenty motions "to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." I observe that defendants have had ample opportunity to defend their position. See INVST Financial Group, Inc., 815 F.2d at 405. I also observe that I will not reiterate the legal discussions contained in my June 2nd bench opinion, but rather simply will supplement those discussions to the extent necessary to determine whether defendants' six motions were legally untenable or frivolous.
The first motion the Court will discuss is defendants' motion to dismiss based on their efforts under the Consent Decree entered in the case of United States v. Michigan, No. G84-63 (W.D.Mich.), to enhance the conditions of confinement in their prisons. Defendants argued that under Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), they were entitled to have the Court grant their motion. In their response to the Court's show cause order, defendants argue that their motion was not frivolous because "[t]he exact dimensions and contours of the Eleventh Amendment doctrine ... is not at all clear"; that to sanction them would be "pernicious to the development of the Eleventh Amendment doctrine"; that they were merely seeking to determine whether plaintiffs intended to litigate conditions that had been corrected; and that they partially succeeded in their motion since the Court stated in its June 2nd opinion that plaintiffs could litigate only those conditions of confinement that existed as of the time of trial.
The Court rejected defendants' motion in its June 2nd opinion, and it now finds that defendants filed this motion in violation of rule 11. I base this finding on several grounds. First, although Green clearly was distinguishable from this case because in Green it was undisputed that a change in federal law had mooted plaintiffs' claim while here the factual issues were (and still are) hotly contested, defendants made little effort to place this case within the factual context of Green or other Eleventh Amendment decisions. Indeed, defendants' motion consisted of little more than a page of discussion, which they supplemented with a three-page reply to plaintiffs' responsive brief. Secondly, defendants made no attempt to delineate what conditions of confinement should be removed from this case, or to justify under the applicable constitutional standards the conditions that existed in their institutions in February 1986. They made no showing in their motion, by affidavit, exhibits, or otherwise, either of (a) "alleged constitutional violations which have been corrected" or (b) "alleged constitutional violations which are subject to the consent decree in USA v. Michigan and corrections pursuant to terms of the decree and under control of this court." Defendants' Motion at 3. They in essence requested the Court to rule in a factual vacuum and to issue an advisory decision that plaintiffs cannot litigate conditions that no longer exist when they did not demonstrate in their motion that plaintiffs intended to do so. Defendants produced no evidence that plaintiffs intended to litigate changed conditions in violation of Green, and the Court, for the reasons stated above and in its June 2nd bench opinion, accordingly must find that they filed their motion in violation of rule 11. I have attached a copy of defendants' motion and reply brief to this opinion as examples of what the Court considers to be sanctionable filings.
The next motion the Court will consider is defendants' motion to dismiss under the Eleventh Amendment. In this motion, defendants again argue that the Court should dismiss plaintiffs' action, excepting only plaintiffs' claims regarding the lack of toilets at the Riverside Correctional Facility and racial discrimination at the Central Complex 518 of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, because of the efforts they are *518 taking pursuant to the Consent Decree in the United States v. Michigan proceeding. For many of the same reasons I gave above concerning the preceding motion, I find that defendants filed this motion in violation of rule 11. The Court bases its finding basically on two grounds. First, defendants made no effort in their motion to demonstrate (1) that they had

corrected the conditions of which plaintiffs complain and (2) that their corrections were sufficient to satisfy applicable constitutional standards. Once again, they requested the Court to rule in a factual vacuum and to issue an advisory opinion. Secondly, and more importantly, defendants were well aware that they had resisted allowing the plaintiffs to intervene as a party in the United States v. Michigan proceeding, that the Consent Decree specifically provides that it will have no effect on plaintiffs' case, and that the Decree did not decide whether defendants are housing inmates in unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The issues defendants raised in their motion are issues to be proved at trial, not a basis for a motion to dismiss. Defendants should be sanctioned under rule 11 for having filed this motion.
The third motion the Court will discuss is defendants' request that the Court dismiss the action against them in their official capacities. The Court discussed this motion's lack of merit in its June 2nd bench opinion, and will not repeat that discussion here. See Transcript at 20-25. If defendants had wanted the Court to forge new Eleventh Amendment doctrine, they should have said so and should have demonstrated that their motion presented a "good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." They did not do so. I still fail to understand the grounds for this motion. Plaintiffs are suing defendants in their official capacities because defendants act toward them in those capacities; e.g., Director Brown implements policy and otherwise takes or fails to take actions concerning the plaintiffs in his official, not his individual, capacity. Allowing plaintiffs to maintain an official capacity action neither allows them to proceed under the doctrine of respondeat superior nor allows them to hold present defendants accountable for the actions of former defendants, and there is no evidence they are trying to do so. The Court thus does not believe that defendants brought this motion in objective good faith.
Defendants' next motion is that the named plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. In essence, they presented two arguments here. First, they argued that the named plaintiffs are not suffering the injuries claimed in plaintiffs' first amended complaint. Secondly, they argued that plaintiffs' allegations are conclusory. Although this motion presents a close question under rule 11, the Court believes that it passes muster. While the Court found in its June 2nd opinion that plaintiffs' first amended complaint is proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it agreed with defendants that the complaint could have been more specific. The question of whether the named plaintiffs adequately represent the class, moreover, is one on which reasonable persons can differ and is always open to dispute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1).
Defendants' fifth motion concerns plaintiffs' claim of racially discriminatory treatment. In this motion, defendants devoted four pages to their discussion of this complex issue. In support of the motion, defendants submitted two affidavits and various policy directives and guides. One affidavit was from Daniel Bolden, the Department's Deputy Director for the Bureau of Correctional Facilities. Mr. Bolden stated that racial discrimination is prohibited by official policy and that inmates may seek redress for claims of racial discrimination through the grievance procedure. The second affidavit was from Jack Boyett, the Department's Personnel Director. Mr. Boyett stated that employees are prohibited from engaging in acts of racial discrimination and that the Department has a successful affirmative action policy for its employees. In their brief, defendants do not explicitly deny that racial 519 discrimination occurs in the subject institutions, but rather present the defense that they are doing *519 everything within their power to prevent discrimination from occurring.
The Court rejected defendants' motion in its June 2nd bench opinion, and now finds that defendants filed this motion in violation of rule 11. I find it difficult to believe that defendants expected me to take their motion seriously. Racial discrimination is a difficult and complex issue that often-times requires detailed analysis of the law and facts. In moving for summary judgment, moreover, a party bears the burden of establishing that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact. Neither Mr. Bolden nor Mr. Boyett stated in their affidavits that inmates at the subject institutions do not suffer from racial discrimination. They asserted only that official policy prohibits racially discriminatory practices. Whether official policy is followed, however, is a different story, and it is a story the affiants did not address in their affidavits and which defendants did not address in their brief. Defendants' motion does not represent a considered and thoughtful discussion of plaintiffs' racial discrimination claim, and in my opinion does not indicate that defense counsel made the requisite inquiry to determine whether the motion was "well grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." The Court in particular finds defendants' conduct sanctionable under rule 11 because by February 25, 1986 the parties had engaged in considerable discovery and defendants thus

had ample material to analyze in meeting their initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed.
The final motion the Court will discuss is defendants' motion for the appointment of a special master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to conduct the trial. This motion presents a close question under rule 11. Defendants based their motion in part on their belief that the Court may have been prejudiced by its involvement in the United States v. Michigan proceedings. As plaintiffs note, this argument in essence represents a reversal in defendants' earlier position on this issue, when they opposed plaintiffs' motion to transfer this action to the Eastern District of Michigan. The motion also is troublesome in light of the Supreme Court's strong admonition in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co. against district court judges referring a case to a special master for trial on the merits. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256-59, 77 S.Ct. 309, 313-15, 1 L.Ed.2d 290 (1957). I nevertheless cannot find that defendants filed this motion in violation of rule 11. Defendants' motion had sufficient merit to pass muster under the rule.
In addition to determining whether defendants had filed individual motions in violation of rule 11, the Court must examine whether defendants "interposed" their motions "for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Applying an objective standard to defendants' conduct, see W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 0907 A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 195-97 (1985), the Court has determined that defendants did interpose their motions for an improper purpose. The Court bases this determination on four factors.
First, defendants filed twenty potentially dispositive motions on the last possible day they could do so. As plaintiffs observe in their memorandum in support of rule 11 sanctions, defendants apparently could have spaced their motions out a bit; it indeed is hard to believe that none of the motions was ready to be filed prior to the 25th. Defendants' decision to wait until the last day to file these motions, when the parties were busily engaged in last minute discovery and a trial date was near, raises significant doubt as to their purpose in doing so. Secondly, the Court has considered the substance and merit of the motions defendants filed on that day. I already have found that defendants filed four of those motions in violation of rule 11. Most of the other motions defendants filed that 520 day, moreover, were not much better in terms of substance and merit. A *520 court reasonably may question the propriety of filing on one day twenty motions that are, for the most part, not well supported by briefs, memoranda, and other documentation.
Thirdly, defendants refused to give plaintiffs an unconditional extension of time in which to respond to the motions. Finally, the Court considered defendants' conduct throughout this litigation in determining whether they had filed their February 25th motions for an improper purpose within the meaning of rule 11. The trial transcript documents the Court's concerns regarding the inability of the attorneys for both parties to interact in a professional manner. The numerous discovery proceedings conducted by Magistrate Rowland further evince the parties', and in particular defendants', inability to cooperate with each other in good faith. The Court has no interest in whether the attorneys like each other personally or respect each others' legal abilities. When personal animosity spills over into the courtroom, however, as it apparently did when defendants decided to file twenty motions on February 25, 1986, the Court does become interested. Rule 11 was drafted in part to prevent this kind of conduct and burden on the Court.[1]
521 *521 For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that it should sanction defendants under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I now must decide on an appropriate sanction. The Sixth Circuit recently stated that the goals of rule 11 are "the deterrence and punishment of offenders and the compensation of their opponents for expenditure of time and resources responding to unreasonable pleadings or motions." INVST Financial Group, Inc., 815 F.2d at 404. The Sixth Circuit went on to provide guidance for courts who decide to award the opposing party the reasonable expenses it incurred because "of the filing of the pleading, motion, and other paper."
[I]n order to award the fees sought by plaintiff's counsel ..., the court must find that the actions for which fees are sought were reasonably necessary to defend against the motions. A reasonableness inquiry necessarily requires a determination as to what extent plaintiff's expenses and fees could have been avoided and were self-imposed. When counsel is called upon to defend against its adversary's unreasonable motion practices, he must mitigate damages by correlating

his response, in terms of hours and funds expended, to the merit of the claims. The mitigation

requirement prevents a party from misusing rule 11 sanctions in order to benefit from the errors of

opposing counsel.... The district court is therefore required to balance carefully these competing

522

interests in determining the amount of sanctions. *522 Id. at 404 (footnote and citations omitted).

Rule 11 expressly provides, of course, that an award of the opposing party's reasonable

expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, is only one possible sanction. A district court,

moreover, is given wide discretion "in deciding the nature and extent of sanctions to impose." Id.

at 401.

In this case, since the Court has found that defendants violated rule 11 in two different ways, it believes that it should impose two different santions on them. With regard to the four motions that defendants filed in violation of rule 11, the Court will award plaintiffs the reasonable expenses they incurred in defending against such motions. The Court also believes that a monetary sanction is appropriate for defendants having filed their February 25th motions for an improper purpose. Such a sanction will partially compensate plaintiffs for any unnecessary burdens they incurred in responding to such motions at that time and will act as a deterrent to defendants engaging in such conduct in the future.

Plaintiffs request an award of $10,150.00 in fees and expenses as a sanction against defendants. With regard to the four motions that defendants filed in violation of rule 11, the Court believes that an award of $6,165.00 is appropriate. This award is composed of two parts. First, the Court awards plaintiffs $3,165.00 in attorney's fees for having to respond to the four motions. This award is composed of $1,462.50 for Ms. Alexander's fees (9.75 hours at $150.00 per hour); $1,562.50 for Ms. Aiyetoro's fees (12.50 hours at $125.00 per hour); and $140.00 for Ms. Lipkin's fees (3.5 hours at $40.00 per hour). I find that plaintiffs reasonably incurred these fees in defending against the four motions. Secondly, the Court awards plaintiffs $3,000.00 in attorney's fees for having to prepare their rule 11 briefs. This award is based on twenty (20) hours of preparation time for Ms. Alexander at a rate of $150.00 per hour. I credit plaintiffs with only twenty (20) hours of preparation time, when they asked for 33.75 hours, because they only partially succeeded on their motion.

With regard to defendants having filed their motions for an improper purpose, the Court believes that a monetary award to plaintiffs of $2,500.00 is appropriate. This amount may not seem like much, but the Court will assess it directly against defense counsel, and not their clients, in the hope that it will deter such conduct from recurring.

As a final note, the Court observes that plaintiffs repeatedly have requested it to strike the form affidavits defense counsel almost invariably attach to their motions, and to preclude defendants from continuing to use the affidavits. These affidavits are meaningless to the Court and I have no idea why defendants use them. They tell me nothing and I attach no weight to them. I nevertheless see no basis for ordering defendants not to use them if they wish to, and thus will deny plaintiff's request.

II. Jobs, Idleness, Rehabilitation, and Education

Plaintiffs' first amended complaint states in pertinent part as follows:
B. Protection from Harm
51. Jackson, Marquette, and Ionia suffer from an atmosphere of violence. Inmate/inmate attacks, including stabbing, are commonplace at Jackson.
52. The prisons lack employment, educational and recreational opportunities, resulting in pervasive idleness. The lack of meaningful inmate programming contributes to the level of violence at the institutions.
First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 51 & 52. Defendants seek to dismiss this "claim" for two reasons. First, they argue that plaintiffs have no constitutional right to jobs or to education, or to participate in a rehabilitation program, and that the lack of such programming thus does not violate the Constitution. Secondly, they argue that plaintiffs cannot circumvent this rule by attempting to attach this claim to their inmate violence claim. Plaintiffs respond that 523 their claim is proper for two reasons. *523 First, they contend that although a lack of programming does not

violate the Constitution, the unreasonable level of violence at the institutions does violate it and the Court should consider the lack of programming as a factor influencing the level of violence. Secondly, they contend that if the Court finds that unconstitutional levels of violence exist in the institutions, it can order defendants to provide inmate programs as part of its remedy.
The Court does not believe that plaintiffs are claiming that a lack of programming by itself violates the Constitution. They state that they are not pursuing such a claim, and there is no basis in the case law for one. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir.1982). The issue, rather, is whether the Court should strike plaintiffs' allegations concerning programming from the complaint and should preclude plaintiffs from introducing testimony and other evidence on that issue at trial. The Court finds that it should not do so for two reasons.
First, both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have stated that in assessing whether conditions of confinement deprive inmates of life's necessities (e.g. personal safety) in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a court must consider "all the prison's conditions and circumstances, rather than isolated conditions and events." Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir.1985); see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 ("[c]onditions ..., alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"). If plaintiffs establish, for example, that excessive idleness has led to rampant inmate violence at the institutions, then I do not believe that I am precluded from taking remedial action simply because inmates have no constitutional right to adequate programming. See id. at 348, 101 S.Ct. at 2400 (noting that the district court had not found that double celling had increased "violence among inmates"); see also Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 (3d Cir.1983) (in evaluating whether inmates have been deprived of their right to habitable shelter, a court must consider "all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the shelter afforded to sentenced inmates") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984). Under such circumstances, the conditions of confinement would violate the inmates' constitutional right to at least some modicum of personal safety. Secondly, the Court may be able to consider inmate programming as a possible remedy for unconstitutional levels of violence. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). Although this kind of remedy certainly would not be automatic even if I were to find a constitutional violation, and would depend on the circumstances, the Court believes that it should allow plaintiffs to present evidence on lack of inmate programming and idleness in deciding whether unconstitutional levels of violence exist at the institutions. I therefore will deny defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.
III. Recreational Activities
Defendants' second motion for summary judgment also is directed at paragraphs 51 and 52 of plaintiffs' first amended complaint. They argue in this motion that the Court should dismiss plaintiffs' claim of lack of adequate recreational opportunities because inmates in the Michigan system receive adequate recreational opportunities, and because under Hoptowit and Walker plaintiffs cannot combine conditions of confinement to create an unconstitutional totality of conditions. The Court will deny defendants' motion for two reasons.
First, as plaintiffs assert, a total denial of recreational opportunities may violate the Constitution. See Walker, 771 F.2d at 927-28; Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir.1983). The parties dispute what the State Plan for Compliance in the United States v. Michigan proceeding, No. G84-63 (W.D.Mich.), requires of defendants in this area. The Court's concern at this point, however, is not what the State Plan requires but rather whether 524 inmates *524 in the subject institutions are completely denied recreational activities in violation of the Constitution. On that constitutional issue, defendants have not satisfied their initial burden under rule 56(c) of demonstrating that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact. Secondly, the Court believes, as it discussed above concerning defendants' first motion, that the level of recreational activities available to the inmates is relevant to plaintiffs' claim that the inmates suffer from excessive violence. I agree with defendants that the Sixth Circuit rejected a true "totality of conditions of confinement" approach in Walker. Plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits of their case if they are unable to establish that defendants' actions have deprived them of life's necessities, i.e., they cannot aggregate constitutional conditions of confinement to create an unconstitutional condition of confinement. I interpret the Sixth Circuit's admonition in Walker, however, that a court must consider "all the prison's conditions and circumstances," Walker, 771 F.2d at 925, as requiring me to examine all facets of

the institutions' operations that are relevant to the issue of whether the inmates suffer from unconstitutional levels of violence.
The evidence produced at trial may not support plaintiffs' claim that they lack adequate recreational opportunities, or their claim that the Court should order additional recreational programs as a remedy for any unconstitutional levels of violence that may exist. At this point, though, my sole concern is whether I should strike plaintiffs' allegations concerning inadequate recreational opportunities from the complaint, or rather allow them to present testimony on that issue at trial. Under Rhodes and Walker, I believe that I should allow plaintiffs to present this testimony at trial, unless of course defendants can establish in accordance with the requirements of rule 56 that plaintiffs' recreational opportunities are sufficiently adequate that they bear no relation to any possible unconstitutional levels of inmate violence. For the above reasons, the Court will deny defendants' second motion for partial summary judgment.
IV. Sanitation
In their next motion defendants challenge plaintiffs' assertions, contained in paragraphs 38, 41, and 46 of the first amended complaint, that sanitary conditions at the subject institutions are constitutionally inadequate. Defendants make numerous factual assertions in their brief that are utterly unsupported by any citations to the record or to admitted facts in other cases. As I stated previously in this opinion, I view the form affidavit defendants attached to their motion as being meaningless. Since defendants have not satisfied their burden under rule 56 of establishing that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 277 (1986) (White, J., concurring), the Court will deny their motion for partial summary judgment on the sanitation issue.
V. Medical Care
Defendants direct their fourth motion for partial summary judgment toward plaintiffs' claims that they are denied access to adequate medical care. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 57-62 & 73. In support of their motion, defendants argue that the fact they have budgeted $35,524,000 for the delivery of health care services to the inmate population, and that they employ 17.7 full-time physicians, 129 physician's assistants, and 124.6 nurses at the subject institutions, indicate that they are not deliberately indifferent to the inmates' serious medical needs. Defendants support their factual assertions with affidavits from the Director of their Office of Health Care, the Fiscal Coordinator for the Bureau of Health Care Services, and the Associate Director of Health Care. In response to this motion, plaintiffs argue that the Court must consider the overall situation at the institutions to determine what level of budgeting and staffing is necessary for defendants to provide adequate medical care to the inmates, and in addition contend that serious problems exist in defendants' medical care system.
525 *525 In the area of medical care, defendants violate the Eighth Amendment if they are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Prison officials cannot be held liable for negligently providing inadequate medical treatment. Id. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292. They can be held liable, however, for any deliberate indifference that may occur, whether this indifference "is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed." Id. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92 (footnotes omitted). As this last quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Estelle indicates, the deliberate indifference standard requires a court to judge, at least to a limited extent, the quality as well as the quantity of medical care provided to an inmate population. See id. at 104 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. at 291 n. 10.
In their motion, however, defendants do not analyze the quality of the care they provide the plaintiff class. The Court is impressed with the amount of money defendants spend on medical care and with the number of staff they have hired in pursuit of that endeavor. These cold figures do not, though, entitle defendants to a judgment on plaintiffs' medical care claim. Absent undisputed evidence that defendants' medical staff are not deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' serious medical needs, the Court will deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue.

VI. Food
Defendants' fifth motion for partial summary judgment concerns plaintiffs' claims that "[t]he food service areas at all three prisons are infested with insects and rodents," that food is "served at unsafe temperatures," and that "[o]verall conditions in the food service areas and milk pasteurization operations at Jackson and Marquette constitute public health hazards." First Amended Complaint ¶ 48. Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on plaintiffs' claim because the food served at the subject institutions is nutritionally adequate and because plaintiffs have failed to allege that any inmates have suffered any serious illness or have died from eating the food. Plaintiffs contend in response that inmates have suffered from food poisoning at one of the subject institutions; that numerous inmates have indicated the food has made them ill; that sanitation experts have detailed defendants' problems with food sanitation and food temperatures; and that the provision of unsanitary food and the maintenance of dangerous conditions of food preparation and service can violate the inmates' constitutional rights.
The Court will deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue. Plaintiffs could have made their claim more specific. The issue they raise, however, is not whether defendants serve nutritionally adequate food, but rather whether the food is safe for them to eat. Food is one of the basic necessities of life protected by the Eighth Amendment. See Walker, 771 F.2d at 926. The Court does not believe, moreover, that plaintiffs' claim is deficient because they have failed to allege that any inmates have suffered serious illness or have died from eating defendants' food. The Court need not wait until an inmate has died before acting to protect plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants have not attempted to rebut plaintiffs' contentions that the food preparation and service facilities are unsanitary and that defendants serve food at unsafe temperatures. The Court therefore sees no basis for granting the motion for summary judgment at this time, and will enter an order denying it.
VII. Fire and Smoke Hazards
Defendants' next motion for partial summary judgment concerns plaintiffs' claim that conditions at the subject institutions expose the inmates to an unreasonable risk of harm from fire and smoke. They argue in support of 526 their motion that they have taken numerous steps to improve fire safety protection at the subject institutions and *526 that no inmate has suffered injury from a fire at any of the institutions. Defendants support their factual assertions with an affidavit from the Special Projects Manager who has been involved in implementing the fire safety provisions of the United States v. Michigan Consent Decree. Plaintiffs respond that defendants have not yet implemented all of the fire safety measures they discuss in their motion, and further contend that recent reports by the Independent Expert in the United States v. Michigan proceeding and by their own fire safety expert indicate that unconstitutional conditions exist at the subject facilities.
Under the Eighth Amendment "[p]risoners have the right not to be subjected to the unreasonable threat of injury or death by fire and need not wait until actual casualties occur in order to obtain relief from such conditions." Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir.1985). They are not, however, entitled to a riskfree environment. The Court finds significant merit in defendants' motion. I must deny it, though, because defendants did not adequately support it in accordance with rule 56(e). This rule provides in part that "[s]upporting ... affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." In his affidavit, Mr. Walter does not state the basis for his knowledge concerning all of defendants' fire safety efforts, and more particularly does not state that he has personal, admissible knowledge of all of the facts stated in his affidavit. He asserts, for example, that "evacuation plans have been prepared and posted throughout the institutions" and that "exits are kept clear and available for use." Affidavit of George Walter ¶¶ 5 & 8. He does not state, however, whether he has personal knowledge of these facts, or rather learned of them from other sources. Defendants may have been able to support their motion adequately with affidavits from persons closer to the institutions, such as the institutional fire safety inspectors. They did not do so, however, and the Court must deny their motion for summary judgment on this issue. I also observe, moreover, that as stated in plaintiffs' response, there is doubt whether defendants are fully implementing all of the measures stated in Mr. Walter's affidavit.

