. ,

Case 2:06-cv-00233-ALM-TPK Document 2 Filed 03/27/2006 Page 1 of 6

\
06 MAR Z1 PM 2: \ S

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.

COMMISSION,

) )

g:06 CV 233

Plaintiff,

)

)

.Jt1DGI MARBLEY

v.

) )

-M-A--~--A~TJ-~l: ,T(TJ)GF: KEMP

HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC.

)

COMPLAINT

)

Defendant.

)

)

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of retaliation for protected opposition activity and to provide appropriate relief to Monica Ways, who was adversely affected by such practices. Defendant discharged Ways in retaliation for her opposition to discriminatory employment practices and she suffered resulting damages.

Case 2:06-cv-00233-ALM-TPK Document 2 Filed 03/27/2006 Page 2 of 6
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuantto Section 706(f)(1) and (3) ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a ("CRA of 1991"). 2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Honda of America Mfg., Inc. (the "Employer"), has continuously been an Ohio corporation for profit doing business in the State of Ohio and the City of Marysville, Ohio and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
2

Case 2:06-cv-00233-ALM-TPK Document 2 Filed 03/27/2006 Page 3 of 6
5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701 (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS Conditions Precedent
6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Monica Ways filed a Charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
Title VII Individual Claim 7. On or about April 14, 2004, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Marysville, Ohio facility in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-3(a). Such practices include Defendant's discharge of Monica Ways, in retaliation for her protected opposition activity after she protested racial discrimination in employment and she suffered resulting damages. 8. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 7 above, has been to deprive Monica Ways of equal employment opportunities, because of her protected opposition activity. 9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above, were intentional. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above, were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Monica Ways.
3

Case 2:06-cv-00233-ALM-TPK Document 2 Filed 03/27/2006 Page 4 of 6
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors and assigns, and all other persons in active concert or participation with it, from retaliating against Monica Ways and all other employees similarly situated, for their protected opposition activity, including without limitation, by discharging Ways, in retaliation for protesting racial discrimination in employment and from engaging in any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of retaliation. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which provide equal employment opportunities, terms, conditions and privileges of employment for employees who have opposed unlawful employment practices and which eradicate the effects of its past unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Monica Ways, by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to an offer to Ways of rightful place reinstatement or frontpay in lieu of reinstatement.
4

Case 2:06-cv-00233-ALM-TPK Document 2 Filed 03/27/2006 Page 5 of 6
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Monica Ways by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs 7-10 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Monica Ways by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraphs 7-10 above, including emotional upset and pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employerto make whole Monica Ways by providing punitive damages for its malicious or recklessly indifferent conduct described in paragraphs 7-10 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this Action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted, JAMES L. LEE DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL
5

