U.S. District Court District of Alaska (Anchorage) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:18−cv−00190−SLG

CLOSED

The Downtown Soup Kitchen v. Municipality of Anchorage et al Date Filed: 08/16/2018

Assigned to: Sharon L. Gleason

Date Terminated: 10/02/2019

Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Jury Demand: None

Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff

The Downtown Soup Kitchen doing business as Downtown Hope Center

represented by David Andrew Cortman Alliance Defending Freedom (GA) 1000 Hurricane Shoals Road, N.E., Suite D−1100 Lawrenceville, GA 30043 770−339−0774 Fax: 770−339−6744 Email: dcortman@adflegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine L. Anderson Alliance Defending Freedom 15100 N. 90th Street Scottsdale, AZ 85260 480−444−0020 Fax: 480−444−0028 Email: kanderson@adflegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan Jeffrey Tucker Alliance Defending Freedom 15100 North 90th Street Scottsdale, AZ 85260 480−444−0020 Fax: 480−444−0028 Email: rtucker@adflegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sonja Kathleen Redmond Law Office of Sonja Redmond 35865 Sunset Park St. Soldotna, AK 99669 907−262−7846 Fax: 907−262−7872 Email: sredmond@greatlandjustice.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Andrew Scruggs Alliance Defending Freedom 15100 North 90th Street Scottsdale, AZ 85260 480−444−0020 Fax: 480−444−0028 Email: jscruggs@adflegal.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin G. Clarkson Case: 3:18-cv-190 As of: 07/20/2020 05:26 PM AKDT 1 of 9

Brena, Bell & Clarkson, P.C. 810 N. Street, Suite 100 Anchorage, AK 99501 907−258−2000 Fax: 907−258−2001 Email: kclarkson@brenalaw.com TERMINATED: 12/06/2018

V. Defendant Municipality of Anchorage
Defendant Anchorage Equal Rights Commission
Defendant Pamela Basler Individually and in her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission

represented by Meagan Rae Carmichael Municipality of Anchorage, Municipal Attorney's Office Civil Division PO Box 1966550 Anchorage, AK 99519−6650 907−343−4545 Fax: 907−343−4550 Email: uslit@muni.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan A. Stuart Municipality of Anchorage 632 W 6th Avenue, Suite 730 Anchorage, AK 99501 9073434545 Fax: 9073434550 Email: uslit@muni.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Meagan Rae Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan A. Stuart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Meagan Rae Carmichael (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan A. Stuart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/16/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 097−−2564564.), filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Shelter Policies, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Shelter Policies, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Posting Statement)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/16/2018)

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08/16/2018 2 Civil Cover Sheet. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/16/2018)

08/16/2018

3 Unissued summons re Defendant Municipality of Anchorage, (Attachments: # 1 Unissued Summons re Defendant Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, # 2 Unissued Summons re Defendant Pamela Basler, in Official Capacity, # 3 Unissued Summons re Defendant Pamela Basler, individually)(PXS, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 08/16/2018)

08/16/2018

Summons Issued as to Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (PXS, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 08/16/2018)

08/17/2018

4 MOTION for Leave to Appear as Pro Hac Vice (Non−Resident ) Attorney Ryan J. Tucker. ( Pro Hac Vice Admission fee $150.00 paid. Receipt number 097−−2565086.) by The Downtown Soup Kitchen.(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/17/2018)

08/17/2018

5 MOTION for Leave to Appear as Pro Hac Vice (Non−Resident ) Attorney David A. Cortman. ( Pro Hac Vice Admission fee $150.00 paid. Receipt number 097−−2565094.) by The Downtown Soup Kitchen.(Cortman, David) (Entered: 08/17/2018)

08/17/2018

6 MOTION for Leave to Appear as Pro Hac Vice (Non−Resident ) Attorney Katherine L. Anderson. ( Pro Hac Vice Admission fee $150.00 paid. Receipt number 097−−2565111.) by The Downtown Soup Kitchen.(Anderson, Katherine) (Entered: 08/17/2018)

08/20/2018

7 CLERK'S NOTICE re 4 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Ryan J. Tucker, at docket 4 , is authorized under D.Ak. LR 83.1(d). (BJK, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 08/20/2018)

08/20/2018

8 CLERK'S NOTICE re 5 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice by David A. Cortman, at docket 5 , is authorized under D.Ak. LR 83.1(d). (BJK, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 08/20/2018)

08/20/2018

9 CLERK'S NOTICE re 6 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Katherine L. Anderson, at docket 6 , is authorized under D.Ak. LR 83.1(d). (BJK, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 08/20/2018)

08/21/2018

10 MOTION for Leave to Appear as Pro Hac Vice (Non−Resident ) Attorney Jonathan A. Scruggs. ( Pro Hac Vice Admission fee $150.00 paid. Receipt number 097−−2566353.) by The Downtown Soup Kitchen.(Scruggs, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/21/2018)

08/24/2018

11 CLERK'S NOTICE re 10 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Jonathan A. Scruggs, at docket 10 , is authorized under D.Ak. LR 83.1(d). (BJK, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 08/24/2018)

08/27/2018 12 Corporate Disclosure Statement by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/27/2018)

08/29/2018

13 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Verified Complaint served on Municipality of Anchorage on 08/17/2018, filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

08/29/2018

14 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Verified Complaint served on Anchorage Equal Rights Commission on 08/17/2018, filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

08/29/2018

15 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Verified Complaint served on Pamela Basler, Executive Director on 08/17/2018, filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

08/29/2018

16 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Verified Complaint served on Pamela Basler, Individually on 08/17/2018, filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

09/04/2018 17 NOTICE of Appearance by Meagan Rae Carmichael on behalf of All Defendants (Carmichael, Meagan) (Entered: 09/04/2018)

09/04/2018

18 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, Unopposed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Meagan) (Entered: 09/04/2018)

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09/17/2018 09/24/2018

19 ORDER: granting 18 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 18 is GRANTED. Municipality of Anchorage's Answer is due September 27, 2018. Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 09/17/2018. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
20 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, (Unopposed) by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Meagan) (Entered: 09/24/2018)

09/25/2018 21 NOTICE re Motions to Dismiss advising counsel of procedures to follow prior to filing a motion to dismiss. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 09/25/2018)

09/26/2018

22 SLG TEXT ORDER: The Motion for Extension of Time to Answer at Docket 20 is GRANTED. Defendant's to file its Answer by October 12,2018. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 09/26/2018)

10/03/2018 10/12/2018 10/15/2018
10/17/2018

23 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin G. Clarkson on behalf of The Downtown Soup Kitchen (Clarkson, Kevin) (Entered: 10/03/2018)
24 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Meagan) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
25 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER TO COMPLAINT: RE 24 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 24 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, is GRANTED. Municipality of Anchorage answer due 10/17/2018. Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 10/15/2018. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
26 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by All Defendants.(Carmichael, Meagan) (Entered: 10/17/2018)

10/19/2018

27 ORDER RE INITIAL SCHEDULING & PLANNING CONFERENCE REPORT: Counsel for plaintiff shall serve and file the Rule 26 Meeting Report within 21 days of service of this order.. Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 10/19/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Form)(CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 10/19/2018)

11/01/2018
11/01/2018 11/01/2018 11/01/2018 11/01/2018

28 MOTION for Leave to File Documents Using Initials Of Third Parties And Redactions by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−V, # 2 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
30 MEMORANDUM in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
31 DECLARATION of Ryan Tucker re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
32 DECLARATION of Sherrie Laurie re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)

11/01/2018 33 DECLARATION of Sonja Redmond re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)

11/01/2018 11/01/2018 11/01/2018 11/09/2018 11/14/2018

34 DECLARATION of S.D. re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
35 DECLARATION of G.O. re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
36 DECLARATION of F.S. re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
37 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/09/2018)
38 SCHEDULING AND PLANNING ORDER: Fact Discovery completed by 9/20/2019. Dispositive Motions due by 11/22/2019. See Order for additional deadlines.

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11/14/2018 11/14/2018
11/16/2018 11/21/2018 11/21/2018 11/21/2018 11/21/2018 11/21/2018
11/26/2018 11/27/2018 11/27/2018 11/28/2018 11/28/2018 11/29/2018

Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 11/13/18. (JLH, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 11/14/2018)
39 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 30 Memorandum, 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Unopposed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Carmichael, Meagan) (Entered: 11/14/2018)
40 NOTICE Re Filing Amended Proposed Order by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage re 39 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 30 Memorandum, 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Unopposed (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Amended)(Carmichael, Meagan) (Entered: 11/14/2018)
41 SLG TEXT ORDER: The Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply, at docket 39 , is hereby GRANTED. The response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is due by 11/29/2018, replies due by 12/13/2018. (JLH, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
42 NOTICE of Appearance by Ryan A. Stuart on behalf of All Defendants (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
43 MOTION FOR FEDERAL ABSTENTION by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
44 MOTION to Stay by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
45 MOTION to Expedite Motion for Shortened Time to Consider Motion to Stay Proceedings by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
46 ERRATA Affidavit of Ryan Stuart by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage 45 MOTION to Expedite Motion for Shortened Time to Consider Motion to Stay Proceedings filed by Municipality of Anchorage, Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
47 RESPONSE in Opposition re 45 MOTION to Expedite Motion for Shortened Time to Consider Motion to Stay Proceedings filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
48 REPLY to Response to Motion re 45 MOTION to Expedite Motion for Shortened Time to Consider Motion to Stay Proceedings filed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
49 AFFIDAVIT of Deitra Ennis re 48 Reply to Response to Motion by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
50 SLG TEXT ORDER: The Municipalitys motion to expedite consideration at Docket 45 , seeking expedited consideration of the motion to stay (Docket 44 ), is DENIED. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
51 SLG TEXT ORDER: granting 28 Motion for Leave to File. The documents lodged at 28−1 through 28−5 accepted for filing as redacted. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
52 RESPONSE in Opposition re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Proposed Order)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 11/29/2018)

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11/29/2018
11/29/2018
12/05/2018 12/05/2018 12/06/2018 12/07/2018 12/10/2018 12/12/2018 12/12/2018
12/13/2018
12/13/2018 12/13/2018 12/14/2018 12/17/2018 12/18/2018 12/18/2018 12/20/2018 12/20/2018

53 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Basler re 52 Response in Opposition to Motion, by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) Modified on 12/3/2018 to link to dkt 29 (JLH, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 11/29/2018)
54 NOTICE of Filing Unsigned Affidavit of Wanda Greene by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage re 52 Response in Opposition to Motion, (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Wanda Greene)(Stuart, Ryan) Modified on 12/3/2018 to link to dkt 29 (JLH, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 11/29/2018)
55 RESPONSE in Opposition re 44 MOTION to Stay filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/05/2018)
56 RESPONSE in Opposition re 43 MOTION FOR FEDERAL ABSTENTION filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/05/2018)
57 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF CO−COUNSEL by The Downtown Soup Kitchen (Clarkson, Kevin) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
58 Witness List by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 12/07/2018)
59 NOTICE of Filing Signed Affidavit of Wanda Greene by Municipality of Anchorage re 52 Response in Opposition to Motion, (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Wanda Greene − Signed)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 12/10/2018)
60 REPLY to Response to Motion re 44 MOTION to Stay filed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
61 REPLY to Response to Motion re 43 MOTION FOR FEDERAL ABSTENTION filed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C, # 2 Exhibit D, # 3 Exhibit E, # 4 Exhibit F)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
62 MOTION for Hearing re 56 Response in Opposition to Motion, 43 MOTION FOR FEDERAL ABSTENTION, 61 Reply to Response to Motion, Request for Oral Argument by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage.(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
63 REPLY to Response to Motion re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
64 DECLARATION of Sherrie Laurie re 63 Reply to Response to Motion by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
65 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Proposed Confidentiality Agreement by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
66 SLG TEXT ORDER: granting 65 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Proposed confidentiality agreement to be filed by December 19, 2018. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
67 STIPULATION For Protective Order by The Downtown Soup Kitchen.(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
68 MOTION for Hearing re 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen.(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
69 ORDER: The parties stipulation for protective order at Docket 67 is GRANTED. (See order for details). Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 12/20/2018. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 12/20/2018)
70 SLG TEXT ORDER: Oral argument on all motions then pending shall be held on 1/11/2019 01:30 PM in Anchorage Courtroom 3 before Sharon L. Gleason. Each party shall be accorded a total of up to 20 minutes on which to make its arguments on the motions. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 12/20/2018)

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01/11/2019
01/14/2019 01/14/2019 03/27/2019 04/03/2019
05/13/2019 05/14/2019 05/20/2019 05/24/2019 05/24/2019 06/06/2019 06/06/2019

71 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sharon L. Gleason: Oral Argument on Pending Motions at Docket's (29, 43,44, 62, and 68) held at 1:32 p.m. to 2:31 p.m. on 1/11/2019. Court and counsel heard re filings at Docket 30 and 56 to be re−filed without the footers as soon as possible. Arguments heard; Court heard the Motions at Dockets 29, 43, and 44 are taken UNDER ADVISEMENT, written ruling to issue. APPEARANCES: David Andrew Cortman, Ryan Jeffrey Tucker, Sonja Kathleen Redmond; Meagan Rae Carmichael, Ryan A. Stuart; Sonja L. Reeves, Official Court Reporter. (CME, COURT STAFF) Modified on 1/11/2019 to remove reference to dockets 62 and 68. NEF regenerated.(CME, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 01/11/2019)
72 ERRATA Regarding ECF No. 30 by The Downtown Soup Kitchen 30 Memorandum filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Tucker, Ryan) Modified on 1/14/2019 Create relationship to document #29 (CME, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 01/14/2019)
73 ERRATA Regarding ECF No. 56 by The Downtown Soup Kitchen 56 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Tucker, Ryan) Modified on 1/14/2019 Create relationship to document #43 (CME, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 01/14/2019)
74 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 03/27/2019)
75 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings ; Oral Argument held on January 11, 2019 before Judge Sharon L. Gleason. Realtime Court Reporter: Sonja L. Reeves, RMR−CRR.
Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may purchase a copy by calling Realtime Court Reporter, Sonja L. Reeves, RMR−CRR (907) 677−6136. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.
The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after Release of Transcript Restriction deadline of 7/2/2019. Ordered by: Ryan J. Tucker (SLR) (Entered: 04/03/2019)
76 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage re 52 Response in Opposition to Motion, 29 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 05/13/2019)
77 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
78 NOTICE in Response to Anchorage's Notice of Supplemental Authority by The Downtown Soup Kitchen re 76 Notice (Other), (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
79 MOTION to Supplement or For Judicial Notice re 30 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
80 MOTION to Seal Document 79 MOTION to Supplement or For Judicial Notice re 30 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
82 RESPONSE to Motion (Non−Opposition) re 80 MOTION to Seal Document 79 MOTION to Supplement or For Judicial Notice re 30 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
83 First MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 06/06/2019)

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06/06/2019
06/07/2019 06/11/2019 06/12/2019
06/20/2019 06/21/2019 06/24/2019 06/24/2019 07/11/2019 08/09/2019
08/23/2019 08/23/2019 09/09/2019
09/30/2019 10/02/2019
10/02/2019 10/02/2019

85 RESPONSE in Opposition re 79 MOTION to Supplement or For Judicial Notice re 30 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
86 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 85 Response in Opposition to Motion, (Unopposed) by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Scruggs, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/07/2019)
87 SLG TEXT ORDER: The unopposed Motion for Leave to File Documents under Seal at Docket 80 is GRANTED. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 06/11/2019)
88 SLG TEXT ORDER: The Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply at Docket 86 is GRANTED. Plaintiff has until June 24, 2019, to file its reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement or for Judicial Notice (Docket 79).(NMM, Chambers Staff) Modified on 6/12/2019 Create relationship to document #79 (CME, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 06/12/2019)
89 RESPONSE to Motion (Non−Opposition) re 83 First MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal filed by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
90 SLG TEXT ORDER: The unopposed Motion for Leave to File Documents under Seal at Docket 83 is GRANTED. (JLH, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 06/21/2019)
91 MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 06/24/2019)
93 NOTICE of Ongoing Case by The Downtown Soup Kitchen (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 06/24/2019)
96 SLG TEXT ORDER: granting 91 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 07/11/2019)
97 ORDER DENYING Motion for Federal Abstention at Docket 43 ; DENYING as moot Motion to Stay Proceedings at Docket 44 ; GRANTING Motion to Supplement or for Judicial Notice at Docket 79 ; GRANTING Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 29 . Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 8/9/2019. (JDH) (Entered: 08/09/2019)
98 Witness List by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
99 Witness List by Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Pamela Basler, Municipality of Anchorage. (Stuart, Ryan) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
100 TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Trial by Court set for 4/6/2020 at 9:00 a.m. in Anchorage Courtroom 3 before Sharon L. Gleason. Trial Briefs due 3/16/2020. Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/27/2020 at 3:00 p.m. in Anchorage Courtroom 3 before Sharon L. Gleason. Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 9/9/19. (LLR, CHAMBERS STAFF) (Entered: 09/09/2019)
101 Joint MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment by The Downtown Soup Kitchen. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tucker, Ryan) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
102 JOINT CONSENT DECREE: the Court finds that this Consent Decree is fair and reasonable, both procedurally and substantively, consistent with applicable law, in good faith, and in the public interest. The foregoing Consent Decree is hereby APPROVED. There being no just reason for delay, the Court expressly directs ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT in accordance with the terms of the Consent Decree. (See Order for details). Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 10/02/2019. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
103 SLG TEXT ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set 03/27/2020 is VACATED. Trial by Court set 04/06/2020 is VACATED. (CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
104 JUDGMENT: THAT the Defendants shall pay to Plaintiff Hope Center $1.00 in damages and $100,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs to Hope Center's attorneys, Alliance Defending Freedom. Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 10/02/2019.

