Case 1:13-cv-00323 Document 1 Filed 05/21/13 Page 1 of 51 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, ATHA MOHAMMAD ABDUL, KESAVARAO BUNDANKAYALA, RAJU DIVAKARAN, BIJU PERUMPILLY GEORGE, KRISHNA GONTHINA, NAYAPPULLI JAYACHANDRAN, GALLA VENKATA RAMA KRISHNA, SAMUEL JOSE KUMRUMTHODATHIL, LOHITHAKSHAN MADAMPET, JOHNY MANDY MATHAI, BELTHAZAR PETER, MOHANAN BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, SANTHOSH KUMAR RAJENDRAN PILLAI, ABY KARICKATHARA RAJU, SUMESH PORAMBATHUPARAMBIL SUBRAMANIAN, and CHANDRAN SHAJU THANISSERY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P., MALVERN C. BURNETT, GULF COAST IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C. BURNETT, A.P.C., GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., MICHAEL POL, SACHIN DEWAN, and DEWAN CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH CONSULTANTS),

) ) ) ) Civil No. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Defendants.

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COMPLAINT INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs (as defined below) and approxi mately 590 Indian m en, were trafficked into the United States through the federal govern ment’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services (the “Indian H-2B W orkers”) to Defendants Signal International L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, L.P., a nd Signal Internati onal Texas, G.P. (collectively “Signal”). Recruited to perform welding, pipefitting, and other m arine fabrication work, Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labo r and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. 2. Plaintiffs bring this action to recover damages inflicted by Signal and Signal’s recruiters and agents operating in Ind ia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Unite d States. Defendants, defined be low, have exploited and defra uded Plaintiffs by fraudulently recruiting them to work in the Unite d States and effectuating a broad schem e of psychological coercion, threats of serious harm and physical restraint, and threatened abuse of the legal process to maintain control over Plaintiffs. 3. Lured by, and in reliance upon, Defendants’ fraudulent prom ises of legal and permanent work-based imm igration to th e U nited S tates f or them selves and th eir f amilies, Plaintiffs plunged them selves and their fam ilies into debt to take advantage of thes e seemingly promising opportunities. Plaintiffs incurred sign ificant debts to pay m andatory recruitm ent, immigration processing, and travel fees char ged by De fendants totaling as m uch as $12,000 to
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$20,0001 per worker, equivalent to two to three year s of an Indian welde r’s salary working in India. Trusting the veracity of the immigra tion and work benefits prom ised by Defendants , Plaintiffs further relinquished st able employment opportunities in India and as guest workers in the Persian Gulf and Singapore.
4. Defendants’ m ain recruiting agents in I ndia and the United Arab Em irates held Plaintiffs’ p assports an d visas, and threaten ed, coerced, and defrauded Plaintiffs into p aying extraordinary fees for recruitm ent, imm igration processing, a nd travel. Several Defendants further caused Plaintiffs to believe that if th ey did not work for Signal under the auspices of temporary, Signal-restricted, H-2B guest worker visas, they woul d suf fer abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process, physical restraint, or other serious harm.
5. The false promises, collection of exorbitant recruiting fees, and strong-arm tactics of Signal and its agents were, upon inform ation and belief, authorized by Defendant Signal. Defendant Signal knew of the exorb itant fees charged and the Indian H-2B Workers’ green card expectations by December 2006, before any of Plain tiffs arrived at Sign al’s facility. (Order and Reasons Denying Class Certification, at 33, Kurian David, et al. v. Signal International, LLC, et al., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK, (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012), EC F No. 1117.) Far from taking any corrective m easures, Defendant Signal ratified and perpetuated the schem e by continuing to facilitate th e transpo rtation of additiona l wave s of Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs , from December 2006 through February 2007. 1 Paym ents were m ade by Plaintiffs in both In dian Rupees and United States Dollars. For th e purposes of this Com plaint, all paym ents m ade in Indian Rupees discussed throughout the Complaint were converted to United States Dollars. An exchange rate of 45 Indian Rupees to 1 United States Dollar was utilized as the approximate exchange rate for the relevant period.
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6. Upon Plaintiffs’ arrival in the United States, Defendant Signal required that Plaintiffs live in a guarded, overc rowded, and isolated labor camp located in Orange, Texas (the “Texas Labor Cam p”). Defendants further d eceived Plaintiffs regarding their visa sta tus, threatened Plaintiffs with arrest, loss of i mmigration status and deportation, and generally perpetrated a campaign of psychological abuse, coercion, and fraud designed to render Plaintiffs afraid, intimidated, and unable to leave Signal’s employ.
7. Defendant Signal subjected Pl aintiffs to d iscriminatory and offensive mandatory room and board arrangem ents at the Texas Labor Camp to which non-Indian and United States citizen em ployees were not subjected. More over, Defendant Signal imposed upon Plaintiffs discriminatory job-related requirem ents and ad verse term s and conditions of e mployment on Plaintiffs to which non-Indian and United S tates citizen em ployees were not subjected. Defendant Signal subjected Plaintiffs to an objectively hostile a nd abusive work environment on account of Plaintiffs’ race and alienage.
8. Plaintiffs assert claim s against Defendants arising from violat ions of their rights under the Victim s of Tr afficking and Violence Protection Act (“TVPA”) (18 U.S.C. § 1581, et al.; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga nizations Act (“RICO”); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); the Ku Klux Klan Ac t of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985); the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §2201); and claim s fo r dam ages arising from fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. This Court has jurisdiction over this acti on pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (civil trafficking), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO), and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights). 10. This Court has supplem ental jurisdiction over the causes of action based on state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as the state law claim s arise out of the sa me nucleus of operative facts which support the federal claims. 11. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texa s under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in that Defendants and/or agents of Defendants, resided or have been found in Orange, Texas during the relevant time periods and a substantia l portion of the communications, transactions, events or om issions underlying P laintiffs’ claim s occurre d to se cure labor for Signal’s Orange, Texas operations in this judicial district. 12. Declaratory relief is sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 13. Plaintiffs are of South Asian Indian des cent, Indian nationals, and form er H-2B guest workers who were recruite d from India or the United Ar ab Em irates by Defendants at various times within calendar years 2006 and 2007. 14. Plaintiffs are members of a racial minority, as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. §1981. 15. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were “persons” within the meaning of that term as defined by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 16. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant Signal.
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17. At all re levant times, Defendants were engaged in inter state commerce or in the production of goods for sale in interstate commerce.
18. Plaintiffs were form er putative class m embers in the Civil Action s tyled Kurian David, et. al. v. Signal International, LLC, et.al ., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK, currently pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. On January 4, 2012, class certification was denied, thus paving the way for Pl aintiffs to file individual actions. Order and Reasons Denying Class Certification, at 33, Kurian David, et al. v. Signal International, LLC, et al., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK, (E.D. La. January 4, 2012), ECF No. 1117.
19. Plaintiff Reji Sam uel (“Plaintiff Samuel”) is a residen t of Texas and a pipefitter and welder by trade. Plaintiff Samuel was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 12, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
20. Plaintiff Atha Mohamm ad Abdul (“Plainti ff Abdul”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plain tiff Abdul was induced by De fendants to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about December 11, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
21. Plaintiff Kesavaro Budankayala (“Plainti ff Budankayala”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Budankaya la was induced by Defendants to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about Decem ber 11, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
22. Plaintiff Raju Divakaran (“ Plaintiff Divakaran”) is a resident of Georgia and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Divakaran was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 9, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
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23. Plaintiff Biju Perum pilly Geor ge (“Plaintiff George”) is a resident of California and a welder by trade. Plaintiff Ge orge was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 3, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
24. Plaintiff Krishna Gonthina (“Plaintiff Gonthina”) is a resident of Texas and a welder by trade. Plaintiff G onthina was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 13, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
25. Plaintiff Na yappulli Jayacha ndran (“Plaintiff Jayachandr an”) is a resident of Louisiana and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Jayachandran was induced by De fendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about Ja nuary 23, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
26. Plaintiff Galla Venkaga Rama Krishna (“Plaintiff Krishna”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Krishna wa s induced by Defendants to leave M umbai, India on an airplane on or about December 12, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
27. Plaintiff Samuel Jose Kurumthodathil (“Plaintiff Kurumthodathil”) is a resident of California and a welder by trade. Plaintiff Kurum thodathil was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about Decem ber 13, 2006 to work for Defenda nt Signal in Orange, Texas.
28. Plaintiff Lohithakashan Mada mpet (“Plaintiff Madampet”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Madampet was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 11, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
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29. Plaintiff Johny Mandy Mathai (“Plaintiff Ma thai”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plainti ff Mathai was induced by Defendants to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about February 15, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
30. Plaintiff Belthazar Peter (“Plaintiff Peter”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Peter was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 18, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
31. Plaintiff Mohanan Balak irshna Pillai (“Plaintiff B. Pillai” ) is a residen t of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff B. Pillai wa s induced b y Defendants to leave M umbai, India on an airplane on or about December 17, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
32. Plaintiff Santhosh Kumar Rajendra n Pillai ( “Plaintiff R. Pilla i”) is a r esident of Texas and a pipef itter a nd welder b y trad e. Plaintiff R. Pilla i was ind uced by De fendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about January 23, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
33. Plaintiff Aby Karicka thara Raju (“P laintiff Raju”) is a resident of Georgia and a welder by trade. Plain tiff Raju was induced by Defenda nts to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about December 18, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
34. Plaintiff Sumesh Pora mbathuparambil Subramanian (“Plaintiff Subramanian”) is a resident of Louisiana and a welder by trade. Plaintiff Subramanian was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airp lane on or about December 10, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
35. Plaintiff Chandran Shaju Thanissery (“Pl aintiff Thanissery”) is a resident of Texas and is a p ipefitter by trad e. Plain tiff Thannissery was induced by Defendants to leave
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Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about Febr uary 1, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
Defendants Defendant Signal 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signal International LLC is a corporation organized under the laws of Dela ware and a provider of m arine and fabrication services in the Gulf Coast region, with operations in Orange, Texas; Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Mobile, Alabama. 37. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant S ignal Internat ional Texas, G.P. is a general partnership organized under the laws of Texas and employed the labor for Signal International LLC and Signal International, Inc. at the Texas Labor Camp. 38. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Si gnal Interna tional Texas, L.P. is a limited partnership of Signal Intern ational, L.L.C. and Signal Inte rnational Texas, G.P. and is organized under the laws of Texas. 39. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signa l International, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of Dela ware and a provider of m arine and fabrication services in the Gulf Coast region, with operations in Orange, Texas; Pascagoula, Mi ssissippi; and Mobile, Alabama. 40. Upon inform ation and belief, all polic ies, money for payroll, corporate governance and legal advice for Defendant Signal International, G.P. was provided by Signal International, L.L.C..
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41. Upon inform ation and belief, all polic ies, money for payroll, corporate governance and legal advice for Defendant Signal International, L.P. was provided by Signal International, L.L.C..
42. Upon infor mation and belief, Defendant Si gnal does distinguish the roles of the Signal entities including, but not limited to, which entity paid Plaintiffs.
43. Upon infor mation and belief, Defendant Si gnal International, L.L.C. executed contracts relevant to this Complaint in the name of Signal International, Inc.
44. Upon infor mation and belief, Signal di d not docum ent which entity employed Plaintiffs.
45. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant S ignal International, Inc. is the sole member of Defendant Signal International, L.L.C.
46. Upon information and belief, Defendants Si gnal International, L.L.C. and Signal International, Inc. are and func tion as, the alter egos of Signal International Texas, G.P. and Signal International Texas, L.P.
47. Defendants Signal International L.L.C., Signal Inte rnational, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. will be referred to collectively as “Signal”.
48. Upon information and belief, Defendant Si gnal paid the Indian H-2B Workers at the Texas Labor Camp through a Texas bank account and Texas payroll account.
Recruiter Defendants 49. Defendant Global Resources, In c. (“Global”) is, or at al l relevant tim es, was, a corporation organized under the laws of Mississi ppi and engaged in the business of recruitin g
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workers from India, including Plaintiffs, for employment in Texas. Global entered into contracts

with Defendant Signal, Burnett Defendants (defined below), Dewan Defendants (defined below),

and Plaintiffs for labor to be provided in Si gnal’s Texas L abor Cam p. Upon inform ation and

belief, Global recruited Plainti ffs for em ployment within Texas. Upon inform ation and belief,

Global committed tortious conduct in Texas.

50. Defendant Michael Pol (“Pol”) is or was the President of Global, and resides in

Mississippi. Def endant Pol entered into contra cts with Defendant Signal, Burnett Defendants,

Dewan Defendants, and Plaintiffs for labor to be provided in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp. Upon

information and belief, P ol recruited Plaintiffs for em ployment within Texas. Upon infor mation

and belief, Pol committed tortious conduct in Texas.

51. Defendant Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/a Medtech Consultan ts) (“Dewan

Consultants”) is a priv ate lim ited liability com pany organized under the laws of India, which

maintains offices in Mum bai (Bombay), India, and Dubai, United Arab Em irates. Defendant

Dewan Consultants entered into contracts with Defendant Signal, B urnett Defendants, Pol

Defendants, and Plaintiffs for labor to be pr ovided in S ignal’s T exas Labor Camp. Dewa n

Consultants recruited P laintiffs for em ployment within T exas. Upon inform ation and belief,

Defendant Dewan Consultants committed tortious conduct in Texas.

52. Defendant Sachin Dewan (“Dewan”) is the Director of Dewan Consultants.

Dewan resides in India. Dewan entered into

contracts with Defendant Signal, Burnett

Defendants, Pol De fendants, and Plaintiffs for labor to be pr ovided in Signal’s Texas Labor

Camp. De wan recruited Plaintiffs for e mployment within Texas. Upon inform ation and belief,

Dewan committed tortious conduct in Texas. 11

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53. Upon inform ation and belief, Defenda nts Dewan and Dewan Consultants (“Dewan Defendants”) authorized and utiliz ed Defendants Pol and Global, and Burnett Defendants to act as their United States-based operations and/or agents.
54. Upon information and belief, Defendants Pol and Global, Burnett Def endants and Defendant Signal authorized and utilized Defendants Dewan and Dewa n Consultants to act as their India and United Arab Emirates based operations and/or agents.
55. Upon infor mation and belief, Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, and Global, and Burnett Defendants, acted as a join t ventu re with respe ct to the r ecruitment, contracting, and retention of Plaintiffs for the provision of labor or services.
56. Defendants Pol and Global, and Burnett Defendants, utilized Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants to conduct and carry out th eir shared business inte rests and activities in India and the United Arab Em irates. Among ot her things, Defendants Pol and Global shared offices with Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants in India and the United Arab Emirates.
57. Upon information and belief, Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants utilized Defendants Pol and Global, and Burnett Defendant s, to conduct and effectuate their shared business interests and activities in the United States.
58. Throughout this Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, and Global collectively as “Recruiter Defendants.”
Burnett Defendants 59. Defendant Malvern C. Burnett (“ Burnett”) is an atto rney who resides and maintains offices in New Orleans, Louisiana.
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60. Defendant Gulf Coast Imm igration Law Center L.L.C. (“GCILC”) is a lim ited liability cor poration or ganized un der the laws of Louisiana and lo cated in New Orleans , Louisiana. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Burnett serves as GC ILC’s sole registered agent, member, and/or corporate officer.
61. Defendant Law Offices of Malvern C. Burn ett, A.P.C. (“Burnett Law Offices”) is a professional law corporati on organized under the laws of Louisiana and located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Upon information and belief, Defendant Burnett serves as its sole registered agent, member, and/or corporate officer.
62. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendants Burnett, GCIL C, and Burnett Law Offices are engaged in a joint venture or are alter egos in that all entities have the same corporate mailing address, interm ingle business assets, do not operate at arm s’ length, and Defendant Burnett serv es as the registered agent and so le m ember or corporate officer for GCILC and Burnett Law Offices.
63. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Burnett, GCILC, and the Burnett Law Offices have the sam e business objectives, and Defendant Burnett uses GCILC and the Burnett Law Offices to conduct and effectuate shared business objectives.
64. Defendants Burnett, GCILC and the Burnett La w Of fices entered into contra cts with Recruiter Defendants and Plaintiffs for labor to be provided in Signal’s Texas Labor Ca mp. Burnett Defendants recruited Plaintiffs for e mployment within Texas. Upon inform ation and belief, Burnett Defendants committed tortious conduct in Texas.
65. Throughout this Com plaint, P laintiffs re fer to Defendants B urnett, GCILC, and Burnett Law Offices collectively as “Burnett Defendants.”
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All Defendants 66. At all relevant tim es, Defendants Dewa n, Dewan Consultants, Pol, Global, Burnett, Burnett Law Offices and GCILC acted as agents of Defendant Signal for the purposes of recruiting, obtaining, contracting, tr ansporting Plaintiffs to provide labor services in the state of Texas. 67. Individually and thr ough their ag ents, asso ciates, attorney s, or em ployees, all Defendants have done or are doing business in Orange, Texas. 68. At all relevant times, Defendants were “persons” as that term is defined in RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 69. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendants have been engaged in contacts with Plaintiffs, including recruiting, obtaining, labor contracting, providing imm igration-related services to, transporting, harboring, providing /or employing Plaintiffs. 70. At all relevant tim es, Defendants opera ted enterp rises engaged in inte rstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. 71. At all relevant times, Defendant Signal employed Plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS The Recruitment Process Recruitment of Plaintiffs 72. Acting as D efendant Signal’s recruiting ag ent for the pu rposes of facilitating the recruitment of Indian H -2B W orkers for em ployment at Signal, Recruiter Defendants placed advertisements in newspapers throughout India and the United Arab Em irates in the spring, summer, and fall of 2006 offering opportunities for welders and pipefitters to imm igrate
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permanently to the United States und er the auspices of Signal, “a leading m arine and fabrication company in Mississippi and Texas.” Plaintiffs were targeted for recruitment on the basis of their race or alienage.
73. Recruiter Defendants’ advertisements and other recruiting efforts were undertaken on behalf of, at the direction of, or in coordi nation and consultation with Defendant Signal and Burnett Defendants.
74. Recruiter D efendants’ advertisem ents and other recruiting efforts prom ised “permanent residency” or “green cards.”
75. In response to the advertisem ents poste d by Recruiter Defenda nts, Plaintiffs contacted R ecruiter Defendants in the spring, summer and fall of 2006 via telephone and inperson meetings.
76. Specific facts relevan t to the experiences of Plaintiffs are se t f orth in the table attached as Exhibit 1 to this Complaint, which are incorporated herein by reference.
77. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Si gnal’s direction and coordination of Recruiter Defendants’ and Burnett Defendants’ recruitment efforts were effectuated by the use of numerous telephone, fax, e-m ail, or mail communications that occurred from the spring of 2006 through at least January 2007.
78. Upon inform ation and belief, in th ese communications Defendant Signal authorized Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants to act as their agents for the purposes of recruiting and providing Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s Orange, Texas operations.
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79. Upon information and belief, in these co mmunications, Defendant Signal further authorized Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defe ndants to represent that Signal would agree to sponsor bona fide green card applications for Plaintiffs and obtain at least two H-2B visa extensions on behalf of Plaintiffs to allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while their green card applications were being processed.
80. Defendant Signal authorized these repr esentations even though it knew or had reason to know that such vi sa extensions and green card applications would not be bona fide , valid, or lawful under United States imm igration law and even though Signal did not have the intention at that time to apply for visa extensions or green cards on behalf of all the Indian H-2B Workers, including Plaintiffs.
81. At the latest, Defendant Signal knew th at the H-2B W orkers paid exorbitant recruitment fees to Sign al’s agents – Recrui ter Defendants and Burnett Defendants – and m ade those p ayments on the basis of p romises, nam ely th at the workers wo uld receiv e green cards, which Signal knew to be false. Defendant Si gnal nonetheless continue d to f acilitate the transportation, to Signal worksites in Texas an d Mississippi, of hundreds m ore Indian H-2B Workers, including Plaintiffs, because it was in Signal’s financial interest to do so.
82. In the spring, summer, and fall of 2006, Pl aintiffs attended m eetings at which Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants, actin g on Signal’s behalf, info rmed Plaintiffs of the opportunity to work for Defendant Signal on H- 2B visas which were represented to lead to permanent resident (green card) status.
83. Upon infor mation and belief, prior to attending these m eetings and testing sessions (discussed in paragraphs 91 to 95 below), Defendant Signa l, Recruiter Defendants, and
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Burnett Defendants conferred in the spring, su mmer, and fall of 2006 by phone, m ail, fax or email to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these meetings.
84. The United States -based Recruiter De fendants (Pol and Global), Burnett Defendants, and Defendant Signal traveled across st ate and international lines to attend meetings with Plaintiffs in India and the United Arab Emirates in the spring, summer, and fall of 2006.
85. According to the statem ents made at these meeting s and in comm unications effected by wire and mail during this tim e peri od, Defendant Signal repr esented that it would sponsor Plaintiffs’ green card applications and extend their H-2B visas multiple times to enable Plaintiffs to work in the United States while their green card applications were pending. In exchange, each Plaintiff was required to pay fe es totaling as m uch as 8 lakh rupees ($20,000), each in a series of approximately three installments.
86. Plaintiffs were furthe r inform ed by Recruiter Defendants and/or Burnett Defendants that Plaintif fs would be able to obtain le gal perm anent residen ce for their spouses and children.
87. At inform ational m eetings and in telephone conversations, faxes, contracts, and other written documents transmitted through the use of m ail and wire communications occurring during the spring, sum mer and fall of 2006, Recr uiter D efendants and Burnett Defendants, personally or through their agents, representatives, or em ployees, represented to Plaintiffs that: Defendant Signal would provide lawful, stable , and a mple employment opportunities; working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsis tent with applying for perm anent immigration status sponsored by Signal; a nd, Signal would obtain for P laintiffs work-authorized green cards enabling Plaintiffs to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families.
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88. In such co mmunications with Plainti ffs, Recruiter Def endants and Burnett Defendants f urther p romised to ac t diligen tly a nd to do everything nece ssary to ensure that Plaintiffs would obtain green cards within 24 months of initiating the green-card process.
89. In reasonable reliance upon these and ot her contractually-binding prom ises made to them regarding green cards and work opport unities in the United Stat es, P laintiffs signed green card contracts at various points from m id-2006 to early 2007 with Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants pursuant to which Plainti ffs promised to pay the fees charged by these Defendants.
90. Contracts signed by Plaintiffs and other documents provided to Plaintiffs by Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants thr ough the use of m ail or wire transm issions in and around m id-2006 through at least early 2007, further prom ised that Plaintiffs would promptly receive a refund of all or nearly all of their pay ments if these Defendants did no t succeed in securing green cards for Plaintiffs, as promised.
91. Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants kne w or should have known, however, that they would not refund Plaintiffs’ money as prom ised in the contracts and other documents.
92. Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants induced Plaintiffs to enter the green card contracts even th ough such defendants did not intend to pursue diligen tly Plaintiffs’ applications and without any basis whatsoever fo r representing, inter alia, that Defendant Signal had lawful long-term employm ent opportunities to provide Plaintiffs; that Signal could legally apply for num erous H-2B visa extensions to main tain Plaintiffs’ presence in the United State s; that working under an H-2B visa for Signal w as not inconsistent with applying for perm anent
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immigration status sponsored by Signal; that gr een card applications sponsored by Signal would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and that such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.
93. In reasonable reliance o n Recruiter Defe ndants’ and Burnett Defendants’ explicit and repeated prom ises regarding the procurem ent of green cards and employm ent opportunities in the United States, Plaintiffs undertook considerable economic, personal and familial sacrifices, including the m ortgaging or sale of personal property and other incurrence of debt, in order to amass the funds necessary to initiate the green card process with Defendant Signal.
94. In reasonab le reliance on the pro mises of Recruiter Def endants and Burnett Defendants, Plaintiffs signed contracts with th ese Defendants and m ade the paym ents required by these contracts.
95. Plaintiffs would not have paid the f ees charg ed by Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants for green cards, visas, a nd em ployment opportunities had they known that these Defendants’ promises and representations were false.
96. Plaintiffs would not have paid the f ees charg ed by Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants for green cards, visas, a nd em ployment opportunities had they known that these Def endants had f ailed to dis close m aterial facts con cerning the nature and term s and conditions of the purported immigration and work opportunities offered.
Departure for Signal Operations in the United States 97. At various tim es during the spring, summ er, and fall of 2006, em ployees of Defendant Signal traveled to vari ous locations in India and the Un ited Arab Emirates and tested Plaintiffs’ welding and pipefitting skills in anticipation of employing them in the United States.
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98. Plaintiffs paid costs necessary to travel to the cities where these tests were held. 99. Plaintiffs paid admission fees in order to take these tests. 100. Plaintiffs attended and passe d thes e tests, which were ov erseen and graded by Defendant Signal’s or Defendant Dewan’s agents, employees, or representatives. 101. Upon infor mation and belief, prior to attending these m eetings and testing sessions, D efendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and B urnett Defendants conferred in the spring, summer, and fall of 2006 by phone, m ail, fax or e-mail to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these testing sessions. 102. On or about July 20, 2006 and August 17, 2006, the United States Departm ent of Labor approved Signal’s labor cer tification applications for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007. 103. In approving these labor certification applications, the United Sta tes Department of Labor relied on the accuracy of the applicants’ stated 10-month period of labor need. 104. On infor mation and belief, the Departm ent of Labor is proh ibited by its internal guidelines from granting labor certification ap plications without relying on the applicants’ statement of temporary labor need. 105. In late August and early Septem ber 2006, the United S tates Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) approved Signal’s H-2B visa petitions for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007. 106. In approving these visa petitions, the USCIS relied on the purported accuracy of the applicants’ stated 10-m onth pe riod of labor need and the representation that Defendant Signal’s need was based on a one time peak-load temporary demand.
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107. The USCIS m ust, according to regulation, rely on the stated perio d of the petitioner’s labor need, see 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(6)(ii)(B) (2006).
108. Defendant Signal, Burnett Defendants, and Recruiter Defendants knew that the stated period of need in Signa l’s a pplications f or labor cer tifications and for H-2B visas were inconsistent with Sign al’s p rojected actu al labor need, and therefore Defendants knew these statements to the United States Government were false.
109. Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendant s used the H-2B visas, obtained fro m the U.S. Governm ent on the basis of false statem ents by Defendant Signal and Burnett Defendants, to elicit certain payments from Plaintiffs.
110. Plaintiffs entered the United States on H- 2B guest worker visas, issued by th e United States Government on the basis of fals e statem ents m ade by Defendant Signal and Burnett Defendants, in late 2006 and early 20 07 for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Texas Labor Camp.
111. Around the tim e of USCIS visa ap proval, Plaintiffs made necessary preparations to trave l to the United States on H-2B visas to work for Signal, including: paying to obtain necessary travel and legal documents; making payments to the United States consulate, Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants for m andatory H-2B visa and consular processing fees; attending H-2B visa interviews; and paying Recruiter Defendants for travel arrangements.
112. In order to secure H-2B visas to work for Signal, Plain tiffs were inte rviewed by representatives of the United States Consular offices in Indian cities.
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113. These consular interviews necessitated that Plaintiffs pay th e costs of travel from their hom es or current places of employment to various large In dian cities in cluding Chennai (Madras) and Mumbai (Bombay).
114. Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants, acting as Defendant Signal’s agents, required that Plain tiffs m eet with Recruiter D efendants or Burnett Defe ndants in these Indian cities prior to attending their consular interviews.
115. Upon inform ation and belief, prior to th ese meetings, Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants discussed am ong them selves and w ith Defendant Signal by e-m ail, telephone, or in-person communications the topics to be discussed and instructions to be given to Plaintiffs at these meetings.
116. At these pr e-interview m eetings, Recr uiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants ensured that Plaintiffs were up-to-date on paying the fee installments required by their green card contracts.
117. Defendants further requ ired that Plaintiffs pay an additio nal 35,000 to 45,000 rupees ($800 to $1,100) fee for H-2B visa processing.
118. Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants required Plaintiffs to sign docum ents permitting Defendant Dewan to receive their visa -stamped passports from the Consulate o n Plaintiffs’ behalf.
119. Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants also coached Plaintiffs on what to say during consular interviews.
120. Recruiter D efendants or Burnett Defendants told Plaintiffs that if they did not follow these ins tructions regarding the in terviews, Plaintiffs would not receive th eir visas an d
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would forfeit all of the money they had previously paid to Defendants, in addition to losing their opportunity to permanently immigrate to the United States.
121. During Plaintiffs’ consular interviews, th e consular official s took Plaintiffs’ passports from them.
122. Once Plaintiffs’ visas were approved, consul ar officials sen t their passports, with H-2B visas affixed, directly to Defendant Dewan.
123. After receiv ing word th at Plain tiffs’ vi sas were approved, Recruiter Defendants made travel arrangements for Plaintiffs’ departures to the United States.
124. Before Plaintiffs could leav e for the Un ited States, however, Plain tiffs were required to attend final meetings in Recruiter Defendants’ office.
125. Such m eetings typically took place m ere hours before Plaintiffs’ scheduled departures to the United States, when Recruite r Defendants’ office was teem ing with anxious fellow Indian H-2B Workers awaiting departure to the United States.
126. At these meetings, Recruiter Defendants collected final installm ent paym ents required by Plaintiffs’ green card contracts.
127. Recruiter Defendants also required that Plaintiffs, most of whom do not or did not at the time read or speak English proficiently, sign English language docum ents with little or no time for review, and did not allow Plaintiffs to keep a copy of the documents.
128. Recruiter Defendants refused to return Pl aintiffs’ passports — which had been in Defendant Dewan’s possession sin ce Plaintiffs’ H-2B visas were approved by consular officials — until af ter Plain tiffs had paid the f inal ins tallments of their f ees and signed m andatory paperwork.
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129. In forceful tones, Recruiter Defendants or their staff de manded that Plaintiffs quickly s ign the m andatory docum ents, le st the y m iss the f lights to the United Sta tes, which Recruiter Defendants had scheduled for them and forfeit the fees they had paid.
130. Without possession of their passports and within this ru shed and hostile atmosphere, Plaintiffs had no reasonable opportun ity to review, negotiate, or m ake any changes to the documents presented them.
131. On occasions when wor kers who appeared at th e Mumbai office failed to present sufficient funds to pay the final installm ent requ ired by the green card contracts, Defendant Dewan and his associates threatened to destroy or deface these workers’ passports.
132. Such threats were uttered in the pres ence of other workers, causing these workers to reasonably believe that they had no choice but to pay their final fee installments in full.
133. Based on Recruiter Defendants’ threateni ng and coercive beha vior during these pre-departure meetings in Mum bai and the extrao rdinary and increasing levels of debt they had incurred to pay Recruiter Defendants and Burn ett Defendants for green card and H-2B visa arrangements, Plaintiffs reasonab ly believed that they had no choice but to m ake the paym ents required by Recruiter Defendants and to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal. Not until P laintiffs had f ulfilled all of Def endants’ r equirements did Plaintif fs have their passports and visas returned to them.
134. Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Worker s traveled from M umbai to Defendant Signal’s operations in the U.S. at va rious times from late October 2006 to April 2007 on tickets arranged by Recruiter Defendants.
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135. Defendant Signal collected Plaintiffs at the Houston airport upon arrival and transported them immediately to the Texas Labor Camp.
136. Pursuant to Defendant Signal’s instruc tions and arrangements, approximately 300 workers were sent to Signal’s Pascagoula, Miss issippi facility (the “M ississippi Labor Ca mp” and collectively with the Texas L abor Cam p, the “Labor Cam ps”) and approxim ately 290 workers were sent to the Texas Labor Camp upon arrival in the United States.
137. Plaintiffs had no choice but to use Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants to secure employment at Defendant Signal’s operations.
138. Plaintiffs had no choice but to pay the fees ch arged by Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants to secure employment at Defendant Signal’s operations.
139. Management personnel at Defendant Si gnal m ade the conscious and deliberate decision to prohibit Plaintiffs from securing em ployment at Signal’s oper ations eith er through another recruiter or by bypassing recruiters altogether and applying directly with Signal.
Conditions at the Texas Labor Camp 140. Upon arrival at Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Camp, Plaintiffs were shocked to discover that they were expected to live in an isolated, overcrowded labor cam p comprised of trailer-like bunkhouses surrounded by barbed-wire fences, and accessible only b y a single, guarded entrance. 141. Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Camp was lo cated in an is olated, industrial area miles rem oved from s hopping areas, places of worship, public transpor tation or residential communities.
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142. Initially, there were no telephones and no internet access available for Plaintiffs to communicate outside of the Texas Labor Camp.
143. Initially, the re were no telev isions availabl e for Plaintiffs to keep apprised of events outside of the Texas Labor Camp.
144. The Texas Labor Camp gates were cons tantly m onitored by security guards retained by Defendant Signal. Signal’s security guards monitored Plaintiffs’ comings and goings by requiring them to show their employee identi fication badges and recording when Plaintiffs entered and exited the Texas Labor Cam p. Signal’ s secu rity gua rds also search ed Plain tiffs’ packages and bags when they entered the Texas Labor Camp.
145. Except on r are occasions, Plaintiffs were not pe rmitted to r eceive visitors in th e Texas Labor Camp.
146. Up to twenty-four men were housed in each bunkhouse and made to sleep in twotiered bunk beds. The bunk beds were so tightly packed in the bunkhouses that it w as difficult for workers to m ove about in the narrow passa geways between bunks or sit up in bed. These housing conditions violated OSHA regulations.
147. The Texas Labor Ca mp bunkhouses had insufficient to ilet and bathin g facilities for twenty-four men, one or two toilets per bunkhous e, resulting in long lines for the bathroom s before and after work shifts and unsanitary c onditions due to unresolved plumbing problems that rendered the toilets inoperable.
148. Privacy was non-existent, and Plaintiffs often experienced extrem e difficulty sleeping due to the constant noise resulting from the close quarters and the com ings and goings of workers who worked on different shifts.
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149. Defendant Signal’s personnel and security guards conducted surprise searches of the dormitory areas of the bunkhouses, including searches of workers’ personal belongings.
150. Plaintiffs took their m eals in Defenda nt Signal’s m ess halls, which were only open during lim ited hours. Due to unhygienic kitche n conditions, Plainti ffs frequently becam e ill, sometimes requiring hospitalization.
151. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Signal did not obtain the required permit(s) to furnish board at the Texas Labor Camp, and the condition and sanitation of the board provided further violated federal, state, and/or local law including, inter alia, the U.S. Food and Drug Adm inistration Food Code 2005 2, as adopted and m odified by Texas Food Establishment Rules. 25 Tex. Admin. Code. §§229.161 – 229.171, 229.173-229.175.
152. Defendant Signal deducted labor camp f ees of approxim ately $35 per day ($245 per week, or approxim ately $1,050 per m onth) from Plaintiffs’ paychecks for these substandard accommodations and meals.
153. When Plain tiffs com plained and as ked to live outside th e Texas Labor Cam p, Defendant Signal initially refused and subsequently told workers that if they tried to live outs ide the Texas Labor Ca mp Defendant Signal would stil l deduct the labor camp fees from Plaintiffs’ wages. As a resu lt, Plaintif fs reason ably be lieved they had no choice but to contin ue liv ing in Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Camp.
154. Defendant Signal only housed Indian H-2B Workers such as Plaintiffs in its Labor Camps, which other employees and m anagement at Signal referred to as the “res ervation(s)”. Upon information and belief, United States citizens and other workers of non-Indian descent and 2 Available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/food/guidanceregulation/ucm123926.pdf.
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non-Indian race were n either required nor allo wed to live in o r pay for accommodations in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp.
155. Defendant Signal subjected Pl aintiffs to skills testing and re-testing, on-the-job discipline, layoffs, periods witho ut work, l ack of safety precau tions, unfav orable job assignments, evaluation processes, and other a dverse em ployment actions to which non-Indian and United States citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
156. In addition, Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Ca mp personnel and supervisors frequently used offensive language while speaking with or referring to Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers, and regularly insulted Plaintiffs on the basis of their race or alienage.
157. During th e first week o f em ploying Plaintiffs in th e United States, D efendant Signal did not reim burse Plaintiffs for any of the expenses that Plaintiffs were required to incur as a pre-condition of seeking employment with Signal.
158. During th e f irst two we eks of em ploying Plaintiffs, De fendant Signal deducted approximately $100 to $200 each week from Plainti ffs’ checks for job-related to ol kits which Signal required Plaintiffs to purchase from Signal.
159. Defendant Signal personnel and m anagement regularly threatened Plain tiffs and other Indian H-2B W orkers that if they did not continue worki ng for Defendant Signal, did not work according to Defendant Signal’s specifications, or complained abo ut the working or living conditions, Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers would be deported back to India.
160. In the iso lated and guarded atm osphere of the Texas Labor Cam p and saddled with the crushing debts they had incurred to come to the United States in reliance upon the Defendants’ representatives, Plaint iffs reasonably believed Signal’ s statements were threatening
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and believed they had no choice but to continue working for Signal despite deplorable working and living conditions.
161. At regular m eetings and in one-on-one or sm all group conversations with Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Ca mp pers onnel and m anagement, som e workers voiced complaints regarding the discrim inatory trea tment to which Indian H-2B Wo rkers were subjected, but to which non-Indian and U.S. citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
162. When De fendant Signal took no action in response to workers’ complaints, numerous Indian H-2B W orkers living at the Texas Labor Ca mp, including Plaintiffs, began meeting to discuss how to persuade Defendant Signal to improve conditions in the Texas Labor Camp, and also began meeting with third parties to discuss how best to address their concerns.
163. Upon information and belief, Defendant Si gnal became aware of these m eetings between workers, including Plaintiffs, and third parties whom Signal believed to be attorneys.
164. Upon information and belief, Defendant Si gnal, through its em ployees or agents, contacted Recruiter Def endants and Burnett Defe ndants to express its concerns about worker organizing efforts and the specific involvement of Plaintiffs.
165. Upon inform ation and belief, during thes e conversations Recruiter D efendants, Burnett Defendants, and Defendant Signal reached an agreem ent regarding steps to be taken to discourage further worker organi zing efforts and to ensure th at the Indian H-2B W orkers continued to work at Signal without com plaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B W orkers from exercising their legal rights.
166. On March 9, 2007, Plaintiffs learned that Defendant Signal used private security guards to raid Signal’s Mississippi Labor Camp.
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167. Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Work ers beca me increasingly frigh tened and confused by these activities, part icularly when word spread that Defendant Signal had locked up the Mississippi Labor Ca mp Indian H-2B Workers who com plained about the working conditions.
168. Plaintiffs learned of an I ndian H-2B Worker at the Miss issippi Labor Camp who attempted s uicide, rath er than be deported an d face debts he had in curred in India to p ay Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants.
169. Defendant Signal’s actions on and after March 9, 2007 at the Mississippi Labor Camp significantly intensified the reasonable fears of Plaintiffs and othe r Indian H-2 B Workers in the Texas Labor Camp that if they trie d to leave Defendant Signal’s em ploy or oppose unlawful and coercive employment conditions at Defendant Signal, including by consulting with counsel, they faced the threat of physical restraint, detention, forced deportation, or other serious harm or abuses of the legal process. This r eaction was, upon infor mation and belief, exactly the reaction Signal wanted and expected from the Indian H-2B Workers.
170. Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, Signal personnel in the Labor Camps held various m eetings with Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers to discuss the status of Plaintiffs’ and other Indian H-2B Workers’ visas and green card applications.
171. Defendant Signal officials held a m eeting with the In dian H-2B W orkers, including Plaintiffs. Defendant Si gnal ind icated that they had se lected Plain tiffs to continu e working, promising visa extensions in July 2007.
172. In the summ er of 2007, an Indian H-2B W orker was arrested by im migration police in a town near th e Texas Lab or Camp because his visa had expired. Plaintiffs knew that
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worker to be one whom Defendant Signal had prom ised to extend a visa. Hearing of this arrest, Plaintiffs’ fear of leaving the barbed-wire fence that surrounded Texas Labor Camp increased.
173. Defendant Signal representatives then m et with Indian H-2B W orkers and told them not to leave the Texas Labor C amp because if anyone ended up in jail due to immigration issues, Defendant Signal would not pay the bond required to release them.
174. In m eetings and conversa tions in the spring and summ er of 2007, Defendant Signal, through its agents and em ployees at the Texas Labor Ca mp, c ontinued to prom ise that Defendant Signal would arrange for the H-2B vi sa extensions and green cards originally promised Plaintiffs when they were recruited in India and the United Arab Emirates.
175. While Defendant Signal prom ised to arrang e for H-2B visa extensions and green cards for Plaintiffs, Signal in fact was secretly evaluating all of the Indian H-2B Workers with no intention of applying for visa extensions for certain of the Indian H-2B Workers.
176. Plaintiffs’ continuing dependence on Defendant Signal for their present and future immigration status, their continuing high levels of indebtedness, as well as o ther factors reasonably led Plaintiffs, whose e mployment had not been term inated by Signal, to fear serious harm and abuse of the legal process if they left Signal’s employ.
177. Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs reasonably felt like they had no choice but to continue working for Signal.
178. At various tim es relev ant to P laintiffs’ claim s, Defendant Signal refused to confirm whether valid H-2B visa extensions had in fact been obtained for Plaintif fs, coercing Plaintiffs to continue w orking for Signal in the hope that Signal woul d finally resolve their uncertain immigration status.
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179. Since f irst c ontracting with Def endants in India and the United Arab Em irates, Plaintiffs have yet to receive fr om Defendants the promised green cards or permanent residency. Despite clear contractual provisi ons requiring them to do so, R ecruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants have refused to refund any of the fees Plaintiffs paid to them for unsuccessful green card and visa processing.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003 Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589) and 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage,
slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor) All Defendants
180. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
181. Plaintiffs are authorized to bring these civil claims against Defendants pursuant to the civil rem edies provision of the Trafficking Victim s Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
182. Defendants attempted to and did subject P laintiffs to forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
183. Defendants knowingly attem pted to and di d physically restrain and threaten Plaintiffs with serious harm in order to obtain the labor and services of Plai ntiffs in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(1).
184. Defendants knowingly attem pted to and di d obtain the labor and services of Plaintiffs using a schem e, pla n, or pattern which, in the tota lity of the c ircumstances, wa s
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intended to coerce and did coerce Plaintiffs to believe that they would suffer serious harm if they were to leave the employ of the Defendant Signal, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(2).
185. Defendants’ schem e to isolate Pla intiffs, to co erce them to liv e in c onditions causing psychological harm , and to lim it th eir outside contacts, including unlawful discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, wa s designed to convince Plaintiffs that they would suffer serious harm if they were to leave the employ of Defendant Signal.
186. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for attempts to exer cise their lega l rights, and threatened Plain tiffs with dep ortation an d deceiv ed Plaintiffs about the term s of their immigration status in a m anner that constitutes an abuse of th e legal process under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(3).
187. Defendants knowingly recruited, transporte d, harbored, provided, and/or obtained Plaintiffs so as to ob tain the ir labo r and serv ices in violation of la ws prohibiting peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, a nd f orced labor within the m eaning of the provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (TVPA).
188. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, an d in add ition to th e violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 set forth above, Defendants knowingly recrui ted, transported, harbored and/or obtained Plaintiffs for labor or services in f urtherance of these Defendants’ violations of the following provisions of Title 18, Chapter 77 of the U.S. Code:
a. enticing, persuading, or inducing Plaintiffs to go on board an airliner, train and passenger van, and to go to vari ous locations thr oughout the United Arab Emirates, India, an d the United States, with the inten t that th ey may be made or held in modern-day slavery, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1583; 33
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b. knowingly and willfully holding Plain tiffs to involuntar y servitude, as defined by the TVPA, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(5 )(a) and (b), violating 18 U.S.C. § 1584;
c. removing, confiscating, or possessi ng Plaintiffs’ passports and other immigration docum ents in the course of , or with the inten t to vio late 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1590, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); and
d. attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1590, and violating 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a).
189. As a proxim ate result of the conduct of Defendants, P laintiffs have suffered injuries to their persons, businesses, and property, and other damages.
190. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) All Defendants
191. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
192. Plaintiffs’ allegations cont ained in Exhibit 1, appended to this Com plaint, are incorporated herein by reference.
193. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Infl uenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (“RICO”), are brought against all Defendants.
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194. Plaintiffs are “persons” with standin g to sue within the m eaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
195. Each of De fendants is a “RICO person” with in the m eaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1).
196. All Def endants and th e United States Consular of fices in India con stitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterpri se I”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
197. Recruiter Defendants, Burnett Defenda nts, and Defendant Si gnal ar e an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterprise II”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
The RICO Enterprises RICO Enterprise I
198. At all relevant tim es, RICO Enterpri se I was an ongoing business relationship among all Defendants, and the United States C onsular officers in India, with the common purpose of recruiting, transporting, providing, processing, and obtaining foreign workers to work in shipyards in the United States, including in Signal’s operations in Texas.
199. At all r elevant times, RICO Enterpr ise I was en gaged in in terstate commerce in that its activities and transac tions rela ting to the inte rnational and in terstate m ovement of workers affected in terstate commerce and frequently requ ire travel and communications across state and international lines.
200. At all rele vant tim es, the m embers of RICO Enterprise I functioned as a continuing unit.
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201. At all relevant tim es, Defendants conducte d or participated i n, and conspired to

conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO En terprise I through a pattern of num erous acts of

racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), related by

their common goal to recruit, obtai n, transport, process, and provi de workers through the use of

fraudulent promises, exorbitant fees, forced labor, and trafficking.

