Case 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV Document 1 Filed 12/23/08 Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

STEPHEN SLEVIN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

No. CIV-

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISIONERS FOR THE COUNTY OF DONA ANA; THE DONA ANA COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, CHRISTOPHER BARELA, JOHN DOES 1-3,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

Plaintiff brings this complaint for damages caused by the violation of his civil and

constitutional rights: Plaintiff files this complaint under the federal Civil Rights Act, and the

Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff also brings claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims

Act. In support of this Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action is conferred by 28 U.S.C 1331 and
42 U.S.C §§1983 and 1988. Venue us proper as the acts complained of occurred exclusively within Dona Ana County, New Mexico.

PARTIES 2. Plaintiff, Stephen Slevin, is an individual and former resident of Dona Ana County,
New Mexico.

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3. Defendant Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, (hereinafter “Board”), is a governmental entity within the State of New Mexico and a “person” under 43 U.S.C. § 1983. At all times material to this Complaint the Board was the employer of the individual defendants.
4. Defendant Dona Ana County Detention Center (“DACDC”) is the agency responsible for the safe, secure and humane housing of detainees in Dona Ana County.
5. Defendant Christopher Barela at all material times was the Director of DACDC and is sued in his individual and official capacities. Defendant Barela was acting under color of state law and within the scope of his employment at all material times.
6. Defendant John Doe 1 is the case worker assigned to Plaintiff and is sued in his individual capacity. John Doe 1 was acting under color of state law and within the scope of his employment at all material times.
7. John Doe 2 is the person entrusted with the responsibility to provide medical services to Plaintiff during his incarceration, and is sued in his individual and official capacities. John Doe 2 was acting under color of state law and within the scope of his employment at all material times.
8. John Doe 3 is the supervisor who worked in the solitary confinement pod where Plaintiff was housed and is sued in his individual and official capacities. John Doe 3 was acting under color of state law and within the scope of his employment at all material times.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 9. On August 24, 2005 Plaintiff was booked into DACDC on charges of driving while
intoxicated and receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle.
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10. Plaintiff had a lifelong history of mental illness when he entered DACDC. 11. Due to the Plaintiff’s illness DACDC placed him in segregation. 12. On admission to DACDC Plaintiff was a well nourished, physically healthy, adult
male with a mental illness. 13. On May 8, 2007, after approximately eighteen months of solitary confinement,
Plaintiff was transferred from DACDC to the New Mexico Behavioral Health Institute at Las Vegas (hereinafter “Las Vegas”), for a psychiatric review. 14. On admission to Las Vegas, Plaintiff was malnourished weighing approximately 133lbs. 15. On admission to Las Vegas, Plaintiff smelled, was disheveled and had an overgrown beard and hair. 16. On admission to Las Vegas, Plaintiff had untreated dental problems and complained of bedsores and a fungus on his skin. 17. On admission to Las Vegas, Plaintiff was not alert to time or situation. 18. On admission to Las Vegas, Plaintiff was unaware he had spent the last eighteen months confined in the county jail. 19. During his stay at Las Vegas, Plaintiff was given mental health care. 20. During his stay at Las Vegas, Plaintiff was reintroduced to human interaction and socialization. 21. During his stay at Las Vegas, Plaintiff became alert and aware of his situation. 22. On May 22, 2007, after only 14 days of mental health treatment Plaintiff was discharged from Las Vegas and returned to DACDC. 23. On his return to DACDC Plaintiff was once again placed in solitary confinement.
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24. Plaintiff’s mental health again began to deteriorate. 25. Plaintiff requested medical care, including dental treatment. 26. Plaintiff’s mental illness was exacerbated by his removal from contact with human
beings. 27. Due to the lack of medical care, Plaintiff was forced to pull his own tooth while in
DACDC. 28. The charges against Plaintiff were eventually dismissed. 29. Plaintiff was released on June 25, 2007. 30. Plaintiff spent twenty-two months incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee, most of the
time spent in solitary confinement.
COUNT I: VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 31. Plaintiff restates each of the preceding allegations as if fully stated herein. 32. Plaintiff was placed into extraordinary periods of solitary confinement. 33. Plaintiff was not afforded a hearing before being placed in solitary confinement. 34. In placing Plaintiff in solitary confinement for such long periods of time without
affording him a hearing, Defendants denied Plaintiff procedural due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT II: VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 35. Plaintiff restates each of the preceding allegations as if fully stated herein. 36. Plaintiff has a substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
humane conditions of confinement and adequate medical care.
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37. Rather than treat Plaintiff’s mental health condition, Defendants chose to place him in solitary confinement.
38. Defendants also failed to provide rudimentary dental care to the point Plaintiff was forced to pull out his own tooth.
39. Defendants failed to treat Plaintiff’s bedsores caused by lengthy periods of inactivity. 40. Defendants failed to take care of Plaintiff’s hygiene after he lost the ability to care for
himself. 41. Defendants knew Plaintiff’s mental condition was deteriorating during his time in
solitary confinement. 42. As Plaintiff’s condition worsened his appearance made it obvious he was in need of
immediate medical attention. 43. Defendants failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the harm caused by such a
lengthy period of solitary confinement. 44. Defendants knew Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious mental harm if his
conditions of confinement did not meet contemporary standards of decency. 45. Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to this risk. 46. Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement amounted to punishment of a pre-trial detainee
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT III: VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 47. Plaintiff restates each of the preceding allegations as if fully stated herein. 48. plaintiff is entitled to be free from discrimination under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.
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49. Defendants failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s mental disability and denied him the benefits and services of the jail by reason of his mental disability.
50. Plaintiff was denied social interaction by reason of his mental disability. 51. Plaintiff was unnecessarily segregated due to his mental disability. 52. Plaintiff was denied reasonable standards of hygiene, dental and medical care due to
his mental disability. 53. As a proximate and foreseeable result of Defendants’ discriminatory acts and
omissions Plaintiff suffered injuries including pain and suffering, emotional distress and an exacerbation of his mental illness.
COUNT IV: MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 54. Plaintiff states each of the preceding allegations as if fully stated herein. 55. Defendants Board and Barela are policy makers responsible for hiring training and
supervision of its employees. 56. The policies, customs, decisions and practices of Defendants Board and Barela have
created a climate within DACDC whereby the mentally ill are deprived of adequate medical care and humane conditions of incarceration. 57. Defendants Board and Barela have a policy and custom of placing inmates with mental disabilities into solitary confinement. 58. There is a causal connection between Defendants’ policies and the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with amounts to deliberate indifference.
COUNT V: FALSE IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE TORT CLAIMS ACT 59. Plaintiff restates each of the preceding allegations as if fully stated herein.
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60. Plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement in violation of his constitutional rights. 61. Plaintiff’s prolonged detention in solitary confinement was not justified or privileged
under state law and therefore constituted false imprisonment. 62. The Board and DACDC Defendants are responsible to Plaintiff under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the conduct of their employees. 63. The actions of Defendants were willful, wanton and in gross and reckless disregard of
Plaintiff’s rights.
COUNT VI: NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF A BUILDING UNDER THE TORT CLAIMS ACT
64. Plaintiff restates each of the preceding allegations as if fully stated herein. 65. Defendants know they are entrusted with the detention of large numbers of mentally
ill inmates. 66. Defendants’ facility is not designed to house people with severe mental illnesses. 67. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care not to house him in a manner likely to cause
injury. 68. In operating DACDC Defendant chose to house Plaintiff in solitary confinement
rather than in a medical facility capable of treating his illness. 69. By subjecting Plaintiff to such a long period of solitary confinement Defendants
breached their duty to house Plaintiff in a reasonably prudent manner. 70. Plaintiff suffered injuries as a direct result of Defendants’ negligent conduct.
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DAMAGES 71. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has suffered damages and injuries including but
no limited to, physical injuries, pain and suffering, and severe psychological and emotional distress.
JURY DEMAND 72. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all counts so triable.
Wherefore, Plaintiff requests judgment as follows: 1. Compensatory damages in an as yet undetermined amount, jointly and severally against all Defendants, including damages for attorney’s fees and emotional harm. 2. Punitive damages in an as yet undetermined amount severally against the individually named Defendants. 3. Reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in bringing this action. 4. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully Submitted by,
/s/Matthew Coyte MATTHEW COYTE COYTE LAW P.C. 1000 Second St. NW Albuquerque, NM 87102 Tel: (505) 244-3030 Fax: (505) 244-1406
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 Case 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV Document 145 Filed 01/14/13 Page 1 of 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

STEPHEN SLEVIN, Plaintiff,
vs. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR THE COUNTY OF DOÑA ANA, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 08-cv-1185 MV/SMV