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(CME, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 10/02/2019) Case: 3:18-cv-190 As of: 07/20/2020 05:26 PM AKDT 9 of 9

 
 David A. Cortman, AZ Bar No. 029490 Jonathan A. Scruggs, AZ Bar No. 030505 Ryan J. Tucker, AZ Bar No. 034382 Katherine L. Anderson, AZ Bar No. 033104 ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 15100 N. 90th Street Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 (480) 444-0020 (480) 444-0028 (Fax) dcortman@adflegal.org jscruggs@adflegal.org rtucker@adflegal.org kanderson@adflegal.org
Sonja Redmond, AK Bar No. 0605022 LAW OFFICE OF SONJA REDMOND 35865 Sunset Park St. Soldotna, Alaska 99669 (907) 262-7846 (907) 262-7872 (Fax) sredmond@greatlandjustice.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

THE DOWNTOWN SOUP KITCHEN d/b/a DOWNTOWN HOPE CENTER,

Plaintiff,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, ANCHORAGE EQUAL RIGHTS COMMISSION, and PAMELA BASLER, Individually and in her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,

Case No. VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION 1. This challenge seeks to protect the right of a faith-based homeless shelter to exercise its religious beliefs and to speak about those beliefs so that it can help homeless and hurting women in downtown Anchorage. 2. The Downtown Soup Kitchen d/b/a Downtown Hope Center (“Hope Center”) is a private, faith-based, non-profit organization that offers free religious teaching, food, and safe shelter to a limited number of homeless women who must first satisfy certain requirements, and many of whom have been abused by men and want to escape sex-trafficking. 3. The Hope Center’s motto is “Hope Restored • Hearts Renewed • Lives Transformed.” 4. But Anchorage1 is interpreting its laws to force the Hope Center to admit men into its women’s shelter and to stay silent about the differences between men and women. 5. That violates Anchorage’s own laws and the Constitution. 6. The practical result of this enforcement would be not only to force a religious ministry to abandon its mission and message but also to force homeless women to sleep alongside and interact with men in intimate settings—even though those women may have just been beaten, raped, and sexually assaulted by a man the day before. 7. Anchorage is doing all this under the guise of its public accommodation and fair housing law, Anchorage Municipal Code, Title 5, § 5.20.050 and § 5.20.020. 8. The former makes it illegal for public accommodations to:
 “deny” “accommodations” and “services” on the basis of sex or gender identity;  “[p]ublish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail a written or printed
communication, notice or advertisement” that “states or implies” that any of its
1 The term “Anchorage” refers to all Defendants unless context indicates otherwise. 2
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accommodations would be “refused” or “withheld” to a person based on their sex or gender identity; and
 publish a statement that “states or implies” that a person’s “patronage or presence” belonging to a particular sex or gender identity would be “unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable.”
9. And the latter makes it illegal for owners, lessors, managers, or agents to:
 “[c]irculate, issue or display, make, print or publish, or cause to be made or displayed, printed or published, any communication, sign, notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the use, sale, lease or rental of real property that indicates any preference, limitation, specification or discrimination based on” sex or gender identity.
10. But the Hope Center is not a public accommodation, either under the law or under the specific exemption found in the code. See § 5.25.030(A)(9) (This chapter “shall not apply to…shelters for the homeless.”); and see § 5.20.020(A) (“With the exception of those conditions described in section 5.25.030A, as ‘lawful practices’, it is unlawful…”).
11. And the Hope Center is not selling or leasing any real property. It is helping the homeless free of charge.
12. Nevertheless, Anchorage is currently investigating the Hope Center for violating its law in January 2018 when the Hope Center directed someone away from its women’s shelter to a hospital—even paying for transportation—because that individual was injured, inebriated, and past check-in time for the shelter.
13. So that action was based on intoxication and late arrival, not any protected category. In fact, the Hope Center has never once turned anyone away from its shelter on the basis of gender identity.
14. The individual who sought access in January 2018 nonetheless filed a complaint with the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission (“Commission”), accusing the Hope Center of
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discriminating on the basis of sex and gender identity, despite clear evidence of the nondiscriminatory basis for that denial.
15. Although the Hope Center clearly did not violate the code, the Commission’s Executive Director did not dismiss the complaint early on but continues to harass the Center through a now nearly 6 month “investigation.”
16. And during that investigation, the Executive Director initiated another complaint against the Hope Center, and this time included Brena, Bell & Clarkson—the law firm for Hope Center’s then attorney. In this complaint, the Director accused the Hope Center and its attorney of violating the public accommodation and fair housing law because the attorney discussed the first complaint against the Hope Center with news reporters who asked about a local referendum that would decide if biological men could access opposite-sex restrooms.
17. By pursuing this frivolous claim, Anchorage forced the Hope Center to obtain new counsel.
18. Meanwhile, the Hope Center filed motions challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction in both of the complaints brought against it—the first motion brought nearly 4 months ago. Yet the Commission has still refused to rule on those motions or issue a determination of no substantial evidence. Instead, the Commission is continuing to engage in irrelevant, overreaching, and harassing discovery.
19. As these events prove, Anchorage is not interested in investigating a past violation of its law; it is harassing the Hope Center in bad faith, pressuring the Hope Center to change its policy and to stay silent when the Hope Center has done nothing illegal.
20. These investigations prove that Anchorage is using its law—a law which contains an express exemption for homeless shelters—and will continue to use this law in the future to
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force the Hope Center to change its faith-based policies, to allow biological men into its women’s shelter, and to stay silent about its religious beliefs.
21. To stop this imminent irreparable harm, the Hope Center asks this Court to enjoin future enforcement of parts of the Anchorage Municipal Code and to declare specific sections unconstitutional, so that the Hope Center may freely speak its beliefs, freely exercise its faith, and freely serve hurting women who deserve a safe place to sleep in Anchorage.2
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 22. This civil rights action raises federal questions under the United States Constitution, particularly the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 24. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 25. This Court has authority to issue the requested declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57; the requested injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65; the requested damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1343; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 26. Venue lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all events giving rise to the claims detailed here occurred within the District of Alaska and the Defendants reside in the District of Alaska.
2 The Hope Center is not, at this time, challenging the current investigations against the Hope Center and its attorney, but may move to amend if that challenge becomes necessary.
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PLAINTIFF 27. Plaintiff The Downtown Soup Kitchen a/k/a Downtown Hope Center is a nonprofit, religious entity organized under the laws of the State of Alaska, with a principal place of business at 240 E. 3rd Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska 99501.
DEFENDANTS 28. The Municipality of Anchorage (“Anchorage”) is a home rule municipality organized under the laws of the State of Alaska, and is subject to suit under AS 29.35.010 and the common law. 29. The Anchorage Equal Rights Commission (“the Commission”) is an administrative agency within the Municipality of Anchorage. 30. Pamela Basler (“Basler”) is a citizen of Alaska and the Executive Director of the Commission. Her authority is delegated to her by the Commission. 31. Basler is sued individually, and in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Commission. 32. All actions taken by Anchorage officials in this complaint were taken on behalf of, with the authority of, and to act on behalf of Anchorage. 33. Anchorage approved of, acquiesced in, and/or supported the actions of the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission. 34. All actions taken by Defendants, including the violations of the Hope Center’s constitutional rights, were the result of a policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by Defendants and/or their officers and were actions also taken under color of law by policy and/or decision makers.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Hope Center’s History
35. The Hope Center was prompted by the vision of a few Anchorage church leaders who wanted to share God’s love with Anchorage's homeless.
36. Formed over thirty years ago, the Hope Center provides food and showers to homeless individuals in the downtown Anchorage area and provides shelter to homeless women, many of whom have been abused or battered by men.
37. Operating out of a little red house on Fourth Avenue in downtown Anchorage, the Hope Center initially provided nearly 300 free cups of soup each day to homeless and low-income families.
38. It also offered free showers and free clothing handouts from a yellow A-frame located next door.
39. In 2012, the Hope Center moved into its new facility on Third Avenue in downtown Anchorage.
40. The Hope Center later expanded its mission to include assisting the Brother Francis Shelter (the “Francis Shelter”), a program of Catholic Social Services that provides free emergency shelter for individuals in Anchorage who are without a home.
41. The Francis Shelter often had to shelter more homeless individuals than its facilities could accommodate and faced the challenge of trying to provide a safe shelter environment for homeless women, many of whom had been abused or battered by men on the streets or otherwise.
42. The Francis Shelter and the Hope Center therefore agreed that the Hope Center would assist the Francis Shelter by taking in and providing safe shelter to the Francis Shelter’s
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overflow of homeless women who presented themselves at and who otherwise qualified for shelter at the Francis Shelter.
43. Originally, the Francis Shelter checked individuals in and then the Hope Center would transport the overflow of women from the Francis Shelter to the Hope Center.
44. But the Anchorage homeless community eventually learned of the Hope Center’s “shelter” and began appearing at Hope Center directly.
45. For its shelter, the Hope Center now accepts both an overflow of homeless women from the Francis Shelter, as well as some homeless women who either appear at or are referred to the Hope Center directly.
46. The Hope Center can provide shelter to fifty homeless women at any given time. 47. Of the women the Hope Center provides shelter to, most of these women have been abused or battered or escaped from sex trafficking. 48. Because of its limited space and its religious mission, the Hope Center shelter only accepts biological women to protect the physical, psychological, and emotional safety of the women seeking refuge from abuse, primarily from men. 49. The Hope Center also gives priority to the elderly and disabled. 50. To gain entry, the Hope Center shelter guests must first check in and meet many conditions. The Hope Center’s Religious Beliefs 51. The Hope Center is a faith-based, non-profit organization. 52. The Hope Center’s mission statement is “[i]nspired by the love of Jesus, we offer those in need support, shelter, sustenance, and skills to transform their lives.”
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53. The Hope Center does this both through acts of service and through the inculcation of Christian beliefs and values.
54. The Hope Center believes that Jesus’ transforming love can free people of destructive situations, habits, and addictions.
55. The Hope Center believes that the Bible teaches that God creates people male or female.
56. The Hope Center believes that a person’s sex (whether male or female) is an immutable God-given gift and that it is wrong for a person to deny his or her God-given sex.
57. The Hope Center believes that women should be cherished, respected, and protected.
58. The Hope Center’s sincerely held religious belief is that it should convey and promote messages about God’s creation of each unique individual, whether male or female, and that it should not convey conflicting messages.
59. The Hope Center’s sincerely held religious belief is that it should be loving, upfront, and honest in its interactions with others.
60. It would not only be dangerous and against common sense, but it would violate the Hope Center’s sincerely held religious beliefs to admit biological men into its shelter and allow them to sleep side by side and disrobe next to women, some of whom have been assaulted by men and fear for their safety.
61. The Hope Center’s sincerely held religious belief is that it should care for women who lack shelter.
62. The Hope Center’s sincerely held religious belief is that those providing shelter to homeless women play a critical role in their understanding of God’s design for them.
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63. The Hope Center believes that an environment allowing a biological male to sleep with and disrobe next to abused and battered females is not as ideal as an environment that allows those females to sleep in a room with members of the same biological sex.
64. To be true to its beliefs, teaching, mission, and values, the Hope Center must abide by its Christian beliefs in how it operates, including in what it teaches and how it treats others. The Hope Center’s Operations
65. The Hope Center’s purpose is religious. 66. Inspired by the love of Jesus, the Hope Center fulfills its religious mission in serving and teaching the poor. 67. The Hope Center guests must be willing to be exposed to Christian teachings and not disrupt meetings inculcating Christian values. 68. The Hope Center guests are offered Christian counseling, teaching, and advice provided by staff and leaders associated with the Hope Center. 69. These activities include, but are not limited to, group prayer before meals, Bible studies, group devotions, Christian music and television, signs and decor with Christian messages, teachings, and symbols. 70. The Hope Center hopes that by loving, serving, and teaching the homeless, hurting, and poor, the Hope Center encourages those it serves to put their faith in Jesus and free themselves from destructive addictions and habits. 71. While not currently posted, the Hope Center desires to post, publish, or circulate its admittance policy or a portion thereof not only for clarity, but for peace of mind to those
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seeking refuge from the harsh conditions of homeless life and also so that it can fulfill its religious desire to be upfront and honest with those seeking access to the shelter.
72. According to that policy, the Hope Center shelter guests must be biological females, at least 18 years of age, not demonstrate dangerous behavior, be clean and sober, be exposed to or attend prayer meetings and devotionals, be able to meet their personal needs without assistance, and must respect shelter guidelines.
73. No Hope Center policy prohibits biological women who identify as men from accessing the shelter.
74. In fact, the Hope Center has allowed and is currently allowing biological women who identify as men to access its shelter.
75. Shelter guidelines at the Hope Center also include prohibitions against smoking, fighting, foul language, and wandering, as certain areas of the facility are off limits.
76. In addition, all shelter guests at the Hope Center must sign up for a chore, assist with clean-up at the facility, and adhere to a schedule.
77. No shelter guest at the Hope Center is allowed to stay in the shelter without complying with its procedures.
78. The Hope Center has one large open room in which it provides dinner to the homeless women.
79. After dinner, the homeless women who have signed up and qualify are permitted to stay the night, based upon space availability and priority of sign-up time and satisfaction of the shelters conditions and guidelines.
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80. Those who stay for the night at the Hope Center are given mats, along with a bag of blankets and a sheet, so that they can sleep on the floor in the one large open room where women sometimes change or are in various states of undress.
81. Showers and laundry are also provided to those who have signed up and qualified to stay the night, and breakfast is provided in the morning to those who stayed the previous night.
82. On Saturdays, shelter guests at the Hope Center are monitored by volunteers. 83. The Hope Center’s Saturday shelter policy is that no one is allowed in the building to participate in the day shelter unless they have stayed in the shelter the night before, having checked in and gone through a bag check. 84. True and correct copies of those Hope Center shelter policies are attached as Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2. 85. Saturday check-in time at the Hope Center for new guests is at 5:45 p.m. 86. In addition to providing charitable food and shelter, the Hope Center maintains a church on its property. 87. Further, other homeless shelters in the Anchorage area accept biological males. 88. The Hope Center has and will continue to direct any biological males who seek access to its women’s shelter to those other shelters. The Hope Center’s Interaction with “Jessie Doe”3 89. On Friday, January 26, 2018, at about 6:00 p.m., ”Jessie Doe” (“Doe”) was dropped off at the Hope Center by officers of the Anchorage Police Department.
3 The real name of the complainant is not disclosed in this filing to address privacy concerns. 12
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90. Sherrie Laurie (“Laurie”), Hope Center’s Executive Director, was called to the Dining Hall, which also serves as the sleeping area for the homeless women’s shelter, to discern the course of action to be taken about Doe.
91. Doe smelled strongly of alcohol and also had an open wound above Doe’s eye. 92. Doe acted very agitated and was aggressive in body language. 93. The Hope Center is a sober and clean shelter. No one is allowed to stay in the Hope Center shelter if inebriated or high. 94. Laurie informed Doe that the Hope Center did not accept individuals who were inebriated, under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that Doe could not stay at Hope Center for that reason. 95. Laurie was eventually informed by the Francis Shelter that Doe had initiated a very disruptive fight at the Francis Shelter, that the police had been called to handle the situation, and that Doe had been banned from the Francis Shelter property until July 4, 2018. 96. Laurie recommended that Doe go to the hospital to receive medical care for the wound over Doe’s eye. 97. Following much resistance, Doe agreed to go to the hospital, and Laurie paid for a cab to take Doe to the emergency room. 98. The Hope Center did not see Doe again that evening. 99. The next day, on Saturday, January 27, 2018, around 2:00 p.m., Doe showed up at Hope Center again and sought to be admitted. 100. Doe was not admitted, however, because Doe had not stayed the previous evening which is required by Shelter policy and because Doe sought entry at a time when the shelter was not accepting new guests.
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101. Doe was asked to leave the Hope Center property because the Hope Center, as a courtesy to neighbors, does not allow loitering.
102. Doe left the Hope Center and never returned. 103. Doe later filed a complaint with the Commission claiming that the Hope Center had discriminated against Doe on the basis of sex and gender identity under the Anchorage Municipal Code. The Anchorage Municipal Code 104. The Commission was established by Section 17.02 of the Anchorage Municipal Charter. AMC § 5.10.020. 105. It is an administrative agency within the Municipality of Anchorage. 106. Section 17.02 of the Anchorage Municipal Charter states that “[t]he assembly by ordinance shall establish an equal rights commission and prescribe its duties. The commission shall appoint its principal executive officer with the approval of the mayor. The principal executive officer shall serve at the pleasure of the commission.” 107. The Commission is authorized to hire an Executive Director, subject to the approval of the mayor, who serves at the pleasure of the Commission. AMC § 5.10.040. 108. The Commission may delegate to the Executive Director of the Commission all powers and duties given by Title 5 of the AMC, except the power to hold public hearings, issue orders, and hire the executive director. AMC § 5.10.040(11). 109. The Executive Director of the Commission has the power to initiate, dismiss, and administratively close complaints, initiate a civil action for injunctive relief, make determinations that a complaint is or is not supported by substantial evidence, initiate general investigations, issue discovery to a party, issue subpoenas, proceed with civil remedies,