Case 2:06-cv-00233-ALM-TPK Document 2 Filed 03/27/2006 Page 6 of 6
~~~~
(.U\CQUlNE H. MCNAIR Regional Attorney Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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Associate Regional Attorney LarryWatson@eeoc.gov (Email)
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0 . LAWRENCE MAYS (0038288) -
Supervisory Trial Attorney Lawrence.Mays@eeoc.gov(Email)
Jeffrey A. Stern (0020107) Senior Trial Attorney Jeffrey.Stern@eeoc.gov (Email) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION Cleveland Field Office The AJC Federal Office Building 1240 East 9th Street, Room 3001 Cleveland, Ohio 44199 (216) 522-7455 (Watson-Voice) (216) 522-4796 (Mays-Voice) (216) 522-7458 (Stern-Voice) (216) 522-7430 (Facsimile)
6

 
 FILED
TIME:_ _ _ __
JUl ~ 6 2!lC5
JAMES BONINI, Clerk COLUMBUS, OHIO

RECEIVED
JUN 1 22006
JAMES BONlNl, CLERK COLUMBUS, OHIO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO'

,

. WESTER,,! DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

I
Ii Equal Employment Opportunity
il Commission,

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Plaintiff,

!.

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Case No. 2:06CV233

Judge Marhley Magistrate Kemp

I

II -and-
II

:i Monica P. Ways,
,I 35 Invemess Court
[I Springboro, Ohio 45066
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II
II

·vs-

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Plaintiff·Intervener,

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'I,ll Honda of America Mfg, Inc" '. 24000 Honda Parkway
Ii Marysville, Ohio 43040-9251
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Plaintiff-Intervener's Verified Complaint for Money Damages With Jury Demand

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Defendant.

II
:1 For Service of Process Only on Honda

II of America Mfg., Inc.:

II Statutory Agent Corporation
,52 East Gay Street I,! Columbus, Ohio 43215
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff-Intervener Monica Ways brings this action to intervene so as to obtain full and complete relief and to redress the unlawful conduct andlor employment
practioes described herein.

'6

II

II 2

Plaintiff-Intervener seeks intervention in this action to recover damages against

\ . Defendant for state law claims, inclusive of federal claims, for race and gender

discrimination, disparate impact discrimination, retaliation, and creation of a hostile

work environment in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as

amended, 42 U.S.c. §2000e-5 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.c. §1981, and Ohio Revised

Code §§4112.02 and 4112.99. Plaintiff-Intervener also asserts the various state law

claims for Defendant's violation of Ohio law and public policy.

3. This action seeks monetary, declaratory, injunctive, punitive, and other equitable relief from discrimination and retaliation in employment and wrongful discharge against Plaintiff-Intervener on account of her race and gender and in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §1981, O.RC. §§4112.02 and 4112.99, and Ohio law and public policy.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This action is instituted and authorized by §706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. §2000e-et seq. and §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981(a).

Jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the claims is based on 28 U,S.C. §1331 (Federal Question) and 28 U.S.C. §1343 (Civil Rights). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff·Intervener's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §1367(a).

6. A declaratory judgment is sought pursuant to 28 U.S,c. §§2201 and 2202. A declaration on the state law claims is sought pursuant to O.R.C. §2721.02.

Intervention is proper, as a matter ofright, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §2000e-5(f)(1).

8. Venue is proper in this Court as all the acts complained of herein occurred in the State of Ohio, within the jurisdiction of this Court,

PARTms

\Plaintiff and Plaintiff·Intervener

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JWKll R. Gtt~R'" III & Al.sociaitS
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Pbon.; 9371225-3991 fax, 937 / 295-4719
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Plaintiff EEOC is an agency of the United States authorized to bring a civil action under Title VII including §706(f)(1) and §707 of the statute. 42 U.S.C. §2000e5(f)(1) and 6.
2

, :' "f 27

Plaintiff-Intervener Monica p, Ways ("Plaintiff-Intervener" or "Ms, Ways") is an African-American female citizen ofthe United States and a resident ofthe state of Ohio.

11. Ms. Ways was employed at Honda of America Mfg., Inc. ("HAM") from February

3,2003 through the termination of her employment on April 19, 2004.

I

12. Throughout her employment and at the time of her termination, Ms. Ways was

employed as the Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM in

Marysville, Ohio.

13. After being terminated from her employment by Defendant HAM, Plaintiff-

I

Intervener filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

14. The EEOC investigated Plaintiff-Intervener's charges.

IS. The EEOC fIled this action based on the charge of discrimination filed by PlaintiffIntervener.

16. Intervention is being timely sought and Plaintiff-Intervener, as an aggrieved person, has the right to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and §2000e-5 of Title VII.

Defendant

17. At all times material herein, Defendant HAM was and is an employer under 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(b) engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(h), and capable of being sued in this Court.

FACTS

18. On February 3, 2003, Ms. Ways began her employment as the Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM's corporate office location in Marysville, Ohio.

19. Honda manufactures automobiles, motorcycles, personal watercraft, and power products in the United States and sells them to American Honda, who in turn sells them to dealers.

Jam~ R. GRell!:, III & Ai;.oci3te<
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20.

HAM manufactures engines at the Anna Engine Plant, automobiles at the Marysville Automobile Plant and the East Liberty Plant, and motorcycles at the Marysville Motorcycle Plant.
3

In her role as Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics, Ms. Ways was recrnited for the primary function ofdeveloping strategies geared toward making HAM a more diverse, inclusive, and ethical organization.

22. Ms. Ways' duties included supervising the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") function, which was to audit personnel actions and processes, report diversity matters to federal agencies, and ensure that all HAM employees and job applicants were given equal opportunity for consideration in hiring, promotion, and development.

23. Ms. Ways was also responsible for managing a business tearn that consisted of Corporate Compliance and Ethics, Government Contracting and Equal Employment Opportunity as well as matrix responsibility for Supplier (Procurement) Diversity, and Staffing.

24. Over the COUl'se ofher fourteen months of employment at HAM, Ms. Ways diligently performed her duties despite the challenges she faced daily at HAM.

25. On her own initiative, in an effort to fully understand her role and function at HAM,
and consistent with Honda's practice and policies of "going to the spot," Ms. Ways
worked the production lines at the Anna Engine, East Liberty, and Marysville Auto
Plants and the Marysville Motorcycle Plant. During these visits, Ms. Ways talked Vlith the minority, female, as well as majority and male associates, to find out how
they perceived diversity at HAM.

26. To better understand Honda's corporate structure and American business, Ms. Ways also visited American Honda sales operations in Torrence, California, Honda Manufacturing ofAlabama ("HMA") in Lincoln, Alahama, and Honda South Carolina ("HSC") in Timmonsville, South Carolina.

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Ms. Ways was deeply motivated to understand all aspects of the company so she could better contribute to HAM's success by providing leadership to help the company become more diverse, inclusive, and ethical.
At all times during her employment at HAM, Ms. Ways was under the supervision ofRick Schostek, who held the positions ofVice President of Support Services and General Counsel as well as Compliance Officer, Secretary to the HAM Board of Directors, and Acting ChiefFinancial Officer.
For approximately the first nine months ofher employment at HAM, Ms. Ways observed that Mr. Schostek seemed engaged in and receptive of her ideas and approach for increasing diversity at HA'v1.

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30. From the beginning of her employment at HAM and for the next three to six months, Mr. Schostek had regular meetings with Ms. Ways, which later became group meetings that Mr. Schostek had with all senior managers reporting to him.
31. However, Mr. Schostek's attitude toward Ms. Ways changed after Ms. Ways began questioning various HAM employment and other business practices that were contrary to the diversity efforts she and her business team were attempting to implement.
32. Ms. Ways raised concerns with Mr. Schostek regarding HAM's minimalist approach andlor lack of compliance with federal guidelines for EEO.
33. Ms. Ways also pointed out that HAM was not acting in compliance consistent with the requirements for federal subcontractors as depicted by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program ("OFCCP").
34. Whenever she observed or became aware of conduct she considered being discriminatory, Ms. Ways did not hesitate to express her opposition.
35. Over the course of her employment at HAM, Ms. Ways became increasingly aware of the denial of equal job consideration, lack ofjob promotion, lack ofjob posting, and compliance issues particularly in areas of under-utilization.
36. When Ms. Ways became aware of qualified minority candidates who were not given full consideration during the hiring process, she advocated for them. For example, Ms. Ways intervened on behalf of a qualified African-American engineering applicant who was denied a position at HAM.
37. During HAM's Special Voluntary Retirement Opportunity ("SVRO"), Ms. Ways became aware that a committee of HAM executives and managers were meeting to hand pick employees to backfill positions vacated by the SVRO, also in direct violation of HAM's EEO policy. Ms. Ways communicated to Mr. Schostek the potential discrimination that could occur in this situation.
38. With regard to filling the positions vacated as result of the SVRO, Ms. Ways had discovered that HAM did not post all of the job openings and did not give equal or fair consideration to minority candidates. Specifically, Ms. Ways became aware of several key management positions available at HAM that were not posted, but were instead given to select employees in direct violation of HAM's EEO policy.

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II 39. Despite compiling the necessary research and supportive data for the various

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changes she and her business tcam tried to implement at HAM during her

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employment, Ms. Ways' EEO related proposals were repeatedly and systematically

delayed and stalled by Mr. Schostek., Timothy Garrett, the Vice President of

I!

Administration at HAM in Marysville, Ohio, and Lyon Dennison, currently Assistant Viee President and General Counsel at HAM.

I

I

40. Shortly after Ms. Ways and her business team began preparing HAM's Affirmative

Action Plans ("AAPs"), Ms. Ways had several meetings with Mr. Schostek, and some with Mr. Garrett.

I

4l. The purpose of these meetings was for Ms. Ways to express her concerns that Mr. Schostek and }.ofr. Garrett, along with Ms. Dennison, were intentionally frustrating

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Ms. Ways' efforts to create a more diverse, inclusive, and ethical environment at HAM.

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Ii 42.
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Ms. Ways also communicated her frustrations to Mr. Koki Hirashima ("Mr. Hirashirna"), the President and ChiefExecutive Officer ofHAM, and Mr. Tad Nagouchi ("Mr. Nagouchi"), HAM Senior Vice President for Support Services, and

I

I:

requested their assistance and support.

I

43. Mr. Hirashima had previously advised Ms. Ways that part ofher and her business team's responsibi.lities were to serve as a "check and audit" function for HAM.

I

i 44. Mr. Hirashima also informed Ms. Ways that he knew that he was not always told
the full truth abOut what was occurring at HAM.

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i 45. While developing HAM's AAPs, Ms. Ways and her business tcam worked with

1

HA..\1's outside counsel, Vorys, Sater, Seymour, & Pease ("VSSP''), LLP.

11 46. In their attempts to comply with federal guidelines and develop AAPs that were
affmnative and truthful, Ms. Ways and her business tcam encountered tremendous

I

resistance from Mr. Schostck, Mr. Garrett, Ms. Dennison, and each of their support

staff, along with HAM's outside counseL

I

I1147. Mr. Schostek, Mr. Garrett, Ms. Dermison, and each of their support staff all

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attempted to thwart Ms. Ways and her business team's efforts to develop the AAPs by trying to redirect their attention to less important matters and ignore Ms. Ways

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and her business team's requests for information.

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Mr. Schostek, Mr. Garrett, Ms. Dermison, and their support staff took the position with Ms. Ways and her business team that HAM's employment practices at that time were in compliance with the law and did not need to be changed.

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Thus, they did not express any desire or motivation to act affirmatively to create a diwrsc and more inclusive organization, which is contrary to what was told to Ms. Ways when she was hired at HAM.

I: 50.
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Around the same time that the AAPs were being prepared, HAM received Equal Opportunity ("EO") Surveys from the OFCCP that had to be certitied by Ms. Ways.
In order to certify the EO Surveys, Ms. Ways requested all of HAM's compensation data from HAM's outside counsel, who were completing the EO Surveys at the direction of HAM's legal department.

52. Ms. Ways found it extremely difficult to obtain the compensation data records from HAM's outside counsel, whom she later found out had the requisite data despite having claimed the information was not in their possession.

Because of the resistance she received from outside counsel, Ms. Ways was forced to inform VSSP that she would not sign and/or certifY the EO Surveys without the appropriate compensation documentation, only then did VSSP send Ms. Ways the necessary data.

In March 2004, Mr. Schostek asked to meet with Ms. Ways while they were
attending the Honda Campus All-Star Challenge ("HCASC") event held in Orlando, Florida.

I 55. During their informal meeting, Mr. Schostek stated for the first time that Mary Ellen

'I

Fairfield, a senior attorney with VSSP, had accused Ms. Ways ofbeing disrespectful

toward David Campbell, one of the attorneys at VSSP working on the EO Surveys.

156. Mr. Campbell and Douglas Matthews, another VSSP attorney, had heen assigned

I

the task of preparing HAM's AAPs as well as HAM's responses to the EO Surveys.

i 57. Ms. Ways disagreed that she had in any way acted disrespectfully in her

communications with Mr. Campbell.

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Ms. Ways further explained to Mr. Schostek that Mr. Camphell expeL'ted her to certify the EO Surveys without her having seen the compensation data that was used to compile HAM's response.
Mr. Schostek replied by stating that Mr. Campbell was correct in his position that Ms. Ways did not need to see the compensation data in order to certify the EO Surveys.
7

6

60. Mr. Schostek then infonned Ms. Ways that he, as an executive of HAM, regularly signs documents without requiring the supporting documentation.

1 6 1.
I I 62.

Ms. Ways explained to Mr. Schostek that she was not comfortable with thai approach, and further stated that to comply with his suggestion would be unlav,j'uL
Mr. Scho~1ek became visibly agitated upon hearing Ms. Ways' response, and
continued to criticize her approach in developing strategies for diversity. However, Mr. Schostek did not offer any suggestions on how Ms. Ways might change or improve her approach.

63. Mr. Schostek did not, at any time duriog their conversation, indicate that their
meeting was anything more than an informal meeting to discuss Ms. Ways' alleged disrespect toward Mr. Campbell.

64. When Ms. Ways returned home from the trip to Orlando, Florida, she met with Mr. Campbell at his frnn's office to sign a final copy ofthe EO Surveys.

,65. I: <ilI
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'I 67.

During her meeting with Mr. Campbell, Ms. Ways told him what Mr. Schostek said

to her.

..

Ms. Ways observed that Mr. Campbell appeared nervous and stated, "If Mary Ellen told Rick that then that is on her," or words to that effect.

Ms. Ways explained to Mr. Campbell that she wanted to have a good working relationship v.1th him, and that it was never her intent to disrespect him.

Mr. Campbell assured Ms. Ways that their working relationship was fine, and they shook hands and Ms. Ways departed.

When Ms. Ways reported what had occurred at this meeting to Mr. Schostek, he seemed to question Ms. Ways' truthfulness and further told her that he stood by Ms. Fairfield's account, stating that he trusted her.

70. When Ms. Ways asked him to explain or elaborate on his statement, Mr. Schostck
told her that she needed 10 work on her communication skills.

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In an effort to address Mr. Schostek's concerns, Ms. Ways immediately contacted
Andrew Woods, a highly regarded communications consultant for Honda.
Ms. Ways invited Mr. Woods to come to H~\1 and review her diversity andlor inclusion strategy and to assist her in improving her ability to communicate her strategy to HAM's leadership.
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73. Mr. Woods was responsive to Ms. Ways' request and met with her approximately a week later.

74. During their meeting, Mr. Woods assured Ms. Ways that challenging the "status quo" was the Honda way.

After spending the afternoon and early evening in meetings with Ms. Ways, Mr. Woods invited her to dinner with a Japanese associate. That associate, who was returning to Japan, assured Ms. Ways that she was handling things the "Honda Way."

76. However, Ms. Ways' efforts were in vain because the follo\ving week on April 19, 2004 she was abruptly terminated for allegedly engaging in disrespectful behavior and for purported inaccuracies in communication.

77 . :1
1 78.

During the week prior to her termination of employment, Ms. Ways received an email message from Mr. Schostek requesting a meeting with her on April 19, 2004.
Ms. Ways, assuming this meeting was going to be with Mr. Schostek and Mr. Garrett regarding another matter, reminded Mr. Schostek that Mr. Garrett had already scheduled a meeting for the three of them to take place on the moming of April 19, 2004.

In his reply, Mr. Schostek changed the time of his requested meeting to 5:00 p.m. that evening and said he would inform Mr. Garrett ofthe meeting change..

80. Mr. Schostek arrived for the meeting shortly after Ms. Ways, and as they were

walking to the designated meeting room, Jl.1r. Schostek told Ms. Ways that due to

IiI

the nature of the meeting, Henry Real, the Senior Manager of Associate Relations at HAM, would bejoining them.

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81. Ms. Ways was shocked to learn that the purpose of the meeting was to terminate her employment.

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During the meeting, Mr. Schostek proceeded to read from a typed statement the purported reasons for Ms. Ways' termination - disrespectful behavior and inaccuracies in communication.
When Ms. Ways inquired about whom she had becn disrespectful to, Mr. Schostek replied by referring to the aceusation made by Ms. Fairfield about the conversation
between Ms. Ways and Mr. Campbell, a conversation that Ms. Fairfield was not
present for.
9

Ii1 84.
!

With regard to the alleged inaccuracies in communication, Mr. Schostek stated this referred to an occasion when Ms. Ways told him that one of her direct reports had not received some data from another department when, in fact, they had.

85. Mr. Schostek further stated that he had previously spoken to Ms. Ways in very strong terms about her behavior and indicated that she had not corrected that behavior.

To Ms. Ways' knowledge, she did not receive any formal discipline during her employment at HAM.

87. Mr. Schostek never made Ms. Ways aware that any of their conversations constituted any kind of progressive discipline or corrective action nor had he or anyone else at HAM spoken to Ms. Ways in very strong terms or in any manner that might be considered anything other than casual conversation.
Likewise, Ms. Ways was never told that any written documentation was added to
her personnel file concerning any progressive discipline or corrective action in the form of coaching or cOlUlseJing that she had purportedly received from Mr. Schostek or anyone else at HAM.

189. To the contrary, Ms. Ways received two performance evaluations during her

'I

employment at HAM, both of which were favorable.

90. During the termination meeting, Mr. Schostek asked Ms. Ways for the compensation data records she had obtained from YSSP.

When Ms. Ways asked Mr. Schostek if her request for the compensation data was
the actual reason for her termination of employment, Mr. Schostek ignored her and instead slid an envelope across the table to Ms. Ways and began explaining the terms ofthe severance package HAM was offering her.

92. Ms. Ways was then told to relinquish all company property in her possession before being escorted off HAM's premises.

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During her fourteen months ofemployment at HAM, Ms. Ways uncovered discriminatory, inequitable, and unethical practices oceurring at the company, which she reported to senior officials, including the presidents of both HAM and American Honda.
Ms. Ways believes her termination was in retaliation for reporting HAM's discriminatory, inequitable, and 'unethical practices and for her efforts to encourage HAM to comply with federal guidelines and regulations.
10

95. Ms. Ways is not aware of any senior manager at HAM being tenninated for
disrespectful behavior andlor inaccuracies in communication, alfuough severnl employees treated Ms. Ways with disrespect.

96.
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During her employment at HAM, Ms. W~s complained about the disrespect shown toward her authority as Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics by Lynn Dennison and others on her staff as well as Kim Smalley, Assistant Vice President ofAdminiatration, and Pam Greeno Johnson, Manager of Staffing.
In her complaints, Ms. Ways provided written documentation offue disrespect
shown toward her and her business team by these individuals, but none ofthem were terminated for fueir conduct and Ms. Ways is not even aware ofthem being disciplined.

I. 98. During her employment at HAM, Ms. Ways tried to incorporate the "Challenging Spirit," a corporate practice that encourages employees to take initiative and be challenging and innovative. Ms. Ways was doing this very thing by opposing discrimination at HAM and making great effort to increase diversity and integrity in
reporting diversity matters to federal agencies; just as President Hirashima directed Ms. Ways and her business team to do.

Ms. Ways performed her duties and respousibilities with the encouragement and
support of several Japanese associates who told Ms. Ways that HAM vvuuld never fire anyone for spotting problems and telling the truth about them.

Ms. Ways subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which in
tum determined that HAM violated federal law by terminating Ms. Ways because of her raee and in retaliation for opposing discrimination at fue company.

•. 101.
Ipi 02.
I
I

The EEOC filed a federal lawsuit based on their findings.
Accordingly, upon information and belief, Plaintiff-Intervener has been subjected to additional discriminatory, retaliatory, and hostile treatment the full extent ofwhich will become known throughout the course ofdiscovery, and Ms. Ways hereby reserves the right to pursue such incidents as they become known.

First Claim for Relief Race Discrimination in Violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-S)

Llxr(yT'J!I'U
12(j:Wes:St<:"nJ~~ $111\>;91)0
Oiyt<:m, ot,j(l 45W2
5" ?ham; i 125.:'991 fm '371285-4719 Ema.i: JRGA1UW€l¥>1.c.nn

Plaintiff-Intervener hereby reaJleges and incorporates by reference as iffully set forth herein, the allegations ofparagraphs 1 through 102 above.
II

I I
i 104.

At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff-Intervener was and is an employee within the meaning of Title VII, protected against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, in that Plaintiff-Intervener is a member of a protected and recognized minority group or category.

105.
I
I
1106.

At all times material hereto, Defendant HAM was and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, having fifteen or more employees, and as such was prohibited from discriminating in employment on the basis of race.
Throughout her employment and up until and including her termination, Defendant HAM, by and through its agents, discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener on the basis of her race as alleged herein.

107. Defendant HAM's purported reasons for the actions taken against PlaintiffIntervener are pretext for discrimination.

108. Plaintiff-Intervener has been discriminated against by Defendant HAM on the basis

