U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW

McCadden et al v. Flint et al Assigned to: District Judge Denise Page Hood Referred to: Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen
Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti (Settlement) Cause: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

Date Filed: 07/31/2018 Date Terminated: 09/29/2020 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 446 Civil Rights: Americans with Disabilities - Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Cameron McCadden

represented by Claudia Center American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415-343-0762 Fax: 415-395-0950 Email: ccenter@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan R. Marko Marko Law 1300 Broadway Suite 500 Detroit, MI 48236 313-777-7529 Fax: 313-771-5785 Email: jon@markolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Mizner American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415-343-0781 Email: smizner@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark P. Fancher American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan

Plaintiff Chrystal McCadden
V. Defendant Flint, City of

2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313-578-6800 Fax: 313-578-6811 Email: mfancher@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Claudia Center (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan R. Marko (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Mizner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark P. Fancher (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Reed E. Eriksson City of Flint Legal Department 1101 S. Saginaw St. 3rd Floor Flint, MI 48502 810-237-2078 Email: reriksson@cityofflint.com TERMINATED: 04/17/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Young Kim City of Flint 1101 S. Saginaw Street Third Floor Flint, MI 48502 810-766-7146 Fax: 810-232-2114

Defendant Timothy Johnson TERMINATED: 05/20/2019 Defendant Terrance Walker
Defendant Flint Chamber of Commerce

Email: wkim@cityofflint.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by William Young Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael W. Edmunds Gault Davison, PC 8305 S. Saginaw St. suite 8 Grand Blanc, MI 48439 (810) 234-3633 Fax: (810) 579-0680 Email: MEdmunds@EdmundsLawOffice.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joseph A. Starr Starr, Butler, Alexopoulos, & Stoner, PLLC 20700 Civic Center Drive Suite 290 Southfield, MI 48076 248-864-4934 Email: jstarr@starrbutler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy K. Chinonis Cline, Cline & Griffin P.C. 503 S. Saginaw Street Flint, MI 48502 810-232-3141 Fax: 810-232-1079 Email: nchinonis@ccglawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan J. Koss Starr, Butler, Alexopoulos & Stoner, PLLC 20700 Civic Center Drive Suite 290

Defendant Genesee Chamber of Commerce

Southfield, MI 48076 248-554-2700 Email: rkoss@starrbutler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joseph A. Starr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy K. Chinonis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan J. Koss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/31/2018
07/31/2018 07/31/2018 07/31/2018 08/10/2018 08/29/2018 09/05/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants with Jury Demand. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 0645-6839731 - Fee: $ 400. County of 1st Plaintiff: Genesee - County Where Action Arose: Genesee - County of 1st Defendant: Genesee. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Fancher, Mark) (Entered: 07/31/2018)
2 SUMMONS Issued for * All Defendants * (EKar) (Entered: 07/31/2018)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Susan Mizner on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Mizner, Susan) (Entered: 07/31/2018)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Claudia Center on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Center, Claudia) (Entered: 07/31/2018)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Jonathan R. Marko on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Marko, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/10/2018)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Nancy K. Chinonis on behalf of Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce. (Chinonis, Nancy) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by William Young Kim on behalf of Flint, City of, Timothy Johnson. (Kim, William) (Entered: 09/05/2018)

09/10/2018 09/11/2018 09/11/2018 09/14/2018
09/19/2018
09/26/2018 10/09/2018
10/09/2018 10/10/2018 10/10/2018 10/11/2018 10/11/2018

8 STIPULATION To Extend Response Deadline by Flint, City of, Timothy Johnson (Kim, William) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph A. Starr on behalf of Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce. (Starr, Joseph) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Ryan J. Koss on behalf of Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce. (Koss, Ryan) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
11 ORDER Extending Response Deadline re 1 Complaint, ( Response due by 10/9/2018) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) Modified on 9/14/2018 (LSau). (Entered: 09/14/2018)
12 STIPULATED ORDER Extending Time to Answer or Otherwise
Respond to Complaint 1 Complaint, ( Response due by 10/10/2018) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/19/2018)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael W. Edmunds on behalf of Terrance Walker. (Edmunds, Michael) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
14 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses and Limited Reliance Upon and Objection to Jury Demand by Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce. (Koss, Ryan) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
15 MOTION to Dismiss by Flint, City of, Timothy Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Kim, William) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
16 RESPONSE to 15 MOTION to Dismiss (Concurrence) filed by Terrance Walker. (Edmunds, Michael) (Entered: 10/10/2018)
17 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses and Reliance Upon Jury Demand by Terrance Walker. (Edmunds, Michael) (Entered: 10/10/2018)
18 STATEMENT of DISCLOSURE of CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS and FINANCIAL INTEREST by Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce (Koss, Ryan) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
19 NOTICE OF HEARING on 15 MOTION to Dismiss . Motion Hearing set for 11/28/2018 03:45 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 10/11/2018)

10/29/2018 11/05/2018 11/06/2018
11/19/2018 11/28/2018
12/03/2018 04/12/2019

20 RESPONSE to 15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Fancher, Mark) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
21 STIPULATION re 15 MOTION to Dismiss by Flint, City of, Timothy Johnson (Kim, William) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
22 ORDER Extending Time for Defendant City of Flint and Chief Timothy Johnson to File Reply Brief, Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings as to 15 MOTION to Dismiss :( Reply due by 11/19/2018) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
23 REPLY to Response re 15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Flint, City of, Timothy Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B) (Kim, William) (Entered: 11/19/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Motion Hearing held on 11/28/2018 re 15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Flint, City of, Timothy Johnson Disposition: Motion taken under advisement (Court Reporter: Darlene May) (LSau) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
24 SUR-REPLY re 15 MOTION to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Center, Claudia) (Entered: 12/03/2018)
25 ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part City Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 15 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 04/12/2019)

04/12/2019
04/24/2019 05/17/2019 05/20/2019 05/21/2019

26 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 5/20/2019 10:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
27 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by Flint, City of. (Kim, William) (Entered: 04/24/2019)
28 NOTICE of Appearance by Reed E. Eriksson on behalf of Flint, City of. (Eriksson, Reed) (Entered: 05/17/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Scheduling Conference held on 5/20/2019 (LSau) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
29 SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 12/20/2019 Dispositive Motion Cut-off set for 1/21/2020 Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/20/2020 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Jury Trial set for 5/19/2020 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (Refer to image for additional dates) (LSau) (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019
06/04/2019 07/22/2019
08/02/2019
08/02/2019 08/05/2019 08/19/2019 08/21/2019 08/23/2019 10/21/2019 10/21/2019 10/21/2019 10/21/2019

30 ORDER REFERRING OTHER MATTERS to Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti : Settlement Conference to be conducted during the month of July - August 2019. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 05/21/2019)
31 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Settlement Conference set for 8/21/2019 01:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti (MWil) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
32 AMENDED COMPLAINT with Jury Demand filed by All Plaintiffs against Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce, Flint, City of, Terrance Walker. NO NEW PARTIES ADDED. (Fancher, Mark) (Entered: 07/22/2019)
33 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses and Limited Reliance Upon and Objection to Jury Demand by Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce. (Koss, Ryan) (Entered: 08/02/2019)
34 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION for All Plaintiffs : Jonathan R. Marko added. (Marko, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/02/2019)
35 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by Flint, City of. (Kim, William) (Entered: 08/05/2019)
36 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses and Reliance on Jury Demand by Terrance Walker. (Edmunds, Michael) (Entered: 08/19/2019)
TEXT-ONLY NOTICE: Settlement Conference on 8/21/2019 is Cancelled re 31 Notice to Appear. New Date TBD. (MWil) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
37 RE-NOTICE TO APPEAR: Settlement Conference RESET TO 11/15/2019 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti**BY PARTIES' REQUEST** (MWil) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
38 Initial WITNESS LIST by Flint Chamber of Commerce, Genesee Chamber of Commerce (Koss, Ryan) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
39 WITNESS LIST by Terrance Walker (Edmunds, Michael) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
40 WITNESS LIST by Flint, City of (Kim, William) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
41 Initial WITNESS LIST by All Plaintiffs (Center, Claudia) (Entered: 10/21/2019)

11/15/2019 11/15/2019
12/11/2019 12/23/2019
01/07/2020 02/11/2020 02/21/2020

TEXT-ONLY NOTICE: Attorney Susan Mizner may participate by phone from California re: 37 Notice to Appear (settlement conference).-Signed by Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti. (MWil) (Entered: 11/15/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Settlement Conference held on 11/15/2019, Set Deadlines/Hearings:( Telephonic Status Conference set for 12/23/2019 01:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti) Disposition: Settlement Conference held and continued.**Conference call instructions to be sent one week before conference call** (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil). (Entered: 11/18/2019)
42 STIPULATION AND ORDER Amending Scheduling Order, ( Discovery due by 3/27/2020, Dispositive Motion Cut-off set for 4/30/2020, Final Pretrial Conference set for 8/3/2020 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood, Jury Trial set for 9/8/2020 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 12/11/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Telephonic Continuation of Settlement Conference held on 12/23/2019, Set Deadlines/Hearings:( Settlement Conference CONTINUED to 1/7/2020 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti). Disposition: Settlement conference held by phone with all counsel and continued to January 7, 2020 at 11 a.m., at which time only counsel for Plaintiff and the City of Flint will be required to participate. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil) (Entered: 12/23/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Telephonic Settlement Conference held on 1/7/2020, Set Deadlines/Hearings:( Telephonic Continuation of Settlement Conference set for 2/13/2020 01:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti) Disposition: Held and Continued. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil) (Entered: 01/07/2020)
43 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Telephonic Continuation of Settlement Conference set for 2/21/2020 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti **Date reset at parties' request** (MWil) (Entered: 02/11/2020)
Text-Only Order of reassignment from Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub to Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen pursuant to Administrative Order 19-ao-024. (SSch) (Entered: 02/21/2020)