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substitute herself in for a complainant in a case, and determine whether conciliation efforts have failed. AMC §§ 5.40.010, 5.40.060, 5.50.030, 5.50.060, 5.50.070, 5.50.080, 5.60.010, 5.60.020, 5.60.050, 5.80.010.
110. The Chair of the Commission is the duly elected chairperson of the Commission, and has the power to rule on discovery objections and subpoenas, proceed with civil remedies, rule on requests for reconsideration, appoint hearing panels, rule on challenges to commissioner appointments. AMC §§ 5.20.010, 5.50.070, 5.50.080, 5.70.040.
111. Anchorage’s public accommodation law is found in AMC, Title 5, which was amended in 2015 to include “gender identity” to the grounds of discrimination prohibited by the title. AMC § 5.20.050.
112. AMC § 5.20.010 defines “gender identity” as “a person’s gender-related selfidentity, as expressed in appearance or behavior, regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth. A person’s gender identity may be established by evidence of medical history, care or treatment of the gender identity, consistent and uniform assertion of the gender identity, or other evidence that the gender identity is sincerely held, core to a person’s gender-related self-identity, and not being asserted for an improper purpose.”
113. The terms and phrases such as “evidence of medical history,” “consistent,” “uniform,” and “improper purpose” are not defined and the ordinance does not provide further guidance on how to interpret or enforce these terms.
114. AMC § 5.20.050 makes it illegal for public accommodations to: (1) refuse or deny any of its accommodations, facilities, or services on the basis of sex or gender identity; (2) “[p]ublish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail a written or printed communication, notice or advertisement” that “states or implies” that any of its accommodations would be “refused” or
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“withheld” to a person based on their sex or gender identity; and (3) publish a statement that “states or implies” that a person’s “patronage or presence” belonging to a particular sex or gender identity would be “unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable.”
115. The terms and phrases such as “implies that,” “unwelcome,” “not desired,” “not solicited,” “objectionable,” and “unacceptable” are not defined and the ordinance does not provide further guidance on how to interpret or enforce these terms.
116. AMC § 5.20.010 defines “public accommodation” as “any business or professional activity that is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of, or caters or offers goods or services to the general public, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.”
117. In cases involving public accommodations, the Commission may order any equitable relief, including but not limited to admission or service in a place of public accommodation, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Commission.
118. Although the Hope Center has repeatedly denied that it is a “public accommodation” and provided evidence accordingly, Anchorage continues to interpret its public accommodation law to include the Hope Center.
119. The Anchorage Municipal Code also includes a section titled “Unlawful practices in the sale, rental or use of real property,” which provides in relevant part that: “[I]t is unlawful for the owner, lessor, manager, agent, brokerage service, or other person having the right to sell, lease, rent, advertise, or an owner’s association having the powers of governance and operation of real property to … [perform certain prohibited acts].” AMC § 5.20.020(A).
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120. The practices prohibited in AMC § 5.20.020 are subject to important exemptions set out in AMC § 5.25.030. “[C]onditions described in section 5.25.030(A). as ‘lawful practices’” are not subject to this chapter.
121. One of the exemptions in section 5.25.030(A) states that the chapter shall not apply to the “establishment of same-sex dormitories or portions thereof by educational facilities, provided that such establishment shall not discriminate among its residents on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, age, physical or mental disability, or familial status.” AMC § 5.25.030(A)(8).
122. Another exemption in section 5.25.030(A) states that the chapter shall not apply to [t]he establishment of a … shelter … or residential facility for the care and lodging of persons in need of special medical, rehabilitative, social, or psychological support, including, but not limited to … shelters for the homeless.” AMC § 5.25.030(A)(9) (emphasis added).
123. A finding of a discriminatory housing violation may result in issuance of an order that includes, but is not limited to, actual damages, injunctive relief, and civil penalties not exceeding $11,000 if the respondent has not been adjudged to have committed any earlier discriminatory housing practice.
124. Despite the Hope Center’s objection and a clear exemption in the ordinance, Anchorage has likewise interpreted AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) to apply to the Hope Center.
125. Title 5 of the AMC discusses the filing of complaints with or by the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, as well as the investigative process of those complaints and fact finding procedures.
126. The Commission or the Executive Director of the Commission may initiate investigations against an organization at any time. AMC § 5.50.060.
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127. According to AMC § 5.50.020(A), “[a]fter a complaint has been filed, staff shall convene a fact finding conference with the parties to define issues, receive and exchange information relevant to the complaint and response, if any, and negotiate a voluntary resolution of the complaint, if possible, through a pre-determination settlement agreement. Parties shall be permitted to be fully represented by legal counsel at the fact finding conference. Legal counsel shall be entitled to speak and present on behalf of the represented party at the fact finding conference. Legal counsel may not, however, crossexamine the other party and must submit any questions through staff.”
128. A “fact finding conference” is an initial meeting where evidence is produced and the complaint is discussed with the parties. AMC § 5.20.010.
129. The AMC also provides that the Commission shall provide “[t]he procedures to be followed at the conference” at least 21 days prior to the fact finding conference, “[e]xhibits and documents received at a fact finding conference may be used as evidence in making a determination”, “[s]tatements made by a party during a fact finding conference may be used as evidence in making a determination….”, and that “[e]ach party may bring a reasonable number of witnesses.” AMC §§ 5.50.020(B)(3), (C), (F), (G).
130. If a matter is not settled between the parties, the Executive Director notifies the Commission, and the chair of the Commission then appoints a “hearing panel,” which consists of three commissioners hand-picked by the chair. AMC §§ 5.70.20, 5.70.030.
131. The hearing panel may conduct hearings or appoint a hearing examiner to conduct hearings. In conducting a hearing, the hearing panel or hearing examiner has full authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence and other procedural matters. AMC § 5.70.040.
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132. At the completion of a public hearing, the hearing panel may issue a final order in the case. AMC § 5.70.130.
133. The Commission may obtain a court order for the enforcement of any of its orders by filing a complaint with the superior court in the Third Judicial District. AMC § 5.80.030(B).
134. The Commission and/or its employees or representatives have the power to file a complaint, initiate an investigation, conduct discovery, conduct the hearing, choose those that preside over it, issue a ruling and enforce any penalty and punishment. The First Commission Complaint
135. On February 1, 2018, Doe filed a complaint (“First Complaint”) with the Commission claiming that the Hope Center had discriminated against Doe on the basis of sex and gender identity under AMC § 5.20.050, which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation.
136. The following day, the Commission forwarded the First Complaint to the Hope Center, along with a notice of a fact finding conference.
137. On March 6, 2018, the Hope Center’s counsel, Kevin Clarkson (“Clarkson”), responded to the First Complaint via letter, informing the Commission that (a) the Hope Center was not a place of public accommodation; (b) Doe was turned away initially because Doe was under the influence of alcohol and had been involved in a fight at Francis Shelter; (c) Doe was turned away the following day because Doe appeared at a time when the Hope Center was not accepting individuals; and (d) the Hope Center has a First Amendment right to religious liberty and association that permit it to operate exclusively so as to provide charitable shelter to abused and battered women (“March 6 Letter”).
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138. Clarkson concluded the March 6 Letter by stating the Hope Center would not be attending the fact finding conference, and that should the Commission decide to proceed with the matter, the Hope Center intended to file a motion to dismiss.
139. The information provided should have been sufficient for the Commission to dismiss the First Complaint or reach a determination that the complaint was not supported by substantial evidence.
140. But instead, the Commission continued its “investigation” by serving mostly irrelevant and overbroad interrogatories to the Hope Center that contained close to 30 different subparts. Proposition 1
141. On March 14, 2018, the Anchorage Daily News published an article about Proposition 1, an Anchorage initiative to regulate restrooms, locker rooms, and other facilities based on the sex at birth of those seeking to access those facilities. (“March 14 Article”).
142. In that March 14 Article, the reporter referenced alleged comments made by Attorney Clarkson concerning the First Complaint against the Hope Center.
143. Discussion of the First Complaint was relevant to the ongoing political debate in Anchorage about whether Proposition 1 should be passed.
144. According to the March 14 Article, Clarkson said that “the person who filed the [First Complaint] was not kept out of the shelter because they were transgender. He said it was because the person was intoxicated and came to the shelter while it was closed. Even so, Clarkson said the Hope Center is a religious organization that would not allow a
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‘biological man’ to be sheltered there. The city’s other two emergency women’s shelters, one of which is run by Catholic Social Services, do take in transgender women.”
145. On April 23, 2018, the Hope Center filed its motion to dismiss the First Complaint against it for lack of jurisdiction with the Commission, but to date the Commission has refused to rule on the motion.
146. On April 26, 2018, the Commission “noted” receipt of the motion to dismiss, and made the first of several accusatory comments against the Hope Center and/or its counsel.
147. For example, rather than dismiss or reach a determination that the complaint was not supported by substantial evidence, the Commission attached a “pre-determination settlement agreement, which [it believed would] adequately address [Hope Center’s] perceived misconduct and the Commission’s public policy concerns which arose as a result of [Hope Center’s] or its attorney’s actions.”
148. Based upon the Commission’s statements to and interactions with the Hope Center during this investigation, it became clear that the Commission interpreted the Anchorage public accommodation law as requiring the Hope Center to admit biological men into its women’s shelter and that the Commission considered the Hope Center guilty of committing “sex” or “gender identity” discrimination in violation of that law.
149. On Friday, May 11, 2018, the Hope Center declined the Commission’s predetermination settlement proposal related to the First Complaint as it had violated no law.
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The Second Commission Complaint 150. Unable to find any wrongdoing by the Hope Center in the First Complaint but
unwilling to dismiss that complaint, the Commission continued its effort to force the Hope Center to change its policies anyway.
151. On Tuesday, May 15, 2018, Director Basler, filed a second complaint against the Hope Center. (“Second Complaint”).
152. Director Basler also filed this Second Complaint against Brena, Bell & Clarkson, P.C., the counsel of record for Hope Center at the time.
153. In this Second Complaint, the Commission alleged that the Hope Center, through its alleged “spokesperson,” Clarkson, “published, circulated, issued, displayed, posted, or mailed a written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, or caused to be circulated, issued or displayed, made, printed or published, a communication which states or implies that the use of Downtown Hope Center’s real property and/or services or facilities will be refused to or denied to a person because of their sex and/or gender identity, in violation of Anchorage Municipal Code § 5.20.020(A)(7) and/or Anchorage Municipal Code § 5.20.050(A)(2).”
154. The Commission contends in its Second Complaint that Clarkson has been identified as the source of statements published in various media which implied or stated that transgender individuals would not be allowed to be sheltered at the Hope Center.
155. Contemporaneously with the filing of the Second Complaint, the Commission set a fact finding conference and sent a “Request for Essential Information.”
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156. As a result of the potential conflict caused by the Commission’s filing of the Second Complaint against the Hope Center’s attorney, the Hope Center was forced to hire new counsel, Alliance Defending Freedom, the undersigned representing it in this litigation.
157. On June 21, 2018, Alliance Defending Freedom (“ADF”) entered an appearance in the Second Complaint, and informed the Commission that an ADF attorney would serve as the “contact person” for the Hope Center.
158. But the Commission refused to correspond with ADF attorneys even though these attorneys had affiliated themselves with a local attorney who was also representing the Hope Center.
159. On June 29, 2018, the Hope Center’s new counsel sent a letter to the Commission (“June 29 Letter”) informing the Commission that counsel had a conflict with the fact finding conference date chosen by the Commission and had several concerns related to the lack of constitutional procedures and protections pertaining to the fact finding conference itself.
160. The June 29 letter also noted that Hope Center intended to supplement its interrogatory answers to include additional information on the jurisdictional issues.
161. The June 29 Letter also informed the Commission that the “procedures to be followed at the conference” had not been sent to the parties, as required, and requested a copy of all relevant procedures referred to in the AMC.
162. Next, to the extent the “procedures” mentioned in AMC § 5.50.020(B)(3) referred to AMC § 5.50.020 as a whole, the June 29 Letter stated the Hope Center’s concerns about the lack of constitutional protections provided in the ordinance itself.
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163. Fact finding conferences at the Commission are evidentiary in nature, but as counsel pointed out in its June 29 Letter, it is unclear what rules govern the admission of evidence at those conferences and how those rules are applied.
164. In its June 29 Letter, the Hope Center’s counsel asked whether objections to evidence would be allowed, whether there was a different standard for “documents” submitted, what rules were applicable, and how objections to evidence or “documents” were preserved.
165. In relation to AMC § 5.50.020(G), the Hope Center asked in its June 29 Letter whether counsel may object to questions asked or answers given, instruct a client not to answer, or even ask a client to clarify a response during the conference.
166. The Hope Center also pointed out in its June 29 Letter that it had similar issues with the “reasonable number of witnesses” that a party may bring.
167. And the Hope Center inquired whether the prohibition on cross examination of the “other party” extended to witnesses brought by the “other party.”
168. Due to unavailability of lead counsel and the fact it was unclear what the procedures were, what rules were applicable, how those rules were expected to be applied, and whether those procedures would comply with due process, the Hope Center requested a reset of the fact finding conference in its June 29 Letter.
169. The Commission failed to answer any of the questions posed by the Hope Center’s counsel in its June 29 Letter.
170. Even though the Commission set the fact finding conference without inquiring about counsel’s availability, the Commission contacted Hope Center’s local attorney and proceeded to deny the request for continuation of the fact finding conference
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and stated that the information requested in its Request for Essential Information was due days before the fact finding conference.
171. On July 5, 2018, before the fact finding conference, the Hope Center’s counsel sent a letter to the Commission, noted disappointment with the Commission’s refusal to reschedule the conference, again requested clarity about the conference’s procedures, and submitted responses to the Commission’s Request for Essential Information.
172. The same day, the Hope Center filed a motion for lack of jurisdiction, further illustrating that the Commission had no basis to hold a fact finding conference.
173. In its Second Complaint, the Commission did not accuse the Hope Center of directly violating AMC § 5.20.020 or AMC § 5.20.050, but instead contends that oral statements made by Clarkson, its former counsel, subject it to this section.
174. The Commission has not alleged that Clarkson or his firm is an “owner,” “lessor,” “manager,” “brokerage service,” “owner’s association,” or “person having the right to sell, lease, rent [or] advertise” the Hope Center.
175. Instead, the Commission appears to be accusing Clarkson of being an “agent” of real property for the Hope Center.
176. But Clarkson was the Hope Center’s attorney—not an “agent” of real property. 177. Clarkson’s comments themselves are also not actionable under the law. In addition to being protected by the litigation privilege, the law requires a written statement, and Clarkson’s comments to the media were done orally. 178. In its motion for lack of jurisdiction, the Hope Center pointed out that not only had the Commission failed to properly plead a claim against the Hope Center for violation
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of AMC § 5.20.020 and 5.20.050, but that homeless shelters were specifically excluded from that section as well as all of Title 5 of the AMC.
179. Section 5.20.020(A) specifically incorporates the exemption for homeless shelters found at 5.25.030(A)(9).
180. And because the Hope Center is a “shelter for the homeless” and all sections of an ordinance should be construed together so that all have meaning and no section conflicts with one another, the Commission should have dismissed the First Complaint and Second Complaint against the Hope Center on this basis alone.
181. Along with the specific exclusion from the ordinance, the Hope Center is also not a place of public accommodation.
182. The AMC limits its definition of public accommodation to a business or commercial enterprise that serves the general public for profit or some other form of financial benefit.
183. The Hope Center’s women’s shelter is not a business or commercial enterprise, currently receives no government funds directly, but instead receives private donations from individuals, other non-profits, businesses, foundations, and churches.
184. The Hope Center women’s shelter operates exclusively on a charitable basis. 185. The Hope Center women’s shelter does not conduct commercial transactions or other forms of “for profit” activities, and it does not cater to, or offer goods or services to, “the general public.” 186. Despite the Hope Center women’s shelter not meeting the definition of “public accommodation” and despite the Hope Center asking the Commission to address this point, the Commission pressed forward with the fact finding conference anyway.
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Fact Finding Conference 187. On July 9, 2018, local counsel for the Hope Center, as well as local counsel
for Brena, Bell & Clarkson, appeared at the fact finding conference in the Second Complaint.
188. As they previously told the Commission, Brena, Bell & Clarkson’s local counsel came prepared with a court reporter to transcribe the fact finding conference.