202. Specifically, Defendants conducte d or participated in and agreed to conspire to

conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by

engaging in the following predicate acts of

racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):

a. Enticement into modern day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583;

b. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584;

c. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589;

d. Trafficking persons w ith respect to m odern day slavery, involuntary

servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; and

e. Unlawful docum ent-related practices in furtherance of trafficking in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a).

203. Specifically, all Defendants conducted or participated in and agreed to conspire to

conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by

engaging in the following predicate acts of

racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):

a. Mail fraud to further their unlawful sc heme in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1341;

b. Wire fraud to further th eir unlawful scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

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c. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. 204. Defendants’ engagem ent in the above lis ted predicate acts in the conduct of affairs of RICO Enterprise I, resulted in the individual financial g ain of each Defendant at the expense of business, property, and personal injury to Plaintiffs.
RICO Enterprise II 205. At all relevant tim es, RICO Enterprise II was an ongoing business relationship among De fendants with the comm on purpose of se lling United S tates green cards, visas, and work opportunities to Indian worker s to convince such workers to pay fees and to travel to the United States to work for companies, including Defendant Signal. 206. At all relevant times, the members of RICO Enterprise II operated as a continuing unit. 207. At all rele vant times, RICO Enterprise II was engaged in intersta te commerce in that its activities and transactions relating to the sale of United States green cards, visas, and jo b opportunities affected interstate commerce. 208. At all relevant tim es, Defendants conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO Ente rprise II through a pattern of num erous acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), related by their common goal to sell United States green cards and work opportunities to Indian workers for the purposes of furnishing such workers for employment at Signal’s operations. 209. Specifically, Defendants conducted or par ticipated in the affairs of RICO Enterprise II by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
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a. Enticement into modern day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583; b. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584; c. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; d. Trafficking persons w ith respect to m odern day slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; e. Unlawful docum ent-related practices in furtherance of trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); f. Mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; g. Wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and h. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. 210. Defendants’ engagem ent in the above lis ted predicate acts in the conduct of affairs of RICO Enterprise II, resulted in the individual financial gain of each Defendant at the expense of business, property, and personal injury to Plaintiffs.
Predicate Acts Enticement into Slavery: 18 U.S.C. § 1583 211. Defendants, through E nterprises I and II, enticed, persuaded, and induced Plaintiffs, to board a vessel, airpla ne, train, or passenger vehicle with the intent that Plaintiffs be compelled into forced labor or involuntary servitude. 212. Defendants, through Enterprises I and II, willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and conspir ed to comm it m ultiple pred icate acts of enticem ent into m odern-day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
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Involuntary Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1584 213. Defendants, through R ICO Enterprise s I and II, willfully, knowingly, and intentionally comm itted and/or con spired to commit m ultiple p redicate acts of involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1584, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
Forced Labor: 18 U.S.C. § 1589 214. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, knowingly pr ovided or obtained the labor or services of Plaintiffs by means of threats of seri ous harm or by m eans of threatened abuse of the legal process. 215. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, benefitted financially from participation in a venture in which Defendants k nowingly engaged in providing or obtaining the forced labor or services of Plaintiff. 216. Defendants through RICO Enterprise s I and II willfully, knowingly, and intentionally comm itted and con spired to com mit multiple pred icate acts of f orced labo r in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
Trafficking for the Purposes of Forced Labor and Involuntary Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1590
217. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, knowingly recruited, harbored, transported, or provided Plaintiffs for labor or services in violation of the TVPA.
218. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs , Defendants through RICO Enterprises I and II willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and conspired to com mit m ultiple predicate acts of trafficking for the purposes o f forced labor and/or involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
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Document Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1592 219. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and Exhibit 1, Defendants through RICO Enterprises I and II, knowingly and intentionally confiscated and possessed Plaintiffs’ visa and immigration documents in violation of the TVPA. 220. Defendants, through Enterprises I and II willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and conspired to commit multiple predicate acts of document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
Mail and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 221. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, intentio nally made a nd conspired to m ake false prom ises regarding green cards and other benefits in a schem e calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sum s of money. 222. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, m ade and conspired to m ake false statements related to a pplications submitted to the U.S. Governm ent f or H-2B visa s and f alse prom ises to Plaintif fs regardin g green cards and other benefits in a schem e calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sum s of money. 223. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, used th e mails and wire comm unications, including communications via telepho ne, fax, internet and e-m ail, on num erous occasions to f urther these fraudulent schemes.
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224. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, used th e mails and wire comm unications, including communications via telephone, fax, internet and e-mail on numerous occasions to further this fraudulent scheme.
225. As set f orth in the prec eding paragraphs and in Exhibi t 1, Plaintiffs reasonably relied on these false statem ents m ade by Defe ndants, through RICO Ente rprises I and II, and suffered injury as a result of such reliance and Defendants’ ensuing conduct.
226. These willf ul, knowing, and inten tional acts constitu te m ail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.
Immigration Document Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) 227. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, fraudu lently so ld an d conspired to sell H-2B visa extensions and green ca rds to Plain tiffs despite the se Def endants’ awarenes s that app lications for th ese green cards and visa extensions were not bona fide or lawful under United States immigration law. 228. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, ob tained, accepted, and received H2-B visas despite kn owing these visas to have been procured through false statements and/or fraud on the U.S. Government. 229. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, fraudu lently so ld an d conspired to sell H2-B visa extensions and green cards to Plaintiffs despite Defendants’ aw areness that applica tions for these green card s and visa extensions were not bona fide or lawful under United States immigration law. 230. These willful, knowing, and intentional acts constitu te im migration docum ent fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
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Pattern of Related Racketeering Acts 231. Defendants engaged in the racketeering act ivity and commission of predicate acts as described in this Complain t repeatedly, beginning in 2003 and continuing at leas t through January 2009 with respect to approximately 590 Indian workers. 232. As set forth in the preceding paragra phs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants have committed at least two acts of racketeering activities in the past 10 years. 233. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Signal sought new Indian tem porary workers for employment at Signal who were potentially subject to similar racketeering activities. 234. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, implemented the racketeering acts described in this Complaint to conduct their regular business activities. 235. Defendants’ racketeering acts have or ha d sim ilar purposes: to profit from the fraudulent recruitm ent and forced labor of Plaintiffs and other In dian workers, and to recruit, obtain, provide and m aintain a co nsistent, subm issive, isolate d, and com pliant Indian H-2B Worker labor force at Signal’s operations. 236. Defendants’ acts yielded sim ilar results and caused similar injur ies to Plaintif fs, including payment of high fees, as sumption of significant interest bearing debt , loss of real and personal property, lost work opportunities, lost or unpaid wages and related legal fees. 237. As set forth in the p receding paragraphs an d in Exhib it 1, Defendants’ racketeering acts have or had similar participants: Recruiter Defendants, Burnett Defendants, and Defendant Signal. 238. As set forth in the preceding paragra phs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, though RICO Enterprises I and II, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Indian workers
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who contacted Recruiter Defendants in search of green cards, econom ic opportunity, and stable employment in the United States.
239. Defendants’ acts have or had sim ilar m ethods of comm ission, such as comm on recruitment tactics, relative ly cons istent pra ctices with respect to collecting pay ments from Plaintiffs and other Indian workers, and the us e of si milar e mployment practices and policies with respect to Plaintiffs and other Indian workers.
Injury 240. As a direct and proxim ate result of De fendants’ willful, kno wing, and in tentional acts discussed in this section, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property and businesses including, but not lim ited to: exorb itant fees paid by Plaintiffs for green cards, visas and other immigration and recruitment-related services; interest on debts assumed by Plaintiffs to pay such fees; losses of personal and real property incurred in reliance on Defendants’ fraudulent acts; lost and unpaid wages, lost em ployment opportunities , and other pecuniary and losses to real or personal property. 241. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award o f da mages in an am ount to b e determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Defendant Signal (Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal International
Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.) 242. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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243. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for declaratory relief and damages against Defendant Signal.
244. The actions of Defendant Signal, as set fo rth herein, violated Plaintiffs’ rights to receive the full and equal bene fit of all laws as guarantee d by 42 U .S.C. § 1981, including Plaintiffs’ rights to enjoy and benefit from non -discriminatory em ployment relationships with Signal.
245. Specifically, Defendant Signal subjected Plaintiffs to discriminatory and offensive mandatory room and board arrangements at the Texas Labor Camp.
246. Defendant Signal did not subj ect its non-Indian and U.S. citizen employees to the same or similar room and board arrangements.
247. As set forth in th e p receding paragraphs, Defendant Signal also imposed discriminatory job-related requ irements and ad verse term s and conditions of em ployment to which non-Indian and United States citizen employees were not similarly subjected.
248. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, th rough the actions and statements of its personnel referring to and directed at Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers, Defendant Signal maintained an objectively hostile and abusive work environm ent on account of Plaintiffs’ race and alienage.
249. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs , Defendant Signal’s discrim inatory and offensive treatm ent of Plainti ffs was sufficiently sev ere that it created a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
250. Plaintiffs reasonably perceived their work environment to be hostile, abusive, and discriminatory on the basis of their race and alienage.
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251. Defendant Signal’s hostile, abusive, and discriminatory treatm ent of Plaintiffs

was unwelcome.

252. Defendant Signal knowingly, willfully, m aliciously, intenti onally, and without

justification acted to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights on the basis of Plaintiffs’ race and alienage.

253. As a result of Defendant Signal’s unlawful acts, Plaintiffs have suffered injury to

their property and persons.

254. Plaintiffs seek all app ropriate relief, including declaratory relief, attorn eys’ fees,

costs of this action, and dam ages, including compensatory and punitive dam ages, in an am ount

to be determined at trial.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

VIOLATIONS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT OF 1871 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Thirteenth Amendment

All Defendants

255. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every a llegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

256. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for declaratory relief,

and damages against Defendants.

257. As set f orth in the pr eceding parag raphs and P laintiffs’ Fir st Claim f or Relief ,

Defendants conspired, agreed, planned and coordinated for the purpos e of depriving Plaintiffs of

equal protection of their rights under the Th

irteenth Am endment to the United States

Constitution and its implementing and enforcing statutes (inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590) to

be free from forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.

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258. Defendants were m otivated by racial, anti-Indian, and an ti-immigrant anim us when they conspired to deprive P laintiffs of their rights and acted in furt herance of a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.
259. Defendants knowingly, willfully , m aliciously, inten tionally, and without justification planned and acted to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.
260. As a result of the unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered damages. 261. Plaintiffs seek all app ropriate relief, including declaratory relief, attorn eys’ fees, costs of this action, and dam ages, including compensatory and punitive dam ages, in an am ount to be determined at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
All Defendants 262. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs. 263. As set forth in the preced ing paragr aphs and in Exhibit 1, D efendants, individually and through their agents, employees, and representa tives, knowingly or negligently made materially false and untrue statements and representations to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and term s and conditions of applications and opportunities for imm igration status and employment in the United States. 264. As set f orth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhi bit 1, Defendants knowingly or neglig ently f ailed to disclos e m aterial f acts to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and term s and
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conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and em ployment in the United States.
265. Defendants intended that th e false statem ents m ade by Defendants and their agents, em ployees, and represen tatives would i nduce Plaintiffs to pay the exorbitant fees demanded by Recruiter Defendants, and/or Burnett Defendants.
266. Defendants intended that th e false statem ents m ade by Defendants and their agents, em ployees, o r represen tatives would in duce Plaintiffs to leave their hom es and jobs i n India and the United Arab Emirates and travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.
267. Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on Defendants’ representations. 268. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and em ployment opportuniti es, Plaintiffs paid large su ms of m oney to Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants. 269. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and employm ent opportunities, Plaintiffs incurred substant ial interest-bearing debts in order to pay recruitment, immigration-related, and travel fees charged by Defendants and their agents, employees or representatives. 270. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and employm ent opportunities, Plaintiffs sold personal a nd real property and surrendered employment opportunities in India and the United Arab Emirates. 271. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and employm ent opportunities, Plaintiffs left their hom es and jobs and India and other countries and traveled to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.
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272. At all times, Plaintiffs’ reliance was reasonable. 273. As a direct and proxim ate result of De fendants’ knowin g, willing, intentional, and/or negligent actions, Plaintiffs have been injured. 274. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF BREACH OF CONTRACT All Defendants
275. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
276. As set forth in the preceding paragra phs, Defendants, individually and through their agen ts, em ployees and rep resentatives, offered to obtain perm anent residence and immigration status f or Plaintiffs in the United St ates within 18 to 24 m onths as well as steady work opportunities in the United States with Defendant Signal in exchange f or Plaintiffs’ payment of exorbitant fees to Defendants and their employees, agents and/or representatives.
277. Plaintiffs accepted Defendants’ offers, pa id the agreed upon fees, and p erformed the agreed-upon work.
278. Defendants breached their contracts with Plaintiffs by failing to comply with their binding promises regarding permanent residence and immigration status.
279. In reliance on these agreem ents, Plaintiffs paid large sum s of m oney and entered into substantial debts, surrendered other em ployment opportunities, and in curred other financial losses.
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280. As a direct result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiffs have suffered damages. 281. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT All Defendants
282. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
283. Defendants Signal International, L.L.C. and Signal Internati onal, In c. are and function as, the alte r eg os of Signal Interna tional Texas, G.P. and Signal International Texas, L.P., thus piercing the corporate veil.
284. Defendant Global Resources is and f unctions a s the a lter ego of Defendant Pol, thus piercing the corporate veil.
285. Defendant Dewan Consultants is and func tions as the alter ego of Defendant Dewan, thus piercing the corporate veil.
286. Defendants Burnett Law Offices and GCILC are and function as the alter ego of Defendant Burnet, thus piercing the corporate veil.
287. A real and actual contro versy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants; which is justiciable in character, concerning the trafficki ng of Plaintiffs, violati ons of Plaintiffs’ civil rights, violation of the Klu Klux Klan Act, breach of contract, negligence and fraud. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgm ent under 28 U.S. C. §2201 declaring the al ter egos referenced above.
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288. A declarato ry judgm ent is necessary to pr eserve the rights o f the Plaintiffs who were victims of Defendants.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief:
a. Declaratory relief; b. Compensatory damages; c. Punitive damages; d. Treble damages as authorized by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); e. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; f. A finding of alter ego between Signal International Texas, G.P. and Signal
International Texas, L.P., thus piercing the corporate veil; g. A finding of alter ego between Signal International Texas, L.P. and Signal
International LLC, thus piercing the corporate veil; h. A finding that Signal International, Inc. is the successor in interest to
Signal International LLC, or in the alternative, a finding of alter ego between Signal International LLC and Signal International, Inc., thus piercing the corporate veil; i. A finding of alter ego among Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., thus piercing the corporate veil; j. A finding of alter ego between Global Resources, Inc. and Michael Pol, thus piercing the corporate veil; k. A finding of alter ego between Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt., thus piercing the corporate veil; and l. Such other relief as the court deems just and appropriate.
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Respectfully submitted,

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP
By: /s/ William H. Boice William H. Boice Georgia Bar No. 065725 Brian G. Corgan (pro hac vice application to be filed) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (pro hac vice application to be filed) Georgia Bar No. 735027 Heather L. Heindel (pro hac vice application to be filed) Georgia Bar No. 285204
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Fax: (404)-815-6555

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 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 149 Filed 10/15/14 Page 1 of 23 PageID #: 2968

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., et al. '

1:13-CV-323

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON SIGNAL’S MOTION TO COMPEL (DOC. NO. 122) AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR INTERIM PROTECTIVE ORDER UNDER RULE 30(d)(3) (DOC. NO. 140)
This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia Crone, United States District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings pursuant to a referral order entered on May 22, 2013. (Doc. No. 5.) Pending before the undersigned is the “Signal Defendants’ Motion to Compel” (Doc. No. 122) filed by Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, “Signal”), and the Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Interim Protective Order Under FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3).” (Doc. No. 140.)
Both motions center on the resolution of one issue—to what extent does the in terrorem effect preclude discovery into the Plaintiffs’ “immigration status, immigration history, employment history, and personal information.” (Doc. No. 140, p. 1.)
Signal seeks to compel production of the “plaintiffs’ T or U visas, their applications for such visas and other similar evidence, including evidence as to the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment.” (Doc. No. 122, p. 1–2.) T and U visas are available to victims of human trafficking or other “qualifying criminal activity” and allow those who qualify to stay in the United States for up to four years, and may even lead to permanent residence. The Plaintiffs resist production on two grounds. First, they claim that requiring production of immigration

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related documents might reveal their immigration status, which “would harass, embarrass, and oppress the Samuel Plaintiffs . . . and otherwise chill legitimate claims against such illegal activity.” (Doc. No. 125, p. 1.) This is also known as the in terrorem effect. (Id. at p. 7–9.) Second, in its objections to discovery propounded by the Plaintiffs, Signal claimed that documents relating to events occurring after the Plaintiffs stopped working for Signal were irrelevant. Therefore, the Plaintiffs contend that Signal cannot now seek to compel the production of documents from this period. (Id. at p. 6–7.) In turn, the Plaintiffs request that a protective order be entered preventing discovery into “immigration status, immigration history, employment history, and personal information of the Samuel Plaintiffs or their families after the Samuel Plaintiffs’ employment with the Signal Defendants was terminated.” (Id. at p. 10); (see also Doc. No. 140, p. 1.)
After considering the parties’ briefing and applicable authorities, the undersigned grants in part and denies in part Signal’s motion. Specifically, as to Signal’s request for the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas, given the nature and stage of this case, and the fact that the documents are both relevant and discoverable, the undersigned finds that Signal’s need for the information regarding the Plaintiffs’ visas outweighs any potential in terrorem effect. Therefore, the undersigned grants Signal’s motion as to the visas. As for documents related to the Plaintiffs’ lives “after Signal employment,” Signal failed to identify with any specificity what it is seeking and why it needs this information, and therefore, failed to meet its burden. In addition, because Signal has resisted discovery of information from this period on the grounds that it is irrelevant, Signal cannot now claim that this information is discoverable. Accordingly, Signal’s motion as it relates to information about “the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment” is denied.
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As to the Plaintiffs’ requests to enter a protective order (Doc. Nos. 125 and 140), the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show good cause why discovery on certain topics should be completely precluded. The information that the Plaintiffs seek to protect is relevant and discoverable. However, should Signal seek discovery that is clearly irrelevant and solely aimed at harassment, particularly extensive discovery regarding the Plaintiffs’ relatives and other third parties, the undersigned will at that time consider whether judicially imposed limits are necessary.
I. Background 1. Factual Background
The Plaintiffs are seventeen Indian men who allege that they are victims of human trafficking. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 2, 6–9.) The Plaintiffs assert that Signal, along with several other defendants, lured them into this country with the false promise that if they adequately performed work for Signal, that this could be a pathway to “legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States . . . .” (Id. at 2.) Based on these allegedly false promises and misleading statements, the Plaintiffs paid significant sums of money to obtain work papers and visas to come to the United States. (Id.) Once here, the Plaintiffs claim to have found themselves in deplorable living and working conditions, as well as subject to threats of “arrest, loss of immigration status and deportation, and . . . a campaign of psychological abuse, coercion, and fraud designed to render Plaintiffs afraid, intimidated, and unable to leave Signal’s employ.” (Id. at p. 4.)
2. Procedural Background This case has its origins in a putative class action filed in the Eastern District of
Louisiana. (See Doc. No. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-01220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008)). Class certification was denied, which caused the individual putative class members to
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file suit in the districts where their injuries allegedly occurred. (See Doc. No. 1117, David, 2:08cv-01220 (E.D. La. Jan 4, 2012)). Cases were filed in the Eastern District of Texas, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and the Southern District of Mississippi. The Mississippi cases were consolidated and transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana under the “first-to-file” rule. (See Doc. No. 44, Achari v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 1:13-cv-222 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 18, 2013)). In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit in the Southern District of Mississippi alleging multiple Title VII violations that was also transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana. (See Doc. No. 52, EEOC v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 1:11-cv-179 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 29, 2012)).
All of the cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana are pending in the same court, and that court has severely limited discovery related to immigration status. (Doc. No. 125, p. 5.); see also David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 257 F.R.D. 114, 126 (E.D. La. 2009) (“[A]ny inquiry into plaintiffs’ current immigration status, current residence and/or post-termination employment history will most assuredly strike paralyzing fear in the plaintiffs sufficient to chill any inclination they may have had to prosecute their pending claims.”). The Plaintiffs argue that “[t]o require disclosure in this case would not only conflict with other protective orders in the Related Cases, it would also allow the Signal Defendants to circumvent those orders and obtain discovery other courts have excluded.” (Doc. No. 125, p. 4–5.) The undersigned is confident, however, that to the extent any order entered in this case conflicts with an order entered in a related case pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana, any impact can be ameliorated by proper limits on the dissemination and use of the information produced.
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III. Legal Standard “Generally, the scope of discovery is broad and permits the discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.’” Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)). “A discovery request is relevant when the request seeks admissible evidence or ‘is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” Id. (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, “a district court has broad discretion in all discovery matters, and such discretion will not be disturbed ordinarily unless there are unusual circumstances showing a clear abuse.” Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 606 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling . . . discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). “The moving party bears the burden of showing that the materials and information sought are relevant to the action or will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Marin v. Gilberg, Civ. A. No. V-07-62, 2009 WL 426061, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2009). If the moving party meets its burden, “the burden then shifts to the party resisting discovery to show why the discovery is irrelevant, overly broad, or unduly burdensome or oppressive, and thus should not be permitted.” Id. In addition, “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” a party may move for a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The party seeking a protective order bears the burden to show that good cause exists. See In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit has noted that this requires showing “‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garret, 571 F.2d 1323,
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1326 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978)); compare Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 77–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting the idea that “protective orders must be supported by concrete factual showings” and noting that some courts only require “good cause”) (citations omitted).
IV. Analysis 1. Signal’s “Motion to Compel” (Doc. No. 122)
Signal seeks to compel the production of the “plaintiffs’ T or U visas, their applications for such visas and other similar evidence, including evidence as to the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment.” (Doc. No. 122, p. 1–2.) At a minimum, it appears that Signal is requesting that the undersigned compel production of documents related to Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 8.1 (Doc. No. 122, Ex. A) (See also Doc. No. 125) (identifying four specific Requests for Production at issue in Signal’s motion, including Requests Nos. 7 and 8). These requests relate specifically to the Plaintiffs’ T visas.2 It is unclear what Signal means by “evidence as to the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment,” because Signal failed to identify any particular Request to Production to which it is seeking a response. Thus, the information that Signal seeks can be grouped into two categories: visa related documents and post-Signal employment documents. Each set will be addressed separately.
1. The requests are as follows: Request for Production No. 7: Complete copies of Plaintiff[’s] T Visa application. This request includes copies of any supplemental application and any other correspondence provided by Plaintiff, or representative, to the US government in any way to his T-Visa application. Request for Production No. 8: Complete copies of the results of Plaintiff[’s] T Visa application. Plainitff[’s] response should include any document ever received from the US Government relating in any way to Plaintiff’s T visa application, including, but not limited to, any final determination, as well as a copy of the visa issued, if any.
2. Signal’s motion seeks to compel production of both T and U visas, but Signal did not specifically request the U visa in its Requests for Production. (Doc. No. 122.) The Plaintiffs, however, do not raise this as a reason not to produce the U visas. Given the similarity of the T and U visas, the undersigned will consider compelling production of both visas.
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a. Visa related documents i. Background on T and U visas
T and U visas were created with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act (“VTVPA”). See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 107, 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1477–79, 1534–37. The T visa is available to unauthorized immigrants who have been victims of human trafficking, whereas a U visa is available to victims of “qualifying criminal activity.” See 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.11 (T visa); 214.14 (U visa). The Code of Federal Regulations contains a laundry list of “qualifying criminal activity,” which includes such crimes as trafficking, involuntary servitude, and slave trade. Id. § 214.14(a)(9).
The T and U visas share some important characteristics that are relevant to this case. First, they are available not only to the victim, but also certain family members of the victim. Id. §§ 214.11(o) (T visa); 214.14(f) (U visa). Second, both require cooperation with law enforcement. To obtain a T visa, the victim must comply with any reasonable requests from a law enforcement agency for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of human trafficking. Id. § 214.11(h). Similarly, to obtain a U visa, a victim must have been “helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to a certifying agency in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity upon which his or her petition is based . . . .” Id. § 214.14(b)(3). Third, each visa is valid for four years, and after a period of three years, the victim may seek permanent residence. Id. §§ 245.23(a) (T visa); 241.14(g) (U visa). Lastly, each visa authorizes the victim to lawfully obtain employment. Id. §§ 214.11(l) (T visa); 214.14(i)(7) (U visa).
ii. Signal has met its burden As the movant, it is Signal’s burden to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas are
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discoverable. Signal argues that because there are substantial benefits derived from obtaining
one of these visas, there may be an incentive for the Plaintiffs to fabricate their claims or
exaggerate the extent of the harm that they suffered as a result of Signal’s conduct. Therefore,
according to Signal, these documents are discoverable because they may be probative of the Plaintiffs’ motives.3
The information that Signal seeks falls within the broad scope of discovery. FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense . . .” and “relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).4
Information in the visas and visa applications may shed light on Signal’s claim that the Plaintiffs
“manufactured their allegations against Signal,” or could at least lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. (Doc. No. 122, p. 4.) For example, in the T visa application, under penalty
of perjury, a victim must check a box stating that they are a victim of severe trafficking. The
applicant is also requested to explain certain answers, such as whether they will suffer extreme
hardship if removed from the United States, and whether they have reported these acts to law enforcement, as well as submit a “personal narrative statement describing the trafficking.”5 See
I-914, Application for T Nonimmigrant Status, http://www.uscis.gov/i-914. Moreover, a law
3. Signal devotes much of its motion to arguments related to the confrontation clause and its constitutional rights to discovery. These arguments are misplaced. The confrontation clause, by its terms, only applies in the criminal setting. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”) (emphasis added). In a civil case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate Signal’s rights to information. So long as this court does not clearly abuse its discretion in applying these rules and completely deprive Signal of access to discovery (which in an extreme case may potentially be a due process violation), Signal’s constitutional rights will have been protected.
4. See also Local Civil Rule CV-26(d) (noting that information is discoverable if “it is information that is likely to have an influence on or affect the outcome of a claim or defense” or “that deserves to be considered in the preparation, evaluation or trial of a claim or defense”).
5. The Plaintiffs claim that redacted affidavits attached to their visa applications have been produced. (Doc. No. 125, p. 3 n. 1.)
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enforcement officer may also fill out a form containing similar information. See I-914, Supplement B, Declaration of Law Enforcement Officer for Victim of Trafficking in Persons, http://www.uscis.gov/i-914 (noting that a person may qualify for a T visa without this form, but “submission of the Supplement B is strongly advised”). In this form, a law enforcement officer is to describe the victimization, as well as mark a box on whether the applicant has been a victim of trafficking. Signal is entitled to know what boxes, if any, were checked by the Plaintiffs or law enforcement, and any proffered descriptions, which would necessarily relate to the events giving rise to this lawsuit.
In addition, Signal filed a cross-claim against the other defendants, arguing that if there is any wrongdoing, the other defendants are to blame. (Doc. No. 79, p. 56) (“Plaintiffs’ suit alleges that Signal was part of a concerted wrongdoing directed at foreign workers. However, Signal was a victim of the cross claim defendants’ actions rather than a willing participant.”). The information contained in the visa application, particularly where an applicant is requested to do more than just check a box, but rather, describe their experiences, may be informative. If, for example, Plaintiffs’ applications made no mention of Signal, but only of the other defendants, this could be highly relevant to this case. While the undersigned is not determining at this juncture whether such evidence will be admissible at trial, it is not beyond belief that it might, at the very least, lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Therefore, Signal has met its burden of demonstrating this information is discoverable.
iii. The burden shifts to the Plaintiffs The Plaintiffs argue that they should not be compelled to produce immigration related documents on two grounds. First, in its responses to the Plaintiffs discovery requests, Signal narrowed the scope of discovery by claiming that documents from the time that Plaintiffs
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stopped working for Signal are irrelevant, and as such, Signal cannot now claim that information from this period is discoverable. Second, producing these documents would have an in terrorem effect on the Plaintiffs, as well as other victims of trafficking, and therefore, social policies trump Signal’s need for the visas.
1. The immigration documents are relevant As to the Plaintiffs’ first argument, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas cannot be classified as merely documents relating to the Plaintiffs’ post-Signal activities. First, it is unclear when, or even if, any of Plaintiffs sought these visas. It is plausible that if any Plaintiffs applied for these visas, they did so while still employed at Signal. Moreover, these documents will likely contain factual statements and assertions about the Plaintiffs’ experiences related to their trafficking and their experiences while employed by Signal. Accordingly, even if the Plaintiffs applied for these visas after they left Signal, the information contained in the applications is not simply information related to Plaintiffs’ post-Signal activities. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ objection on relevancy grounds is not sufficient to deny Signal access to these documents.
2. The in terrorem effect does not outweigh Signal’s need for the documents
The Plaintiffs next argue that, even if the visas are relevant, they should not be required to produce them because, if forced to do so, it would dissuade them from prosecuting this case. This is known as the in terrorem effect, and has been invoked to preclude or limit discovery into sensitive topics, particularly immigration status.
The in terrorem effect is predicated on two concepts. First, that certain remedial statutes, in order to achieve their goals, rely on enforcement by private citizens. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Congress intended to empower individuals to act
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as private attorneys general in enforcing provisions of Title VII.”); Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 251 (2010) (noting that the VTVPA was amended in 2003 to add a private cause of action “thereby codifying a new class of private attorneys general and representing an effort to extend civil rights protections to trafficked persons”). Second, if forced to disclose their immigration status in a lawsuit, victims may be reluctant to file suit because, if it is revealed that they are not in the country legally, they may face deportation or harassment. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064. One court even reasoned that documented workers might be deterred from enforcing their rights for “fear that their immigration status would be changed, or that their status would reveal the immigration problems of their family or friends . . . .” Id. at 1065. Thus, the in terrorem effect reflects a policy choice that the enforcement of certain statutes outweighs a party’s need for full and unfettered discovery into matters that may be of minimal or no relevance. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064–66 (discussing the policy reasons behind the in terrorem doctrine and holding: “Given Title VII’s dependence on private enforcement, we find that the national effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace would be hampered by the discovery practices [the defendant] seeks to validate here.”); Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[A]llowing parties to inquire about the immigration status of other parties, . . . present[s] a danger of intimidation [that] would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights.”) (citation omitted).
There is no bright-line rule for when the in terrorem effect should limit discovery. Rather, courts balance the unique facts and posture of each case against the relevant social policies of the statutes at issue. See, e.g., Thomas A. Doyle, “Competing Concerns in Employment Litigation: How Courts are Managing Discovery of an Employee’s Immigration
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Status,” 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 405, 406–14 (Spring 2013) (identifying eight factors courts often consider in deciding whether to allow discovery of an employee’s immigration status). The two most relevant factors that courts tend to consider are: what statute the plaintiff is suing under and the procedural posture of the case.
As for the statute that a plaintiff is suing under, this informs whether immigration status is in any way relevant to the underlying case. Where irrelevant or merely collateral to a party’s claim or defense, courts often preclude immigration related discovery. See Topo, 210 F.R.D. at 77–78. For example, the Fifth Circuit granted a writ of mandamus and reversed a trial court’s order requiring the plaintiffs to answer questions related to their immigration status, because the “protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act are applicable to citizens and aliens alike and whether the alien is documented or undocumented is irrelevant.” In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1987); see also EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., Inc., CV-10-3033-LRS, 2012 WL 442025 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2012) (noting that immigration status has no bearing on determining liability under Title VII). Conversely, when immigration status is arguably relevant, courts have allowed for discovery. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., No. 3:10-cv135, 2014 WL 281979, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 24, 2014).
The heart of the issue in this case is human trafficking. One could argue that, like claims under Title VII or the FLSA, immigration status is irrelevant to claim for trafficking. See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 170–71. A person can bring a trafficking claim regardless of whether they are a citizen, legal immigrant, or undocumented worker. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1590. However, something sets a trafficking claim apart from one brought pursuant to Title VII or the FLSA— the T and U visa. These visas create a safe harbor, allowing victims of trafficking and certain other crimes to stay in the United States legally while prosecuting their case. No such equivalent
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visa, amnesty, or safe harbor exists for a plaintiff bringing an FLSA or Title VII claim. The availability of these visas impact the in terrorem analysis in two important respects.
First, they create an incentive for an undocumented worker to fabricate or exaggerate a claim of human trafficking. See Cazorla, 2014 WL 281979, at *1 (noting that certain immigration benefits were available to plaintiffs due to their allegations). The undersigned is not insinuating that this is the case here. However, it appears that this is at least conceivable, and Signal should have the opportunity to explore this possibility. Second, they create a safe harbor for illegal immigrants who were victims of trafficking. One of the underpinnings of the in terrorem effect is that undocumented workers will be less likely to seek redress for fear that their immigration status will be revealed and they will then face deportation. Because an undocumented worker who was the victim of severe trafficking can receive a T or U visa, any chilling effect is greatly minimized. In fact, it is difficult to imagine an undocumented worker who would bring a civil suit alleging to be a victim of trafficking, but fail to seek such a visa. Or, stated another way, it is difficult to comprehend an instance in which a person would not report that they were a victim of human trafficking for fear their T visa would be potentially discoverable in a lawsuit years later—a lawsuit they themselves initiated. The only workers whose rights might be chilled would be those who were trafficked but failed to qualify for either visa. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that this is a relatively small group, and the Plaintiffs have not suggested that could be the case here.6
6. From 2002 through 2012, 5,820 T-1 visa applications, which are visas issued directly to the victim, were filed. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-914 – Application for T Nonimmigrant Status, Form I918 – Petition for Nonimmigrant Status Receipts, Approvals, and Denials, Fiscal Year 2013, Through Third Quarter, http://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-914-application-t-nonimmigrantstatus (last visited October 15, 2014). Of those applied for, 1,671 were denied, equating to 29%. As for T-2,3,4 or 5 visas, which are available to family members of a victim, 606 applications, or 20%, were denied. From 2009 through 2012, 18% of U-1 visa (victim visas) were denied, and 16% of U-2,3,4,5 (family member visas) were denied.
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The procedural posture of a case also impacts the in terrorem analysis. For example, in Rivera, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a protective order precluding discovery related to immigration status, because such discovery was irrelevant at that time to the issue before the court, which was liability (as opposed to damages) under Title VII. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1074–75. The trial court, however, had yet to decide whether the proceedings were going to be bifurcated, leaving the door open to the possibility that the analysis may change in the future. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1062, 1070. As one court subsequently noted, “Rivera did not foreclose the possibility that immigration status, although clearly irrelevant to the Title VII liability determination, might not become relevant later in the remedies portion of the litigation.” Rodriguez v. ACL Farms, Inc., No. cv-10-3010, 2010 WL 4683743, *4 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2010). Likewise, in David, one of the parallel cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana, when the court first entered the protective order (that the Plaintiffs argue the undersigned should adopt), the issue being resolved was class certification. David, 257 F.R.D. at 125. Immigration status of the plaintiffs had no bearing on the issues of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id.
Courts, however, have recognized that as a case progresses and moves towards trial, the pendulum begins to swing in favor of allowing discovery, and depending on the facts of the case, a defendant’s need may outweigh any social policies that would otherwise prevent disclosure. See Cazorla, 2014 WL 281979 at *1. For example, in Cazorla, Koch Foods of Mississippi was accused of committing atrocities against Hispanic workers. Id. The court, early in the case, entered a protective order prohibiting discovery of immigration related documents. Id. Koch Foods later sought reconsideration of the protective order and specifically to compel the production of the plaintiffs’ U visas. Id. The court granted Koch’s motion as to the visas, noting
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that they were relevant because “immigration benefits may be made available to [the plaintiffs] because of the allegations they have made.” Id. The court held:
The issue is the relevance of the information sought by Koch Foods to the claims and defenses in this action. Koch Foods has raised a legitimate defense regarding U visas, T visas, or other immigration benefits, and it is entitled to pursue discovery, including visa applications, that supports the defense. The relevance of this information clearly outweighs its in terrorem effect, as any individuals who have applied for immigration benefits have, necessarily, already disclosed their immigration status to federal authorities. Id. at *2. Likewise, other courts, after balancing all the factors, have found that a defendant’s need for information outweighed any potential in terrorem effect. See Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., Nos. 10-cv-772, 11-cv-1132, 2012 WL 5931716, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Nov. 27, 2012) (granting a motion to compel production of the plaintiffs’ T or U visas in a human trafficking case); EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. cv-11-3045, 2013 WL 3940674, at *4–7 (E.D. Wash July 31, 2013) (lifting the prohibition on discovery related to the plaintiffs’ immigration status because the information was relevant, and the plaintiffs failed to show good cause warranting a continued limitation). After weighing all the relevant factors and policies, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that “good cause” exists to enter a protective order precluding production of the Plaintiffs’ visa related documents. The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there would in fact be a chilling effect if, at this stage, they were required to disclose their visas. See In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that a party must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements”). What the undersigned finds most compelling is that, in this context, any chilling effect is largely offset by the availability of the T or U visa. A victim of trafficking does not need to choose between risking deportation by filing suit to rectify
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a wrong, or allowing atrocities to go unpunished in order to avoid bringing attention to their immigration status. Instead, purported victims of human trafficking are allowed to blow the whistle on their employers while at the same time being protected from deportation by obtaining a T visa. While there may be a small subset of people who are legitimate victims of trafficking but denied a T visa, when balanced against the relevancy of this information and Signal’s need for it, the undersigned finds protecting this small and undefined class is an insufficient reason to deny Signal the information it seeks.
Accordingly, the undersigned grants Signals’ motion as to the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas. iv. Limits on further discovery and on the use and dissemination of the Plaintiffs’ documents
The Plaintiffs seek to block Signal from obtaining personal information about them, as well as their relatives. (Doc. No. 125, p. 10.) As discussed above, some discovery into the Plaintiffs’ immigration status is permissible. Nevertheless, discovery aimed at sensitive information of people who are not parties to this case may very well have an in terrorem effect on the Plaintiffs and deter them from prosecuting this suit. Signal, however, has not made such a request.7 Therefore, at this time, there is no need to enter a broad protective order. Should Signal seek such discovery, the undersigned will at that time weigh the potential in terrorem effect against Signal’s need for the information, and the balance of the various factors may very well change.
In addition, it is worth noting that discovery related to the immigration status of friends and relatives would appear to be irrelevant. For example, a condition precedent of a family member receiving a visa is that the victim be awarded a visa. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(o) (“an alien who has applied for and been granted T-1 nonimmigrant status may apply for admission of an
7. See supra Note 1.
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immediate family member . . . .”). Therefore, production of the named Plaintiffs’ visa information should be sufficient for Signal to test its theories regarding the Plaintiffs’ motives. Should Signal seek discovery related to the Plaintiffs’ family members, it will need to demonstrate a particular need. However, because it is theoretically possible that such a need may exist, the undersigned will address that issue if and when it presents itself.
The Plaintiffs shall designate any documents produced pursuant to this order as “Confidential” and those documents are to be treated as “Protected Documents,” as defined in the protective order governing this case. (Doc. Nos. 55 and 94.) Moreover, the undersigned is mindful that to some extent this order conflicts with ones that have been entered in the cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Therefore, to prevent Signal from circumventing the protective orders in other cases, Signal may only use information regarding the Plaintiffs visas in this case; use outside this case, in any manner, including depositions, motions, etc., particularly in the EEOC case, which shares common plaintiffs, would be a violation of this order and would subject the violating party to sanctions.
b. Post-Signal documents In addition to the immigration materials discussed above, Signal also seeks to compel production of “other similar evidence, including evidence as to the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment.” (Doc. No. 122, p. 1–2.) Signal, however, fails to cite which particular Requests for Production it is seeking to have the Plaintiffs respond to, and fails to cite with any specificity what documents it is seeking. See, e.g., Hart v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Del. 2010) (“Plaintiff makes only generalized arguments about Defendant’s responses, and the Court will not undertake a review of each of the 65 document requests without more specific guidance from Plaintiff on what responses it is challenging and why.”).
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The only actual guidance that Signal offers is a reference of “see Exhibit 1, pp. 4-9,” which covers Requests for Production Nos. 1 through 10, and that it is seeking “written material concerning the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment.” (Doc. No. 122, p. 11.) It is not the role of the undersigned to parse out Signal’s Requests for Production or guess at which requests Signal seeks responses. Plaintiffs contend that at issue, other than the specific requests for visas, are Requests for Production Nos. 2 (current driver’s license) and 47 (first paycheck from an employer located in the U.S. other than Signal). (Doc. 125, p. 1.)
Signal has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that these materials are relevant, or will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Signal’s motion is almost exclusively focused on compelling production of the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas, and only vaguely argues that this other information is needed because it will “deepen the jury’s appreciation of the motives of the plaintiffs.” (Doc. No. 122, p. 2.) For instance, Signal does not address why it needs copies of the Plaintiffs’ current driver’s license, why it needs a copy of Plaintiffs’ first paycheck after they left Signal, or how this information may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Signal’s failure to demonstrate with precision what it is seeking, or why this information is relevant, is reason enough to deny Signal’s motion. See Hart, 270 F.R.D. at 169 (“While the Court recognizes the potential relevance [of the information sought] . . . Plaintiff has not directed the Court’s attention to any particular document request or to make any particularized argument with respect to a document request.”).
However, there is an additional reason to deny Signal’s request—Signal has objected to several requests for production propounded by the Plaintiffs on the grounds that:
documents requested for the time frame January 1, 2004 through July 31, 2005 and February 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009 are not relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information. Signal objects to the date range in this request because only events during the recruitment of the H2B workers and
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their time of employment at Signal are probative of the claims in this action. (Doc. No. 125, Ex. 1, pp. 2, 4–5, 7.) (emphasis added). Signal cannot refuse to produce documents on grounds that any documents from outside a certain period are irrelevant to the dispute, and then seek to compel production of documents from this same timeframe. As the Plaintiffs correctly note, “the Signal Defendants cannot have it both ways.” (Doc. No. 125, p. 7.) Because Signal has objected to any discovery after the Plaintiffs left Signal, and from the information before the court there is no indication that Signal withdrew these objections or that the parties have subsequently agreed to expand the relevant period for discovery, the undersigned denies Signal’s motion as to “the lives of the Plaintiffs after Signal employment.”
2. Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Interim Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)” (Doc. No. 140) Plaintiffs allege that Signal is seeking information during depositions that is calculated to
have an in terrorem effect, and they have requested that the undersigned enter a protective order “limit[ing] depositions of the Samuel Plaintiffs and any other witnesses with relevant information so as to exclude any questions having an in terrorem effect on the Samuel Plaintiffs . . . including discovery of immigration status, immigration history, employment history, and personal information of the Samuel Plaintiffs.” (Doc. No. 140.) As discussed above, it is the Plaintiffs’ burden to show that good exists warranting a protective order. See In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998). For reasons detailed below, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden, and therefore, declines to enter broad protective order at this time.
Plaintiffs argue that there are “three categories of behavior” that evidence Signal’s discovery abuses and demonstrate the need for a protective order. (Doc. No. 140, p. 4.) First, that Signal is attempting to harass the Plaintiffs by seeking information related to their family
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members. As evidence, the Plaintiffs offer portions of a deposition transcript containing an exchange between one of the Plaintiffs and Signal. (Id., Ex. A.) There are two excerpts that warrant attention. In one excerpt, Signal asked whether this Plaintiff’s brother had a green card. In another, Signal indicated a desire to depose this Plaintiff’s brother and requested his contact information. It appears from the broken record before the court that Signal is trying to piece together an argument that because this Plaintiff was in contact with a relative prior to his employment with Signal, who had knowledge of the immigration process, that this Plaintiff knows more about the immigration process than he is letting on. It is plausible that the Plaintiff’s brother may corroborate this, and therefore, Signal should be allowed to depose the Plaintiff’s brother because this information is highly relevant to some of the claims and defenses in this case.
Therefore, the undersigned does not find that all inquiries of relatives and family members should be off limits. However, if Signal were to depose a non-party family member, this deposition should be narrowly tailored to the issues in this case. For reasons discussed above, the current immigration or employment status of a Plaintiffs’ relatives or friends does not appear relevant to the issues in this case, nor does it appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Intrusive and probing discovery into the lives of the Plaintiffs’ family may very well have an in terrorem effect on the Plaintiffs. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065–66 (discussing the fear that undocumented workers face in bringing suit, and noting that even some documented workers may be deterred because “their status would reveal the immigration problems of their family and friends . . . ”). Whether to allow such questioning would call for a fact-specific analysis, and without knowing who Signal is seeking to depose, what is being asked, and why, the undersigned cannot determine whether the questioning is
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permissible. The undersigned is not going to attempt to delineate the contours of what issues Signal may or may not inquire about without being presented a specific factual dispute.8
Second, the Plaintiffs argue that Signal has inappropriately used information gleaned from a deposition in this case in another matter. (Doc. No. 140, p. 5–6.) In other words, Signal is using the lack of a protective order in this case to circumvent protective orders in other cases. (Doc. No. 125, p. 5–6.) Because the undersigned does not find that a protective order like the one entered in David is warranted, to prohibit a party from circumventing a protective order in another case, the undersigned orders that information learned in this case, that would be subject to a protective order in another case, cannot be used in that case. In other words, there is a “Chinese wall” between all of the various matters as it relates to the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas.9 From the date of this order forward, violation of this separation between cases, as it relates to immigration related discovery, will be considered an abuse of the discovery process and subject the violating party to sanctions. At the time of the deposition, however, there was no protective order in place in this case protecting this information. While better judgment may have counseled against using information from this case in another case (particularly one in which a protective order precluding such discovery was in place), technically Signal did not violate any of this court’s orders.
Third, the Plaintiffs complain that deposition transcripts, which were marked “highly confidential” from this case, were filed, not under seal, in another case pending in the Eastern District of Texas. (Doc. No. 140, p. 7.) There is no order in this case that would compel, or even
8. Should another dispute about an appropriate line of questioning arise during a deposition, the parties are reminded that this District maintains a discovery hotline that allows the parties to get an immediate resolution of their issues and carry on with the deposition. See Local Civil Rule CV-26(e).
9. This does not impact the “Consent Order Regarding Use of Discovery from Related Cases.” (Doc. No. 96.) Rather, this mandate only applies to sensitive information produced pursuant to Signal’s motion to compel.
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allow, for this to be filed under seal. Local Civil Rule CV-5(a)(7) states: “Unless authorized by statute or rule, a document in a civil case shall not be filed under seal” unless counsel has moved to seal the document, or the “court has already granted authorization to seal the document.” (emphasis added). The only protective order in this case relates to the dissemination of “confidential proprietary and business information and/or trade secrets” (Doc. No. 55); this does not cover personal information regarding immigration status.
Moreover, the undersigned does not find that the use of the excerpt goes so far as to the point of being harassing. It merely indicates that one of the Plaintiffs received a T visa. Signal is simply trying to draw the parallel that it is likely that the Plaintiffs in that case have also received a T visa. However, since this order clarifies that information learned in one case about a Plaintiffs’ immigration status may not be used in another, moving forward, this is should not to be an issue.
Ultimately, the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden for why a broad protective order should be entered. Plaintiffs’ arguments about the in terrorem effect are wholly general, and fail to detail precisely how these Plaintiffs will be deterred from prosecuting this suit. Moreover, for reasons stated above, the undersigned finds that in terrorem effect does not operate in this case to close off all immigration related lines of questioning. The areas that Signal is inquiring about are relevant, or at the very least, may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Should the Plaintiffs’ believe that Signal is crossing the line, the undersigned will address those concerns on a case-by-case basis.
V. Conclusion It is therefore ORDERED that Signal’s “Motion to Compel” (Doc. No. 122) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Within seven (7) days, the Plaintiffs shall
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 149 Filed 10/15/14 Page 23 of 23 PageID #: 2990 produce documents responsive to Signal’s Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 8, including information related to U visas. Signal’s motion as it relates to “other similar evidence, including evidence as to the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment” is DENIED. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs’ requests for the entry of a protective order (Doc. Nos. 125 and 140) are DENIED. Lastly, Signal is precluded from using information related to the Plaintiffs’ immigration status gathered through the discovery process in this case, in any other matter pending in either the Eastern District of Texas or Eastern District of Louisiana. SIGNED this 15th day of October, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
23

