Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 1 of 16
ADRMOP,APPEAL,CLOSED,REFSET−DMR
U.S. District Court California Northern District (San Francisco) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:18−cv−04609−WHA

Edwards et al v. Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc. et al Assigned to: Judge William Alsup Referred to: Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu (Settlement) Demand: $5,000,000 Case in other court: 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 20−15070 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/31/2018 Date Terminated: 12/19/2019 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

William Edwards on behalf of himself and others similarly situated

represented by Marissa Hatton 400 7th Street NW, Suite 602 Washington, DC 20004 202−838−6709 Email: mhatton@equaljusticeunderlaw.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine Bentley Sevcenko Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street NW Suite 602 Washington, DC 20004 703−643−7227 Email: catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org TERMINATED: 12/14/2018 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phil Telfeyan Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street NW Suite 602 Washington, DC 20004 202−505−2058 Email: ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Jackson on behalf of himself and others similarly situated

represented by Marissa Hatton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine Bentley Sevcenko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
James Brooks on behalf of himself and others similarly situated

represented by Marissa Hatton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff
Kyser Wilson on behalf of himself and others similarly situated

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine Bentley Sevcenko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marissa Hatton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine Bentley Sevcenko (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/14/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.
Defendant Supercom, Inc.

represented by Kevin E. Gilbert Orbach Huff Suarez + Henderson LLP 6210 Stoneridge Mall Road, Suite 210 Plesanton, CA 94588 510−999−7908 Fax: 510−999−7918 Email: kgilbert@ohshlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristina Doan Strottman 444 South Figueroa Street Suite 2400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−2953 213−236−0600 Fax: 213−236−2700 Email: kgruenberg@bwslaw.com TERMINATED: 08/14/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman Burke, Williams & Sorensen LLP 444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−2953 213−236−0600 Fax: 213−236−2700 Email: scoleman@bwslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address)

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 3 of 16

Defendant Linda Connelly
Defendant Diane Harrington
Defendant Kent Borowick
Defendant Raelene Rivas
Defendant Jeanette Arguello−Ramos
Defendant Belinda Doe Defendant Alameda County

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin E. Gilbert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman

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Defendant Wynne Carvill TERMINATED: 10/09/2018
Defendant Wendy Still

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Louis Fox Duane Morris LLP Spear Tower One Market Plaza, Suite 2200 San Francisco, CA 94105−1127 415−957−3092 Fax: 415−276−5775 Email: MLFox@duanemorris.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin E. Gilbert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Eileen Coleman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristina Doan Strottman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/31/2018 07/31/2018
08/01/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Alameda County, Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Wynne Carvill, Linda Connelly, Belinda Doe, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas, Wendy Still, Supercom, Inc. (Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0971−12555761). Filed by James Brooks, Robert Jackson, William Edwards, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−5, # 2 Exhibit 6−10, # 3 Exhibit 11−15, # 4 Exhibit 16−20, # 5 Exhibit 21−26, # 6 Civil Cover Sheet)(Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 7/31/2018) Modified on 8/2/2018 (slhS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 07/31/2018)
2 Case assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley.
Counsel for plaintiff or the removing party is responsible for serving the Complaint or Notice of Removal, Summons and the assigned judge's standing orders and all other new case documents upon the opposing parties. For information, visit E−Filing A New Civil Case at http://cand.uscourts.gov/ecf/caseopening.
Standing orders can be downloaded from the court's web page at www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges. Upon receipt, the summons will be issued and returned electronically. Counsel is required to send chambers a copy of the initiating documents pursuant to L.R. 5−1(e)(7). A scheduling order will be sent by Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) within two business days. Consent/Declination due by 8/14/2018. (srnS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/31/2018) (Entered: 07/31/2018)
3 Proposed Summons. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 8/1/2018) (Entered: 08/01/2018)

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08/02/2018 08/02/2018 08/02/2018 08/03/2018 08/17/2018 09/11/2018 09/11/2018
09/12/2018 09/12/2018
09/13/2018 09/14/2018
09/14/2018 09/14/2018

4 Initial Case Management Scheduling Order with ADR Deadlines: Case Management Statement due by 10/25/2018. Initial Case Management Conference set for 11/1/2018 01:30 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom F, 15th Floor. (slhS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/2/2018) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
Electronic filing error Re: 3 Proposed Summons filed by Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, William Edwards, James Brooks. This court does not issue summons to "Doe" def endants. This filing will not be processed by the clerks office.Please re−file in its entirety without listing the Doe defendant. (slhS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/2/2018) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
5 Proposed Summons. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 8/2/2018) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
6 Summons Issued as to Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Wynne Carvill, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas, Wendy Still, Supercom, Inc. (aaaS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/3/2018) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
7 CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson.. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 8/17/2018) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
8 MOTION for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice by Catherine Sevcenko ( Filing fee $ 310, receipt number 0971−12667848.) filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)(Sevcenko, Catherine) (Filed on 9/11/2018) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
9 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER re 1 Complaint,, to Extend Time for Defendants to File Initial Responsive Pleading to Plaintiffs' Complaint filed by Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas, Supercom, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 9/11/2018) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
10 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granting 9 Stipulation to Extend Time for Defendants to File Initial Responsive Pleading to Plaintiffs' Complaint. (ahmS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/12/2018) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
11 CLERK'S NOTICE Re: Consent or Declination: Defendants LEADERS IN COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, INC., LINDA CONNELLY, DIANE HARRINGTON, KENT BOROWICK, RAELENE RIVAS, JEANETTE ARGUELLO−RAMOS shall file a consent or declination to proceed before a magistrate judge by 9/26/2018. Note that any party is free to withhold consent to proceed before a magistrate judge without adverse substantive consequences. The forms are available at: http://cand.uscourts.gov/civilforms. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/12/2018) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
12 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granting 8 Motion for Pro Hac Vice as to Catherine Sevcenko. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/13/2018) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
13 Certificate of Interested Entities by Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas identifying Other Affiliate Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Other Affiliate Lloyds of London, Brit Syndicate 2987 for Diane Harrington, Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Raelene Rivas; Corporate Parent SuperCom, Inc., Other Affiliate Lloyds of London, Brit Syndicate 2987 for Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 9/14/2018) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
14 CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas.. (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 9/14/2018) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
15 CLERK'S NOTICE OF IMPENDING REASSIGNMENT TO A U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: The Clerk of this Court will now randomly reassign this case to a District Judge because either (1) a party has not consented to the jurisdiction of a

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09/17/2018
09/18/2018 09/18/2018
10/05/2018 10/05/2018 10/11/2018 10/11/2018
10/11/2018 10/11/2018 10/11/2018 10/12/2018

Magistrate Judge, or (2) time is of the essence in deciding a pending judicial action for which the necessary consents to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction have not been secured. You will be informed by separate notice of the district judge to whom this case is reassigned.
ALL HEARING DATES PRESENTLY SCHEDULED BEFORE THE CURRENT MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARE VACATED AND SHOULD BE RE−NOTICED FOR HEARING BEFORE THE JUDGE TO WHOM THIS CASE IS REASSIGNED.
This is a text only docket entry; there is no document associated with this notice. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/14/2018) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
16 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge William Alsup for all further proceedings. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley no longer assigned to the case. This case is assigned to a judge who participates in the Cameras in the Courtroom Pilot Project. See General Order 65 and http://cand.uscourts.gov/cameras. Signed by the Executive Committee on 9/17/18. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Eligibility for Video Recording)(srnS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/17/2018) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
17 NOTICE AND ORDER RE PUTATIVE CLASS ACTIONS AND FACTORS TO BE EVALUATED FOR ANY PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT. Signed by Judge Alsup on 9/18/2018. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/18/2018) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
18 CLERK'S NOTICE SCHEDULING INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE UPON REASSIGNMENT: Joint Case Management Statement due by 10/25/2018. Initial Case Management Conference set for 11/1/2018 11:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor. Standing orders can be downloaded from the court's web page at www.cand.uscourts.gov/whaorders.. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/18/2018) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
19 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of Hon. Wynne Carvill Without Prejudice filed by Wynne Carvill. (Fox, Michael) (Filed on 10/5/2018) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
20 ORDER GRANTING 19 STIPULATED DISMISSAL OF HON. WYNNE CARVILL WITHOUT PREJUDICE by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/5/2018) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
21 ADR Certification (ADR L.R. 3−5 b) of discussion of ADR options by Plaintiffs (Sevcenko, Catherine) (Filed on 10/11/2018) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
22 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas, Supercom, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 11/29/2018 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Responses due by 10/25/2018. Replies due by 11/1/2018. (Gruenberg, Kristina) (Filed on 10/11/2018) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
23 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Alameda County, Wendy Still. Motion Hearing set for 11/29/2018 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Responses due by 10/25/2018. Replies due by 11/1/2018. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 10/11/2018) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
24 Proposed Order re 22 MOTION to Dismiss by Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas, Supercom, Inc.. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 10/11/2018) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
25 Proposed Order re 23 MOTION to Dismiss by Alameda County, Wendy Still. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 10/11/2018) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
26 CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by Alameda County, Wendy Still, Supercom, Inc... (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 10/12/2018) (Entered: 10/12/2018)

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10/12/2018 10/25/2018 10/25/2018 10/25/2018 11/01/2018
11/01/2018 11/01/2018 11/01/2018
11/02/2018 11/06/2018
11/15/2018 11/27/2018

27 Certificate of Interested Entities by Alameda County, Wendy Still identifying Corporate Parent Supercom, Inc. for Alameda County, Wendy Still. (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 10/12/2018) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
28 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Alameda County, Jeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas, Wendy Still, Supercom, Inc.. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 10/25/2018) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
29 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 22 MOTION to Dismiss ) filed byJames Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 10/25/2018) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
30 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 23 MOTION to Dismiss ) filed byJames Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 10/25/2018) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
31 CASE MANAGEMENT SCHEDULING ORDER: ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu for Mediation/Settlement. Motion to certify a class must be filed by 3/14/2019 to be heard on a 49−day track. Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/22/2020 02:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor. Jury Trial set for 1/27/2020 07:30 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Amended Pleadings due by 12/27/2018. Discovery due by 8/23/2019. Expert Witness List due by 8/23/2019. Motions due by 10/17/2019. Signed by Judge William Alsup on 11/1/2018. (whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/1/2018) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
32 REPLY (re 22 MOTION to Dismiss ) filed byJeanette Arguello−Ramos, Kent Borowick, Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Raelene Rivas, Supercom, Inc.. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 11/1/2018) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
33 REPLY (re 23 MOTION to Dismiss ) filed byAlameda County, Wendy Still. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 11/1/2018) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
34 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William Alsup: Initial Case Management Conference held on 11/1/2018. CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu for Settlement Conference. Jury Selection set for 1/27/2020 07:30 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Jury Trial set for 1/27/2020, 1/28/2020, 1/29/2020, 1/30/2020 07:30 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. (Total Time in Court: 17 minutes.)
Court Reporter: Belle Ball. Plaintiff Attorney: Phil Telfeyan, Kevin Mitchell. Defendant Attorney: Kristina Strottman.
(This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 11/1/2018) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu for Settlement (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/2/2018) (Entered: 11/02/2018)
35 CLERK'S NOTICE: Notice is hereby given to all parties that Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu will convene a pre−settlement conference call to discuss timing and preparation for an in−person settlement conference. Judge Ryu anticipates that the phone call will last approximately 20−30 minutes. The conference call shall take place on 1/17/2019 11:30 AM. Lead Counsel for all parties shall participate. Counsel will receive the call−in information via e−mail from Judge Ryu's courtroom deputy. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/6/2018) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
36 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin E. Gilbert for Defendants Alameda County and Wendy Still (Gilbert, Kevin) (Filed on 11/15/2018) (Entered: 11/15/2018)
37 MOTION to Substitute Attorney filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 11/27/2018) (Entered: 11/27/2018)

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11/28/2018 11/29/2018
12/13/2018 12/14/2018 12/14/2018 01/04/2019 01/10/2019 01/17/2019
01/17/2019
01/17/2019 01/17/2019 01/18/2019

38 ORDER DENYING 37 PRO HAC VICE APPLICATION OF ATTORNEY MARISSA HATTON by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/28/2018) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
39 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William Alsup: Motion Hearing re 22 MOTION to Dismiss, 23 MOTION to Dismiss held on 11/29/2018. Matter taken under submission. Court to issue written order. (Total Time in Court: 22 minutes.)
Court Reporter: Belle Ball. Plaintiff Attorney: Marissa Hatton, Phil Telfeyan. Defendant Attorney: Kevin Gilbert, Kristina Doan Strottman.
(This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlh, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 11/29/2018) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
40 Amended MOTION to Substitute Attorney filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit)(Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 12/13/2018) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
41 ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION OF ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE by Judge William Alsup granting 40 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Catherine Bentley Sevcenko terminated. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/14/2018) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
42 ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS by Judge Alsup granting in part and denying in part 22 Motion to Dismiss; granting 23 Motion to Dismiss. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/14/2018) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
43 NOTICE by Alameda County, Wendy Still of Lodging [Proposed] Judgment (Attachments: # 1 [Proposed] Judgment)(Gilbert, Kevin) (Filed on 1/4/2019) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
44 NOTICE RE 43 PROPOSED JUDGMENT AS TO ALAMEDA COUNTY AND CHIEF WENDY STILL. Signed by Judge Alsup on 1/10/2019. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/10/2019) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
45 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu: Planning call for in−person settlement conference held on 1/17/2019. The court will issue a scheduling order for a settlement conference to take place on 6/25/2019, and will also convene a further planning call to take place approximately 30 days before the in−person session. FTR Time: Not Recorded. Attachment: Civil Conference Minute Order. (ig, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 1/17/2019) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
46 CLERK'S NOTICE: Notice is hereby given to all parties that Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu will convene a further pre−settlement conference call to discuss preparation for an in−person settlement conference. Judge Ryu anticipates that the phone call will last approximately 20−30 minutes. The conference call shall take place on 5/24/2019 4:00 PM. Lead Counsel for all parties shall participate. Counsel shall use the same call−in information that was provided to them by Judge Ryu's courtroom deputy on 11/6/2018 via e−mail. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/17/2019) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
Set/Reset Hearing re 46 Clerk's Notice Settlement Conference set for 5/24/2019 04:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/17/2019) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
47 ORDER SETTING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: Settlement Conference set for 6/25/2019 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu in Oakland, Courtroom 4, 3rd Floor. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu on 1/17/19.(ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/17/2019) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
48 ANSWER to 1 Complaint with Jury Demand byLeaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 1/18/2019) Modified on 1/18/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 01/18/2019)

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02/01/2019 02/04/2019
02/06/2019 02/06/2019 02/06/2019 02/13/2019
02/13/2019 02/15/2019 02/15/2019 02/27/2019 03/01/2019 03/04/2019

49 Discovery Letter Brief filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Interrogatories 4 and 5, # 2 Exhibit 2 RFPs 10 and 11, # 3 Exhibit 3 E−mail Narrowed Requests)(Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 2/1/2019) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
50 ORDER SETTING DISCOVERY HEARING [re 49 Discovery Letter Brief filed by Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, William Edwards, James Brooks]. Response due by NOON on 2/7/2019. Two−hour meet−and−confer in Court's jury room from 8:00−10:00 AM 2/11/2019. Discovery Hearing set for 2/11/2019 10:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Signed by Judge William Alsup on 2/4/2019. (whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/4/2019) (Entered: 02/04/2019)
51 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER re 50 Order,, Set Deadlines/Hearings, filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., William Edwards, Robert Jackson, James Brooks and Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 2/6/2019) Modified on 2/6/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 02/06/2019)
52 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 49 Discovery Letter Brief ) filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 2/6/2019) Modified on 2/6/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 02/06/2019)
53 AMENDED ORDER MOVING DISCOVERY HEARING by Judge William Alsup [granting 51 Stipulation]. Response due by NOON on 2/7/2019. Two−hour meet−and−confer in Court's jury room from 8:00 AM −− 10:00 AM on 2/13/2019. Discovery Hearing set for 2/13/2019 10:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup.(whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/6/2019) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
54 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William Alsup: Discovery Hearing re 49 Discovery Letter Brief held on 2/13/2019. Matter taken under submission. Court to issue written order. (Total Time in Court: 21 minutes.)
Court Reporter: Debra Pas. Plaintiff Attorney: Marissa Hatton. Defendant Attorney: Kristina Doan Strottman.
(This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 2/13/2019) (Entered: 02/13/2019)
55 ORDER FOLLOWING DISCOVERY HEARING by Judge William Alsup granting in part and denying in part 49 Discovery Letter Brief. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/13/2019) (Entered: 02/13/2019)
56 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER re 55 Order on Discovery Letter Brief (Stipulated Protective Order) filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., William Edwards, Robert Jackson, James Brooks and Kyser Wilson. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 2/15/2019) Modified on 2/19/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 02/15/2019)
57 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR RELEASE OF CLIENT AND EMPLOYEE INFORMATION by Judge William Alsup granting 56 Stipulation. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/15/2019) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
58 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER Stipulated Protective Order for EM Fee Rate and Related Information filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson and Leadres in Community Alternatives, Inc. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 2/27/2019) Modified on 2/27/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 02/27/2019)
59 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on 02/13/2019 before Judge William Alsup by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, for Court Reporter Debra Pas. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 3/1/2019) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
60 ORDER APPROVING 58 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER SUBJECT TO STATED CONDITIONS by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/4/2019) (Entered: 03/04/2019)

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 10 of 16

03/04/2019 03/06/2019 03/13/2019 03/13/2019 03/16/2019
03/20/2019
03/21/2019 03/21/2019
03/27/2019
04/08/2019

61 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER FOR DEPOSITION filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., William Edwards, Robert Jackson, James Brooks and Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 3/4/2019) Modified on 3/4/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 03/04/2019)
62 ORDER GRANTING 61 STIPULATED REQUEST TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM EDWARDS (AS MODIFIED) by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2019) (Entered: 03/06/2019)
63 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER Two−Day Deadline Extension filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson and Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 3/13/2019) Modified on 3/13/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 03/13/2019)
64 ORDER GRANTING 63 STIPULATED REQUEST TO EXTEND CLASS CERTIFICATION DEADLINE BY TWO DAYS by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/13/2019) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
65 ***DISREGARD. FILED IN ERROR. SEE 68 FOR CORRECTED MOTION. *** MOTION to Certify Class filed by James Brooks, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. Motion Hearing set for 5/9/2019 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Responses due by 4/8/2019. Replies due by 4/22/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Declaration, # 4 Declaration, # 5 Declaration, # 6 Declaration, # 7 Declaration, # 8 Declaration, # 9 Declaration, # 10 Declaration, # 11 Declaration, # 12 Declaration, # 13 Declaration, # 14 Declaration, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Declaration, # 18 Proposed Order)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 3/16/2019) Modified on 3/22/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 03/16/2019)
66 Transcript of Proceedings held on 2−13−2019, before Judge William H. Alsup. Court Reporter/Transcriber Debra L. Pas, CRR, telephone number (415) 431−1477/Email: Debra_Pas@cand.uscourts.gov. Per General Order No. 59 and Judicial Conference policy, this transcript may be viewed only at the Clerk's Office public terminal or may be purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber until the deadline for the Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Any Notice of Intent to Request Redaction, if required, is due no later than 5 business days from date of this filing. (Re 59 Transcript Order ) Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/18/2019. (Related documents(s) 59 ) (pasdl50S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/20/2019) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
67 ERRATA re 65 MOTION to Certify Class by Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 3/21/2019) (Entered: 03/21/2019)
68 MOTION to Certify Class CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 65 filed by James Brooks, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. Motion Hearing set for 5/9/2019 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Responses due by 4/8/2019. Replies due by 4/22/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Declaration, # 4 Declaration, # 5 Declaration, # 6 Declaration, # 7 Declaration, # 8 Declaration, # 9 Declaration, # 10 Declaration, # 11 Declaration, # 12 Declaration, # 13 Declaration, # 14 Declaration, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Declaration, # 18 Proposed Order, # 19 Errata)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 3/21/2019) (Entered: 03/21/2019)
69 CLERK'S NOTICE: Notice is hereby given to all parties that the further pre−settlement conference call previously scheduled for 5/24/2019 4:00 PM has been rescheduled to 5/24/2019 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. Judge Ryu anticipates that the phone call will last approximately 20−30 minutes. Lead Counsel for all parties shall participate. Counsel will receive the call−in information via e−mail from Judge Ryu's courtroom deputy. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/27/2019) (Entered: 03/27/2019)
70 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 68 MOTION to Certify Class CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 65 ) filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit 1−6; A−U)(Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 4/8/2019) Modified on 4/8/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 04/08/2019)

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 11 of 16

04/08/2019 04/08/2019 04/12/2019 04/14/2019 04/22/2019 04/22/2019 04/22/2019 05/06/2019
05/06/2019 05/06/2019 05/07/2019 05/08/2019

71 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration K. Strottman, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Redacted Declaration R. Crandall, # 4 Unredacted Declaration R. Crandall)(Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 4/8/2019) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
72 Declaration of Jesse M. Adams in Support of 70 Opposition/Response to Motion, filed byLeaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Related document(s) 70 ) (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 4/8/2019) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
73 Joint MOTION to Vacate Hearing Date filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson and Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc. Responses due by 4/26/2019. Replies due by 5/3/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Telfeyan, Phil) (Filed on 4/12/2019) Modified on 4/12/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 04/12/2019)
74 ORDER ADVANCING HEARING ON MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge William Alsup denying 73 Motion to Vacate. Motion Hearing set for 5/8/2019 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/14/2019) (Entered: 04/14/2019)
75 MOTION for Leave to File Opposition to Administrative Motion to Seal (Dkt. 71) filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Proposed Order)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 4/22/2019) (Entered: 04/22/2019)
76 MOTION to Quash Motion to Quash Third−Party Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order filed by William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. Responses due by 5/6/2019. Replies due by 5/13/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Proposed Order)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 4/22/2019) (Entered: 04/22/2019)
77 REPLY (re 68 MOTION to Certify Class CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 65 ) filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Declaration)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 4/22/2019) Modified on 4/23/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 04/22/2019)
78 CLERK'S NOTICE: Notice is hereby given to all parties that the further pre−settlement conference call previously scheduled for 5/24/2019 10:00 AM has been rescheduled to 5/24/2019 9:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. Judge Ryu anticipates that the phone call will last approximately 20−30 minutes. Lead Counsel for all parties shall participate. Counsel shall use the same call−in information that has been provided to them by Judge Ryu's courtroom deputy last 3/27/2019 via e−mail. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/6/2019) (Entered: 05/06/2019)
79 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 75 MOTION for Leave to File Opposition to Administrative Motion to Seal (Dkt. 71) ) filed byLeaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 5/6/2019) (Entered: 05/06/2019)
80 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 76 MOTION to Quash Motion to Quash Third−Party Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order ) filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 5/6/2019) Modified on 5/6/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 05/06/2019)
81 REPLY (re 75 MOTION for Leave to File Opposition to Administrative Motion to Seal (Dkt. 71 ) ) filed byJames Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 5/7/2019) Modified on 5/8/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 05/07/2019)
82 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William Alsup: Motion Hearing re 68 MOTION to Certify Class held on 5/8/2019. Counsel for plaintiffs will bring witnesses Vargas, Barrera, and Canas for testimony and all witnesses' records from their time of employment at LCA to the evidentiary hearing. Evidentiary Hearing set for 5/29/2019 12:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. (Total Time in Court: 34 minutes.)

