UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----------------------------------------------------------------------X GERTRUDE WILLISTON; and TAWANA, LATOYA, and TANDIKA CUMMINS, by their parent, PAULETTE CUMMINS, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

04 Civ.

Plaintiffs, - against -

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services; and ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance.

Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------X

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Plaintiffs Gertrude Williston and Tawana, Latoya and Tamika Cummins bring this

action on behalf of themselves and a class of needy New York City individuals and families, challengingDefendants’policiesandpracticesoffailingtoprovidefoodstampstothoseeligibleina timelymanner,inviolationoffederalandstatelaw,andStateDefendant’sfailureto properly oversee andsuperviseCityDefendant’sadministrationoftheFoodStampsprogram,inviolationoffederal

and state law.

2. Plaintiff Gertrude Williston brings this action on behalf of herself and a subclass of needy New York City individuals and families,challengingDefendants’policiesandpracticesof

failing to provide food stamps to those eligible within thirty days of application, in violation of

federal and state law.

3. Plaintiffs Tawana, Latoya, and Tamika Cummins, by their parent, Paulette Cummins,

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bring this action on behalf of themselves and a subclass of needy New York City individuals and families,challengingDefendants’policiesandpracticesof(a)deterring,discouragingandpreventing individuals and families from filing applications for food stamps upon initial contact with the NonPublicAssistance(“NPA”)foodstampsoffices;and(b)failingtoprovideexpeditedfoodstamp benefits at the NPA food stamps offices within the time frame required by federal and state law.
4. Plaintiffs seek to permanently enjoin Defendants to provide food stamps to those eligible in a timely manner, in compliance with federal and state law.
5. Plaintiffs further seek to permanently enjoin Defendants (a) from deterring, discouraging and preventing persons from filing applications for food stamps upon initial contact with the NPA food stamps offices; and (b) to issue expedited food stamp benefits at the NPA food stamp offices within the time frames required by federal and state law.
6. Plaintiffs seek to permanently enjoin State Defendant to oversee and supervise City Defendant’sadministrationoftheFoodStampprogram.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 7. This action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation of statutory and constitutional rights. 8. Jurisdiction over this action is conferred upon this court by (a) 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for jurisdiction in the United States district courts of civil actions arising under the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States; (b) 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), which provides for jurisdiction in the United States district courts of civil actions to redress deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States; and (c) 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which vests United States district courts with supplemental and pendent jurisdiction.
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9. Venue properly lies with this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). CLASS ALLEGATIONS
10. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of a class defined as: All New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps in New York City.
11. This class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Hundreds of New York City residents apply for food stamps in New York City each month.
12. There are numerous questions of fact and law common to the class concerning whether Defendants fail to provide food stamps within the time frames required by law.
13. TheindividualPlaintiffs’claimsaretypicaloftheclaimsofthe class in that all of the named Plaintiffs are eligible for food stamps, and have sought to apply for or are seeking to apply for food stamps in New York City.
14. Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of a subclass defined as All New York City residents who have applied for food stamps in New York City and who have not had those applications processed within thirty days of the date of application.
15. The subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Hundreds of New York City residents apply for food stamps in New York City each month.
16. There are numerous questions of fact and law common to the class concerning whether Defendants fail to provide food stamps within the time frames required by law.
17. GertrudeWilliston’sclaimsaretypical of the claims of the subclass in that she is eligible for food stamps, has sought to apply for or is seeking to apply for food stamps and has not received food stamps within thirty days of the date of application.
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18. Plaintiffs further bring this action on behalf of a subclass defined as: All New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps in New York City at food stamps offices which do not accept applications for cash assistance, and who have been deterred, discouraged and prevented from filing applications and/or who have not received expedited food stamp benefits.
19. The subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Hundreds of New York City residents apply for food stamps at the NPA food stamps offices each month.
20. There are numerous questions of fact and law common to the subclass concerning Defendants’policiesandpracticesof(a)deterring,discouragingandpreventingPlaintiffsand Plaintiff subclass members from filing applications for food stamp benefits upon initial contact with the NPA food stamps offices; and (b) failing to provide expedited food stamp benefits at the NPA food stamps.
21. Tawana,Latoya,andTandikaCummins’sclaimsaretypicaloftheclaimsofthe subclass in that they were deterred, discouraged and prevented from filing an application for food stamps upon initial contact with the NPA food stamps office.
22. Declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate with respect to the class as a whole and with respect to the subclasses as a whole because Defendants have acted on grounds applicable to the class and to the subclass.
23. The named Plaintiffs and the proposed class, along with the proposed subclasses, are represented by the New York Legal Assistance Group, the Urban Justice Center and the Welfare Law
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Center, whose attorneys are experienced in class action litigation and will adequately represent the class.
24. A class action is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this matter in that the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would unduly burden the Court and create the possibility of conflicting decisions.
PARTIES Plaintiffs
25. Plaintiff Gertrude Williston resides at 1269 Sheridan Avenue, Apt. 5K, Bronx, NY. 26. Plaintiffs Tawana, Latoya, and Tandika Cummins reside at 317 Lefferts Avenue, Apt. 5F, Brooklyn, NY. Defendants 27. Defendant Verna Eggleston is the Commissioner of the City of New York Human Resources Administration, which is the local social services agency that covers New York City. She is responsible for, inter alia (a) the overall operation and administration of the Food Stamps program within New York City, including the operation of the Food Stamps Centers; and (b) complying with federal and state law and regulations relating to the Food Stamps program. 28. Defendant Robert Doar is the Commissioner of the State of New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance. He is responsible for, inter alia, (a) the administration of New YorkState’sFoodStampsprogram;(b)supervisionoftheadministrationoftheFoodStamps program for the local social services districts, including New York City; and (c) complying with federal and state law and regulations relating to the Food Stamps program.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEME
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Food Stamps Entitlement 29. Congress established the federally funded, state-administered Food Stamp program in
1964 to“safeguardthehealthandwell-beingofthenation’spopulationsbyraisinglevelsofnutrition among low-incomehouseholds.”7U.S.C.§2011;7C.F.R.§271.1.
30. Tobeeligibleforongoingfoodstamps,ahousehold’snetincomemustbebelowthe federal poverty line, and its available resources may not exceed $2,000 (or, where a household includes a member who is disabled or is sixty years of age or older, $3,000). 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c), (g). Law Governing Processing of Applications
31. Under the federal Food Stamp Act, households must be permitted to file an application on the first day they contact the local social services office. 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e)(2)(B)(iii); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c)(1), (2)(i).
32. If an individual or household seeks to apply jointly for cash assistance and food stamps, any delays in the processing of the application for cash assistance may not result in a delay of the processing of the food stamps application. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b); 2020(e)(1)(B)(i), (e)(3); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (g)(1).
33. If the cash assistance application is denied or withdrawn, the applicant can not be required to submit a new application for food stamps. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014 (b); 2020(e)(1)(B)(i), (e)(3); 7 C.F.R.§ 273.2(g)(1).
34. The State agency and its delegate agencies must provide ongoing food stamps to eligible applicants no later than 30 days after date of application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R § 273.2 (a), (g)(1). Expedited Food Stamp Benefits Requirements
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35. The State agency and its delegate agencies must provide expedited food stamps to: (1) households with $100 or less in liquid resources (cash) and less than $150 in gross monthly income; (2) households with shelter costs that are more than the total gross income and liquid resources; and (3) certain migrant and seasonal worker households. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (i)(1).
36. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9) is implemented by 7 C.F.R.§ 273.2(i)(2), which requires a state toaffirmatively“identifyhouseholdseligibleforexpeditedserviceatthetimethehouseholdrequests assistance. For example, a receptionist, volunteer, or other employee shall be responsible for screening applications as they are filed or as individuals come in to apply.”7C.F.R.§273.2(i)(2) (emphasis added); 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9).
37. Under federal law, expedited food stamp benefits must be provided to eligible households not later than the seventh calender day following the date an application is filed. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i)(3)(i).
38. However, in New York State, expedited food stamp benefits must be available to eligible households within five days of the date the application is filed. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a). FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO THE PLAINTIFF CLASS AND SUBCLASSES A. Background
39. Persons seeking to apply for food stamps may apply at either a Job Center or an NPA food stamps office. Both locations are administered by Defendants. At Job Centers, applicants can also apply for cash assistance and/or medical assistance. At NPA food stamps offices, applicants may only apply for food stamps.
40. There are 32 Job Centers and 20 NPA food stamps offices located throughout the five
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boroughs of New York City. 41. Accordingtothe2003NewYorkCityMayor’sManagementReport,approximately
871,000 people received food stamps in New York City in Fiscal Year 2003. Of that, approximately 439,000 received food stamps through NPA food stamps offices.
42. However, it is estimated that approximately 800,000 people who are eligible for food stamps do not receive that crucial assistance. B. The Application Process in the Job Centers
43. At first contact with a Job Center, a person seeking assistance is given a State approvedsixteenpagecommonapplicationform,sometimesreferredtoasthe“jointapplication.”
44. Defendants routinely fail to provide food stamps to eligible persons within thirty days of applying. C. The Application Process at the NPA Food Stamps Offices
45. Applicants for food stamps must be provided with a four page food stamps application upon initial contact with the NPA food stamps offices.
46. Defendants deter, discourage and prevent persons from applying for food stamps at initial contact with the NPA food stamps offices. Workers, in violation of federal and state law, routinely tell persons that they cannot apply for food stamps because they do not have income, or because of their immigration status.
47. Workers at NPA food stamp offices, in violation of federal and state law, routinely tell persons that they cannot apply for food stamps on the first date they contact the NPA food stamps office and instead must return another day, and/or unnecessarily misdirect persons to other NPA food stamps offices or Job Centers.
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48. Workers at NPA food stamps offices, in violation of federal and state law, routinely providemisinformationaboutimmigrants’eligibilityforfoodstampsandwronglyinform persons that they cannot apply for food stamps without original copies of documents such as Social Security cards or birth certificates.
49. Defendants routinely fail to screen persons who come to the NPA food stamps offices for expedited food stamps benefits eligibility.
50. Defendants routinely fail to issue expedited food stamps to eligible households within five days of applying.
FACTS OF INDIVIDUAL NAMED PLAINTIFFS Gertrude Williston
51. Gertrude Williston is 59 years old and resides at 1269 Sheridan Avenue, Apartment 5K, Bronx New York, with her husband, Rupert Williston, also age 59.
52. Gertrude Williston and her husband have been lawful permanent residents of the United States since August 1998.
53. Rupert Williston worked as a carpenter in Jamaica and the United States for more than twenty years. He was forced to stop working in December 2003 when he suffered a stroke. Due to neurological problems stemming from the stroke, he has not been physically able to work since his stroke.
54. Ms. Williston has been supporting her husband and herself on and off as a home health aide. She worked for Alliance for Health from April 14, 2002 to August 22, 2003. At that point she took a short-term disability leave because she suffered from diabetes, high blood pressure and other medical conditions.
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55. Ms. Williston received short-term disability benefits of $170 gross per week for a

week in early September 2003, and then again from early November until the middle of December

2003. At the end of her short-term disability leave, her employer could not find work for her.

56. In January 2004, Ms. Williston applied for unemployment insurance benefits but was

denied. She continued to look for employment without success.

57. Without any income or resources, the Willistons depended on the assistance of their

38 year-old daughter, Yvonne Reid, to help them with their rent, food and expenses. However, their

daughter could not afford to continue to support them as she has her own family and works at a low-

wage job. 58.

TheWilliston’srentis$625permonthandtheypayapproximately$45amonthfor

gas and electricity. They are currently two months behind in their rent.

59. On or about January 26, 2004, Gertrude Williston went for a routine check up at

Lincoln Hospital. At the hospital, a food stamps outreach worker from the Citizens Advice Bureau

told her about food stamps and advised her that she and her husband were eligible for them. The

outreach worker helped Ms. Williston complete a food stamps application and scheduled an

appointment for her to apply for food stamps at Center 40, an NPA food stamps office, on January

30, 2004.

60. On January 30, 2004, Ms. Williston went to Center 40 to apply for food stamps for

her husband and herself. She submitted the completed application to the caseworker, Ms. Finley.

She told Ms. Finley that she had applied for unemployment insurance benefits in January 2004. Ms. FinleyaskedhertoprovideherwithacopyoftheDepartmentofLabor’smedicalformthatwas

completed by her treating physician, Dr. Pathkumar, as part of the application for unemployment

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insurance benefits by February 20th. Ms. Finley also told her that in a few days she would receive expedited food stamp benefits on the Medicaid benefits card that she already had.
61. On or about February 2nd, Ms. Williston received $275 in expedited food stamps, covering January 30, 2004 to February 29, 2004.
62. On or about February 18, Ms. Williston called Ms. Finley to explain that she could not obtain a copy of the Department of Labor letter by the deadline. Ms. Finley granted Ms. Williston an extension until February 27, 2004 to return the form.
63. On February 26, 2004, Ms. Williston went to Center 40 and submitted a copy of the Department of Labor medical form to the receptionist.
64. The Willistons ran out of food from the expedited food stamps by the second week of March. They were again forced to borrow money for rent, food and utilities from their daughter.
65. Ms. Williston has never received a notice regarding the status of her food stamps application.
66. Aside from the expedited food stamps that were used up by the second week of March, Ms. Williston has not received any other food stamps.
67. In the beginning of May 2003, Ms. Williston began working as a home health aide at Caring People Alliance, where she earns $540 gross every two weeks; even with this income, they continue to be eligible for food stamps. Even with her job, they continue to have difficulty meeting their expenses, such as food and rent.
68. Due to her diabetes and high blood pressure, Ms. Williston should eat a special diet of fish and vegetables. With their limited income and lack of resources, she often cannot afford to eat these foods; her blood sugar levels are often too high as a result. Mr. Williston also has a special
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anti-cholesterol diet, and they often cannot afford to buy him the nutritious, low-cholesterol foods that he requires.
69. Ms. Williston contacted Ms. Betancourt at the Citizens Advice Bureau to tell her that they had never received ongoing food stamps. She referred her to Amy Leung, an advocate at the Urban Justice Center.
70. OnApril23,2004,Ms.LeungrequestedafairhearingtochallengeDefendants’ failure to provide Ms. Williston with food stamps.
71. OnMay19,2004,atafairhearingwasheldregardingtheCityDefendant’sfailureto actonMs.Williston’s food stamps application.
72. StateDefendant’sAdministrativeLawJudgeruledinMs.Williston’sfavorina decision dated May 26, 2004. In this decision, the City Defendant is directed to process Ms. Williston’sapplicationforfoodstampsandtorestoreall lost benefits resulting from their failure to provide Ms. Williston with food stamps within thirty days of her submitting the application.
73. To date, Ms. Williston has not received any further food stamps. Tawana, Latoya, and Tandika Cummins
74. Tawana, Latoya, and Tandika Cummins reside with their parents, Paulette and Aubrey Cummins, and their grandmother, Lynette Cummins, at 317 Lefferts Avenue, Apartment 5F, Brooklyn, NY.
75. Lynette Cummins purchases and prepares food separately from the rest of the family because she has a special anti-cholesterol diet; she is therefore considered a separate household for food stamps purposes.
76. Each member of the Cummins family is a legal permanent resident.
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77. Tawana, Latoya, and Tandika Cummins are eligible for food stamps; due to additional durational residency requirements imposed non-disabled adults, Paulette and Aubrey Cummins are not.
78. Paulette Cummins supports her family on the $678 monthly she earns as a sales clerk. Aubrey Cummins has been searching for work, but has been unsuccessful and is currently unemployed.
79. TheCummins’smonthlyrentis$574andtheypayapproximately$86amonthforgas and electricity.
80. With this limited income, it is difficult for Ms. Cummins to provide her family with adequate food.
81. In October 2003, Ms. Cummins went to apply for food stamps for Tawana, Latoya, and Tandika at the NPA food stamps office located at 275 Bergen Street in Brooklyn. She completed the application for food stamps and spoke to her caseworker, Ms. Dunston. Ms. Dunston looked at her application and wrongly told her that her children were not eligible for food stamps because they were only legal permanent residents, not citizens. She refused to accept or process the application.
82. Ms. Cummins then contacted a community organization in New York City. One of theorganization’sstaffmembersdraftedaletterforhertosubmittotheNPAfoodstampsoffice when she reapplied for food stamps.
83. On November 7, 2003, Ms. Cummins returned to the same NPA food stamps office with a signed application for food stamps. She then again met with the caseworker. Once again, Ms. Dunston tried to discourage her from applying for food stamps for her children. She again wrongly
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told her that her children were not eligible for food stamps because they only recently came to the United States.
84. InresponsetoMs.Dunston’sdiscouragement,Ms.Cumminsshowedhertheletter from the community organization worker. After Ms. Dunston read the letter, she took the completed application.
85. On this same day, Ms. Dunston told her that she had to return to the NPA food stamps office by November 19th with certain required documents.
86. On November 13, 2003, well before the November 19th deadline, Ms. Cummins went to the NPA food stamps office to drop off the requested documents.
87. On or about November 14, 2003, Tamara, Latoya, and Tandika received $296 in expedited food stamps, covering November 7 to November 30, 2003.
88. By mid-December, Ms. Cummins had not heard anything from the NPA food stamps office about the ongoing food stamps application and had not received any ongoing food stamps. The family had used up their expedited food stamps at this point. Ms. Cummins called Ms. Dunston and was informed that she would have to wait for an unknown period of time because there were too many applications to handle.
89. By the first week of January 2004, Tamara, Latoya, Tandika were still without ongoing food stamps. Worried, Ms. Cummins again called Ms. Dunston and was told that her children would receive food stamps in a week.
90. On January 13, 2004, more than two months after submitting the food stamps application, Tawana, Latoya, and Tandika finally received ongoing food stamps.
91. During the more than two month period that Tawana, Latoya, and Tandika waited for
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food stamps, it was tremendously difficult for Ms. Cummins to feed the family. She only had enough food to cook dinner twice a week. The family made these two meals last the rest of the week by eating very small portions. She also could not afford nutritious food, such as juice, fruits and meat. Their meals largely consisted of rice, vegetables and crackers.
92. Although the children receive free lunch at school, often four-year old Tandika complained of hunger.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FIRST CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS 93. Defendants’policiesandpracticesoffailingtoprovideongoingfoodstampsto eligible individuals and families within thirty days of the date of application violates 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(2), (g)(1). SECOND CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS 94. Defendants’policiesandpracticesofdeterring,discouragingandpreventingeligible individuals and families from filing applications for food stamps at initial contact with the NPA food stamps offices violate 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B),(e)(9), and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (c)(2), (e)(1), (g), (i)(2)(3). THIRD CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS 95. Defendants’policiesandpracticesoffailingtoprovideexpeditedfoodstampbenefits in a timely manner to eligible households at NPA food stamps offices violate 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (a)(2), (i)(2), (i)(3)(i); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 133; and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a). FOURTH CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS
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96. State Defendant’spolicyandpracticeoffailingtoproperlyoverseeandsuperviseCity Defendant’sadministrationofthefoodstampsprogramviolates7U.S.C.§2020,et seq, and N.Y. Soc. Serv. L § 95(3)(a).
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court 13. Permanently enjoin Defendants from (i) failing to provide food stamps to eligible individuals and families within the federally- mandated time frames; (ii) deterring, discouraging and preventing needy individuals and families from filing applications for food stamps at initial contact with the NPA food stamp offices; and (iii) failing to provide expedited food stamp benefits to eligible individuals and families within the time frames required by federal and state law at NPA food stamps offices; 14. Enteradeclarationpursuantto28U.S.C.§2202thatDefendants’policiesand practices of (i) failing to provide food stamps in a timely manner to eligible individuals and families; (ii) deterring, discouraging and preventing needy individuals and families from filing applications for food stamps at initial contact with the NPA food stamp offices; and (iii) failing to provide expedited food stamp benefits to eligible individuals and families within the time frames required by federal and state lawatNPAfoodstampsoffices,violatethePlaintiffs’andPlaintiffclassandsubclass members’rightsunderfederalandstatelaw; 15. Enteradeclarationpursuantto28U.S.C.§2202thatStateDefendant’spoliciesand practices of failing to properly overseeandsuperviseCityDefendant’sadministrationofthefood stampsprogramviolatethePlaintiffs’andPlaintiffclassandsubclassmembers’rightsunderfederal and state law;
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16. Enjoin State Defendant from failing to oversee and supervise CityDefendant’s administration of the Food Stamp program;
17. Enjoin Defendants to (i) identify all persons unlawfully deterred from or delayed in applying for food stamps at NPA food stamp offices, process their applications, and provide them with benefits, if eligible, retroactive to the first day they attempted to apply, and (ii) identify all persons who did not receive food stamps in a timely manner, and provide them with benefits, if eligible, retroactive to the date of application;
18. Award reasonable attorneys’fees,asprovidedby42U.S.C.§1988; 19. Award costs and disbursements; and 20. Order such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York June 14, 2004

Respectfully submitted,

WENDY BACH, ESQ. (WB 1878) THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER HOMELESSNESS OUTREACH PREVENTION PROJECT 666 Broadway, 10th Floor New York, NY 10012 Tel. (646) 602-5640
YISROEL SCHULMAN, ESQ. (YS 3107) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Randal S. Jeffrey, of Counsel (RSJ 3396) Elissa S. Devins, of Counsel (ESD 9197) 130 East 59th Street, 14th Floor New York, New York 10022 Tel. (212) 750-0800
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HENRY A. FREEDMAN WELFARE LAW CENTER, INC. Marc Cohan (MC 2612) Rebecca L. Scharf (RS 4166) Petra T. Tasheff (PT 8762) 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1205 New York, NY 10001 Tel. (212) 633-6967 By: ____________________________________
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 Legal Notice Approved by Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Honorable Robert W. Sweet, United States District Judge, Dated: New York, NY, February 27,2008, Williston v. Eggleston, 04 Civ. 4454.
NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION CONCERNING THE TIMELY PROCESSING OF FOOD STAMPS APPLICATIONS
Have you recently applied for or do you intend to apply for food stamps at a Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Center? Have you recently received assistance in completing an application for food stamps from a community-based organization in New York City? If you answered yes to either question, you should read this notice because it gives you information about the settlement of a lawsuit about the Food Stamp application process.
BACKGROUND
In 2004, a lawsuit, Williston v. Eggleston, 04 Civ. 4454, was brought claiming that the New York City Human Resources AdministrationiDepartment of Social Services ("BRA") does not process applications for food stamps on time. The lawsuit also claimed that the State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA) failed to supervise the timeliness by which BRA processes food stamp applications. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify the case as a class action on behalf of New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps in a Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Center in New York City. The Commissioners of OTDA and HRA deny any wrongdoing, and the Court has not made any fmal decisions about the claims in the lawsuit. The parties have agreed to a settlement in the case, which must be approved by the Court.
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
You can see the entire proposed settlement at the websites for the plaintiffs' counsel: New York Legal Assistance Group, www.nvlag.org; Urban Justice Center, www.urbanjustice.org; and Welfare Law Center, www.ncleLorg.
The basic terms of the settlement are:
1. The plaintiff class will consist of "all individuals who apply for Food Stamp benefits at a Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Center, or for whom an application is submitted at a Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Center."
2. BRA will post and maintain signs in Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Centers with information on the right to apply for Food Stamp benefits and the time frames for the provision offood stamps.
3. BRA will screen Food Stamp applications for eligibility for expedited processing. 4. BRA will provide Food Stamps to eligible households within five days if eligible for expedited food stamp processing,
and within thirty days if otherwise eligible, unless the delay was caused by the household. 5. OTDA will supervise BRA's compliance with the timeliness provisions of the federal food stamp laws. 6. BRA will monitor its own compliance with the timeliness provisions ·of the food stamp laws. 7. Plaintiffs' counsel will also monitor HRA's and OTDA's compliance with their obligations under the settlement.
RIGHT TO OBJECT
Any class member has the right to let the Court, the attorneys, and the parties know if he or she objects to the proposed settlement. The Court has set a hearing for this purpose on April 16, 2008, at 12:00 p.ni. at the following address:
Honorable Robert W. Sweet, United States District Judge United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St., Room 1920, New York, NY 10007
Class members may also object to the settlement by sending a letter marked ''Williston Settlement" and postmarked by April 10, 2008, to the Court at the address listed above. Class members may also call the Urban Justice Center, which represents the plaintiffs in this lawsuit, with objections to or comments on the settlement or with any questions, at: 646-6025639.

