Case: 1:13-cv-07150 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/04/13 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GREGORY KOGER,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY; and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS )

)

Defendants.

)

)

No. 13 C ___________ Judge ______________

COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND OTHER INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff GREGORY KOGER, by his undersigned attorneys, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complains against the Defendants Sheriff Thomas J. Dart and Cook County as follows:
Nature of the Case 1. This is a civil rights action in which Plaintiff seek relief for Defendants' violations of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2. At all times relevant, Defendant Dart has promulgated and enforced a constitutionally defective policy that prohibits all inmates at the Cook County Jail from receiving and obtaining any newspapers, including the Chicago Tribune, while detained in jail, resulting in the interference with Plaintiff's and other inmates' First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. 3. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant Dart’s policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving newspapers violates Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Plaintiff also seek injunctive relief to prohibit Defendant Dart from enforcing such policy in the future. Plaintiff also seeks nominal monetary damages ($1.00) for Defendant Dart’s violation of his First Amendment rights, as well as such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just.
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Jurisdiction and Venue 4. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties and to grant all further relief deemed necessary and proper. Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes injunctive relief. This Court has authority to award costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 3613(c)(2). 5. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as all the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in Cook County.
Parties 6. Plaintiff Gregory Koger is a citizen of the United States and at all times relevant hereto was a resident of the City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois. 7. Defendant Thomas J. Dart is and at all time relevant hereto was the Sheriff of Cook County and is and was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Cook County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff sues Dart in his official capacity. 8. Plaintiff joins Cook County pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F. 3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003). Cook County is empowered and directed to pay any judgment for compensatory damages (and associated attorneys' fees and costs) for which any Cook County employee acting within the scope of his/her employment is found liable.
Factual Allegations 9. Plaintiff was admitted to Cook County Jail, located at 2600 South California Ave., Chicago, Illinois, on or about July 23, 2013 to serve the remaining portion of his 300-day sentence for misdemeanor criminal trespass, simple battery and resisting arrest. (People v. Koger, Case No. 09-200 4948 01, Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division). 10. Plaintiff is set to be released from Cook County Jail on or around October 24, 2013. 11. On August 7, 2013, Plaintiff's friend Barbara Lyons sent him at the jail a copy of a Chicago Tribune newspaper, dated August 5, 2013 to keep him up to date and
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informed on news and public affairs in Chicago and throughout the world. 12. On August 13, 2013, the newspaper was returned to Barbara Lyons in the
same manilla envelope in which it was sent, with the word “Return!” written in black magic marker on the face of the envelope.
13. Inside the returned envelope, there were two items: the returned copy of the Chicago Tribune and a form entitled “Cook County Department of Corrections/Notice of Return Mail,” which lists 40-plus items prohibited from being sent to inmates at the jail, including an item that reads “No Newspapers.”
14. On the enclosed form, the item “No Newspapers” was circled and checked with an “X,” thereby indicating that this was the basis for the jail's decision to return the Tribune to Plaintiff's friend Barbara Lyons.
15. Plaintiff was never given notice by the jail that the newspaper was returned to its sender.
Section 1983 Liability Against Defendant Dart for Jail's Unconstitutional Policy
16. The Cook County Department of Corrections has a formal written policy that absolutely prohibits inmates at the Cook County Jail from receiving and obtaining newspapers.
17. The form described above, entitled “Cook County Department of Corrections/Notice of Return Mail,” clearly indicates the existence of such policy.
18. In addition, the Cook County Department of Correction's own website sets forth an alphabetical list of items that “CAN NOT be sent to an inmate,” and includes on this list a blanket ban on “newspapers.” (See, http://www.cookcountysheriff. org/doc/doc_ inmatemail.html, last visited on October 4, 2013).
19. The Department of Correction's “No Newspaper” policy is also set forth in Cook County Department of Corrections General Order 9.7.1, which lists all “newspapers” as a form of “institutional contraband.”
20. By having a well-established express policy and practice of prohibiting inmates from obtaining and receiving all newspapers, Defendant Dart directed, knew about, facilitated, approved, condoned, and consented to the conduct that causes and
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caused the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights; and violated Plaintiff's rights by maintaining policies and practices that were the moving force behind the constitutional violation at issue. First Amendment Harm
21. The Cook County Department of Correction's policy of absolutely banning imates from obtaining and receiving any and all newspapers violates Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment, as it unreasonably and irrationally censors and restricts Plaintiff's ability to read a large and important body of First-Amendment protected speech and stay informed and engaged in local news and world events and, in addition, serves as a way to impose ignorance onto Plaintiff and an entire population of inmates at the Cook County Jail of such news and world events.
22. As a result of the policy, Plaintiff and other inmates have suffered, and continue to suffer injury, including the objective harm of being prohibited from reading newspapers, even though the receiving and obtaining such newspapers (like the Chicago Tribune) does not create any substantial security risk. The Appropriateness of Injunctive Relief
23. The Cook County Department of Correction's policy of prohibiting inmates at Cook County Jail from receiving and obtaining newspapers is (1) ongoing and enforced many times on a daily basis; (2) the policy subjects Plaintiff and fellow inmates to the continual deprivation of their First Amendment rights; and (3) Plaintiff whose constitutional rights are being interfered with by Defendant Dart's “No Newspaper” policy has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to his constitutional rights unless Defendant Dart is enjoined from continuing its policy.
COUNT I 42 U.S.C § 1983: First Amendment: Unconstitutionally Overlybroad Policy
(Monell Express Policy Claim For Declaratory, Injunctive, and Nominal Monetary Relief Against Defendant on Behalf of Plaintiff) 24. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-23 as if fully set forth herein.
25. The Cook County Department of Correction's express policy of banning inmates from receiving and obtaining any and all newspapers, including the Chicago
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Tribune, is overbroad on its face, as it censors and restricts a large and important body of protected speech for no legitimate peneological purpose and is insufficiently tailored to meet realistic security concerns that might cause disruption and/or produce violence.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court: a. Enter a declaration that the Cook County Department of Correction's absolute ban on inmates receiving and obtaining any and all newspapers violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; b. Enter a preliminary and then a permanent injunction barring Defendant Dart and his agents, servants, employees and attorneys from undertaking to ban inmates from receiving and obtaining any and all newspapers, as challenged herein; c. Enter judgment for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing this action; d. Award Plaintiff Koger nominal monetary damages ($1.00) for the violation of his First Amendment rights; and e. Award such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate and equitable.
Plaintiff demands trial by jury.

Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, IL 60641 (773) 283-3913 Illinois Atty. No. 6199578

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Mark G. Weinberg
/s/ Zisl Taub Edelson Counsel for Plaintiffs
Zisl Taub Edelson, Esq. 6257 N. McCormick, Blvd, #144 Chicago, IL 60659 Ph. 773-587-9693 Illinois Atty. No. 6196728
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 Case: 1:13-cv-07150 Document #: 20 Filed: 11/19/13 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:53
FI1L1/1E9/D2013
FOINRTTHHEEUNNOIRTTEHDESRTNATDEISSTDRISICTRTIOCFTICLOLIUNROTCISLERTKH,OUM.SA.SDGIS.TBRRICUTTOCNOURT EASTERN DIVISION

GREGORY KOGER,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY; and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS )

)

Defendants.

)

)

No. 13 C 7150
Judge Kennelly Magistrate Judge Keys

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND OTHER INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff GREGORY KOGER, by his undersigned attorneys, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complains against the Defendants Sheriff Thomas J. Dart and Cook County as follows:
Nature of the Case  This is a civil rights action in which Plaintiff seek relief for Defendants' violations of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  At all times relevant, Defendant Dart has promulgated and enforced a constitutionally defective policy that prohibits all inmates at the Cook County Jail from receiving and obtaining any newspapers, including the Chicago Tribune, while detained in jail, resulting in the interference with Plaintiff's and other inmates' First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.  Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant Dart’s policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving newspapers violates Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Plaintiff also seeks permanent injunctive relief to prohibit Defendant Dart from enforcing such policy in the future. Plaintiff also seeks nominal monetary damages ($1.00) for Defendant Dart’s violation of his First Amendment rights, as well as such other relief as this Court deems equitable and just.