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 211 Filed 12/08/14 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: 8669

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-323

ORDER SEVERING AND TRANSFERRING SIGNAL’S CROSS-CLAIMS TO THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia Crone, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for all pretrial matters. (Doc. No. 5.)

Pending before the undersigned is the “Motion to Defer Signal’s Cross Claim[s] or in the

Alternative to Transfer Venue of Signal’s Cross Claim[s] Pursuant to the First-Filed Rule” (Doc.

No. 195) filed by Defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Malvern C. Burnett A.P.C., and the Gulf Coast

Immigration Center, L.L.C. (collectively, “Burnett”). The certificate of conference states that

“Signal has no objection to the filing of the motion, but has not determined, as yet, its position on

the merits of the motion itself . . . .” (Id. at p. 13.) It was not indicated whether any other party

opposed the motion. However, the time for responding to Burnett’s motion has passed and no

objections were filed. Accordingly, the undersigned considers the motion unopposed. See

Local Rule CV-7(d) (“In the event that a party fails to oppose a motion in the manner prescribed

herein, the court will assume that the party has no objection.”). After reviewing Burnett’s motion

and the applicable authorities, the undersigned finds that Burnett’s motion should be granted in

part and that Signal’s cross-claims should be severed from the main action and transferred to the

Eastern District of Louisiana.

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 211 Filed 12/08/14 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: 8670
I. Background On March 7, 2008, a putative class action was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of over five hundred plaintiffs who were allegedly victims of human trafficking. (See Doc. No. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008)). The court in David denied class certification (as to all claims except the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims), which caused the putative class members to file suit in the district where their injuries allegedly occurred. The Plaintiffs in this case filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas because they claim to have suffered their injuries at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas. Like in David, the Plaintiffs in this case sued numerous defendants. (See Doc. No. 1); (See also Doc. No. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008)) (naming twelve defendants). For convenience, the Plaintiffs grouped the Defendants into three categories: “Signal” (collectively, Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., and Signal International, Inc.), “Recruiter Defendants,” (collectively, Global Resources, Inc., Michael Pol, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., and Sachin Dewan), and “Burnett” (collectively, Malvern C. Burnett, Malvern C. Burnett A.P.C., and the Gulf Coast Immigration Center, L.L.C). Also common to both cases are cross-claims Signal filed against these defendants. (Doc. No. 79, pp. 47–66.); (Doc. No. 60, David v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. May 9, 2008)).1 Signal filed its cross-claims in the David case in 2008, and filed its cross-claims in this case in 2014.
II. Analysis Burnett moves, pursuant to the “first-to-file-rule,” to have this court “prophylactically refuse[] to hear Signal’s Cross Claims.” (Doc. No. 195, p. 9.) Alternatively, Burnett requests
1. In this case, Signal claims that is has suspended its cross-claims against defendant Michael Pol (Doc. No. 79, p. 48 n. 1), and in David, Signal’s claims against him have been dismissed. (Doc. No. 1976, David v. Signal, Inl’t, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2014)).
2

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that the undersigned transfer his claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana. (Id.) No party filed an opposition or response to Burnett’s motion, thus, it is considered unopposed. See Local Rule CV-7(d) (“In the event that a party fails to oppose a motion in the manner prescribed herein, the court will assume that the party has no objection.”). However, despite the fact that the undersigned considers Burnett’s motion unopposed, the undersigned finds it prudent to consider the merits of Burnett’s motion.
“Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mex. Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “In such a case, the district court in which the later action was filed may dismiss, stay, or transfer the suit in order to avoid duplicative litigation and enforce the principle of comity.” Carter v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 228 F. App’x 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). “In deciding whether to apply the first-to-file rule, the Court must resolve two questions: (1) are the two pending actions so duplicative or do they involve such substantially similar issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions, and if so, (2) which of the two courts should take the case.” Datamize, Inc. v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, 2:03-CV-321-DF, 2004 WL 1683171, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2004) (Folsom, J.) (citing Tex. Instruments v. Micron Semiconductor, 815 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). “Only the first issue is for the second-filed court to decide, however, for in this circuit, ‘[o]nce the likelihood of a substantial overlap between the two suits ha[s] been demonstrated, it [is] no longer up to the [second filed court] to resolve the question of whether both should be allowed to proceed.’” Nabors Drilling USA, L.P. v. Markow, Walker, P.A., 451 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 605–06 (5th Cir. 1999)).
3

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The undersigned finds that the first prong of the first-to-file rule is satisfied here. Signal’s cross-claims in David are not just similar or related to the ones in this case—they are virtually identical. White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“The first-to-file rule does not require that cases be identical, but merely that there is a substantial overlap in issues and parties.”). First, the only difference in the parties between the two cases is that Signal sued an additional three Defendants, the “Labor Broker Defendants,” in David who are not parties to this action.2 Compare (Doc. No. 79) with (Doc. No. 60, David v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. May 9, 2008)); see also Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Complete identity of parties is not required for dismissal or transfer of a case filed subsequently to a substantially related action.”). It is also worth noting that Signal’s cross-claims are in no way impacted by the difference in the make-up of the plaintiffs in each case.
Second, Signal asserted nearly identical cross-claims in each case. The only variation is that Signal asserted a claim for tortious interference with contract in David that it did not include here. (See Doc. No. 195, p. 2.) In addition, beyond just pleading the same causes of action against the same defendants, resolution of Signal’s cross-claims involves the same facts and raises the same issues in both cases. In contrast, the undersigned denied Signal’s and Burnett’s requests to transfer the Plaintiffs’ claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana in part because the Plaintiffs in this case worked at a different facility than the plaintiffs in David, and therefore, the proof and facts for the claims would differ between the two cases. (Doc. Nos. 56, 110.) This is not the case for Signal’s cross-claims. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that there is substantial overlap between Signal’s cross-claims in this case and those in David.
2. Signal also filed a third-party claim against Zito Companies, L.L.C. that was dismissed. (Doc. No. 391, David v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. April 7, 2009)).
4

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Therefore, the proper course of action is to either transfer, stay, or dismiss Signal’s cross-claims. Burnett requests that this court stay Signal’s cross claims because “simply declining to hear those Cross Claims herein would be the easiest procedural vehicle to allow Signal’s Cross Claims to proceed in the court in which they were first filed.” (Doc. No. 195, p. 9.) The undersigned, however, perceives no benefit to merely staying these claims. To do so would only invite additional litigation on issue and/or claim preclusion after these claims are decided in David. (Id. at p. 3) (“Whatever disposition may be reached in David on Signal’s Cross Claims against Burnett and the other Cross Claim Defendants will be res judicata herein.”). The first-to-file rule was meant to promote efficiency, not create additional substantive issues.
In the alternative, Burnett requests that the undersigned transfer Signal’s cross-claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Because this is the most efficient manner of resolving these claims, the undersigned finds that this is the appropriate remedy. However, in order to transfer just Signal’s cross-claims, as opposed the entire case (including the Plaintiffs’ claims), Signal’s cross-claims must first be severed from the main case. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, a “trial court has broad discretion to sever issues to be tried before it.” Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 21); see also United States v. O’Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that under Rule 21 a district court properly severed a party’s counterclaims). The undersigned has authority under Rule 21 to sever Signal’s cross-claims even though Burnett did not specifically request such relief. See Brunet, 15 F.3d at 505; United States v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CIV.A 86-1094, 2004 WL 1335723, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2004) (“Thus, while neither party has asked this Court to sever, Rule 21 permits a court to sever claims sua sponte.”).
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III. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned GRANTS IN PART Burnett’s “Motion to Defer Signal’s Cross Claim or in the Alternative to Transfer Venue of Signal’s Cross Claim Pursuant to the First-Filed Rule.” (Doc. No. 195.) Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to sever from this action Signal’s cross-claims against cross-defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. and Michael Pol; and it is further ORDERED that Signal’s “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability of Defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Law Center, L.L.C. and the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. for Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (Doc. No. 166), Burnett’s response (Doc. No. 177), and Signal’s reply (Doc. No. 197) are part of the severed case; and it is further ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall TRANSFER Signal’s cross-claims against Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. and Michael Pol and the motions listed in the preceding paragraph to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
SIGNED this 8th day of December, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
6

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 217 Filed 01/26/15 Page 1 of 32 PageID #: 8725

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-323

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON SIGNAL’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 165)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia A. Crone, United States District Judge, and

is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 5.) Pending before the undersigned is a “Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment” (Doc. No. 165) filed by Defendants Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International,

Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, “Signal”).

Signal seeks summary judgment on three of the Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that some claims are

defective as a matter of law, and that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to others.

After considering the parties’ briefing (Doc. Nos. 165, 187, 200, 209) and the applicable

authorities, the undersigned recommends that Signal’s “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”

(Doc. No. 165) be denied.

I. Background1

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the seventeen

Plaintiffs in this case, were allegedly trafficked into the United States to provide labor for Signal’s

operations. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 2–9.) The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants made false promises

1. Local Rule CV-56(a) requires that a motion for summary judgment include a “Statement of Undisputed Facts.” Signal’s “Statement of Undisputed Facts” contains both hotly contested facts, as well as legal conclusions. Therefore, this section contains only a brief recitation of the background of this case and should not be construed as a statement of facts.

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 217 Filed 01/26/15 Page 2 of 32 PageID #: 8726
of “permanent work-based immigration to the United States,” and that to take advantage of this promising opportunity, the Plaintiffs allegedly “incurred significant debts to pay mandatory recruitment, immigration processing, and travel fees . . . .” (Id. at p. 2.) After arriving at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to serious abuses, threatened with deportation if they left, and forced to live in substandard conditions. In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that they could not leave their jobs with Signal due to the large debts they incurred in their homeland. Signal denies any wrongdoing and denies that the Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor, trafficking, or involuntary servitude.
A putative class action was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of all the workers who had allegedly been trafficked to the United States to work at Signal’s facilities in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. (See Doc. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (March 7, 2008)). The court in David denied class certification, which caused the individual class members to file suit where their alleged injuries occurred. See David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at *37 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012). The Plaintiffs in this case worked at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas, which is within this judicial district.
The Plaintiffs are suing Signal, as well as Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C, Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants). The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: (1) the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; (2) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; (3) the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and (4) the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 32–50.) In addition, the Plaintiffs assert causes of action for state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against all of the Defendants. (Id.)
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II. Legal Standard “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Gellhaus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (Crone, J.) This burden is not met by “merely mak[ing] a conclusory statement that the other party has no evidence to prove its case.” Inn Foods, Inc. v. Mida, No. 6:06-cv-169, 2008 WL 2078965, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2008) (Schneider, J.) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986)). “If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” Id. at *2 (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). “If the movant does, however, meet this burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1069. The nonmovant’s “burden is not satisfied with some ‘metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Id. at 1075 (internal citations omitted). “Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing
3

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that an actual controversy exists.” Espinoza v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 622 F.3d 432, 437– 38 (5th Cir. 2010).
III. Analysis The Plaintiffs’ complaint contains seven claims for relief. (See Doc. No. 1, pp. 32–50.) Signal moved for summary judgment on three claims: violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (“TVPRA”), violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985(3)). (See Doc. No. 165.) The undersigned will address Signal’s motion on a claim by claim basis. A. First Claim: Violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 to “combat trafficking in persons.” See Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, 1446 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.). This act was amended in 2003 to, inter alia, create a civil remedy for certain violations of Chapter 77 of Title 18 of the United States Code. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (“TVPRA”), Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 (creating a civil remedy for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591). In their first cause of action, the Plaintiffs seek damages under the civil remedies provision of the TVPRA (18 U.S.C. § 1595) for “forced labor” (18 U.S.C. § 1589) and “trafficking with respect to . . . forced labor” (18 U.S.C. § 1590).2
2. The Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, and 1592(a). (Doc. No. 1, pp. 32–34.) The Plaintiffs’ response, however, is clear that they are abandoning their reliance on these statutes. (See Doc. No. 187, p. 2) (“Plaintiffs have therefore determined to simplify the case by dismissing voluntarily their claim under the TVPA to the extent it relies upon sections 1583, 1584, 1592(a) and 1592(b).”). In addition, they have moved for dismissal of their claims to the extent they are based on these statutes. (Doc. No. 212.)
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Signal claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim (18 U.S.C. § 1590) because (1) the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially at the time of the alleged trafficking and (2) “‘that there is an absence of evidence to support’ the case of the Plaintiffs with regard to the scienter required by § 1590 . . . .” (Doc. No. 165, p. 20) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). As for the Plaintiffs’ claims premised on violations of §§ 1592 and 1594, Signal argues that summary judgment is warranted because imposing civil liability for violations of these two statutes would require an impermissible retroactive application of the TVPRA.
a. Applying the TVPRA to the facts of this case constitutes a domestic—not extraterritorial—application of the statute
Signal argues that the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially at the time of the alleged trafficking, and because the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim stems from conduct that is “significantly extraterritorial,” their claim fails as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 165, pp. 12–15.) The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the TVPRA had no extraterritorial reach prior to 2008. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5071–72 (amending the TVPRA to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction). Rather, the Plaintiffs insist that they are merely seeking a domestic application of statute, and therefore, whether the TVPRA can be applied extraterritorially is irrelevant. (Doc. No. 187, pp. 13–17.) The undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs, and finds that applying the TVPRA to the facts at hand—which involves trafficking workers into the United States—requires only a domestic application of the statute.3
To determine whether a statute is being applied extraterritorially or domestically, courts are to examine the facts of the case in light of the “‘focus’ of Congressional concern” in enacting
3. Because this case involves a domestic application of the TVPRA, the undersigned expresses no opinion on whether the TVPRA had any extraterritorial reach prior to 2008. Compare Adhikari v. Dauod & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831, 835–36 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (withdrawing a previous opinion and holding that the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially prior to 2008).
5