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants= Renewed and Supplemented Recusal Motion [Doc. 122]. The Court, having considered the motion, briefs, relevant law and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the Motion is not well-taken and will be denied.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff Stephen Slevin commenced the instant action on December 28, 2008. See Doc. 1 (Complaint). Plaintiff had been arrested on state charges of driving while intoxicated and receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, and was booked into the Doña Ana County Detention Center (the ADetention Center@) on August 24, 2005. Id. at 2. He remained at the Detention Center until June 25, 2007, when the charges against him were dismissed. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration. Id. at 2-4. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants violated his procedural due process and substantive
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due process rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and committed the torts of false imprisonment and negligent maintenance of a building. Id. at 4-7.
On December 1, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to disqualify this Court (“First Recusal Motion”). Doc. 57. The Court entered an Order denying Defendants’ First Recusal Motion, Doc. 68, and subsequently entered a Memorandum Opinion (“Original Opinion”) setting forth the rationale for its Order. Doc. 112.
After a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. See Doc. 96 (Special Verdict Form). Specifically, the jury found Defendants Board of County Commissioners (the “County”), Christopher Barela, Director of the Detention Center, and Daniel Zemek, Medical Director of the Detention Center, liable for depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights to humane conditions of confinement, adequate medical care, and procedural due process, and as a result of these constitutional deprivations, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the County, Barela,and Zemek, and to punitive damages from Barela and Zemek. Id. The jury awarded Plaintiff $3 million in punitive damages against Barela, and $3.5 million in punitive damages against Zemek. Id. The jury further found Defendant Barela liable for violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and as result of this violation, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from Barela. Id. Next, the jury found the Detention Center liable for the torts of false imprisonment and negligent operation or maintenance of a building, and as a result of this liability, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the Detention Center. Id. Finally, the jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, to include $500,000 for each month that Plaintiff was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for eachyear since Plaintiff’s release fromcustody. Id.
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The Court entered a Final Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on February 17, 2012. Doc. 105 (Final Judgment). Thereafter, on March 16, 2012, Defendants filed the instant motion (“Motion to Reconsider”), requesting reconsideration of the Court’s decision denying their First Recusal Motion. Doc. 122 at 1. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on April 6, 2012. Doc. 129. Defendants’ reply followed on April 23, 2012. Doc. 135.
LEGAL STANDARD Defendants summarily indicate that their motion to reconsider is made pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a ‘motion to reconsider.’” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). Rather, the Rules allow a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered to file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). See id. Under either rule, a motion to reconsider is an “inappropriate vehicle[] to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, “[i]t is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Id. Under Rule 59(e), a party may file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days of entry of that judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “The purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion is to correct manifest errors of law or to present newly discovered evidence.” Monge v. RG Petro-Machinery (Group) Co. Ltd., __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 6062511, *10 (10th Cir. Dec. 7, 2012) (citation omitted); Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Thus, a Rule 59(e)
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motion may be granted where “the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
Under Rule 60(b), “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for six enumerated reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In particular, the Court may grant relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) in cases of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” where there is “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial,” or for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (2), (6). Relief under Rule 60(b) “is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1009. “Parties seeking relief under Rule 60(b) have a higher hurdle to overcome because such a motion is not a substitute for an appeal.” Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955 (10th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION Defendants ask the Court to “reconsider its prior refusal to recuse itself” from this matter, and “grant a new trial as a consequence of its earlier failure to do so,” or in the alternative, “remove itself from consideration of further matters in this case.” Doc. 122 at 1. In support of this request, Defendants essentially raise two arguments: first, that the Court mistakenly denied their First Recusal Motion; and second, that two events at trial show that the Court indeed is biased against them. In making these arguments, Defendants utterly fail to articulate the legal standard for a motion to reconsider under either Rule 59(e)or Rule 60(b), much less attempt to demonstrate that they have met their burden under that standard. Indeed, Defendants fail even to identify which of the Rule 60(b) subsections they believe are relevant to their motion. Rather, in contravention of clear authority, Defendants seek “a second opportunity . . . to make [their]
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strongest case, to rehash arguments, [and] to dress up arguments that previously failed” – precisely the sort of relief a losing party is foreclosed from seeking on a motion to reconsider. Kuston Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1235 (D. Kan. 2003), aff’d, Nos. 03-1431, 03-1432, 2004 WL 2370634 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004). Because Defendants fail to demonstrate a manifest error of law in need of correction, present any newly discovered evidence, or recite any exceptional circumstance warranting relief from judgment, the Court finds that reconsideration of the Original Opinion is not warranted under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). I. There is No Valid Basis for the Court to Reconsider the Original Opinion.
In its Original Opinion, the Court denied Defendants’ First Recusal Motion, finding that Defendants failed to provide a sufficient basis to justify recusal under either 28 U.S.C. Section 455(a) or 28 U.S.C. Section 455(b)(1). In arguing that the Original Opinion was wrongly decided, Defendants point to no newly discovered evidence that, if considered by the Court, would change the outcome of its earlier decision, any “facially obvious errors of law” that require correction, or any other exceptional circumstance that would justify relief. Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244. Moreover, Defendants nowhere contend that the Court misapprehended the legal standard for recusal under Section 455(a) or Section 455(b)(1), the facts that formed the basis for their recusal request, or Defendants’ position as to the application of the relevant standard to those facts. Rather, Defendants take issue with the fact that the Court reached a position different from theirs as to the proper application of the relevant standard to the facts. Ultim ately, Defendants do no more than revisit their original argument that recusal is appropriate, and insist that, simply because the Court determined that recusal is not appropriate, the Court’s decision was incorrect.
Throughout their brief, Defendants call into question the Court’s reasoning, noting, for example, that the Court’s analysis was inadequate to “address the concerns of the recusal statute,”
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and that the Court put ‘too fine” a distinction on its comparison of the issues in this case with the subject matter of my two visits to the Detention Center.1 Doc. 122 at 7-8, 10-11; Doc. 135 at 9. The Court, however, addressed in detail each of Defendants’ arguments in favor of recusal, and explained why those arguments were insufficient to meet the standard under either Section 455(a) or Section 455(b)(1). See Doc. 112 (Original Opinion) at 7-13. Accordingly, Defendants’ real concern appears to be not that the Court’s reasoning was inadequate, but that it led to a conclusion contrary to their own. But arguing that the Court “got it wrong,”simply because its reasoning led to a conclusion contrary to the one sought by a losing party, is insufficient to warrant reconsideration.
Defendants come closest to arguing a misapprehension of the law in their discussion of this Court’s previous decision in McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, Civ. No. 95-24, Doc. 718 (“McClendon Opinion”), granting Defendant Bernalillo County’s motion to disqualify. In McClendon, in January 1995, a class of individuals confined in the Bernalillo County Detention Center (“BCDC”) filed a lawsuit alleging unlawful conditions of confinement. See Civ. No. 95-24, Doc. 699 at 2. The Court certified “a class of all persons presently confined in BCDC or who may/will be so confined in the future” and a “subclass of all persons with mental and/or developmental disabilities who are, or in the future may be, detained at BCDC.” Id. In November 1996, the parties entered into settlement agreements set forth in two Court orders. Id. For the next ten years, the parties engaged in litigation to ensure continuing compliance with the Court orders. Id.
1 Defendants also call into question the Court’s discharge of its duties as Chief Judge, opining that it was not my place “to ensure that the constitutional needs of federal detainees are met in a detention center.” Doc. 122 at 9. Defendants’ apparent disagreement with the notion that the judiciary should be concerned about the constitutionality of the system subject to our oversight provides no basis for reconsideration of the Original Opinion.
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In June 2003, the defendants opened a new facility, the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), and transferred all of the McClendon class and subclass members from BCDC to MDC. Id. at 2-3. After further litigation, in 2005, the parties entered into new stipulated settlement agreements, approved by the Court, which addressed the conditions of confinement at MDC. Id. at 3-4.
After the transfer, the BCDC facility was renamed the Regional Corrections Center (“RCC”). Id. at 4. At the time the Court approved the 2005 settlement agreements, the defendants represented to the Court that RCC had been leased to Cornell Companies, Inc., that Cornell intended to renovate the facility and use it to house federaldetainees pursuant to a contract with the United States, and that Cornellhad sole operational authority over RCC. Id. More than two years later, the plaintiffs discovered, and disclosed to the Court, that Bernalillo County in fact had continued to maintain operational and management authority over RCC since at least June of 2004, and, in March 2005, had entered into an agreement to house federal detainees at RCC. Id. at 6. Becau se the McClendon settlement agreements were intended to encompass all facilities operated or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Bernalillo County, its continued operation and control of RCC meant that RCC, in addition to MDC, fell within the purview of the settlement agreements, and thus within the Court’s oversight of those agreements. See Civ No. 95-24, Doc. 718 at 1-2.
Before learning of Bernalillo County’s role in the operation and control of RCC, the Court began receiving numerous complaints from federal detainees held at RCC about the availability of drugs, inadequate medical care, and unsanitary conditions. Id. at 2-3. Based on those complaints, I made three visits to RCC, where I “witnessed the most deplorable conditions [I] had ever encountered at a detention facility.” Id. at 3. After the Court issued a Memorandum
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Opinion and Order finding that the defendants had misrepresented material information to the

plaintiffs and to the Court, see Civ. 95-24, Doc. 699, Bernalillo County moved to disqualify the

Court from the McClendon case. Civ. 95-24, Doc. 702. In support of their motion, Bernalillo

County argued that I had engaged in an “extrajudicial factfinding and evidence gathering” mission

related to the lawsuit, engaged in ex parte communications, and attempted to use my position as a

federal judge to arrange a visit with my sister-in-law, Carla Maestas, who was an inmate at MDC

in April 2007. Id.

In

the McClendon Opinion, the Court strongly rejected all of the accusations leveled

against it by the defendants, found that the defendants’ motion was untimely, and declined to

recuse pursuant to Section 455(b)(1). See Civ. 95-24, Doc. 718. Nonetheless, the Court

determined that, based on “all of the facts at issue,” recusal was appropriate under Section 455(a)

for two reasons. First, the Court explained that, since RCC had been identified as a facility

subject to the McClendon lawsuit, and since conditions at that facility would “undoubtedly be an

issue going forward, . . . [t]he Court’s expression of its opinion regarding RCC in the past”

provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable person to question my impartiality in the McClendon

case. Id. at 15. Second, the Court found that because ofmy relationship with Ms. Maestas, who,

for a brief time, was a member of the plaintiff class, a reasonable person might infer that I could

not be impartial. Id. at 16.

Defendants’ reliance on the McClendon Opinion is unavailing. As an initial matter, the

McClendon Opinion was entered on May 18, 2009, more than two years before Defendants filed

their First Recusal Motion on December 1, 2011. Accordingly, the McClendon Opinion and any

arguments based on that opinion were available to Defendants at the time their First Recusal

Motion was filed. For this reason alone, on their instant Motion to Reconsider, Defendants are

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foreclosed from advancing new arguments based on the McClendon Opinion. See Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
Even if Defendants’ reliance on McClendon were permissible, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from those here. While, as Defendants note, the Court in McClendon recused despite the untimeliness of Bernalillo County’s motion, the Court made this determination based on factors, entirely absent here, that reasonably called into question my impartiality and thus necessitated recusal under Section 455(a). Specifically, in McClendon, I had visited RCC to investigate the general conditions of confinement at that facility, an issue which ultimately fit squarely within those before the Court. In contrast, here, my visit to the Detention Center occurred two years after Plaintiff had been released, and was in response to and addressed issues materially distinct from those raised by Plaintiff herein. See Doc. 112 at 9-10. Further, in McClendon, I unequivocally expressed a negative opinion about the conditions at RCC; here, none of the statements attributable to me provide the factual basis necessary to call my impartiality into question. See id. at 11. Finally, my familial relationship with a former class member in McClendon provided an independent basis for recusal; indisputably, no such basis exists here. Accordingly, the fact that the Court here reached a conclusion contrary to the one it hadreached in McClendon, despite the untimeliness of the motion filed in each case, demonstrates not that the Original Opinion misapprehended the law as applied in McClendon, but rather that the Court was called upon to apply that same law to an entirely different set of circumstances.2 See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[C]ases within § 455(a) are extremely fact driven and
2 Defendants appear to be arguing that the Court here found untimeliness to be determinative, while it reached the opposite conclusion in McClendon. This argument ignores that untimeliness was only one of the bases on which the Court denied Defendants’ First Recusal Motion. The Court also specifically found that Defendants failed to establish that recusal is proper under either Section 455(a) or Section 455(b)(1). Defendant’s request for recusal thus would have been without merit even if it had been timely.
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must be judged on [their] unique facts and circumstances more than comparison to situations considered in prior jurisprudence.”).
Defendants are equally mistaken that the McClendon Opinion calls into question the Court’s determination in the Original Opinion that my communications with Detention Center staff during my visits were not improper ex parte communications. In the McClendon Opinion, in the course of analyzing the defendant’s claim of ex parte communications, the Court noted that none of the individuals at RCC with whom I spoke were parties with respect to RCC at the time of the communications. Civ. No. 95-24, Doc. 718 at 10. Nowhere in the McClendon Opinion, however, did the Court hold that communications are necessarily ex parte simply by virtue of the fact that they occur with individuals who are party to a pending case. Indeed, to the contrary, the Court specifically noted that while two of the individuals with whom I communicated were defendants in the present McClendon lawsuit, the Court was “not forbidden from communicating with them about matters unrelated to the lawsuit.” Id. at 10 n.3. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, because “[i]n 2007, RCC was unrelated to the present lawsuit, . . . the Court’s meeting with them about RCC was not improper.” Id. This reasoning is identical to the Court’s reasoning in the Original Opinion. See Doc. 112 at 7-8 (rejecting the claim of ex parte communications where none of my discussions with Defendant Barela or any other Detention Center staff involved Plaintiff or the instant case). Accordingly, the Court’s interpretation of the law on ex parte communications and its application of that law to the facts of this case are entirely consistent with its previous interpretation and application of that law in McClendon.
Finally, by combining into one timeline events that occurred in three unrelated cases, namely, this case, McClendon, and the case of Bravo v. Board of County Comm’rs of Doña Ana County, Civ. No. 08-10, a putative class action filed in 2008 on behalf of inmates at the Detention
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Center, Defendants attempt to create an inference of impropriety that has no basis in reality. Specifically, Defendants note that only three days after the Court’s decision to recuse in McClendon, the Bravo case was reassigned to another judge; yet, in this case, the Court refused to disqualify itself. Defendants have no inkling of the basis for the reassignment of the Bravo case, which was entirely unrelated to my recusal in McClendon. Further, Plaintiff was never a member of the class in Bravo: he was released before the Bravo litigation began, and in fact, class certification was never obtained in Bravo at all. There thus are no meaningful connections, let alone nefarious ones, to be drawn from the timing of events in three cases whose only similarity was their assignment to this Court. II. Events At Trial Do Not Establish Bias Warranting Recusal.
Defendants argue that, during trial, I displayed a bias against them in both an evidentiary ruling and comments to a witness. According to Defendants, this display of bias prejudiced their case, and requires reconsideration of my earlier decision not to recuse. T he Court disagrees.
First, Defendants point to the fact that, although I had originally ruled admissible some evidence of remedial measures, I ultimately decided not to allow Defendants to present evidence of remedial measures. See Doc. 103 (Trial Tr. 1/23/12) at 31. According to Defendants, as a consequence of my ruling, they “lost their opportunity to rebut Plaintiff’s evidence tending to show that Defendants were deliberately and culpably indifferent to the conditions to which Plaintiff was exposed.” Doc. 122 at 4. As an initial matter, the law is clear that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a biasor partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). My evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence of remedial measures – a ruling which Defendants do not claim either abused my discretion or was against the weight of authority – is no exception to this rule. Further, Defendants suffered no prejudice from my
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exclusion of remedial measures as, despite my ruling, Defendants proceeded to offer such evidence, Plaintiff failed to object to its admission, and the jury thus had heard the evidence when it rendered its verdict. See Doc. 116 (Trial Tr. 1/23/12) at 90-91; 93-94; 113-117. Accordingly, my ruling had no adverse impact on Defendants’ case.
Next, Defendants note my statements to Plaintiff’s witness, John Oates, a former inmate at the Detention Center. His testimony included a discussion of “the emotional upset he had experienced while waiting in the holding cell the day before.” Doc. 122 at 15. At the conclusion of his testimony, I stated:
Thank you very much, Mr. Oates. And I’m sorry about yesterday, but I thank you very much for coming today and answering all of our questions.
And I want to thank the officers very much for making another trip today. Sorry for the inconvenience yesterday. But thank you very much for driving Mr. Oates today. All right.
Mr. Oates, best to you. Doc. 111 at 96-97 (Tr. 1/19/12). According to Defendants, my statements “projected empathy for Oates’s – and thus Plaintiff’s – distress,” and thus were “prejudicial to Defendants because [they] suggested that society owed Plaintiff, too, an apology.” Doc. 122 at 15.
Notably, “judicial remarks during the course ofa trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. . . . [T]hey will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (emphasis in original). My remarks of appreciation and apology fall far short of demonstrating a high degree of favoritism to Plaintiff or antagonism to Defendants. Read in context, it is clear that I expressed to the correctional officers who transferred Mr. Oates – just as much a proxy for the Detention Center as Defendants claim Mr. Oates was for Plaintiff – the same degree of “empathy” I expressed to Mr. Oates himself.
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Further, it is entirely unreasonable to interpret my comments, clearly addressed to the specific circumstances of Mr. Oates’ trip to the Courthouse, as “legitimiz[ing] Plaintiff’s claims.” Doc. 122 at 15. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that my comments at trial support their challenge to my impartiality.
CONCLUSION Neither of the arguments raised by Defendants in support of their request for reconsideration, namely, that the Court mistakenly denied their First Recusal Motion, and that two events at trial show that the Court is biased against them, have any merit. Further, in making these arguments, Defendants fail to articulate the legal standard for a motion to reconsider under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), much less attempt to demonstrate that they have met their burden under that standard. Rather, Defendants improperly seek a second bite at the proverbial apple. Because Defendants fail to demonstrate a manifest error of law in need of correction, present any newly discovered evidence, or recite any exceptional circumstance warranting relief from judgment, Defendants’ request that the Court reconsider its prior refusal to recuse itself and either grant a new trial or remove itself from consideration of further matters is not warranted under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Renewed and Supplemented Recusal Motion [Doc. 122] is DENIED. DATED this 14th day of January, 2013.
MARTHA VÁZQUEZ United States District Judge
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 Case 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV Document 141 Filed 01/08/13 Page 1 of 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