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------------x
GERTRUDE WILLISTON; and TAWANA, LATOYA, and TANDIKA CUMMINS, by their parent, PAULETTE CUMMINS, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

.. ··t··... T'~'-'-" ".,..
.7 19tCB,... ,

- and -

Plaintiffs,

04 Civ. 4454 (RWS)

JOSE FELIZ, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenors

o PIN ION

- against -

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services; and ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,

Defendants.

----------------------------------------x

A P PEA RAN C E S:

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER HOMELESSNESS OUTREACH PREVENTION PROJECT
666 Broadway, 10th Floor New York, NY 10012 By: WENDY BACH, ESQ.
MUNIR PUJARA, ESQ. Of Counsel

NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP 130 East 59th Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10022 By: YISROEL SCHULMAN, ESQ.
RANDAL S. JEFFREY, ESQ. ELISSA D. DEVINS, ESQ. Of Counsel

APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE:

WELFARE LAW CENTER, INC. 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1205 New York, NY 10001 By: MARC COHAN, ESQ.
REBECCA L. SCHARF, ESQ. PETRA T. TASHEFF, ESQ. Of Counsel
Attorneys for Defendants:
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER Attorney General of the State of New York 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 By: DEBORAH HOCHHAUSER, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel

Sweet, D.J.,
Florence Greenbaum ("Greenbaum") and Jose Feliz ("Feliz") have moved under Rule 24(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., to intervene in this putative class action, and their motion is opposed by defendant Robert Doar, Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("State Commissioner" or the "State,,).l For the reasons set forth below, the motion to intervene is granted.
Prior Proceedings
The plaintiffs Gertrude Williston ("Williston") and Tawana Cummins, Latoya Cummins and Tandika Cummins and their parent Paulette Cummins (the "Cummins"), filed their class action complaint (the "Complaint") on June 15, 2004. The Complaint and the proceedings thus far in this action are described more fully in the opinion filed this date denying the defendants' motion to dismiss.
This motion to intervene was marked fully submitted on January 19, 2005.
1 The defendant Verna Eggleston, Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, has by stipulation agreed to the proposed intervention.
1

The Intervenors

Greenbaum is homeless and stays at a shelter in Manhattan. She has alleged that she has no income or liquid resources, is eligible for expedited food stamps, and applied for food stamps in person on December 10, 2004, and Greenbaum has not received expedited or ongoing food stamps. (Greenberg Aff. ~~ 1, 2, 3.)

Feliz, a Bronx resident, has alleged by affidavit that he applied for food stamps on November 15, 2004, that he is eligible for expedited processing of his food stamp application and has not received food stamps or been contacted by the government. (Feliz Aff. ~~ 5, 6, 7.)

The Standard For Intervention

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24(b) provides, in

I

relevant part, that intervention is permissible "[u] pon timely

application

(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the

main action have a question of law and fact in common." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(b) (2). Another factor to be considered in determining

whether to allow a party to intervene is "whether permitting

intervention will assist in developing and resolving the factual

and legal disputes in the litigation." In re Visa Check/Master-

money Antitrust Litigation, 190 F.R.D. 309, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).

2

Intervention under this rule is permitted in the discretion of the district court. See,~, H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1986). Within this discretion, courts have held that Rule 24(b) (2) is to be liberally construed. See,~, McNeill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Davis v. Smith, 431 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 607 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.1977)).
Intervention Is Granted
The central claim in this action is that the defendants have a policy and practice of failing to provide food stamps to eligible households in a timely manner. (Compl . ~ 1.) The Complaint alleges that the defendants fail to process the food stamp applications of eligible households within 30 days and that, at Non-Public Assistance Food Stamp Offices, defendants fail to provide expedited food stamps to eligible households and deter, discourage and prevent households from applying at those offices. (Compl. ~~ 4-6.)
Like the original plaintiffs, proposed plaintiff intervenors Feliz and Greenbaum allege an unlawful delay in the processing of their food stamp applications. (See Compl. ~ 1.) They allege that they applied for food stamps, were qualified to
3

-- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

receive food stamps within five days of their application2 and did not receive food stamps within that time frame. (Class Action Compl. (Jose Feliz) ~~ 95-100; Class Action Intervener Compl. (Florence Greenbaum) ~~ 96-101.)

In deciding motions to intervene, federal courts have

recognized that no two individuals will present identical facts and

have refused to allow minor distinctions such as those emphasized

by the State to preclude intervention. Even where factual

distinctions exist, courts have permitted intervention where the

same legal issue is presented. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 63 F.R.D.

409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) When confronting essentially the same

question in the context of motions for class certification, the

Second Circuit has not found such differences to preclude a finding

of typicality. See,~, Robideaux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 937

(2d Cir. 1993) (typicality requirement for purposes of class

certification met, "

irrespective of minor variation in the

fact patterns underlying individual claims."); Marisol A. v.

Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376-78 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding district

court finding of typicality in certification of a class of

plaintiffs alleging a wide variety of means by which defendants

violated the plaintiffs' right to legally mandated child welfare

services.) . Since Feliz and Greenbaum present the same legal

2 Defendants were required to process applications for food stamps within five days of application under New York State law, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 387.8(a) (2) (i) (a), and seven days under federal law, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e) (9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i) (3) (i). It is undisputed that they did not meet either of these requirements.
4

claims as to the timeliness of the processing of their food stamp applications as plaintiffs, their intervention into this matter is appropriate.

The State has resisted the intervention on the grounds it will result in "undue delay" and "prejudice." However, since no answers have been filed and no discovery had, the proposed intervention will not delay the proceedings or prejudice the State.

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for intervention of Feliz and Greenbaum is granted.

It is so ordered.

New York, NY

July

Icf

, 2005

(
~ET U.S.D.J.

5

 
 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------------x

GERTRUDE WILLISTONj and TAWANA, LATOYA, and TANDIKA CUMMINS, by their parent, PAULETTE CUMMINS, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

- and -

Plaintiffs,

04 Civ. 4454 (RWS)

JOSE FELIZ, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenors

o PIN ION

- against -

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Servicesj and ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,
Defendants.

,__ "'\I.LY J.'

----------------------------------------x A P PEA RAN C E S:

.,. ~ . "
..... ~., __./.. .".~ .....,. . . . . '"' ...........,.l' .•• M;"~''''-. '-.... """ 'C'~"_ W

. .-_".,.~<:.~~,_.,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER HOMELESSNESS OUTREACH PREVENTION PROJECT
666 Broadway, lOth Floor New York, NY 10012 By: WENDY BACH, ESQ.
MUNIR PUJARA, ESQ.
Of Counsel

NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP 130 East 59th Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10022 By: YISROEL SCHULMAN, ESQ.
RANDAL S. JEFFREY, ESQ. ELISSA D. DEVINS, ESQ. Of Counsel

APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE:

WELFARE LAW CENTER, INC. 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1205 New York, NY 10001 By: MARC COHAN, ESQ.
REBECCA L. SCHARF, ESQ. PETRA T. TASHEFF, ESQ. Of Counsel
Attorneys for Defendants:
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER Attorney General of the State of New York 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 By: DEBORAH HOCHHAUSER, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel

Sweet, D.J.,
Defendant Verna Eggleston, Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration ("City Commissioner" or the "City") and Robert Doar, Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (" State Commissioner" or the "State") (collectively, the "Defendants") have moved under Rule 12 (b) (6) and 12 (b) (1) to dismiss the putative class action complaint (the "Complaint") of Gertrude Will iston ("Williston") and Tawana Cummins, Latoya Cummins and Tandika Cummins, by their parent Paulet te Cummins (collectively the "Cummins") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"). The Plaintiffs seek enforcement in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action of their rights under the Food Stamp Act ("FSA" or the "Act"), Public Law 88-525; 78 STAT. 703, alleging that the Defendants have a policy and practice of failing to provide food stamps to eligible individuals in a timely manner in violation of federal and state law, and that the State defendant has failed to properly oversee and supervise City defendant's administration of the Food Stamp program in violation of federal and state law. 1
The City has moved to dismiss on grounds that the Plaintiffs do not have a private right of action and lack standing. The State has moved to dismiss on grounds of the Eleventh Amendment
1 The caption of the complaint refers to the City defendant as the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services ("DSS") . However, as correctly noted throughout the complaint, Eggleston is the Commissioner of the Human Resources Administration.
1

to the United States Constitution, failure of the Plaintiffs to state a claim and a prior action pending. Significant and difficult issues are thus presented.
For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.
Prior Proceedings
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on June 15, 2004, alleging that Defendants have a policy and practice of failing to provide food stamps to eligible individuals in a timely manner and, as such, seek enforcement of their rights under the FSA pursuant to 42 u.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants' motion to dismiss was heard and marked fully submitted on November 10, 2004.
The Facts
The facts are set forth in the statements of the parties and are not in dispute except as noted below. All well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true for the purpose of this motion. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002). The following statements do not constitute findings of the Court.
The Complaint was filed on June 15, 2004, and identifies New York City residents who have applied for food stamps at NonPublic Assistance ("NPA") food stamp offices. (See Compl. at ~~
2

60, 81.) It alleges that in New York City, individuals seeking to apply for food stamps may apply at either a Job Center or a NPA food stamps office and at Job Centers, and may also apply for cash assistance and/or medical assistance. (See Compl. at ~ 39.) At NPA food stamp offices, applicants may only apply for food stamps. (rd.) There are 32 Job Centers and 20 NPA food stamp offices located in the five boroughs of New York City. (rd. at ~ 40.) The Plaintiffs in the instant action all applied for food stamps at NPA food stamp offices. (See Compl. generally.)
According to the Complaint, the Plaintiffs are New York City residents who have applied for food stamps at NPA food stamp offices. (See Compl. at ~~ 60, 81.) Williston alleges that she is eligible for food stamps, and that she sought to apply for food stamps at an NPA office, but did not receive food stamps within 30 days of the date of application. (rd. at ~~ 17, 59.) The Cummins Plaintiffs allege that they were deterred, discouraged, and prevented from filing an application for food stamps upon initial contact at an NPA food stamps office, (id. at ~ 21), and also failed to receive food stamps within 30 days of application. (rd. at ~ 88, 90.)
The Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves and a purported class defined as: "All New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps in New York City." (Compl. at ~ 10.) Plaintiffs also bring this
3

action on behalf of a subclass defined as: "All New York City residents who have applied for food stamps in New York City and who have not had those applications processed within thirty days of application." (Compl. at ~ 14.) The foregoing proposed class and subclass definitions do not differentiate where precisely the applications were sought - - whether at Job Centers or NPA food stamp offices. 2 (See Compl. at ~~ 10-13, 14.) rn sum, Plaintiffs claim that their food stamp applications are not timely processed; that individuals are discouraged or prevented from applying for food stamp benefits; and that Defendants fail to provide expedited food stamp benefits. (See Compl. generally.)
According to the Complaint, Williston applied for food stamp benefits at Center 40, a NPA food stamp office, on January 30, 2004. (rd. ~ 60.) On February 2, 2004, she received "expedited food stamps" for the period of January 30, 2004 to February 29, 2004. (rd. ~ 61.) However, Williston claims that she did not receive "ongoing food stamps" and that on April 23, 2004 she requested a fair hearing with the State to challenge the City's failure to provide her with food stamps. (rd. ~~ 70, 71.) On May 19, 2004, a fair hearing was held and by Decision after Fair Hearing, dated May 26, 2004 ("DAFH"), the State directed the City
2 One of Plaintiffs' proposed subclass definitions is limited to NPA food stamp offices: "All New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps in New York City at food stamp offices which do not accept applications for cash assistance, and who have been deterred, discouraged and prevented from filing applications and/or who have not received expedited food stamp benefits." (See Compl. at ~ 3.)
4

to process Williston's food stamp benefit application and to restore all lost benefits resulting from the City's failure to provide Williston with food stamps within 30 days of her submitting the application. (rd. ~~ 71, 72.) At the time Williston filed this complaint, it was alleged she had not received any further food stamps. (rd. ~ 73.) On June 23, 2004, Williston was authorized to receive food stamp benefits and these benefits were subsequently accessed. See Affidavit of Carolyn Karins, sworn to August 20, 2004 ("Karins Aff.") attached to notice of motion.
According to Cummins' Complaint, she went to apply for food stamp benefits in October 2003 at a NPA food stamp office located on Bergen Street in Brooklyn, New York, and the case worker refused to accept the application stating that Cummins' children were not eligible for food stamp benefits. (Compl. ~ 81.)
On November 7, 2003, Cummins went back to the same NPA food stamp office wherein, although she claimed she was discouraged from applying for food stamps, her application was in fact filed. (rd. ~~ 83, 84.) On November 7, 2004, Cummins was told to return to the NPA food stamp center with the requested documentation by November 19, 2004. (rd. ~ 85.) On November 13, 2003, she returned to the NPA food stamp office with the requested documentation and on November 14, 2003, she received "expedited food stamps" covering the period of November 7 to November 30, 2003. (rd. ~~ 86, 87.)
5

On January 13, 2004, Cummins received "ongoing food stamps." (rd. ~ 90.)
The Statutory Scheme
The FSA, originally enacted August 31, 1964, as "The Food Stamp Act of 1964" is a complex federal funding statute that grants monies to the states for the operation of food stamp programs. See Public Law 88-525j 78 STAT. 703. The Secretary of Agriculture and state agencies are given express authority with respect to administration of the food stamp programj however, Congress solely vested the Secretary with overall enforcement of the Act. See 7 u.S.C. §§ 2013 (a), 2024 (a) (2004) .
The provision of the Act entitled "Establishment of Program" provides:
[T] he secretary is authorized to formulate and administer a food stamp program under which, at the request of the State agency, eligible households within the State shall be provided an opportunity to obtain a more nutritious diet through the issuance to them of an allotment ...
rd. (internal citations omitted). Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c), the Secretary of Agriculture is further authorized to make such regulations as deemed necessary for effective administration of the Food Stamp Program. "The Secretary shall issue such regulations consistent with this Act as the Secretary deems necessary or
6

appropriate for the effective and efficient administration of the

food stamp program .

" (rd. at § 2013.)

The section of the Act entitled "Violations and Enforcement" states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act the Secretary may provide for the issuance or presentment for redemption of coupons to such person or persons, and at such times and in such manner, as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate to protect the interests of the United States or to ensure enforcement of the provisions of this Act or the regulations issued pursuant to this Act.

7 U.S.C. § 2024 (a).

Section 2020 of the FSA governs the administration of the Food Stamp Program, and mandates, "The State agency of each participating State shall assume responsibility for the certification of applicant households and for the issuance of coupons and the control and accountability thereof." 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (a) . State agencies are also charged with improper denials and underissuances of food stamp benefits. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(b).

The State agency is also responsible for reporting on its administration to the Food and Nutrition Service ("FNS"). See 7 C.F.R. § 275.3. FNS conducts reviews to determine whether a State agency is operating the Food Stamp Program and the performance reporting system in accordance with program requirements. rd. A
7

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

federal reviewer and FNS regional offices will conduct reviews to

examine state agency and project area operations, as considered

necessary to determine compliance with program requirements. 3 See

7 C.F.R. 275.3. FNS shall notify the state of any deficiencies in

program or system operations, and the state is given 60 days in

which to respond to the findings of each review and to develop

corrective action addressing all deficiencies detected in the

operation of the program.

FNS also validates each state

agency's payment error rate and under-issuance error rate, during

each annual quality control review period. See 7 C.F.R. 275.3(c).

The Act also sets forth an enforcement mechanism in the event of non-compliance with the federal regulations:

I f the Secretary determines, upon information received by the Secretary, investigation initiated by the Secretary, or investigation that the Secretary shall initiate upon receiving sufficient information evidencing a pattern of lack of compliance by a State agency of a type specified in this subsection, that in the administration of the food stamp program there is a failure by a State agency without good cause to comply with any of the provisions of this Act, the regulations issued pursuant to this Act,
the Secretary shall immediately inform such State agency of such failure and shall allow the State agency a specified period of time for the correction of such failure.
3 Specifically, the regulation provides: "FNS shall conduct an annual review of certain functions performed at the State agency level in the administration/operation of the program. FNS will designate specific areas required to be reviewed each fiscal year. FNS will review each State agency's management evaluation system on a biennial basis; however, FNS may review a State agency's management evaluation system on a more frequent basis if a regular review reveals serious deficiencies in the ME system." 7 C.F.R. § 275.3 (a) (b).
8

7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) (citations omitted). The state agency is given a specified period of time to correct such failure, and if the deficiency is not corrected, "the Secretary may refer the matter to the Attorney General with a request that injunctive relief be sought to require compliance forthwith by the State agency [.]" Id. The Secretary is mandated to withhold funds from the state agency whether or not such matter has been referred to the Attorney General. Id.
In New York State, the Food Stamp Program is administered through 58 local social services districts, each of which is a county department, except for the New York City district (which comprises five counties). See New York Social Services Law ("NYSSL") § 95. The Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") is the New York State agency which supervised the local district's administration of the Food Stamp Program. See NYSSL § 95; see also 18 NYCRR Part 387.
under the State regulations, the local districts are responsible, inter alia, for conducting intake, processing applications for food stamps and making eligibility determinations. See 18 NYCRR §§ 387.2(e), (f), (h) and (i). State regulations also provide that the local districts shall "have applications readily available for potentially eligible households and provide an application to anyone requesting one." 18 NYCRR § 387.2(e) State regulations further provide that local districts "provide [appli-
9

cants] with the opportunity to apply for food stamps. II 18 NYCRR § 387.2 (h), (i).
Certain food stamp applicants are eligible for the expedited processing of their application for food stamp benefits. Expedited processing of the application for food stamp benefits is generally available to households with low income and few resources, whose housing costs exceed their income and resources and households that have certain migrant and seasonal workers. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e) (9) (A) (i) - (ii) i see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (i) (1) . Under federal law, an applicant, if eligible, must receive the expedited processing of their application for food stamp benefits no later than seven days after the date of application. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e) (9). New York State regulations require that an applicant, if eligible, receive the expedited processing of their application for food stamp benefits within five days of the date of application. See 18 NYCRR § 387.8 (a) (2) (i) (a) .
In New York City, applicants may apply for food stamp benefits at a NPA food stamp office. (Compl. ~ 39.) In addition, a household may apply jointly for food stamp benefits and public assistance at a job center. (Id. )
OTDA has supervised the local social services districts' administration of the Food Stamp Program through, inter alia, management evaluation reviews, see 7 C.F.R. Part 275(B), quality
10

control reviews, see 7 C.F.R. Part 275(C), regulations, administrative directives, informational letters and the fair hearing process. The fair hearing process represents an important aspect of the State's supervision of the local districts' compliance with program requirements. See Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 108788 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972).
State statute and regulations afford a food stamp applicant the right to a state administrative fair hearing (i.e., before OTDA) to challenge a local district's action with respect to his or her application, including a local district's alleged failure to timely process a food stamp application. See New York Social Services Law § 27; see also 18 NYCRR §§ 387.20 (d), 3586.4(a).
When the State's decision after fair hearing is adverse to the local district, the local district must comply with the decision. See 18 NYCRR § 358-6.4 (a) . If the applicant or recipient believes that the local district has failed to comply with the State's decision and wishes the State to secure the local district's compliance, he or she must submit a complaint to OTDA's Office of Administrative Hearing's Compliance Unit. See 18 NYCRR § 358-6.4(c). The Office of Administrative Hearing's Compliance Uni t will thereafter" secure compliance by whatever means is deemed necessary and appropriate under the circumstances of the case." Id.
11

If, on the other hand, the State's decision after fair hearing is adverse to the applicant or recipient, he or she has the right to challenge the adverse decision after fair hearing by commencing a proceeding in New York State Supreme Court pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78.
The Issues Presented
The City has challenged the existence of a private right of action under the FSA citing Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002). The State has urged an Eleventh Amendment bar to the Plaintiffs. Additionally, Defendants have challenged the Complaint for failure to state a claim based upon mootness and lack of standing. Because of the difficulty of the Gonzaga issue, see Kapps v. Wing., 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005), it is appropriate to resolve the challenges to the Complaint before addressing the § 1983 issue.
The 12(b) (6) Standard
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), the Court should construe the complaint liberally, "accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor," Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687,691 (2d Cir.2001)), although
12

"mere conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions" need not be accepted. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 771 (2d Cir .1994). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)) In other words, "'the office of a motion to dismiss is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York, 375 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980)). Dismissal is only appropriate when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief." Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.2000) i accord Eternity Global Master Fund, 375 F.3d at 176-77.
Issues of contract interpretation "are generally matters of law and therefore [are] suitable for disposition on a motion to dismiss." Thayer v. Dial Indus. Sales, Inc., 85 F.Supp. 2d 263, 269 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) i see also Lind v. Vanguard Offset Printers, Inc., 857 F.Supp. 1060, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Furthermore, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider exhibits to the complaint and documents incorporated in the complaint by reference. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002).
13

State Defendant's Challenges to the Complaint
A. Plaintiffs Have Suffered Injury
According to the State Commissioner, neither Williston nor Cummins have suffered harm as a result of any conduct of the Defendants. Williston was successful in the DAFH process, and the OTDA directed the City to process her application for food stamps and to restore all lost benefits. According to the State Commissioner, Cummins failed to invoke the DAFH procedure and thus suffered no injury as a result of state action. Further, the State has raised a challenge to the Complaint on the basis of mootness and the prior action pending while the City has questioned the standing of the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiff Williston
With respect to Williston, it is the position of the Plaintiffs that the State is obligated not only to provide a hearing procedure but to take any affirmative action necessary to provide that applicants receive the benefits of the FSA. Williston did not receive such benefits in the first instance and that obligation is not satisfied by the later action taken by the State.
The FSA is clear in its conferral of responsibility onto the State to administer, supervise, and review the distribution of
14

food stamp assistance to applicants at each local agency. Section

2012(n) defines the single state agency charged with the responsi-

bility for administering the FSA as "the agency of the State

government

. which has the responsibility for the administra-

tion of the federally aided public assistance programs within the

state" as well as the local agencies. 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (n). The

State must submit for approval a plan to the Department of

Agricul ture "specifying the manner in which [the Food Stamp

program] will be conducted within the State in every political

subdivision." 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (d).