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the statute. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–70 (2010) (“For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States.”). For example, in Morrison, the Supreme Court considered whether §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was being applied domestically or extraterritorially. Id. The alleged misrepresentations that formed the basis of the claim were made in the United States and were about an American company, but the securities that were affected were only traded on a foreign stock exchange. Id. at 251–53. The Supreme Court found that the focus of §10(b) was “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities,” as opposed to where the misrepresentations occurred. Id. at 267. Therefore, because the securities were only traded on a foreign exchange, as opposed to a domestic exchange, imposing liability would require an extraterritorial application of the statute.
After reviewing the plain language of the TVPRA, as well as the legislative history, the undersigned finds that what is critical under the TVPRA is “where the forced labor occurred and to where to victims were trafficked, and not from where the victims were trafficked . . . .” Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., No. SA CV 10-01172, 2012 WL 5378742, at * 6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012) (emphasis added) (reaching this conclusion based on a comparison to the facts of Morrison). For example, the Congressional findings supporting the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000—which are codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)—recognize that trafficking victims are “trafficked within or across international borders,” and that “traffickers often transport victims from their home communities to unfamiliar destinations, including foreign countries.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1), (5); see also Tanedo, 2012 WL 5378742, at *6 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-939, at 1 (2000)). Here, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs were eventually brought to the United States. Accordingly, imposing liability under
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§ 1590 requires only a domestic application of the statute. (See Doc. No. 2077, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2015) (finding that the plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPRA are not extraterritorial)).
Signal argues that the undersigned should follow Adhikari v. Dauod & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2014), which dismissed a trafficking claim on the grounds that the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially prior to 2008. (See Doc. No. 165, pp. 13–17); see Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 835–37. Signal, however, overlooks a critical distinction—the workers in Adhikari were not trafficked to the United States—they were trafficked from Nepal to Iraq.4 Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 835–37; see also John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 998, 990, 999–1002 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that the TVPRA did not apply where the alleged involuntary servitude occurred solely in Liberia). Thus, Adhikari is not on point.
Accordingly, the undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs and finds the that transporting or recruiting of workers into the United States is a domestic—not extraterritorial—application of the TVPRA. The fact that the Plaintiffs are foreign or some of the acts may have occurred abroad does not change the domestic character of the Plaintiffs’ claims.
b. The Plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Signal is liable for trafficking
Signal next argues that summary judgment is warranted because “the Plaintiffs have no evidence to prove [] that Signal always subjectively intended to convert the recruited individuals into involuntary, slave-like, forced laborers once they arrived in the United States.” (Doc. No. 165, p. 20.) Signal’s argument has three parts. First, § 1590 requires finding that Signal
4. Some of the workers were told that their ultimate destination would be an American military installation in Iraq, and the plaintiffs alternatively argued that Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”) made it a domestic application of the TVPRA. Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. at 833. The court found this unpersuasive. Id. at 837 (noting that “the Court [had] already expressed [an] unwillingness to rest its jurisdiction on the ‘murky area of the law’ that is the MEJA”).
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“knowingly” trafficked the Plaintiffs “for the purpose” of forced labor, which Signal argues requires “proof of the specific intent associated with premeditated crime.” (Id. at p. 21.) Second, there is no evidence to show that Signal had such intent. Third, to the extent that the Plaintiffs’ claim stems from “financial coercion” based on the large debts they incurred, this type of harm was not recognized under the TVPRA until 2008. Therefore, according to Signal, to find liability based on financial coercion alone would require a retroactive application of the statute.
i. Mental state required under §1590 It is unclear whether the parties truly dispute what is required to prove liability under § 1590. Signal argues that “what is required is proof that the recruits [were] being recruited for an unlawful form of labor, labor acquired through threats, for example, of serious harm.” (Id.) The Plaintiffs have not argued that a lesser showing is needed or that Signal is per se liable for trafficking merely by recruiting workers. However, to the extent that there is a dispute, the undersigned will address Signal’s argument. Section 1590 states: “whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in violation of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. §1590; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1594 (creating a civil remedy for violations of § 1590). By its terms, § 1590 requires recruiting or transporting a person with the knowledge that it is for, amongst other things, forced labor. “Knowingly” means having the factual knowledge. See United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 605 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he term ‘knowingly’ does not have any reference to a state of mind or to knowledge of the law. The knowledge requisite to a knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law . . . .”) (alterations in original) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998)). Therefore, the Plaintiffs need to demonstrate
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that Signal had knowledge that workers were recruited or transported to be used as forced labor (or
at least create a genuine dispute of material fact to survive summary judgment). In other words,
“[o]btaining the services of another person is not itself illegal; it is illegal only when accompanied
by one of the three given circumstances [in §1589], and the jury must find that the defendant knew
that the circumstance existed.” See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2008). As noted above, it appears that the parties agree on this proposition.5 (Doc. No. 165, p.
21); (Doc. No. 187, pp. 22–23.) To the extent that Signal believes that some higher mental state is
required, Signal has cited no authority for such a proposition.
ii. The Plaintiffs have put forth sufficient evidence of forced labor and trafficking to create a genuine dispute of material fact
Signal claims that “the freedom the plaintiffs exercised during their time at Signal is
irreconcilable with the inference that these individuals were trafficked,” thus, it is entitled to
summary judgment. (Doc. No. 165, p. 25.) To support its argument, Signal presents the
Plaintiffs’ depositions, in which they testified about their ability to freely come and go from
Signal’s facility. (Id. at pp. 9–12.) An example from Aby Raju’s deposition is illustrative:
Q: Every time you wanted to walk out of the housing facility, so long as you signed your name on the sign-out sheet, you can do that. Right?
A: If you are asking like that, that they would ask you, “Where are you going? What do you have in your hand,” they examined that; when you are going out and coming
5. Perhaps the undersigned’s confusion stems from Signal’s extensive discussion of Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). In Morrissette, the defendant was convicted for “knowingly” stealing and converting government property. Id. at 248. The defendant admitted to taking the property, but argued that he believed that it had been abandoned, and as such, did not “knowingly” convert the property. Id. The trial court, however, refused to allow this defense, which effectively read a mental state out of the statute. Id. (noting that the trial court stated: “He took it because he thought it was abandoned and he knew he was on government property. . . That is no defense . . . I will not permit you to show this man thought it was abandoned.”). The Supreme Court held that this was an error, and that the statute required the defendant to know—as a matter of fact—that he was taking government property. Id. at 270–74. Therefore, if the jury believed that he thought the property had been abandoned, he did not “knowingly” convert government property. To the extent that Morrissette instructs that the undersigned cannot simply read out of the TVPRA the “knowingly” element (which the Plaintiffs have not urged), it is applicable. Otherwise, the undersigned strains to understand Signal’s point.
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in, they check you in person; and then they would also look at your badge number and try and see your ID for when you are going out and coming back in, too. Q: But my question is every time you wanted to go out, you can go out? A: Yes. I could go out, but provided I meet all these conditions, then I could go out. (Id., Ex. 14, 70:12–24.) The other Plaintiffs testified similarly. (See id. at pp. 9–12.) Signal argues that because the Plaintiffs were not kept under lock-and-key and physically had the ability to leave its facility, there can be no claim of forced labor. In turn, because there is no claim of forced labor, there can be no claim for trafficking. See 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (prohibiting the trafficking of a person for forced labor). Signal’s argument, however, is inconsistent with the TVPRA. At the relevant time, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 prohibited knowingly providing or obtaining the labor or services of a person: (1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person; (2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1478, 1486–87 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1589). By including the term “serious harm,” the statute expressly sought to not just prohibit forced labor through physical restraint, but also other oppressive forms of “nonviolent coercion” as well. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1), (13). Therefore, Signal’s argument that summary judgment should be granted merely because the Plaintiffs could leave its facility does not comport with the definition of forced labor under the TVPRA. The Plaintiffs can survive summary judgment by presenting evidence that creates a fact
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issue as to whether they were forced to continue working for Signal through “physical restraint,” threats of “serious harm,” or “abuse of law or the legal process.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
After reviewing the Plaintiffs’ evidence, the undersigned finds that there is a fact issue as to whether the Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor. For example, Mr. Raju testified that Signal made numerous threats that if he left Signal, he would be turned into immigration authorities. (Doc. No. 187, Ex. 8, 210:11–18.) “[M]any courts have determined that threats of deportation constitute a condition of servitude induced through abuse of the legal process.” Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp. 2d 107, 115 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases); but see Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 540–41 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that “[a]bsent some special circumstances, threats of deportation are insufficient to constitute involuntary servitude,” and that because the plaintiffs did not claim that they were compelled to go to work each day, nor forced to stay once their work was finished, and had considerable freedom to move to other cities and find different jobs, there was no claim of involuntary servitude); (See also Doc. No. 2077, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (Jan. 6, 2015) (finding that Signal was not entitled to summary judgment in part because “Plaintiffs have introduced evidence from which a jury could infer Signal knowingly threatened immigration consequences in order to maintain its forced labor”)). The other Plaintiffs tell similar stories about threats of deportation, and some even state that their passports were confiscated. (Doc. No. 187, pp. 5–18.) Furthermore, Biju George testified about times when he was not allowed to leave Signal’s facility. (Id., Ex. 10, 88:7–89:15; 123:4–19.) Therefore, there is a fact issue as to whether the Plaintiffs were able to freely leave Signal’s facility. Accordingly, given the Plaintiffs’ testimony and the broad definition of forced labor under the TVPRA, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the Plaintiffs’ forced labor and trafficking claims.
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iii. Financial coercion was actionable under the TVPRA before the 2008 amendments
Signal next argues that to the extent that the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim is premised on the fact that the large debts that they undertook to pay the recruitment fees forced them to continue working for Signal, this was not actionable under the TVPRA until 2008. (Doc. No. 165, pp. 27– 31.) “Serious harm” was not defined in the original statute. The 2008 amendments added a definition:
The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5069. Signal argues that because financial harm was added to the TVPRA in 2008, and “Congress does not legislate unnecessarily,” financial harm could not have been not part of the statute prior to 2008. (Doc. No. 165, pp. 28–29.) Therefore, Signal asserts that imposing liability based on financial coercion would be an impermissible retroactive application of the 2008 amendments. The Plaintiffs argue that the statute was broad enough, at the time of the alleged trafficking, to encompass their claim of financial coercion. (Doc. No. 187, pp. 17–22.) The undersigned is not persuaded by Signal’s argument. First, while financial coercion may be a part of the Plaintiffs’ claim, it is not their only basis for imposing liability under the TVPRA. As discussed above, there appears to be other alleged actions taken by Signal that meet the definition of forced labor under the TVPRA. Second, the plain language of the statute demonstrates that it encompasses more than just threats of physical harm. Forced labor was defined at the relevant time as “threats of serious harm . . . or physical restraint.” As the court in
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Tanedo noted: “That § 1589 distinguishes between serious harm and physical restraint indicates that, prior to 2008, Congress intended that serious harm not be limited to physical harm, and instead include at least some non-physical harm, e.g., financial harm.” Tanedo, 2012 WL 5378742 at *4. The legislative history supports this reading. “[T]he House Conference Report from 2000 [] stated that the [Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000] ‘refers to a broad array of harms, including both physical and nonphysical,’ and would apply ‘where the traffickers use more subtle means designed to cause their victims to believe that serious harm will result to themselves or others if the leave’ such as threats of families’ ‘bankruptcy in their home country.’” Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (2000)). In addition, while not directly addressing a claim of financial coercion, the Fifth Circuit found that, prior to 2008, “serious harm [under §1589(a)] can include psychological coercion.” United States v. Nnaji, 447 F. App’x 558, 559 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Lastly, Signal cites no case applying such a narrow interpretation of “serious harm” under the TVPRA. As the Plaintiffs correctly note, the one case upon which Signal relies does not apply the TVPRA, but rather is examining slavery as defined by international norms. See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 319–23 (2d Cir. 2012).6
Because the goal of the TVPRA was to reach modern day slavery, which may take on many forms, and “serious harm” should be interpreted broadly, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs’ claim of financial coercion was cognizable before 2008. (See also Doc. No. 2077,
6. Interestingly, the district court in Velez dismissed a claim for forced labor under the TVPRA. See Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F. Supp. 2d 488, 498–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). The court converted the plaintiff’s claim from one brought under the Alien Tort Statute to one brought pursuant to § 1589, but found that the evidence did not support such a claim. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff’s fear of being yelled at was not actionable and that “by her own admission, [she] never feared physical harm . . . .” Id. at 498. Therefore, neither opinion in Velez adopts Signal’s narrow interpretation.
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David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (Jan. 6, 2015) (holding that “serious harm under pre-amendment Section 1589 includes financial harm”)).
c. Retroactive application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1592 and 1594 is no longer at issue Signal also argues that “Section 1595 did not authorize a private right of action for violations of §§ 1592 or 1594 prior to [2008].” (Doc. No. 165, p. 18.) While Signal is correct that the civil remedies provision of the TVPRA did not expressly encompass these statutes until 2008, the Plaintiffs have abandoned their reliance on these sections (as well as §§ 1583 and 1584). (See Doc. No. 187, p. 13 n. 11); (Doc. No. 212) (moving to voluntarily dismiss certain claims). Therefore, there is no need to consider whether these sections apply retroactively. B. Second Claim: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) The Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief consists of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). (Doc. No. 1, pp. 34–43.) Signal claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ RICO claims because: (1) the Plaintiffs failed to establish a distinct RICO enterprise; (2) RICO does not apply extraterritorially; and (3) there no proof of a conspiracy. (Doc. No. 165, pp. 31–39.)
a. The Plaintiffs have alleged a distinct RICO person and RICO enterprise Signal argues that the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is “structurally defective” because the Plaintiffs “allege both that Signal is a RICO ‘person’ and that Signal was a ‘member’ of all RICO Enterprises alleged in the Second Claim for Relief . . . .” (Id. at p. 31.) Signal’s argument misconstrues the Plaintiffs’ complaint, as well as misapplies the law on the person/enterprise distinction under RICO. “RICO claims under § 1962 require: ‘(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an
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enterprise.” Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 625, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (quoting In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 741–42 (5th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in original). “To establish liability under § 1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same ‘person’ referred to by a different name.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001). RICO defines a “person” as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” 18 U.S.C. §1961(3). Signal does not dispute that it can be a RICO person. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 447 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] corporation obviously qualifies as a ‘person’ under RICO and may be subject to RICO liability.”) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984)).
“An enterprise under RICO can include the usual legal entities such as partnerships and corporations, but it also can include ‘any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity . . . .’” Bradley, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (quoting Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 1988)). The Supreme Court has indicated that “enterprise” should be interpreted broadly. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 943–45 (2009) (noting that the “very concept of an association in fact is expansive”). Here, the Plaintiffs argue that there are two association in fact type enterprises, both of which Signal is a member. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 35–38.) To establish such an enterprise, the Plaintiffs must show evidence of “an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944.
In addition, for claims under § 1962(c), courts also require that the RICO person and RICO enterprise be distinct. St. Paul Mercury Ins., 224 F.3d at 447 (“[S]ubsection (c) requires that the RICO person be distinct from the RICO enterprise.”). This is where Signal argues that the
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Plaintiffs’ claim is defective. Signal insists that because “the Complaint alleges both that Signal is a RICO ‘person’ and that Signal was a ‘member’ of all RICO enterprises,” the Plaintiffs have failed to allege an enterprise that is separate and distinct from Signal itself. (Doc. No. 165, p. 31.)
Signal’s argument is misplaced. First, Signal is simply incorrect when it asserts that the Plaintiffs are alleging that “Signal enterprised with itself.” (Doc. No. 200, p. 5.) The Plaintiffs have alleged that Signal is a member of an enterprise; they have not alleged that the entire enterprise consists only of Signal and its officers, directors, or employees. Compare Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that “Anadarko Bank, Anadarko Bankshares, and [] three employees” were not an association in fact enterprise separate and distinct from Andarko Bank because there was no evidence that these entities “were associated in any manner apart from the activities of the bank”).
Second, Signal misconstrues the relevant case law. The cases cited by Signal do not stand for the proposition that the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is defective as a matter of law merely because a corporation is named as a person and a part of a RICO enterprise. Rather, these cases hold that the distinctiveness element was not satisfied based on the facts. For example, in Bradley, the plaintiffs alleged that the enterprise consisted of a group of companies. Bradley, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 651. The court found that there was nothing in the plaintiffs’ complaint “to suggest that the enterprise existed for any reason other than to commit the alleged predicate acts.” Id. Moreover, the court found that “even if [the plaintiffs] had adequately pled an enterprise, they have failed to plead that any Defendants were ‘employed by or associated with [the] enterprise’ as required under § 1962(c).” Id. at 651–52. Signal has not pointed to anything in the record that demonstrates, as a matter of fact, that the alleged enterprises are not distinct from the various members. Accordingly, Signal has not met its burden for summary judgment.
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Moreover, Bradley did not hold that a corporation could not—as a matter of law—be named as part of an enterprise. What Signal appears to be alluding to is a line of cases holding that when a corporation is named as a RICO person, and that same corporation is named as the enterprise, the distinctiveness requirement may not be satisfied. See Atkinson, 808 F.2d at 440; see also Heden v. Hill, 937 F. Supp. 1230, 1242 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“When the alleged Section 1962(c) violator is a legal entity, such as a corporation, this required separation is not established by merely showing that the corporation, through its employees, officers, and/or directors, committed a pattern of predicate acts in the conduct of its own business.”). As the Second Circuit noted, alleging a corporation as a member of an enterprise “does not foreclose the possibility of a corporate entity being held liable as a defendant under Section 1962(c) where it associates with others to form an enterprise that is sufficiently distinct from itself.” See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F. 3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 1994). In other words, groups of corporations can form an association in fact type enterprise, but a party cannot avoid the distinctiveness requirement by “alleging a RICO enterprise that consists merely of a corporation defendant associated with its own employees or agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendants.” Isystems v. Spark Networks, Ltd., No. 10-10905, 2012 WL 3101672, at *5 (5th Cir. March 21, 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., 130 F.3d 143, 155) (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding allegations of an enterprise that consisted of multiple corporations). Because the Plaintiffs have alleged a larger enterprise than just Signal, the Plaintiffs’ claim is not structurally defective as a matter of law.7 (See also Doc. No. 2115, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C.,
7. Some commentators have argued that based on principles of statutory interpretation, a corporation cannot be part of an association in fact RICO enterprise. See, e.g., Randy D. Gordon, “Of Gangs and Gaggles: Can a Corporation be part of an Association-in-Fact RICO Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, and Rhetorical Perspectives, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973, 998–1008 (2014). According to Mr. Gordon, circuit courts have erred by allowing plaintiffs
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2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2014) (finding that nearly identical RICO enterprises, which
included Signal as a member, did not violate the distinctiveness requirement)).
Accordingly, because Signal does not cite to anything in the record demonstrating that the
alleged members did not form an enterprise, and because merely pleading that Signal is a member
of an enterprise is not fatal to the Plaintiffs’ RICO claims, Signal is not entitled to summary
judgment. Of course, at trial, the Plaintiffs will need to prove all of the elements of a RICO
enterprise. See, e.g., Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944 (noting that an association in fact enterprise is
“proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit”).
b. Extraterritorial application of RICO
Signal next argues that RICO does not apply extraterritorially. (Doc. No. 165, pp. 32–34.) Specifically, Signal argues that “the civil RICO claim should be dismissed pro tanto,8 based on
the theory’s often unlawful, extraterritorial nature with regard to (1) mail and wire fraud; (2)
trafficking; and (3) unlawful document related practices under § 1592.” (Id. at p. 37.) The
Plaintiffs have abandoned their claim under § 1592.
“to allege association-in-fact enterprises that include (and in many cases consist only of) corporations or other legal entities.” Id. at 1028; see also Caroline N. Mitchell, et al., “Returning RICO to Racketeers: Corporations Cannot Constitute an Associated-in-Fact Enterprise Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), 13 FORDHAM J. COPR. & FIN. L. 1 (2008) (calling for a return to the “plain meaning” of RICO and arguing that based on questions asked at oral argument during Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006), many of the justices showed a concern about interpreting RICO so broadly). While these commentators raise interesting points, until the Supreme Court revisits Boyle, which instructed courts to interpret “enterprise” broadly, or the Fifth Circuit dictates otherwise, the undersigned is obligated to follow precedent. See, e.g, United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (affirming a RICO conviction when the enterprise consisted of both individuals and corporations). Moreover, Signal has not raised the issues that these commentators were discussing. Rather, Signal’s argument is based on the faulty premise that the Plaintiffs alleged that Signal has been named as the enterprise, as opposed to just a member of a larger enterprise.
8. Pro tanto is defined as: “To that extent; for so much; as far as it goes.” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1259 (8th ed. 2004). The undersigned understands this to mean that to the extent that the Plaintiffs have plead a civil RICO cause of action based on the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, trafficking, and unlawful document production, the Plaintiffs’ claim fails. The Plaintiffs, however, also pled the predicate act of forced labor, and Signal did not move for summary judgment on that claim.
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Signal argues as follows: RICO does not apply to conduct outside the United States, most of the alleged actionable conduct occurred abroad, therefore, the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim fails. (Id. at p. 32.) Signal’s analysis is overly simplistic. While Signal is correct that numerous courts have held that RICO does not apply extraterritorially, that does not end the inquiry. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 933, 937–38 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[C]ourts have uniformly held that RICO is silent as to its extraterritorial application and that, under Morrison, it therefore has none.”). The real issue is whether applying RICO to these set of facts requires an extraterritorial application. In other words, if this were a case involving only foreign conduct, RICO would not apply. But that is not the case here. The facts of this case are partly foreign and partly domestic.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974–78 (9th Cir. 2013), which involved a scheme that had both foreign and domestic ties, undertook a comprehensive analysis of what conduct RICO reaches in light of Morrison. The defendants in Xu were charged under RICO for a “scheme to steal funds from the Bank of China.” Id. at 972. They argued, however, that the entire conspiracy took place overseas, thus they could not be charged. Id. at 974–75. The conspiracy consisted of two parts: first, “a criminal enterprise that involved . . . embezzlement against the Bank of China that occurred in China and Hong Kong,” and second, “immigration fraud to escape to the to the United States with [the] ill-gotten gains.” Id. at 975.
The court in Xu started with the presumption that RICO does not apply extraterritorially. Id. at 974–75. The court then examined whether “under the circumstances . . . RICO can be lawfully applied to any, or all, of Defendants’ conduct—foreign or domestic.” Id. at 975. The court noted, “Morrison frames the extraterritorial inquiry in terms of the focus of congressional concern in enacting the statute,” and while “RICO’s focus is far from clear-cut,” two general
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approaches have evolved. Id. “One camp asserts that RICO’s focus is on the enterprise,” while “the other camp asserts that RICO’s focus is on the pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. In addition, after the Ninth Circuit issued Xu, the Second Circuit articulated yet another test, finding that RICO applies extraterritorially to the extent that the underlying predicate offense applies extraterritorially. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2014) (“RICO applies extraterritorially if, and only if, liability could attach to extraterritorial conduct under the relevant RICO predicate act.”). The Fifth Circuit has yet to address which test to apply and courts are split. See CGC Holding Co., L.L.C. v. Broad & Cassel, No. 13-1255, 2014 WL 6872148, at *15–17 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) (noting that “[c]ourts have gone in two directions in identifying the ‘focus’ of RICO”). However, the undersigned need not guess at which test applies, since under any approach, Signal’s conduct is domestic in nature.
If the focus is on the pattern of racketeering, it is evident that there are sufficient ties to the United States to apply RICO to the instant case. As discussed above, the conspiracy in Xu had two distinct parts. Xu, 706 F.3d at 978. The first part, which consisted of stealing money from the Bank of China, had no domestic ties. Id. The second part, however, which consisted of entering the United States using fraudulent visas and passports in violation of United States immigration laws, “bound the Defendants’ enterprise to the territorial United States.” Id. Therefore, the court found that because the goal of the enterprise involved a violation of United States immigration law, “the dual parts of Defendants’ enterprise were necessarily conjoined in pursuit of that goal—i.e., to steal large amounts of money from the Bank of China and get away with it in the United States.” Id. at 978–79. The court held that the defendants could be liable under RICO.
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Here, while the actual recruitment of the Plaintiffs may have occurred abroad, it is undisputed that the goal was to bring them to the United States. This nexus to the United States ties “the Defendants’ enterprise to the territorial United States” and allows for RICO to attach. For example, had the Defendants recruited the Plaintiffs for work in Mexico, then it would be a stronger case the there was no domestic tie to trigger RICO under the pattern of racketeering test. However, because the workers were recruited for work in the United States, and actually brought here, this conduct is actionable under RICO.
Likewise, under the enterprise test, the undersigned finds that this is a domestic enterprise. Courts applying this test consider “where the enterprise’s decisions are made, as opposed to carried out, and thus centers on the ‘brains’ of an enterprise, not the ‘brawn.’” Xu, 706 F.3d at 976 (citing European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. March 8, 2011) rev’d 764 F.3d 129).9 Courts have analogized this inquiry to the “nerve center” test enunciated in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *6. The enterprises alleged in this case consist mainly of domestic entities. Compare In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 0-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011) (“[T]he very title of the statute, ‘Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,’ suggests an emphasis on the organization, or enterprise itself. Consistent with this principle, it has been found that RICO is inapplicable to a solely foreign enterprise.”) (citations omitted); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (noting that the enterprise, which consisted of only Peruvian individuals and companies, was a foreign enterprise). Here, the majority of the Defendants are domestic entities, and only Defendants Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants are
9. The Second Circuit rejected this test in favor of defining RICO’s extraterritorial conduct in terms of the underlying predicate acts. European Cmty., 764 F.3d at 139 (“We think it far more reasonable to make the extraterritorial application of RICO coextensive with the extraterritorial application of the relevant predicate statutes.”). The enterprise test, however, has been applied outside of the Second Circuit, and therefore, it is still a viable approach.
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foreign. Moreover, Signal cites no portion of the factual record in making this argument and therefore, has not demonstrated that this is a foreign enterprise. The Plaintiffs, however, attached evidence that tends to show that the enterprises were driven primarily by Signal. (Doc. No. 187, pp. 31–32) (citing evidence showing how “each of the Indian-based defendants received directives from the U.S-based members”). Therefore, at the very least, there is a fact issue as to whether this would be a domestic enterprise under this approach.
In addition, under the Second Circuit’s recently minted test, the undersigned finds that RICO liability can attach to Signal’s conduct. The Second Circuit considers whether the predicate act has an extraterritorial reach. European Cmty., 764 F.3d at 139. If it does, then RICO liability can attach. Id. The court also held that “[i]f domestic conduct satisfies every essential element to prove a violation of a United States statute that does not apply extraterritorially, that statute is violated even if some further conduct contributing to the violation occurred outside the United States.” Id. at 142. Here, the Plaintiffs rely on three predicate acts: trafficking, mail fraud, and wire fraud. As discussed above, the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim is domestic, therefore, RICO liability can attach. As for mail and wire fraud, while these statutes do not apply extraterritorially, the Plaintiffs have made sufficient allegations that Signal, along with the other Defendants, used the United States mail and wire systems to further their scheme. See id. (noting that because “[t]he complaint alleges that defendants hatched schemes to defraud in the United States, and that they used the U.S. mails and wires in furtherance of these schemes and with the intent to do so,” the domestic conduct satisfied every element essential element, and therefore, RICO liability could attach). Furthermore, Signal has pointed to nothing in the record showing that the alleged mail and wire fraud occurred only abroad. (See also Doc. No. 2115, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2014)).
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Therefore, under any of the above approaches, Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.
c. Involuntary servitude/slavery Signal also seeks “partial summary judgment on the claims alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, and implicitly, the Thirteenth Amendment.” (Doc. No. 165, p. 34.) The Plaintiffs, however, have abandoned their reliance on these statutes, and have moved to dismiss their RICO claims based on these predicate acts. Accordingly, the undersigned need not address Signal’s arguments as to these claims.
d. Conspiracy Signal argues that the Plaintiffs’ claim under §1962(d) should be dismissed because “Plaintiffs lack the evidence required to establish the scienter § 1962(d) requires under countless federal authorities.” (Doc. No. 165, p. 38.) According to Signal, “missing is proof that cognitively, Signal subjectively entertained the required mens rea to defraud, i.e., knew at the time that statements concerning green cards, in that context, were fraudulent statements . . . .” (Doc. No. 200, p. 8.) “In order to demonstrate a RICO conspiracy under §1962(d), [the Plaintiffs] must demonstrate ‘(1) that two or more people agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense and (2) that [the defendant] knew of and agreed to the overall object of the RICO offense.’” Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 239 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 825, 869 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A conspirator must at least know of the conspiracy and ‘adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.’” Id. (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997)).
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Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ § 1962(d) claim for two reasons. First, Signal has not carried its burden. Signal merely offers the conclusion that the Plaintiffs have no evidence that Signal had the requisite intent to defraud and does not cite to any portion of the record in making this argument. “It is not enough for the moving party to merely make a conclusory statement that the other party has no evidence to prove his case.” See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J. concurring); see also Ash v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Before the non-moving party is required to produce evidence in opposition to [a motion for summary judgment], the moving party must first satisfy its obligation of demonstrating that there are no factual issues warranting trial.”) (citation omitted). While Signal does not have to “negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case,” Signal must offer more than the mere assertion that the Plaintiffs cannot prove their case. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; see also Seastrunk v. Darwell Integrated Tech., No. 3:05-cv-0531, 2008 WL 190316, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2008) (“The moving party, while not needing to produce evidence, must at least identify portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of evidence.”).
Second, despite Signal not meeting its burden, the Plaintiffs put forth enough evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. The Plaintiffs offer, amongst other evidence, the deposition of Sachin Dewan, who testified that Signal knew he had made false promises of permanent residency. (Doc. No. 187, Ex. 36.) This evidence creates a triable issue as to whether Signal knew of the false promises, yet participated in the conspiracy by continuing to use Dewan to recruit the Plaintiffs and facilitate the illicit scheme. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are the jury functions, not those
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of a judge . . . .The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”) (citations omitted).
In sum, in light of the Plaintiffs’ evidence, there is a fact issue as to what Signal knew, when Signal knew it, and Signal’s level of participation in the overall scheme. Accordingly, summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim is not warranted.
C. Claim Four: Violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)) In the Plaintiffs’ fourth claim for relief, they seek damages under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3)
claiming that “Defendants conspired, agreed, planned and coordinated for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of equal protection of their rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its implementing and enforcing statutes (inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§1589, 1590) to be free from forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.” (Doc. No. 1, p. 45.) The Plaintiffs’ complaint lists three separate and distinct acts that allegedly violate § 1985(3): involuntary servitude, forced labor, and trafficking. (Id.) Unlike their claims under the TVPRA and RICO, the Plaintiffs did not abandon their claim of involuntary servitude as to their §1985(3) cause of action. Signal moves for summary judgment on two grounds. First, Signal claims that the evidence negates the Plaintiffs’ claim. (Doc. No. 165, p. 39) (“[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the truth that the plaintiffs knew that they were free to leave Signal whenever they wanted, even if leaving was in some sense painful . . . .”). Second, that §§ 1589 and 1590 are not actionable under §1985(3).
a. Definition of involuntary servitude under §1985(3) Section 1985(3) states: If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages.
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42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Supreme Court has recognized only two rights protected by this statute: the right to interstate travel and the right to be free from involuntary servitude. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993).
At issue here is how broadly to interpret “involuntary servitude” under §1985(3). Signal argues that the definition, as stated in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), is controlling. (Doc. No. 165, pp. 34–39.) In Kozminski, two men were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which “prohibits conspiracy to interfere with an individual’s Thirteenth Amendment right to be from ‘involuntary servitude,’” and 18 U.S.C. § 1584, which “makes it a crime [to] knowingly and willfully hold another person ‘to involuntary servitude.’” Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934. The issue in Kozminzki was “the meaning of ‘involuntary servitude’” under these two statutes. Id. at 939. The Court held that “involuntary servitude” was to be narrowly construed and limited to “the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.” Id. at 952. The Court considered statutes implementing the Thirteenth Amendment, and found that Congress had not undertaken to broadly define involuntary servitude, and “that nothing in the history of the Slave Trade statute [the precursor to §1584] suggests that it was intended to extend to conditions of servitude beyond those applied to slaves, i.e., physical or legal coercion.” Id. at 946–47.
Congress, however, expressly repudiated Kozminski’s narrow definition of involuntary servitude with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Kiwanuka, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16 (“Kozminski is not controlling, as Congress has specifically addressed the Kozminski decision and rejected it as too narrow.”). This Act broadened the definition of involuntary servitude to “include cases in which persons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion.” See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
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of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1446, 1467 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101). Specifically, involuntary servitude is defined as “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter into or continue in such a condition, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.” 22 U.S.C. § 7102(6) (emphasis added).
Here, the expanded definition of “involuntary servitude” defeats Signal’s motion. 10 Signal simply argues that because the Plaintiffs were physically free to leave, there can be no claim for involuntary servitude. (Doc. No. 165, p. 35) (“[T]he statement of Undisputed Facts above demonstrates that the Plaintiffs recognized that they could have left Signal physically if they had chosen to. Under Kozminski, the claims of slavery and involuntary servitude are therefore insupportable.”). However, as discussed above, after 2000, involuntary servitude now encompasses nonviolent coercion and threats of serious harm. A review of the evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to create a fact issue as to whether they have satisfied the current definition of involuntary servitude. For instance, each of the Plaintiffs testified that Signal threatened them with deportation. (See Doc. No. 187, pp. 5–11.) In addition, most of the Plaintiffs claim that they had their passports taken and were threatened with physical force. (See id.) One Plaintiff goes so far as to claim the camp was gated and he felt he was kept under lock and key. (Id., Ex. 10, 88:7-10) (“Q: Was there ever a time when you wanted to leave the camp that you were stopped from doing so? A: Yes, there was an incident like that.”). While the threats of deportation and confiscation of passports may not have been actionable under Kozminkzi, it is these types of “nonviolent coercion” that Congress sought to reach with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Therefore, the mere fact that the Plaintiffs were physically free to leave Signal’s facility does not
10. The civil remedy provision of the TVPRA did not extend to 18 U.S.C. § 1584—the crime of involuntary servitude—until 2008. However, because § 1985(3) provides the remedy, not 18 U.S.C. § 1595, finding Signal liable for damages for conspiracy to commit involuntary servitude would not be a retroactive application of § 1595.
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entitle Signal to judgment as a matter of law, and the Plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence to create a fact issue as to whether they were victims of involuntary servitude.
b. §§1589 and 1590 are actionable under §1985(3) At the outset, is unclear whether Signal is actually seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims under §1985(3) to the extent that they are relying on violations of §§ 1589 and 1590. (Compare Doc. No. 165, p. 34) (seeking a pro tanto dismissal of certain portions of the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim). The Plaintiffs’ claim for relief under §1985(3) is predicated on involuntary servitude, in addition to forced labor and trafficking. As discussed above, Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the involuntary servitude prong of the Plaintiffs’ claim. However, Signal states in passing that dismissal is warranted because “§1985(3) in no way ‘derives . . . from §§ 1589 and 1590.’” (Id. at p. 39) (quoting David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at *36 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012)). The undersigned, however, finds that private conspiracies to violate §§ 1589 or 1590, that are motivated by racial animus, are actionable under § 1985(3). Therefore, Signal is not entitled to summary judgment. Section 1985(3) is not a source of rights, rather “the rights, privileges and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere . . . .” United Broth. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 462 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). One of the rights protected by this section is the right to be free from involuntary servitude. Therefore, if §§1589 and 1590 are statutes that enforce the Thirteenth Amendment (as the Plaintiffs argue), then a conspiracy to violate these statutes should be actionable under § 1985(3). See, e.g., Wells v. Rhodes, 928 F. Supp. 2d 920, 930–31 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that “§ 1982 provides an adequate basis for a private conspiracy claim under § 1985(3) . . . [because] § 1982 protects citizens against private infringements in their property
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rights . . . [and] shares a close relationship with the Thirteenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has recognized as a source of rights for § 1985(3).”).
Courts have found that § 1589 is “an exercise of Congressional power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.”11 John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 988, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2007); United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that § 1589 was passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Garcia, No. 02-cr-1105-01, 2003 WL 22938040, at *2–3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003) (rejecting a claim that §1589 was unconstitutional because Congress lacked power under the commerce clause, and holding that §1589 was a “proper exercise of Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment”); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(22) (“The right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude is among those inalienable rights. Acknowledging this fact, the United States outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, recognizing them as evil institutions that must be abolished. Current practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of women and children are similarly abhorrent to the principles upon which the United States was founded.”). Moreover, Congress is afforded wide latitude to both define modern forms of slavery and involuntary servitude, as well as to enact legislation to combat these insidious institutions. In discussing Congress’s power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit recognized that:
[T]he Supreme Court held [in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)] that the scope of Congress’s power was not limited to measures intended to end structures of slavery in a literal or a formal sense. Instead, the Supreme Court held that Congress has the authority to enact legislation necessary to abolish “badges” and “incidents” of slavery, as well as the power to rationally determine what those “badges” and “incidents” are. United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 was a valid exercise of Congressional power
11. But see H.R. Rep. No. 106-487, pt. 2, at 27 (2000) (noting that the “Constitutional Authority” for the act is “Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution”).
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under the Thirteenth Amendment). Therefore, because § 1985(3) protects the right to be free from involuntary servitude, and §§ 1589 and 1590 define and outlaw modern day manifestations of involuntary servitude and slavery, it follows that conspiracies to violate these statutes are actionable under § 1985(3).
The only other case that has addressed this specific issue is David, which is not binding. The court in David found that “the [Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000], which sought to criminalize involuntary servitude based [on] other forms of coercion, did not change the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.” David, 2012 WL 10759668, at *36. The undersigned, however, respectfully disagrees with the David court’s reasoning in finding that a private conspiracy to violate §§ 1589 or 1590 is not actionable under § 1985(3). First, the court in David found that extending the reach of § 1985(3) would lead to “every criminal statute that involves a victim [] potentially giv[ing] rise to a ‘right’” under § 1985(3). Id. at *36 n. 50. Section 1985(3), however, has been on the books for nearly one hundred and fifty years and only two rights have been recognized: interstate travel and involuntary servitude. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (holding that the right to be free from workplace discrimination under Title VII was not actionable under § 1985(3)). Moreover, finding statutes that combat modern day involuntary servitude actionable under § 1985(3) does not expand the rights protected by §1985, but merely clarifies the definition of involuntary servitude.
Second, the David court noted that interpreting § 1985(3) too broadly would “render it ‘a general federal tort law’” which would be “contrary to the admonition that the Supreme Court has long held since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 (1971) . . . .” Id. at *36 n. 50. Griffin, however, held that a necessary element under § 1985(3) is that “there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’
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actions.” See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. This requirement limits the reach of private conspiracies under § 1985(3) and prevents it from becoming a federal tort law. Accordingly, the undersigned does not share the David court’s concerns.
Therefore, the undersigned finds that Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ §1985(3) claim, regardless of whether it is predicated on involuntary servitude, forced labor, or trafficking.
IV. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that Signal’s “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” (Doc. No. 165) be DENIED.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report; and (4) be no more than eight pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Local Rule CV-72(c). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 217 Filed 01/26/15 Page 32 of 32 PageID #: 8756 and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 23rd day of January, 2015. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 56 Filed 12/02/13 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 1299

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., et al. '

1:13-CV-323

ORDER DENYING SIGNAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia A. Crone, United States District Judge, and

is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 5.) Pending before the undersigned is a “Motion Pursuant to First

Filed Rule to Transfer Action” (Doc. No. 12), filed by Signal International, L.L.C., Signal

International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., and Signal International, Inc. (“Signal

Defendants”). Having considered the pending motion and the corresponding Response (Doc. No.

21), Reply (Doc. No. 23), and Sur-Reply (Doc. No. 33), in light of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc.

No. 1), the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Transfer Action be denied because there is

not a substantial overlap between the instant suit and Kurian David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et.

al., the first filed suit.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who allegedly were trafficked into the United States

filed a putative class action in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC,

Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). The Court denied class certification for the Plaintiffs’

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trafficking, RICO, civil rights and state law contract and fraud claims.1 David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). As a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly enslaved. (Doc. No. 21 at 9.) On May 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this court against the following Defendants: Signal, Malven C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Global Resources, Inc., Michael Pol, Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants PVT. LTD. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants). (Doc. No. 1.) The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: 1) The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; 2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; 3) The Civil Rights act of 1866; and 4) The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Id.) In addition, the Plaintiffs bring state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract claims against all of the Defendants. (Id. at 46-48.) On July 29, 2013, the Signal Defendants filed the pending Motion to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule. (Doc. No. 12.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) The Plaintiffs claim that they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id.)
1. The District Court has not ruled on the collective action FLSA claims in the David case, which include opt-ins by the Plaintiffs in this case. (Doc. No. 21 at 4.)
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Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. (Id. at 4.) Each Plaintiff has a different story as to their recruitment, travel and abuse while working for Signal. (Doc. No. 21 at 8.)
II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. First to File Rule “Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mexico Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999)). “The first-to-file rule is a discretionary doctrine.” Jones v. Xerox Commercial Solutions, LLC, CIV. A. No. H-13-0650, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013) (quoting Cadle Co., 174 F.3d at 603). The rule is utilized “to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997).
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The party wishing to transfer the case has the burden to prove that transfer is warranted. Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (citing Sanofi–Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 n. 5 (E.D. Tex. 2009); VCode Holdings, Inc. v. Cognex Corp., No. 2:07–CV–138, 2007 WL 2238054, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007); Buckalew v. Celanese, LTD., No. G–05–315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2005)). “In deciding whether to apply the first-to-file rule, the Court must resolve two questions: (1) are the two pending actions so duplicative or do they involve such substantially similar issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions, and if so, (2) which of the two courts should take the case.” Datamize, Inc. v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, 2:03-CV-321-DF, 2004 WL 1683171, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2004) (citing Texas Instruments v. Micron Semiconductor, 815 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). “The first-to-file rule does not require that cases be identical, but merely that there is a substantial overlap in issues and parties.” White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (S.D. Miss. 2008). “Once the likelihood of substantial overlap between the two suits has been demonstrated, it is no longer up to the second-filed court to resolve the question of whether both should be allowed to proceed.” Id. (quoting Cadle Co., 174 F.3d at 605).
IV. Analysis The Signal Defendants argue that there is substantial overlap between the instant case and the first filed case, David. While there are similarities in the two cases, the undersigned finds that the two cases do not involve such substantially similar parties and issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions.
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A. Parties There is some overlap between the parties in David and the instant case, but it is not
substantial. While all of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit are also plaintiffs in David, as explained below, they are only asserting FLSA claims in David, which they do not assert here.2 The Plaintiffs also do not object to the David court transferring their FLSA claims to this court.3 (Doc. No. 21 at 10.) If the David court was to transfer those claims, then there would be no common plaintiffs in either case. Conversely, none of the David plaintiffs asserting non-FLSA claims are parties in the instant case. (Id.) The David defendants and the Defendants in this suit are not completely identical, but for purposes of this analysis, the court agrees with Signal that the difference is insignificant. (Doc. No. 12 at 3-5.) While the first-to-file rule does not require identical parties, see Save Power Ltd., 121 F.3d at 950, “the fact that the parties are different cuts against an argument for substantial overlap.” Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *4. B. Claims
While the first-to-file rule also does not require the issues to completely overlap, “the cases should be more than merely related to support a motion to transfer when venue is otherwise appropriate.” Buckalew v. Celanese, Ltd., CIV. A. No. G-05-315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2005). The instant suit and David are related to the extent that all of the claims asserted in this suit are also asserted by the different David Plaintiffs. However, there is not
2. Even if the Plaintiffs in this case were at one point putative class members in the David class action litigation, they were never parties since the class was never certified. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) (holding that it is erroneous to believe a nonnamed class member is a party to class action litigation before the class is certified, or if certification is ultimately denied).
3. In fact, it appears that the Plaintiffs may have already requested this relief with the David court. See Joseph v. Signal International LLC et al., No. 1:13-CV-324 (Doc. No. 54 at 2, n. 2).
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substantial overlap among the claims in both suits. As the District Court established in its opinion denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification in David, each of the Plaintiffs’ claims require individualized proof as it pertains to that particular Plaintiff. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). Thus, not only are each of the individual plaintiffs’ forced labor, trafficking, RICO and civil rights claims different from one another in this suit, as explained below, they are entirely different from their pending FLSA claims in David. Therefore, the issues presented by the Plaintiffs cannot be resolved in the David suit. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, S. Atl. & Gulf Coast Dist. of ILA, AFL-CIO, 751 F.2d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 1985).
1. Forced Labor and Trafficking The success of each Plaintiff’s forced labor and trafficking claims is dependent on individualized factors. The question in a forced labor case is “whether Defendants’ coercive conduct was such that it could overcome the will of the victim so as to make him render his labor involuntary.” David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247 at 77. “This question cannot be answered via generalized class-wide proof but rather must be answered individually based upon individualized proof.” Id. Similarly, with trafficking, “individual issues will play a significant part” because involuntary servitude is an essential element of the claim. Id. at 80-81. 2. RICO Claims The success of each Plaintiff’s RICO claim is also based on each individual’s experience because the Plaintiffs will be “required to prove that the [Defendants] committed the predicate acts upon which they rely for the pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. at 92. As stated above, proof
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of the predicate acts of trafficking and forced labor are “all premised on coercion” and “cannot be made without resort to individualized proof.” Id. Additionally, in order to prove the fraud-based predicate acts, each Plaintiff will “have to prove first-party reliance on the alleged fraud that was directed at them,” because “the question of individual reliance [is] paramount to resolving whether Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a RICO violation.” Id. at 105-06.
3. Civil Rights Claims The Plaintiffs are suing the Signal Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for violating their rights to “enjoy and benefit from non-discriminatory employment relationships” with the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 1 at 44.) In order to obtain compensatory damages under this claim, as sought by the Plaintiffs, each “Plaintiff must prove actual injury to himself and that injury must be attributable to (caused by) the Defendant’s disparate treatment.” David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *119. For this reason, the outcome of each Plaintiff’s case will vary based on their individualized experience. 4. Violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants violated the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1971 by violating their right to be free from “forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.” (Doc. No. 1 at 45.) Forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking all include an element of coercion, which requires an individualized analysis of each Plaintiff’s situation, as stated above. David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *128. As one can easily discern, none of the above causes of action involve substantially similar issues to the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims pending in David, which include claims of violating the
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federally mandated minimum wage laws. The undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs that the proof required for the FLSA claims and the remedies sought are distinct from the proof and remedies at issue in the instant matter. Given that there is not a substantial overlap of the claims between the David litigation and this case, and with the exception of the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in David, none of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit and David overlap, the court’s denial of the Signal Defendants’ motion to transfer will not result in “piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997).
V. Conclusion The undersigned finds that the instant suit does not substantially overlap with the first-filed suit, David. Accordingly, the Signal Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED. SIGNED this 2nd day of December, 2013.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 65 Filed 02/18/14 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 1539

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-323

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING DEFENDANT SIGNAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 13)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia Crone, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to

enter findings of fact and recommend disposition on case-dispositive matters, and to determine

non-dispositive matters. (Doc. No. 5.) Before the undersigned magistrate judge is a Motion to

Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Signal International, L.L.C.,

Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Signal”). For the reasons stated below, Signal’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) should be denied.

I. Jurisdiction

The Plaintiffs are a group of seventeen skilled construction workers of Indian descent who

were allegedly lured to the United States by Signal and a network of recruiters working on Signal’s

behalf. (Doc. No. 1.) In their complaint, the Plaintiffs assert four causes of action pursuant to

federal statutory and constitutional law: violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection

Reauthorization Act (18 U.S.C. § 1595); the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(18 U.S.C. § 1962); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); the Ku Klux Klan Act of

1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985) and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc.

No. 1.) For actions brought under federal statutory and constitutional provisions, the court has

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subject matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1331. In their fifth and sixth causes of action, the Plaintiffs bring state law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. (Doc. No. 1.) The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper in this case because the events giving rise to the claims occurred within the confines of this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). When a court analyzes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). A court should grant such a motion only when the complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
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III. Analysis Signal moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because “the [c]omplaint alleges that the facts from which they originate” occurred abroad. (Doc. No. 13, p. 1.) In addition, Signal asserts the Plaintiffs failed to identify which state’s laws apply to their claims. (Id. pp. 8-11.) Although not entirely clear, Signal also seems to contend that the complaint should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs failed to meaningfully engage in a choice-of-law analysis in order to determine which, if any, state’s law applies. (Id.) Lastly, Signal moves to dismiss the complaint pro tanto1 “to the degree the [c]omplaint refers to facts that occurred abroad” with regard to the Plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 1981 and 1985. (Id. pp. 11-14.) The Plaintiffs counter that their complaint adequately alleges facts that their state law claims occurred in Texas and that Texas law applies to their claims. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue the complaint makes clear that the tortious actions originated, were performed, and continued to occur in Texas, specifically at the Texas Labor Camp located in Orange, Texas. (Doc. No. 22.) Furthermore, the Plaintiffs complain that Signal’s fixation on the supposed “foreign character” of their allegations misstates the complaint and offers no plausible grounds for dismissing their common law claims. (Id.) Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that a fact intensive choice of law analysis is premature given the sufficient facts that plausibly support the events centered around the Texas Labor Camp. (Id.) 1. State Law Claims Only Occurred Abroad Signal’s argument that the complaint should be dismissed because the alleged facts underlying the state law claims only occurred abroad is without merit. The complaint is replete
1. Pro Tanto: To that extent; for so much; as far as it goes Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACK.
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with allegations that Signal committed the state law torts in Texas. The following is a summary
of the Plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. No. 1):
The Plaintiffs were recruited by Signal and its recruiters, both in the United States and abroad, to work at Signal’s Texas Labor Camp. Signal and its recruiters contracted with the Plaintiffs to obtain permanent residence and immigration status in the United States within eighteen to twenty-four months. The Plaintiffs accepted Signal’s offer, paid their fees, and were transported to the Texas Labor Camp in the United States to perform work for Signal. Once at the Texas Labor Camp, Signal ratified the actions of the recruiters, and breached its obligations and defrauded the Plaintiffs regarding their immigration status upon their arrival. In the Texas Labor Camp, Signal personnel held various meetings with the Plaintiffs to discuss the status of the Plaintiffs’ visas and green card applications. Signal again promised the same visa extensions and green cards for the Plaintiffs as when they were recruited abroad. However, Signal continued to breach its contracts with the Plaintiffs by failing to comply with their binding promises regarding permanent residence and immigration status. Signal and its recruiters knowingly or negligently made materially false and untrue statements and representations to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. Signal intended that the false statements made by Signal and its recruiters would induce Plaintiffs to pay them exorbitant fees and remain as Texas Labor Camp under deplorable conditions.
When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must consider these facts as true.
In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205. From these allegations, the Plaintiffs have clearly
pleaded enough factual content to draw the reasonable inference that the alleged pendent state law
claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract occurred in Texas. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 at 678.
2. Complaint Fails to Identify Which State’s Laws Apply
Next, Signal argues the state law claims are subject to dismissal because the complaint fails
to identify which state’s law applies. (Doc. No. 13, pp. 10-11.) Signal also argues the complaint
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is defective because it does not address the factors that would convince the court that Texas state law, for example, applies. (Id.)
A court has discretion to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal question jurisdiction is proper and the state-law claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Federal courts apply the forum state’s conflict-of-law rules to determine what law governs the state-law claims. Bailey v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 609 F.3d 710, 722 (5th Cir. 2010), citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Texas courts first determine whether there is a conflict between Texas law and another potentially applicable law. Id. (citation omitted.) If there is no such conflict, a choice-of-law analysis is unnecessary. Id. (citing SAVA gumarska in kemijska industria d.d. v. Advanced Polymer Sciences, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 314 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)). But, where there is a conflict of laws, Texas follows the “most significant relationship” test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. (citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 953 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1997)).
Signal does not dispute the court has proper federal question jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims. Signal only argues the complaint is subject to dismissal because it does not explicitly identify which state’s laws apply. While courts have granted 12(b)(6) motions by applying a particular state’s substantive law under the “most significant relationship” test,2 Signal does not cite, and the undersigned cannot find, any binding Fifth Circuit authority for a 12(b)(6) dismissal because the complaint fails to plead the particular state’s law at issue for the pendent state law claims. Nevertheless, Signal has not shown there is even a conflict of laws between
2. See Signal Reply Brief, (Doc. No. 24, pp. 44-5), and cases cited.
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Texas and any other potentially applicable law.3 Without such a showing, a choice-of-law analysis is unnecessary. Even if a choice-of-law analysis were required, there is no authority for dismissing a complaint under 12(b)(6) for failing to analyze in the complaint which state law controls under the “most significant relationship” test promulgated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. In any event, Signal’s choice-of-law argument is irrelevant. As discussed previously, the Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to draw the reasonable inference that Signal’s alleged misconduct occurred in Texas, thereby invoking Texas law to govern the state causes of action.
3. Pro Tanto Dismissal Finally, Signal moves to dismiss the complaint pro tanto “to the degree the [c]omplaint refers to facts that occurred abroad” with regard to the Plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 1981 and 1985. Signal begins with the premise that §§ 1981 and 1985 claims are not extraterritorial. Signal would then like the court to compare the complaint in this suit with 1) the first amended complaint4 in David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et. al. and 2) one sentence in the David court’s order5 denying class certification concerning what damages are attributable to the David plaintiffs’ discrimination claims. Signal argues this comparison would show that at least part of the Plaintiffs’ §§ 1981 and 1985 claims in this case occurred abroad. Thus, Signal requests a pro tanto dismissal of the complaint to the degree the §§ 1981 and 1985 claims refer to facts that occurred abroad.
3. Signal argues in its reply brief (without any citation) that “under the Indian Contracts Act, and the jurisprudence construing it, a contract cannot be enforced if its enforcement would violate the law or public policy of India.” (Doc. No. 24, p.6.) Signal has not shown to what extent this conflicts with Texas law, why Indian law would be applied under the “most significant relationship test,” or why the Plaintiffs’ state law claims should be dismissed for failing to undergo this analysis in the complaint.
4. David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.) (Doc. No. 47). 5. David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et. al., Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
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In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court typically does not look beyond the complaint. However, a court may consider attachments to briefing if the documents are referenced in the complaint, central to the complaint, referenced by the parties, and their authenticity is not in dispute. See Walch v. Adjutant Gen. Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). While the David litigation was casually mentioned in the complaint (Doc. No 1, pp. 3, 6), the David first amended complaint and the David court’s order denying class certification are not central to the Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case. Furthermore, Signal failed to include the documents in its briefing to this court. Obviously, without being able to consider the David court documents, Signal’s motion should not be granted on this basis.
IV. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) should be denied.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 65 Filed 02/18/14 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 1546 A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276– 77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 18th day of February, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 83 Filed 04/23/14 Page 1 of 56 PageID #: 1954

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, ATHA MOHAMMAD ABDUL, KESAVARAO BUNDANKAYALA, RAJU DIVAKARAN, BIJU PERUMPILLY GEORGE, KRISHNA GONTHINA, NAYAPPULLI JAYACHANDRAN, GALLA VENKATA RAMA KRISHNA, SAMUEL JOSE KUMRUMTHODATHIL, LOHITHAKSHAN MADAMPET, JOHNY MANDY MATHAI, BELTHAZAR PETER, MOHANAN BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, SANTHOSH KUMAR RAJENDRAN PILLAI, ABY KARICKATHARA RAJU, SUMESH PORAMBATHUPARAMBIL SUBRAMANIAN, and CHANDRAN SHAJU THANISSERY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P., MALVERN C. BURNETT, GULF COAST IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C. BURNETT, A.P.C., GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., MICHAEL POL, SACHIN DEWAN, and DEWAN CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH CONSULTANTS),
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. 1:13-cv-00323 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 83 Filed 04/23/14 Page 2 of 56 PageID #: 1955
INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs (as defined below) and approxi mately 590 Indian m en, were trafficked into the United States through the federal govern ment’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services (the “Indian H-2B W orkers”) to Defendants Signal International L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, L.P., a nd Signal Internati onal Texas, G.P. (collectively “Signal”). Recruited to perform welding, pipefitting, and other m arine fabrication work, Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labo r and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. 2. Plaintiffs bring this action to recover damages inflicted by Signal and Signal’s recruiters and agents operating in Ind ia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Unite d States. Defendants, defined be low, have exploited and defra uded Plaintiffs by fraudulently recruiting them to work in the Unite d States and effectuating a broad schem e of psychological coercion, threats of serious harm and physical restraint, and threatened abuse of the legal process to maintain control over Plaintiffs. 3. Lured by, and in reliance upon, Defendants’ fraudulent prom ises of legal and permanent work-based imm igration to th e U nited S tates f or them selves and th eir f amilies, Plaintiffs plunged them selves and their fam ilies into debt to take advantage of thes e seemingly promising opportunities. Plaintiffs incurred sign ificant debts to pay m andatory recruitm ent, immigration processing, and travel fees char ged by De fendants totaling as m uch as $12,000 to
2

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$20,0001 per worker, equivalent to two to three year s of an Indian welde r’s salary working in India. Trusting the veracity of the immigra tion and work benefits prom ised by Defendants , Plaintiffs further relinquished st able employment opportunities in India and as guest workers in the Persian Gulf and Singapore.
4. Defendants’ m ain recruiting agents in I ndia and the United Arab Em irates held Plaintiffs’ p assports an d visas, and threaten ed, coerced, and defrauded Plaintiffs into p aying extraordinary fees for recruitm ent, imm igration processing, a nd travel. Several Defendants further caused Plaintiffs to believe that if th ey did not work for Signal under the auspices of temporary, Signal-restricted, H-2B guest worker visas, they woul d suf fer abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process, physical restraint, or other serious harm.
5. The false promises, collection of exorbitant recruiting fees, and strong-arm tactics of Signal and its agents were, upon inform ation and belief, authorized by Defendant Signal. Defendant Signal knew of the exorb itant fees charged and the Indian H-2B Workers’ green card expectations by December 2006, before any of Plain tiffs arrived at Sign al’s facility. (Order and Reasons Denying Class Certification, at 33, Kurian David, et al. v. Signal International, LLC, et al., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK, (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012), EC F No. 1117.) Far from taking any corrective m easures, Defendant Signal ratified and perpetuated the schem e by continuing to facilitate th e transpo rtation of additiona l wave s of Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs , from December 2006 through February 2007.
1 Paym ents were m ade by Plaintiffs in both In dian Rupees and United States Dollars. For th e purposes of this Com plaint, all paym ents m ade in Indian Rupees discussed throughout the Complaint were converted to United States Dollars. An exchange rate of 45 Indian Rupees to 1 United States Dollar was utilized as the approximate exchange rate for the relevant period.
3

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6. Upon Plaintiffs’ arrival in the United States, Defendant Signal required that Plaintiffs live in a guarded, overc rowded, and isolated labor camp located in Orange, Texas (the “Texas Labor Cam p”). Defendants further d eceived Plaintiffs regarding their visa sta tus, threatened Plaintiffs with arrest, loss of i mmigration status and deportation, and generally perpetrated a campaign of psychological abuse, coercion, and fraud designed to render Plaintiffs afraid, intimidated, and unable to leave Signal’s employ.
7. Defendant Signal subjected Pl aintiffs to d iscriminatory and offensive mandatory room and board arrangem ents at the Texas Labor Camp to which non-Indian and United States citizen em ployees were not subjected. More over, Defendant Signal imposed upon Plaintiffs discriminatory job-related requirem ents and ad verse term s and conditions of e mployment on Plaintiffs to which non-Indian and United S tates citizen em ployees were not subjected. Defendant Signal subjected Plaintiffs to an objectively hostile a nd abusive work environment on account of Plaintiffs’ race and alienage.
8. Plaintiffs assert claim s against Defendants arising from violat ions of their rights under the Victim s of Tr afficking and Violence Protection Act (“TVPA”) (18 U.S.C. § 1581, et al.; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga nizations Act (“RICO”); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); the Ku Klux Klan Ac t of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985); the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §2201); the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (29 U.S.C. §201, et seq.); and claim s for dam ages arising from fr aud, negligent m isrepresentation, and breach of contract.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. This Court has jurisdiction over this acti on pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (civil trafficking), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c ) (RICO), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights); and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (FLSA). 10. This Court has supplem ental jurisdiction over the causes of action based on state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as the state law claim s arise out of the sa me nucleus of operative facts which support the federal claims. 11. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texa s under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in that Defendants and/or agents of Defendants, resided or have been found in Orange, Texas during the relevant time periods and a substantia l portion of the communications, transactions, events or om issions underlying P laintiffs’ claim s occurre d to se cure labor for Signal’s Orange, Texas operations in this judicial district. 12. Declaratory relief is sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 13. Plaintiffs are of South Asian Indian des cent, Indian nationals, and form er H-2B guest workers who were recruite d from India or the United Ar ab Em irates by Defendants at various times within calendar years 2006 and 2007. 14. Plaintiffs are members of a racial minority, as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. §1981. 15. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were “persons” within the meaning of that term as defined by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
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16. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant Signal as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
17. At all re levant times, Defendants were engaged in inter state commerce or in the production of goods for sale in interstate commerce.
18. Plaintiffs were form er putative class m embers in the Civil Action s tyled Kurian David, et. al. v. Signal International, LLC, et.al ., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK, currently pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. On January 4, 2012, class certification was denied, thus paving the way for Pl aintiffs to file individual actions. Order and Reasons Denying Class Certification, at 33, Kurian David, et al. v. Signal International, LLC, et al., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK, (E.D. La. January 4, 2012), ECF No. 1117.
19. Plaintiff Reji Sam uel (“Plaintiff Samuel”) is a residen t of Texas and a pipefitter and welder by trade. Plaintiff Samuel was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 12, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
20. Plaintiff Atha Mohamm ad Abdul (“Plainti ff Abdul”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plain tiff Abdul was induced by De fendants to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about December 11, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
21. Plaintiff Kesavaro Budankayala (“Plainti ff Budankayala”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Budankaya la was induced by Defendants to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about Decem ber 11, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 83 Filed 04/23/14 Page 7 of 56 PageID #: 1960
22. Plaintiff Raju Divakaran (“ Plaintiff Divakaran”) is a resident of Georgia and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Divakaran was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 9, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
23. Plaintiff Biju Perum pilly Geor ge (“Plaintiff George”) is a resident of California and a welder by trade. Plaintiff Ge orge was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 3, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
24. Plaintiff Krishna Gonthina (“Plaintiff Gonthina”) is a resident of Texas and a welder by trade. Plaintiff G onthina was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 13, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
25. Plaintiff Na yappulli Jayacha ndran (“Plaintiff Jayachandr an”) is a resident of Louisiana and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Jayachandran was induced by De fendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about Ja nuary 23, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
26. Plaintiff Galla Venkaga Rama Krishna (“Plaintiff Krishna”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Krishna wa s induced by Defendants to leave M umbai, India on an airplane on or about December 12, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
27. Plaintiff Samuel Jose Kurumthodathil (“Plaintiff Kurumthodathil”) is a resident of California and a welder by trade. Plaintiff Kurum thodathil was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about Decem ber 13, 2006 to work for Defenda nt Signal in Orange, Texas.
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28. Plaintiff Lohithakashan Mada mpet (“Plaintiff Madampet”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Madampet was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 11, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
29. Plaintiff Johny Mandy Mathai (“Plaintiff Ma thai”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plainti ff Mathai was induced by Defendants to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about February 15, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
30. Plaintiff Belthazar Peter (“Plaintiff Peter”) is a resident of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff Peter was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about December 18, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
31. Plaintiff Mohanan Balak irshna Pillai (“Plaintiff B. Pillai” ) is a residen t of Texas and a pipefitter by trade. Plaintiff B. Pillai wa s induced b y Defendants to leave M umbai, India on an airplane on or about December 17, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
32. Plaintiff Santhosh Kumar Rajendra n Pillai ( “Plaintiff R. Pilla i”) is a r esident of Texas and a pipef itter a nd welder b y trad e. Plaintiff R. Pilla i was ind uced by De fendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about January 23, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
33. Plaintiff Aby Karicka thara Raju (“P laintiff Raju”) is a resident of Georgia and a welder by trade. Plain tiff Raju was induced by Defenda nts to leave Mum bai, India on an airplane on or about December 18, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
34. Plaintiff Sumesh Pora mbathuparambil Subramanian (“Plaintiff Subramanian”) is a resident of Louisiana and a welder by trade. Plaintiff Subramanian was induced by Defendants
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to leave Mumbai, India on an airp lane on or about December 10, 2006 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
35. Plaintiff Chandran Shaju Thanissery (“Pl aintiff Thanissery”) is a resident of Texas and is a p ipefitter by trad e. Plain tiff Thannissery was induced by Defendants to leave Mumbai, India on an airplane on or about Febr uary 1, 2007 to work for Defendant Signal in Orange, Texas.
Defendants Defendant Signal 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signal International LLC is a corporation organized under the laws of Dela ware and a provider of m arine and fabrication services in the Gulf Coast region, with operations in Orange, Texas; Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Mobile, Alabama. 37. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant S ignal Internat ional Texas, G.P. is a general partnership organized under the laws of Texas and employed the labor for Signal International LLC and Signal International, Inc. at the Texas Labor Camp. 38. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Si gnal Interna tional Texas, L.P. is a limited partnership of Signal Intern ational, L.L.C. and Signal Inte rnational Texas, G.P. and is organized under the laws of Texas. 39. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signa l International, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of Dela ware and a provider of m arine and fabrication services in the Gulf Coast region, with operations in Orange, Texas; Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Mobile, Alabama.
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40. Upon inform ation and belief, all polic ies, money for payroll, corporate governance and legal advice for Defendant Signal International, G.P. was provided by Signal International, L.L.C..
41. Upon inform ation and belief, all polic ies, money for payroll, corporate governance and legal advice for Defendant Signal International, L.P. was provided by Signal International, L.L.C..
42. Upon infor mation and belief, Defendant Si gnal does distinguish the roles of the Signal entities including, but not limited to, which entity paid Plaintiffs.
43. Upon infor mation and belief, Defendant Si gnal International, L.L.C. executed contracts relevant to this Complaint in the name of Signal International, Inc.
44. Upon infor mation and belief, Signal di d not docum ent which entity employed Plaintiffs.
45. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant S ignal International, Inc. is the sole member of Defendant Signal International, L.L.C.
46. Upon information and belief, Defendants Si gnal International, L.L.C. and Signal International, Inc. are and func tion as, the alter egos of Signal International Texas, G.P. and Signal International Texas, L.P.
47. Defendants Signal International L.L.C., Signal Inte rnational, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. will be referred to collectively as “Signal”.
48. Upon information and belief, Defendant Si gnal paid the Indian H-2B Workers at the Texas Labor Camp through a Texas bank account and Texas payroll account.
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 83 Filed 04/23/14 Page 11 of 56 PageID #: 1964

Recruiter Defendants

49. Defendant Global Resources, In c. (“Global”) is, or at al l relevant tim es, was, a

corporation organized under the laws of Mississi ppi and engaged in the business of recruitin g

workers from India, including Plaintiffs, for employment in Texas. Global entered into contracts

with Defendant Signal, Burnett Defendants (defined below), Dewan Defendants (defined below),

and Plaintiffs for labor to be provided in Si gnal’s Texas L abor Cam p. Upon inform ation and

belief, Global recruited Plainti ffs for em ployment within Texas. Upon inform ation and belief,

Global committed tortious conduct in Texas.