of her race and because of her advocacy in violation of Title VII by Defendant

engaging in discriminatory conduct, through the acts and/or omissions alleged

herein.

.

109. HAM contracted with Plaintiff-Intervener to ensure equality in employment within the company.

110.
,1111.

In her role as the Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM, Plaintiff-Intervener served as a high-level affirmative action official whose job responsibilities included advocating minority and women's rights.
Defendant HAM has discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener because of her race as an African-American by restraining her and her business team from fully performing their corporate responsibility to provide leadership on EEO and corporate compliance issues at HAM.

112. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's race discrimination, PlaintiffIntervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Jame! R. C.~elle, III &; A.socims
Libert)" Tow.r 120 West $.econdSuw
Suitt 9QO Dayllln, Qh;" 45402
Ph"".: 937 '225-3991 Fox: ~37 , 2S5-4719
Email: JRGATLAW@aoLcom

Second Claim for Relief Gender Discrimination in Violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-5)
113. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as iffuUy set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 112 above.
12

1\

114. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff-Intervener was and is an employee within the meaning ofTitIe VII, protected against discrimination in employment on the basis of her gender, in that Plaintiff-Intervener is a member of a protected and recognized minority group or category.

115. At all times material hereto, Defendant HAM was and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, having fifteen or more employees, and as such was prohibited from discriminating in employment on the basis of gender.

Throughout her employment and up until and including her termination, Defendant HAM, by and tIuougb its agents, discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener on the basis ofher gender as alleged herein.

.117. Defendant HAM's purported feasOrts for the actions taken against PlaintiffIntervener are pretext for discrimination.

118. Plaintiff-Intervener has been discriminated against by Defendant HAM on the basis of her gender and because of her advocacy in violation of Title VII by Defendant engaging in discriminatory conduct, tIuough the acts and/or omissions alleged herein.

HAM contracted with Plaintiff"Intcrvener to ensure equality in employment within the company.

i
121.

In her role as the Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM, Plaintiff-Intervener served as a highclevel affirmative action official whose job responsibilities included advocating minority and women's rights.
Defendant HAJ\;1 bas discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener because of her gender by restraining her and her business team frClm fully performing their corporate responsibility to provide leadership on EEO and corporate compliance issues at HAM.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's gender discrimination, PlaintiffIntervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impainnent of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, angnish, hwniliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all 10 Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

L:\J<,Jtj'T::r!.'r 120 Wei! Se:end S~:
Suiu- 9(Xl D~YIDn, Ohio 454.02

PhDne' 9:17 1225-3~~1
F~", 'J371285·4f"1~

13

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I

Third Claim for Relief

! Disparate Impaet Discrimination in Violation of Title VII (42 U.S.CA. §2000e-5)

123. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby reallege. and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the allegations ofparagraphs I through 122 above.

. 124. !

Throughout her employment at Defendant HAM, Plaintiff-Intervener challenged various company employment policies and practices that were contrary 10 thc diversity efforts she and her business team were instructed and thereafter attempted to implement.

125. Plaintiff-Intervener challenged those employment policies and practices at Defendant HAM that resulted in disparities between protected and non-protected classes. Specifically, Plaintiff-Intervener determined that Defendant HAM's employment policies and practices resulted in qualified minority candidates being denied equal job consideration and being ineligible for promotions. Likewise, jobs
were not being posted and there were compliance issues, particularly in areas of
under-utilization.

126 Defendant HAM's challenged employment policies and practices had an adverse 1 . effect on African-American and other minority employees at the company.

1 127. Plaintiff-Intervener was subsequently terminated for challenging Defendant HAM's

!

employment policies and practices and advocating on behalf of minority employees

at the company.

128. Schostek, Garrett, and Dennison, and each of their support staff, all took the position with Plaintiff-Intervener and her business team that HAM's employment practices and policies were in compliance with the law and did not necd to be cbanged.

129. Thus, Defendant HAM did not express any desire or motivation to act affirmatively to create a diverse and more inclusive organization in response to PlaintiffIntervener challenges, which is contrary to what was told to Plaintiff-Intervener when she was hired at HAM.

I_ 130. The employment practices and policies that were challenged by Plaintiff-Intervener

'--&""""'."''''' II

failed to serve HAM's purported legitimate employment goal of creating a diverse and mOre inclusive orgaaization.

UlttIj'Ti7N«
12{) Wet! moo Srtttt
S>Jju?\Xl l)~t, 011", 454112

i't:<m<:' 937121~mJ
Fax· 937 t 2e).471?

14

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131. As a direct and proximate result of the disparate impact discrimination, disparities exist between protected and non-protected classes at HAM. In addition, PlaintiffIntervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential darnagesand expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Fourtb Claim for Relief Retaliatiol\ in tbe Workplaee il\ Violation of Title VII

132. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby reallege. and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 131 above.

133.
,
,1
II
I]
i 134.
!

At all times asserted herein, Plaintiff-Intervener was an employee within the meaning of Title VI!, protected against discrimination in employment on the basis of her race and gender with regard to filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, in that Plaintiff-Intervener is a member of a protected group or category,
At all times asserted herein, Plaintiff-Intervener was engaged in protected activity when she challenged and/or reported HA."v1's discriminatory, inequitable, and unethical practices and encouraged HAM to comply with federal guidelines and regulations.

135. Defendant HAM, by and through its agents, has discriminated against PlaintiffIntervener on the basis of retaliation and in violation of Title VII §704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, for challenging and/or reporting HAM's discriminatory, inequitable, and 1lllethical practices and encouraging HAM to comply with federal guidelines and regulations.

136, As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's retaliation, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, !U1.xiety, anguish, humiliation, and other iricidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Fifth Claim for Relief Creation of a Hostile Work Environment al\d/or Workplace Harassment in Violation ofTitle VII

lilx::tyT;;r.vc Hi Wt$, Serofid Scree:
Suire 900 Darton, Ohio 45402
;>hQfl(: 937 I :;25-3~)9l
fu; 51}} r285-47EI:
Email: JRGAnA'W@WLcom

131. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporatcs by reference as iffully sct forth herein, the allegations ofparagraphs I through 136 above.
15

138. Defendant HAM, by and through its agents, created a hostile work environment for
Plaintiff-Intervener by fostering unfavorable working conditions and/or harassing Plaintiff-Intervener during her employment at HAM as described herein while she carried out her "check and audit" function by challenging HAM's discriminatory and/or inequitable employment policies and practices and advocated on behalf of minorities and women.

139. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's creation of a hostile work environment andlor workplace haras;ment, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Sixth Claim for Relief Race Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981

140. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein. the allegations ofparagraphs I through 139 above.

141. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff-h,tervener was and is a person protected against discrimination in the employment setting on the basis of race, in that Plaintiff·Intervener is a member ofa protected and recogniud minority group or category.

142. HAM contracted with Plaintiff-Intervener by offering her employment, which she accepted in order to ensure eqnality in employment within the company.

143. In her role as the Seuior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM, Plaintiff-Intervener served as a high-level affirmative action official whose job responsibilities included advocating minority and women's rights.

144. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener on the basis of her race and because ofher advocacy on behalf of racial minorities in violation of42 V.S.c. §198 t as alleged herein.

LiStrtyTIMcr 120 Wt~ &rond Strtt(
Suitt )00

Further, throughout her employment and up until and including her termination, Defendant HAM, by and through its agents, discriminated against PlaintiffIntervener on the basis ofher race as alleged herein.
146. Defendant HAM's purported reasons for the actions taken against PlaintiffIntervener are pretext for discrimination.

i>ht»le; ')7 112~3'91 Fn., '/37 '2$5-4/19

16

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" I

1
I
147.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's race discrimination, PlaintiffIntervener has suffered loss ofincome and benefits and impainnent of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount accordiag to proof.

Seventh Claim for Relief Racial HarassmentIRaeiaIIy Hostile Work Environment in Violation of 42 U.S.C.
§1981

148. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 147 above.

149. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff·Intervener was and is a person protected against racial harassment and the creation of a hostile work environment in the employment setting, in that Plaintiff·Intervener is a member of a protected and recognized minority group or category.

150. HAM contracted with Plaintiff·Intervener by offering her employment, which she accepted in order to ensure equality in employment within the company.

151. In her role as the Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM, Plaintiff-Intervener served as a high-level affirmative action official whose job responsibilities included advocating minority and women's rights.

152. Defendant HAM, by and through its agents, created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff-Intervener by fostering unfavorable working conditions and/or harassing Plaintiff-Intervener during her employment at HAM as described herein while she carried out her "check and audit" function by challenging HAM's discriminatory and/or inequitable employment policies and practices and advocated on behalf of minorities and women.

153. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant' s creation ofa hostile work environment and/or workplace harassroent, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff·lntervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Eighth Claim for Relief Retaliation in Violation of 42 U.s.C. §1981

Libert:r".b"'~r 154. Plaintiff·Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as iffully set

lWWe\r:Sem:.><l&"l'U

forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 153.

?h<mw 957 I 225·3991 F.>JI; 9371285-4719

17

£m~iJ: JRGATLAW@~I..;t)m

155. At aU times asserted herein, Plaintiff-Intervener was in a contractual relationship with Defendant and thus protected against discrimination and retaliation in employment on the basis of her race under 42 U.S.C. §1981.

! 156.
I

At aU times asserted herein, Plaintiff-Intervener was engaged in protected activity when she challenged and/or reported HAM's discriminatory, inequitable, and unethical practices and encouraged HAM to comply with federal guidelines and regulations.

157. Defendant HAM, by and through its agents, has discriminated against PlaintiffIntervener on the basis of retaliation and in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981 for challenging and/or reporting HAM's discriminatory, inequitable, and unethical practices and encouraging HAM to comply with federal guidelines and regulations.

158. As a direct arid proximate result of Defendant's retaliation, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment ofeaming capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, aU to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Ninth Claim for Relief Race Discrimination in Violation of Ohio Revised Code §§4112.02 and 4112.99

159. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as iffully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 158 above.

160. HAM contracted with Plaintiff-Intervener to ensure equality in employment within the company.

161. In her role as the Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM, Plaintiff-Intervener served as a high-level affirmative action official whose job responsibilities included advocating minority and women's rights.

162. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener on the basis of her race and because of her advocacy on behalf of minorities and women in violation of O.R.C. §§4112.02 and 4112.99.

James R. Gttttlt, III & ASIOcil.tes
liberty Tower 120 \Ii'est Sec.ond Strttr
Suire 900 Dayton. Ohio 45402
Phone: ?37 / 225-3991 Fax: 937 / 28S-m9
Email: JRGATL\W@aol.~om

163. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener because of her race as an African-American by restraining her and her business team from fully performing their corporate responsibility to provide leadership on EEO and corporate compliance issues at HAM.
18

I

164. As a direct and proximate result ofDefendanfs race discrimination, PlaintiffIntervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment ofearning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Tenth Claim for Relief Gender Disnimination in Violation of Ohio Revised Code §§4112.02 and 4112.99

165. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as iffully set forth herein, the allegations ofparagraphs I through 164 above.

•166. HAM contracted with Plaintiff·Intervener to ensure equality in employment within the company.

167. In her role as the Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics at HAM, Plaintiff·Intervener served as a high-level affirmative action official whose job
responsibilities included advocating minnrity and women's rights.

168. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener on the basis ofher gender and because ofher advocacy on behalf of minorities and women in violation of O.RC. §§4112.02 and 4112.99.

169. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener on the basis of her gender by restraining her and her business team from fully performing their corporate responsibility to provide leadership on EEO and corporate compliance issues at
HAM.

170. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff-Intervener is not aware ofany males who were denied the ability to perform their job duties or who were thwarted without cause.

171. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's gender discrimination, Plaintiff· Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Lbetl)' T<lwt'r )20 West 5c,ood Suw:
S",n: 900 D>yton, Olm) 454(12
Ph"n", 9')7 { n,} >")1
~: 937 t zt$-4iJi) Email: )R(,--ATLAW~Jl oxn

Eleventh Claim for Relief Disparate Impact Discrimination in Violation of Ohio Revised Code §§4112.02 and
4112.99
172. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the allegations ofparagraphs I through 171 above.
19

173. Throughout her employment at Defendant HAM, Plaintiff-Intervener challenged various company employment policies and practices that were contrary to the diversity efforts she and her business team were attempting to implement.

174, Plaintiff-Intervener challenged those employment policies and practices at
Defendant HAM that resulted in disparities between protected and non-protected classes. Specifically, Plaintiff-Intervener determined that Defendant HAM's
employment policies and practices resulted in qualified minority candidates being denied equal job consideration and being ineligible for promotions. Likewise, jobs were not being posted and there were compliance issues, particularly in areas of under-utilization.

175. Defendant HAM's challenged employment policies and practices had an adverse effect on African-American and other minority employees at the company.

176. Plaintiff-Intervener was subsequently temlinated for challenging Defendant HAM's employment policies and practices and advocating on behalfofminority employees at the company.

177. Schostek, Garrett, and Dennison, and each of their support staff, all took the po~-ition with Plaintiff-Intervener and her business team that HAM's employment
practices and policies were in compliance with the law and did not need to be changed.

178. Thus, Defendant did not express any desire or motivation to act affirmatively to create a diverse and more inclusive organization in response to Plaintiff-Intervener challenges, which is contrary to what W<IS told to Plaintiff-Intervener when she was hired at HAM.

179 1.
I

The employment practices and policies that were challenged by Plaintiff-Intervener failed to serve Defendant's purported legitimate employment goal of creating a diverse and more inclusive organization.

1180.

As a direct and proximate result of the disparate impact discrimination, disparities exist between protected and non-protected classes at HAM. In addition, Plaintiff.Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment ofearning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expcnses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Lb.:rt)'TmJ:r
1M! Wc<:5~dSuerf Suj~ 9t"}
DayWn, alu,., *;.402

Phnne" 5'J71 Il,)-3991 F;rx,93712B5-47l?

20

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I
I:

'7

Twelfth Claim for Relief Retaliation in Violation of Ohio Law

18 Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as if fully set 1 1. forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 180 above.

I 182.
II
Ii
11
183.
I

Defendant intentionally, willfully, and wantonly retaliated against PlaintiffIntervener in response to her advocacy on behalf of minorities and women at HAM and for challenging discrimination at HAM.
As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's retaliatory conduct, as described herein, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered loss ofincome and benefits and impairment ofearning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

Thirteenth Claim for Relief
Creation of a Hostile Work Environment
and/or Workplace Harassment in Violation of Title vn

184. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby rea1leges and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 183 above.

185. Defendant created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff-Intervener by fostering unfavorable working conditions and/or harassing Plaintiff-Intervener during her employment at HAM as described herein while she carried out her "check and andit" function by challenging HAM's discriminatory and/or inequitable employment policies and practices and advocated on behalf ofminorities and women to ensure equality in the employment practices at HAM.

186. Defendant harassed Plaintiff-Intervener and/or subjected her to a racially and gender hostile work environment throughout her employment at HAM and up until and including the termination of Plaintiff-Intervener's employment on April 19, 2004.

187.
1 I

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant'S creation ofa hostile work environment and/or workplace harassment, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, aU to 1'Iaintiff-lntervener's damages in an amount according to proof.

LibcryT{l"'ef {2(1 Wtm $«o.:d SU:«I
Su",,"900 tmywn, 01:;0 45402

Pbotl~; 937 J2.25·3991
m Fax; '~8~4719

21

£.mail: JRGATLAW@~"I.C(IJ)'J

c

\e

7

Fourteenth Claim for Relief
Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Ohio Public Policy

188. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the allegations ofparagraphs 1 through 187 above.

189. Ohio has an express public policy prohibiting discrimination.

190. Ohio Revised Code §4112.02 reflects Ohio's strong public policy against workplace based discrimination. It states in pertinent part that "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

(A) [1)or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin. handicap, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just CIIuse, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment." [Emphasis not in original].

191. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervener on the basis ofher race and sex (gender) by tenninating her employment in violation of Ohio's common law public policy against discrimination in the workplace;

192. As II direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful discharge of PlaintiffIntervener in violation ofObio publie policy, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered loss of income and benefits and impairment ofearning capacity, emotional distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to. Plaintiff-Intervener's damages in an !!momt according to proof.

Fifteenth Claim for Relief Breach of Contrae!

193. Plaintiff·Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as jffully. set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs I through 192 above.

.194. Plaintiff-Intervener's position was held under both express and implied promises of job security and in accordance with HAM's employee handbook, all of which constituted a contract ofemployment.

UkftyTm>'tt 120 ~ &mad Strtu

, 195.
'I

Th:fendant's lll:tions in rem<3vi.ng Plaintiff-Inllorvenetfrom her jlCsiti<>n, end their failure \0 reinstate her, constitutes a willful breach of her contract with the Defendant.

"flt"t>t; 'm 1225-3991
Em:: 9:): j 235471, &.d: JRGA1U.w"@a,;I.ccm

22
i

196. As a result of Defendant's actions, Plaintiff-Intervener has suffered irreparable injuries, including but not limited to loss of pay, benefits and other economic losses, emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, personal indignity, and other intangible injuries, all for which she should be compensated.

Sixteenth Claim for Relief Fraudulent Inducement and/or Fraudulent Misrepresentation

197. Plaintiff-Intervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 196 above.

198. Defendant made representations, promises, and material omissions to PlaintiffIntervener, including, among other things, that she was being hired to create a more diverse workforce at Defendant HAM.

199. In addition, Defendant fraudulently andlor negligently concealed material facts and information from Plaintiff-Intervener, including, without limitation, pertinent employee compensation data.

200. The representations and promises made by Defendant to Plaintiff-Intervener were false.

201. Plaintiff-Intervener, who had sought reassurance as to her job security, believed that Defendant's representations and promises were true as it regards her role and responsibilities at Defendant HAM, and she was unaware that they were, in fact, false.

202. Plaintiff-Intervener relied on Defendant's false representations, promises, and material omissions to her detriment.

203. Defendant HAM recruited Plaintiff-Intervener while she was employed as the Executive Director ofthe Dayton region of the National Conference for Community Justice ("NCCl").

204. Defendant HAM recruited Plaintiff-Intervener from her previous job to purportedly develop strategies that would result in Defendant HAM becoming a more diverse, inclusive, and ethical organization.

Attomrys & Co"" ..I",,,;It L.....
James a Gmne, III &AssooalO$
Liberty Tower 120 W~sr S.cond Serte{
Suite 900 D"Yt<;>o, Ohio 45401
Pl!one: 937 / 225-3991 Fa~: 937 / 28>4719
Em.il; JRGATI.AW@.ol.com

205. Among other things,Plaintiff-lntervener resigned from her employment with the NCCl, accepted employment with Defendant HAM, and forewent other employment opportunities;
23

2:(

7

II

II 206.

Plaintiff-Intervener's reliance was reasonable under the circumstances, as Defendant had concealed the true facts from her, and proofof their contrary intention was unavailable to her.

207.
\1
\
I
:\
208.
I
i:
. 1
!i

By the aforesaid acts and omissions ofDefendant, Plaintiff-Intervener has been directly and legally caused to suffer actual damages including, but not limited to, loss of earnings, reliance damages, costs of suit, and other pecuniary losses in an amount not presently ascertained, but to be proven at trial.
As a further direct and legal result of the acts and conduct of Defendant, as aforesaid, Plaintifl:lntervener has been caused to and did sufler and continues to suffer severe emotional and mental distress, anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and anxiety.
Seventeenth Claim for Relief Promissory Estoppel

209. Plaintifl:lntervener hereby realleges and incorporates by reference as iffu1ly sct

II

forth herein, the allegations ofparagraphs I through 208 above.

210. Defendant made representations, promises, and material omissions to Plaintiff-

I

Intervener, including, among other things, that she was being hired to create a more

II 211.

diverse workforce at Defendant HAM. Defendant HAM recruited Plaintiff-Intervener while she was employed as the

\

Executive Director of the Dayton region of the NCCJ.

I

... 212. Defendant HAM.recruited Plaintiff-Intervener from her previous job to purportedly develop strategies that would result in Defendant HAM beooming a more diverse, inclusive, and ethical organization.