Under the FSA, each state must "permit an applicant

household to apply to participate . . on the same day that the

household first contacts some food stamps office in person during

office hours." 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e) (2) (B) (iii). The FSA also

requires that once the application has been filed, the state must

"promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant household by

way of verification of income,

household size," and other

factors. rd. at § 2020(e) (3). Moreover, the FSA imposes on each

state a duty to "provide each applicant household, at the time of

application, a clear written statement explaining what acts the

household must perform to cooperate in obtaining verification and

otherwise completing the verification process." rd. Finally, the

FSA contains an unequivocal statutory mandate that the state

provide food stamps to certain needy households on an expedited

basis. rd. at § 2020 (e) (9) . See also Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821

15

F.2d 1526, 1528 (lIth Cir. 1987) ("Title 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e) (9) speaks in imperative, not merely permissive, terms mandating that state agencies 'shall ... provide coupons no later than five days after the date of application' to destitute applicants.") (citations omitted). As discussed below, each of the above requirements expressly applies to the State.
Further, the implementing regulations impose a duty on the State to supervise the City's acts or failures to act. Section 275.5 (a) provides that "[e] ach State agency shall ensure that [local districts] operate the Food Stamp Program in accordance with the Act, regulations, and FNS-approved State Plan of Operation." 7 C.F.R. § 275.5 (a). The same regulation requires the State to conduct periodic reviews of the City's performance so as to provide "a systematic method of monitoring and assessing program operations" and to provide "a basis for [local districts] to improve and strengthen program operations by identifying and correcting deficiencies." Id. § 275.5 (a) (1) and (2). The further goal of the reviews is to provide "a continuing flow of information between the [local districts], the state, and FNS, necessary to develop the solutions to problems in program policies and procedures." Id. § 275.5(a)(3).
In addition, under the regulations, the State must engage in a regular program of "corrective action planning" to determine "appropriate actions to reduce substantially or eliminate deficien-
16

cies in program operations and provide responsive services to

eligible households." 7 C.F.R. § 275.16(a). Food Stamp regula-

tions further mandate that the "State agency shall ensure that

corrective action plans are prepared at the project area [local

district] level .

The project area/management unit corrective

action plans shall be open-ended and shall remain in effect until

all deficiencies in program operations have been reduced substan-

tially or eliminated." rd. at § 275.18(a).

The FSA and implementing regulations impose an enforceable duty on the State to supervise the City's administration of the Food Stamp program in New York City. The statute and regulations the Plaintiffs seek to enforce expressly benefit the Plaintiffs. For example, the statute and regulations speak in terms of ensuring that "the program provide responsive service to eligible households," 7 C.F.R. § 275.19(a), and correct deficiencies in program operations. rd. at §§ 275.5(a), 275.16(a).

The State thereby has a duty to ensure that Plaintiffs timely receive their food stamps.

Plaintiff Cummins

With respect to the allegations of the Complaint regarding Cummins, the State has taken the position that her claims are precluded by a failure to exhaust.
17

Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have
repeatedly held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required for claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patsy
v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) i DeSario v. Thomas,
139 F.3d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1998) i Wilbur v. Harris, 53 F.3d 542,
544 (2d Cir. 1995). In Wilbur, the Second Circuit observed: "As
the Supreme Court has clearly held, the 'exhaustion of state
administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to
bringing an action pursuant to Sec. 1983.'" Id. at 544 (quoting
Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516). In DeSario, the Court characterized the
Patsy holding as a "categorical statement that exhaustion is not
required" and as a reflection of an "expansive view of the federal
role in protecting constitutional rights." Desario, 139 F.3d at
86. The Court in Reynolds III, evaluating the applicability of the
exhaustion requirement under the FSA, observed:
As discussed in the preceding section, the complaint asserts viable claims against the State defendants under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for violations of federal law. This Court has already observed that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for such claims under Section 1983. See Reynolds I, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 341 n.9 (citing Wilbur v. Harris, 53 F. 3d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1995) i Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982)) i see also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) ("exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to §§ 1983") i DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Slekis v. Thomas, 525 U.S. 1098, 119 S.Ct. 864, 142 L.Ed.2d 767 (1999) (same) i Roberson, 2000 WL 760300, at *11 (Although both the Food Stamp Act and Medicaid statute require States to provide for administrative hearings when requested by recipients, the State defendants fail to point out any indication of congressional intent to
18

require exhaustion of such remedies prior to bringing a Section 1983 action.").

118 F.Supp. 2d 352, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

As the First Circuit held in Commonwealth of Mass. v. 1Y!:!s, 893 F.2d 424, 427 (1st Cir. 1990), "the scheme of the food stamp statute does not require exhaustion." Nor do the statutes and regulations on which the State relies impose any such requirement. To be sure, section 2020 (e) (10) requires the State to provide a fair hearing to households aggrieved by actions of the state agency, but nowhere does that statute require or discuss exhaustion of the fair hearing option as a condition of enforcing the FSA. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e) (10) .

Moreover, the State's duty to supervise the City is not dependent on the Plaintiffs' choice to utilize the administrative review process. As Reynolds III noted:

The State defendants contend that one primary way in which the State implements the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts is by providing applicants and recipients with the right to administrative fair hearings to redress their grievances with local agency actions. The State defendants argue that the majority of plaintiffs have failed to avail themselves of the fair hearing process, and therefore cannot allege that the State defendants failed
to supervise.

The Court rej ects this argument. As discussed

above, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their

administrative remedies.

Additionally, the State

defendants have an independent duty to investigate the

City defendants' performance and act in an ongoing

19

oversight capacity to ensure their compliance with federal mandates separate and apart from the fair hearing process.

Reynolds III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 386.

B. Plaintiffs Claims Are Not Moot

The State has urged that the Plaintiffs' claims are moot, food stamps having been received.

However, even if it is assumed that Williston received her food stamps on June 23, 2004, she did so five days after the motion for class certification was filed and seven days after the filing of the Complaint. As the Second Circuit has observed:

the fact that the plaintiffs received their unlawfully delayed benefits after the lawsuit was commenced did not mean that the action thereby became moot. Where class claims are inherently transitory, "the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class." Even where the class is not certified until after the claims of the individual class representatives have become moot, certification may be deemed to relate back to the filing of the complaint in order to avoid mooting the entire controversy.

Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993) Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).

See also Comer v.

The Cummins' claims are not moot since they are seeking food stamps for the period from October 2003 through January 2004.
20

Accordingly, they are still entitled to an order requiring the City to process their application effective October 2003. As Reynolds III noted, this claim "is for injunctive relief, not for retroactive money damages," 118 F. Supp. 2d at 392, and therefore the claim is not moot.
c. No Bar To Suit Due To Prior Pending Action
The State has argued that this action is barred by a prior class action pending in this district before the Honorable William H. Pauley, III, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Reynolds I); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 98 Civ. 887 (S.D.N.Y., Pauley, J.) (Reynolds II); 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Reynolds
The Plaintiffs in Reynolds are challenging, among other things, the City and State's alleged policies and practices of deterring, discouraging, and preventing individuals from filing applications for and receiving food stamps from Job Centers.
The representative class of plaintiffs in Reynolds is comprised of:
All New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance from City defendants at Job Centers. Reynolds Complaint ~ 61.
21

----------------------------------------
Here, the proposed class consists of:
All New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps in New York City.
Complaint ~ 10. The subclasses consist of:
All New York City residents who have applied for food stamps in New York City and who have not had those applications processed within thirty days of the date of application.
Id. ~ 14; and
all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps in New York City at food stamps offices which do not accept applications for cash assistance, and who have been deterred, discouraged and prevented from filing applications and/or who have not received expedited food stamp benefits.
Id. ~ 18.
Included in the relief requested by the plaintiffs in Reynolds is a declaration that OTDA has a policy and practice of failing to process all applications for food stamps, including expedited food stamps, within the time frames required by law; that OTDA fails to properly oversee the City's administration of the Food Stamp program in violation of Plaintiffs' rights under federal and state law and the Due Process Clause of the United States Consti tution; to enj oin OTDA to refrain from discouraging and
22

-~---------~-------~~--
deterring Plaintiffs and Plaintiff class members from filing applications for food stamps, including applications for expedited food stamps, and to require the processing of all food stamp applications, including expedited food stamps, within the time frames required by law; and to oversee and supervise the administration of the Food Stamp Program by HRA to ensure that Plaintiffs and Plaintiff class members are not deterred, discouraged, or prevented from applying for food stamps.
However, despite this specific attention to food stamp distribution, the general focus of Reynolds challenged the City's conversion of traditional welfare offices, where applications for cash assistance and related benefits could be filed, to Job Centers.
In Reynolds, plaintiffs asserted, as part of the process of converting welfare centers to Job Centers, that defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of
providing applicants with false and misleading information in an effort to prune the welfare rolls. Plaintiffs further allege that the City defendants are impermissibly raising impediments to applications by needy individuals for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance.
Reynolds I, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 336. Consequently, the Court issued relief that focused on the right of applicants at Job centers to file applications and to receive, where eligible, expedited
23

service. Specifically, Judge Pauley ordered relief, exclusively covering Job Centers, that, inter alia, directed the City to:
1. allow plaintiffs and all persons applying for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance, including expedi ted food stamps and temporary pre-investigation grants to apply for such benefits on the first day that they visit a Job Center; 2. process all applications for expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigation grants at Job Centers within the time frames required by law.
Reynolds II, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
Only one claim in this action concerns the City's conduct at Job Centers, failure to timely process applications for ongoing food stamps, and that claim was not implicated by the Job Center conversion process. The Reynolds complaint contains twelve causes of action, but none allege delays in the processing of food stamp applications at Job Centers.
To the extent that the relief sought ln the Reynolds complaint contains language addressing timely processing, that language, as indicated by the Complaint, concerns the front-end process of permitting persons to submit the application on the first day they seek assistance and to provide expedited food stamp service to eligible applicants. Indeed, paragraphs 84 through 89 of the Complaint describe the "delay" in processing applications and concern the ability to have the application accepted for
24

processing and not the overall time taken ln processing the application.
The three Reynolds decisions were concerned only with violations of law that arose during the period from the time the plaintiffs sought to file an application through the initial processing phase when applications were withdrawn or modified, emergency benefits issued or denied, and concomitant notices issued. See Reynolds I, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 331; Reynolds II, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 492; Reynolds III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
As Judge Pauley carefully noted:
After drawing the sample, the City utilized a new audit instrument to review the sampled case files and measure performance in the following areas: (a) providing immediate needs cash assistance where appropriate; (b) providing expedited food stamp service where appropriate; (c) timely providing immediate needs and expedited food stamps; and (d) making separate determinations or referrals for food stamps or Medicaid where cash assistance was denied or the application was withdrawn. Additionally, the instrument sought to determine whether a notice of benefit determination was issued to an applicant.
Reynolds III at 364. Here, the Plaintiffs seek an order finding that "Defendants' policies and practices of failing to provide ongoing food stamps to eligible individuals and families within thirty days of the date of application violates 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e) (3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (a) (2), (g) (1) ." See CompI., First
25

Claim Against Defendants. Therefore, Reynolds is not a prior action which precludes the relief sought here.
City Defendant's Challenges to the Complaint
A. Plaintiffs Do Not Lack Standing
The City has also sought dismissal on the grounds that the Plaintiffs lack standing. The City has appropriately noted that "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing." Luj an v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996) i accord St. Pierre v. Dye, 208 F.3d 394, 401 (2d Cir. 2000). Courts have interpreted the "case" or "controversy" language of Article III of the United States Constitution to require that a plaintiff seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction have standing to sue. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 561.
A plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations of injury to establish standing to sue. See Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 350, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1141, at *10
26

(S.D.N.Y. 2002). "[I]t is a long-settled principle that standing cannot be 'inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings.'" Id. (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) ) .
There are 32 Job Centers and 20 NPA food stamp offices located in the five boroughs of New York City. The Plaintiffs are individuals who have applied for food stamps at NPA food stamp offices. See Compl. at ~~ 60, 81. The Complaint does not identify any named individuals who have applied for food stamps at any of the 32 Job Centers throughout the City. According to the City, the Plaintiffs do not have standing to allege an injury to themselves, or on behalf of others, to the extent that such a claim pertains to Job Centers.
However, here the Plaintiffs do not seek to certify a class of food stamp applicants suffering delays at Job Centers and a separate class of food stamp applicants suffering delays at nonJob Center sites. Rather, Plaintiffs seek to certify a sub-class of applicants defined as "[a]ll New York City residents who have applied for food stamps in New York City and who have not had those applications processed within thirty days of the date of application." (Compl. at ~ 14.) The FSA would permit no such application differentiation based on place of filing since even if the cash assistance application is denied or withdrawn, the applicant cannot be required to submit a new application for food stamps. See 7
27

u.s.c. §§ 2014 (b), 2020 (e) (1) (B) (i), 2020 (e) (3); 7 C.F.R. §
273.2 (g) (1)
The City's contention, taken in its logical extreme, would require consideration of each individual office where applications are processed. This Court has previously rejected an attempt to draw such distinctions in the context of Medicaid delays. In Kessler v. Blum, 591 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), five New York City residents sued on behalf of a state-wide class to challenge delays in processing applications for prior approval of certain Medicaid services. Defendants sought to limit the class to only residents of New York City. This Court rej ected the motion, even though none of the named plaintiffs resided outside New York City. Id. at 1033; see also Robertson v. Jackson, 766 F. Supp. 470, 473-75 (E.D. Va. 1991) (Court found for a state-wide plaintiff class despite significant differences in performance among local offices.)
The Plaintiffs seek on behalf of a city-wide class of food stamp applicants to compel Defendants to timely process applications and therefore have standing to represent the class regardless of where the application is filed.
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss the Complaint is denied on the preliminary grounds advanced by the
28

Defendants: lack of injury, mootness, the existence of prior
lawsuit, and standing.
B. There Is A Private Right Of Action To Enforce The FSA
As has already been noted, the City has raised the
difficult issue as to whether the FSA creates a private right of
action enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Second Circuit in
Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005), has already noted the
issues and the authorities while considering the Low Income Home
Energy Assistant Act ("LIHEAA"), stating:
The question of whether § 8624(b) (13) of the LIHEAA creates rights that are enforceable under § 1983 is not an easy one. On the one hand, as the plaintiffs point out, § 8624(b) (13) has many of the characteristics that the Supreme Court has identified as important to the creation of privately enforceable statutory rights. See, ~, Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430 (1987) ; Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 497 U.S. 498, 509 (1990); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) ; see also Marshall v. Switzer, 10 F.3d 925, 929 (2d Cir. 1993). On the other hand, the Court has appeared to be increasingly reluctant to find § 1983enforceable rights in statutes which, like the LIHEAA, set forth their requirements in the context of delineating the obligations that accompany participation in federal spending clause programs. See,~, Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358 (1992) ; Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280, 287 (2002). In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Gonzaga University, our circuit has not yet established a unified approach to provisions contained in spending clause statutes such as the LIHEAA. Compare Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of educ., 313 F.3d 768, 786 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding post-Gonzaga, that § 1232g(a) of the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act did not create § 1983 enforceable rights), with Rabin v. WilsonCoker, 362 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that §
29

1396r-6 of the Medicaid Act did create § 1983 enforceable rights) .
Given the difficulty of the question, and the fact that the district court's ruling on the LIHEAA/§ 1983 issue was not necessary to its grant of inj unctive relief, we decline to decide at this time whether § 8624(b) (13) creates privately enforceable rights.
rd. at 127.
Because it has been concluded as set forth above that the Plaintiffs have appropriately alleged an injury, it is necessary to resolve whether the Plaintiffs have a private right of action. Each of the statutory and regulatory provisions at issue in this action meet the three-prong test for federal court enforceability
set forth by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 u.s.
329 (1997), and reaffirmed in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Gonzaga articulates the difference between those statutes giving right to section 1983 claims and those that do not. Citing specifically to its decision in Wright v. Roanoke Redev. Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987), and Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), as well as Blessing, the Court in Gonzaga stated the question is whether the statute confers, "a mandatory [benefit] focusing on the individual." Gonzaga at 280.
The Gonzaga Court restated the Blessing test, which provides that:
30

To determine whether a private right of action exists under a federal statute, a plaintiff must show that the statute is: (1) intended to benefit the plaintiff seeking to enforce it; (2) a binding obligation on the governmental unit, rather than merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct; and (3) not so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary
to enforce.

Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.

In examining another federal benefit program intended to

aid the nation's neediest families, the Medicaid Act, the Second

Circui t held that 42 U. S. C. § 13 96r- 6 (a) is enforceable under

section 1983. See Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201 (2d

Cir. 2004). Section 13 96r- 6 (a) provides that "each State plan

approved under this sub-chapter must provide that each family which

was receiving ["AFDC"] in at least 3 of the 6 months immediately

preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for

aid, because of

. income from employment . . remain eligible

for assistance under the plan

during the immediately

succeeding 6 month period." 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6 (a) . The Rabin

court, in analyzing whether an enforceable right existed, examined

the statutory provision's "language, the context in which the

language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a

whole." Rabin, 362 F. 3d at 196 (quoting Freir v. Westinghouse

Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 197 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538

U.S. 998 (2003))

Further, in evaluating whether the Medicaid

provision had "rights-creating" language, the Rabin court examined

whether the text of the Medicaid provision is "phrased in terms of

31

the persons benefitted," (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979)), and held that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 13 96r- 6 "focuses much more directly than does the [Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act] provision on the individual's entitlement." Rabin, 362 F.3d at 201.
Rabin rejected the defendant's argument that the wording of 42 u. S. C. § 1396r- 6 (a), which requires that the State Plan provide eligible applicants with aid rather than directly requiring that all eligible individuals receive assistance, means that "Congress focused on the aggregate and the responsibilities of various administrative actors rather than the rights of recipients." rd. at 201-02. The Rabin court further rejected defendant's argument by pointing to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, another provision of the Medicaid Act which provides that" [i]n an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter [which includes the Medicaid statutes], such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan." rd. at 202.
The provisions of the FSA here appear to relate to the individual household that applies for benefits just as the provisions of the Medicaid Act at issue in Rabin with respect to a specific relief to a specific class of beneficiaries and time
32

frames within which eligible households must receive the benefits provided.

Rather than having an "aggregate focus," the FSA does establish specific rights for individual households applying for food stamps and for eligible households to receive food stamps in a timely manner.

Twice before in this Circuit, using a Blessing analysis, courts have found subsections 2020 (e) (2) (B) (iii), 2020 (e) (3) and 2020 (e) (9) of the FSA,4 the provisions of the FSA at issue in Williston, to confer enforceable rights. In Reynolds v. Giuliani, Judge Pauley in a careful and complete opinion held that 7 U.S.C. §§ 2020 (e) (2) (B), (e) (3) and (e) (9), the exact same provisions of the FSA involved here, as well as provisions of the Medicaid Act, create rights enforceable under § 1983. Reynolds I, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 340-41. Applying the Blessing test, Reynolds I found that Congress "undoubtedly intended to benefit individuals such as the

4 Section 2020 (e) (3) mandates defendants to provide food

stamps to eligible households within thirty days of application:

[T]he State agency shall thereafter promptly determine the

eligibility of each applicant household

so as to complete

certification of and provide an allotment retroactive to the period

of application to any eligible household not later than thirty days

following its filing of an application." Section 2020 (e) (9)

directs defendants to provide expedited food stamps to eligible

households within seven days of application. Section 2020(e) (2)-

(B) (iii) directs defendants to allow applicant households to apply

immediately for food stamps upon initial contact with a food stamp

office: "[T]he State agency shall permit an applicant household to

apply to participate in the program on the same day that the

household first contacts a food stamp office during office hours."