50. Defendant Michael Pol (“Pol”) is or was the President of Global, and resides in

Mississippi. Def endant Pol entered into contra cts with Defendant Signal, Burnett Defendants,

Dewan Defendants, and Plaintiffs for labor to be provided in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp. Upon

information and belief, P ol recruited Plaintiffs for em ployment within Texas. Upon infor mation

and belief, Pol committed tortious conduct in Texas.

51. Defendant Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/a Medtech Consultan ts) (“Dewan

Consultants”) is a priv ate lim ited liability com pany organized under the laws of India, which

maintains offices in Mum bai (Bombay), India, and Dubai, United Arab Em irates. Defendant

Dewan Consultants entered into contracts with Defendant Signal, B urnett Defendants, Pol

Defendants, and Plaintiffs for labor to be pr ovided in S ignal’s T exas Labor Camp. Dewa n

Consultants recruited P laintiffs for em ployment within T exas. Upon inform ation and belief,

Defendant Dewan Consultants committed tortious conduct in Texas.

52. Defendant Sachin Dewan (“Dewan”) is the Director of Dewan Consultants.

Dewan resides in India. Dewan entered into

contracts with Defendant Signal, Burnett

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Defendants, Pol De fendants, and Plaintiffs for labor to be pr ovided in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp. De wan recruited Plaintiffs for e mployment within Texas. Upon inform ation and belief, Dewan committed tortious conduct in Texas.
53. Upon inform ation and belief, Defenda nts Dewan and Dewan Consultants (“Dewan Defendants”) authorized and utiliz ed Defendants Pol and Global, and Burnett Defendants to act as their United States-based operations and/or agents.
54. Upon information and belief, Defendants Pol and Global, Burnett Def endants and Defendant Signal authorized and utilized Defendants Dewan and Dewa n Consultants to act as their India and United Arab Emirates based operations and/or agents.
55. Upon infor mation and belief, Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, and Global, and Burnett Defendants, acted as a join t ventu re with respe ct to the r ecruitment, contracting, and retention of Plaintiffs for the provision of labor or services.
56. Defendants Pol and Global, and Burnett Defendants, utilized Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants to conduct and carry out th eir shared business inte rests and activities in India and the United Arab Em irates. Among ot her things, Defendants Pol and Global shared offices with Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants in India and the United Arab Emirates.
57. Upon information and belief, Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants utilized Defendants Pol and Global, and Burnett Defendant s, to conduct and effectuate their shared business interests and activities in the United States.
58. Throughout this Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, and Global collectively as “Recruiter Defendants.”
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Burnett Defendants 59. Defendant Malvern C. Burnett (“ Burnett”) is an atto rney who resides and maintains offices in New Orleans, Louisiana. 60. Defendant Gulf Coast Imm igration Law Center L.L.C. (“GCILC”) is a lim ited liability cor poration or ganized un der the laws of Louisiana and lo cated in New Orleans , Louisiana. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Burnett serves as GC ILC’s sole registered agent, member, and/or corporate officer. 61. Defendant Law Offices of Malvern C. Burn ett, A.P.C. (“Burnett Law Offices”) is a professional law corporati on organized under the laws of Louisiana and located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Upon information and belief, Defendant Burnett serves as its sole registered agent, member, and/or corporate officer. 62. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendants Burnett, GCIL C, and Burnett Law Offices are engaged in a joint venture or are alter egos in that all entities have the same corporate mailing address, interm ingle business assets, do not operate at arm s’ length, and Defendant Burnett serv es as the registered agent and so le m ember or corporate officer for GCILC and Burnett Law Offices. 63. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Burnett, GCILC, and the Burnett Law Offices have the sam e business objectives, and Defendant Burnett uses GCILC and the Burnett Law Offices to conduct and effectuate shared business objectives. 64. Defendants Burnett, GCILC and the Burnett La w Of fices entered into contra cts with Recruiter Defendants and Plaintiffs for labor to be provided in Signal’s Texas Labor Ca mp.
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Burnett Defendants recruited Plaintiffs for e mployment within Texas. Upon inform ation and belief, Burnett Defendants committed tortious conduct in Texas.
65. Throughout this Com plaint, P laintiffs re fer to Defendants B urnett, GCILC, and Burnett Law Offices collectively as “Burnett Defendants.”
All Defendants 66. At all relevant tim es, Defendants Dewa n, Dewan Consultants, Pol, Global, Burnett, Burnett Law Offices and GCILC acted as agents of Defendant Signal for the purposes of recruiting, obtaining, contracting, tr ansporting Plaintiffs to provide labor services in the state of Texas. 67. Individually and thr ough their ag ents, asso ciates, attorney s, or em ployees, all Defendants have done or are doing business in Orange, Texas. 68. At all relevant times, Defendants were “persons” as that term is defined in RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 69. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendants have been engaged in contacts with Plaintiffs, including recruiting, obtaining, labor contracting, providing imm igration-related services to, transporting, harboring, providing /or employing Plaintiffs. 70. At all relevant tim es, Defendants opera ted enterp rises engaged in inte rstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. 71. At all relevant times, Defendant Signal employed Plaintiffs.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS The Recruitment Process Recruitment of Plaintiffs 72. Acting as D efendant Signal’s recruiting ag ent for the pu rposes of facilitating the recruitment of Indian H -2B W orkers for em ployment at Signal, Recruiter Defendants placed advertisements in newspapers throughout India and the United Arab Em irates in the spring, summer, and fall of 2006 offering opportunities for welders and pipefitters to imm igrate permanently to the United States und er the auspices of Signal, “a leading m arine and fabrication company in Mississippi and Texas.” Plaintiffs were targeted for recruitment on the basis of their race or alienage. 73. Recruiter Defendants’ advertisements and other recruiting efforts were undertaken on behalf of, at the direction of, or in coordi nation and consultation with Defendant Signal and Burnett Defendants. 74. Recruiter D efendants’ advertisem ents and other recruiting efforts prom ised “permanent residency” or “green cards.” 75. In response to the advertisem ents poste d by Recruiter Defenda nts, Plaintiffs contacted R ecruiter Defendants in the spring, summer and fall of 2006 via telephone and inperson meetings. 76. Specific facts relevan t to the experiences of Plaintiffs are se t f orth in the table attached as Exhibit 1 to this Complaint, which are incorporated herein by reference. 77. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Si gnal’s direction and coordination of Recruiter Defendants’ and Burnett Defendants’ recruitment efforts were effectuated by the use of
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numerous telephone, fax, e-m ail, or mail communications that occurred from the spring of 2006 through at least January 2007.
78. Upon inform ation and belief, in th ese communications Defendant Signal authorized Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants to act as their agents for the purposes of recruiting and providing Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s Orange, Texas operations.
79. Upon information and belief, in these co mmunications, Defendant Signal further authorized Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defe ndants to represent that Signal would agree to sponsor bona fide green card applications for Plaintiffs and obtain at least two H-2B visa extensions on behalf of Plaintiffs to allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while their green card applications were being processed.
80. Defendant Signal authorized these repr esentations even though it knew or had reason to know that such vi sa extensions and green card applications would not be bona fide , valid, or lawful under United States imm igration law and even though Signal did not have the intention at that time to apply for visa extensions or green cards on behalf of all the Indian H-2B Workers, including Plaintiffs.
81. At the latest, Defendant Signal knew th at the H-2B W orkers paid exorbitant recruitment fees to Sign al’s agents – Recrui ter Defendants and Burnett Defendants – and m ade those p ayments on the basis of p romises, nam ely th at the workers wo uld receiv e green cards, which Signal knew to be false. Defendant Si gnal nonetheless continue d to f acilitate the transportation, to Signal worksites in Texas an d Mississippi, of hundreds m ore Indian H-2B Workers, including Plaintiffs, because it was in Signal’s financial interest to do so.
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82. In the spring, summer, and fall of 2006, Pl aintiffs attended m eetings at which Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants, actin g on Signal’s behalf, info rmed Plaintiffs of the opportunity to work for Defendant Signal on H- 2B visas which were represented to lead to permanent resident (green card) status.
83. Upon infor mation and belief, prior to attending these m eetings and testing sessions (discussed in paragraphs 91 to 95 below), Defendant Signa l, Recruiter Defendants, and Burnett Defendants conferred in the spring, su mmer, and fall of 2006 by phone, m ail, fax or email to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these meetings.
84. The United States -based Recruiter De fendants (Pol and Global), Burnett Defendants, and Defendant Signal traveled across st ate and international lines to attend meetings with Plaintiffs in India and the United Arab Emirates in the spring, summer, and fall of 2006.
85. According to the statem ents made at these meeting s and in comm unications effected by wire and mail during this tim e peri od, Defendant Signal repr esented that it would sponsor Plaintiffs’ green card applications and extend their H-2B visas multiple times to enable Plaintiffs to work in the United States while their green card applications were pending. In exchange, each Plaintiff was required to pay fe es totaling as m uch as 8 lakh rupees ($20,000), each in a series of approximately three installments.
86. Plaintiffs were furthe r inform ed by Recruiter Defendants and/or Burnett Defendants that Plaintif fs would be able to obtain le gal perm anent residen ce for their spouses and children.
87. At inform ational m eetings and in telephone conversations, faxes, contracts, and other written documents transmitted through the use of m ail and wire communications occurring
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during the spring, sum mer and fall of 2006, Recr uiter D efendants and Burnett Defendants, personally or through their agents, representatives, or em ployees, represented to Plaintiffs that: Defendant Signal would provide lawful, stable , and a mple employment opportunities; working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsis tent with applying for perm anent immigration status sponsored by Signal; a nd, Signal would obtain for P laintiffs work-authorized green cards enabling Plaintiffs to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families.
88. In such co mmunications with Plainti ffs, Recruiter Def endants and Burnett Defendants f urther p romised to ac t diligen tly a nd to do everything nece ssary to ensure that Plaintiffs would obtain green cards within 24 months of initiating the green-card process.
89. In reasonable reliance upon these and ot her contractually-binding prom ises made to them regarding green cards and work opport unities in the United Stat es, P laintiffs signed green card contracts at various points from m id-2006 to early 2007 with Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants pursuant to which Plainti ffs promised to pay the fees charged by these Defendants.
90. Contracts signed by Plaintiffs and other documents provided to Plaintiffs by Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants thr ough the use of m ail or wire transm issions in and around m id-2006 through at least early 2007, further prom ised that Plaintiffs would promptly receive a refund of all or nearly all of their pay ments if these Defendants did no t succeed in securing green cards for Plaintiffs, as promised.
91. Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants kne w or should have known, however, that they would not refund Plaintiffs’ money as prom ised in the contracts and other documents.
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92. Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants induced Plaintiffs to enter the green card contracts even th ough such defendants did not intend to pursue diligen tly Plaintiffs’ applications and without any basis whatsoever fo r representing, inter alia, that Defendant Signal had lawful long-term employm ent opportunities to provide Plaintiffs; that Signal could legally apply for num erous H-2B visa extensions to main tain Plaintiffs’ presence in the United State s; that working under an H-2B visa for Signal w as not inconsistent with applying for perm anent immigration status sponsored by Signal; that gr een card applications sponsored by Signal would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and that such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.
93. In reasonable reliance o n Recruiter Defe ndants’ and Burnett Defendants’ explicit and repeated prom ises regarding the procurem ent of green cards and employm ent opportunities in the United States, Plaintiffs undertook considerable economic, personal and familial sacrifices, including the m ortgaging or sale of personal property and other incurrence of debt, in order to amass the funds necessary to initiate the green card process with Defendant Signal.
94. In reasonab le reliance on the pro mises of Recruiter Def endants and Burnett Defendants, Plaintiffs signed contracts with th ese Defendants and m ade the paym ents required by these contracts.
95. Plaintiffs would not have paid the f ees charg ed by Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants for green cards, visas, a nd em ployment opportunities had they known that these Defendants’ promises and representations were false.
96. Plaintiffs would not have paid the f ees charg ed by Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants for green cards, visas, a nd em ployment opportunities had they known that
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these Def endants had f ailed to dis close m aterial facts con cerning the nature and term s and conditions of the purported immigration and work opportunities offered.
Departure for Signal Operations in the United States 97. At various tim es during the spring, summ er, and fall of 2006, em ployees of Defendant Signal traveled to vari ous locations in India and the Un ited Arab Emirates and tested Plaintiffs’ welding and pipefitting skills in anticipation of employing them in the United States. 98. Plaintiffs paid costs necessary to travel to the cities where these tests were held. 99. Plaintiffs paid admission fees in order to take these tests. 100. Plaintiffs attended and passe d thes e tests, which were ov erseen and graded by Defendant Signal’s or Defendant Dewan’s agents, employees, or representatives. 101. Upon infor mation and belief, prior to attending these m eetings and testing sessions, D efendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and B urnett Defendants conferred in the spring, summer, and fall of 2006 by phone, m ail, fax or e-mail to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these testing sessions. 102. On or about July 20, 2006 and August 17, 2006, the United States Departm ent of Labor approved Signal’s labor cer tification applications for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007. 103. In approving these labor certification applications, the United Sta tes Department of Labor relied on the accuracy of the applicants’ stated 10-month period of labor need. 104. On infor mation and belief, the Departm ent of Labor is proh ibited by its internal guidelines from granting labor certification ap plications without relying on the applicants’ statement of temporary labor need.
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105. In late August and early Septem ber 2006, the United S tates Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) approved Signal’s H-2B visa petitions for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007.
106. In approving these visa petitions, the USCIS relied on the purported accuracy of the applicants’ stated 10-m onth pe riod of labor need and the representation that Defendant Signal’s need was based on a one time peak-load temporary demand.
107. The USCIS m ust, according to regulation, rely on the stated perio d of the petitioner’s labor need, see 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(6)(ii)(B) (2006).
108. Defendant Signal, Burnett Defendants, and Recruiter Defendants knew that the stated period of need in Signa l’s a pplications f or labor cer tifications and for H-2B visas were inconsistent with Sign al’s p rojected actu al labor need, and therefore Defendants knew these statements to the United States Government were false.
109. Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendant s used the H-2B visas, obtained fro m the U.S. Governm ent on the basis of false statem ents by Defendant Signal and Burnett Defendants, to elicit certain payments from Plaintiffs.
110. Plaintiffs entered the United States on H- 2B guest worker visas, issued by th e United States Government on the basis of fals e statem ents m ade by Defendant Signal and Burnett Defendants, in late 2006 and early 20 07 for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Texas Labor Camp.
111. Around the tim e of USCIS visa ap proval, Plaintiffs made necessary preparations to trave l to the United States on H-2B visas to work for Signal, including: paying to obtain necessary travel and legal documents; making payments to the United States consulate, Recruiter
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Defendants and Burnett Defendants for m andatory H-2B visa and consular processing fees; attending H-2B visa interviews; and paying Recruiter Defendants for travel arrangements.
112. In order to secure H-2B visas to work for Signal, Plain tiffs were inte rviewed by representatives of the United States Consular offices in Indian cities.
113. These consular interviews necessitated that Plaintiffs pay th e costs of travel from their hom es or current places of employment to various large In dian cities in cluding Chennai (Madras) and Mumbai (Bombay).
114. Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants, acting as Defendant Signal’s agents, required that Plain tiffs m eet with Recruiter D efendants or Burnett Defe ndants in these Indian cities prior to attending their consular interviews.
115. Upon inform ation and belief, prior to th ese meetings, Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants discussed am ong them selves and w ith Defendant Signal by e-m ail, telephone, or in-person communications the topics to be discussed and instructions to be given to Plaintiffs at these meetings.
116. At these pr e-interview m eetings, Recr uiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants ensured that Plaintiffs were up-to-date on paying the fee installments required by their green card contracts.
117. Defendants further requ ired that Plaintiffs pay an additio nal 35,000 to 45,000 rupees ($800 to $1,100) fee for H-2B visa processing.
118. Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants required Plaintiffs to sign docum ents permitting Defendant Dewan to receive their visa -stamped passports from the Consulate o n Plaintiffs’ behalf.
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119. Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants also coached Plaintiffs on what to say during consular interviews.
120. Recruiter D efendants or Burnett Defendants told Plaintiffs that if they did not follow these ins tructions regarding the in terviews, Plaintiffs would not receive th eir visas an d would forfeit all of the money they had previously paid to Defendants, in addition to losing their opportunity to permanently immigrate to the United States.
121. During Plaintiffs’ consular interviews, th e consular official s took Plaintiffs’ passports from them.
122. Once Plaintiffs’ visas were approved, consul ar officials sen t their passp orts, with H-2B visas affixed, directly to Defendant Dewan.
123. After receiv ing word th at Plain tiffs’ vi sas were approved, Recruiter Defendants made travel arrangements for Plaintiffs’ departures to the United States.
124. Before Plaintiffs could leav e for the Un ited States, however, Plain tiffs were required to attend final meetings in Recruiter Defendants’ office.
125. Such m eetings typically took place m ere hours before Plaintiffs’ scheduled departures to the United States, when Recruite r Defendants’ office was teem ing with anxious fellow Indian H-2B Workers awaiting departure to the United States.
126. At these meetings, Recruiter Defendants collected final installm ent paym ents required by Plaintiffs’ green card contracts.
127. Recruiter Defendants also required that Plaintiffs, most of whom do not or did not at the time read or speak English proficiently, sign English language docum ents with little or no time for review, and did not allow Plaintiffs to keep a copy of the documents.
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128. Recruiter Defendants refused to return Pl aintiffs’ passports — which had been in Defendant Dewan’s possession sin ce Plaintiffs’ H-2B visas were approved by consular officials — until af ter Plain tiffs had paid the f inal ins tallments of their f ees and signed m andatory paperwork.
129. In forceful tones, Recruiter Defendants or their staff de manded that Plaintiffs quickly s ign the m andatory docum ents, le st the y m iss the f lights to the United Sta tes, which Recruiter Defendants had scheduled for them and forfeit the fees they had paid.
130. Without possession of their passports and within this ru shed and hostile atmosphere, Plaintiffs had no reasonable opportun ity to review, negotiate, or m ake any changes to the documents presented them.
131. On occasions when wor kers who appeared at th e Mumbai office failed to present sufficient funds to pay the final installm ent requ ired by the green card contracts, Defendant Dewan and his associates threatened to destroy or deface these workers’ passports.
132. Such threats were uttered in the pres ence of other workers, causing these workers to reasonably believe that they had no choice but to pay their final fee installments in full.
133. Based on Recruiter Defendants’ threateni ng and coercive beha vior during these pre-departure meetings in Mum bai and the extrao rdinary and increasing levels of debt they had incurred to pay Recruiter Defendants and Burn ett Defendants for green card and H-2B visa arrangements, Plaintiffs reasonab ly believed that they had no choice but to m ake the paym ents required by Recruiter Defendants and to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal. Not until P laintiffs had f ulfilled all of Def endants’ r equirements did Plaintif fs have their passports and visas returned to them.
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134. Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Worker s traveled from M umbai to Defendant Signal’s operations in the U.S. at va rious times from late October 2006 to April 2007 on tickets arranged by Recruiter Defendants.
135. Defendant Signal collected Plaintiffs at the Houston airport upon arrival and transported them immediately to the Texas Labor Camp.
136. Pursuant to Defendant Signal’s instruc tions and arrangements, approximately 300 workers were sent to Signal’s Pascagoula, Miss issippi facility (the “M ississippi Labor Ca mp” and collectively with the Texas L abor Cam p, the “Labor Cam ps”) and approxim ately 290 workers were sent to the Texas Labor Camp upon arrival in the United States.
137. Plaintiffs had no choice but to use Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants to secure employment at Defendant Signal’s operations.
138. Plaintiffs had no choice but to pay the fees ch arged by Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants to secure employment at Defendant Signal’s operations.
139. Management personnel at Defendant Si gnal m ade the conscious and deliberate decision to prohibit Plaintiffs from securing em ployment at Signal’s oper ations eith er through another recruiter or by bypassing recruiters altogether and applying directly with Signal.
Conditions at the Texas Labor Camp 140. Upon arrival at Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Camp, Plaintiffs were shocked to discover that they were expected to live in an isolated, overcrowded labor cam p comprised of trailer-like bunkhouses surrounded by barbed-wire fences, and accessible only b y a single, guarded entrance.
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141. Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Camp was lo cated in an is olated, industrial area miles rem oved from s hopping areas, places of worship, public transpor tation or residential communities.
142. Initially, there were no telephones and no internet access available for Plaintiffs to communicate outside of the Texas Labor Camp.
143. Initially, the re were no telev isions availabl e for Plaintiffs to keep apprised of events outside of the Texas Labor Camp.
144. The Texas Labor Camp gates were cons tantly m onitored by security guards retained by Defendant Signal. Signal’s security guards monitored Plaintiffs’ comings and goings by requiring them to show their employee identi fication badges and recording when Plaintiffs entered and exited the Texas Labor Cam p. Signal’ s secu rity gua rds also search ed Plain tiffs’ packages and bags when they entered the Texas Labor Camp.
145. Except on r are occasions, Plaintiffs were not pe rmitted to r eceive visitors in th e Texas Labor Camp.
146. Up to twenty-four men were housed in each bunkhouse and made to sleep in twotiered bunk beds. The bunk beds were so tightly packed in the bunkhouses that it w as difficult for workers to m ove about in the narrow passa geways between bunks or sit up in bed. These housing conditions violated OSHA regulations.
147. The Texas Labor Ca mp bunkhouses had insufficient to ilet and bathin g facilities for twenty-four men, one or two toilets per bunkhous e, resulting in long lines for the bathroom s before and after work shifts and unsanitary c onditions due to unresolved plumbing problems that rendered the toilets inoperable.
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148. Privacy was non-existent, and Plaintiffs often experienced extrem e difficulty sleeping due to the constant noise resulting from the close quarters and the com ings and goings of workers who worked on different shifts.
149. Defendant Signal’s personnel and security guards conducted surprise searches of the dormitory areas of the bunkhouses, including searches of workers’ personal belongings.
150. Plaintiffs took their m eals in Defenda nt Signal’s m ess halls, which were only open during lim ited hours. Due to unhygienic kitche n conditions, Plainti ffs frequently becam e ill, sometimes requiring hospitalization.
151. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Signal did not obtain the required permit(s) to furnish board at the Texas Labor Camp, and the condition and sanitation of the board provided further violated federal, state, and/or local law including, inter alia, the U.S. Food and Drug Adm inistration Food Code 2005 2, as adopted and m odified by Texas Food Establishment Rules. 25 Tex. Admin. Code. §§229.161 – 229.171, 229.173-229.175.
152. Defendant Signal deducted labor camp f ees of approxim ately $35 per day ($245 per week, or approxim ately $1,050 per m onth) from Plaintiffs’ paychecks for these substandard accommodations and meals.
153. When Plain tiffs com plained and as ked to live outside th e Texas Labor Cam p, Defendant Signal initially refused and subsequently told workers that if they tried to live outs ide the Texas Labor Ca mp Defendant Signal would stil l deduct the labor camp fees from Plaintiffs’ wages. As a resu lt, Plaintif fs reason ably be lieved they had no choice but to contin ue liv ing in Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Camp.
2 Available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/food/guidanceregulation/ucm123926.pdf. 27

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154. Defendant Signal only housed Indian H-2B Workers such as Plaintiffs in its Labor Camps, which other employees and m anagement at Signal referred to as the “res ervation(s)”. Upon information and belief, United States citizens and other workers of non-Indian descent and non-Indian race were n either required nor allo wed to live in o r pay for accommodations in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp.
155. Defendant Signal subjected Pl aintiffs to skills testing and re-testing, on-the-job discipline, layoffs, periods witho ut work, l ack of safety precau tions, unfav orable job assignments, evaluation processes, and other a dverse em ployment actions to which non-Indian and United States citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
156. In addition, Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Ca mp personnel and supervisors frequently used offensive language while speaking with or referring to Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers, and regularly insulted Plaintiffs on the basis of their race or alienage.
157. During th e first week o f em ploying Plaintiffs in th e United States, D efendant Signal did not reim burse Plaintiffs for any of the expenses that Plaintiffs were required to incur as a pre-condition of seeking employment with Signal.
158. During th e f irst two we eks of em ploying Plaintiffs, De fendant Signal deducted approximately $100 to $200 each week from Plainti ffs’ checks for job-related to ol kits which Signal required Plaintiffs to purchase from Signal.
159. Defendant Signal personnel and m anagement regularly threatened Plain tiffs and other Indian H-2B W orkers that if they did not continue worki ng for Defendant Signal, did not work according to Defendant Signal’s specifications, or complained abo ut the working or living conditions, Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers would be deported back to India.
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160. In the iso lated and guarded atm osphere of the Texas Labor Cam p and saddled with the crushing debts they had incurred to come to the United States in reliance upon the Defendants’ representatives, Plaint iffs reasonably believed Signal’ s statements were threatening and believed they had no choice but to continue working for Signal despite deplorable working and living conditions.
161. At regular m eetings and in one-on-one or sm all group conversations with Defendant Signal’s Texas Labor Ca mp pers onnel and m anagement, som e workers voiced complaints regarding the discrim inatory trea tment to which Indian H-2B Wo rkers were subjected, but to which non-Indian and U.S. citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
162. When De fendant Signal took no action in response to workers’ complaints, numerous Indian H-2B W orkers living at the Texas Labor Ca mp, including Plaintiffs, began meeting to discuss how to persuade Defendant Signal to improve conditions in the Texas Labor Camp, and also began meeting with third parties to discuss how best to address their concerns.
163. Upon information and belief, Defendant Si gnal became aware of these m eetings between workers, including Plaintiffs, and third parties whom Signal believed to be attorneys.
164. Upon information and belief, Defendant Si gnal, through its em ployees or agents, contacted Recruiter Def endants and Burnett Defe ndants to express its concerns about worker organizing efforts and the specific involvement of Plaintiffs.
165. Upon inform ation and belief, during thes e conversations Recruiter D efendants, Burnett Defendants, and Defendant Signal reached an agreem ent regarding steps to be taken to discourage further worker organi zing efforts and to ensure th at the Indian H-2B W orkers
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continued to work at Signal without com plaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B W orkers from exercising their legal rights.
166. On March 9, 2007, Plaintiffs learned that Defendant Signal used private security guards to raid Signal’s Mississippi Labor Camp.
167. Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Work ers beca me increasingly frigh tened and confused by these activities, part icularly when word spread that Defendant Signal had locked up the Mississippi Labor Ca mp Indian H-2B Workers who com plained about the working conditions.
168. Plaintiffs learned of an I ndian H-2B Worker at the Miss issippi Labor Camp who attempted s uicide, rath er than be deported an d face debts he had in curred in India to p ay Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants.
169. Defendant Signal’s actions on and after March 9, 2007 at the Mississippi Labor Camp significantly intensified the reasonable fears of Plaintiffs and othe r Indian H-2 B Workers in the Texas Labor Camp that if they trie d to leave Defendant Signal’s em ploy or oppose unlawful and coercive employment conditions at Defendant Signal, including by consulting with counsel, they faced the threat of physical restraint, detention, forced deportation, or other serious harm or abuses of the legal process. This r eaction was, upon infor mation and belief, exactly the reaction Signal wanted and expected from the Indian H-2B Workers.
170. Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, Signal personnel in the Labor Camps held various m eetings with Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers to discuss the status of Plaintiffs’ and other Indian H-2B Workers’ visas and green card applications.
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171. Defendant Signal officials held a m eeting with the In dian H-2B W orkers, including Plaintiffs. Defendant Si gnal ind icated that they had se lected Plain tiffs to continu e working, promising visa extensions in July 2007.
172. In the summ er of 2007, an Indian H-2B W orker was arrested by im migration police in a town near th e Texas Lab or Camp because his visa had expired. Plaintiffs knew that worker to be one whom Defendant Signal had prom ised to extend a visa. Hearing of this arrest, Plaintiffs’ fear of leaving the barbed-wire fence that surrounded Texas Labor Camp increased.
173. Defendant Signal representatives then m et with Indian H-2B W orkers and told them not to leave the Texas Labor C amp because if anyone ended up in jail due to immigration issues, Defendant Signal would not pay the bond required to release them.
174. In m eetings and conversa tions in the spring and summ er of 2007, Defendant Signal, through its agents and em ployees at the Texas Labor Ca mp, c ontinued to prom ise that Defendant Signal would arrange for the H-2B vi sa extensions and green cards originally promised Plaintiffs when they were recruited in India and the United Arab Emirates.
175. While Defendant Signal prom ised to arrang e for H-2B visa extensions and green cards for Plaintiffs, Signal in fact was secretly evaluating all of the Indian H-2B Workers with no intention of applying for visa extensions for certain of the Indian H-2B Workers.
176. Plaintiffs’ continuing dependence on Defendant Signal for their present and future immigration status, their continuing high levels of indebtedness, as well as o ther factors reasonably led Plaintiffs, whose e mployment had not been term inated by Signal, to fear serious harm and abuse of the legal process if they left Signal’s employ.
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177. Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs reasonably felt like they had no choice but to continue working for Signal.
178. At various tim es relev ant to P laintiffs’ claim s, Defendant Signal refused to confirm whether valid H-2B visa extensions had in fact been obtained for Plaintif fs, coercing Plaintiffs to continue w orking for Signal in the hope that Signal woul d finally resolve their uncertain immigration status.
179. Since f irst c ontracting with Def endants in India and the United Arab Em irates, Plaintiffs have yet to receive fr om Defendants the promised green cards or permanent residency. Despite clear contractual provisi ons requiring them to do so, R ecruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants have refused to refund any of the fees Plaintiffs paid to them for unsuccessful green card and visa processing.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003 Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589) and 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage,
slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor) All Defendants
180. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
181. Plaintiffs are authorized to bring these civil claims against Defendants pursuant to the civil rem edies provision of the Trafficking Victim s Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
182. Defendants attempted to and did subject P laintiffs to forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
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183. Defendants knowingly attem pted to and di d physically restrain and threaten Plaintiffs with serious harm in order to obtain the labor and services of Plai ntiffs in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(1).
184. Defendants knowingly attem pted to and di d obtain the labor and services of Plaintiffs using a schem e, pla n, or pattern which, in the tota lity of the c ircumstances, wa s intended to coerce and did coerce Plaintiffs to believe that they would suffer serious harm if they were to leave the employ of the Defendant Signal, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(2).
185. Defendants’ schem e to isolate Pla intiffs, to co erce them to liv e in c onditions causing psychological harm , and to lim it th eir outside contacts, including unlawful discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, wa s designed to convince Plaintiffs that they would suffer serious harm if they were to leave the employ of Defendant Signal.
186. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for attempts to exer cise their lega l rights, and threatened Plain tiffs with dep ortation an d deceiv ed Plaintiffs about the term s of their immigration status in a m anner that constitutes an abuse of th e legal process under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(3).
187. Defendants knowingly recruited, transporte d, harbored, provided, and/or obtained Plaintiffs so as to ob tain the ir labo r and serv ices in violation of la ws prohibiting peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, a nd f orced labor within the m eaning of the provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (TVPA).
188. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, an d in add ition to th e violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 set forth above, Defendants knowingly recrui ted, transported, harbored and/or obtained
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Plaintiffs for labor or services in f urtherance of these Defendants’ violations of the following provisions of Title 18, Chapter 77 of the U.S. Code:
a. enticing, persuading, or inducing Plaintiffs to go on board an airliner, train and passenger van, and to go to vari ous locations thr oughout the United Arab Emirates, India, an d the United States, with the inten t that th ey may be made or held in modern-day slavery, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1583;
b. knowingly and willfully holding Plain tiffs to involuntar y servitude, as defined by the TVPA, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(5 )(a) and (b), violating 18 U.S.C. § 1584;
c. removing, confiscating, or possessi ng Plaintiffs’ passports and other immigration docum ents in the course of , or with the inten t to vio late 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1590, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); and
d. attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1590, and violating 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a).
189. As a proxim ate result of the conduct of Defendants, P laintiffs have suffered injuries to their persons, businesses, and property, and other damages.
190. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) All Defendants
191. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
192. Plaintiffs’ allegations cont ained in Exhibit 1, appended to this Com plaint, are incorporated herein by reference.
193. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Infl uenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (“RICO”), are brought against all Defendants.
194. Plaintiffs are “persons” with standin g to sue within the m eaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
195. Each of De fendants is a “RICO person” with in the m eaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1).
196. All Def endants and th e United States Consular of fices in India con stitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterpri se I”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
197. Recruiter Defendants, Burnett Defenda nts, and Defendant Si gnal ar e an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterprise II”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
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The RICO Enterprises

RICO Enterprise I

198. At all relevant tim es, RICO Enterpri se I was an ongoing business relationship

among all Defendants, and the United States C onsular officers in India, with the common

purpose of recruiting, transporting, providing, processing, and obtaining foreign workers to work

in shipyards in the United States, including in Signal’s operations in Texas.

199. At all r elevant times, RICO Enterpr ise I was en gaged in in terstate commerce in

that its activities and transac tions rela ting to the inte rnational and in terstate m ovement of

workers affected in terstate commerce and frequently requ ire travel and communications across

state and international lines.

200. At all rele vant tim es, the m embers of RICO Enterprise I functioned as a

continuing unit.

201. At all relevant tim es, Defendants conducte d or participated i n, and conspired to

conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO En terprise I through a pattern of num erous acts of

racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), related by

their common goal to recruit, obtai n, transport, process, and provi de workers through the use of

fraudulent promises, exorbitant fees, forced labor, and trafficking.

202. Specifically, Defendants conducte d or participated in and agreed to conspire to

conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by

engaging in the following predicate acts of

racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):

a. Enticement into modern day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583;

b. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584; 36

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c. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589;

d. Trafficking persons w ith respect to m odern day slavery, involuntary

servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; and

e. Unlawful docum ent-related practices in furtherance of trafficking in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a).

203. Specifically, all Defendants conducted or participated in and agreed to conspire to

conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by

engaging in the following predicate acts of

racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):

a. Mail fraud to further their unlawful sc heme in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1341;

b. Wire fraud to further th eir unlawful scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1343; and

c. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546.

204. Defendants’ engagem ent in the above lis ted predicate acts in the conduct of

affairs of RICO Enterprise I, resulted in the individual financial g ain of each Defendant at the

expense of business, property, and personal injury to Plaintiffs.

RICO Enterprise II

205. At all relevant tim es, RICO Enterprise II was an ongoing business relationship

among De fendants with the comm on purpose of se lling United S tates green cards, visas, and

work opportunities to Indian worker s to convince such workers to pay fees and to travel to the

United States to work for companies, including Defendant Signal.