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Jurisdiction and Venue

4. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

2201. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties and to grant all

further relief deemed necessary and proper. Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure authorizes injunctive relief. This Court has authority to award costs and

attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 3613(c)(2).

5. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as all the

events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in Cook County.

Parties  Plaintiff Gregory Koger is a citizen of the United States and at all times

relevant hereto was a resident of the City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois.  Defendant Thomas J. Dart is and at all time relevant hereto was the Sheriff

of Cook County and is and was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Cook

County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff sues Dart in his official capacity. 
 Plaintiff joins Cook County pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle

County, 324 F. 3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003). Cook County is empowered and directed to pay

any judgment for compensatory damages (and associated attorneys' fees and costs) for

which any Cook County employee acting within the scope of his/her employment is

found liable.

Factual Allegations  Plaintiff was admitted to Cook County Jail, located at 2600 South

California Ave., Chicago, Illinois, on or about July 23, 2013 to serve the remaining

portion of his 300-day sentence for misdemeanor criminal trespass, simple battery and

resisting arrest. (People v. Koger, Case No. 09-200 4948 01, Circuit Court of Cook

County, Criminal Division).

10. Plaintiff is set to be released from Cook County Jail on or around October

24, 2013. 

On August 7, 2013, Plaintiff's friend Barbara Lyons sent him at the jail a

copy of a Chicago Tribune newspaper, dated August 5, 2013 to keep him up to date and



Case: 1:13-cv-07150 Document #: 20 Filed: 11/19/13 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:55
informed on news and public affairs in Chicago and throughout the world. 12. On August 13, 2013, the newspaper was returned to Barbara Lyons in the
same manilla envelope in which it was sent, with the word “Return!” written in black magic marker on the face of the envelope.
 Inside the returned envelope, there were two items: the returned copy of the Chicago Tribune and a form entitled “Cook County Department of Corrections/Notice of Return Mail,” which lists 40-plus items prohibited from being sent to inmates at the jail, including an item that reads “No Newspapers.”
 On the enclosed form, the item “No Newspapers” was circled and checked with an “X,” thereby indicating that this was the basis for the jail's decision to return the Tribune to Plaintiff's friend Barbara Lyons.
 Plaintiff was never given notice by the jail that the newspaper was returned to its sender.1
Section 1983 Liability Against Defendant Dart for Jail's Unconstitutional Policy
16. The Cook County Department of Corrections has a formal written policy that absolutely prohibits inmates at the Cook County Jail from receiving and obtaining newspapers.
17. The form described above, entitled “Cook County Department of Corrections/Notice of Return Mail,” clearly indicates the existence of such policy.

 In addition, the Cook County Department of Correction's own website sets forth an alphabetical list of items that “CAN NOT be sent to an inmate,” and includes on this list a blanket ban on “newspapers.” (See, http://www.cookcountysheriff. org/doc/doc_ inmatemail.html, last visited on October 4, 2013).
 On August 22, 2013, when told by a visitor that his newspaper was returned to sender and that inmates are prohibited by policy from obtaining and receiving newspapers, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Cook County jail objecting to the blanket ban. A copy of Plaintiff's grievance is attached as Exhibit A hereto. As of the date of the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint, it has been six weeks since Plaintiff filed his grievance. During this time, he has received no response from the jail about it, in violation of their own grievance procedures, as outlined in Sheriff’s Order 11.14.5.0 (“S.O. 11.14.5.0”)/ Pursuant to the Sheriff's procedures, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office “shall have 15 days upon receipt of the grievance to determine whether it is sustained or not-sustained and assign a remedy, if no exceptions apply.” (Id.). 

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 The Department of Correction's “No Newspaper” policy is also set forth in Cook County Department of Corrections General Order 9.7.1, which lists all “newspapers” as a form of “institutional contraband.”
 By having a well-established express policy and practice of prohibiting inmates from obtaining and receiving all newspapers, Defendant Dart directed, knew about, facilitated, approved, condoned, and consented to the conduct that causes and caused the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights; and violated Plaintiff's rights by maintaining policies and practices that were the moving force behind the constitutional violation at issue. First Amendment Harm
 The Cook County Department of Correction's policy of absolutely banning imates from obtaining and receiving any and all newspapers violates Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment, as it unreasonably and irrationally censors and restricts Plaintiff's ability to read a large and important body of First-Amendment protected speech and stay informed and engaged in local news and world events and, in addition, serves as a way to impose ignorance onto Plaintiff and an entire population of inmates at the Cook County Jail of such news and world events.
 As a result of the policy, Plaintiff and other inmates have suffered, and continue to suffer injury, including the objective harm of being prohibited from reading newspapers, even though the receiving and obtaining such newspapers (like the Chicago Tribune) does not create any substantial security risk.
COUNT I 42 U.S.C § 1983: First Amendment: Unconstitutionally Overlybroad Policy
(Monell Express Policy Claim For Declaratory, Injunctive, and Nominal Monetary Relief Against Defendant on Behalf of Plaintiff) 23. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-23 as if fully set forth herein.
 The Cook County Department of Correction's express policy of banning inmates from receiving and obtaining any and all newspapers, including the Chicago Tribune, is overbroad on its face, as it censors and restricts a large and important body of protected speech for no legitimate peneological purpose and is insufficiently tailored to


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meet realistic security concerns that might cause disruption and/or produce violence.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court: a. Enter a declaration that the Cook County Department of Correction's absolute ban on inmates receiving and obtaining any and all newspapers violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; b. Enter a permanent injunction barring Defendant Dart and his agents, servants, employees and attorneys from undertaking to ban inmates from receiving and obtaining any and all newspapers, as challenged herein; c. Enter judgment for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing this action;  Award Plaintiff Koger nominal monetary damages ($1.00) for the violation of his First Amendment rights; and e. Award such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate and equitable.
Plaintiff demands trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted,

Mark G. Weinberg 3612 N. Tripp Avenue Chicago, IL 60641 Ph. (773) 283-3913 Illinois Atty. No. 6199578

/s/ Mark G. Weinberg
/s/ Zisl Taub Edelson Counsel for Plaintiffs
Zisl Taub Edelson, Esq. 6257 N. McCormick, Blvd, #144 Chicago, IL 60659 Ph. 773-587-9693 Illinois Atty. No. 6196728



 
 Case: 1:13-cv-07150 Document #: 29 Filed: 03/03/14 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:88
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1
Eastern Division

Gregory Koger v. Thomas J. Dart, et al.

Plaintiff, Defendant.