STEPHEN SLEVIN, Plaintiff,
vs. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR THE COUNTY OF DOÑA ANA, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 08-cv-1185 MV/SMV

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants= Motion for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney-Client Relationship Between Plaintiff’s Counsel and Witness John Oates [Doc. 126]. The Court, having considered the motion, briefs, relevant law and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the Motion is not well-taken and will be denied.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff Stephen Slevin commenced the instant action on December 28, 2008. See Doc. 1 (Complaint). Plaintiff had been arrested on state charges of driving while intoxicated and receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, and was booked into the Doña Ana County Detention Center (the ADetention Center@) on August 24, 2005. Id. at 2. He remained at the Detention Center until June 25, 2007, when the charges against him were dismissed. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration. Id. at 2-4. Based on these
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allegations, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants violated his procedural due process and substantive due process rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and committed the torts of false imprisonment and negligent maintenance of a building. Id. at 4-7.
On February 16, 2010, Matthew Coyte, Plaintiff’s counsel, took the deposition of John Oates. See Doc. 133-1 (Deposition Tr. 1/16/10). At the time, Mr. Oates was confined at the Central New Mexico Correctional Facility in Los Lunas (“Los Lunas Level Two”), and the deposition was held there. Previously, Mr. Oates had been detained at the Detention Center from March 2003 to June 2006, where he was held in administrative segregation for the majority of his detention. Id. at 5-6. At the beginning of the deposition, Mr. Coyte advised Mr. Oates that neither he nor Mr. Caldwell, Defendants’ counsel, represented his interests. Id. at 3. Both Mr. Coyte and Mr. Caldwell questioned Mr. Oates durni g the deposition. In response to the attorneys’ questions, Mr. Oates testified about the conditions of administrative confinement at the Detention Center, and contrasted those conditions to those of the general population at the Detention Center. See id. at 7-13, 18-35, 39-44, 69-71.
At one point during the deposition, Mr. Oates indicated that he needed certain books that the prison would not provide in order to complete a class he was taking. See Doc. 133 (Affidavit of Mr. Coyte) ¶ 9. Mr. Caldwell offered to pay for Mr. Oates’ books, and Mr. Coyte offered to pay for half the cost, if necessary. Id. ¶ 10. Ultimately, Mr. Caldwell was unable to arrange to pay for Mr. Oates’ books, and sometime in 2010, Mr. Coyte communicated with Mr. Oates about Mr. Caldwell’s unsuccessful efforts. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
Approximately nine months after Mr. Oates’ deposition, Mr. Coyte learned of allegations that Los Lunas Level Two had been using a form of sexual humiliation against the prisoners. Id. ¶ 19. In January 2011, Mr. Coyte, along with JackBennett Jacks (co-counsel for Plaintiff herein),
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visited Mr. Oates to askabout the allegations. Id. ¶ 21. Mr. Oates indicated that he had been one of the victims of the alleged sexual humiliation. Id. At that point, Mr. Coyte entered an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Oates as a potential class representative. Id. ¶ 22. In February 2011, Mr. Coyte filed a putative class actoin against the Deputy Director of Adult Prisons for the State of New Mexico, the Warden of Los Lunas Two, and unidentified correctional officers at Los Lunas Two, alleging civil rights violations based on the alleged sexual humiliation of prisoners. See J.O. v. Dorsey, No. 11-cv-254 (MCA/GBW), Doc. 1-1. The class action was removed to federal court in March 2011. See id., Doc. 1. Although originally identified as “J.O.” in order to protect against retaliation, Mr. Oates’ full name was revealed in an amended complaint filed September 29, 2011. Doc. 133 ¶¶ 32, 44.
In connection with the instant case, Mr. Coyte provided Mr. Caldwell with the telephone numbers of the witnesses he intended to call at trial, including Mr. Oates. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants do not deny, that Mr. Caldwell made no attempt to contact Mr. Oates prior to trial. Id.
Trial in the instant case commenced on January 17, 2012. During the trial, Plaintiff called Mr. Oates as a witness. Mr. Oates provided testimony consistent with his deposition testimony contrasting the conditions of administrative confinement with the conditions of the general population at the Detention Center. See Doc. 111 (Trial Tr. 1/19/12) at 58-62, 64-75, 80-81. In the course of cross examination, Mr. Caldwell made one inquiry of Mr. Oates as to his communications with Mr. Coyte, as follows: “Prior to your being deposed in 2010, you had spoken with Mr. Coyte on at least two occasions, had you not?” Id. at 93. Mr. Oates responded, “I spoke with him when I got a letter in the mail. I went to my case worker and called him to ask what the letter was about. And I spoke with him once in Los Lunas.” Id. at 93-94. Thereafter,
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on redirect examination, Mr. Coyte inquired: “The letter and the telephone conversation with me, Mr. Caldwell just referred to,did I tell you how to testify?” Id. at 94. Mr. Oates responded, “No, sir.” Id. Mr. Coyte then asked, “Did I put anything in your mind as to what – what to say?” Id. Mr. Oates again responded, “No, sir.” Id.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. See Doc. 96 (Special Verdict Form). Specifically, the jury found Defendants Board of County Commissioners (the “County”), Christopher Barela, Director of the Detention Center, and Daniel Zemek, Medical Director of the Detention Center, liable for depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights to humane conditions of confinement, adequate medical care, and procedural due process, and as a result of these constitutional deprivations, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the County, Barela, and Zemek, and to punitive damages from Barela and Zemek. Id. The jury awarded Plaintiff $3 million in punitive damages against Barela, and $3.5 million in punitive damages against Zemek. Id. The jury further found Defendant Barela liable for violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and as result of this violation, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from Barela. Id. Next, the jury found the Detention Center liable for the torts of false imprisonment and negligent operation or maintenance of a building, and as a result of this liability, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the Detention Center. Id. Finally, the jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, to include $500,000 for each month that Plaintiff was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for each year since Plaintiff’s release from custody. Id.
The Court entered a Final Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on February 17, 2012. Doc. 105 (Final Judgment). The reafter, Defendants retained an investigator to interview the jurors. See Doc. 126-1 (Affidavit of Mr. Caldwell) ¶ 6. On March 8, 2012, the investigator informed Mr.
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Caldwell that he recognized Mr. Oates, witnessin this case, as the lead plaintiff in theDorsey class action, and that Mr. Coyte represented Mr. Oates in the Dorsey action. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Caldwell sent Mr. Coyte an email message inquiring about his discovery. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Coyte advised Mr. Caldwell that he did not believe that his representation of Mr. Oates was relevant to the present matter or required a specific disclosure. Id.
Thereafter, on April 4, 2012, Defendants filed the instant motion seeking a new trial based on the nondisclosure of the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff’s counsel and Mr. Oates. Doc. 126. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on April 20, 2012. Doc. 132. Defendants’ reply followed on May 2, 2012. Doc. 138.
LEGAL STANDARD Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relief under Rule 60(b) “is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000). “Parties seeking relief under Rule 60(b) have a higher hurdle to overcome because such a motion is not a substitute for an appeal.” Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955 (10th Cir. 2004). Rule 60(b)(3), in particular, allows a courtto relieve a party froma final judgment based on “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). “The burden is on the moving party, and they must show ‘clear and convincing proof’ of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.” Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this to require a showing that the opposing party “acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court, by means of a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme.”
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Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1291-92 (10th Cir. 2005) (articulating heightened standard applicable in Tenth Circuit to misconduct claims under Rule 60(b)(3)). Further, “the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Zurich, 426 F.3d at 1290 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Finally, “[s]ubsection (b)(3) is aimed at judgments which were unfairly obtained, not at those which are factually incorrect.” Id. (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION Defendants ask the Court to grant Rule 60(b)(3) relief from the Final Judgment and a new trial, on the grounds that Plaintiff’s counsel “engaged in misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and to Defendants,” by failing to disclose that, at the time of trial, Mr. Coyte and Mr. Jacks had an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff’s witness, Mr. Oates. Doc. 126 at 1. In support of their request, Defendants argue that the fact that Plaintiff’s counsel also represented Mr. Oates in the Dorsey litigation “was exceedingly relevant,” and that the jury was unable to properly assess Mr. Oates’ credibility in the absence of this “crucially important information bearing on Oates’ believability.” Id. at 5. According to Defendants, the failure to disclose Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of Mr. Oates “violated ethical standards and affirmatively presented misleadingly incomplete evidence to the jury, amounting to misconduct that justifies a new trial.” Id. at 7. Although arguing adamantly about relevancy and ethical considerations, Defendants fail to articulate the legal standard relevant to their motion, much less demonstrate that they have met their burden under that standard.
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I. Defendants Fail to Show Clear and Convincing Proof of Fraud. As set forth above, in order to succeed on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, Defendants must show
“clear and convincing proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.” Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955. In the Tenth Circuit, this standard requires Defendants to show that Plaintiff “acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court, by means of a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme.” Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1231; Zurich, 426 F.3d at 1291-92. Defendants nowhere argue that Plaintiff or his counsel acted with such intent todeceive or defraud the Court. Moreover, the facts Defendants offer in support of their motion fall far short of demonstrating “a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme.” Indeed, rather than asserting that Plaintiff’s counsel had a “scheme” to actively conceal their representation of Mr. Oates, Defendants instead rest their request for relief on Mr. Coyte’s failure, after hearing Mr. Oates’ testimony on cross examination, to volunteer information regarding the unrelated Dorsey litigation. Under the circumstances, the Court cannot find that this omission amounts to the sort of deception or fraud required to warrant Rule 60(b)(3) relief.
As an initial matter, Mr. Oates’ role in the Dorsey litigation and Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of Mr. Oates in that litigation had been a matter of public record since at least September 2011, four months before trial commenced. Mr. Oates was not a surprise witness; Mr. Caldwell knew in advance of trial that Plaintiff intended to call Mr. Oates as a witness, and thus had the opportunity to investigate, for impeachment purposes, any interest that Mr. Oates might have had in testifying on Plaintiff’s behalf. Defe ndants have pointed to no discovery rule, and the Court has found none, that would haverequired Plaintiff to undertaketo disclose to his adversaries what Defendants now allege amounts to relevant impeachment information.
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Further, the Court does not find that Mr. Coyte’s omission of his attorney-client relationship with Mr. Oates rendered the record materially misleading. C ontrary to Defendants’ assertion, the facts relevant to Mr. Caldwell’s questions and Mr. Oates’ responses thereto had not changed between the time of Mr. Oates’ deposition and trial herein. Doc. 126 at 6. In inquiring of Mr. Oates as to his communications with Mr. Coyte, Mr. Caldwell specifically limited his question to the time period “prior to [Mr. Oates] being deposed in 2010.” Doc. 111 at 93. Mr. Caldwell never asked about communications with Mr. Coyte after Mr. Oates’ deposition. Because of the contours of Mr. Caldwell’s question, Mr. Oates’ attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff’s counsel, which undisputedly began after Mr. Oates’ deposition, was not relevant to either Mr. Caldwell’s questions or Mr. Oates’ response thereto. Mr. Coyte’s redirect examination, properly limited in scope to the issues raised on cross examination, similarly addressed only the time period prior to Mr. Oates’ deposition. Mr. Coyte elicited testimony to clarify that, during the conversations about which Mr. Oates had testified on cross examination, Mr. Coyte did not tell him how to testify, or put anything in his mind as to what to say. See id. at 94.
In light of the questions asked on direct, cross and redirect examination, there was nothing “misleadingly incomplete” about Mr. Oates’ testimony. Any “known facts” regarding Mr. Oates’ communication with Plaintiff’s counsel after his deposition – whether about the instant case, the Dorsey litigation, the status of Mr. Caldwell’s attempts to send him textbooks, or otherwise – were simply immaterial. Mr. Coyte thus had no duty to “correct” Mr. Oates’ testimony. In the absence of such a duty, the fact that Mr. Coyte did not volunteer information about his
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representation of Mr. Oates in the Dorsey litigation is simply insufficient to demonstrate fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(3).1 II. Defendants Fail to Show Substantial Interference with Their Defense.
As stated above, on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, Defendants also must demonstrate that the challenged behavior substantially interfered with their “ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Zurich, 426 F.3d at 1290. Defendants do not argue outright that the nondisclosure of Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of Mr. Oates substantially interfered with their ability to prepare for and proceed at trial.2 Defendants do, however, contend that Plaintiff’s failure to disclose the Dorsey litigation prevented them from impeaching Mr. Oates’ testimony “contrasting his segregated confinement in the [Detention Center] with his less oppressive confinement in the general population in Los Lunas.” Doc. 126 at 7. According to Defendants, because Mr. Oates is “pursuing allegations of prisoner abuse at the Los Lunas facility,” id., disclosure of the Dorsey litigation necessarily would have called into question the credibility ofhis testimony describing the conditions at the Detention Center as less favorable than those as the Los Lunas facility. Id.3
This argument ignores the fundamental differences between the instant action and the Dorsey litigation. Here, Plaintiff alleged violations based on his placement in administrative
1 Notably, Defendants fail to explain precisely how Mr. Coyte could have “corrected” the record to include information regarding the Dorsey litigation. To raise this issue on redirect examination would have exceeded the scope of cross examination; to testify himself as to the issue would have required him to become a witness. 2 Indeed, this would be a difficult argument to make, as Defendants were not prevented, by Plaintiff’s alleged nondisclosure or otherwise, from contacting Mr. Oates prior to trial, or from questioning him at trial about his pretrial communications with Plaintiff’s counsel. 3 Note that, while Defendants frame their motion as one based on “nondisclosure of attorney-client relationship,” this argument, along with their argument regarding the unfairness of the judgment (discussed below), are based on the nondisclosure of the Dorsey litigation itself, rather than the nondisclosure of Mr. Oates’ relationship with Plaintiff’s counsel.
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segregation. In contrast, in Dorsey, the plaintiff class alleges that they were subject to sexual humiliation. Accordingly, even if Mr. Oates had provided favorable testimony regarding the conditions of the general population at the facility at issue in the Dorsey litigation, his role in a lawsuit alleging violations unrelated to those conditions would provide no basis for calling into question the truth of his trial testimony.
But, in fact, Mr. Oates did not provide testimony regarding the conditions of the general population at the facility at issue in the Dorsey litigation. Rather, Mr. Oates’ testimony about conditions at Los Lunas referred to “RDC in Los Lunas,” where he was taken for an evaluation at some point during his three-year stay at the Detention Center, which began in 2003. Specifically, Mr. Oates testified that he left from and then returned to the Detention Center twice, both times for evaluations, once to “Las Vegas,” and once to “RDC in Los Lunas.” Doc. 111 at 77. Thus, Mr. Oates never so much as mentioned, let alone favorably described, the conditions at the facility where, according to the complaint in Dorsey, he was subject to sexual humiliation during his later confinement in 2009. Accordingly, the Court does not find any “inconsistency” between Mr. Oates’ testimony and his position in the Dorsey litigation. It follows that Plaintiff’s failure to disclose the Dorsey litigation did not substantially interfere with Defendants’ ability to impeach Mr. Oates at trial. III. Defendants Fail to Show that the Final Judgment Was Unfairly Obtained.
Rule 60(b)(3) provides relief only where the judgment was “unfairly obtained.” Zurich, 426 F.3d at 1290. Defendants appear to be arguing that the judgment against them was unfairly obtained because Mr. Oates “was the only witness to testify to conditions at the [Detention Center] from an inmate’s perspective and was virtually the only source of adverse evidence about conditions at the facility,” and, in hearing his testimony, “[i]t would have made a great difference”
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to the jury if it had known that Mr. Oates “was pursuing his own lawsuit alleging mistreatment within a New Mexico correctional facility.” D oc. 126 at 4. Gi ven the totality of the evidence introduced at trial, the Court simply cannot agree that the jury would have reached a different resolution if it had known of the Dorsey litigation.
Although Mr. Oates was the only former inmate to testify about the conditions at the Detention Center, his testimony was far from the “only source of adverse evidence” about those conditions. To the contrary, his testimony was consistent with that of Defendants Barela and Zemek themselves, each of whom admitted that he failed to provide the appropriate level of physical and mental care to Plaintiff. See, e.g., Doc. 109 (Trial Tr. 1/18/12) at 80-81, 102-106, 130-32, 155. Further, Mr. Oates’ testimony as to the effects of solitary confinement was consistent with the testimony ofPlaintiff’s expert, Dr. Grassian,who described the lasting physical and mental impact of solitary confinement on Plaintiff, whose life is now “kind of torture.” See Doc. 115 (Trial Tr. 1/20/12) at 41, 51, 74, 77. Given the overwhelming evidence – presented by Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ witnesses alike – of Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care or conditions of confinement, the Court would be hard pressed to find that, because the jury was unaware of Mr. Oates’ role in an unrelated litigation, similar to the one here only in that it involves “mistreatment within a New Mexico correctional facility,” the judgment against Defendants was “unfairly obtained.”
CONCLUSION Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting the extraordinary relief for which Rule 60(b)(3) provides. Specifically, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the nondisclosure of Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of John Oates in the unrelated Dorsey litigation constitutes fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct,
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Case 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV Document 141 Filed 01/08/13 Page 12 of 12 substantially interfered with Defendants’ ability to impeach Mr. Oates at trial, or resulted in an unfairly obtained judgment. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to relief from the Final Judgment entered herein, or to a new trial.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney-Client Relationship Between Plaintiff’s Counsel and Witness John Oates [Doc. 126], is DENIED.
DATED this 8th day of January, 2013. MARTHA VÁZQUEZ United States District Judge
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 Case 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV Document 140 Filed 12/14/12 Page 1 of 18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

