UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

Allaeddin K. Qandah and Samuel J. Howard,

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individually and on behalf of others

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similarly situated,

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)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

George A. Lombardi, in his official capacity as )

Director of the Missouri Department of )

Corrections,

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)

Defendant.

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2:12-cv-4213

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR PROSPECTIVE RELIEF INTRODUCTION
1. It appears that on August 7, 2012, a majority of the Missouri voters cast a

ballot in favor of Amendment 2, which will amend Article I, § 5 of the Constitution of 1945 of

the State of Missouri. If enforced after taking effect on or about September 6, 2012, the

amendment will take from all prisoners the additional protection of religious liberty that

Missouri’s constitutions has provided, until now, to all persons since 1820.

2. Because Amendment 2 withdraws an existing right or benefit from one group,

but not others, without a legitimate reason, the provision of Amendment 2 that would limit

prisoners (and only prisoners) to rights afforded by federal law violates the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. Because Amendment 2’s withdrawal from prisoners of existing state

constitutional protection of religious liberty has a principal or primary effect of inhibiting

religion, it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as incorporated by the

Fourteenth Amendment.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over Plaintiffs’ claims of a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution under color of state law. 5. In addition, this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Plaintiffs’ civil action arising under the Constitution of the United States. 6. In addition, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. 7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and L.R. 3.1 (b)(1) because Defendant resides in Cole County and carries out the official duties that give rise to Plaintiffs’ claims for relief in Cole County.
PARTIES 8. Plaintiff Allaeddin K. Qandah is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, who is prisoner of the State of Missouri in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. 9. Plaintiff Samuel J. Howard is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, who is prisoner of the State of Missouri in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. 10. Defendant, George A. Lombardi, is the Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections, in which capacity he is responsible for overseeing the enforcement and implementation of laws, including the state and federal constitutions, within the Missouri Department of Corrections, as well as the creation and implantation of policies for the Missouri
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Department of Corrections. The Missouri Department of Corrections operates twenty-one institutions, including Algoa Correctional Center and Jefferson City Correctional Center in Cole County. Lombardi carries out his duties as Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections primarily from his office located in Cole County.
11. Defendant is sued solely in his official capacity. 12. Defendant’s actions in implementing and enforcing Amendment 2 are taken under color of state law.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 13. The Named Plaintiffs are members of a class of current and future prisoners confined in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. 14. The total number of persons currently imprisoned in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections is approximately 30,000; thus, the number of individuals in the class of current and future prisoners confined in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections is so numerous that joinder of all members of the class would be impracticable. 15. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the claims of the class, including legal questions of whether Amendment 2 impermissibly infringes on class members’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; whether Amendment 2’s withdraw from prisoners of the additional protections for religious liberty afforded by the state constitution serves a legitimate purpose; and whether Amendment 2’s withdraw from prisoners of the additional protections for religious liberty afforded by the state constitution has a principal or primary effect of inhibiting religion. 16. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class.
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17. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 18. The challenged provision of Amendment 2 and Defendant’s obligation to enforce the challenged provision are generally applicable to the class, making appropriate the grant of relief to the class as a whole.
FACTS 19. Beginning with its first Constitution in 1820, Missouri has provided additional protections of religious liberty beyond those secured by federal law. 20. In 1820, a year before statehood, Missouri adopted its first constitution. 21. Article XIII, § 4 of the Constitution of 1820 of the State of Missouri provided:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can be compelled to erect, support, or attend any place of worship, or to maintain any minister of the gospel, or teacher of religion; that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience; that no person can ever be hurt, molested, or restrained in his religious profession or sentiments, if he do not disturb others in their religious worship. 22. In 1865, at the end of the Civil War, Missouri adopted a new constitution. 23. Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of 1865 of the State of Missouri provided: That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no person can, on account of his religious opinions, be rendered ineligible to any office of trust or profit under this State,
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nor be disqualified from testifying, or from .serving as a juror; that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience; that no person ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion or profession; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of this State, or with the rights of others. 24. Missouri’s third constitution, the Constitution of 1875 of the State of Missouri, retained the identical language of Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of 1865 of the State of Missouri; however, the provision was placed as Article II, § 5 of the Constitution of 1875 of the State of Missouri. 25. Missouri adopted its fourth, and current, Constitution in 1945. 26. Prior to Amendment 2, Article I, § 5 of the Constitution of 1945 of the State of Missouri provided: That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience; that no person shall, on account of his religious persuasion or belief, be rendered ineligible to any public office or trust or profit in this state, be disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror, or be molested in his person or estate; but this section shall not be construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor
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to justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with the rights of others. 27. At all times since 1820 until the passage of Amendment 2, the Constitution of Missouri has been more protective of an individual right to religious liberty and expression than federal law. 28. Prior to Amendment 2, “the religious freedom provisions of the Missouri Constitution [we]re broader than those of the First Amendment[.]” Perry v. Johnston, 641 F.3d 953, 956-57 (8th Cir. 2011)(citing Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997)). 29. At all times since 1820 until the passage of Amendment 2, the religious freedom provisions of the various Missouri constitutions have applied to all individuals, including prisoners. 30. Plaintiff Howard has sought and obtained an accommodation of his religious beliefs, including through the grievance process and by bringing a suit under the First Amendment and Article I, § 5, in settlement of which he secured a religious accommodation. 31. The Constitution of 1945 of the State of Missouri provides mechanisms for amendment of the constitution by initiative petition or by initiative referred to the voters by the General Assembly. 32. Since the adoption of the current constitution in 1945, it has been amended more than 200 times by popular vote following either referral by the legislature or a petition by voters to place a proposed amendment on the ballot. 33. Prior to Amendment 2, Article I, § 5 of the Constitution of 1945 of the State of Missouri had never been amended.
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34. Mike McGhee, in his capacity as a state representative, sponsored House Joint Resolution 2 in the First Regular Session of the Ninety-Sixth General Assembly.
35. McGhee’s resolution referred Amendment 2 to the voters. 36. Amendment 2 will cause Article I, § 5 of the Constitution of 1945 of the State of Missouri to read:
That all men and women have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience; that no person shall, on account of his or her religious persuasion or belief, be rendered ineligible to any public office or trust or profit in this state, be disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror, or be molested in his or her person or estate; that to secure a citizen's right to acknowledge Almighty God according to the dictates of his or her own conscience, neither the state nor any of its political subdivisions shall establish any official religion, nor shall a citizen's right to pray or express his or her religious beliefs be infringed; that the state shall not coerce any person to participate in any prayer or other religious activity, but shall ensure that any person shall have the right to pray individually or corporately in a private or public setting so long as such prayer does not result in disturbance of the peace or disruption of a public meeting or assembly; that citizens as well as elected officials and employees of the state of Missouri and its
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political subdivisions shall have the right to pray on government premises and public property so long as such prayers abide within the same parameters placed upon any other free speech under similar circumstances; that the General Assembly and the governing bodies of political subdivisions may extend to ministers, clergypersons, and other individuals the privilege to offer invocations or other prayers at meetings or sessions of the General Assembly or governing bodies; that students may express their beliefs about religion in written and oral assignments free from discrimination based on the religious content of their work; that no student shall be compelled to perform or participate in academic assignments or educational presentations that violate his or her religious beliefs; that the state shall ensure public school students their right to free exercise of religious expression without interference, as long as such prayer or other expression is private and voluntary, whether individually or corporately, and in a manner that is not disruptive and as long as such prayers or expressions abide within the same parameters placed upon any other free speech under similar circumstances; and, to emphasize the right to free exercise of religious expression, that all free public schools receiving state appropriations shall display, in a conspicuous and legible manner, the text of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States; but this section shall not be
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construed to expand the rights of prisoners in state or local custody beyond those afforded by the laws of the United States, excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with the rights of others. 37. The initiative was placed on the ballot for the August 7, 2012, election. 38. It appears that a majority of those casting a vote regarding the adoption of Amendment 2 have voted in favor of adopting Amendment 2. 39. Subsequent to the election, the Secretary of State will convene the board of state canvassers to total the votes and certify the results of the election. 40. In cases where the majority votes in favor of a proposed constitutional amendment, the amendment goes into effect 30 days after the election. 41. Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class will be chilled in their religious expression if deprived of the broader protection of religious liberty afforded by the Missouri Constitution because, without the further layer of security for religious liberty, they fear lesser protection of their rights. 42. The withdrawal from Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class of the broader protection of religious liberty afforded by the Missouri Constitution inhibits their practice and exercise of religion and religious expression. 43. Plaintiffs are further harmed because Amendment 2 imposes a barrier that makes it more difficult for prisoners, as a group, to obtain the benefit of the Missouri Constitution’s safeguards of religious liberty, than for other groups.
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44. Plaintiffs are further harmed because Amendment 2 stigmatizes prisoners, a disfavored group, as innately inferior and, therefore, less worthy of the protection of the Missouri Constitution.
45. In addition, Plaintiffs are harmed in that Amendment 2 perpetuates archaic and stereotypic notions of prisoners, a disfavored group, as inferior and less worthy of the protection of the Missouri Constitution.
46. In this case, Plaintiffs challenge only the following provision inserted by Amendment 2: “but this section shall not be construed to expand the rights of prisoners in state or local custody beyond those afforded by the laws of the United States[.]”
47. The challenged provision is severable and may be enjoined or stricken without affecting any other portion of Article I, § 5 of the Constitution of 1945 of the State of Missouri.
48. In the alternative, the challenged provision is not severable because it is interrelated to the remaining portions of Amendment 2 and Amendment 2 does not contain a severability clause.
49. The challenged provision does not rationally or actually advance a neutral and legitimate government interest.
50. Plaintiffs have no alternate means of exercising the rights withdrawn by the challenged provision.
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COUNT I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Equal Protection Clause 51. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 52. The challenged provision withdraws an existing right or benefit from one group—prisoners—but from no other individuals. 53. Prisoners are a politically unpopular group. 54. The challenged provision, without a legitimate reason, withdraws from prisoners an existing right or benefit. 55. The General Assembly does not possess expert judgment about legitimate penological objectives or how to achieve them. 56. As a group, the voters who cast ballots in favor of Amendment 2 do not possess expert judgment about legitimate penological objective or how to achieve them.
COUNT II 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Establishment Clause 57. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 58. The challenged provision has the principal or primary effect of inhibiting religion among prisoners in Missouri.
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WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray this Court:

A.

Upon proper motion, certify a Plaintiff Class;

B.

Upon proper motion, issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary

injunction, or both;

C.

Enter declaratory judgment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the

challenged provision of Amendment 2 is unconstitutional;

D.

Permanently enjoin enforcement or implementation of Amendment 2 or

the challenged provision of Amendment 2;

E.

Award Plaintiffs costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1988 or any other applicable law;

F.

Allow to Plaintiff such other and further relief as is just and proper under

the circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert ANTHONY E. ROTHERT, #44827 GRANT R. DOTY, #60788 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF EASTERN MISSOURI 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, Missouri 63108 Telephone: (314) 652-3114 Facsimile: (314) 652-3112 tony@aclu-em.org grant@aclu-em.org
ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI CENTRAL DIVISION

Allaeddin K. Qandah, et.al., Plaintiffs, v.
George A. Lombardi, Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) C ase No. 12-04213-CV-C-HFS ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Two prisoners in Missouri penal institutions seek class action protection against changes in the Missouri Constitution, adopted by the voters last August, t hat allegedly take from all prisoners unspecified protections of religious liberty, available since Statehood, that allegedly exceed the Federal First Amendment religious rights of such prisoners. A motion to dismiss has been filed, asserting failure to exhaust grievances, and also contending that there is no specific exercise of religious liberty identified in the complaint as endangered, and the case is therefore a moot dispute over abstract, hypothetical concepts, unripe for judicial resolution. I reject the state’s first contention, but agree with the second, and will therefore dismiss.
The voters were not informed that the proposed amendment relates to prisoner rights. The ballot language, as recited in State Court litigation challenging the sufficiency of the summary, said the proposal would simply “ensure that the right of Missouri citizens to express their religious beliefs shall not be infringed” and also that “school children have the right to pray and acknowledge God voluntarily in their schools.” Coburn v. M ayer, 368 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Mo. App. 2012). T he amendment i tself w as a long and wordy general recitation of religious rights, but also provided that “this section shall not be construed to expand the rights of prisoners in state or local custody beyond those afforded by the laws of the United States.” Id. 1