Case No.: 1:13−cv−07150 Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, March 3, 2014:
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The Court denies defendant's motion to dismiss. As the Court previously stated in an oral ruling, the complaint states a claim; defendant's contention that the claim lacks merit because plaintiff suffered no actual damage but only nominal damage is legally frivolous, because the law permits a person to sue for violation of his constitutional rights in this situation even if he suffered no tangible monetary loss. Defendant also argues that plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Perhaps so−−there is a strong probability that plaintiff will be unable to obtain a permanent injunction due to the absence of a likelihood that he will be subjected to the challenged practice in the future−−but because plaintiff has stated a claim for damages that he clearly has standing to pursue, the Court need not determine definitively at this point exactly what types of relief plaintiff may obtain if he prevails. That is appropriately be taken up if and when it becomes an issue. The request for an injunction is not a separate claim for relief that the Court can or should deal with separately at this point; it is a request for a type of relief on the single claim that plaintiff has made. Defendant is directed to answer the complaint by no later than 3/17/2014, and both sides are directed to make Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures by that same date. The status hearing set for 3/5/2014 is vacated and reset to 3/19/2014 at 9:00 a.m. and will be held in chambers (Room 2188), for the purpose of setting a discovery and pretrial schedule. (mk)

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please refer to it for additional information.
For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 1 of 10
TERMED,VALDEZ
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−07150

Koger v. Dart Assigned to: Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff Gregory Koger

Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Date Terminated: 07/15/2015 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Mark G. Weinberg Attorney at Law 3612 North Tripp Chicago, IL 60641 (312) 283−3913 Email: mweinberg@sbcglobal.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adele D. Nicholas Nicholas Law Office 4510 N. Paulina St. Suite 3E Chicago, IL 60640 847 361 3869 Email: adele@civilrightschicago.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zisl Taub Edelson Edelson Law 6257 N. McCormick Blvd #144 Chicago, IL 60659 (773) 587−9693 Email: zisl@zedelsonlaw.com

V.
Defendant
Thomas J. Dart Sheriff of Cook County

represented by Brenden Rae Bryant Cook County State's Attorney's Office 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5471 Email: brenden.bryant@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Zecchin Cook County State's Attorney's Office 500 Daley Center 50 West Washington Chicago, IL 60602 312 603 3373 Email: anthony.zecchin@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Conor Thomas Fleming Cook County State's Attorney's Office 500 Richard J. Daley Center

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 2 of 10

Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5527 Fax: (312) 603−3000 Email: conor.fleming@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John M. Power Cook County State's Attorney's Office Richard J. Daley Center, Fifth Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312−603−4370 Email: John.Power@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin D Syvertsen Cook County State's Attorney Richard J. Daley Center 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−6672 Email: martin.syvertsen@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Gallagher Burke, Wise, Morrissey &Kaveny 161 N. Clark Street Suite 3200 Chicago, IL 60601 (312)580−2040 Fax: (312) 580−2041 Email: mlg@bwmklaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Cook County Illinois

represented by Brenden Rae Bryant (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Conor Thomas Fleming (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John M. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin D Syvertsen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/04/2013
10/04/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Gregory Koger; jury demand. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752−8799169. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/04/2013)

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10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/09/2013 10/11/2013 10/11/2013 10/11/2013 10/11/2013 10/11/2013 10/12/2013 10/17/2013 10/18/2013 10/18/2013 10/18/2013 10/21/2013
10/31/2013 11/04/2013
11/13/2013 11/14/2013 11/19/2013

CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Arlander Keys. (nsf, ) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Gregory Koger by Mark G. Weinberg (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart (pg, ) (Entered: 10/09/2013)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Gregory Koger as to Cook County on 10/11/2011, answer due 11/1/2011. (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
5 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for preliminary injunction (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
6 NOTICE of Motion by Mark G. Weinberg for presentment of motion for preliminary injunction 5 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 10/17/2013 at 09:30 AM. (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
7 MEMORANDUM by Gregory Koger in support of motion for preliminary injunction 5 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
8 CERTIFICATE of Service Regarding Motion for Prel. Injunction, Notice of Motion, and Memorandum In Support of Injunction by Mark G. Weinberg on behalf of Gregory Koger (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
9 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Gregory Koger as to Thomas J. Dart on 10/11/2013, answer due 11/1/2013. (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 10/12/2013)
10 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 10/17/2013 and continued to 10/21/2013 at 09:30 a.m.Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas J. Dart by Brenden Rae Bryant (Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
12 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas J. Dart by Michael L. Gallagher (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Gregory Koger by Zisl Taub Edelson (Edelson, Zisl) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
14 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 10/21/2013. Defendant's response to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 5 is due 10/31/2013. Status hearing set for 11/4/2013 at 09:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
15 RESPONSE by Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for preliminary injunction 5 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit I)(Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
16 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 11/4/2013. Reply to motion for preliminary injunction 5 is due by 11/18/2013. Sur−reply is due by 12/3/2013. Status hearing set for 12/5/2013 at 09:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
17 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for leave to file amended complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit amended complaint, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
18 NOTICE of Motion by Mark G. Weinberg for presentment of motion for leave to file 17 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/19/2013 at 9:30 a.m.(pjg, ) (Entered: 11/14/2013)
19 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Motion hearing held on 11/19/2013. Motion for leave to file 17 is granted. Motion for preliminary injunction 5 is terminated as moot. The status hearing set for 12/5/2013 remains as scheduled. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 11/19/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 4 of 10

11/19/2013 12/05/2013 01/17/2014 01/17/2014 01/29/2014
02/11/2014 02/26/2014 02/28/2014 02/28/2014 03/03/2014
03/04/2014 03/17/2014 03/19/2014

20 FIRST AMENDED complaint by Gregory Koger against Cook County, Thomas J. Dart. (ao,) (Entered: 11/20/2013)
21 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 12/5/2013. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1) disclosures are due by 1/9/2014. The deadline for amending pleadings and adding parties is 2/11/2014. Discovery is ordered closed by 4/11/2014. Status hearing is set for 1/29/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
22 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
23 NOTICE of Motion by Brenden Rae Bryant for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 22 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 1/29/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
24 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 1/29/2014. Response to Argument No. 1 of the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 22 to be filed by 2/12/2014; Defendant to reply by 2/26/2014. Ruling on Motion to Dismiss 22 set for 3/5/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Argument No. 2 of Motion to Dismiss 22 is overruled for reasons stated in open court. Status hearing set for 3/5/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
25 MEMORANDUM RESPONSE by Gregory Kogerin Opposition to MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 22 (Edelson, Zisl) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
26 REPLY by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart to response in opposition to motion 25 (Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
27 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to file instanter Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
28 NOTICE of Motion by Mark G. Weinberg for presentment of motion to file instanter 27 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 3/5/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
29 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The Court denies defendant's motion to dismiss. As the Court previously stated in an oral ruling, the complaint states a claim; defendant's contention that the claim lacks merit because plaintiff suffered no actual damage but only nominal damage is legally frivolous, because the law permits a person to sue for violation of his constitutional rights in this situation even if he suffered no tangible monetary loss. Defendant also argues that plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Perhaps so−−there is a strong probability that plaintiff will be unable to obtain a permanent injunction due to the absence of a likelihood that he will be subjected to the challenged practice in the future−−but because plaintiff has stated a claim for damages that he clearly has standing to pursue, the Court need not determine definitively at this point exactly what types of relief plaintiff may obtain if he prevails. That is appropriately be taken up if and when it becomes an issue. The request for an injunction is not a separate claim for relief that the Court can or should deal with separately at this point; it is a request for a type of relief on the single claim that plaintiff has made. Defendant is directed to answer the complaint by no later than 3/17/2014, and both sides are directed to make Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures by that same date. The status hearing set for 3/5/2014 is vacated and reset to 3/19/2014 at 9:00 a.m. and will be held in chambers (Room 2188), for the purpose of setting a discovery and pretrial schedule. (mk) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
30 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Plaintiff's motion to cite additional authority 27 is terminated as moot. (mk) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
31 ANSWER to amended complaint by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart(Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
32 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Rule 16(b) status hearing held on 3/19/2014 with attorneys for both sides. Deadline for amending pleadings and adding parties is 4/30/2014. Fact discovery ordered closed by 5/30/2014. Status hearing is set for 5/21/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, )

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 5 of 10

04/13/2014 05/01/2014 05/01/2014 05/06/2014 05/07/2014 05/19/2014 06/06/2014 06/06/2014 06/09/2014 06/11/2014 06/12/2014 06/23/2014 07/13/2014 07/13/2014 07/21/2014
07/21/2014