STEPHEN SLEVIN, Plaintiff,
vs. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR THE COUNTY OF DOÑA ANA, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 08-cv-1185 MV/SMV

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants= Motion for New Trial on Damages or, in the Alternative, Remittitur [Doc. 120]. The Court, having considered the motion, briefs, relevant law and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the Motion is not well-taken and will be denied.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff Stephen Slevin commenced the instant action on December 28, 2008. See Doc. 1 (Complaint). Plaintiff had been arrested on state charges of driving while intoxicated and receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, and was booked into the Doña Ana County Detention Center (the ADetention Center@) on August 24, 2005. Id. at 2. He remained at the Detention Center until June 25, 2007, when the charges against him were dismissed. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration. Id. at 2-4. Based on these
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allegations, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants violated his procedural due process and substantive due process rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and committed the torts of false imprisonment and negligent maintenance of a building. Id. at 4-7.
The case proceeded to a five-day jury trial. After several hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. See Doc. 96 (Special Verdict Form). Specifically, the jury found Defendants Board of County Commissioners (the “County”), Christopher Barela, Director of the Detention Center, and Daniel Zemek, Medical Director of the Detention Center, liable for depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights to humane conditions of confinement, adequate medical care, and procedural due process, and as a result of these constitutional deprivations, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the County, Barela, and Zemek, and to punitive damages from Barela and Zemek. Id. The jury awarded Plaintiff $3 million in punitive damages against Barela, and $3.5 million in punitive damages against Zemek. Id. The jury further found Defendant Barela liable for violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and as result of this violation, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from Barela. Id. Next, the jury found the Detention Center liable for the torts of false imprisonment and negligent operation or maintenance of a building, and as a result of this liability, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the Detention Center. Id. Finally, the jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, to include $500,000 for each month that Plaintiff was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for each year since Plaintiff’s release from custody. Id.
A Final Judgment in favor of Plaintiff was entered on February 17, 2012. Doc. 105. Thereafter, on March 16, 2012, Defendants filed the instant motion seeking a new trial or, in the
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alternative, remittitur. Doc. 120. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on April 6, 2012, Doc. 128, and Defendants’ reply followed on April 23, 2012. Doc. 134.
LEGAL STANDARD This Court’s “review of a jury’s findings withrespect to damages is limited to whether they are supported by substantial evidence.” Evans v. Fogerty, 241 F. App’x 542, 561, 2007 WL 2380990 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1018 (2008). In reviewing a damages award for excessiveness, the Court is guided by the principle that “[i]t is within the virtually exclusive purview of the jury to evaluate credibility and fix damages.” United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 588 (2001); State Office Sys., Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of America, 762 F.2d 843, 847 (10th Cir. 1985)(noting that “[t]he fixing of damages is peculiarly a function of the jury”) (citation omitted); see also Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1170 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (“What is most relevant in this case is not the judicial conscience, it is the conscience of the community as represented by the six people who served on this trial jury.”). Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit has made clear that, unless the jury has awarded damages “so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial, the jury’s determination of the damages is considered inviolate.” Id. at 1168. While “bias, prejudice or passion can be inferred from excessiveness[,] . . . a verdict will not be set aside on this basis unless it is so plainly excessive as to suggest that it was the product of such passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.” Id. Upon a finding that a damages award is erroneously excessive, under the practice of remittitur, the Court “may condition a denial of a motion for a new trial on the plaintfif’s accepting damages in a reduced amount.” McClary v. Coughlin, III, 87 F. Supp. 2d 205, 218 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 237 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2001).
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I. Com

DISCUSSION pensatory Damages Award

Defendants ask this Court to grant a new trial on damages, or in the alternative, condition

denial of a new trial on Plaintiff’s acceptance of a reduction in his compensatory damages award

from $15.5 million to $2 million. Although admitting both that the jury’s finding of liability was

proper, and that there was “substantial evidence supporting an award of compensatory damages,”

Doc. 121 at 2, Defendants nonetheless argue that the compensatory damages award fixed by the

jury is “‘plainly excessive’ and likely the product of passion and prejudice.” Id. at 3. According

to Defendants, although the “evidence and injury [suffered by Plaintiff] are not to be minimized . .