33

plaintiffs" and held that the FSA provisions imposed unambiguous obligations on State agencies. Id.; see also Reynolds III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 383 (finding provisions of the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts enforceable under § 1983).
Similarly, in Roberson v. Giuliani, the court held that provisions of the Food Stamps Act at issue in this action, including 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e) (2) (B) (application upon initial contact with food stamp office) and 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e) (9) (mandating a seven day time frame for emergency food stamps), were enforceable under § 1983. Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ. 10900 (DLC), 2000 WL 760300, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jun 12, 2000). The Roberson court applied the Blessing test and found" [t]hat these provisions of the FSA were enacted by Congress in order to protect the intended recipients of food stamps is not open to serious doubt. Furthermore, these provisions impose unambiguous obligations on State agencies." Id. 5
Gonzaga observes that "[T]he State may rebut [a] presumption [of enforceable rights] by showing that Congress
5 Other pre-Gonzaga cases utilizing a Blessing-type analysis have found these same provisions enforceable. See,~, Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff is entitled to pursue § 1983 action for redress of violation of her right to expedited food stamps); Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that applicants for expedited food stamps could bring § 1983 action to enforce state compliance with Act' s requirements); Pa. Food Merchants Assoc. v. Houston, 999 F. Supp. 611, 619-20 (M. D. Pa. 1998) (holding that 7 U.S.C. § 2016 (g) (2) is enforceable under § 1983) .
34

, specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.'" The State's burden is to demonstrate that Congress shut the door to private enforcement either expressly, through "specific evidence from the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §§ 1983," Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285, n.4 (citations omitted.)
The City has cited Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002), Ass'n of Comm. Org. for Reform Now v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Taylor, like Gonzaga, involved claims under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ("FERPA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1282 (g). The Second Circuit followed Gonzaga's reasoning in finding that a different provision of FERPA, the records-access provision, similarly did not confer rights on parents and, therefore, did not create an enforceable right. Taylor, 313 F. 3d at 785. In Community Organizations, the court found that certain sections of the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLBA") did not create individual rights enforceable under § 1983. 269 F. Supp. 2d at 344-47. The court, however, held that a statute does create an enforceable right if it "focuses on conferring a benefit or entitlement on an individual or a class of individuals and does not focus on the entity or person that the statute intends to regulate." Id. at 344. As discussed above, the FSA has the kind of rights conferring provision envisioned by this language.
35

The City also has relied upon two district court decisions from other circuits, Community Organizations, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 345-46, and Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00 CV 7524, 2002 WL 31730963, *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002), for the proposition that Congress's designation of the Secretary of Agriculture to handle violations of the FSA under 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) indicates that Congress did not intend to grant any individually enforceable rights. However, the FSA requires that state agencies provide "for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the state agency under any provision of its plan of operation." 7 U. S. C. § 2020 (e) (10) . This fair hearing provision is exactly the kind of individualized administrative remedy that constitutes evidence of Congressional intent to create an enforceable rights. In Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004), and Kapps v. Wing, 283 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), the courts held that the existence of a fair hearing provision in a statute is not an enforcement scheme comprehensive enough to preclude action under 1983.
Further, Almendares acknowledged that" [t]he administrative scheme is only evidence of Congress' intent not to create an individually enforceable private right. The administrative scheme in the Food Stamp Act is not the type of remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant a 1983 claim." 2002 WL 31730963, *5 n.4.
36

The Almendares court addressed only 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(1) (B), which governs the obligation of the State agency to hire bi-lingual personnel and use language-appropriate materials and reasoned that 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e) (1) (B) has an "aggregate focus" and "is not concerned with whether the needs of any particular person has been satisfied," and that II [t]his provision is simply intended to ensure that the State plan of operation includes provisions to deal with counties with high populations of low income households whose language is other than English. II Id. at *5.
Finally, post-Gonzaga, courts have held that Congress's establishment of an enforcement mechanism in a statute does not preclude the existence of rights that are enforceable under § 1983. In Sabree, 367 F.3d at 192, observing that the Medicaid Act lacked provisions explicitly precluding individual actions, the Third Circuit found that II [t]he burden to demonstrate that Congress has explicitly withdrawn the remedy is on defendant, II and that a court should not "lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy II for deprivation of a conferred right. Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989)) (citations omitted) Looking at the Medicaid Act, which has a fair hearing provision similar to that in the FSA, the Sabree court found that the Medicaid Act did not have comprehensive enforcement mechanisms intended to preclude an enforceable right and held "that [if] Congress provides a remedy for itself for non-compliance[, it] does not necessarily preclude
37

a coherent and coexisting intent to create an enforceable right in individual beneficiaries." Id. at 193.
In another post-Gonzaga case, Kapps v. Wing, 283 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), the district court examined whether 42 U. S. C. § § 8624 (b) (5) and (b) (13) of the HEAP statute contain rights that are enforceable under § 1983. Kapps, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 866. The Kapps court examined the language of the involved provisions that directed the state to provide timely issuance of heating assistance to specific low- income individuals, see 42 U. S. C. § 9624 (b) (5), and directs the state to provide fair hearings for individuals to compel timely processing, see 42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(13), finding that the provisions had "rights-creating" language. Kapps, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 880. In addition, the court held that the HEAP statute, which has fair hearing and funding withdrawal provisions, did not have a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement scheme so to preclude action under § 1983. "Courts in this [Second] circuit have found a private right of action where the relevant federal statute contains a funding withdrawal provision." Id. at 880.
As these authorities indicate, the reasoning of Judges Pauley and Gershon in Reynolds I and III and Kapps is adopted here. Rather than focusing on the "aggregate," the provisions discussed above speak in terms of each individual applicant household's right to apply for food stamps upon initial contact with a food stamp
38

center and the eligible household's right to receive expedited and ongoing food stamps in a timely manner.

The regulations at issue in this action define enforce-

able statutory rights that are themselves enforceable rights

through § 1983. See Reynolds III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 382, n.32.

Section 271.2 (g) (1) establishes: "The State agency shall provide

eligible households that complete the initial application process

an opportunity to participate. . as soon as possible, but no

later than 30 calendar days following the date the application was

filed

" 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g) (1). Section 273.2(i) (3) (I)

further elaborates that, "[f]or households entitled to expedited

service, the State agency shall make available to the recipient

coupons or an ATP card not later than the seventh calendar day

following the date an application was filed." 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (i)-

(3) (I). Finally, Section 274.2 (e) (2) (I) directs that "State

agencies shall encourage households to file an application form the

same day the household or its representative contacts the food

stamp office in person or by telephone and expresses interest in

obtaining food stamps assistance or expresses concern which

indicates food insecurity." 7 C.F.R. § 274.2(e) (2) (I). Each of

these regulations do nothing more than carry forward already

explicit statutory mandates.

39

These authorities support the conclusion that the Plaintiffs have an enforceable private right of action under the FSA.
The Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar This Action
The State has contended that the Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory relief seek "retrospective relief" barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, where Plaintiffs allege an ongoing violation of federal law, prospective relief may take the form of declaratory as well as injunctive relief. A declaration for past wrongs may be appropriate, since such relief does not seek to impose a monetary loss upon the State for past conduct. Further, as the Complaint seeks the reprocessing of food stamp applications over the period of time during which class members' benefits were wrongly denied, this request for relief constitutes a request for injunctive relief, "not retroactive money damages." Reynolds III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 392. Therefore, "[i]nsofar as the exposure of the State is concerned, the prayer for declaratory relief adds nothing to the prayer for injunction." Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211,227-28 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Servo Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002)).
The State has sought to rely upon Green v. Mansour. The Green court specifically premised its holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred declaratory relief on the lack of any allegation
40

of continuing violation of federal law. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 73 (1983) ("We think that these cases demonstrate the impropri-
ety of the issuance of a declaratory judgment in this case. There
is no claimed continuing violation of federal law, and therefore no
occasion to issue an injunction."). Here, the Plaintiffs claim
ongoing violation of federal law, rendering their declaratory
relief request permissible under the Eleventh Amendment.
Judge Pauley in Reynolds III carefully considered the
appropriate authorities rej ecting the State Eleventh Amendment
defense, explaining:
Plaintiffs' claims against the State defendants fall squarely within the Ex Parte Young exception. See Reynolds I, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 340 n.8 ("the Court observes that official-capacity actions seeing prospective injunctive relief for alleged violations of federal law are not treated as actions against the State."). Plaintiffs have named state officials, not the state itself, as defendants. (Compl. ~~ 16-19) Plaintiffs allege that the state officials are violating and continuing to violate federal laws, including the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2020 et ~, and the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396. [FN30]6 (CompI. ~~ 255-61,263-66) Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief, and not retroactive money damages, against the State defendants.
6 FN30. The State defendants contend, and plaintiffs deny, that plaintiffs have sued them for violations of State law. See State Defs.' Suppl. Mem. at 21-23; PIs.' Supp. Mem. at 28 n.16 Al though the complaint appears to plead State law claims only against the City defendants, see Compl. ~ 262, to the extent that plaintiffs' requested relief is premised on the State defendants' violations of State law, see Compl. Relief for Request ~~ b (viii), c. (i), such relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-06 S.Ct. at 910-11.
41

[FN31]7 See Roberson v. Giuliani, *382 2000 WL 760300, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 12, 2000) (99 Civ. 10900 (DLC)) (denying State officials' motion to dismiss claims for prospective injunctive relief for violations of the Food Stamp Act) i Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F. Supp. 2d 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying State defendant's motion to dismiss claims for prospective injunctive relief for violations of the Medicaid Act) .
Relying on Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. at 908, and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 n. 17, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1133 n.17, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the State defendants assert that the Ex Parte Young doctrine is inapplicable. This argument is unpersuasive.
Reynolds III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 381-82.
There is no need to rehearse these authorities further, and Judge Pauley's reasoning is adopted. The State's motion to dismiss the Complaint on Eleventh Amendment grounds is denied.
7 FN31. However, this Court reserves decision on whether, if such an issue arises, the State defendants are immune from a claim for retroactive money damages to the extent the federal government will reimburse the State for a retroactive money judgment. See generally Bennett v. White, 865 F.2d 1395, 1407-08 (3d Cir. 1989) i Bermudez v. Dep't of Agric., 490 F.2d 718, 721-24 (1973) i Harrington v. Blum, 483 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) i Conrad v. Perales, 92 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180-81 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
42

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing conclusions the motions of the City and the State to dismiss the Complaint are denied.
It is so ordered.

/--7 New York, NY
July

, 2005

U.S.D.J.

43

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NE~; YORK

--- - ---------- ----- ---- - ----- --X

GERTRUDE WILLISTO~; a~d TAW~~A, LATOYA, and T~"lDlKA CUY[i'lI~S, by their parent,
PAULETTE Cu"'MMINS, on their own behalf a~d on behalf of al~ others scmilarly si::uated,

- and -

Plaintiffs,

04 Civ. 4454 (RWS)

~OSE ?E~IZ, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others si~ilarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenors

o PIN ION

- against

VERNA EGG~ESTON, as Commissioner of New York Ci::y Departrr,ent of Soclal Services; and ROBERT DOAR, as Co~~issioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,

Defendants.
----- -x

A P PEA RAN C E 5:

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

THE URB~"l JUSTICE CENTER HOMELESS~ESS OUTREACH PREVENTION PROJECT
666 Broadway, lOth Floor New York, ~Y 10012 By: WENDY BACH, ESQ.
MUNIR PUJARA, ESQ. Of Counsel

NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTk"lCE GROUP
130 East 59th Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10022 By: YISROEL SCH0~MAN, ESQ.
RANDAL S. JEFFREY, ESQ. ELISSA D. DEVINS, ESQ. Of Counsel

APPEARANCES CONTIN0ED ON FOLLOWING PAGE:

WELFARE LAW CENTER, INC. 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1205 New York, NY 10001 By: ~ARC COHAN, ESQ.
REBECCA L. SCHARF, ESQ. PETRA T. TASHEFF, ESQ. Of Counsel
Atto~neys for Defendants:
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER Attorney General of the State of New York 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 By: DEBORAH HOCHHAUSER, ESQ.
Assistan~ At~orney General
0= Counsel

Sweet, D. J . ,

Defendant Verna Eggles~on, Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration ("City Defendant" or "Defendant"), has moved for leave to appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), frorr. this Court's July 27,2005 order and op::'r~ion ("Opinion") and for a concomitant stay of the underlying proceedings. For the reasons set. forth below, Defendant's motions are denied.

Prior Proceedings

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on June 15, 2004, alleging that the State and City of New York r:ave a policy and practice of fai"ing to provide food stamps to eligible individuals in a timely nanner and, as such, seek enforcement of their rights under the Food Stamp Act (the "?SA") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City and State Defendants filed respective motions to dismiss, which were heard and marked fully submitted on November 10, 2004.

The Opinion, faniliarity with which is assumed, denied

City Defendant's motion to dismiss, reject

City Defendant's

argument that Plaintiffs did not have a private right of action

under the FSA and thus lacked standing to bring sui t.

Williston v. Ecgleston, 379 F. St;pp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) The

City seeks leave to appeal the Opinion as it pertains to the

1

private right of action issue, asserting that

availabili ty of

a private right of action under ':he FSA a purely legal quest.

that current' remains unsettled under Second Circuit jurisprJ

dence.

The motion for certification for leave to appeal and for the concomitant stay of the underlyir::g proceedings was marked fully s".lbmitted on September 14, 2005.

Certification Is Denied

This Court has previously articulated the requirer:1en':s for interlocutory review CJnder 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as follows:

Title 28 :::nited St.ates Code sect lOr:: 1292 grants district

courts discretion to issue interlocutory orders when an

issue or issCJes involve" [1] controlling questions of law

[2J as to whicI-, there is substantial groc.md for differ

ence of opir::ion and that [3J an immediate appeal from the

order may materially advance the ultimate termination of

the :itigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see SEC v. Credit

Bancorp, Ltd., 103 F. SCJpp. 2d 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