(Entered: 03/19/2014)
33 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Gregory Koger by Adele D. Nicholas (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 04/13/2014)
34 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to compel Responses To Plaintiff's Outstanding Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiff's Written discovery, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiff's Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition, # 3 Exhibit E−Mail Correspondences)(Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
35 NOTICE of Motion by Mark G. Weinberg for presentment of motion to compel, 34 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 5/7/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Weinberg, Mark) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
36 RESPONSE by Cook County, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to compel Responses To Plaintiff's Outstanding Discovery 34 (Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
37 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Motion hearing held on 5/7/2014 regarding Motion to compel 34 . Hearing is continued to 5/19/2014 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
38 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Hearing held on 5/19/2014 regarding motion to compel 34 . The discovery deadline is extended to 7/15/2014. The status hearing set for 5/21/2014 is vacated and reset to 7/21/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
39 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to compel Defendants to Answer Outstanding Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
40 NOTICE of Motion by Adele D. Nicholas for presentment of motion to compel 39 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 6/11/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
41 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: On the Court's motion, the hearing date on plaintiffs' motion to compel is reset to 6/12/2014 at 9:30 AM due to Judge Kennelly's unavailability on 6/11/2014 at 9:30 AM. (mk) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
42 RESPONSE by Defendant Thomas J. Dart to motion to compel 39 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bryant, Brenden) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
43 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Motion hearing held on 6/12/2014. Motion to compel 39 is granted in part and denied in part as stated in open court. Telephone status hearing, to be initiated by the parties, is set for 6/23/2014 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
44 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Telephone status hearing held on 6/23/2014 with attorneys for both sides. Status hearing set for 7/21/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
45 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for extension of time to complete discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (Production Requests), # 2 Exhibit (Interrogatory))(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 07/13/2014)
46 NOTICE of Motion by Adele D. Nicholas for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 45 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 7/21/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 07/13/2014)
47 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing and motion hearing held on 7/21/2014. Motion for extension of time to complete discovery 45 is granted. The deadline for fact discovery is extended to 8/7/2014. Status hearing set for 8/12/2014 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
48 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The case is referred to Magistrate Judge Keys to conduct a settlement conference. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 07/21/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 6 of 10

07/21/2014 07/22/2014 07/22/2014 07/23/2014 07/28/2014
07/29/2014 07/31/2014
08/12/2014 09/05/2014 09/18/2014 10/14/2014 10/14/2014 10/17/2014

49 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Arlander Keys for the purpose of holding proceedings related to a settlement conference. Mailed notice.(pjg, ) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
50 MINUTE entry 49 is corrected as follows: This case will be referred to a magistrate judge of this court for the purpose of holding proceedings related to a settlement conference. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
51 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Referral to Magistrate Judge Keys is hereby withdrawn. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
52 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case referred to the Honorable Maria Valdez for settlement conference. Signed by Executive Committee on July 23, 2014. (ao,) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
53 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: This case has been referred to Judge Valdez to conduct a settlement conference. The parties are ordered to appear for status on 7/31/2014 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1041 to set a settlement conference date. The Parties are further directed to consult with their respective clients before the status date to determine the dates of unavailability for a settlement conference that may be set within the next eight weeks. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
54 STATUS Report (Joint Initial Magistrate Judge Status Report) by Gregory Koger (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
55 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 7/31/2014. This case is set to 9/5/2014 at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1041 for settlement conference. Judge Valdez requires full compliance with the Court's Standing Order on Settlement Conference found on Judge Valdez's website available at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov, or the parties can contact courtroom deputy, Lisa Provine, at 312/408−5135 for a copy. Failure to comply with the provisions of the Court's Standing Order may result in the unilateral cancellation of the settlement conference by the Court. Absent leave from the Court, cancellation will result if the Plaintiff fails to submit to chambers copies of the settlement letters four days prior to the settlement conference. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
56 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 8/12/2014 and continued to 9/18/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 08/12/2014)
57 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Settlement conference held on 9/5/2014. Parties unable to reach terms of settlement at this time. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
58 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 9/18/2014. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is due by 10/20/2014. Defendant's response and cross motion is due by 11/18/2014; Response and reply due by 12/2/2014; Final reply is due by 12/12/2014. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
59 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for leave to file excess pages in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
60 NOTICE of Motion by Adele D. Nicholas for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 59 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 10/21/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
61 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a brief with excess pages 59 is granted in part; plaintiff's summary judgment brief may be up to 20 pages long. The case involves a single claim, and

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 7 of 10

10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014
11/18/2014 11/18/2014 11/21/2014
12/12/2014 12/16/2014 12/16/2014 12/16/2014
12/16/2014 12/16/2014 12/16/2014 12/16/2014 12/16/2014 12/24/2014

the Court is not persuaded that a 25 page brief is warranted. (mk) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
62 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for summary judgment (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
63 RULE 56.1(a)(1) Statement by Gregory Koger regarding motion for summary judgment 62 (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
64 APPENDIX Rule 56 statement 63 , motion for summary judgment 62 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Koger Dep, # 2 Exhibit Kurtovich Dep, # 3 Exhibit Lyons Dep, # 4 Exhibit Notice of Returned Mail, # 5 Exhibit G.O. 14.10, # 6 Exhibit G.O. 9.7.1, # 7 Exhibit Photos of Property Box, # 8 Exhibit 8/22/13 Grievance, # 9 Exhibit Handbook, # 10 Exhibit Interrogatory Answers (1st), # 11 Exhibit Returned Envelope, # 12 Exhibit Incident Reports, # 13 Exhibit Koger Declaration, # 14 Exhibit Commissary List, # 15 Exhibit Jail Policies, # 16 Exhibit Holmes Declaration, # 17 Exhibit Interrogatory Answers (2nd Set))(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
65 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for summary judgment 62 and any cross−motion for summary judgment (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
66 NOTICE of Motion by Michael L. Gallagher for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 65 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/25/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
67 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Defendant's motion to enlarge time is granted. Due date for response to summary judgment motion and cross−motion (if any) is extended to 12/16/2014; due date for plaintiff's response / reply is extended to 12/30/2014; due date for defendant's reply on the cross−motion is extended to 1/9/2015. (mk) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
68 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart by Anthony E. Zecchin (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
69 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart by Martin D Syvertsen (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
70 MOTION by Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Cook County for summary judgment (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
71 RULE 56.1 Statement by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart regarding motion for summary judgment 70 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Plaintiff's Deposition, # 2 Exhibit B− Kurtovich Deposition, # 3 Exhibit C− Incoming Mail, # 4 Exhibit D− Lyons Deposition, # 5 Exhibit E− Moreci Affidavit, # 6 Exhibit F− IMACs Sheet, # 7 Exhibit G− Agreed Order)(Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
72 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart in support of motion for summary judgment 70 (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
73 NOTICE by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart re Rule 56 statement, 71 , MOTION by Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Cook County for summary judgment 70 , memorandum in support of motion 72 (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
74 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart to Rule 56 statement 63 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Moreci Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit B− Agreed Order)(Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
75 RESPONSE by Cook County, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for summary judgment 62 (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
76 NOTICE by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart re response in opposition to motion 75 , Response 74 (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
77 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to strike Response 74 (Affidavit of Dan Moreci) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (declaration of Holmes), # 2 Exhibit

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 8 of 10

12/24/2014 12/29/2014 12/30/2014 12/30/2014 12/30/2014 12/31/2014 12/31/2014 01/02/2015 01/06/2015
01/09/2015 01/09/2015 01/09/2015 01/09/2015 01/11/2015 01/13/2015
01/27/2015 01/27/2015