02/21/2020 03/12/2020 04/13/2020 04/15/2020
04/17/2020 05/11/2020 05/28/2020 06/11/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Telephonic Continuation of Settlement Conference held on 2/21/2020, ( CONTINUATION of Telephonic Settlement Conference set for 4/15/2020 11:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti) Disposition: Held and Continued. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil) (Entered: 02/24/2020)
44 STIPULATION AND ORDER Amending Scheduling Order, ( Discovery due by 6/26/2020, Dispositive Motion Cut-off set for 7/30/2020, Final Pretrial Conference set for 11/9/2020 02:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood, Jury Trial set for 12/8/2020 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 03/12/2020)
45 MOTION for Withdrawal of Attorney Reed E. Eriksson by Flint, City of. (Eriksson, Reed) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Telephonic Settlement Conference held on 4/15/2020, ( CONTINUATION of Telephonic Settlement Conference set for 5/11/2020 03:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti) Disposition: Settlement Confernece held and continued. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil) (Entered: 04/15/2020)
46 ORDER Granting Motion for Withdrawal of Attorney Reed E. Eriksson as Attorney for Defendant City of Flint 45 .Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 04/17/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Telephonic Settlement Conference held on 5/11/2020, ( Telephonic Continuation of Settlement Conference set for 6/11/2020 01:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti) Disposition: Held and Continued. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil) Modified on 5/12/2020 (MWil). (Entered: 05/11/2020)
47 STIPULATION and ORDER to Amend Scheduling Order, ( Discovery due by 8/28/2020, Dispositive Motion Cut-off set for 9/30/2020, Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/11/2021 03:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood, Jury Trial set for 2/16/2021 09:00 AM before District Judge Denise Page Hood) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Telephonic Settlement Conference held on 6/11/2020, ( TELEPHONIC Status Conference set for 7/10/2020 12:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti) Disposition: Settlement conference held. The

06/12/2020 06/29/2020 07/10/2020 07/10/2020
07/27/2020 07/30/2020 07/30/2020

dispute between Plaintiff and the Defendant Flint Chamber of Commerce has been substantially resolved, and those parties are ironing out the final details of their resolution. The attorneys for the remaining parties shall appear for a telephonic status conference with me on July 10, 2020 at 12 p.m., although attendance by Defendant Terrance Walkers counsel is optional. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil) (Entered: 06/11/2020)
48 MOTION Approve Settlement by All Plaintiffs. (Marko, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/12/2020)
49 NOTICE OF HEARING on 48 MOTION Approve Settlement . Motion Hearing set for 8/12/2020 04:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood (LSau) (Entered: 06/29/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti: Telephonic Status Conference held on 7/10/2020. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (MWil) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
TEXT-ONLY ORDER: Plaintiff, her counsel, Defendant City of Flint (specifically including its Chief of Police) and its counsel are ORDERED to hold a video conference of at least two hours duration on or before July 24, 2020 and to submit a joint, off the record settlement status report to the Undersigned's case manager by July 28, 2020. The Court has scheduled a final conference call with Judge Patti for July 30, 2020 at 11:30 a.m., which will be held or cancelled after the Court reviews the joint report. Entered by Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti. (MWil). (Entered: 07/10/2020)
TEXT-ONLY NOTICE: Conference on 07/30/220 is Cancelled. Case has been conditionally resolved in its entirety. Propose Stipulated order of Dismissal with prejudice to be submitted by 08/31/2020. (MWil) (Entered: 07/27/2020)
TEXT-ONLY NOTICE: Motion Hearing on August 12, 2020 is Cancelled re 49 Notice of Hearing on Motion. (LSau) (Entered: 07/30/2020)
50 NOTICE OF HEARING BY VIDEO CONFERENCE on 48 MOTION Approve Settlement . Motion Hearing set for 8/12/2020 04:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood |Zoom Webinar Information: https://zoom.us/j/96576089082?pwd=R0RMVjN5MU90VXJJbFJkZUd LZkY3dz09 Passcode: 320493 Or iPhone one-tap : US: +13017158592,,96576089082#,,,,,,0#,,320493# or +13126266799,,96576089082#,,,,,,0#,,320493#| (LSau) (Entered: 07/30/2020)

08/04/2020 08/12/2020
08/13/2020 08/14/2020 08/31/2020 09/09/2020 09/29/2020

51 RESPONSE to 48 MOTION Approve Settlement filed by Terrance Walker. (Edmunds, Michael) (Entered: 08/04/2020)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Denise Page Hood: Motion Hearing held on 8/12/2020 re 48 MOTION Approve Settlement filed by Chrystal McCadden, Cameron McCadden Disposition: Motion granted (Court Reporter: Sheri Ward) (LSau) (Entered: 08/12/2020)
52 NOTICE by Flint, City of of Resolution Approving Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Flint City Council Resolution 200339) (Kim, William) (Entered: 08/13/2020)
53 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT by All Plaintiffs (Marko, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/14/2020)
54 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re Text-Only Notice of Hearing Cancelled (Fancher, Mark) (Entered: 08/31/2020)
55 ORDER Granting Motion to Approve Settlement 48 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/09/2020)
56 STIPULATED ORDER of Dismissal. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau) (Entered: 09/29/2020)

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 Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-MKM ECF No. 1 filed 07/31/18 PageID.1 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAMERON MCCADDEN, a minor, by his next friend, CHRYSTAL MCCADDEN,
Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF FLINT; TIMOTHY JOHNSON, Chief of Police, City of Flint, in his official capacity; TERRANCE WALKER, in his individual capacity, and FLINT & GENESEE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, a Michigan non-profit corporation,

Hon. Case No.
COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants. /

Jonathan R. Marko (P72450) MARKO LAW, PLC 645 Griswold Street, Suite 4100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 965-5555/Fax (313) 965-5556 jon@ernstmarkolaw.com
John Mark Finnegan (P68050) Heberle & Finnegan 2580 Craig Road Ann Arbor, MI 48130 (734) 302-3233 jmarkfinnegan@comcast.net

Mark P. Fancher (P56223) Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6822 mfancher@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
Susan Mizner* Claudia Center* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 343-0762 center@aclu.org smizner@aclu.org

*Applications for admission forthcoming

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-MKM ECF No. 1 filed 07/31/18 PageID.2 Page 2 of 20
INTRODUCTION 1. This is an action for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy Defendants’ violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”). 2. Plaintiff Cameron McCadden is a ten-year-old African American boy with a disability who was handcuffed for nearly one hour by Defendant Terrance Walker, a Flint Police Department school resource officer, on October 12, 2015 when he was seven years old and while participating in a YouthQuest program administered by Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce. 3. Defendant Flint Police Department (“Flint PD”) has acknowledged that Officer Walker handcuffed Cameron. 4. The use of handcuffs on children with disabilities is contrary to guidance on the use of restraint against children with disabilities. 5. At no time did Cameron pose an imminent danger of physical harm to himself or anyone else that would have justified Officer Walker’s prolonged handcuffing of him. 6. As a result of being subjected to unwarranted and prolonged handcuffing, Cameron has suffered fear, anxiety, emotional trauma, and an exacerbation of his disability. 7. The Flint PD has the responsibility for establishing and implementing policies, practices, supervision and training to ensure that school resource officers such as Officer Walker respect the rights of children with disabilities, particularly when using force and restraint against such children. 8. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) published the results of a nationwide study documenting hundreds of alleged uses of restraint in schools
2

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between 1990 and 2009, including 20 restraints that resulted in the death of a child.1 Nearly all of the incidents investigated by the GAO involved children with disabilities. That same year, in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Education and Labor Committee, the GAO presented these findings and reported on the risks of injury and death associated with the restraint of children. The GAO explained that even in situations where a child does not sustain any physical injury as a result of restraint, he is often severely traumatized.2
9. A recent analysis of 2011-12 data by the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights revealed that although students with disabilities account for only 12% of public school students, they comprise 75% of students subjected to physical restraint in schools.3 That same analysis also revealed that while African American students represent only 19% of students with disabilities, they account for 36% of these students who are subjected to mechanical restraint such as handcuffs.4
10. The restraint of children with disabilities has generated significant interest among the public and policymakers in Michigan, particularly given the size of the state’s population of children with disabilities. According to the Michigan Department of Education’s Center for Educational Performance and EvInformation12.77 percent of students attending public schools in Michigan have disabilities. In Flint, where Cameron was handcuffed, about 20 percent of students attending Flint Community Schools (“FCS”) have identified disabilities.
1 Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S. Government Accountability Office, to Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives 8 (May 2009), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09719t.pdf. 2 Id. at 1. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 1: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, RESTRAINT, & SECLUSION HIGHLIGHTS 9 (Mar. 2014). 4 Id. at 10.
3

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11. Recognizing the need to promote the safety and dignity of all students, Michigan’s State Board of Education released its Standards for the Emergency Use of Seclusion and Restraint in 2006. These standards prohibit the use of mechanical restraint “under all circumstances, including emergency situations.”5 Furthermore, even permissible forms of physical restraint “should not be used any longer than necessary to allow students to regain control of their behavior; and generally no longer than ten minutes.”6 Any use of emergency restraint “shall be . . . documented in a written report . . . and given to the parent or guardian within 24 hours.”7
12. In 2014 and 2015, Michigan Lieutenant Governor Brian Calley held nine town halls across the state and posted an online survey to solicit input from parents, educators, and advocates about challenges facing students with disabilities in Michigan. One of the Lieutenant Governor’s key conclusions following these sessions was a call to end the use of restraint in schools in all but specific emergency situations. The Lieutenant Governor called restraint “inhumane and barbaric” and warned that it “results in increasingly dangerous situations for children and staff.”8
13. In 2014, the Flint PD received a Community Oriented Policing Services grant of $1.1M from the U.S. Department of Justice to place six school resource officers (“SRO’s”) inside FCS through 2018. This would add to the six SRO’s already in FCS’s 15 schools. Speaking at the time, then-Flint Police Chief James Tolbert said the new SRO’s would be drawn
5 MICHIGAN DEP’T OF EDUCATION, SUPPORTING STUDENT BEHAVIOR: STANDARDS FOR THE EMERGENCY USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 2, 18 (Dec. 2006). 6 Id. at 15. 7 Id. at 15-16. 8 LT. GOV. BRIAN CALLEY, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE MICHIGAN BOARD OF EDUCATION (Sept. 8, 2015).
4