"The statute must be strictly construed and 'o::lly

exceptional circ".lmstances [willJ justify a departure from

the basic pol

of postponir::g appellate review un':il

after the entry a final judgment.'" Colon v. BIC USA,

Inc., No. 00 Civ 3666 (SAS) , 2001 WL 88230 at *2 (S.D.-

N.Y. Jan. 30, 2001) (quot.ing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C.

~~~~~~~, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990».

Wausau Business Ins. Co. v. T".lrner Constr. Co., 151 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). CO".lrts interpreting this standard have maintained that "the 'question of law' must refer to a 'pure'
2

question of law that the reviewing court 'could decide quick::'y and c1 early without having to study the record.'" See Ahrenhol z v. Board of ~rustees of the University of I"inois, 219 F.3d 674, 67677 (7th Cir. 2000), q~oted in In re Wor1dcom, Inc., No. M-47 (HB) , 2003 WL 21498904 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2003).

Co~rts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere have noted

that certification is appropriate only =-n "exceptional cases,"

where interlocutory review "rr:ight avoid protracted and expensive

litigation." Telectronics Prop;r:ietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc.,

690 F. Supp. 170, 172 (S.D.N.::. 1987). "Interlocutory appeal was

not intended as a vehicle to provide early review of difficu::'t

rulings in hard cases .

The benef to the district court in

avoiding an unnecessary tria::' must be weighed against the ineffi-

ciency of having the Court of Appeals hear multiple appeals in the

same case." Wausau, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (citing cases).

In addition, the party seek

an interlocutory appeal

0: has the burden

showing !lexcep~ional circumstances r li

see, ~, Perera v. Cogan, 265 B.R. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y.

200::'); In re A1 exander, 248 B.R. 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y.

2000); Ir. re IonosDIlere, 179 B.R. 24, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1995),

to overcome the "general aversion to piecemeal litiga

tion," In r", AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d 610, 619 (2d Cir.

1999), and to show that the circ~mstances warrant "a

departure from the

policy 0:: postponing appellate

review until after entry of a final Judgment."

437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978); .see also K::'inghoffer v. S.N.C.

Achi:le ~auro, 921 F.2d at 25 (2d Cir. 1990).

3

In re Wo~ldcom, Inc., No. M-47 (EB) , 2003 WL 21498901,., at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003).

"The criteria are conjunctive, not disjunctive. 'ehe federal scheme does not provide for an immediate appeal solon the ground that such an appeal may advance the proceedings in the district court.'" Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 676 (quotiClg Harriscom Svenska AB .v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 631 (2d Cir. 1991)). See also :.9 JalT.es Wm. Mccre, et a::'., Moore's Federal Practice, § 203.31[11, at 203-86-87 (ed. 1999) (" [Ilr. practice ::.he courts treat the statutory criteria as a unitary requirement, and ::.he decisions
granting and discussing interlocutory appeals under 28 U. s. C. §
1292(b) uCliformly te all three of the elements as being present in any particular case.").

In the case at hand, Defendant asks this Court to certi

the following question: "Whether

FSA confers a prlvate right of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?" While Plaintiffs concede that this

issue presents a "controlling question of law" under the 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 (b) standard and would terminate the litigation if no private

right of action were to be found upon appellate review, Plaintiffs

argue that there is no "substantial ground for difference of

opinion" as is also required.

The parties agree that the precise question at issue in this case has not yet been directly addressed by either the Supreme
4

Court or the Second Circuit. Sir:1ply because a question of law has

not he en authori tatively addressed, however, does not r:1ake the

question grounds

a substantial difference of opinion. Hubbell,

Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, ::nc., 1995 WL 464906, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);

Chamarac Properties, :Cnc. v. P:'ke, 1994 WL 410902, *2 (S.D.N.Y.

1994); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. North American 'ndustries, Inc.,

783 F. Supp. 810, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Nor, for that matter, does

the fact that the parties themselves disagree as to the :"nterp:r-eta-

tion of persuasive authori::y constitute "a difference

opinion"

sufficient to warrant certification. See Hubbell, Inc. v. Pass &

.Seymour, Inc., at *2.

Assuming ~~~~~ that the issue of enforceability under § 1983, which is presented here, is "difficult," certif:'cation under § 1292 (b) "is not intended as a vehicle to provide early review of difficult rulings in hard cases." German v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 896 F. Supp, 1385, 1398 (S.D.N,Y, 1995). The dis::rict court must "analyze the strength of the arguments in opposition to the challenged ruling, and deterr:1ine whether there is 'substantial doubt' that the district court's order was co:r-rect." In.:r-e t1ethyl Tertiary Butyl Ether, Nos. 04 Civ. 1716, 1718, 1719, 1720 & 3420, 2005 WL 1773678, *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2005) (cuotinq Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., Nos. 85 Civ. 6866, 86 Civ. 4271, 1987 WL 10026/ *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 21, 1987)); Am. Telephor..e &Telegraph Co. v. N. Am, Indus. of N.Y. Inc" 783 F. Supp. 810,814 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that, even if a movant for a § 1292(b)
5

certification makes a legal argument that has not been explicitly rejected in any case in the involved jurisdiction, this does not mean that a difference of opinion is "substantial" rac:her than "merely mec:aphysical") .

While the Second Circuit has observed ;cha;c "our circlit

has not yet

ished a 'emi ed approach to provisions contained

in spending clause statutes such as the LIHEAA," Kapps v. Wing, 404

?3d ::'05, 127 (2d Cir. 2005), it has held

provisions of the

Medicaid Act, the most analogous legisla- on to the FSA, are

enforceab:e.

Rabinv. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 202 (2dC::'r.

2004) As discussed in d:.e Opinion, the

court, applying the

test articulated in Gonzaga Dniv. v. Doe, 536 C.S. 273 (2002),

examined tr,e Medicaid Act ar~d held the statutory provisions to be

enforceable under § 1983.

City Defendant has

ied upon ~aylor v. Vermont Dep't of

EdL:.c., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002). However, when corr.paring ;:he

outcomes of

and Taylor, the Circuit did not reach different

outcomes when applying the ""''''''~= test to li:.ce statutes. Rather,

the Circuit arrived a;: d::'fferent outcomes because the statutes at

issue were different. These cases do not demonstrate "substant.ial

ground for difference of opinion" but, instead, demonstrate

"differences in factual al'egations."

Worldcom, 2003 i'lL

22533398 at *11 (denying defendants certificat.ion ur~der § 1292 (b)

and holding t.ha;: defendant.s failed t.o ident.ify a "subst.ant.ial

6

ground for difference of opinion" when the two cases defendants cited to show conflict involved "differences in t':le factual allegations" rather than nsubstantia~ differences as to a controll~ng question

Finding ao subs::antial ground for a difference of

opinion, the use of interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

would

inappropriate in

s instance. As such, Defendant'S

motion for leave to appeal is denied.

Stay is Denied

For the same reasons that certification for interlocutory review is not appropriate here, tll.e City Defendan:: has fai::'ed to make a showing of good cause for a stay. See In re Currency Conversion Fee Am:itrust Litig., MDL 1409, M 21··95 (WHP). 2002 WL 88278, at *: (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting Chryslgr CaPita:' Corp. v. ~entury Power Corp., 37 F.R.D. 209, 209-10) (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating "tll.at a stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion where ::he motion 'appear [sl to have subs::antial grounds' or, stated another way, 'do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law'''); Association Fe Y Allegr;a v. The Republic of Ecuador, :'\10. 98-8650 (BSJ) , No. 98 8693 (BS,}), 1999 WL 147716, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1999) (stating ::hat a stay of discovery is appropriate only when resolution of a preliminary matter may dispose of ::he entire case) .
7

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Defendant's motions to certify an issue for appeal and to concor.1itantly stay this action are

It is so ordered.

New York, NY
January 'j-tf, 2006

.. /

ROBERT W. SWEET

v j

U.S.D.J.

B

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------------------x-

GERTRUDE WILLISTON; and TAWANA, LATOYA, and TANDIKA CUMMINS, by their parent, PAULETTE CUMMINS, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
JOSE FELIZ, and FLORENCE GREENBAUM, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
-against-
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services; and ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------x-

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT
04 Civ. 4454 (RWS)

WHEREAS, plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a class action complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of applicants for Food Stamp benefits in the City of New York;
WHEREAS, plaintiffs allege that Defendant Eggleston (“City defendant”) unlawfully: (a) fails to provide Food Stamp benefits to those eligible within thirty days of application in violation of federal and state law; (b) deters, discourages and prevents individuals and families from filing applications for Food Stamp benefits upon initial contact with Non-Cash Assistance (“NCA”) Food Stamps Centers; and (c) fails to provide expedited Food Stamp benefits at the NCA Food Stamp Centers within the time frames required by federal and state law;
Page 1 of 19

WHEREAS, plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Doar (“State defendant”) has failed to supervise appropriately the actions of City defendant as required by law;
WHEREAS, plaintiffs have filed a motion for class certification, and defendants have opposed said motion;
WHEREAS, plaintiffs seek, inter alia, a class-wide order enjoining City defendant (1) to provide Food Stamp benefits to those eligible in a timely manner; (2) from deterring, discouraging and preventing persons from filing applications for Food Stamp benefits upon initial contact with the NCA Food Stamp Centers; and (3) to issue expedited Food Stamp benefits at the NCA Food Stamp Centers within the time frames required by federal and state law. Plaintiffs also seek an order enjoining State defendant to supervise City defendant adequately;
WHEREAS, defendants deny each and every allegation contained in the complaint and stated in the whereas clauses set forth in this Stipulation and Order of Settlement;
WHEREAS, no finding of liability has been made; WHEREAS, the parties desire to resolve the issues raised in this litigation, without further proceedings and without admitting any fault or liability; NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the undersigned, as follows:
DEFINITIONS 1. “NCA Food Stamp Center” is defined as a non cash public assistance Food Stamp
center operated by City defendant and includes centers known as Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Centers. 2. “Apply for Food Stamp benefits,” as set forth in paragraph 3, shall include anyone who applies for Food Stamp benefits during the effective term of this settlement, or
Page 2 of 19

who has a pending Food Stamp application during the effective term of this settlement. 3. “Apply for Food Stamp benefits at a NCA Food Stamp Center,” as set forth in paragraph 4, shall include applications submitted at NCA Food Stamp Centers, as well as applications submitted to NCA Food Stamp Centers by HRA or HRA representatives, contractors or designees who are located at local community based organizations.
CLASS CERTIFICATION 4. A class is certified consisting of all individuals who apply for Food Stamp benefits
at a NCA Food Stamp Center, or for whom an application is submitted at an NCA Food Stamp Center.
DEFENDANTS’ OBLIGATIONS 5. During the effective term of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, City defendant
shall: a. provide Food Stamp benefits to eligible households included in the class
within the 30 day time frame as provided in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g)(1), except that nothing herein shall require City defendant to provide Food Stamp benefits within the 30 day time frame to eligible households when the delay in provision of benefits is caused by the household as described in 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(h)(1)(i). b. provide Food Stamp benefits to households included in the class that are eligible for expedited service of their Food Stamp application within the seven day time frame as provided in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9); 7 C.F.R. §
Page 3 of 19

273.2(i)(3(i). c. provide Food Stamp benefits to households included in the class that are
eligible for expedited service of their Food Stamp application within the five day time frame as provided in 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a). d. post signs and maintain signs in NCA Food Stamp Centers setting forth the right to apply for Food Stamp benefits and the time frames for the processing of applications. 6. During the effective term of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, State defendant will supervise City defendant’s compliance with ¶ 5(a) and (b) of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement by taking, inter alia, the following actions: a. State defendant will review and evaluate the results of the reports that are prepared and transmitted to State defendant by City defendant pursuant to this Stipulation and Order of Settlement. b. State defendant shall provide to plaintiffs’ counsel and City defendant, on a quarterly basis, commencing after the close of the reporting period of October through December 2008, a report generated from the Welfare Management System (“WMS”) indicating the time periods by which Food Stamp benefits were issued to households applying at a New York City NCA Food Stamp Center where a code which denotes the issuance of Food Stamp benefits on an expedited basis was entered into WMS by City defendant. The report will indicate the number of days following the date of application in which the Food Stamp benefit became available to the households. The report will be broken down by month, and NCA Food Stamp Center, and will
Page 4 of 19

be provided to plaintiffs’ counsel and City defendant within 90 days after the close of the reporting period. In addition, State defendant will provide to plaintiffs’ counsel and City defendant the above described report which contains the data for the months of August and September 2008 within 90 days after the close of this two month reporting period. c. State defendant shall provide to plaintiffs’ counsel and City defendant, on a quarterly basis, commencing after the close of the reporting period of October through December 2008, a report indicating: 1) the number of households which were issued Food Stamp benefits within 30 days after the date of application at New York City NCA Food Stamp Centers where a code which denotes the issuance of Food Stamp benefits was entered into WMS by City defendant; and 2) the time periods by which Food Stamp benefits were issued to households for periods beyond 30 days after the date of application at New York City NCA Food Stamp Centers where a code which denotes the issuance of Food Stamp benefits was entered into WMS by City defendant. The report will be broken down by month, and by NCA Food Stamp Center, and will be provided to plaintiffs’ counsel and City defendant within 120 days after the close of the reporting period. In addition, State defendant will provide to plaintiffs’ counsel and City defendant the above described report which contains the data for the months of August and September 2008 within 120 days after the close of this two month reporting period.
Page 5 of 19

MONITORING 7. City defendant shall provide the following monitoring as set forth below:
a. Provision of Reports - During the term of this Agreement, City defendant shall provide Plaintiffs’ counsel and State defendants’ Counsel with the following information, within 45 business days of the expiration of each month: i. A report noting the number of applications received in the month, by NCA Food Stamp Center where filed. For those applications received in the reporting month for which a determination has been made the report will also show: a) The number of applicants screened for eligibility for expedited service; b) The number of applicants determined eligible for expedited service; c) For those applicants determined to be entitled to expedited service, the number of determinations regarding eligibility made within five days following the date the application was filed; d) For those applicants not determined to be entitled to expedited service, the number of determinations regarding eligibility for Food Stamp benefits made within 30 days following the date the application was filed; e) For those applicants determined to be entitled to expedited Page 6 of 19

service, the number to whom Food Stamps benefits were issued within 5 days following the date the application was filed; f) For those applicants not determined to be entitled to expedited service, the number to whom Food Stamp benefits were issued within 30 days following the date the application was filed; and g) the number of applications approved and the number of applications denied. ii. For each NCA Food Stamp Center, a report indicating the number of applications for which Food Stamps benefits were not provided within 5 or 30 days, subdivided by whether applicants were eligible for expedited service or not, and subdivided by whether the delay is attributable to the City Defendant or to the household and the extent of the delay as follows: a) 1 day; b) 2 days; c) 3-5 days; and d) more than 5 days iii. For each NCA Food Stamp Center, a report indicating the number of applications during the reported month where a determination has not yet been made, known as “open applications.” iv. For each NCA Food Stamp Center, a report indicating the number of applications from the previous month’s “open applications” list, identified
Page 7 of 19

in subparagraph 7(a)(iii) above, where there has been a determination. v. City defendant represents that (a) the reports to be generated pursuant to
paragraph 7(a) of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement will be drawn from the data maintained in the Paperless Office System “POS” maintained by City defendant; (b) POS requires that applicants be screened for eligibility for expedited processing of their Food Stamp application; and (c) POS can accurately measure the number of days from application to determination of eligibility and, where appropriate, issuance of Food Stamp bernefits to eligible households. vi. Pursuant to sub-paragraph 7(c) of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, the parties will meet and confer to agree on the format of the monthly reports. b. Sampling – The City defendant shall engage in sampling as follows: i. Sample Definition (a) City defendant shall draw a one-time systematic or random sample
of 296 cases (subject to the terms of subparagraph 7(c)(iii) below) from the universe of NCA Food Stamp applications for a month to be determined by the parties, except that the month to be sampled shall not be before March 2009. Within 90 days of the end of the month sampled, City defendant shall submit a report to plaintiffs’ counsel that indicates the following: (1) for those applications determined eligible for expedited Food
Stamp application processing, whether or not Food Stamp Page 8 of 19

benefits were issued within 5 days following the date the application was filed; (2) for those applications not determined eligible for expedited processing, whether the applications were processed and benefits issued within 30 days following the filing of the application; (3) for cases where a determination was not made within 5 or thirty (30) days following the date the application was filed, whether the delay was attributable to the client or to the agency; and (4) for NCA Food Stamp applications where the application has been accepted for Food Stamp benefits, whether the applicant was eligible for expedited processing of his or her application for Food Stamp benefits and, if eligible, whether or not the Food Stamp benefit was issued within 5 days following the date the application was filed. (b) Pursuant to subparagraph 7(c) below, plaintiffs and City defendant shall meet and confer regarding the month to be sampled and the method of selection. ii. Additional Sampling Issues. (a) With regard to cases in the sample that have been reported as not being correctly or timely processed, the City defendant will conduct a review of those cases and provide corrective action on those cases
Page 9 of 19

that still need processing. City defendant will provide a report of its findings and corrective action taken on these cases to plaintiffs’ counsel within 120 days from the end of the sampling period. (b) In the event that plaintiffs in good faith believe, based on the results of the sample described in subparagraph 7(b)(i)(a) above, that the monitoring report identified in subparagraph 7(a) above is not reliable with regard to the timely processing of applications for Food Stamp benefits and/or the timely and/or the screening for expedited processing of applications for Food Stamp benefits and/or accurate expedited processing of applications for Food Stamp benefits, they will give notice to City defendant and counsel for plaintiffs and City defendant will meet and confer regarding the results of the sample. If the City defendant agrees with the plaintiffs, plaintiffs and City defendant will attempt to arrive at a resolution, which may include, inter alia, if necessary, the conducting of an additional sample. In the event the plaintiffs and City defendant are unable to agree that a resolution is necessary and/or to the scope of a resolution , the disputed issues will be referred to the Court for resolution. c. The plaintiffs and City defendant shall meet and confer before the reports are finalized and before the sample(s) is defined to determine, inter alia, i. the month from which the sample identified in subparagraph 7(b)(i) is drawn; ii. The sampling methodology; iii. Sample Size. Note the present sample size of two-hundred and ninety-six
Page 10 of 19

(296) set forth in subparagraph 7(b)(ii)(c)(i) is based upon an assumed population proportion estimate of seventy-four (74) percent of the applications in the sample universe being timely processed for Food Stamps and for expedited processing. However, if the data provided in the reports identified in subparagraph 7(a) of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement indicates for at least two months a different proportion estimate, the parties shall confer in good faith on the use of a sample size consistent with that population proportion estimate. iv. The data recording instrument to be used for recording the information drawn from the samples; v. The format of the monthly reports; and vi. The data sources for both the monthly reports and the samples. In the event the plaintiffs and City defendant are unable to agree to any or all of these matters, they shall agree upon an expert to whom the question shall be submitted for the provision of an expert opinion. If the parties are still unable to agree, either side may move the Court to determine any unresolved issues. However, no party may so move any earlier than May 15, 2008. d. Prior to October 1, 2008, City defendant will provide aggregate data on the processing of Food Stamp applications from those NCA Food Stamp Centers where the POS has been operational for at least three months; however the frequency of reports and specific information they contain may vary from that specified above.
INDIVIDUAL RELIEF 8. Without diminishing the right of the plaintiff class to seek enforcement of the
provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, or of any individual class Page 11 of 19

member to seek relief as set forth in paragraph 22 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, City defendant shall provide a mechanism pursuant to which plaintiffs’ counsel may bring to the attention of City defendant individual cases or instances in which there has been an alleged violation of the terms and conditions of this Settlement. City defendant shall investigate the cases(s), take any appropriate steps required to resolve the issue(s) concerning each individual case, and report the result of such investigation in writing to plaintiffs’ counsel. Such report shall be provided within 5 business days of receiving plaintiffs’ counsel’s report of the alleged violation(s), provided, however that the time frame for response shall be 2 business days when the alleged violation(s) concern the provision of expedited Food Stamp benefits. If responding to the alleged violation brought to the attention of City defendant pursuant to this paragraph reasonably requires information in order to identify the class member, then City defendant shall promptly inform plaintiffs’ counsel of what information is required, and the time for responding shall not include any period between the date City defendant makes a written or oral request for the information and the date City defendant receives the information. In addition, if providing Food Stamp benefits to the household at issue requires the household to complete the application process, then City defendant shall promptly inform plaintiffs’ counsel of what action the household must take to complete the application process.
JURISDICTION 9. The provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement shall not take effect unless
and until the Court “so orders”this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, at which time Page 12 of 19

it shall become effective (“effective date”). Defendants' obligations under this Stipulation and Order of Settlement shall run from the effective date until the jurisdiction of the Court lapses. However, notwithstanding the “so ordering” this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, plaintiffs are precluded from moving for enforcement or contempt with respect to paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement prior to October 2008. 10. As of the effective date, all remedies sought in the complaint are limited to the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement. 11. All claims not resolved herein, specifically that part of plaintiffs’ first claim that concerns applications for Food Stamp benefits filed at Job Centers and plaintiffs’ second claim, are dismissed without prejudice. 12. The jurisdiction of this Court shall end at the conclusion of forty-eight (48) months following the effective date unless plaintiffs move pursuant to paragraphs 17 and 18 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement. At the time of termination of jurisdiction, all rights and claims arising under the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement shall terminate and all remaining claims under this complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice. 13. In any motion for enforcement, contempt, or to extend the term of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, no party shall rely on any monitoring reports provided before October 2008.
ENFORCEMENT 14. In the event of a motion by plaintiffs for enforcement or contempt based upon any
defendant’s alleged non-compliance with this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, Page 13 of 19

that defendant shall be considered to be in compliance with the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement unless plaintiffs establish that defendant’s failures or omissions to comply with the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement were not minimal or isolated, but were sufficiently significant and widespread or recurring as to be systemic. 15. During the forty-eight (48) months following the effective date, if plaintiffs’ counsel believes that one or both of defendants have failed to comply, as defined by paragraph 14 above, with the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, plaintiffs’ counsel shall notify such defendants’ counsel in writing of the nature and specifics of the alleged failure to comply and shall specify the monitoring reports, if any, upon which such a belief is based, at least thirty (30) days before any motion is made for enforcement of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement or for contempt. Unless otherwise resolved, the parties’ counsel shall meet within the thirty (30) day period following notice to defendants’ counsel in an attempt to arrive at a resolution of the alleged failure to comply. 16. If no resolution is reached within thirty (30) days from the date of notice, plaintiffs may move this Court for an order enforcing the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement and/or for contempt. Plaintiffs shall bear the burden of proving that the alleged noncompliance is sufficiently significant and widespread or recurring as to be systemic. Non-systemic individual and isolated violations of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement shall not form a basis for a finding that defendants have acted in contempt of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, or as a basis for a motion for enforcement. No motion for contempt or enforcement shall be brought
Page 14 of 19

to remedy those violations that the parties agree (a) have been cured, or (b) will be cured pursuant to a plan agreed upon by the parties, provided that the plan actually cured those violations. In the event that the parties agree to a plan to cure an alleged violation and plaintiffs believe that the violation has still not been cured, plaintiffs must provide at least thirty (30) days notice before any motion is made for enforcement of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement or for contempt.
EXTENSION OF THE TERM OF THE STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT
17. Plaintiffs may move this Court for an order extending the jurisdiction of the Court over this Stipulation and Order of Settlement by complying with the provisions of paragraphs 15 and 16, and shall make any such motion on or before the scheduled termination of this Court’s jurisdiction, unless another date is agreed to by the parties.
18. In the event plaintiffs move to extend the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to paragraph 17 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, the standard for measuring defendants’ compliance with the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement is that set out in paragraph 14 above of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement. Any such extension of the jurisdiction of this Court shall be for a period of not more than two (2) years from the date the Court’s jurisdiction was scheduled to terminate, and the scope of the relief the Court may order shall extend only so far as is necessary to correct violations of the provisions of this Stipulation and Order
Page 15 of 19

of Settlement. 19. Prior to the expiration of any period of extended jurisdiction set forth in paragraph