VIII. Overcrowding
Defendants' seventh, and most significant, motion for partial summary judgment concerns plaintiffs' claim that the subject institutions are unconstitutionally overcrowded. The Court believes that plaintiffs' complaint raises two issues in this regard: (1) whether defendants' institutions are overcrowded, and (2) if they are, whether the overcrowding violates the inmates' constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants argue that the subject facilities are not overcrowded in the cell (maximum security and close custody) areas, and that the minimum security dormitories are only slightly overcrowded. They further contend that whatever overcrowding does exist is not unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Plaintiffs respond that the overcrowding, at least in the minimum security areas, is significant and drastically affects other areas of concern, such as the classification system, recreational opportunities, medical and mental health services, and violence.
The Court believes that defendants' motion has substantial merit, at least as it concerns the cell blocks. Much of plaintiffs' concern, moreover, appears to be directed at conditions at institutions that are not covered by this suit. The Court cannot grant defendants' motion at this time, however, because as was the case with many of their other motions for partial summary judgment, defendants failed to support this motion in accordance with rule 56 (c). In support of their motion, defendants attached a "Michigan Department of Corrections Summary Client Census Report" dated February 5, 1986. This report is not, as rule 56(c) requires, a pleading, deposition, answer 527 to interrogatory, admission, or affidavit. The Court therefore *527 must find that defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of establishing that there exist no genuine issues of material fact on the overcrowding issue. In addition, defendants have failed to submit any affidavits or other documentation assessing the effects of any overcrowding that does exist in the subject facilities. The Court accordingly will enter an order denying defendants' motion.
IX. Classification
Defendants seek in their next motion for summary judgment to have the Court render judgment on plaintiffs' claims that "[i]nmates are not properly classified," that "[o]vercrowding results in inappropriate and frequently unsafe placements for inmates," and that "[c]lassification decisions are primarily determined by the availability of an inmate bunk rather than individual inmate characteristics." First Amended Complaint ¶ 54. Defendants argue that they have the discretion to devise and to implement any classification system they desire as long as it is not completely irrational, and that the Court cannot grant plaintiffs' claim for relief under the theory that the allegedly inadequate classification system, considered in conjunction with other conditions of confinement, creates unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1255 (finding that if misclassification "does not itself create a deprivation in one of the areas that the Eighth Amendment protects, it cannot be held an Eighth Amendment violation"). In addition, defendants contend that misclassification by itself does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1256; see Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566-67 (10th Cir.1980) (finding that shortcomings in the area of classification "are not of constitutional dimension"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). The Court believes that defendants' motion has substantial merit. I must decline to grant it at this time, however, for two reasons.
First, defendants' motion and supporting documentation discuss only the structure of the classification system and, except for one general comment in Mr. Kime's affidavit that the policy has "proven to be an effective tool in meeting the increasing Michigan prison populations," not its implementation, and therefore is inadequate to refute plaintiffs' claim that defendants do not follow the system and do place inmates in unsafe living areas. The Ninth Circuit indicated in Hoptowit v. Ray that a classification system may violate inmates' constitutional rights if it creates "a deprivation in one of the areas that the Eighth Amendment protects," such as personal safety. Although plaintiffs' claim appears to be tenuous, the Court cannot grant defendants' motion at this time because they have not established that there exist no genuine issues of material fact with respect to such claim. To consider defendants' motion further, the Court would have to receive appropriate submissions (see rule 56(c)) establishing that defendants are not operating their classification system in a manner that significantly endangers

the safety of inmates. See Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F.Supp. 1052, 1124 (M.D.Tenn.1982) ("if the proof shows a sufficient connection between an improper classification system and a protected constitutional right, such as the right to be reasonably free from excessive violence, there may be just cause for court intervention in the proper case").
Secondly, plaintiffs present an interesting argument that state law grants them a liberty interest in being classified according to specific criteria, and that defendants are violating that liberty interest by "overriding" the classification system due to lack of adequate bedspace. The Court considers this to be a ground for relief distinct from the issue discussed in the preceding paragraph; it is based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. I cannot decide its validity at this time, however, for two reasons. First, apparently neither party has provided me with a copy of the administrative rule on which plaintiffs rely, Rule 791.4401(1). Secondly, defendants have not responded to 528 plaintiffs' analysis of this issue and the Court is hesitant to *528 decide its validity without the benefit of defendants' input. I therefore will decline to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on the classification issue, at least at this time.
X. Mental Health Care
Defendants' final motion for partial summary judgment concerns plaintiffs' claim that defendants are deliberately indifferent to their serious mental health needs. Defendants argue that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that they are not deliberately indifferent to the inmates' serious mental health needs, and offer in support of this assertion an affidavit from their Acting Assistant Health Care Administrator that details the mental health care assistance available to inmates and indicates that defendants spend $16,887,500 per year in funding mental health care professionals. As legal support for their motion, defendants cite and discuss numerous cases in which courts have approved significantly lower levels of staffing and funding as being constitutionally adequate. Plaintiffs respond that there is substantial evidence that despite their impressive numbers, defendants do not provide inmates constitutionally adequate care for their serious mental health needs.
As was the case with defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of medical care, the Court believes that defendants have not adequately supported this motion. Once again, the Court is impressed with the efforts defendants have taken in this area, particularly in comparison to the situations other courts have found to be constitutionally acceptable. Defendants, however, have not supported their claim that they provide mental health care that is of sufficient quality to pass constitutional scrutiny. The Court agrees with defendants that the Constitution does not require the best care but rather only that reasonable professional judgment is exercised. Plaintiffs dispute whether defendants meet even this minimal standard of care, however, and absent supporting documentation from defendants establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists on this issue I cannot grant their motion for partial summary judgment. The Court accordingly will enter an order denying the motion.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion dated August 20, 1987;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for sanctions under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; plaintiffs are awarded $6,165.00 as a sanction against the defendants; they are awarded an additional $2,500.00 as a sanction against defense counsel; this latter sanction is imposed against defense counsel personally and is not to be paid by such counsels' clients;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding jobs, idleness, rehabilitation, and education is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding recreational activities is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding sanitation is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding medical care is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding unsafe food is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding fire and smoke hazards is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding overcrowding is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding classification is DENIED;
529 *529 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' February 25, 1986 motion for partial summary judgment regarding mental health care is DENIED.
ATTACHMENT 1
United States District Court Western District of Michigan Southern Division.
Feb. 25, 1985.
MOTION TO DISMISS RE: PAST VIOLATIONS
NOW COME Defendants in their individual capacity, by and through their attorneys, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General for the State of Michigan, and Thomas C. Nelson, Elaine D. Fischhoff, and Brian MacKenzie, Assistants Attorney General, and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, move to dismiss the above reference cause of action to the extent the action seeks a declaratory judgment as to alleged past violation of the Constitution or federal law as being barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and unappropriate as a matter of law according to principles of equity.
Respectfully submitted, FRANK J. KELLEY Attorney General s/ Brian MacKenzie Thomas C. Nelson (P25147) Assistant Attorney General Elaine D. Fischhoff (P24520) Assistant Attorney General Brian MacKenzie (P24097) Assistant Attorney General Business Address: Corrections Division Plaza One Building 401 S. Washington Square Lansing, Michigan 48913 Telephone: (517) 373-3474
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
ARGUMENT
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS DECLARATORY RELIEF AS TO ALLEGED PAST VIOLATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN CURED.
Here a consent decree entered in USA v. Michigan, Docket No. G84-63 to which Plaintiffs were permitted to participate as amici has resulted in the correction or court ordered actions to correct many of the conditions of confinement complained of in Plaintiffs' Complaint. This court has insisted on compliance with the terms of the order.
Plaintiffs now seek declaratory relief regarding those conditions of confinement.

In Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) the court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the requested declaratory judgment action over the past lawfulness of a respondent's actions where the same are not of a continuing nature.
It is submitted that this case is governed by Green v. Mansour, supra and that the Eleventh Amendment bars declaratory relief where:
a) it addresses alleged constitutional violations which are not of a continuing nature; and
b) it addresses alleged constitutional violations where the court has established a plan for correction of other alleged constitutional inadequacies and plaintiffs have been permitted to participate as amici in that proceeding and comment on compliance in circumstances specified by the court.
No valid purpose consistent with Eleventh amendment objectives is served by issuing a declaratory ruling.
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendants, under the authority of Green v. Mansour, supra, and alternatively pursuant to the discretionary power of the court pray that the court dismiss the action for declaratory judgment:
a) as to alleged constitutional violations which have been corrected; and
b) as to alleged constitutional violations which are subject to the consent decree in USA v. Michigan and corrections pursuant to terms of the decree and under control of this court.
530 *530 Respectfully submitted, FRANK J. KELLEY Attorney General s/ Brian MacKenzie Thomas C. Nelson (P25147) Assistant Attorney General Elaine D. Fischhoff (P24520) Assistant Attorney General Brian MacKenzie (P24097) Assistant Attorney General Business Address: Corrections Division Plaza One Building 401 S. Washington Square Lansing, Michigan 48913 Telephone: (517) 373-3474
ATTACHMENT 2
United States District Court Western District of Michigan Southern Division.
March 17, 1986.
REPLY TO "RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS REGARDING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS DECLARATORY RELIEF AS TO ALLEGED PAST VIOLATIONS"
NOW COME Defendants, by and through their attorneys, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General for the State of Michigan, and Thomas C. Nelson, Elaine D. Fischhoff, Brian MacKenzie and David G. Edick, and reply to Plaintiffs' "Response to Motion to Dismiss Regarding the Argument that the Eleventh Amendment Bars Declaratory Relief as to Alleged Past Violations", saying as follows:
1. The defense of the Eleventh Amendment is in the nature of an objection to subject matter jurisdiction which can be raised at any time. See Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Defendants have sought to have the Court dismiss the case as it pertains to conditions of confinement which no longer exist or are currently being remedied. The purpose of the motion is to attempt to limit this case to those alleged violations which have not been remedied, and are not in the course of being remedied.
3. Plaintiffs are apparently asking that this court and Defendants spend weeks in trial addressing conditions that no longer exist and which are governed by an existing Consent Decree. Irrespective of the Eleventh Amendment,

unless damages are an object, what possible purpose would be served by such a trial, since no meaningful injunctive or declaratory relief could be rendered?
4. Plaintiffs state that the Defendants are asking the Court to dismiss "premised on the naked claim that the Michigan system is constitutional". That statement by Plaintiffs was not made in good faith. If Plaintiffs are contending that none of the alleged conditions have been remedied under the Consent Decree and make such a claim consistent with their obligations to the Court and Defendants under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then the Plaintiffs should not object to the motion. However, if Plaintiffs acknowledge as Defendants contend that they must, that many of the alleged conditions have already been remedied or are being remedied under an existing Consent Decree, then the motion will dismiss all claims pertaining to those conditions which have been remedied or are being remedied and significantly narrow the scope of the trial.
5. Plaintiffs' response suggests that Plaintiffs would claim the right for example to spend perhaps days in trial on the alleged inadequacies of the old hospital facility at the Jackson Central Complex when by the time of trial a new hospital is complete, staffed and functioning. Green v. Mansour upon which Defendants rely holds that the interests of the Supremacy Clause have been vindicated in such circumstances and that hence the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit as to violations which are not continuing.
6. Plaintiffs have not taken seriously a very significant motion. Plaintiffs' response gives reason to fear that the trial is going to focus in large part on conditions that no longer exist. If the Court permits Plaintiffs to go forward in 531 such a fashion, Defendants will be forced to spend days adducing evidence to show for example *531 that the former health care delivery facilities met constitutional minimums. The Plaintiffs' position simply does not make any sense and is extremely wasteful of state and judicial resources.
7. Given the Plaintiffs' apparent position, i.e. that granting the motion is tantamount to dismissing the whole suit, Defendants respectfully suggest that if the Court grant Defendants' Motion but finds that Plaintiffs' position has arguable merit that the Court certify its ruling under the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and stay proceedings until resolution by the Court of Appeals.
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that this Court grant the Motion and certify its ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) granting a stay of proceedings until resolution by the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted, FRANK J. KELLEY Attorney General s/ Brian MacKenzie Thomas C. Nelson (P25147) Assistant Attorney General Elaine D. Fischhoff (P24520) Assistant Attorney General Brian MacKenzie (P24097) Assistant Attorney General David G. Edick (P30780) Assistant Attorney General Business Address: Corrections Division Plaza One Building 401 S. Washington Square Lansing, Michigan 48913 Telephone: (517) 373-3474
[1] Unfortunately, defendants far too often filed motions and briefs with the Court that did little to clarify the issues and imposed an undue burden on the Court, as well as on the plaintiffs. Many of defendants' submissions reflected careful thought and research on the issues. Several others, however, were hurriedly and sloppily written and organized, and failed to present clearly defendants' request for relief and the bases for the request. An example of this is defendants' First Motion in Limine and Standing Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Exhibits and Testimony, which they filed on May 22, 1986. In their motion, defendants properly listed the exhibits and proposed testimony to which they had objections and the grounds for their objections. In their brief in support of the motion, however, defendants failed entirely to discuss the legal support for their request or, for each document or even each group of documents, why the Court should grant their motion. The following is defendant's entire brief in support of their motion:
"The format of this brief parallels the format of the Motion. In support of Defendants' First Motion in Limine and Standing Objection, Defendants rely upon the following authorities.
A. Rules 103, 104, 105, 401, and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. Rules 106, 901, 1002 and 1005 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
C. Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
D. Rules 802 and 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
E. Rules 32(a)(1) and (3) and 32(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Baylor v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 733 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir., 1984).
F. Rule 32(a)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
G. Rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
II.
A. Rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants neither expressly or implicitly consent to trial on any issues not raised in the pleadings. If this Court allows an amendment, Defendants request a continuance to enable Defendants to meet whatever new issues are raised. Defendants reserve the right to name new witnesses including expert witnesses, and conduct further discovery on Plaintiff Class as well as submit any relevant exhibits concerning any new issues raised by an amendment to the pleadings.
B. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Pollnow v. Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2nd Cir., 1985).
C. Hays v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, 668 F.2d 869, rehrg. den., 673 F.2d 152 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 459 U.S. 833, 103 S.Ct. 75, 74 L.Ed.2d 73 (1982); Sommer v. Dixon, 709 F.2d 173 (2nd Cir., 1983).
D. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, amended in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266, cert. den., 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (5th Cir., 1982); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, ___, n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, n. 11, 89 L.Ed.2d 452, 464, n. 11 (1986).
E. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, et al. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157, 28 S.Ct. 441, 452, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
F. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
G. Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514, 94 S.Ct. 685, 38 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974); Mayor of the City of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, supra.
H. Defendants incorporate by reference the Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on February 25, 1986 addressing the issues of unnecessary remedies.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Court to enter an order precluding the use of any evidence objected to by Defendants or alternatively, to treat these objections as standing objections."
Many of the briefs that defendants filed with the Court, moreover, obviously had not been reviewed and proofread before being filed. A prime example of this is defendants' May 15, 1987 Memorandum Regarding Race Discrimination, which contained the following sentences and paragraphs. The Court has taken these sentences and paragraphs verbatim from the document defendants filed, i.e. sic has been ommitted.
Defendants do not condone or tolerate use of racial slurs by staff (T-3/17/87, 158; T-3/17/87, 213). In this regard, there is no order of any claims of racial slurs by custody officers, black corroboration that occur in the context of issuance of misconduct reports T-3/17/87, 141-52).
Memorandum at 2.

Defendants generally assign prisoners to segregation on the basis of race. Protective segregation is voluntarily self-selected and granted upon request of the inmate (T-3/16/87, 87). Punitive segregation is a result of the disciplinary hearing process which includes independent staff review of tickets and a hearing before an independent, attorney hearings officer. Assignment to administrative segregation as a result of decisions by the classification committee based on the record of inmate behavior (T-3/16/87, 84).
Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied).
Plaintiffs offered no rebuttal evidence to this testimony. Ms. Camp's testimony, along with that of Dan Bolden and Director Brown, the only three corrections experts that testified on the issue of dining hall, were uniformly of the opinion that an attempt to make inmates enter or sit in the dining hall in a nonself-selecting manner would have significant potential for disruption of the institution. Thus, the uncontested testimony of the corrections experts is that such an approach would be counter-productive and dangerous.
Id. at 8.
As to Plaintiffs' first claim, racial slurs, Defendants do not tolerate racial slurs and have taken action against employees who engage in this type of conduct. Obviously, Defendants cannot withdraw to bigger reach of the 9,000 employees in the Department of Corrections at all times, but fails to establish that there is a pattern and practice of racial derogatory remarks which Defendants have chosen to ignore. There is thus no basis for supervisory liability under the circumstances.
Id. at 9.
... Nothing in Defendants' policy or practice encourages or otherwise sanctions separation of racial groups in the dining areas. The evidence, in fact, not only supports a conclusion that were such separation does occur it is the result of self-selection.
Id. at 10.
Almost all respective, it is obvious that the dynamics of population balance within the institution represent another significant factor in determination of the composition of the segregation population.
Id. at 11-12.
I think I have the right to expect that defense counsel will at least proofread their motions, memorandums, and briefs before they file them with the Court. I expect briefs to contain an occasional typographical error, and I recognize that each attorney has his or her own style of writing. All too often, however, defendants' submissions reflected not these factors, but rather sheer carelessness and indifference. I have to spend time reading defendants' submissions 0907 I would think that they would care enough about their work to send me the best product they can prepare.
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 685 F.Supp. 636 (1988)
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John
Prelesnik, and Jack Bergman, Defendants.
No. G84-651.
United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.
May 5, 1988.
637 *637 National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, D.C. by Elizabeth Alexander, Adjoa Aiyetoro, for plaintiffs.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., State of Mich., Lansing, Mich. by Thomas C. Nelson, Brian MacKenzie, for defendants.
OPINION
ENSLEN, District Judge.
Upon the completion of a lengthy bench trial on the liability issues in this matter, the Court directed defendants to submit proposed plans to remedy the constitutional violations found to exist at the subject institutions. See, Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.Mich.1987). Defendants' submitted their proposed plans on October 13, 1987. Plaintiffs submitted their comments on those plans, and their own recommendations on November 17, 1987. On March 1, 1988 the Court began a four day hearing on the entry of the remedial plans proposed by both parties. The order which follows this Opinion is the product of the Court's consideration of the testimony received at that hearing and the plans submitted by both parties.
In devising a remedial order to redress the numerous constitutional violations found to exist in this Court's Opinion and Order of August 10, 1987, the Court was not unmindful of the Sixth Circuit's admonition that a district court must "impose the least intrusive remedy available" to remedy unconstitutional conditions in state prisons. Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438 (6th Cir.1984). In my order, I have attempted to abide by the restraints imposed by Kendrick, and by the precepts of comity and federalism so often noted in similar cases. See, State of Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658, 695-96, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3079, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2757, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). I have also attempted to utilize the "healthy sense of realism" noted in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), by deferring, wherever possible, to the judgment of prison administrators, 638 and *638 by retaining, to the largest degree possible, their discretion to control matters of internal discipline. See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1879, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145-1146 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983).
Comity, federalism and appropriate deference to prison administrators notwithstanding, it remains this Court's duty to devise an order which will promptly and effectively remedy the constitutional inadequacies noted in my opinion of August 10, 1987. "It is fundamental that the federal forum, as the ultimate guardian of constitutional rights, possesses the authority to implement whatever remedy is necessary to rectify constitutionally infirm

practices, policies or conduct." Kendrick, 740 F.2d at 437. See also, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 note 9, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2572 note 9, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1979) ("Once invoked, `the scope of a district court's equitable power to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies'") (quoting, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971)).
1. Toilets at RCF. Defendants originally requested that they be given three years to construct the necessary toilet facilities at this institution. George Walter, the department's Physical Plant Division Manager, testified in his deposition, however, that the project could be completed within 26 months, if the defendants attended to it on an expedited basis. Walters Deposition of February 24, 1988 at 13-15 and Exhibit 1. He further testified that the project could take between five and six years to complete, if it were allowed to filter through the "normal process" of obtaining funding, accepting bids and construction.
The Court chose to adopt the earlier completion date as requested by plaintiffs because of the clear need to remedy this unconstitutional condition as quickly as possible. Prisoners will continue to be incarcerated in locked cells without sanitary toilet facilities until the construction mandated by this Order is completed. The unconstitutional condition will continue to exist, and to impact directly upon those prisoners until that time. Further, the Court is well aware from its experience in implementing the consent decree in United States v. State of Michigan, No. G84-63 (W.D.Mich.), that construction delays are inevitable, and often unavoidable, and that the only way to insure reasonably prompt completion of such a project is to impose a strict deadline upon it. Obviously, as the order itself indicates, the Court is willing to accept a certain amount of delay in the completion of this project, but the Court can see no reason to build that delay into its order at the outset. Thus, I have chosen to impose a construction deadline which will require defendants to attend to this matter promptly, and which will allow the Court and the parties to take delays into consideration as they occur.
2. Legal Mail. This aspect of the order is essentially consistent with defendants' proposed plan, except that it remedies the most serious omission of that plan by providing a means for notifying current prisoners of the change in the legal mail policy. I have given defendants discretion to adopt an appropriate method for notifying these prisoners of the new policy. The Court notes that, notwithstanding the requirement that defendants inform this Court of their plan to notify current prisoners of the change, defendants are required to begin informing new prisoners of the policy immediately. The Court notes further that it would be prepared to accept a notice plan for current prisoners which is similar to the plan adopted by the parties to notify class members of the impending dismissal of certain claims in this action. In other words, the Court would accept a notice plan which provides for posting of the new regulation on bulletin boards in general population housing units and for individual notice to prisoners in segregation units or to prisoners who would not otherwise have access to those bulletin boards.
639 *639 3. Racial Slurs. This portion of the order presented the most difficult issue for the Court to resolve. The Court heard a great deal of testimony both at trial and at the remedial hearing regarding the defendants' employee discipline policy, its collective bargaining agreement, the Civil Service Regulations and the need for flexibility and discretion in resolving personnel matters. In my opinion of August 10, 1987, I found that the defendants had violated the Constitution by intentionally subjecting black inmates to a pattern of racial harassment, in the form of racially derogatory conduct by corrections officers. Opinion at 76. I further found that, while the defendants' official employment policies prohibited racial discrimination by staff, the defendants rarely, if ever, disciplined staff for engaging in such conduct. In addition, I found that the defendants' requirement that allegations of racially derogatory conduct be substantiated by other staff members effectively prevented such discipline from occurring. See, Opinion at 77-79; 3-17-87 Tr. at 142-43; 3-18-87 Tr. at 34-35; 3-19-87 Tr. at 13; Defendants' Exhibits 100, 1091 110 and 319a. I thus concluded that the defendants, acting in their official capacities, had "consciously, voluntarily and with reckless indifference to the rights of black inmates ... failed to implement policies that would prevent this situation from occurring and [that the defendants] affirmatively encourage its continuation." Opinion at 79.
The testimony by defense witnesses at the remedial hearing essentially mirrored the testimony considered by the Court in its August 10, 1987 Opinion. Defendants' proposed remedial plan would only continue the ineffective policies of staff training and counselling currently in place. I heard no testimony at the remedial hearing which convinced me that the defendants' current policies would be any more effective at eliminating the use of racial slurs by corrections officers now than those policies have been in the past. Moreover, defendants' proposed

plans contained no provision for remedying the most glaring deficiency in the current policies 0907the requirement that inmate allegations of racially derogatory staff conduct be corroborated by other staff before disciplinary action is considered.
In short, I found that a constitutionally infirm policy existed, even in light of the anti-discrimination and employee discipline policies adopted by the defendants, because the plaintiffs clearly showed at trial that corrections officers were rarely, if ever, disciplined for engaging in racially derogatory conduct. The defendants' proposed plan, although it would achieve the somewhat salutary goal of retaining departmental control over personnel policy, does nothing to alleviate that constitutional deficiency. It thus appears to the Court that the defendants have had an opportunity to remedy unconstitutional policies without federal interference and have failed to do so. A more intrusive remedial order is not only appropriate, it is constitutionally required. See, Kendrick, 740 F.2d at 439 ("In the event that the state fails to avail itself of the deferential opportunity to correct its constitutional defects with minimal federal intrusion, the federal court may implement a more intrusive remedy"). See also, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 note 9, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2572 note 9, 57 L.Ed. 2d 522 (1979); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275-76, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).
The Court was persuaded by the testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness, Mr. McManus, that the only way to eliminate racially derogatory conduct by staff is to send staff a clear message that such conduct simply will not be tolerated by the prison administration. The most effective way to send that message is to impose and enforce harsh penalties for such unacceptable behavior. Defendants' proposed policies of training and counselling are targeted toward changing the corrections officers' hearts and minds rather than toward changing their conduct. The Court would be the first to agree that changing bigotted attitudes is the ultimate goal of any policy to eliminate discriminatory conduct, but the fact remains that staff conduct and not staff "attitudes" created the 640 constitutional *640 violation, and it is the conduct which must change in order to remedy that violation. If changes in attitudes follow, so much the better, but the Court will not adopt an order which ignores very real, current behavior by staff in the hope that at some unforeseeable time in the future bigotted staff members will either quit their jobs or change their attitudes. As Mr. McManus testified, this is essentially a management problem and, as I found in my August 10 Opinion, the prison administrators have demonstrated their unwillingness or inability to deal with this problem in a realistic, firm manner. The Court has no alternative, given this situation, but to usurp some measure of the defendants' discretion as administrators in order to insure that the constitutional violation is remedied.
Thus, the Court has taken the somewhat drastic step of mandating particular disciplinary actions in the event that racially derogatory conduct is found to have occurred. In so ordering, the Court was not unmindful of the due process rights of public employees, or of the defendants' obligations under the current collective bargaining agreements. The Court believes that its order is consistent with both of these considerations, because it provides for disciplinary action only after an investigation, a hearing and a finding that racially derogatory conduct took place based upon clear and convincing evidence. These procedures are intended to supplement current disciplinary procedures, not to supplant them. Defendants are, of course, encouraged to continue the training and counselling programs currently in place.
In addition, the Department of Corrections retains substantial input in the employee discipline process, by virtue of the director's ability to comment upon disciplinary actions recommended by the panel. Thus, considerations of personnel policy which might otherwise escape the attention of the panel will be brought to its attention, and the panel retains authority to modify its disciplinary order in light of those considerations.
The Court is not unaware that inmates may use the disciplinary process contemplated by its order to harass corrections officers by filing frivolous or unfounded claims of racially derogatory conduct. First, the Court has every confidence that the Ombudsman's panel established by this Order will be able to recognize such grievances, and to deal with them in the appropriate fashion. Second, the Order provides that past uncorroborated allegations of such conduct may be used only in very limited instances, and only in those instances where they would appear to be most helpful. I have attempted to resolve the tension between the due process rights of corrections officers and the obvious fact that most inmate complaints of racially derogatory conduct are ignored or go unsubstantiated by staff in two ways. First, the order provides that lack of staff corroboration will not automatically resolve the grievance in favor of staff. Second, it provides that records of all

grievances be maintained and severely limits their use. Thus, if a pattern of frivolous complaints by a particular inmate develops, or if a pattern of non-frivolous, but unsubstantiated complaints against a particular staff member develops, the panel may take this into account in deciding whether to modify a disciplinary finding or in considering a grievance for which there is no staff corroboration. Third, the order attempts to deal with the problem of unsubstantiated complaints by providing a method for mediating such disputes. It is hoped that staff and inmates will be able to resolve such grievances through this mediation process, without the necessity of formal disciplinary action against either the staff member or the inmate involved. However, the panel retains final authority to order formal discipline, should the mediation process fail.
Finally, the order requires the Ombudsman's Office to maintain a record of each grievance filed alleging racially derogatory conduct, and the result of that grievance. As noted above, these records may only be used for very limited purposes. In addition, the Ombudsman's Office will use the records to prepare an annual report for the Court and the parties to review. If it appears, upon receipt of this report that the Court's plan is ineffective or 641 unworkable, *641 the Court will consider modifying this aspect of its Order.
4. Access to Courts. The most difficult aspect of this portion of the order was attempting to devise a plan which would provide the constitutionally required amount of access without exceeding the constitutional minimum. Obviously, the defendants may not be forced to provide more than minimally adequate access to the courts, and they must be allowed to choose their preferred method for providing that access, within minimal constitutional constraints. See, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). The defendants' proposed remedial plan was deficient in several respects. The most obvious deficiencies included increased responsibilities for prison law librarians without a corresponding increase in the amount of legal training offered to those individuals, and the proposed abolishment of the "jailhouse lawyer" system. Moreover, my Opinion of August 10, 1987 identified fundamental difficulties in the inventory system currently in place within the law library system, and defendants failed to propose a reasonable alternative to the current system. Finally, the defendants' plan for providing paralegal assistance to certain prisoners provided no assurance that prisoner communications with these paralegals would be considered confidential, and the requirement that prisoners execute a waiver of liability before such services would be provided to them would unacceptably undermine inmate confidence in the system. In addition, the defendants' plan creates an unacceptable degree of conflict of interest, in that the paralegals are employed and supervised by the very department they are paid to sue. The defendants' plan would also delay paralegal services provided to prisoners in segregation, with no provision for providing earlier assistance to those prisoners facing court-imposed deadlines.
Plaintiffs' original plan also contained certain deficiencies. First, plaintiffs requested that the Court constrain the defendants' ability to transfer prisoner paralegals to other institutions for nondisciplinary reasons. The Court declined to accept this recommendation for several reasons. First, I believe that it unacceptably intrudes on the discretion of prison administrators to control prison populations and to maintain discipline within the institutions. See, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). Prisoner transfers may be necessary for any number of reasons, and the need to transfer a particular prisoner need not always relate to that prisoner's misconduct. Thus, I believe it is essential to maintain the defendants' discretion to transfer any prisoner for nonarbitrary or nonretaliatory reasons of sound corrections management. Second, while it is certainly possible that defendants will use this power to weaken the legal access program established by this order, by transferring trained prisoner paralegals to other institutions for retaliatory reasons, I do not assume that the defendants will act in that fashion. Until it becomes apparent that the defendants have abused their discretion, I am unwilling to usurp their role as administrators.
Plaintiffs also suggested that the department's authority to search the legal access program's offices be curtailed. The defendants presented credible evidence that such a requirement would unacceptably intrude on their ability to maintain internal discipline and order. On the other hand, it is necessary to provide prisoners with some assurance that their confidential legal communications will in fact remain confidential. Thus, the order provides that the legal access program designate one staff member who is available at all times and within two hours of any departmental request to supervise a search or "shakedown" of the program's offices. This program staff member will be allowed to observe departmental searches of the program's offices, but the order does not incorporate plaintiffs' suggestion that only one departmental employee be allowed to search prisoner files at any one time. I believe that this compromise adequately takes into account prisoners' privacy interests in their legal