1213.

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11215.

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UhcnyTowu l10 Wctt StO)¥la SHeet
_900
Dayroll1 Qlll(. 45.fO!

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£m.i1: JRGATIAW@ao1.Olm

Among other things, Plaintiff-Intervener resigned from her employment with the NeeJ, accepted employment with Defendant HAM, and forewent other employment opportunities.
Plaintiff-Intervener rel.ied on Defendant's false representations, promises, and material omissions to her detriment.
By the aforesaid acts and omissions of Defendant, Plaintiff-Intervener has been directly and legally caused to sufier actual damages including, but not limited to, loss of earnings, reliance damages, costs of suit, and other pecuniary losses in an amOlmt not presently ascertained, but to be proven at trial.
24

U'

-q

216. As a further direct and legal result of the acts and conduct of Defendant, as aforesaid, Plaintiff-Intervener has been caused to and did suffer and continues to suffer severe emotional and mental distress, anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and anxiety.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Inten 'ner respectful1y requests that this Court:

A. Order Defendant to make Plaintiff-Intervener whole by reinstating her to her former position, awarding her app,opriate back pay, front pay, and any benefits PlaintiffIntervener would have received had Defendant not discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis ofher race and gender and because ofher advocacy on behalf ofminorities and women and for wrongfully terminating her employment;

B. Award Plaintiff-Intervener liquidated and consequential damages in an amount to be determined at trial for the economic loss she has suffered as a proximate result of Defendant's conduct;

C. Impose liability upon Defendant;

D. Award Plaintiff-Intervener compensation for pas! and future pecuniary losses resulting from Defendant's unlawful employment practices, including compensatory and punitive damages for the humiliation, damage to her reputation, mental and emotional distress and pain and suffering that she has experienced and endured as a result of Defendant's conduct;

E. Order Defendant to pay Plaintiff-Intervener punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct.

F. Issue a prohibitory injunction to enjoin Defendant, and its agents, employees, officers and successors in interest, and those acting in concert with them, from engaging in the il1egal and unlawful customs, policies, and practices described herein and from further unlawful conduct as alleged;

O.

Attom~ & Coun••lan II t.-
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Phone: 937 J 225-3991 Fax: 937/ 28)47J9

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Email, )RGATlAW@aoLtom

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Issue a declaratory judgment that the acts, policies, practices and procedures of Detendant complained of herein are unlawful and are in violation of federal and state law and in violation of Plaintiff-Intervener's rights under those laws;
Order Defendant to make Plaintiff-Intervener whole by providing her with employment, seniority, and any other affrrmative relief necessary to eliminate the effects of Defendant's unlawful employment practices;
Award Plaintiff-Intervener pre and post judgment interest on ail sums awarded;
25

I I
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Award to Plaintiff-Intervener the costs incurred in this action and reasonable attorneys'fees;and Grant such other legal and equitable relief as is necessary and proper.
.wRY DEMAND Plaintiff-Intervener requests a jury to hear and decide all issues of fact.

STATE OF OHIO COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, SS:
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II

I.1

I, Monica P. Ways, being first duly cautioned and sworn, do hereby state that I am

II the Plaintiff-Intervener in the above-entitled action and that I have read the foregoing
III Complaint and all of the facts and allegations coutained therein are true and accurate to the

I; best of my knowledge andlor belief.
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day of June, 2006.

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Respectfully Snbmitted,

Willie Gary, Trial Attorney for Plaintiff-Intervener Tricia P. Hoffler Debra S. Nolan Charlene R. Banks Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson, & Sperando, P.L. (772) 383-8260 (772) 463-4319 (Facsimile) (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, do hereby certifY that a true and accurate copy ofthe foregoing
Verified Complaint for Money Damages with Jury Demand 'MIS served upon Defendants in
a manner prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

c=~;:;z

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27

Emat" }ROOtAW@avlillJJl

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

2006 WL 2934072 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC., Defendant.
No. 2:06-cv-0233. | Oct. 12, 2006.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jeffrey A. Stern, C. Larry Watson, Lawrence Mays, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cleveland District Office, Cleveland, OH, Jacqueline H. McNair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Frank Allen Ray, Frank A. Ray Co. LPA, Columbus, OH, Ebony D. Wilkerson, John F. Birmingham, Nancy J. Sennett, Philip B. Phillips, Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER
TERENCE P. KAMP, Magistrate Judge.
*1 This employment case is before the Court to consider a motion to quash filed by non-party the Director of the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS). Defendant Honda, the issuer of the subpoena, has opposed the motion. ODJFS has not filed a reply, and neither the EEOC nor the intervening plaintiff, Monica Ways, has taken a position on the motion. For the following reasons, the motion to quash will be denied.
The subpoena, a copy of which is attached to the motion to quash, requested the ODJFS to produce a complete copy of the unemployment compensation file for Monica Ways. ODJFS based its motion to quash on the non-disclosure provisions of O.R.C. § 4141.21, which prohibits the disclosure or use of information supplied to

the ODJFS in connection with a claim for unemployment benefits in connection with any other proceeding, including court proceedings. In response, Honda argues that such a state prohibition against disclosure is not enforceable in an action filed in a federal court and based upon federal law. This case is based upon federal law because the EEOC’s claim is that Honda violated Title VII by discharging Ms. Ways on account of her race. Consequently, Honda asserts that there is no basis for the motion to quash.
As Honda correctly notes, this Court has dealt directly with this issue in the past and has decided the issue adversely to the position taken by the ODJFS. In Freed v. Grand Court Lifestyles, 100 F.Supp.2d 610 (S.D.Ohio 1998) (Rice, J.), the court noted that evidentiary and discovery privileges in cases filed in a federal court and based on federal law are governed not by state law but by Fed.R.Evid. 501, which states that “the privilege of a ... State ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” Thus, the question posed when a litigant or non-party asserts a state law privilege in response to an otherwise appropriate discovery request is not whether the privilege is enforceable in the state courts, but whether there is a federal common law privilege that would exempt the requested information from disclosure. In Freed, the court did not simply reject the claim of privilege because it rested on state law, but it engaged in a balancing of the interests served by the state prohibition against disclosure against the requesting party’s interest in obtaining the information. There, dealing with the same type of information that is requested here and with the same statute, the court concluded that the result of the balancing of interests favored disclosure. At least one other Judge of this Court has reached a similar result in a case involving O.R.C. § 4141.21, see Klaus v. Kilb, Rogel & Hamilton Co., 437 F.Supp.2d 706 (S.D.Ohio 2006)(Sargus, J.), and the undersigned has also adopted the method of analysis set forth in Freed. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Case No. 2:05-cv-688 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2006) (analyzing claim of privilege based on exemptions found in the Ohio Public Records Act, O.R.C. § 149.43).
*2 Here, the asserted relevance of Ms. Ways’ unemployment compensation file is that she may have made statements about the reasons for the termination of her employment in connection with her claim for benefits, and the reasons for the termination of her employment
1

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

have been placed at issue by the EEOC’s assertion that Honda acted with a discriminatory motive when it discharged Ms. Ways. Although the State of Ohio does have an interest in encouraging participants in the unemployment compensation system to make truthful statements about their employment situation without fear that those statements will be used against them in some other setting, a defendant in a federal discrimination lawsuit also has an interest in determining if the person alleging discrimination has made statements to a state agency that are inconsistent with the claim of discrimination being asserted in the federal lawsuit. The Court does not believe that persons applying for unemployment benefits will be generally dissuaded from making truthful statements about the reasons for the termination of their employment if they know that such statements might later be used in a discrimination claim brought against their employer. Further, there does not appear to be any particular privacy interest surrounding these statements, especially since the only information Honda appears to be requesting relates to Ms. Ways’ claim for benefits arising out of her employment with Honda. She has not asserted any such interests and has not filed a memorandum in support of the motion to quash. Consequently, after performing the balancing required by Freed, which decision the Court finds persuasive, the Court concludes that no privilege for unemployment records should be recognized here.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion of non-party the Director of the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family services to quash subpoena (# 26) is denied. The requested documents concerning Monica Ways’ unemployment compensation claim relating to her employment with defendant Honda of America shall be produced within fifteen days of the date of this order.
Any party may, within ten (10) days after this Order is filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for reconsideration by a District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt. I., F., 5. The motion must specifically designate the order or part in question and the basis for any objection. Responses to objections are due ten days after objections are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter. The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.4.
	  

2

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 682088 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPURTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC., Defendant.
No. 2:06-cv-0233. | Feb. 28, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jeffrey A. Stern, C. Larry Watson, Lawrence Mays, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cleveland, OH, Jacqueline H. McNair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Frank Allen Ray, Frank A. Ray Co LPA, Sarah Daggett Morrison, Chester Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, Ebony D. Wilkerson, John F. Birmingham, Philip B. Phillips, Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit, MI, Nancy J. Sennett, Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER
TERENCE P. KEMP, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This is an employment action in which the EEOC initially asserted a discrimination claim on behalf of Monica Ways, a former employee of Honda of America. Ms. Ways has subsequently intervened in the case. On February 1, 2007, Honda filed a motion to quash deposition notices which were issued by Ms. Ways. Both Ms. Ways and the EEOC have filed responses, and Honda has replied. For the following reasons, the motion to quash will be granted.
I.

The facts underlying the motion to quash are fairly straightforward. During the time that Ms. Ways worked for Honda, she was under the direct or indirect supervision of two more highly-placed officials, Koki Hirashimi and Tadashi Nogouchi. Wishing to take testimony from those two individuals, she noticed their depositions. The deposition notice requested them to appear at Ms. Ways’ counsel’s office in Dayton, Ohio. Neither of the deponents is currently employed by Honda of America. According to affidavits filed by Honda, Mr. Hirashimi left Honda of America’s employ in 2005 and now works for Honda Motor Company, Ltd. in Japan. Mr. Nogouchi left Honda’s employ in 2004 and now works for Mobilityland Corp., also in Japan. Neither has any ongoing relationship with Honda of America. Although the plaintiffs asserted in their memoranda that Mr. Hirashimi is still a director of Honda of America, that statement was not supported by evidence, and Honda attached to its reply memorandum Mr. Hirashimi’s resignation letter effective March 31, 2005.
There apparently is some corporate relationship between Honda Motor Company, Ltd., Honda of America, and Mobilityland. The latter two may each be wholly-owned subsidiaries of Honda Motor Company, Ltd. However, all are separate corporations. It is with these facts in mind that the instant motion to quash will be decided.
II.
The proper resolution on Honda’s motion to quash turns on the way in which Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d) is interpreted. That rule provides that “[i]f ... an officer, director or managing agent of a party ... fails ... to appear before the officer who is to take [a] deposition, after being served with the proper notice” the Court may impose sanctions against the non-appearing party. Because of the availability of such sanctions under Rule 37(d), a deposition notice, unaccompanied by a subpoena, is ordinarily sufficient to compel the appearance of a corporate opponent’s officers, directors, and managing agents at a deposition. Other witnesses who do not fall into the category of officer, director, or managing agent, may be compelled to appear and testify at a deposition only if the procedures set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P 45 are followed. Here, Honda contends that because neither of the two deponents are currently officers, directors, or managing agents of Honda of America, the deposition
1

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

notices served by Ms. Ways are simply ineffective to compel their appearance at the deposition.
The responsive memoranda devote considerable argument to the question of whether the Court can properly issue an order preventing the plaintiffs from taking the depositions of Messrs. Hirashimi and Nogouchi. That is not the issue, however, and the cases cited in support of the proposition that the Court should rarely bar a litigating party from taking a deposition are simply inapposite. The question is not whether the plaintiffs are entitled to take these depositions, but whether they can compel the two deponents to appear in Dayton, Ohio by virtue of the deposition notices which were issued. The Court now turns to that question.
*2 The general rule relating to depositions of non-party witnesses, including persons who may either have or have had a relationship with a corporate party, can be stated as follows. If the witness is not an officer, director, or managing agent of a corporate opponent, “[s]uch a witness must be subpoenaed pursuant to Rule 45 ... or, if the witness is overseas, the procedures of the Hague Convention or other applicable treaty must be utilized.” Stone v.. Morton International, 170 F.R.D. 498, 503 (D.Utah 1997). The determination as to whether a deponent is an officer, director, or managing agent of a corporate party is made at the time the deposition is noticed, rather than at the time that the events in question occurred. In re Honda Motor Co., Inc., Dealership Relations Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 535 (D.Md.1996). The burden is on the party noticing the deposition to demonstrate that the deponent is an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporate opponent. Id. However, this burden has been described as “modest” and may require nothing more than a showing that it is a “close question” as to whether the needed relationship exists. See Boss Mfg. Co. v. Hugo Boss AG, 1999 WL 20828 (S.D.N.Y. January 13, 1999).
Honda argues that a former corporate employee is clearly not an officer or director of a corporation once his or her formal relationship with the corporation has terminated, and that such a person can also never qualify as a “managing agent.” As a general rule, that statement is true. See, e.g., Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 33 F.R.D. 262 (M.D.Pa.1963) (holding that it is obvious that the deposition of a retired officer of a corporation (in that case, the former president) may not be taken simply by notice). However, there are a handful of cases holding that, under particular circumstances, someone who has terminated his or her relationship with a corporate party

might still be considered to be a “managing agent” for purposes of Rule 37(d). The question then becomes whether any of these exceptions applies in this case.
The EEOC cites two decisions in support of its position that Messrs. Hirashimi and Nogouchi might still be considered to be managing agents of Honda of America. See Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 342 (N.D.Ohio 1999); Boston Diagnostics Development Corp. v. Kollsman Mfg. Co., 123 F.R.D. 415 (D.Mass.1988). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that these cases are either inapplicable or are not persuasive on the issue of whether deposition notices suffice in this case to compel the attendance of these two witnesses.
The Libbey decision appears to have relied on the case of Independent Production Equip. v. Loew’s, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 19 (S.D .N.Y.1959) for the proposition that a former corporate employee who maintains some relationship with, or an identity of interest with, a corporate party in litigation may be compelled to appear at a deposition by way of a deposition notice. The Loew’s case relied, in turn, on a decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, O’Shea v. Jewel Tea Co., 233 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.1956) as authority for that same proposition. O’Shea, however, did not deal with deposition notices, but rather the completely separate question of whether a former corporate employee could be treated as a hostile witness at trial. Further, as noted in Colonial Capital Co. v. General Motors, 29 F.R.D. 514 (D.Conn.1961), the “peculiar facts” of the Loew’s case radically limit its value as a general precedent in this area. Rather, at most, Loew’s stands for the proposition that a witness may be considered to be a managing agent of a corporation after his resignation only if he still exercises some control or judgment over the daily affairs of the corporation or if the resignation was effected in order to avoid the possibility that the witness could be deposed through service of a deposition notice. See JSC Foreign Economic Association Technostroyexport v. International Development Trade Services, 220 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y.2004); see also In re Honda American Motor Co. Inc., Dealership Relations Litigation, supra (confirming that the general rule may be inapplicable if the resignation occurred in order to prevent an employee from being deposed). At a minimum, therefore, if the deposition notices are to be given effect in this case, the plaintiffs must show that the two witnesses are still involved in the corporate business of Honda of America, see Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 1992 WL 168085 (E.D.Pa. July 9, 1992), or that they resigned precisely in order to avoid having their depositions taken in this case.
2

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

*3 Neither of those facts have been demonstrated here. First, there is no evidence that the decisions made by Mr. Nogouchi in 2004 or Mr. Hirashimi in 2005 to go to work either for the parent company of Honda of America or a sister subsidiary were related in any way to this litigation or a desire to avoid being deposed. Plaintiffs have not suggested that this is the case. Further, there is no evidence that either gentleman has retained any control or authority over day-to-day business decisions of Honda of America. The mere fact that they work for related corporations is insufficient to establish that type of control. Plaintiffs have not cited a single case, nor has the Court’s own research located any cases, holding that simply because a witness works for a related corporation, that witness can both be deemed to be a managing agent of a different corporation and can be compelled to appear at a deposition through the service of a deposition notice on that corporation. In short, there is simply no factual basis upon which the Court can determine either that Messrs. Nogouchi and Hirashimi ought to be classified as “managing agents” of Honda of America or that any other exception to the general rule requiring such witnesses to be subpoenaed to a deposition, rather than noticed, applies here. Consequently, the motion to quash is well-taken and will be granted.

III.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant Honda of America, Inc. to quash and/or for a protective order (# 43) is granted.
Any party may, within ten (10) days after this Order is filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for reconsideration by a District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt. I., F., 5. The motion must specifically designate the order or part in question and the basis for any objection. Responses to objections are due ten days after objections are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter. The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.4.
	  

3

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 1541364 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,
Monica P. Ways, Plaintiff-Intervener, v.
HONDA OF AMERICA, MFG., INC., Defendant.
No. 2:06-cv-00233. | May 23, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jeffrey A. Stern, C. Larry Watson, Lawrence Mays, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cleveland District Office, Cleveland, OH, Jacqueline H. McNair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Willie E. Gary, Charlene R. Banks, Debra S. Nolan, Tricia P. Hoffler, Gary Williams Parenti Finney Lewis McManus Watson & Sperando, Stuart, FL, James R. Greene, III, Valerie Lynn Colbert, James R. Greene III & Associates, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff-Intervener.
Frank Allen Ray, Frank A. Ray Co. LPA, Sarah Daggett Morrison, Chester Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, John F. Birmingham, Philip B. Phillips, Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit, MI, Nancy J. Sennett, Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.
Opinion
OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL H. WATSON, United States District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting that defendant terminated plaintiff-intervener’s employment on the basis of plaintiff-intervener’s race and in retaliation for plaintiff-intervener engaging in protected activities. In a separate complaint, plaintiff-intervener asserts various additional claims under Title VII and state law. This

matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion for partial dismissal of plaintiff-intervener’s claims (Doc. 24). Defendant argues, inter alia, that plaintiff-intervener failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her Title VII hostile work environment and disparate impact claims, and that she failed to plead fraud with particularity. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendants’ motion for partial dismissal.
I. Facts
The Court accepts as true the following well-pleaded facts set forth in plaintiff-intervener’s complaint (Doc. 17). Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is an agency of the United States. Plaintiff-intervener Monica P. Ways (“Ways”) is an African-American female citizen of the United States. She resides in Ohio. Defendant Honda of America Mfg., Inc. (“Honda”) is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. Ways worked for Honda as its Senior Manager for Diversity Management and Ethics from February 3, 2003 until Honda terminated her employment on April 19, 2004.
Honda recruited Ways while she was working as the Executive Director of the Dayton, Ohio region of the National Conference for Community Justice. Although she does not identify the declarant, Ways alleges that she was told that she was being hired to create a more diverse workforce at Honda.
Throughout her employment at Honda, Ways was supervised by Rick Schostek (“Schostek”). Schostek held the positions of Vice President of Support Services and General Counsel, as well as EEO Compliance Officer, Secretary of Honda’s Board of Directors, and Acting Chief Financial Officer.
For about the first nine months of her employment at Honda, Ways observed that Schostek seemed engaged in and receptive to her ideas and approach for increasing diversity at Honda. Ways avers, however, that Schostek’s attitude toward her began to change as she questioned Honda’s employment and business practices. Ways maintains that Schostek and others began to intentionally frustrate her efforts to create a more diverse, inclusive and ethical environment at Honda.
1

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