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 12 of 16

05/16/2019 05/17/2019 05/23/2019
05/24/2019
05/24/2019 05/24/2019 05/29/2019 05/29/2019
05/29/2019 05/30/2019 05/30/2019

Court Reporter: Marla Knox. Plaintiff Attorney: Marissa Hatton, Phil Telfeyan. Defendant Attorney: Kristina Doan Strottman.
(This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 5/8/2019) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
83 ORDER RE 76 MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/16/2019) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
84 ASSOCIATION of Counsel by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 5/17/2019) (Entered: 05/17/2019)
85 CLERK'S NOTICE: Notice is hereby given to all parties that the Settlement Conference previously set for 6/25/2019 11:00 AM has been rescheduled to 6/25/2019 11:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu in Oakland, Courtroom 4, 3rd Floor. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/23/2019) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
86 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu: Further planning call held on 5/24/2019. Results: Further planning call set for 5/31/2019 09:30 AM. Counsel should use the same call−in credentials that they used for today's call. FTR Time: Not Recorded. For Plaintiffs: Phil Telfeyan; Marissa Hatton. For Defendants: Kristina Strottman. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 5/24/2019) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
87 CLERK'S NOTICE ADVANCING HEARING: Evidentiary Hearing previously set for 5/29/2019 12:00 PM is rescheduled to 5/29/2019 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/24/2019) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
88 NOTICE RE WEDNESDAY'S EVIDENTIARY HEARING. Signed by Judge Alsup on 5/24/2019. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/24/2019) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
89 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on 5/29/19 before Judge William Alsup by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, for Court Reporter Debra Pas. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 5/29/2019) (Entered: 05/29/2019)
90 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William Alsup: Evidentiary Hearing re 68 MOTION to Certify Class held on 5/29/2019. Supplemental briefs due 6/3/2019. Reply briefs due 6/5/2019. (Total Time in Court: 2 hours 42 minutes.)
Court Reporter: Debra Pas. Plaintiff Attorney: Marissa Hatton, James Davy. Defendant Attorney: Susan Coleman, Kristina Strottman.
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Log)(tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 5/29/2019) (Entered: 05/29/2019)
91 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on 05/29/2019 before Judge William Alsup by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., for Court Reporter Debra Pas. (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 5/29/2019) (Entered: 05/29/2019)
92 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on 05/08/19 before Judge William Alsup by Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, for Court Reporter Marla Knox. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 5/30/2019) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
93 Transcript of Proceedings held on 5−29−2019, before Judge William H. Alsup. Court Reporter/Transcriber Debra L. Pas, CRR, telephone number (415) 431−1477/Email:

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 13 of 16

05/31/2019
05/31/2019 06/03/2019 06/03/2019 06/05/2019 06/05/2019 06/06/2019 06/06/2019 06/12/2019 06/17/2019

Debra_Pas@cand.uscourts.gov. Per General Order No. 59 and Judicial Conference policy, this transcript may be viewed only at the Clerk's Office public terminal or may be purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber until the deadline for the Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Any Notice of Intent to Request Redaction, if required, is due no later than 5 business days from date of this filing. (Re 91 Transcript Order ) Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/28/2019. (Related documents(s) 91 ) (pasdl50S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/30/2019) (Entered: 05/30/2019)
94 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu: Planning call held on 5/31/2019. Results: The 6/25/2019 settlement conference is vacated and continued to 7/26/2019. Plaintiffs shall serve a detailed settlement demand by 7/10/2019 with an emailed copy to Judge Ryu (DMRsettlement@cand.uscourts.gov). FTR Time: Not Recorded. For Plaintiffs: Marissa Hatton; Phil Telfeyan. For Defendant: Kristina Strottman. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 5/31/2019) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
95 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE AND SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE ORDER: Settlement Conference rescheduled to 7/26/2019 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu on 5/31/19. (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/31/2019) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
96 Supplemental Brief re 70 Opposition/Response to Motion, 90 Evidentiary Hearing, filed byLeaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Related document(s) 70 , 90 ) (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 6/3/2019) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
97 Supplemental Brief re 77 Reply to Opposition/Response, 68 MOTION to Certify Class CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 65 Supplemental Brief following Evidentiary Hearing filed byJames Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Related document(s) 77 , 68 ) (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 6/3/2019) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
98 Supplemental Brief re 97 Supplemental Brief, RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Related document(s) 97 ) (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 6/5/2019) Modified on 6/5/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 06/05/2019)
99 RESPONSE re 96 Supplemental Brief by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 6/5/2019) (Entered: 06/05/2019)
100 ORDER RE 68 MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/6/2019) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
101 ORDER RE MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL by Judge Alsup denying 71 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal; finding as moot 75 Motion for Leave to File. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/6/2019) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
102 Declaration of Robert Crandall in Support of 70 Opposition/Response to Motion, 101 Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal, Order on Motion for Leave to File filed byLeaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Related document(s) 70 , 101 ) (Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 6/12/2019) (Entered: 06/12/2019)
103 Transcript of Proceedings held on May 8, 2019, before Judge William H. Alsup. Court Reporter, Marla F. Knox, RPR, CRR, telephone number (602) 391−6990. Per General Order No. 59 and Judicial Conference policy, this transcript may be viewed only at the Clerk's Office public terminal or may be purchased through the Court Reporter until the deadline for the Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Any Notice of Intent to Request Redaction, if required, is due no later than 5 business days from date of this filing. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/16/2019. (mfk, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/17/2019) (Entered: 06/17/2019)

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 14 of 16

07/10/2019 07/11/2019 07/25/2019 07/26/2019
08/08/2019 08/14/2019 08/15/2019 08/23/2019 10/17/2019 10/31/2019
11/01/2019

104 Ex Parte Application re 42 Order on Motion to Dismiss, for Clarification in advance of the July 26, 2019 Settlement Conference filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 7/10/2019) (Entered: 07/10/2019)
105 ORDER RE 104 CLARIFICATION OF MOTION TO DISMISS ORDER by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/11/2019) (Entered: 07/11/2019)
106 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint filed by William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed First Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Proposed Order)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 7/25/2019) (Entered: 07/25/2019)
107 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu: Settlement Conference held on 7/26/2019. Results: Matter did not settle. Settlement prospects to be reassessed after summary judgment. In the meantime, counsel are invited to contact Judge Ryu for further assistance (510−637−1006). FTR Time: Not Recorded. For Plaintiffs: Marissa Hatton; Phil Telfeyan; Kevin Mitchell; James Brooks, Kyser Wilson; Robert Jackson For Defendants: Kristina Strottman; Susan Coleman; Kent Borowick; Leonard Bare; Paul Espinosa (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ig, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 7/26/2019) (Entered: 07/29/2019)
108 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 106 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint ) filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration K. Strottman)(Strottman, Kristina) (Filed on 8/8/2019) Modified on 8/9/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 08/08/2019)
109 NOTICE of Change In Counsel by Susan Eileen Coleman (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 8/14/2019) (Entered: 08/14/2019)
110 REPLY (re 106 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint ) filed byJames Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 8/15/2019) (Entered: 08/15/2019)
111 ORDER DENYING 106 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT by Judge William Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/23/2019) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
112 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 11/21/2019 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. Responses due by 10/31/2019. Replies due by 11/7/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Declaration, # 4 Proposed Order)(Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 10/17/2019) (Entered: 10/17/2019)
113 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment ) filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Appendix)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 10/31/2019) Modified on 11/1/2019 (amgS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 10/31/2019)
114 CLERK'S NOTICE CONTINUING MOTION HEARING: Motion Hearing re 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment previously set for 11/21/2019 08:00 AM is rescheduled to 12/5/2019 08:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom 12, 19th Floor before Judge William Alsup. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/1/2019) (Entered: 11/01/2019)

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 15 of 16

11/07/2019 12/05/2019

115 REPLY (re 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment ) filed byLeaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 11/7/2019) (Entered: 11/07/2019)
116 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William Alsup: Motion Hearing re 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment held on 12/5/2019. Defense counsel's declaration due by 12/9/2019 at Noon. Plaintiff counsel's counter−declaration due by 12/11/2019 at Noon. Matter will be deemed submitted once the declarations have been submitted. (Total Time in Court: 41 minutes.)

Court Reporter: JoAnn Bryce. Plaintiff Attorney: Marissa Hatton, Phil Telfeyan. Defendant Attorney: Susan Coleman.

12/09/2019 12/11/2019 12/19/2019 12/19/2019 01/02/2020 01/03/2020 01/10/2020
01/15/2020 01/15/2020 01/15/2020

(This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 12/5/2019) Modified on 12/6/2019 (tlhS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 12/06/2019)
117 Declaration of Jeffrey Essex in Support of 112 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 116 Motion Hearing,, Supplemental filed byLeaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. (Related document(s) 112 , 116 ) (Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 12/9/2019) (Entered: 12/09/2019)
118 RESPONSE re 117 Declaration in Support, Plaintiffs' Declaration and Response to Declaration of Jeffrey Essex by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Declaration of Kyser Wilson)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 12/11/2019) (Entered: 12/11/2019)
119 ORDER RE 112 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/19/2019) (Entered: 12/19/2019)
120 JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Alsup on 12/19/2019. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/19/2019) (Entered: 12/19/2019)
121 BILL OF COSTS by Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc.. Objections due by 1/16/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Itemization of Costs)(Coleman, Susan) (Filed on 1/2/2020) (Entered: 01/02/2020)
122 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on 12/05/2019 before Judge William Alsup by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, for Court Reporter Jo Ann Bryce. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 1/3/2020) (Entered: 01/03/2020)
123 Transcript of Proceedings held on 12/5/19, before Judge William H. Alsup. Court Reporter Jo Ann Bryce, telephone number 510−910−5888, joann_bryce@cand.uscourts.gov. Per General Order No. 59 and Judicial Conference policy, this transcript may be viewed only at the Clerk's Office public terminal or may be purchased through the Court Reporter until the deadline for the Release of Transcript Restriction after 90 days. After that date, it may be obtained through PACER. Any Notice of Intent to Request Redaction, if required, is due no later than 5 business days from date of this filing. (Re 122 Transcript Order ) Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/9/2020. (Related documents(s) 122 ) (jabS, COURTSTAFF) (Filed on 1/10/2020) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
124 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Appeal fee of $505 receipt number 0971−14072374 paid.) (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Representation Statement)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 1/15/2020) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
125 OBJECTIONS to re 121 Bill of Costs and Motion to Deny Taxation of Costs by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Objection Chart, # 2 Exhibit Transcript Invoice, # 3 Exhibit Transcript Invoices, # 4 Exhibit Letter re Subpoenas, # 5 Exhibit Strottman E−mail)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 1/15/2020) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
126 USCA Case Number 20−15070 9th Circuit Court of Appeals for 124 Notice of Appeal, filed by Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, William Edwards, James Brooks. (msrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/15/2020) (Entered: 01/16/2020)

Case: 3:18-cv-4609 As of: 03/31/2020 11:24 AM PDT 16 of 16

02/14/2020 02/14/2020 02/27/2020 03/27/2020

127 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on 11/29/18 before Judge William Alsup by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson, for Court Reporter Belle Ball. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 2/14/2020) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
128 Transcript Designation Form re 124 Notice of Appeal, 126 USCA Case Number 20−15070 Transcript due by 2/14/2020. (Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 2/14/2020) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
129 Costs Taxed in amount of $ 12,592.06 against Plaintiffs Robert Jackson and Kyser Wilson. (tlhS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/27/2020) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
130 MOTION for Review of Taxation of Costs filed by James Brooks, William Edwards, Robert Jackson, Kyser Wilson. Responses due by 4/10/2020. Replies due by 4/17/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Hatton, Marissa) (Filed on 3/27/2020) (Entered: 03/27/2020)

 
 Case 3:18-cv-04609-WHA Document 1 Filed 07/31/18 Page 1 of 64

Phil Telfeyan (CA Bar No. 258270) Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street NW, Suite 602 Washington DC 20004 ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org 202-505-2058

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

________________________________________________

)

WILLIAM EDWARDS, ROBERT JACKSON,

)

JAMES BROOKS, and KYSER WILSON

)

on behalf of themselves and others

)

similarly situated,

)

Case No. 4:18-cv-4609

)

Plaintiffs,

)

CLASS ACTION

)

v.

)

JURY DEMANDED

)

LEADERS IN COMMUNITY

)

ALTERNATIVES, INC., SUPERCOM, INC.,

)

LINDA CONNELLY, DIANE

)

HARRINGTON, KENT BOROWICK,

)

RAELENE RIVAS, JEANETTE

)

ARGUELLO-RAMOS, BELINDA DOE,

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DOES 1–10, inclusive,

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ALAMEDA COUNTY, WYNNE CARVILL,

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and WENDY STILL,

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Defendants.

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________________________________________________)

COMPLAINT

Introduction

1. This case is about Alameda County allowing a private company — Leaders in

Community Alternatives (“LCA”) — to extort money from poor Californians. Alameda County

has contracted with LCA to provide court-ordered GPS and alcohol tracking devices for

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individuals on pre-trial or home detention. In reality, this means LCA attaches one or more devices that can weigh nearly a pound to an individual’s ankle and then imposes a daily fee for this “monitoring service.” Alameda County pays nothing; the cost is instead placed on Class Members, many of whom are unable to pay the hundreds of dollars a month that LCA demands. Because only LCA has the power to remove the devices, they are in essence high-tech shackles.
2. Alameda County has looked the other way while LCA has demanded $25.50 per day — $765 per month, or $9,180 per year — from low-income individuals sentenced to wear its devices, despite California law requiring that individuals not be charged more than they are able to pay. When individuals sentenced to LCA tracking fall behind on making payments they cannot afford, LCA staff threatens to inform the court they are violating their release conditions. Under this pay-or-jail scheme, an alternative to incarceration masks a form of extortion: pay what is demanded or end up in a jail cell. The Named Plaintiffs in this action have given up their homes and borrowed money from family and friends to keep up with payments and avoid returning to jail. Since Class Members are often offered home detention to accommodate special circumstances (one of the Named Plaintiffs requires chemotherapy and another is the sole caretaker for his bed-ridden mother), they are in a particularly vulnerable position — remand to jail could have catastrophic results.
3. This civil rights action is brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the United States Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and California law to stop the Defendants from continuing to operate a racketeering enterprise that is extorting money from some of the most impoverished people in Alameda County.
Nature of the Action

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4. Alameda County and LCA entered into a contract, effective July 31, 2013, under which either the Superior Court or the Probation Department can refer people to LCA to have a GPS tracking device and/or alcohol monitor attached to their bodies. Ex. 1, Alameda County Agreement with LCA. Under the terms of the agreement, LCA is responsible for tracking people in the program 24 hours per day, seven days a week; providing the necessary equipment (radio frequency tracking, GPS, or alcohol monitoring); and immediately reporting any “noncompliance events.” Id.
5. In exchange, the County allows LCA to charge individuals assigned to them “fees.” Exhibit B of the contract states that it is up to LCA to make the program financially viable for itself. The County is not obligated to help LCA collect its money. Instead, the “Electronic Monitoring Program will be completely participant-funded and neither the Probation Department nor the County will have any financial responsibility for this Program.” Id.
6. Rather than paying the costs of enforcing the law, Alameda County instead passes those costs, which amount to $765 a month, onto the very people targeted by its system — many of whom are indigent and all of whom are already struggling with the consequences of being accused or convicted of a crime. This user-funded model allows the County to shirk its financial responsibility and place an unlawful and coercive burden upon indigent individuals. LCA gives them a false choice between unaffordable payment or jail, extorting money from individuals desperate to keep their jobs and care for their families.
7. The enterprise between Alameda County and LCA means that a supposedly neutral contractor with profit incentives decides how much it is going to charge for a government function and the tactics it will use to extract money from Class Members, many of whom have insufficient means to pay the daily price tag attached to this alternative to jail.

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8. LCA interprets the contract as giving it freedom to decide how much money it thinks it can make off of every Class Member and then to exert whatever pressure it wants to get the person to meet LCA’s financial demands. If the person does not have the ability to pay, LCA “violates” that individual, potentially resulting in his or her return to jail and scaring other Class Members in the program into giving into LCA’s demands for payment, no matter how onerous.
9. The American legal system has long relied on neutral court and law enforcement officials, such a pre-trial services staff, probation officers, or court clerks who, as employees, are charged with working with individuals within the criminal justice system to comply with all court orders and restrictions. These public servants have no incentive to revoke an individual’s terms of release other than to fulfill a duty to uphold the law.
10. In contrast, LCA has no obligation to protect public safety, prevent recidivism, or better the community. Instead, it has a direct financial stake in each person who comes through its doors and a commitment to make as much money as possible for its parent company SuperCom, Inc.’s shareholders. LCA has therefore executed its contract with Alameda in a way that violates the basic notions of due process, neutrality, and fairness in its quest for profits.
11. LCA begins by assigning everyone a daily rate of $25.50 or more when they are first booked into the GPS tracking program. LCA staff then erect a series of barriers for anyone who tries to get that amount reduced.
12. LCA has an obligation, which it ignores, to inform people sentenced to wear its devices that they must only pay what they can afford and threatens to have them sent back to jail if they do not pay, in violation of California law that states, “No person shall be denied consideration for, or be removed from, participation in any of the programs to which this section applies because of an inability to pay all or a portion of the program supervision fees.” Cal Code

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1208.2(g). 13. In order to justify charging high rates, LCA bases its assessment of how much to
charge on “household income,” regardless of whether there is a legal relationship between individuals in the household or not. LCA thus intentionally deceives participants into thinking that their household’s income, rather than the participant’s income, is the determining factor of a participant’s ability to pay, directly contradicting California statute. Cal. Code 1208.2(e) (defining ability to pay based on “the person’s” financial situation); Ex. 2, Edwards Financial Needs Assessment Form.
14. LCA intentionally fails to tell participants that they have the right to have a judge determine how much they can afford to pay while in its monitoring programs. Compare Cal Code. 1208.2(h) (providing for a judge to resolve ability to pay disputes) with Ex. 3, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2014 at 3; Ex. 4, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2016 at 5 (failing to mention the right to seek daily rate reduction from the court).
15. LCA intentionally misleads participants into thinking that they must try to “come to an agreement with LCA regarding the terms of payment” before exercising their right to have a judge assess their ability to pay.
16. LCA makes the agreement process intentionally burdensome and slow so participants will be forced to pay them at a higher rate they cannot afford for as long as possible.
17. Even when an individual is able to complete the burdensome paperwork to prove their indigence, LCA stalls by claiming that the papers are not in their proper form. Once it cannot find any more excuses for delay, it lowers the daily rate by a trivial amount, again starting the cycle of bureaucracy for obtaining a further reduction in fees.
18. If individuals sentenced to wear LCA shackles do not disclose all the details of

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their finances or if they are late in submitting a payment, LCA threatens to “violate” them by reporting to the Sheriff or the Court that they are not in compliance with the terms of their release. They tell these individuals that if they are “violated,” they will be dropped from the program and sent to jail.
19. In short, failure to pay an extortionate amount to a private company — or even provide financial records quickly enough — can result in someone being sent to jail. This can be disastrous, resulting in job loss, disruptions to family integrity, and inability to obtain crucial medical care.
20. LCA is not concerned with a tracked individual’s actual ability to pay the exorbitant fees it charges. Rather, it automatically charges every Class Member subject to wearing a GPS device $25.50 per day — a fee that accrues daily and quickly becomes debilitating for indigent individuals. LCA’s pay-or-jail scheme also places the burden on those shackled individuals to prove that paying LCA’s price is not feasible.
21. LCA receives no payment from Alameda County to provide GPS tracking; it relies solely on fees extracted from individuals sentenced to GPS tracking to cover its costs and make a profit. Therefore, every reduction in the daily rate a person must pay affects LCA’s bottom line. As a for-profit entity, LCA does everything it can to prevent loss of income from lowered daily fees.
22. In addition to the human suffering of individual Class Members caught in LCA’s pay-or-jail extortion scheme, the entire community is harmed when individuals are returned to jail simply for being poor. The costs of jailing people and of social services to support the families left behind inevitably go up, transferring the burden to Alameda County taxpayers to provide LCA’s profit margin.