642 papers, while allowing *642 the department to conduct extensive searches of the program's offices on short notice.
The order attempts to resolve the difficulties inherent in providing only the minimum amount of legal access constitutionally required by allowing the program's board of directors to adopt bylaws defining both the services which will be provided by the program and the types of prisoners to whom those services will be available. While this solution introduces a degree of uncertainty into the order, I believe that it represents a "healthy sense of realism" about the difficulties of administering any legal access program in a prison context. The board will know, better than the Court, which services are necessary and which inmates need those services, given the constitutional requirements and the inevitably limited resources the program will receive. It seems far more efficient to allow the individuals who provide those services to draw up regulations concerning their availability, than to have a Court, which stands far removed from the realities of prison life, allocate those services. The order requires that the board adopt bylaws which will provide only the constitutionally required minimum amount of service. The department will have adequate representation on the board to insure that it performs this function adequately, and that it is aware of departmental budgetary constraints when it draws up the bylaws. Finally, the order requires that the board submit its bylaws to the Court for review. Should the board adopt over-zealous bylaws, the Court will be able to curtail that enthusiasm and ensure that defendants are required to do no more than that which is constitutionally required.
The order further requires the defendants to provide both paralegal assistance and law libraries to prisoners. Defendants' proposed order incorporated the same mix of services, and thus the Court does not believe that this aspect of the order requires defendants to provide more than minimally adequate services. See, Penland v. Warrent County Jail, 759 F.2d 524, 531-32 (6th Cir.1985); Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1985). Moreover, as I noted in my earlier opinion, the defendants failed to demonstrate at trial that the library system provided adequate access to illiterate prisoners, to prisoners who do not speak English or to prisoners who lacked the skills necessary to use the library materials available. Provision of paralegal assistance to at least those prisoners is constitutionally required. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498.
The only other provision of the order which merits comment is the provision which allows defendants to abolish the mini law library system in exchange for providing greater paralegal assistance to prisoners in segregation units. Those units are currently provided legal access through the use of mini law libraries and through a call-out system which allows prisoners to obtain books from the main law library. The order contemplates that defendants would abolish the mini law libraries, but leave the call-out system in tact, while providing all segregation prisoners with paralegal assistance.
I decided to provide defendants with this option because, after attempting to supervise the mini law library system in United States v. Michigan, No. G84-63, I have concluded that it is an unworkable solution to the problem of providing legal access to prisoners in segregation units. There have been chronic problems with maintaining the proper collection inside the mini law libraries and with preventing the mutilation of the remaining volumes. Even assuming the collections are maintained in a constitutionally adequate condition, I have no confidence that the majority of segregation prisoners possess the skills required to make adequate use of that collection. Further, there are very real security problems associated with maintaining the mini law libraries. The present system places a great burden on corrections officers in segregation units because it requires that prisoners be moved from their cells to the law library cell. The degree of prisoner movement involved increases security risks to 643 guards and takes away from *643 the time they have to perform their other duties.
On the other hand, I cannot conclude that the mini law libraries do not provide constitutionally adequate access to the courts, assuming that the complete collection is maintained. The defendants have discretion to provide access to the courts through the use of law libraries. They are not required to provide legal assistance to prisoners if they provide adequate opportunities for "self-help" programs. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498, Penland, 759 F.2d at 531; Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d 639, 640-41 (6th Cir.1983). It seems to me, however, that a realistic evaluation of the mini law library system can lead only to the conclusion that it is more trouble than it is worth. While it does provide minimal access it also poses constant problems both in maintaining the adequate collection and in maintaining proper discipline and order within the segregation units. As I have said, these shortcomings do not render the system constitutionally inadequate, they only indicate that it is inefficient. Thus, I

believe it would be improper, and inconsistent with my previous rulings, to require defendants to abolish the mini law libraries. I have, therefore, decided to give them the option of abolishing that system, in exchange for their commitment to provide increased paralegal assistance to prisoners in segregation, including those prisoners who would otherwise be ineligible to receive those services. Obviously this would require modification of the consent decree currently in place in United States v. Michigan, and the Court would be disposed to grant a motion to that effect. In addition, defendants may have an obligation arising in Hadix v. Johnson to maintain the mini law library system. This Court, of course, has no control over that litigation and can give no assurance that the court or the plaintiffs involved in that case would agree to the system proposed in this order. I can only indicate that I think it would be a more efficient and more reasonable alternative for providing the constitutionally required access to the courts than the system currently in place.
CONCLUSION
This order represents at least a partial culmination of four years of litigation on numerous complex issues of constitutional law. The Court is confident that its order represents a fair and workable solution to the constitutional inadequacies noted in its previous opinion, and that it adequately balances the constitutional rights of prisoners against the very real difficulties of prison administration encountered by the defendants. After such long and arduous litigation, an order which did not accomplish these goals would constitute a miscarriage of justice for the prisoners involved, for the defendants and for the public. For this reason, the Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this matter to monitor the implementation of its order, and remains open to the possibility that certain aspects of its order will require modification in light of the complex and intractable problems encountered by both prisoners and prison administrators.
ORDER
I. TOILETS AT RIVERSIDE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
A. The defendants shall complete the installation of in-room toilet facilities in the administrative and reception units at the Riverside Correctional Facility (RCF) within twenty-six (26) months of the date of this Order.
B. Within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, the defendants shall submit to the Court a plan for the construction of in-room toilet facilities at RCF. The plan shall identify the various stages necessary to complete the construction of these facilities (bidding, funding, planning, construction, etc.) and the expected completion date for each step.
C. Defendants shall submit quarterly reports to the Court and the parties indicating the progress of each stage of this project. Defendants shall submit such a report each quarter until the construction of the toilet facilities is completed.
644 *644 D. The defendants shall promptly inform the Court and the parties of any anticipated delays in the completion of this project and the reason(s) for such delays.
E. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, the defendants shall submit a plan for monitoring inmate access to sanitary toilet facilities at RCF during the interim between this Order and completion of this project. The defendants shall identify the monitor (who shall not be an employee of the Department of Corrections) and his or her duties. Those duties shall include regular inspections of interim facilities available at RCF, interviews with staff and inmates, the availability of clean urinals, cleaning supplies, and inmate release to use sanitary facilities. The monitor shall submit quarterly reports to the Court and the parties each quarter until construction of toilet facilities is complete.

II. LEGAL MAIL
A. Defendants shall revise their policy on the handling of legal mail to indicate that all mail received from any civilian attorney or paralegal, from a court or from the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman shall be opened only in the presence of the prisoner, if the prisoner submits a written request for such handling. The policy for handling legal mail shall be uniform at each institution involved in the instant litigation.
B. Once a prisoner has submitted a request in writing to have his legal mail opened in his presence, the request shall be indicated on the CMIS computer to alert all institutions to which the prisoner might transfer that his or her legal mail requires special handling. Defendants shall revise their policy on the handling of legal mail to insure that all institutions are aware of and use this code.
C. Each prisoner who is received by the Department of Corrections at any of its Reception and Guidance Centers will be given written notice of this policy and asked if he wishes to have legal mail receive special handling. The defendants shall ensure that prisoners who are unable to read this written notice shall receive equivalent notice of the legal mail policy. If the prisoner wishes to have his legal mail receive special handling, a notification to that effect shall promptly be placed on the CMIS computer. If the prisoner does not request special handling, the prisoner shall be informed that he may receive special handling at any time by submitting a written request to the mailroom supervisor at the institution where he is incarcerated.
D. Defendants shall submit, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, a plan to notify all current prisoners, on a one time basis, of the changes in the legal mail policy, and to place any requests of current prisoners to have their legal mail receive special handling on the CMIS computer.
E. Defendants shall submit, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, their proposed revision of the legal mail policy.
F. This Order shall become final upon the Court's approval of defendant's revised policy.
III. RACIAL SLURS
A. All prisoner grievances concerning racially derogatory conduct by staff shall be forwarded by the Director of Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC" or "the department") to the Legislative Ombudsman's Office for investigation. The Ombudsman's Office shall appoint a three person panel to investigate each grievance. The panel shall submit findings and recommendations to the Director of the department ("the Director") within thirty (30) days of receipt of the grievance.
1. In investigating the grievance, the panel may take any steps necessary to develop the relevant information concerning whether racially derogatory conduct by staff took place. This should include the taking of statements from all persons in the area at the time the conduct allegedly occurred. Lack of staff corroboration shall not automatically resolve the grievance in favor of staff. The panel shall not recommend disciplinary action unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the racially derogatory conduct took place.
645 *645 2. The staff member alleged to have engaged in racially derogatory conduct and the inmate(s) submitting the grievance shall have an opportunity to appear before the panel to present a defense, to explain the charges made and to respond to any information developed by the panel. Inmates in segregation may be required to submit their comments in written form if security or logistical considerations prevent them from appearing before the panel in person.
3. Before making its final recommendation, the panel may require the staff member(s) and inmate(s) involved to meet in an effort to mediate the dispute. The parties may resolve the grievance in any manner which is agreeable to all parties and to the panel, including, but not limited to the following:
a. Less severe sanctions for staff conduct than those provided by this Order;

b. In any case where a prisoner has been subject to disciplinary action and alleges that the circumstances of the offense included some form of racial harassment, the panel and parties may agree to recommend to the Hearing Officer or the Administrative Segregation Committee that any punishment received by the prisoner be modified pursuant to paragraph IIIC of this Order. The Hearing Officer and the Administrative Segregation Committee shall accept this recommendation unless clear and convincing evidence indicates to the contrary.
c. The parties may agree to expunge the grievance from the Ombudsman's Office's records or from staff and prisoner records which would otherwise indicate that such a grievance had been filed or its result.
4. If the panel finds that racially derogatory conduct took place, the panel shall recommend the following disciplinary action, and shall inform the staff member, the grievant and the Director of its final recommendation and the reasons for this recommendation in writing:
a. In the case of any staff member who has less than two years seniority:
(i) first offense: formal counselling and a written reprimand to be placed in the staff member's personnel file;
(ii) second offense in two years: two days suspension without pay;
(iii) third offense in two years: three days suspension without pay;
(iv) fourth offense in two years: five days suspension without pay;
(v) fifth offense in two years: discharge;
b. In the case of any staff member who has two years or more seniority:
(i) first offense: two days suspension without pay;
(ii) second offense in two years: three days suspension without pay;
(iii) third offense in two years: five days suspension without pay;
(iv) fourth offense in two years: discharge.
5. If the panel finds that the racially derogatory conduct did not take place, that the evidence does not support disciplinary action against the staff member, or that disciplinary action may not be taken against the staff member for other reasons, the panel shall advise the staff member, the grievant and the Director of that result and the reasons for the panel's decision in writing.
B. The Director, or his designated representative, shall review the panel's findings and recommendation and shall, within ten (10) days of its receipt, inform the panel, the staff member and the grievant of the Director's decision to accept or reject the panel's recommendation.
1. If the Director takes no action within ten (10) days after receipt of the panel's finding and recommendation, the panel's finding and recommendation shall become final;
2. If the Director agrees with the panel's finding and recommendation, the panel's decision shall become final;
3. If the Director disagrees with the panel's decision, he shall inform all parties concerned of his reasons for 646 rejecting the panel's decision and shall, within ten (10) days, meet with the panel to attempt to *646 resolve the
disagreement. If the Director and the panel are unable to come to a mutually agreeable resolution of the grievance, the panel's decision shall become final. If the Director and the panel are able to agree upon a modified decision, they shall inform all parties of the modification in writing and that modified finding and recommendation shall become final.
C. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inmates:

1. If an inmate charged with a disciplinary offense alleges that the circumstances of the offense included some form of racially derogatory conduct by staff, this claim shall be referred to the panel established by the Ombudsman's Office. The panel shall investigate the claim in the manner described in paragraph IIIA(1) of this Order.
2. If the panel finds that racially derogatory conduct took place, the Hearing Officer in charge of the underlying disciplinary proceedings shall hold a rehearing to determine whether any remaining punishment should be modified. The report of the rehearing shall include the finding of racially derogatory conduct. In any case where disciplinary action against an inmate resulted in the assignment of the inmate to administrative segregation, and the placement was based in whole or in part on the incident involving racially derogatory conduct, the Administrative Segregation Committee shall review the decision to assign the inmate to administrative segregation and consider whether that assignment should be modified.
D. The Ombudsman's Office, or the panel, shall create and maintain a system of records to monitor the incidence of inmate grievances concerning racially derogatory conduct by staff members and the resolution of such grievances.
1. The records referred to above shall include, at a minimum:
a. Each such grievance filed, and each claim referred to the panel pursuant to paragraph IIIC of this Order;
b. The name(s) of the inmate(s) filing the grievance or claim and the staff member(s) against whom the grievance or claim was filed;
c. The result of such grievances or claims, including any disciplinary action taken or any other findings made by the panel;
d. Whether the Director agreed or disagreed with the panel's findings and recommendation and any modification of that decision made pursuant to paragraph III(B)(3) of this Order;
e. Whether the grievance was resolved through paragraph III(A)(3) of this Order and the agreement reached by the parties (including whether the Hearing Officer or Administrative Segregation Committee adopted the panel's recommendation to reduce or modify disciplinary action taken against a prisoner);
f. Whether disciplinary action taken against a prisoner was modified pursuant to paragraph III(A)(3)(b) of this Order.
2. The panel may consider whether a staff member has had previous grievances filed against him or her which alleged racially derogatory conduct but which were not the subject of disciplinary action against the staff member, and/or whether the inmate filing the grievance has filed such grievances in the past which were not the subject of disciplinary action against a staff member only in the following circumstances:
a. In considering whether to modify its final findings and recommendations at the request of the Director pursuant to paragraph III(B) of this Order;
b. In considering a grievance for which there is no staff corroboration.
3. The Ombudsman's Office shall, on an annual basis, submit to the Court and the parties a report indicating the number of such grievances and claims filed, their outcome and any recommendations the Ombudsman's Office has for modifying the procedures created by this Order. The parties shall submit their written responses to this report, if any, within thirty (30) days of its receipt. The Court will then entertain arguments for the modification of this portion of its Order.
647 *647 IV. ACCESS TO COURTS

A. Legal Access Program
1. The MDOC shall contract with a nonprofit corporation that will provide paralegal services in the subject institutions to assist prisoners in making collateral attacks upon their convictions and in challenging the conditions of their confinement.
a. The MDOC may choose to contract with an existing non-profit legal services corporation, such as Prison Legal Services at SPSM, provided that the authority and staff of such corporation are expanded consistent with the requirements of this Order.
b. The MDOC shall award the contract referred to in this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order, unless it shows cause why, acting with all deliberate speed, the contract cannot be awarded within that time period.
2. Board of Directors:
a. Composition: The Board of Directors of this corporation shall consist of seven members, selected as follows (unless the MDOC decides to contract with an already existing program which has a board of directors or its equivalent):
(i) three members selected by defendants;
(ii) three members selected by the plaintiffs;
(iii) one member selected by a vote of the appointed members who shall serve as chair.
b. Term: The members of the Board of Directors shall serve two-year terms, without compensation.
c. The Board of Directors shall hire and supervise the Legal Program Director pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(3) of this Order.
d. Bylaws: The Board of Directors shall develop bylaws for the operation of the legal access program which bylaws shall be submitted to the Court for approval within ninety (90) days of the Board's appointment. The bylaws shall, at a minimum, address the following issues:
(i) Standards for determining which prisoners are entitled to receive the services of the program. These standards should, at a minimum, provide the following services;
(A) general research assistance to any prisoner using a law library;
(B) assistance in drafting pleadings, responding to motions or to reports and recommendations for inmates who are illiterate, who do not speak English or who are otherwise unable to translate their complaints into an organized presentation;
(C) the standards shall be designed to insure that the program provides only the minimum amount of service constitutionally required.
(ii) Duties of civilian paralegals hired pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4)(a) of this Order, which shall include:
(A) periodic visits to segregation units, protective custody units and other areas of the institutions where inmates do not have direct access to a main law library;
(B) the frequency with which these visits must be made;
(C) prompt response to written prisoner requests for paralegal assistance;
(D) conducting inventories of main and mini law libraries and submitting orders for replacement or duplicate copies of library materials;

(E) regular "desk hours" in law libraries to provide general research assistance to prisoners using the libraries, including the times such assistance will be available, and the portion of the paralegal's work hours devoted to such assistance;
(F) regular "office hours" to discuss particular cases with clients unable to use the library; including how such visits will be scheduled and supervised and the portion of the paralegal's work hours devoted to such assistance;
(G) scheduling of law library time for general population prisoners (call-outs), including scheduling time for meetings between "jailhouse lawyers" and other prisoners and between prisoner paralegals and other prisoners;
648 (H) delivery of materials from the main law library to prisoners who would not *648 otherwise have access to the main law library.
(iii) Duties of prisoner paralegals, hired pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4)(b) of this Order, to include:
(A) regular "desk hours" at law libraries to provide general research assistance to prisoners;
(B) provision of research and drafting assistance to civilian paralegals;
(C) rules governing confidential conferences between prisoner paralegals and other prisoners, if any such conferences are to be allowed, and how those conferences should be scheduled and supervised.
(iv) Standards for denying program assistance, other than general research assistance to prisoners, and alternatives to be made available to prisoner if program assistance is denied. These standards should address the issues of:
(A) assaultive prisoners;
(B) prisoners who wish to proceed with frivolous complaints and/or prisoners who are excessively litigious;
(C) categories of cases the program shall not provide assistance for (e.g., cases for which equivalent services are already available).
e. Shakedowns and other security issues: The Board shall provide a means by which at least one civilian staff person is "on call" at all times (available 24 hours a day and within two hours of any department request) for the purpose of facilitating shakedowns pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(5)(d) of this Order. The Board shall insure that the appropriate departmental staff at each subject institution are aware at all times of the identity and location of the staff person designated pursuant to this paragraph.
f. Annual Report: The Board shall prepare an annual report to be submitted to the Court and the parties. This report shall include annual case statistics, prisoner utilization data, a review of library inventories and replacement of materials or provision of duplicate materials, a review of staffing levels required pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4)(a) and (b) of this Order and any recommendations the Board may have for the modification of any provision of this Order.
3. Program Director: The Board shall hire one program director who shall be an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Michigan. The Board shall conduct an annual performance evaluation of the Director.
a. The Director's salary and benefits shall be competitive with the salary and benefits provided to other attorneys employed by the State of Michigan.
b. The Director shall have the following duties:
(i) Hiring, training and supervision of civilian and prisoner paralegals at each institution;
(ii) Development of the training curricula for civilian and prisoner paralegals which shall include both substantive and procedural matters;

(iii) Processing of prisoner grievances regarding the law library, library collection and paralegals. All such grievances shall be made directly to the program director as a Step III grievance;

(iv) Approval of "jailhouse lawyer" contracts pursuant to the standards currently specified in PD-DWA-61.01 and Rule 791.6617.

(v) The presentation of an annual report to the Board which shall include:

(A) performance evaluations of civilian and prisoner paralegals;

(B) annual case statistics, prisoner utilization data and recommendations for changes in staffing requirements.

4. Staffing Requirements: In addition to the Program Director, the following staff shall be provided at each institution:

a. Civilian Paralegals: Each institution shall have full-time civilian paralegals, who shall possess at least a twoyear paralegal degree, as follows:

MBP: One for general population and trustee

One for segregation and protective custody

MR: One for general population and trustee

649

*649 One for segregation and protective custody

SPSM North: One

SPSM South: One

b. Prisoner Paralegals:

(i) Each institution shall hire paid prisoner paralegals as follows:

MBP: 4 MB-Trustee: 2 MR: 5 MR-Trustee: 1 SPSM North: 3 SPSM South: 3

(ii) This position shall be a paid prison job assignment with wages comparable to those in Industries.

(iii) The department shall retain the right to transfer prisoner paralegals for disciplinary and other reasons consistent with sound corrections management. The department shall, however, insure that prisoner paralegals are not transferred for arbitrary or retaliatory reasons.

(iv) Prisoner paralegals shall be hired by the program director upon recommendation of the civilian paralegal and shall not be restricted by the prison job classification requirements. In the hiring process, the program director and civilian paralegal shall consider the candidate's skill, interests and length of sentence. When prisoners have equal skills and interest, the civilian paralegal shall recommend the prisoner with the longest sentence.

c. Inmate Law Clerks: Defendants shall either retain the inmate law clerks with their current duties and training or provide a corresponding increase in the number of prisoner paralegals hired and transfer duties currently given to law clerks to the prisoner paralegals.

5. Physical Requirements

a. Sufficient office space will be provided for all civilian paralegals at or near the main law libraries with suitable privacy to conduct interviews with prisoner clients.

b. Hours of operation shall not be limited by the hours of operation of the law library.

c. Existing equipment and supplies shall be available to the program and shall include the following at each main law library office:

(i) photocopy machine;
(ii) electric typewriters;
(iii) telephone lines with access to both institutional and outside lines (provided, however, that prisoner paralegals shall not be allowed access to outside telephone lines).
d. All shakedowns of the areas in which the employees of the corporation work shall be done in the presence of the civilian paralegal or other civilian employee of the program designated pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(2)(d)(v) of this Order. Shakedowns shall be conducted in such a manner that Department employees do not read the legal materials and that the civilian paralegal or other employee is able to observe each Department employee as the search is carried out. Department employees shall conduct the search in such a manner as to assure only searches for contraband and not the reading of client files.
B. Libraries
1. The defendants shall supplement the required minimum collection at each main law library with at least one copy of the following materials:
a. A complete set of Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure;
b. Michigan Civil Jury Instructions
c. Local state court rules and the local rules for the Western and Eastern Districts of Michigan and for the Sixth Circuit;
2. The defendants shall supplement the required minimum collection at the main law library at Marquette Branch Prison with the materials noted in paragraph IV(B)(1) of this Order, and with a recent treatise on Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Remedies.
3. Defendants shall maintain the mini law libraries at each of the subject institutions and shall supplement the collection at each mini law library with the following materials:
a. Current PDs and OPs;
b. State Administrative Rules regarding the MDOC;
650 *650 c. Pencils, writing and carbon paper, kite and grievance forms, and forms to request books from the main law library collection;
d. Posted instructions on obtaining assistance from the civilian paralegal and obtaining books from the main law library collection;
e. At least two chairs and suitable surface space for interviews with the civilian paralegals.
4. As an alternative to the maintenance of the mini law libraries pursuant to paragraphs IV(A)(6) and IV(B) of this Order, the defendants may choose to abolish the mini law libraries and to provide, instead, increased paralegal assistance to prisoners in segregation units. If the defendants adopt the latter alternative, defendants shall provide appropriate increases in the civilian and prisoner paralegal staff pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4) of this Order and shall authorize the legal access program to provide all necessary legal services to all prisoners in segregation units. This will include all general research assistance as well as assistance in drafting pleadings and other legal documents. Defendants shall insure that paralegal assistance is provided to segregation prisoners who might not otherwise require such assistance, in order to replace the previously available self-help assistance provided by the mini law libraries. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to alter segregation prisoners' current level of access to materials from the main law libraries on a call-out basis. Defendants shall inform the Court and the plaintiffs of their decision, as between these alternatives, within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order.