At one point, Schostek became visibly agitated when Ways refused to sign Equal Opportunity Surveys without first seeing the compensation data used to compile Honda’s response. Ways was also accused of being disrespectful towards an attorney who worked with the law firm that served as Honda’s outside legal counsel. On April 19, 2004, Honda terminated Ways’ employment. Ways filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and moved to intervene in this lawsuit within the prescribed statute of limitations.
II. Motion to Dismiss
*2 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(1), for lack of jurisdiction, 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 9(b), for failure to plead fraud with particularity.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir.2007). The complaint need only put a party on notice of the claim being asserted against it to satisfy the requirement of stating a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8; Memphis, Tennessee Area Local, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir.2004). “A complaint need not anticipate every defense and accordingly need not plead every response to a potential defense. Id. All well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true and be construed in favor of the non-movant. Thomas, 481 F.3d at 437; Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 855 (6th Cir.2003).
III. Discussion
Honda seeks dismissal of Ways’ Title VII disparate impact claim (Claim Three) and her Title VII hostile work environment claims (Claims Five and Thirteen) on the ground that Ways failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Honda moves to dismiss Ways’ Title VII and Ohio Revised Code disparate impact claims (Claims Three and Eleven) on the bases that Ways has failed to

isolate and identify a specific policy that disparately impacted African-Americans, and that Ways lacks standing to assert disparate impact claims. Honda also requests dismissal of Ways’ claim of wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy (Claim Fourteen) on the ground that Ohio law does not recognize such a claim where, as here, statutory remedies exist. Honda seeks dismissal of Ways’ common law fraud claim (Claim Sixteen) on the basis that Ways has failed to plead fraud with particularity. Honda also moves the Court to strike Ways’ request for non-economic damages in connection with her Fifteenth Claim, breach of contract, and her Seventeenth Claim, promissory estoppel. The Court will address these grounds for dismissal seriatim.
A. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Honda argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Ways’ Title VII disparate impact and hostile work environment claims because Ways failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to those claims.
A plaintiff seeking to assert a claim under Title VII in federal court must first exhaust her administrative remedies by submitting the claim in a charge timely filed with the EEOC. Randolph v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Serv., 453 F.3d 724, 731 (6th Cir.2006); Tisdale v. Federal Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir.2004). The purpose of the requirement is to afford the EEOC the opportunity to persuade the parties to enter a voluntary settlement, which is the preferred disposition of such claims. Randolph, 453 F.3d at 731. The requirement, however, is not rigid. Id. at 732. Hence, EEOC complaints are construed liberally to encompass all claims “ ‘reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ “ Id. (quoting Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 675 (6th Cir.1992).
*3 Ways filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on August 5, 2004. On the charge form, she indicated that Honda had discriminated against her based on race, sex and retaliation. The “particulars” portion of her charge states as follows in its entirety:
I was hired on February 2, 2003 by Honda of America (hereinafter referred to as Respondent), most recently performing duties as a Senior manager of Diversity Management & Ethic [sic]. My primary role was to develop strategies that would result in Respondent
2

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

becoming a more diverse, inclusive, and ethical organization.
On April 19, 2004, I was informed by Rick Schostek (White/Male), Vice President Support Services & General Counsel, and Hank Real (White/Male), Senior Manager of Associate Relations that I was being terminated for disrespectful behavior and inaccuracies in communication.
During my employment, I never received a letter to my file or any type of progressive discipline in the form of coaching or counseling regarding my behavior. Although, I did received [sic] positive performance evaluations during the year 2003.
I am also aware that my male predecessor received higher wages than I. He also received 20% bonuses, whereas I received a much lower percentage in bonuses.
Also, I uncovered discriminatory, inequitable, and unethical practices at the company and made senior officials in the company, including the president, aware of them. I believe my termination was the result of these actions coupled with my efforts to encourage Respondent to comply with EEOC and OFCCP guidelines and regulations.
I believe I was denied equal wages because of my sex, female; discharged because of my race, black; sex, female; and in retaliation for making Respondent aware of discriminatory and unethical practices going on in the workplace in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Exhibit A, Motion for Partial Dismissal (Doc. 24). The EEOC investigated Ways’ charge, and issued its Determination on April 20, 2005. The relevant portion of the Determination states as follows:
The investigation does not reveal that Charging Party was discriminated against when she was denied equal pay due to her sex, female.
The investigation revealed evidence to establish that Charging Party was discriminated against due to her race, Black and retaliated against when she was discharged. The evidence also shows that prior to being discharged the Charging Party was also subjected to different terms and conditions of employment because of her race and based on retaliation.

Exhibit B, Motion for Partial Dismissal (Doc. 24).
Ways maintains that her Title VII disparate impact and hostile work environment claims “arise out of, and can be integrally connected to” her claims of race discrimination. Memo. in Opposition (Doc. 34) at 9. Ways contends that her charge would have prompted an investigation into her hostile work environment and disparate impact claims. Id. at 10.
*4 Even applying the most liberal construction in Ways’ favor, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that Ways’ EEOC charge would not have given rise to an investigation of claims based upon hostile work environment or disparate impact. Ways’ charge plainly sets forth claims for discrimination based on race and sex, retaliation, and unequal pay. Her charge refers to alleged “discriminatory, inequitable, and unethical practices” at Honda. Nonetheless, Ways does not suggest that she was subjected to these practices. Rather, she made officials at Honda aware of the practices, and Honda then allegedly terminated her employment in retaliation. Hence, the allegations logically refer to her retaliation claim. Construed liberally, Ways’ charge does not remotely call to mind claims for hostile work environment or disparate impact. The Court therefore concludes that Ways failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her Title VII claims for hostile work environment and disparate impact. Accordingly, Honda is entitled to dismissal of Ways’ Third, Fifth, and Thirteenth Claims for relief.
B. Disparate impact: specific policy
Honda next argues that Ways’ federal and state law disparate impact claims are subject to dismissal because Ways has failed to isolate and identify any specific policy or practice that injured her. Ways relies on the following two paragraphs in her complaint to establish her disparate impact claim:
125. Plaintiff-Intervener challenged those employment policies and practices at Defendant HAM that resulted in disparities between protected and non-protected classes. Specifically, Plaintiff-Intervener determined that Defendant HAM’s employment policies and practices resulted in qualified minority candidates being denied equal job consideration and being ineligible for
3

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

promotions. Likewise, jobs were not being posted and there were compliance issues, particularly in areas of under-utilization.
126. Defendant HAM’s challenged employment policies and practices had an adverse effect on African-American and other minority employees at the company.
Complaint (Doc. 17) at 14.
Honda maintains that a plaintiff asserting a disparate impact claim must isolate and identify the specific policy or practice giving rise to the disparity. The requirement was applied to a claim arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005):
Turning to the case before us, we initially note that petitioners have done little more than point out that the pay plan at issue is relatively less generous to older workers than to younger workers. They have not identified any specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on older workers. As we held in Wards Cove, it is not enough to simply allege that there is a disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized policy that leads to such an impact. Rather, the employee is “ ‘responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.’ “ 490 U.S., at 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (emphasis added) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S ., at 994, 108 S.Ct. 2777). Petitioners have failed to do so. Their failure to identify the specific practice being challenged is the sort of omission that could “result in employers being potentially liable for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances....’ “ 490 U.S., at 657, 109 S.Ct. 2115.
*5 Id. at 241. One of the decisions Honda cites illustrates the application of this principle. See White v. American Axle & Mfg., Inc., No. 05-CV-72741-DT, 2006 WL 335710 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 14, 2006). White presented claims under both Title VII and the ADEA. The defendant in White moved to dismiss all of the plaintiff’s disparate impact claims, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to identify a facially-neutral policy that caused the disparity. The court in White analyzed the Title VII and ADEPA claims separately. Following Smith, the court applied the Wards Cove standard to the plaintiff’s ADEA disparate impact claim. White, at *5-6. The court in White also recognized:

“1991 amendments to Title VII superseded portions of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988), which held that a plaintiff in a disparate impact case must show the discriminatory effect of specific practices on protected group members. The amendments provide that if the plaintiff demonstrates that ‘the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one practice.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).”
Id. at *3 (quoting Philips v. Cohen, 400 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir.2005)). In the instant case, however, Ways does not invoke the “not capable of separation” analysis. Moreover, the court in White concluded that even under the 1991 amendments to Title VII, a plaintiff must still identify, at the pleading stage, a specific facially neutral policy or practice that resulted in disparate impact. Id. Finding that the plaintiff had failed to meet this standard, the court in White dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.
Here, Ways has likewise failed to identify any specific facially neutral policy or practice that resulted in disparate impact. Ways does not cogently explain why her disparate impact claims should not be dismissed on this basis. Rather, she discusses United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1094 (6th Cir.1998), for the proposition that the Wards Cove requirement concerning labor statistics is relaxed when such statistics are not reasonably available. Ways’ argument misses the mark. Honda does not seek dismissal of Ways’ disparate impact claims because Ways has failed to plead statistics; rather, Honda argues dismissal is required because Ways has failed to identify any facially neutral policy or practice that resulted in disparate impact. Accordingly, the Court rejects Ways’ arguments based on Warren, and will dismiss Ways’ Third and Eleventh Claims.
C. Standing
In the alternative, Honda argues that Ways’ disparate impact claims must be dismissed because Ways lacks standing to assert such claims. Specifically, Honda maintains Ways does not have standing because she fails to allege that she was personally injured by the subject policies or practices.
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E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

*6 To establish constitutional standing to bring a claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that she was personally injured by the defendant’s alleged discrimination. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Phillips, 400 F.3d at 396. In the instant case, Ways alleges as follows:

Specifically, Plaintiff-Intervener

determined that Defendant HAM’s

employment policies and practices

resulted in qualified minority

candidates being denied equal job

consideration and being ineligible

for promotions. Likewise, jobs

were not being posted and there

were

compliance

issues,

particularly in areas of

under-utilization.

Complaint (Doc. 17) at 14.

Ways does not meaningfully respond to Honda’s standing argument. Rather, she contends she was terminated because of her opposition to the subject policies and practices. This argument, however, is relevant to her retaliation claim, which Honda does not seek to dismiss, not her disparate impact claims.

Honda hired Ways, so Ways cannot assert she was injured because she was denied equal job consideration. Ways does not allege that she was denied a promotion; therefore she cannot maintain she was injured by any policy affecting eligibility for promotions. Similarly, Ways does not contend she was injured as a result of the manner in which jobs were posted by Honda, or by any alleged under-utilization. In short, Ways has failed to plead any facts indicating that she was personally injured by any policies or practices at Honda that allegedly led to disparate impact. Consequently, Ways lacks standing to assert her disparate impact claims. For this additional reason, Honda is entitled to dismissal of Claims Three and Eleven.

for her termination. Ways expressly concedes that her public policy claim is subject to dismissal. Memo. in Opp. (Doc 34) at 15-16. The Court will therefore dismiss Ways’ Fourteenth Claim.

E. Fraud
Honda argues Ways’ fraud claim must be dismissed because Ways failed to plead the claim with sufficient particularity. Specifically, Honda contends that Ways has not identified any material representation upon which she relied. Ways maintains that she has identified such a representation, namely, Honda’s statement that Ways was hired to create a more diverse workforce at Honda.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) requires a plaintiff to plead a claim of fraud with particularity. To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must plead specifically the times, places and contents of the fraud. Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Academy, 273 F.3d 671, 678 (6th Cir.2001). In Ullmo, the plaintiffs based their fraud claims upon the defendant’s representation in its handbook that “it would work to fully develop its students and would respect its students differing abilities and styles of learning.” 273 F.3d at 677. The court in Ullmo held that such a statement was too vague and indefinite to support a claim for fraud. Id. at 678.
*7 Ullmo is on point. Like the representation at issue in Ullmo, the representation allegedly made by Honda in the instant case is indefinite and aspirational. The Court therefore finds that Ways has failed to plead her fraud claim with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). Accordingly, Ways’ Sixteenth Claim will be dismissed.1

1

Ways seeks leave to amend her fraud claim. Ways,

however, does not indicate what such an amendment

would consist of, or how it would cure the defect in her

pleading. The Court therefore denies Ways’ request to

amend her fraud claim.

D. Public policy
Honda next asserts that Ways’ claim of wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy must be dismissed because Ways has adequate statutory remedies

F. Non-economic damages for breach of contract and promissory estoppel
Lastly, Honda seeks an order striking the non-economic
5

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

damages components of Ways’ breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. Honda asserts that damages for emotional distress are not available for breach of contract or promissory estoppel.
Ways relies on a decision by the Ohio Supreme Court that carved a narrow exception to the rule that damages for emotional distress may not be recovered for breach of contract. See Kishmarton v. Williams Bailey Construction, Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 226 (2001). Kishmarton, however, is expressly limited to cases involving transactions between vendees and building vendors. Brainard v. American Skandia Life Assurance Corp., 432 F.3d 655, 665 (6th Cir.2005). The facts of the instant case as pleaded by Ways do not fall within the narrow exception identified in Kishmarton. As a result, Honda is entitled to an order striking the non-economic damages components of Ways’ breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims.

IV. Disposition
Based on the above, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for partial dismissal (Doc. 24). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Ways’ Third, Fifth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Sixteenth Claims for Relief. In addition, the Court STRIKES the noneconomic damages components of Ways’ Fifteenth and Seventeenth Claims for Relief.
The Clerk shall remove Doc. 24 from the Court’s next Civil Justice Reform Act motions report.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
	  

6

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 1024426 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPURTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC., Defendant.
No. 2:06-cv-0233. | March 29, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jeffrey A. Stern, C. Larry Watson, Jacqueline H. McNair, Lawrence Mays, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Cleveland District Office, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.
Frank Allen Ray, Sarah Daggett Morrison, Columbus, OH, Ebony D. Wilkerson, John F. Birmingham, Philip B. Phillips, Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit, MI, Nancy J. Sennett, Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER
TERENCE P. KEMP, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This employment action is currently before the Court to consider whether an amendment to the complaint should be permitted. The proposed amendment would name two additional defendants to the state law claims pleaded by intervenor Monica Ways. The two proposed new defendants are Koki Hirashimi and Tadashi Nogouchi, both of whom were officials of Honda of America while Ms. Ways was employed there. For the following reasons, the motion for leave to amend will be denied.
Ms. Ways has argued her motion exclusively under the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), which provides generally that leave to amend should be purely granted when justice so requires and as long as there is no substantial prejudice to the opposing party. However, because the Court previously established a deadline for the filing of motions for leave to amend which has now

passed, before determining whether the standards of Rule 15 would permit the amendment, the Court must consider whether the requirements of Fed.R . Civ.P. 16(b) have been satisfied. See, e.g., Inge v. Rock Financial Corp, 281 F.3d 613 (6th Cir.2002).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b) requires the Court, in each civil action which is not exempt from that rule, to “enter a scheduling order that limits the time” to, inter alia, file motions, identify expert witnesses, and complete discovery. The rule further provides that “[a] schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause....”
Although the Court has broad discretion to modify its own pretrial orders, it must be remembered that “[a]dherence to reasonable deadlines is ... critical to maintaining integrity in court proceedings,” Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F.Supp. 1191, 1199 (N.D.Iowa 1994), and that pretrial scheduling orders are “the essential mechanism for cases becoming trial-ready in an efficient, just, and certain manner.” Id. at 1198. In evaluating whether the party seeking modification of a pretrial scheduling order has demonstrated good cause, the Court is mindful that “[t]he party seeking an extension must show that despite due diligence it could not have reasonably met the scheduled deadlines.” Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, 904 F.Supp. 1218, 1221 (D.Kan.1995). The focus is primarily upon the diligence of the movant; the absence of prejudice to the opposing party is not equivalent to a showing of good cause. Tschantz v. McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D.Ind.1995). Of course, “[c]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Dilmer Oil Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 986 F.Supp. 959, 980 (D.S.C.1997). Further, although the primary focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s diligence, the presence or absence of prejudice to the other party or parties is a factor to be considered. Inge v. Rock Financial Corp., 281 F.3d 613 (6th Cir.2002). It is with these standards in mind that the instant motion will be decided.
Honda raised the Rule 16(b) issue in its responsive memorandum and Ms. Ways has not filed a reply, so it is difficult for the Court to determine exactly what arguments Ms. Ways might advance on the question of whether good cause has been shown to permit the amendment. Certainly, she cannot argue that she was unaware prior to the deadline that the two proposed new defendants held supervisory positions with her employer, or that under some circumstances (which, as Honda argues, may well not be present here) individuals may be held liable for employment discrimination under Ohio law. She might attempt to argue that the amendment
1

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

became necessary when it became apparent that Honda would not voluntarily produce these two gentlemen for depositions in Ohio, but the case law on that issue (as set forth in the Court’s order granting Honda’s motion for a protective order) is clear that foreign nationals who are not employed by a party defendant cannot be compelled to appear in the United States for a deposition, and she should have been aware at least of the potential for a dispute about that issue well before the deadline for amending the pleadings had passed. In any event, because Ms. Ways has advanced no argument that the good cause requirement of Rule 16(b) has been satisfied, and because it is not otherwise evident from the record that good cause exists, the Court declines to amend the scheduling order and therefore must deny the motion for leave to amend. This disposition renders it unnecessary to address Honda’s argument that the proposed amendment would be futile because the amended complaint fails to state a claim against either of the two proposed new defendants.
*2 For the foregoing reasons, the motion of intervening

plaintiff Monica Ways for leave to file an amended complaint (# 40) is denied.
Any party may, within ten (10) days after this Order is filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for reconsideration by a District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt. I., F., 5. The motion must specifically designate the order or part in question and the basis for any objection. Responses to objections are due ten days after objections are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter. The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.4.

2

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 4248204 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC., Defendant.
No. 2:06-CV-0233. | Nov. 30, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jeffrey A. Stern, C. Larry Watson, Lawrence Mays, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Cleveland District Office, Cleveland, OH, Jacqueline H. McNair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
John F. Birmingham, Philip B. Phillips, Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit, MI, Nancy J. Sennett, Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, Frank Allen Ray, Frank A. Ray Co LPA, Sarah Daggett Morrison, Chester Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER
TERENCE P. KEMP, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 In an order filed on March 29, 2007, the Court denied a motion filed by Intervenor Monica Ways to add two additional defendants to this case. Those defendants, Koki Hirashima and Tadashi Noguchi, both worked for Honda of America while Ms. Ways was employed there. On October 18, 2007, Ms. Ways filed a second motion for leave to amend her complaint, again requesting leave to add these two gentlemen as defendants. For the following reasons, that motion will likewise be denied.
Ms. Ways’ first motion for leave to amend was denied because she made no argument that she had shown good cause for moving for leave to amend the complaint after the deadline for filing such motions. That deadline, September 1, 2006, was established in the Court’s preliminary pretrial order. The Court noted in passing that it was unlikely that the proposed amended complaint

stated a claim against the two proposed new defendants, but did not deny the motion on that ground.