18 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, plaintiffs may move for contempt or enforcement consistent with the provisions set forth in paragraphs 15 and 16 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement. Plaintiffs may also move for a further extension of the jurisdiction of the Court beyond that set forth in paragraph 18 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement; except that no motion for extension of the Court’s jurisdiction shall be made prior to six months before the expiration of the Court’s jurisdiction and is subject to the provisions for extension of the Court’s jurisdiction set forth in paragraphs 17 and 18 of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement.
GENERAL PROVISIONS 20. Plaintiffs reserve the right to apply to the Court to recover such costs and fees within
90 days of the Court so ordering this Stipulation and Order of Settlement and defendants reserve the right to oppose such an application. 21. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall have access, upon reasonable notice, to the data in City defendant’s possession reasonably necessary to determine whether those cases sampled by City defendant and determined to be an issuance in compliance with the applicable statute and/or regulation were accurately characterized. As part of such reasonable notice, plaintiffs shall inform City defendant of the basis for their reasonable belief of the need for such production and shall limit any such request to only those data or documents consistent with the reasonable need. City defendant will preserve the underlying data for a minimum of two years from the date a report
Page 16 of 19

is produced. 22. No provision in this Stipulation and Order of Settlement shall infringe upon any
household’s right to seek to compel defendants to provide any form of relief the household deems appropriate by way of an administrative hearing or a proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules so long as the household is not seeking to challenge any of the policies set forth in this Stipulation and Order of Settlement. 23. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall protect the confidentiality of any household’s information provided by defendants under the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement and shall not disclose such information to any individual not involved in the administration of the Food Stamp program within the City of New York in accordance with applicable New York State statutes and implementing regulations, if any, except (1) the household whose case is involved or (2) as is necessary to the prosecution of this action. 24. Nothing contained in this Stipulation and Order of Settlement shall be deemed to be a finding or an admission that defendants have in any manner violated plaintiffs’ rights as contained in the Constitution, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules and Regulations of the United States, the State of New York or the City of New York. 25. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement, defendants reserve the right to implement, change, or otherwise alter or amend the procedures and requirements of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement if required by intervening changes in federal statute or regulation or state statute or regulation which are inconsistent with the terms of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement.
Page 17 of 19

Defendants shall provide plaintiffs’ counsel with written notification of a required change at least thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of implementation, unless defendants are required to commence implementation of such a required change in less than thirty (30) days. If defendants are required to commence implementation of a required change in less than thirty (30) days, counsel for defendants shall provide such notice no later than seven (7) working days after learning thereof. Plaintiffs reserve the right to oppose any changes sought by defendants pursuant to this paragraph. 26. This Stipulation and Order of Settlement is final and binding upon the parties, their successors and their assigns.

Dated:

New York, New York February , 2008

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

MICHAELA. CARDOZO CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK Attorney for City Defendant 100 Church Street, Room 6C25 New York, New York 10007 (212) 788-0923
By: _______________________________ MARTHA CALHOUN Assistant Corporation Counsel

YISROEL SCHULMAN, ESQ. (YS 3107) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Randal S. Jeffrey, of Counsel (RSJ 3396) Elissa S. Devins, of Counsel (ESD 9197) Elena S. Goldstein, of Counsel (ESG 8586) 450 West 33rd Street, 11th Floor New York, New York 10001 Tel. (212) 613-5000
By: ________________________________

ANDREW M. CUOMO

THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER HOMELESSNESS OUTREACH

Page 18 of 19

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Attorney for State Defendant 120 Broadway New York, New York 10271 (212) 416-8561
By: _______________________________ DEBORAH HOCHHAUSER Assistant Attorney General

PREVENTION PROJECT Leslie T. Annexstein (LA 0430) Jennifer Magida (JM 2513) Ami Sanghvi (AS 5128) 123 William Street, 16th Floor New York, NY, 10038 Tel. (646) 602-5649
By: ________________________________

HENRY A. FREEMAN WELFARE LAW CENTER, INC. Marc Cohan (MC 2612) Petra T. Tasheff (PT 8762) 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1205 New York, New York 10001 Tel. (212) 633-6967

By: __________________________________

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

New York, New York ________, 2008

ENTER

Robert W. Sweet United States District Judge

Page 19 of 19

 
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UNITED STATES DISTR1CT COURT 
 SOUTI-IE.RN DISTR1CT OF NEW YORK 


GERTRUDE WlLl.JSrON; and TAWANA, LATOYA, and TANfJIKA CUMMlNS, by their parent, PAUJ..ETfE CUMl\,fiNS, on their own. behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

x AMENDED STIPULATION A~l) ORDER OF SETTL,EMENT
04 eiv. 4454 (RWS)

JOSE FELIZ, and FLORENCE GREENBAlJ1.ti, on their 0\V11 behalf and 011 behalf of all others similady situated,

PlailltiffS~Int.ervenortr:IrI··U--:S--D.-C-=S.-D--NY. '

-a~ai~st-.. ~;~~;~ll~NT.. .' ~ . "

".

. J

ROBERT DOAR, as ComrmSSlOn€ .r of the New York ell)" c C ,.,L.. _RONICALLY FILED

I I Depmtroent of SooiaJ Services; and ELIZABETH

ii L)()C #:

l"""Z--­ BERLlN,
Office of

IlS Acting Conl1n.i:s.'lio?-~r oft~e New York
Tempotary and Dlsablhty ASSistance,!

State:!~t.,~", ~'~.T~-r..~-· _F'IL_E"'_V-0.+'=::==+-:5-~ F1-,f--..-...

~

_

'"-------­

Defcndau,ts.

WHEREAS, plaintiffs commen.ced thif! action by filing 41, cla!lS action complaint, pUrStlant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on hcnalfofappUcants for F.ood Stamp benefits:in the City ofNew York;
WII.EREAS, plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Eggleston ("City defendant") unlawfuJJy: (a) fa..il11 to provide Food Stamp benefit<; to those eligible within thirty days of application in violation of fedenll and state luw; (b) dete.rs, discOtlfagos and prevonts individuaJs and families from fiUng appUcatiOllS for Food Stamp benefits \Ipon iniHal contact with Non-Cash Assistance ("NCA") Food
.\ Mr. DoarreplaccR Verna Eggleston and Ms. Bl;)rlin replaces Mr. Doar. Page 1 of 14

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Stamps Centers; and (c) fails to provide expedited Food Stamp benefitf; at the NCA Food Stamp Centers within the time frames rC(PJir~d by fedoral and state law;
WHEREAS, plairrliffs ftuthcralleged that Defendant DORt' ~'State defendant") bas failed to supervise appropriately the actions of City defendant as required 'by law;
WHEREAS, plainti.ffs filed a l:tlotion for ela.ss certification, Rnd defendants opposed said motion;
WHEREAS, plaintiffs sought, inter alia, a Clas5~widc order en,joining City defendant (1) to provide Food St~mp benefits to thoso eligible in a timely manner; (2) from detel'.r.ing, discouraging and preventing persollS from filiIlg applications for Food Stamp hcr.rC:/its upon initia1 contact witl) the NCA Food Stamp Ccn.ters; and (3) to is::.'Ue expedited FoodStamp benefits at the NCA Food Stamp Centers within the time frames requited by federal and state law. Pla.intiffs also sought an ord.er enjoining State defend,mt to supervise City defendaut adequatelY;
WUEREAS, the parties en.tered into a Stipulation and Order of Seltlemc.ot resolving the claims ofthe plaintiffs in thJs action, including tJ)0 certification of a class;
WHEREAS, defendants denied each and every allegation oontaiued in the complaint and stated in the whereas clauses set forth in the Original Stipulation and Order of Settlement;
WHEREAS, 110 findi ng of liability has beeo. made; WHEREAS.. 011 April 18, 2008, this emut so ordered the Stipulation and Orde:r of Settlement after Et fairness hearing conducted pursuant to Fed. Rule eiv. Pro. 23(e); WHEREAS, plaintiff.'1 allege that City defclldan.t is failing to provIde Food Stamp bonefits to those eligible in. a timely manner; WHEREAS, u.o fmdil'lg of liability has been made as to plaintiffs' claim; WHEREAS, the parties desire to rosolve the remaining issues raised in this litigation,
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without fm'ther proceedings and without admitting any fault or lia.bility; NOW~ THERE,FORE, rI'lS f:IJ~REBY STJPULATED AND AGREED; by and between
the tU1,c1crsigncd~ as foHows:
DEFINITIONS I. "NCA :Foocl Stamp Centex" is defined as a non cash public assistance Food Stamp
center operated by Clty defendant and includes centers known 3.,.,) Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Centers, 2. «Apply for Food St:unp benefil:s,h as set forth in paragraph 3, shall include anyone
who applies tor Food Stamp benefits during the effectivtl tenn of this settlement, Or
who has a pending Food Stamp application durlng the effective term of this settlement, 3, "Apply for Food Stamp benefits at a NCA Food Stamp Center," as set fOlth 1.n paragr.aph 4) shall incltlde applicatio.ns submitted at NCA Food Stamp Cellters, as well as applications submitted to NCA Food Stamp Centers by liRA or HRA representatives, cO,l;itr~\ctors or designees who arc located at looal community basod
organizations.
CLASS CERTIFICATION 4. A daRB is certified consisting ofall individuals who apply for Food Stamp benefits
at a NCA Fooel Stamp Center, or for wbom an application lS submitted at an NCA
Food Stamp Center. DEFENDANTS' OBl.IGA'flONS
5. During the effective term of tbis Amended Stipulation and Order of Settlement CAme:lJded Order"), City defc.lldant sball: 

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05/07/2012 17C:2a4se 1:02412-c5v33-054374154-RWS DocumentN1C1LE2J Filed 05/08/12 Page 4 of 17 PAGE 05/19
a. provide Food Stamp benefits to eligible households included in the class within the 30 day t.ime frame as provided in 7 U.S.c. § 2020(e)(3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273,2(g)(l), except t.hat llothing herein shall require City defelldant to provide f.'ood. Stamp benefits within the 30 day time frame to eligible hou~cholds when the dCIay In provision of bene:fits is ca1.lSe::d by the household as described in 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(h)(J )0).
b. post signs 8.D,d maintain signR ill NCA Food Stamp Centers setting forth the right to apply fOf Food Stonlp benefits and the time frames for the processing of applications.
(i. During tbe effective term oftlti;: Ame.n.ded Order., State dcfendflIlt will supervise City
defendal1t:'s compliance with 1f 5(a) ofthe Amended Order by taking, inter alia, t1H~
following actions: a. State defendant will review and evalu.ate the results of the reports that are
prepared and transmitted to State defendant by City defendant ptJ!suant to this Amended Order. h. State defendant shall provide to plaintiffs' counsel and City defendant, on a quarterl,y b~tsis, commencing after tl.'1c close ofilic reporting period of July througb September 2012, a report indicating: 1) tbe l1tlluber ofhouseho1ds which wereislmed Food Stamp b~nefits within 30 clays after the date of application at Now Yod( City NCA Food Stamp Cen.ters where a code which denotes tIle issuance ofFood Stamp benefits was entered lnto WMS by City defendant; and 2) the tjm.c periods bywhich Food Starllp benefits were issued to households for periods beyond 30 days after the date o,hpplication at New
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Yor1c City NCA Food Stamp Centers where a code which denotes the

issuance ofFood Stamp benefits was entered into WMS by City defendant.

The report will be broken down by month, and by NCA Food Stamp Center,

tmd will be provided to plaintiffs' counsel and City defendant within 120

days afrer the close of the r.epOlting period..

MONITORING

7. City defendant: shall provldc the following monitoring as set fortb below:

a.

Provision of Reports - During the tenn of this Agreement~ City defendant

shall provide Plainti:ffs' counsel and State defendants' COll1Jsel with the

following information) within 45 bUldness days of the eJxpiration of each

month:

1.

A report l10ting 1:l1e number of ~lpplications received in the month} hy

NCA Food Stamp Center where flied. :For those applications

received in the reporting month for which a d;,;;terminatioll bas beel1

tnade the report will also show:

a) The n'umber of applicant'S screened fot eligibility for

expedited service;

b) The number of applioants dctotmined eligible for expedited

service:

c) For those appJic('U1ts determined to be eI1titled to ex.pedited

service, the ll'l.tniber of detenuinatiolls regarding eligibility

made within jive days fbllowing the date the application was

filed; Page 5 of 14

05/07/2012 17C:a2s4e 1:0241-2c5v3-3054347514-RWS DocumentN1C1L2EJ Filed 05/08/12 Page 6 of 17 PAGE 08/19
d) For those applicants not determined to be entitled to
expedited service, the number of determinations rega.rdiug eligibility for Food Stamp benefits made within 30 days
following the date the application was filed;
e) For those applicants detennined to be entitled to ex,pedited service, the J'},tllnber to whom Food Staml>s benefits were issued withi.n 5 days following the date the application was
filed; f) :1401' those applicaI),ts not determined to be entitled to
expedited service, the U'\.),mber to wbom Food Stamp benefits were issued witbin 30 days following the date the application was filed; and g) the number. of npplications approved and the number of applications denied. ii. For each NCA Food Stamp Center, a report indicating the number of
appli,cations for which Food Stamps benefits were not provIded withi.n 5 or 30 days, subdivided by whether applicants \vere eligible for expedited serv.ioo
or not, and :mbdivided by whether the delay is attdbt.Ttall1c to the CiW Defelldallt Of to the household and the extent ofll,e delay I:1S foHows: a) 1 day; b) 2 days; c) 3-5 da.ys; alld d) mote than 5 days
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m. Fol' each NCA Food Stamp Center) a report indicating the Ullrnbcl' of
applications during the reported month where a determination has not yet ol!)cn made, lt11cwn as "open applications."
lv. For each NCA Food Stamp Center, a report indicating the llumber of applications trOll) the previous month's "open applications" list, idenHiied in subparagraph 1(a)(iii) above} where there has been a dotenninatio:t1.
v. City defendant represent" that (a) the reports to bo generated pursuant to par.agraph 7(a) of this Amcp.ded Order will be drawn from the data maintained in the Paperless Office System "p~s" maintained by City dClfe110.atJ.1:; (b) POS -requires that applicants be scroenod for eligibility for expedited processi.n,g of their Food Stamp applioation; IUld (c) POS can accurately m.easure the number of days from application to determination of eligibility andI where appropiiatc, iSS'Llance ofFood Stamp benefits to eHgible households. INDlVJDUAL RELIEF
8. Without diminish.ing the right of the plaintiff class to seek enforcement of the prOViS10llS oHilis Amended Order, or of any illdividual class member to seek relief as set forth ill paragraph 1S of this Amended Order. City defendant shall provide a nlcchatlism pursuant to whicb plaintiffs' counsel may hring to the attention of City dcfendanl; individ1.ml cases or instances itl which ther,c has been an alleged violation offue terms and conditions of this Settlemellt. City doflDlldant sball investigate the Caqe(R), take any appropriate stepil :required to resolve the issue(s) concerning each individllal case, and report ibo result of lIuch investigation jf) writing 1:0 plaintiffs' Page 7 of 14

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counsel. Such reportshall be provided within. Sbusiness days ofreccivjng plaIntiff.c;' counse1's l"Cport oftha alleged violation(s), If responding to the alleged violation brought to the attentioll, of City defendal1t pUfau.ant to tllis paragraph reasonably requires information ill order to identUy the class member, tben City defendant shall promptly .inform. plF.l.intift.s' counsel ofwhat in±ormatlon is required, and the time for responding shall not include !l,ny period between. tile date City defendant makes a written or oral request for the information. and tho date City defendant reccive.."l the information. In addition, ifproviding Food Stamp benefits to the household at issue J'cquirel'lthe househ.old to complete the application process, then City defendant shall promptly ulfonn plaintiffs' counsel of what acHon the household must take to complete the application prOC0s.~.
JURISDICTION 9. The provisions ofthis Amended Order shall not take effect tmJcss and until tl1e Court
"so orders'~th.i..<; Amended Order, at which time it shall beco:r:ne effective ("effective date"). Defendantsl ohHgatiollB under this Amended Order shall run from the effective date uutiltile jl.lrisdictioll of the Court lapses. 10. As of the effective date~ all remedies sought in the complaint are limited to the provisions oHhls Amended Order. 11. The. jurisdiction of this Court shall end March 31, 2013 unless plaintiffs move purSUtlllt to paragraplul l4 al.ld 15 ofthis Amended Order. On tbe effective date of this Amended Order, the Thitd Clajm agaillst Deffmdant.s regarding tJle provision of expedited Food Stamp be1lefits sct forth in paragraph 95 of the complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice. At the lime oftenuinatiol1 ofjurisdic1.iOll (lithe remaining
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claims, all rights and claims arisillg tmdcr the provisions of this Amended Order shall tennit\atc and all remailling claims under tllis complaint shall be dismiss¢d with
prej'lld;cc.
ENFORCEMENT
12. In t110 event of fl motion by plninHffs for enforcement or cOl.ltempt based UpOll all.y
defendant's alleged nOll~compliance with this Am.cnded. Ordct~ that defendant shall be considered to be in compliance with the proviSiOllS of this Amended Order wlless plabtiff.'l establish that defendant's failures Of omissions to comply wil11 the provisions ofthis Amended. Order were not roinhnal orisolated, but: were sufficielltly
sigllificant and widesprea.d or recurring as to be systemic.
13. During the term oftMs Amended Order, ifplaintiff'l' counsel bolieves that One or
both of defendants have failed to comply, as de:flned by paragraph. 12 of the
Amel1ded Order, Witll the provisions of this Amended Order, plHintiffs' counsel. shall notify lSuci\:t defendantR' counsel in wt:'.iting of the nature and specifics of the nlJegcd fs.Htlre to comply and shall spcci(y the monitoring reports, if any, upon Wl1ich 81.1Ch a beliefis based, at 1east thirty (30) days before allY tn.otion is mado for enforcement
of thIs Amended Order or for contempt. Unless otherwise resolved, the partics' counsel shall nJeet within the thhty (30) daypedod followil1g notice to defendants' aouns('}l in an attompt to a:rr.ive at II resolution of tho alleged failure to comply. 13. Ifno rcsob.ttion is reached \\-'1tl1in thirty (30) days {rom the date ofnotice, plaintiffs may move tbJs Court for an order enforcing the provlsions of this Amended Order and/or for contempt. Plaintiffs sha.ll boar the burden of proving that the alleged Mnoolnpliance is suff.icie~ltly significant el.l1d widespread or recurring as to be
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systen:ric. NOll-systemic individual and isol.ated violations of this AnumdedOrder shall not fotCJ a basis for a tlndillg that defendants have acted in contempt of this Amended Order, or as a basis for a motion for enJorcement. No motion for cOlltcmpt or enforcelneot shnll be brought to remedy those violations that the p!lTties agree (a) .have been cured, or (b) will be cured pursl.um1: to a plan agreed upon by the parties, provided tbat the plan actuaIty c'\.ll'ed those violations. In Ule event that th0 parties agree to a plan to cure an alleged violation and. plaintiffs believe that the violation Jm3 stiH not been curedl plaintiff" mu,st provide at least thirty (30) days notice before any motion i.s Jnadtl fOT enfO!Cl:lment of tbjs Amended Order or for contempt. EXTENSION OF' 'tHE TERlVI OF THE AMENDED ORDER lA. Plaintiffs may UlOV~ this Court for an order extending the jurisdiction of the Court over this AmOllclcd Ord.er by complying with the provisions ofparagraphs 12 and 13, and shall make any such moti 011 on or before the scheduled termination of this Court's jurisdiction, unless atJOther date is agreed to by the parties. 15. 1n the event plaiJ1tiffs move to extei).d th.e juriRdiction of this Court pursuant to paragraph 14 of this Am0l1ded OroOl', the standard for nl!;.)asuring defendants' compliance with tho provisions of this Arncl1.ded Order is that set out in paragl'apb. 12 above ofthis Amctlded Order. Any such extension. ofthe jurisdiction ofthis CO\lti: shall be for a period of not more than two (2) yeats from tlle date the Caurt's jurisdiction was scheduled to terminate, and the scope of the relief the Cotlrt luay order shaH extend only 00 far as ]1'1 necessary to conect violaLion~ of the provislom ofthig Atncnded Order_
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16. Prior to the expiration of any perjod of extended jurisdiction set for11l in paragraph
1.5 of this Am.ended Order, plaintiffs may move for col1tempt or enforcement
consistent W.iIll the provisions set forth i.n p;;rragraphs 12 and 13 of this Amellded Order. Plai.n.tiffs may also move for a further extension of the jurisdiction of the COl.lrt beyond that set forth in paragraph 11 of this Ame.nded Order; except that 110 motion for exl:ension of the COl.lrt~a jurisdjction shall be made prior to SL,( months before the oxpiraLion oHlle Court'sjl.lrisdiction and is subject to the provisions for extension of the Court's jurisdiction set forth in paragraphs 12 illld 13 of this Amended Order.
GENERAT... PROVISIONS 17. Plaintiffs reserve the right to apply to the Court to recover such costs and foes within
90 days of thf;) Court so ordering this Amended Order and defendants reserve the
right kl oppose sllch all application, 18. No provision 111 this Amended Order shall infringe Up011 any household's right to
seek to compol defelldants to provide allY form ofiellef the household deems appropria.te by way of an adminlstrntive he.:ll'ing or a proceeding pursuant to ar.~jc1e
78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and. Rules gO long as the household is not seeking to cballenge any of the policies set forlb in this Amended Order.
19. Plaintiff.;;' coullsel shall proteot the cOlliidentiaHty of any household's information provid.ed by defendanm under the provisions ofthis Amended Order and shall not disclose such illformatioll to any Indiv.idual not illvolved in th.c administration ofthc:: Food Stamp program within the City of New York in accordance with applicable New York State statute." and. .implementing l'ogulatlons, if ally, except (1) the Page 11 0f 14

05/07/2012 17C:a2s4e 1:0241-2c5v3-3054347514-RWS DocumentN1C1L2EJ Filed 05/08/12 Page 12 of 17 PAGE 14/19
household whose case is involved or (2) as is necessary to the prosecution ofthis action.
20. Nothing contained in this Amended Order shall be deemed. to be a findiog Or an
admission that defendants have in anymttnncrviolated plaintiffs' rights as contained i:L"l the Constitutio:n~ Statutes, Ordinances and Rules and Regulations of the United St.ates, the State of New York or the City of New York. 21. Notwithstanding the provisions ofthis Amended Order, defendants reserve the right to imple.ment~ change, or othcl:wise alter or amend the procedures and requirements of thJs Amended Order if required by intervening changes in federal statute or regulation or state statute or regulation which are inconsistent with tho terms ofthis Amended Order. Defendants shaH provide plahltiffs' counsel with written notification ofa required change at least thirty (30) days prior to the commencemen.t ofimplementation, unless defendants are requlred to commence implemontation of such a t'cquired change in less than tllirty (30) days. If defendants arc required to commence implemellt"a.tion ofa required change in less than thIrty (30) days, cOl.msel tor defendants shaD :providc sucb notice no later than seven (7) working days at'l:er lcaming thereof. Plaintiff." .reselve the right to oppose any changes sought by dcfeno,mt<; p~trsuant to tlns parng.t'apb, 22. This Amended Order is fhull and binding t\pon the partieR, their S\lcce~SOr5 a:nd theh' assigns.
Page 12 of 14

05/07/2012 C17a:s2e4 1:042-c12v6-03346435741-RWS Document 1N1C2LEJFiled 05/08/12 Page 13 of 17 PAGE 15/19

Dated;

Now York~ New York
APRIL 12, 2012

COUNSEL FOR DBFBNDANTS
MICHAELA. CARDOZO CORPORATION COUNSEL OP THE CITY OF NEW YORK Attorney for City Defendant
100 Church Street, Room GC2.5
,,/:."t Now York, New Yorl.< 10007
(212) 7gB-092~,
By:.__ .~~~_.
. MARTHA A. CAJ..HOUN Assistant COlporation. Cmmscl

ERIC T, SCHNEIDERMAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK'·
Attol'uey for State Defendant 120 Broadway, 2411• Floor NewYal'k, New York 10271 (212)416-8632

By:_,"""......_

~.. _-._....--...

... ROBERT L, KRA.FT

Assistant Attorney Oono)'[\l

COUNSEL FOR "PLAINTIFFS
YISROEl. SCHULMAN, ESQ, (YS 31()1) NBW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
RANDAL S. JEFFREY, ofCot}tlsol (RS)
3396) 7 Hanover Square, 18th New York, New York 10004 Tel. (212) 613~5000
By: ___
TIIE. URBAN JUSTICE CENTER
HOMELESSNBSS OUTREACH PREVENTION PROJECT
DENISE MIRANDA
123 William 8treet~ 16th Floor
New York~ NY, 30038
Tel. (646) 602-5649
HENRY A. FREEMAN
WELFARE LAW CBNl'ER, INC. Marc Coban (Me 2(12) t'0b'a r.Tasheff(PT 87(2)
275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 12.05
New Yorl{, New York 10001
Tel. (212) 633-6967

By;_. _""'"'-_""'"-_.......----­

Page 13 of 14

05/07/2012 C17a:s2e4 1:042-1c2v5-03345435741-RWS Document 1N1C2LEJFiled 05/08/12 Page 14 of 17 PAGE 15/19

Dated:

New York, New York APRIL J.2, 2012

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
NITC}IAELA.CARDOZQ
CORPORATION COUNSEL OF TIlE CITY OF NEW YORK Attornoy for City Defendant 100 Church Street. Room 6C25
New York, New York 10007 (2] 2) 788-0923
ny: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
MARTHA A. CAUIOUN
Assistant Corporation Counsel
EIUe T. SCHNEIDERMAN
ATTORNEY GRN"ERAt.. OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK. Attorn.ey for State Defendant 120 Broadway, 24lh Floor New YOrk. Ne\vYorl~ 10271 (212) 41G-8632
By: __~~_ _~_____ ROBERt L. KRAFT
Assistant Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

YISROEL SCHULMAN, ESQ. (yS 3107) 


NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP 


RANDAL S. JEFFREY, of Counsel (RSJ 


3396) 


7

Rl'luover

Square,

18

1 l!




New York, New York l0004~ Tel. (2l2) 613-5000

By' &l J. f,L

THE URBAN JUSTIcE CENTER
HOMELESSNESS OUTREACH PREVENTT.ON PROJECT DENISE MIRANDA
123 William Street, 16th Floor New York, NY. 10038 Tel. (646) 602-5649
By: _ __

HHNRY A. FREEMAN WEl..FARE LAW CENTER, INC.
Marc Cohan (Me 2612) Potra T. Tallheft' O'T 8762) 275 Seventh Avonuo, Suite :20.5 New York, New York lOOOl Tel. (212) 633-6961

By: _ _ _ _ _ _- - -_ _ _ __

Page 13 of 14

................ 


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DocumentN1C1L2EJ Filed 05/08/12

PAGE
Page 15 of 17

17/19

Dated:

New York, New York APRIL 12, 2012

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDAl'J"TS

COUNSEJ~ FOR PLAINTIFFS

MICHAELA. CARDOZO CORPORATION COUNSEL OF TIIB CTrY OF NEW YORK
Attorney for City Defendant
100 Ch:l.lrcll SIl'eet.• Room 6C25 New York, New York 10007 (12) 788-0923
By: _ _ _~_ _ _ _ _ ._ _ MARTHA A. CALHOUN Assistant Corporation Counsel
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF nrn STAT8
OF NEW YORK. Atto.rney foI' State Defendant 120 Brofldway, 24tb Floor NcwVork, New York 1027.1 (212) 416~8632

YJSROEL SCHULMAN, ESQ. (YS 3107) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP RANDAL S. JEFFREY, OfCoullsel (RSJ 3396) 7 H.anov0l' Sqnare~ 18th New York, New York 10004 TeL (212) 613-5000
By:,_ _
THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER HOMELESSNESS ODTREACH
PREVENTION PROJECT
DENISE MIRANDA 123 William Street, 16th Floor Now York, NY, 10038 Tel. (646) 602-5649
By:

By: _____ ._____---:=-:-:=--.-­ ROBERT L. KRAFT Assistnllt Attorney Genera1

HENRY A. FREEMAN
WELFARE LAW CENTER, INC. Marc Cohan (Me 2612)
Petra T. Tas.bcff(PT 8762) 275 Seventh .Avellt1e" S·t1ire 1205
New York, New York 10001 Tel. (212) 633-6967
~{ By..---1..--- .~,-,-.,-""'_"'_'____

Page 13 of 14

05/07/2012

17C:2a4se 1:02412-c6v33-064374154-RWS

DocumentN1CL1E2J Filed 05/08/12

PAGE
Page 16 of 17

18/1'3

Dated:

New York~ New York APRIL 12,2012

COUNSEl.. BOR PEFEN])ANTS

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

MICHAELA. CARDOZO CORPORATION COUNSEL OF 'r,BE CITY
OF NEW YORK
Attorney for City Defendant 100 Church Street, Room 6C25 New York, NcwYol'k 10007 (212) 788~0923
By: -'MA-R-YI1A A CAL·.,-g,-O..,..U'"'"'N,---­
Asslstallt Co.tp~ration Counsol
ERfC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
A170fu'i13Y GBNERAL OF THE STATB OF NEW YORK Attorney fi)r Stute Deiel1dant /.20 BrQadway. 24!~ Floor New Yo , :v York 10271 (212) 4, )-8632

YISROEL SCHULMAN, ESQ. (YS 3107)
NEW YORK LEGAl. ASSiSTANCE GROlJP
RANDAL S, JEFFREY, ofCotmse! (RSJ 3396) 7 Hnnovet Square, 181h
New York; New York 10004
Tel. (212) 613·.5000
By; ._ _ _ _ .,-.-~ _ _ _ _ __
THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER naMELESSNESS OUTREACH PREVENTION PROJECT
DENISE MIRANDA 123 William Street, 16th FIo0I' New York '.10038 Tel. (64 0'02., %49 ~
~ By; __. ~;;",.;;o..::::::.::::::=-,

By: -..f-.,.-'\-:-~--=~=--- _ __

HENRY A. FREEMAN WHLFARELAW CEN1.~ER) INC,
Marc C()n~n (Me 2612) .T'cl,'11 T, Tashcff (PT 87(2)
275 Sevent.h Avenue, Suite 1205
New York, Now York 10001 Tel. (212) 633~6967

By:

Pngt~ 13 of 14

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Case 1:04-cv-04454-RWS

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DocumenNtC1L1E2J

Filed 05/08/12

Page 17 of 17PAGE

19/19

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: ~Y:'NewYork
,2012

Page 14 of 14

 
 APR-03-2013 13:26
Case 1:04-cv-04454-RWS Document 127 Filed 04/03/13 Page 1 of 7

P.02/08

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----x ___~ ____________ - ____ • __ ~__ww____~.____________________________
GERTRUDE WILLISTON; tUld TAWANA, LATOYA, and TANDIKA CUMMINS, by parent, PAULETTE CUMMINS. on their
own behalf and on behalf ofall others similarly situated,

-against-

Plaintiffs,

STIPULATION

AND

ORDER OF

SETTLEMENT

CONCERNING

ATTORNEYS'

o Ycv FEES

-

4y :JL{@US)

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services, and ROBERT DOARt as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,

Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------x
WHEREAS, on February 27, Z008, the Court certified the plaintiff class ("Plaintiff