5. Defendants shall assure that prisoners at the Michigan Reformatory Trustee Division have access to the courts through either of the following means:
a. Establishment of a main law library with the required minimum collection and the supplements ordered in paragraphs IV(B)(1) and IV(B)(2) of this Order plus general research assistance and advice for prisoners who require it from a civilian or prisoner paralegal; or
b. Establishment of a mini law library pursuant to paragraph IV(B)(3) of this Order with access to the services of a civilian paralegal and to books from a main law library without the necessity of requesting a temporary transfer to another institution.
c. Defendants shall inform the Court and the plaintiffs of their decision, as between these alternatives, within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order.
6. Library Time:
a. Time in the mini law library shall not be restricted.
b. Time in main law libraries will be as follows:
(i) General population: Six (6) hours weekly, with additional time as needed and approved by the civilian paralegal;
(ii) Jailhouse Lawyers: No restriction for those prisoners providing legal assistance to other prisoners pursuant to defendant's policy directive PD-DWA-61.01 and Rule 791.6617.
c. Time spent in conference with the prisoner or civilian paralegals shall not be counted as law library time.
7. Inventories:
a. Defendants shall insure that each subject institution uses a standardized form to inventory main and mini law library collections. The current SPSM form is acceptable.
b. The civilian paralegal shall conduct inventories of the main and mini law libraries at least semi-annually. Prisoner paralegals shall conduct inventories of the main law library collections for quarters during which the civilian paralegal does not conduct an inventory.
c. The semi-annual inventories conducted by civilian paralegals shall be submitted to the Program Director for review and to the librarian at each institution.
d. The civilian paralegal shall post the most recent inventories of the main and mini law library collections in each mini law library.
e. The Program Director shall submit to defendants a plan for standardizing the replacement of law library 651 materials and *651 for providing duplicate copies of those materials when needed. The plan shall create a
standard for determining when a duplicate copy must be ordered and shall identify the individual(s) responsible for ordering duplicate and replacement materials.
V. CONTINUING JURISDICTION
The Court shall exercise continuing jurisdiction over this matter to monitor defendants' compliance with this Order.
VI. FINAL ORDER
Notwithstanding any obligation to submit plans to this Court, the defendants are directed to act with all deliberate speed to immediately implement the various requirements of this Order. This Order is intended to become final

and appealable within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order, or upon a submission by defendants indicating their choice between the alternatives noted in paragraphs IV(B)(4) and IV(B)(5) of this Order, whichever occurs first.
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 977 F.2d 996 (1992)
Gary KNOP, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees. Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, Individually and as Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 88-1563, 88-1634 and 88-1879.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued August 3, 1992. Decided October 16, 1992.
9978 *997 *998 Patricia A. Streeter, Detroit, Mich., William L. Fette, American Civ. Liberties Fund of Michigan, Kalamazoo, Mich., Elizabeth R. Alexander (argued and briefed), Chief, Staff Counsel, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellees Gary Knop, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon and Kerwin Cook.
Susan Przekop Shaw, Barbara A. Schmidt, Office of Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Thomas C. Nelson (argued and briefed), Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Habeas Div., Lansing, Mich., for defendants-appellants Perry Johnson, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John Prelesnik and Jack Bergman.
Larry Bennett, Lopatin, Miller, Freedman, Bluestone, Erlich & Rosen, Michael Barnhart (argued), Barnhart & Mirer, Patricia A. Streeter (briefed), Detroit, Mich., Thomas M. Loeb, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellees Everett Hadix, Richard Mapes, Patrick C. Sommerville, Rossevelt Hudson, Jr., Brent E. Koster, Lee A. McDonald, Darryl Sturges, Robert Flemster, William Lovett, James Covington, Frank Thomas and James Hadix.
Susan A. Harris (argued and briefed), Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen. of Mich., Detroit, Mich., Susan Przekop Shaw, Office of Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Lansing, Mich., for defendant-appellant Perry Johnson and defendants Barry Mintzes, individually and as Warden, Charles Anderson, individually and as Past Warden, William F. Grant, individually and as Deputy Warden, Daniel Trudell, individually and as Deputy Warden, Duane Sholes, individually and as Deputy Warden, John Jabe, individually and as Business Manager of State of Mich., 999 James Pogats, individually *999 and as Administrative Asst. to the Warden, Roy Rider, individually and as Classification Director of State Prison, Charles Ustess, individually and as Resident Services Director of State Prison, Don P. Leduc, individually and as Chairman of Corrections Com'n, Robert Brown, Jr., Deputy Director, Graham Allen, Elton Scott, Pam Withrow, Frank E. Elo, Marjorie Van Ochten and John Prelesnik.
Arthur J. Tarnow, Detroit, Mich., Sandra Girard (argued and briefed), Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc., Jackson, Mich., for amicus curiae Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc.
Before: NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and WILHOIT, District Judge.[*]
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge.
These are consolidated appeals in two class actions brought against the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections by inmates of the Michigan prison system who challenge the constitutionality of certain conditions of their confinement. Both cases involve the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson, and Knop involves three other Michigan prisons as well.
An issue common to the appeals in both Knop and Hadix is whether the district courts erred in finding, as both did, that Michigan prisoners have been denied their right of access to the courts. On the records before us, and

finding no clear error in the facts as determined by the district courts (Enslen and Feikens, JJ.) in their thorough and well-crafted opinions, we are satisfied that there are at least some Michigan prisoners who have been denied the type of access to the courts required under current Supreme Court doctrine.
Although it is well established that the federal constitution requires states affirmatively to assist state prisoners in obtaining access to the courts for presentation of constitutional claims related to their confinement, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), there has been some uncertainty as to the breadth of the class of claims covered by this requirement and as to how far the states must go in affirmatively facilitating the prisoners' access to the courts. Our recent decision in John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.1992), which involved incarcerated juveniles, teaches that affirmative assistance need not be provided for litigation that is not related to the inmate's incarceration. The same limiting principle applies, we believe, with respect to adult prisoners. The principle was correctly applied in Knop, but not in Hadix; the remedial order in the latter case should have been limited, as was the order in Knop, to assistance for prisoners in making collateral attacks on their convictions and in challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of their confinement.
Meaningful access to the courts cannot be assured for juveniles, as both sides agreed in John L., absent access to an attorney. For adult prisoners, however, access to the courts need not entail access to an attorney; access to an adequate law library, or to paralegal personnel with access to such a library, is sufficient. The Hadix court directed the Department of Corrections to provide both a constitutionally sufficient law library and a staff of attorneys; in this, as in certain other respects, we conclude that the court abused its discretion.
The Knop court did not require that a staff of attorneys be maintained, but it ordered the Department to procure paralegal services by contract with a non-profit corporation. The court rejected a plan under which paralegal assistance would have been provided directly by the Department. Here too, we believe, the remedy went too far; both cases must be remanded for the development of less intrusive remedies. In the interest of insuring uniformity in the reshaping of the remedies, we shall remand both cases to a single court.
1000 The appeal in the Hadix case is limited to the access to courts issue, but Knop presents *1000 several other issues as well. Except as indicated below, we shall affirm the judgment of the district court as to each of the remaining issues presented in Knop.
I
The plaintiff class that was certified in Knop consists of prisoners at the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson,[1] the Marquette Branch Prison, the Michigan Reformatory at Ionia, and the Riverside Correctional Facility, also located in Ionia. Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467, 469 (W.D.Mich.1987). With the exception of the prisoners at Riverside and the Central Complex at Jackson, the Knop class evidently corresponds to that certified in Walker v. Johnson, 544 F.Supp. 345 (E.D.Mich.1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920 (6th Cir.1985).
One of the claims advanced in Walker was that the Michigan authorities had "violated plaintiffs' equal protection clause right to meaningful access to the courts as established in the Supreme Court case of Bounds v. Smith." 544 F.Supp. at 361. The district court acknowledged in Walker that Michigan's prison law library facilities were adequate, but found that a cutback in library hours following a series of prison riots had unlawfully restricted access to the libraries. Id. The district court ordered that library hours be increased.
On appeal, this court observed that there had been no showing that any prisoner had actually been denied access to the courts or had actually been prejudiced in a lawsuit. 771 F.2d at 932. We reversed the order in which the district court had specified hours of operation for prison libraries, and we directed the court to consider, on remand, "whether adequate access to court has been denied any prisoner." Id.
Although the Walker case was remanded to the Eastern District of Michigan, access to courts was one of the issues litigated in a 35-day bench trial conducted by Judge Enslen, of the Western District of Michigan, in Knop. The parties did not inform Judge Enslen that the access to courts issue had been remanded to another court, and it was only in preparing his opinion that he focused on this. See 667 F.Supp. at 484-85.[2] Acknowledging that "[i]t

may be regrettable that there have been two federal court proceedings involving the same issue and the same class of inmates," Judge Enslen concluded that it was simply too late in the game for him not to decide the plaintiffs' access to courts claim. Id. at 485. We have no quarrel with this conclusion.
Judge Enslen discussed the merits of the plaintiffs' access claim at pages 486 through 496. After describing the library system in detail and identifying its perceived defects, Judge Enslen found that although some inmates were able to use the system to prepare effective complaints, a greater number (particularly inmates confined in segregation, the illiterate, and inmates with intellectual handicaps) were unable to use the system to gain meaningful access to judicial forums. Such access, as the court correctly noted, entails not only the drafting of complaints and petitions for relief but also the drafting of responses to motions to dismiss and the drafting of objections to magistrates' reports and recommendations.
1001 After the submission of proposed remedial plans and comments thereon, Judge Enslen *1001 conducted further hearings in March of 1988. He subsequently issued a final opinion and order, reported as Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636 (W.D.Mich.1988), directing the Michigan Department of Corrections to contract with a non-profit corporation for providing paralegal assistance to prisoners; requiring the hiring of an attorney to function as a program director; and establishing staffing requirements that included specified numbers of civilians with two-year paralegal degrees, prisoner paralegals, and/or inmate law clerks. The order further provided that the corporation's board of directors, only a minority of whom were to be chosen by the Department, should develop standards for providing general research assistance to any prisoner using a law library, plus drafting assistance to illiterate prisoners and those unable to express themselves in English. Portions of the order were stayed by this court pending appeal.
Shortly after entry of the remedial order in Knop, an opinion and order were filed in Hadix. See Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich.1988) (Feikens, J.). A class consisting of all prisoners confined in Jackson's Central Complex had been certified in Hadix some years earlier. Most of the issues raised in the case were settled under a comprehensive consent decree entered early in 1985. Section VI of the consent decree, captioned "Access To Courts," contained detailed provisions on how much time various categories of prisoners should be permitted to spend in prison libraries, what books should be included in the libraries, how prisoners facing court deadlines could get additional library time, and related matters. (A copy of Section VI, with its "Appendix B," is set forth as an appendix to this opinion.) Two questions relating to court access were not settled in the consent decree, however, and the decree provided for the submission of these questions to the court for resolution after a hearing on the merits. The decree framed the questions thus:
"(1) Whether and to what extent Defendants are constitutionally required to provide attorneys to assist prisoners with legal matters.
(2) If attorneys must be provided, whether and to what extent these attorneys must be independent."
The opinion and order issued by Judge Feikens in 1988 broadened the issue as follows:
"whether, and to what extent, the defendants are constitutionally required to provide access to the courts for inmates in the Central Complex through the provision of additional attorneys, paralegals (civilian or inmate), and other means to assist inmates with civil actions (including habeas corpus proceedings) and related matters (i.e., grievances)." 694 F.Supp. at 262-63.
In 1979 Judge Feikens had remarked on "the existence of experienced writ writers at [Jackson] and other institutions who are able to frame an inmate's complaint in constitutional terms well enough for presentation to a state or federal court." Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075, 1097 (E.D.Mich.1979). By 1988, however Judge Feikens had become persuaded, as had Judge Enslen, that the pool of competent inmate writ-writers, or "jailhouse lawyers," was not adequate to meet constitutional norms.[3]
Judge Feikens concluded that the Department of Corrections was constitutionally required to establish a program of legal assistance for Central Complex inmates substantially more comprehensive than the program ordered in Knop for inmates housed elsewhere. Under the Hadix order, for example, requests for legal assistance were to

be entertained not only in connection with the drafting of habeas corpus petitions and civil rights claims (including, but not limited to, those challenging conditions of confinement) but also in connection with "[o]ther civil 1002 claims involving matters such as domestic relations, personal injury, deportation, workers' compensation, social *1002 security, detainer, wills and estates, and taxation." 694 F.Supp. at 295. The Hadix court further found that representation should be provided "in civil matters where an inmate (1) is a defendant; (2) did not initiate the action; and (3) where an inmate's rights will expire absent timely initiation of suit...." Id. at 294. To provide nonjudicial relief for prisoners with administrative concerns, moreover, the Hadix court ordered the Department of Corrections to adopt an elaborate grievance program conforming to criteria spelled out by the court. Id. at 296-98. And to provide the legal representation thought to be necessary for Central Complex prisoners, the Department of Corrections was ordered to enter into a five-year renewable contract with Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc. That entity, under the court's order, was to maintain staffing levels consisting, at a minimum, of a program director, four staff attorneys, six certified paralegals, and necessary auxiliary staff. Id. at 295.
The Director of the Department of Corrections has appealed from the orders in both Hadix and Knop. The Knop plaintiffs have appealed from the denial of certain racial discrimination claims.
II
In Part A of this section we discuss the constitutional underpinnings and scope of the right to affirmative assistance in obtaining access to courts. In Part B we discuss the types of legal matters to which the state's duty of providing affirmative assistance extends.
A
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), represents the Supreme Court's most far reaching description of the "right of access" first recognized in Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941).[4] The Court's opinion in Bounds is silent as to the source of this right, but on other occasions the Supreme Court has said variously that it is founded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), or the Equal Protection Clause, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2768, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 and see id. at 11 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 2771 n. 6 (1989) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.), or the First Amendment right to petition for a redress of grievances, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 1003 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969)); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 *1003 S.Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (same). Lower courts have also implicated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir.1990). See generally John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 231-32 (6th Cir. 1992).
One Court of Appeals has suggested, with respect to principles developed under the "right of access" rubric, that "because their textual footing in the Constitution is not clear, these principles suffer for lack of internal definition and prove far easier to state than to apply." Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir.1985). Judge Enslen, similarly, has spoken of the "vagueness" of the decision in Bounds. Knop, 667 F.Supp. at 493. But while the constitutional underpinnings of today's right of access doctrine may be thought to lack intellectual coherence, we believe that the parameters of the doctrine are relatively clear.
The Supreme Court did not hold, in Bounds, that prison authorities are constitutionally required to provide attorneys-at-law to assist prisoners in the preparation of habeas corpus petitions and the like. The Bounds inmates asserted, before the district court, that a library facility plan proposed by North Carolina prison officials as a means of assuring access to the courts could not pass constitutional muster unless supplemented by a legal defenders' program under which prisoners could receive the assistance of independent attorneys. See Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 542 (4th Cir.1975). The district court refused to require the state to establish an

independent attorneys' office, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: "the District Court correctly ruled that the State is under no constitutional duty to offer the inmates of its penal institutions both adequate legal research facilities and an independent attorneys' office, however helpful the dual service might be." Id. at 544 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court likewise affirmed, holding that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 (footnote omitted, emphasis supplied). As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, "it is noteworthy that Bounds refers to law libraries or other forms of legal assistance, in the disjunctive, no fewer than five times." Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 313, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986).[5]
1004 *1004 Although the Bounds Court noted that many states provide some degree of professional or quasiprofessional legal assistance to prisoners under programs that "may have a number of advantages over libraries alone," 430 U.S. at 830-31, 97 S.Ct. at 1499, the Court specifically stated that "a legal access program need not include any particular element" of this kind. Id. at 832, 97 S.Ct. at 1500. Inmates must be assured access to courts that is "adequate, effective, and meaningful," id. at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495, but the touchstone is access to courts, not access to lawyers.
As the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), prisoners have no constitutional right to be represented by state-paid counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions. Even where inmates on death row are concerned (and there are no such inmates in Michigan, that state having no death penalty), Bounds teaches that "[t]he requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various ways," and "state legislatures and prison administrators must be given `wide discretion' to select appropriate solutions." Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2773, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (concurring opinion of Kennedy, J., quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 833, 97 S.Ct. at 1500).
The prison library plan that was approved in Bounds contemplated the establishment of approximately seven core libraries to serve a prison population of about 10,000 people. 538 F.2d at 542-43. It was stipulated that "each library [would] make use of one or two inmates as typists to prepare court petitions and ... supervise the day-to-day use of the library. * * * Those inmates who work in the libraries ... [would] be trained to the best extent possible in researching legal questions and assisting inmates in their research. They [would] also be permitted to help illiterate and semi-literate inmates." Id. at 543, n. 1. If North Carolina had implemented this plan, the Bounds litigation would presumably have been at an end.
North Carolina did not properly implement the plan, as it turned out. Almost a decade after the plan was approved as satisfying the state's constitutional obligation, the state still had no workable program for training inmate paralegals to assist other prisoners in the use of the libraries. See Harrington v. Holshouser, 741 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir.1984). Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the state's efforts in this area 0907 described by the Court of Appeals as "a chronology of failure," id. 0907 the court initially rejected the thesis that "the only way that the State constitutionally can afford library access to its inmates is by employing the services of a legal services plan...." Id. at 70.
On remand, after the state had repeatedly failed to respond to orders directing it to show that it was in compliance with its plan, the district court finally concluded that the only way to ensure that inmates received meaningful access to the courts would be to require the assistance of licensed counsel. Smith v. Bounds, 610 F.Supp. 597, 605-06 (E.D.N.C.1985). The plan adopted by the district court provided for ten attorneys (one for every 1,000 prisoners), who were to be made available under a contract with Legal Services of North Carolina, Inc. Smith v. Bounds, 657 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D.N.C.1986).
A Fourth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's decision. It was uncontested, the panel said, that, among other 1005 things, "the state had not demonstrated [even after *1005 the passage of ten years] that it had provided for the
training and placement of any inmate paralegals." Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299, 1302 (4th Cir.1987) (emphasis supplied). The panel went on to make the following observations:
"The district court did not conclude, as the defendants contend, that prisoners have a constitutional right to access to an attorney. The district court ordered a remedy of attorney

assistance because the state's program of law libraries had failed to meet the defendants' constitutional obligation of providing meaningful access to the courts." Id.
The panel opinion was approved by the court en banc in a brief per curiam opinion that stressed the defendants' long history of failing to respond to the district court's orders and concluded that the record showed "North Carolina was unable or unwilling to implement its library plan consistent with minimum constitutional requirements." Smith v. Bounds, 841 F.2d 77, 78 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869, 109 S.Ct. 176, 102 L.Ed.2d 146 (1988).
The Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections has not engaged in the sort of contumacious conduct attributed to the North Carolina authorities in the Bounds litigation. Absent such conduct, we see no justification for the federal courts to require the authorities in Michigan to use taxpayer dollars to hire attorneys-at-law for the preparation of prisoner lawsuits.[6]
It may well be a good idea for Michigan to provide lawyers for prisoners who want to bring lawsuits of their own. Federal judges, however, should be ever mindful of the obvious fact that not all good ideas are mandated by the Constitution. Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 313, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986). As Justice O'Connor succinctly put it in her concurring opinion in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2772, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), "[b]eyond the requirements of Bounds, the matter is one of legislative choice based on difficult policy considerations and the allocation of scarce legal resources." (Emphasis supplied.)[7]
In our constitutional democracy, as we understand it, legislative choices are to be made by legislators who are subject to removal by the people, and not by judges who enjoy office for life. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1295, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (courts lack both authority and competence to assume a legislative role); cf. Kelley v. Metropolitan Co. Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986, 996 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206, 108 S.Ct. 2848, 101 L.Ed.2d 885 (1988). A "`mother knows best' approach should play no part in traditional constitutional adjudication." Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2771, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).[8]
But the conclusion that Michigan need not provide attorneys to prepare prisoner lawsuits does not end our inquiry. Standing alone, law libraries that are adequate for prisoners who know how to use them and who have reasonable physical access to their collections are not adequate for prisoners who cannot read and write English, or who lack the intelligence necessary to prepare coherent pleadings, or who, because of protracted confinement 1006 in administrative or punitive segregation or protective *1006 custody, may not be able to identify the books they need.
Under the library plan that was considered by the Supreme Court in Bounds, as we have seen, the libraries would not have stood alone; it was contemplated that trained inmates would be made available for helping the illiterate and semi-literate, for performing or helping in the performance of legal research, and for typing court petitions. It does not appear that comparable assistance has been provided, to the extent required, in the Michigan prisons. Judge Enslen found, for example, that librarians at Jackson's North and South Complexes were not competent to perform legal research; that inmates hired there as law clerks were not allowed to assist other inmates in their legal research; and that "the often-fabled jailhouse lawyers or writ-writers are, at least in the Michigan system, too few and often too uninformed to provide adequate assistance to the inmates." Knop, 667 F.Supp. at 488. As far as Jackson's Central Complex is concerned, similarly, Judge Feikens found that neither the librarians nor the inmate library clerks were sources of legal assistance; that the assistance available from jailhouse lawyers and inmate paralegals was "unreliable" and "restricted by financial, security, and other constraints;" and that outside attorneys were not available with any certainty, particularly for the substantial percentage of inmates (between 20% and 50%) who are unable to explain their grievances in writing. Hadix, 694 F.Supp. at 284-85.[9] The records contain evidence of a number of specific instances where unassisted inmates suffered individualized harm because of inability to use library resources properly.
We do not disagree with the conclusion, reached by both of the district courts, that something more was required in the way of paralegal assistance. It is fundamental that a prisoner who claims to be confined unconstitutionally

must be allowed to state his case to a court. Some such prisoners, given law books and simplified pleading forms of the sort furnished by the courts, can handle the task adequately themselves. Others, for reasons fully explained in the opinions of both district courts, cannot. For prisoners of the latter sort, as a practical matter, there can be no meaningful access to the judicial system unless some literate person is available to reduce their stories to intelligible written pleadings.
To the extent that inmate writ-writers, or jailhouse lawyers, are not adequately filling the needs of prisoners who claim they are being held unconstitutionally, the state must furnish, at a minimum, the functional equivalent of jailhouse lawyers who are up to the job. This means paralegals 0907 not necessarily individuals who have completed two-year training courses designed for document-managers at large corporate law firms, but intelligent laypeople who can write coherent English and who have had some modicum of exposure to legal research and to the rudiments of prisonerrights law. "Although legal training need not be extensive, Bounds does require that inmates be provided the legal assistance of persons with at least some training in the law." Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1511 (9th Cir.1991) (citations omitted).
The order of the district court in Hadix contemplates that Prison Legal Services will "represent" inmates in a variety of civil matters. The court's verb choice is significant, and it reflects, we think, a misunderstanding of what the Supreme Court has said the Constitution requires. Inmates who have signified a desire to go to court to present civil rights claims or claims for post-conviction relief are not ipso facto entitled to legal representation. 1007 They are entitled, rather, to "access" 0907 which means getting the courthouse door *1007 opened in such a way that it will not automatically be slammed shut on them. Once access has been attained, whether through a complaint that is entirely homemade or through one prepared by or with the help of a writ-writer or paralegal, the court can decide whether the case presented is one that calls for the appointment of a lawyer to represent the plaintiff.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the court may request an attorney to represent any indigent prisoner litigant 0907 but "[a]ppointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is not appropriate when a pro se litigant's claims are frivolous ... or when the chances of success are extremely slim." Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1384 (6th Cir.1987), quoting Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir.1985). If the court does not choose to see that the litigant receives legal representation, the state obviously has no independent duty to provide such representation. And the state, as Judge Enslen correctly noted, "is not obligated to do anything more than assist inmates at the pleading stage." Knop, 667 F.Supp. at 494. The required assistance, as we have seen, falls considerably short of legal "representation."
Although the Knop court acknowledged that "a district court must impose the least intrusive remedy available," 685 F.Supp. at 637 (internal quotes omitted), and must allow the defendants to choose their preferred method of providing at least minimally adequate access to the courts, id. at 641, we believe that the final order in Knop was more intrusive than necessary. The defendants submitted a plan for providing assistance for certain prisoners through paralegals employed and supervised by the state. The court rejected this approach because (1) it failed to assure that prisoner-paralegal communications would receive the kind of confidentiality that attaches to lawyerclient communications, (2) it required prisoners to waive any right to sue the paralegals for malpractice, and (3) it created an unacceptable degree of conflict of interest, the paralegals not being independent of the state. Id. In place of the state's plan, the court ordered the Department of Corrections to obtain paralegal services from a non-profit corporation controlled by a board of directors on which both the prisoners and the department would have representation. Id. at 647. The program of legal services furnished by the corporation was to be operated under detailed bylaws developed by the board and approved by the court. Id. Other than appointing a minority of the corporation's board of directors and paying all the bills, the state was evidently to have little to do in seeing to the provision of paralegal assistance.
It is far from self-evident that access to courts cannot be assured without having paralegals hired by a legal services corporation that has been created to insulate the paralegals from supervision, direct or indirect, by those whom the electorate have chosen to govern. We note that under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, "unit attorneys" are appointed directly by the state government to serve as legal advisors, or "talking lawbooks," for inmates wishing to bring incarceration-related litigation. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 5, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2767, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); cf. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F.Supp. 511, 514 (E.D.Va.1986). Even

as to prisoners on death row, five of the current justices of the United States Supreme Court concluded, in Giarratano, that Virginia's scheme does not violate the Constitution. And the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by the remaining three justices (two of whom are no longer members of the Court), did not assert that the Virginia plan would be constitutionally inadequate for prisoners who have not been sentenced to death.
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), is also instructive in this connection. Because Tennessee provided no meaningful alternative for prisoners who wished to seek post-conviction relief, the United States Supreme Court held that Tennessee could not impose a blanket prohibition against inmates setting themselves up as writ-writers for other inmates. "Jails and penitentiaries," said the Court, "include among 1008 their inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally *1008 or functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited." Id. at 487, 89 S.Ct. at 750. Such persons are not automatically entitled to appointed counsel when they indicate they wish to seek post-conviction relief, the Court declared, which is why the state must at least let them consult with prisoner writ-writers 0907 and must do so notwithstanding that such writ-writers "are sometimes a menace to prison discipline and that their petitions are often so unskillful as to be a burden on the courts which receive them." Id. at 488, 89 S.Ct. at 750.
The Johnson Court noted with apparent approval that "[a]t least one State employs senior law students to interview and advise inmates," while other states have public defenders, paid from public funds, available to consult with prisoners on habeas corpus matters. Id. at 489, 89 S.Ct. at 750. Without expressing any judgment concerning such plans, the Court noted that they demonstrate the availability of "techniques ... to provide alternatives if the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates." Id. at 489-90, 89 S.Ct. at 751.
Neither a system involving the direct employment of legal personnel by a state nor a system of mutual assistance among inmates could guarantee avoidance of the type of potential conflict of interest by which the Knop court was troubled. Neither system, similarly, could assure a prisoner whom the system had failed that he would have a reasonable chance of obtaining a collectable judgment for malpractice. And where unregulated inmate writwriters are concerned, at least, it seems doubtful that the confidentiality of inmate communications could be assured. Such considerations simply did not seem to trouble the Johnson court 0907 one reason, in all probability, being that the Court obviously did not think of writ-writers as providing legal representation.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), finally, the Supreme Court declared that illiterate inmates involved in prison disciplinary proceedings "should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff." Id. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2982 (emphasis supplied). Here again, the Supreme Court seems to have been far less concerned than was the Knop court about reliance on assistance provided by employees of the state.
Perhaps the advantages of placing all prisoner paralegals on the payroll of a non-profit corporation would outweigh the disadvantages of doing so. We do not believe, however, that the courts may appropriately tell the Department of Corrections how to strike this balance. "Injunctive relief against a state agency or official must be no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). Fundamental precepts of comity and federalism admit of no other rule 0907 and such precepts "are perhaps nowhere more compelling than in actions seeking relief against unconstitutional practices ... in state penal institutions." Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 437 (6th Cir.1984), citing, among other cases, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400 n. 14, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88-89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-08, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1878, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); and Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 748, 753, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). If the State of Michigan wishes to facilitate its prisoners' access to the courts by furnishing assistance through paralegals hired and supervised by the state itself, we think it should be permitted to do so.