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23. LCA and the County have conspired to enforce their pay-or-jail scheme by sending individuals who cannot pay enough to satisfy LCA to jail as a warning to other nonpayers. This tactic coerces the others into begging and borrowing from family and friends to add to LCA’s profits from this illegal scheme.
24. The treatment of the Named Plaintiffs was caused by and is representative of the policies and practices employed by the County and LCA to subject Class Members to electronic monitoring so that they can be charged whatever fees LCA sees fit to collect.
25. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief for themselves and all others similarly situated.
26. Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction from this Court to stop LCA from continuing its illegal fee extortion scheme because they are reasonably likely to be sentenced to additional time on an LCA monitor and therefore be subject to LCA’s illegal activities once again.
27. Plaintiff Robert Jackson has an open case for Driving Under the Influence and is reasonably likely to be sentenced to additional time on a LCA monitor if he cannot pay for the Sheriff’s Work Alternative Program (SWAP).
28. Mr. Jackson is on probation until June 8, 2021 and is reasonably likely to be sentenced to LCA should he be found in violation of the terms of his probation.
29. Plaintiff James Brooks is on probation until November 7, 2022 and is reasonably likely to be sentenced to LCA should he be found to be in violation of the terms of his probation.
30. Mr. Brooks is still making payments on the bond because he had to submit to LCA’s demands for payment based on a daily rate he could not afford. Failure to make those payments is reasonably likely to result in legal action against him. Ex. 5, Declaration of James

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Brooks. 31. Plaintiff Kyser Wilson is on probation until July 29, 2021 and is reasonably likely
to be sentenced to LCA should he be found to be in violation of the terms of his probation. 32. Mr. Wilson is also unable to pay his restitution and is subject to court action,
including charges of contempt, because he was forced to submit to LCA’s demands for money, thus leaving him nothing to satisfy his other court debt. Ex. 6, Declaration of Kyser Wilson.
33. Mr. Wilson does not have a valid driver’s license because he owes court debt. If he has to drive with a suspended license due to an emergency, it is reasonably likely he could be stopped by the police and be subject to prosecution that would end with an additional sentence of LCA monitoring.
34. By failing to supervise LCA properly, Alameda County has a policy of allowing LCA to extract as much money as possible from people under its control, allowing it to extort money from every individual who is placed under its supervision by the county. Ex. 1.
35. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek injunctive relief against LCA because LCA’s conduct is ongoing and continuous and will continue to affect members of the class.
36. Only individuals with relatively short sentences may be booked into LCA’s program, resulting in supervision durations that are capable of repetition but evading review.
37. LCA collects extensive financial information from individuals sentenced to wear high-tech shackles — which LCA euphemistically refers to as “electronic monitoring” — and thus knows if they are impoverished. LCA nevertheless demands that these individuals obtain money from friends and relatives rather than lowering the cost of electronic shackling. The Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that a person cannot be jailed simply for being too poor to pay a fine or fee — yet LCA employees threaten Class Members with exactly that

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consequence if they do not pay whatever fees LCA sees fit to demand. This policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment, California law, and the terms of LCA’s contract with Alameda County.
38. By and through their attorneys and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Named Plaintiffs William Edwards, Robert Jackson, James Brooks, and Kyser Wilson seek injunctive relief to protect the rights of all those ordered to wear GPS tracking devices and to end the practice of extorting money from indigent Class Members. They also request compensation for the civil rights violations that they suffered, including punitive damages to deter similar misconduct in the future.
Jurisdiction and Venue 39. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action asserted in this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims form part of the same case or controversy as the federal law claims. 40. In connection with the RICO claim, the ends of justice require that all the Defendants be summoned to the Northern District of California. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965; Butcher’s Union Local No. 498, United Food & Commercial Workers v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants who are citizens of California. There is no other district in which a court will have personal jurisdiction over all the alleged co-conspirators. 41. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Intradistrict Assignment

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42. Because Alameda County is a Defendant and the majority of the actions challenged in this complaint occurred in Alameda County, jurisdiction is proper in the Oakland or San Francisco Division of the Northern District of California. Civil L.R. 3-2(c)-(d).
Parties 43. Named Plaintiff William Edwards is a 38-year-old African-American who was subjected to LCA’s GPS tracking program from January 9 to April 12, 2017. Cal Code 1208.018 (pretrial terms of release). At the time, he worked at the Contra Costa County Public Defender’s office as a clerk, where he earned $16.77 per hour with no benefits, which is barely a living wage in Alameda County.1 Mr. Edwards’s sole asset is a 2002 Buick Regal worth $600. Ex. 2, Edwards Financial Needs Assessment Form. Mr. Edwards also has cancer that requires frequent medical attention and daily chemotherapy. He often must miss work to deal with his health issues, further reducing his subsistence income. While on the tracking device, he paid LCA a total of $1,343. Ex. 7, Edwards Equipment Return Form. 44. Robert Jackson is a 38-year-old African-American widower raising three daughters. In February 2017, he was given compassionate release from a 120-day jail sentence and ordered onto an LCA ankle monitor when his wife passed away suddenly. Cal Code. 1208.016; Ex. 8, Jackson Minute Entry. Although he worked as a forklift operator earning $400500 a week, LCA charged him $250 per week, or 50-65% of his income, to fund his own monitoring. Mr. Jackson paid LCA approximately $4,500 for 113 days of monitoring. Ex. 9, Declaration of Robert Jackson. 45. James Brooks is a 49-year-old African-American longshoreman who was unable to work at the time he was ordered to LCA monitoring because he was the sole caretaker for his

1 http://livingwage.mit.edu/counties/06001

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seriously ill mother. Cal Code. 1208.016. In order to make ends meet, he rented out his home and moved into his mother’s apartment. Their sole income was the rent (minus the mortgage payment) and his mother’s social security and disability payments. Despite his dire financial situation, LCA refused to lower Mr. Brooks’ daily rate. He paid LCA $1,629 for 58 days of GPS tracking. Ex. 10, Brooks Enrollment Form.
46. Kyser Wilson is a 40-year-old African-American who at the time he was on an LCA tether worked as a hotel desk clerk for $14 an hour and earned income on the side as a barber. Cal Code. 1208.016; Ex. 11, Wilson Proof of Employment. LCA charged him $650 per month, or approximately 30 percent of his gross income, for a GPS tracking device and an alcohol monitor. Because of the amount of money LCA demanded, Mr. Wilson was unable to pay his other court debt, which has gone up nearly $1000 due to late fees and interest. Mr. Wilson paid LCA a total of $2,100 for 90 days of monitoring. Ex. 6, Declaration of Kyser Wilson.
47. Defendant Leaders in Community Alternatives (LCA) is a California corporation that was founded in 1991. Between January 2015 and October 2016, on average, 112 citizens of Alameda County were enrolled in LCA’s monitoring programs on any given day. Ex. 12, Statistics Power Point.
48. Defendant SuperCom, Inc., is LCA’s parent company, and is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York City. Ex. 13, SuperCom 20-F Form at 30. It is responsible for the business activities in the United States of SuperCom, Ltd., a corporation headquartered in Hertzliya Pituach, Israel.
49. SuperCom does business in California by leasing 1,200 square meters of office space for LCA’s operations. Ex. 13 at p. 30-31.

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50. SuperCom does business in California by supplying LCA with the equipment and software it uses for surveillance of individuals under court orders.
51. SuperCom participates in management of LCA through Defendant Diane Harrington, who became Executive Director of LCA in 2017. Ms. Harrington is listed as a “Key Employee” in SuperCom’s F-20 and has been Director of Treatment at SuperCom, Inc. since 2014. Ex. 13 at 41- 42.
52. Defendant Linda Connelly is the Founder of LCA and was President and CEO of the company when the electronic monitoring contract with the County was signed. Ms. Connelly was responsible for LCA’s actions during the time of misconduct alleged in this case.
53. Defendant Diane Harrington is the current Executive Director of LCA, having been promoted to that position in April 2017 from Director of Program Services. In both capacities, she knew, or should have known, about LCA’s illegal overcharging of indigent clients.
54. Defendant Kent Borowick is the Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer of LCA. He joined LCA in 2009 and is responsible for LCA’s finances and has oversight of LCA’s electronic monitoring program. In that capacity, he knew, or should have known, about LCA’s illegal overcharging of indigent clients.
55. Defendant Raelene Rivas is the Senior Case Manager for LCA who handled Named Plaintiff William Edwards’s case, among others. In that capacity, Ms. Rivas was directly involved in LCA’s illegal overcharging of indigent clients.
56. Defendant Jeanette Arguello-Ramos is the case manager for LCA who handled Named Plaintiff James Brooks’s case, among others. In that capacity, Ms. Rivas was directly involved in LCA’s illegal overcharging of indigent clients.

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57. Jane Doe is the case manager for LCA who handled Named Plaintiff Kyser Wilson’s case, among others. In that capacity, Jane Doe was directly involved in LCA’s illegal overcharging of indigent clients.
58. Defendant Belinda Doe (last name not currently known) is the case manager for LCA who handled Named Plaintiff Robert Jackson’s case, among others. In that capacity, Belinda Doe was directly involved in LCA’s illegal overcharging of indigent clients.
59. Defendants Jane or John Does 3-10 are case managers and other staff at LCA who made decisions that resulted in indigent Class Members being charged more than they could afford or violated indigent individuals because they could not afford to pay LCA’s exorbitant rates. The identity of these LCA employees will be revealed during discovery when Plaintiffs will request not only the records that LCA maintained on them, but information about how many Class Members LCA caused to be sent to jail for non-payment.
60. Defendants Linda Connelly, Diane Harrington, Kent Borowick, Raelene Rivas, Jeanette Arguello-Ramos, Belinda Doe, and Jane or John Does 1-10 each used their discretion as case managers and supervisors to apply LCA policies and practices to determine how much money each Class Member owed, how much they were forced to pay, when to “violate” them, and every other discretionary decision discussed in this Complaint. Together with LCA, these individual Defendants will occasionally be referred to as the “LCA Defendants.”
61. Defendant Alameda County is a local subdivision of the State of California and a body corporate organized and existing under the Constitution of the State of California. Cal. Const. Art. IX § 1. It is governed by a five-member Board of Supervisors. Cal. Const. Art. IX § 4.
62. Alameda County’s Board of Supervisors created a program of home detention

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under Cal. Code 1203.016 and 1203.018 on July 30, 2013. The Board of Supervisors approved the contract with LCA to provide electronic monitoring services on the same day, on the understanding that the program would have “NO increase in NET COUNTY COST.” Ex. 14, Board of Supervisors Memo (capitalization in original).
63. Defendant Wynne S. Carvill is the Presiding Judge of the Alameda County court and is responsible for the administration of the court, including overseeing financial expenditures. Cal. Rules of Court 10.603(a)(1). LCA provides services directly to the Superior Court of Alameda and thus the court has oversight responsibility to make sure that the contract is being executed according to its terms and the laws of California. Id. Judge Carvill is being sued in his policymaking and administrative capacity as the presiding judge of the Alameda County Court.
64. Defendant Wendy Still is the Chief Probation Officer of Alameda County. Ms. Still entered into office on August 1, 2016 and is responsible for oversight of the contract for electronic monitoring with LCA that was signed by her predecessor, LaDonna Harris, in January 2013. Ms. Still is sued in her official capacity. Together with Alameda County, these individual Defendants will occasionally be referred to as “County Defendants.”
65. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), both the Chief Judge and the Chief Probation Officer of Alameda County may be sued in their official administrative capacities and can be enjoined from enforcing any unconstitutional state laws. The County’s delegation of electronic monitoring functions to a for-profit company with a financial interest is each of its supervisees violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
66. Under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Alameda County, its

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court, and its probation office are liable for their unconstitutional policies and practices.

Factual Background

I. The Realities of GPS Tracking

A. Electronic Shackles Are Debilitating and Intrusive 67. Under the “Scope of Services” section in the Agreement between Alameda

County and LCA, LCA is obligated to “provide an electronic monitoring program” using

specified equipment, which it will “install[]” and “remove[]” by attaching GPS tracking devices

to the ankles of human beings. Ex. 1.

68. LCA attached a BluTag tracking device to Plaintiff William Edwards’s ankle that

could not be removed. Ex. 7. It is 4.33 x 2.08 x 1.25 inches and weighs six ounces,

approximately the equivalent having two cell phones bound to one’s ankle at all times, including

when sleeping, showering, exercising, and during all other activities.

69. The BluTag tracking device must be charged one hour each day, which means its

wearer must sit next to a wall outlet while this process is completed.

70. If the wearer does not have access to an electrical outlet on a given day or their

tracking device otherwise loses its charge, even for a few seconds, the incident will be

immediately reported as a non-compliance violation, subjecting the tracked individual to

consequences including imprisonment.

71. Plaintiff James Brooks had two devices attached to his ankle: a GPS tracker and a

SCRAM alcohol monitor. Downloading the alcohol tracking information required him to stand

next to the equipment base for ten minutes every night.

72. Plaintiff Kyser Wilson and Robert Jackson had single devices that tracked both

location and exposure to alcohol.

73.
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was debating whether to make tracking devices “small and unobtrusive so there’s not a stigma? Or do we make them big and obnoxious, like a Scarlet Letter?” She concluded that the industry had decided on a device that is noticeable but can be covered by a loose pant leg.2
74. LCA must monitor the equipment 24 hours a day and “immediately report all non-compliance events.” Ex. 1, Scope of Services at Exhibit A.
75. GPS Tracking devices can be programmed to limit a person to a designated area, which can be as small as the inside of an apartment, or to exclude them from certain areas.
76. The devices can also be programmed so that the shackled person must be at a specific place at a designated time, e.g. at work every day from 9 am to 5 pm, or allow the person to go to an authorized activity, such as a medical appointment on a particular day.
77. Any deviation from this preset schedule results in a notification to LCA that the shackled individual has violated their terms of release, even if the delay is beyond the person’s control — for instance, unanticipated traffic, public transportation not running on time, a delay at a doctor’s office, etc.
78. All deviations from the preset schedule must be approved in advance — therefore a person on the monitor cannot notify LCA that he or she will be late due to unforeseen circumstances and cannot accommodate emergency situations without risking a violation. There is no way to avoid a violation — and the threat of jail time that comes with it — even if a shackled individual arrives only a few minutes late.
B. The Booking Process into LCA’s GPS Tracking Program 79. Either the Superior Court or the Alameda Sheriff can refer people to LCA as a

2 Rachel Swan, Jail-To-Go, SF Weekly May 21, 2014, http://www.sfweekly.com/news/jail-togo-ankle-bracelets-could-be-the-next-great-law-enforcement-tool-if-the-city-doesnt-getdefeated-by-data/ (last visited June 14, 2018).

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form of alternate incarceration or as a form of supervision for those on pre-trial release, parole, or probation. Once referred, the person must report to one of LCA’s offices be booked into the program.
80. People who are placed on a GPS shackle from LCA are required to fill out an enrollment form, providing basic contact information, employment details, an emergency contact, and information about their court case. In addition, LCA asks sensitive yet irrelevant questions designed to embarrass individuals in the tracking program, such as whether the person has a “alcohol problem,” or the “Last time [they] used illegal or non-prescribed drugs” or “What is/was [their] drug of choice.” Ex. 15, Edwards Enrollment Form.
81. Without conducting an inquiry into ability to pay, LCA requires individuals to sign a “Supervision Fee Agreement” that includes a $150 “Initial Enrollment and Administrative Fee” as well as a commitment to pay $25.50 per day, or $765 per month. They must pay at least two weeks in advance and pay by credit or debit card, money order, or cashier’s check. See, e.g., Ex. 10, Brooks Enrollment Form; Ex. 15, Edwards Enrollment Form.
82. By signing the agreement, individuals must agree that “if [they] fail to make a payment by the due date that an incident report will be submitted to the court and/or supervising agency. Sanctions for failure to make timely payments may include termination from EMP [electronic monitoring program].” Id.
83. If a person is removed from the tracking program for failure to pay, he or she must surrender to the Sheriff and is put in jail. Even those who are put on electronic monitoring pre-trial, and thus are presumed innocent, can be confined to jail simply because they cannot afford the monitoring fee.
84. Defendant Linda Connelly stated in an interview that LCA is “stringent” with

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policies and procedures. In fact, courts have complained that LCA files too many notices of violation.3
85. The decision to lock a person up is not based on whether they are a danger to the community or a flight risk, but solely on whether they have enough money to pay LCA to keep them out of jail.
86. During the monitoring period, individuals on LCA shackles and their families must submit to intrusive and unnecessary supervision. For instance, those being tracked must agree that LCA representatives may enter their homes at any time of the day or night to verify that they are at home and search for contraband. See Ex. 10, Brooks Enrollment Form; Ex. 15, Edwards Enrollment Form.
87. This is a particularly egregious violation of the rights of those awaiting trial. Defendant Connelly has admitted that it is inappropriate to have them on a tether because “if they’re okay to be out, they should be out without it [a monitor].” James Kilgore, Electronic Monitoring Is Not the Answer, Urbana-Champagne Ind. Media. Ctr. (2015) at p. 11.
88. Anyone else living in the household with someone being monitored must acknowledge this intrusive measure and also agree to allow unannounced searches of their own homes. Ex. 10, Brooks Enrollment Form; Ex. 15, Edwards Enrollment Form.
89. The LCA contract mandates that shackled individuals not drink any alcohol, even if their charges are not related to alcohol abuse in any way. Id.
90. Individuals tracked by LCA must have a phone line that is essentially dedicated to supporting the tracking system. Id.

3 Audio of interview between James Kilgore and Linda Connelly, at minute 15:00. A copy of the audio is on file with the Plaintiffs’ counsel.

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91. Rather than tailoring monitoring conditions to each Class Member, LCA enforces

a one-size-fits-all monitoring regime. LCA imposes irrelevant and costly limitations on

monitored individuals designed only to increase its profits rather than enhance community

safety.

C. Restrictions and Impositions LCA Places on Those Under Its Control

92. LCA prohibits tracked individuals from using alcohol or drugs, including legally-

prescribed marijuana, as a condition of supervision even if their alleged offense was not alcohol

or drug-related. See, e.g., Ex. 4, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2016 at 5. LCA imposes this

restriction without any basis — neither California law nor the Agreement with Alameda County

authorizes LCA to restrict individuals’ legal consumption of alcohol or marijuana without a court

order.

93. Based on this arbitrary prohibition, LCA can subject individuals under its control

to mandatory drug testing — whether or not their charges are related to illegal use of controlled

substances in any way. Any LCA employee can demand an on-the-spot drug test, and failure to

comply will result in LCA seeking “sanctions,” including return to jail. LCA charges individuals

a $25 fee for each time it orders such an arbitrary drug test. Ex. 3, LCA Client Handbook, Rev

2014 at 3; Ex. 4, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2016 at 5; Ex. 16, LCA Client Handbook, Rev

2017 at 6. LCA prohibits alcohol and drug consumption in order to create another revenue

stream for the company: charging for drug tests. By creating another unwarranted and

unauthorized restriction on those being monitored, LCA creates another trap that can keep Class

Members ensnared within the criminal justice system and make more profit for LCA.

94. Without any legal or contractual justification, LCA also requires individuals on

LCA shackles to prove “ongoing employment by submitting paycheck stubs . . . [or] a business

license.” LCA benefits from this burdensome mandate, as it is able to monitor individuals’

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incomes to increase fees if they acquire a greater ability to pay. Ex. 3, LCA Client Handbook,

Rev 2014 at 3; Ex. 4, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2016 at 6; Ex. 16, LCA Client Handbook, Rev

2017 at 6.

95. LCA forbids individuals being tracked from working for cash unless they submit

a notarized letter from their employer. This intrusive financial monitoring discriminates against

people with lower incomes, as they are more likely to work intermittently for cash and thus

cannot comply with this unreasonable requirement. Ex. 3, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2014 at

3; Ex. 4, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2016 at 6; Ex. 16, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2017 at 6.

96. Failure to comply with LCA’s demands for financial information is cause for the

company to “violate” someone, which could result in their return to jail.

II. LCA Extorts Money from Individuals Sentenced to Wear Its GPS Shackles

A. LCA’s Unlawful Fee Determination Practices

97. Under the terms of the Scope of Services, LCA is responsible for “case

management,” including “collection of participant fees.” Although the program is “partcipant

funded,” LCA is supposed to “adjust participant fees based on ability to pay.” Ex. 1, Exhibit A,

Scope of Services.

98. Under the contract with Alameda County, LCA must “accept and collect

payments from defendants on a sliding scale with consideration of each defendant’s ability to

pay.” Id.

99. California law defines “ability to pay” as a person’s overall financial situation as

shown by his or her “(1) Present financial position. (2) Reasonably discernible future financial

position [limited to six months from date of booking]. (3) Likelihood that the person shall be

able to obtain employment within the six-month period from the date of acceptance into the

program. (4) Any other factor that may bear upon the person’s financial capability to [pay].” See

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Cal. Penal Code § 1208.2(e) 100. LCA ignores these four factors and does not adjust fees based on a person’s actual
financial situation. Instead, it extorts as much money from individuals wearing its shackles as it can by threatening to return them to jail if they do not pay the amount LCA demands — in violation of Supreme Court precedent, California law, and its contractual obligations.
101. When an individual is first put into the LCA tracking program, LCA automatically assigns a rate of $25.50 per day and charges a $150 “enrollment fee.” Ex. 17, Linda Connelly, The Argument for Client-funded Programs, Journal of Offender Monitoring (2015); Ex. 15, Edwards Enrollment Form; Ex. 10, Brooks Enrollment Form. LCA assigns this fee before obtaining or analyzing an individual’s financial information.
102. When individuals are first put into the high-tech shackle program, LCA automatically charges them for 15 days, or $382.50, plus the $150 “enrollment fee” for a total of $532.50 without any inquiry into whether they can afford that fee or not. Ex. 3, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2014 at 2; Ex. 15, Edwards Enrollment Form; Ex. 10, Brooks Enrollment Form.
103. At no point in the booking process does LCA inform Class Members that their daily fee must be tied to their ability to pay, although it is required to do so under California law.
104. LCA claims that it has a sliding scale for determining daily payment but that it is “proprietary.” LCA refuses to divulge its method for calculating daily fees based on a person’s income, even to the very people upon whom the fees are imposed.
105. If this sliding scale exists, LCA does not use it to determine a daily monitoring fee that an individual can afford to pay. Instead, LCA determines financial need under criteria of its own invention that are not court-ordered and are contrary to California law.
106. LCA claims that a “waiting list may apply” to receive a reduced daily monitoring

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fee. Ex. 2, Edwards Financial Needs Assessment. California Penal Code § 1208.2 (d)-(e) mandates that fees for participants on electronic monitoring programs be based on ability to pay. This provision does not have a grace period before it applies. Id.
107. Indeed, LCA states that individuals who apply for a reduced rate after enrollment should “expect a delay in processing.” Id.
108. It is impossible for individuals sentenced to electronic monitoring to apply for reduced payments in advance. LCA’s “waiting lists” and ambiguous “processing” delays are merely another tactic to allow it to charge highest rates possible for at least some period of time, regardless of whether the person can afford it or not.
109. LCA also falsely claims the ability-to-pay determination is based on “household income,” meaning it calculates a single individual’s ability to pay based on a combination of the income of every single person living in the home — regardless of their relationship with the monitored individual or their ability and willingness to help pay monitoring fees. Id. There is no legal basis for this policy. See Cal. Penal Code § 1208.2(e) (defining “ability to pay” as “the overall capacity of the person to reimburse the costs, or a portion of the costs, of providing supervision”) (emphasis added).
110. LCA requires household income with the sole purpose of preventing qualifying individuals from receiving the reduced rate to which they are entitled.
111. LCA’s demand that tracked individuals provide financial information from “household members” — whether they are related to the person being monitored or not — is an unauthorized invasion of privacy.
112. LCA’s policy of calculating an individual’s ability to pay based on the aggregate income of everyone they live with is especially burdensome on indigent households, where it is

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more common for the home composition to be multi-generational, multi-familial, and non-

nuclear.