. no reasonable calculus can value Plaintiff’s compensatory damages at $6 million per year of

incarceration, as the jury did.” Id. As set forth herein, under the “relatively generous” standard

applicable to this Court’s review of the damages award, and carefully considering the facts of this

case, see Evans, 241 F. App’x at 562, the Court cannot agree with Defendants that the jury’s

compensatory damages award shocks the judicial conscience.

A. The Jury’s Compensatory Award is Not Excessive on Its Face.

Defendants argue that the sheer amount of the award demonstrates its excessiveness, and

that on this basis alone, the award should be remitted. In support of this argument, Defendants

first note that at least $15 million of the award is attributable solely to “intangibles,” namely, pain,

suffering, and emotional distress. Without providing any explanation or legal authority for their

position, Defendants appear to be arguing that $15 million is an unreasonably high award for

non-economic, non-medical losses.

But case law makes clear that it is precisely inthis situation – where the jury has been asked

to place a monetary value on Plaintiff’s experience of non-economic harm – that deference to the

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jury’s determination is most appropriate. See Eich v. Board of Regents for Cent. Missouri State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[A]wards for pain and suffering are highly subjective and should be committed to the sound discretion of the jury, especially when the jury is being asked to determine injuries not easily calculatedin economic terms.”). Indeed, where the jury has fixed an award to compensate a plaintiff for pain and suffering, the court is permitted to grant a new trial or remit the judgment “only rarely and in extraordinary circumstances.” Bielunas v. F/V Misty Dawn, Inc., 621 F.3d 72, 80 (1st Cir. 2010). This is especially true where, as here, the jury found that the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement violated his constitutional rights. Evans, 241 F. App’x at 562 (stating that, in casesinvolving constitutional rights, compensation “should not be approached in a miserly fashion. It is in the public interest that there be a reasonably spacious approach to a fair compensatory award for denial or curtailment of the right”) (citation omitted). As the First Circuit has explained, “dollars are atbest a rough and awkward proxy for itme spent in the throes of wrongful incarceration. In the final analysis, it is for the trier of fact to resolve the difficult questions of quantification and monetization that lurk in the penumbra of cases such as this.” Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 105 (1st Cir. 2009). Defendants have failed to demonstrate that any rare or extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant the Court’s substitution of its own judgment for that of the jury on the difficult question of quantifying Plaintiff’s pain, suffering, and emotional loss.
In further support of their argument that the jury’s award is “facially excessive,” Defendants point to the request made by Plaintiff’s counsel, in closing, for a compensatory damages award of $6 million. According to Defendants, because the jury awarded “more than two and one-half times” the amount that Plaintiff’s counsel described as “fair compensation” for Plaintiff’s injuries, the award must be excessive. Doc. 121 at 3. As an initial matter, Defendants
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have pointed to no authority for the proposition that an attorney’s argument as to what might constitute “fair compensation” is a basis for rejecting the award that the jury ultimately fixes. Indeed, to the contrary, the jury’s refusal to blindly agree with what it heard in argument suggests that it instead properly followed the Court’s instruction to make an independent determination as to what damages were fair in light of the evidence. Further, as Defendants themselves admit, Plaintiff’s counsel did not limit his request to $6 million, but instead “was careful to leave roomfor the jury to make a higher assessment.” Doc. 121 at 3. While initially stating that $6 million would be fair compensation, Plaintiff’s counsel later changed his mind, stating, “Actually, it’s not. I don’t know why I said that. It’s not fair compensation, we can’t give it to him.” Doc. 116 at 160 (Tr. 1/23/12). Accordingly, assuming arguendo that it would be proper for the Court to consider closing arguments in analyzing the propriety of the damages award, the statements made during Plaintiff’s closing provide no basis for the Court to find that “fair compensation” is limited to $6 million.
Defendants next ask the Court to find the damages award excessive based on a comparison with other cases “comparable to the present case in various respects and therefore informative about community and judicial attitudes regarding fair compensation.” Doc. 121 at 3-4. It is well-settled, however, that “a jury’s damages award is highly specific to the facts and circumstances of the case.” Evans, 241 F. App’x at 562. Although the Court’s determination may be “informed by a review of awards granted in other comparable cases, . . . comparisons with other cases are not dispositive,” and indeed, need not be referenced in analyzing the propriety of a damages award. McInerney v. United Air Lines, Inc., 463 F. App’x 709, 723 7232011 WL 1350453 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Rather, “the relevant inquiry is whether the compensatory award was excessive in relation to the injury.” Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1169.
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The Court is “not persuaded by [Defendants’] comparisons to other jury awards.” McInerney, 463 F. App’x at 723. First, in several of the cases cited by Defendants, the court actually upheld the damages award set by the jury. See, e.g., Limone, 579 F.3d at 106-07 (finding that awards fell short of shocking the conscience); Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F. Supp. 2d 405, 427 (D. Mass. 2011) (“defer[ring] to the jury’s finding on the monetary value of the harm that Drumgold suffered for fourteen years in prison”); Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 368 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding jury verdict supported by record, and noting that “[d]amages assessed by a jury are largely discretionary with it”). These cases provide no authority for reversing the jury’s damages award. Indeed, the propriety of a damages award in the amount at issue here was simply not before the court in any of these cases. They thus have no precedential value as to the sole issue before this Court, namely, whether the jury’s determination of damages, based on the specific evidence before it, shocks the judicial conscience.
Moreover, several cases upon which Defendants rely did not involve motions to remit a jury award, but rather involved the district court, in the first instance, calculating compensatory damages. See, e.g., Ford v. Bender, No. 07-11457, 2012 WL 262532, *16 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2012); Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F. Supp. 2d 274, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y 2001); Nettles v. Griffith, 883 F. Supp. 136, 145-46 (E.D. Tex. 1995). This is a significant distinction. While a court has the benefit of legal precedent in fashioning what it finds to be a fair damages award, a jury is afforded no such comparative information, or any other guideposts, in valuing a plaintiff’s losses. Indeed, the jury here was specifically instructed that “[n]o evidence of the value of intangible things, such as mental or physical pain and suffering, has been or need be introduced, and that there is “no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded” for intangible things such as mental or physical pain and suffering. Doc. 93 at 32 (Instruction No. 24). Rather,
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the Court instructed the jury to be “guided by dispassionate common sense,” to use “sound discretion,” and to make an award that is “fair in light of the evidence.” Id. at 31-32. After thus relegating the damages determination to the jury’s “sound discretion”, it would be hypocritical for the Court now to find the jury’s damages award excessive, based on a purported standard of “judicial attitudes regarding fair compensation” articulated in court decisions of which the jury was unaware. The Court declines to hold the jury responsible for deviating from a “norm”, when the jury was not made privy to any such norm, and indeed, was instructed that no such norm exists.
Finally, the Court finds unpersuasive the remaining case cited by Defendants, McClary v. Coughlin, supra. In that 12 year-old case, the court had required the plaintiff, before trial, to submit an itemization of damages claimed. The court relied in part on this itemization, and in part on its review of “the range of damages previously awarded to inmates who suffered unlawful SHU confinement,” in finding the jury award to be excessive. 87 F. Supp. 2d at 218. In contrast, here, there was no itemization required of, or provided by, Plaintiff. Further, as noted above, this Court declines to consider, as did the McClary court, the amount of damages awarded in other “similar” cases in determining the propriety of the jury’s damages award.
Instead, following the Tenth Circuit’s directive, this Court inquires as to “whether the compensatory award was excessive in relation to the injury.” Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1169. Having presided over the trial, heard the testimony, received the exhibits, and observed the demeanor of the witnesses, the Court cannot find that the award was excessive in relation to the injury.
Without recounting the entirety of the evidence presented at trial, the Court notes that the jury saw and heard evidence of Plaintiff’s physical, emotional, and mental suffering as a result of his confinement in administrative segregation. That evidence included letters written by Plaintiff
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seeking help, and sick call requests documenting Plaintiff’s suffering from bed sores on his thighs, fungus growing on his face, rotting teeth, pain, inability to sleep and nightmares when he could sleep. See Exs. 4-6. In a letter written in November 2005, he described “at least 4 or 5 anxiety attacks a day,” and said, “I don’t know how much longer I can go on like this.” Ex. 4. Later in 2005, he described conditions as going “from bad to worst.” Id. His letters show the deterioration in his ability to write. Medical records kept by the Detention Center similarly documented Plaintiff’s experience of pain and suffering, and the lack of treatment for his many medical and dental conditions. Further, the Detention Center’s “recreation log” revealed that Plaintiff was allowed out of his cell for virtually no time in May or June 2006, no time out at all in July, only three days in August, two days in September, and two days in October 2006. Although Plaintiff remained incarcerated for six months after October 2006, the Detention Center’s records showed no recreation at all for himafter that date. Plaintiff thus spent six months alone in his cell with virtually no human contact before his release.
Although first attempting to explain away this lack of recreation time by testifying that Plaintiff refused to come out of his cell, Barela testified that he would not have put his dog in a cell like Plaintiff’s cell and left him there for a month at a time, even if his dog refused to come out. He admitted that, if his dog refused to come out, he would wonder what was wrong with her and take her to the veterinarian. Barela also acknowledged that he knew it was not acceptable toleave his dog or Plaintiff in the conditions in which Plaintiff was left, and that Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement were not in accord with the standards of the Detention Center. Doc. 109 at 196-99 (Tr. 1/18/12).
With regard to the injurious effects of administrative confinement on Plaintiff, his expert, Dr. Grassian, testified that although there was “pretty clear evidence that Mr. Slevin was quite a
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competent individual prior to his incarceration,” the conditions of his confinement left him “broken,” with “massively severe” PTSD, to the extent that it was questionable whether he could have been found competent to stand trial by October of 2006. Doc. 115 at 41, 51, 74 (Tr. 1/20/12). Dr. Grassian described Plaintiff’s PTSD as “horribly symptomatic, with intrusive thoughts, the anxiety, the startle response, the fearfulness, the decreased self-esteem, and social isolation,” and testified that Plaintiff was “more massively impaired by the PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder, than [he] ha[d] ever seen in [his] entire professional life.” Id. at 74. According to Dr. Grassian’s testimony, Plaintiff’s life “is kind of torture.” Id. at 77. Kim Travers and John Richard Stevens, witnesses who knew Plaintiff before his confinement, similarly testified that Plaintiff had become “empty”; “[n]ot a whole person”; “vacant”; “a shell of the former person that he was”; and “[l]ike an old man that just didn’t have any life left in him.” Doc. 116 at 40, 159, 64 (Tr. 1/23/12).
Considering the whole of the evidence, including Plaintiff’s condition before and after the impact of his solitary confinement, and the testimony of present and permanent mental injury to Plaintiff, the Court is satisfied that the jury’s “compensatory award itself is not so plainly excessive that [the Court] should infer that it was the product of passion or prejudice or hold that it is so shocking to the conscience of the court.” Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1170-71. Rather, the jury’s “award was justified by the evidence and cannot be said by reason of its amount to demonstrate bias or passion on the part of the jury in arriving at its verdict.” Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 230 (10th Cir. 1962).
B. The Circumstances of the Trial Did Not Bias the Jury. Defendants argue that the compensatory award should be remitted for the additional reason that the specific circumstances of the trial caused “the flames of passion to enter into the jury’s
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consideration.” Doc. 121 at 6. In support of this argument, Defendants insist that the nature of this case, namely the “glaringly deficient” treatment accorded jail detainees, in addition to the testimony of John Oates “describing the sounds, smells, and experiences of life as a detainee” and the Court’s statements following that testimony, are by their very nature inflammatory. Id. at 6-7. Defendants further insist that the jury’s use of a “per diem” method of determining damages, coupled with the jury’s communications to the Court, demonstrate that the jury, in awarding damages, indeed must have succumbed to the influence of passion and prejudice. The Court disagrees.
As an initial matter, Defendants’ argument ignores the fact that the Court’s instructions to the jury – to which neither party raised any objections – specifically directed the jurors: not to allow “personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, or sympathy” to affect their decision-making; not to infer from the instructions, or from anything the Court said or did, as indicating that the Court has “an opinion regarding the evidence or what [the] verdict should be”; and not to impose compensatory damages as a punishment, or to increase such damages for the purpose of penalizing a defendant. See Doc. 93 at 1, 31 (Instruction Nos. 1, 24). There is a well-established presumption that jurors follow their instructions. Sanchez v. Brokop, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1182 (D.N.M. 2005). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has explained:
The jury system is premised on the idea that rationality and careful regard for the court’s instructions will confine and exclude jurors’ raw emotions. Jurors routinely serve as impartial factfinders in cases that involve sensitive, even life-and-death matters. In those cases, as in all cases, juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Thurston Hensley, 556 U.S. 838, 841 (2009). Defendants have presented no compelling evidence to rebut this presumption, and thus no reason for the Court to find that the jury abdicated its responsibilities. Accordingly, the Court finds that the jury followed its
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instructions to “decide the case solely on the evidence before [it],” “consider only the testimony and exhibits received into evidence,” and award Plaintiff compensatory damages in an amount “that [] fairly compensate[d] Plaintiff . . . for “[a]ny bodily injury that Plaintiff sustained and any pain and suffering, emotional distress, personal humiliation, disability, disfigurement, mental anguish, and/or loss of capacity for enjoyment of life that Plaintiff experienced in the past or is reasonably likely to experience in the future.” Id. at 1, 24, 32 (Instruction Nos. 1, 17, 24).
Further, in arguing that the jury’s compensatory award cannot possibly have been based on the evidence because that evidence “vividly portray[ed] Plaintiff’s degeneration into a disheveled, unkempt, withdrawn, and haunted individual during his period of incarceration,” Defendants misunderstand the responsibility of a jury in a case where, as here, the disturbing nature of the evidence is beyond dispute. Doc. 121 at 6. As the Tenth Circuit has stated, “[i]t is not the duty of jurors to set aside, even if it were possible,all the decenciesof human emotion when called upon to decide controversy.” Barnes, 305 F.2d at 229. Rather, “[i]t is the duty of jurors not to allow emotion to overcome fact, not to allow sympathy to overcome reason, not to allow desire for result to overcome justice.” Id. Although like Barnes, this case is “one where complete detachment would be unnatural and natural pity could dominate the course of the trial,” id., the evidence properly presented at trial provided a solid, factual foundation more than sufficient to support the jury’s award. The Court thus cannot find, as Defendants urge, that the jury’s award was based on emotion, sympathy, or desire for result, rather thanfact, reason, and justice. To the contrary, as in Barnes, the Court finds “that the verdict was the result of conscientious deliberation and the admirable performance of duty.” Id.
Also unpersuasive is Defendants’ argument that the Court’s own statements at the conclusion of Mr. Oates’ testimony “could only have suggested to the jury that Plaintiff, too, was
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owed an apology by society in the form of substantial damages.” Doc. 121 at 7. After Mr. Oates testified about the effects of having been kept in a holding cell the previous day, the Court stated:
Thank you very much, Mr. Oates. And I’m sorry about yesterday, but I thank you very much for coming today and answering all of our questions.
And I want to thank the officers very much for making another trip today. Sorry for the inconvenience yesterday. But thank you very much for driving Mr. Oates today. All right.
Mr. Oates, best to you. Doc. 111 at 96-97 (Tr. 1/19/12). To describe as a stretch Defendants’ reading of these statements to be a “judicial endorsement of Plaintiff’s claim” would be overly generous. Doc. 121 at 7. Indeed, read in context, it is clear that the Court expressed to the transporting officers – just as much a “proxy” for the Detention Center as was Mr. Oates for Plaintiff – the same gratitude and apology it expressed to Mr. Oates himself. The bias in the Court’s statements is nonexistent.
Finally, neither the jury’s use of a “per diem” method to calculate damages, nor the questions asked by the jury during deliberations, prove Defendants’ theory that the jury must have been motivated by prejudice or passion. First, as Defendants admit, using a “per diem” method to determine damages is entirely proper. Doc. 121 at 8. Defendants fail to explain why the jury’s use of this method should be interpreted as a manifestation of its bias, rather than as a legitimate attempt by the jury to rationally “resolve the difficult questions of quantification and monetization” which it was called upon to accomplish. Limone, 579 F.3d at 105.
Next, a plain reading of the jury’s notes dispels any notion thatthe jury’s inquiries reflected an improper desire to punish the County through the compensatory award. During its deliberations, the jury sent four notes to the Courtseeking clarification of its instructions. Two of the jury’s notes involved damages. The first jury note inquired as to who would be “responsible for compensatory damages – Defendants? Or County?”, and then asked, “Punitive falls to Zemek
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& Barela – right?” Doc. 94 at 2. The jury thus was requesting clarification as to who is responsible for each type of damages, compensatory and punitive. By so inquiring, the jury displayed no inclination to impose either category of damages on any party to whomsuch damages would not properly be imposed. The more likely conclusion is that the jury sent the note to ensure that it imposed only the proper category of damages on each party.
The fourth jury note asked for clarification as to the punitive damages instruction. Specifically, because that instruction states that the financial resources of Defendant is a proper factor for consideration in setting a punitive damages award, the jury asked whether it could or would be provided such information, “i.e. if we want to award punitive damages above any insurance policy limits to make sure it is personally felt by defendants.” Id. at 7. The wording of this note makes clear that the jury was considering punishment solely in the context of punitive damages. This, obviously, is entirely proper. Indeed, the Court specifically instructed the jury that the purpose of punitive damages is “to punish Defendant and to deter Defendant and others from committing similar acts in the future,” and accordingly, that in awarding punitive damages, the jury may consider “the degree of reprehensibility of Defendant’s conduct, the relationship of any award of punitive damages to any actual injury inflicted on Plaintiff, and the financial resources of Defendant.” Doc. 93 at 34-35 (Instruction No. 26). The same instruction makes clear that the jury could only consider punitive damages against Defendants Barela and Zemek. Id. at 34. Given the language of the note, coupled with the language of the instruction for which the jury sought clarification, it would be nonsensical to interpret the jury’s inquiry as evincing an attempt to punish the County, rather than the individual Defendants.
Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude, from the jury’s calculation of the damages award, their notes to the court, or otherwise, that any of the circumstances at trial, including the
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nature of the case, the testimony of Mr. Oates, or the Court’s own statements, caused the jury to allow “the flames of passion” to enter into its consideration of the compensatory damages awarded to Plaintiff. II. Punitive Damages Award
Defendants ask the Court to “presume” that the punitive damages awarded by the jury against Barela and Zemek were “driven to excessive levels by the jury’s unchecked emotions.” Doc. 121 at 10. In support of this request, Defendants cite no legal authority, and state only that “the compensatory award was colored by jury passion and prejudice,” and that “nothing indicates that the punitive awards were not similarly affected.” Id.
“It is well established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards, and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.” Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 F.3d 1106, 1121 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In analyzing the constitutionality of punitive damages, the Court considers: “1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions; 2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and 3) the difference between the punitive damage award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Id. In addition to a constitutional challenge to a punitive damages award, a defendant also may make a common law challenge on the basis that “the award is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial.” Id. (citation omitted). On a common law challenge, however, “even where a persuasive explanation of the jury’s damages award indicates an award contrary to law, the
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possibility of a proper explanation, however slight the chance, will suffice to sustain the damages award.” Id. at 1123 (citation omitted).
Here, Defendants have failed to raise any constitutional challenge to the punitive damages awarded by the jury. Accordingly, Defendants’ excessiveness claim is a common law one, and not a constitutional one. That claim must fail, as Defendants have not provided any persuasive explanation of the jury’sdamages award that indicates an award contrary to law. Further, “[t]here is more than a mere possibility that the punitive damage awards in this casewere properly intended to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition.” Id. (citation omitted).
As noted above, the only “explanation” of the jury’s damages award provided by Defendants is that, because the compensatory damages award was colored by passion and prejudice, the punitive damages award also must have been so improperly colored. As discussed in detail above, the Court disagrees with the underlying premise that the compensatory damages award was improper. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that the punitive damages award is contrary to law for the simple reason that it must have been “similarly affected” is equally unavailing.
Beyond this argument by extension, Defendants provide no evidence to rebut the presumption that the jury followed the Court’s instructions with regard to punitive damages. See CSX Transp., Inc., 556 U.S. at 841. In its instructions, the Court: cautioned that punitive damages would be appropriate only if the jury found “that Defendant’s conduct was malicious, willful or with callous or reckless indifference to the safety or rights of others;” instructed the jury to “use reason in setting the amount” of punitive damages; and prohibited the jury from imposing a punitive damage award that “reflect[s] bias, prejudice or sympathy toward any party.” Doc. 93 at
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34-35 (Instruction No. 26). The Court finds that the jury followed each of these instructions in calculating its punitive damages awards.
Further, there is “more than a mere possibility” that the jury, by awarding punitive damages against Barela in the amount of $3.5 million and against Zemek in the amount of $3 million, properly intended to punish each for what has occurred. The evidence presented at trial to prove deliberate indifference, an essential element of the constitutional claims against Barela and Zemek, was equally sufficient to prove the “callous or reckless indifference” necessary to award punitive damages. Such evidence included the testimony of Barela and Zemek themselves, each of whom admitted that he failed to provide the appropriate level of physical and mental care to Plaintiff. Considerin g the whole of the evidence, including the admissions of Barela and Zemek, the Court cannot find that “the punitive award was so excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience or leads to an inescapable inference that it resulted from improper passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.” Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1177.
Finally, the Court notes that this is not a case where the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is excessively high. In fact, the punitive damages award represents a fraction of the compensatory award, rather than a multiplier of it. For all of these reasons, the Court declines to accept Defendants’ invitation to presume that the punitive damages award is excessive.
CONCLUSION The Court finds that the jury’s compensatory damages award was justified by the evidence and cannot be said by reason of its amount to demonstrate bias or passion on the part of the jury in arriving at its verdict. The Court further finds that none of the circumstances at trial caused the jury to allow “the flames of passion” to enter into its consideration of the compensatory damages awarded to Plaintiff. Finally, the Court finds that the jury’s punitive damages awards are not so
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for New Trial on Damages or, in the Alternative, Remittitur [Doc. 120], is DENIED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2012. MARTHA VÁZQUEZ United States District Judge
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 Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 1 of 15
U.S. District Court District of New Mexico − Version 6.1 (Albuquerque) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:08−cv−01185−MV−SMV