1The ballot description was sustained by the Missouri court as sufficient, a decision apparently somewhat driven by the legislative requirement of a fifty-word limit on such

The limitation of prisoner rights to those deemed granted by the First Amendment is the target of this litigation. Plaintiffs rely on State and Federal rulings saying there is a divergence between the protected religious rights under M issouri and Federal law. T he Missouri rights have been referred to as “broader than those of the First Amendment.” Perry v. Johnston, 641 F.3d 953, 956 - 57 (8th Cir. 2011). In different language, but also noting divergence, the Missouri Supreme Court has concluded that Missouri’s religious clauses are “more restrictive” than the First Amendment. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. Banc 1997).2
I. Exhaustion
The State seeks dismissal of this suit because the prisoners have failed to exhaust the
grievance procedures under State Law, as generally required before filing a challenge. Plaintiffs
respond that they are not complaining of prison conditions, where exhaustion is required, but of
legislative action, where grievances are not permitted. I am satisfied that no successful grievance
challenging the constitutional amendment would be possible. Therefore, since exhaustion is only
required where relief by grievance is “available,” that ground for dismissal is unsupported. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e (a). No prison body would have “authority to provide any relief or take any
action whatsoever in response to a complaint” directed against the constitutional amendment. That is the test. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001). 3
descriptions. Id. at 326. 2Missouri’s restrictions traditionally tend to solidify the “wall” between church and state,
particularly in connection with the use of public funds in a manner assisting sectarian activities. See Paster v. T ussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Banc 1979) and cases cited.
3Of course I do not mean that a particular restriction on prisoners that violates the First Amendment or the Missouri Constitution could not be remedied by a grievance. No specific violation of current or preexisting rights is alleged, however, which gives defendant its right to dismissal under the second ground asserted in its motion. A specific complaint would presumably need to be processed under the grievance procedures.

II. M oot Questions
Defendant contends the controversy is not “ripe” for ruling on t he merits, in essence because prisoners are not seeking to engage in or be relieved from some program or challenging a condition where a result would occur if the unamended Missouri Constitution were to be followed that is more favorable to them than simply using the protections of the First Amendment. Defendant contends plaintiffs are thus asking me to deal in abstractions, issuing an advisory opinion rather than one dealing with a real legal controversy. In other words, it is contended that judges should await a state of facts where the grievance procedure might be used.
Plaintiffs do fail to specify either a particular program or condition that is involved in this case, or some instance where the amendment takes away a specific right. They rest on the theory that it h as already been ruled that the First Amendment is less favorable to contestants than the unamended Missouri Constitution which restricts them to First Amendment rights, and that the naming of prisoners as a disadvantaged class in the amendment suffices to entitle them to relief. I disagree on both aspects of the contention.
The Coburn ruling of last June, which the parties do not cite, even though plaintiffs’ counsel were counsel in that case, refers to a contention that the amendment “will repeal prisoners’ rights for religious expression” (368 S.W.3d at 323), and that this significant change in law is not disclosed to voters in the ballot description. Judge Hardwick responded for the appellate panel that the amendment “simply makes those rights coextensive with federal law,” and concluded it is “purely conjectural” that some extra right under the unamended Missouri Constitution would be affected. Id. a t 325. In footnote 3 s he adds the comment that plaintiffs “do not cite to any cases that have interpreted article I, section 5 [of the Missouri Constitution] to provide greater free exercise rights than those found in the First Amendment.”
The general statements that were made in Perry and Gibson about differences between the protection of the Missouri and Federal Constitutions were in cases dealing with subjects unrelated to prisoners’ rights. The only case I find where Missouri prisoners litigated in State Court on a religious rights claim treated Missouri law as being similar to Federal law. Adams