113. Thus LCA uses it baseless policy to deny reduced rates to shackled individuals

based on their grandparents’ and parents’ social security income; the income of other families

renting rooms in the home; the income of their children or romantic partners; or the income of

individuals using the address for official purposes but who do not live in or contribute to the

household’s finances.

114. LCA arbitrarily decides what can be claimed as an “expense” when determining

reduced fees, inexplicably excluding “court costs, including fines, attorney fees, etc.” Ex. 2.

Although these costs can easily come to tens of thousands of dollars, LCA excludes them from

individual’s financial assessment in an effort to force its way to the head of the creditor line.

115. Thus under LCA’s profit-first scheme, an individual on pre-trial monitoring —

who faces potentially significant attorney’s fees to mount a viable criminal defense — will not

have those fees taken into account as they try to ease the burden of paying for their own pre-trial

supervision.

116. Similarly, an individual struggling to pay thousands of dollars in court costs and

fines will not have those debts taken into account as they try to successfully reenter society.

117. LCA has invented two categories — indigent and financially challenged — to

further mystify its financial needs assessment. Id. This distinction has no basis in law and can

only serve as an illegitimate ground to deny a fee reduction.

B. LCA’s Business Model Amounts to Extortion 118. LCA extorts payments out of shackled individuals by threatening to send anyone

who fails to keep up with payments to jail — a consequence severe enough to virtually guarantee

payment, even from those who cannot afford it.

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119. Under this pay-or-jail scheme, LCA — by and through the official authority of Alameda County — extracts arbitrary and profit-driven fees from shackled individuals with the threat of incarceration.
120. California law defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.” Cal. Penal Code § 518; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing “extortion” as defined by state law as “racketeering activity”).
121. A threat induces sufficient fear to amount to extortion when it promises (1) “an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened”; (2) accuse[s] the individual threatened . . . , of any crime”; or (3) “expose[s], or to impute[s] to him or them any deformity, disgrace or crime.” Cal. Penal Code § 519. LCA’s business strategy of threatening shackled individuals in its programs with jail unless they pay more than they can afford — even though under the Constitution and California law they may not lose their liberty for inability to pay — constitutes an injury to the person being threatened.
122. LCA’s business strategy of “violating” Class Members on GPS tethers who fall behind on their payments by falsely informing the court that they are violating their terms of release amounts to accusing that individual of a crime.
123. LCA’s business strategy of returning individuals under its control to jail because they fail to pay fees they cannot afford exposes them to the disgrace of being incarcerated.
124. LCA’s business strategy meets the definition of extortion under California law. 125. Named Plaintiffs William Edwards, Robert Jackson, James Brooks, and Kyser Wilson all paid money to LCA that they could not afford, causing them great hardship, because LCA threatened to “violate” them so that they would be returned to jail if they did not pay what

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LCA demanded. Ex. 5, 6, 9, 18, P. Declarations.

C. LCA’s Predatory and Misleading Business Practices Violate California Law 126. California law requires LCA to provide “a written statement of the person’s

rights” related to the monitoring program, including the “fact that the person cannot be denied

consideration for or removed from the program because of an inability to pay all or a portion of

the program’s fees.” Cal. Penal Code § 1208.2(i)(1).

127. Named Plaintiffs William Edwards, Robert Johnson, James Brooks, and Kyser

Wilson did not receive this required notification when they were booked into LCA.

128. LCA failed to inform Named Plaintiffs and fails to inform those similarly situated

that they cannot be removed from the program if they cannot afford the daily fee, in violation of

California law.

129. LCA does not set its daily rate based on ability to pay but rather on how much

money it can force each individual to pay the company to maximize its profits.

130. LCA also failed to inform Named Plaintiffs and fails to inform those similarly

situated that they have a right under California law to a court hearing if there is a disagreement

“regarding the person’s ability to pay, the amount which is to be paid, or the manner and

frequency with which payment is to be made.” Cal. Penal Code § 1208.2(i)(2).

131. LCA continues to withhold information from individuals on LCA shackles

concerning their right to a hearing to determine their ability to pay.

132. LCA deliberately ignores its affirmative obligation to provide information

regarding the right to a hearing before the Court regarding “Ability to Pay” determinations.

133. Instead, its 2016 Client Handbook states, “Failure to abide by the fee agreement

may result in termination from the program. LCA will work with a participant if there is a

change in their financial status while on the program.” Ex. 4, LCA Client Handbook, Rev 2016

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at 5. This statement is misleading and is not adequate to inform individuals of their rights.

134. Under California Penal Code § 1208.2, LCA has a statutory obligation to charge

individuals they are tracking an amount they can afford so that they can remain in the program

without financial hardship, starting from the very first day of ordered supervision.

135. LCA has a statutory obligation to abide by court determinations regarding

disputes over ability to pay.

136. LCA conceals from those forced to pay for their own supervision that they have a

right to have payment disputes decided by a judge and is thus blocking access to a third party

neutral arbiter who could resolve any dispute against LCA’s financial interests.

137. LCA fails to meet its obligation to avoid imposing financial hardship on those

sentenced to wear its monitor, instead resorting to delay tactics, unfair fee calculation practices,

and physical threats in order to increase profits gained from individuals under its “supervision.”

D. LCA’s Business Practices Violate Its Contract with Alameda County

138. Under the terms of its services agreement contract with Alameda County, LCA

has a contractual obligation to charge individuals being tracked only what they can reasonably

afford.

139. LCA has breached that duty.

140. LCA has a contractual obligation to abide by court determinations regarding

disputes over ability to pay. Instead, LCA is concealing the fact that individuals being tracked in

its ankle monitor program have a right to have payment disputes decided by a judge and is thus

blocking access to a third party neutral arbiter who could resolve any dispute against LCA’s

financial interests.

141. In restricting access to the courts, LCA is violating its Services Agreement with

Alameda County and Plaintiffs’ rights.

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E. Named Plaintiffs’ Interactions with LCA

142. Named Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of their underlying criminal

convictions; they instead challenge LCA’s abusive practices and LCA’s use of the criminal

detention power of the government to extort money from indigent individuals sentenced to wear

LCA shackles.

i. William Edwards 143. At the time of the events relevant to this case, Mr. Edwards was an employee of

the Contra Costa Public Defender’s Office, working for approximately $16 per hour with no

benefits. Ex. 18, Declaration of William Edwards.

144. Mr. Edwards suffers from Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, a disorder that causes

white blood cells to overproduce and reduces the number of red blood cells, leading to oxygen

deprivation in the body. If left untreated, CML will lead to organ failure and death. Id.

145. To treat this disease, which currently has no known cure, Mr. Edwards must take

chemotherapy pills twice a day. Mr. Edwards frequently experiences pain, nausea, fatigue, and

headaches as side effects of the treatment. In addition, Mr. Edwards must undergo a battery of

medical tests and a physical examination at least once a month. Id.

146. Mr. Edwards’s medical condition limits his ability to work due to the side effects

of the chemotherapy and his need for frequent medical attention.

147. In November 2016, Mr. Edwards was driving an acquaintance’s car with the

owner in the vehicle when the Alameda County police pulled the car over. The police found

drugs in the owner’s bag and a firearm in the glove compartment. The police arrested both men,

although nothing linked Mr. Edwards to the drugs or the weapon.

148. Mr. Edwards spent December 2016 locked up in the Alameda County jail, where

his health began to deteriorate as he could not obtain the daily chemotherapy he needed. In

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January 2017, at the point that his life was in danger, Mr. Edwards was released for medical reasons but was required to wear a GPS shackle from January 9 to April 12, 2017, when the charges against him were eventually dropped. Id.; Ex. 19, Edwards Docket.
149. Mr. Edwards was supposed to be released to LCA so that he could be taken to the hospital for treatment, but LCA failed to pick him up at the jail. Ex. 20, OR Release to LCA; Ex. 18, Declaration of William Edwards.
150. On January 6, 2017, Mr. Edwards was released to his attorney who drove him to the hospital. Under the terms of his release order, Mr. Edwards had to submit to electronic monitoring under the auspices of LCA. Ex. 21, Jan. 6 Release Order. In addition, the court authorized Mr. Edwards to work and go to medical appointments at the hospital to treat his cancer.
151. Mr. Edwards reported to LCA’s Oakland office on January 9, 2017, to book himself into the electronic tracking program. He signed the “participant agreement” on that day.
152. As part of the LCA booking process, Mr. Edwards provided LCA with information about his income, assets, financial liabilities, and debts. It also collected information about his medical history. After collecting this personal information, LCA enrolled him in the program and attached the shackle to his ankle.
153. LCA staff did not conduct an “ability to pay” assessment as required both by its contract with Alameda County and California law. In spite of having Mr. Edwards’s medical and financial information, Defendant Raelene Rivas, Mr. Edwards’s case manager, automatically imposed a fee of $25.50 per day — nearly 20% of his income for an eight-hour working day. Ms. Rivas provided no explanation or justification for that amount.
154. Ms. Rivas did not inform Mr. Edwards that LCA was obligated to determine his

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daily charge on a sliding scale on the basis of his financial situation. 155. LCA also did not inform Mr. Edwards that he had a right to a hearing before the
judge on his case if he disagreed with LCA’s assessment of how much he could afford to pay. 156. In order to begin his sentence in the electronic monitoring program, LCA required
Mr. Edwards to pay a total of $532.50; a $150 non-refundable “enrollment fee” and $382.50 for two weeks’ advance monitoring. Ex. 15, Edwards enrollment form.
157. Although $382.50 represents 15 days’ worth of monitoring fees, LCA charges Mr. Edwards $382.50 every two weeks, or 14 days. LCA never explained or justified this practice to Mr. Edwards.
158. Mr. Edwards explained to LCA that he was only able to pay $350. He paid this amount, which was applied to the “enrollment fee” and first week’s monitoring, leaving an outstanding balance of $182.50 that Mr. Edwards was unable to pay. Ms. Rivas told him that someone from LCA would contact him within five days to explain how he could obtain a reduced rate based on his ability to pay. No one from LCA ever did so.
159. When Mr. Edwards did not hear back from LCA, he placed multiple calls to Raelene Rivas, LCA’s lead case manager, who refused to provide information over the telephone. Instead, she told Mr. Edwards that if he wanted to be considered for a reduction in fees, he would have to return to LCA’s office to pick up the necessary paperwork.
160. Mr. Edwards asked on several occasions whether he could speak to Ms. Rivas’s supervisor to resolve the situation. On each occasion, Ms. Rivas refused, saying that her supervisor wouldn’t want to speak with Mr. Edwards.
161. When Named Plaintiff William Edwards applied for a reduction in his daily rate, LCA demanded financial information from him and his girlfriend, with whom he shared an

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apartment. LCA then refused to accept the required documents because they were copies, and when Mr. Edwards was not able to produce originals quickly enough, LCA reported to the Alameda County Court that he had violated the terms of his release. Ex. 22, Incident Report.
162. In contradiction to California law, Ms. Rivas told Mr. Edwards that LCA is authorized to determine ability to pay based on “household income,” including Mr. Edwards’s girlfriend, Gina Jenkins. Ms. Rivas demanded that Mr. Edwards prove that Ms. Jenkins was receiving financial assistance by submitting an original government document. Ex. 18.
163. There was no basis for this request in California law or LCA’s contract with Alameda County.
164. The sole purpose for this requirement was to discourage Mr. Edwards from seeking reduced fees so that LCA could extort money from him that he did not have.
165. Mr. Edwards was forced to take off time from work — and thus lose wages that he needed to provide for his basic necessities — to gather the information that LCA demanded to reassess his daily rate.
166. In addition, Mr. Edwards was on court-ordered home detention, requiring him to get permission in advance each time he needed to deviate from his set schedule to gather the necessary documents.
167. LCA created burdensome and unreasonable requirements to delay Mr. Edwards’s request for reduced fees — for which LCA staff knew he was eligible — so that they could overcharge him for as long as possible.
168. Although neither Ms. Rivas or any other staff member contacted Mr. Edwards to explain how to get a reduced daily rate, Ms. Rivas made sure to call Mr. Edwards on January 16, 2017, to demand $182.50 to pay off his outstanding balance from the charges at his booking on

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January 9.

169. On January 23, Ms. Rivas submitted an “incident report” to the Alameda Superior

Court, alleging that Mr. Edwards was “non-compliant” because he had “not submitted required

verification of household income.”

170. Being out of compliance with the requirements of electronic monitoring is

grounds for arrest and return to jail.

171. Ms. Rivas “violated” Mr. Edwards because he had been unable to comply with

her unreasonable demands regarding verification of household income, although LCA had no

legal basis upon which to consider that information in its assessment of inability to pay.

172. Mr. Edwards was terrified that LCA would return him to jail, where he feared he

would not survive.

173. Instead Ms. Rivas, acting on behalf of LCA and SuperCom, “violated” Mr.

Edwards to intimidate him into paying the daily rate LCA demanded even though he did not

have the ability to do so.

174. By threatening Mr. Edwards’s ability to stay out of jail, and thus receive life-

saving medical treatment, Ms. Rivas extorted funds from Mr. Edwards. LCA absorbed Mr.

Edwards’s payments into its revenue stream, introducing the funds into interstate commerce, thus

benefitting itself and its parent company SuperCom.

ii.

Robert Jackson

175. Robert Jackson has worked as a forklift operator for approximately seven years.

He and his wife Natasha were married in 2011 and created a close-knit family with their

daughters, now aged 17, 15, and 9, from previous relationships. Ex. 9, Declaration of Robert

Jackson.

176. In December 2016, Mr. Jackson pled guilty to a firearms possession charge and

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received an eight-month prison sentence with half time credits under PC 4019, or 120 days. Mr. Jackson began his sentence on January 27, 2017.
177. Four days later, a guard woke Mr. Jackson at 3:30 am to inform him that his wife had passed away on February 2 from meningitis.
178. Mr. Jackson immediately contacted his parole officer because his children were now left without a mother or father.
179. On February 3, Mr. Jackson was released, and his parole officer told him to contact “Belinda” at LCA.
180. Belinda told him to report to the office immediately although he was trying to arrange his wife’s funeral. She also demanded that he come with $550, money Mr. Jackson did not have. He was forced to borrow money from his parents, siblings, and friends.
181. LCA charged Mr. Jackson $250 per week for GPS tracking. In March, his probation officer requested that SCRAM alcohol monitoring be added, to which Mr. Jackson had no choice but to agree or be returned to jail.
182. In late February 2017, Mr. Jackson asked if his weekly rate could be lowered because he was facing severe financial hardship — paying approximately 40-50% of his takehome pay to LCA while also trying to meet basic expenses such as rent, food, and necessities for his daughters.
183. LCA supervisor Jane Doe refused his request based on a short conversation with Mr. Jackson’s case manager. She made no effort to review his documents or consider his request.
184. Mr. Jackson did not ask again for a reduction in fees because he was afraid that LCA would terminate him from the monitoring program and he would have to return to jail.

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185. Instead, Mr. Jackson made special arrangements at work to get his twice-monthly paycheck on Wednesdays so he could pay LCA by Friday. Because he could only pay every other week, LCA routinely called him to harass him about being behind on his payments during the “off” weeks when he had no money to spare.
186. At the end of June, LCA called Mr. Jackson and informed him he owed an additional $800. LCA did not give him a reason nor offer any accounting or documentation proving the additional debt.
187. Mr. Jackson had no choice but to agree to their demands because LCA would not remove the tracking devices (and thus stop the accrual of daily fees) unless he paid in full. Fearing a “violation” and return to jail, Mr. Jackson was thus forced to find a way to pay this additional debt to LCA.
188. In order to raise the money, Mr. Jackson had to sell his car and use the money to rent a storage unit. He then moved out of his apartment and was forced to place his children with others so that he could get the deposit money back to use to pay LCA. As a result, his bereaved children lost the stability of their home just a few months after the death of their mother.
189. Mr. Jackson displaced his family and lost his home to pay LCA the amount they demanded without explanation or justification.
190. Mr. Jackson had no permanent place to live for the next four months. It was very difficult for him to see and support his children while moving around between temporary housing.
191. When Mr. Jackson finally paid LCA the $800, they claimed it was insufficient and he owed them more money. Again, Mr. Jackson did not receive any accounting or explanation.

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192. Mr. Jackson did not have the extra funds, so LCA refused to notify the court that

he had successfully served his sentence until he paid in full.

193. On June 28, 2017, an LCA employee named Kenya Kyle sent a report to the court

stating that Mr. Jackson was in violation of LCA’s program because he owed them $122. Ex.

23, LCA Violation Report, June 28.

194. The report also noted two times when Mr. Jackson had returned home after his

curfew, the first time on May 21 and again on June 4. Contrary to LCA’s contract with Alameda

County, which requires immediately reporting non-compliance events, Ms. Kyle had not

reported these incidents to the court at the time; only when Mr. Jackson owed LCA money did

LCA claim that he was not in compliance.

195. Mr. Jackson finally managed to make his last payment in August and LCA

certified his successful completion of his sentence on August 22, 2017. Ex. 24, Jackson Final

Report.

iii. James Brooks 196. James Brooks is a longshoreman by profession, but he is unable to work because

his mother suffered a catastrophic stroke, leaving her paralyzed and in need of 24-hour care. Mr.

Brooks cannot afford to put his mother in a nursing home or hire in-home caregivers full time.

197. Mr. Brooks is eligible for California’s In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS),

which provides in-home care to people who are receiving Medi-Cal benefits and are blind,

disabled, or more than 65 years old and unable to live at home safely without help. Mr. Brooks

signed up with IHSS to be his mother’s care-giver, expecting a salary of $12.50 per hour.

198. On April 7, 2017, Mr. Brooks was arrested for driving under the influence. Based

on a plea deal reached in November, Mr. Brooks was sentenced to 120 days in jail with half time

credits, which the judge ordered be served with a GPS monitor, SCRAM alcohol monitoring

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device, and alcohol testing provided by LCA. Ex. 25, Brooks Sentencing. 199. Mr. Brooks began his 58-day sentence with LCA on December 17, 2017. LCA
required that he wear two separate shackles on one ankle, although LCA has devices that are able to complete both the GPS and the alcohol monitoring functions simultaneously. Ex. 12, Statistics Power Point. Mr. Brooks estimates that the devices together weighed two to three pounds and were very awkward to wear. Ex. 5, Declaration of James Brooks.
200. Mr. Brooks frequently received calls from LCA saying that he was outside his “allowed area,” sometimes as often as twice a week. Usually this happened when he was washing dishes, as his kitchen sink was out of range of the modem LCA provided.
201. In order to prove that he was at home, LCA required Mr. Brooks to stop what he was doing and download the information on his monitor, a process that took about 10 minutes. LCA refused to swap out the equipment, instead blaming him for having a bad internet connection.
202. Due to problems with the IHSS, Mr. Brooks was not paid during the time he was on LCA’s tracking program. In order to pay LCA, he rented out his house and moved in with his mother. They lived off the leftover rent that he received after paying his mortgage as well as on his mother’s social security and disability payments. When that proved to be insufficient to meet their basic needs, Mr. Brooks scrambled to raise money to satisfy LCA by selling his personal possessions on Craig’s List.
203. Mr. Brooks informed LCA about his desperate financial situation and repeatedly asked for an explanation of how they calculated his daily rate. His LCA case manager, Jeanette Arguello-Ramos, simply told him “that’s how we run things.” Id.
204. Ms. Arguello-Ramos told Mr. Brooks on January 4, 2018 that his daily rate was

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$13, amounting to approximately $400 a month. When Mr. Brooks asked for a breakdown of

what he had paid and how the rate was calculated, Ms. Arguello-Ramos said he would have to

meet with her supervisor, William Basler.

205. Mr. Brooks explained to Mr. Basler that it was hard to find caretakers for his

mother and when he could, it would cost him $60 for the three-hour minimum plus $15 in

transportation to LCA’s office. He again asked to be sent a fee breakdown by email but received

no response.

206. Mr. Brooks then made arrangements to meet with Mr. Basler on the afternoon of

January 25, whereupon Mr. Basler emailed him to say that he would be out of the office that

afternoon. Id.

207. LCA staff refused to give Mr. Brooks a daily breakdown of his charges.

208. In spite of being told he was being charged $13 per day, LCA charged him $1,629

for 58 days, which works out to a daily rate of $28.

209. At no time did LCA inform Mr. Brooks that he was entitled to apply for a reduced

rate, despite LCA being required under the terms of its contract and California law to determine

a daily rate based on ability to pay.

210. LCA also withheld the information that Mr. Brooks was entitled to a hearing

before a judge if he and LCA could not agree on a fair daily rate.

211. Mr. Brooks was forced to pay LCA a total of $1,629 for 58 days of GPS tracking

and alcohol monitoring because LCA had convinced him that he would go to jail if he failed to

pay and he did not think his mother could survive without him.

iv. Kyser Wilson

212. At the time that Mr. Wilson was under LCA monitoring, he had just started a

fulltime job as the night desk clerk at the Hartland Hotel for $14.24 per hour. Mr. Wilson also

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made money on the side as a barber. He made approximately $2,200 per month. LCA

demanded $650 per month for both GPS tracking and alcohol monitoring, or 30% of his monthly

income.

213. Mr. Wilson was arrested for driving under the influence and driving on a

suspended license in June 2016. Mr. Wilson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 180 days of

LCA monitoring. On July 25, 2016, LCA booked him into both their alcohol monitoring and

GPS tracking programs.