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206. At all relevant times, the members of RICO Enterprise II operated as a continuing unit.
207. At all rele vant times, RICO Enterprise II was engaged in intersta te commerce in that its activities and transactions relating to the sale of United States green cards, visas, and jo b opportunities affected interstate commerce.
208. At all relevant tim es, Defendants conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO Ente rprise II through a pattern of num erous acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), related by their common goal to sell United States green cards and work opportunities to Indian workers for the purposes of furnishing such workers for employment at Signal’s operations.
209. Specifically, Defendants conducted or par ticipated in the affairs of RICO Enterprise II by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Enticement into modern day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583; b. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584; c. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; d. Trafficking persons w ith respect to m odern day slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; e. Unlawful docum ent-related practices in furtherance of trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); f. Mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; g. Wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and
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h. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. 210. Defendants’ engagem ent in the above lis ted predicate acts in the conduct of affairs of RICO Enterprise II, resulted in the individual financial gain of each Defendant at the expense of business, property, and personal injury to Plaintiffs.
Predicate Acts Enticement into Slavery: 18 U.S.C. § 1583 211. Defendants, through E nterprises I and II, enticed, persuaded, and induced Plaintiffs, to board a vessel, airpla ne, train, or passenger vehicle with the intent that Plaintiffs be compelled into forced labor or involuntary servitude. 212. Defendants, through Enterprises I and II, willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and conspir ed to comm it m ultiple pred icate acts of enticem ent into m odern-day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief. Involuntary Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1584 213. Defendants, through R ICO Enterprise s I and II, willfully, knowingly, and intentionally comm itted and/or con spired to commit m ultiple p redicate acts of involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1584, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
Forced Labor: 18 U.S.C. § 1589 214. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, knowingly pr ovided or obtained the labor or services of Plaintiffs by means of threats of seri ous harm or by m eans of threatened abuse of the legal process.
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215. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, benefitted financially from participation in a venture in which Defendants k nowingly engaged in providing or obtaining the forced labor or services of Plaintiff.
216. Defendants through RICO Enterprise s I and II willfully, knowingly, and intentionally comm itted and con spired to com mit multiple pred icate acts of f orced labo r in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
Trafficking for the Purposes of Forced Labor and Involuntary Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1590
217. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, knowingly recruited, harbored, transported, or provided Plaintiffs for labor or services in violation of the TVPA.
218. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs , Defendants through RICO Enterprises I and II willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and conspired to com mit m ultiple predicate acts of trafficking for the purposes o f forced labor and/or involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
Document Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1592 219. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and Exhibit 1, Defendants through RICO Enterprises I and II, knowingly and intentionally confiscated and possessed Plaintiffs’ visa and immigration documents in violation of the TVPA. 220. Defendants, through Enterprises I and II willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and conspired to commit multiple predicate acts of document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief.
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Mail and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 221. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, intentio nally made a nd conspired to m ake false prom ises regarding green cards and other benefits in a schem e calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sum s of money. 222. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, m ade and conspired to m ake false statements related to a pplications submitted to the U.S. Governm ent f or H-2B visa s and f alse prom ises to Plaintif fs regardin g green cards and other benefits in a schem e calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sum s of money. 223. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, used th e mails and wire comm unications, including communications via telepho ne, fax, internet and e-m ail, on num erous occasions to f urther these fraudulent schemes. 224. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, used th e mails and wire comm unications, including communications via telephone, fax, internet and e-mail on numerous occasions to further this fraudulent scheme. 225. As set f orth in the prec eding paragraphs and in Exhibi t 1, Plaintiffs reasonably relied on these false statem ents m ade by Defe ndants, through RICO Ente rprises I and II, and suffered injury as a result of such reliance and Defendants’ ensuing conduct. 226. These willf ul, knowing, and inten tional acts constitu te m ail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.
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Immigration Document Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) 227. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, fraudu lently so ld an d conspired to sell H-2B visa extensions and green ca rds to Plain tiffs despite the se Def endants’ awarenes s that app lications for th ese green cards and visa extensions were not bona fide or lawful under United States immigration law. 228. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, ob tained, accepted, and received H2-B visas despite kn owing these visas to have been procured through false statements and/or fraud on the U.S. Government. 229. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, fraudu lently so ld an d conspired to sell H2-B visa extensions and green cards to Plaintiffs despite Defendants’ aw areness that applica tions for these green card s and visa extensions were not bona fide or lawful under United States immigration law. 230. These willful, knowing, and intentional acts constitu te im migration docum ent fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
Pattern of Related Racketeering Acts 231. Defendants engaged in the racketeering act ivity and commission of predicate acts as described in this Complain t repeatedly, beginning in 2003 and continuing at leas t through January 2009 with respect to approximately 590 Indian workers. 232. As set forth in the preceding paragra phs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants have committed at least two acts of racketeering activities in the past 10 years. 233. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Signal sought new Indian tem porary workers for employment at Signal who were potentially subject to similar racketeering activities.
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234. Defendants, through RICO Enterprises I and II, implemented the racketeering acts described in this Complaint to conduct their regular business activities.
235. Defendants’ racketeering acts have or ha d sim ilar purposes: to profit from the fraudulent recruitm ent and forced labor of Plaintiffs and other In dian workers, and to recruit, obtain, provide and m aintain a co nsistent, subm issive, isolate d, and com pliant Indian H-2B Worker labor force at Signal’s operations.
236. Defendants’ acts yielded sim ilar results and caused similar injur ies to Plaintif fs, including payment of high fees, as sumption of significant interest bearing debt , loss of real and personal property, lost work opportunities, lost or unpaid wages and related legal fees.
237. As set forth in the p receding paragraphs an d in Exhib it 1, Defendants’ racketeering acts have or had similar participants: Recruiter Defendants, Burnett Defendants, and Defendant Signal.
238. As set forth in the preceding paragra phs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, though RICO Enterprises I and II, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: Indian workers who contacted Recruiter Defendants in search of green cards, econom ic opportunity, and stable employment in the United States.
239. Defendants’ acts have or had sim ilar m ethods of comm ission, such as comm on recruitment tactics, relative ly cons istent pra ctices with respect to collecting pay ments from Plaintiffs and other Indian workers, and the us e of si milar e mployment practices and policies with respect to Plaintiffs and other Indian workers.
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Injury 240. As a direct and proxim ate result of De fendants’ willful, kno wing, and in tentional acts discussed in this section, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property and businesses including, but not lim ited to: exorb itant fees paid by Plaintiffs for green cards, visas and other immigration and recruitment-related services; interest on debts assumed by Plaintiffs to pay such fees; losses of personal and real property incurred in reliance on Defendants’ fraudulent acts; lost and unpaid wages, lost em ployment opportunities , and other pecuniary and losses to real or personal property. 241. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award o f da mages in an am ount to b e determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Defendant Signal (Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal International
Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.) 242. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 243. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for declaratory relief and damages against Defendant Signal. 244. The actions of Defendant Signal, as set fo rth herein, violated Plaintiffs’ rights to receive the full and equal bene fit of all laws as guarantee d by 42 U .S.C. § 1981, including Plaintiffs’ rights to enjoy and benefit from non -discriminatory em ployment relationships with Signal.
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245. Specifically, Defendant Signal subjected Plaintiffs to discriminatory and offensive mandatory room and board arrangements at the Texas Labor Camp.
246. Defendant Signal did not subj ect its non-Indian and U.S. citizen employees to the same or similar room and board arrangements.
247. As set forth in th e p receding paragraphs, Defendant Signal also imposed discriminatory job-related requ irements and ad verse term s and conditions of em ployment to which non-Indian and United States citizen employees were not similarly subjected.
248. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, th rough the actions and statements of its personnel referring to and directed at Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers, Defendant Signal maintained an objectively hostile and abusive work environm ent on account of Plaintiffs’ race and alienage.
249. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs , Defendant Signal’s discrim inatory and offensive treatm ent of Plainti ffs was sufficiently sev ere that it created a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
250. Plaintiffs reasonably perceived their work environment to be hostile, abusive, and discriminatory on the basis of their race and alienage.
251. Defendant Signal’s hostile, abusive, and discriminatory treatm ent of Plaintiffs was unwelcome.
252. Defendant Signal knowingly, willfully, m aliciously, intenti onally, and without justification acted to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights on the basis of Plaintiffs’ race and alienage.
253. As a result of Defendant Signal’s unlawful acts, Plaintiffs have suffered injury to their property and persons.
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254. Plaintiffs seek all app ropriate relief, including declaratory relief, attorn eys’ fees,

costs of this action, and dam ages, including compensatory and punitive dam ages, in an am ount

to be determined at trial.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

VIOLATIONS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT OF 1871 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Thirteenth Amendment
All Defendants
255. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

256. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for declaratory relief,

and damages against Defendants.

257. As set f orth in the pr eceding parag raphs and P laintiffs’ Fir st Claim f or Relief ,

Defendants conspired, agreed, planned and coordinated for the purpos e of depriving Plaintiffs of

equal protection of their rights under the Th

irteenth Am endment to the United States

Constitution and its implementing and enforcing statutes (inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590) to

be free from forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.

258. Defendants were m otivated by racial, anti-Indian, and an ti-immigrant anim us

when they conspired to deprive P laintiffs of their rights and acted in furt herance of a conspiracy

to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.

259. Defendants knowingly, willfully , m aliciously, inten tionally, and without

justification planned and acted to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.

260. As a result of the unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered damages.

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261. Plaintiffs seek all app ropriate relief, including declaratory relief, attorn eys’ fees, costs of this action, and dam ages, including compensatory and punitive dam ages, in an am ount to be determined at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
All Defendants 262. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs. 263. As set forth in the preced ing paragr aphs and in Exhibit 1, D efendants, individually and through their agents, employees, and representa tives, knowingly or negligently made materially false and untrue statements and representations to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and term s and conditions of applications and opportunities for imm igration status and employment in the United States. 264. As set f orth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhi bit 1, Defendants knowingly or neglig ently f ailed to disclos e m aterial f acts to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and term s and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and em ployment in the United States. 265. Defendants intended that th e false statem ents m ade by Defendants and their agents, em ployees, and represen tatives would i nduce Plaintiffs to pay the exorbitant fees demanded by Recruiter Defendants, and/or Burnett Defendants.
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266. Defendants intended that th e false statem ents m ade by Defendants and their agents, em ployees, o r represen tatives would in duce Plaintiffs to leave their hom es and jobs i n India and the United Arab Emirates and travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.
267. Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on Defendants’ representations. 268. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and em ployment opportuniti es, Plaintiffs paid large su ms of m oney to Recruiter Defendants or Burnett Defendants. 269. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and employm ent opportunities, Plaintiffs incurred substant ial interest-bearing debts in order to pay recruitment, immigration-related, and travel fees charged by Defendants and their agents, employees or representatives. 270. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and employm ent opportunities, Plaintiffs sold personal a nd real property and surrendered employment opportunities in India and the United Arab Emirates. 271. In reliance on Defendants’ false or ne gligent repres entations regarding green cards and employm ent opportunities, Plaintiffs left their hom es and jobs and India and other countries and traveled to the United States to work for Defendant Signal. 272. At all times, Plaintiffs’ reliance was reasonable. 273. As a direct and proxim ate result of De fendants’ knowin g, willing, intentional, and/or negligent actions, Plaintiffs have been injured. 274. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
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SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF BREACH OF CONTRACT All Defendants
275. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
276. As set forth in the preceding paragra phs, Defendants, individually and through their agen ts, em ployees and rep resentatives, offered to obtain perm anent residence and immigration status f or Plaintiffs in the United St ates within 18 to 24 m onths as well as steady work opportunities in the United States with Defendant Signal in exchange f or Plaintiffs’ payment of exorbitant fees to Defendants and their employees, agents and/or representatives.
277. Plaintiffs accepted Defendants’ offers, pa id the agreed upon fees, and p erformed the agreed-upon work.
278. Defendants breached their contracts with Plaintiffs by failing to comply with their binding promises regarding permanent residence and immigration status.
279. In reliance on these agreem ents, Plaintiffs paid large sum s of m oney and entered into substantial debts, surrendered other em ployment opportunities, and in curred other financial losses.
280. As a direct result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiffs have suffered damages. 281. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
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SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
All Defendants 282. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 283. Defendants Signal International, L.L.C. and Signal Internati onal, In c. are and function as, the alte r eg os of Signal Interna tional Texas, G.P. and Signal International Texas, L.P., thus piercing the corporate veil. 284. Defendant Global Resources is and f unctions a s the a lter ego of Defendant Pol, thus piercing the corporate veil. 285. Defendant Dewan Consultants is and func tions as the alter ego of Defendant Dewan, thus piercing the corporate veil. 286. Defendants Burnett Law Offices and GCILC are and function as the alter ego of Defendant Burnet, thus piercing the corporate veil. 287. A real and actual contro versy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants; which is justiciable in character, concerning the trafficki ng of Plaintiffs, violati ons of Plaintiffs’ civil rights, violation of the Klu Klux Klan Act, breach of contract, negligence and fraud. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgm ent under 28 U.S. C. §2201 declaring the al ter egos referenced above. 288. A declarato ry judgm ent is necessary to pr eserve the rights o f the Plaintiffs who were victims of Defendants.
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EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (“FLSA”) Defendant Signal (Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.) 289. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 290. Over the course of th eir em ployment at Defendant Signal, Plaintiffs were routinely awarded a fifty cent per hour “safet y bonus” for workweeks when they were not written up for violations of Defendant Signal’s safety rules. 291. The safety bonus Defe ndant Signal paid the P laintiffs was in addition to their regular hourly wage. 292. Upon information and belief, the safety bonus was non-discretionary with respect both to the decision to pay the bonus and to the amount of the bonus. 293. Defendant Signal paid the safety bonus to the Plaintiffs pursuant to a prior agreement or prom ise causing the Plaintiffs to e xpect the bonus paym ents regularly if they m et the required safety criteria. 294. During workweeks when the Plaintiffs worked m ore than 40 hours, Defendant Signal did not pay one and one-half tim es the amount of the safety bonus for all overtime hours worked. 295. Plaintiffs’ tim ely f iled opt-in con sents in the Kurian David, et. al. v. Signal International, LLC, et.al., 2:08-cv-01220-SM-DEK , tolling the statute of limitations for their claims
under the FLSA. (See Exhibit 2 attached hereto.)
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296. Plaintiffs assert this claim for dam ages against Defendant Signa l pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
297. Defendant Signal v iolated 29 U.S. C. § 206 by failing to pay Plaintiffs the applicable minimum wage for every compensable hour of labor they performed.
298. The violations of the FLSA minimum wage requirement set forth in the preceding paragraph resulted from Defendant Signal’s unla wful deductions from the wages of Plaintif fs including, inter alia:
a. Expenses and fees for point-of-hire travel, visa and other immigrationrelated m atters, and rec ruitment, all of which were serv ices f urnished prim arily f or th e benefit or convenience of Defenda nt Signal. These expenses a nd fees also were services furnished in violation of federal, state, or local law, includin g, inter alia, the TVPA and the RICO as set forth supra including in ¶ 157.
b. Tools of the trade tha t were f urnished prim arily f or the benef it or convenience of Defendant Signal as set forth in ¶ 158, supra.
c. Housing furnished prim arily for the benefit or convenience of De fendant Signal. The conditions and ove rcrowding of the housing also violated federal, state, and/or local law, including, inter alia, the OSHA as set forth supra, including in ¶¶ 140153.
d. Board furnished prim arily for the benefit or convenience of De fendant Signal. Upon infor mation and belief, Defe ndant Signal did not obtain the required permit(s) to furnish the board at their Texas m an camp, and the condition and sanitation of the board further violated federal, state, and/or local law includi ng, inter alia, the U.S.
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Food and Drug Adm inistration Food Code, as adopted a nd m odified by Texas Food Establishment Rules, as set forth in ¶¶ 105-152, supra. 299. Defendant Signal v iolated 29 U.S. C. § 207 by failing to pay Plaintiffs the applicable overtime wage for every compensable hour of labor they performed. 300. The violations of the FLSA overtim e re quirement set forth in the preceding paragraph resulted from, inter alia:
a. Defendant Signal’s failure to pay one and one-half the regular rate of pay for overtim e hours during workweeks when Plaintiffs and receiv ed a safety bonus premium, as set forth in ¶¶ 289-293, supra.
b. Unlawful deductions from the wages of Plaintiffs including, inter alia: (i) Expenses and fees for point-o f-hire travel, visa and other
immigration-related matters, and recruitment, all of which were services furnished primarily for the benefit or convenience of Defendant Signal. These expenses and fees also were s ervices furnished in viol ation of f ederal, state, or lo cal law, including, inter alia, the TVPA and the RICO as set forth supra including in ¶ 157.
(ii) Tools of the trade that were f urnished primarily for the ben efit or convenience of Defendant Signal as set forth in ¶ 158, supra.
(iii) Housing furnished primarily for the benefit or convenience of Defendant Signal. The condition and overc rowding of the housing also violated federal, state, and/or local law, includ ing, inter alia, the OSHA as set forth supra including in ¶¶ 140-156.
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(iv) Board furnished prim arily for the benefit or convenience of

Defendant Signal. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendant Si gnal did not obtain

the requ ired perm it(s) to f urnish the board at their Texas m an ca mp, and the

condition and sanitation of the board further violated federal, state, and/or local

law including, inter alia, the U.S. F ood and Drug Adm inistration Food Code, as

adopted and m odified by Texas Food Esta blishment Rules as set forth in ¶¶ 150-

152, supra.

301. For the purpose of the proceeding paragraphs, the term “deductions” shall include

both withholdings Defendant Signal m ade from th e wages of Plaintiffs and out-of-pocket costs

Plaintiffs that amounted to de facto deductions.

302. Defendant Signal’s failure to pay Plaint iffs the federally m andated minimum and

overtime wages were willful violations of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).

303. As a consequence of Defendant Signal’s vi olations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs are

entitled to recover the following damages, including but not limited to:

a.

reimbursement of Plaintiffs’ unpaid minimum wages;

b. reimbursement of Plaintiffs’ unpaid overtime wages;

c. an additional equal amount in liquidated damages;

d. costs of suit; and

e. reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

304. For this cau se of action, no Plaintiff seeks dam ages from any Defendant Signal

relating to events that occurred after his employment with Signal ended.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief:
a. Declaratory relief; b. Compensatory damages; c. Punitive damages; d. Treble damages as authorized by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); e. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; f. A finding of alter ego between Signal International Texas, G.P. and Signal
International Texas, L.P., thus piercing the corporate veil; g. A finding of alter ego between Signal International Texas, L.P. and Signal
International LLC, thus piercing the corporate veil; h. A finding that Signal International, Inc. is the successor in interest to
Signal International LLC, or in the alternative, a finding of alter ego between Signal International LLC and Signal International, Inc., thus piercing the corporate veil; i. A finding of alter ego among Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., thus piercing the corporate veil; j. A finding of alter ego between Global Resources, Inc. and Michael Pol, thus piercing the corporate veil; k. A finding of alter ego between Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt., thus piercing the corporate veil; l. Liquidated damages as authorized by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216; and m. Such other relief as the court deems just and appropriate.
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Respectfully submitted,

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP
By: Susan W. Pangborn William H. Boice Georgia Bar No. 065725 Brian G. Corgan (pro hac vice application to be filed) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (pro hac vice application to be filed) Georgia Bar No. 735027 Heather L. Heindel (pro hac vice application to be filed) Georgia Bar No. 285204
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Fax: (404)-815-6555

56

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 86 Filed 04/30/14 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 2083

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., et al. '

1:13-CV-323

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia A. Crone, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 5.) Pending before the undersigned is the “Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) of Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett,

A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C.” (Doc. No. 38.) The undersigned has

considered the pending motion and the corresponding response. (Doc. No. 42.) The

Defendants’ motion should be denied because 1) the court has personal jurisdiction over the

Defendants since the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process; and 2) the court has

specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendants given the number of alleged tortious acts

committed by the Defendants both outside and inside Texas that injured the Plaintiffs within

Texas.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States

to work for Defendant Signal filed a putative class action in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See

David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class certification

for the Plaintiffs’ trafficking, RICO, civil rights and state law contract and fraud claims. David v.

Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3,

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 86 Filed 04/30/14 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 2084
2012). As a result of this ruling, on May 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed suit in this District against the following Defendants: Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Signal”), Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Burnett Defendants”), Global Resources, Inc., Michael Pol, Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants PVT. LTD. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants). (Doc. No. 1.) The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: 1) The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; 2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”); 3) The Civil Rights act of 1866; and 4) The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Id.) In addition, the Plaintiffs bring state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract claims against all of the Defendants. (Id. at 46-48.) On September 10, 2013, the Burnett Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 38.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide services to Signal. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) The Plaintiffs claim that they were lured to work for Signal through fraudulent promises made by the Burnett Defendants and others of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States. (Id.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal’s operations in Orange, Texas. (Id. at 4.)
II. Jurisdiction The Burnett Defendants move to dismiss the instant case under Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(2) alleging that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (Doc. No. 38.) Rule 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a claim if it does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 855 F. Supp. 2d 625, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). “When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, the party asserting jurisdiction is required to present facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction to satisfy its burden.” Duke Energy Int’l, L.L.C. v. Napoli, 748 F. Supp. 2d 656, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Central Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2003); Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco A.B., 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000)). “[O]n a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). A. Nationwide Service of Process under the RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b)
In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege RICO claims against all of the Defendants, including the Burnett Defendants. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 34-43.) A federal court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute if that statute provides for nationwide service of process and the defendant has had minimum contacts with the United States. Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994). The Burnett Defendants have minimum contacts with the United States. (See Doc. No. 38, Ex. 1, Affidavit of Malvern Burnett.) Thus, the next issue to be decided is whether the RICO statute provides nationwide service of process.
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 1965 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. (b) In any action under section 1964 [the civil RICO remedies] of this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.
While the Fifth Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue, it appears all of the district courts in
this Circuit have interpreted § 1965(b) to confer nationwide jurisdiction in a RICO action over
nonresident defendants if the plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction over at least one
defendant under § 1965(a). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, No. 3-08-cv-0388-M, 2009 WL
347423, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (citing Rolls–Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d
765, 778-79 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel, No. 3–08–cv–0279–L, 2008 WL
4936488 at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2008)); see also Hawkins v. Upjohn Co., 890 F. Supp. 601, 606
(E.D. Tex. 1994); Paolino v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C., 401 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
Furthermore, the majority of circuit courts have determined that § 1965(b) confers nationwide
service of process in RICO cases. See Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 WL 347423, at *3 n.2 (collecting
cases).
The Burnett Defendants argue that even if § 1965(b) provides for nationwide service of
process, “the requirements of the constitution and due process must still be fulfilled.” (Doc. No.
38, p. 2.) Thus, the Burnett Defendants argue they have insufficient minimum contacts with
Texas to justify personal jurisdiction here. (Id.) This argument is contrary to Fifth Circuit
precedent. As stated previously, a federal court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
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suit based upon a federal statute if that statute provides for nationwide service of process and the defendant has had minimum contacts with the United States. Busch, 11 F.3d at 1258. Accordingly, the undersigned will follow the majority rule that § 1965(b) of the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process if the plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction over at least one defendant under § 1965(a). That is easily determined here. In the instant case, it is clear that Defendant Signal transacts its affairs in this forum as they have a facility in Orange, Texas.
Having decided § 1965(b) provides nationwide service of process, the last inquiry is whether the “ends of justice require” the Burnett Defendants, who reside and conduct business in the Eastern District of Louisiana and Southern District of Mississippi, be brought before the court in the Eastern District of Texas. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (“In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned . . . .”). The Burnett Defendants argue that “under the totality of the circumstances” and given the speculative allegations against them in the complaint, the “ends of justice” do not require they be brought before this court. Again, the Burnett Defendants take issue with their lack of contacts with Texas, the forum state. Furthermore, they argue the Plaintiffs have failed to plead enough facts in their complaint to show the Burnett Defendants engaged in a conspiracy or a scheme to defraud or commit illegal acts subjecting them to the personal jurisdiction of this court.
These are not relevant considerations when deciding whether “the ends of justice” require the Burnett Defendants to be brought to Texas. To reiterate, when a federal court attempts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit based on a federal statute providing for
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nationwide service of process—which is the case here—the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole, not the forum state. Busch, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258; Adams v. Unione Mediterranea di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 650-51 (5th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, questions of whether the complaint sufficiently pleads violations of the RICO statute should not be raised in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) challenging personal jurisdiction. See Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 WL 347423, at *4.
“[T]he ‘ends of justice’ is a flexible concept uniquely tailored to the facts of each case.” Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit has not implemented any legal test as to what exact set of facts meet “the ends of justice” requirement. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign, Inc., No. 6:05-cv-456, 2006 WL 2822151, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006). While courts have used somewhat differing tests, the two considerations that are used most frequently are 1) whether no other district court would have personal jurisdiction over all of the alleged RICO conspirators1 and 2) judicial economy.2
The “ends of justice” require the Burnett Defendants to answer in this forum because numerous defendants reside in different states, and there is likely no alternative forum in which jurisdiction would be proper as to all defendants.3 For reasons of judicial economy, the “ends of justice” should also require the Burnett Defendants to litigate this suit in Texas. There are
1. Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.1986). 2. Farmers Bank of State of Del. v. Bell Mortg. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D.C. Del. 1978). 3. The various Signal defendants have operations in Texas, Mississippi and Alabama and are organized under the laws of Delaware and Texas; Michael Pol is a Mississippi resident; Global is a Mississippi corporation; Sachin Dewan is a resident of India while Sachin Consultants conduct operations in India and the United Arab Emirates; and Malvern Burnett is a Louisiana resident who practices law there and in Mississippi. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 9-12.) Defendants Law Office of Malvern Burnett, APC and Gulf Coast Immigration Center were corporations organized under the laws of Louisiana. (Doc. No. 38, Ex. 1, p. 3.)
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currently seventeen plaintiffs in this case and over seventy in the four companion cases.4 Most of these same plaintiffs already have pending FLSA claims in the Eastern District of Louisiana stemming from the same allegations.5 (Doc. No. 56.) This court and the Fifth Circuit have already denied Signal’s vigorous attempts to transfer this case to Louisiana. (Doc. Nos. 56, 63, 66); In re: Signal International, L.L.C., et al., No. 14-40313, (5th Cir. April 4, 2014) (court order denying the petition for writ of mandamus in reference to their motion to transfer filed by Signal). Thus, it can safely be assumed that approximately ninety plaintiffs will be trying this case here in Texas against the lead Defendant Signal and other defendants that have not sought transfer. If the Burnett Defendants were dismissed from this case, most of the plaintiffs in this and the companion cases would be litigating their FLSA claims against Signal in Louisiana, all of the plaintiffs would be litigating their RICO, federal law and state law claims against the remaining defendants here, and then potentially those same RICO, federal law and state law claims against only the Burnett Defendants would be litigated in an entirely different forum. 6 That would be contrary to Congress’ intent for the “ends of justice” provision which enables plaintiffs to bring all members of a nationwide RICO conspiracy before a court in a single trial. Butcher’s Union, 788 F.2d 535, 539. The undersigned also notes that it would be impractical to require roughly ninety plaintiffs to travel to a different forum all for the sake of the Burnett Defendants, who consist of a single attorney and two defunct companies located in a contiguous state. B. The Burnett Defendants are also subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this District
Although this court has personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants due to the
4. See 1:13-cv-324; 1:13-cv-497; 1:13-cv-499; 1:13-cv-498. 5. The Plaintiffs recently filed an amended complaint in which they seek to transfer their FLSA claims to this court. (Doc. No. 83.) However, the undersigned has not yet ruled on this motion. 6. The Burnett Defendants do not say which forum they would be subject to personal jurisdiction.
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nationwide service provisions of the RICO statute, this court also has specific personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants. Absent a statute that permits nationwide service of process, when a suit is based on a federal statute, the court looks to the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits to determine whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987). The Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution. Companion Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palermo, 723 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the undersigned’s focus is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction offends or satisfies constitutional requirements of due process.
In order to satisfy due process, the Burnett Defendants must have “certain minimum contacts with [Texas] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Parker v. Pro W. Contractors, L.L.C., No. 13-30142, 2013 WL 3534082, at *1 (5th Cir. July 15, 2013) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “The minimum contacts requirement is satisfied by either: (1) contacts that give rise to general personal jurisdiction or (2) contacts that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994)). Because the Plaintiffs do not argue minimum contacts are satisfied through general personal jurisdiction, the undersigned will focus only on whether the Burnett Defendants have sufficient contacts that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.
“Specific jurisdiction is proper where the defendant has ‘purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.’” Parker, 2013 WL 3534082, at *1 (5th Cir. July 15, 2013) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)); see also Electrosource, Inc. v. Horizon Battery Techs. Ltd., 176 F.3d 867, 871 (5th Cir. 1999) (litigation must arise out of or
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relate to activities purposefully directed at residents of the forum). “The constitutional
requirement for specific jurisdiction is that the defendant has ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum
state such that imposing a judgment would not ‘offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”’ Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
The complaint raises these allegations against the Burnett Defendants:
Signal authorized the Burnett Defendants to act as their agents for the purposes of recruiting and providing Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s Orange, Texas operations. Signal further authorized the Burnett Defendants to represent that Signal would agree to sponsor bona fide green card applications for the Plaintiffs and obtain at least two H-2B visa extensions which would allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while their green card applications were being processed. Signal knew that the H-2B Workers paid exorbitant recruitment fees to the Burnett Defendants for these services. In 2006, the Plaintiffs attended meetings at which the Burnett Defendants, acting on Signal’s behalf, informed the Plaintiffs of the opportunity to work for Defendant Signal on H-2B visas which were represented to lead to permanent resident (green card) status. The Plaintiffs were further informed by the Burnett Defendants that the Plaintiffs would be able to obtain legal permanent residence for their spouses and children. The Burnett Defendants, personally or through their agents, represented to the Plaintiffs that Signal would provide lawful, stable, and ample employment opportunities; working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsistent with applying for permanent immigration status sponsored by Signal; and, Signal would obtain work-authorized green cards for the Plaintiffs, enabling them to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families. In such communications with the Plaintiffs, the Burnett Defendants further promised to act diligently and to do everything necessary to ensure that the Plaintiffs would obtain green cards within twenty-four months of initiating the green-card process.
In reasonable reliance upon these and other contractually-binding promises made to them regarding green cards and work opportunities in the United States, the Plaintiffs signed green card contracts at various points from mid-2006 to early 2007
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with the Burnett Defendants pursuant to which the Plaintiffs promised to pay the fees charged by the Burnett Defendants. The contracts signed by the Plaintiffs and other documents provided to the Plaintiffs by the Burnett Defendants further promised that the Plaintiffs would promptly receive a refund of all or nearly all of their payments if the Burnett Defendants did not succeed in securing green cards for the Plaintiffs, as promised.
The Burnett Defendants knew or should have known, however, that they would not refund the Plaintiffs’ money as promised in the contracts and other documents. The Burnett Defendants induced the Plaintiffs to enter the green card contracts even though they did not intend to diligently pursue the Plaintiffs’ applications and without any basis for representing that Signal had lawful long-term employment opportunities to provide the Plaintiffs; that Signal could legally apply for numerous H-2B visa extensions to maintain the Plaintiffs’ presence in the United States; that working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsistent with applying for permanent immigration status sponsored by Signal; that green card applications sponsored by Signal would be valid and bona fide under United States immigration law; and that such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines. In reasonable reliance on the Burnett Defendants’ explicit and repeated promises regarding the procurement of green cards and employment opportunities in the United States, the Plaintiffs undertook considerable economic, personal and familial sacrifices in order to amass the funds necessary to initiate the green card process with Signal. In reasonable reliance on the promises of the Burnett Defendants, the Plaintiffs signed contracts with these Defendants and made the payments required by these contracts. Signal and the Burnett Defendants knew that the stated period of need in Signal’s applications for labor certifications and for H-2B visas was inconsistent with Signal’s projected actual labor need, and therefore the Burnett Defendants knew their statements made to the United States Government were false. The Burnett Defendants used the H-2B visas, obtained from the United States Government on the basis of false statements by the Burnett Defendants, to elicit certain payments from Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs then entered the United States on H-2B guest worker visas, issued by the United States Government on the basis of false statements made by Signal and the Burnett Defendants for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Texas Labor Camp in Orange, Texas.
After the Plaintiffs arrived at the Orange, Texas Labor Camp, the Burnett Defendants and Defendant Signal reached an agreement regarding steps to be taken to discourage worker organizing efforts and to ensure that the Indian H-2B Workers
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continued to work at Signal without complaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B Workers from exercising their legal rights. Since first contracting with the Burnett Defendants, the Plaintiffs have yet to receive the promised green cards or permanent residency from any of the Defendants. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, the Burnett Defendants have refused to refund any of the fees the Plaintiffs paid them for unsuccessful green card and visa processing. First, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the minimum contacts requirement by alleging that the Burnett Defendants committed acts outside of Texas—defrauding the Plaintiffs—that caused tortious injuries within Texas. The Fifth Circuit has held that sufficient minimum contacts are established “[w]hen a nonresident defendant commits a tort within the state, or an act outside the state that causes tortious injury within the state.” Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). “Even an act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s conduct.” Id. (collecting cases). An individual injured in Texas “need not go to [another jurisdiction] to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in other states, intentionally, knowingly and recklessly caused severe physical, emotional and economic injuries to the plaintiffs and others” in Texas. Id. at 630. Based upon the complaint alone, the Plaintiffs have established that the Burnett Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas because the alleged tortious acts committed by the Burnett Defendants, even if most were committed outside of Texas, caused tortious injuries within Texas. The Burnett Defendants, who allegedly conspired with Signal to lure the Plaintiffs to Orange, Texas with false promises, cannot credibly argue that they could not reasonably have anticipated being sued in this District. Second, it will not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” for this
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court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants. The Fifth Circuit has used the following test to assess the reasonableness of a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction: “(1) the burden upon the nonresident defendant to litigate in that forum; (2) the forum state’s interests in the matter; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in securing relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the several states’ shared interest in furthering substantive social policies.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)). First, the Burnett Defendants will not face a large burden in litigating the instant case in this District, because the Burnett Defendants, who consist of a single attorney and two defunct companies, are located in Louisiana, which is contiguous to Texas. Second, the forum state, Texas, does have an interest in the matter because the seventeen Plaintiffs were allegedly injured while working at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. Third, keeping the Burnett Defendants claims in this District will provide the most efficient resolution of this case. Notwithstanding their status as putative class members, the Plaintiffs have already moved their case once from a different federal district court after their motion for class certification was denied. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). The most expeditious option at this point would be to continue this case in this District. Finally, the Burnett Defendants have not pointed out any clashes between the substantive social policies of Texas and any other potential forum state in regards to this case. Taking these factors into consideration, the undersigned finds that this court will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice by exercising personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants.
In summary, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiciton over the Defendants because the RICO statute provides
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for nationwide service of process. Furthermore, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have also established a prima facie case that this court has personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants by showing 1) the Burnett Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas; and 2) it will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants.
IV. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) of Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C.” (Doc. No. 38) should be DENIED.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 86 Filed 04/30/14 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 2096 findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 30th day of April, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 96 Filed 05/30/14 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 2294

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, ATHA MOHAMMAD ABDUL,

)

KESAVARAO BUNDANKAYALA, RAJU

)

DIVAKARAN, BIJU PERUMPILLY GEORGE,

)

KRISHNA GONTHINA, NAYAPPULLI

)

JAYACHANDRAN, GALLA VENKATA RAMA

)

KRISHNA, SAMUEL JOSE

)

KUMRUMTHODATHIL, LOHITHAKSHAN

)

MADAMPET, JOHNY MANDY MATHAI,

)

BELTHAZAR PETER, MOHANAN BALAKRISHNA )

PILLAI, SANTHOSH KUMAR RAJENDRAN

)

PILLAI, ABY KARICKATHARA RAJU, SUMESH )

PORAMBATHUPARAMBIL SUBRAMANIAN, and )

CHANDRAN SHAJU THANISSERY,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P., MALVERN C.

)

BURNETT, GULF COAST IMMIGRATION LAW )

CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C. )

BURNETT, A.P.C., GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., )

MICHAEL POL, SACHIN DEWAN, and DEWAN )

CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH

)

CONSULTANTS),

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIV. NO. 1:13-cv-00323

CONSENT ORDER REGARDING USE OF DISCOVERY FROM RELATED CASES

1. Plaintiffs in this case were absent putative class members in the case of David, et

al. v. Signal International, et al. , United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Louisiana, No. 08-1220 (SM/DEK). In David, twelve individuals alleged various federal and

state claims for themselves and a putative class arising out of an alleged labor trafficking scheme

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 96 Filed 05/30/14 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 2295
which resulted in hundreds of workers from India being employed by Signal in Mississippi and in Texas.
2. Judge Zainey denied a motion for class certification in the David case, id., Dkt. 1117 (January 4, 2012). Plaintiffs in this Joseph case and different sets of plaintiffs in several other cases noted below filed lawsuits in this District and in the Southern District of Mississippi against groups of Defendants, varying by case, which overlapped with those sued in the David case, and alleging individual claims arising out of the alleged labor trafficking scheme described in David. The cases filed in the Southern District of Mississippi have been transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana. These other cases (“the related individual cases”), with a different set of individual plaintiffs in each and with several common defendants in each, are as follows:
• David, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et al., No. 08-1220 (SM/DEK) (E.D. La.); • Achari, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et al., No. 13-6218 (SM/DEK) (E.D. La.); • Chakkiyattil, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et al., No. 13-6219 (SM/DEK) (E.D. La.); • Joseph, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et al., No. 13-CV-00324-RC-ZHI (E.D.Tex.); • Krishnakutty, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC , et al. , No. 13-6220 (SM/DEK) (E.D.
La.); • Devassy, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et al., No. 13-6221 (SM/DEK) (E.D. La.); • Singh, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et al., No. 14-732 (ILRL-SS) (E.D La.); • Meganathan, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC, et al. , No. 1:13-cv-00497-MAC-ZJH
(E.D. Tex.); • Kambala, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC , et al. , No. 1:13-cv-00498-RC-ZJH (E.D.
Tex); and
2

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• Marimuthu, et al. v. Signal Int’l, LLC , et al., No. 1:13-cv-00499-MAC-ZJH (E.D. Tex.).
3. In addition, the EEOC has filed a lawsuit (“the EEOC case”) against Signal, which has been joined by the David plaintiffs, EEOC v. Signal Int’l, LLC , et al. , 12-00557 (SM/DEK) (E.D. La.).
4. The related individual cases and the EEOC case will hereinafter be referred to as “the Related Cases.”
5. The parties in this case who have expressed a view on the issue agree that it will be most efficient and economical for all parties if all discovery produced or taken in the Related Cases, including documents produced, written discovery responses and deposition testimony, is made available to the parties for use in this case as if the discovery had been taken for use in this case.
6. The parties in this case who have expressed a view on the issue agree that the Samuel Plaintiffs may attend and/or participate in depositions which have been scheduled in the Related Cases. Such attendance and/or participation does not waive the Samuel Plaintiffs rights to notice other depositions, including Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, and the Samuel Plaintiffs specifically reserve the right to depose previously deposed witnesses on topics germane to the Samuel Plaintiffs to the extent those topics have not been addressed in previous depositions. The Samuel Plaintiffs do not intend on duplicating depositions, however given the Signal Defendants position on the sharing of the ESI produced in a portion of the Related Cases, the Samuel Plaintiffs cannot to commit to reviewing the yet unproduced data and be prepared for depositions starting in a few weeks in the Related Cases.
3

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 96 Filed 05/30/14 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 2297
7. The parties in this case all agree that the cost of securing multiple sealed original transcripts is excessive and could be duplicative in the circumstances were one deposition transcript is utilized in more than one trial. The parties stipulate to the authenticity of deposition transcripts from Related Cases and agree that the use of sealed original transcripts is not necessary for deposition transcripts from Related Cases.
8. Through counsel, Plaintiffs here and three groups of Defendants have consented to the entry of this Order. The consenting defendants are the Signal Defendants (the four named Signal entities), the Burnett Defendants (Malvern Burnett and his law firms) and the Dewan Defendants (Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consulting). Global Resources (whose principal, Michael Pol, is in bankruptcy) have been sent notice of this proposed Order, but have not objected or responded.
9. For good cause shown, the Court hereby orders as follows: (a) Any discovery provided by any party in any of the Related Cases,
including documents produced, responses to written discovery requests and deposition testimony, shall be usable by any party in this case as if provided in and/or taken for use in this case.
(b) Any non-party discovery provided or taken in any of the Related Cases shall be usable by any party in this case as if provided in or taken for use in this case.
(c) Any discovery provided as confidential under any protective order in effect in any of the Related Cases shall be similarly treated under the Protective Order in this case.
(d) The parties are expected to utilize discovery from the Related Cases to limit the need for duplicative discovery in this case. But all parties to this case reserve the right
4

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 96 Filed 05/30/14 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 2298 to seek additional discovery on particular topics from any party or witness, subject to the rights of other parties and/or witnesses to seek a protective order on the ground that discovery in the Related Cases has been sufficient in that regard. SO ORDERED SIGNED this 30th day of May, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
5

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 120 Filed 07/29/14 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 2523

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, et al.