v. M oore, 861 S .W.2d 680 (Mo. App. 1993). Experience suggests that prisoners typically litigate about grooming standards, as in Adams, dietary issues, and organized prayer opportunities. P laintiffs do not offer any reason to suppose that the unamended Missouri Constitution would give them any greater benefits than they have under Federal law. Thus, no practical change in law can be supposed, and plaintiffs fail to suggest hypothetical situations where the results would be altered by the new amendment.
Plaintiffs fall back on a contention that they are entitled to relief from any invidious distinction in the language of the Missouri Constitution. Insofar as they deplore negative attitudes toward prisoner litigation, I acknowledge that something like special skepticism about such litigation is suggested as a motivating factor in the proviso written into the Constitutional amendment. Defendant accepts that challenge by asserting that “prisoner litigation is highly disfavored and costly . . .” (Doc. 12, p.4) I doubt this characterization appears so strongly in judicial statements. But Congress has likewise enacted special legislation having a “purpose of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation by instituting economic sanctions for prisoners wishing to file civil claims.” Ashley v. D ilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (dissent), citing Christiansen v. C larke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998). In Christiansen, it was observed that “because prisoners have excessive amounts of free time on their hands, they are more likely than paying plaintiffs to file meritless suits.” 147 F.3d at 658. See also the views expressed in Green v. M cKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986). Adverse stereotypes concerning prisoner litigation have not, however, been condemned as constitutionally vulnerable (although I would hope and expect that most judges would, as carefully and impartially as feasible, try to separate the wheat from the chaff).
Although special procedural rules for prisoner litigation have not been condemned, plaintiffs rely on t heir additional claim to pursue merely generalized rights, without discrimination as in Romer v. E vans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), where the imposition of a “special disability” upon those seeking gay and lesbian protective legislation was invalidated. W hile the rights there in question were somewhat generalized, the type of protection likely to be sought was sufficiently understood as to withstand inquiry on grounds of abstractness. In this case it

would seem that the sky is the limit, and the analyst cannot sufficiently characterize the rights to be claimed so as to allow meaningful determination of whether there is a realistic limitation imposed on pr isoners, comparing Federal and State law rights. Without a plausible claim of actual prejudice, justification becomes unnecessary.
For the reasons stated, I conclude that the motion to dismiss the complaint for mootness or lack of ripeness (Doc. 8) is sound, the motion will be granted, and the complaint dismissed. SO ORDERED.

February 25 , 2013 Kansas City, Missouri

/s/ Howard F. Sachs HOWARD F. SACHS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 U.S. District Court Western District of Missouri (Jefferson City) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:12−cv−04213−HFS

CLOSED

Qandah et al v. Lombardi Assigned to: District Judge Howard F. Sachs Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff Allaeddin K Qandah
Plaintiff Samuel J. Howard

Date Filed: 08/08/2012 Date Terminated: 02/25/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Grant R. Doty American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation−StL 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, MO 63108 (314) 669−3422 Fax: (314) 652−3112 Email: grant@aclu−em.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Rothert American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation−StL 454 Whittier Street St. Louis, MO 63108 (314) 669−3420 Fax: (314) 652−3112 Email: trothert@aclu−mo.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Grant R. Doty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Rothert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant George A. Lombardi

represented by Joanna L.W. Trachtenberg Missouri Attorney General's Office−JC P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65102 (573) 751−8869 Fax: (573) 751−9456 Email: joanna.trachtenberg@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/08/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against George A. Lombardi filed by Anthony E. Rothert on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $350, receipt number 0866−3191164. Service due by

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08/08/2012
08/09/2012 08/10/2012 08/10/2012 08/13/2012 08/24/2012 09/10/2012 09/10/2012 09/20/2012
09/21/2012
10/01/2012 10/09/2012 10/11/2012 10/15/2012