214. In addition, Mr. Wilson was ordered to pay a fine of $4,509 and complete 56

hours of community service.

215. Under the terms of LCA monitoring, Mr. Wilson was allowed to go to work,

schedule doctor’s appointments, and go to church on Sunday.

216. In addition to his LCA charges, Mr. Wilson had to pay his rent, pay thousands in

court-ordered fines, buy basic necessities, and make payments on his car note.

217. When Mr. Wilson told his case manager that he was having difficulty making his

payments, he was told that he could not fall behind or he would be “violated” and remanded into

custody.

218. Mr. Wilson feared that if he did not pay LCA he would be sent to jail and lose his

job.

219. No one at LCA ever told Mr. Wilson that his daily rate was supposed to be based

on his ability to pay, that he could apply for a reduced rate, or that he could return to court to

request that the judge lower his charges.

III. Alameda County’s Failure to Supervise Implementation of the LCA Contract

220. Alameda County and LCA entered into a contract for LCA to provide GPS

tracking for individuals in the County’s criminal justice system based on referrals from the

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Superior Court or probation office. The contract went into effect on July 13, 2013. Ex. 1. It has been renewed every two years since then.
221. On July 30, 2013, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors authorized a program of home detention and approved the contract with LCA to provide GPS tracking services as part of that program. Ex. 26, LCA Contract Approval. By doing so, the Board of Supervisors made it official County policy to delegate GPS tracking of individuals within the County’s system to a private for-profit entity.
222. By delegating the costs of pre- and post-trial supervision, Alameda County saves costs by not running these programs itself. The County therefore has a direct financial stake in allowing LCA to continue its coercive and unlawful practices.
223. The California statute authorizing electronic monitoring mandates that no one be excluded from the monitoring program because of inability to pay all or even a portion of the program’s fees.
224. The contract between Alameda County and LCA specifies that LCA must set a daily rate for monitoring that is based on the individual’s financial information and ability to pay.
225. Instead LCA has created a pay-or-jail scheme to maximize profits. Alameda County has actively allowed that scheme to thrive.
226. The County has allowed LCA to charge those being tracked more than they can afford, extracting enormous sums. LCA has also put additional pressure on Class Members by reporting them for violating conditions of their release that were imposed by LCA, not the courts, with the tacit approval and criminal enforcement power of the County.
227. The joint enterprise between Alameda County, which exercises control over individuals’ criminal adjudications and freedom, and LCA, which exercises control over

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individuals’ “success” within that system based on their ability to pay, violates the due process rights of Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. Such a scheme does not provide safeguards to protect individuals’ liberty interests, but rather is designed to serve Alameda’s and LCA’s own financial interests.
228. The joint enterprise between Alameda County and LCA violates the due process rights of Plaintiffs and those similarly situated because LCA’s decisions determining who remains out of jail are based on profit motive, not a neutral assessment of whether the person has complied with the conditions of release.
229. Even though California law requires that no person be terminated from a monitoring program if they cannot afford the monitoring fees, LCA routinely threatens or follows through on such terminations. The County makes no attempt to monitor or prevent this unlawful practice.
230. Indeed, LCA routinely deprives individuals of notice, an opportunity to be heard, and access to information and safeguards that would allow them to assert their rights. The County makes no attempt to monitor or prevent this unlawful practice.
231. The Alameda County-LCA enterprise violates the equal protection rights of Plaintiffs and those similarly situated because those who can afford to pay LCA do not risk being returned to prison, whereas those who are indigent live with that threat every day because their freedom is contingent upon income. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that a person cannot be jailed if unable to pay court debt).
232. Returning someone to jail because they cannot afford to pay a private company hundreds of dollars a month punishes them for being poor and violates their equal protection rights.

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233. LCA’s policy is to terminate any Class Member from its tracking program who is more than ten days behind on payments. This is a particularly harsh practice, as LCA also requires Class Members to maintain at least seven days’ worth of daily fees in their account at all times. Ex. 17, Linda Connelly, The Argument for Client-funded Programs, Journal of Offender Monitoring (2015) at 10.
234. Alameda County’s board of supervisors approved the contract with LCA at the request of the head of the County probation office, acting as the County’s final policy makers. The County is liable for the injury caused by the contract’s unconstitutional implementation.
235. Alameda County fails to enforce the safeguards in the Alameda County-LCA Agreement, namely reference to the state law requiring that private contractors conduct meaningful ability-to-pay analysis and adjust each Class Member’s daily rate as appropriate. See California Penal Code § 1208.2.
236. By entering into a contract under which LCA’s profits would be determined solely by how much money it could get from Class Members, Alameda County acted with objective deliberate indifference to the likelihood the LCA would attempt to extract higher payments than Class Members could afford to pay, in violation of California law and the constitutional rights of individuals sentenced to LCA.
237. LCA routinely “violates” Class Members for being behind on their payments, giving Alameda County policymakers and officials, including court and probation office employees, actual or constructive knowledge that LCA was and is charging individuals more than they can pay. Thus the county is liable for LCA’s actions.
238. Alameda County knew that LCA was demanding a daily rate that was not based on an individual’s ability to pay and yet did nothing, failing to supervise and thus making it

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responsible for violations of California law and tracked individuals’ constitutional rights. 239. Defendant Linda Connolly, LCA’s CEO until April 2017, has admitted that LCA
violated numerous Class Members subject to GPS tracking. See supra at fn. 3, Kilgore Interview. By recommending to the Alameda Superior Court and Probation Office that people be removed from LCA’s program simply because they could not pay what LCA wanted, LCA violated California law and monitored individuals’ constitutional rights.
240. Alameda County failed to train court and probation office employees to question LCA’s pattern of violations for non-payment rather than legitimate probation or supervision violations. Both California law and the terms of the contract with the County required LCA to tailor its fees to each individual’s ability to pay. Instead, County officials either sent tracked individuals to jail or ignored the violation reports to the court, allowing LCA to continue its illegal practices unchallenged and to injure Plaintiffs with impunity.
241. County officials are aware of and complicit in LCA’s policies and practices. The Agreement stipulates that LCA’s fees must be fair and based on ability to pay and that the Alameda Probation Department “at its sole discretion, may assist LCA with its collection efforts . . . when participants willfully refuse to pay the agreed upon fee.” Ex. 1.
242. Instead, Alameda County uses its police powers to assist in debt collection efforts that are unfair and not based on ability to pay.
243. The Agreement also allows LCA to withhold its final certification that an individual has successfully completed the electronic monitoring sentence until it has collected all the fees it has imposed, leaving Class Members pressured into meeting to LCA’s demands for money. The County makes no attempt to stop LCA’s illegal withholding of completion reports or profit-driven abuses.

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IV. Defendants’ Conduct Violates the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act 244. The Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against the LCA Defendants and not Alameda County.
245. The Plaintiffs are “persons” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c).
246. Defendant LCA is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
247. Defendant SuperCom is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. Defendant SuperCom entered into a contract to buy LCA in January 2013 over a three-year period and completed in the acquisition in January 2016.
248. Defendants Linda Connelly, Kent Borowick, Diane Harrington, Raelene Rivas, Jeanette Arguello-Ramos, Belinda Doe, and Does 1-10 are each a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because they are capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
A. The RICO Enterprise 249. The LCA Defendants, together with Alameda County and the other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). This RICO Enterprise is an ongoing contractual and business relationship with the common purpose of unlawfully maximizing the collection of fees by LCA for GPS tracking and alcohol monitoring without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay as required by the LCA-Alameda County contract and California law.

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250. The members of the RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit. Linda Connelly negotiated and signed the contract with Alameda County that is the basis for the RICO enterprise. Alameda County courts and probation officers subject Class Members to LCA’s electronic monitoring program. The employees of LCA execute the enterprise by demanding payments that individuals are unable to pay, and then threatening those individuals with jail if they do not produce the money that LCA demands. LCA and SuperCom collect these overpayments as illegitimate profits.
251. Alameda County officials fail to adequately supervise the execution of the contract with LCA, allowing the LCA Defendants to maximize profits by extorting fees higher than those allowed by the contract or California law. Alameda County benefitted by outsourcing a government function at no cost, relieving itself of an administrative burden while LCA took advantage of its contractual relationship with the county to squeeze shackled individuals under its control for payments they could not pay.
252. The execution of the contract between LCA and Alameda County constitutes cooperation to enable activities that are outside the bounds of a normal commercial operation.
253. The RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because its activities and transactions relating to the collection of money involve activities in California, New York, and Herzliya, Israel. The activities of the enterprise involve movement and communications across state lines, use of the telephone and internet for monitoring purposes, as well as use of the United States mail service to communicate with Alameda County and Superior Court officials, demand payment from individuals in the monitoring programs, and transmit threats of termination and jailing for nonpayment.
254. The LCA Defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are

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associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
255. The LCA Defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Specifically, the LCA Defendants conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; b. Extortion in violation of Cal. Code § 516PC; c. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952; and d. Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. B. Predicate Acts 256. The LCA Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with the other Defendants, have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various fees discussed in this Complaint, including (but not limited to) the $25.50 daily fee and charges for alleged damage to equipment, with intent to deprive individuals under LCA’s control of this money. 257. The LCA Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO Enterprise, threaten Plaintiffs and similarly-situated individuals on LCA shackles that if they do not agree to pay money to LCA, they: (a) will be terminated from the program; (b) will be accused by LCA of violating the conditions of release; and (c) will be returned to jail without considering Plaintiffs’ ability to pay, as required by law. 258. These threats (a) demonstrate a desire to extort; (b) are premised on deception; (c)

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are made in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victims; and (d) are demanded under in

violation of LCA’s contract with Alameda County and California law.

259. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiffs paid the fees that LCA demanded

out of fear.

260. The LCA Defendants, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants

of the RICO enterprise, created a fee extortion scheme which intentionally misrepresents or

omits participants’ legal rights while threatening them with “violation.”

261. Their electronic tracking program is a scheme to defraud participants out of their

money.

262. The LCA Defendants and the other participants of the RICO enterprise used the

United States wires and caused the use of the United States wires with specific intent to deceive

their victims.

263. LCA’s intent at all times was to maximize profits from participants by deceiving

them. LCA convinced individuals it was authorized to calculate fees based on the household’s

ability to pay rather than the individual’s resources; LCA made clear that individuals had to pay

whatever LCA assigned them or go to jail; LCA led individuals to believe they had no choice but

to go through LCA’s intentionally burdensome process to receive a daily rate that they could

afford to pay; and LCA did not inform them of their right to have a judge resolve any dispute

about a fair daily rate.

264. By misinforming or not telling participants their legal rights while threatening

them with jail for not paying the demanded amount, the LCA Defendants’ fee extortion scheme

was reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence.

i. Extortion in Violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951

265. The LCA Defendants have, individually and in conspiracy with the other

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participants in the RICO Enterprise, used fear to secure Plaintiffs’ consent to pay excessive fees

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act).

266. The proceeds of LCA Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce,

and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as

these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

267. The final buy-out price that SuperCom would pay Defendant Linda Connelly for

LCA was dependent on LCA’s revenues between 2013-2016. By collecting higher fees than

allowed, LCA inflated its value through fees that were obtained by violating the rights of those

being tracked.

ii. Extortion in Violation of California Penal Code § 518-19PC

268. California law defines extortion as obtaining the property of another through

wrongful use of fear, with fear defined as being induced by threat of committing an unlawful

injury, accusing of that person of a crime, or exposing him or her to disgrace. See Cal. Penal

Code §§ 518 and 519. The LCA Defendants have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other

persons in the RICO enterprise, threatened to cause Plaintiffs to be put in jail for violating the

terms of their release in order to obtain unlawful amounts of money from Plaintiffs.

269. Causing someone to be put in jail without legitimate grounds constitutes injury by

depriving them of their liberty, and thus constitutes extortion under California law.

270. Accusing someone of violating the terms of their release is equivalent to accusing

them of a crime, and thus constitutes extortion under California law.

271. Forcing someone back into jail exposes them to disgrace in the eyes of many

members of the community, including potential employers, landlords, and law enforcement

officers, and thus constitutes extortion under California law.

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272. The LCA Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in

the RICO Enterprise, have threatened Plaintiffs into paying fees they could not afford with intent

to deprive them of money and the enjoyment of their state and federal rights, constituting

extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2) (Travel Act) and California law.

273. The LCA Defendants have traveled in interstate commerce and have used the mail

and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to

communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of the scheme.

274. LCA is a corporate entity that is wholly owned by SuperCom, a global company

based outside of California. LCA is operating the extortionate activities described herein within

Alameda County, California, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1). The LCA Defendants have

traveled in interstate commerce, and have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to

otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate the promotion, management,

establishment, or carrying on, of an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).

iv. Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 275. LCA intentionally deceives participants about their legal rights to extort fees and

uses United States interstate wires to do so.

276. LCA’s practice of extorting money from participants regardless of ability to pay

falls under the definition of wire fraud as it is a “scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining

money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises[.]” 18

U.S. Code § 1343.

277. In order to track Class Members, LCA “transmits or causes to be transmitted by

means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any

writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.”

Id.

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278. LCA falsely represents that ability to pay is determined by household rather than individual income; that participants have no recourse when assessed fees they cannot pay, although they have a right to request that a judge review the daily rate; and that they must try to come to an agreement with LCA over their ability to pay before exercising their right under the California Law and the Constitution to have a neutral arbiter assess their ability to pay.
279. This deception allows LCA to drag participants through a burdensome, lengthy “agreement” process with the intent to make participants keep paying fees they cannot afford as long as possible.
280. In furtherance of its fee extortion scheme, LCA uses the wires of the United States to make such false representations. LCA requires participants to have a telephone line open so it can monitor their position and makes participants download and update software provided by SuperCom via the Internet.
281. The LCA Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO enterprise, have misrepresented participants’ legal rights to them through the enrollment process, client handbooks, and fee reduction process so LCA could take the maximum amount of money from participants for as long as possible.
282. LCA uses telephone wires and SuperCom’s proprietary software to track participants’ locations in furtherance of this scheme. LCA forces participants to use the United States wires to update software published by SuperCom in furtherance of this scheme.
283. The LCA Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO enterprise, have created a scheme to defraud participants and have used and caused the use of interstate and foreign United States wires with the specific intent to defraud participants in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

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C. Pattern of Racketeering Activity

284. The LCA Defendants and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise have

engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since at least 2013

and continue through the present with respect to hundreds of individuals subject to electronic

shackling in Alameda County. LCA Defendants have threatened to “violate” numerous

individuals in their electronic monitoring program unless those people paid them money they

either did not owe or could not afford. LCA Defendants have misled numerous participants

about their legal rights while being tracked by electronic monitoring. These racketeering acts are

part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business.

285. The racketeering acts of the LCA Defendants and the other participants in the

RICO enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of fees by LCA and

minimize costs to the County without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without

informing monitored individuals of their legal rights.

286. The racketeering acts of the LCA Defendants and the other participants in the

RICO Enterprise have yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to the Plaintiffs, who

have all been subjected to fees paid to Defendant LCA as a result of the LCA Defendants’

unlawful conduct. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have all been subjected to threats of physical

confinement for the purpose of financial profit to LCA as well as relinquishing their federal and

state rights through onerous and unlawful electronic monitoring conditions.

287. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar

participants: LCA Defendants, County officials, and the other participants in the RICO

Enterprise.

288. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, LCA acted under the color of official

capacity as an agent of Alameda County authorized to supervise those ordered by the County

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court into LCA’s electronic monitoring program. LCA used that authority to achieve an

illegitimate objective, namely threatening to falsely report that shackled individuals were

violating the terms of their release in order to receive fee payments to which it was not lawfully

entitled.

289. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Plaintiffs reasonably feared that LCA

would “violate” them if they did not agree to LCA’s demands for payment because LCA had the

power to make good on its threats and in fact did report violations to the court based on non-

payment, even if the person did not have the ability to pay the amount LCA demanded.

290. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Alameda County did not benefit from

LCA’s overcharges. It would have received the same benefit — free monitoring services — had

LCA honored the terms of the contract.

291. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, LCA Defendants and the other

participants in the RICO Enterprise, through the RICO Enterprise, directed their racketeering

activities at similar victims: the named Plaintiffs specifically, and, more generally, all individuals

on pre-trial release or eligible for alternative sentencing or probation monitoring through the

Alameda County court system.

292. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of the LCA

Defendants and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise have similar methods of

commission, namely: extorting and deceiving the named Plaintiffs and, more generally, all

individuals being monitored electronically under LCA’s contract with Alameda County who

cannot afford to pay their monitoring fees two weeks in advance, and/or at the daily rate LCA

demands, and/or pay for unnecessary and intrusive drug testing.

D. Proximate Cause

293. As a direct and proximate result of the LCA Defendants and the other participants

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in the RICO Enterprise’s willful, knowing, and intentional acts alleged in this Complaint, the

Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property. By reason of being forced to pay excessive

monitoring fees and surcharges to Defendant LCA, even when they cannot afford to do so

without sacrificing the basic necessities of life, Plaintiffs have suffered economic harm to

themselves and their families.

294. It was foreseeable that by demanding fees that Plaintiffs could not afford to pay,

Defendants would injure the Plaintiffs.

295. There are no independent causes of Plaintiffs’ injuries: if they had not been

ordered to submit to LCA tracking, they would not have been overcharged for electronic

monitoring fees.

296. There is a direct causal connection between LCA demanding fees that the

Plaintiffs were unable to pay and their injuries, including a decrease in funds available for

everyday necessities, loss of wages due to LCA’s unreasonable bureaucratic demands upon

individuals attempting to obtain a lower daily fee, separation from family in an attempt to

comply with LCA’s extortionate demands, and extreme anxiety about being returned to jail for

being too poor to comply with LCA’s monetary demands.

E. Damages

297. The Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages because of LCA’s unlawful

taking of Plaintiffs’ money and forcing Plaintiffs to take on unnecessary loan debt in an amount

to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with

this action.

V. Defendants’ Conduct Violates the United States Constitution

A. Defendant Alameda County Violates the Due Process Clause

298. Defendant Alameda County’s use of a private actor with an interest in profiting

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off of individuals and keeping only those who are able to pay in its electronic tracking program as a supposedly neutral monitoring entity violates plaintiffs’ due process rights.
299. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits neutral judicial officials and civil and criminal law enforcement actors from having a personal financial interest in the cases they prosecute and manage in our legal system.
300. Alameda County has contracted with a private, for-profit company to perform a traditional government function — monitoring individuals pre-trial and on probation. The County allows this private entity to dictate decisions about whether Class Members booked into LCA remain under supervision or must return to jail depending on whether they can keep their payments for the monitoring “service” current.
301. In contrast to the traditional and longstanding role of pretrial services case managers or probation officers, LCA has a direct financial stake in every decision that it makes regarding case supervision, enforcement, and revocation. LCA has a personal financial interest in managing cases to maximize its personal profit and not as a neutral law enforcement officer.
302. LCA’s profits depend significantly on decisions about whether to place people on electronic monitoring, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what reports to make, and what sanctions to recommend. Therefore, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it makes those decisions.
303. Because this private entity has a significant personal financial interest in how these cases are managed — unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department — the Defendants’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in courts of justice.

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304. Under the Defendants’ scheme, LCA decides whether to “violate” an individual

under its control. LCA fabricates rules and then uses those restrictions, which have no legal

basis, to determine when to drop someone from its program based on the perceived violation of

those rules or other conditions. It also controls how individuals are monitored and what

information is provided to or withheld from them concerning their legal rights.

B. Defendant Alameda County’s Conduct Violates the Equal Protection Clause

305. Defendant Alameda County’s delegation of supervision to a private actor that

harasses and threatens individuals who cannot afford illegitimate fees, and threatens those who

fall behind on payment with return to jail, violates plaintiffs’ equal protection rights.

306. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishing

people, including returning them to jail, simply because they are poor. Bearden v. Georgia, 461

U.S. 660 (1983). Alameda County has contracted with a private, for-profit company to supervise

Class Members and then allows LCA to decide who remains free from jail based on ability to

pay the fees it demands.

307. Wealthy individuals who can afford to pay LCA’s high daily rates are left in

peace and continue their lives, hampered only by the tracking devices themselves. People living

in poverty are subjected to threats, harassment, and bureaucratic stonewalling in order to force

them to borrow money or give up basic necessities to avoid going back to jail.

308. The County’s policy of allowing LCA to harass and violate individuals with

limited incomes while leaving similarly situated (but wealthy) individuals in peace serves no

government interest. The policy of allowing people to be sent back to jail simply if they cannot

pay what LCA demands constitutes punishing people because they are poor.

309. By wielding the police power delegated by Alameda County, LCA can, and does,

send people to jail simply because they cannot pay the amounts that it demands. Defendants’

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policies and practices violate the longstanding equal protection restrictions against punishing people simply for being unable to pay.
C. Defendants’ Conduct Is an Abuse of Process 310. LCA abuses the legal process to seek arrest warrants and revocation of electronic monitoring orders with an ulterior motive to collect additional fees. 311. LCA files written documents with the Alameda County court that can trigger the revocation process. 312. When individuals on electronic shackles are unable to pay what LCA demands, LCA “violates” the indigent non-payer by reporting them to the Alameda County court, which then has the option to revoke the person’s release. 313. LCA engages in this activity, which is completely unrelated to public safety, with the ulterior motive of either pressuring people to pay or returning people to jail to scare other indigent individuals under its control into coming up with the demanded funds. 314. LCA also engages in an abuse of process by using monitoring not to do justice and assist individuals, but for the ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and using the threat of removal from the program to extort money. D. Alameda County Is Liable for Its Unconstitutional Policies and Practices and
Its Failure to Train 315. A government body such as Alameda County may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the execution of government policy or custom, that may be fairly said to represent its official policy, inflicts injury on a plaintiff. 316. Alameda County established an official policy of contracting out electronic monitoring of individuals in the County’s court system to a private entity, LCA. Alameda County’s Board of Supervisors ratified a contract with LCA to memorialize this policy.