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from veteran Flint police officers so that the city would not have to wait for new hires and because current officers would be more experienced.9
14. Despite doubling the number of officers in schools, Defendant Flint PD has not designed or implemented adequate policies, practices, procedures, or training regarding the use of mechanical restraints, handcuffs, and other modes of force on young schoolchildren, including children with disabilities such as Cameron.
15. Similarly, despite knowing of Cameron’s disabilities, Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce failed to ensure disability nondiscrimination and to provide simple reasonable modifications in its YouthQuest program, and instead called for a police officer to respond to non-threatening disability behaviors.
16. Cameron seeks permanent injunctive relief that would prohibit Defendants from authorizing or using unnecessary, excessive, and prolonged restraint and handcuffing on schoolchildren, including those with disabilities, and to compel Defendant Flint PD to establish and implement, or to revise its policies, procedures, practice, and trainings to respect the rights of children with disabilities. Cameron also seeks declaratory relief establishing that Defendants have violated his Constitutional and civil rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the PWDCRA. Finally, Cameron seeks damages for the trauma he suffered as a result of Defendants’ unconstitutional and illegal conduct, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing this action.
9 Dominic Adams, Flint police to add 6 school resource officers thanks to $1.1 million Department of Justice grant,” MLive, (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/01/flint_police_to_add_6_school_r.html
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 17. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims raised this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim under the PWDCRA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 18. Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C § 12132 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. Plaintiff also seeks reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205. 19. This Court has jurisdiction to issue declaratory, injunctive, and other relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 20. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to this action occurred in the City of Flint, Genesee County, Michigan.
PARTIES
21. Plaintiff CAMERON MCCADDEN was seven years old and weighed 55 pounds when he was handcuffed by Defendant Officer Walker on October 12, 2015. At all relevant times, Cameron was a participant in the YouthQuest Afterschool Program operating within FCS, where he was a student. Cameron has a disability—attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”)—and is thus a person with a disability under Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the PWDCRA. Cameron brings this action through his mother and next friend, Chrystal McCadden.
22. Defendant CITY OF FLINT is a municipal corporation in Genesee County, Michigan, subject to the laws and Constitution of the United States. Defendant CITY OF FLINT
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operates, manages, and controls the Flint Police Department. Defendant CITY OF FLINT is a public entity under Title II and a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance for purposes of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It is also a “person” under the PWDCRA.
23. Defendant TIMOTHY JOHNSON is the Chief of Police for the City of Flint, and the official responsible for actions and inactions complained of herein, including policies, practices, customs, and training. Chief Johnson is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the PWDCRA. At all times relevant to this complaint, Chief Johnson and his predecessors were acting under color of state law. Chief Johnson is sued in his official capacity.
24. Defendant TERRANCE WALKER is an officer with the Flint Police Department. Officer Walker is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the PWDCRA, and an agent of the City of Flint and the Flint Police Department for the purposes of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. At all times relevant to this complaint, Officer Walker was acting under color of state law. He is sued in his individual capacity.
25. Defendant FLINT & GENESEE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, a nonprofit corporation, operated YouthQuest, which is a public accommodation for purposes of Title III of the ADA.
FACTS 26. In October 2015, Cameron was seven years old and enrolled in the second grade at Brownell K-2 STEM Academy. He stood just shy of four feet tall and weighed approximately 55 pounds. 27. As documented in his school records, Cameron is a friendly, likeable student in school who enjoys helping his peers and teachers. 28. Cameron was first diagnosed with ADHD in 2012. Cameron’s ADHD makes it difficult for him to focus, maintain attention, control his behavior, follow directions, and stay
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seated. It also substantially limits him in major life activities, including learning, concentrating, and neurological/brain functions.
29. In November 2012, FCS developed an individualized education plan (“IEP”) for Cameron to provide for special education and related services to address his disability-related behaviors. The team considered positive behavioral interventions and supports to assist Cameron with managing his disability. Cameron has received some behavioral supports at school.
30. In September 2015, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha revealed in a press conference at Hurley Medical Center that children’s lead levels had doubled in Flint since April of 2014, and urged residents, particularly children, to stop drinking the water. After Dr. Hanna-Attisha released her study, the City of Flint issued a lead health advisory, and the Genesee County Health Department urged residents to stop drinking Flint tap water. On October 1, 2015, the Genesee County Board of Commissioners declared a public health emergency. Articles published in Michigan newspapers in late September 2015 detailed how, even at low levels, lead causes behavioral problems and learning disabilities in children.
31. Cameron has attended the YouthQuest Afterschool Program, which is held at Brownell STEM Academy, since September 2014.
32. Upon enrolling Cameron in YouthQuest, Cameron’s mother informed program staff—including YouthQuest’s Site Team Leader for Brownell, Ashley Liddell-Ruffin—of Cameron’s ADHD diagnosis, his IEP, his medication, and his disability-related behavioral challenges.
33. Over the course of the 13 months in which Cameron participated in Youth Quest, Ms. McCadden and Ms. Liddell-Ruffin had several conversations concerning Cameron’s ADHD
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and strategies for assisting him with managing his disability-related behavior. 34. Sometime between 2:49 PM and 4:42 PM on October 12, 2015, Cameron
experienced disability-related behavioral challenges—which manifested in him kicking a supply cart in the lobby of the Brownell STEM Academy—while participating in YouthQuest activities.
35. Following Cameron’s disability-related behavior, Ms. Liddell-Ruffin radioed for an SRO.
36. At approximately 4:42 PM, Ms. Liddell-Ruffin called Cameron’s mother. She told Ms. McCadden that Cameron was running around on the bleachers. This behavior was consistent with Cameron’s disability.
37. Ms. McCadden told Ms. Liddell-Ruffin she would pick Cameron up immediately. 38. Before hanging up, Ms. Liddell-Ruffin told Ms. McCadden that Cameron had been handcuffed. Ms. McCadden assumed she was referring to a costumed event for Halloween. 39. When Ms. McCadden arrived at the school less than 10 minutes later, she met Officer Walker outside the school. Officer Walker was wearing his SRO uniform from Academy West, an alternative high school located in Flint. 40. Ms. McCadden had not seen Officer Walker at YouthQuest in the past. He was not one of the three police officers to whom YouthQuest parents were introduced at an orientation in 2013. 41. Officer Walker confirmed for Ms. McCadden that her son was in handcuffs. 42. Moments later, Ms. McCadden reached the lobby of the school and saw Cameron with his hands handcuffed behind his back. She was shocked and horrified. 43. She immediately asked Officer Walker to remove the handcuffs. 44. Officer Walker responded that the key was in a lockbox and he was waiting for a
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police cruiser to bring it to the school. 45. By this point, school and YouthQuest staff began to congregate around the scene
in the lobby. Brownell and YouthQuest parents were also passing by, creating a humiliating scene for Cameron, his sister, and his mother.
46. A Flint PD cruiser arrived at the school with the handcuffs key at approximately 5:36 PM, meaning that Cameron was handcuffed behind his back for approximately one hour.
47. Cameron was never taken into custody, or arrested or charged with any crime. 48. Cameron’s mother has never been informed that Cameron violated any rule of the YouthQuest program. She never received any explanation of why her seven-year-old son was handcuffed. 49. Cameron experienced significant emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma during and after the October 12 handcuffing. He continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers. 50. Cameron has not returned to YouthQuest since the handcuffing. Cameron and his mother are deterred from participating in the YouthQuest program because of Cameron’s experiences.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I – UNREASONABLE SEIZURE AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against Chief Johnson and Officer Walker)
51. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 52. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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53. The actions of the Defendants were taken under color of state law. 54. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protected Cameron from unreasonable seizure and excessive force. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution extends the Fourth Amendment’s protections to the states. 55. Whether a seizure is unreasonable and thus unconstitutional depends on the totality of the circumstances. 56. Officer Walker’s seizure of Cameron was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional in light of the totality of the following circumstances, including but not limited to:
a. that Cameron had not and was not engaging in criminal activity; b. that Cameron posed no physical threat to anyone; c. that Cameron was not attempting to flee the school grounds; d. Cameron’s age, size, and disability; e. the failure of the officer to appropriately interact with a child of Cameron’s
age, size, and disability; f. the lack of any necessity for the handcuffing; g. that the handcuffing violated the Michigan Board of Education’s Standards
for the Emergency Use of Seclusion and Restraint; h. the prolonged period of time – about one hour – during which Cameron was
handcuffed; and i. the trauma imposed by the extended handcuffing. 57. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, Officer Walker, acting under color of law and with deliberate indifference, violated Cameron’s right under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force.
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58. Cameron’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force as described herein was clearly established at the time Officer Walker handcuffed him.
59. Officer Walker acted intentionally, maliciously, and in reckless disregard of Cameron’s rights. Further, Officer Walker was plainly incompetent in failing to maintain the handcuffs key on his person.
60. As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers.
61. Cameron is entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT II – MONELL LIABILITY IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Against the City of Flint)
62. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 63. Defendants were state actors acting under color of law. 64. Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 65. Plaintiff has been subjected to a deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights and privileges secured by the United States Constitution as set forth herein. 66. The deprivations were caused by the series of deliberately indifferent policies, customs, and established practices, including inadequate training, by the City of Flint, acting under the color of its statutory and legal authority, including but not limited to:
a. Directing and/or ratifying humiliating, outrageous, discriminatory, and belittling actions toward children, including children with disabilities;
b. Maintaining and implementing a custom, policy, and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children including 12