'

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-323

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING THE BURNETT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 37)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia A. Crone, United States District Judge, and

is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 5.) Before the undersigned is a “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” filed by Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.,

and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C (hereinafter referred to interchangeably as

“Burnett” and “the Burnett Defendants”). (Doc. No. 37.) The undersigned has considered the

pending motion and the corresponding response (Doc. No. 43). The Burnett Defendants’ motion

should be denied because the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted, and a motion for summary judgment is the proper vehicle to prove the Plaintiffs state law

claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States

filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See

David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class

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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 120 Filed 07/29/14 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 2524
certification;1 and, as a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas. (Doc. No. 1.) On May 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court against the following Defendants: the Burnett Defendants, Signal International L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively referred to as “Signal”), Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants PVT. LTD. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants). (Id.) On September 10, 2013, the Burnett Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 37.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 1, p. 1.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id., p. 2.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas. (Id., p. 4.)
The Burnett Defendants consist of Malvern C. Burnett and his two corporations: Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. and the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. The Plaintiffs accuse Burnett of conspiring with Signal and other Defendants to recruit Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s operations with false promises of permanent residency in the United States for the workers and their families. (Id.)
1. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
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II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). When a court analyzes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). A court should grant such a motion only when the complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
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IV. Analysis The Plaintiffs allege Burnett violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPA”), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (“KKA”). (Doc. No. 1.) The Plaintiffs have also asserted state law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against Burnett. (Id.) First, Burnett argues the Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient facts to state any claim. (Doc. No. 37.) Second, Burnett asserts the Plaintiffs’ state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Id.) A. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 1. Insufficient Facts Burnett generally argues the Plaintiffs failed to state more than mere conclusions and recitals of statutory language without any basis in fact in their complaint. In particular, Burnett argues that the Plaintiffs did not provide any facts showing Burnett engaged in illegal activity. In addition, Burnett argues that each of the Plaintiffs’ federal claims “has as its linchpin” the false concept “that threats of deportation satisfy the definition of involuntary servitude.” (Doc. No. 37, p. 2.) First, the undersigned finds, contrary to Burnett’s assertion, that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that Burnett is liable for the alleged misconduct. In their complaint the Plaintiffs stated the following:
The Plaintiffs were trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to Signal. Recruited to perform welding, pipefitting, and other marine fabrication work, the Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal’s operations in Orange, Texas. All of the Defendants, including Burnett, have exploited and defrauded the Plaintiffs by fraudulently recruiting them to work in the United States and effectuating a broad
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 120 Filed 07/29/14 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 2527
scheme of psychological coercion, threats of serious harm and physical restraint, and threatened abuse of the legal process to maintain control over the Plaintiffs.
At all relevant times, the Burnett Defendants acted as agents of Signal for the purposes of recruiting, obtaining, contracting, and transporting the Plaintiffs to provide labor services in the state of Texas. Signal’s direction and coordination of the Recruiter Defendants’ and the Burnett Defendants’ recruitment efforts were effectuated by the use of numerous telephone, fax, e-mail, or mail communications that occurred from the spring of 2006 through at least January 2007. In these communications Signal authorized the Recruiter Defendants and the Burnett Defendants to act as their agents for the purposes of recruiting Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s Orange, Texas operations. Signal further authorized the Recruiter Defendants and the Burnett Defendants to represent that Signal would agree to sponsor bona fide green card applications for the Plaintiffs and obtain at least two H-2B visa extensions on behalf of Plaintiffs to allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while their green card applications were being processed. In exchange, each Plaintiff was required to pay fees totaling as much as 8 lakh rupees ($20,000), each in a series of approximately three installments.
At informational meetings and in telephone conversations, faxes, contracts, and other written documents transmitted through the use of mail and wire communications occurring during the spring, summer and fall of 2006, the Recruiter Defendants and the Burnett Defendants, personally or through their agents, representatives, or employees, represented to the Plaintiffs that Signal would provide lawful, stable, and ample employment opportunities; working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsistent with applying for permanent immigration status sponsored by Signal; and, Signal would obtain for the Plaintiffs work-authorized green cards enabling them to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families. Burnett further promised to act diligently and to do everything necessary to ensure that Plaintiffs would obtain green cards within 24 months of initiating the green-card process. Finally, Burnett and the Recruiter Defendants promised that the Plaintiffs would promptly receive a refund of all or nearly all of their payments if these Defendants did not succeed in securing green cards for Plaintiffs, as promised.
The Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants induced the Plaintiffs to enter the green card contracts even though they did not intend to pursue diligently the Plaintiffs’ applications and without any basis whatsoever for representing that: 1) Signal had
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lawful long-term employment opportunities to provide the Plaintiffs; 2) Signal could legally apply for numerous H-2B visa extensions to maintain the Plaintiffs’ presence in the United States; 3) working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsistent with applying for permanent immigration status sponsored by Signal; 4) green card applications sponsored by Signal would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and 5) such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines. Furthermore, the Burnett Defendants and Recruiter Defendants knew or should have known that they would not refund Plaintiffs’ money as promised in the contracts and other documents.
In late August and early September 2006, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) approved Signal’s H-2B visa petitions for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007. In approving these visa petitions, the USCIS relied on the purported accuracy of the applicants’ stated 10-month period of labor need and the representation that Signal’s need was based on a one time peak-load temporary demand. Signal, the Burnett Defendants, and the Recruiter Defendants knew that the stated period of need in Signal’s applications for labor certifications and for H-2B visas were inconsistent with Signal’s projected actual labor need; and, therefore the Defendants knew these statements to the United States Government were false.
Lured by, and in reliance upon, the Defendants’ fraudulent promises of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families, the Plaintiffs plunged themselves and their families into debt to take advantage of these seemingly promising opportunities. The Plaintiffs incurred significant debts to pay mandatory recruitment, immigration processing, and travel fees charged by Defendants. Upon the Plaintiffs’ arrival in the United States, Signal required that the Plaintiffs live in a guarded, overcrowded, and isolated labor camp located in Orange, Texas (the “Texas Labor Camp”). The Plaintiffs had no choice but to use Recruiter Defendants and Burnett Defendants to secure employment at Signal’s operations. Management personnel at Signal made the conscious and deliberate decision to prohibit Plaintiffs from securing employment at Signal’s operations either through another recruiter or by bypassing recruiters altogether and applying directly with Signal.
Signal, through its employees or agents, contacted the Recruiter Defendants and the Burnett Defendants to express its concerns about worker organizing efforts and the specific involvement of the Plaintiffs. During these conversations the Recruiter Defendants, the Burnett Defendants and Signal reached an agreement regarding steps to be taken to discourage further worker
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organizing efforts and to ensure that the Indian H-2B Workers continued to work at Signal without complaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B Workers from exercising their legal rights.
Since first contracting with Defendants in India and the United Arab Emirates, the Plaintiffs have yet to receive from the Defendants the promised green cards or permanent residency. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, the Recruiter Defendants and the Burnett Defendants have refused to refund any of the fees Plaintiffs paid to them for unsuccessful green card and visa processing. The Plaintiffs have clearly alleged the Burnett Defendants were an “integral member of a labor trafficking scheme designed to recruit the Plaintiffs for work at Signal based on false promises of permanent residency.” (Doc. No. 43, p. 5.) In their motion to dismiss, the Burnett Defendants argue that these facts are merely “occurrences and actions that are consistent with any attorney representing his or her clients.” (Doc. No. 37, p. 3.) However, the Plaintiffs have provided facts describing Burnett’s acts that are entirely inconsistent with a “normal” attorney-client relationship. As stated above, Burnett allegedly made false promises to the Plaintiffs to lure them into working for Signal. Burnett also required the Plaintiffs to pay him exorbitant fees for his services, and then refused to refund the Plaintiffs’ money when he failed to perform as promised. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have provided sufficient facts to support their argument that Burnett is liable for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” As detailed above, Burnett made several promises to the Plaintiffs that he allegedly knew to be untrue: 1) Signal had lawful long-term employment opportunities to provide Plaintiffs; 2) Signal could legally apply for numerous H-2B visa extensions to maintain Plaintiffs’ presence in the United States; 3) working under an H-2B visa for Signal was not inconsistent with applying
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for permanent immigration status sponsored by Signal; 4) green card applications sponsored by Signal would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; 5) such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines; and 6) Burnett would refund the Plaintiffs’ money if he failed to perform. In reliance on Burnett’s promises, the Plaintiffs “plunged themselves and their families into debt,” and traveled to the United States to work at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. (Doc. No. 1, p. 2.)
The Plaintiffs have also provided sufficient facts alleging that Burnett conspired with Signal. More than once, in their complaint and the RICO chart attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1, the Plaintiffs allege that the Burnett Defendants worked with the Recruiter Defendants and Signal to carry out this scheme. The Plaintiffs allege there are letters and phone conversations showing the Defendants conspired to: 1) recruit the Plaintiffs with false promises of permanent residency for themselves and their families; and 2) keep the Plaintiffs from protesting their mistreatment and leaving Signal’s employ.
Finally, Burnett generally states the Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support their breach of contract claim. (Doc. No. 37, p. 5.) However, the Plaintiffs allege they entered into contracts with Burnett under which they would pay fees to Burnett in exchange for his promise to provide them with lawful employment and work-authorized green cards enabling them to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families. (Doc. No. 1, p. 17.) Burnett allegedly breached this contract by not fulfilling those promises and refusing to refund the fees the Plaintiffs paid him. (Id.)
2. Involuntary Servitude The Burnett Defendants also argue that “each of the federal causes of action has as its linchpin the concept that threats of deportation satisfies the definition of involuntary servitude,”
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and “as a matter of law, the threat of deportation does not satisfy a determination of involuntary servitude.” (Doc. No. 37, p. 2.) The Burnett Defendants do not elaborate on how each of the Plaintiffs’ claims is based on the premise that threats of deportation satisfy the definition of involuntary servitude.
Nonetheless, the case cited by Burnett in support of his assertion is easily distinguished from the instant case. In Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, the plaintiffs were “seeking compensation for unpaid overtime and certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), civil damages under RICO, and damages for false imprisonment.” Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs supported their RICO and false imprisonment claims on the theory that the defendants forced them into working by threatening to report their immigration status to the authorities. Id. at 533. The Court stated that “absent some special circumstances, threats of deportation are insufficient to constitute involuntary servitude.” Id. at 541. However, unlike the instant case, in Zavala, Wal-Mart did not contract directly with the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs did not work exclusively for Wal-Mart and “often switched jobs, freely moving to different employers in different cities;” and the plaintiffs were not housed in labor camps. Id. In fact, the Zavala court asserted that “[m]odern day examples of involuntary servitude have been limited to labor camps, isolated religious sects, or forced confinement.” Id. at 540. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs allege they were housed in a guarded, overcrowded and isolated “labor camp, which other employees and management at Signal referred to as the reservation.” (Doc. No. 1, p. 4, 27.) The “labor camp” was allegedly surrounded by barbed-wire fences and was located in an isolated industrial area miles removed from shopping, places of worship, public transportation or residential communities. (Doc. No. 1, p. 25.)
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Kozminski that “the
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vulnerabilities of the victim are relevant in determining whether the physical or legal coercion or
threats thereof could plausibly have compelled the victim to serve” involuntarily. United States
v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). The Court further held that “a trial court could properly
find that evidence of . . . extremely poor working conditions is relevant to corroborate disputed
evidence regarding the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion . . . .” Id. Therefore, a
court must consider all of the relevant circumstances when determining whether the Plaintiffs were
forced to serve involuntarily. In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege the following:
The Texas Labor Camp gates were constantly monitored by security guards retained by Signal. Signal’s security guards monitored the Plaintiffs’ comings and goings by requiring them to show their employee identification badges and recording when the Plaintiffs entered and exited the camp. Signal’s security guards also searched the Plaintiffs’ packages and bags when they entered the camp. Except on rare occasions, the Plaintiffs were not permitted to receive visitors in the camp.
Up to twenty-four men were housed in each bunkhouse and made to sleep in two tiered bunk beds. The bunk beds were so tightly packed in the bunkhouses that it was difficult for workers to move about in the narrow passageways between bunks or sit up in bed. These housing conditions violated OSHA regulations. The Texas Labor Camp bunkhouses had insufficient toilet and bathing facilities for twenty-four men, one or two toilets per bunkhouse, resulting in long lines for the bathrooms before and after work shifts and unsanitary conditions due to unresolved plumbing problems that rendered the toilets inoperable. Signal’s personnel and security guards conducted surprise searches of the dormitory areas of the bunkhouses, including searches of workers’ personal belongings. Upon information and belief, Signal did not obtain the required permit(s) to furnish board at the Texas Labor Camp, and the condition and sanitation of the board provided further violated federal, state, and/or local law. When the Plaintiffs complained and asked to live outside the Texas Labor Camp, Signal initially refused and subsequently told workers that if they tried to live outside the Texas Labor Camp, Signal would still deduct the labor camp fees from the Plaintiffs’ wages. As a result, the Plaintiffs reasonably believed they had no choice but to continue living in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp.
Signal only housed Indian H-2B Workers such as the Plaintiffs in its Labor Camps, which other employees and
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management at Signal referred to as the “reservation(s).” Upon information and belief, United States citizens and other workers of non-Indian descent and non-Indian race were neither required nor allowed to live in or pay for accommodations in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp. Signal subjected the Plaintiffs to skills testing and re-testing, on-the-job discipline, layoffs, periods without work, lack of safety precautions, unfavorable job assignments, evaluation processes, and other adverse employment actions to which non-Indian and United States citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
In the isolated and guarded atmosphere of the Texas Labor Camp and saddled with the crushing debts they had incurred to come to the United States in reliance upon the Defendants’ representatives, the Plaintiffs reasonably believed Signal’s statements were threatening and believed they had no choice but to continue working for Signal despite deplorable working and living conditions.
The Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers became increasingly frightened and confused, particularly when word spread that Signal had locked up the Mississippi Labor Camp Indian H-2B Workers who complained about the working conditions. Signal’s actions at the Mississippi Labor Camp significantly intensified the reasonable fears of the Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers in the Texas Labor Camp that if they tried to leave Signal’s employ or oppose unlawful and coercive employment conditions at Signal, including by consulting with counsel, they faced the threat of physical restraint, detention, forced deportation, or other serious harm or abuses of the legal process.
In light of these allegations, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have stated a plausible
claim of involuntary servitude. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the court deny the
Burnet Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible
claim.
B. Statute of Limitations
The Burnett Defendants also assert that the Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims are time
barred by the statute of limitations. Burnett argues the statute of limitations on the state law
claims began to run, at the latest, when the David case was filed on March 7, 2008. Burnett
submits that because the plaintiffs were putative class members in David, they were “necessarily
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aware of all the facts” that would trigger the running of the statute of limitations. Although Burnett does not catalogue the statute of limitations for each pendent state law claim under Texas law, he claims they would expire, at the latest, in four years—2012. The complaint in the instant case was filed in 2013. Burnett also argues the federal class action filed in the David court, which was not certified, did not toll the running of the statute of limitations on the state law claims. In response, the Plaintiffs argue the David Court explicitly tolled the statute of limitations on all of the Plaintiffs’ state law claims. (Doc. No. 43, p. 15.) In the alternative, they argue Texas law supports the tolling of the statute of limitations as to all purported members of a class upon the filing of the class action. (Id.)
The David complaint was filed on March 7, 2008. (Doc. No. 37, Exh. 2.) United States District Judge Zainey, upon the consent of Signal and the Burnett Defendants, entered an order tolling the statute of limitations for the absent class members’ (who are the Plaintiffs in this case) state law claims for 120 days until after the court’s final ruling on class certification. Order, Kurian David et al. v. Signal International, L.L.C., et al., No. 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011) (Doc. No. 982). Judge Zainey entered an order denying class certification on January 4, 2012, making the expiration of the tolling period May 3, 2012. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1117). The case was subsequently transferred to United States District Judge Susie Morgan. Order Reassigning Case, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1157). Over Signal’s objection, Judge Morgan further tolled the statute of limitations for the Plaintiffs’ claims until August 28, 2013. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1379). However, pursuant to Burnett’s request, Judge Morgan clarified that prior order by stating it only tolled the limitations period for the federal law claims, not any state law claims. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1417).
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For a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is typically not to look beyond the complaint. However, a court may consider attachments to briefing regarding a motion to dismiss if the documents are referenced in the complaint, central to the complaint, referenced by the parties, and their authenticity is not in dispute. See Walch v. Adjutant Gen. Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Those are the only documents the undersigned should consider in deciding the motion to dismiss as it concerns the limitations issue—not the various court orders entered by the New Orleans district courts tolling state statutes of limitations for the pendent state law claims.2
Nevertheless, even if the undersigned were to consider and apply Judge Zainey’s tolling order from the date the David complaint was filed until its expiration, the undersigned would still need to go outside the pleadings to intelligently determine the appropriate accrual date for the various state law claims and what effect the tolling period from Judge Zainey’s order has on the timeliness of the pendent state law claims filed in the instant complaint.3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), “if on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present material that is pertinent to the motion.” Accordingly, to the extent the Burnett Defendants believe the Plaintiffs’ state law claims are still barred by the statute of limitations in light of Judge Zainey’s
2. Burnett did not address the tolling orders entered by the David court, and the Plaintiffs only mentioned Judge Morgan’s initial order tolling the statute of limitations for the state law claims, not the order clarifying that the previous order only applied to the federal law claims. It should be noted that the briefing on the instant motion occurred before Judge Morgan’s order clarifying the previous order was entered.
3. Burnett cites Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App. 1995) in support of their argument that Texas courts hold the filing of a proposed federal class action does not toll the limitations period on pendent state law claims. See also Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2008). In those cases, it does not appear the Defendants consented to the tolling of the statute of limitations, as the Burnett Defendants did here, at least for the period of time reflected in Judge Zainey’s order. As such, those cases appear to be inapposite.
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tolling order, that is a matter best addressed in a motion for summary judgment, after the parties have had an opportunity for full discovery and the court can consider evidence outside the pleadings.
V. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the Burnett Defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” (Doc. No. 37) should be denied, subject to reconsideration in a motion for summary judgment that the state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
VI. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276– 77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings
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Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 120 Filed 07/29/14 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 2537 of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 29th day of July, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 235 Filed 07/14/15 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 9001

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

REJI SAMUEL, et al.,

§

§

Plaintiffs,

§

§

versus

§

§

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., et al., §

§

Defendants.

§

CIVIL ACTION 1:13-CV-323

ORDER STAYING CASE PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY

In light of Defendants Signal International, Inc., signal Ship Repair, LLC, Signal

International, LLC, Signal International Texas GP, LLC, and Signal International Texas, L.P.’s

filing a Suggestion of Bankruptcy (#234) pursuant to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,

this case is administratively closed. The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay,

applicable to all entities, of—

1. the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
2. the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
3. any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
4. any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
5. any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;

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6. any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
7. the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
8. the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning a tax liability of a debtor that is a corporation for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Thus, Defendants’ bankruptcy petition stays the proceedings in this case. Accordingly, this case is STAYED pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). It is ORDERED that
the parties shall file a notice every 120 days, informing the court of the status of the bankruptcy proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if any of the other parties believe that they have grounds for severance of their claims, so that the court may adjudicate their claims without delay, said party shall file a letter brief of no more than five (5) pages summarizing its position by July 31, 2015. Any opposition to the letter brief shall be no more than five (5) pages long and shall be filed within the response period as defined by Local Rule CV-7(e).
2

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 239 Filed 07/11/16 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 9017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, ATHA MOHAMMAD ABDUL,

)

KESAVARAO BUNDANKAYALA, RAJU DIVAKARAN,

)

BIJU PERUMPILLY GEORGE, KRISHNA GONTHINA,

)

NAYAPPULLI JAYACHANDRAN, GALLA VENKATA

)

RAMA KRISHNA, SAMUEL JOSE KUMRUMTHODATHIL, )

LOHITHAKSHAN MADAMPET, JOHNY MANDY MATHAI, )

BELTHAZAR PETER, MOHANAN BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, )

SANTHOSH KUMAR RAJENDRAN PILLAI, ABY

)

KARICKATHARA RAJU, SUMESH

)

PORAMBATHUPARAMBIL SUBRAMANIAN, and

)

CHANDRAN SHAJU THANISSERY,

)

v.

Plaintiffs,

) ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: ) 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL

)

TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.,

)

MALVERN C. BURNETT, GULF COAST IMMIGRATION )

LAW CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C.

)

BURNETT, A.P.C., GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., MICHAEL )

POL, SACHIN DEWAN, and DEWAN CONSULTANTS PVT. )

LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH CONSULTANTS),

)

Defendants.

)

PLAINTIFFS’ LETTER BRIEF UPDATING THE COURT ON STATUS OF THE SIGNAL BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING AS OF JULY 11, 2016

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com bcorgan@kilpatricktownsend.com spangborn@kilpatricktownsend.com sramsey@kilpatricktownsend.com

William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987 Brian G. Corgan (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 735027; CA Bar No. 282533 Shane G. Ramsey (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 940547 Remaining Counsel Listed on Signature Page
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 239 Filed 07/11/16 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 9018
Plaintiffs, Sachin Dewan, Malvern Burnett and Signal International, LLC, and certain of its affiliates (the “Signal Entities”), in accordance with the Court’s Order Staying Case Pursuant to Bankruptcy [Dkt. No. 235] requiring the parties to file a notice every 120 days informing the Court of the status of the Signal Entities’ bankruptcy proceedings, hereby file this Status Report as of July 11, 2015.
As noted in Plaintiffs’ and the Signal Entities’ prior notice, the Signal Entities filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July 12, 2015. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”).1 On November 24, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [ECF No. 555] (the “Confirmation Order”), confirming the Signal Entities’ plan of liquidation, which implemented the plan support agreement among the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities and certain other parties, for the settlement of, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the relevant Signal Entities. Pursuant to the Plan, a litigation trust (the “Signal Litigation Trust”) has been created for the distribution of the settlement proceeds. That process remains ongoing, as the Signal Litigation Trust distributed Trust Claim Forms in February and the Plaintiffs have submitted their claim forms.
The Plan became effective on December 14, 2015. As of that date, pursuant to the Confirmation Order, “any suit, legal action, or other proceeding … in any forum in the United
1 The other entities are: Signal Ship Repair, LLC (Case No. 15-11499), Signal Int’l, LLC (Case No. 15-11500), Signal Int’l Texas GP, LLC (Case No. 15-11501), and Signal Int’l Texas, L.P. (Case No. 15-11502). By the Bankruptcy Court’s order, all five cases are being jointly administered with the Signal Int’l, Inc. case. In re Signal Int’l, Inc., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 55.

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 239 Filed 07/11/16 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 9019

States that is released, stayed, or enjoined pursuant to Article XI of the Plan against or affecting

any Released Party [the Signal Entities], shall be stayed, enjoined or otherwise prohibited from

continuation as to any Released Party.” (Confirmation Order at 25.)

In light of Signal Entities’ ongoing bankruptcy cases, Plaintiffs respectfully request that

the stay remain in effect. This report has been approved by counsel for all parties. Pursuant to

the Court’s Order on July 14, 2015 [Dkt. No. 235], the parties will file a further status update in

120 days.

DATED: July 11, 2016.

Respectfully Submitted,

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com bcorgan@kilpatricktownsend.com spangborn@kilpatricktownsend.com sramsey@kilpatricktownsend.com tludlam@kilpatricktownsend.com kreed@kilpatricktownsend.com abelagodu@kilpatricktownsend.com rwilliamson@kilpatricktownsend.com

By: s/ William E. Dorris William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987 Brian G. Corgan (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 735027; CA Bar No. 282533 Shane G. Ramsey (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 940547 Akarsh P. Belagodu (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 496714 Reginald A. Williamson (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 462110 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555

Taylor H. Ludlam (Pro Hac Vice) North Carolina Bar No. 42377 4208 Six Forks Road, Suite 1400 Raleigh, NC 27609

Kristopher L. Reed Colorado Bar No. 36991 1400 Wewatta Street, Suite 600 Denver, CO 80202

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

US2008 11612678 1

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 239 Filed 07/11/16 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 9020

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 11, 2016 a true and correct copy of the above
document was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will
automatically send e-mail notification of such filings to all attorneys of record.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that U.S. Mail sent to the address of record for Global Resources,
Inc. has been returned undeliverable, therefore I am unable to serve a copy of these pleadings on
Global Resources, Inc. The last known address of Global Resources, Inc. is:
Global Resources, Inc. c/o Michael Pol 13 Herring Road Beaumont, MS 39423-2055

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com

By: s/ William E. Dorris William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987
Attorney for Plaintiffs

US2008 11612678 1

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 243 Filed 07/07/17 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 9034

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, ATHA MOHAMMAD ABDUL,

)

KESAVARAO BUNDANKAYALA, RAJU DIVAKARAN,

)

BIJU PERUMPILLY GEORGE, KRISHNA GONTHINA,

)

NAYAPPULLI JAYACHANDRAN, GALLA VENKATA

)

RAMA KRISHNA, SAMUEL JOSE KUMRUMTHODATHIL, )

LOHITHAKSHAN MADAMPET, JOHNY MANDY MATHAI, )

BELTHAZAR PETER, MOHANAN BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, )

SANTHOSH KUMAR RAJENDRAN PILLAI, ABY

)

KARICKATHARA RAJU, SUMESH

)

PORAMBATHUPARAMBIL SUBRAMANIAN, and

)

CHANDRAN SHAJU THANISSERY,

)

v.

Plaintiffs,

) ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: ) 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL

)

TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.,

)

MALVERN C. BURNETT, GULF COAST IMMIGRATION )

LAW CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C.

)

BURNETT, A.P.C., GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., MICHAEL )

POL, SACHIN DEWAN, and DEWAN CONSULTANTS PVT. )

LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH CONSULTANTS),

)

Defendants.

)

PLAINTIFFS’ LETTER BRIEF UPDATING THE COURT ON STATUS OF THE SIGNAL BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING AS OF JULY 7, 2017

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com bcorgan@kilpatricktownsend.com spangborn@kilpatricktownsend.com rwilliamson@kilpatricktownsend.com

William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987 Brian G. Corgan (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 735027; CA Bar No. 282533 Reginald A. Williamson (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 462110 Remaining Counsel Listed on Signature Page
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 243 Filed 07/07/17 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 9035
Plaintiffs, Sachin Dewan, Malvern Burnett and Signal International, LLC, and certain of its affiliates (the “Signal Entities”), in accordance with the Court’s Order Staying Case Pursuant to Bankruptcy [Dkt. No. 235] requiring the parties to file a notice every 120 days informing the Court of the status of the Signal Entities’ bankruptcy proceedings, hereby file this Status Report as of July 7, 2017.
As noted in Plaintiffs’ and the Signal Entities’ prior notices, the Signal Entities filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July 12, 2015. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”).1 On November 24, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [ECF No. 555] (the “Confirmation Order”), confirming the Signal Entities’ plan of liquidation, which implemented the plan support agreement among the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities and certain other parties, for the settlement of, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the relevant Signal Entities. Pursuant to the Plan, a litigation trust (the “Signal Litigation Trust”) has been created for the distribution of the settlement proceeds. That process remains ongoing, as the Signal Litigation Trust distributed Trust Claim Forms in February 2015 and the Plaintiffs submitted their claim forms.
The Plan became effective on December 14, 2015. As of that date, pursuant to the Confirmation Order, “any suit, legal action, or other proceeding … in any forum in the United
1 The other entities are: Signal Ship Repair, LLC (Case No. 15-11499), Signal Int’l, LLC (Case No. 15-11500), Signal Int’l Texas GP, LLC (Case No. 15-11501), and Signal Int’l Texas, L.P. (Case No. 15-11502). By the Bankruptcy Court’s order, all five cases are being jointly administered with the Signal Int’l, Inc. case. In re Signal Int’l, Inc., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 55.

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 243 Filed 07/07/17 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 9036

States that is released, stayed, or enjoined pursuant to Article XI of the Plan against or affecting

any Released Party [the Signal Entities], shall be stayed, enjoined or otherwise prohibited from

continuation as to any Released Party.” (Confirmation Order at 25.)

In light of the Signal Entities’ ongoing bankruptcy cases, Plaintiffs respectfully request

that the stay remain in effect. The parties will file a further status update in 120 days.

DATED: July 7, 2017.

Respectfully Submitted,

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com bcorgan@kilpatricktownsend.com spangborn@kilpatricktownsend.com tludlam@kilpatricktownsend.com abelagodu@kilpatricktownsend.com rwilliamson@kilpatricktownsend.com

By: s/ William E. Dorris William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987 Brian G. Corgan (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 735027; CA Bar No. 282533 Akarsh P. Belagodu (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 496714 Reginald A. Williamson (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 462110 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555

Taylor H. Ludlam (Pro Hac Vice) North Carolina Bar No. 42377 4208 Six Forks Road, Suite 1400 Raleigh, NC 27609

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

US2008 13084457 1

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 243 Filed 07/07/17 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 9037

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 7, 2017 a true and correct copy of the above

document was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will

automatically send e-mail notification of such filings to all attorneys of record.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that U.S. Mail sent to the address of record for Global Resources,

Inc. has been returned undeliverable, therefore I am unable to serve a copy of these pleadings on

Global Resources, Inc. The last known address of Global Resources, Inc. is:

Global Resources, Inc. c/o Michael Pol 13 Herring Road Beaumont, MS 39423-2055

Dated: July 7, 2017
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com

By: s/ William E. Dorris William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987
Attorney for Plaintiffs

US2008 13084457 1

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 246 Filed 11/06/17 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 9043

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

REJI SAMUEL, ATHA MOHAMMAD ABDUL,

)

KESAVARAO BUNDANKAYALA, RAJU DIVAKARAN,

)

BIJU PERUMPILLY GEORGE, KRISHNA GONTHINA,

)

NAYAPPULLI JAYACHANDRAN, GALLA VENKATA

)

RAMA KRISHNA, SAMUEL JOSE KUMRUMTHODATHIL, )

LOHITHAKSHAN MADAMPET, JOHNY MANDY MATHAI, )

BELTHAZAR PETER, MOHANAN BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, )

SANTHOSH KUMAR RAJENDRAN PILLAI, ABY

)

KARICKATHARA RAJU, SUMESH

)

PORAMBATHUPARAMBIL SUBRAMANIAN, and

)

CHANDRAN SHAJU THANISSERY,

)

v.

Plaintiffs,

) ) )

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C., SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL

)

TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.,

)

MALVERN C. BURNETT, GULF COAST IMMIGRATION

)

LAW CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C.

)

BURNETT, A.P.C., GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., MICHAEL )

POL, SACHIN DEWAN, and DEWAN CONSULTANTS PVT. )

LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH CONSULTANTS),

)

Defendants.

)

PLAINTIFFS’ LETTER BRIEF UPDATING THE COURT ON STATUS OF THE SIGNAL BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING AS OF NOVEMBER 6, 2017

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com bcorgan@kilpatricktownsend.com spangborn@kilpatricktownsend.com

William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987 Brian G. Corgan (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 735027; CA Bar No. 282533
Remaining Counsel Listed on Signature Page
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 246 Filed 11/06/17 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 9044
Plaintiffs, Sachin Dewan, Malvern Burnett and Signal International, LLC, and certain of its affiliates (the “Signal Entities”), in accordance with the Court’s Order Staying Case Pursuant to Bankruptcy [Dkt. No. 235] requiring the parties to file a notice every 120 days informing the Court of the status of the Signal Entities’ bankruptcy proceedings, hereby file this Status Report as of November 6, 2017.
As noted in Plaintiffs’ and the Signal Entities’ prior notices, the Signal Entities filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July 12, 2015. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”).1 On November 24, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [ECF No. 555] (the “Confirmation Order”), confirming the Signal Entities’ plan of liquidation, which implemented the plan support agreement among the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities and certain other parties, for the settlement of, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the relevant Signal Entities. Pursuant to the Plan, a litigation trust (the “Signal Litigation Trust”) has been created for the distribution of the settlement proceeds. That process remains ongoing, as the Signal Litigation Trust distributed Trust Claim Forms in February 2015 and the Plaintiffs submitted their claim forms.
The Plan became effective on December 14, 2015. As of that date, pursuant to the Confirmation Order, “any suit, legal action, or other proceeding … in any forum in the United
1 The other entities are: Signal Ship Repair, LLC (Case No. 15-11499), Signal Int’l, LLC (Case No. 15-11500), Signal Int’l Texas GP, LLC (Case No. 15-11501), and Signal Int’l Texas, L.P. (Case No. 15-11502). By the Bankruptcy Court’s order, all five cases are being jointly administered with the Signal Int’l, Inc. case. In re Signal Int’l, Inc., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 55.

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 246 Filed 11/06/17 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 9045

States that is released, stayed, or enjoined pursuant to Article XI of the Plan against or affecting

any Released Party [the Signal Entities], shall be stayed, enjoined or otherwise prohibited from

continuation as to any Released Party.” (Confirmation Order at 25.)

In light of the Signal Entities’ ongoing bankruptcy cases, Plaintiffs respectfully request

that the stay remain in effect. The parties will file a further status update in 120 days.

DATED: November 6, 2017.

Respectfully Submitted,

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com bcorgan@kilpatricktownsend.com spangborn@kilpatricktownsend.com tludlam@kilpatricktownsend.com

By: s/ William E. Dorris William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987 Brian G. Corgan (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 187700 Susan W. Pangborn (Pro Hac Vice) Georgia Bar No. 735027; CA Bar No. 282533 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555

Taylor H. Ludlam (Pro Hac Vice) North Carolina Bar No. 42377 4208 Six Forks Road, Suite 1400 Raleigh, NC 27609

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

US2008 13541596 1

Case 1:13-cv-00323-MAC-ZJH Document 246 Filed 11/06/17 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 9046

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 6, 2017 a true and correct copy of the above

document was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will

automatically send e-mail notification of such filings to all attorneys of record.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that U.S. Mail sent to the address of record for Global Resources,

Inc. has been returned undeliverable, therefore I am unable to serve a copy of these pleadings on

Global Resources, Inc. The last known address of Global Resources, Inc. is:

Global Resources, Inc. c/o Michael Pol 13 Herring Road Beaumont, MS 39423-2055

Dated: November 6, 2017
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com

By: s/ William E. Dorris William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987
Attorney for Plaintiffs

US2008 13541596 1

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 1 of 50
CASREF,JURY,PROTECTIVE−ORDER,STAYED
U.S. District Court Eastern District of TEXAS [LIVE] (Beaumont) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−00323−MAC−ZJH

Samuel et al v. Signal International L.L.C. et al Assigned to: Judge Marcia A. Crone Referred to: Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn Related Cases: 1:13−cv−00498−RC−ZJH
1:13−cv−00497−MAC−ZJH 1:13−cv−00499−MAC−ZJH 1:13−cv−00324−RC−ZJH Cause: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act Plaintiff
Reji Samuel

Date Filed: 05/21/2013 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by William E Dorris Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Atlanta 1100 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404−815−6104 Fax: 404−541−3183 Email: bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Atlanta 1100 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404.815.6003 Fax: 404.541.3385 Email: abelagodu@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Atlanta 1100 Peachtree St Ste 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404−815−6217 Fax: 404−541−3163 Email: bcorgan@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Atlanta 1100 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404.541.6685 Fax: 404.541.4717 Email: liza.akins@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP −

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 2 of 50
Atlanta 1100 Peachtree St Ste 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404−745−2577 Fax: 404−541−3367 Email: hheindel@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Denver 1400 Wewatta Street Suite 600 Denver, CO 80202 303.405.8536 Fax: 303.648.6683 Email: kreed@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Atlanta 1100 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404.815.6095 Fax: 404.541.4777 Email: rwilliamson@kilpatricktownsend.com TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − NY 1114 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 212.775.8767 Fax: 212.775.8800 Email: sramsey@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Atlanta 1100 Peachtree St Ste 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404/815−6305 Fax: 404/541−3328 Email: spangborn@kilpatrickstockton.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − Raleigh 4208 Six Forks Road Suite 1400 Raleigh, NC 27609 919/420−1705 Fax: 919/420−1800 Email: taludlam@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP −

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 3 of 50

Atlanta 1100 Peachtree St Ste 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309−4530 404/815−6464 Fax: 404/541−3134 Email: bboice@kilpatricktownsend.com TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Atha Mohammad Abdul

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Kesavarao Bundankayala

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 4 of 50

Plaintiff Raju Divakaran

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 5 of 50

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Biju Perumpilly George

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 6 of 50

Plaintiff Krishna Gonthina
Plaintiff Nayappulli Jayachandran

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 7 of 50

Plaintiff Galla Venkata Rama Krishna

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 8 of 50

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Lohithakshan Madampet

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 9 of 50

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Johny Mandy Mathai

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 10 of 50

Plaintiff Belthazar Peter

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 11 of 50

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 12 of 50

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

Plaintiff Aby Karickathara Raju

represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 13 of 50

Plaintiff Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian
Plaintiff Chandran Shaju Thanissery

Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015
represented by William E Dorris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 14 of 50

Akarsh P Belagodu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian G Corgan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Crabtree Akins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather L Heindel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristopher L Reed (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald A Williamson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/23/2017
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan W Pangborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor Higgins Ludlam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H Boice (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2015

V. Defendant Signal International L.L.C.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman Herman Law Firm 1601 Elm Street Suite 2002 Dallas, TX 75201 214−624−9805 Fax: 469−383−3469 Email: jherman@herman−lawfirm.com TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan Dean Weinberger Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Email: aweinberger@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 15 of 50
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Christopher Roux Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: broux@hanrylaw.com TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominic J Gianna Middleberg Riddle & Gianna 201 St Charles Ave Suite 3100 New Orleans, LA 70170 504−525−7200 Fax: 504−581−5983 Email: dgianna@midrid.com TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elham R Rabbani Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: erabbani@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Casey Hangartner Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: ehangartner@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hal D Ungar Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: hungar@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James L Cornblatt Patricia A Bollman, APLC 3636 S Interstate 10 Service Rd W Metarie, LA 70001 504.218.5887 Email: jcornblatt25@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 16 of 50

Kevin Patrick Maney Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: kmaney@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: lrydberg@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: lmasur@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: mhasenkampf@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman Patricia A Bollman, APLC PO Box 13707 New Orleans, LA 70185 504.218.5887 Fax: 504.304.0890 Email: patricia@bollmanfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: rkeller@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International, Inc.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 17 of 50

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International Texas, G.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 18 of 50

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International Texas, L.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 19 of 50

TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Malvern C. Burnett

represented by

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 20 of 50

Timothy W Cerniglia Timothy W. Cerniglia, PLC 1521 St Charles Ave New Orleans, LA 70130 504−586−0555 Fax: 504−586−0550 Email: tcerniglia@cerniglialaw.pro LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E Buras , Jr Buras Law Firm, LLC 301 N Columbia Street Covington, LA 70433 985.306.1769 Fax: 888.383.4079 Email: dburas@buraslawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C.

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E Buras , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E Buras , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Global Resources, Inc.