B
1009 We turn next to the question of the types of legal matters to which the state's *1009 obligation of affirmative assistance extends. The Knop order requires only that the prisoners be furnished paralegal assistance for making collateral attacks upon their convictions and for challenging the conditions of their confinement; the Hadix order, as we have seen, requires legal assistance for a variety of additional purposes, including the handling of a broad spectrum of civil matters in which inmates have been named as defendants, as well as matters in which an inmate must commence suit in a timely manner or suffer his claim to be barred by laches or a statute of limitations.
Other courts of appeals have declined to extend the Bounds rule beyond assistance in initiating habeas corpus proceedings (the type of lawsuit addressed in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718) and civil rights actions involving constitutional claims (a form of action which the Supreme Court has held cannot reasonably be distinguished from the habeas action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-80, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2985-86, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). See, e.g., Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 855 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985); Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir.1985) (semble). Our own court, similarly, has read Bounds as requiring affirmative assistance for incarcerated juveniles only in "the preparation of legal papers in cases involving constitutional rights and other civil rights actions related to their incarceration." John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 235 (6th Cir. 1992). As to other types of civil actions, although "states may not erect barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons," we held that a requirement of affirmative assistance would be "an unwarranted extension of the right of access." Id. at 235-36. If such a requirement is unwarranted for incarcerated juveniles, it is unwarranted for incarcerated adults.
It might be a good idea for the taxpayers of Michigan to provide legal assistance for prisoners in all civil matters as to which a need can be demonstrated, just as it might be a good idea for the taxpayers to provide such assistance for the populace at large. Again, however, we return to the obvious truth that not every good idea is mandated by the Constitution. And if the ordinary law-abiding Michigander has no constitutional right of access to the public purse for legal assistance on claims involving such things as domestic relations, personal injury, deportation, workers compensation, social security, detainer, wills and estates, and taxation, it does not seem to us that such a constitutional right springs into existence by virtue of the needy person's having been convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison.
III
In the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997 et seq., Congress provided for the granting of continuances in prisoner civil rights actions "in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). In this connection, Congress directed the United States Attorney General to "promulgate minimum standards for the development and implementation of a plain, speedy and effective system for the resolution of [state prisoners'] grievances...." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b)(1). Such grievance resolution systems as may be "voluntarily submitted" by individual states are to be reviewed by the Attorney General and may be certified by him as being in compliance with the minimum standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). The failure of a state to adopt an administrative grievance procedure meeting the prescribed standards cannot constitute the basis of an action by the Attorney General, however, notwithstanding the Attorney General's power, under § 1997a, to sue states that are believed to be depriving prisoners of their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).
Although adoption of a prisoner grievance system designed to meet federal standards is not mandatory under the act passed by Congress, it has been made mandatory for the Central Complex at Jackson under the order issued 1010 by the court in *1010 Hadix. Agreeing with the findings of "two court-appointed experts ... that the current grievance program is ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of both the inmates and the Central Complex administration," 694 F.Supp. at 296, the district court ordered the Department of Corrections to draft policy directives to meet standards promulgated by the Attorney General for grievance programs. Id. at 297. The court went on to specify in some detail how this would be done with respect to such matters as inmate review of the

grievance program, representation of the entire Central Complex inmate population in the review process, and employee participation in an advisory role. Id. The court further ordered that the grievance process should incorporate a series of discrete steps specified by the court; that the Department of Corrections should "implement personnel changes as recommended by Professor Wolfson [one of the court-appointed experts] in his study," including the hiring of qualified persons to serve as grievance investigators, members of grievance panels, grievance coordinators, and "other personnel as necessary for the objectives;" that certain of the newly hired persons ("grievance coordinators independent of the Department of Corrections, [hired] to oversee the work of the grievance investigators and the grievance panels") should provide yearly reports evaluating the performance of the grievance system; that persons involved in the grievance process should be provided training in investigation and mediation techniques; and that "the Department of Corrections shall commission a periodic review of the grievance system at the Central Complex by an outside body." Id. at 297-98. The district court felt that a restructured grievance program would reduce the workload of the courts by encouraging administrative resolution of disputes that currently wind up in court. The modifications that the Department of Corrections was directed to make in the existing grievance system were said to be "minimal but necessary." Id. at 298.
Desirable though many of these provisions may be, they do not strike us as "minimal." Neither do they appear to come within the ambit of the issues reserved by the consent decree for resolution by the court. And be that as it may, they certainly do not represent the least intrusive remedy that can be justified as necessary to vindicate inmates' constitutional right of access to the courts. If prisoners currently exercise their right of access to the courts on a broader scale than the courts would like, that hardly justifies judicial intervention in the state's administrative system under the guise of protecting the right of access to, of all things, the courts! "Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been adjudicated." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 748, 762, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). This part of the Hadix order looks to us like judicial legislation run wild.
IV
Subsequent to issuance of the order in Hadix, the defendant moved for a new trial on the strength of what appeared to be ex parte communications between the court and a key witness for the plaintiffs. The motion was denied in an order (docket item 505) wherein the court set forth the pertinent facts in considerable detail. The defendant contends on appeal that the Hadix court committed reversible error in failing either to recuse itself or to grant a new trial.
The communications in question followed a request that Judge Feikens made in open court during testimony presented by Sandra Girard, the Director of Prison Legal Services, Inc. The court asked Ms. Girard if she would prepare a written memorandum describing the impact on Prison Legal Services of frequent prisoner transfers necessitated by overcrowding. Ms. Girard said she would, agreeing, at the court's request, to send copies to counsel. No objection was made by the defendant.
In response to the court's request, Prison Legal Services prepared a nine-page memorandum dated March 11, 1988. Copies were sent to the court and to counsel.
1011 *1011 A few days later Judge Feikens sent Sandra Girard a letter asking further questions. Although defense counsel initially disclaimed receipt of a copy of this letter, which is not part of the official court record, it is now conceded that copies were sent to counsel. Ms. Girard responded to the court's request by furnishing a survey and related materials describing legal services programs in other states. It is undisputed that defense counsel were provided copies.
Following his review of the new materials, Judge Feikens had his law clerk telephone Ms. Girard to ask about the availability of further background materials. Pursuant to this inquiry, Ms. Girard sent the court a letter, with a copy to counsel, offering to provide, among other things, certain questionnaires dealing with legal services programs in other states. Judge Feikens then had his law clerk telephone Ms. Girard again and request copies of the materials referred to in her letter. A third package of documents was submitted to the court in response to this

request, with copies of the transmittal letter going to counsel. This led to the filing of written objections by the defendant and, ultimately, to the motion for new trial.
This court has made it clear that it is "impermissible for a trial judge to deliberately set about gathering facts outside the record." Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir.1980). Moreover, "a judge may not direct his law clerk to do that which is prohibited to the judge." Id. Ex parte communications from a judge's chambers to one side in a contested lawsuit are "clearly at odds with our adversary system of justice." Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 425 (6th Cir. 1981) (Merritt, J., concurring). In view of these principles, Judge Feikens' requests for additional information should have been placed on the record, and the one-on-one telephone calls from the court's law clerk to the plaintiffs' key witness should not have been made.
In context, however, these lapses appear relatively harmless. Because Ms. Girard was consistently scrupulous about sending counsel copies of her letters 0907 as the court doubtless expected her to be 0907 the court was furnished nothing that counsel did not know about. Judge Feikens has expressly stated, moreover, that "[n]one of the documents included in the three packages of materials submitted by Girard in response to inquiries made by the Court formed any basis for my findings of fact or my conclusions of law in my Memorandum Opinion and Order filed July 1, 1988." Doc. entry 505. We have no reason to question this, and we find no error in the denial of the defendant's motion.
The only remaining issue raised on appeal in Hadix is whether the Hadix court erred in taking judicial notice of proofs in Knop without notice to the defendant. Our disposition of the appeals makes it unnecessary to address this question.
V
The access to courts claim that was tried in Knop contained a sub-issue not presented in Hadix: the constitutionality of the prison officials' system of handling mail sent to inmates by courts and by counsel. Concluding that there were problems in this area, the court ordered implementation of a system-wide policy insuring that legal mail will be opened only in the presence of the addressee if that is the addressee's wish.
The Knop court also heard evidence on three additional claims: (1) that prisoners had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by reason of the Department's alleged failure to provide proper winter clothing; (2) that the lack of toilets and washbasins in certain locked cells constituted cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) that inmates were denied equal protection of the law by a variety of practices claimed to reflect racial discrimination.
The district court granted a measure of relief on each of these claims. Taking judicial notice of the severity of Michigan's winters, the court ordered that inmates who were required to go outside in the wintertime be provided 1012 adequate clothing, *1012 including hats and gloves or mittens and, where appropriate, boots. The installation of in-cell flush-toilets was ordered in certain units at the Riverside facility. And with regard to racial discrimination, the Department of Corrections was ordered to forward all prisoner grievances on the subject to the Legislative Ombudsman's Office. Both sides have appealed from the district court's order on the racial discrimination question, and the defendants have appealed on the other issues.
A
Under Michigan's established policy, privileged mail is to be opened only in the presence of the addressee prisoner if the prisoner has opted to request such treatment. During their orientation to the prison system, inmates receive a handbook that is supposed to explain the privileged mail policy, along with a variety of other matters. The policy is explained orally as well.
In practice, the policy varies from institution to institution. The handbooks used at some facilities do not explain the policy clearly or do not discuss it at all. At Jackson and Marquette, mail from any attorney is treated as privileged after an inmate notifies the mailroom that he has an attorney. At the Reformatory, only mail from attorneys specified by the inmate receives such treatment.

The district court found no constitutional infirmity in the opt-in system as such, but did find that the authorities' method of implementing the system, particularly at the Reformatory, permitted needless infringement of the inmates' right to confidentiality in their communications with counsel. The court observed that it is not uncommon for a prisoner to receive mail from a court-appointed attorney before the inmate knows the attorney's identity. The court therefore ordered implementation of a uniform policy at all facilities, with inmates being asked at intake whether they wish to invoke their privilege of being present at the opening of legal mail. Where the response is affirmative, all incoming mail from attorneys and from the courts is to be treated as privileged mail.
A prisoner's right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 603 (6th Cir.1986). In criminal settings, the Sixth Amendment protects the attorney-client relationship from unwarranted intrusion. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Prison officials may, of course, impose restrictions that are "reasonably related" to the prison's security needs or other "legitimate penological objectives." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Our court has said that prison officials must "put forth legitimate reasons for interfering with a prisoner's incoming mail." Parrish, 800 F.2d at 604.
We agree with the conclusion of the district court that prisoners may not be required to designate particular attorneys in order to activate privileged treatment of their legal mail. The district court acted properly in requiring that each prisoner receive written notice of the legal mail policy upon intake and in eliminating any requirement that requests for special treatment of legal mail be renewed upon transfer from one facility to another.
B
The district court found that the defendants were failing to provide inmates with adequate winter clothing. This finding was not clearly erroneous. We cannot agree with the defendants' argument that the district court wrongly substituted its judgment for that of prison authorities. The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that "involve[s] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Exposure to Michigan winters without adequate clothing can obviously inflict pain. No 1013 legitimate government interest is served by withholding adequate *1013 clothing, and the district court was justified in ordering the remedy it did.
C
Certain cells at Riverside lack flush-toilets and wash basins with running water. Inmates in these cells use central lavatory facilities as permitted by prison officers. There are occasions when access to the central toilets is not permitted, necessitating the use of nonflushable receptacles in the inmates' cells. The court found the Riverside facilities to be generally clean, with the exception of areas where urine may have been spilled on the floor.
Access to toilets varies among four population groups at Riverside. One hundred thirty cells in the Riverside reception and guidance center lack toilets and wash basins. Inmates in the center are locked in their cells approximately 18 hours per day, being out of the cell three times a day for meals and once for recreation. Inmates receive portable urinals on their arrival, and some inmates use these to throw urine and feces into the courtyard. The court found that the defendants failed to provide inmates in the reception area with regular access to bathroom facilities, forcing them to relieve themselves in their cells. The court concluded that this was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Ninety-six cells in the protective custody unit lack toilets and basins. Protective custody inmates are locked in their cells each night from about 10 or 11 p.m. to 6 or 6:30 a.m. During the day they are generally out of their cells. Officers frequently let inmates out during the night to use the toilet facilities. Nonetheless, the court found that inmates faced a substantial risk of not being allowed to use the toilet facilities upon request and were frequently forced to urinate or defecate in their cells. In the court's view this was unconstitutional.

Approximately 20 inmates are housed in the administrative segregation unit. These inmates are confined to their cells except for a daily recreation period of one hour and during toilet trips. Officers make regular bathroom runs four or five times a day and make rounds every 30 minutes, at which time inmates can request to use the toilet. These requests are not always granted, however, particularly during the late night and early morning. The court found this to be unconstitutional.
We do not agree that it violates the Eighth Amendment to require prisoners to use nonflushable toilets on occasion. The drafters of the Eighth Amendment used them, after all, and countless millions of modern Americans have done so too. The district court "specifically f[ound] that the [Riverside Correctional Facility] and the [Riverside Psychiatric Center] generally are clean facilities, that defendants maintain clean hallways, and, with the exception of areas where urine may be spilled on the floor, that the cells are clean." 667 F.Supp. at 480 (citations omitted). The "[d]efendants established ... that correctional officers frequently let inmates out during the night to use the toilet facilities." Id. at 481. In light of these findings, we do not believe a constitutional violation can be shown on the basis of additional findings that inmates "do use their urinals in their cells, and on occasion even are forced to defecate in their cells," or that inmates regularly throw urine and feces into the courtyard. Id.
D
The district court found that black inmates are not intentionally discriminated against on a classwide basis in terms of their placement in protective custody; that there is no intentional racial discrimination with respect to eating areas, food serving lines, or servers; and that racial disparities in job assignments do not represent a widespread or general pattern of discrimination. The court found further that although prison officials do not condone incidents of racially discriminatory punishment of inmates, they have condoned racial slurs. This form of racial harassment was found to represent a policy, practice, or custom of the Department of Corrections, and the court ordered the defendants to submit a remedial plan.
1014 *1014 Because the plan ultimately submitted was considered inadequate, the court took the (in its words) "somewhat drastic step of mandating particular disciplinary actions." Knop, 685 F.Supp. 636, 640. The order prescribed a detailed grievance system to be operated under the supervision of the Legislative Ombudsman's Office. Pursuant to the procedure described in First National Bank of Salem v. Hirsch, 535 F.2d 343 (6th Cir.1976), the court subsequently indicated that it was prepared to modify this portion of the order to reflect the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the Ombudsman's Office. Instead of telling the Ombudsman's Office what to do, the court proposed to order the defendants to contract with that office, or with a similar independent agency, to implement the grievance and disciplinary procedure outlined in the court's order.
We have recognized that racial harassment by government employees can violate rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 780 (1989). Supervisory officials, however, are not liable for harassment by their subordinates absent "a showing that the supervisor encouraged the ... misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it." Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 156, 83 L.Ed.2d 93 (1984). The defendants' failure adequately to investigate claims of racial harassment in this case did not, in our view, rise to the level of "encouragement." The detailed grievance procedure set forth in the district court's order, moreover, intrudes unnecessarily in the state's operation of its prisons. Part III of the order, set forth at 685 F.Supp. at 644-46, will therefore be vacated.
Shortly before trial, the plaintiffs altered their discrimination-in-employment claim to assert that the defendants' anti-discrimination policy was unconstitutional because it set a limit on minority employment. The district court correctly recognized that the altered claim pitted members of the class against each other, and it decertified the class with respect to the claim. The plaintiffs do not challenge the partial decertification, but they contend that the court erred in failing to decide the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. As the defendants point out, however, the court was not asked to do so.

VI

The district court imposed sanctions against the defendants and their counsel under Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., for the filing of four pretrial motions for summary judgment. The court determined that the motions were legally untenable and had been filed for an improper purpose. Finding that the district court did not "base[] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence," and thus did not abuse its discretion, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), we uphold the imposition of the sanctions.
The judgments of the district courts are AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The remedial order entered by the district court in Hadix is VACATED, Parts I, III and IV A of the remedial order entered by the district court in Knop are VACATED, and both cases are REMANDED to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
APPENDIX

SECTION VI OF CONSENT DECREE

VI. Access to Courts

1015

1. Each General Population inmate may use the law library at least six hours per week in two-hour segments. To accommodate this use, the law library shall remain open at least 55 hours per week, with at least one-third of those hours during evenings after 5:00 p.m. and weekends. The law library will remain open additional hours as staff becomes available. Prisoners who have pending court cases requiring additional law library *1015 time in excess of the six-hour guarantee will be allowed the additional access necessary.
2. Within 30 days after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will initiate procedures to order for the main law library, to the extent not currently provided, each of the publications listed in Appendix B, "Minimum Collection for Main Law Libraries," with the addition of a complete edition of Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated. For each required publication, the Department shall have a subscription for revised additions, pocket parts, or advance sheets which shall be made available for prisoner use forthwith upon delivery to the institution. Periodically, at six-month intervals, Defendant shall survey each collection to identify missing or mutilated volumes. All missing or mutilated volumes, however discovered to be missing or mutilated, will be replaced or restored promptly.
3. Inmates in Administrative Segregation or Protective Custody shall be guaranteed two hours per week direct personal access to a limited law library collection as indicated in Appendix B, "Minimum Collection for Administrative Segregation Law Libraries." In addition, on three days each week, such inmates may request five volumes brought to them from the main law library collection unless the particular volumes are loaned to another inmate. These volumes shall be delivered to the inmate in segregation on the day following the day on which requests are collected. The book(s) may be collected after 24 hours.
4. Law library facilities shall be maintained with adequate ventilation and lighting with sufficient space to accommodate the reasonable needs of the inmates.
5. The allotted time per prisoner for law library use shall not include the time necessary to travel to and from the library, but will include only the amount of time actually spent in the library.
6. The detail system by which inmates in general population presently gain access to the law library shall be continued in order to assure prisoner access to the law library.

1016

7. Special and additional library time shall be allowed on a call out system to an individual prisoner as needed, provided that he can demonstrate a bona fide need as determined by the supervisor of the law library. Such a bona fide need shall include, but not be limited to, situations such as a deadline for filing briefs, pleadings, responses to a pleading, or other such documents with a court.
8. Inmate staff working in the law library shall not have the authority to deny other prisoners access to the law library. Inmate staff shall be supervised by a professional librarian and staff clerk.
9. The Department of Corrections shall provide notarial services as necessary. Pursuant to the request of plaintiffs, the Department of Corrections shall post a notice at the prison law library indicating that in many cases declarations under penalty of perjury, in lieu of formal affidavits, are allowed.
10. The Department shall enforce its policy for treatment of privileged legal mail, including mail from Federal, State and local courts, governmental agencies, and attorneys, which provides that such mail will not be read, that upon the inmate's written demand, such mail will not be opened except in the presence of the inmate to whom the mail is addressed, and that such mail may be opened to search for contraband. The Department further shall provide that inmates shall seal all outgoing legal mail which prison officials shall then cause to be posted unopened in the U.S. mail.
11. Paralegal training will be instituted at the State Prison of Southern Michigan as a regular educational program *1016 under the auspices of Jackson Community College.
12. Electric typewriters shall be permitted.
13. Any property limitation imposed on prisoners shall not apply to legal papers and law books except that if the quantity thereof conflicts with important institutional goals such as security or fire safety, a limitation may be sought through the administrative hearing process. The standard for imposition of a limitation shall be whether the material in question is reasonably necessary to assist the prisoner with respect to his pending litigation.
14. Each visiting attorney shall be afforded a table and chair in a space providing suitable privacy.

APPENDIX B

MINIMUM COLLECTION FOR MAIN LAW LIBRARIES

MICHIGAN MATERIALS 1. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated (Vol. 1-2, 38-39, 40-41) OR Michigan Statutes Annotated (Vol. 1, 24, 24A, 25, 25A) 2. Michigan Digest (West) (all) OR Michigan Digest (Callaghan) (all) 3. Michigan Supreme Court Reports (Vol. 358 (1960) to the present plus subscription to advance sheets) 4. Michigan Appeals Reports (Vol. 1 to the present plus subscription to advance sheets)

5. Shepard's Michigan Citations (all) 6. Gillespie 0907 Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (all) 7. Honigman and Hawkins 0907 Michigan Court Rules Annotated (all) 8. Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions (all) 9. Hensel 0907 Appeals in the Michigan Courts FEDERAL MATERIALS 1. United States Code Annotated (Constitution volumes, Titles 18, 28, 42) 2. Supreme Court Reporter (From Vol. 80 (1959) to the present plus subscription to advance sheets) OR United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition, 2nd Series (From Vol. 4 (1959) to the present plus subscription to advance sheets) 3. Federal Reporter, 2nd Series (From Vol. 300 (1962) to the present plus subscription to advance sheets) 4. Federal Supplement (From Vol. 200 (1961) to the present plus subscription to advance sheets) 5. Federal Practice Digest, 2d (all) 6. Shepard's United States Citations (all) 7. Shepard's Federal Citations (all) 8. Wright 0907 Federal Practice and Procedures (Vols. 1, 2 and 3) (Criminal) 9. Sokol 0907 Federal Habeas Corpus (latest edition) GENERAL MATERIALS 1. Corpus Juris Secundum (22, 22A, 23, 23A, 24, 24A, 24B (Vols. covering Criminal Law)) 2. Black 0907 Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed. (1968) OR Ballentine 0907 Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed. (1969) 3. Cohen, M. 0907 Legal Research in a Nutshell (latest edition) OR Elias 0907 Legal Research: How to Find and Understand the Law 4. Bailey and Rothblatt 0907 Complete Manual of Criminal Forms, 2nd Ed. (2 volumes) 5. Israel and LaFave 0907 Criminal Procedure in a Nutshell, 2nd Ed. (1975) 6. Criminal Law Reporter 7. Rubin 0907 Law of Criminal Correction, 2nd Ed. (1973) 8. Werner 0907 Manual for Prison Law Libraries (1976) 1017 *1017 9. Dorsen, N. 0907 The Rights of Prisoners (1973)

OR Rudovsky, D. 0907 The Rights of Prisoners (1973) OR Palmer, J.W. 0907 Constitutional Rights of Prisoners (1977) 10. LaFave, W.R. 0907 Principles of Criminal Law (1978) OR LaFave and Scott, Handbook in Criminal Law (1972) OR Loewy, A.R. 0907 Criminal Law in a Nutshell, 2nd Ed. (1972) Additional Volumes A complete edition of MCLA for SPSM Main Law Library. MINIMUM COLLECTION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION LAW LIBRARIES 1. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated (Vol. 1-2, 38-39, 40-41) OR Michigan Statutes Annotated (Vol. 1, 24, 24A, 25, 25A) 2. A treatise on Michigan criminal law and procedure 3. Superseded "advance sheets" of Shepard's Citations (United States, Federal, and Michigan) 4. A treatise (e.g., Nutshell series) on prisoners' rights 5. A treatise on habeas corpus 6. A general treatise on criminal law and on criminal procedure 7. A legal dictionary 8. Federal rules of civil and criminal procedure 9. A Michigan Department of Corrections Resident Guidebook and 10. A list of the main law library holdings as periodically updated.
[*] The Honorable Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. [1] The Jackson facility contains several "complexes," one of which 0907 the Central Complex, housing about 2,400 prisoners 0907 is the subject of the order in Hadix. Central Complex prisoners have been excluded from the Knop class as far as the access to courts issue is concerned. [2] In an opinion filed 18 months earlier in connection with a motion for partial dismissal on res judicata grounds, however, the Knop court did say that it had examined Walker carefully, and it did note that the Sixth Circuit had remanded the case "for the district court to consider whether adequate access to court has been denied any prisoner." Slip Op. of 3/20/86, docket item 466, at p. 7, quoting Walker, 771 F.2d at 932. Given the extraordinary amount of written material connected with this litigation, and given the fact that none of the litigants questioned

the appropriateness of the Western District as a forum for litigation over the access to courts issue, we do not find it surprising that the district court should have failed to raise this question at the outset on its own motion.
[3] The Department of Corrections has also had its problems with jailhouse lawyers. In the proceedings held before Judge Enslen with respect to a remedy, the Department proposed abolition of the jailhouse lawyer system altogether. See 685 F.Supp. at 641.
[4] In Hull, a prisoner 0907 who was incarcerated at Jackson, as it happens 0907 had repeatedly tried to send a petition for habeas corpus, supported by exhibits, to the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court. Michigan prison officials kept confiscating these materials, but with help from his father the prisoner finally succeeded in getting them to the Court. To justify the institution's attempts to prevent the prisoner from filing his papers, the prison warden cited a regulation requiring all petitions to be reviewed and approved by state officials before they could be filed. The Supreme Court held the regulation invalid:
"The considerations that prompted its formulation are not without merit, but the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." 312 U.S. at 549, 61 S.Ct. at 642.
The prohibition against abridging or impairing a prisoner's right to apply for habeas corpus relief subsequently spawned a requirement for affirmatively aiding and abetting such applications. The seminal case is Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971), a two-sentence per curiam opinion affirming the decision of a three-judge district court in Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.Supp. 105 (N.D.Cal. 1970) (California Department of Corrections ordered either to expand its prison libraries or "devis[e] another system whereby indigent prisoners are given adequate means of obtaining the legal expertise necessary to obtain judicial consideration of alleged grievances cognizable by the courts." Id. at 112). The only authority that the Supreme Court cited on the merits in Younger v. Gilmore was Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), which held simply that in the absence of alternative legal resources a state may not constitutionally prohibit prison inmates from assisting other inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief.
[5] Our own court, like other courts of appeals, has always understood the Supreme Court to have meant what it said in holding that prisoners must be provided adequate law libraries "or" adequate assistance from persons with legal training. In Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d 639, 640 (6th Cir.1983), we explicitly endorsed "the proposition that a prisoner's constitutionally-guaranteed right of access to the courts has been protected when a state provides that prisoner with either the legal tools necessary to defend himself, e.g., a state-provided law library, or the assistance of legally-trained personnel." (Emphasis supplied.) We went on to observe, in Pitts, that
"The alternative avenues open to state authorities to protect a prisoner's right of access to the courts are precisely that 0907 alternatives. The choice between alternatives lies with the state." Id.
Cf. Penland v. Warren County Jail, 759 F.2d 524, 531 n. 7 (6th Cir.1985) (en banc) ("Prisoners may not dictate to the state the method by which access to the courts will be assured."). Accord, Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1984) ("Bounds requires only `adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law,' not both"); Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856, 860 (10th Cir.1985) ("Under Bounds, the State is free to make a choice...."); Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 313, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986) (reversing a district court holding that "no plan contemplating libraries alone could be sufficient due to inmate illiteracy;" the Bounds Court necessarily contemplated reliance on inmate writ-writers or nonlawyer law clerks, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969)); Kelsey v. Minnesota, 622 F.2d 956, 958 (8th Cir. 1980) ("government need not provide inmates with every possible means of access to the courts").
Where female prisoners lack their male counterparts' history of "self-help" in the law, however, equal protection considerations may require that library facilities be supplemented by assistance from a lawyer. Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F.Supp. 174, 216 (W.D.Ky.1982), aff'd. No. 86-6067, 1989 WL 40131, 1989 U.S.App. LEXIS 4789 (6th Cir. April 10, 1989) [875 F.2d 862 (table)] (unpublished), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991, 110 S.Ct. 539, 107 L.Ed.2d 536 (1989). Cf. Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 545 (4th Cir. 1975) (women prisoners may not be afforded less access to legal research facilities than male prisoners). See also Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp.