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children with disabilities; c. Failing to train and supervise adequately its officers including SROs, despite the
foreseeable consequences of such failure, on appropriately interacting with children, including children with disabilities, and on the likelihood that officers and SROs in particular will interact with children with disabilities; d. Failing to train and supervise adequately its officers including SROs, despite the foreseeable consequences of such failure, on proper procedures and preparation regarding handcuffing and handcuffing safety; and e. Failing and refusing to discipline its officers for engaging in humiliating, outrageous, discriminatory, and belittling actions. 67. These directions, ratifications, customs, policies, practices, and/or failures to train and supervise were a moving force in the constitutional violations inflicted by the individual Defendants upon the Plaintiff. 68. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts of the Defendants as alleged herein, Plaintiff has sustained a violation of his rights under the law and, as a result, is entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT III – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Against the City of Flint)
69. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 70. Title II of the ADA requires that public entities refrain from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA require that public entities avoid unnecessary policies, practices, criteria or
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methods of administration that have the effect or tendency of excluding or discriminating against persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3). Further, the regulations require that public entities provide reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, or procedures in order to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Reasonable modifications include positive behavioral interventions and supports, redirection, de-escalation, crisis intervention, patience, and waiting.
71. Under these provisions, law enforcement agencies and officers—including SROs like Officer Walker—may not discriminate on the basis of disability, and must provide reasonable modifications as needed during when interacting with persons with disabilities. Law enforcement agencies and officers including SROs should expect and anticipate that many of the children with whom they interact are children with disabilities.
72. Children with disabilities, and particularly children such as Cameron, whose disabilities manifest as behavioral challenges, are disproportionately vulnerable to and injured by the unnecessary use of restraints such as handcuffs on the basis of their disabilities. The effects on these children with disabilities include substantial and disproportionate physical and emotional injuries, and disruptive exclusions from educational programming.
73. Instead of interacting appropriately with Cameron, and providing reasonable accommodations, Officer Walker escalated his encounter with Cameron, and unnecessarily handcuffed him behind his back for nearly an hour, with deliberate indifference.
74. Based on information and belief, Defendant City of Flint has maintained and continues to maintain, with deliberate indifference, a policy and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children with disabilities, including Cameron. This policy and practice violates and continues to violate Title II of the ADA.
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75. Further, based on information and belief, Defendant City of Flint has failed with deliberate indifference to implement the nondiscrimination and reasonable modification requirements of Title II of the ADA through adequate policies, practices, procedures, training, or supervision that take needs of children with disabilities into account, and instead authorized SROs, including Officer Walker, to discriminate against children with disabilities such as Cameron on the basis of disability.
76. Through its failure with deliberate indifference to adopt an adequate policy and practice of providing reasonable modifications to children with disabilities, including Cameron, such as positive behavioral interventions and supports, redirection, de-escalation, crisis intervention, patience, and waiting, Defendant City of Flint has violated and continues to violate Title II of the ADA.
77. As a proximate result of Defendant City of Flint’s actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers.
78. As a result of Defendant City of Flint’s violations of Title II of the ADA, Cameron is entitled to compensatory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT IV – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Against the City of Flint)
79. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 80. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance to refrain from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
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require that entities receiving federal financial assistance avoid unnecessary policies, practices, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating against persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3)(i).
81. Children with disabilities, and particularly children with disabilities that manifest as behavioral challenges, including Cameron, are particularly vulnerable to and injured by the unnecessary use of restraints, including handcuffs, on the basis of their disabilities. The effects on these children with disabilities include substantial and disproportionate physical and emotional injuries, and disruptive exclusions from educational programming.
82. Defendant City of Flint has maintained and continues to maintain a policy and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children with disabilities, including Cameron. This policy and practice violates and continues to violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
83. As a proximate result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers.
84. As a result of Defendant City of Flint’s violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Cameron is entitled to compensatory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT IV – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE III OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. 12182 (Against Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce)
85. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 86. Title III of the ADA requires that public accommodations, as defined, to refrain from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability, and requires reasonable
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modifications in policies, practices, or procedures where necessary to serve individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
87. The YouthQuest program, which is operated by the Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce, is a public accommodation as defined by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J), (K).
88. By contacting an SRO for his non-emergency disability-related behavior, Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce in its YouthQuest Program discriminated against Cameron on the basis of disability, and failed and refused to provide him with reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures as required by law.
89. As a result of Defendant’s discrimination in violation of the ADA, Cameron and his mother have been deterred from participating in the YouthQuest program. Cameron would return to YouthQuest if he and his mother were assured that YouthQuest would provide Cameron with services in compliance with the ADA.
90. As a result of Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce’s violation of Title III of the ADA, Cameron is entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT V – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF MICHIGAN’S PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 37.1101 et seq (Against Defendants City of Flint and Officer Walker) 91. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 92. The PWDCRA requires persons such as Defendants to accommodate persons with disabilities for purposes of public accommodation, public service, and education. Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1102. It also prohibits persons such as Defendants from denying persons with disabilities to full and equal enjoyment of services, privileges, and advantages of places of public accommodation and public services on the basis of disability. Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1302.
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93. Children with disabilities, and particularly children with disabilities that manifest as behavioral challenges, including Cameron, are particularly vulnerable to and injured by the unnecessary use of restraints, including handcuffs, on the basis of their disabilities. The effects on these children with disabilities include substantial and disproportionate physical and emotional injuries, and disruptive exclusions from educational programming.
94. By handcuffing Cameron, Officer Walker failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation for the purposes of education and public service.
95. In handcuffing Cameron, Officer Walker further denied him full and equal enjoyment of educational and recreational services at Brownell STEM Academy, a public school, on the basis of his disability.
96. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, Officer Walker, violated Cameron’s right under the PWDRCA to be free from discrimination on the basis of disability.
97. Based on information and belief, Defendant City of Flint has maintained and continues to maintain a policy and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children with disabilities, including Cameron. This policy and practice violates and continues to violate the PWDRCA.
98. As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers.
99. As a result of Defendants City of Flint and Officer Walker’s violations of the PWDRCA, Cameron is entitled to compensatory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
DEMAND FOR RELIEF
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Plaintiff requests that this Court: a. assert jurisdiction over this matter; b. enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants; c. enter judgment declaring that the actions and inactions described herein violated the rights of Plaintiff under the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title III of the ADA, and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act; d. issue an order enjoining the Defendants from engaging in the unlawful conduct described herein; e. order all relief necessary to ensure that Defendants stop restraining children with disabilities for their disability-related behaviors, including for disabilities and behaviors that are caused by lead exposure, up to and including ordering Defendants to cease patrolling elementary schools; f. award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants City of Flint, Johnson, and Walker; g. award costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205; and h. grant other appropriate relief. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a jury on all issues so triable.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/Jonathan R. Marko Jonathan R. Marko (P72450) MARKO LAW, PLC 645 Griswold Street, Suite 4100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 965-5555/Fax (313) 965-5556 jon@ernstmarkolaw.com
/s/John Mark Finnegan John Mark Finnegan (P68050) Heberle & Finnegan 2580 Craig Road Ann Arbor, MI 48130 (734) 302-3233 jmarkfinnegan@comcast.net

/s/Mark P. Fancher Mark P. Fancher (P56223) Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6822 mfancher@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
Susan Mizner* Claudia Center* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 343-0762 center@aclu.org smizner@aclu.org
*Applications for admission forthcoming

Dated: July 31, 2018

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAMERON McCADDEN, a minor, by his next friend, CHRYSTAL McCADDEN,

Plaintiff, v.

Case No: 18-12377 Honorable Denise Page Hood

CITY OF FLINT, et al.

Defendants. _________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. No. 15] I. INTRODUCTION On July 31, 2018, Plaintiff Cameron McCadden, a minor by his next friend, Chrystal McCadden, filed this action for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). On October 9, 2018, Defendants City of Flint (the “City”) and City Police Chief Timothy Johnson (“Johnson”) (collectively, “City Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims against the City Defendants. Dkt. No. 15. The Motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted as to the claim against Johnson and granted in part and denied in part with respect to the claims against the City.
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS On October 12, 2015, Plaintiff, a seven-year-old with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), experienced a disability-induced behavior episode. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 34. The after-school program administered by Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce (“FGCC”) contacted Defendant Terrance Walker, a City police officer who served as a school resource officer (“Walker”). Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 35. Walker did not inquire whether Plaintiff had a disability or an individualized education plan (“IEP”), and Walker immediately placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. Plaintiff remained in those restraints for almost one hour. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 36–46.
The City Police Department has an official policy on police interactions with children. Section III(C)(2) of this policy states:
Juveniles taken into custody for status offenses should normally be frisked for weapons prior to being transported and may be handcuffed or otherwise restrained at any time if, in the judgment of the officer, the juvenile poses a physical risk to the officer or others. (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s Complaint includes five claims in which Johnson or the City are sued: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant Police Chief Timothy Johnson (“Johnson”) for unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Count I); (2) a Monell liability claim against the City (Count II); (3) a claim against the City for
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disability-based discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA (Count III); (4) a claim for disability-based discrimination by the City for violating Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Count IV1); and (5) disability-based discrimination by the City in violation of Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”) (Count V). III. LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint. Accepting all factual allegations as true, the court will review the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). As a general rule, to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The complaint must demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that the defendant’s conduct was unlawful. Id. at 556. Claims comprised of “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
1The Complaint includes two claims captioned “Count IV.” Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim is the first “Count IV” in the Complaint.
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Count I - Unreasonable Search and Seizure/Excessive Force (Johnson)
Plaintiff has sued Johnson only in his official capacity. [Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 23; see
also Complaint’s Case Caption] The Complaint only references Johnson in the
following manners:
(1) In the caption (“TIMOTHY JOHNSON, Chief of Police, City of Flint, in his official capacity”);
(2) At Paragraph 23 (“Defendant TIMOTHY JOHNSON is the Chief of Police for the City of Flint, and the official responsible for actions and inactions complained of herein, including policies, practices, customs, and training. Chief Johnson is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the PWDCRA. At all times relevant to this complaint, Chief Johnson and his predecessors were acting under color of state law. Chief Johnson is sued in his official capacity.”);
(3) In the heading of Count I (“COUNT I - UNREASONABLE SEIZURE AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against Chief Johnson and Officer Walker)”); and
(4) In the “Demand for Relief,” where “Plaintiff requests that this Court: . . . award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants City of Flint, Johnson, and Walker; . . .”
[Dkt. No. 1]
The City Defendants argue that when “[a]n official-capacity claim against a
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person is essentially a claim against the municipality,” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016), it is duplicative and appropriate to dismiss. Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). The City Defendants state that, assuming Plaintiff intends to hold the City liable pursuant to the Monell claim in Count II, Count I should be dismissed against Johnson in his official capacity as duplicative.
Plaintiff acknowledges that some courts have dismissed as duplicative claims against a municipal official in his or her official capacity if the municipality is also sued. Citing Trimble v. District of Columbia, 779 F.Supp.2d 54, 58 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that he has alleged that Johnson is responsible for “policies, practices, customs and training” for the City Police Department, so Johnson is an active participant in an issue central to this case, such that judicial resources are likely to be conserved if the claims against Johnson remain. Plaintiff also asserts that he is seeking injunctive relief against the City Police Department that Johnson would have to address and implement as Chief of Police, so the motion to dismiss Johnson should be denied.
The Court dismisses the claim against Johnson, as it is framed as a claim against Johnson only in his official capacity. Plaintiff’s failure to specify any distinct action by Johnson is significant. Other than allegedly being responsible for the policies,
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practices, customs, and training for the City Police Department, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Johnson took any action that impacted or harmed Plaintiff. Accordingly, the claims against Johnson are simply for executing his duties as the City official in charge of the Police Department. To the extent that any relief is granted against the City, whomever is performing in the role as the City official in charge of the Police Department will have the responsibility and obligation to ensure that such relief is implemented.
B. Count II - Monell Liability A municipal defendant can only be subject to direct liability if it causes the constitutional harm because it “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by” that body’s officers. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). “[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under Section 1983.” Id. at 694. A plaintiff cannot allege a viable claim based solely on vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Id. at 691. The municipality’s policy (or absence of one) must be a “moving force” in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and such policy must have arisen from “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its citizens. Doe
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v. Claiborne Cty., Tenn., 103 F.3d at 508. In addition to policy or custom, the inadequacy of police training may serve as
a basis for Section 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The question is “whether the training program is adequate; and if it is not, the question becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent ‘city policy.’” Id. at 390.
Plaintiff alleges that the City had an official policy of “humiliating, outrageous, discriminatory, and belittling actions toward children” and “imposing unnecessary mechical restraints such as handcuffs on children.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 66(a)-(b). Plaintiff relies on the portion of the Juvenile Offenders Policy cited above that states, in part: “Juveniles taken into custody for status offenses . . . may be handcuffed or otherwise restrained at any time.” Dkt. No. 15, Ex. 1 at 4. Plaintiff contends that, because Plaintiff has alleged that Walker complied with this official policy when handcuffing Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the City had an unconstitutional policy. Plaintiff suggests that discovery will allow the parties to determine whether Walker’s use of handcuffs on Plaintiff was objectively reasonable pursuant to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
The City relies on the Juvenile Offenders Policy’s express language to rebuke
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Plaintiff’s arguments regarding an unconstitutional policy. In addition to the provision cited by Plaintiff in the preceding paragraph, the Policy states that “[i]t shall be the policy of the Flint Police Department to deal with juvenile offenders in the least coercive manner possible” and that its officers are given the ability to “exercise reasonable discretion as outlined in this policy in deciding on appropriate actions.” Dkt. No. 15, Ex. A at 1, 2. The City notes that the Juvenile Offenders Policy also states that, “Release without further action or following informal counseling, referral to community services or parents may be appropriate in incidents where property damage or personal injury is not involved but intervention is necessary to avoid potential delinquent actions and when the youth has had no prior enforcement contacts with the police.” Id. at 2.
The City argues that the portion of the Juvenile Offenders Policy Plaintiff relies upon (that juveniles “maybe handcuffed or otherwise restrained at any time”) does not require that an officer handcuff juveniles. The City states that the language affords a City police officer the discretion to restrain a juvenile if the juvenile poses a physical risk to the officer or others but does not require restraint of a juvenile. The City concludes that having a policy that allows an officer to handcuff in those circumstances satisfies constitutional standards because it requires a determination whether officer’s actions are “objective reasonable in light of the facts and
8