189. But the Commission informed counsel that transcription of the conference by the court reporter would not be allowed.
190. Rather than address whether the Hope Center was a public accommodation or any of the facts or allegations involved in the Second Complaint, the Commission instead wrongly accused the Hope Center of not providing truthful answers to interrogatories in the First Complaint served two months earlier.
191. The Commission also alluded to materials it had in its possession allegedly demonstrating inconsistencies with the Hope Center’s discovery responses involving funding, but refused to show those materials to counsel and suggested it might at some later point.
192. On July 13, 2018, the Hope Center’s local counsel followed up with the Commission and again asked for the materials promised during the fact finding conference in the Second Complaint (“July 13 e-mail”).
193. But Hope Center’s counsel received the following negative response from the Commission’s investigator in return:
In an effort to not distract what should be the immediate concerns of the parties regarding [settlement], we are not going to require [the Hope Center] to provide any supplemental information at this time, nor are we, at this time, going to be supplementing the information provided to the parties.
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194. In the same communication, the Commission also made derogatory comments
about the Hope Center’s prior counsel who had to withdraw from representation of the Hope
Center due to the complaint filed by the Executive Director.
195. The Commission’s investigator continued his July 13 e-mail by stating that
“[p]erhaps [the Hope Center’s prior counsel] will be more forthcoming with providing []
information to [the Hope Center’s new counsel] than he has been to the Commission….”
196. After receiving the July 13 e-mail, the Hope Center received a proposed pre-
determination settlement proposal from the Commission.
197. Despite the Commission’s targeting of the Hope Center and its counsel, the
Hope Center proceeded in good faith to engage in settlement discussions.
198. On August 3, 2018, in the midst of those settlement discussions, the
Commission unexpectedly accused the Hope Center and its counsel of not being forthright
with the Commission.
199. Specifically, the Commission accused Hope Center’s counsel of failing to
supplement discovery responses, even though the Hope Center’s counsel indicated its intent
to supplement its responses earlier and the Commission told counsel that supplementation
was not necessary. See supra ¶¶ 157, 185-90.
200. The Commission sent an e-mail on that date stating in part as follows:
This notice is being sent to all of you because each of you has a professional responsibility to correct any false or misrepresented information that has previously been submitted to the Commission during its investigation of the above-referenced complaint. Although you may not have been representing the client at the time the statements were made to the Commission, as Respondent’s current attorneys, each of you is ethically obligated to correct any omissions, false statements, and/or misrepresentations previously made to the Commission.
I have attached a copy of the previously submitted interrogatories. Respondent has already been allowed almost three months to make corrections to this information,
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and the Commission’s ability to fully consider Respondent’s arguments will continue to be limited by Respondent’s failure to timely amend and correct its earlier responses. The Commission will allow Respondent until August 9, 2018, to make appropriate corrections to the interrogatory responses before it takes any formal action in regards to what it views as Respondent’s lack of candor about its receipt of taxpayer funds and the contractual obligations for the receipt of those funds. 201. The Commission’s allegations in its August 3, 2018 e-mail were false. 202. The Commission had not been waiting for “almost three months” for the Hope Center to make “corrections” to its interrogatory answers. 203. The Hope Center was first informed on July 9, 2018 during the fact finding conference in the Second Complaint that the Commission had a vague concern related to its discovery responses. 204. Four days after that fact finding conference, the Commission told the Hope Center’s counsel that it was not going to require the Hope Center to provide any supplemental information at that time, but instead wanted to focus on resolution. 205. Despite the Commission’s attacks, the Hope Center on August 9, 2018, amended its answers and objections to the Commission’s interrogatories in the First Complaint—not to correct alleged deficiencies, but to further substantiate reasons for dismissal of the complaint and to demonstrate more plainly to the Commission that its original answers were indeed truthful. 206. To date, the Commission has not ruled on the Hope Center’s motions for lack of jurisdiction. 207. Nor has the Commission issued any determination that the First Complaint or Second Complaint is or is not supported by substantial evidence.
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208. The First Complaint and Second Complaint are still in the “impartial investigation” phase. Anchorage is interpreting its law to stop the Hope Center from helping others
209. The Hope Center desires to continue its policy of allowing only biological females into its women’s shelter.
210. And due to the recent complaints filed against the Hope Center and publicity surrounding it and its desire to be upfront and honest with others, the Hope Center likewise desires to make its policies clear by posting them both at the women’s shelter and online.
211. But because of Anchorage’s public accommodation laws and the Commission’s hostile interpretation of them, the Hope Center faces only burdensome options.
212. First, the Hope Center could comply with Anchorage’s interpretation of these laws and seek to avoid investigation and punishment by allowing biological males to sleep in its shelter reserved solely for biological women, many of whom have been abused by men or escaped sex trafficking.
213. But the Hope Center cannot take this first option because it not only places women at risk, it defies common sense, and likewise violates its religious beliefs.
214. Women who use the shelter have informed Hope Center officials that they would not feel safe if they had to sleep and undress next to men.
215. The Hope Center cannot pursue its religious mission or teach its religious beliefs about loving those in need and about the difference between men and women when Anchorage forces the Hope Center to put homeless women at risk and to deny the distinction between men and women.
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216. Second, the Hope Center could violate Anchorage’s interpretation of these laws by posting statements on the Hope Center grounds and on its website explaining the Hope Center’s beliefs about sex and gender identity and explaining its denial of biological males into its women’s shelter.
217. The Hope Center could also violate Anchorage’s interpretation of these laws by having its attorneys talk about the Hope Center’s policies, its beliefs about sex and gender identity, and the complaints filed against the Hope Center.
218. In fact, if not for Anchorage’s interpretation of its laws, the Hope Center would direct its current lawyers to speak about the Hope Center’s policies about sex and gender identity, its beliefs about sex and gender identity, and the complaints filed against the Hope Center.
219. And if not for Anchorage’s interpretation of its laws, the Hope Center’s attorneys would speak about these subjects in press releases, media interviews, and on their website.
220. But the Hope Center and its attorneys will not take this second option because they do not want to violate Anchorage’s laws and suffer its penalties.
221. Third, the Hope Center could refrain from posting statements explaining its beliefs on sex and gender identity, the complaints filed against the Hope Center, and its policies on sex and gender identity, and the Hope Center could also have its attorneys refrain from public discussion of these topics as well.
222. The Hope Center has temporarily taken this third option to avoid violating the Anchorage laws.
223. Specifically, the Hope Center has refrained from posting a statement on its grounds where women are admitted into its shelter, as well as on its website under the tab
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“About the Women’s Shelter” located at https://www.downtownhopecenter.org/ womensshelter.
224. The statement the Hope Center wants to post is attached as Exhibit 3. 225. Likewise, the Hope Center’s attorneys have been chilled from publicly discussing the Hope Center’s religious beliefs and policies on its website (www.adflegal.org), in press releases, and in media interviews even though it typically discusses those topics for other clients through these mediums. 226. The Hope Center will not post its desired statement on its grounds or on its website, and the Hope Center’s attorneys have been chilled in communicating about the Hope Center in its typical fashion for fear of violating Anchorage’s laws. 227. If not for Anchorage’s laws, the Hope Center would immediately post the statement attached as Exhibit 3 both on its grounds where the women are admitted into its shelter as well as on the “About the Women’s Shelter” portion of its website. 228. This third option—not posting—also violates the Hope Center’s religious beliefs because the Hope Center is religiously motivated and obligated to follow God’s calling to foster a safe environment for those women seeking refuge from the horrors they have experienced. 229. Left with no option that does not violate its faith or the law, the Hope Center has no choice but to challenge the Anchorage laws for violating the United States and Alaska Constitutions.
ALLEGATIONS OF LAW 230. At all times relevant to this Complaint, each and all of the acts alleged here are attributable to Defendants, who acted under color of a statute, regulation, custom, ordinance, or usage of the Municipality of Anchorage.
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231. The Hope Center currently suffers imminent and irreparable harm because of Defendants’ actions that violate the Hope Center’s constitutional rights.
232. The Hope Center has no adequate or speedy remedy at law for the loss of its constitutional rights.
233. Unless Defendants’ conduct is enjoined, the Hope Center will continue to suffer irreparable injury.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION First Amendment: Free Exercise of Religion 234. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 235. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the Hope Center’s rights to operate, publish, speak, and not speak, in accordance with its religious beliefs. 236. The Hope Center has sincerely held religious beliefs that motivate and require it to operate its ministry in accordance with biblical moral teachings and to teach and explain those beliefs to the public and those the Hope Center serves. 237. The Hope Center would violate its religious beliefs if it were forced to allow biological males admittance into its women’s only shelter and stopped from informing others about its religious beliefs. 238. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 are not neutral or generally applicable as applied because they are based on hostility towards the Hope Center’s disfavored religious beliefs and they target the Hope Center’s disfavored religious beliefs for punishment. 239. The Commission is pursuing complaints against the Hope Center without any substantial evidence.
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240. The Commission has made statements during the course of its investigation indicating its disdain for the Hope Center and/or its attorneys.
241. The Commission is engaging in intrusive and unnecessary discovery in the First Complaint.
242. Director Basler, through the Commission, purposefully brought a frivolous complaint against the Hope Center and its prior counsel without any basis in the law, resulting in the need for it to obtain new representation.
243. The First Amendment protects the Hope Center’s rights to believe and profess the religious doctrines of its choice.
244. The First Amendment prohibits the government from interfering with this right by punishing the profession of a religious belief or imposing special disabilities on the basis of stating disfavored religious views.
245. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 punish the Hope Center’s profession of its religious beliefs.
246. Application of AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 are being threatened against the Hope Center to coerce it into changing its policies based on its own religious beliefs.
247. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020, therefore, impose special disabilities on the Hope Center due exclusively to its profession of disfavored religious beliefs.
248. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 directly and substantially interfere with the Hope Center’s power to order its own affairs, including on matters of faith, doctrine, and operation.
249. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 are also not neutral or generally applicable because they contain categorical exemptions.
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250. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 are not neutral or generally applicable because they are enforced through a system of individualized assessments.
251. For example, AMC § 5.20.050 contains the undefined, vague, and overbroad terms “unwelcome,” “not solicited,” “objectionable,” and “unacceptable” to describe what the AMC prohibits. Anchorage officials must determine—without any guidance—whether any of these prohibitions apply in a given case based on their own subjective determinations.
252. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 also violate Plaintiff’s free exercise rights under the hybrid rights doctrine because they implicate free exercise rights in conjunction with other constitutional protections, like the rights to free speech, expressive association, due process and equal protection.
253. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 burden the Hope Center’s sincerely held religious beliefs by banning, deterring, and preventing its religiously motivated speech, including the statement in Exhibit 3.
254. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 burden the Hope Center’s sincerely held religious beliefs by preventing it from operating in accordance with its religious beliefs.
255. Anchorage laws effectively prevent the Hope Center from speaking its religiously-desired messages, from not speaking in ways required by its faith, and from adhering to key aspects of its faith.
256. AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 do not serve any compelling, significant or legitimate, or even valid interests in a narrowly tailored way.
257. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center, AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 violate the First Amendment right to free exercise.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION First Amendment: Freedom of Speech 258. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 259. The First Amendment Free Speech Clause protects the Hope Center’s rights to speak, to publish speech, to be free from content and viewpoint discrimination, to be free from unconstitutional conditions, to be free from vague laws allowing unbridled discretion, to be free from overbroad laws, to not speak, and to not publish speech. 260. If not for Anchorage’s interpretation of AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2) and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) as shown in the Second Complaint, the Hope Center and its agents, including its attorneys, would immediately engage in protected speech, including but not limited to, publishing and teaching its desired messages as set forth in Exhibit 3. 261. Instead, the Hope Center is not only unable to publish or display a portion of its admittance policy, it likewise cannot discuss the Hope Center’s religious beliefs concerning sex and gender identity. 262. The Hope Center has not and will not engage in certain protected speech to avoid violating Anchorage’s interpretation of AMC 5.20.050(A)(2) and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) and to avoid incurring the penalties for violating Anchorage’s interpretation of that law. 263. The Hope Center is currently suffering ongoing harm because of Anchorage’s interpretation of AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2) and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7). 264. Because Anchorage’s interpretation of AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2) and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) infringes rights under the Free Speech Clause, AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2) and
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AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) and Anchorage’s enforcement of these provisions chill, deter, and restrict the Hope Center.
265. Further, vague and overbroad language included in the AMC allows unbridled discretion.
266. AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) makes it “unlawful” for the owner, agent, or employee of a public accommodation to imply that a person’s “patronage or presence” belonging to a particular sex or gender identity would be “unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable.”
267. AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) uses undefined and overbroad terms and phrases such as “implies that,” “unwelcome,” “not desired,” “not solicited,” “objectionable,” and “unacceptable” to describe the speech that is prohibited.
268. AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) is vague, facially and as applied, because it outlaws communications stating that any accommodations, facilities, or services will be refused or restricted because of gender identity.
269. AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) is overbroad because it outlaws publishing, circulating, issuing, displaying, posting or mailing a written or printed communication, notice of advertisement “which states or implies that . . . [t]he patronage or presence of a person belonging to a particular race, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national origin, marital status, age, or physical or mental disability is unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable.”
270. And the AMC definition of “gender identity” in AMC § 5.20.010 is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause because its vague terms grant
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unbridled discretion to enforcement officials to ban speech the government opposes and to allow speech the government supports.
271. AMC § 5.20.010 uses undefined and overbroad terms and phrases such as “evidence of medical history,” “consistent,” “uniform,” and “improper purpose” to define “gender identity.”
272. Those terms and phrases are not defined by the AMC, nor does that ordinance language provide guidelines to govern the decisions of Defendants in applying and enforcing these vague and overbroad terms.
273. This permits Defendants to use unbounded discretion to punish disfavored speech on sex, gender identity, and other topics of public concern.
274. This unbridled discretion also exacerbates the issue of viewpoint discrimination. 275. Because Defendants’ interpretation of AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2) and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) violates free-speech principles for all of the reasons stated above, they must further a compelling interest in a narrowly tailored way. 276. Prohibiting the Hope Center from displaying or publishing its religiously motivated policy explaining its religious beliefs does not further any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling interest. 277. Punishing the Hope Center’s speech also does not serve any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling government interest in a narrowly tailored way. 278. Defendants have alternative, less restrictive means to achieve any legitimate interest they may possess rather than forcing the Hope Center to abandon its free-speech rights. 279. Moreover, punishing speech which states or implies the patronage or presence of a person belonging to a protected class is “unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable
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or unacceptable” does not further any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling interest, and certainly does not further any such interests in a narrowly tailored way.
280. Defendants have alternative, less restrictive means to achieve any legitimate interest they may possess rather than banning all speech which states or implies the patronage or presence of a person belonging to a protected class is “unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable” because of a protected classification.
281. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center and any of its agents, AMC § 5.20.050(A)(1)-(3) and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) violates the First Amendment right to free speech.