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317. This policy deprived Class Members, including the Plaintiffs, of their right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have a neutral arbiter to make decisions about their freedom while involved with the criminal justice system.
318. Alameda County both created, ratified, and implemented this policy. Therefore, it is liable for the constitutional violations committed LCA employees because it allows LCA to send those to jail who do not have the resources to buy their freedom.
319. Through its contract with Alameda County, LCA and its employees are performing essential government functions.
320. The conduct of LCA Defendants and LCA employees is attributable to Alameda County.
321. In allowing LCA to ignore its obligation to determine how much each Class Member on its electronic monitoring program could pay, Alameda County violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have a right to have neutral arbiters decide their cases and not to be jailed simply because they are poor.
322. At all times relevant to this Complaint, LCA was acting under color of the laws of the State of California and Alameda County.
323. At the time LCA was demanding fees from individuals under its control that they could not afford, California Penal Code § 1208.2 provided (and still provides) that any individual who is eligible for electronic monitoring instead of incarceration may not be denied that option because of inability to pay. Nevertheless, the LCA Defendants demanded payment from individuals that LCA employees knew they could not afford.
324. Alameda County has a contractual and legal obligation to monitor the execution

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of the contract with LCA to ensure that electronic monitoring is being provided in accordance

with the terms of the contract and California law.

325. The County is also liable for failure to train employees, leading to the deprivation

of constitutional rights. Alameda County fails to train its court personnel, administrators, and

employees adequately with respect to the procedural and substantive rights of Class Members

not to be imprisoned simply because they are poor, and the rights of Class Members who cannot

pay a private company what it demands to maintain their freedom.

326. County managers and employees who were responsible for monitoring LCA’s

performance displayed deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those subject to

LCA’s electronic monitoring program. The County failed to supervise and discipline its

administrators and employees for not protecting the rights of Class Members on electronic

monitoring under the Constitution and California law.

VI. Class Action Allegations

327. The named Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated, to assert the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis.

328. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the

named Plaintiffs and unknown Class Members can challenge Defendants’ unlawful “pay-or-jail”

extortion scheme.

329. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant

to Rule 23(a)(l)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

330. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy

requirements of those provisions.

331. Plaintiffs propose one Class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as

damages. The Class is defined as: All individuals who have been or will be put on any LCA

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monitoring program by the Alameda County Court system from 2013 until this litigation is complete.
A. Numerosity — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 332. Between January 2015 and September 2016, LCA monitored an average of 112 people a day for the Alameda County Court system, for a total of 746 individuals. Ex. 12, Statistics Power Point. 333. On May 17, 2018, in one courtroom (Department 112), 18 percent of the docket was comprised of individuals involved with LCA (three out of seventeen). Of the two individuals sentenced that day, both were assigned to LCA. 334. In FY 2016-17, Alameda County disposed of 246,058 criminal cases. If only 1 percent of those cases resulted in electronic tracking, that would account for over 2,400 people.4 335. A review of SuperCom’s publicly available financial documents does not indicate that LCA has suffered any drop in business since September 2016. In fact, SuperCom’s investor presentation from May 2018 calls electronic monitoring an “[i]ncreasing source of high-margin, recurring revenues.”5 336. SuperCom reported 11.3 million dollars in revenue in 2017 from electronic tracking alone. 337. Hundreds of people currently involved in the Alameda County court or probation system are subject to electronic or alcohol monitoring by LCA and are being charged rates that they cannot afford.

4 Judicial Council of California, 2017 Court Statistics Report, Appx. G (2017), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2017-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf (last visited June 15, 2018). 5 http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/78f816_c30c3182be9e4d9085773b543d2ce718.pdf, at 15 (last visited June 15, 2018).

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B. Commonality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)
338. The relief sought is common to all Class Members, and common questions of law
and fact exist as to all Class Members. The named Plaintiffs seek relief concerning whether
LCA’s fee extortion scheme violates the rights of the Class Members under the Constitution and
California law. They further seek relief mandating that Defendants end the “pay-or-jail” scheme
and, as appropriate, pay damages so that the rights of the Class Members and future LCA clients
are vindicated.
339. These common legal and factual questions arise from one scheme: LCA’s policy
of demanding fees from individuals under the its control, regardless of their ability to pay those
fees, and threatening to return individuals to jail if they do not meet LCA’s demands. The
material effects of the unlawful implementation of the electronic monitoring contract do not vary
from Class Member to Class Member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues will
determine whether all Class Members are entitled to the relief they seek.
340. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
• Whether Alameda County has a policy and practice of failing to follow California law and the United States Constitution by allowing LCA to extort fees from electronic monitoring individuals that they cannot afford under the threat of returning them to jail;
• Whether Alameda County, acting by and through LCA, has failed to supervise LCA and/or train its employees to conduct the ability to pay analysis for each individual under LCA control, referred by Alameda County, as required by California law;
• Whether Alameda County, acting by and through LCA, has failed to supervise LCA and/or train its employees to prevent the unlawful extortion of fees under its electronic monitoring program;
• Whether the LCA Defendants committed the predicate acts of extortion by threatening to “violate” Alameda County Defendants if they fell behind on payments, even if they had evidence that the individual did not have the money to pay;
• Whether LCA Defendants had a policy of “violating” individuals being tracked for failure to pay even small amounts in order to scare others into paying in full;
• Whether the LCA Defendants as a matter of policy did not tell individuals being

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tracked that they only needed to pay what they could afford; created bureaucratic hurdles to applying for financial assistance; and withheld information about appealing disputes over a fair fee to the presiding judge; and • Whether LCA Defendants in fact have a sliding scale of fees tied to income, or whether the company has a policy of automatically charging Class Members $25.50 a day for as long as possible.
341. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of law are:
• Whether fundamental principles of due process forbid Alameda County from turning over its electronic monitoring program to LCA, a non-neutral arbiter that has a business interest in extracting as much money as possible from individuals under its control and sending those who fail to meet its financial demands back to jail as a warning to others;
• Whether Alameda County’s failure to monitor the execution of the contract with LCA, thus subjecting them to fee-driven consequences for criminal behavior, constitutes a violation of Class Members’ civil rights;
• Whether Alameda County’s failure to ensure LCA was conducting the ability to pay analysis required by California law before causing people to be remanded into custody constitutes a procedural due process violation;
• Whether Alameda County had a policy and practice of allowing LCA to extort money from electronic monitoring Class Members, subjecting it to liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services;
• Whether Alameda County failed to train its employees to monitor the Agreement with LCA to prevent abuses, subjecting it to liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services;
• Whether LCA’s demands that indigent individuals pay a daily rate for GPS tracking and alcohol monitoring beyond what they can afford violates California law;
• Whether LCA’s failure to conduct meaningful ability to pay analyses violates California law;
• Whether the contract between Alameda County and LCA constitutes an enterprise under RICO; and
• Whether forcing indigent Class Members to pay daily rates beyond what they can afford by threatening to return them to jail constitutes extortion under RICO.
C. Typicality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)
342. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the other Class Members’ claims, and
they have the same interests in this case as all other Class Members. Each Class Member has
had or will have fees set by LCA for electronic tracking that they are unable to pay. The answer
to whether Defendants’ fee schedule and collection procedures are unlawful will determine the

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claims of the named Plaintiffs and every other Class Member.

343. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in the claim that Defendants’ policies and

practices concerning fee collection violate their constitutional rights, constitute a RICO

conspiracy, or violate California law, that ruling will likewise benefit every other Class Member.

D. Adequacy — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)

344. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because their

interests in the vindication of the legal claims that they raise are entirely aligned with the

interests of the other Class Members, who each have the same constitutional and legal claims.

They have been subjected to GPS and/or alcohol monitoring both pre-trial and as part of a

sentence, thus representing the various ways LCA’s monitoring programs are used in Alameda

County. Named Plaintiffs are members of the Class, and their interests coincide with, and are

not antagonistic to, those of the other Class Members.

345. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class Members, all of whom have

a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional and legal rights in the face of Defendants’ fee

extortion scheme.

346. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law and the Law

Offices of Kevin E. Mitchell, all of whom have experience in litigating complex civil rights

matters and criminal matters in federal and state court and extensive knowledge of both the

details of Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law.

347. The combined efforts of Class counsel have so far included extensive

investigation into Defendants’ contract and LCA’s execution of its extortion scheme, including

interviewing attorneys in the Bay Area, as well as state and national experts in electronic

monitoring.

348. Class counsel have a detailed understanding of local law and practices as they

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relate to federal constitutional requirements.

349. As a result, counsel have devoted enormous time and resources to becoming

intimately familiar with Defendants’ scheme and with the relevant state and federal laws. The

interests of the Class Members will be fairly and adequately protected by the named Plaintiffs

and their attorneys.

E. Rule 23(b)(2)

350. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted or will act in the

same unlawful and unconstitutional manner with respect to all Class Members. LCA Defendants

enforce a punitive and counterproductive fee extortion scheme by demanding that individuals

subject to electronic monitoring shackles pay a daily fee without consideration of their financial

circumstances or ability to pay. Alameda County has a policy and practice of ignoring LCA’s

activities, allowing its contract to act as a cover for illegal activity.

351. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants

from demanding daily fees that individuals under LCA’s control cannot afford to pay. Because

the putative Class challenges Defendants’ “pay-or-jail” scheme as unconstitutional and unlawful

through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every Class

Member, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.

352. Injunctive relief compelling Defendants to comply with these constitutional rights

will similarly protect each Class Member from being subjected to Defendants’ unlawful policies

and practices. A declaration and injunction stating that Defendants must guarantee that anyone

eligible can participate in the electronic monitoring program at a rate he or she can afford —

including at no cost at all — would provide relief to every Class Member. Therefore, declaratory

and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.

353. A damage award against the Defendants for violating these constitutional rights

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will similarly compensate each Class Member for being subjected to Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices. A damage award returning to Plaintiffs the money that they were forced to pay — or more — would provide relief to every Class Member. Therefore, a damage award with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF Count I: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) and (d) (Against Defendants LCA, SuperCom, Connelly, Borowick, Harrington, Arguello-Ramos, Rivas, and Does 1–10 ) 354. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint. 355. LCA, its parent company, founder, and some of its employees, have conspired to create an enterprise that operates in interstate commerce to extort money by charging those under LCA’s supervision daily rates far beyond their ability to pay. Defendants have engaged in the predicate acts of extortion and wire fraud to induce fear in those under their control for the purpose of obtaining as much money as possible; Defendants routinely threaten individuals on the LCA shackle who fall behind on their payments with court-notified “violations,” effectively threatening individuals with jail if they do not pay the exorbitant fees demanded by LCA. These acts constitute a pattern of racketeering activity that has caused the Plaintiffs damage, including financial harm, disruption of family ties, deterioration of health, and mental stress.
Count II: Due Process Violation Under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(County Defendants and LCA Defendants) 356. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint. 357. County Defendants use a private actor (LCA) with a strong profit motive to track

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people on pre-trial supervision and home detention. LCA Defendants erect unnecessary barriers and use deceptive and illegal practices to ensure supervisees lack (a) access to fee adjustments to which they are lawfully entitled, (b) ability-to-pay-inquiries, (c) adequate notice of fee calculation, and (d) neutral judicial review of fee demands. Defendants thereby violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights — including adequate notice, opportunity, and the right to have a neutral judicial officer make decisions bearing on their fundamental liberty rights — within the criminal justice system.
358. County Defendants — through the contract with LCA, through a policy and practice of allowing LCA Defendants to violate Class Members’ constitutional rights, and through failing to train its court and probation officers to monitor LCA’s practices and identify abuses — also violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause
Count III: Violation of Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (County Defendants and LCA Defendants)
359. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this Complaint.
360. LCA Defendants use constant threats of jail and extortion against those who cannot afford the daily fees and who fall behind on payment, violating Plaintiffs’ right under the Equal Protection Clause not to be imprisoned or punished simply because of their wealth status.
361. County Defendants — through the contract with LCA, through a policy and practice of allowing LCA Defendants to violate Class Members’ constitutional rights, and through failing to train its court and probation officers to monitor LCA’s practices and identify abuses — also violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Count IV: Abuse of Process (LCA Defendants)

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362. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and all of the previous allegations in this
Complaint.
363. LCA Defendants engage in abuse of process by using the Alameda County court
system to extort fees from people sentenced to LCA who do not have the financial resources to
meet LCA’s demands for payment.
Requests for Relief
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs demand a jury trial and the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that subjecting the Plaintiffs to the Defendants’ conduct as alleged in the Counts listed above is unlawful; b. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining the Defendants from continuing the above-described unconstitutional and illegal policies and practices against the Plaintiffs and the Class of similarly situated people on whose behalf they are bringing suit; c. A judgment compensating the Plaintiffs and the Class of similarly situated individuals for the damages that they suffered as a result of the Defendants’ unconstitutional and unlawful conduct; d. A judgment granting the treble and punitive damages authorized by statute based on the Defendants’ willful and egregious violations of the law; e. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Phil Telfeyan Phil Telfeyan Catherine Sevcenko (pro hac vice pending) Marissa Hatton (pro hac vice pending) Equal Justice Under Law 400 7th Street NW, Suite 602 Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 670-1004 ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org mhatton@equaljusticeunderlaw.org

Complaint

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8

9

10 WILLIAM EDWARDS, ROBERT

11

JACKSON, JAMES BROOKS, and KYSER WILSON, individually and on behalf of others

12 similarly situated,

13

Plaintiffs,

No. C 18-04609 WHA
ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS

14

v.

15

LEADERS IN COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, INC., SUPERCOM, INC.,

16

LINDA CONNELLY, DIANE HARRINGTON, KENT BOROWICK,

17

RAELENE RIVAS, JEANETTE ARGUELLO-RAMOS, BELINDA DOE,

18

DOES 1–10, inclusive, ALAMEDA COUNTY, and WENDY STILL,

19

Defendants.

20

/

21

22

INTRODUCTION

23

In this putative class action for alleged fraudulent and extortionate conduct, defendants

24 move to dismiss. For the reasons below, the Alameda defendants’ motion to dismiss is

25 GRANTED. The LCA defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

26

STATEMENT

27

Defendant County of Alameda contracted with defendant Leaders in Community

28 Alternatives, Inc. to provide an electronic-monitoring program, including GPS and alcohol

monitoring, for criminal defendants on pre-trial or home detention. Defendant SuperCom, Inc.

Case 3:18-cv-04609-WHA Document 42 Filed 12/14/18 Page 2 of 17

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 was LCA’s parent company. LCA executives and employees included defendants Diane

2 Harrington (executive director), Linda Connelly (founder, president and CEO), Kent Borowick

3 (CFO and COO), Raelene Rivas (case manager) and Jeanette Arguello-Ramos (case manager)

4 (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 47–56).

5

Under the contract between Alameda County and LCA, both the superior court and the

6 probation department referred individuals to LCA’s program. Once referred, LCA tracked the

7 participants, providing the necessary equipment, and reported any non-compliance. Defendant

8 Wendy Still, Alameda County’s chief probation officer, oversaw Alameda County’s contract

9 with LCA. On average, 112 Alameda County residents participated in LCA’s electronic

10 monitoring on any given day (id. ¶¶ 4, 47, 62, 64, 67, 79).

11

Plaintiffs William Edwards, Robert Jackson, James Brooks, and Kyser Wilson were

12 referred to LCA’s program. LCA required plaintiffs to fill out an enrollment form which

13 included, among other things, basic contact information, employment details, and information

14 about their court case. Without conducting an inquiry into their ability to pay, LCA required

15 plaintiffs to sign a “Supervision Fee Agreement” that imposed a $150 enrollment fee and a

16 commitment to pay $25.50 per day. Plaintiffs had to pay at least two weeks in advance by credit

17 or debit card, money order, or cashier’s check. Plaintiffs also agreed that failure to make timely

18 payments could result in their termination from electronic monitoring (id. ¶¶ 80–82).

19

LCA’s program was (and still is) fully funded by fees charged to participants. Neither

20 Alameda County nor its probation department had any financial responsibility for the program.

21 Although LCA’s contract provided that LCA must “adjust participant fees based on ability to

22 pay,” and although Section 1208.2(g) of the California Penal Code provided that persons cannot

23 be removed from an electronic-monitoring program “because of an inability to pay all or a

24 portion of the program supervision fees,” LCA did not inform plaintiffs that they only needed to

25 pay what they could afford. Nor did LCA inform plaintiffs of their right to have a judge

26 determine how much they can afford to pay while on LCA’s monitoring programs (id. ¶¶ 5,

27 12–14, 97–99).

28

2

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

LCA also imposed a series of “roadblocks” to keep individuals from obtaining a reduced

2 fee. For example, LCA claimed that the ability-to-pay determination was based on “household

3 income,” meaning the combined income of every person living in the home regardless of their

4 relationship with plaintiff or their ability and willingness to help pay LCA’s fees. LCA also

5 excluded “court costs, including fines, [and] attorney fees” as expenses in plaintiffs’ financial

6 assessments. Plaintiffs all paid LCA amounts they could not afford because they feared LCA

7 would “violate” them so that they would return to jail if they failed to pay (id. ¶¶ 105–14, 125).

8

Based on these allegations, plaintiffs filed this putative class action in July 2018,

9 asserting a RICO claim, claims under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, and a

10 claim for abuse of process. Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety (Dkt.

11 Nos. 1, 22–23). This order follows full briefing and oral argument.

12

ANALYSIS

13

1.

NO STANDING FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

14

In addition to monetary damages, plaintiffs seek an order enjoining defendants’ “illegal

15 fee extortion scheme.” The constitutional standing requirement derives from Article III, Section

16 2 of the United States Constitution, which restricts adjudication in federal courts to “cases” and

17 “controversies.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,

18 Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). Article III standing is present only when (1) a plaintiff suffers a

19 concrete, particularized injury which is actual or imminent; (2) there is a causal connection

20 between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury will likely be redressed by

21 a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

22

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief, standing requires a “real

23 and immediate threat” of future injury. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).

24 Although all plaintiffs participated in LCA’s electronic-monitoring program in the past, no

25 plaintiff currently participates in the program. The complaint instead alleges that plaintiffs

26 Jackson, Brooks, and Wilson are on probation and are “reasonably likely to be sentenced to LCA

27 should [they] be found in violation of the terms of [their] probation.” This scenario is too

28 speculative to satisfy the standing requirements for injunctive relief. Courts assume that

3

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 plaintiffs “will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction.”

2 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974). Plaintiffs’ musings that they will violate the

3 terms of their probation and that such violations will result in a sentence of electronic monitoring

4 are insufficient.

5

Plaintiffs’ additional allegations that (1) Jackson may be sentenced to electronic

6 monitoring in connection with a DUI case if he cannot afford the Sheriff’s Work Alternative

7 Program, (2) Brooks is still making payments on his bond and Wilson cannot pay his restitution

8 because they paid LCA’s fees at rates they could not afford, and (3) Wilson does not have a valid

9 driver’s license and may be stopped, prosecuted, and sentenced to electronic monitoring if he has

10 to drive in an emergency, are also too speculative. Plaintiffs fail to allege, for example, that they

11 have ever violated the terms of their probation, that Jackson cannot, in fact, afford SWAP, or that

12 Brooks or Wilson have failed to make a court-ordered payment. Moreover, even if plaintiffs had

13 alleged a reasonable likelihood of a technical violation of the terms of their probation (such as a

14 missed court date or meeting with their probation officer) the complaint lacks any factual

15 allegations to support their claim that such minor violations would result in electronic

16 monitoring. As currently pled, the complaint fails to allege facts showing a “real and immediate

17 threat” of future injury. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.

18

Finally, although not alleged the complaint, the parties explain that Edwards is currently

19 incarcerated on a no-bail hold pending new murder charges. Plaintiffs argue that because

20 Edwards is currently incarcerated and in pre-trial proceedings, he could be released pre-trial or

21 sentenced to electronic monitoring because he suffers from chronic myeloid leukemia. In light

22 of Edwards’ medical condition, plaintiffs argue, it is “more than mere conjecture” that he could

23 be released from jail and placed on electronic monitoring. As an initial matter, in deciding a

24 motion to dismiss, a court is ordinarily limited to the face of the complaint. Van Buskirk v.

25 Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). But even if alleged in the

26 complaint, Edwards’ first-degree murder charges are pending in Contra Costa County, not

27 Alameda County. Plaintiffs have accordingly failed to show a reasonable likelihood that

28 Edwards would be referred to LCA’s electronic-monitoring program.

4

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

To the extent plaintiffs argue that they may seek injunctive relief on behalf of the

2 putative class even if they themselves lack standing, they are incorrect. Plaintiffs cite Gerstein v.

3 Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which involved detainees raising claims concerning their pre-trial

4 detention. Although normally a class action is moot if no named class representative with an

5 unexpired claim remains at the time of class certification, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, n.11

6 (1975), the Supreme Court in Gerstein held that the case remained live because pre-trial custody

7 was inherently temporary and the court could not determine “that any given individual, named as

8 plaintiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to certify the class.” Id. at

9 110 n.11. Here, by contrast, an individual may be referred to electronic monitoring either in

10 connection with pre-trial release or in connection with sentencing for a criminal conviction.

11 Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that “[o]nly individuals with relatively short sentences may be

12 booked into LCA’s program, resulting in supervision durations that are capable of repetition but

13 evading review,” Compl. ¶ 36, is insufficient to invoke Gerstein’s exception. Defendants’

14 motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are accordingly GRANTED. This order

15 need not reach defendants’ alternative argument that plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are

16 moot in light of recent changes to LCA’s policies.

17

2.

NO YOUNGER ABSTENTION.

18

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), requires federal courts to abstain from exercising

19 jurisdiction where “(1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates

20 important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal

21 constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the

22 proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding

23 in a way that Younger disapproves.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political

24 Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

25 All four elements of Younger must be present in order for abstention to be appropriate.

26

Here, the first factor of Younger abstention does not apply. Defendants argue that by

27 seeking relief related to the conditions of their probation, plaintiffs’ claims involve “state court

28

5

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 criminal sentencing and probation proceedings.” In a decision not cited by either side, our court

2 of appeals explained:

3

Probation is not a pending criminal action for Younger purposes . . .

The Supreme Court has made clear that federal post-trial intervention

4

is not precluded by Younger, unless the intervention is designed to

annul the results of a state trial by expunging an individual’s record or

5

by removing other collateral effects of his conviction.