Slevin vs. Board of County Commissioners et al Assigned to: District Judge Martha Vazquez Referred to: Magistrate Judge Stephan M. Vidmar Case in other court: Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 13−02010 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 12/23/2008 Date Terminated: 02/17/2012 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Stephen Slevin

represented by Alice T Lorenz Lorenz Law 2501 Rio Grande Blvd NW, Ste A Albuquerque, NM 87104 505 247−2456 Fax: 505 242−6655 Email: alice@alorenzlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jack Bennett Jacks Law Office of J.B. Jacks 1000 Second Street NW Albuquerque, NM 87102 (505) 463−1021 Fax: (888) 503−5086 Email: jack.justiceinc@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew Coyte Coyte Law, PC 1000 Second Street, NW Albuquerque, NM 87102 (505) 244−3030 Fax: (505) 244−1406 Email: mcoyte@earthlink.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon L Kennedy Kennedy &Oliver PC 1000 2nd Street NW Albuquerque, NM 87102 505−244−1400 Fax: 505−244−1406 Email: slk@civilrightslawnewmexico.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana

represented by John W Caldwell PO Box 1405 Fairacres, NM 88033 915−566−8688 Fax: 888−665−1285 Email: john@johnwcaldwell.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward Ricco Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin &Robb PO Box 1888

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 2 of 15

Albuquerque, NM 87103−1888 (505) 765−5900 Fax: 768−7395 Email: ericco@rodey.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jocelyn Drennan Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin &Robb PO Box 1888 Albuquerque, NM 87103−1888 (505) 765−5900 Fax: 768−7395 Email: jdrennan@rodey.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
The Dona Ana County Detention Center

represented by John W Caldwell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Edward Ricco (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jocelyn Drennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Christopher Barela

represented by John W Caldwell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Edward Ricco (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jocelyn Drennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Does 1−3

represented by John W Caldwell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Dan Zemek

represented by John W Caldwell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Edward Ricco (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jocelyn Drennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 3 of 15