282. Accordingly, facially, AMC § 5.20.010’s definition of gender identity and AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) violate the First Amendment right to free speech.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Fourteenth Amendment: Procedural Due Process 283. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 284. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees persons the right to due process of law, which includes the right to be free from vague guidelines granting officials unbridled discretion. 285. The Hope Center’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process is violated in both the vague language the ordinance uses as well as the lack of procedural safeguards included in the investigatory process.
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286. First, AMC § 5.20.010 uses undefined and overbroad terms and phrases such as “evidence of medical history,” “consistent,” “uniform,” and “improper purpose” to define “gender identity.”
287. AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) also uses undefined and overbroad terms and phrases such as “implies that,” “unwelcome,” “not desired,” “not solicited,” “objectionable,” and “unacceptable” to describe the speech that is prohibited.
288. Second, although AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) does not apply to “shelters for the homeless,” Defendants have interpreted such language to apply to the Hope Center.
289. AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) is therefore vague as applied to the Hope Center and does not provide it fair notice.
290. And even though AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) is not applicable to attorneys, the Commission is applying it as such.
291. Third, according to AMC § 5.50.020(A), “[a]fter a complaint has been filed, staff shall convene a fact finding conference with the parties to define issues, receive and exchange information relevant to the complaint and response, if any, and negotiate a voluntary resolution of the complaint, if possible, through a pre-determination settlement agreement. Parties shall be permitted to be fully represented by legal counsel at the fact finding conference. Legal counsel shall be entitled to speak and present on behalf of the represented party at the fact finding conference. Legal counsel may not, however, crossexamine the other party and must submit any questions through staff.”
292. The AMC also provides that the Commission shall provide “[t]he procedures to be followed at the conference” at least 21 days prior to the fact finding conference, “[e]xhibits and documents received at a fact finding conference may be used as evidence in
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making a determination”, “[s]tatements made by a party during a fact finding conference may be used as evidence in making a determination….”, and that “[e]ach party may bring a reasonable number of witnesses.” AMC §§ 5.50.020(B)(3), (C), (F), (G).
293. These provisions use vague and undefined terms and guidelines granting officials unbridled discretion.
294. Lastly, the Hope Center is entitled to a neutral arbiter, but the powers provided to the Commission in AMC Title 5 do not afford it that right.
295. The mayor has the power to appoint members to the Commission, and the Commission has the authority to hire an executive director, subject to the approval of the mayor.
296. The Commission then and/or its employees or representatives have the power to file a complaint, initiate an investigation, conduct discovery, conduct the hearing, choose those that preside over it, issue a ruling, and enforce any penalty and punishment.
297. As such, Title 5 is devoid of procedural safeguards to protect any respondent who has had a claim filed against it. The broad powers given to the Commission violate the concepts of legal fairness, objectivity and due process.
298. In addition, the Commission’s actions have also interfered with the Hope Center’s representation by counsel.
299. AMC §§ 5.20.010, 5.20.050, and 5.50.020 do not serve any compelling, significant or legitimate, or even valid interest in a narrowly tailored way.
300. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center, AMC §§ 5.20.010, 5.20.050, and 5.50.020 violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under the laws.
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301. Accordingly, facially, AMC § 5.20.010’s definition of gender identity, § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b), and the lack of procedural safeguards contained in Title 5 violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under the laws.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION First Amendment: Freedom of Expressive Association 302. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 303. The First Amendment protects the right of people to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. 304. The First Amendment bars the government from compelling people to associate with others in an association expressing messages. 305. The First Amendment also prohibits the government from banning people from associating with others in an association expressing messages. 306. The Hope Center is an expressive association because people with likeminded beliefs, including those on staff and volunteers at its shelter, are joining together to teach and serve the homeless in Anchorage and express their religious beliefs about the differences between men and women. 307. The volunteers and staff at the Hope Center’s shelter advocate the position that women deserve dignity and respect and a safe space. Forcing the Hope Center’s shelter to accept men would undermine its ability to advocate that position and cause it to reconsider its operations going forward. 308. AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2) and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) harm the Hope Center’s ability to promote its beliefs by requiring it to either decline to associate with others that help
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promote its religious messages or to associate with individuals and events that will require it to speak messages that completely contradict its desired message.
309. The Hope Center likewise engages in expressive association when Hope Center officials partner with each other and decide to partner with homeless women, teaching them certain biblical values and lessons.
310. In offering shelter and engaging in Bible studies with those who seek shelter, the Hope Center expressively associates with those homeless women for the purpose of communicating desirable messages to those individuals.
311. One of the reasons that the Hope Center associates with homeless women is to express messages consistent with its religious beliefs about God’s ability to restore, renew, and transform.
312. The Hope Center uses real-life stories of care that it helped facilitate to promote their religious view of God’s design.
313. The Hope Center uses these real-life stories in various ways, such as in speaking engagements, to encourage others to adopt their religious ideals regarding God’s design.
314. When the Hope Center assists a homeless woman get on her feet, they associate with that individual, who themselves become an ongoing, living example that communicates to friends, co-workers, and others regarding the Hope Center’s views about God’s design.
315. It is common for people to learn about the homeless shelter services that the Hope Center provides from women who have used the Hope Center’s services.
316. When people learn that the Hope Center assisted a homeless female, people believe that the services provided were consistent with the Hope Center’s religious beliefs.
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317. Defendants have indicated that, under AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7), the Hope Center must expressively associate with biological males in its women’s only shelter and allow them access to homeless women who have been abused and battered.
318. By compelling the Hope Center to expressively associate with biological males in its women’s only shelter, Defendants force the Hope Center to expressively associate in a way that communicates messages to women under its care and the community that are contrary to the Hope Center’s desired messages, including messages that contradict the Hope Center’s religious beliefs.
319. Thus, Defendants’ interpretation of AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) infringes on the Hope Center’s right to expressively associate and to be free from compelled expressive association.
320. Because AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) infringes on the Hope Center’s expressive association rights, it must further a compelling interest in a narrowly tailored way.
321. As applied to the Hope Center, AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020(A)(7) does not further any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling interest by forcing the Hope Center to expressively associate with biological males who desire to sleep under the same roof as homeless women, thereby conveying messages to the women under its care and the community that violates the Hope Center’s religious beliefs.
322. Moreover, compelling such expressive association does not serve any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling interest in a narrowly tailored way.
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323. Defendants have alternative, less restrictive means to achieve any legitimate interest they may possess rather than forcing the Hope Center to abandon its freedom of expressive association.
324. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center, AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20(A)(7) violate the Hope Center’s right to expressive association protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION First Amendment: Establishment Clause 325. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 326. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires the government to act with a secular purpose and to neither promote nor inhibit religion. 327. The government may not interfere with the power of a religious organization to order its own affairs, including on matters of faith, doctrine, and operation. 328. Defendants’ continued investigation of the Hope Center lacks any secular purpose. Instead, Defendants have targeted and singled out religious speech and belief for exclusion. 329. Defendants’ investigation and threatened enforcement of its public accommodation laws violate the Establishment Clause by singling out religious speech and belief for hostility. 330. Defendants’ investigation and threatened enforcement singles out and excludes the Hope Center based on a disfavored religious view and sends a message that a religious
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person, such as the Hope Center, is a second-class citizen, outsider, and not a full member of the community.
331. No compelling state interest exists to justify the actions of Defendants. 332. Because Defendants’ actions violate the Hope Center’s rights under the Establishment Clause, they must further a compelling government interest in a narrowly tailored way. 333. Targeting the Hope Center for exclusion based on its statement of a disfavored religious view does not further any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling government interest; nor does it serve any legitimate government interest in a narrowly tailored way. 334. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center, Defendants’ actions violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as incorporated and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection 335. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 336. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the government may not treat someone disparately as compared to similarly situated persons when such disparate treatment burdens the exercise of a fundamental right. 337. The Hope Center has a fundamental right to free speech and free exercise. 338. The Hope Center is similarly situated to other similarly situated facilities in Anchorage that provide housing.
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339. Defendants treat the Hope Center’s exercise of its religious beliefs differently than those similarly situated facilities.
340. Under the AMC’s housing section, educational facilities may establish same-sex dormitories; however, Anchorage has interpreted its public accommodation laws to forbid the Hope Center from doing the same. See AMC § 5.25.030(A)(8).
341. Section 5.25.030(A)(9) of the AMC’s housing section also states that the chapter shall not apply to homeless shelters.
342. Thus, Defendants treat the Hope Center differently from similarly situated parties in a manner that infringes on the Hope Center’s freedom of religion, speech, and association.
343. When the enforcement of laws, like the AMC, infringes on a fundamental right, courts presume discriminatory intent.
344. In this case, the presumption of discriminatory intent is also borne out in Defendants’ targeting of the Hope Center based on its religious beliefs.
345. Defendants do not serve any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling interest in treating the Hope Center differently than similarly situated agencies based solely on Hope Center’s exercise of its fundamental rights.
346. Defendants have many alternative, less restrictive mechanisms available to serve any legitimate interests they possess.
347. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center, Defendants’ actions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as incorporated and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Alaska Constitution Article 1 § 4: Freedom of Religion 348. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 349. Article 1, § 4 of the Alaska Constitution provides that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 350. Article 1, § 4 of the Alaska Constitution has been interpreted more broadly than its federal counterparts. 351. The government may not interfere with the power of a religious organization to order its own affairs, including on matters of faith, doctrine, and operation. 352. Defendants’ actions and interpretation of AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 substantially burden the Hope Centers’ religious exercise by using their investigation and threats of enforcement of public accommodation laws to surrender their religious beliefs and expression in order to provide shelter for the homeless community. 353. Further, Defendants’ continued investigation of the Hope Center lacks any secular purpose. Instead, Defendants have targeted and singled out religious speech and belief for exclusion. 354. Defendants’ investigation and threatened enforcement of its public accommodation laws violate Article 1, § 4 of the Alaska Constitution by singling out religious speech and belief for hostility. 355. Defendants’ investigation and threatened enforcement singles out and excludes the Hope Center based on a disfavored religious view and sends a message that a religious
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person, such as the Hope Center, is a second-class citizen, outsider, and not a full member of the community.
356. Because Defendants’ actions violate Article 1, § 4 of the Alaska Constitution, they must further a compelling government interest in a narrowly tailored way.
357. The exercise of governmental authority which threatens to substantially burden the Hope Center’s rights under Article 1, § 4 of the Alaska Constitution is imminent.
358. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center, AMC § 5.20.050 and AMC § 5.20.020 violate Article 1, § 4 of the Alaska Constitution.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION Alaska Constitution Article 1 § 1: Equal Protection 359. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint. 360. Article 1, § 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides in part that “all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law….” 361. The equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution has been interpreted more broadly then the federal equal protection clause. 362. The government may not treat someone disparately as compared to similarly situated persons when such disparate treatment burdens the exercise of a fundamental right. 363. The Hope Center has a fundamental right to free speech and free exercise. 364. The Hope Center is similarly situated to other similarly situated facilities in Anchorage that provide housing. 365. Defendants treat the Hope Center’s exercise of its religious beliefs differently than those similarly situated facilities.
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366. Under the AMC’s housing section, educational facilities may establish same-sex dormitories; however, Anchorage has interpreted its public accommodation laws to forbid the Hope Center from doing the same. AMC § 5.25.030(A)(8).
367. Section 5.25.030(A)(9) of the AMC’s housing section also states that the chapter shall not apply to homeless shelters.
368. Thus, Defendants treat the Hope Center differently from similarly situated parties in a manner that infringes on the Hope Center’s freedom of religion, speech, and association.
369. When the enforcement of laws, like the AMC, infringes on a fundamental right, courts presume discriminatory intent.
370. In this case, the presumption of discriminatory intent is also borne out in Defendants’ targeting of the Hope Center based on its religious beliefs.
371. Defendants do not serve any legitimate, rational, substantial, or compelling interest in treating the Hope Center differently than similarly situated agencies based solely on Hope Center’s exercise of its fundamental rights.
372. Defendants have many alternative, less restrictive mechanisms available to serve any legitimate interests they possess.
373. Accordingly, as applied to the Hope Center, Defendants’ actions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION Alaska Constitution Article 1 § 22: Right of Privacy 374. The Hope Center repeats and realleges each allegation contained in paragraphs 1233 of this Complaint.
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375. Article 1, § 22 of the Alaska Constitution provides in part that “[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”
376. Women who stay at the Hope Center sometimes change at the shelter or are in various states of undress when preparing to sleep for the night. There are no biological males allowed at the women’s shelter.
377. Homeless women do not expect, nor should they be forced, to change, sleep alongside, and interact with men in intimate settings. And this is particularly true considering that several of the women present at the shelter may have been beaten, raped, and sexually assaulted by men.
378. The Hope Center’s interest in protecting women at its shelter conflicts with the Commission’s desire to force those women to change, sleep alongside, and interact with men in intimate settings.
379. Because Defendants’ actions violate Article 1, § 22 of the Alaska Constitution, they must further a compelling government interest in a narrowly tailored way.
380. The exercise of governmental authority which threatens to substantially burden the Hope Center’s rights under Article 1, § 22 of the Alaska Constitution is imminent.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF The Hope Center respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment against Defendants and provide the Hope Center with the following relief: (A) A temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction to stop Anchorage and any person acting in concert with it from enforcing AMC Title 5 asapplied to the constitutionally protected activities of the Hope Center and its agents, including its
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right to post its desired policies, and to open its women’s homeless shelter to biological women only;
(B) A temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction to stop Anchorage and any person acting in concert with it from enforcing AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) or AMC § 5.20.010’s definition of gender identity facially or asapplied to the constitutionally protected activities of the Hope Center and its agents, including its right to post its desired policies, and to open its women’s homeless shelter to biological women only;
(C) A declaration that AMC Title 5 violates the United States Constitution’s Free Exercise of Religion, Freedom of Speech, Establishment, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses and Sections 1, 4, and 22 of the Alaska Constitution as-applied to the constitutionally protected activities of the Hope Center and its agents, including its right to post its desired policies, and to open its women’s homeless shelter to biological women only;
(D) A declaration that AMC § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) and AMC § 5.20.010’s definition of gender identity facially violate the United States Constitution’s Freedom of Speech and Due Process Clauses and the Alaska Constitution’s Free Speech Clause;
(E) That this Court adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations of the parties to the subject matter in controversy here so that these declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment;
(F) That this Court award nominal damages for the violation of the Hope Center’s constitutional and statutory rights;
(G) That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing its orders and that it adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations of the parties to
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the subject matter here in controversy so that these declarations shall have the force and effect of