In her more recent motion for leave to amend, Ms. Ways asserts that new facts which have come to light as a result of additional discovery justify her current attempt to amend her complaint. Those new facts include notes produced and deposition testimony given by Tracy McPherson, a Honda employee, and Ms. Ways’ own deposition testimony. Ms. Ways could not have learned new facts from her own deposition testimony, however, so that basis of her argument will be disregarded. The question is then whether any new facts learned from Ms. McPherson’s notes or testimony justifies a relaxation of the deadlines set for filing motions for leave to amend.
At her deposition taken on October 12, 2007, Ms. McPherson testified that when she learned from Richard Schostek, then Vice President and General Counsel of Honda of America, that he had decided to terminate Ms. Ways’ employment, she questioned whether that decision was proper. She raised her concerns with Mr. Schostek’s immediate superior, a Mr. Adams. She definitively testified that she never discussed the matter with Mr. Noguchi because she did not respect his judgment. When asked whether she discussed the matter with Mr. Hirashima, who was President of Honda of America at one time, she stated that she probably did not. She could not specifically recall whether Mr. Hirashima had moved on at that time, but stated that he probably had because, if he had not, she likely would have discussed her concerns with him. She provided no other testimony indicating that either Mr. Hirashima or Mr. Noguchi were involved in any way in Mr. Schostek’s decision to terminate Ms. Ways’ employment.
It is clear that no new facts have emerged from this discovery. Ms. Ways has always been aware that Mr. Hirashima and Mr. Noguchi worked for Honda of America and that they were either directly or indirectly above her in some supervisory capacity. Ms. McPherson’s testimony that she never discussed Ms. Ways’ termination with Mr. Noguchi and probably did not discuss it with Mr. Hirashima contributes nothing to the question of whether Ms. Ways is in possession of the facts which would enable her to plead a viable cause of action against either of those individuals. Her cause of action could arise only under Ohio law and could be based only upon the allegation that either of the proposed new defendants was a supervisor as defined under Ohio law and participated in the decision to terminate Ms. Ways’ employment for discriminatory reasons. Ms. Ways knows as much, or as little, about those subjects now as she did prior to the time
1

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

that Ms. McPherson testified. As a result, she has not demonstrated good cause for leave to file an amended complaint after the September 1, 2006 deadline. The Court also notes, parenthetically, that the amended complaint does not appear to state a cause of action against these two proposed new defendants because it does not allege their direct participation in the decision to terminate her. Although Mr. Schostek’s affidavit states that neither was involved, because that is a factual matter more appropriate for resolution by way of a summary judgment motion, the Court has not taken that assertion into account in making its decision.
*2 Based upon the foregoing, the second motion for leave to amend (# 70) is denied.
Any party may, within ten (10) days after this Order is

filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for reconsideration by a District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt. I., F., 5. The motion must specifically designate the order or part in question and the basis for any objection. Responses to objections are due ten days after objections are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter. The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.4.

2

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2008)

2008 WL 440437 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, and
Monica P. Ways, Plaintiff-Intervener, v.
HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC., Defendant.
No. 2:06-cv-0233. | Feb. 13, 2008.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jeffrey A. Stern, C. Larry Watson, Lawrence Mays, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cleveland District Office, Cleveland, OH, Jacqueline H. McNair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Willie E. Gary, Charlene R. Banks, Debra S. Nolan, Tricia P. Hoffler, Gary Williams Parenti Finney Lewis McManus Watson & Sperando, Stuart, FL, James R. Greene, III, Valerie Lynn Colbert, James R Greene III & Associates, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff-Intervener.
Frank Allen Ray, Frank A. Ray Co. LPA, Sarah Daggett Morrison, Chester Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, John F. Birmingham, Jr., Philip B. Phillips, Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit, MI, Nancy J. Sennett, Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.
Opinion
OPINION AND ORDER
TERENCE P. KEMP, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This employment discrimination case is before the Court to address two filings raising issues relating to discovery. The first is defendant Honda of America Mfg.’s motion of December 13, 2007, which requests the Court to quash a deposition subpoena, to declare certain documents privileged, to compel their return, and to award sanctions. The other is a document filed by Plaintiff-Intervener Monica P. Ways on January 22, 2008 which is entitled “Reply in Support of Plaintiff-Intervener

Monica Ways’ Amended Notice of Videotaped Deposition Decus Tecum of Rick Schostek.” The Court will deal with these filings in reverse order.
I.
The Court turns first to the issues raised by Ms. Ways’ January 22, 2008 filing. Although the filing is not styled as a motion, it does request the Court to take certain action. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that no action is needed with respect to the matters raised in that filing.
By way of background, according to Ms. Ways’ memorandum, she served an amended notice of videotaped deposition duces tecum of Rick Schostek, a Honda official, on December 27, 2007. The notice scheduled Mr. Schostek’s deposition for January 4, 2008, and requested that he bring with him certain documents, including notes which he received from Mary Ellen Fairfield and Lynn Dennison concerning a complaint made about Ms. Ways by David Campbell, a lawyer at Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, and any notes which either he or Ms. Fairfield wrote concerning Ms. Ways and relating to any of the matters set forth in the complaint. Honda filed objections to the notice on January 3, 2008 contending, among other things, that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34 the document request was improper because it did not give Mr. Schostek 30 days within which to produce the documents. In her memorandum, Ms. Ways argues that Rule 34 does not apply to her document request, but rather Rule 45, which does not contain a 30-day response provision.
Honda makes a number of counter-arguments in its January 25, 2008 memorandum. The only one which the Court need consider, however, is that Honda has affirmatively represented, both at the deposition as part of a telephone conference with the Court, and in its memorandum, that all non-privileged documents described in the notice of deposition had already been produced. As Honda succinctly states on page five of its reply memorandum, Honda “has produced all non-privileged documents within the scope of the EEOC document request and the Amended Notice. It has nothing more to produce.”
Whatever view the Court may have of the procedural issues raised by the parties, one thing is clear. A party cannot be compelled to produce documents for a second time which it has already produced once. Ms. Ways does
1

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2008)

not contend in her memorandum that Honda’s representation concerning its production of non-privileged documents is inaccurate. Rather, at page five of her memorandum she states, somewhat obliquely, her belief that any privileged notes which have been withheld “must be disclosed if they are a defense to the termination of Ways or a justification for that termination.”
*2 Presumably, the privileged documents which Honda has withheld have been identified properly on a privilege log. The information on the privilege log should be detailed enough to allow Ms. Ways or plaintiff EEOC, if either so chose, to file a motion challenging Honda’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege. If such a motion were presented, Honda would have the opportunity to respond by justifying its invocation of the privilege, and the Court would then have a record upon which to determine whether the privilege was properly invoked. None of that has occurred here.
The Court did caution Honda’s attorneys, during the course of the telephone conference conducted as part of Mr. Schostek’s deposition, to examine any withheld notes in order to insure that the invocation of attorney-client privilege was appropriate. The Court stated that the notes could be withheld only if they reflected communications between Honda and its attorney, Ms. Fairfield, about matters for which legal advice was being sought or about which Ms. Fairfield was acting in the capacity of an attorney. Factual information which Ms. Fairfield may have relayed concerning Mr. Campbell’s complaint does not appear to fall in that category. Additionally, if any withheld notes reflected Ms. Fairfield’s business advice to Mr. Schostek concerning what, as a business matter, he might wish to do with the information received from Mr. Campbell, as opposed to legal advice advising Mr. Schostek what he was entitled to do with that information, such business advice would not be privileged. The Court assumes that Honda’s counsel followed its admonition and that the only notes being withheld relate to matters of legal advice. Under the current circumstances, when no motion to compel production of privileged documents has been presented, and no direct arguments have been made to the Court concerning whether Honda’s invocation of privilege with respect to these documents is appropriate, there is no basis for the Court to take any action beyond that which has already occurred. Consequently, no relief will be granted with respect to the January 22, 2008 filing.
II.
The other discovery motion requiring a ruling relates to

two subpoenas issued to Tracy McPherson, a former Honda employee. Ms. McPherson was deposed on October 12, 2007, and Ms. Ways then served her with a document subpoena. According to Honda, when Ms. McPherson responded to that document subpoena, she produced documents covered by the attorney-client privilege. Honda asked counsel for both Ms. Ways and the EEOC to return these documents, but they have not done so. Additionally, Ms. Ways noticed Ms. McPherson for a second deposition. Honda has asked the Court to quash the subpoena. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Honda is entitled to have any privileged documents returned, and is also entitled to an order quashing the deposition subpoena.
Like many discovery matters, a precise procedural history of what occurred is essential to determining whether the party requesting the Court’s intervention is entitled to relief. The Court will therefore state the procedural history of this matter to the best of its ability based upon the parties’ filings and the Court’s docket.
*3 The first subpoena at issue is a document subpoena which was prepared by Ms. Ways’ counsel on October 19, 2007, and apparently served on Ms. McPherson by regular mail on the same day. That subpoena requested Ms. McPherson to produce any personal files she maintained while employed at Honda. The date and time for production of those documents was established as November 5, 2007 at Ms. Ways’ counsel’s office in Dayton, Ohio. However, the record is silent as to whether a copy of this subpoena was served on Honda as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b)(1), which requires that “[p] rior notice of any commanded production of documents ... shall be served on each party in the manner prescribed by Rule 5(b).” The subpoena itself has never been filed with the Court, the copy attached to Honda’s motion as Exhibit 7 to the affidavit of Sarah Morrison does not contain a certificate of service, and there has otherwise been no compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d).
It does not appear that counsel for Honda attended the document production. However, after Ms. McPherson produced documents in response to the subpoena, Ms. Ways’ counsel declined to provide Honda with a copy of them, stating that Honda could get its own set from Ms. McPherson. Honda was apparently unable to do so because she provided the original documents to Ms. Ways’ counsel. Honda did not see the produced documents until December 6, 2007.
After reviewing these documents, Honda immediately determined that a number of them appear to be privileged. During Ms. McPherson’s deposition, Honda addressed
2

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2008)

any privileged communications Ms. McPherson might have been privy to while employed at Honda by stating that Honda was not waiving the attorney-client privilege with respect to such communications. After learning that Ms. McPherson had produced documents to Ms. Ways’ counsel, but prior to seeing the documents, Honda again raised the issue concerning privileged materials and again noted that Ms. McPherson had no authority to waive Honda’s attorney-client privilege. After obtaining copies, Honda prepared a chart listing those documents produced by McPherson which it claims to be privileged. It also asked counsel for Ms. Ways and the EEOC to return their copies of these documents, but they have not done so.
It would have been helpful for the Court to know whether Honda was served with a copy of the document subpoena directed to Ms. McPherson at or before the time set for production. Such service is, of course, required by Rule 45(b)(1). One of the reasons the Rule incorporates this requirement is “to afford the other party the opportunity to object to the production or inspection” of documents described in the subpoena. See Advisory Committee Notes to 1991 Amendment to Rule 45; see also Automotive Inspection Services v. Flint Auto Auction, 2007 WL 3333016 (E.D.Mich. Nov. 9, 2007). One of the bases for an objection to a subpoena duces tecum directed to a non-party is that the subpoena calls for the production of privileged documents. See Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iii). In some circumstances, a party to litigation can waive the attorney-client privilege by failing to object to a subpoena that clearly calls for the production of privileged documents. American Home Assurance Co. v. Freemont Indemnity Co., 1993 WL 426984 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1993).
*4 Here, if Honda was not served with a copy of the subpoena duces tecum, Honda’s first opportunity to object to any production of privileged documents would have come only after it viewed the documents on December 6, 2007. Were that the case, there would be no question that Honda’s objection was timely, and that the only issue would be whether the documents are privileged. However, because the record is silent on the service issue, the Court will also analyze the question under the assumption that Honda had advance notice of the issuance of the document subpoena and therefore had an opportunity to make its objection known prior to Ms. McPherson’s production of the documents. Under those circumstances, the Court must decide whether Honda’s failure to make that objection constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege which might otherwise protect these documents from disclosure.
Under this latter scenario, Honda’s decision to permit Ms.

McPherson to produce privileged documents is akin to its own production of such documents through inadvertence. In fact, Honda has analyzed the issue in this fashion. In determining whether an inadvertent waiver has occurred which, despite the production of privileged documents, entitles the producing party to their return, this Court considers those factors set forth in Nilavar v. Mercer Health Systems-Western Ohio, 2004 WL 5345311 (S.D.Ohio March 22, 2004) (Rice, J.). Those factors include whether the party whose privileged documents have been produced took reasonable precautions to prevent the production, the number of documents disclosed, the extent of the disclosure, the promptness of the measures taken to rectify the disclosure, and the interests of justice.
With respect to the first factor, Honda asserts that it took reasonable precautions to prevent the production of privileged documents by asserting at Ms. McPherson’s deposition that it did not waive any attorney-client privilege with respect to communications between Ms. McPherson and Honda’s counsel, and by questioning in its post-production letters whether she had produced privileged documents. Given the fact that Honda was apparently on notice as early as the deposition taken on October 12, 2007, that Ms. McPherson might have privileged documents, its failure to make a written objection to the subpoena issued to her (assuming, again, that it had prior notice of the issuance of the subpoena) is somewhat unreasonable. The same could be said with respect to its failure to attend the document production if it believed that Ms. McPherson might be producing privileged documents. That would have been an ideal time for it to review the documents at the same time as counsel for the opposing parties and to assert its claim of privilege. By not doing either of these things, it created the opportunity for Ms. McPherson to produce privileged documents and for them to be viewed by counsel for the EEOC and Ms. Ways. Consequently, Honda may not have taken reasonable steps to prevent the production of these privileged documents.
*5 That, however is not the end of the inquiry. In this case, it appears that only a handful of privileged documents were disclosed, and the extent of the disclosure of privileged information was neither broad nor necessarily related in any significant way to the issues in this litigation. It is also true that, promptly after seeing these documents, Honda made every effort to obtain their return. It clearly would have made its request almost immediately after the documents were produced but for the inexplicable refusal of counsel for Ms. Ways and the EEOC to provide Honda with a copy of those documents. Once Honda contacted Ms. McPherson and discovered
3

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2008)

that she had turned her originals over to Ms. Ways’ counsel, Ms. Ways’ counsel still delayed sharing those documents with Honda. Thus, Honda acted as promptly as the circumstances permitted to rectify the disclosure.
The final consideration for the Court is the interests of justice. Again, evaluating this factor depends to some extent on whether Honda was given prior notice of the issuance of the document subpoena. If Honda had been aware in advance of the potential for disclosure of these documents, but failed either to make a formal objection to the document subpoena or to attend the document production to see what Ms. McPherson was producing, it may have been responsible to some extent for the disclosure. On the other hand, even under those circumstances, it may not have been appropriate for opposing counsel to accept clearly privileged documents from Ms. McPherson given Honda’s express invocation of that privilege at her October 12, 2007 deposition. This concept is more fully explored below, and it suggests that the interests of justice favor a return of the documents even if Honda had been given prior notice of the document subpoena.
If Honda was not aware that a subpoena had been issued to Ms. McPherson, the interests of justice are evaluated entirely differently. Sending a subpoena for documents to a non-party who is a former employee of a party, without providing notice that this has occurred, is essentially an ex parte communication with that employee. While the applicable ethical guidelines do not prohibit ex parte contact with former employees, they do require the party initiating the contact to take every effort to avoid the unauthorized disclosure of attorney-client communications. Thus, one court, construing Model Rule 4.4 (“Respect for the Rights of Third Persons”), concluded that “[i]n accordance with this rule, counsel must refrain from seeking, inducing or listening to the disclosure of any matter protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Brown v. St. Joseph County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 255 (N .D.Ind.1993). In fact, an attorney who initiates contact with a former employee of a corporate opponent in litigation is “ethically obligated to advise [the former employee] not to divulge information subject to the attorney-client privilege.” Concerned Parents of Jordan Park v. Housing Authority of City of St. Petersburg, 934 F.Supp. 406, 409 (M.D.Fla.1996). Moreover, although “an attorney may have ex parte contact with an unrepresented former employee of an organizational party ... the attorney may not inquire into areas subject to the attorney-client privilege....” Smith v. Kalamazco Opthamology, 322 F.Supp.2d 883, 890-91 (W.D.Mich.2004). Given these ethical restrictions, which do not vanish entirely just because the contact with the

former employee results from the issuance of a subpoena, the interests of justice strongly favor an order that the documents be returned.
*6 Here, balancing all of the factors required by Nilavar, and taking into account the fact that Honda appears to have been unaware that Ms. McPherson retained documents after she left Honda’s employ which contained attorney-client privileged communications, the Court agrees that any disclosure which occurred in this case was, at worst, inadvertent and did not constitute a waiver of the privilege.
This analysis does not, of course, address the question of whether any of the documents at issue are privileged. Ms. Ways asserts that the Court should not take Honda’s word for the fact that these documents are privileged. In response, Honda argues, citing to Rule 26(b)(5)(B), that once it makes a claim of privilege, it is the obligation of the party who received the privileged documents to “present the information to the Court under seal for a determination of the claim.” Ms. Ways has not done so. Further, Honda asserts that it has provided Ms. Ways’ counsel with sufficient information for counsel to determine that the documents in question constitute requests by Ms. McPherson to legal counsel for legal advice.
It may well be that Ms. Ways does not contest that one or more of the produced documents are privileged communications and has declined to return them only because she wished to litigate the issue of whether there had been a waiver of the privilege by inadvertent disclosure. If that is the case, that basis for refusing to return the documents no longer exists. On the other hand, if there is a genuine dispute about whether any of the documents constitutes a privileged communication, the parties shall arrange to have those documents submitted to the Court for an in camera review. That shall occur within ten days of the date of this order. Only those documents about which there is a legitimate basis for disagreement should be submitted, however.
The Court now turns to the issue of whether a second deposition of Ms. McPherson is justified. The sole ground advanced by Ms. Ways for taking the second deposition is that she should have received the additional documents she obtained from Ms. McPherson from Honda in advance of the first deposition. Because Honda did not produce those documents, Ms. Ways was unable to question Ms. McPherson about them. She asserts that Honda has not met its “heavy burden” of justifying an order quashing the deposition subpoena.
4

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2008)

Here, the proper Rule of Civil Procedure to be applied to the issue of whether Ms. McPherson can be re-deposed is Rule 30(a)(2). That rule provides that a party “must obtain leave of court” to take a deposition if “the person to be examined has already been deposed in the case....” Rule 30(a)(2) further states that such leave shall be granted to the extent consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2). That Rule, in turn, requires the Court to limit discovery which is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or if the party seeking discovery “has had ample opportunity ... to obtain the information sought....” Thus, the question becomes whether Ms. Ways had ample opportunity to depose Ms. McPherson with respect to these documents at the first session of her deposition. A secondary, but also important, question is whether the additional deposition would be unreasonably duplicative or burdensome or whether the cost of conducting the deposition outweighs any potential benefit of the deposition. See Fresenius Medical Care Holdings v. Roxane Laboratories, 2007 WL 764302 (S.D.Ohio March 9, 2007).
*7 Ms. Ways did not send Ms. McPherson a subpoena for documents prior to her first deposition. She did request that Honda provide documents from Ms. McPherson’s files, and Honda did so. However, it was clearly known to Ms. Ways prior to the deposition that Ms. McPherson was no longer employed by Honda. As a result, Ms. Ways should have appreciated the fact that Honda did not have control over Ms. McPherson. Consequently, while Honda was entitled to ask Ms. McPherson to produce documents responsive to the earlier document request (and, according to its counsel’s affidavit, it did so), Ms. McPherson was under no obligation to provide Honda with any documents or, as it turns out, to provide Honda with a complete set of documents. Rather, Ms. McPherson apparently chose to withhold certain documents from Honda and to produce them only in response to the subpoena.
The reluctance or refusal of a non-party to provide documents in response to a voluntary request is not unanticipated in litigation. It is certainly the better practice to send a non-party a document subpoena prior to that person’s deposition. It is ordinarily unreasonable to rely upon the former employer of a non-party witness to obtain all documents from that person in response to a document request to the employer. In fact, the former employer has no obligation to seek such documents from a former employee and, in many cases, has no reason to believe that the former employee has retained any such documents. Consequently, the Court believes that Ms. Ways had ample opportunity to obtain these documents directly from Ms. McPherson prior to her deposition. Further, it would have been a simple matter for the