1075, 1094-97, 1103 (E.D.Mich.1979) (the fact that a women's prison library was much smaller than the men's library at Jackson did not constitute illegal discrimination, but the state was ordered to continue offering the assistance of Prison Legal Services because the women had no experienced inmate writ-writers and lacked any history of self-help in the legal field).
[6] In many cases, it should be remembered, the taxpayers will already have paid for attorneys to represent the prisoners in their criminal trials and in their direct appeals. Approximately 20 attorneys on the staff of the State Appellate Defenders Office, for example, represent indigent Michigan prisoners in appeals as of right. Hadix, 694 F.Supp. at 275. That kind of legal aid is, of course, a horse of a different color; we are concerned here with civil actions in which the prisoner is the plaintiff, not criminal actions in which the prisoner is the defendant.
[7] "Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of [the legislative and executive branches of government], and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
[8] For a somewhat different view, see Feikens, "Federal Courts are Governing Society Today: Should They?" 1991 Det.L.Rev. 1363.
[9] Inmates who are reasonably articulate, on the other hand, and who have legitimate constitutional claims cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are often able to retain outside counsel. The bar is not unaware that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes the award of reasonable attorney fees to plaintiffs who prevail in § 1983 actions, and such awards are sometimes substantial. See, for example, Roland v. Johnson, No. 91-1460, 1992 WL 214441, 1992 U.S.App. LEXIS 22047 (6th Cir., September 4, 1992) [974 F.2d 1339 (table)] (unpublished), where the lawyers for a Michigan prisoner who prevailed in a § 1983 action are receiving a fee of almost $150,000.
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 712 F.Supp. 571 (1989)
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John
Prelesnik, and Jack Bergman, Defendants.
File No. G84-651.
United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.
April 5, 1989.
5723 *572 *573 National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Foundation, by Elizabeth Alexander, Adjoa Aiyetoro, Mark Lopez, Jenner & Block, Washington, D.C. by Bruce J. Ennis, Donald Verelli and Theresa Chmara, for plaintiffs.
Frank Kelley, Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., by Thomas C. Nelson and Brent Simmons, for defendants.
OPINION
ENSLEN, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs' counsel's petition for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. After nearly five years of litigation in a major prison conditions case, resulting in a judgment favorable to the plaintiff class, plaintiffs' counsel seek $2,043,960.38 in attorneys fees, expenses and costs. The facts and legal issues involved in this matter are adequately reported in this Court's published decisions, Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.Mich.1987); and Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636 (W.D.Mich.1988); and will not be repeated here.
Defendants have interposed a number of objections to plaintiffs' fee request. They contend that plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to $156,950.00 in attorneys' fees and $1,067.50 in costs and expenses. This calculation can most charitably be described as a gross underestimation. The trial alone in this matter lasted 35 days. Hearings on the remedial plans submitted by the parties lasted another four days. Plaintiffs were represented by four attorneys at trial and three at the remedial hearing. Assuming a trial or hearing day of 4.5 hours and compensation at an 574 hourly rate even defendants admit is reasonable, $100 per hour, plaintiffs' counsel are entitled *574 to $68,400 in fees for in-court time alone. This does not include their substantial travel time, or the hours they spent attending the many hearings on non-dispositive matters held in this case.
That having been said, however, the Court finds that a number of the defendants' objections have substantial merit. While I have concluded that the reductions advocated by defendants are too extreme, the fee petition must be reduced to account for plaintiffs' partial success on the race claim, excessive or duplicative hours and noncompensable costs and expenses. After conducting a two-day evidentiary hearing and reviewing each entry on each billing and expense record submitted by counsel, I find that attorneys fees in the amount of $1,299,563.04 and costs and expenses in the amount of $184,443.24 are appropriate. This results in a total award of $1,484,006.28.
Plaintiffs' counsel have submitted three separate applications for fees. This opinion treats each application separately. The Court's calculations of reasonable attorneys' fees for each application and the allowable expenses and costs may be found in the tables annexed to this Opinion.

I. Amended Petition for Attorneys Fees and Costs
Plaintiffs' counsel initially submitted their petition for attorneys fees on April 12, 1988. After discovering that computer errors had resulted in some duplicative entries on their billing records, plaintiffs' submitted an amended application for fees on November 28, 1988. This Opinion refers to the billing records attached to the amended application.
A. Reasonable Hours
Having won a judgment in their favor, plaintiffs are without doubt "prevailing parties" within the meaning of § 1988. Plaintiffs' counsel are thus entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses and costs for their efforts. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the appropriate method for determining reasonable attorneys fees under § 1988 is to determine the number of hours "reasonably expended on the litigation," and to multiply that figure by a reasonable hourly rate.[1] The ultimate fee award must reflect the degree to which plaintiffs succeeded on their claims for relief and deny compensation for hours that were not reasonably expended on the litigation. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40.
1. Partial Success on the Merits
One of the defendants' major contentions is that the fee award must be reduced to reflect the limited degree of success plaintiffs obtained on the race discrimination claims. Plaintiffs began this litigation with a number of claims regarding racial discrimination against prisoners. These included: (1) discrimination in job assignment; (2) segregation of cafeteria serving lines; (3) discrimination in assignment to punitive segregation and protective custody; and (4) staff displays of racially motivated hostility toward black inmates. First Amended Complaint ¶ 55. Plaintiffs succeeded on only one of those claims0907the claim that staff engaged in racially derogatory behavior, principally the use of racial slurs, against black inmates. Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467, 504-07 (W.D. Mich.1987). The defendants argue that the majority of time spent on plaintiffs' race claims involved the claims of discrimination in job assignment, punitive segregation and cafeteria serving lines. They argue that the fee request should be substantially reduced to reflect the hours spent on these unsuccessful claims.
In Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, the Supreme Court held that a party's fee award must be reduced where the party prevailed on some, but not all of the claims presented. "In this situation two questions must be 575 addressed. First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that *575 were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?" Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. Claims are unrelated where they are "distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories." Id. In such instances: "The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim." Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1006, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3465, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (court must evaluate the requested fee "in light of the relationship between particular claims for which work is done and the plaintiff's success").
Where the plaintiff's successful and unsuccessful claims are based on "a common core of facts" and "related legal theories," the lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims, and "the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. In making these determinations, the court "may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success." Id. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941.
A number of cases have allowed compensation for hours spent on unsuccessful claims where the successful and unsuccessful claims involve a common core of facts and rely upon related legal theories. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 571, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2693, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986); Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1283

(4th Cir.1987); Davis v. City of Charleston, 827 F.2d 317, 323 (8th Cir.1987); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 826 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir.1987); Wolfel v. Bates, 749 F.2d 7, 9 (6th Cir. 1984); Vaughns v. Board of Education, 598 F.Supp. 1262, 1271-72 (D.Md.1984). Alternatively, claims may be considered related where they seek relief for essentially the same course of conduct. "Under this analysis, an unsuccessful claim will be unrelated to a successful claim when the relief sought on the unsuccessful claim is intended to remedy a course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from the course of conduct that gave rise to the injury on which the relief granted is premised." Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1279 (7th Cir.1983).
As the Supreme Court recognized in Hensley and Smith, it is often difficult to determine which hours expended on a case contributed to the relief obtained and which did not. This is especially true where the plaintiffs raise a number of conceptually distinct but factually related claims. In such circumstances, it is appropriate to reduce the fee applicant's award by a flat amount, rather than attempting to determine which specific hours were spent on the unsuccessful claims. In Toussaint, for example, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' various claims were not easily categorized as "related" or "unrelated." Although the claims were based upon related facts and legal theories, the plaintiffs had achieved only limited success on appeal, and it was impossible to determine the exact number of hours spent on each claim. Thus, the court reduced the fee award by one-third, to account for plaintiffs' "very limited" success on appeal. Toussaint, 826 F.2d at 905.
Plaintiffs achieved only partial success on their race-related claims. They submit that they are entitled to full compensation for hours spent on these claims because the Court found their statistical evidence to be significant, because the results obtained are extremely significant to the plaintiff class, and because the Court's ruling on the racial slur issue will impact corrections officials not only in Michigan, but across the country. Defendants argue that because plaintiffs' billing records make it impossible to determine exactly how much time was spent on the unsuccessful claims, virtually all of the hours claimed must be excluded either as spent on unsuccessful claims or as inadequately documented.
576 *576 I find the defendants' suggestion to be completely unreasonable. Clearly, where the documentation of hours in inadequate, the Court may reduce an award of attorneys fees or deny the petition in its entirety. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. Acceptance of defendants' objection would, however, result in an almost complete denial of fees. A denial of fees for inadequate documentation is generally reserved for cases where the petition is unsupported by contemporaneous time records or is otherwise wholly undocumented. Southerland v. International Longshoremen's Local 8, 845 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir.1988) ("Total denial of fees because of poor documentation is a stringent sanction, to be reserved for only the most severe of situations..."). While it is preferable for counsel to "maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims," it is also true that "counsel ... is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 n. 12. See also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 826 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir.1987) (where plaintiffs' claims involve common facts and legal theories, "it would be unfair to require plaintiffs to produce documentation demonstrating the time spent on each individual issue raised..."). Documentation offered in support of an attorneys' fee petition is sufficient where it is contemporaneously compiled and sufficiently detailed to allow the Court to determine with certainty the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, etc. v. G & M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 502 (6th Cir.1984).
In considering defendants' objections to the petition for attorneys fees, the Court has reviewed every billing entry on every billing record submitted by plaintiffs. In many instances, the entries identify the specific issue the attorney was working on at the time. At other times, the billing entries are more general. For example, billing entries often state, "prepared responses to interrogatories," or "compiled documents," while at other times they state, "drafted race brief," or "prepared interrogatory answers re: race claims." Because the entries are at times specific and at other times general, I think it fair to assume that at least some of the general entries refer to work relevant to the entire case, while the more specific entries reflect instances where attorneys spent substantial amounts of time working on a discrete claim. While the billing entries are not always as detailed as one would prefer, I am satisfied that they were contemporaneously compiled, and that they accurately reflect the number of hours each attorney spent working on this case. I find that plaintiffs' counsel have adequately documented their request for fees, and I will deny defendants' request to eliminate virtually every hour claimed by counsel for lack of proper documentation.

The plaintiffs' position, however, is also unreasonable. They simply were not successful in obtaining the relief sought on a large percentage of their race-related claims. Hopefully, the Court's ruling on the racial slur issue will enhance the lives of the plaintiff class and will convince prison officials here and elsewhere to aggressively discipline staff for such conduct. Perhaps at some point in the future, the Court's findings regarding plaintiffs' statistical evidence will be helpful in another race discrimination suit. But the fact remains that plaintiffs were unsuccessful in the attempt to convince the Court that the defendants segregated cafeteria serving lines, or that they discriminated on the basis of race in job assignments or in assignments to administrative segregation or protective custody. Under Hensley and its progeny, their fee award must be reduced by some amount to account for this partial success.
The question of how much to reduce the fee award is one of great difficulty for the Court. The various race claims are unrelated in the sense that they each relate to different policies and conduct of the defendants. They are related in the sense that the evidence of discriminatory intent and conduct was relevant to both the successful 577 and unsuccessful race claims. Certainly, if *577 plaintiffs had chosen from the beginning to pursue only the racial slur issue, their attorney fees and costs would be lower. On the other hand, the costs and fees associated with the race claims would not have been eliminated entirely. Presumably, plaintiffs' counsel would have had to conduct numerous prisoner interviews, review records compiled by the defendants and consult expert witnesses in substantiating that claim.
Nor can it be said with confidence that none of the information compiled on the unsuccessful race discrimination claims contributed to plaintiffs' success on the racial slur claim. For example, much of the testimony about racial slurs was elicited while prisoner witnesses were testifying about other issues, and the evidence regarding racially stereotypic views held by staff contributed to the Court's finding that the Department of Corrections at least implicitly authorized racially motivated conduct by staff. This information, in all likelihood, would not have been discovered or presented to the Court had plaintiffs not chosen to proceed to trial on the unsuccessful race claims. The matter is further complicated by the fact that some attorneys spent a great deal of time on the race issues, while others spent relatively little time on those claims.
Because the billing records do not always identify the particular issue involved, and because some attorneys had more responsibility for the race claims than did others, I find that it would be unfair to reduce all attorneys' fees by some arbitrary percentage to account for the partial success on these claims. By the same token, the sheer bulk of the billing sheets, their failure to always identify the particular issue involved and the relationship between the various race claims, makes it difficult to determine with certainty the exact number of hours spent on the unsuccessful claims. For these reasons, I adopted the following methodology in determining the appropriate reduction of plaintiffs' fee request.
I reviewed each billing entry and attempted to identify those hours spent working on the unsuccessful claims. In the course of this review, I also considered the hours defendants identified as having been spent on unsuccessful claims.[2] I then determined the percentage of each attorneys' time attributable to work on the race claims.[3] Because many of the billing entries are general, rather than specific, this process probably understates the amount of time each attorney spent on the race claims in general. However, since the plaintiffs succeeded on one of their race claims, and since a portion of the hours attributable to the unsuccessful claims are reasonably related to that successful claim, I find that it is equitable to reduce each attorney's claimed hours by this percentage. This method compensates the plaintiffs for hours spent on tasks related to their successful claims, while reducing the overall award to account for their partial success.
2. Excessive or Duplicative Hours
Defendants' next major objection is that the attorneys' fees request should be substantially reduced to account for duplication of effort, excessive time spent on routine tasks and inefficient use of attorney time. A moderate reduction in claims hours is appropriate where counsels' billing records indicate substantial duplication of effort or inefficiency. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40 ("Cases may be overstaffed and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely. Counsel ... should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request

hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary"); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir.1983). The bulk of the hours claimed are attributed to four attorneys who had primary responsibility for this litigation: Elizabeth Alexander, Adjoa Aiyetoro, Patricia Streeter, and Nkechi Taifa-Caldwell. Four other attorneys, 578 one paralegal and a number of law clerks and law student interns also expended hours attributable to *578 this case. Many hours claimed were spent in conferences between attorneys and law clerks. It is within the Court's discretion to grant attorneys fees for time spent conferring with co-counsel and with subordinates, and I will do so here. Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir.1985); National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1337 (D.C.Cir.1982); Daggett v. Kimmelman, 617 F.Supp. 1269, 1280-81 (D.N.J. 1985); aff'd in relevant part, 811 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.1987).
Hensley requires that counsel for a prevailing party exercise "billing judgment" in making a fee request, and that counsel excise "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" hours from that request. 461 U.S. at 464, 103 S.Ct. at 1955. Plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably expended on their successful claims, but they are not entitled to compensation for hours attributable to "overkill" or to the assumption that "the standard of service to be rendered and compensated is one of perfection, the best that illimitable expenditures of time can achieve." Grendel's Den Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 953 (1st Cir.1984). Similarly, because more experienced attorneys charge higher rates for their services, they are expected to perform legal work in an expedited manner. Garrett v. Goodwin, 588 F.Supp. 825, 828 (E.D.Ark, 1984). As the Third Circuit noted in Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir.1983), "A fee applicant cannot demand a high hourly rate0907which is based upon his or her experience, reputation, and a presumed familiarity with the applicable law0907and then run up an inordinate amount of time researching the same law. Double dipping, in any form, cannot be condoned." On the other hand, it is also necessary to evaluate the defendants' conduct in determining whether claimed hours were reasonably spent. As the Supreme Court noted in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986), defense counsel "cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response." See also Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal Inc., 583 F.Supp. 40, 49 (N.D.Ind.1983) ("It was ... [defendants'] right to contest every aspect of this claim, but they cannot now disclaim the consequences of their actions").
The requirement under Hensley is that plaintiffs' hours be reasonably spent. There is no requirement that plaintiffs' counsel staff their cases or delegate responsibilities in the same way that defense counsel would. In reviewing plaintiffs' billing records in light of this objection, I found very few instances of the excessive or duplicative work defense counsel claimed existed. While a small reduction is appropriate for certain hours, I will decline defendants' invitation to reduce counsels' hours by twenty (20%) percent. The billing records do not substantiate such a large reduction.
Defendants particularly object to the hours claimed by Taifa-Caldwell as excessive or duplicative, given her general inexperience. Ms. Taifa-Caldwell's inexperience is reflected in the lower hourly rate requested for her services. In analyzing each of the hours defendants objected to because they were "excessive, duplicative or compensable at a lower rate," I discovered that defendants object to virtually every hour she spent responding to prisoner correspondence, summarizing depositions and analyzing them for admissions, scheduling trips and depositions, researching, compiling documents for exhibits and attachments to briefs and proof reading plaintiffs' submissions. I find that these activities are appropriately delegated to an inexperienced attorney and that the hours claimed for these services are compensable. Obviously, plaintiffs' counsel had an ethical duty to communicate with their clients, and time spent on that task is compensable. The time spent proof reading was time well spent, and the Court sincerely wishes counsel for the defense had been as conscientious in that regard 579 during the course of this litigation.[4] In short, after reviewing *579 Ms. Taifa-Caldwell's billing records, I do not find a substantial number of "excessive" hours spent on "routine" tasks as easily delegated to support staff. I will therefore decline to reduce her claimed hours on that basis.
In reviewing the hours claimed by Ms. Aiyetoro, I also do not find evidence of excessive duplication or hours spent on routine tasks. Many of the defendants' objections relate to hours Ms. Aiyetoro spent compiling documents and exhibits, and hours she spent coordinating witness appearances. I do not find those hours to be excessive. Although most document identification can be handled by support staff or less experienced attorneys, the attorney with primary responsibility for conducting deposition or trial testimony must also spend some time compiling and reviewing the pertinent documents. Similarly, some one with knowledge of the case and the trial

schedule had to assume responsibility for identifying the prisoner witnesses and coordinating their appearances. The hours Ms. Aiyetoro spent on these tasks are not excessive or unreasonable. Defendants object that on May 1, 1986, Ms. Aiyetoro claims to have spent 25.2 hours working on this case. While I note that those billings are either excessive or an error in transcription, see Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition for Attorneys Fees, Sept. 16, 1988 at 6, n. 5, at least half of the hours claimed have already been excised as related to unsuccessful claims. There is no need to further excise these hours for possible duplication.
On a number of other occasions, Ms. Aiyetoro billed more than eight hours for a single day. Standing alone, I do not view this as evidence of duplication or inefficiency. It is certainly not unusual for attorneys to work long hours when they are litigating a complex matter, and in fact I would be more suspicious of the billing entries if there were not days where counsel claimed to have spent more than eight hours working on this case.[5]See Ramos v. Lamm, 632 F.Supp. 376, 381, 383 (D.Colo. 1986). Defendants also object to the 127.6 hours Ms. Aiyetoro spent working on plaintiffs' response to their motion to dismiss in December, 1986. I note first that, during this period, at least six motions to dismiss were pending, each of which was accompanied by an oversized brief. It comes as no surprise that the plaintiffs' research and drafting time in responding to these motions was considerable. I would agree, however, that at least a portion of this time could have been delegated to a less experienced, and less expensive attorney.
In reviewing Ms. Aiyetoro's billing records, I did not find a substantial number of entries indicating duplicative work. As noted above, I find that many of the hours defendants object to on this basis were, in fact, reasonably spent. I did, however, find a number of entries that are objectionable. For example, on June 6 and 7, 1985, Ms. Aiyetoro bills nine hours for travel between Washington, D.C. and Lansing, but appears to have performed no compensable services on or near those dates. On November 21, 1985, she spent 17.5 hours preparing for a two hour deposition. On May 14 and 15, 1986, Ms. Aiyetoro spent 15 hours marking documents. On August 5, 1986, she spent 2.25 hours in court organizing exhibits. These are examples of the hours I identified as having been unreasonably spent, in addition to those spent responding to the motion to dismiss. A two percent reduction in her claimed hours is sufficient to account for the possibility that she spent excessive amounts of time on certain tasks.
580 *580 Defendants' primary objection to Ms. Alexander's hours is that she spent long periods of time drafting briefs and other documents, when the research and initial drafting could have been less expensively delegated to a subordinate. Ms. Alexander testified that she did most of the research and briefing in this case by herself because she wanted to brief the complex legal issues presented carefully, and because she did not trust junior attorneys or law clerks to do the work as thoroughly as she would. I have reviewed Ms. Alexander's billing records, and while she clearly spent a great deal of time on briefing tasks, there is nothing excessive or unreasonable about the hours claimed. In all likelihood, these hours would have been greater had the research or initial drafting been delegated to less experienced counsel. Further, I found no evidence of duplicated effort on the brief writing. The other lawyers involved do not bill large amounts of time for work on the same documents. I find that these hours were efficiently and reasonably spent, and I will decline defendants' request that they be reduced.
I did find some evidence of excessive hours in the time Ms. Alexander spent on discovery related matters. In reviewing her time sheets, I noted 263 hours attributed to discovery related tasks such as drafting or answering interrogatories, reviewing documents, summarizing depositions, preparing document lists and marking documents. This number does not include time spent planning discovery, editing or supervising other attorneys' work or discussing information obtained with other counsel. It is certainly necessary for senior attorneys to participate in the discovery process, especially where, as here, the discovery requested by both sides was extensive and the process was complicated by defendants' seeming inability to promptly and properly reply to any discovery request. On the other hand, tasks such as marking documents and summarizing depositions are routinely delegated either to paralegals or junior attorneys. In light of these considerations, I find that a two percent reduction in Ms. Alexander's claimed hours is sufficient to account for hours which could as easily have been delegated to a less experienced attorney.
I found no evidence of duplication of effort or excessive hours in the hours claimed by the remaining attorneys on the case, the paralegals, law student interns or law clerks. I will, therefore, decline to reduce their hours on this basis.