Class") and.appointed plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel; and

WHEREAS, on April 17, 2008, the Court granted the parties' motions to adopt the

settlement of this class action and so ordered the parties' Stipulation and Order of Settlement

("Settlement"); and

WHEREAS, on May 8, 2012, the Court so ordered the Amended Stipulation and Order of

Settlement <"Amended Settlement')' which modified the Settlement entered into by the parties;

and

~~T'< _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ " ,

APR-03-2013 13:26
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P.03/08

WIIEREAS, the Amended Settlement provides that within 90 days of the entry of the Settlement, plaintiffs' counsel may submit a request for attorneys' fees und costs to the Court; and
WHEREAS, by stipulations between the parties and by orders of the Court, the time within which plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs has been extended to permit the parties to negotiate a. settlement of the fees and costs; and
WHEREAS, plaintiffs and City and State defendants now seek to resolve the issue of
u.s. attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements pursuant to the provisions of 42 C. §1988: for the
period from the commencement of this action through the Court's so-order of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement un May 8, 2012, without further proceedings On terms and conditions just and fair to all parties;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and
between plaintiffs and defendants, as represented below, as follows: 1. City Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of fifty-two thousand dollars and no
cents ($52,000.00) to the below designated plaintiffs' cOllnsel; and State Defendant agrees to pay
the total sum of thirteen thousand dollars and no cents ($13,000.00) to the below designated plaintiffs' counsel, [or a total of sixty-five thousand dollars and no cents ($65,000.00). which
payment will be made in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees and costs sought by the Plaintiff Class as against the Defendants for the period from the commencement of this action
through the Coun's so-order of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement on May 8, 2012, as well as for all fees generated in connection with negotiating the terms of this Stipulation and Order,
2. Payment of the amount owed by Defendants shall be made no later than ninety
(90) days from the date that a so ordered copy of this Agreement has been docketed with the

APR-03-2013 13:26
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P.04/08

Clerk of the Court. Payment shall be maoe by the City Defendant and the State Detendant, respectively, delivering t.:hec.ks payablt: in the amounts stated in paragraph I above to the ANational Center for Law and Economic JU5tice® '-It 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506, New York, NY 10001.
3. Payment of the amount recited in paragraph #1 by State Defendant is subject to the approval of all appropriate New York State officials in accordance with {he provisions for indemnification under Section 17 of the New York Public Officers Law. fn the event that State Defendant is unable to obtain such approval within 90 days of the entry of this So Ordered Stipulation, State Defendlmt shall sa notify the plaintiffs' counsel within five (5) days of the disapproval. In the event of such disapproval, plaintiffs shaH have 90 days from such notice within which to make a motion seeking from the State defendants fees, costs, litigation expenses and disbursements. Plaintiffs' counsel agree to execute and deliver to counsel for the State Defendant a.ll necessary and appropriate vouchers and other documents requested with respect to such payment.
4. . Nothing herein shall preclude the Plaintiff Class or its counsel from moving to compel pa.yment in the event that the payments are nO[ made within the time periods set forth above.
5. 1n consideration for these payments, the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel release defendants and any present Or former employees, agents, or officials of said defendants, the City of New York or the State of New York, from any and all liability. claims, or rights of action for attorneys' fees, costs, and dlsbursements, in or arising from this action, accrued or incurred up to and including the date of May 8, 2012 as well as any fees, costs or expenses incurred in
3

APR-03-2013 13:25
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P.05/08

negotiating the fee award through and including the date that this Stipulation und Order of Settlement is signed by the parties' counseL
6. Nothing in this Stipulation shall be construed as an admission or acknowledgment of liability whatsoever by the defendants regarding any of the allegations made by the plaintiffs in the Complaint. In addition, nothing contained herein shall be deemed to constitute a custom, pOlicy, or practice of either the City defendant or the State defendant.
7. Nothing in this Stipulation shaH be deemed a waiver by plaintiffs' counsel of any claims to fees, costs, or disbursements for monitoring defendants' compliance with the Stipulation and Order of Settlement accruing or incurred after May 8, 2012 or a waiver by defendants of any defense to any such application which may be made,
8. Subject to the provisions ofthe foregoing paragraphs, in the event payment of the amounts recited in par.igraph #1 above are not made within 90 days after the date that a "so­ ordered" copy of this Stipulation and Order has been docketed with the Clerk of the Court, interest shall nccme on the outstanding principal balance at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, beginning on the ninety-first day after the "so-ordered') copy has been docketed.
9. This Stipulation and Order shall have no prccedential value or effect whatsoever and shall not be admissible in any other action or proceeding as evidence or for any other purpose, except in an action or proceeding to enforce this Stipulation.
10. This StipUlation and Order embodies the entire agreement of the parties in this matter and 110 oral agreement entered' into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Stipulation and Order regarding the subject matter of the instant proceedings, other than the Settlement, shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the parties hereto, or to vary the terms and conditions contained herein.
4

RPR-03-2013 13:26
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P.06/08

11. This StipuJation and Order of Settlement is fina) and binding upOn the parties,
their successors and assigns.
Dated: New York, New York March 29, 2013
Respectfully submitted,
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
YISROEL SCffiiLMAN, BSQ. (yS 3107) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP RANDAL S, JEFFREY, ofCo\lIlSol (RSJ 3396) 7 Hanover Squa.r~ 18th New York" New York t 0004
By._J1A l ItltL··­ Tel.. (212)613-S000. RANDAL S. JEFFREY

HENRY A. FREEMAN VlELFARB LAW CENTER Marc Cohan Petrl:l Tasheff 275 Sev~nth Avenue, Suite 1205 Nc:wYork. New York 10001 Tel. (212) 633~6967 1
tasheff@n.Ol~j·pL

By: /,/!

__

Marc Cohan

._ ...

CONIlNUED

5

RPR-03-2013 13:27
Case 1:04-cv-04454-RWS Document 127 Filed 04/03/13 Page 6 of 7

P.07/08

THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER HOMELESSNESS PR.EVENTION PROJECT Derise Miranda 123 WiIlicm Street New York. New York 1O[)~g
Tel. (646) 602-5640
~ By: ,?;2 , tnisc Miranda
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
MICHA.BL CARDOZO CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE Cl1Y OF NEW YORK Manb, calhoun
Assistant Corporation CoUIUlIiII 100 Churoh Street 
 New York. New York 10007 
 (212) 7&8·0923 

mca1noun@law.nyc.gov 


ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN ATIORNEY GENERAL OP' THE STATE OF NEW YORK Attomoy for Sttte Defendant 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York l027l
(212.)4r6-\

By!

\,

R

KRAFr

A .:ltanr I me)' General

6 


APR-03-2013 Ca1s3e:217:04-cv-04454-RWS Document 127 Filed 04/03/13 Page 7 of 7

P.08/08

SO ORDERED:

Dated:

York ,..Q;~""'::""---lr----"-P 20 13

ENTER
Robert United S

7 

TOTAL P.08

 
 Case 1:04-cv-04454-RWS

Document 12F8ax 2F12il7e8d8880757 /31/13

PMaayg2e9 1201o3f 311;28am

P002/004
'F­

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

GERTRUDE "WILLISTON; TAWANA, LATOYA, 
 and TA}JDIKA CUMMINS, by their parent, PAULETTE
CUMMfNS, on their own behalf and behalf of all others 
 similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, against VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of New York City Department of Social Services; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,
Defendants.

04 eiv. 04454 (RS)(GG) 
 Order on Consent

STIPULATION WHEREAS, the Stipulation and Order of Settlement ("Settlement") entered into by the parties and so-ordered by the Court on May 8, 2012 provides the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend until March 31, 201 . WHEREAS, on March 29,2013, the Court so ordered a Stipulation extending the Court's jurisdiction until May, 31,2013; WHEREAS, the patties are engaged in negotiations as to whether the Stipulation of Settlement should be extended and, if so, under what terms; WHEREAS, if such an agreement can be reached between the parties it would obviate the need for motion practice; IT IS THEREFORE STIPULATED AND AGREED that the tenns of the Stipulation of Settlement entered by the Court on May 8, 2012 and this Court's jurisdiction for all purposes be extended to July 1,2013.

Fax 2127888877

May 29 2013 11:28am P003/00d

Case 1:04-cv-04454-RWS Document 128 Filed 05/31/13 Page 2 of 3

May, 29,2013
New York, NY

Respectfully submitted,
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS BY:
HENRY A. FREEMl\N V{ELFARE LAW CENTER
Marc Cohan (MC 2612) Petra Tasheff (PT 8762) 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1205 Ne""v York, New York 1000 1 TeL (212) 633~6967 cohan@nc1ej.org
By: 151 Marc Cohan,
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
MICHAEL CARDOZO CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IV1artha Calhoun Assistant Corporation Counsel 100 Church Street New York, New York 10007 (212) 788-0923 mcalhou n@law.nyc-90v
By: lsi Martha Calhol!n
ERIC T SCHNEIDERMAN ATIORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEWYORK Attorney for State Defendant 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York 10271 (212) 416-8632
By: Is! ROBERT L KRAFT
ROBERT L KRAFT Assistant Attorney General
2

Case 1:04-cv-04454-RWS Document 12F8ax 2F12il7e8d8880757 /31/13 PMaayg2e9 3201o3f 131;28am POOd/OOd

l;,:r 
 SO ORDERED:
Dated: ..r:J

~ 2N0e1w2 York

7. Sweet tates District Judge

3 


 
 Williston v. Eggleston Individual ReliefFonn Tara Crean /Leslie Annexstein

From:

Name Organization Telephone Fax Number Email Date

Name of Client _____________________________ Client address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.Phone # _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Food Stamp case number _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Social Security # ___________ EBT card # _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ How many people are in the household? _ _ _--'-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Names, ages and relationship to each other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Sources and amounts of any household income

Does the client live with anyone not in the food stamp household? If not, explain. _ _ _ _ __

Monthly rent _ _ _ _ Type ofHousing (e.g, private, NYCHA, Section 8) _ _ _ _ _ __

Does your client pay separately for heating and cooling? [YIN] List Resources, if any _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'-_ _ _ __

N. on

Cash

Assistance

(NCA)

Food

Stamp .

Center

name/number

Date client applied for food stamps at an NCA Center _ _ _ _ _ _~_ __

Has your client received any food stamps in conjunction with this application? [YIN] If yes, when andhowmuch? _________________~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Has your client received a written notice telling himlher that their food stamp application was either accepted or rej ected by the agency? [YIN] If so, please attach the notice.

Please check the situation that applies: _ BRA failed to provide expedited food stamps within five calendar days of application. _ BRA failed to provide "ongoing" food stamps within thirty calendar days of application. Additional information:
Please complete this Form as thoroughly as possible to obtain prompt relief.

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 1 of 15
U.S. District Court Southern District of New York (Foley Square) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04−cv−04454−RWS

CLOSED,ECF

Williston et al v. Eggleston et al Assigned to: Judge Robert W. Sweet Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Other
Plaintiff Gertrude Williston

Date Filed: 06/15/2004 Date Terminated: 04/18/2008 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 444 Civil Rights: Welfare (DISCONTINUED AFTER 1/1/2012) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Wendy Anne Bach Urban Justice Center 123 William Street,16th Floor New York, NY 10038 646−602−5640 Fax: 212−533−4598 Email: wbach@urbanjustice.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ami T. Sanghvi Urban Justice Center 123 William Street,16th Floor New York, NY 10038 (646) 602−5643 Fax: (212) 533−4598 Email: asanghvi@urbanjustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elena Stacy Goldstein New York Legal Assistance Group 7 Hanover Square, 7th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212)−613−5024 Fax: (212)−750−0820 Email: egoldstein@nylag.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie T. Annexstein Urban Justice Center 123 William Street,16th Floor New York, NY 10038 (646)−602−5600 X5640 Fax: (212)−533−4598 Email: lannexstein@urbanjustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Petra T. Tasheff National Center For Law and Economic Justice 275 Seventh Ave, New York, NY 10001 (212)−633−6967 Fax: (212)−633−6371 Email: tasheff@nclej.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marc Cohan Welfare Law Center, Inc. 275 Seventh Avenue

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 2 of 15

Suite 1506 New York, NY 10001 212−633−6967 Fax: 212−633−6371 Email: cohan@nclej.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Tawana Cummins by their parent, Paulette Cummins, on their own behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Wendy Anne Bach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie T. Annexstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Latoya Cummins by their parent, Paulette Cummins, on their own behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Wendy Anne Bach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie T. Annexstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Paulette Cummins by their parent, Paulette Cummins, on their own behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Wendy Anne Bach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ami T. Sanghvi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie T. Annexstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Personnel Director Verna Eggleston as commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services

represented by Abigail Lynne Goldenberg New York City Law Department 100 Church Street, Room 4−114 New York, NY 10007 212−788−1275 Fax: 212−788−0940 Email: abgolden@law.nyc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha Anne Calhoun NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel (NYC) 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−356−0856 Fax: 212−356−1148 Email: mcalhoun@law.nyc.gov

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 3 of 15

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Madonna Marie Kasbohm New York City Law Depart. Office of the Corporation Counsel 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−788−0957 Fax: 212−788−0940 Email: dkasbohm@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert Doar as commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance

represented by Jennifer Lynn Johnson New York State Office of the Attorney General (NYC) 120 Broadway 12th Floor New York, NY 10271 (212)−416−6211 Fax: (212)−416−6075 Email: jennifer.johnson@oag.state.ny.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah Ellen Hochhauser Attorney General of the State of New York 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 (212)416−8629 Fax: (212)416−6077 Email: Deborah.Hochhauser@oag.state.ny.us TERMINATED: 07/08/2008

Robert Lewis Kraft Office of the Attorney General, New York State 120 Broadway 24th Floor New York, NY 10271 212−416−8632 Fax: 212−416−6075 Email: robert.kraft@ag.ny.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant City of New York

represented by Abigail Lynne Goldenberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Jose Feliz

represented by Ami T. Sanghvi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie T. Annexstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Florence Greenbaum

represented by

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Ami T. Sanghvi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie T. Annexstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Intervenor Plaintiff Viveca Peatree
Intervenor Plaintiff Miladis Nunez

Date Filed 06/15/2004
06/15/2004 06/15/2004 06/15/2004 06/18/2004
06/18/2004 07/16/2004
07/16/2004 07/16/2004
07/16/2004 08/09/2004 08/09/2004 08/20/2004

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Robert Doar, Verna Eggleston. (Filing Fee $ 150.00, Receipt Number 511926)Document filed by Latoya Cummins, Paulette Cummins, Tawana Cummins, Gertrude Williston.(laq, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 6/18/2004 (laq, ). (Entered: 06/15/2004)
SUMMONS ISSUED as to Robert Doar, Verna Eggleston. (laq, ) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein is so designated. (laq, ) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
Case Designated ECF. (laq, ) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
2 FIRST MOTION to Certify Class pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(2). Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Responses due by 7/23/2004 Return Date set for 8/18/2004 12:00 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Devins Declaration# 2 Exhibit # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 Exhibit)(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
3 FIRST BRIEF re: 2 FIRST MOTION to Certify Class pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(2).. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Attachments: # 1 Text of MOL in Support of Motion for Class Certification)(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
4 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Donna M. Kasbohm dated 7/6/04. Defendant City's time to respond to the complaint is extended to 8/7/04. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/14/04) (kw, ) (Entered: 07/16/2004)
Set Answer Due Date purs. to 4 Endorsed Letter as to City of New York answer due on 8/7/2004. (kw, ) (Entered: 07/16/2004)
5 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Deborah Ferleger dated 7/8/04. Defendant Robert Doar's time to respond to the complaint is extended to 8/23/04. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/14/04) (kw, ) (Entered: 07/16/2004)
Set Answer Due Date purs. to 5 Endorsed Letter as to Robert Doar answer due on 8/23/2004. (kw, ) (Entered: 07/16/2004)
6 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. Responses due by 9/17/2004 Return Date set for 10/6/2004 12:00 PM. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
7 MOTION to Dismiss MOL. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. Responses due by 9/17/2004 Return Date set for 10/6/2004 12:00 PM. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
8 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of Notic of Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law served on Gertrude Williston; and Tawana Cummins et al on August 9, 2004. Service was made by Electronically and by mail. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 08/20/2004)

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08/23/2004 09/08/2004
09/27/2004 09/30/2004 09/30/2004 10/07/2004 10/14/2004 10/15/2004 10/18/2004 11/02/2004 11/02/2004 12/14/2004 12/14/2004 12/14/2004 12/23/2004

9 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint. Document filed by Robert Doar. Responses due by 9/28/2004 Return Date set for 10/20/2004 09:30 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Karins# 2 Affidavit Ferleger# 3 Supplement OTDA memorandum of Law in Support)(Ferleger, Deborah) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
10 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Donna M. Kasbohm dated 8/27/04. All defendants' time to respond to plaintiffs' motion for class certification is adjourned. Return date on City defendant's motion is adjourned to 10/20/04. Plaintiffs' Response to City's motion to dismisss due by 9/28/2004. Reply due by 10/15/2004. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/7/04) (kw, ) (Entered: 09/09/2004)
11 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Marc Cohan dated 9/27/04. Granting plaintiffs' request for an extension until 9/30/04 to respond to defendants' motions to dismiss. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/27/04) (kw, ) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
12 FIRST MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 6 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss., 7 MOTION to Dismiss MOL., 9 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 09/30/2004)
13 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 6 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss., 7 MOTION to Dismiss MOL., 9 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 09/30/2004)
14 ORDER re: 2 FIRST MOTION to Certify Class. The plaintiffs' motion for class certification is removed from the docket, with leave to restore by letter. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/6/04) (kw, ) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
15 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Donna M. Kasbohm dated 10/13/04. Defendants' reply to their pending motion to dismiss is now due by 10/18/2004. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/14/04) (kw, ) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
16 FIRST REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 9 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint.. Document filed by Robert Doar. (Ferleger, Deborah) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
17 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 6 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 10/18/2004)
18 SECOND REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 9 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint. Sur−Reply. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
19 FIRST MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Sur−Reply to State Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
20 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Jose Feliz. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Return Date set for 1/5/2005 12:00 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Intervenor declaration# 2 Affidavit Affidavit of translation# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 1)(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
21 MOTION to Intervene Proposed Intervenor Complaint. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
22 MOTION to Intervene Memorandum of Law. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Return Date set for 1/5/2005 12:00 PM. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
23 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Florence Greenbaum. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Return Date set for 1/12/2004 12:00 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Greenbaum Declaration# 2 Exhibit Greenbaum Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit Greenbaum Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit Greenbaum Exhibit 3# 5 Proposed Amended Complaint# 6 Memorandum of Law)(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 12/23/2004)

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01/07/2005
01/07/2005 01/07/2005 01/13/2005
01/13/2005 01/18/2005
07/19/2005
07/29/2005 07/29/2005
08/15/2005 08/15/2005 08/15/2005 09/07/2005 09/14/2005 11/28/2005 01/24/2006
01/24/2006

24 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Donna M. Kasbohm dated 12/29/04 re: request that motions made returnable 1/19/05; oppositions due 1/13/05 and replies due 1/18/05. Application GRANTED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/5/05) (db, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Replies due by 1/18/2005. Responses due by 1/13/2005 (db, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 23 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Florence Greenbaum. Responses due by 1/13/2005 Replies due by 1/18/2005. (db, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
25 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 20 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Jose Feliz., 21 MOTION to Intervene Proposed Intervenor Complaint., 22 MOTION to Intervene Memorandum of Law., 23 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Florence Greenbaum.. Document filed by Robert Doar. (Hochhauser, Deborah) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
26 MOTION to Intervene Stip of No Opposition. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
27 FIRST REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 20 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Jose Feliz., 26 MOTION to Intervene Stip of No Opposition., 23 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Florence Greenbaum.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
28 OPINION 91876 re:granting 20 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Jose Feliz. filed by Gertrude Williston,, 23 FIRST MOTION to Intervene Florence Greenbaum. filed by Gertrude Williston,. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/14/05) (djc, ) Modified on 7/21/2005 (sao, ). (Entered: 07/20/2005)
29 PRETRIAL ORDER; ptc set for 9/14/05 at 4:30 pm. Plntf's counsel to notify all parties. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/29/05) (cd, ) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
30 OPINION # 91928 ; re: Based upon the foregoing conclusions the motions of the City and the State to dismiss the Complaint are denied : 6 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss, filed by Verna Eggleston. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/27/05) (sac, ) Modified on 8/3/2005 (sgu, ). (Entered: 08/02/2005)
31 ANSWER to Complaint. Document filed by Robert Doar.(Hochhauser, Deborah) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
32 NOTICE of Leave to Appeal. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
33 FIRST MOTION for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to 1292(b) Document filed by Verna Eggleston. Return Date set for 9/14/2005 12:00 PM. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
34 FIRST MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 33 FIRST MOTION for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to 1292(b). Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 09/07/2005)
35 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 33 FIRST MOTION for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to 1292(b). Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Kasbohm, Madonna) (Entered: 09/14/2005)
36 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert Lewis Kraft on behalf of Robert Doar (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 11/28/2005)
37 OPINION 92653 for the reasons stated above,the Defendant's motions to certify an issue for appeal and to concomitantly stay this action are denied.It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/24/2006) (jmi, ) Modified on 1/26/2006 (ns, ). (Entered: 01/25/2006)
38 ORDER Pretrial Conference set for 3/15/2006 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/24/2006) (jmi, ) (Entered: 01/25/2006)

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02/08/2006 03/15/2006 04/04/2006 04/04/2006
04/11/2006 04/11/2006 05/11/2006 05/22/2006 05/22/2006
05/31/2006 06/06/2006 06/07/2006
06/29/2006 07/13/2006
07/27/2006

39 ANSWER to Complaint. Document filed by Verna Eggleston, City of New York.(Goldenberg, Abigail) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet : Pretrial Conference held on 3/15/2006. Parties are to submit a stipulation regarding proposed dates. (db, ) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
40 SCHEDULING ORDER: Motions due by 4/27/2007. Discovery due by 4/27/2007. Final Pretrial Conference set for 5/9/2007 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/4/06) (js, ) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
41 SCHEDULING ORDER: The motion for class certification shall be returnable no later than June 14, 2006. All expert reports, if any, shall be served by January 27, 2007. All rebuttal expert reports, if any shall be served by February 26, 2007 Motions due by 4/27/2007. Discovery due by 12/13/2006. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/3/06) (js, ) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
42 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Marc Cohan on behalf of Gertrude Williston (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
43 PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Motions due by 4/27/2007. Discovery due by 12/13/2006. See Document for further Scheduling Deadlines. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/10/06) (sac, ) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
44 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Elena Stacy Goldstein on behalf of Gertrude Williston (Goldstein, Elena) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
45 MOTION to Certify Class. Document filed by Gertrude Willistonand Tawana, Latoya and Tandika Cummins by parent Paulette Cummins. Responses due by 6/6/2006 (Goldstein, Elena) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
46 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 45 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Ami Sanghvi# 2 Exhibit A−F to Sanghvi Decl.# 3 Exhibit G−K to Sanghvi Decl.# 4 Affidavit Elena Goldstein# 5 Exhibit A−C to Goldstein Decl.# 6 Exhibit D−F to Goldstein Decl.)(Goldstein, Elena) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
47 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Ami T. Sanghvi on behalf of Jose Feliz, Florence Greenbaum, Gertrude Williston, Tawana Cummins, Latoya Cummins, Paulette Cummins (Sanghvi, Ami) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
48 SCHEDULING ORDER: re plntfs' restored motion for class certification: Responses due by 7/6/2006 Replies due by 7/18/2006. Oral Argument set for 7/19/2006 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/6/06) (cd, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
49 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Robert L. Kraft dated 6/6/2006 re: to ask that the State defednant's time to respond to the motion for class certification be adjusted to conform to that agreed upon by plaintiffs and the city defendant in their proposed revised scheduling order forwarded to you this date. ENDORSEMENT: So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/6/2006) (jmi, ) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
50 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 45 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Robert Doar. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