deposition subpoena to have included a duces tecum in order to insure that Ms. McPherson had not withheld any documents from production. Having failed to take those steps to prevent exactly the situation which occurred here, Ms. Ways cannot reasonably be heard to complain that she cannot take a second deposition of the same witness, especially when Honda bears no responsibility for Ms. Ways’ failure to obtain these documents prior to Ms. McPherson’s deposition.
Moreover, Honda has argued persuasively that the additional documents produced are largely irrelevant to any claims asserted by Ms. Ways in this case. Apparently, they relate to matters which occurred prior to Ms. Ways’ employment at Honda and to subjects entirely unrelated to her employment or the termination of that employment. The Court is not persuaded that there would be any benefit to the parties from an additional deposition and concludes that any benefit would be outweighed by the cost of that proceeding. For both these reasons, the Court concludes that the deposition ought not to go forward.
III.
Based upon the foregoing, the motion of defendant Honda of American Mfg. for an order quashing the subpoena of Tracy McPherson, declaring certain documents privileged and compelling their return, for a protective order, and for the award of reasonable expenses (# 91) is granted as follows. The deposition subpoena is quashed. The documents in question shall be submitted by the parties to the Court for an in camera inspection within ten days. Only those documents about which there is a legitimate difference of opinion concerning whether they are privileged attorney-client communications shall be submitted. Neither the EEOC nor Ms. Ways may disclose or make any use of the documents pending the Court’s review of the documents. The Court declines to award expenses in connection with this motion, primarily because the record is silent as to whether Honda was given advance notice of the issuance of the document subpoena to Ms. McPherson and thereby had some opportunity to protect its interests in privileged documents prior to or at the time of their initial production.
*8 Any party may, within ten (10) days after this Order is filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for reconsideration by a District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt. I., F., 5. The motion must specifically designate the order or part in question and the basis for
5

E.E.O.C. v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2008)

any objection. Responses to objections are due ten days after objections are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter. The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.4.

6

 
 Case: 2:06-cv-00233-MHW-TPK Doc #: 163 Filed: 03/31/09 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 3081
**AO 450 (Rev. 5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Plaintiff,
Monica P. Ways, Plaintiff-Intervener,
vs.
Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., Defendant.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Case No. 2:06-cv-233 Judge Michael H. Watson

[] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.
[] Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
[X] Decision by Court. This action was decided by the Court without a trial or hearing.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that pursuant to the March 31, 2009 Opinion and Order, the Court GRANTS Honda of America, Mfg., Inc.’s motion to enforce resolution. Final judgment is entered in favor of Honda of America, Mfg., Inc. and against the EEOC and Monica Ways, dismissing this action with prejudice. The judgment shall reflect that the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the May 12, 2008 settlement agreements, and to reopen the case for good cause shown if the terms of the settlement agreements are not fulfilled. The Court also retains jurisdiction to determine, separately, whether Honda of America, Mfg., Inc. is entitled to fees and costs in connection with its efforts to enforce the settlement agreements.

Date: March 31, 2009

James Bonini, Clerk

s/ Jennifer Kacsor By Jennifer Kacsor/Courtroom Deputy

 
 Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 1 of 15
CLOSED,JURY
U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio (Columbus) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:06−cv−00233−MHW−TPK

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Honda Of America Mfg Inc Assigned to: Judge Michael H. Watson Referred to: Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)
Interested Party

Date Filed: 03/27/2006 Date Terminated: 03/31/2009 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Ohio Department of Job and Family Services

represented by Patria V Hoskins Ohio Attorney General − 2 Employment Services Section 140 E Town Street 15th Floor Columbus, OH 43215−6001 614−995−1975 Email: patria.hoskins@ohioattorneygeneral.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Jeffrey A Stern Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Cleveland District Office Anthony J. Celebrezze Federal Office Building 1240 East 9th Street Suite 3001 Cleveland, OH 44199 216−522−7458 Fax: 216−522−7430 Email: jeffrey.stern@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

C Larry Watson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission AJC Federal Office Building Suite 3001 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216−522−7455 Fax: FAX−522−7430 Email: larry.watson@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacqueline H McNair Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 801 Market St Suite 1300 Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−440−2666 Fax: 215−440−2674 Email: jacqueline.mcnair@eeoc.gov

Lawrence Mays Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 2 of 15
AJC Federal Office Building Suite 3001 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216−522−4796 Fax: 216−522−7430 Email: Lawrence.Mays@EEOC.GOV ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways

represented by Willie E Gary Gary Williams Parenti Finney Lewis McManus Watson & Sperando 221 E Osceola Street Stuart, FL 34994 772−283−8260 Fax: 772.463.4319 Email: weg@williegary.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charlene R. Banks Gary, Williams Parenti, Finney, Lewis 221 East Osceola Street Stuart, FL 34994−2175 Email: crb@williegary.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Debra S. Nolan Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis 221 East Osceola Street Stuart, FL 34994−2175 772.283.8260 Fax: 772.463.4319 Email: dsn@williegary.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James R Greene , III James R Greene III & Associates Liberty Tower 120 W Second Street Suite 900 Dayton, OH 45402 937−225−3991 Email: jrgatlaw@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tricia P. Hoffler Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis 221 East Osceola Street Stuart, FL 34994−2175 772.283.8260 Fax: 772.463.4319 Email: tph@williegary.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Valerie Lynn Colbert James R. Greene, III & Associates 120 West Second St., Suite 900 Dayton, OH 45402 Email: valerie.colbert@ymail.com

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 3 of 15 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc
ThirdParty Plaintiff Monica P. Ways

represented by Frank Allen Ray Frank A. Ray Co., L.P.A PO Box 21444 Columbus, OH 43221−0444 614−223−2121 Fax: 614−224−3933 Email: fray@frankraylaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony D. Wilkerson Foley & Lardner LLP One Detroit Center 500 Woodward Avenue, Ste. 2700 Detroit, MI 48226 313.234.7145 Fax: 313.234.2800 Email: ewilkerson@foley.com TERMINATED: 03/22/2007
John F Birmingham , Jr. Foley & Lardner LLP 500 Woodward Avenue, Ste. 2700 Detroit, MI 48226 313.234.7127 Fax: 313.234.2800 Email: jbirmingham@foley.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy J. Sennett Foley & Lardner LLP 777 East Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, WI 53202 414.271.2400 Fax: 414.297.4900 Email: nsennett@foley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip B. Phillips Foley & Lardner LLP One Detroit Center 500 Woodward Ave., Ste. 2700 Detroit, MI 48226−3489 313.234.7109 Email: pphillips@foley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Daggett Morrison Ohio BWC 30 W. Spring Street Level 29 Columbus, OH 43215 614−466−1938 Email: sarahdmorrison@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 4 of 15
Willie E Gary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charlene R. Banks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Debra S. Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James R Greene , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tricia P. Hoffler (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Valerie Lynn Colbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc

represented by Frank Allen Ray (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ebony D. Wilkerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/22/2007
John F Birmingham , Jr. (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy J. Sennett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip B. Phillips (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Daggett Morrison (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/27/2006 03/27/2006

# Docket Text
1 Civil Cover Sheet (jm, ) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
2 COMPLAINT against Honda Of America Mfg Inc , filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(jm, ) (Entered: 03/27/2006)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 5 of 15

04/14/2006 05/24/2006 05/24/2006 05/25/2006
05/25/2006 06/08/2006
06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006
06/12/2006 06/13/2006
06/23/2006
06/29/2006 07/06/2006
07/06/2006 07/11/2006
07/11/2006 07/12/2006

3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed Honda Of America Mfg Inc waiver sent on 3/28/2006, answer due 5/30/2006. (Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
4 Defendant's ANSWER to Complaint by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc.(Ray, Frank) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Ray, Frank) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
6 ORDER granting 5 John F. Birmingham, Jr., Philip B. Phillips, and Nancy J. Sennett's Motion to Appear PHV on behalf of Defendant. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 05/25/06. (dms) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
Filing fee: $ 150.00, receipt number 251489 re 5 Motion to appear (jm, ) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
7 NOTICE: Pretrial Conference set for 7/11/2006 @ 3:30PM in chambers before Terence P Kemp (Attachments: # 1 Important Notice−2 # 2 Notice re discovery)(wh1, ) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
8 MOTION filed by Intervenor/Plaintiff Monica P. Ways to Intervene. (Attachments: # 1 Verified Complaint)(dms) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
9 MOTION filed by Willie E. Gary for Leave to Appear PHV on behalf of Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. Filing fee $ 50.00. (dms) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
10 MOTION filed by Tricia P. Hoffler for Leave to Appear PHV on behalf of Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. Filing fee $ 50.00. (dms) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
11 MOTION filed by Charlene R. Banks for Leave to Appear PHV on behalf of Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. Filing fee $ 50.00. (dms) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
12 MOTION filed by Debra S. Nolan for Leave to Appear PHV on behalf of Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. Filing fee $ 50.00. (dms) Modified on 6/13/2006 to correct docket text. (dms) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
Filing fee: $ 200.00, receipt number 200 251715 for PHV apps of Gary, Hoffler, Nolan and Banks. (dms) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
13 ORDER granting 9 Willie E. Gary Motion, 10 Tricia P. Hoffler's Motion, 11 Charlene Banks' Motion and 12 Debra Nolan's Motion to Appear PHV on behalf of Plaintiff−Intervenor Monica P. Ways. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 06/13/06. (dms) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
14 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Michael H. Watson for all further proceedings. Judge Algenon L. Marbley no longer assigned to case. Signed by Judge Algenon L. Marbley on 6/23/2006. (cw, ) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
15 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting conducted by the parties on June 20, 2006. (Ray, Frank) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
16 ORDER granting 8 Motion to Intervene. The clerk shall detach and file the intervenor's complaint attached to the motion . Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 07/06/06. (jm, ) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
17 Plaintiff−Intervener's COMPLAINT against Honda Of America Mfg Inc , filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways.(jm, ) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
18 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Attorney Ebony D. Wilkerson. Filing fee $ 50. by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Ray, Frank) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
Initial Pretrial Conference held on 7/11/2006 before Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp (for statistical purposes only). (pb1, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
19 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of Service of Records Subpoena upon Ohio Job & Family Services (Ray, Frank) (Entered: 07/12/2006)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 6 of 15

07/13/2006 07/14/2006 07/14/2006 07/14/2006 07/25/2006 07/27/2006 07/27/2006
07/27/2006 07/28/2006 07/28/2006 08/01/2006
08/11/2006 08/15/2006

20 NOTICE: Status Conference set for 1/16/2007 @ 1:30PM in chambers before Terence P Kemp (wh1, ) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
21 ORDER granting 18 Motion for Ebony D. Wilkerson to Appear pro hac vice on behalf of defendant. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 07/14/06. (jm, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
22 PRELIMINARY PRETRIAL ORDER: Joinder of Parties and Motions to Amend due by 9/1/2006. Primary Expert due by 6/30/2007. Rebuttal Expert due by 8/31/2007. Discovery due by 10/31/2007. Dispositive motions due by 12/15/2007.The Clerk shall set this matter for status conference on or after January 15, 2007 . Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 07/13/06. (jm, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
Mailed a copy of order 21 , 22 to Ebony D. Wilkerson (jm, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
23 ORDER notifying Jacqueline H. McNair to either register for electronic filing, per the Court's Electronic Filing Policies & Procedures Manual, or file a motion to be excused from this procedure. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 7/25/06. (er ) (Entered: 07/26/2006)
Remark: Doc 23 was sent to Nancy J. Sennett & Jacqueline H. McNair via ordinary mail. (er ) (Entered: 07/27/2006)
24 MOTION to Dismiss (Partial Dismissal) of Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways' Claims by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. Responses due by 8/21/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit A − Charge of Discrimination# 3 Exhibit B − Determination# 4 Exhibit C − Young v DaimlerChrysler Corp. case# 5 Exhibit D − Lomax v Sears, Roebuck & Co. case# 6 Exhibit E − Graessle v NCI Resource Management, Inc. case# 7 Exhibit F − Brown v Worthington Steel, Inc. case# 8 Exhibit G − Lett v Reliable Ruskin case# 9 Exhibit H − Grace v Bank of America case# 10 Exhibit I − White v American Axle & Manuf., Inc. case# 11 Exhibit J − Mongo v The Home Depot case# 12 Exhibit K − Kulkarni v City University of New York case# 13 Exhibit L − Henderson v Nordstrom, Inc. case# 14 Exhibit M − McCutchen v Sunoco, Inc. case# 15 Exhibit N − Carrasco v Noamtc case# 16 Exhibit O − Stange v Deloitte & Touche case# 17 Exhibit P − Kolcun v Nationwide Ins. Co. case# 18 Exhibit Q − Friesner v Mid American Nat'l Bank & Trust case# 19 Exhibit R − Brown Deer Restaurant, Inc. v New Market Corp case)(Ray, Frank) (Entered: 07/27/2006)
25 ANSWER to Third Party Complaint Filed by Plaintiff−Intervener and Affirmative Defenses by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc.(Ray, Frank) (Entered: 07/27/2006)
26 MOTION to Quash. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Hoskins, Patria) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
27 SCHEDULING ORDER: Settlement Conference set for 3/21/2007 at 10:00 AM before Judge Michael H. Watson. Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/19/2007 at 10:00 AM before Judge Michael H. Watson. Jury Trial set for 5/21/2007 at 9:30 AM before Judge Michael H. Watson. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 7/28/2006. (kw) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
28 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Settlement Conference set for 4/3/2008 at 10:00 a.m. in Chambers, Room 322; Final Pretrial Conference set for 5/7/2008 at 10:00 a.m. in Chambers, Room 322; and Jury Trial set for 6/2/2008 at 9:30 a.m. before Judge Michael H. Watson in a courtroom to be determined. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 8/1/2006. (kw) Modified on 8/1/2006 to reflect document is an Amended Scheduling Order (jk). (Entered: 08/01/2006)
29 RESPONSE in Opposition re 26 MOTION to Quash and Motion for Order Compelling Compliance with Subpoena filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Ray, Frank) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
30 MOTION to Excuse EEOC Philadelphia Regional Attorney McNair from ECF Registration re 23 Order by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/15/2006)

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08/17/2006 08/18/2006
08/29/2006 09/11/2006 09/20/2006 09/22/2006
10/09/2006 10/12/2006 12/28/2006 01/16/2007 01/17/2007 01/25/2007 01/26/2007 01/29/2007 02/01/2007
02/09/2007
02/09/2007

31 ORDER granting 30 Pltf's Motion to Excuse Jacqueline H. McNair from ECF Registration. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 8/17/2006. (kk1) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
32 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 24 MOTION to Dismiss (Partial Dismissal) of Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways' Claims New date requested 9/11/2006. by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
33 ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply − responses due by 9/11/2006. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 8/29/2006. (kk1) (Entered: 08/29/2006)
34 RESPONSE in Opposition re 24 MOTION to Dismiss (Partial Dismissal) of Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways' Claims filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
35 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply New date requested 10/9/2006. in Support of Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff−Intervener's Claims by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Ray, Frank) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
36 ORDER granting 35 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 24 MOTION to Dismiss (Partial Dismissal) of Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways' Claims − Reply brief due 10/9/2006. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 9/22/2006. (kk1) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
37 RESPONSE in Support re 24 MOTION to Dismiss (Partial Dismissal) of Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways' Claims filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 10/09/2006)
38 ORDER denying 26 Motion to Quash Subpoena − documents re Monica Ways' unemployment compensation claim due w/in fifteen (15) days. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 10/12/2006. (kk1) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
39 NOTICE of Appearance by Sarah Daggett Morrison for Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 12/28/2006)
Status Conference held on 1/16/2007 before Judge Terence P Kemp. (kk2) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
40 First MOTION to Amend/Correct 17 Third Party Complaint by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Greene, James) (Entered: 01/17/2007)
41 NOTICE: Status Conference set for 1/26/2007 @ 9:30am by teleconference before Terence P Kemp − (wh1) (Entered: 01/25/2007)
Status Conference held on 1/26/2007 before Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp. (kk2) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
42 ORDER signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 1/29/2007 −mtn for proto due 2/1/2007 −m/c due 2/9/2007 −reply due 2/14/2007 −(wh1) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
43 MOTION to Quash Discovery Issued by Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways and/or for Protective Order by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit A − Affidavit of Tim Garrett# 3 Exhibit B − 10/30/06 letter to J. Birmingham# 4 Exhibit C − 11/10/06 letter to J. Greene, III# 5 Exhibit D − Deposition Notice of K. Hirashima# 6 Exhibit E − Amended Notice of Deposition of K. Hirashima# 7 Exhibit F − 1/17/07 letter to J. Greene, III)(Birmingham, John) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
44 RESPONSE in Opposition re 43 MOTION to Quash Discovery Issued by Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways and/or for Protective Order filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 # 4 # 5 Exhibit E# 6 # 7 Exhibit G)(Colbert, Valerie) (Entered: 02/09/2007)
45 RESPONSE In Opposition to 43 MOTION to Quash Discovery Issued by Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways and/or for Protective Order filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Mays, Lawrence)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 8 of 15

02/09/2007
02/09/2007 02/12/2007 02/12/2007
02/14/2007
02/28/2007 03/22/2007 03/29/2007 04/08/2007 04/23/2007 05/23/2007 06/19/2007 06/30/2007 06/30/2007 06/30/2007 07/02/2007

Modified on 2/12/2007 to correct document title in text (kk2). (Entered: 02/09/2007)
RESPONSE to Motion re 43 MOTION to Quash Discovery Issued by Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways and/or for Protective Order (corrected) filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Mays, Lawrence) Modified on 2/12/2007 − document deleted & re−filed as current dkt #46 to correct filing event (kk2). (Entered: 02/09/2007)
46 CORRECTED RESPONSE in Opposition to 43 MOTION to Quash Discovery Issued by Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways and/or for Protective Order filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (kk2) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
Notice of Correction − Former docket #46 (Response to Motion) filed by Lawrence Mays deleted & re−filed as current docket # 46 (Response in Opposition to Motion) in order to correct ECF filing event. (kk2) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
47 RESPONSE in Opposition re 40 First MOTION to Amend/Correct 17 Third Party Complaint filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit A − 10/30/06 letter to J. Birmingham# 3 Exhibit B − Affidavit of Tim Garrett# 4 Exhibit C − 11/10/06 letter to J. Greene, III# 5 Exhibit D − Notice of Depositions# 6 Exhibit E − 1/16/07 letter to J. Birmingham# 7 Exhibit F − 1/17/07 letter to J. Greene, III# 8 Exhibit G − Affidavit of Richard Schostek)(Birmingham, John) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
48 REPLY to Response to Motion re 43 MOTION to Quash Discovery Issued by Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways and/or for Protective Order filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit A − Resignation letter dated 3/16/05# 3 Exhibit B − Affidavit of Tim Garrett# 4 Exhibit C − Affidavit of Richard Schostek)(Birmingham, John) (Entered: 02/14/2007)
49 ORDER signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 2/28/2007 granting 43 Motion to Quash and/or for protective order − (wh1) (Entered: 02/28/2007)
50 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of Withdrawal as Counsel of Ebony D. Wilkerson (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 03/22/2007)
51 ORDER signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 3/29/2007 denying 40 Motion to Amend cmplt − (wh1) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
52 Objection to Magistrate Judge Order re 51 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 04/08/2007)
53 RESPONSE in Opposition re 52 Objection to Magistrate Judge Order re 51 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint and/or Motion for Reconsideration filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit A − 11/10/06 letter to J. Greene, III) (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
54 ORDER granting Defendants' 24 Motion for Partial Dismissal. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 5/23/2007. (kw) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
55 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
56 NOTICE by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways of Filing Expert Report of Ralph Frasca, Ph.D. (Attachments: # 1 Dr. Frasca Expert Report# 2 Dr. Frasca Curriculum Vitae and Fee Schedule# 3 Dr. Frasca Expert Testimony) (Colbert, Valerie) (Entered: 06/30/2007)
57 NOTICE by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways of Filing Expert Report of Izumi Suzuki, Japanese Interpreter (Attachments: # 1 Suzuki Expert Report# 2 Suzuki Fee Schedule# 3 Suzuki Translation Policy# 4 Suzuki Interpretation Policy) (Colbert, Valerie) (Entered: 06/30/2007)
58 NOTICE by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways re 57 Notice (Other) Suzuki Curriculum Vitae (Colbert, Valerie) (Entered: 06/30/2007)