3. Paralegals and Law Clerks
Defendants object to the hours billed by paralegals, law clerks and law student interns as vague, excessive or related to unsuccessful issues. I have already excised a portion of their claimed hours as related to unsuccessful issues, and I believe that this reduction is sufficient. The hours claimed by these individuals are neither vaguely documented nor excessive. I find them to be reasonable and compensable, with the exception already noted. See Louisville Black Police Officers Organization v. City of Louisville, 700 F.2d 268, 273 (6th Cir.1983); Stewart v. Rhodes, 656 F.2d 1216, 1216-17 (6th Cir.1981). Further, plaintiffs' counsel established to my satisfaction at the hearing that they do not treat paralegal and law clerk time as part of their overhead. Compensation for this time is, therefore, appropriate. Chapman v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 456 F.Supp. 77, 83 (N.D.Cal.1978).
4. Duplicative Award of Fees for Rule 11 Sanctions
Defendants also object that plaintiffs' counsel should not be compensated on this petition for time spent seeking Rule 11 sanctions and on the appeal of those sanctions. On August 20, 1987, I granted plaintiffs' counsel $6,165.00 in sanctions for defendants' conduct in filing frivolous motions. See Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 512, 522 (W.D.Mich.1987). Approximately half of this award compensated plaintiffs' counsel for time spent responding to the frivolous motions, while the other half compensated them for time spent on their Rule 11 briefs. Id. An additional sanction of $2,500 was imposed against defense counsel personally and is not at issue at this time.
581 *581 Although they admit that an award of attorneys fees for this time would be duplicative of the Rule 11 sanctions already granted, plaintiffs' counsel argue that they are entitled to reimbursement for these hours. To deny fees on this motion would, they argue, be to take away the effect of the sanction. I agree. Defense counsel acted in bad faith in filing a number of frivolous motions on the very last day for filing dispositive motions. I assessed attorneys fees against them to punish them for this unprofessional, objectively unreasonable behavior. This petition for attorneys fees is not concerned with defendants' behavior, but with plaintiffs' success. In light of plaintiffs' substantial success, the defendants would have been liable for the attorneys fees and expenses attributable to responding to their frivolous motions, even if I had not awarded sanctions. Obviously, if I deny compensation for these hours on this petition, the punitive effect of the sanction disappears. Defendants' objection is without merit.
B. Hourly Rates
The defendants next object that the hourly rates sought by plaintiffs' counsel are unreasonably high. Plaintiffs' counsel seeks compensation for the relevant attorneys at hourly rates ranging from a high of $190 to a low of $90. Paralegals, law student interns and law clerks are billed at lower rates, ranging from $65 per hour to $25 per hour. Plaintiffs' counsel have distinguished between time spent in court, out of court and in travel. They have submitted affidavits from three attorneys familiar with billing practices in the State of Michigan indicating that the hourly rates sought are reasonable for attorneys engaged in complex litigation in this state. See Declarations of Joseph L. Harding, Plaintiffs' Exhibit ("PX") 1, William Marshall Ellmann, PX 2, William H. Goodman, PX 3. I find as a matter of fact that the hourly rates requested for each attorney are reasonable, in light of the attorneys' expertise in this complex and highly specialized area of the law, the high quality of their representation, the nationwide scope of their practice and the hourly rates charged by attorneys in private practice for services of a similar nature.
In attacking the rates sought by plaintiffs' counsel, defendants focused upon the following passage from Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984):
The statute and legislative history established that "reasonable fees" under § 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel.11

. . . . .
11. We recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate "market rate" for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and most services are determined by supply and demand. In this traditional sense there is no such thing as a prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers in a particular community. The type of services rendered by lawyers, as well as their experience, skill, and reputation, varies extensively0907even within a law firm. Accordingly, the hourly rates of lawyers in private practice also varies widely. ... [T]he critical inquiry in determining reasonableness is now generally recognized as the appropriate hourly rate. And the rates charged in private representations may afford relevant comparisons.
. . . . .
... To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence ... that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, evidence, and reputation.
Id. at 895-96 and n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 and n. 11 (emphasis added).
Defendants contend, on the basis of this passage, that plaintiffs' counsel are entitled only to the median hourly 582 rate charged by attorneys practicing in Michigan. In support of that contention, they *582 offered the testimony of
Dr. Lawrence Stiffman, an individual who has conducted surveys of billing practices in the Michigan bar. See Defendants' Exhibit ("DX") 2. Dr. Stiffman testified that, in his opinion, Michigan lawyers with similar experience, practicing in a firm with between two and seven partners, would charge a median rate of between $110 and $85 per hour for their services. See DX 3 at p. 6. Dr. Stiffman prefers to concentrate on the median rate, rather than an average hourly rate, because he believes the median provides a "measure of central tendency" which is not affected by extremely high or low rates charged by a few practitioners in the relevant markets. Dr. Stiffman could offer no opinion on the hourly rates requested for in-court and travel time, because his survey of billing practices does not request or receive information regarding such rates. He further testified that the survey received information regarding attorneys' "overall" hourly rates0907the rates used as a beginning point for negotiting actual hourly rates with particular clients on particular cases. His survey did not compile information on rates charged by attorneys for services on particularly complex matters or for the services of particularly skilled, specialized attorneys. Finally, Dr. Stiffman offered an opinion on the median hourly rates charged by attorneys litigating complex matters in federal court. However, he made no attempt to discover, nor did he offer an opinion on, the hourly rates a fee paying client in the state of Michigan would pay for the services of these particular attorneys in litigating this particular case.
Defendants appear to assume that the Court is without discretion to award fees at a rate higher than the median hourly rate as determined by Dr. Stiffman's survey. There is no support in the law for that proposition. In Blum, the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that there is no such thing as a single "prevailing market rate" for lawyers' services, and that district courts have discretion to establish a reasonable hourly rate based upon a number of factors, including the attorneys' experience and expertise, and the complexity or novelty of the case at issue. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, n. 11, 898-99, 104 S.Ct. at 1547, n. 11, 1548-49 (noting that complexity, novelty, and quality of representation should be reflected in hourly rates awarded). Blum does not hold that there is only one reasonable market rate. In fact the opinion refers to "prevailing rates," in the plural, further emphasizing the existence of a range of reasonable market rates. Finally, Blum contains no language limiting fee awards to median, rather than actual or even above average, market rates.
Further, in Louisville Black Police Officers Organization, the Sixth Circuit expressly acknowledged that district courts have discretion to award fees based upon an hourly rate the district court determines to be reasonable.
... Northcross [v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979)] specifically provides that "[f]or those attorneys who have no private practice, the rates customarily charged in the community for similar services can be looked to for guidance." 611 F.2d at 638. However, in keeping with the discretionary nature of fee awards, we did not require the district court to look only to such rates.

In fact, there is nothing in Northcross to prevent a district judge from adjusting a fee upward or downward to reflect the quality of representation.

Id. at 276-77 (emphasis in original). The court further noted that while reasonable hourly rates may be determined by looking to the jurisdiction where a case is tried, id. at 277 (quoting Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765, 770 (6th Cir.1980)), the district court retains discretion to award fees based upon other considerations:

Today's holding is not to be interpreted as requiring district courts to always base the fees

awarded non-private attorneys on the local rates. District courts are free to look to a national

market, an area of specialization market or any other market they believe appropriate to fairly

compensate particular attorneys in individual cases. ... [W]e reiterate today that the district courts

583

retain their *583 discretion in such matters constrained only by their duty to achieve the goal

enunciated in Northcross: "to make an award of fees which is `adequate to attract competent

counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys.'" 611 F.2d at 633.

Louisville Black Police Officers, 700 F.2d at 278 (emphasis in original). See also NAACP Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police Officers Association, 620 F.Supp. 1173, 1183 (E.D.Mich.1985) (awarding fees based upon national market rates and specifically declining to award fees based on a median rate determined by 1981 survey of Michigan bar billing rates).

As the above citations indicate, I have no duty to slavishly adhere to the hourly rates Dr. Stiffman believes are reasonable. First, I think it unreasonable to confine these attorneys to a "median" market rate for their services. These attorneys are nationally recognized experts in a complex field of federal practice. They are by no means the "median" member of the bar, and their hourly rates should be adjusted upward to reflect both their specialization and the extremely high quality of the representation they provided to the plaintiff class. Such an adjustment is not simply reasonable, it is mandated by equity and fairness.

Second, I note that Dr. Stiffman based his opinion of reasonable rates on the assumption that plaintiffs' counsel practice in a firm with between two and seven partners. He further testified that the size of the firm is crucial to determining the hourly rate appropriately charged by counsel. But it is unfair and unreasonable to consider these attorneys as persons who practice for such a small firm. The National Prison Project is but one legal project funded by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation ("ACLUF"). The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the ACLUF employs more than seven lawyers, not including the thousands of attorneys across the country who volunteer their time and services to aid the organization's litigating efforts. In light of these considerations, it is more appropriate to consider the National Prison Project a department, or branch office of a large law firm, rather than a separate law firm.

Further, to compensate these attorneys at the lower rates available to lawyers in smaller firms would fail to recognize the truly nationwide scope of the National Prison Project's practice. At present, the National Prison Project is involved in litigation in 22 states. Lawyers from small firms rarely practice outside their particular community, while lawyers from larger firms often have a statewide or nationwide practice, and are entitled to charge higher rates for these services. I note that none of the rates sought by the fee petitioners exceeds the range of rates reported by Dr. Stiffman's study for firms with between 51 and 100 lawyers. See DX 2 at p. 23.

Third, Dr. Stiffman could not offer an opinion on what any particular lawyer in Michigan would actually charge a fee paying client to handle a case of this size and complexity. The plaintiffs on the other hand, offered the affidavits of three practicing attorneys in Michigan indicating that the rates sought are equal to or below the rates attorneys in private practice would charge for similar services. In addition, the plaintiffs offered evidence indicating that the defendants themselves consulted outside counsel in this case, and compensated those attorneys at higher hourly rates than those sought here. PX 32. Defendants protest that these rates are not an "admission" on their part of what reasonable hourly rates would be, but the rates do indicate that there are attorneys in Michigan whose hourly rates are similar to those requested here.

Finally, I note that awarding the hourly rates requested would serve the policy announced in Northcross, that attorney fee awards should be "adequate to attract competent counsel," without producing a windfall for the attorneys involved. 611 F.2d at 633. See also Coulter v. State of Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir.1986). It

584 has been my experience that prisoners are generally unable to retain attorneys in private *584 practice.[6] Ms. Alexander testified that, when this litigation was initially contemplated, the National Prison Project contacted the ACLUF's Michigan director to determine whether local counsel could handle the case. Their efforts to find local counsel willing to take on this large a commitment were unsuccessful. An award of fees at relatively high hourly rates is necessary to convince lawyers in private practice to enter this field of litigation.
I find, therefore, that the hourly rates sought by plaintiffs' counsel are reasonable for attorneys practicing in the state of Michigan. To the extent that they are higher than the median rate, the increase is more than justified by the expertise of the attorneys involved, the nationwide scope of their practice, the high quality of the representation they provided their clients, and the complexity of the issues involved in this litigation. An award of fees at the requested rates is also necessary to attract competent counsel to this demanding field of practice. I will, therefore, award plaintiffs' counsel fees at the requested hourly rates. I will apply current, rather than historic hourly rates to compensate plaintiffs' counsel for the delay in payment. See Louisville Black Police Officers, 700 F.2d at 276; Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 86 F.R.D. 752, 767 (E.D.Mich.1980); Mader v. Crowell, 506 F.Supp. 484, 487 (M.D. Tenn.1981).
C. Multiplier
Plaintiffs' counsel in this case seek a multiplier or enhancement of the lodestar figure for two reasons. First, they argue that defense counsels' uncooperative and unprofessional behavior made litigating this case "hazardous duty," and they should be compensated for having to withstand that behavior. Second, counsel argues that the economic risk associated with this case0907the chance that the massive costs advanced in order to litigate the case would not be repaid0907justifies a multiplier. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have not achieved the exceptional success necessary to justify a multiplier, that a multiplier should not be applied to punish counsel for improper behavior and that enhancements based upon the risk on non-recovery are unavailable under Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987).
Delaware Valley is, to say the least, a confusing case. A plurality of the Court concluded that fee shifting statutes such as § 1988 should not be construed to permit supplementing the lodestar to compensate counsel for assuming the risk of nonpayment of fees. The plurality went on to reason, however, that even if such enhancements are available, an enhancement was inappropriate in that case. The plurality questioned enhancements based upon the risk of nonpayment for two reasons. First, such enhancements compensate plaintiffs' counsel for having lost other cases, while Congress intended to compensate counsel only when they prevail. Second, such enhancements tend to penalize the defendants who have the most meritorious cases, rather than those whose cases are weak. Id. at 725, 107 S.Ct. at 3086, 97 L.Ed.2d at 597. The plurality also concluded, however, that if a risk-based enhancement is appropriate, it "should be reserved for exceptional cases where the need and justification for such enhancement are readily apparent and are supported by evidence in the record and specific findings by the courts." Id. at 728, 107 S.Ct. at 3088, 97 L.Ed.2d at 599. Thus, in order to levy a risk-based enhancement, the trial court should find "that without risk enhancement plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market." Id. at 731, 107 S.Ct. at 3089, 97 L.Ed.2d at 601.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion held that "Congress did not intend to foreclose consideration of contingency in setting a reasonable fee under fee-shifting provisions...." Id. at 731, 107 S.Ct. at 3089, 97 L.Ed.2d at 601. She found that "compensation for contingency must be based on the difference in market treatment of 585 contingent fee cases as a class rather than on an assessment of the `riskiness' *585 of any particular case." Id. Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality's opinion that risk-based enhancements should be available only where plaintiffs can show an inability to retain competent counsel without the enhancement and with its conclusion that an enhancement was unnecessary in that case. Id. at 733, 107 S.Ct. at 3090, 97 L.Ed.2d at 603.
Delaware Valley may be read to limit the availability of fee enhancements or multipliers even beyond the limitations imposed by Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). In Blum, the Court found that the lodestar figure, the product of reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate, "is presumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by § 1988." Id. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548. Enhancement of the lodestar is

available in cases of exceptional success or where the "basic standard of reasonable rates multiplied by reasonably expended hours results in a fee that is ... unreasonably low...." Id. The Court further found that a number of factors used to justify enhancements, such as the novelty and complexity of the issues involved, the quality of representation or the results obtained, were inappropriate reasons for increasing an otherwise reasonable fee. Id. at 898-900, 104 S.Ct. at 1548-1550.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Delaware Valley and Blum leave at least one avenue available for enhancing the attorneys' fees available under § 1988. Justice O'Connor and the Delaware Valley plurality agreed that an enhancement would be available where "necessary to attract competent counsel in the relevant community." 483 U.S. at 734, 107 S.Ct. at 3091, 97 L.Ed. 2d at 603. In this case, an enhancement of the lodestar figure is necessary for that reason. As I noted above, plaintiffs' counsel attempted unsuccessfully to find local counsel willing to litigate this major prison conditions case. This occurred even though the local practitioners were aware of the potential for recovering attorneys fees. Given the complexity of the issues involved, the potential for protracted litigation and the massive expenses which counsel would have to advance in order to properly litigate this case, it is not surprising that the ACLUF was unsuccessful in its effort to find private attorneys willing to handle more than one aspect of the case. That the lodestar figure also reflects the complexity and length of this particular case does not detract from the need for an enhancement based upon the need to attract competent local counsel to this type of litigation.
In order to convince counsel in private practice to accept cases of this nature, the fee awards must compensate counsel for time spent on the particular case involved, and be sufficient to convince them to forego fees they would have earned from their regular clients in order to properly litigate a case of this nature. Because counsel in private practice are unwilling to accept the responsibility of litigating a major prison conditions case such as this, even with the potential for fee shifting, an enhancement is necessary to vindicate the congressional policy behind section 19880907that of providing competent legal representation for those who are otherwise unable to afford it. See Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 731, 107 S.Ct. at 3089, 91 L.Ed.2d at 601; Northcross, 611 F.2d at 633.
As I read Delaware Valley, even the plurality's opinion would not foreclose an enhancement in a case like this where plaintiffs were able to show that local attorneys were unwilling to participate in the case, at least in part because of the enormous cost associated with that participation. Plaintiffs' counsel advanced almost $300,000 in costs and expenses to litigate this case to its conclusion. Indigent civil rights plaintiffs who cannot afford to compensate their attorneys for expenses advanced will never be able to retain counsel in a major civil rights case if counsel are not compensated for the risk that they will not recover these out-of-pocket expenditures. This is true whether the counsel retained comes from the private bar or from a legal assistance project. Charitable organizations, like lawyers in private practice, have limits on the funds they can expend on any particular case. I 586 note further that enhancing fees to compensate *586 for the risk of not recovering these costs does not punish defendants who have strong cases. Rather, it compensates plaintiffs' counsel for accepting cases that are expensive to prove.
Other factors mandate that plaintiffs' counsel be awarded an enhancement of the lodestar figure. First, and most significantly, an enhancement is necessary to compensate plaintiffs' counsel for the unpleasantness, stress, and gross inconvenience of litigating against counsel who repeatedly ignored deadlines imposed by the Federal Rules and by the Court, required plaintiffs' counsel to return to Court again and again in order to accomplish adequate discovery, and who launched improper attacks on both plaintiffs' counsel and witnesses. A brief sampling of some instances of defense counsel's unprofessional conduct may be necessary (although undesirable).
First, as plaintiffs' counsel testified at the fee hearing, defense counsel never responded timely to a single discovery request made during this litigation. Although they were repeatedly granted extensions of time, the defendants consistently failed to meet even these extended deadlines. Defendants delayed over five months in responding to plaintiffs' request for admissions. Their answers to interrogatories were as much as four months late. Defendants' responses to requests for production were not simply late, they were virtually non-existent. On at least one instance, plaintiffs were required to travel to Michigan to compile certain documents themselves because defense counsel were simply unwilling to do the work. As a direct result of defense counsels' lack of cooperation, plaintiffs were unable to complete discovery before trial began.

Defendants' uncooperative attitude resulted in the untimely filing of the joint pretrial order. They failed to disclose their list of expert witnesses until November, 1985, nearly five months past the stipulated date for disclosure. Even at this tardy date, defendants' list was incomplete and they subsequently substituted at least one expert witness. Defendants attempted to prevent plaintiffs' expert on race issues from touring the subject institutions, necessitating yet another pretrial hearing. Finally, defendants consistently failed to produce required summaries of their lay witnesses' testimony, and subsequently had some of their lay witnesses stricken.
Plaintiffs are manifestly correct when they argue that defendants' misconduct during discovery was due to counsels' bad faith, rather than the difficulty of responding to the discovery requested. While defense counsel was unable to respond to discovery requests, they were vigorously engaged in filing a massive number of pretrial motions. Some of these motions were meritorious, or at least colorable, while others were patently frivolous.
The unnecessary stress and frustration visited upon plaintiffs' counsel by the defense was not limited to discovery matters. Defense counsel were uncooperative in accomplishing notice to the plaintiff class and arguably violated the Canons of Ethics by communicating directly with members of the class who had been designated as witnesses rather than going through counsel. Interrogatories were served directly upon these individuals, rather than upon their counsel, and included instructions to return the answers directly to defendants. Plaintiffs' counsel were not served with these interrogatories and had to obtain a protective order, necessitating yet another pretrial hearing, in order to prevent this practice. Order of February 19, 1986.
Finally, I note once again, that certain defense counsels' treatment of plaintiffs' counsel and their witnesses fell well below minimal standards of professional courtesy. Their conduct went beyond zealous advocacy and fell directly into the category (or gutter) of personal insult. Certain defense counsel routinely referred to plaintiffs' arguments as laughable, ludicrous, abusive, and speculative. See, Response to Order to Show Cause Why Rule 11 Sanctions Should Not Enter, July 18, 1986 at 19 (plaintiffs' case "a reckless and dangerous presentation of obvious untruths, irrelevancies, and misleading information coupled with naive opinions of marginally qualified 587 corps of *587 self-proclaimed experts"); Reply to Plaintiffs' December 15, 1986 Response, December 23, 1986 at 4, 13, 14, 20, 28, 29 and 34. On at least two occasions, defense counsel accused plaintiffs' counsel of clearly unethical behavior with absolutely no factual foundation for those accusations. See Transcript of Hearing, February 19, 1986 (accusing plaintiffs' counsel of forging a document); Brief in Support of Answer ... and Request for Sanction under Rule 11, February 5, 1986 at 7-9 (implying that plaintiffs' counsel fabricated and/or intentionally misrepresented factual basis for motion and requesting that Ms. Alexander be removed as plaintiffs' counsel). Finally, defense counsel treated plaintiffs' witnesses, expert and lay, with extreme disrespect by consistently inquiring into witnesses' religious beliefs, and intimating that these beliefs included racism. See Trial Transcript at 2175 ("... does your religion consider whites to be sons of devils?" Objection sustained. "Do they consider whites to be spawns of Satan?"); Reply to Plaintiffs' December 15, 1986 Response to Defendants' Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, December 23, 1986 at 28. Defense counsels' treatment of witness Chapman was especially insulting to everyone involved with this case, including the Court. See Defendants' Brief in Support of Involuntary Dismissal, November 26, 1986 at 40-41 (referring to Mr. Chapman's testimony as "nothing more than a worthless, unsupported, rank form of conjecture"); Chapman Dep. at 140-41 (inquiring into whether Mr. Chapman had "ever practiced any form of Islamic faith" as relevant to "a possible source of bias").
This type of conduct may (or may not) fall below the level of sanctionable conduct under Rule 11, and in fact I am not concerned with whether the conduct should, in retrospect, have been punished with more force. The point here is that reasonable attorneys should never have to put up with this kind of behavior from their adversaries. The stress, frustration and outrage of having to do so vastly increased the personal toll plaintiffs' counsel paid for participating in this case. That price is not adequately reflected in the lodestar figure, since personal insults, untimely responses, and uncooperative attitudes do not increase the number of hours one spends litigating a case nor do they increase one's expertise or hourly rate in any meaningful fashion. I wish to emphasize that I find this behavior to be a basis for increasing the lodestar, not because I wish to sanction defense counsel or defendants' themselves, but because I believe that the lodestar does not adequately compensate plaintiffs' counsel for their efforts in this case, efforts which were insulted and frustrated at every turn by the behavior described above. An enhancement or multiplier is available in exceptional cases where the lodestar figure does not result in a reasonable attorneys' fee. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711,

727, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 3087, 97 L.Ed.2d 585, 599 (1987); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education, 773 F.2d 677 (6th Cir.1985); Northcross, 611 F.2d at 638. The behavior outlined here in brief establishes that this is such an exceptional case, and establishes, in my considered judgment, that the lodestar fee is not adequate to reasonably compensate plaintiffs' counsel for their efforts.
A second source of inconvenience to plaintiffs' counsel also merits an enhancement of the fee award. This case involved four major prisons, widely spaced throughout the state of Michigan, and with the exception of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, located in remote areas. Plaintiffs' counsel were required on several occasions to visit each of these prisons. In addition to the arduous travel, plaintiffs' were inconvenienced by the prison officials' refusal to promptly comply with their requests to interview members of the plaintiff class. Counsel testified at the hearing, and the billing records corroborate, that they were forced to spend long periods of time on each visit simply waiting to see their clients. This is evidence, not only of the defendants' uncooperative behavior, but also 588 of the additional stress and inconvenience plaintiffs' counsel experienced *588 while litigating this case. The lodestar figure and costs will reimburse counsel for the time and expense of travel, but not for these more intangible difficulties. An enhancement is appropriate for this reason as well.
Finally, I note that these reasons for granting a fee enhancement do not necessarily rely upon the degree of success achieved by plaintiffs' counsel. To the extent that a finding of exceptional success is necessary to justify an enhancement, I make it now. Plaintiffs' counsel completely prevailed on four of the five major issues severed for trial. With regard to the fifth issue, racial discrimination, they were partially successful. The results obtained by plaintiffs' counsel are extremely important and beneficial to their clients, because the issues tried affect the plaintiff class members' every day lives. For example, members of the plaintiff class now have adequate winter clothing. They can be assured that their privileged legal mail will be treated as confidential. Prisoners housed in locked cells will no longer have to depend upon a corrections officer's consent to use sanitary toilet facilities. For the first time in Michigan, illiterate or non-English speaking prisoners will be able to consult with legal counsel on their civil rights claims. For other prisoners, their access to the courts has been increased by the expansion of the prisons' law libraries. Finally, and for this Court most significantly, prisoners can be assured that openly racist behavior by corrections officers will no longer go unpunished by the defendants and that their complaints about such behavior will be taken seriously. This recognition of prisoners' basic right to be treated with dignity can only be described as an exceptional success for the plaintiff class.
I find, therefore, that a multiplier, or enhancement of the basic fee is appropriate in this case for four reasons. First, plaintiffs' counsel established to my satisfaction that the costs associated with this litigation, coupled with the risk of non-recovery, made it impossible for the plaintiff class to retain local counsel. Without an enhancement of the basic fee, other similarly situated plaintiffs will also be unable to attract competent local counsel. Second, I find that the increased stress and frustration counsel suffered due to the conduct of defense counsel justifies an enhancement. The basic fee award is insufficient to compensate counsel for the personal costs they paid as a result of their participation in this litigation. Third, a multiplier is justified because of the inherent difficulty of litigating this case, given counsels' limited access to their clients and the difficulties associated with the simultaneously litigating conditions in four separate, remote institutions. Fourth, plaintiffs' counsel achieved exceptional success for their clients. In recognition of these factors, therefore, I have determined that a multiplier of 30% (1.3) should be applied to the basic fee award.
D. Costs and Expenses
Plaintiffs request reimbursement for expert witness fees in the amount of $97,530.61. Defendants object that, under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1988), plaintiffs are entitled only to the statutory witness fees provided by 28 U.S. C. § 1821(b). Plaintiffs respond that the use of experts was essential to their success on the merits of this action and that expenses for these witnesses should be allowed as part of the reasonable attorneys fee.
Section 1988 has been construed, as a general rule, to allow reimbursement for all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by prevailing counsel which normally are charged separately to fee-paying clients and which

are not incorporated as part of office overhead into the attorneys' billing rates. See Kuzma v. I.R.S., 821 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir.1987) (§ 1988 fees include recovery of photocopying, travel and telephone costs, as distinct from "nonrecoverable routine office overhead"); Mennor v. Fort Hood National Bank, 829 F.2d 553, 556-57 (5th Cir.1987) (allowing recovery for postage, long-distance telephone calls and travel in Title VII case); Laffey v. 589 Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 30 (D.C.Cir.1984); Henry v. Webermeier, *589 738 F.2d 188, 192 (7th Cir.1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 559 (10th Cir.1983). The question of expert witness fees has always divided the courts of appeals, however, with some courts holding that these expenses are recoverable as part of the attorneys' fees, see Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1203-04 (7th Cir.1984); and others holding that § 1988 does not authorize compensation for "non-legal experts." Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R., 803 F.2d 1322, 1328 (4th Cir.1986).
In Northcross, the Sixth Circuit ruled that, "The authority granted in section 1988 to award a `reasonable attorney's fee' included the authority to award those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services. Reasonable photocopying, paralegal expense, and travel and telephone costs are thus recoverable pursuant to the statutory authority of § 1988." 611 F.2d at 639. In contrast, "docket fees, investigation expenses, deposition expenses, witness expenses and the costs of charts and maps" are recoverable, "in the court's discretion as costs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920." Id. at 639, 642.
In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed. 2d 385 (1988), the Supreme Court held that, "absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant's witness as costs, federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920." Although the Crawford Court expressly reserved the question of whether expert witness fees could be reimbursed under § 1988, a number of lower courts have held that Crawford prohibits reimbursement of expert witness fees in excess of the statutory limit. See Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 959 (4th Cir.1988); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.1988) ("The broad language in Crawford Fitting indicates that, although a statute may shift attorney fees, the statute does not operate to shift witness fees unless the statute refers explicitly to witness fees"); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir.1987) ("A prevailing party in a civil rights case is not entitled to tax [expert witness] fees as costs"); Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 584 (5th Cir.1987). At least two district courts have held that Crawford Fitting does not preclude recovery of expert witness fees under § 1988. Hillburn v. Commissioner, 683 F.Supp. 23, 27 (D.Conn.1987); United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 118 F.R.D. 326, 330 (S.D.N.Y.1987).
It seems to me that the distinction drawn by these courts between reasonable expenses which are recoverable as part of an attorneys' fee, and the cost of expert witnesses which are recoverable only under § 1920, is illogical. Expert witnesses, as surely as long distance telephone calls, photocopies and airline tickets, are necessary expenses in many civil rights cases. Certainly that is true of prison conditions cases. Moreover, the cost of retaining an expert witness is an expense which would normally be billed to a fee-paying client in other types of litigation. Further, I think Congress' intent to allow recovery of necessary expert witness expenses is demonstrated not only by the legislative history of § 1988, 122 Cong.Rec. 35,123 (1976) ("the phrase `attorney's fees' would include ... all incidental and necessary expenses incurred in furnishing effective and competent representation"); but also by the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii), which allows compensation for expert witness fees in actions against the federal government.
Whatever the merits of the rule, however, Northcross clearly held that the cost of expert witnesses is compensable, if at all, under § 1920, and Crawford Fitting held that § 1920 limits compensation to the statutory witness fee provided by § 1821. Although I wholeheartedly agree with plaintiffs' argument that the use of expert witnesses was crucial to their success on the merits of this action, Northcross and Crawford Fitting require me, albeit reluctantly, to accept the defendants' position. Costs for expert witnesses are limited to their travel 590 expenses and witness fees of *590 $30 per day for each day they appeared at a deposition or in court.[7]
Section 1821 provides that witnesses who are before the Court "or before any person authorized to take his deposition" shall be paid an attendance fee of $30 per day for each day's attendance. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1), (b). Witnesses who travel by common carrier are to be compensated for their travel expenses, 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (c)(1), and witnesses who use ground transportation are to be reimbursed for mileage, toll charges, taxicab fares,