(interrogatory answers), # 3 Exhibit (Kurtovich Dep excerpt))(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/24/2014)
78 NOTICE of Motion by Adele D. Nicholas for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief 77 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/30/2014 at 09:30 AM. (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/24/2014)
79 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The hearing on plaintiff's motion to strike is reset to 1/5/2015 at 9:30 AM because Judge Kennelly is not holding court through 1/2/2015. (mk) (Entered: 12/29/2014)
80 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to response in opposition to motion 75 for summary judgment and reply in support of his motion for summary judgment (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
81 RULE 56 (b)(3) Statement (Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
82 RULE 56 (a)(3) Statement (Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Additional Facts) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
83 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for leave to file combined reply in support of his motion for summary judgment and response to defendants' cross−motion for summary judgment (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
84 NOTICE of Motion by Adele D. Nicholas for presentment of motion for leave to file 83 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 1/5/2015 at 09:30 AM. (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
85 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart by John M. Power (Power, John) (Entered: 01/02/2015)
86 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Motion hearing held on 1/5/2015. Motion for leave to file instanter 83 is granted. Response to motion to strike 77 is due by 1/9/2015. Motion to strike 77 is entered and continued to 1/13/2015 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
87 RESPONSE by Cook County, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to strike Response 74 (Affidavit of Dan Moreci) 77 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
88 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart by Conor Thomas Fleming (Fleming, Conor) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
89 REPLY by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart to Rule 56 statement, 71 , Response 80 , MOTION by Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Cook County for summary judgment 70 , memorandum in support of motion 72 (Fleming, Conor) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
90 NOTICE by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart re reply to response to motion 89 (Fleming, Conor) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
91 REPLY by Plaintiff Gregory Koger to response in opposition to motion 87 (reply in support of motion to strike affidavit of Dan Moreci) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit G.O. 14.10)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 01/11/2015)
92 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Motion hearing held on 1/13/2015. Motion to strike 77 is granted. Affidavit of Dan Moreci and arguments based on it, as well as summary judgment briefs 72 , 75 , 80 , and 89 are stricken. Defendant has until 1/27/2015 to refile a combined summary judgment memorandum / response memorandum. Plaintiff has until 2/10/2015 to file a combined response / reply memorandum. Defendant has until 2/17/2015 to file a reply brief on its cross−motion. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 01/13/2015)
93 MOTION by Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Cook County for summary judgment (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
94 RULE 56.1(b) Statement by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart regarding motion for summary judgment 93 , motion for summary judgment 62 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Plainitff's Mail History, # 2 Exhibit B− Agreed Order)(Syvertsen,

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 9 of 10

01/27/2015 01/27/2015 02/09/2015 02/09/2015 02/17/2015 07/06/2015
07/15/2015
07/15/2015 07/15/2015 08/04/2015 08/07/2015 08/11/2015
08/11/2015 08/12/2015

Martin) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
95 MEMORANDUM motion for summary judgment 93 , motion for summary judgment 62 by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart Combined Memorandum in support and Response (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
96 NOTICE by Cook County, Thomas J. Dart re MOTION by Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Cook County for summary judgment 93 , memorandum 95 , Rule 56 statement, 94 (Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
97 RESPONSE by Gregory Kogerin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Cook County for summary judgment 93 (combined response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Rely in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
98 RULE 56.1(a)(3) Statement by Gregory Koger regarding motion for summary judgment 62 (Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Additional Facts) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
99 REPLY by Defendants Cook County, Thomas J. Dart to response in opposition to motion, 97 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Syvertsen, Martin) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
100 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 7/6/2015: For the reasons state din the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court partly grants and partly denies both motions for summary judgment [dkt. nos. 62, 70 &93]. The Court will issue a declaratory judgment in plaintiff's favor and will award plaintiff nominal damages in the amount of one dollar. The Court denies plaintiff's request for an injunction. The parties' proposed form(s) of judgment are to be submitted by July 13, 2015. The case is set for a status hearing on July 15, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. (mk) (Entered: 07/06/2015)
101 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held on 7/15/2015. Judgment to be entered in favor of plaintiff Gregory Koger and against defendants Sheriff Thomas J. Dart and Cook County. The Court concludes that the Cook County Jail's ban on newspapers violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff is awarded $1.00 in damages. Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is denied as moot. Fee petitions are to be filed by 8/12/2015. Status hearing set for 8/19/2015 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
102 ENTERED JUDGMENT ON 7/15/2051. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
***Civil Case Terminated. (pjg, ) (Entered: 08/03/2015)
103 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for bill of costs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemization, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1 (clerk costs), # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2 (deposition costs), # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3 (other costs))(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/04/2015)
104 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Response to bill of costs is to be filed by 8/231/2015. Reply to response is to be filed by 8/28/2015. (mk) (Entered: 08/07/2015)
105 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for leave to file instanter the attached amended bill of costs (unopposed) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Bill of Costs, # 2 Exhibit Amended Itemization of Costs, # 3 Exhibit (Ex. 1 to Bill of Costs − Clerk Costs), # 4 Exhibit (Ex. 2 to Bill of Costs − Deposition Costs), # 5 Exhibit (Ex. 3 to Bill of Costs − Other Costs))(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/11/2015)
106 NOTICE of Motion by Adele D. Nicholas for presentment of motion for leave to file, 105 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 8/19/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/11/2015)
107 MOTION by Plaintiff Gregory Koger for attorney fees (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 08/12/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-7150 As of: 11/14/2015 01:06 PM CST 10 of 10

08/14/2015 08/19/2015 10/16/2015 10/16/2015 10/20/2015

108 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The status and motion hearing set for 8/19/2015 is moved to 9:30 AM on that date. (mk) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing and motion hearing held on 8/19/2015. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file instanter the amended bill of costs 105 is granted without objection. Costs awarded in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $1,025.34. Motion for bill of costs 103 is terminated as moot. Response to motion for attorney fees 107 to be filed by 9/15/2015 Replies due by 9/29/2015. Mailed notice. (pjg, ) (Entered: 08/19/2015)
110 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Plaintiff, the prevailing party in this case, moved for an award of attorney's fees and expenses under 42 USC 1988. Defendant did not file an objection or response within the time ordered by the Court and did not seek an extension of time. Defendant is deemed to have conceded the merits of the motion. The Court grants plaintiff's motion and awards plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $110,163 and $232.70 in expenses. (Mk) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
111 NOTICE OF EMAIL NOTIFICATION FAILURE, for document # 110 sent to Attorney Zisl Taub Edelson zisl@zedelsonlaw.com returned as: Bad destination host. The Clerk mailed to attorney Zisl Taub Edelson Letter re: bounce back email and a Notification of Change of Address form. Notices have been set to No. Counsel must email the Clerk's Office at Docketing_ILND@uscourts.gov when a Notification of Change of Address has been filed to ensure electronic notification is reset. (mr, ) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
112 STIPULATION (Settlement of Attorneys Fees and Costs) (Nicholas, Adele D.) (Entered: 10/20/2015)

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GREGORY KOGER,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook

)