59 ORDER signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 7/2/07 re 56 , 57 , 58 Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosures filed by Intervenor Pltf; such disclosures are not to be filed, therefore docs. 56 , 57 , and 58 are striken. (pes) (Entered: 07/02/2007)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 9 of 15

07/26/2007
07/31/2007 10/12/2007 10/12/2007 10/12/2007 10/12/2007 10/12/2007
10/15/2007 10/15/2007 10/15/2007 10/17/2007
10/18/2007
10/19/2007 10/19/2007 10/19/2007
10/22/2007
10/23/2007 10/23/2007 10/26/2007
10/30/2007

60 STIPULATION for Protective Order by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P Ways. (Morrison, Sarah) Modified on 7/27/2007 to correct filers (kk2). (Entered: 07/26/2007)
61 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 7/31/07. (kch) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
62 MOTION to Compel by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiff Intervener Exhibits) (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
Discovery Conference held on 10/12/2007 before Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp. (pb1, ) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
63 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of Filing Documents Under Seal (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
64 MOTION for Order to Require Plaintiff to File Documents Under Seal by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
65 SEALED MOTION: Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing's Motion for a Protective Order. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Sarah D. Morrison # 2 Exhibit 1 # 3 Exhibit 2 # 4 Exhibit 3 # 5 Exhibit 4 # 6 Exhibit 5 # 7 Exhibit 6) (pes1) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
66 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of Filing Deposition Excerpts Under Seal (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
67 MOTION for Hearing /Status Conference by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
68 Sealed Document: Filing Deposition Excerpts (pes1) (Entered: 10/16/2007)
69 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct 2 Complaint by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2) (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/17/2007)
70 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct 2 Complaint by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2) (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
71 NOTICE by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways of Filing Documents Under Seal (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/19/2007)
72 RESPONSE to Motion re 67 MOTION for Hearing /Status Conference filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/19/2007)
74 Sealed Document: Response in Opposition to # 65 filed by Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A # 2 Exhibit B) (pes1) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
73 RESPONSE to Motion re 64 MOTION for Order to Require Plaintiff to File Documents Under Seal filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
75 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of Filing Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Protective Order Under Seal (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/23/2007)
76 Sealed Document: Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for a Protective Order. (pes1) (Entered: 10/24/2007)
77 SEALED MOTION for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing's Motion for a Protective Order by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (pes1) (Entered: 10/29/2007)
78 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of Filing Response to Plaintiff−Intervener's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply in Opposition to Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.'s Motion for Protective Order Under Seal (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/30/2007)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 10 of 15

10/30/2007
10/31/2007 11/05/2007 11/07/2007
11/09/2007 11/09/2007
11/09/2007 11/13/2007 11/16/2007 11/16/2007 11/19/2007 11/19/2007
11/30/2007 12/13/2007 12/19/2007 12/20/2007 01/02/2008

79 Sealed Document: Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.'s Response to Plaintiff−Intervenor's Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.'s Motion for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A # 2 Exhibit B) (pes1) (Entered: 10/31/2007)
80 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 11/30/2007. by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/31/2007)
81 ORDER granting in part and denying in part # 62 Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part # 65 Sealed Motion; finding as moot # 67 Motion for Hearing. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 11/5/07. (pes1) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
82 RESPONSE in Opposition re 70 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct 2 Complaint filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit 1 − Deposition of T. McPherson# 3 Exhibit 2 − Affidavit of R. Schostek# 4 Exhibit 3 − First Document Requests from EEOC) (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 11/07/2007)
83 RESPONSE in Opposition re 80 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 11/30/2007. filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Sennett, Nancy) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
84 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 83 Response in Opposition to MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 11/30/2007. filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Sennett, Nancy) Modified on 11/13/2007 to link to correct document (jr). (Entered: 11/09/2007)
85 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc re 84 Affidavit in Support of Motion, 83 Response in Opposition to Motion (Sennett, Nancy) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
86 REPLY to Response to Motion re 80 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 11/30/2007. filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
87 RESPONSE in Support re 70 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct 2 Complaint filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 11/16/2007)
88 REPLY to Response to Motion re 70 Second MOTION to Amend/Correct 2 Complaint filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (jr) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
Notice of Correction re: 87 Response in Support of Motion filed by James Greene was deleted and refiled as 88 Reply to Response to Motion to correct filing event. (jr) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
89 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 80 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The discovery cutoff is extended to January 11, 2008 and the dispositive motion filing date is extended to January 18, 2008. Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 11/19/2007. (Kemp, Terence) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
90 ORDER denying # 70 . Signed by Judge Terence P Kemp on 11/30/07. (pes) (Entered: 11/30/2007)
91 MOTION for Protective Order Re: Subpoena and Return of Privileged Documents by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Sarah Morrison) (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
Discovery Conference held on 12/19/2007 before Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp. (pb1, ) (Entered: 12/20/2007)
RESET Columbus PPTO Deadlines: Discovery due by 1/11/2008 & Dispositive motions due by 1/18/2008 per 89 (Order). (kk2) (Entered: 12/20/2007)
92 RESPONSE in Opposition re 91 MOTION for Protective Order Re: Subpoena and Return of Privileged Documents filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 01/02/2008)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 11 of 15

01/04/2008 01/16/2008
01/18/2008
01/18/2008
01/22/2008 01/25/2008
02/04/2008 02/08/2008 02/08/2008 02/08/2008
02/13/2008
02/15/2008 02/20/2008 02/20/2008

Discovery Conference held on 1/4/2008 before Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp (for statistical purposes only). (pb1, ) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
93 REPLY to Response to Motion re 91 MOTION for Protective Order Re: Subpoena and Return of Privileged Documents filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Hust Affidavit# 2 Appendix Cited deposition excerpts# 3 Appendix EEOC Document Request) (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
94 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc.Responses due by 2/11/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Excerpts from Fairfield deposition# 2 Appendix Excerpts from Ways depositions# 3 Affidavit Boggs Affidavit# 4 Affidavit Campbell Affidavit# 5 Affidavit Core Affidavit# 6 Affidavit Dennison Affidavit# 7 Affidavit Garrett Affidavit# 8 Affidavit Schostek Affidavit# 9 Affidavit Smalley Affidavit# 10 Affidavit Whipps Affidavit# 11 Exhibit Exhibits 1 through 30# 12 Exhibit Exhibits 31 through 61) (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 01/18/2008)
95 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits to Ways Transcript# 4 Appendix MaryEllen Fairfield Deposition) (Morrison, Sarah) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/3/2008: # 5 Appendix Monica Ways Deposition Vol 1, # 6 Appendix Monica Ways Deposition Vol 2, # 7 page 72, # 8 pages 288−289, # 9 pages 357−359) (jr1). (Entered: 01/18/2008)
96 Reply in Support of Plaintiff−Intervener Monica Ways' Amended Notice of Videotaped Deposition Duces Tecum of Rick Schostek by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Greene, James) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
97 Response re 96 Reply (non motion) regarding Amended Notice of Deposition by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Objections to notice of deposition, # 2 Affidavit John Birmingham, # 3 Exhibit B − deposition excerpts, # 4 Exhibit C − Emails wtih Ms. Colbert) (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 01/25/2008)
98 ORDER finding as moot 52 Objection to Magistrate Judge Order. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 2/4/08. (jk) (Entered: 02/04/2008)
99 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 94 MOTION for Summary Judgment New date requested 2/25/2008. by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 02/08/2008)
100 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply New date requested 2/25/2008. by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/08/2008)
101 RESPONSE in Opposition re 99 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 94 MOTION for Summary Judgment New date requested 2/25/2008., 100 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply New date requested 2/25/2008. filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 02/08/2008)
102 ORDER re # 91 and # 96 : # 91 is granted as follows: deposition subpoena is quashed; documents in question shall be submitted to the Court for an in camera inspection within ten days. The Court concludes that no action is needed with respect to the matters raised in # 96 . Signed by Terence P Kemp on 2/13/2008. (pes) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
103 ORDER granting 99 and 100 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 94 MOTION for Summary Judgment ; Responses due by 2/25/2008. Signed by Terence P Kemp on 2/15/08. (pes) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
104 SEALED MOTION to Place certain pages of the transcript of Monica Ways under seal by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (pes1) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
105 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc re 104 SEALED MOTION notice that filed under seal (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 02/20/2008)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 12 of 15

02/25/2008 02/26/2008 02/26/2008 02/26/2008 02/26/2008 02/27/2008
02/28/2008 02/29/2008 02/29/2008 03/10/2008 03/26/2008 04/03/2008 04/04/2008 04/10/2008 04/16/2008 04/16/2008 04/17/2008
04/30/2008

106 RESPONSE in Opposition re 94 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment B) (Mays, Lawrence) Modified on 2/26/2008 to correct text (jr). (Entered: 02/25/2008)
107 RESPONSE in Opposition re 94 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
108 NOTICE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 106 Response in Support of Motion Notice of Filing Attachment A Instanter (Resized) (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
109 MOTION for Leave to File Instanter Plaintiff−Intervener's Response in Opposition to Defendant Honda of America Mfg., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Greene, James) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
110 DEPOSITION of Richard Schostek taken on 01/04/2008 by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Signature and Errata Pages) (Colbert, Valerie) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
111 MOTION for Leave to File Instanter Plaintiff−Intervener's Corrected Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) (Greene, James) (Entered: 02/27/2008)
112 ORDER granting 109 Motion for Leave to File response in opposition instanter. Signed by Terence P Kemp on 2/28/2008. (pes) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
113 ORDER granting # 111 Motion for Leave to File Corrected Memorandum in Opposition. Signed by Terence P Kemp on 2/29/2008. (pes) (Entered: 02/29/2008)
114 Corrected Response in Opposition re 94 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (pes) (Entered: 02/29/2008)
115 REPLY to Response to Motion re 94 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
116 NOTICE of Hearing: Settlement Conference RESCHEDULED for 5/29/2008 at 11:00 a.m. before Judge Michael H. Watson. (jk) (Entered: 03/26/2008)
117 ORDER granting 104 Motion to Seal pages from deposition. Signed by Terence P Kemp on 4/3/08. (jr) (Entered: 04/03/2008)
118 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time New date requested 5/14/2008. to File Motions in Limine by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
119 ORDER granting 118 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to file motions in Limine − ext. to 5/14/08. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 4/10/08. (kch1) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
120 Witness List by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
121 Witness List by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
122 MOTION for Leave to File Instanter Plaintiff−Intervener's Statement of Witnesses, Designation of Deposition Portions, and Exhibit List by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways. (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, Deposition Designations, and Exhibit List) (Greene, James) (Entered: 04/17/2008)
123 Proposed Jury Instructions by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Joint Jury Instruction, # 3 Exhibit Defendant's Jury Instructions, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiff and Plaintiff−Intervener's Jury Instructions, # 5 Exhibit Verdict Form, # 6 Exhibit Front Pay and Punitive Damages Instructions) (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 04/30/2008)

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 13 of 15

05/01/2008 05/02/2008 05/02/2008 05/08/2008 05/21/2008 05/21/2008 05/22/2008 05/23/2008 05/23/2008 05/23/2008 05/23/2008 05/27/2008
06/02/2008 06/06/2008
06/06/2008 06/13/2008

124 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time New date requested 5/27/2008. To Exhibit Demonstrative Evidence To Opposing Counsel by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Birmingham, John) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
125 ORDER − The Court CONTINUES the final pretrial conference scheduled for 5/7/08 at 10:00 a.m.; notice to follow. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 5/2/08. (jk) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
126 ORDER granting 124 Motion for Extension of Time, to and including 5/27/08, for the parties to exhibit their demonstrative evidence to opposing counsel. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 5/2/08. (jk) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
127 NOTICE of Hearing: Final Pretrial Conference set for 5/28/2008 at 2:00 p.m. before Judge Michael H. Watson. (jk) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
128 MOTION to Seal documents related to enforcing settlement agreement by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
129 MOTION for Settlement enforcement, for attorney fees, and to dismiss by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc, ThirdParty Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
130 ORDER granting 128 Motion to Seal. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 5/22/08. (kch) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
131 RESPONSE in Opposition re 128 MOTION to Seal documents related to enforcing settlement agreement and Objections to the Court's Order filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
132 Sealed Document: Defendant Honda of America MFG, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Enforce Resolution, for Attorney Fees, and to Dismiss. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (pes1) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
133 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of filing documents under seal (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
134 Sealed Document: Reply Memorandum of Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. in Support of its Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal and for Order Requiring Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff to File Documents Under Seal. (pes1) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
135 ORDER Cancelling Deadline: In order to allow sufficient time for plaintiff and plaintiff−intervener to respond to defendant's motion to enforce resolution, and to afford the Court adequate time to rule on the motion, as well as the motion for summary judgment, the Court VACATES the final pretrial conference scheduled for 5/29/08, the trial scheduled for 6/2/08, and all deadlines associated therewith. The Court will set this case for trial, if ever, by a separate order. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 5/27/08. (kch1) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
136 MOTION of Plaintiff, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Under FRCP 60 For Relief From The Court's Order On Filing Documents Under Seal and Response to Defendant Honda's Reply by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
137 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc re 136 MOTION of Plaintiff, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Under FRCP 60 For Relief From The Court's Order On Filing Documents Under Seal and Response to Defendant Honda's Reply Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 06/06/2008)
138 Sealed Document: Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing's Response to Plaintiff EEOC's Motion for Relief from the Court's Order on Filing Documents Under Seal. (pes1) (Entered: 06/09/2008)
139 NOTICE by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways of Filing Under Seal Plaintiff−Intervener's Response to Defendant Honda of America Mfg., Inc.'s Motion to Enforce Resolution, for Attorneys' Fees, and to Dismiss and Motion to Set Aside

Case: 2:06-cv-233 As of: 07/12/2018 07:36 PM EDT 14 of 15

06/16/2008
06/16/2008
06/17/2008 06/23/2008
06/26/2008 06/26/2008 07/31/2008 09/02/2008 09/10/2008
10/16/2008 10/18/2008 10/20/2008 10/20/2008 10/22/2008 10/27/2008
10/27/2008

Settlement Agreement (Greene, James) (Entered: 06/13/2008)
140 NOTICE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Filing Under Seal Plaintiff EEOC's Response to Honda of America Mfg. Inc's Motion to Enforce Resolution, for Attorney's Fees, and to Dismiss (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
141 Sealed Document. Plaintiff−Intervener Monica P. Ways' Response to Honda of America MFG. Inc.'s Motion to Enforce Resolution, For Attorneys' Fees, and to Dismiss and Motion to Set Aside Settlement Agreement. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Cases cited in support of response, manually filed in Clerk's Office (pes1) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
142 Sealed Document. Plaintiff EEOC'S Response to Honda of America MFG. Inc.'s Motion to Enforce Resolution, For Attorney's Fees, and to Dismiss. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (pes1) (Entered: 06/17/2008)
143 Reply re 138 Sealed Document Memorandum of Plaintiff, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, In Suport of Motion Under FRCP 60 For Relief From The Court's Order on Filing Documents Under Seal by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/23/2008)
144 Sealed Document: Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.'s Joint Reply Brief in Support of its Motion to Enforce Settlement. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of John Birmingham, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2) (pes1) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
145 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc re 144 Sealed Document (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
146 NOTICE of Hearing: Motion Hearing set for 8/21/2008 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 4 before Judge Michael H. Watson. (kch1) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
147 ORDER − The hearing previously scheduled for Thursday, August 21, 2008 is rescheduled to Monday, October 27, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 9/2/08. (jk) (Entered: 09/02/2008)
148 ORDER denying 94 Honda of America Mfg. Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment for statistical purposes only, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RENEWAL OR REFILING should the Court deny Honda of America Mfg. Inc.'s motion to enforce. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 9/10/08. (jk) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
149 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 43.2 Disclosure and General Plan for Attorney Testimony (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
150 NOTICE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 147 Order Regarding General Plan for Attorney Testimony (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/18/2008)
151 NOTICE by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 43.2 Disclosure and General Plan for Attorney Testimony (Greene, James) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
152 MOTION to keep confidential certain settlement terms by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
153 RESPONSE to Motion re 152 MOTION to keep confidential certain settlement terms and Motion for Relief from the Court's Order filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
154 ORDER denying 136 EEOC's Motion to reconsider the Court's prior order sealing documents related to Honda's motion to enforce; granting 152 Honda's Motion to keep confidential certain settlement terms. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 10/27/08. (jk1) (Entered: 10/27/2008)
155 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Michael H. Watson: Motion Hearing held on 10/27/2008 re 129 MOTION for Settlement enforcement, for attorney fees, and to dismiss filed by Honda Of America Mfg Inc. (Court Reporter Darla Coulter) (jk) (Entered: 10/28/2008)

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11/13/2008 11/28/2008
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156 Sealed Document. Transcript of Motion Hearing. (jr) (Entered: 11/13/2008)
157 NOTICE by Defendant Honda Of America Mfg Inc of Filing Closing Brief (Morrison, Sarah) (Entered: 11/28/2008)
158 Sealed Document. Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.'s Closing Brief in Support of its Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreements ( docket entry # 129 ) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Transcript Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)

Brief filed with the Clerk's Office without an exhibit 4.

11/28/2008 12/01/2008 02/24/2009 03/20/2009 03/31/2009 03/31/2009
05/12/2009

(pes1) (Entered: 11/28/2008)
159 NOTICE by Intervenor Plaintiff Monica P. Ways of Filing Under Seal Plaintiff−Intervener Monica P. Ways' Closing Brief Regarding Hearing on Motion for Settlement Enforcement, for Attorney Fees, and to Dismiss (Colbert, Valerie) (Entered: 11/28/2008)
160 NOTICE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of filing of Post−Hearing Brief under Seal (Mays, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
161 ORDER granting 122 Plaintiff−Intervener's Motion for Leave to File Instanter her statement of witnesses, designation of depositions and exhibit list. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 2/24/09. (jk) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
Motions No Longer Referred: 129 MOTION for Settlement enforcement, for attorney fees, and to dismiss per TPK (kk2) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
162 *SEALED* Opinion and Order granting 129 Motion to Enforce Settlement. Signed by Judge Michael H Watson on 3/31/2009 (jk1) Modified on 4/1/2009 to correct text (kk2). (Entered: 03/31/2009)
163 CLERK'S JUDGMENT − Pursuant to the March 31, 2009 Opinion and Order, the Court GRANTS Honda of America, Mfg., Inc's motion to enforce resolution. Final judgment is entered in favor of Honda of America, Mfg., Inc. and against the EEOC and Monica Ways, dismissing this action with prejudice. The judgment shall reflect that the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the May 12, 2008 settlement agreements, and to reopen the case for good cause shown if the terms of the settlement agreements are not fulfilled. The Court also retains jurisdiction to determine, separately, whether Honda of America, Mfg., Inc. is entitled to fees and costs in connection with its efforts to enforce the settlement agreements. (jk) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
164 *SEALED* Sealed Document − Order Waiving Appellate Rights. Signed by Judge Michael H Watson on 5/12/2009 (jk1) (Entered: 05/12/2009)