Defendant Michael Pol

Defendant Sachin Dewan

represented by Stephen H Shapiro Stephen H Shapiro, Attorney at Law, LLC 700 Camp Street New Orleans, LA 70130 504.309.8442 Fax: 504.934.2000 Email: steve@shapirolaw−nola.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. also known as Medtech Consultants

represented by Stephen H Shapiro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 21 of 50

Cross Claimant Signal International Texas, L.P.
Cross Claimant Signal International L.L.C.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hal D Ungar (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 22 of 50

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant Signal International Texas, G.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant Signal International, Inc.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 23 of 50
(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hal D Ungar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Cross Defendant Malvern C. Burnett TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Sachin Dewan TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Global Resources, Inc. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 Cross Defendant Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E Buras , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen H Shapiro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen H Shapiro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E Buras , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E Buras , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 24 of 50
Cross Defendant Michael Pol TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

Date Filed 05/21/2013
05/21/2013 05/21/2013
05/22/2013 05/22/2013 05/22/2013 05/22/2013 05/28/2013 06/04/2013
06/04/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0540−4146646.), filed by Johny Mandy Mathai, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Chandran Shaju Thanissery, Atha Mohammad Abdul, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Krishna Gonthina, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Belthazar Peter, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Raju Divakaran, Lohithakshan Madampet, Biju Perumpilly George. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Rico Fraud Chart, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Boice, William) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
Case Assigned to Judge Marcia A. Crone. (aam, ) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
In accordance with the provisions of 28 USC Section 636(c), you are hereby notified that a U.S. Magistrate Judge of this district court is available to conduct any or all proceedings in this case including a jury or non−jury trial and to order the entry of a final judgment. The form Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge is available on our website. All signed consent forms, excluding pro se parties, should be filed electronically using the event Notice of Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge. (aam, ) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
2 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Brian G Corgan on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4149194. (Corgan, Brian) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
3 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Susan W Pangborn on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4149211. (Pangborn, Susan) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
4 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Heather L Heindel on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4149230. (Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
5 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to enter findings of fact and recommended disposition on case−dispositive matters, and to determine non−dispositive matters. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 5/22/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 05/23/2013)
6 SUMMONS Issued as to Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Global Resources, Inc., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Michael Pol, Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P. and Signal International, Inc. and emailed to plas' atty for service (aam, ) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
7 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Boice, William) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
8 NOTICE by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery Plaintiffs' Notice of Related Cases (Boice, William) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 25 of 50

06/18/2013
06/27/2013
07/03/2013 07/29/2013 07/29/2013 08/06/2013 08/06/2013 08/07/2013 08/07/2013 08/07/2013 08/07/2013 08/07/2013 08/15/2013 08/15/2013 08/22/2013 08/22/2013

9 NOTICE by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery Notice of Suggestion of Bankruptcy (Boice, William) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
10 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/28/2013: # 2 Revised Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 06/27/2013)
11 ORDER granting 10 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. The Defendants have until 7/28/13, to file any pleadings responsive to the Plaintiffs' Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/2/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
12 MOTION to Change Venue (Transfer Pursuant to First Filed Rule) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
13 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
14 ADVISORY ORDER. This case is assigned for trial to Judge Marcia A. Crone, and is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for pretrial proceedings. Upon receipt of all the parties' consent, this case may be reassigned to the undersigned for trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/6/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
15 ORDER to Conduct Rule 26(f) Conference with a proposed Scheduling Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/6/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
16 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Reji Samuel. Signal International Texas, L.P. served on 6/25/2013, answer due 7/16/2013. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
17 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Reji Samuel. Signal International Texas, G.P. served on 6/25/2013, answer due 7/16/2013. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
18 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Reji Samuel. Signal International, Inc. served on 6/20/2013, answer due 7/11/2013. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
19 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Reji Samuel. Signal International L.L.C. served on 6/25/2013, answer due 7/16/2013. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
20 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Reji Samuel. Global Resources, Inc. served on 7/1/2013, answer due 7/22/2013. (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
21 RESPONSE in Opposition to 12 MOTION to Change Venue (Transfer Pursuant to First Filed Rule) filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, et al., (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A to Plaintiffs' Response In Opposition to Motion to Transfer Action, # 2 Proposed Order)(Boice, William) Modified on 8/16/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 08/15/2013)
22 RESPONSE in Opposition to 13 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) by Reji Samuel et al., (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A to Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Proposed Order)(Boice, William) Modified on 8/16/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 08/15/2013)
23 REPLY to Response to 12 MOTION to Change Venue (Transfer Pursuant to First Filed Rule) filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/22/2013)
24 REPLY to Response to 13 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Herman, Jonathan) (Entered:

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 26 of 50

08/23/2013 08/29/2013 08/29/2013 08/29/2013 08/29/2013 08/29/2013 08/29/2013 08/29/2013 09/03/2013 09/03/2013 09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/10/2013

08/22/2013)
25 SUMMONS REISSUED as to Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd and physically mailed to pltf's attorney, William H Boice, pursuant to his request. Fedex Tracking No. 796530534173. (dlc, ) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
26 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Alan Dean Weinberger on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4289998. (Weinberger, Alan) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
27 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Erin Casey Hangartner on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4290027. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
28 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Hal D Ungar on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4290047. (Ungar, Hal) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
29 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Elham R Rabbani on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4290084. (Rabbani, Elham) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
30 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Dominic J Gianna on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4290113. (Gianna, Dominic) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
31 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Patricia Bollman on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4290134. (Bollman, Patricia) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
32 MOTION to Consolidate Cases /for Limited Consolidation by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
33 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to 12 MOTION to Change Venue (Transfer Pursuant to First Filed Rule) filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, et al.,. (Boice, William) Modified on 9/4/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 09/03/2013)
34 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to 13 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, et al.,. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A)(Boice, William) Modified on 9/4/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 09/03/2013)
35 SUMMONS Returned Executed on Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. served on 8/28/2013, answer due 9/18/2013. (bjc) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
36 ***FILED IN ERROR. PLEASE IGNORE.*** MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Malvern C. Burnett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Affidavit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 9/10/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/10/2013)
37 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(6) by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 − La. Complaint, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 9/10/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/10/2013)
38 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(2) by Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C, Malvern C Burnett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Affidavit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 9/10/2013 (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/10/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 27 of 50

09/10/2013

***FILED IN ERROR. Document # 36, motion to dismiss. Atty refiled motion, see Doc# 38. PLEASE IGNORE.***

09/11/2013 09/16/2013
09/18/2013
09/19/2013 09/27/2013 09/27/2013 09/30/2013 10/01/2013
10/04/2013 10/07/2013

(bjc) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
39 MOTION to Change Venue by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − La. Complaint, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
40 RESPONSE in Opposition re 32 MOTION to Consolidate Cases /for Limited Consolidation filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Boice, William) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/17/2013: # 2 Revised Proposed Order) (bjc, ). (Entered: 09/16/2013)
41 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time for Service on Defendants Residing in a Foreign Country by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − June 27 2013 Letter, # 2 Exhibit B − August 8 2013 Notice, # 3 Exhibit C − August 8 2013 2nd Notice, # 4 Exhibit D − September 11 2013 Letter, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Boice, William) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
ORAL ORDER granting 41 Motion for extension of time for service on defendant's residing in a foreign country. The date of service for the defendant referenced in doc. 41 is extended until January 17, 2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 9−19−2013. (Hawthorn, Zack) (Entered: 09/19/2013)
42 RESPONSE in Opposition to 38 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul et al., (Attachments: # 1 Appendix of Authority Pursuant to MC−7(b)(4), # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Boice, William) Modified on 9/30/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 09/27/2013)
43 RESPONSE in Opposition to 37 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(6) filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul., (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Order on Class Certification, # 2 Exhibit B − Letter Regarding Burnett Fees, # 3 Appendix A − Authority Pursuant to MC−7(b)(4), # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Boice, William) Modified on 9/30/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 09/27/2013)
44 RESPONSE in Opposition to 39 MOTION to Change Venue filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul et al., (Attachments: # 1 Appendix of Authority Pursuant to MC−7(b)(4), # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Boice, William) Modified on 10/1/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 09/30/2013)
45 Emergency MOTION to Stay by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − (Doc. 1349) Order & Reasons, # 2 Exhibit 2 − (Doc. 1406) Order, # 3 Exhibit 3 − (Doc. 1380) Order & Reasons, # 4 Exhibit 4 − (Doc. 1391) Notice Regarding Plaintiffs' Proposed DPCMO, # 5 Exhibit 5 − (Doc. 1396) Signal's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Proposed DPCMO, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Affidavit of Erin Casey Hangartner, # 7 Exhibit 7 − (Doc. 1352) Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/2/2013: # 8 Text of Proposed Order) (mrp, ). (Entered: 10/01/2013)
46 ORDER denying 45 Motion to Stay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/4/2013. (bjc) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
47 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 46 Order on Motion to Stay Pursuant to Rule 72 and LR 72(b) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 28 of 50

10/07/2013 10/08/2013 10/08/2013
10/10/2013 10/10/2013 10/15/2013
10/17/2013 10/17/2013 10/21/2013 10/22/2013
10/23/2013 11/18/2013 12/02/2013

(Entered: 10/07/2013)
NOTICE of Deficiency regarding the Motion for Reconsideration submitted by Signal International L.L.C.. Document is not pdf searchable and did NOT have a proposed order. This motion has been terminated. Correction should be made within 1 business day. (mrp, ) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
48 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 46 Order on Motion to Stay Pursuant to Rule 72 and LR 72(b) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
49 NOTICE by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery Plaintiffs' Notice of Initial and Supplemental Disclosures (Boice, William) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
50 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order / Proposed Scheduling Order)(Boice, William) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
51 ORDER denying 48 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 10/10/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
52 NOTICE by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery re 50 Report of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting of Filing Plaintiffs ESI & Document Production Protocol (Boice, William) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn: 10:20 am − 10:38am Scheduling Conference held on 10/17/2013. Appearances: William Boice, Pla counsel; Patricia Bollman & Erin Hangartner, Def counsel. (Courtroom Deputy & DCR Op: Piper.) (ttp, ) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
53 SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference is set for 12/5/2014 at 10:00 AM in Ctrm 3 (Beaumont) before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Amended Pleadings due by 12/20/2013. Discovery due by 7/25/2014. Motions due by 8/8/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/17/18. (mrp, ) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
54 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
In accordance with the provisions of 28 USC Section 636(c), you are hereby notified that a U.S. Magistrate Judge of this district court is available to conduct any or all proceedings in this case including a jury or non−jury trial and to order the entry of a final judgment. The form Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge is available on our website. All signed consent forms, excluding pro se parties, should be filed electronically using the event Notice of Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge. (bjc, ) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
***FILED IN ERROR. Document # 54, Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. This motion has been terminated. PLEASE IGNORE.***
(mrp, ) (Entered: 10/23/2013)
55 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/18/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
56 ORDER denying 12 Motion to Change Venue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 12/2/13. (mrp, ) (Entered: 12/02/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 29 of 50

12/13/2013 12/23/2013 12/30/2013 01/02/2014 02/07/2014 02/10/2014 02/11/2014 02/12/2014 02/17/2014 02/18/2014 02/19/2014
02/19/2014 02/19/2014 02/28/2014 02/28/2014 03/05/2014

57 MOTION for Reconsideration re 56 Order on Motion to Change Venue by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/16/2013: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (mrp, ). (Entered: 12/13/2013)
58 RESPONSE in Opposition re 57 MOTION for Reconsideration re 56 Order on Motion to Change Venue filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul et al.,. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A − Authority Pursuant to MC−7(b)(4), # 2 Text of Proposed Order Denying Motion for Review)(Boice, William) Modified on 12/26/2013 (mrp, ). (Entered: 12/23/2013)
59 REPLY to Response to Motion re 57 MOTION for Reconsideration re 56 Order on Motion to Change Venue filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 12/30/2013)
60 NOTICE of Change of Address by Erin Casey Hangartner (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
61 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Stephen H Shapiro on behalf of Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4514557. (Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
62 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer Complaint by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Attachment 1 replaced on 2/11/2014) (mrp, ). (Entered: 02/10/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 62 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 12−11−2014. (Hawthorn, Zack) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
63 ORDER denying 57 Motion for Reconsideration. After considering the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, the court finds that the magistrate judge's order is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 2/12/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/13/2014)
64 ANSWER to 1 Complaint,, by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd..(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 02/17/2014)
65 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 13 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) should be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/18/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
66 ORDER denying as moot 32 Signal's Motion for Limited Consolidation. On February 12, 2014, United States District Judge Marcia A. Crone denied Signal's motion to reconsider the undersigned's order denying their motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to the first−to−file rule. The relief Signal requests in the instant motion is no longer available. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/19/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
67 MOTION to Stay by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
68 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Reji Samuel. Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. served on 12/3/2013, answer due 12/24/2013. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
69 MOTION for Reconsideration re 65 Report and Recommendations by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
70 EXHIBIT to # 69 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Signal International L.L.C., et al.,(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 3/5/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 02/28/2014)
***FILED IN ERROR. Document # 70, Exhibit to Motion for Reconsideration # 69 was filed in error as a second Motion for Reconsideration. This motion has been terminated. PLEASE IGNORE.***

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 30 of 50

03/10/2014
03/13/2014
03/17/2014 03/17/2014
03/19/2014 03/19/2014 03/21/2014 04/02/2014
04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/17/2014

(mrp, ) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
71 RESPONSE in Opposition re 67 MOTION to Stay filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Appendix Pursuant to MC−7(b)(2))(Boice, William) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
72 ORDER denying 67 Emergency Motion to Stay. Signal requests a stay "to avoid inconsistencies, duplication, and prejudice while the petition is pending." However, Signal has yet to file the mandamus petition even though Signal claimed almost a month ago it was "expeditiously finalizing its writ application." Because Signal requests a stay based upon a writ of mandamus that does not exist, such request is denied as moot. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3/13/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
73 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney of Record (Dominic J. Gianna) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
74 RESPONSE to 69 Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Rule 72 Objections to the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Hawthorn by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2), # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Boice, William) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 73 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Dominic J Gianna terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3−19−14. (Hawthorn, Zack) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
75 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Reji Samuel. Sachin Dewan served on 12/2/2013. (mrp, ) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
76 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE. It is ordered that the 13 Motion to Dismiss, filed by Signal International, et al., is denied. Signal's objections are without merit. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 3/20/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
77 NOTICE of Discovery Disclosure by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery Plaintiffs' Notice of Service of Discovery (Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
78 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Jonathan M. Herman and Middleberg Riddle Group by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 78 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jonathan Marc Herman terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/4/14. (zjh1) . (Entered: 04/04/2014)
79 ANSWER to 1 Complaint,, and Affirmative Defenses, CROSSCLAIM against Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Global Resources, Inc., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett,

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 31 of 50

04/22/2014 04/23/2014 04/23/2014 04/23/2014
04/25/2014 04/28/2014
04/30/2014

A.P.C., Michael Pol by Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International, Inc..(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
80 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Brian Christopher Roux on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4624066. (Roux, Brian) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
81 PAPER TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. for proceedings held on 10.17.13 Rule 16 Case Management Conference before Judge Zack Hawthorne. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
82 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint with Tolling of the Statute of Limitations by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2), # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Pangborn, Susan) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
83 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Global Resources, Inc., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., filed by Nayappulli Jayachandran, Chandran Shaju Thanissery, Atha Mohammad Abdul, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Krishna Gonthina, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Belthazar Peter, Aby Karickathara Raju, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−RICO Chart, # 2 Exhibit 2−Plaintiffs' Opt−In Consents)(Pangborn, Susan) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
84 USCA ORDER denying the petition for writ of mandamus. It is Further Ordered that petitioner's alternative motion for stay pending appeal is DENIED as MOOT. Circuit Judges: Owen, Elrod, and Haynes. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Cover Letter)(dlc, ) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
85 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Case Management Conference held on 10/17/2013 before Judge Zack Hawthorn. Court Reporter: Tonya Jackson, Telephone number: 409.654.2833.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.txed.uscourts.gov
Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 5/22/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/2/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/31/2014. (tj, ) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
86 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 38 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. should be denied. The Defendants' motion should be denied because 1) the court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants since the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process; and 2) the court has specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendants given the number of alleged tortious acts committed by the Defendants both outside and inside Texas that injured the Plaintiffs within Texas. Signed by

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 32 of 50

04/30/2014
05/01/2014 05/07/2014 05/08/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/19/2014 05/29/2014
05/30/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014
05/30/2014 05/30/2014

Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/30/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
87 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File / Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert Witnesses and Provide Expert Reports by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 87 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/1/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
88 RESPONSE in Opposition re 82 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint with Tolling of the Statute of Limitations filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
89 ANSWER to 79 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,, of Signal International, LLC by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd..(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
90 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Daniel E Buras, Jr on behalf of Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4653590. (Buras, Daniel) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
91 OBJECTION to 86 Report and Recommendations by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Buras, Daniel) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
92 REPLY to Response to 82 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint with Tolling of the Statute of Limitations filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, et al., (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2))(Pangborn, Susan) Modified on 5/20/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 05/19/2014)
93 Unopposed MOTION for Discovery and for Entry of Consent Orders Regarding Discovery by Atha Mohammad Abdul., et al. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Order Regarding Protocols for the Production of Electronically Stored Information, # 2 Consent Supplemental Protective Order, # 3 Consent Clawback Order, # 4 Consent Order Regarding Use of Discovery From Related Cases)(Heindel, Heather) Modified on 5/30/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 05/29/2014)
94 CONSENT SUPPLEMENTAL PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/30/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
95 CONSENT ORDER REGARDING PROTOCOLS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/30/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
96 CONSENT ORDER REGARDING USE OF DISCOVERY FROM RELATED CASES. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/30/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
97 ***DOCKETED IN ERROR***
CONSENT SUPPLEMENTAL PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/30/14. (mrp, ) Modified on 5/30/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 05/30/2014)
Order # 97 was docketed in error. It is a duplicate of Order # 94 . Please disregard. (mrp, ) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
98 CONSENT CLAWBACK ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/30/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 33 of 50

05/30/2014
06/09/2014 06/12/2014 06/20/2014 06/23/2014 06/23/2014 06/23/2014 06/23/2014 06/24/2014 06/25/2014 06/26/2014 06/26/2014 06/26/2014 06/26/2014 06/26/2014 07/02/2014

99 RESPONSE in Opposition to 91 Objection to Report and Recommendation to Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 12(b)(2) of Malvern C. Burnett, The Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul., (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A to Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Objections Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2), # 2 Proposed Order Denying Burnetts' Objections)(Heindel, Heather) Modified on 6/2/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 05/30/2014)
100 NOTICE of Discovery Disclosure by Atha Mohammad Abdul., et al. (Heindel, Heather) Modified on 6/10/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 06/09/2014)
101 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 38 Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction is denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 6/12/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
102 MOTION for Reconsideration by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
NOTICE of Deficiency regarding the Motion for Reconsideration submitted by Malvern C. Burnett. Motion did not have a certificate of conference. Correction should be made within 1 business day. (mrp, ) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
103 MOTION to Amend/Correct Certificate of Conference by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
NOTICE of Deficiency regarding the Certificate of Conference submitted by Malvern C. Burnett. Document was filed in error as a Motion. This motion has been terminated. Correction should be made within 1 business day. (mrp, ) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
104 MOTION for Reconsideration by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 6/26/2014 08:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. (ttp, ) (Entered: 06/24/2014)
105 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 06/25/2014)
NOTICE of Deficiency regarding the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record. submitted by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. Motion did not have a certificate of conference as required by the Local Rules. Correction should be made by Within 1 business day. Motion has been terminated. (mrp, ) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn: 8:37am − 9:41 am Telephone Conference held on 6/26/2014. Appearances: William Boice, Pla cnsl; Hal Ungar, Alan Weinberger, Timothy Cerniglia and Stephen Shapiro, Dft csnl. (Courtroom Deputy & DCR Op: Piper, T.) (ttp, ) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
106 PAPER TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. for proceedings held on 6−26−14 Telephone Conference before Judge Zack Hawthorne. (Ungar, Hal) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
107 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Certificate of Conference, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
108 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference is set for 3/6/2015 at 10:00 AM in Ctrm 3 (Beaumont) before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Discovery due by 8/1/2014. Motions due by 8/8/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6/26/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 06/27/2014)
109 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Telephone Conference held on 6/26/2014 before Judge Zack Hawthorn. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Tonya Jackson, Telephone number: 409.654.2833.

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NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.txed.uscourts.gov

07/03/2014 07/08/2014 07/10/2014
07/11/2014 07/14/2014 07/14/2014 07/16/2014 07/21/2014 07/21/2014 07/29/2014 07/29/2014

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 7/28/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/7/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/3/2014. (tj, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
110 ORDER denying 39 Motion to Change Venue. The court's denial of the Burnett Defendants' motion to transfer will not result in "piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result." Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/2/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
111 ORDER DESIGNATION PLAINTIFFS FOR FIRST TRIAL SETTING. The parties have agreed the following Plaintiffs are designated to proceed to trial for the court's first trial setting: Aby Karickathara Raju, Lohithakshan Madampet, Biju Perumpilly George, Raju Divakaran and Nayappulli Jayachandran. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/7/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
112 RESPONSE in Opposition re 104 MOTION for Reconsideration of Order of June 12, 2014, or Alternatively to Supplement Order So As to Allow for Interlocutory Appeal filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A To Pltfs' Response in Opposition to Motion Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2), # 2 Text of Proposed Order Denying Burnett Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 07/10/2014)
113 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Lance R Rydberg on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4740843. (Rydberg, Lance) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
114 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
115 RESPONSE in Opposition to 107 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, et al., (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Heindel, Heather) Modified on 7/15/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 07/14/2014)
116 ADVISORY ORDER CONCERNING PAGE LIMITATIONS FOR APPEALS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISIONS. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/15/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
117 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and extend other case related deadlines by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
118 REPLY to Response to Motion re 107 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.. (Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
119 NOTICE of Discovery Disclosure by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
120 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING 37 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(6) subject to reconsideration in a motion for summary judgment that

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 35 of 50

07/29/2014 07/30/2014 07/31/2014 08/05/2014
08/18/2014 08/18/2014

the state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/29/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/30/2014)
121 SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference is set for 3/6/2015 at 10:00 AM in Ctrm 3 (Beaumont) before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Discovery due by 9/19/2014. Motions due by 9/26/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/29/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/30/2014)
122 MOTION to Compel by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 07/30/2014)
123 RESPONSE to 114 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Appeal or Objection to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation to Deny Motions of Burnett to Transfer Venue by Atha Mohammad Abdul., et al., (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A To Pltfs' Response in Opposition to Burnett Defs' Appeal or Objections, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Denying Burnett Defs' Appeal or Objections)(Boice, William) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
124 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Shane G Ramsey on behalf of Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4777267. (Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 08/05/2014)
125 RESPONSE in Opposition to Defendants' 122 MOTION to Compel Immigration Information and Plaintiffs' Request for Protective Order filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, et al., (Attachments: # 1 Exh 1 − Signal's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Documents, # 2 Appendix A of Case Law Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2), # 3 Proposed Order)(Heindel, Heather) Modified on 8/19/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 08/18/2014)
126 ***FILED IN ERROR***

08/19/2014 08/19/2014 08/20/2014

NOTICE by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery re 125 Response in Opposition to Motion,,, Notice of Filing Plaintiffs' Supplement to Appendix A to Plaintiffs' Response to Signal Defendants' Motion to Compel Immigration Information and Plaintiffs' Request for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A − Supplement to Appendix A)(Heindel, Heather) Modified on 8/19/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 08/18/2014)
NOTICE of Deficiency regarding the Notice of Filing Supplement submitted by Plaintiffs. This document should have been filed as an Additional Attachment to Document # 125 . Filing as a Notice does not allow proper linkage to # 125 . (mrp, ) (Entered: 08/19/2014)
127 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 125 Response in Opposition to Motion,.. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit A − Supplement to Appendix A)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 08/19/2014)
128 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Akarsh P Belagodu on behalf of Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4798700. (Belagodu, Akarsh) (Entered: 08/20/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 36 of 50

08/25/2014 08/25/2014
09/09/2014 09/10/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/15/2014 09/15/2014 09/19/2014
09/23/2014 09/23/2014 09/24/2014 09/25/2014

129 REPLY to Response to Motion re 122 MOTION to Compel filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
130 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Motion under Fed. R. Civ. P 30(d)(3) by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
131 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE. It is ordered that # 37 Motion to Dismiss is denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 9/9/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
132 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Reginald A Williamson on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4827075. (Williamson, Reginald) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
133 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Kevin Patrick Maney on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4832440. (Maney, Kevin) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
134 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Robert L Keller, II on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4832692. (Keller, Robert) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
135 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by James L Cornblatt on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4833018. (Cornblatt, James) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
136 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Mitchell P Hasenkampf on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4834511. (Hasenkampf, Mitchell) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
137 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Lauren Masur Davis on behalf of Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4835027. (Davis, Lauren) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
138 Emergency MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (to Extend Motion Deadline, Discovery Deadline and Deadline for the Depositions of Experts) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
ORAL ORDER denying as moot 117 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 9−23−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 130 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Motion Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3). Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 9−23−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
139 ORDER granting 138 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Discovery deadine is 10/3/14. Expert depositions deadline is 10/10/14. Motions deadline is 10/17/14. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 9/23/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
140 SEALED MOTION Plaintiffs' Motion for Interim Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3) − Filed Under Seal by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 37 of 50

09/26/2014
10/02/2014 10/06/2014
10/06/2014
10/08/2014
10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014

Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Excerpts Deposition Transcript of N. Jayachandran, # 2 Exhibit B − Excerpts Deposition Transcript of M. Kelleher, # 3 Exhibit C − Excerpts Deposition Transcript of A. Raju, # 4 Exhibit D − Pltfs' Response to Signal's Motion to Compel, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 09/25/2014)
141 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Taylor Higgins Ludlam on behalf of Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4857401. (Ludlam, Taylor) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
142 RESPONSE in Opposition re 140 SEALED MOTION Plaintiffs' Motion for Interim Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3) − Filed Under Seal filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
143 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Kristopher L Reed on behalf of Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4869775. (Reed, Kristopher) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
144 STIPULATION of Dismissal Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of Claims of Lohithakshan Madampet with Prejudice by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Boice, William) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
145 Emergency MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Emergency Agreed Motion to Extend Deadline for Deposition of Experts and Motion Deadline) by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order On Emergency Agreed Motion to Extend Deadline)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
146 ORDER Setting Telephonic Conference on Motions 145 Emergency MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and 107 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney. Telephonic Conference is set for 10/9/2014 at 3:00 PM. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/9/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
147 MOTION to Withdraw 107 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 147 Motion to Withdraw 107 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10−9−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
ORAL ORDER denying 145 Motion for Extension of Time for reasons stated during telephonic conference held on 10−9−2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10−9−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 38 of 50

10/09/2014 10/14/2014 10/15/2014 10/16/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn: Motion Hearing held on 10/9/2014 re 145 Emergency MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Emergency Agreed Motion to Extend Deadline for Deposition of Experts and Motion Deadline. Court hears arguments. Court denies motion. (Court Reporter DCR Jill Veazey.) (jmv, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
148 REPLY to Response to Motion re 140 SEALED MOTION Plaintiffs' Motion for Interim Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3) − Filed Under Seal filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
149 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 122 Motion to Compel; denying 140 Plaintiff's Motion for Interim Protective Order Under Rule 30(d)(3). Within 7 days, the Plaintiffs shall produce documents responsive to Signal's Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 8, including information related to U visas. Signal's motion as it relates to "other similar evidence, including evidence as to the lives of the plaintiffs after Signal employment" is denied. The Plaintiffs' requests for entry of a protective order are denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/15/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
150 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Elizabeth Crabtree Akins on behalf of Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4886594. (Akins, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
151 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Virginia Miles by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report, # 2 Appendix A − of Cases, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
152 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Donald H. Strobel by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report, # 2 Appendix A of Cases, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
153 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report, # 2 Appendix A of Cases, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
154 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 153 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham .. (Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 10/17/2014)

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155 MOTION to limit the testimony of Enrique Gonzalez III by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report, # 2 Exhibit B − Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Appendix A of Cases, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) Modified on 10/20/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
156 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike Expert Report of Ronald J. McAlear by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report, # 2 Exhibit B − Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit C − Expert Report David Case, # 4 Appendix A of Cases, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
157 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report, # 2 Exhibit B − Transcript of Deposition of L. Shelley, # 3 Appendix A of Cases, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
158 MOTION in Limine to exclude legal opinion testimony of Signal's immigration law experts by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
159 MOTION in Limine /Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report Samuel in globol, # 2 Exhibit A − Expert Report Joseph in Globol, # 3 Exhibit A − Expert Report David in Globo, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
160 Additional Attachments to Main Document: Exhibit B to 159 MOTION in Limine /Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl.. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/20/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
161 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Samuel Expert Report in Globo, # 2 Exhibit A Joseph Expert Report in Globo, # 3 Exhibit A David Expert Report in Globo, # 4 Exhibit B Deposition Testimony, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
162 MOTION to exclude the testimony of Louis Shelly, Signal International LLC's proposed expert witness by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
163 MOTION for Leave to File 2nd Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading, # 3 Exhibit A−J, # 4 Exhibit K−Y, # 5 Exhibit Y−AA, # 6 Exhibit 1−10, # 7 Exhibit 11−13, # 8 Exhibit 14−16, # 9 Exhibit 17, # 10 Exhibit 18−19, # 11 Exhibit 20A Part 1, # 12 Exhibit 20A Part 2, # 13 Exhibit 21−24, # 14 Affidavit, # 15 Statement of Facts)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
164 Additional Attachments to Main Document: Exhibit 25 to 163 MOTION for Leave to File 2nd Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on

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10/20/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
165 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Statement of Issues, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Exhibit 14, # 17 Exhibit 15, # 18 Exhibit 16, # 19 Exhibit 17, # 20 Exhibit 18, # 21 Exhibit 19, # 22 Exhibit 20, # 23 Exhibit 21, # 24 Exhibit 22, # 25 Exhibit 23)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/18/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 163 Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10−20−2014. (zjh1) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
166 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Uncontested Facts, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit A−J, # 4 Exhibit K−X, # 5 Exhibit Y−AA, # 6 Exhibit 1−10, # 7 Exhibit 11−13, # 8 Exhibit 14−16, # 9 Exhibit 17, # 10 Exhibit 18−19, # 11 Exhibit 20A Part 1, # 12 Exhibit 20A Part 2, # 13 Exhibit 21−24, # 14 Exhibit 25)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/21/2014: # 15 Text of Proposed Order) (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/20/2014)
167 ***DUPLICATE. PLEASE IGNORE.*** Additional Attachments to Main Document: 159 MOTION in Limine /Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl.. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/21/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/20/2014)
170 ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration of Order of June 12, 2014, or Alternatively to Supplement Order so as to Allow for Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. No. 104) is denied. Burnetts alternative request for an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is also denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 10/20/2014. (bjc) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
168 Amended MOTION Samuel Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Appendix, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
***FILED IN ERROR. Document # 167, Additional attachments to main document. Duplicate see Doc# 160. PLEASE IGNORE.***

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(bjc) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
169 EXHIBIT 20 to 166 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 20)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/21/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/21/2014)
171 ORDERED that Burnetts Appeal of Magistrate Judges Order, or Alternatively Objection to Magistrates Report and Recommendation to Deny Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. No. 114) is denied. Burnetts alternative request for an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the FifthCircuit is also denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 10/20/2014. (bjc) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
172 ***FILED IN ERROR***

RESPONSE in Opposition re 151 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Virginia Miles filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/31/2014 (mrp, ). (Entered: 10/30/2014)

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173 RESPONSE in Opposition re 156 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike Expert Report of Ronald J. McAlear filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
174 RESPONSE to 149 Order on Motion to Compel, Order on Sealed Motion,,,, Samuel Plaintiffs' Objection to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order on Signal's Motion to Compel (Doc No. 122) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Interim Protective Order Under Rule 30(d)(3) (Doc No. 140) by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Joseph v Signal Motion for Reconsideration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
175 RESPONSE in Opposition re 151 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Virginia Miles filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Clyde Payne, # 2 Exhibit B − Portions of 1989 OSHA Field Manual)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
***FILED IN ERROR. Document # 172, Response. See correctly refiled Document # 173 . PLEASE IGNORE.***

10/31/2014 10/31/2014
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(mrp, ) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
176 RESPONSE in Opposition re 158 MOTION in Limine to exclude legal opinion testimony of Signals immigration law experts filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Enrique Gonzalez, # 2 Exhibit B − Speaking Engagement)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
177 RESPONSE in Opposition re 165 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) filed by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Statement of Contested Facts, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
178 RESPONSE in Opposition re 155 MOTION tolimit the testimony of Enrique Gonzalez III filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Enrique Gonzalez, # 2 Exhibit B − relevant portions of deposition trancript, # 3 Exhibit C − Speaking Engagements)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
179 RESPONSE in Opposition re 152 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Donald H. Strobel filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
180 RESPONSE in Opposition re 153 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Relevant portions of deposition transcript of Richard Marler, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Relevant portions of deposition transcript of Lisa Spears, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Information considered by Kevin Fox Gotham, # 4 Exhibit 4 − CV of Kevin Fox Gotham, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Relevant portions of deposition transcript of Kevin Fox Gotham)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
181 MOTION for Leave to File Signal's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Samuel Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Exclude Testimony and Strike Expert Report of Dr.

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Louise Shelley and in Opposition to Dewan Defendants' Motion and Inc. Memorandum to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
182 RESPONSE in Opposition re 162 MOTION to exclude expert testimony of Louis Shelly, Signal International LLC's proposed expert witness, 157 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/01/2014)
183 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 182 Response in Opposition to Motion,.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/01/2014)
184 RESPONSE in Opposition re 161 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Florence Burke, # 2 Exhibit B − Deposition Testimony of Florence Burke, # 3 Appendix A of Case Law, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
185 RESPONSE in Opposition re 159 MOTION in Limine /Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Amy Mowl, # 2 Exhibit B − Deposition Testimony of Amy Mowl, # 3 Appendix A of Case Law, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 181 Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11−03−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
186 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 186 Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11−4−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
187 RESPONSE in Opposition re 166 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Response to Statement of Signal Defendants of Issues to be Decided by the Court, # 2 Appendix of Unreported Cases, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
188 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 187 Response in Opposition to Motion,,.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Compensation Chart, # 2 Exhibit 2− Housing Agreements, # 3 Exhibit 3− Raju Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 4− Dicakaran

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Declaration)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
189 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 187 Response in Opposition to Motion,,.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5− George Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 6− Jayachandran Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit 7− Pillai Declaration)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
190 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 187 Response in Opposition to Motion,,.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 8− Raju Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit 9− Divakaran Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit 10− George Deposition Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit 11− Sanders email, # 5 Exhibit 12− Dewan Class Deposition Excerpts, # 6 Exhibit 13−Pol Deposition Excerpts, # 7 Exhibit 14− Materical Business Agreement, # 8 Exhibit 15− Power of Attorney, # 9 Exhibit 16− Dewan Demand Letter, # 10 Exhibit 17− Skiller Worker Recruitment Agreement, # 11 Exhibit 18− Burnett Jurisdiction Deposition Excerpts, # 12 Exhibit 19− Burnett Class Deposition Excerpts, # 13 Exhibit 20− Schnoor Class Deposition Excerpts)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
191 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 187 Response in Opposition to Motion,,.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21− Cunningham Class Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit 22− Burnett Retention Letter, # 3 Exhibit 23− Burnett July 2007 Fee Agreement, # 4 Exhibit 24− Burnett Sept. 2007 Fee Agreement, # 5 Exhibit 25− Global Resources email, # 6 Exhibit 26− Sanders Weekly Update, # 7 Exhibit 27− Dewan/Burnett emails, # 8 Exhibit 28− Receipt of Payment from George, # 9 Exhibit 29− Notice of Action, # 10 Exhibit 30− Letter to Dept. of Homeland Security, # 11 Exhibit 31−I129 Petition)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
192 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 187 Response in Opposition to Motion,,.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 32− Orange Master List, # 2 Exhibit 33− Sanders handwritten notes, # 3 Exhibit 34− Sanders email, # 4 Exhibit 35− Cunningham email, # 5 Exhibit 36−Dewan 2014 Deposition Excerpts, # 6 Exhibit 37−Sanders email, # 7 Exhibit 38−Compilation of correspondence, # 8 Exhibit 39− Multilaterial Business Agreement, # 9 Exhibit 40− Skilled Worker Recruitment Agreement, # 10 Exhibit 41− Compilation of correspondence)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
193 ANSWER to 83 Amended Complaint,,, by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C..(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
194 ANSWER to 79 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,, by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C..(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
195 MOTION Transfer Venue of Cross Claim or Defer re 79 Answer to Complaint, Crossclaim,, by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
196 RESPONSE in Support re 161 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
197 REPLY to Response to Motion re 166 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability of Defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Law Center, LLC and the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, APC for Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 11/10/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 11/07/2014)
198 REPLY to Response to Motion re 156 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike Expert Report of Ronald J. McAlear filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Excerpts McLear Deposition)(Ramsey,

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Shane) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
199 REPLY to Response to Motion re 151 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Virginia Miles filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Excerpts Deposition of Clyde Payne, # 2 Exhibit B − Exhibit 1 − Payne Deposition)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
200 REPLY to Response to Motion re 165 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
201 RESPONSE to 174 Response to Non−Motion,,, Samuel Plaintiffs' Objection to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order on Signal's Motion to Compel 122 and Samuel Plaintiffs' Motion for Interim Protective Order Under Rule 30(d)(3) 140 filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − (Joseph Doc. #188))(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
202 REPLY to Response to Motion re 159 MOTION in Limine /Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Amy Mowl depo transcript, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
203 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response of Signal Defendants in Further Opposition to Samuel Plaintiffs' Objection [#174] to Mag. Judge's Memorandum and Order [#149] Granting in Part and Denying in Part Signal's Motion to Compel and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
204 RESPONSE to 174 Response to Non−Motion,,, Samuel Plaintiffs' Objection to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order 149 Granting in Part and Denying in Part Signal's Motion to Compel and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
205 REPLY to Response to Motion re 153 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Gotham Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix A of Cases)(Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
206 REPLY to Response to Motion re 155 MOTION tolimit the testimony of Enrique Gonzalez III filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Aug. 2006 Email, # 2 Appendix A: Unreported Cases)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
207 REPLY to Response to Motion re 157 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina,

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 45 of 50

11/12/2014
11/20/2014 11/21/2014
12/08/2014
12/16/2014 12/29/2014 01/05/2015 01/08/2015

Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Shelley Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Appendix A− Unreported Cases)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
208 REPLY to Response to Motion re 152 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Donald H. Strobel filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Strobel Expert Report in David Case, # 2 Affidavit A− Unreported Cases)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
209 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 165 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A: Unreported Cases)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 11/20/2014)
210 RESPONSE to 201 Response to Non−Motion, [Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of and Objection to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order (ECF #174)] filed by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Heindel, Heather) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
211 ORDER Severing and Transferring Signal's Cross−Claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Clerk of Court is directed to sever from this action Signal's cross−claims against cross−defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. and Michael Pol. It is further ordered that Signal's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability of Defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Law Center, L.L.C. and the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. for Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty # 166 , Burnett's Response # 177 and Signal's reply #[107 are part of the severed case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 12/8/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 12/09/2014)
Severed cross claims sent to USDC E/D LA opened as case number 2:14cv2811 filed on 12/11/14. (mrp, ) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
212 Consent MOTION to Dismiss for Voluntary Partial Dismissal of Certain Claims by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 12/29/2014)
213 NOTICE by Plaintiffs of Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Gox Gotham (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− David Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
214 NOTICE by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 46 of 50

01/20/2015 01/21/2015 01/26/2015 01/26/2015
01/27/2015
01/28/2015 01/29/2015 02/02/2015

Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery re 156 MOTION To Exclude Testimony and Strike Expert Report of Ronald J. McAlear Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority In Support of Motion to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Ronald J. McAlear (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − David Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
215 NOTICE by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery re 187 Response in Opposition to Motion,, Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Motion of Signal Defendants for Partial Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− David TVPRA Order, # 2 Exhibit 2− David RICO Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
216 ORDER denying 82 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint with Tolling of the Statute of Limitations, subject to reconsideration if the court in David denies class certification. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/21/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
217 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION on Signal's 165 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. The undersigned finds that Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff's 1985(3) claim, regardless of whether it is predicated on involuntary servitude, forced labor, or trafficking. It is recommended that Signal's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" # 165 be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/23/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
218 Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Attorney Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion Permitting William E. Boice to Withdraw as Lead Attorney for Plaintiffs and Substituting William E. Dorris as Lead Attorney for Plaintiffs by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Boice, William) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 218 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Added attorney William E Dorris for Atha Mohammad Abdul,William E Dorris for Kesavarao Bundankayala,William E Dorris for Raju Divakaran,William E Dorris for Biju Perumpilly George,William E Dorris for Krishna Gonthina,William E Dorris for Nayappulli Jayachandran,William E Dorris for Galla Venkata Rama Krishna,William E Dorris for Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil,William E Dorris for Lohithakshan Madampet,William E Dorris for Johny Mandy Mathai,William E Dorris for Belthazar Peter,William E Dorris for Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai,William E Dorris for Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai,William E Dorris for Aby Karickathara Raju,William E Dorris for Reji Samuel,William E Dorris for Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian,William E Dorris for Chandran Shaju Thanissery. Attorney William H Boice terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 01/27/2015. (ttp, ) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
219 THIRD AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference is set for 8/7/2015 at 10:00 AM in Ctrm 3 (Beaumont) before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/27/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
220 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 212 Consent MOTION for Voluntary Partial Dismissal of Certain Claims filed by Plaintiffs should be granted, and that the Plaintiffs' TVPRA and RICO claims, to the extent that they are premised upon violations of 18 USC 1583, 1584, 1592 and 1594, be dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/29/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 01/29/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 203 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Response. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2−2−2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 02/02/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 47 of 50

02/06/2015
02/09/2015 02/13/2015 02/26/2015
02/26/2015 02/26/2015 03/03/2015 03/31/2015 04/10/2015 04/14/2015 07/01/2015

221 MEMORANDUM ORDER ON THE PARTIES' MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY. Motion # 156 to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Ronald J. McLear is granted in part. Motion # 151 to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Report of Virginia Miles is denied. Motion # 152 to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Donald H. Strobel is granted subject to reconsideration should the court at a later time allow the Plaintiffs to file FLSA claims in this case. Motion # 153 to Exclude and Strike the Expert Report of Kevin Fox Gotham is granted in part. Motion # 161 in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke is granted in part. Amended Motion # 168 to Exclude Testimony and Strike the Expert Report of Dr. Louise Shelley is granted in part. Motion # 162 to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony is granted. Motion # 157 to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Louise Shelley is denied as moot. Motion # 155 to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez III is granted. Motion # 158 to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Signal's Immigration Law expert is granted in part. Motion # 159 in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl is denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/6/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
222 OBJECTIONS to 217 Report and Recommendation filed by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc.. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 2/10/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/09/2015)
223 ORDER denying the # 171 Parties' Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order on Signal's Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 2/13/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
224 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Plaintiffs' Objections to Magistrate's Memorandum and Order Regarding Daubert Motions by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 02/26/2015)
225 OBJECTIONS to Magistrate's Memorandum and RESPONSE to 221 Order Regarding Daubert Motions filed by Samuel Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A of Cases Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2), # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramsey, Shane) Modified on 2/27/2015 (mrp, ). (Entered: 02/26/2015)
226 Samuel Plaintiffs' RESPONSE in Opposition to 222 Objections of Signal Defendants to Magistrate's Report & Recommendation (Doc. 217). (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A of Cases Pursuant to Standing Order MC−7(b)(2), # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Dorris, William) Modified on 2/27/2015 (mrp, ). (Entered: 02/26/2015)
227 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the Plaintiffs' # 212 "Motion for Voluntary Partial Dismissal of Certain Claims" is granted. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 3/2/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
228 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 165 Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 3/31/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 224 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/10/2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
229 ORDER denying the Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Order on the Parties' Daubert Motions. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 4/14/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
230 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order by Atha Mohammad Abdul. (Attachments: # 1 Exh A − Declaration of William E. Dorris, # 2 Exh B − Declaration of Daniel Werner, # 3 Exh C − Declaration of Sten−Erik Hoidal, # 4 Exh D − Declaration of Timothy H. Birnbaum)(Dorris, William) (Entered: 07/01/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 48 of 50

07/01/2015 07/02/2015 07/10/2015
07/13/2015 07/14/2015 07/31/2015
11/12/2015 03/11/2016 07/11/2016 11/08/2016 11/16/2016 11/29/2016 03/08/2017 07/07/2017

231 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference is set for 10/14/2015 at 10:00 AM in Ctrm 3 (Beaumont) before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 6/30/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
232 MOTION to Continue Pretrial Conference and Trial by Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
233 ORDER Granting 232 Burnett's Motion to Change Trial Date. Final Pretrial Conference is set for 10/26/2015 at 10:00 AM in Ctrm 3 (Beaumont) before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Jury Trial is set for 11/2/2015 at 10:00 AM in Ctrm 3 (Beaumont) before Judge Marcia A. Crone. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/10/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/10/2015)
234 NOTICE by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. (Suggestion of Bankruptcy) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−1, # 2 Exhibit A−2, # 3 Exhibit A−3, # 4 Exhibit A−4, # 5 Exhibit A−5)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
235 ORDER STAYING CASE PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY. It is ordered that the parties shall file a notice every 120 days, informing the court of the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 7/14/15. (mrp, ) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
236 RESPONSE to 235 Order Staying Case Samuel Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Regarding Severance of Claims as to Non−Signal Defendants by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Dorris, William) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
237 STATUS REPORT. Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of November 12, 2015. (Dorris, William) Modified on 3/8/2017 (mrp, ). (Entered: 11/12/2015)
238 STATUS REPORT [Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of March 11, 2016] by Reji Samuel, et al., (Dorris, William) Modified on 3/14/2016 (mrp, ). (Entered: 03/11/2016)
239 STATUS REPORT. Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of July 11, 2016. (Dorris, William) Modified on 3/8/2017 (mrp, ). (Entered: 07/11/2016)
240 STATUS REPORT. Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of November 8, 2016. (Dorris, William) Modified on 3/8/2017 (mrp, ). (Entered: 11/08/2016)
241 Ex Parte MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Brian C. Roux by Signal International L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
ORDER granting 241 Defendants' Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Brian Christopher Roux terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/29/2016. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
242 STATUS REPORT. Plaintiff's Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of March 8, 2017. (Dorris, William) Modified on 3/8/2017 (mrp, ). (Entered: 03/08/2017)
243 STATUS REPORT re Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of July 7, 2017. (Dorris, William) Modified on 7/7/2017 (mrp, ). (Entered: 07/07/2017)

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 49 of 50

10/19/2017 10/23/2017 11/06/2017 03/06/2018 07/16/2018 11/13/2018 03/13/2019 07/11/2019 11/08/2019

244 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney For Plaintiffs by Reginald A. Williamson by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Williamson, Reginald) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
245 ORDER granting 244 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Reginald A Williamson terminated as counsel of record for Plaintiffs in this action. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/23/17. (mrp, ) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
246 Plaintiff's Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of November 6, 2017. (Dorris, William) Modified on 11/6/2017 (mrp, ). (Entered: 11/06/2017)
247 STATUS REPORT (Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of March 6, 2018) by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Dorris, William) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
248 STATUS REPORT as of July 16, 2018 by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Dorris, William) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
249 STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status as of November 13, 2018 by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Dorris, William) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
250 STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of March 13, 2019 by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Dorris, William) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
251 STATUS REPORT (Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of July 11, 2019) by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Dorris, William) (Entered: 07/11/2019)
252 STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs' Letter Brief Updating the Court on Status of the Signal Bankruptcy Proceeding as of November 8, 2019 by Atha Mohammad Abdul, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Raju Divakaran, Biju Perumpilly George, Krishna Gonthina, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Lohithakshan Madampet, Johny Mandy Mathai, Belthazar Peter, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Aby Karickathara

Case: 1:13-cv-323 As of: 11/23/2019 12:15 PM CST 50 of 50
Raju, Reji Samuel, Sumesh Porambathuparam Subramanian, Chandran Shaju Thanissery. (Dorris, William) (Entered: 11/08/2019)