Date Filed 12/23/2008
12/24/2008 12/24/2008 12/29/2008 12/30/2008 01/09/2009 01/20/2009 02/14/2009 02/22/2009
03/02/2009
03/06/2009 03/18/2009 03/19/2009 03/31/2009 04/01/2009 04/01/2009 04/01/2009 04/01/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT FOR THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS against Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela ( Filing Fee − Online Payment), filed by Stephen Slevin. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/23/2008)
Magistrate Judge Robert Hayes Scott and Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet assigned. (jm) (Entered: 12/24/2008)
2 Letter re: consent to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate Judge (jm) (Entered: 12/24/2008)
3 NOTICE of Refusal to Proceed Before US Magistrate Judge by Stephen Slevin (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/29/2008)
4 MINUTE ORDER reassigning case to Chief U.S. District Judge Martha Vazquez. Magistrate Judge Robert Hayes Scott no longer assigned to case by Clerk of Court. (eh) (Entered: 12/30/2008)
5 Filing fee: $ 350.00, receipt number ALB005974. (mr) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
Summons Issued as to Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela. (nm) (Entered: 01/20/2009)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by John W Caldwell on behalf of Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, John Does (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 02/14/2009)
7 Defendants ANSWER to 1 Complaint, with Jury Demand by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, John Does. Related document: 1 Complaint, filed by Stephen Slevin.(Caldwell, John) (Entered: 02/22/2009)
8 INITIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet Joint Status Report due by 3/24/2009. Scheduling Conference set for 4/1/2009 10:00 AM in Albuquerque − 421 Gold 2nd Floor before Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet. (mdm) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
9 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin of Unavailability (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
10 Joint Status Report AND PROVISIONAL DISCOVERY PLAN by Stephen Slevin (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Shannon L Kennedy on behalf of Stephen Slevin (Kennedy, Shannon) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
13 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet: Scheduling Conference held on 4/1/2009. (mdm) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
14 ORDER ADOPTING JOINT STATUS REPORT by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet (mdm) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
15 SCHEDULING ORDER: by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet Discovery due by 9/28/2009. Motions due by 12/14/2009. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 3/1/2010. (mdm) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, John Does Defendants' Rule 26 Disclosures (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 04/01/2009)

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 4 of 15

04/27/2009 04/27/2009 04/28/2009
05/04/2009
05/15/2009 05/18/2009 05/19/2009 06/07/2009 06/10/2009 06/30/2009 07/01/2009 07/09/2009
08/09/2009
08/09/2009
08/09/2009
08/11/2009 08/12/2009

17 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet Settlement Conference set for 6/3/2009 01:30 PM in Albuquerque − 421 Gold, 2nd Floor before Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet. (mdm) (Entered: 04/27/2009)
18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's Amended Initial Disclosures (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 04/27/2009)
19 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet resetting settlement conference. Settlement Conference now set for 6/10/2009 08:30 AM in Albuquerque − 421 Gold, 2nd Floor before Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet. (mdm) (Entered: 04/28/2009)
20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, John Does Defendants' First Amended Disclosures (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
21 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct the Caption and to Extend the Deadline to Join Additional Parties by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
22 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet granting 21 Motion to Amend/Correct (og) (Entered: 05/18/2009)
23 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Dona Ana Detention Center (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana BOCC First Set of Discovery Requests (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 06/07/2009)
25 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet: Settlement Conference held on 6/10/2009. (mdm) (Entered: 06/11/2009)
26 Unopposed MOTION to Extend (other) THE DEADLINE TO IDENTIFY EXPERT WITNESSES AND TO PROVIDE EXPERT REPORTS by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
27 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet granting 26 ORDER on Motion to Extend (mdm) (Entered: 07/01/2009)
28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's Answers and Responses to Defendant Board of County Commissioners' First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
29 NOTICE by Dan Zemek, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, John Does of Counsel's Unavailability from September 22, 2009 through October 6, 2009 (Caldwell, John) Modified on 8/10/2009 to include detail (kdf). (Entered: 08/09/2009)
30 First Amended ANSWER to 1 Complaint, with Jury Demand by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, Dan Zemek, John Does. Related document: 1 Complaint, filed by Stephen Slevin.(Caldwell, John) (Entered: 08/09/2009)
31 Joint MOTION to Extend (other) Expert Deadlines by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, Dan Zemek, John Does. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 08/09/2009)
32 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet granting 31 ORDER on Motion to Extend (og) (Entered: 08/11/2009)
33 Witness List by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 08/12/2009)

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 5 of 15

09/15/2009
09/17/2009 10/09/2009 10/09/2009 10/16/2009 10/16/2009
10/26/2009 11/05/2009 11/18/2009 12/30/2009 01/21/2010
01/22/2010 01/27/2010 03/30/2010
04/12/2010 04/16/2010
04/16/2010

34 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Defendants' Designation of Experts by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, Dan Zemek, John Does. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
35 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet granting 34 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery: Discovery closes 11/30/09; Defendants' expert disclosures must be made by 10/16/09. (mdm) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
36 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Dona Ana Detention Center (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
37 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's Request for Supplementation of Defendant's Discovery Responses (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
38 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's Second Amended Initial Disclosures (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
39 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, Dan Zemek, John Does Defendants' Expert Report (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
40 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin of Unavailability (11/19/09−11/28/09) (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 10/26/2009)
41 MOTION to Extend (other) DISCOVERY AND PRE−TRIAL DEADLINES by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 11/05/2009)
42 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet granting 41 ORDER on Motion to Extend (og) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's Third Amended Initial Disclosures (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/30/2009)
44 Joint MOTION to Extend (other) Discovery and Pre−Trial Deadlines by Stephen Slevin, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Christopher Barela, Dan Zemek. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/21/2010)
45 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet granting 44 ORDER on Motion to Extend (og) (Entered: 01/22/2010)
46 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Stephen Slevin Plaintiff's 3rd Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Dona Ana Detention Center (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/27/2010)
47 ORDER SETTING TELEPHONE STATUS CONFERENCE by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet. Telephone Status Conference set for 4/8/2010 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet. Counsel shall call the Court's conference line (505) 348−2388 five minutes prior to the scheduled conference time. [THIS IS A TEXT−ONLY ENTRY. THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS ATTACHED.](kjg) (Entered: 03/30/2010)
48 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet: Status Conference held on 4/8/2010. (kjg) (Entered: 04/12/2010)
49 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by May 18, 2010 by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, John Does, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 04/16/2010)
50 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet Granting 49 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Discovery due by 5/18/2010. [THIS IS A TEXT−ONLY ENTRY. THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS ATTACHED.](kjg) (Entered: 04/16/2010)

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 6 of 15

02/24/2011 02/24/2011 02/24/2011 04/05/2011 04/20/2011
06/27/2011
11/23/2011
12/01/2011
12/06/2011
12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/14/2011 12/14/2011 12/16/2011 12/19/2011 12/19/2011 12/21/2011

51 PRETRIAL ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez (mjr) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
52 TRIAL NOTICE : Jury Selection/Trial set for 8/15/2011 at 9:00 AM in Santa Fe − Aspen Courtroom (2nd Floor) before District Judge Martha Vazquez. (mjr) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
Set Hearing: Pretrial Conference set for 7/26/2011 at 1:30 PM in Santa Fe − Aspen Courtroom (2nd Floor) before District Judge Martha Vazquez. (mjr) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
53 MOTION to Reset Pre−Trial Conference by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 04/05/2011)
54 ORDER RESCHEDULING PRE−TRIAL CONFERENCE by District Judge Martha Vazquez GRANTING 53 MOTION to Reset Pre−Trial Conference filed by Stephen Slevin. Pretrial Conference set for 7/12/2011 at 1:30 PM in Santa Fe − Aspen Courtroom (2nd Floor) before District Judge Martha Vazquez. (gr) (Entered: 04/20/2011)
55 AMENDED TRIAL NOTICE − Jury Selection/Trial set for 1/17/2012 at 9:00 AM in Santa Fe − Aspen Courtroom (2nd Floor) before District Judge Martha Vazquez. Pretrial Conference set for 1/3/2012 at 1:30 PM in Santa Fe − Aspen Courtroom (2nd Floor) before District Judge Martha Vazquez. (gr) (Entered: 06/27/2011)
56 AMENDED NOTICE of Hearing: Pretrial Conference reset for 1/5/2012 at 01:30 PM in Santa Fe − Aspen Courtroom (2nd Floor) before District Judge Martha Vazquez. (laz) [THIS IS A TEXT−ONLY ENTRY. THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS ATTACHED.] (Entered: 11/23/2011)
57 Opposed MOTION to Disqualify Judge by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Baker, # 2 Affidavit Roach, # 3 Affidavit Barela)(Caldwell, John) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
58 ORDER Setting Briefing Schedule by District Judge Martha Vazquez − Due to the upcoming trial date in this matter, the briefing schedule on Defendants' Motion to Disqualify [Doc. 57] shall be as follows: Plaintiff's Response, if any, must be filed no later than December 15, 2011; Defendants' Reply, if any, must be filed no later than December 21, 2011. (laz) [THIS IS A TEXT−ONLY ENTRY. THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS ATTACHED.] (Entered: 12/06/2011)
59 MOTION for a Transport Order by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
60 RESPONSE in Opposition re 57 Opposed MOTION to Disqualify Judge filed by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
61 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF DOCUMENT as to document 59 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief by Stephen Slevin (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/14/2011)
62 MOTION for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/14/2011)
63 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin Joint Statement of the Case (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
64 MOTION in Limine TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS AND CONVICTIONS by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
65 Proposed Jury Instructions by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, Stephen Slevin, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
66 REPLY to Response to Motion re 57 Opposed MOTION to Disqualify Judge filed by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, Stephen Slevin, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek.

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 7 of 15

12/21/2011
12/21/2011 12/22/2011 12/27/2011 12/27/2011 12/30/2011 12/30/2011 01/05/2012 01/05/2012 01/06/2012 01/10/2012 01/10/2012 01/10/2012 01/10/2012 01/16/2012 01/17/2012 01/18/2012 01/19/2012 01/19/2012

(Caldwell, John) (Entered: 12/21/2011)
67 NOTICE of Briefing Complete by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek re 57 Opposed MOTION to Disqualify Judge filed by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek, Christopher Barela (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 12/21/2011)
68 ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez denying 57 Motion To Disqualify And Memorandum In Support Thereof. (laz) (Entered: 12/21/2011)
69 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin to Extend Pre−Trial Deadlines (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/22/2011)
70 ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez granting 62 Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum. (mjr) (Entered: 12/27/2011)
71 Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum Issued as to John Oates for 1/18/12 and 1/19/12. (mjr) (Entered: 12/27/2011)
72 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin of Intended Deposition Use at Trial (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
73 Witness List by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, Stephen Slevin, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
74 MINUTE ORDER reassigning Magistrate Judge Stephan M. Vidmar. Magistrate Judge Don J. Svet no longer assigned to case. (ah) (Entered: 01/05/2012)
75 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before District Judge Martha Vazquez: Pretrial Conference held on 1/5/2012. (Court Reporter S. Sperry) (mjr) (Entered: 01/06/2012)
76 STIPULATION by Stephen Slevin (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/06/2012)
77 TRIAL BRIEF by Stephen Slevin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: DACDC Booking Photo of Stephen Slevin, # 2 Exhibit 2: Intake Photo of Stephen Slevin at NM Behavioral Health Institute at Las Vegas)(Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
78 Proposed Voir Dire by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
79 TRIAL BRIEF by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
80 Proposed Voir Dire by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
81 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Coyte on behalf of Stephen Slevin (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/16/2012)
87 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before District Judge Martha Vazquez: Jury Trial begins on 1/17/2012. (Court Reporter S. Sperry) (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
88 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before District Judge Martha Vazquez: Day Two of Jury Trial held on 1/18/2012. (Court Reporter S. Sperry) (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
82 First MOTION in Limine Re Remedial Actions by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 01/19/2012)
89 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before District Judge Martha Vazquez: Day Three of Jury Trial held on 1/19/2012. (Court Reporter S. Sperry) (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 8 of 15

01/20/2012 01/20/2012
01/22/2012
01/22/2012
01/22/2012 01/23/2012
01/24/2012
01/24/2012 01/24/2012 01/24/2012 01/24/2012 01/31/2012
02/12/2012

83 MOTION in Limine by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/20/2012)
90 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before District Judge Martha Vazquez: Day Four of Jury Trial held on 1/20/2012. (Court Reporter S. Sperry) (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
84 NOTICE by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek Filing of Bravo Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Caldwell, John) (Entered: 01/22/2012)
85 Second MOTION to Continue Trial by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 01/22/2012)
86 MOTION for Reconsideration re 83 MOTION in Limine by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/22/2012)
91 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before District Judge Martha Vazquez: Day Five of Jury Trial held on 1/23/2012. (Court Reporter S. Sperry) (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
92 Clerk's Minutes for proceedings held before District Judge Martha Vazquez: Jury Trial completed on 1/24/2012. (Court Reporter S. Sperry) (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
93 Court's Jury Instructions by District Judge Martha Vazquez. (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
94 Jury Notes. (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
96 JURY VERDICT. (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
98 RETURN OF EXHIBITS to counsel. (mjr) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
99 NOTICE− TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM for proceedings from 1/17/12 through 1/24/12; Court Reporter: Susan Sperry; Transcripts are not for an Appeal as indicated on the form. (mjr) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
100 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Proceedings held on 01/18/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.