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
Plaintiff also alleges that the City “failed to train” its officers. Plaintiff has alleged that his unconstitutional seizure was “caused by the series of deliberately indifferent policies, customs, and established practices, including inadequate training by the City of Flint . . .” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 66(c)-(e). Plaintiff argues that, “where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact,” such failure to train may serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
The City contends that Plaintiff’s failure to train argument is deficient because there are no allegations of “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [City] has ignored a history of abuse and clearly was on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). The City notes that Plaintiff has not alleged any pattern of similar constitutional violations, such that the City could have been on notice of the need for additional training or policies.
Plaintiff responds that, sometimes, a history of events or a pattern of conduct is unnecessary, as the Supreme Court recognized:
In Canton, the Court left open the possibility that, ‘in a narrow range of circumstances,’ a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to
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show deliberate indifference. …The Court posed the hypothetical example of a city that arms its police force with firearms and deploys the armed officers into the public to capture fleeing felons without training the officers in the constitutional limitation on the use of deadly force...Given the known frequency with which police attempt to arrest fleeing felons and the ‘predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens' rights,’ the Court theorized that a city’s decision not to train the officers about constitutional limits on the use of deadly force could reflect the city's deliberate indifference to the ‘highly predictable consequence,’ namely, violations of constitutional rights... The Court sought not to foreclose the possibility, however rare, that the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could be liable under §1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 (2011). See also Kulpa for Estate of Kulpa v.
Cantea, 708 F. App’x 846, 856 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing cases) (recognizing a Monell
cause of action for a municipality’s failure “to provide adequate training in light of
foreseeable consequences that could result from the lack of instruction.”); Martin v.
City of Broadview Heights, 2011 WL 3648103, at **9, 10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2011).
Plaintiff argues that he has alleged that, in this case, the circumstances reflect
that the need for adequate training was so obvious that the City’s failure to provide it
constitutes deliberate indifference to the risks of constitutional violations. Citing Dkt.
No. 1 at ¶¶ 8-12 (identifying a national study by the General Accounting Office about
children placed in restraints; citing a U.S. Dept. of Education study that concluded that
75 percent of students placed in physical restraints in schools have disabilities; noting
that approximately 20 percent of Flint Community Schools students have disabilities;
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arguing that the Michigan State Board of Education published standards that prohibit the use of mechanical restraints on children under all circumstances, including emergencies; and stating that Michigan’s Lieutenant Governor has characterized restraints as “inhumane and barbaric.”). Plaintiff argues that the City should have known the importance of training officers – especially School Resource Officers like Walker – to first inquire whether the student at issue have disabilities for which an IEP or other guidelines are in place for how the student should be treated. For these reasons, Plaintiff contends that he was not required to plead a pattern of conduct or a sequence of events that would provide the City (or Johnson or Walker) with notice of the need for different training.
The City counters that the only way that Plaintiff can demonstrate that the City utilizes untrained police officers is to allege that the training is inadequate because its officers are trained. The City states that such an argument requires that Plaintifff allege that there is a pattern of violations to show that additional training is needed to address that inadequacy. Citing Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478.
The Court grants the City’s Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim based on Plaintiff’s allegations that the Juvenile Offender Policy is an unconstitutional policy. Plaintiff does not allege that the Juvenile Offender Policy requires its police officers to handcuff or restrain juveniles with whom officers interact. As the City states, the
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Policy states that it “shall be the policy of the Flint Police Department to deal with juvenile offenders in the least coercive manner possible” and that its officers are given the ability to “exercise reasonable discretion as outlined in this policy in deciding on appropriate actions.” Therefore, although the actions of an officer may be “objectively unreasonable,” the policy itself is not deliberately indifferent or constitutionally deficient on its face.
The Court denies the City’s Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim with respect to Plaintiff’s failure to train claim. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the City has failed to train its police officers on appropriately interacting with juveniles who statistically, based on existing data and studies, may have a disability that would dictate how an officer – particularly a School Resource Officer – should interact with such a juvenile. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the City was deliberately indifferent to a highly predictable consequence regarding juveniles.
C. Count III - Title II of the ADA Claim Plaintiff argues that he has alleged that the City discriminated against him in violation of the ADA by: (a) authorizing Officer Walker to discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of disability; (b) failing to provide reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability; (c) failing to ensure policies, practices, procedures, training, or supervision that take the
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needs of children with disabilities into account; and (d) failing to avoid unnecessary policies, practices, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating against persons with disabilities. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 70, 73-77 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3), (7)). See also Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F.Supp.3d 409, 426-27 (D. Md. 2014) (finding that plaintiff’s estate stated a claim under the ADA for failure to properly train deputies “to interact with members of the community with developmental disabilities,” and failure to accommodate his disability); S.R. v. Kenton Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2015 WL 9462973, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2015) (“Taking the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint as true, plaintiffs have adequately pled a Title II claim. … Plaintiffs allege that the Kenton County Sheriff’s practice of handcuffing disabled students is impermissible because it bypasses less severe measures such as crisis intervention, de-escalation, etc. to address their behavioral problems.”).
Title II of the ADA provides: Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). The “plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that: (1) [he] has a disability; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified; and (3) [he] was being
13

excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under the program because of [his] disability.” Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, “the plaintiff must show that [(1)] the defendant took action because of the plaintiff’s disability . . . [and (2)] the discrimination was intentionally directed toward him or her in particular.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to Title II of the ADA, individuals with disabilities cannot be “excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” nor may they be “subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “[T]he phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ encompasses virtually everything that a public entity does.” Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff asserts he was discriminated against by the City with respect to the “services, programs, or activities” of law enforcement, and that he was otherwise “subjected to discrimination” by the City.
The City argues that Plaintiff’s Title II claim is inadequate for several reasons. First, the City contends that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a discriminatory policy. The City argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimnation are contradicted by the City Police Department’s Juvenile Offender Policy, which directs that its officers are to utilize “the least coercive manner possible” and directs officers to “exercise
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reasonable discretion . . . in deciding on appropriate actions.” Dkt. No. 15, Ex. A at 1-2. Second, the City argues that Plaintiff has not alleged that the policy was enacted for a discriminatory purpose - specifically, to discriminate against juveniles with ADHD.
Third, the City asserts that Plaintiff fails to allege that the City’s policies discriminated against or were directed toward Plaintiff in particular. Citing Anderson, 798 F.3d at 357 (requiring that discrimination be intentionally directed toward an individual). The City asserts that Plaintiff makes only generalized, non-specific allegations of discrimination against persons similarly situated to Plaintiff, which are insufficient to sustain an ADA claim. Citing Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that individualized discrimination was not alleged where the policy and training at issue affected all similarly-situated disabled persons).
The City relies on the fact that the Juvenile Offenders Policy gave officers the discretion to handcuff a juvenile – it did not require an officer to handcuff a juvenile or someone with ADHD. The City also notes that neither the City nor Johnson (or even Walker) is alleged to have known that Plaintiff had ADHD or suffered from a disability and, as such, none of them could have discriminated against Plaintiff because of his disability. Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2008) (“the plaintiff must show that the discrimination was intentionally directed toward him or
15