County; and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 13 C 7150

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Gregory Koger has sued Cook County and its Sheriff Thomas Dart under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Koger alleges that the Cook County Jail's absolute ban on newspapers is unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and he requests an injunction, declaratory relief, and nominal damages. Both sides have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that Koger's request for an injunction is moot and therefore grants defendants' motion for summary judgment as to that relief. The Court concludes that the jail's newspaper ban is unconstitutional and therefore grants Koger's motion for summary judgment on his First Amendment claim and awards a declaratory judgment and nominal damages.
Background Gregory Koger is a member of a group called the Ethical Humanist Society. In 2009, he was arrested while videotaping the remarks of a speaker who had cancelled a meeting with the group. Koger was sentenced to 300 days in jail for misdemeanor

criminal trespass, simple battery, and resisting arrest. A committee of supporters provided Koger with a legal defense and other assistance during his incarceration.
Between July and October 2013, Koger served the last portion of his sentence in the Cook County Jail. While there, Barbara Lyons, one of Koger's supporters, sent him letters, books, magazines, an issue of Revolution Newspaper, and an issue of the Chicago Tribune. Although Koger received the books, letters, magazines, and even Revolution Newspaper, the jail returned the Chicago Tribune to Lyons with a form marked "no newspapers."
The issue of the Chicago Tribune was refused pursuant to the jail's absolute ban on newspapers, which has been in place since 1984. The no-newspaper policy applies regardless of content; newspapers with local news, national news, international news, political commentary, and entertainment news are all banned. The policy also applies regardless of origin; that is, it applies even if the newspaper is sent directly from the publisher. It applies to entire newspapers and newspaper clippings. And it applies throughout the jail.
Although inmates may not possess newspapers, they are permitted to possess paper bags, notepaper, drawing pads, books, magazines (including magazines made from the same material as newspapers), envelopes, legal materials, greeting cards, playing cards, religious texts, letters and photos sent from outside the jail, toilet paper, extra undergarments, and bedding. These possessions, however, must fit into a property box that measures 21" long, 8.5" deep, and 15.5" wide. Thus, the jail imposes a strict limit on how much property an inmate may possess at any given time.
In August 2013, Koger filed a grievance demanding that the jail rescind its
2

newspaper policy. The grievance went unanswered. Koger filed suit against Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart on October 4, 2013, twenty days before he was released from jail. He alleges that the jail's newspaper policy violates the First Amendment and requests an injunction, declaratory relief, and nominal damages
Discussion The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on Koger's First Amendment claim, which is his only claim. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court assesses whether each movant has satisfied the requirements of Rule 56. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 427 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2005). A party is entitled to summary judgment if it shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is inappropriate "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). A. Mootness Defendants contend that Koger's request for injunctive relief is moot. Article III of the Constitution restricts federal court jurisdiction to "live cases and controversies." Goldman v. Gagnard, 757 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2014); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "A case is moot, and thus falls outside of the judicial power conferred in Article III, if the outcome will no longer settle an active dispute about the parties' rights." Goldman, 757 F.3d at 581. "The requirement that a case have an actual, ongoing controversy extends
3

throughout the pendency of the action." Stotts v. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 230 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2000).
Koger's request for injunctive relief is indeed moot. Koger filed suit while he was still incarcerated at the jail, and he had Article III standing to seek injunctive relief at that time. Shortly thereafter, however, he was released. Because Koger is no longer incarcerated at the jail, and there is no evidence that he will suffer injury from the jail's newspaper policy in the future, his request for injunctive relief is now moot. See Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen a prisoner who seeks injunctive relief for a condition specific to a particular prison is transferred out of that prison, the need for relief, and hence the prisoner’s claim, become moot."); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 843 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999); Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The plaintiffs . . . , by virtue of their transfers, are no longer incarcerated at [the prison]. Unaccompanied by any continuing, present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury, their past exposure to illegal conduct at [the prison] does not show a pending case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . and we must vacate as moot that portion of their prayer for relief.").
Koger argues that overbreadth doctrine provides an exception to the Article III case-or-controversy requirement as it applies in this case, thus rescuing his claim for injunctive relief. But Koger conflates the Article III case-or-controversy requirement and the "[t]he presumption against third-party standing," a prudential standing requirement. Marin-Garcia v. Holder, 647 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2011).
The presumption against third-party standing holds that "even though a person may suffer an injury that satisfies the constitutional case or controversy requirement of
4

Article III . . . he generally may not redress his injury by reference to someone else's rights." Id. It thus "recognizes that claims are best prosecuted by those who actually have been injured, rather than by someone in their stead." Id. The overbreadth doctrine, however, "permits litigants already before the court to challenge a regulation on its face and raise the rights of third parties" in order to "avoid chilling the speech of third parties who may be unwilling or unlikely to raise a challenge in their own stead . . . ." Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, "in the area of First Amendment litigation, the federal courts have relaxed their prudential concern with regard to third-party standing because of the challenged law or regulation's potential chilling effect on protected expression." Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 1996). This is permissible because third-party standing is "rooted in prudence, rather than the Constitution . . . ." Id. at 509.
Even when the overbreadth doctrine applies, however, the plaintiff must satisfy Article III. See Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984) (holding that overbreadth doctrine applied, and thus "[t]he crucial issues are whether [the plaintiff] satisfies the requirement of 'injury-in-fact,' and whether it can be expected to satisfactorily frame the issues in the case"); Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 754 (5th Cir. 2010) ("Article III standing retains rigor even in an overbreadth claim."); Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[The plaintiff] still must meet the requirements for overbreadth standing: injury in fact and ability satisfactorily to frame the issues in the case."); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 1057, 1061 (2d Cir. 1991) (overbreadth doctrine is a "slender exception to the prudential limits on standing" and "does not affect the rigid constitutional requirement
5