51 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Abigail Goldenberg dated 7/5/2006 re: to request an extension of time from July 6, 2006, until July 20, 2006, for City defednant to submit its opposition to plaintiffs' restored Motion for Class Certification. Responses due by 7/20/2006. ENDORSEMENT So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/12/2006) (jmi, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
52 REVISED PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Motions due by 6/27/2006. Responses due by 9/20/2006 Replies due by 10/2/2006. Discovery due by 2/13/2007. Additional deadlines are as set forth in this Order. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/27/06) (pl, ) Modified on 7/28/2006 (pl, ). (Entered: 07/28/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 8 of 15

07/28/2006 09/21/2006
09/21/2006 11/07/2006 12/06/2006 12/06/2006 12/06/2006 01/10/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007

53 PRETRIAL ORDER; Pretrial Conference set for 7/4/2006 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/28/06) (pl, ) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
54 PROPOSED REVISED PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: City defednat's opposition to plaintiffs' Restored Motion for Class Certification shall be served no later than November 6, 2006. Any reply to City and State defednants' opposition shall be served no later than November 20, 2006. The motion for Class Certification shall be returnable on November 22, 2006, at noon, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. All discovery, except for expert discovery, shall be completed by March 30, 2007. All expert reports, if any, shall be served by May 11, 2007. All rebuttal expert reports, if any, shall be served by June 11, 2007. Dispositive motions shall be served and filed August 11, 2007. So Ordered. Motions due by 11/22/2006. Discovery due by 3/30/2007. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/21/2006) (jmi, ) (Entered: 09/22/2006)
55 PRETRIAL ORDER Pretrial Conference set for 9/12/2007 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/21/2006) (jmi, ) (Entered: 09/22/2006)
56 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Martha A. Calhoun and Abigail Goldenberg dated 11/6/06 re: a request on behalf of defendant Commissioner Verna Eggelston to hold this matter in abeyance for an additional thirty days until 12/6/2006 so that the parties can continue to attempt to negotiate a possible settlement. ENDORSEMENT: SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 11/6/06) (kco, ) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
57 ORDER; parties shall complete all discovey, inspection and motions by 11/12/07; Parties shall submit to teh court trial briefs, a jointproposed pretrial order, and, if applicable, proposed jury charges and voir dire requests in accordance with the annexed form and instructions by 11/28/07. A final pretrial conference will be held at 4:30 p.m. on Nov. 28, 2007. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 12/6/06) (djc, ) (Entered: 12/06/2006)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Discovery due by 11/12/2007. Motions due by 11/12/2007. Pretrial Order due by 11/28/2007. Final Pretrial Conference set for 11/28/2007 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (djc, ) (Entered: 12/06/2006)
58 PROPOSED REVISED PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER:Dispositive Motions due by 11/12/2007. Discovery due by 6/30/2007. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 12/5/06) (db, ) (Entered: 12/07/2006)
59 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Leslie T. Annexstein on behalf of Jose Feliz, Florence Greenbaum, Gertrude Williston, Tawana Cummins, Latoya Cummins, Paulette Cummins (Annexstein, Leslie) (Entered: 01/10/2007)
60 MOTION to Intervene Proposed Class Representatives Peartree and Nunez. Document filed by Gertrude Williston.Return Date set for 2/21/2007 12:00 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Ami Sangvhi# 2 Affidavit Peartree Declaration# 3 Affidavit Hargraves Declaration for Peartree# 4 Affidavit Nunez Declaration# 5 Affidavit Hargraves Declaration for Nunez# 6 Affidavit Dandelat Affidavit of translation)(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 01/31/2007)
61 FILING ERROR − WRONG DOCUMENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Intervene (Peartree and Nunez Proposed Complaint)(INTERVENOR COMPLAINT). Document filed by Gertrude Williston.Return Date set for 2/21/2007 12:00 PM.(Cohan, Marc) Modified on 2/1/2007 (Allen, Kathleen). (Entered: 01/31/2007)
62 FILING ERROR − WRONG DOCUMENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − BRIEF re: 60 MOTION to Intervene (Proposed Class Representatives Peartree and Nunez) (MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION). Document filed by Gertrude Williston.(Cohan, Marc) Modified on 2/1/2007 (Allen, Kathleen). (Entered: 01/31/2007)
63 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of Notion of Motion, Exhibits, Brief served on Eggleston, Doar on January 31, 2007. Service was made by Mail. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 01/31/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 9 of 15

02/01/2007 02/01/2007 02/01/2007 02/02/2007 02/02/2007 02/02/2007 02/09/2007
02/09/2007
02/09/2007 03/06/2007 03/09/2007 03/12/2007

***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DOCUMENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Marc Cohan to RE−FILE Document 61 MOTION to Intervene (Peartree and Nunez Proposed Complaint). Use the document type Intervenor Complaint found under the document list Complaints and Other Initiating Documents. (kg) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DOCUMENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Marc Cohan to RE−FILE Document 62 Brief. Use the document type Memorandum of Law in support of motion found under the document list Replies, Opposition and Supporting Documents. (kg) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
64 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 60 MOTION to Intervene Proposed Class Representatives Peartree and Nunez.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
65 DECLARATION of Elena S. Goldstein in Support re: 60 MOTION to Intervene Proposed Class Representatives Peartree and Nunez.. Document filed by Tawana Cummins, Latoya Cummins, Paulette Cummins. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A _ Plaintiffs' Proposed Class Action Intervenor Complaint)(Goldstein, Elena) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
66 PRETRIAL ORDER: Counsel are directed to appear in Courtroom 18C on April 11, 2007 at 4:30 pm for a pretrial conference for the purpose of resolving any outstanding discovery or other issues, and setting a time for trial. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/2/07) (js) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Pretrial Conference set for 4/11/2007 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. In courtroom 18C. (js) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
67 REVISED PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER:City deft's opposition to Plaintiffs' Restored Motion for Class Certification and Deft's opposition to Plaitiffs' Motion to Intervene shall be served no later than 3/6/2007. Any Replies to City and State defts' opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and to Intervene shall be served by 3/21/2007. The pending motions shall be returnable on 3/28/2007 at noon. All Discovery due by 7/30/2007.All expert reports, if any served by 9/10/2007. All rebuttal expert reports, served by 10/10/2007. Dispositive motions shall be served and filed by 12/12/2007.SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/7/2007) (jar) (Entered: 02/13/2007)
68 ORDER. The parties shall submit to the Court trial briefs, a joint proposed pretrial order, and if applicable, proposed jury charges and voir dire requests by 12/26/2007. Final pretrial conference will be held at 4:30 pm on that date. Adjournemtns of the dates set forth above will not be granted except for good cause and upon written application. Failure to comply with any of the provisions of this order will result in dismissal of the action, entry of a default judgment, or other appropriate sanction. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/9/2007) (jar) (Entered: 02/13/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Final Pretrial Conference set for 12/26/2007 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (jar) (Entered: 02/13/2007)
69 RESPONSE to Motion re: 60 MOTION to Intervene Proposed Class Representatives Peartree and Nunez. Stipulation of No Opposition to Intervene Proposed Class Representatives Peartree and Nunez. Document filed by Robert Doar. (Hochhauser, Deborah) (Entered: 03/06/2007)
70 REVISED SCHEDULING ORDER:Dispositive Motions due by 12/12/2007; Responses by City defts to plntfs' Restored Motion for Class certification due by 3/13/2007,Replies due by 3/28/2007.,Discovery due by 7/30/2007. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/7/07) (cd) (Entered: 03/12/2007)
71 STIPULATION OF NO OPPOSITION Verna Eggleston, and Robert Doar do not oppose plaintiffs' motions to Intervene proposed Plaintiffs Viveca Peartree and Miladis Nunez. Should the Court grant Plaintiffs' Intervenor Motions, City and State Defendants reserve all defenses against the complaints of Intervenors Viveca Peatree and Miladis Nunez. So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum on 3/9/07) (jco) (Entered: 03/13/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 10 of 15

03/13/2007 03/13/2007 03/28/2007 04/03/2007
08/03/2007 08/03/2007 08/13/2007 08/13/2007 08/13/2007 01/17/2008 02/26/2008 02/26/2008
02/26/2008

72 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 45 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston, City of New York. (Goldenberg, Abigail) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
73 DECLARATION of Lisa Fitzpatrick in Opposition re: 45 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston, City of New York. (Attachments: # 1)(Goldenberg, Abigail) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
74 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 45 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
75 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Ami Sanghvi dated 3/26/07 re: counsel for plaintiffs request permission to submit a reply memorandum of law to dfts' opposition toplaintiff's restored motion for class certification in excess of 10 pages in order to fully address the points raised by dfts. So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/2/07) (dle) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
76 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Abigail Goldenberg dated 7/27/07 re: Counsel writes to request a ninety−day extension until 10/30/07 to complete fact discovery. ENDORSEMENT: So Ordered. Discovery due by 10/30/2007. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/31/07) (jco) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
77 ORDER Discovery due by 3/12/2008. Motions due by 3/12/2008. Pretrial Order due by 3/26/2008. Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/26/2008 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/3/07) (jco) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
78 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Leslie T. Annexstein on behalf of all plaintiffs. New Address: Urban Justice Center, 123 William Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York, USA 10038, 646−602−5600. (Annexstein, Leslie) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
79 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Leslie T. Annexstein on behalf of all plaintiffs. New Address: Urban Justice Center, 123 William Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York, USA 10038, 646−602−5600. (Annexstein, Leslie) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
80 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Leslie T. Annexstein on behalf of all plaintiffs. New Address: Urban Justice Center, 123 William Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York, USA 10038, 646−602−5600. (Annexstein, Leslie) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
81 ORDER: The motion for class certification filed by plaintiffs on May 22, 2006 (docket no. 45) shall be dismissed without prejudice or penalty for failure to prosecute. Leave is GRANTED to refile the motion by letter without payment of filing fee. So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/17/08) (js) (Entered: 01/18/2008)
82 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND PROPOSED ORDER. Document filed by Gertrude Williston.(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
83 FILING ERROR − ELECTRONIC FILING FOR NON−ECF DOCUMENT − FIRST MOTION to Certify Class, FIRST MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment, MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment(ORDER PURS. TO FRCP 23(e).( Return Date set for 2/27/2008 at 12:00 PM.) Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Letter to Court, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Granting Class Certification, # 3 Exhibit Proposed Notice to Class)(Cohan, Marc) Modified on 2/26/2008 (KA). (Entered: 02/26/2008)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − NON−ECF DOCUMENT ERROR. Note to Attorney Marc Cohan to E−MAIL pdf copy of ORDER to orders_and_judgments@nysd.uscourts.gov Document No. 83 Order. This document is not filed via ECF. (KA) (Entered: 02/26/2008)

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 11 of 15

03/03/2008
03/03/2008
03/03/2008 04/09/2008 04/09/2008 04/15/2008 04/15/2008 04/16/2008 04/16/2008 04/16/2008 04/16/2008 04/16/2008 04/18/2008

84 ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS AND APPOINTING CLASS COUNSEL: pursuant to the parties' Stipulation, the following class is certified: All Individuals who apply for Food Stamp benefits at a Non−Cash Assistance Food Stamp Center, or for whom an application is submitted at an NCA Food Stamp Center. The New York Legal Assistance Group, Urban Justice Center, and Welfare Law Center, all in New York, are appointed class counsel for the certified class. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/27/08) (tro) (Entered: 03/03/2008)
85 ORDER PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e): A Hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the F.R.C.P. shall be held on 4/16/2008 at 12:00 PM, Room 1920, before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Any member of the plaintiff class may object to or comment on the Settlement by submitting objections in writing. Objections or comments must be post−marked by 4/10/08. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/27/08) (tro) (Entered: 03/03/2008)
86 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT...regarding procedures to be followed that shall govern the handling of the settlement of this action. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/27/08) (tro) (Entered: 03/03/2008)
87 AFFIDAVIT of Ami Sangvhi in Support re: 83 FIRST MOTION to Certify Class.FIRST MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment. MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 04/09/2008)
88 AFFIDAVIT of Lynn Lu in Support re: 83 FIRST MOTION to Certify Class.FIRST MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment. MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 04/09/2008)
89 FILING ERROR − WRONG DOCUMENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment(DECLARATION OF MARTHA A. CALHOUN). Document filed by Verna Eggleston.(Calhoun, Martha) Modified on 4/16/2008 (KA). (Entered: 04/15/2008)
90 FILING ERROR − WRONG DOCUMENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment (Declaration of Compliance with 23(e) order). Document filed by Verna Eggleston.(Calhoun, Martha) Modified on 4/16/2008 (KA). (Entered: 04/15/2008)
91 FILING ERROR − WRONG DOCUMENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment (Declaration of Sebastian Addamo). Document filed by Robert Doar. Return Date set for 4/16/2008 at 12:00 PM.(Hochhauser, Deborah) Modified on 4/16/2008 (KA). (Entered: 04/16/2008)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DOCUMENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Martha Anne Calhoun to RE−FILE Document 89 MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment. Use the document type Declaration (non−motion) found under the document list Other Answers. (KA) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DOCUMENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Martha Anne Calhoun to RE−FILE Document 90 MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment (Declaration of Compliance with 23(e) order). Use the document type Declaration (non−motion) found under the document list Other Answers. (KA) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DOCUMENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Deborah Ellen Hochhauser to RE−FILE Document 91 MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment (Declaration in support). Use the document type Declaaration (non−motion) found under the document list Other Answers. (KA) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
92 DECLARATION of Sebastian Addamo in Support. Document filed by Robert Doar. (Hochhauser, Deborah) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
93 ORDER: It is hereby ordered that the Stipulation and Order of settlement of this action is approved. The parties Stipulation and Order of Settlement is so ordered; the terms of that Stipulation and Order are deemed to be in effect as of the date of

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 12 of 15

07/08/2008 07/10/2008 09/12/2008 10/21/2008 11/24/2008 01/14/2009 02/12/2009 04/06/2009
06/10/2009 08/14/2009 09/02/2009 09/03/2009

this Order, as set forth herein. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/17/2008) (jpo) (Entered: 04/21/2008)
94 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Jennifer Lynn Johnson on behalf of Robert Doar (Johnson, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/08/2008)
95 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: It is hereby stipulated and agreed that the time within which plaintiff's must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and including October 1, 2008. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/9/2008) (jfe) (Entered: 07/10/2008)
96 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and including 11/3/08. ( Motion due by 11/3/2008.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/12/08) (cd) (Entered: 09/15/2008)
97 STIPULATION, that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and including 12/1/08. ( Motion due by 12/1/2008.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/20/08) (cd) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
98 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: IT IS THEREFORE STIPULATED AND AGREED that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and including January 16, 2009. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 11/24/2008) (jfe) (Entered: 11/24/2008)
99 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: The time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and includes 2/16/09. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/14/09) (tro) (Entered: 01/14/2009)
100 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: IT IS THEREFORE STIPULATED AND AGREED that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and includes April 17, 2009. So Ordered (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/10/09) (js) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
101 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Petra T. Tasheff dated 4/6/09 re: On behalf of all parties, counsel requests that the Court "so order" the attached Stipulation Regarding Attorney's Fee Motion. Counsel now proposes extending the date by which plaintiffs must file a motion for their application for fees from 8/17/09 to 6/16/09. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/6/09) (tro) Modified on 4/17/2009 (tro). (Entered: 04/07/2009)
102 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: It is therefore stipulated and agreed by and between the parties that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and including August 17, 2009. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/5/2009) (jpo) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
103 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION; that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for Costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and includes September 16, 2009. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/14/2009) (tve) Modified on 8/14/2009 (tve). (Entered: 08/14/2009)
104 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONCERNING ATTORNEYS FEES. Document filed by Gertrude Williston.(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
105 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT CONCERNING ATTORNEYS' FEES: NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between plaintiffs and defendants as represented below, as follows: 1. City Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of thee−hundred and fifty−six thousand and two−hundred and fifty dollars and no cents ($356,250.00))

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 13 of 15

04/16/2012 04/16/2012 04/17/2012 04/17/2012 04/17/2012 04/17/2012 04/17/2012 04/23/2012
05/08/2012 07/30/2012
10/10/2012

to the below designated plaintiffs' counsel; and State Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of one−hundred and eighteen−thousand and seven−hundred and fifty dollars and no cents ($118,750.00) to the below designated plaintiffs' counsel, for a total of four−hundred and seventy−five thousand dollars and no cents ($475,000.00), which payment will be made in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees and costs sought by the Plaintiff Class as against the Defendants for the period from the commencement of this action through the Court's so−order of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement on April 18,2008, as well as for all fees generated in connection with negotiating the terms of this Stipulation and Order. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/2/2009) (jfe) Modified on 9/10/2009 (jfe). (Entered: 09/03/2009)
106 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − FIRST MOTION for Settlement Approval and Enforcement. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Return Date set for 5/9/2012 at 12:00 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Cohan, Marc) Modified on 4/17/2012 (db). (Entered: 04/16/2012)
107 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 106 FIRST MOTION for Settlement Approval and Enforcement.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) Modified on 4/17/2012 (db). (Entered: 04/16/2012)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Marc Cohan to RE−FILE Document 106 FIRST MOTION for Settlement Approval and Enforcement. ERROR(S): Supporting Documents are filed separately, each receiving their own document #. (db) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Marc Cohan to RE−FILE Document 107 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion. ERROR(S): Document linked to filing error. (db) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
108 MOTION for Settlement and Enforcement. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Return Date set for 5/9/2012 at 12:00 PM.(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
109 AFFIRMATION of Marc Cohan in Support re: 108 MOTION for Settlement and Enforcement.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
110 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 108 MOTION for Settlement and Enforcement.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Cohan, Marc) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
111 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for settlement and enforcement, dated April 16, 2012, will be heard at noon on Wednesday, May 9, 2012, in Courtroom 18C. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 108 MOTION for Settlement and Enforcement:( Motion Hearing set for 5/9/2012 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/23/2012) (mro) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
112 AMENDED STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT governing the terms of settlement. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/08/2012) (ama) (Entered: 05/08/2012)
113 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: IT IS THEREFORE STIPULATED AND AGREED that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and includes October 16, 2012. ( Motions due by 10/16/2012.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/25/2012) (jfe) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
114 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: Motion for costs and fees as provided for in the Settlement due by 11/16/2012. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/10/2012) (cd) (Entered: 10/10/2012)

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 14 of 15

11/15/2012
11/15/2012 12/19/2012 12/19/2012 01/28/2013
01/28/2013 01/28/2013
01/28/2013 01/29/2013 01/29/2013 01/29/2013 01/31/2013
02/11/2013
03/04/2013

115 MEMO ENDORSEMENT RE: STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: IT IS THEREFORE STIPULATED AND AGREED that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and includes December 17, 2012. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 11/15/2012) (mt) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Application for costs and fees due by 12/17/2012. (mt) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
116 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE MOTION: that the time within which plaintiffs must file an application for costs and fees with the Court as provided for in the Settlement is extended to and includes January 31, 2013. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 12/12/2012) (pl) (Entered: 12/19/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motions due by 1/31/2013. (pl) (Entered: 12/19/2012)
117 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION for Attorney Fees . Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Return Date set for 3/6/2013 at 12:00 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Cohan Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A to Cohan Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B to Cohan Declaration, # 4 Exhibit Exhbit C to Cohan Declaration)(Tasheff, Petra) Modified on 1/29/2013 (ldi). (Entered: 01/28/2013)
118 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 117 MOTION for Attorney Fees.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Tasheff, Petra) Modified on 1/29/2013 (ldi). (Entered: 01/28/2013)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Petra T. Tasheff to RE−FILE Document 117 MOTION for Attorney Fees. ERROR(S): Supporting documents must be filed separately, each receiving their own document number. Declaration in Support of Motion is found under the event list Replies, Opposition and Supporting Documents. (ldi) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Petra T. Tasheff to RE−FILE Document 118 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion. ERROR(S): Document linked to filing error. (ldi) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
119 MOTION for Attorney Fees. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. Return Date set for 3/6/2013 at 12:00 PM.(Tasheff, Petra) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
120 DECLARATION of Marc Cohan in Support re: 119 MOTION for Attorney Fees.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex A NCLEJ Time Records, # 2 Exhibit Ex B NYLAG Time Records, # 3 Exhibit Ex C UJC Time Records)(Tasheff, Petra) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
121 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 119 MOTION for Attorney Fees.. Document filed by Gertrude Williston. (Tasheff, Petra) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
122 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs, dated January 29, 2013, will be heard at noon on Wednesday, March 13, 2013, in Courtroom 18C. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 119 MOTION for Attorney Fees. :( Motion Hearing set for 3/13/2013 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/30/2013) (pl) (Entered: 01/31/2013)
123 STIPULATION REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEE MOTION: IT IS THEREFORE STIPULATED AND AGREED that the time for defendants to file their opposition be adjourned from February 11 to February 25, 2013 and the time for plaintiffs reply be adjourned to March 4, 2013. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/11/2013) (js) (Entered: 02/11/2013)
124 STIPULATION AND ORDER: The briefing schedule for the response and reply to the plaintiffs' pending 119 MOTION for Attorney Fees is revised so that defendants' responsive papers, if any, are to be filed on or before 4/1/2013, and

Case: 1:04-cv-4454 As of: 03/02/2016 10:56 AM EST 15 of 15

03/08/2013 04/02/2013 04/03/2013
05/31/2013

plaintiffs' reply papers, if any, are to be filed on or before 4/15/2013, with a date for oral argument on the motion to be set thereafter at the Court's convenience. To the extent the Court's jurisdiction to enforce prior stipulations in this action does not extend beyond 3/31/2013, the parties hereto agree that this Court shall retain jurisdiction after 3/31/2013, for the limited purposes of plaintiffs' pending motion for attorney's fees.(Responses due by 4/1/2013, Replies due by 4/15/2013.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/27/2013) (sac) (Entered: 03/04/2013)
125 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees will be heard at noon on Wednesday, April 17, 2013, in courtroom 18C. All papers to be served in accordance with Local Rule 6.1. Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 119 MOTION for Attorney Fees: (Motion Hearing set for 4/17/2013 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/8/2013) (ft) (Entered: 03/08/2013)
126 STIPULATION AND ORDER ON CONSENT: That the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement entered by the Court on May 8, 2012 and this Court's jurisdiction for all purposes be extended through and including May 31, 2013. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/29/2013) (cd) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
127 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT CONCERNING ATTORNEYS' FEES: City Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of fifty−two thousand dollars and no cents ($52,000.00) to the below designated plaintiffs' counsel; and State Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of thirteen thousand dollars and no cents ($13,000.00) to the below designated plaintiffs' counsel, for a total of sixty−five thousand dollars and no cents ($65,000.00), which payment will be made in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees and costs sought by the Plaintiff Class as against the Defendants for the period from the commencement of this action through the Court's so−order of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement on May 8, 2012, as well as for all fees generated in connection with negotiating the terms of this Stipulation and Order. Payment of the amount owed by Defendants shall be made no later than ninety (90) days from the date that a so ordered copy of this Agreement has been docketed with the Clerk of the Court. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/3/2013) (ft) (Entered: 04/03/2013)
128 STIPULATION: that the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement entered by the Court on May 8, 2012 and this Court's jurisdiction for all purposes be extended to July 1, 2013. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/29/2013) (ja) (Entered: 05/31/2013)