her in particular”). Plaintiff counters that “intentional discrimination is not an element of a prima
facie case.” Tanney v. Boles, 400 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (discussing the Rehabilitation Act). Plaintiff also argues that “intentional discrimination may be inferred from a defendant’s deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally protected rights.” Citing Velzen v. GVSU, 902 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1046 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff states that he has alleged deliberate indifference. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 73-78. Plaintiff notes that Anderson and Dillery were cases decided on summary judgment, not at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
Fourth, the City argues that Plaintiff’s Title II claim fails against the City because Plaintiff alleges that FGCC (but not the City) operates YouthQuest. The City contends that Title II only prohibits denial of “benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or be[ing] subjected to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The City suggests that this means that only the public entity providing the service, program, or activity is subject to Title II’s requirements. The City contends that, because YouthQuest, and not the City, is the public entity that provides the services, programs, or activities about which Plaintiff complains, the City cannot be liable under Title II.
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Plaintiff counters that the fact that he alleges disability discrimination by another entity – FGCC, the administrator of the YouthQuest program – does not extinguish Plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination by the City. Plaintiff states that compliance with Title II requires that public entities: (1) cease engagement in negative acts of disability discrimination, and (2) take certain affirmative steps to ensure that disabled individuals are not subjected to disability discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; 28 C.F.R. pt. 35. Plaintiff asserts that the City has failed to meet these standards, causing him harm. Plaintiff contends that the Juvenile Offender Policy does not control at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, as it cannot resolve the factintensive questions of whether that policy has the effect of disability discrimination.
The Court denies the Motion to Dismiss as it pertains to Plaintiff’s Title II claims. Plaintiff has alleged that the City provides public safety services (and the fact that FGCC operates the YouthQuest program is irrelevant to the fact that the City provides those services), so it is a public entity that falls within Title II. And, although the City, Johnson, and Walker are not alleged to have known about Plaintiff’s disability, Plaintiff has alleged that the City knew or should have know about the elevated likelihood that any Flint juveniles would suffer from a disability and should have taken action to address how officers interact with Flint juveniles. See, e.g., Velzen, 902 F.Supp.2d at 1046 (“intentional discrimination may be inferred from
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a defendant’s deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally protected rights.”).
D. Count IV - Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Claim The parties agree that a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is substantially similar to a Title II claim under the ADA, with two notable differences. One difference is that the Rehabilitation Act applies only to federally funded entities, not any public entity. See Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Sch. Distr., 836 F.3d 672, 690 (6th Cir. 2016). The other is that Rehabilitation Act claims apply only when the denial of benefits is “solely by reason of disability.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues, and the City does not dispute, that the City is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Plaintiff asserts that the Complaint details how Plaintiff suffered discrimination solely on the basis of his disability (ADHD), citing Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 26-50, but Plaintiff does not identify any specific paragraph or language. Plaintiff also asserts that the “solely” requirement cannot be determined on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. As discussed above, the City asserts that, as Plaintiff does not allege that the City, Johnson or Walker knew of Plaintiff’s disability (ADHD) when Walker handcuffed and restrained Plaintiff, none of them could have discriminated against Plaintiff (solely or even in part) on the basis of his disability.
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The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim because it has failed to allege that the City, Johnson, or Walker knew about Plaintiff’s disability and, therefore, could not have discriminated against him on that basis.
E. Count V - PWDCRA Claim The PWDCRA “substantially mirrors the ADA, and resolution of a plaintiff’s ADA claim will generally, though not always, resolve the Plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim.” Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996)); Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2012). As Plaintiff states, his PWDCRA claim “should be interpreted in accord with its federal counterpart and the ‘resolution of a [defendant’s] . . . motion with respect to the ADA claim will also resolve the . . . motion with respect to the [PWDCRA] claim.’” Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint, 942 F. Supp. 1129, 1136 n.14 (E.D. Mich. 1996). See also Monette, 90 F.3d at 1178 n.3. Accordingly, like Plaintiff’s Title II ADA claim, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim is denied. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Johnson and the City
19

[Dkt. No. 15] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim(s) against Johnson in his

official capacity are DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City is

DISMISSED to the extent it is based on an unconstitutional policy.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City

REMAINS to the extent it is based on a failure to train.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s PWDRCA and Title II ADA

claims REMAIN.

IT IS ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2019

s/Denise Page Hood Chief Judge, U. S. District Court

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 Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW ECF No. 32 filed 07/22/19 PageID.301 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAMERON MCCADDEN, a minor, by his next friend, CHRYSTAL MCCADDEN,
Plaintiff, v.

Case No. 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-MKM Hon. Denise Page Hood, Chief Judge

CITY OF FLINT; TERRANCE WALKER, in his individual capacity, and FLINT & GENESEE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, a Michigan non-profit corporation,
Defendants. /

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Jonathan R. Marko (P72450) MARKO LAW, PLC 645 Griswold Street, Suite 4100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 965-5555/Fax (313) 965-5556 jon@ernstmarkolaw.com
John Mark Finnegan (P68050) Heberle & Finnegan 2580 Craig Road Ann Arbor, MI 48130 (734) 302-3233 jmarkfinnegan@comcast.net

Mark P. Fancher (P56223) Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6822 mfancher@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
Susan Mizner, admitted to district Claudia Center, admitted to district American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 343-0762 center@aclu.org smizner@aclu.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW ECF No. 32 filed 07/22/19 PageID.302 Page 2 of 21
INTRODUCTION 1. This is an action for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy Defendants’ violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”). 2. Plaintiff Cameron McCadden is a ten-year-old African American boy with a disability who was handcuffed for nearly one hour by Defendant Terrance Walker, a Flint Police Department school resource officer, on October 12, 2015 when he was seven years old and while participating in a YouthQuest program administered by Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce. 3. Defendant Flint Police Department (“Flint PD”) has acknowledged that Officer Walker handcuffed Cameron. 4. The use of handcuffs on children with disabilities is contrary to guidance on the use of restraint against children with disabilities. 5. At no time did Cameron pose an imminent danger of physical harm to himself or anyone else that would have justified Officer Walker’s prolonged handcuffing of him. 6. As a result of being subjected to unwarranted and prolonged handcuffing, Cameron has suffered fear, anxiety, emotional trauma, and an exacerbation of his disability. 7. The Flint PD has the responsibility for establishing and implementing policies, practices, supervision and training to ensure that school resource officers such as Officer Walker respect the rights of children with disabilities, particularly when using force and restraint against such children. 8. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) published the results of a nationwide study documenting hundreds of alleged uses of restraint in schools
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between 1990 and 2009, including 20 restraints that resulted in the death of a child.1 Nearly all of the incidents investigated by the GAO involved children with disabilities. That same year, in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Education and Labor Committee, the GAO presented these findings and reported on the risks of injury and death associated with the restraint of children. The GAO explained that even in situations where a child does not sustain any physical injury as a result of restraint, he is often severely traumatized.2
9. A recent analysis of 2011-12 data by the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights revealed that although students with disabilities account for only 12% of public school students, they comprise 75% of students subjected to physical restraint in schools.3 That same analysis also revealed that while African American students represent only 19% of students with disabilities, they account for 36% of these students who are subjected to mechanical restraint such as handcuffs.4
10. The restraint of children with disabilities has generated significant interest among the public and policymakers in Michigan, particularly given the size of the state’s population of children with disabilities. According to the Michigan Department of Education’s Center for Educational Performance and Information, 12.77 percent of students attending public schools in Michigan have disabilities. In Flint, where Cameron was handcuffed, about 20 percent of students attending Flint Community Schools (“FCS”) have identified disabilities.
1 Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S. Government Accountability Office, to Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives 8 (May 2009), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09719t.pdf. 2 Id. at 1. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 1: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, RESTRAINT, & SECLUSION HIGHLIGHTS 9 (Mar. 2014). 4 Id. at 10.
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11. Recognizing the need to promote the safety and dignity of all students, Michigan’s State Board of Education released its Standards for the Emergency Use of Seclusion and Restraint in 2006. These standards prohibit the use of mechanical restraint “under all circumstances, including emergency situations.”5 Furthermore, even permissible forms of physical restraint “should not be used any longer than necessary to allow students to regain control of their behavior; and generally no longer than ten minutes.”6 Any use of emergency restraint “shall be . . . documented in a written report . . . and given to the parent or guardian within 24 hours.”7
12. In 2014 and 2015, Michigan Lieutenant Governor Brian Calley held nine town halls across the state and posted an online survey to solicit input from parents, educators, and advocates about challenges facing students with disabilities in Michigan. One of the Lieutenant Governor’s key conclusions following these sessions was a call to end the use of restraint in schools in all but specific emergency situations. The Lieutenant Governor called restraint “inhumane and barbaric” and warned that it “results in increasingly dangerous situations for children and staff.”8
13. In 2014, the Flint PD received a Community Oriented Policing Services grant of $1.1M from the U.S. Department of Justice to place six school resource officers (“SRO’s”) inside FCS through 2018. This would add to the six SRO’s already in FCS’s 15 schools. Speaking at the time, then-Flint Police Chief James Tolbert said the new SRO’s would be drawn
5 MICHIGAN DEP’T OF EDUCATION, SUPPORTING STUDENT BEHAVIOR: STANDARDS FOR THE EMERGENCY USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 2, 18 (Dec. 2006). 6 Id. at 15. 7 Id. at 15-16. 8 LT. GOV. BRIAN CALLEY, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE MICHIGAN BOARD OF EDUCATION (Sept. 8, 2015).
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from veteran Flint police officers so that the city would not have to wait for new hires and because current officers would be more experienced.9
14. Despite doubling the number of officers in schools, Defendant Flint PD has not designed or implemented adequate policies, practices, procedures, or training regarding the use of mechanical restraints, handcuffs, and other modes of force on young schoolchildren, including children with disabilities such as Cameron.
15. Similarly, despite knowing of Cameron’s disabilities, Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce failed to ensure disability nondiscrimination and to provide simple reasonable modifications in its YouthQuest program, and instead called for a police officer to respond to non-threatening disability behaviors.
16. Cameron seeks permanent injunctive relief that would prohibit Defendants from authorizing or using unnecessary, excessive, and prolonged restraint and handcuffing on schoolchildren, including those with disabilities, and to compel Defendant Flint PD to establish and implement, or to revise its policies, procedures, practice, and trainings to respect the rights of children with disabilities. Cameron also seeks declaratory relief establishing that Defendants have violated his Constitutional and civil rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the PWDCRA. Finally, Cameron seeks damages for the trauma he suffered as a result of Defendants’ unconstitutional and illegal conduct, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing this action.
9 Dominic Adams, Flint police to add 6 school resource officers thanks to $1.1 million Department of Justice grant,” MLive, (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/01/flint_police_to_add_6_school_r.html
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 17. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims raised this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim under the PWDCRA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 18. Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C § 12132 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. Plaintiff also seeks reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205. 19. This Court has jurisdiction to issue declaratory, injunctive, and other relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 20. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to this action occurred in the City of Flint, Genesee County, Michigan.
PARTIES
21. Plaintiff CAMERON MCCADDEN was seven years old and weighed 55 pounds when he was handcuffed by Defendant Officer Walker on October 12, 2015. At all relevant times, Cameron was a participant in the YouthQuest Afterschool Program operating within FCS, where he was a student. Cameron has a disability—attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”)—and is thus a person with a disability under Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the PWDCRA. Cameron brings this action through his mother and next friend, Chrystal McCadden.
22. Defendant CITY OF FLINT is a municipal corporation in Genesee County, Michigan, subject to the laws and Constitution of the United States. Defendant CITY OF FLINT
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operates, manages, and controls the Flint Police Department. Defendant CITY OF FLINT is a public entity under Title II and a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance for purposes of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It is also a “person” under the PWDCRA.
23. Defendant TERRANCE WALKER is an officer with the Flint Police Department. Officer Walker is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the PWDCRA, and an agent of the City of Flint and the Flint Police Department for the purposes of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. At all times relevant to this complaint, Officer Walker was acting under color of state law. He is sued in his individual capacity.
24. Defendant FLINT & GENESEE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, a nonprofit corporation, operated YouthQuest, which is a public accommodation for purposes of Title III of the ADA. It is also a “person” under the PWDCRA.
FACTS 25. In October 2015, Cameron was seven years old and enrolled in the second grade at Brownell K-2 STEM Academy. He stood just shy of four feet tall and weighed approximately 55 pounds. 26. As documented in his school records, Cameron is a friendly, likeable student in school who enjoys helping his peers and teachers. 27. Cameron was first diagnosed with ADHD in 2012. Cameron’s ADHD makes it difficult for him to focus, maintain attention, control his behavior, follow directions, and stay seated. It also substantially limits him in major life activities, including learning, concentrating, and neurological/brain functions. 28. In November 2012, FCS developed an individualized education plan (“IEP”) for Cameron to provide for special education and related services to address his disability-related
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behaviors. The team considered positive behavioral interventions and supports to assist Cameron with managing his disability. Cameron has received some behavioral supports at school.
29. In September 2015, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha revealed in a press conference at Hurley Medical Center that children’s lead levels had doubled in Flint since April of 2014, and urged residents, particularly children, to stop drinking the water. After Dr. Hanna-Attisha released her study, the City of Flint issued a lead health advisory, and the Genesee County Health Department urged residents to stop drinking Flint tap water. On October 1, 2015, the Genesee County Board of Commissioners declared a public health emergency. Articles published in Michigan newspapers in late September 2015 detailed how, even at low levels, lead causes behavioral problems and learning disabilities in children.
30. Cameron attended the YouthQuest Afterschool Program, which is held at Brownell STEM Academy, beginning in September 2014.
31. Upon enrolling Cameron in YouthQuest, Cameron’s mother informed program staff—including YouthQuest’s Site Team Leader for Brownell, Ashley Liddell-Ruffin—of Cameron’s ADHD diagnosis, his IEP, his medication, and his disability-related behavioral challenges.
32. Over the course of the 13 months in which Cameron participated in Youth Quest, Ms. McCadden and Ms. Liddell-Ruffin had several conversations concerning Cameron’s ADHD and strategies for assisting him with managing his disability-related behavior.
33. Sometime between 2:49 PM and 4:42 PM on October 12, 2015, Cameron experienced disability-related behavioral challenges—which manifested in him kicking a supply cart in the lobby of the Brownell STEM Academy—while participating in YouthQuest activities.
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34. Following Cameron’s disability-related behavior, Ms. Liddell-Ruffin radioed for an SRO.
35. At approximately 4:42 PM, Ms. Liddell-Ruffin called Cameron’s mother. She told Ms. McCadden that Cameron was running around on the bleachers. This behavior was consistent with Cameron’s disability.
36. Ms. McCadden told Ms. Liddell-Ruffin she would pick Cameron up immediately. 37. Before hanging up, Ms. Liddell-Ruffin told Ms. McCadden that Cameron had been handcuffed. Ms. McCadden assumed she was referring to a costumed event for Halloween. 38. When Ms. McCadden arrived at the school less than 10 minutes later, she met Officer Walker outside the school. Officer Walker was wearing his SRO uniform from Academy West, an alternative high school located in Flint. 39. Ms. McCadden had not seen Officer Walker at YouthQuest in the past. He was not one of the three police officers to whom YouthQuest parents were introduced at an orientation in 2013. 40. Officer Walker confirmed for Ms. McCadden that her son was in handcuffs. 41. Moments later, Ms. McCadden reached the lobby of the school and saw Cameron with his hands handcuffed behind his back. She was shocked and horrified. 42. She immediately asked Officer Walker to remove the handcuffs. 43. Officer Walker responded that the key was in a lockbox and he was waiting for a police cruiser to bring it to the school. 44. By this point, school and YouthQuest staff began to congregate around the scene in the lobby. Brownell and YouthQuest parents were also passing by, creating a humiliating scene for Cameron, his sister, and his mother.
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45. A Flint PD cruiser arrived at the school with the handcuffs key at approximately 5:36 PM, meaning that Cameron was handcuffed behind his back for approximately one hour.
46. Cameron was never taken into custody or arrested or charged with any crime. 47. Cameron’s mother has never been informed that Cameron violated any rule of the YouthQuest program. She never received any explanation of why her seven-year-old son was handcuffed. 48. Cameron experienced significant emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma during and after the October 12 handcuffing. He continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers. 49. Cameron has not returned to YouthQuest since the handcuffing. Cameron and his mother have been deterred from participating in the YouthQuest program because of Cameron’s experiences. Cameron is currently enrolled in a charter school that operates its own after-school program. Nevertheless, he has had to change schools three times in the past three years because of the instability of Flint schools, and particularly charter schools, given the Flint water crisis. Given Cameron’s inability to afford private schooling, and his expectation that due to charter school instability he will eventually have to change schools yet again, his only foreseeable options will be schools with after-school programs operated by YouthQuest. He will enroll again in a YouthQuest program if it is ADA-compliant. For Cameron, compliance will require, among other things: supervision by teachers other than those who supervised him on the day that he was restrained; appropriate training for program personnel; and non-involvement of law enforcement officers in student discipline.
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I – UNREASONABLE SEIZURE AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against Officer Walker)
50. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 51. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 52. The actions of the Defendants were taken under color of state law. 53. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protected Cameron from unreasonable seizure and excessive force. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution extends the Fourth Amendment’s protections to the states. 54. Whether a seizure is unreasonable and thus unconstitutional depends on the totality of the circumstances. 55. Officer Walker’s seizure of Cameron was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional in light of the totality of the following circumstances, including but not limited to:
a. that Cameron had not and was not engaging in criminal activity; b. that Cameron posed no physical threat to anyone; c. that Cameron was not attempting to flee the school grounds; d. Cameron’s age, size, and disability; e. the failure of the officer to appropriately interact with a child of Cameron’s
age, size, and disability; f. the lack of any necessity for the handcuffing; g. that the handcuffing violated the Michigan Board of Education’s Standards
for the Emergency Use of Seclusion and Restraint; 11