that plaintiffs must demonstrate an injury in fact to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction"). An overbreadth challenge is therefore no cure for mootness, an Article III defect. See Goldman, 757 F.3d at 581.
Although Koger's request for injunctive relief is moot, he may still pursue nominal damages, as well as his request for a declaratory judgment as a predicate to an award of nominal damages. See Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 883 (7th Cir. 2009) ("When a claim for injunctive relief is barred but a claim of damages remains, a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award can survive."). The Court notes that defendants do not argue that Koger lacks standing to pursue his claim for nominal damages. B. First Amendment claim
The Court turns next to the merits of Koger's First Amendment claim. Koger contends that the jail's newspaper policy violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. The jail defines newspapers as contraband. All newspapers are prohibited, regardless of origin or content. While Koger was incarcerated at the jail, he was sent an issue of the Chicago Tribune, which the jail refused pursuant to this policy. A governmental entity "may be found liable under § 1983 when it violates constitutional rights via . . . the enforcement of an express policy . . . ." Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010).
"Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Constitutional rights inside a prison or jail, however, are not identical to those outside; "the Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it would allow
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elsewhere." Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006). Courts acknowledge that running a prison "is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government." Turner, 482 at 84-85. Courts must therefore "accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them." Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).1
Balancing these two considerations, the Supreme Court has held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. To determine reasonableness, the Court must consider four factors: whether the regulation is rationally connected to a legitimate and neutral government objective; whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open to the inmate; what impact accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates; and whether there are obvious alternatives to the regulation that show that it is an exaggerated response to prison concerns. Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91). "The burden . . . is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it." Overton, 539 U.S. at 132.
1 At summary judgment, this means that the Court "must distinguish between inferences relating to disputed facts and those relating to disputed matters of professional judgment." Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, the Court draws reasonable factual inferences in the non-movant's favor but defers to prison administrators on matters of professional judgment.
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"Freedom of speech is not merely freedom to speak; it is also freedom to read." King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005). Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving an absolute ban on newspapers in prison, the Court addressed a more limited ban in Beard. In Beard, the prison banned newspapers in the prison's "special unit[] . . . maintain[ed] for difficult prisoners." Beard, 548 U.S. at 525. The purpose of the ban was to motivate these inmates to improve their behavior. Id. at 530-31. If an inmate's behavior improved, he could "graduate to the less restrictive level" of the special unit, where he would "enjoy . . . the right to receive one newspaper and five magazines." Id. at 526. The plurality held that this restriction was reasonably related to improving inmate behavior. Id. at 530. It also acknowledged, however, that "the constitutional interest here is an important one" and the prison's "restriction is severe . . . ." Id. at 535. Thus, the plurality suggested in dicta, "if faced with evidence that [it were] a de facto permanent ban"—that is, evidence showing that inmates rarely graduated to the less restrictive level—"we might reach a different conclusion . . . ." Id. That suggests that the Supreme Court may be poised to strike down an absolute ban on newspapers in prisons. If the Court were prepared to find unconstitutional a de facto permanent ban limited to difficult inmates, then a permanent ban applicable to all inmates necessarily would fall.
The Seventh Circuit has previously declared unconstitutional a jail policy that banned newspapers. In Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1982), the jail "barred access by pretrial detainees to reading material other than softbound (paperback) books and [non-pictorial] magazines." Id. at 740. The Seventh Circuit held that "[m]aintenance of security and discipline do not justify the wholesale prohibition of
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pictorial magazines, hardbound books or newspapers." Id. at 744. But Kincaid does not control the present case, for three reasons. First, the ban at issue in Kincaid was broader than the ban here, encompassing not just newspapers but also pictorial magazines and hardbound books. Second, Kincaid addressed a smaller set of security risks (fires and sanitation) than those advanced by defendants to justify the Cook County Jail's newspaper ban. Third, and most important, Kincaid predated Turner, where the Supreme Court articulated the factors for determining whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.
More recently, in a post-Turner case, the Seventh Circuit considered a "publishers only" rule that banned "clippings of published articles, or photocopies of such clippings." Lindell, 377 F.3d at 658. Applying the Turner factors, the court held that the ban on newspaper clippings was unconstitutional. Id. at 660. A finding that the absolute ban on newspapers at issue in the present case violates the First Amendment would seem to follow from Lindell's holding that a ban confined to newspaper clippings is unconstitutional—a conclusion that is supported by the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in Kincaid, as well as out-of-circuit precedent. See, e.g., Thomas v. Leslie, 176 F.3d 489, at *7 (10th Cir. 1999) (table) ("[T]he absolute ban on newspapers does not constitute a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forth to justify it . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1986).
Although the case law points towards unconstitutionality, defendants argue that their newspaper ban addresses jail concerns that distinguish this case from Lindell and these out-of-circuit cases. The Court must therefore scrutinize the evidence in the
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record to determine whether the ban can be justified. The factors set forth in Turner provide the framework for this analysis.
The first Turner factor involves whether there is "a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must also "inquire [into] whether prison regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." Id. at 90. "Neutral" in this context simply means that "the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415 (1989).
Defendants assert the following rationales for the ban on newspapers: (1) newspapers are flammable, (2) they can cause sanitation problems (inmates can use them to clog toilets, and they are issued with greater frequency than other publications, thus increasing the volume of material that must be disposed), (3) newspapers can be fashioned into weapons using paper mâché, and (4) they can cause violence (inmates may learn about the nature of other inmates' charges or about outside gang activity). Defendants argue that all of these rationales are tied to maintaining jail security, "perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals." Overton, 539 U.S. at 133. All four of these rationales are rationally connected to jail security. Although Koger contends that the newspaper ban is underinclusive because the jail permits other material that can cause these problems, he does not dispute that newspapers can be used for these purposes.
Having concluded that the newspaper policy is rationally connected to
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maintaining jail security, the Court must assess "whether the . . . policy is a reasonable solution to the stated security problem . . . ." Lindell, 377 F.3d at 659. This question is assessed by means of the remaining Turner factors. Id.
The second Turner factor is "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates." Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The lack of alternative means for exercising the right is evidence that the regulation is unreasonable. Overton, 539 U.S. at 135. It is undisputed that the jail categorically bans newspapers. This factor thus weighs in favor of Koger.
Defendants note that Koger was permitted to read books and magazines, receive visitors and letters, and make telephone calls. They argue that these are adequate alternatives for jail inmates. But courts have not framed the right at this level of generality—that is, simply as a right to read, or as a right to receive news. In Beard, for instance, though the inmate was denied access to newspapers and magazines, he was "permitted legal and personal correspondence, religious and legal materials, two library books, and writing paper." Beard, 548 U.S. at 526 (emphasis added). Even though the inmate was permitted to read books and engage in correspondence, the Supreme Court found that "no alternative means of exercising the right remain[ed] open to him." Id. at 532 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Lindell, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a newspaper subscription is not an alternative to newspaper clippings "because subscribing requires inmates to anticipate which papers might have articles that they like to read and to subscribe to all such papers." Lindell, 377 F.3d at 659. That suggests that the right at issue is not simply a general right to read or find out about the news. Other courts have similarly characterized the right as a right to read
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newspapers, not a right to read or a right to receive news. See Thomas, 176 F.3d at *5, 8 (concluding that the jail did not provide adequate alternatives to newspapers even though inmates had access to paperback books and television).
Defendants point to Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). There, the Supreme Court stated that in evaluating the second Turner factor, "'the right' in question must be viewed sensibly and expansively." Id. at 417. But the Court did not have occasion to consider the sort of restriction at issue here, as the policy in Thornburgh did not restrict an entire category of publications. Rather, that policy provided that a publication could be rejected "only if it is determined detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution," prohibited the prison "from establishing an excluded list of publications," and required that "each issue of a subscription publication . . . be reviewed separately." Id. at 404-05. Because the policy permitted a "broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read," the Court concluded that inmates had alternative means of exercising their First Amendment rights. Id. at 418. Thus, given the policy at issue in Thornburgh—which permitted all categories of reading material, even if certain items were restricted on a case-by-case basis—the Court's comment that the right should be viewed "sensibly and expansively" cannot be read to equate newspapers with books and magazines for purposes of the present analysis. Indeed, the Court indicated that although "[t]he exercise of discretion called for by [the] regulations may produce seeming 'inconsistencies' . . . [a]ny attempt to achieve greater consistency by broader exclusions might itself run afoul of the second Turner factor . . . ." Id. at 417 n.15.
Defendants also contend that television is an alternative to newspapers that the
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jail does not restrict. But "[t]elevision cannot supply the depth and diversity of coverage that newspapers can provide." Thomas, 176 F.3d at *8; see also Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Whatever the intrinsic merits of television in comparison with newspapers and magazines, the contents of television are different from what one finds in the printed media. It is not up to the Midland County Sheriff or this court to decide that television can adequately serve the first amendment right to receive protected materials."). It is undisputed, furthermore, that "[w]hat inmates watch on television is subject to consensus among the prisoners about what to watch, or alternatively, left to the discretion of corrections officers." Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s LR 56.1(a), ¶ 27. This likewise weighs against the availability of television as saving the jail's newspaper ban. See Thomas, 176 F.3d at *8.