02/12/2012

Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 2/21/2012. Redaction Request due 3/5/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/14/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/14/2012.(ss) (Entered: 02/12/2012)
101 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Proceedings held on 01/19/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 9 of 15

02/12/2012
02/12/2012
02/15/2012 02/17/2012 02/22/2012

transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 2/21/2012. Redaction Request due 3/5/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/14/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/14/2012.(ss) (Entered: 02/12/2012)
102 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Proceedings held on 01/20/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 2/21/2012. Redaction Request due 3/5/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/14/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/14/2012.(ss) (Entered: 02/12/2012)
103 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial Proceedings held on 01/23/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 2/21/2012. Redaction Request due 3/5/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/14/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/14/2012.(ss) (Entered: 02/12/2012)
104 Unopposed MOTION File Memorandum Opinion by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 02/15/2012)
105 FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants by District Judge Martha Vazquez. (mjr) (Entered: 02/17/2012)
106 NOTICE of Appearance by Jocelyn Drennan on behalf of Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana (Drennan, Jocelyn) (Entered: 02/22/2012)

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 10 of 15

03/01/2012 03/04/2012

107 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin of Unavailability March 12−25, 2012 (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 03/01/2012)
108 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of the Jury Trial (Complete) held on 01/17/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.

03/04/2012

Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 3/12/2012. Redaction Request due 3/26/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/4/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/4/2012.(ss) (Entered: 03/04/2012)
109 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of Jury Trial (Complete) held on 01/18/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.

03/05/2012 03/05/2012

Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 3/12/2012. Redaction Request due 3/26/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/4/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/4/2012.(ss) (Entered: 03/04/2012)
110 NOTICE of Appearance by Shannon L Kennedy on behalf of Stephen Slevin (Kennedy, Shannon) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
111 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of the Jury Trial (Complete) held on 01/19/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.

Case: 1:08-cv-01185-MV-SMV As of: 02/07/2015 12:10 PM MST 11 of 15

03/07/2012 03/07/2012 03/08/2012
03/09/2012
03/10/2012

Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 3/12/2012. Redaction Request due 3/26/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/5/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/4/2012.(ss) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
112 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez denying 57 Opposed MOTION to Disqualify Judge. (mjr) (Entered: 03/07/2012)
113 ORDER denying as moot 104 Defendants' Motion Requesting Court to Issue Its Memorandum Opinion Relating to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify by District Judge Martha Vazquez. (laz) [THIS IS A TEXT−ONLY ENTRY. THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS ATTACHED.] (Entered: 03/07/2012)
114 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings, Closing Arguments, held on 01/23/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 3/15/2012. Redaction Request due 3/29/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/9/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/6/2012.(ss) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
115 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of the Jury Trial (Complete) held on 01/20/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 3/16/2012. Redaction Request due 3/30/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/9/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/7/2012.(ss) (Entered: 03/09/2012)
116 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of Jury Trial (Complete) held on 01/23/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the

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complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 3/19/2012. Redaction Request due 4/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/10/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/8/2012.(ss) (Entered: 03/10/2012)
117 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of the Jury Trial (Complete) held on 01/24/2012, before Judge Martha Vazquez. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Sperry, Telephone number 505−577−4470.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that each party now has seven (7) calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of any personal identifiers from this transcript. If no notice is filed during this seven−day period, the court will assume that redaction of personal data is not necessary and will make the transcript electronically available, as is, to the public after 90 days. For additional guidance, PLEASE REVIEW the complete policy, located in the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Manual at www.nmcourt.fed.us. Transcripts may be purchased from the court reporter and/or viewed (but not copied) at the Clerk's Office public terminal within the 90−day period.
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction set for 3/19/2012. Redaction Request due 4/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/10/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/8/2012.(ss) (Entered: 03/10/2012)
118 NOTICE of Appearance by Alice T Lorenz on behalf of Stephen Slevin (Lorenz, Alice) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
119 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Section 1988 Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses Petition by Stephen Slevin. (Kennedy, Shannon) (Entered: 03/14/2012)
120 First MOTION for New Trial by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 03/16/2012)
121 Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial 120 by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) Modified text on 3/19/2012 (mjr). (Entered: 03/16/2012)
122 Second MOTION to Disqualify Judge Martha Vazquez by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 03/16/2012)
123 ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez granting 119 Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline to File Section 1988 Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses Petition. Counsel are requested, on any future unopposed Motions, to provide a proposed Order, pursuant to Rule 7.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure: "An unopposed Motion must be accompanied by a proposed Order approved by each party, in accordance with the procedure set by the assigned Judge."(laz) [THIS IS A TEXT−ONLY ENTRY. THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS ATTACHED.] (Entered: 03/19/2012)
124 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin re 120 First MOTION for New Trial Notice of Extension of Briefing (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
125 NOTICE by Stephen Slevin re 122 Second MOTION to Disqualify Judge Martha Vazquez Notice of Extension of Briefing (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 03/29/2012)

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05/02/2012
05/02/2012

126 MOTION for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney−Client Relationship Between Plaintiff's Counsel and Witness John Oates by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Ricco, Edward) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
127 "FILED IN ERROR" RESPONSE in Opposition re 126 MOTION for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney−Client Relationship Between Plaintiff's Counsel and Witness John Oates Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative, Remittitur filed by Stephen Slevin. (Lorenz, Alice) Modified text on 4/11/2012, pursuant to phone call received on the CM/ECF held desk (eh). (Entered: 04/06/2012)
128 RESPONSE to Motion re 120 First MOTION for New Trial or in the Alternative, Remittitur filed by Stephen Slevin. (Lorenz, Alice) (Entered: 04/06/2012)
129 RESPONSE in Opposition re 122 Second MOTION to Disqualify Judge Martha Vazquez filed by Stephen Slevin. (Jacks, Jack) (Entered: 04/06/2012)
130 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Section 1988 Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses Petition by Stephen Slevin. (Kennedy, Shannon) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
131 ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez granting 130 Motion for Extension of Time to File Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses. (mjr) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
132 RESPONSE in Opposition re 126 MOTION for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney−Client Relationship Between Plaintiff's Counsel and Witness John Oates filed by Stephen Slevin. (Lorenz, Alice) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
133 AFFIDAVIT re 132 Response in Opposition to Motion Affidavit of Matthew Coyte by Stephen Slevin (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: Deposition of John Oates, # 2 Exhibit 2: 2/17/11 ABQ Journal Article, # 3 Exhibit 3: 2/19/11 ABQ Journal Editorial, # 4 Exhibit 4: 2/19/11 AP Article)(Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
134 REPLY to Response to Motion re 120 First MOTION for New Trial filed by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
135 REPLY to Response to Motion re 122 Second MOTION to Disqualify Judge Martha Vazquez filed by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
136 NOTICE of Briefing Complete by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek re 120 First MOTION for New Trial filed by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek, Christopher Barela (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
137 NOTICE of Briefing Complete by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek re 122 Second MOTION to Disqualify Judge Martha Vazquez filed by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek, Christopher Barela (Caldwell, John) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
138 REPLY to Response to Motion re 126 MOTION for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney−Client Relationship Between Plaintiff's Counsel and Witness John Oates filed by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Ricco, Edward) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
139 NOTICE of Briefing Complete by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek re 126 MOTION for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of

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12/14/2012 01/08/2013
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Attorney−Client Relationship Between Plaintiff's Counsel and Witness John Oates filed by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek, Christopher Barela (Ricco, Edward) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
140 ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez denying 120 Motion for New Trial on Damages, Or, In the Alternative, Remittitur. (laz) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
141 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez DENYING 126 MOTION for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney−Client Relationship Between Plaintiff's Counsel and Witness John Oates. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Motion for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney−Client Relationship Between Plaintiffs Counsel and Witness John Oates 126 , is DENIED. (gr) (Entered: 01/08/2013)
142 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 105 Judgment by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, John Does, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Filing Fee − Online Payment) (Ricco, Edward) (Entered: 01/11/2013)
Filing Fee Received: $ 455 receipt number 1084−2864814 re 142 Notice of Appeal filed by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek, Christopher Barela, John Does (Payment made via Pay.gov)(Ricco, Edward) (Entered: 01/11/2013)
143 Transmission of Preliminary Record to US Court of Appeals re 142 Notice of Appeal. (gr) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
144 USCA Information Letter with Case Number 13−2010 for 142 Notice of Appeal filed by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek, Christopher Barela, John Does. (gr) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
145 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez DENYING 122 Second MOTION to Disqualify Judge Martha Vazquez. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Renewed and Supplemented Recusal Motion 122 is DENIED. (gr) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
146 AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 105 Judgment by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, John Does, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek. (Ricco, Edward) (Entered: 01/15/2013)
147 MOTION for a Declaration that the Board of Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana must post a Spersedeas Bond in Order to Obtain a Stay on Appeal by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
148 MEMORANDUM in Support re 147 MOTION for a Declaration that the Board of Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana must post a Spersedeas Bond in Order to Obtain a Stay on Appeal filed by Stephen Slevin. (Coyte, Matthew) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
149 Transmission of Preliminary Record to US Court of Appeals re 146 Amended Notice of Appeal. (gr) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
150 NOTICE by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, John Does, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek of Extension of Briefing Deadline (Drennan, Jocelyn) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
151 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek for the 142 Notice of Appeal (Ricco, Edward) (Entered: 01/28/2013)
152 BRIEFING SCHEDULE to USCA for brief by Appellant(s) re 146 Amended Notice of Appeal. Please be advised that the transcript which was ordered by the appellant in the above referenced case is now on file with the US District Court for the District of New Mexico. The appeal record is now complete. Appellants brief is

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due to be filed with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals forty (40) days from the date of this letter.(gr) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
153 ***FILED IN ERROR*** Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Section 1988 Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses Petition Until April 15, 2013 by Stephen Slevin. (Kennedy, Joseph) Modified to add error text on 2/5/2013, to be refiled by atty S. Kennedy. (gr). (Entered: 02/04/2013)
154 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Section 1988 Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses Petition until April 15, 2013 by Stephen Slevin. (Kennedy, Shannon) (Entered: 02/05/2013)
155 NOTICE by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, John Does, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek of Extension of Briefing Deadline (Drennan, Jocelyn) (Entered: 02/14/2013)
156 ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez GRANTING 154 Motion for Extension of Time to File. IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs is granted leave to file Section 1988 Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Expenses Petition until April 15, 2013.(gr) (Entered: 02/20/2013)
157 RESPONSE in Opposition re 147 MOTION for a Declaration that the Board of Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana must post a Spersedeas Bond in Order to Obtain a Stay on Appeal filed by Christopher Barela, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, Dan Zemek. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Padilla)(Caldwell, John) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
158 MANDATE of USCA as to 146 Amended Notice of Appeal filed by Board of County Commissioners for the County of Dona Ana, The Dona Ana County Detention Center, Dan Zemek, Christopher Barela, and John Does. In accordance with 10th Cir. R. 33.1 and upon consideration of the stipulation of the parties to voluntarily dismiss the captioned appeal, this appeal is dismissed. See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). Each party will bear its own costs on appeal. (Attachments: # 1 Order)(gr) (Entered: 03/12/2013)
159 MOTION to Withdraw Motion For a Declaration that the Board is Required to Post Supersedeas Bond by Stephen Slevin. (Lorenz, Alice) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
160 ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez granting 159 Motion to Withdraw Motion; and withdrawing 147 Motion for a Declaration.(laz) [THIS IS A TEXT−ONLY ENTRY. THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS ATTACHED.] (Entered: 03/28/2013)