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h. the prolonged period of time – about one hour – during which Cameron was handcuffed; and
i. the trauma imposed by the extended handcuffing. 56. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, Officer Walker, acting under color of law and with deliberate indifference, violated Cameron’s right under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force. 57. Cameron’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force as described herein was clearly established at the time Officer Walker handcuffed him. 58. Officer Walker acted intentionally, maliciously, and in reckless disregard of Cameron’s rights. Further, Officer Walker was plainly incompetent in failing to maintain the handcuffs key on his person. 59. As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers. 60. Cameron is entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT II – MONELL LIABILITY IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Against the City of Flint)
61. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 62. Defendants were state actors acting under color of law. 63. Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 64. Plaintiff has been subjected to a deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights and privileges secured by the United States Constitution as set forth herein. 65. The deprivations were caused by the series of deliberately indifferent policies,
12

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customs, and established practices, including inadequate training, by the City of Flint, acting under the color of its statutory and legal authority, including but not limited to:
a. Directing and/or ratifying humiliating, outrageous, discriminatory, and belittling actions toward children, including children with disabilities;
b. Maintaining and implementing a custom, policy, and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children including children with disabilities;
c. Failing to train and supervise adequately its officers including SROs, despite the foreseeable consequences of such failure, on appropriately interacting with children, including children with disabilities, and on the likelihood that officers and SROs in particular will interact with children with disabilities;
d. Failing to train and supervise adequately its officers including SROs, despite the foreseeable consequences of such failure, on proper procedures and preparation regarding handcuffing and handcuffing safety; and
e. Failing and refusing to discipline its officers for engaging in humiliating, outrageous, discriminatory, and belittling actions.
66. These directions, ratifications, customs, policies, practices, and/or failures to train and supervise were a moving force in the constitutional violations inflicted by the individual Defendants upon the Plaintiff.
67. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts of the Defendants as alleged herein, Plaintiff has sustained a violation of his rights under the law and, as a result, is entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
13

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COUNT III – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Against the City of Flint)
68. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 69. Title II of the ADA requires that public entities refrain from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA require that public entities avoid unnecessary policies, practices, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect or tendency of excluding or discriminating against persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3). Further, the regulations require that public entities provide reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, or procedures in order to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Reasonable modifications include positive behavioral interventions and supports, redirection, de-escalation, crisis intervention, patience, and waiting. 70. Under these provisions, law enforcement agencies and officers—including SROs like Officer Walker—may not discriminate on the basis of disability and must provide reasonable modifications as needed during when interacting with persons with disabilities. Law enforcement agencies and officers including SROs should expect and anticipate that many of the children with whom they interact are children with disabilities. 71. Children with disabilities, and particularly children such as Cameron, whose disabilities manifest as behavioral challenges, are disproportionately vulnerable to and injured by the unnecessary use of restraints such as handcuffs on the basis of their disabilities. The effects on these children with disabilities include substantial and disproportionate physical and emotional injuries, and disruptive exclusions from educational programming. 72. Instead of interacting appropriately with Cameron, and providing reasonable
14

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accommodations, Officer Walker escalated his encounter with Cameron, and unnecessarily handcuffed him behind his back for nearly an hour, with deliberate indifference.
73. Based on information and belief, Defendant City of Flint has maintained and continues to maintain, with deliberate indifference, a policy and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children with disabilities, including Cameron. This policy and practice violate and continues to violate Title II of the ADA.
74. Further, based on information and belief, Defendant City of Flint has failed with deliberate indifference to implement the nondiscrimination and reasonable modification requirements of Title II of the ADA through adequate policies, practices, procedures, training, or supervision that take needs of children with disabilities into account, and instead authorized SROs, including Officer Walker, to discriminate against children with disabilities such as Cameron on the basis of disability.
75. Through its failure with deliberate indifference to adopt an adequate policy and practice of providing reasonable modifications to children with disabilities, including Cameron, such as positive behavioral interventions and supports, redirection, de-escalation, crisis intervention, patience, and waiting, Defendant City of Flint has violated and continues to violate Title II of the ADA.
76. As a proximate result of Defendant City of Flint’s actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers.
77. As a result of Defendant City of Flint’s violations of Title II of the ADA, Cameron is entitled to compensatory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
15

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COUNT IV – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Against the City of Flint)
78. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 79. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance to refrain from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act require that entities receiving federal financial assistance avoid unnecessary policies, practices, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating against persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3)(i). 80. Children with disabilities, and particularly children with disabilities that manifest as behavioral challenges, including Cameron, are particularly vulnerable to and injured by the unnecessary use of restraints, including handcuffs, on the basis of their disabilities. The effects on these children with disabilities include substantial and disproportionate physical and emotional injuries, and disruptive exclusions from educational programming. 81. Defendant City of Flint has maintained and continues to maintain a policy and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children with disabilities, including Cameron. This policy and practice violate and continues to violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 82. As a proximate result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers. 83. As a result of Defendant City of Flint’s violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Cameron is entitled to compensatory damages, injunctive and declaratory
16