final judgment;

(H) That this Court award the Hope Center costs and expenses of this action,

including reasonable attorneys’ fees, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

(I) That this Court grant any other relief that it deems equitable and just in the

circumstances.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of August, 2018.

By: s/ David A. Cortman David A. Cortman, AZ Bar No. 029490* Jonathan A. Scruggs, AZ Bar No. 030505* Ryan J. Tucker, AZ Bar No. 034382* Katherine L. Anderson, AZ Bar No. 033104* ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 15100 N. 90th Street Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 (480) 444-0020 (480) 444-0028 (Fax) dcortman@adflegal.org jscruggs@adflegal.org rtucker@adflegal.org kanderson@adflegal.org

* pro hac vice admission forthcoming

Sonja Redmond, AK Bar No. 0605022 LAW OFFICE OF SONJA REDMOND 35865 Sunset Park St. Soldotna, Alaska 99669 (907) 262-7846 (907) 262-7872 (Fax) sredmond@greatlandjustice.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

53 The Downtown Soup Kitchen v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission
Case 3:18-cv-00190-SLG Document 1 Filed 08/16/18 Page 53 of 54

VERIFICATION OF COMPLAINT I, Sherrie Laurie, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Alaska, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint and the factual allegations contained therein, and the facts as alleged are true and correct. Executed this 14 day of August, 2018, in Anchorage, Alaska.
Sherrie Laurie
Case 3:18-cv-00190-SLG Document 1 Filed 08/16/18 Page 54 of 54

 
 406 F.Supp.3d 776 (2019)
The DOWNTOWN SOUP KITCHEN d/b/a Downtown Hope Center, Plaintiff, v.
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, and Pamela Basler, Individually and in her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, Defendants.
Case No. 3:18-cv-00190-SLG.
United States District Court, D. Alaska.
Signed August 9, 2019.
781*781 David Andrew Cortman, Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, GA, Katherine L. Anderson, Ryan Jeffrey Tucker, Jonathan Andrew Scruggs, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ, Sonja Kathleen Redmond, Law Office of Sonja Redmond, Soldotna, AK, Kevin G. Clarkson, Brena, Bell & Clarkson, P.C., Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff.
Meagan Rae Carmichael, Ryan A. Stuart, Municipality of Anchorage, Municipal Attorney's Office, Anchorage, AK, for Defendants.
ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS
Sharon L. Gleason, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before the Court are four motions. First, Plaintiff The Downtown Soup Kitchen ("Hope Center") filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 29. Defendants Municipality of Anchorage, Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, and Pamela Basler (collectively, "Anchorage") responded in opposition at Docket 52, and Hope Center replied at Docket 63. Second, Anchorage filed a Motion for Federal Abstention at Docket 43. Hope Center responded in opposition at Docket 56, and Anchorage replied at Docket 61. Third, Anchorage filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Defendants' Motion for Abstention at Docket 44. Hope Center responded in opposition at Docket 55, and Anchorage replied at Docket 60. Fourth, Hope Center filed a Motion to Supplement or for Judicial Notice at Docket 79. Anchorage responded in opposition at Docket 85. On January 11, 2019, the parties presented oral argument on the first three motions. Oral argument on the fourth motion was not requested and was not necessary to the Court's determination.
BACKGROUND

Hope Center
Plaintiff Hope Center is a faith-based, non-profit organization that offers free food, showers, Christian ministry, and other services to homeless men and women in the downtown Anchorage area, as well as overnight shelter to homeless women.[1] Most of the women that Hope Center shelters have escaped from sex trafficking or been abused or battered, primarily at the hands of men.[2] Hope Center can accommodate 782*782 up to 50 women overnight,[3] all of whom sleep on the floor in one large room, where they may change clothes or be in various states of undress.[4] Because of its religious beliefs and its limited space, Hope Center accepts only persons who were determined to be female at birth into its overnight shelter.[5] Persons who were determined to be female at birth and who self-identify as men are permitted to access the shelter.[6]
Hope Center maintains that its religious beliefs include that a person's sex is an immutable God-given gift, and that it is wrong for a person to deny his or her Godgiven sex.[7] It contends that it would be against Hope Center's religious beliefs to allow persons who were determined to be male at birth to disrobe and sleep in its shelter next to persons who were determined to be female at birth.[8]
Hope Center requires overnight guests to be persons who were determined to be female at birth; to be at least 18 years old; to demonstrate no dangerous behavior; to be clean and sober; to be exposed to religious activities; to be able to meet their personal needs without assistance; and to respect shelter guidelines, including prohibitions against smoking, fighting, foul language, and wandering about the property.[9] On Saturdays, when the shelter is staffed by volunteers, no one is allowed into the building to participate in the day shelter unless she stayed in the shelter the Friday night before and thus has gone through a bag check.[10] Saturday check-in time for new guests is at 5:45 p.m.[11]
Hope Center would like to post, publish, or circulate its admittance policy or portions of it,[12] but it has refrained from doing so for fear of violating the Anchorage Municipal Code ("AMC").[13] Similarly, Hope Center would like its attorneys to be able to speak and write about its policies[14] but fears that having them do so would violate the AMC.[15]
783*783 Anchorage Equal Rights Commission
Defendant Anchorage Equal Rights Commission ("AERC") is an administrative agency within the Municipality of Anchorage.[16] In support of the Municipality's policy of guaranteeing "fair and equal treatment under law to all people of the municipality,"[17] AERC investigates complaints of discrimination "based upon race, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national origin, marital status, age, or physical or mental disability."[18] It also is empowered to initiate a general investigation on its own motion to determine whether an individual or organization is engaging in such discrimination.[19] AERC is authorized to conduct discovery,[20] subpoena witnesses and documents,[21] and hold hearings.[22]

When a private person or entity files a complaint with AERC, the agency is required to convene a fact-finding conference with the complainant and the respondent and attempt to negotiate a voluntary resolution of the complaint.[23] At least 21 days before the fact-finding conference, AERC is required to provide information and instructions about the conference to the parties.[24] At the conference, parties may be represented by legal counsel, but counsel may not cross-examine the other party and must submit any questions through AERC staff.[25]
AERC is required to investigate discrimination complaints promptly and impartially and to issue a determination within 240 days of the filing of the complaint.[26] If it determines that the allegations are not supported by substantial evidence, AERC closes or dismisses the complaint.[27] If instead it finds an unlawful discriminatory practice, AERC issues an order requiring cessation of the discriminatory conduct.[28] A party against whom such an order is issued may appeal to the Alaska Superior Court.[29]
The "Jessie Doe" Incident
"Jessie Doe" self-identifies as "female and transgender."[30] On Friday, January 26, 2018, at about 6:00 p.m., Anchorage Police Department officers brought Doe to Hope Center.[31] Doe smelled strongly of alcohol, was very agitated, was aggressive in body language, and had an open wound above one eye.[32] Hope Center's Executive Director, Sherrie Laurie, informed Doe that because Hope Center did not accept individuals who were inebriated or under the influence of alcohol or drugs, Doe could not stay at the shelter.[33] She recommended that Doe go to the hospital for medical care of the eye wound.[34] Doe eventually 784*784 agreed, and Laurie paid for a cab to take Doe to the emergency room.[35] At approximately 2:00 p.m. the next day, a Saturday, Doe returned to Hope Center and sought admission, which was denied because Doe had not stayed the previous night, as was required for Saturday admission prior to 5:45 p.m.[36] Later, Laurie learned that Doe had initiated a fight at another homeless shelter, the police had been called, and Doe had been banned from the other homeless shelter until July 4, 2018.[37]
Procedural History
On February 1, 2018, Doe filed a complaint ("First Complaint") with AERC, alleging that Hope Center's shelter was a public accommodation and that Hope Center had discriminated against Doe on the basis of sex and gender identity in violation of AMC § 5.20.050.[38] AERC informed Hope Center about the First Complaint and scheduled a factfinding conference for March 15, 2018.[39] In a detailed letter to AERC dated March 6, 2018, Hope Center explained that it did not consider itself to be a public accommodation, that it had not discriminated against Doe on the basis of gender identity, and that it "has First Amendment religious liberty and association rights to operate as it does."[40] Hope Center asserted that the fact-finding conference should thus be cancelled and stated that it would not attend the conference and would file a motion to dismiss if AERC pursued the matter.[41] AERC pursued its investigation by serving interrogatories on Hope Center.[42] On April 23, 2018, Hope Center filed a motion to dismiss that focused on its assertion that its

shelter is not a public accommodation covered by AMC § 5.20.050.[43] AERC responded with a proposed settlement agreement addressing Hope Center's "perceived misconduct."[44] On May 11, 2018, Hope Center declined the settlement proposal.[45]
On May 15, 2018, AERC filed a separate discrimination complaint against Hope Center and its attorney ("Second Complaint"), claiming that the attorney had made statements published in various media that stated or implied that transgender individuals would not be allowed to be sheltered at Hope Center, in violation of AMC § 5.20.020 and/or § 5.20.050.[46] AERC also set a fact-finding conference and sent a "Request for Essential Information."[47] Because of the potential conflict caused by the Second Complaint against Hope Center's attorney, Hope Center retained new counsel.[48]
On June 21, 2018, Hope Center's new counsel entered an appearance with AERC on the Second Complaint.[49] On June 29, 2018, AERC requested a continuance of the fact-finding conference.[50] It also expressed 785*785 concerns that the fact-finding conference, and the ordinance providing for it, lacked constitutional procedures and protections.[51] Finally, the letter noted that Hope Center would supplement its interrogatory answers to include additional information on the jurisdictional issues it intended to raise.[52]
AERC denied the continuance request and informed Hope Center that it still expected the information it had sought in its "Request for Essential Information."[53] On July 5, 2018, Hope Center submitted its responses to that request.[54] The same day, it also filed a motion to dismiss the Second Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.[55]
The fact-finding conference on the Second Complaint was held on July 9, 2018.[56] At the conference, AERC told Hope Center that the agency had materials that contradicted Hope Center's discovery responses, but would not provide them to Hope Center at that time.[57]
On July 13, 2018, Hope Center's counsel emailed AERC to request the materials discussed at the fact-finding conference.[58] In an emailed response, AERC stated that because the parties' immediate concern should be a settlement, it would not provide any supplemental information, nor would it require Hope Center to provide any supplemental information.[59]
On August 3, 2018, while settlement discussions were ongoing, AERC sent Hope Center's counsel an email that stated in part:
[AERC's] ability to fully consider [Hope Center's] arguments will continue to be limited by [Hope Center's] failure to timely amend and correct its earlier responses. [AERC] will allow [Hope Center] until August 9, 2018, to make appropriate corrections to the interrogatory responses before it takes any formal action in regards to what it views as [Hope Center's] lack of candor about its receipt of taxpayer funds and the contractual obligations for the receipt of those funds.[60]

On August 9, 2018, Hope Center provided amended answers to a number of interrogatories that AERC had propounded to it; it indicated it did so not to correct alleged errors but to make clear that its original answers were truthful.[61]
Hope Center filed its Complaint in this Court on August 16, 2018, claiming violation of its First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of expressive association; violation of the Establishment Clause; violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of procedural due process and equal protection; and violation of its Alaska constitutional rights of freedom of religion, equal protection, and privacy.[62] Thereafter, in October 2018, AERC administratively closed the Second Complaint.[63] The First Complaint remains unresolved.[64] In November 2018, 786*786 AERC Executive Director Pamela Basler and AERC Chairperson Wanda Greene filed sworn statements in this case, attesting that "AERC has undertaken no enforcement action against [Hope Center] regarding" the First Complaint.[65] They further certified that "AERC will undertake no investigative or enforcement actions regarding [the First Complaint] while this Court exercises jurisdiction in the matter."[66]
Relevant Municipal Code Provisions
Title 5 of the AMC, entitled "Equal Rights," is intended to "guarantee fair and equal treatment under law to all people of the municipality, consistent with federal and state constitutional freedoms and laws, including freedom of expression, freedom of association and the free exercise of religion."[67] Chapter 5.20 includes prohibitions on discriminatory practices in places of public accommodation[68] and in the sale, rental, or use of real property.[69]
Section 5.20.050, "Unlawful practices in places of public accommodation," provides in relevant part:
A. It is unlawful for a person, whether the owner, operator, agent or employee of an owner or operator of a public accommodation, to: 1. Refuse, withhold from or deny to a person any of its accommodations, advantages, facilities, benefits, privileges, services or goods of that place on account of ... sex [or] gender identity.... 2. Publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail a written or printed communication, notice or advertisement which states or implies that: a. Any of the services, goods, facilities, benefits, accommodations, advantages or privileges of the public accommodation will be refused, withheld from or denied to a person of a certain ... sex [or] gender identity ...; or b. The patronage or presence of a person belonging to a particular ... sex [or] gender identity ... is unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable.
"Public accommodation" is defined in the AMC as "any business or professional activity that is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of, or caters or offers goods or services to the

general public, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons."[70]
Although the First Complaint was only brought pursuant to Section 5.20.050, also relevant to this dispute is Section 5.20.020, "Unlawful practices in the sale, rental or use of real property," which provides in relevant part:
A. With the exception of those conditions described in section 5.25.030A. as "lawful practices", it is unlawful for the owner, lessor, manager, agent, brokerage service, or other person having the right to sell, lease, rent, [or] advertise ... real property to: 1. Refuse to sell, lease or rent, or to otherwise make unavailable, the real property to a person because of ... sex [or] gender identity.... 787*787 2. Discriminate against a person because of ... sex [or] gender identity... in a term, condition or privilege relating to the use ... of real property.... 7. Circulate, issue or display, make, print or publish, or cause to be made or displayed, printed or published, any communication, sign, notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the use... of real property that indicates any preference, limitation, specification or discrimination based on... sex [or] gender identity....
Section 5.25.030, "Lawful practices," provides in relevant part:
A. Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, it shall not apply with respect to the following conditions:... 9. The establishment of a hospital, convent, monastery, shelter, asylum, or residential facility for the care and lodging of persons in need of special medical, rehabilitative, social, or psychological support, including, but not limited to... shelters for the homeless.
JURISDICTION
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and supplemental jurisdiction with respect to the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION FOR FEDERAL ABSTENTION
As a threshold matter, Anchorage asserts that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Younger doctrine.[71]
A. Legal Standard
"Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."[72] "[F]ederal courts ordinarily should entertain and resolve on the merits an action

within the scope of a jurisdictional grant, and should not refuse to decide a case in deference to the states."[73] The Supreme Court has instructed that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation... to exercise the jurisdiction given them."[74]
However, in "exceptional circumstances," a federal court may abstain from exercising its jurisdiction "where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest."[75] One such circumstance is Younger abstention, in which "concerns for comity and federalism" make abstention appropriate when a particular type of state proceeding is pending.[76]
788*788 "A federal court may abstain under Younger in three categories of cases: `(1) parallel, pending state criminal proceedings, (2) state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, and (3) state civil proceedings that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'"[77] In addition to falling into one of the three categories, to warrant Younger abstention "the state proceeding must be (1) `ongoing,' (2) `implicate important state interests,' and (3) provide `an adequate opportunity ... to raise constitutional challenges.'"[78] If those threshold elements are met, a federal court may abstain under Younger if the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and no other exception to Younger applies.[79]
Here, the proceedings before AERC are clearly not category (1) or (3) proceedings. At issue is whether the proceeding before AERC falls within category (2); that is, whether the AERC proceeding is a state civil proceeding that is akin to a criminal prosecution. The Ninth Circuit has described this category of cases as "quasi-criminal enforcement actions."[80] Although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, several federal courts have concluded that when the pending state proceedings are at the investigative stage, the state proceeding is not a "quasi-criminal enforcement action." For example, in Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, a state agency notified a fundraising company that the agency had received a complaint alleging prohibited conduct and asked the company to attend an informal factfinding conference.[81] After attending the conference, the company filed a federal suit seeking protection against action by the agency on First Amendment grounds, among other claims.[82] The Fourth Circuit held "that the period between the threat of enforcement and the onset of formal enforcement proceedings may be an appropriate time for a litigant to bring its First Amendment challenges in federal court."[83] As the court explained:
Where no formal enforcement action has been undertaken, any disruption of state process will be slight.... Appellant's contention—that abstention is required whenever enforcement is threatened—would leave a party's constitutional rights in limbo while an agency contemplates enforcement but does not undertake it. A federal plaintiff would be placed "between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what [it] believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed" in enforcement proceedings.[84]
Noting that the agency had not initiated formal enforcement proceedings against the company, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision not to abstain.[85]

789*789 The First Circuit applied a similar approach in Guillemard-Ginorio v. ContrerasGomez.[86] There, the Office of the Insurance Commissioner of Puerto Rico ("OIC") had notified the plaintiff insurance agency and its principals that they were being investigated; it commenced an investigation but had not brought charges prior to the initiation of the federal case. Noting that "no formal enforcement action ha[d] been undertaken" against the company or its principals, the First Circuit concluded "that the agency's investigation of the plaintiffs was at too preliminary a stage to constitute a `proceeding' triggering Younger abstention."[87] Based in part on this conclusion, the circuit court held that the district court properly denied abstention.[88] Other federal courts have reached similar conclusions.[89]
B. Analysis
Because the underlying state proceeding in this case is an administrative proceeding, Younger abstention is appropriate only if that proceeding is a "quasi-criminal enforcement action."[90] But at the time this action was filed, the AERC proceeding was not a quasi-criminal enforcement action; rather, that proceeding was in the investigative phase. AERC had not yet determined whether Hope Center's conduct violated the AMC provisions at issue, or even whether AERC has jurisdiction regarding the First Complaint.[91] Indeed, in November 2018, AERC's Executive Director and its Chairperson both certified that "AERC has undertaken no enforcement action against Plaintiff regarding" the First Complaint.[92] Like the state court proceedings at issue in Telco Communications, Inc., Guillemard-Ginorio, and the other federal cases cited above, the AERC proceeding is not a "quasi-criminal enforcement action" that would justify Younger abstention by this Court.
Anchorage contends that this case is analogous to Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.[93] and Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden State Bar Association.[94] Both cases, however, are distinguishable from 790*790 the case at hand, because "the regulating agencies in those cases had investigated the allegations, made determinations that probable cause existed, and served formal charges on the entities."[95] As noted above, the AERC proceeding against Hope Center did not progress past the investigatory stage. "In short, the state action [in Dayton Christian Schools and Middlesex] had progressed significantly beyond that here."[96]
Because the state proceeding before AERC regarding the First Complaint is not a "quasicriminal enforcement action," Younger abstention is not appropriate. Accordingly, Anchorage's motion for federal abstention will be denied.[97]
II. MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
Anchorage moved to stay all proceedings in this case pending a ruling on Anchorage's motion for abstention.[98] For the reasons discussed in Section I. above, the Court is denying Anchorage's motion for abstention. Accordingly, Anchorage's motion to stay will be denied as moot.

III. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT OR FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Hope Center moves to supplement its Motion for Preliminary Injunction with several sealed documents. In the alternative, Hope Center requests that the Court take judicial notice of the documents.[99] Anchorage contends that Hope Center has offered no explanation as to why the relevance of the sealed documents was not appreciated until after briefing was complete, and that accordingly Hope Center's motion does not satisfy the requirements for supplementation pursuant to Alaska Local Civil Rule 7.1(d).[100] While the Court finds the sealed documents to be of limited relevance to the pending motions, the Court will allow Hope Center to supplement its Motion for Preliminary Injunction with these documents. Accordingly, the Court does not address Hope Center's request that the Court take judicial notice of the documents.
IV. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
A. Legal Standard
Hope Center moves for "a preliminary injunction to stop Defendants from applying Anchorage Municipal Code, Title 5, § 5.20.050 and § 5.20.020 in a manner that violates Hope Center's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and under Article 1, §§ 1, 4, and 22 of the Alaska Constitution."[101]
A party moving for a preliminary injunction must make a "clear showing 791*791 of each element of standing."[102] "[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" consists of three elements: injury in fact, causation, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the plaintiff's alleged injury.[103] When challenging a law prior to its enforcement, a plaintiff satisfies the injury in fact requirement where the plaintiff "intends to engage in `a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest' and [ ] there is a credible threat that the challenged provision will be invoked against the plaintiff."[104] "First Amendment challenges `present unique standing considerations' because of the `chilling effect of sweeping restrictions' on speech."[105] Accordingly, "when the threatened enforcement effort implicates First Amendment rights, the inquiry tilts dramatically toward a finding of standing."[106] "Even in the First Amendment context," however, "a plaintiff must show a credible threat of enforcement."[107] "In determining whether a plaintiff faces [] a credible threat in the pre-enforcement context, this Court considers three factors: (1) the likelihood that the law will be enforced against the plaintiff; (2) whether the plaintiff has shown, `with some degree of concrete detail,' that [it] intends to violate the challenged law; and (3) whether the law even applies to the plaintiff."[108] When a plaintiff challenges the enforcement of multiple legal provisions, a court considers separately whether the plaintiff has standing to challenge the enforcement of each provision at issue.[109]

In addition to standing, plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish that "(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest."[110] "Under the sliding scale approach 792*792 to preliminary injunctions observed in [the Ninth Circuit], the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another."[111] But in any event, even with the sliding-scale approach, "plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction."[112] Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, and "[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction is the power of the court to fashion a remedy depending upon the necessities of the particular case."[113]
B. Analysis
1. Standing to seek a preliminary injunction
A federal court has "an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it."[114] "A suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a `case or controversy,' and an Article III federal court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit."[115] The Court therefore first considers on its own initiative whether Hope Center has standing to challenge the enforcement of AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050.[116] The Court addresses separately Hope Center's standing to challenge each provision.[117]
The Court first turns to the public accommodation provision, AMC § 5.20.050. Doe's First Complaint cited to this provision, but that AERC proceeding has not progressed past the investigatory phase. Accordingly, the Court must determine whether Hope Center has suffered "a credible threat in the pre-enforcement context."[118] To that end, the Court will consider (1) the likelihood that the law will be enforced against Hope Center; (2) whether Hope Center has shown, "with some degree of concrete detail," that it intends to violate the challenged law; and (3) whether the law even applies to Hope Center.[119]
Considering these factors, the Court is satisfied that Hope Center has established a credible threat of enforcement with respect to AMC § 5.20.050. First, AMC § 5.20.050 prohibits public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of sex or gender identity. Unlike AMC § 5.20.020, § 5.20.050 does not include language explicitly exempting homeless shelters from that prohibition.[120] Accordingly, Hope Center's intended conduct 793*793 "arguably falls within the [provision's] reach."[121] Turning to the likelihood of enforcement, there is currently an "impending proceeding" against Hope Center that was initiated pursuant to AMC § 5.20.050.[122] AERC has not suggested that the provision would not be enforced if it were violated, nor had the provision "fallen into desuetude."[123] Indeed, after the First Complaint was filed, AERC's executive director initiated a second AERC proceeding against Hope Center pursuant to AMC § 5.20.050.[124] Accordingly, Hope Center's assertion that they are refraining from engaging in certain conduct for fear of an enforcement action against it under this provision is reasonable. Finally, Hope Center has

shown that it has a concrete plan to engage in conduct that arguably violates the provision. Among other assertions, Hope Center has declared a specific intent to post, publish, or circulate its admittance policy or portions of it.[125] Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Hope Center has standing to challenge AMC § 5.20.050.
Turning to AMC § 5.20.020, the Court must determine whether Hope Center has suffered "a credible threat in the pre-enforcement context" with respect to this code provision.[126] This provision presents a closer question, as two of the three factors suggest that Hope Center does not face a credible threat of enforcement: First, AMC § 5.20.020 explicitly exempts homeless shelters. Even in cases that may implicate First Amendment rights, courts have found that claims of future harm lack credibility where, as here, the provision in question "clearly fails to cover [the plaintiff's] conduct."[127] Second, Hope Center does not appear to have alleged a concrete plan to engage in conduct that arguably violates the provision; because Hope Center is a homeless shelter, the provision's prohibitions on sex and gender discrimination would not appear to cover Hope Center's proposed conduct.
Although two factors suggest that Hope Center does not face a credible threat of enforcement with respect to AMC § 5.20.020, the third factor weighs heavily in Hope Center's favor. The First Complaint against Hope Center was filed only pursuant to AMC § 5.20.050; but the Second Complaint was filed pursuant to both AMC § 5.20.020 and AMC § 5.20.050. And while the First Complaint was filed by Doe, the Second Complaint was filed by AERC's Executive Director.[128] Although AERC later dismissed the Second Complaint, the agency has not explained the basis for that dismissal. And while AMC § 5.20.020 is not implicated in any ongoing AERC proceeding, the record does not indicate that the agency has "disavow[ed] application of the challenged provision" to Hope Center in the future.[129]
794*794 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the "likelihood of enforcement" factor weighs in Hope Center's favor. Further, "keeping in mind that `when the threatened enforcement effort implicates First Amendment rights, the [standing] inquiry tilts dramatically toward a finding of standing,'" the Court concludes that Hope Center has established a credible threat of enforcement as to AMC § 5.20.020.[130] Furthermore, the alleged injury is traceable to AMC § 5.20.020 and would likely be redressed by a favorable decision enjoining enforcement of the provision. Accordingly, Hope Center has standing to challenge AMC § 5.20.020.
2. Preliminary injunctive relief
a. Likelihood of success on the merits
Hope Center contends that a preliminary injunction is appropriate because AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050 are unconstitutional as-applied to the constitutionally protected activities of Hope Center and its agents.[131] However, "[i]t is a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of [the federal court's] jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case."[132] Here, Hope Center also contends that AMC § 5.20.020 does not apply to

"shelters for the homeless" and that Hope Center is not a "public accommodation" within the meaning of AMC § 5.20.050.[133] If that is the case, then Anchorage would not be able to enforce these provisions against Hope Center, irrespective of their constitutionality. Accordingly, the Court will first consider whether either of these code provisions apply to Hope Center's overnight living space for homeless persons.
Determining whether AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050 apply to Hope Center's homeless shelter requires interpretation of the Anchorage Municipal Code. "The interpretation of municipal ordinances and charters "is governed by rules of statutory construction."[134] Federal courts apply state rules of statutory construction when interpreting municipal laws.[135] Alaska courts "apply the same rules of interpretation" when construing statutes and municipal ordinances.[136] The Alaska Supreme Court has explained Alaska's rules of statutory interpretation as follows:
Interpretation of a statute begins with its text. In addition to the text, we also consider a statute's legislative history 795*795 and purpose. In construing a statute, we have adopted a sliding scale approach whereby the plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be. Whenever possible we interpret each part or section of a statute with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.[137]
The Alaska Supreme Court has also held that "[w]here an agency interprets its own regulations, a deferential standard of review properly recognizes that the agency is best able to discern its intent in promulgating the regulation at issue."[138]
With these principles in mind, the Court first turns to AMC § 5.20.020. In relevant part, the provision states that it is unlawful for certain persons, including an owner of real property,[139] to:
1. Refuse to sell, lease or rent, or to otherwise make unavailable, the real property to a person because of ... sex [or] gender identity .... 2. Discriminate against a person because of ... sex [or] gender identity... in a term, condition or privilege relating to the use ... of real property.... 7. Circulate, issue or display, make, print or publish, or cause to be made or displayed, printed or published, any communication, sign, notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the use ... of real property that indicates any preference, limitation, specification or discrimination based on ... sex [or] gender identity....
The provision also states that these prohibitions do not apply to "those conditions described in section 5.25.030A as "lawful practices." In relevant part, AMC § 5.25.030 defines "lawful practices" to include:
9. The establishment of a hospital, convent, monastery, shelter, asylum, or residential facility for the care and lodging of persons in need of special medical, rehabilitative, social, or psychological support, including, but not limited to ... shelters for the homeless.

It is clear from the structure and plain text of these provisions that the drafters of the AMC intended to exempt homeless shelters from the prohibitions on conduct articulated in AMC § 5.20.020. Furthermore, the Alaska Supreme Court has concluded that "[t]he purpose of AMC 5.20.020 ... is to prohibit discrimination in the rental housing market."[140] Applying the provision's prohibitions to Hope Center's homeless shelter would not further this purpose. Hope Center is thus likely to succeed as to its contention that AMC § 5.20.020 does not apply to Hope Center's homeless shelter.
The Court next turns to AMC § 5.20.050. In relevant part, the provision states that it is unlawful for the "owner or operator of a public accommodation" to:
1. Refuse, withhold from or deny to a person any of its accommodations, advantages, facilities, benefits, privileges, services or goods of that place 796*796 on account of ... sex [or] gender identity.... 2. Publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail a written or printed communication, notice or advertisement which states or implies that: a. Any of the services, goods, facilities, benefits, accommodations, advantages or privileges of the public accommodation will be refused, withheld from or denied to a person of a certain ... sex [or] gender identity ...; or b. The patronage or presence of a person belonging to a particular... sex [or] gender identity ... is unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable.
To determine whether these prohibitions apply to Hope Center, the Court must consider whether Hope Center is an "owner or operator of a public accommodation" within the meaning of the AMC. The AMC defines "public accommodation" as "any business or professional activity that is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of, or caters or offers goods or services to the general public, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons."[141]
In contrast to AMC § 5.20.020, § 5.20.050 does not include language that expressly exempts homeless shelters from its prohibitions.[142] Nevertheless, Alaska's rules of statutory interpretation and the structure of the Anchorage Municipal Code as a whole suggest that homeless shelters are not public accommodations as defined in AMC § 5.20.050. For if the term "public accommodation" in AMC § 5.20.050 is read to apply to homeless shelters, then the exemption for homeless shelters contained in AMC § 5.20.020 would have no effect.[143] Pursuant to Alaska Supreme Court precedent, this Court must "interpret each part or section of a statute [or municipal code] with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole."[144] To give effect to the exemption for homeless shelters contained in AMC 797*797 § 5.20.020, the Court concludes that Hope Center is not an "owner or operator of a public accommodation" within the meaning of AMC § 5.20.050.[145] Hope Center is thus likely to succeed as to its contention that AMC § 5.20.050 does not apply to Hope Center's homeless shelter. Because neither of the AMC provisions at issue appear to apply to Hope Center's homeless shelter, it has a "likelihood of success on the merits" as to its claims.

b. Likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief
Irreparable harm "analysis focuses on irreparability, `irrespective of the magnitude of the injury.'"[146] "A threat of irreparable harm is sufficiently immediate to warrant preliminary injunctive relief if the plaintiff `is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.'"[147]
Hope Center alleges injury in the form of interference with its constitutional rights.[148] Hope Center also alleges that the code provisions at issue have "hindered [Hope Center's] ability to raise funds, leaving it in a tenuous financial state."[149] Additionally, Hope Center contends that enforcement of AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050 against Hope Center would impede its ability to provide overnight living space for homeless persons.[150] Anchorage asserts that Hope Center has failed to "demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction, not merely that it is possible."[151] It also asserts that Hope Center has not shown that its alleged financial injury would be irreparable.[152]
Here, Hope Center has established a sufficient likelihood of irreparable harm resulting from restrictions on Hope Center's ability to provide overnight living space to homeless persons. In Hawaii v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit found that Hawaii's "inability to assist in refugee resettlement" weighed in favor of finding a likelihood of irreparable harm to the State.[153] Similarly, in Doe v. Trump, the 798*798 District Court for the Western District of Washington found irreparable harm when the plaintiff organizations "ha[d] built programs specifically to serve Muslim and Arabic-speaking refugees," and government action would impede their ability to continue providing services to those populations.[154] The harms alleged in those cases are similar to those at issue here. Declarations from persons who have used Hope Center's overnight living space provide additional support for Hope Center's contention that it would have difficulty serving its target population if AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050 were enforced against the shelter.[155] Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Hope Center has demonstrated that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief.
c. Balance of the equities
The third requirement that a moving party must show in order to obtain a preliminary injunction is that the balance of equities tips in its favor.[156] "[T]he very purpose of a preliminary injunction ... is to preserve the status quo and the rights of the parties until a final judgment issues in the cause."[157] One factor considered by courts when balancing the equities is whether a mandatory or prohibitory injunction is sought; the latter is considered substantially less burdensome to the defendant.[158]
Hope Center contends that the equities favor it because the Code provisions at issue "irreparably harm Hope Center's constitutional freedoms and significantly hinder its ministry"; in contrast, it maintains that "Anchorage can achieve any valid interest through

laws already on the books."[159] Anchorage responds that it has "a substantial interest in (1) the comity of the courts and the orderly administration of ongoing state proceedings ... and (2) enforcing AMC § 5.20.050, which serves the fundamentally important purpose of protecting the rights of all protected classes in the Municipality of Anchorage."[160] Anchorage also contends that Hope Center "seeks to alter the status quo by ... posting its policies and beliefs regarding sex and gender identity."[161]
Hope Center seeks to enjoin Anchorage from enforcing AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050 against it. In that regard, Hope Center seeks to preserve the status quo at its homeless shelter.[162] Additionally, Hope Center is not asking the Court to order Anchorage to take any specific action. 799*799 And while Anchorage undoubtedly has an interest in enforcing the city's anti-discrimination provisions, the issuance of a preliminary injunction in this instance would not unduly limit Anchorage's ability to do so, as the actions Hope Center seeks to enjoin appear to be beyond the scope of the relevant provisions.[163]
Accordingly, the equities tip in Hope Center's favor.
d. Whether injunctive relief is in the public interest
"The public interest analysis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction requires [the Court] to consider whether there exists some critical public interest that would be injured by the grant of preliminary relief."[164]
Preventing discrimination against protected classes is clearly an important public interest. But AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050 do not appear to apply to Hope Center's homeless shelter. Therefore, enjoining the enforcement of those provisions against Hope Center's homeless shelter will not significantly curtail the public interest.[165] Moreover, the provision of overnight living space for homeless persons furthers the public interest. Affidavits submitted by persons who have used Hope Center's overnight living space support the conclusion that the public interest would be adversely affected if AMC §§ 5.20.020 and 5.20.050 were enforced against Hope Center.[166]
Accordingly, the public interest favors issuance of a preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
Anchorage's Motion for Federal Abstention at Docket 43 is DENIED.
Anchorage's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Defendants' Motion for Abstention at Docket 44 is DENIED as moot.