The third and fourth Turner factors are often intertwined. The third Turner factor is "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally." Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Assessment of this factor can depend on how the right is accommodated, which goes to the fourth Turner factor: "[T]he existence of obvious, easy alternatives" that suggest that the regulation "is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison concerns." Id. Although "[t]his is not a 'least restrictive alternative' test," if Koger "can point to an alternative that fully accommodates [his] rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests," the Court "may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Id. at 90-91.
It is undisputed that the jail permits inmates to possess paper bags, notepaper, drawing pads, books, magazines (including magazines made from the same material as
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newspapers), envelopes, legal materials, greeting cards, playing cards, religious texts, letters and photos sent from outside the jail, toilet paper, extra undergarments, and bedding. All of this material can, like newspapers, be used to start fires, clog toilets, or make weapons. Defendants contend that newspapers are uniquely flammable. But aside from an isolated, conclusory statement in the deposition of defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) designee, there is not a speck of evidence to support this contention (indeed, it is undisputed that defendants did not consider empirical evidence about the flammability of newspapers in fashioning the policy). See Pl.'s LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Ex. 2 (Kurtovich Dep.), at 32:8-11 (stating that in his "personal opinion" newspapers are more flammable than other kinds of paper, but admitting "I'm not a fire expert"). Moreover, because the jail already limits inmate possessions to a property box, allowing newspapers would not increase the amount of such material in circulation. On this record, no reasonable fact finder could find that lifting the ban on newspapers would have more than a de minimis impact on the number of fires, clogged toilets, or paper mâché weapons in the jail. As to these three rationales, then, the third Turner factor weighs in favor of Koger.
The impact of lifting the ban on waste disposal, however, is less clear. Because newspapers typically are published with greater frequency than other publications, they generate more waste that requires disposal. Even with the property box limitations, then, lifting the ban would increase waste disposal to some extent. Although Koger contends that few inmates would order newspaper subscriptions, this is speculative. On this point, the Court defers to the professional judgment of the prison administrators.
The impact of lifting the ban on inmate violence—by providing a source of information about the nature of other inmates' charges or outside gang activity—is also
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unclear. It is true that inmates can already learn about charges pending against of other inmates and local gang activity from television, letters, and visitors. But newspapers would provide an additional—and arguably more comprehensive—source of this information. The Court thus defers to the professional judgment of the prison administrators on this point as well.
As to these two rationales, then, the third Turner factor weighs in favor of the prison administrators. Accordingly, the Court must determine whether, under the fourth Turner factor, Koger's proposed alternatives to the newspaper ban would accommodate his rights at de minimis cost to jail security.
Koger identifies four alternatives to an absolute ban on newspapers. Specifically, he says that the jail could limit the number of newspapers permitted in each inmate's cell; prohibit local newspapers, which are more likely to contain information about other inmates and local gang activity; require newspapers to be sent directly from the publisher; or permit newspapers only in the jail's libraries and dayrooms.
Defendants have essentially refused to address these alternatives.2 They argue only that they are not supported by evidence and repeat the assertion that "the unique risk posed by newspapers highlights the lack of alternative approaches." Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 21. The Court is disinclined to do defendants' work for them. That said, some of these alternatives would not fully address the concerns raised by the jail. A limit on the number of newspapers permitted in each inmate's cell, for instance, would not completely address the claim of instigation of inmate violence,
2 Notably, defendants have not argued that any of Koger's proposed alternatives would unduly burden jail resources.
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because some (though fewer) newspapers identifying inmates' charges or describing local gang activity would still get through. And there would be some material (though less) that theoretically could be used to make weapons—though this is not really a viable security concern, as described earlier, given the absence of limitations on other paper-based materials. Prohibiting local newspapers would address the jail's concern about inciting violence by reports about inmates' pending charges or describing local gang activity. It would not necessarily resolve the waste disposal burden, however, though it is fair to infer that a prohibition on local newspapers would lower the overall number of newspapers received at the jail.
The last of these alternatives proposed by Koger—permitting newspapers in libraries and day rooms, but not individual cells—would accommodate the right while completely addressing the jail's concerns.3 Restricting newspapers to these rooms would limit the amount of additional material entering the jail, thus addressing defendants' waste disposal concerns. It would also enable the jail to control information that is likely to cause violence. The jail could decide to purchase only national or international newspapers, which would be far less likely to contain information about the jail's inmates and local gang activity. The jail could also review each incoming issue for objectionable content. Because the jail already reviews incoming mail for security risks, there is no basis to believe this would pose any more than a minimal added burden on prison administrative resources.
The existence of this obvious, easy alternative to a total ban suggests that
3 The Court notes that, because the jail completely bans newspapers, the right at issue here is the right to read newspapers; no question is raised about a right to subscribe to newspapers or to read a broad variety of newspapers.
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banning newspapers is an exaggerated and therefore unreasonable response to the
jail's concerns. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. That is not to say that this alternative
would pass constitutional muster; the First Amendment may require even greater
access to newspapers. But the Court need not define the precise contours of a
restriction that would be constitutional in order to invalidate the restriction that is
currently in place. For present purposes, the availability of an alternative that would
accommodate the right but would not adversely impact jail security provides evidence
that the jail's absolute ban on newspapers is unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.
The newspaper policies of other penal institutions provide further evidence that the ban is an exaggerated response to concerns about institutional security.4 See Pl.'s
LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Ex. 15. At least three other Illinois counties permit access to
newspapers. See DuPage Cty. Sheriff, Corrections & Jail: Mail & Letters,
http://www.dupagesheriff.org/Corrections-Jail/90/ (last visited July 6, 2015) ("Books,
magazines and newspapers must be NEW and sent directly from the publisher (i.e.
Newsweek, Chicago Tribune) or a reputable and verified .com company."); Will Cty.
Sheriff, Adult Detention Inmates & Facilities: Mail Regulations,
http://www.willcosheriff.org/adult-detention/mail-regulations (last visited July 6, 2015)
(stating that the jail bans "[l]ocal newspaper articles" and "[b]ooks / magazines not
directly sent from a publisher"); Champaign Cty. Sheriff, Correctional Center Inmate
4 Defendants argue that the information from these websites is hearsay. But "a court 'shall' take judicial notice of a fact that is 'not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.'" Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). This includes information contained on government websites. Id. at 926-27 (collecting cases, holding that the district court abused its discretion by withdrawing judicial notice of information contained on federal government website, and taking judicial notice of this information).
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Mail Information, http://www1.co.champaign.il.us/SHERIFF/InmateMail.php (last visited July 6, 2015) (stating that the jail bans "[l]ocal newspaper articles" and "[b]ooks / magazines not directly sent from a publisher"). The Federal Bureau of Prisons and Illinois Department of Corrections also permit newspapers. The Federal Bureau of Prisons allows inmates to "subscribe to or to receive" newspapers "without prior approval" if they are sent directly from the publisher. 28 C.F.R. § 540.70; id. § 540.71. The Illinois Department of Corrections' policy is even more lenient: "[I]nmates can receive publications, including . . . newspapers . . . . Inmates can receive publications from a vendor, friend or family. There is no limit through the mail. Publications brought to the facility shall be limited to 5 per visit." Ill. Dep't of Corrs., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.illinois.gov/idoc/aboutus/Pages/faq.aspx (last visited July 6, 2015).
The Court must "accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators . . . ." Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. But though deference given to prison officials is substantial, it is not complete. See Stanley v. Henson, 337 F.3d 961, 966 (7th Cir. 2003). As this Court previously observed in another context, "[o]fficials do not have carte blanche to institute any policy they please under the justification of institutional security." Thompson v. Cty. of Cook, 412 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Stanley, 337 F.3d at 966). Id. Although the jail's newspaper ban is rationally connected to jail security, the remaining Turner factors weigh heavily against defendants. The policy is the most extreme response available to the jail; it completely extinguishes an inmate's ability to exercise his First Amendment right to read newspapers. And it is an exaggerated response to the jail's security concerns, as there
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are obvious, easy alternatives to an outright ban that would accommodate the right, with de minimis impact on the jail. Indeed, state and federal prisons have already accommodated the same right at issue here (much more generously, the Court notes, than Koger's proposed alternative), and there is no basis to believe that these accommodations have jeopardized institutional security. On the present record, no reasonable jury could find that banning newspapers is "reasonably related to [the jail's] legitimate penological interest[]." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Court is therefore "not persuaded that deference [to jail administrators] is proper." Kincaid, 670 F.2d at 74445.
Defendants have failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether the jail's newspaper ban is reasonably related to institutional security. The Court therefore concludes that the jail's policy banning newspapers is unconstitutional. Because the jail applied this policy to Koger by returning a newspaper that was mailed to him, he is entitled to summary judgment on his First Amendment claim.
The only forms of relief available to Koger in light of the mootness of his request for an injunction and the absence of a claim of actual damages are his request for a declaratory judgment and nominal damages. Because Koger is entitled to summary judgment, he is entitled to both of these forms of relief. The Court directs the parties to confer regarding an appropriate form of judgment and to submit a proposal or separate proposals to the Court by no later than July 13, 2015.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court partly grants and partly denies both motions for summary judgment [dkt. nos. 62, 70 & 93]. The Court will issue a declaratory
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judgment in plaintiff's favor and will award plaintiff nominal damages in the amount of one dollar. The Court denies plaintiff's request for an injunction. The parties' proposed form(s) of judgment are to be submitted by July 13, 2015. The case is set for a status hearing on July 15, 2015 at 9:30 a.m.

Date: July 6, 2015

___ _____________________________ MATTHEW F. KENNELLY United States District Judge

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