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relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT IV – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE III OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. 12182 (Against Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce)
84. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 85. Title III of the ADA requires that public accommodations, as defined, to refrain from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability, and requires reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures where necessary to serve individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. 86. The YouthQuest program, which is operated by the Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce, is a public accommodation as defined by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J), (K). 87. By contacting an SRO for his non-emergency disability-related behavior, Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce in its YouthQuest Program discriminated against Cameron on the basis of disability and failed and refused to provide him with reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures as required by law. 88. As a result of Defendant’s discrimination in violation of the ADA, Cameron and his mother have been deterred from participating in the YouthQuest program. 89. As a result of Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce’s violation of Title III of the ADA, Cameron is entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT V – DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF MICHIGAN’S PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 37.1101 et seq (Against Defendants City of Flint, Officer Walker, and
Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce)
17

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90. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 91. The PWDCRA requires persons such as Defendants to accommodate persons with disabilities for purposes of public accommodation, public service, and education. Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1102. It also prohibits persons such as Defendants from denying persons with disabilities to full and equal enjoyment of services, privileges, and advantages of places of public accommodation and public services on the basis of disability. Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1302. 92. Children with disabilities, and particularly children with disabilities that manifest as behavioral challenges, including Cameron, are particularly vulnerable to and injured by the unnecessary use of restraints, including handcuffs, on the basis of their disabilities. The effects on these children with disabilities include substantial and disproportionate physical and emotional injuries, and disruptive exclusions from educational programming. 93. By contacting an SRO for his non-emergency disability-related behavior, Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce in its YouthQuest Program discriminated against Cameron on the basis of disability and failed and refused to provide him with reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures as required by law. 94. By handcuffing Cameron, Officer Walker failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation for the purposes of education and public service. 95. In handcuffing Cameron, Officer Walker further denied him full and equal enjoyment of educational and recreational services at Brownell STEM Academy, a public school, on the basis of his disability. 96. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, Officer Walker, violated Cameron’s right under the PWDRCA to be free from discrimination on the basis of disability. 97. Based on information and belief, Defendant City of Flint has maintained and
18

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continues to maintain a policy and practice of imposing unnecessary mechanical restraints such as handcuffs on children with disabilities, including Cameron. This policy and practice violate and continues to violate the PWDRCA.
98. As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions and inactions, Cameron suffered and continues to suffer emotional suffering, psychological injury, and trauma. Cameron continues to experience fear, distrust, and anxiety regarding law enforcement officers.
99. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the PWDRCA, Cameron is entitled to compensatory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
DEMAND FOR RELIEF Plaintiff requests that this Court:
a. assert jurisdiction over this matter; b. enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants; c. enter judgment declaring that the actions and inactions described herein
violated the rights of Plaintiff under the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title III of the ADA, and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act; d. issue an order enjoining the Defendants from engaging in the unlawful conduct described herein; e. order all relief necessary to ensure that Defendants stop restraining children with disabilities for their disability-related behaviors, including for disabilities and behaviors that are caused by lead exposure, up to and including ordering Defendants to cease patrolling elementary schools;
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f. award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants City of Flint, Walker, and Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce;
g. award costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205; and h. grant other appropriate relief.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a jury on all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jonathan R. Marko Jonathan R. Marko (P72450) MARKO LAW, PLC 645 Griswold Street, Suite 4100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 965-5555/Fax (313) 965-5556 jon@ernstmarkolaw.com
/s/ John Mark Finnegan John Mark Finnegan (P68050) Heberle & Finnegan 2580 Craig Road Ann Arbor, MI 48130 (734) 302-3233 jmarkfinnegan@comcast.net

/s/ Mark Fancher Mark Fancher (P56223) Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6822 mfancher@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
Susan Mizner Claudia Center American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 343-0762 center@aclu.org smizner@aclu.org

Dated: July 22, 2019

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW ECF No. 32 filed 07/22/19 PageID.321 Page 21 of 21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 22, 2019 I electronically filed the foregoing document through the court’s electronic filing system, and that the court will serve opposing counsel through the electronic filing system.
/s/ Mark Fancher (P56223) American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6822 mfancher@aclumich.org
21

 
 Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW ECF No. 48 filed 06/12/20 PageID.454 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAMERON MCCADDEN, a minor, by his next friend, CHRYSTAL MCCADDEN
Plaintiff, v.

Case No. 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-MKM Hon. Denise Page Hood

CITY OF FLINT, et al.,

Defendants. /
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jonathan R. Marko (P72450) Marko Law, PLC 645 Griswold Street, Suite 4100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 965-5555/Fax (313) 965-5556 jon@ernstmarkolaw.com
John Mark Finnegan (P68050) Heberle & Finnegan 2580 Craig Road Ann Arbor, MI 48130 (734) 302-3233 jmarkfinnegan@comcast.net
Mark P. Fancher (P56223) Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6822 mfancher@aclumich.org

Attorney for City of Flint and Chief Timothy Johnson William Y. Kim (P76411) City of Flint Department of Law 1101 S. Saginaw St., 3rd Floor Flint, MI 48502 (810) 766-7146 wkim@cityofflint.com
Attorney for Terrence Walker Michael W. Edmunds (P55748) Gault Davison, PC 8455 S. Saginaw St., Ste. 2 Grand Blanc, Michigan 48439 (810) 234-3633 medmunds@edmundslawoffice.com
Attorney for Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce Joseph A. Starr (P47253) Ryan J. Koss (P79893) Attorneys for Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce 20700 Civic Center Dr., Ste. 290

Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW ECF No. 48 filed 06/12/20 PageID.455 Page 2 of 4

Susan Mizner Claudia Center American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 343-0762 center@aclu.org smizner@aclu.org

Southfield, MI 48076 (248) 554-2700 jstarr@starrbutler.com rkoss@starrbutler.com

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT, ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AND TO AUTHORIZE DISBURSEMENTS
NOW COMES Plaintiffs by and through their attorneys, and for her Motion for Approval of Settlement, Attorneys Fees and Costs and to Authorize Disbursements states as follows:
1. That this is a 1983 case involving a disabled minor. 2. Plaintiff, a disabled individual, was restrained at school with handcuffs. 3. A settlement has been reached with all parties. 4. The law firms representing the Plaintiffs expended certain monies and time in pursuing this matter for which are entitled to reimbursement for pursuant to their Contingency Fee Agreement. Those amounts will be presented at the hearing.

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5. It is in Cameron’s best interest to place the settlement proceeds into a Supplemental Needs Trust for his benefit to protect said benefits.
6. Plaintiff requests authority to establish a Supplemental Needs Trust for the benefit of Cameron McCadden as Grantor and Trustee pursuant to the Michigan Bridges Eligibility Manual (BEM) Sec. 401 which authorizes her as legal guardian to establish the Trust.
7. The Supplemental Needs Trust, which complies with 42 U.S.C section 1396p(d)(4)(A), would initially be funded with the settlement proceeds and would be supervised by the Genesee County Probate Court with Annual Accountings to be filed.
8. That in addition to the Plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs, the Plaintiff has separately hired a probate attorney to administer and handle the probate proceedings and the trust. That attorney fee and costs will also need to be approved.
9. That the attorneys’ fees and costs should be approved by this Honorable Court and disbursement authorized.
10. That this Honorable Court should approve the settlement. 11. That the balance of funds will be placed into a structured settlement for the benefit of Plaintiff. The structured settlement will be presented at the hearing.

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12. That this Honorable Court should authorize distribution to the

interested parties.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court

enter an Order Approving Settlement, Attorneys Fees and Costs and to Authorize

Disbursements.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 12, 2020

/s/ Jonathan R. Marko Jonathan R. Marko (P72450) MARKO LAW, PLLC 1300 Broadway Street Fifth Floor Detroit, MI 48226 Phone: 313-777-7529 Fax: 313-777-5785 Email: jon@jmarkolaw.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 12, 2020, I presented the foregoing paper to this Court’s MiFile System which will
send notification of such filing to the above listed attorneys of record.
/s/ Marissa A. Williams

 
 Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW ECF No. 55 filed 09/09/20 PageID.473 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAMERON McCADDEN, a minor, by his next friend, CHRYSTAL McCADDEN,

Plaintiff, v.

Case No: 18-12377 Honorable Denise Page Hood

CITY OF FLINT, et al.

Defendants. _________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT [ECF No. 48]

On July 31, 2018, Plaintiff Cameron McCadden, a minor by his next friend,

Chrystal McCadden, filed this action for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights

and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). On June 12, 2020,

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Approve Settlement, ECF No. 48, and submitted a

settlement disposition document that identified how the settlement proceeds would be

distributed. The Motion to Approve Settlement was unopposed, and the Court held

a hearing on the Motion to Approve Settlement on August 12, 2020.

Pursuant to the Court’s questioning at the hearing, the City of Flint submitted

a resolution approving the settlement, ECF No. 52, and Plaintiff filed an updated and

more thorough settlement disposition document that broke down and finalized the
1

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attorney fees to be deducted from the settlement amount. ECF No. 53.

The Court, having: (a) reviewed and considered the Motion to Approve

Settlement; (b) heard the arguments of the parties and testimony of Plaintiff; and ©

reviewed and considered the parties’ post-hearing submissions, grants the Motion to

Approve Settlement. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Approve Settlement is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to and is awarded

$29,747.63, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement docketed as ECF No. 53.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit promptly a stipulated

order of dismissal.

IT IS ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2020

s/Denise Page Hood DENISE PAGE HOOD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

 
 Case 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-RSW ECF No. 52 filed 08/13/20 PageID.464 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

C. MCCADDEN, by his next friend, CHRYSTAL MCCADDEN

Case No. 2:18-cv-12377-DPH-MKM Hon. Denise Page Hood

Plaintiff,

v

CITY OF FLINT, et al.,

Defendants. /

NOTICE OF RESOLUTION APPROVING SETTLEMENT Pursuant to the Court’s directive given from the bench on August 12, 2020,

the City of Flint files this notice confirming that the Flint City Council approved the

City’s portion of settlement in this matter, as required by the City’s Charter. See Ex.

A (Flint City Council Resolution 200339).

Respectfully Submitted,

Date: August 13, 2020

/s/ William Y. Kim (P76411)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on August 13, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing

pleadings using the ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the

counsels of record.

Date: August 13, 2020

/s/ William Y. Kim (P76411)

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