6 Almodovar v. Reiner, 832 F.2d 1138, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted).

7 Plaintiffs do not seek to have their records expunged or to otherwise overturn an aspect of a

8 state-court order. Rather, they seek damages in the form of amounts paid to LCA. Because

9 plaintiffs’ probationary status does not amount to ongoing state judicial proceedings for Younger

10 purposes, abstention is not warranted here.

11

Pointing to Section 1208.2(h) of the California Penal Code, plaintiffs next argue that

12 Younger abstention applies because plaintiffs’ claims regarding amounts paid under LCA’s

13 program “should be decided by the state criminal courts.” Section 1208.2(h) provides:

14

If the person and the administrator, or his or her designee, are unable

to come to an agreement regarding the person’s ability to pay, or the

15

amount that is to be paid, or the method and frequency with which

payment is to be made, the administrator, or his or her designee, shall

16

advise the appropriate court of the fact that the person and

administrator, or his or her designee, have not been able to reach

17

agreement and the court shall then resolve the disagreement by

determining the person’s ability to pay, the amount that is to be paid,

18

and the method and frequency with which payment is to be made.

19 Defendants do not contend, however, that plaintiffs or defendants ever initiated such

20 proceedings. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

21

3.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS.

22

A. Alameda County.

23

(1) Equal Protection.

24

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government

25 from denying individuals equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “While

26 Equal Protection is typically used to analyze government actions that draw a distinction among

27 people based on specific characteristics, it is also used if the government discriminates among

28 people as to the exercise of a fundamental right.” Buffin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No.

6

Case 3:18-cv-04609-WHA Document 42 Filed 12/14/18 Page 7 of 17

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 15-cv-04959, 2018 WL 424362, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018) (Judge Yvonne Gonzalez

2 Rogers).

3

Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ “pay-or-jail scheme” violates the Equal Protection

4 Clause because indigent defendants are threatened with probation violations and associated

5 criminal consequences while those who can afford to pay LCA’s high fees are not. A rational-

6 basis review applies to plaintiffs’ equal-protection claim. Citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.

7 660 (1983), and other cases in our Supreme Court’s criminal-law jurisprudence, plaintiffs argue

8 that criminal consequences based on indigence, including probation revocation, are

9 impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore warrant greater scrutiny than

10 rational-basis review. Here, however, plaintiffs do not allege that they were incarcerated or had

11 their probation revoked due to their failure to pay LCA’s fees. Rather, plaintiffs bring a civil

12 lawsuit for monetary damages based on allegations the LCA extorted them for (and defrauded

13 them out of) fees they could not afford. Rational-basis review applies to plaintiffs’ equal-

14 protection claim.

15

Under a rational-basis review, defendants’ purported “wealth-based” classification “must

16 be sustained unless ‘the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of

17 [any legitimate governmental] objective.’” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)

18 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Alameda County’s interest in providing an electronic-

19 monitoring program as an alternative to incarceration is legitimate and requiring individuals to

20 pay fees to participate in the program is rationally related to that interest. Moreover, as far as the

21 complaint alleges, the conduct underlying defendants’ “scheme” — i.e., convincing plaintiffs

22 that LCA could calculate fees based on the household’s ability to pay, threatening plaintiffs that

23 they had to pay LCA’s assigned fees or be terminated from the program, leading them to believe

24 they had to go through LCA’s burdensome process to receive a reduced rate, and failing to

25 inform plaintiffs of their rights under the Penal Code — was uniformly applied regardless of

26 financial status. Because the complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Alameda

27 County violated the Equal Protection Clause, Alameda County’s motion to dismiss this claim is

28 GRANTED.

7

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1

(2) Due Process.

2

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from

3 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST.

4 amend. XIV, § 1. In general, it “provides heightened protection against government interference

5 with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,

6 720 (1997). Accordingly, the threshold inquiry in every due process challenge is “whether the

7 plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins.

8 Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (quoting Fourteenth Amendment).

9

Plaintiffs assert that the existence of defendants’ “joint enterprise” — i.e., Alameda

10 County’s contract with LCA to provide an electronic-monitoring program as an alternative to

11 incarceration — in and of itself violates plaintiffs’ due process rights because LCA’s decisions

12 regarding who to “violate” and who to keep out of jail are based on a profit motive, not a neutral

13 assessment of whether or not someone has complied with the conditions of release. Plaintiffs

14 further argue that LCA, a private company, has an inherent conflict of interest in imposing

15 supervision fees because it needs those fees to turn a profit. Because due process “entitles a

16 person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases,” Marshall v.

17 Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980), plaintiffs argue that Alameda County violated due

18 process by entering into an agreement whereby “a defendant-funded criminal justice system [is]

19 run by a for-profit corporation” (Dkt. No. 30 at 10). This order disagrees.

20

Alameda County’s contract with LCA is specifically permitted by Section 1203.016 of

21 the Penal Code, which provides that Alameda County “may administer a home detention

22 program pursuant to written contracts with appropriate public or private agencies or entities to

23 provide specified program services.” The Penal Code also provides procedural safeguards. If an

24 individual and LCA cannot “come to an agreement regarding the person’s ability to pay, or the

25 amount that is to be paid, or the method and frequency with which payment is to be made . . . the

26 court shall then resolve the disagreement.” Cal. Penal Code § 1208.2(h). Moreover, although

27 plaintiffs allege that LCA sent the criminal court notices of plaintiffs’ “non-compliance,”

28 nowhere do they allege that these notices resulted in criminal consequences. The ultimate

8

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1 decision regarding an individual’s deprivation of property or liberty remained with a neutral

2 decision maker, not LCA employees.

3

In any event, plaintiffs fail to allege that a due process violation resulted from Alameda

4 County’s policies or customs as required by Monell v. New York City Department of Social

5 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, a municipality may be liable when a municipal

6 policy causes an employee to violate another’s constitutional right. Id. at 690–91. A plaintiff

7 can establish a Monell claim by “showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes

8 the standard procedure of the local governmental entity.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d

9 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs claim that contracting with a private company to provide

10 electronic monitoring in and of itself caused plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional deprivations. Yet

11 according to the contract, LCA had an obligation to reduce individuals’ fees if they lacked the

12 ability to pay. The contract also required LCA to “observe and comply with all applicable laws,

13 ordinances, codes and regulations of governmental agencies, including federal, state, municipal,

14 and local governing bodies, having jurisdiction over the scope of services” (Compl. ¶ 98, Exh. 1

15 at 8).

16

Nor have plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a Monell claim based on a failure to train, which

17 requires a showing that Alameda County was deliberately indifferent “to the rights of persons

18 with whom the [local officials] come into contact.” Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d

19 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989). Deliberate indifference, in turn, requires a showing that Alameda

20 County had actual or constructive notice that its failure to train would likely result in a

21 constitutional violation. Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1145 (9th Cir. 2012). This

22 order rejects plaintiffs’ unsupported contention that Alameda County was deliberatively

23 indifferent to (or had constructive knowledge of) due process violations based solely on LCA’s

24 status as a for-profit corporation. Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion in their brief that LCA’s

25 violations could have been avoided with effective training, the complaint is devoid of any well-

26 pled allegation plausibly suggesting that Alameda County had notice of extortionate or otherwise

27 unlawful conduct by LCA. Plaintiffs point to their allegation that courts in Alameda County

28 complained that LCA officers were filing too many notices of supervision violations (Compl. ¶

9

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1 84), but this alone fails to plausibly suggest that Alameda County, a separate entity from the

2 courts, had notice of such conduct. Alameda’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ due process claim is

3 GRANTED.

4

B. Claims against Probation Chief Still.

5

Plaintiffs have also brought their constitutional claims against defendant Still, the chief

6 probation officer for Alameda County. Supervisor liability under Section 1983 exists when the

7 supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a sufficient causal

8 connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Starr v.

9 Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). The requisite causal connection can be established

10 “by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of

11 acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others

12 to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207–08 (internal citations, quotation marks, and

13 brackets omitted).

14

Plaintiffs allege that Probation Chief Still was responsible for oversight of the LCA

15 contract and “resolution of program non-compliance issues,” and that the LCA contract “itself

16 amounts to a violation of procedural due process protections” (Compl. ¶ 64, Exh. 1 at 21; Opp. at

17 24). For the reasons above, plaintiffs have failed to allege that the existence or implementation

18 of the LCA contract violated plaintiffs’ rights to due processor equal protection. Accordingly,

19 the complaint fails to show a causal connection between Probation Chief Still’s conduct and any

20 constitutional violation. The Alameda defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims

21 against Probation Chief Still is GRANTED.

22

C. Claims against LCA Defendants.

23

To state a claim under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, a plaintiff

24 must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

25 United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

26 acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Even assuming

27 plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the LCA defendants acted under color of state law,

28 plaintiffs’ opposition to the LCA defendants’ motion to dismiss makes clear that their due

10

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1 process and equal protection claims are based on the same theories as the constitutional claims

2 asserted against Alameda County. As explained above, plaintiffs have failed to state a

3 cognizable claim for a violation of their due process or equal protection rights. The motion to

4 dismiss plaintiffs’ constitutional claims against the LCA defendants is accordingly GRANTED.

5

4. RICO CLAIM.

6

Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is brought solely against the LCA defendants. The elements of a

7 civil RICO claim are as follows: “(1) conduct; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern (4) of

8 racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’); (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s ‘business or

9 property.’” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir.

10 2005) (citation omitted). “Racketeering activity” is defined as a number of specific criminal acts

11 under federal and state laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Here, plaintiffs base their RICO claim on

12 the predicate crimes of (a) extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), (b)

13 extortion in violation of California law (Cal. Penal Code §§ 518, 519), (c) extortion in violation

14 of the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952), and (d) wire fraud (18 U.S.C § 1343).

15

A. Wire Fraud.

16

Plaintiffs have failed to allege predicate acts of wire fraud. The wire fraud statute

17 contains three elements: (a) the formation of a scheme to defraud, (b) the use of interstate wires

18 in furtherance of that scheme, and (c) the specific intent to defraud. Eclectic Properties E., LLC

19 v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). “‘[C]ircumstances constituting

20 fraud’ must be pleaded with particularity; that is also the case when alleged fraud forms the

21 predicate acts.” Bitton v. Gencor Nutrientes, Inc., 654 Fed. Appx. 358, 363 (9th Cir. 2016)

22 (citing FRCP 9(b)). Plaintiffs argue that the complaint’s allegations plausibly suggest that LCA

23 case managers “systematically withheld information, lied, or fabricated unauthorized

24 requirements in an effort to make it virtually impossible for participants to get a rate they could

25 afford” (Dkt. No. 29 at 3). This order disagrees. Plaintiffs point to various allegations, none of

26 which gives rise to a claim for wire fraud.

27

First, the complaint alleges that when plaintiffs began electronic monitoring, their

28 respective case managers imposed a high daily fee despite knowing that the fee amounted to

11

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1 twenty percent (Edwards), ninety-nine percent (Brooks), and fifty percent (Jackson) of plaintiffs’

2 respective personal daily incomes (Compl. ¶¶ 152–53, 182–83, Exh. 5). Plaintiffs fail to explain,

3 however, how charging a large portion (or all) of a participant’s personal income for electronic

4 monitoring gives rise to the inference that LCA and/or its employees had a specific intent to

5 defraud. Although charging such high sums may violate Section 1208.2(f)’s requirement that

6 such fees “be based on the person’s ability to pay,” the complaint does not contain facts

7 plausibly suggesting that the case managers intended to charge more than Section 1208.2(f)

8 permitted or that LCA shared plaintiffs’ interpretation of “ability to pay.” As plaintiffs

9 themselves allege, LCA determined an individual’s “ability to pay” based on household income,

10 not personal income.

11

This order disregards the conclusory allegation that LCA “intentionally deceive[d]”

12 plaintiffs into thinking that their household income, rather than their personal income,

13 determined their ability to pay (Compl. ¶ 13). Plaintiffs’ brief also points to Brooks’ declaration,

14 where he states that his case manager told him he was “receiving the minimum daily rate.”

15 Plaintiffs fail to mention, however, that Brooks’ case manager also told him that “LCA would

16 review [his] financial form to confirm [he] would have a low payment” (Compl. Exh. 5 ¶ 8).

17 Taken together, plaintiffs’ allegations do not plausibly suggest a specific intent to defraud.

18

Second, plaintiffs argue that the LCA Handbooks and enrollment forms provided to

19 plaintiffs “deceptively stated that failure to pay LCA’s monetary demands could promptly result

20 in termination from the program” (Dkt. No. 29 at 4). But plaintiffs selectively quote these

21 documents (which documents are attached to the complaint). The LCA Handbook actually

22 states: “Failure to abide by the fee agreement may result in termination from the program. LCA

23 will work with a participant if there is a change in their financial status while on the program”

24 (Compl. Exh. 4 at 5) (emphasis added). The enrollment forms stated that “[s]anctions for failure

25 to make timely payments may include termination from the [electronic-monitoring program],”

26 but then quoted Section 1203.016(b)(4) of the Penal Code, which states in relevant part (Compl.

27 Exh. 10 at 4):

28

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1

The participant shall agree that the correctional administrator in

charge of the county correctional facility from which the

2

participant was released may, without further order of the court,

immediately retake the person into custody to serve the balance of

3

his or her sentence if . . . the person willfully fails to pay fees to the

provider of electronic home detention services, as stipulated in the

4

agreement, subsequent to the written notification of the participant

that the payment has not been received and that return to custody

5

may result[.]

6 Citation to the Penal Code does not show a specific intent to defraud.

7

Third, plaintiffs allege that LCA’s case managers imposed artificial roadblocks to

8 obtaining a reduced fee, such as telling plaintiffs that they needed to pick up the required

9 documents at LCA’s offices, telling Edwards that LCA required original documentary evidence

10 of his household, and referring disputes to supervisors who were either unavailable or denied

11 plaintiffs’ requests without explanation. This order disregards plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations

12 that LCA imposed these administrative requirements for purposes of defrauding them. Although

13 plaintiffs’ brief argues that they could not personally go to LCA’s offices to pick up paperwork

14 because of their electronic-monitoring requirements, the LCA Handbooks attached to the

15 complaint explain that plaintiffs could submit their schedules to their case managers on a weekly

16 basis and could request “4 hours of errand time.” Moreover, although Edwards’ case manager

17 told him that someone would call him with information regarding a reduced rate, that Edwards

18 never received such a call is insufficient to plausibly suggest fraudulent intent (Compl. ¶¶

19 159–167, 203). Because plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing a specific intent to

20 defraud, they have failed to allege that defendants engaged in wire fraud.

21

B. Extortion.

22

Plaintiffs’ extortion-based claims under the Hobbs Act, the California Penal Code, and

23 the Travel Act are premised on the theory that LCA wrongfully threatened plaintiffs with

24 revocation if they failed to pay LCA’s fees. At most, the complaint alleges that LCA told

25 Wilson and Jackson that they would be remanded into custody if they fell behind on their

26 payments (Compl. ¶ 217, Exh. 9 ¶ 12). With respect to the remaining plaintiffs, however, this

27 theory of racketeering activity is not supported by the factual allegations in the complaint.

28

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1

As to Edwards, the complaint alleges that his case manager submitted an “incident

2 report” when Edwards failed to submit verification of his household income. Although the

3 complaint alleges that LCA submitted this report “to intimidate him into paying the daily rate

4 LCA demanded,” the face of the report states that LCA’s program “include[d] a sliding scale fee

5 that is adjusted based on a participant’s ability to pay,” and that Edwards failed to meet his

6 requirement to “submit verification of his household income in order to determine the daily

7 supervision fee” (Compl. Exh. 22). It is simply implausible that filing this report constituted a

8 threat that Edwards would be remanded to custody if he failed to pay. Moreover, the

9 complaint’s allegations that “LCA had convinced [Brooks] that he would go to jail if he failed to

10 pay” and that Edwards was “terrified that LCA would return him to jail” are too conclusory to

11 support an extortion claim (Compl. ¶¶ 172, 211).

12

While improper threats of imprisonment are sufficient at the pleading stage to allege

13 extortion, merely calling plaintiffs to demand LCA’s fees is not. In sum, plaintiffs have pled

14 only two instances of a predicate crime of extortion: when LCA told Wilson and Jackson that

15 they would be remanded into custody if they fell behind on their payments. At trial or on

16 summary judgment, additional facts or circumstances may explain away the hard edge of these

17 threats and doom the case. But for now, these allegations are sufficient to state violations of the

18 Hobbs Act and the Penal Code. Plaintiffs claim under the Travel Act, by contrast, nevertheless

19 fails because plaintiffs fail to allege that LCA used “any facility in interstate commerce” to

20 extort funds from Wilson or Jackson. 18 U.S.C. § 1952.

21

C. Conduct of SuperCom and the Individual Defendants.

22

A RICO defendant must “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of

23 [an] enterprise’s affairs.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). “Conduct” here means more than mere

24 participation in the enterprise’s affairs. RICO liability only attaches to “those who participate in

25 the operation or management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Reves

26 v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184 (1993). Thus, in order for this element to be met, “one

27 must have some part in directing [the enterprise’s] affairs.” Id. at 179. Here, plaintiffs have

28

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1 failed to plausibly allege that SuperCom, Connelly, Borowick, Harrington, Arguello-Ramos or

2 Rivas participated in the alleged racketeering activity.

3

With respect to SuperCom, LCA’s corporate parent, the complaint alleges only that LCA

4 used SuperCom’s software and equipment. This lone allegation does not show that SuperCom

5 participated in LCA’s alleged extortion scheme. Similarly, there are no allegations as to

6 Borowick and Harrington other than identifying their roles as CFO/COO and executive director,

7 respectively (Comp. ¶¶ 53–54). While the complaint asserts marginally more allegations

8 concerning Connelly — namely that she negotiated and signed LCA’s contract with Alameda

9 County in 2013 — these allegations also fail to plausibly suggest she participated in the RICO

10 enterprise’s affairs. Finally, although the complaint details plaintiffs’ interactions with case

11 managers Arguello-Ramos and Rivas, no facts connect these defendants with the extortionate

12 acts described above.

13

Essentially conceding their failure to plead facts suggesting the direct involvement of

14 SuperCom, Connelly, Borowick or Harrington, plaintiffs argue that these defendants can be held

15 liable under a respondeat superior theory. If an employer benefitted from its employee’s RICO

16 violation, traditional principles of respondeat superior determine whether the employer is liable

17 for the acts of its employees. While the complaint contains facts plausibly suggesting that some

18 defendants benefitted from LCA’s extortionate conduct, an employer is vicariously liable where

19 her employee’s acts were committed within the course and scope of employment. Oki

20 Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 298 F.3d 768, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2002).

21 Here, however, the complaint fails to allege facts showing that any threats by LCA employees

22 were made at the behest of SuperCom, Connelly, Borowick or Harrington. As currently pled,

23 respondeat superior is inapplicable to plaintiffs’ RICO claim. While plaintiffs’ RICO claim

24 against LCA itself may proceed, the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO claim as to the remaining

25 LCA defendants is GRANTED.

26

5.

ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM.

27

Under California law, abuse of process requires proof that the “'the defendant (1)

28 contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use

15

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1 of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” Johnson v. Lucent Techs.

2 Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Booker v. Rountree, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1366,

3 1371 (2007)).

4

Plaintiffs allege that LCA filed “incident reports” with the ulterior motive of pressuring

5 them to pay fees they could not afford. For the reasons explained above, the facts surrounding

6 the incident report filed by Edwards’ case manager does not plausibly suggest abuse of process.

7 Rather, the incident report informed the superior court that Edwards had not provided

8 documentation needed so that LCA could evaluate whether to impose a reduced fee. Plaintiffs

9 also point to a “progress report” filed in Jackson’s criminal case (Compl. Exh. 23). There, the

10 report informed the superior court that Jackson owed fees at the end of his term of electronic

11 monitoring, yet there is no mention (let alone threat) of a probation violation or return to

12 custody. Because plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that these reports were filed to

13 scare program participants into paying LCA’s fees, they have not alleged a claim for abuse of

14 process. The motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED.

15

CONCLUSION

16

For the foregoing reasons, the Alameda defendants’ motion is GRANTED and the LCA

17 defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. This order sustains plaintiffs’

18 RICO claim against LCA. All other claims are dismissed. Under no circumstances should this

19 order be construed as interfering with the conditions of release imposed by Alameda County or

20 the conditions of release imposed by LCA. In sustaining plaintiffs’ RICO claim against LCA,

21 this order does not suggest that Edwards should be released from pre-trial detention. Nor does it

22 bless plaintiffs’ various allegations regarding the inconveniences associated with electronic

23 monitoring or LCA’s restrictions on individuals’ use of alcohol or medical marijuana.

24

By JANUARY 4 AT NOON, plaintiffs may seek leave to amend the dismissed claims by a

25 motion noticed on the normal 35-day calendar. Plaintiffs must plead their best case. Their

26 motion should affirmatively demonstrate how the proposed amended complaint corrects the

27 deficiencies identified in this order, as well as any others raised in defendants’ motions but not

28

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1 addressed herein. The motion should be accompanied by a redlined copy of the proposed

2 amended complaint.

3

4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

6 Dated: December 14, 2018. 7

WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 3:18-cv-04609-WHA Document 100 Filed 06/06/19 Page 1 of 8

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1

2

3

4

5

6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8

9

10 ROBERT JACKSON, JAMES BROOKS, and

11

KYSER WILSON, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,

12

Plaintiffs,

13

v.

14 LEADERS IN COMMUNITY 15 ALTERNATIVES, INC.,

16

Defendant.

17

/

No. C 18-04609 WHA
ORDER RE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

18

INTRODUCTION

19

In this putative class action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

20 Act, plaintiffs move for class certification. For the reasons below, the motion is DENIED.

21

STATEMENT

22

The County of Alameda contracted with defendant Leaders in Community Alternatives,

23 Inc. to provide an electronic-monitoring program, including GPS and alcohol monitoring, for

24 criminal defendants on pre-trial release or home detention. The superior court, the probation

25 department and criminal defense attorneys all referred individuals to LCA’s program. Once

26 referred, LCA tracked the participants, provided the necessary equipment, and reported any non-

27 compliance. On average, 112 Alameda County residents participated in LCA’s electronic

28 monitoring on any given day. Plaintiffs Robert Jackson, James Brooks, and Kyser Wilson were

among those referred to LCA’s program. LCA required plaintiffs to sign a “Supervision Fee

Case 3:18-cv-04609-WHA Document 100 Filed 06/06/19 Page 2 of 8

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1 Agreement” that imposed a $150 enrollment fee and a commitment to pay $25.50 per day.