Hope Center's Motion to Supplement or for Judicial Notice at Docket 79 is GRANTED as to Hope Center's request to supplement the record.
Hope Center's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 29 is GRANTED with respect to its homeless shelter and IT IS ORDERED as follows:
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(1) This Order applies to all named Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation 800*800 with Defendants who receive actual notice of this Order.
(2) The above-described Defendants and persons are temporarily enjoined from enforcing Anchorage Municipal Code § 5.20.050 and § 5.20.020 as applied to the provision of overnight living space to homeless persons by Hope Center and its agents, including its right to post its desired policies (including Exhibit 3 to the Verified Complaint), and to open its overnight shelter only to persons who were determined to be female at birth.
(3) The above-described Defendants and persons are enjoined from enforcing Anchorage Municipal Code § 5.20.050(A)(2)(b) as applied to the right of the Hope Center to post and discuss its desired policies (including Exhibit 3 to the Verified Complaint) with respect to its overnight homeless shelter.
(4) This Preliminary Injunction is effective as of the date of this Order and shall remain in place during this litigation unless and until the Court orders otherwise.
(5) The Court issues this preliminary injunction without a bond or other security.[167]
[1] Docket 1 (Compl.) at 7 ¶ 36, 8 ¶¶ 51-52, 9 ¶ 53, 10 ¶¶ 68-69.
[2] Id. at 8 ¶¶ 47-48.
[3] Id. ¶ 46.
[4] Id. at 12 ¶ 80.
[5] Id. at 8 ¶ 48.
The Court adopts the following definitions from the Third Circuit:
"Sex" is defined as the "anatomical and physiological processes that lead to or denote male or female." Typically, sex is determined at birth based on the appearance of external genitalia.
"Gender" is a "broader societal construct" that encompasses how a "society defines what male or female is within a certain cultural context." A person's gender identity is their subjective, deep-core sense of self as being a particular gender.... "[C]isgender" refers to a person who identifies with the sex that person was determined to have at birth. The term "transgender" refers to a person whose gender identity does not align with the sex that person was

determined to have at birth. A transgender boy [or man] is therefore a person who has a lasting, persistent male gender identity, though that person's sex was determined to be female at birth. A transgender girl [or woman] is a person who has a lasting, persistent female gender identity though that person's sex was determined to be male at birth. Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 522 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2636, 204 L.Ed.2d 300 (2019) (citations omitted). [6] Id. at 11 ¶¶ 73-74. [7] Id. at 9 ¶ 56. [8] Id. ¶ 60. [9] Id. at 11 ¶¶ 72, 75. [10] Id. at 12 ¶¶ 82-83. [11] Id. ¶ 85. [12] Id. at 10-11 ¶ 71, 30 ¶ 210. [13] Id. at 31 ¶¶ 216-20. [14] Id. ¶¶ 218-19. [15] Id. ¶¶ 217, 220. [16] AMC § 5.10.020. [17] AMC § 5.10.010. [18] AMC §§ 5.10.010, 5.10.040(A)(2). [19] AMC § 5.50.060. [20] AMC § 5.50.070. [21] AMC §§ 5.10.040(A)(3), 5.50.080. [22] AMC §§ 5.10.040(A)(5), 5.70.010. [23] AMC § 5.50.020(A). [24] AMC § 5.50.020(B). [25] AMC § 5.50.020(A). [26] AMC §§ 5.50.010, 5.50.050. [27] AMC § 5.50.010.

[28] AMC § 5.70.140. [29] AMC § 5.80.030(A). [30] Docket 43-2 (AERC Discrimination Compl. No. 18-041). [31] Docket 1 at 12 ¶ 89. [32] Id. at 13 ¶¶ 91-92. [33] Id. ¶ 94. [34] Id. ¶ 96. [35] Id. ¶ 97. [36] Id. ¶¶ 99-100. [37] Id. ¶ 95. [38] Docket 43-2. [39] Docket 29-1 (Attachments to Motion for Preliminary Injunction) at 5. [40] Id. at 4-5 (capitalization omitted). [41] Id. at 5. [42] Docket 1 at 20 ¶ 140. [43] Id. at 21 ¶ 145; Docket 29-1 at 7. There is no indication in the record that AERC has ruled on that motion. See Docket 1 at 4 ¶ 18. [44] Docket 1 at 21 ¶¶ 146-47. [45] Id. at 21 ¶ 149. [46] Id. at 22 ¶¶ 151-54. [47] Id. ¶ 155. [48] Id. at 23 ¶ 156. [49] Id. ¶ 157. [50] Id. ¶ 159 and at 24 ¶ 168. [51] Id. at 23 ¶¶ 159, 162. [52] Id. ¶ 160.

[53] Id. at 24-25 ¶¶ 169-70. [54] Id. at 25 ¶ 171. [55] Id. ¶ 172. [56] Id. at 27 ¶ 187. [57] Id. ¶ 191. [58] Id. ¶ 192. [59] Id. ¶ 193. [60] Id. at 28-29 ¶¶ 198-200. [61] Id. at 29 ¶ 205. [62] Docket 1. [63] Docket 43-1 (AERC Closure). [64] Docket 1 at 29 ¶ 207. [65] Docket 53 (Basler Aff.) at 2, ¶ 2; Docket 59-1 (Greene Aff.) at 2, ¶ 2. [66] Docket 53 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket 59-1 at 2, ¶ 3. [67] AMC § 5.10. [68] AMC § 5.20.050. [69] AMC § 5.20.020. [70] AMC § 5.20.010. [71] Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). [72] Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). [73] Sprint Commc'ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (NOPSI)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). [74] Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236. [75] Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (surveying various types of federal abstention). [76] See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619, 627, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (surveying Younger line of cases).

[77] Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014)).
[78] Id. at 1044 (quoting Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)).
[79] ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759.
[80] Id.
[81] 885 F.2d 1225, 1227 (4th Cir. 1989).
[82] Id.
[83] Id. at 1229.
[84] Id. (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974)) (citing Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826, 831 (1st Cir. 1972)).
[85] Id. at 1228, 1230.
[86] 585 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2009).
[87] Id. at 519, 520.
[88] Id. at 523.
[89] See, e.g., Mulholland v. Marion Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014) (state investigatory proceedings were at too preliminary a stage to warrant federal deference); La. Debating & Literary Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1490-91 (5th Cir. 1995) (district court's ruling that there was no ongoing proceeding did not constitute abuse of discretion where "[s]ubsequent to ... complaints being filed with the Commission against the [plaintiffs] ... the only administrative activity ha[d] been" letters issued to plaintiffs advising them of the allegations); Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1137 (D. Mont. 2016) ("While a proceeding before [Montana's Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC")] has the potential to be `akin to criminal proceedings,' ODC's investigation into this case has not progressed beyond the investigation stage. Other courts have determined that investigation proceedings, without more, do not trigger Younger." (citations omitted)); cf. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[I]f the mere `initiation' of a judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceeding were an act of civil enforcement, Younger would extend to every case in which a state judicial officer resolves a dispute between two private parties.").
[90] ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 758; see Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019).
[91] Docket 53 at 2; Docket 59-1 at 2.
[92] Docket 53 at 2; Docket 59-1 at 2.
[93] 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986); see Docket 61 at 4-7.
[94] 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982).
[95] La. Debating & Literary Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1490 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. at 623-24, 106 S.Ct. 2718; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 428, 102 S.Ct. 2515).

[96] Id.
[97] In light of this conclusion, the Court does not reach the three-part test articulated in Herrera or determine whether other considerations would preclude Younger abstention. See Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2019); ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759.
[98] Docket 44.
[99] Docket 79 at 2.
[100] Docket 95 at 3-4.
In relevant part, Rule 7.1(d) reads as follows:
[A]fter briefing of a motion is complete, supplementation of factual materials may occur only by motion for good cause. The motion must have the proposed factual materials attached as an exhibit and address the reasons earlier filing was not possible or their relevance was not appreciated. Such motions will not routinely be granted.
[101] Docket 29 at 2, ¶ 1.
[102] Townley v. Miller, 722 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). Although the parties do not address standing in their briefing on this motion, the Court addresses it on its own initiative. See D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[B]oth the Supreme Court and this court have held that whether or not the parties raise the issue, `[f]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.'" (emphasis in original) (quoting Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002)) (citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995))).
[103] Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
[104] LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)).
[105] Italian Colors Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless (ARLPAC), 320 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003)).
[106] LSO, 205 F.3d at 1155.
[107] Italian Colors, 878 F.3d at 1171.
[108] Id. at 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 786 (9th Cir. 2010)).
[109] See, e.g., McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012).
[110] Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).
Anchorage contends that "[b]eause the government is a party to these proceedings, the final two factors of a preliminary injunction analysis ... merge." Docket 52 at 17 (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). The cases this Court has reviewed have merged these factors when the federal government is a party to the proceeding. See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal.), reconsideration denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-16886, 2018 WL 1401847 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009)).

[111] Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-35 (2011) (discussing post-Winter circuit split over continuing viability of sliding-scale approach and joining Seventh and Second Circuits in retaining it).
[112] All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365) (emphasis in original).
[113] Sierra Forest, 577 F.3d at 1022 (quoting United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1987)).
[114] Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010) (citations omitted).
[115] Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)).
[116] See supra note 102.
[117] See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012).
[118] Italian Colors Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2018).
[119] Id. at 1172.
[120] In its briefing before the AERC, Hope Center contended that the "lawful practices" exemption extends to AMC § 5.20.050. In light of the analysis below, the Court assumes, without deciding, that the exemption applies only to AMC § 5.20.020.
[121] See Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003)).
[122] See Italian Colors, 878 F.3d at 1173.
[123] Id. (quoting Arizona Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003)).
[124] The Second Complaint also cited AMC § 5.20.050. See Docket 28-5 (AERC Discrimination Compl. No. 18-167).
[125] Docket 1 at 10-11 ¶ 71, 30 ¶ 210.
[126] Italian Colors, 878 F.3d at 1171-72.
[127] Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2003)).
[128] Docket 28-5.
[129] See LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Courts have also considered the Government's failure to disavow application of the challenged provision as a factor in favor of a finding of standing.").
[130] Italian Colors, 878 F.3d at 1174 (quoting LSO, 205 F.3d at 1155).
[131] Docket 29 at 1, 3-4.

[132] Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205, 129 S.Ct. 2504, 174 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009) (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51, 104 S.Ct. 1577, 80 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984)); cf. United States v. Vargas, 915 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Vargas presents almost all of his argument in constitutional terms, asserting that the judge violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.... It is, for him, the Constitution or nothing[.] ... This is a hopeless strategy, because courts are obliged to consider statutory and rulebased arguments ahead of constitutional ones.").
[133] See Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 10; 40, ¶ 288; 47, ¶ 341; 50, ¶ 367; Docket 29-1 at 4.
[134] Canfield v. Sullivan, 774 F.2d 1466, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
[135] See id.; see also McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 387-88 (9th Cir. 1989).
[136] Cent. Recycling Servs., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 389 P.3d 54, 57 (Alaska 2017).
[137] Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr., LLC v. Bolinder, 427 P.3d 754, 763 (Alaska 2018), reh'g denied (Oct. 10, 2018) (citations and quotations omitted).
[138] Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 284 n.13 (Alaska 1994) (citation omitted).
[139] AMC § 5.20.020 applies to "the owner, lessor, manager, agent, brokerage service, or other person having the right to sell, lease, rent, advertise, or an owner's association having the powers of governance and operation of real property."
[140] Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 (footnote omitted).
[141] AMC § 5.20.010.
[142] In its briefing before the AERC, Hope Center contended that the "lawful practices" exemption extends to AMC § 5.20.050. In light of the analysis below, the Court assumes, without deciding, that the exemption applies only to AMC § 5.20.020.
[143] While the language used in the two provisions is slightly different, the conduct prohibited by the two provisions is essentially identical. Compare 5.20.020(A)(1)-(2) ("Refuse to sell, lease or rent, or to otherwise make unavailable, the real property to a person because of ... sex [or] gender identity [or] .... Discriminate against a person because of ... sex [or] gender identity ... in a term, condition or privilege relating to the use ... of real property....") with 5.20.050(A)(1)("Refuse, withhold from or deny to a person any of its accommodations, advantages, facilities, benefits, privileges, services or goods of that place on account of ... sex [or] gender identity...."); compare 5.20.20(A)(7) ("Circulate, issue or display, make, print or publish, or cause to be made or displayed, printed or published, any communication, sign, notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the use ... of real property that indicates any preference, limitation, specification or discrimination based on ... sex [or] gender identity....") with 5.20.50(A)(2) ("Publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail a written or printed communication, notice or advertisement which states or implies that: [ ] Any of the services, goods, facilities, benefits, accommodations, advantages or privileges of the public accommodation will be refused, withheld from or denied to a person of a certain ... sex [or] gender identity ...; or ... The patronage or presence of a person belonging to a particular ... sex [or] gender identity ... is unwelcome, not desired, not solicited, objectionable or unacceptable.").
[144] Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr., LLC v. Bolinder, 427 P.3d 754, 763 (Alaska 2018), reh'g denied (Oct. 10, 2018) (citations and quotations omitted).
[145] This conclusion may seem at odds with the Court's standing analysis. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. However, Ninth Circuit precedent indicates that at the standing stage, the applicability factor weighs in favor of standing if conduct "arguably falls within the [provision's] reach." Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir.

2010) (emphasis added) (citing California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003)). In contrast, the question at this stage is whether Hope Center would likely succeed on the merits.
[146] California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 581 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Little Sisters of the Poor Jeanne Jugan Residence v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2716, 204 L.Ed.2d 1111, 2019 WL 1207008 (2019) (quoting Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999)).
[147] Boardman v. Pac. Seafood Grp., 822 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).
[148] Docket 30 at 29; see Docket 63 at 13 ("Anchorage's acts either chill Hope Center's speech or threaten imminent enforcement that will stop Hope Center from operating consistent with its beliefs.").
[149] Docket 56 at 28 ("Hope Center's women's shelter will likely close its doors if it does not get equitable relief from this Court.").
[150] Docket 1 at 30 ¶¶ 212-15.
[151] Docket 52 at 14 (quoting Arc of California v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2014)).
[152] Docket 75 at 37-38.
[153] 859 F.3d 741, 782 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L.Ed.2d 643 (2017), vacated and remanded on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 337, 199 L.Ed.2d 275 (2017).
[154] 288 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1083 (W.D. Wash. 2017), reconsideration denied, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (W.D. Wash. 2018); see also Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 165 F. Supp. 3d 718, 739 (S.D. Ind. 2016), aff'd, 838 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Although the funding denied to [the agency] could be reimbursed, [the agency] has presented evidence that, in the interim, its organizational objectives would be irreparably damaged by its inability to provide adequate social services to its clients.").
[155] Docket 34 (S.D. Decl.); Docket 35 (G.O. Decl.); Docket 36 (F.S. Decl.).
[156] Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).
[157] U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010).
[158] See, e.g., Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009).
[159] Docket 30 at 29-30.
[160] Docket 52 at 19.
[161] Docket 52 at 18.
[162] See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that "status quo" refers to status quo refers to the "legally relevant relationship between the parties before the controversy arose" (emphasis omitted)).
[163] Cf. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 783 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L.Ed.2d 643, (2017), vacated and remanded on other grounds, U.S. ___,

138 S. Ct. 377, 199 L.Ed.2d 275 (2017) ("[T]he Government's interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order. Nonetheless, the President must exercise his authority under § 1182(f) lawfully.... Because the President has not done so, we cannot conclude that national security interests outweigh the harms to Plaintiffs." (quotation and citations omitted)).
[164] Cal. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 132 S.Ct. 1204, 182 L.Ed.2d 101 (2012) (citation omitted).
[165] See Hawaii 859 F.3d at 784 (9th Cir.) ("Although we recognize that sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs are implicated, the President must nonetheless exercise his executive power under § 1182(f) lawfully." (quotation and citation omitted)).
[166] See Docket 34 (S.D. Decl.); Docket 35 (G.O. Decl.); Docket 36 (F.S. Decl.).
[167] Based on the Court's evaluation of the public interest in this case, the Court waives the bond requirement. See Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005).