and parking. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)-(3). Witnesses who must stay away from home overnight are also entitled to a subsistence allowance which shall not exceed the maximum per diem allowance for federal employees.
I have reviewed every item of expense claimed by the plaintiffs' counsel, as well as the bills submitted by the expert witnesses themselves. During this review, I checked deposition and testimony dates against counsel's billing records, the Court's docket sheet, and its minute entries from trial and hearing dates. I also considered the objections interposed by defendants as well as their calculation of allowable witness expenses. This calculation was in error because it did not include reimbursement for deposition testimony which is clearly allowed by statute. I find that plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to reimbursement for witness fees and expenses in the amount of $3,691.97.[8]
Other out-of-pocket expenses normally reimbursed as part of the attorneys' fees will, however, be allowed. Crawford Fitting did not reach this issue, and Northcross allows compensation for photocopying, travel, telephone and other extraordinary expenses as part of the reasonable attorneys fee, rather than as costs under § 1920. Other courts have routinely allowed recovery for non-overhead expenses such as postage, and I will do so as well. Because I find that these costs were necessary to the litigation as a whole, I will not reduce them to account for the plaintiffs' partial success. The recoverable expenses would not have differed dramatically had plaintiffs pursued only their successful claims.
In evaluating plaintiffs' claimed expenses for items other than expert witnesses, I checked the expense records against counsels' billing records and against the specific objections interposed by the defendants. I have denied reimbursement where I was unable to find that counsel performed any legal services during the relevant period of time, although I allowed for some margin of error in the recording process (for example, if air fare was recorded for June 3, 1986 but services were performed only on June 2, 1986, I allowed the airfare on the theory that one entry or the other must be a simple mistake.)[9] I have not excluded expenses incurred by counsel in touring the various institutions because I find that these tours were reasonably necessary to the claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed at trial. The same is true for expenses incurred by counsel while attending depositions, hearings or trial. These expenses are charged as part of the reasonable attorneys' fees available under § 1988. Defendants have objected to certain expense entries because more than one attorney attended the trial or hearing involved. I have not excised these expenses because I find that it was reasonable for more than one attorney to attend.
After reviewing every single expense entry, I find that the expenses, with the exceptions noted above, are entirely reasonable and will be awarded. Costs for photocopying, postage, express mail are reasonable. Similarly, I find that the plaintiffs request expenses only for extraordinary secretarial and paralegal expenses. These are expenses which would normally be billed to a client and they will be reimbursed. The same finding pertains to 591 expenses *591 for air fares, hotel charges, ground transportation and rental cars. Although defendants claim that certain air fares and hotel charges are excessive, I am not prepared to take issue with what airlines and hotels charge for reservations made on short notice or under other exceptional circumstances. I believe that plaintiffs have been entirely honest in their reporting of expenses, and I will reimburse them for the charges claimed.
Defendants successfully pointed out a couple of minor duplicative or erroneous billings. See DX 27, 28. I have excised those charges. With regard to the remaining charges, they will be reimbursed as described above.
Defendants object that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover costs associated with depositions, such as court reporter fees and transcript costs, unless the deposition was entered into evidence at trial. I disagree. Section 1920 and F.R.Civ.P. 54(d) grant the Court discretion to tax costs for depositions which are reasonably necessary. Furr v. AT & T Technologies, 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir.1987); Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir.1984); In re Air Crash Disaster, 687 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.1982); Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1982); SCA Services Inc. v. Lucky Stores, 599 F.2d 178 (7th Cir.1979); Koppinger v. Cullen-Schlitz & Assoc., 513 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.1975); C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, 10 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2676 (2d ed.1988) (citing cases). I find that the depositions taken in this case were reasonably necessary to plaintiffs' success on the merits and that costs for those depositions are appropriately taxed against defendants.
Similarly, awarding of costs for trial transcript expenses is within the discretion of the court. Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964); McDowell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 758

F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.1985); Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 10 F.R.D. 248 (W.D.Mich.1950) aff'd 186 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.1951); 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). Such costs are generally awarded where the transcript was necessarily obtained for use in the case. See e.g., Wahl v. Carrier Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.1975). Where a trial is long and involves complex issues or where the Court requires proposed findings of fact from the parties, transcript costs are generally allowed. See Farmer, 379 U.S. at 233, 85 S.Ct. at 415; National Bancard Corp. v. VISA, U.S.A.. Inc., 112 F.R.D. 62, 64 (S.D.Fla.1986); Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 547 F.Supp. 348, 352 (E.D.Mich.1982).
In this case, I find that it is appropriate to tax costs associated with obtaining a trial transcript. The trial in this case was lengthy and fragmented. The issues involved were complex and the Court required the parties to submit proposed findings of fact. I find that the costs requested are reasonable and I will tax those costs to the defendants.
II. First Supplemental Application
In reviewing plaintiffs' first supplemental application for attorneys' fees and expenses, I followed the same methodology described above. With regard to the expenses claimed, I have excised expenses for expert witness fees. I have also excised expenses claimed by Ms. Aiyetoro for the period of time between August 19, 1988 and August 29, 1988. I could find no services performed by Ms. Aiyetoro in Knop on those dates, and the dates coincide with a compliance hearing on medical and mental health care issues in United States v. Michigan. I find that these services are unrelated to the claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed and that the expenses claimed are not compensable.
I reviewed the attorneys' billing records and found relatively few hours which merited excision. I have deducted two hours from Ms. Alexander's claim for time spent on April 7, 1988 preparing for overcrowding depositions. I believe those depositions were unrelated to the successful claims. Ms. Aiyetoro's hours and Mr. Lopez's hours will be fully compensated. I have also deducted 1.4 hours from the time claimed by law student interns on June 592 10, 1988. These hours were spent responding to an inquiry about urine testing, a subject *592 which I believe to be unrelated to the prevailing claims.
With these exceptions, the first supplemental application will be granted at the hourly rates requested by plaintiffs' counsel.[10] For the reasons outlined in my opinion on the amended application, a multiplier of 1.3 will be applied to hours spent working on the merits of this case. No multiplier will be applied to hours spent working on the fee petition itself.
III. Second Supplemental Application
In their second supplemental application, plaintiffs' counsel seek attorneys fees for time expended on the fee litigation itself. Counsel are entitled to reasonable attorneys fees for litigation associated with the fee petition. Northcross, 611 F.2d at 631. Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). Where necessary, fee petitioners may hire outside counsel to represent them in fee litigation. The outside counsel may also recover reasonable attorneys fees. Jonas v. Stack, 758 F.2d 567, 569 (11th Cir.1985); Grendel's Den Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 958 (1st Cir.1984). Plaintiffs' counsel retained the law firm of Jenner & Block to represent them in this fee petition. Given the extensive discovery conducted by both sides on the fee petition and the vigor with which defendants have litigated this issue, I find that the retention of outside counsel was reasonably necessary. Jenner & Block is entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee.
As I have with the other aspects of this fee petition, I extensively reviewed the billing records and expenses claimed by Jenner & Block. I find that their fee petition is adequately documented, based upon contemporaneous time records, and supported by affidavits from the attorneys and paralegals seeking fees.
The hours spent on the fee petition litigation were reasonable. In reviewing counsel's billing records, I noted that fee counsel spent approximately 18% of their time (primarily that of Theresa Chmara) doing legal research and

reviewing the underlying litigation with plaintiffs' counsel. The majority of the briefing that occurred on this fee petition was accomplished by plaintiffs' counsel rather than by fee counsel. The plaintiffs' counsel prepared the initial and amended petition for fees, the reply brief to defendants' objections and the response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. Fee counsel prepared a relatively lengthy pre-hearing memorandum and a brief memorandum in support of their second supplemental application for fees. At first blush, it would appear that the hours spent on legal research were excessive or duplicative hours spent by the plaintiffs' counsel. On the other hand, it is obvious that fee counsel must do legal research to adequately represent their client's interests. The parties engaged in substantial discovery on the fee petition and fee counsel represented plaintiffs' counsel at the hearing on the fee petition. Legal research and an extensive review of the underlying litigation were necessary in order to appropriately conduct these activities. Not all legal research results in documents for the Court's consideration. I note further that fee counsel volunteered to submit a post-hearing brief, a request which the Court declined. I find, therefore, that the hours spent on research and review were reasonably necessary.
I find that the hours spent on other tasks, such as reviewing defendants' objections to the fee petition and engaging in discovery were reasonably spent. It was necessary for fee counsel to engage in this work primarily because defendants vigorously objected to the fee petition. Defendants' objections were lengthy and specific. Fee counsel was required to spend a great deal of time preparing their response to these objections. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed. 2d 466 (1986). I find, therefore, that the hours claimed by fee counsel are reasonable and will award fees for the hours sought.
593 *593 The hourly rates sought by fee counsel are reasonable. Fee counsel requests fees at hourly rates ranging from $220 per hour to $55 per hour. These rates are higher than the rates sought by plaintiffs' counsel. However, Jenner & Block is a major law firm, with offices in Washington, D.C., among other cities, and the hourly rates sought are the rates charged by these lawyers for their work with other clients. See Declaration of Bruce J. Ennis at 4. In Louisville Black Police Officers, 700 F.2d at 277, the Sixth Circuit noted:
This is not a case in which a private out-of-town practicing attorney has been called in to try a case. In such a situation, the court would be justified in looking to his or her standard rate in the community where that attorney normally practices as a reflection of that attorney's training, background, expertise and skill.
The declarations of fee counsel adequately document their unique expertise and skill, as well as the fact that the hourly rates sought are those charged to paying clients in the Washington, D.C. area. See also Declaration of William A. Bradford, PX 4 at 3 (indicating reasonable Washington, D.C. hourly rates). I will award fee counsel fees at the hourly rates sought.
Fee counsel have established to my satisfaction that the fees sought for paralegal and librarian assistance would normally be billed separately to paying clients, and are not included in the firm's overhead. See Declaration of Chandanie Botejue; PX 4 at 4 (indicating that Washington, D.C. firms bill paralegals to clients, and do not charge their time to overhead). These fees will also be allowed.
Finally, I find that the expenses sought by fee counsel are reasonable and appropriate. Fee counsel seek reimbursement for expenses such as postage, transportation, long distance telephone calls, special messenger services and photocopying. I am satisfied that these are the type of expenses which would normally be billed to paying clients and that the expenses were reasonably necessary to the litigation. I will, therefore, reimburse fee counsel for the expenses claimed.

TABLE 1

Amended Application Attorney's Fees

Attorney

Hours

Fee

Elizabeth Alexander

In court ($190/hour) Out of court ($150/hour)
0907 10% partial success 0907 2% excess/duplication Travel ($80/hour)
Total
Adjoa Aiyetoro In court ($160/hour) 0907 25% partial success Out of court ($125/hour) 0907 40% partial success 0907 2% excess/duplication
Travel ($75/hour)
Total
Patricia Streeter All hours ($110/hour) 0907 5% partial success

594 *594

Attorney

Patricia Streeter Total

Nkechi Taifa-Caldwell In court ($90/hour) Out of court ($75/hour) 0907 12% partial success Travel ($50/hour)

Total

Mary McClymont In court ($150/hour) 0907 50% partial success Out of court ($125/hour) 0907 20% partial success Travel ($75/hour)

Total

Edward Koren Out of court ($150/hour) 0907 5% partial success
Total

Alexa Freeman Out of court ($100/hour)
Total

334.60 2,293.35 2,064.02 2,022.74
321.25
218.35 163.77 1,434.00 860.40 843.20 129.95
896.30 851.49

$ 63,574.00
303,411.00 25,700.00
____________ $392,685.00
$ 26,203.20
105,400.00 9,746.25
____________ $141,349.45

Hours
150.70 1,001.80
881.59 46.70
18.00 9.00
75.90 60.72 16.00
56.75 53.92
23.40

Fee
$ 93,663.90
$ 13,563.00 66,119.25 2,335.00
____________ $ 82,017.25
$ 1,350.00 7,590.00 1,200.00
____________ $ 10,140.00
$ 8,088.00
$ 2,340.00

Urvashi Vaid Out of court ($90/hour)
Total
Daniel Manville Out of court ($65/hour) 0907 10% partial success Travel ($30/hour)
Total
Rhonda Lipkin Out of court ($50/hour) 0907 33% partial success Travel ($30/hour)
Total
Law Clerks Out of court ($50/hour) 0907 18% partial success Travel ($25/hour)
Total
Law Student Interns Out of court ($25/hour) 0907 30% partial success
Total
Sharon Goretsky Out of court ($45/hour)

20.30
1,732.15 1,558.94
207.55
671.85 450.14
44.35
652.80 535.30
15.50
622.20 435.54
27.50

$ 1,827.00
$101,331.10 6,226.50
____________ $107,557.60
$ 22,507.00 1,330.50
____________ $ 23,837.50
$ 26,765.00 387.50
____________ $ 27,152.50
$ 10,888.50

595 *595

Attorney

Hours

Sharon Goretsky 0907 30% partial success
Total

19.25

Julia Case Out of court ($60/hour)
Total

21.65

Total Attorneys' Fees

Multiplier (1.3)

Witness

Witness Fees Item

Christensen

Fee

$

886.25

$ 1,299.00 $ 903,731.95 $1,174,851.54
Fee

Dep. 4-7-86 Trial 6-3-86 Trial 6-4-86 Trial 6-5-86
Total Wilber Trial 6-5-86 Trial 8-4-85 Trial 8-5-85 Hearing 3-3-88
Hearing 3-4-88
Total McManus Hearing 3-3-88
Total Duel Dep. 4-2-86 Trial 8-5-86 Trial 8-6-86
Total
596 *596 Witness
Rundel Trial 10-22-86

Witness fee Witness fee Food Witness fee Food Witness fee Food Hotel
Witness fee Food Witness fee Food Witness fee Food Witness fee Food Food Food Hotel Witness fee Food Mileage
Witness fee Air fare Parking Food Taxi
Witness fee Witness fee Witness fee Mileage
Item
Witness fee Air fare Food

$ 30.00 30.00 29.00 30.00 17.60 30.00 3.31
498.76 ________
$668.67
$ 30.00 17.60 30.00 5.00 30.00 3.75 30.00 32.79 5.25 15.65 87.48 30.00 4.00 58.50
________ $380.02
$ 30.00 398.00 21.50 20.00 8.00
________ $477.50
$ 30.00 30.00 30.00 95.25
_________ $185.25
Fee
$ 30.00 560.00 16.57

Total

_______ $606.57

Chapman Dep. 5-9-86 Trial 8-6-86 Dep. 11-5-85
Total

Witness fee Air fare Food Ground transportation Witness fee Air fare Hotel Food Witness fee Air fare Hotel Ground transportation

$ 30.00 165.00 3.43 16.00 30.00 408.00 102.45 14.27 60.00 150.00 139.34 70.00
_________ $1,188.49

Lay Witness Expenses Trial 8-13-86 Trial 10-20-86
Total

$ 95.97 61.10 28.40
_________ $ 185.47

Total Witnesses Expenses

$3,691.97

Disallowed Expenses Other Than Witness Fees & Expenses No services recorded

Date 9-16-85 and 9-17-85 6-05-85 and 6-06-85 9-12-85 10-14-85 10-15-85 10-16-85 10-21-85 10-27-85 10-19-85 to 11-01-85 11-12-85 and 11-13-85 11-14-85 to 11-17-85 11-18-85

Attorney
Manville
Aiyetoro Taifa Taifa Taifa Taifa Taifa Taifa
Taifa
Taifa
Taifa

Expense
$ 371.73
236.15 281.48 928.47
7.45 13.00 690.00 841.64
767.41
485.39
516.68

to 11-19-85

Taifa

145.48

597 *597

Date

Attorney

11-20-85

to

11-23-85

Aiyetoro

(excessive, reduced by one-half)

12-04-85

to

12-07-85

Taifa

12-16-85

to

12-18-85

Taifa

Total

Expense
$290.00
595.93
777.62 __________
$6,948.43

10-16-85 10-25-88
Total

Duplicate Billings Alexander/Manville Manville

$ 61.00 271.00
_________ $ 332.00

8-28-86

Miscellaneous Manville (medicine for prisoner)

$ 4.99

Expenses Claimed Less Disallowed Expert Expenses Less Disallowed Attorney Expenses
Witness Fees
Total Allowable Expenses and Costs

$285,392.66 108,177.04 7,285.42
____________ $169,930.20 3,691.97
____________
$173,622.17

TABLE 2

First Supplemental Application Attorneys' Fees0907Merits

Attorney

Hours

Fee

Elizabeth Alexander Out of court ($150/hour)

34.50

$ 5,175.00

Adjoa Aiyetoro In court ($160/hour) Out of court ($125/hour) Travel ($75/hour)
Total

1.50 51.00
6.70

240.00 6,375.00
502.50 __________ $ 7,117.50

Law Student Interns Out of court ($25/hour)
Total Hours Multiplier (1.3)
Expenses
Disallowed Expenses Expert Fees Aiyetoro Travel (8-19 to 8-28-88)
Total

43.90 137.60

$ 1,097.50 $13,390.00 $17,407.00
$ 2,109.00 1,007.37
__________ $ 3,116.37

598 *598
Expenses Claimed Less Disallowed Expenses
Allowed Expenses

Expenses

$ 6,709.14 3,116.37
__________ $ 3,592.77

Fees-Fee Petition

Elizabeth Alexander Out of court ($150/hour)

12.50

$ 1,875.00

Adjoa Aiyetoro In court ($160/hour) Out of court ($125/hour) Travel ($75/hour)
Total

1.00 22.90
2.71

160.00 2,862.50
203.25 __________ $ 3,225.75

Mark Lopez Out of court ($75/hour)

50.20

$ 3,765.00

Law Clerks Out of court ($50/hour)

16.00

$ 800.00

Law Student Interns Out of court ($25/hour)
Total

72.80

$ 1,820.00 $11,485.75

Total Attorneys' Fees Total Expenses
GRAND TOTAL

$28,892.75 3,592.77
___________ $32,485.52

TABLE 3

Second Supplemental Application Attorney Fees

Attorney Bruce J. Ennis
($220/hour) David W. Ogden
($165/hour) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
($140/hour) Mark D. Schneider
($140/hour) Theresa Chmara
($90/hour) Chandanie Botejue
($70/hour) Mary C. Nally
($65/hour) Paul Cane
($65/hour) Vivek Jain
($55/hour) Rosalie Gerber
($70/hour)
Total

Hours 89.00
.50 201.00
37.50 433.75
7.50 41.75
4.0 1.0 2.5 818.50

Fee $19,580.00
82.50 28,140.00
5,250.00 39,037.50
525.00 2,713.75
260.00 55.00
175.00 ___________
$95,818.75

599 *599
Total Expenses GRAND TOTAL

Expenses

$7,228.30 $103,047.05

TABLE 4

Total Attorneys' Fees Amended Application First Supplemental Application Second Supplemental Application
Total

$1,174,851.54 28,892.75 95,818.75
______________ $1,299,563.04

Total Expenses Amended Application First Supplemental Application Second Supplemental Application
Total

$173,622.17 3,592.77 7,228.30
____________ $184,443.24

GRAND TOTAL

$1,484,006.28

ORDER

In accordance with the opinion entered April 5, 1989;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Amended Application for Attorneys' Fees, Plaintiffs' Supplemental Application for Attorneys' Fees and Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Application for Attorneys' Fees are GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall pay to Plaintiffs' counsel the sum of $1,484,006.28 in attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
[1] The product of reasonable hours and hourly rates is generally referred to as the "lodestar" figure.
[2] See, Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Application for Attorneys Fees and Costs, Exhibits A-G; Defendants Exhibits 6-17.
[3] See Table 1, infra.
[4] I have often commented on the proofreading skills exhibited by defense counsel in this matter. See e.g., Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 512, 520 n. 1 (W.D.Mich.1987). Apparently impervious to constructive criticism, the defendants' objections to plaintiffs' petition for fees show typographical errors on virtually every page, and the Court's copy of that document contained only the odd-numbered pages. (Fortunately, by digging through the Clerk of the Court files, I found the even-numbered pages.)
[5] Perhaps the defendants' attorneys are not used to working such lengthy hours. I do not know how many hours most Assistant Attorneys General work each week, but I do know that working hours in my chambers exceed 50 hours a week as a general rule, and often total between 60 and 80 hours per week during trial terms.
[6] In this regard, Ms. Streeter is a welcome exception to the rule.
[7] This ruling obviates the need to determine whether any reduction in plaintiffs' expert witness expenses is required to account for plaintiffs' partial success on their race claims.
[8] See Table 1, infra.
[9] The excluded expenses are itemized in Table 1, infra.
[10] See Table 2, infra.
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 Knop v. Johnson, 841 F.2d 1126 (1988)
841 F.2d 1126 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat
Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, Kerwin Cook, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees, v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John Prelesnik, Jack Bergman, Defendants-Appellees CrossAppellants.
Nos. 88-1118, 88-1119. | March 7, 1988.
W.D.Mich., 667 F.Supp. 467.
DISMISSED.
Before ENGEL, MERRITT and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
ORDER
*1 Defendants-appellees move to stay the district court’s order of August 10, 1987 which directed them to prepare a plan remedying certain constitutional deficiencies in the operation of the four Michigan prisons and enjoined them to provide inmates with constitutionally adequate winter

clothing. Defendants claim that the portions of the order involving access to toilet and lavatory facilities at the Riverside Correctional Facility, access to state and federal courts, and race discrimination in the form of racial slurs involve significant expense and administrative burden to remedy and should be stayed pending appeal. Defendants do not seek to stay the portions of the order involving inmate access to legal mail and the injunction to provide adequate clothing. The plaintiffs-appellants oppose the motion.
The district court denied a stay pending appeal, correctly questioning the appealability of its order which, with the exception of the clothing directive, only requires defendants to prepare a plan. This court has consistently rejected attempts to review orders requiring the submission of remedial plans. Groseclose v. Dutton, 788 F.2d 356, 359 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam). See Bradley v. Milliken, 468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972), Reed v. Rhodes, 549 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.1976).
Furthermore, while the requirement to provide inmates with adequate winter clothing is appealable as an injunction, we do not find that it might have a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,” and that it can be “effectively challenged” only by immediate appeal. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981); Bradley v. Milliken, 772 F.2d 266, 270-71 (6th Cir.1985). Accordingly,
It is ORDERED that this appeal is dismissed sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction and the motion for a stay pending appeal is dismissed as moot.
Parallel Citations
1988 WL 18764 (C.A.6 (Mich.))
	  

1

 
 Knop v. Johnson, 848 F.2d 191 (1988)
848 F.2d 191 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Gary KNOP, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat
Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similary Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale
Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John Prelesnek, and Jack Bergman, Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 87-2016. | May 20, 1988.
W.D.Mich., 667 F.Supp. 512.
DISMISSED.
Before NATHANIEL R. JONES, WELLFORD and ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
ORDER
*1 This matter is before the court upon consideration of the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss and the defendants’ response.
A review of the record indicates that on August 20, 1987,

the district court filed an order imposing sanctions against the defendants and their counsel. A notice of appeal from that order was filed by the defendants.
Sanction orders are not final orders appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 but may be appealable if they fit within the various statutory and jurisdictional exceptions to the final judgment rule such as the “collateral order” exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (exceptions noted therein), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1979 (1987). The appeal taken by the defendants does not fit within the “collateral order” exception or any other exception to the final judgment rule.
Counsel for defendants argue on appeal that the portion of the sanction order as it applies to them is immediately appealable and this court has jurisdiction to review their appeal. A review of the district court record reveals that the notice of appeal indicated that defendants were appealing but no mention was made of counsel’s intent to appeal from the sanction order as it applies to them. Such a notice of appeal is insufficient to make counsel appellants to this appeal. See Life Time Doors, Inc. v. Walled Lake Door Co., 505 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir.1974); Van Hoose v. Edison, 450 F.2d 746 (6th Cir.1971); Cook & Sons Equip., Inc. v. Killen, 277 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.1960). Because counsel did not appeal the sanction order, this court does not get to the question of whether the sanction order as it applies to counsel was immediately appealable.
It is ORDERED that the motion to dismiss be granted and the appeal be and hereby is dismissed. Rule 8, Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
Parallel Citations
1988 WL 50177 (C.A.6 (Mich.))
	  

1

 
 Knop v. McGinnis, 507 U.S. 973 (1993)

113 S.Ct. 1415 Supreme Court of the United States
Gary KNOP, et al., petitioners, v.
Kenneth L. McGINNIS, et al.
No. 92-1202. | March 8, 1993
Opinion
Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636; Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.Supp. 259; 977 F.2d 996.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Denied.
Parallel Citations 113 S.Ct. 1415 (Mem), 122 L.Ed.2d 786, 61 USLW 3620, 61 USLW 3615, 61 USLW 3523
	  

1