12/10/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/08/2012)
2 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER TRANSFERRING/REASSIGNING CASE to Judge Howard F. Sachs. Upon review, case was redrawn from Missouri Constitution judge deck. Case reassigned to District Judge Howard F. Sachs for all further proceedings. This is a TEXT ONLY ENTRY. No document is attached. (Russel, Jeri) (Entered: 08/08/2012)
SUMMONS ISSUED as to George A. Lombardi. (James, Carrie) (Entered: 08/09/2012)
3 MOTION to certify class filed by Anthony E. Rothert on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Suggestions in opposition/response due by 8/27/2012 unless otherwise directed by the court. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/10/2012)
4 SUGGESTIONS in support re 3 MOTION to certify class filed by Anthony E. Rothert on behalf of Plaintiffs Samuel J. Howard, Allaeddin K Qandah. (Related document(s) 3 ) (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/10/2012)
5 RETURN OF SERVICE of complaint executed by Allaeddin K Qandah, Samuel J. Howard. George A. Lombardi served on 8/13/2012, answer due 9/4/2012. (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
6 MOTION for extension of time to file response/reply as to 3 MOTION to certify class , 1 Complaint filed by Joanna L.W. Trachtenberg on behalf of George A. Lombardi. Suggestions in opposition/response due by 9/10/2012 unless otherwise directed by the court. (Related document(s) 3 , 1 ) (Trachtenberg, Joanna) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
7 SUGGESTIONS in opposition re 3 MOTION to certify class filed by Joanna L.W. Trachtenberg on behalf of Defendant George A. Lombardi. Reply suggestions due by 9/27/2012 unless otherwise directed by the court (Related document(s) 3 ) (Trachtenberg, Joanna) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
8 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Joanna L.W. Trachtenberg on behalf of George A. Lombardi. Suggestions in opposition/response due by 9/27/2012 unless otherwise directed by the court. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Trachtenberg, Joanna) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
9 Consent MOTION for extension of time to file response/reply as to 3 MOTION to certify class filed by Anthony E. Rothert on behalf of Samuel J. Howard, Allaeddin K Qandah. Suggestions in opposition/response due by 10/9/2012 unless otherwise directed by the court. (Related document(s) 3 ) (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
10 SUGGESTIONS in opposition re 8 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Anthony E. Rothert on behalf of Plaintiffs Samuel J. Howard, Allaeddin K Qandah. Reply suggestions due by 10/9/2012 unless otherwise directed by the court (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex, A)(Related document(s) 8 ) (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
11 REPLY SUGGESTIONS to motion re 3 MOTION to certify class filed by Anthony E. Rothert on behalf of Plaintiffs Samuel J. Howard, Allaeddin K Qandah. (Related document(s) 3 ) (Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
12 REPLY SUGGESTIONS to motion re 8 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Joanna L.W. Trachtenberg on behalf of Defendant George A. Lombardi. (Related document(s) 8 ) (Trachtenberg, Joanna) (Entered: 10/09/2012)
13 MOTION for leave to file surreply regarding defendant's motion to dismiss filed by Anthony E. Rothert on behalf of Samuel J. Howard, Allaeddin K Qandah. Suggestions in opposition/response due by 10/29/2012 unless otherwise directed by the court. (Attachments: # 1 proposed surreply)(Rothert, Anthony) (Entered: 10/11/2012)
14 ORDER granting 6 defendants motion for extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' complaint and plaintiffs' motion for class certification with retroactive effect. ORDER granting 9 plaintiffs' motion for extension of time. Plaintiffs are directed to file their reply on or before 10/11/12. Signed on 10/15/12 by District Judge Howard F. Sachs.

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02/25/2013 02/25/2013

(Duer, Tina) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
15 ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss for mootness or lack of ripeness and the complaint is dismissed. Signed on 02/25/13 by District Judge Howard F. Sachs. (Duer, Tina) (Entered: 02/25/2013)
16 CLERK'S JUDGMENT entered on February 25, 2013. (Duer, Tina) (Entered: 02/25/2013)

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