2 Plaintiffs allege that they all paid LCA amounts they could not afford because LCA threatened to

3 “violate” them so that they would return to jail if they failed to pay LCA’s fee (Compl. ¶¶ 1–4,

4 47–64, 80–82, 107–25).

5

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs assert a RICO claim based on predicate acts of

6 extortion under state and federal law. They seek to certify the following class pursuant to

7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3):

8

All individuals who have been or will be put on LCA’s Electronic

Monitoring program by the Alameda County Court system from

9

July 31, 2014, until this litigation is complete, who were

threatened with jail by LCA or any of its employees, agents, or

10

representatives.

11

This order follows full briefing and oral argument. At an evidentiary hearing in May

12 2019, three former LCA employees testified. Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties

13 submitted supplemental briefing (Dkt. Nos. 68–77, 96–99).

14

ANALYSIS

15

Certification under FRCP 23(b)(3) is a two-step process. Plaintiffs must first show that

16 the class meets the following four requirements of FRCP 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous that

17 joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the

18 class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses

19 of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

20 the class. Plaintiffs must next establish “that the questions of law or fact common to class

21 members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class

22 action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

23 controversy.” FRCP 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that these

24 requirements are met. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012)

25 (citation omitted).

26

To prove their RICO claim, plaintiffs will need to show (1) the conduct (2) of an

27 enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358

28 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 2004). To prove a pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiffs must show

2

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1 that LCA committed at least two predicate offenses within ten years of each other. Turner v.

2 Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1229 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs allege that LCA committed predicate

3 offenses of extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Section 518 of the California

4 Penal Code, both of which define extortion as obtaining property from another, with his consent,

5 induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force or fear.

6

Plaintiffs describe this case as being “about Alameda County allowing a private company

7 . . . to extort money from poor Californians” (Compl. ¶ 1). In an effort to show a pattern of

8 extortionate conduct, plaintiffs submitted “declarations” from seven putative class members

9 wherein they checked boxes indicating the types of statements made to them by LCA employees.

10 For example, a putative class member could indicate whether he was told that he “would be

11 incarcerated if [he] was late on payments or did not make full payments” or was told that he

12 “would or could go to jail if [he] was late on payments or did not make full payments.” The

13 survey later allowed the individual to provide “[o]ther comments.” Although all seven

14 respondents agreed with counsel’s prepared statement that “[they] could not afford the fees LCA

15 charged, but [they] felt coerced to pay and/or that [they] had no choice but to pay because of the

16 consequences of nonpayment that LCA told [them] about,” the commonalities end there. Rather,

17 the narrative description of LCA’s “threats” vary by individual. For example, Mr. Lackey was

18 told that “if [he] didn’t pay [he] would end up back in court,” whereas Mr. Childs explained that

19 “LCA threatened [him] with jail or going back to court multiple times.” LCA told Mr. Smith, by

20 contrast, that when he was late on payments he “could go to jail[]” (Dkt. No. 55; Hatton Decl.

21 Exhs. 8–14).1

22

Plaintiffs also submitted declarations from five former (and seemingly disgruntled) LCA

23 employees. As these declarations highlight, conversations between these employees and their

24 clients regarding the possibility of jail varied. While Ms. Barrera said that “it was an every day

25 thing to hear case managers tell people they would go to jail if they did not pay,” Ms. Ambriz

26 overheard case managers telling clients “that they needed to make their payments because

27
1 Following a discovery hearing, an order directed LCA to produce contact information for 20
28 randomly-assigned former LCA clients. Of those twenty clients, plaintiffs’ counsel succeeded in contacting
nine individuals, seven of which filled out plaintiffs’ survey.

3

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1 otherwise they would be terminated from the program and, ultimately, thrown in jail.” Ms.

2 Vargas, in turn, stated in her declaration that she “heard clients being told it was either ‘this’

3 (comply with LCA) ‘or jail’ during enrollment as a way to ensure they would make payments in

4 the future” (Hatton Decl. Exhs. 3–7). Because the declarations failed to make clear whether, and

5 the extent to which, LCA employees uniformly communicated the possibility of jail to program

6 participants in connection with a failure to pay, the undersigned judge directed three of the

7 declarants to attend an evidentiary hearing to testify.

8

During the evidentiary hearing, former-LCA employees Yvette Barrera, Maria Vargas

9 and Claudia Canas spoke to the “fearful tactics” they and other LCA employees used to obtain

10 payments. The context and wording of the “threats” the former employees purportedly made

11 varied. For example, Ms. Barrera testified that she and other LCA employees “would tell the

12 clients that we had to do an Incident Report and we would tell them that if they didn’t make a

13 payment, they would have to go back to jail.” Ms. Barrera was directed by her superiors to “Just

14 send an Incident Report. Tell them what could happen, and that was going back to jail.” She

15 also explained that she used these “fearful tactics” with “starting clients only” (Tr. at 6:15–17,

16 11:17–12:12).

17

Ms. Vargas, in turn, testified that if her LCA clients “refused to give a payment” or were

18 “completely non-compliant” then she would tell them “it would be this or jail.” She elaborated

19 that if after multiple warnings the participant still failed to pay, she would send a violation report

20 to the client and the court and “take the bracelet back off and basically that would mean them

21 going back to jail in that sense.” Ms. Vargas explained that when she told participants that she

22 would be writing an incident report, “clients would freak out because they knew so many

23 Incident Reports coming back to a judge would mean, like, oh, I’m not doing what I’m supposed

24 to be doing, which means could result in jail.” She later described this same tactic as telling

25 clients “they are going to go to jail if they don’t follow through.” At other times, she described

26 these advisements regarding the possibility of jail as “friendly” (Tr. at 45:11–47:11, 64:6–13).2

27

28

2 In addition to sending the incident report to the court, a copy would also be sent to the participant’s

attorney (Tr. at 52:12–16).

4

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1

Finally, Ms. Canas testified that she observed LCA employees “threatening” and

2 “instill[ing] fear” during initial intake meetings with program participants (Tr. at 76:19–77:2):

3

I believe something along the lines if a client asked, well, what

would happen if the fees aren’t up to date. And they were

4

instructed that a Violation Report gets sent out to their jurisdiction.

So it could have been the county in Oakland, but personally for

5

myself, because I was in Marin, it was to the parole board and it

was depending upon them how they would determine that. But it

6

was always with — the possibility of going to jail was always

adamant about that. It was always at the front force of it.

7

Ms. Canas further explained that the “possibility of jail time” was something that program

8

participants “were always told.” When defense counsel asked Ms. Canas “the difference in [her]

9

mind between a threat and a consequence,” she responded, “[a] threat is something that you’re

10

constantly reminding the person of. A consequence is something you only say once.” She

11

denied telling a client “If you don’t pay this fee, you’re going to jail,” explaining that she would

12

instead say, “You are aware that if your fees aren’t brought to date the possibility of jail time is

13

there for you” (Tr. at 77:5–78:12, 89:5–9, 91:7–13).

14

This evidentiary record demonstrates that maintaining a class action under FRCP

15

23(b)(3) is inappropriate in this case. It is undisputed that no formal training or policy required

16

or encouraged LCA employees to threaten putative class members. Nor were any allegedly

17

extortionate threats made in writing. Rather, plaintiffs’ RICO claim is premised on allegations

18

that LCA employees orally and wrongfully threatened putative class members with jail if they

19

failed to pay LCA’s fees. Yet LCA clearly does not engage in extortion merely by demanding

20

fees properly owed under its electronic-monitoring program. As currently defined, however, the

21

proposed class includes not only individuals who were “threatened with jail” when they could

22

not pay, but also includes individuals who were “threatened with jail” when they would not pay.

23

Indeed, while the complaint describes this case as being about Alameda County allowing LCA

24

“to extort money from poor Californians,” Alameda County participants have a wide-range of

25

income levels (Essex Decl. ¶ 18; Crandall Decl. ¶ 30).

26

It is also undisputed that LCA employees do not engage in extortion simply by informing

27

participants that they will submit an incident report to the court if the individual fails to comply

28

with the program’s requirements. Jail is a potential sanction that a court may impose if an

5

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1 individual willfully refuses to pay their fees, see Cal. Penal Code § 1203.016(b)(4), and

2 plaintiffs’ counsel has rightfully conceded that LCA has an ethical obligation to inform program

3 participants that a possible consequence of nonpayment is returning to jail (Tr. at 103:11–22). A

4 key issue at trial will accordingly be whether LCA employees referenced the possibility of jail as

5 an appropriate advisements of the program’s requirements or, rather, as an extortionate threat

6 made to wrongfully instill fear and profit LCA. At most, the testimony presented at the

7 evidentiary hearing could provide a common method of proving that LCA employees had an

8 Alameda County-wide practice of acting as bill collectors and reminding clients that they might

9 go to jail if they failed to pay. This does not, however, amount to a common method of proving

10 a pattern of extortionate threats in the furtherance of a RICO enterprise.

11

Even with the testimony of former LCA employees and clients, resolving plaintiffs’

12 RICO claim will require individualized inquiries into the circumstances surrounding oral

13 communications between LCA employees and putative class members. Relevant circumstances

14 include whether LCA employees said that jail would certainly follow non-payment or whether

15 they merely referenced jail as a possible sanction within the court’s discretion. Also relevant is

16 whether the communication followed a putative class member’s failure to pay because of valid

17 financial constraints, or whether jail was invoked after a willful failure to adhere to LCA’s

18 program. Yet another relevant circumstance will be the timing of LCA’s advisement regarding

19 jail. Ms. Canas explained that she referenced the possibility of jail when a new participant asked

20 her what would happen if he failed to pay LCA’s fees. In Ms. Canas’s view, it was appropriate

21 to advise new participants about the possibility of jail if they failed to adhere to the program, but

22 that the advisement became a threat once LCA “constantly remind[ed] the person” about it. Ms.

23 Barrera, however, explained that she only used “fearful tactics” with “starting clients.” Even the

24 tone of a statement could be relevant to the extortion inquiry. While Ms. Barrera described

25 “scaring” program participants, Ms. Vargas said that advisements regarding jail were sometimes

26 “friendly.” These individualized issues would predominate at trial.

27

Plaintiffs’ non-binding authorities are distinguishable. In McMahon Books, Inc. v.

28 Willow Grove Association, 108 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (Judge Donald VanArtsdalen), the

6

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1 tenants of a shopping mall sued the owners and operators of the mall to recover alleged

2 overcharges in connection with the plaintiffs’ leases. Although the plaintiffs succeeded in

3 obtaining class certification on a RICO claim, that claim was predicated on mail fraud, not oral

4 threats. Id. at 39. Although the plaintiffs also alleged oral misrepresentations, the record

5 showed that the oral misrepresentations “appear[ed] to be similar for each tenant.” Id. at 37.

6 And in In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litigation, 729 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2013), the

7 plaintiff-customers alleged that a large food distributor had engaged in a fraudulent overbilling

8 scheme in violation of RICO. In upholding the district court’s certification of the RICO claim

9 based on mail fraud and wire fraud, the appellate court explained that uniform

10 misrepresentations had been made to all class members and the claim was therefore susceptible

11 to generalized proof. Id. at 118. Here, by contrast, there is no uniformity in how “threats of jail”

12 were made to putative class members.

13

Finally, at oral argument plaintiffs’ counsel referenced an instance in which a district

14 court certified an extortion-based RICO claim. Westways World Travel, Inc. v. AMR Corp., 218

15 F.R.D. 223 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (Judge Robert Timlin). Notably, however, a later decision in that

16 same case decertified the RICO claim for class treatment. As Westways explained, “[c]lass

17 certification for an extortion claim is only viable if it is susceptible to class-wide proof,” yet a

18 determination of the defendant’s liability for extortion would “require ‘a fact-intensive inquiry’

19 into [the defendant’s] legal and contractual relationship” with each putative class member to

20 determine whether the relevant conduct amounted to extortion. Westways World Travel, Inc. v.

21 AMR Corp., No. 99-cv-00386, 2005 WL 6523266, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2005) (Judge Robert

22 Timlin), aff’d, 265 Fed. Appx. 472 (9th Cir. 2008). Similarly, here, plaintiffs’ own evidence

23 demonstrates that determining whether or not a “threat” by LCA was, in fact, unlawful extortion

24 will require a fact-intensive inquiry into each LCA employee’s relationship with the particular

25 putative class member.

26

For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden under FRCP

27 23(b)(3) of showing that common issues of fact or law will predominate in resolving their RICO

28 claim. The motion for class certification is accordingly DENIED.

7

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

CONCLUSION

2

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motions for class certification is DENIED. This case

3 will proceed to trial as scheduled on an individual basis.

4

5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6

7 Dated: June 6, 2019. 8

WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6

7

8 ROBERT JACKSON and KYSER WILSON,

9

individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,

10

Plaintiffs,

11

v.

12 LEADERS IN COMMUNITY 13 ALTERNATIVES, INC.,

14

Defendant.

15

/

No. C 18-04609 WHA
ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

16

INTRODUCTION

17

In this civil RICO action, defendant moves for summary judgment. To the extent stated

18 below, the motion is GRANTED.

19

STATEMENT

20

The County of Alameda contracted with defendant Leaders in Community Alternatives,

21 Inc. to provide an electronic-monitoring program, including GPS and alcohol monitoring, for

22 criminal defendants on pre-trial release or home detention. LCA tracked down participants,

23 provided the necessary equipment, and reported any non-compliance. Plaintiffs were among

24 those referred to LCA’s program. LCA required plaintiffs to sign a “Supervision Fee

25 Agreement” that imposed an enrollment fee and a commitment to pay an additional amount per

26 day. Plaintiffs allege that they both paid LCA amounts they could not afford because they feared

27 LCA would “violate” them so that they would return to jail if they failed to pay LCA’s fee

28 (Compl. ¶¶ 1–4, 47–64, 80–82, 107–25).

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

Class certification was denied. At this stage, the only remaining claim is plaintiffs

2 Robert Jackson and Kyser Wilson’s RICO claim against LCA.

3

ANALYSIS

4

Summary judgment is granted when the pleadings and the evidence in the record “show

5 that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

6 judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). A dispute is genuine only if there is sufficient

7 evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to find for the non-moving party, and material only if the

8 fact may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49

9 (1986). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving

10 party. Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir.2010).

11

To prove a RICO claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) the conduct (2) of an enterprise

12 (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616,

13 620 (9th Cir. 2004). To prove a pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiffs must show that LCA

14 committed at least two predicate offenses within ten years of each other. Turner v. Cook, 362

15 F.3d 1219, 1229 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs allege that LCA committed predicate offenses of

16 extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Section 518 of the California Penal Code.

17

Extortion is defined in the Hobbs Act and the California Penal Code as obtaining

18 property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force or

19 fear. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The only possible predicate crimes of extortion here would be LCA’s

20 statements to plaintiffs Wilson and Jackson that they would be remanded into custody if they

21 failed to make their payments.

22

In recounting the alleged threats he received, plaintiff Wilson stated the following:

23

A: She told me if I didn’t make a payment, I was gonna go to jail.

24

Q: Those were her exact words?

25

A: Yes.

26

[. . .]

27

A: She just told me that, then she went on to say, “This is how it

happens,” so – but she told me – she put the fear in me that if I

28

didn’t pay I was gonna go to jail. So that’s how that went.

2

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1

Q: – and then you said she explained the process, which was –

2

A: After that, she’s gonna say – she’s gonna recommend that I go to

court. Because if you don’t make a payment, you’re going back to

3

court anyway. They want to know why you didn’t make a payment.

If you don’t make a payment, you have to serve the remainder of

4

your time. So it’s not a threat, it’s a promise.

5

[. . .]

6

Q: Okay. So her only thing that she said to you was, “If you don’t

make a payment, you would be going to jail”?

7

A: Yes.

8

Q: Okay. And she didn’t give any more explanation of what she was

9

going to do?

10

A: She told me how it goes.

11

Q: Okay. So what –

12

A: Like, you go to court – you go to court, and if you don’t make the

payment, you’re gonna go to jail. You’re gonna serve the

13

remainder of your time.

14 (Dkt. No. 113, Exh. 7 49:9–12; 49:25; 50:1–17; 51:7–17)

15

Plaintiff Jackson made the following statements regarding his conversations with his case

16 manager:

17

A: That’s exactly – I never forget this. She said, “If you don’t bring

us $800 by the end of the day, then you unsuccessfully complete

18

your ankle monitor.

19

Q: But she didn’t specifically say, “And you’ll have another four

months in Santa Rita Jail”?

20

A: Well, I already knew that was, ‘cause she had already been telling

21

me that for four months.

22

[. . .]

23

Q: And that threat was?

24

A: “Pay me or go to jail.”

25

Q: Those were their exact words?

26

A: Yes.

27

[. . .]

28

Q: Do you understand that if you didn’t pay, LCA would just be

writing a report to the court?

3

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

A: Yes.

2

Q: Okay. Did you understand that it would be a judge who’s

ultimately making the decision of whether you go back to jail or

3

not?

4

A: Yes.

5 (Dkt. No. 113, Exh. 8 52:19–25; 64:5–8; 119:9–16)(emphasis added)).

6

Regardless of whether the LCA employees believed they were making threats or if

7 plaintiffs felt threatened by the employees’ statements and feared going to jail, such use of those

8 threats are only considered extortionate under the Hobbs Act and California Penal Code if the

9 employees made them wrongfully. Nonviolent threats made outside the labor context are not

10 inherently wrongful. It is the circumstances of the threat, not the property demanded in the

11 threat that makes the threat wrongful. United States v. Villalobos, 748 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.

12 2014).

13

For example, in All Direct Travel Services, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., our court of

14 appeals found defendant Delta Airlines did not engage in extortion by threatening to terminate its

15 relationship with employees that refused to pay debit memos because Delta had the legal right to

16 terminate relationships with employees for any reason. 120 F. App’x 673, 675 (9th Cir. 2005).

17 Similarly, in Rothman v. Vedder Park Management, our court of appeals found that property

18 management employees did not engage in extortion by threatening residents with “If you don’t

19 sign the lease, you don’t know what you are in for because without a lease they can charge you

20 anything they want,” and by alluding to rent increases. 912 F.2d 315, 318 (9th Cir. 1990). The

21 management company could raise the rent of residents, and warning them of such a possibility

22 was thus not wrongful.

23

Plaintiffs Wilson and Jackson both stated that they felt threatened when their case

24 managers told them they would go back to jail if they did not make the payments. It is possible

25 this conduct could have been extortionate if the employees had, for example, only stated without

26 providing further context or making further statements that LCA itself would ensure plaintiffs

27 would go to jail if they failed to pay. Such conduct could be wrongful because LCA did not

28 have the ability to directly send plaintiffs to jail. It is clear, however, from examining the

4

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1 context of the employees’ statements, even if not explicitly stated in every instance, that

2 plaintiffs knew failure to pay at all would result in LCA reporting such failure to the court, which

3 could then likely lead to a court remand of plaintiffs into custody. There is no dispute that LCA

4 may write such reports.

5

At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel likened this situation to a child support agent telling

6 a parent, “Pay me a thousand dollars or I’m going to make sure your kids are taken away from

7 you.” What would make this threat extortionate would be the fact that the agent had no right to

8 the parent’s money. That is, not, however, the case here. Plaintiffs agreed to pay fees as part of

9 their respective ankle monitoring programs. It is true that plaintiffs’ inability to pay does not

10 allow LCA to deny participation in the electronic monitoring program altogether. LCA did not

11 threaten to end plaintiffs’ participation in the program upon nonpayment though. Rather, based

12 on LCA’s statements, plaintiffs were made aware that the outcome of failing to pay at all would

13 be a violation report with the likely possibility of being remanded to jail. Unlike the child

14 support agent in the example above, LCA’s conduct was not wrongful because LCA had a right

15 to at least some of plaintiffs’ payments.

16

Plaintiff Wilson signed an agreement recognizing his obligation to pay and LCA’s right

17 to submit an incident report if he failed to pay (Essex Decl. Ex. C). He questions the authenticity

18 of this document, stating that defendant has not provided an authenticating declaration.

19 Nonetheless, declarant Jeffrey Essex’s declaration is sufficient to authenticate the document.

20 Essex is the Director of Program Services at LCA. He swears that LCA maintains “a (1)

21 database of participants, and (2) a hard file for each participant.” He further swears his

22 familiarity with the database and hard files, both categories of which are business records. In

23 preparing his declaration, Essex viewed plaintiff Wilson’s file and attached the agreement. The

24 agreement is also signed by plaintiff Wilson and the signature matches the one in his declaration.

25

Similarly, although defendant has failed to find a similar agreement for plaintiff Jackson,

26 he stated the following about his first meeting with his case manager:

27

Q: So did Belinda tell you – explain to you that this was a program

where you would have to pay?

28

A: Yes.

5

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United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

Q: And what did you say in response to her about that?

2

A: Uh, I didn’t say anything. I just – I agreed.

3 (Dkt. No. 112-3, Ex. P at 180). LCA includes the supervision fee agreement in its electronic

4 monitoring enrollment forms, which is submitted before the participant can begin electronic

5 monitoring. Plaintiff Jackson has also not denied that he signed a fee agreement.

6

The main issue for summary judgment in this case is whether defendant’s conduct was

7 wrongful. Here, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that plaintiffs both agreed to

8 pay fees as part of their respective electronic monitoring programs and that defendant was thus

9 entitled to payments from plaintiffs, regardless of the amount. In stating that nonpayment could

10 result in being remanded to jail, defendant did not commit the predicate act of extortion

11 necessary for a violation of RICO. This order thus need not and will not address the remaining

12 elements for a RICO violation. Summary judgment is GRANTED for defendant as to plaintiffs

13 Jackson and Wilson’s only remaining claim of a RICO violation.

14

CONCLUSION

15

To the foregoing extent, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

16 Judgment will be entered separately for defendant and against plaintiffs.

17

18

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19

20 Dated: December 19, 2019.

21

WILLIAM ALSUP

22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23

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25

26

27

28

6